


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
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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG IIMAF/MACV ltr 3/df over 3480
Ser 0087066 of 18Jul66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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3480
Ser: 0087066
18 July 1966

[REDACTED] - Unclassified when basic material is removed

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG, FMFPac msg 251942Z Aug 65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for May 1966.

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

E. G. Glidden Jr.
E. G. GLIDDEN JR.
Deputy Chief of Staff

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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY


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
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PART ONE ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART TWO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART THREE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
PART FOUR ENCLOSURES

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PART ONEORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDING

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR PERIOD 1 MAY - 31 MAY 1966

CHIEF OF STAFF	MGEN JONAS M. PLATT, USMC
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	COL ELMER G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1	COL DON W. GALBREATH, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2	COL JOHN E. GORMAN, USMC (1-3 MAY) COL THELL H. FISHER, USMC (4-30 MAY)
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3	COL JOHN R. CHAISSON, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4	COL STEVE J. CIBIK, USMC (1-20 MAY) COL JOHN F. QUINBY JR, USMC (21-30 MAY)
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5	COL ERIC S. HOLMGREN, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6	MAJ TILTON A. ANDERSON, USMC
SUPPLY OFFICER	COL HOWARD G. TAFT, USMC
FORCE ENGINEER OFFICER	LTCOL LESTER G. HARMON, USMC
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OFFICER	COL JAKE B. HILL, USMC
ADJUTANT	LTCOL BURTON L. LUCAS JR, USMC
COMPTROLLER	CAPT WILSON A. VOIGHT, USMC
CHAPLAIN	CAPT FRANCIS L. GARRETT, USN
COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU	COL THOMAS M. FIELDS, USMC

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DIRECTOR, COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER

DIRECTOR, COMMAND CENTER

FOOD SERVICE OFFICER

LEGAL OFFICER

SURGEON

MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER

ORDNANCE OFFICER

PROTOCOL OFFICER

PROVOST MARSHAL

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

TRANSPORTATION/EMBARKATION OFFICER

SUBORDINATE UNITS

3D MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

7TH ENGINEER BATTALION (RRIN)

9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION

5TH COMMUNICATIONS BATTALION

SUB UNIT # 1, FIRST RADIO BATTALION

LTCOL CHARLES A. WEBSTER, USMC (1-23MAY)

MAJ EVAN L. PARKER, USMC (24-31MAY)

LTCOL JOSEPH V. MCLERNON, USMC

LTCOL HENRY G. ROBERTS, USMC

COL VERNON A. FELTZER, USMC

CAPT WILLIAM A. WOLFMAN, USN

LTCOL EDWIN W. KILLIAN, USMC

MAJ WALTER F. BOWRON, USMC

MAJ RALPH H. BROWN, USMC

MAJ LEE H. HARDEE, USMC

COL EDWIN G. WINSTEAD, USMC (1-2MAY)

COL JOHN F. GORMAN, USMC (3-31MAY)

MAJ GEORGE P. CRIBB, USMC

COMMANDERS

MGEN WOOD B. KYLER, USMC

MGEN LEWIS J. MURPHY, USMC

MGEN KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON, (1-15MAY)

MGEN LOUIS B. ROBERTSHAW, (16-31MAY)

COL GEORGE C. AXTELL, USMC

LTCOL JOSHUA W. DORSEY III, USMC

LTCOL BRUCE L. LESKER, USMC

MAJ JOSEPH E. JONES, USMC

LTCOL HERCULES R. KELLY, (1-30MAY)

LTCOL JOSEPH NASTASI, (31MAY)

CAPT RUSSELL W. RADLER, USMC

[REDACTED]

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HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY

MAJ ANTHONY J. PALONIS JR, USMC

SUB UNIT # 1, 1ST ANGLICO

LTCOL CARROLL B. BURCH, USMC

SENTRY DOG PLATOON

LT LEONARD E. OLIVER, USMCR

SCOUT DOG PLATOON

LT ROBERT V. WILDER, USMCR

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PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During May 1966, III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at Coordinates (AT 993754), which is 550 meters west of Danang Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, and adjacent to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Post. All forces under operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone with the exception of AMBICO detachments that were operating in all four CTZ's. III MAF decreased in average personnel strength from 58,815 to 52,712 during May, with 54,308 on hand at the end of the period.

B. Activities. III MAF continued operations in the accomplishment of the objectives as established by reference (e), COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966.

II. OPERATIONS

A. General. The continuing objective of destruction of VC/NVA forces was accomplished during the month by conducting ten major operations outside and two within the TAORs. The majority of contacts with enemy forces was by small unit action. III MAF elements destroyed VC forces, numerous bunkers, tunnels, fortifications, booby traps, areas of refuge, and confiscated large caches of rice.

B. Operation VIRGINIA. A Battalion Reconnaissance in Force operation was conducted during 17 April through 1 May. The area of operations centered around the Khe Sanh SF/CIDG camp in the western portion of Quang Tri Province. During Phase I elements of the battalion conducted sweeps with no contact. Phase II of Operation Virginia consisted of a reconnaissance in force on Route 9 from Khe Sanh to Dong Ha. VC Casualties for the operation were 1 VC KIA (PROB).

C. Operation Georgia. A battalion search and destroy operation in progress since 21 April terminated on 10 May. The center of the area of operations was located 20 miles southwest of Danang Air Base, the area bounded by the Nui Duong Thong hills to the south, the Song Vu Gia to the north, GL (AT 80) to the west, and GL (BT 01) to the east; an area encompassing about 350 square kilometers. The mission continued to be destroy VC forces and installations, open the area to GVN influence, assist rural construction, and provide rural harvest assistance. The battalion tactics consisted chiefly of multi-company sweeps toward on platoon or company in blocking positions. It is significant that of the total VC casualties, 50 VC KIA and 100 VC KIA (PROB) were achieved by artillery fire missions called by recon observation posts and infantry units during which time these units did not physically close with the enemy. Total VC casualties were 103 KIA and 164 KIA (PROBABLE).

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D. Operation CHEROKEE. A regimental size search and destroy operation with three infantry battalions plus an artillery battalion was conducted 5-7 May. Area of operations was 12 miles northwest of Hue in an area bounded to the north by route # 1, to the south by Nui Ong Gia hills and to the east by the Song Bo. The purpose of the operation was to destroy enemy personnel and installations. Two battalions swept to the southeast with one USMC battalion in blocking position along the Nui Ong Gia and Nui Dong hills and one ARVN battalion blocking to north and east. Contact was light with final VC casualties totalling 9 VC KIA and 17 VC KIA (PROB).

E. Operation MONTGOMERY. A regimental size search and destroy operation in conjunction with ARVN units was initiated on 9 May and terminated on 14 May. Area of operations located in Quang Ngai Province 17 miles south of Chu Lai airfield, in an area adjacent to and north of the Song Tra Khuc and east of mid line (BS 40). The purpose of the operation was to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies, and equipment located in area of operations. Two battalions swept east from west side of zone while one battalion blocked to the northeastern portion of the area of operations. The regiment inflicted VC casualties mainly through small unit contacts. VC casualties for the operation were 53 KIA and 39 KIA (PROB).

F. Operation WAYNE. A regimental size search and destroy operation with two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion was conducted from 10-12 May. Area of operations was in Thua Thien Province nine miles southeast of Hue Phu Bai airfield, a mile to southeast and outside of the Phu Bai TAMR. Purpose of the operation was to destroy or capture enemy forces, installations, and material in area of operations. One battalion was helilifted to the western portion of the zone, to sweep east while another battalion entered the northern sector of the area to sweep south with one company blocking to the southeast. The battalions had sporadic contact with operations shifting to patrols and ambushes until termination of the operation. VC casualties totaled 5 VC KIA.

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G. Operation YUMA. Battalion size search and destroy operation was conducted during 16-17 May. Location of operational area was the hamlet of Tan Phuoc (4) in Quang Ngai Province nine miles directly south of Chu Lai Airfield. Purpose of the operation was to locate and destroy enemy installations in area. The battalions cordoned the village and conducted sweeps for one and a half days with very light contact. A pathfinder team moving to the helicopter landing zone prior to the operation inflicted all the VC casualties of Operation YUMA by ambushing a VC column. Total VC casualties for the operation was 6 VC KIA.

H. Operation MORGAN. A battalion size search and destroy operation in conjunction with ARVN elements was conducted from 20-22 May in Quang Ngai Province in an area 11 miles south of Chu Lai airfield, adjacent to the north bank of the Song Tra Bong and east of Suoi Sau; an area of about 2 square kilometers. The battalion units commenced sweeping the area making no physical contact with the enemy. County Fair was conducted throughout 21 May. Thirty VN were medically treated, 53 VN received dental care, 1650 meals were served, 800 VN magazines distributed; and 5 psychological warfare movies were presented while aircraft broadcasted messages and dropped leaflets. It is note worthy that all VC casualties were inflicted by aircraft or arty. Total VC casualties for the operation were 2 VC KIA and 21 KIA (PROB).

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I. Operation CHEYENNE. A one day search and destroy operation was conducted by one Marine battalion in conjunction with an ARVN battalion on 24 May in Quang Tin Province 12 miles northwest of Chu Lai airfield. The area of operations was approximately 12 square kilometers and located along the sea coast. The purpose of the operation was to locate and destroy enemy personnel. Battalions swept northwest apprehending 1 VCS.

J. Operation ATHENS. A battalion size search and destroy operation was conducted from 25 May through the end of the reporting period. The area of operations was located southeast of and adjacent to the Phu Bai TAOR. The purpose of the operation was to conduct extensive patrol and ambush activity to prevent enemy movement through the area and to intercept enemy forces attempting to attack villages and other installations along highway 1. At the end of the reporting period the VC casualties were 10 KIA and 4 KIA (PROB).

K. Operations MOBILE. A battalion size search and destroy operation was conducted during 25-28 May in Quang Ngai Province eight miles southeast of Chu Lai airfield on peninsula formed by South China Sea and Song Tra Bay. Purpose of the operation was to locate and destroy enemy forces, equipment and facilities in zone. Battalion elements swept zone with two companies conducting amphibious landings, one company helilifting into zone, and one company moving to area of operations overland. VC casualties were 15 KIA and 25 KIA (PROB).

L. Operation RENO. A battalion size operation commenced on 30 May and continued through the end of reporting period. Operating area for RENO was defined as the area of a circle with a 10KM radius centered at Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province. There were no VC Casualties at end of period.

M. Operation CHEYENNE II. A battalion size search and destroy operation in conjunction with ARVN forces was conducted on 31 May. The area of operation was 12 miles northwest of Chu Lai airfield along the coast; an area of about 12 square kilometers. Purpose of the operation was to destroy or capture enemy personnel, facilities, and material. Elements of the battalion swept southeast. During the operations 21 VC were captured, 8 VC were WIA.

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SECRETN. Other Operations

1. Operation OSAGE. 27 Apr - 2 May, was an amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF in the Phu Loc area (AC 0800). BMT 1/5 was committed to the search and destroy operation with a concurrent mission of harvest protection within the area of operations. III MAF supported the amphibious task force with fixed wing and other support as required and was ready to assume OpCon in event control was passed ashore. Enemy contact was negligible. The operation cost the VC 8 confirmed and 3 estimated dead.

2. County Fair Operation (9 May). Two USMC companies in conjunction with two companies of the 1/51st ARVN conducted a County Fair operation at Le Son (2), vicinity of (AT 9764) and Thai Cam (1) at (AT 9864). Results of the operation were 7 VC KIA, 3 VCC, 6 weapons and numerous grenades captured.

3. 1st Bn, 9th Marines Contact (12 May). A squad patrol from B/1/9 made contact with an unknown number of VC in the vicinity of (AT 9254 in the Banang TRON. Bravo Company proceeded to the scene of the fire fight and made heavy contact with the VC in strongly entrenched positions. Air and artillery missions were conducted against the positions throughout the afternoon. The cumulative results of the engagement were 55 VC KIA and 120 killed by air and artillery.

4. Two unnamed battalion search and destroy operations were conducted during the period with no significant contact. 13,363 small unit operations were conducted within the TAORS. 1,074 contacts with enemy elements were made.

O. AIR SUPPORT

1. Fixed Wing. III MAF provided fixed wing aircraft during May as indicated in Table I.

TABLE IIII MAF FIXED WING OPERATIONS

<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>			
	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>7TH AF</u>	<u>TF 77</u>
Close Air Support	171		8	
Direct Air Support	946			
Landing Zone Preparation	110	29		
Helo Escort	386	330		
Interdiction	22		768	
Photo	137			
ECM	1		64	66
Other Tactical	45			1
Non Tactical	342		20	
Steel Tiger			1134	
TOTALS	2160	359	1944	67

2. Helicopter. III MAF provided helicopter aircraft during May as indicated in Table II.

TABLE II

III MAF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

<u>TASK</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Convoy Escort	168
Combat Troop Carrier	3738
Armed Helo	722
Combat Cargo	1292
Logistic Troop Carrier	3141
Logistic Cargo	2382
Command and Control	56
Search and Rescue	49
Tactical Helo Evac	1031
Recon	533
Tactical Air Coord (Airborne)	31
Tactical Aircraft Recovery	7
Training	112
Maintenance	372
VIP	288
Admin/Inspection	830
DayOps	6
Other	178
Tasks	14876
Sorties	36790
Cargo (Tons)	2384
Passengers	54624

P. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. Naval Gunfire Support ships supported III MAF units with 171 rounds of 8"/55, 67 rounds of 6"/47, 1670 rounds of 5"/38/54, for a total of 2578 rounds fired.

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III. INTELLIGENCE

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A. PHU BAI. Operation Virginia at Khe Sanh concluded on 1 May with no contact established. Neither Operation Cherokee, to the west of Hue, nor Wayne, to the south of the TAOR resulted in significant contact. From 17-20 May, VC activity in the 11th Division Tactical Area (DTA) increased considerably with 4 VC attacks occurring. In Thua Thien, on 17 May and again on 20 May, determined mortar and infantry attacks were made by VC units against the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines position in the Co Bi-Thanh area (YD 5432) and (YD 5426). Both attacks occurred in the early morning and involved apparent suicide squads carrying demolitions. Both attacks were repulsed. On 19 May, an estimated VC Battalion attacked an ARVN outpost at Gio Linh (YD 214710) after firing 150 rounds of 81/82mm mortar. At the same time, an unknown number of VC attacked and overran an ARVN position at Con Thien (YD 115700). Except for contact with an estimated 100 VC in well fortified positions in the Co Bi-Thanh Tan area on 29 May, VC activity in the remainder of the period slackened considerably. Minor contacts were reported by both ARVN and Marine Sweeps but failed to engage significant enemy units. Enemy strength in this area give the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Phu Bai TAOR with a strength equivalent to two Regiments (the 6th NVA Regiment and the 95th "B" NVA Regiment), reinforced by local force and guerrilla elements.

B. DANANG. Operation Georgia, in the An Hoa area (AT 8746) ended on 10 May with a total of 193 VC KIA for the three week operation. 4 returnees turned themselves in during the operation. Three significant VC encounters occurred within the Danang TAOR during the period. On 12 May, an estimated two VC companies attacked a USMC patrol. Subsequent Marine reinforcements and supporting arms accounted for 55 KIA. Two days later a 2d Battalion, 9th Marines patrol encountered an estimated company of VC. The engagement resulted in 37 VC KIA before the VC withdrew. On 21 May, units of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines engaged an estimated two VC Companies. The engagement which lasted throughout the afternoon, resulted in 53 confirmed VC KIA. The southern half of the TAOR was again the scene of numerous VC harassing actions involving small scale incidents. Enemy strength in this area give the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Danang TAOR with the equivalent of two regiments (the 21st Regiment and the R-20 and 70th Battalions), reinforced by local force and guerrilla units. While the 21st Regiment is carried as unlocated, it is believed to be located in northern Quang Tin Province. It is considered capable of attacking the Danang TAOR with little shifting of forces.

C. CHU LAI. Operation Montgomery terminated at 141620H, after 5 days of sporadic light contact. Although numerous sightings of small enemy groups were made, no significant contacts could be developed. Report of enemy movements indicate the VC may be temporarily clearing the old Texas-Utah-Indiana-Hot Springs operations area to avoid major contact. Total confirmed VC losses were 51 KIA. Operation Cheyenne, to the north of Chu Lai; and Operation Mobile, in the southern portion of the TAOR, were combined USMC and ARVN operations, neither developed significant contact. Elsewhere in the two southernmost I Corps provinces, the standard VC harassment tactics

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continued. Enemy strength in this area give the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Chu Lai TAOR with two regiments (the 1st VC and 21st NVA Regiments), reinforced by the 195th NVA AA Battalion, the 52nd Battalion and guerrilla elements.

D. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION. The VC have shown some concern over recent reports that villagers are smuggling radios and friendly propaganda leaflets into VC controlled areas. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) issued orders to begin a campaign called "Back to the City Campaign". The purpose of this campaign is to send political cadres to infiltrate the provinces and cities in ICTZ, to organize propaganda units, and to cause disorder. For example, in Danang the VC Provincial Committee is to organize student and labor groups and to cause divisions between religious/political factions, etc. During the recent political unrest, the VC were reported to have sent many VC cadre to the provinces and towns on propaganda and indoctrination missions. In areas under VC control or partial control, VC terror and propaganda activities have been successful in gaining support. The numerous political, religious, and ethnic groups have been used to sow dissension and distrust among the population. Vietnamese living in Viet Cong controlled areas are exploited to put pressure on relatives supporting the RVN. It appears that the VC intend to exploit the current political unrest to their advantage. Reports indicate that VC are occupying those village and hamlets that have been vacated by ARVN Forces that joined in "Struggle Activities". The VC are reportedly issuing directives to subordinate district committees to intensify military and political activities. This is to be a two-month campaign covering the period 2 May - 30 June 1966. Political activities will include intensification of efforts in organizing the fifth columnist among government troops; an increase in the troop proselyting activities to include urging government servicemen to defect; and to increase the training of female espionage agents.

E. TERRORISM. Terroristic activities have substantially increased for this reporting period, particularly in the Chu Lai TAOR. The VC appear to be using the villagers to transport the recent rice harvest from various areas throughout the ICTZ to VC Secret Zones. Reports of VC directives found indicate that the gathering of rice and the acquisition of laborers to transport the rice to secret storehouses is still a primary effort at this time. Emphasis is also being placed on the assassination and kidnapping of GVN Pacification cadre.

F. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE. Viet Cong employment of Liaison and Reconnaissance Cells continued during the month of May throughout the ICTZ. These cells are usually composed of youths procured by the intelligence organizations. They are instructed in the rudiments of espionage and propaganda techniques, especially methods of spreading suspicion and hatred of the US/GVN Governments. Much emphasis have been placed on targets such as bridges, railroads, culverts and other lines of communications. The VC are continuing to conduct sabotage training in an effort to improve their capability and techniques.

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G. MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. The incidence of enemy employment of mines and booby traps increased by 17.5% over the previous reporting period. The VC continued to use these explosive devices throughout areas susceptible to friendly operations and in locations frequented primarily by civilians. One new type of booby trap was discovered during the reporting period. On 26 May, 1st MAW BOD personnel disarmed four booby traps in the Tai Nang Valley area near Ba To, Quang Ngai. Each booby trap, in dense foliage, was composed of a CBU-3/B bomb which had been inverted and placed on a hard surface (rock) with its large mushroom striker facing upward. Suspended above it by a series of levers and communications wire was a 20 to 30 pound rock, attached to a trip wire. When the wire was disturbed, it released the rock which in turn fell on the striker, setting off the bomblet.

H. ANTI-AIRCRAFT. The frequency of anti-aircraft incidents and hits on aircraft increased slightly over the previous month. A comparison of anti-aircraft statistics between April and May indicate the following:

	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>PCT CHANGE</u>
INCIDENTS	368	399*	+8.4%
AIRCRAFT HIT	98	102**	+3.1%

*(306 Helo, 93F/W)
 **(95 Helo, 7F/W)


Pertinent statistics relating to enemy initiated action and personnel and weapons losses for the reporting period are set forth below:

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS

AMBUSH	1
ATTACK	4
ASSAULT BY FIRE	1
HARASSING FIRE	534
MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS	114
HAMLET HARASSMENT	3
OTHER HARASSMENT	3
SABOTAGE	1
PROPAGANDA	4
AA FIRE	399
TOTAL	1064

ENEMY PERSONNEL LOSSES

	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
KIA	521	437
KBA	137	183
VCC	95	
VCS	579	
REFURNISHED	82	



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ENEMY WEAPONS LOSSES

RIFLE	32
AUTOMATIC RIFLE	6
CARBINE	38
SUB-MACHINEGUN	26
MACHINEGUN	2
MORTAR	1
SHOTGUN	1
PISTOL	3
M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHER	2
UNKNOWN TYPE	5
TOTAL	116

I. WEATHER. During May, several periods of light rainfall and occasional periods of crachin with attendant low ceilings and fog occurred. On several occasions, these conditions resulted in short periods during which friendly mobility and air operations were restricted in certain localities.

TOTAL PRECIPITATION FOR MAY

<u>AREA</u>	<u>PRECIPITATION</u>	<u>MEAN FOR MONTH</u>
DANGANG	7.17"	3.0"
CHU LAI	7.85"	3.0"
PHU BAI	1.30"	3.0"

III MAF OB HAS ACCEPTED THE FOLLOWING NEWLY IDENTIFIED UNITS IN ICTZ

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>RATING</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Hq, 620th Div (NVA)	100	CONF	QUANG TIN PROV	26Apr66
31st Regt (NVA)	2000	POSS	QUANG TIN PROV	26Apr66

J. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE ICTZCONFIRMED

1 Military Region Hqs
 1 Military Sub-Region Hqs
 1 Div Hq*
 4 Regiments (3 NVA)
 27 Battalions (9 NVA)**
 32 Companies

PROBABLE

8 Battalions
 5 Companies

*The existance of the Headquarters of the 620th NVA Division was confirmed in Quang Tin on 26 April by COMUSMACV. The Headquarters strength is 100 men. It controls the 1st VC and the 21st NVA Regiments, which have been previously carried as confirmed, and the 31st NVA Regiment which has just been identified as possible. III MAF and MACV only consider confirmed and probable units when estimating enemy capability, therefore those capabilities have not been changed by the possible existence of the 31st NVA Regiment.

**Includes 2 Transportation Battalions, 1 Weapons Battalion and 1 AA Battalion.

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IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. STRENGTH. The average monthly strength of III MAF dropped from 58,815 to 52,712 during May. The decrease occurred because III MAF no longer reports strengths of NSA and 30th NCR, now under administrative reporting of COMNAVFORV.

TABLE VIII

Average Personnel Strength
III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters

	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
HQ III MAF	92	7	184	4
H&S Co	11	0	145	1

III Marine Amphibious Force

3201 295 47,261 2,035

B. CASUALTIES. III MAF Casualties are shown in Table IX.

TABLE IX

1. Battle

<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
110	5	793	37	13	0	0	0

2. Non-Battle

<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
13	1	44	1

C. SHIFT OF COMMAND (LESS OPCON) BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV UNITS LOCATED IN RVN

1. CG FMFPAC message 100017Z May 66 (C) directed that effective 25 May all Divisional units in RVN, with the exception of the First and Third Service Battalions, would be returned to the Command (less OPCON) of their parent Division. Operational control in all cases would be as established by the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.

2. A conference was held on 16 May at III MAF Headquarters with representation from Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, First Marine Division, Third Marine Division, FMFPAC/I MAC (fwd), Force Logistic Command, And Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Pacific to discuss and formulate plans

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and procedures to accomplish efficiently the administrative control shift.

3. On 25 May the following units shifted ADCON from Third Marine Division to First Marine Division:

1st Battalion, 1st Marines
 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
 Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines
 Platoon, Company A, 1st Recon Battalion
 Platoon, Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion
 Platoon (Rein), Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion
 Shore Party Team, Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion

D. OFFICERS AUGMENTATION (TAD BASIS) TO III MAF HEADQUARTERS

1. During the visit of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific to this Headquarters on 12-15 May, the shortage of officer personnel in the III MAF Headquarters Staff was discussed and the problems involved were presented. The Commanding General, FMFPAC, indicated that the proposed T/O revision to III MAF Headquarters submitted in March 1966 was the monitoring document used by that Headquarters for ordering personnel to III MAF Headquarters. The proposed T/O revision increases the officer strength from 133 to 159. During May, the officer shortage was approximately 58 against the requirements proposed. Headquarters FMFPAC indicated that measures had been taken to ensure an acceleration in officer input.

2. As an interim measure to provide officer personnel assistance to the III MAF Staff, 13 officers from FMFPAC Headquarters and Subordinate Commands arrive on 23 May for a period of 30 days TAD. The augmentation was comprised of 1 Colonel, 3 Lt Colonels, 8 Majors and 1 Captain. The Officers were assigned to the G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 Sections of III MAF Headquarters.

E. CHAPLAIN

1. With the designation of Force Logistic Command as a Major Command, Chaplains Wood and Stewart were transferred from Third Marine Division to Force Logistic Command. The Force Chaplain has been assigned as Religious Advisor to FLC and is functioning in the religious program of that Command pending the permanent assignment of a full Chaplain complement.

2. Chapel construction in III MAF continues at a steady pace. As of 31 May a total of 43 Chapels are in use. Of these, 5 are designated as permanent Chapels, 5 are of native construction, 13 are modified contention structures. The remaining 20 chapels are intended for dual use spaces. An additional 5 Chapels are now under construction and 7 are in the planning stages.

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3. A level of 400 Divine Services per week has now been reached. a continuing effort to increase the number of services offered is being made, with an emphasis on week-day services. Several Battalion Chaplains have inaugurated the practice of staying over-night with deployed companies. A Divine Service is conducted after evening meal when day patrols have returned and prior to departure of night patrols.

4. The outstanding event of the month was the observance of Memorial Day. A single Memorial Service was held in each TAOR. All units were represented and the colors massed for the firing of the volleys and the sounding of taps. Reports from all TAOR's indicate that a dignified and meaningful tribute to those lost in action resulted.

F. SPECIAL SERVICES

1. Film Exchange. The movie film exchange was physically moved from the Danang USO facility to the III MAF Headquarters Compound.

2. Shows

(a) The "Big Tiry Little Show" performed in the ICTZ from 8 May through 11 May. There were approximately 4,000 service men that observed the performance.

(b) The ROK Marine Swing Band presented entertainment in the ICTZ from 23 May through 28 May for a total of 21 performances.

(c) Don Defore visited units in the area during 25 and 26 May.

(d) Frank Sutton arrived in Danang on 31 May for a nine day visit to units in the area.


3. R&R Program

(a) There were no significant problem areas in the R&R program during the month of May. Saigon R&R continued closed.

(b) R&R totals were as set forth in Table X.

TABLE X

Bangkok	726
Hong Kong	433
Taipei	439
Tokyo	797
Manila	185
Singapore	107
Okinawa	<u>1,131</u>
TOTAL	3,818



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G. USO~~SECRET~~

1. New USO facility located in new Recreation Area opened 5 May on austere basis. Ice cream and soft drinks were provided. Continued improvements in facility and services were effected during the month.

2. USO facility in Danang city was reopened for services on 8 May after being closed due to previous civil unrest in the city. This facility was again closed on 16 May for remaining period of month due to re-occurrence of civil unrest.

H. RED CROSS CENTER CLUBMOBILE

1. The Red Cross Center operated daily from 0900-1800 except, 16 May, when staff restricted to living quarters in Danang due to civil unrest. The center-clubmobile staff varied between nine and seven members.

2. Clubmobile runs continued as scheduled. Each scheduled military unit was visited on a weekly basis.

I. EFFECTS ON G-1 MATTERS DUE TO POLITICAL UNREST IN THE AREA

1. On 14 May condition Yellow was set in the Danang complex due to political unrest. This condition created certain problems related to G-1 matters. Liberty continued to be suspended in the entire ICTZ. China Beach was closed from 14 May through 24 May. R&R program continued, however, the only problem encountered was the movement of personnel from downtown Danang and Danang East to the airfield. Red Cross Girls vacated quarters in downtown Danang on 17 May and moved into the Red Cross Quonset located in new recreation area. They moved back into quarters on 22 May.

2. The exchange retail operations in Main Exchange Danang was closed during period 15 through 25 May. Exchange Depot operations during same period was limited to pick up of health and comfort items and beverages to field exchanges. Rigid security measure were enforced in the perimeter of the Exchange complex.

3. Civilian employee absenteeism in the area varied daily throughout the period of civil unrest. Absenteeism among civilian workers within III MAF units was approximately 50% during period 15 through 23 May. Thereafter for the month absenteeism was normal.

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~~SECRET~~V. LOGISTICSA. GENERAL.

(1) Civil strife in the Danang area again affected logistic operations, but to a lesser degree than in the month of April. Cargo movement and civilian support were curtailed from 15 to 23 May, and the main supply route through the city of Danang was closed during this same period.

(2) Fuel storage capacity at Col Co Fuel Farm was extended to include all four products with the addition of 60,000 gallons each of MoGas and Diesel on 25 May.

(3) Major General Carl A. YOUNGDALE visited III MAF during May, heading a Logistic Study Group from Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

(4) At the request of COMUSMACV, III MAF undertook a study of housing available in ICTZ for non-combatants who might be displaced due to civil strife or tactical emergency.

B. ENGINEER.

(1) Political unrest in the Danang area continued to have a limited effect on 7th Engineer Battalion operations during May. Movement of cantonment material from East to West Danang was curtailed. Approximately 50 men were diverted from routine projects to be assigned to assist RMK in soil cementing the new parallel runway for the Danang Air Base during the last two weeks of the month. Employment of Marines on this high priority project was necessitated by continued absence of the local labor force. Marines were secured from this project on 31 May after completing approximately 476,300 sq. ft. of the runway (about 30%).

(2) Construction was commenced on the Brig - MP Bn - Dog Kennel area in Danang. This project calls for thirty-five strongbacks, three 20x40 frame buildings, a 500 man modified galley and two 40 dog kennels. Also commenced during the month were five 2-lane timber trestle, class 60 bridges on Route 4 in the Danang area. The lengths and locations of these bridges are as follows: 33 ft (AT 933747); 8 ft (AT 930745); 32 ft (AT 926744); 15 ft (AT 917741) and 12 ft (AT 913743).

(3) A detailed road reconnaissance was conducted of National Route #1 from Chu Lai to Phu Bai. This was accomplished in two increments, by an engineer route reconnaissance party accompanied by a reinforced infantry platoon security element in each case. Returning from Chu Lai to Danang

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the lead vehicle of the security element was damaged by an exploding mine just south of the Danang TAOR, injuring 2 members of the security element. No other incidents were reported.

(4) A 7th Engineer Battalion survey team, in conjunction with representatives from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, conducted a reconnaissance of 12 short airfields throughout I Corps Tactical Zone, via C-130 aircraft and helicopter. The purpose of this survey was to up-date data on existing facilities and to make estimates of engineer effort required for improvement and extension of runways to provide for utilization by C-130 aircraft.

(5) On 24 May an inspection was made of the An Hoa runway southwest of Danang to determine the extent of damage which may have resulted from extensive use by C-123 aircraft. No serious degradation was found and necessary repairs are being made by the RVN maintenance force, which has an adequate engineer capability to maintain the strip in usable condition.


(6) The advance party of the 9th Engineer Battalion arrived at Chu Lai. 45 men of a 75 man detachment of the 7th Engineers working on 1st Marine Division cantonment at Chu Lai returned to Danang. The first week in June. "C" Company of the 7th Engineer Battalion detached from the 3rd Marine Division and reverted to parent unit control for the first time since 1958.

(7) Engineers continued providing plumbing assistance, equipment and equipment operators at the new III MAF CP; however, in spite of the augmentation by military personnel, the civil strife and the political unrest involving the indigenous labor force caused the additional slippage of the BOD to approximately 15 June.

(8) Because of projected increases in external road responsibility, the 7th Engineer Battalion was relieved of road work in the new FISO Alpha area at Red Beach by MCB-1. Subsequently, the 7th Engineer Battalion relieved the 3rd Marine Division engineers of responsibility for maintenance and mine clearance of approximately 10 miles of roads. The 7th Engineers are now responsible for more than 50 miles of roads throughout the Danang area.

C. SUPPLY

(1) An interim garrison property account has been established by III MAF; the Force Logistic Command is in process of establishing a permanent account.

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(2) Red Ball for the month of May shows a sharp increase in the number of items added to Red Ball. The majority of items added were in the electronics category. A recap of Red Ball during the month of May follows:

Total line items on Red Ball 1 May 1966	184
Total line items added during May	317
Total line items deleted during May	136
Total line items on Red Ball 31 May 1966	365

D. EMBARKATION & PORT OPERATION.

(1) Three major Marine units arrived in Vietnam during the month: BLT 1/5 debarked from the SLF at Chu Lai during the period 6-8 May and was assigned to the 1st Marine Division; RIT-5 Headquarters arrived at Chu Lai from Okinawa on 27 May; and the 1st MP Battalion arrived at Danang on the USNS UPSHUR (TAP 198) and commenced debarkation on 31 May.

(2) "Firsts" accomplished during the month included the lift of the first retrograde vehicles under the R&E program for PWD, Yokosuka, and the movement of the reefer barge YFRN 997 from Danang to Chu Lai.

(3) The Alaska Barge PEYAKA commenced operations on the Danang/Phu Bai shuttle and made five round trips. The barge also made two lifts of RMK cement from Danang to Chu Lai.

(4) During May, 20 US Navy ships and 34 MSTB ships debarked/embarked cargoes at Danang. 28 LST's moored at Chu Lai and 7 heavy USS ships debarked. The Danang total cargo throughput was 72,019 S/T and 113,910 M/T. Daily average was 2,323 S/T and 3,675 M/T. Chu Lai handled 29,992 S/T and 34,273 M/T for a daily average of 967 S/T and 1,106 M/T. 5,817 S/T or 15,275 M/T were shipped to Phu Bai.

E. FISCAL.

(1) Fleet Marine Force, Pacific provided 3d Force Service Regiment with approximately \$17 million additional funding in BP 11 for support of WestPac forces. In this amount are two III MAF projects: \$500,00 for T/E deficiencies, and \$640,000 for messhall and galley equipment.

(2) The III MAF Comptroller and assistant attended a NAVFORV conference in Saigon, also attended by the Fiscal Officer, NSA Saigon; Fiscal Officer, NSA Danang; N-4 NAVFORV; and 30th NCR. The purpose was to study and recommend to the MACV Comptroller:

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- (a) Particulars as to the establishment of both III MAF and NAVFORV as AIK account holders.
- (b) The transfer of NSA Danang and 30th NCR as III MAF sub-accounts to NAVFORV.
- (c) The concomitant transfer of III MAF AIK funds.

F. ORDNANCE.

- (1) The retrograde movement of LVT's to CONUS for rebuild was expedited, and replacements were allocated to the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions.
- (2) During the civil disturbances emergency loans of Class V supplies to Coast Guard and MARKET TIME forces were approved; arrangements were made for helicopter resupply of these units when road travel was restricted.
- (3) Arrangements were made through the Force Supply Officer to borrow five M16 Rifles for use by the 1st Marine Division on special operations with Army units armed with this weapon. They were obtained on temporary loan from the U. S. Air Force in Danang.

G. DENTAL. The office of Force Dental Officer, III MAF, established by a 27 March revision of T/O m4931, reached its full complement of two officers and one enlisted during May. In addition to providing the Commanding General with information and recommendations pertaining to dental support of III MAF, this section performs advisory, planning, supervisory and coordinating functions for the Dental Civil Affairs Program in ICTZ.

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VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. A slight decrease in total message traffic through the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center was noted during May. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>DECREASE</u>
Incoming	27,247	28,808	
Outgoing	26,403	23,762	
Total	53,650	52,570	1,080

B. A detachment of the USAF 1st Mobile Communication Group which arrived during April installed a 12 channel (AN/MRC-61) radio relay circuit between III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center and Danang Control. This circuit was activated to provide services previously provided by the 04 Cable which is out of service for repair and renovation.

C. A detachment of the USAF 1st Mobile Communication Group arrived during May to establish a 24 channel (AN/MRC-80) teopospheric scatter radio system. This system will be used by III Marine Amphibious Force unit to supplement communications between Danang and Hue-Pm Bai. Activation of the circuit is planned for June. This system is an interim measure until arrival of organic assets (AN/TRC-97).

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VII CIVIC ACTION

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civic Action program remains the same, during the month of May. Particular emphasis was placed on improving the educational opportunities of the Vietnamese people through school construction and vocational training programs.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. In spite of the political unrest existing in Danang City during May, the Council was able to meet and function as an organization four times. Of primary interest to the council throughout the month was the overall problems of efficient and effective port operations. Port operations were hampered by a large backlog of supplies, created by the April political unrest, that were awaiting unloading and a general shortage of laborers and truckers to perform necessary work in the port facilities.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. Three committees of the council met during the month.

1. Public Health Committee. Preparation is underway to conduct dental instruction during the fall term at University of Hue medical school. The instruction, to start 1 September 1966, will consist of a minimum of two hours lecture each week with frequent lengthy field trips including practical training. Action is being taken by Ministry of Health (GVN) and all cognizant authorities to raise the minimum wage of all health workers to \$2500VN with possibility of additional benefits. Low minimum wages throughout the years have forced trained or qualified personnel away from a Public Health profession to other professions paying higher wages. Low wages were also reported as hindering the pilot malaria control program by being totally inadequate to hire sufficient day laborers to carry out the required anti-malaria measures. Food supplements are being planned as an added inducement to those hired to work in this program.

2. Commodities Distribution. All agencies represented on this committee reported that they were expecting to receive an increase in commodities in the future. Storage problems were not anticipated. The representative of the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare presented a proposal for distribution of the gift rice recently received from West Germany. The committee agreed to the plan and implementation will be affected upon receipt of approval from Saigon.

3. Port Committee. A special meeting was called in an effort to solve existing port problems. The Union Leader outlined the four major problem areas as follows:

- (a) Need for better facilities for workers
- (b) Need for better warehouses, pier space and more port equipment
- (c) Need for renovation of existing port complex
- (d) Need for higher wages

Discussions were held on the above points and results were encouraging. Successful negotiations will be effected however, because control of the port is divided between the Mayor of Danang and the GVN Port Director.

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D. Medical Assistance. Sixty nine MEDCAP teams operated in 173 locations during May and provided 67,913 medical/dental treatments to 58,651 Vietnamese civilians. This represents an increase of 278 civilian contacted as compared with April.

Distribution of treatments was as follows:

Miscellaneous ailments	22.10
Disease of Skin	18.95
Upper Respiratory infection	15.15
Stomach Ache	11.05
Injuries	10.70
Headache	8.70
Dental	6.46
Diarrhea	4.61
Fevers	2.19
Veneral Disease	0.09
	<u>100.00%</u>

The number of treatments by TAOR were:

Danang	40,106
Chu Lai	21,304
Phu Bai	6,503

E. Political Unrest. During May, the population centers of IOTZ and Danang in particular, experienced a renewal of April's political unrest. The political unrest started on 15 May with a renewed QVN struggle force confrontation. The renewed struggle had a very definite effect on the III MAF Civic Action Program in the TAOR. Restrictions were placed on travel in urban Danang which effectively cut off CARE, CRS, and USAID as a source of commodities resupply. III MAF had sufficient commodities on hand to continue civic action programs in the rural areas for a limited time. USAID was unable to deliver commodities from the provincial capital (Hoi An) to villages/hamlets of the province. By 29 May, however, the political unrest had eased sufficiently to allow limited vehicular traffic in the city of Danang and a general return to normal Civic Action Programs. Medical treatments which had shown a marked decrease during the unrest were returning to a pre-unrest level. At the close of the month, Civic Action activities in the III MAF TAOR's had returned to normal. CARE, CRS and USAID were in operation and all had adequate commodities on hand to support the III MAF Civic Action Program.

F. Care Program. During May, CARE provided 1000 pounds of rice for support of III MAF Civic Action Programs.

G. III MAF Education Program. DURING May several school construction and expansion projects were started throughout the III MAF TAOR's. This work is being done as part of the III MAF educational program. The vocational training school being sponsored by NavSupAct, Danang, neared reality as it was scheduled for a 1 June opening.

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VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**SECRET**A. Political situation in I Corps

1. The ineffectiveness of the 3d Psywar Bn (ARVN) reported last month continued through this month even though the members of the battalion returned to duty. Measures are being taken to completely reorganize the battalion staff in order to improve its effectiveness.
2. Vietnamese propagandists were again generally unavailable to work with the Audio/Visual Psywar Teams and little or no printing was accomplished by the ARVN members. Indications favor the establishment of new active Cultural Drama Teams, presently some Bn members are in training. During June there should be marked improvement in 3d Psywar Bn activities.
3. The I Corps political situation in general remains critical although at times it has quieted down considerably. The situation greatly affects the returnee rate in I Corps. Seventy ralliers were reported, an increase over last month which may indicate a trend.

B. Tactical Operations

1. Approximately 1,900,000 leaflets were distributed over I Corps this month. Psywar support was used in operations Morgan, Mobile, Montgomery, and Cherokee. General themes expressed US intentions to remain in new area and indicated inevitable defeat of VC. Friendship of U.S. and Vietnamese people was emphasized and several leaflets were dropped with regard to mines and booby traps, offering rewards for information on their locations.
2. Magazines and films were used in several areas to entertain and educate the people as to the presence of the U.S. in Vietnam and the value of the present VN government and some of the many government projects being undertaken. The County Fair operations are a continued success and have shown good results. Plans to continue this type of operation have been made.

C. Chieu Hoi Program

1. Plans to step up the Chieu Hoi program are being made and new centers are being built at present to increase the handling capability and add to the effectiveness of the program. Difficulties have been encountered with the Chieu Hoi Chiefs in certain areas and adjustments are being made accordingly to replace the ineffective personnel.
2. Loudspeaker broadcasts using tapes made by returnees have proved effective and every opportunity to use the returnee in person to person situations with villagers is being attempted as soon as the returnees are recovered. Extensive use of the 5th Air Commando U-10 aircraft has been utilized for this type of mission.

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2. In Quang Ngai, cadre previously from Mo Duc District were assigned to work in 7 cleared hamlets in Binh Son District within the USMC TAOR. In addition, 3 hamlets in Mo Duc were reoccupied and have cadre working. This represents a net increase of 10 hamlets undergoing securing in Quang Ngai, which is a significant improvement in this province.

3. The continuing crisis in Hue curtailed any improvement in the Revolutionary Development Program in the 11th DTA.

E. Psyops/CA.

1. During the first half of May psywar showed progress in recovering from political instability in April. After the political crisis of 15 May psywar virtually stopped in the 11th DTA and Quang Nam Sector. Only minor adverse effects were noted in the 12th DTA.

2. Leaflets dropped in May increased to 12.7 million primarily due to US advisory personnel and Psyops CO. They were primarily the Chieu Hoi type. There was also a 20% increase in Quy-Chanh for a total of 77.

F. Personnel.

1. ARVN morale was considerably affected by the recent series of political events commencing 15 May through the present period. In particular morale was low among ARVN troops in the 1st Infantry Division and in Quang Nam. At the outset of the Struggle Forces effort there was a division of loyalty among individual soldiers and some ARVN units or portions thereof, joined the Struggle movement. This condition was gradually alleviated by the stabilization of the political situation and most of the soldiers rejoined their units.

2. Another factor which influenced morale has been a shortage of rice in ARVN military commissaries. Troops purchased rice on the open market at prices far exceeding those in ARVN commissaries. Rice is available for the commissary and as soon as transportation becomes available this situation will be alleviated.

G. Regional Force/Popular Force.

1. Comparison of RF/PF personnel losses versus VC losses during May showed a favorable ratio of 56 RF/PF KIA to 96 VC KIA. RF/PF also suffered 88 WIA and 6 MIA. Three VC were captured. Weapons and equipment losses were unfavorable. The RF/PF lost 25 assorted individual weapons, 1 60mm mortar, 2 .30 cal machine guns, 2 BAR's and 5 AN/PRC-10 radios, as compared to 22 assorted individual weapons and 2 flame throwers captured.

2. Normal training continued at the training centers except for NCO course 4-66 at Hoa Cam. This course was disrupted when 80 members participated with the Struggle Forces in the political turmoil. Of the 114 members of the class, 43 failed to return to duty. The remainder resumed training.

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IX. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

A. Background. Demonstrations and civil strife in the Danang and Hue/Phu Bai area hampered the CIB in escorting civilian news media in the field. During May, only 187 escorted visits were accomplished by the CIB. These trips covered operations, civic action, and various other subjects of interest to the press. The Press Center, now under full operational and administrative control of CG III MAF, hosted the largest influx of newsmen during the period 15-23 May. Sixty newsmen, an overflow capacity, were billeted and fed with Marine personnel normally engaged in field operations, each day taking over duties normally performed by Vietnamese civilians employed at the Press Center who were unable to come to work.

B. Transportation. Escorted visits to the field of news media representatives represented a problem during the month of May because of lack of vehicles. Of the three M-38's assigned to CIB, one has been turned in for survey, one has been dead-lined more than two thirds of the month and only one has been available for continuous use. This vehicle, along with the assigned stationwagon, averaged more than 12 hours a day in spite of a slight decline of news media representatives to the field.

C. Photography. The Photo Section forwarded a total of 23,600 feet of motion picture film during the month of May. This included film exposed by all photographic units within the III MAF. 40% of the coverage was operational, 32% was Civic Action. The balance included film exposed on a technical film report on Mines and Booby Traps and VIP coverage. Of significant interest was film shot on the An Hoa Industrial complex, the Joint Coordinating Council, Operations Wyoming, Montgomery, Wayne, Morgan, Cherokee, Virginia and Georgia.

D. Radio/TV. During the month of May, the Radio Section released a total of 70 releases. These included sound tapes for two films shot by the photo section, Mine warfare and Booby trap school and the Chaplain story. Also included in these releases were six five minute shows to AFRTS, Saigon entitled "THE OLD GUNNY". These shows are aired on a weekly basis by AFRTS, each Sunday.

E. Escort. Of the 187 escorted media to Marine units, 41 were devoted to coverage of civic action ranging from the An Hoa Industrial District, Operations Sam Pan and County Fairs. These covered by the wire services and CBS. KNXT-TV Hollywood (CBS) shot extensive coverage of various civic action programs. Of more than 70 media total represented at the Press Center, 40 foreign media were represented during May. Notable media representatives who visited during the month were: Neil Sheehan, Peter Brasstrup, Raymond Apple, New York Times; Robert Shapan, N. Y. Magazine; Francis Sully, Bill Cook, Newsweek; Frank Latourette, KNXT-TV Hollywood; Richard Critchfield, Crosby Noyes, Washington Star; Joe Brown, Copley News Service; Leon Daniels, UPI; Robert Ohman, AP; Ronald Nessen, Dean Brelis, David Burrington, NCB; Carl Sorensen, Murray Fromson, Erick Sevareid, CBS; William McWhirter, Karsten Prager, Time-Life News service; Lyle Nelson, Honolulu Star Bulletin; Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard; Anthony Lawrence, BBC; Timothy Bowden, Australian Broadcasting Commission; Alain Raymond, Agency France Press; Charles Troeller, Stern Magazine (Germany); Michael Neal, Jonathan Fenby, Reuters; Alain Taieb, Paris Match; Jack O'Grady, Charles Klensch, Robert Lukeman, ABC; Stan Karnow, Washington Post; Earl Guiney, Israel Press; Ruben Salazar, Los Angeles Times; Donald Deder, Arizona Republic; Warren Bosworth, Dallas Times Herald; Tom Flynn, Oakland Tribune; Richard Dudman, St. Louis Post Dispatch and Sok Lee, Daong-A-Ilbo, Korea.

casualties. As the VC withdrew, the ARVN troops withdrew to their original positions and waited for the Viet Cong to return to recover their dead and wounded. Once again the VC were attacked and they sustained additional casualties. Results of the operation were an estimated 100 VC KIA/WIA. Fifty-seven weapons and 1 radio were captured. ARVN losses were 2 MIA.

C. VC Activities.

1. During the month of May VC initiated incidents continued to remain at a relatively low level with a total of 225 as compared to 263 last month.

2. In the 11th DTA there were two significant VC attacks. Both occurred on 19 May. At 0245 hours Gio Linh Outpost (YD 220740) received 150 rounds of 81mm mortar fire which was followed by a ground assault by an estimated VC battalion. Although the VC momentarily penetrated the outpost, they failed to overrun it. Friendly casualties were 43 KIA (1 US) and 54 WIA. Enemy losses were 7 KIA and 10 weapons captured. At 0310 hours, Con Thien Outpost (YD 115 700) was also hit by mortar fire and assaulted by an estimated VC company. ARVN losses were 20 KIA and 12 WIA. VC losses were 20 KIA and 5 weapons captured.

3. The most significant enemy movement during the month was the displacement of the 21st NVA Regiment from Quang Ngai to Quang Tin. The 1st VC Regiment remained in Quang Ngai Province.

4. Political unrest again dominated the scene in the I CTZ. The first half of May was marked with a continued feeling of political uneasiness, but quiet prevailed. After the arrival of government troops in Danang on the morning of 15 May there were numerous clashes and firefights as the Struggle Forces attacked government forces. Subsequent actions included introduction of APC's and tanks, plus the use of air strikes to bring about the surrender of Struggle Forces in Danang. Control of Quang Nam Sector/Danang was re-established on 23 May and the situation stabilized. Demonstrations in Hue continued and were marked by burning of USIS Library on 26 May. Conditions in Hue remained explosive at the end of the reporting period.

5. VC in the I CTZ are capable of conducting a multi-battalion attack throughout the Corps area at a time and place of their choosing.

D. Revolutionary Development.

1. Progress in the National Priority Area was slight during the month of May. The crisis in Danang resulted in the temporary withdrawal of many security forces which caused evacuation of the area by the cadre. Both cadre and the majority of security forces, however, returned toward the end of May. The security force was augmented by one USMC battalion. Quang Nam Special Sector was replaced by a regular province and sector organization at the end of the month. These new organizations fix responsibility more clearly and should enhance the Revolutionary Development Program. Many personnel changes have been made which will accelerate the program.

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3. During the month 33 PF platoons totalling 1,214 men completed MIP training. The cumulative total of MIP trained PF soldiers in I CTZ is 4,686. MIP training came to a halt in Quang Nam sector due to Political crisis, but continued in the other sectors of I CTZ.

4. The RF refresher training program continued to run behind schedule and no RF companies reported for training during the month.

5. Approximately 17,500 pounds of foodstuffs were distributed during the month to widows and dependents of deceased RF/PF soldiers in ICTZ. Directives were sent to the field encouraging the expansion of the rehabilitation centers to include developing trades and skills for which tool kits are available.

H. Logistics.

1. The political crisis caused resupply operations to cease during the period 15 May to 24 May. Limited air resupply of selected items, however, began 24 May and continued through the end of the month.

2. No convoys or railroad operations were conducted from 15 May to 31 May. Consequently, all classes of supplies with the exception of Class V became low in the I CTZ outside of Danang area.

3. A significant amount of ordnance equipment was lost or damaged during the political crisis. Actual losses have not been verified.

I. Engineer.

1. VC activity against roads and bridges increased during the month to 20 incidents and continued to cause interruptions in I Corps movement capability. The political unrest in the I Corps area precluded rapid repair of damaged structures. Highway 1 was trafficable from the DMZ to Quang Ngai 60% of the month. The railroad line between Danang and Hue was open 50% of the month. The political unrest in the I CTZ stopped progress on all current projects except emergency road repairs during this reporting period.

2. A lack of adequate road maintenance funds assigned to Public Works District Engineer resulted in continued deterioration of the national highway road net. Correspondence outlining the problem has been forwarded through ARVN, US military, USAID, and Public Works channels with no effect to date.

3. The 103d and 104th Engineer Battalions were activated in June and September 1965 respectively. To date the 103d Engineer Battalion has received only 40% of its authorized dozers and 20% of its authorized dump trucks. Lack of dump trucks, dozers, cranes, and air compressors in the 104th Engineer Battalion also adversely effected the Corps Engineer's construction capability. Inquiries as to date of receipt of equipment have been forwarded through ARVN and US channels without positive results.

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4. The ARVN engineer and ordnance maintenance programs of the 10th Engineer Group are barely satisfactory. A critical shortage of trained mechanics and maintenance personnel, as well as a lack of command interest in the program continues. Equipment was constantly abused by misuse and lack of unit maintenance. The back up maintenance programs continued to be ineffective and provided little assistance to the supported units. In an effort to improve the engineer and ordnance unit maintenance programs US advisors have instituted a maintenance instruction program.

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PART THREECHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1 May - Operation VIRGINIA Terminated
 5 May - Operation CHEROKEE Initiated
 7 May - Operation CHEROKEE Terminated
 County Fair conducted
 9 May - Operation MONTGOMERY Initiated
 10 May - Operation GEORGIA Terminated
 Operation WAYNE Initiated
 12 May - 1st Battalion 9th Marines Contact
 Operation WAYNE Terminated
 14 May - Operation MONTGOMERY Terminated
 16 May - Operation YUMA Initiated
 17 May - Operation YUMA Terminated
 20 May - Operation MORGAN Initiated
 22 May - Operation MORGAN Terminated
 24 May - Operation CHEYENNE Initiated and Terminated
 25 May - Operation ATHENS Initiated
 Operation MOBILE Initiated
 28 May - Operation MOBILE Terminated
 30 May - Operation RENO Initiated
 31 May - Operation CHEYENNE II Initiated
 Operation CHEYENNE II Terminated
 Operation RENO Continued

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CHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS~~SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
1May	William G. WESTMORELAND	Gen.	COMUSMACV
2May	R. G. OWENS Jr.	BGen.	JCS Study Group
3-4May	John A. HEINTGES	LtGen.	Deputy COMUSMACV
5May	Shelton E. LOLLIS	BGen.	Deputy CG, 1st Logistic Command
5May	William W. MOMYER	LtGen.	Commander Air Training Command
5-6May	A. E. COWAN	BGen.	Dir Joint Research & Test Act.
6May	Jackson D. ARNOLD	RAdm.	Force Materiel Officer, COMNAVAIRPAC
6May	D. LAMBERT	RAdm.	Commander Training Command Pac Flt
6May	Felix ASHINHURST	Mr.	Director, CARE in RVN
6May	R. RAMP	Mr.	Senior Field Rep. CARE in RVN
8-9May	Edwin B. HOOPER	RAdm.	COMSERVPAC
10May	KHANG	MGen.	Comdt VN Marine Corps
10May	William K. JONES	BGen.	Dir of Combat Operations Center
11May	John R. DEANE	BGen.	C/S, Field Forces Vietnam
12May	Harley L. MOORE Jr.	BGen.	USARV Provost Marshall
12-15May	Victor H. KRULAK	LtGen.	CG, FMFPac
12May	Carroll H. DUNN	MGen.	MACV Engineer
12May	John S. MONAGAN	Cong.	R-Conn.
12May	Robert P. GRIFFIN	Cong.	R-Mica.
13May	Howard H. GALLAWAY	Cong.	R-Ga.
13May	Donald HUMSFELD	Cong.	R-Ill.
13May	Thomas D. MORRIS	Mr.	Asst. Secretary of Defense (Manpower)

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
13May	James V. EDMUNDSON	LtGen.	USAF
13May	Frank A. BARTIMO	Mr.	Secretary of Defense Team
13May	Donald H. MC GOVERN	BGen.	MACV J-1
14-31May	C. A. YOUNGDALE	MGen.	Logistics Study Group
14May	Barry ZORTHIAN	Mr.	Director, JUSPAC
14May	E. SEVAREID	Mr.	CBS News
14May	James SKIDMORE	Mr.	President of JCC
21May	Robert G. OWENS Jr.	BGen.	JCS Team
22May	William W. SCRANTON	Gov.	Governor, R-Pa.
25May	William R. PEERS	MGen.	OSD, SACSA
26May	Dwight E. BEACH	Gen.	Commander US Forces Korea and CG, 8th US Army
29May	John S. FOSTER Jr.	Dr.	Director of Defense Research and Engineering

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PART FOUR

REFERENCES

- (A) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology, May 1966.
- (B) 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, May 1966.
- (C) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, May 1966.
- (D) Force Logistic Command Chronology, May 1966.
- (E) COMUSMACV LOI (LOI 3-66) of 30 March 1966 (s).

ENCLOSURES

- (1) 7th Engineer Battalion (-) Rein Command Chronology May 1966.
- (2) 9th Motor Transport Battalion Command Chronology May 1966.
- (3) 5th Communication Battalion Command Chronology May 1966.
- (4) 1st Marine Corps Scout Dog Platoon Monthly Report of Activities for May 1966.
- (5) 1st Sentry Dog Platoon Monthly Report of Activities for May 1966.
- (6) Headquarters III MAF Command Directory May 1966.

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HEADQUARTERS
 III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

7/enc
 10 May 1966

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COMMAND DIRECTORY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER "PARCHMENT" OR AS INDICATED</u>	<u>DATE</u>
CG III MAF	LtGen	WALT, L. W.	6, DANANG 6100	8/57
Senior Aide	Maj	FRIBERCHS, F. G.	13	9/67
Aide	*Capt	JOHNSON, R. K.	13	9/66
Aide	1stLt	WINDHAM, D. D. M.	13	8/66
Political Advisor	Mr.	THOMSON, S. B.	DANANG 6293	7/66
<u>CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION</u>				
Chief of Staff	BGen	PLATT, J. M.	5, DANANG 6383 or DANANG 6100	12/66
Dep. Chief of Staff	Col	GLEDEN, E. G. Jr.	32, DANANG 6383	8/66
Staff Secretary	Maj	CORREVEAU, O. J.	38, DANANG 6100	8/66
Admin Asst to the Chief of Staff	2ndLt	EMMI, J. P.	38, DANANG 6100	3/67
<u>G-1 SECTION</u>				
G-1	Col	GALBREATH, D. W.	1	7/66
Asst G-1	LtCol	REDALEN, D. L.	101	9/66
<u>G-2 SECTION</u>				
G-2	Col	FISHER, G. H.	2	8/66
Asst G-2	LtCol	WILSON, A. A. Jr.	2	2/67
Cmbt Intell Off	Capt	PLICK, W. H.	202	8/66
Asst Plans/Intell Off	Maj	BAKER, W. H.	202	1/67
SEC/Plans/Int	Maj	BUCK, J. A.	202	6/66
Intell Specialist	Maj	HERBERT, C. G. COC	102	2/67
Force CI Off	Maj	BROWER, C. W.	702	11/66
OC/SPL Intell Off	Maj	PURCHLEY, J. C.	602	9/66
Asst Cmbt Intell Off	Capt	ARMSTRONG, S. A. COC	602	2/67
Target Off	Capt	CARRON, J. P. COC	702	2/67
Asst Cmbt Intell Off	Capt	CHARRA, M. D. COC	102	5/67
Statistical Off	2ndLt	BANKS, J. F.	602	8/66

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G-4 SECTION

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G-3	Col	CHAISSON, J. R.	3	2/67
Ops Off	Col	WEGLEY, D. E.	103	7/66
Dep G-3	Col	WEST, R. E.	103	5/67
LNC	Col	WICKOFF, D. P.	448 TIGER	6/66
LNO	LtCol	WILW, G. D.	448 TIGER	8/66
Ops Off-Air	LtCol	WINDS, A. R.	103	9/66
Ops Off Ground	LtCol	SCHARBERG, G. R.	103	6/66
R&D Off	LtCol	WATSON, P. B. Jr.	503	11/66
Asst Cons Off/OIC	LtCol	WEBSTER, C. A.	403 COC	8/66
Asst Plans Off	Maj	WEDSON, R. E.	503	8/66
Asst Ops Off-Air	Maj	WIBICH, M. J.	103	2/67
Admin Off	Maj	MCCONNELL, W. M.	103	2/67
Asst Plans Off	Maj	RAPP, J. M.	503	3/67
Watch Off	Maj	ROSENBERG, H. A.	103 COC	3/67
Trng Off/COC Watch	Maj	ROSENBERG, H. A.	103 COC	3/67
LNO KMC	LtCol	ROSONG, IK PYO	124	
LNO 1st MarDiv	Maj	ROSONG, R.	503	11/66
LNO	Capt	CROWS, D. P.	448 TIGER	10/66
LNO	LtCol	PARTNER, M. T.	448 TIGER	9/66
COC Watch Off	LtCol	MOORE, D. W.	203 COC	4/67

G-4 SECTION

G-4	Col	CIBIK, S. J.	4	2/67
Asst G-4	Col	SMITH, J. N.	4	3/67
Log Plans Off	LtCol	SVARIL, W. J.	204/404	10/66
Log Ops Off	LtCol	ZLOGAR, A. J.	104	6/66
Asst LogOps Off	LtCol	MCCOOL, W. G.	104	3/67
Asst LogOps Off	Maj	DAVIS, L. O.	204	3/67
Asst LogPlans Off	Maj	JOHNSON, L. E.	404	3/67
Asst LogPlans Off (C)	Maj	SCHENCK, K. W.	404	4/67

G-5 SECTION

G-5	Col	McMURRAY, E. S.	301	2/67
Asst G-5	Col	FRIBOURG, L. P.	301	7/66
Asst G-5	LtCol	EVANS, D. L. Jr.	46	3/67
Med Ad. Off	LtCol	SANDERS, L. S.	401	10/66
CAC	Maj	MALCHER, P. P.	46	10/66
Rept Off	Capt	DOUGLAS, D. M.	46	3/67
Admin/Asst CAC	LtCol	DOUGLAS, D. M.	301	3/67
Payroll Officer	LtCol	ROSER, R. D.	401	6/66

G-6	Maj	ANDERSON, T. A.	103	2/67
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GENERAL OFFICER SECTION

Commander	Capt	VOYGT, W. A.	50	9/66
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SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

Special Services Off	Col	CORMAN, J. E.	37	8/66
Asst Spl Serv Off	Maj	SHERMAN, J. A. Jr.	37	2/67
Asst Spl Serv Off/ Custodian	1stLt	SMITH, D. H.	37	11/66
OIC China Beach	*1stLt	ROSENBERG, G. R.	MUTUAL, ask for China Beach	8/66
OIC R&R Program	*1stLt	SCHNACKENBERG, F. J.	44/241	9/66

TRANS/MAIL SECTION

Trans/ Mail Off	Maj	CRABB, G. F.	39	8/66
Asst Empl/Trans Off	Maj	FOSTER, J. A.	304	2/67

ADJUTANT SECTION

Asst Adjutant	1stLt	MOORE, B. L. Jr.	7	7/66
S&C Officer	1stLt	CAKES, M. A.	7/207	5/67
		MYERS, R. A.	107	12/66

REPRODUCTION SECTION

Reproduction Off	OWO-3	SPIKES, A. W.	307	3/67
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COMMAND CENTER

Director	1stCol	MOLERNAN, J. V.	105	6/66
Watch Off	Maj	GOWDY, R. J.	105	4/67
Watch Off	Capt	VAIL, A. L.	105	4/67
Watch Off	Capt	COLLINS, F. A.	105	4/67
Watch Off	1stLt	LUCKEY, S. A.	105	4/67

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

Chief in Charge	Col	STANLEY, G. M.	DANANG 6259	1/67
Asst CIO	Maj	STANLEY, M. J.	DANANG 6259	10/66
Asst CIO	Capt	WEC, M. R.	DANANG 6259	10/66
Asst CIO	2ndLt	BRADSHAW, J. E.	DANANG 6259	7/66
Asst PressO	2ndLt	FOCKNER, P. Jr.	DANANG 6259	8/66
PressO & Escort	W	SMITH, J. T.	DANANG 6259	6/66

EO SECTION

CEO	Col	HILL, J. B.	10	4/67
Asst CEO	Maj	FOCKNER, P. N.	210	1/67
Asst CEO	Maj	WELLS, H. G.	410	6/66
Asst CEO	Maj	HOLDS, R. R.	310	2/67
Exec Coord	Capt	BORDERS, J. R.	310	5/67

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FOOD SERVICES SECTION

Food Services Officer	LtCol	ROBERTS, H. G.	MOMENT 58	10/66
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HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY

Commanding Officer	Maj	PALONIS, A. J. Jr.	34	10/66
Executive Officer	Capt	MURKE, J. J.	134	5/67
Supply Officer	Capt	ASH, D. I.	221	12/66
Security Officer	Capt	SAENZ, O.	BEACH HOUSE	2/67
Motor Trans Off	1stLt	PEARCE, D. B.	135	4/67
Admin Off	CWO	WARD, G. B.	134	2/67
S-3	Capt	PRATHER, G. D.	221	6/66
S-4	1stLt	HANKINS, P. T.	221	3/66

LEGAL SECTION

Legal Officer	Col	PELTZER, V. A.	17	7/66
Law Officer, Navy- Marine Corps Judicial Activity RVN	LtCol	WANDER, W. W.	17	5/67

MEDICAL SECTION

Medical Officer	Capt	WULFMAN, W. A.	16	7/66
Asst Med Officer	Cmdr	GAY, L. W.	16	8/66

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Force Chaplain	Capt	BARRETT, P. I.	19	10/66
Asst Force Chaplain	Lt	RADASKY, R. M.	19	8/66

DENTAL SECTION

Force Dental Off	Capt	LONGREEN, E. J.	40	7/66
Dental Admin Off	Lt	NEILL, G. S.	40	5/67

VEHICLE TRANSPORT SECTION

Motor Trans Officer	LtCol	KIRKMAN, P. W.	SHOVE 39	10/66
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ORDNANCE SECTION

Ordnance Off	Maj	BOWRON, W. F.	8	11/66
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PROTOCOL SECTION

Protocol Off	Maj	BROWN, R. E.	62, DANANG 6206	11/66
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POSTMASTER MARSHAL SECTION

Postmaster Marshal	Maj	HANDEE, L. H.	SHOVE 27	10/66
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ENGINEERING

Engineer Of	1stLt	HARMON, L. O.	15	8/66
Asst Engr	1stCol	HETRICK, L. W.	15	9/66
Chf Off	Capt	INGELS, E. T.	19	4/67

DATA PROCESSING

Data Processing Off	1stLt	GORMAN, M. W.	KIT CARSON (DPP 16)	7/66
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ADJUTANT SECTION

Adjutant	Col	TAFT, H. G.	11	8/66
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PARACHUTERS FLO

Commanding Officer	Col	AXFELL, G. O. Jr.	PITCHBLEND 6	10/66
G-1	Maj	WIND, H. J. Jr.	PITCHBLEND 1	4/67
G-2/Chf Mailer	1stCol	OLSON, W. C.	PITCHBLEND 50	9/66
G-3	1stCol	NELSON, W. L.	PITCHBLEND 3	12/66
Asst G-3	1stCol	TAFT, L. C.	PITCHBLEND 102	4/67
Asst G-3	Maj	HODGE, W. K.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
Asst G-3	Maj	SKAGENBERG, A. E.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
Asst G-3	Capt	HOLT, J. M.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
Asst G-3	Capt	KOZLOVSKY, J. R.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
GEO	1stLt	GORE, J. D.	PITCHBLEND 101	4/67
Asst G-3	1stLt	SMITH, C. W. Jr.	PITCHBLEND 203	4/67
G-4	1stCol	COOK, R. M.	PITCHBLEND 4	4/67
Asst G-4	Maj	KNOBEL, W. H.	PITCHBLEND 4	4/67
Adjutant	Maj	JOHANSEN, C.	PITCHBLEND 7	4/67
Personnel	Maj	KENT, J. A.	PITCHBLEND 101	4/67
SAC OFF	2ndLt	CRAIG, T. P.	PITCHBLEND 50	4/67

DANANG REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE STAFF

Real Prop Chf	1stCol	DANGLBY, G. R.	DANANG 6257	8/66
Asst A-6	1stCol	DANGLBY, D. G. Jr.	DANANG 6257	9/66
Asst Real Prop Chf	Chf	RAMBY, R. L.	DANANG 6257	9/67

* Denotes functional, joint, or attached duty.

Report errors, changes, and/or omissions to the Force Adjutant, PARCHMENT 7.

[Signature]
 LtCol USMC
 Force Adjutant

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