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Ser: 00359 66

15 MAR 1966


[REDACTED] (unclassified upon removal of the basic report)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF/NCC MACV ltr 3/rsb Ser: 0022366
of 2Mar66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

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66-2428

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

Copy / of 30 Copies
3/feb
Ser: 0022366
2 March 1966

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From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251942Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for January 1966

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is herewith submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

G. C. AxteLL
G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

[REDACTED]

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


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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

JANUARY 1966



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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART TWO


SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES



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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III Marine Amphibious Force

Danang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam

LEWIS W. WALT

Major General United States Marine Corps

Commanding

Command Chronology for period 1 January - 31 January 1966

Chief of Staff	Col George C. AXTELL, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff	Not filled
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col Don W. GALBREATH, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col Leo J. DULACKI, USMC 1 - 24 January 1966
	LtCol Joseph T. ODENTHAL 25 - 31 January 1966
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col Harold A. HAYES, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Maj Charles J. KEEVER, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6	Col Elmer G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC
Supply Officer	Col Howard G. TAFT, USMC
Force Engineer	LtCol Lester G. HARMON, USMC
Communications - Electronics Officer	Col Frederick C. DODSON, USMC
Adjutant	LtCol Burton L. LUCAS JR, USMC
Comptroller	Capt Wilson A. VOIGT, USMC
Chaplain	Capt Francis L. GARRET, USN
Combat Information Bureau	Maj Dean C. MACHO, USMC
Director, Command Center	LtCol Joseph V. MC LERNON, USMC

Food Services Officer

LtCol Henry G. ROBERTS, USMC

Headquarters Commandant

Maj Anthony J. PALONIS, JR, USMC

Legal Officer

Col Vernon A. PELTZER, USMC

Surgeon

Capt William A. WOLFMAN, USN

Motor Transport Officer

LtCol F. W. KILLIAN, USMC

Ordnance Officer

Maj Walter F. BOWRON, USMC

Protocol Officer

Maj Ernest H. GRAHAM, JR, USMC

Provost Marshal

Maj Howard L. BARRET

Special Services Officer

Col Edwin G. WINSTEAD

Transportation/Embarkation Officer

Maj George F. CRIBB

SUBORDINATE UNITS

COMMANDER

3d Marine Division

MajGen Lewis W. WALT, USMC

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

MajGen Keith P. MCCUTCHEON, USMC

Force Logistics Support Group

Col Mauro J. PADALINO, USMC

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

LtCol William W. TAYLOR, USMC

7th Engineer Battalion

LtCol Ermine L. MEEKER, USMC

9th Motor Transport Battalion

Maj Joseph F. JONES, USMC

5th Communications Battalion

LtCol Hercules R. KELLY, USMC

Sub Unit #1, First Radio Battalion

Maj Brodrick M. STEWART, USMC

Provisional Dog Platoon

Lt B. E. DAVIS

Average Monthly Strength

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	
2419	35,658	454	6,441	44,972

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PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTSUNCLASSIFIED
INTRODUCTION

A. General. During January 1966 III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at coordinates (AT 994754) which is 350 meters west of DANANG Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, adjacent to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Post. All forces under operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone. III MAF continued to grow as personnel strength increased from 44,138 to 44,972 in January.

B. Activities. III MAF continued operations in the accomplishment of the objective established by reference (c). The most significant operation during January was Operation MALLARD.

II. OPERATIONS

A. General. The continuing objective of destruction of VC forces was accomplished during the month by conducting two major operations inside and two outside the TAOR's; and a third is continuing. The number of small unit operations conducted within the TAOR's increased by 20% over the month of December.

B. OPERATION LONG LANCE. This was a battalion (reinforced) size search and destroy operation, conducted 3-8 January in area (AT 9366), (AT 9466), (AT 9459), (AT 9161), (BT 7954), and (AT 8057). While no significant contacts were made, III MAF units disrupted VC logistic bases, entered relatively unchallenged VC controlled areas and exposed the Vietnamese Nationals to U. S. units for the first time.

C. OPERATION MALLARD. This two battalion (reinforced) search and destroy operation, was conducted 11-17 January in area (ZC 2154), (AT 9253), (AT 9954), (AT 8543), (BT 8346), (BT 7943), and (ZC 2049). An Arc Light Strike was conducted 12 January via (AT 7946) with a battalion exploiting the strike. Although VC casualties were relatively light, the operation was successful in destroying caves and tunnels, keeping the VC moving, and confiscation of large quantities of rice which was turned over to the GVN authorities for redistribution to the people.

D. OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE. This operation is continuing at the end of the reporting period. It is a coordinated ARVN/USMC/USN operation which commenced 28 January in THAC TRU - HUI DAU - DUC PHO - BA TO area. The operation is being conducted in a series of consecutive phases designed to position Task Force Delta in the objective area for the ultimate purpose of finding and destroying major enemy forces. The buildup of forces, Phase I, was accomplished in a manner to deceive the enemy

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as to the ultimate intentions by creating the impression that forces are ashore to conduct operations in a zone approximately 6,000 to 8,000 meters to the west and north of the landing area. Phase II will consist of locating and destroying enemy forces in mountainous area and in Phase III, the forces will be retracted. Phase I was completed at the end of this reporting period with little enemy contact.

E. OTHER OPERATIONS. A total of 12,118 small unit operations were conducted within the TACR's resulting in 482 contacts. This is the largest number of small unit operations conducted to date with contacts increasing in proportion to III MAF activity.

(1) Significant Small Unit Action. At approximately 140130H during operation MALLARD, a fire team from Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was moving from (AT 851518) to (AT 853515). At (BT 851517), the fire team leader observed approximately 40 VC in an assault position. The fire team leader observed the VC before being detected and immediately brought them under a heavy volume of fire. The VC became disorganized and dispersed. An unknown number of VC withdrew to a hill at (AT 853515) and began throwing hand grenades at the fire team. The fire team leader was wounded in the right hand at this time. He withdrew approximately 25 meters and continued to fire on the remaining VC. A squad was dispatched from the platoon position at (AT 851581) and an assault was conducted against the remaining VC. The VC broke contact. 81mm mortars illuminated the area and a search was conducted. Four 60mm mortars and approximately 80 rounds of 60mm ammunition were found in the area of the original contact along with four dead VC, two carbines, approximately 15 packs and a quantity of assorted small arms ammunition.

F. Air Support

1. Fixed Wing. III MAF provided fixed wing aircraft during January as indicated in Table I.

TABLE I

III MAF FIXED WING OPERATIONS

<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>2D AD</u>	<u>TF 77</u>	
Helicopter Escort	591	419			1010
Interdiction	175	413			588
Landing Zone Preparation	56	35			91

TYPE SORTIEUNIT SUPPORTED

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>2D AD</u>	<u>TF 77</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Close Air Support	704	257			961
Photography	98				98
Escort/CAP			117		117
Non Tactical	190				190
Steel Tiger			1070		1070
Other-Special	68		10		78
Landing Zone CAP	60				60
ECM/ELINT			131	2	133
TOTAL	1940	1124	1328	2	4396

2. Helicopter. III MAF helicopters flew 25,952 sorties, transporting 33,777 troops and 1,906 tons of cargo.

III. INTELLIGENCE

A. General. Viet Cong activities within the three Marine TAOR'S continued to emphasize small unit harassing activities including sniper fire, probes, the frequent use of both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, and the widespread employment of booby-traps. Of significance was the introduction and use of 120mm mortars by the Viet Cong against the U. S. Army Special Forces Camp at KHE SANH in the northwest portion of the I CTZ and the DANANG airbase.

B. Operations. Although no regimental or battalion size attacks occurred and only one small attack was reported, the Viet Cong continued their harassments and attacks against GVN outposts and District Headquarters throughout the I CTZ. In one instance the Viet Cong conducted a mortar attack against the 2d ARVN Division Headquarters at QUANG NGAI City and a small scale ground attack against nearby installations including a re-settlement camp. Frequent reports continued to be received of Viet Cong intentions to conduct attacks, raids and sabotage of critical installations within the TAORs; however, with the exception of one mortar attack employing both 120mm and 81mm mortars against the Danang Airbase and Marble Mountain cantonment area, no such activities materialized. The most significant aspects of enemy activities in the I CTZ were: continued efforts to attack and destroy isolated outposts and small detachments such as bridge guards and political action teams in outlying hamlets; continued harassment of Marine forces while avoiding large scale contact with USMC

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units; the introduction and employment, in two widely separated areas, of 120mm mortars; the frequent sabotage of lines of communication; and the probable increase, by one regiment, in the Viet Cong order of battle.

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1. PHU BAI. The tempo of Viet Cong initiated incidents of harassment including small arms fire, mining and booby trapping increased sharply over the previous period. Incidents of enemy propaganda, agitation and terrorism decreased significantly. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the PHU BAI TAOR with a strength equivalent to one regiment, reinforced by local force and guerrilla elements.

2. CHU LAI. In the CHU LAI TAOR the tempo of enemy activity continued at approximately the same level as last month. Small unit actions against Marine forces emphasized harassing fire, sniping and the use of mines and booby traps. A single small scale attack by an estimated 20-30 Viet Cong against a Marine squad position in the northern sector of the TAOR was repulsed. Increases in enemy strength in the vicinity of the CHU LAI Enclave gave the enemy a capability to attack in the TAOR with two Regiments (the 1st and 2d VC), reinforced by two main force battalions, local force and guerrilla elements, and a possible additional VC Regiment (the QUYET TAM).

C. Propaganda and Agitation. While Viet Cong propaganda activities showed a sharp increase within and adjacent to the Marine TAORs, this increase is directly attributable to a concerted VC effort during the TET holiday period to emphasize psychological warfare. Of a total of 92 incidents reported, 65 occurred during the four-day TET "cease-fire". These activities included demonstrations demanding cessation of GVN/US combat operations, air-strikes and artillery fires; rallies; meetings; distribution of leaflets; display of banners and VC flags; and political indoctrination lectures.

D. Terrorism. Agent reports of planned acts of terrorism continued to be received, but there was a downward trend in incidence of such activities. A total of 18 acts of terrorism were reported within or adjacent to the enclaves. Significant incidents included the assassination of a Hamlet Chief, a 17 year old girl Youth Cadre and a Popular Forces Platoon Leader; a mortar attack on a Vietnamese orphanage; an attack on the TAM KY Refugee Camp; and grenade throwing incidents against U.S. personnel and billets in DANANG, resulting in injuries to three USAF enlisted men; and kidnapping of GVN troops and civilians.

E. Sabotage. A Viet Cong document captured on 5 January revealed that the VC have organized several infra-structures within the city of HUE, including infiltration of the Trade Union, University and High School Student Groups. Numerous reports were received of VC plans to sabotage critical

installations. On 12 January, ARVN and U.S. intelligence sources reported Viet Cong plans to infiltrate a VC sapper company into HUE. Acts of sabotage were mainly confined to the lines of communications. The railroad between DANANG and HUE was repeatedly mined and on one occasion an engine and four cars were derailed.

F. Mines and Booby Traps. The ingenious and makeshift employment of mines and booby traps by the Viet Cong continued at a high level within each TACR and in areas on the periphery of the enclaves. Although some increase was noted in the frequency of use of these explosive devices, no significant change in their type or employment was apparent.

G. Anti-Aircraft. The frequency of enemy anti-aircraft incidents showed a slight increase over the previous month while the hit rate decreased. A comparison of anti-aircraft statistics between December and January are indicated in Table II.

TABLE II

ANTI-AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Incidents	247	280
Aircraft Hits	105	63
Number of Hits	252	88

H. Summary of Activity. Pertinent statistics relating to Viet Cong initiated action and personnel and weapons losses for the reporting period are shown in Tables III, IV, and V.

TABLE III

VC INITIATED INCIDENTS

AMBUSH	0
ATTACK	1
HARASSING FIRE	315
MINING/BOOBY TRAPS	59
AA FIRE	279
ASSASSINATION	7

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VC INITIATED INCIDENTS

KIDNAPPING	19
UNCL SABOTAGE	2
PROPAGANDA	17
AGITATION	13
MORTAR FIRE	7

TABLE IV

VC PERSONNEL LOSSES

	CONFIRMED	POSSIBLE
KIA	332	209
UNCL MIA	111	
WIA	26	155
VCC	59	
VCS	618	
RALLIERS	4	

TABLE V

VC WEAPONS LOSSES

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Rifle	10
Carbine	22
Submachine gun	9
Mortar	4
Pistol	2
Unknown type	<u>7</u>
TOTAL	55

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I. VC Order of Battle. Table VI shows the VC Order of Battle in I CTZ.

TABLE VI

III MAF ORDER OF BATTLE HAS ACCEPTED THE FOLLOWING NEWLY IDENTIFIED UNITS IN ICTZ.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>RATING</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>
3D BN 36TH REGT (NVA)	UNK	POSSIBLE	BT 0030	9JAN66
1ST VOLUNTEER BN	200	POSSIBLE	AT 9553	16JAN66
30TH AA CO	UNK	POSSIBLE	BT 0252	23JAN66
QUYET TAM REGT	1500	PROBABLE	QUANG NGAI PROV	16JAN66

ORDER OF BATTLE WITHIN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AS OF 31 JANUARY 1966 IS AS FOLLOWS:

CONFIRMED

1 MILITARY REGION HQ

1 MILITARY SUB-REGION HQ

3 REGT (NVA)

*23 BATTALIONS (3 NVA)

32 COMPANIES

* Includes 1 Anti-Aircraft Battalion and 1 Weapons Battalion

** Includes 1 Weapons Battalion

PROBABLE

3 REGT (1 NVA)

**12 BATTALIONS (2 NVA)

5 COMPANIES

J. Weather. Weather for the month included short periods of moderate rainfall and prolonged periods of drizzle with attendant drizzle, low ceilings and fog. The conditions resulted in occasional deterioration of roads and restriction of mobility and air operations. Precipitation for the month is shown in table VII.

TABLE VII

TOTAL PRECIPITATION FOR

<u>AREA</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>MEAN FOR MONTH</u>
Da Nang	3.05"	4.2"
Chu Lai	5.15"	6.0"
Phu Bai	2.45"	10.0"

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A. Strength. The average monthly strength of III MAF was increased from 44,318 to 44,972 in January. Table VIII shows the Average Personnel Strength for III MAF during January.

TABLE VIII

AVERAGE PERSONNEL STRENGTH**III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters**

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
85	5	171	3

III Marine Amphibious Force

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
2,419	454	35,658	6,441

B. Casualties. III MAF casualties are shown in Table IX.

TABLE IX

III MAF CASUALTIES - JANUARY 1966

<u>BATTLE</u>						<u>NON BATTLE</u>				
<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>		
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
47	4	413	18	12	6	6	3	51	15	

C. National Health Agencies Campaign. The Tenth Annual National Health Agencies Campaign commenced on 15 January for a period of one month. Force/Naval Component Command Bulletin 5340 (Enclosure (19)) sets forth the program.

D. Force/Naval Component Command Order 5420.1 dated 12Jan66 (Enclosure (20)) established the Political and Civil Affairs Coordinating Committee. The purpose of this committee is to evaluate the political effects of the

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activities of the Command as related to the mission of the III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command in the Republic of Vietnam.

E. Special Services Functions

1. The Brothers Four, a USO show, gave one performance at MAG-16 on 5 January 1966. This was the only show given in Danang due to the late arrival and early departure of the show. The show was well received by an audience of about 600 persons.

2. During the period 14 through 31 January 1966, a total of 200 "B" and 200 "C" kits, comprised of recreational material, were received from CG, FMFPAC and distributed to subordinate organizations.

3. The American Red Cross Clubmobile Unit, Da Nang held its official opening ceremony on 15 January 1966. The opening was attended by General WALT and General ENGLISH and representatives of the four subordinate commands of III MAF/NCC.

4. Charlton Heston, the actor, made a visitation tour of the III MAF/NCC 17 through 20 January 1966. Mr. Heston visited 41 battalion/squadron units.

G. R&R Program.

1. During January 1966, the Force R&R Section was established with a T/O of 1 officer and 5 enlisted men. The officer and 4 enlisted men are employed at Da Nang at the Transient Facility compound. This section manages and administers the MACV and Force R&R Program in the I Corps area for all services. The remaining enlisted man is stationed in Saigon and acts as the MAF/NCC R&R Liaison NCO at the Meyerkord Hotel for in-country R&R.

2. All augmentation personnel provided to MACV for assignment to R&R Liaison Sections in Bangkok and Manila were replaced during the month. The American Embassy in Manila and other officials have requested that the services of the original officer be retained. Accordingly, the replacement officer has been recalled to Da Nang and the original officer will remain in Manila.

3. The MACV quota allocations for January 1966 are set forth in Table X.

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BANGKOK	728	TOKYO	340
HONG KONG	363	MANILA	138
TAIPEI	145	SAIGON	1,300

4. A CINCPACAF message to CINCPAC indicated that commercial aircraft will be chartered to operate the Tokyo, Manila and Taipei legs of the MACV out-of-country program in the near future. Military aircraft will continue to operate the Bangkok and Hong Kong legs. It was also indicated that with the commencement of commercial aircraft assistance, the program would double in two months and increase five-fold by the end of Calendar Year 66.

5. The Force R&R program to Okinawa has been reduced by one-half to correspond with the MACV quota increase for January. This is in keeping with the spirit of CINCPAC approval to continue that R&R until such time as MACV provides the full, planned 13,500 it strived for some months ago. This action has allowed the length of stay for R&R personnel on Okinawa to be increased from 3 to 6 nights, thereby bringing Okinawa R&R up-to-par with the other out-of-country ports as far as length of stay is concerned. A total of 1,280 quotas were available for Okinawa R&R during January 1966.

V. LOGISTICS

A. General. Consistent with availability of materials, satisfactory progress in all types of construction was maintained throughout the month. The main effort was devoted to construction, repair and maintenance of the Danang MBR and the airfield facilities at Chu Lai. Heavy rains during the last week of January caused some road damage, however, trafficability was maintained and essentially all road work continued.

B. Supply. During January supply action was focused on expediting critical items of supply. RED BALL increased by 101 items during the month. The majority of this 101 increase was due to the criticality of the Rough Terrain Forklift 6000 lb, and the high deadline rate for this item of equipment.

Total line items on Red Ball 1 January - 207
 Total line items added during January - 169
 Total line items deleted during January - 68
 Total line items on Red Ball 31 January - 308

FMFPac message 190543Z January, outlining the Red Ball system and procedures was received, required some revision to the Red Ball system within III MAF. In compliance with the message new procedures were sent to 3d Marine Division, First Marine Aircraft Wing and Force Logistic Support Group.

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SECRET**C. Embarkation and Port Operations.**

1. The Subic Bay to Danang Shuttle was initiated during January when the USS TIOGA COUNTY (IST 1158) arrived at Danang on 12 January with cargo which had been transferred from the SS WILLIAM KYKES at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. Cargo was also transferred from the SS SOLON TRUMAN and the operation proved highly successful for eliminating congestion in Danang Harbor and expediting shipment when weather conditions are not favorable for debarkation in Danang. IST's will continue to lift high priority Class V(A), aviation supply and other critical cargoes as required. Naval Support Activity set a record cargo handling day on 25 January with a total cargo throughput of 9301 S/T. At the end of January the Chu Lai backlog was reduced to 2649 S/T. This is the lowest backlog figure in five months. The following data is submitted concerning cargo and ships handled during the month:

45 MSTs Ships and 15 USS Ships debarked at Danang
 20 IST's and two deep draft ships debarked at Chu Lai
 127,547 M/T were off-loaded at Danang with a daily average of
 4114 M/T and 2375 S/T
 32,925 M/T were off-loaded at Chu Lai with a daily average of
 1,062 M/T and 580 S/T

D. Ordnance.

1. The on hand stocks of class V and V(A) continued to improve as the weather permitted an increase in the quantity unloaded from ships. III MAF received two (2) new items of Chemical Warfare equipment i.e. the Cluster Canister Riot Control, CS, 130 lb, E-139 and Multiple Launcher 35mm 16 Tube E-8.

E. Fiscal.

1. During January, CY-65 AIK funds were closed out. The comptroller opened up the CY-66 AIK Funds and allocated these funds to respective units.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. During the month of January 1966, the III Marine Amphibious Force Communications Center experienced a slight increase in total transmissions as outlined below:

	DECEMBER	JANUARY	INCREASE
Incoming	39,648	41,527	1,879
Outgoing	31,538	31,614	76
TOTAL	71,186	73,141	1,955

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B. Mr. Edward Radzokowski, Electronic Engineer (wire), from OICC Mid-Pac, reported to this Command on 15 January for the purpose of conducting an outside plant engineering survey for the installation of an automatic dial exchange at Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. Mr. Radzokowski has completed the survey of the Chu Lai area and is presently preparing plans for submission to OICC Republic of Vietnam (Saigon), who is responsible for the design and construction of the exchange building. In addition, Mr. Radzokowski will also compile the Chu Lai dial telephone requirements and forward this information to OICC MidPac in order to prepare preliminary engineering on the central office equipment (inside plant). Subsequently, he will follow the same procedure for Quang Ngai.

C. A five member communication engineering survey team reported to this Command on 29 January for the purpose of conducting a survey of fixed plant communication center equipment requirements. The team is composed of the following personnel: Team Leader, Major MITCHELL representing CNO/CMC; Captain BRONSON representing CINCPACFLT/COM FMFPAC; Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Thornton representing NAVCOMMSYSHQ; and Mr. Asate representing INDMAN 14/NAVSEEC. The team has completed an extensive survey of the communication centers serving the major headquarters within III Marine Amphibious Force and is preparing recommendations for future fixed plant equipment requirements. In addition, the team has prepared blue line design drawings for the future construction of the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center in Marble Mountain Area.

VII CIVIC ACTION

A. General. The basic objective of the III MAF Civic Action Program remained the same during January. Particular emphasis was placed on TET, incorporating Army C.A. teams and Operation Double Eagle.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. The council met each week during the month of January, during which a Roads Committee was formed, consisting of the following memberships: I Corps Engineer, III MAF Engineer, I Corps MACV Engineer Advisor GVN Engineer for 1st Region and USOM Regional Engineer advisor for 1st Region. The council received reports from the following committees: Commodities Distribution Committee, Public Health Committee and Agriculture Committee. The council was briefed on the NGU HANK SON pacification program and the CARE-USMCR fund. Further the committee published a memorandum for record which formalized membership, mission and statement of policy.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committee. All the Committees functioned during the month making studies in their respective fields. The following reports were submitted to the council:

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1. Commodities Distribution Committee. The committee's primary business was to decide what the proper distribution of the commodities received from American Christmas Trucks and Trains (ACTT) would be. It was agreed that an inventory would be taken by a combined Vietnamese-United States team. The Government of Viet-Nam agreed to make a warehouse available for this purpose. It was agreed that Province Commodities Distribution Committees were to be established for the purpose of making recommendations to the Corps committee concerning the distribution of these commodities in accordance with the following general priorities: needy families in newly pacified hamlets; refugees and ralliers in resettlement centers; Popular Force members and their families; widows and survivors of RVAF members; orphanages and hospitals. The committee did not undertake to discuss problems in connection with transportation of these commodities throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone, which is yet to be solved.

2. Public Health Committee. Presented a report on progress which has been made in connection with integrating the Medical Civic Action Program of III MAF and the Government of Viet-Nam rural health program. Highlights of the report follows:

(a) The committee's original concept, as developed 11 September 1965, was that medical assistance would be provided by the military Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) teams in areas of operations. As areas become secure, these teams would be replaced by rural health workers.

(b) In November 1965, it was discovered that the Administration General for Health Development (AGHD), which was responsible for the administration of the rural health program, was to be abolished 1 January 1966 and its functions transferred to the Ministry of Health. This served to delay developments further because of the lack of clear-cut lines of authority and specific guidance.

(c) On 4 December 1965, the Minister of Health agreed to hire persons trained by military medical teams, if the training program were approved in advance.

3. Agriculture Committee. An agriculture study of the I Corps Tactical Zone was submitted to the Council which covered the entire scope of agriculture problems, from fisheries to irrigation. This study will be used to determine which areas would be suitable for agricultural development.

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4. Medical Assistance. Forty (40) MEDCAP teams provided 65,000 Medical and Dental Treatments to 56,000 Vietnamese citizens in 122 locations during the month of January. This was approximately a 13% reduction from December which is contributed to a 4 day suspension during the TET holidays. Treatments administered were as follows:

Skin disease	26.5%
Miscellaneous ailments	18.0%
Headache	17.0%
Respiratory infections	10.0%
Stomach ailments	9.0%
Injuries	7.0%
Dental conditions	5.0%
Diarrhea	4.5%
Fevers	3.0%

The number of treatments by enclaves were:

Danang	39,060
Chu Lai	23,284
Phi Bai	2,059

Sixteen health workers, 2 volunteer nurses, and 4 volunteer medical trainees received training during the month. Thirty students at Hue University School of Medicine received formal training in medicine and dental emergencies from III MAF Medical Officers.

5. Project Handclasp. Approximately 63,000 pounds of miscellaneous commodities were received during January through Project Handclasp. In addition, 300 measured tons of commodities were received from American Christmas Train and Trucks (ACTT).

6. CARE Program. During January, III MAF units received 100 textile kits, 3667 school kits, 30 woodworking kits, 5 blacksmith kits, 12 midwifery kits and 38 midwifery replacement kits. In addition, 5,000 dollars in plasters were delivered to the CG III MAF to initiate his contingency fund.

7. Catholic Relief Society. 430,00 lbs of rolled wheat was received by III MAF units from Catholic Relief during the month of January.

VIII PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

A. General. The psychological warfare program continued with general leaflet and poster dissemination, loudspeaker broadcasts and audio-visual team shows.

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B. TET Psychological Warfare Campaign. This campaign began on 9 January with leaflet drops coordinated with aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. 28.4 million copies of 14 leaflets were dropped in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Three themes were utilized with each emphasized on the dates indicated below.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>THEME</u>
9-11 January	The Viet Cong are losing the war
15-17 January	Lonliness of the Viet Cong/NVA
18-20 January	Safe conduct passes were distributed

Seventy seven Viet Cong/NVA turned themselves in during this campaign.

C. Operation MALLARD. A total of 425,000 leaflets were dropped during January exclusive of the TET PsyWar campaign. A large portion of this total included leaflets dropped in support of Operation MALLARD. Main theme of leaflets used during this operation was to explain the presence of U. S. Forces in Viet-Nam. Other themes included the following:

1. VC are losing the war
2. GVN has the power to best govern the people, and will do so in their interest
3. GVN can provide a more abundant life for the Vietnamese people
4. Viet Cong are the true enemy of the people
5. Surrender appeals and safe-conduct passes

D. Audio/Visual Psychological Warfare Teams. These teams from the I Corps Joint PsyWar/CA Center continued to operate throughout the Danang TAOR. Teams consist of a U. S. leader, a Vietnamese propagandist and interpreter, and a U. S. audio/visual technician. These teams are used to augment the III MAF PsyWar capability, and provide an excellent means of giving a face-to-face approach to themes that are reinforced by leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. These teams are used in general campaigns and have also been called upon to exploit specific situations. For example, if there is a significant GVN/US victory in the immediate area, or there is a particular Viet Cong atrocity that is known to the people in the area, the audio/visual psywar team will exploit these events.

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E. The 27th Psychological Operations Field Support Detachment. This detachment was established in Quang Ngai City, Quang Ngai Province during January. It will support the 2d ARVN Division and the U. S. Marines located in the Chu Lai area. This detachment has the same capability as the 1st PsyOp Field Support Detachment in Danang, with the exception of the audio/visual psywar teams. The audio/visual trucks which are part of the detachments normal equipment have not yet arrived. It is expected in the near future. The introduction of this detachment will fill the gap in psychological warfare operations in the Chu Lai Area.

IX COMBAT INFORMATION

A. Photography. During January 17,500 feet of motion picture film was exposed and forwarded to CMC. Approximately 10% was VIP coverage, 15% Civic action, 15% special projects and 60% operational coverage. Coverage of special interest included: CMC visit and Medical Evacuation for CMC.

B. Radio/Television. Fifty nine releases were produced for radio/TV and motion picture. The documentary radio program "Night in Vietnam" was completed. It featured Company L, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines on Hill 22. It was designed to give a civilian audience an insight into what Marines face daily. Four and one-half hours of sound was edited to 28 minutes. Actual sounds of Viet Cong small arms fire, Marine small arm, mortar, artillery fire and interviews with the officers and men of Company L are included in the program.

C. News Releases. A total of 198 news releases were distributed. The releases covered III MAF activities with VIP's, operations, civic action, special projects and features. 1325 releases were forwarded to Fleet Home Town News.

D. Escorts. The Combat Information Bureau conducted 383 escorted trips for correspondents to the three enclaves. In addition to resident correspondents from all wire services and the three major TV networks, notable press representatives were: Frank McCullough, John Mulligan and Larry Burrows from Time-Life Magazine; Paul Avery, San Francisco Chronicle and Don Niff, Time Magazine. Notable network personalities included: Dean Brellis, NBC; Jack Lawrence, CBS; and Ray Maloney, ABC.

X. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE ACTIVITY

A. General. The number of VC initiated incidents decreased in the I Corps Tactical Zone for the first time since July 1965. This decrease is attributed to the lull during the TET holiday period. VC activities throughout I Corps were highlighted by large scale mortar attacks. One significant operation was conducted during the period and one is continuing.

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B. Operations. I Corps (ARVN) conducted 55 battalion or larger operations as compared to 35 in December. Operations against the Viet Cong resulted in 513 VC killed compared to 1019 in December. The number of Viet-Cong captured declined from 192 in December to 97 this month. Weapons captured also decreased from 211 to 117. ARVN battle deaths declined from 427 to 67 while the number of weapons lost decreased from 211 to 177.

1. Operation QUYET 12. This search and destroy operation was conducted in the 2d ARVN Division Area approximately 12 miles northwest of Quang Ngai City. During the operation a B52 strike was exploited. ARVN units participating were the 37th Ranger Battalion; 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment; 4th Company, 4th APC Troop and an airborne task force composed of the 1st and 5th Battalions. Results of the operation were: 14 VC KIA, 11 VCC and 23 VCS; and 3 weapons captured. Fifteen hundred pounds of salt, fourteen tons of rice and ten tons of rice plants were destroyed.

2. Lien Ket 22. This is a coordinated search and clear operation being conducted in conjunction with operation DOUBLE EAGLE. The 1st and 4th Battalion, RVN Marine Combat Group; 37th Ranger Battalion, 4th Regiment; and 4th Company, 4th APC Troop are participating. It commenced on 29 January and is continuing.

C. Air Support. US Aircraft flew 1,623 (1,124 USMC) and VNAF 333 sorties in support of I Corps Tactical Zone. This was a marked increase over last month when US flew 969 and VNAF 246 sorties. One B52 strike was conducted on suspected VC troop concentrations in Quang Nam Special Sector and two in Quang Ngai Province.

D. Naval Gunfire. Naval Gunfire conducted 184 missions and expended 3,287 rounds in support of I Corps Tactical Zone, eighty percent of the missions were conducted in support of the 2d Infantry Division (ARVN) in Quang Ngai Province.

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28 January - Operation DOUBLE EAGLE began.

29 January - LtGen John A. HEINTGES

Deputy COMUSMACV

30 January - LtGen Jean E. ENGLER

DCG, USARV

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PART IV

REFERENCES

- (a) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology January 1966
- (b) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology January 1966
- (c) COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) dated 21 November 1965
- (d) Maps, Vietnam L701 Series, Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 6658 I II III IV, 6659 II III IV, 6756 I IV, 6757 II III, 6559 I II III IV, 6560 II III IV

ENCLOSURES

- (1) ✓ III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop list (U)✓
- (2) ✓ Annex W to Operation Plan 106-66 (DOUBLE TIME). (Contingency Plan for Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province).
- (3) ✓ FLSG Command Chronology for January 1966
- (4) ✓ 3d Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology for January 1966
- (5) ✓ 5th Communication Battalion Command Chronology for January 1966
- (6) ✓ 7th Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for January 1966
- (7) ✓ Memorandum for Records: 3/EHA; tes of 13 January 1966, Subject "I Corps/II Corps Conference, 0930-1130, 13 January 1966"
- (8) ✓ Summary of Significant Events in Planning Operation DOUBLE EAGLE
- (9) ✓ After Action Report on the Mortar Attack of MCB-9 cantonment on 25 January 1966
- (10) ✓ III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Subjects: "War Dog Requirements"
- (11) ✓ III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Subjects: "Naval Gunfire Support"
- (12) ✓ III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Subjects: "Fragmentation of Marine Air-Ground Team"
- (13) ✓ III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Subjects: "Detecting Set Intrusion AN/PSR-1"
- (14) ✓ III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Subjects: "RVN Marine Corps Employment in Amphibious Operations"
- (15) ✓ III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Subject: "People's Action Team (PAT)"
- (16) ✓ III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Subjects: "RF/PF Status and Improvement"
- (17) ✓ CG III MAF 150536Z, Subject: "III MAF and NCC Command Relations in Vietnam"
- (18) ✓ CG III MAF 180652Z, Subject: "Operations During TET"
- (19) ✓ Force/Naval Component Command Bulletin 5340 of 28 Dec 1965 Subject: "National Health Agencies Campaign"
- (20) ✓ Force/Naval Component Command Order 5420.1 Subject: "Political and Civil Affairs Coordinating Committee"

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HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco,
California 96601

For/NCC Bul 005440
103/GHG/jfc
Serial: 009666
26 January 1966

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FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND BULLETIN 005440

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop List (U)

Ref: (a) III MAF/NCC Order 3121.1B

Encl: (1) III MAF/NCC 31Dec65 Task Organization Troop List

1. Purpose. To promulgate the III MAF/NCC 31 December 1965 Task Organization/Troop List.
2. Background. Reference (a) requires subordinate units to submit by the 10th day of each month a report of their task organization/troop list based on operational control for the last day of the preceding month.
3. Information. Enclosure (1) contains the 31 December 1965 III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop List. Addressees are requested to review enclosures and report changes to this Headquarters.
4. Self-cancellation. 20 February 1966.


G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

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Encl (1)

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Task Organization - 31 December 1965

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
I. <u>Naval Component Command (I CTG)</u>	9	19	224	4789	5041
A. <u>Headquarters (DANANG)</u>	6	18	1		25
1. Det, Sub Unit #2 H&SCo HqBn	5	7	1		13
2. Det, 5th Comm Bn		10			10
3. Det, H&HS-1 MWHG, FMAW	1	1			2
B. <u>30th NCR</u>	3	1	78	2023	2105
1. Hq, 30th NCR (DANANG)	3	1	6	25	35
2. MCB-4 (CHU LAI)			18	498	516
3. MCB-5 (DA NANG)			17	552	569
4. MCB-8 (DA NANG)			21	397	418
5. MCB-8 (PHU BAI)			1	49	50
6. MCB-9 (DA NANG)			15	502	517
C. <u>Nav Supt Act</u>			145	2766	2911
1. DANANG (PCS)			101	2281	2382
2. DANANG (TDY)			15	291	306
3. Station Hospital (DANANG)			29	184	213
4. CHU LAI Detachment				10	10
II. <u>III Marine Amphibious Force</u>	2411	35869	194	1497	39971
A. <u>HQ III MAF DANANG</u>	97	723	5	11	836
1. Staff	75	120	5	2	202
2. 5th CommBn (-)	18	584		9	611
3. Prov Dog Plt	1	11			12
4. 7th CI Tm (CHU LAI)	3	8			11
B. <u>Base Defense Bn (DANANG)</u>	32	955	3	51	1041

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
1. 3d Bn 9th Marines	32	955	3	51	1041
C. <u>7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	35	998	1	16	1050
1. 7th Engr Bn (- Co C)	29	855	1	16	901
2. 1st Bridge Co (-)	6	143			149
D. <u>9th MT Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	18	397	1	9	425
E. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st ANGLICO</u>	5	42	6		53
1. SAIGON	1	14	1		16
2. BIEN HOA		5	1		6
3. BERIA	1	3			4
4. DANANG		4	1		5
5. QUANG NGAI	1	3			4
6. QUI NHON	1	2			3
7. PLEIKU		4	1		5
8. NHA TRANG		2	1		3
9. CAN THO	1	5	1		7
F. <u>Det. J, 1st Radio Bn FMF</u>	2	65			67
1. HQ & TM 1(DANANG)	1	35			36
2. Team 2,(CHU LAI)	1	26			27
3. Team 3,(PHU BAI)		4			4
G. <u>3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF</u>	1056	21162	106	1045	23369
1. <u>HqBn (-)(DANANG)</u>	155	1508	13	27	1703
a. HqCo	119	690	13	27	849
b. Comm Co (-)	11	356			367
c. Service Co	15	318			333
d. MP Co (-)	5	111			116
e. 3d CIT	4	16			20
f. Det, 1st ITT	1	17			18

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2. <u>3d Marines (-)(Rein)(DANANG-PHU BAI)</u>	168	3830	10	174	4182
a. <u>HqCo (Rein)(DANANG)</u>	17	219	1	5	242
(1) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv		3			3
b. <u>1stBn, 1stMarines (DANANG)</u>	37	983	3	57	1080
c. <u>1stBn, 3dMarines (DANANG)</u>	39	1023	3	53	1118
d. <u>2dBn, 1stMarines(Rein)(PHU BAI)</u>	75	1602	3	59	1739
(1) 2dBn, 1stMarines	40	999	3	50	1092
(2) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	1	6			7
(3) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st AT Bn (5 M50A1 Ontos)	1	19			20
(4) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1stEngrBn	1	44			45
(5) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st TK Bn (5 M48A3 Tanks)	1	27			28
(6) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Recon Bn	1	23			24
(7) <u>4thBn, 12th Marines (-)(Rein)</u> (PHU BAI)	30	484		9	523
(a) HqBtry(-)(Rein)(CMR Team)	14	161		3	178
(b) Btry M, 4thBn(SP)(6-155How)	4	120		2	126
(c) Btry B, 1stBn, 11thMar, (6-105How)	8	124		2	134
(d) 107mm Mortar Btry, 1stBn, 11th Marines (6 Mortars)	4	79		2	85
3. <u>ADC Command Group (CHU LAI)</u>	7	26			33
4. <u>4th Marines (-)(Rein)(CHU LAI)</u>	107	2654	6	128	2895
a. <u>HqCo</u>	24	268	2	2	296
(1) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	3	16			19
b. <u>1stBn, 4th Marines</u>	35	968	2	58	1063
c. <u>2dBn, 4th Marines</u>	34	969	2	58	1063

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
d. <u>CoB (-)(Rein), 3dAT Bn</u>	2	67	2		71
(1) Co B (-)	1	40			41
(2) Det, H&SCo, 3d AT Bn	1	27	2		30
e. <u>CoB (-)(Rein), 3dEngrBn</u>	3	119	2		124
(1) Co B (-)	3	75			78
(2) Det Support Co		44	2		46
f. <u>CoA (-)(Rein), 1stAmTracBn, FMF</u> (34 LVTP-5, 1 LVTC, 1 LVTR-1, 2LVTEL)	5	168	4		177
g. <u>Co C (-), 3d TK Bn, FMF</u> (12 M48A3 Tanks)	4	95	2		101
(1) Co C (-)	4	85			89
(2) Det, H&SCo (3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)		10	2		12
5. <u>Artillery Bn Group (CHU LAI)</u>	76	1273	6	24	1379
a. <u>3dBn (-), 11th Marines</u>	36	593	2	11	642
(1) Hq Btry	11	150	2	3	166
(2) Btry G (6-105How)	7	118		2	127
(3) Btry H (6-105How)	8	120		2	130
(4) Btry I (6-105How)	7	125		2	134
(5) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 mortars)	3	80		2	85
b. <u>3dBn (-)(Rein), 12th Marines</u>	40	680	4	13	737
(1) HqBtry (Rein)	14	164	4	11	193
(a) HqBtry	14	150	4	11	179
(b) Det, CMR HqBtry, 12th Marines		14			14
(2) Btry G (6-105How)	8	114			122

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(3) Btry H (6-105How)	7	113			120
(4) Btry M, 4thBn, 11thMar (6-155How)	5	131		2	138
(5) 3d 155 Gun Btry, (SP)(-) FMP (4-155Guns)	4	113			117
(6) 1st Plt, 1st 8"HowBtry (SP) (2-8"How)	2	45			47
6. <u>7th Marines (Rein) (CHU LAI)</u>	147	3576	11	183	3917
a. <u>HqCo (-)(Rein)</u>	21	281	2	3	307
(1) HqCo (-)	17	224	2	3	246
(2) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	4	57			61
b. <u>1st Bn, 7th Marines</u>	39	979	3	62	1083
c. <u>2d Bn, 7th Marines</u>	38	914	3	55	1010
d. <u>3d Bn, 7th Marines</u>	37	942	3	57	1039
e. <u>Co C (Rein), 1st AT Bn</u> (15 M50A1 Ontos)	3	85		2	90
(1) Co C	2	59			61
(2) HqCo (-)	1	26		2	29
f. <u>CoC (Rein), 1st EngrBn</u>	4	157		1	162
g. <u>CoA (Rein), 3d AmTrac Bn</u> (47 M48A3 Tanks)	5	218		3	226
7. <u>9th Marines (DANANG)</u>	115	3090	10	168	3383
a. <u>HqCo</u>	15	193	2	3	213
b. <u>1st Bn, 9th Marines</u>	35	969	3	56	1063
c. <u>2d Bn, 9th Marines</u>	36	958	2	54	1050
d. <u>3d Bn, 9th Marines</u>	29	970	3	55	1057
8. <u>12th Marines (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	111	1705	8	36	1860
a. <u>HqBtry (-)(2-CMRS)</u>	22	209	3	4	238

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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
b. <u>1st 8" How Btry (SP)(-)(Rein)</u> (4-8" How)	7	161		3	171
c. <u>3d Plt, 3d 155 Gun Btry (SP),</u> <u>FMF (2-155G)</u>	1	35		1	37
d. <u>1st Bn (-), 12th Marines</u>	43	701	2	14	760
(1) HqBtry	14	163	2	4	183
(2) Btry A (6-105How)	7	115		2	124
(3) Btry A, 1st Bn, 11thMar	8	124		2	134
(4) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars)	3	75		2	80
(5) Btry C, 1st Bn, 12thMar	8	110		2	120
(6) Btry K, 4thBn, 12thMar (6-155 (SP))	3	114		2	119
e. <u>2dBn (-), 12th Marines</u>	38	599	3	14	654
(1) HqBtry	14	153	3	5	175
(2) Btry D (6-105How)	7	114		2	123
(3) Btry E (6-105How)	7	109		1	117
(4) Btry F (6-105How)	7	106		3	116
(5) Btry L, 4thBn, 12th Mar (6-155 (SP))	3	117		3	123
9. <u>3d AT Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	15	305		10	330
a. H&SCo	9	147		7	163
b. Co A (-)(Rein)(10 M50A1 Ontos)	3	63		1	67
c. Co C (Rein)(20 M50A1 Ontos)	3	95		2	100
10. <u>3d Engr Bn(-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	28	686	1	13	728
a. H&SCo	10	117	1	13	141
b. Support Co	4	268			272
c. Co A (-)	5	74			79

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
d. Co C	6	147			153
e. Co C, 7th Engr Bn	3	80			83
11. <u>3d Med Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	3	101	27	153	284
a. H&SCo	3	101	8	45	157
b. Co C			18	102	120
c. Co D			1	6	7
12. <u>3d Recon Bn (DANANG)</u>	21	302	1	17	341
a. H&SCo	9	99	1	6	115
b. Co A	4	66		4	74
c. Co C	4	68		3	75
d. Co D	4	69		4	77
13. <u>Recon Group Alpha (CHU LAI)</u>	8	132		5	145
a. Co B (-) (Rein), 3d Recon Bn	4	63		2	69
(1) H&SCo					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 2d Plt					
b. Co C (Rein), 1st Recon Bn	4	69		3	76
14. <u>1st Force Recon</u>	9	128		5	142
15. <u>3d MT Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	10	154		8	172
a. H&SCo	7	84		8	99
b. Co A (-) (1t M-35, 2½ ton trucks)	2	39			41
c. 2dPlt, CoB(15 M-35, 2½ ton trucks)	1	31			32

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
16. <u>1stAmTracBn(-)(Rein),FMF (DANANG)</u>	26	639	2	13	680
a. H&SCo (12 LVTP5, 3 LVTC1, 1 LVTR1)	17	319	2	11	349
b. 1st Prov Armored Amphib Plt (6 LVTH-6)	2	74		2	78
c. Co B (Rein) (54 LVTP5, 4 LVTC1, 1 LVTR1)	7	246			253
17. <u>3d Tank Bn (-)(Rein) (DANANG)</u>	23	489	1	11	524
a. H&SCo (-) (2 M48A3 Tks)	15	267	1	7	290
b. Co A (-) (Rein) (12 M48A3 Tk and 3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)	3	89		2	94
c. Co B (Rein) (17 M48A3 Tk & 3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)	5	110		2	117
d. 1st Plt Co C (5 M48A3 Tks)		23			23
18. <u>3d Shore Party Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	22	438	1	25	486
a. H&SCo	12	184	1	10	207
b. Co A	3	86		5	94
c. Co B	4	82		5	91
d. Co C	3	86		5	94
19. <u>Co C, 1st Shore Party Bn (CHU LAI)</u>	5	126	1	10	142
20. <u>3d Dental Co (DANANG)</u>			8	35	43
H. <u>First Marine Aircraft Wing</u>	1068	8332	40	147	9587
1. <u>MWHG-1</u>	249	2159	12	50	2470
a. H&HS-1 (DANANG)	141	803	10	28	982
b. MASS-2	19	119			138
(1) Det A (CHU LAI)	4	18			22

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(2) Det B (DANANG)	4	19			23
(3) Det C (CHU LAI)	3	13			16
(4) DASC (DANANG)	7	19			26
c. MACS-7	23	221		2	246
(1) Det A (PHU BAI)	3	17			20
d. 1st LAAM Bn (DANANG)	13	481	1	10	505
e. 2d LAAM Bn (CHU LAI)	32	449	1	10	492
2. <u>MAG-11 (DANANG)</u>	178	1817	5	21	2021
a. H&MS-11	34	416			450
b. MABS-11	13	490	3	16	522
c. VMFA-115	41	274	1	2	318
d. VMFA-323	43	278	1	2	324
e. VMCJ-1	29	222			251
f. VMF(AW)-312	18	137		1	156
3. <u>MAG-12 (CHU LAI)</u>	166	1654	6	26	1852
a. H&MS-12	41	364			405
b. MABS-12	19	519	3	22	563
c. VMA-211	29	179		2	210
d. VMA-214	24	176	1		201
e. VMA-223	27	178	1	2	208
f. VMA-224	22	176	1		199
g. MATCU-67	4	62			66
4. <u>MAG-16</u>	240	1407	9	21	1677

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
a. H&MS-16 (DANANG)	31	281			312
b. MABS-16 (DANANG)	13	441	5	6	365
c. Det MABS (PHU BAI)		12			12
d. Det MABS (QUANG NGAI)		2			2
e. Det MABS (QUANG TRI)		2			2
f. SU#1, MABS-16 (DANANG)	10	61		1	72
g. HMM-161 (PHU BAI)	50	178	1	3	232
h. HMM-263 (DANANG)	46	175	1	3	225
i. HMM-361 (DANANG)	51	158	1	3	213
j. VMO-2 (DANANG)	33	136	1	5	175
k. MATCU-69 (DANANG)	6	61			67
5. <u>MAG-36</u>	235	1295	8	29	1567
a. H&MS-36 (CHU LAI)	34	315			349
b. MABS-36 (CHU LAI)	14	342	4	26	386
c. HMM-362 (CHU LAI)	53	160	1		214
d. HMM-363 (QUI NHON)	54	176	2	3	235
e. HMM-364 (CHU LAI)	54	152	1		207
f. VMO-6 (CHU LAI)	26	150			176
I. <u>Force Logistics Support Group</u>	98	3195	32	216	3543
1. <u>Force Logistics Support Group (DANANG)</u>	52	1649	4	31	1736
a. H&S Co (-) (Rein) 3dSvobn	22	373	3	15	413
b. Supply Co (-) (Rein) 3dSvobn	22	750	1	16	789
c. Maint Co (-) (Rein) 3dSvobn	6	399			405

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
d. Truok Co (-) (Rein) 3dSvobn	2	127			129
2. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit #1 (CHU LAI)</u> 38	1308		19	130	1495
a. <u>FLSU Headquarters</u>	24	871		8	903
(1) H&SCo (Provisional)	11	197		8	216
(2) Supply Co (Provisional)	7	326			333
(3) Maint Co (Provisional)	6	348			354
b. <u>Shore Party Group (Provisional)</u>	4	136	1	10	151
(1) Co "C", 1stSPBn	4	136	1	10	151
c. <u>MT Group (Provisional)</u>	10	268		4	282
(1) Co "A", 7th MTBn (-)	3	84		2	89
(2) 2dPlt, Co "C", 9th MTBn	1	27			28
(3) Co "C", 1stMTBn (-)	3	81		1	85
(4) Co "C", 3d MTBn	3	76		1	80
d. <u>Co "B", 3dMedBn (Rein)</u>		33	18	108	159
3. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit #2 (PHU BAI)</u> 8	238		9	57	312
a. <u>FLSU Headquarters</u>	6	190		4	200
(1) H&SCo (Provisional)	3	40		4	47
(2) Supply Plat		62			62
(3) Maint Plat	3	88			91
b. <u>Co "B", 3d MTBn (-)</u>	2	37			39
c. <u>Co "A", 3d MedBn</u>		11	9	53	73

Major Lee

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 Ser: *6-3*

JAN 21 1966

Annex W-3 to Operation Plan 106-66 (Double Time)

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 6657 I, II; 6757
 III, IV

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Confirmed and probable enemy units located in and near TAM KY DISTRICT are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GENERAL LOCATION</u>
(a) 1st VC Regiment	TIEN PHOUC DISTRICT
60th Bn	Vic BT 1036
80th Bn	Vic BT 1920
90th Bn	Vic BT 1915
400th Arty Bn (Possible 1-105mm How, 6-81mm mortars and 75mm and 57mm RR)	Vic BT 3005 (loc last rptd 5Sep65)
(b) 36th PAVN Regiment (Probable)	Vic BT 0030
1st Bn	Vic BT 0130
2d Bn	Vic BT 0131
3d Bn (Possible)	Unlocated
(c) 5 Separate Battalions	TIEN PHOUC DISTRICT
49th Bn (MF) (Probable)	Vic BT 1528
70th Bn (MF)	Vic BT 4000
94th Bn (MF) (Probable)	Vic AT 9538
CHU DUNG BN (MF)	Vic BT 0023
195th AA Bn (18-12.7 AA guns)	

(d) 7 LF Companies QUANG TIN PROVINCE

- (2) Total strength of these units is estimated to be 4900. Guerilla forces which could influence friendly operations in the area number approximately 300.

W-3-1

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- (3) No 120mm mortars have been reported in the area, however, the enemy possesses that capability elsewhere in I Corps.
- (4) Five recent agent reports of various degrees of validity indicate that 2 battalions (60th and 90th Battalions) of the 1st VO Regiment may be moving from their present locations to central and SOUTHERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE. Other reports indicate that 3 or 4 local force companies in the area may combine to form a battalion.
- (5) In summary, the enemy has a capability to attack TAM KY CITY and ARVN outposts in the TAM KY DISTRICT with a force of up to 2 Regiments (5 infantry and 1 artillery battalion), 5 separate battalions (4 infantry and 1 AA battalion), 7 local force companies, and a small guerrilla force.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Friendly Forces and critical locations in the TAM KY area:

(a) QUANG TIN PROVINCE Hq	(BT 315220)
(b) TAM KY DISTRICT Hq	(BT 315220)
(c) 6th Regt (-) (Hq 1/6, 3/6)	(BT 315218)
(d) 4th Bn, 5th Regt (ARVN)(2 companies)	(BT 315218)
(e) 1 APC Platoon	(BT 315218)
(f) 1 Plt 155mm How	(BT 290228)
(g) 2 Plt 105mm How	(BT 309218)
(h) 4th Bn, 5th Regt (ARVN)(Hq and 1 company)	(BT 338238)
(i) 1 Plt 105mm How	(BT 337237)
(j) Hill 159 (1 company, 2/6)	(BT 277155)
(k) 1 Plt 105mm How	(BT 282157)
(l) 928th RF Company	TAM KY
(m) 722nd RF Company	TAM KY
(n) 496th RF Company	TAM KY
(o) 931st RF Company	TAM KY

W-3-2

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(2) Units listed at the above locations may change, however, the location itself will generally contain a rear echelon or some type facility that will remain.

(3) See basic plan for other friendly forces.

2. MISSION

See basic plan.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept. See basic plan.

b. Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.

(1) Be prepared to deploy one battalion (Rein) to the TAN KY area on the following reaction time.

(a) 1st company - 1 hour.

(b) Battalion (-) (Rein) - 6 hours.

(2) Movement may be by motorized/mechanized column or by helo lift.

c. Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

(1) Be prepared to provide helilift as required.

(2) Be prepared to provide air cover over motorized/mechanized columns if required.

(3) Be prepared to provide air support to ARVN as requested and directed by 2d Air Division.

d. Commanding Officer, I Corps Advisory Group.

(1) Keep this headquarters fully informed on friendly/enemy situation in the TAN KY area.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) See basic plan.

4. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION

See basic plan.

SECRET**5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS****a. Communications.**

- (1) References (e), (f), and (g). (Basic Plan)
- (2) III MAF voice and/or teletype circuits will be established, as directed.

b. Command Posts.

- (1) III MAF (AF 994755).
- (2) 3d MarDiv (AT 955752).
- (3) 1st MAW (AF 994755).
- (4) ARVN. See Annex B, basic plan.
- (5) Tactical units report initial GP locations and changes to respective senior headquarters by PRIORITY message.


c. Command Relationships. To be announced.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

G. C. AXTELL
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 106-66

OFFICIAL:



E. H. SIMMONS
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
6-3

W-3-4

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

3/EHS/tes
13 Jan 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subj: I Corps/II Corps conference, I Corps Headquarters, 0930-1130,

13 January 1966.

1. LtGen THI, CG, ICTZ, opened the conference, welcoming the visitors and stating the purpose as being to develop a general concept for operations in southern QUANG-NGAI - northern BINH DINH provinces.
2. LtGen LOC, CG, IIOTZ, asked CG, III MAF for the Marine concept for operations in southern QUANG NGAI province.
3. Col SIMMONS, G-3, III MAF, presented a brief, generalized concept, stating that the objective area would be bounded by the VE valley, the coastline, and the province boundary, and that three major maneuver elements were envisioned: an amphibious element in the vicinity of THACH TRU - DUC PHO, a helo/airborne element at BA TO and an overland element moving down the SONG VE valley. The fourth side of the box would be provided by II Corps forces.
4. LtGen LOC stressed the importance of timing and coordination to prevent VC forces from shuttling back and forth across the Corps' boundary.
5. Col THANH, C/S I Corps, stressed the importance of northern BINH DINH province and stated this should be main battle area with I Corps forces supporting by establishing blocking positions on boundary. He stated the III MAF concept was an operation of concern only to I Corps.

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6. MajGen LARSEN, CG FFORCEV, stated the need for separate but coordinated operations. He reviewed the characteristics of northern BINH DINH province and gave as the FFORCEV concept that a 4 battalion brigade from 1stAirCavDiv, and a 5 battalion ARVN airborne brigade would operate in the coastal region, vicinity of TAM QUAN, and a 3 battalion element from the 22d ARVN Division would operate in AN LAO valley. He saw this operation as being in support of I Corps operations as outlined by III MAF.
7. BGen PHONG, J-3, JGS, stated that I Corps had the mission of destroying PAVN/VC elements in QUANG NGAI province, that this was the main effort, and that II Corps operations were in support.
8. MajGen WALT, CG III MAF, stated that his understanding of the mission was the same as MajGen LARSEN'S, that he saw these operations as a converging effort to entrap the PAVN/VC, and that he was sure that the Corps boundaries were not inviolate - they could be crossed by I Corps and II Corps forces as required to exploit the situation.
9. MajGen LARSEN commented on the difficulty of locating the enemy precisely, that we should not think in terms of entrapping and annihilating large bodies of VC, but should consider ourselves highly successful to destroy one battalion.
10. MajGen LAM, CG 2dARVN Div, said there were six VC regiments in his division zone and these were supported by VC base areas in AN LAU valley and TAM QUAN. He saw the respective missions as follows: I Corps to try to destroy the VC in lower QUANG NGAI province; II Corps to go after the base areas.
11. Col JONES, SA, 2d ARVN Div, endorsed the III MAF concept and argued

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that the main effort should get the majority of the forces; that is, I Corps not II Corps should get the ARVN airborne brigade.

12. Col THANH, C/S I Corps, stated that I Corps accepted the concept that I Corps/III MAF would seek to destroy the VC north of the boundary while II Corps went after the base areas. I Corps would not ask for reinforcements but asked that the general reserve be held ready for use in either Corps area, as required.

13. LtGen LOC in remarks addressed to BGen PHONG stressed the importance of occupying TAM QUAN and recommended two battalions be made available for two months for this task. He "insisted" that at least one battalion be made available for this purpose.

14. The conference adjourned, the conferees presumably satisfied that a concensus had been reached.

E. H. SIMMONS

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SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN PLANNING OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE.

- 070002Z Dec65 COMUSMACV directed operations during Jan - Feb against VC in lower QUANG NGAI Province possibly 18th PAVN REGT. Code name MAN-O-WAR. FFORCEV concurrently ordered to conduct operation in BINH DINH Province same time frame with code name MASHER.
- 200310Z Dec65 Broad concept of operations submitted to COMUSMACV and FFORCEV. Established intent to coordinate operation with FFORCEV. Time frame late Jan66.
- 230735Z Dec65 Concept approved by COMUSMACV
Dirlnauth III MAF, FFORCEV, COMSEVENTHFLT.
28Dec COMUSMACV briefed on concept of operation MAN-O-WAR at III MAF.
- 300050Z Dec65 Time frame of MAN-O-WAR designated 25Jan to 15Feb. Code name MAN-O-WAR dropped.
- 030606Z Jan66 Code name DOUBLE EAGLE adopted for opn.
- 030938Z Jan66 Initial msg contact established with COMSEVENTHFLT.
- 060630Z Jan66 TF Delta activated for planning. 4th Marines staff forms nucleus TF Delta staff.
- 062322Z Jan66 COMUSMACV requested CINPAC assign BLT 2/3, BLT 3/1 and amphib shipping for opn, name CATF, CLF.
- 6 Jan Initial liaison established with FFORCEV
- 6-7 Jan COMPHIBRON 5/CTG 76.6 and CTG 79.5 visited III MAF. Mission and tentative concept of operation distributed.
- 080516Z Jan CINPAC appvd concept, assigned BLT 2/3, BLT 3/1 as landing force for planning.
- 080915Z Jan FFORCEV views opn MASHER mission to reduce pressure on DOUBLE EAGLE from II CTZ

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120150Z Jan Initiating directive published by COMSEVENTHFLT. CTG 76.6/
 COMPHIBRON 5 designated CATF. CTG 79.5 designated CLF.
 OpCon to III MAF or desig rep when control passed ashore.
 Command rel IAW NWP 22(a).

13Jan Meeting between CG I CTZ, CG II CTZ, CG FFORCEV, CG 2D DIV
 (ARVN), J-3, JGS (ARVN, CG III MAF at I Corps Hq to discuss opn.

13 Jan Ground recon established best BSA location at BS 8342.

130522Z Jan66 Pre-planned on-call ARC LIGHT strikes requested.

140917Z Jan66 Amphib shipping requested.

141216Z Jan66 DirLnAuth TF Delta, CTF 76, CTF 79, CTG 76.6 CTG 79.5.

15Jan66 III MAF OpOrd 307-66 (DOUBLE EAGLE) published.

150236Z Jan66 Concept modified to provide for 3/1, 2/4 landing over beach
 in trace. SLF (BLT 2/3) on LPH remain out of sight of land
 during Phase I. Requested amphib shipping for 2/4.

160124Z Jan66 D-day slipped to 28Jan to allow for BLT 3/1, BLT 2/3 re-
 hersal in Philippines.

171432Z Jan66 New initiating directive. Revision accounts for addition
 of 2/4 to Landing Force.

18Jan66 3d MarDiv OpOrd 362-66 published.

210254Z Jan66 Landing Force authorized use of RCA.

21Jan66 1stMAW OpOrd 310-66 (DOUBLE EAGLE) published.

231306Z Jan66 COMUSMACV requested to arrange reservation of airspace in
 AOA. NOTAM to be published not prior to 271800

252000H Jan CG TF Delta briefing for III MAF General Staff on latest
 Concept of Operations.

G-3
psr

3ONCR:01:WRG:jal
3480
Ser: 01
31 January 1966

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
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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, MCB-9 ltr ser 02 of 27 Jan 66

From: Commander THIRTIETH Naval Construction Regiment
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: After Action Report

- 1. Forwarded.


N. R. ANDERSON

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Encl (9)

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U. S. NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION NINE

FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:
NMCBNINE:02:1gp
3480
Ser 02

CONFIDENTIAL

27 JAN 1966

From: Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion NINE
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Via: Commander THIRTIETH Naval Construction Regiment

Subj: After Action Report

Ref: (a) NMCB NINE OPORD 3-65, Condition I
(b) NMCB NINE OPORD 2-65, Condition II

Encl: (1) Detailed account of incidents as they occurred
(2) Mortar analysis diagram and assigned perimeter defenses
(3) Casualty list
(4) Photographs of Damage (6)

1. Enclosures (1) through (4) are forwarded.

2. NMCB ELEVEN's advance party is on board preliminary to that Battalion relieving NMCB NINE. LIMA Company, Third Battalion, Ninth Marine Regiment is based in NMCB NINE's camp for purposes of tactical employment as patrol and ambush forces as well as a mobile reactionary force for the Marble Mountain Complex.

3. References (a) and (b) do not provide perimeter defensive positions for NMCB ELEVEN and LIMA Company personnel. It is noted, however, that NMCB ELEVEN personnel man the defense perimeter formerly assigned to DELTA Company. DELTA Company has been reassigned to a portion of the BRAVO Company defensive perimeter as shown in enclosure (2). LIMA Company is berthed in the extreme south end of the camp area with no assigned perimeter defense due to their primary assignment as a reactionary force for the rear area of the Marble Mountain Complex.


R. E. ANDERSON

Copy to:
CNO (098)
BUDOCKS
COMUSMACV
COMCBPAC
CO NINTH MARINE REGIMENT
CO FIRST BATTALION NINTH MARINES
CO THIRD BATTALION NINTH MARINES
CO CBC PORHUE
OIC NCBBU PORHUE
CO NMCB ELEVEN (2)

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DETAILED ACCOUNT OF INCIDENTS AS THEY OCCURRED

1. On the evening of 24 January 1966, NMCB NINE and NMCB ELEVEN Advance Party was in Readiness Condition II. Twelve bunkers were manned by three men each and the duty section (118 men) manning slit trenches around the perimeter, plus two roving patrols throughout the camp living area serving as fire watches. Each bunker is equipped with an M-60 machine gun, two M-14's with automatic selector switches, one M-14 with grenade launcher attachment, and fragmentation grenades. In addition to the normal defense manned by NMCB's NINE and ELEVEN, LIMA Company mans two 81 MM mortar positions on a 24 hour basis (see enclosure (2)). References (a) and (b) describe the various conditions of readiness.
2. At 2235 NMCB NINE posts reported white parachute flares to the West across the Tourane River over the rice paddies and to the South of the camp area. Frequent reports from NMCB NINE posts of flare activity continued to be made to the Battalion CP until 0026. Flare activity is a nightly occurrence throughout the Marble Mountain Complex. There was no indication of Viet Cong forces in the area with a mission to bring military targets in the Marble Mountain Complex under mortar attack. At 0033 all posts and roving patrols reported to the Battalion CP that all conditions were normal.
3. At 0034 Post 9 reported an explosion approximately 500 meters north northwest of that post. At 0035 it was readily apparent that the NMCB NINE camp was under 81 MM mortar attack. Mortar attack ceased at 0040. The calibre was later determined from a dud and fragments of nose fuzes and tail fin assemblies found in and out of the camp area. All NMCB NINE and NMCB ELEVEN personnel are trained to hit their mortar holes first in event of a mortar attack and then proceed to their preassigned fighting positions when mortar attack ceases. All hands proceeded to their posts as they were trained to do when flying missiles subsided.
4. At 0050 Condition I was set. All personnel were accounted for by 0115.
5. Upon manning the Battalion Command Post, battalion radios were switched to First Battalion, Ninth Marine Regiment net control and the incident of the attack reported. At the same time the S-2 conference line was manned and telephone communications established with all units in the Marble Mountain Complex, with First Battalion, Ninth Marines having net control.
6. At 0105 Post 9 reported a marine approached the NMCB NINE defense perimeter and reported that his ambush team had sustained casualties and requested assistance in getting wounded men into camp. After positive identification, the Commanding Officer dispatched a reserve

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DETAILED ACCOUNT OF INCIDENTS AS THEY OCCURRED (CONT'D)

squad and a hospital corpsman with stretchers to the perimeter fence near Post 8 to assist getting the marines inside camp and to the medical aid station. This was accomplished by lifting the wounded on stretchers over the defensive wire. At 0120 MAG 16 was requested to provide air medivac. At 0135 the first helicopter landed in Alpha Company area and lifted off at 0143 with a mortally wounded marine and NMCB NINE's Medical Officer enroute to Naval Hospital, Da Nang East. At 0145 the second helicopter landed and departed immediately to the Naval Hospital, Da Nang East with one marine who was killed in action by mortar fire while manning the marine ambush site approximately 500' north northwest of Post 9. This helicopter returned to camp with NMCB NINE's Medical Officer at 0235 and departed to MAG 16.

7. At 0233 the following equipment damage report was received by the Commanding Officer:

a. Equipment damaged beyond repair:

(1) Fuel tank truck, Code 0754, USN No. 96-18861 - Fire and shrapnel damage.

(2) Decontamination sprayer, Code 5420, USN No. 54-00593 - Fire damage.

b. Equipment damaged by shrapnel but repairable:

(1) Water distributor, Code 2521, USN No. 25-0110.

(2) Truck mounted crane, Code 8220, USN No. 82-02448.

(3) Grader, motor, Code 4420, USN No. 44-01504.

(4) Grader, motor, Code 4420, USN No. 44-01506.

c. Minor shrapnel damage to eight NMCB ELEVEN connex boxes and freon bottled gas was sustained.

8. At 0354, MAG 16 reported to First Battalion Ninth Marines that it was possible that the main road was interdicted with mines. First Battalion, Ninth Marines immediately directed that no vehicular traffic be permitted on the road until further notice. At 0615, First Battalion, Ninth Marines reported road had been swept and cleared for traffic. No mines were found.

9. At 0525, First Battalion, Ninth Marines advised all units to secure S-2 conference line and radio net as it was apparent that no further attack was imminent.

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Enclosure (1)

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DETAILED ACCOUNT OF INCIDENTS AS THEY OCCURRED (CONT'D)

10. Duds were reported to have fallen inside the camp area. The Commanding Officer directed all NMCB NINE Company Commanders, Executive Officer, NMCB ELEVEN, and Commanding Officer, LIMA Company to caution their personnel not to disturb craters, tail fins, or duds. At first light the camp area was thoroughly searched and all areas where mortars had fallen were flagged to assist crater analysis and explosive ordnance demolition teams and for the safety of camp personnel. It was determined that 13 mortar rounds fell within the camp area one of which was a dud and 17 mortar rounds fell outside of camp along the western perimeter.

11. Azimuths taken by the First Battalion, Ninth Marines crater analysis team in the NMCB NINE and First Battalion, Ninth Marine Regiment camp areas determined that mortars were fired from grid square BT 0570 (map series L701, sheet number 6658 IV).

12. After close evaluation of all information and reports received, it is the opinion of the Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion NINE that:

a. NMCB NINE and First Battalion, Ninth Marine Regiment camps were primary targets.

b. Purpose of attack was to inflict heavy personnel casualties on both units and possibly to cause extensive damage to NMCB NINE's construction equipment.

c. Failure of attack to cause extensive casualties and equipment damage to both camps is believed to be due to sighting error. This is determined from a plot of the first several rounds falling to the West of NMCB NINE's camp area. A possible sight adjustment was made and the remaining rounds fell in the camp equipment and storage area approximately 1,000 feet short of the berthing area. It is noted that the pattern of mortar rounds fired at the First Battalion, Ninth Marines camp were off target approximately the same distance and to the South of that camp.

d. Apparently gun crews were new, inadequately trained and unfamiliar with local terrain.

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Enclosure (1)

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C A S U A L T Y L I S T1. NMCS NINE - Two minor casualties:

BURCHFIELD, Chester E., 682 30 84, EOHON, USN - Shrapnel wound

MORRIS, Robert M., 750 20 77, ON, USN - Shrapnel wound

2. NMCS ELEVEN - Two minor casualties:

DZIEMA, Ronald J., 697 01 48, ON, USN - Shrapnel wound

CORNELIUS, Dana L., 524 97 44, CMA3, USN - Shrapnel wound

3. LIMA Company, Third Battalion, Ninth Marine Regiment

a. Camp personnel:

(1) MILLER, Justus K., 073590, CAPT, USMC - Shrapnel wound

(2) GALAN, David L., 2072682, PFC, USMC - Wounded in action by shrapnel. Later died of wounds.

(3) LEANEY, Frederick R., 2104253, LCPL, USMC - Shrapnel wound

(4) SNOW, Bernard L., 2061020, CPL, USMC - Shrapnel wound

b. LIMA Company ambush team:

(1) KOWALSKI, Robert A., 2008124, CPL, USMC - Killed in action

(2) DEES, Donald H., 2131109, PFC, USMC - Shrapnel wound

(3) GREENWOOD, Freddie G., 1993926, CPL, USMC - Shrapnel wound

(4) BURTON, Wilfred R., 695 50 59, HM3, USN - Shrapnel wound

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Enclosure (3)

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 4 Jan 1966

AGENDA SUBJECT: War Dog Requirements

Ref: (a) CG FMFPAC MSG 121948Z Dec 1965

1. FACTS:

a. III MAF received the first complement of war dogs on 26 August when eleven sentry dogs and handlers arrived from Japan. The handlers had been selected from units of the 3d Division and sent to Japan for three weeks training with the dogs. After approximately three weeks additional training in-country, the sentry dogs were assigned to posts at ammunition supply points, LAAMS Battery sites, 2d ARVN Division Compound, and Marble Mountain Air Facility.

b. At present III MAF has no scout dogs assigned. Scout dogs with handlers are procured on a case-by-case basis from the ARVN.

c. III MAF is presently retraining four sentry dogs for use as scout dogs.

d. One scout dog platoon and one sentry dog platoon with handlers and supervision personnel have entered training in United States and are expected in-country approximately 20 March 1966.

e. An Air Force veterinarian is permanently stationed at Da Nang and is available to care for the Marine dogs.

f. III MAF/NCC has received many requests from subordinate units for the use of both sentry and scout dogs which cannot be filled by present assets.

g. At present III MAF has one lieutenant assigned to the dog platoon in a supervisory capacity. Two dogs are located at MAG-16, two at LAAMS B Battery on Monkey Mt.; three at 2d ARVN Div Hqs (Future MAF CP; one of the three is also used at irregular intervals at Camp TIENSHA and four are being retrained as scout dogs at the kennels.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. III MAF experience in the use of sentry dogs ranges from completely satisfactory to marginally unsatisfactory. Sentry dogs must be used in areas where few personnel are working or living for satisfactory performance.

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One of the best locations for III MAF use of sentry dogs has been at the Monkey Mountain LAAMS Battery site. The area is remote and very few personnel pass through area. As a result, the dogs provide excellent security. Conversely, an attempt was made to use sentry dogs around the ammunition supply point. Marine personnel are working in the area practically around the clock. This level of activity simply confused the dog. As a result, dogs had to be removed from this duty before they became completely ineffective.

b. III MAF has obtained scout dogs from ARVN on a case-by-case basis. Usually the dogs are obtained for about two to four days. Here again experience varies widely. However, it was the opinion of the unit employing the dogs that many of the problems evolve from the language barrier. In those cases where the handler could understand and speak some English, results were considerably better. It is believed that the effectiveness of scout dogs will increase considerably when III MAF is capable of providing scout dogs with Marine handlers.

c. III MAF is presently retraining four sentry dogs to scout dog duties. This has been instituted for two reasons: First, to obtain experience in handling scout dogs before arrival of the full scout dog platoon. Second, to determine the capability and length of retraining in the event an operational requirement necessitates retraining.

d. III MAF plans to house both incoming dog platoons in the Da Nang area. Both sentry and scout dogs will be furnished to the other enclaves on an as required basis. Dogs will be rotated back to the Da Nang kennels, probably at weekly intervals.

e. III MAF has been unable to determine the rationale behind the procedure of assigning two handlers per dog as indicated in reference (a). Experience gained in RVN indicates that the dog will tire and become ineffective long before the man. In addition, dogs are not kept on patrol more than four or five days at a time. They are then given a rest period of approximately same period. Considering the above, it is possible that III MAF may have a number of dog handlers available for assignment to other duties if all the handlers are deployed.

f. It is envisioned that the role of the sentry dog may become increasingly important as III MAF is able to fence adequately logistic areas, warehouses, and ammunition dumps. Once the areas are fenced and level of activity and movement reduced, sentry dogs should be able to provide excellent security against attempted infiltration or pilferage. The ability of the dog to cover much larger areas than an armed guard should significantly reduce manpower requirements.

g. As additional units are brought in country and as III MAF Forces adopt a more mobile role, it is envisioned that additional dog platoons will be required for the Chu Lai enclave and possibly the Hue Phu Bai en-

clave. Usage data at present is very sketchy. However, it is anticipated that a minimum of one scout dog platoon and one sentry dog platoon will be required for the Chu Lai enclave by July 1966.

h. Information has not been made available to MAF regarding the rank and number of supervisory personnel or equipment accompanying the dog platoons.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That III MAF be informed whether two handlers per dog will be sent overseas.

b. That III MAF be informed of the number and rank of supervisory personnel that will accompany the two dog platoons.

c. That additional forces of one scout dog platoon and one sentry dog platoon be programmed for arrival in country approximately July 1966.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF:

a. III MAF will continue to obtain as much information and experience as possible in the proper utilization of both scout and sentry dogs. This information to be disseminated in lessons learned.

b. III MAF is taking action to have a canine cantonment ready for the arrival of the two dog platoons in March.

5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

a. Obtain the information required in paragraph 3.a. and b. and forward to III MAF.

b. Action be taken to procure the additional dog platoons enumerated in paragraph 3.c.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o PPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

G-1 Section
4 Jan 1966

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AGENDA SUBJECT: Naval Gunfire Support

1. FACTS:

- a. NGF support has been credited with saving an ARVN Battalion outpost at Thach Tru and has been particularly helpful elsewhere in Quang Ngai Province.
- b. NGFS ships assigned usually have 5"/38 main armament.
- c. The range of the 5"/38 is 15,000 yds with full charge at a sustained rate of fire of 8 rounds per minute.
- d. The range of the 5"/54 is 22,500 yds with full charge at a sustained rate of fire of 40 rounds per minute.
- e. COMUSMACV has ordered an increase in tempo of offensive operations throughout RVN.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Since the introduction in RVN of Naval Gunfire Support in May 65 there has been a general acceptance of Naval Gunfire by ARVN as a combat support arm. This is evidenced by enclosure (1) comparing the support provided ARVN via a-via 3d MarDiv during the period Aug-Dec 1965. At Thach Tru in November, Naval Gunfire was the only fire support able to be delivered in support of a heavily-engaged 37th Ranger Battalion. This support was credited with enabling the battalion to successfully defend its positions at heavy cost to the VC.

b. Under normal circumstances there is one NGFS ship assigned to the I CTZ. A second is assigned to a Harbor Defense role at Da Nang. It is routinely available during daylight hours but may be made available at night only under emergency conditions. The NGFS ships are normally DD/DER types with a 5"/38 main armament. Occasionally a CL with 6"/47 armament is made available. There are instances when the normal support ship is diverted to another Corps TZ and others when an additional ship is available

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During scheduled amphibious operations such as STARLITE/PIRANHA, etc., NGFS ships are normally assigned as part of the ATF in accordance with current amphibious doctrine. This usually takes the form of a CL and a DD, often at the expense of the normal Corps NGFS ship.

a. Control of fires is accomplished through normal T/O assets for USMC forces. When firing in support of ARVN, SFCP of 1st ANGLICO in I CTZ is the normal means of fire control. However, ALO's, FAC's or airborne artillery spotters trained in NGF spotting procedures may control fire under exceptional circumstances. For the current level of NGFS ships in ICTZ, adequate spotting resources have been available. Request and control procedures have been established and are working satisfactorily.

d. NGFS ships with a 5"/38 main armament must fire at maximum or near maximum ranges to support MIR positions in the Da Nang enclave. The use of 5"/54 guns allows complete coverage of MIR positions at medium ranges as well as the ability to support smaller operations in front of the MIR. The high velocity impact and high rate of fire of naval guns provides a greater shock effect on VC troops and cause more extensive damage to well dug in positions than organic artillery fires.

e. The extended range of the 5"/54 over the 5"/38 provides NGF coverage extending into the hills and mountains away from the coastal delta region. In effect, this means an increased interdiction capability against Main Force VC and PAVN units coming out of mountain base areas into the delta region where the mass of the population is located. The ability of NGF to reach the mountains increases our capability to destroy base areas located by intelligence means. In addition, more long range NGFS weapons would reduce the transportation requirements to move artillery units and ammunition into support positions for ground operations. This will be particularly true as operations begin to move away from the coast and into the VC base areas in the mountains.

f. The movement of artillery units tends to disclose friendly tactical maneuvers. Fire support from NGFS ships off the coast would minimize this disclosure, thereby increasing the likelihood of success of tactical maneuvers.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the level of NGFS be increased from its present level in order to be able to support adequately the increased tempo of operations ordered by COMUSMACV.

b. That DD types equipped with 5"/54 armament be assigned to NGF missions in I Corps.

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4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF: A letter is being drafted to COMUSMACV requesting an increase in NGFS ships and that DD type NGFS ships be furnished which have 5"/54 automatic turret main armament.

5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: Action will be required by COMUSMACV and higher echelons on the III MAF letter mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

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NGF SUPPORT OF ARVN ELEMENTS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ICGUM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
AUG*	2075	93	389	2557
SEP	3367	68	400	3835
OCT	7127	176	329	7632
NOV	3900	187	465	4552
DEC**	2077	110	176	2353

* Records do not include period 1-6 Aug 1965

** Records do not include period 19-31 Dec 1965

NGF SUPPORT OF USMC ELEMENTS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ICGM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
AUG*	4145	381	570	5096
SEP	1045	120	0	1165
OCT	477	95	0	572
NOV	1073	0	63	1136
DEC	0	0	0	0

* Includes 1061 rounds fired on Operation STARLITE

Enclosure (1)
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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 4 Jan 1966

SECRET

AGENDA SUBJECT: Fragmentation of Marine Air-Ground Team

1. FACTS:

a. Since the inception of III MAF operations in RVN various fragmentations of the Marine air-ground team have occurred.

(1) BLT 3/7, (SLF), landed at Qui Nhon on 1 July and a USMC TACR was established. Subsequently BLT 3/7 was relieved on 8 July by BLT 2/7. That unit remained in position until 7 November under the operational control of CG Task Force Alpha (later redesignated CG, Field Forces, Vietnam).

(2) A 10 aircraft detachment of HMM 161 was deployed to Qui Nhon on 8 July in support of BLT 2/7. Subsequently on 28 September HMM 363 relieved the HMM 161 detachment at Qui Nhon and was placed under the operational control of CG Field Forces Vietnam in general support of II CTZ. A tentative release date for return to III MAF control has been set as 31 January.

(3) A III MAF ASRT was deployed to the Pleiku-Kontom area and became operational on 27 July to provide an all-weather close-air support capability to II CTZ. This unit was placed under the tactical direction of Senior Advisor II Corps. Subsequently, on 25 August, a second ASRT was deployed to Pleiku at the direction of COMUSMACV to provide priority of III MAF resources to that area. Both ASRT's were returned to III MAF control following the monsoonal weather shift on 15 November.

(4) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is widely dispersed. The Wing Headquarters, four tactical MAG's, and MWHG-1 are in RVN in support of III MAF and I Corps ground units. Marine Wing Service Group and MAG-13 operate the all weather air station Iwakuni, provide the CINCPAC SIOP requirement, and train pilots to maintain the proficiency of FMAW tactical units. A helicopter training and support function is maintained by FMAW at MCAF Futema.

b. In addition to the foregoing deployments and postures, III MAF is tasked to be prepared to provide one reinforced battalion on request on 6 hours notice prepared to conduct contingency operations anywhere in RVN.

2. DISCUSSION:

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a. The fragmentation of III MAF combat and combat support units has had a detrimental effect on III MAF's capability to pursue its primary mission in RVN.

(1) From 8 July to 7 November, one Marine maneuver battalions was deployed in RVN but was not available to III MAF.

(2) From 8 July until 28 September, 10 Marine UH34 helicopters and from 28 September to date 24 UH34 helicopters have been deployed in RVN but not available to III MAF.

(3) From 27 July until 15 November, one and then two Marine ASRT's were deployed to RVN but not available to III MAF.

(4) While the dispersal and varied responsibilities of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing have not precluded adequate support of III MAF and I Corps ground units there is no doubt that were these requirements of a lesser degree a greater capability would exist than is presently enjoyed.

b. While detrimental to the total effort, the above examples of fragmentation were and are manageable and COMUSMACV's command authority to deploy his combat elements must be recognized. A much more serious fragmentation, of course, would occur if the Marine air-ground team were divided. At present, it would appear that COMUSMACV has no intentions to split away the ground forces although there is an increasing tendency to give detailed tactical direction from Saigon. A more serious, continuing threat is the 2d Air Division's effort, consonant with Air Force philosophy and doctrine, to gain control of all the air effort.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF:

III MAF will continue to monitor the problem areas closely and take action as required or request assistance from higher authority.

5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

Continue to safeguard the integrity of the Marine air-ground team.

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 4 Jan 1966

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AGENDA SUBJECT: Detecting Set Intrusion AN/PSR-1 (Formerly Seismic Intrusion Devices, SID-150)

Reference: (a) CG FMFPAC ltr ser 097865 of 11Dec65
 (b) Force/NCC Bul 03433 of 22Oct65

Enclosure: (1) Distribution of AN/PSR-1 (SIDs)

1. FACTS:

a. A total of 600 AN/PSR-1's (SIDs) have been received by III MAF. Detecting sets have been distributed within III MAF as indicated by enclosure (1).

b. All AN/PSR-1 have been issued to units of III MAF with the exception of 23 units remaining in FLSG maintenance float. Twelve SIDs have been loaned to 1st Marine Division for training and evaluation.

c. Reference (a) provided III MAF with new reporting format. Reference (b) is being modified to include the new reporting procedure.

d. Marine Aircraft Group 12 has conducted a series of significant tests around the airfield at Chu Lai.

e. AN/PSR-1 has proven effective in detecting potential intruders in several instances.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. The AN/PSR-1 sets have been distributed throughout III MAF to provide an "across-the-board" environment of background noise, soil types, and varied employment.

b. The one factor which limits the use of the AN/PSR-1 is the availability of communications wire required from the detecting head to the control box. Each detecting head requires two wires to the control box.

c. From the reports received by using units, most AN/PSR-1 are being used in CP defenses, MIA defenses, and in ambush. The AN/PSR-1 are being

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used by FLSG in storage areas and in aviation units in remote LAAMS Battery sites and air control/air support locations.

d. The AN/PSR-1 has accomplished a limited number of successful detections to date however it is believed that the time the sets have been in use is quite significant. A majority of the sets were distributed from mid-November to mid-December. In a number of cases the amount of communications wire required for installation was a factor in placing the units in operation. In addition a short training period for operators is required. It is believed that as operators become more skillful, III MAF can anticipate a larger number of detections.

e. From tests conducted around the Chu Lai Airfield, Marine Aircraft Group 12 determined that close-in use of the AN/PSR-1 was not practical due to background noise and activity.

f. The III MAF staff does not contain an R&D Section. A considerable number of items are being forwarded to III MAF for evaluation. It is believed that an R&D Section is required to provide the proper guidance.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That III MAF continue the operational evaluation as planned.

b. That considerations be given to augmenting III MAF Staff with representatives of the Landing Force Development Center to assist in such evaluations.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF:

a. III MAF is in the process of publishing a new order which combines all the latest changes in reporting procedures, training and allocations.

b. III MAF units are tasked with continually attempting new uses with the AN/PSR-1.

5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

a. Investigate the possibility of assigning personnel from LFDC as indicated in paragraph 3.b.

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Allocation of AN/PSR-1

1. Allocation will be made as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number</u>
Airfield Defense Battalion 3/9	50
2d Battalion, 9th Marines	20
2d Battalion, 3d Marines	20
2d Battalion, 4th Marines	20
12th Marines	36
3d Recon Battalion	12
3d MT Battalion	12
3d Battalion, 4th Marines	32
FLSG	40
MWHG-1	30
MAG-16	30
Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Div	12
Force Recon Company, FMF	4
1st Bn, 9th Marines	20
1st Bn, 4th Marines	20
1st Bn, 7th Marines	20
Hq Co, 9th Marines	8
Hq Co, 4th Marines	8
Hq Co, 3d Marines	8
Hq Co, 7th Marines	8
2d Bn, 7th Marines	20
3d Bn, 7th Marines	20
1st Bn, 1st Marines	20
3d AT Bn	8
1st AmTrac Bn	8
3d Bn, 3d Marines	20
3d Tank Bn	20
MWHG-1	20
MAG-36	20
NAVSUPACT	3
FISG (Maintenance Float)	35

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

G-3 Section
4 Jan 1966

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AGENDA SUBJECT: RVN Marine Corps Employment in Amphibious Operations

1. FACTS:

- a. The 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion participated in Phase I of Operation Blue Marlin, in an amphibious landing Northeast of Tam Ky on 10 November 1965
- b. The original schedule was for the 3d VNMC Bn to be airlifted to Chu Lai on 4 November in order to receive 4 days of intensive amphibious training prior to loading aboard two LST's on 8 November. Due to other circumstances, the 3d VNMC Bn was lifted to Quang Ngai where the Battalion reported to the 2d ARVN Division and was not released until 6 November. Transit time and establishment of a camp at Chu Lai reduced the available time for amphibious training to one day. As a result, training had to be limited to the bare necessities for the intended landing method.
- c. The planned ship-to-shore movement of the 3d VNMC Bn was to be in two free waves of LVTP-5's from LST 1167 and LST 1170. These waves would not be landed until after the BLT 2/7 assault landing had secured the beachhead.
- d. The high sea state and surf conditions during the landing phases on 10 November 1965 were marginal. One LST lost her bow anchor making LVT offloading impossible. Additionally, a cable was snapped on the LSD thus preventing offloading the landing force artillery and additional LVT's. Only one wave of the VNMC was able to land in LVT's as planned. An attempt was made to offload the remainder of the VNMC by LCM but only a few troops were able to negotiate the nets because of the high sea state. Finally, the last elements of the VNMC Bn were landed by helicopter.
- e. During the amphibious phases the VNMC Bn was under the operational control of the CTF Commander. All operations ashore, however, were conducted as a coordinated operation.

2. DISCUSSION:

- a. This was the first combined USMC/VNMC amphibious operation.

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b. Opportunities for amphibious operations do not generally present sufficient time for minimum amphibious training of troops prior to the optimum landing time. Therefore, amphibious operations involving the VNMC or ARVN must be relatively uncomplicated with the troops being placed ashore by the safest and simplest means such as was planned for Operation Blue Marlin. In the event of adverse weather conditions, sea or surf state, or unexpected enemy opposition, any type of amphibious operation for untrained troops is impractical.

c. The 3d VNMC Battalion was very receptive to the limited amphibious training received and could in the opinion of the U. S. Advisor be trained for amphibious operations. Chu Lai offers an area where this training could be received by both the VNMC and ARVN. Refresher training could also be accomplished by Marine Corps units.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That amphibious courses be conducted for VNMC and ARVN units on a periodic basis at Chu Lai.

4. ACTIONS BEING TAKEN BY III MAF:

a. None at this time. An investigation of the feasibility and desirability of providing limited amphibious training of VNMC and ARVN at Chu Lai will be undertaken in the future.

5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

a. None at this time. If the study proposed above proves the feasibility and desirability of providing amphibious training to the VNMC/ARVN, the following support may be requested:

- (1) Troop Training Teams from LFTU Pac.
- (2) Staff Planning Instructional Teams from LFTU Pac.
- (3) Limited amphibious shipping for instructional purposes.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96601

G-3 Section
5 Jan 1966

SECRET

AGENDA SUBJECT: People's Action Team (PAT)

1. FACTS:

a. PAT's exist in all provinces of I Corps, supported by Controlled American Sources (CAS) officers and under the operational control of province and district chiefs. There is a CAS officer within each province that handles the PAT for that particular area and contacts on a volunteer basis U. S. tactical units operating within the province to assist in tactical operations where possible.

b. PAT's are designed as the first echelon of the rural construction effort to follow ARVN or U. S. clearing operations, with the mission of starting recently cleared villages on the road to self-government by rooting out the VC infrastructure and assisting the village chief to recruit his own security forces (PF and Police). The training of the PAT is oriented toward a mission of 60% civil action and 40% military.

c. The PAT is organized on a 40 man platoon basis with a 7 man Headquarters section and three 11 man squads. Personnel in the Headquarters are the team leader, assistant team leader, political supervisor, medical cadre (2), an intelligence man and a communicator. The squad contains a squad leader and an assistant squad leader with 9 men. Armament for the squad generally consists of 1 BAR, 3 M1 rifles, 3 M2 carbines, and 4 M3A1 submachine guns. The PAT has two uniforms - black suits (2 per man) and camouflage suits (2 per man).

d. PAT teams in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

	<u>Required</u>	<u>Deployed</u>	<u>In Training</u>
(1) Quang Tri	22	22	0
(2) Thua Thien	23	16	7
(3) Quang Nam	29	16	4
(4) Quang Tin	16	11	3
(5) Quang Ngai	<u>39</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	129	104	14

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Coordination with PAT.

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(1) Coordination between Marine units and PAT has not followed any set pattern and has been only occasionally successful. From 23 August, two PAT's (75 men total) were working in Cam Ne village. On 26 September, Commanding Officer, 9th Marines recommended withdrawal of teams owing to ineffectiveness. Specific complaints were that they had stolen Marines' gear, failed to coordinate movements and location with the 9th Marines, and they had fired into the Marines positions. On 27 September the two teams withdrew of their own accord from Cam Ne. This incident was reported to COMUSMACV in detail. The nine village pacification program in progress since November in the 9th Marines area initially involved 5 PAT teams. Strength of these teams dropped off considerably and one team was sent home for lack of effectiveness. However, four teams remained and very recently a fifth has moved into the area. Although the strength of the 5 teams is only 122 of an authorized 200, they are reported to be working fairly effectively with the Marines and other ARVN forces in the area.

b. Control of PAT's

(1) Control of the PAT is vested in the province chief and normally delegated on down to the district chief. Amount of control varies with the degree of influence the VNQDD (the VN counterpart of the old Kuomintang) has within the Province. The VNQDD is a legal political party, strongly nationalistic, and anti-communist. The problem arises in those areas where the party is strong since PAT members demonstrate more loyalty to party officials than to Province officials. Control in each province is as follows:

(a) Thua Thien and Quang Ngai - These province chiefs provide general guidance to the district chief, who in turn directs the day to day activity of the PATs. No difficulty is experienced with the VNQDD political party in Thua Thien, and in Quang Ngai previous difficulties with the VNQDD have been virtually eliminated.

(b) Quang Tri - While the province chief does not completely agree that the majority of PAT missions be of the Civic Action type he has nevertheless directed his district chief that the teams be employed primarily in civic action programs. No difficulty has been experienced with the VNQDD.

(c) Quang Tin - In this area PATs being labeled as "US Mercenaries" or the military arm of the VNQDD has hampered the district chiefs control of the platoons. However, reports indicate this situation has been improving and the province chief has issued emphatic instructions that PATs serve the GVN and obey orders of the district chiefs.

(d) Quang Nam - The VNQDD exerts heavy pressure here and considerably limits the control of the province and district chiefs. The majority of the platoons feel their loyalty lies with the party which makes for limited control.

(2) Control is seriously hampered by a lack of authority. There is no contract and no obligated service. The team leader can only report a man to the district chief who has the power to fine him or refer the case to the province chief. The latter has the authority to dismiss him which apparently does carry some stigma. Since 1 Sept there has been a charge of

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desertion in PAT that is punishable as in ARVN.

c. Effectiveness.

(1) In Quang Tri and Thua Thien the teams are considered excellent in their civic action type programs. They are becoming an increasingly good source of information. Few disciplinary problems exist. In Quang Tin and Quang Ngai the PATs are considered an asset to the rural construction program. Their discipline is good and esprit high. They are quite efficient in performing their primary mission and have been of great assistance in gaining and maintaining government control of the villages and hamlets. In Quang Nam, effectiveness of the PATs is directly affected by their questionable loyalty to the GVN. Their effectiveness, morale and loyalty decreases significantly when they are employed outside their home districts or on purely combat missions over an extended period of time. A lack of specific disciplinary procedures has further reduced their effectiveness and morale.

d. Effect on Popular Forces.

(1) While there is no direct relationship between the PF and the PAT the latter has a great effect on the Popular Forces. Both of these forces are controlled by the province chief and in each case control is delegated down to the district chief. Both forces are subjected to the same recruiting restrictions, that is, they must recruit from manpower not eligible for ARVN or Regional Forces. This throws the forces into direct competition with each other in the search for manpower. However, all of the advantages are on the side of the PAT making it impossible for the PF to compete. The PAT command higher salaries, have a great many more benefits, have much better equipment and uniforms, do less fighting and suffer less casualties.

e. Conclusions.

(1) The GVN has relied on three primary forces - the ARVN, RF, and PF. These forces have complementing missions and all have amassed a combat record. On the other hand the PAT has no combat record and is more oriented toward a pacification role along the lines of the civilian pacification cadre.

(2) It becomes apparent that the PAT cannot assume the role of the Popular Force without considerable reorientation and training. Further the Popular Force cannot be built up as long as the PAT is in existence, unless the central government takes positive action to improve the lot of the PF.

(3) The PAT carries a stigma in many areas of "American Mercenary" that makes it incompatible with the other services working toward a common goal. Further, as all of the hidden benefits come to light PAT may be a destructive force not only to the PF, but also to RF and ARVN.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the PAT be reoriented and retrained to become part of the PF. The alternative to this is that the PAT be absorbed into the civilian pacification cadre.

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b. That pay scales and benefits be standardized. Apparently USOM is objecting to a raise for the PF on the grounds of inflation, however no mention has been made of the destructive economic influence of PAT with the multiple benefits in addition to higher base salary.

c. That III MAF submit proposals contained in this fact sheet to COMUSMACV.

4. ACTION TAKEN BY III MAF:

a. III MAF is continuing to research this area and maintaining a flexible policy to be able to work within any framework established by GVN.

5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

a. The problem of multiple agencies competing for manpower should be carefully studied with the view in mind of selecting the proper individual for a job that will provide the GVN with the best final results.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 5 Jan 1966

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AGENDA SUBJECT: RF/PF Status and Improvement

1. FACTS:

a. RF/PF strength in I Corps Tactical Zone

(n) Authorized	RF	PF
	18427	28986
(2) Assigned	17369	23013
(3) Present for duty	14698	20447

b. RF/PF within Marine TAORS

- (1) Phu Bai - 6 PF Platoons (180 personnel present for duty)
- (2) Da Nang - 10 RF Companies (1237 personnel present for duty)
- 39 PF Platoons } (1490 personnel present for duty)
- 19 PF squads }
- (3) Chu Lai - 2 RF companies (272 personnel present for duty)
- 11 PF Platoons } (408 personnel present for duty)
- 7 PF Squads }

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Coordination with RF/PF

(1) General

(a) It would be desirable to see the Regional Forces up to the authorized strength but the government is aware of the problem and is taking appropriate action. Generally this force is considered to be a competent service and compares very favorably with ARVN. From a training

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standpoint combined operations are extremely beneficial and also the recent policy of attaching an RF Company to a Marine Regiment works to mutual advantage. The Popular Forces pose another problem. In addition to the present shortage of Popular Forces, monthly losses are consistently remaining ahead of input. III MAF has submitted several proposals that are designed to improve both the number and the training of Popular Forces. These proposals are to place Marines with selected PF platoons to operate on a continuing basis; and to provide communication, supporting arms, and reserve forces. In addition we have offered to place Marine noncommissioned officers in each of the Popular Force training centers.

(b) In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these proposals the Popular Forces must be divided into three categories:

Category I. PF located in proximity to a Marine Unit employed in a static defense.

Category II. PF located in the areas of operation of the front line battalions.

Category III. PF located outside the Marine TAOR.

(c) Obviously the proposals remain valid for the first two categories with the exception that in Category II the individual Marines contact with the Popular Force is less. Category III remains a GVN responsibility but III MAF hopes to influence the situation by focusing attention on the Popular Force situation thus starting a combined effort on the overall improvement of this force. An analysis of experience and present operations in each enclave will indicate progress toward the final goal.

(2) Phu Bai. In this TAOR, a Marine squad has been assigned to each Popular Force Platoon and the various platoons have been organized into a Combined Action Company commanded by a Vietnamese speaking Marine Captain with a Vietnamese lieutenant as the executive officer. Communications, fire support, and reserve forces have been made available to each platoon. This combined action company has functioned very efficiently and has served as a model for III MAF proposals in effecting coordination between Marine and Popular Forces. There are no Regional Force Companies in the Phu Bai TAOR. It is significant that recently, when the battalion at Phu Bai rotated, 36 members of the combined action company including the Commanding Officer elected to remain at Phu Bai with the company.

(3) Da Nang

(a) The system of assigning an RF company to an infantry regiment has been used with success. The 3d Marines and 9th Marines each

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have one RF company. These companies have been integrated into Marine operations and assist in identification, searches and combat.

(b) Other RF companies within the TAOR in close coordination with Marine units. As an example, in the present pacification operation taking place in the 9th Marines area there are five RF companies. Four make up the 59th RF Battalion, while the fifth, the 703d Co, is a separate company. Coordination with Marine units is continuous in this and other areas.

(c) Experience in the Da Nang TAOR has highlighted the PF problem in view of the critical shortage of Popular Forces in this area and the dense population living in proximity to our vital installations. This situation prompted the submission of the III MAF proposals previously discussed. These proposals were coordinated at all levels starting with the Chief of Staff, I Corps, Commander Quang Nam Special Sector, Province Chief, Sub-sector Commanders and District Chief. This procedure was adopted not only to gain concurrence for the proposals but also to focus attention on the critical need for an adequate Popular Force. The initial reaction was very favorable as indicated in a letter from Gen Thi endorsing these proposals in some detail and assigning eight PF platoons to the limited operations control of III MAF, seven in the area of the Air Base Defense Battalion and one in Hoa Long village, south of Marble Mountain. For approximately four weeks now the Marines and Popular Forces have been working together. While much remains to be done in this initial project indications are that this program should be expanded to all Marine enclaves. Since Marines and Popular Forces have been patrolling together reports of innocent people being detained have decreased considerably. In addition, the Popular Forces have received some good training and have been provided increased security. Of primary importance is the fact that Marines and Popular Forces have been working very well together which provides a foundation for building a firm basis for better understanding and mutual respect among the ARVN and Marine Forces.

(d) Further, recent VC activity directed at outposts and against RF/PF units dictates some urgency in expanding this program to all Marine enclaves. In view of this, a letter has been prepared to Gen Thi from Gen Walt requesting concurrence in the immediate expansion of the Marine/Popular Force program.

(e) The overall goal of this program is to improve the effectiveness and prestige of the Popular Forces (this will give an assist to the lagging recruitment program and establish the Popular Force as a service capable of providing adequate security behind the front line Marine and ARVN units. There is no doubt that if the Marines work toward this end with the full support of the advisory effort throughout I Corps (and the Popular Forces are constantly highlighted) that this force can be improved, and with some help from the central government, improved dramatically.

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(4) Chu Lai

(a) In this TAOR, elements of Popular Forces platoons have been brought into the Marine battalion area for a designated period of training. Upon returning to their villages, communications, supporting fires, and reserve forces have been provided to the platoons. This has greatly increased the confidence of the Popular Forces and they have been very effective in combining with Marines for operations in addition to providing security for their villages. It is anticipated that in the very near future the program described for the Da Nang enclave will be effectively instituted in the Chu Lai area. Increasingly effective operations are conducted with Regional Forces in the area. However, RF companies are not attached to Marine Regiments, as in the Da Nang area, due to the shortage of RF units in Chu Lai.

b. RF/PF Problem Areas

(1) RF - As previously stated there is a shortage of Regional Forces but the government is taking positive action to remedy this situation. Generally the RF is considered an effective force that compares very favorably with ARVN.

(2) PF - Improvement in this force has been discussed in some detail at the local level. However, many of the ills of the PF must be resolved at the governmental level. Areas of particular concern are:

- (a) Low pay (less than half of ARVN & RF scale).
- (b) Lack of Benefits (no family allowance, no retirement, no widows benefits).
- (c) Small recruiting base. 20-30 year olds not eligible for enlistment.
- (d) Combat losses and desertions. PF consistently take greater combat losses than ARVN. Many desert to join ARVN, RF or PAT for higher pay, better equipment, and greater prestige.
- (e) Lack of uniforms (Programmed for 1st Quarter 1966).
- (f) Shortage of automatic weapons and radios. (Now T/E is assigned to cover this - to be implemented in 1966).
- (g) Rehabilitation of Training Centers. (Under study)
- (h) Resupply of remote PF units.

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3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Standardize, throughout each enclave, operational cooperation presently being instituted in Quang Nam Special Sector with RF/PF.

b. Continue to focus attention at all levels on the importance of Popular Forces and the necessity of expanding the recruiting program.

c. Insure that advisory personnel are thoroughly familiar with the aims of the program and thus advising their counterparts.

d. Improve prestige and security of PF units whenever possible by making available supporting fires, reserve forces, and helicopter resupply.

e. Continue requesting MACV to persuade RVNAF Joint General Staff to:

(1) Increase recruiting base for PF.

(2) Take action on the man power competition problem and particularly in the PF/PAT area.

(3) Raise PF pay and allowances.

(4) Expediate providing equipment authorized under the revised T/E's.

(5) Provide uniforms. In the interim authorize issue of surveyed Marine utilities to PF.

(6) Provide funds for rehabilitation of training centers.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF: In addition to implementing recommendations a through d, III MAF is continuing liaison at all levels on the PF problem areas and is maintaining an alert flexible policy to incorporate any improvements into the present procedures.

5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: All of the recommendations in paragraph 3e are presently under study with decision/action expected by early 1966.

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*Cmd Chronology
May 66*

JAN 18 1966

*Al Schenberg
Acting Officer
10/1006*

HAS BEEN SENT

VV DDKE275
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FM CG III MAF
TO YVNA/CG FMFPAC
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SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
III MAF AND NCC COMMAND RELATIONS IN VIETNAM
A. TELCON 11JANG6 GEN GREENE TO GEN WALT
B. MACV DIR 10-11 SER 001029 OF 10 NOV65 SUBJ: COMD RELATION
SHIPS AND TERMS OF REF FOR USMACV
C. CG III MAF MEMO FOR CG FMFPAC G-6: EGG:JPR OVER 5211 OF
3JANG6
D. COMUSMACV 130154Z
1. PRIOR TO DEP SVN GEN GREENE BY REF A, ADVISED GEN WALT
THE FOLLOWING:

PAGE TWO DDKE 862 SECRET
A. CMC HAD CONFERRED WITH GEN WESTMORELAND AND ADM WARD
CHNAVADVGRP, IN SAIGON. THE DISCUSSION, INTER ALIA, INCLUDED
THE MATTER OF THE POSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE III MAF AND
THE NCC IN THE COMD AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF USMACV. GEN
GREENE STATED THAT HE HAD AGREED TO THE NECESSITY OF
INCREASED NAVY PARTICIPATION IN RVN, AND TO THE NEED FOR A
NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER IN SAIGON. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE
MATTER SHOULD RECEIVE ADDITIONAL STUDY.
B. GEN WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
INTERFERENCE OR INTERPOSITION OF NCC WITHING THE COMMAND
RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN III MAF COMUSMACV AND CG III MAF, AND
THAT THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM SHOULD REMAIN UNDER OP-CON
OF COMUSMACV.
C. THE INCREASED NAVY PARTICIPATION REQUIRED A REAR
ADMIRAL (UPPER HALF) AS NCC, LOCATED IN SAIGON. THE LARGE
NAVY ACTIVITY IN DANANG SHOULD BE UNDER A DEPUTY NCC, A
REAR ADMIRAL (LOWER HALF) LOCATED IN DANANG. THE NCC WOULD
BE TASKED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT REQUIRED BY III MAF.
D. CMC REQ THAT GEN WALT EXAMINE SUCH A USMACV COMMAND
STRUCTURE AS OUTLINED ABOVE TO DETERMINE IF THE III MAF COULD

CG III MAF

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OPERATE IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT,

2. GEN WESTMORELAND AGREED WITH GEN WALT THAT III MAF SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT ALL COMPONENT COMMANDER MEETINGS BY A GENERAL OFFICER FROM III MAF.

3. BASED UPON THE FORGOING, A PRELIMINARY STUDY HAS PRODUCED A USMACV COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE. IN CONSTRUCTING THIS ORGANIZATION THE ASSUMPTION WAS MADE THAT NCC WOULD ASSUME OP-CON OF THE NAVY FUNCTIONS NOW OPERATING IN RVN, HOWEVER, THE , THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 30TH NCR, OR OF THE NCB'S SHOULD BE EXAMINED CLOSELY DUE TO THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR CB CAPABILITY. THE CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE/CONSTRUCTION CB CAPABILITY AT CHU LAI IS TYPICAL. SOME NCB'S SHOULD BE ASSIGNED OP-CON III MAF OR IF THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO NAVY, THEN NCC SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY TASKED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE NCB STRENGTH IN DIRECT SUPPORT III MAF.

4. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE PROVIDES FOR THE FOLLOWING:

A. PROVIDES CG III MAF WITH A STATUS EQUAL TO THAT OF A COMPONENT COMMANDER. THIS IS CONSIDERED ABSOLUTELY

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ESSENTIAL IN VIEW OF THE LARGE PERCENTAGE OF MARFOR IN SVN.

B. PLACES THE INTACT MARINE AIR/GROUND PACKAGE UNDER THE OP-CON COMUSMACV. ESTABLISHES NO INTERVENING LAYER OF COMD BETWEEN THE CG III MAF AND COMUSMACV.

C. DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CG III MAF, CG FMFPAC AND THE 7TH FLT, WITH REF TO AMPHIB OPS AND UTILIZATION OF THE SLF IN COORDINATED OPS IN SVN.

5. CG III MAF MUST BE EST IN THE USMACV STRUCTURE AT THE SAME LEVEL AS THE COMPONENT COMDRS. TO REFLECT THIS, PAR 5B OF REF B. SHOULD BE CHANGED TO INCLUDE CG III MAF.

A. ADD A NEW SUB-PAR 5B (4)

(4) CG III MAF HAS THE SAME RELATIONSHIP TO MACV AS DO THE OTHER COMPONENT COMDRS WITH RESPECT TO UNISERVICE MATTERS.

B. ADD NEW SUB-PAR 5B (5) (SEE PARA 8.10 REF B)

(5) WITH RESPECT TO ADMIN, TECH, AND OTHER NON-POLICY MATTERS OF UNISERVICE INTEREST, COMPONENT COMDRS AND CG III MAF, MAY RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM AND ARE AUTH TO COMMUNICATE THROUGH UNILATERAL SERVICE CHANNELS WITH THEIR RESP MIL SERVICES AND AGENCIES THEREOF. COMUSMACV WILL BE KEPT INF AS APPROPRIATE.

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6. CG III MAF WOULD BE TASKED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) COMMAND US MARINE FORCES FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMBAT COMBAT SPT, AND COMBAT SERVICE SPT OPS IN SVN.

(2) ADVISE COMUSMACV ON USMC COMBAT, COMBAT SPT AND COMBAT SERVICE SPT MATTERS.

(3) KEEP FMFPAC INF OF MARINE CORPS FUNCTIONS PERF IN SPT OF COMUSMACV.

(4) PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SPT TO COMUSMACV.

(5) CONDUCT PLANNING TO SPT COMUSMACV'S OP-PLANS FOR CURRENT OPS AND CONTINGENCY U.S. UNILATERAL OP-PLANS.

(6) PERFORM MANPOWER AUTH AND OTHER PERS FUNCTIONS FOR ASG UNITS AS DIR BY FMFPAC.

(7) CONDUCT IN COORDINATION WITH CG I CORPS (ARVN) UNILATERAL US COMBINED US/FWMAF AND/OR COMBINED US/RVNAF COMBAT OPS.

(8) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DESIGNATED CRITICAL US AND GVN INSTALLATIONS IN ARVN I CTZ

(9) EXERCISE OPS CONTROL OF U.S. ARMY ADVISORY GRP IN THE ICTZ AND SERVE AS SENIOR ADV TO THE CG I CORPS (ARVN).

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 FM CG III MAF
 TO YNA/CG FMFPAC
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

(10) PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF US AREA COORDINATOR IN ICTZ.

(11) PROVIDE CLOSE AIR SPT FOR GRND OPS IN ACCORD WITH USMACV DIR 95-4.

(12) DESIGNATE TO 2D AIRDIV THOSE FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN AN CONDUCT AIR DEFENSE TASKS AS AGREED BY COM 2D AIRDIV AND CG FMAW.

(13) PREPARE TO EXECUTE CONTINGENCY PLANS AS DIR BY COMUSMACV.

(14) PERFORM OTHER MISSIONS AND TASKS AS REQ AND/OR AS

PAGE TWO DDKE 863 **S E C R E T**
 DIR BY COMUSMACV.

7. SOME ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED ORG DESCRIBED ABOVE AND TASKED AS IN PAR 5 ABOVE.

ADVANTAGES

A. KEEPS THE USMC AIR/GRND TEAM INTACT.

B. PROVIDES CG III MAF WITH THE SAME COMD RELATIONS STATUS WITH COMUSMACV AS COMPONENT COMDRS.

C. RELIEVES CG III MAF OF DIRECT CONCERN OF NAVY LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROBLEMS IN I CTZ.

D. RETAINS FOR CG III MAF OP-CON OF I CORPS ADVISORY GRP AND AREA COORDINATION FUNCTIONS.

DISADVANTAGES

A. REMOVES CG III MAF FROM DIRECT CONTROL OVER IMPORTANT LOGISTIS SPT ACTIVITIES.

B. LOSES OP-CON OF VALUABEL SPT CAPABILITIES OF 30TH NCR UNLESS OP-CON REASSIGNED FROM NCC TO III MAF. SEE REMARKS PAR 3.

C. SEPARATES THE NAVY/MARINE FAMILY IN SVN.

B. ON BALANCE IT APPEARS THAT IF THE DUAL FACTIONS OF CG III MAF AND NCC WERE SEPARATED AND EACH VESTED IN A SEPARATE

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COMD, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR CG III MAF TO CONTINUE OPS IN
SVN AS TASKED IN PAR 5 ABOVE.

9. REF C FORWARDED A SEPARATE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
IMPROVING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE NCC COMDR TO MACV.

10. REF D. PROVIDES COMUSMACV VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.

11. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY
NCC FOR III MAF IN AREAS LOGISTIC SPT, BASE DEV AND CONST/
ENGR, RECOMMENDED THAT ANY ACTIONS TAKEN TO REVISE USMACV
STRUCTURE AND SEPARATE III MAF AND NCC INCLUDE PROVISION
FOR STRONG USMC REPRESENTATION AT POLICY, AND WORKING LEVEL

12. A DRAFT PROPOSED USMACV ORGANIZATIONAL CHART DEPICTING
THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE DESCRIBED IN PRECEDING
PAR WILL BE HAND CARRIED TO FMFPAC BY COL GLIDDEN, III MAF
REP AT HAWAII PLANNING CONFERENCE.

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CG III MAF
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MAR DIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
RUMSVD/CDR I CORPS ADV GRU
ZEN/NAVSUPACT DANANG
ZEN/38TH NCR
ZEN/5TH COMM BN
ZEN/7TH ENGR BN
ZEN/30 BN, 9TH MAR
BT

SECRET
OPERATIONS DURING TET (U)
A. COMUSMACV 170300Z
B. COMUSMACV 131055Z
C. CG III MAF 180152Z
D. CG III MAF 171226Z
E. COMUSMACV 130105Z NOV (PASEP)

1. GENERAL:
A. REF A PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING ACTIONS OF US AND FREE
WORLD FORCES DURING TET PERIOD 201200H JAN TO 231800H JAN.

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 078 SECRET
B. REF B PROVIDES BASIC GUIDANCE ON MILITARY OBSERVANCE OF TET.
REF C AMPLIFIES THIS GUIDANCE AND PROVIDES SPECIFIC PROCEDURES
APPLICABLE TO III MAF/NCC.
C. REF D PROVIDES FOR INCREASED RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE,
AND COLLECTION EFFORT DURING TET.
2. FOR ALL:
A. ALL UNITS WILL ASSUME POSTURE OF EXTREME ALERTNESS, CONTINUING
AND ENHANCING ALL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS, INCLUDING INTENSIFIED
PATROL ACTIVITY.
B. NO OFFENSIVE GROUND OPERATIONS WILL BE INITIATED.
C. HARASSING AND INTERDICTION FIRES OF ALL KINDS WILL BE SUSPENDED.
D. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT THERE WILL BE VC ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATIONS
DURING TET. REF E PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR MINIMIZING EFFECTS OF
DEMONSTRATIONS.
E. ALL UNITS WILL ASSURE THAT WIDE DISSEMINATION OF GUIDANCE ON
MILITARY OBSERVANCE OF TET CONTAINED IN REFS B AND C IS MADE.
F. MILITARY ACTIVITIES, EXCEPT THOSE OF A CIVIC ACTION OR
HUMANITARIAN NATURE, WILL AVOID, WHENEVER POSSIBLE HAMLETS,
VILLAGES, URBAN AREAS IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE IMPACT ON CIVILIAN
POPULACE.

CG III MAF

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G. ALL UNITS WILL PLAN FOR A VIGOROUS RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING END OF TET. IN THIS CONNECTION, VC HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR UNITS TO DO LIKEWISE. TET PERIOD ANNOUNCED BY VC TERMINATES AT 232200H.

H. NO PUBLIC COMMENT WILL BE MADE ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS. ANY INQUIRIES FROM THE PRESS WILL BE REFERRED TO THE CIB.

3. FOR 3RD MARDIV:

IV:

A. UNITS IN CONTACT WITH VC FORCES AT INCEPTION OF TET WILL NOT BREAK CONTACT UNLESS VC/PAVN EFFORT TO WITHDRAW IS CLEARLY EVIDENT.

B. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE MOBILE RESERVES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO ANY VC/PAVN INITIATIVES. THIS RESPONSE MAY INCLUDE EXECUTION OF CONTINGENCY MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF ARVN FORCES.

4. FOR 1ST MAW:

A. CONDUCT COMBAT AIR OPNS IN SVN ONLY IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES IN CONTACT WITH VC/PAVN FORCES OR AS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

5. FOR NAVSUPACT, DANANG:

A. CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY HARBOR SECURITY MEASURES.

B. NO NAVAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED EXCEPT IN

PAGE FOUR RUMMF 078 S E C R E T

SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES IN CONTACT WITH VC/PAVN FORCES OR AS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED.

6. FOR AIR BASE DEF BN:

A. SPECIAL EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN TO SECURITY OF DANANG AIR BASE.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96601

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FOR/NCC Bul 5340
1/DLR/ref
December 1965

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND BULLETIN 5340

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander
To: Distribution List

Subj: National Health Agencies Campaign

Ref: (a) MACV MACJ2 ltr of 4Dec65 (NOTAL)

1. Purpose. To announce the Tenth Annual National Health Agencies Campaign that will be conducted in this Command during the period from 15 January to 15 February 1966.

2. Background. The Honorary National Chairman for this campaign is Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey and the National Chairman is Mr. Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury. Last year the military in the Far East contributed \$152,389 to this campaign.

3. General. The Health Campaign helps support the programs of 12 National Health Agencies. The work of these agencies is as follows:

a. THE ARTHRITIS FOUNDATION, the sole national voluntary health agency in the fight against arthritis, extends to the nation's 12 million victims of this crippling disease its programs of research, patient care and education. The Foundation's unified medical and scientific approach emphasizes that early diagnosis and treatment can prevent serious crippling in most cases.

b. MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY ASSOCIATIONS OF AMERICA, with your help, advances the scientific conquest of dystrophy, a crippling and ultimately fatal disease which strikes mostly children, ages 3 to 13. Through its international research and nation-wide patient care programs, MDAA brings hope and comfort to millions afflicted by dystrophy and related neuromuscular diseases.

c. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH provides hope for the ill through research to cure and prevent mental illness. It helps mental patients with volunteer services, rehabilitation and after-care, plus special treatment services and schooling for mentally ill children. It fosters public understanding of mental illness and works to establish community-based treatment centers.

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FOR/NCC Bul 9340
28 December 1965

1. THE AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION (Heart Fund) spearheads a nationwide program to combat heart and circulatory diseases — responsible for 55 per cent of all U. S. deaths. Your Heart Fund fights heart attack, stroke, high blood pressure, rheumatic fever, inborn heart defects and other disorders affecting more than 22 million Americans.

4. Administration Instructions

a. Lieutenant Colonel D. L. REDALEN, USMC, Assistant G-1, III Marine Amphibious Force, telephone Parchment 101, is designated the III Marine Amphibious Force Project Officer.

b. Project Officers assigned by the 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 30th Naval Construction Regiment, and Naval Support Activity, Danang, will be notified by the III Marine Amphibious Force Project Officer when campaign material is ready for receipt.

c. As usual, no monetary goal will be set, but a request for 100% participation and a generous gift from all personnel will be the aim.

d. Project Officers will ensure that all keyman's kits are properly filled out to indicate the identification of unit, military address, project officer's name, keyman's name, and the number of contributor's envelopes enclosed in each kit.

e. Contributions to this campaign will be in the form of MPC's or personal checks payable to "Health".

f. Instructions concerning the monetary control and campaign procedures are contained in the campaign material. In general, these instructions are:

(1) It is suggested that each keyman is assigned to solicit no more than 25 members.

(2) Each keyman receives a kit containing a four-part keyman tally sheet, a campaign poster, 25 contribution envelopes and educational folders for him to distribute an envelope and folder to each person he solicits.

(3) Instructions appear on each kit and individual envelope. Designators of specific agencies by the contributor are urged. This gives the donors the opportunity of donating to the health agencies of their choice. Occasionally, a receipt is requested. The keyman is authorized to write one if the donor is willing to make his monetary contribution known.

(4) The donor inserts his gift in the envelope, designates specific amounts to the agencies of his choice and seals the envelope. Each keyman submits in his kit the four filled-out copies of his tally sheet and the sealed envelopes he has collected. The unit or assigned project officer initials the fourth copy of the tally sheet and returns it to the keyman. The other three copies are reinserted with the sealed envelopes in the kit.

FOR/NCC Bul 5340
28 December 1965

(5) Senior Subordinate Command Project Officers will ensure kits are sealed and delivered in adequate containers and under security to the III Marine Amphibious Force Project Officer at 0900 on 1 March 1966. A memorandum for the record showing total number of kits and donor envelopes enclosed will be provided.

(6) The III Marine Amphibious Force Project Officer will ensure further delivery of kits under proper security to the MACV Project Officer, Saigon.


g. A new eight-minute 16mm sound-color film which depicts a family surmounting a health crisis with the aid of a National Health Agency will be available for showing through I Corps Special Services film exchange office. Project Officers are encouraged to show this film in connection with this campaign.

5. Action

a. Commanders are requested to give wide dissemination to the contents of this Bulletin and are urged to stress 100% participation in this worthwhile campaign for better health.

b. Commands are encouraged to use the technique of personal solicitation by keyman to secure maximum voluntary participation.

6. Self-cancellation. 31 April 1966.



DISTRIBUTION:
Case 1 (less B,G,I)
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Case 2 A,C,J

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco
 California 96601

Force/NCC O 5420.1
 1/DTD/es
 12 Jan 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND ORDER 5420.1

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander
 To: Distribution List

Subj: Political and Civil Affairs Coordinating Committee

1. Purpose. To establish a committee to evaluate the political effects of the activities of this Command as related to the mission of the III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command in the Republic of Vietnam.
2. Background. Recent events indicate the need for constant monitoring of all activities of this Command in light of the political consequences which may ensue therefrom. In addition to the political effects of tactical operations, close evaluation of the impact of personnel on liberty, motor vehicle traffic problems, the effects of Viet Cong anti-American propaganda, derogatory incidents between Vietnamese Nationals and U. S. personnel, and liaison problems and methods with the various GVN agencies all require evaluation to determine political effects.
3. Organization. The Chief of Staff, III Marine Amphibious Force is designated as the Chairman of the Political and Civil Affairs Coordinating Committee

a. The following members of the III Marine Amphibious Force Staff are designated as members:

Political Advisor
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
 Force Legal Officer
 Force Provost Marshal

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ENCL (20)

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b. Subordinate Commanders are requested to assign members to the Committee as indicated below:

(1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division: Three officers of pay grade O-5 or above.

(2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing: Two officers of pay grade O-5 or above.

(3) Commanding Officer, 30th Naval Construction Regiment: One Officer of pay grade O-5 or above.

(4) Commanding Officer, Naval Support Activity, Danang: One Officer of pay grade O-5 or above.

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, will act as recorder for the board.

4. Action

a. The board will meet on the call of the Chairman.

b. The board is authorized to call upon members of the III MAF/NCC staff for assistance and information required in its deliberations.

c. The board will keep complete records of its deliberations and will furnish a continuous analysis of the political consequences of the presence and actions of this Command and its individual members.

d. The board will furnish a recommended political evaluation for entry into the monthly Command Chronology.

G. C. Atwell
G. C. ATWELL
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 3 (less A)

INFO COPY:

Case 2, C (41)