

25. CG III MAF 151636Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: SITREP 150350-151800H
26. CG III MAF 161632Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE and LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Situation Report 151800H-161800H
27. CG III MAF 171542Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 161800H - 171800H
28. CG III MAF 181632Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 171800H - 181800H
29. CG III MAF 191648Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 181800H - 192200H
30. CG III MAF 201750 May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 192200H - 202200H
31. CG III MAF 211814Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 202100H - 212200H
32. CG III MAF 221558Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 212200H - 222200H
33. CG III MAF 231628Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 222200H to 221800H
34. CG III MAF 241622Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for General GREENE info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 232200 to 242200
35. CG III MAF 251516Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 242200H to 252200H
36. CG III MAF 261552Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 252200H - 262200H

37. CG III MAF 271438Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 262200 - 272200
38. CG III MAF 291502Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 282200H - 292200H
39. CG III MAF 301458Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Significant events during period 292200H - 302200H
40. CG III MAF 311352Z May 66 (SECRET) Gp-4  
Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT  
Subj: Significant Events during period 302200H - 311400H



PARTY CP AND WANTED TO TALK TO GEN DIEM. HE CAME TO III NAF CP AND REMAINED ALL DAY/

AT 0927 GEN VIEN DECLINED GEN WALT'S INVITATION TO VISIT III NAF FOR A CONFERENCE , STATING THAT PREMIER KY WAS EXPECTED AT I CORPS

AT 0935 GEN WHEELER CALLED AND TOLD CG III NAF TO CONTINUE DOING WHAT HE HAD BEEN DOING TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND RECOMMENDED THAT CG III NAF TALK TO LT GEN VIEN AND TO PRIME MINISTER KY IF HE CAME TO DANANG. AFTER SEVERAL EXCHANGES , CG III NAF WENT TO I CORPS HQ AND DISCUSSED MATTERS WITH GEN VIEN, PARTICULARLY ON THE STATUS OF GEN DIEM. LATER, AT ABOUT 1000, CG III NAF WAS ADVISED BY WASHINGTON (STATE

ADVISED THAT HE SHOULD VISIT PRIME MINISTER KY IN DANANG AND SOLICIT VIENS AND PLANS FOR DANANG.

DURING THIS PERIOD GEN DIEM ISSUED ORDERS TO COL YEL AT HOI AN TO KEEP 39TH RANGERS AT HOI AN. THIS ORDER WAS OBEYED/ AT ONE TIME DURING BELIEVED MOVEMENT OF ARVN FORCES NORTH FROM HOI AN AND SOUTH FROM HUE, VNAF AIRCRAFT BUZZED AND STRAFFED COLUMNS. CG III NAF REQUESTED GEN

TO HALT TROOP MOVEMENTS AND . THROUGH SENIOR ADVISOR TO VNAF REQUESTED STRAFFING BE STOPPED. AT 1155, COL LOAN REPLIED THAT THEY DID'FT WANT

FOUR RUNNIF 767 S E C R E T NOFORN

WASHED AND WERE TAKING ALL MEANS TO PREVENT IT: THEY ASKED AMERICANS TO BE PATIENT BECAUSE THEY (VNAF) WERE TAKING CALCULATED RISKS TO MAINTAIN GOVERNMENT STABILITY.

AT 1115 PRIME MINISTER KY ARRIVED AT DANANG AIR BASES AND WENT TO THE HQ.

AT 1140 A REQUEST WAS RECEIVED FROM ADVISORY GROUP AS TO WHETHER ADVISORS SHOULD STAY WITH ARVN. THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO STAY WITH ARVN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TO PREVENT CONFLICT, BUT THAT THEY WERE NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN FIGHTING . THE ADVISORS WERE THE 1ST AND 2D ADVISORY BATTAL. THEY DID NOT ACCOMPANY THEM IN OPERATIONS IN DANANG BUT REMAINED IN DA

AT 1210 I CORPS G-6 ADVISOR STATED THAT THE 11TH DTA WOULD BE USED TO DEFEND THE 11TH DTA. THE 11TH DTA WOULD BE USED TO DEFEND THE 11TH DTA. THE 11TH DTA WOULD BE USED TO DEFEND THE 11TH DTA. THE 11TH DTA WOULD BE USED TO DEFEND THE 11TH DTA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

CALL FOR GENERAL STRIKE COMMENCED AT 1400H. THREE MEMBERS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION AND 1000 OF THE 2ND AIR CONTROL TOWER AND INSTRUCTING ALL VNAF AIRCRAFT TO LAND.

AT 1200, 150 RIOT TROOPS LANDED AT DANANG AB. THE TROOPS CARRIED SHIELDS. CONCURRENTLY 10 VNAF HELOS CONTAINING VNAF TROOPS DEPARTED DANANG AND HEADED TOWARD THE COASTLINE. DESTINATION STILL UNKNOWN AT CLOSE OF PERIOD.

AT 1300 GENERAL DINH, GENERAL CO, MAJOR VIEN, B/S DUONG, B/S HATT, COL HANDLEN AND MAJOR NIN (AIDE TO DINH) MET IN CONFERENCE AT VNAF COMPOUND. GENERAL CO STATED THAT THEY DESIRED GEN DINH TO

SAIGON AND THAT HE COULD GUARANTEE HIS WELL BEING; GENERAL DINH POINTED OUT THAT HIS HOME HAD BEEN FIRED UPON. GENERAL CO STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT HIM BUT THAT THEY DID NOT WANT A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. GENERAL CO STATED THAT GENERAL DINH WAS TO CONTINUE AS CO OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION. GENERAL CO STATED THAT HE HAD NO COMMAND OVER THE RIOT TROOPS WHO WERE TO REMAIN WITH THE HELOS; THEY WERE TO REMAIN WITH THE HELOS. GENERAL CO STATED THAT OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN DANANG. GENERAL CO STATED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING CONDUCTED BY DANANG. GENERAL CO STATED THAT GENERAL HATT WAS TO MEET THE AMBASSADOR. NO AMBASSADOR WAS PRESENT AND FORGIVE

SECRET NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF THE SECTION  
FOR GENERAL ORDER TO GET THE SECTION TO GET HATT  
GENERAL DINH  
ARMED FORCES  
DINH

... AT 1645 ARMED FORCES ... THE INTERSECTION OF ... AT 1705 I TOC REPORTS THAT ... AT 1710 MARINE NPS REPORTED ... THROUGHOUT REMAINDER OF AFTERNOON ... CONSOLIDATE AND SECURE IMPORTANT INSTALLATIONS AND KEY STREETS

RESISTANCE AT THE ... PERIOD THEY HELD THE ... COMPOUND, CITY HALL ... BARRICKADING THE ... SECRET AT 1600 AFTER ... APPROXIMATELY 4000 PEOPLE ... AT 1600 A RAINSTORM BROKE UP

PAGE THREE RUNNY 789 S E C R E T NOFORN  
THE CROWDS AND AT 1600 HAS NOT REFORMED.

THE ENTIRE REPORTING PERIOD WAS MARKED BY SHOCK AND CONFUSION  
PART OF THE POPULACE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RADIO STATION NO

RESUBSTANCE WAS MET AS THE VNCF AND ABN FORCES MOVED THROUGH THE CITY  
THE SITUATION IS TENSE AND VOLATILE AND HOLDS THE POSSIBILITY OF

FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS AND / OR COMMENTS ARE BELIEVED SIGNIFICANT  
A. NEITHER KYI CO, OR LTCENVIEN HAVE ADMITTED KNOWING ANYTHING  
ABOUT VNAF HELOS DELIVERING ARMS TO BANG DIEN LAST WEEK / THIS IS  
HARD TO BELIEVE

B. A VNAF CAPTAIN WHO HAS BEEN A RELIABLE SOURCE IN THE PAST  
ADVISOR THAT TODAY'S OPERATION AGAINST DANANG HAD BEEN PLANNED

C. CO AND VIEN ALLEGE THAT THEY HAD REPORTS FROM 1ST RANGERS  
TALION THAT STRUGGLE FORCES WERE GOING TO TAKE OVER IN DANANG.

DID NOT GO THROUGH I CORPS NOR WAS ... TO QUOTE REINFORCE END QUOTE ...

D. SOON AFTER ... BEEN FOR ...

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**S E C R E T** WORKFORM SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS  
SUBMITTED FOR GENERAL STAFF AND LTGEN YRULAK FROM LTGEN WALS  
OPERATION REPORT 111000 141000

FOLLOWING ARE SIGNS AND SYMBOLS REPORTING PERA  
DURING 1965-1966 AND 1967-1968



RETURNED TO GEN VALT'S QUARTERS WHERE HE REMAINED AT HIS OWN REQUEST.

4. DURING MORNING HOP UP OPERATIONS CONTINUED IN DANANG, PARADES WERE BLOCKED OFF BY VMC AND ARVN TROOPS. CIVILIAN WORKERS WERE PERMITTED TO ENTER BASE BY VMC TROOPS. SOME ARVN WORKERS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DETAINED. VMC TROOPS SUPPORTED BY TANKS MOVED THROUGHOUT TOWN DESTROYING STORES AND CIVILIANS AND REMOVING THE STORES. ROCKETS OF VMC TROOPS APPEARED TO CENTER ON PARADES WHICH APPEARED TO BE BEING HELD BY SANDINHAS/ THE VN MARINES APPEARED TO BE MOVING THROUGHOUT MOST OF TOWN WITH THE INTENT OF DESTROYING STORES AND CIVILIANS AND IN VEST. LATER CIVILIANS APPEARED TO BE PERMITTED CIVILIANS TO GO BACK TO WORK AND CIVILIAN WORKERS/ OTHERS ADVISED THAT MEETING OF VMC TROOPS AND OFFICERS TO CLOSE SCHOOLS AND STOPS AND PROTEST IN DANANG. THE MAIN PROVINCIAL PARADE APPEARED TO BE BEING HELD. ALLEGEDLY PRESENT AT PARADE ARE HAYOR NAM AND POLICE CHIEF NGO. THIS REPORT IS UNCONFIRMED.

IN EAST DANANG THE ARVN 10TH ENGINEER BATTALION AND ONE COMPANY OF 51ST ARVN REGIMENT WERE REPORTED (BY ADVISOR) TO HAVE

PAGE FIVE DOKE 027 S E C R E T NORFON  
ESTABLISHED DEFENSIVE LINE ACROSS THE PENINSULA FROM FERRY LANDING NEAR NEM III HAF UP TO BEAKH. COMMANDER OF 51ST COMPANY SAID HE WOULD DEFEND HIS CAMP (NEAR TIEN SHA). HE CLAIMED HE WAS ON SIDE OF GOVERNMENT BUT WILL OPPOSE FORCE.

5. AT ABOUT 1215H VNAF ADVISOR REPORTED THAT COL LOAN TALKED TO HIM THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT THAT III HAF WOULD FIRE ON VNAF AIRCRAFT IF THEY PATROLLED ROUTE ONE NORTH SOUTH OF DANANG. IT WAS LATER LEARNED THAT THIS REPORT WAS PASSED TO PREMIER KY/ THIS REPORT WAS EITHER BADLY GARBLED BY PERSON THROUGH WHOM IT WAS PASSED OR DELIBERATELY DISTORTED/

NOT  
REASABLE  
FOREIGN  
FUNCTIONALS

FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:  
III HAF RECEIVED A REPORT THAT VNAF WAS GOING TO ATTACK ARVN AT TIME AND PLACE UNKNOWN TO III HAF. III HAF ADVISED STAFF CORPS HQ THAT THERE WERE US ADVISORS WITH ARVN UNITS. THAT ATTACKS WOULD ENDANGER US ADVISORS, AND THAT IF SUCH ATTACK PLACE WE WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PROTECT AMERICA WITH OUR AIRCRAFT. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS VNAF HAS BEEN

SECRET

SECRET NORFOLK FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE AND LTGEN KHELAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
CO AND THIU TO RETAIN THEIR POWERS AND POSITIONS. DINH SAID  
IT WAS NOT A BAD MAN, AND RECEIVED, AND ACCEPTED, VERY BAD ADVICE.  
DINH IS OBVIOUSLY AFRAID TO RETURN TO SAIGON AT PRESENT TIME  
AND BEING GENUINELY FEARED OF LONG RANGE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT  
ACTIVITIES IN DANANG.

1. AT 1030 GEN CAO ARR DANANG BY VNAF C-47, MET BY GEN PLATT,  
GEN FRIEND, COL HANBLEN AND LTCOL NUNG (CO 41ST TFW, VNAF). CAO  
REQUESTED MEETING WITH GEN WALT AND AIRBORNE BROADCAST SUPPORT.  
CAO THEN LEFT FOR VNAF HQ; LATER WENT TO I CORPS CP. AT 1330  
HE ARR III NAF CP. MET WITH GEN WALT AND HAD LUNCH IN HIS OFFICE.

PAGE TWO DDKE 828 SECRET NORFOLK  
CAO MADE FOLLOWING POINTS: HE DID NOT WANT JOB AS CG I CORPS BUT  
ACCEPTED BECAUSE HE WAS VOTED IN UNANIMOUSLY BY ARMED FORCES  
COUNCIL; HE WAS A NATIVE OF HUE AND HAS A COUSIN WHO IS HIGHLY  
PLACED IN BUDDHISTS HIERARCHY WHO WOULD QUOTE TAKE CARE OF HIM  
AND QUOTE; HE WAS AN OLD FRIEND OF DINH AND NHUAN; HE WAS BEST  
LEADER MAN IN ARMY; AND HE WOULD GO BACK TO SAIGON IF DIVISION  
COMMANDERS DID NOT ACCEPT HIM. CAO SPECIFICALLY MADE POINT THAT  
HE REQUESTED THAT HE BE MADE CG I CORPS BY GOVERNMENTAL DECREE  
AND BY MESSAGE AS HAD BEEN THE CASE WITH DINH. FROM 1430 TO 1600  
CAO WAS BRIEFED BY III NAF STAFF ON INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONAL  
AND POLITICAL ACTION MATTERS. AT 1600 HE MET WITH GENERAL DINH AT GEN  
QUARTERS. GEN PLATT ACCOMPANIED HIM AT HIS REQUEST. CAO AND G  
MET ABOUT ONE HOUR. DINH REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN CHANGE OF  
COMMAND POINTING OUT... THAT CAO COULD TAKE OVER SINGLY AS HE SA  
HE STATED DINH TOO YOUNG TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO VISIT MAJOR I  
HE DID NOT WANT THIN... GEN PLATT HE NEEDED A PLAN

REMAINED AT GEN WALT'S QUARTERS FOR BREAKFAST AND IS SPENDING THE MORNING  
S. FROM 1648 TO 1745 WMAF HELD WITH III MAF EQUIPMENT BROADCAST  
OVER DOWNTOWN DANANG USING WMAF TAPE INTRODUCED CAO AS NEW CORPS  
COMMANDER WHO APPEARED TO BE A CIVILIAN AND MILITARY FORCE TO BAND TOGETHER  
IN SUPPORT OF THE USMC. III MAF PSY WAR OFFICERS  
ADVISED THAT THE  
A. ADVISORS REMAINING IN DANANG WERE IN USA AT DANANG EAST AND  
DANANG WEST HEADQUARTERS. ADVISORS WERE MORE THAN NORMAL THROUGHOUT  
OPERATION WMAF. ADVISORS DID RESTRICTIONS ON  
VEHICULAR AND PERSONAL  
ADVISORS REMAINING IN DANANG WERE EXCEPT BLACK PANTHER COMPANY  
THE ADVISOR WITH THE BLACK PANTHER COMPANY ORDERED BACK FROM FORWARD POST  
TO PHU LOC SECTOR HEADQUARTERS. ADVISORS WERE WITH VMC OR ARVN  
BATTALIONS.

AT 1400 ALL USMC AIRCRAFT WERE DIRECTED BY III MAF TO AVOID FL  
WITHIN TWO MILES OF HAI VAN PASS EXCEPT IN OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY.  
WMAF PLANES WERE URGED TO REMAIN CLEAR ALSO BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE  
CONFRONTATION IN THAT AREA.  
16. FOLLOWING EVENTS NOT INCLUDED YESTERDAY'S SITREP HAVE ASSUMED  
GREATER SIGNIFICANCE IN LIGHT OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

PAGE FOUR DDKESSES S E C R E T NORFORN

A. AT APPROXIMATELY 150000 GEN DINH MADE HIS WAY VIA VEHICLE TO  
WALT'S QUARTERS. ENROUTE GEN DINH AVOIDED AN ARMORED COLUMN THAT  
APPEARED TO BE AFTER HIM. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS INDICATED HIS HQ  
WAS FINE ON; THIS TENDING CONFIRM DINH'S STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT.  
B. BETWEEN 150500 AND 150600 THERE WERE NUMEROUS REPORTS FROM  
DANANG OF LOUD EXPLOSIONS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE THROUGHOUT THE  
CITY; AN ARVN SOLDIER WAS OBSERVED INDISCRIMINATELY THROUGH  
15-15 GRENADES NEAR THE PUBLIC WORKS COMPOUND. THESE EVENTS TOOK  
PLACE PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE VMC INTO I CORPS HQS AND DANANG  
DANANG WHICH STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THEY WERE STAGED TO SIMULATE  
ACTION.

C. AT 151000 TWO WMAF A-1'S BUZZED AND ESCORTED TWO USMC  
HELICOPTERS TO DANANG. THIS ACTION WAS PROTECTED BY THE  
USMC.

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REQUIREMENTS

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SECRET NOFORN SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS  
 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT

1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING REPORTING PERIOD 161800H - 171800H.
2. THE EVENING HOURS WERE GENERALLY QUIET AS THE VMC AND ABN FORCES CONTINUED TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL OF DANANG. AT 161900H A LOUDSPEAKER MOVED THROUGH DANANG PROCLAIMING LTGEN CAO AS THE NEW I CORPS COMMANDER AND A MESSAGE FROM HIM TO THE PEOPLE QUOTE TO TRUST HIM AND HE WILL LEAD THEM TO A BETTER WAY OF LIFE UNQUOTE. A HELO VETERAN REQUESTED THE CANH SAT (LOCAL POLICE) TO GO BACK TO WORK THROUGHOUT AND FOR ALL SHOPS TO REOPEN. PAMPHLETS DROPPED READ QUOTE NO MORE STRIKES RETURN THINGS TO NORMAL. THANK YOU GIB (GIB) AND DANANG THANKS THE LIBERATION TROOPS UNQUOTE.
3. AT 162825 3D MARDIV REPORTED THAT NEW RADIO BROADCAST AN ORDER FROM COLONEL NO I CORPS RF COMMANDER FOR ALL RF UNITS TO PROCEED TO DANANG TO FIGHT AGAINST PRO-KV FORCES.
4. AT 170700 GEN CAO REQUESTED TO SEE GEN VALT AT III MAF CP. ARRIVED AT 0730. IN LONG HANELING CONVERSATION IN GENERAL VALT'S OFFICE DURING NEARLY TWO HOURS OF WAITING FOR CAO TO DEPART FOR CAO MADE NUMBER OF INTERESTING POINTS:
  - A. CAO TWICE REFERRED TO "FULL U.S. SUPPORT" AND "DECISION FROM WASHINGTON" IN REGARD TO SITUATION IN FIRST DIVISION. AT ONE HE SAID IT WILL TAKE TWO DIVISIONS TO RESTORE CONTROL OVER THE DIVISION AND "KEEP AREA FROM BECOMING COMMUNIST". AT ANOTHER HE SAID "ONE DIVISION EITHER US OR KOREAN LANDED BY SEA ALONG PARALLEL WILL SOLVE PROBLEM."
  - B. CAO REPORTED LONG CONVERSATION WITH GEN VALT ON THE EVENING OF MAY 16. CAO SAID HE WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH VALT'S VIEW ON THE NEW INTO NORTH VIETNAM.

CG III MAF

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TO FOREIGN  
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TO HUE, SAYING THAT IF NHUAN SAW HIM, NHUAN WOULD BE KILLED BY PEOPLE. TRI QUANG ALSO TRIED TO CONVINCe CAO TO RETURN TO SAIGON OR RESIGN COMMISSION RATHER THAN SERVE GOVERNMENT IN "OPPRESSION" OF CENTER. TRI QUANG REFUSED TO SEE HIM UNLESS HE DECLARED FOR STRUGGLE GROUP.

C. CAO SAID HE RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS: HE IS AN OFFICER DOING JOB. HAD NO CHOICE. HOPED TO SAVE GENERAL VIET NAM AS WELL AS NATION. HE HOPED THAT IF HE WAS KILLED DOING HIS DUTY TRI QUANG WOULD TAKE CARE OF HIS CHILDREN.

D. CAO THEN SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO SAIGON, WHO HAD INFORMED HIM HE WAS TO OFFER BOTH THI AND BINH RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS IF THEY WOULD RETURN TO SAIGON. THI WAS TO BE IMPROVED THAT IF HE DID NOT RETURN IN THE DAYS HE WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN OUTLAW.

E. DURING CONVERSATION CAO SPoke BY PHONE TO BINH, WHO SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GO TO HUE WITH CAO TO EXPLAIN SITUATION TO TRI QUANG. CAO RELATED CONVERSATION TO GENERAL VALT ASKING THAT BINH GO, BUT THAT GENERAL VALT AND POLAD ALSO ADVISED HIM, AND THAT HE CAN LEAVE VERY SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING TO HUE. THE POSSIBILITY THAT BINH AND TRI QUANG ATTEMPT TO CONTACT HIM, AS WELL AS VALT AND POLAD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO STAY IN THE AREA TO STRICTLY MILITARY

PERFORMANCES BY CAO AT DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND NOT CONFINE TO POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS MATTERS. BINH SAID HE WOULD TRY TO RELAY

5. AT 170700 AO REPORTED HUE AND SAIGON DURING. AT 170955 NPS REPORTED THAT THE HQ OF THE 1ST DIVISION AT HUE WAS MOVING A PLATOON TO INTERSECTION OF HIGHWAY 1 AND 1901500, HQ OF NDOAI-0 POLICE STATION NOW UNDER CONTROL OF STRUGGLE FORCE.

6. AT 171000H CAO DEPARTED III CORPS IN ADVISOR'S HELICOPTER ACCOMPANIED BY BOEN PLATT C/S III CORPS AND MR. HANSEN DEP AN AM CORPS PLUS ARVN AIDE AND OFFICER PHOTOGRAPHER. ARRIVED AT DIVISION 1830. MET BY LOCAL ENDA, PROVINCE CHIEF AND SENIOR ARVN OFFICER PRESENT. CAO HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT GEN NHUAN HAD IN DAMANG AND SAIGON THAT HE WAS SICK AND HAD DESIGNATED KHOA TO ACT HIS ABSENCE.

A. AFTER HONOR GUARD AND GREETING SOME OF DIVISION STAFF CAO WAS GIVEN A ROUTINE G-2/G-3 BRIEFING AT CONCLUSION OF WHICH HE MADE A 10-MINUTE SPEECH. DIVISION G-3 THEN TOLD HER 3 SHIPS WERE LANDING SWMC DNS NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS. BOTH CAO AND PLATT DERIVED THIS RUMOR.

B. AT ABOUT 1101 CAO TOOK DEPARTURE FROM HUE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED FOR PART OF JOURNEY BY...

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

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... NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO STOP OR OTHERWISE CONTROL CROWD AT  
EVEN THOUGH PLATT TOLD KHOA TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. CAO, VISIBLY  
DISTURBED, RAPIDLY BOARDED HELO. CROWD, INCLUDING PHOTOGRAPHERS,  
CLOSED IN AND JUST PRIOR TO TAKE OFF AN ARVN OFFICER FIRED TWICE  
AT HELO FROM ABOUT 50 FEET WITH 45 CAL PISTOL. ARMY GUNNER, AFTER  
SECOND ROUND WAS FIRED, OPENED UP WITH A 5 TO 6 ROUND BURST WITH  
MACHINE GUN. HELO TOOK OFF. LATER DETERMINED IT HAD ONE BULLET  
HOLE IN TAIL ROTOR DRIVE MECHANISM. SENIOR ADVISOR 1ST ARVN REPORTS  
THAT ONE ARVN 2D LT WAS KIA; 6 OTHER ARVN WERE WOUNDED; THREE  
SERIOUSLY. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THERE WAS OTHER FIRING WHICH MIGHT  
HAVE CAUSED SOME OF THE CASUALTIES.

AT HIS REQUEST CAO LANDED AT III MAF CP WHERE PARTY HAD LUNCH. CAO  
VISIBLY SHAKEN, WAS NOT KEEN ON CONTINUING ON TO QUANG NGAI BUT  
WAS PERSUADED ALL WOUND BEGIN GOOD DINNER AT 2D ARVN DIVISION.  
SAME PARTY DEPARTED FOR QUANG NGAI AT 1515 IN USMC HELO. MET AT  
HELO PAD BY GEN LAN AND DR HOANG, PROVINCIAL CHIEF, GUARD AND BAND  
WERE PARADED; ROUTINE 8-2/8-3 BRIEFING WAS CONDUCTED; CAO HAD 45  
MINUTE PRIVATE SESSION WITH LAN. ON WAY TO HELO CAO AND LAN TALKED  
ABOUT EACH OTHER. AFTER TAKE OFF CAO, VISIBLY PLEASED! STATED LAN  
V&S WITH HIM.

PARTY RETURNED TO I CORPS CP WHERE CAO HAD MEETING WITH STAFF  
OFFICERS AND LOCAL COMMANDERS.

7. AT 1835 AO REPORTED THAT ARVN FORCES BELIEVED TO BE FROM 184 IN  
BN OCCUPIED POSN EAST SIDE OF BRIDGE (2443761) WHILE ONE COMPANY  
OCCUPIED POSN WEST SIDE OF BRIDGE (2443760). NEITHER SIDE WAS MOVING  
HOWEVER, MORTARS AND MACHINE GUNS WERE IN POSN.

8. AT 171100 VINH CO PROCEEDED ACROSS BRIDGE TO EAST SIDE AND ESTABLISHED  
POSN WITHIN 400 METERS OF THE ARVN FORCES. AT 1250 800 III  
MAF REQUESTED GEN CAO TO WITHDRAW HIS TROOPS TO WEST SIDE OF  
BRIDGE IN ORDER TO AVOID BLOODSHED. LATER AT 171500 III MAF AND 184TH  
BN HAD BROKEN DOWN AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT GEN CAO WAS RE-  
QUESTED TO MOVE THE VINH FORCES WITH WHOM HE WAS IN CONTACT. AT  
1900 THE VINH FORCES HAD WITHDRAWN TO THE WEST SIDE OF THE RIVER  
POSNS CURRENTLY OCCUPIED.

9. AT 171300 I TOC REPORTED VIA LT COL BROWN SA RF, THAT RF CO  
CHIEU DUC AT 947699), 785 (KY TDA ST 2443761) 786 CO AT HOI AN  
UNK CO ARE FORMING A BN UNDER CAPT TRUC. BELIEVED THE BN WILL  
VIC MARLE NT. HON UNK. AT 171500 304TH BN REPORTED VIA COL  
THAT LT COL KHOA (PROV CH AND MAYOR OF HOI AN) WAS ASKING 1ST ARVN  
CORPS, GENERAL NHUAN HAVING ASSIGNED SEVERAL OF ALLIED THAI  
BUDDHIST ARE BEING TOLD TO REMAIN OFF THE STREETS.

10. AT 1500 THERE WAS A DEMONSTRATION IN HOI AN INVOLVING APPROX  
PEOPLE WHICH LASTED UNTIL 1700. THEY MARCHED THROUGH THE STREETS  
PEACEFULLY CARRYING SIGNS READING ABOUT REMOVE GEN DINH. REMOVE  
GOVERNMENT TROOPS FROM DANANG, QUOTE.

11. AT 171755H HACH COC REPORTED THAT 10 C-47 AND ONE C-46 BEING  
DISPATCHED AT 171745 CARGO AND DESTINATION UNKNOWN. I TOC REPORTED  
7 VNAF C-47S WERE ENROUTE TO DANANG WITH VINH TROOPS.

12. GEN DINH AND PERSONNEL STAFF REMAINED AT GEN CAO'S QUARTERS  
THROUGHOUT DAY.

GP-4

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CG III MAF

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RELEASEABLE  
TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

**SECRET**

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FIRST MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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FM CG III MAF  
TO VJND/CMC

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INFO YNA/CG FMFPAC  
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**SECRET** NOFORN SSCTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LIGEN MRULAF FROM LIGEN WALT

1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING PERIOD 171800H TO 181800H.
2. THE REPORTING PERIOD HAS BEEN TENSE AND CHARACTERIZED BY TROOP MOVEMENTS AND COUNTER MOVEMENTS BY THE PRO-GOVERNMENT AND STRUGGLE GROUP FORCES. A NUMBER OF SMALL BUT SHARP FIRE FIGHTS OCCURRED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. DURING THE DAY THERE WERE A NUMBER OF REPORTS OF TROOP CONFRONTATIONS BUT NO MAJOR EXCHANGES OF FIRE.
3. AT 211500H DINH RECEIVED A PHONE CALL AT GEN WALT'S QUARTERS.

CG III MAF

0 181632Z MAY 66

FM III MAF

**SECRET**

AFTER THE CALL HE TOLD GEN WALT THAT HIS BROTHER WAS SICK AND MIGHT DIE. DINH REQUESTED HE TO TRANSFER TO HUE BEFORE DEPARTING. GEN WALT'S QUARTERS HE GAVE GEN WALT A NOTE SAYING HE WAS GOING TO HUE AND THAT HE WOULD BE BACK IN DANANG FOR THE CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY AT I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. DINH LEFT THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION ADVISORY GROUP FOR RETURN TO TRANSPORTATION.

4. AT 172120H, REPORT RECEIVED THAT 44 CIVILIAN GROUP HAVE BROKEN INTO THE ARMORY AT HOA SAH AND TAKEN WEAPONS AND AMMO. A RF COMPANY FROM HUE WENT TO JOIN THE STRUGGLE FORCES IN DANANG.

5. AT 172230H, NSA REPORTS ARVN FORCE BELIEVED TO HAVE FIRED FIRE FROM VICINITY NEW MAF CP INTO DANANG AND DESTROYED WHITE ELEPHANT.

6. AT 172240H, 3D MARDIV REPORTED A BOMB EXPLOSION KILLED SEVEN ARVN AND VNMC AT INTERSECTION OF HWY 19 AND 19A.

7. AT 180620H, MACV REPORTED 32D RANGERS IN CONTACT WITH ENEMY POSSIBLY TO DANANG. ETD 180830H.

8. AT ABOUT 0800 DINH PHONED COL BOSTON AND ASKED HIM TO COME TO THE GOVERNMENT DELTA.

PAGE THREE DDKE 0345 E C R E T NOFORN

BOSTON ARRIVED DINH THANKED BOSTON FOR HIS SERVICE AND ASKED BOSTON TO BE HIS LIAISON TO GEN WALT. UP CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY, NHUAN SAID HE WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND COULD NOT ATTEND. DINH MADE NO COMMENT. THE BROTHER BROUGHT UP YESTERDAY'S INCIDENT WITH THE HELICOPTER, STATING THAT TRICH TRI QUANG THAT HE WAS IN ERROR BECAUSE THE AMERICAN POINTED THE PISTOL FIRST AND AMERICAN GUNNER FIRED IN SELF-DEFENSE.

9. AT 0930 GEN WALT AND POLAD MET WITH GEN LAM AT ORU LAC.

10. AT 180940H, NSA REPORTED ARVN 104 ENG COMPANY STILL OCCUPIED EAST END OF I CORPS BRIDGE. AN ARVN OFFICER STATED THAT THE BRIDGE WAS RIGGED FOR DEMO AND WOULD BE BLOWN IF VNMC FORCES WENT TO CROSS.

11. AT 181000H G-2SI CORPS REPORTED APPROX 2000 PEOPLE HAD GATHERED AT THE DIEC BE PAGODA IN HUE. 2D LT THUC'S BODY WILL BE PARADED THROUGH TOWN TO THE YU DAN PAGODA.

12. I CORPS CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY SCHEDULED FOR 1100H. CG AND C/SSIII MAF AND CG 1ST MAW ATTENDED ALONG WITH POLAD AND USAID AND JUSPOA REPS. PARTY WAITED IN I CORPS COMMANDER'S OFFICE. PREMIER KY, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER CO, CHIEF OF JCS VIEN, MARINE COMMANDANT KHANG, I CORPS COMMANDER CAO AND NUMEROUS VN AND US COLONELS WERE ALSO WAITING. AT 1130 PARTY MOVED TO I CORPS BRIEFING

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
120000Z  
FIELD MAIL ROOM, FALCON

BEFORE 0005034 SECRET NOFORN  
WHERE MOST OF I CORPS STAFF WERE PRESENT. LT COL. PHAM THO HOANG,  
SISTANT G-3, READS PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING CAO AS COMBAT COMMANDER.  
I CORPS FLAG WAS PASSED FROM COLOR GUARD. CAO GAVE SHORT  
SPEECH ON DANGEROUS SITUATION AND GREAT RESPONSIBILITY PASSING ON  
TO CAO. CAO RESPONDED BRIEFLY, ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY. GENERAL  
CONGRATULATED CAO ON NEWS ASSIGNMENT. LARGEST SINGLE COMPANY MEMORIAL  
ON, WAS PRESS CORPS.

FOLLOWING CEREMONY GROUP ADJOURNED BACK TO COMBAT COMMANDER'S  
OFFICE WHERE KY DELIVERED 5 MINUTE INFORMAL SPEECH. KY  
EXPRESSED HIMSELF TO CURRENT DANGEROUS SITUATION AND THE  
GOVERNMENT ACTION IN JUNAG, Y EXPLAINED THAT GOVERNMENT  
WAS NOT SECRETLY OPPOSITE TO ALL AMERICANS BECAUSE HIS WAS  
POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY OPERATION HE KILLED FOR CLOSE TO ALL FIELD  
REMINING THE ALICE OF THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE  
AND THE REEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. KY  
ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS SENDING EMISSA TO SEE PRESIDENT  
NIXON TO EXPLAIN SITUATION TO HIM DIRECTLY.

FOLLOWING KY'S REMARKS GENERAL WALKSUD ALL AMERICANS OF I  
CORPS WERE WORKING TO HELP GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND WOULD HAVE  
GENERAL CAO FULL COOPERATION.

C. ALTHOUGH PUCH WAS NEXT ON SCHEDULE, ALL GENERALS HELD HALF HOUR  
MIDDLE WITH COLONEL LOAN, APPARENTLY PLANNING OPERATIONS WITH SOME  
STRUGGLE ELEMENT IN DANANG.

D. LUNCH BEGAN AT 1245 HOURS AND ENDED AT 1330 WITHOUT ANY  
EVENTS.

E. PRIOR TO LUNCH CAO CALLED PLATT ASIDE AND TOLD HIM, INTER ALIA,  
THAT LOAN WAS MOVING TROOPS WITHOUT CONSULTING HIM. HE GAVE AS AN  
EXAMPLE, THAT THE 112H RANGER BATTALION (QUOTE THE BATTALION THAT WAS  
USED TO OVERTHROW DINH END QUOTE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE SO IN SAIGON BUT  
WAS NOT REMAINING IN DANANG.

13. AT 1049 I TOC REPORTED ROAD BLOCKS SET UP IN THE VIC OF THE  
INTERSECTION OF ONG ICH KHIM AND HOANG DIEU STREETS APPARENTLY BY  
STRUGGLE FORCES. FORCES ARE BEHIND ROADBLOCKS WITH BACKS TO FAGODA  
AND FACING VMC AND ABN FORCES. TWO VMC TANKS ARE IN VIC. CON-  
CURRENTLY ARMED FORCES POLICE REPORTED THAT 15 TRUCK LOADS ARVN  
RANGERS AND BUDDHIST MONKS WERE HEADED NORTH AT INTERSECTION HWY  
1A AND 1.

14. AT 1105H I TOC REPORTED ELEMENTS 11TH RANGERS LOADING INTO TRUCKS  
AT SOCCER STADIUM.

15. AT 1150H, ARMED FORCES SECURITY REPORTED THAT TEN C47'S AND  
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CG III MAF

0 181632Z MAY 66

3-7

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, RVN

SECRET NOFORN SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN LAM  
THREE C54'S HAVE LANDED. APPROX 820 TROOPS WERE IN  
FREIGHT. REPORTED TO BE THE 32D RANGERS.

16. AT 1300, I TOC REPORTED THAT ELEMENTS OF 11TH ARVN DIVISION  
XC HAD MOVED FROM SOCCER STADIUM TO UNKNOWN DESTINATION (MAYBE  
MAYN PAGODA). PG SO INFORMED US ADVISOR THAT HE WOULD NOT  
FIGHT OTHER RANGERS AND HE INTENDED TO SIT AROUND AND DRINKING.

17. AT 1445H, 3D MARDIV REPORTED DEMONSTRATIONS UNDERWAY IN HUE.  
BODY OF LT THUC ON DISPLAY. RADIO HUE HAS ANNOUNCED THESE ARE  
PAGE TWO DDKE 035 SECRET NOFORN

THE TIME FOR AMERICANS TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS WHOSE SIDE THEY ARE  
ON END QUOTE. ALSO STATED VMC ENROUTE TO HUE SO FAR NO  
AMERICAN ACTS OR BANNERS DISPLAYED.

18. AT 1500H, I TOC REPORTED THAT REBELS HAD 1000 PEOPLE  
FORCES HAD RECD ORDERS FROM SENIOR BUDDHIST CHAPLAIN TO  
ATTACK PREPLANNED TARGETS. TSTS BELIEVED TO BE CHANGING LOCATIONS.

19. DURING EVENING 17 MAY, ELEMENTS OF 04 ARVN DIVISION POSITIONED  
AT EAST END OF TOURANE RIVER BRIDGE ESTABLISHED ROAD BLOCKS. RE-  
FUSED TO PERMIT VEHICULAR TRAFFIC OVER THE BRIDGE AND DEMAND  
DEMOLITION CHARGES ON SPAN AND APPROACHES. DEMOLITION CHARGES  
WAS TAKEN TO PREVENT VMC COMPANY, IN POSITION AT WESTERN END OF  
BRIDGE, FROM CROSSING INTO EAST DANANG. AT 1911H, USMC  
THROUGH ENGINEER ADVISORS, III MAF MADE AN EFFORT TO REMOVE  
ENGINEERS TO REMOVE DEMOLITIONS AND WERE IN POSITION AT WESTERN  
ENDED TWO MACHINE GUNS AND 57MM. ALSO, THE ARVN ENGINEERS  
TO PULL BACK FROM WESTERN APPROACHES AND WERE IN POSITION AT WESTERN  
TO USMC. THE ARVN ENGINEERS REFUSED TO MOVE INTO WESTERN  
SQUAD OF MARINES, WITH A PLATOON AT THE READY, MOVED INTO ARVN  
POSITION AT EAST END OF BRIDGE. THERE WAS A NONFATAL CONFRONTATION  
DURING WHICH ONE ROUND WAS FIRED BY ARVN, BUT THE U.S. TROOPS  
PAGE THREE DDKE 035 SECRET NOFORN

TOOK THEIR POSITIONS. AT ABOUT 1400, CG III MAF ORDERED  
TO ORDER VMC AWAY FROM WESTERN END OF BRIDGE. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED  
AND A USMC COMPANY TOOK OVER. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE USMC  
ACROSS BRIDGE AND AFTER CONSIDERABLE DEBATE WITH ARVN ENGINEERS,  
SUCCEEDED IN REMOVING THE DEMOLITIONS FROM BRIDGE. ALL OF THE  
BRIDGE AND ITS APPROACHES HAD BEEN SECURED BY USMC AND THE ARVN  
AND VMC HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE BRIDGE AREA. IT IS PLANNED TO USE  
THE BRIDGE FOR CIVILIAN AND U.S. MILITARY TRAFFIC COMMERCIAL 18  
MAY.

20. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS CONCERNING CAO:  
A. AT 1900 17 MAY GEN CAO INFORMED COL HAMBLEN, DEPT SENIOR ADVISOR  
I CORPS, THAT COL LOAN HSS HAD INFORMED CAO THAT SOVIET TROOPS FROM  
SAIGON WERE GOING TO ATTACK PGO DA PAGODA IN DANANG SINCE COMMUNIST  
FORCES WERE USING PAGODA TO HIDE REBELS, WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES.  
CAO STATED HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO PAGODA ATK AT THAT TIME. CAO ASKED  
HAMBLEN TO SECURE US PSN ON PAGODA ATK. ALSO CAO STATED AS HE HAS  
MANY TIMES THAT CLOSE US-VN COOPERATION ESSENTIAL IN HIS NEW POSITION  
AS CG I CORPS, THEREFORE, IF ANY ARVN COMMANDERS AND STAFF WERE NOT  
GIVING FULL COOPERATION TO US! HE DESIRED TO HAVE NAMES SO HE COULD  
RELIEVE INDIVIDUALS. HE STATED ANY ARVN WHO DOES NOT COOPERATE WITH

CG III MAF 0 181632Z MAY 66 4-7

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HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE CORPS

US EITHER FRENCH OR COMMUNIST, AND BOTH WERE  
B. AT 0910 CAO REQUESTED HAMBLEN GIVE HIM US POLICY ON PAGODA ATK  
CAO INFORMED THAT US COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER AT THAT TIME BUT THAT  
CONTINUING US POLICY WAS TO AVOID BLOODS AND BURNING OF PAGODAS. IN  
ADDITION THAT AS A GENERAL POLICY US TROOPS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED  
NEVER TO FIRE UPON RELIGIOUS SHRINES OR GREAT MONUMENTS IN OR NEAR  
THEM. DSA ADVISED CAO NOT TO ATK PAGODAS. CAO THEN ASKED ABOUT SATIS-  
FACTION WITH THIS RESPONSE AND STATED THAT HE WOULD NEVER AUTHORIZE  
ATK OF A PAGODA OR CHURCH. HE STATED THAT HE PLANNED TO LEAVE TODAY  
WITH KY OR OTHERS FROM SAIGON RE RELIEF OF COLONEL NGUYEN CMR;  
SUB-BRIG NHUAN, 1ST DIV ARN CMR; AND COL TRAM, 1ST DIV ARN.  
HAMBLEN DISCUSSED THE CRITICALITY OF THE DANANG SITUATION WITH  
CAO AND STRONGLY SUGGESTED EMPLOYING US MARINES TO OCCUPY THE  
THE WESTERN END OF BRIDGE SINCE ANTI-GOV FORCES IN DANANG 104TH  
ENGR BN, HOLD EASTERN END OF BRIDGE. CAO STATED HE WOULD DISCUSS  
WITH SUB-BRIG LONG, TASK-FORCE CMR OF SAIGON. HAMBLEN LEFT  
DANANG.

C. AT 1300, WHILE PREMIER KY DISCUSSING BACKGROUND OF AMERICANS IN I  
CORPS PAST MONTH WITH DISTINGUISHED GUESTS AFTER DINNER AND  
CEREMONY, COL. LOAN CALLED CAO OUT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FROM

PAGE FIVE DDKE 035 S E C R E T NOFORN

CAO OF ALLEGED CRITICAL SITUATION IN DANANG.

D. AT 1310 CAO INFORMED DSA THAT LOAN STATED THAT HE HAD SEEN A MILITIAN  
AND SEVERAL HUNDRED REBEL SOLDIERS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS GATHERED  
AROUND THE PHO DA PAGODA. LOAN STATED HE HAD THE TROOPS SURROUNDED BY  
ARVN MARINES. LOAN INSISTED THAT CAO ORDER AN IMMEDIATE ATK ON THE  
PAGODA AND LOAN BECAME VERY EMOTIONAL WHEN CAO DID NOT READILY AGREE  
TO DO SO. CAO WAS VISIBLY SHAKEN BY HIS ENCOUNTER WITH LOAN.

E. AT 1350 IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEPARTURE OF KY AND PARTY FROM I CORPS,  
CAO HAD CONFERENCE WITH DSA. CAO STATED (1) 11TH ENGINEERS TO BE WITH-  
DRAWN FROM DANANG AND SENT TO 2D ARVN DIV FOR CPN. 11TH TO MOVE AS  
SOON AS ASSEMBLED AND DEPART ON AIRCRAFT THAT WERE BRINGING 32D RANGERS  
FROM SAIGON TO DANANG AFTERNOON OF 13 MAY. CAO ASKED THAT DSA TELL SA  
2D DIV TO EMPLOY 11TH IN OPNS SOONEST. (2) CAO STATED SAIGON SELECTED  
LT COL GUONG AS NEW MAYOR OF DANANG; CAO HAD NO VOICE IN MATTER. (3)  
LOAN STILL INSISTED ON IMMEDIATE ATK OF PAGODA. (4) CAO AGREED TO HAVE  
US MARINE OCCUPY WEST END DANANG RIVER BRIDGE. AFTER US MARINES IN  
PSN, ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO GET 104TH ENGINEER ELEMENT TO MOVE FROM  
EAST END OF BRIDGE.

F. AT 1450 DSA REPORTED DIRECTLY IN CAO'S OFFICE WITHOUT BEING  
ANNOUNCED AS CAO HAD ASKED HIM TO DO. DSA FOUND A TIGHT CIRCLE  
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CG 111 MAY

0 181632Z MAY 66

5-7

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S E C R E T NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

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NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BREWHE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT OF VN OFFICERS SEATED AROUND CAO WITH COL LOAN SPEAKING VERY RAPIDLY IN CAO'S FACE. THREE OR FOUR ENLISTED MEN (OBVIOUSLY GUARDS) WERE IN THE ROOM. ONE INDIVIDUAL WAS STANDING DIRECTLY BEHIND CAO AND APPEARED TO HAVE A PISTOL IN HIS HAND BUT AS DSA ENTERED THE ROOM IT APPEARED AS THOUGH HE WITHDREW PISTOL OR WHATEVER HE HAD IN HIS HAND. DSA INFORMED CAO THAT GEN VALT DESIRED TO MEET CAO ON THE DANANG RIVER BRIDGE TO DISCUSS DEFENSE SITUATION. CAO LOOKED COMPLETELY DOMINATED AND STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GO. DSA PAGE TWO DDDKE 836 S E C R E T NOFORN

LEFT OFFICE BUT WALKED FOR FIVE MINUTES BACK AND FORTH IN FRONT OF WINDOWS IN PLAIN VIEW OF THOSE INSIDE. (COMMENT; LATER CAO ADVISED DSA THAT DSA HAD SAVED HIS LIFE SINCE LOAN HAD THREATENED TO KILL HIM IF HE DID NOT ORDER THE ATK OF PAGODA. CAO STATED THAT SINCE LOAN THOUGHT DSA STILL IN VICINITY, LOAN AND PARTY DEPARTED I CORPS SHORTLY THEREAFTER).

G. AT 1450, DSA REPORTED AGAIN TO CAO AS REARRANGED TO DISCUSS RELIEF OF GNSG CHDR. UPON ENTERING CG'S OFFICE, DSA MET CAO IN COMPANY OF BRIG GEN DONG AND COL NGHI, ACTING C/S FOR CAO. DONG IMMEDIATELY SPOKE UP AND ADVISED DSA THAT CAO HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND DID NOT WANT THE US MARINES TO DEFEND THE WEST END OF THE DANANG RIVER BRIDGE. HE STATED THAT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE I CORPS HQ AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT HIS TROOPS DEFEND THE WEST END OF BRIDGE. HE DID NOT FEEL US MARINES WOULD DO ADEQUATELY. DSA TOOK A STRONG EXCEPTION TO DONG'S CHANGING PSN SINCE US MARINES WERE ALREADY MOVING TO TAKE OVER DEFENSE OF WEST END OF BRIDGE. CAO AGREED WITH DSA BUT RECEIVED MUCH VIOLENT DISAGREEMENT WITH CAO'S WILLINGNESS TO LET HIS ORIGINAL DECISION STAND (COMMENT: LATER CAO ADVISED DSA THAT DONG HAD NOT EVEN CONSULTED HIM ON THE DEFENSE AND THAT DONG STATED HE WAS IN CHARGE OF DEFENSE OF

PAGE THREE DDDKE 836 S E C R E T NOFORN DANANG INSOFAR AS THE SAIGON TROOPS WERE CONCERNED NOT CAO). DSA NOTED GUARDS WERE STILL STATIONED AROUND CG'S OFFICE. GUARDS THAT CAO STATED WERE NOT HIS. CAO WAS MEER AND DEFLECTED IN DISCUSSION WITH DSA IN PRESENCE OF DONG. DSA INSISTED THAT CAO ACCOMPANY HIM TO BRIDGE FOR GEN VALT WAS STILL THERE. DONG AND NGHI NOT EAGER THAT CAO MAKE TRIP BUT FINALLY AGREED AND NGHI ACCOMPANIED CAO AND DSA ON VISIT TO BRIDGE. WHERE A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN WORKED OUT. GEN VALT AND CAO RETURNED TO CG'S OFFICE AT I CORPS. AFTER DISCUSSION ON GENERAL SITUATION IN DANANG AND REPEATED SUGGESTIONS BY DSA AND GEN VALT CAO AGREED TO MAKE A HELICOPTER RECON OF DANANG TO CHECK SITUATION. HE APPEARED EAGER TO HAVE A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH GEN VALT, BUT STATED SO IN A VERY CONFIDENTIAL TONE OUT OF EARSHOT OF NGHI. AFTER A SHORT AIRBORNE RECON, THE PARTY WENT TO III MAF CP. THERE FOLLOWED A SHORT DISCUSSION IN WHICH NGHI PLAYED DSA MORE DOMINANT ROLE THAN CAO.

H. AFTER NGHI LEFT FOR I CORPS WITH DSA CAO ASKED GEN VALT FOR ASYLUM STATED HE WOULD GO BACK TO I CORPS OR HE WOULD BE KILLED. CAO STATED HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE OFFER AND WOULD RETURN TO SAIGON.

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HE PLACED HIS LIFE IN JEOPARDY. CAO WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE FOR THE UNITED STATES ASEP. ACCORDING TO CAO HE COULD NO LONGER TRUST EVEN NGHI THE C/S HE BROUGHT FROM SAIGON. HE BELIEVES NGHI TOO IS RESPONSIVE TO LOAN. ADDITIONAL POINTS MADE BY CAO WERE: LOAN AND HUNG ARE VERY ANTI-AMERICAN; KY KNOWS WHAT LOAN IS DOING; LOAN INTENDS TO ATTACK PAGODAS AND TO LIBERATE HOI AN. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT CAO, WHILE HE WAS STILL CG I CORPS, SIGN AN ORDER TO DONG FORBIDDING ATTACKS ON PAGODAS AND HOI AN. CAO DID THIS AND THE ORDER WAS DELIVERED TO DONG. CAO WOULD NOT TALK TO LOAN WHEN LOAN PHONED. CAO DID TALK TO PREMISE KY WHO PROMISED TO RECALL LOAN AND SEND LOAN VIEN UP TO INVESTIGATE. THIS STILL DID NOT CHANGE CAO'S MIND THAT HE WANTED TO REMAIN AT III MAF CP. I. AT ABOUT 2115 VIEN ARRIVED FROM SAIGON AND WAS MET BY GEN WALT WHO FLEW HIM TO III MAF CP TO MEET WITH CAO. CAO AND VIEN HAD LONG DISCUSSION WHICH DID NOT SEEM TO CHANGE CAO'S MIND. VIEN THEN FLEW TO AIRBASE WHERE HE INTENDED TO MEET WITH DONG (WHO IS NOW ACTING CORPS COMMANDER) AND HUNG (CO 41ST WING VNAF AND A LOAN DISCIPLE). VIEN MADE THESE POINTS TO GEN WALT: SITUATION IS VERY SERIOUS; LAST THING KY TOLD THEM THIS MORNING WAS THAT HE DID WANT ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION NOR ANY ATTACKS ON PAGODAS THERE WILL BE NO

PAGE FIVE DDKE 836 S E C R E T NOFORN

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS BY GEN DONG'S FORCES TOMORROW.

NOT 21. FOLLOWING REPORT RECEIVED ON 20 LI NGUYEN DAI THUC, SEVN,  
RELEASEABURO FIRED ON HELO AT HUE YESTERDAY AT 1ST DIV HQ. THUC WAS ASSIGNED  
O FOREIGN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AT HSS HQS FOR THE 11TH TACTICAL ZONE.  
NATIONAL DURING PAST 6 MOS, THUC HAS BEEN REASSIGNED TO DIFFERENT JOBS, EACH  
WITH LESS RESPONSIBILITY. HSS CHIEF AT HUE STATED HE SUSPECTED  
THUC OF PASSING INFORMATION TO TU DOM PAGODA IN HUE. THUC VERY  
ACTIVE IN STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS MADE  
ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS.

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CG III MAF

0 184632Z MAY 66

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KENLAK FROM LTGEN VALT  
1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD  
181800H TO 192200H  
2. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE PRO-STRUGGLE  
FORCES AND PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES HOWEVER THE NUMBER OF FIRE FIGHTS  
WERE REMARKABLY FEW/  
3. AT 181830 AO REPORTED THAT AN OE HAD BEEN HIT BY SA FIRE FROM  
(BT 021771) AND WAS FORCED TO LAND ON DIRT ROAD AT (BT 058762).  
SECURITY FORCES ENROUTE TO SCENE. AT 192200 300N 30 MARINES REPORTED

PAGE TWO DDXE 129 S E C R E T NOFORN  
THAT CO HAD MOVED TO 058762 TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DOG. ON  
CREW WAS PICKED UP BY HELO. AT 0825H ARMY HELO LIFTED CREW OIE.  
4. AT 1840 I TOC REPORTED THAT THE 511TH ANMO DMP (AT 046792) WAS  
IN THE HANDS OF THE STRUGGLE FORCES. AT 1000H THE SEN ADVISOR I ALC  
ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ THONG, DEP CO I ALC WENT TO 511TH ANMO CO AT  
EAST DANANG DUMP. THEY WERE DENIED ADMITTANCE; INFORMED THAT CAPT  
THAN (104TH ENG BN) WAS IN COMMAND; ADVISED THAT ELEMENTS OF 104TH  
ENG BN AND 511TH ANMO COMPANY WOULD DEFEND COMPOUND IF GOVERNMENT  
FORCES APPROACHED.  
5. AT 1915H I TOC REPORTED THAT 40-60 TROOPS OF THE 11TH RANGERS  
HAD DEPARTED FOR HUE. APPROXIMATELY 30 MEMBERS WERE WITH THE VMHC  
NEAR DANANG RADIO STATION AND APPROXIMATELY 10 HAD JOINED THE  
STRUGGLE FORCES.  
6. AT 2230H IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE MSS ARRESTED COL THANH (I CORPS  
CHIEF OF STAFF UNTIL ARRIVAL OF 010) AND REMOVED HIM FROM I CORPS CP.  
7. AROUND 2300 LTGEN VIEN LEFT FOR SAIGON.  
8. AT 0638H 3D BN 3D MARINES REPORTED 32ND RANGERS ACCOMPANIED BY  
TWO TANKS WERE MOVING TOWARD THE III MAF COMPOUND. SHORTLY THEREAFTER  
WORD WAS RECEIVED THAT THE FORCE HAD CONTINUED PAST III MAF HQS AND OUT  
GATE 12 VIC FLSG.

CG III MAF

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

PAGE THREE DDKK 129 S E C R E T NOFORN

9. AT 0700 I YOC REPORTED THAT 1/1 OF 1ST ARVN DIV WOULD MOVE AT 0900 FROM AN LO TO LA VANG.

10. AT 0730 IN HOI AN COL YEU, CO QNSS, TOLD LTCOL COADY, HIS ADVISOR, THAT CAO HAD APPOINTED COL LAP TO RELIEVE HIM. LAP IS CO 1ST REGT. YEU STATED HE WOULD FIGHT TO PREVENT THE RELIEF. BOTH YEUS AND LAP WERE MAKING PREPARATIONS TO FIGHT XVER HOI AN. ON ADVICE OF COADY AND AS APPROVED BY SENIOR ADVISOR, YEU ACCEPTED HELO TRANSPORTATION TO III MAF TO SEE CAO. GEN CAO MET WITH YEU AND PERSUADED HIM TO TAKE LEAVE AND REMAIN. YEU IS CURRENTLY LIVING AT 3D MAR DIV CAMP.

11. AT 0805 COL LA BERGE (SA VNAF2 ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH COL LOAN AT THE AIR BASE/ IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PREVIOUS NIGHT VINA AND KY HAD BOTH SAID LOAN WOULD BE RETURNED TO SAIGON.

12. AT 0800 DSA TELEPHONED ACTING CG I CORPS, SUBJECTS DONG TO INQUIRE ABOUT MOVEMENT OF ARVN MARINE, AIRBORNE AND TANKS OUT OF DANANG. DONG STATED BULK OF TROOPS WERE BEING MOVED ON 19 MAY, OUT OF 20 KM OUT OF DANANG TO PREVENT INCIDENTS WITH CIVILIAN POPULATION AND NORTH-SOUTH TROOP MOVEMENTS CONTEMPLATED. AFTER LIVING IN TROOPS IN ISOLATED AREA FOR FOUR DAYS, SOME TROOPS WERE "BORROWING" EXCESSIVE AND GETTING TOO "FRIENDLY" WITH WOMEN. (COMMENT: ON 18 MAY, DONG HAD MENTIONED TO DSA THAT SUCH A MOVEMENT OF TROOPS WAS NECESSARY TO

PAGE FOUR DDKK 129 S E C R E T NOFORN

(AVOID UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY)

0915 AT CONFERENCE WITH DSA, DONG CONFIRMED THAT MOVEMENT OF TROOP UNITS WAS PROCEEDING AS PLANNED, TROOPS REMAINING IN DANANG WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN SECURITY DUTIES.

13. AT 0825H 3D BN 3D MARINES REPORTED THAT THE 32D BATTAL IS UNDER CAPT HUAN HAD THE MISSION OF SEARCHING NOA PHAT.

14. AT ABOUT 1045 MAJ NGOC AND CAPT NGHE ARRIVED FROM HUE IN ADVISORY GROUP HELO. IT WAS THOUGHT THESE OFFICERS WERE SENT BY DINH. AFTER THEY VISITED CAO, HOWEVER, HE SAID NGOC WAS DISBURRING OFFICER WITH PAYROLLS FOR CAO TO SIGN. NGHE BROUGHT CAO A LETTER FROM CATHOLIC BISHOP IN HUE.

15. AT 1000 GEN WALT AND DSA I MET WITH DONG WHO STATED GEN HE HAD PREVIOUSLY PLANNED FOR 0800 19 MAY TO INSTALL LT COL LAP AS QNSS CMR BY FORCE AT HOI AN WAS DISCARDED/ GEN WALT PLEDGED US SUPPORT OF DONG, BUT CAUTIONED NEED FOR LEVEL HEADS AND PARTICULARLY STRESSED THE DISASTROUS RESULTS THAT COULD FOLLOW ATTACK ON PAGODASI AND THE NECESSITY FOR US TO CONTROL BOTH ENDS OF DANANG BRIDGE/ DONG AGREED.

16/ AT 1015 DSA OBSERVED COL LOAN, MSS, AND LT COL HUNG, CO 41ST WING, ENTER OFFICE OF CG I CORPS.

17. AT 1055 DONG AND DSA MET LT GEN CO, DEP PREMIER, AT DANANG AIR

CG III MAF

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SECRET INFORM SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT

AND JOIN 2ND APVN DIVISION. CO AGREED.

19. AT 1500 IT APPEARED SITUATION IN HOI AN WAS AN IMPASSE. IN SPITE OF EFFORTS OF US ADVISOR STRUGGLE FORCE LEADERS STOUTLY MAINTAINED THEY WOULD RESIST COL LAP BY FORCE AND WOULD FIRE ON ANY ARVN FORCES WHO ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE HOI AN TO JOIN LAP. FORCE AT MAIN PAGODA PREPARED FOR SELF IMMOLATION IF LAP MOVES ON HOI AN. AT END OF PERIOD SOME ARVN FORCES HAD SUCCEEDED IN LEAVING AND JOINING LAP AT DIEN BAN. US ADVISOR ALSO JOINED LAP.

BASE AND MOVED PROMPTLY TO HQ I CORPS. IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL AT OFFICE OF CG I CORPS, CO REQUESTED DSA TO ARRANGE MEETING BETWEEN CAO AND CO AT III MAF HQ AT A LOCATION AGREEABLE TO CAO.

18. AT 1130 CO ARRIVED III MAF CP WHERE HE AND COL NGHI (THE C/S CAO BROUGHT WITH HIM) TRIED FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD TO PERSUADE CAO TO RETURN TO I CORPS CP. CAO DECLINED SAYING HE WILL STILL FUNCTION AS CG I CORPS BUT WILL NOT LEAVE III MAF CP. CAO IS DEATHLY AFRAID OF LOAN. CAO ALSO STATED TO C/S III MAF THAT HE TRUSTS NO ONE IN SVN BUT HIS WIFE. CO AND NGHI HAD LUNCH IN WING MESS CAN ATE IN HIS ROOM.

A. IN DISCUSSION OF LOAN, CO STATED HE WAS SURPRISED LOAN WAS STILL IN DANANG. SAID HE WAS GOING TO ASK KY TO RECALL LOAN TO SAIGON AND IF KY DID NOT DO THIS, CO WOULD WASH HIS HANDS OF WHOLE AFFAIR.

B. CO TOLD GEN WALT THAT KY, THIEU AND LOAN PLANNED THE WHOLE OPERATION OF THE 15TH TELLING HIM, VIEN AND KHANG AT THE LAST MOMENT. JUST PRIOR TO LEAVING III MAF FOR I CORPS CO SAID HE INTENDED TO REMAIN IN DANANG TO ASSIST CAC FOR 2 TO 3 DAYS. ABOUT AN HOUR LATER CO LEFT FOR SAIGON.

C. WHILE CO WAS AT III MAF HE WAS ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AN 1ST WAS GOING TO LAND AN APC TROOP AT DANANG ON 20 MAY. CO REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE STATING THAT THIS WAS A ROUTINE TROOP MOVEMENT. IT WAS RECOMMENDED TO CO BY CG III MAF THAT APC TROOP BE LANDED IN CHU LAI

20. AT 191100H 3D CIT REPORTED THAT A LARGE PILE OF SCRAP WOOD WITH A CHAIR PERCHED ON TOP WAS LOCATED IN FRONT OF THE BUDDHIST PAGODA VIC (AT 995752). LOCAL VILLAGERS INDICATE THAT SHOULD THE PAGODA BE ATTACKED A MONK WOULD PERFORM SELF SACRIFICE. BUDDHIST MONK MADE A SPEECH STATING QUOTE THE PEOPLE PROTEST THE ACTS OF KY AND THIEU IN THE USE OF TROOPS AGAINST CIVILIANS. KY COULD EMPLOY HIS MILITARY FORCES TO MEET IMPORTANT TASKS ELSEWHERE UNQUOTE.

21. AT 1230 AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH CO AND SA QNSS, LTCOL LAP DEVELOPED PLAN TO ASSUME CONTROL OF QNSS WITHOUT ATTACKING HOI AN. PLAN IS TO MOVE KEY US ADVISORS PLUS 1/3/51 AND TWO COMPANIES OF 34TH RANGERS, ALL LOYAL TO LAP. FROM HOI AN TO DINH BAN. QNSS WOULD OPERATE FROM DINH BAN UNTIL HOI AN READY TO RECEIVE LAP (COMMENT: DURING DAY LAP SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING TWO OF THREE KEY ANTI-GOVERNMENT OFFICERS OF HOI AN TO BE LOYAL TO LAP. PLAN HAS HIGH CHANCE OF SUCCESS)

22. AT 1415 DEP SR ADV MET WITH CAO IN PRESENCE OF COL NGHI, FOR 30 MINUTES. CAO STATED HE STILL FEARED FOR HIS SAFETY EVEN IF LOAN DOES RETURN TO SAIGON. NGHI NOTED ONLY I CORPS STAFF OFFICERS REPORTED FOR DUTY BECAUSE OF LACK OF LEADERSHIP IN HQ. GEN DONG IS CONDUCTING OPN IN DANANG OF SAIGON TROOPS BUT NO ONE IS RUNNING

INFORM

CG III MAF

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
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PAGE THREE DDKES 130 S E C R E T NOFORN  
I CORPS. NGHI NO LONGER HAS ANY STATUS SINCE HE WAS CAO'S CHIEF OF STAFF IN OFFICE OF POLITICAL WARFARE, BUT HAS NO OFFICIAL STATUS IN I CORPS, PARTICULARLY WITH CAO BEING ABSENT FROM I CORPS HQ. CAO FELT NGHI MUST RETURN TO SAIGON TO RESUME HIS OFFICIAL POSITION. CAO FEARS EVEN TO RETURN TO SAIGON. CAO ADVISED DEP SR ADV THAT IF SAIGON WANTS HIM TO CONTINUE AS I CORPS CMDR HE WOULD STILL WANT TO REMAIN AT III MAF. HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT HE IS NOT GETTING PROPER SUPPORT FROM SAIGON. HE STRENUOUSLY OBJECTED TO THE PROSECUTE LOAN PUT ON HIM TO DIRECT THE ATTACK ON DANANG PAGODAS. LOAN ADVISED HIM THERE WERE THOUSANDS AROUND THE PAGODAS AND YET ON PERSONAL RECON BY HELICOPTER CAO ONLY NOTED A FEW HUNDRED AROUND THE PAGODAS. HE FELT OVERWHELMING PRESSURE WAS BEING PLACED ON HIM TO ACT AT ONCE BEFORE HE HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY AND PLAN HIS MOVES CAREFULLY. CAO FEELS THAT IF ONE PAGODA IS ATTACKED IT WOULD TAKE MONTHS EVEN YEARS TO CORRECT THE DAMAGE DONE. CAO STATED THAT AS SOON AS HE LANDED AT THE DANANG AIRBASE 16 MAY, HE WANTED TO SPEND SOME MOMENTS TALKING WITH GENERALS PHUONG AND PLUNG. HUNG (CO 41ST VIMB) RUDELY RUSHED HIM OFF TO 41ST HQ. KY STATED CAO STATED THAT WHEN HE SPOKE TO KY ON TELEPHONE 16 MAY, KY SAID HE WOULD COME TO DANANG TO TALK WITH CAO IF HE WISHED AND HE VOLUNTEERED

PAGE FOUR DDKE 130 S E C R E T NOFORN  
TO SEND LOAN BACK TO SAIGON. CAO TOLD DEP SR ADV HOWEVER THAT HE INFORMED KY THAT IT WAS KY'S PROBLEM AND ONLY HE COULD SOLVE IT. 23SAT 1415 VN MARINES AND ABN TROOPS WERE MOVING TOWARDS PAGODAS. MARINES SUFFERED 2 KIA AND ABN 2 KIA AND 5 WIA. AT ONE INTERSECTION IN FRONT OF ABN BN, 4 BUDDHISTS MONKS AND 15 BOY SCOUTS POSITIONED THEMSELVES IN ROAD TO BLOCK MOVEMENT. THROUGHOUT TOWN GREASESON ROADS, SOME BARRICADES AND SMALL GROUPS OF SIT-INS WERE BLOCKING GOVERNMENT TROOP MOVEMENT.

24. AT ABOUT 1500 IT APPEARED THAT COL YEN, CO VMC TASK FORCES AND NOW MILITARY COMMANDER OF DANANG, WAS PREPARING TO RETURN FIRE AGAINST PAGODAS. BOTH CO AND CAO STATED CATEGORICALLY THEY HAD NOT ISSUED ORDERS TO MAKE SUCH ATTACKS. CG III MAF MADE APPEAL TO YEN THROUGH LIAISON OFFICER AND BY END OF REPORTING PERIOD IT APPEARED THAT NO ATTACK WOULD BE MADE ON PAGODAS.

25. AT 1530 CO, DONG AND DSA MET AT I CORPS HQ TO DISCUSS CURRENT DANANG SITUATION. SAIGON TROOPS NO LONGER RING CITY SINCE MANY TROOPS HAVE MOVED OUT OF TOWN PROPER. DONG STATED (AND DSA CONFIRMED WITH ARVN TANK CMDR) THAT ANTI-GOVT FORCES HAVE FIRED APPROX 20 RDS 57MM RR AT M 41 TANKS SINCE GOVT ACTION BEGAN 15 MAY. ONLY HE AMMO USED HENCE NO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO TANKS FROM 37MM. TWO CG III MAF

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HEADQUARTERS  
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PAGE FIVE DDKE 130 **S E C R E T** NOFORN  
 ROUNDS FIRED AT TANK TODAY/ ASSA RESULT OF YOU S ACTIVELY BY GOVT FORCES  
 HAVE HAD 8 WOUNDED FROM 57 RR AND 34 CAL MG. DONG STATES DONG HAS  
 PERMITTED THEM TO FIRE AT ANTI GOVT FORCES TODAY. HE HAS PERMITTED  
 THEM TO FIRE HIGH IN THE AIR AND PERMITTED THE USE OF  
 SMOKE GRENADES. NEITHER HAS BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE IN DRIVING THE CROWDS  
 THAT VERY FORM 50 TO 250 WHICH GATHER IN FRONT OF TANK. DONG PREVENT  
 THEM FROM PATROLLING SOME STREETS. DONG STATES HIS TROOPS ARE BEING  
 BACKED OFF TROUBLE BUT TROOPS WERE NOT HAPPY. OPERATIONS WERE  
 DOWN MARKEDLY AS OF THE TIME OF CONFERENCE DONG STATED  
 AIR OBSERVERS FOR I CORPS CONFIRMED THIS FACT. DONG STATED  
 STATED HE HAD INTENDED TO REMAIN AT DANANG FOR SEVERAL DAYS BUT HE  
 RECEIVED A CALL FROM THIEU IN SAIGON ASKING HIM TO RETURN TO REPORT  
 TO REPORT ON SITUATION. CO FELT THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE OF RETURN  
 TO DANANG.

26. AT ABOUT 1530 COL THANH (EX I CORPS C/S) AND LTCOL THUNG (EX 9-3)  
 ASKED ADVISORY GROUP FOR SANCTUARY. STATING THAT CATHOLIC OFFICERS  
 COULD NOT STAY AT I CORPS. THEY WERE TAKEN TO EAST DANANG BY HELO  
 TO STAY WITH BISHOP. AT THIS POINT THEY ARE BELLETED AT TAG-16.

27. AT 1625 IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM DANANG AIR BASE  
 CO ASKED DSASI CORPS TO OFFICIALLY INFORM GEN CAO THAT CAO WAS STILL

**S E C R E T** NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF THREE SECTIONS  
 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
 I CORPS CMDR EVEN THOUGH HE REMAINED AT III MAF CP. AND THAT CAO SHOULD  
 KEEP IN TOUCH WITH DONG RE DANANG SITUATION. CO FURTHER ASKED DSA  
 TO INFORM DONG TO KEEP CAO FULLY ADVISED ON DANANG SITUATION AND  
 OPERATIONS.

28. AT 1615 IN A CONFERENCE AT 41ST WING HQ WHICH DSA BRIEFLY ATTENDED  
 CO INFORMED DSA IN PRESENCE OF LOAN THAT LOAN WOULD BE RETURNING  
 TO SAIGON TONIGHT. CO STATED HE HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF EVENTS FROM  
 CAO, DONG, NGAI AND OTHERS AND WOULD REPORT TO KY. DSA RECEIVED

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NO RESPONSE FROM LOAN TO REQUEST FROM DSA TO LOAN TO CONFIRM HIS DEPARTURE FOR SAIGON TONIGHT.

29. AT 1610 PRIOR TO HIS RETURN TO SAIGON JUNIOR AIDE TO CAO GAVE DSA PACKAGE TO CAO AND CAO SHOWED HIM 100,000 PIASTRES. CAO STATED THAT ON 18 MAY KY HAD GIVEN CAO ONE MILLION PIASTRES FOR TROOP SPT, 500,000 P'S TO DONG AND 500,000 TO LOAN. CAO HAD DSA RETURN ALL 100,000 P'S TO DONG WITH STATEMENT QUOTE MONEY IS FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS. EVEN THOUGH I HAVE LITTLE MONEY WITH ME, I WOULD NOT KEEP THE MONEY. END QUOTE DSA LATER RETURNED MONEY TO DONG TOGETHER WITH EXPLANATORY NOTE FROM CAO.

30. AT 1510 A LOUDSPEAKER WAS HEARD IN TOWN ANNOUNCING THAT A CURFEW WOULD BE IMPOSED FOR EVERYONE COMMENCING AT 1700 AND LASTING UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. INITIALLY COL YEN, VMMC, MILITARY COMMANDER OF DANANG INDICATED THAT CURFEW WAS APPLICABLE TO US MILITARY. GEN YEN ADDRESSED GEN CAO AND DONG ON THIS SUBJECT AND WAS ASSURED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AGAINST US MILITARY. CIVILIAN PATROLS WERE MADE TO HAVE THREE MP PATROLS OF TWO VEHICLES EACH TO PATROL THE TOWN DURING CURFEW TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF ACTIVITIES AND TO INSURE PROTECTION OF AMERICANS. MAJOR ADDERSON, ADVISOR TO COL YEN, WAS IN LIAISON WITH LATTER TO INSURE COMMON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN USMAF

PAGE THREE DEK 131 S E C R E T NOFORM AND VMC.

31. AT 1555 IT WAS REPORTED UNIT DEMONSTRATION AT HOA PHAT (NAR III MAF CP) WAS BREAKING UP AND BUDDHIST MONK HAD COME DOWN OFF THE PYRE 32 RANGERS STILL AROUND PAGODA BUT CLASH DOES NOT APPEAR IMMEDIATE. RANGERS CHECKING ALL TRAFFIC (ARVN/KIVILIAN) ON RT NE 1 AND APPEAR TO BE MOVING SOUTH.

32. AT 1800 ONE 2 1/2 TON TRUCK AND 5 CIVILIAN BUSES WITH APPROXIMATELY 300 ARMED ARVN TROOPS AND MONKS FLYING BUDDHISTS FLAG NEAR TAM KY (BT 2432). 1 OFFICER AND 28 ENLISTED OF 22D ARVN ARMY BATTERY JOINED IN DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS AT TAM KY. THEY MOVED NORTH TOWARD HOI AN.

33. AT CLOSE OF PERIOD THE CITY APPEARED TO BE SETTLING DOWN AS GOVERNMENT TROOPS MOVED BACK FROM PAGODAS. IN SOME AREA BARBED WIRE WAS BEING STRUNG AROUND PAGODAS AND TROOPS ENCIRCLING THEM. REPORT FROM COL YEN VMMC THAT AN EFFORT MIGHT BE MADE TO ISOLATE THE PAGODAS BUT NOT ATTACK THEM.

34. DISPOSITION OF CONTESTING FORCES AT 1800 AS FOLLOWS:
- (1) HOA KHUE KING THUAN PAGODA (BZ 025755); UNK (STPEN)
  - (2) PAGODA NEAR III MAF CP (SA SON AREA; AT 994751); UNK STREN.
  - (3) HINH HOI PAGODA LOSS TWO COMPOSITE ARVN COMPANIES (PRO STRUGG)

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SECTION 1 AND 2 OF TWO SECTIONS  
PERSONNEL SENT TO BRIDGE AND LIGHT HOUSE

1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD 192200N TO 202200N.
2. DURING THE EARLY EVENING SPORADIC FIRING WAS REPORTED THROUGHOUT THE CITY. IT QUIETED DOWN ABOUT 2300 AND REMAINED SO FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE NIGHT.
3. AT 2300 VNAF ADVISOR ATTEMPTED WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DETERMINE THE WEAPONS OF COL 100N.
4. AT 0300N ALL DAY DESIGNATED USE BETWEEN AIRBORNE AND GROUND

END ALL INFO

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POINTS IN DANANG. THIS ROUTE TO BE MAINTAINED AS ROAD LOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ROUTE IN WEST DANANG. ALSO ONE SLIPROADS UNDER BRIDGE TO U.S. MILITARY TRAFFIC ONLY.

5. AT 1304T 1966 GEN DOWE PHONED GEN COA TO ASKIN HOW TO GET HIM TO MOVE BACK TO 1 CORPS CP. COA REFUSED STATING HE WAS IN CRIST CO.

6. AT ABOUT 1335H LTCOL COADY: ONSS ADVISOR WAS AC... HAPPING COL YEU. CROWD OUTSIDE ONSS COMPOUND ALSO... LAP WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS YEU'S RELIEF AND IF COADY LEFT... LAP AT DIEN BAN, THEY WOULD TAKE THE ONSS COMPOUND... COADY GOT CROWN QUIETED DOWN, THEN FLEW TO SEE YEU. YEU'S WIFE... TO STAY AT 3D MARDIV BUT GIVE COADY... KIDNAPPED, HOI AN STAYED QUIET BUT... FORCES WILL FIGHT LAP IF HE MOVES ON THE... 7. AT 1435H DINH SENT A MESSAGE TO GEN WALT WHICH... FOLLOWS:

QUOTE IT HAS JUST BEEN REPORTED TO ME THAT THE PROV... UNIFIED ASSOCIATION HEADQUARTERS, AND PAGODAS IN... ATTACKED. A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE BEING KILLED... THIS REALLY IS A GREVIOUS ACTION. YOU ARE REQUESTED...

PAGE THREE DDKES225 S E C R E T NOFORN  
AUTHORITY TO TAKE ACTION WITH COMMANDERS OF... STOP ALL REPRESSIONS WHICH ONLY RESULT IN... BROTHERS AND UNPREDICABLE DISASTER TO THE... YOU. END QUOTE

8. ABOUT 1200 W TO 1300H AN URGENT LETTER FOR GEN... TO AN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT BY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE... QUOTE WE ALL THE BUDDHISTS - MILITARIES, CIVILIANS... CORPS AT DANANG, EXCEPT GENERAL WALT INTERVENE IMMEDIATE... IMPENT SITUATION IN ORDER TO SAVE ALL THE PEOPLE OF... WEST GENERAL WALT FORCE THIEU-KY'S ARMY WITHDRAWAL... 14Y 2071, 1966 BECAUSE THERE WAS AT LEAST 1,000... IF THERE ARE ANY REASON GENERAL WALT DON'T INTERVENE... TO DIE FOR OUR RELIGION AND NATION AND DESTROY INNE... AIR FIELD. THAT IS A STARTING AND SUPPLY PLACE OF... TO KILL DANANG CITIZENS. TO THE FOREIGN REPORTERS -... OR SEND THIS INFORMATION TO GENERAL WALT IMMEDIATELY... IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES ALSO REQUESTED THAT AMERICAN AMBULANCES... THE "PAGODA" AND TAKE OUT CASUALTIES BECAUSE THE VICTIMS... ARE FIRING ON THE AMBULANCES END OF QUOTE

9. AT 1215 WAS INFORMED BY... THE TRI QUANG...

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HIM A MESSAGE FOR PRESUS STATING TRI QUANG HAD GOTTEN A REPORT THAT PAGODAS IN DANANG ARE UNDER UNRESTRICTED ATTACK AND ASKED FOR U.S/ HELP.

10. WITH REGARD TO ALL THE STATEMENTS RE PAGODAS, III MAF HAS NO EVIDENCE THEY HAVE BEEN ATTACKED/ STRUGGLE FORCES RE IN PAGODAS AND TAKE THEIR WOUNDED THERE BUT GVN FORCES HAVE MADE ATTEMPTS TO ATTACK THEM.

11. AT 1234 REPORT RECEIVED THAT COLUMN OF TRUCKS AND BUSES LOADED WITH TROOPS AND CIVILIAN DISPLAYING BUDDHIST FLAG WERE STOPPED ON HIGHWAY 1 AND WAS OPPOSED BY ARVN ROAD BLOCK AT (BT 061582). COLUMN REPORTEDLY HIT BY VNAF AIR STRIKES BUT CONTINUED ON TO POSITION NORTH OF DIEN BAN (BT 061582). ESTIMATED CASUALTIES (CONVOY) 1 KIA AND 3 BLOCKING FORCE 3 KIA 10 VIA. AT 1721 CONVOY COMMENCED MOVING NORTH RAPIDLY AFTER THREE TO FOUR HOUR STOP NEAR DIEN BAN. CONVOY WAS REPORTED TO HAVE AWAITED INSTRUCTIONS FROM COL YEUNG. CONVOY CROSSED BRIDGE AT (797785). AT (BT 062723) CONVOY WAS HIT BY 2 VNAF A1'S. AIRCRAFT MADE TWO RUNS AT CONVOY AND THE LEAD TRUCKS CARRYING TROOPS. AFTER THE FIRING RUNS OF THE AIRCRAFT STRUCKS THE CONVOY HALTED AND THE TROOPS AND CIVILIANS SPREAD OUT. CASUALTIES WERE ESTIMATED AS 5 KIA AND 8 VIA. THE LEADER OF THE CONVOY APPEARED

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PAGE FIVE DOKE 226 S E C R E T NOFORN

TO BE AN ARVN LL. HOWEVER, THERE WERE A COUPLE OF ARVN SOLDIERS WHO WERE ALSO GIVING ORDERS. WHILE THE CONVOY WAS HALTED, A TANK CAME FROM THE EAST FIRED SEVERAL ROUNDS AT THE LEAD TRUCKS. TANK FIRE STOPPED MOST OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE CONVOY. A PAGODA ABOUT 300 METERS FROM THE SCENE OF THE STRAFING. THE CONVOY WAS HUDDLED AROUND THE PAGODA WITH SOME OF THE TROOPS HAVING TURNED AROUND AND HEADED SOUTH.

12/ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DEBRIEFING FLOPIAN AND PFC CURTIS, BOTH MEMBERS OF ECHO CO 2ND BN 9TH MARINES. A. AT APPROXIMATELY 1320 THIS DATE WE WERE DRIVING SOUTH ON HIGHWAY 1, NEAR THE TURNOFF TO THE 9TH MARINES CP, WHEN WE WERE STOPPED BY ARVN SOLDIERS. WE WERE NOT ABLE TO CONTINUE DUE TO ARVN TRUCKS BLOCKING THE ROAD. UPON INVESTIGATION, SAW MANY ARVN WOUNDS. (CONVOY STAYED 10 KIA AND APPROX 18 VIA). AT THIS TIME, AN UNIDENTIFIED USMC COLONEL (G-3 III MAF) ARRIVED ON THE SCENE AND REQUESTED US TO HELP EVACUATE THE WOUNDED. WE LOADED EIGHT (8) VIA AND 10 UNIDENTIFIED WIFE AND ONE (1) CIVILIAN TO GIVE DIRECTIONS AND PROCEEDED TO A HOSPITAL. THE UNIDENTIFIED CIVILIAN DIRECTED US TO A VN HOSPITAL LOCATED IN DOWN TOWN DANANG. THE WOUNDED WERE OFFLOADED AT THE PAGODA. IT APPEARED PERSONNEL AT THE PAGODA WERE EXPECTING THE VIA'S AS THE ST

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PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM [REDACTED] WERE  
WERE READY WITH STRETCHERS AND IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE [REDACTED] THE  
MITE. THERE WAS APPROXIMATELY 1000 PEOPLE IN THE PERVA AREA.  
LOUDSPEAKERS WERE SET UP AND AN UNIDENTIFIED VN WAS TALKING TO THE  
PEOPLE. THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA WERE OVERLY FRIENDLY TOWARD THE  
MARINES, OFFERING THEM BEER, SODA AND CIGARETTES. WE WERE THANXED  
FOR HELPING BRING IN THE WOUNDED AND THE [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
AT THIS TIME AN UNIDENTIFIED VN WHO SPOKE ENGLISH CAME TO US AND  
INTRODUCED US TO THE BUDDYIST PRIEST. THROUGH THE [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

PAGE TWO DDMM 227 S E C R E T NOFORN  
VN, THE PRIEST ASKED US IF WE WERE THERE TO HELP [REDACTED] [REDACTED] NOT  
ANSWER. THE ENGLISH SPEAKING VN THEN INTRODUCED US TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
(A MAJOR OR MAJOR GENERAL) NAME NOT REMEMBERED. THIS MAN WAS WEARING  
CIVILIAN CLOTHES, 5'4" OR 5'5", BLACK HAIR, STRIGHT COMBED, [REDACTED]  
OF HAIR BEING COMBED OVER LEFT EYE AND TEMPLE, MEDIUM BUILD, [REDACTED]  
MANNERED. HE APPEARED VERY SERIOUS AND SELF CONFIDENT. HE [REDACTED]  
THEIR FORCES WANTED A FREESELECTION WITHOUT ANY UNDE [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
WE WERE ASKED TO MAKE A STATEMENT INTO THE MINE BUT WE DECIDED [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
WE WERE ALSO ASKED HOW MANY MARINES CAME TO FIGHT. HE WERE ALSO ASKED  
WHERE WE WERE FROM, TO WHICH PFC CURTIS STATED, "MONTANA, USA".  
WE WERE ASKED IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE GENERAL WALT TONIGHT. IT  
WAS STATED THAT IT WAS DOUBTFUL. WE WERE ASKED IF WE WOULD BELIEVE  
MESSAGE TO GENERAL WALT AND WE SAID YES.  
WE WERE THEN ASKED IF WE COULD STAY OVER NIGHT WITH THEM, BUT WE  
REFUSED. THE UNIDENTIFIED VN REAPPEARED WITH THE NOTE FOR GENERAL  
WALT. VN STATED THEY HOLD 3000 TROOPS TO DESTROY THE AIRBASE.  
THE NOTE TO GEN WALT STATED THAT IF HE (GEN WALT) DID NOT STOP THE  
AIRSTRIKES ON THE ARVN TROOPS, THEY WOULD DESTROY THE AIRBASE.  
HE STARTED TO LEAVE, STATING HE HAD TO GET BACK TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
WHEN HE NOTICED A [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
~~CLASSIFICATION CHANGES NOV 1997~~

THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD  
202100H TO 212200H.

1. COMMENCING AT 202135 A NUMBER OF REPORTS WERE RECEIVED THAT A  
HEAVY VOLUME OF 50 CAL FIRE WAS BEING DIRECTED INTO DANANG CITY  
FROM EAST DANANG. SHORTLY THEREAFTER MORTAR AND 57 RR ROUNDS BE-  
GAN FALLING IN CITY VIC BT 032770 AND BT 034777. SOURCE OF  
MORTAR FIRE WAS REPORTED TO BE VIC BT 042767 AND 044761.

CG III MAF

**SECRET**

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

MOPTAR POUNDS FELL INTO III MAF CIB COMPOUND. NO SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES REPORTED. VMC FORES DEPLOYED TWO TANKS INTO POSITION AND TOOK .50 CAL MG POSITIONS IN EAST DANANG UNDER FIRE. MGS WERE SILENCED FOLLOWING DIRECT HIT OF TRUCK MOUNTED GUN POSITION. HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.

2. AT ABOUT 210720 VNAF A1 AIRCRAFT STARTED MAKING RUNS VIC NEV III MAF CP COMPOUND AT 042785. FOLLOWING REPORT BASED ON INVESTIGATION ON THE SCENE AND SUPPORTED BY PHOTOGRAPHS AND FRAGMENTS. AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT THE NEV CP, WHICH IS PRESENTLY STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION, WAS OCCUPIED BY ABOUT 400 USMC PERSONNEL. FIRST TWO A/C MADE A LOW NONFIRING PASS WEST OF NEV CP FROM NORTH TO SOUTH OVER DANANG RIVER. THESE A/C DREW FIRE INCLUDING FIRE FROM TRUCK-MOUNTED MACHINE GUNS ON ROAD EAST AND NORTH OF COMPOUND. NEXT TWO A/C MADE STRAFING RUNS EAST OF COMPOUND FROM SOUTH TO NORTH. NEXT TWO A/C MADE STRAFING RUNS EAST OF COMPOUND FROM NORTH TO SOUTH. NEXT ONE A/C MADE A STRAFING AND ROCKET RUN FROM WEST TO EAST INSIDE THE COMPOUND FIRING 20MM AND 2.75 ROCKETS. FIVE ROCKETS LEFT CRATERS APPROX 50 TO 60 FEET INSIDE COMPOUND AND TWO ROCKETS BLEW A LARGE HOLE IN BESS HALL ROOF. TWO MORE STRAFING RUNS WERE MADE IN SAME GENERAL AREA. 47 20MM CRATERS FOUND PLUS MANY 20MM HITS \* BOO.

PAGE THREE DDKE 337 S E C R E T NOFORN  
CASUALTIES THREE VIA ALL MED EVAC.

3. AT 0725 COL LASERGE VNAF ADVISOR WAS DIRECTED TO INFORM VNAF CC FOLLOWING: THAT CG III MAF WOULD NOT ALLOW VNAF A/C TO STRAFE OR BOMB DANANG OR DANANG EAST SINCE THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICANS IN THOSE AREAS AND SUCH BOMBING OR STRAFING WILL ENDANGER THEIR LIVES. III MAF HAS LAUNCHED FIGHTERS AND WILL SHOOT DOWN VNAF A/C IF THEY CONTINUE. THIS WORD ALSO PASSED TO MACV WITH REQUEST THEY GET VNAF TO DESIST, AND TO COL TRUNG AT I CORPS TO BEING. BEEN DONG NOT AVAILABLE TO SEE DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR. SOON THEREAFTER III MAF INFORMED THAT BEEN DONG HAD ISSUED ORDER TO VNAF TO STOP.

4. AT 0728 AN INITIAL REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT VNAF A1S WERE STRAFING AND BOMBING THE PAGODA LOCATED AT 026775 SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH CAS REPRESENTATIVE WHO LIVES WITHIN 300 METERS OF THE PAGODA ELICITED THE INFORMATION THAT THE PAGODA HAD NOT BEEN ATTACKED. IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT THE INITIAL OBSERVER SAW THE VNAF AIRCRAFT THEN CONDUCTING STRIKES AGAINST EAST DANANG ACROSS THE RIVER AND BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE INVOLVED AND LINE OF OBSERVATION (OBSERVER WAS TO THE WEST OF THE PAGODA) WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ATTACKS WERE ON WEST BANK OF RIVER AND

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AGAINST THE PAGODA KNOWN TO BE OCCUPIED BY STRUGGLE FORCES. AFTER CAREFUL INVESTIGATION THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PAGODAS HAS BEEN OBTAINED:

A. CRD REPORTED THAT AT 0845 APPROX 40-60 YOUNG BUDDHISTS SURRENDERED AT THE TAN NINH PAGODA BT 032787 ALONG WITH 10 ARVN (BELIEVED TO BE STRUGGLE FORCES) WITH A RECOILLESS RIFLE. SAME SOURCE REPORTS THAT AT 1345 THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAD BEEN SUSTAINED AT OR NEAR THE PAGODA: 1 VNMC KIA; 2 VNMC VIA; 6 CIV VIA; AND TWO BUDDHIST MONKS KILLED.

AT 1345 A US SGT LOCATED AT DANANG GARRISON REPORTED THAT APPROX 150 PERSONS (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED BUT BELIEVED TO BE PRO-STRUGGLE FORCES) WERE THEN AT DANANG GARRISON. THE PERSONNEL WERE REPORTEDLY REMOVED OR HAD SURRENDERED FROM THE TAN NINH PAGODA. THE VNMC HAD ALSO CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING ARMS: 6 BAP; 150 CARBINE; 1 M16; 3 .50 CAL MG; 6 .30 CAL MG AND 150 GRENADES. THIS SOURCE REPORTS CASUALTIES AS 1 VNMC KIA; 2 STRUGGLE FORCE VIA; 6 CIV VIA; AND TWO BUDDHIST MONKS KIA. CRD REPORTED THAT THE PAGODA APPEARED TO BE SECURED AROUND NOON TODAY.

C. NO OTHER REPORTS ARE AVAILABLE. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AT 2000 AND SUGGESTS THAT THE PAGODA COULD HAVE BEEN

PAGE FIVE DDKE 337 S E C R E T NOFORN

FIRED UPON. HOWEVER THERE IS NO FIRM AND POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT ANY PAGODA HAS BEEN ATTACKED DIRECTLY BY GROUND OR AIR FORCE. IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT HEAVY FIRING HAS TAKEN PLACE IN ADJACENT AREAS AND THE PAGODAS ARE ENCIRCLED BY GVN FORCES MAKING DIRECT OBSERVATION BY US PERSONNEL DIFFICULT.

D. PRINCIPAL PAGODAS OF INTEREST ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) TAN NINH PAGODA-BT 032787, THIS PAGODA WAS REPORTEDLY SECURED BY PROGOVERNMENT FORCES THE MORNING OF THE 21ST.

(2) PROVINCIAL PAGODA-BT 026775, THIS PAGODA APPEARS TO BE THE MAIN HEADQUARTERS OF THE STRUGGLE FORCES. (TINH HOI)

(3) PHO DA PAGODA-BT 029767, THIS PAGODA WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AS BEING THE STRUGGLE FORCES HEADQUARTERS DURING THE LATER PART OF APRIL AND EARLY MAY.

(4) TAN BAO TU BUDDHIST INSTITUTE-BT 030770, THIS IS A BUDDHIST INSTITUTE AND PRIOR TO 21 MAY WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BULLETED THE FOLLOWING STRUGGLE FORCES:

1 ENG PLT (UNK)

1 CO RANGERS (BELIEVED TO BE PART OF THE 11TH RANGER BN)

1 CO TRANSPORTATION TROOPS (UNIT UNK)

THESE FORCES HAVE PRESENTLY MOVED FROM THIS INSTITUTION TO THE BT

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S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
PROVINCIAL PAGODA. (THE TAN BAO TU INSTITUTE IS BELIEVED AT THE  
PRESENT TIME TO HOUSE ONLY BUDDHIST STUDENTS AND MAYBE A FEW  
SOLDIERS.)

(5) PAGODA BY 000713 CONTAINS STRUGGLE FORCES WHO WERE ATTACKED BY  
AIR EVENING 20 MAY - 100 TROOPS, 60 BOY SCOUTS AND CIVILIANS.

3. AT 0730 NSA REPORTED THE STRUGGLE FORCES HAVE TAKEN OVER A  
BILLET AT 31 1/2 DUY LAM STREET OCCUPIED BY 4 NSA OFFICERS. ONE  
OCCUPANT VIA.

PAGE TWO DDKE 338 S E C R E T NOFORN

6. AT 0735 TWO USMC F8 AC SCRAMBLED FROM DANANG AB WITH INSTRUCTIONS  
TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE VNAF A1'S UNDER ATTACK WHEN DIRECTED BY CG  
III MAF THROUGH TADC; TWO ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT SCRAMBLED AT 0740.  
STAFF OFFICER DISPATCHED TO VNAF 41ST TACFTR WING HQ WITH MESSAGE  
FROM CG III MAF REITERATING THAT ANY ATTACKS IN DANANG OR EAST  
DANANG AREA WOULD RESULT IN VNAF AIRCRAFT BEING SHOT DOWN. MESSAGE  
DELIVERED TO XO 41ST FIGHTER WING AND ACKNOWLEDGED. AT 0815, VNAF  
CEASED MAKING FIRING PASSES.

7. AT 0740 AIRBASE DEFENSE BN REPORTED TOTAL OF 12 ROUNDS MORTAR  
FIRE HAVE BEEN RECEIVED ON AIRBASE. 1 VEHICLE DAMAGED 1 USA KIA.  
ITOC REPORTED MORTAR ROUNDS CAME FROM STRUGGLE FORCES.

8. AT ABOUT 0825 THREE ROUNDS OF 60MM IMPACTED VIC 043985. FIRST  
TWO LANDED EAST OF NEW III MAF CP COMPOUND. THIRD LANDED IN COM-  
POUND. 8 KIA ALL MED EVAC. THESE ROUNDS CAME FROM DOWNTOWN DANANG.  
EXACT LOC UNKNOWN.

9. AT 0835 MAJ THAI OF 41ST VNAF WING PHONED C/S III MAF AND  
OFFERED FOLLOWING EXPLANATION OF ATK ON NEW III MAF CP. STATED THAT  
COL YEN OF DANANG GARRISON REPORTED THAT VNAF WAS RECEIVING FIRE  
FROM III MAF OFFICER'S CLUB. YEN REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN WATER AND  
THEY DID. THAI FELT THAT LANDING IN COMPOUND MUST HAVE BEEN

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FINED BY STRUGGLE FORCES. THAT ALSO REQUESTED THROUGH ADVISOR THAT  
III MAF FURNISH A LN OFFICER IN VNUF WAR ROOM WITH A MAP OF ALL US  
DISPOSITIONS AND SAID HE WOULD CLEAR ALL VNAF AIR REQUESTS WITH LN  
OFFICER. VNAF ADVISOR INFORMED THAT LN OFFICER WOULD NOT BE PRO-  
VIDED.

14. AT 0917 VNAF ADVISOR REPORTED THAT A1 A/C WOULD REMAIN ON AIR-  
BORNE ALERT BUT WOULD NOT BOMB, ROCKET OR STRAFE.

11. AT 1025 AIRBASE DEFENSE BATTALION REPORTED ONE KIA FROM COMPANY  
ASSIGNED DEFENSE OF TOURANE RIVER BRIDGE. WIA OCCURRED DURING FIRE  
FIGHT NEARBY BETWEEN STRUGGLE AND GOVT FORCES.

12. AT 1055 LGEN VIEN AND BGEN PHONG ARRIVED I CORPS CP FROM SAIGON.  
PHONG WILL BE NGEN CAO'S C/S FOR VC MATTERS. BGEN DONG WILL STILL  
HANDLE FIGHT AGAINST STRUGGLE FORCES.

13. AT 1100 REPORT RECEIVED THAT 7TH ABN BATTALION ARRIVED DANANG  
(STRENGTH 500). 3D ABN BATTALION REPORTED ON ALERT IN SAIGON FOR MOVE  
NORTH.

14. AT 1107 SENIOR ADVISOR VNAF REPORTED THAT VNAF ON AIRBASE  
TOOK SNIPER FIRE FROM VIC ARVN HOSPITAL. ELEMENTS OF ABN BATTALION  
MOVED IN TO SWEEP HOSPITAL AREA.

15. AT 1155 RECEIVED A PHONE MESSAGE FOR GENERAL WALT ORIGINATED  
BY A PERSON WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS MAJ KIEK AIDE TO GENERAL

PAGE FOUR DDKE 338 S E C R E T NOFORN

DINH. QUOTE THE TAN DINH PAGODA HAS BEEN STRAFED AND BOMBED BY  
VNAF FORCES FROM SAIGON INCLUDING SKY RAIDERS, TANKS, AND M109  
CARS WITH MANY CASUALTIES WOUNDED AND KILLED. A WOK BY THE NAME  
OF PHAM HUU SEVERELY WOUNDED AND A NOVICE KILLED. TOTAL CASUALTY  
BEING 50 KILLED AND 200 WOUNDED. GENERAL DINH REQUESTS GENERAL WALT  
USE HIS PRESTIGE AND POWER TO AVOID BLOODSHED AT DANANG.

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM DANANG THIS MORNING THAT FORCE WILL ATT  
PROVINCIAL PAGODA THINH HOI AT 1200 TODAY. SIGNED GENERAL DINH  
END QUOTE. FOLLOWING REPLY SENT TO DINH QUOTE I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR  
MESSAGE AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I AM DOING EVERYTHING  
POSSIBLE TO AVOID BLOODSHED AND TO PROTECT THE AIRFIELD. GENERAL  
WALT. END QUOTE.

16. AT ABOUT 1300 RECEIVED EXTENSIVE REPORT FROM MAJ BINH, DANANG  
EAST COMMANDER FOR GOVERNMENT FORCES. IN VISIT TO III MAF CP  
BINH MADE FOLLOWING POINTS: GVN PLANS TO LAND 1ST WITH TROOPS  
AND APC AT TIEN SHA TO SECURE DANANG EAST INCLUDING ARVN ANMO  
DUMP; STRUGGLE FORCES IN DANANG EAST NUMBER ABOUT 300; XO  
STRUGGLE FORCES IS A LT NGOC KNOWN AS AN EXTREMIST; ANMO DUMP  
IS DEFENDED BY 150 TROOPS; LT NGOC HAS ANMO DUMP PREPARED WITH  
DEFINITIONS AND IF ATTACKED BY GVN TROOPS WILL WITHDRAW AND

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LOW DUMP.

17. AT 1343 GEN WALT, GEN PLAT, POLAD, DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS, AND I CORPS ENGINEER ADVISOR MET WITH GENERAL CAO VAN LIEN, DEPUTY CORPS COMMANDER, GENERAL DONG, NEW I CORPS CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL PHONG AND GVN COMMANDER FOR DANANG EAST, MAJOR BINH AT I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. PRIMARY PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS PROBLEM OF AMMUNITION DUMP IN DANANG EAST CURRENTLY BEING HELD BY STRUGGLE FORCE CONTINGENTS AND POSSIBLE GVN PLANS TO ATTACK IT.

A. GENERAL VIEN AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ATTEMPT A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE DUMP. HE PROMISED TO LAND AN LST LOAD OF APC NORTH OF DANANG RATHER THAN IN DANANG EAST, WHERE THEY WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF PREPARING TO ATTACK THE DUMP, OR ALONG THE HAN RIVER, WHERE THEY COULD DRAW FIRE FROM STRUGGLE FORCES IN DANANG EAST.

B. GENERAL VIEN REQUESTED THAT U.S. ASSIST IN NEUTRALIZING THE AMMUNITION DUMP BY CARRYING AN ORDER, SIGNED BY THE CORPS COMMANDER, INSTRUCTING COMMANDER OF THE DUMP TO TURN IT OVER TO THE MARINES AND GIVING HIM AN OFFER OF AMNESTY, SIGNED BY VIEN HIMSELF. AMERICANS AGREED TO ATTEMPT TO MEET THE DUMP COMMANDER

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SECRET NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
TO SEE IF SUCH EFFORTS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE.

C. IN REGARD TO THE VNAF INCIDENT AT NEW WAF CP IN DANANG EAST THIS MORNING, GENERAL VIEN APOLOGIZED FOR MISTAKE AND SAID VNAF COMBAT CRAFT WERE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED TO FLY OVER DANANG. HE ALSO MADE ASSURANCE THAT GVN FORCES WOULD NOT ATTACK PAGODAS.

18. AT 1545 GEN VIEN MET WITH GEN CAO AT III WAF CP. CAO REQUESTED C/S III WAF BE PRESENT. CAO EXPLAINED HIS ACTION TO VIEN WHO WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

**SECRET**

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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HANDLED 19. AT 1600 TO 1800 CG III MAF AND POLAD NET WITH COMUSMACV IN  
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20. AT 1723 LOCAL VNAF THROUGH ADVISOR STATED THAT THEY WERE  
PLANNING ON HAVING A1 A/C OVERHEAD AT NIGHT IN CASE OF MORTAR  
ATTACK FROM DANANG EAST. III MAF RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS:

A. LTGEN VIEN TOLD CG III MAF THAT VNAF WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
FLY A1'S OVER DANANG. III MAF KNOWS OF NO CHANGE TO THIS POLICY.  
B. III MAF DOES NOT CONCUR WITH USING A1'S IN DANANG OR DANANG  
EAST UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. A1'S HAVE PROVEN THAT THEY ARE  
DANGEROUS TO AMERICAN LIVES IN DAYLIGHT. THEY WILL BE MORE SO  
AT NIGHT.

C. MORTAR ATTACKS ON THE AIRFIELD WILL BE HANDLED BY MEANS OTHER  
THAN A1 AIRCRAFT. III MAF, AS IT WOULD IN NORMAL TIMES, WILL  
RETALIATE WITH APPROPRIATE WEAPONS DEPENDING ON THE PROXIMITY OF  
MORTARS TO US INSTALLATIONS, VN INSTALLATIONS OR VN CIVILIANS.  
FOREGOING WAS ALSO DELIVERED TO BGEN DONG.

21. AT 1800 CG 2/4 AT III MAF CP REPORTED THAT LT NGOC (DEPUTY  
COMMANDER OF 104 ENBR COMPANY THAT IS HOLDING EAST DANANG AMMO DUMP)  
DISCUSSED SITUATION WITH HIM THIS AFTERNOON. NGOC TOLD HIM THAT AMMO  
DUMP IS NOT PIGGED FOR DEMOLITION, BUT THAT IT COULD BE. HE SAID

PAGE THREE DDKE 339 **S E C R E T** NOFORN

STRUGGLE FORCES WOULD FIGHT TO HOLD THE DUMP AND WOULD DESTROY IT IF  
VNIC ATTACKED EAST DANANG.

22. AT 2138 DSA REPORTED THAT DONG, AFTER RECEIVING III MAF POSITION  
ON USE OF VNAF A/C AGAINST MORTARS, POINTED OUT THAT IF MORTARS ARE  
LOCATED IN AREA OF USMC OR NEAR USMC WHAT ARE SAIGON TROOPS EXPECT  
TO DO? THEY DO NOT HAVE ARTY. DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS SUCH AS TANKS OR  
RECOILLESS RIFLES WILL DO MORE DAMAGE TO MARINES IF FIRED AT  
MORTARS. THEN HE ASKED IF III MAF WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SILENCING  
MORTARS IN OR NEAR MARINE LOCATIONS. AT 2145 THE FOLLOWING ANSWER  
GIVEN.

A. III MAF WILL FIRE BACK AT MORTARS ONLY IF THEY ARE SHOOTING AT  
PERSONNEL OR INSTALLATIONS. III MAF IS NOT GOING TO ENGAGE IN A GVN  
FIGHT.

B. GVN FORCES MUST CAREFULLY EVALUATE POSSIBLE INJURY TO US PER-  
SONNEL BEFORE THEY FIRE. MORTARS MAY BE SO CLOSE THEY CANNOT FIRE.

C. THIS IS ONE OF THE THINGS GVN MUST HAVE CONSIDERED BEFORE THEY  
STARTED TO FIGHT IN A CITY WITH A HEAVY AMERICAN POPULATION.

D. III MAF WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE STRUGGLE FORCES  
TO MOVE AWAY FROM US INSTALLATIONS. IF STRUGGLE FORCES  
GOING POSITION WAS...  
CG III MAF

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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TO BGENS DONG AND THONG.

23. FOLLOW UP ON CONVOY OF STRUGGLE FORCES THAT WAS ATTACKED IN 9TH MARINES AREA ON 21 MAY BY VNAF AIR STRIKES AND ARVN BN TANK FIRE. CONVOY COMMANDED BY 1ST LT KUNG 2D ARVN DIV. FORCE NOW CONSISTS OF 110 TROOPS AND 40 CIVILIANS (14-17 YEAR OLDS.) MOST TROOPS FROM QUANG TRI. FIVE MILITARY VEHICLES IN CONVOY; THREE WITH 2D DIVISION MARKINGS. KUNG CLAIMS HE CAME TO DANANG AT REQUEST OF GEN BINH. SIX OF GROUP WERE KIA AND 5 MIA.

24. III MAF REPOSITIONED AC FROM DANANG TO AREAS INDICATED (FOR DISPERSAL):

- A - UDORN
  - (1) 11 F-4S ARMED
  - (2) 4 F-4S UNARMED
- B - CHU LAI
  - (1) 5 EF-108
  - (2) 2 RF-3
  - (3) 3 F-4S (UNARMED)
  - (4) 3 F-8S (OUT OF COMMISSION)

25. AFTER DISCUSSION BETWEEN GEN WALT AND GEN VIER PLANS MADE TO UNLOAD LST-589 AT RED BEACH INSTEAD OF TIEN SPA OR MUSEUM PIER. THE NATIONALS

PAGE FIVE DDVE 359 S E C R E T NOFORM  
IS TO PRECLUDE UNLOADING OF LST IN AREA THAT COULD BE ATTACKED BY STRUGGLE FORCES. FINAL DECISION AS TO TIME AND PLACE OF LANDING NOT FIRM.  
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CG III MAF

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FM CG III MAF  
TO WVD/CDC  
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**SECRET //NOFORN//** SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KIRBY FROM LTGEN MALE

1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING PERIOD 212000H TO 222000H.
2. DANANG CITY AND THE SURROUNDING AREA WAS RELATIVELY QUIET THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT OF 21-22 MAY.
3. DELAYED REPORT INDICATED THAT AT 212050H A CROWD OF 500-1000 GATHERED AT MAIN ENTRANCE TO 2ND ARVN DIV HQ APPEARED TO BE HOSTILE, AND WERE ATTEMPTING TO ASSEMBLE FORCES. REPORTEDLY MALE ATTEMPTED TO ORDER 2ND ARVN DIV TO CHECK OUT AREA TO THE SOUTH OF DANANG CITY.

**SECRET**

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

RECEIVED GOV'T END OF QUOTE. THREE BUDDHIST MONKS AWAITING ARRIVAL OF  
HANDLING GENERAL LAM. CROWD BROKE UP AT 212145 WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE  
REMOVED THREE MONKS MET WITH GENERAL LAM, DETAILS OF CONVERSATION  
UNKNOWN.

4. ON 21 MAY MACV NOTIFIED III MAF VIA TELECON THAT LST  
508 DEPARTED SAIGON. RPTD CARGO WAS 13 APC'S AND 200 TRPS.  
ORIGINAL PLAN WAS THAT LST WAS TO DISPATCH CARGO IN THE  
VICINITY OF TIEN SHA RAMP TO SWEEP SOUTH AND CLEAR STRUGGLE  
FORCES FROM DANANG EAST AREA. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS DICTATED  
THAT THIS CONCEPT BE RECONSIDERED. MUSEUM PIER WAS SECOND  
CHOICE OF I CORPS, HOWEVER THIS WOULD PLACE THE SHIP IN AN  
EASY SOFT FOR SMALL ARMS AND MG FIRE FROM EAST DANANG WHICH  
WOULD AFFORD VNAF AN EXCUSE FOR RETALIATION ATTACKS ON EAST  
DANANG. THE PREFERRED PLACE TO LAND WAS RED BEACH TO AVOID  
REACTION IN DANANG CITY OR DANANG EAST. AT 211945H NSA RPTD  
THAT LST 508 WAS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE DANANG AREA 220400-  
0500. STATED THE LATEST INFO INDICATED UNLOADING WOULD TAKE  
PLACE AT MUSEUM PIER. WAS AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING  
AND DESTINATION. DID NOT CONSIDER RED BEACH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED  
AT THIS TIME AND STATED NSA COULD ONLY INFLUENCE ACTION BY

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PAGE THREE DDKE 449 S E C R E T //NOFORN//  
PROVIDING BERTHING SPACE AS FAR OUT AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THIS  
WAS TO PREVENT LST FROM STEAMING UP RIVER TO MUSEUM PIER.  
ARRIVED DANANG AREA APPROX 220500H. ISSUE REMAINED IN DOUBT  
AS TO LANDING SITE FOR SEVERAL HOURS WITH COORDINATION  
CONTINUING TO INFLUENCE THE DECISION. ADM WESCHLER RPTD TO  
C/S III MAF THAT TIEN SHA RAMP WAS LOADED WITH US GEAR PRECLUDING  
USE BY ANYONE. FURTHER, FLOATING CRANE AND DIVING BARGE LOCATED  
IN THE CHANNEL COULD BE USED TO BLOCK A MOVEMENT TOWARD MUSEUM  
PIER. MID MORNING GEN PHONG DIRECTED THAT LST 508 LAND AT RED  
BEACH. LST BEACHED 221200H VIC (BT 216787) AND COMMENCED UNLOADING  
AT 221400H LST AND UNLOADED 14 APC'S AND ABOUT 200 TROOPS. CLAM  
DOORS AND BEGAN RETRACTING FROM BEACH WHILE SA FIRE PICKED UP IN  
THE VIC OF RED BEACH. APC TROOP MOVED TO I CORPS HEADQUARTERS  
SUBSEQUENTLY WAS DEPLOYED TO VICINITY OF DANANG GARRISON.  
3. AT 220615H REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT 500-900 BUDDHISTS WERE  
MOVING NORTH IN VIC OF HOA PHAT BUDDHIST TEMPLE (AT 993753).  
FORCES ARMED WITH SA AND CARBINES PLUS 6 38 CAL MGS, M-79 AND  
3.5 RKTs. THE FORCES MOVED PAST III MAF CP ON HWY 1 AND APPROX  
THE 32ND BATTAL POSITION AT INTERSECTION OF HWY 1A AND HWY  
OF 987753). AT 220615H THE 32ND BATTAL WAS ADVISED THE SA WERE

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HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

APPROACHING BUDDHISTS FORCE AT A RANGE OF 300 METERS. THE COLUMN HALTED AND AFTER A BRIEF CONFERENCE AMONG THEMSELVES HEAVY TO MODERATE FIRE WAS EXCHANGED. SHARP BUT INTERMITTENT FIRING CONTINUED UNTIL 0800. AT THIS TIME A RANGER COMPANY PLUS TWO TANKS MOVED FROM SOUTH TO NORTH OF HQ 1 TOWARD THE REAR OF THE BUDDHIST FORCE THUS TRAPPING THE FORCE BETWEEN TWO RANGER UNITS. FOLLOWING A BRIEF EXCHANGE OF FIRE IT WAS REPORTED THAT AT 0800 ONE HUNDRED STRUGGLE FORCES SURRENDERED WITH 100 WEAPONS PLUS 2 30 CAL M85. THE REMAINING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS REPORTEDLY BROKE UP INTO SMALL GROUPS AND DISAPPEARED INTO HOA PHAT VILLAGE. ONE U.S. MARINE WAS KIA BY 8/A ROUND AS A RESULT OF STRAY FIRE RECEIVED IN III MAF COMPOUND DURING THE EXCHANGE. IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT ELEMENTS OF THE BUDDHISTS FORCE MAY HAVE REGROUPED IN THE PHUOC THONG PAGODA (AT 995752). AT THE CLOSE OF THE PERIOD THE PAGODA HAD BEEN SURROUNDED UNTIL 32ND RANGERS CONDUCTED A THOROUGH SEARCH OF HOA PHAT VILLAGE.

6. AT 1005H REPORT RECEIVED THAT 7 VNAF HELICOPTERS WITH APPROXIMATELY 70 TROOPS HAD TAKEN OFF FOR DANANG AT 0915 AND HEADED NORTH. AT 0955 7 MORE HELICOPTERS WITH TROOPS TOOK OFF AND WERE HEADING TOWARD DANANG EAST. LATER REPORT CONFIRMED THAT THESE CHOPPERS

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PAGE FIVE DDKE 049 **SECRET** // NOFORN //

WERE TRANSPORTING AN ADDITIONAL VNAF COMPANY TO HAI VAN PASS, BRINGING TOTAL FORCE IN THAT AREA TO TWO COMPANIES.

7. AT ABOUT 1000 CRITCHFIELD OF THE WASHINGTON STAR PASSED FOLLOWING INFO TO III MAF PIO:

A. AT TINH HOI PAGODA MORNING OF MAY 22ND CRITCHFIELD MET WITH BY THREE MEN WHO REPRESENTED THEMSELVES AND APPEARED TO BE STRUGGLE FORCE LEADERS THAT THEY HAD HEARD ABOUT A GEN INVITATION TO STRUGGLE FORCE LEADERS TO MEET AT I CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

B. STRUGGLE FORCE LEADERS SAID IF THIS REPORT WAS TRUE, THEY WOULD GO TO SUCH A MEETING UNDER FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

- (1) GEN VALT CHAIR MEETING.
- (2) GEN VALT ASSURE THEIR SECURITY AND PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM PAGODA.
- (3) GEN VALT SENT A LETTER TO PAGODA TO THIS EFFECT.

INQUIRY AT I CORPS INDICATED THAT SAIGON FORCES HAD MADE A BROADCAST REQUESTING ALL UNIT COMMANDERS COME TO I CORPS FOR A MEETING AT 1600. APPARENTLY THE STRUGGLE FORCE LEADERS DELIBERATELY OR ACCIDENTLY MISINTERPRETED THE BROADCAST. THE MATTER WAS DISCUSSED WITH I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. SINCE NO SUCH MEETING WAS CONTEMPLATED BY I CORPS, NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN.

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**SECRET**

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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**S E C R E T //NOFORN// SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
G. AT ABOUT 1100 IT WAS REPORTED THAT 1ST ARVN DIVISION FORCES  
WERE MOVING SOUTH AND WERE BETWEEN 859000 TO 873905.**

**A. THIS WAS THE 3D BN, 3D REGT (3/3) WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE  
CONDUCTING AN OPERATION IN THE VIC OF PHU LOC 17 KM FURTHER FROM  
DANANG. G-3 OF SAIGON TASK FORCE ASKED I CORPS ADVISORS WHY THIS  
FORCE WAS MOVING TOWARD DANANG. SENIOR ADVISOR DIRECTED ADVISORS  
WITH THE UNIT TO URGE CO 3/3 TO RETURN NORTHWARD TO PHU LOC AND IF  
HE DID NOT COMPLY THEY WERE TO LEAVE THE BN AND RETURN TO PHU LOC.  
ADVISORS ALSO TOLD CO 3/3 THEY COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THE BN**

**PAGE TWO DDKE 450 S E C R E T //NOFORN//  
WOULD NOT BE HIT BY VNAF.**

**B. VNAF, AS A RESULT OF ABOVE LAUNCHED 4 A/C AND STATED THEY WOULD  
ATTACK 3/3.**

**C. CO 3/3 INFORMED ADVISORS THAT BN HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO SECURE  
BRIDGE AT LANG CO (888957) SINCE PF WHO HAD BEEN PROVIDING SECURITY  
HAD LEFT. GEN NHUAN INFORMED HIS ADVISOR THAT HE HAD ADVISED  
GEN VIEN IN SAIGON TO THIS EFFECT, AND VIEN TOLD HIM TO PROTECT  
BRIDGE BUT TO PROCEED NO FURTHER SOUTH.**

**D. BGEN DONG, ALTHOUGH AWARE OF VIEN'S POSITION, STATED NO MORE  
THAN ONE CO WAS NEEDED TO SECURE BRIDGE AND MADE HIS VIEW KNOWN  
TO NHUAN THROUGH ADVISORS. 3/3 (-ONE CO AT BRIDGE) WITHDREW TO  
83000.**

**E. AT ABOUT THE TIME THIS SITUATION APPEARED SETTLED TO THE SAT-  
ISFACTION OF BOTH PARTIES, A COMPOSITE BATTALION OF ABOUT 300  
MEN FROM CORPS TROOPS AT HUE PROCEEDING SOUTH IN TRUCKS ARRIVED  
NORTH OF LANG CO BRIDGE. VNAF STATED THEY WOULD ATTACK THIS UNIT.  
IN RESPONSE LGEN DINH SENT FOLLOWING MESSAGE THROUGH ADVISORY  
CHANNELS QUOTE IF VNAF FIRES ON THIS BN THERE WILL BE THOUSANDS  
AND THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS ON THE GROUND AND QUOTE IN RESPONSE  
TO A REMARK BY ADVISOR...**

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

IN PREVENTING BLOODSHED, KEEP VNAF OFF MY (SIC) BATTALION END QUOTE .

7. GEN NHUAN TOLD ADVISORS HE COULD NOT CONTROL COMPOSITE BN. HE DID HOWEVER, ORDER THE CO OF 3/3 TO PREVENT MOVEMENT NORTH OR SOUTH LANG CO BRIDGE.

8. GEN DONG EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY THAT COMPOSITE BN WOULD INFILTRATE AND SAID HE WAS CALLING SAIGON FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

9. 1417 LTCOL CODY, SF ADVISOR, GMS, IN HOI AN RECEIVED FOLLOWING RADIO MSG FR LCOL LAP QUOTE IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN INCIDENT EVACUATE TO DIEN BAN OR DANANG PRIOR TO 2357ZPM END QUOTE. CODY FLEW TO HOI AN TO VISIT LAP. LAP RECOMMENDED AGAIN THAT ADVISORS LEAVE HOI AN. 1710 LAP STATED HE WAS THROUGH FOOLING AROUND AND WAS GOING TO REOCCUPY HOI AN BY FORCE IF NECESSARY; CODY STATED HIS TEAM WOULD REMAIN IN HOI AN MACV COMPOUND. WHEN CODY DEPARTED DIEN BAN FOR HOI AN LAP GAVE CODY SEVERAL LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION TO LEADERS OF UNITS IN HOI AN. AS A RESULT CAPTAIN CAU, 2/4 APC CO ELECTED TO RETURN WITH CODY TO DIEN BAN TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH LAP. THIS SITUATION HAS NOT GOTTEN TO POINT WHERE EVAC OF ADVISORS NECESSARY.

PAGE FOUR DDKE 458 S E C R E T //NOFORN//

10. AT 0330 EXEC OFF OF 511TH MILITARY POLICE AND MUNITIONS COMPANY STATIONED AT EAST DANANG AMMO DUMP CALLED ON CO 2/4 BY NEV III 4AF CP AND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER PROSPECTIVE ATTACK ON EAST DANANG BY VMC. CO 2/4 EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ENTER AMMO DUMP WITH U. S. MARINES TO TAKE OVER SECURITY (THIS WAS KEY TO PLAN TO ELIMINATE THREAT OF DESTRUCTION OF AMMO DUMP). LT DECLINED BUT AGREED THAT HE AND CAPT THANH, HIS CO, WOULD PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT AT 1030. AT 1030 CAPT THANH MET WITH LTCOL PICK, I CORPS ENG ADVISOR; LTCOL KELLY, CO 2/4; MAJOR LINK EAST DANANG COMMANDER AND OTHERS. AT THIS CONFERENCE A LETTER FROM GEN VIEN WAS PRESENTED TO CAPT THINK OFFERING AMNESTY IF STRUGGLE FORCES WOULD RETURN TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL. AT THIS CONFERENCE MAJOR LINK, WHO WAS PRESENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING IN THE PASSAGE OF CONTROL OF THE AMMO DUMP TO THE USMC, SABOTAGED THE PROCEEDINGS BY ADVISING CAPT THANH THAT HE HAD THREE BNS THAT COULD ASSIST IN DEFENCE OF DUMP, AND BY INFORMING THANH THAT VMC WOULD NOT ATTACK THE DUMP SO LONG AS MARINES WERE NEARBY. THIS STATEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN INADVERTENT BUT WAS NONE THE LESS, FATAL. THE TALKS CONTINUED AT 1100 WHEN GEN VIEN CALLED THE MEETING TO A CLOSE.

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IT WAS ADDRESSED TO CAPT THANH AND READ QUOTE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE COMPATRIOTS AND THE ALLIED SOLDIERS, DURING THE UNSETTLED SITUATION, I REQUEST THAT CAPT THAN LET THE U.S. MARINES COME AND MAINTAIN THE AMMUNITION DEPOT OF THIS 511TH COMPANY. THIS AMMUNITION WILL ONLY BE ISSUED TO ANYONE FIRING AT THE CONG. CAPT THAN WILL HELP THE U.S. MARINES STRICTLY ENFORCE THIS SPECIAL TASK. GEN HUYNH VAN CAO COMMANDER I CORPS UNQUOTE. THE STRUGGLE FORCES REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS ORDER FROM CAO BUT SAID THEY WOULD ACCEPT IT PERSONALLY FROM VIEN. VIEN WAS NOT IN DANANG SO GEN PHONG, C/S I CORPS, PERSONALLY DELIVERED THE ORDER TO CAPT THANH. THANH SAID HE WAS WILLING BUT HIS SUBORDINATES WOULD NOT FOLLOW HIM. GEN PHONG FELT THAT FURTHER EFFORT ON HIS PART WAS USELESS AND LEFT BUT SAID THANH MIGHT STILL WORK IT OUT WITH AMERICANS. NO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONDUCTED. HOWEVER, C. O. 2/4 STANDS READY TO MOVE INTO AMMO DUMP IF THANH AGREES OR IF OPPORTUNITY ARISES.

12. AT 1930 BUDDHISTS AT TINH HO PAGODA ANNOUNCED THAT THEY HAD A STATEMENT TO MAKE; ABOUT 40 NEWSMEN TOOK OFF FOR PAGODA. UPON ARRIVAL THERE WAS NO BIG STATEMENT; ANNOUNCEMENT APPEARED TO BE A RUSE. BUDDHISTS URGED PRESS TO REMAIN. WHEN PRESS STARTED BT

**S E C R E T //NOFORN//** FINAL SECTION OF THREE SECTIONS PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT OUT SOMEONE NEAR ENTRANCE TO PAGODA COMMENCED FIRING. CIR REPORTS THAT SOME OF PRESS ARE POSITIVE THAT FIRING WAS INITIATED FROM VICINITY OF PAGODA. FIRE WAS RETURNED FROM ENCIRCLING TROOP. 3 MEMBERS OF THE PRESS WERE WOUNDED. PRESS TEND TO BLAME BUDDHISTS FOR THE INCIDENT.

13. AT 220130H IT WAS REPORTED THAT A LARGE GROUP OF STRUGGLE FORCES (3-400) ARE HOLDING OUT IN THE MAIN PAGODA (TINH HO BT 026775). THEY ARE ENCIRCLED WITH THE 3/7 APC TROOP THAT ARRIVED TODAY AND SOME TANKS. HEAVY FIRE CONTINUES. A SMALL

PAGE TWO DDKE 451 **S E C R E T //NOFORN//** GROUP OF STRUGGLE FORCES ARE HOLDING OUT AT PHU DA PAGODA (BT 029767). AT APPROX 2130H, THE STRUGGLE FORCES IN EAST DANANG CALLED (BY PHONE) GEN DONG'S HQ AT I CORPS AND REQUESTED TO SURRENDER. GEN DONG'S REACTION IS UNK. IN OTHER AREAS OF DANANG, THINGS ARE BASICALLY QUIET. I CORPS HAS OBSERVED OVER 300 CAPTIVES (STRUGGLE FORCES) BEING PROCESSED THROUGH I CORPS HQ'S. (OFFER TO SURRENDER BY EAST DANANG FORCES REPORTED AS ERRONEOUS AT 2415).

14. U. S. FORCES HAVE SUFFERED 20 CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF THE CIVIL UNREST IN DANANG. ELEVEN OF THESE WERE MARINES AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE OF THE NEW III MAF HEADQUARTERS IN DANANG EAST. FOUR OTHER MARINES WERE WOUNDED IN ISOLATED INCIDENTS. THERE WERE FOUR AIR FORCE CASUALTIES ALL IN THE VICINITY OF THEIR COMPOUND OR THE EAST SIDE OF THE DANANG AIRFIELD. THE ONE NAVY WOUNDED OCCURRED IN A BILLET IN DANANG.

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**S E C R E T** WNNVV SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL ORDER INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LT GEN WAI  
THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING PERIOD  
SECTION TO BE

1. DURING AREA GENERALLY QUIET THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT WITH  
REPORTS OF SPORADIC FIRE INCIDENTS. TWO MARINE NP'S VIA FROM  
SA OR BY TRACKING. THEIR JIP RECEIVED FOUR ROUNDS SA FIRE  
VIC (BY SQUADS). SQUADS TREATED AND RETURNED TO DUTY. ALSO  
REMOVED THE BODIES AND BURIED IN UNIDENTIFIED GROUND  
FOR THE NIGHT.

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2. AT 0630 2/4 (-) ENTERED ARVN AMMO DUMP IN EAST DANANG WITH NO PROBLEMS. SEE LAST PARAGRAPH FOR DETAILS LEADING UP TO THIS EVENT. 3. III MAF OPENED MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE FROM AIR BASE TO DANANG WEST FOR LOGISTICAL AND OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC; TOURANE RIVER BRIDGE OPEN TO US MILITARY TRAFFIC; ROAD NETWORK DANANG EAST OPEN FOR OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL TRAFFIC. UNLOADING PROCEEDING ON BOTH SIDES OF DANANG HARBOR USING TIEN SHA AND BRIDGE RAMP SITES.

4. SHARDIV REPORTS ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM LMO IN HUE THAT IT WAS BELIEVED 251000 WAS ESTABLISHED DEADLINE FOR REMOVAL/WITHDRAWAL OF 190 ARVN DIVISION ELEMENTS NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS, REPORTED 1ST DIVISION HAD NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING AND TROOPS WERE PREPARING FOR AIR/GROUND ATTACK. NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE. REPORT NOT CONFIRMED.

5. STARTING AT ABOUT 1100 LT COL CODY, SA QNSS, CAPT CUC, C/S QNSS, CAPT NGAI, G-3 QNSS, AND TRICH MINH TRI, LEADING BUNDIST IN NOI AND CONFERRED WITH LT COL LAP, NEW QNSS CO, AT DIEN BAN.

A. MAIN CONCERN OF NOI AN DELEGATION WAS WHETHER THERE WO'LD BE REPRISALS WHEN LAP AND TROOPS ENTERED NOI AN. LAP SAID HE WOULD DO ALL IN

PAGE THREE DDKE 531 S E C R E T NOFORN  
HIS POWER TO PREVENT REPRISALS. LAP STATED HE WOULD COLLECT ALL WEAPONS FROM CIVILIANS. HE WOULD NOT PUNISH MILITARY PERSON WHO HAD NOT FOLLOWED ORDERS. THEY WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY SAIGON. THE NOI AN DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED WITH LAPS STATEMENTS AND IT WAS AGREED LAP SHOULD ENTER NOI AN PEACEFULLY AT 1600 25 01 68. THE GROUP LEFT LAP VISITED COL YEU AT SHARDIV CP AND A SHORT DISCUSSION FOLLOWED WITH SIMILAR AGREEMENT.

C. DELEGATION RETURNED TO NOI AN TO PAVE THE WAY FOR LAP'S ENTRANCE AT 1800.

D. AT 1930 2D BN 5001 INF ENTERED QNSS COMPOUND. HONOR GUARD AND STAFF STANDING BY. AREA PEACEFUL NO SHOLVIA GOTTED.

E. AT 2100 2D BN 5001 INF ENTERED QNSS COMPOUND. RECEIVED BY HONOR GUARD. ENTERED BRIEFING ROOM FULL OF NERVOUS STAFF OFFICERS. ADVISORS WERE NOT INVITED TO INITIAL BRIEFING. AREA QUIET.

F. ONLY TWO COMPLAINTS IN QNSS SO FAR. ONE FROM CAPT CUC, C/S QNSS; THE OTHER FROM CAPT NI, G-3 QNSS. BOTH WERE TAKEN TO 1 CORPS BY CHOPPER CARRIED WITH GARASARANG WITH VC. AFTER THE TWO ARRIVED, SAIGON WENT INTO CUC'S HOUSE AND TOOK 25,000 WEAPONS AND AMMO. LAP WAS ADVISED THE TWO WERE TAKEN TO 1 CORPS BY CHOPPER CARRIED WITH GARASARANG WITH VC.

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6. AT 231400 CID RPT THAT AP NEWS WAS FILING THE STORY THAT STRUGGLE FORCES HAVE COME OUT OF THE MAIN PAGODA AT TINH HOI AND ARE SURRENDERING. SUBSEQUENTLY WAS RPTD BY CRD THAT 370 WPMS CPTD, 250 UNIFORMED PERSONNEL AND 75 CIVILIANS SURRENDERED AT THIS PAGODA. 33 DEAD RPTD.

7. RPTD BY I CORPS G-2 AT APPROX 1400 THE PNO DA PAGODA (BT 029767) WAS NO LONGER OCCUPIED BY STRUGGLE FORCES. NO BIG KILLS OR SURRENDER OCCURRED AT PNO DA. IT APPEARED THAT MOST OF DISSENT ELEMENT HAS MOVED TO JUNGLE MAIN ELEMENT IN TINH HOI PAGODA. RPTS THAT ENTRENCHMENTS AROUND PAGODA HAD BEEN EVACUATED. A FEW CIVILIANS WERE IN THE PAGODA APPARENTLY TO AVOID RAIN. THE RPT COMPILED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES.

8. CRD RPTS GVN FORCES ARE APPARENTLY IN CONTROL OF DANANG CITY BUT IN NO CASE ARE THEY ATTEMPTING TO OCCUPY OR CONTROL THE PAGODAS. BUDDHIST MONKS ARE COMING AND GOING AS THEY PLEASE.

9. AT 231635 IT WAS REPORTED THAT DR NAM, FORMER MAYOR OF DANANG, HAD BEEN CAPTURED. REPORTEDLY BEING SENT TO SAIGON. FURTHER REPORTED THAT DR TAN, LEADER OF SUICIDE GROUP TRAINING COURSE HAS ALSO BEEN CAPTURED, LOCATION UNKNOWN. THICH TRI VAN,

PAGE FIVE DORE 531 S E C R E T NOFORN  
CHAIRMAN OF QUANG NAM BUDDHIST COUNCIL AND THICH NHU HUU WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE SURRENDERED TO THE VC/DK TODAY. BOTH CURRENTLY HELD AT VHOUC PROVINCE OFFICE AT HOI AN.

10. III MAF CI REPORTED THAT PHUOC THONG PAGODA VIC III MAF CP (AT 995758) WAS APPROACHED BY 360 RANGERS AND INFORMED UNLESS SURRENDERED BY 1800 PAGODA WOULD BE TAKEN. AT 1730 ARVN LT CAME OUT FOLLOWED BY 8 SOLDIERS AND SURRENDERED THEIR WPMS. APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 50 PEOPLE STILL INSIDE. SUBSEQUENTLY RPTS RECEIVED THAT WITILATION OF BUDDHIST PROTESTERS INSIDE PAGODA.

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WORLD NOT ACCEPT MEDICAL AID FROM 360 RANGERS BUT REPORTEDLY WOULD ACCEPT USMC AID. III MAF DISPATCHED MEDICAL AID TEAM TO AREA OF PAGODA. TEAM CHECKED IN VARIOUS ROOMS AND STATED MEDICAL AID WAS AVAILABLE FOR ANYONE WHO NEEDED IT. RELATIONSHIP COORDIAL WITH RANGERS; HOWEVER RANGER OFFICER STATED HE HAD A DOCTOR WITH HIM AND HAD NO REQUIREMENT FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. ONE VN YOUTH LOCATED NORTH OF THE PAGODA WITH THREE FINGERS SEVERED. TAKEN TO IED MED CAMP AND EVACUATED TO "C" MED.

11. AT 1800 CD 20 BY 360 RANGERS A ROAD LEADING FROM DANANG EAST FROM BRIDGE INTERSECTION TO ... ALL ROAD BOLCKS WERE

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DOWN; ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL (STRUGGLE FORCES) HAD DEPARTED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. POSITION HELD BY CO 104TH ENG TO EAST OF TOURANE BRIDGE HAD BEEN ABANDONED. APPROX 150 MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS ON DANANG EAST CHECKED IN WITH 91TH DEPOT AND THEN RETURNED TO PARENT ORGANIZATIONS. APPEARS THAT ALL RESISTANCE IN DANANG EAST COMPLEX IS GONE. 12. DURING THE MORNING OF 21 MAY A REQUEST FOR TRANSFUSION BLOOD FROM THE ARVN HOSPITAL WAS PASSED BY THE I CORPS MEDICAL

PAGE TWO DOOR 532 S E C R E T NOFORN  
ADVISOR. 40 UNITS WERE DELIVERED VEHICLE. DURING THE AFTERNOON ARVN HOSPITAL REQUESTED SURGICAL ASSISTANCE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT MOST EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE COULD BE PROVIDED BY MOVING VIETNAMESE SURGICAL PATIENTS TO 3RD MED BN. 20 PATIENTS WERE MOVED; 16 BY HELICOPTER PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW. ARVN THEN REPORTED THEY HAD NO MORE PATIENTS REQUIRING OUT SURGICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE TRANSFER WAS SUSPENDED AT 2030 PENDING ANOTHER REQUEST. DURING THIS PERIOD ALL III MAF MEDICAL FACILITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THOSE VIETNAMESE WHO PRESENT THEMSELVES AS HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PAST. DURING THE MORNING OF 22 MAY THE 1ST MAW DISPENSARY EMERGENCY CARE TO 9 ARVN PERSONNEL AND TRANSFERRED THEM TO 3RD MED BN. DURING THE AFTERNOON 3RD MED BN VEHICLES MOVED 18 VIETNAMESE PATIENTS BACK TO ARVN HOSPITAL AND TOOK VIETNAMESE PATIENTS TO 3RD MED BN FOR CARE. THE ABOVE VIETNAMESE INCLUDED MILITARY PERSONNEL OF ALL FACTIONS AND CIVILIANS.

14. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN EAST DANANG THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY REPORTED IN PREVIOUS REPORTS.  
A. ON 16 MAY 1ST MAW DELIVERED A REPORT FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THE 1ST MAW HAD BEEN MOVED FROM DANANG TO THE AREA OF THE 1ST MAW

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PREPARED FOR DEMOLITION BY STRUGGLE FORCES. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS INDICATED THE ANHO DUMP WOULD BE BLOWN IF ATTACKED. WHEN III MAF TOOK OVER THE BRIDGE THERE WERE EXPLOSIVES IN PLACE AND IT WAS READY TO BE BLOWN.

B. ANHO DUMP CONTAINED OVER 6300 TONS OF ASSORTED ANHO.

C. ON 21 APR IT WAS LEARNED THAT AN ATTACK ON EAST DANANG WAS PLANNED USING LST 500 WITH ITS EMBARKED APC TROOP AND 200 TROOPS.

D. A MEETING WAS HELD BETWEEN GEN VIEN AND GEN VALT TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM. VIEN AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO LAND THE LST IN DANANG EAST AT TIEN SHA BEACH OR AT MUSEUM PIER WHERE IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY DRAW FIRE FROM DANANG EAST AND AGGRAVATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION. VIEN AGREED TO LAND THE LST ON PED BEACH NW OF DANANG. GEN VIEN REQUESTED THAT US ASSIST IN NEUTRALIZING THE DUMP BY CARRYING AN ORDER, SIGNED BY GEN CAO, INSTRUCTING THE COMMANDER OF THE DUMP TO TURN IT OVER TO THE US MARINES AND GIVING HIM AN ORDER OF AMNESTY, SIGNED BY VIEN HIMSELF. III MAF AGREED TO HAVE REPS MEET THE DUMP COMMANDER TO SEE IF SUCH EFFORTS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE.

E. EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE ON 21 MAY WERE FUTILE. A MEETING

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PAGE FOUR DOKE 502 S E C R E T NOFORN

WAS SET UP FOR 22 MAY AT 1000.

F. DURING THE NIGHT OF 21 MAY NUMEROUS REPORTS WERE RECEIVED THAT LST 500 WOULD LAND AT MUSEUM PIER. G. AT MIDNIGHT 21 MAY A REQUEST WAS RECEIVED BY NSA TO LAND LST 500 AT TIEN SHA BAY. NSA RESPONDED BY SAYING TIEN SHA NOT AVAILABLE.

H. AT 0005 NSA RECEIVED A REPORT THE LST WOULD LAND AT MUSEUM PIER. III MAF REQUESTED NSA TO BLOCK CHANNEL TO MUSEUM PIER. THIS WAS DONE WITH A FLOATING CRANE AND DIVING BARGE.

I. III MAF REQUESTED GEN DONG TO ENSURE THAT LST WAS LANDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENT WITH VIEN. DONG'S ATTITUDE WAS THAT HE KNEW OF NO CHANGE AND WOULD ENSURE LST DID NOT ENTER RIVER.

J. LST BEACHED AT 1200 NW OF DANANG AND DISCHARGED IN APC AND 200 TROOPS.

K. MEANWHILE AT 1030 NEGOTIATIONS STATED AT ANHO DUMP. PRESENT WAS MAJ LINN, ARVN SPECIAL FORCES, WHO IS MILITARY COMMANDER OF DANANG EAST AND WAS PRESENT AT MEETING WITH VIEN. LINE SABOTAGE THE PROCEEDINGS BY STATING THAT GEN VIEN WOULD NOT ATTACK THE DUMP AS LONG AS US MARINES WERE PRESENT. CAPT THANH, CO OF ANHO DUMP, IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE DUMP AND INCIDENT IN MARKED CONTACT TO THE DUMP COMMANDER. THE DUMP COMMANDER ORDERED FROM

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CAO AND AMNESTY PROMISE FROM VIEN MADE LITTLE IMPRESSION. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED OFF AND ON ALL DAY TO LITTLE AVAIL. L. ON THE NIGHT OF 28 MAY A NEW APPROACH WAS TRIED. FIRST, CB III MAF SENT WORD TO MAJ LINH THROUGH HIS ADVISOR THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT HIM TO GEN VIEN AS A QUESTIONABLE CHARACTER SINCE, DUE TO HIS STATEMENTS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE STRUGGLE FORCES OR LOYAL TO GVN. SECOND, LTCOL KELLY (CO OF THE BN AT NEW III MAF CP) MET AGAIN WITH THANH. HE TOLD HIM THAT ONLY REASON VIEN WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK DANANG EAST WAS PRESENCE OF US FORCES, AND THAT IF THANH PERSISTED IN HIS PRESENT STANCE TO III MAF WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO IMPOSE VIEN HE WOULD WITHDRAWING HIS FORCES FROM THE AREA. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT CAUSED A PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE IN THANH. NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED AND AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN WHICH US MARINES WOULD TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF THE DUMP. THANH'S TROOPS, (ABOUT 150 STRONG) WERE PERMITTED TO REMAIN INSIDE AS A FACE-SAVING DEVICE.

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RELEASEABLE AT 0830 ON 29M AND ONE CO OF 2/4 PLUS 2 TANKS MOVED TO THE DUMP. RELATIONS WITH VN TROOPS WERE CORDIAL. US ADVISORS INSPECTED MAGAZINE AREA. NO DEMOLITION CHARGES WERE FOUND.

13. U.S. FORCES SUFFERED TWO ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES IN THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AS TWO MARINE HP'S ON PATROL IN DANANG RECEIVED STUN BOUNDS. LAST REPORTING OF A MARINE WOUNDED AT THE NEW III MAF CP RAISED THE TOTAL CASUALTIES TO 23 ALL USA. TOTAL MIA ARE HHC 13 AND 6 USMC 1.

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**SECRET NOFORN SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS**  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTJG [REDACTED] MILT  
**THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE**  
**PERIOD 232200 TO 242200.**

1. 8829 - III MAF HAS REDUCED SECURITY FORCES ON DANANG  
BRIDGE FROM CO TO ONE PLT. BRIDGE HAS BEEN OPENED TO ALL  
TRAFFIC V/CONCURRENCE OF I CORPS. AIR BASE DEF BN RPTS THAT  
22 SOLDIERS FROM 789 RF CO HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO WEST END  
OF BRIDGE V/MISSION OF CHECKING ARVN TRAFFIC. COORDINATION HAS  
BEEN EFFECTED. NSR HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO DANANG HOTEL TO IN-

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GUIDE ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL PIER.  
2. 1200 - I CORPS G-2 RPTS VERY LARGE DEMONSTRATION SOLICITED FOR RUE 258900. EXPECTED TO HAVE AMERICAN OVERLOOKED.  
3. FOLLOW UP ON NOI AN SITUATION.  
A. LTCOL LAP ENTERED HOIS AT NOI AN REGION. PRECEDED BY CITY BY 1ST AND 3D BNS 51ST REGT AND 2 COS OF 39TH RANGERS. INCIDENTS WERE PPTD.  
B. NEW UNOP ASSEMBLED STAFF AND UNITS ORDERS TO OBLIGE PLAN TO ESTABLISH GOVT CONTROL AND ISSUE IMPLEMENTING ORDERS. ORDERS WERE ORDERED TO HUSHER TRPS AND UNPS W/OUT DUE TIME IN 24 HOURS.  
C. 24 H A DAY CURFEW WAS ANNOUNCED BY LOUDSPEAKERS. ALSO BROADCAST THAT ALL UNPS IN HANDS OF CIVILIANS WERE TO BE TURNED INTO SECTOR WITHIN JVR HOURS.  
D. LAP THEN RELIEVED CAPT CUC, C/S 1ST BATTAL 1ST REGT, AND 1 MI G-5 BNSS. THESE OFFICERS DELIVERED TO DANANG 11 MAY 1968 PRESUMABLY UNDER APREST AS STRUGGLERS W/OUT TRPS.  
E. HOUSES WOULD NOT BE SEARCHED FOR UNPS UNTIL 0600 HRS. PERIOD HAD PASSED. HOWEVER, CAPT CUC'S FAMILY TOOK REFUGEE IN RUCY COMPOUND OVERNIGHT AND WERE RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES.

PAGE THREE DDKE 648 S E C R E T N 0000  
241100H W/LAP'S APPROVAL.  
F. CAPT TRUC, 11TH RANGERS, WHO WAS BROUGHT TO NOI AN BY COL TEU TO ORGANIZE DEFENSES HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED. TO BE IN A LOCAL PAGODA W/FEW STRAGGLERS ARMED W/INDIVID UNPS, M5, AND 1 GRN MORTAR.  
G. EXEC OFF 102 ENGR BN ALSO HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED. BELIEVED BE STRUGGLE LEADER AND BUDDHIST FANATIC.  
H. COL LAP ESTIMATED 400 RIFLES AND 2 M55 MISSING AND BELIEVED IN HANDS OF DISSIDENT GRPS. 45 OF 241400H 74 INDIV WERE HAD BEEN COLLECTED.  
I. PLAN IS TO PROCEED W/THOROUGH SEARCH OF CITY UTILIZING 3 BNS: 1/51, 3/51, 39TH RANGERS. COL LAP ESTIMATES TIME OF COMPLETION TWO-THREE DAYS.  
J. RETURN OF TRPS TO PACIFICATION AREA DEPENDS ON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF NOI AN OCCUPATION. THERE HAVE BEEN NO FIRING INCIDENTS TO DATE. DANANG CITY REMAINS QUIET, APPEARED TO BE RETURNING TO NORMAL THROUGHOUT THE DAY.  
4. DURING THE MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF 24 MAY THE TIN HOI AND THE TAN HINH PAGODAS WERE VISITED. THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE:

CG III MAP

**SECRET**

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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A. TAN HAI PAGODA - ON ENTERING THE COURTYARD IT WAS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THIS PAGODA HAD RECEIVED SOME SMALL ARMS FIRE. THE BUILDING AND SURROUNDING WALLS APPEARED TO BE POCK MARKED WITH BOTH 30 CALIBER AND 50 CALIBER PITS. INITIAL INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE HITS APPEARED TO BE AT RIGHT ANGLES TO THE STRUCTURE, AND NO INDICATION THAT IT HAD RECEIVED FIRE FROM ABOVE. A RELIGIOUS CEREMONY WAS IN PROGRESS AT THIS TIME, (BELIEVED TO BE CONNECTED WITH THE 33 THAT HAD BEEN KILLED, AND THE TWO BUDDHIST MONKS THAT LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE VICINITY OF THE TEMPLE). THE PAGODA WAS QUITE CROWDED AND THE RELIGIOUS ATTENDEES WERE BACKED UP INTO THE COURTYARD.

B. TIN HOI PAGODA - THE TIN HOI PAGODA WAS VISITED FROM 1959 TO 1960, 24 MAY, AFTER SECURING APPROVAL FROM AIRBORNE TROOPS GUARDING THAT AREA. THE ROAD APPROACHES LEADING TO THE TIN HOI AREA WERE BLOCKED IN MANY PLACES BY BARBED WIRE AND WOODEN ROAD BLOCKS. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 200-300 ARMED TROOPS AT THE ENTRANCE TO THIS PAGODA. THE PAGODA, ON CLOSE INSPECTION, APPEARED TO BE FREE OF ANY SIGNS OF DESTRUCTION OR EVIDENCE OF DESTRUCTION BY SMALL ARMS OR LARGE BOMBING.

PAGE FIVE DDKE 648 S E C R E T NOFORN

A "HIGH" BUDDHIST CEREMONY WAS IN PROGRESS DURING THE VISIT. A LARGE CROWD OF WORSHIPERS WERE WITHIN THE MAIN TEMPLE. A LESSEER NUMBER WERE INTERSPERSED WITHIN THE COURTYARD. IN ADDITION TO THE FOURNERS. THE CROWDS WERE ORDERLY AT BOTH PAGODAS.

5. FOLLOWING IS A REPORT OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED VIETNAMESE DURING RECENT CONFRONTATION IN DANANG. ALL III MAF MEDICAL FACILITIES CONTINUED TO PROVIDE CARE TO ALL VIETNAMESE, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, WHO PRESENTED THEMSELVES FOR TREATMENT. MAJOR MAJ CUONG LOCATED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DIRECTED OR ARRANGED TRANSPORTATION FOR THEM TO USAID HOSPITAL. SUPPLIES WERE SATISFACTORY AND THERE WAS NO PATIENT BACKLOG. III MAF MAINTAINED TWO (2) MEDICAL TEAMS AT THE USAID HOSPITAL. EACH TEAM CONSISTED OF ONE AMBULANCE, ONE MEDICAL OFFICER, THREE (3) HOSPITAL CORPSMEN AND STANDARD EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT. MEDICAL TEAM PERSONNEL ASSISTED USAID STAFF. EVENING OF 22 MAY ELEVEN (11) SURGICAL CASES AND THREE (3) NEUROSURGICAL CASES WERE MOVED FROM ARVN

TO 100 MI 24 ANDNSA HOSPITAL RESPECTIVELY. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE SECTION, 3D MED BN COMPLETED INSECT SPRAYING AT THE USAID HOSPITAL

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SECRET NOFORN SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRUMHOLTZ FROM LTGEN  
HOSPITAL. ARVN HOSPITAL NOW HAS 185 CIVILIAN PATIENTS. NO  
PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED FROM III MAF. HOWEVER  
NEED FOR FOOD FOR THE CIVILIAN PATIENTS AND TWO (2) TONS  
OF MEDICAL SUPPLY EXISTS. III MAF G-2 WILL HANDLE REQUEST  
FOR FOOD AND SENIOR MEDICAL ADVISOR I CORPS WILL HANDLE  
REQUEST FOR MEDICAL SUPPLIES.  
6. COL TRIAN, WHO REPLACED LT. COL WHE AS I CORPS PSYWAR  
PSYWAR AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS, STATES REQUIREMENT FOR

PAGE TWO DOKI 649 SECRET NOFORN  
LEAFLETS PER DAY EXPLAINING RECENT EVENTS IN A FACTUAL  
MANNER AND CALLING FOR UNITY AND SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT.  
OUTPUT EXCEEDS CAPACITY OF VN PERSONNEL AND PRINTING  
AT DANANG PSYWAR CENTER BY ABOUT 900 PCT. HOWEVER COULD  
MET BY ALL U. S. PR INSEACILITIES, IF COMPLETELY EMPLOYED  
IN RESPONSE TO THAT REQUEST AND DIVERTED FROM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
MISSION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMUSMACV INSTRUCTION ON SUBJECT, COL  
TRIAN INFORMED THAT U. S. FACILITIES FULLY COMMITTED TO  
PRODUCTION OF ANTI-VN MATERIAL AT PRESENT. HE STATED THAT  
WOULD BE REQUESTED FROM MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND  
PROBABLY BE FORTHCOMING. I CORPS PSYWAR ADVISOR TO OBTAIN  
TRANSLATION OF TEXT IN ORDER TO REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR  
PRODUCTION BY U S AMBASSADOR TO VN.

7. AT 1633 BG PHONG, I CORPS C/S REG DEP SR ADV DELIVERED  
DEFENSE MINISTRY MSG TO COL DAN QUANG YEU. MSG STATED COL  
YEU MUST REPORT TO SAIGON BY 25 MAY OR BE CONSIDERED A  
DEserter. MSG WAS DELIVERED TO COL YEU. AFTER READING MSG  
COL YEU COMMENTED HE DIDN'T THINK HE WOULD GO TO SAIGON  
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ARRESTED.  
LATER COL YEU CALLED COL WHE AND STATED HE WOULD NOT GO TO SAIGON

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NOT GOING TO SAIGON BECAUSE HE MIGHT BE ARRESTED. HE ALSO STATED GEN CO HAD PROMISED THAT COL YEU COULD STAY IN 1 CORPS UNTIL THE CRISIS SUBSIDED THEN BE GIVEN A JOB IN 1 CORPS. IF THIS COULD NOT BE DONE COL YEU STATED HE WOULD RATHER RETIRE. GEN PHONG STATED HE WOULD SEND A REPORT TO SAIGON WITH RCL SEA'S ANSWER. PHONG COMMENTED: "COL YEU WILL BE A DESERTER"

8. USAID REGIONAL DIRECTOR STATES 13 TONS RICE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION DANANG AREA. REQUESTS FROM ACTING MAYOR DANANG TOTAL 5 TONS AT PRESENT FOR EMERGENCY, PARTLY FOR 187 CIVILIAN PATIENTS ARVN HOSPITAL (WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP). RICE AND OTHER STAPLES READILY AVAILABLE NOW IN DANANG COMMERCIALLY AT PRE- 15 MAY PRICE. 2,500 TONS OF RICE IN DANANG HARBOR ON BARGES, ALTHOUGH UNLOADING PRESENTS SOME PROBLEM. OVERALL SITUATION REGARDING FOODSTUFFS NOT CRITICAL. MAYOR DANANG WORKING CLOSELY WITH USAID AND NAV-SUPACT TO DETERMINE ACTUAL NEEDS FOR ASSISTANCE TO POPULACE, INFORM CRITICAL SHORTAGES, SUBSISTENCE OR MEDICAL, YET DISCOVERED

9. FOLLOWING IS A RECAP OF 1ST DIV UNITS SOUTH OF HUE  
A. ON 21 MAY A PROVISIONAL BN WAS ORGANIZED IN HUE FROM

PAGE FOUR DDKE 649 S E C R E T NOFORN  
SOLDIERS ON LEAVE, CIVILIANS AND DISSIDENTS FROM MARINE UNITS. PROV BN MOVED IN TRUCKS TO PHU LOC AND BY 1300 27 MAY WERE LOC VIC BY GIA. PROV BN MOVED TOWARDS LANG CO BRIDGE AND CAME UNDER OBSERVATION BY SAIGON ISROOPS AT VAN PASS. VNAF LAUNCHED A-19 AND BUZZED THE UNIT. WHEN THEY DID NOT STOP AT LEAST ONE ROCKET WAS FIRED IN THE AREA OF THE UNIT AS A WARNING. WORD WAS PASSED TO PROV BN THROUGH 3/3 WHICH WAS OPERATING VIC LANG CO BRIDGE THAT IF THEY MOVED SOUTH OF THE BRIDGE, THEY WOULD BE TAKEN UNDER FIRE. CB 17 DIV ATTEMPTED TO GET UNIT TO RETURN TO HUE BUT PROV BN REFUSED, STATING THE UNIT WAS COMPOSED OF CORPS TROOPS AND WERE NOT RESPONSIVE TO 1ST DIV.

B. 1400 - LTGEN DIEM, FORMER 1 CORPS CHDR, INFORMED G-3 ADVISOR 1ST DIV THAT PROV BN WAS RESPONSIVE TO HIM AND STATED THAT IF VNAF FIRES ON THE BN THEY WILL HAVE THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS ON TOP OF THEM. GEN NHUAN PLACED A COMPANY AT THE NORTH END OF THE LANG CO BRIDGE AND ORDERED THEM TO LET NO ONE PASS OVER THE BRIDGE IN ANY DIRECTION. COMPANY OF 1000 MEN AT THE SOUTH END OF THE BRIDGE WAS

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AT NORTH END OF BRIDGE.  
C. AT 0920, 23 MAY, CG 1ST DIV TOGETHER WITH HIS STAFF AND/ARTY CHDR VISITED 3/3 CP AT MY DIA. CG 1ST DIV REQUESTED CO 3/3 TO MOVE 3/3 MINDS ON IPLN NORTH TO PHU LOC AND PARTICIPATE IN OPN LS274. ONE PLATOON OF 3/3 WAS ORDERED TO REMAIN AT NORTH END LANG CO BRIDGE WITH STATED MISSION OF PREVENTING TROOP MOVEMENT EITHER DIRECTION ACROSS BRIDGE. THE ENGINEER CO WAS TO REMAIN IN THE AREA. AT 1000 HOURS FROM HQ 1ST DIV MET WITH PROV BN CHDR, CAPT NGUYEN DINH AT MY DIA. HQA HAD BEEN THE CHIEF OF HQA VANG DISTRICT UNTIL HE LEFT THE DISTRICT ON 15 MAY WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARVN FORCES. HQA STATED HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQA DINH NOT TO CROSS THE BRIDGE; THAT HE AND HIS PROV BN WOULD NOT MOVE BACK FROM LANG CO; THAT HIS UNIT IS WELL SITUATED IN LANG CO VILLAGE, WITH HIS MEN LIVING IN ALLNHQZS, CATHOLICS AND BUDDHISTS ALIKE, SO THAT AN AIR STRIKE WOULD AFFECT ALL; THAT HE HAD NO SUPPLY PROBLEMS; AND THAT THE CENTRAL GOVT WOULD MAKE A GREAT MISTAKE IF IT ATTACKED THE VILLAGE, SINCE THE PROV BN WOULD NOT RESPOND TO A 1ST DIV ORDER. AT

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SECRET NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF THREE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRILAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
1530, GEN CAO, CG I CORPS, PREPARED AN ORDER AT III MAF  
FOR DIRECTING CAPT CAO THE PROV BN CHDR TO RETURN THE BRIDGE  
TO US, AND HAVE THE SOLDIERS RETURN TO THEIR UNITS.  
D. GEN CAO GAVE THIS ORDER TO DEPUTY SA I CORPS TO DELIVER  
TO CAPT HQA. AFTER CLEARING WITH HQA DONG, OSA PROCEEDED  
BY HELICOPTER TO PHU LOC TO GET DISTRICT CHIEF TO ACCOMPANY  
HIM TO LANG CO. HQA DONG STATED THAT HQA DONG WOULD  
BE ACCOMPANYING HQA DONG.

SPECIAL WAS TOO DANGEROUS. PHU LOC SUBSECTOR ADVISOR ACCOMPANIED  
HANDLING DEP SR ADV TO LANG CO. DEP SR ADV NOTED PLAT OF 3/3 WAS  
REQUIRED EFFECTIVELY BLOCKING NORTHERN END OF LANG CO BRIDGE.  
A MEMBER OF 3/3 LED DSA, SUB-SECTOR ADVISOR AND 1 COPPS  
SGT NAJ ON FOOT FOR ONE-HALF MILE THROUGH VILLAGE OF LANG CO.  
MEN OF PROV BN WERE LOCATED NEAR OR IN NEARLY ALL HUTS OF  
THE VILLAGE. THE RECEPTION WAS COOL. AMONG THE PATCHES  
WORN BY MEMBERS PROV BN WERE 11TH RANGERS, 39TH RANGERS,  
10ATH ENGINEERS, 10TH ARTY, AND 51ST INF. SEVERAL CIVILIANS IN  
THE GROUP STATED THEY WERE STUDENTS FROM HUE AND DANANG GARRISON.  
CAPT HOA WAS CIVIL WITH DEP SR ADV WHEN HE RECEIVED THE ORDER, BUT  
UPON READING IT HE BECAME EXCITED/UPSET, AND BELLIGERENT. HIS GR  
CLOSED IN ABOUT THE THREE U. S. AND MADE MENACING GESTURES.  
ONE INDIVIDUAL PULLED THE PIN ON A GRENADE. THE GRENADE FELL  
OUT OF HIS HAND BUT HE CAUGHT IT BEFORE THE SPOON FLEW OFF.  
HOA GAVE THE ORDER BACK TO DSA STATING THAT IF HE HAD ANY  
MORE ORDERS LIKE THAT HE HAD BETTER NOT DELIVER THEM.  
HE WAS BITTER ABOUT THE ROCKET THAT HAD FIRED AT THEM. HOA  
STATED THAT GEN CAO HAD BLOOD ON HIS HANDS FROM THE HUE  
INCIDENT (THE ATTEMPTED KILLING OF CAO WHEN ASSASSIN WAS

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PAGE THREE DOKI 630 S E C R E T NOFORN  
KILLED BY HELICOPTER GUNNER) AND THAT HOA RESPECTED  
ORDER ONLY FROM GEN DINH. HOA AGREED TO WRITE A NOTE IN  
WHICH HE WROTE HE RESPECTED ORDERS ONLY FROM DINH. BY  
AGREEING TO ZURE THREE CIVILIANS WHO ARE EMPLOYED IN DANANG  
BACK WITH HIM DEP SR ADV DOUBLED THE SIZE OF THE FRIENDLY FORCES  
AND WALKED BACK TO HELICOPTER MIDST A MOST HOSTILE FORCE  
ESTIMATED ABOUT 250 INDIVIDUALS. DEP SR ADV PROCEEDED TO  
SEE ABOUT 1900 AND DELIVERED COPY OF ORDER TO SA, CG 1ST DIV,  
FOR THE CG, AND THEN REPORTED THE RESULTS OF LIAISON  
VISIT FOR GEN DONG AND GEN CAO.

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2. ON 24 MAY 7 BUS AND TRUCK LOADS OF UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS  
PRESUMED TO BE PROV BN MOVED FROM LANG CO BRIDGE TO HOA  
SCHOOL, TWO KM NORTH OF BRIDGE OF CAU HAI VILLAGE. THE  
COMPANY OF ENGINEERS REMAINS AT BRIDGE. ENGINEERS ARE  
CORPS ENGINEERS ATTACHED TO 1ST DIV AND OBEY ORDERS OF CG  
1ST DIV.

10. THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES CASUALTIES REPORTED  
IN THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. TOTALS REMAIN 18 USMC 4  
USAF 1 USN.

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SECRET NOFORN SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GEN GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD  
242200N TO 252200N.

1. OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT DANANG AREA WERE CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ALL AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD BEEN DISPERSED RETURNED BY 1900 ON 24MAY. ALL FORCES OF 3D MARDIV AND 1ST MAF WHICH HAD BEEN ALERTED FOR RIOT CONTROL POSSIBLE EVACUATION, OR COMBAT ROLES WERE GIVEN A STAND DOWN AS OF APPROXIMATELY 242300N. THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE IN DOWNTOWN DANANG WAS EXTENDED TO COMMERCIAL PIER. PER-

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MISSION WAS GRANTED FOR THE I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERS TO OPEN AND PERSONNEL TO RETURN TO BILLETTS IN DANANG, CHINA BEACH RECREATION AREA WAS OPEN TO ORGANIZED SWIPPING PARTIES. MAIN PX OPENED FOR BUSINESS. I CORPS ARVN PERSONNEL JOINED THE MARINES ON TOURANE RIVER BRIDGE TO CONTROL THE VN TRAFFIC. THROUGHOUT THE DANANG AREA, ACTIVITY RAPIDLY RETURNING TO NORMAL.

2. AT 0715 COL YEU REQUESTED THAT HE SE SA ONSS, C/S I CORPS AND I CORPS COMMANDER. SENIOR ADVISOR ONSS VISITED COL YEU AT HIS QUARTERS AND WAS ASKED FOR ADVICE ON WHAT COL YEU SHOULD DO. SA ADVISED YEU TO COMPLY WITH HIS ORDERS. YEU SAID HIS ORDERS WERE TO GO TO SAIGON OR BE DECLARED A DESERTER. HE DESIRED TO SPEAK WITH GEN CAO. GEN CAO WAS INFORMED OF REQUEST AND STATED THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO SPEAK WITH YEU THIS WAS PASSED TO YEU. AT 1048 GEN PHONG VISITED III MAF FOR BRIEFING. HE SAID THAT YEU WANTED TO COME TO I CORPS HQ TO REPORT IN RATHER THAN TO SAIGON. GEN PHONG SAID HE WOULD GUARANTEE YEU'S LIFE IF HE CAME TO I CORPS BUT WOULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SENT TO SAIGON. YEU WENT TO I CORPS HQ ACCOMPANIED BY SA. HE HAD AN APPOINTMENT WITH GEN PHONG FOR 1800. HE SPOKE BRIEFLY TO GEN PHONG AND TO GEN CO FOLLOWING WHICH HE WENT TO AIRPORT AND DEPARTED FOR SAIGON BY MILITARY AIR AT APPROXIMATELY 1730.

PAGE THREE DDKE 732 **S E C R E T** **NOFORN**  
IN BETWEEN 0845 AND 1110 MORE THAN 2000 PEOPLE DEMONSTRATED IN HUE. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS ANTI-GVN WITH STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN TONES. ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS STEW FROM ALLEGED US SUPPORT OF KY AND THE DEMONSTRATOR'S CONTENTION THAT SUCH SUPPORT ENABLED GVN TO SUPPRESS THE PEOPLE. SLOGANS AND SPEECHES HAD FOLLOWING THEMES QUOTE DOWN WITH THIEU AND KY FOR KILLING PEOPLE OF CENTRAL VIETNAM. UNOWN WITH THE US FOR SUPPORTING THIEU AND KY END OF QUOTE.

A. AT 1020K 50 HUE STUDENTS BEGAN A HUNGER STRIKE TO PROTEST THIEU AND KY'S SUPPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE OF CENTRAL VN. AT 1342N 50 STUDENTS WERE PROTESTING IN FRONT OF U.S. CONSULATE. STUDENTS ALSO WROTE A PROTEST OF US SUPPORT IN BLOOD AND PRESENTED IT TO THE RED CROSS. THE STUDENTS STATED IF THEY DO NOT HEAR FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN 24 HOURS THEY WOULD LET THE PEOPLE TAKE ACTION.

B. AN CONSUL HUE REPORTED THAT AT ABOUT 0915H STRUGGLE FORCE LEADER BUOTON PHONED USIS TO INFORM LOCAL EMPLOYEE SHE SHOULD LEAVE LIBRARY FOR HER OWN SAFETY. BUOTON SAID DEMONSTRATORS WOULD COME TO LIBRARY TO DESTROY IT AND BURN VEHICLES. BASED ON THIS INFO LIBRARY WAS EVACUATED.

C. AFTER RECEIVING ADDITIONAL INFO FROM CAS THAT DEMONSTRATORS WERE PLANNING TO COME TO CONSULATE TO TEAR IT DOWN, CONSUL HAD CLASSIFIED

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MATERIAL BURNED. CONSUL REQUESTED SA 1ST ARVN DIV TO REQUEST GENERAL  
THUAN TO TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES.

D. ALTHOUGH STREETS HAVE BARRICADES IN VICINITY OF CONSULATE SA 1ST  
ARVN DIVISION HAD NO TROUBLE GETTING INTO CONSULATE AT 1430H.

E. ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION IS SCHEDULED FOR 260900H.

4. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH BGEN PHONG THAT III MAF IN RESPONSE  
TO GVN REQUEST WOULD FURNISH 1ST ARVN DIVISION DIESEL AND HOGAS TO  
MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. ISSUE WOULD BE MADE AT PHU PAI ON  
BASIS OF TWO DGS PER ISSUE. ADVISORS WILL OBSERVE USAGE TO ENSURE NO  
STOCK PILING. LATTER TWO STIPULATIONS AT PHONG'S REQUEST. BASED ON  
THIS, ON 22MAY, 1ST ARVN DIV WAS ISSUED 8488 GALS HOGAS AND 4248 GALS  
OF DIESEL.

5. AT 0930 I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MET FOR FIRST TIME  
SINCE 18 MAY. REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING SCHEDULED 17 MAY WAS  
CANCELLED. PRESENT ON US SIDE WERE CG 1ST MAF; POLAD; C/S III  
MAF; COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG; SENIOR REPS OF USAID, CAS, JUSPAG,  
AND I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP. ON VN SIDE WERE COL CACH, I CORPS  
DEPUTY C/S FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND COL THUAN WHO MAY BE CACH'S  
RELIEF. MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO REVIEW OF SITUATION WITH PARTICULAR  
EMPHASIS ON PROVISION OF US SUPPORT TO GVN EFFORTS TO RESTORE

PAGE FIVE DDKE 732 S E C R E T WOFORN

NORMAL LIVING CONDITIONS IN DANANG AND HOI AN. CONSENSUS  
THAT ALL GVN REQUESTS TO DATE HAD BEEN MET OR WERE IN PROCESS  
OF BEING MET.

6. AT 1210 LGEN CO ARRIVED AT DANANG AIR BASE SAID HE INTENDS  
TO STAY 2 TO 3 DAYS. BGEN PHONG REPORTED TO SA I CORPS THAT CO  
SCHEDULED MEETING OF ALL MILITARY LEADERS IN DANANG AREA  
AT 1600 AND ALL CIVILIAN OFFICIALS OF DANANG AT 1700, SUCH  
MEETINGS TOOK PLACE AS SCHEDULED.

7. ON 24 MAY MAJ KIM, AIDE TO GEN DINH PHONG SA 1ST ARVN  
DIVISION REQUESTING FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE SENT TO GENERAL WALT  
QUOTE REPORT RECEIVED HERE THAT MANY STRUGGLE FORCE SOLDIERS  
WHO SURRENDERED IN DANANG WERE KILLED BY SAIGON MARINES WHO  
THEY SURRENDERED TO. THIS IS CAUSING MUCH UNREST AMONG  
CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS IN HUE. REQUEST REPORT AS TO WHETHER  
THIS IS TRUE OR NOT. THIS IS ENOUGH OF FOOLISH OPERATIONS OF  
GENERAL XY. END QUOTE.

ON 25 MAY GEN WALT SENT THE FOLLOWING ANSWER TO DINH QUOTE  
AS YOU KNOW THERE WERE NO U. S. ADVISORS WITH GOVERNMENT FORCES  
DURING THEIR OPERATIONS IN DANANG, AND VERY FEW U. S. MILITARY  
PERSONNEL IN ANY CAPACITY SAW AND PART OF THESE OPERATIONS.

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PERSONAL FOR GEN GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT  
THEREFORE, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, EXCEPT FOR THE INCIDENT  
I READ ABOUT IN THE PRESS, I AM UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH INCIDENTS  
AS YOU REFERRED TO IN YOUR MESSAGE.

END QUOTE.

8. AT HOI AN, COL LAP IS CONDUCTING A 3-DAY SEARCH FOR  
STRUGGLE FORCE PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS. THERE MAY BE SOMOJ  
PEOPLE HOLDING OUT IN PASOJA 2 BNS (1CO) FO THE 51ST REGT  
ARE BEING USED IN THE SEARCH. AT 1800 EVERYTHING WAS

PAGE TWO DDKE 733 SECRET NOFORN  
REPORTED AS QUIET.

9. THDCOMPOSITE THOUC BATTALION HAS REMAINED AT CAU HI  
SCHOOL (ZD 085005) VIC PHU LOC. STRENGTH ESTIMATED TO BE  
300. AT 1200 THE BN COMMANDER TOLD SA FO 3/3 THAT THIS UNIT  
WAS FOR FIGHTING VC.

10. AT 1955 SA I CORPS REPORTED THAT GEN GO HAD MET WITH  
LOCAL COMMANDERS STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. DISCIPLINE TO MILITARY
2. MILITARY ARE HOLDING COUNTRY TOGETHER, MUST STAY UNITED.
3. TNI WAS REMOVED AS WE DID NOT AGREE WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
4. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES MUST FOLLOW POLICIES OF CENTRAL GOVT.
5. GOVERNMENT IS MAKING PLANS FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
6. PRESENT GOVERNMENT WILL NOT HAND OVER CONTROL TO CIVILIANS UNTIL ASSURED OF POLITICAL FOLLOWING AND ARE CAPABLE OF SOLVING NATION PROBLEMS.

11. CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE SHOWED UP IN GOOD NUMBERS AT MOST  
LOCATIONS IN THE DANANG AREA ON 25 MAY. MARKED INCREASE NOTED  
OVER 24 MAY WHICH WAS THE FIRST DAY THAT A BACK TO WORK CON-

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MENTED. FOLLOWING DATA SHOWS APPROXIMATE NUMBERS:

ACTIVITY	WORK FORCE	24 MAY	25 MAY
MMK	7540	850	2350
NSA	990	990	740
SEWARD IV	395	290	310
1ST MAW	308	308	320
PLC	199	141	157
308CR	929	222	456
AAFIS	200	75	120
USO	50	10	20

12. RUMORS OF GOUGING ON STAPLES SUCH AS RICE IN DANANG AREA APPEAR TO BE UNFOUNDED. BEST QUALITY UNBROKEN DOMESTIC RICE, WHICH SHOULD SELL AT 25 PIASTER PER KILO, IS PROBABLY IN SHORT SUPPLY AND OVERPRICED, BUT IMPORTED RICE, WHICH SHOULD SELL AT 12 PIASTER PER KILO, IS AVAILABLE IN QUANTITY AT 13 TO 14 PIASTER. SOME GOUGING BELIEVED TO BE INEVITABLE IN VIEW OF TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES, BUT RELEASE OF 10 TONS OF CAPE RICE BY SOCIAL WELFARE, DANANG SHOULD HELP TO COUNTER-ACT SUCH TENDENCY. PORT REMAINS CHIEF OBSTACLE TO RESUMPTION OF NORMAL TRADE.

PAGE FOUR DDKE 733 S E C R E T NOFORN  
 USAID RELUCTANT TO CALL UPON NAVSUPACT FOR HELP IN UNLOADING COMMERCIAL CARGO DUE TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN DOCK WORKERS AND TEAMSTERS. LATTER NIGHT REFUSES TO FUNCTION IF US NAVY UNLOADS COMMERCIAL SHIPS. PROBLEM SHOULD BE RESOLVED SHORTLY, JUDGING FROM GENERAL RETURN OF WORKERS TO NORMAL OCCUPATIONS.  
 13. THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL U.S. CASUALTIES REPORTED IN THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. TOTALS REMAIN 18 USMC 4 USAF 1 USN.  
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**S E C R E T** NOFORN SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KAULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD  
252200H TO 262200H

1. SITUATION IN DANANG VIRTUALLY BACK TO NORMAL INSOFAR AS III MAF AND NAVSUPACT ACTIVITIES CONCERNED. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES WORKING AT NEARLY FULL LEVEL; UNLOADING FOLLOWING NORMAL SCHEDULE; NO INCIDENTS.
2. HUE SITUATION
  - A. AT 0745 PEOPLE BEGAN GATHERING AT THE DIEU DOA PAGODA IN HUE.

PAGE TWO DDKE 810 **S E C R E T** NOFORN  
 BY 0925, THE CROWD HAD GROWN TO AN ESTIMATED 5-6,000 DISPLAYING SLOGANS "DOWN WITH AMERICAN COLONIALISM," AND "HISTORY WILL NAME THE PEOPLE WHO DIE FOR COUNTRY AND NATIONALISM." BY 1100 HOURS THE CROWD HAD FORMED A PROCESSION WHICH WAS ABOUT 2 KM IN LENGTH. THE HEAD OF THE COLUMN HAD PASSED THE US CONSULATE BELIEVED HEADED IN THE DIRECTION OF A BURIAL GROUND OUTSIDE OF HUE. THE PROCESSION ESTIMATED 10,000 WAS PRESUMABLY A FUNERAL FOR LT THUC WHO WAS KILLED IN THE HELICOPTER INCIDENT ON 17 MAY. THE STUDENTS ON HUNGER STRIKE SINCE 1000 HOURS WEDNESDAY MORNING ENDED THE STRIKE AT 1000 HOURS THIS MORNING. STUDENT LEADERS INDICATED THAT THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS MERELY THE FIRST STEP. THE DEMONSTRATION ENDED JUST PRIOR TO 1200 HOURS, AS THE HUNGER STRIKE GROUP JOINED THE FUNERAL PROCESSION.  
 B. AT 1515 HOURS STUDENTS IN HUE MET AT THE MORAN BUILDING TO DISCUSS FURTHER PLANS. AT 1630 HOURS 200-250 PERSONS ARRIVED AT THE USIS BUILDING, TORE DOWN THE FRONT DOOR ENTERED IN BUILDING AND BEGAN THROWING OUT BOOKS AND FURNITURE. IT WAS REPORTED THAT USIS WOULD BE BURNED TODAY AND THE CONSULATE WOULD BE BURNED TOMORROW.  
 C. AT 1600 THE SA 1ST DIV VISITED GENERAL DINH AT THE

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DELEGATE HOUSE AND ASKED HIM IF HE WAS AWARE OF THE STUDENTS MEETING AND ASKED IF HE WAS AWARE OF THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT TO BURN USIS BUILDING AND CONSULATE. HE ASSURED THE SA THAT HE HAD ALREADY MADE CONTACT WITH THE STRUGGLE FORCE AND PLEADED WITH THEM NOT TO TAKE SUCH ACTION.

D. LATER SMOKE COULD BE SEEN COMING FROM INSIDE THE USIS BUILDING. AT 1755 HOURS, A VEHICLE OUTSIDE THE US CONSULATE WAS BURNED. AT 1838 HOURS A CROWD WAS STILL GATHERED IN FRONT OF THE USIS BUILDING WATCHING IT BURN. STUDENTS WERE THROWING MOLOTOV COCKTAILS TO HELP MAKE THE BUILDING BURN. SOLDIERS AND POSSIBLE NATIONAL POLICE, WERE REPORTEDLY HELPING THE STUDENTS PREPARE MOLOTOV COCKTAILS.

E. THICH TRI QUANG WAS REPORTED TO BE IN THE CROWD IN FRONT OF THE USIS BUILDING AT 1745 HOURS. HE ASKED THAT THE CROWD BE CALM AND THAT THE STUDENTS LIMIT THEIR ACTIONS. AT 1930 HOURS THE CROWD IN FRONT OF THE USIS BUILDING DISPERSED. THE BUILDING WAS STILL BURNING.

F. SA, 1ST DIVISION MADE SECOND TRIP TO DELEGATE HOUSE AT 1745 HOURS WHERE HE PERSONALLY MET WITH LTGEN DINH, GEN NHUAN AND LT COLONEL KHOA PROVINCE CHIEF, AT WHICH TIME HE REITERATED

PAGE FOUR DDKE 518 S E C R E T NOFORN

THE NECESSITY FOR ARVN TROOPS FROM 1ST DIVISION TO BE COMMITTED AS A SECURITY FORCE IN HUE FOR THE US CONSULATE MACV COMPOUND AND VOA SITES. HE WAS ASSURED AT THAT TIME THAT THE 2D BN 3RD INFANTRY JUST NORTH OF HUE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO HUE AND WOULD BE UNDER COMMAND OF PROVINCE CHIEF. THIS BATTALION WAS IN FACT COMMITTED AT APPROXIMATELY 2030 HOURS AT WHICH TIME THE BATTALION ADVISORY TEAM REPORTED TO MACV COMPOUND.

3. AT ABOUT 0900 GEN CO TOLD DSA THAT HE HAD PHONED DINH AND DINH HAD SEEN THE LIGHT. CO CLAIMED DINH WAS DISENCHANTED WITH TRI QUANG AND WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE HUE BUT HE IS BEING CLOSELY WATCHED. CO ASKED DSA TO HAVE SA 1ST ARVN DIVISION CONTACT DINH AND SEE IF HE WOULD COME TO PHU BAI AT 1000, 27 MAY. CO SAID HE WOULD MEET DINH AT PHU BAI TO SEE WHAT DINH WANTED TO DO. SA CONTACTED DINH WHO SAID HE SAW NO NEED TO MEET WITH CO SINCE HE HAD TALKED TO HIM ON THE PHONE LAST NIGHT.

4. AT 1200 HRS LTGEN CO. REQUESTED ADSA, TO ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION TO MAJGEN CAO'S OFFICE. WHEN MAJGEN CAO WAS CALLED FOR APPOINTMENT HE STATED HE WOULD NOT SEE LTGEN CO UNTIL HE HAD TALKED TO LTGEN VALT. AFTER TALKING TO LTGEN VALT, MAJGEN

CG III HAF

6 MAY 66

2-3

CAO AGREED TO SEE LTGEN CO AT 101 MAR HQ S AT 1245 HRS. THE  
ADSA ACCOMPANIED MAJGEN CAO TO THE LTGEN CO. AFTER THE MEETING  
CO TOLD THE DSA THAT MAJGEN CAO HAD STATED HE WAS AFRAID TO  
GO TO SAIGON AND HE WAS AFRAID TO GO TO 1 CORPS HQ S. HIS  
DESIRES ARE TO GO TO THE USA WITH HIS FAMILY. MAJGEN CAO  
STILL FEARS FOR HIS LIFE BECAUSE OF ASSASSINATION  
ATTEMPTS MADE BY AN NVA LIEUTENANT AT HUE AND AN ALLYED  
THREAT ON HIS LIFE BY COL LOAN ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. LTGEN  
CO STATED THAT MAJGEN CAO CAN NEVER COMMAND TROOPS NOW  
BECAUSE HE HAS SHOWN HE LACKS COURAGE.

5. FROM 1430 TO 1700 GEN CO VISITED NOI AN AREA HEADQUARTERS  
DSA I CORPS.

A. CO FIRST MET WITH MILITARY AT SECTOR HEADQUARTERS WHERE HE  
MADE SPEECH EXPLAINING GVN ACTIONS AND ANSWERED QUESTIONS.

B. HE THEN HELD A SIMILAR MEETING AT PROVINCE HQ ATTENDED  
BY ABOUT 400 INCLUDING KEY CIVILIANS.

C. WHEN C NNCCCED AT PROVINCE HQ THAT DR. CHI WOULD RETURN  
AS PROVINCE CHIEF ON 27 MAY, THERE WAS MUCH APPROBATION.

D. LCOL LAP TOLD CO HE HAD COLLECTED 120 OUT OF AN ESTIMATED  
400 WEAPONS IN HANDS OF STRUGGLE FORCES.

SECRET NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT  
LCOL LAP TOLD CO THERE WAS NO MONEY AVAILABLE TO MEET  
PROVINCIAL PAYROLL.

F. LAP ALSO SAID THAT 2D CO OF 10TH RANGERS IS STILL HOLDING OUT  
AT OUE SON.

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SECRET NOFORN SECTION 1 OF 5 SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KPULAK FROM LTGEN VALT  
THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD  
260000 TO 270000.

- 1. DANANG SITUATION.
  - A. SITUATION THROUGHOUT CITY NEARLY NORMAL. FOUR BATTALIONS OF  
GVN TROOPS STILL IN CITY WITH 5TH BN ON NORTHWEST OUTSKIRTS.  
TROOPS ARE IN EVIDENCE ON EVERY STREET AND AT EACH INTER-  
SECTION. APPEAR TO BE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR WEAPONS.
  - B. 3D BN 4TH MARINES COMMAND GROUP AND ONE COMPANY WITHDRAWN

PAGE 2 DDKE 391 SECRET NOFORN  
FROM AREA OF AMMUNITION DUMP IN EAST DANANG. ONE RIFLE COMPANY  
(1-2-4) REMAINS INSIDE AMMO DUMP AS SECURITY FORCE. ONE  
PLATOON OF 3D BN 3D MARINES REMAINS AS BRIDGE GUARD ON  
TOURANE RIVER BRIDGE.

- C. MAF'S EXPANDED TO PERMIT NEARLY NORMAL TRAFFIC. PORT  
UNLOADING NORMAL CONDITION YELLOW STILL IN EFFECT.
- D. ALL REFUGEES IN DANANG AND VICINITY HAVE BEEN CHECKED  
BY U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM AND FOUND TO BE WELL CARED  
FOR. PRICES OF STAPLES REMAIN NEAR PRE 15 MAY LEVEL.
- E. REPORT RECEIVED FROM I CORPS PYEVAR ADVISOR THAT MEANS  
AND PROCEDURES FOR INDENNIFYING VICTIMS OF RECENT STRIKE  
IN DANANG ARE UNDER STUDY BY I CORPS (ARVN) STAFF. PROBABLE  
SOLUTION WILL BE GRADUATED SCALE OF PAYMENTS DEPENDING  
UPON SERIOUSNESS OF INJURY OR LOSS SIMILAR TO GVN COM-  
PENSATION FOR COMBAT CLAIMANTS.
- F. ALL COMMANDS IN THE DANANG AREA EMPLOYING CIVILIANS  
REPORTED A NEAR-NORMAL LABOR FORCE REPORTED TO WORK ON  
27 MAY. THE FOLLOWING DATA SHOWS THE ACTIVITIES INVOLVED,  
THE EMPLOYEES IN THE FULL LABOR FORCE, NUMBER ON HAND 26  
MAY AND NUMBER ON HAND 27 MAY (READ IN FOUR COLUMNS):

CG III MAF

0 271438Z/MAY 66

ACTN: S/SEC 1-11

SECRET

ACTIVITY	LABOR FORCE	26 MAY	27 MAY
RMK	7548	6786	6786 EST
NSA	998	775	900 EST
304RDIV	399	335	335
1STNAV	358	348	343
PLC	199	164	171
35 TPV	429	388	383
30 NCR	529	475	475 EST
I CORPS ADVGRP	15	15	15
EXCHANGE	200	138	120
USO	98	19	20

RMK, NSA AND 304NCR FIGURES ARE BASED ON PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES RATHER THAN ACTUAL HEAD COUNT

2. HUE SITUATION.

A. BY 0900 THIS MORNING TROOPS FREA 2/3 WERE IN POSITION BLOCKING STREET IN FRONT OF CONSULATE AND USIS BLDG. TROOPS REFUSED TO ALLOW U.S. PERSONNEL TO PASS EITHER DIRECTION. A PROTEST WAS MADE TO MAJ KIEH 1ST DIV 8-3 AND U.S. PERSONNEL WERE ALLOWED TO TRANSIT ROAD BLOCKS.

B. APPROXIMATELY 20 MONKS WALKED THROUGH ROAD BLOCKS TO

PAGE 4 DDKE 391 5 E C P E T NOFORN

CONSULATE AND ASKED TO SEE THE CONSUL. CONSUL REFUSED TO SEE ALL 20 BUT AGREED TO SEE A REPRESENTATIVE. MONKS REFUSED TO GO UNLESS ALL COULD ENTER. MONKS ASSUMED PRAYING POSITIONS IN FRONT OF CONSULATE. SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS GATHERED TO DEMONSTRATE.

C. LTCOL KHOA PROVINCE CHIEF AND MAYOR OF HUE, AFTER DISCUSSION WITH BUDDHISTS AND STUDENTS SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION AS MAYOR AND PROVINCE CHIEF. HE DID NOT RESIGN AS SECTOR COMMANDER. HE STATED HE HAD NO CONTROL OVER TROOPS IN HUE, HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN THREATENED SO HE WAS MOVING HIS HEADQUARTERS TO HUONG THUY DISTRICT. KHOA CLAIMED TO HAVE 1000 LOYAL TROOPS IN HUONG THUY. TRI QUANG ASKED KHOA TO REMAIN AS MAYOR BUT HE DECLINED.

D. AT NOON ALL WAS QUIET. ADVISORS NOT REQUIRED IN OPERATIONS CENTER WERE MOVED TO MACV COMPOUND. AT 1300 45 U.S. CIVILIANS WERE ASSEMBLED IN THE MACV COMPOUND THEN MOVED TO HUE CITADEL AIRFIELD. AT 0600 THEY WERE EVACUATED TO DANANG BY CV2'S WHERE THEY WERE FURTHER EVACUATED TO SAIGON.

E. AT 1700 APPROXIMATELY 100 STUDENTS GATHERED AROUND THE 20 MONKS WHO REMAINED AT THE CONSULATE. RELIGIOUS CEREMONY WAS

CG III MAF

O 071300Z/MAY 66

2-11

PERFORMED. VICE CONSUL STATED HE AND HIS STAFF WOULD MOVE TO MACV COMPOUND AS SOON AS THE CROWD DISPERSED. PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE TO MOVE THE ADVISOR OPERATIONS CENTER TO MACV COMPOUND IF REQUIRED.

5. AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT INDICATED THE CONSULATE WOULD BE BURNED IF APOLOGY WAS NOT RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT JENDON BY 1700 27 MAY. REPORT FURTHER STATED MACV COMPOUND WOULD BE ATTACKED NEXT.

1. AT 2020 REPORT RECEIVED THAT AMERICAN CONSUL AND CONSULATE PERSONNEL WERE AT MACV COMPOUND.

2. AT 2100 EMERGENCY EVACUATION FORCE AT 100-PMU 100 CONSISTING OF 5(C-) AND 22 HELICOPTERS, WAS HELD IN FULL EMERGENCY ALERT STATUS.

3. QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE SECTOR COMMANDER OF QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR ON 27 MAY 1966.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES:

(1) 4. CAPT BLONG FROM QUANG TIN HAS BEEN APPOINTED CHIEF OF STAFF AND BE/PE COMMANDER OF QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR.

(2) 5. QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR WILL BE DISSOLVED AT 2300 27 MAY 1966. QUANG NAM SECTOR WILL TAKE THE PLACE OF MSS.

(3) 6. A SEPARATE DANANG COMMAND WILL BE FORMED UNDER 1 CORPS.

(4) 7. HOA HANG DISTRICT NORTH OF DANANG WILL BE FORMED INTO A SEPARATE DISTRICT.

(5) 8. MAJOR HOJAN WILL BE APPOINTED DEPUTY SECTOR COMMANDER.

(6) 9. MAJOR AN WILL CONTINUE AS DEPUTY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER WITH DUTY STATION DIEN BAN, THE TACTICAL CP OF THE REGIMENT.

(7) 10. MAJOR NHAI WILL BE APPOINTED DEPUTY FOR PACIFICATION OF THE ENTIRE PROVINCE, WORKING FOR THE PROVINCE CHIEF.

(8) SECTOR COMMANDER PROPOSES CAPT HOA TO BE THE NEW HOA

SECRET

VANG DISTRICT CHIEF. HE NOW COMMANDS THE 1ST BN, 51ST REGIMENT. HE WILL HAVE A CAPTAIN ASSISTANT.

(9) NHU HANH SON PACIFICATION PROGRAM WILL COME DIRECTLY UNDER THE PROVINCE CHIEF.

(10) A TEAM FROM SAIGON RF/PP IS IN HOI AN CHECKING RECORDS TO DETERMINE CHANGES IN RF/PP SINCE 15 MAY. THE 325TH RF COMPANY FROM HU DUC WAS THE ONLY RF UNIT THAT DEFECTED EN MASSE TO THE STRUGGLE FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 50 OF THEM WERE CAPTURED IN DANANG. ONE COMPANY AT DUY XUYEN AND ONE COMPANY AT QUE SON WANTED TO JOIN THE STRUGGLE FORCES, BUT WERE UNABLE DUE TO THEIR PHYSICAL LOCATION. THE TEAM FROM SAIGON WILL GIVE THEM A TALK IN AN ATTEMPT TO RALLY TO THE GOV.

(11) A RANGER COMMAND LTCOL IS DUE IN HOI AN 27 MAY TO TALK TO THE 11TH RANGER COMPANY AT QUE SON. THE COMPANY COMMANDER OF THIS COMPANY MAY BE REPLACED.

B. THE SECTOR COMMANDER OF QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT 271130 MAY. HE GAVE THE STORY OF THE OCCUPATION OF HOI AN. HE STATED THAT THERE WERE A FEW STRUGGLE FORCES HOLDING OUT IN A PAGODA IN HOI AN. HE WILL

PAGE THREE DDKE 892 S E C R E T WOPORN  
ATTEMPT TO GET THEM OUT USING PERSUASION INSTEAD OF FORCE. THERE WAS A NEAR RIOT WHEN MR HIEN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG NAM PROVINCE COUNCIL, STARTED TO MAKE A SPEECH STATING THAT HE HAD JOINED THE STRUGGLE FORCES FOR 24 HOURS, AFTER INFORMING THE REMAINDER OF THE COUNCIL OF HIS INTENTIONS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING BLOODSHED. HE WAS SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING BLOODSHED. PEOPLE AT THIS POINT STARTED YELLING THAT HE WAS A LIAR AND SHOULD BE THROWN OUT, AND ONE MAN GRABBED HIM BY THE FRONT OF HIS SKIRT. AFTER ORDER WAS RESTORED MR HIEN SPOKE FOR 10 MINUTES IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN HIS POSITION.

C. THE SECTOR COMMANDER STATED AFTER THE CONFERENCE THAT EVEN THOUGH THE COUNCIL WAS ELECTED, THEY WILL PROBABLY BE REPLACED BECAUSE OF THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE STRUGGLE FORCES.

D. LTCOL LAP IS IN PROCESS OF MOVING 39TH RANGER BN LESS ONE COMPANY FROM HOI AN TO DIEN BAN. FIRST AND THIRD BN 51ST REGIMENT, AND ONE CO 39TH RANGERS WILL REMAIN IN HOI AN. CITY IS QUIET BUT TROOPS HAVE NOT YET ENTERED PAGODA WHERE UNKNOWN NUMBER OF STRUGGLE FORCE SYMPATHIZERS REMAIN.

CG III MAF

0 271330 MAY 66

4-11

SECRET

- E. SOME PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR OFFICES AND ARE COOPERATING WITH LTCOL LAP.  
FXNMLTOOL LAP ESTIMATES FRII HUNDRED WEAPONS WERE TURNED OVER TO STRUGGLE FORCE. OF THESE, ONE HUNDRED SIXTEEN HAVE BEEN RECOVERED. REMAINDER, INCLUDING EIGHT MACHINE GUNS, ARE STILL AT LARGE. HE SUSPECTS MANY ARE BURIED IN PAGODA COMPOUND.
4. PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETINGS.
- A. ON 26 MAY GUIDANCE WAS RECEIVED FROM MACV TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN THI AND KY AT CHU LAI FOR 271000H AND A SUBSEQUENT MEETING BETWEEN CG III NAF AND DINH AT PHU BAI.
- B. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 26 MAY ARRANGMENTS WERE MADE WITH THI THROUGH SA 1ST ARVN DIV FOR CHU LAI MEETING.
- C. DURING THE EVENING CG 2D ARVN DIV (GEN LAN) REQUESTED HELO SUPPORT FOR A MEETING BETWEEN KY, THI, AND DINH. C/S III NAF INFORMED LAN THAT KY - THI MEETING WAS ALL ARRANGED BUT THAT III NAF DID NOT KNOW DINH WAS TO ATTEND. LAN STATED HE WOULD CALL DINH, ARRANGE WITH NIN TO ATTEND AND CALL C/S GEN LAN DID NOT CALL BACK.
- D. AT 2215 COL HANDLEN DEA I CORPS AND COL BOSTON SA 1ST DIV MET WITH GEN DINH AT GOVERNMENT DELEGATES HOUSE.  
(1) GEN DINH AGREED TO MEETING WITH GEN VALT AT 1500 HOURS

PAGE FIVE DOKE 892 S E C R E T NOFORN

27 MAY AT RUE CITADEL AIRFIELD OFFICE NOT REPEAT NOT AT PHU BAI.  
C/S GEN DINH TOLD HANDLEN THAT HE HAD MADE A MAJOR EFFORT AS I CORPS CMDR TO SETTLE ALL FACTION DOWN BY TELLING THEM THAT HE GEN DINH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY OF I CORPS THEREFORE NO NEED FOR THEM TO WORRY ABOUT CENTRAL GOVT ATTACKING THEM. THE PEOPLE BELIEVED NIN. TH N TRAL GOVT DID ATTACK PEOPLE OF DANANG GEN DINH KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT. DINH STATES THE GOVT ATTACK MADE DINH A LIAR TO THE PEOPLE. HE NOW FEELS HE IS HONOR BOUND TO BE WITH THE PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE NIN IN GOOD FAITH.D

(3) DINH STATED HE WAS CONVINCED KY-THIEU GOVT WILL NOW FALL. AFTER A NEW GOVERNMENT IS SET UP DINH STATES HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE TWO MONTHS LEAVE AND THEN HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO ACCEPT A POSITION AS AMBASSADOR.

(4) DINH STATED THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DID HE WISH TO HAVE A CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL CO. DINH TOLD CO. ALL HE HAD

TO TELL NIN IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF 25 MAY.

E. AT 0730 CG III NAF SENT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO DINH BY BOSTON.  
QUOTE DUE TO SITUATION IN RUE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO MEET YOU AT RUE CITADEL. I WOULD STILL LIKE TO MEET YOU AT PHU BT

CG III NAF

O 271430Z MAY 66

3-11

SECRET

SECRET //NOFORN// SECTION THREE OF FIVE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KPULAK FROM LTGEN VALT  
BAI AT 1500. END QUOTE.

F. PRIOR TO GETTING DINH TO AGREE TO MEET I III MAF AT CHU  
LAI IT WAS NECESSARY FOR SA 1ST ARVN DIVISION TO FURNISH  
HIM A WRITTEN INVITATION WHICH INCLUDED: SPECIFICS AS TO TIME  
AND PLACE; GUARANTEED SECURITY; ASSURED HELO TRANSPORT TO AND  
FROM HUE; AND A STATEMENT THAT NO VN GENERALS FROM SAIGON  
WOULD ATTEND. AFTER THIS WAS DELIVERED INQUIRY WAS MADE  
AS TO DURATION OF THE MEETING AND SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED.  
THE REPLY ESTIMATED 30 MINUTES DURATION AND STATED THAT THE

PAGE TWO DDKE 893 SECRET NOFORN  
MEETING WOULD CONCERN THE GENERAL SITUATION IN HUE. AT  
0110 DINH AGREED TO ATTEND MEETING.

5. MEETING BETWEEN KY AND THI.

A. AT 0855 HANLEEN PICKED UP THI AT HUE CITADEL AND  
BROUGHT HIM TO DANANG LANDING AT HELO PAD AT CG III  
MAF'S QUARTERS. CG III MAF THEN TOOK THI TO CHU LAI IN  
HIS HELO ARRIVING AT 0930. LAN WAS ALREADY ON HAND, KY  
AND VIENT ARRIVED 1005. PARTY PROCEEDED BY VEHICLES TO MAG-  
12 AREA WHERE CO MAG-12 QUARTERS WERE MADE AVAILABLE FOR  
MEETING. KY, THI, VIENT AND LAN MET IN QUARTERS. GEN VINH  
LOC ARRIVED FROM II CORPS ABOUT 1030 EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD  
BEEN TIED UP WITH OPERATIONS. VINH LOC JOINED MEETING  
WHICH BROKE UP ABOUT 1140. ATTENDEES WERE ALL SMILES  
COMING OUT IN CONTRAST TO SOMBER EXPRESSIONS GOING IN.  
KY AND THI WERE BACK SLAPPING AND EXTREMELY CORDIAL TO EACH  
OTHER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MEETING. NO ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE  
OF WHAT TRANSPIRED. VIENT TOLD CG III MAF IT WAS A GOOD  
MEETING.

B. KY AND VIENT LEFT FOR LUNCH WITH CO, CG III MAF AND KY  
LEFT FOR DANANG BY HELO. VINH LOC LEFT FOR PLEIKU. LAN

CG III MAF

0 2700Z/MAY 66

6-21

SECRET

RE MAINED.

C. ENROUTE DANANG KY ASKED CG III MAF GO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH CJBEM KY WANTED TO PERSUADE CAO TO RETURN TO I CORPS HQ. THI INFORMED CG III MAF THAT CAO WAS AN HONEST MAN BUT WAS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION.

G. MEETING BETWEEN THI AND CAO.

A. CAO SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO MEET WITH KY AT CG III MAF'S QUARTERS. ONLY OTHERS PRESENT WERE CG III MAF AND C/S.

B. CAO AND THI GREETED EACH OTHER CORDIALLY AND HAD LENGTHLY DISCUSSION IN VIETNAMESE.

C. DURING LUNCH THI EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER BURNING OF USIS BUILDING STATING SOME VC HAD PENETRATED STRUGGLE MOVEMENT. THI DEPLORED SUCH ANTI-AMERICAN ACTIONS STATING THAT THEY ONLY SERVED FOR VC AND AGAINST SVN. THI ALSO CALLED NHUAN A VERY WEAK LEADER. IF NHUAN WERE REPLACED BY A STRONG LEADER, THI FELT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TROUBLE WITH FIRST DIVISION. STRUGGLE MOVEMENT PENETRATION OF DIVISION, HE SAID, WAS MOSTLY IN CAPTAIN RANKS.

D. THI REMARKED AFTER MEETING THAT CAO WOULD NOT RETURN

PAGE FOUR DOKE 893 S E C R E T NOFORN TO I CORPS

E. FOLLOWING IS CAO'S VERSION OF MEETING.

(1) THI REPORTED TO CAO THAT HE HAD JUST MET WITH PRIME MINISTER KY AND GENERALS LAN AND VIEW. KY PROPOSED THAT THI RETURN TO DANANG AS COMMANDING GENERAL I CORPS. ACCORDING TO THI, HE REFUSED/ KY'S SECOND PROPOSAL WAS TO HAVE GENERAL LAN BECOME I CORPS COMMANDER WITH CIVILIAN DELEGATE. TN SAAENHAT KY ALSO OFFERED HIM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. ACCORDING TO THI, KY MENTIONED SENDING CAO TO U.S. FOR SCHOOL.

(2) THI ENCOURAGED CAO TO RETURN TO I CORPS HEADQUARTERS RATHER THAN TRY TO GO TO UNITED STATES. THI REMAINDED CAO THAT IF HE WENT ABROAD HIS REPUTATION WOULD BE RUINED AND HIS CHILDREN WOULD BE SHAMED. HE SUGGESTED THAT CAO RETURN TO SAIGON AND LIVE IN CATHOLIC AREA UNDER PROTECTION OF PRIESTS IF NEED BE OR GO TO DALAT. THI ADMITTED CAO COULD NOT REMAIN AS I CORPS BECAUSE MANY PEOPLE HOLD CAO RESPONSIBLE FOR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS IN DANANG.

(3) THE SUBJECT OF THI'S CHILDREN STUDYING IN THE U.S. WAS SOMEHOW BROUGHT INTO CONVERSATION. THI SAID HE COULD NOT AFFORD

CG III MAF

O 271332 MAY 66

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TO KEEP THEM THERE MUCH LONGER AND WAS THINKING OF BRINGING THEM BACK. CAO ASSERTED THAT HE ENCOURAGED THI TO KEEP HIS CHILDREN IN SCHOOL, ASSURING THI THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PAY ANY COST TO GREAT FOR THI HIMSELF.

(4) THI CALLED GENERAL NGUAN A WEAK MAN WHO CANNOT ACT WITHOUT APPROVAL OF TRI QUANG. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT AGENTS OF TRAN VAN DON ARE IN HUE ACTING TO SUPPORT DON.

(6) CAO SAID HE ENCOURAGED THI TO ACCEPT POSITION AS MINISTER

MINISTER OF DEFENSE. ACCORDING TO CAO, HE TOLD THI HE WAS REMAINING UNDER PROTECTION OF U.S. MARINES IN ORDER TO AVOID EM-BARRASSING GVN. IF HE LEFT SANCTUARY HE WOULD HAVE TO TELL WHY HE SOUGHT PROTECTION IN THE FIRST PLACE. CAO REPORTED THAT HE HAD ASSURED THI HE HAD DONE HIS BEST AS CORPS COMMANDER TO AVOID ATTACKING PAGODAS OR QUOTE "DOING HARM TO BUDDHISTS." END QUOTE.

7. MEETING BETWEEN CG III NAF AND DINH.

FROM 1925 TO 1928 CG III NAF MET WITH GEN DINH AT PHU BAI. ALSO PRESENT WERE DSA, I CORPS, AND SA, 1ST ARVN DIV.

A. DINH DECLINED TO GO TO DALAT TO HIS FAMILY ON THE BASIS HE WILL LOSE THE FAITH OF THE PEOPLE. HE SAID THAT CG I

SECRET //NOFORN// SECTION FOUR OF FIVE SECTIONS PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT CORPS HE SPOKE TO MANY GROUPS THROUGHOUT I CTZ AGAIN AS THEY DID IN APRIL. WHEN TROOPS WERE SENT AGAIN DINH SAID HE LOST MUCH FACE AND HONOR THUS THE ONLY WAY HE CAN CONVINCE PEOPLE HE WAS SINCERE IS TO STAY WITH THEM.

B. DINH LISTENED TO CG III NAF RELATE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF HOW GVN TROOPS CONDUCTED THEMSELVES IN DAMANG AND THE EXTENT OF THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE TO PAGODAS. WHEN CG III NAF OFFERED TO FLY DINH OVER DAMANG TO SHOW HIM THAT THE DAMAGE WAS FAR LESS THAN REPORTED FROM HUE, DINH DECLINED

CG III NAF

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8-11

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STATING THAT HE BELIEVED CG III NAF, DINH AGREED THAT HE, TRI QUANG AND OTHERS HAD RECEIVED MUCH INCORRECT INFO ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED IN DANANG. HE SAID HE WILL RELATE WHAT CG III NAF TOLD HIM TO TRI QUANG.

C. REFERENCE THE BURNING OF THE USIS BUILDING, DINH STATED THAT HE DID NOT LEARN OF THE INCIDENT IN TIME TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HE SAID THAT HE TOLD TRI QUANG HOW VERY WRONG HE WAS TO PERMIT THE BURNING. DINH STATED THAT FOUR OR FIVE STUDENTS MUST BE ARRESTED FOR THE ACTION TO SHOW THAT DISCIPLINE CAN AND WILL BE MAINTAINED IN HUE. DINH WILL TALK TO TRU QUANG AGAIN AND STRESS THE NECESSITY OF TRI QUANG CONTROLLING THE STUDENTS AND THE BUDDHISTS. HE DID DECLARE THAT TRI QUANG IS VERY BITTER ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT DANANG AND IS NOT EASY TO TALK TO. HE FURTHER STATED THERE IS A LACK OF DISCIPLINE IN THE BUDDHIST RANKS.

D. DINH WAS AWARE THAT VXE HAD BEEN ORDERED INTO HUE LAST NIGHT BY KHOA, THE MAYOR AND PROVINCE CHIEF, IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE USIS, THE CONSULATE, AND THE MACV COMPOUND. HE DID NOT KNOW THAT KHOA FELT THAT 2/3 HAD BEEN VERY INEFFECTIVE IN PROTECTING THESE INSTALLATIONS. HE WAS

PAGE THREE DDKE 894 S E C R E T NOFORN  
INFORMED THAT WHEN THE MONKS AND STUDENTS APPROACHED CONSULATE THIS MORNING, THE SOLDIERS OF 2/3 STOOD BY AND WATCHED AS THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS REMOVED THE BARRICADES IN FRONT OF THE CONSULATE. DINH WAS ADVISED BY BOSTON THAT KHOA WAS SO UNHAPPY WITH THE SOLDIERS OF 2/3 FOLLOWING THE URGES OF THE MONKS AND DISREGARDING KHOA'S ORDERS THAT KHOA TOLD TRI QUANG HE RESIGNED HIS JOB AS MAYOR AND SECTOR COMMANDER AND WOULD KEEP HIS JOB AS PROVINCE CHIEF ONLY UNTIL HE IS PROPERLY REPLACED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. DINH WAS SURPRISED AT THIS DEVELOPMENT FOR HE STATED THAT KHOA WAS A GOOD MAN AND IT WAS NECESSARY THAT HE STAY AND MAINTAIN ORDER IN HUE. DINH INDICATED THAT HE WOULD SEE KHOA IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE RETURNED FROM THE MEETING AND WILL TRY TO ASSIST HIM.

E. IN RESPONSE TO A SUGGESTION OF CG III NAF, DINH STATED THAT HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO SEPARATE THE MILITARY FROM THE STRAGGLE FORCES IN HUE AND ATTEMPT TO GET THE MILITARY TO RETURN TO THEIR UNITS TO FIGHT THE VC.

F. DINH STATED THAT KHUAN IS A VERY WEAK COMMANDER AND THAT THE LEADERSHIP THAT COULD BE EXERCISED BY A STRONG DIVISION

CG III NAF

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COMMANDER WOULD DO MUCH TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM IN HUE. THIS POINT WAS ALSO ENPHATICALLY MADE BY THI AT LUNCH. DINH, LIKE THI, CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY GVN KEEPS NHUAN AS CG 1ST DIVISION. DINH FEARS GVN IS LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE TO SEND THEIR TROOPS TO HUE AS THEY DID TO DANANG. IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT BOTH DINH AND THI STRESS HOW INEFFECTUAL NHUAN IS AND THE SERIOUS IMPACT THIS HAS ON ONE DIVIS ON/AND THE OVERALL SUTVIATION IN HUE.

G. DINH EMPHASIZED THAT HE IS VERY PRO AMERICAN, WANTS TO DO EVERYTHCNW N CAN TO HELP HIS COUNTRY, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO ALL HE CAN TO PREVENT BLOODSHED.

H. IN RESPONSE TO CG III NAF REQUEST, DINH AGREED TO CALL VIEN AND EXPRESS HIS VIEWPOINT AS HE DID TO CG III NAF.

I. MISCELLANEOUS

A. AFTER LUNCH ON MAY 27, PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY SPOKE IN THE HUONG VUONG THEATER IN DANANG CITY. ACCORDING TO A VIETNAMESE WHO WAS PRESENT THERE WERE OVER 1900 PEOPLE IN THE AUDIENCE. SOME OF KY'S STATEMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS CAME TO DANANG TO RESTORE ORDER, NOT TO OPPRESS THE PEOPLE.

PAGE FIVE DDKE 894 S E C R E T NOFORN

(2) THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ALLOW A GROUP WITHIN THE COUNTRY TO MAINTAIN A SEPARATIST POSITION WITHIN THE COUNTRY. (3) HAYOR HAN TOOK \$200 MILLION VN PPSTERS FROM THE TREASURY

OF DANANG CITY, AS WELL AS ARMS AND AMMUNITION AND GAVE THEM TO THE STRUGGLE FORCES.

(4) KY WAS READY AND WILLING TO TALK TO ANYONE AT ANYTIME TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

(5) KY HAD SIGNED A DECREE ORDERING THAT VEGETABLES BE FLOWN INTO DANANG FROM DALAT. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, KY SPOKE FOR A LONG TIME AND "SLEEPY" S MEANING VERY SLOWLY. THE IMPRESSCN WAS THAT IT WAS NOT A ROUSING SPEECH. APPLAUSE WAS GIVEN ONLY AT THE END OF THE SPEECH. THE EVENT WAS WELL COVERED BY THE PRESS/

B. AT 1100 DSA, I CORPS HAD FOLLOWING CONVERSATION WITH LTGEN CO.

(1) DSA INFORMED CO THAT DSA HAD TALKED TO DINH FOR AN HOUR THE EVENING OF 26 MAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE, CO'S BEHALF, A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING AT NEUTRAL SITE. DINH DECLINED STATING THAT WHEN SAIGON TROOPS ENTERED DANANG, IT MADE A LIAR OUT OF DINH WHO DECLARED THAT HE HAD SPENT MANY DAYS BT

CG III NAF

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**S E C R E T //NOFORN// FINAL SECTION OF FIVE SECTIONS  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT  
TALKING TO MANY VARIOUS GROUPS, MILITARY AND CIVILIANS,  
TELLING THEM TO GIVE UP STRUGGLE ACTIVITIES, TURN IN THEIR  
ARMS, AND LEAVE THE SECURITY OF THE I CORPS TO DINH. HE  
PROMISED THE PEOPLE SAIGON WOULD NOT AGAIN SEND TROOPS TO  
I CORPS TO FIGHT THEM. WHEN SAIGON DID NOT KEEP ITS WORD,  
DINH SAID HE LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE, LOST MUCH  
FACE, AND THE ONLY WAY HE COULD SHOW THE PEOPLE AND TROOPS  
OF I CORPS THAT HE WAS SINCERE WHEN HE STATED SAIGON WOULD  
NOT ATTACK THEM AGAIN WAS BY ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THOSE**

**PAGE TWO DOKE 899 S E C R E T NOFORN  
WHO OPPOSED SAIGON'S ACTION.**

**(2) CO STATED HE UNDERSTOOD DINH'S FEELING, BUT CO FELT DINH'S  
ACTIONS WOULD GO VERY BADLY AGAINST HIM IN THE ARMY.  
C. AT 1115, IN CONVERSATION WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL PHONG, DSA I  
CORPS LEARNED THE FOLLOWING:  
A. DR CRI WILL REPORT AS PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM ON 27 MAY.  
B. CURFEW HOURS IN DARIANG WILL BE REDUCED TO THE PERIOD 2200 -  
0500 BEGINNING 27 MAY.  
C. GENERAL PHONG REQUESTED US AIRLIFT TO MOVE THE 11TH RANGERS  
TO DUC HY TRAINING CENTER FOR REFITTING AND RETRAINING  
ASAP. HE STATES THAT UNIT HAS DISINTEGRATED AND NEEDS TO  
START AGAIN. AFTER COMPLETING THE TRAINING AT DUC HY, THE  
11TH RANGERS SHOULD BE REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER CORPS AREA.  
D. GENERAL PHONG FEELS THAT THE 32ND RANGERS SHOULD BE MOVED  
OUT OF I CORPS SOON AND REPLACED WITH A UNIT WHICH WAS NOT  
INVOLVED IN THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT. HIS LONG-RANGE PLAN IS TO  
ASSIGN TWO NEW RANGER COMPANIES TO I CORPS TO BE USED AS  
CORPS REACTION FORCE, REPLACING THE 11TH AND 39TH RANGER  
BATTALIONS.**

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**CG III MAF**

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SECRET NOFORN  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT

1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED BETWEEN 282200H AND 292200H.

2. RUE SITUATION

A. AT 282300H - SA I CORPS REPORTED:

(1.) RUE STUDENTS HELD MEETING AT 2100 AND CITY CYCLE DRIVERS MET ABOUT 2200 AT BUS STATION. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH EITHER EVENT.

(2.) LTCOL KROA INDICATED HE WOULD CONTINUE AS MAYOR OF

PAGE TWO DDKE 066 SECRET NOFORN

RUE AND THAT HE INTENDED TO SEIZE RADIO STATION. TWO ARVN BUS CS/S. SA I IN THE UNDER CONTROL KROA.

(3.) FOLLOWING MEETING AT PWY BAY IN WHICH WHEAN DECORATED CO NOW 143 AND SA I BACK TO RUE. KROA TOLD SA 1ST DIV THAT A FINDER SA I IN THE CHANG'S ENCOURAGE AND VOLUNTARILY TO SACRIFICE HIMSELF AT THE TERMINATION OF THE BUDDHIST NUMBER STREET.

B. AT 0430 A BOMBING WAS DONE, SA I IS BURNED HIMSELF TO DEATH IN THE COURTYARD OF DIED BE KROA. THIS IS REPORTED TO BE THE THIRD TIME THAT SA I HAS ATTEMPTED TO BURN HIMSELF.

C. THE RUE STUDENTS MET 0900-1100. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE BY THE STUDENTS

(1.) THIN THIN PROTECT THEM FROM BEING HELD FOR PRISONERS WITHIN 24 HOURS.

(2.) DISTRICT OFFICE NUMBER ONE, NUMBER TWO, NUMBER THREE AND NUMBER FOUR BE ESTABLISHED.

(3.) RADIO STATION AT RUE TO BE ESTABLISHED AT RUE.

(4.) PLAN TO BE ESTABLISHED AT RUE.

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(6.) PLAN ATTACK ON RURAL RECONSTRUCTION HQS IN HUE.

(7.) BURN HOMES OF VN WHO WORK FOR THE US.

D. C/S 1ST DIV MET WITH SA, IN CG'S QUARTERS AT 1800. C/S STATED GENERAL HAD AGREED TO RECOMMENDATION THAT HE MOVE 1/7 TANK TROOP TO LAVANG AND 2/7 APC TO PK17. SECURITY FORCE 2/3 TO REMAIN IN CITY TO PROTECT US INSTALLATIONS. NHUAN WAS ALLEGEDLY IN BED PARALYZED FROM WIFE DOWN. C/S OBTAINED AGREEMENT FROM CG TO MOVE DIVISION TAG CP OUT OF HUE TO LAVANG EFFECTIVE 0900 30 MAY. BY 1545 1/7 HAD DEPARTED AND ONLY FOUR APC'S REMAINED IN THE CITY.

E. LTCOL KHOA REPORTS RECEIVING FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FROM CG 1ST DIVISION: IN CASE RADIO STATION HAS TO BE TAKEN BY OUTSIDE FORCES, 1ST DIVISION WILL MOVE NORTH AND SECTOR WILL MOVE SOUTH OUT OF TOWN.

F. INTELLIGENCE REPORT INDICATES THAT COMPOSITE BATTALION (THOUC BN) HAS TURNED IN THEIR WEAPONS AND DISPERSED.

G. COL BOSTON SA 1ST DIV MET WITH GEN KYLE, CG 3D MARDIV AT 1300 IN HUE. DID NOT MEET WITH NHUAN BECAUSE NHUAN WAS SICK IN QUARTERS. STRUGGLE FORCES HAVE BERATED CG AND C/S, 1ST DIVISION FOR ACCEPTING BRIBES FROM SENIOR US ARMY AND MARINE OFFICIALS

PAGE FOUR 066 S E C R E T NOFORN

AND CIA FOR INFORMATION AGAINST STRUGGLE FORCES. COL BOSTON AND SHERMAN, CG 4TH MARDIV, CONTACTED C/S KHIEU AND COORDINATED MOVEMENT OF A US NAVYING BN TO DONG HA FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS. KHIEU AGREED TO THE COORDINATED PLAN AND ALSO AGREED TO CONTACT HUE GARRISON COMMANDER TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO LCU UNLOADING SITE.

H. DURING AFTERNOON DINH MET WITH STUDENT AND BUDDHIST LEADERS TRYING TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEM. MEETING WAS FOLLOWED BY PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1700 IN A PAGODA HELD BY TRI QUANG.

I. APPROXIMATELY 15 US DEPENDENTS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE EVACUATED FROM HUE TO DANANG AT 1700. INCLUDED WAS THE FAN OF LT COL KHOA, PROVINCE CHIEF OF TRI THIEP. (SEE PAGE 2)

J. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RECEIVED WHILE DURING THIS PERIOD OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE WILL BE RELEASED BY THE CG OF THE US COMBATE.

K. AT 1800 SITUATION AT

(L) BY REVIEWING

ON 100 OFFICERS

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**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED**

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**(4) REACTION FORCE AVAILABLE FROM PHU BAI IF NEEDED.  
BASED ON ABOVE, CONSIDER THAT NO SERIOUS THREAT TO  
POSITIONS EXISTS, AT THIS TIME**

**2. DONG HA**

**AT 0600 HRS NACH ALERTED III MAF TO POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR  
ONE BN TO MOVE TO DONG HA ON 29 MAY. ON 29 MAY DESIGNATED 2/4TH  
BATTALION AS THE BATTALION TO SUPPORT THE COMBATTANTS IN FORCE IN  
AREA IN KILOMETERS AROUND PHU BAI. EVACUATION OPERATIONS TO  
BE CONDUCTED ON COORDINATED BASIS WITH ARVN FORCES. MOVEMENT DELAYED  
UNTIL 20 MAY TO INSURE SUPPORT OF 1ST ARVN DIV. THIS WAS  
COMPLETED AFTERNOON OF 29 MAY. SUPPORT OF 2/4TH BATTALION TO  
BE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. SUPPORTING BATTALION  
TO BE POSITIONED TO SUPPORT THE BATTALION IN CASE OF CRISIS.  
OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED ON COORDINATED BASIS WITH ARVN  
FORCES IN VIEW OF POSSIBILITY OF COMBATTANTS MOVING TO.**

**POSITIONS HELD BY COMBATTANTS IN AREA TO BE MAINTAINED  
IN VIEW OF POSSIBILITY OF COMBATTANTS MOVING TO. SUPPORTING  
BATTALION TO BE POSITIONED TO SUPPORT THE BATTALION IN CASE  
OF CRISIS. OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED ON COORDINATED BASIS  
WITH ARVN FORCES IN VIEW OF POSSIBILITY OF COMBATTANTS  
MOVING TO. SUPPORTING BATTALION TO BE POSITIONED TO SUPPORT  
THE BATTALION IN CASE OF CRISIS. OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED  
ON COORDINATED BASIS WITH ARVN FORCES IN VIEW OF POSSIBILITY  
OF COMBATTANTS MOVING TO. SUPPORTING BATTALION TO BE  
POSITIONED TO SUPPORT THE BATTALION IN CASE OF CRISIS.**

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**S E C R E T** NOFORN SECTION ON OF YOU  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRUIAN FIVE  
1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE  
PERIOD 292200H TO 032200H.  
2. AT 0900 A TAC CP WITH A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF USN  
STAFF MOVED FROM HUE TO LA VANG WITH C/S IN CHARGE OF THE ROVERER  
GENERAL NHUAN IS APPARENTLY REALLY SICK THIS TIME WITH LUMBAGO IN  
THE SMALL OF THE BACK. HE WAS ATTENDED BY TWO VIETNAMESE DOCTORS  
EARLY TODAY AND TWO U.S. NAVY DOCTORS LATER IN THE AFTERNOON  
3. LTCOL KHOA, THUA THIEN PROVINCE CHIEF, MET WITH THE

CG III MAF

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HEADQUARTERS  
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LEADERS TODAY AND GAVE THEM THE FOLLOWING DEMANDS:

- A. TURN IN APMS
- B. RETURN RADIO STATION TO PROVINCE CONTROL WITH THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE THAT THE STRUGGLE FORCES WOULD BE PERMITTED ONE HOUR BROADCAST TIME PER DAY IF THE TEXT IS APPROVED BY 1ST DIVISION.
- C. STOP VIOLENCE IN STRUGGLE FORCE DEMONSTRATIONS.

KHOA STATED IF DEMANDS ARE NOT MET HE WILL STOP ALL ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND ORDER PROVINCE OFFICIALS TO STAY HOME. KHOA STATED HE WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT MAY HAPPEN IN THE CITY IF HIS DEMANDS ARE NOT MET.

4. DURING THE MORNING LTCOL KHOA MOVED A TACTICAL STAFF TO HUONG THUY. ALTHOUGH NHUAN WAS EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO GO TO HIS TAC CP AT LA VANG, LTCOL KHOA'S FORCEFULNESS AND WILL, ALMOST HIS DEMAND, CAUSED NHUAN TO LEAVE HUE AT 1845 FOR THE 1ST DIV TAC CP. THESE TWO ACTIONS HAVE LEFT HUE DEVOID OF ALL TROOPS EXCEPT 2'S WHICH IS DISPERSED GENERALLY THROUGHOUT THE CITY ON GUARD DUTY AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EFFECTIVE FORCE TO COUNTER ANY ORGANIZED ATTEMPT TO "CAPTURE" HUE. THERE

NO ONE LEFT IN THE CITY TO MAKE DECISIONS.

- 5. THE 1ST DIVISION ADVISORY STAFF IS CONVINCED THAT THE STRONG

PAGE THREE DRKE 144 S E C R E T 1000000

MAN ON THE SCENE NOW IS LTCOL KHOA. 1 CORPS ESTABLISHED SEPARATE RADIO NET WITH LTCOL KHOA THIS AFTERNOON. LTCOL KHOA ACQUAINTED GENERAL PHONG WITH THE SITUATION IN HUE. GENERAL PHONG HAMBLEN LEARNED FROM COL BOSTON, SA 1ST DIVISION, THAT HAMBLEN NEEDED GUIDANCE AS TO HIS FURTHER COURSES OF ACTION. GENERAL PHONG COLONEL HAMBLEN DISCUSSED SEPARATELY WITH BOTH DONG THON AND VIEN THE VULNERABILITY OF THE CITY OF HUE TO VC ATTACK. GENERAL PHONG OF COL HAMBLEN'S DISCUSSION WITH PHONG, PHONG COMMENTED THAT VIEN AND GAVE HIM HUE'S CURRENT STATUS. ABOUT 1830 GENERAL PHONG ADVISED PHONG THAT WITH BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY SO CLOSE, GENERAL PHONG NOT FEEL THEY SHOULD PHYSICALLY ENTER HUE BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS REPERCUSSIONS. HUE IS ALSO A DIFFICULT OPERATIONAL PROBLEM. GENERAL PHONG AT HAMBLEN'S SUGGESTION AGREED TO ADVISE LTCOL KHOA OF VIEN'S COMMENTS SINCE ADVISORS OF 1ST DIVISION FEEL THAT KHOA IS ANXIOUSLY SEEKING GUIDANCE FROM 1 CORPS AS TO HIS NEXT COURSE OF ACTION. PHONG STATED HE WOULD ADVISE KHOA TO TAKE SUCH DEFINITE MEASURES AS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT SURPRISE VC MOVEMENT INTO HUE.

- 6. PHONG ADVISED HAMBLEN THAT LAN IS NOW OFFICIAL THE 1 CORPS COMMANDER AND THAT LAN IS FLYING TO SAIGON 31 MAY FOR DETAILED

CG III MAF

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
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INSTRUCTIONS OF THE HUE SITUATION. LAM SHOULD RETURN LATE ON 31 MAY  
OR 1 JUNE TO PHYSICALLY ASSUME COMMAND OF ICZEL PHONG STATED THAT  
UPON SEN LAM'S ARRIVAL AT I CORPS LAM

WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CON-  
TROLLING THE ACTION IN HUE.

7. UNREP FLEW LOW PASS OVER HUE, FOR PURPOSE OF DISRUPTING ASSEMBLIES,  
WITHOUT DRAWING FIRE.

8. THIRTY SCHOOL CHILDREN WHO HAD BEEN ATTENDING CHURCH AND BROTHER'S  
CATHOLIC SCHOOL IN HUE WERE EVACUATED TO THEIR HOME BY BOMBS BY  
CV-8 AIRCRAFT AT 1700 TODAY.

9. THE CITY OF HUE WAS QUIET THROUGHOUT THE DAY. A GENERAL STRIKE  
WAS IN PROGRESS. CIVILIANS EMPLOYED BY MACV WERE PREVENTED FROM  
ENTERING THE COMPOUND.

10. A MR. KE IS TO BE THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATE IN THE I CORPS  
AREA, SO PHONG STATED. HE IS THE FATHER OF THE SON OF MAJ. LIEUTENANT  
VINS. GENERAL PHONG IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT  
DELEGATE WILL OPERATE FROM DANANG NOT HUE.

11. BSEN PHONG VISITED TAM KY AND HOI AN.

12. IN HOI AN LTCOL LAP SECTOR COMMANDER RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE  
BUDDHIST CHAPLAIN TRICH NHU HUE WHICH ALLEGED THAT 100 PEOPLE, INCLUDING  
PAT, WERE ILLEGALLY ARRESTING PEOPLE AND DESTROYING PROPERTY.

PAGE FIVE DDKE 144 S E C R E T NOFORN

THE LETTER FURTHER ALLEGED THAT 100 PEOPLE WERE HELD IN TAY HO RF CAMP IN HOI AN. SENIOR ADVISOR VISITED  
THE CAMP AND REPORTED NO ONE BEING HELD THERE.

13. LTCOL LAP RECEIVED A REPORT FROM A LIEUTENANT CHAPLAIN AT THE MAIN PAGODA. HE REPORTED THERE WERE 200 MONKS,  
MEN, TWO SCHOOL TEACHERS, TWO POLICEMEN AND TWO OR THREE OTHERS STAYING  
IN THE PAGODA. LAP HAS MADE NO MOVE TO ENTER THE PAGODAS. HE IN-  
FORMED THE SA, ONS THAT THE PEOPLE CAN BE PERSUADED TO LEAVE THE  
PAGODAS WITHOUT BLOODSHED. THE SEARCH OF HOI AN CONTINUES SEPARATELY  
WITH NATIONAL POLICE. TROOPS WERE EMPLOYED PRINCIPALLY TO CONTROL  
MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND TO SECURE THE CITY AGAINST VIOLENCE.  
HOI AN REMAINED QUIET THROUGHOUT THE DAY.

14. CAPTAIN UNG YUS BEEN TO QUANG NAM SECTOR AS UNREP COMMANDER.  
HE HAD FORMERLY OCCUPIED THAT POSITION UNTIL THE PREVIOUS MONTH. DOUYOR  
NGUYEN HON CHI, THE NEW PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM, REPORTED IN  
DANANG TODAY AND VISITED I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. CHI WAS FORMERLY  
PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM UNTIL LAST MONTH.

15. NEXPECT 4TH BN, 51ST REGT WILL MOVE TO PACIFICATION AREA TOMORROW.

16. QUANG NAM SECTOR:  
EFFECTIVE 28 MAY 1966, QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR WAS REORGANIZED AND  
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**S E C R E T NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LIAISON  
REDESIGNATED QUANG NAM SECTOR. QUANG NAM SECTOR WILL ASSUME THE RESP  
IBILITY OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE LESS DANANG SPECIAL ZONE. LOCATION  
OF THE SECTOR HEADQUARTERS WILL REMAIN IN HOI AN.  
MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THE CHANGES IS THAT THE MAYOR OF DANANG, AS  
DANANG SPECIAL ZONE COMMANDER WILL NOW REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE COM  
MANDING GENERAL OF I CORPS. HIS RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE OVERALL  
SECURITY, SECURITY OF PORT AND LOGISTICAL INSTALLATIONS AND COOR  
INATION WITH III MAF FOR SECURITY OF DANANG AIR BASE.**

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RELEASEABLE  
TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

**PAGE TWO DDKE 145 S E C R E T NOFORN  
ALSO IN THE DANANG ZONE THERE WILL BE A DANANG GARRISON COM  
WHO REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE CG I CORPS. HIS FUNCTION WILL I  
DISCIPLINE, ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE  
FORCE IN THE DANANG ZONE.**

**GP-4**

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**CG III MAF**

**SECRET**

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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PERSONAL FOR GENERAL GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT

1. THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD 302200H TO 311400H
2. HUE SITUATION:
  - A. BLACK PANTHER CO, 1ST DIV MOVED INTO HUE, SECURED DIV TRAINING CENTER AND DIV CP AT 312100H. 2/3 REMAINS DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE CITY ON GUARD DUTY.
  - B. HUE REMAINED QUIET TODAY. GENERAL STRIKE ENDED AT 1200. A STUDENT MEETING STARTED AT 1700 INCREASED ACTIVITY

PAGE TWO DDKE 208 **SECRET** NOFORN

IS EXPECTED FOLLOWING MEETING.

C. A 16 YEAR OLD GIRL ATTEMPTED SELF IMMOLATION BETWEEN 0330 AND 0430. SHE DIED LATER OF BURNS IN HUE CITY HOSPITAL. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT ANOTHER GIRL WAS TO BURN HERSELF IN FRONT OF A SCHOOL AT 1600. AS OF 1830 SHE HAD NOT DONE SO.

D. THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT 5 MEN PAT TEAMS ARE KNOWN TO BE EXTREMELY LOYAL TO LCOL KHOA. MISSION OF PAT'S UNKNOWN.

E. THE HUE RADIO STATION RESUMED BROADCASTING AT 1200. STATION REMAINS IN HANDS OF STRUGGLE FORCES.

3. HOI AN REMAINED QUIET TODAY. LESS THAN 30 STRUGGLE FORCES ARE REPORTED TO BE IN THE MAIN PAGODA.

4. MOVEMENT OF 11 RANGERS BN TO DUC MY INITIATED TODAY. REMAINDER OF BN WILL BE MOVED BY 2 JUNE 1966. ON COMPLETION OF TRAINING, 11 RANGERS WILL BE REASSIGNED OUTSIDE ICTZ.

5. AT ABOUT 0900 BISHOP CHI OF DANAG VISITED GEN CAO AT BISHOP'S REQUEST.

6. ABOUT 1145 PASSED MESSAGE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND TO GEN CAO ADVISING CAO TO RETURN TO SAIGON NOW THAT GEN LAN WAS ASSIGNED

CG III MAF

0 311352Z/MAY 66

ACTN: 6

NOT  
RELEASABLE  
TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

SECRET

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  
HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. AIR FORCE

GEN DONGKENDI, SAO, ALTHOUGH VISIBLY SHAKEN, REFUSED TO RETIRE.  
AT 1530 GEN PHONG AND NEW MAYOR OF DANANG LEFT I CORPS CP  
TO SAY GOODBYE TO CAGC. ABOUT 1100 CAGC DEPARTED FOR PHU BAI IN AN AIRCRAFT  
ACCOMPANIED BY GEN FREUND.  
AT ABOUT 1200 PASSED FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CG III MAF FROM  
CG III MAF FOR GEN DINH QUOTE GENERAL WESTROCK SAID THAT  
GEN DINH WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH YOU AT PHU BAI FROM PHU BAI, AT  
1530 I WILL BE GLAD TO MEET YOU AT PHU BAI TO ACCOMPANY YOU  
TO PHU LAI AND RETURN. COL BOSTON WILL APPEAR TO ACCOMPANY TO PHU  
BAI AND RETURN. I FEEL THIS SEEING TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION TO  
ATTEND END QUOTE. AT 1530 RECEIVED WORD FROM CG III MAF ACCEPTED  
AFTER RECEIVING WRITTEN ASSURANCE FROM DSA AS TO THE SITUATION DOWN  
AND BACK AND HIS PERSONAL SECURITY.  
AT ABOUT 1800 GEN LAM ARRIVED DANANG IN A HELICOPTER WITH CG  
III MAF, C/S MAF, GEN PHONG, DSA AND MAYOR. PART OF COL LAM  
BY VEHICLE TO I CORPS CP WHERE LAM WELCOMED BY GEN PHONG, GEN  
HONOR GUARD, STAFF AND LOCAL COMMANDERS. IN HIS SPEECH GEN  
LAM STATED PLAINLY TO CG III MAF THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT  
THE JOB AS I CORPS COMMANDER BUT HE WAS VOTED TO ACCEPT IT.  
HE FURTHER STATED IT WAS HIS PURPOSE TO REMOVE HIMSELF FROM

PAGE FOUR DDKE 208 S E C R E T NOROKK  
FROM POLITICS. GEN PHONG ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS RETURNING TO JOBS  
TO RESUME HIS DUTIES AS 7-3.  
GEN DONG CONTINUED HIS POLICY OF NON-ASSOCIATION WITH  
I CORPS BY NOT BEING PRESENT WHEN LAM ARRIVED. DONG HAS  
REPEATEDLY MADE THE POINT THAT HE IS RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR HIS  
TASK FORCE.  
10 RAN CONVOY TO PHU BAI FROM DANANG AND ANOTHER CONVOY FROM  
DANANG TO PHU BAI. NO INCIDENTS. THESE ARE THE FIRST CONVOYS  
CONDUCTED ON THIS ROUTE SINCE 14 MAY.

GP-4  
BT

CG III MAF

O 311352Z/MAY 66

2-2