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 Unit: III AF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 060800Z, Feb 1966
 Ref: III AF 1

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PLINTREP NO 1.

Period Covered: 300001 Jan66 to 052400 Feb66.

Ref: (a) US Maps Series L-701, Sheets (Hue/Phu Bai TDR) 6460-I-II, 6560-II-III-IV, (Danang TAOR) 6559 I-II 6338 I, 6539 II-III-IV, 6656 I-IV; (Chu Lai TAOR) 6657 I-II, 6557 II-III-IV, 6756 I-II, 6656 I, Scale 1:50,000

1. General Enemy Situation. During the week covered, the enemy continued his harassment tactics with particular emphasis on the Marine Units in the DANANG enclave. Numerous incidents of mining and booby trapping were recorded which illustrated the increasing ingenuity and growing sophistication of the VC in this field. VC initiated incidents against USMC elements were widespread with enemy forces ranging in strength from individual snipers to several platoons in size. Weapons employed ranged from individual small arms weapons to crew served machine guns and mortars up to 81mm in caliber. Of particular interest are the two recent discoveries of ammunition and equipment caches found in local temples/pagodas near DANANG, one of them containing considerable ammunition.

a. The major USMC operation within the ICBM during the time frame covered was operation DOUBLE SCALE in Southern Quang Ngai province. Whereas the enemy initially failed to oppose the landing on 28 January, enemy opposition built up each day with growing harassing activity. Towards the end of the period, forceful opposition was initiated by VC units, of at least one platoon in size. Accepted VC casualty figures at the end of the period for Operation Double Scale included 109 VC confirmed KIA and 20 possible KIA.

b. Anti-aircraft fire directed against friendly aircraft within ICBM was widespread. This included fire from individual small arms through caliber 50 machine guns.

c. Indications of increased enemy activity around the perimeter of the three USMC enclaves were noted, evidence of the use of elephants for transport was found near both Danang and Phu Bai.

EP-4, DECLASSIFIED AT THREE YEAR INTERVALS
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2. Enemy Operations During the Period. A total of 37 incidents were reported during this period, including 43 reports of small arms fire, 6 reports of grenades thrown at friendly units, 16 reports of booby traps and 1 mortar incident.

- a. Strength and dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New enemy tactics, weapons and equipment.

(1) Tactics. On 31 Jan 70 placed dummies in tree line vic (BT 042706) with fake weapons, an actual VC was nearby. VC fired at Marines from long range. Marines returned fire at dummy positions.

(2) On 1 Feb a patrol found markers made of sheet metal pointing to unit command post.

(3) On 1 Feb VC prior to attack on patrol base, boat drums for about 10 minutes. No success tactic.

(4) On 2 Feb river patrol noted a round boat, about 6' in diameter floating on river VIC (BT 034655), threw a grappling hook to the boat and the boat exploded.

(5) On 2 Feb while wire team was checking line for break, tripped a grenade 5' from break VIC (AT 935063). Land line had been purposely cut by VC.

(6) On 2 Feb VC placed a 20 lb TNT charge on the side of dike VIC (AT 953676) with a large piece of rock in front of charge. When charge was detonated, a dispersion fan of about 20 meters was obtained.

(7) On 2 Feb a cache of ammo was found on top of a pagoda VIC (BT 052704). The VC appear to be using religious shrines and other facilities more frequently, knowing that U.S. personnel will respect such buildings and have had certain restrictions imposed which limit activity in and around them.

(8) On 2 Feb a friendly patrol VIC (BT 063608) detonated a grenade booby trap. When detonated, a grenade at the head, middle and end of the column detonated simultaneously.

(9) On 2 Feb NVA reported that NVA Bn VIC (BT 4303) planted new type AP mine (squirrel type) which are actuated by disturbing gunji stakes.

(10) On 3 Feb unit located a cache of VC ammo and equipment VIC (BT 047713) on roof of pagoda. (2nd report of this acty)

- e. Negative.
- f. Administrative units.

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(1) On 2 Feb unit reported location of a concrete bunker VIC (AT 968555) underneath a straw hut. Bunker has 2 gunnery positions and is possibly a VC comm center. Information reported by Hoi An liaison - unvaluated.

g. Negative.

H. Air defense.

(1) There was a considerable increase of A1 fire during the reporting period. A total of 125 incidents were recorded, with 43 hits on 29 aircraft. Primary areas of reported incidents were in the Arang MMR and Double Eagle area. The intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. There were 8 reported incidents of 12.7mm/50 cal. fire being received.

i. Through g. Negative.

q. Infantry.

(1) During the reporting period VC incidents ranged from 1-2 man probes to 15 man probes against friendly units. No major contacts with the VC were made during the period.

r. Negative.

s. Other elements.

(1) Numerous reports of elephants to the west of Hoi An PAC indicate the VC may be using the elephants for transport.

3. Other intelligence factors.

a. Enemy organization. Annex A

b. Enemy identifications. Annex A

c. Enemy equipment. Annex A

d. Personalities. Annex A

e. Casualties (including SCUD? MIA IIR)

MIA 137 MIA 2 VCC 31

g. Enemy defenses, mine fields, fortifications, barriers, obstacles and other defensive works.

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(1) TAGOR	LOCATION	DATE	TYPE
PENG LAI	XD 667435	31 Jan	Voxholes
	XD 865435	31 Jan	Hole Stakes
	XD 865435	31 Jan	Poss Mortar PENS
	YD 0552	1 Feb	Trenches
DAMANG	AT 930540	31 Jan	Trench
	BT 945602	31 Jan	Tunnels
	BT 045704	31 Jan	Tunnels
	AT 930618	31 Jan	Trenches
	AT 995529	31 Jan	Trenches
	AT 987518	31 Jan	Tunnels
	BT 006570	3 Feb	Trenches
	BT 080671	3 Feb	Trenches
	BT 051626	3 Feb	Trenches
	WU ANH	DS 614366	31 Jan
RS 639337		31 Jan	M/P PENS
BT 012334		1 Feb	Trenches
RS 608906		1 Feb	Trenches

(2) PLAT 03 District (AT 866716) chief reports that VC who are mining BSR with air arty rounds is a highly trained platoon sized unit.

(3) Mine fields. Friendly units have used six line charges against some VC mines IC (AT 9761). Nine secondary explosions have been achieved. The VC mines were laid in a triangular pattern on crests that might be used by armored vehicles.

b. Details of Administrative Installations and Support.

(1) (see para f.)

1. Terrain. See Appendix 1 (ICTF) to Annex A (intelligence) to ACV concept study on operations in Vietnam, dated 23 July 1965.

g. Weather.

(1) During reporting period weather remained good. Some scattered showers throughout enclaves but this did not hamper military operations. All roads within enclaves remain trafficable. Temperatures were mild and surface winds were light approximately 5-8 knots.

5. Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities.

a. Enemy Capabilities. With forces presently located within the ICTF, the enemy has the capability:

(1) to continue his campaign of sabotage, assassination, terrorism and anti-USA and/or anti-US propaganda.

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(2) To attack isolated ARVN outposts and NVN district headquarters with forces up to multi-battalion or regimental size.

(3) To continue to interdict lines of communication.

(4) To continue his attempts to infiltrate suicide units into US bases for sabotage attacks.

(5) With a minor redistribution of forces, to attack:

(a) The HUE FMU LAI enclave with the equivalent of one regiment reinforced.

(b) The DANANG enclave with a force equivalent to two regiments reinforced by two main force battalions and local force and guerrilla elements.

(c) The QNU LAI enclave with the equivalent of two regiments reinforced by two main force battalions and local force and guerrilla elements.

c. Relative probability of adoption.

(1) Para 3.a (1), 3.a(2) and 3.a(3) above.

(2) Para 3.a (4) in conjunction with above.

(3) Para 3.a (5).

d. Vulnerabilities. The two major weaknesses of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese are his relatively poor logistical capability and his generally rigid adherence to pre-arranged battle tactics.

(1) Due primarily to a lack of mechanized transport combined with the necessarily covert introduction of supplies, the enemy lacks the logistical back up to sustain large scale operations against US and ARVN forces. While he can and has accumulated sufficient supplies to launch large scale and successful attacks against the more remote outposts and district headquarters, he seldom is capable of holding the positions gained against determined counter assaults.

(2) A time proven mode of operandi of the VC is the painstakingly planned attack, well rehearsed and executed. An inherent paucity of communications frequently renders such attacks inflexible and sudden changes in the disposition of friendly troops can disrupt his plans to the point of critical failure.

(3) The VC/NVA vulnerability to US/ARVN air observation and attack forces has been well demonstrated but his lack of control of air space forces such movements into a lengthy time span.

J.T. COHEN
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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ANNEXES: A - ORDER OF BATTLE
B - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
C - CAPTIVES, RETURNED AND REFUGEE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2
CG THIRD MARDIV	2
CG FIRST MAF	2
CHOK I CORPS AAV GP	3
CG REFORCEV	1
GP	1

ANNEX A to ILL MAP SCHEMATIC No. 1

TRC/PHU HAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>FUNCTIONALITIES</u>
HUONG THA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THA THA
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-HUONG THUY THAI AI
K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	YD 8042	1-811111111111 2-600011111111 2-571111111111 2-111111111111 12-311111111111	CO-THAM DINH; TRU
310TH LN	PROB	400	PHU HAI WEST	3-811111111111 6-601111111111 3-RR 18-AR 3-AR UNK-311111111111	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY (AKA THAI) PO-SUOAPU THUYEN DUNG

2. RESERVE AND REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES AREA)

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLEDANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9364	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-AR, 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-IMG	CO-DOAN NINH VO KHAN LAM NGUYEN TUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE HIEN XO-TRAN CAI
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-IMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHAI)
HOA HINH CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-IMG, 7 AR 30-IMG	CO-NGUYEN BOA
HIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SIG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DIY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SIG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG PHAN PO-DUONG QU
U/I BN	PROD	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

2. ARMED AND/OR DANGEROUS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF MAIN)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>CTR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MULTI</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AV 8753	1-81ST HOBT 2-60TH HOBT 1-57TH BR 16-AR	CO-SUANG KA (AKA LU) SO-HIEU PO-YOAN
HIEN VAN CO	CONF	120	HT 0355	1-81ST HOBT 1-60TH HOBT 1-57TH BR 3-REG, 18 REG	CO-HIEN A K I AN, PHUEN BINH KHUAT
V/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9069	1-81ST HOBT 1-60TH HOBT 26-AR	UNK

CHU LAI1. FORCE IS LOCALLY AVAILABLE:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	INF	300	BT 1000	1-81ST BORT 2-60TH BORT 3-2ND, 2-5TH BR 1-AA GEN 3-TM; 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN HAI HOAN KO-LOAN TAN
T-19 CO	COMP	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN HAI

2. UNITS AND/OR REGIMENTS. (WITHIN 10 KILOMETERS OF EACH)

52ND BN	COMP	350	BS 7090	2-81ST BORT 8-60TH BORT 3-57TH BR 4-30 C L BRG 24-AR	CO-VO HUNG SO; VT CAU THI KO-THAN KINH; CAPT PHO
T-18 CO	COMP	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	COMP	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-BONG KO-LINE PO-LINE
400TH ARMY BN	COMP	200	BT 3005	2-81ST BORT 2-75TH BORT 2-70TH BORT 1-105TH BORT	CO-SRCAPT LAI KO-SRCAPT HOANG CON
A-19 CO	COMP	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; MAC
A-21 CO	COMP	100	BT 3315	1-60TH BORT 1-5TH BR 1-IMG	CO-NGUYEN LICH

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	104-11111	<u>CLASS</u>	PI03	<u>REF</u>	300	<u>LOCATION</u>	DS 6692	<u>EMPIP</u>	1-81 W 10-11 3-60 W 10-11 2-10; 18-11	<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	CO-MINISTRI HI CIAV; AGIA TUS
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ANNEX B to III MAP PERINTREP No. 1

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. General. There were no significant changes in the counterintelligence situation within the Chu Lai, Banang and Phu Bai Enclaves during the period covered. The most prominent incident was on 2 February - a VC instigated civil demonstration at HUEI THUY District Headquarters (YD 877174) involving approximately 100 residents of LOI NONG Hamlet (YD 839195).

b. Espionage. 2 Feb - 1st Mar relayed report from a Ly Tin District Agent that VC have 300,000\$ VN to distribute to VC Infrastructures. Money is to be used to obtain intelligence from RMX Employees. (G-2 Cmt: Rated F/3).

c. Sabotage. 2 Feb - 1st Mar relayed report from a Ly Tin District Agent that VC are planning to place plastic bombs in the restaurant Diamond, An Tan vic (BT 499067), which is frequented by American and RMX personnel. (G-2 Cmt: Rated F/3).

d. Political. None Reported.

e. Propaganda & Rumors.

(1) 2 Feb - 2nd Bn 1st Mar reported a VC instigated demonstration at HUEI THUY District Headquarters, vic (YD 877174). The entire population of LOI NONG Hamlet (YD 839195) assembled at District Headquarters with the body of an elderly blind man who had been accidentally shot and killed in his home during Marine operations on 1 Feb. Spokesman of demonstrators indicated that the victim had not been shot deliberately, but apparently from a stray round. Demonstration was instigated by a known full time VC Political Cadre who entered LOI NONG Hamlet with 5-9 VC assistants and induced 40 families, all having sons in the ARVN, to participate in the demonstration.

(2) 2 Feb - 3d Mar relayed rpt from BINH LHO that after COMUS operations, VC Political Cadre urge local residents to express discontent and to have a "Political Struggle." The latter often takes the form of claims for alleged "damage" resulting from such operations. On about 20 January, the people of MIEN BAN District were reportedly urged to have such a "Political Struggle." LHO advised that claims should be referred to liaison personnel for study to determine if claims are valid or VC instigated. (G-2 Cmt: Rated B/2).

(3) 4 Feb - 3d Mar reported that Catholic Priest of HOA THANH vic (AT 512774) relayed Buddhists in Banang are being infiltrated by VC and plan to demonstrate in near future. (G-2 Cmt: Rated F/3).

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Miscellaneous.

3 Feb - School House in AN TRACH (1) vic (AT 972662) was burned down by 10 yr old boy. Boy was reportedly advanced 1000 VN to burn down the school with a promise that he would receive 9000 VN after completion of the task. (S-2 Cmt: Typical VC tactic - Incident being investigated.)

REF ID: A66001

CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT

	CAPTIVES		RETURNEES		SUSPECTS
	NVA	OTHER	NVA	OTHER	
Number captured or acquired during reporting period.	None	None	None	Callier Female 1	*159
Present location	None	None	None	2d ARVN Div	All released to ARVN authorities
Status of Interrogation	None	None	None	Unk	159 Completed
Total captives, returnees held at the end of the reporting period by Corps, each Division and Sector.	None	None	None	None	None

* Not including Operation Double Eagle

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 Location: DANANG, RVN
 DTG 130800H, FEB 1966
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PERINTREP NO 2

PERIOD COVERED: 060001H Feb to 122400H Feb 66

Ref: Same

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

- A. I Corps Tactical Zone. The pattern of VC activity lagged somewhat during the period. Several instances of VC sabotage of roads and railroads were experienced. Continued terrorism tactics and widespread use of mines and booby traps was noted.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN/PHU BAI TAOR.

- (A) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN: Primary VC interest in the area appeared to be in the interdiction of the DANANG - PHU BAI railroad. Numerous small bridges were blown and two trains hit mines. Practically all of this activity was concentrated in the PHU LOC area north of the AI VAN ridge line.
- (B) PHU BAI TAOR - Only minor and infrequent VC activity was experienced in the PHU BAI TAOR during the period.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR/DANANG TAOR

- (A) QNSS: Several reports were received of VC intentions to conduct mortar attacks on the Esso fuel dump in north Danang. VC road blocks were established in the AI VAN Pass and movement into that area of a reported of an est 400 VC was reported. Two significant VC mortar attacks were reported during the period; one against DUY XUYEN District Headquarters on 9 February with 15 rounds of 60mm mortar and another on both the 9th and 10th of February with 47 rounds of 60 and 81mm mortar fire delivered on the THUONG DUC District Headquarters (ZC 145535).
- (B) In the DANANG TAOR, indications of VC sabotage attempts against shipping in the Danang harbor were received but, possibly due to increased precaution, did not materialize. VC mining and booby traps, especially in the southern section the TAOR remained at a high pitch. Small VC units of up to platoon strength were encountered. Their posture was that of harassment as well as deliberate attempts to maintain control by terrorism of the VN population.

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(3) QUANG TRI - THIEN/CHU LAI TAOR

- (A) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN: VC activity in the ICTZ apparently centered in the TIEN PHUOC area in central QUANG TIN Province with an increase in low validity-type movement and sightings reports generating from that area. This could represent a movement away from the Double Eagle area and/or a concentration for future offensive operations against TAM KY and/or other important ARVN/RVN civil headquarters.
- (B) CHU LAI TAOR - Only minor VC activity was reported in the CHU LAI TAOR. "Of an harassment nature".
- (C) DOUBLE EAGLE - (Southern QUANG NGAI Province). In spite of aggressive searching by friendly forces, the VC in the Double Eagle objective area very largely succeeded in avoiding direct contact. An analysis of reports received indicates that the VC moved to the western mountainous section of the QUANG NGAI - BINH DINH border and also to the NW into the SW corner of SON TINH District. Delaying action was evident in the beginning of the period, decreasing to almost no contact in the middle of the week and then renewing as the period closed. VC were observed and otherwise reported in the mountain area moving away from USMC operations but small enemy elements up to 2 platoons in size conducted harassing attacks and attempted ambushes on USMC units. Total VC casualties since the beginning of the operation on 28 January amounted at the close of the period to 257 KIA, 58 KIA (POSS), 13 VCC and 8 ralliers.

2. Enemy Operations During the Period. A total of 95 incidents were reported within the 3 marine enclaves during the period, including 72 reports of harassing fire, 21 reports of mine/booby traps, 1 sabotage and 1 propaganda.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. On 6 February, vic (BT 514091), a First Marines unit discovered a marker constructed with 3 stones arranged in a triangular pattern, with a stick in the center, pointing towards the Battalion CP.

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- (2) On 7 February, First Marines reported the Communications Trunk Line between 1/4 and the Regimental CP had been tapped and cut. Tap lines were in evidence.
- (3) On 9 February, Ninth Marines reported destroying a hollow tree, with a secondary explosion. The report further stated that four multiple cartridge traps, with approximately 30 carbine rounds, and using nails as firing pins were destroyed at coord (BT 056706).
- (4) On 10 February, Third Marines reported detonating a grenade booby trap vic (AT 957682). The trip wire was placed underwater at a stream crossing.
- (5) The SA I Corps forwarded a translation of a VC document, captured on 17 January in the vic (BT 160560). "Our recent release of POW's and surrender's has had a very large impact. According to higher headquarters, we will badly need U. S. POW's for use. In the battles, our Armed Forces and semi-armed forces must try to capture U. S. POW's and POW's from satellite forces, keep them carefully, insure our policy, and send them immediately to the specialized military proselyting agencies, to use them in necessary missions."
- (6) New Weapons. ARVN reported capture of a CHICOM version of the GORYUNOV heavy MG (M1943) (7.62mm) during February operations.

e. Negative.f. Administrative Units.

- (1) On 5 February, a District agent reported a secret base is located vic (BS 401766), 21 miles SE of CHU LAI, with high ranking cadre, a military hospital was also reported vic (BS 366775), 23 miles SE of CHU LAI, with a reported 500 people located there. The VC plan to booby-trap the instruments in the event ARVN forces discover this hospital (ARVN rated C/3).

g. Negative.h. Air Defense.

- (1) There was a slight decrease of AA incidents during the reporting period. A total of 98 incidents were recorded involving III MAF aircraft. Twenty five aircraft received a total of 40 hits from ground fire. Primary areas of reported incidents were the DANANG TAOR and Double Eagle area. There were six reported incidents of 12.7mm/.50 cal fire being

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directed at aircraft. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense.

- (2) On 7 February, vic (YD 871131), an A/O sighted a new AA position, camouflaged to look like an old site.
 - (3) On 9 February, A/O reported a new AA defensive position, vic (AT 947587).
 - (4) Photography of 12 Jan revealed a possible AA position, on top of the hill, vic (BT 377115).
- i. Negative.
 - j. Negative.
 - k. Artillery.
 - (1) On 7 February, NAD reported the 467th Bn is stationed in BA REM. The report further stated the Battalion's "SOLE" 105mm howitzer will soon be moved to DIEN BAN District, "piece by piece". Possible location (BT 1858). (F-5).
 - (2) On 7 February, NAD reported the 637th Bn is located in KHE TRAI, near the HUE-DANANG Pass. This Battalion is also reported to have one 105mm howitzer in their possession. Possible location (ZC 1882). (F-5).
 - (3) On 26 January, a district agent reported to I Corps that the 37th Bn and 107th Bn, strength 650, with two 105mm howitzers moved to YEN NGUA (BS 522631), 27 miles SW of CHU LAI. Report rated F-5, howitzers rated F-4. (SEE III MAF INTSUM 31, Para 8.K.)
 - l. Negative.
 - m. Negative.
 - n. Engineers.
 - (1) On 10 February, Third Marines reported the Engineer Co. of the 1st VC Regiment is located in the vic of GO LANG, (AT 903693).
 - o. Negative.

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- (1) On 5 February district agent reported a Bn training vic (BT 180180) and (BT 182160), 26 miles W of CHU LAI. (ARVN rated C/3). (G-2 Cmt: F/3, probably Bn of NVA 36th Regt.)
- (2) I Corps Adv Group reported the 90th Bn and 300th Bn, located 24 miles NW CHU LAI were practicing attack drills. (G-2 Cmt: This is the second report of these units holding attack drills. See III MAF INTSUM No. 41, sub-para 8.G.)

r. Reconnaissance

- (1) On 10 February Third Marines reported the Recon Co. of the 1st VC Regt is located in the vic of GO LANG, (AT 903693).

s. Other Elements

- (1) Ambushes. Two incidents were reported by I Corps of VC road ambushes that resulted in US advisor casualties.
 - (A) 121400H: VC ambush at (AT 922930) in the AI VAN Pass resulted in casualties to 2 US and 1 Australian Advisor accompanying an ARVN convoy.
 - (B) 102035H: At (BS 797404), VC ambushed a vehicle containing the DUC PHO assistant district chief and two US advisors.
- (2) Base Camps. 3d Recon Bn determined during patrol conducted 2-7 February that the French resort at BA-NA (ZC 2071) is not currently harboring VC elements or units. It was evident however, that the VC may have utilized the BA-NA complex 5 or 6 months ago as indicated by the shelters, camp fires, and elephant tracks.
- (3) Religious Sanctuaries, Use Of. On 8 February a river road block at (BT 032648) reported receiving 20-30 rounds of small arms fire from 3 VC in a pagoda (BT 033652). This is the 3d report in 3 weeks of local VC using religious structures for military purposes. This particular incident could be an attempt to draw US fire on a religious shrine for subsequent propaganda use.
- (4) Terrorism. On 9 February, I Corps reported that THUONG DUC District headquarters (ZC 145535) received enemy mortar fire. (G-2 Cmt: On 3 February, ARVN reported that helo's "Outloading" at PHUONG DUC (ZC 142530), were approached by approx 300 badly frightened villagers, near panic, who attempted to board the A/C.

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About 100 civilians were dissuaded only at gunpoint. This appears to be an indication of increased VC activity in the area.)

- (5) Training. On 7 February a patrol reported discovering a device constructed of wood and the tail assembly from an 81mm mortar round vic (AT 927666). COMMENT: This could possibly be a mock-up of an 81mm mortar for training or an indicator for mortar position.
- (6) Underwater Attacks. On 1 February a Japanese sentry on a Japanese LST located (BT 515115), observed a man treading water 10 meters off the stern. When the sentry chambered a round into his weapon, the suspect submerged. It was reported the suspect was wearing black clothing and/or scuba gear.

3. Other Intelligence Factors.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. (Including Double Eagle)

KIA 194 WIA 1 VCC 9

- f. Morale. Considered Good.
- g. Enemy Defenses, Mine Fields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles and Other Defensive Works.

- (1) On 8 February, Third Marines, Battalion S-2 received a report from a Vietnamese civilian that 2 booby-traps were located at coords (AT 957667). The Marines searched the area and found 2 M26 grenades. (Bn S-2 Cmt: As a results of this report, the civilian was paid 500\$ VN).
- (2) On 9 February, I Corps reported a relief train hit a mine vic (ZD 123013).
- (3) I Corps reported on 9 February that anti-helo stakes were located at (BT 257207). The report stated the stakes were 6-8' high and running north and south between 2 houses.

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DTG 130800H, FEB 1966

- (4) On 8 February, photography revealed anti-helo stakes located vic (BS 714088). Two oblong shaped areas; (1) 150' long by 100' wide; (2) 180' long by 125' wide.
- (5) On 9 February, Ninth Marines reported an extensive tunnel network vic (BT 008648 to BT 008647).
- (6) On 9 February, A/O reported a "Y" shaped trench vic (BS 630931). Trench is 8' long and has 6 fighting holes around it.
- (7) On 10 February, 1st Marines found 3 improvised mines, approximately 3 inches in diameter and 6 inches long, vic (AT 867620).
- (8) On 7 February, 3d Marines fired 2 line charges in an effort to clear hill 55 (AT 969619) of mines. 7 secondary explosions were obtained.

h. Details of Administrative Installations and Support.

- (1) I Corps Adv Group reported on 9 February that 400 laborers moved from SON HA to HO DONG TRE (BS 530590), 30 miles S of CHU LAI, to move food. (G-2 Cmt: VC probably moving material to avoid operations in this area.)

i. Terrain. No change from III MAF PERINTREP NR. 1.

j. Weather. The weather remained good throughout the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 70° low and 85° high, with a trace of rain-showers. Clouds were broken to 8000', winds averaged 10 kts from ESE.

k. Captive Returnee and Refugee Report. (See Annex C).

5. Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities.

a. No change from III MAF PERINTREP NR. 1.

J. T. Odenthal
J. T. ODENTHAL
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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ANNEXES: A. Order of Battle
 B. Counterintelligence
 C. Captives, Returnee and Refugee Report

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2
CG FMFPAC	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	8 10
CG FIRST MARDIV	4 10
CG FIRST MAW	10
CMDR I CORPS ADV GP	5
CG FFORCEV	1
DET 5TH USASF	1
CO FLSG	1
CO 30TH NCR	1
CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CO 9TH MT BN	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO NAVSUPACT	5
NCC	1
GICV	1

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ANNEX A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 2

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	YD 8042	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES TAOR)

S10TH BN	PROB	400	PHU LOC DIST	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY (AKA THI) PO-SRCAPT NGUYEN SONG
----------	------	-----	--------------	--	---

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATIO</u>	<u>EQUIP-</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRAS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIH VO XUAN LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PC-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THIU PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0355	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN, NGUYEN DINH KHIEP
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK

CHU LAI1. FORCED LOCALLY AVAILABLE:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2-57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL. HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM MORT 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW?	CO-SRCAPT DAI XO-SRCAPT HOANG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN

ORGANIZATION

104TH BN

CLASS

PROB

STR

300

LOCATION

BS 6692

EQUIP1-81MM MORT
3-60MM MORT
3-MG; 18-ARPERSONALITIESCO-NGUYEN HI
CHAW; NGHIA TUU

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

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ANNEX B TO III MAF PERINTREP NR 2.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. GENERAL. No significant incidents occurred during the periods covered to change the Counterintelligence situation in the Chu Lai, Banang and Phu Bai enclaves. However, there appears to be an increase in VC attempts to penetrate friendly installations to gain information on strength, disposition and deployment. VC propaganda leaflets and lectures indicate a definitely stronger trend toward anti-US/allied forces.

B. ESPIONAGE.

(1) On 7 Feb 1966 the 3d CI Team relayed a report from a Vietnamese Government Agency that indigenous employees of either USMC or Army units in the Phu Bai area had supplied information and maps of the defensive positions of that area to the VC. (G-2 Cmt: Rated F/3)

(2) Recent checks of an RVN identification card, recovered in the vic (YD 831094) on 2 Jan 1966, revealed it to be false. Thua Thien National Police reported that the forged identification card was darker in color; the paper was thinner; variations in print; finger prints are different from those on file at the ID card section, Hue (Inner City) National Police Headquarters; variations of the authenticating "Bamboo Bush" stamp; and the forged signature of the Chief, Hue (Inner City) National Police District.

C. SABOTAGE.

(1) 6 FEB - 3d Mar Div relayed COMUSMACV report that VC are utilizing new techniques for sabotage of vehicles by taping grenade spoon with various types of adhesive tape then placing the grenade in the vehicle gas tank. The gas gradually softens adhesive on the tape until the tension of the spoon overcomes the resistance thereby detonating the grenade. Tests have revealed time delay variations from 50 seconds to 5 hours and 33 minutes.

(2) 10 Feb - 9th Mar relayed a report from Marine LNO at Hoa Vang District Headquarters that the VC District Chief of Hoa Vang is planning to install mines, described as "DD-X4" at the "Ferry Point" vic (BT 033734) in order to sabotage ARVN and allied forces' vehicles utilizing this area as a vehicle washing point. (G-2 Cmt: No info avail as to description or characteristics of "DD-X4" mine, but believed to be an under-water type device. Rated F/6).

D. POLITICAL. None reported.E. PROPAGANDA AND RUMORS.

(1) 7 Feb - I Corps reported an estimated 15 VC distributed propaganda leaflets in vic (ZD 085003), theme unk. VC conducted lectures with the theme "Fight against the Americans" at Xnam Ham (YD 870259). Another 40 VC entered Phu Ham (1) and Thuy Phu Ham (2) (YD 905112) and assembled residents for propaganda lectures with same theme. Prior to leaving, the VC left a number of leaflets with the villagers.

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(2) 9 Feb - 12th Mar reported Hoa Village Chief turned in a number of propaganda leaflets distributed by the VC on 8 Feb in the hamlet of Kim Lien (AT 925855). The Chief commented that enemy propaganda is both "Aggressive and Effective" in Kim Lien village, but the leaflets haven't reached or effected the villagers of Namo (AT 935835). The VC propagandize and obtain food at night and withdraw to the mountain area during the daylight hours. (G-2 Cmt: Rated F/3)

(3) 8 Feb - FBIS reported Peking's NCNA commenting on Honolulu conference indicates US strategy is to broaden war in RVN and that the Vietnamese people are ready to smash all "new schemes". The Viet Cong have issued a directive for a "Competition to kill enemy troops 'ruthlessly'". . . and in "great numbers" to mark the 5th anniversary of Army day on 15 Feb. (G-2 Cmt: While NCNA is well noted for its propaganda trends - all units are cautioned to remain alert for concerted VC effort during this period. Evaluation of leftist press info - 3).

B-2

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ANNEX C TO III MAF PERINTREP NR.2

CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		<u>SUSPECTS</u>
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC	VCS
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	13		5	48

Present Location

<u>Chu Lai</u>	6	5	24
<u>Danang</u>	7	0	20
<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	0	4

Status of Interrogation

<u>Completed</u>	13	5	48
<u>In Progress</u>	0	0	

All released to ARVN
Authority

*Total captives, returnees held at the end of the reporting period.	0	0	0
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Above report does not include operations in the DOUBLE EAGLE area.

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Copy No. 66 of 70 Copies
 Unit: III MAP
 Location: DANANG, RVN
 DEG: 200800H, FEB 1966
 REF: III MAP 3
 020566

PERINTREP NO. 3

PERIOD COVERED: 130000H Feb to 202400H Feb 66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series 1701, sheets: (PHU BAI TAOR) 6460-1 II, 6560 II, III, IV, (LAWANG TAOR) 6559-1, II, 6560-1, 6559 II, III IV; 6658 I, IV; (TRU LAI TAOR) 6657 I, II; 6657 II, III, IV; 6756 I, II; 6656 I, scale 1:50,000.

GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. I Corps Tactical Zone. VC activity consisted of several determined attacks against small RVN outposts, continued sabotage of lines of communication, and successful evasion of major contact.

(1) QUANG TRI - TRUA/PHU BAI TAOR.

- a. QUANG TRI-TRUA THIEH. VC continued to sabotage the HUE-DANANG railroad with destruction of 3 culverts (15 - 16 Feb) and on 15 Feb the mining of two trains. This brought to fifteen, the number of sabotage incidents against the railroad in TRUA THIEH Province during February. The continued high incident rate of railroad sabotage in this area reflects VC effort to close a principal supply route to HUE and PHU BAI. Reports of enemy movement in the vicinity of the PHU BAI TAOR increased during the period. Increased activity reported in the area north of the RAO ELING and west of the SOUH BO (30 km west of HUE) indicates possible infiltration and probably a buildup of forces in the general area.
- b. PHU BAI TAOR. VC overt activity remained minor with only sporadic harassing fire incidents indicated. Reports were received, concerning a VC buildup around PHU BAI and VC plans for an attack in strength upon Marine Installations. However, no evidence is available that such an attack will be executed in the immediate future.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTION/DANANG TAOR.

- a. QUANG NAM. An estimated company of VC attacked and overran the GO PHU outpost (TR 093633) manned by regional forces in the early morning hours of 16 Feb. VC withdrew prior to arrival of the relief forces. Near Daifung, 2 VC assassins murdered the village chief of HUE TCU.

III MAP PERINTREP #3

13-20 020566

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- b. DAMANG. VC continued their extensive mining and booby trapping activities within the TAOR. Harassing attacks by small VC units were numerous.
- c. Operation PAUT BOW. Operation PAUT BOW was a 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (3) (Rain) operation conducted 9-16 Feb in the Eastern portion of "Happy Valley". The route covered encompassed the lower portions of the mountain slopes south of the SONG LO DOENG and north of the hill line, hill 1235 (ZC 200620) - hill 1025 (AT 807627). During the operation, 14 VC contacts were made with a total of an estimated 70 VC resulting in 8 VC KIA. Evidence was found of an extensive VC sanctuary in the hill slopes under the jungle canopy. Documents found on dead VC indicated the presence of ammunition dumps. Signs in Vietnamese warned against entry. VC casualties were in 2 cases determined to be RHADE tribesmen and one document and one dying statement identified the H-59 unit.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI/CHU LAI TAOR.

- a. QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI. VC activity consisted of several determined attacks on outposts and bridges. On 15 Feb in an early morning attack, an estimated VC Battalion attacked an RF outpost on hill 28 (BT 236232) with MORTAR and 57mm RR fire. The CP was retaken at 1100 by friendly forces. At the same time, a bridge at (BT 610 950) defended by 2 PAV platoons was attacked by an undetermined number of VC. On 14 Feb an est VC Co attacked an RF/PF unit VIC (BT 433105). The attack began at 140015H and VC broke contact at 0600 when reaction forces arrived.
- b. CHU LAI TAOR. VC activity during the week was very light, confined to mining incidents and occasional harassing SA fire.
- c. DOUBLE EAGLE. Phase I of Operation Double Eagle ended on 17 Feb 66. Throughout the operation, VC successfully avoided large unit contacts and pursued delaying tactics using local force and guerrilla units. Numerous sightings and agent reports indicated the movement of large enemy units into the mountains to the west, away from Marine Corps forces. VC activity other than evasion consisted of numerous small unit harassing attacks including the use of 60mm and 81mm mortars, sniper fire, mining and booby trapping. Anti-aircraft fire was delivered throughout the area. The final cumulative VC losses for Phase I of Double Eagle included 312 KIA, 87 possible KIA, 19 VCS and 6 Raiders.
- d. DOUBLE EAGLE, PHASE II. Phase II of Double Eagle began on 19 Feb in QUANG TIN Province to the West and Northwest of TAN KY. Initial opposition was light and no organized resistance was encountered as the period closed.

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2. Enemy Operations during the period. A total of 154 incidents were reported during the period within the 3 USMC enclaves. Included were 74 harassing fire, 21 mines and booby trap, 56 AAA, 1 assassination, 2 mortar fire.

a. Strengths and Dispositions

- (1) QUANG TRI Province. No significant activity to report.
- (2) THUA THIEN Province. Activity in the THUA THIEN Province has increased during the reporting period. Reports indicate a buildup in the vicinity of the PHU BAI TAOR. An agent report indicated a detailed "Plan of Attack" on PHU BAI (Annex B, para 2b). The date of this attack is unknown. A possibility exists that the 602nd Bn is being deployed southeast of the PHU BAI TAOR.

A Regt (designated the 19th) was reported to have infiltrated into SVN during Jan, and is now located in THUA THIEN Province. This Regt is composed of the 301st and 309th Bn's with 2 additional Bn's.

The 301st Bn was reported as operating in HUONG QUUY and PAU LOC districts, (S.E. and West of PHU BAI TAOR). Location of the 309th and 2 unknown Bn's has not been determined.

The new "Mobile" or "Roving" Regt has been reported as the 1st Regt, with the 800th and 804th Bn's, operating in the Trieu Phong, Hai Long and Phuong Dien Districts.

- (3) QUANG NAM Province. Reports indicate a buildup of enemy forces in western DIA LOC District. The buildup consists of (one time reports) an unidentified Regt of the 325th Div. Other new unit identifications in QUANG NAM Province are: The 44th Bn, 594th Bn, 467th Bn, 657th Bn, and two unidentified Bn companies.

The headquarters of the 36th Regt (NVA) and its subordinate units are still believed to be located on the QUANG NAM-QUANG TIN border area, in QUE SON. However, recently (17 Feb) received reports indicate an element of the 36th Regt (NVA) of unk size maybe in the general vicinity of QUANG NGAI City.

The majority of activity in central QUANG NAM can be contributed to the R-20 Bn and the 1st "Volunteer" Bn.

- (4) QUANG TIN Province. Activity was centered in TAM KY and along the border of TAM KY/TIEN PHONG Districts. Several reports have been received mentioning a unit of the 1st Regt by name. On 7 Feb, and again on 9 Feb, the 90th Bn and the often reported, but unconfirmed 300th Bn were practicing attack drills.

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Indications are that the 1st Regt is now reorganizing, re-equipping and training for future operations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Province. Recent reports tend to indicate a movement by the 80th and 90th Bn into Quang Ngai Province.

- (5) Quang Ngai Province. Information as to the probable location of the 2nd Regt indicates the BA TO district and possibly the An Lo district of Binh Dinh province. Low level agent reports state the 95th Bn moved north into the Son Tinh district. It has now been accepted that the Quyét Tan Regt is located in northern Binh Dinh province. Numerous sighting and movement reports have been received concerning the Tan Dong area. These reports are attributed to local force movements, to screen supply routes across Binh Son district.

- (6) See Annex A.

- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
 c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
 d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics

(a) Multi-Grenade Usage

On 14 Feb MACV reported a VC document captured on 20 Dec in Bien Hoa province (YS 258882) revealed a new VC tactic for using grenades against infantry troops, landing helicopters, and moving vehicles. The VC dig a series of conical shaped holes, 60cm by 60cm, and place a 1.4 kg TNT charge at the bottom of the hole. The TNT is covered with dirt, and a board with 10-16 grenades is placed over the hole. The safety pins are pulled and each grenade is fastened to the board between two nails. When the target approaches, the TNT is detonated, the grenades are impelled upward and detonate at 120 to 250 meters altitude. When used against helicopters the grenade mines are placed in cleared areas that are likely landing zones. When used against vehicles and troops maximum use is made of ant hills and dirt mounds, and the hole is dug at a 45 degree angle. As the target approaches, the mine is electrically detonated, tossing the grenades into the troops or vehicles.

(b) Counter-Naval Activity

On 18 Feb, PCS 13 patrolling 2,000 yds off shore, received 5 rounds of unknown size mortar fire, from approximately (BT 1750).

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(c) Possible Use of Juveniles

On 17 Feb. 1st Bn, 1st Mar, observed five children between the ages of eight and ten years of age, vic (AF 953667). The children ran when hailed by the Marines, and while engaged in their pursuit, an M-26 grenade booby-trap was detonated. (G-2 cont: VC may be using children to emplace such devices.)

(2) Weapons(a) New Type Grenade

A report from Indian Head Arsenal, Md., dated 5 Feb states the VC have introduced a new type of hand grenade into the field. The grenade will detonate when the spoon is depressed or disturbed. It may be any type of grenade or any color. The report further stated that mercury switches were recovered when a VC ammo plant and storage area was overrun. Mercury switch precautions should be observed with any type of enemy ordnance.

c. Negative.

f. Administrative units

- (1) On 9 Feb, agent report, (ARVN F-6), a portion of or one of the Ho Chi Minh trails from Quang Nam to Kontum, Hwy No 14, has been widened to 6 meters. This route, under heavy jungle canopy, branches off towards Kontum, vic (BS 597-510). Way stations are located every 10 kilometers and consist of 15 small houses. Code names for the way stations are FO 1, 2, 3, etc. In this vic (BS 250498), there is a food production camp surrounded by sugar cane fields. A rice mill is also located at the above coords. It is also reported that 200 youths (ages unknown), are taking R and R at this camp with NVA soldiers. The report stated 10 220MM Howitzers are also located at the above coords. (G-2 cont: If true, the above weapons could be 120MM Mortars. Normally 6 120MM Mortars are assigned to a NVA regt. Could possibly be a regimental Headquarters or a new unit infiltrating through the area.)

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense

- (1) On 13 Feb, a G-123 pilot reported sighting 10-15 air bursts at an altitude of approximately 9500', vic (BS 870070).

- (2) There was a decrease of anti-air incidents during the reporting period. A total of 55 incidents were recorded involving III MAF aircraft. Seventeen aircraft received a total of 22 hits from ground fire. Primary area of reported incidents were the Banang BACH and the Dougle Eagle area. There were two reported incidents of 12.7/.50 cal. fire being directed at aircraft. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. (See Para 5.)

i through v. Negative.

3. Other Intelligence Factors

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A

b. Enemy Identification. Annex A

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A

d. Personnel. Annex A

e. Casualties.

KIA 87 VCC 7

f. Morale. Considered Good.

g. Enemy Defenses, Mine Fields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles and Defensive Works.

- (1) On 14 Feb, the lead LVT, vic (AT 895825), returning across Song Cude River, detonated large mine or Arty projectile placed in muddy channelized trail constantly used by AMFRAC's.
- (2) On 14 Feb, a tank operating in the vic (BT 058661) detonated a device, described as a US anti-tank mine, with an explosive charge of approximately 40 pounds of TNT.
- (3) On 16 Feb, an engineer team on a mine clearing detail, in the vic (AT 959676), detonated a device, causing a large explosion. The 3 Marine KIA's were "35 meters apart."
- (4) On 14 Feb, an engineer mine clearing team operating in the vic (AT 943666), found a 155mm round packed in explosives and wrapped with plastic. The mine had an electrical detonating device.
- (5) On 13 Feb, a train was mined vic (YD 994043). Believe 2 mines were detonated at the same time. A relief train proceeding from Banang was also mined in vic (AT 934947).
- (6) Documents and receipts captured by 3d Recon Bn on OPN TANT BOW indicate the issue in late Jan and early Feb of "CLAMORE" mines to units in Quang Nam. The mines were issued by C7A (prev indicated as a "WAREHOUSE") to Q14 (the Dai Loc Dist Co), C100, (unidentified), and H57 (indicated in previous documents

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to be the "Engineer Pit in Mountain Pass"). The type mine issued to the latter unit was indicated to be, "Old, Big Ones", possibly referring to the DF-10 directional mine. (G-2 cont: While low-level agent reports have stated VC units have directional mines, captured receipts represent the first documentary evidence indicating VC units in the Danang area possess this type mine. While directional mine incidents have been concentrated in the Tay Loan River area (AF 8970), the documents point to an increased emphasis and employment of directional mines throughout the TAOR. The reference to "Old, Big" "Claymores" indicates the VC have a new type of directional mine.)

h. See para 2.f.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. During the first day of the reporting period, scattered rainshowers were noted throughout I Corps area. The weather remained good through the remainder of the period. The retraction of forces involved in operation Double Eagle were delayed slightly due to high surf conditions. Temperature averaged 74, winds were from ESE, averaging 10 kts, visibility 7-10 miles except in rainshower, when visibility was reduced to 2½ miles.

k. Captive, Returnee and Refugee Report. See Annex C.

l. Other factors:

(1) Attempted Sabotage. On 19 Feb, Military Police reported 2 Vietnamese boys, (ages 14-16) were apprehended in the city of Danang, while attempting to set a military truck afire. The boys had removed a gas cap and was attempting to light the fuel with a cigarette lighter. One of the boys had a long knife hidden in his trousers.

(2) Attitude and Opinions. The following information was obtained through interrogation of a returnee on 16 Feb 1966. The returnee stated the guerrillas in Thai Cam (H), vic (AF 979-643), do not really believe in the Viet Cong, but since their families and homes are in the area, they must remain there and do as the Viet Cong tell them. Many would like to return as the Americans enter the area but they are afraid because the Marines are distrustful and shoot too quickly. The returnee stated that some of the fear and distrust of Marines is propaganda spread by the Viet Cong, the rest comes from word that filters in from other areas where Marines have operated.

4. Counterintelligence. See Annex B.

5. Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities. (Ground)

a. Enemy Capabilities. With forces presently located within the I CTZ the enemy has the capability:

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- (1) To continue his campaign of sabotage, assassination, terrorism and anti-RVN and/or anti-U.S. propaganda.
- (2) To attack isolated ARVN outposts and GVN district headquarters with forces up to multi-battalion or regimental size.
- (3) To continue to interdict LOC.
- (4) To continue his attempts to infiltrate suicide units into U.S. bases for sabotage attacks.
- (5) With minor redistribution of forces, to attack:
 - (a) The Hue Phu Bai enclave with the equivalent of one regiment reinforced.
 - (b) The Danang enclave with a force equivalent to two regiments, reinforced with two Main Force Bn's and Local Force and Guerrilla elements.
 - (c) The Chu Lai enclave with the equivalent of two regiments, reinforced by two Main force Bn's and Local Force and guerrilla elements.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption.

- (1) Para 5.a.(1), 5.a.(2) and 5.a.(5) above.
- (2) Para 5.a.(4) in conjunction with above.
- (5) Para 5.a.(5).

d. Vulnerabilities. The two major weaknesses of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese are his relatively poor logistical capability and his generally rigid adherence to pre-arranged battle tactics.

- (1) Due primarily to a lack of mechanized transport combined with the necessarily covert introduction of supplies, the enemy lacks the logistical backup to sustain large scale operations against U.S. and ARVN forces for any prolonged period.
- (2) A time proven VC tactic is the painstakingly planned attack, well rehearsed and executed. Sudden changes in disposition of friendly troops can disrupt his plans to the point of critical failure.
- (3) The VC/VNA vulnerability to US/ARVN air observation and attack, forces him into the cover of darkness, poor weather and the more heavily forested areas.

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6. Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities. (Air)

a. The enemy has the capability to oppose friendly air operations with:

- (1) Confirmed 7.62mm/30 cal. SA and AW, 12.7mm/50 cal. AW and possible 37mm AA fire.
- (2) To oppose low altitude air operations with mortar fire, reportedly fuzed to effect air bursts.
- (3) To oppose Helo landing operations by placement of anti-helo stakes and/or demolition charges.
- (4) To employ communications jamming and deception.
- (5) To survive friendly air delivered ordnance by use of prepared trenches, fox holes, caves and underground tunnels.
- (6) To deny aerial acquisition of physical targets by use of effective camouflage, restricting movements to hours of darkness, and maintaining a high degree of discipline with lights and fires.
- (7) To employ decoy fires and/or lights at night to entice aerial attack or aerial ordnance disposal in areas of no military value, or by the same method, to entice aircraft into flak traps.
- (8) To employ primitive but effective visual and audio attack warning devices.

b. Relative Probability or Adoption

- (1) The enemy will adopt the above capabilities either singly or several in conjunction.

c. Vulnerabilities

- (1) The enemy lacks the means to detect or oppose high altitude and/or all weather bombing.

J. T. O'Denthal
 J. T. O'DENTHAL
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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ANNEXES: A. Order of Battle
 B. Counterintelligence
 C. Captives, Returnees and Refugee Report

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2
CG FMFRAC	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	9
CG FIRST MARDIV	1
CG FIRST MAW	10
CMDR I CORPS ADV GP	5
CG FFORCEV	1
DET 5TH USASF	1
CO FLSG	1
CO 30TH MCR	1
CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CO 9TH MT BN	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO NAVSUPACT	5
NCC	1
CICV	1

AGENCY 6 to 110. MAP LOCATED TO. 7

AD/2000/100

1. ITEMS LOCALLY AVAILABLE

ORGANIZATION	CLASS	SR	LOCATION	MODEL	PERSONALITIES
TRUNG TUA CO	PROB	100	LD 7512	3LE	CO-THUAT
HOANG THUY CO	PRCS	50?	YD 8009	UMK	CO-NGUYEN THANH AN
H-41 CO	COMPHED	95	Yd 6042	1-81MM MORE 2-60MM MORE 2-57MM SK 2-41MM 12-5MG	CO-PEAK NINE; PBU

2. RESTORE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (WITHIN 10 MILES TACH)

SUOTE BN	PROB	400	PBU LOC DEST	3-01MM MORE 6-60MM MORE 3-4R 18-AR 3-5G UMK-5MG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY (AKA TET) CO-THUAT NGUYEN SONG

A-1

3. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLEDANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-SMG, 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHICH VO XUAN LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-FRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9366	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8951	1-60MM 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SANH
DUY TUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROD	500	AF 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CC-QUANG LAN (AKA LU) XC-THET PC-TOAN
DINH BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0555	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-1MG, 18 SMP	CC-THAN ANH MAN, NGUYEN DINH KHINH
U/I BN	FROB	300	AF 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK

A-3

CHU JAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	FACE	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2-57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN KO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL. HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SON; BY CAU THI KO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT NHO
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-LONG KO-MINH PO-MINH
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM MORT 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW?	CO-SRCAPT BAI KO-SRCAPT HOANG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3335	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>ST#</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
104TH BN	PROB	500	BS 6692	1-61MM MORT 5-60MM MORT 3-82; 18-AR	CO - JAGUERE HI CEAM; KAZIA 708

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) to PERINTREP NO. 3

1. General

a. The Viet Cong activities remain somewhat static in the I Corps area of responsibility. However, some concerted effort to infiltrate US defenses appear to be taking place in the Phu Bai and Chu Lai TAORS. Propaganda activities tend to point toward terroristic intimidations of villagers and hamlet chiefs in certain areas. Probably the most significant incident took place in the Danang TAOR when a civil official was openly assassinated by the VC on 15 February 1966.

2. Espionage

a. CHU LAI. on 3 Feb 1966, SMIAT reported that the VC held an urgent meeting in an open field in the vic (BT 661029) at the junction of Song Moi and Song Cau Rivers in the Tuyet Diem Area. The meeting was held to discuss a plan to distribute one million piasters to VC agents and trustworthy civilians who are able to obtain employment at the Chu Lai Airfield. They are to collect information, to include sketches of warehouses, hangers, troop billets and any other information pertaining to the airfield. All collected information is to be forwarded to a VC cadre at a restaurant in the vic (BT 620023). On 9 Feb 1966, a SMIAT report indicated that Nguyen Tru (Nguyen (Cong) Tru), a high ranking VC cadre was using Phung's restaurant, Cau Son Tra Estuary (BT 620023), as a contact place. Phung, a VC agent, is supplying necessary papers for employment of the VC at Chu Lai Airfield. On 9 Feb, at Quang Ngai, Duc Hung, VC agent, was given 5,500 piasters to use in the collection of information on Chu Lai Airfield.

b. PHU BAI. on 7 Feb 1966, SMIAT agent reported that VC are developing a plan to attack the American Installation at Phu Bai (YD 873150). the date of attack is not known, however, the exact coordinates for the ammunition depot, air strip, artillery positions and billets are known and will be hit by mortar fire at the beginning of the attack. Deep agents are at work collecting information on the military installation, these agents are contract employees working with either the ARVN or American soldiers at Phu Bai. These include laundry women and employees or owners of concessions operating along the perimeter at various camps. G-2 Comment: (Evaluation of information, 3) Above reports would indicate that the VC may be exerting considerable effort and money to acquire the much needed information on both the Chu Lai and Phu Bai airfields and adjacent installations. It has been previously reported that the VC had some 300,000 piasters to distribute in the Chu Lai area in an attempt to obtain information from civilian contract employees. That the VC have the coordinates of various buildings and defensive positions on Phu Bai may also indicate that they may have been somewhat successful in infiltrating certain areas. Whether the agent reports are valid and if the VC have been successful in penetrating certain US defenses to gain information to carry out an attack in both areas can not be determined at this time. However, the VC capability to infiltrate in these and other areas cannot be discounted.

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3. Sabotage

a. 14 Feb 1966, Thua Thien, District Agent reported that a number of female cadre have attended an Intelligence/Reconnaissance course for the purpose of conducting intelligence operations in and around Hue. They also intend to sabotage highways, railroad bridges, culverts and forward installations. It is reported that a terrain study of the bridges and culverts on the outskirts of Hue has been made. G-2 Comment: (Evaluation of information 3); coincides with previous build-up around Phu Bai and previous reported of VC intentions to attack Phu Bai base area. Female demolition cells have been previously reported.

b. 5 Feb 1966, a SMIAT agent reported that 30 VC guerrillas and 18 cadre (not further identified) entered Phu Whieu (BS 729875) and announced to the residents that it was permissible to travel to government controlled areas for trading purposes, however, they should not disclose any information of intelligence value. The VC then held a meeting with the VC cadre and stated that when ever Government of Vietnam troops were encountered they were to attack unless outnumbered, then they were to conceal their weapons and pass as civilians. G-2 Comment: This may be a two-fold program. The VC may be attempting to ease travel restrictions previously imposed on the local populace in order to inject counterfeit notes in government areas to undermine economy, and with ease of movement infiltrate government zones by placing VC agents in the groups traveling to and from these areas. Past reports would point to concerted VC efforts to obtain information on the Chu Lai airfield.

c. 14 Feb 1966, SMIAT reported that on 8 Feb 1966, Pham Kinh, a member of the VC District Party Committee arrived in the Sub-District Kuyen Tra (BT 010477) and Kuyen Hiep (BT 043460) to direct political operations. Instructions to Sub-District Autonomous Committee were to organize a teenage guerrilla group. (Two teenage Guerrilla Groups have been formed each as a platoon in Kuyen Tra) Training has been given to these groups including collection of information, reconnaissance and guarding avenues of approach to VC areas. G-2 Comment: (Evaluation of information 6) Past information indicates that the VC have attempted to recruit and pay children to conduct single acts of sabotage and to collect information. This is the first report received of VC organizing teenage guerrilla groups for this other purpose.

4. Political. None reported.

5. Propaganda and Rumors

a. 4 Feb 1966, MSS reported a VC entertainment company operating in Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province and one VC entertainment company operating in Viem Minh Trung and Ngai Ha Hamlets (BT 060655) Thanh Thuy village, Dien Ban District. They will perform at Viem Minh Trung (BT 070635) and Ngan Cau Hamlet (BT 065532) to praise VC victories and spread VC propaganda. G-2 Comment: These companies were probably sent to the area for the VC TET celebrations.

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b. 16 Feb 1966, a Vietnamese agent furnished information concerning the VC intentions to step-up propaganda activity in attempt to foil the "RVN Pacification Plan" for rural reconstruction. The VC Central Committee recently issued instruction to Provincial Districts and village committees to increase their propaganda efforts designed to frighten hamlet and other low-level chiefs to refuse to cooperate with RVN officials. If the propaganda efforts do not succeed, the chiefs will be visited and intimidated by VC cadre. Final measure call for assassination of selected chiefs. G-2 Comment: (Evaluation of information 3) VC use of propaganda intimidation is not new, and assassination of Pro-ORVN local officials by the VC to gain and/or maintain control of large areas is well known. This report may indicate a future rise in VC terror and propaganda efforts in an attempt to slow progress of RVN Pacification and Rural Reconstruction efforts.

6. Terrorism

a. At approximately 1300, 15 February 1966, Ngo Van Tuong, the Village Chief of Hoa Lac (AT 8883) was shot and killed in the hamlet of Quan Nam (AT 903813). Mr. Tuong was shot and killed at close range by an automatic weapon, as he prepared to take part in religious ceremonies, two VC appeared banishing automatic weapons and opened fire on Mr. Tuong and his party. Two Buddhist priests and Mr. Tuong's aunt were also killed in this VC terroristic action.

G-2 Comment: On 11 January 1966, Mr. Tuong was appointed Village Chief, Hoa Lac. From that time until his assassination he placed many reforms into effect and had cooperated fully with US military officials. It may be assumed that the VC had targeted Mr. Tuong as a person that must be annihilated and since this incident was performed in the presence of some forty persons, was a VC reminder to other village chiefs of the reward for cooperating with US and RVN authorities. This is the first assassination of a civil official in several months. It is not possible to determine whether intimidation and reduced effectiveness of other village chiefs will result. However, civil officials may be inclined to seek protection, especially when they feel threatened and this may point to troubled areas which could justify increased military action.

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ANNEX C to LII MAF PERINTREP No. 3

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		<u>VCS</u>
	<u>NVA</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>NVA</u>	<u>VC</u>	
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	15	0	4	91
Present Location:					
<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	4	0	0	23
<u>Danang</u>	0	11	0	4	40
<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	0	0	0	27
Status of Interrogation					
<u>Completed</u>	0	15	0	4	91
All released to ARVN authority		<u>In Progress</u>			
Total captives, returnees held at the end of the reporting period by Corps, each Division and Sector	0	0	0	0	

* ARVN DESERTER - 1

Copy NO _____ of _____ Copies
Unit: III MAF
Location: DANANG, RVN
DTG: 280800H, FEB 1966
Ref: III MAF \$

Perintrep File

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PERINTREP NO. 4

PERIOD COVERED: 200001 TO 262400 FEB 66

REF: (a) Maps: AMS Series D701, sheets (PHU BAI TAOR) 6460-1, II, 6560 II, III, IV, (DANANG TAOR) 6559-1, II, 6588-1, 6659 II, III, IV, 6658 I, IV; (CHU LAI TAOR) 6657 I, II, 6657 II, III, IV; 6756 I, II; 6656 I, scale 1:50,000

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. A considerable increase in enemy activity was experienced during the period throughout the I CTZ with relatively large scale determined attacks being experienced in all areas. Of particular significance were VC initiated contacts against US Marine units and several VC attacks on ARVN units during daylight hours.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN, PHU BAI TAOR

(a) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. Major VC units were contacted by the ARVN during the period as enemy activity increased. In opn LAM SON 234, an ARVN battalion made contact on 21-22 Feb with an estimated Main Force VC battalion near hwy 1 in THUA THIEN vic (YD 5825) and another ARVN battalion contacted a similar force vic (YD 5825). Heavy sustained combat resulted in over 6 VC KIA. ARVN officials reported that the VC force was believed to be elements of the "1st Mobile VC Regt." Further north, on 22 Feb, near QUANG TRI City, an RF pln was attacked at (YD 3256) by a force identified by a VCC as the 808th Battalion. Major contacts continued during the period with opn LAM SON 235 beginning 22 Feb to the east of QUANG TRI City. In a series of running engagements, VC KIA count rose to 229 by the end of the period. The operation continues.

(2) PHU BAI TAOR. No significant activity reported.

(3) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR, DANANG TAOR

(a) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR. A determined VC attack commenced at 220500H when an estimated 2 companies of VC launched an assault on an RF platoon guarding the BINH LONG bridge (BT 003588). The attack continued when an estimated battalion of VC engaged ARVN reaction force units at approximately 220900H vic (BT 000590). VC employed 81mm mortar fire, 82mm RR fire, grenades, SA and AW fire. The enemy broke contact at approximately 221500H after suffering approximately 100 KIA. (See sub-para 3.6 (5) (B)).

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PERINTREP #4

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(b) DANANG TAOR. The usual harassing and mining activity continued throughout the TAOR but enemy actions turned to a markedly more determined character during the period with a multi-platoon attack during the afternoon of 22 Feb on a 3d Recon Bn platoon patrol at (ZC 208-806) and a close quarter night attack against USMC installations vic (AT 9967) on 21 Feb. The latter attack against an Infantry Battalion CP and an artillery battery was preceded by 60mm mortar barrages and culminated in a close quarter assault with satchel charges.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI/CHU LAI TAOR

(a) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI. Determined daylight VC attacks were experienced in northern QUANG NGAI. At 211530H, an ARVN convoy was attacked on Hwy Nr 1 vic (BS 6387) by an est VC Bn. This followed shortly after a VC Co size ambush at 210950H of 2 PAT Plts and 2 RF Plts vic (BS 628830).

(b) CHU LAI TAOR. Two determined VC assaults during the period against USMC units illustrated a marked change in VC activity after a long period of studiously avoided contact. In the early morning of 21 Feb, an undetermined number of VC attacked a Co D, 1st Bn 7th Marines position at (BS 628992). The attack at close quarters included mortar, RR, SA, grenade and AW fire. The VC were repulsed after the loss of 12 VC KIA and 5 weapons. On 26 Feb, again in the early morning, a platoon of Co A, 1st Bn 4th Mar at the north end of the TAOR vic (BT 476049) was attacked by an estimated Company of VC with the same type weapons of the earlier attack. The attack lasted for approximately 4 hours until the VC were driven off with a loss of 23 VC KIA, 1 VCC (WIA), 6 individual weapons and 20 grenades.

2. Enemy Operations During Period. A total of 327 incidents were reported during the period. Included were: 100 harassing fire, 26 mines/booby traps; 10 mortar fire; 188 AA fire; 2 assassinations and 1 sabotage.

a. Strength and Dispositions

- (1) QUANG TRI Province: Heavy VC activity was reported in TRIEU PHONG District. A TIEN GIANG Bn was reported in the coastal area of TRIEU PHONG District on 7 Feb. The 1st (Mobile) Regiment was previously reported as operating in TRIEU PHONG, HAI LANG and PHONG DIEN Districts.
- (2) THUA THIEN Province: The new 1st Regiment reported as being formed in THUA THIEN Province is now reported under the command of LtCol GIANG. One (1) Bn has been identified as the NVA 309th Bn which is now designated 809th or QUYET THANH Bn. Regiment Hq is reported located (YD 595153). The 309th (809th) was previously reported in SVN on 8 Feb along with a 301st Bn (NVA). Both Bn's were reported to be sub to the 196th Regiment which was reported as infiltrated

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into SVN during Jan. GIANG was reported present at meeting in PHU LEM secret zone on 26 Jan.

(3) QUANG NAM Province:(a) 36th Regiment (NVA)

There were no reports from QUANG NAM Province during the period mentioning the 36th Regiment. Most of the reported activity of this Regiment seems to be centered in the THANG BINH District of QUANG TIN Province. There have been some Battalion size sightings in QUE SON District which can probably be attributed to the 36th Regiment. There was one report regarding the 36th in QUANG NGAI Province. Details of this report will be covered in QUANG NGAI. The 3d Bn of the 36th Regt has been upgraded from POSSIBLE to PROBABLE.

(b) Other Units:

1 R-20 Battalion. The companies of this Battalion are active in the South portion of the DANANG TAOR, (DIEM BLEN District).

2 Three new units have been reported in QUANG NAM Province: the Hq of the 5th VC Regt, and H-41 Bn, 2d Bn, 5th VC Regt.

(4) QUANG TIN Province:(a) 1st VC Regiment

Little information has been received regarding the 1st VC Regiment. The few scattered reports received, indicate the units of the 1st Regiment are still in TAM KY/TIEN PHUOC Districts and are now probably avoiding friendly operations in this area.

One report received stated Military Region 5 headquarters had ordered the 1st Regiment to move into QUANG NGAI. While several reports located the 80th and 90th Bn's in the TRA BONG area. There were no reports to indicate troop movement across the QUANG TIN/QUANG NGAI border.

(b) 195th AA Battalion

Several reports from VCC via JFT indicate that the 195th AA Bn may be in central or southern TAM KY Districts. A VCC reported that two (2) MF companies

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armed with 6 12.7MM AA guns (per company) passed through KY LONG (V) BT 2216. The only known unit in the area armed with 6 12.7MM AA guns (per company) is the 195th AA Bn. Another report from VCS stated 30 Main Force VC passed through the area of BT 1814. Leader was identified as TIEN. A LE VAN TIEN is an aspirant in the 195th AA Bn.

(c) Other Units

The 94th Bn has been active in LY TIN District west of CHU LAI. Many reports have been received stating the A-19 and A-21 Local Force companies are now operating with the 94th Bn, and that the 94th Bn is now the controlling Hq's for the A-19 and A-21 companies. This is probably true and it is believed these Local Forces will harass Hwy #1 north of CHU LAI as well as possibly conduct harassing raids in the CHU LAI area. There are numerous reports of movement north of the QUANG NGAI border in LY TIN District. There are indications of a possible buildup in this area.

(d) Other Significant Activities

Several reports are still received indicating a possible buildup in the TIEN PHUOC/HIEP DUC/HAU DUC District border area.

One report stated the 2nd VC Regt was now located in northern HIEP DUC. This was evaluated as F/5.

(3) QUANG NGAI Provinces(a) 2D VC Regiment

On 21 February COMUSMACV stated the 2nd Regiment (-) is now located in BINH DINH Province. The 2nd is probably located along the QUANG NGAI/BINH DINH border.

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(b) Other Units

With the 2nd Regiment (-) reported in BINH DINH Province the only other known confirmed units of battalion size in QUANG NGAI are the 20th Bn, the 38th Bn and the 52nd Bn. The 20th Bn is believed located in SON HA District, but one (1) report places them in western SON TINH District. The 38th Battalion is believed located in the MINH LONG/NGHIA HANH area. The 52nd Bn is believed located in eastern BINH SON District.

(c) Other Significant Activity

The only other areas in QUANG NGAI reporting significant activity is western SON TINH and adjoining eastern TRA BONG Districts. Many battalion sightings have occurred to the area south of the TRA BONG Valley and in the BA GIA area of SON TINH. In addition to the sighting and movement reports of Bn size units many reports of company size sighting are being reported from the TRA BONG Area.

A report on 17 Feb stated two (2) VC were killed in a friendly mine field north of QUANG NGAI City vicinity of BS 6381. ID cards on the bodies indicated they were members of the 6th Regiment (NVA) AKA 36th Regiment (NVA). The 36th Regiment is considered located on the QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN border. While there have been many battalion sightings to the west of QUANG NGAI City and some to the north, this is the first indication of a southward movement of the 36th Regiment or elements of this Regiment.

With the 1st Regiment located in QUANG TIN and the 2nd Regiment now reported in BINH DINH, the possibility exists the 36th Regiment (NVA) may soon begin operations in QUANG NGAI Province.

(5) See Annex A.

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- b. Order of Battle. Annex A
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics.

(a) During the reporting period, numerous reports of VC using vines as trip wires for beebie traps. Much harder to notice than wire.

(b) Report of Possible 120mm Mortars.

Agent Report - Early in Feb, 2 VC Bns (one the 402d) moved back to the north and are now located at YD 104767 (near PHUOC SON). They were armed with approx. 20 81mm mortars. The two units reportedly went north to be reinforced by an artillery Bn, armed with approx. 6-125mm mortars. When they return to SVN, they will use elephants to transport the "Heavy Guns" to THIEN CHANH area (YD 160502). The mortars are to be set up in this area to bombard the U.S. base at DONG HA (YD 230572) and will also bombard CA LU (XD 990490), CAM LO and GIO LINH with 81's. The report further stated to draw attention from the 125's, the 81's will be placed behind the 125mm firing line. (G-2/Cnt: The 125's are probably 120mm mortars. F-6)

(c) VC Hinderance of Helo Operations.

22Feb: While a USMC helo was engaged in retracting Marine units in 2d Bn, 9th Mar BLZ, the LZ perimeter reported sighting the ignition of several illumination grenades. The grenades are believed to be used as a device to hinder or distract helo ops.

25Feb: Helo's observed VC attempting to lure A/C into possible ambush by use of 2 yellow smoke grenades and 1 red rectangular panel, 2' x 6'.

(d) Beebie Traps.

23Feb: 3d Bn, 7th Mar elements destroyed 12 "punji traps", 5 of which were beebie trapped with grenades.

23Feb: 1st Bn, 4th Mar, reported destroying 30 "punji traps" via BT 459150, of which 9 were beebie trapped with grenades.

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24Feb: 2d Bn, 3d Mar reports unit patrol member set off grenade booby trap while pulling up "punji stakes" vic BT 075240. (G-2 Cont: This tactic previously reported, Para 2 sub-para 9 of III MAF PERINTREP #1)

- (e) 14Feb: 1st ARVN Div (C-3) reported VC have dispatched females who have attended intel/reson course to operate on the outskirts of HUE City. Their mission is to destroy bridges, culverts and critical installations.

20Feb: 3d Bn, 3d Mar reported two VC approached their position carrying white flags. When the Marines indicated for the VC to continue their approach, they fled into a nearby cane field. The Marines fired and pursued the VC into the cane field. At this time, additional VC fired approx 250 SA fire at the Marines.

24Feb: District agent, QUANG TIN Province, reported LU GIANG, CMDR of 107th and 108th VC Regts has directed his units to adopt new tactics, these are to continue employment of harassing and/or offensive actions to confine friendly units to defensive positions. This will enable major assaults to be launched against bridges at TAM KY, BA BAU, ONG BO and at the TAC HAUN outpost. (ARVN C-2) (G-2 Cont: F-3, LU GIANG, reported CMDR, 94th Bn, 16Feb66)

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units.

- (1) Supply Storage. Agent Report, 16Feb: On 8 Feb the VC mobilized a number of local residents from Minh Hiep sub-district into a labor force to carry supplies from storage buildings vic BS 498496, to a storage area at Nui Hum, vic BS 437507. The latter area consists of 10 structures used to store rice, unhusked rice, ammo and weapons. The area is manned by at least 10 VC guerrillas. (F/6).
- (2) POW Compound. 21Feb: Elements of USMC Recon Bn., discovered a VC PW camp (vic BS 254915). 22 men and 7 women were released. Medical supplies were found in the camp. Camp consisted of 6 reinforced buildings. All prisoners were either close relatives of responsible RVN officials or held positions with the GVN (Hamlet chiefs, intel agents, strike force members, PF unit leaders, village admin clerks, Buddhist priests, etc.) Male captives related incidents of maltreatment, women were not mistreated other than being placed in stocks and underfed. Camp was one of many. New camps are constructed by captives as the need to move arises.
- (3) HEADQUARTERS. 20Feb: Agent Rpt: The Tu Nghia VC District Headquarters is located at Da Son (BS 483716). The Tu Phuoc Sub-district Headquarters is located 100 meters from the district headquarters. Each headquarters consists of 3 thatched structures and is guarded by 2 plts of VC. (F/4).

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- (4) WAY STATIONS. 17Feb: Agent Rpt: At the mouth of Dung Canyon (YD 610231) the VC have a way station for transporting supplies from the piedmont areas to the mountains for storing. 12 VC stay at this location to receive the goods and a plt of 32 VC guard the supplies. They are armed with 3 AR, 1 60mm mortar, and individual weapons. The supplies are carried south to the mouth of the canyon. Then, turning west, they are carried to Thong Cung Mountain for storage. (YD 610210). The supplies are stored in 3 thatched roof huts approx 4 x 8 x 5 meters high. No guards were observed at this location. (F/6).
- (5) HOSPITAL. 24Feb: Interrogation of Returnee described a 360 bed VC hospital in caves vic (BT 000230) operated by NVN medical personnel and by a company of NVN recruits. It was further stated that recent bombings were ineffective. Returnee estimated 350 VC in hospital during recent USMC operation on 25 Feb. 2d Bn 7th Mar loc portion of hospital caves vic (AT 972229). Hospital consisted of several groups of small empty caves. At (AT 976227), 2d Bn 7th Mar located remainder of hospital caves. 1 cave contained 15 beds. No equipment located. Total hospital area believed large enough for 360 patient capacity.

G. Negative.

H. AIR DEFENSE. Anti-aircraft fire almost doubled during this reporting period. A total of 160 incidents were recorded involving III MAF aircraft. Fifty-five (55) A/C received a total of 77 hits from ground fire. Primary areas of reported incidents were in the Double Eagle and Danang Areas. There were 9 incidents reported of A/C receiving 12.7 mm/50 cal and poss 37mm fire. AA fire was reported light to intense.

21 Feb: A USMC F4B flying at 16,000 ft was fired on by a weapon of unk cal. Burst near A/C were from 3 to 5 ft. in dia. Pilot cut lights but continued to draw accurate fire. Pilot est. fire weapon to be 37/57mm.

20Feb: VMO-6 A/C reported one airburst at 2000ft. Black puff of smoke 20 ft in dia. A/C at 1600 ft vic (BT 2318). Hwy wpn position vic (BT 174155), 8 - 9 ft dia. (G-2 Cmt: Poss 37mm).

22Feb: III MAF AO rptd AA gun being emplaced (BT 036578)

23Feb: Two USAF G-130's rptd receiving AA fire while approaching Phu Bai A/F. Both A/C were hit with what appears to have been 12.7mm AAMG.

(I-R) NEGATIVE.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- A. ENEMY ORGANIZATION. ANNEX A.
- B. ENEMY IDENTIFICATION. ANNEX A.
- C. ENEMY EQUIPMENT. ANNEX A.

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D. Personalities. Annex A.

E. Casualties:

KIA 148 VCC 15

F. Morale, Considered good.

G. New Defenses, Mine Fields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles, and Defensive Works.

(1) 21 Feb: VC blew rail bridge at (YD 607278), the bridge was 70% destroyed, traffic resumed in 72 hours. (ARVN report)

(2) 24 Feb: The Danang bridge, loc (BT 045765), was rendered unserviceable when it collapsed under a vehicle. Time of repair is estimated at 5 days. LCU's and LCM's are augmenting as ferries.

(3) 25 Feb: AO reported improved gun position at (BT 388098) new gun position at (BT 383103); 3 circular positions and 12 foxholes at (BT 701976) newly improved.

(4) 25 Feb: AO reported new 100m trench line at (AT 813552), new trench line from (AT 933803) to (AT 934604); new system of spider holes along trail at (AT 983562); new AW positions at (AT 998546) and (AT 981552).

H. See Para 2. f.

I. Terrain. No change.

J. Weather. During reporting period, weather was generally fair. In the latter portion of period, a northerly cold front brought rain and drizzle to the plains, thunderstorms to the mountains and cloudiness throughout the area. Winds were southerly, averaging 7 kts with gusts to 16 kts. Temperature averaged from a high of 85° to a low of 74°. Vis. 7 miles.

L. Other Significant Information

(1) 21 Feb: 3D ITT Rpt. VC POW states that VC tell villagers not to pick up propaganda leaflets because they are poison.

(2) 22 Feb: 1st Bn 9th Mar reported that a VN villager (unidentified), presented a quantity of documents to the Bn CP. The documents were in Vietnamese.

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(3) 22 Feb: 1st Bn 9th Mar reported apprehending VCS. Suspect was apprehended when local villagers indicated to Marines that suspect was VC.

(4) 19 Feb: Agent Rpt: The VC C-355 Bn commanded by LA THANH HUNG, located at TAM SON (BT 220073) suffered 16 KBA and 13 WBA during friendly air strikes on 16 Feb.

(5) Significant ARVN Activity During Period

(a) 21 Feb: VC attacked ARVN Outpost vic (YD 337555) (QUANG TRI City). Attack was preceded by 100 rds 81mm Mortar, followed by raid. VC broke contact 0415, VC cas unk. (ARVN cas. 15 KIA, 12 WIA)

(b) 22 Feb: A report from ARVN sources stated that the ARVN 3d Ranger Bn., 7th Regt. Made contact with a VC force initially estimated as one (1) Bn in vic of BINH LONG bridge (BT 0156). The ARVN force received mortar and RR fire. The ARVN's established a defense perimeter and waited for assistance. A later report (unofficial, but from a reliable U. S. Military source) stated that approximately 100 VC were KIA, the majority resulting from friendly air strikes. This report also stated that 57 weapons were captured including one (1) 60mm mortar and 7 unidentified sub-machineguns. Included in the report was an estimate by local villagers that the total VC KIA was approximately 300, the majority being carried away prior to VC breaking contact. A report from G-2 I Corps indicated forces in this area may have been two (2) enemy Battalions.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See Annex B.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.



E. GORMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. CAPTIVE, RETURNEE AND REFUGEE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

COMUSMACV	2	CG 1ST MAW	10	1ST 100 5TH USASF	1	CO 5TH COMM BN
CG FMFPAC	1	CMDR NCC	1	1ST 100 60 PLSG ADV GP	1	CO NAVSUPACT
CG FFORCEV	1	CICV	1	1ST 100 30TH NCR	5	
CG 3D MARDIV	10	CTF 115	1	1ST 100 7TH ENGR BN	1	
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CMDR I CORPS ADV GP	5	1ST 100 9TH ENGR BN	1	

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) to PERINTREP No. 4

1. General

The VC continue to press for the recruitment of low-level espionage and sabotage agents in the I Corps Area. This, and recently acquired VC documents, point to what appears to be a highly effective espionage apparatus operating in the Danang Area. All efforts appear to be channeled toward collecting information on the airfields in this area, which present the most lucrative target. Terrorism also appears to be increasing. Two more village/hamlet chiefs have been assassinated increasing to a total of three deaths since 15 February 1966.

2. Espionage

a. DANANG. On 4 Feb 66, a meeting, presided over by a VC Intra-Region Committee member, was held in Tan Phong Hamlet, (AT 976515), to discuss courses of action within the Danang enclave for the coming months. At this meeting the following items were discussed: Money will be made available to organize a program for the assassination of RVN Government Officials. Rewards for these acts of terrorism will vary from 5,000 VN\$ for village and district officials and 10,000 VN\$ for province officials and higher. Money will also be made available for recruiting members of the RVN Government to work as agents for the VC, to employ female cadres in Danang to gather information, and organize subversive nets within the local RVN Government. The target set for VC agent recruitment in 1966 was 1,060. Source: An RVN Government Official. G-2 Comments: Evaluation, C/3. Previous reports received from various sources confirm a VC meeting taking place in this vicinity on 4 February 1966. Believe this is more details on that meeting. Two reported assassinations took place in I Corps Area which would tend to support VC plans for an increase of terrorist acts. (See paragraph 5 below)

A report received on 28 Feb 1966, relates that the VC have, and are recruiting buffalo herdsman living near US installations in Danang to gather information on US defenses. The VC have directed these herdsman to feed their cattle near the Danang Airbase perimeter fence in order to determine positions of sentry post and the location of protective mine fields. Source, an RVN government agency official. G-2 Comment: This is the first report received of the VC recruiting buffalo herdsman in this area to conduct low-level espionage, however, past reports indicated an increased effort by the VC to collect information about US defensive positions etc., and using buffalo herdsman appears to be a logical cover for conducting such operations.

On 3 Feb 1966, a large number of VC documents were found in a VC base camp in the vicinity (AT 809652). Translations of these indicate a highly effective VC espionage organization operating in the I Corps Area. These documents include detailed maps of the Danang Air Base as well as listing of VC Agents and a VC blacklist for Quang Nam Province.

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G-2 Comments: Information evaluated (3). This is the first substantial report pointing to an organized intelligence apparatus operating in the Danang area.

B. PHU BAI. A 15 February report related that the VC were planning to attack the Phu Bai area during the relief of the on line battalion. In order to plan for this the VC are presently collecting information pertaining to the length of time a unit will remain in a certain area, in what manner it will be relieved and the position of ammunition and fuel storage areas. Source-SMIAT-from district agent (F). G-2 Comments: Information evaluated as (3). Reports continue to be received on VC attempts to infiltrate the Phu Bai military complex. Present trends point to the use of low-level informants by the VC to acquire information for proposed attacks.

3. Sabotage

a. DANANG. During the night of 18 February and the early morning of the 19th, two large "sail boats" arrived off-shore in the Cau Dai Estuary area and landed at Phuoc Trash Beach (BT 200583), and off loaded an unknown quantity of explosive cargo. The unloading was performed by local fishermen living in that area. Each boat had a crew of 6, all dressed in traditional black Vietnamese dress. Four crew members were armed. The explosives are to be distributed to various VC elements in Quang Nam Province for sabotage purposes. Source. SMIAT agent (C) from a number of casual sources (F). G-2 Comments: Information evaluated (6). A recent report from the Danang Garrison that information had been received that the VC planned to attack various US installations and billets in the Danang City area. If additional explosives have been received by the VC in this area, an effective operation of this sort may be possible and depending on the type of explosives received, sophisticated devices could be employed.

3d Marine Division reported on 1 Feb 66, that the overall VC sabotage effort appears to be well controlled and executed. There were isolated incidents of amateur behavior, but they seem to be exceptions, in most operations much stress has been placed on intelligence data down to extensive detail. The time has been chosen mostly to facilitate introduction of the device. Because the VC gather extensive information and plan the actual attack in detail, they are most likely to strike at known specific targets rather than indiscriminately bomb a general area.

4. Propaganda

a. PHU BAI. 12 Feb 66, Hoang Thuy District Police reported that several VC entered the village of Thuy Chau and distributed locally produced propaganda leaflets, written by a high school student, which stated as follows.

1. Be tolerant of those who repent and do meritorious work to return with the people.

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2. The Liberation Front of Thua Thien Province orders the people not to help the Americans. If some people do not obey them they cannot complain when they are killed.
3. Turn your rifles with people and against the Americans for national salvation.
4. Punish severely the traitors and the puppet government of South Vietnam.

G-2 Comment: The high school student has been arrested and is under police investigation by Huong Thuy District Headquarters.

5. Terrorism

a. PHU BAI. At approximately 0100, 20 February, eight VC entered Ton Khat Hamlet (YD 935091), Loc Son Village. Two VC entered the residence of NGUYEN CHINH, Ton Khat Hamlet Chief while the others remained outside on guard. NGUYEN was ordered out of bed, when he refused, one of the VC fired three rounds from a 45 caliber pistol, one of which struck NGUYEN in the neck and killed him. The VC left a note attached to NGUYEN's body informing that he was a spy for the Americans, and had taken advantage of his position and had perpetrated crimes against the people. For this reason he was assassinated. Source - Detachment 3rd Counterintelligence Team from USMC personnel.

b. CHU LAI. On the night of 22 February VC elements entered the Chua Tu (1) Hamlet (BS 592938) and assassinated the Hamlet Chief. The Binh Son District Chief verified the incident. G-2 Comment: The above two incidents of terrorism add to a total of three government officials assassinated in the I Corps Area between 15-22 February. It would appear, based on reports of VC meetings, that the VC intend to continue to exterminate those officials who would align themselves with RVN and US Forces. These acts will probably broaden in scope in the near future. I Corps reports that one priest and two children were killed by a VC mine emplaced in a church in the vicinity of (YD 204625).

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ANNEX C (CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) to PERINTREP No. 4

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		VCS	
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
Number captured or acquired during reporting period.	0	61	0	10	113	
<u>Present Location</u>						
	<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	13	0	0	51
All released to ARVN authority	<u>Danang</u>	0	48	0	10	49
	<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	0	0	0	13
<u>Status of Interrogation</u>						
	<u>Completed</u>	0	61	0	0	113
	<u>In Progress</u>	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Total captives, returnees held at the end of the reporting period by Corps, each Division and Sector</u>						
		0	0	0	0	0

C - 1

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 Location: DANANG, RVN
 DTG: 080800H
 REF: III MAF 5

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PERINTREP NO 5

PERIOD COVERED: 270001 to 052400 MAR 1966

REF: (a) MAPS: NO CHANGE

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. Enemy activity continued in intensity during the week with multi-battalion VC/NVA units encountered in the northern portion of the Zone and in Quang Ngai Province.

(1) QUANG TRI - Thua Thien/Phu Bai

(a) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. ARVN Opn LAM SON 235 continued from the previous week in the lowlands areas east of QUANG TRI city with VC units in contact identified as the 806th and 808th Battalions. Heavy fighting resulted in a total of 359 VC KIA, 14 VCC and a total of 86 weapons captured at the conclusion of the Operation on 1 March. Subsequent operations east of HUE, ARVN operation THUA THIEN 177B, established contact with the 810th VC Battalion. On 28 ~~Feb~~, a USMC battalion engaged the 810th in a pitched battle due east of the PHU BAI TAOR. VC losses inflicted by Marines amounted to 122 VC KIA and 69 weapons. ARVN inflicted losses for THUA THIEN 177B at end of week were 47 VC KIA and 17 weapons captured.

(b) PHU BAI TAOR. Minor skirmishes with small VC units near the PHU BAI TAOR were experienced while Marines engaged VC of the 810th Battalion to the East as described above.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR/DANANG TAOR.

(a) No significant enemy action occurred during the period. Enemy harrassing attacks, mining and booby trapping continued in their usual tempo. A VC terrorist attack which blew up a civilian bus on highway 1 and associated VC warnings against use of the road underlined VC attempts to convince the population of their effective control of the area.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI/CHU LAI TAOR.

(a) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI. A considerable increase in VC activity in northern QUANG NGAI followed a pattern parallel to recent VC operations in the two Northern Provinces. VC forces came out of the mountain jungles and were located to the northwest of QUANG NGAI city. Response by ARVN troops and US Marines to VCC statements established contact with a VC force estimated at least two battalions. By the end of the week, Operation UTAH under control of TASK FORCE DELTA has accounted for at least 258 VC KIA.

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(b) CHU LAI TAOR. No significant contacts were reported within the TAOR as Chu Lai Marine units went south into Operation UTAH.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

During the period, a total of 208 VC initiated incidents were reported. Of these incidents, 92 were harassing fire, 92 AA fire, 23 mines and booby trap and 1 propaganda.

A. Strengths and Dispositions. See Annex A

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. Enemy operation in the past two weeks in the lowland areas of the two northern provinces were executed by the 800 series battalions. These contacts coincided with a VCC description of Phase I of the "Winter Spring" Campaign. Phase I was to consist of operations in the lowlands and attack on PF/RF units. Phase II was not described. These VC operations may possibly be directed at the March rice harvest in Quang Tri, the 806th and 808th Battalion were engaged east of Quang Tri City. Several VCC interrogations mentioned the 6th VC Regiment as being in Quang Tri Province. It was not clear which of the 800 series battalions are supposed to compose this regiment, however, one VCC spoke of the 806th, 808th and an NVA Battalion. Another VCC statement mentioned the 812th Battalion as a component of the 6th Regiment, in THUA THIEN Province, the 802nd, 804th and 810th Battalions were identified in contact in the past two weeks. The 800th Battalion is also carried in THUA THIEN. VCC interrogations have mentioned a 1st Mobile and/or a 1st Provincial Regiment in the area. Again, it is not clear which of these battalions is supposed to compose this regiment (if it in fact exists). The possibility arises of a task force being organized.

(2) QUANG NAM - QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI. Contact identifications and VCC interrogations give rise to the probability that at least elements of the 36th (AKA 6th, AKA 20th) NVA regiment and of the 195th AA Battalion are now located in northern QUANG NGAI Province. The location of the 1st VCC regiment is in doubt, however, the 70th Battalion, which may now be operating as a part of the 1st Regiment, was recently identified in QUANG NAM. It is also interesting to note that a continuing series of agent reports have mentioned recent movements of various battalions of the 2nd VC Regiment from BINH DINH to QUANG NGAI Province.

B. Order of Battle. See Annex A

C. Reserves and Reinforcements. See Annex A

D. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) During a VC attack against USMC/PF units on 26 Feb, a VCC stated that 2 companies took part in the atk, A-19 Co and an unidentified Demolition Co. The Demolition Co's mission just prior to assault was to locate and destroy unit leaders and AW positions by probes.

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(2) On 4 Mar, 2nd Bn, 3d Mar rptd detonating an explosive device attached "waist high" to a tree, vic (AT 899701). The explosion sheared the tree which was 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter and shrapnel penetrated a Marine's flak jacket. The two wounded Marines were 10 to 20 meters from the point of detonation and another Marine was knocked to the ground approx 40 meters away.

E. Omitted.

F. Administrative Units. See para 3h.

G. Omitted.

H. Air Defense.

(1) Anti aircraft fire decreased somewhat during the reporting period. A total of 92 incidents were recorded involving III MAF aircraft. Thirty five aircraft received a total of 57 hits from ground AA fire. Areas of highest density AA fire were in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR and operation UTAH area. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. 12.7/.50 cal AA fire was reported in 17 incidents, primarily on 4 March, in operation UTAH action.

(2) On 5 Mar A/C supporting TFD rptd air burst, w/black smoke, 5' fireball vic (Bs 5680-5681-5682). A/C alt, 2000-3000'. Various observations of airbursts have been reported in the operation UTAH area. (BS 5585). Descriptions vary from 2' to 5' in diameter, with gray/black bursts, between 100 and 200 ft agl, to black colored explosions of 3 to 7 ft diameter. (G-2 cmt: (Ref: III MAF PERINTREP #3. Sub-para 2.d,(1)(a)). The VC have a known capability to launch groups of 10-16 grenades to burst at heights of over 600 ft by using an electrically detonated TNT charge remotely fuzed from a position away from a potential HLZ. Variable strength TNT impelling charges could account for the reported lower altitude bursts. The higher bursts, around 2000' AGL, can be the result of set-back fuzing of a traverse mounted 60mm mortar having effective vertical ranges of between 650 ft and 1970 ft AGL; and which has been reported in use within ICTZ.)

I. Through R omitted.

S. Other Elements.

(1) 17Feb, ARVN rptd the VC are launching a campaign to acquire the March Rice Harvest. Local VC organizations have been ordered to use any means to get the people to pay their taxes with rice. The VC will also use money to buy the March Harvest to support their program of gathering rice. The VC will increase sabotage of lines of communications to support the collection of rice.

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(2) 3d Mar rpt from Hieu Duc Dist Hq stated a VC Bn, comd by TUNG, was loc vic (AT 9362), (AT 9462) and (AT 9562). Rpt further stated the Bn is accompanied by a USSR Advisor. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A
- c. Equipment. Annex A
- d. Personalities. Annex A
- e. Casualties.

KIA	CONFIRMED	POSS
GROUND FORCES	328	120
KBA	<u>34</u>	<u>30</u>
TOTAL	362	150

f. Morale:

(1) Although the VC/NVA have suffered heavy losses during the period, morale is considered good.

g. Enemy Defenses, Mine Fields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles, And Other Defensive Works.

- (1) 2Mar66, 3d Bn, 3d Mar (OPCON 9thMar), on mine clearing detail, fired 4 line charges from an LVTE and obtained 9 secondary explosions. Mine clearing ops are being conducted on Hill 55 (AT 970620). To date, a total of 35 line charges have been fired resulting in 108 secondary explosions.

h. Details of Administrative Installations and Support. The following installations were the subject of SMIAT reports dtd 24 and 25 Feb 66: G-2 evaluation is given as F/3.

(1) MUNITIONS FACTORY.

(a) The VC have moved their T-60 workshop from its former location at (BS 045939) to a new location in NVOC OA. The area covered by the T-60 workshop is from (AS 985920) to (AS 985910). This move

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took place during 16-20 Jan 66.

(b) The manager of T-60 workshop is LE THUC and he is assisted by Major DUC, who is also Cmdr of the Security Co guarding this workshop. Major DUC has attended an ordnance course in Red China during Sept-Dec 1954 and an engr course during Mar-Jun 1962. A CHICOM armor expert is also located at this workshop.

(c) The workshop is composed of many small thatched structures, hidden under the jungle canopy. Each thatched structure is protected by a dirt embankment, on all sides, approx 1.2 meters high and 0.60 meters thick, and is covered with grass.

(d) The equip moved from the former T-60 workshop to the new site included two (2) boring machines, one (1) wood lathe to make handles for stick grenades, one (1) grenade casting machine, one (1) machine to forge 57mm RR shell casings, one (1) machine to forge rifle cartridge casings, and one (1) primer seating machine for rifle cartridges.

(e) The T-60 workshop is operated only during night time for fear of discovery by air observation, due to the smoke rising from various structures within the T-60 workshop area.

(f) On the north end of the workshop (AS 985920) and the south end (AS 985910), an anti aircraft platoon is emplaced. Type of weapons and strength is unknown.

(g) The workshop is also protected by two (2) Bns, the VC 80th Regular Bn, and the QUANG TIN Province MF Bn. Both Bns are deployed from TRA MY (BS 020975) to (AS 985955), with their Hqs in TRA MY Elem School (BS 020971). The strengths of these two Bns are not known, but they are equipped with four (4) 81mm mort, six (6) 60mm mortcs, three (3) AA guns (Type and size unk), six (6) 75MM RR, eight (8) 57mm RR, six (6) .30 cal mg's, 40 ARS and an unknown quantity of various types of individual wps. Uniforms worn by the 80th Bn are heavy grey cotton uniforms, black berets and black rubber sandals, while members of the QUANG TIN Bn wear Black PJ's, black berets and black sandals.

(2) AMMUNITION CACHE.

(a) During the period 24-26 Jan66, many civilian laborers were drafted from the VC controlled areas to move 100 cases of CHICOM manufactured new rifle cartridges from the T-60 workshop area (AS 985920) to (AS 985910) to a new ammo cache site loc sw of NUOC TA VI Stream, vic (AS 915917). This ammo site covers an area approx 300 meters square. The ammo bunkers are 10 meters apart and covered with dirt and leaves.

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The area is guarded by one (1) Montagnard CO, armed w/rifles and spears.

(3) RICE STORAGE.

(a) A VC farm site and rice storage area containing six (6) storage buildings is located vic (BS 075910). Approx 3,000 bushels of unhusked rice and 30 bags, each bag containing 100 kilo of husked rice, are stored in the six structures. The VC farm has a total of 150 forced laborers, of which the majority are political detainees working on the farm. Forced laborers attempting to escape are returned to the farm and "shot on the spot".

(4) EXPLOSIVE CACHE.

(a) A VC cache for explosives, covering an area less than 150 meters is located at the river junction of the TRANH and a branch river at (AS 848975). There are approx 3000 bars of plastic explosive charges, each bar weighing about 300 grams, and approx 48 hard explosive blocks, each weighing over 1 kilo, stored at this cache site. On 3Feb66, nine (9) hard explosive block and 100 plastic bars were taken from this cache, to PHUONG XA DONG.

(5) VC BASE CAMP.

(a) 1st Bn, 3d Mar discovered a VC guerrilla Base Camp on 4 Mar, vic (AT 869846). A search of the area revealed the following enemy equip; three cases of TNT; one 15 pound shape charge; one WP grenade; 1/2 pound block TNT rigged for electrical detonation; assorted ammo and magazines estimated 13 pounds of medical supplies; ten 81mm and one 106mm duds.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather.

(a) Weather remained excellent for military operations during the period. Temperatures were warm, surface winds were ESE, averaging 8-10 knots. Visibility averaged 7-10 miles except during early morning hours of fog and low hanging clouds.

k. Captives, Returnee and Refugee Report. Annex C.

l. Omitted.

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change from PERINTREP NO. 3.

J. E. Gorman

J. E. GORMAN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A- ORDER OF BATTLE
B- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
C- CAPTIVE, RETURNEE AND REFUGEE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CO FLSG	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 30TH NCR	5
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CO 7th ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CO 9th MT BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	10	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG FFORCEV	1	CMDR NAV SUPPACT	5
CMDR I CORPS ADVGRP	5	NCC	1
DET 5th USASF	1	CICV	1
		CF 115	1

ANNEX A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 5

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>SPR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	YD 8042	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
810TH BN	PROB	400	YD 9815*	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY (AKA THI) PO-SRCAPT NGUYEN SONG

* Place of last contact.

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2 MG, 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIH VO XUAM LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0355	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG, 18 SMF	CO-PHAN ANK MAN, NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2-57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-NINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS, (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM MORT 4-30 CAL. HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN
400PH ARMY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW	CO-SRCAPT DAI XO-SRCAPT HONG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN

ORGANIZATION

CLASS

STR

LOCATION

EQUIP

PERSONALITIES

104TH BN

PROB

300

BS 6692

1-81MM MORT
3-60MM MORT
3-MG; 18-AR

CO-NGUYEN BI
CHAW; NGHIA TUU

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) to PERINTREP No. 5

1. General.

The VC recruiting program of low-level espionage and sabotage agents and infiltration of VC sympathizers appears to have been accelerated within the Danang complex. The VC continue to propagandize and proselytize both, the military and civilian population. Terrorism continues to be the formidable weapon of the VC as evidenced in past reports. Recent kidnappings and one assassination have increased, with a total of seven (7) incidents within the Phu Bai and Chu Lai TAOR's during the period 26 February - 1 March 1966.

2. Espionage.

a. DANANG: A report received on 1 March 1966, related that VC Cadres living within the villages of the East central and central Hoa Vang District, have relocated their families and have placed them in the refugee centers in Danang City and other centers in Hoa Vang District. The stated purposes for these moves were to add to the VC information collection capability and to augment those agents presently operating in the area. VC dressed in civilian clothing are attempting to, and have succeeded in making friends with Americans in the Marble Mountain area for the purpose of soliciting US defense information. These same cadres have been propagandizing the local people to protest against the reclamation policy of the GVN and threatening the inhabitants in government-controlled areas with death in the future if they refused to align with VC policies. Source: CRD, GVN Agent source evaluated F/3. G-2 comment: This action to emplace both families and low level agent into Hoa Vang District indicates concerted espionage efforts and tends to confirm previously reported organized VC intelligence apparatus in Danang. Information received on 2 March, revealed that VC have presently opened a new campaign to force families with relatives in the ARVN to furnish two photographs of ARVN member. If not readily available, families will be instructed to write member requesting two photographs. Source: GVN informant evaluated C/3. G-2 comments: Photos could be used for: (1) Identification of ARVN personalities for assassination; (2) Forging ID Cards/Passes; or (3) Extorting ARVN personnel to defect by implicating their families through use of acquired photos. A VN employee was recently apprehended aboard a US installation with photos of US/ARVN/ROK personalities which were salvaged from a rubbish container.

3. Sabotage.

a. PHU BAI: Report received on 28 February 1966, disclosed that a VC unit, size unknown, has been trained for terrorism and sabotage with mission to infiltrate the City of Hue and conduct operations. Each member is reportedly armed with one (1) automatic rifle and one (1) colt, model 1912. TRAN VIET CHAU, former Chief of Security for THUA THIEN (P), now Chief of Security, 4th Inter Region, has been assigned the mission of organizing sabotage activities in HUE. Source: SMIAT,

rated C/3. G-2 comment: This may be VC Sapper Company reported undergoing one (1) month training course vicinity (YD 728933) on 12 January 1966. Members were reportedly being trained in methods and use of explosives and sub-machine guns. Upon graduation, company was to be sent to HUE to conduct operations.

b. DANANG-PHU BAI: From the period 27 February to 5 March 1966, two incidents which can be classified sabotage occurred. On 3 March 1966, the Danang-Hue railroad was blown up in the vicinity (YD 993043) with approximately 100 meters of track damaged or destroyed. On 5 March 1966, the railroad was mined at (ZD 073011) which resulted in derailment of 3 cars.

4. Propaganda.

a. DANANG: On 28 February 1966, the HOA VANG Sub-Section reported that VC Political Cadres and 20 other VC were attempting to induce residents of New Life Hamlet (AT 983698), to organize a demonstration to object to the clearing of bushes around the Hamlet. G-2 comment: Should the VC be successful in organizing a demonstration against and prohibit the construction of a New Life Hamlet, it would be a considerable propaganda gain for the VC.

On 3 March 1966, the VC District Propaganda-Proselyting Company was reported operating with 100 agents, including (9) females, in the Cam An (BT 165600) and Cam Hai (BT 103625) villages, Quang Nam Province. Mission is to propagandize and proselytize both the military and civilian population.

5. Terrorism.

a. PHU BAI: General terrorism trend continues in this area as evidenced by the kidnapping of (1) female resident of Thuong Phuoc Hamlet (YD 510485) on 26 February 1966.

b. CHU LAI: VC continue to intimidate the civilian populace of this area with terroristic activities as evidenced by reports indicating (1) assassination and (5) kidnappings in this area in the past week. G-2 comment: The assassination of a 70 year old loyal VN, tends to add to the assumption that VC intend to continue to exterminate officials and those who would align themselves with RVN and US forces.

ANNEX C (CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) TO PERINPREP #5

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		VCS
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC	
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	121	1	2	190*
Present Location					
All released to ARVN Authority					
<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	66	1	0	47
<u>Danang</u>	0	55	0	2	135
<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	0	0	0	8
Status of Interrogation					
<u>Completed</u>	0	121	0	2	190
<u>In Progress</u>					
Total captives, returnees held at the end of the reporting period by Corps, each Division and Sector.	0	0	0	0	0

* 7 ARVN DESERTERS NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE TOTAL.

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96602

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 150800H

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PERINTREP NO 6

PERIOD COVERED: 060001 - 122400H MAR 1966

REF: (A) MAPS: NO CHANGE

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. VC activity was concentrated in two areas during the period, in northern QUANG NGAI in a major engagement which began during the previous period and in western THUA THIEN were a VC attack in force captured the Special Forces outpost at A SHAU.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN/PHU BAI TAOR

(a) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. In western THUA THIEN Province, a VC force estimated as six battalions including 1 Heavy Weapons Battalion launched a determined attack on the A SHAU Special Forces Camp (YC 4886). The attack began at 090200H and by mid-day on the 10th the VC were in control of one wall of the small, triangular shaped compound. The attack slowed temporarily while VC concentrated on anti-aircraft fire against friendly air support and appeared to be waiting for US/ARVN reinforcements to enter the area. The VC gained control of the Camp late on the 10th as evacuation of Special Forces commenced. Enemy casualties are unknown.

(b) PHU BAI TAOR. No significant VC activity was encountered.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR/DANANG TAOR

(a) The only significant VC actions in the central Province consisted of one mass demonstration and one terrorist attack. At the Marble Mountain Air Facility on the morning of 11 March, approximately 600 Vietnamese protested air and artillery strikes. The demonstration was apparently VC organized. At a village near the Danang air strip at 112115H, an unknown number of VC threw grenades and fired small arms into a group of Vietnamese PF and civil officials following a political meeting killing two and wounding at least nine.

(b) DANANG TAOR. The above incidents, which occurred within the DANANG TAOR, marked the only departure from the continued standard small unit harassment tactics and extensive mining and booby trapping. Large scale civilian - military demonstrations within DANANG and other ICTZ population centers were inspired by reaction to the relief of the I Corps CG, General THI. No VC interference was discernable.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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III MAF

PERINTREP #6

6-12 Mar 66

CONFIDENTIAL(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI/CHU LAI TAOR.

(a) Elements of both the 1st VC Regiment and the 36th NVA Regiment were identified in Operation UTAH (ARVN OPN LIEN KIT 26) NW of QUANG NGAI city. A stubborn defense was fought by a well equipped VC force of at least two battalions from an elaborate trench and tunnel complex up until the night of 6-7 March. Final USMC inflicted VC casualties were 358 confirmed KIA and 325 possible KIA. ARVN operation LIEN KIT 26, a 2d ARVN Div Operation in conjunction with Operation UTAH, terminated 071600H with final VC losses tabulated as 228 KIA, 1 VCC and 33 weapons.

(b) CHU LAI TAOR. No significant VC activity was reported within the TAOR.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. There was a slight decrease in incidents (198) during this reporting period. There were 65 harassing fires, 23 mine/booby traps, 107AA fires and 3 propaganda incidents.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics.

(a) 6 Mar: 2dBn, 3dMar rpt: An unidentified female was evacuated from the vicinity of the pontoon bridge, location (AT 946699). The woman had suffered shrapnel wounds as a result of an explosive device. Questioning was precluded by her condition. (G-2 Cmt: Possibility VC using females to set booby traps.)

(b) 6 Mar: 2dBn, 7thMar member upon entering a pagoda, tripped a Chicom grenade. Upon examination, another grenade was found rigged with a trip wire. Area marked with sticks 20" long with newspaper on each end.

(c) 6 Mar: 1stBn, 3dMar OP observed reaction to an intrusion device, search made, device found disconnected. 10 meters from device, a clip (M-1) with 8 rounds (very clean) was found.

(d) 8 Mar: 3dBn, 9thMar S-2 rpt: Information was provided by the 3dBn, 9thMar S-2, regarding a method introduced by the VC in this area for employment of US type grenades (M-28) against mine clearing personnel. The device utilized a grenade and a ration can, buried approximately 6" below ground. The spoon is positioned so it fits under the ration can and the can is tied by string or wire to the safety ring. Extraction of the can by mine clearing personnel serves to detonate the grenade.

(e) Translation of a captured enemy document revealed the following: a raid (unnamed) by VC troops started at 0345. The signal to start the raid was two green flares.

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(f) 11 Mar: 3dBn, 3dMar patrol reported observing a figure laying in the rice paddy, vic (AT 982626). Upon leaving the trail to investigate, a booby-trap grenade was tripped about halfway between the trail and the figure. The figure turned out to be a straw-filled dummy. (G-2 Cmt: This appears to be a new type tactic employed by the VC to lure Americans into booby traps.)

(2) Mines.

(a) There is evidence that the VC are manufacturing locally modified shaped charges to utilize their blast effect horizontally as directional mines. Several such mines have been captured and destroyed to date, the latest two by 1st Bn 3dMar (AT 877834) on 7 March. General configuration follows that of a conventional shaped charge approx 12" in height with lower 5 3/4" portion 5 7/8" in diameter, upper portion tapering to a 1 3/4" neck, 1 1/2" in diameter. A detachable metal cap over the neck protects a string pull friction actuating device that can also be rigged for controlled electrical detonation. Filler is tritonal, possibly recovered from dud bombs. The 3 1/2" deep inverted cone appears generally fashioned from brass, possibly 105mm shell casing. Embedded in the matrix of resin/beeswax like substance on the concave surface of the cone are tightly spaced 1/4" square metal pellets apparently cold-chiseled from reinforcing rods. The thickness of matrixed cone is approx 7/16" at the base. The cone surface is then covered with thin cardboard held by glue. The cone is soldered into place and overall construction appears crude. The mine is painted olive drab. Hand-painted in yellow in the upper portion of several of the captured mines in four separate lines was the following inscription: "MDH, TNB, L.20.12.65, ZQD." The mine casing is 1/16" thick with a wire loop handle rivetted into place. Also soldered to a side is a U-shaped ring 1/2" wide, apparently used for hanging or positioning the mine horizontally. (G-2 Cmt: A continuing study is being made to determine the lethal effects of these mines and to develop other technical data. No data is available on the casualties caused thus far by these mines.)

e. Negative.

f. Admin Units.

(1) 7 Mar: 3d Recon Bn elements while checking area vic (ZC 196863), found evidence of VC activity. Area appeared to be once used as jungle training area. Many trees were lashed together for no other apparent reason than instruction. Appeared to be several classroom areas. Cans and dishes were found throughout the area.

(2) 10 Mar: SMIAT rpt: 20 Feb. An unknown quantity and type of ammunition was carried by local villagers for the VC from (YD 104776) to DA BAC (YD 100627) and then to BA CONG, QUANG TRI province. There were many wooden huts with thatched roofs at the (YD 104776) location. Three of these huts were used as possible medical clinics. The ammunition depot is located away from the huts, (distance unknown.).

(3) 5 Mar: Agent report, 27 Feb. Approximately 20 wooden huts with thatched roofs were located at NUOC Canyon (YD 090712). Each hut was approximately 15 meters long and is used as a temporary supply point for VC troops operating in the mountainous areas of QUANG TRI Province. The huts contained weapons, ammunition, military clothing and food. (G-2 Cmt: T/C)

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(4) 3 Mar, Agent report of 16-27 Feb. On the west side of LONG GUNG Mountain (YD 485210), the VC have two (2) cloth shelters that are used as a signal installation. One shelter is used as living quarters and the other shelter contains signal equipment (type and amount of equipment unk). Six antenna poles approximately 15 meters high are around the shelters. On the top of these poles are metal elements about the size of "fingers" which extend skyward and down toward the ground. Approximately 15 VC are stationed here with seven of them working on the signal equipment. Two of the men stationed here speak Chinese. Approximately 40 VC are scattered around the area for security.

(5) 4 March, Agent report, 16-22 Feb. An old palm leaf house is being used as an ammunition storage depot at CUNG Canyon vic (YD 535190). Approximately 300 boxes of ammunition are stored in the house. The ammunition is shipped on the TRO River and carried by the people to the depot. There are Chinese characters written on the boxes. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

g. Negative.

h. Air DEFENSE. AA fire incidents increased during the period 6-12 March. There was a total of 107 incidents involving 11 MAF A/C in I Corps. 53 A/C received a total of 130 hits. There were 10 reported incidents of 12.7mm/.50 cal and one possible .37mm AA fire directed at A/C. Areas of highest density were Grid Squares (BS 57, BS 58, AT 95 and YC 48). Fire varied from light to intense.

(1) 7 March, AO report. While checking southern half of DANANG TAOR, pilot received ground fire vic (AT 880510). AO stated fire sounded larger than .30 cal. This vicinity is heavily entrenched with numerous AA/AW positions from (AT 882891) to (AT 870500).

(2) 11 March, MAG-11 reported possible .37mm AA fire from vic (XD 965355). 12-14 bursts, bright orange and yellow, 2-3' in diameter with 2-3 seconds between bursts. No tracers. Bursts occurred 14-15,000' agl.

i and j. Negative.

k. Artillery.

(1) 7 Mar. QUANG TRI District Agent Rpt. Two Bns cmdy by DINH DAI and DINH SAT, with many heavy weapons, moved from (BS 445500) to (BS 430730). Prior to the move, two "Big Guns" had to be dismantled.

(2) 6 March, National Police reported two Battalions with 2 105mm Howitzers were located 8 miles south of CHU-LAI. (C/3) (G-2 Cmt: F/4, first report of 105's in this area. Two 105's were captured by VC at BA GIA in early summer of 1965. One gun was reported destroyed. Elephants were reported in this area on 27 Feb, approximately 9 miles to the SW of the reported guns. It is considered doubtful the guns would be located at this position.

l - r. Negative.

3. Other Intelligence Factors.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A

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- b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. There were 276 VC KIA during the reporting period.
- f. Morale. Considered good.
- g. Enemy Defenses, mine fields, fortifications, barriers, obstacles and defensive works.

(1) 7 Mar. 1st Mar rpt: A 3-wheeled vehicle with 7 VN traveling south on Hwy #1, vic (BT 398154) activated a VC landmine. 6 KIA, 1 Ser WIA. Road damage: 6' wide by 4' deep hole in west lane, east lane open to traffic. VC reportedly employed a 105mm rd.

(2) 7 Mar. AO rpt. Hwy #1 cut vic (BT 400147). Road appears to have been mined on both sides. There is a depression 10' wide and 6-8' deep.

(3) 7 Mar. AO rpt. Observed brush piled on center pedestal of AW position at (AT 998546). (G-2 Cmt: Possible concealment of gun mount.)

(4) 8 Mar. 2d Bn 9th Mar plt, while on patrol, detonated a 105mm rd. Projectile suspended 5 meters in air, hidden in tree line. Maximum force and frag resulted. patrol investigated incident; another booby trap was tripped, this one consisted of an M-26 rigged as a mine.

(5) 12 Mar. Booby trap indicator. 3d Recon Bn: Patrol reported that notched trees indicate locations of VC booby traps. Three horizontal notches are cut in the trees along trails. By placing a stick along the center notch and looking down the axis. It will point to the booby trap.

h. See para 2.f.

i. No change.

j. Weather: Weather over I Corps during the reporting period was generally clear to partly cloudy caused by a southwesterly flow. A northwesterly flow brought some scattered rain showers but no accumulation occurred. Temperatures averaged 85° high and 74° low. Winds averaged 8 kts with gusts to 15 kts. Vis, mi.

k. Captive, returnee and refugee report. Annex C.

l. Other significant information.

(1) 6 Mar: Elements of 3d Bn 9th Mar apprehended 24 VCS in S&D operation loc (BT 0663 - 0662) VCS were pointed out to Marines by village chief and Natl Police during a 7 hr period.

(2) 10 Mar: Agent rpt: On 26 Feb, there were approx 3000 VC reserves, commanded by NUOL, located at BEN THAN (YD 10778). In March, April, May and June, the VC will be active in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provs., in order to achieve their

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objective "Bloodshed in March, Peace in June".

(3) 11 Mar: A CRD report of 2 Mar indicated the VC QUANG NAM Prov committee has ordered their low-level committees into the hamlets and villages of HOA VAN and DIEM BAN Districts, to construct Secret underground tunnels for VC cadres and soldiers during operations in these areas. Each village must have a tunnel capable of containing one VC plt, while each hamlet must have a tunnel capable of containing 3 persons. (G-2 Cmt: C/3).

(4) 8 Mar: 7th Mar reported that two female VN approached Marines and stated there were two men in boat off-shore (BT 620070). VN's stated the men fished by day and carried grenades for VC at night. Marines apprehended suspects, one denied any connections with VC, the other admitted signaling VC when patrols were in area.

(5) 3 Mar: Agent rpt. On the night of 21 Feb, approximately 50 wounded VC were carried from KY NAM MOUNTAIN (YD 660190). KY NAM MOUNTAIN was the HOUNG TRA District force base and had been bombed. The wounded were carried to DUONG HOA (YD 790060). On 22 Feb a group of porters were used to carry rice and salt from the bombed base at KY NAM Mountain to the new base at PHUNG HOANG Mountain (YD 650170). Three (3) canvas shelters have been erected here for the storage of this material and approximately 300 men were deployed from KY NAM Mountain to HON VUON (YD 660202) on the same day.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ANNEX B

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change from PERINTREP NO. 3.


J. E. GORMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

A- ORDER OF BATTLE

B- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

C- CAPTIVE, RETURNEE AND REFUGEE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CO FLSG	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 30TH NCR	5
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	10	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG FFORCE 1	1	CMDR NAV SUPPACT	5
CG FFORCE 2	1	NCC	1
CMDR I CORPS ADVGRP	5	CICV (MACV)	1
DET 5TH USASF	1	CTF 115	1

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ANNEX A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 6

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO=THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO=NGUYEN THAM AI
K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO=PHAM KINH; PHU
810TH BN	PROB	400	VIC YD 0396	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY (AKA THI) PO- SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2 MG, 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIH VO XUAM LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0355	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG, 18 SMF	CO-PHAN ANK MAN, NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-NG 4-57RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR. CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH

A-3

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2-57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-NINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS, (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL. HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SGM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW	CO-SRCAPT DAI XO-SRCAPT HONG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

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<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) to PERINTREP No. 6

1. General. The VC appear to have concentrated their efforts on establishing effective espionage networks within the city of Danang as evidenced by the presence of two high ranking VC organizers in the city. Propaganda and agitation within the Danang TAOR indicate a definite trend toward increase, especially within the central portion. Three incidents that could be classified as terrorist activity occurred within the Danang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai TAORS. Sabotage efforts continue to provide a usual threat to all US installations within RVN. Probably the most significant happening that bears watching is the political movement in all I Corps as the result of General Nguyen Chanh Thi's dismissal. As of now this seems to have manifested itself in well organized and peaceful demonstrations in the central I Corps area.

2. Espionage.

a. Danang: Previous reports furnished information that a VC unit had entered the Cam Hai Village (BT 134612) and (BT 132613) and is operating with two local VC platoons. Their reported purpose is to conduct operations in the vicinity of USMC units in the area in an attempt to collect pertinent information to attack or ambush the USMC elements. Another report received on 3 March 1966, furnished information that province commissar, NGO CHAU (AKA NGUYEN CA and PHAM VAN HAI) is presently in the city of Danang for undisclosed purposes. Also another ranking VC official, HO KY, the Dai Loc District commissar is present in Danang for the reported purpose of gaining entrance to the Danang Air Base. HO will attempt this intrusion by seeking employment aboard the Base. (G-2 comment; Reports received throughout the past week indicate that VC espionage operations are centering primarily within the Danang TAOR and more pointedly, particularly in areas controlled or influenced by the VC. The arrival of these two officials in Danang may possibly point to a more coordinated and directed VC espionage effort.)

b. Chu Lai: On 26 - 28 February 1966, a platoon size unit of VC, dressed as civilians, is dispatched daily to the An Tan (BT 505061) and Chu Lai (BT 5060) areas to collect information pertaining to the disposition of US forces. On 9 March 1966, it was reported that a VC clandestine radio station had been located in the vicinity of (BS 714961). (G-2 comment: This and other reports indicates a continuation of VC efforts to collect information by disguising themselves as civilians, Priest, Monks, etc. The reported radio station may point to an electronic monitoring or counter-measure capability by the VC.)

3. Sabotage.

a. Chu Lai: On 9 March 1966, inhabitants of Vinh An Hamlet, Binh Sa Village, stated that Binh Son District VC are paying the people to place M-26 grenade type booby traps near Marine positions. Another report received on 2 March, furnished information that a VC "Demolition Team" was sent to the Chu Lai area to conduct sabotage operations against

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the US/ARVN forces in that locale. Reportedly, this team will take advantage of the relaxed security during the hours of darkness to infiltrate US/ARVN defensive perimeters to accomplish their mission. A number of other VC agents are reportedly operating in this area to collect information of defensive positions and to advise on special targets of opportunity.

b. Danang - Hue: From the period 6 thru 12 March, there were five incidents occurring on the rail-line between Danang and Hue that can be classified as sabotage. On 1 and 5 March, two bridges were rendered unusable at (YD 386468) and (ZD 073011), as the result of enemy action. There were three reports of tracks being mined causing two de-railments, 5 March at (ZD 073011), 7 March at (ZD 148010) and 10 March at (AU 800009).

c. Special: A number of Chinese Communist craft disguised as fishing boats were reportedly attempting to penetrate the South Vietnam major ports and other coastal areas. These craft have two decks, the lower being false and containing explosive charges, with the upper containing ordinary fishing gear. When approached by another vessel, or in the event of being captured, the explosive charges will be detonated. (G-2 comment: This is the first report of Chinese Communist craft attempting infiltration and possible sabotage.)

4. Political.

a. Danang: Information received on 10 March 1966, revealed the dismissal of Lieutenant General Nguyen Chan THI as Commander, I Corps Tactical Zone and Regional Government Administrator. As a result of this move, demonstrations protesting THI's removal subsequently took place on 11 and 12 March 1966 in the City of Danang and Hoi An Township.

On 11 March 1966, at 1600 hours, approximately 2,000 persons gathered at Dien Hong Square, Danang, to protest the removal of General THI. The demonstration was organized by the "Military-Civilian Struggle Committee" (MCSC) of I Corps. Banners, carried by ARVN military personnel, brought into the area displayed slogans such as, "Down with the General Command in Saigon," and "At any price, the people of I Corps are determined to demand the return of General THI to I Corps".

On 12 March 1966, two demonstrations were observed in Danang, in the same area, from 1000 - 1100 and 1730 - 1850 hours. Both demonstrations followed the same theme as that of the previous day. Both drew approximately 3,000 persons. Speeches centered around "Freedom of country - Stable Government and Reinstatement of General THI". One speaker, announced that he and his followers were proceeding to the Danang Radio Station to make an appeal broadcast and that the Hoi An Radio Station had already been seized.

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Information received from Hoi An revealed that the Radio Station had been broadcasting one message repeatedly - "All persons should assemble in Hoi An at 1500 to find out what happened to General THI." At approximately 1500 hours, 2,000 persons were assembled. Themes remained the same.

Leaflets were distributed by ARVN personnel on 12 March 1966, throughout the City of Danang, encouraging the civilian populace to initiate a "General Strike", i.e., close all shops, stores, etc., until further notice, commencing at 0700, 13 March 1966. (G-2 comment: During the period covered, all demonstrations appeared well organized, peaceful and conducted without any significant incidents.)

5. Propaganda and Agitation.

a. Danang: On 9 March 1966, propaganda leaflets were found on the steering wheel of a military vehicle in the city of Danang. Five familiar type VC propaganda leaflets, printed in English, were found on 7 March at a bridge in the vicinity of (AT 943661). These leaflets were attached conspicuously to bamboo stakes with the theme to call for repatriation of all US troops in Vietnam. (G-2 comment: These are but a few of the numerous reports received on findings of VC propaganda material. It appears that there had been a decisive increase in this field, especially in the East central portion of the Danang TAOR.)

b. Phu Bai - Chu Lai: Document found on a VC body on 28 February 1966, in the vicinity of (YD 262590) stated that the VC Proselyting Section of the 5th Region has met to discuss concepts of reorganizing their fifth column. (sic) They attach importance to Officers, especially the drafted students who become Officers in the Armed Forces. (G-2 comment: The Fifth Columnist movement has not been defined but is believed to be another attempt to subvert local populace in that area with the thought in mind of eventual take over.)

A VC meeting which convened 1 March 1966, at (BS 285782) to discuss the launching of a Military and Political Campaign in the Districts of Mo Duc, Nghia Hanh and Minh Long have been reported by a Quang Ngai District Agent. (G-2 comment: This again would point to a possible organizing movement by the VC. It appears that the Proselytizing and Propaganda actions are not yet effectively organized in either the Phu Bai and Chu Lai TAORS, but apparently are in the early stages of reorganization which could prove to be highly effective in the future.)

On 3 March 1966, approximately 200 Vietnamese Nationals (VN) approached a Marine position at (BS 628993) demanding that they be allowed to work the fields occupied by the Marines. Upon being told that they would have to obtain the Binh Son District Chief's approval, the VC protested and began to demonstrate. Some agitators carried signs printed in English, protesting denial of their rights. During the demonstration approximately 20 rounds of small arms fire was received by a friendly unit. Subsequently, interrogation

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of some of the demonstrators indicated that the demonstration was VC inspired. (CI comment: Apparently from the above report, the villagers came prepared to demonstrate and knew that permission had to be acquired for their entry into a US defensive position. Other reports from the Danang area have indicated that the VC have approached local VN that have been restricted in their use of land; and have been successful in forming demonstrations.)

6. Terrorism.

a. Danang: On the night of 9 March 1966, 18 VC entered the village of La Chau (AT 957678) and collected rice from the local villagers and prior to their departure, murdered a young boy. A recent report was received that a bus detonated a VC mine in the vicinity of (BT 122487), killing 8 and wounding 12 VN civilians. a similar report in the same general area was received with 8 more civilians killed and 10 wounded, when a bus detonated a VC mine. The VC have reportedly placed mines at the Kung My Village (4) vicinity (AT 912688), entrance without informing the villagers of their presence or positions. (G-2 comment; There has been a slight decline in the terrorist activities in the past week. This may be due to increased efforts in the espionage, sabotage and propaganda movements. However, the murder of small children for no apparent reason and the emplacement of mines without the villagers knowledge would keep the Vietnamese people in a high state of confusion and unrest. The ultimate goal being that of complete fear to those who would continue to resist the VC takeover.)

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ANNEX C (CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) to PERINTREP 6

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		VCS
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC	
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	51	0	0	126*
Present Location:					
<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	33	0	0	37
All released to ARVN authority					
<u>Danang</u>	0	18	0	0	85
<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	0	0	0	4
Status of Interrogation					
<u>Completed</u>	0	51	0	0	126
<u>In Progress</u>	0	0	0	0	0

* 9 ARVN DESERTERS NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE TOTAL

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E
SE
SE

Diamond
Emerald

Negligible
12

ERAN

Lara
Lian

53
30
83

7015
29
50

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 220800H MARCH 66
 ser: 030166

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PERINTREP NO. 7

PERIOD COVERED: 130001H to 192400H MARCH 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: NO CHANGE.

1. General Enemy Situation.

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. VC activity in the zone returned to small unit contacts during the period as movements of VC/NVA units through the highland areas were reported and major VC units appeared to be repositioning and/or regrouping following heavy losses sustained in late February and early March engagements. The only major activity in the zone was centered around civil disturbances generated by replacement of the I Corps CG - General THI (See Annex B) in which no VC influence has been discernable.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. While a few unconfirmed reports of low validity placed the 95B NVA Regiment to the east of ASHAU, moving towards the HUE-PHU BAI complex, a considerable number of sightings of enemy positions throughout the valley and ridges north of ASHAU indicated the probability of the VC unit remaining in that area.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR - DANANG TAOR. A number of reports received during the period forecast a VC mortar attack against USMC facilities. A slight increase in reports of VC units within the DANANG TAOR was noted, however no major enemy units were contacted during the period.

(a) DANANG TAOR. At 190045H, an estimated company of VC attacked elements of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines vicinity (BT 003614) with 55 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 7 rounds of 81mm mortar fire and heavy S/A fire. Return fire accounted for 6 VC KIA. Harassing mortar and S/A fire continued through the night and an estimated 50 VC were observed and routed at (BT 003587) at approximately 191015H.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. An increase in small unit contacts was noticeable within the Northwest portion of the CHU LAI TAOR. Reports of movement of major enemy units in the southern part of QUANG NGAI Province continue to be received.

(a) CHU LAI TAOR. A total of 46 VC were KIA between the 13th and 18th of March in the NW portion of the CHU LAI TAOR and RAOR in a series of 33 incidents between VC groups and Reconnaissance Battalion and 2d Battalion 4th Marines units. Units of up to 30 VC were sighted by Recon Bn in the area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.a. STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS.CONFIDENTIAL

Group 4
 Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years

III MAF PERINTREP # 7 13-19 MAR 66

PERINTREP NO. 7
22 March 1966

(1) GENERAL. Movement reports and sightings over the past few weeks have indicated some adjustment in enemy dispositions throughout the ICTZ. As noted in paragraph 5 below, the apparent introduction of new units into the Northern Provinces has caused a re-evaluation of enemy capabilities as they affect the HUE-PHU BAI complex. No appreciable change in VC capabilities affecting DANANG and CHU LAI has occurred recently, however movements in these areas indicating focal points of VC interest are worthy of note.

(2) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. Unconfirmed reports have indicated movements of VC units east from the ASHAU area towards HUE. A series of reports over the past several weeks have forecast attacks against PHU BAI and have indicated construction of fortifications and elaborate trench complexes near PHU BAI. It is probable that the 802d and possibly the 810th Battalion have returned to the PHU BAI area to regroup following the losses suffered in February encounters.

(3) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Although increased reporting of VC units in the DANANG TAOR has been noted over the past two weeks, VC activity is not appreciably above previously established norms within the Provinces. The South Central portion of the TAOR has been the focal point of the increased reporting of VC movements. Although the reporting indicates the movement of four new battalions into the general area, only one, the 70th, has been accepted as having recently moved from QUANG TIN to QUANG NAM and is considered to be operating approximately 2 miles south of the TAOR. Several recent reports have indicated mortar attacks against the DANANG complex in the near future with an emphasis on the Marble Mountain Air Facility.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. The northwest corner of the CHU LAI TAOR continues to be the scene of most reported VC activity in recent weeks. Contacts by Reconnaissance Battalion and 2d Battalion, 4th Marines in the area have increased considerably in the past week. Sightings and movement reports continue to point to this area as one of considerable interest although information is still not sufficiently firm to pinpoint a VC buildup in that area. Further south, a multitude of unconfirmed reports have raised the possibility of return of elements of the 2d VC Regiment and/or the 18th NVA Regiment to southern QUANG NGAI Province. The recent heavy losses SE of CHU LAI inflicted on what was probably several battalions of the 36th (AKA 6th, AKA 21st) NVA Regiment may have thwarted a move by that unit into the QUANG NGAI lowlands.

(5) Summary. The above movements may be in accord with previously suspected VC designs to harass and attempt to contain USMC elements near their TAOR's during the rice harvest season as to allow the VC freedom to collect the rice harvest.

- b. Order of Battle. Annex A
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 10 March, 7th Marines. Villagers of VINH AN (BT 6000), stated that the VC of BINH SON district are paying the people to place M-26 grenades near Marine positions. Villagers also stated that the VC no longer use sampans

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22 March 1966

or basket boats to cross the river, instead they have constructed a bamboo triangle to act as water wings.

(2) 13 Mar, 2d Bn, 4th Mar. Patrol found and apprehended an elderly VN (female) making explosive devices vic (BT 445028). The woman had been filling expended .50 cal cartridges with explosives. Marines also found 20mm cartridge cases that had been repacked.

(3) 19 Mar, New Weapon. ARVN forces captured a new type HEAT rocket on 12 Feb. The rocket carries a B-50 designation and is similar in configuration to the B-40 type rocket. This new type rocket is believed to be fired from a "Soviet RPG-7" type launcher which may be distinguished from the B-40 launcher by the second hand grip beneath the tube.

e. Negative

f. Admin Units.

(1) 8 Mar: QUANG NAM, SMIAT rpt (F-6). In mid-February 1966, the VC administration authorities in DUY XUYEN District established a recruit training camp at AN THANT (BT 045453). Approx 200 recruits are being trained at this location.

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense.

(1) 17 Mar: F4B pilot reported receiving air bursts at 6000' mean SL, (YC 473865). There were 6 or 7 bursts, 1-2 seconds between bursts, 50' apart, 100' in front of A/C. The bursts were 10' in dia., gray and white in color.

i and j. Negative.

k. Artillery.

(1) 12 Mar: LY TIN District report (C/2), stated the 301st Bn moved to KY THANH (V) vic (BT 371060). Wpns include: 1-105mm howitzer, 3-81mm mort, 1-57mm RR, 2-MG and 4-AR. (G-2 eval F/4 as to howitzer).

(2) 14 Mar: QUANG TRI, I Corps Adv Group report. According to VC document originated from VC northern sub Region Headquarters, the VC plan an attack in the HAI LANG area (SE QUANG TRI Prov). Units of 6th Regiment are involved and 120mm mortars will be employed. (G-2 cmt: 120mm mort employed in 4 Jan attack on KHE SANH).

(3) 17 Mar: QUANG NAM. 3d MarDiv reported information received of 3 VC Battalions located in DIEN BIEN District, 1st Bn vic (AT 998603) equipped with one 75mm howitzer (G-2 cmt: 1st report of 75mm How in QUANG NAM).

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22 March 1966

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1. Negative.

m. Biological, Chemical, Electronic, or Radiological Warfare.

(1) 12 Mar: Chemicals (smoke). QUANG NAM, MSS rpt (B/2) VC have forced population in vic (BT 015587), (BT 005574) and (BT 015575) to pile trash in their yards. When required, trash will be fired to create smoke so VC can move undetected.

n-r. Negative.

s. Transportation.

(1) 14 Mar: QUANG NAM, 1st Bn, 51st ARVN Regt, reported companies located at KY MINH village (AT 979608) have taken an unknown number of workers and congregated 70 boats. Mission was not stated.

(2) 14 Mar: QUANG NAM, District Agent report. One (1) VC Bn moved to vic (AT 8754) where they gave orders to guerrilla elements to procure 20 boats and locate them vic (AT 874557). SIA, I Corps eval C/3; comment: In the past, VC have located boats in this area prior to attacks on hill 60 (AT 878577).

(3) 14 Mar: QUANG NGAI Dist Agt report (C/3) VC have constructed a road 2 meters wide from (BS 500350) along BA BANG and BA HEP villages to (BS 500240). VC 20th Transportation Battalion has used this road to move supplies. (G-2 Cmt: Status of road not confirmed, info on 20 Transp Bn Eval (F/4), 20th Bn last reported in PLEIKU area).

(4) 17 Mar: 3d Recon Bn elements found a trail in good condition vic (BT 814845). The trail is about 1 meter wide, with a canopy 15-30' high and runs NW from above coor. trail not used much.

(5) 9 Mar: 3d Recon Bn, reported finding large trail vic (AT 814768) which appeared to be used recently and was worn bare by elephant tracks.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Personalities. Annex A.

e. Casualties. 117 VC KIA this period.

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22 March 1966f. Morale. Considered good.g. Enemy Defenses, Mines, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles, Defensive Works, and Booby Traps.(1) Mines: 7th Marines: 11 March, a VN PC hit a mine on road vic (BS 591235).(2) Gun Position: 13 Mar, AO observed 35 to 40 people building a circular gun position loc (BS 550913). People were being supervised by 5-6 VC in camouflaged utilities.

(3) 13 Mar: AO reported three donut shaped gun positions at (BT 342144). The gun positions were partly camouflaged, no personnel observed in area.

(4) 13 Mar: 3d Tank Bn. Tank hit mine (BT 097617), track broken, center road wheels blown off. Crater 4' x 3'.

(5) 13 Mar: I Corps TOC reported that the railway bridge at (AU 820005) was mined by the VC. There was moderate damage to the bridge. Traffic interrupted for 2 days.

(6) 16 Mar: AO reported newly dug square hole approximately 10' by 10' x 4' deep (BS 523932). A rectangular mound approximately 20' long by 15' wide and 18' high (BS 513926). A newly dug hole approximately 10' x 10' x 6' deep (BS 514929). One hole 15' x 30' partly camouflaged, (BS 542899).

(7) 18 Mar: Booby Trap. 3d Bn, 3d Mar patrol tripped grenade rigged with wire. Grenade was in stream bed on the edge of the stream. The trip wire was located underwater. Second rpt of this tactic.(8) 13 Mar: 3d Engr road sweeping team found one anti-vehicle mine (U. S. WWII type), in a shallow hole (YD 815169). Mine was approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ " above ground and contained 6 lbs TMT. A small portion of the firing pin cap was missing, preventing arming of mine.

(9) 2 Mar, THUA THIEN, SMIAT report (C/3). Orders have been given by the North Division to THUA THIEN Prov. Committee to dig secret trench system adjacent to the PHU BAI base. An estimated 40 men have moved into the PHUONG LAM TAY and PHUONG LAM DONG areas (YD 824163) and (YD 831168) with digging equipment.

(10) 11 Mar: THUA THIEN, Dist Agt rpt (F/6). Estimated 300 VC seen digging holes and weapons pits at DINH MON Hamlet (YD 785115), 8 miles SW PHU BAI.

h. Negative.i. Terrain. No change.

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j. Weather. Weather in general was fair throughout the reporting period. Moist air in low levels with light variable winds resulted in mostly cloudy skies, fog, haze and a trace of precipitation over I Corps. Winds were from the south and southeast at 4 kts with gusts to 12. Temperatures averaged 88° high and 75° low. Visibility was from 3-7 miles with some haze during portions of period.

(1) Returnees. On 15 March, 3d Bn, 3d Mar units engaged in an operation in the vic of BICH BAC Hamlet (AT 987629), predicated on information received from recent ralliers (former VC) who assisted Marines. Two ralliers surrendered at 151115H with 5 40mm (M-79) rounds, one U. S. (M-26) grenade, one steel helmet, one U. S. flashlight and one cartridge belt. At 151500H, at (AT 967638) 5 female VCS were apprehended when pointed out by ralliers as VC.

(2) 15 Mar, TAM KY LNO rpts VC defector gave following information: There are 2 depots with large quantity of rice (2000) tons, vic (BT 304054) and a rice and weapons storage area with dispensary vic (BT 304036).

4. Counterintelligence. Annex B.

5. Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities. Refer to III MAF PERINTREP NO 3, Para 5a (5)(a). Change to read: The HUE BAI complex with the equivalent of one VC Regiment and one NVA Regiment supported by 2-3 local force battalions.

J. E. Gorman
J. E. GORMAN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
G-2

ANNEXES:

A - ORDER OF BATTLE
B - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
C - CAPTIVE, RETURNEE AND REFUGEE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

CCMUSMACV	2	CO FLSG	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 30TH NCR	5
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	10	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG FFORCEV 1	1	CMDR NAV SUPPACT	5
CG FFORCEV 2	1	NCC	1
CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	CICV (MACV)	1
DET 5TH USASF	1	CTF 115	1

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ANNEX A to III MAF PERINREP No. 7

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
● ONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
**810TH BN	CONFIRMED	400	VIC ZC 1385	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN. REPORTED SUFFERED 169 KIA IN RECENT OPERATIONS.

* CURRENTLY REPORTED TO BE IN REST AREA AT LOCATION SHOWN, PROBABLY REGROUPING AS A RESULT OF LOSSES SUFFERED 23 MARCH. NORMAL OPERATING AREA IS IN PROXIMITY OF PHU BAI TAOR.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG, 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIE VO XUAM LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0355	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG, 18 BNG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN, NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MF 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR. CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2-57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-NINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SON; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO
* 195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW	CO-SRCAPT DAI XO-SRCAPT HONG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE WENS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6.

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

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<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) to PERINTREP No. 7

1. General. VC propaganda activities appear to head the list of operations in the ICTZ. Sabotage and espionage also continue with an indication that the VC are attempting to conduct these campaigns in an organized manner. Probably the one event that overshadowed VC activities was the relief of General NGUYEN CHANH THI as I Corps Commander. This brought many military and Buddhist inspired rallies and demonstrations in this area.

2. Espionage

a. Danang: VC are using children to infiltrate U. S. positions, posing as vendors. Their mission is to collect information concerning defensive positions, steal ammunition, cut wires and "annoy and assassinate troops". The area targeted is HUONG SON Hamlet in HOA LOUNG Village in the vicinity of Hill 41 (AT 9366). Another report furnished information that a 14 year old boy was apprehended at (AT 930670) by local Vietnamese authorities for planting booby traps. On 14 March, a report was received that a VC leader was in the vicinity of CAM EA (BT 115573), his mission; to collect information pertaining to U. S. Forces installations for attacks in the near future. CI comment: Numerous reports received indicate children, teenagers and civilians have been employed by the VC to collect information, spread terrorism and conduct sabotage within the DANANG TAOR. This action is not coincidental but appears to be preplanned coordinated effort by the VC to establish every means to acquire information.

b. Hue/Phu Bai. A report received on 8 March from Hue, indicated that NGUYEN VAN THONG, NGUYEN VAN MANH and NGUYEN VAN DONG, believed to be VC members, may be employed by Americans at military installations.

3. Sabotage.

a. A report received 2 March furnished the following information. The VC Central Agency has instructed THUA THIEN Province Committee to form additional units for sabotage teams and to collect information. Orders have been given to construct a secret trench system adjacent to the PHU BAI Base. CI comment: First report of Central Agency, however it could possibly be an advisory element of MR-5; it is doubtful that VC would employ newly formed guerrilla units for sabotage if trained Demolition and Sapper units are available. Past reports indicate that the VC have asked families to furnish a quantity of iron costing about 3000 piastres in order to construct combat trenches in the QUANG NAM area. It is possible that comparable demands have been made on families within the PHU BAI enclave.

b. A report received on 8 March, that VC Sapper and security agents are dressing in the uniforms of people action teams, National Security and Popular Forces personnel to facilitate sabotage operations in various cities. CI comment: Reports received have indicated that the Headquarters of QUANG NAM Liberation Front has ordered VC cadres and soldiers to collect the rank and unit insigna from the corpses of ARVN personnel after each battle. The VC cadres have been directed to purchase the rank and unit insignas of medium and high ranking ARVN officers. It is obvious that the VC will continue to infiltrate U. S. controlled areas disguised as V. N. officials, soldiers and civilians to accomplish designed operations.

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c. Phu Bai: Several pounds of C-4 explosive was found planted under a water heater within the living quarters of 8th RRU on 6 March 1966. This device contained a chemically activated fuse assembly. Detailed inspection of the explosive device revealed that pieces of grass, tobacco, and other foreign objects were adhered to the plastic, indicating that it was probably brought into the area bit by bit, possibly hidden in the clothes and baskets of the unknown saboteur. It was noted that while a search of each employee is conducted before they are allowed entrance, it would not be difficult to conceal the pliable explosive upon one's person. It was estimated that the explosives had been in place for at least a week. It was further estimated by EOD personnel that the explosive would have gone off within the next couple of days. As a result of this discovery, all Vietnamese, except those essential for the messing facilities, were barred from the installation on 7 Mar. In the Chu Lai TAOR an RMK interpreter was apprehended in the act of stealing explosives. A search revealed that he had 4 electric blasting caps, 2 detonating cords, one-half pound of composition C-4, 12 electric detonating wires, and a large quantity of medical supplies in his possession. CI comment: Several reports have indicated that the VC are continuing their efforts to use VN employees at US installations for both sabotage and espionage activities.

4. Propaganda and Agitation:

a. Danang: A report that the VC committee of QUANG NAM Province is launching a campaign called "Victory one all points of View" in HO VANG and DIEN BAN district. The objectives of this campaign are to incite the masses to struggle against the pacification campaign launched by RVN government and the spirit of Honolulu conference; to raise the morale of the masses whose loyalty to the VC may be questionable since the occupation of HOA VANG and DIEN BAN district by the RVNAF and USMC units, and to collect rice during the March harvest. One VC Reconnaissance Company commanded by VO NHU, has been sent to HO VANG DIEN BAN districts to support local VC agents during this campaign. The supporting VC troops have set mines and booby traps along the access routes into the village where they are operating. TU CAU and THI AN Hamlets, THANH THUY village (BT 050670), DIEN BAN district, were the starting places for this VC campaign, from there they intend to progress to the NON NUOC area (Marble Mountain), HOA VANG district, QUANG NAM Province.

5. Terrorism.

a. Hue: A report received 15 March indicated that the infrastructure in the PHU VANG District area appears to badly damaged. It is estimated that the VC will not get 50% of the rice that they received last year. The area directly northeast and northwest of HUE is considered vulnerable to VC attempts at rice collection during the harvest. Increased demands have been placed on the villagers by the VC in the past few weeks probably due to the forthcoming March rice harvest. VC methods of collecting rice have varied from brief meetings of village officials emphasizing the coming rice harvest, to sending trained terrorist units into a village and forcing families to contribute rice. CI comment: Past reports indicate that one purpose may be to create a severe food shortage throughout Vietnam and to restrict US Forces movement to assist the local populace during harvesting. Other reports indicate that possibly two to three VC tax collecting units are working in the CAM NE area and also east the SONG VINH DIEN river opposite CO MAN and LIEM LAC villages. These tax collectors supposedly are extracting 300 piasters per person.

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b. DANANG: On 18 March it was reported that at approximately 172120H, an unidentified Vietnamese male approached the entrance of the alley way which passes in front of US Navy Preventative Medicines Staff billet, 86 THANH CHY TRINH Street, DANANG, QUANG NAM Province, and threw a hand grenade against the fence surrounding the above property. The grenade exploded approximately three feet from the fence, knocking the guard down, however there were no US personnel injured. Two Vietnamese persons were injured; both were treated at the USOM Hospital, Danang, and released. It was believed that the person who threw the grenade was injured by the blast. CI comments: This is the first attempt at terrorism in Danang in quite a few months. It is not known whether this act was VC inspired of by a disgruntled person. The grenade was later identified as being US M-26 series.

6. Political. (See Appendix 1 to Annex B.)

APPENDIX 1 (POLITICAL) to ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) to PERINTREP NO. 7

Subj: Resume of Political Activities resulting in the removal of General THI as I Corps Commander

10 March 1966 - DANANG

On 10 March 1966, General NGUYEN CHANH THI was removed as I Corps Commander by action of the Military Directorate, Saigon.

11 - 12 March 1966 - DANANG

During the day of 11 March when the announcement was made in Danang of THI's removal, the Military-Civilian Struggle Committee (MCSC), swung into action and began to plan for the formation of rallies and demonstrations. The first rally was formed at 1500 in downtown Danang, sponsored by the MCSC with some 2000 persons in attendance. Banners and slogans carried by Vietnamese Nationals (VN), displayed the slogans "DOWN WITH THE GENERAL COMMAND IN SAIGON" and "AT ANY PRICE, THE PEOPLE OF I CORPS ARE DETERMINED TO DEMAND THE REINSTATEMENT OF GENERAL THI". Three rallies took place in DANANG on 12 March 1966, all sponsored by the MCSC, and all under the general themes of, REINSTATEMENT OF THI, and REPLACE THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. The 1000-1100 rally drew crowds of approximately 2500. The second rally was formed at 1600, with approximately 2000 in attendance. The last rally took place from 1800-1900 with some 1200 in attendance. All three gatherings were peaceful and without incident.

12 March 1966 - HOI AN CITY (QUANG NAM CITY)

At 1500, approximately 1800 Vietnamese participated in a peaceful demonstration, the main themes were the same as in Danang, "RETURN GENERAL THI TO I CORPS, DOWN WITH THE SAIGON DICTATORSHIP". ect:

A crowd of about 1000, mostly students, assembled on the morning of the 12th in front of the DONG KHANH high school to protest THI's dismissal. As of 1300, the city was calm. Students boycotted classes after the morning rally.

13 March 1966 - DANANG

General stike began in DANANG at 0700, the majority of shops and stores were closed in the main part of town throughout the day. A rally was held from 1500 to 1800, with some 2500 in attendance. Leaflets were distributed throughout the day, but DANANG appeared to remain quiet.

14 March 1966 - DANANG

At 1800 14 March 1966, unidentified speakers made various speeches to a crowd of approximately 1000, encouraging the populace to call strike; to protest against General THIEU and General CO, and to demand the return of General THI to I Corps.

CONFIDENTIAL14 March 1966 - QUANG NGAI

At approximately 0630, 1000 persons composed primarily of students, participated in a demonstration. The Popular Struggle Committee (PSC) requested support for a stable government against communist aggression and reinstatement of General THI, a hero of the 11 November 1960 Revolution. Demands were made to: annihilate the communist invasion; challenge the powers of the political dictators; demand a government elected by the people; and be grateful for assistance of allied nations in Vietnam's fight against the Viet Cong.

14 March 1966 - HUE

At 0800 14 March, an estimated crowd of 5000 gathered at DIEU DE Pagoda. Generals THIEU and CO were criticized; the latter for wealth he has accumulated while serving in official positions. By 0930, the meeting had broken up and participants dispersed. Schools were closed and notices were posted stating that classes will be boycotted through Wednesday.

15 March 1966 - DANANG

Early morning of the 15th preparations were commencing in DANANG for continuation of the general strike. Token road blocks were being set up. Later that morning these road blocks stopped pedestrian and vehicular traffic and persuaded those employees traveling toward U. S. Forces installations to turn back. Loud-speaker trucks were traversing the city, calling for all to support the General. All shops and stores in the downtown area were closed. Only 50% of the III MAF indigenous employees showed up for work. From 1600 to 1730, approximately 3500 persons gathered to listen to speeches given by representatives of the MCCS opposing the THIEU government, reestablishment of a civil government, a national assembly to represent the people, reinstate all generals involved in the 1960 Revolution and reinstate General THI. All dispersed peacefully with no reported incidents.

16 March 1966 - DANANG

General Strike was over. Markets and shops were open and city appeared normal. Students were back to school, although as of 0900 the port workers had not returned to work. General THI arrived at noon and proceeded to I Corps Headquarters. After a brief meeting with I Corps Officials, he motored into DANANG. At 1300, a rally was held in DANANG, site of previous gatherings, and at 1340 General THI arrived and was greeted with great enthusiasm. He ended with an appeal for the peoples "Struggle" to be an orderly and disciplined struggle. At 1425 the crowd peacefully dispersed and there were no reported incidents.

16 March 1966 - HUE

Markets, universities and public schools were closed. At 0800, 10,000 gathered for a rally, three major themes; (1) DOWN WITH THE THIEU GOVERNMENT, (2) BETTER ECONOMIC STANDARDS, AND (3) REINSTATE ALL GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE NOVEMBER 1963 REVOLUTION. A demonstration parade followed and participants marched to the provincial government seat. There were no reported incidents.

CONFIDENTIAL18 March 1966 - DANANG

The morning of the 18th was normal in Danang and all markets were open. The MCSC sent forth word that a general strike would be held commencing at 1400. At 1300, most base employees for all U. S. forces in Danang began their exodus, and all shops began closing. At approximately 1700, 5000 persons were assembled and listened to four speakers, the last being General THI. THI's speech was short (5-7 minutes) and again was non-committal. In his speech, THI made reference to the fact that for the past two years, the people of DANANG and his servicemen had remained at his side to help him realize a social revolution, meaning, give rice to the poor and bring jobs to the laborers. THI stated he felt he was loved by the people of central Vietnam because of his efforts to bring about this social revolution. THI further stated that he was on the side of the military and civilian people to struggle for a strong and prosperous Vietnam.

19 March 1966 - DANANG.

Morning activity was normal following the half day strike. All shops and markets were open and VN employees returned to the base. General THI departed Danang at approximately 0930 and motored to HOI AN. At 1000, THI addressed approximately 2000 VN at the sports arena, HOI AN. At 1600, some 2000 VN (Predominately Buddhist) formed at the Buddhist temple in Danang for the purpose of explaining the three points issued by the Buddhist association in SAIGON; the formation of a civilian government, better economic standards, and return of the generals who were instrumental in the 1960 Revolution. The activity was orderly, interjected with prayers. Both boy and girl scouts were active in the ceremonies.

20 March 1966 - DANANG

Sunday in Danang was very peaceful. All shops and stores normally open on Sunday were doing business and the city appeared to be functioning normally.

ANNEX C (CAPTIVE, HIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) TO PIR #7

NUMBER CAPTURED OR ACQUIRED DURING REPORTING PERIOD	CAPTIVES		RETURNEES		* VCS	
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
	0	74	0	2	114	
PRESENT LOCATION ALL RELEASED TO ARVN AUTHORITY	<u>CHU LAI</u>	0	56	0	0	26
	<u>DANANG</u>	0	18	0	2	80
	<u>PHU BAI</u>	0	0	0	0	17
STATUS OF INTERROGATION	<u>COMPLETED</u>	0	74	0	2	114
	<u>IN PROGRESS</u>	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CAPTIVES, RETURNEES HELD AT THE END OF THE REPORTING PERIOD BY CORPS, EACH DIVISION AND SECTOR.						

*7 ARVN DESERTERS NOT INCLUDED IN TOTAL.

C-1

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Copy _____ of _____ Copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 290800H March 1966
 Ser:

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TIME PERIOD

Period Covered: 200001H to 262400 March 1966

Ref: (A) Maps: No change.

General Enemy Situation.

a. I Corps Tactical Zone: The enemy was located in strength in two major encounters in the Zone and in both cases executed an initially determined defense in force prior to withdrawing. Additionally, two VC attacks were initiated in early morning hours, one against a USMC patrol base in the Danang TAOR and the other against positions in the Chu Lai TAOR.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. In Operation OREGON, an estimated VC battalion fought a stubborn defense on 20 and 21 March against attacking USMC units from a strongly fortified village vic (YD 555433) in North Eastern THUA THIEN. The village was surrounded by barbed wire and mine fields and was defended by 60 and 81mm mortars, recoilless rifles and automatic weapons of up to .50 caliber. A total of 99 confirmed VC KIA and 4 VC captives were counted for the operation. ARVN operations during the period met with less resistance at various areas within the 2 Provinces. No significant VC activity was experienced in the vicinity of the PHU BAI TAOR.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR - DANANG TAOR. Two midnight mortar attacks against HOI AN city were experienced. At 250030H March, a VC Battalion attacked Patrol Base position of the 2d Bn, 9th Marines vic (AT 958548) during Operation Kings. Using Bullocks to screen their approach, the VC attacked at close range following approx 70 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The VC were driven off at approx 250200H. Subsequent pursuit and clearing of the area revealed 41 VC KIA and obtained documents which identified all 3 companies of the R-20 Quang Nam Provincial Battalion.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. A major engagement developed Southwest of Chu Lai when US Marines and ARVN troops launched Operation TEXAS on 20 March as a consequence of the attack on the AN HOA outpost (BS 471879). An estimated 2 Battalion of VC opposed the ARVN - USMC attack with intense AA fire including 12.7mm. Heavy AW, SA and 60mm and 81mm mortar fire was used by the VC in defending a series of extremely well fortified villages with interlocking trench and tunnel connected bunkers. The enemy defended stubbornly and well from the 20th through the 22nd with resistance still being offered sporadically on the 23rd. Villagers reported that the VC retreated South across the SONG TRA KHUC on the night of the 22nd and on the 23rd. Villagers, documents and VCC indicated that elements of the 1st VC Regiment and of the 36th NVA Regiment had been encountered in the operation. USMC inflicted VC losses were 405 KIA (confirmed), 429 KIA (Possible) and 2 VCC. ARVN Operation LIEN KET 28,

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;

Declassified after 12 years

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III MAF

PERINT-REF #8

20-26 Mar 66

coordinated with TEXAS, accounted for 68 VC KIA (confirmed), 101 KIA (Possible) and 1 VCC.

(a) CHU LAI TAOR. At 230215H, a VC force estimated to be at least 20 VC attacked USMC infantry and artillery positions vic (BT 528070) near the Chu Lai airstrip. The VC attack was well coordinated with 60mm mortar fire accompanied by rifle grenades and heavy SA fire. Return fire drove VC off at approximately 230230H.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. There was a total of 289 VC initiated incidents during the reporting period consisting of: 2 attacks, 90 harassing fires, 11 mine/booby traps, 4 propaganda, 181 AA fires and 1 sabotage.

- a. STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy tactics, weapons and equipment.

(1) 17 Mar. 5th SFG TRA BONG, agent rpt (C-3): 2 VC platoons are constructing decoys of troops and positions to draw air strikes away from actual targets vic BS 395877, BS 405878 and BS 408873.

(2) 20 Mar. MAG 36 reports five guns positions vic BS 4486 forming a triangle. Each position is occupied by 3 dummies made of straw, dressed in black PJ's, and armed with sticks. (Pilot cmt: poss AA posns in surrounding hills). A fake artillery position was observed in the same vicinity consisting of a hole and a log resembling a 155mm weapon (BS 443868).

(3) 25 Mar. the DAI LOC Dist Chief reported that the VC who operate in the DAI LOC area frequently evade USMC detection and apprehension by donning white colored civilian clothing and assuming the guise of farmers. The report also stated that in the past, CVN PF units operating in area, had discovered wpns hidden by the VC in the vicinity (AT 954591) and (AT 952589).

- e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

(1) 10 Mar. SMIAT agent rpt dtd 28 Feb. A VC training site is located at NU COI Canyon vic YD 868157. There is a thatched house, approximately 6 X 8 X 4 meters high, furnished with 10 bamboo tables and chairs. It is used as a theoretical training center for lightning battle with light arms. There are approx 150 VC stationed here. The training course started on 1 March 1966 and lasted for 3 weeks. (G-2 cmt: F/6).

(2) 23 Mar. SMIAT agent rpt. Refer to para 2.f. (1) of III MAF PERINTREP #7. On 14 Mar. a VC recruit training center at AN THABHT (BT 045 453) was hit by an unknown number of friendly Jet A/C. Details of damage and VC losses are unknown, but local rumor is that the A/C "bulls-eyed" the target. VC immediately placed the area off-limits after the strike.

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(3) 22 Mar, LY TIN Dist Hq. relayed the following report from PAT Plt Ldr: VC Secret Zone w/wpns, food caches and a POW compound located vic (BS 400988), (BS 390982), and (BS 400985). Wpns and food came from LY TIN District and QUANG NAM (P). (G-2 Cmt: 2d rpt of VC Secret Zone this area).

- g. Negative.
- h. Air Defense.
- i-1. Negative.
- m. Biological, Chemical, Electronic, or Radiological Warfare.

(1) 22 Mar, Information received recently reveals that VC may be starting to employ chemical agents. A report from II Corps stated that on 7 March the VC employed a chemical agent against US troops. It was described as a grenade type device, perforated cylinder, with a handle on one end. Agent had sulphurous odor and emitted green hazy smoke. Effects on personnel were shortness of breath, smarting of eyes, burning in throat and suffocating sensation. Effects only lasted a few minutes.

- n-j. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 626 VC KIA.
- f. Morale. Considered Good. 15 Mar, The following information was obtained from a VCC in vic BT 4510. The VC morale is high. Jets are feared, but HUIEs are most feared as they can chase a man and kill very easily.
- g. Enemy Defenses, Mines, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles, Defensive Works and Booby Traps.

(1) 20 Mar, Booby Trap: 2d Bn, 9th Mar reported that engineers accompanying a patrol discovered an explosive device at (BT 028642). The device was described as a 40mm (M-79) round positioned beneath the road surface and had a board rigged above the ground. The device was set in the wheel ruts of the road.

(2) 12 Mar, Booby Trap: 2d Bn, 3d Mar patrol detonated a grenade type booby trap at AT 896704 attached to four or five lbs of TNT. The grenade was tripped by touching a bamboo stick hanging over the trail. A "clicking" noise was heard before the device exploded.

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(3) 16 Mar, (NAM HOA) (P), District Agent report, C/3. Local VC at HAI CAT (YD 743154), are using local villagers to dig foxholes, trenches and defensive systems around the hamlet. All are camouflaged for air security.

(4) 22 Mar, 2d Bn, 9th Marines element operating vic BT 0161, reported discovering approximately 30 small caves and fighting holes. Almost 1000 meters of trenchline was also discovered.

(5) 20 Mar, SMIAT rpt (F/6). During the nights of 14-16 Mar, the VC forced inhabitants from surrounding areas to construct trenches and tunnels at KHANH VAN (4) (H), (BS 612802). The tunnels were dug into a hillside at depths of approximately 10 meters. The VC stated that this project will continue.

(6) 25 Mar, VMO-6 report newly fortified bunker on hill vic (BT 313041). Fields of fire cleared, possible 57 or 75mm position. Center of trench positioned to direct fire on LZ vic (BT 401130), fighting holes were also observed in the area.

(7) 20 Mar, AO rpt. Five new circular gun positions are located at BS 480828, two new circular positions with four deep foxholes at BS 540825, and numerous foxholes on tops of hills at BS 452815 and BS 462815.

(8) 24 Mar, AO reported new AW position located at ZC 112556, another consisting of emplacements and what appears to be a connecting tunnel, at AT 881539.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Generally fair throughout the period. South and Southwesterly flows brought thunderstorms and thundershowers to the mountain regions, morning stratus, ground fog, and haze to the valleys during the reporting period. Winds were mostly southerly averaging 7 kts with one time report of gusts to 25 kts. Visibility 7 mi, temperatures averaged 95 degrees high and 75 degrees low.

k. Captive, Returnee, and Refugee Report. Annex C.

l. Document Translation. 22 Mar. The following is a translation of a VC document captured on 17 Mar at (AT 952651) and concerns Marine "County Fair" operations.

"At 0200 on 7 March, a combined force of US and GVN military personnel numbering 600 men launched a search operation in a hamlet of "H" (DUONG SON Hamlet), coordinates (AT 995676). The US and GVN forces displaced the villagers to a central area where our cadre were separated from them. Some of our cadre and guerrilla fighters were forced to emerge from their hiding places in tunnels so as to try to contact (mold with) the people. As a consequence, five of our men were killed by US and GVN soldiers. This should serve as a lesson (warning) to all of us. The enemy may conduct this same type of operation in the future, in other areas. This warning must be disseminated to all of the villages.

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Water and food stocks, adequate for a period of three to five days must be prepared. It is also necessary to surround the hamlet, and as quickly as possible, escape the encirclement."

(Signed) BANG
Commander of HQ-73

m. Radio Broadcast. 24 Mar, E Co, 2d Bn, 3d Marines (AT 935633). Elements reported hearing a foreign language, similiar to Chinese on their radio net. A portion of the broadcast was spoken in English, and was directed at ECHO 6 (Commanding Officer).

n. VC ferry site. 26 Mar. BINH SON Dist Chief reported to 7th Marines that VC continue to use ferry site (BS 614950) to move at night in reported harassments against Dist Hqs.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No Change.

J. E. Gorman
J. E. GORMAN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. REFUGEE, RETURNEE, CAPTIVE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CO FLC	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 30TH MCR	5
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	10	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG FFORCEV 1	1	CMDR NAV SUPFACT	5
CG FFORCEV 2	1	NCC	1
CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	CICV (MACV)	1
DET 5TH USASF	1	CTF 115	1
		CO CAMP BUTLER	2

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ANNEX A TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 8

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THANH AI
K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM MINH PHU
**810TH BN	CONFIRMED	400	VIC ZC 1385	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SOI

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN. REPORTED SUFFERED 169 KIA IN RECENT OPERATIONS.

CURRENTLY REPORTED TO BE IN REST AREA AT LOCATION SHOWN, PROBABLY REGROUPING AS A RESULT OF LOSSES SUFFERED 23 MARCH. NORMAL OPERATING AREA IS IN PROXIMITY OF PHU BAI TAOR.

A-1

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIH VO XUAM LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	3-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0355	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-LMG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR. CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH

CHU LAI TAORCONFIDENTIAL1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2-57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-NINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL HMG 24-AR 18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
* 195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082		
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HCV	CO-SRCAPT DAI XO-SR CAPT HONG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

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<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
104TH BN	PROB	300	RS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 12-AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP # 8

1. General. Espionage and propaganda appear to head the list of V.C. activities in IOTZ. One attempt at sabotage was investigated in the city of Danang. Civil disturbances and strikes continued as the result of General THI's dismissal and the movement now appears to have taken on political connotations and one presently aimed at removal of various heads of the present V.N. Government.

2. Espionage

(a) Danang. Reports received indicate the V.C. are intensifying efforts to recruit female agents and to organize intelligence networks within Quang Nam Province. One woman, Truong Thi TIEM, from Dien Ban District is reportedly a member of the V. C. Executive Committee. She is operating in Thanh-Minh and Cam Hai Townships, disguised as a vendor of vegetables. TIEM has been observed entering the city of Danang on several occasions, reportedly for the purpose of collecting information. A recently captured VC document was revealed to contain instructions to all districts within the Quang Nam Province directing that female Vietnamese be selected to attend a one week English Language course at a training center located in the vicinity of (ZC 100450). Another report of 18 March stated that a number of VC cadre have returned from North Vietnam and are secretly trying to establish agent networks in Hoa Lan village located at (BT 040680). CI Comment: Past reports point to a well organized VC espionage network within the Danang TAOR. The above reports would indicate that it continues to function with emphasis placed on recruiting low level agents who would come in contact with US servicemen.

(b) Phu Bai. A Vietnamese male was apprehended on 19 March by the National Police as a suspect VC agent. He was allegedly trying to map the Phu Bai installations. The suspect stated that he had been approached by the VC to secure a detailed map of the Phu Bai installation, another report received on 18 March indicated that a VC observation team departs the Gia Tam Ut area (YD 850050) daily to observe the Phu Bai Airfield. The VC reportedly have sketches of Phu Bai installations and have been observed stopping Vietnamese people in the area to question them concerning the Phu Bai Installation.

3. Sabotage.

(a) Danang. A homemade electrical device was found by the NSA Harbor Security under the Bach Bang Pier, adjacent to the White Elephant/NCC in downtown Danang. It was incomplete in that the explosive charge was missing. On 22 March a report was indicated that VC agencies had sent organizers into Danang to set-up sabotage cells within Danang. CI Comment: A sabotage organization may well be in the early stages of being established in Danang.

4. Propaganda and Agitation.

(a) Chu Lai. USMC units, engaged in Operation Texas in Central Quang Ngai Province have found two types of V.C. propaganda leaflets, both issued by "The South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation". One leaflet, entitled "to American Servicemen in South Vietnam", appealed to servicemen's conscience to reject the war and call for "Repatriation" citing "Nation-wide" anti-war demonstrations in the U.S. The second leaflet, consisting of two pages, showed a wounded Marine supported by two others. The theme of this leaflet was "The Unmoral Nature of U. S. Participation in the War in Vietnam hardships suffered by U. S.

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servicemen and the jeopardizing of U. S. servicemen's family happiness in serving the interest of "Munition Makers". Two additional new types of propaganda leaflets were also found by USMC units on 21 March in the vicinity of (AT 963659). These leaflets stated substantially as follows: The U. S. will be defeated and the U. S. servicemen should withdraw from Vietnam, refuse to carry out orders and sympathize with and support the "Just Struggle" of the South Vietnamese people. CI Comment: All four propaganda leaflets found indicate that a new phase has been added to a previously reported propaganda program. It is believed the V. C. aim is to provoke hatred between ARVN and American Forces. The above mentioned leaflets were very professional both in appearance and composition.

(b) Denang. A report was received on 13 March that approximately fifty persons gathered at "Ong Cop" temple located at (BT 147577) under Buddhist banners. The demonstrators told the National Police that the Provincial Buddhist Association (PBA) had summoned them to a Buddhist Ceremony and asked for the return of General THI. Investigation by the National Police revealed that the PBA did not summon the Demonstrators. After being told that the PBA had not called the meeting, the demonstrators dispersed, leaving VC leaflets behind. The themes were both anti-US and pro- THI. In the vicinity of (AT 994605) (La Tho hamlet), it was reported that the VC had urged local villagers of this area to "Wail and Shout" near the USMC positions when artillery was being fired (in what apparently is an attempt to coerce the Marines to terminate the artillery fire), the report added that the villagers also were to request that the Marines provide money to pay for the burial of villagers killed as a result of USMC artillery fire. CI comment: The V. C. have directed past demonstrations in an attempt to force the Americans to yield and to negotiate for a settlement advantageous to the V. C. Recent civil disturbances are considered to be a lucrative target for the V. C. However, there is presently no indications of a well directed effort to capitalize on recent events.

5. Terrorism

a. A report was received on the 24th of March that the V. C. have assessed the villagers of HOA HAI and HOA LAN for taxes. Reportedly "poor" families are required to pay 1,000 VN\$ and wealthier families are required to pay 3,000VN\$. The report indicated that the V. C. tax collection is currently in this area. Another report indicated that an estimated 100 VC dispersed from (BT 100630) to (BT 070610) on 17 March to collect Agricultural taxes from the populace in that area.

6. Civil Disturbance (See Appendix 1 to Annex B)

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appendix 1 (Civil Disturbances) to Annex B (Counterintelligence) to PERINTREP No. 8

Subj: Resume of Civil Disturbances resulting from the removal of General THI as I Corps Commander.

21 March 1966 - Danang

The city of Danang remained quiet during the morning and afternoon. All base employees returned to work, and the city appeared to be functioning normally. The Mayor of Danang related that General THI will remain in Hue, and has an intention of departing Hue at the present time or in the near future.

At 1700, a motor parade was held in downtown Danang, involving approx 100 Cycle's and motor-scooter buses. This activity was to indicate their support for the Military-Civilian Struggle Council (MCSC). The demonstration was conducted without incident. At the conclusion of this motor-parade, approx 300 VN gathered at a public meeting, sponsored by the (MCSC). A representative of the Current Affairs Committee (NFI) read substantially the following: The (MCSC) struggles against dictatorship, injustice, corruption and for the establishment of democracy, and further asked an end to the military regime. Additionally asked that the Generals of the 1963 Revolution be reinstated.

21 March 1966 - Hue

Cycle demonstration similar to that in Danang was conducted in Hue.

22 March 1966 - Danang

Several banners were displayed in downtown Danang, with anti-Thieu and Co connotations. 200 students took part in a peaceful demonstration from 1000 - 1100. The activity appeared to be aimed at backing the PFSR Movement in Danang.

23 March 1966 - Danang

A general strike commenced in Danang and was observed by most commercial establishments and the majority of US employed Vietnamese. A rally, sponsored by the Popular Forces to Struggle for The Revolution, Danang (PFSR), was conducted from 0900 - 1045, with some 2500-3000 persons in attendance. Anti-US banners in English and anti-THIEU and KY banners were displayed. Crowd appeared orderly and not over enthusiastic. Many high school students were present at this activity. Crowd dispersed with no reported incidents. A cycle demonstration was conducted from 1500 to 1630 with 500 cycle drivers in attendance. Protests centered on: (1) Breaking the statue in Danang (Statue was reportedly that of a VN girl who was killed by the Diem police in July 1963), (2) Why are some of the Generals who helped overthrow Diem now out of power, and (3) Request a government by the people, civilian government, not military. Radio broadcasts from Hue this A.M. were very inflammatory, anti-US and claimed to expose the ills of the war effort. Struggle Forces in Hue indicate that a special committee will be set-up in Hue to oppose the Saigon government and to take over postal, press, telegraph and telephone services.

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In the early evening of 23 March, sources speculated that the anti-US movements being waged by the Struggle Forces were increasing. Members of this movement have stated that they now need an incident involving a US National to further their cause.

24 March 1966 - Danang

The second day of the General Strike continued in Danang. Less than 50% of the Vietnamese employed by US forces reported for work. Check points were established at various road junctions and points along road routes leading to and from the city as early as 0600. VN's (Believed to be representing the Struggle Committee) were stopping all VN foot and vehicular traffic and advising pedestrians and drivers of the general strike. Reports from base employees, stopped by these check points, related that no physical force was used, but threats were conveyed, should they proceed to work. At 1100, all of these check points were secured.

25 March 1966 - Danang

Full work forces reported for work at all US installations. Strike was reportedly terminated to allow people to buy food staples and for the Struggle Forces to regroup while awaiting further instructions.

26 March 1966 - Hue

Student activities continued to increase. An incident involving USMC personnel which could have residual effects occurred at 1130 today. Marines on a working party in the vicinity of Hue University destroyed one anti-US banner emplaced by students. Student leader Buu Ton was quite indignant over this incident and requested immediate apology by Marines concerned. In addition, threats were made to march on USIS if apologies not received. Marine representatives met with student leaders this afternoon. Buu Ton has accepted verbal apologies, but insists on written apology also. At the close of this reporting period, student activities have subsided and discussions were underway concerning USMC courses of action in this incident.

B-1-2

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ANNEX C (CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) TO PIR #8

	CAPTIVES		RETURNEES		VCS*	
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	4	38	0	3	146	
Present Location						
All released to ARVN authority						
	<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	21	0	1	32
	<u>Danang</u>	0	15	0	2	93
	<u>Phu Bai</u>	4	2	0	0	21
Status of Interrogation						
	<u>Completed</u>	4	38	0	3	146
	<u>In Progress</u>	0	0	0	0	0
Total captives, returnees held at the end of the reporting period by Corps, each Division and Sector.	0	0	0	0	0	

*2 ARVN DESERTER Not included in total

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Copy _____ of _____ copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: DANANG, RVN
 DTG: 040800 APRIL 1966
 Ser: 036866

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PERINTREP NO. 9

Period Covered; 270001H MARCH to 022400H APRIL 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. The major VC action of significance during the period was an attack of 28 March on ARVN positions near QUANG NGAI city by an estimated VC Battalion. In reaction to this attack Operation INDIANA (LIEN KET 30) was initiated by USMC and ARVN Forces.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. On 28-29 March, an estimated VC Battalion (reported to be the 808th) was engaged by ARVN forces on the coast of QUANG TRI Province due east of QUANG TRI city. VC losses were 58 KIA and 6 VCC. No other significant encounters were reported. Movement reports and sightings continued to indicate a buildup of VC forces near KHE SANH (see Annex D).

(a) PHU BAI TAOR. No significant enemy activity was encountered during the period.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR - DANANG TAOR.

Reports continue to indicate the movement of VC units towards and across the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR. Low validity reports indicate the possible presence in South Central QUANG NAM of a new VC Regiment. This could be formed by upgrading of local force companies to Battalion strength, by the introduction of new Battalion size VC units or a combination of both.

(a) DANANG TAOR. No significant VC attacks were experienced, however, mine and booby trap incidents across the southern portion of the TAOR remain numerous. Harassing attacks by small enemy groups were frequent in this same area.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. The enemy continued to pursue his concentrated effort to maintain his hold upon the area north and northwest of QUANG NGAI city. Reports of considerable VC activity in the SONG TRA BONG Valley continued to be received. There were sightings and other

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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III MAF
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reports of VC reconstruction of positions destroyed during operations UTAH and TEXAS. Early on 28 March, an estimated Battalion of VC attacked an ARVN Battalion vic (BS 587767). Operation INDIANA (and ARVN Operation LIEN KET 30 (QUYET THANG 72) commenced immediately). Heavy fighting on 28 March resulted in VC losses by USMC action of 89 VC KIA (incl 19 by air strikes), 5 VCC and 19 weapons. Strong resistance by well entrenched, well disciplined VC units in Operations UTAH, TEXAS and INDIANA, all within one month and all in the lowland area between the SONG TRA BONG and SONG TRA KHUC have indicated a determined VC effort to retain a hold on the Northwest section of the QUANG NGAI lowlands. Units in this area have been identified as the 36th NVA Regiment, the 195th NVA AA Battalion and elements of the 1st VC Regiment. Reports also indicate that VC units in strength of probably two Battalions have returned to the VAN THUONG Peninsula - CAP BATANGAN area (Opns STARLIGHT - PIRANHA). Further South, reports continue to indicate the movement back into Southern QUANG NGAI District of units of the 18th NVA, QUYET TAM, and of the 2d VC Regiment.

(b) CHU LAI TAOR. VC activity in the Chu Lai TAOR during the period was confined to relatively few incidents involving VC units of platoon size and smaller.

(4) SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS. See Annex D.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. There was a total of 267 VC initiated incidents during the reporting period. Incidents consisted of 1 ambush, 144 harassing fires, 20 mine/booby trap, 1 hamlet harassment, 2 propaganda and 100 AA fires.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment. None.
- e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units

(1) 29 Mar, SMIAT rpt., THUA THIEN Prov. A VC training camp is located at (YD 590148). This camp consists of three huts; two are used for classes and the other for a kitchen. Approximately 200 VC with personal weapons are at this camp. The VC are being trained in groups of 15 to 30 men. (G-2 eval: F/6)

(2) 29 Mar, 3d Recon Bn rpt., An old VC training site was found at AT 853631.

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Inside of the training area were freshly dug punji traps, rebuilt trenches and tunnels. Numerous ambush and harbor sites were along the trail leading to the site. (G-2 eval: B/2)

(3) 26 Mar, Dist Agt report (F/3). VC are building houses at BS 359-878 and BS 389873. A guerrilla school is located at BS 445854 and 2 VC Headquarters are located vic BS 399875 and BS 437854. 100 civilians are building prison type houses at BS 345625. (G-2 eval: F/3)

(4) 24 Mar, SMIAT rpt (F/6). From 13-17 Mar, the VC completed six warehouses in the LUONG MIEU Mt. area (YD 790063). Warehouses are constructed of bamboo, earth, thatch and palm leaves. Each is approximately 8x12x4 meters high. Two are weapons depots, four are foodstuff warehouses. (G-2 eval: F/6)

(5) 23 Mar. SMIAT rpt (F/6). Three rice storage buildings are located near SONG KE (BS 570514). The buildings are 8 meters long and 5 meters wide. They are covered with thatch and located under thick trees to prevent detection from the air. (G-2 eval: F/6)

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents on III MAF aircraft were moderate during the reporting period with a total of 91. 26 aircraft received a total of 50 hits. Grid squares of highest intensity were AT 95, AT 96, BT 06 and BS 57. Fire ranged from light to intense and there were 12 cases of 12.7mm fire.

(1) 22 March. Interrogation of VCC captured by 1st ARVN Airborne Bn. 4 March 1966 at BS 575830 revealed man to be member of "21st AA Bn" (AKA 195th NVA AA Bn). VCC stated that he and one other VC at time of capture were constructing a "decoy duck" on hill, BS 575830. He states that the unit frequently established decoy positions to draw airstrikes away from true positions. (G-2 eval: F/2)

i - j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Hvy Mortars

(1) 26 Mar. Report of 120 mortars. THUA THIEN (P), TG Fox-trot relayed a report by the 1st ARVN Div. LNO that initial interrogation of a VCC in HAI LANG Dist, QUANG TRI (P), indicates the 6th VC Regt. left its 120mm mortar unit and elements in HAI LANG. The remainder of the Regt. has moved to THUA THIEN (P). (G-2 cmt: (F/6) First report of 120 mortars organic to this Regt.)

(2) 25 Mar. THUA THIEN, JIC agt rpt. 802d VC Bn plans to move to attack PHO THACH (YD 529345). Bn reportedly armed w/120mm mortar. (G-2 eval F/6)

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(3) 25 Mar. Det C-1, 5th USSF rpt. At KHE SANH, 4 agents (C/3) reported that a NVN regimental headquarters is located vic YD 094234 in an underground installation. The Regt is equipped with many AA MG's, 81mm mortars and two 120mm mortars. (G-2 eval: F/3)

l - m. Negative.

n. Engineer Units

(1) 21 Mar, QUANG NAM, District agent report (C/3). 2 VC Engr plts, cmd by HUYNH TRE, equipped with mines and explosives, are loc vic (BT 091562) and (BT 119543). They have combined with guerrilla platoons with mission to atk CAU LAU Bridge (BT 091552) and BA TEN Bridge (BT 102-510). (G-2 cmt: (F/6) First report of Engr units this area.) HUYNH TRE prev rptd as cmdr of a guerrilla Co in vic of (BT 135532).

(2) SMIAT report: On 19 March 1966, an unidentified NVA unit consisting of approximately 3000 men was located from BEN QUANG (YD 045-836) to BEN THAN (YD 095767). A generator (Specific's unk) was used all through the day. (G-2 eval: F/6)

o. - s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Personalities. Annex A.

e. Casualties. 187 VC KIA this period.

f. Morale. Considered Good.

g. Enemy Defenses, Mines, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles, Defensive Works and Booby Traps

(1) Tunnel and Cave complex. MACJ21 document translation bulletin No. 256. The following translation is from a document captured 16 Feb 66 near DANANG.

TO: ALL COMRADES

According to reliable sources, the enemy plans to conduct bombings by B-52's against our bases in the near future as he did in the South.

It is requested that plans for the protection of our bases be drawn up with emphasis being placed on the construction of tunnels extending deep into the mountains with several entrances and exits so that depots, machines and equipment can be safeguarded.

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Reports on the progress of the undertaking will be submitted to T-110.

Day _____ Month _____ 1965

USMACV DEC CMT: T-110 is the DANANG City Committee.

(2) A new type VC improvised bamboo contact device for electrical detonation of anti-vehicle mines was found in a cave vic (BS 561765) by 2d Bn, 4th Marines during Opn TEXAS. The device is a 22" section of 2" bamboo cut in half longitudinally to present a half moon curvature throughout it's length. Inside both ends and at the center are holes drilled to secure sheet metal contacts to the inner concave surface. The bottom part is a flat bamboo slat running the length of the upper bamboo section and secured to it in the middle and on both ends by rattan strips. The upper surface of the bottom slat has secured to it sheet metal contacts corresponding with those in the upper section. Wire connection between these contact points extend the length of both the upper and lower sections; wire connection to the mine extends from the middle contact points. The crushing weight of a vehicle will provide the electrical contact required to detonate the mine. (G-2 Cmt: While no USMC vehicle is known to have detonated a mine actuated by such a device, its simple construction and sound principle attest to another effective improvisation by VC ingenuity in mine warfare.)

(3) 30 Mar. AO rpt. The area bounded by grid squares (YC 8192-8588 - 7979 - 8080 - 8880 - 9080) revealed 2-4 newly burnt-out fields approximately 100x200 meters with 18-24 fighting holes each field. All trees have been cut down. The aforementioned was accomplished within the preceeding 48 hours.

(4) 26 Mar. 2d Bn, 9th Marines elements discovered approximately seventeen hundred (1700) meters of trenchline in vic (AT 9760) and (AT 9962).

(5) 30 Mar. AO reported Bridge out Hwy #1 at (BT 412128). Crater 6' - 8' diameter. 4 cuts 4' long 4' deep (BT 401135).

(6) 29 Mar. A GVN military source at HOI AN reported that VC emplace mines and booby traps in vicinity of the CAO DAI temple at CAN AAI village (BT 097664). (G-2 Cmt: F/6)

(7) HOI AN LNO Rpt. There is a VC minefield located in area bounded by (BT 105637), (BT 112628), (BT 110664) and (BT 115637). (F/6)

(8) AO Rpt, 1 April. Hwy #1 cut at numerous places from (BT 395155) to (BT 410130). Some cuts are completely across Hwy and others halfway.

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h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Fog, stratus and partly cloudy skies caused by South-easterly and Northwesterly flows dominated the weather scene over I Corps during the reporting period. Temperatures ranged from an average 86° high and 73° low. Winds were generally out of the North and Northwest at 6 kts with gusts to 22 kts. Visibility averaged 7 miles.

k. Captive, Returnee, and Refugee Report. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Intelligence

(1) 28 Mar. Surveillance of O-1 A/C. Information obtained from a recent returnee (6 Mar) indicates the VC are maintaining surveillance of patterns established by O-1 A/C in visual recon. Special attention is made to the establishment of a set landing time at the end of each day. This information is used by VC to determine what time in the evening VC units can start moving without fear of aerial observation. (G-2 eval: F/3)

(2) 10 Mar. VC anti A/C and Artillery Techniques. A recently captured VC document described anti A/C and artillery techniques used by the VC in the dry season. Underground bunkers will be constructed 100-200 meters away from river banks and houses. Bunkers will have a top cover of 15-20 inches thick. Each family will dig a winding communication trench 1 meter wide by 120cm in depth, leading to the underground bunker. Another underground bunker with strong top cover will be built inside the house. (G-2 eval: F/3)

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.

J. E. Gorman

J. E. GORMAN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. REFUGEE, RETURNEE, CAPTIVE REPORT
- D. SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS

DISTRIBUTION:		CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	NCC	1
COMUSMACV	2	DET 5TH USASF	1	CICV	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CO FLC	1	CTF 115.5	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CO 30TH NCR	5	COMCAMP BUNDER	2
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1		
CG 1ST MAW	10	CO 9TH MT BN	1		
CG FFORCEV I	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1		
CG FFORCEV II	1	CMDR NAV SUPPACT	5		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 9

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
**810TH BN	CONFIRMED	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

** 810TH BN BELIEVED TO BE READY FOR OPNS AFTER RECENT REORGANIZATION - REPLACEMENT.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA VO XUAM LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XC-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0355	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XC-SR, CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400?	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2 57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17 AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-NINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW CAPT PHO
*195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW	CO-SR CAPT DAI XO-SR CAPT HONG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP #9

1. General. VC espionage and sabotage activities appear to have sharply declined during the past week. Propaganda, agitation and terroristic activities have noticeably increased, with a concerted effort to dissuade the populace from cooperating with the American and RVN Forces.
2. Sabotage. From the period 27 March to 1 April 1966, one incident which can be classified as sabotage was conducted against the Danang-Hue rail line. This occurred on 29 March when a portion of the bridge at (ZD 005033) was destroyed by VC explosives.
3. Propaganda and Agitation. On 30 March, a report that VC propaganda training programs for the Quang Ngai Province Committee is reportedly conducted in Loc Tro Village, located in the vicinity (BS 464700 - 470680 - 470700 - 475680). Small printing machines are also located in this area. A similar report, although in a different area, indicated that the VC information office of Thua Thien Province has moved its headquarters to Khe Dai, located at (YD 744022). (Sophisticated leaflets found in widely separated areas may point to larger and a more efficient VC propaganda organization operating in the ICPZ.)
Local inhabitants from various parts of Xuyen Tra Subdistrict attended a propaganda and indoctrination class, organized and conducted at An Thanh (1) Hamlet (BT 053453) from 21 through 24 March. The reported purpose of this class was to "boost" the people's anti-government feelings and to urge them to oppose military actions, and to protest bombardments and artillery fire in that area. Another VC propaganda lecture was given to the villagers of Go Don (BS 387610) while security was provided by an additional VC platoon. The lecture encouraged the people to return to their old villages or they would lose their land. CI COMMENT: It appears that as the VC written propaganda campaign increases - meetings and small lecture classes also increase proportionately.
4. Terrorism. Several Vietnamese were reportedly kidnapped by the VC while fishing in the vicinity of (BT 452128). Investigation of this incident revealed that a boat containing approximately 10 VC stopped another vessel on 24 March in the vicinity of (BT 4312). Out of a group of approximately 20 Vietnamese Civilians on board, the VC kidnapped three women and one man, for interrogation concerning three general areas; (1) information for VC propaganda value, (2) military intelligence and (3) names of VC civilians who were profiting through sales to Americans. After releasing the three women later the same day, the VC warned them that they would be shot if they sold goods to Americans. The Vietnamese male kidnapped by the VC was not released.
Six civilians were reportedly killed on 2 April, when a VC mine was detonated by an unknown source in the vicinity of Hoa Long Village (BT 074707). On March an unconfirmed report from Ly-Tin District advisors stated that the VC have increased their activity of stopping buses and other traffic along Route 1 in the vicinity of (BT 4608). On 1 April a report received stated that because of the VC harassment along route 1, many people have been traveling to Tam-Ky by boat. Approximately 10 VC guerrillas, armed with carbines and Czech submachine guns, have been stopping these boats in the vicinity of (BT 4312). The VC use a vessel piloted by an old woman. The civilians are questioned about Marine activities and are threatened with death if they deal with or help the Americans.

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A paper sign, entitled "Strict Order" was discovered in the vicinity of coordinates (AT 908698). This order was signed by the "Autonomous Committee of Hoa-Binh Village" and warned villagers not to work for, donate to, or associate with, the enemy. (US/RVN). CI COMMENT: Increased effort has been made by the VC to prevent the Vietnamese people from associating or working for U.S. Forces. The VC may feel that close association with the U.S. military by VNs may encourage the pacification effort and by restricting movement, local kidnappings etc - prove to the people that complete protection cannot be afforded them by U.S. and RVN forces.

5. Civil Disturbance. (See appendix 1 to annex B)

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Appendix 1 (Civil Disturbances) to Annex B (Counterintelligence) to PERINTREP No. 9

RESUME OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES

27 March 1966 - Hue

A demonstration-parade was conducted in Hue from 0900 to 1130, with 16,000 in attendance. The main themes centered on new governmental reforms. Removal of Premier KY was mentioned for the first time. A telegram was sent to President Johnson, protesting alleged U.S. interference in Vietnamese affairs. Activity appeared orderly and well organized.

28 March 1966 - Danang and Hue

Both cities were quiet.

29 March 1966 - Danang and Hue

Danang and Hue were quiet. Reports indicated that vehicle demonstrations were being planned for both cities on 30 March 1966.

30 March 1966 - Danang

The vehicle demonstration parade commenced at approximately 0930. The activity was orderly until approximately 1050. At this time two civilian cars (VN) stopped in front of the Marine Security Detachment (MSD) Billet, Danang, vicinity (BT 028785). Vietnamese civilians started to stop demonstration vehicles in this area. At 1110, the second relief of the USMC guard embarked in a 3/4 ton military vehicle and attempted to back out of the drive. There was a slight accident involving the military vehicle and a small commercial bus. The accident was described as very minor, a bent license plate. The bus proceeded some 50 yards and stopped when a Struggle Forces loud speaker truck pulled along side and broadcasted in Vietnamese (text unknown). All vehicular traffic immediately stopped, most drivers and passengers assembled around the military vehicle. The USMC personnel on the truck locked and loaded weapons and all Vietnamese immediately dispersed. This action provoked demonstrators to assemble subsequently around the entrance to the (MSD) area to protest U.S. interference in Struggle Forces affairs. No further incidents were reported.

31 March 1966 - Danang and Hue

A VC meeting was reportedly held in Danang on the night of 30 March. Attendees indicated that a bus-load of students from Hue would arrive in Danang on 2 April to organize a demonstration. In addition, the VC will send six cadres to Hoi An on 2 April to organize a demonstration in that area.

A demonstration was conducted on 31 March in downtown Danang from 1600 to 1800, with some 1500 persons in attendance. Originally the gathering had been called as a memorial in remembrance of Quach Thi Trang, a Vietnamese heroine, but when the 16 speakers had concluded their talks, it was clearly evident that this activity had taken on Anti-American Overtones. Although this was the first demonstration with strong Anti-U.S. connotations, the activity appeared to be well organized and peaceful and there were no reported incidents.

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1 April 1966 - Danang

On 1 April Danang functioned normally. There were no reported incidents.

2 April 1966 - Danang

At 0720 crowds were reported gathering on the streets leading to the main Buddhist Pagoda in Danang. This Buddhist Ceremony was in commemoration of the Anniversary of Hung Vuong. Approximately 2600 persons participated in the Buddhist activity at 1125. At the close of the day, Danang remained quiet and there were no reported incidents.

2 April 1966 - Hue

A demonstration formed in Hue around 0830. Approximately 5000 had gathered by 0830, reportedly for the purpose of protesting a recent speech made by Premier KY in Saigon. A large participation by ARVN Troops was observed. Also, approximately 600 police and civil servants were observed in the crowd. 8th RRU workers were prohibited from going to work this morning. (The above activity started as a religious ceremony but reportedly Struggle Forces had taken control). The demonstrators disbanded near the National Delegates House at 1130. There were no reported incidents.

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ANNEX C (CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) to PIRINTREP No. 9

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		*VCS	
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	44	0	0	79	
Present Location						
	<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	28	0	0	21
All released to ARVN authority	<u>Danang</u>	0	15	0	0	55
	<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	1	0	0	3
Status of Interrogation						
	<u>Completed</u>	0	14	0	0	79
	<u>In Progress</u>	0	0	0	0	0

1 ARVN not included in above total.
 * 1 ARVN not included in above total.

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ANNEX D (Special Forces Camps) to III MAF PERINTREP No. 9

The following extracts have been taken from Det C-1, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 6 and are presented as a matter of interest concerning VC activities near the TRA BONG and KHE SANH Special Forces Camps. While considerable enemy activities has been noted at other Camps, these two are cited as being of major concern and interest at the moment.

1. Enemy activity, week of 18-25 March 1966.

a. TRA BONG. The AN HOA OP vic (BS 473864) was attacked and overrun at 190030H March by an estimated enemy battalion. The USMC restored the OP on 20 March. The OP was again attacked on 24 March but no assault was made. Operation TEXAS (20-25 March) engaged elements of the 1st VC Regiment, 36th NVA Regt (AKA 21st and 6th) and 195 NVA AA Bn, confirming previous reports of a major build up in the TRA BONG area. In spite of this operation, the above units began reappearing at the close of the period in areas previously swept by Marines vic (BS 4585). Other elements of the 1st and 36th Regt and 195th AA Bn are believed to have moved Southwest of TRA BONG vic YINH TUY/DONG KE and South of TRA BONG vic (BS 325839) and (BS 375857) to escape the sweep. In the valley itself, the VC continued their efforts to secure the entire rice harvest, other than the bare essential of rice needed by the people. Operation TEXAS had little effect on these efforts and the VC were able to maintain a line of defense vic (BS 375864) to (BS 383868) to (BS 383876) which limited penetration east of this point. A patrol made contact here with as estimated 2 squads supported by .50 cal and .30 cal MG fire on 22 March. Reports have consistently indicated the presence of a Battalion at this location and 1 km South vic (BS 365854), where a large defensive complex is being constructed.

b. KHE SANH. At KHE SANH, 4 agents (C/3) reported that an NVA Regimental Headquarters is located vic (YD 094234) in an underground installation. Subordinate Battalions are positioned with a 700 meter radius of this Headquarters. The Regiment is equipped with many AAM's and 81mm Mortars and 2 120mm Mortars and has 12 Chinese Advisors. Supporting it are food production centers located at (YD 070305), (YD 066335), (YD 090290) and (YD 085265) and 1 large ferry located vic (YD 090290). Also located vic (YD 070305) is the 118th NVA Bn. This report is supported by RED HAZE flown 5 March and other reports received at this Headquarters. Recent infiltration South of KHE SANH indicates the possibility of a multi-Regiment complex between KHE SANH and ASHAU. A post-infiltration training center has previously been identified vic (YD 040051). Indications that the VC are preparing for a coordinated attack on LANG VEI and KHE SANH continue to appear. On 23 March an elephant was found tethered at (XD 812443) within Mortar range of the camp. On 25 March an overflight sighted 12-15 positions, some with overhead cover, and 1 Mortar pit vic (XD 776389) within Mortar range of LANG VEI. These positions were estimated to be 1 to 2 weeks old. Positions (.50 cal MG) were also found the previous week vic (XD 861413) and estimated to be 1 week old.

2. Discussion of VC Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

a. The situation at TRA BONG remains both serious and immediate. While operation TEXAS relieved some of the pressure on TRA BONG, regroupment of enemy forces a few kilometers south and southeast of the camp poses a new threat, perhaps more serious than before. Large units can move undetected in this area, and it is reasonable to assume an attack would be launched from this direction and/or from the north. Preparations for an attack are well advanced, and approximately five intelligence reports in the last month have indicated an attack was coming. However, it is felt the VC are more

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concerned at present with getting as much rice as possible out of the valley. An attack now would risk losing much of the harvest. Therefore, the VC will continue to secure the harvest in the TRA BONG Valley and maintain a line of defense 3 km east of the SF camp to prevent patrols from interfering with their efforts. More attacks on the AN HOA OP should also be expected until it is no longer restored. This will ensure complete control of the valley by the VC except for the SF camp. At the conclusion of the rice harvest in early or mid-April an attack on the camp itself should be expected.

b. At KHE SANH preparations for a full-size attack are not quite so advanced. An attack must first be preceded by additional VC reconnaissance and digging around the camp. However, the situation remains serious, particularly since large units can move around in the area north of the camp undetected. In addition, since an attack will be supported by 120mm mortars, preparations need not be as great as is usually the case. An attack on KHE SANH will be coordinated with an attack on LANG VEI.

c. The Viet Cong will continue to harass LLLB-USASF camps and plant false information concerning build-ups around and impending attacks on these camps. This is designed to put the camps in a defensive posture so that maximum effort can be expended in securing and storing rice.

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 Unit: III MAF
 Location: DANANG, RVN
 DTG: 120800 April 1966
 Ser: **041566**

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PERINTREP NO. 10

Period Covered: 030001H to 092400H April 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No Change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. No significant VC activity was reported throughout the period. The enemy situation was completely overshadowed by the local political situation. Considerable agitation occurred throughout the zone but centered on DANANG and HUE as "STRUGGLE FORCES" continued anti-government moves and speeches and received support from certain ARVN elements. The political situation is covered in appendix 1 (Civil Disturbances) to Annex B (Counterintelligence).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. A total of 224 VC incidents occurred during the period. There were 107 harassing fire, 86 AA fire, 27 mines/bobby traps, 2 hamlet harassments, 1 sabotage and 1 propaganda incident.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. 3Apr, III Corps reports VC troops wore ARVN fatigues and 5th Div patches in attack on 5th Inf training center. VC were able to enter compound unopposed.

(2) Tactics. 8Apr, A covered source reported that the VC have developed a diversionary tactic to counter Visual Recon Flights. A VC battalion commander instructed one squad to fall behind the Marine forces who were operating in the area. As an aircraft flew over the squad position, they were instructed to fire all weapons at once. A situation like this occurred with AO reporting heavy fire from the squad's position. In the meantime, the main force of the VC Battalion escaped because the ground operations were directed at the squad position.

(3) Weapons (from HEAT Rocket captured by ARVN 2d Arm Cav Regt). Characteristics of "B-50" rocket. (Refer to Para 2.d.(3) of III MAF PERINTREP No. 7). Warhead diameter: 100mm (approx); overlength with propellant: 41" (approx); tailboom diameter: 50mm (approx); armor penetration: 9-10"; max

Group 4
 Downgraded at 5 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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III MAF

PERINTREP #10

3-9 April 66

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effective range: 400 meters.

e. Negative

f. Admin Units

(1) 17 Mar, QUANG NAM, Agt reported that in November 1965 a labor force composed of 2,700 civilians drafted from various parts of QUANG NAM Province was formed into a Logistics Group. The group carried a large quantity of food supplies from PHU PHONG area (AT 855527) to inter-region IV in NVN. The route followed passed by BA NA Mountain (ZC 2070). Group returned to QUANG NAM Province in mid-March 1966 with large quantity of new individual weapons which they stored in PHU PHONG (AT 855527). (G-2 Cmt: F/6; First report of this large labor force. Possible food used in caches along an infiltration route for use by an infiltrating unit. BA NA Mountain is on known infiltration route. A SMIAT report (F) of 21 March, received from a VN impressed into a VN labor force, stated that weapons were being transported from LAOS to a storage area in vic (AT 795488).)

(2) 30 Mar. TRA BONG agent reported (F/3). 1 MF Bn bivouaced vic (BS 449891) caching rice, 5 dispensaries, 5 kitchens and many nurses also located this area. (G-2 Cmt: Large rice storage facilities previously reported at this location. Rice cache reported vic (BS 441899).)

(3) 3 Apr. 1st Bn, 3d Marines. Interrogation of VCC revealed a VC training camp is located in hills, in draws vic (ZC 2053). (F/3)

(4) 2 Apr. Det C-1 USSF Agt rpt.: There is a VC training camp located vic (ZC 113498). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

g. Negative

h. Air Defense. There were 86 incidents involving III MAF A/C during the reporting period. 26 A/C were hit with a total of 35 rounds. Grid squares of highest intensity were (ZC 1050, ZC 2050 and ZC 9050) with fire ranging from light to intense. There was one case of 12.7mm fire.

(1) 1 Apr, AO report. Two camouflaged AA positions and several camouflaged foxholes spotted vic (YD 581197).

(2) 29 Mar, AO report. Village vic (BS 544814) is heavily entrenched and has AA positions. Trenches and gun positions (BS 528808), all look new and well kept.

i - j. Negative

k. Artillery and Hvy Mortars.

(1) 4 Apr, ARVN I Corps INTSUM No. 3369: 18 March Rallier at HAI LANG sub sector, QUANG TRI Province, claimed to be a member of the C-22 120 Mort Co. Strength is 200, armed with 4 120mm Morts, unknown number of auto wpns. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; first report of C-22 Co, there are several "C"

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series Co's in the QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN District. All are special Co's. (i.e. Intel, Sapper, Engineer. These units are subordinate to THUA THIEN Military HQ. Possible C-22 is heavy weapons support Co. 120mm Mort prev rptd this area.)

- l - m. Negative.
- n. Engineers - Negative.
- o - q. Negative.
- s. Infiltration

(1) 30 Mar. Overflight. Bivouac areas w/positions seen vicinity (XD 790281) and (XD 840311) along known infiltration route. Heavily used trails seen vicinity (XD 590140), (XD 655238), (XD 704191), (XD 710176), (XD 734180), (XD 760195) and (XD 794193) along suspected infiltration route from route 92 in LAOS. Known infiltration route vic (XD 850339).

(2) 2 Apr. SLAR report (B/2). Many moving targets were reported on trail vic (XD 779545) and in woods, (XD 770540). All of these targets fall along a new suspected infiltration route from (XD 870640) to (XD 870575). 2 reports of large NVN units along this route have been received. (F/6, NVN unit report).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization - Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications - Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment - Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities - Annex A.
- e. Casualties - 103 VC KIA - 16 VCC this period.
- f. Morale - Considered good.
- g. New Enemy Mines, Barriers, Fortifications, Obstacles, Defensive Works and Booby Traps.

(1) 2 Apr. AO report. THUA THIEN; newly prepared fortified positions, three fields freshly burned out with trees cut for approximately 100-200 meters vic (YD 405285). Approximately 8-10 foxholes in each of the fields. Bunkers and foxholes lined and reinforced with wooden planks.

(2) 7 Apr. AO reported a fortified village vic (BS 560836) with zig-zag trenches and 10 foxholes. Four prepared gun positions vic (BS 556838), zig-zag trench line around village vic (BS 566839). Trench recently repaired around village (BS 563835) about 60 foxholes located throughout area.

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h. Negative

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Southwesterly flows over I Corps brought partly cloudy to cloudy skies, scattered thunderstorms over the mountains, and early morning fog and stratus during the reporting period. Precipitation was negligible, winds were out of the southeast averaging 6 kts with strong gusts. Temperatures ranged from a 90° high to a 74° low. Average visibility was 7 miles.

k. Captive, Returnee, Refugee Report. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Information

(1) Communications. 2 Apr. 3d Bn 1st Marines reported they heard foreign transmission on their conduct of fire radio net. An intelligence man with 1st Marines stated transmission did not sound oriental, but slaviv.

(2) Communications. 6 Apr. 2nd Bn, 12th Marines reported jamming of their radio net. Transmission was described as an oriental speaking English, voice was saying: "1-2-3-4-5-6-0-8-1, 1 round, this is first transmission for purposes of an air burst round". Message was repeated over and over jamming VC's transmissions for night defensive fire.

(3) Communications. 4 Apr, HIEU DUC District Headquarters report: Two VC Bn, one designated "RANG DONG", w/combined strength of 1500 men are loc vic (AT 8161). Equipment includes one telegraph wireless capable of contact with HANOI. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(4) VC Document. Translation by US MACV of an "absolute secret" rept issued 5 Feb 66 by unit 100B, captured by 2nd Bn, 7th Mar on 26 Feb vic (BT 206243) during Opn DOUBLE EAGLE, reveals problems in VC political indoctrination and ideological leadership. While "satisfactory performance of some training and combat missions" was acknowledged, particularly, in increased determination of troops to fight U.S. forces and endure hardships, more confidence in "victory of the revolution", better "class consciousness" and discipline, increased sense of responsibility and more effective part of cadres in combat, and "maturing" of troops and guerrillas thru direct engagement with U.S. forces, "serious shortcomings" attributed to a "lack of class consciousness, political indoctrination and ideological leadership" were discussed. Specifically, these shortcomings were noted as follows: "some soldiers fear the American, their artillery, aircraft and strength and always try to avoid contact. They willingly conduct isolated guerrilla ops but balk at concentrated actions by large-size units for fear of encirclement. Fear of hardships and the Americans has resulted in desertion and surrender. In one Local Force Co., seven cases of desertion were reported in a single month. Party committee and chapter officials lack political vigilance and do not realize the harmful effect of the enemy "CHIEU HOI" policy. Lack of

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solidarity has also been noted." To correct these shortcomings, cadres were enjoined to make their subordinates "see the revolutionary forces" temporary difficulties and available advantages, and the enemy's temporary strength and basic weaknesses. Rightism, peace illusions, subjectivism, and reluctance to sacrifices must be fought to the utmost." Further, "lack of revolutionary vigilance" has enabled the CHIEU HOI program to "eat its way into revolutionary ranks." (G-2 Cmt: F/6; Unit 100B unknown to III MAF COB. The above document is quoted as to possible indicator of impact of CHIEU HOI program on local VC).

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES

a. Discussion

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. The month of March produced several significant changes in VC/NVA posture in the two Northern Provinces. The attack on AS HAU gained for the VC a propaganda victory and eliminated a GVN obstacle on an important infiltration route. It also resulted in addition of a confirmed NVA Regiment, the 95B, to enemy order of battle in the 11th DTA. The 800 series of Battalions (800th, 802d, 804th, 806th, 808th, 810th and 812th) constitute the equivalent of over two Regiments. Reports of varying reliability have reported a 6th Regiment and a possible 1st Provincial Regiment as being control Headquarters for these Battalions. There has, however, been a variance in reports as to which of the Battalions compose which of the reputed Regiments. This leads to the possibility that the 6th and 1st Prov Regts, if they do exist, may be control Headquarters under which the Battalions are task organized when the need arises. There have been reports of at least one additional Regiment in the KHE SANH area of QUANG TRI, reportedly NVA, but there is no firm evidence available to verify such a unit.

(2) QUANG NAM. Reports have indicated the possible presence in QUANG NAM of a new regiment, the 5th. The Headquarters of the 5th Regt. is considered a possible unit and the 3d Bn, 5th Regt has been accepted as probable. The recent movement of the 36th Regt from the QUANG NAM - QUANG TIN border area and of at least elements of the 1st VC Regiment from Northern QUANG TIN - both to QUANG NGAI - have created a void in this area. The possibility of new Regiments moving in and/or of local units being upgraded to fill this void cannot be over looked. The 303d Bn (MF), CHU DUNG Bn (MF), R-20 Bn (LF), 70th Bn (MF) and the 3d Bn, 5th Regt and two U/I Battalions are all carried as confirmed and/or probable in QUANG NAM Province.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI. Engagements in Northern QUANG NGAI in March served to identify all or at least major elements of both the 1st VC and the 36th (AKA 6th, AKA 21st) Regiments, as well as the 195th AA Battalion as being in that area. Reports continue to indicate a return of the 18th NVA and the 2nd VC Regiments to QUANG NGAI from BINH DINH. An additional three Local Force Battalions (20th, 38th and 52nd) are carried as confirmed in QUANG NGAI Provinces; the 104th LF Bn is carried as probable. This accumulation of VC/NVA units in QUANG NGAI, if all reports are true, would represent the equivalent of more than five Regiments in this one province and indicate a very determined and concerted effort on the part of the VC

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to establish their hegemony over an important segment of the ICTZ. In addition, several reports have been received of a 100th Regiment in Northern QUANG TIN Province, however reports are still too vague to accept such a unit as even possible at this time.

(4) General. The above disposition of forces represents a considerable change in VC Order of Battle, in the ICTZ, in a time frame of one month. Excluding movement and location reports of uncertain validity, overall VC/NVA strength has increased by at least one confirmed regiment (95B) and major elements of two regiments (1st and 36th) displaced south into Northern QUANG NGAI. Additionally, one regiment (36th) and one battalion (810th) were upgraded from probable to confirmed, one new battalion (812th) was added as probable, and the 3d Bn, 5th Regt was upgraded from possible to probable. VC/NVA strength in the ICTZ has not been at this level since the 18th NVA, 2d VC and QUYEN TAM Regiments displaced south to BINH DINH prior to DOUBLE EAGLE. If these latter units have returned as many reports would indicate, VC/NVA strength in the ICTZ is currently at an all time high.

b. Capabilities. With only a minor redistribution of forces, the enemy is capable of attacking:

(1) The PHU BAI TAOR with the equivalent of two Regiments supported by one Local Force Battalion.

(2) The DANANG TAOR, with the equivalent of two Regiments reinforced by two Main Force Battalions.

(3) The CHU LAI TAOR with the equivalent of two Regiments reinforced by two Main Force Battalions and one NVA AA Battalion.

NOTE: All the above can be reinforced with local force units and guerrillas forces.

J. E. Gorman
J. E. GORMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. REFUGEE, RETURNEE, CAPTIVE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:		CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	NCC	1
COMUSMACV	2	DET 5TH USASF	2	CICV	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CO FLC	1	CTF 115	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CO 30TH NCR	5	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1		
CG 1ST MAW	10	CO 9TH MT BN	1		
CG FFORCEV I	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1		
CG FFORCEV II	1	CMDR NAV SUPPACT	5		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 10

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
**810TH BN	CONFIRMED	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

*RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

**810TH BN BELIEVED TO BE READY FOR OPNS AFTER RECENT REORGANIZATION - REPLACEMENT.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA VO XUAM LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0355	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400?	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2 57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17 AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-NINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW CAPT PHO
*195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>SFR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW	CO-SR CAPT DAI XC-SR CAPT HONG CON
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

*RECENT RPTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 10

1. General. VC efforts appear to be centered in the ICTZ, on propaganda and sabotage. Reports indicate that their direction in the propaganda program is to offset the current pacification programs and to restrict movements of local villagers. Reports also indicate that sapper units are being formed for the purpose of conducting sabotage and terrorism. Political movements still dominate the scene in I Corps and have probably provided the cover for VC infiltration into Danang.
2. Espionage and Sabotage. The VC reportedly have been training villagers in the Western part of Tu Nghia District in the vicinity of (BS 6667), to be Sapper Cadre. This cadre will attempt to acquire important military and political documents from U. S./ARVN forces for the VC. An unknown number of VC believed to be Sapper Teams, are also being sent to penetrate the city of Danang. Each member of these teams is armed with a pistol. Combined, these teams reportedly have a total of 300 KG's (660 pounds) of explosives. In addition, 200 KG's is held at (BT 024785) and another 100 KG's at (BT 017770). Their mission is supposedly to "murder and destroy".
3. Propaganda and Agitation. Reports indicate a continuation of the propaganda/indoctrination program by the VC. Lectures were reportedly organized and conducted on 21 through 24 March at An Thanh (1) hamlet located at coordinates (BT 053453). The themes were centered around Anti-government. A translation of an "Absolute Secret" report issued by unit 100B indicated that "Serious Shortcomings" of the VC's propaganda and indoctrination programs were attributed to a "lack of Class consciousness, political indoctrination and ideological leadership. This report also indicated that the "Chieu Hoi" policy had a definite effect on the VC efforts. To correct these shortcomings cadres were enjoined to make all efforts to cover deficiencies. CI Comment: Reports received in the past would indicate the VC are quite concerned over the deficiencies of their propaganda and indoctrination programs, it also appears that their efforts point in the direction of a complete reorganization and improvement of these programs. The Chieu Hoi program has hindered VC efforts in establishing an effective propaganda and indoctrination program.
4. Extortion. On 2 April a report was received that 5,000 bushels of unhusked rice from the recent rice harvest had been shipped to a VC rice storage area located at (ZC 106646). This rice was reportedly collected from farmers in various areas of Thuong Duc District, Quang Nam Province, in exchange for VC bonds.
5. Terrorism. On 23 March a report was received that approximately 300 VC entered Luong Diem Thuong Hamlet, (YD 967050) and forced each family to contribute 1,000\$VN. Prior to departing the hamlet the VC assassinated one resident. Another comparable report received 3 April indicated that approximately 15 armed Guerrillas entered Hoa Xuan island in the vicinity of (BT 4215) wearing civilians clothes. Their purpose was to enforce a 1900 to 0700 curfew on the local residents and to collect money from the people. On the 9th of April it was reported that a VC unit killed 8 civilians in Cam Ne (3) vicinity (AT 965 687) three of the eight killed were considered to be friendly toward the GVN.
6. Assassination Plans. To counter the ARVN Pacification Operations, VC plan to isolate cities in initiating a campaign called "Annihilate Enemy Cadres". This plan calls for the VC to exploit the present state of unrest in cities of I Corps and to infiltrate a number of Sapper Cadres, both male and female. These cadres will have the mission to establish contact with agents in the city in order to assassinate both military and administrative officials. The VC male cadres will have the mission of wandering on deserted streets or frequenting public places to assassinate soldiers or officials walking alone. VC female cadre will have the mission of seducing and luring friendly officials to locations where VC will carry out the assassination.
7. Civil Disturbances. See Appendix 1 to Annex B

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Appendix 1 (Civil Disturbance) to Annex B (Counterintelligence) to PERINTREP
No 10

Resume of Civil Disturbances

3 April 1966 - Danang

From 0730 - 0940 some 800 National Police assembled in Danang to conduct a peaceful rally and demonstration parade. The activity was well organized and there were no reported incidents.

- Hue

Hue appeared quiet throughout the day. A previous report indicated that 3 April in Hue would be marked as "Hate America Day" however, this failed to materialize. Some small student gatherings were observed. These were called to protest police butaluty in recent Saigon riots.

- Hoi An

Approximately 1000 persons gathered in Hoi An to conduct a vehicle demonstration parade. There were no anti-U.S. banners or themes present. A general strike was conducted in the town for a 48 hour period.

- Quang Tri

Commencing at 0900 approximately 10,000 persons participated in what was reported as a Buddhist religious ceremony. 200 National Police attended this activity.

4 April 1966 - Danang

Following Premier Ky's announcement, 3 April 66, that he considered Danang to be in the hands of communists, Struggle Forces were quite active in trying to consolidate their forces. The city appeared to be in a state of confusion and the citizens were quite apprehensive. There were also some reports that the VNQDD were rallying their forces to counter Struggle Forces movements. Two anti-U.S. banners were on display - they read: "Down with the American Attempt to Protect the Ky Government."; "America should be responsible for the impolite attitude of the Ky Government". During the night of 4-5 April, 2 Battalions of RVN Marines were flown into Danang and assumed a defensive posture around the airbase.

5 April 1966 - Danang

Local radio stations were active and carried excerpts of Premier Ky's speech and Struggle Forces broadcast. Danang remained quiet through the day. A 3d Marine Battalion joined the others at the Airbase.

6 April 1966 - Danang

Some harassment of RVN Marines by Struggle Forces was observed at the South gate of Danang Airbase. No serious incidents were reported. Struggle Forces were active in Danang and many roadblocks and check points were

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established throughout the city. However, the day passed without incident and U.S. Military vehicles were afforded freedom of movement. There were no serious incidents reported.

- Hue

A Buddhist inspired demonstration was observed in Hue with some 10,000 persons in attendance. The crowd dispersed at 1015. The main theme was anti-government and there were no reported incidents.

- Quang Tri

A vehicle demonstration-parade was conducted in Quang Tri with some 100 marchers. Demonstrator reportedly tore down the barriers in front of the MAC-V Command but later replaced them. The city was quiet at 1600 and remained so throughout the day.

7 April 1966

In Danang, road blocks and barricades were observed throughout the city, some manned by ARVN forces, some by civilians. Many were unmanned obstacles only. Inflammatory messages were broadcasted by the Struggle Forces urging people to arm and defend themselves. Reports from HUE described a student "Suicide Squad" being trained in the use of fire arms. Their mission was reported to be to proceed to Danang to protect the city from GVN attack.

8 April 1966

There was considerable movement of civilian and military groups in and around Danang but the pattern was difficult to analyze. Loudspeakers and a radio of uncertain origin harranged the population and urged resistance to movements of Americans. In at least two cases, Americans were refused passage at roadblocks. A group of approximately 120 students reported to be of the "Suicide Squad" departed HUE in the morning in busses and proceeded to Danang. At 081510H, at the outskirts of Danang, a VNAF aircraft fired one rocket in the vicinity of the busses. The busses were not hit. A local radio subsequently broadcasted that Ky's planes had bombed the students from Hue.

9 April 1966

Movements of a convoy of ARVN troops in APC's and other military vehicles from HOI AN occurred during the day. The convoy stopped at (AT 999699) at approximately noon when a VNAF aircraft fired 2 rockets in the vicinity of the convoy. No damage was reported. Two platoons of 155mm Howitzers also deployed towards Danang with one stopping on the road and the other assuming firing positions further north at (PT 026658) pointing toward Danang. At the close of the day, the troops and howitzers withdrew a short distance south. The situation remained unresolved at the close of the period.

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ANNEX C (CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT)

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		*VCS	
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	29	0	0	43	
Present Location						
All released to ARVN authority.						
	<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	11	0	0	15
	<u>Danang</u>	0	18	0	0	20
	<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	0	0	0	08
Status of Interrogation						
	<u>Completed</u>	0	29	0	0	43
	<u>In Progress</u>	0	0	0	0	0

2 ARVN Deserters not included in above totals.

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Copy _____ of _____ Copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 190800H April 1966
 Ser#: 010736

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PERINTREP NO. 11

Period Covered: 100001H to 162400H April 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No Change.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. The political tension eased considerably during the period, however some tension remained and no permanent solution appears to have been reached. The only significant VC attack during the period against USMC elements occurred on 16 April in the DANANG TAOR. Indications of extensive troop movements within and possibly into the ICT Zone continue to be reported.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. Reports continue to be received of large scale enemy movements in the Western part of the 11th DPA. The possibility exists of large scale infiltration along the Route 9 - BA LONG Valley route. The threat to the KHE SANH Special Forces camp has not abated.

(a) PHU BAI TAOR. Golden Fleece operations in the Phu Bai area met generally with good cooperation from local villagers. Scattered enemy opposition was encountered.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Operation Orange, to the Southwest of the Danang TAOR, vic (ZC 1353) concluded on 11 April with a cumulative total of 57 VC KIA, 6 VCC and over 15,000 pounds of rice captured. VC opposition to this eleven day search and clear operation was initially determined but slackened. VC elements withdrew from the area.

(a) DANANG TAOR. VC activity retained the pattern of constant harassing incidents throughout the Southern sector of the TAOR but little or no activity in the West or North. A significant VC assault occurred on the early morning of 16 April against Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines position at (AT 979585). Approximately 150 rounds of 60 and 81mm Mortar fire, with an undetermined amount of 57mm RR fire, was followed by an attack against the company position by an estimated 150 VC in khaki uniforms. The attack was repulsed with a confirmed VC loss of 12 KIA and the VC withdrew to the South and Southwest.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. In Quang Ngai, Operation NEVADA began on 12 April to the Northeast of QUANG NGAI City. Although no major VC forces had been contacted by the end of the

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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PERINTREP # 11

10-16 Apr 66

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period, extensive and elaborate caves were discovered in the BATANGAN Peninsula. Cave clearance, destruction and denial operations continue. Elsewhere in QUANG NGAI Province, evidence continues to indicate large VC/NVA forces throughout the area. Reports continue to be received that the 18th NVA, the 2nd VC and the QUANG TAM Regiments, or elements thereof, may have returned to QUANG NGAI.

(a) CHU LAI TAOR. Light, sporadic VC activity was encountered during the period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. A total of 240 incidents occurred during the reporting period consisting of: 136 harassing fires, 88 A A fires, 15 mine/booby traps and 1 propaganda.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. 10 April, HMM-161. As a squadron helicopter was proceeding to a USMC position which was to be marked by a yellow smoke grenade, a VC unit in the area set off a white smoke grenade. This may have been an attempt to mislead the helicopter. (G-2 Cmt: Refer to para 2.d.(c) of III MA F PERINTREP No. 4).

(2) Tactics; Recognition Signals. A VC "secret" document captured by Co L, 3d Bn, 3d Marines vicinity (AT 967595) on 29 March contained a listing of unit challenges and passwords. Although expired, the document illustrates the use of words and other noises (clucking, clapping) at night. Simple gestures, innocuous body movements, carrying of common items, peculiarity in the wearing of clothing are listed as recognition methods, to wit:

<u>Day</u>	<u>Challenges</u>	<u>Password</u>
17	Left hand hold hat; wave	Left hand hold handkerchief
18	Handkerchief to left	Left hand straight overhead.
19	Left hand hold hat; wave leaf from left to right to the front	Hold leaf straight over head

(3) New Weapons. The following information has been extracted from I FORCEV PERINTREP No. 12 dtd 11 Apr 66.

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(a) 25 Pounder Gun-Howitzer, 3 Apr. A British 25 pounder may have been employed recently by the VC against the CAI CAI SF camp (WT 562732), IN KIEN PHONG Province. One round reported fired against camp. Australian personnel identified fuse as coming from British 25 pounder arty shell, and technical intelligence is now analyzing the fragments. At 042030H Apr, US personnel at SF camp observed large trucks towing two arty pieces vic (WT 566115). One wpn had 4 wheel body; the other was on two wheels. (Source: Det C/4, SF camp CAN THO). MACV Cmt: Location of reported sighting of weapons is in or near Cambodia. Cambodian army is known to have eight British 25 pounders. This suggests the possibility that round may have been fired by either Cambodians or VC and could well have been fired from Cambodian territory.

The UK 25 pounder Gun - Howitzer Mark 2 consists of the following Characteristics:

Caliber: 87.6mm
 Weight: 7335 lbs
 Length: 26 ft
 Width: 7 ft
 Height: 5.5 ft
 Max horizontal range: 12,253m

(4) Weapon: 23 Mar, Quang Nam, agent report, SMIAT rated F/6, 10 VC guerrillas rested at Ha My (BT 120620), they had 2 60mm Mortar Bamboo tubes, approximately 1 meter long, mounted on wood base. Tubes reinforced with rattan fiber, which aided in holding hot tube after firing. Nail at base served as firing pin. Range with maximum propellant charge is 300-400 meters. Tubes only good for 4 rounds with maximum charge; heat from 60mm shell shatters them. Using less charge lengthens use of tube. (G-2 Cmt: First report of this weapon received by this Headquarters).

e. Negative.

f. Admin Units.

(1) 30 Mar. SMIAT rated F/6. A VC factory is located at (BS 460820). This factory makes mines, grenades and clothing. It employs 100 men and has two Chinese advisors. Factory was reportedly built in 1965 and started with four sewing machines.

(2) 5 Apr. Tra Bong agent report; F/4. 30 men and 6 nurses located at dispensary vic (BS 405825). Dispensary cares for wounded and is run by Nguyen Thi Tam, Tran Huan, Bui Thi Dang and Nguyen Manh. The dispensary has been in this location for 45 days.

(3) 9 Apr. Tien Phuoc agent report C/4. 400 VC replacements staging vic (BS 537405). Rice and salt cached nearby vic (BS 505434) and (BS 520413). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

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(4) 5 Apr, Thua Thien, agent report (rated (F) by SMIAT) that a VC Comm Liaison Training Camp is loc (ZC 166946). Camp consist of 2 huts built under bamboo and rattan trees, which houses 20 instructors and 30 monitors. Approx 100 VC guard this area. Training camp of 8 palm leaf huts loc Trai Canyon (YD 590148). Approx 400 trps are at this camp. Trenches have been dug around the camp, w/4 AA Wpns. (G-2 Cmt: 3 houses, 1 w/radio, rptd vic of (ZC 110930) on 24 Feb. VC hosp w/7 huts rptd vic of (YD 500123) on 27 Mar.)

g. Negative

h. Air Defense. Air incidents totaled 84 during the reporting period, showing a decrease from last period. Areas of highest density were grid squares (AT 9050), (BS 5070), (BS 6090) and (BS 7080). Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. 4 cases of 12.7mm fire and 1 airburst (higher cal, but unknown), were reported.

(1) 8 Apr. AO report. New AA positions are located at (YD 493168), (YD 495171) and (YD 495167).

(2) 9 Apr. New AA positions. Visual Recon; new AA positions located (YC 670774). AA position and 6 foxholes located (YC 647760). AA gun position located on small knoll vic (YC 379929).

(3) 1 Apr. QUANG NGAI district agent report. VC have 2 AA machine guns' located (BS 200901). One guard company located (BS 185 890), to protect the 2 guns. Mission is to fire on aircraft spraying chemicals in area. (F/3).

i-j. Negative.k. Artillery/Hvy Mortars.

(1) 11 Apr. BO MUNG LNC (51st ARVN Regt), reported that approximately 90 men displaced to vic (BT 066630). The report also stated this force was transporting a weapon described as being of such size that it required 15 men to carry it. (G-2 Cmt: F/4; an unidentified company equipped with "a big gun", was reported in vic (BT 0567) on 30 March. A 120mm Mortar, dismantled, might possible require 15 men for transportation.)

(2) British 25 pounder. See para 2.d.(3) above.

l-r. Negative.s. Other elements

(1) Transportation. 9 Apr. CIDG (F/4), two elephants are being used to carry ammunition between XALO and NUOC BON vic (BS 345 705), trip is made every two days.

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- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 103 VC KIA, during the reporting period. Also see para 1.(4) below.
- f. Morale. Considered good.
- g. New Enemy defenses, mines, fortifications, barriers, obstacles, defensive workers, and booby traps.

(1) 12 Apr. I Corps Adv Gp. Bridge out at BS 777447; no bypass available. South of this location bridges are out at the following locations: BS 778442; no bypass, BS 794408; no bypass, BS 798399; no bypass and BS 840330; no bypass. Estimation as to time of repair: unknown.

(2) 8 Apr. USSF plt report. Entire area vic BS 5329, BS 5632, BS 5629 and BS 5331 is covered by new punji stakes.

(3) 15 Apr. VHC-6 AO report. Trench with foxholes running along trail from BS 448750 to BS 460763 to BS 407762 to BS 482750. 7 unoccupied AA gun positions located BS 497833. Fortified village with foxholes and trenches located BS 415738.

(4) A clearing located vic XD 829544 is now in process of being enlarged. Possible helo pad. Clearing shows extensive use. (G-2 Cmt: Clearing could possibly be helo trap).

(5) 2 Apr. SMIAT (F/6) Binh Son District. Many mines have been located in the area BS 530944, BS 530947 and BS 534950.

(6) 7 Apr. Elements of 3d Marines found two caves loc ZC 172 546. Cave #1 had entrance 3' x 4½' and led into chamber 5' tall by 10' square. The cave was reinforced with bamboo along walls, 4 poles thick. Center beam was 8" x 8". Second cave consisted of 3 levels 30' x 4½', both caves were equipped with beds.

(7) 11 Apr. 2d Bn 3d Marines element found a homemade shape charge booby trap (AT 891711) located three feet above the ground on a bamboo pole. It was wrapped in rain-proof material with trip wire attached. The booby trap was detonated, with shrapnel going about 45 meters to the front.

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j. Weather. Partly cloudy to cloudy skies produced by southeasterly flows dominated the weather picture over I Corps during the reporting period. Occasional scattered thunderstorms over mountain areas brought a trace of precipitation to the lowlands during the latter portion of the period. Temperatures averaged 89° high to 75° low. Winds were mostly southeasterly at an average 7 knots. Visibility averaged 7 miles.

k. Captive, returnee, refugee report. Annex C.l. Other Significant Information.

(1) Signal Devices. 3d Bn, 3d Marines reported that the Viet Cong employed a green star cluster pyrotechnic as a signal device during the 122022H Mortar and small arms attack against Company L positions at (AT 967588). On 11 April, during a firefight at (AT 668 603) with a unit of 3d Bn, 9th Marines the VC employed 4 green star clusters. (G-2 Cmt: Use of pyrotechnic signals by VC is becoming more common and may be used as attempts at confusing US units as well as for signalling purpose.)

(2) Information Obtained from Civilians. The below incidents cited to illustrate potential value of offering rewards to VN for turn in of enemy equipment.

(a) 10 Apr. 2nd Bn, 3d Marines reported a M-26 grenade was found by a woodcutter under some brush (AT 919707). Woodcutter led Marines to grenade. (G-2 Cmt: Same woodcutter that led Marines to 8" howitzer dud at (AT 921705). Man was rewarded.)

(b) 091550H. Co H, 2nd Bn, 3d Marines reported that VN children at (AT 920707) found 1 "pineapple" grenade, believed to be old U.S. type. Children brought grenade to Co H. Children were rewarded with 900 P's.

(3) VC use of Religious Buildings. 6 Apr. SMIAT report (F/6). At XUAN HOA (3) (BS 505809) there are two tunnels which have their entrance under the pagoda of XUAN HOA. Each tunnel is approximately 60 meters in length, 3 meters in width and 3 meters in depth. The tunnels are being utilized by the VC for storage of rice and salt. The tunnels have been located at this point since sometime in 1965.

(4) Results of Air Strikes. 12 Apr, THUA THIEN, agent report. The Headquarters of the 95th Regt was hit by airstrikes.

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Exact casualties are unknown, however, many used bandages, used cotton and blood was observed scattered over the area of the Hqs location. The Headquarters of the 95th Regt has subsequently moved to KHE DUNG Mountains (ZC 040927). Approximately 12 cloth shelters have been set up on the side of the canyon; the 810th VC Battalion was hit by an airstrike and has suffered many casualties at (YC 895 996). This unit has withdrawn back thru BEN TAU (YC 895995). Approximately 100 VC were in the Battalion as they withdrew. (G-2 Cmt: A VC Regt was reported vic of (YC 995920) on 27 and 31 March. Airstrikes were called in on this location on 31 March. The 810th Battalion (conf) was previously at location given. Information considered possible, but not confirmed.)

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.



J. E. GORMAN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. REFUGEE, RETURNEE, CAPTIVE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	NCC	1
CG FMFPAC	1	DET 5TH USASF	2	CICV	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CG FLC	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CG 30TH NCR	5	CG CAMP BULTER	
CG 1ST MAW	10	CG 7TH ENGR BN	1	CSC DANANG	1
CG FFORCEV I	1	CG 9TH MT BN	1		
CG FFORCEV II	1	CG 5TH COMM BN	1		
		CMDR NAV SUPPACT	5		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 11

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; *PHU
**810TH BN	CONFIRMED	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG GAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

** 810TH BN BELIEVED TO BE READY FOR OPNS AFTER RECENT REORGANIZATION - REPLACEMENT.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9254	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA VO-XUAN LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 9-AR, 18 SMG	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400?	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG2, 2 57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17 AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XC-LONG TAN
T 19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XC-MINH PC-NINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XC-TRAM KIEW CAPT PHO
*195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T 18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T 20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
460TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW	CO. SR CAPT DAI XO. SR CAPT HONG CON
A 19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO. NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A 21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO. NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO. NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP #11

1. General. Civil disturbances still dominate the scene in I Corps, however, some pro-government activities have appeared on the scene. Some V.C. influence is suspected in the form of propaganda and in speeches. Espionage, conducted by low level agents, still persists and an increase in sabotage planning has been noted. Propaganda and terrorism still share the limelight in V.C. tactics in this area. The direction of these two movements appear to be aimed at undermining the GVN/US pacification effort.

2. Espionage and Sabotage. Danang: On 9 April the Village Chief of Dai La Village (AT 923742) apprehended a Vietnamese female (VCS) in the Village Area. At the time of apprehension she possessed a map revealing USMC artillery battery and defensive positions. CI Comment: The VC is intent on employing English speaking Cadre and Low-level agents, impersonating civilians, priests, ARVN soldiers, etc. in an attempt to penetrate US Compounds and Installations in order to detect relaxed security practices and to conduct espionage and sabotage activities.

The VC are reportedly attempting to emplace explosives in US billets in Danang for the purpose of creating confusion in the city and arousing suspicions. A report received on 14 April indicates that VC agents were tasked to measure the thickness of the walls at the Danang Hotel and to report any increase or changes of the security measures taken since the beginning of the present political unrest. CI Comment: These and other reports received indicate that the VC may be directing their efforts more towards conducting acts of terrorism than sabotage at the present time; however, it is believed that the VC are still attempting to organize an effective sabotage apparatus within the Danang TAOR.

3. Propaganda and Agitation. The VC are sending many guerrillas to pacification areas to combine with local VC to cause political unrest and to gain intelligence for attacks on friendly positions. Such guerrillas were reported to have appeared in Lee Son (AT 980659), Mieu Dong, (BT 016683), Qua Giang (BT 017666), Dong Son (AT 996687) and Phong Le (2) (BT 002704) on 7 April. An agent also reported that the VC are concentrating their forces both North and South of the pacification areas. CI Comment: VC disruption of pacification efforts is a primary target. The VC have continued to apply strong and determined resistance to the joint GVN/USMC pacification operation. The resistance by the military/political infrastructures is supported by well trained VC military elements oriented on destroying and demoralizing the GVN para-military Security forces and reconstruction cadre. Indications are that this effective resistance will continue. If the current resistance trend continues it may be anticipated that tangible evidents of regression of friendly efforts will be forthcoming.

One VC Battalion, with loudspeaker systems, was reported as being in the vicinity of Loc Hung Village (AT 940550) and Loc Phong located at (AT 910550). One VC company was to provide security for the Battalion while they propagandized the villages.

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Broadcasts exhorted the people to contribute agriculture taxes, and youths were urged to join the VC. Another report received indicated that eighty VC entered Dong Tien (2), (BT 014616) on the 14th of April to spread VC propaganda. CI Comment: VC activities are organized around cellular units and terrorism is conducted to impress the population of the futility of expecting GVN protection. Propaganda, agitation and recruitment are conducted on a personal basis.

4. Terrorism: An estimated VC company entered CAO DOI (ZC 084998) and Sach Chu (ZC 085997) and assembled the residents for a lecture entitled "Fight Against Americans". The VC then kidnapped eight residents. A VC platoon was reported to have entered Cam Ne (4) Hamlet (AT 970695) on 7 April. There they assembled the residents and berated them for aiding Government Forces. After the meeting adjourned the VC murdered eight residents by cutting their throats and kidnapped four others. The VC were reported to have attempted to kidnap fifty workers from village located in the vicinities of (AT 983329) and (AT 993332) on 10 April 1966. CI Comment: As in all regions of the RVN, the VC have attempted to gain control of this area at the grass roots level. This is accomplished through terror, coercion, harassment and subversion. Trained VC Cadre follow up these actions and step into the leadership and political vacuum created. The most important element of VC strategy appears to be gaining support of the people. The people furnish the VC food, concealment when necessary, and join their ranks to oppose the government. Without their assistance, whether gained through fear, coercion or voluntarily, the VC could not function. Viet Cong recruiting cadre have been successful, chiefly through appealing to the anarchistic tendencies of the population and the use of terror tactics. Recently, the Viet Cong have resorted to increased taxation and the enforcement of a military draft. These measures may indicate that the VC are losing some of their popular support once enjoyed.

5. Civil Disturbances: Struggle Forces continued to hold rallies and demonstrations during the week. The removal of the VN Marines may have relieved some pressures on the city of Danang - The city itself appears to be returning to normal. This week the markets and stores appeared to be opening again for business. Most of the roadblocks and check points have disappeared and the streets of Danang were cleared of debris. The following demonstrations were conducted:

a. Danang: On 12 April 3000 persons gathered under the theme (Down with the formation of National Assembly). Another 2000 assembled on the 16th to continue the same protest. This activity was followed with a demonstration parade through town - one banner read: "U. S. should not interfere or support the National Assembly." Both activities were sponsored by the Struggle Forces.

b. Hue: On 12 April, 6000 persons assembled, under the sponsorship of the Struggle Forces, to protest the formation of a National Assembly.

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On 15 April pro-government elements conducted a parade through the streets of Hue, calling for the people to back the present administration calling for an increase in the rural pacification program.

c. Tam Ky: On 15 April, Tam Ky was the site of two demonstrations. One sponsored by the Struggle Forces, protesting the formation of the National Assembly - 3500 persons in attendance. The other activity was anti-Struggle Forces in nature and thanked the U.S. for their cooperation in stemming the VC tide.

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Annex C (CAPTIVES, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) to III MAF PERINTREP No. 11

	<u>CAPTIVE</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		*VCS		
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC			
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	31	0	0	93		
Present Location							
All released to ARVN authority							
		<u>CHU LAI</u>					
		<u>DANANG</u>					
	0	31	0	0	93		
		<u>PHU BAI</u>					
Status of Interrogation							
		<u>Completed</u>	0	31	0	0	93
		<u>In Progress</u>	0	0	0	0	0

* 3 ARVN Deserters - Not included in above total.

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Copy of 75 Copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 260800H April 1966
 Ser: **048266**

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PERINTREP NO. 12

Period Covered: 170001H to 232400H April 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. A major engagement with elements of the 1st VC Regiment took place in QUANG NGAI province during the period. The VC continued their standard harassment attacks and mining activity throughout the zone and in Danang, launched a well executed assault on an artillery position.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. Operation VIRGINIA commenced 17 April in the KHE SANH area. Extensive patrolling to the north of the Special Forces camp failed to locate any VC elements. GOLDEN FLEECE operations in the vicinity of PHU BAI encountered sporadic VC resistance while protecting local villagers in the Spring rice harvest. Of interest was the ambush by a VC company sized force of a PF platoon at YD 207767, less than 5 km south of the demarkation line. This ambush was within 2 km of a 2 March VC attack on a National Police patrol.

(a) PHU BAI TAOR. No significant enemy activity was reported during the period.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Operation GEORGIA commenced 21 April in the vicinity of AN HOA (AT 8746). No significant enemy activity was encountered.

(a) DANANG TAOR. At 180200H April, a well organized assault by an estimated 45 VC penetrated an artillery battery position at (AT 923793). The VC were armed with AK's, B40 rocket launchers, satchel charges and grenades and attacked simultaneously from 3 sides. The VC withdrew at approximately 0515. Coordinated small arms and mortar fire was placed on another nearby artillery battery and road approaches had been mined. It is noted that this attack took place in the west center of the Danang TAOR which has been in the past few months the area of least VC activity in the TAOR. Combined with the 21 February attack against an artillery battery at (AT 988672) and the 23 March attack against 8" howitzer positions at (BT 525070), this is the third deliberate attack against USMC artillery positions in as many months.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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PERINTREP

#12

17-23 Apr 66

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(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. The area northwest of QUANG NGAI city was again the scene of a major encounter with VC units. In rapid response to information received 20 April by the 2d ARVN Division from a defector from the 1st VC Regiment, operation HOT SPRINGS (LIEN KET 36) began 21 April against positions identified by the defector as locations of the Regimental CP and two battalions of the 1st VC Regiment. Extensive preparatory fires were followed by sporadic heavy contacts throughout the day with VC company and battalion size units in an area approximately 10 miles northwest of QUANG NGAI city. By the 22nd, the VC had abandoned the area. 142 VC were KIA by USMC action. I Corps reported 207 VC KIA (110 US Confirmed) for operation LIEN KET 36. Operation NEVADA in the BATANGAN peninsula area, which began on 12 April, concluded 17 April with a total of 50 VC KIA by USMC and 18 VC KIA by ARVN forces. The combined operation uncovered and destroyed extensive and elaborate cave-tunnel complexes in the area but met with no large enemy forces.

(a) CHU LAI TAOR. Sporadic VC activity throughout the TAOR was marked by a company size VC attack on 20 April against Company H, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines positions at (BT 401149). The VC attack began at approximately 0225 hours. A heavy volume of VC fire lasted approximately 15 minutes with 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and an estimated 2000 rounds of SA fire and 3 grenades. Anti-tank positions received AW and 57mm HR fire. The VC withdrew to the west with light SA fire being employed for approximately an hour in covering their withdrawal. Villagers later reported that VC had suffered 25 KIA.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents increased during the reporting period with a total of 255. Incidents consisted of: 131 harassing fires, 94 AA fires, 24 mine/booby trap, 2 attacks, 2 propaganda, 1 ambush and 1 sabotage.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(2) 16 April. Tactics. 1st MAW reported two dummies dressed in black P. J.'s in trench vicinity (BS 570911) and an estimated 15 straw dummies in rice paddy vicinity (BS 468933). (G-2 Cmt: This VC tactic is possibly used as a flak and/or ground troop trap. This is the second report of this tactic in this same general area. Refer to para 2.d.(2) of III MAF PERINTREP NO. 6)

(2) 20 April. Tactics. 51st ARVN Regimental Hqs. Report received that VC would initiate what was described as a new tactic in the employment of their mortars in the attack phase in that they would concentrate 5-10 mortars in one general location, fire a prescribed number of rounds per mortar then quickly disassemble the mortar and vacate the area before counter-mortar fire could be brought to bear. (P/3).

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(3) New Weapons. CHICOM FLAME THROWER. (II FORCEV PERINTREP NR 13). At 092300 April, a VC unit estimated at battalion strength attacked TUEK NEON (XS 200625) employing a flame thrower against buildings in the compound. The flame thrower, which was subsequently captured, was the first employed by VC in the IV Corps Area (Source: 5th Special Forces). G-2 III MAF Cnt: There is no record of VC use of flame throwers in ICTZ.

(4) VC Attack Tactics.

(a) In the past three months, the VC have conducted eight attacks involving physical assault against USMC positions. With one exception, the attacks listed below do not include those occurring during the conduct of major operations which could fall into the category of counter attacks. The 25 March attack occurred during operation KINGS but the attack occurred within the TAOR and the attacking unit had not been recently engaged.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Primary Target</u>
21 Feb 66	0155	DANANG	105mm HOW Btry
21 Feb 66	0200	CHU LAI	Inf Co
26 Feb 66	0245	CHU LAI	Inf plt psn
23 Mar 66	0215	CHU LAI	8" HOW posn
25 Mar 66	0030	DANANG	Inf Bn patrol base
16 Apr 66	0405	DANANG	Inf Co
18 Apr 66	0145	DANANG	105mm HOW Btry
20 Apr 66	0225	CHU LAI	Inf plt psn

(b) Certain similarities are apparent

(1) All of the attacks occurred during nights of little or no moonlight (on 16 April, the moon rose at 0347).

(2) 60mm Mortar fire was used in each attack, either against the primary target or a neighboring unit.

(3) Attacks in each incident began at close range, (on the 25 March attack, bullocks were used to screen the approach).

(4) Attacking units were generally well armed.

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Recoilless rifles, grenades, rocket launchers and assault rifles characterized most of the above. In the case of both attacks against 105 Howitzer positions, satchel charges were used.

(5) Withdrawals appear to have been carefully planned in each case.

(6) In almost all cases, the above attacks reveal an excellent knowledge of the terrain and defensive installations in the immediate area of the attack. Most of the above positions were of a semi-permanent nature (the major exception, the 25 March incident, was the most costly for the VC).

(5) 16 Apr. Weapons. THUA THIEN agent report (SMLAT C/3). A VC artillery Bn armed with 3 120mm Mortars and 1 105mm Howitzer located vicinity NHANH Canyon (YD 714036) and NHU Canyon (YD 706005). Bn commanded by VINH SUNG. (G-2 Cmt: F/3, this is the general area of PHU LIM Secret Zone. 2 VC companies were reported in this area with AA guns on 18 March. First report of 105mm in this area).

e. Negative

f. Admin Units

(1) 12 April. VC Detention Area. SMLAT report (F/6). There is a VC detainee compound at NUOC DUNG (BS 215789). The installation consists of eight structures, each approximately 20 meters in length. There are about 100 Montagnards being detained here. 200 VC are also located in this area.

(2) 13 April. SMLAT agent report (C). A VC training camp is located at HOEN SUOI Mountain (YD 754103). Camp is comprised of two palm leaf huts built side by side. Approximately 400 troops are undergoing training here. Course started in April and lasts two months. (G-2 Cmt: F/3, Second report of a VC training site in this general area. Refer to para 2.f.(1) of III MAF PERINTREP NO. 8. Coordinates should read: (YD 6508 vice YD 868157).

(3) 15 April. VC District Committee. QUANG NGAI agent report (F/5). A VC district committee is located in VINH LOC (BS 536 807). The chief of the intelligence section is NGUYEN KIEN, a resident of THO LOC (BS 547766). The offices of the committee are located in a tunnel in VINH LOC. Approximately 20 VC cadre work at this location.

g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA incidents involving III MAF A/C reflected a 13% increase over last period with a total of 95. 27 A/C were hit by a total of 48 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were BS 5080, AT 9050, BT 4000 and YD 8000. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. 8 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

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- i. Negative
- j. Negative
- k. Artillery/Hvy Mortars

(1) 15 Apr. THUA THIEN agent report (SMLAT C/3). Two VC Bns armed with an unknown number of 120mm mortars and various other weapons are located in the vicinity of XD 8950. (G-2 Eval: F/3).

(2) 15 Apr. THUA THIEN agent report (SMLAT C/3). Two VC Bns armed with unknown number of 120mm mortars located in the vicinity of LIEP canyon (YD 765085) and DAY canyon (YD 732102). (G-2 Cmt: F/4; previous reports of company sized units in this area. AO checked area with negative results.)

(3) 6 Apr. QUANG TRI agent report (C/3, 5th SFG). 300 NVA troops armed with one 120mm mortar and 8 81mm mortars located vicinity XD 913478. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; possible elements of NVA Regiment reported in this area on 2 April. Refer to para 2.s.(2) of III MAF PERINTREP NO. 10).

l-s. Negative

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. A total of 233 VC were KIA as a result of USMC actions during the reporting period.
- f. Morale. Considered good.
- g. New Enemy Defenses, Mines, Fortifications, Barriers, Defensive Works and Booby traps.

(1) 15 April. AO report new fighting holes, covered trenches, bunkers and AA positions in villages at (YD 556254) and (YD 557242). New AA positions at (YD 600242).

(2) 16 April. AO reports villages at (YD 105511), (YD 112511) and (YD 109501) are fortified with trenches throughout.

(3) 20 April. AO report. Extensive new work on old trench and new fighting holes, (YD 552248).

(4) 20 April. 4th Marines. A heavily fortified Hamlet is located at (YD 539289).

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(5) 17 April. AO report. Extensive trenchlines, caves, and fortifications in vicinity (AT 9151).

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Generally fair weather prevailed over I Corps during the reporting period. South and southwesterly flows produced partly cloudy to cloudy skies, stratus, thunderstorms and showers throughout the period. Winds averaged 5-10 knots from the East. Visibility averaged 6 miles, temperatures ranged from an average 90° high to 76° low.

k. Captive, Returnee, Refugee report. Annex C.

l. Other significant Intelligence.

(1) 11 Apr. Communications. SMIAT report, (F/6). The VC have constructed a tunnel (site unk) at the foot of the mountain (hill?) in KHANH MY (1) vicinity BS 554848. The tunnel is being used as a communications center with radio and telephone equipment installed. A field hospital was also reported at this location staffed by four women.

(2) 12 Apr. Rice Storage Area. SMIAT report (F/6). Four VC rice storage houses, covered with thatch, are located at BS 558456. The houses are guarded by two VC montagnards.

(3) 20 Apr. "County Fair" Operations. USMC LO assigned to 51st ARVN Regt reported the results of "County Fair" operations conducted in the HA DONG hamlet area (AT 996643) during the period 19-20 April. There were 4 VC KIA, 12 VCC and 10 VCS apprehended. The report stated that these twelve VC were identified from documents discovered on the bodies of the dead VC, and included five females and seven males with duties ranging from VC hamlet chief to supply sergeant. The report added that one U. S. carbine, cal .30 (M-1), one bag of medicines (Unidentified), two bags of documents and one SONY radio were recovered during the operation. In addition, a total of eight tunnels were destroyed. Among the VC captured was one NGUYEN NHONG, identified as the VC committee chief of HA DONG.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 12

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONFIRMED	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
** 810TH BN	CONFIRMED	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PC-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

** 810TH BN BELIEVED TO BE READY FOR OPNS AFTER RECENT REORGANIZATION - REPLACEMENT.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R 20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R 21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM MORT 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA VO-XUAN LAM NGUYEN DUC
R 22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R 23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R 24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400?	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCE LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-BRG-2, 2 57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17 AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW CAPT PHO
*195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T 18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T 20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
400TH ARTY BN	CONF	200	BT 3005	2-81MM MORT 2-75MM HOW 2-70MM GUNS 1-105MM HOW	CO-SR CAPT DAI XO-SR CAPT HONG CON
A 19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A 21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-LMG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP NUMBER 12

1. General. A general subsiding of civil disturbances, except for recent hostilities between opposing forces in QUANG NGAI, has been observed within the ICTZ. Buddhist leaders appear to have, at least for the time being, stemmed present demonstration activities. On the other hand the V.C. have continued their activities. Propaganda still appears to head the list with several acts of terrorism against the populace. Recent indications that the VC may be becoming more bold in infiltration was the recent cutting of communication lines prior to a VC attack.

2. Espionage and Sabotage. A report of 14 April indicated that one VC company deployed at (BT 0366), is possibly a guerrilla unit of Hoa Vang District. On 13 April a report was received that district cadre combined with guerrillas were used as guides to agents attempting to infiltrate the city of Danang for sabotage activities. One VC company commanded by Nguyen-Dien is reportedly located in Vinh-Xuan Village in the vicinity (BT 096607). This company has the mission of sabotaging Route #1 from Hoi An (BT 145576) to Vinh-Dien (BT 059582).

On 18 April three wires of a series of 25 were reported to have been cut in the vicinity of (AT 948763). All three wires were communication lines leading to an Artillery Battery which was attacked early on the morning of 18 April. CI Comment: The VC means of conducting sabotage operations appear to be crude and sometimes ineffective, however, their sabotage operations have caused a large percentage of our effort and forces to be directed towards the security of support areas. The VC are considered to have the capability of neutralizing many targets which they may deem appropriate, except for the larger military bases in the ICTZ. Sabotage incidents have been fairly equally distributed among road, road bridge, railroad, and railroad bridge sabotage.

3. Propaganda and Agitation. VC propaganda leaflets directed at U.S. servicemen and more pointedly toward the Negro servicemen has been noted throughout South Vietnam. The Viet Cong have used leaflets, classes, political lectures, newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and whisper campaigns as propaganda media to further subversion in the ICTZ. Reports received on 18 April indicate the VC are attempting to lure the Americans into committing crimes such as rape, plundering of peoples properties with tangible evidences; all aimed at creating adverse U.S. impressions among the populace. Since the rural people are considered to be light-hearted and easy believers, they may be swayed to fear and hate Americans, due to the Viet Cong's efforts. One of the VC's main purposes is to sow the thought that the USA is a colonialist, imperialist country in order to distort the US anti-communist policy and at the same time to inveigle the masses to support the VC in the present war. The VC continue to urge the people to make greater sacrifices in the name of the "Cause"; greater economic support is a necessity and intensification of struggle movements and other social movement propaganda work is indicated. In addition the VC appear to focus heavily on military victories, disintegration of the GVN Forces, impotence of the American Forces, appeals to US servicemen to demand their return to America and to their families.

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4. Terrorism: The VC in Quang Nam Province are reportedly paying bounties for assassination of government cadre. A report received on 16 April indicates the deputy chief (Ngo Hinh) of Dong Xuan Hamlet in the vicinity of (BT 487117), Ky Xuan Island was assassinated on the night of 16 April. Another report indicated that the VC have ordered a number of suicide cadre to infiltrate secure areas to assassinate Government and Military cadre of RVN.

A report of 6 April indicates that 20 VC kidnapped 24 government officials at CHAU-TU hamlet number two, Binh-Thang Village, Binh Son District. Seven were released the following morning. The remainder were reportedly held at Thanh-TARA hamlet number two in the vicinity of (BS 533946). CI comments: Other reports received indicate the Viet Cong are continuing to attempt to gain support of the villagers through terrorism and other acts which tend to prove their point that the US and GVN cannot guarantee protection of pacified areas.

5. Civil Disturbances: During the early part of the week Struggle Forces appeared to be continuing in their attempts to project their political image. A practice alert was conducted by the Struggle Forces at 1400 on 17 April 1966. Roadblocks and check points again dotted many of the main thoroughfares in Danang, and both ARVN and civilians took up positions throughout the city. This activity however, was called off an hour later as quickly as it was formed. A sudden halt came to the future planned demonstration when Buddhist leader Tri Quang visited Danang on the 8th. Although one demonstration preceded Quang's visit, 16 April 1966, and one followed on the day of his arrival, both of these were peaceful and well organized. Quang asked during a news broadcast that the struggle should continue but should also be orderly. Earlier on the 18th Quang had visited Hue where he was greeted by some 5000 persons who conducted a well organized and orderly demonstration.

Elsewhere, Quang Ngai became the site of the most heated exchange between pro and anti-government forces to date. Some shots were exchanged between opposing elements which resulted in the death of 5 persons, with several more placed in the hospital. However, at the close of the reporting period, all things being equal, there seems to be a gradual subsiding of hostilities within Quang Ngai, and throughout the ICFZ.

On 16 April, approximately 400 women and children of Binh - Thuan Village approached a USMC unit at (BS 629992), in an attempt to get the Marines to stop shelling Tan-Hy #2 Hamlet and Binh-Thuan Village. The people were told to return to their homes. They were further told that if they had any complaints, the men of Tan-Hy #2 Hamlet should return with the names of the people supposedly killed during the shelling of the hamlet five days before. The crowd dispersed. Approximately 50 minutes after the first demonstration, about 50 women and children returned to the same area for the same purpose. CI comments: Other reports received indicate that the VC were suspected of planning demonstrations with the intent to intersperse VC suicide troops among them. These demonstrations were reportedly planned for Binh-Son District Headquarters at some unknown future date. One demonstration did take place on 3 March 1966, at (BS 628993), and during

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this demonstration USMC units received approximately twenty rounds of small arms fire. Interrogations of suspects revealed that the 3 March activity was VC inspired. It is possible that the above demonstration was also VC inspired and possibly more such demonstrations can be expected in the near future.

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Annex C (CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT) to III MAF PERINTREP No. 12

	<u>CAPTIVES</u>		<u>RETURNEES</u>		VCS	
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
Number captured or acquired during reporting period	0	11	0	0	68	
Present Location						
	<u>Chu Lai</u>	0	0	0	0	
All released to ARVN authority	<u>Danang</u>	0	9	0	58	
	<u>Phu Bai</u>	0	2	0	10	
Status of Interrogation						
	Completed	0	11	0	0	68
	In Progress	0	0	0	0	0

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Copy _____ of _____ Copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG 030800H May 1966
 Ser: **051166**

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PERINTREP NO. 13

Period Covered: 240001H to 302400H April 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No Change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. Friendly operations throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone failed to establish any significant enemy contact. Normal VC harassing activity continued in all areas.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN. Operation Virginia continued in the KHE SANH area and on 27 April became a reconnaissance in force along route 9 from KHE SANH towards the coast with no VC activity encountered. VC activity was generally light throughout the two Northern provinces with one ineffective mortar attack against the Citadel airfield and bridges near HUE at 242300H.

(a) PHU BAI TAOR. Only minor harassing fire and mining incidents reported during the period.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR - DANANG TAOR. Operation Georgia continued in the AN HOA (AT 8746) area with wide sweeps encountering sporadic resistance. VC were sighted in groups as large as 40-50 but avoided direct contact.

(a) DANANG TAOR. VC harassing fire and mining incidents continued in the TAOR with the largest number of incidents in the Southern sector.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. The area Northwest of QUANG NGAI City continues to be the scene of reports of battalion and regimental movements. Indications have been received that elements of the 1st VC regiment which exfiltrated the area during Operation HOT SPRINGS are in the process of returning. Agent reports indicate the movement of a new regimental size unit entering the area. If true, this could be either a build-up or simply replacements for the heavy casualties suffered by the 1st VC and 36th NVA (21st) Regiments. In any case, following operations UTAH, TEXAS, INDIANA and HOT SPRINGS, the return of VC units to this locality indicates a tenacious endeavor to maintain control in spite of serious reverses.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
 Declassified after 12 years

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III
 MAF
 PERINTREP #13

24-30
 April 66

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(a) CHU LAI TAOR. VC harassment incidents continued within the TAOR. Operation WYOMING was conducted 26-30 April to the immediate North-west of the TAOR with no significant enemy contact.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. 209 VC initiated incidents occurred during the reporting period. Incidents consisted of: 103 harassing fires, 82 AA fires, 22 mine/booby trap, 1 hamlet harassment and 1 sabotage.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment

(1) Tactics. Following information extracted from FFORCEV PERINTREP NO. 6. 1/CAV reports when elements of 2/12 CAV had VC in cross-fire, 2 VC called in English, "hold your fire, we're friendly, don't shoot". When artillery was adjusted on VC, Bn mortars heard radio transmission on their frequencies, "cease fire, cease fire, you are hitting friendly troops". Several other attempts to pass false information over nearly all Bn radio nets were heard. This instance indicates a proficiency by VC in learning English phrases.

(2) Tactics. SA, HIEU DUC District Headquarters report. Friendly forces should be cautious of VC who attempt to surrender in groups of 2 or 3. There have been recent incidents whereby the VC have turned on friendly forces with grenades and carbines.

- e. Negative
- f. Admin Units

(1) 19 April. MINH LONG agent report. There is one VC dispensary equipped with 100 beds located (BS 578494). Dispensary is also reported to have a Red Chinese doctor. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; this is third report of medical facility in this area, second report of Chinese doctor.)

(2) 19 April. TRA BONG agent report. VC have set up a training center vicinity (BS 276924). 1000 trainees began training on 12 April and upon completion, will be sent to main force Battalions. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; Recon operations in this area have resulted in negative sightings.)

(3) 20 April. THUA THIEN agent report. (SMIAT rated (C)). A VC hospital comprised of seven small thatched huts and one large hut with a tin roof is located at ALA (YD 500125). This large hut has a room for surgery, fluorescent lights and a generator located underground behind it.

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Elephants are also located in this area to carry wounded and medical supplies. Approximately 80 young women and 40 young men (ages 16-20) are attending a medical course at this site. Approximately 100 VC armed with automatic weapons and machine guns guard this area. (G-2 Cmt: F/3)

g. Negative

h. Air Defense. Antiaircraft fire incidents involving III MAF A/C reflected a decrease of 22% in comparison with the last reporting period. A total of 21 A/C were hit with 30 rounds for the 74 incidents reported. Grid squares of highest density were BS 5090, BS 0060 and AT 9050. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. There was one report of 12.7mm fire.

i. Negativej. Negativek. Artillery/Heavy Mortars

(1) 19 April. 120 Mortars. SMIAT rated C/3. The 812th Bn armed with an unknown number of B-40 RR, 82mm and 120mm Mortars is deployed from YD 601246 to YD 613166. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; 300 VC reported in training camp at this location on 27 March. If the 812th is stationed here, it is possible that a 120 Mortar is attached to its combat support company.)

(2) 12 Apr. 1st ARVN Division agent report. (C/3) An estimated VC Regiment armed with 120 Mortars, 8-81mm Mortars has infiltrated SVN and is located in the vicinity of XD 890500, XD 910470 and XD 913478. 4 elephants are used to carry ammunition and supplies. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; Second report of a large concentration of VC armed with 120mm, 81mm Mortars and four elephants at this location.)

(3) 28 April. I Corps Adv Gp Captive report. C-22 120mm Mortar Co. I Corps Advisory Group reports the apprehension on 25 April of VCC NUONG MINH CHANG, member of C-22 120mm Mortar Co. Significant information obtained indicated present location of Company is in vicinity of (YD 268-385). Armament include 4 120mm Mortars, strength 200 men. The VCC is a North Vietnamese. His information relates to that of 18 March rallier NGUYEN MINH KHAI. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; Second report of C-22 120mm Mortar Co. Refer to para 2. k. (1) of III MAF PERINTREP NO. 10).

4. Negative3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS**CONFIDENTIAL**

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- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 110 VC were KIA by USMC during the reporting period.
- f. Morale. Considered good.
- g. Enemy Defenses, Mines, Fortifications, Barriers, Defensive Works, and Booby Traps.

(1) 26 April. AO report. HMM-163 pilot reported a freshly cut trail at (YD 559293) and three new trenches along north side of trail located in grid square (YD 5529).

(2) 28 April. AO reports. 3 circular gun positions, two camouflaged, one new without camouflage located at (BS 793850). 50 Anti-Helo stakes, 6' tall, located in a small clearing at (BS 249883); Anti-Helo stakes on top and east side of hill (BS 676985); Anti-Helo stakes on hill top covering a 20m x 20m area. Stakes 8-10' tall.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. The weather picture in I Corps was generally fair during the reporting period. Partly cloudy skies, thunderstorms and showers prevailed in the mountain areas and in the latter portion of the period, rain was recorded in the lowlands. Temperatures ranged from 95° high to 79° low. Winds were out of the south and averaged 5-10 knots. Visibility 7 mi.

k. Negative.

l. Other Significant Intelligence

(1) 20 April. Results of Airstrikes. SMIAT (C). The VC training camp that had been located at MU COI Canyon (YD 670075) has moved to a new location after being hit by an airstrike. New location and casualties are unknown. (G-2 Cmt: F/3, possibly same training camp reported in para 2. f. (2) of III MAF PERINTREP NO. 12.).

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(2) 26 April. VC commerce. Natl Police (C/4). VC Economic Team used junks from vicinity (BS 830420) to go to NHA TRANG and PHAN THIET to buy fish sauce, nylon, medicines, roofing materials and cloth. Junks returned to (BS 830420) and off-loaded supplies which were then carried by laborers to storage areas in the mountains (loc unk). (G-2 Cmt: F/3, Third report of VC junk usage at above location).

(3) 29 April. Rice Storage Area. SMIAT Report. During the period from 1-5 Apr 66, residents of the Subdistricts of KY SON, KY TRA, and KY YEN in TAM KY District were drafted into labor force to haul more than 10 tons of husked rice from above Subdistricts to SAU DONG Pass (local name) (BT 244077). The husked rice is contained in 50 kilo bags. At the storage site, bags of rice were stacked into 10 separate stacks and each stack was covered with an OD color nylon sheet, instead of storing the rice supply in the fixed buildings. The OD nylon sheet is to protect the rice from the weather and also to serve as camouflage from aerial observation. The placement of rice supply in the open is to facilitate quick removal in case of air strikes. The choice of this present site as their rice storage area is the result of the VC reasoning that the area had been hit by airstrikes on few occasions causing heavy losses in personnel and equipment to the VC, so there will not be another airstrike. The rice supply is a grave problem and of concern to the VC in this area. The air attacks as well as air delivery of chemical defoliants by the friendly aircraft have caused much losses to their rice crops and the VC are suffering from serious rice shortage for their regular units. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(4) 29 April. VC Tunnel Complex. SMIAT (F). In 1964 the VC completed two (2) underground tunnels called the "combat tunnels", in PHU VINH THUONG Village (BT 1614), PHUOC TIEN Sub-district, TIEN PHUOC District. The main entrance to the first tunnel is located on the river bank behind the house of Mr TRAM (alias PHU TRAM) at (BT 164146). This tunnel has two (2) branches, one leads to (BT 189154) in DONG TRUNG Hamlet, and the other leads to (BT 179142) a market area in LIEN HUONG Hamlet. Both of these tunnels lead to Rural Road #9. The main entrance to the second tunnel is located behind the house of Mr KHUONG (alias THAY KHUONG) at (BT 165142) and the entrance is also on the river bank. This tunnel leads to an area known locally as CAU VOI Bridge (BT 172140). The construction of these tunnels took (8) months to complete. The tunnels are more than three (3) meters deep and 1.5 meters wide, and they zig zag the entire length of approximately 6,000 meters. The tops of the tunnels are reinforced with timber and covered with soil and grasses. The tunnels are well camouflaged where they run under open areas. One (1) VC Regular Platoon guards the main entrances to the tunnels in PHU VINH THUONG Village. The members of this platoon are living in nearby civilian houses. The main entrances of the two (2) tunnels are considered to be an important communication-liaison points by the VC. These tunnels can handle movement of troops up to regimental size units from various areas along the Route #9. Friendly airstrikes against this tunnel complex during 2-6 Apr 66 burned all the houses in the vicinity of the tunnel entrances but did not damage the main entrances or the tunnels. (G-2 Eval: F/6).

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(5) Exfiltration Tactics. The following extract from 1stMARDIV INTSUM No. 29 is presented as an example of VC withdrawal/exfiltration planning:

The following is a summary of all available information on the movements and locations of the 1st VC Regt subsequent to the initiation of operation "HOT SPRINGS". The defector from the 1st VC Regt, whose statements largely generated this operation, indicated that when the Regt was contacted by a significant enemy force, the VC would wait until dark and exfiltrate the battle area southward. They would then cross the TRA KHUC River, turn west and then turn north near the DA SON area. They would recross the river, continue north into VINH TUY and then turn east and move back into the SON CHAU and VINH LOC area where they started. This movement was to require approximately 6 days. This information was corroborated by a SMIAT agent. He reported that at (BS 516814), at 1800H on the 1st day of HOT SPRINGS, April 21st, his unit was directed to secure 6 days rations, cache their weapons and exfiltrate the area in 3 and 4 man groups. They were to blend into the population and avoid contact with friendly forces. They were directed to regroup at (BS 516814) in 6 days. During the 1st day of the operation, it was apparent the VC were utilizing refugee columns as a cover to escape. The next day, the 22d, a SMIAT agent reported a 400 man unit had just arrived from a battle with USMC and ARVN Forces at (BS 485813). The unit had traveled in groups of 30 to 40 men each. Also on the 23rd an agent reported 36 wounded VC were carried to the vicinity of (BS 470893) and (BS 477892). On the 25th, a PAT agent reported an unidentified unit involved in HOT SPRINGS was located in the area of (BS 440745), (BS 440763), (BS 460745) and (BS 460763). (G-2 Cmt: The basic exfiltration and movement plan has thus far been carried out with a few deviations. These deviations were probably due to battlefield expedients rather than a change in the plan. Thus, it is possible that the plan will be essentially carried through and the 1st VC Regt will again locate in the HOT SPRINGS area. It should be pointed out, however, that the time frame may be altered and extended so that the Regiment can recruit 300 plus troops to replace their personnel casualties and also obtain replacements for the crew served weapons lost.

(6) 29 Apr. Results of Airstrikes. SMIAT report (F). On 13 April, an airstrike with incendiary bombs was conducted against a VC rice storage area located at (BT 070462) and on a mountain slope at (BT 045-453). The strike caused large fires in these areas and most of the rice was destroyed. The destruction of the rice supply is reportedly causing the Local VC guerrillas to wonder if they are going to starve. The VC suspect they have been betrayed by local residents who informed friendly forces of the storage area.

(7) 26 Apr. "COUNTY FAIR" Operation. Another highly successful County Fair operation was conducted by Company M, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment at THANH QUIT Village (BT 054-635). An unidentified VC force was engaged during the day, 26 April, with ARVN forces reporting 45 VC KIA and 17 VCC, 14 individual weapons and numerous grenades were captured and 1 sketch of the Danang Airfield was seized.

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.

J. H. Fisher
T. H. FISHER

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
C.

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG FMFPAC	1	DET C-1 5TH USSF	2	CICV	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	10	CO FLC	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	10	CO 30TH NCR	9	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CG 1ST MAW	10	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1	CSC DANANG	1
CG FFORCEV I	1	CO 9TH MT BN	1		
CG FFORCEV II	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1		
		CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG	5		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 13

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
**810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-LMG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

** 810TH BN BELIEVED TO BE READY FOR OPNS AFTER RECENT REORGANIZATION - REPLACEMENT.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY HUYEN	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
W/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SB CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400?	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-RPG-2, 2 57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17 AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; MY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW, CAPT PHO
*195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT'D)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

* RECENT REPORTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 36TH NVA REGT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI TAOR.

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP NO. 13

1. GENERAL: The period of political unrest appears to have subsided within the ICTZ. One demonstration was reported as being conducted in HOI AN. VC activities still appear to be centered on propaganda and proselyting the populace in areas which they control. Recent unrest has also created conditions where by the VC have reportedly been able to infiltrate agents into major cities, villages and hamlets, for espionage, sabotage and terrorism purposes.
2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE. A late report of 14 April indicated that two VC regular companies located at Tra-Nam (BT 146538) and Tra-Dong (BT 160546) hamlets have sent VC agents into Hoi-An and Hieu-Nhon to collect information about the Military authorities and organizations in this area. Another report revealed that female cadre have been observed frequenting Vinh Dien and Thanh-Quit markets reportedly for the purpose of collecting information. A report of 19 April indicated five young girls and forty other youths, disguised in Scout uniforms, were working as intelligence agents in the hamlets and townships in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 055545). Three Vietnamese boys were observed walking north along the Phu Bai Defense perimeter (YD 883183) on 13 April, with several water buffalo. One youth carried a long stick, with which he drew sketches on the ground pointing out defensive positions of the Phu Bai Installation. CI Comments: The above reports and other reports received would indicate that the VC are continuing to organize, recruit and train low-level agents with particular attention given to employing small children and female agents. In taking advantage of the political unrest in DaNang and Hoi An, the VC have sent a number of agents disguised as students, merchants and military servicemen (armed with light weapons or hand grenades) to these areas. Their purpose is to assassinate GVN officials and emplace explosives in public offices and American billets.
3. EXTORTION. The VC continue to force the populace to contribute rice and other staples to the VC Food Fund. As indicated by recent reports, a VC Farmers Association section chief has reportedly collected food for the VC in the vicinity of (BT 052441).
4. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION. Reports indicate a continuation of the propaganda/agitation effort by the VC with emphasis being placed on the present political unrest in central Viet Nam. In Quang Tri Province: Anti-war, anti-conscription themes remain strong. The number of English language leaflets appear to have slightly increased, with some direction pointing toward the "Vietnik" activity in the U. S.

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Thua Thien Province: Proselytizing efforts against civil servants, including threats against relatives if the civil servants do not defect, appear predominant. Anti-war theme continues to be strong, including social-movement propaganda activities against artillery shelling and GVN military operations. Increased use of sophisticated leaflets has been noted. Quang Nam Province: VC infiltrated demonstrations were apparent throughout Quang Nam Province during the recent political unrest. Reports have indicated that the VC plan to use the political situation to infiltrate several cadre into Danang for the purpose of organizing cells to destroy public installations and to cause agitation. Quang Ngai Province: A relatively low-level of agitation-propaganda activity has been noted; VC activity in general appears to be keyed to GVN's pacification programs. A VC company presently at KHE DAU, approximately in the vicinity of (BT 069484), (BT 037497) and (BT 077476), reportedly has the mission of keeping the people calm and "consolidating" hamlets which have been bombed. They are also to block US/ARVN forces if and when the opportunity occurs. Another report revealed that the VC in both Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces have begun a campaign called, "LY QUE THANH" (Penetration into URBAN areas from RURAL areas). The objective of this campaign is to infiltrate hard core VC into cities, province headquarters and district seats. Their mission is to contact the underground VC agents already operating in their respective areas, to assist in political agitation activities, and to assassinate hostile individuals.

5. TERRORISM. VC cadres with missions to assassinate GVN cadres and PF's are indicated by reports of numerous assassinations in the past week. On 13 April 1966, the assistant Hamlet Chief of Hamlet number one, Ky Xuan Village, LY-TIN District, located in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 483115) was assassinated. On 18 April 1966 an unidentified member of the Hue Junk Fleet was assassinated while home on leave at HOA-AN Hamlet, KY-HOA Village, LY-TIN District located at (BT 457157). On 24 April, Mr. CU, Village Chief of KY KHUONG Village, LY-TIN District was assassinated in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 465077). Twelve VC surrounded the house where CU was sleeping. Two VC entered the house, threatened the owner of the house, and shot CU and his girlfriend. On 27 April PHAN THUYET, Chairman of Danang VNQDD City Committee, was shot and killed at the intersection of Nguyen Thi Gian and Day H Long streets in the city of Danang. A report was received that VC in the vicinity of (BT 2334) on 24 April killed 1 member of the Political Action Team and kidnapped six civilians.

6. CIVIL DISTURBANCES: Civil disorder within the ICFZ has apparently subsided during the reporting period. Recent moves by governing officials to outlaw mass assemblies, rallies and demonstrations, unless prior approval is received from the Government may be considered one of the curtailing factors for the decrease in spontaneous gatherings. New curfew laws, 2100 to 0600, have also been placed in effect within the Quang Nam Special Sector. One demonstration was observed in Hoi An on 27 April when approximately 2500 persons gathered to conduct an anti-struggle forces and pro-government rally. The assembly appeared orderly and well organized; there were no reported incidents.

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Copy 1 of 1 Copies
 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 100800 May 1966
 Ser: **053966**

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PERINTREP NO. 14

Period Covered: 010001H to 072400H May 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. A number of low level reports were received indicating the possible movement of battalion and regimental size units but no significant enemy action was reported in the I Corps Area during the period.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Operation Virginia concluded 1 May with no contact established. Operation CHEROKEE began on 5 May in the CO BI - THANH TAN area to the West of HUE. Only sporadic enemy activity was encountered.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. The VC continued to avoid contact with Marines engaged in Operation Georgia, although VC were observed in the AN HOA area in multi-platoon units. In the rest of the province, low level reports indicated the presence of several battalions and various sources reported regimental groupings. Rumors of VC efforts to commemorate May Day failed to result in any significant action.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Movements of regimental size VC forces were reported frequently with indications being received that the 36th (AKA 6th, 21st) NVA Regiment had moved from the QUANG NGAI scene of its losses (Operations UTAH and TEXAS), back towards its previous operational area in QUANG TIN. The 1st VC regiment was believed to have returned to the area NW of QUANG NGAI city and many reports indicated the movement into that area of the 18th NVA and/or the 2nd VC regiment. Both the latter have been the subjects of numerous recent reports in Southern QUANG NGAI district. The movement of at least one of them into Northern QUANG NGAI in the wake of the movement north of the 36th regiment would be in accordance with past movements.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. A total of 222 incidents were reported during the period. Incidents consisted of 109 Harassing Fire, 88 AA Fire, 22 Mines/Booby Traps, 3 Propaganda.

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
 Declassified after 12 years

III MAF PERINTREP # 14
 1-2 May 66

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- a. Strengths and Dispositions. See Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. See Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. See Annex A.
- d. New Energy Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment

(1) VC Use of Children. On 1 May, 2/5 rptd a Marine sentry observed a VN child (age 8-12), with an M-26 Grenade, vic (BT 465074). As the sentry was taking the grenade from the child, the VN boy pulled the pin and ran. The sentry held the grenade and replaced the pin. The child was not apprehended.

(2) Scope Mounted Rifle. On 28 Apr, vic of (BT 001518), I/3/9 rptd receiving 15 rounds of S/A fire from 2 VC, one of whom was armed with a scope mounted rifle. This is the first positive sighting in this area of VC use of a scope mounted rifle.

(3) Cooking Discipline. An agt rpt dtd 2 May concerning a VC unit in the vicinity of (ZB 215915) stated that VC are preparing their day's meals by cooking between 0300 and 0400 hours. This practice is being carried out to minimize detection by aircraft.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units

(1) VC Ammunition Factory. THUA THIEN, SMIAT rptd, 27 Apr, VC ammunition factory is located in the area between CA DE Canyon (YC 805955) and LOI MOI Canyon (YC 843936). The factory consists of several different small shops, (exact locations unknown) which produce ammunition for CHICOM and CZECH Rifles, SMG's, AR's and MG's. The factory also produces mines and grenades. LE THUYEN, who attended a training course on ammunition in Czechoslovakia during 1957 and 1958, is in charge of the factory.

(2) VC Workshop. 1 May, QUANG TIN agt rptd a new workshop has been completed by the VC at (BT 225042). This workshop repairs weapons and makes grenades. The area is guarded by 30 men.

(3) Food Storage Area. 2 May, QUANG TIN agt rptd approx 3,000 tons of food supplies were moved in March to (BT 245078), (BT 252086) and (BT 260095). The supplies were formerly in the vic of KY SON, KY QUE, KY YEN and KY THANH, in TAM KY District. The move was made as a result of air strikes which destroyed some rice. (Cmt: F/6. Quantity appears greatly exaggerated)

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(4) VC Hospital. 23 Apr, THUA THIEN agt rpts a VC Hospital is loc approx 500 meters east of CAI MUONG Mountain (YD 400325), with 60 VC wounded. The camp consists of 5 houses, each 5 meters by 10 meters, situated under large trees. The camp has 10 nurses and aidmen and 6 cooks.

(5) VC Arms Storage Area. QUANG TIN Prov, agt rpt (agent rated C by source). A VC weapons and ammunition distribution was set up at XUAN RIA area (ZB 215915). Approximately 1500 weapons of various types and 100 cases of ammunition are stored at this location. During the period 12-20 April, a labor force carried from the above area to THANH TRUC (BT 209003) in PHUONG DONG sub-district the following: 200 Russian rifles, 10 81mm Mortars, 6 82mm Mortars, 15 60mm Mortars, 13 57mm RR, 7 Russian HMG's, 9 .50 cal MG's, 12 .50 cal MG's, 10 RR's, 5 bazookas and 60 long tubes of bazookas.

(6) VC Workshop. 27 Apr, BA TO Dist Police rpt a VC weapons depot is located at (BS 661505). An arsenal is reportedly located vic (BS 710480), where grenades are manufactured and small arms are repaired.

(7) VC Storage Area. 27 Apr, QUANG NGAI, SMIAT rpts the VC have nine structures that are used for storage, located at LANG TACH (BS 440-660). Food, munitions and tools are stored in this area. The VC call this area SECRET ZONE 336.

(8) VC Hospital. 25 Apr, SON TINH Dist Police rpt a 40 room hospital, named I-30, is located vic (BS 594810). An unknown number of VC wounded are located at this hospital.

(9) VC Road Construction. THUA THIEN, SMIAT rpt dtd 27 Apr 66. As of 11-18 April, the VC have begun construction of a road from (YD 788-060) near LUONG MIEU to (YC 780990). The road is 3.5 to 5 meters wide and suitable for animal-transport. About 300 workmen are employed.

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense.

(1) Anti-aircraft fire incidents involving III MAF A/C increased 18 percent over the last reporting period. A total of 88 incidents were reported, with 25 A/C receiving a total of 66 hits. Highest density of fire was received from grid squares (AT 8040, 8050, 9050, 9060), (BT 1010, 3010, 4010) and (BS 6090). Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense, with 2 reports of 12.7mm/.50 cal fire being received.

i. Negative.

n. Engineers. 29 Apr, BINH SON agt rptd a VC Sapper platoon commanded by ROI, with unknown number of mines, is located vic (BS 577828). Sapper platoon will mine Hwy 1 and sabotage US vehicles from CHU LAI and BINH SON.

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- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. KIA 78, KIA (Poss) 125, KIA by multiple weapons systems 12, KIA MWS (Poss) 29.

f. Morale. In the upper echelon of VC units, morale is considered good to excellent. Recent reports from VCC indicate morale in the lower ranks is declining. This is reportedly due to continued air and artillery strikes, lack of sufficient rice and other food staples and VC promises of a good life for the soldier not being fulfilled.

g. ENEMY DEFENSES, MINE FIELDS, FORTIFICATIONS, BARRIERS AND OBSTACLES.

(1) VC Tunnels. 26 April, QUANG NGAI SMIAT rptd the VC have tunnels located vic (BS 652956) and (BS 638955). Size of these tunnels are rptd to be 600 meters long and 3 meters high. The tunnels are capable of accomodating 400 people. During friendly operations, VC hide in these tunnels to avoid detection. These tunnels are located under a banana and pineapple grove.

(2) Fortified Hamlet. 3d Recon Bn rptd on 4 May that LAM PHUNG (1) Hamlet (AT 803555), appears to have been developed into a fortified hamlet, with what was described as a "massive" trench and tunnel system.

(3) 29 Apr, 3a ITT interrogation of a VCS revealed a poss VC minefield located on a knoll, 1 KM West of AN-MY (2) Hamlet, (AT 932613).

(4) Booby Traps. 4 May, 1/9 squad size patrol discovered an explosive device at (AT 964662). A piece of silk cloth was found on the trail in close proximity to the device and may have served as a warning signal.

(5) 4 May, 1/9 patrol detonated an explosive device vic (AT 958-654). Several punji stakes were positioned approx 7 meters distant and may poss served as a warning signal for the explosion device.

h. See para 2. f. above.

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CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIALi. Terrain. No change

j. Weather. During the early portion of the reporting period, the weather was hot and dry, with several heat casualties being reported. Partly cloudy skies, with some thunderstorms and showers reported in the mountainous regions. Temperatures ranged from a high of 98 to a low of 72. Winds were north-westerly averaging 8 to 10 knots. Visibility was 5 to 7 miles except during early morning fog and low hanging clouds.

k. Captive, Refugee and Returnee Report. See Annex C.l. Other Significant Intelligence.

(1) Viet Cong Suspects. The following breakdown of personnel apprehended during Operation Georgia was submitted by the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines as of 021200H May 1966. Operation Georgia began on 21 April in the AN HOA area (AT 8746) to the Southwest of the DANANG TAOR in an area long under VC control. Exclusive of obvious VCC's, a total of 284 persons had been apprehended and screened in the area. The results, listed below, are of interest as an example of low level VC structure within a representative area of VC control.

VC Laborers ass'n	5
VC Farmers ass'n	173
VC Youth group ass'n	10
VC Women's ass'n	4
VC Cadre	1
VC Guerrilla	8
VC Old Men ass'n	41
TOTAL:	242

Others	
ARVN Deserter	1
Civilians	10
Mentally disturbed	28
Undetermined (Still VCS)	1
TOTAL:	42

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- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See Annex B.
- 5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.

J. H. Fisher
 J. H. FISHER

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. CAPTIVE, REFUGEE AND RETURNEE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG FMFPAC	1	DET C-1 5TH USSF	2	CICV	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	15	CO FLC	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CO 30TH NCR	9	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CG 1ST MAW	15	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1	CSC DANANG	1
CG FFORCEV I	1	CO 9TH MT BN	1		
CG FFORCEV II	1	CMDR NAV SUPPACT ENG	5		

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ANNEX A TO III-MAF PERINTREP NO. 13

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	507	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; HHU
**810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RE-STRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

** 810TH BN BELIEVED TO BE READY FOR OPNS AFTER RECENT REORGANIZATION - REPLACEMENT.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHEN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	4007	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2-57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
94TH BN	PROB	300	BT 4000	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 3-RPG-2, 2-57MM RR 1-AA GUN 3-LMG, 17-AR	CO-NGUYEN TAI TOAN XO-LONG TAN
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW, CAPT PHO
*195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	1100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT'D)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

* RECENT REPORTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 36TH NVA REGT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI TAOR.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP NO. 14**

1. GENERAL. VC recruitment of low-level agents for espionage and sabotage activities continue. Propaganda and agitation slightly declined for this reporting period. Terrorism activities appear to have substantially increased throughout the ICTZ. Numerous incidents of kidnapping, burning of houses, and extortion indicate that the Viet Cong have concentrated their efforts toward forcing the civilian populace to cooperate with and support the Viet Cong.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

a. A report received on 3 May indicated that NGUYEN DUONG, a known VC, is working as a barber in the vicinity of coordinates (AT 966754). DUONG's reported mission is to collect information pertaining to traffic entering and departing USMC units located within this area. DUONG was previously reported operating in this area on 18 January but eluded capture. Another report of 3 May indicated that BANH THI NGOC HAI, a Vietnamese female, who operates laundry concessions within the HOA KHAN Village Complex (AT 9476), was observed transporting known VC in her vehicle. HAI may or may not have knowledge that her passengers are VC, but this may afford the VC an opportunity to collect information concerning USMC positions in this area. CI Comment: The VC espionage organizations are primarily concerned with the collection of strategic intelligence and carrying out counterespionage activities, while urban security organizations are responsible for obtaining tactical information on government and allied political, military, and economic activities, according to captured VC documents. However, because of the close relationship of their work, both are under the direct command of local People's Revolutionary Party Security Sections and are responsible for infiltrating their cadres into government installations and other target organizations to obtain pertinent information.

b. Ten VC have been observed daily in the vicinity of DIEN PHO (1) (BT 398150) and DIEN PHO (2) (BT 4113). Their mission is reportedly to mingle with the local inhabitants along Highway #1 in order to collect information on the friendly situation in this area. Another report of 3 May, indicates that one VC platoon, dressed in civilian attire, is operating in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 371070) with missions to observe government outposts and to conduct acts of sabotage along Highway #1. The 48th VC battalion, located in the vicinity of DUC THUAN (BS 764511) has been reported to have the mission of sabotaging the Song Ve bridge (BS 695936).

3. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

a. A meeting of Key VC cadres and Autonomous Committees of various townships located throughout Dien Ban District was reportedly held at Toc Co Church located in Dien Son Hamlet, Dien Ban District on 25 April. The meaning of May Day, preparation of flags to be displayed on May Day, dropping of propaganda leaflets and the setting up of gates at the Pacification townships and secure areas for the welcoming of May Day, and establishment of contacts with enemy (US/ARVN) proselyting agents who may be operating in VC areas, were among the primary points discussed.

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b. A captured document dated 23 January 1966 revealed that much emphasis is being placed on the anti-Chieu Hoi program. Some of the preventive measures to be taken include; increasing the revolutionary soldiers' pride and enhance the traditions of the revolutionary army, instill in the soldiers that once they turn themselves over to the GVN. They will be mistreated, and undesirable relations between men and women must be checked quickly. Reports indicate that the Chieu Hoi program is adversely affecting the VC.

c. On 27 April VC propaganda leaflets found in the vicinity of TRA BONG (BS 345880) continued to urge the Vietnamese people to "rise up and fight against the US Imperialists and their Lackeys, for independence and freedom", and to urge for repatriation of all US Servicemen in Vietnam. Propaganda leaflets, pointed at Negro servicemen, continue. Anti-American leaflets, found on 3 May in the vicinities of (AT 9460) and (AT 9560) were scattered throughout the area, with some of the leaflets placed conspicuously on stakes in nearby fields. CI Comment: VC appear to be quite concerned over recent reports that villagers are smuggling radios and friendly propaganda leaflets into VC controlled areas. The VC have tried various methods to counter friendly propaganda, one such method is to have VC cadre destroy all leaflets dropped in their respective areas and to punish villagers who read or conceal leaflets, and consider them as having betrayed the Party. The civilians have also been ordered to beat gongs and shoot at aircraft which employ loudspeakers in their villages.

4. TERRORISM

a. A report of 30 April indicated that a VC company deployed between CHAU HIEP (BT 072502), DUY XUYEN District and (BT 079495) South of BA REN River in Que Son District, have the mission to ambush vehicles on the provincial highway, attack friendly forces in DUY XUYEN District, and to assassinate or capture government officials. Kidnapping has sharply increased for this reporting period as indicated by reports received. A total of twenty-six kidnappings have been reported throughout the ICTZ. Included in this total, one hamlet chief, one assistant hamlet chief and one security agent was reportedly kidnapped in Tan An Hamlet located at coordinates (BS 745735). Numerous other acts of terrorism have been reported during this reporting period; one Catholic church and one school were sabotaged at Giao Trich hamlet (BS 6494); another report received on 3 May indicated that the VC burned nine houses at Duc PHO (BS 722576).

5. EXTORTION

a. Translation of captured enemy documents reveal the VC are not pleased with the 1965 Tax Collection program. It appears that poor results were obtained because in many areas collection of taxes were not extensively developed, tax collection was not properly promoted in weak areas and few taxes were collected in cities, provinces and towns. The VC are apparently trying to promote a stable Tax Collection effort as revealed in a captured document dated 26 April 1966, by offering a five-percent reduction to civilians, who will pay advance taxes now, and by threatening anyone who did not meet the late March payment deadline for 1966 taxes.

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCE AND/OR RETURNEE REPORTS) to III MAF
PERINTRESP NO. 14

1. 70th Bn. 3d ITT report #322-4-66. Subj: Interrogation report of defector from 70th Bn. On 29 April, Pvt DINH NGOC THIET defected at AT 958681 from 70th Battalion. VC states 70th Battalion composed of 5 Companies (C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5), each with an approximate strength of 149 men. Each company has 4 platoons, the 4th being a transportation platoon. The defector states that his company, C3, is armed with 2 60mm Mortars and 2 81mm Mortars. He believes that each company is similarly armed except the C3 Company which has 3 60mm Mortars and 1 81mm Mortar. Each company is armed with one US .30 cal MG and 1 US BAR. Other weapons in the 70th Battalion are K-44's, carbines, SMG's and M-1's. The defector stated that the 70th Battalion was located in the vicinity of (AT 8454), (AT 8354) and (AT 8254) on 25 April. He claims that the Battalion moves constantly and that 4 days is the longest time the Battalion has ever stayed in one area. The remainder of the information from the returnee is of low validity as he apparently feared that he would be punished if he admitted having engaged in combat action. He first claimed that the 70th Battalion had never participated in an attack but later admitted that in February 1966 the 70th Battalion supported an unknown unit in an attack on the BINH LONG bridge. (G-2 Cmt: Composition of Bn is rated F/3. Strength and weapons appear excessive and are rated F/4. The last reported strength of the 70th Battalion was 500, support weapons are believed to include 1 (or poss 2) 81mm Mortars and 3 60mm Mortars.

2. 37th, 39th and 20th Bns. (SMIAT Rpt ZAO 15559 dtd 28 Apr 66). The following report is evaluated F/3 by SMIAT (information as of 26 Apr 66):

(a) A VC Regiment, designation unknown, commanded by HA KY NGO, in QUANG NAM province, has organized a campaign called the "Summer Campaign" in order to celebrate the birthday of HO CHI MINH on 19 May. The regiment consists of 3 Battalions:

(b) 37th Bn. Cmdr: NGUYEN NGOC CHUONG, strength 300, now located at (BT 025515) and (BT 071519) and reinforced by local guerrilla units. Armament: 1 82mm Mortar, 2 60mm Mortar, 3 MG's, 4 M-79 grenade launchers.

(c) 39th Bn. Cmdr unk. Consists of 3 Companies of 100 men each. CO of 1st Co: LU, CO of 2nd Co: DOAN NGHINH, CO of 3d Co: QUY. Location: (AT 997556), (BT 005574), (BT 040590) and (BT 010610).

(d) 20th Bn. Cmdr: DOAN QUANG TRACH consists of 3 Companies of approximately 100 men each. CO of 1st Co: HUNG, CO of 2nd Co: CHI, CO of 3d Co: TRAN NGO. Armament of each Company: 1 82mm Mortar, 1 57mm RR, 3 M-79 Rocket Launchers. In addition, 2nd Co also has 1 60mm Mortar. The Battalion is reinforced by regular troops of the H-55th Company. The Battalion is dispersing its troops and stationing them at (AT 960550), (AT 990530), (BT 130550) and (BT 014500).

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G-2 Cmt: F/3; HA KY NGO previously reported as cmdr 93d Regiment on 22 Feb in DAI LOC District and also reported as cmdr of 15th Regiment on 6 Mar At (AT 8639). Each of the three Battalions has been previously reported in this general area, (although a 37th Battalion has also been reported many times in southern QUANG NGAI). The H55 Company is the DIEN BAN LF Co. The information is considered basically correct. It is considered doubtful that this is an organized Regiment but rather a possible organizing of province and district local forces. The reported 82mm Mortars are probably 81mm Mortars; 82mm Mortars are usually found in NVA units.)

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Unit: III MAF

Location: Danang, RVN

DTG: 170800H May 1966

Ser: **057466**

PERINTREP NO. 15

Period Covered: 080001H to 142400H May 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. With the notable exception of Danang, the enemy continued to avoid contact throughout the I Corps area during the period. In the Danang TAOR, two significant contacts were established during the period as reports continued to indicate the presence of battalion size units moving to the South of the Danang TAOR and well within it. Several reports indicate a VC threat to launch a significant attack in honor of Ho Chi Minh's birthday (19 May) which happens to correspond with the dark of the moon phase.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Operation CHEROKEE, in the CO BI - THANH TAN area to the West of HUE, ended on 7 May with no significant contact. Local villagers indicated that VC in the area in battalion strength had dispersed approximately two days before the operation began. Operation WAYNE, to the South of the PHU BAI TAOR was conducted 10 through 12 May with no significant contact.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Operation GEORGIA, in the AN HOA area (AT 8746) ended on 10 May with a total of 103 VC KIA for the three week operation. Whereas multi-platoon units of VC were observed in the surrounding area and harassment tactics were employed sporadically, the VC posture was largely avoidance of contact. Two significant VC encounters occurred during the period within the DANANG TAOR. On 12 May, at (AT 922547), an estimated two companies of VC attacked a USMC patrol. Subsequent Marine reinforcements and supporting arms accounted for 55 VC KIA. On 14 May, a 2d Battalion, 9th Marines patrol encountered an estimated Company of VC at (BT 000614). The engagement resulted in 37 VC KIA before the VC withdrew to the South. Elsewhere within and to the immediate South of the TAOR, reports continued to indicate considerable movement of VC units.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Operation MONTGOMERY ended on 14 May following a sweep of the UTAH - TEXAS - INDIANA - HOT SPRINGS Area.

Dowgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

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III MAF PERINTREP #15

8-14 May 66

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A total of 51 VC KIA resulted from sporadic contacts with local force units. No significant engagements nor enemy units were encountered. Elsewhere in the 12 DTA and the CHU LAI TAOR, the standard VC harassment tactics continued.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 296, consisting of: 134 harassing fires, 132 anti-aircraft fires, 28 mine/booby trap, 1 attack and 1 propaganda.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 10 May. New Weapons. At 080700H, vicinity (BS 474093) 2nd plt, Co D of 1st Recon Bn ambushed 4 VC. 3 were killed and 1 captured. 4 weapons were captured including a Soviet 7.62mm rifle M1891/30 with a 2.5 scope mounted on the rifle. (G-2 Cmt: Second rpt of this weapon, refer to Para 2.d.(2) of III MAF PERINTREP #14).

(2) 8 May. Tactics. Following information extracted from 1st MarDiv ISUM No. 41. In what may be considered a new VC tactic of deception, the following was observed by an AO: As AO traveled a valley flying from (BT 2110) to (BT 2612), small smoke producing fires preceded A/C for entire length of the valley. Small groups of people were seen near 3 of the 5 fires that were deliberately set as A/C approached. (G-2 Cmt: This tactic may have been an attempt to conceal VC activities from aerial observation. The use of smoke by VC to avoid detection was reported in Para 2.m.(1) of III MAF PERINTREP #7).

- e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

(1) 7 May. Interrogation of VCC by 1st ARVN Div Advisors. VCC vicinity PHU BAI TAOR on 5 May stated that there is a VC District Headquarters in two caves located in vicinity (YC 923992). (G-2 Cmt: F/3; Other information and documents received support VCC's statements).

- g. Negative.
- h. Air Defense.

(1) Anti-aircraft fire incidents over I Corps involving III MAF aircraft showed a 31.5 percent increase over the last reporting period. A total of 116 incidents were reported with 35 aircraft sustaining hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9050), (BS 4070), (BS 5070) and (BS 5080). Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense.

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No incidents of 12.7mm fire or larger were reported.

i-j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Hvy Mortars.

(1) 120mm Mortar Bn. Continuing interrogation of the VCC taken by 1st Bn 7th Marines on 10 May during Operation MONTGOMERY indicates subject's unit, RQ330 120mm Mortar Bn was attached to 21st NVA Regt, (AKA 36th Regt). Subject stated Bn infiltrated SVN with 6 tubes and 70 rds per tube. Bn now has 50 rds per tube. Trip from NVN took 2½ months. Three companies of 250 men each detached from Bn upon arrival in Quang Nam Province during Dec 1965. Subject's company, (3d Company) was attached to the 21st Regt and attempted to deliver 120mm Mortar fire against USMC units during operation Harvest Moon near Viet An, but USMC withdrew. 3d Company deployed into Quang Ngai with 21st Regt. About 17 Apr, 3d Company returned to Quang Tin leaving subject and 12 others behind because of illness. Subject stated that mortars were never fired in Quang Ngai and all tubes were taken back to Quang Tin. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; RQ330 Bn possible AKA RQ 23D Bn, AKA RQ 33 Bn).

l-s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 249 VC were KIA during the reporting period with 30 additional VCC.
- f. Morale. Considered Good
- g. Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers and Obstacles.

(1) 9 May. ITT report. A 100 meter long tunnel is located near HOA BINH (BS 445152); large cave that runs under the SONG BA TUC river is located near AN PHU (BT 373158). (F/6).

(2) 5 May. ITT Interrogation of VCC. The VC are planning a tunnel system from KY BICH (BT 3416) to KHUONG THO (1) (BT 4407) and KHUONG NHO (BT 4308). Some sections are finished vicinity DUC BO (BT 3714), BICH NGO (2) (BT 3416) and XUAN NGO (1) (BT 3912).

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Proposed plan is to have apparent "old wells" about 60 meters apart filled with dirt about 10 meters and have tunnel line at that level. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps during the reporting period was generally fair. Southwesterly flows caused partly cloudy skies with scattered thunderstorms and showers. Temperatures ranged from an average 95° high to 86° low. Winds were mostly light and variable. Vis 7 miles.

k. Captive, Returnee, Refugee Report. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Intelligence

(1) 3 May. VC Storage Area. QUANG NGAI District agent report (C/3). During the past two months the VC have transported large quantities of rice, salt and equipment to food storage area No. 2 located (BS 460440-BS 460450-BS 484432). There are many small camps in this area. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; this area of MINH LONG District is under VC control, consequently it is very possible that VC storage areas are located throughout this district).

(2) 11 May. Rice Storage Area. USSF/VNSF Agent report. A rice storage area is located vicinity (BS 593367). Area has 1 squad of VC acting as security. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 6 May. VC Rice gathering Activities. ARVN MSS Agent report rated (C/3). The VC self-help committee of Ky Ngoc, Ky Minh (AT 978599), and Ky Quang (AT 960587) Villages, Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, have forced the local people to transport rice which was harvested in this area during the March 1966 Harvest season to VC secret storage areas.

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500 baskets of rice were transported to a tile roofed house in Tu Phu Dong Hamlet (AT 980540), while the remainder of the rice was taken to Xuyen Thanh Village (exact location unknown), Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province. As for the people of Thanh Quit (BT 045630), Thanh Phong (BT 010610), Thanh Trung (BT 033645), and Thanh Son (AT 975630) Villages, Dien Ban District, they transported the rice in the direction of Ky Quang Village (AT 960587), and it is stored at Bao An Hamlet (AT 980535). They are still transporting the rice in this direction. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(5) Use of Captive Information. The following incident from 9th Marines INTSUM No. 127 is described as illustrative of the benefits of exploitation of battlefield intelligence. At 061540H May, Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of (AT 915497) in response to information received from a Viet Cong suspect (later reported to be a returnee). The VCS led Marines to a tunnel complex. While the Marines were investigating, a Viet Cong tossed grenade and fired five small arms rounds at the Marines. The Marines returned ten grenades and breached the tunnel. Five Viet Cong KIA were found in the tunnel as well as two (2) US rifles, Cal .30 M1, one (1) CHICOM carbine (Mossin-Nagant) model 53 and eight (8) grenades.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.



T. H. FISHER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
C. CAPTIVE, REFUGEE AND RETURNEE REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG FMFPAC	1	DET C-1 5TH USSF	2	CICV	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	15	CO FLC	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CO 30TH NCR	9	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CG 1ST MAW	15	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1	CSC DANANG	1
CG FFORCEV I	2	CO 9TH MT BN	1		
CG FFORCEV II	1	CMDR NAV SUPFACT ENG	5		


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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 15

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO_THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO_NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
**810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

*RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

**810TH BN BELIEVED TO BE READY FOR OPNS AFTER RECENT REORGANIZATION - REPLACEMENT.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT. 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2-57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW, CAPT PHO
195TH AA BN (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	*18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT HOANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT'D)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT. 3-MG; 18-AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

*RECENT REPORTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 36TH NVA REGT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI TAOR.

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ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP #15

1. GENERAL. VC propaganda again appears to head the list of activities in the ICTZ. Apparently during the period of political unrest, the VC were able to consolidate plans for a general increase in proselyting operations. Interrogation reports reveal the use of VC coercion in the two areas. Assembling local villagers to demonstrate against U. S. military units and recruitment of low level agents, especially female, is also included in the VC plans for espionage and sabotage.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE. A Vietnamese Catholic Priest reported that the Viet Cong plan to introduce "plastique" into Camp Tien Sha Compound. The Modus Operandi is to coerce local indigenous citizens into carrying the plastique into Camp Tien Sha via trucks, bicycles and/or hand-carried bags. A likely hiding place would be in the tires of trucks. CI Comment: Introduction of explosives into a Naval or Marine Corps Installation could have devastating consequences. Past reports have indicated that the VC may have taken advantage of the current political unrest to infiltrate saboteurs and introduce explosives into the city of Danang. A report of 10 May indicates that the VC are selecting young females, in villages under VC control, and will send them to a ten day training class located at Lam settlement (AT 825490). Approximately seventy trainees are expected to attend. After graduation the female cadres will be sent to Hao Long Village (BT 057745), Hoa Phat Village (AT 990743), Danang and other locations where there are US troops. CI Comment: Numerous reports received indicate that the Viet Cong continue to concentrate their efforts toward organizing and training low-level agents to penetrate GVN/US controlled areas and military installations.

3. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION: A report was received that a VC platoon entered Que Chu Hamlet in the vicinity of (YD 977051) and assembled residents for a propaganda lecture. Another VC platoon entered Thanh Cam Hamlet (YD 660330), assembled residents for a propaganda lecture and circulated leaflets. Another report stated that thirty VC entered Vinh Vy Hamlet (YD 940072) and assembled residents for propaganda lecture. On 2 May an estimated eighty Viet Cong assembled residents in Long Ho Hamlet (YD 710182) and held a propaganda lecture. Twenty VC were reported to have entered a village at (YD 908112) and circulated propaganda leaflets. Twenty other VC conducted a propaganda meeting in a village located at (YD 568432). CI Comments: Above reports would indicate that the VC are continuing in their program of physically contacting hamlet and village residents to wage their propaganda campaigns.

At approximately 1030 hours 6 May 1966, about 200 women and children gathered at the perimeter of a USMC unit located in the vicinity (BS 628993) and staged a demonstration protesting the firing of Marine artillery into the area. When the demonstrators left the area, propaganda leaflets were found. There are demonstrations staged near this USMC unit approximately once a week and the participants appear to come from the direction of Tan Hy hamlet (BT 625009).

The average size is 200 but as many as 600 persons have assembled. The usual theme is to protest the Marine artillery firing into the area. On occasions, the demonstrators have brought dead cows, dead persons and pieces of human bodies supposedly killed by the artillery fire. On 7 May 1966, an 18 year old Vietnamese female who lives in Tan Ky Hamlet, Binh Giang Village, was interrogated and provided the following information: "The VC are responsible for organizing these demonstrations. A VC Cadre appears at the hamlets and force the people to stage protest demonstrations. They are forced to take the bodies of cows or people that have supposedly been killed as results of shelling, or give them propaganda leaflets to distribute near the Marine positions. The people who do not want to attend the demonstrations are beaten and are threatened with being sent to the mountains for political training. The majority of the participants are from Binh Giang and Binh Thong Villages. On 6 May three VC Women Cadre came to Tan Hy hamlet and told the people that they would have to join in a demonstration. They had the bodies of some women that the villagers were to take with them. The people took the bodies part of the way to the Marine positions but when they heard shooting, they became afraid and hid the bodies. The main VC Woman Cadre in Tan Hy is HUYNH-THI-KHA, who has a home in Tan-Hy but stays at different places to avoid capture. The VC cadre do not accompany the people during the demonstrations but stay in the hamlets to identify those persons who do not participate." Another report received from a USMC unit stated on 6 May that 200 Women and children approached a Marine Security Force in the vicinity of coordinates (BS 628993). When the demonstrators reached the Marine Positions, they distributed pamphlets and dispersed.

On 12 May the president of the NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSVN) issued orders to begin a campaign throughout SVN, called "Back to the City Campaign". The purpose of this campaign is to send political cadres to infiltrate the provinces and cities to organize propaganda units and cause disorder. In particular, in the city of Danang, the VC Provincial Committee will organize a training course for political cadres in late May 1966 (location unknown). This course will last one week. The VC will use these cadres to organize student and labor groups and attempt to cause divisions between religious/political factions etc. The VC intend to concentrate on the latter objective during the dry season. During the present unrest the VC are reported to have sent many VC cadre to the provinces and towns on propaganda and indoctrination missions.

4. TERRORISM: A report of 1 May 1966 indicated that on 28 April LAM HOA, Assistant Hamlet chief of Phuoc-Binh hamlet, Binh Thang Village, Binh Son District was assassinated. Three VC dressed as farmers entered HOA's house located at coordinates (BS 589957) and shot him with a submachine gun. HOA was a member of the BINH-SON District Psychological Warfare Team. On 6 May 1966, a USMC unit reported an unknown number of VC entered the village of Cong Luong (YD 798248) and assassinated a hamlet official and the hamlet chief. Another report from the same unit was received that an unknown number of VC entered a village located at (YD 626387) and on 6 May assassinated the former village chief. On 6 May a pacification cadre leader in Hoa Loi village reported that Hamlet chief NGUYEN LUONG, LA BONG Hamlet (AT 975671) was kidnapped and detained in the vicinity of (AT 9762) for a period of about 24 hours. LUONG was questioned about USMC strength and disposition in the area and then released.

A report was received on 14 May that one VC company attacked the villages of Vinh Phuoc (BT 060565), Phu Loc (BT 053564) and Phu Phong (BT 053571). The VC captured the Village Chief of Vinh Phuoc, a sub-sector intelligence agent, (SIC) one combat youth and four civilians. The VC confiscated files from Vinh Phuoc Village offices.

5. EXTORTION: The VC hold meetings in Tu Chanh every 15 to 20 days. NGUYEN PHAN presides at these meetings which are concerned with VC victories, procurement of rice, and the construction of trenches by local villagers. People in TU CHANH were forced to build a trench 175 meters long, 2 feet wide, and 2½ feet deep with a parapet, at the north end of TU CHANH and were then prohibited from approaching after construction. An interrogation report indicated that during the month of April 1966, the VC autonomous chief of CHAU SON Hamlet (AT 970645) held a village meeting which he collected taxes from the people. He explained that since it was impossible for rice to be transported, money would be collected instead. The villagers were taxes 450\$VN each. Another captive from Ky Chanh village, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, stated that the local villagers were forced to pay a "rice tax" to the VC of approximately 1.3% of the harvest, however this tax has not yet been collected.

ANNEX C (Significant Agent, VCC and/or Returnee Reports) to III MAF
 PERINTREP No. 15

1. 6th Regt. USMACV Document Exploitation Center Log #05-0702-66 dtd 2 May 66. Following information obtained from interrogation of NGUYEN WAN THUYET, member of 812th Battalion who rallied 24 March 66 in QUANG TRI Province; VC CON TRUONG 6 (WORKSITE 6) moved from QUANG TRI to THUA THIEN. This regiment is composed of the 800th, 806th and 812th Battalions and of the C15 AA Co, C25, C22 Co 120mm Mortar, C17 DK2 Co. In addition, the 802nd and 804th Battalions are also present in THUA THIEN (DEC Cmt: Information of VC 6th Regt and VC force in THUA THIEN is consistent with previously collected information).

2. 36th Regt (AKA 21st, AKA 6th). 3 May, QUANG TIN, additional information from VC captured (BT 2317) on 1 May. (Ref III MAF INTSUM No. 124, para 14.A.) Recon Co, 21 Regt located (BT 153217). Recon Co left QUANG NGAI after attack on 3d Bn 5th Marines (28Mar). Trip took 4 days. Staff team of 21st Regt departed QUANG NGAI after Recon Co, 2nd Bn (22) departed on 17 Apr after attack on 2d Bn 4th Marines (14Apr) via trail of Tra Bong. A different route was used to move into QUANG NGAI in Jan 66. 21st Regt moved to QUANG NGAI for 5 month operation designed to attack OP, strategic hamlets and seize control of the area. Regt moved back to QUANG TIN due to heavy losses and because their location was known. Subject does not know if the regiment was relieved by another unit.

Recon Co had 4 KIA and 1 POW in QUANG NGAI, strength is now 80.

Subject was part of 5 man team (3 Recon, 2 Local Militia-2 Recon KIA, Militia escaped). Deputy Regimental Commander assigned mission to study area bounded by (BT 200186), (BT 200158), (BT 233175) and (BT 233158). Following are codes for CO's of 21st Regt:

13 - Recon	14 - 75mm RR (4)
15 - TNG	16 - 81mm Mort (2-81, 2-82)
17 - .30 Cal MG	18 - Signal
19 - Medical	29 - Trans

3. 9 May, THUA THIEN, 4th Mar relayed the following information received from initial interrogation of a VCC. Subject claimed he was a school teacher and was forced to teach for the VC. He stated that a unidentified RF Bn size unit, in grey uniforms, equipped w/1 12.7 AA Gun, 81 and 82mm Mortars, Heavy MG's AR and SA, had occupied THANH TAN (YD 5624) on 1-2 May. Captive indicated unit had mortared 1st Bn, 4th Mar on 4 or 5 nights and claimed to have destroyed 2 artillery pieces. VCC stated unit moved from HIEN AN (YD 5425) to CO KUAN (YD 5428) to mortar USMC positions. Captive said that while in THANH TAN, the VC occupied hamlets of HIEN AN (YD 5425), CONG THANG (YD 5525) and CO BI (YD 5925). The captive stated the VC mission was to push Marines out of area to regain rice. Captive stated VC heard a large USMC unit was coming to THANH TAN, and left from CONG THANG (YD 5525) heading south into mountains. A small unit was left behind to observe and harass USMC. (G-2 Cmt: F/2; Consistent with previous information (see INTSUM No. 129, subpara 8.A.(2)). Poss element of the 6th NVA Regt reported by reliable sources to be operating in this area.)

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 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 240800H May 1966
 Ser: **059966**

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PERINTREP NO. 16

Period Covered: 150001H to 212400H May 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. VC/NVA activity was largely limited to the Northern two provinces where a total of four deliberate attacks were launched during the week against friendly forces. Elsewhere in the zone, with the exception of one major contact inside the DANANG TAOR, enemy activity was slack in spite of widely publicized threats to mark the 19 May anniversary of HO CHI MINH by attacks on USMC installations. Political unrest completely dominated the scene in DANANG.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. VC activity in the 11th DTA increased considerably during the period. On 19 May, an estimated VC battalion attacked an ARVN outpost at GIO LINH (YD 214710). 150 rounds of 81/82mm mortar were fired against the outpost. The attack was repulsed. At the same time, an unknown number of VC attacked and overran an RVN position at CON THIEN (YD 115700). Both of these attacks, close to the DMZ, coincided with reports of large scale enemy movements into QUANG TRI province (See para 3, Annex C). These same two attacks were the only significant VC action within the ICTZ on HO CHI MINH's birthday. In THUA THIEN, on 17 May and again on 20 May, determined mortar and infantry attacks were made by VC units against 1st Battalion, 4th Marines positions in the CO BI-THANH TAN area (YD 5432) and (YD 5426). Both attacks occurred in the early morning and involved apparent suicide squads carrying demolitions. Both attacks were repulsed.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. One significant engagement took place during the afternoon of 21 May when units of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines engaged an estimated 2 companies of VC within the DANANG TAOR at (AT 957650). The engagement, which lasted throughout the afternoon, resulted in 53 confirmed VC KIA. The remainder of the period was characterized by numerous VC harassing actions throughout the Southern half of the DANANG TAOR.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Movement reports continue to indicate the movement of the 21st NVA Regt (AKA 36th) from QUANG NGAI into QUANG TIN. No significant enemy contacts occurred during the period.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
 Declassified after 12 years

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 PERINTREP # 16

15-21 May 66

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents against USMC elements for the reporting period totaled 286, consisting of 2 attacks, 159 harassing fires, 23 mine/booby traps, 101 AA fires and 1 Hamlet harassment.

- a. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- b. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. Negative.
- e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units

(1) 5 May, Quang Nam agent reported that one VC hospital commanded by a surgeon, and one re-education camp is located in the HIO QUI mountains vic (ZC 176486), (BS 182426) and (BS 187487). Area has been reported as base for DAI LOC District agency with many depots, a dispensary and a prison. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; Previous reports of supply depots and prison sites in this general area.)

(2) 16 May, VC Ordnance Shops. Quang Tin SMIAT report. Three ordnance shops to repair and manufacture weapons and ammunition are located at (BT 255047). There was an unknown number of personnel working at the shops and on 27 April, another 40 personnel were assigned. When these new personnel came there was an unknown number of civilian laborers with them who brought a quantity of unserviceable weapons and dud rounds for repair. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

(3) 12 May, VC Hospital. TU NGHIA District agent report. One VC district hospital is located in vicinity (BS 475710). Area consists of numerous houses. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

(4) 12 May, VC Supply Area. TU NGHIA district agent report. A weapons and ammunition cache is located vicinity (BS 496686). Cache reportedly supplies all VC units in district. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents decreased 13 percent during the reporting period. 101 incidents were reported with 27 A/C receiving a total of 35 hits. Grid squares of highest density were AT 9050, BT 0006, BS 7040 and BS 7050. Intensity of fire was light to intense. 3 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

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- i-j. Negative.
- k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars. See Annex C.
- l-q. Negative.
- r. Reconnaissance

(1) 13 May. QUANG NAM SMIAT report. On 16 April a VC Regular Battalion designated as "Reconnaissance Battalion" (TIEU DOAN THAM SAT), arrived in XUYEN TRA sub-district (BT 0847) from XUYEN HANH sub-district. This move was to avoid friendly forces operating in the two sub-districts. The strength of the battalion is approximately 450 men and it is armed with 4-81mm, and 4-60mm mortars, 4-.30 cal. machineguns, unknown quantities of automatic rifles, small machineguns and various types of individual weapons. Unit also equipped with five PRC-10 radios. Mission of this battalion is to support guerrilla units in the coastal sub-districts of DUY XUYEN district. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; First report of this type unit).

s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 149 VC were KIA during the period, with an additional 22 VCC.
- f. Morale. Considered Good.
- g. New Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers and Obstacles

(1) 20 May. 1st MAW report. A well fortified village is located at (AT 857581). Village is surrounded by freshly dug trenches.

- h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No Change.

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j. Weather. Weather in I Corps consisted of partly cloudy to cloudy skies with scattered thunderstorms and thundershowers throughout the period. Temperatures ranged from an average 90° high to a 77° low. Winds were mostly light and variable with occasional gusts to 15 knots. Visibility 7 miles.

k. Significant Agent, VCC/Returnee and Document Reports. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Intelligence.

(1) 13 May. VC Rice Storage Area. SMIAT report QUANG NAM Prov. On 23 April approximately 280 civilians from XUYEN THANH sub-district, DU Y XUYEN district were drafted into a labor force to move approximately 2,000 bushels of unhusked rice from storage areas in XUYEN LOC and XUYEN THANH sub-districts to a new area in DONG LOC (local name) (AT 9444). The rice is stored in civilian houses. The purpose of the move is to prevent the rice from falling into the hands of friendly forces operating in XUYEN THANH. The VC are prepared to move the rice to a new area if the situation warrants. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 14 May. VC Tunnels. QUANG TIN Prov, SMIAT report. Underground tunnels are being built in the vicinity (BF 342091). The entrance to one tunnel is located below the water level of the AN KIEM river (above coordinates). Each tunnel will serve as shelter for 1 VC platoon during friendly forces "Search and destroy" operations in this area. The number of tunnels being constructed is unknown. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 13 May. VC Storage Tunnel. BINH SON district SMIAT report. The VC 3/21 Battalion is using a tunnel for storage of weapons, ammunition and food. Some elements of the Bn. use the tunnel for living quarters. The location of the tunnel is as follows: principal entrance is located at (BS 680960); an entrance is located at PMO TIMH mountain (BS 660940); another at (BS 695955) and at LE THUY (BS 685975). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(4) 20 May. VC Supplies by Sea. COMNAVFORV ISUM No. 42-66 Following information reported 17 May. The VC are receiving supplies by sea from an unknown location in the South. Supplies are reportedly being landed at (BS 854403) and (BS 765826). Supplies include medicine, Kerosene, Nylon, Milk, Clothing and unknown type of ammunition. No weapons included in supplies. (G-2 Cmt: F/3).

(5) 14 May, THUA THIEN Prov SMIAT report of VC Weapons Depot. The VC have a weapons storage area at CAO HOA HIEN mountain (YD 448147). This depot consists of 1 palm leaf hut 12 by 15 meters. There are approximately 30 weapons stored here consisting of: 81mm and 82mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles and bazookas. Approximately 30 VC take care of these weapons. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

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(6) 19 May. 5th SF Grp. On 18 May, a BODY RECOVERY team was inserted in the ASHAU camp and retrieved bodies of Special Forces personnel killed during the March engagement. Evidence at the camp indicated that the force which attacked the camp abandoned it hastily. No mines or booby traps were encountered. A few North Vietnamese bodies were seen within the camp dressed in blue grey uniforms with leather web gear and canvas boots with red rubber lug soles. While numerous small arms that had been destroyed by fire were observed, no small arms ammunition was noted, although a detailed search of the camp was made. Several 81mm and 60mm mortar rounds, as well as mortar baseplates, were observed but the mortar tubes and tripods were missing.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

a. General. Basically, there has been no recent confirmed change in enemy capabilities within the I Corps Tactical Zone. Whereas the VC undoubtedly suffered severe losses in the 800 series of battalions during numerous encounters in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN in February and March, there has been sufficient time subsequently to regroup and these units must again be considered at normal strength. More recent losses by the 1st VC and the 21st NVA (AKA 36th) Regiments in QUANG NGAI are probably still being felt by these units but their recent avoidance of contact has probably assisted them in rebuilding and reequipping. Noticeable in the last month has been the absence of reports concerning the 95B Regiment. During the early March attack on ASHAU, this regiment is known to have taken heavy casualties and it is possible that some of the new units reported to have infiltrated into the 11th DTA may have been absorbed as replacements. It can be assumed that the 95B Regiment has been regrouping in the relatively safe mountainous areas of THUA THIEN province and is probably by this time ready to reassume an active roll.

b. Enumeration of VC/NVA Capabilities. The VC/NVA have the capability:

(1) To attack, with a minimum shifting of forces:

(a) The PHU BAI TAOR with a strength of two regiments (the 6th and the 95B NVA) supported by two local force battalions.

(b) The DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of two regiments and two local force battalions.

(c) The CHU LAI TAOR with two regiments (the 21st NVA and the 1st VC) supported by two local force battalions.

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(2) To attack isolated outposts and units, US and/or RVN, anywhere in the ICTZ in strengths up to Multi-regiment in size.

(3) To execute suicide type demolition attacks against US and/or ARVN installations within the ICTZ.

(4) To continue their pattern of constant small scale harassing attacks within all three USMC TAOR's and throughout the ICTZ in an effort to tie down friendly forces and at the same time influence the civilian population and disrupt the pacification program.

(5) To support any of the above with mortar fire up to 120mm.

(6) To reinforce present units within the ICTZ with any one or all three of the regiments (the 18th NVA, 2d VC and/or QUYET TAM) of the 610 Division currently carried in BINH DINH province and possibly with one or more regiments reported to be in proximity to the DMZ. In addition, reinforcement by infiltration units from North Vietnam through LAOS is a strong and continuing capability.

(7) To continue the programs of sabotage and interdiction against lines of communications.

(8) To maintain pressure on the local population by assassination, kidnapping, propaganda and other forms of coercion in order to obtain supplies, collect taxes and effect (by force where necessary) local support.


T. H. FISHER

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	15	CO 9TH MT EN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG	5
CG 1ST MAW	15	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG FFORCEV I	2	CICV	1
CG FFORCEV II	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
DET C-1 5TH USSF	2	GSG DANANG	1
CO FLC	1		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 16

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO_THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO_NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO_PHAM KINH; PHU
810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW, CAPT PHO
RQ 21 BN (AA) (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	*18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT ROANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RF 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

*RECENT REPORTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 36TH NVA REGT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI TAOR.

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CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIALANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINPREP #16

1. GENERAL. The current political unrest again dominated the scene in the ICTZ. With the arrival of pro-government forces, many ARVN units have turned their attention to happenings in Danang. The V.C. on the other hand have been active in all phases of espionage and sabotage. It appears that the V.C. may exploit this current period of political unrest for their own purposes. Recent information would point to a detailed proposal by the V.C. to take advantage of the situation and the dilemma now facing many of the ARVN troops.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE. A report of 12 May 1966, indicated that a twenty-five man guerrilla platoon manned an outpost in the vicinity of La Chua (AT 9567). Agents who are members of this platoon, are sent into various villages in this area to collect information pertaining to USMC activity. A report received on 14 May indicates that a VC liaison and reconnaissance cell is operating in the Nai Hien Settlement, Hoa Cuong Village, Hoa Vang District and that members of this cell are transported by junks and wooden rafts from Than Son Village, Hoa Vang District to Ho Cuong. They often have been observed stopping at the homes of the following individuals: Phan PHIEU, residing at Phong Bac (coordinates unknown), Ngo LIEN and Pham GIAN residing at Cam Bac (AT 970705) and Muo NO and Mr. XUYEN, both of whom reside in Duong Hamlet. A "Spy" Squad has been reported to be operating from the house of Mrs. XONG, Nhut Dong Sub-Hamlet, Tan Phuoc Hamlet, Binh Tuy Village, (BS 558910). This squad has the responsibility to collect information on strengths and dispositions of US/ARVN positions in order to formulate plans for future attacks. CI Comment: The "Spy" squad may possibly be comparable to a VC liaison and reconnaissance cell. These cells are usually composed of youths procured by the intelligence organizations; depending on the youth's degree of maturity and propensity to learn. They are instructed in the rudiments of espionage and in propaganda techniques; especially methods of spreading suspicion and hatred of the US/GVN Governments. Their training includes instruction in conducting liaison, reconnaissance, reporting, and security of property and documents. After recruitment, these youths are divided into liaison and reconnaissance cells or various other cells according to their prior occupations and interests. Each cell consists of seven to thirteen members with a chief and a deputy chief.

On 15 May, a USMC Unit apprehended a Vietnamese Male at (YD 550-259). The VCS possessed an identification card, which did not match his features. CI Comments: Other reports received indicate that the VC have forced families, who have relatives in ARVN, to furnish two photographs of the ARVN member. Possibly the above incident may be an effort to gain access to US/ARVN installations through altered identification cards. Numerous reports have indicated the VC have utilized methods of disguise and deception to gain entrance and obtain information pertaining to US/ARVN positions.

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Recruitment and infiltration of low-level espionage agents appear to be a continuing VC effort.

3. PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSION. The VC are reportedly issuing directives to subordinate district committees to intensify military and political activities. This is to be a two-month campaign covering the period 2 May - 30 June 1966. Increased sabotage of roads and direct mortar attacks against the urban areas, particularly the airfields of Danang and the Marble Mountain complex will be the primary military effort. Political Activities will include intensification of efforts in organizing the fifth columnists among government troops; an increase in the troop proselyting activities, to include urging government servicemen to defect; and to increase the training of female espionage agents. CI Comment: Although this information must be classified hearsay, similar reports received indicate that this information is possibly true, and appears to be a probable course of action to be taken by the VC, especially during present political unrest in the ICPZ. On 9 May, a VC cadre meeting was reported to have been held at the Man Quang Pagoda, Hoa Lan Village (BT 038689). The purpose of the meeting was to map the VC strategy. The following points were presented:

1. The struggle campaign in Danang.
2. Plans for celebrating Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 19 May 66.
3. Plans to hinder the forthcoming Buddhist Anniversary, 27 May 66.

The following demands and actions were discussed concerning the Buddhist, Catholics, RVN Government and US personnel.

1. That Buddhism be elevated to the National Religion.
2. All foreign troops, all Protestant and Catholic leaders withdraw from Vietnam.
3. A social revolution be achieved; that all foreign interests, especially those of the Catholics, be appropriated and handed to the poor.
4. All former Diem-Nhu henchmen and lackeys be severely punished.
5. The military regime be abolished and an elected government be installed.
6. All Catholic operated enterprises be nationalized.
7. A cease-fire be instituted to lead to peace, else Central Vietnam will become neutral and the government transferred to Hue.
8. The links between government administration and the military be cut.
9. Step up the class struggle in Saigon and its provinces.
10. Resist any change engineered by the central government in Central Vietnam.

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11. Hamper foreign policy so as to confuse and discourage friendly countries.
12. Step up political propaganda.
13. Step up the campaign to demoralize servicemen and infuse hatred between the ranks.
14. Step up terrorist activities against US Installations.
15. Demand the US withdraw it's support from the Thieu-Ky Government.
16. Urge the Buddhists to overthrow the government and set up a neutral and unified country.
17. Gain the support of Buddhist students, workers and small business men in carrying out the above listed actions.

If the above reports are true, it would indicate that the V.C. intend to exploit the current political unrest to their advantage. Other reports point to V.C. occupying those villages and hamlets that have been vacated by ARVN forces to join in present struggle activities. To exploit both the political and tactical weaknesses of the VN government appears to be a very logical move on the V.C.'s part.

4. TERRORISM. On 12 May, a report was received that an estimated ten VC entered Cao Doi Hamlet (ZD 085003), and kidnapped seven residents. Another report of 14 May indicated that a VC company, with the support of mortar fire attacked the villages of Vinh Phuoc (BT 060565), Phu Loc (BT 053564) and Phu Phong (BT 053571). The VC then kidnapped the Village Chief of Vinh Phuoc, a District Intelligence Agent, one Combat Youth, and four civilians. The 2nd ARVN Div reports that an unknown number of VC raided GATU THUY Hamlet (BS 623935) and kidnapped 3 civilians on 15 May. On 17 May, VC kidnapped 14 guards from DONG KAT Hamlet (BS 735544). On 11 May 1966, the National Front Committee for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) ordered fifty men and ten women, from various villages in Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, to participate as coolies. These coolies were to have met on 13 May 1966 at Cuu Dean Pier (BT 050645). CI Comment: The VC appear to be using the villagers to transport the recent rice harvest from this area to VC Secret Zones. Reports of VC directives found indicated the gathering of rice and acquisition of laborers to transport the rice to secret storehouses, is still a primary effort at this time; much emphasis is also being placed on assassination and kidnapping of low-level cadre of the GRVN pacification program, which apparently remains a constant threat to the VC's efforts.

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ANNEX C (Significant Agent, VCC and/or Returnee Reports) to III MAF
PERINTREP NO. 16

1. 120mm Mortar employment. The following information was obtained by 9th ITT interrogation of Pvt. LE QUI TUAT of 3d Co, 7th Bn (AKA RQ330, RQ33 120mm Mortar Bn) attached to 21st NVA Regt. (AKA 36th Regt) (See para 2.k. III MAF PERINTREP NO. 15)

a. Forward Observer Teams. The 3d Co has 3 FO Teams. Where the 3d Co is assigned in direct support of an infantry battalion, the FO's are assigned down to Infantry company level. Subject states that the 3d Co has 2 radios, one used by the FO team, one by the company command (FDC?). The name of the radio is unknown but it has a 9 kilometer range and a 5kw output.

b. Fire Direction. There are 2 FDC men with each gun, no central FDC. They use Chinese Communist firing charts. Two firing stakes are used for each gun, either to the front or rear. The first stake is 5 meters and the second 10 meters from the weapon. Elevation is 35° minimum, 95° maximum with 45° elevation generally used for maximum range. The weapon has a trigger mechanism.

c. Employment. On the move, the minimum time to set up and fire the first round is 7 minutes. When in position, natural camouflage is used. Whenever they have been in an area for awhile, they bury the mortars. In position, security is provided by 4 riflemen (ammo carriers) armed with SKS's. Mortars are usually set in a line 30 meters apart.

d. Powder. Each round comes with 5 powder bags, one for each kilometer of range, maximum range being 5 kilometers. The powder bags or increments come in cloth bags and the powder is of a greenish color. Excess powder bags are burned after a fire mission.

e. Personnel. Each gun has two (2) 12 man crews headed by a WO. When moving, 4 men carry the gun, 4 men carry the base and 4 men carry the bags. The carriers are exchanged every hour, crew 1 to crew 2.

f. Fuzes. The captive states that his unit has only HE rounds with them but with their fuzes they can have an air burst approximately 5 meters off the ground or an impact detonation. The captive describes the muzzle blast at night with 5 charges as being 12 meters.

2. 800th Bn. On the body of one of the VC KIA following the 20 May attack against Company C, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines at (YD 527265), a document was found with the letter box designation 1520. (G-2 III MAF Cmt: 1520 is designation of 800th Bn which is known to operate in this area.)

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3. Marine Liaison officer assigned to the 1st ARVN Division passed the following Spot Report:

A VC captured at GI LINH, vicinity YD 231722, stated during interrogation that he is a member of an advance staff and reconnaissance group of the 312th NVA Division. He also stated that this Division has planned to advance to the DONG HA Valley, vicinity YD 1060. Proceed through the valley to attack QUANG TRI Province Headquarters. (III MAF G-2 Cmt: F/6; Previous reports of activity of Division and multi-Division size units North of the DMZ. The 312th Division is composed of the following major units; three (3) Infantry Regts (141st, 165th and the 209th). The 8th Arty Regt and the 531st AA Bn. strength of the Division is 12,500. The 312th Division is subordinate to the Military Region, left bank, Headquarters last reported at THAI NGUYEN, approx 30 miles North of Hanoi.

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Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 310800H May, 1966

Ser: **063566**CONFIDENTIAL

PERINTREP NO. 17

PERIOD COVERED: 220001H to 282400H May 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No Change.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I Corps Tactical Zone. VC/NVA activity was largely confined to local small scale harassing actions throughout the zone during the period. No significant VC-USMC contacts were reported but two VC-RVN forces encounters were noted in the 12th DTA.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. VC activity slackened considerably from the previous week. Minor contacts were reported but both ARVN and USMC sweeps failed to engage significant enemy units.

(2) QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR - DANANG TAOR. Political unrest appeared to be at least temporarily resolved in DANANG as Struggle Force activities folded. VC activity in the Southern half of the DANANG TAOR remained as usual the area of most small scale incidents within the zone.

(3) QUANG TRI - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Both USMC-ARVN combined operations, CHEYENNE to the North of CHU LAI and MOBILE in the South of the CHU LAI TAOR, had no significant contact. Operation CHEYENNE was undertaken as a result of a reported ARVN contact with two VC companies on 23 May vic (BT 381231). Although the VC avoided contact during this operations, the area in the North of the CHU LAI TAOR has become the scene of increased VC sightings and contacts within the past week. This step-up in activity seems to have coincided with the move of the 21st Regiment into QUANG TIN to the West of CHU LAI and TAM KY. Further South, VC activity continues in the MO DUC, DUC PHU area. On 25 May, 2 RF Platoons and 2 PAT Platoons were attacked by an estimated battalion of VC at (BS 722574). A discussion of the numerous recent reports of movement of major enemy units into QUANG NGAI from BINH DINH is contained in Annex C.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. 221 VC initiated incidents were reported during the period. Incidents were comprised of: 114 harassing fires, 79 AA fires, 24 mine/booby traps, 2 hamlet harassments, 1 ambush and 1 sabotage.

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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III MAF

PERINTREP NO. 17

22-28 May 66

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- a. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- b. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 24 May. New Weapons. (USSF SITREP No. 145) agent report. 300 VC crossed border vicinity (XD 764286) and moved towards LANG HOLE (XD 871308) at 240900. Weapons included two 106mm Recoilless Rifles. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; possible new unit infiltrating RVN on known infiltration route. First report of VC armed with 106mm RR).

e. Negative.

f. Admin Units

(1) 18 May. HIEP DUC Recon agent report of VC Dispensary. A VC Dispensary is located at (AT 939107), (AT 938101), (AT 929105) and (AT 931113). This facility consists of 2 rows of cottages along a stream. Approximately 50 VC staff the facility. The Dispensary is presently treating about 200 VC WIA's. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; first report of Dispensary in this area. Wounded are possibly from the 21st Regiment now believed to be located approximately 8 miles to the North of the Dispensary).

(2) 20 May. VC Prison Camp. QUANG NGAI province SMIAT report. The VC have a prison camp with approximately 300 VN and Montagnards prisoners located at (BS 265805). This facility consists of two tunnels; each approximately 100 meters in length. The camp is reportedly commanded by CHANH-ON. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 20 May. VC Training Camp. QUANG NGAI province SMIAT report. A VC training camp has been established at (BS 195765) consisting of 8 structures each capable of housing 30-40 people. Adjacent to the buildings are four tunnels, each approximately 100 meters in length. In conjunction with training, the tunnels are also used for storage of food stuffs including rice and cereals. This camp is known as the training camp for "VC Guerrillas of the Highlands". Present number of personnel at the camp is unknown. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Anti-Aircraft fire incidents involving III MAF A/C showed a 20% decrease over last period. 80 incidents were reported with 16 A/C being hit with a total of 21 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were AT 6090, AT 9050, BS 6050 and BT 0006. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. 2 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

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(1) 17 May. QUANG TRI agent report (F/3). An NVA Battalion with a strength of 400 men is located in vicinity (XD 774528) and (XD 770590). Battalion is armed with 1-120mm Mortar and 5 81mm Mortars with 300 rounds of ammunition (number of each type unknown), and 3 AA MG's. 2 CHICOM advisers and 5 elephants were also reported to be with this Battalion. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; 18th NVA Bn (UNCONF) was reported in this vicinity (XD 7580) on 22 April).

l - r. Negative.s. Transportation

(1) 19 May. QUANG NGAI agent report. The VC reportedly have re-opened their East-West transportation route on the North and South bases of NUI VO mountain (BS 6284). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 20 May. VC Road Improvement. QUANG NGAI SMIAT report. On or about 1 April 1966, the VC forced an unknown number of Montagnards to begin road improvement work on the road that runs from MANG KIM (BS 175745) to THA PHONG (BS 148882). The project involves improvement and widening of the road to two meters. (G-2 Cmt: F/3).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.e. Casualties. Marine operations accounted for 103 VC KIA and 3 VCC during the reporting period.f. Morale. Considered good.g. New Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Obstacles and Barriers.

(1) 22 May, 3d Bn, 4th Marines. A 15 year old VN boy stated that there was a probable mine on railroad tracks vicinity (ZD 017026). Engineer units that investigated report they found a 40 lb charge at the location given by the boy. The mine consisted of a 5 lb booster charge and the 40 lb main charge. 6 flashlight batteries were attached to booster. Mine would activate when vibrations caused two exposed wires to touch.

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CONFIDENTIALh. Negative.**CONFIDENTIAL**i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps was generally cloudy with rain during most of the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 85° high and 75° low. Winds were mostly variable at 5-8 knots. Visibility ranged from 3-7 miles.

k. Significant Captive/Returnee and Document Reports. Annex C.l. Other Significant Information.

(1) Medical. The following information was reported in 1st MARDIV ISUM No. 52: On 19 May, an ex-government official, experienced in dealing with VC affairs, reported the following information to the QUANG NGAI PAT Headquarters: The VC supply of medicine is principally handled by women who are apparently carrying NUOC MAM, and by women who act as nurses and midwives. Women carrying cans of NUOC MAM with false bottoms, buy the medicine, wrap it in nylon bags and hide it in the cans for transportation back to the VC area. (G-2 Cmt: F/3).

(2) 17 May. VC Supply Activities. Following information extracted from 1st MARDIV ISUM No. 56. At 0830 on 17 May, a PAT agent reported that a ship dropped supplies to the VC at (BS 789839). The ship was described as being approximately 50 meters long, 10 meters wide and was bearing the number "508" in black paint. A triangular flag was also observed. Flag was red with a white half moon in the center and a blue edge. The ship was anchored for about 55 minutes to unload its cargo. Cargo was not for wide distribution nor transportation to Western QUANG NGAI. Cargo included 200-25 liter cans of kerosene, 60 bags of rice, 16 large nylon bags containing a powder like substance, 6 rolls of dark khaki cloth and medicines. The ship arrived from the North. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; Area is known infiltration center. A point of significance is that the VC conducted this activity during daylight hours).

(3) 12 May, VC Signal Installation. THUA THIEN SMIAT report. The VC have a Signal Installation located on top of HON CHAY mountain (AT 804935). This site consists of 1 large canvas shelter and 4 smaller shelters surrounding it. Many different types of radio equipment are housed in the large shelter and 4 wooden poles, (approximately 20 meters in height) with antennas, are positioned on top of it. Approximately 40 VC work at this installation. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; first report of Signal Installation in this area).

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No Change.


 T. H. FISHER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
 B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
 C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	15	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG	5
CG 1ST MAW	15	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG FFORCEV I	2	CICV	1
CG FFORCEV II	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
DET C-1 5TH USSF	2	CSC DANANG	1
CO FLC	1	CO 5th COMM BN	1

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 17

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY PO-SR CAPT NGUYEN SONG

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MLEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG, 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG, 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIEH
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG, 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 5392	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW, CAPT PHO
RQ 21 BN (AA) (NVA)	CONF	300	BS 5082	*18-12.7MM AA MG	CO-CAPT ROANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

*RECENT REPORTS INDICATE WPNS IN THIS BN NOW REDUCED TO 6.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 36TH NVA REGT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI TAOR.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINPREP NO. 17

1. General. The VC continue to increase in potential, as the period of political unrest continues. Although the Government Troops have won a victory in Quang Nam Province, the VC still persist to press for stability and sophistication in waging their propaganda, sabotage, and espionage campaigns. During the past several weeks, VC terrorism has continued to press to the fore, with kidnappings centering in the CHU LAI TAOR. Whether this is an indication of the VC need of more forced labor, for new units, or simply attempts to further intimidate the local villager into the VC fold is not assessable at this time.

2. Espionage and Sabotage. Viet Cong employment of Liaison and Reconnaissance Cells continue throughout ICTZ as indicated by reports received and information obtained from a VCC, captured in Hoa Vang District. The VCC indicated that these VC teams are collecting USMC Order of Battle information from envelopes and papers found in trash containers throughout Hoa Vang District. Each team consist of one chief, who records information received, and three runners, or contact men, who collect the information. CI Comment: A substantial number of low-level agents have apparently formed liaison and reconnaissance cells which target easily accessible installations, organizations and groups. The VC have been able to exploit the divergent political and social aims of numerous religious, ethnic, and student groups within ICTZ, thereby gaining access to information available to these semi-official groups. Plans to penetrate Military installations for espionage purposes have significantly increased in the past six months. Analysis of captured documents have revealed that virtually every fixed target of significance, especially military air facilities and military installations in urban areas, has been targeted.

VC sabotage is often conducted by small groups or cells, usually attached to larger units for administrative and logistical support. All VC military and paramilitary units are considered capable of conducting sabotage activities. Much emphasis has been placed on targets such as bridges, railroads, culverts and other lines of communications. The VC continue to conduct sabotage training in an effort to improve their capability and techniques. The VC are also reportedly capable of causing a form of local economic sabotage by controlling sections of the main arteries of transportation. The VC have attempted to destroy the economy of friendly rural areas by raids, taxes and terrorism. This type of economic sabotage would serve a dual purpose by providing funds, supplies, sympathizers, and by destroying faith and loyalty in the national government.

3. Propaganda and Subversion. On 27 May, an estimated 150 Vietnamese villagers gathered in the vicinity of (AT 967616) to protest to Marine units for mortar fire in that area. The protestors brought one dead Vietnamese female, who was allegedly killed as a result of mortar fire received. Anti-American leaflets were left behind as the crowd dispersed. CI Comment: The VC have reportedly organized and conducted propaganda and indoctrination classes in this area. One such class was reported

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during the period from 21 through 24 March. The purpose of these classes is to "boost" the people's anti-government feelings and to urge them to oppose military actions, and to protest bombardments and artillery fire in the area. This incident, as in the case of those reported previously, may have been VC inspired. In the case in point, research failed to find any friendly fire mission coincident with the time and place of the protested casualty.

A report received indicated that the VC held meetings from 10-16 May, MUM Mountain (BS 412496). Approximately 100 persons with representatives from Province, District and Village levels were present. During the meetings, cooperation of local inhabitants with the VC was stressed to provide information on Government Forces. GI Comment. In areas under VC control or partial control, VC terror and propaganda activities have been successful in gaining support. Viet Cong efforts to subvert the population are apparently less successful in areas where friendly forces have provided adequate protection. The numerous political, religious and ethnic groups have been used to show dissension and distrust among the population. Vietnamese loyalty to the family has often been considered to be above loyalty to the state, religion or political group. Vietnamese living in Viet Cong controlled areas are exploited to put pressure on relatives supporting the RVN. Proselyting new recruits into the VC structure is a continuing requirement; much time and effort is devoted to this task.

4. Terrorism. On 21 May, a report received indicated two Villagers from Ky-Xuan Village, Ly Tin District were killed by VC. A later report identified the two villagers as: VO-Quang-Hong, who had been a sergeant in the French Army prior to 1954. Recently he had been a foreman of a construction crew building the new high school near Ly Tin District Headquarters. The other man was identified as TRAN-DO from Ky-Xuan #3. DO had reportedly been killed because the VC suspected him of being an ARVN agent. A 23 May report indicated that an estimated 100 VC entered the hamlet of Thanh Luong (YD 682276) and kidnapped seven residents. The VC assassinated the police chief, Assistant police chief, killed three civilians and wounded five other civilians in Hue (2) (BS 6198) on 25 May 1966. A report received indicated that an estimated VC Squad entered Yen Noi Village (BS 609978) assassinated the police chief, four civilians and wounded another five civilians.

An estimated VC company attacked the village of Vinh Phuoc Loc and Phu Phong (BT 065653, BT 053564, BT 053573) in the early hours of 15 May. In this engagement the VC kidnapped the Vinh Phuoc Village Chief and a subsector intelligence agent. Two pacification cadre leaders were reportedly killed by the VC in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 004670). Another report from a pacification Cadre leader revealed that an unreported number of VC entered Duong Son (1) hamlet, destroyed 1,000 meters of fence, and destroyed furniture in the hamlet headquarters building.

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The VC later entered Yen Ne (2) Can Ne and Giang Dong hamlets, distributed propaganda leaflets, gave propaganda lectures, raised a VC Flag and kidnapped an unidentified Vietnamese Male. CI Comments: During the period of political unrest, it would appear that the VC were satisfied with directing their attention toward propaganda and infiltration. Meanwhile, the overt acts in the absence of military engagements, appeared to have centered on conducting acts of terrorism. Kidnapping also appears to have become more prevalent.

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Annex C (SIGNIFICANT CAPTIVE/RETURNEE and DOCUMENT REPORTS) to III
MAF PERINTREP NR. 17

I. 610th Division (AKA YELLOW STAR, AKA SAO VANG)

2nd VC Regiment (AKA QUYET CHIEN Regiment)

18th NVA Regiment

22nd Regiment (AKA QUYET TAM Regiment)

a. Over the past two months, there have been numerous agent reports indicating the movement of regimental size units from the South into Quang Ngai Province. Prior to January 1966, the 2d VC Regiment, the 18th NVA Regiment and possible the Quyét Tam Regiment were located in Quang Ngai province. In approximately January, prior to operation DOUBLE EAGLE, these units moved South into BINH DINH. A return of any one or all to QUANG NGAI is not illogical. Historically, when the 1st VC Regiment has moved North to QUANG TIN, as it did following Operation STARLIGHT in August 1965, the 2d VC Regiment has moved North to fill the void. Likewise, the movement South of the 2d Regiment prior to DOUBLE EAGLE was paralleled by the move of the 1st Regiment back to Quang Ngai. In the last move, both Regiments had a companion Regiment; the 1st with the 36th (21st) and the 2d with the 18th. The 21st is now accepted as having returned to Quang Tin. Although still of too low validity to be accepted, there have been reports recently that the 1st VC Regiment has returned to Quang Tin. The move Northward of the 21st and possibly of the 1st would argue for a return of at least one regiment from the Yellow Star Division into Quang Ngai. Increased VC activity in recent weeks in the MO DUC, DUC PHU Districts indicates the probable introduction of fresh units to that area.

b. In line with the above reasoning, the following VCC and document identifications are quoted as indications of the locations of some of the units in question:

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DATE OF CAPTURE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
I FORCEV INTSUM 139	1 VCC	7 MAY	92d Co, 9thBn, 22d Regt	BS857112
"	1 VCC	7 MAY	"	BS859113
"	3 VCC	6 MAY	93dCo, 9thBn, 22d Regt	BS859119
"	1 VCC	7 MAY	94thCo, 9thBn, 22d Regt	BS860118
1st AIR CAV DIV INTSUM 137	DOC	16 MAY	97thBn, 2d Regt	BS671628
I FORCEV INTSUM 143	DOC	22 MAY	93dBn, 2d Regt	BR6662

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c. The evidence given above would indicate that elements of the 22d Regiment were in Northern Binh Dinh Province in early May and the 2d Regiment more recently further South. Research by this Headquarters found no very recent firm identification of the 18th NVA Regiment. If the numerous agent reports of movement of units North into Quang Ngai are to be accepted, the 18th Regiment appears to be the likely candidate or possibly, elements of the 22d Regiment.

II. Elements, 1st VC Regt. 26 May. 2d Bn, 5th ARVN Regiment during operation LIEN KET 44 (MOBILE) destroyed a cave vicinity (BS 710945). A subsequent search of the cave revealed 7 VC KIA. Documents found indicated that the KIA were members of the 60th and 80th Battalions of the 1st VC Regiment and they had been on leave in this area since 5 May. ARVN sources in possession of the documents reported that the documents indicated that the 1st VC Regiment has been in QUANG TIN for approximately one month. G-2 III MAF Comment: The 1st VC Regiment has been previously associated with this area (Opn STARLIGHT, August 1965) and probably has many personnel recruited from the area. The 21st (AKA 36th) NVA Regiment is believed to have returned from QUANG NGAI to QUANG TIN, however, the 1st VC Regiment is still carried in QUANG NGAI Province.

III. 21st NVA Regt (AKA 36th, AKA 6th). (2d ARVN Div INTSUM Nr 122). A VC captured at (BT 2317) on 1 May states that the Reconnaissance Company of the 21st Regiment is located at (BT 153217). This company left Quang Ngai after the 28 March attack on the 3d Bn, 5th ARVN Regt. The trip took 4 days. A staff team of the 21st Regiment departed Quang Ngai after the Reconnaissance Company. He states that the 22d Battalion departed on 17 April after the 14 April attack on the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (SIC) via a trail west of TRA BONG. A different route had been used to move into Quang Ngai in January 1966. The VCC claims that the 21st Regiment moved into Quang Ngai for a 5 month operation designed to attack outposts and strategic hamlets and to seize control of the area. He states that the Regiment moved back to Quang Tin due to heavy losses and because their location was known. Subject states that he was part of a 5 man team assigned the mission of studying an area bounded by (BT 200186 - 200158 - 233175 - 233158). (G-2 Cmt: An estimated Bn of VC attacked 3d Bn, 5th ARVN Regt positions vic (BS 597795) on 28 March. I Corps DASC DISUM Nr. 16D6 reports that the 2d Bn/4th ARVN Regt was in contact with an estimated 1 Co of VC from 1200 to 1930 on 14 April. Other information obtained from this VCC is in consonance with information obtained from other sources.)

IV. 802d Battalion, THUA THIEN. 4th Marines report of 221530H May quotes a report from the THUA THIEN sector advisor that a rallier from the 802d Battalion stated that his Company's strength was 80-90 men, that the men of the battalion are hungry, that they have very little rice and eat soup most of the time.

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He says that the battalion is searching the hills to the North and North-west of HUE and cannot collect much rice. An initial spot report from the HUE liaison officer of a wounded VC who rallied on the night of 23 May quoted the rallier (from the 802d Bn) as stating that the battalion had moved to (YD 622185 - 630180 - 628195 - 632195).

V. Initial and Unconfirmed Spot Reports of New Units in QUANG TRI

a. 324th Div. QUANG TRI. (THIRD MARDIV INTSUM Nr. 145). On 24 May, 4th Marines relayed a 1st ARVN Div initial interrogation report of a VC who rallied on 19 May vic (YD 025562) and stated that he was from the 3d Co, 8th Bn, 3d Regt, 324th B Div. He stated that the Division was activated in September 1965. Division Headquarters is located at (YD 173-888). The rallier infiltrated into South Vietnam on 15 May with a food transportation platoon. He stated that the troops were informed they would infiltrate SVN and coordinate with another Division to liberate Quang Tri.

b. 312th NVA Div. (QUANG TRI) (refer to III MAF PERINTREP #16, Annex C, para 3) On 21 May, 4th Marines relayed a 1st ARVN Div interrogation report of a VCC at GIO LINH (YD 231722). VC stated that he is a member of an advance staff and reconnaissance group of the 312th NVA Division. NOTE: No capture date was given for this VCC.

c. G-2 Comment: The above two reports are quoted for information purposes. It is noted that an estimated VC battalion attacked an ARVN outpost at GIO LINH (YD 214710) on 19 May. At the same time, an RVN position at (YD 115700) was attacked and overrun by an unknown number of VC. There have been previous reports of VC activity just North of the DMZ in recent weeks. The above reports are strictly preliminary and unevaluated spot reports. The 324 B Div is probably AKA for the 312 Division.

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 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 070800H June, 1966

Ser: **066266**CONFIDENTIAL

PERINTREP NO. 18

Period Covered: 290001H May to 042400H June 1966

Ref: (a) Map: No change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. VC/NVA activity remained at a low level, primarily characterized by avoidance of large scale actions, although several small scale attacks were conducted by the VC throughout the Zone. Small scale harassing actions and mining continued at the usual pace in all TAOR'S.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. There was one contact in the CO BI - THANH TAN area on 29 May with an estimated 100 VC in well fortified positions. Otherwise, VC activity in the 11th DTA was relatively minor. Operations RENO at DONG HA and ATHENS to the South of PHU BAI resulted in no significant enemy contact.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the Southern portion of the DANANG TAOR, however, no VC units of any appreciable size were encountered.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. VC units in the Southern provinces of the ICTZ avoided contact with USMC/ARVN elements but initiated several actions against PAT and PF elements. Centers of VC activity and VC sightings were to the West of TAM KY in QUANG TIN and in the MO DUC area of QUANG NGAI.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. A total of 241 incidents were reported during the period, consisting of 130 harassing SA fire, 61 AA fire incidents, 48 mine/booby trap, 1 propaganda and 1 assault by fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years

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III MAF PERINTREP #18

29 May - 4 June 66

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIALd. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 26 May. B-50 Rocket Launcher. Following information extracted from COMNAVFORV ISUM #47-66. A new CHICOM anti-tank rocket launcher (model B-50) and two 105mm fin-stabilized rounds were captured by an RF company in vicinity (YS 018612). Launcher has smooth bore, is 52" long, 57mm exterior, 50mm interior, with a monopod forward and a bipod to the rear. Trigger and hammer assembly are CHICOM copy of Soviet RPG-2 AT grenade launcher, but is larger. 105mm rounds contain shaped charge believed to be capable of penetrating 10-12" of hardened steel at a zero degree angle. (G-2 Cmt: 2nd report of this type weapon being captured. Refer to Para 2.d.(3) of III MAF PERINTREP NO. 7).

(2) 14 May. Equipment. Information extracted from USSF SITREP #148. VC cadre TU BINH, reportedly held a meeting vicinity (BS 625326). He brought 13 tunnel digging machines and 3 ground pressing machines which he stated came from NVN. The digging machines are chain-driven, 2 meters long and 1/2 meter high. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; first report of VC possessing this type equipment).

(3) Weapons Smuggling (COMNAVFORV INTSUM 50-66). 29 May in AN XUYEN, an ARVN inspection team using a hand held mine detector on a trial basis, inspected a sampan. The search of the interior of the sampan was negative, however, the instrument indicated the presence of metal. Further search revealed a box secured to the underside of the sampan. The box contained grenades.

e. Negative.f. Admin Units

(1) 2 June. VC Ordnance Shop. QUANG TIN Prov. SMIAT report. Construction of a new VC ordnance workshop was completed at HO SAU (local name) (BT 190060) and has been in operation since 22 April 1966. The workshop is a single story, wooden structure 40m x 15m, and has a thatch roof. The workshop area covers approximately a 100m square and faces the BONG MINU River on the east side. PHAM HUU DIEM is the director and he has approximately 100 personnel working under him. Equipment and tools at this workshop consist of the following: two (2) charcoal operated electric generators, two (2) lathes, one (1) machine for making grenade casings, one (1) machine for anti-personnel mine casings, and one (1) machine for 60mm mortar shells. A Battalion size unit is deployed throughout the workshop area for security on 24-hour basis. (G-2 Cmt: F/3).

(2) Possible Sea Infiltration (FCZA SIR 250847Z May). In the area formed by joining (BT 200260-260120-400050-160070) there is a concentration of VC/NVA forces.

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It is possible that these forces are externally supplied by sea. NILO QUANG NGAI reported in February that the vicinity of (BT 330330) was suspected of being a coastal redistribution/infiltration point. FCZA has previously reported the coast from (BT 290300 to 450150) as suspect due to minimal patrol effort by coastal groups in this area. (G-2 III MAF Cmt: The area mentioned and inland to the west of TAM KY has been the scene of much increase in VC activity recently coincident with the return of the 21st VC Regiment to QUANG TIN).

(3) 30 May. VC Hospital. QUANG NGAI Province SMIAT report. A VC hospital is located near the foot of a mountain at XUAN THIEN (BS 625510). It is constructed of thatching (size unk). A doctor reportedly visits the patients to administer treatment. It is unknown at what intervals or how frequently the doctor visits the hospital. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Anti-Aircraft fire incidents decreased by 24% from the previous reporting period. 61 incidents were reported with 11 aircraft being hit with a total of 16 rounds. Grid squares with highest density of fire were (AT 9050) and (BS 4090). Fire ranged from light to intense, with 2 cases of 12.7/50 cal fire being received.

i-j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars

(1) 17 May. QUANG NGAI, SMIAT agent report of large guns. During March 1966, the VC recruited approximately 300 laborers for the purpose of transporting material from North to South Vietnam. These personnel were recruited from western QUANG NGAI Province. Source was assigned to a group that transported 3 "large guns" into QUANG NGAI Province. Each "large gun" was broken into 3 parts for transport and a total of 8 persons were required to transport each weapon. On 2 May 1966, the 3 "large guns" were deposited in the vicinity of (BS 220950) and the laborers were released. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; "large guns" being referred to could possibly be 120mm Mortars).

l-s. Negative

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

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- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 109 VC KIA and 26 VCC were reported during the reporting period.
- f. Morale. Considered good.
- g. Enemy Defenses, Mines, Minefields, Defense Works, Fortification, Barriers and Booby Traps.

(1) 28 May. Mine Incident. A VN woman informed Marines that six VC had positioned a mine at (AT 984632). An Engineer mine detector team with detectors failed to produce the device, however, when the Engineers were returning from the sweep, their truck (3/4 ton M-37) detonated a mine at (AT 984632) - the position stated by the informer and the area which the engineers had just carefully examined. The engineer officer-in-charge stated that extra care had been taken in that area, furthermore, 1 tank, 1-1/4 ton vehicle, 1-3/4 ton truck and two M-274 "mules" had traversed the road prior to the detonation. The device was identified as a rudimentary, homemade mine consisting of 20 lbs of explosive rigged with what was presumed to be a non-metallic pressure-type detonating device. The resulting crater was approximately three feet deep and 5-6 feet across at road level.

(2) VC Naval Mines. (COMNAVFORV 270014Z May) The referenced message describes a floating mine arrangement recently used by the VC in South Vietnam as follows: The device consisted of two five-gallon cans filled with explosives and floated beneath the surface by inflated rubber pillows and palm wood pieces. The arrangement was fastened (either by a swimmer or possibly floated with the tide) to the anchor chain with metal hooks and streamed against the side of the ship on lengths of nylon parachute shroud. It is believed that a clockwork mechanism was used to trigger the mine.

(3) CBU-3/B Bomblet Booby Trap. On 26 May, 1st MAW EOD personnel disarmed four booby traps in the TAI NANG Valley area near BA TO, QUANG NGAI. Each booby trap, in dense foliage, was composed of a CBU-3/B bomb which had been inverted and placed on a hard surface (rock) with its large mushroom striker facing upward. Suspended above it by a series of levers and communications wire was a 20 to 30 pound rock, attached to a trip wire. When the wire was disturbed, it released the rock which in turn fell on the striker, setting off the bomblet.

(4) 27 May, AO reported observing a well camouflaged bunker at (BT 351099). The bunker was made of logs 10' X 15' and had firing ports (2 per side) on all four sides. Foxholes were also observed and the entire area seem to be well fortified.

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(5) 27 May, VC Placement of Mines. The following information was obtained from a captured VC document:

Translation revealed the document to be a directive from a VC Headquarters. The directive was addressed to hamlet guerrillas and stressed VC policy on placement of mines. It was pointed out that mines should not be placed in a disorderly manner because too many civilians have been injured when they accidentally detonated the mines. The directive stated that sites for mines should be selected in advance and when American or ARVN troops approach, the mines should be set in the pre-selected positions. The directive added that when mines are put in position the civilians in the area must be warned about their location and appropriate warning signs should be put out. The directive concluded by stating that violators of the policy outlined in the directive would be severely punished.

(6) 1 Jun, VC Mine. 3d Engr Bn sweep team. While working with a drag line along side a road vic (AT 943674), a wire was pulled up. Wire was cut and upon tracing it to the center of the road and probing, a 25 lb shaped charge was uncovered. Charge was in a wooden box 7" deep, 14" long, 6 1/2" across the top and 4 1/2" across the bottom. Bottom was lined with blocks of TNT and on top was placed a layer of glass resembling the bottom of beer or coke bottles. All were sealed with plastic. The wire extended 100 yds into a rice paddy and ended behind a tombstone. The ends of the wire were bare and ready for immediate attachment to a battery.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps was mostly hot and humid with occasional thunderstorms and showers during the reporting period. Winds were mostly variable at 5-9 knots. Visibility ranged from 7-20 miles. Temperatures ranged from an average 96° high to 77° low.

k. Significant Captive/Returnee and Documents report. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 21 May contact vic (AT 9564). The following additional information is submitted in respect to the 21 May fire fight between elements of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and an estimated two companies of VC: (The engagement, which lasted throughout the afternoon, resulted in 53 VC KIA (body count)). The VC were dressed mostly in black or white shorts and shirts. Almost all of them, however, had a uniform of some sort in their possession, usually carried in a pack. Most of the uniforms were grey and brand new, but some were faded green or faded khaki.

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Some of the VC reportedly had helmets; however most wore short brimmed straw hats or cloth hats. Many of the hats were camouflaged with sticks and leaves. Most of the VC were barefooted but some wore the "HO CHI MINH" type sandals. Many of the VC were well equipped; wearing packs, web gear, canteens, first aid packets, ponchos, magazines and grenade pouches, entrenching tools, plus weapons and grenades. In some cases the packs contained flashlights, razors, toothbrushes and personal effects indicating that the VC force may have been a Main Force unit augmented by local guerrillas. The VC were well armed with every other man carrying an automatic weapon. Some typical weapons used by the VC were K-50's, M-14, M1, Carbine, M-44 and BAR's. The VC used 60mm Mortars and 57mm Recoilless rifles during the engagement. In the initial stages of the action, the VC stood and fought from trenches until they were overrun by the Marines. Later in the action they were seen attempting to run from the Marines, trying to avoid contact. During the later stages of the fight, the VC became very confused and seemed to be without leadership and discipline. Except for one report of a whistle, no signs of any attempt to use signals or communications were noted. It is possible that the leaders were killed or wounded early in the fight, thus leaving the troops in a state of confusion. Unit identifications indicate that the R21 and R23 companies of the R20 Battalion participated in the action. There is every indication that a sizeable group of the VC swam the SONG YEN from west to east with all their weapons, grenades and ammunition. A total of 16 weapons were found in the area after the battle was over.

(2) VC Operations within the DANANG TAOR. A study has been made of VC activity within the DANANG TAOR. For comparative purposes, all incidents involving VC elements during the months of February 1966 and May 1966 were plotted and analyzed. The following conclusions were reached:

A. There has been an overall increase in the total number of incidents (332 for February, 406 for May) even when considering a 10% increase in the number of days involved.

B. There was an overall decrease in contacts with small units (12 or less VC) and an increase in the number of engagements involving larger (13 or more) groups of VC.


C. The number of incidents increased in proportion to the distance from the center of the DANANG airfield; i.e. within 5 km of the airfield there were 3 incidents recorded for each month, whereas in the area from 15 km of the center of the airfield to the edge of the TAOR the number of incidents increased from 34 to 86.

D. The area of greatest VC activity and, significantly, the area of most contact with larger size VC units is the area East of Hill 55 in grid squares (BT 0063, 0062, 0061, 0161 and 0162).

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.


 T. H. FISHER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
 B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
 C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG FMFBAC	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	15	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG	5
CG 1ST MAW	15	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG FFORCEV I	2	CICV	1
CG FFORCEV II	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CG, 1ST BRIG, 101ST ABN DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	CSC DANANG	1
DET C-1 5TH USSF	2	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO FLC	1		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF FERINTREP NO. 18

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGAINIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
*K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RE 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO- GA PT DANG CAO KY

* RECENT RPTS INDICATE THIS COMPANY HAS BEEN DISBANDED AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE USED TO RESTRENGTHEN THE 810TH BN.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-IE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGAINIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG IAM (AKA LU) XO- THEI PO-TOAN
DIEM BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STF</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5784	UNK	CO=LONG XO=MINH PO=MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO=VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO=TRAN KIEW, CAPT PHO
RQ 21 BN (AA) (NVA)	CONF	300	UNLOC QUANG TIN/QUANG NGAI BORDER AREA	18-12.7MM AA MG	CO=CAPT ROANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO=TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-IMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 36TH NVA REGT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI TAOR.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**ANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NUMBER 18

1. General. During the reporting period there has been no new developments in counterintelligence trends. It appears that the VC have made no large scale moves to capitalize on the present period of political unrest other than infiltrating their low level agents into urban areas. VC propaganda operations continue to be conducted throughout the ICTZ. The VC appear to have organized at least a low level espionage net within the ICTZ and may be directing their efforts toward ~~sophisticated~~ espionage operations.

2. Espionage and Sabotage. A report received on 25 May, indicated Le MOI, identification card number 032577, issued by Hoi An and dated 19 April 1962, is presently residing in Ha Trung Hamlet, Cam Nam Township. MOI, a VC Political Cadre, is organizing an espionage network in Ha Trung. Another report of 20 May, indicated that Nguyen Dinh LONG, a VCS, captured at Tra Khuong Village, Tra Bong District, readily admitted working for the VC as an agent handler and had several low level espionage agents in his employ. These agents supplied him with information pertaining to US Military positions and installations located within the Tra Bong District and adjacent Districts. LONG did not have direct contact with "superior" agents, but turned all information received over to another unidentified agent. Le UNG, a native of Quan Nam Hamlet, Hoa Vang District, formerly a VC squad leader, is also reportedly collecting information for VC agents. CI Comment: Numerous reports would tend to confirm that a low level espionage net may be organized and operating throughout ICTZ. It appears that during the recent political unrest, the VC have concentrated their effort toward improving and enlarging this net.

During the night of 22 May 1966, the VC destroyed a total of twenty-one miles of communication lines installed along the railroad tracks parallel to Highway number One (BT 449090) to (BT 432105). The wire had been cut and chopped into small segments. Booby traps were also discovered along the entire route. CI Comment: Past reports indicate the VC have placed considerable emphasis on destroying lines of communication, and it is probable that these acts of sabotage will continue, possibly at a higher rate.

3. Propaganda and Subversion. A report of 10 May indicated that the VC had sent VC Cadre into the city of Danang, during the recent political unrest, to supply other VC already in Danang with propaganda leaflets and VC flags. A VC leaflet was reportedly found along the Perfume River, hung on a balcony, near a bathing site, in Trinh Minh the Park, Hue. A VC flag was also found at this location. These leaflets were written in English and contained the following message: "American servicemen should not take the risk of fighting a dirty war waged by the Johnson Administration in South Vietnam". "You'll be insured safety, well treatment, early repatriation to rejoin your families if on the battlefield you don't resist the Liberation Armed Forces". "Tens of thousands of American mothers and wives went into mourning for their dear sons, their husbands, fallen in Korea". "Don't let such a plight reoccur through the war in South Vietnam". CI Comment: This act would further substantiate previous reports of VC movements within the major cities during the period of political unrest.

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During the night of 20 May, the VC reportedly held a propaganda meeting at Phu Nhon Chinh Hamlet (BT 002478). The VC have also reportedly destroyed friendly propaganda leaflets dropped in Quang Tang Hamlet (BT 084460). Another report of 20 May indicated that a VC main force company gathered the local residents of Thi Lai (1) Hamlet for an anti-government propaganda meeting. On 31 May, the VC reportedly infiltrated Hoa Da Village (BT 0271) and subjected the villagers to propaganda speeches and harassment, and have attempted to persuade the RF's to desert and join the VC.

4. Terrorism: A military/political conference reportedly convened on 11 May and continued for one week at Cam Son Hamlet (BT 051461). One of the topics of discussion was the initiation of a program of "Competition" for kidnapping Government personalities in sub-districts. Awards were to be given to individuals or groups who excelled in carrying out this program. The program supposedly terminated at the end of May 1966. Another report of 22 May indicated the VC kidnapped four civilians at Vinh Phu Hamlet (BS 635525). CI Comment: A marked increase in kidnappings was observed in the month of May in the Quang Tin Province as opposed to previous months.

A report received indicated that Mai Xuan Tho, a Central Rural Construction Council member, was assassinated by the VC at Lo Giang Hamlet (BT 025705) on 15 May 1966. No further details of the assassination are presently available. On 21 May, an unknown number of VC reportedly fired at civilians riding in Lambrettas at (BS 635836); four civilians were wounded. On 27 May, a report was received indicated that the VC entered a hamlet at (BT 325237), wounded three Popular Forces personnel and one assistant Hamlet Chief.

5. Extortion. A report of 24 May indicated the VC are forcing residents of Mau Hoa Hamlet, Duy Xuyen District, to purchase five kegs of rice when going to markets in secure areas. The rice will be deducted from future taxes.

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT CAPTIVE/RETURNEE and DOCUMENT REPORTS) to III MAF
PERINTREP NR 18

I. 610th Division (BINH DINH)

a. The location stated in para I. b. of PERINTREP No. 17 opposite 97th Bn, 2d Regt. should have read (BR 671628) vice (BS 671628). In view of the continued reports of movement of units of the 610th Division North into QUANG NGAI province, this headquarters will continue to report information received concerning elements of that Division. It is pointed out that, whereas units of this Division may be located in Binh Dinh Province, it is not improbable that supply, labor and/or recruiting trips may be routinely carried out in QUANG NGAI province - this activity giving rise in turn to movement reports.

b. 2d VC Regt (HQ I FFORCEV INTSUM NR 147). Documents captured by 1st Cav Div 22 May 66 vic BR 720648 made mention of the SONG BA Regiment. On 26 May 66, 1/5 Cav captured documents vic BR 669739 from QUYET CHIEN "C" and SONG BA "C". The documents were signed by the same individual, Van Loc (Chief SONG BA "C", AKA QUYET CHIEN "C", AKA 2D VC REGT Road Services). One envelope had QUYET CHIEN "C" crossed out and SONG BA "C" entered in its place. (G-2 Cmt: VCC PO, SR LT. HO CUONG from the 97th BN QUYET TAM (AKA 22D Regt) stated his unit changed its designation to SONG HONG around 1 May 66. The above documents tend to confirm the fact that on or about 1 May the QUYET CHIEN Regt changed its designation to SONG BA. (I FFORCEV Cmt: Since this Hqs has received numerous reports of contacts with elements of the 2d VC Regiment in this general area it is quite possible that the QUYET CHIEN Regiment (AKA 2d VC Regt, AKA HONG HA Regt), and the SONG BA Regt, are the same unit.

II 620th Div (Rpt by 1st Mar Div) QUANG TIN/QUANG NGAI. Translation of document captured during LIEN KEY 44 Vic (BS 710945) on 25 May. The document was issued by the Staff section (CHI LANG 4 A) of the 620th Division (CHI LANG 4). It is titled "Liberation Forces of MRV".

"The Staff section of the 620th Division (CHI LANG 4A) directs the 1st VC Regiment (AN CHIANG UNIT) to collect the personnel of the 21st NVA Regiment (AN LONG UNIT) still located in the districts of Quang Ngai province. When the collection teams of the 1st VC Regiment encounter personnel of the 21st NVA Regiment in the various regions, they are to organize them and direct them to the 1st VC Regiment. The personnel of the 21st Regiment will execute the orders of the collection teams exactly as directed".

The document is signed by Le Thach who has previously been identified as commander of the 1st VC Regiment. (G-2 Comment, The report is in line with the reported movement of the 21st Regiment to Quang Tin. It also would indicate that a straggler problem exists.)

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III. 21st NVA Regt. (AKA 36th, AKA 6th) QUANG TIN. USSF, On 31 May, USSF elements attacked an estimated 74 VC at (BT 092207). The VC were armed with AK assault rifles and U. S. Carbines. 12 VC were KIA. Documents captured indicated the 11X33 Company AKA 1st Company, 3d Battalion, 21st NVA Regiment.

IV. 324 B Div. (3d Mar Div INTSUM 151) QUANG TRI. Further interrogation of rallier Bui Thanh Quang, squad leader, 3d squad, 4th company, 8th battalion, 3d regiment, 324th B Division (previously reported) indicated that he infiltrated South Vietnam with a 200 man cadre group of the 324th B Division. This group was composed of division level cadre down to company commander of support company plus a 30 man Sapper unit, a 30 man Intelligence platoon, 30 men as an Escort platoon and 27 men as a Rear Service platoon. The mission of the group was to study the Ba Long and Quang Tri areas. When the group has completed their mission, the whole Division would infiltrate into South Vietnam. He stated that the morale and combat experience is good, due in part to combat experience gained in LAOS.

V. 802d Battalion, THUA THIEN.

a. 24 May. Returnee PHAM TAN, PFC of 9th Squad, 3d Platoon, 2d Company, 802d Battalion, rallied 240600 May. Subject assigned to 802d Battalion 17 May 66; previously was a member of the 22d Company (120 mortar). Returnee stated that on 10 May, the 22d Company dispersed its men among the 800th, 802nd and 806th Battalions (70 men to 800th, 30 to 802nd and 90 to the 806th). Subject stated that the 802d Battalion was located at (YD 645192) on 19 May. (G-2 Comment: F/3; C.22 Company previously reported as 120mm Mortar Co. Previous VCC and ralliers indicated that the 800th, 802nd and 806th Battalions were short on personnel. Possible that this company could have been used as replacements.

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Unit: III MAF

Location: Danang, RVN

DTG: 140800 June, 1966

Ser: **070566**CONFIDENTIAL

PERINTREP NO. 19

Period Covered: 050001H to 112400H June 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. Enemy activity within the ICTZ remained predominately one of avoidance of contact, with isolated attacks conducted against the smaller friendly installations. Reports of VC/NVA movements and locations indicated concentrations of enemy forces for possible future offensive employments. The most notable concentration has developed in QUANG TIN Province to the West of TAM KY.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Operations BEAVER and FLORIDA in the CO BI - THANH TAN area uncovered isolated VC activity but no significant actions developed. ARVN operations in the Northern provinces contacted no major enemy units although the 1st ARVN Division claimed that new, large scale enemy units had entered the area.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. On 8 June, between 1830 and 2030 hours, an estimated Company of VC attacked the Special Forces camp at THUONG DUC (ZC 1554) with mortar and small arms fire. The attack was repulsed with minor VC losses. Enemy activity in the area was otherwise confined to the standard small unit encounters and continued mining and booby trap activity.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Evidence continues to build up of large concentrations of VC/NVA units of the 620th Division located in QUANG TIN province (See Annex C). Currently, enemy activity appears to be confined to reconnaissance and the build up of forces for future operations, probably the VC "Summer Campaign".

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;

Declassified after 12 years

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MAF
PERINTREP #19

5-11 June 66

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents during the reporting period showed a slight increase over last period. A total of 287 incidents were reported consisting of: 148 small unit engagements, 103 AA fires, 34 mine/booby trap, 1 sabotage and 1 propaganda.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 3 June. Weapons. 3d Recon Bn. Elements of 3d Recon Bn captured a CZECH 7.62mm model 58 assault rifle at (AT 803847). Rifle has a folding metal stock, is similar in appearance to the model 56 assault rifle and fires the same ammunition. However, the machining is not of the quality found in CHICOM copies of the model 56.

Characteristics are as follows: Caliber 7.62
Gas operated selective fire, folding metal stock, forearms and pistol grip are plastic.

Muzzle velocity: 2,300 FPS

Barrel length: 15.8"; 700-800 RPM; cyclic rate of fire

Magazines: 30 rds, staggered column

- e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

(1) 1 June. VC Hospital and District Admin Office. QUANG TIN, SMIAT report. As of 30 April 1966, a hospital for cadre of district level or higher and the VC TIEN PHUOC District admin office was located in the vicinity of (BT 170056). The TIEN PHUOC District admin office is operated by a 12-man staff and is located near the hospital. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

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g. Negative

h. Air Defense. A total of 99 AA fire incidents were reported for the period 5-11 June showing a 61% increase. 20 aircraft were hit with a total of 29 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were AT 9050, BS 7050, and BT 0006. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. 4 cases of possible 12.7mm fire were reported.

i-j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars.

(1) 30 May. USSF Sitrep #155. ARVN agent reported 1 Regular battalion with a strength of 400 men and armed with 2-105mm Howitzers is located at (BS 575758) approximately 12 miles NE of HA THANH. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; on battalion location. 2d report of 105mm Howitzers, (refer to para 2.k.(1) of III MAF PERINTREP No. 7) Rated F/5; doubtful that VC could move 105's into this area undetected).

(2) 5 June. QUANG NGAI agent report. The VC have placed a 105mm cannon at (BS 373769) and another at (BS 357741). (G-2 Cmt: Refer to above para).

l-s. Negative

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 230 VC KIA's were reported during the period and 39 VCC.
- f. Morale. Considered good.
- g. Negative.
- h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No change.

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j. Weather. Weather in I Corps remained generally hot and humid with partly cloudy skies and scattered rain and thundershowers in the mountain areas. Winds were mostly southerly and light with frequent gusts occurring towards the close of the period. Temperatures ranged from an average high of 94° to a low of 80°. Visibility averaged 7-10 miles with reduced visibility in the morning due to haze.

k. Significant Agent, VCC/Returnees and Document Reports. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 31 May. VC 5th Inter-Region Headquarters. QUANG TIN province SMIAT report. As of 30Apr66, the VC 5th Inter-Region Headquarters was located in a densely wooded area covering approximately one (1) square kilometer centered vic (BS 016947). The construction of this headquarters and secret zone was completed in mid-March 1966. The area consists of a complex of over 130 thatched structures 5 to 7 meters long, arranged in a random pattern and well protected by the thick jungle canopy. Security is provided by a Ranger battalion, 2 Montagnard companies and at least 1 anti-aircraft position located on Hill 162 (BS 025976). Rice is supplied to the secret zone from the area of DUONG YEN (BT 080020). Other supply items such as fish sauce, salt, kerosene, clothing material, etc. are received from the area of TRAI CAU (local name) (BT 180085), and are carried by civilian laborers to TRA MY market (BS 020974). Another labor party, usually consisting of 15 civilians, carries the supplies to DAI AN THUONG (BS 043965). Finally, the supplies are picked up during the hours of darkness by VC soldiers and taken to the secret zone. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 2 June. VC Rice Storage Areas. QUANG TIN province SMIAT report. The construction of three new rice storehouses in DUONG YEN Sub-district, HAU DUC District, QUANG TIN Province, was completed on 20 Apr 66. One storehouse, containing husked rice, is located at (BT 095015). The other two, containing unhusked rice, are located at (BT 089013), and (BT 099012). The structures are thatched, with the roof covered with jungle leaves for camouflage. They contain an estimated 200 tons of rice. The husked rice is reserved to supply the VC Inter-Region Committee Headquarters in DO XA Secret Zone (AS 890880). Supply parties carry the rice to this secret area twice a month. Frequent air strikes in this area during the months of February and March 1966 resulted in the destruction of approximately 70% of the food supplies stored there at that time, and an unknown number of casualties. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

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- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
- 5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.



T. H. FISHER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV	2	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	15	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG	5
CG 1ST MAW	15	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG I FORCEV	2	CICV	1
CG II FORCEV	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CG, 1ST BRIG, 101ST ABNDIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	CSC DANANG	1
DET C-1 5TH USSF	2	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO FLC	1		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 19

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH PHU
810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE, DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHO)
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
U/I BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5784	UNK	CO=LONG XO=MINH PO=MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2=81MM MORT 8=60MM MORT 3=57MM RR 4=.30 CAL HMG 24=AR	CO=VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO=TRAM KIEW, CAPT PHO
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO=TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC, 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAOR.

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CONFIDENTIALANNEX B (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO PERINTREP #19**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. General. There were no new developments during the reporting period. Political unrest still dominates the scene in I Corps. Reports of VC efforts to exploit the political confusion are still received, however there does not appear to be a concerted effort along these lines, but rather a sporadic exploitation where the opportunity presents itself. Terrorism has increased, but not sharply and the VC still appear intent on kidnapping villagers where possible. Some propaganda activities appear to be directed now at the central government of Vietnam paralleling the Struggle Forces line.

2. Espionage and Sabotage:

a. Thua Thien: A US sentry observed three Vietnamese children on 9 Jun 66, in the vicinity of coordinates (YD 900137), attempting to gain entry through the defensive wire located in that area. The children fled as the sentry approached. The sentry fired a warning shot in an attempt to halt the children, but they disappeared into the nearby tree line.

b. Quang Nam: On 4 June a USMC unit found an explosive device in a woman's purse, in a building at coordinates (AT 900493). On 7 June PAT and THIRD Battalion, Fifty-First Regiment Troops, surrounded two Pagodas in Hoi An. Three Monks, twenty policemen and four VC were found hidden on the Pagoda Grounds.

c. Quang Ngai: A report received on 1 June 1966, indicated that the Viet Cong are using children in their intelligence activities. The children are to infiltrate cities, towns and outposts in the Eastern Villages of Son Thinh (BS 635768), to collect information which will aid the Viet Cong in the current "Political Struggle".

On 5 June, the 48th VC Battalion located at coordinates (BS 760600) and (BS 755585) and the C19 Local Force Company located at (BS 735603), reportedly are to sabotage bridges and roads from Song Ve to Mb Duc. The reported purpose for conducting acts of sabotage in this area is the eventual isolation of Southern Quang Ngai Province. Another report received on 6 June 1966, that the Viet Cong have recruited several "Good Divers" to train for underwater demolition in order to sabotage ships in the Quang Ngai waters. The divers are to live aboard small boats and emplace mines to destroy approaching US/GVN ships.

CI COMMENTS: Reports from IV Corps Area, indicate that the Viet Cong have employed new sabotage tactics, utilizing the sampan. Explosive charges are being placed aboard sampans, which are then set adrift in canals near GVN control outposts and towns. The VC are taking advantage of the fact that free-floating and unoccupied sampans are investigated by GVN officials. When the boxes are checked the cargo explodes. Another report indicated that two new miniature weapons are being produced for use by the Viet Cong. One, a small steel and brass hand gun in the shape of a large fountain pen, and the other, a cigarette package containing an anti-personnel mine.

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Although the effectiveness of these weapons has not been determined, both could be carried easily into large crowds or installations without detection to be used for sabotage or assassination attempts. It is estimated that sabotage and espionage will increase substantially during the next few months, largely through the use of low-level agents, women and children, who have had only the minimum of training. It also appears that Quang Ngai Province may be a primary target.

3. Propaganda and Subversion:

a. Quang Tri: On 31 May 1966, an estimated thirty Viet Cong reportedly entered Da Dung Village (YD 287464) and gave a propaganda lecture to the woodcutters. (Theme unreported).

b. Thua Thien: On 3 June 1966, approximately thirty VC entered Van Trinh Hamlet (YD 520355), assembled the residents and conducted a propaganda lecture. The theme of which centered on the "Viet Cong Victories in the Thua Thien Area". Another report received on 5 June indicated that six VC entered Phu O Hamlet (YD 885248) and circulated propaganda leaflets. (Theme unknown). A retrieved document captured on 16 April by the 3d Regiment, 1st Army Republic of Vietnam sets forth VC plans to capitalize on the current political unrest, to oust the current military government of RVN, and to implement certain VC objectives. The translation in part, stated that the VC policy is to send more people into cities to aid the struggle movement. A request for a strong united front was presented along these main points: "Reinforce the strength of the city people, consolidate the confidence of the people behind us, in order to keep the struggle going in the direction which we choose, and to keep it's momentum going and inspire trouble in the city; make the enemy open the rural areas, so that we can attack stronger than before."

c. Quang Nam: The VC were reportedly prepared to introduce agents, dressed as Buddhist Monks, into Danang and Hoi An, to mingle with the populace during the celebration of Buddha's birthday (3 Jun 66). Their purpose was to incite riots and cause disorder. CI Comment: No reports of incidents were received, however, reports continue to be received on VC intentions to infiltrate their agents into Danang, and other major urban areas.

d. Quang Ngai: On 31 May the VC distributed a number of leaflets in the vicinity of (BS 652645) with the purpose of distorting the political crisis at Danang and Hue. CI Comment: The VC have been slow to take any initiative toward exploiting the present period of political unrest. However, there now appears to be some major effort to capitalize on certain movements in specific areas. It is too early to assess what, if any, marked effect this propaganda will have on both the individual Vietnamese or the Struggle Force elements. There now appears, however, to be some conclusive proof that the VC were influencing, to a certain degree, some struggle activities and will probably continue to exploit these movements whenever it appears to be to their advantage.

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CONFIDENTIAL4. Terrorism:**CONFIDENTIAL**

a. Thua Thien: On 1 June two Viet Cong platoons entered Ou Hoan hamlet (YD 425492) and kidnapped five residents. Another report of 1 June indicated that a Pacification team operating from Nhu Le Hamlet were ambushed by the VC at (YD 364525), two were killed. On 4 June an estimated ten VC entered An Truyen Hamlet (YD 810265) and assassinated one unidentified resident. An unreported number of VC entered a village located at (YD 8729) on 8 June killed the ex-mayor of the Village and a Vietnamese Air Force Sergeant. Another report received from the Village Chief of Thai Duong Ha Hamlet stated that two Village Chiefs, assigned to villages Southeast of Thai Duong Ha Village, have been assassinated.

b. Quang Ngai: One civilian was killed and three wounded on 2 June, when an unreported number of VC raided Kim Long Hamlet (BS 690780). An unknown number of VC reportedly raided Tra Trung Village (BS 315829) on 3 June and kidnapped two Montagnards. The National Police of Mo Duc District reported on 6 June that the VC are attempting to assassinate ARVN/US soldiers in the Mo Duc area. The VC have organized a number of "Shock Teams" comprised of young men and women. Each team is armed with small arms and grenades. Their mission is to infiltrate crowds in opportune areas, disguised as ARVN or PAT personnel, and throw grenades into passing military vehicles. CI Comment: Previous reports would indicate that the Pacification Program is a constant threat to the VC efforts and the assassination of Pacification Team members may be expected to continue. This is the first report of "VC Shock Teams"; they may be synonymous with Sapper Platoons. However, reference is again made to "young men and women" which point to still more accentuation being placed on the employment of young people to conduct terrorism, propaganda, etc.

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP NR 19.

I. 610th Division (DINH DINH).

a. 9th Bn, 18th NVA Regt. (COMUSMACV INTSUM 156-66) The 1st Cav captured a VC in BINH DINH province who stated that he was a member of of the 9th Battalion, 12th NVA Regiment (AKA 18th, AKA QUYET THANG, AKA SONG DA). The captive claimed that his battalion has 180 men; 30 are South Vietnamese and the remainder NVA. The captive states that his unit is located at (BR 760635). (J-2 MACV Comment: This is the first firm evidence of contact with the 12th Regiment so far in operation CRAZY HORSE. Other units that have been contacted include the 22d NVA and the 2nd VC Regiment. If the captives story is verified, it may indicate that the 12th has sustained heavy casualties in Operation CRAZY HORSE, or that it still has not recouped from past operations (WHITE WING and SUIBOK).

b. 6th Medial Co, 22d Regt. (AKA QUYET TAM Regt) (CG I FFORCEV INTSUM No. 149). Medical documents captured by 1st Air Cav Div. vic BT 697671 on 27 May 66 identified the 6th Co, 22d Regt. Documents and equipment captured indicated that the unit is set up as a Regimental aid station (G-2 I FFORCEV Cmt: This is the third indication of elements of the QUYET TAM Regiment operating in the area of operations of CRAZY HORSE. Elements of the 2d VC Regiment have also been engaged during this operation).

c. 17th Rear Serv Bn, 22d Regt. (I Corps Interrogation Report 1696-66). VCC NGO DINH NHUONG, captured 11 Apr 66 vic BINH DUC Village (BS 773841) (report recd this Hq 6 June) VCC states he is a member of the 4th Platoon, K/2 Company, 17th Rear Service Battalion, QUYET TAM Regiment. The interrogation report infers that this VCC had been wandering aimlessly around QUANG NGAI for about 2 months prior to his capture, chiefly as a result of a malaria attack. His interrogation includes the statement that, "since its infiltration into SVN, the Regiment was stationed at HOAI-CHAU village, HOAI-NHON District, BINH DINH Province. Sometimes they moved to QUANG NGAI; after that they returned to the mountain area West of NOAI-NHON". (G-2 Cmt: The time, circumstances and place of capture of this VCC does not affect the accepted location of the 22d Regt in BINH DINH. This interrogation is included in this report as an example of possibly misleading reports of unit locations).

d. 610th Division. G-2 Comment: Agent reports continue to be received indicating that elements of the 610th Division are located in QUANG NGAI Province. While there is no reason to question the feasibility of such deployment, there is considerable VCC and document evidence (see above and Annex C of PERINTREP's 17 and 18) that indicate the continued presence of major elements of this Division in BINH DINH Province.

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CONFIDENTIALII. 620th Division (QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI)**CONFIDENTIAL**

a. RQ 20B Bn. (Det C-1, 5th SF GP). Initial report of returnee LE TAN HY (rallied 31May66). Subject claims to have been deputy platoon leader in 2d Company of RQ 20B Battalion subordinate to NONG TRUONG 2 (AKA 620th Div). Subject states that RQ 20B Battalion has a strength of 380 men, is commanded by NGUYEN VAN CON, and moved to BT 095345 on 10 May. He states that the battalion is waiting for CONG TRUONG 1 (AKA 1st VC Regt), presently located at (AT 945278), to move down to prepare to open the summer campaign at QUE SON and THANG BINH. The returnee heard that CONG TRUONG 2 (AKA 21st Regt) and CONG TRONG 3 (Prob AKA 31st Regt) will move out to the Southwest of QUE SON District also, and one NGHIA YU (Draftee) Regiment which just infiltrated into SVN in April 1966 is now stationed at KHE HOA Mountain area (ZC 100400). The RQ 20B Bn has been carried as a possible unit subordinate to 620th Div. (III MAF G-2 Cmt: F/6; No information is available on the NGHIA VU Regiment though it has been reported in this area several times. The 21st Regt is believed to be located in Northern TIEN PHOUC, Western THANG BINH, Eastern HIEP DUC District and possibly Southern QUE SON District. Reports indicate that the 1st VC Regiment may be moving North to join the 21st Regiment in QUANG TIN Province. Little information is available concerning the 31st Regiment reported by COMUSMACV in QUANG TIN Province. The possibility exists that the 31st Regiment is located in QUANG NAM Province rather than QUANG TIN; a 93rd Regiment has been reported frequently around the Southern areas of the DANANG TAOR since December 1965. It is possible that this is an AKA for the 31st Regiment (using the VC play on numbers, i.e., 31x3=93).

b. RQ 21 AA Bn. (2d ARVN Div Rpt). Sgt TINH THE defected 5 June; stated he was a member of the RQ 21 AA Bn, subordinate to the 620th Division. Subject reported the following units of the Division:
 21st Regt: AT 897263 - 940287 - 950280 - 944268 - 917268 - 907254.
 RQ 21 12.7mm AA Bn: AT 921224 - 934235 - 949234 - 949229 - 925219.
 RQ 32 120mm Mort Bn: AT 878250 - 892261 - 897254 - 882245 - 918214 - 923226 - 928207 - 925203. 75mm RR Bn: AT 914250 - 918258 - 938264 - 940259 - 918248.
 U/I Inf Bn: AT 960310 - 966321 - 980326 - 985321 - 966305. Security Bn: AT 960247. Medical Unit: AT 915282. U/I Inf Bn: AT 900218. RQ 24 Eng Bn: HIEP DUC Area. Signal Bn: HIEP DUC Area. The Sergeant further claimed that the 1st VC Regiment remains in QUANG NGAI and that a new Regiment infiltrated one month ago, that it passed through HIEP DUC and headed NE.

c. 3d Regt. (620th Div?). Pvt DO NHU PHUONG, North Vietnamese, rallied at QUE SON District Headquarters on 9 June 1966. Rallier states that he was a member of 64th Regt, 320th Div in North Vietnam. In South Vietnam he was a member of the 11th Squad, 4th Platoon, 10th Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Regiment. Subject was drafted into NVA in April 1965. He states that the Regiment infiltrated into SVN on 29 Jan 66, arrived in the THUONG DUC area on 28Apr66 and in the HIEP DUC area on 1Jun66. Strength of the Regiment is 2500 of which 80% are draftees and 20% regulars. The mission is to join a division for large operations in QUANG TIN Province. He states that the 3d Regiment is composed of three (3) Battalions (1st, 2nd and 3d) and six (6) Support Companies: C-13 AA Co. (armed with unk nr 12.7mm AA MG), C-14 Signal Co, C-15 Transport Co, C-16 Weapons Support Co (75mm RR and 82mm Mort), C-17 Recon Co, C-20 Medical Co.

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(G-2 Cmt: 31st Regt is carried as a possible unit of the 620th Div. A NGHIA VU (Draftee) Regiment has more recently been reported. Poss this is one or the other or that 3d Regt is AKA 31st and also draftee. F/6).

d. C.15 AA Co (THUA THIEN). Translated document taken from VC KIA at 080730H vic (YD 495227) by 1st Plt, 1st Force Recon indicated KIA was a member of the C.15 AA Co. He was hospitalized from 19 Mar to 12 Apr 66 and upon release he was retd to his unit and was to deliver 6,000 piasters to KHANH (Poss political officer of C.15). KIA had 3,000 piasters when killed. (G-2 Cmt: Rallier NGUYEN VAN THUYET rptd the C.15 AA Co was OP with the 6th NVA Regt which was mov fm QUANG TRI to THUA THIEN in Mar66. A NGUYEN KIM KHANH has been rptd as XO, C.15 AA Co).

III. OTHER

a. 402d NVA Bn (QUANG NAM). 3d Marines relayed the following preliminary information from a returnee at DAI LOC District Headquarters. Report submitted 10 June, date of rally not stated. Returnee states his unit is 402d NVA Bn, commanded by NGUYEN VAN TRAN, strength 206. He states his unit was formally the T.89 Special Engineer Battalion of Danang. He locates his unit vic AT 8356 - 8255 - 8355 - 8554 - 8654 and says it would move at 101300H June to AT 8655 - 8755. He says he is a Sergeant and carries a Sergeants pay card from the 402d NVA Bn. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; No previous report of 402d Bn, NGUYEN VAN TRAN, or T.89 Battalion. The strength figure is low; formation of an NVA battalion from a local (Sp Engr Bn of Danang) unit is unusual. The report is preliminary and this portion, at least, is probably incorrect).

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Unit: III MAF

Location: Danang, RVN

DTG: 210800 June 1966

Ser: **074168**CONFIDENTIAL

PERINTREP NO. 20

Period Covered: 120001H to 182400H June 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. VC/NVA activity remained at a low level and was essentially characterized by the avoidance of any large scale actions, except in the south. There were several VC/NVA small scale attacks throughout the Tactical Zone and two attacks of estimated battalion size in the 12th DTA. Small scale harassing actions and missions continued at the usual pace in all TAOR's.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. VC activity in the 11th DTA remained light during the period. Operations Florida concluded and Athens continued with no significant contact. Political unrest continued to increase in HUE throughout the period.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR; however, no VC units in any appreciable size were encountered.

(3) QUANG TRI - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. The 5th VN Marine Bn contacted a reinforced VC Bn on 12 June in QUANG NGAI (BS 663577) during operation QUYET THANG 234. A RF Co in QUANG NGAI (BS 721575) was attacked by an estimated VC Bn. A platoon of the 1st Recon Bn was attacked on 16 June in QUANG TIN province by a battalion of the newly infiltrated 3d Regt, 320th NVA Division. Viet An outpost (BT 018270) has been struck by mortar and 57mm RR fire on several occasions during the period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents during the period totaled 311. Incidents were comprised of the following: 143 small unit engagements, 138 AA fires, 27 mine/booty trap and 3 assaults by fire.

- a. Order of Battle. Annex A
- b. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;

Declassified after 12 years

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III MAF PERINTREP # 20

12-18 June 66

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- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment

(1) Tactics: Following information extracted from II FFORCEV PERINTREP NO. 11. The VC have developed a new sabotage tactic utilizing the sampan. Explosive charges are placed aboard sampans which are then set adrift in canals near outposts and town areas to take advantage of the fact that free-floating and unoccupied sampans are investigated by GVN officials. When the boxes are checked, the cargo explodes..

(2) Weapons: Following information extracted from II FFORCEV PERINTREP NO. 11. Two new miniature weapons are being produced and used by the VC. One, a steel and brass hand gun in the shape of a large fountain pen, is being manufactured by the VC for use as an assassination weapon. The pen-gun is 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ " long and $\frac{1}{2}$ " in diameter. The upper portion resembles the top of a fountain pen even to the inclusion of a pocket clip. The hollow lower portion contains a steel spring, firing pin and an intricate trigger device for firing. The estimated effective range is five to eight feet. (II FFORCEV Cmt: F/6).

The other weapon, a cigarette package containing an anti-personnel mine, was discovered in IV Corps at SA DEC District town (WS 8437). The mine has a 20 minute delay fuze. Although the effectiveness of these weapons has not been determined, both could be carried easily into large crowds without detection to be used for sabotage or assassinations.

- e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

(1) 8 June. VC Political Training Camp. TRA BONG district SMIAT report. A camp of 300-400 VC is located at Ca Nam mountain (BS 280770). The camp is comprised of 6 houses, each 5 by 30 meters and arranged in a "U" shape. The camp is reportedly used to train VC in politics. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 8 June. VC Training Area. TRA BONG district SMIAT report. On 25 May, an unidentified VC unit of 500 men was encamped at a VC training area located in the vicinity of DAU mountain (BS 443823). The site consists of 6 houses covered with leaves and surrounded by bamboo stakes. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

- g. Negative.
- h. Air Defense. A total of 141 anti-aircraft fire incidents involving III MAF aircraft were reported during the period.

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29 A/C sustained a total of 57 hits. Grid squares of highest density were AT 9060, BS 6050, BT 0006 and BT 1020. Intensity of fire was light to intense. Twelve cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

- i. - j. Negative.
- k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars. See para I, of Annex C.
- l. Negative.
- m. Biological, Chemical, Electronic or Radiological Warfare.

(1) 16 June. Following information extracted from I FFORCEV PERINTREP NO. 20. Detachment C-3, 5th SF reported on 21 May that the VC in War Zone D have a weapon that fires a gas type projectile which does not kill but blinds. The weapon and ammunition are allegedly of CHICOM manufacture, and the effective radius is from 20-30 meters. USSF rates C/2. (G-2 I FFORCEV Cmt: This report is the strongest indication to date that the VC have the gas and delivery system which is capable of this alleged degree of incapacitation).

- n. - s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. Casualties for the period totaled 208 VC KIA with 11 VCC.
- f. Morale. Considered good.
- g. Enemy Defenses, Mines, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers and Booby Traps.

(1) VC Employment of Mines. In the DANANG area, the VC have given indications of following a pattern in the effective employment of the M16A1 in mine fields. The following incidents, two days apart, resulted in numerous casualties.

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111102H - While a rifle company was participating in an operation, a mine identified as an M16A1 type was detonated at (AT 986608). As the wounded were being evacuated, a second and possible a third detonation occurred.

131230H - As a group of Marines in the vicinity of an LVT began to deploy on order, a mine reported as an M16A1 was detonated. As an aid party moved to assist, another mine was detonated. When a corpsman and others attempted to assist, a third mine detonated.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Clear to partly cloudy skies, gusty winds, high temperatures and occasional scattered thunderstorms in the mountain areas constituted the weather in I Corps during the reporting period. Temperatures ranged from an average 95° high to a 70° low. Winds were mostly variable at an average 6 knots and gusting. No precipitation was recorded. Visibility 7 miles.

k. Significant Agent, VCC/Returns and Document Reports. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Information

(1) 8 June. VC Storage Area. NGHI HANH District, SMIAT report. A VC storage area containing approximately 5 tons of rice is located at (BS 462496). 30 structures, each 5 meters long and 4 meters wide, with a distance of 50 meters between buildings, comprise the area. Currently, rice from MINH DIEN Village (BS 490450) is being delivered to the storage area. (G-2 Cuts F/6).

(2) 6 June. AN TAN District, SMIAT report of a VC Agricultural Site. A VC Agricultural production site is located at CHEO BEO (local name) (BT 235096). This site was originally activated in February 1966. Commander is TRAN CONG THANH. In April 1966, the area was hit by friendly airstrikes and the facilities were moved away to an unknown location. On 28 May 66, the site was reopened for production. Personnel include 30 blacksmiths, whose jobs are to manufacture tools such as entrenching shovels, hoes and machetes. Also, there are approximately 200 young men between 18 and 30 years old, who came to the site on 30 May 66 from DANH SON (BT 260095). These men are called "Production Site Suicide Personnel". They are undergoing a one-month military training program, scheduled to end on 30 June. Upon completion of the training, the personnel will be organized into two teams, one having to provide security for the site while the other team is engaged in agricultural production work. The teams will rotate duties every six months. (G-2 Cuts F/6).

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(3) 13 June. VC Ammunition and Rice Cache. QUANG NAM province SMIAT report. On 9 June, approximately 10 civilian laborers transported an unknown number of 40x60cm wooden cases to a thatched structure located in vicinity (BT 049438). The cases reportedly contain an unknown type of ammunition. This cache is guarded by a 36 man VC platoon. Also on 9 June about 30 civilians moved approximately 60 bags of rice to a thatched structure at (BT 052441). The bags were made of heavy cotton, similar to the rice bags received through US AID programs. The rice was reportedly moved from an unknown location on the coast. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(4) Food Storage Area. On 7 June a QUANG NAM agent reported 2 food storage depots consisting of a total of 30 buildings (10m x 8m) along a stream at (BT 001421), (BT 000414), (BT 005412) and (BT 010419). An ammunition storage facility, exact location unknown, is in the general area. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; this area was previously reported as a VC storage area for units operating in QUE SON District.

(5) Observation Post. On 5 June a THUA THIEN agent reported a VC observation post on top of TRUOI mountain (YC 950950) and claims that the OP which is equipped with 2 radios is used by the 95B Regiment. This is the first recent report of an element of the 95B Regiment.

(6) 12 May, contact vic (BS 665577). The following additional information is submitted concerning the action involving the 5th VN Marine battalion and a reinforced VC battalion. The 5th VN Marine battalion participated in operation QUYET THANG 234, a search and destroy heliborne operation in QUANG NGAI. The VC 38th battalion, reinforced, was encountered. Advisors reported a stubborn fight and counterattack before action was broken off VC losses were reported at 22 KIA, 145 possible and 12 VCS.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.



T. R. FISHER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT

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COMUSMACV	2	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG THIRD MARDIV	15	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG	5
CG 1ST MAW	15	COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	1
CG I FFORCEV	2	CICV	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST BRIG, 101ST ABNDIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP	5	CSC DANANG	1
DET C-1, 5TH USSF	2	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO FLC	1		

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 20

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7512	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50?	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
K-41 CO	CONF	95	UNK	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH; PHU
810TH BN	CONF	400	ZC 0592	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
R-20 BN HQTRS	CONF	130	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR	UNK
R-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
R-22 CO	CONF	120	AT 9762	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
R-23 CO	CONF	120	AT 9863	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
R-24 CO	CONF	120	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR	CO-THY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KI
HOA HIEU CO	CONF	120	AT 9166	2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG	CO-NGUYEN DOA
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG-TANH PO-DUONG DO
U/I BN	PROB	300	BT 0764	UNK	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
5TH BN	PROB	500	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
DIEN BAN CO	CONF	120	BT 0335	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG	CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET
51ST BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK
70TH BN	CONF	500	AT 9550	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400	AT 8734	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5784	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

52ND BN	CONF	350	BS 7090	2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR	CO-VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 3411	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 3315	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR	CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC, 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAOR.

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ANNEX B (COMINT) INTELLIGENCE TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 20

1. GENERAL. The current political unrest in HUE has dominated the political scene in the ICTZ. The VC appear to have increased their propoganda efforts in an attempt to exploit the current unrest. Reports indicate that some efforts to osilate the populace through both oral and written propaganda has been discovered. Terrorism is still prevelent and appears to be at least the major lever for VC subversion. Low level attempts at espionage are still reported.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE:

QUANG NAM - An unreported number of VC disguised as civilians, proceeded to NAM O and LIEN CHIEU areas, HOA VANG District on 1 June to collect information. Another report received on 12 June, indicated that a member of a VC intelligence network had been observed drawing sketches of the new FLSG Compound, located near Highway number 19. This intelligence network, reportedly consists of five members, of which PHAN DIEN AN is the leader. The other members of the cell are residing in hamlets; THUY TU (AT 915847) and XUAN THIEU (AT 935812). At various times the members of this intelligence net have met at the home of PHAM DUOC, who resides in DA PHUOC Hamlet, (AT 947785).

QUANG NGAI - On 9 June 1966, approximately five hundred VC were reported to be deployed at coordinates (BS 787856) and (BS 754840). One VC Sapper Platoon, armed with TNT and mines, reportedly is attached to this unit with the mission of mining roads and bridges in that area.

CI Comments: Recently, several agent reports have indicated an increased effort by the VC to strengthen their intelligence collection capability. Both male and female agents are being utilized clandestinely to achieve the desired results. Such activity was confirmed when a VC agent handler was discovered and interrogated at TRA BONG. The agent handler had eight agents in his employ; one of whom had penetrated the TRA BONG Special Forces Camp as a CIDG soldier and another who was a member of the Popular Forces in TRA BONG District. These agents were successful in obtaining information peculiar to troop strengths and dispositions, times and areas of impending friendly operations, weaponry within the Camp and district, and aircraft cargos arriving at and departing from friendly installations.

A previous report received indicated the VC are attempting to form a sabotage force known as the DUNG SI DIET MY (Valiant Men destroying Americans) (VMDA) with the mission of conducting sabotage against American and GVN military installations and assassinating high ranking officers.

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3. PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSION

QUANG TRI - On 8 June an estimated two VC platoons reportedly gave propaganda lectures in LINH AN and LONG QUANG NAM areas, located in the vicinity of (YD 365614). The theme of these lectures was not reported.

THUA THIEN - On 7 June an unknown number of VC circulated propaganda leaflets in PHU MY Village (YD 822241). Theme was not reported. At 2300 hours on 10 June, a VC platoon entered MY LAM Hamlet (YD 828-241), assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture and distributed propaganda leaflets during the lecture. The VC reportedly entered PHU BAI Hamlet, number one (YD 903111) on 13 June and ordered the people not to cooperate with the Village Chief or the Ky Government. Another report of 14 June, indicated that approximately one hundred fifty VC were operating in CONG LONG Hamlet (YD 830246) and maneuvering towards GIA LE CHANH Hamlet (YD 811240). Their mission is to support the Buddhist Struggle Forces, they intend to propagandize the local residents that the Americans are oppressing the Buddhists.

QUANG NAM - A VC meeting was reportedly held on the night of 26 May 1966, approximately 300 residents of XUYEN CHAU Village, DUY XUYEN District were assembled by the VC. During the meeting, the VC exposed propaganda concerning the collapse of the Saigon Government and the victories scored by the VC Forces. CI Cmt: This report was received on 16 June and has not been previously reported by this Headquarters.

QUANG NGAI - An unreported number of VC infiltrated KHUONG BINH Hamlet (BS 725675), HOA GAI (BS 730670), MY VIEN (BS 730660) and NHU NANG (BS 705665), dropping leaflets appealing to officers and men to counter the Government oppression of HUE and DANANG citizens.

Propaganda and Subversion CI Comments:

Several Viet Cong leaflets, varying in themes, and in either Vietnamese or English language, have been found throughout ICTZ. The VC continue to stress the liberal VC treatment of Government of Vietnam Military and Civilian personnel when they defect, and VC Front policies for these personnel are described. One document has ordered Vietnamese residents in VC-controlled areas not to leave their homes, to continue their normal activities, and to refuse to cooperate with GVN authorities. These leaflets, in some cases, attempt to exploit the confusion and tensions accompanying the political situation in I Corps which erupted in March and April. It appears that the VC have decided to increase their anti-government movement and create confusion among various towns to induce the people to stage anti-government demonstrations, and spread disension among various religious sects and political parties.

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4. TERRORISM:

THUA THIEN - On 7 June a report was received that an estimated VC squad entered PHU THUAN Village (YD 870303) and assassinated two unidentified individuals. Another report indicated that on 8 June, fifteen VC crossed from the vicinity of (YD 870208) to (YD 890286) to AN DUONG and tortured and killed one ARVN soldier who was on leave, and one ex-village official. A 13 June report indicated that NGO HOA, 34 year old civic worker, had been assassinated by three VC. No further information was received.

QUANG NAM - On 3 June, one VC security assault squad (Tieu doi Cong-an Xung-Phong), commanded by LE CANH, was reportedly hiding in the NAI NAM area (BT 040745). This squad had come from the PHU KY area, DIEN BAN District, had legal identification cards, and wore civilian clothing. Their mission is to infiltrate DANANG and be prepared to carry out terrorism, sabotage or assassination assignments. Another report indicated that on 17 June, an unidentified terrorist tossed a grenade into a US Marine truck at the corner of THAI PHIEN Street, DANANG - No further information has been received at this time.

QUANG NGAI - On 8 June 1966, the VC Party of MO DUC District ordered an unknown number of local guerrillas to move from their present location and to attempt to kill Americans. Students were ordered to attend school in QUANG NGAI City, and to collect information concerning Americans and RVN Armed Forces. Some students within these groups have been assigned to assassinate RVN and US agents and personnel in the QUANG NGAI City area. On 10 June, an unreported number of VC stopped a Bus in the vicinity of (BS 583954) and kidnapped two unidentified persons.

CI Comment: Local Forces and guerrillas appear to continue to conduct diversionary attacks and acts of terrorism in GVN controlled areas and around US installations. A report received from the 12th DTA indicated that VC-initiated incidents within their area declined slightly from 148 to 145 during May. Kidnappings were reported to have constituted a large percentage of initiated incidents, with most occurring in QUANG NGAI Province.

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AMERICAN (SIGNIFICANT AGENT; VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)
TO III MAF PERINTREP NR 20.

I. 21st NVA Regt. (AKA 36th, AKA 6th) QUANG NAM, 13 June, a defector TRAN HOE, age 17, a laborer with U/I Bn of the 21st NVA Regt defected at QUC SON. He claims that the VC shot his father. He reports the battalion strength at 500 and weapons as being 6 - 57mm RR, 2 - 12.7mm AA MG, 6 - 81mm Mortars, 4 60mm Mortars, possible 2 - 120mm Mortars. The battalion is located at CHAU SON (4) in the vicinity of (BT 0030) with recon and sapper units last reported at (AT 9929) and battalion weapons located in a Pagoda at CHAU SON (5) (AT 9730). The battalion was making preparations to move on 14 June to HOA QUC in the vicinity of (AT 9326). Units of the 21st NVA have been reported in the HIEP DUC area by several sources. The weapons indicate that this Bn probably has a support unit attached.

II. USSF Sitrep - 166, 14 June. BA TO camp. VCC reported that the VC Bn that attacked an OP on 14 June is now resting at (BS 6237 - 6236 - 6436 - 6437). (G-2 III MAF Cmt: F/6; C-212 LF Co known to be located in this area. Possibly C-212 and guerrillas. Large number of NVA troops reported this area on 1 June, but unconfirmed).

III. Translation of the following document indicates VC concern for indiscriminate use of mines in VC controlled areas. The document was discovered by a member of Co M, 3d Bn, 9th Marines at (AT 873522) following an ambush conducted by that unit.

E 03
#012 QS/

TO VILLAGE UNIT CP's

Recently, the villages captured a number of the enemy's mines, and received land mines from the Higher Command. These mines were planted disorderly in villages and hamlets. Thus, they caused some losses of persons and domestic animals.

E 03 Hq issues the order to the localities, and forbids them to plant the mines or land mines disorderly in hamlets and villages, or on the mounds, tombs and the lanes which people usually walk on.

You should choose available positions, and you plant the mines when the enemy is approaching, and you must dig up the mines when the enemy withdraws. You must inform the civilian laborers of the mine positions in the entire hamlet, and the people who have houses near the mine positions. (Except the bad partisans).

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You should not plant the mines at the gate in front of the guard house of the hamlet when you just changed the sentry. You can plant the mines on the hills, mountains and the enemy's posts, but you should notice the people and domestic animals. You must limit the planting of mines in hamlets and villages, on the other hand, you should plant the mines in accordance with the situation.

You should not usually plant spikes in the hamlet or certain places which the people circulate on. You can plant the mines in the hamlet or certain places when the enemy is going to approach. Whenever you plant the mines you must forbid the people and domestic animals to circulate on the mine positions.

The villages which have land mines must be divided into responsible zones, and the civilian laborers must be responsible for each zone. Forbid to plant the mines disorderly. Must plant the mines before the enemy's arrival, and must dig up mines after the enemy's withdrawal. When you plant the mines you should mark the mine positions in order to avoid the danger and protect the maintenance of the property.

The villages must study and make a plan. The villages must execute correctly this directive. If certain villages cause loss by mines or land mines, they will be disciplined severely.

12 May 66

Cmdr of E 03

NGUYEN VAN DUONG

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