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Ser: 00406 66

29 MAR 1966


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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF/NCC MACV ltr 103/RPL/jfc Ser  
0016266 of 11Feb66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology

1. Forwarded.

  
M. C. DALBY  
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco,  
California 96601

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103/RPL/jfc

11 FEB 1966

0016266

  
From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251940Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for December 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is herewith submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosure (1).


  
G.C. AXTELL  
CHIEF OF STAFF

  
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


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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY


DECEMBER 1965



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
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
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PART ONE	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART TWO	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART THREE	CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
PART FOUR	ENCLOSURES



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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III Marine Amphibious Force

Danang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam


LEWIS W. WALT

Major General United States Marine Corps


Commanding

Command Chronology for period 1 December - 31 December 1965

Chief of Staff	Col George C. AXTELL, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col Howard E. WERTMAN, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col Don W. GALBREAITH, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col Leo J. DULACKI, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col Harold A. HAYES, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Maj Charles J. KEEVER, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6	Col Elmer G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC
Supply Officer	Col Howard G. TAFT, USMC
Force Engineer	LtCol Lester G. HARMON, USMC
Communications - Electronics Officer	Col Frederick C. DODSON
Adjutant	LtCol Burton L. LUCAS JR, USMC
Base Development Officer	LtCol Charles F. LANGLEY, USMC
Comptroller	Capt Wilson A. VOIGT, USMC
Chaplain	Capt Francis L. GARRET, USN
Combat Information Bureau	Maj Dean C. MACHO, USMC



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Director, Command Center	LtCol Joseph V. MC LERNON, USMC
Food Services Officer	LtCol Henry G. ROBERTS, USMC
Headquarters Commandant	Maj Anthony J. PALONIS, JR, USMC
Legal Officer	Col Vernon A. PELTZER, USMC
Force Surgeon	Capt William A. WOLFMAN, USN
Motor Transport Officer	LtCol F. W. KILLIAN, USMC
Ordnance Officer	Maj Walter F. BOWRON, USMC
Protocol Officer	Maj Ernest H. GRAHAM, JR, USMC
Provost Marshal	Maj Howard L. BARRETT
Special Services Officer	Col Edwin G. WINSTEAD
Transportation/Embarkation Officer	Maj George F. CRIBB

SUBORDINATE UNITS


3d Marine Division  
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
 Force Logistics Support Group  
 3d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 7th Engineer Battalion  
 9th Motor Transport Battalion  
 5th Communications Battalion

COMMANDER


MajGen Lewis W. WALT, USMC  
 BGen Keith B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC  
 Col Mauro J. PADALINO, USMC  
 LtCol William W. TAYLOR, USMC  
 LtCol Ermine L. MEEKER, USMC  
 Maj Joseph F. JONES, USMC  
 LtCol Hercules R. KELLY, USMC

Average Monthly Strength

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	
2440	35,357	424	6,087	44,318



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## PART TWO

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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During December 1965, III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at coordinates (AT 994754) which is 350 meters west of DANANG Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, adjacent to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Post. All forces under operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone. III MAF continued to grow as personnel strength increased from 43,955 to 44,318 in December.

B. Activities. III MAF continued operations in the accomplishment of the objectives established by reference (a). The most significant operation during December was Operation HARVEST MOON. Also significant was a 40% increase in minor operations over the month of November.

## II. OPERATIONS

A. General. The continuing objective of destruction of VC forces was accomplished during the month by conducting three major operations, and increasing the number of minor operations conducted by 40%. The statistical gauge of success of these endeavors was a 200% increase in VC casualties over the previous month.

B. HARVEST MOON

1. General. Operation HARVEST MOON, a coordinated ARVN/USMC operation in the VIET AN/QUE SON area was conducted between 8 and 20 December by forces consisting of a 3 battalion US Marine Task Force, and 3 ARVN battalions, supported by air and artillery units. The operation covered over 1500 square kilometers of rugged hills, flooded paddies and swollen streams. Four B-52 strikes were conducted during the operation, two of which were exploited by ground forces. During the final stages of the operation, a well planned, but unsuccessful ambush and attack against a road column of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines indicated that the VC was still determined to resist operations in areas of critical importance. The quick reaction of 2/7 and their aggressive offensive action, resulted in 105 VC KIA with only 11 USMC KIA, 72 WIA and 2 DOW. The full details of this ambush are provided in enclosure (10).

2. Innovations. Unique tactical aspects of the operation included:

a. Employing an ARVN Reconnaissance Company with a USMC Infantry Battalion.



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b. Helilifting 105mm howitzer by dismantling and loading in UH 34 helicopters.

c. Establishing a tactical logistical support area (LSA) which was supplied by truck convoy and from which units were resupplied by helicopters.

d. Employing close air support during weather conditions which previously guaranteed VC security from air attack.

e. Employing B-52 strikes in direct support of ARVN/USMC operations.

3. Results. The quantitative results of Operation HARVEST MOON, are shown in Table I. VC staging bases were also destroyed and the 1st VC Regiment and the 195th/519th PAVN AA Battalion were reduced to approximately 50% of their former effectiveness. The details of Operation HARVEST MOON are presented in enclosure (2).

TABLE IVIET CONG CASUALTY RESULTS

<u>KIA BY:</u>	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
GROUND FORCES	314	327
MARINE AIR	69	284
SAC	<u>24</u>	<u>---</u>
	407	611

POSSIBLE WIA - 100

WEAPONS

INDIVIDUAL - 95

CREW SERVED - 13

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

10,000 RDS SMALL ARMS AMMO

3 TONS SALT

86 MORTAR RDS (60MM AND 81MM)

500 POUNDS SUGAR

14 CASES .50 CAL AMMO

400 POUNDS SOUP MIX

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LARGE QUANTITY HAND & RIFLE GRENADES	125 GALLONS FUEL
45 TONS RICE	500 FLASHLIGHT BATTERIES
1,200 GALLONS FISH SAUCE	3800 METERS CLOTH
40 BOLTS UNIFORMS CLOTH	600 COMPLETE UNIFORMS
20 ROLLS BROWN PLASTIC	9 BICYCLES
4 AN/PRC-10 RADIOS	1 AN/PRC-9 RADIO
1 AN/PRC-6 RADIO	5,000 METERS COMMUNICATIONS WIRE

C. Other Operations. In addition to HARVEST MOON, two major operations, both one day battalion-size, and 10,458 small unit operations, resulting in 463 contacts, were conducted in December. This was an increase of 2461 operations over the November total. Table II shows the small unit actions by type for December. The number of VC contacts during these operations increased from 250 to 463 in December. Of particular significance were the 90 VC initiated contacts during the Christmas truce period (24-27 December) when US forces were not initiating contact.

TABLE IIIII MAF MINOR ACTIONS - DECEMBER

<u>Patrols</u>	<u>Search and Destroy</u>	<u>Ambush</u>	<u>Listening Post</u>	<u>Scout Sniper</u>	<u>Total</u>
4264	129	3078	2769	218	10,458

D. Air Support

1. Fixed Wing. III MAF provided fixed wing aircraft during December as indicated in Table III.

TABLE IIIIII MAF FIXED WING OPERATIONS DECEMBER 1965

<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>2D AD</u>	<u>TF 77</u>	
Helicopter Escort	129	363			492
Interdiction	617	425			1042
Landing Zone Preparation	55				55
Close Air Support	549	119			668

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<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>		<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>			
Photography	70		2		70
Other	46				48
Non Tactical	81		54		81
Escort			8		54
Air Defense			314		8
Steel Tiger					314
Electronic Counter Measures/Electronic Intelligence			76	12	88
TOTAL	1547	907	454	12	2920

2. Helicopter. III MAF helicopters flew 24,962 sorties transporting 33,884 troops and 1971 tons of cargo in support of III MAF operations during December.

E. Force Reconnaissance. Operation BIRDWATCHER, a series of recon patrols from Special Forces Camps, commenced on 29 November with the deployment of the 2d Platoon, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company to Camp BA TO, in QUANG NGAI Province, continued through December. On 6 December the 3d Platoon of 1st Force Reconnaissance Company deployed to Camp TRA BONG also located in QUANG NGAI Province. A series of patrols were conducted through the month with negligible results in the vicinity of TRA BONG but significant sightings made in the vicinity of BA TO. On the night of 16 December the 2d Platoon accompanied by a company of CIDG (60 men), were attacked and overrun while in a patrol base about 8 kilometers east of BA TO. The attacking force, supported by a mortar preparation, consisted of about 150-200 men. Casualties sustained by the 2d Platoon were 3 USMC KIA, 3 USMC WIA, 1 USN WIA. Due to extremely poor weather which prevented use of air support or reinforcement of Camp BA TO, the 3 USMC KIA were not recovered until 21 December. Other U.S. casualties included 1 USASF KIA.

### III. INTELLIGENCE

A. General. Within the three Marine TAORS Viet Cong activities continued to emphasize small unit harassing tactics including sniper fire, probes, use of mines, both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel, and employment of booby-traps. While frequent small unit activities were initiated, the Viet Cong attacked Marine positions only once with battalion-sized forces and once with company-sized forces.

B. Operations. Viet Cong harassment of GVN outposts throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone continued with an increase in the number of attacks on district headquarters and outposts. There were no reports of regimental-sized attacks, but 6 battalion-sized attacks were initiated against

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the GVN. Although frequent reports were received of Viet Cong intentions to conduct attacks and suicide raids against critical installations at CHU LAI and DANANG, no such attacks materialized. Significant aspects of enemy operations in the ICTZ were: increased efforts to destroy ARVN forces and isolated outposts; harassment of Marine forces while generally avoiding large scale contact with USMC units; increased tendency to engage in daylight operations, especially in defense of a base area; the employment of a PAVN 12.7mm AA Battalion in defense of a base area; the increase in the number of confirmed and probable VC units; the increase in the number of low level reports of the sighting of 120mm mortars and ammunition; continued movement of VC units from II Corps into I Corps; and an increase in the number of identified PAVN units.

1. PHU BAI. In the PHU BAI TAOR the Viet Cong maintained the increased tempo of operations which began to be apparent during November. Enemy activity in this portion of the ICTZ was evident primarily as harassment and propagandizing of the local population in the periphery area of the TAOR. Increases in enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the PHU BAI TAOR with one regiment reinforced by local force and guerrilla elements.

2. DANANG. Within the DANANG Enclave the enemy continued to manifest a strong reaction to incursion of Marine forces into areas normally under his control. Small unit actions were frequent throughout the TAOR as the enemy continued his resistance to the expansion of the TAOR and conducted harassment and propaganda activities in rear areas. The most significant ground contact in the enclave occurred during daylight on 27 December when a Marine patrol engaged an estimated 60-75 VC armed with 15-20 automatic weapons. Viet Cong casualties in this action were 41 KIA and 7 POSSIBLE KIA. Increases in enemy strength gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the DANANG TAOR with 1 regiment (the 1st VC regiment) and possibly a second regiment (the 36th PAVN regiment) reinforced by two main force battalions and local force and guerrilla elements.

3. CHU LAI. The CHU LAI enclave was the scene of continuing small unit activity which included frequent incidents of harassment and sniper fire against Marine patrols and forward positions. A Viet Cong attempt during the Christmas cease fire to destroy a bridge guarded by a USMC detachment was unsuccessful, but noteworthy in that the VC employed swimmers with satchel charges in this abortive company size attack. Increases in enemy strength in the CHU LAI enclave gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack in the TAOR with 2 regiments (the 2d VC and 18th PAVN regiments) reinforced by two main force battalions local force and guerrilla elements.

C. Operation HARVEST MOON. Enemy forces engaged in Operation HARVEST MOON included the 1st VC Regiment, the 195th PAVN AA Battalion and the 70th Main Force Battalion. Indications that Operation HARVEST

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MOON had successfully penetrated a highly sensitive, well developed VC base area were:

1. The determined defense encountered.
2. The employment of 12.7mm AA machine guns by the 195th AA Battalion.
3. The large number of complex fortifications.
4. The quantities of material, documents and weapons captured.

D. Propaganda. Viet Cong propaganda activities were frequent within and adjacent to the Marine TAORS. These tactics included VC instigated demonstrations by villagers, proselyting of villagers by insurgent cadres and the distribution of leaflets with themes directed towards Vietnamese civilians, and VNAF and U. S. forces.

E. Sabotage. Sabotage of lines of communications by the VC continued throughout the period with railroad and highway bridges the most frequent targets. A new tactic introduced by the insurgents was the employment of swimmers with satchel charges in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy a bridge guarded by a Marine element. What may have been a similar tactic occurred when a swimmer was detected at night in the immediate vicinity of a ship at anchor in the Bay of Tourane.

F. Mines and Booby Traps. The frequency of employment of mines and booby traps by the Viet Cong continued to increase during the reporting period. No significant change was noted in the type or methods of employment of these explosive devices.

G. Terrorism. Although agent reports continued to be received of Viet Cong intentions to conduct acts of terrorism in DANANG, no terroristic activities were reported within the city proper. A probable damper on VC plans to conduct terrorist activities against U.S. installations in DANANG, was the arrest of Viet Cong propaganda and terrorist cadres in the city, based on information provided by a penetration agent.

H. Anti-Aircraft. The frequency of anti-air incidents showed a marked increase over the previous month. Aircraft both rotary wing and fixed wing, in support of operation HARVEST MOON were subjected to a volume of anti-aircraft fire not previously encountered in the ICTZ. The 195th AA Battalion (PAVN) identified in the HARVEST MOON area of operations employed 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine guns in substantial numbers for the first time. A comparison of anti-aircraft statistics between November and December indicates the following:

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<u>SECRET</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>PCT INCREASE</u>
Incidents	137	247	.80
Aircraft Hit	67	105	.57
Number of Hits	132	252	.91

I. Summary of VC Activity. Pertinent statistics relating to Viet Cong initiated incidents and personnel and weapons losses for the reporting period are shown in Tables IV V and VI.

TABLE IVVC INITIATED INCIDENTS

Ambush	0
Attack	2
Harassing Fire	309
Mining/Booby Traps	37
AA Fire	238
Assassination	4
Kidnapping	20
Sabotage	10
Propaganda	44
Agitation	36
Mortar Fire	14

TABLE VVC PERSONNEL LOSSES

	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
KIA (Ground)	520	603
KBA	158*	
WIA	21	196
VCC	58	
VCS	509	

\* 24 Killed by SAC B-52 Strikes

TABLE VIVC/PAVN WEAPONS LOSSES

Rifle	49
Carbine	63
Machinegun	9
Submachinegun	21

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Rocket Launcher	2
Recoilless Rifle	2
Mortar	2
Unknown Type	<u>1</u>
	149

J. VC Order of Battle. Table VII shows the VC order in ICTZ.

TABLE VII

III MAF ORDER OF BATTLE HAS ACCEPTED THE FOLLOWING NEWLY IDENTIFIED UNITS IN ICTZ

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>RATING</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
U/I Regt (PAVN)	Unk	Prob	QUANG TRI PROV	20 Dec
North Sub-Region Hq	Unk	Confirmed	YD 3832 (U/C)	24 Dec
36th Regt Hq	Unk	Prob	BT 0030	23 Dec
1st Bn, 35 Regt	600	Prob	BT 0130	23 Dec
2d Bn, 36th Regt	Unk	Prob	BT 0131	24 Dec
195th AA Bn (PAVN)	400	Confirmed	BT 0023	28 Dec
Hq, 18th Regt (PAVN)	Unk	Confirmed	BS 6347	28 Dec
9th Bn 18th Regt (PAVN)	Unk	Confirmed	BS 8133	15 Dec
Hq, 2d VC Regt	Unk	Confirmed	BS 7040	28 Dec
93d Bn, 2d Regt	300	Confirmed	BS 6540	28 Dec
95th Bn, 2d Regt	500	Confirmed	MO DUC DIST	28 Dec
97th Bn, 2d Regt	400	Confirmed	MO DUC/DUC PHU DIST	28 Dec

ORDER OF BATTLE WITHIN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AS OF 31 DECEMBER IS AS FOLLOWS:

CONFIRMED

1 Military Region Hq.  
 1 Military Sub-Region Hq.  
 3 Regimental Hq. (1 PAVN)  
 23 Battalions (1 PAVN)  
 32 Companies

PROBABLE

2 Regiments (1 PAVN)  
 12 Battalions  
 5 Companies

K. Weather. Weather for the month included several prolonged periods of rain and increased frequency of the Crachin with its attendant drizzle and fog. These conditions resulted in frequent deterioration of roads and restriction of mobility and air operations.

TOTAL PRECIPITATION FOR THE MONTH WAS AS FOLLOWS:

<u>AREA</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>MEAN FOR MONTH</u>
DANANG	11.70	8.7

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CHU LAI	10.74	11.0
PHU BAI	19.27	17.0

## IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. Strength. The average personnel strength of III MAF increased from 43,955 to 44,318 in December as more individual rotation personnel joined III MAF units. The Monthly Strength Report is included as enclosure (3).

B. Rest and Recreation. In-country R&R to Saigon was suspended at times during December for a number of reasons. From 6-10 December there were other priority commitments for R&R flights. COMUSMACV reduced the quotas by 1/2 in order to provide billeting space for numerous USO troupes in-country during the holidays; and further reduced quotas to provide billeting for personnel whose quarters were destroyed by the Viet Cong attack on the Metropole Hotel. The R&R hotel was closed to R&R personnel through 20-22 December for alterations. Accordingly, only one C-130 load of R&R personnel was transported to Saigon during the remainder of the month. The MACV out-of-country R&R program expanded to include flights to Tachikawa for R&R in Tokyo. The first flight departed Danang on 23 December 1965 with 40 passengers aboard. The Tokyo program will be operated by using "Stars and Stripes" aircraft. III MAF participation in the R&R programs is shown in Table VIII.

TABLE VIIIIII MAF REST AND RECREATION

MACV Program	Bangkok	672
	Hong Kong	258
	Taipei	102
	Tokyo	132
	Saigon	246
III MAF Program	Okinawa	<u>2480</u> 3890

C. Christmas gifts from home. Individuals and organizations in the United States displayed the Christmas spirit by sending 239,000 pounds of Christmas packages for distribution throughout III MAF. These, in addition to the thousands of pounds of personal gifts received by members of III MAF during the holiday period, went a long way toward making life in a combat zone acceptable during this time when primary thoughts are of home and family.

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D. Activation of the Naval Component Command Staff. Force/NCC Order 5400.1 (Enclosure (4)) dated 24 December 1965, authorized the activation of the Naval Component Command Staff under a Deputy Chief of Staff who reports directly to the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force/Naval Component Command. Simultaneously, the Provisional Naval Component Command Support Activity was deactivated and personnel were reassigned with the Naval Component Command Staff.

E. Casualties. III MAF casualties during December are shown in Table IX.

TABLE IXIII MAF CASUALTIESDECEMBER 1965

<u>BATTLE</u>				<u>NON-BATTLE</u>					
<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
73	1	521	30	14	5	17	3	36	6

## V. LOGISTICS

A. General. Heavy rainfall and heavy seas continued to hamper logistic operations during December. Port operations were reduced and vehicle traffic had to be limited, during 12 days of the month, to essential movement because of road conditions throughout the III MAF TAORS. On 31 December engineer liaison personnel from the 1st Marine Division were aboard and discussed land, building, transportation and construction material requirements for support of 1st Marine Division Units scheduled to arrive during the first and second quarters of calendar year 1966.

B. Supply. During December the items on RED BALL were reduced, as a result of detailed review based on revised FMFPAC criteria. A recap of RED BALL during the month of December:

Total line items on Red Ball 1 December	<u>377</u>
Total line items added during December	<u>99</u>
Total line items deleted	<u>269</u>
Total line items on Red Ball 31 December	<u>207</u>

C. Embarkation and Port Operations. During the month of December three LST's of Landing Ship Squadron Nine lifted 994 S/T and two USNS LST's lifted 582 S/T of retrograde cargo to Okinawa. This was a 1031 S/T increase over November. The rotation of BLT 2/1 and BLT 3/4 was accomplished at the

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Hue River Inlet. Heavy seas and adverse weather conditions caused complete stoppage in offloading operations in Danang Harbor for three and one half days. Offloading operations were restricted to large landing craft for several additional days. Monthly tonnage transshipments from Danang to Chu Lai was 8201 S/T. This was an increase of 1956 S/T over the month of November. The following data is submitted concerning cargo and ships handled during the month:

33 MSTS ships and 13 US ships offloaded at Danang.  
 19 LST's offloaded at Chu Lai.  
 77,661 M/T were offloaded at Danang.  
 17,178 M/T were offloaded at Chu Lai.

#### D. Construction

1. General. Throughout the month engineer improvements were continued on the MSR's within each of the TAORs. The rains caused considerable damage to many of the roads; however all roads were kept open by imposing traffic restrictions periodically. Crushed rock and "rip rap" as well as other fill material was provided by MCB-5 and 7th Engineers on Routes 3 and 4 during the month to establish a firm road base. The MSR from the Division CP to Danang continued to be improved during the month.

2. Bridges. On 1 December, the 1st Bridge Company erected a 38 ft class 60 M416 fixed bridge on route 5 over a creek in the vicinity of coordinates AT 943677. This bridge provides a necessary link to forward positions of the 3d Marine Division. On 28 December a platoon from the 1st Bridge Company was sent to Chu Lai to construct and operate a 60 ton capacity M416 raft in support of III MAF operations. The raft will operate on the AN TAN River in the vicinity of (BT 498066). In response to an emergency tactical requirement of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines on 27 December, the 7th Engineer Battalion installed a 360 ft aluminum footbridge over the Song Bau Xau River at coordinates AT 990641.

3. Bunkers. Commencing 10 December, the 7th Engineer Battalion assisted the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines in the construction of timber bunkers and in clearing fields of fire along portions of the Danang Air Base defensive perimeter.

4. Airfields. During the second week of December, MCB-4 commenced an interchange of M9M2 airfield matting on the South taxiway of the Chu Lai Expeditionary Airfield and AM2 matting on the South helicopter parking apron at MAG-36. Concurrent with exchange of the matting, the width of the taxiway is being increased to 48 feet. Throughout December, MCB-4 continued to perform emergency night repairs to the deteriorating subgrade of the Northern 4000 ft of Chu Lai runway. The extent and frequency of repairs has rendered it impractical to continue in this manner and MCB-4 was directed to completely restabilize the entire 4000 ft with a sand-cement mixture as was recently accomplished to the Southern 4000 ft. This program could not be commenced until sufficient stocks of JATO were held by MAG 12 to insure continuous operation from the shortened runway.

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5. POL Storage. On 16 December the 7th Engineer Battalion completed construction of earthen berms for the expeditionary POL storage area at the North end of Danang Air base.

6. Roads. The 7th Engineer Battalion continued to improve roads and drainage facilities within the FLSG complex on Danang Air Base. In an effort to speed up improvements and reduce the criticality of crushed rock, the battalion set up a 15 ton rock crusher in the FLSG area and is providing this crusher with rock purchased from a local Vietnamese contractor.

E. Fiscal. During the month of December all available AIK Funds were obligated and CY-65 books were balanced and closed and CY-66 Budget was opened.

## VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. General. During the month of December the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center experienced substantial increase in total transmissions as outlined below:

	November	December	Increase
Incoming	33,554	39,648	6,094
Outgoing	20,955	31,538	10,583
TOTAL	54,509	71,186	16,677

B. Project TALK QUICK. Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force secure voice equipment for project Talk Quick was installed at III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters during December. Activation is slated during January and is dependent upon Western Electric Company signalling equipment being installed and landline tie-ins established across the Danang main runway with Danang Control. Three pair of cables have been reserved for this purpose.

C. Autodin. Autodin circuits providing transmission media between Danang, Phu Bai and Chu Lai underwent intensive upgrading by III Marine Amphibious Force, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and Defense Communication Agency representatives during December. This upgrading of circuitry routed via in-country troposcatter systems 77UTV2 (AN/TRC-90 operated by 362d Signal Company and the 178 Signal Company) and 77UHB5 (AN/TRC-24 operated by the 178 Signal Company). With the exception of some transceiver difficulties, these circuits have performed dependably throughout December.

D. Single Sideband. The Communication-Electronics Officer, III Marine

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Amphibious Force was called upon to fulfill a communication requirement in support of operation "HARVEST MOON" from 10-17 December in order to enhance overall command and control. A single side band radio net was established between I Corps Headquarters (Danang) and the Second ARVN Division Command Post in the field. A single side band III Marine Amphibious Force Liaison Net was also established between Headquarters III Marine Amphibious Force, Headquarters 3d Marine Division, Task Force Delta, Logistics Support Area and the 2d ARVN Division Headquarters in the field in order to provide the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force the necessary control facilities as he moved from place to place. These two radio nets proved adequate and enhanced the overall command and control of the operation.

E. Navy-Marine Amateur Radio Service. III Marine Amphibious Force was authorized by Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam to operate stations on Navy MARS at Danang and Chu Lai. 3d Marine Division commenced operation of station NOEFA on 25 December and a station at Chu Lai was established on 27 Dec with call sign NOEFC under the control of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Presently one frequency exists and it is being used on a scheduled basis with the Danang and Chu Lai stations until additional operating frequencies are assigned. Station FOEFA at Danang has experienced successful operation while station NOEFC at Chu Lai has experienced equipment problems and has been unable to pass traffic. Radio frequency propagation precludes more than three hours of operation daily thus limiting total transmissions. A request for additional frequencies has been submitted to Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and equipment requirements to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

F. Automatic Dial Exchange. On December 29, 1965 the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication-Electronics Officer and the Base Development Officer prepared and submitted DD forms 1391 (Military Construction Line Item Data) to Commander in Chief, Pacific for the installation of automatic dial telephone exchanges to serve Marble Mountain Air Facility, Chu Lai, and Quang Ngai. The Marble Mountain exchange is programmed for 1500 lines with the capability for expansion to 3000 lines. Estimated cost for the primary and supporting facilities is \$2,844,000.00. The Chu Lai exchange is programmed for 2200 lines with the capability for expansion to 3000 lines. Estimated cost for the primary and supporting facilities is \$2,529,000.00. The Quang Ngai exchange is programmed for 300 lines with the capability for expansion in 500 line increments. Estimated cost for the primary and supporting facilities is \$558,000.00. The required operational date for the three exchanges is 1 July 1966.

## VII. CIVIC ACTION

A. Objectives. The basic objective of III MAF Civic Action Program remained the same during December. Particular emphasis was placed on Vietnamese Christmas parties.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. The council met each week during

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December except the week of 27 December to allow for Christmas leaves for many of its members. The true effectiveness of the council was demonstrated by the procurement and transporting of medical supplies for Danang USOM hospital which had suffered from lack of supplies for a substantial period of time and by the publishing of a bi-weekly news sheet for the NGU HANH SON campaign area within ten (10) days after it has been brought to the attention of the committee. During the month the council was briefed on the Rural Construction budget for I Corps. An investigation into the costs and problems of widening the Danang-Hue road for two way traffic was initiated.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committee. All the Committee functioned during the month making studies in their respective fields. The following reports were submitted to the council:

1. Port of Danang Committee. It was reported that the Commanding Officer of Naval Support Activity will serve as chairman of this committee and that membership will include the Union.

2. Public Health Committee. This committee's activities centered in the following:

a. Overlooking the organization and establishment of the Military Provisional Hospital Augmentation Program.

b. Improving delivery system of medical supplies into Danang from Saigon.

c. Further entrance of Vietnamese health workers into secure areas and into refugee camps.

d. More active role in controlling venereal disease.

3. Agriculture Committee. This committee is studying the agriculture characteristics of the land presently under Viet Cong domination to determine which areas would be suitable for agricultural development.

4. Medical Assistance. Thirty-six (36) MEDCAP teams provided 75,000 medical and dental treatments to 61,000 VN citizens in 115 locations during the month of December. Treatments were as follows:

Miscellaneous ailments	20%
Skin disease	28%
Respiratory infections	13%
Injuries	10%
Headaches	18%
Stomach ailments	7%
Dental Conditions	6%
Diarrhea conditions	5%
Fevers	4%

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The number of treatments by enclave were:

Danang	49,938
Chu Lai	23,391
Hue Phu Bai	1,210

In addition, 15 VN school patrol children received medical training and 35 health workers received training. "A" MED, Phu Bai, presented 24 hours of formal lectures to Hue medical students and donated 24 hours to supervision of Senior Hue Medical students during outpatient rounds.

D. Project HANDCLASP. Approximately 67,000 pounds of miscellaneous commodities were received during December through Project HANDCLASP. These commodities were inventoried and distributed through III MAF units.

E. CARE Program. During December III MAF received no CARE kits. Plans for an enlarged program through USMCR were formulated.

F. Other Programs. The other programs listed in the Command Chronology for August, 1965 continue to develop. Details of these programs are reported in reference (c).

#### VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A. General. Psychological Warfare consisted of continued general leaflet and poster dissemination, loudspeaker broadcasts and audio visual team shows.

B. Operation HARVEST MOON. Daily psychological warfare activity during the operation was as follows:

1. 12 Dec - 180,000 leaflets were dropped over three selected areas. Leaflet themes were two letters from VCC appealing to other VC to surrender (90,000 of each letter).
2. 13 Dec - Aerial Broadcast on tape of VCC appealing to comrades to surrender, and a speech by the Chief of THANG BINH District.
3. 14 Dec - 75,000 surrender appeal-safe conduct passes dropped.
4. 15 Dec - Aerial broadcast of VCC letter to comrades and speech by VC rallier.
5. 16 Dec - Aerial broadcast of speeches by a VCC, a rallier, and the Vietnamese National Anthem.
6. 17, 18, 19 Dec - Weather prevented execution of psychological warfare plans.
7. 20 Dec - Loudspeaker broadcast of VCC telling of good treatment received as prisoner of US and ARVN Forces. Aerial drop of 100,000 leaflets also made.

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## IX. COMBAT INFORMATION

A. General. December proved to be the most productive month for CIB activities since its beginning in May 1965. A total of 404 escorted trips for news media and visiting dignitaries were conducted throughout the Marine TAOR's. In addition, Operation HARVEST MOON was covered extensively by civilian and military writers and still and motion picture cameramen. Special Christmas features were covered throughout the I Corps area. Special requests from civilian media to interview individuals from their area were set up with units prior to the arrival of the requesting agency. This expedited their work here. In addition, Operation ALOHA, sponsored by the citizens of Hawaii was handled by photo/writer teams in the CHU LAI area.

B. Photography. During December, 16,340 feet of motion picture film was exposed and forwarded by commercial air freight to CMC. Approximately 5% was VIP coverage, 20% Christmas story and Civic Action, 75% was operational coverage. Coverage of special interest included: Operation HARVEST MOON, General KRULAK's press conference, Monsoon flood conditions, and Christmas activities.

C. Radio/TV. During the month of December, this section produced 164 releases for radio/TV and motion picture use. These releases included Christmas greetings, interviews for HQMC, and FHTNC. A special series of tapes were produced to cover "Christmas in Vietnam" which included both interviews and sound that was obtained for possible use as sound track for motion picture coverage of this subject. Also included in these releases was the coverage of Operation HARVEST MOON.

D. News Releases. A total of 224 releases, 73 photos, were made during the month of December. These covered special requests (Christmas Star), III MAF activities with VIP's, operations, civic action, special projects (III MAF Chaplains in field at Christmas) and features.

E. Escort. The number of escorted trips to the Marine TAOR's during the month almost doubled any previous month's total. In addition to resident press such as AP and UPI, Reuters and the Networks, distinguished journalists and projects included: Sander Van Ocur, NBC; ABC and NBC crews filming a Hawk Missile shoot at CHU LAI; Mason Alterie, KHVH-TV, Hawaii, gathering material for a one hour special; Don Neff, Time Magazine; Bill Roberts, Time-Life Broadcasting; Phil Galligan, CBS, Philadelphia; Dean Bralix & TV crew (NBC); John Apple, N.Y. Times; Ray Maloney with ABC crew; Merton Perry, Newsweek; Wick Fowler, Texas News; Ernest Ferguson, Baltimore Sun; T.H. Van Sauter, Knight publications; Bob Krause, Honolulu Advertiser; and foreign correspondents from France, Germany, Spain and Australia.

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F. Press Conferences. During Operation HARVEST MOON, a press conference was held at the Press Center. MajGen WALT and MajGen THI were the main speakers. Gen KRULAK and Gen WALT held a press conference on 7 December.

X. I CORPS ACTIVITY

A. General. The number of VC initiated incidents continued to increase in the I Corps Tactical Zone as the monthly total reflected the highest incident rate since February 1965. A buildup of PAVN units rapidly increased and enemy strength in the Corps Zone is now considered to be at an all time high. There was a decline in battalion size or larger operations this month and a lull in activity was experienced just prior and subsequent to the 30 hour truce period. A highly significant operation took place in southern QUANG NAM and northern QUANG TIN Provinces. This coordinated ARVN-USMC operation struck at the heart of a VC logistical base and seriously disrupted VC activity in an area previously considered to be a safe haven. Stepped up VC efforts during the month minimized rural construction progress.

B. Current Operations. I Corps (ARVN) conducted 35 battalion or larger unit operations during the month as compared to 44 in November. Contact was made with the Viet Cong in 21 of these operations. During December, operations against the Viet Cong resulted in 1019 VC killed compared to 1175 in November. There was a corresponding decrease in VC captured from 213 in November to 192 this month and in weapons seized from 419 to 323. ARVN battle deaths rose from 205 to 427 while the number of weapons lost varied slightly from 209 in November to 211 in December. Two significant operations took place in the Corps during the reporting period. The first of these was the coordinated ARVN-USMC operation (LIEN KET 18 - HARVEST MOON) which encompassed a major portion of the districts of THANG BINH and QUE SON. The operation began on 8 December and terminated 11 days later. ARVN units initially committed were the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, and the 11th Ranger Battalion. While advancing toward an intermediate objective the 11th Ranger Battalion was attacked five kilometers west of THANG BINH District Headquarters from the front and flanks by a reinforced Viet Cong battalion. Heavy casualties were sustained by the ranger unit. Just prior to daybreak on 9 December, the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, and the regimental headquarters were attacked and overrun by an estimated enemy regiment. In the action the regimental commander was killed. I Corps reinforced the units in contact with the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, and the 3d Battalion, 1st Regiment, on 8 and 9 December. Concurrently, three USMC battalions were committed to trap and destroy the Viet Cong in an area to the west of I Corps units. By 10 December, VC contact with ARVN controlled units ceased. Thereafter, I Corps units operated for nine days northwest of QUE SON District Headquarters with two battalions and an armored personnel carrier troop. No additional heavy contact by ARVN with the enemy occurred. ARVN losses in this operation were 90 killed, 141 wounded, and 91 missing in action; also two US advisors were killed and one Australian was wounded. US advisors estimate that 720 Viet Cong were killed by air strikes, artillery, and small arms fire. During this operation ARVN-USMC units engaged major elements of the 1st VC Regiment plus local and guerrilla forces.

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C. Air Support. US aircraft flew 969 sorties and VNAF flew 246 in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Two B-52 strikes were conducted on 28 December in QUANG TRI Province, 25 kilometers south of the DMZ near the Laotian border, to strike suspected Viet Cong troop concentrations.

D. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire conducted 184 missions and expended 3287 rounds. Ninety per cent of the missions fired were in support of the 2d Infantry Division (ARVN) in QUANG NGAI Province.

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## PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1 December - The following VIPs visited III MAF

Sen John C. TOWERS  
Mr. Charles B. KIRBON

Republican - Texas  
Chief Clerk Senate Armed  
Forces Committee

Sen George MC GOVERN  
Mr. Angus DUNTOW

Democrat - South Dakota  
Vice President Dreyfus  
Fund

Adm U. S. Grant SHARP, USN  
BGen Homer G. HUTCHINSON, USMC  
BGen Frank WHITE, USA  
BGen William E. DEPUY, USA

CINCPAC  
CINCPAC J-3  
CINCPAC J-4  
MACV J-3

3 December - VMFA 323 relieved VMFA 542.

6 December - The following VIPs visited III MAF

LtGen Victor H. KRULAK, USMC  
Mr. Edwin REISCHAUER

CG FMFPac  
U.S. Ambassador to Japan

7 December - Rep David S. KING

Democrat - Utah

8 December - 3d Platoon, Force Reconnaissance Company established a base camp at TRA BONG.

- Operation HARVEST MOON began.  
- The following VIPs visited III MAF

Rep Thaddeus J. DULSKI  
MGen Ben STERNBERG, USA

Democrat - New York  
MACV J-1

9 December - Mr. Robert H. BALDWIN, Under Secretary of the Navy visited III MAF.

10 December - The following VIPs visited III MAF

MGen Harry KINNARD, USA  
BGen Richard T. KNOWLES, USA

CG 1st Air Cavalry (AM)  
ADC 1st Air Cavalry (AM)

11 December - Sen Henry M. JACKSON, Democrat - Washington visited III MAF.

12 December - The following VIPs visited III MAF

Rep Robert L. SIKES  
Rep Glenard P. LIPSCOMB

Democrat - Florida  
Republican - California

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Rep William E. MINSHALL  
 Rep Clarence D. LONG  
 Rep Charles S. JOELSON  
 Mr. Robert L. MICHAEL

Republican - Ohio  
 Democrat - Maryland  
 Democrat - New York  
 Staff Assistant; Defense  
 Appropriation Sub-Com-  
 mittee  
 Deputy Assistant Sec-  
 retary of the Air Force  
 for Air Force Instal-  
 lations  
 Deputy COMUSMACV

Mr. Lewis E. TURNER

LtGen John A. HEINTGES

- 15 December - RAdm Edwin B. HOOPER USN, Commander Service Force visited III MAF
- 16 December - RAdm Paul E. HARTMAN, COMFAIRWESTPAC visited III MAF.
- 20 December - Operation HARVEST MOON secured.  
 - Rep Joseph Y. RESNICK, Democrat - New York visited III MAF.  
 - 2/1 relieved 3/4 at HUE PHU BAI after participating in HARVEST MOON.
- 21 December - The following VIPs visited III MAF
- LtGen Nguyen Van THIEU, Chief of Staff and Chairman of the National Leadership Committee, RVN.  
 LtGen Nguyen Huu CO, Deputy Chief of Staff, RVN  
 LtCol Dao Trong TEDUNG, Chief of Military Cabinet of the Office of the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee, RVN
- 22 December - Christmas Truce began at 1800H.
- 25 December - Christmas Truce ended at mid-night, but U.S. Forces instructed to conduct no offensive operation until VC initiated action.  
 - Francis, Cardinal, Spellman, Military Archbishop of the Armed Forces, visited III MAF and celebrated the Christmas Mass.
- 26 December - The following VIPs visited III MAF
- Gen Harold K. JOHNSON, USA                      Chief of Staff, USA  
 Rep Thomas C. MC GRATH                      Democrat - New Jersey
- 29 December - The following VIPs visited III MAF
- Sen Stuart SYMINGTON                      Democrat - Missouri  
 Mr. Bob HOPE and Cast
- 30 December - Gen William C. WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, visited III MAF.
- 31 December - MGen Lewis J. FIELDS, CG 1st MarDiv (Rein) FFMF visited III MAF.

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## References

- (a) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology December 1965
- (b) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology December 1965
- (c) COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) dated 21 November 1965 (S)
- (d) Maps, Vietnam L701 Series, Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 6658 I II III IV, 6659 II III IV, 6756 I IV, 6757 II III, 6659 I II III IV, 6560 II III IV

## Enclosures

- (1) Overlays showing III MAF TAOR development in 1965 (S)
- (2) Operation HARVEST MOON After Action Report
- (3) III MAF Monthly Strength Report
- (4) Force/NCC Order 5400.1 dated 24 Dec 1965
- (5) FLSG Command Chronology for December 1965
- (6) 3d Battalion 9th Marines Command Chronology for December 1965
- (7) 5th Communications Battalion Command Chronology for December 1965
- (8) 7th Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for December 1965
- (9) I Corps Advisory Group Monthly Evaluation Report December 1965
- (10) Status Chart Photographs
- (11) 2d Battalion 7th Marines Action at KY PHU, RVN
- (12) Christmas Cease-Fire Order
- (13) III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop List (U)

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
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DANANG TACF


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HUE PHU BAI TACR



MAP: VIETNAM 1:250,000




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CHU LAI TAOR



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HEADQUARTERS  
TASK FORCE DELTA  
3d Marine Division (-), FMP

Copy 24 of 30 copies.  
Hq, TASK FORCE DELTA  
DANANG, RVN  
28 December 1965  
Serial No: 00176

From: Commanding General, Task Force Delta  
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (Attn: J321),  
APO U. S. Forces 96243  
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMP  
(2) Commanding General, III MAF  
Subj: After Action Report, Operation HARVEST MOON  
Ref: (a) MACV Directive 335-8\*, dtd 1 Jul 65

Encl: (1) Artillery  
(2) Intelligence  
(3) Air Support  
(4) Communications  
(5) Psychological Warfare  
(6) Administrative Matters  
(7) Daily Operation Overlays (10)  
(8) Letter from Citizens of Que Son

1. NAME OF THE OPERATION. Operation HARVEST MOON, was a search, fix, and destroy operation in coordination and conjunction with elements of the 2d Division, I Corps, ARVN, in the QUE SON - VIET AN - HIEP DUC Valley complex.

2. DATE OF OPERATION. 080600H to 202130H December 1965.

3. LOCATION. The QUE SON - VIET AN - HIEP DUC Valley complex in QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces between the DA NANG and CHU LAI enclaves encompassed by grid coordinates BT 100510, BT 960390, BT 870290; BT 900250, BT 040210, BT 280250; AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I and IV, 6658 II and III.

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. Headquarters, Task Force Delta.

5. REPORTING OFFICER. Brigadier General J. M. PLATT, Commanding General; Task Force Delta.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Commander Task Force Delta.

Brig Gen HENDERSON  
8 Dec - 10 Dec

Brig Gen PLATT  
10 Dec - 20 Dec

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Composite Comm Plt  
 Det Hqs Co, Hqs Bn  
 Plat MP Co, Hqs Bn

2d Bn, 7th Marines (-) Rein

Co H, 2d Bn, 9th Marines (13-19Dec)  
 2d Plat, Co C, 3d Engr Bn  
 HST, Co A, 3d SP Bn

LtCol UTTER

3d Bn, 3d Marines (-) Rein

Co L, 3d Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co E, 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co G, 2d Bn, 4th Marines (15-19Dec)  
 Co G, 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
 4th Plat, Co C, 3d Engr Bn  
 HST, Co A, 3d SP Bn

LtCol DORSEY III

BLT 2/1. (Special Landing Force)

LtCol HANIFIN

Provisional Arty Bn.

Det Hq Btry, 12th Marines  
 Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines  
 Btry F, 2d Bn, 12th Marines  
 Btry L, 4th Bn, 12th Marines  
 Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines

LtCol SNYDER

Co G (-), 3d Recon Bn

Capt REVELL

Composite Co (-), 3d Engr Bn

Capt O'LAUGHLIN

Logistic Support Unit

A Co (-), 3d Shore Party Bn  
 Det, Ammo Co, FLSU  
 Det, Ration Co, FLSU  
 Det, EOD, FLSU  
 Clearing Plat (-) (Rein), 3d Med Bn  
 Det, 3d Engr Bn  
 Det, 1st Bridge Plat, 7th Engr Bn  
 Det, MABS 36, MAG 36 (TAPDS)

Maj BENSTEAD

3d MT Bn (Rein)

Maj BAKER

Co H, 2d Bn, 9th Marines (12 Dec security LSU)

Capt GORMLEY

Co D, 1st Bn, 3d Marines

Capt SPENCE

Co D, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Capt MILLER

Plat, Mortar Btry, 1st Bn, 12th MarinesPlat, Mortar Btry, 1st Bn, 11th MarinesSECRET

SECRET7. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. 1st Bn, 7th Marines; convoy security from Chu Lai enclave.

b. Marine Air.

(1) MAG 16  
 VMO- 2  
 HMM - 361  
 HMM - 263  
 HMM - 161

(2) MAG 12  
 VMA - 224  
 VMA - 223  
 VMA - 214  
 VMA - 211

(3) MAG 36  
 VMO - 6  
 HMM - 362  
 HMM - 364  
 HMM - 363

(4) MAG 11  
 VMFA - 323  
 VMFA - 115  
 VMCJ - 1

(5) HMM 261, Special Landing Force  
 VMGR 152

c. USAF

(1) Strategic Air Command (B-52 strikes)

(2) 4th Air Commando (Flare planes)

d. Army Air Units

1st Cav Div (Helo-lift of downed H-34)

e. Regional Forces

2d Recon Co, 529th, ARVN  
 RF Co, QUE SON  
 RF Co, THIEN PHYOC

8. INTELLIGENCE. See Enclosure (2).

9. MISSION. Commencing D-Day Task Force Delta in coordination with participating ARVN forces fix and destroy organized VC elements in the QUE SON - VIET AN - HIEP DUC Valley complex. The operation was essentially a spoiling attack to prevent the Viet Cong from their announced objective of

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capturing QUE SON. The operation was also to have eliminated VC forces that have isolated the ARVN outpost at VIET AN, permitting ARVN to reestablish lines of communications.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. General. Task Force Delta consisting of three Marine infantry Battalions, (including BLT 2/1, the infantry element of the Special Landing Force, 7th Fleet (SLF), and other supporting 3d Mar Div elements, in coordination with an ARVN Regiment, conducted a three stage search and destroy operation in the QUE SON - VIET AN - HIEP DUC Valley complex. Marine logistic support was staged from a combat established logistic support area in the vicinity of HUONG XUAN.

b. Definition of Stages.

(1) Stage I. Period D-1 and D-Day, D-1 ARVN forces conducted search and clear mission in the vicinity of THANG BINH. On D-Day ARVN forces crossed LD at 0500 H and proceeded generally southwest along Route 35 to vicinity Phase Line A. Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines, with one rifle platoon from 2/7, moved by motor march from CHU LAI enclave to vicinity of THANG BINH to provide artillery fire support for ARVN forces in vicinity of Phase Line B. 2d Bn, 7th Marines motor marched from CHU LAI to vicinity TAM KY.

(2) Stage II. Period D+1 to D+10. ARVN forces were to establish and maintain contact with enemy force. 2d Bn, 7th Marines was to be helo-lifted on D+1 to vicinity Objective 1, seize objective and then be prepared to move out to seek and destroy the enemy as ordered. On D+1 all other elements of task force except the SLF were to move from DA NANG enclave to either the THANG BINH or QUE SON complex. Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines was to continue to support from position at THANG BINH. 3d Bn, 3d Marines and SLF were to be prepared for immediate commitment to objective area on order. Logistic Support Unit supported this force from D+1 to D+10 from LSA vicinity HUONG XUAN. Force Command Group, Prov Arty Bn (-), Recon Co (-) bases at QUE SON on D+1. No major displacement of this element, with the exception of the Reconnaissance Co (-), was contemplated prior to D+10.

(3) Stage III. D+11 to D+12. All elements of Task Force Delta withdraw by helo/foot/motor march to their respective enclaves. LSA transfers surplus supplies to FLSG control in enclave. Operation HARVEST MOON was scheduled to terminate on D+12.

11. EXECUTION.

a. During the first few days of December the G-2 Section, 3d Marine Division developed information that indicated the presence of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in the QUE SON - VIET AN - HIEP DUC Valley complex. On 4 December the Commanding General III MAF met with the Commanding General I Corps; both concurred in the intelligence indications and the necessity to launch a sizeable attack in that area to destroy, disrupt, and impede whatever progress had been made by the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in establishing an area of operations.

b. The following day Task Force Delta was formed. The major elements

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consisted of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines who had been alerted and pre-designated for such operations by 3d Marine Division contingency plans. A provisional artillery battalion was formed from elements of the 11th Marines and the 12th Marines. Additionally, plans called for the employment of BLT 2/1, Special Landing Force, (SLF) to participate as Task Force Delta's reserve. Logistic support was to be provided by a Logistics Support Unit to be established in the objective area.

c. The Task Force Delta staff was formed on 5 December from personnel within the 3d Marine Division. Planning commenced on 5 December in conjunction with the 2d Division, I Corps, ARVN. On 7 December plans and orders were completed and issued.

d. Operations D-Day, 8 December.

(1) Task Force Delta commenced operation HARVEST MOON when 2d Battalion, 7th Marines departed CHU LAI enclaves at 080500H via motor march and closed assembly area vicinity TAM KY BT 3025 at 081530H. The battalion established defensive positions and prepared for helicopter lift into objective area on order. Btry M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines departed DA NANG enclave as planned and was positioned (BT 1641) for action by 081445H. No contact was established. The 5th ARVN Regiment consisting of the 1st Battalion 5th Regiment and the 11th Ranger Battalion advanced southwest on an axis parallel to and south of the SONG LY LY. At 081330 at vicinity (BT 0934) the 11th Rangers came under heavy fire from an estimated VC Battalion. The Rangers withdrew to vicinity (BT 1235) and were reinforced in the late afternoon by the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, ARVN transported by Marine helicopters from TAM KY. At 1600H 11th Rangers had reorganized and were in position with 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, ARVN.

e. Operations D+1, 9 December.

(1) On D+1, 9 December, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines helolifted from vicinity TAM KY to BT 016318 to threaten the flank and rear of units that made contact with the 5th ARVN Regiment on D-Day. The lift was completed at 1335H. By 1755H the Battalion C.P. Group, Companies E and H had advanced through objective A, BT 030315, and had secured objective B, BT 050315. Companies G and F followed in trace from the landing zone. By darkness D+1 Companies G and F occupied and defended objective A while Companies E and H held objective B.

(2) The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines commenced their motor march from the DA NANG enclave at 0500. Lead elements arrived in the LSA vicinity HUONG XUAN at 1030H. At 1400H the battalion helolifted to BT 144306 to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, ARVN some 2,500 meters to the northwest. At 1500H the battalion with Company L and 2 platoons of E advanced toward Hill 43 BT 122321. At 1530H Company L moving northwest made contact. Movement continued. At 1645H the battalion turned to move toward Hill 43. At 1700 the battalion came under heavy fire from an estimated 200 Viet Cong supported by mortars and machine guns. The firefight

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lasted until 1830H. Periodic small arms fire continued until 2030H. Night defensive positions were established in the vicinity of BT 122316. Company G and one platoon of E established night defensive positions on Hill 43 BT 122321.

(3) Initial units of the LSU arrived at HUONG XUAN and commenced operations of logistic support of Task Force Delta.

(4) Task Force Delta command group "B" helolifted from DA NANG to HUONG XUAN to QUE SON BT 042347. By midmorning contact had been established with the principal elements of the Task Force. The Command Group "C" proceeded to HUONG XUAN by motor march with the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and joined the command group at QUE SON in midafternoon after being helolifted from HUONG XUAN. BLT 2/1 (SLF) was alerted and permission received to commit two companies and the command group of BLT 2/1 in support of Task Force Delta operations ashore. The two remaining companies were not available but were to be landed upon arrival in the Objective Area.

f. Operations D+2, 10 December.

(1) At 0945H Company F (-), BLT 2/1 and elements of Command Group "A" were helolifted to BT 071293 and came under heavy small arms and mortar fire. The remaining elements of Company F and Company G were landed via helicopter from the USS Valley Forge at BT 067304. Company G, BLT 2/1, and Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines covered the withdrawal of Company F (-) from the initial landing zone. By 1900H enemy contact was broken. Companies F and G, BLT 2/1, and Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines had consolidated into a battalion perimeter defense from coordinates BT 076302 to BT 079302 by 110300H.

(2) The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines continued their advance from objectives A and B to objective C BT 082325. During the advance the battalion met light resistance. At approximately 1515H Co E junctured with Co F, BLT 2/1, and commenced a coordinated attack on Viet Cong elements in the vicinity of BT 078292. At 1610H Company H had secured Objective C. At 1650H the battalion command group and Companies F and G were 600 meters from Objective C and closed shortly thereafter.

(3) At 0645H 3d Battalion, 3d Marines crossed the LOD in their advance to Hill 43, BT 123321. At 1300 the battalion had secured Hill 43 and had established defensive positions there. At 1400H the battalion was ordered to Objective C to juncture with the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. By 1535H the battalion was located at BT 095330 proceeding toward Objective C. By 1730H the battalion had closed Objective C and had established night defensive positions in conjunction with elements of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.

(4) Company C (-), 3d Reconnaissance Battalion arrived in QUE SON the evening of the 9th. On 10 December the Company patrolled approximately 2,500 meters south of QUE SON and received occasional small arms fire during the patrol.

(5) The LSU became fully operational and provided logistic support via helicopter for the elements of the Task Force.

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(6) Companies E and H, BLT 2/1 conducted an at sea transfer from the USS Montrose to the USS Valley Forge in preparation for helolift into the objective area on 11 December.

g. Operations D+3, 11 December.

(1) BLT 2/1 prepared to receive Companies E and H for a planned advance south. Companies E and H were lifted into vicinity BT 0930 from USS Valley Forge. BLT 2/1, after arrival of Companies E and H, commenced their advance south by 1800H the units dispositions were; Companies E and G consolidated from BT 085285, to BT 087285, Company F BT 082287, Company H BT 075296. The BLT had met light to moderate Viet Cong resistance.

(2) At approximately 0630H 2d Battalion, 7th Marines advanced from Objective C with Companies E, G, and H to the south to link-up with Companies E and G of BLT 2/1. At approximately 1000H the over land juncture was accomplished in the vicinity BT 097301. Company F, and 81mm mortars and 106 recoilless rifles were helolifted from Objective B to Objective C. The Battalion then advanced Company H south in an assault of Hill 407, BT 0727 by 111830H the leading elements were at the top of Hill 407. The company closed shortly thereafter and consolidated for the night. Companies E and G with the Battalion CP were disposed in a perimeter defense for the night at BT 067302 to BT 068302 to BT 064299 to BT 064304. Company F and 81mm mortars and 106 recoilless rifles remained on Objective C in coordinated defense with 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.

(3) The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines occupied Objective C and patrolled 1800 - 2000 meters to the west and 1,000 meters to the east. An extensive tunnel and cave system was found in vicinity Objective C, BT 076323 and BT 083325. The system included areas large areas large enough to house 75 people and included cooking and ventilation vents. These caves were searched in detail and destroyed.

(4) The Task Force CP continued to operate from QUE SON. TPQ air strikes by Marine aircraft were planned and conducted during the night on targets; BT 098275, BT 106275, BT 104270, BT 125280, BT 135280, BT 082227. Targets were suspected assembly and storage areas, and unit locations.

h. Operations D+4, 12 December.

(1) At 1900H BLT 2/1 commenced advance southwest through grid squares BT 0828 and 0927. A defensive position vicinity BT 113277 to BT 106272 was established that evening.

(2) Previous plans to helolift the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines were cancelled due to bad weather in the battalions location. At 1335H the mission was modified and the battalion directed to occupy an area vicinity of BT 045292, Hill 106. Company F moved from Objective C and joined the Battalion at 1550H. The battalion advanced overland in tactical column to Hill 106; the leading elements arriving at 1735H. The remaining elements closing at 1830H. Night defensive positions were established for Companies E, F, and G in the

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vicinity BT 045291. The battalion CP was located at BT 047294. Company H remained at Hill 407, BT 077276.

(3) At 120730H the first of an eventual series of four B-52 strikes occurred. This strike hit a reported VC base area in the valley SE of Hill 330 (BT 0925-1227-1326-1124). Considered noteworthy in this strike was the timing and coverage. Immediately after the first strike, three additional strikes were planned by G-3 USMACV and CG Task Force Delta based on current intelligence. During this planning, CG TFD was informed that 1000 meters was the deflection safety distance for friendly troops.

(4) The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines were helolifted from vicinity Objective C commencing approximately 0900H to landing zone BT 145285 with the assigned mission of searching and destroying to the south in the valley BT 1328 and BT 1125 and to provide damage surveillance of the B-52 SAC strike conducted between 0705H and 0730H 12 December. At 1005H the leading elements had arrived and secured the landing zone vicinity BT 145285. The remaining elements were all landed by 1015H. At approximately 1115H Companies L and G advanced on either side of the valley. At 1400H Company L had secured Hill 100 BT 1228. Company G came under heavy small arms and mortar fire at the base of Hill 180 BT 1327. Air and artillery strikes were called in support but Company G could not advance due to an unfordable river. The Company retracted and helolifted to Hill 180 commencing 1650H. The lift was supported by air preparation of the hill and completed at 1725H. During the afternoon the 2d Reconnaissance Company, 529th ARVN, junctured with the Battalion and conducted patrols and established outposts to the south and east. By darkness Companies L and G established defensive positions on Hills 100 and 180 respectively, the remaining units established defensive positions in conjunction with the Battalion CP.

i. Operations D+5, 13 December.

(1) At approximately 130400H a message was received from 3dMarDiv with information that the B-52 strike requested for that day would occur at BT 0623-0625-0925-0923. The message also directed that no friendly troops be within 3000 meters of the strike zone. This necessitated the withdrawal of all friendly troops to the north of grid line 28 and postponement of a planned helicopter lift of a mortar platoon and troops to the top of hill 407. The withdrawal of troops was completed by approximately 0815H.

(2) At 130440H, 2/1 was ordered to withdraw to north of grid line 28 because of the scheduled B-52 strike. At 1015H the BLT was ordered to continue their search and destroy mission to the south and to advance commencing 1300H. By 1800H the BLT was disposed from BT 100267 to BT 109273. There had been no enemy contact except that Company H had apprehended eight (8) Viet Cong dressed as women on Hill 330 BT 1127. The BLT had advanced slowly over rough terrain across a 2,000 meter front.

(3) At 1130H 2d Battalion, 7th Marines conducted a heliborne assault from BT 043291 to secure Hill 185 BT 0228. Company H, early D+5 was moved north of east-west grid line 28 in preparation for B-52 strike. At 1015H Company H commenced movement to Hill 407 Bt 0727 to secure position for one platoon of 4.2 mortars sited for fire support of operations further to south

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in the hill mass. At approximately 1420H the battalion was disposed from BT 029288 to BT 031283 with Company F at BT 029288 prepared to advance to Hill 185. Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines now attached to the battalion remained at previous night's battalion CP location, prepared to reinforce. At 1610H the battalion was ordered to advance south to VIET AN BT 0226. At 1940H the lead elements reached VIET AN, the remaining elements closed shortly thereafter and established defensive positions. The Battalion met light resistance during the day.

(4) The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines continued the search of the valley and the entrance to the valley. Many caves were found throughout the valley area. At BT 127277 caves were found containing cots, blankets, and medical supplies. At 1700H the battalion located caves containing sewing machines, large quantities of medical supplies, large quantities of uniform material, flash light batteries, ball point pens, and documents. At darkness the search ended, units established positions for the night. The battalion CP was located at Hill 100 BT 129286.

j. Operations D+6, 14 December.

(1) BLT 2/1 continued their advance south over Hill 370 BT 0926 toward TRUNG LAM (3) in vicinity BT 0925. The battalion received occasional small arms fire. Extremely rough terrain necessitated cutting through dense jungle growth. At 1830H the BLT established a perimeter defense in vicinity BT 074240. The battalion was directed to provide damage surveillance of the B-52 strike zone in its area of operations, but because of rough terrain, bad weather, and time limitations was able to search only the east quarter of the strike zone during this and the next day.

(2) The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines executed a heliborne assault to the high ground vicinity BT 0023 in an effort to block along a reported Viet Cong ferry site on the SONG CHANG. At 1125H the battalion reported no fire from the landing zone, however, helicopters were receiving 50 Cal MG fire from vicinity of AT 994222. Air and 81mm mortars were directed at the MG location with excellent results. At 1430H the front line positions were reported from AT 999233 to BT 002223. At 1440H a mortar platoon of 1/12 was laid and ready to fire at BT 999232. The battalion dispatched one unit to secure the ferry crossing at the suspected location AT 993221. The battalion CP with Company F and Company H, 2d Battalion 9th Marines consolidated and defended for the night at BT 000232, Company G established defensive positions at BT 002232.

(3) The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines continued the advance through the valley to the southwest. Again found many caves, and located an abandoned guerrilla base camp at BT 133274. From BT 131274 to BT 131265 the battalion found surgical uniforms, ID cards and bandages. At BT 129270 found 1300 lbs of rice. Additionally large quantities of salt, gasoline and 3 sewing machines were found. At BT 119265 in the area hit by B-52's, the battalion found 12 bodies with cartridge belts, grenades and a Russian carbine. At 1554 the battalion had searched to BT 115253.

k. Operations D+7, 15 December.

(1) BLT 2/1 continued search and destroy operations. Platoon patrols searched in the following areas: Company E, BT 0624; Company G, BT 0623; Company H,

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BT 0723. The patrols encountered many tunnels and occasional Viet Cong suspects in caves. By evening the BLT had consolidated for the night in the following positions; Company E, from BT 066242 to BT 069243; Company F, from BT 069243 to BT 069238; Company G, from BT 069238 to BT 066237; Company H, from BT 066237 to BT 066242.

(2) The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines remained in the ferry site area and conducted patrols in and around that area. Company F patrolled in an area AT 985227 to AT 986230 southwest to grid line 23 and south to the river. Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines patrolled from the river BT 000218 to BT 000227 to BT 024220 and south to the northern edge of the SONG CHANG and northwest along the river. Company H rejoined the battalion at 1330H and remained with the battalion and Company G at BT 024220. At 1630H the ferry site was located at AT 993221 by Company F who disposed to occupy and control the site. By darkness Companies F and H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines had established defensive positions in conjunction with their CPs located at AT 996219 and BT 003218 respectively. The remaining Companies established night defensive positions in conjunction with the battalion CP at BT 001232.

(3) The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines continued their search of PHUOC HA Valley area finding several weapons including three TSMG's and one BAR and four dead at BT 143280. At 1100H shortly after finding the above weapons and bodies the battalion made contact at BT 144283 with the enemy who employed 60mm and 81mm mortars. Shortly thereafter, 1114H, Company G received small arms fire in the vicinity BT 145279. Artillery fire was directed against the area and a platoon dispatched to search the area. The fire was believed to be diversionary to detract from the search area where weapons were found. At 1330H BT 142289 Company G found one cloth pullover gas mask. At 1500H Company G, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived at the battalion CP and came under OPCON of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Additionally the battalion found large quantities of rice, fish oil, and 5,000 meters of communications wire. By darkness the battalion established defensive positions.

1. D+8. 16 December.

(1) At 0850H as BLT 2/1 continued their search north toward 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, they received sporadic small arms fire from coordinates BT 093233. At 1130H the battalion made and maintained contact at BT 110240 with an estimated 40 to 50 Viet Cong. By midafternoon the Viet Cong Company broke contact and withdrew. By evening the battalion established defensive positions as follows: Company E, BT 105239 to BT 108239; Company G, BT 105239 to BT 104236; Company H, BT 107326 to BT 100239; the battalion CP was located at BT 107230.

(2) At 0730H the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines departed the ferry site to conduct search and clear operations to the east. Swollen streams caused by the continuous heavy rains slowed the tactical column throughout the day. At BT 039210 the battalion found what appeared to be a Viet Cong staging area. One of the buildings at the site contained many blood stains and used bandages. Several caves were found in the area. The battalion established defensive perimeter positions in the vicinity BT 068211.

(3) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines continued their search of the PHUOC HA Valley area. During the morning Company G, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines located ten tons of rice at BT 128294. At 1015H Company E at BT 127277 and Company G, 2d Bat-

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talion, 4th Marines at BT 117257 were alerted and prepared to move south to block or attack those Viet Cong units in contact with BLT 2/1. The battalion was not employed in a blocking role and continued their search. Additional caves were discovered at BT 133294 which contained small quantities of medical supplies. At 1540H the ARVN reconnaissance Company under OPCON of the battalion discovered a cave at BT 119258 containing 25 Viet Cong bodies wearing dark grey uniforms. At 1700H the battalion established night defensive positions in conjunction with the battalion CP.

m. D+8 through D+12, 17 through 20 December.

(1) On the evening of 16 December Task Force Delta issued orders to the three participating battalions to commence search and clear operations to the east and northeast toward Highway 1 for eventual retraction from the area of operations.

(2) BLT 2/1 commenced their advance at 170930H. At 171230H the lead elements were located at BT 113252. At 171334H BLT 2/1 reported their front lines at BT 126269 with no significant occurrences. At 175050H the BLT reported that they were closing on Hill 180 BT 1327 and had received occasional small arms fire during the move from BT 125269. At 172000H the BLT defended from the following positions: Company E, BT 133275 to BT 135276; Company G, BT 131276 to BT 134278; Company H, BT 134278 to BT 135279. At 180945H the BLT advanced from their night positions. At 181320H the forward elements of the BLT had reached the river at BT 183304. The river was swollen and impassable requiring a helolift. At 181800 the helo-ferry-lift was completed and unit dispositions for the night were: Company E, BT 187305 to BT 187302; Company G, BT 190304 to BT 187305; Company H, BT 187303 to BT 190304. The BLT CP was located at BT 189308. On the 19th the BLT continued their movement and closed at L and M Battery positions BT 2331 during the afternoon; by dark all BLT units were helolifted to the SLF for deployment and future relief of units at the PHU BAI enclave.

(3) At 170855H the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines continued to search and clear to the east. At 170959H the battalion reported their leading elements at BT 096213. By 171114H the battalion reported their lead element at BT 110218. The battalion continued their movement east reporting their lead element at BT 130218 at 171217H. At 171250H the battalion received long range small arms fire in the vicinity of BT 133219 to BT 129219. At 171430H the battalion reported its lead elements at BT 144219. At 171810H the battalion lead elements halted for the day and established night positions of Company F and Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines at BT 164222. Company G, upon closing established their defensive positions to the east and in conjunction with Company G and H defensive positions. At 180800H the battalion continued its movement to the east. At 181005H the lead elements were reported at BT 220227. At 181009H the battalion halted their advance to helo-evac medical casualties and equipment from BT 177219. The advance continued after the lift and at 181303H the lead elements of the tactical column were located at BT 225228. At 181330H the battalion reported lead elements in contact with an estimated Viet Cong platoon at BT 225223, the platoon was taken under fire, broke contact and withdrew. At 181350H the Viet Cong attacked the center of the battalion at two locations BT 212224 and at BT 219225 in an attempt to cut the tactical column. In addition to small arms fire the Viet Cong employed

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mortars, machine guns, and 57mm recoilless rifles; their strength was estimated at more than a reinforced company. The battalion consolidated their positions in KY PHU BT 2122 while Company F flanked the attacking Viet Cong. Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, supported by artillery, made their way from the rear to reinforce and rejoin the center of the column. The attack lasted approximately three hours after which the remaining Viet Cong elements withdrew. The battalion suffered light casualties while the Viet Cong, after final count the following morning, suffered over 100 KIA. By evening the battalion established defensive positions from BT 215226 to BT 218227 to BT 215224 to BT 218225. On the 19th the battalion conducted a search of the Viet Cong positions finding a trench line and bunker system. Weapons and many bloody bandages found in the bunker system indicated numerous wounded, but not counted, during the previous days battle. After destroying the enemy positions the battalion continued their advance east. At 191445H the battalion reported its location at THON HAI BT 2425 and headed for BT 280225 where they were to entruck to stage at TAM KY for the motor march back to the CHU LAI enclave. However, the highway bridge at BT 291240 was rendered impassable due to damage by the enemy action and the convoy could not make the assigned entrucking area. In order to juncture with the convoy a foot bridge was installed at BT 263253. At 191750H the last element of the battalion crossed the foot bridge on their way to entruck north of the damaged bridge BT 291240. Upon reaching the road Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines entrucked and departed for the ISA where they joined a convoy for the DA NANG enclave closing DA NANG late that evening. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines entrucked and after receiving and returning small arms fire from the village of PHOUNG HOA (2) BT 2923 departed for the CHU LAI enclave.

(4) At 170805H the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines commenced their advance northeast. Movement was difficult due to heavy rains and near impassable streams. At 171400H Company E received small arms fire at BT 155293, the battalion returned fire and called armed helicopters killing two (2) Viet Cong. The battalion proceeded to vicinity BT 179313 where the stream was impassable. Helicopters commenced lifting Company G, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and the 2d ARVN Reconnaissance Company, 529th, from BT 175314 to L Battery positions BT 235316. The lift began at approximately 171700H and halted at 171750H due to bad weather. During the night Companies E and G remained with the battalion CP at BT 175313 while the two lifted companies remained at Battery L's positions. The next morning Companies E and G were helolifted to BT 235316 where they joined Company G, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines entrucked and proceeded to the ISA BT 1544. The battalion was then lifted at approximately 181500H, via helicopter to DA NANG. The lift was completed at 181900H.

(5) At 191350H the Task Force CP began displacing to the ISA BT 1544 to better control the retraction of all units from the objective area.

(6) Artillery and other combat support and logistic units commenced

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phase-out in conjunction with the retraction of infantry units. Sufficient infantry security was provided all supporting units during the retraction. On the 20th the last remaining security and logistic support elements departed the ISA at 1815H via motor march closing the DA NANG enclave at 2030H. At approximately the same time Task Force Delta CP closed the DA NANG enclave.

n. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. See enclosure (5).

## 12. RESULTS.

a. General. Most significant results of Operation HARVEST MOON are the severe losses inflicted on a major Viet Cong Command, destruction of a large enemy supply installation, and the psychological impact on both the Viet Cong forces and the local populace of friendly offensive operations, conducted almost at will, in an area which had been strongly controlled by the Viet Cong.

b. Friendly Equipment and Material losses.

(1) One H-34 helicopter due to mechanical failure.

(2) One UH-1E helicopter due to ground fire.

(3) One AN/PRC 10 radio with MIA forward observer accompanying ARVN Forces.

c. Enemy Equipment and Material losses.

(1) Supplies: 45 tons of rice, 11 tons of tea, 1,200 gallons of fish oil, 3 tons of salt, large store of peanuts, 500 lbs of sugar, 300 lbs of soup mix, 125 gallons of fuel, 500 flashlight batteries, medical supplies, 3,800 meters plus 40 bolts uniform cloth, 600 complete uniforms, 15,000 buttons, large quantities of paper and rolls of brown plastic material.

(2) Equipment: 9 bicycles, 31 pick/mattock, 15 entrenching tools, 200 bamboo signal drums, 3 sewing machines, 1 16 inch loud speaker, 1 cloth pullover gas mask, 4 AN/PRC-10 radios, 1 AN/PRC-9 radio, 1 AN/PRC-6 radio and 2,000 meters of communications wire.

(3) Weapons: 107 total:

(a) Crew served: 2 57mm recoilless rifles, 1 81mm mortar, 1 60mm mortar, 1 .50 Cal MG, 2 M1919A4 MG, 1 DPM MG, 1 French MG, 2 CZECH BRNO MG (1 is CHIGOM copy), and 2 B-40 rocket launchers.

(b) Individual: 12 US BAR, 6 TSMG, 14 M-1 rifles, 4 M-1 carbines, 1K-50, 5 MATK-49, 1 AK, 38 K-44, 8 MAJ-36, 3 MAUSERS, 1 ENFIELD, 1 UNK SMG, and 1 UNK rifle.

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(c) Miscellaneous: 2 grenade launchers, 1 12.7 mm AA MG tripod and 1 81mm mortar base plate.

(d) Ammunition: 10,000 small arms rds, 24 57 recoilless rifle rds, 13 81mm mortar rds, 73 60mm mortar rds, 14 cases 50 Cal.

d. Friendly Losses: KIA - 44, WIA - 265\*, DOW - 6, MIA - 1, NBD - 1.

\* As of 23 December 112 WIA had been returned to duty.

e. Enemy Losses.

(1) KIA:	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
Ground Forces:	314	327
Marine Air:	69	284
SAC:	24	UNK

(2) WIA: estimated 100

(3) VCC: 33 (including 4 PAVN)

(4) VCS: 231

(5) Ralliers: 3 (including 2 PAVN)

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. See enclosure (6).

14. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS.

a. Enemy.

(1) Noteworthy in this operation was the very apparent lack of response/reaction by VC units against potentially lucrative targets in the objective area, some static for relatively long periods of time. In certain of these cases, such as the Task Force Command Post and the Logistic Support Area, the risk was recognized but accepted on a carefully considered basis, with due precaution exercised. In other cases the presentation of targets to VC activity was involuntary, often dictated by conditions beyond the control of the Task Force. Notable among these was bad weather which at times prevented movement of certain heavy support weapons. Although active operations detrimental to the VC effort continued to be initiated from these positions, there were no significant enemy efforts directed against such targets.

(2) Similarly, the VC failed to respond to the large-scale use of Route 1 by troop, artillery, and supply convoys proceeding south from DaNang and north from Chu Lai to the objective area, a distance of 22 and 41 miles respectively. Fifty-four convoys were conducted over Route 1 during the period 9-20Dec with

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only occasional small arms fire and occasional mortar rounds directed at vehicles. One vehicle was damaged by a mine, slightly wounding the driver and assistant driver, and several troop within trucks were hit, none seriously, by small arms fire. There was no serious opposition by the Viet Cong.

(3) Although ARVN officers familiar with the objective area cautioned about extensive minefields and defensive positions in certain areas deep within the VC homeland which we planned to penetrate, subsequent movement of units through these areas revealed an almost total lack of such defenses.

b. Weather and Terrain.

(1) Of the eleven days that Task Force Delta was actively engaged in operations against VC forces and installations, good weather (clear and sunny) was experienced on only two days; marginal weather was encountered on three days (ceilings 500 - 1200 feet; visibility 1 - 3 miles; light, intermittent rain); and bad weather was the order of the day during the other six days.

(2) The terrain was either high and rugged or low, flat, wet ground with very little average between the two. The few existing roads and trails had been systematically destroyed by the VC during a period of better than a year. An engineer estimate indicated a major engineer effort of approximately a month's duration was necessary to place one road, which could have been used as an MSR, into use. Accordingly, trafficability in the area was poor; mobility was vested in two means: foot or helicopter.

(3) These adverse conditions of weather and terrain dictated a positive requirement for detailed alternate plans, particularly in view of the heavy reliance on helicopters dictated by poor ground trafficability. When helicopters were unable to fly, primary plans had to be cancelled and alternate plans immediately substituted for troop commitments and troop and supporting weapon movement.

c. General. Most lessons learned in this operation are merely reaffirmation of existing doctrine. Certain recommendations contained in annexes to this report as submitted by various participating units and staff sections, are being evaluated within the 3d Marine Division. Additional items considered significant follow:

(1) Artillery was used extensively in the operation. Two towed batteries of 155mm Howitzers were convoyed to firing positions along Route 1 and covered a large portion of the TAOR. Two batteries of 105mm Howitzers were lifted by helo into position generally in the center of the objective area providing additional coverage. Remaining areas that could not be covered by artillery were covered by 4.2" mortar and howtar platoons helolifted into suitable positions with plans to leap frog them along in trace of the wide-ranging battalion.

(2) The UH-1E helicopter was used extensively as a reconnaissance

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and command vehicle, and when gunfigured, for close support of infantry and troop convoys, particularly when weather prevented the use of fixed wing air. In the widely extended and rapidly moving situation experienced in HARVEST MOON, the UH-1E was essential for the overall commander and highly desirable for use by the battalion commanders, to whom it was made available on many occasions.

(3) Where possible, landing zones for lifts of assaulting units and landing sites for resupply of units moving overland, were selected on high ground. It was found that little, if any, opposition was experienced in the use of such LZ's. The VC seemed to have prepared his defenses solely on the lower slopes of those hill masses he defended.

(4) Accurate, systematic and timely reporting is mandatory. Reports must have sufficient detail to answer at least who, what, when, where, and when possible, how and why. The reporting requirement demands the meticulous attention of commanders at all echelons.

(5) The requirement for positive and easy identification of widely separated friendly unit locations on the ground to aviators and observers airborne was re-emphasized during this operation. The identification problems stemmed primarily from difficult terrain, adverse weather, and unfamiliarity of some pilots with the area. Better solutions to existing air-ground identification procedures are being sought within the 3d Marine Division.

(6) Several B-52 strikes were employed in support of the ground operation during HARVEST MOON. The bombs were dropped where they were supposed to be dropped, when they were supposed to be dropped and with excellent area coverage. A need exists to promulgate troop safety limits to field commanders and to develop a means of immediately and directly informing the field commander when the last bomb is dropped.

(7) During most of the operation, troops of the infantry battalions in particular, were exposed to heavy, frequent rainfall and almost continual wading through flooded paddies, streams, and rivers. Several problems were developed because of this constant exposure which kept the individual Marine and all of his weapons and equipment thoroughly soaked.

(a) Immersion foot became a real problem. Certain antidotes in addition to medical treatment, were used during the operation such as the automatic issue of thousands of pairs of new, dry socks during resupply of the battalions; fires were built where possible to dry feet, socks and boots; and units of company size were rotated out of the operation with fresh companies assigned as reliefs.

(b) Field boots rotted very rapidly and a high replacement rate was experienced. Issue of needed boots was also effected, on request by battalions, during the daily helo resupply.

(c) The jungle boot inner sole chafed feet badly after continued immersion in water. An unsatisfactory equipment report is being prepared on this item.

(d) A definite need exists for weapons cleaning gear which is an

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individual, waterproofed item of issue. Cloth swabs for bore cleaning, for example, are currently packaged in large, un-waterproofed bundles, usually wrapped in only regular department store-type wrapping paper. These large bundles containing thousands of patches arrived at battalions in resupply runs, already water-soaked even before distribution to companies. A return to the WW II small waterproof packet containing about ten cloth swabs is needed. Lubricating oil is received most often in large, several gallon containers, or larger, which complicates distribution to the individual and often results in much waste through spillage. Smaller containers are essential. A water-proof, spray type lubricant of the WD-40 type appears to be highly desirable for operations in extremely wet climates.

(8) The attitude of the villagers in the QUE SON District Headquarters is worthy of note. The village had been surrounded by VC for more than a year. The only road into the village from the coast and Route 1, was impassable because of extensive demolition by the VC during that year. Buses and other vehicles were parked within the village, stranded, unable to proceed more than 500 meters along the road in any direction. The village was slowly being constricted and strangled. An air of hopelessness and apathy pervaded the entire area. This changed to cheer, hopefulness and optimism, almost overnight, when sizeable numbers of friendly forces began to arrive in the vicinity. It was obvious that the villagers were under the impression that these forces were going to stay. They welcomed the Americans whole-heartedly and, on departure of the troops ten days later, sincere regret was evinced not only by the village officials, but also by a large part of the population. (Enclosure (8)).

(9) Insofar as civic action is concerned, hundreds of villagers were treated in the village dispensary by the small medical staff attached to the Task Force Headquarters. Medical supplies and blankets were made available to the village dispensary through the District Chief, obtained from Civic Action Medical Assistance Program sources. Certain obvious damage to private property, primarily that caused by air resupply drops, was settled on the spot through the District Chief or other local officials, using small amounts of captured funds made available by 3d Marine Division G-2 for this purpose. Otherwise time and geographical remoteness of the village precluded major civic action endeavors.



J. M. PIATT

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Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco  
California, 96601

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1080  
Ser: 001066  
3 Jan 1966

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
(Attention: MACV J-1)

Subj: Monthly Strength Report for period ending 31 December 1965.

of: (a) COMUSMACV Directive 3352-14 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Strength Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter becomes unclassified upon removal of the enclosure.

P. L. McDERMOTT.  
By direction

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UNIT DESIGNATION	CORPS	PROVINCE	LOCATION	PERSONNEL					PERSONNEL					TOTAL PERSONNEL					DOD CIV	REMARKS	
				PCS IN-COUNTRY		TDY IN-COUNTRY		AGGR	MARINE		NAVY		AGGR	MARINE		NAVY					
				OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
HQ III MAF/NCC	I	Quang Nam	Danang	84	157	6	2	249							84	157	6	2	249		
3rdMARDIV FMF																					
HqBN																					
HqCo (includes 3dMarI Div Staff)		Quang Nam	Danang	124	723	13	27	887	3	27	17	23	70	127	750	30	50	957			
ServCo				15	318			333						15	318			333			
CommCo				11	356			367						11	356			367			
MPCo				5	111			116						5	111			116			
1stForceReconCo				9	128			137						9	128			137			
SUB TOTAL				164	1636	13	27	1840	3	27	17	23	70	167	1663	30	50	1910			
3dMarRegt																					
HqCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	19	251	2	2	274						19	251	2	2	274			
1stBn, 1stMar				37	983	3	57	1080						37	983	3	57	1080			
1stBn, 3dMar				39	1023	3	53	1118						39	1023	3	53	1118			
2ndBn, 1stMar	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai	36	975	3	49	1063						36	975	3	49	1063			
SUB TOTAL				131	3232	11	161	3535						131	3232	11	161	3535			
4thMarRegt																					
HqCo	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	19	251	2	2	274						19	251	2	2	274			
1stBn, 4thMar				37	965	2	59	1063						37	965	2	59	1063			
2ndBn, 4thMar				36	951	3	53	1043						36	951	3	53	1043			
SUB TOTAL				92	2167	7	114	2380						92	2167	7	114	2380			
7thMarRegt																					
HqCo	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	21	281	2	3	307						21	281	2	3	307			
1stBn, 7thMar				39	979	3	62	1083						39	979	3	62	1083			
2ndBn, 7thMar				38	914	3	55	1010						38	914	3	55	1010			
3dBn, 7thMar				37	942	3	57	1039						37	942	3	57	1039			
SUB TOTAL				135	3116	11	177	3439						135	3116	11	177	3439			

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UNIT DESIGNATION	CORPS	PROVINCE	LOCATION	PERSONNEL PCS IN-COUNTRY					PERSONNEL TDY IN-COUNTRY					TOTAL PERSONNEL					DOD CIV	REMARKS
				MARINE		NAVY			MARINE		NAVY			MARINE		NAVY				
				OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR		
<b>9thMarRegt</b>																				
HqCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	15	194	2	3	214							15	194	2	3	214	
1stBn,9thMar				35	969	3	56	1063							35	969	3	56	1063	
2ndBn,9thMar				36	955	2	54	1047							36	955	2	54	1047	
3dBn,3dMar				29	967	3	55	1054							29	967	3	55	1054	
3dBn,9thMar				32	955	3	51	1041							32	955	3	51	1041	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>147</b>	<b>4090</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>4419</b>							<b>147</b>	<b>4090</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>4419</b>	
<b>12thMarRegt</b>																				
HqBtry	I	Quang Nam	Danang	22	209	3	4	238							22	209	3	4	238	
1stBn,12thMar				43	701	2	14	760							43	701	2	14	760	
2ndBn,12thMar				38	599	3	13	653							38	599	3	13	653	
3dBn,12thMar	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	35	549	4	11	599							35	549	4	11	599	
3dBn,11thMar				41	723	2	13	779							41	723	2	13	779	
4thBn,12thMar	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai	30	484	0	9	523							30	484	0	9	523	
8*HowBtry	I	Quang Nam	Danang	8	196	0	4	208							8	196	0	4	208	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>217</b>	<b>3461</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>3760</b>							<b>217</b>	<b>3461</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>3760</b>	
<b>3dMTBn</b>																				
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	7	84	0	8	99							7	84	0	8	99	
*A*Co,3dMTBn				3	70	0	0	73							3	70	0	0	73	
*B*Co,3dMTBn	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai	1	10	0	0	11							1	10	0	0	11	
*C*Co,3dMTBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	3	77	0	1	81							3	77	0	1	81	
*C*Co,1stMTBn				3	81	0	1	85							3	81	0	1	85	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>17</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>349</b>							<b>17</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>349</b>	
<b>3dMedBn</b>																				
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	3	101	8	45	157							3	101	8	45	157	
*A*Co,3dMedBn	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai	0	16	12	50	78							0	16	12	50	78	
*B*Co,3dMedBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	0	31	15	107	153							0	31	15	107	153	
*C*Co,3dMedBn	I	Quang Nam	Danang	0	0	18	102	120							0	0	18	102	120	
*D*Co,3dMedBn				0	0	1	6	7							0	0	1	6	7	
*C*Co,1stMedBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	0	1	1	5	7							0	1	1	5	7	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>3</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>522</b>							<b>3</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>522</b>	

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UNIT DESIGNATION	CORPS	PROVINCE	LOCATION	PERSONNEL PCS IN-COUNTRY					PERSONNEL TDY IN-COUNTRY					TOTAL PERSONNEL					DOD CIV	REMARKS
				MARINE		NAVY			MARINE		NAVY			MARINE		NAVY				
				OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR		
<b>3dReconBn</b>																				
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	9	101	1	7	118							9	101	1	7	118	
"A"Co				4	65	0	4	73							4	65	0	4	73	
"B"Co	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	4	59	0	2	65							4	59	0	2	65	
"C"Co	I	Quang Nam	Danang	4	67	0	4	75							4	67	0	4	75	
"D"Co				4	69	0	4	77							4	69	0	4	77	
"C"Co.1stReconBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	4	70	0	3	77							4	70	0	3	77	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>29</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>485</b>							<b>29</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>485</b>	
<b>3dServBn</b>																				
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	12	277	3	15	307							12	277	3	15	307	
SupCo				14	450	1	16	481							14	450	1	16	481	
MaintCo				5	295	0	0	300							5	295	0	0	300	
TruckCo				2	91	0	0	93							2	91	0	0	93	
SU#1,SupCo	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	5	248	0	6	259							5	248	0	6	259	
SU#2,SupCo	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai	2	86	0	4	92							2	86	0	4	92	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>40</b>	<b>1447</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>1532</b>							<b>40</b>	<b>1447</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>1532</b>	
<b>FSR Sub Units</b>																				
SU#1	I	Quang Nam	Danang	19	536	0	0	555							19	536	0	0	555	
SU#2	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai	4	104	0	0	108							4	104	0	0	108	
SU#3	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	19	621	0	2	642							19	621	0	2	642	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>42</b>	<b>1261</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1305</b>							<b>42</b>	<b>1261</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1305</b>	
<b>3dSPBn</b>																				
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	12	184	1	10	207							12	184	1	10	207	
"A"Co				3	86	0	5	94							3	86	0	5	94	
"B"Co				4	83	0	5	92							4	83	0	5	92	
"C"Co				3	84	0	5	92							3	84	0	5	92	
"C"Co.1stSPBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	5	126	1	10	142							5	126	1	10	142	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>27</b>	<b>563</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>627</b>							<b>27</b>	<b>563</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>627</b>	
<b>3dEngrBn</b>																				
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	10	120	1	13	144							10	120	1	13	144	
"A"Co				5	74	0	0	79							5	74	0	0	79	
"B"Co	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	4	118	0	2	124							4	118	0	2	124	
"C"Co	I	Quang Nam	Danang	6	145	0	0	151							6	145	0	0	151	
"C"Co.7thEngrBn				3	80	0	0	83							3	80	0	0	83	
"C"Co.1stEngrBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	4	160	0	1	165							4	160	0	1	165	
SptCo.3dEngrBn	I	Quang Nam	Danang	4	279	0	0	283							4	279	0	0	283	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>36</b>	<b>976</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1029</b>							<b>36</b>	<b>976</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1029</b>	

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UNIT DESIGNATION	CORPS	PROVINCE	LOCATION	PERSONNEL PCS IN-COUNTRY					PERSONNEL TDY IN-COUNTRY					TOTAL PERSONNEL					DOD	REMARKS	
				MARINE		NAVY		AGGR:	MARINE		NAVY		AGGR:	MARINE		NAVY		AGGR:			CIV
				OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
<b>1stAmTracBn</b>																					
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	17	319	2	11	349													
"A"Co	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	5	167	0	3	175													
"B"Co	I	Quang Nam	Danang	7	246	0	0	253													
"A"Co, 3dAmTracBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	5	218	0	3	226													
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>34</b>	<b>950</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1003</b>													
<b>9thMTBn</b>																					
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	5	65	1	9	80													
"A"Co				3	79	0	0	82													
"B"Co				3	72	0	0	75													
"C"Co				3	75	0	0	78													
"D"Co				3	74	0	0	77													
"A"Co, 7thMTBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	3	84	0	0	87													
"D"Co, 7thMTBn	I	Quang Nam	Danang	1	32	0	0	33													
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>21</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>512</b>													
<b>3dATBn</b>																					
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	9	147	0	7	163													
"A"Co				3	63	0	1	67													
"B"Co	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	2	67	0	2	71													
"C"Co	I	Quang Nam	Danang	3	95	0	2	100													
"C"Co, 1stATBn				3	85	0	2	90													
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>20</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>491</b>													
<b>7thEngrBn</b>																					
HqCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	8	180	1	16	205													
ServCo				6	251	0	0	257													
"A"Co				5	156	0	0	161													
"B"Co				5	130	0	0	135													
"D"Co				5	138	0	0	143													
BridgeCo				6	143	0	0	149													
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>35</b>	<b>998</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1050</b>													

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UNIT DESIGNATION	CORPS	PROVINCE	LOCATION	PERSONNEL PCS IN-COUNTRY					PERSONNEL TDY IN-COUNTRY					TOTAL PERSONNEL					DOD	REMARKS
				MARINE		NAVY			MARINE		NAVY			MARINE		NAVY				
				OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR		
3dTksBn																				
H&SCo	I	Quang Nam	Danang	15	297	1	7	320												
"A"Co				3	89	0	2	94												
"B"Co				5	110	0	2	117												
"C"Co				3	94	0	2	99												
"B"Co, 1stTksBn	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	5	127	0	2	134												
SUB TOTAL				31	717	1	15	764												
5thCommBn	I	Quang Nam	Danang	18	584	0	8	610												
SUB TOTAL				18	584	0	8	610												
3dDental Co	I	Quang Nam	Danang	0	0	26	46	72												
SUB TOTAL				0	0	26	46	72												

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## MONTHLY STRENGTH REPORT

UNIT DESIGNATION	CORPS	PROVINCE	LOCATION	PERSONNEL PCS IN-COUNTRY					PERSONNEL TDY IN-COUNTRY					TOTAL PERSONNEL					DOD	REMARKS	
				MARINE		NAVY		AGGR.	MARINE		NAVY		AGGR.	MARINE		NAVY		AGGR.			CIV.
				OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
1stMAV																					
MMEG-1																					
E&S-1	I	Quang Nam	Danang	135	796	10	28	969	6	7	0	0	13	141	803	10	28	982	1	Note #1	
MASS-2				19	119			138					19	119				138	2	Note #1	
DET A	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	4	18			22					4	18				22			
DET B	I	Quang Nam	Danang	4	19			23					4	19				23			
DET C	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	3	13			16					3	13				16			
DASC				7	19			26					7	19				26			
MAGS-7				23	221		2	246					23	221		2		246			
DET A	I	Binh Dinh	Qui Nhon	3	17			20					3	17				20			
1stLAAMBX	I	Quang Nam	Danang	13	481		1	505					13	481		1	10	505			
2ndLAAMBX	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	32	449		1	492					32	449		1	10	492			
SUB TOTAL				243	2152	12	50	2457	6	7	0	0	13	249	2159	12	50	2470	3	Note #1	
MAG-11																					
E&S-11	I	Quang Nam	Danang	33	414			447	1	2			3	34	416			450			
MABS-11				12	490	3	16	521	1				1	13	490	3	16	522			
VMFA-115				41	274	1	2	318					41	274	1	2		318	2	Note #1	
VMFA-323				43	278	1	2	324					43	278	1	2		324			
VMCJ-1				29	222			251					29	222				251			
VMF(AW)-312				18	137		1	156					18	137		1		156			
SUB TOTAL				176	1815	5	21	2017	2	2			4	178	1817	5	21	2021	2	Note #1	
MAG-12																					
E&S-12	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	41	357			398		7			7	41	364			405	2	Note #1	
MABS-12				19	517	2	22	560		2	1		3	19	519	3	22	563			
VMA-211				29	179		2	210					29	179		2		210			
VMA-214				21	170	1		192	3	6			9	24	176	1		201			
VMA-223				27	178	1	2	208					27	178	1	2		208			
VMA-224				19	168	1		188	3	8			11	22	176	1		199			
MATCU-67				3	62			65	1				1	4	62			66	1	Note #1	
SUB TOTAL				159	1631	5	26	1821	7	23	1		31	166	1654	6	26	1852	3	Note #1	

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UNIT DESIGNATION	CORPS	PROVINCE	LOCATION	PERSONNEL					PERSONNEL					TOTAL PERSONNEL		DOD	REMARKS	
				PCS IN-COUNTRY		AGGR:			TDY IN-COUNTRY		AGGR:			MARINE	NAVY			CIV
				OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR:	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	AGGR:	OFF	ENL			
MAG-16				28	273			301	3	8	11	31	281			312		
H&MS-16	I	Quang Nam	Danang	11	337	5	6	359	2	4	6	13	441	5	6	365		
MABS-16					12			12					12			12		
DET MABS	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai		2			2					2			2		
DET MABS	I	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai		2			2					2			2		
DET MABS	I	Quang Tri	Quang Tri		2			2					2			2		
SU#1, MABS-16	I	Quang Nam	Danang	10	61		1	72				10	61		1	72		
HMM-161	I	Thau Thein	Phu Bai	50	174	1	3	228		4	4	50	178	1	3	232		
HMM-263	I	Quang Nam	Danang	46	173	1	3	223		2	2	46	175	1	3	225		
HMM-361				51	158	1	3	213				51	158	1	3	213		
VMO-2				33	133	1	5	172		3	3	33	136	1	5	175	2 Note #1	
MATCU-68				6	60			66		1	1	6	61			67		
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>235</b>	<b>1385</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>1650</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>1407</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>1677</b>	<b>2 Note #1</b>	
MAG-36				27	307			334	7	8	15	34	315			349		
H&MS-36	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	9	334	4	26	373	5	8	13	14	342	4	26	386		
MABS-36				51	157	1		209	2	3	5	53	160	1		214		
HMM-362				54	176	2	3	235				54	176	2	3	235		
HMM-363	I	Binh Dinh	Qui Nhon	45	145	1		191	9	7	16	54	152	1		207		
HMM-364	I	Quang Tin	Chu Lai	23	136			159	3	14	17	26	150			176	2 Note #1	
VMO-6				209	1255	8	29	1501	26	40	66	235	1295	8	29	1567	2 Note #1	
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>				<b>209</b>	<b>1255</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1501</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>1295</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1567</b>	<b>2 Note #1</b>	

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco,  
California 96601

Force/BCCO 5400.1  
7/ha  
24 December 1965

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND ORDER 5400.1

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Naval Component Command Staff

Ref: (a) III MAF Msg 252400Z July 1965  
(b) FMFPAC Ltr dated 3 Dec 1965, Serial 1/gff/5321/4,  
Subject "FY 66 Manning Level"

Encl: (1) Responsibilities of the NCC Staff  
(2) NCC Staff Organisational Chart

1. Purpose. To promulgate information and initial policy guidance concerning the formation and responsibilities of the Naval Component Command Staff.

2. Background

a. The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force is also designated as the Naval Component Commander for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (NCC MACV). As the Naval Component Commander, the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force assumes many responsibilities ranging from recommending to COMUSMACV the proper employment of Naval Forces in Vietnam to base development functions normal to the Component.

b. To date there has been no formal staff distinction between the responsibilities of the Commanding General, and those peculiar to the Naval Component Commander. The III Marine Amphibious Force staff has functioned in a dual III Marine Amphibious Force/Naval Component Command staff capacity. The steadily increasing magnitude of the staff requirements for both the Marine Amphibious Force and the Naval Component Command requires that there be a separation of the staff functions performed by the III Marine Amphibious Force and the Naval Component Command.

3. Action

a. Effective this date the Naval Component Command staff is activated under a Deputy Chief of Staff who will report directly to the

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Force/NCCO 5400.1  
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Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force/Naval Component Command through the Chief of Staff, III Marine Amphibious Force/Naval Component Command.

b. Simultaneously with this activation the Provisional Naval Component Command Support Activity is deactivated and personnel thereon are assigned duty with the Naval Component Command Staff.

c. Personnel currently assigned to the Provisional Naval Component Command Support Activity will comprise the initial Naval Component Commander Staff. Additional personnel will be assigned in accordance with the manning level established by reference (b).

d. The Component Command Staff Command Post will be in the spaces assigned to the Provisional Naval Component Command Support Activity at 52 Bach Dang Street, Danang.

e. Concurrent with the deactivation of the PNCCSA, reference (a) is cancelled, and operational control of 3rd Shore Party Battalion (-) reverts to 3rd Marine Division.

4. Mission. To plan, direct and coordinate the employment of Naval Component Forces.

5. Tasks. The principal tasks of the Naval Component Commander are as follows:

a. The conduct of U. S. Military port operations to include the development of required military ports and beach facilities, and the loading and unloading of ships.

b. Direct establishment and operation of necessary supply depots and water terminals, to include port clearance at such depots.

c. Direct receipt, storage, maintenance, control and issue of common items previously provided by Headquarters, Support Activity Saigon (HSAS).

d. Providing for the operation of POL terminals, to include storage and issue of bulk POL. This includes operation and maintenance of tankage and pipelines to complement in-country resources.

e. Providing for the movement of incoming and outgoing cargo between terminal storage areas and ships or crafts.

f. The establishment of a Class I Depot at Danang.

g. Supervising and coordinating and directing the activities of the Naval Support Activity, Danang and the Naval Construction Regiment.

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- h. Such other tasks as may be directed by the CG, III MAF/NCC.
6. Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the NCC Staff are listed in enclosure (1) of this order.
7. Assignment. Colonel R. W. BOYD, 05315/9906, U. S. Marine Corps is assigned duty as Deputy Chief of Staff, Naval Component Command.



L. W. WALT

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Case 1 A

Case 4

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Case 2; (B, C, (15) G, H, J, K, L)

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24 December 1965

Responsibilities Naval Component Staff

1. Deputy Chief of Staff for the Naval Component Matters. The Dep C/S NCC will report directly to the CG III MAF/NCC through the C/S III MAF/NCC. The Dep C/S NCC is responsible for the organization, coordination, direction, and supervision of the activities of the general and special NCC Staff. He will organize the NCC Staff personnel per enclosure (2). Initial and priority effort will be directed toward the establishment of N-3 (Operations), N-6 (Base Development) and N-1 (Administration) divisions.
2. N-1 (Administration) Division. The N-1 division will initially furnish only internal administration within the NCC Staff. When augmented by additional personnel, in addition to internal staff functions, the N-1 will be prepared to assume cognizance and planning responsibility for the following I Corps Area Coordinator Functions:
  - a. Messing.
  - b. Billeting.
  - c. Post Exchange.
  - d. Religious Activities.
  - e. Morale, Welfare, Recreation.
  - f. Special Services.
3. N-3 (Operations). The N-3 will act as the principal advisor to the Naval Component Commander pertaining to the planned operations, current operations and capabilities of the assigned Naval Components. The N-3 division will coordinate and direct the employment of assigned organizations and prepare necessary operation orders, movement orders and policy directives.
4. N-6 (Base Development). The N-6 will act as the principal Staff Advisor to the Naval Component Commander on matters pertaining to base development. Principal responsibilities will be:
  - a. Preparation of Base Development Plans.
  - b. Development of a joint base development plan for those bases jointly used by other services, Third Country Forces, or Vietnamese forces within their respective areas of responsibility for base development planning.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Force/NCCO 5400.1  
24 December 1965

c. Initiation and coordination through COMUSMACV of base development matters involving third country forces.

d. Submission of base development plans to COMUSMACV for concurrence prior to forwarding through service channels to CINCPAC for review.

e. Revision of approved base development plans semi-annually or at any time significant changes are required.

f. Submission of reports and information required.

g. Coordination or preparation, and timely submission of the Military Construction Program as it pertains to the construction projects within the Naval Component Commander's area of responsibility.

5. Real Estate (Special Staff). Real Estate will function as the principal advisor to the Naval Component Commander on all matters pertaining to real estate. Principal responsibilities will be:

a. Coordination of real estate functions and activities of all U.S. Forces and International Military Assistance Forces (IMAF) within area assigned for base development in accordance with MACV Directive 405-2 of 27 Aug 1965 and MACV Directive 405-1 of 30 Aug 1965. Matters on which essential agreement cannot be obtained will be referred to COMUSMACV for resolution.

b. Submitting all real estate requests, except lease requests, required by organizations within the NCC to COMUSMACV (Attn: J4), in accordance with MACV Directive 405-1 of 30 Aug 1965.

c. Reporting all real estate holdings of U.S. Forces and IMAF in areas assigned for base development to COMUSMACV (Attn: J4), in accordance with MACV Directive 405-1 of 30 Aug 1965.

d. Reporting GVN owned real estate no longer required for use by U.S. Forces and IMAF to COMUSMACV (Attn: J4).

e. Coordinate leasing of privately owned real estate as required to avoid competitive bidding.

f. Publish such directives as are necessary to ensure that the requirements and regulations of this and of higher headquarters are known and followed.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Force/NCCO 5400.1  
24 December 1965

6. General

a. Until additional personnel are available for assignment to the NCC Staff, the III MAF general and special staff sections will assist the NCC staff in the discharge of assigned responsibilities as requested. Direct and continuous liaison between NCC and III MAF Staff sections is authorized and expected.

b. As no N-2 (Intelligence) or N-5 (Communications) sections are contemplated, the corresponding III MAF Staff Sections will continue to be available to the NCC for the discharge of associated functions as required.

c. When fully staffed in accordance with an approved T/O the coordination, direction and supervision of the I Corps Area Coordinator functions (MACV Directive No. 10-4\*) will become the responsibility of the NCC Staff.


ENCLOSURE (1)

Form 1000-04  
24 December 1965

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D c/s NCC



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HEADQUARTERS  
I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP  
Advisory Team #1  
APO US Forces 96337

MAC TN-ICOP

7 January 1966

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation Report (U)


THRU: Commanding General  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco 96601

TO: See Distribution.

Attached hereto is Monthly Evaluation Report for the month of  
December 1965.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

  
JOHN O. ROWELL, JR.  
Captain, Inf  
Admin Officer

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Cy 9 of 16cys CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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Encl. # 9

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LICOM-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (December 1965) (U)

ANNEX-A

I CORPS

1. (C) GENERAL: The number of VC initiated incidents continued to increase in the I Corps Tactical Zone as the monthly total reflected the highest incident rate since February 1965. A buildup of PAVN units rapidly increased and enemy strength in the Corps Zone is now considered to be at an all time high. There was a decline in battalion size or larger operations this month and a lull in activity was experienced just prior and subsequent to the 30 hour truce period. A highly significant operation took place in southern Quang Nam and northern Quang Tin Provinces. This coordinated ARVN-USMC operation struck at the heart of a VC logistical base and seriously disrupted VC activity in a area previously considered to be a safe haven. Stepped up VC efforts during the month minimized rural construction progress.

2. (C) CURRENT OPERATIONS: I Corps (ARVN) conducted 35 battalion or larger unit operations during the month as compared to 44 in November. Contact was made with the Viet Cong in 21 of these operations. During December, operations against the Viet Cong resulted in 1019 VC killed compared to 1175 in November. There was a corresponding decrease in VC captured from 213 in November to 192 this month and in weapons seized from 419 to 323. ARVN battle deaths rose from 205 to 427 while the number of weapons lost varied slightly from 209 in November to 211 in December. Two significant operations took place in the Corps during the reporting period. The first of these was the coordinated ARVN-USMC operation (Lien Ket 18-Harvest Moon) which encompassed a major portion of the districts of Thang

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HASTU-TO

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (December 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

Binh and Que Son. The operation began on 8 December and terminated 11 days later. ARVN units initially committed were the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, and the 11th Ranger Battalion. While advancing toward an intermediate objective the 11th Ranger Battalion was attacked five kilometers west of Thang Binh District Headquarters from the front and flanks by a reinforced Viet Cong battalion. Heavy casualties were sustained by the ranger unit. Just prior to daybreak on 9 December, the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, and the regimental headquarters were attacked and overrun by an estimated enemy regiment. In the action the regimental commander was killed. I Corps reinforced the units in contact with the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, and the 3d Battalion, 1st Regiment, on 8 and 9 December. Concurrently, three USMC battalions were committed to trap and destroy the Viet Cong in an area to the west of I Corps units. By 10 December, VC contact with ARVN controlled units ceased. Thereafter, I Corps units operated for nine days northwest of Que Son District Headquarters with two battalions and an armored personnel carrier troop. No additional heavy contact by ARVN with the enemy occurred. ARVN losses in this operation were 90 killed, 141 wounded, and 91 missing in action; also two US advisors were killed and one Australian was wounded. US advisors estimate that 720 Viet Cong were killed by air strikes, artillery, and small arms fire. During this operation ARVN-USMC units engaged major elements of the 1st VC Regiment plus local and guerrilla forces. <sup>cm</sup>The second noteworthy operation, Thua Thien 160, began on 18 November north of the Phu Bai TAOR. This operation

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MCTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (December 1965) (U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

controlled by Thua Thien Sector was originally scheduled for 10 days, but met with such success that it was continued for an additional 28 days. The 1st Battalion, 3d Regiment, four Regional Force companies, 15 Popular Force platoons, and the 12th and 13th Coastal Groups continued a methodical search and clearance of the area until 27 December. US advisor confirmed results include 71 VC killed, 85 VC captured, 85 VC suspects detained, and 55 weapons seized. The only friendly casualty was one wounded. <sup>C. Air Support.</sup> US aircraft flew 969 sorties and WNAF flew 246 in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Two B-52 strikes were conducted on 28 December in Quang Tri Province, 25 kilometers south of the DMZ near the Laotian border, to strike suspected Viet Cong troop concentrations. <sup>D. Naval Support.</sup> Naval gunfire conducted 184 missions and expended 3278 rounds. Ninety per cent of the missions fired were in support of the 2d Infantry Division (ARVN) in Quang Ngai Province.

3. (C) VC ACTIVITIES: During December the number of VC initiated incidents rose to 432 as opposed to 371 for November. There was a sharp decrease in the number of attacks from 50 last month to 29 this month. Nevertheless, an analysis of documents, agent reports, and interrogation of VC prisoners and ralliers continue to indicate a significant overall VC build up especially in the southern portion of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Units confirmed during the reporting period include the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 36th PAVN Regiment, in Quang Nam Special Sector; the 195th AA Battalion, a separate PAVN battalion attached to the 1st VC Regiment, in Quang Tin Province; and, both the 2d VC Regiment and the 18th Regiment, 325th Division,

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MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (December 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

in Quang Ngai Province. As this build up in strength continues, the VC are also displaying more of a willingness to engage friendly troops during daylight hours. On 4 December an unknown number of VC attacked three hamlets in Duc Pho District, 32 kilometers south of Quang Ngai. A relief force of two PAT platoons and one Popular Force platoon dispatched from district headquarters suffered heavy casualties. The 2nd Division (ARVN) Strike Company linked up with the initial relief force on 5 December. Final results of the action were 38 friendly KIA (two US) and 27 WIA (two US). ARVN estimates 230 VC were killed by tactical air support and naval gunfire. Two Popular Force platoons were attacked by an estimated PAVN battalion at My Trang outpost, 40 kilometers south of Quang Ngai early on 15 December. Heavy contact continued during the morning and the attack was repulsed with the assistance of numerous air strikes and naval gunfire missions. This was a significant victory for the Popular Force platoons as 57 enemy were killed and an additional 100 were estimated to have been KIA. Nine enemy and 37 weapons were captured. Friendly losses stood at two KIA and 16 WIA. On 30 December the Minh Long District Headquarters, 25 kilometers southwest of Quang Ngai, was lost to the VC. No casualty figures were available as a result of the attack by the end of the reporting period. Other significant attacks during the month took place at Son Ha District Headquarters, 25 kilometers west of Quang Ngai; at Hill 60, two kilometers west of Dai Loc District Headquarters in Quang Nam Province; and, at Huong My outpost on the

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SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (December 1965) (U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

Laotian border, 12 kilometers west of Khe Sanh Special Forces Camp in Quang Tri Province. The pattern of attacking isolated district headquarters and outposts, particularly those on major VC infiltration routes, probably will continue as VC strength increases. There has been no change in the order of battle in the 1st Division (ARVN) area, although the attack on Huong My outpost indicates that PAVN units may have recently infiltrated across the border of Laos into Quang Tri Province. The VC retain the capability to launch regimental size attacks throughout the Corps Tactical Zone. In the Da Nang area, the major threat continues to be company size raids conducted by specially trained sapper teams and the possibility of terroristic attacks against US installations and billets.

4. (C) RURAL CONSTRUCTION: Rural Construction progress in the I Corps Tactical Zone has been negligible during the month due to concerted Viet Cong activity. The two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien continued to show results; however, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai suffered setbacks and Quang Nam was at a virtual standstill. VC opposition to pacification efforts has been particularly strong in the Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts in Quang Ngai, in and around Tam Ky, and in the 9 village pacification area in Quang Nam. These areas are now being bolstered with more security forces in order to continue the rural construction effort. A new pacification commander has been appointed in the 9 village area and two companies of the 51st Regiment have been committed to provide more security.

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SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (December 1965) (U)

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ANNEX A (Cont'd)

5. (C) PSYOPS/CA: The recent assignment of four U-10 psywar aircraft to operate in direct support of I Corps resulted in a substantial increase in airborne loudspeaker and leaflet missions over previous months in spite of unfavorable weather. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts and printed media dissemination continued at a steady pace. Major themes of all media were surrender appeals, Chieu Hoi, GVN/US victories, VC atrocities, urging people to support GVN, and news bulletins. Civic action continued on a small scale except for MEDCAP which treated approximately 60,000 patients.
6. (C) REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE: Two thirds of the 105 Regional Force companies occupy static defensive positions which protect vital military and civilian installations. The remainder of these units conduct separate or joint operations with ARVN and are available for employment as reaction forces. The 529 Popular Force platoons and 352 squads are used primarily for village and hamlet defense but reinforce Regional Force companies on operations as required. There currently exists a shortage of approximately 6000 authorized Popular Force personnel. During the month USOM provided, and the Social Welfare Section of I Corps, G-5 Section, distributed, bulgar wheat, salad oil, powdered milk and blankets to widows and dependents of deceased Regional Force/ Popular Force soldiers. A similar distribution of necessities was made by the Vietnamese Red Cross in the city of Da Nang. The Hoa Cam Regional Force Training Center during the past year has conducted training courses for 28 newly activated

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SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (December 1965) (U)

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ANNEX A (Cont'd)

Regional Force companies and refresher training courses for 10 other companies. When the construction of 30 additional billets are completed at Hoa Cam, the Van Thanh Popular Force Training Center at Hue will be turned over to the ARVN and all assigned cadre and classes which are taught there will be transferred to Hoa Cam.

7. (C) LOGISTICS: Resupplying the 12th DTA continues to be a major problem area. Highway 1 from Da Nang to Quang Ngai was open during most of the month but the 2nd Division was unable to furnish security for convoys. An LST was used to ferry 40 trucks from Da Nang to Chu Lai. This was the only means of resupply for the area except for air. In this regard, the 12th DTA was given 1st priority on all air shipments during the month. The stockage levels at the I ALC depots in Quang Ngai and Tam Ky remain dangerously low and road convoys are planned to alleviate this condition. Resupply to the 11th DTA has been good. Six convoys were completed and the railroad was used when possible to transport all supplies except ammunition. The I ALC depot levels there were kept well within their safety limits. The 115th Truck Company (I ALC) was issued 27 new 2½ ton trucks and is operating on a limited basis. The employment of this company will help alleviate the truck shortage that formerly existed in the Corps area.

8. (C) ENGINEER: Keeping Highway 1 open remains the primary engineer task. VC activity against roads and bridges continued to limit

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KY PHU - AN AMBUSH DEFEATEDI. INTRODUCTORY FACTS BEARING ON ACTION OF 2/7 AT KY PHU ON 18 DEC 1965.

1. 18 DEC WAS THE 10TH DAY OF "OPERATION HARVEST MOON".
2. IT HAD RAINED CONTINUOUSLY 4 OF THE LAST 5 DAYS AND NO ONE HAD A CHANCE TO DRY OUT.
3. THE BATTALION (-) HAD BEEN WALKING OVER RUGGED TERRAIN FOR THE PAST TWO AND ONE HALF DAYS COVERING 18-19 MILES THROUGH MUDDY STREAMS AND RICE PADDIES. WE WERE TIRED!
4. HELO RESUPPLY RUNS HAD THUS FAR EVACUATED A TOTAL OF 54 MARINES WITH IMMERSION FOOT. OTHERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EVACUATED BUT REFUSED TO GO.
5. TERRAIN AROUND KY PHU OPENED UP A BIT, IF YOU CAN CONSIDER RICE PADDIES AND HEDGE ROWS AROUND SMALL HAMLETS AS BEING OPEN. (TRANSPARENCY #1).
6. KY PHU ITSELF WAS A SMALL MARKET TOWN WHICH CONSISTED OF A LARGE NUMBER OF PERMANENT AND SEMI-PERMANENT STRUCTURES. AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION IT WAS PRACTICALLY VOID OF ANY CIVILIAN ACTIVITY.
7. WHEN THE INITIAL ACTION COMMENCED FORCES OF THE BATTALION WERE DISPOSED IN TACTICAL COLUMN. (SEE TRANSPARENCY #2).
8. IMPORTANT TO NOTE IS THAT THE BATTALION WAS MINUS TWO OF ITS OWN RIFLE COMPANIES. COMPANY E HAD BEEN REPLACED FIVE DAYS PERVIOUSLY BY COMPANY H 2/9 AS DIRECTED BY GEN WALT. COMPANY E HAD BEEN HURT BAD ON 10 DEC WHEN IT HAD GONE TO THE AID OF 2/1 NEAR CAM LA (1) (BT 078292). COMPANY H HAD BEEN ASSIGNED AN INDEPENDENT MISSION TO RECONNOITER A B-52 STRIKE AREA SOUTH OF THE SONG KHANG RIVER, BUT THE MISSION WAS SCRATCHED BECAUSE HELO SUPPORT WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO POOR WEATHER. AN ADDITIONAL MISSION HAD THE COMPANY PROVIDING SECURITY FOR A 4.2 MORTAR SECTION THAT

Incl #11

HAD EARLIER PROVIDED FIRE SUPPORT FOR THE BATTALION FOR THE FIRST 7000 METERS OF ITS TREK TO THE EAST. POOR WEATHER HELD COMPANY H IN ITS POSITION UNTIL 19 DEC 65.

9. THE LOCATION OF THE ACTION WAS IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE APPROXIMATELY 8000 METERS WEST OF TAM KY.

## II. BODY

1. DISPOSITION OF 2/7 IN TACTICAL COLUMN. (TRANSPARENCY #2)

2. 2/7, NOW ON ITS 10TH DAY OF OPERATION HARVEST MOON REGARDED THE INITIAL SNIPER FIRE THAT COMPANY G RECEIVED AS A NUSIANCE AND AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS, FOR THE BATTALION HAD TWO GOALS THAT WERE FAST OPPOSING ONE ANOTHER. FIRST, FOR MORE THAN A WEEK THEY'D PUSHED THE VC BEFORE THEM WITH NO MORE THAN A SMALL SKIRMISH - AND THERE WAS VENGEANCE IN THEIR HEARTS FOR THE 10 DAYS OF MISERY THEY HAD ENDURED. SECOND, ALTHOUGH THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER HAD GIVEN PERMISSION FOR THEM TO PATROL THE 20 ODD MILES OUT FROM WHERE THEY HAD COME DEEP INSIDE VC COUNTRY HE COULD GIVE THEM ONLY THREE AND ONE HALF DAYS. FOR HE WAS RUNNING OUT OF TIME AND RESOURCES AT THE TASK FORCE LEVEL.

3. TWO AND ONE HALF DAYS ON THE TRAIL HAD PRODUCED NOTHING BUT A DOZEN ODD SNIPERS AND LESS THAN 24 HOURS REMAINED OF THE ALLOTTED TIME. AS COMPANY G STARTED THEIR SNIPER ELIMINATION TACTICS, THERE WERE MORE THAN FOUR MILES OF TRAIL AND ONE LARGE CITY REMAINING TO BE SWEEPED.

4. COMPANY G FLANKERS WORKED HARD, OUT TO THE LIMIT OF VISIBILITY - OPERATING AS MUCH AS FIVE OR SEVEN HUNDRED METERS - SWEEPING, PROBING AND STUMBLING IN MUD AND THICK UNDERGROWTH - AND FINDING NOTHING BUT ABANDONED EARTHWORKS, ESPECIALLY ON THE APPROACHES TO KY PHU.

5. THE INITIAL SNIPER FIRE THE ADVANCE GUARD RECEIVED NOW INCREASED IN TEMPO AS AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE WAS NOW BROUGHT TO BEAR ON COMPANY G.

ORDERS WERE ISSUED - (TRANSPARENCY #3)

- A. COMPANY G WAS ORDERED TO DEVELOP AND ELIMINATE THE VC OPPOSITION.
- B. COMPANY F WAS DIRECTED TO SLIDE BY COMPANY G TO TAKE UP POSITION AS ADVANCE GUARD, HAS AND COMPANY H TO FOLLOW AS THE MAIN BODY WITH COMPANY G TO BREAK CONTACT ON ORDER AND FALL IN AS THE NEW REAR GUARD.

6. COMPANY F MOVED IN GOOD ORDER AND HAD JUST BY-PASSED THE BATTALION COMMAND GROUP AT THE EAST END OF TOWN WHEN A SUDDEN RATTLE OF SMALL ARMS AND A HALF-DOZEN MORTAR ROUNDS CAME BOOMING UP FROM THE REAR OF THE COLUMN. IT WAS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THE COMPANY G ACTION WAS SOMETHING BIGGER THAN SHIPERS AS THEY NOW REPORTED RECEIVING MORTAR FIRE. THEY IMMEDIATELY COUNTERED WITH THE MORTAR SECTION THEY HAD ATTACHED AND COMPANY G WAS IN NO REAL DIFFICULTY. (TRANSPARENCY #4)

7. THE INITIAL REPORT RECEIVED FROM THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER WAS NOT AS ENCOURAGING, AS HE REPORTED THE MAIN BODY UNDER HEAVY FIRE FROM BOTH THE NORTH AND SOUTH SIDE OF THE ROAD. ORDERS WERE NOW ISSUED TO DEPLOY THE BATTALION. THE BATTALION COMMANDER WANTED COMPANY H TO MOVE FORWARD AND HELP HAS BUT WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT THEM ON THE RADIO. SOUNDS OF THE BATTLE FAIRLY WELL INDICATED THAT COMPANY H WAS HEAVILY ENGAGED TOO, THUS LEAVING COMPANY F AS THE ONLY UNIT FREE TO MANEUVER. ORDERS WERE ISSUED AND COMPANY F TURNED AROUND TO COME BACK THROUGH KY PHU SWEEPING THE SOUTHERN PORTION AS THEY MOVED. THEY REACHED THE WEST SIDE OF TOWN JUST IN TIME TO ENGAGE AND ELIMINATE A VC MACHINEGUN SQUAD THAT HAD INFILTRATED THE COLUMN AND HAD STARTED TO SET UP A 50 CAL MACHINEGUN TO ENFILADE THE MAIN BODY. THE COMPANY COMMANDER QUICKLY DEPLOYED HIS FORCES FACING BOTH SOUTH AND WEST AND PROCEEDED TO DEVELOP HIS PLAN TO ATTACK THE VC POSITION AND TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF THE MAIN BODY. (TRANSPARENCY #5)

DECLASSIFIED

8. MEANWHILE COMMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH THE TWO 155MM HOWITZER BATTERIES ON ROUTE #1, AND BY RELAYING FIRE REQUESTS FROM THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER ON THE BATTALION TACTICAL NET THEN VIA THE ARTILLERY LIAISON NET, SOME VERY EFFECTIVE SUPPORTING FIRES WERE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE VC POSITIONS SOUTH OF THE MAIN BODY. THE MAIN BODY WAS STILL HEAVILY ENGAGED, BUT THE ARTILLERY FIRES, AND PRESSURE COMPANY F WAS NOW BRINGING TO BEAR ON THE VC, WAS PERMITTING MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION ON THEIR PART.

9. COMMUNICATIONS WERE FINALLY REESTABLISHED WITH COMPANY H REVEALING THAT THE COMPANY COMMANDER AND RADIO OPERATOR HAD BOTH BEEN KILLED AT THE OUTSET OF ACTION BY A 57 RR ROUND. THE COMPANY'S ARTILLERY FORWARD OBSERVER WAS NOW IN COMMAND AND REPORTED HIS SITUATION. HE WAS RECEIVING FIRE FROM BOTH THE NORTH AND SOUTH SIDE OF THE ROAD WITH THE HEAVIEST VC CONCENTRATIONS TO THE SOUTH. A PLATOON HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO DESTROY THE VC TO THE NORTH AND HAD SUCCESSFULLY DONE SO. THE BIGGEST THREAT WAS FURTHER VC INFILTRATION THROUGH THE COLUMN TO CUT OFF COMPANY H AND H&S COMPANY. ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT WAS MADE AVAILABLE, BEING RELAYED IN THE SAME FASHION AS FOR H&S COMPANY.

10. THE COMPANY F ENVELOPING ELEMENT RAN INTO TWO WELL EMPLACED VC MACHINEGUNS AS THEY MOVED AROUND THE ENEMY RIGHT FLANK. CASUALTIES WERE HEAVY, IN TWO SEPARATE SQUADS THERE REMAINED ONLY A SQUAD LEADER IN ONE AND A SQUAD LEADER AND TWO MEN IN THE OTHER. FOXTROT HAD LOST TWO PLATOON COMMANDERS IN THE ACTION THUS FAR AND THE COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER AS WELL. COMPANY F'S ACTION, ALONG WITH THE ARTILLERY SUPPORT, HAD ENABLED H&S COMPANY ELEMENTS TO MOVE INTO KY PHU. SOME OF THE FIRST UNITS INCLUDED THE FLAME THROWER SECTION. TWO SQUADS OF FLAME THROWERS WERE IMMEDIATELY DIS-

PATCHED TO COMPANY F AND THE METHODOICAL BUSINESS OF DIGGING OUT THE ENEMY - BLINDING, BURNING AND BLASTING - COMMENCED. WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE TWO ENEMY MACHINEGUN POSITIONS COMPANY F PRESSED FORWARD AGAINST VC FORCES THAT WERE NOW BEGINNING TO BREAK. THIS LATTER ACTION PERMITTED ALL OF H&S COMPANY TO MOVE INTO KY PHU. THE TWO MEDICAL OFFICERS WERE HARD AT WORK IN AN AID STATION ESTABLISHED IN ONE OF THE PERMANENT BUILDINGS OF KY PHU TAKING CARE OF THE WOUNDED.

11. COMPANY H WAS STILL BEING PRESSED FROM THE SOUTH BY WHAT WAS ESTIMATED TO BE A COMPANY. THE WEATHER HAD STARTED TO PARTIALLY CLEAR SOMEWHAT FOR HELO'S, BUT NOT FIXED WING ABOUT AN HOUR EARLIER. THREE ARMED UH1S HAD COME ON STATION AND THE BATTALION COMMANDER TURNED THEM OVER TO COMPANY H. AGAIN THE BATTALION TACTICAL NET HAD TO BE USED. THIS TIME TO CONTROL AIR. THE ARMED UH1S WERE PUT TO GOOD USE AND COMPANY H BEGAN TO REGAIN FIRE SUPERIORITY OVER THE ENEMY. WITH THE UH1S KEEPING THE VC PINNED DOWN THE PLATOON TO THE NORTH OF THE ROAD WAS DIRECTED TO CLEAR AN LZ FOR THE EVACUATION OF COMPANY H'S DEAD AND WOUNDED. TWO H-34'S WERE ON STATION AND WERE SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR EFFORTS TO EVACUATE THE CASUALTIES OF COMPANY H. ONCE COMPANY H HAD SOME BREATHING ROOM THE BATTALION COMMANDER DIRECTED IT TO MOVE EAST TO KY PHU. THE VC THREAT WAS STILL PRESENT IN THE FORM OF A CONTINUED ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE 2/7 BY SURROUNDING SEGMENTS OF THE COLUMN. A PLATOON SOON WORKED ITS WAY ACROSS THE OPEN RICE PADDY WHICH SEPARATED "H" FROM KY PHU AND MOVED INTO THE WEST SIDE OF TOWN. COMPANY F'S ACTION HAD ALSO MADE THIS POSSIBLE. COMPANY H WAS OVERBURDENED WITH GEAR, SOME OF WHICH WAS USELESS-RENDERED INOPERATIVE BY ENEMY FIRE. THIS INCLUDED VC EQUIPMENT AS WELL. THE COMPANY COMMANDER WAS INSTRUCTED TO HAVE THE ENGINEER TEAM WITH HIM DESTROY WHAT COULDN'T BE CARRIED AND MOVE TO THE EAST TO JOIN THE BATTALION IN KY PHU. THE REMAINDER OF COMPANY H PUSHED TO THE EAST AND

REJOINED THE BATTALION IN KY PHU ABOUT 1630. (TRANSPARENCY #6).

12. COMPANY G'S ACTION HAD BROKEN OFF EARLIER AS THE VC FORCE, ESTIMATED TO BE A REINFORCED PLATOON IN SIZE, MOVED SOUTHWEST. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MANY, IF NOT ALL OF THIS VC FORCE, JOINED THE MAIN EFFORT AGAINST THE CENTER OF THE COLUMN. THE COMPANY HAD BEEN ORDERED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE TOWN TO THE EAST AND SECURE AN LZ FOR MED-EVACS AND RESUPPLY. THIS WAS DONE WITH GREAT EXPEDIENCY AND EVACUATION AND RESUPPLY HAD BEEN GOING ON AS THE ACTION IN COMPANY F SECTOR WAS AT ITS PEAK. COMPANY G ALSO HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO HAVE A PLATOON SWEEP THE TOWN ONCE AGAIN TO INSURE ITS SECURITY. OVER 200 OLD MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE GATHERED UP BUT NO OTHER CONTACT WAS MADE.

13. WITH THE ARRIVAL OF COMPANY H INTO KY PHU, COMPANY F WAS DIRECTED TO FALL BACK AND PROVIDE SECURITY TO THE WEST. COMPANY H FILLED IN SOME BLANK SPACES TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND A SOLID PERIMETER HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. NO OTHER CONTACT WAS EXPERIENCED THAT NIGHT. A FLARE SHIP WAS ON STATION AND THE 155'S CONTINUED TO PROVIDE H&I FIRE SUPPORT THE REMAINDER OF THE NIGHT. (TRANSPARENCY #7).

14. CASUALTIES FOR THE DAY HAD BEEN:

A. VC KIA 62 (BODY COUNT)

WIA 2 (BOTH CONFIRMED THAT THE ENEMY FORCE WAS IN FACT THE 80TH BN OF 1ST VC REGIMENT)

WIA (ESTIMATED - 50-75)

B. FRIENDLY KIA 11

WIA 71

DOW 2

15. VC CAPTURED EQUIPMENT:

2 60MM MORTARS

1 81MM MORTAR  
 1 50 CAL MG  
 3 30 CAL MG  
 6 BARS  
 4 FRENCH SMG  
 2 US CARBINES  
 5 M1 RIFLES  
 1 MAS 36  
 1 THOMPSON SMG  
 1 CHU COM SMG  
 1 CHU COM CARBINE  
 2 57MM RR  
 2 PRCIOA RADIOS

16. THE NEXT MORNING COMPANY F SWEEP THE BATTLE AREA WHERE THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING HAD GONE ON AND UNCOVERED ANOTHER 43 VC KIA AND ADDITIONAL WEAPONS INCLUDED IN THE COUNT JUST GIVEN. IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT THE VC WERE NOT CAPABLE OF CLEARING THESE DEAD AND PRECIOUS WEAPONS FROM THE BATTLE FIELD. A TRUE INDICATION OF HOW BADLY THEY'D BEEN HIT.

### III. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED

1. 2/7 USED NO SPECIAL TACTICS OR TECHNIQUES IN THE DEFEAT OF THE BOTH VC BATTALION. IF THERE IS A LESSON TO BE LEARNED FROM OUR ENGAGEMENT IT IS THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT PUBLISHED TACTICAL DOCTRINE WE TEACH IN OUR SCHOOLS, AND THE CONSTANT EMPHASIS WE PLACE ON THIS DOCTRINE IN OUR TRAINING, IS ALL SOUND. THE VIGOROUS AND TIMELY APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES BY ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND IS WHAT COUNTERED THE VC AMBUSH.

2. ALL OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN MENTIONED BEFORE, BUT WE MUST LOOK THEM OVER AS THEY BEAR REPEATING:

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A. POSITIVE CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY MUST BE FOLLOWED BY QUICK AND AGGRESSIVE ACTION TO REGAIN FIRE SUPERIORITY AND FREEDOM OF ACTION, WITH THE RESULTING ABILITY TO MANEUVER.

B. WHEN MOVING IN A TACTICAL COLUMN AVOID THE TENDENCY TO DEPLOY FOR SNIPER ACTION. THE VC WANTS TO SEE YOU STOP - TO LOOK YOU OVER AND/OR DELAY YOUR PROGRESS.

C. A MORTAR SECTION WITH THE ADVANCE GUARD IS A MUST. THIS POSITION PERMITS A MORE RAPID RESPONSE AND GENERALLY ENABLES GUN CREWS TO MAKE A DIRECT LAY.

D. BRING ALL AVAILABLE SUPPORTING ARMS TO BEAR AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

E. PREVIOUSLY SWEEPED AREAS BY FLANK GUARDS IS NO GUARANTEE THEY WILL REMAIN CLEARED. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COLUMN MUST BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN FLANK SECURITY.

F. ALTERNATE PLANS MUST BE MADE TO CONCENTRATE ALL RADIO TRAFFIC ON ONE NET SHOULD OTHER NETS BECOME INOPERABLE. NET CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE MUST BE MAINTAINED.

G. TIMELY RESUPPLY ON AN AUTOMATIC BASIS SHOULD BE PLANNED FOR. ANTICIPATING THE NEEDS OF AN ENGAGED UNIT PRECLUDES A LATER DELAY OF DELIVERY SHOULD REQUESTS NOT GET THROUGH BY NORMAL CHANNELS.

H. SUBORDINATE UNIT LEADERS MUST KEEP ABREAST OF THE SITUATION BY CONTINUED MAP RECONNAISSANCE, AND RELATE MAP LOCATION TO GROUND LOCATION. IN THE DAYS OF THE 1:50,000 MAP SCALE THIS A MUST.

I. INFANTRY IS THE ARM THAT CLOSES AND DESTROYS, BUT IT MUST BE AUGMENTED WITH SUPPORTING ARMS.

J. A SUBORDINATE WHO ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS SENIORS WILL PERFORM BETTER WHEN HE KNOWS ABOUT IT.


K. HELICOPTER SUPPORT MUST BE AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED. PRE-PLANNING, WITH A FIXED SCHEDULE IS NOT ALWAYS COMPATIBLE TO THE LOCATION AND SITUATION OF THE UNIT SUPPLIED.

IV. QUESTIONS

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DEC 26 1965



~~TOP SECRET~~

*MAF-18*  
*Ready to*  
*3d MAR Div*  
*FMAW*  
*F/S B*  
*9TH MT*  
*17H ENGR*  
*I COMPS Adu Cdr*  
*NAUSUPPTACT*  
*5TH Comm Bw*  
*Info: CGFMFPac*  
*STG 25 2228Z*

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USIACV  
NM/CG III MAF  
/CG FFORCEV  
RUMSVB/CG 1ST INF DIV  
RUMSVT/SA IV CORPS  
RUMSBJ/COMR 2D AD  
RUMSBB/OTF 115  
ZEN/SOC  
RUMSAB/CO 3TH S GR  
EN/SA CDR  
ZEN/AMBASSY SAIGON  
INFO RUMHQ/CINCPAC  
RUEKDA/JCS  
BT

SECRET 45148 FROM MACV J3  
REFERENCE: A. MACV 221221Z.  
B. MACV 241135A.  
C. MACV 250714Z

1. ALL RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SVN CONTAINED REF A, B, & C ARE LIFTED. COMMANDERS WILL RESUME FULL SCALE OPERATIONS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
2. PARALLEL INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE ISSUED BY JCS. CONTACT COUNTERPARTS AND INFORM THEM OF THIS DIRECTIVE.
3. NO COMMENT TO PRESS. POSS STATEMENT ON VC RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE ISSUED SAIGON.

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**SECRET**

READDRESSAL FORM

CCN: 2622

PRECEDENCE FLASH

DTG 252228Z

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: CG 3D MARDIV  
CG FMAW  
~~XXXXXXXX~~  
CG FLSG  
CG 9TH MT  
INFO: CG 7TH ENG  
CG I CORPS ADV GRU  
CMDR NAV SUP ACT DANANG  
CG 5TH COMM BN

DRAFTED BY 83

CONCURRED BY \_\_\_\_\_

RELEASED BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO: CG FMPPAC

----- READDRESSAL OF -----

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

DTG 252120Z

MONTH/YEAR DEC 65

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

SUBJECT 1. ALL RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY OPERATIONS.....ETC.....ETC.....

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CCW 26 DC  
DTG 250942Z

G-3/EH8/r11

- OO III MAF
- OO 3D MARDIV
- OO FMAV
- OO FLSG
- OO 9TH ME
- OO 7TH REG
- OO I CORPS ADV GRU
- OOER NAV SUP ACT DANANG
- OO 5TH COMM BN

XX FLASH/IMMEDIATE XX

XXXXXX

INFO: OO FMPPAC

SECRET

- A. CONUSMACV 250714Z (PASEP)
- B. CONUSMACV 221221Z
- C. CONUSMACV 241135Z
- D. OO III MAF 240004Z

1. REF A STATES IN PART THAT IT IS DESIRABLE THAT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES  
 THE CHRISTMAS CROSS FIRE BE CLEARLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VC/PAVN. THEREFORE  
 REF B AS AMPLIFIED BY REF E, REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
2. IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, REF D REMAINS IN EFFECT. POSITIVE STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE  
 THAT H & I FIRES AND OTHER OFFENSIVE ACTIONS ARE NOT RESUMED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

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**FLASH**

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 FM CONUSMACV  
 TO RUMNMF/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG FFORCEV  
 RUMSVB/CG 1ST INF DIV  
 RUMSBJ/CDR 2D AD  
 RUMSBB/CTF 115  
 RUMSVI/SA IV CORPS  
 ZEN/SOG  
 ZEN/SA CMR  
 INFO RUMSVC/DEPCG USARV  
 RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
 RUEKDA/JCS

**S E C R E T** 45113 FROM: MACJ3  
 SUBJECT: CHRISTMAS CEASE FIRE

REF: A. MACV MSG DTG 221221Z  
 B. MACV MSG DTG 241135Z

1. IT IS DESIRABLE THAT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES AFTER THE CHRISTMAS CEASE FIRE BE CLEARLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VC/PAVN. THEREFORE, REF A, AS AMPLIFIED BY REF B, WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS.
2. IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH CONCLUSIVELY THAT VC AGGRESSION HAS BEEN RENEWED AND THE CEASE FIRE TERMINATED BY THE VC/PAVN

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2346M **S E C R E T**

ALL COMMANDERS, WHILE TAKING THE NECESSARY MILITARY ACTION TO WEFEGUARD EITHER US OR VIETNAMESE FORCES WHICH MAY COME UNDER ATTACK WILL REPORT BY FLASH MESSAGE IN DETAIL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES, GIVING TIMES, PLACES, THE NATURE OF THE RENEWED HOSTILITIES, THE SIZE OF VC FORCES INVOLVED, ANY CASUALTIES WHICH MAY RESULT, AND THE ACTIONS OF US AND VIETNAMESE FORCES. IT MAY BE ANTICIPATED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES WILL BE A MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST AND, THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE CLOSEST SCRUTINY BY THE PRESS WHO MAY BE EXPECTED TO WISH TO VISIT THE SITE AND MAKE DETAILED INQUIRIES. THEREFORE, COMMANDERS MUST VERIFY THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND PHOTOGRAPHS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS EVIDENCE IF POSSIBLE.

3. THE DECISION TO RESUME OPERATIONS IN OTHER AREAS WILL BE MADE BY COMUSMACV AND TRANSMITTED TO ALL COMMANDERS BY FLASH MESSAGE.

4. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT MORE THAN A FEW HOURS OR AT THE MOST ONE OR TWO DAYS WILL ELAPSE BEFORE THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES BY THE VC/PAVN, WE DO NOT INTEND TO AUTHORIZE THE RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS UNTIL COMUSMACV HAS LAID BEFORE HIM THE

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 2346N S E C R E T

FULL DETAILS AS REQUESTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

5. YOUR ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO PARA 2 OF REF B WHICH EMPHASIZES THAT US FORCES WILL NOT RESUME OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO MINOR PROVOCATIONS OR HARRASSMENT.

6. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, NO ARC LIGHT STRIKES WILL BE FLOWN UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

7. WE EXPECT THAT PARALLEL INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE ISSUED BY THE GVN WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS, UPON TELEPHONIC AUTHORIZATION FROM THIS HQ REFERRING TO THIS PARAGRAPH, COMMANDERS WILL COMMUNICATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS DIRECTIVE TO THEIR COUNTERPARTS.

8. THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC COMMENT ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND NO DISCUSSIONS OF ANY KIND REGARDING THE EXTENSION OF THE CEASE FIRE. IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH YOUR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF DIMINISHING ITS FULL COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF VIETNAM. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN CONNECTION WITH WORLD-WIDE SUPPORT OF THE GVN/FREE WORLD EFFORT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ONUS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BREAKING THE CHRISTMAS CEASE FIRE REST SQUARELY ON THE SHOULDERS OF VC/PAVN FORCES.

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2346N S E C R E T

9. COMUSMACV DESIRES THAT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BE STEPPED UP ACROSS THE BOARD. PATROLS AND OTHER MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SECURITY OF US FORCES WILL BE INTENSIFIED IMMEDIATELY. INTELLIGENCE PATROLS AND VISUAL, IR, AND PHOTOGRAPHIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS WILL BE INCREASED IMMEDIATELY. GP4

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TO RUMNMF/CG III MAF  
RUMSAB/CG FFORCEV  
RUMSBJ/CDR 2D AD  
ZEN/CTF 115  
RUMSVB/CG 1ST INF DIV  
ZEN/SOG  
RUMSVT/SA IV CORPS  
ZEN/SA CMR

*Antoni Complot*  
*a* *Es*

**FLASH**

BT  
SECRET 45054 FROM: MACJ3  
SUBJECT: CHRISTMAS CEASE FIRE

1. COMUSMACV IS CONCERNED THAT THE VC MAY PROVOKE US FORCES INTO BREAKING THE CHRISTMAS CEASE FIRE AND THEN EXPLOIT IT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

2. THEREFORE, COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELOUS WILL BE INFORMED THAT THEY WILL NOT RESPOND TO MINOR PROVOCATIONS OR HARRASSMENT AS LONG AS THOSE PROVOCATIONS OR HARASSMENT  
RDO  
TD

FMO POSE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THIER COMMAND.

3. 2D AD HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO REVIEW ALL REQUESTS FOR

PAGW 2 RUMSMA 2294M SECRET  
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AGAINST THIW CRITERIA AND BEFORE LAUCHING STRIKE AIRCRAFT, TO VERIFY WITH COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND THAT DESIGNATED TARGETS DO , IN FACT , POST A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE GROUND ELEMENT. THE SAME RESTRAINT SHOULD BE APPLIED BY CTF 115 AND BY ALL OTHER COMMANDERS.

4. IT IS UNDERSTOOD, OF COURSE, THERE WILL BE NO H & I FIRES BY ARTILLERY OF ANY KIND DURING THIS PERIOD.

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COMUSMACV

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VV FMB438  
OO RUMSVD RUHLBP  
DE RUMNMF 508 3580004  
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FM CG III MAF/NCC/SR ADV I CORPS  
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
ZEN/FLSG  
ZEN/NINTH MT BN  
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN  
ZEN/FIFTH COMM BN  
INFO RUMSVD/CO I CORPS ADV GRP  
ZEN/NAVSUPACT DANANG  
RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC  
BT

DEC 24 1968

**SECRET**

OPERATIONS OF US AND FREE WORLD FORCES DURING CHRISTMAS DAY (U)

A. COMUSMACV 220950Z

1. REF A ESTABLISHES FOLLOWING RULES TO BE OBSERVED DURING PERIOD 241800H TO 252400H.

A. ASSUME A POSTURE OF EXTREMELY ALERTNESS, CONTINUE NORMAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS, AND BE PREPARED WITH READY REACTION FORCES, TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO ANY VC INITIATIVES.

B. UNITS IN CONTACT WITH VC FORCES WILL NOT BREAK CONTACT.

C. NO GROUND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED, HOWEVER, ALL

CG III MAF/NCC/SA I CORPS

240004Z/DEC

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PAGE TWO RUMNMF 508 S E C R E T

FORCES WILL BE PREPARED TO REACT PROMPTLY AND WILL BE PREPARED TO DESTROY VC OR PAVN FORCES IF THEY INITIATE OPERATIONS WHICH PRESENT SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY.

D. AIR OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN SUPPORT OF US/RVNAF FORCES IN CONTACT. HOWEVER, 2D AIR DIVISION WILL MAINTAIN GROUND AND AIR ALERT AS REQUESTED AND AS REQUIRED AND UNEXPENDED ORDNANCE WILL BE JETTISONED IN UNPOPULATED AREAS OR PREVIOUSLY "SPECIFIED STRIKE AREAS."

E. OPERATIONS INVOLVING ROUTE SECURITY NEED NOT BE DISCONTINUED AND AIR OR GROUND ALERT AIRCRAFT WILL BE PROVIDED FOR SUCH OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

2. FOR PURPOSES OF CLARIFICATION, THE FOLLOWING RULES WILL BE OBSERVED WITHIN III MAF DURING THIS PERIOD.

A. NO H&I FIRES

B. RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS WILL BE CONTINUED

C. COMBAT PATROLS WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED EXCEPT FOR IMMEDIATE AREA SECURITY.

D. NORMAL AMBUSHES WILL BE CONDUCTED.

E. NO OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS (INCLUDING NO TPQ-10 MISSIONS) EXCEPT IN SUPPORT OF US/ARVN FORCES IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

PAGE THREE RUMNMF 508 S E C R E T

F. HELO AND FIXED WING RESUPPLY OR MED EVAC WILL BE ESCORTED IF SCHEDULED INTO UNSECURED AREAS.

G. AIRCRAFT WILL BE MAINTAINED ON NORMAL GROUND ALERT STATUS.

3. NO STATEMENTS RPY NO STATEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO PRESS. ALL INQUIRIES WILL BE REFERRED TO III MAF CIB.

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DEC 23 1965

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OO RUMNYF  
DE RUMSMA 2028M 3560950  
ZNY SSSS3  
O 220950Z  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO VMAC

**S E C R E T** VMAC 129/65 FROM: MACCOC12  
SUBJ: OPERATIONS OF US AND FREE WORLD FORCES DURING  
CHRISTMAS DAY (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING POLICY WILL APPLY TO OPERATIONS OF U.S.  
AND FREE WORLD FORCES FROM 1800 HOURS, 24 DECEMBER TO 2400  
HRS, 25 DECEMBER.

- A. ASSUME A POSTURE OF EXTREME ALERTNESS, CONTINUE NORMAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS, AND BE PREPARED WITH READY REACTION FORCES, TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO ANY VC INITIATIVES.
- B. UNITS IN CONTACT WITH VC FORCES WILL NOT BREAK

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2028M **S E C R E T**  
CONTACT.

C. NO GROUND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED HOWEVER, ALL FORCES WILL BE PREPARED TO REACT PROMPTLY AND WILL BE PREPARED TO DESTROY VC OR PAVN FORCES IF THEY INITIATE OPERATIONS WHICH PRESENT SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY.

D. AIR OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN SUPPORT OF US/RVNAF FORCES IN CONTACT. HOWEVER, 2D AIR DIVISION WILL MAINTAIN GROUND AND AIR ALERT AS REQUESTED AND AS REQUIRED AND UNEXPENDED ORDNANCE WILL BE JETTISONED IN UN-POPULATED AREAS OR PREVIOUSLY "SPECIFIED STRIKE AREAS."

E. OPERATIONS INVOLVING ROUTE SECURITY NEED NOT BE DISCONTINUED AND AIR OR GROUND ALERT AIRCRAFT WILL BE PROVIDED FOR SUCH OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED. THIS SPECIFICALLY APPLIES TO HIGHWAY 19.

3. VIETNAMESE JOINT GENERAL STAFF WILL ISSUE AN ORDER OF THE DAY SETTING FORTH THESE SAME GROUND RULES.

4. NO STATEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO THE PRESS. ALL QUERIES WILL BE REFERRED TO MACV OFFICE OF INFORMATION.

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COMUSMACV

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G-3/DSW

CG III MAF

X FLASH

CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG FIRST MAW  
CG FLSG  
CG 5TH COMBEN  
CG 7TH ENGRY BN

CG 9TH MT BN  
CG I CORPS ADV GRU  
COMDR NAVSUPACT  
DANANG

*9/1*

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A. COMUSMACV 252120Z

B. CG III MAF 240004Z

1. REF A LIFTS RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON UNITS REGARDING HOSTILITIES.

THEREFORE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY REF B CANCELLED.

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66-1112

HEADQUARTERS  
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
 c/o FPO San Francisco,  
 California 96601

For/NCC Bul 005440  
 103/GHG/jfc  
 Serial: 009666  
 26 January 1966

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FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND BULLETIN 005440

From: Commanding General  
 To: Distribution List

Subj: III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop List (U)

Ref: (a) III MAF/NCC Order 3121.1B

Encl: (1) III MAF/NCC 31Dec65 Task Organization Troop List

1. Purpose. To promulgate the III MAF/NCC 31 December 1965 Task Organization/Troop List.
2. Background. Reference (a) requires subordinate units to submit by the 10th day of each month a report of their task organization/troop list based on operational control for the last day of the preceding month.
3. Information. Enclosure (1) contains the 31 December 1965 III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop List. Addressees are requested to review enclosures and report changes to this Headquarters.
4. Self-cancellation. 20 February 1966.

  
 G. C. AXTEFF  
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:  
 Case 1 (Less B)  
 Case 2 (Less G, H, I, M)  
 Extra 30

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 Downgraded at 3 year intervals,  
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Encl # 13

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Task Organization - 31 December 1965

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
I. Naval Component Command (I CTE)	9	19	224	4789	5041
A. <u>Headquarters</u> (DANANG)	6	18	1		25
1. Det, Sub Unit #2 H&SCo HqBn	5	7	1		13
2. Det, 5th Comm Bn		10			10
3. Det, H&HS-1 MWHG, FMAW	1	1			2
B. <u>30th NCR</u>	3	1	78	2023	2105
1. Hq, 30th NCR (DANANG)	3	1	6	25	35
2. MCB-4 (CHU LAI)			18	498	516
3. MCB-5 (DA NANG)			17	552	569
4. MCB-8 (DA NANG)			21	397	418
5. MCB-8 (PHU BAI)			1	49	50
6. MCB-9 (DA NANG)			15	502	517
C. <u>Nav Supt Act</u>			145	2766	2911
1. DANANG (PCS)			101	2281	2382
2. DANANG (TDY)			15	291	306
3. Station Hospital (DANANG)			29	184	213
4. CHU LAI Detachment				10	10
II. <u>III Marine Amphibious Force</u>	2411	35869	194	1497	39971
A. <u>HQ III MAF DANANG</u>	97	723	5	11	836
1. Staff	75	120	5	2	202
2. 5th CommBn (-)	18	584		9	611
3. Prov Dog Plt	1	11			12
4. 7th CI Tm (CHU LAI)	3	8			11
B. <u>Base Defense Bn (DANANG)</u>	32	955	3	51	1041

**SECRET**ENCLOSURE (1)  
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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
1. 3d Bn 9th Marines	32	955	3	51	1041
<b>C. <u>7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u></b>	35	998	1	16	1050
1. 7th Engr Bn (- Co C)	29	855	1	16	901
2. 1st Bridge Co (-)	6	143			149
<b>D. <u>9th MT Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u></b>	18	397	1	9	425
<b>E. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st ANGLICO</u></b>	5	42	6	0	53
1. SAIGON	1	14	1		16
2. BIEN HOA		5	1		6
3. BERIA	1	3			4
4. DANANG		4	1		5
5. QUANG NGAI	1	3			4
6. QUI NHON	1	2			3
7. PLEIKU		4	1		5
8. NHA TRANG		2	1		3
9. CAN THO	1	5	1		7
<b>F. <u>Det, J, 1st Radio Bn FMF</u></b>	2	65			67
1. HQ & TM 1 (DANANG)	1	35			36
2. Team 2, (CHU LAI)	1	26			27
3. Team 3, (PHU BAI)		4			4
<b>G. <u>3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF</u></b>	1056	21162	106	1045	23369
1. <u>HqBn (-)(DANANG)</u>	155	1508	13	27	1703
a. HqCo	119	690	13	27	849
b. Comm Co (-)	11	356			367
c. Service Co	15	318			333
d. MP Co (-)	5	111			116
e. 3d CIT	4	16			20
f. Det, 1st ITT	1	17			18

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
2. <u>3d Marines (-)(Rein)(DANANG-PHU BAI)</u>	168	3830	10	174	4182
a. <u>HqCo (Rein)(DANANG)</u>	17	219	1	5	242
(1) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv		3			3
b. <u>1stBn, 1stMarines (DANANG)</u>	37	983	3	57	1080
c. <u>1stBn, 3dMarines (DANANG)</u>	39	1023	3	53	1118
d. <u>2dBn, 1stMarines(Rein)(PHU BAI)</u>	75	1602	3	59	1739
(1) 2dBn, 1stMarines	40	999	3	50	1092
(2) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	1	6			7
(3) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st AT Bn (5 M50A1 Ontos)	1	19			20
(4) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1stEngrBn	1	44			45
(5) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st TK Bn (5 M48A3 Tanks)	1	27			28
(6) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Recon Bn	1	23			24
(7) <u>4thBn, 12th Marines (-)(Rein)</u> (PHU BAI)	30	484		9	523
(a) HqBtry(-)(Rein)(CMR Team)	14	161		3	178
(b) Btry M, 4thBn(SP)(6-155How)	4	120		2	126
(c) Btry B, 1stBn, 11thMar, (6-105How)	8	124		2	134
(d) 107mm Mortar Btry, 1stBn, 11th Marines (6 Mortars)	4	79		2	85
3. <u>ADC Command Group (CHU LAI)</u>	7	26			33
4. <u>4th Marines (-)(Rein)(CHU LAI)</u>	107	2654	6	128	2895
a. <u>HqCo</u>	24	268	2	2	296
(1) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	3	16			19
b. <u>1stBn, 4th Marines</u>	35	968	2	58	1063
c. <u>2dBn, 4th Marines</u>	34	969	2	58	1063

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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
d. <u>CoB (-)(Rein), 3dAT Bn</u>	2	67		2	71
(1) Co B (-)	1	40			41
(2) Det, H&SCo, 3d AT Bn	1	27		2	30
e. <u>CoB (-)(Rein), 3dEngrBn</u>	3	119		2	124
(1) Co B (-)	3	75			78
(2) Det Support Co		44		2	46
f. <u>CoA (-)(Rein), 1stAmTracBn, FMF</u> (34 LVTP-5, 1 LVTC, 1 LVTR-1, 2LVTEL)	5	168		4	177
g. <u>Co C (-), 3d TK Bn, FMF</u> (12 M48A3 Tanks)	4	95		2	101
(1) Co C (-)	4	85			89
(2) Det, H&SCo (3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)		10		2	12
5. <u>Artillery Bn Group (CHU LAI)</u>	76	1273	6	24	1379
a. <u>3dBn (-), 11th Marines</u>	36	593	2	11	642
(1) Hq Btry	11	150	2	3	166
(2) Btry G (6-105How)	7	118		2	127
(3) Btry H (6-105How)	8	120		2	130
(4) Btry I (6-105How)	7	125		2	134
(5) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 mortars)	3	80		2	85
b. <u>3dBn (-)(Rein), 12th Marines</u>	40	680	4	13	737
(1) HqBtry (Rein)	14	164	4	11	193
(a) HqBtry	14	150	4	11	179
(b) Det, CMR HqBtry, 12th Marines		14			14
(2) Btry G (6-105How)	8	114			122



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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(3) Btry H (6-105How)	7	113			120
(4) Btry M, 4thBn, 11thMar (6-155How)	5	131		2	138
(5) 3d 155 Gun Btry, (SP)(-) FMP (4-155Guns)	4	113			117
(6) 1st Plt, 1st 8"HowBtry (SP) (2-8"How)	2	45			47
6. <u>7th Marines (Rein) (CHU LAI)</u>	147	3576	11	183	3917
a. <u>HqCo (-)(Rein)</u>	21	281	2	3	307
(1) HqCo (-)	17	224	2	3	246
(2) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	4	57			61
b. <u>1st Bn, 7th Marines</u>	39	979	3	62	1083
c. <u>2d Bn, 7th Marines</u>	38	914	3	55	1010
↔ d. <u>3d Bn, 7th Marines</u>	37	942	3	57	1039
e. <u>Co C (Rein), 1st AT Bn</u> (15 M50A1 Ontos)	3	85		2	90
(1) Co C	2	59			61
(2) HqCo (-)	1	26		2	29
f. <u>CoC (Rein), 1st EngrBn</u>	4	157		1	162
g. <u>CoA (Rein), 3d AmTrac Bn</u> (47 M48A3 Tanks)	5	218		3	226
7. <u>9th Marines (DANANG)</u>	115	3090	10	168	3383
a. <u>HqCo</u>	15	193	2	3	213
b. <u>1st Bn, 9th Marines</u>	35	969	3	56	1063
c. <u>2d Bn, 9th Marines</u>	36	958	2	54	1050
d. <u>3d Bn, 9th Marines</u>	29	970	3	55	1057
8. <u>12th Marines (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	111	1705	8	36	1860
a. <u>HqBtry (-)(2-CMRS)</u>	22	209	3	4	238




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
	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
b. <u>1st 8" How Btry (SP)(-)(Rein)</u> <u>(4-8" How)</u>	7	161		3	171
c. <u>3d Plt, 3d 155 Gun Btry (SP),</u> <u>FMF (2-155G)</u>	1	35		1	37
d. <u>1st Bn (-), 12th Marines</u>	43	701	2	14	760
(1) HqBtry	14	163	2	4	183
(2) Btry A (6-105How)	7	115		2	124
(3) Btry A, 1st Bn, 11thMar	8	124		2	134
(4) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars)	3	75		2	80
(5) Btry C, 1st Bn, 12thMar	8	110		2	120
(6) Btry K, 4thBn, 12thMar (6-155 (SP))	3	114		2	119
e. <u>2dBn (-), 12th Marines</u>	38	599	3	14	654
(1) HqBtry	14	153	3	5	175
(2) Btry D (6-105How)	7	114		2	123
(3) Btry E (6-105How)	7	109		1	117
(4) Btry F (6-105How)	7	106		3	116
(5) Btry L, 4thBn, 12th Mar (6-155 (SP))	3	117		3	123
9. <u>3d AT Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	15	305		10	330
a. H&SCo	9	147		7	163
b. Co A (-)(Rein)(10 M50A1 Ontos)	3	63		1	67
c. Co C (Rein)(20 M50A1 Ontos)	3	95		2	100
10. <u>3d Engr Bn(-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	28	686	1	13	728
a. H&SCo	10	117	1	13	141
b. Support Co	4	268			272
c. Co A (-)	5	74			79

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
d. Co C	6	147			153
e. Co C, 7th Engr Bn	3	80			83
11. <u>3d Med Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	3	101	27	153	284
a. H&SCo	3	101	8	45	157
b. Co C			18	102	120
c. Co D			1	6	7
12. <u>3d Recon Bn (DANANG)</u>	21	302	1	17	341
a. H&SCo	9	99	1	6	115
b. Co A	4	66		4	74
c. Co C	4	68		3	75
d. Co D	4	69		4	77
13. <u>Recon Group Alpha (CHU LAI)</u>	8	132		5	145
a. Co B (-) (Rein), 3d Recon Bn	4	63		2	69
(1) H&SCo					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 2d Plt					
b. Co C (Rein), 1st Recon Bn	4	69		3	76
14. <u>1st Force Recon</u>	9	128		5	142
15. <u>3d MF Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	10	154		8	172
a. H&SCo	7	84		8	99
b. Co A (-) (1t M-35, 2½ ton trucks)	2	39			41
c. 2d Plt, CoB (15 M-35, 2½ ton trucks)	1	31			32




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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
16. <u>1stAmTraoBn(-)(Rein), FMF (DANANG)</u>	26	639	2	13	680
a. H&SCo (12 LVTP5, 3 LVT01, 1 LVTR1)	17	319	2	11	349
b. 1st Prov Armored Amphib Plt (6 LVTH-6)	2	74		2	78
c. Co B (Rein) (54 LVTP5, 4 LVT01, 1 LVTR1)	7	246			253
17. <u>3d Tank Bn (-)(Rein) (DANANG)</u>	23	489	1	11	524
a. H&SCo (-) (2 M48A3 Tks)	15	267	1	7	290
b. Co A (-) (Rein) (12 M48A3 Tk and 3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)	3	89		2	94
c. Co B (Rein) (17 M48A3 Tk & 3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)	5	110		2	117
d. 1st Plt Co C (5 M48A3 Tks)		23			23
18. <u>3d Shore Party Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	22	438	1	25	486
a. H&SCo	12	184	1	10	207
b. Co A	3	86		5	94
c. Co B	4	82		5	91
d. Co C	3	86		5	94
19. <u>Co G, 1st Shore Party Bn (CHU LAI)</u>	5	126	1	10	142
20. <u>3d Dental Co (DANANG)</u>			8	33	43
H. <u>First Marine Aircraft Wing</u>	1068	8332	40	147	9587
1. <u>MWHG-1</u>	249	2159	12	50	2470
a. H&HS-1 (DANANG)	141	803	10	28	982
b. MASS-2	19	119			138
(1) Det A (CHU LAI)	4	18			22

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(2) Det B (DANANG)	4	19			23
(3) Det C (CHU LAI)	3	13			16
(4) DASC (DANANG)	7	19			26
c. MACS-7	23	221		2	246
(1) Det A (PHU BAI)	3	17			20
d. 1st LAAM Bn (DANANG)	13	481	1	10	505
e. 2d LAAM Bn (CHU LAI)	32	449	1	10	492
2. <u>MAG-11 (DANANG)</u>	178	1817	5	21	2021
a. H&MS-11	34	416			450
b. MAES-11	13	490	3	16	522
c. VMFA-115	41	274	1	2	318
d. VMFA-323	43	278	1	2	324
e. VMGJ-1	29	222			251
f. VMF(AW)-312	18	137		1	156
3. <u>MAG-12 (CHU LAI)</u>	166	1654	6	26	1852
a. H&MS-12	41	364			405
b. MAES-12	19	519	3	22	563
c. VMA-211	29	179		2	210
d. VMA-214	24	176	1		201
e. VMA-223	27	178	1	2	208
f. VMA-224	22	176	1		199
g. MATCU-67	4	62			66
4. <u>MAG-16</u>	240	1407	9	21	1677


  
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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
a. H&MS-16 (DANANG)	31	281			312
b. MABS-16 (DANANG)	13	441	5	6	365
c. Det MABS (PHU BAI)		12			12
d. Det MABS (QUANG NGAI)		2			2
e. Det MABS (QUANG TRI)		2			2
f. SU#1, MABS-16 (DANANG)	10	61		1	72
g. HMM-161 (PHU BAI)	50	178	1	3	232
h. HMM-263 (DANANG)	46	175	1	3	225
i. HMM-361 (DANANG)	51	158	1	3	213
j. VMO-2 (DANANG)	33	136	1	5	175
k. MATCU-68 (DANANG)	6	61			67
5. <u>MAG-36</u>	235	1295	8	29	1567
a. H&MS-36 (CHU LAI)	34	315			349
b. MABS-36 (CHU LAI)	14	342	4	26	386
c. HMM-362 (CHU LAI)	53	160	1		214
d. HMM-363 (QUI NHON)	54	176	2	3	235
e. HMM-364 (CHU LAI)	54	152	1		207
f. VMO-6 (CHU LAI)	26	150			176
I. <u>Force Logistics Support Group</u>	98	3195	32	218	3543
1. <u>Force Logistics Support Group (DANANG)</u>	52	1649	4	31	1736
a. H&SCo(-)(Rein) 3dSvcBn	22	373	3	15	413
b. Supply Co (-) (Rein) 3dSvcBn	22	750	1	16	789
c. Maint Co (-) (Rein) 3dSvcBn	6	399			405

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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
d. Truok Co (-) (Rein) 3dSvobn	2	127			129
2. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit #1 (CHU LAI)</u> 38	1308		19	130	1495
a. <u>FLSU Headquarters</u>	24	871		8	903
(1) H&SCo (Provisional)	11	197		8	216
(2) Supply Co (Provisional)	7	326			333
(3) Maint Co (Provisional)	6	348			354
b. <u>Shore Party Group (Provisional)</u>	4	136	1	10	151
(1) Co "C", 1stSPBn	4	136	1	10	151
c. <u>MT Group (Provisional)</u>	10	268		4	282
(1) Co "A", 7th MTBn (-)	3	84		2	89
(2) 2dPlt, Co "C", 9th MTBn	1	27			28
(3) Co "C", 1stMTBn (-)	3	81		1	85
(4) Co "C", 3d MTBn	3	76		1	80
d. <u>Co "B", 3dMedBn (Rein)</u>		33	18	108	159
3. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit #2 (PHU BAI)</u> 8	238		9	57	312
a. <u>FLSU Headquarters</u>	6	190		4	200
(1) H&SCo (Provisional)	3	40		4	47
(2) Supply Plat		62			62
(3) Maint Plat	3	88			91
b. <u>Co "B", 3d MTBn (-)</u>	2	37			39
c. <u>Co "A", 3d MedBn</u>		11	9	53	73

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