

55.	CG III MAF	011200Z Dec <i>gp - not shown</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK Subj: Answers to TELCON Queries of 1Dec65
56.	CG III MAF	021230Z Dec 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal to LtGen KRULAK Subj: Schedule of Events
57.	CG III MAF	012344Z Dec 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal to LtGen KRULAK Subj: M-16
58.	CG III MAF	022346Z Dec 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal to Gen WESTMORELAND Subj: M-16
59.	CG III MAF	Spd Ltr 2/10/65 over 290063 Dec	Personal for LtGen KRULAK Subj: Subversive Propaganda Material
60.	CG III MAF	062352Z Dec <i>removed, placed in FS folder BJA</i>	Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND Subj: Outpost Min Dec
61.	CG III MAF	070830Z Dec 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for BGen DEPUY Subj: Conversation of Gen CHUAN
62.	CG III MAF	001410Z Dec	Personal Cdr. TASK FORCE DELTA Subj: Harvest Year
63.	CG III MAF	140100Z Dec	Personal to Wada HYLAND Subj: Congratulations on assumption of Comd.
64.	CG III MAF	191518Z Dec 65 <i>gp - not shown</i>	Personal to LtGen KRULAK Subj: Port-Development
65.	CG III MAF	200224Z Dec 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal to LtGen KRULAK info MGen FIELDS Subj: Movement of PHEPAC Units to RVN
66.	CG III MAF	250700Z Dec 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for MGen ROSSON Subj: Men-C-War
67.	CG III MAF	270600Z Dec	Personal to MGen FIELDS Subj: Suggest dates for visit
68.	CG III MAF	272550Z Dec <i>removed, placed in FS folder BJA</i>	Personal to LtGen KRULAK and BGen MCCUTCHEON Subj: Dong Air Base (U)

0 250700Z

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

BT

SECRET LINDIS

OPERATION MAN-O-WAR (U)

DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN ROSSON FROM MAJGEN WALT

A. COMUSMACV 230735Z

B. CG III MAF 200310Z

1 REF A RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED.

2. THIS MSG REVEALS FACT THAT III MAF, FFORCEV AND COMSEVENTHFLT
ARE INVOLVED IN FUTURE OPERATION.

3. STRONGLY RECOMMEND ALL TRAFFIC SUCH AS REF A BE HANDLED ON
LINDIS NEED TO KNOW BASIS AS RECOMMENDED IN REF B.

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 665 SECRET LINDIS

4. RECOMMEND FURTHER THAT BECAUSE OF THIS POSSIBLE COMPROMISE THAT
THE CODE NAME MAN-O-WAR BE CHANGED.

GP-4

BT

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0 250700/DEC

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CG III MAF

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O 200224Z
FM CG III MAF
TO YDNA/CG FMFPAC
INFO NMSB/CG FIRST MARDIV
BT

S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK, INFO PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN
FIELDS, FROM MAJGEN WALT

A. CG FMFPAC 121320Z
B. CG III MAF 190204Z

1. REF A INDICATED AVAILABILITY FMFPAC UNITS FOR MOVEMENT TO
VIETNAM TO MEET ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT APPROVED BY SAC DEPT. RYF
B CONTAINS MY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT BLT-1 AND BLT 3/1 GO TO
CHU LAI IN JAN, BLT 2/3 TO DANANG IN FEB, AND BLT 3/4 TO DANANG
IN MAR. REF A ALSO INDICATED 1ST MARDIV HQ AS AVAILABLE FOR DEPL-
OYMENT IN MARCH. 1ST MARDIV HQ, OF COURSE, WILL GO TO CHU LAI.

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE TWO DDKE 978 S E C R E T

2. AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED, I HAVE HOPED THAT 1ST MARDIV HQ WOULD ARRIVE
IN JAN. IN THAT IT CANNOT, I PROPOSE TO DEVELOP THE ADC GROUP AT
CHU LAI INTO A PROVISIONAL INFANTRY BRIGADE-TYPE HQ. I FEEL THEY
MUST HAVE THIS AUGMENTED COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY. THE
REASONS ARE SEVERAL. FIRST, THERE IS THE QUICKENING TEMPO OF
MAJOR OPERATIONS. SECOND, THERE IS THE GROWING NUMBER OF BATTALIONS.
THIRD, THERE IS THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING DAY-BY-DAY OPERATIONS
AT CHU LAI FROM DANANG. IN THE PAST THE ROLE OF THE ADC GROUP
HAS LARGELY BEEN CONFINED TO THE COORDINATION OF LOGISTIC AND
BASE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS. NOW I THINK IT IS TIME FOR THEM TO
ASSUME A LARGER TACTICAL ROLE.

3. I DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO STAFF SUCH A HEADQUARTERS
ADEQUATELY. HOWEVER, AS I SEE IT, THIS AUGMENTATION COULD COME
PROFITABLE FROM THE 1ST MARDIV BY BRINGING IN SELECTED INDIVIDUALS
AND ELEMENTS OF 1ST MARDIV HQ. THIS ALSO OFFERS THE MAJOR
ADVANTAGE OF PHASING IN 1ST MARDIV CONTROL ELEMENTS, THUS
ASSURING MAXIMUM CONTINUITY AGAINST THE TIME CG 1ST MARDIV ASSUMES
COMMAND.

4. IF THE GENERAL PROPOSAL TO CREATE A BRIGADE-TYPE HQ AT CHU LAI,
STAFFED IN PART BY ELEMENTS OF 1ST MARDIV HQ, MEETS WITH YOUR

PAGE THREE DDKE 978 S E C R E T

APPROVAL, I WOULD FURTHER PROPOSE DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN
1ST MARDIV AND 3D MARDIV TO DETERMINE THE

COMPOSITION, PHASING, AND STAFFING OF THE HQ.

GP-4

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Fu

O 191518Z
FM CG III MAF
TO YVNA/ CG 32FAC
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FROM MIEN WALT TO EDGERN KRULAK DELIVERED DURING PERICIALA ROURE
ADM HOOPER AND PARTY - PDWT DEVELOPMENT.

1. ADM HOOPER AND PARTY TOOK A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE
APPROACH IN TACKLING THE ASSIGNMENT TO DETERMINE THE RESPONSE EFFORTS
OF NSA IN EXECUTION OF ITS SUPPORT ROLE AND THE PLANNING AND
PROGRAMMING ACCOMPLISHED BY III MAF/NSA. AT HIS DEPARTURE JUST
PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, THE ADM INDICATED THAT THE LEADER SECRETARY
LEFT SVN WITH AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE OF THE PLANNING AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
ATTAINED. MENTIONED HIS MOST DIFFICULT TASK WAS TO CONVEY AND CONVINCE

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O 1915-97/023

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PAGE TWO 924 DDKE C O N F I D E N T I A L

TOP ECHELONS OF THE MANY CONSTRUCTIVE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND TO PLACE THE PROBLEM IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

2. AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF ADM HOOPER, THE FIRST ITEM OF BUSINESS WAS TO BRIEF THE ADM AND HIS PARTY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A COMMON BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING FOR DISCUSSIONS TO FOLLOW:

A. THE FOLLOWING PERSONALITIES WERE IN ATTENDANCE AT BRIEFING.

DEP CG III MAF
C/S III MAF
CO NSA
CO 30TH NCR
OICC SVN
OICC DANANG
COL BOYD, NCC
COL HANSEN, NCC
III MAF G-4/EMB/ENGR
NCC BASE DEVELOPEMENT OFFICER

B. OUTLINE OF BRIEFING

REQUIREMENTS, PORTS DANANG/CHU LAI
(PAST-FUTURE)
CAPABILITIES- (STAGING AREAS, RAMP/ WARRF SPACE)

PAGE THREE 924 DDKE C O N F I D E N T I A L

BASE DEVELOPEMENT PLAN

PROGRAMS

CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL ITEMS

DREDGING

MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT

LIGHTERAGE

CONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES

LAND ACQUISITION

SPECIAL BRIEFING ON PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR DANANG

HARBOR BY OICC SVN

UPON COMPLETION OF BRIEFING THE ADMIRAL TOURED PORT AREA AND ON THE FOLLOWING TWO DAYS HE PROCEEDED TO SAIGON FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH OICC SVN AND J-4 MACV. HIS PARTY REMAINED IN DANANG TO DEVELOPE APPENDICES FOR HIS REPORT. THESE APPENDICES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

REQUIREMENTS

PORT CAPABILITIES

PORT DEVELOPEMENT PLAN

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO INCREASE DREDGING CAPABILITIES

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PAGE FOUR 924 DDKE C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. THE ADMIRAL STATED HE INTENDED TO SUBMIT A PERSONAL MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL JOHNSTON ON HIS FINDINGS- THIS MEMO IS IN ROUGH FORM NOW I HAVE NOT REVIEW IT THOUGH LARRY SNOODY HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO AND TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS. THE ADM PLANS TO COMPLETE HIS REPORT WHILE WAITING TRANSPORTATION AT CLARK TOMORROW. HIS GENERAL OUTLINE PRESENTED ORALLY TO ME CONTAINED NO SUBJECTS OR PROPOSALS THAT ARE CRITICAL OF OUR METHOD OF OPERATIONS OR PLANNING. HE IS STILL SEEKING IDEAS THAT WILL PROVIDE SOME DRAMATIC METHOD TO ACCELERATE THE ATTAINMENT OF SPECIFIC PROJECTS WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE PORT CAPACITY AT DANANG AND CHU LAI HE WILL PROPOSE (A) THE DESIGNATION OF A PORT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER ON NCC STAFF WHO WOULD HAVE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE ALL ASPECTS OF PORT DEVELOPMENT
(B) ACTIONS TO EXPEDITE THE MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES OF CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS.
(C) THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND LIGHTERAGE TO NASA - ADDITION TO PHASE II INCREMENTS.
(D) THE CONSIDERATION OF CONSOLIDATING THE FUNDING OF ALL PORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT INTO A SINGLE LINE ITEM DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF EXECUTION DELEGATED TO THE NCC OR

PAGE FIVE DDKE 924 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE OTHER AGENT AT THE OPERATING LEVEL.

4. IN ADDITION, ADM HOOPER EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO CINCPAC ON THE SCHEDULING OF LST SUPPORT AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR OTHER COMMANDS FURNISHING SUPPORT TO III MAF/NCC TO COORDINATE WITH COMUSMACV.
COMUSMACV 170438Z PASEP. REGARDS.

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DE:YMZDKI 06027/0829Z DEC
O:070830Z ZYH
FM:CG III MAF
TO:COMUSMACV
ZEN

SECURITY
PERSONAL FOREIGN DEPUTY FROM MAJ GEN VALT
ELIYER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. SUBSEQUENT TO RECEIVING YOUR PERSONAL MSG MAC 06027 I HAD AN
INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH GEN CHUAN, CC, 1ST ARVN DIVISION,
N 3 DEC CONCERNING THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE PT AND PAT. THIS
CONVERSATION ANSWERED SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN
UR BSG.

2. GEN CHUAN SAID THAT HE IS EXPLORING AND TESTING THE POSSIBILITY
COMBINING THE PAT TEAMS INTO COMPANIES BUT HAS COME TO NO
CONCLUSION YET. IN GENERAL, HE FAVORS LARGER FORMATIONS TO SMALL
DETACHMENTS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE IS PRESENTLY COMBINING PT HARLET
ADS INTO MOBILE PLATOONS. IT IS HIS FEELING THAT THE HARLET
ADS SERVE NO PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO PROVIDE BODY GUARDS FOR
E HARLET CHIEFS. ALSO, THAT THESE SMALL DETACHMENTS OFFER
VULNERABLE TARGETS.

3. HE SAID THERE WAS AMPLE MANPOWER AVAILABLE IN HIS TWO
PROVINCES AND THAT RECRUITING WAS GOOD, NOT ONLY FOR HIS OWN
DIVISION BUT ALSO FOR THE GENERAL RESERVE BNS. HE STRESSED THAT
COMPETITION WAS KEEN BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS AND THAT THE
HAD THE LEAST TO OFFER THE RECRUIT.

4. I HAVE ASKED COL BOSTON, SA WITH 1ST ARVN DIV, TO DEVELOP AS
MUCH INFO AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING STATISTICS, RELATING TO THE PT AND
AT IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES. THIS I WILL FORWARD AS
IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

GP-4
270

070830Z Dec

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#61

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DRAWN: I. V. WALT
SECT: C/G PHONE SHOVE 6

DTG 022346Z

SECRET/PRIORITY

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FROM: CG III MAF
TO: COMUSMACV

PERSONAL FROM MAJGEN WALT TO CGM WESTMORELAND

MAJGEN HELMERS CALLED ON ME TODAY TO DETERMINE MY REACTION TO A STATEMENT REGARDING THE NEED FOR AN INCREASED NUMBER OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF THE TROOPS. BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE HERE TO DATE MY SUPPORT WAS READILY PROVIDED. I NEED NOT PROVIDE SPECIFICS SINCE YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF VC TACTICS IN THE ASSAULT ON POSITIONS.

YOU MAY OR MAY NOT KNOW OF THE DETAILED STUDY AND TESTING I DID OF INFANTRY WEAPONS CONDUCTED OVER A PERIOD OF 18 MONTHS WHILE ON MY LAST TOUR OF DUTY. HAVING ALWAYS BEEN IN THE INFANTRY, THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE'S WEAPON HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF VITAL INTEREST TO ME AND IT WAS NO CHORE FOR ME TO MAKE A THOROUGH AND, I HOPE, OBJECTIVE STUDY OF ALL THE MOST ABUNDANTLY AVAILABLE WEAPONS. THIS STUDY INCLUDED MY PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN ALL PHASES OF THE TEST.

AS A RESULT OF MY EXPERIENCE, OF ALL RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS TESTED, I FOUND THAT THE FAMILY OF WEAPONS MAKING UP THE STONER WEAPONS SYSTEM EQUALED ALL OF THE WEAPONS TESTED AND BESTED MOST TO A MARKED DEGREE. THE ADVANTAGES OF TRAINING, LOGISTICS, MAINTENANCE AND COST OFFERED BY A FAMILY OF WEAPONS IS OBVIOUS. I CHOSE THE STONER BECAUSE IT IS IN THE MAINWARE STOCK, USES SAME AMMO AS M-16, IS AVAILABLE AND COULD BE MASS PRODUCED. HAD COLT OR ANY OTHER COMPANY HAD A FAMILY AVAILABLE I WOULD HAVE TESTED THOSE BUT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE NO OTHER SUCH FAMILY EXISTS. THE COLT "FAMILY" DOES NOT HAVE INTERCHANGABILITY OF PARTS BETWEEN RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS.

THE ABOVE TEST INCLUDED THE AR-15 OR M-16. I FOUND IT TO BE AN EXCELLENT WEAPON SUPERIOR IN MANY RESPECTS TO THE M-14. FOR THIS REASON I WOULD ~~CONTINUE TO~~ SUPPORT IT FOR THE MARINE RIFLE SQUAD AS AN INTERIM WEAPON. MY PREFERENCE STILL LIES, AS I TOLD MAJGEN HELMERS, WITH THE FAMILY OF WEAPONS. IN ANY EVENT I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE TO INCLUDE IN ANY REQUEST THE REQUIREMENT FOR A LIGHT MACHINE GUN OF THE STONER

CG III MAF

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P 022346Z/DEC

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TYPE THAT CAN BE CARRIED IN EACH OF THE THREE FIRE TEAMS OF OUR MARINE RIFLE SQUAD. I THINK THE SQUAD NEEDS THIS TYPE OF FIRE POWER IN THESE CLOSE CONTACT HEAVY VOLUME FIRE FIGHTS. VERY RESPECTFULLY. L. W. WALT.
GP-4

CON: 194

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DRAFTER: L. W. WALT
SECT: CG PHONE SHOW 6

DTG: 022344Z

SECRET/PRIORITY

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMFPAC

HAS BEEN SENT

PERSONAL FROM MAJGEN WALT TO LTGEN NEULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

WAS CONFRONTED THIS MORNING WITH A VERY INTERESTING SITUATION. LTGEN HEINTGES CAME TO SEE ME ABOUT CONCURRING WITH THE NEED TO HAVE AN AUTOMATIC RIFLE IN THE HANDS OF EACH INFANTRYMAN. MORE SPECIFICALLY, HE WANTED MY CONCURRENCE IN MACV REQUESTING IMMEDIATELY SOME 35,000 M-16 RIFLES. A MESSAGE WHICH I DIDN'T SEE HAD ALREADY BEEN PREPARED FOR SAIGON TO THIS EFFECT, BUT IT WAS DESIRED THAT GEN WESTMORELAND BE ABLE TO SAY IN THE MESSAGE THAT EVERY FIELD COMMANDER HE HAD SUPPORTED THIS REQUEST.

MY POSITION IS CLEAR ON THE MATTER OF NEEDING ADDITIONAL FIREPOWER IN THE HANDS OF THE INFANTRY IN THE FORM OF INCREASED NUMBER OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. OUR EXPERIENCE TO DATE DEFINITELY CONFIRMS THIS FACT.

TESTED

AS YOU KNOW, I ~~TESTED~~ THE M-16 AND FOUND IT TO BE A GOOD WEAPON. AND, I TOLD LTGEN HEINTGES THAT.

HOWEVER, I FOLLOWED THIS UP WITH A RECAP OF MY EXPERIENCE IN TESTING ALL SMALL ARMS WEAPONS TO INCLUDE MACHINE GUNS. AND I SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED MY FAVORITE, THE STONER WEAPONS SYSTEM - NOT SO MUCH AS THE STONER IS CONCERNED - BUT MORE BECAUSE OF THE VALUE OF A FAMILY OF WEAPONS.

AND HERE WE GET INTO THE LONG STANDING AND ARGUMENTATIVE POSITION RELATIVE TO SPIW. LTGEN HEINTGES IS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE SPIW AND HE APPARENTLY HAS SOME INFORMATION REGARDING A BREAKTHROUGH ON THIS WEAPON. OF COURSE, THESE BREAKTHROUGHS HAVE BEEN TALKED ABOUT FOR YEARS. I STILL PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THAT WEAPONS IS A LONG WAY OFF, AND EVEN SO, IS STILL NOT A FAMILY SYSTEM.

DESPITE THE OBVIOUS NEED FOR AN AUTOMATIC HERE, I COULD DETECT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COULD BE A STALLING GAME TO GIVE ENOUGH TIME FOR THE SPIW TO BE DEVELOPED. ON THE BASIS OF LTGEN HEINTGES STATEMENT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ARMY IS FALLING OFF THE AGREEMENT THAT CMC HAD WITH C/S ARMY TO THE EFFECT THAT ON CONCLUSION OF THE SAW'S STUDY ON 1 JULY 1966, THE ARMY WOULD DECIDE AT THAT TIME WHAT WEAPON WOULD BE CHOSEN. ALSO, THERE MAY BE SOMETHING NEW ON THE WASHINGTON SCENE THAT MIGHT BE CAUSING THE SPIW PROPONENTS SOME CONCERN WHAT WITH THE MARINE CORPS' STATED NEED FOR A NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM TO BE BUDGETED FOR THIS COMING YEAR.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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AT ANY RATE I SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR AUTOMATIC REPLES BUT PROPOSED ALSO THAT THE STONER LIGHT MACHINE GUN BE INCLUDED IN THE MESSAGE. THIS WE COULD USE IN EACH FIRE TEAM ALONG WITH THREE M-16'S. IT ALSO WOULD KEEP THE STONER ALIVE, OR GOLT, OR ANY OTHER FAMILY SO THAT WE DON'T GET PUSHED INTO A CORNER.

THIS IS A BASIC DECISION TO MAKE ON THE BASIS OF A NEED FOR AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, BUT I PASS THIS INFORMATION ON BECAUSE I FEEL THAT PROCUREMENT OF THE M-16 FOR MARINE UNITS MIGHT WELL JEOPARDIZE THE COMMANDANT'S GRANTED POSITION OF DESIRING A FAMILY OF WEAPONS. IN ANY EVENT, IF THE M-16 IS ACCEPTED IT SHOULD CLEARLY BE SET FORTH THAT THIS IS AN INFANTRY WEAPON.

THIS MAY ALSO BE THE TIME FOR THE COMMANDANT TO RE-EVALUATE HIS PREVIOUS COMMITMENT TO THE ARMY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MARINE CORPS WILL STICK WITH THE ARMY ON THE WEAPON OF THEIR CHOICE PROVIDED THE MARINE CORPS HAS ITS INPUT TO THE DECISION. I UNDERSTAND MUCH SUPPORT WAS AVAILABLE TO THE MARINE CORPS LAST YEAR TO INCLUDE IN THE FY 1966 BUDGET THE NECESSARY DOLLARS FOR THE MARINE CORPS TO GO IT ALONE, BUT THE OMC WISELY CHOSE TO PERMIT THE ARMY TIME TO MAKE A DECISION.

AM LOCKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT, VERY RESPECTFULLY, L. W. VALP.

GP-4

CCN: 173

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FM CG III MAF/NCC
TO RUHLDP/CG FMFPAC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL TO LTGEN KRULAK FROM NGEN WALT

1. THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE OF EVENTS IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR APPROVAL:

6 DEC 1050-1100 ARRIVE AIR FORCE OPERATIONS
1100-1140 HELO TOUR TAOR AND MARBLE MT AIR FACILITY
1140-1200 FREE TIME IN QUARTERS
1200-1330 LUNCHEON (SEE NOTE NR 1)
1330-1355 VISIT PATIENTS "C" MED
1405-1450 BRIEFING/TOUR MAG-16
1500-1545 AWARDS CEREMONY 9TH MAR

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 140 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1625-1725 VISIT AIR/GROUND UNITS HOE PHU DAI
1805-1835 FREE TIME IN QUARTERS
1835-1900 SOCIAL WITH CG III MAF/NCC
1900-2300 DINNER WITH CG III MAF/NCC
2000-2130 BRIEFING ON CG FMFPAC'S DISCUSSION TOPICS (CG 'S

QUARTERS)

7DEC 0615-0645 BREAKFAST WITH CG III MAF/NCC
0700-0730 REQUEST MAST, OFFICE CG III MAF/NCC
0730-0830 ATTEND CG'S MORNING BRIEFING
0915-1630 VISIT AIR/GROUND UNITS CHU LAI; OBSERVE HAWK FIREX
1715-1735 PRESS CONFERENCE CIB
1800-1830 FREE TIME IN QUARTERS
1830-1930 DINNER WITH CG 1ST NAV
1930-2100 BRIEFING ON CG FMFPAC'S DISCUSSION TOPICS

(III MAF/NCC BRIEFING ROOM)

8 DEC 0615-0645 BREAKFAST WITH CG III MAF/NCC
0720-0920 BRIEFING/TOUR NAVSUPPACT
0940-1040 BRIEFING/TOUR FLSG
1050-1150 BRIEFING/TOUR 3D MAR
1200-1240 WORKING LUNCH WITH GENERAL OFFICERS
1300-1420 ENROUTE TSN

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1420-1450 ENROUTE MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND HQ

1500-1600 CALL ON COMUSMACV

1600-1630 ENROUTE TSN

1630-1750 ENROUTE DANANG

1800-1830 FREE TIME IN QUARTERS

1830-1900 SOCIAL WITH CG III MAF/NCC (SEE NOTE 2)

1900-2000 DINNER WITH CG III MAF/NCC (SEE NOTE 2)

2000-2100 BRIEFING ON JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL

NOTE 1 LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL VICTOR K. KRULAK

PLACE: CG'S MESS

GUESTS: HONORABLE EDWIN REISCHAUER, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN

MR. E. J. NICKEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNSELOR

MR. J.O. ZURNELLEN, JR. POLITICAL COUNSELOR

COL EDWARD BAUTZ MACV

SGEN NGUYEN CHANH THI 1CTZ CG COL JONES SA2ND DIV

SGEN HOANG XUAN LAN 2ND DIV CG COL BOSTON SA 1ST DIV

SGEN NGUYEN VAN CHAUN 1ST DIV CG LTCOL COADY SA QUANG NAM SS

COL HUYNH GONG THANH C/S I CORPS LTCOL NG CORD ADV DANANG

COL NGUYEN VAN THIEN MAYOR DANANG LTCOL DUONG THEIN HUNG CG

41ST TAC UING

COL DAN QUANG YEU QUANG NAM SSC

PAGE FOUR RUNNMF 140 C O N F I D E N T I A L

COL VINCENT R. LABERGE SA VNAF COL HOWARD B. ST CLAIR SA I CORPS

MR SAMUEL B. THOMSEN POLAD

NOTE 2 DINNER CG'S MESS

GUESTS: I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL

SGEN K.D. MC GUTCHEON

COL FRANK QUANTE, JR. I CORPS

COL D.D. HENDERSON

LTCOL JOHNSON I CORPS

MR MARCUS GORDON USOM

MAJ CHARLES KEEVER G5 III MAF

MR FLOYD WADE JUSFAC

LTCOL COCH I CORPS

MR SAMUEL B. THOMSEN POLAD

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CG III MAF

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PROTOCOL

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P 011200Z
FM CG III MAF
TO CG ZMPAC

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT

1. THE FOLLOWING ANSWERS ARE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO YOUR TELECON OF 10DEC65:

ITEM 1: WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE NUMBER AND TRAINING OF PF-FORCES?

ANSWER: A. PRESENTLY 16,373 REGIONAL FORCES ASSIGNED FOR THORIZED 18,185. OF COURSE, DESIRABLE TO SEE FORCE UP TO THORIZED STRENGTH BUT GOVERNMENT AWARE OF PROBLEM AND IS TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION. GENERALLY REGIONAL FORCE CONSIDERED A COMPLETE SERVICE AND COMPARES VERY FAVORABLY WITH ARVN. FROM TRAINING STANDPOINT COMBINED OPERATIONS EXTREMELY BENEFICIAL. A RECENT POLICY OF ATTACHING RF COMPANY TO MARINE REGIMENT RKS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

B. POPULAR FORCES POSE ANOTHER PROBLEM. IN I CORPS AUTHORIZED STRENGTH IS 28,986 WITH 22,727 ASSIGNED FOR DUTY. FURTHER, MONTHLY LOSSES CONSISTENTLY REMAINING AHEAD OF INPUT. III MAF HAS SUBMITTED SEVERAL PROPOSALS THAT SHOULD IMPROVE BOTH NUMBER AND TRAINING OF POPULAR FORCES WITHIN ENCLAVES. PROPOSALS ARE TO PLACE ARMS WITH SELECTED PF PLATOONS TO OPERATE ON PERMANENT BASIS, PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS, SUPPORTING ARMS, AND RESERVE FORCES. ADDITION HAVE OFFERED TO PLACE MARINE NCOs IN EACH OF POPULAR FORCE TRAINING CENTERS. PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN COORDINATED WITH SECTOR COMMANDER, PROVINCE CHIEF, SUB-SECTOR COMMANDER, AND DISTRICT CHIEF NOT ONLY TO GAIN CONCURRENCE BUT ALSO TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON CRITICAL NEED FOR AN ADEQUATE POPULAR FORCE. GENERALLY REACTION HAS BEEN VERY FAVORABLE AND MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN LETTER FROM GENERAL THI ENDORSING PROPOSAL IN SOME DETAIL. AS A RESULT SPECIFIED PLATOONS HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF. OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPROVE THE PRESTIGE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POPULAR FORCES WHICH IN TURN SHOULD INCREASE NUMBERS.

ITEM 2, 3: WHAT DO WE NEED IN NUMBERS - TIME, AND SCALE? WHAT DO WE HAVE NOW?

ANSWER: BREAKDOWN OF RF/PF IS LISTED BELOW BY PROVINCE: READ IN THREE COLUMNS, FORCE, AUTHORIZED, ASSIGNED:

REGIONAL FORCE		
QUANG TRI	2,362	2,333
THUA THIEN	3,472	2,923
QUANG NAM	3,830	3,350
DANANG GARRISON	807	749
QUANG TIN	2,516	2,337
QUANG NGAI	4,110	3,721
POPULAR FORCES		
QUANG TRI	5,282	4,077
HUA THIEN	5,649	3,909
QUANG NAM	5,967	3,927
DANANG GARRISON	462	224
QUANG TIN	5,124	4,250
QUANG NGAI	6,502	5,914

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NUMBER NEEDED WOULD BE UP TO THAT FIGURE AUTHORIZED. POPULAR FORCES AUTHORIZED ARE BASED ON ONE PLATOON EACH VILLAGE AND SQUAD FOR EACH HAMLET. THIS HEADQUARTERS CONSIDERS THIS A MINIMUM REQUIREMENT. THIS ONCE THIS FIGURE REACHED THEN SITUATION WOULD REQUIRE REEVALUATION. PERHAPS THERE IS REQUIREMENT FOR MORE THAN AUTHORIZED ALLOWANCE BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE GOVERNMENT ACTION. TIME REQUIRED WOULD BE DICTATED BY TRAINING CENTER CAPACITY, ASSUMING RECRUITS WERE AVAILABLE. TRAINING CENTERS ARE PRESENTLY OPERATING AT 50 PERCENT OF CAPACITY. TRAINING PERIOD FOR REPLACEMENTS IS 7 WEEKS WITH ANNUAL REQUIREMENT FOR A 3 WEEK PERIOD OF REFRESHER TRAINING. REQUIREMENT FOR 3 WEEK PERIOD COULD BE SATISFIED BY TRAINING RECEIVED WORKING WITH MARINES. ESTIMATED, ASSUMING RECRUITS AVAILABLE, POPULAR FORCES COULD BE BROUGHT UP TO STRENGTH (TRAINED) IN 6 MONTHS TO A YEAR.

ITEM 4: WHAT IS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH OUR AIMS?

ANSWER: LOCALLY, THE REQUIREMENT IS THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING AT ALL LEVELS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE OF POPULAR FORCES AND BENEFITS TO BE GAINED BY IMPLEMENTING III MAF PROPOSALS. SUPPORT ESSENTIAL FROM ALL LEVELS OF GVN COMMAND AND FROM ADVISORY PERSONNEL. ALL CONCERNED INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL MARINES WORKING WITH PF MUST HAVE A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF THE AIMS OF PROGRAM. ALL OF THE ILLS OF POPULAR FORCE CANNOT BE CURED AT LOCAL LEVEL. GOVERNMENTAL ACTION IS REQUIRED TO IMPROVE PAY, BENEFITS, AVAILABILITY OF UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT.

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