

**SECRET**

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EXCLUSIVE

062225Z Jan 1966

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O 062225Z  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO CG III MAF

//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND MAJGEN WALT FROM  
 LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. TODAY ADM JOHNSON SHOWED ME A BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM ADM  
 MCDONALD WHICH URGED HIM AND SHARP TO PRESS AHEAD ON THE NCC MATTER.  
 MCDONALD'S PROPOSAL WAS TO ESTABLISH A NAVY ADM IN SAIGON, WITH  
 ADEQUATE STAFF, AS NCC. HE DID NOT MENTION WHAT RANK ADM HE HAD  
 IN MIND.
2. CONVERSATIONS WITH SHARP AND JOHNSON TODAY REVEALED THAT THEY  
 BOTH FEEL THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE AT ONCE TO COVER SUCH  
 NAVY TASKS AS HARBOR SECURITY, MINE COUNTERMEASURES, RIVER  
 OPERATIONS, MARKET TIME ETC. HOWEVER, NEITHER OF THEM IS YET  
 SURE JUST HOW TO DO IT, AND STILL MEET THE MARINES' PROBLEMS.
3. I REITERATED TO EACH OF THEM SEPARATELY THE ESSENTIAL USMC  
 INTERESTS: FIRM PROTECTION OF THE AIR-GROUND TEAM; PRESERVATION  
 OF THE DIRECT OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEW AND MACV, WITH  
 NO INTERVENING AUTHORITY; AND PRESERVATION OF THE DIRECT LOGISTIC  
 AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEW AND ME, WITH NO  
 INTERVENING AUTHORITY.
4. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS, AS I LEARN THEM. REGARDS.  
 GP-4

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 COPIES 3-4 OF 4 COPIES - CMC

CG FMFPAC

O 062225Z/JAN

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P 082255Z

FM CG FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

BT

//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL GREENE AND MGEN WALT  
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. DISCUSSED THE NCC MATTER FURTHER WITH JOHNSON TODAY. HE SAID  
 THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A PERSONAL FROM WARD IN SAIGON, WHO  
 SAID:

A. THAT IN A CONFERENCE BETWEEN HIM AND LEW ON THE SUBJECT, LEW  
 STOOD FAST ON RETAINING THE NCC HAT.

B. THAT A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER WITH CMC DISCLOSED THAT  
 HE HELD GENERALLY THE SAME VIEW AS LEW.

C. THAT SINCE NAVY - MARINE DISCORD SHOULD BE AVOIDED, WARD  
 RECOMMENDED - FOR THE TIME BEING - THAT THE IDEA OF A SAIGON BASED  
 ADMIRAL DEPUTY NCC BE ACCEPTED. MEANWHILE HE WOULD SOUND OUT WESTY  
 AS TO HIS VIEWS.

2. JOHNSON THEN EXPRESSED HIS OWN CONVICTIONS, AS FOLLOWS:

A. THERE HAS TO BE AN ADMIRAL IN OVERALL COMMAND OF MARKET TIME,  
 MINE COUNTERMEASURES, HARBOR DEFENSE, USN FORCES INVOLVED IN  
 RIVERINE OPERATIONS ETC, AS WELL AS TO REPRESENT THE  
 NAVY IN SAIGON. THIS SHOULD BE A REAR ADMIRAL, NOT A VICE ADMIRAL,  
 AND HE HAS SO ADVISED CNO.

B. THERE SHOULD BE A JUNIOR REAR ADMIRAL IN COMMAND OF NSA DANANG,  
 SUBORDINATE TO THE ONE IN SAIGON.

C. THE FOREGOING SHOULD NOT INFRINGE THE STATURE OR STATUS OF III  
 MAF, WITH RESPECT TO MACV OR FMFPAC.

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3. I RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE NCC ARRANGEMENT, TO DATE, HAS BEEN VALUABLE, IN THAT IT HAS HELPED PRESERVE THE USMC AIR/GROUND TEAM, AS WELL AS THE BASIC MARINE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FLEET. IN ADDITION, IT HAS GIVEN III MAF BENEFICIAL STATURE IN THE MACV OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

B. THE NAVY'S PROBLEMS IN RVN NOW AND IN THE PAST ARE CHARGEABLE MAINLY TO THE RELUCTANCE TO PUT ENOUGH PEOPLE AND ENOUGH GOOD PEOPLE INTO THE JOB.

C. I RECOGNIZE THE VARIOUS PURELY NAVY TASKS INVOLVED, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR A NAVY OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OVER THEM.

D. HOWEVER, I CANNOT SUPPORT ANY PLAN THAT JEOPARDIZES OUR AIR/GROUND TEAM, LEW'S DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTY, OR HIS DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH ME. THESE CONDITIONS ARE MET IN THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT, AND WOULD BE MET IN AN ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING A NAVY DEPUTY IN SAIGON WHO EXERCISES OPERATION AUTHORITY, UNDER MACV, OVER THE VARIOUS NAVY FORCES.

4. JOHNSON REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ESSENTIAL POINTS WHICH THE MARINES HAD TO STAND ON: THAT HE AGREED THEY ARE ESSENTIAL: THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT US IN PURSUING THEM. AGAIN, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT OUTLINE EXACTLY HOW HE WOULD PROPOSE TO SEE IT DONE. I HONESTLY BELIEVE HE HAS NOT FIGURED IT OUT YET, TO HIS OWN SATISFACTION.

5. I HAVE HAD A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH SHARP ON THE SUBJECT. HIS COMMENTS WERE CONFINED TO THE VIEW THAT THE NAVY NEEDED TO GET BUSY ON THE VARIOUS SEAGOING ASPECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR, OR THEY MIGHT LOSE CONTROL OF THEIR FORCES. I WILL TALK FURTHER TO HIM.

REGARDS

GP-4

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JAN

CG FMFPAC

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O 092247Z  
 FM: CG PIRFAC  
 TO: CG IFA MIF  
 CMC

//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTJEN HANGRUM AND MCEN VALT  
 FROM LTJEN KRULIK.

1. DISCUSSED NCO MATTER WITH SHARP. HE REGITED THE BACKGROUND ESSENTIALLY AS WE ALL KNOW IT, WITH ONLY ONE VARIATION. HE SAID THAT, WHILE BALDWIN DID INDEED PROPOSE A THREE STAR NCO, MCDONALD IS NOW OPPOSED TO IT, PREFERRING A REAR ADMIRAL. HE SHOWED ME A BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM MCDONALD TO HIM ON THE SUBJECT, WHICH REQUESTED THE ACORN NAVY BILLS AND PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FLAG OFFICER TO COVER THEM. MCDONALD'S MESSAGE DID NOT MENTION MIRINES.

2. SHARP THEN SAID THAT HE BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE AN ADMIRAL DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO MCMV FOR ALL OF THE NAVY JOBS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING. AMONG THEM HE LISTED FORT OPERATIONS. HE SHOWED ME A BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD SENT YESTERDAY TO WESTY, MAKING THIS POINT CMM AND PROPOSING THAT WARD BE THE M'N. MARINES AND MARINE RELATIONSHIPS WERE NOT MENTIONED IN HIS MESSAGE. I ASKED HIM WHY, AND HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY CHANGE IN MARINE RELATIONSHIPS, EXCEPT THAT LEW WOULD NO LONGER BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RUNNING THE PORT OF DANANG.

3. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS NAIVE AND PERHAPS OPTIMISTIC, AND THEN EXPLAINED MY APPREHENSIONS IN THE TERMS WITH WHICH WE ARE ALL FAMILIAR. I ENDED UP BY RESTATING THE THREE PRIME BENEFITS THAT THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT HAS BROUGHT US;

- A. PROTECTION OF THE AIR-DASH GROUND TEAM.
- B. DIRECT OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP FROM LEW TO WESTY.
- C. DIRECT LOGISTIC RELATIONSHIP FROM LEW TO ME.

AND THEN SAID THE M'NINES COULD NOT COUNTENANCE ANY DEGRADATION IN ANY OF THESE. I WAS PRETTY STRONG IN THE WAY I PUT IT, AND WAS NOT SURE WHAT REACTION I WOULD GET.

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4. SHARP'S RESPONSE WAS AS FOLLOWS;  
 "I AGREE WITH ALL THREE POINTS AND IT IS UP TO ME TO PROTECT YOU. IF ANYONE TRIES TO UPSET ANY ONE OF THEM I WILL KNOCK THEM DOWN, AND I MEAN NOT ONLY WESTY BUT CNO. I DON'T BELIEVE THE NAVY HAS ANY THOUGHT OF TRYING TO GET BETWEEN WALT AND WESTY OR YOU, BUT I KNOW THAT THE AIR FORCE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE OVER WALT'S AIR. I WON'T ALLOW IT."
5. I THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF WESTY TRYING TO PUT 100 M F-OR PARY OF IT-UNDER FIELD FORCES, TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD NOT SEE THE MARINES BROKEN APART OF SEVERED FROM DIRECT SUBORDINATION TO WESTY.
6. THE MEETING ENDED AT THIS POINT, BECAUSE SHARP HAD A VISITOR. HOWEVER, MY EVALUATION, AT THIS POINT, IS;
- A. THAT HE WAS CANDID AND SINCERE, IN WHAT HE SAID.
  - B. THAT HE IS GOING TO DRIVE HARD TO CARRY FORWARD THE IDEA EXPRESSED IN PARA TWO.
  - C. THAT HE WILL GO TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS, WITHIN THE ABOVE CONTEXT, TO TAKE CARE OF US.
  - D. THAT IT WILL BE HARDER TO DO THAN HE THINKS.
7. LEV, PLEASE TRY AND GET THIS DOPE TO WALLY, IF POSSIBLE.
8. REGARDS TO ALL.

GP-1

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 COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES: CMC

DIST:  
 CG FMFPAC

O 092217Z/JAN 66

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Jan

CG FMFPAC

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MAF G-4

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// COMM NOTE: FIRST THREE LINES OF  
 TEXT CORRECTED BY ORIGINATOR.  
 CG III MAF NOT ADDEE IN ORIGINAL  
 MSG. //

O 162102Z  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMNMF/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL JOHNSON AND MAJGEN WALT, FROM  
 LTGEN KRULAK CG III MAF NOT ADDEE PASS ACTION TO ADM JOHNSON  
 INFO TO MAJGEN WALT

A. COMUSMACV 130159Z

1. I HAVE STUDIED REF A AND BELIEVE WE CAN OPERATE EFFECTIVELY  
 UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. HOWEVER, ONE INTERNAL NAVY-MARINE AREA  
 WHICH I RECOMMEND YOU LOOK INTO CAREFULLY DURING YOUR VISIT IS  
 THE MATTER OF CB SUPPORT TO THE MARINES.

2. PARA 4C TAKES THE 30TH NCR AWAY FROM WALT'S CONTROL.

HERETOFORE, THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THAT UNIT HAS BEEN  
 GOVERNED BY WALT'S JUDGEMENT OF WHAT IS MOST NEEDED TO GET ON

D0-43 2 RUHLBP 2137S E C R E T

WITH THE WAR. UNDER THE NEW ARRANGEMENT IT WILL RESPOND TO THE  
 ANALYSIS OF THE NCC, AS TO WHERE THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION  
 DEMANDS ARE GREATEST. I FORSEE THAT THERE ARE GOING TO BE TIMES  
 WHERE III MAF AND NCC WILL NOT SEE EYE TO EYE ON PRIORITIES.  
 THERE SHOULD BE AN IN-HOUSE SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT THESE PROBLEMS  
 ARE SOLVED WITH A MAXIMUM OF EFFICIENCY, GIVING FULL DISCOUNT TO  
 THE FACT THAT THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF 30TH NCR ARE ADDRESSED TO  
 ENSURING THAT III MAF HAS MAXIMUM SUPPORT IN PROSECUTING THE  
 BATTLE. I RECOMMEND YOU DISCUSS WAYS AND MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH  
 THIS WITH ALL CONCERNED.

GP-4

BT

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CG FMFPAC

O 162102Z/JAN

GEN WALT

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O 300414Z  
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
 TO CINCPACFLT  
 CG FMFPAC  
 CTG 76.6  
 CTG 79.5  
 CG III MAF  
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR COL BURNETT AND CAPT MADDOCKS  
 INFO ADM JOHNSON, LGEN KRULAK, BGEN PLATT, LGEN WALT, FROM VADM  
 HYLAND.

1. IN ORDER HOLD TO ESTABLISHED AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE AND NOT SET  
 PRECEDENT WHICH MIGHT LATER BE USED BY OTHER SERVICES TO OUR  
 DETRIMENT DESIRE COL BURNETT ACTUALLY ASSUME COMMAND OF THE LANDING  
 FORCE ASHORE WHEN ESTABLISHED AND ISO ANNOUNCE BY OFFICIAL MESSAGE  
 TO ALL CONCERNED. COL BURNETT MAY CHOP HIS FORCES TO BGEN PLATT  
 AS REQUESTED.

2. FOR COL BURNETT. REALIZE YOU ARE NOT COMPLETELY STAFFED TO  
 ASSUME SUCH A TASK, HOWEVER, ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE SHOULD BE  
 FOLLOWED IN DETAIL. IT IS EXPECTED THAT YOU WOULD THEN CHOP YOUR  
 FORCES TO CG TASK FORCE DELTA.

GP-4

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COMSEVENTHFLT

300414Z/JAN

COL BURNETT  
 CAPT MADDOCKS

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*Col Burnett*  
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