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
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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG IIMAF/MACV ltr 3/rel over 3480 Ser:
0067166 of 10Jun66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

296271

First PR

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ser: 0075066

JUN 24 1966

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E R R A T A

TO III MAF COMMAND CHRONOLOGY, APRIL 1966

1. Insert paragraph V into III MAF Command Chronology for April 1966.
2. Enclosures (1) through (10) submitted for insertion and forwarding with original of III MAF Command Chronology April 1966.

Copy to:
CMC (AO3D)
CG, FMEPAC

Copy 1 of 4 Copies

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/rel

3480

Ser:

0067166

10 June 1966

---Unclassified when basic material is removed

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG, FMFPac msg 251942Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for April 1966

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

E. G. Glidden Jr.
E. G. GLIDDEN JR.
Deputy Chief of Staff

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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

APRIL 1966

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PART ONE	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART TWO	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART THREE	CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
PART FOUR	ENCLOSURES

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDING

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR PERIOD 1 APRIL - 30 APRIL 1966

CHIEF OF STAFF

BGEN JONAS M. PLATT, USMC

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

COL EIMER G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

COL DON W. GAILBREATH, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

COL JOHN E. GORMAN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

COL JOHN R. CHATISSON, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4

COL STEVE J. CIBIK, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5

COL ERIC S. HOLMGRAIN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6

MAJ TILTON A. ANDERSON, USMC

SUPPLY OFFICER

COL HOWARD G. TAFT, USMC

FORCE ENGINEER OFFICER

LTCOL LESTER G. HARMON, USMC

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OFFICER

COL JAKE B. HILL, USMC

ADJUTANT

LTCOL BURTON L. LUCAS JR, USMC

COMPTROLLER

CAPT WILSON A. VOIGHT, USMC

CHAPLAIN

CAPT FRANCIS L. GARRETT, USN

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

COL THOMAS M. FIELDS, USMC

DIRECTOR, COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER

LTCOL CHARLES A. WEBSTER, USN

DIRECTOR, COMMAND CENTER

LTCOL JOSEPH V. McLERNON, USN

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FOOD SERVICES OFFICER

LEGAL OFFICER

SURGEON

MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER

ORDNANCE OFFICER

PROTOCOL OFFICER

PROVOST MARSHAL

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

TRANSPORTATION/EMBARKATION OFFICER

LTCOL HENRY G. ROBERTS, USMC

COL VERNON A. PELTZER, USMC

CAPT WILLIAM A. WOLFMAN, USN

LTCOL EDWIN W. KILLIAN, USMC

MAJ WALTER F. BOWRON, USMC

MAJ RALPH H. BROWN, USMC

MAJ LEE H. HARDEE, USMC

COL EDWIN G. WINSTEAD, USMC

MAJ GEORGE F. CRIBB, USMC

SUBORDINATE UNITS

3D MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

7TH ENGINEER BATTALION (REIN)

9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION

5TH COMMUNICATIONS BATTALION

SUB-UNIT #1, FIRST RADIO BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY

SUB-UNIT #1, 1ST ANGLICO

SENTRY DOG PLATOON

SCOUT DOG PLATOON

COMMANDER

MGEN WOOD B. KYLE, USMC

MGEN LEWIS J. FIELDS, USMC

MGEN KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC

COL GEORGE C. AXTELL, USMC

LTCOL JOSHUA W. DORSEY III, USMC

LTCOL ERMINE L. MEEKER, USMC

MAJ JOSEPH F. JONES, USMC

LTCOL HERCULES R. KELLY, USMC

CAPT RUSSELL W. RADER, USMC

MAJ ANTHONY J. PALONIS JR, USMC

LTCOL CARROLL B. BURCH, USMC

LT LEONARD E. OLIVER, USMCR

LT ROBERT V. WILDER, USMCR

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PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During April 1966, III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at Coordinates (AT 993754), which is 350 meters west of Danang Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, and adjacent to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Post. All forces under operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone with the exception of ANGLICO detachments that were operating in all four CTZ's. III MAF continued to grow as average personnel strength increased from 51,905 to 58,815 during April, with 60,019 on hand at the end of the period.

B. On 1 April 1966, Naval Forces, Vietnam Command was activated. The functions and responsibilities of the Naval Component Command were transferred from III Marine Amphibious Force to the newly activated Command.

C. Activities. III MAF continued operations in the accomplishment of the objectives as established by reference (e), COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966.

II. OPERATIONS

A. General. The continuing objective of destruction of VC/NVA forces was accomplished during the month by conducting eight major operations outside and two within the TAORs. The majority of contacts with enemy forces was by small unit actions. One large scale contact was made by a major unit. III MAF elements destroyed VC forces, numerous bunkers, tunnels, fortifications, booby traps, areas of refuge, and confiscated large caches of rice.

B. Operation ORANGE, a Battalion Search and Destroy operation, was conducted 1-11 April in the vicinity of Thong Duc Special Forces Camp, Quang Nam Province. Its purpose was to destroy VC forces and installations while providing security for the establishment of the CIDG Camp and airstrip. Numerous caves, trenches, and fortifications were destroyed during the operation. The operation cost the VC 57 confirmed and 127 estimated dead.

C. Operation IOWA, a Battalion Search and Destroy operation, was conducted on 8-9 April in the Northwest portion of the Chu Lai TAOR. No significant events occurred during the operation. There were no friendly or enemy casualties.

D. Operation NEVADA, was a two battalion (-) (Rein) operation conducted 12-17 April in coordination with ARVN and VNMC units. The area of operation was on Batangan Peninsula southeast of the Chu Lai TAOR. Contact was sporadic throughout the operation. The operation was successful in destroying numerous caves and tunnels. One tunnel complex was located approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ mile long with sleeping quarters for several hundred persons. Large caches of rice were confiscated. The operation cost the VC 50 confirmed and 40 estimated dead.

E. Operation VIRGINIA, a Battalion Search and Destroy operation, was conducted 17-27 April in the vicinity of Khe San SF/CIDG Camp in western Quang Tri Province. No contact was established during the operation. There were no casualties. On 27 April, Phase II of Operation Virginia began with the mission to conduct a Reconnaissance in Force along Route 9 from Khe Sanh to Dong Ha. At the close of the reporting period the battalion was located at Cam Lo, just west of Dong Ha. No contact or casualties were reported.

F. Operation GEORGIA, a Battalion (Rein) Search and Destroy operation, began on 21 April and was continuing at the close of the reporting period. The area of operation is located approximately 5 miles southwest of the extreme edge of the Danang TAOR and encompasses approximately 350 square kilometers. The Battalion missions are to destroy VC forces and installations, open the area to GVN influence, assist in GOLDEN FLEET operations, and provide rural construction assistance. During Phase I, an operational base was established in the vicinity of An Hoa airfield. Phase II began by conducting daily battalion (-) size Search and Destroy operations in random TAORs within the area of operations. Estimated duration of the operation is 20 days. Contact with enemy forces has been sporadic and generally light. Through the end of the reporting period, Operation GEORGIA had cost the VC 61 confirmed and 56 estimated dead.

G. Operation HOT SPRINGS, 21-24 April, was a Regimental (-) (Rein) size Search and Destroy operation combined and coordinated with two ARVN Battalions. The area of operation was approximately 15 miles southwest of the Chu Lai airstrip and encompassed an area of approximately 32 kilometers. The mission was rapidly planned for execution on hard intelligence that the 1st VC Regimental Headquarters and two VC battalions were in the area. After four and one-half hours of artillery preparatory fires and air strikes on the targets, USMC and ARVN battalions were landed on the western edge of the target area and swept east abreast. Sporadic heavy resistance was encountered on the first day. Contact was light to non-existent on subsequent days. The combined operation succeeded in destroying 349 VC troops and capturing 115 weapons, including 15 crew-served. III MAF units accounted for 142 confirmed VC KIA and 23 weapons.

H. Operation WYOMING, a two battalion (-) (Rein) Search and Destroy operation, was conducted 26-30 April in coordination with ARVN blocking forces in the Northwest corner of the Chu Lai Reconnaissance Zone and TAC. Contact with VC forces was generally light and sporadic throughout the operation. Numerous caves and fortifications were destroyed. The operation cost the VC 11 confirmed and 10 estimated dead.

I. Other Operations

1. COUNTY FAIR Operation (26-28 April). During the early morning hours of 26 April, a USMC Company, M/3/9, surrounded Thanh Quet (5) hamlet, located within the Danang TAOR (BT 054635). At sunrise, elements of the

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3d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment collected all the people in the hamlet and placed them in a centralized area and conducted identification checks, pacification efforts, medical treatments, a census, and fed them. ARVN troops searched the village while the people were kept in the centralized area and a VC force was encountered hiding there within the perimeter of the blocking USMC unit. The results of the engagement cost the VC 45 dead, 17 VCC, and 14 weapons captured. Twenty five tunnels were destroyed along with an unknown amount of food and supplies in them.

2. Operation OSAGE, was an amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SIF in the PHU LOC area (ZD 0800). The area encompassed approximately 80 square kilometers. BLT 1/5 was committed to the operation that began on 27 April. The mission was to conduct search and destroy operations and rice harvest protection within the area of operation. III MAF supported the amphibious Task Force with Fixed Wing and other support as required and was ready to assume OPCON in the event control was passed ashore. Enemy contact was negligible. At the close of the reporting period, the operation had cost the VC 4 confirmed and 3 estimated dead.

3. Three unnamed battalion search and destroy operations in conjunction with rice harvest protection were conducted outside the TAORs. There was no significant contact. 12,683 small unit operations were conducted within the TAORs. 855 contacts with VC elements were made.

J. AIR SUPPORT

1. Fixed Wing. III MAF provided fixed wing aircraft during April as indicated in Table I.

TABLE I

III MAF FIXED WING OPERATIONS

<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>			
	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>7TH AF</u>	<u>TF77</u>
Close Air Support	233		40	
Direct Air Support	829		143	
Landing Zone Preparation	77	8		
Helo Escort	477	257		
Interdiction	49		931	
Photo	153			
ECM	2		63	56
Other Tactical	47		15	1
Non Tactical	314		22	
Aircraft Escort			4	6
Steel Tiger			1380	
TOTALS	2181	265	2598	63 5107

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2. Helicopter. III MAF provided helicopter aircraft during April as indicated in Table II.

TABLE II

III MAF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Armed Helo	626
Convoy Escort	134
Combat Troop Carrier	4142
Combat Cargo	1624
Logistic Troop Carrier	3527
Logistic Cargo	2414
Command and Control	38
Search and Rescue	63
Tactical Med Evac	974
Reconnaissance	759
Tactical Air Coord (Airborne)	71
Tactical Aircraft Recovery	16
Training	30
Maintenance	323
VIP	231
Admin Liaison	828
PsyOps	8
Other	233
Tasks	16041
Sorties	38903
Cargo (Tons)	2717
Passengers	57250

K. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. Naval Gunfire Supported III MAF units with 341 rounds of 3 inch and 2,127 rounds of 5 inch ammunition.

III. INTELLIGENCE

A. General. Within the three Marine TAORs and adjacent areas, Viet Cong activities continued to emphasize small unit harassing tactics including the frequent and wide-spread employment of booby traps and mines, both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel, sniper fire, probes, and occasional small scale attacks. The most significant attacks were directed against USMC positions in the Danang TAOR. Each was of a determined nature, indicating careful planning and coordination, and involved close contact, heavy firepower, and demolitions or grenades. Towards the end of the month, heavy contact was joined between elements of the 1st Marine Division, the 2d ARVN Division, and the 1st VC Regiment northwest of Quang Ngai. This operation, conducted as a rapid reaction to positive intelligence, resulted in the capture of a large quantity of VC supporting arms and ammunition,

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and a kill ratio of about 22 to 1 over the enemy. Reports continued to be received of Viet Cong intentions to conduct suicide attacks, raids, sabotage, and acts of terrorism within the TAORs, however, with the exception of continuing sabotage of lines of communications, such acts did not materialize.

The unstable political situation manifest throughout many of the coastal regions of the I CTZ was actively supported by large segments of the VNAP in the area. The general unrest and demonstrations evident in Hue and Danang early in the month tapered off towards the end of the reporting period and a general state of "Normalcy" was again apparent.

Significant aspects of enemy activities in the I CTZ were their continued efforts to destroy ARVN/RF/PF units, isolated outposts, and small detachments; continued harassment of Marine forces while generally avoiding large scale contact; increased aggressiveness and a tendency to maintain contact on selected occasions; continued emphasis on the use of mines and booby traps; and the increase by one confirmed NVA Regiment and one probable battalion in the enemy order of battle.

B. PHU BAI. The tempo of Viet Cong initiated incidents within and in proximity to the TAOR showed no significant change over the previous reporting period. Frequent reports continued to be received of the location and movement of increased numbers of enemy units in the general area. Large scale reconnaissance operations, however, did not confirm a significant build-up in the approaches leading into Hue-Phu Bai. During the month, enemy activity consisted primarily of continued harassment by small arms fire, mining, and booby trapping. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Phu Bai TAOR with a strength equivalent to two regiments (the 6th NVA Regiment and the 95th NVA Regiment) reinforced by local force and guerrilla elements.

C. DANANG. Within the Danang TAOR, the enemy continued to react strongly to the operations of Marine forces in areas normally under his control. Small unit actions were frequent as the Viet Cong resisted Marine incursions into the limits of the TAOR and beyond. Enemy use of mines and booby-traps continued at a high level while other harassments in the form of sniper fire, propaganda, and terroristic activities were frequently reported. The most significant enemy activity was manifest in two small scale attacks against Marine positions. At approximately 0400 on 16 April, a force of approximately 150-175 VC attacked Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines positions in the southern portion of the TAOR. The enemy directed approximately 150-60mm and 81mm mortar rounds and 40-57mm recoilless rifle rounds against the USMC positions. Intense small arms fire and a large quantity of grenades were expended by the enemy during their assault. The attack was repulsed with 12 VC KIA and 6 individual weapons and 75-100 grenades captured. On 18 April, at approximately 0145, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was attacked by an estimated 45 VC employing Bangalore torpedoes, demolitions, small arms and hand grenades and B-40 rocket

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launchers. During their assault, the Viet Cong gained all six parapets and penetrated into 3 105mm howitzer gun positions. 1-105mm howitzer was destroyed, 3 damaged and 1 ammunition ready bunker was destroyed. Enemy losses included 15 KIA and 7 Chicom AK type 57 rifles and 1 B-40 rocket launcher captured. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Danang TAOR with the equivalent of one regiment (composed of the B-20 battalion and the 70th battalion) reinforced by local force and guerrilla units.

D. CHU LAI. Within and in the vicinity of the TAOR, enemy activity continued at approximately the same level as during the previous reporting period. Enemy initiated incidents included harassment by mortar fire, sniping, the extensive employment of mines and booby-traps, occasional acts of terrorism, and one small scale attack against a Marine infantry position.

At approximately 0225H on 20 April, an estimated VC company attacked H Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine positions in the northwest portion of the TAOR. The enemy employed 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, machine guns, small arms and grenades. Reports received from villagers indicated 25 VC possibly KIA and 25 possibly WIA.

Of considerable significance were the losses suffered by elements of the 1st VC Regiment when attacked by ARVN and Marine forces in a joint operation approximately 17 miles south of Chu Lai on 21 April. Total enemy losses included some 350 VC KIA and 4-75mm recoilless rifles, 1-57mm recoilless rifle, 6-50 caliber machineguns, 1-30 caliber machinegun, 2-82 mortars, 5 bars and 43 rifles captured.

Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Chu Lai TAOR with two regiments (the 1st VC and 36th NVA Regiments) reinforced by one NVA Battalion (the 195 AA Battalion), one LF battalion (the 52nd Battalion) and guerrilla elements.

E. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION. Viet Cong efforts in propaganda, agitation and recruitment activities continued at a high level. Reports indicated that the VC propaganda program was emphasizing conciliatory appeals directed at US troops. There were instances of propaganda directed toward negro servicemen. Leaflets, classes, political lectures, newspapers, magazines, radio broadcast, and whisper campaigns were employed as propaganda media to further subversion in the I CTZ. Attempts to lure Americans into committing crimes such as rape, and plundering of peoples properties in order to create an anti-US reaction, were frequent during the reporting period.

F. TERRORISM. VC terrorist activities increased significantly throughout the I CTZ. "Strict Orders" signed by the various autonomous committees warned villagers not to work for, donate to, or associate with ARVN/US personnel. The VC appeared to be directing much of their terroristic activities toward undermining the GVN/US pacification efforts. Abductions and assassinations were frequent. Reports received indicating that bounties were being paid by the VC for assassination of government cadres and that a VC campaign called "Annihilate Enemy Cadres" had been initiated. A total of twenty-one

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assassinations occurred during the reporting period.

G. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE. The Viet Cong continued to exert efforts toward organizing and training low-level agents to aid in their attempts to penetrate GVN controlled areas and military installations. Several reports indicated that small children and female agents were being used extensively in the collection of information concerning military installations and their defenses. Low-level agents were reported to be impersonating various Vietnamese citizens and officials in order to move freely in and out of GVN controlled areas.

H. POLITICAL UNREST. The political situation ranged from nearly explosive early in the month to a gradual return to "Normalcy" at the end of the period. All major cities in the I CTZ; Danang, Hoi An, Tam Ky, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Hue, were sites of anti-government demonstrations waged by the struggle forces. The theme of the "Popular Forces to struggle for the revolution" changed from that of the previous month when General THI's ouster was the issue, to an anti-KY and THIEU movement with anti-American overtones. Premier KY announced to the press on 3 April that he "considered Danang in communist Hands, and that the mayor of the city, Dr. Nguyen Van MAN was himself a communist". Thereupon the government ordered three battalions of Vietnamese Marines to Danang. The VNMC battalions began arriving by USAF aircraft on 5 April as the struggle forces in Danang erected barriers and roadblocks and issued warnings of bloodshed if the VNMC units entered the city. A new I Corps Commander, General Ton THAT DINH, replaced General CHUAN, and proceeded to establish order and regain control of those military who were aiding and abetting the struggle forces. On 9 April, all US civilians and military quartered in Danang were evacuated from the city. On 12 April, the GVN began the withdrawal of the three deployed VNMC battalions in Danang. As the reporting period drew to a close, a general subsiding of the political unrest was evident. The Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD) however, began conducting anti-struggle forces demonstrations. These activities were peaceful and orderly except in Quang Ngai city where on 19 April, five persons were killed and some twenty were injured when VNQDD and struggle forces clashed. At the close of the month, Danang and other cities appeared to be rapidly returning to normal with shops and markets functioning. The majority of ARVN forces that had assisted the struggle movement returned to their military duties.

I. FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. Numerous reports continued to be received of observation and in many cases destruction of enemy defensive works including caves, revetted tunnels, bunkers, weapons emplacements, defensive wire and bamboo fences and trench systems within the I CTZ.

J. MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. The incidence of enemy employment of mines and booby-traps increased by 21% over the previous reporting period. The VC continued to use these explosive devices throughout areas susceptible to friendly operations and in locations frequented by civilians. No new types of mines or booby-traps were reported and no significant change in their employment was noted.

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K. ANTI-AIRCRAFT. The frequency of anti-aircraft incidents and hits on aircraft decreased significantly over the previous month. While helicopters continued to be the most frequent targets, reports continued to be received of fixed wing aircraft receiving occasional small arms fire during approaches and take-offs at airfields through the I CTZ. A comparison of anti-aircraft statistics between March and April indicate the following:

	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>PCT CHANGE</u>
INCIDENTS	482	368	-.235
AIRCRAFT HIT	182	98	-.462

L. SUMMARY OF VC ACTIVITY. Statistics relating to enemy initiated action and personnel and weapons losses for the reporting period are shown in Tables III, IV, and V.

TABLE IIIENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS

AMBUSH	1
ATTACK	3
ASSAULT BY FIRE	0
HARASSING FIRE	518
MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS	97
HAMLET HARASSMENT	4
OTHER HARASSMENT	0
SABOTAGE	2
PROPAGANDA	4
AA FIRE	371

TABLE IVENEMY PERSONNEL LOSSES

	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
KIA/KBA	593	649
VCC	71	
VCS	698	
RALLIERS	4	

TABLE VENEMY WEAPONS LOSSES

RIFLE	16
AUTOMATIC RIFLE	5
CARBINE	46

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SUB-MACHINEGUN
MACHINEGUN
AA MACHINEGUN
SHOTGUN
PISTOL
M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHER
UNKNOWN TYPE

14
2
5
1
1
3
2
95

M. WEATHER. Weather for the month included several periods of light rainfall and occasional periods of crachin with attendant low ceilings and fog. On several occasions these conditions resulted in short periods during which friendly forces mobility and air operations were restricted in certain localities. Precipitation for the month is shown in Table VI.

TABLE VITOTAL PRECIPITATION FOR APRIL

<u>AREA</u>	<u>PRECIPITATION</u>	<u>MEAN FOR MONTH</u>
Danang	.30"	1.0"
Chu Lai	Trace	1.0"
Phu Bai	.01"	3.0"

N. VC ORDER OF BATTLE. Table VII lists the VC Order of Battle in I CTZ.

TABLE VII

<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>PROBABLE</u>
1 Military Region Hqs	9 Battalions
1 Military Sub-Region Hqs	5 Companies
4 Regiments (3 NVA)	
26 Battalions (9 NVA)*	
36 Companies	

*Includes 2 transportation battalions, 1 weapons battalion and 1 AA battalion.

III MAF OOB HAS ACCEPTED THE FOLLOWING NEWLY IDENTIFIED UNITS IN I CTZ

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>RATING</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>
6th Regt (NVA)	1800	CONF	Quang Tri Prov	15Apr66
3d Bn, 5th Regiment	400	PROB	AT 8734	1Apr66

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IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. Strength. The average monthly strength of III MAF increased from 51,905 in March to 58,815 during April. Total on board strength at the close of the period was 60,019. Table VIII outlines the average personnel strength for III MAF during April.

TABLE VIIIAVERAGE PERSONNEL STRENGTHIII MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS

	<u>OFFICER</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
HQ III MAF	101	6	190	2
H&S CO	7	0	167	0

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

3016	617	45684	9498
------	-----	-------	------

B. Casualties. III MAF casualties are shown in Table IX.

TABLE IX

1. <u>Battle</u>	<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
	56	0	491	15	8	1	1	0
2. <u>Non-battle</u>	<u>Deaths</u>		<u>Inj/Ill</u>					
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>				
	13	2	56	1				

C. Effects of Political Unrest

1. The political unrest which prevailed in the I CTZ during the early part of April caused restrictions and problems associated with certain G-1 functions. Liberty continued to be suspended in the entire I CTZ. In-country R&R program to Saigon was terminated on 6 April and suspended for the remainder of the month. The main exchange store and depot were closed from 5 April through 12 April. Field exchanges remained open. Several MP escorted emergency resupply trips were made to the ~~field~~ exchange depot to replenish the diminishing supplies in the field exchanges.

2. The evacuation of U.S. civilians/military from the Danang area caused the temporary closing of the Red Cross Recreation Center and the USO

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facility. The Red Cross Recreation Center was reopened on 18 April. During early April, the increased restrictions to movement, along with the evacuation of U.S. civilians/military brought virtually all local civilian employment to a standstill. Civilians returned to work during the latter part of the month as conditions moved towards normalcy. The Transient Facility provided emergency billeting for military personnel that were evacuated from billets in Danang.

D. Exchange of Enlisted Personnel Between Western Pacific Aviation and Ground Commands. Force Order 1306.1 (Enclosure 5) implemented an exchange program of personnel possessing certain Ground MOSs common to both Ground and Aviation Commands under the operational control of Commanding General, III MAF.

E. Duty Free Importation of Bona Fide Gifts. Force Bulletin 5840 of 8 April 1966 (Enclosure 6) published information concerning duty free importation of bona fide gifts.

F. Special Services

1. Shows. The Frank Rich and James Drury Shows, originally scheduled during the month of April, were cancelled due to the political unrest in the Danang area.

2. New USO Building. Progress has been excellent during the month toward the completion of the new USO building located at the base of Hill 327. Power is now connected, water available, and ample furniture and equipment is in position.

3. China Beach. China Beach opened on 16 April for swimming on a daily basis between 1000-1800. Currently, one officer and eight enlisted are assigned to support this function.

4. R&R Program

(a) Singapore was opened as an R&R city on 1 April 1966, however, the initial quota to III MAF was allotted on 28 April. 63 III MAF Marines made the initial R&R visit to Singapore.

(b) R&R totals were as set forth in Table X.

TABLE X

Bangkok	586
Hong Kong	419
Taipei	108
Tokyo	621
Manila	180
Singapore	63
Okinawa	1152
Saigon	127
Total	3356

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G. Chaplain

1. Religious activities during Holy Week established a new high in the number of services and attendance. The chaplains conducted 208 Divine Services during Easter Sunday in 20 locations.

2. A special effort was made to provide Easter services to the deployed 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. This effort was dubbed Operation Sunrise. Four Catholic and four Protestant Chaplains, utilizing two helicopters held Catholic and Protestant Services in all company locations.

3. A congregation estimated at 1000 attended the Easter Sunrise Service during which Bishop Mueller, President of the National Council of Churches, preached the sermon.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. A decrease in message traffic through the III MAF Communication Center was noted during April. This was due in part to a message reduction program and the deletion of traffic totals from two wing circuits and the SSO circuit previously counted in the III MAF totals. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Incoming	47,994	27,247	20,747
Outgoing	34,330	26,403	7,927
Total	82,324	53,650	28,674

B. During April the SIF/ARG operated in support of Forces in I Corps Tactical Zone. A covered teletype circuit was established between the III MAF COC and CTG 76.5. This circuit proved effective for the transmission of high precedence operational traffic.

C. A detachment of the USAF 1st Mobile Communication Group equipped with 12 channel radio relay (AN/MRC-61) arrived to provide interim communications between the III MAF Communications Center and Danang Control. This detachment will remain until repairs to the cable normally providing service between III MAF and Danang Control are completed.

VII. CIVIC ACTION

A. General. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civic Action program remained the same during the month of April. Particular emphasis was placed on education, especially in the area of school and classroom construction.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. The council met twice during April. Other regularly scheduled meetings were cancelled as a result of the political unrest existing during the month. Commander, Naval Support

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Activity announced a plan to establish and equip a technical school in the near future. The purpose will be to train adults (18-45) in various technical skills. In a similar move, GVN has approved additional funds for use in connection with the Danang Polytechnic School.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. The majority of council committees were unable to meet during the month.

1. Public Health Committee. Several important developments were brought before the committee. A Cuban Medical team arrived in Quang Ngai in mid-April and will support district dispensaries of Tu Nghia and Son Tinh. Two MILPHAP teams are scheduled to arrive about 20 May and are expected to be deployed to the provincial hospitals at Hoi An and Tam Ky. MEDCAP supplies have reached a critical level in I Corps and are barely sustaining team activities. Efforts were being made to alleviate this situation at the end of the reporting period.

D. Medical Assistance. Forty-three MEDCAP teams operated in 134 locations during April and provided 73,752 medical and dental treatments to 58,373 Vietnamese civilians. This represented a decrease of 23.4 per cent in number of civilians seen and treated as compared with March. This decrease was attributed primarily to the political unrest in the more populated areas. Distribution of treatments was as follows:

Diseases of Skin	20.8%
Upper Respiratory Infection	19.6%
Miscellaneous ailment	16.1%
Injuries	11.6%
Stomach Ache	11.0%
Headache	9.1%
Diarrhea	4.6%
Dental	4.0%
Fevers	3.1%
Venereal Disease	0.1%

The number of treatments by TAOR were:

Danang	46,781
Chu Lai	25,290
Phu Bai	1,681

In addition, forty-three health workers and two volunteer nurses received informal on the job training during the month. Formal training in dental and medical emergencies was given by III MAF Dental and Medical Officers to twenty-six senior medical students in the Hue Medical School and Danang City Hospital.

E. CARE Program. During April, III MAF units received 10,000 school kits, 5,000 replacement kits, 150 physical education kits, 500 woodworking kits, 150 textile packages, 70 Mason kits, 10 midwifery kits, 500 bags of rice, 50 bags salt and 249 cases of tomato soup.

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F. CRS. III MAF units received 12,000 pounds Bulgar Wheat during April.

G. Handolasp. III MAF units received approximately 5,900 pounds of miscellaneous commodities during April.

H. Political Unrest. During April, the population centers in I Corps Tactical Zone, and Danang in particular, experienced a period of political unrest precipitated by the ouster of the Corps Commander, LtGen TRI. This seriously hindered all Civic Action activities and slowed or ceased work on most projects. On 9 April, all civilians were ordered evacuated from Hue and Danang. With that order, USAID, CARE, CRS and International Volunteer Service ceased to function as commodities distribution sources. By 20 April however, the restriction on travel had been lifted and with the exception of a scarcity of certain commodities, the III MAF Civic Action Program was back in operation. By 30 April, USAID, CARE, and CRS had all resumed full operations and, as port operations permitted, the backlog of commodities required to support a Civic Action program were being received.

I. III MAF EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM. A meeting was held at the III MAF G-5 to determine the number and location of classrooms to be constructed under the USMCR-CARE Program in the Danang TAOR. The following persons were in attendance: Quang Nam USAID Provincial Representative, III MAF USAID Liaison Officer, Hoa Vang District, 3d Marine Division G-5 and III MAF G-5. All aspects of the SVN school program were considered (ie, present schools, schools approved for construction and Revolutionary Development Program, teacher availability, students not in school and the availability of III MAF sponsors). Tentative agreement was reached whereby III MAF will construct 4 secondary school classrooms and 16 elementary classrooms in 11 locations throughout the Danang TAOR. Final decision will be made after coordination with the sponsoring units has been completed. Estimated cost per classroom is \$1,500, including a well and toilet facilities. Additionally, III MAF agreed to assist in the repair of all damaged schools in its TAOR, for which teachers were available. Similar meetings were held at Phu Bai and Chu Lai.

VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A. Political Situation in I Corps

1. Psychological Operations during April 1966 were severely affected by the political unrest in I Corps Tactical Zone. During the early part of the month it was noted that little effort was being put forth by members of the 3d ARVN Paywar Battalion to support even well established psychological campaigns. By 8 April it was apparent that many members of the battalion headquarters were actively supporting the so-called "Struggle Force" with both their talent and equipment. This active support continued until 20 April, at which time all members of the battalion headquarters returned to duty ostensibly to resume normal operations.

2. From the time of their return to the end of the month, essentially nothing was accomplished by the ARVN members of the Joint Paywar Center. Token efforts were made at "getting ready" to resume operations, but nothing tangible

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was done. Vietnamese propagandists were generally unavailable to work with Audio/Visual Psywar Teams, no printing was accomplished, and vague reports were received by American Advisors concerning the activities of the Psywar Companies.

3. At a meeting of the Psywar Committee of the Joint Coordinating Council, the I Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Psywar and Social Affairs openly refused to make Psywar Cultural Teams, or any other psywar personnel, available to supplement the current psywar efforts in the Ngu Hanh Son Pacification Campaign, or in County Fair Operations.

B. Operation Nevada. During Operation Nevada, a total of 497,000 leaflets were disseminated over the Operation area. These leaflet drops were supported by aerial loudspeaker broadcasts from U-10 aircraft. The themes of the leaflets and broadcasts were the same as those normally used during tactical operations; warnings not to fire at aircraft, explanation of U.S. presence, offering of rewards for weapons, Chieu Hoi appeals, and safe conduct passed. Little contact was made during the operation, and no significant feed back from the psychological activities was received.

C. Hoa Vinh Thanh Island Project

1. Hoa Vinh Thanh Island, in the Chu Lai TAOR (BT 4215), has, up until April, been under effective Viet Cong control. In April a Marine company moved onto the island and commenced operations. In conjunction with these tactical operations, psychological operations were initiated with a basic program of leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts.

2. This project was considered to be an excellent opportunity to observe a psychological campaign in all phases of development. GVN officials who left the island due to the intense VC activity have been queried on the history of the island and on any vulnerabilities that might be exploitable by psyops.

3. Psychological activities during April were limited to an explanation of U.S. presence, and an enumeration of Viet Cong failures.

4. Plans for the future include the introduction of an Audio/Visual Psywar Team, augmented by psywar cadre from Ly Tin District, to conduct face-to-face propaganda, and the eventual re-introduction of GVN officials to restore local government.

5. This program will be extended over a long time period, and will be watched closely to measure the success of particular themes on a heretofore VC controlled audience.

D. Operation Georgia. An Audio/Visual Psywar Team and a U-10 aircraft were assigned to support the operation. Daily leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted from the psywar aircraft, and the psywar team conducted

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both daytime rallies and night broadcasts. By the end of the month, 2 rallies had been received. There were indications that the guerrilla target audience was successfully affected by the psychological campaign.

IX. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

A. Demonstrations in the Danang and Hue/Phu Bai areas hampered the CIB in escorting civilian news media to the field. 231 newsmen, however, were accompanied into the field covering Marines in Vietnam. Eighteen of these trips covered civic action features, while the majority covered Operations Virginia, Georgia, Hot Springs, Orange and County Fair. In addition to the notable American newsmen arriving, the Press Center also had visiting correspondents from Australia, England, France, Sweden, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Norway.

B. Photography. The Photo Section forwarded a total of 23,600 feet of motion picture film during the month of April. This included material exposed by the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. 65% of the coverage was operational, 15% civic action and 20% was special projects. The coverage included landing of the 1st Marine Division, Danang evacuation, Combined Action Company, Operations Indiana, Orange, Iowa, Virginia, Nevada, Hot Springs and Georgia. Easter services were also covered.

C. Radio/TV. The radio/TV section made 225 releases during the month of April. Of this total, 198 were Mothers Day greetings sent to FHTNC. In addition, two radio shows were produced, one on operation Indiana, and the other on the An Hoa Industrial complex. In response to a request from HQMC, 19 interview tapes were sent to MCIO, New York, for use on the NBC weekend Monitor program.

D. Escorts. Of the 231 escorted trips to Marine units, 18 were devoted to coverage of civic action ranging from MedCap programs to Operation Georgia and the An Hoi Industrial complex. These were covered extensively by CBS, NBC, and ABC. Notable news media representatives who visited the CIB during the month were Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard; Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times; Don Moser, Life Magazine Bureau Chief; Don Neff, Zalen Grant and Bill McWhirter, Time Magazine; Joe Fried, Chicago Daily News; Mert Perry and Mike Bernard, Newsweek Magazine; Joe Treaster, N.Y. Times; Ward Just, Washington Post, Sam Castan, Look Magazine; Warren Bosworth, Dallas Times Herald; Dick Armstrong, Saturday Evening Post; John Steele, Navy Combat Artist; Doc Greene, Detroit News; S. Troelstrup, U.S. News and World Report; Jonathan Fenby and Mike Neal, Reuters; Jack Laurance and Adam Raphael, CBS; Foreign news media who visited the Press Center included Ian Brodie, London Daily Express; J. J. Huizinga, Rotterdam Courant; Andre Lebo, Pathe News Paris; Bunyo Ishakawa, Japan News Service; Riad Rayyes, Al Hayat, Beirut Lebanon; Ihnainen Eriski, Finland; and Jacques Danois, Radio Luxembourg.

E. Press Releases. The Press Section processed and distributed 187 news releases during April. Twenty-two of these concerned civic action. The balance covered feature and operational material. In addition, 1,945 releases were forwarded to the Fleet Home Town News Center.

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F. Press Center. A total of 113 reporters and VIP guests checked in at the Press Center during the month of April.

X. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE ACTIVITY (RVNAF)

A. General. VC initiated incidents declined to 263 this month compared to 435 in March. There was also a significant decline in VC initiated incidents on the National Railroad: two this month compared to 12 last month.

B. Current Operations. I Corps (ARVN) conducted 37 battalion or larger size unit operations during the month as compared to 49 last month. There were 5 combined and 5 airmobile operations included in the above figure. Contact was made with the VC in 19 of these operations (26 last month) resulting in 397 VC KIA (512 VC KIA possible), 102 VCC, 421 VCS and 31 returnees (1501 VC KIA, 120 VCC, 437 VCS and 29 returnees last month). ARVN and RF/PF combat losses were 224 KIA and 443 WIA (381 KIA and 799 WIA last month). The weapons figures were 213 captured and 115 lost (474 weapons were captured and 444 lost last month).

C. Three significant operations took place in the I CTZ during the reporting period:

1. On 10 April 1966, 1st Company, 3/2 ambushed an unknown number of VC in the Gio Linh Sub-Sector. The Company Commander dressed a squad in PF uniforms and they established a defensive position near a known VC infiltration route. The remainder of the company was concealed in flanking positions. The VC "took the bait" and after a brief mortar preparation, assaulted the "PF" squad position. Friendly losses were 3 WIA. VC losses were 33 KIA, 4 VCC. Fourteen weapons were captured.

2. Lien Ket 36/Hot Springs, a combined heliborne ARVN/USMC operation, displayed ARVN's improved ability to launch immediate operations based on hard intelligence. On 20 April a defector from the 1st VC Regiment reported unit locations of elements of the 1st and 21st VC Regiments. On the morning of 21 April the operation was launched in an area 15 kilometers northwest of Quang Ngai City. Friendly losses were 7 KIA and 44 WIA. VC losses were 207 KIA (110 US confirmed), 17 VCC. Eighty-two individual and 8 crew served weapons were captured.

3. COUNTY FAIR 18, a combined ARVN/USMC search and destroy operation conducted on 26-27 April in an area approximately 20 kilometers southwest of Danang, was highly successful. While one USMC company blocked, two ARVN companies conducted search operations to ferret out VC from their hiding places in the hamlets. Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 14 WIA. VC losses were 45 KIA, 17 VCC, 2 VCS. Fourteen weapons were captured.

D. VC ACTIVITIES

1. During April the number of VC initiated incidents decreased considerably (435 to 263). Although there were no VC multi-battalion attacks

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April, there were indications that the VC were using the unsettled political situation to reorganize, recuperate and increase their influence in the populous lowland regions.

2. The 12th DTA experienced two VC battalion attacks during the month. On 10 April the 937th RF Company located at MY DAI (BS 734654) was attacked by an estimated VC battalion. On 14 April two companies of the 2/4 were also attacked by an estimated VC battalion. The VC attack on 14 April resulted in a reaction operation which produced contact with the 90th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment and the 22d Battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment.

3. On 28 April MACV confirmed the 620th VC Division located in the 12th DTA. This division consists of three regiments; the 1st VC and 21st NVA Regiment (confirmed) and the 31st VC Regiment (unconfirmed).

4. The political unrest noted during March increased in intensity during the early days of April as demonstrations against the Central Government were noted throughout much of the Corps area. Demonstrations in Hue, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai City, Hoi An as well as Danang, pressed demands for reforms in the Government of Premier Ky. Student opposition to the Government was vigorously denounced by the Premier on 3 April. He alleged that Danang was in the hands of the Communists and that appropriate steps would be taken to return the city to Government control. The movement of three battalions of Vietnamese Marines and two platoons of M-41 tanks to the Danang Airbase on 4 April threatened to trigger open clashes as the Struggle Forces moved tactical forces toward Danang to block movement of Government troops. On 4 April movement of all US military and civilian personnel was restricted and they were required to stay in their billets or place of duty. On 5 April the advisors with tactical units in the 11th DTA were withdrawn from their units because troops were being positioned for political reasons. By 7 April the troop units had returned to tactical positions in the 11th DTA and the advisors rejoined their units. On 9 April American civilians of the three northern provinces were evacuated to safe areas. Military personnel billeted in Danang were moved to their place of duty or to safe areas. On 10 April Lieutenant General Ton That Dinh, the new I Corps Commander arrived in Danang. His arrival presaged a gradual reduction in tension. The Vietnamese Marines at the airbase were withdrawn by 12 April. In an effort to alleviate tension, Thich Tri Quang, a leading Buddhist from Hue, spoke in Hue, Danang and Hoi An telling the populace that the government had agreed to hold general elections in a few months and that there should be no further demonstrations. The VNQDD and the Struggle Forces clashed briefly in Tam Ky and Quang Ngai City but the general political attitude throughout the Corps was one of lessening tension. There was some Catholic unrest in Danang near the end of the month but this was expected as the minority parties appeared determined not to be thrust aside by the Buddhists in their bid for power.

5. In the I CTZ, the VC retain the capability to launch multi-battalion size attacks at any time and place of their choosing. The possibility of terror-

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istic attacks in the Danang area against US installations and billets continued. The political unrest may be used by the VC to spread anti-American propaganda.

E. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. Little significant Revolutionary Development progress has been observed during the past month. The fact that any progress was made is gratifying however, since early reports indicated that the program had seriously deteriorated. The progress, or lack of regression, can be attributed to a few dedicated personnel who remained aloof from the political maneuvering. The tense political situation throughout I CTZ has prevented any new planning for future projects in Revolutionary Development. Previously planned projects are being completed, but the absence of new plans will have an adverse effect in the near future. Of paramount importance is the need for a permanent province chief for Quang Nam.

F. PSYOPS/CA. The political instability in I CTZ had a considerable impact on psywar planning and printed media production. Planning was nonexistent during the first half of April and printed media production showed a decrease of 33% from the previous month. However, 7.8 million leaflets were disseminated (40% increase) and broadcasts of 124 hours were conducted (26% increase). There was a continued decline of Chieu Hoi returnees (40% less than last month).

G. REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE

1. A considerable increase in recruiting of RF/PF over the past two months has filled training centers to capacity. This increase has been caused by the relaxation of recruiting restrictions by JGS.

2. During April RF/PF combat losses were 87 KIA, 173 WIA, and 34 MIA. VC losses were 281 KIA and 95 VCC. Weapons losses continued with an unfavorable ratio of 151 lost against 114 captured.

3. During the month of April approximately 15,000 pounds of welfare foodstuffs were distributed to widows and dependents of deceased RF/PF soldiers. Distribution of 20 sewing machines, 63 sewing kits and 8400 meters of cloth was made in support of the RF/PF rehabilitation program for widows and veterans of RF/PF. As of 24 April 13,765 PF soldiers have been issued uniforms. Of the 60 self-construction buildings issued to RF units, 17 were nearing completion at the end of April. Construction of buildings is being expedited after a near stand-still in this area because of the political situation.

H. LOGISTICS

1. Rail transportation in the I CTZ continued to be restricted because of depletion of rolling stock. Road convoy operations continued as the principal means of supplying the Corps area. Approximately 1100 tons of supplies were moved by convoy from Danang to the 12th DTA and 2100 tons to the 11th DTA.

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2. POL stockage dropped below safety levels in the 11th DPA. Convoy operations scheduled for early May will alleviate this condition.

I. ENGINEER

1. Keeping Highway 1 open was the primary Engineer task. This highway was trafficable from the DMZ to Quang Ngai 95% of the month.

2. Because VC activity against the railroad decreased, the line was open between Danang and Hue 95% of the month. This is an increase of 45% over March.

3. Lack of road maintenance funds and shortages in bridge decking, crushed rock, cement, and PSP continued.

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PART THREE**SECRET**CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1 April - CG III MAF responsibilities as Naval Component Commander transferred to Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam
Operation ORANGE Began

8 April - Operation IOWA Began

9 April - Operation IOWA Terminated
Approximately 700 U.S. and Friendly country civilians/military evacuated from Danang City by Helo and Boats

11 April - Operation ORANGE Terminated

12 April - Operation NEVADA Began

17 April - Operation NEVADA Terminated
Operation VIRGINIA Began

21 April - Operation GEORGIA Began
Operation HOT SPRINGS Began

24 April - Operation HOT SPRINGS Terminated

26 April - Operation WYOMING Began
County Fair Operation with significant contact with VC Forces

27 April - Operation VIRGINIA, PHASE II, Began
Operation OSAGE, ARG/SLF amphibious operation began

30 April - Operation WYOMING Terminated
Operation GEORGIA Continued
Operation VIRGINIA, PHASE II, Continued
Operation OSAGE Continued

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SECRETCHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
1Apr	Harry H. CRITZ	MGen	CG, Arty Scol, Ft. Sill
1Apr	W. B. ROSSON	MGen	C/S MAGV
2Apr	Thomas J. CORCORAN	Mr.	U.S. Embassy, Saigon
2-4Apr	Frank A. BARTIMO	Mr.	Asst Gen Counsel for Manpower
2-4Apr	Leon WHEELLESS	Mr.	Office of Asst SecDef for Manpower
4Apr	Cyrus R. VANCE	Mr.	Deputy SecDef
4Apr	Paul R. IGNATIUS	Mr.	Asst SecDef
4-5Apr	Gale W. MC GEE	Sen	Democrat, Wyoming
4-5Apr	Frank WISNER	Mr.	Aide to Ambassador PORTER
4-5Apr	Robert KOMER	Mr.	Special Asst to President JOHNSON for Revolutionary Development
5Apr	Robert H. CHARLES	Mr.	Asst Secretary of Air Force
5-10Apr	R. R. VAN STOCKUM	BGen	CG, FMFPac/1 MAC (FWD)
8Apr	John N. EWBANK, Jr.	MGen	AC/S for Plans, MACJ-5
8Apr	J. H. MOORE	LtGen	Cmdr, 7th Air Force
9Apr	John R. DEANE	BGen	C/S for Field Forces Vietnam
10-11Apr	Reuben H. MUELLER	Bishop	Press/National Council Churches
11Apr	W. B. ROSSON	MGen	C/S MACJ-02
12Apr	Sam STRATTON	Cong	Democrat, New York
12Apr	Robert L. LEGGETT	Cong	Democrat, California
12Apr	Floyd V. HICKS	Cong	Democrat, Washington

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
12Apr	Charles E. CHAMBERLAIN	Cong	Republican, Michigan
12Apr	Robert T. STAFFORD	Cong	Republican, Vermont
16Apr	William C. WESTMORELAND	Gen	COMUSMACV
16Apr	U. S. Grant SHARP	Adm	CINCPAC
16Apr	Carroll H. DUNN	BGen	MACV Engineer
16-17Apr	W. M. ENGER	RAdm	Dep Chief BUDOCKS
16-17Apr	W. M. HEAMAN	RAdm	DIRPACDOCKS/COMCEPAC
26Apr	Donald H. MC GOVERN	BGen	MACJ J-1
27Apr	J. L. COLLINS	BGen	Spec1 Asst to COMUSMACV
29Apr	C. E. LONG	MGen	Dep Chief of the Gen Staff Army Hqs, Can- berra
29Apr	Denys WOOD	LCol	RA
29Apr	Peter BRIGHTON	WingCdr	RAF
29Apr	Alan HENSHER	Cdr	RN

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PART FOURREFERENCES

- (A) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology, April 1966
- (B) 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, April 1966
- (C) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, April 1966
- (D) Force Logistic Command Chronology, April 1966
- (E) COMUSMACV LOI (LOI 3-66) of 30 March 1966 (S)

ENCLOSURES

- (1) 7th Engineer Battalion (-) Rein Command Chronology April 1966
- (2) 9th Motor Transport Battalion Command Chronology April 1966
- (3) 5th Communication Battalion Command Chronology April 1966
- (4) 1st Marine Corps Scout Dog Platoon Monthly Report of Activities for March, April 1966
- (5) Force Order 1306.1; Exchange of Enlisted Personnel between Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Western Pacific Aviation and Ground Commands
- (6) Force Bulletin 5840; Duty Free Importation of Bona Fide Gifts
- (7) III MAF Task Organization/Troop List, 30 April 1966
- (8) CG III MAF ltr concerning CH-46A Capability to lift 105mm Howitzer
- (9) Instructions for Operating the Mity Mite Portable blower
- (10) Headquarters III MAF Command Directory

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V. LOGISTICS

A. General

1. Logistics operations were characterized by the need to compensate for lost momentum due to civil unrest in the Danang and Hue areas during the first half of the month. The closing of the city of Danang suspended all work at the city docks. Tien Sha continued to handle debarking cargo throughout the period. All vehicular traffic to and from Danang East was halted, and fuel from commercial sources was stopped. The effects were to stop receipt of cargo from NSA, resupply of AvGas, MoGas and diesel fuel; to stop waterborne shipments to Hue/Phu Bai; and to curtail some shipments from Danang to Chu Lai. Chu Lai continued to receive resupply by shipping, except for trans-shipments from Danang Main. All commercial cargo and POL truck deliveries to Phu Bai ceased.

(a) Specific problem areas included the following:

- (1) Requirement to install an additional fuel line from Red Beach One to the fuel farm at Danang Air Base.
- (2) Reduction of JP-4 storage by 360,000 gallons to allow storage of 120,000 gallons each of MoGas, AvGas, and diesel.
- (3) POL delivery to Marble Mountain Air Facility required installation of a buoyant fuel system.
- (4) Dry stores and B rations were delivered by LCM via Danang River to Cam Le Bridge, one mile south of Danang Air Base.
- (5) Resupply of the Hue/Phu Bai area by use of military convoys and air shipments.
- (6) A backlog of receipts and issues developed; all stock levels at Danang and Hue/Phu Bai decreased.
- (7) Necessity for maintaining increased security reduced the man hours available for logistic efforts.

(b) Issues of material not normally part of the mission were required as follows:

- (1) 100 ration sundry packs to US Air Force.
- (2) 6,000 gallons of diesel fuel to RMK.
- (3) Three DOS of MCI's for 3,000 men to US Air Force.

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(4) 24 general purpose tents loaned to RVN Marines.

(5) 100 drums and 2,500 gallons of bulk diesel, plus a quantity of AvGas to US Air Force.

(6) 352 MCI's to US Army advisors in the Hue and Quang Tri areas.

(c) An Amphibious Assault Bulk Fuel System and a Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System were installed at the mouth of the Hue River, with a combined capacity of 190,000 gallons. The installation includes a buoyant ship-to-shore fuel pipeline and two helicopter landing pads. An LCM has been stationed at the fuel farm to ferry refueler trucks to the Col Co Causeway as required. The tanks were initially filled on 18 April from a US Navy tanker.

(d) Scheduled LCU runs from Danang were resumed at the end of the period of civil unrest, increasing from 2 LCU every third day, to 3 LCU per day on a regular basis.

2. Planning continued for development of port facilities at Hue. Initial development will concentrate on LST ramps, with eventual development into a deep water port. Permission has been requested to make improvements on the road from the Col Co Causeway to Route 1 at Hue, and to the causeway itself.

3. Samples of several different types of gloves, furnished by the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center, were distributed to troop units for field test use in thick brush and elephant grass.

4. Planning continued for reception of the ROK II Marine Brigade, expected at Chu Lai in mid-May. A Korean Marine Lieutenant Colonel arrived at III MAF as a Liaison Officer, followed by a Korean Army Major representing the Brigade's logistic support organization. A concept of support for the ROK Forces was developed jointly by III MAF and NSA Danang, and forwarded to COMUSMACV.

5. The first 8-Butler building complex for the new FLSG-Alpha area near Red Beach was completed, providing 32,000 square feet of covered storage.

B. Engineer

1. Political unrest in the Danang area, with accompanying strikes and tension, had considerable effect on Force Engineer operations during the first two weeks of April. Due to non-availability of the normal indigenous labor force, approximately 150 Force Engineers were diverted from

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normal construction, and were assigned to high priority projects such as the northwest parking apron of the Danang Air Base and the new III MAF CP. By 15 April, however, RVN civilian work crews employed by RMK appeared to have stabilized, thereby allowing release of most military engineers to resume normal work on roads, ASPs and other projects which had been interrupted or reduced.

2. River profiles and site surveys were made on two possible areas for emplacement of a floating bridge across the Danang River. Plans are underway in the actual design of the 1600 foot bridge; real estate clearances have been requested.

3. Two foot bridges, 78' and 135', were installed over the Bau Xau River in support of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines south of Danang. The longer span is used by local villagers, and links together the Hoa Vang and Ben Ti districts for the first time, in a combined military/civic action project.

4. Other significant engineer events during April included the construction of 2000' of temporary aircraft revetments for MAG-11, and the initiation of a 4-kilometer pioneer road in the Hoa Valley.

C. Supply

1. Staff visits were made to all battalions of the 9th Marines to discuss supply problems and to issue disposable mess gear (paper plates and cups, plastic utensils) to 3/9, 2/3 and 3/3 for test. These items are intended for use where water shortage inhibits proper cleaning of standard mess gear. An interim procedure for garrison accounting was staffed and is ready for final approval.

2. A recap of RED BALL during the month of April follows:

Total line items on RED BALL-1 April	247
Total line items added	120
Total line items deleted	183
Total line items on RED BALL-30 April	184

D. Embarkation and Port Operation

1. During early April, the remainder of the 1st Marine Division Headquarters and Support Battalion arrived at Chu Lai. The last ship of this lift was the USS WINSTON which completed debarking Headquarters of the 1st

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Motor Transport Battalion on 6 April. Civil disturbances hindered cargo operations in the Danang area from 2-12 April, and shipments to Hue/Phu Bai ceased during this period. As a result of increased lift requirements and civil disturbances, the amount of cargo waiting lift to Phu Bai on 21 April was 3,100 short tons. Fleet shipping was requested to assist in breaking the back log; CTF 76 assigned the USS POINT DEFIANCE to shuttle cargo to Hue/Phu Bai. The ship shuttled preloaded LCU's of the Naval Support Activity, and in two days reduced the backlog to Hue by 1,615 short tons. BLT 2/5 arrived at Chu Lai on 14 April, debarked and joined the 1st Marine Division. The LVT Platoon and the Landing Support Platoon attached to BLT 2/5 for movement to RVN were returned to 9th MAB on the USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) on 22 April.

2. During April, 22 US Navy Ships and 34 MSTS ships debarked/embarked cargoes at Danang. At Chu Lai, 28 LST's moored, and 10 heavy US ships debarked. The Danang total cargo throughput was 77,544 short tons and 4,844 measurement tons. Chu Lai handled 18,526 short tons and 29,159 measurement tons for a daily average of 618 short tons and 962 measurement tons.

3. 4,316 short tons and 7,119 measurement tons were shipped from Danang to Phu Bai during April. This represents an increase of sixty percent over any previous month.

E. Fiscal. During the period covered by this report, III MAF Comptroller allocated 2nd Quarter AIK funds. COMNAV SUPPACT Danang reported that allocated funds were inadequate to support local national employees now on the rolls, and requested an additional 9,000,000 piastres for the second quarter. MACV Comptroller agreed to advance third quarter funds; these funds were received and allocated.

F. Ordnance

1. The major project of the Ordnance Section for the month of April was in the Riot Control Agent field. Messages and instructions on the use of the M8 RCA munition were issued, along with locally made training aids. A chemical seminar was held at 3d Marine Division conference room, featuring displays of the E158/E159 cannister cluster, E3 Launcher and the Mity Mite Blower. Representatives of I Corps Advisory Team, 1st Marine Division, and III MAF attended, in addition to CBR Officers/NCO's from 3d Division units.

2. A major effort has been expended in reorganizing the distribution and evacuation of LVT's under the FY-66 R&E program. At the end of April, this project was nearing completion.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96602

ForO 1306.1
1/ref
20 April 1966

FORCE ORDER 1306.1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Exchange of Enlisted Personnel between Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,
Western Pacific Aviation and Ground Commands

Ref: (a) CG FMFPac ltr 1B/hmd 1080 of 26Mar66

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order is to implement an exchange program of personnel possessing certain Ground Military Occupational Specialties common to both Ground and Aviation Commands under the operational control of Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Background. There are significant numbers of security-type billets within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing filled by enlisted personnel possessing MOS's in OF 03, 08 and 18. In order to provide for flexibility in assignment and to provide for opportunities to serve in ground commands after approximately one half tour in security work, exchanges may be effected with like numbers from ground commands in the same occupational fields who will shift into the Wing security billets.

3. Information

a. It is desirable that this exchange of personnel be on a voluntary basis. However, in order to equalize the flow it may be necessary to seek personnel to fill quotas.

b. The program will be coordinated by Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force. Names of eligible personnel who desire to shift from aviation to ground commands or vice versa will be furnished to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-1) by the 10th of the month prior to the month of desired exchange. Authority for reassignment will be requested from Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, by III Marine Amphibious Force in accordance with reference (a).

c. Lists will be maintained by III Marine Amphibious Force based upon date of receipt of request. On the cut-off-date for the succeeding months reassignment, balanced nominations will be submitted to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for reassignment authority.

ENCLOSURE (5)

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ForO 1306.1
20 April 1966

d. The following eligibility requirements apply:

(1) Marines to be reassigned must have six months remaining on current overseas tour or volunteer to extend their overseas tour to permit completion of a minimum of six months at the command reassigned.

(2) Marines in occupational fields 03, 08 and 10 will be utilized.

(3) Personnel will not be in a disciplinary status nor have a history of disciplinary problems.

(4) Personnel must complete a minimum of five months before being considered eligible to be reassigned.

4. Applicability. This Order is applicable to enlisted personnel in the following commands:

WESTPAC GRDFORCES

H&SCo, III MAF
1st MarDiv
3dMarDiv
FLC

WESTPAC MARAIRFORCES

1st MAW

5. Action. Major subordinate commands will provide names of personnel who desire reassignment in accordance with the provisions of this Order to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-1) by the 10th of each month for personnel to be reassigned during following month.

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 1

E. G. Glidden Jr.
E. G. GLIDDEN JR.
Deputy Chief of Staff

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*Order's
for April*

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96602

ForBul 5840
1B/ref
8 April 1966

FORCE BULLETIN 5840

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Duty Free Importation of Bona Fide Gifts

Ref: (a) CNO Msg 312016Z MAR (NOTAL)

1. Purpose. To publish information concerning duty free importation of bona fide gifts as announced in reference (a).
2. Background. The President of the United States has signed Public Law 89-368 which authorized U. S. Armed Forces personnel serving in a combat zone to send gifts tax and duty free to the extent such gifts in any shipment do not exceed fifty dollars in aggregate retail value in the country of shipment if such articles were purchased in or through authorized agencies of the Armed Forces of the United States.
3. Information. Pending issuance of detailed Treasury and Office of Secretary Defense Regulations on this matter, all personnel entitled to this privilege will inscribe clearly on the outer wrapping of all such gifts the following: "P.L. 89-368 VALUE NOT MORE THAN FIFTY DOLLARS". This statement is in addition to the customs declarations presently required.
4. Action. Commanders are requested to give wide dissemination of this Bulletin and insure its posting in all unit Post Offices.
5. Self-cancellation. 30 September 1966.

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 1
Case 2C

E. G. Glidden Jr.
E. G. GLIDDEN JR.
Deputy Chief of Staff

ENCLOSURE (6)

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO San Francisco 96602

ForBul 005440

3/jfc

Ser:

16 May 1966

0057066

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FORCE BULLETIN 005440

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: III MAF Task Organization/Troop List (U)

Ref: (a) III MAF/SA I Corps Order 3121.1C
(b) CG III MAF ltr 3/jfc over 5440 Ser 0043666 of 16Apr66

Encl: (1) III MAF April Task Organization/Troop List

1. Purpose. To promulgate the III MAF 30 April 1966 Task Organization/Troop List.
2. Background. Reference (a) requires subordinate units to submit by the 5th day of each month a report of their task organization/troop list based on operational control for the last day of the preceding month.
3. Information. Enclosure (1) contains the 30 April 1966 III MAF Task Organization/Troop List. Addressees are requested to review enclosure (1) and report changes to this Headquarters.
4. Self-cancellation. 30 June 1966.

E. G. Glidden Jr.

E. G. GLIDDEN JR.
Deputy Chief of Staff

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Case 1 (Less B)
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ENCLOSURE (7)

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ForBul 005440

16 May 1966

Task Organization/Troop List - April 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I. III Marine Amphibious Force	3070	46136	301	1976	16	6	51505
A. <u>HQ III MAF DANANG</u>	109	535	7	3	16	6	676
1. Headquarters	101	442	7	2			552
2. Sentry Dog Platoon	2	41					43
3. Scout Dog Platoon	1	40		1			42
4. 7th CI Team	5	12					17
5. Det, 41st Civil Affairs Co					16	6	22
a. Team #4 (QUANG TRI)					4	2	6
b. Team #5 (QUANG NGAI)					4	2	6
c. Team #10 (TAM KY)					4	1	5
d. Team #16 (DA NANG)					4	1	5
B. <u>Base Defense Bn (DANANG)</u>	29	874	3	52			958
1. 1st Bn, 9th Marines	29	874	3	52			958
C. <u>5TH Comm Bn (-)(Rein), FMF (DANANG)</u>	27	690	1	10			728
1. 5th Comm Bn (-)	27	668	1	10			706
2. Det H&S Co III MAF		22					22
D. <u>7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein)</u>	35	1040	2	16			1093
1. 7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)	32	963	2	16			1013
a. 7th Engr Bn (-)	27	813	2	16			858

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ForBul 005440
16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
b. 1st Bridge Co (-)	5	150					155
2. Det, 7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein) (CHU LAI)	3	77					80
a. Det, 7th Engr Bn	3	72					75
b. Det, 1st Bridge Co		5					5
E. <u>9th MT Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	22	398	2	10			432
F. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st Anglico</u>	4	44	6				54
1. DaNang		4	1				5
2. Saigon	1	16	1				18
3. Quang Ngai	1	2					3
4. Pleiku		3	1				4
5. Qui Nhon	1	2					3
6. Beria	1	3					4
7. Binh Hoa		3	1				4
8. Can Tho		3	1				4
9. Ca Mau		2					2
10. Nha Trang		3	1				4
11. Ham Tan		3					3
G. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st Radio Bn</u>	4	164		6			174
1. Hq 2d Plat (DANANG)	3	104		6			113
2. 1st Plat (CHU LAI)	1	47					48
3. Det, 3d Plat (PHU BAI)		3					3
4. Det, 3d Plat (QUANG NGAI)		10					10

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ForBul 003440

16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H. <u>1st Marine Division (-)(Rein)</u> <u>(CHU LAI)</u>	639	11635	105	646			13025
1. <u>HqBn (Rein)</u>	150	1368	23	45			1586
a. HqBn							
b. 1st Dental Co (-)							
c. 7th CIT (-)							
d. 9th ITT							
e. Det 3d ITT							
f. 2nd SSC Tm							
g. 1st ITT							
2. <u>1st Marines (-)(Rein)</u>	80	1897	8	91			2076
a. HqCo (-)							
b. 3d Bn (-)							
c. 2ndBn, 5th Mar (-)							
3. <u>7th Marines</u>	101	3017	12	148			3278
a. HqCo							
b. 1stBn							
c. 2ndBn							
d. 3dBn							
4. <u>Chu Lai Defense Command</u>	8	310					318
a. Det, H&SCo, 3dBn, 1stMar							
b. Co K, 3dBn, 1st Mar							
c. Co F, 2dBn, 5th Mar							

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16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
5. <u>11th Marines (-)(Rein)</u>	120	1816	13	35			1984
a. HqBtry (-)							
b. 3d 155MM Gun Btry (6-155 Gun (SP))							
c. 1stBn (-)(Rein)(12-105 How)							
(1) HqBtry (-)							
(2) Btry C							
(3) Btry E 2d Bn							
d. 4thBn (-)(Rein)(6-155 How TD, 8-155 How SP, 3-8" How SP)							
(1) HqBtry							
(2) Btry K							
(3) Btry M							
(4) 3d 8" HOW Btry (SP)							
6. <u>1st Recon Bn (-)</u>	29	410	2	31			472
a. H&S Co (-)							
b. Co A (-)							
c. Co C							
d. Co D							
e. 1st ForRecon Co (-)							

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
7. <u>1st AT Bn (-)(26 ONIOS)</u>	19	302	1	5			327
a. H&S Co (-)							
b. Co A							
c. Co C							
8. <u>1st TKBn (-)(34-M48 Tks, 9-M67 Flame Tks)</u>	32	538	1	13			564
a. H&S Co							
b. Co A							
c. Co C							
9. <u>1st MT Bn (-)</u>	13	200	2	7			222
a. H&S CO (-)							
b. Co A (-)							
c. Co C							
10. <u>1st Engr Bn (-)(Rein)</u>	23	525	1	9			558
a. HqCo (-)							
b. Spt Co (-)							
c. Co A (-)							
d. Co C							
e. Det 1st Bridge Co							
11. <u>1st Med Bn (-)</u>	3	106	30	175			314
a. H&S Co (-)							
b. Co A							

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
c. Co C							
d. Co D							
12. <u>1st SP Bn (-)</u>	20	278	2	20			320
a. H&S Co (-)							
b. Co A (-)							
c. Co C							
13. <u>3d AmTrac Bn (-)(56-LVTP-5)</u>	24	502	2	11			539
a. H&S Co (-)							
b. Co A (Rein)							
14. <u>7th MT Bn</u>	17	357	1	7			382
a. H&S Co							
b. Co A							
c. Co B							
d. Co C							
e. Transport Co							
15. <u>1st Hosp Co (-)</u>		29	7	49			85
I. <u>3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), F</u>	915	18957	217	2215			20996
1. <u>HqBn (-)(DANANG)</u>	127	563	6	24			720
a. HqCo	127	563	6	24			720
b. Comm Co (-)	8	346					354
c. Serv Co	18	317					335

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16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
d. MP Co (-)	6	104		1			111
e. 3D CIT	2	7					9
f. 3d ITT	2	4					6
2. <u>3d Marines (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	80	2157	8	117			2362
a. HqCo	17	253	2	5			277
b. 1st Bn, 3d Marines (Rein)	34	995	3	60			1092
(1) 1stBn, 3dMar	31	894	3	52			980
(2) Co D, 1stBn, 1stMar	3	101		8			112
c. 2dBn, 3dMar	29	909	3	52			993
3. <u>4thMar (-)(Rein)(PHU BAI)</u>	215	5291	27	316			5849
a. HqCo	19	216	2	4			241
b. Det, HqBn	6	57					63
c. Det, 3d ITT	1	3					4
d. Det, 3d CIT	1	3					4
e. 1stBn, 1stMar (-)	29	844	4	53			930
f. 2dBn, 1stMar	29	956	3	56			1044
g. 1stBn, 4thMar	25	714	3	52			794
h. 3dBn, 4thMar	28	978	3	48			1057
i. 3dBn(-)(Rein), 12thMar	48	772	5	14			839
(1) HqBtry (Rein)	12	155	4	14			185
(2) Btry H (6-105mm How)	6	97					103
(3) Btry I (6-105mm How)	7	117					124
(4) Btry C, 1stBn, 12thMar (6-105mm How)	6	93	1				100

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ForBul 005440
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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(5) Btry B, 1stBn, 11th Mar (6-105mm How)	9	120					129
(6) Mortar Btry, 1stBn 11thMar (6-107mm How)	4	83					87
(7) Btry M, 4thBn, 12thMar (6-155mm How Sp 6-155mm How Towed)	4	107					111
j. Co B, 3d MT Bn	3	104		1			108
k. Prov Recon Group Bravo	5	135		7			147
l. Co C (Rein), 3d TKBn (17 M48A3 Tks, 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)	7	134		2			143
m. Co B (-)(Rein), 3d ATBn (10 M50A1 ONTOS)	5	96		2			103
n. Co A, 3d Med Bn		18	7	68			93
o. Co B 3d Engr Bn (Rein)	4	146		2			152
p. Co A (Rein) 3d Shore Party Bn	5	115		7			127
4. <u>9th Marines (-)(Rein)(DA NANG)</u>	137	3979	15	210			4341
a. HqCo	16	252	3	8			279
b. 2dBn, 9thMar	29	919	3	54			1005
c. 3dBn, 9thMar	34	981	3	52			1070
d. 3dBn, 3dMar	31	952	3	48			1034
e. 2dBn, 4thMar	24	875	3	48			953
5. <u>12th Marines (-)(Rein)(DA NANG)</u>	129	1918	14	23			2114
a. HqBtry (-)(2-CMRS)	24	221	4	4			253
b. 1st 8" HowBtry (SP) (6-8" How)	9	197	2				208

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ForBul 005440
16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
c. 1stBn (-)(Rein), 12thMar	48	517	4	11			580
(1) HqBtry	16	157	4	3			180
(2) Btry A (6-105mm How)	8	92		2			102
(3) Btry A, 1stBn, 11thMar (6-105mm How)	9	106		2			117
(4) Btry B (6-105mm How)	10	94		2			106
(5) 107mm Mortar Btry (6- 4.2 Mortar & 6-107mm Mortar)	5	68		2			75
d. 2dBn, 12thMar	42	518	4	9			573
e. 4th Bn (-), 12thMar	26	465		9			500
(1) HqBtry	10	119		3			132
(2) Btry K, 4thBn, 12thMar (6-155mm How SP & 6-155mm How Towed)	5	100		2			107
(3) Btry L, 4thBn, 12thMar (6-155mm How SP & 6- 155mm How Towed)	6	107		2			115
(4) 1st 155mm GunBtry (SP) FMF (6-155mm Guns)	5	139		2			146
6. <u>3d Recon Bn (DA NANG)</u>	15	263	1	14			293
a. H&S Co	11	104	1	5			121
b. Co A		22		2			24
c. Co C	2	72		3			77
d. Co D	2	65		4			71
7. <u>3d Anti-tank Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	17	349		12			368
a. H&S Co (-)	10	170		8			188

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ForBul 005440
16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
b. Co A (Rein)(15 M50A1 ONTOS)	3	91		2			96
c. Co C (Rein)(20 M50A1 ONTOS)	4	88		2			94
8. <u>3d Tank Bn (-)(Rein)(DA NANG)</u>	34	555	1	11			601
a. H&S Co (-)(2 M48A3 Tks)	18	286	1	8			313
b. Co A (-)(Rein)(17 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)	7	126		1			134
c. Co B (Rein)(17 M48A3 Tks & 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)	9	143		2			154
9. <u>1st AmTrac Bn (-)(Rein), FME (DANANG)</u>	34	731	2	14			781
a. H&S Co (11 LVTP5, 4 LVTR-1, 8 LVTE-1, 6 LVTH-6)	19	316	2	14			351
b. Co A (42 LVTP5, 3 LVTC1, 1 LVTR1)		204					211
c. Co B (42 LVTP5, 3 LVTC1, 1 LVTR1)	8	211					219
10. <u>3d Engr Bn (-)(Rein)(DA NANG)</u>	28	734	2	16			780
a. H&S Co	12	142	2	16			172
b. Supt Co	4	269					273
c. Co A	4	80					84
d. Co C	5	140					145
e. Co, 7th Engr Bn	3	103					106
11. <u>1st Shore Party Bn (-)(DA NANG)</u>	19	284	1	22			326
a. H&S Co	11	145	1	12			169
b. Co B	4	69		5			78

ENCLOSURE (1)

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ForBul 005440
16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
c. Co C	4	70		5			79
12. <u>3d MT Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	16	242		8			266
a. H&S Co	5	64		8			77
b. Co A	6	86					92
c. Co C	5	92					97
13. <u>3d Med Bn (-) (DANANG)</u>	3	109	24	180			316
a. H&S Co	3	109	11	34			157
b. Co C			5	52			57
c. Co D			6	50			56
d. Co B			2	44			46
14. <u>3d Dental Co (-)</u>			16	38			54
a. DANANG			13	34			47
b. PHU BAI			3	4			7
J. <u>1st Marine Aircraft Wing</u>	1154	9275	51	166			10646
1. <u>MWHG-1 (DANANG)</u>	266	2400	22	69			2757
a. H&HS-1 (DANANG)	142	852	12	29			1035
b. MASS-2 (DANANG)	22	138					160
(1) Det A (CHU LAI)	4	16					20
(2) Det B (DANANG)	3	13					16
(3) Det C (PHU BAI)	4	31					35
(4) Det D (DONG HA)	4	11					15
(5) DASC (CHU LAI)	5	30					35
c. MAGS-7 (CHU LAI)	23	250		3			276

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ForBul 005440
16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(1) Det A (PHU BAI)	2	18					20
d. 1st LAAM Bn (DANANG)	25	522	1	10			558
e. 2d LAAM Bn (CHU LAI)	32	519	1	10			562
f. 11th Dental Co			8	17			25
2. <u>MAG-11 (DANANG)</u>	196	1882	6	24			2108
a. H&MS-11 (2-C117D, 1 UC-45J)	42	421					463
b. MARS-11	18	521	2	22			563
c. VMFA-115 (15-F4B)	40	276	1	1			318
d. VMFA-542 (15-F4B)	39	262	1	1			303
e. VTF(AW)-235 (15-F8E)	23	202	1				226
f. VMGJ-1 (7-MF-10B, 5-RF-8A)	34	200	1				235
3. <u>MAG-12 (CHU LAI)</u>	192	1832	7	21			2052
a. H&MS-12 (1-C117D)	46	454					500
b. MARS-12	25	651	3	19			698
c. VMA-211 (20-A4E)	28	168	1	1			198
d. VMA-223 (20-A4E)	27	157	1	1			186
e. VMA-224 (20-A4E)	33	155	1				189
f. VMA-311 (20-A4C)	26	174	1				201
g. MATCU-67	7	73					80
4. <u>MAG-16 (MARBLE MTN)</u>	271	1762	10	25			2068
a. H&MS-16 (1-C117D)	20	317					337
b. Det H&MS-16 (8-CH-37C)	11	62		1			74

ENCLOSURE (1)

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ForBul 005440

16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
c. MABS-16	14	471	4	8			497
d. Det MABS-16 (PHU BAI)		12					12
e. Det MABS-16 (TAM KY)		2					2
f. Det MABS-16 (QUANG TRI)		2					2
g. HMM-161 (24-UH-34D)	45	167	1	3			216
h. HMM-163 (PHU BAI) (24 UH34)	47	169	2	3			221
i. HMM-164 (24-CH46)	53	178	1	3			235
j. HMM-263 (24-UH34D)	43	165		2			211
k. VMO-2 (20-UH1E)	31	151	1	5			188
l. MATCU-68 (PHU BAI)	7	66					73
5. <u>MAG-36 (KY HA)</u>	229	1399	6	27			1661
a. H&MS-36 (1-C117D)	35	320					355
b. MABS-36	12	448	4	24			488
c. HMM-361 (24-UH34D)	49	168					217
d. HMM-362 (24-UH34D)	47	164	1	3			215
e. HMM-363 (24-UH34D)	51	162	1				214
f. VMO-6 (20-UH1E)	35	137					172
K. <u>Force Logistic Command</u>	137	520	7	51			315
1. <u>Headquarters FLC (DANANG)</u>	11	19					30
a. SU #1 H&SCo III MAF	11	19					30
2. <u>Force Logistic Support Group</u>	75	2199	4	36			2314
<u>Alpha/3dSvcbn (Rein)</u>							
a. H&S Co (DANANG)	25	381	3	11			420
		13					

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ForBul 005440
16 May 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USN</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
b. Supply Co (DANANG)	21	869	1	20			911
c. Maint Co (DANANG)	9	387					396
d. Truck Co (DANANG)	5	225					230
e. Force Logistic Support Unit #2 (PHU BAI)	15	337		5			357
3. <u>Force Logistic Support Group</u> <u>Bravo/1stSvobn (Rein)(CHU LAI)</u>	51	1310	3	15			1379
a. H&S Co	19	201	2	6			228
b. Supply Co	16	524	1	9			550
c. Maint Co	13	421					434
d. Truck Co	3	164					167

ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
C/O FPO San Francisco 96602

3/jfc
3700
8 May 1966

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From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: CH-46A Capability to lift 105mm Howitzer

- Encl: (1) Mileage vs Temperature Chart for 105mm Howitzer (4980 lbs)
(2) Mileage vs Temperature Chart for 105mm Howitzer without Flash Shields (4720 lbs)
(3) Mileage vs Temperature Chart for 105mm Howitzer when broken down into carriage (3420 lbs), Tube and Recoil Mechanism (1300 lbs), and Flash Shield (260 lbs)

1. Enclosures (1) through (3) are furnished for information and planning guidance.


J. R. CHAISSON
By direction

DISTRIBUTION:
CG, 1st MarDiv (30)
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ENCLOSURE (8)

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MILEAGE vs TEMPERATURE CHART FOR 105mm HOWITZER (4980 LBS)

Temp. °F/°C =	70 ⁰ /22 ⁰	75 ⁰ /24 ⁰	80 ⁰ /27 ⁰	85 ⁰ /29 ⁰	90 ⁰ /32 ⁰	95 ⁰ /35 ⁰	100 ⁰ /38 ⁰
Dist.(Miles) =	75	75	61	45	21	2	--
NOTE (1) (3) (4)							
Dist.(Miles) =	150	150	122	90	42	4	--
NOTE (2) (3) (4)							
MAXIMUM EXTERNAL LOAD. NOTE (5)	4980	4980	4980	4980	4980	4980	

- NOTES: (1) Return to Pickup Zone for fuel.
 (2) Refuel at Drop Zone.
 (3) Distances are valid when Pickup Zones and/or Drop Zones are at 500 feet above sea level or less.
 (4) Aircraft does not carry any automatic weapons or ammo.
 (5) The 105mm Howitzer, when ready for lift, can not have ammo, tool kits or other extras strapped to gun or carriage.

Enclosure (1)

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MILEAGE vs TEMPERATURE CHART FOR 105mm HOWITZER
(WITHOUT FLASH SHIELDS (4720 LBS))

Temp. $^{\circ}\text{F}/^{\circ}\text{C}$ =	70 ⁰ /22 ⁰	75 ⁰ /24 ⁰	80 ⁰ /27 ⁰	85 ⁰ /29 ⁰	90 ⁰ /32 ⁰	95 ⁰ /35 ⁰	100 ⁰ /38 ⁰
Dist. (Miles) = NOTE (1) (3) (4)	75	75	64	45	33	14	--
Dist. (Miles) = NOTE (2) (3) (4)	150	150	128	90	66	28	--
MAXIMUM EXTERNAL LOAD. NOTE (5) (6)	4720	4720	4720	4720	4720	4720	

- NOTES:
- (1) Return to Pickup Zone.
 - (2) Refuel at Drop Zone.
 - (3) Distances are valid when Pickup Zones and/or Drop Zones are at 500 feet above sea level or less.
 - (4) Aircraft does not carry automatic weapons or ammo.
 - (5) The 105mm Howitzer when ready for lift, can not have ammo, tool kits, or other extras strapped to gun or carriage.
 - (6) The flash shield will be carried internally on another aircraft.

Enclosure (2)

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MILEAGE vs TEMPERATURE CHART FOR 105mm HOWITZER
WHEN BROKEN DOWN INTO CARRIAGE (3420 LBS),
TUBE AND RECOIL MECHANISM (1300 LBS),
AND FLASH SHIELD (260 LBS)

Temp. $^{\circ}\text{F}/^{\circ}\text{C}$	= 70 ⁰ /22 ⁰	75 ⁰ /24 ⁰	80 ⁰ /27 ⁰	85 ⁰ /29 ⁰	90 ⁰ /32 ⁰	95 ⁰ /35 ⁰	100 ⁰ /38 ⁰	105 ⁰ /41 ⁰	110 ⁰ /44 ⁰
Dist. (Miles) =	75	75	75	75	75	42	24	12	2
NOTE (1) (3) (4)									
Dist. (Miles) =	150	150	150	150	150	84	48	24	4
NOTE (2) (3) (4)									
MAXIMUM EXTERNAL LOAD	3420	3420	3420	3420	3420	3420	3420	3420	3420
LOAD NOTE (5)									
WEIGHTS:									
TUBE		973							
W/RECOIL		1300)							
FLASH GUARD		260)	1560	NOTE (6)					
CARRIAGE W/WHEELS			3420						

- NOTES: (1) Return to Pickup Zone for Fuel.
 (2) Refuel at Drop Zone.
 (3) Distances are valid when Pickup Zones and/or Drop Zones are at 500 feet above sea level or less.
 (4) Aircraft does not carry any automatic weapons or ammo.
 (5) The 105mm Howitzer carriage, when ready for lift, can not have ammo, tool kits, or other extras strapped to the carriage.
 (6) The tube, recoil mechanism and flash shield are lifted as an internal load in another aircraft.

Enclosure (3)

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Instructions for Operating the Mity Mite Portable Blower (U)I. (U) Scope

This manual is published for personnel responsible for the operation of the Mity Mite portable blower. It contains a description of the unit and its functions and instructions on its operation.

Any suggestions or problems concerning the maintenance, repair, or operation of the unit should be forwarded to: Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal, ATTN: Directorate of Weapons Systems, CRDL, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland 21010.

II. (C) Use

The Mity Mite portable blower can be used to:

1. Force the evacuation of unmasked personnel from a tunnel system with CS burning grenades.
2. Discourage entry into a tunnel with CS 1 powder.
3. Locate all entrances and vents of a tunnel system with CS and/or colored smoke grenades.
4. Generate an agent cloud for use against unmasked personnel in the open with CS 1 powder.

III. (U) Description

The Mity Mite is an agricultural backpack sprayer-duster which is manufactured by the Buffalo Turbine Agricultural Equipment Company. It is powered by a two-cycle gasoline engine and has an axial flow blower which displaces 450 cubic feet of air per minute. It weighs 25 pounds without fuel or agent. The fuel tank holds approximately one gallon of a gasoline-oil mixture which will permit operation in excess of two hours without refueling. The various parts are shown in figures 1 and 2.

The unit can be equipped with either a 6 foot long brown flexible duct or a 2 foot long black flexible tube with a metal nozzle on the end, each of which is 3 1/2" in diameter. Normally, the 2 foot tube will be used only when dispensing dry powder in the open, and the 6 foot duct will be used when attacking tunnels.

GROUP 4
DOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

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Liquid can also be dispensed with this unit, but no instructions are included in this manual for its use. The liquid valve near the bottom of the hopper should be closed (screwed out) at all times.

IV. (U) Operating Instructions, Maintenance, and Storage

1. Lubrication

a. A gasoline and oil mixture is required to operate the engine. Add 3/4 pint of SAE 30 oil to one gallon of 80 to 90 octane gasoline. Mix gasoline thoroughly with oil in a safety can, never in the fuel tank of the unit.

b. The gear box is the only specific point requiring lubrication on the unit. This should be kept filled to the removable 5/32" allenhead plug on the side of the gear box assembly, right below the muffler flange, with a non-foaming oil (the equivalent of SAE 10). This level of oil must be checked daily.

c. The plug at the base of the engine, below the muffler, serves no purpose on this unit, and requires no attention.

2. Starting and Stopping Engine

- a. Open fuel shut-off valve.
- b. Put ignition switch in "On" position.
- c. Pull choke out fully and open throttle (down)
- d. Crank engine with quick short pull. When engine fires, move choke to halfway position and, as engine warms, push choke in.
- e. To stop engine, put ignition switch in "Off" position.
- f. When engine is warm, it can be restarted with the throttle in idle position without rechoking.

3. Engine Air Filter

a. Air filter should be visually inspected and cleaned when necessary, but daily if powder is used.

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b. To clean, remove cover by turning captive nut and lift out filter. Sloss in clean gasoline and dry.

4. Spark Plug

a. Champion TJ - 8J or equivalent with the electrode gap 0.025 in.

b. If a spark plug wrench will not fit past the muffler, the muffler must be removed before the spark plug can be removed. This is accomplished by removing the adjustable muffler clamp and unscrewing the muffler from the engine by hand, if possible. If a wrench is used, care must be exercised to avoid damaging the thin shell of the muffler.

c. Use moderate torque only when installing a spark plug. Damage to the threads in the engine can result from excessive force.

5. Carburetor

a. Idle adjustment needle (marked LO) on side of carburetor chamber. Turn needle in carefully until it bears against the orifice and then back it out one full turn. Make final adjustment with engine idling.

b. Main mixture adjustment needle (marked HI) on side of carburetor. Turn needle in carefully until it bears against the orifice and then back it out one full turn. Make final adjustment with engine operating at 3/4 to full throttle.

6. Blower Screen

The engine should be stopped before any materials such as leaves or grass are removed from the wire screen covering the blower air intake. If such materials are not removed, the blower will not operate properly.

7. Use of Powder

When powder is used in the hopper, the liquid valve should be closed by turning fully counterclockwise (screwed out) and the dust control lever adjusted for the desired rate of application (lowering the lever increases the flow). The hopper cap must be closed tightly. After using powder, flush the hopper with water and leave open until dry.

8. Flexible Duct

a. To remove the flexible duct or tube, first loosen the clamp which holds it to the blower outlet.

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b. To install the flexible duct or tube, slip the clamp over the end of the duct and then position the hose on the blower outlet. Tighten clamp to hold the duct in place.

9. Repair of Hopper

A hole in the high density polyethylene hopper or outlet can be repaired by applying a piece of pressure sensitive, water resistant adhesive tape (FS #8135-663-0194) and pressing it firmly in place. The tape should be applied to the inside of the hopper, but to the outside of the outlet elbow.

10. Storage

If the unit is to be stored for more than one month, the following steps must be accomplished:

- a. Remove all fuel from the tank.
- b. Operate engine until residual fuel is exhausted.

V. (C) Operating Procedures

1. (C) Forced Evacuation of a Tunnel

When the Mity Mite is used to force the evacuation of unmasked personnel from a tunnel, air is directed through the flexible plastic duct into the tunnel opening which has been sealed with a large plastic sheet. CS is introduced into the tunnel by raising an edge of the plastic sheet and dropping burning CS grenades in the entrance at intervals. If a large tunnel system is encountered, more than one blower can be operated simultaneously at a tunnel entrance. A single plastic sheet can be used to seal an entrance with any number of flexible ducts in use.

The time required for an agent cloud to penetrate all portions of a tunnel system is dependent upon the number of blowers used, the size and length of the tunnel, and the number of entrances and vents which cannot be sealed. The cloud will travel through a typical tunnel with no branches at a speed of approximately 50 feet per minute (0.6 mph) when one blower is used. It is unlikely that any barriers will be encountered in a tunnel which the agent will not penetrate.

As the agent cloud traverses the tunnel system, some of it will escape from any other entrances or vents which are encountered. (If the white CS cloud is difficult to see, an occasional colored smoke grenade can be dropped in the tunnel entrance in addition to a CS grenade.) These openings should be closed, if possible, to prevent escape of the agent cloud from the tunnel, or additional blowers can be installed in them and operated as described above. The agent cloud should penetrate the entire tunnel complex even if all other entrances and vents are not closed, but the time required is increased.

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It is desirable to continue functioning grenades at the specified intervals as long as the blower is operating, but if this is not possible, the blower can be left untended and operating after any number of grenades have been functioned. In any event, the blower should remain operating until the entire tunnel system has been penetrated by the agent cloud.

Operating Procedure at Tunnel Entrance

- a. Place the blower on the ground approximately three to four feet from the edge of the hole.
- b. Place the end of the flexible duct in the tunnel entrance.
- c. Lay the plastic sheet over the entrance and on top of the flexible duct which is laying on the ground. Position the sheet so that the entrance hole and at least two feet of the duct are covered.
- d. Place a small amount of earth on the plastic sheet completely around the edge of the hole. Carefully push the sheet under the sides of the flexible duct and place some earth around it to hold it in place.
- e. Start the engine of the blower and set the throttle to run at maximum speed (See Operating Instructions). If the unit creeps on the ground because of vibration, place it on some loosened earth. Occasionally check the throttle setting.
- f. Don gas mask. While the blower is in continuous operation, remove the safety pin from a single M7 CS hand grenade. Lift one corner of the plastic sheet, drop or throw the grenade in the tunnel entrance, and reseal the hole by placing earth or any available object on the corner of the sheet that was raised.

Caution: Do not function a grenade less than three feet from the plastic sheet. Heat from the grenade could damage the plastic sheet if grenades are functioned closer than three feet.

g. If any of the agent cloud escapes from under the plastic sheet or around the duct, place more earth on the sheet at the points of leakage.

h. Every two to four minutes, function an additional M7 grenade in the tunnel entrance to produce a continuous incapacitating CS cloud in the tunnel.

Warning: Do not function M7 grenades at intervals of less than 2 minutes. A dangerous agent concentration could be produced, causing fatalities.

2. (C) Discourage Entry into a Tunnel

A lingering hazard can be produced in the tunnel entrance by using CS 1 in a dry powder form. The polyethylene hopper holds approximately 10 pounds of CS 1 which is dispensed through the outlet duct into the entrance (See Operating Instructions). This will produce heavy contamination of the tunnel surfaces near the entrance and will discourage entry by unprotected personnel for an undetermined period of time.

This operation can be performed in conjunction with the "Forced Evacuation of a Tunnel." procedure described previously merely by opening the duct control lever (pushing it down). Or, if desired, the two foot tube and nozzle can be installed on the blower outlet to direct CS 1 powder into the tunnel entrance without using a plastic sheet. The unit can be carried on the back during this latter operation.

3. (C) Locate All Entrances and Vents of a Tunnel System

To determine the extent of a tunnel system without producing a noxious cloud, follow the procedure described previously in "Forced Evacuation of a Tunnel," but use colored smoke grenades instead of CS grenades. Since a tunnel must have vents throughout its length, the location of the entire system can be determined.

4. (C) Generate a Cloud in the Open

CS 1 powder can be dispensed in any direction and at any desired concentration with the Mity Mite. The two foot long flexible tubes with nozzle is used for this operation. CS 1 is placed in the hopper and discharged through the nozzle at a speed of 185 mph. The agent concentration is controlled with the duct control lever, as described in the Operating Instructions. The unit can be operated in this manner while it is setting on the ground, mounted on a vehicle, or carried on the back.


VI. (U) Destruction to Prevent Enemy Use

When captured by or abandonment of the Mity Mite blower to an enemy is imminent, it can be made inoperative by various methods.

1. Use sledge hammer, crow bar, pick, axe, or any other heavy tools which may be available to destroy the following:

- a. The blower
- b. The gear box
- c. The engine cylinder

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d. The fuel tank

2. Other methods of destruction include:

- a. Explosives
- b. Incendiary grenades
- c. Small arms fire
- d. Burning

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HEADQUARTERS
 III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

7/gnc
 10 May 1966

COMMAND DIRECTORYFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u> <u>"PARCHMENT" OR</u> <u>AS INDICATED</u>	<u>RTD</u>
CG III MAF	LtGen	WALT, L. W.	6, DANANG 6100	6/67
Senior Aide	Maj	FRIEDRICHS, F. G.	13	9/67
Aide	*Capt	JOINER, R. K.	13	9/66
Aide	1stLt	WINDHAM, D. D. M.	13	8/66
Political Advisor	Mr.	THOMSEN, S. B.	DANANG 6293	7/66

CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION

Chief of Staff	BGen	PLATT, J. M.	5, DANANG 6383 or DANANG 6100	12/66
Dep Chief of Staff	Col	GLIDDEN, E. G. Jr.	32, DANANG 6383	6/66
Staff Secretary	Maj	CORRIVEAU, O. J.	38, DANANG 6100	8/66
Admin Asst to the Chief of Staff	2ndLt	EMMI, J. P.	38, DANANG 6100	3/67

G-1 SECTION

G-1	Col	GALBREAITH, D. W.	1	7/66
Asst G-1	LtCol	REDALEN, D. L.	101	9/66

G-2 SECTION

G-2	Col	FISHER, T. H.	2	8/66
Asst G-2	LtCol	NELSON, A. A. Jr.	2	2/67
Cmbt Intell Off	LtCol	PECK, W. H.	202	6/66
Asst Plans/Est Off	Maj	BAKER, W. H.	202	1/67
LNO/Plans/Est	Maj	BUCK, J. A.	202	6/66
Intell Specialist	Maj	HERBERT, C. G. COC	102	2/67
Force CI Off	Maj	BREWER, C. W.	702	11/66
OCF/SPL Intell Off	Maj	PURCILLY, J. C.	602	9/66
Asst Cmbt Intell Off	Capt	ARMSTRONG, S. A. COC	602	2/67
Target Off	Capt	CARROLL, J. T. COC	102	2/67
Asst Cmbt Intell Off	Capt	CERRETA, M. D. COC	102	5/67
Statistics Off	2ndLt	BATES, J. F.	602	8/66

ENCLOSURE (10)

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G-3 SECTION

G-3	Col	CHAISSON, J. R.	3	2/67
Opns Off	Col	WEGLEY, D. E.	103	7/66
Dep G-3	Col	WEST, R. E.	103	5/67
LNO	Col	WYCKOFF, D. P.	448 TIGER	6/66
LNO	LtCol	KEW, G. D.	448 TIGER	8/66
Opns Off-Air	LtCol	LUCAS, W. R.	103	9/66
Opns Off-Ground	LtCol	SCHARNBERG, G. R.	103	6/66
R&D Off	LtCol	WATSON, P. B. Jr.	503	11/66
Asst Opns Off/OIC	LtCol	WEBSTER, C. A.	403 COC	8/66
Asst Plans Off	Maj	EIDSON, R. E.	503	8/66
Asst Opns Off-Air	Maj	FIBICH, M. J.	103	2/67
Admin Off	Maj	MCCONNELL, W. M.	103	2/67
Asst PlansO/COC				
Watch Off	Maj	RAPP, J. M.	503	3/67
Trng Off/COC WatchO	Maj	ROBINETT, H. M.	103 COC	3/67
LNO KMC	LtCol	MYONG, IK PYO	124	
LNO 1st MarDiv	Maj	LANG, R.	503	11/66
LNO	Capt	CROWE, D. F.	448 TIGER	10/66
LNO	1stLt	FARMER, M. T.	448 TIGER	9/66
COC Watch Off	1stLt	MOORE, D. W.	203 COC	4/67

G-4 SECTION

G-4	Col	CIBIK, S. J.	4	2/67
Asst G-4	LtCol	SNAPPER, J. N.	4	3/67
Log Plans Off	LtCol	SKVARIL, W. J.	204/404	10/66
Log Opns Off	LtCol	ZLOGAR, A. J.	104	6/66
Asst LogOpns Off	LtCol	MCCOOL, W. G.	104	3/67
Asst LogOpns Off	Maj	DAVIS, L. O.	204	3/67
Asst LogPlansOff(A)	Maj	JOHNSON, L. E.	404	3/67
Asst LogPlansOff(G)	Maj	SCHMECK, K. W.	404	4/67

G-5 SECTION

G-5	Col	HOLMGRAIN, E. S.	301	2/67
Asst G-5	Col	FRIBOURG, L. F.	301	7/66
Asst G-5	LtCol	EVANS, D. L. Jr.	46	3/67
Med Advisor	LtCmdr	SANDERS, L. S.	401	10/66
CAO	Maj	MELCHER, P. F.	46	10/66
Rept Off	Capt	DOUGLAS, D. M.	46	3/67
Admin/Asst CAO	1stLt	GREMMELS, N. H.	301	3/67
PsyWar Officer	1stLt	MOSER, E. D.	401	6/66

G-6 SECTION

G-6	*Maj	ANDERSON, T. A.	103	2/67
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COMPTROLLER SECTION

Comptroller	Capt	VOIGT, W. A.	50	9/66
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SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

Special Services Off	Col	GORMAN, J. E.	37	8/66
Asst Spl Serv Off	Maj	SHERMAN, J. A. Jr.	37	2/67
Asst Spl Serv Off/ Custodian	1stLt	SMITH, L. H.	37	11/66
OIC China Beach	*1stLt	FOGELBERG, C. R.	MUTINY, ask for China Beach	8/66
OIC R&R Program	*1stLt	SCHNACKENBERG, F. J.	44/241	9/66

TRANS/EMBARK SECTION

Trans/Embr Off	Maj	CRIBB, G. F.	39	8/66
Asst Embr/Trans Off	Maj	FIGHTER, J. A.	304	2/67

ADJUTANT SECTION

Adjutant	LtCol	LUCAS, B. L. Jr.	7	7/66
Asst Adjutant	WO	OAKES, M. A.	7/207	5/67
S&C Officer	1stLt	AYERS, R. A.	107	12/66

REPRODUCTION SECTION

Reproduction Off	CWO-3	SPIKES, A. W.	307	3/67
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COMMAND CENTER

Director	LtCol	MCLENNAN, J. V.	105	6/66
Watch Off	Maj	GOWDY, R. J.	105	4/67
Watch Off	Capt	VAIL, A. L.	105	4/67
Watch Off	Capt	COLLINS, F. A.	105	4/67
Watch Off	1stLt	LUCKEY, S. A.	105	4/67

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

Officer in Charge	Col	FIELDS, T. M.	DANANG 6259	1/67
Asst FIO	Maj	STYLES, M. J.	DANANG 6259	10/66
OperO	Capt	SVEC, M. R.	DANANG 6259	10/66
PhotoO	2ndLt	CARPENTER, J. E.	DANANG 6259	7/66
Asst PressO	2ndLt	TUCKER, F. Jr.	DANANG 6259	8/66
PressO & EscortO	WO	SMITH, J. T.	DANANG 6259	6/66

CEO SECTION

CEO	Col	HILL, J. B.	10	4/67
Asst CEO	Maj	KYLE, D. N.	210	1/67
Asst CEO	Maj	ILLG, H. G.	410	6/66
Asst CEO	Maj	HULL, R. R.	310	3/67
Freq Coord	Capt	BORDERS, J. R.	310	5/67

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FOOD SERVICES SECTION

Food Services Officer LtCol	ROBERTS, H. G.	MOMENT 58	10/66
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HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY

Commanding Officer	Maj	PALONIS, A. J. Jr.	34	10/66
Executive Officer	Capt	BURKE, J. J.	134	5/67
Supply Officer	Capt	ASH, D. I.	221	12/66
Security Officer	Capt	SAENZ, O.	BEACH HOUSE	2/67
Motor Trans Off	1stLt	PEARCE, D. B.	135	4/67
Admin Off	CWO	WARD, G. B.	134	2/67
S-3	Capt	PRATHER, G. D.	221	6/66
S-4	1stLt	HANKINS, F. T.	221	7/66

LEGAL SECTION

Legal Officer	Col	PELTZER, V. A.	17	7/66
Law Officer, Navy-				
Marine Corps Judic-				
iary Activity RVN	LtCol	WANDER, W. W.	17	5/67

MEDICAL SECTION

Medical Officer	Capt	WULFMAN, W. A.	16	7/66
Asst Med Officer	Cmdr	GAY, L. W.	16	8/66

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Force Chaplain	Capt	GARRETT, P. L.	19	10/66
Asst Force Chap	Lt	RADASKY, R. M.	19	8/66

DENTAL SECTION

Force Dental Off	Capt	LOFGREEN, E. J.	40	7/66
Dental Admin Off	Lt	NEILL, G. S.	40	5/67

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

Motor Trans Officer	*LtCol	KILLIAM, F. W.	SHOVE 35	10/66
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ORDNANCE SECTION

Ordnance Off	Maj	BOWRON, W. F.	8	11/66
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PROTOCOL SECTION

Protocol Off	Maj	BROWN, R. H.	62, DANANG 6206	11/66
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PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

Provost Marshal	*Maj	HARDEE, L. H.	SHOVE 27	12/66
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ENGINEER SECTION

Engineer Off	LtCol	HARMON, L. G.	15	8/66
Asst Engr Off	LtCol	HETRICK, L. W.	15	9/66
Opns Off	Capt	INGELS, L. T.	15	4/67

DATA PROCESSING

Data Processing Off	*Capt	GORMAN, M. W.	KIT CARSON (DPP 16)	7/66
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SUPPLY SECTION

Supply Officer	Col	TAFT, H. G.	21	8/66
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HEADQUARTERS FLC

Commanding Officer	Col	AXTELL, G. C. Jr.	PITCHBLEND 6	10/66
G-1	Maj	FIELD, H. J. Jr.	PITCHBLEND 1	4/67
G-2/Comptroller	LtCol	OLSON, W. C.	PITCHBLEND 50	9/66
G-3	LtCol	NELSON, W. L.	PITCHBLEND 3	12/66
Asst G-3	LtCol	TAFT, L. C.	PITCHBLEND 102	4/67
Asst G-3	Maj	HODGE, W. K.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
Asst G-3	Maj	SKAGERBERG, A. E.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
Asst G-3	Capt	HOLT, J. M.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
Asst G-3	Capt	KOSTELECKY, J. R.	PITCHBLEND 203	5/67
CEO	Maj	GOTT, A. T.	PITCHBLEND 101	5/67
Asst G-3	1stLt	SMITH, C. W. Jr.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
G-4	LtCol	COOK, R. M.	PITCHBLEND 4	4/67
Asst G-4	Maj	KNOBEL, W. H.	PITCHBLEND 4	4/67
Adjutant	Maj	JOHANSEN, C.	PITCHBLEND 7	4/67
Personnel Off	Maj	KENT, J. A.	PITCHBLEND 101	4/67
S&C Off	2ndLt	CRAIG, T. P.	PITCHBLEND 50	4/67

DANANG REPRESENTATIVE, NAVFORV STAFF

Real Prop Off	LtCol	LANGLEY, C. F.	DANANG 6257	8/66
Asst N-6	Maj	CANDLER, D. G. Jr.	DANANG 6257	9/66
Asst Real Prop Off	Capt	HAMBY, R. L.	DANANG 6257	2/67

* Denotes additional, joint, or attached duty.

Report errors, changes, and/or omissions to the Force Adjutant, PARCHMENT 7.

B. L. Lucas, Jr.
 B. L. LUCAS, Jr.
 LtCol USMC
 Force Adjutant

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