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 Unit: III MAF
 Location: Danang, RVN
 DTG: 280800H June 1966
 Ser: **077066**

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PERINTREP NO. 21

Period Covered: 190001H - 252400H June 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

A. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. VC/NVA activity was again characterized by avoidance of large scale activity except for one encounter in the 11th DTA. Small scale harassing actions and missions continued at the usual pace in all TAOR's.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. VC activity in the North remained light. However, on 22-23 June during LAMSON 283 the 808th NVA Bn was successfully encountered in QUANG TRI Province by ARVN units assisted by Marine air (see Para 3. 1. (3)). Political unrest in HUE decreased considerably during the period.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. There was small scale VC activity throughout the Southern portion of the DANANG TAOR. On 24 June at 0200H, the Special Forces outpost at THUONG DUC was mortared and attacked by VC in company strength. THUONG DUC District headquarters was similarly attacked by another company. (See Para 3. 1. (2)).

(3) QUANG TRI - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Battery D of the 2d Bn 11th Marine's was mortared and attacked, during the early morning of 20 June, by VC in company strength (see Para 3. 1. (4)). Operation KANSAS concluded with no significant contact during the reporting period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents totaled 339 for the reporting period. Incidents consisted of 170 small unit engagements, 143 anti-aircraft fires, 24 mine/booby traps, 1 attack and 1 assault by fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

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Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years

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d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 18 June. The following is additional information on the CZECH 7.62mm assault rifle captured by elements of the 3d Recon Bn. at (AT 803847) on 5 June. (Refer to Para 2. d. (1) of III MAF PERINTREP NO. 19). This weapon is new to the ICTZ and differs from the CHICOM and SOVIET models previously captured as follows:

(a) Its hand guards are of molded wood chips and plastic rather than wood.

(b) It is coated with a gray plastic base paint instead of being blued.

(c) The construction of the selector switch, magazine release, bolt lock, operating mechanism and disassembly catches differ from SOVIET and CHICOM models. Parts are not interchangeable.

(d) The magazine is lighter, probably of aluminum rather than steel and is not interchangeable with other BLOC models. This weapon is well constructed and indicates that Czechoslovakia is a possible source of supply.

Another report received from Co C, 1st Bn, 4th Marines stated that on 9 June two CZECH model 58 assault rifle magazines were captured at (YD 821 178). The magazines were for the 7.62mm intermediate cartridge. They were of excellent construction, made of lightweight alloy or aluminum, appeared to be non-corrosive/rust proof and were painted grey.

(2) 20 June. VC Signal Tactics. A USMC interpreter w/PCF reported what appears to be a VC signal system to warn of approach of USN Patrol craft. As PCF rounded cape vic (BS 7393), a fire that billowed white smoke was observed a short distance inland. A few minutes later another fire w/white smoke was started vic (BS 774857). At night, flares have been observed, evidently serving the same purpose. It is suspected these signals warn VC craft in the BATANGAN Area of the PCF's approach. The port at (BS 7682) has long been a major coastal infiltration point. Related to this is the report of a fisherman interrogated by the 9th ITT stating that at AN CUONG, (BS 7192), are 5 VC motorized junks serving as patrol craft which put to sea periodically at night to collect a fish tax from fisherman.

e. Negative.

f. Admin Units

(1) 2 June. QUANG NAM agent reported that a VC prison camp with US and ARVN prisoners is located in vicinity of (ZC 2050). Weapons and food storage areas, a VC hospital and a training area have also been reported in this general area. (G-2 Cmt: F/3).

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g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Anti-aircraft fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 143. 18 aircraft were hit with a total of 31 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were AT 9050, BT 1020 and YD 3050. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. 4 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported for the period.

i.-j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars

(1) 21 June. VNAF Intelligence sources in vicinity of grid squares (BT 0265 - 0365 - 0266 - 0366) reported movement of a 500 man VC unit in this area. Part of this unit is reported to be a heavy weapons company armed with 81 and 120mm mortars. Exact numbers of each is unknown. (VNAF C/2). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

l.-s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Casualties. VC casualties for the period totaled 142 ~~with~~ with 22 VCC.

f. Morale. Considered good.

g. Negative.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps during the reporting period was again characterized by partly cloudy skies, high temperatures, and isolated precipitation in the mountain regions. Temperatures averaged 96° high to 77° low. Winds were mostly Southeasterly at 8 knots. Visibility 7 miles.

k. Significant Agent, VCC/Returnee and Documents Report. Annex C.

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1. Other Significant Information.

(1) 20 June. Examination of 3 CHICOM assault rifles type 56 captured in the assault on 2nd Bn, 11th Marines positions the night of 20 June reveals serial numbers are in same block 947 as weapons of this type captured in Operation UTAH in mid-March. At that time US Forces were in contact with the 21st NVA Regt. It is to be noted that assault rifles are seldom possessed by any but main force soldiers. At present, it is not believed likely that the 21st Regt participated in the attack. It is possible that these personnel had been trained and armed by the 21st or that selected Sappers from the 21st were utilized with the 706th LF Co which is believed AKA for K-53D LF Co or 302nd Co of 72nd Bn, both held this general area.

(2) 24 June. THONG DUC. The District headquarters and Special Forces camp were hit by a coordinated attack on the morning of 24 June. The VC struck in company strength following a mortar attack. VC losses were reported at 7 KIA (US confirmed), VCC and 3 weapons.

(3) 808th Bn. On 22 June during LAM SON 283 in QUANG TRI Province, ARVN Task force 1/1 encountered what is believed to be the NVA 808th Bn. The company commander of the 2nd Company of that Battalion was reported in ARVN hands. Fighting continued throughout most of the night of 22-23 June. ARVN ground units were assisted by ~~flares and bombs that were on station~~ throughout the night and other aircraft which hindered the NVA Battalion from fleeing to the West. When the operation terminated, the VC casualty totals reached 331 KIA (159 confirmed by US Advisors) and an undetermined number WIA.

(4) 20 June. The following information was received after the VC attack on 2nd Bn, 11th Marines positions at (BT 440082). The attack commenced at 200030H. Marines received an estimated 5000 rounds of SA/AV fire, and 69 rounds of 82mm fire. Fire was received from the North, South and West. SHELREPS indicate mortar positions located (BT 40390900). Weapons captured included 1 CHICOM assault rifles, 3 North Vietnamese model 7.62mm SMI type 50N, 31 CHICOM grenades and 3 home made TNT charges.

(5) 16 June. QUANG TIN Recon agent report. The VC have a food depot at (PT 170055). A communication section at (BT 196036) which laid comm wire from this location to (BT 188078 - 190090 - 183110). Also reported in this area is a grenade manufacturing shop located (BT 190036). (G-2 Cmt: F/3; this general area is probably large base areas now being used by the 1st VC Regt).

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- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|-----------------------|---|
| COMUSMACV | 2 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG THIRD MARDIV | 15 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG | 5 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | COMNAVFORV REP DANANG | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | CICV | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | COMNAVFORV | 1 |
| CG 1ST BRIG, 101ST ABNDIV | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 | CSC DANANG | 1 |
| DET C-1, 5TH USSF | 2 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CO FLC | 1 | 35TH TFW(DOI) DNG | 1 |
| | | 1ST MP BN | 1 |

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ANNEX A TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 21

HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K-41 CO | CONF | 95 | UNK | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC C592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 130 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9762 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9863 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8859 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

| | | | | | |
|------------------------|------|-----|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| 52ND BN | CONF | 350 | BS 7090 | 2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR | CO-VO LIEN SOM; KY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO |
| HQ 21 BN (AA) (NVA) | CONF | 300 | NORTHERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE | 16-12.7MM AA MG | CO-CAPT ROANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |

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DALANG TACE (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF RADR)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 5TH BN | PROP | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THAI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 10 SIG | CO-PHAN ANK BINH NGUYEN DINH KHUET |
| 51ST BN | PROP | 300 | AT 9009 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | AT 9550 | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 3B BN, 5TH REGT | PROP | 400 | AT 8734 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONTINUED)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|---------------------------------|
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 3411 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 3315 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 36TH NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAORS. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT A 3D REGT OF THE 620TH DIV MAY BE PRESENT IN THIS GENERAL AREA AND CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE PROBABILITY STATED ABOVE.

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1. General. Reports from field agents over the past month concerning VC espionage activities would indicate that the VC have taken advantage of the political unrest to infiltrate agents into various areas within the ICTZ. Reports further reveal what may be a fairly well organized net operating within this area. However, recent capture of some VC agents would also point to a greater effort by local ARVN and Vietnamese investigative agencies to neutralize the VC actions. Propaganda is still prevalent and indications point to some efforts by the VC to incorporate recent movements of US pacifists and dissident groups into their propaganda program. A slight decline in terrorism was evident as the number of incidents in the ICTZ dropped over the previous period.

2. Espionage and Sabotage

Quang Nam: On 2 June 1966, Do thi MAI who resides at Ly Thuong Kiet, Hoi An, is reported to be a VC Liaison and Proselyting Agent. MAI has also been observed attempting to subvert ARVN soldiers. MAI reported was reported to have the primary mission of collecting intelligence for the VC, and reporting to a VC unit located in Binh Giang village.

On 5 June, another report was received that Diep HUNG, a VC Liaison cadre in the Duy Xuyen District, has organized several VC espionage networks in the Hoi An area. Diep CUU, (HUNG's brother), is reportedly a penetration agent who furnishes information received from HUNG, to the VC Self-Administration Section of Xuyen Tho village.

A 6 June report indicates that Nguyen Thi CAY, apprehended by the Hoi An authorities, had previously worked as a VC Liaison agent and had been supplying the VC with intelligence. Another report received on 9 June that a number of young espionage agents (Male and Female) are operating in Moi and Tu Le sub-hamlets, their mission is to collect information pertaining to the government controlled hamlets located in this area.

A VC platoon located at Vinh Xuan village (BT 095592) reportedly has the mission of collecting information in that area. A 17 June report indicates that VC female agents from the Dien Ban District, have been observed purchasing clothing, batteries, and military equipment in the city of Danang. These women also have the mission of collecting information on U. S. and Allied Forces for the Viet Cong.

A 21 June report indicates that three VCS apprehended by the Hoa Loc Police Chief on 19 June were undercover agents working for the VC. These three has an intelligence collection mission.

Quang Ngai: A 22 June report furnished information that a VC intelligence cell, attached to the Binh Son District Local Force Company, P.31, is operating in Binh Thanh (V) (BS 583941).

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A VC meeting held on 15 June at coordinates (BS 665842), was attended by the Son Think (V) Commissioners, Pha THOY and Truong NUNG along with other local VC village cadre. The topics of discussion reportedly were the collection of rice and the construction of "combat hamlets" and tunnels. Discussed was the primary mission of VC located in the area, which is the sabotage of bridges and roads along Highway Number One from coordinates (BS 633813) to (BS 629835), and to destroy the "Nui Vo Post" (BS 622886), Phu My (D) (BS 656812), "Nui Nhenh Post" (BS 658812), and to isolate Son Tinh and Binh Son villages.

3. Propaganda and Subversion:

QUANG TRI: VC leaflets found at coordinates (ZC 149996) on 16 June 1966, written in English and entitled "The American People are Struggling Fiercely to End the Aggressive War of the U. S. Government in South Vietnam" and reads substantially as follows: "On May 1965 - Students of the California University organized a "Vietnam Day" to oppose the aggressive actions of the Johnson Administration in South Vietnam and to support the just struggle of the Vietnamese people." "On 21 June 1965, the "Mothers Struggling for Peace Organization" sent a letter to President Johnson protesting against the aggressive war waged by the U.S. Government in South Vietnam." "In San Francisco, more than 1,000 people demonstrated outside the town theater, to protest the policy of aggression of the U. S. Government."

A second leaflet read in part as follows: "South Vietnam Liberation People's Front is ready to make negotiations and hold discussions with groups and units of the South Vietnamese Puppet Government Army, who want to combine to combat the Americans and their henchmen."

THUA THIEN: A report dated 14 June, indicated that a VC Company entered a Village, (YD 900100) and conducted a propaganda campaign, (Theme unknown). Another report of 15 June indicated that one hundred fifty VC, maneuvering toward Gia Le Chanh Market (YD 811240), have a mission of supporting the Buddhist Struggle Forces and to propagandize local residents. The general theme being "The Americans are oppressing the Buddhist."

On 19 June, the Village Chief of Loc An reported that six VC entered Nam Pho Ha (YD 954063) and distributed propaganda leaflets. The village Chief believes that these are the same VC that previously distributed leaflets at coordinates (YD 958045).

QUANG NAM: On 14 June, an unknown number of VC cadres reportedly were sent to Dien Ban, Dai Loc, and Duy Xuyen Districts ordering inhabitants to infiltrate into the city of Danang to "save Buddhism". Reportedly these villagers are to enter as refugees and are to be contacted later by the VC in Danang. Presently a number of people are participating in a VC indoctrination course in VC controlled areas to carry out this plan. Source comments that this is possibly part of a larger scheme to infiltrate the remaining structure of the Struggle Movement.

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A directive taken from a captured female VC courier apprehended while riding a bicycle between Hoa Vang and Dien Ban Districts, revealed that the VC continue to urge the people to strongly push the political struggle against the Americans, the overthrow of the Thieu-Ky Government, to hinder all schemes for negotiation, to step up the city movement, to demand the resignation of Thieu-Ky, and to demand that the Americans end their war of aggression. Another report received on 18 June, indicated that a captured VC document revealed VC plans to counteract friendly operations by utilizing the following methods: "Indoctrinate and control the pacifists and escapees to discontinue liaison with the enemy; the individual ration administration must be controlled very strictly in order to protect the liberated regions; train the people to watch for espionage and protect security so we (VC) can fight against the enemy from the outside and protect ourselves from the reactionaries".

On 18 June, a US interpreter stated voices heard emanating from vicinity (AT 992602) were the VC giving a propaganda lecture to villagers. Text of speech could not be understood due to the distance. Another report received indicated that on 19 June during a sweep of Ha Bang Village (BT 104628), many VC propaganda signs and leaflets were found and destroyed.

QUANG NGAI: On 14 June an RMK Foreman discovered a Vietnamese Male, who had entered the Vietnamese Compound at Chu Lai, by the use of a forged identification card. Investigation revealed that a complete set of identification papers had been purchased for 250\$VN. Although in this particular case the male is not believed to be a VC.

CI COMMENTS: A VC document captured in III Corps area revealed an order issued by the VC Long An Province Committee for lower echelons to collect documents, photos and equipment found on officers and enlisted men of US and Allied Forces killed or wounded in action. Reportedly this material is to be used abroad for Propaganda purposes to show the VC in a better light and to vilify U.S. and Allies.

4. TERRORISM

QUANG NAM: An unidentified agent hurled two grenades into the house of Dong Giang village Policeman at Danang Precinct (BT 045780) wounding 1 Policeman and six civilians (including three children). Another report received on 22 June indicated the VC were distributing leaflets throughout Hoa Vang District. The leaflets threatened the lives of the villagers if they participated in the Pacification program. On 22 June, Dai Loc District Headquarters reported that an unknown number of VC swept through a village located at coordinates (AT 925583) and killed a national policeman (No further information received).

THUA THIEN: A report received on 18 June from Phyl Thu District indicated that on the night of 18 June, approximately thirty VC entered a Hamlet located in the vicinity of (YD 850204), kidnapped the hamlet chief and later killed him.

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CI COMMENTS: The Viet Cong Committee, Quang Nam Province, which surrounds Danang, reportedly ordered its subordinate personnel to intensify their political activities during May and June 1966. Political activities to be stressed were: (1) Intensified efforts to organize fifth columnists within the South Vietnamese Government. (2) Training of female agents and directing them against free world forces, and (3) Increased recruiting among South Vietnamese troops, to include encouraging them to defect. The objectives stated above are not new, the use of female agents have appeared frequently in reports of the VC activities and intentions. However, efforts to recruit among South Vietnamese troops and to organize a fifth column among government employees are of note, and may be assisted at this time by the recent demonstrations in Danang and Hue. During the demonstrations some local troops displayed dissatisfaction with the South Vietnamese Government of Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky; the demonstrations also caused instability within the local government as some employees were reassigned or fired and replaced by other personnel.

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT; VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAF
PERINTREP MR 21.

I. 800th Bn, Quang Tri, I Corps Adv Grp. INTSUM #170. MAI Van Nghia, a rallier from the 800th Bn gave the following information during initial interrogation. He was a draftee of the 368th Arty Bde (122 mm) on 30 June 1965. In October 1965 he was assigned to the 250 man 404/A infiltration team commanded by 1st Lt Phaun Quang Lac, the unit moved from HA DONG city 30 September 65 by train. They arrived NINH BINH bridge that evening where they continued to move on foot to VINH city. They passed QUANG BINH Province and crossed the BEN HAI river in the vicinity of (XD 965695). When he arrived in South Viet Nam he was assigned to the C.22 Co (120mm Mort). The company was disbanded and he was assigned to the 800th Bn. On 1 June 66 his unit moved to the vicinity of TRUONG PHUOC Mountain (YD 345395). He gave the following information concerning the 4th Company (supporting Co) of the 800th Battalion. CC-FIANG, XC-NGUYEN, PC-PHONG. Weapons 2-Germov HMG, 1 LMG, 3-82mm Mort, 2-57mm RR, 9-AK SMG, Remainder K.44's.

II. 3d Regt, 320th NVA Division - On 16 June in QUANG TIN Province, a platoon of the First Recon Bn was attacked by a Battalion of the 3d Regt, 320th NVA Division. The following is a summary of the action from the patrol report of 161600H June. Synopsis: This patrol covered a period of 65 hours with 10 sightings of 49 VC. At 160130H the patrol was attacked by a NVA Battalion of 300-400 men. The patrol had received a report of an enemy battalion in the area at 151930H and had assumed 100% alert. At 160130H the CP was hit from three sides with heavy SA fire and grenades, the patrol pulled back into a tight perimeter and beat off the first attack. At this time artillery was requested in an attempt to box in the position. The artillery arrived but landed to the west of the position. Flare ships were requested and arrived on station between 0200 - 0215 and provided light until daylight. Heavy casualties were sustained by the patrol in the initial attack and a Med-Evac was requested. Med-Evac helo arrived but could not land because of heavy enemy fire. Under the cover of darkness the enemy got within 20 feet of the patrol and threw grenades into the position and also moved up machine guns into four locations. When the flare ship arrived on station, fixed wing and helo gunships also arrived. The enemy appeared frightened by the planes and their attack subsided for a short period. The patrol continued to receive automatic and SA fire throughout the night as they were running out of ammo they started to fire only at targets they could see. By the light of the flares they were able to see the hats of the enemy as they moved toward their position and were able to pick them off. Many of the enemy dead found the next morning were shot through the head. A USMC reaction force was helo-lifted in at daylight, finally arriving at the patrol's position at 160800H. At this time one automatic weapon still had the patrol pinned down, and air strikes were called in an attempt to knock it out. At this time the patrol was evacuated except for three men who gathered enemy weapons and equipment for intelligence screening. As they moved around the area they found an enemy gun position, with a 6'-7' tunnel leading back into the hill. This position and tunnel had been dug during the nite. As the enemy tried to take the position, they were yelling obscenities in english and whistles were heard. The enemy had at least 4-.50 Cal, MG's, 60mm Mortars, LMG's and other small arms.

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They were well equipped and well trained. On their assault of the position they moved in fire team rushes. Once flares started to light up the area movement ceased and resumed only after the flares were dying. There were 39 enemy bodies around the position and evidence that many more had been dragged off. The weapons and equipment the patrol brought in included: 5-AK 47 Assault rifles (CHICOM type 56), 1 LMG Model RFD (CHICOM type 56), 2 CHICOM Carbines, 1 60mm Mortar sight, 15 bayonets, 1 Cartridge belt, 1 Canteen, 1 leather belt with a star on one buckle, 3 Magazines for the AK 47 Assault rifle, assorted ammo, documents and assorted rank and unit insignia. In addition to the foregoing, the reaction force picked up additional weapons and equipment, which were forwarded to G-2. The support provided by the flare-ship, fixed wing aircraft, and helicopter gunships was outstanding, and saved the patrol from being over run. The planes were making runs within 75 meters of the position and were right on target each time under extremely difficult light conditions.

III. VC Preparations For Fighting near Coastal Areas. The following is a Translation of portions of a VC directive found on a body following an ambush by the 3d Bn 4th Marines (ZD 010013) in Thua Thien province on 052030H June 1966. Fighting in the sandy delta areas, we must pay attention to: Foxholes and communication trenches: we must dig the top wide and the bottom narrow (top: 1.20m, bottom: 0.70m). The depth depends on the height of each man in order to observe the enemy. Lately some soldiers of C3 (K2) dug their foxholes so deep they could'nt observe the enemy when they reached 20m distance. We must also take care of weapons, keep them away from dust and sand. We must dig several reserve firing positions for AT guns and MGs. After firing 1 or 2 shells, we must move to another position. Absolutely do not use a position to fire a third shell of AT. (Lately, C3(K2) used 57mm recoilless rifle to fire four shells in one position, that fact caused 1 KIA and several WIAs. The MG, after firing 1 or 2 bursts must quickly change position. We must also avoid the "good terrain", because the enemy usually notices that we use good terrain to set up the battlefield (such as: mounds, graves, big trees, temples, etc.). Lately the C's (CO ?) of K.2 set up on the battlefield and had to move to another position because the enemy's use of artillery to smash the good positions before they could advance. We must shoot the enemy who stands up on their vehicles, they are MG gunners. Sometimes, our firing technique is very bad, we cannot hit the enemy at 50m distance (C.3(K2) on 19Nov65).

Moving.

The technique of communication is still bad, loud talk is incorrect. Moved the whole "K" at one time, on one road, left many footprints; this fact makes it easier for the enemy to discover us. During movement if halted, we must disperse and sit down. If any elements are lost, we must wait for them or use liaison men to lead them. If we meet a surprise encounter, the commander must set up deployment according to the stipulated plan.

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During fighting in delta areas, we must have camouflage, stakes for trenches, ponchos and nylon cloth. Put water on the sand and dust. Bring along the oil to put in the RR barrel lock after firing as well as rags for B.90, B.40, MG, AR, SMG. We must clean them carefully, even during action. We must have several firing positions, after firing 1 or 2 shells or bursts, move to another position. Review guns, and ammo before fighting. The gunners of all types of weapons must practice carefully weapons use, assembly and disassembly. The most effective firing range of the B.90 is 100, to 150m (Lately K.2 used 150m firing range to shoot a tank). B.40, from 50m to 100m firing range. (K.2 shot and destroyed 2 tanks at 70m range). Each squad must have 3 Kgs to 5 Kgs of explosive charges. Each Co must set up an AA team. Pay attention to the enemy Strike Forces.

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Send to Units

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7 May 1966

IV. A recently translated document FVS-13,208 dated 10Feb66 and captured in QUANG TIN Province, indicates a concern with the effect of harsh and brutal treatment of prisoners. VC brutality is recognized in the document as having an adverse effect on the allegiance of people in areas under VC control. In order to limit these excesses, the following instructions were given,

- a. Sufficient evidence of a crime must exist before any person can be arrested.
- b. Arrests, whether in liberated or occupied zones, should be made by the provincial committee or security service. In combat situations, arrest may be made without a warrant, but files should be established immediately and sent to provincial Party headquarters.
- c. Orders must be received from the regional committee or regional security service before any important person (key religious leaders, leaders of mass organizations, intellectuals) may be arrested.
- d. Concentration camps will be established at district and provincial levels, but not in villages.
- e. Interrogations should be carried out quickly and should not exceed three months in duration. Forced interrogations are forbidden.
- f. Personal property of prisoners should be safeguarded and returned.
- g. During imprisonment, a prisoner will receive indoctrination and will engage in labor which is productive to the revolution.

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h. All anti-revolutionaries will be publicly tried and sentenced.

i. District courts may pass a sentence of one to three years, provided a report is sent in advance to the provincial committee. Sentences of over five years are decided by the court at provincial level. Provincial courts may pass sentences of up to 20 years for serious opposition to the revolution.

j. Death penalties will be issued only in the most serious cases. Sentences of important leaders, such as province chiefs, must be approved by the zonal committee.

k. A sentence cannot be appealed. A prisoner may be pardoned however, upon recommendation of the court and approval by the next higher court.

l. In the absence of a complete judicial apparatus, security organs will be responsible for organizing people's courts. District and Province Chiefs will preside over trials. Party cadres are elected to serve as jurymen. Security officials serve as prosecutors and court clerks. People's courts are convened when necessary and are dissolved when the trial is over.

V. 17 June, QUANG TIN. Captive report of NGUYEN CHI VIEN, captured by USASF/CIDG at (BT 105160). Captive stated he was a member of 3d Co, 1st Bn, 3d VC Regt formed in 1965 as the 52d Regt in SON TAY, NVN. Captive stated his unit departed NVN in Nov 65, arrived HIEP DUC area Mar 66 and has operated vicinity of QUE SON area since his arrival SVN. The 3d Regt consists of 3 infantry Bns (1st, 2d and 3d), AA Co, 57mm RR Co, SIG Co, Trans Co, and Engr Co. Captive further stated the 3d Bn is located (BT 075180). (G-2 Cmt: This Co was in contact w/1st Recon Bn Platoon on the night of 15-16 June. This has been confirmed by documents found on dead VC by USMC reaction force. These documents also suggested that the 3d Regt was the 64th Regt of the 320th Div in NVN. This is corroborated by the statement of recent defector from the 3d Bn, 3d Regt. The Mar 1 1966, Co B OOB for the NVA lists both the 52d and 64th as subordinate to the 320th Div. It is considered possible that elements of the 52d are included in the 3d Regt. The captive may also be an individual transferee. The Regt organization agrees w/that stated by a previous defector. 1st Bn location is accepted).

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Unit: III MAF

Location: Danang, RVN

DTG: 050800 July 66

Ser: **080566**CONFIDENTIAL

PERINTREP No 22

Period Covered: 260001H June - 022400 July 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: No change

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. Except for a Battalion sized ambush in the 11th DTA and a battalion attack in the 12th DTA, VC/NVA activity was again characterized by avoidance of large scale activity. Small scale harassing actions and missions continued at the usual tempo throughout the zone.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. The 2nd Vietnamese Marine Battalion was ambushed while in convoy on Highway 1 near the QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN Province line. The ambushing force was identified as the 802nd VC Battalion (Rein). The ambush site was within range of artillery supporting Operation Jay. This artillery was quickly shifted to support the Vietnamese Marines. Tactical airstrikes were shortly available as well as a Multi-Battalion Reaction Force (See Para 3.1.(4)).

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the emphasis being placed in the southern portion.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. RF and PF units were attacked on 28 June and 1 July in Northern QUANG TIN Province in the vicinity of Highway 1. The 28 June attack involved a Battalion identified as the 72nd Battalion (See Annex C). VC activity was limited to small scale in the CHU LAI TAOR and against PF units in QUANG NGAI.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

a. Order of Battle. Annex A.

b. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals

Declassified after 12 years

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III MAF PERINTREP # 22

26 June - 2 July 66

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- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. Negative.
- e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

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(1) 13 June 66. QUANG NGAI, SMIAT report of VC Hospital. On 13 June 66, A VC Hospital was observed at DA SON (BS 485715). The Hospital consists of 5 rooms, each 6X10 meters, The building is covered by thatch and is located near heavy tree cover. There were approximately 90 patients in the hospital. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(2) 22 June. QUANG NGAI, SMIAT report of VC Aid Station. The VC have set up a first-aid station at PHU AN (BS 693584) after combat with Allied troops at THI PHO. There were approximately 50 wounded VC at this facility which was staffed by VC nurses. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(3) 16 June 66. THUA THIEN, SMIAT report of VC Hospital. A VC Hospital was located in the vicinity of KHE ME (YD 530180). The facility consisted of 8 leaf-roofed buildings and 4 buildings covered with a green material similar to tentage. Buildings measured approximately 6X15 meters. 150 patients were located in the 8 leaf-roofed buildings. Of the other 4 structures, 1 was used by doctors, 1 by 15 aidmen and nurses, 1 to store and dispense medicines and the last was used as an examination/treatment room. A VC force of approximately 100 provided area security (type weapons and quantity unk). (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(4) 16 June. THUA THIEN, SMIAT report of VC Installation. On 9 June a group of woodcutters were forced by the VC to construct 6 houses at (YD 750070) during the period of 10-16 June. The houses measured approximately 6X10 meters and were covered with palm leaves. On the morning of 15 June a group of 40 VC Cadre arrived at the site. Included in the group were 10 young women. Equipment carried by the VC included pistols, sub-machine guns, radios, telephone wire, typewriters and many packages of paper. 2 of the houses are used as living quarters, 2 for equipment storage, 1 for a kitchen and the last 1 is used to store food. (G-2 Comment: F/6; This alleged cadre could possibly be a VC Administrative Headquarters).

(5) 24 June. QUANG NAM, SMIAT report of VC Training Camp. The VC Guerrillas and Admin Training center, formerly located at (BT 072485), has been moved to a wooded area in the HOA MY area (BT 084469). The director of this training camp is HUYNH HIEM. The course runs for approximately 2 months.

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The present course is being attended by 200 students. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

h. Air Defense. VC initiated AA fire incidents (118) decreased 20% during the reporting period with 21 aircraft receiving hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9050) and (YD 3050). Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. 4 cases of 12.7mm/.50 cal fire were reported.

i-s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

c. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Casualties. 288 VC were KIA and 20 VCC during the reporting period.

f. Morale. Considered good.

g-h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps during the reporting period again remained mostly unchanged from the previous period. Skies were clear to partly cloudy with thunderstorms and showers being reported in the mountain areas. Temperatures averaged 93° high and 79° low. Winds were mostly variable from 5-10 knots. Visibility 7-10 miles. 1.65" of precipitation was recorded.

k. Significant Returnee /VCC, Agent, and Document Report. Annex C.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 19 June. VC Rice Storage Area. An unknown quantity of rice was moved by approximately 100 civilian laborers from various coastal sub-districts of DUY XUYEN district to (BT 052441) and stored in a 5X7 meter thatched structure.

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Security for this area is provided by 1 MF Co, armed with 1 60mm Mortar, 1 .30 MG and various other AW and SA. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(2) 27 June, 7th ITT report, A possible VC storage area was reported to be located in the vicinity of CHINH AN NAM (YD 5642). (G-2 Comment: C/2; A large quantity (35,500 lbs) of rice was captured on 27 June at (YD 570423). This rice cache is possibly the storage area referred to in the ITT report).

(3) 20 May 66. North DMZ SMIAT Agent report on Political and Economic Situation in VC controlled territory. North DMZ authorities are encouraging the inhabitants of the region to enlist or re-enlist in the military forces, to develop and reinforce the para-military forces, to supply these forces with weapons, and to construct combat villages. The authorities are also encouraging the people to join the movement against "American invaders", and to appeal to the people to practice thrift while increasing their production in order to meet the requirements of the war. All the cooperatives are placed under the control/supervision of the NATIONAL COMMERCE AGENCY. It is further reported that because of airstrikes the northern people do not travel in the day time, and work in the cooperatives, markets, and schools at night. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(4) 802 Bn Ambush. The 2nd Vietnamese Marine Battalion moving in convoy along Highway 1 on 290825 June, came under heavy attack by an estimated reinforced VC Battalion. The VC Bn was set up in the vicinity of (YD 493366) with forces on both sides of the highway for a distance of over a kilometer with anti-personnel mines planted close to the highway. After permitting small ARVN elements to pass through the well concealed ambush site, the VC struck the battalion convoy on the front, rear and center with heavy volume of fire which included 75mm RR fire. The 2nd Vietnamese Marine Battalion pushed out of the ambush in an effective manner but not before sustaining many casualties from mines. The VN Marines were assisted with artillery support by the 3d Bn (-) 12th Marines who were supporting the 4th Marines during Operation JAY. Tactical airstrikes by U.S. and VNAF aircraft were called in and a reaction force of 2 Vietnamese Battalions with tanks and APC's moved to the area. A Vietnamese Airborne Battalion and Co I, 3d Bn, 4th Marines were lifted into the area as well. VC losses are reported as 115 VC KIA, 21 individual weapons and 4 crew-served weapons, including 2 75mm RR. There are indications that the 802nd Bn was reinforced with elements of the following units: C-17 RR Co, C-15 AA Co, C-16 Hvy Wpns Co and C-13 Signal Co.

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- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex B.
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No Change.

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T. H. Fisher
 T. H. FISHER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|-----------------------|---|
| COMUSMACV | 2 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG THIRD MARDIV | 15 | CO 9TH MR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG | 5 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | COMNAVFORV REP DANANG | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | CICV | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | COMNAVFORV | 1 |
| CG 1ST BRIG, 101ST ABNDIV | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CMDR, I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 | CSC DANANG | 1 |
| DET C-1, 5TH USSF | 2 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CO FLC | 1 | 35TH TFW (DOI) DNG | 1 |
| | | 1ST MP BN | 1 |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 22

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HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRAI CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K-41 CO | CONF | 95 | UNK | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIST |

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONNEL/TITLES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HMTS | CONF | 130 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-KUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9762 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9863 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8859 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA, KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THAI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIEU |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | AT 9550 | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8734 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|------|-----|------------------|---|--|
| 52ND BN | CONF | 300 | BS 7090 | 2-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-.30 CAL HMG 24-AR | CO-VO LIEN SON; KY CAU THI XO-TRAM KIEW; CAPT PHO |
| RQ 21 BN (AA) (NVA) | CONF | 300 | HIEP DUC DIST | 18-12.7MM AA MG | CO-CAPT ROANG QUY PHAN CAPT NGUYEN PHAN TUYEN |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |

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ORGANIZATION

CHU LAI TACR (CONTINUED)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|---------------------------------|
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 3411 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 3315 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |

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PERSONALITIES

CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC

CO-NGUYEN LIEN

CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW;
NGHIA TUU

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TACR'S. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT A 3D REGT OF THE 620TH DIV MAY BE PRESENT IN THIS GENERAL AREA AND CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE PROBABILITY STATED ABOVE.

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ANNEX B. (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NUMBER 22

1. General. The counterintelligence trend in the ICTZ appears again to be centered on espionage and propaganda attempts. Reports continue to point to increased efforts by the VC to improve their low level espionage apparatus. Espionage nets, or at least some organization, appears to be emerging, with interest centering in the DANANG area. The VC, as reported in the past are again stressing the use of young females to solicit information from U.S. Servicemen. Propaganda activities have increased during the reporting period both oral (lectures) and written (leaflets). Some effort to degrade the U.S. Soldier, picturing him as a immoral character, has appeared. It has been noted that VC propagadna units have attempted to persuade local villagers to demand compensation for alleged destruction brought about by government and U.S. military operations.

2. Espionage and Sabotage.

QUANG NAM: A report of 8 June, indicated that NGUYEN THI LONG, of HA THANH Hamlet is a known VC. She has received eight months training in TRUNG MANG, and is presently in charge of the women proselyting section in THANH TRUNG Village. LONG has reportedly furnished information to DO THI DO, who is reported to be a VC Provincial Commissar.

A report received 21 June furnished information that TRAN CHUC, PHUNG QUANG CHUNG, ONG VAN TRUNG and ONG VAN PHU, are VC espionage agents operating near U.S. installations in the HOA VANG District area. Another report received on 21 June indicated that some VC, under the direction of District Commissars NGO THIEU, ONG VAN DY and PHAN BUU, are undergoing espionage training. Reportedly this cadre is to form an espionage network in the central and southern portion of HOA VANG District. The primary mission of these agents will be to collect information pertaining to the HOA VANG District Headquarters and U.S. installations located in the area.

A 24 June 1966 report related that the VC are employing beautiful girls, teaching them English and sending them into government controlled areas to collect information from Allied troops. Reportedly these girls have been apprehended on several occasions, but released after short interviews. CI Comment: The VC appear to be resuming their efforts to recruit and train low-level espionage agents. The HOA VANG District is apparently a primary target at this time. The VC continue to utilize their capability to mix with the indigenous population.

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Local VC who have fled from friendly operations in this area have left behind many sympathetic friends and relatives who cannot be expected to turn on their VC counterparts. Under these conditions, VC infiltrating the DANANG TAOR may be comparatively safe if they only obey current laws and curfew rules. Also, coupled with this capability to evade detection, is the ability to collect and transmit information. Infiltration and exfiltration is comparatively simple during daylight hours if the VC possess proper identification cards; however, they are vulnerable to extensive identification checks and search. Reports from other Corps areas indicate the VC are using young girls in their intelligence activities and that the VC Women's Associations at all levels have been urged to actively win over young girls, and direct them to work at U. S. installations and billets in order to collect information. If they have trouble obtaining security clearances, they are to use their beauty and, if necessary, money to secure a clearance. Accordingly, the VC will cover the expense incurred by each girl. It is reasonable to assume that VC intelligence apparatus is attempting to employ this type of low-level agent throughout South Vietnam.

QUANG NGAI: A 24 June report indicated that 300 VC, located in the (BS 7358) area, and the C/19 Company (NFI) located in the (BS 7456) area (elements of the 48th Battalion) have the possible mission of sabotaging Highway 1 from SONG VE south to MO DUC. Another 400 VC, of the 83rd Trade Union (NFI), armed with two 81mm Mortars, four 60mm Mortars and two MG's, are located at (BS 6660). Their mission is to attack the AN DAI Post (BS 670640) and sabotage the CAY BUA Bridge located at coordinates (BS 692647).

3. Propaganda and Subversion.

QUANG TRI: On 19 June, an estimated two VC platoons were reported to have entered THUONG NGHIA Hamlet (YD 242633), and assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture (theme unreported).

A leaflet found at TRIEU TAI Village (YD 368550) on 22 June, entitled "South Vietnamese Puppet Government PF Members and Servicemen in QUANG TRI Province" translated in part as follows: "The Americans Imperialists and their henchmen are widely advertising their so-called Rural Pacification Plan, characterized by; expanded aggression, terrorism, slaughtering of the people, and putting the people into strategic hamlets, just as NHU DIEM had attempted to do in vain. In order to carry out this mad ambition, they are changing you into professional fighting men, trained to kill and exterminate the people.....Come to the people. Return fire on the Americans to save our country. Fight decisively against the Rural Pacification Program and the sweep operations. This is the way to live, the way of honor, the way to save ourselves, our homes and our country".

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Another leaflet found on 22 June and distributed in QUANG TRI Province, allegedly in the name of the South Vietnamese Liberation People's Front Committee translated in part as follows: "The American Imperialists have brazenly invaded our country. Their servants, THIEU and KY are carrying on a ruthless conscription. Foreign invasion is deeply offending our people's self-respect....Last year, the Americans and their henchmen's 48 elite battalions were wiped out, following the battles at BA LONG District, TAN LO Hamlet, Route 9, TRIEU PHONG, HAI LONG, and so on....."

THUA THIEN: On 22 June an estimated VC company entered AN XUAN Hamlet (YD 730328) and assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture (theme unreported). On 23 June an estimated VC company entered NIEM PHO (YD 700305) and forced residents to participate in a demonstration. Another report of 23 June indicated that an unknown number of VC forced residents of QUANG LOI village to proceed to AP DONG HO base (YD 602 397), to demand the termination of artillery fire on their village. A report was received on 25 June that the VC entered PHU BAI (1), located in the vicinity of coordinates (YD 905113), and assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture (theme unreported). On 26 June another report was received that an unknown number of VC assembled the residents of KE SUNG Hamlet (YD 913267) for a propaganda lecture (theme unreported). A 29 June report revealed that a VC squad entered THUY DUONG Village (YD 798194), distributed propaganda leaflets (theme unreported) and taxed the residents.

QUANG NAM: A translation of a document found on 14 June 1966, at coordinates (BT 105643), revealed that the VC have published a "3 point plan" to prevent Government "Propaganda Cadre" (probably pacification teams) from attempting to induce guerrillas (VC) to defect. The plan is as follows:

1. "Force the people, teach them the way fo the revolution. Teach the illiterate groups in order to serve as liaison between the government and the people".
2. "In order to protect areas under control of the revolution we must use strong methods to control the villagers with a 5 point plan" (not further described).
3. "Always propagandize the villagers in order to control the situation in the area. Keep information away from informants (U.S./ARVN informants) outside the area in order to protect areas under control of the revolution".

The VC have reportedly organized, in VC controlled villages such as KY BICH (BT 315180) and KY THANH (BT 370060), indoctrination classes which attempt to exploit the present political unrest. The VC instruct the residents in these areas to obey the following points:

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1. "Ask that compensations be paid by the government (RVN) for damages caused by artillery, air strikes, and chemical poisons on crops and property".
2. "Ask for a halt of air strikes, artillery, and the dropping of chemical poisons".
3. "The government must take down the blockade of the VC controlled area so the people can earn their livings in security".
4. "Organize competition. Each villager must bring from TAM KY City, three kilos of rice and three kilos of salt. Anyone who can bring a larger quantity will be commended."

A 28 June 1966 report, indicated that VC cadres in HOA LONG (BT 065738) programmed for a new leaflet soon to be distributed locally. The text of the leaflet starts by recalling the sad fate of the Vietnamese people under the dictatorship of DIEM, and now of THIEU-KY, then goes on to denounce the presence of the U. S. in South Vietnam, especially in DANANG and HOA VANG Districts. U. S. troops are accused of rape, pillage, manslaughter and other atrocities.

4. Terrorism.

THUA THIEN: A 26 June report stated the VC entered PHU BAI Hamlet (YD 925144) and killed a relative of a Popular Forces (PF) soldier. The victim, female, had allegedly furnished information on VC movement to PF and U. S. personnel located in this area. Another 26 June report related that an estimated VC squad entered PHU BAI Hamlet located in the vicinity of coordinates (YD 933139) and assassinated one unidentified resident.

QUANG NAM: A report received on 21 June 1966, stated that the VC located in BAU SUNG (BT 110592), LONG TUYEN (BT 138589) and BAU OC (BT 123601) have disguised themselves as civilians and have the primary mission of assassinating government cadre in these areas. On 22 June an unknown number of VC penetrated LOC CHANH Village (AT 932605), assassinated the village chief and wounded two residents.

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ANNEX C. (SIGNIFICANT AGENT VCC/RETURNEE, DOCUMENT REPORT) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 22

1. 3d Regt (620th Div?). I Corps report dated 24 June 1966. Cpl NGUYEN VAN NGOC an assistant squad leader of the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (AKA Worksite) was taken prisoner on 15 June 1966 in QUANG TIN Province. He indicated that his battalion was formed as the 1st battalion of the 64th Regt NVA; 213 of the battalion were recruits and 113 were experienced soldiers. The 1st Bn left North Vietnam on 18 Jan 1966 and by the end of April reached station 8 KHE HOUA (ZC 103488) where the designation of the regiment was changed to Worksite 3. On 7 June his battalion received an order to move to HIEP DUC. The move was continued to TIEN PHOUC and on 15 June, his company was engaged in its first encounter with the Marine Recon Platoon attack on 15-16 June. He further indicated that the regiment was commanded by a Colonel VIET SON. The 1st Battalion CO is Capt THAO. The battalion strength was about 400 and was equipped with 60mm Mortars, RPD Automatic rifles, AK Submachine guns and SKS rifles.
2. 25th Bn. 24 June VCC LE CUNG, alleged member of the 28th Co, 25th Bn, states the Bn has 4 infantry companies and 1 support company with 3-57mm RR, 4-81mm Mortars and a personnel strength of 500. Bn also has LMG, med MG, HMG and 5 NVN Advisors. Morale of unit is low and some members are sick. LE CUNG is a volunteer from Hamlet 1, XUYEN TAN Village, DUY XUYEN District and has been with his unit 2 months. Captive also stated 4 VC WIA were taken to a hospital located approximately 2 Km west of DAI LOC District Headquarters. (G-2 Comment: F/6; 28th Co, 25th Bn, AKA V-28 Co, V-25 Bn. DAI LOC District Headquarters probably VC District previously reported in vicinity (ZC 182476). Base areas are probably along district boundaries of NAM HOA, PHONG DIEN, HUONG TRA).
3. 72nd Battalion QUANG TIN. A prisoner captured in the vicinity of (BT 175465), on 280815H June during a VC Bn attack of a RF Co and PF Platoon, indicated that he was an aide to Bn commander and Bn had mission of conducting ambushes along Hwy 1. The results of the encounter were 30 VC KIA (estimated) 6 KBA, 1 VCC, 4 weapons captured. Contact was broken at 1050H. VC moved north where they were hit by airstrikes.
4. 402nd Bn. 25 June, 3d Mar Div relayed a DAI LOC District Headquarters report from a returnee that the 402nd Bn is composed of the 301st, 303rd, 305th, and the 309th Companies. Their units are unknown. (G-2 Comment: The same returnee initially identified the 402nd NVA Bn (unconf) as located in the vicinity of (AT 8167) in a series of camp sites.

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Recon patrols conducted 15 to 23 June indicate no recent or present enemy activity in this area).

5. 802nd Bn. 29 June, 4th Marines relayed the following 7th ITT initial interrogation reports of VCC taken during the action in vicinity (YD 5036) following the ambush of an ARVN convoy. 3 of the VCC (2 from the 802nd, 1 from the C.15 Co) are prisoners of the ARVN.

VCC TRAN VAN HONG stated that he was member of the 10th Co and that the 10th is a support Co assigned to support an unknown unit. The 10th Co's mission was to attack an American convoy. They came from PHONG SON village (YD 5225) in early light of 29 June and were to retreat to a specified mountain. (Interrogators comment: Map tracking indicate the hill is possibly hill 81 vicinity (YD 475342). The area has an estimated 300 to 400 VC. Each squad has 7 men, each platoon has 2 squads, the Co has 3 platoons. Weapons consist of K-44, SMG and 2 Hvy MG. Captive is a NVN. The VCC identified his Co commander as CAO TUNG. (G-2 Comment: F/3; C-10 Co last reported to be 10th Sapper Co QUANG TRI Province. Strength 120. First report of CAO TUNG).

VCC stated he was a member of the 802nd Bn and that his Bn ambushed the convoy on the morning of 29 June. The Bn was supported by the C.15 AA Co, armed W/6 12.7 AA MG. Night of 28 June 802nd Bn held a meeting at XUAN DIEN (YD 528273). Rallying point after the ambush was to be hill 51 located 2 Km East of XUAN DIEN. (G-2 Comment: F/2; 802nd Bn believed to be operating in this area.

VCC DOAN MANH CHI stated his rank was PFC and that he was in the 2nd squad, 2nd platoon, 1st Co, 802nd Bn. He did not know the Bn strength, but stated that each Co had 120 men. Mission of Bn was to ambush a convoy. The Bn was supported by 4-12.7 AA MG. He did not know their withdrawal route and stated that they were to be told after the ambush. The Bn had stayed at HOA MY (YD 4327) for 15 days. Captive claims he joined the K.2 Bn previously to stay in HOA MY, after infiltrating through Laos. He carried an AK-47 and had no special duties. He identified the following personalities: Bn Political Officer - KHAM, 1st Co commander - TRAN VAN BAN. (G-2 Comment: F/2; K.2 Co is AKA for 802nd Bn).

VCC NGUYEN VAN DIEN stated he was member of C.15 AA MG Co and that the Co was in support of the ambush. He stated that the C.15 Co and K.2 Bn are part of the 6th Regt. C.15 Co weapons are 6-12.7mm AA MG's. After the ambush their rallying area was hill 51, 2 kilometers East of XUAN DIEN (YD 527275). Unit met at 281600 at XUAN DIEN. They moved from jungle position 1 about 4 hours walk east of XUAN DIEN.

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(G-2 Comment: F/2; K.2 Bn (AKA 802nd) not carried as subordinate to 6th Regt; however the 802nd Bn has operated in conjunction with units of the 6th Regt. C.15 AA Co is listed as subordinate Co to 6th Regt).

6. 808th Bn NVA. During ARVN operation LAM-SON 283 QUANG TRI, 39 VC of the 808th Bn were captured. Interrogation of the group revealed the following information. The battalion was formed at TRACH-DAN early August of 1964 of many re-enlistees with the remainder draftees. The battalion infiltrated into South Vietnam in early December 1964 and arrived in the BA-LONG area during late February where the battalion was redesignated the 808th Bn. The unit was assigned the responsibility of attacking CHO-CHUA post (YD 325645) and "LIBERATING" adjacent areas to include TRIEU PHONG District. The 808th with 814th Bn were assigned to the PHONG-QUANG, TRIEU HAI areas for summer operations. At 212000 June this unit moved to PHU LIEU Hamlet (YD 365582) where it was surrounded by ARVN forces and defeated. Advisors counted 151 KIA in addition to the 39 VCC. The battalion strength on 22 June was about 350 men. Some of the armament consisted of 3-81mm Mortars, 3-Goryunov MG, and 5 57mm DKZ.

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Unit: III MAF

Location: Danang, RVN

DTG: 120800H July 1966

Ser: **083466**CONFIDENTIAL

PERINTREP No. 23

Period Covered: 030001 - 092400 July 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series L701, sheets (PHU BAI TAOR) 6460-1 II; 6560 II, III, IV, (DANANG TAOR) 6659-1, II; 6588-I; 6659 II, III, IV, 6658 I, IV; (CHU LAI TAOR) 6657 I; II; 6657 II, III, IV; 6756 I, II; 6656 I, scale 1:50,000

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. VC/NVA activity was again characterized by avoidance of large scale activity, except for a VC attack in about battalion strength in QUANG NAM Province. Small scale harassing actions and missions continued throughout the zone.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. During ARVN operation LAMSON 287 the VC were encountered in battalion strength. Small scale activity was encountered in the PHU BAI TAOR. The political situation in HUE has remained stable throughout the period.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Company K, 3d Bn 9th Marines encountered VC in about battalion strength south of the DANANG TAOR. The battalion encountered is believed to be the local force R.20 battalion. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the emphasis being placed in the southern portion.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. VC/NVA activity decreased to small scale activity in QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI and the CHU LAI TAOR.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents totaled 276 for the reporting period. Incidents consisted of: 145 small unit engagements, 100 AA fires, 22 mine/booby trap, 3 hamlet harassments, 3 propaganda and 3 acts of terrorism.

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals

Declassified after 12 years

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III MAF PERINTREP # 23

3-9 Jul 66

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- a. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- b. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d - e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

(1) 17 June, QUANG NGAI SMIAT report of VC Training Camps. 2 VC training camps were located at HC BUI (BS 454798). 200 to 300 VC were being trained at the 2 sites. Early warning was provided by female guerrillas stationed from 100 to 200 meters from the camps. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(2) 16 June, QUANG NGAI SMIAT report of VC Supply Camp. A VC supply camp is located at XON BUON (BS 174850). The site consists of 4 houses 10 by 50 meters each and covered with thatch. The houses reportedly store rice, salt, fish sauce, pigs and a large quantity of weapons. This area is guarded by 300 men. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 5 July, QUANG NGAI SMIAT report of a VC POW Camp. On 14 June a sub-agent observed a VC POW Camp at DA LI EP (BS 206903) located in a mountain valley among dense foliage and trees. The camp consists of 2 houses covered with leaves and 2 trenches 2 by 5 meters, which appear to be entrances to tunnels in the ground where 100 to 150 prisoners live at night. No man-made obstacles or guard towers are in evidence. 10 guards patrol the area at all times. The POW's are permitted outside the tunnels during the day when they are being given political indoctrination. The POW's are never shackled or chained in any manner nor are they allowed outside the detention area. The only communication system is reported to be an early warning provided by an outpost observer who fires a rifle shot in the air to warn of the approach of anyone into the area. (G-2 Cmt: F/3; second report of VC POW Camp in this general area. Refer to para 2.f.(2), III MAF PERINTREP No. 17).

g - r. Negative.

s. Transportation.

(1) 19 June, QUANG NGAI SMIAT report of VC Road Building Activities. 200 Montagnards were forced by the VC to clear a road from TRA CAU hamlet (BS 292908) to NUOC MUN (BS 231900).

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The surface is of sand and is 2 meters wide. The VC reportedly will use this road to supply ammunition and food to VC units in the area. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

t. Infiltration.

(1) VC Infiltration route/way station. 4 July, Det C-1, 5th USSF reported a well defined trail (5 to 8 ft wide) runs from (BS 149941) to (BS 177909). A clearing (30 by 90 ft) is located adjacent to the trail at (BS 172909).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Casualties. VC losses for the reporting period totaled 368 KIA and 11 VCC.

f. Morale. Recent information received from the interrogation of ralliers, VCC, etc. indicate that the morale in some VC/NVA MF units is declining, though morale is still considered good in most LF and guerrilla units. Lack of food and medical supplies coupled with heavy losses and fear of artillery were the reasons given in most cases.

g. New Enemy Defenses, Mines, Mine Fields, Fortifications, Obstacles, Barriers, and Booby Traps.

(1) 2 July, VMO-6 reported that a heavily entrenched fortified village is located at (AT 888518).

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Partly cloudy skies, gusty surface winds and scattered thunder showers in the mountain areas dominated the weather picture in I Corps during the reporting period. Temperatures again averaged above normal at 96° high and 81° low. Winds were southwesterly at 8 knots and gusting. Visibility ranged from 7-20 miles throughout the period.

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k. Significant Agent, VCC/Returnee, and Document Report.
Annex B.

1. Other Significant Information.

(1) 6 July, Rallier Interrogation report of VC Rice Cache. Rallier 1stLt NGUYEN VIET of the 3d Regt, 620th Div, stated that 8 to 9 tons of rice is located in the vicinity of (AT 8924). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 6 July, Det C-1, 5th USSF report of VC Ammo/Food Storage Area. A suspected ammunition and/or food storage area is located at (BS 361580). Area consists of 8 large and 4 small buildings around a large animal corral.

(3) 29 June, HA THANH USSF agent report of VC Ammunition Storage Area. A suspected VC ammunition storage area is located at (BS 340715). Site consists of 6 houses, 3 on either side of a stream.

(4) 27 June, QUANG NGAI SMIAT report of VC Supply Storage Area. The VC forced a number of people from CON LOAN (BS 515497) to carry rice to PHU KHUONG (BS 620458). At PHU KHUONG approximately 60 other workers were bringing fish sauce, salt and ammunition from DAM THUY (BS 770560) and THACH THANG (BS 775520). The workers then combined and carried the supplies to their final destination, LANG SO (BS 545417). Approximately 10 guerrillas defend this area. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

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- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.
- 5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No Change.


 P.H. FISHER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|------------------------|---|
| COMUSMACV | 2 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG THIRD MARDIV | 15 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR NAV SUPPACT DNG | 5 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | COMNAVFORCV REP DANANG | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | CICV | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | COMNAVFORV | 1 |
| CG 1ST BRIG, 101ST ABNDIV | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CMDR, I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 | CSC DANANG | 1 |
| DET C-1, 5th USSF | 2 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CO FLC | 1 | 35TH TFW (DCI) DNG | 1 |
| CG 2D BRIG, ROK MC | 1 | 1ST MP BN | 1 |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 23

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HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | UNK | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-IMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 130 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9762 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9863 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8859 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA, KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | AT 9550 | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 3D. BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8734 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

| | | | | | |
|----------|------|-----|---------|---|---------------------------------|
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 3411 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 3315 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAOR'S. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT A 3D REGT OF THE 620TH DIV MAY BE PRESENT IN THIS GENERAL AREA AND CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE PROBABILITY STATED ABOVE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 23.

1. 3d Regt, 620th NVA Division. 1st Lt. NGUYEN VIET who rallied at THANG BINH District Headquarters on 6 July identified himself as Plans Officer for the rear services staff of the 3d Regiment, 620th Division. When he left the Regiment on 3 July, it was deployed as follows: Regt CP (BT 027225), 1st Bn (AT 985224), 3d Bn (BT 092300) and all 8 support companies in the vicinity of (BT 020215). The whole Regiment was under orders to move to the QUE SON area on 4 July for a period of 10 days training and political indoctrination prior to the move. The Regiment was to employ a company size diversionary force in harassment of Route 1, while main elements seized hills 59 and 62 (coordinates unknown).

Before infiltration the Regiment was known as the 64th Regiment, 320th Division, which was home guard for HANOI until August 1965. The Regiment moved to NINH BINH Province where it conducted infiltration training in December 1965. The unit began infiltrating SVN in January and upon arrival at HIEP DUC it became known as the 3d Regiment with a new code name of AN BINH.

The rallier gave the following additional information that he overheard from the Regimental Commander: The division commander received an order on 26 May to move the 1st Regiment to QUANG NGAI Province where it would join with other newly infiltrated units to form a new division.

He stated the following concerning his staff position. The transportation company periodically picks up mail and rice from NVN at TIEN DUA 2 (BT 240405); the majority of food stuffs are obtained at CHO DUC market (BT 2143) and back-packed to units. All ammunition comes from NVN by way of LAOS and there is no shortage of ammunition but artillery ammunition is least plentiful. Medical care is described as good and an abundance of medical supplies are on hand. Morale is said to be low due to constant artillery and air attacks. 110 men have deserted since arrival of the Regiment in SVN.

The rallier identified the following personalities: XO 620th Division, THACH; CO 3d Regiment, LtCol VIET SON; XO Major TRANH ANH KIEM; PO, TRUNG THANK; 1st Bn CO, Capt THANH; 2nd Bn, Capt THAU, 3d Bn, Capt TOAN. Each battalion is equipped with 4 82mm Mortars, 4 MG, 2 75mm RR. In addition, Regimental support companies are equipped with 4 12.7 AA MG, 6 75mm RR, 6 82mm Mortar, 5-6 tons TNT.

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3 July. The following was extracted from an ARVN I Corps rallier interrogation report of DO NHU PHONG, 11th Squad, 4th Platoon, 10th Co, 3d Bn, 3d Regiment, who rallied at QUE SON on 8 June. Among the numerous items contained in the report was reference to the ASHAU Special Forces Camp attack of 9 March. DO stated that while his unit was infiltrating into SVN, in March 66, he saw an estimated VC Regiment (designation unk) coming from the south. This occurred in a mountainous region of QUANG TRI Province. DO further stated that some troops of the regiment said that they had participated in the ASHAU battle. These troops said that their unit had sent one sergeant and one soldier on a recon mission prior to their attack and that the men had defected. Afraid that their attack plan had been compromised, the Regiment attacked ASHAU sooner than scheduled. With some difficulty, they overran and occupied the post. One company disregarded an order to vacate the post and remained at ASHAU cooking and eating supplies they had captured. An air strike subsequently destroyed this company. For this reason the regiment was ordered to return to North Vietnam to, as the rallier put it, "study about strong and weak points". (G-2 Cmt: F/3; 3d MarDiv states: We cannot verify this story, but numerous facts are interesting and do tend to confirm the information. Two NVA soldiers of the 95B Regiment (NGUYEN HOAI and NGUYEN TIEN DUNG) did defect on 5 March and stated that ASHAU was to be attacked by their regiment on 11 or 12 March. ASHAU was attacked by that regiment on March 9. No solid location for the 95B Regiment has been identified since the ASHAU battle, and only agent reports have been received pertaining to this unit. It is carried as unlocated in the THUA THIEN Province. Recent operations at ASHAU established that the post was rapidly evacuated by the enemy force. Battlefield clearance, usually second nature to the VC or NVA forces, was not carried out to any great degree. We also have the programmed actions for the Northern Sub/Region as obtained from the 39 VC taken in LAM SON 283. Their statements accounted for units throughout the Northern Sub/Region, mentioning all 800 series battalions, but did not refer to the 95B Regt. With these facts, we rate the defectors story as possibly true. The 95B Regiment may have returned to NVN immediately following the ASHAU attack.

2. R.20 Bn. On 1 July, NGO VAN BAY, member of the R.20 Bn, rallied to Co A, 1st Bn, 9th Marines. A 28 year old squad leader with the C-1 Co of the R.20, he was armed with M-1 rifle and 112 rounds of ammunition. He said he rallied out of hunger and fear. He talked freely during interrogation and related the following: The R.20 Bn, strength 390, commanded by NGUYEN VAN LAM, armed with 4 81mm Mortars, 3 57mm RR, 6 60mm Mortars, 27 7.5 FR AR, 27 M-1, and 9 MAT-49 SMG, and other SA is deployed in 10-12 man groups from vicinity (AT 9753) to (BT 0255) in peoples houses.

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The Bn is composed of 3 Co's, the C-1, C-2, and C-3. The C-1 and C-3 are infantry Co's and the C-2 is Bn Headquarters. The rifle Co's have 3 platoons each. The C-2 consists of 2 rifle platoons, a Hqs platoon and weapons platoon (Mort/AR). The Bn has an independent 12 man engineer/suicide squad attached. Due to lack of food, medical supplies, heavy losses and fear of artillery, morale is low. Replacements come from other local forces, include the V.25 Bn. The Bn has 3 AN/PRC-10 radios and 3 field phones. Rest areas for the Bn are in the vicinity of KHANH VAN GIANG (AT 888533) and QUANG DAI (AT 910532). DINH VAN SA is Bn XO and HOAH is commander of C-1 Co.

(G-2 Cmt: F/3; Although subordinate unit designations and tone differs both from present OOB holdings and initial interrogation information, the information on unit activity is basically correct. Subject place the R.20 Bn within an acceptable time frame, and location of known USMC units. The present location is also confirmed by other reliable sources. He was also able to confirm in detail previous agent reports of R.20 activity).

3. 806th Bn. VCC, 1 July. VCC during operation JAY stated he was a member of the 806th Bn. The Bn had a unit of the 812th Bn attached. Subject further stated that the 812th has now been broken up and its personnel transferred into the 800th Bn, 802th Bn, and the 806th Bn. These Bn's now make up the 6th Regiment. The 812th no longer exists. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; this is the first report received regarding the disbanding of the 812th Bn. Previous reports received indicate some companies may have been disbanded (C-22 HUY weapons Co) and their personnel used as fillers for the 800 series Bn's).

4. 706th Co. QUANG TIN interrogation report of NGO VAN NGAN (9th IPT 26 June) indicated that he rallied at LY TIN District Headquarters and gave the following information: On or about 20 December 1965 he joined the 706 Company Headquarters training unit in TRUANG CUU 3 (BT 316137). Along with 25 others he was taught how to crawl, to travel at night, camouflage techniques and weapons training. On January 2 he joined the 706 Company and participated in an action on the night of 19 June 1966 at KHUANG NHAN 1 (BT 4309). The normal strength of the company is about 80-90 people; however, 30-40 were sick with malaria and couldn't participate in the 19 June action. Since January the company has lost 18 men. 6 have turned themselves in under the Chieu Hoi Program, and 12 have been killed by artillery fire. He further indicates that the morale of the unit is poor because there isn't enough to eat or enough medical supplies for the sick, which is usually between 5 and 30. The unit is armed with 1 M-60 MG, 2 M-14 rifles, 7 BAR's, 4 Carbines, 3 .45 Cal pistols, 2 Thompsons, 4 Sub-machine guns, 3 M-1's, 50 K-44, and 5 grenade launchers. The company is commanded by NGIA. The executive officer is THANH and the Political officer is QUANG, who is from NVN.

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ANNEX C. (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 23.

1. GENERAL. There has been no new developments in counterintelligence trends within the ICTZ during the reporting period. Reports continue to be received on the establishment of a VC espionage net operating within the DANANG TACR. The initial report of the introduction of "Chinese poison" into the DANANG area, could be used to contaminate the water and food supplies of U. S. Forces. However, there is no indication as to what quantities have been smuggled into this area. Reports of VC propaganda leaflets with anti-GVN and U. S. themes have been discovered in THUA THIEN Province. These materials have appeared generally near the city of HUE and are probably residual efforts of the now ousted struggle force in this area. Other propaganda lectures would indicate that the pacification program is a main target of the VC. Terrorism appears to have increased and incidents have been reported in all of the center three provinces. Some acts appear to be perpetrated against those individuals who have allegedly furnished information on VC activities to U. S. and GVN Forces.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE.

QUANG NAM: According to an agent report received 7 July, seven VC political cadre who previously operated in the HOA THAI and HOA DA areas have moved to BO BAN (H), OC (sub-hamlet), and CAY DUNG (H), HOA LANG (V), HIEU DUC (D), vicinity of (AT 9669). These seven, reportedly have GVN national identification cards which allow them freedom of movement and the opportunity to collect information on friendly troops in the YEN BAC (V), HOA THA (V) area (AT 9870). A report of 4 July furnished information that one VC Company has disguised themselves as a group of "boat-builders" and are presently operating along the CAU DO River.

A 5 July report from a confidential source, alleges that several strangers have been sighted in the vicinity of PHU LOC (H), HOA MINH (V), HOA VANG (D), (AT 968798), who may have the mission to collect information on the new Force Logistics Support Group Compound (FLSG) being constructed in this area. (CI Comment: Previous reports indicate that the VC are attempting to collect information on the new FLSG Compound and reportedly have an intelligence net of five members in this area).

A 7 July report furnished information that two VC cadre are operating in the vicinity of NAM THO (BT 0680). They are identified as MAI MAN (approximately 35 years old) and MAI MO (approximately 36 years old). Both work as fisherman and reportedly collect information on U. S. personnel and installations. The same report further relates that a number of Chinese poisons have been brought into the DANANG area for the purpose of infecting wells and foodstuffs used by U. S. troops. These poisons are described as small tablets, no other details available.

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A 7 July report furnished information and personalities on a suspected espionage net operating out of the TRUNG NGHIA (H), HOA MINH (V), (AT 975776). Reportedly the members of this net are utilizing the present struggle movements as a cover for their covert activities in the TRUNG NGHIA Hamlet area. According to the positions within this net, there appears to be a Propaganda Cell, Assassination Cell, and a Finance Section. (CI Comment: No further information was received on the intended operations of the net.

QUANG NGAI: On 25 June, between 1500 and 2100, a VC District level meeting was held in XAM THAI (sub-hamlet) (BS 518894) which was attended by 21 persons. The VC District President presided over the meetings, which discussed means:

a. To prevent any disclosure of information on VC movements, prevent farm products from entering into nationally controlled (GVN) hands, and restrict the movements of the local villages from frequenting the CHAU-O Market (BINH SON District).

b. Send only trusted persons into the market areas and instruct them to collect information on U. S. Allied operations.

c. To install "proper ideology so that they may clearly understand their mission and review and teach the Political lessons" to the informants (29-30 June).

d. Prepare a labor force to commence work on 2 July (purpose of the labor force was unreported).

3. PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSION:

QUANG NGAI: Interrogation reports from three captured VC reveals the following trends on VC propaganda and subversion. In XUAN TRUANG (V) DUG XUYEN (D), QUANG NAM (P), (BT 0734), there are 5-6 VC cadre in number 2 Hamlet whose mission is to conduct VC propaganda lectures and to organize each villager into one of the following organizations; the Old Men's Association, Women's Association, Farmers Association, and Youth Camp. The second captive gave propaganda lectures on five different occasions to the villages in TRA MY (V) (believed to be in the BS 02 94 area). He reportedly instructed the local populace to plant more rice, dig trenches and family shelters, and to collect arms and ammunition left by ARVN units. He also admonished local villages for speaking for and supporting the GVN. The last captive indicated that once each month the villagers and the VC guerrilla force in LOC THANH TAY (H), KY TAN (V), DIEM BAN (D), (BT 9459), are contacted by a VC propaganda cadre. They are told to produce more rice and to prepare for a large tax collection.

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THUA THIEN: A leaflet, allegedly circulated by the THUA THIEN National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLFSV), entitled "Orders to the Citizens" was discovered in the HUE area. The leaflet called for all citizens to remain at home, continue working and teaching and not to move or re-settle. It instructed that all vestiges, banners, etc. of the KY-THIEU and American Lackeys be destroyed and for the populace to discontinue to follow their (GVN/US) instructions, to discontinue providing food and materials to pro-GVN followers and to destroy the "New Life Hamlets". Further, that anyone disobeying these instructions would be punished, but those who chose to repent for their past activities and carry out the instructions of the NLFSV would be shown leniency.

On 1 July an ARVN Ranger Platoon Leader reported that the VC entered SAU LAI (H) (YD 972061) and distributed propaganda leaflets. On 2 July USMC patrol reported that 20 VC entered AN HONG (1) (H), (YD 9109) and AN NANG (2) (H), (YD 9209), and distributed anti-American and anti-GVN leaflets. The 4th Marines, on 3 July during a sweep of LOI NANG (H), (YD 8B19), discovered anti-US and anti-GVN leaflets throughout the area. Also on 3 July, 60 VC entered HUONG CAN (H), (YD 705276) and assembled the residents for propaganda lectures. On 6 July the village chief of NAM PHO CAN (V), (YD 9504) reported that approximately 20 VC entered his village and distributed propaganda leaflets. On 7 July approximately 20 VC entered the hamlets of PHU BAI (1), (YD 903121) and PHU BAI (2), (YD 915105) to pass out anti-US and anti-GVN propaganda and to collect rice and taxes.

4. TERRORISM

QUANG NAM: On 1 July, a district agent reported that approximately 40 VC are assembled in the vicinity of (AT 9768); their intentions are to kidnap RMK employees in this area, terrorize villagers and collect information on friendly units. A 3d Marines report of 8 July furnished information on VC intentions to organize assassination teams, armed with grenades - the supposed target, AP THUNG SON (H) (AT 915805). A 8 July Report from a Vietnamese official related that approximately 100-200 VC's entered the area of AP THANH VINH (AT 928796) and MIEU THACH SON (AT 928812) on 7 July. There they contained the villagers within the hamlets until 2000, 8 July and then drove the inhabitants from the hamlets.

QUANG TIN: A 6 July report related that three VC demolition team members assassinated the Hamlet Chief of DONG XUAN (2) and KY XUAN (5) Hamlets, (BT 486103). (QUANG TIN Sector confirms report). A 7 July report states that three VC are in the vicinity of (BT 500005) reportedly for the purpose of harassing, conducting espionage and sketching USMC positions in this area through 11 July.

On 8 July at 2000, two unidentified persons threw a satchel charge from the back of a 6X6 near a road block in the vicinity of (BT 534075). A CLDC sentry threw the charge into a nearby pond, where it exploded wounding the sentry. Also on 8 July a VN female was murdered by the VC in the vicinity of (BT 442019). According to the dead woman's daughter, seven VC entered her house and took her mother outside for interrogation.

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They accused the woman of aiding the Americans (not reported how) and then shot her seven times in the head. The VC then indicated that these tactics would continue as long as the villagers help the americans.

THUA THIEN: A 2 July report indicated that on 26 June an unknown number of VC entered VONG TRI (H) (ZD 083006) and kidnapped the Hamlet Chief. On 30 June approximately 30 VC entered AN NONG (H) (YD 918 097) to collect rice and taxes. They shot and killed one boy, age 17, and left a note indicating that the "Peoples Forces" judged the victim guilty of serving the DIEM and KY Governments. On 3 July another 30 VC entered TRUNG HIEU (H), (YD 982074) and assassinated three residents. On 6 July approximately ten VC entered the village at (YD 8117) and killed a 60 year old woman who allegedly had furnished information to the PF's on VC movements.

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PERINTREP No. 24

Period Covered: 100001H - 162400H July 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series L701, sheets (PHU BAI TAOR) 6460-1 II;
 6560 II, III, IV, (DANANG TAOR) 6559-1, II; 6588-I;
 6659 II, III, IV, 6658 I, IV; (CHU LAI TAOR) 6657 I;
 II; 6657 II, III, IV; 6756 I, II; 6656 I, scale 1:50,000

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. VC/NVA activity was again characterized by avoidance of large scale activity. Small scale harassing actions and missions continued at the usual tempo throughout the zone and four bridges were destroyed or damaged along Highway 1 in the II DTA.

(1) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. The presence of the 812th NVA Regt in QUANG TRI Province was confirmed during the period. There are indications of other major units of the 324th B Division newly infiltrated from North Vietnam as well. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to small scale.

(2) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the emphasis being placed in the southern portion of the TAOR.

(3) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. RF and PF units were attacked on 13 and 15 July by VC/NVA in company strength or less. An attack in company strength, supported by 60mm mortar and 57mm RR fire, was made on the positions of Co "M", 3d Bn, 7th Marines in the CHU LAI TAOR during the early morning hours of 15 July (see para 3.1.(6)).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents totaled 285 during the reporting period and consisted of 132 small unit engagements, 117 AA fires, 33 mine/booby traps, 2 propaganda and 1 attack.

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
 Declassified after 12-years.

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III MAF PERINTREP # 24

10-16 Jul 66

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- a. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- b. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. - e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

(1) 8 July. The following information was extracted from Det C-1, 5th USSF ISUM No. 21 and was obtained from the interrogation of VCC PHAM DUC. Subject indicated the VC have established the following categories for laborers:

(a) Class A: Males and females 18-30 years of age and able to perform hard labor. (Individuals are taken from the Farmer's Association and Youth Association). Individuals in this category will also be used to carry dead and wounded from the battlefield.

(b) Class B: Males and females in this group are between the ages of 30-45, able to cook and perform light labor around villages. Individuals are taken from the Farmers and Womens Association.

(c) Class C: Males and females 45 years of age or older able to haul materials short distances (individuals are taken from Old Peoples Association). The Farmers, Womens and Youth Associations have now been disbanded. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; First report of above mentioned disbanding).

(2) 2 July. QUANG NAM SMIAT agent report of VC Military Hospital. A VC military hospital was located on HUI (mountain) HON COC (AT 998462). This hospital was hidden under thick jungle canopy and consisted of two thatched structures, each with an approximate 50 bamboo bunk capacity. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 2 July. QUANG TIN SMIAT agent report of the VC 5th Inter-Region Headquarters and Secret Zone. The 5th VC Inter-Region Headquarters and a Secret Zone are located at NUI (mountain) KIM QUAN SON (river) TRANH in an area bounded by (AT 880100 - 880130 - 930100 - 930130): The Commanding General of this Headquarters is HOANG THAC and his deputy is General NGUYEN DON. The Secret Zone consists of its headquarters, an ammunition storage area, a rice storage area, a quartermaster storage area, and an agricultural production site. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

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(4) 10 July. Returnee VO BUI who defected at NGHIA HANH District stated the following information as to the location of a VC Training Center. A VC Training Center used for training squad and platoon leaders is located at (BS 669526). There are always 100 students in training at one time. CU and XI reportedly control the camp. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(5) 9 July, Returnee TO THE THIET, a PF who was captured by the VC on 21 June 64, escaped and reported to DUC PHO on 7 July 66 and volunteered the following information concerning the location of two Provincial VC Detention Camps. There is a detention camp at DI Village (BS 136600), where the VC are confining 185 prisoners in 18 thatched houses. In XA LO, (BS 195510) there is another Provincial Detention Camp named QUYET THANG where VC are detaining 50 prisoners in 2 thatched houses. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(6) 13 July, 9th ITT, NGUYEN XUAN LAN (civilian) who was captured by the VC in July 65 and released in January 66, reported the following information as to the location of a VC Reconstruction Camp. Subject stated he was captured by the VC because he was a corpsman for the government. He was subsequently taken to the Reconstruction Camp located to the southwest of NUI GOI mountains, in the vicinity of (BS 5062 - 5068 - 4568 - 4564). Center of camp believed to be (BS 480658). The camp is in the shape of a circle, about 500 meters in diameter, and consists of a rice and salt storage area, a 60 bed hospital and a prison camp. There was 20 guards and two instructors at the camp. HA THUONG (AKA TUNG) who trained in NVN, is reportedly working at the hospital. The camp was reportedly hit by air strikes in March 66, with one building destroyed being the only damage sustained. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Anti-aircraft fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 117. 25 aircraft were hit with a total of 36 plus, rounds. Intensity of fire ranged from light to intense. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9050 - YD 0005 - YD 0006). 10 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i. - r. Negative.

s. Infiltration

(1) 19 June. The following information was reported by a QUANG TIN SMIAT agent on the infiltration route of an unknown NVA Division.

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The division infiltrated into RVN from southern LAOS. It moved north and crossed Highway 14, and moved up the SONG (river) TRANH and through TRA MY area (local name) (BS 0298). It proceeded through the areas of DUONG YEN (BT 0801) and PHUONG XA DONG (BT 1600). The march from Highway 14 to TRA MY area took three days for lightly equipped troops and seven days for heavily equipped troops. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Casualties. 204 VC KIA and 11 VCC during the reporting period.

f. Morale. Interrogation of ralliers, VCC, etc. continues to indicate that the morale in some VC/NVA MF units is declining, though morale is still considered good in most LF and guerrilla units. Air strikes, lack of food and medical supplies coupled with heavy losses and fear of artillery were the reasons given in most cases.

g. New Enemy Defenses, Mines, Minefields, Fortifications, Obstacles, Barriers and booby Traps.

(1) VC Mining Procedures. Interrogation report ITT 9-7-66, QUANG NAM. NGUYEN GIOL, identified as being a member of area Military Proselyting Cadre, gave the following information. A group he was with is now in HOI VUC (H); they sometimes lay mines on the TOY LOAN (V) market road. The Viet Cong leave HOI VUC at dusk and make their way on foot to LA CHAU (H) in the vicinity of (AT 944685). They usually arrive at approximately 0300 and depart as soon as mines are emplaced. He indicated that the group will have more mines to emplace prior to 15 July 66. He also heard that a number of mines were emplaced in unknown quantity near a Marine position in the area of KHUONG MY (H). His group also has OP locations on the highground to the northwest of Hill 41.

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The VC at these OP locations watch Marine patrols using trails in the area. The trails used are later mined or booby trapped. The captive identified the types of mines used as CHICOM AT and AP mines and unexploded 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds, as well as CHICOM and U. S. grenades which are used as booby traps.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps during the reporting period consisted of partly cloudy to cloudy skies, thunder showers in the mountain regions during the early portion of the period and thunderstorm/thundershower activity in both the mountain regions and lowlands at the close of the period. Temperatures averaged 94° high and 77° low. Winds were mostly southeasterly at 5-10 knots. Visibility 10 miles.

k. Significant Agent, VCC/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Other Significant Information

(1) 2 July. Results of friendly airstrikes. QUANG NAM SMIAT agent report of 1 July 66, 32 VC were killed and 13 were wounded by an airstrike at (BT 069451). The VC had assembled there to prepare for a morale lifting dinner and meeting. Approximately 80% of the living quarters and storehouses were also damaged by the airstrike. At 0500 hours on 2 July, the remaining VC in the above area moved to AN THANH (1) Hamlet (BT 053454) and during the night of 2 July moved to an unknown area. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 23 June. QUANG TIN SMIAT agent report of VC Weapons Supply and Rice Storage Point. As of 23 June, a VC weapons supply and rice storage area was located at (AT 972138). Over 100 French MAS-36 rifles and carbines are kept at this location for issuance to district guerrilla units. The rice (36,000 kilos) located at the storage area is also used to supply district guerrillas. Civilians are used to guard the rice while two platoons of guerrillas guard the weapons. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 16 June. QUANG TIN SMIAT agent reported results of friendly airstrikes. The results of a friendly airstrike conducted on 23 March 66 in the areas of DANH SON (1) (BT 245078), DANH SON (2) (BT 253068) and at (BT 260093) resulted in the following: 21 VC Regulars were killed, 14 were seriously wounded, and 14 others slightly wounded, while an unknown number of weapons and 100 tons of unhusked rice destroyed, and 16 water buffalo belonging to the local VC Farmers Association were killed.

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On the 28th and the 29th of March 1966, other friendly airstrikes conducted at (BT 247032) and (BT 260030), in the area of NUI (mountain) KEH, killed 150 VC recruits in training and six female cooks. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(4) 18 June. QUANG TIN SMIAT agent report of a VC Rice Storage Area. A rice storage area with approximately 50,000 tons of unhusked rice has been established by the VC at (AT 968057). The area was placed off-limits to civilians. The area is protected by fences, booby-traps and a 100 man provincial Main Force company. (G-2 Cmt: F/2; Recent reports received from this area indicate a large VC logistics build-up in the SONG VANG Valley area. Several reports have also mentioned the use of elephants in this area).

(5) 23 June. QUANG TIN SMIAT agent report of a VC Light Ordnance Shop. A VC Ordnance Shop for repair of small arms was located in the vicinity of HON LOM and DA QUE mountains (local names) (BT 007 028). This shop, situated under thick jungle canopy, was a thatched structure 7X12 meters. 50 weapons repairmen and 15 wood-workers (specializing in carving rifle stocks and handles for stick grenades) are employed here. Equipment includes a torch for welding, a drilling machine and a filing machine. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(6) Attack on 3d Bn, 7th Marines position. 150200 - 150400H. 3d Bn, 7th Marines positions (BS 574923) were attacked by a VC force estimated to be one VC company. Attack started at 0200H with heavy 60mm mortar fire from all directions, exact location unknown. 57 RR and heavy small arms fire from (BS 577922), (BS 572915), (BS 573 923), (BS 569923) and (BS 573917) was also received. VC probed Marine positions from the west, but the main attack came from the southeast. There were at least two .30 cal machine guns and two AR's. Eight to ten VC entered the first platoons position and engaged in hand to hand combat. Fire was returned with artillery and small arms. VC broke contact at 0400H. 18 VC KIA.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No Change.

T. H. Fisher
T. H. FISHER

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|--------------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| COMUSMACV | 2 | CG 2D BDE, ROK MC | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 5 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG 3RD MARDIV | 15 | CO FLC | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV C | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 173RD ABN BDE | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CO, DET C-1,5th USSF | 2 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| COMNAVFORV REP DANANG | 1 | CICV | 1 |
| CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 | | |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 24

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HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | UNK | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-IMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 130 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9762 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9863 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8859 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA, KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|--|---|
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8734 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--|
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|----------|------|-----|---------|---|---------------------------------|
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 3411 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 3315 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAOR'S. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT A 3D REGT OF THE 620TH DIV MAY BE PRESENT IN THIS GENERAL AREA AND CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE PROBABILITY STATED ABOVE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VGC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 24.

1. 21st NVA Regt. 14 July, 9th IPT report. Further interrogation of captive MSgt VUONG VAN GAN, 21st NVA Regt cadre, revealed corrected location of units as follows: 21st Regt OP and 22nd Bn located northwest portion grid squares (AT 9531) and (AT 9532) in foot hill area. 11th Bn located in the vicinity of grid square (AT 9430) with battalion CP located southwest on side of hill 150. The probable location of the 33d Bn is a four hour walk northeast of grid square (AT 9531). The captive states he has never been there. The Regimental Command Group has three or four tunnels used for airstrike shelters. The captive stated individual ammunition issue is as follows: SMG-20 rounds; rifles-100 rounds; BAR's-300 rounds; 12.7mm and 12.8mm AA Guns have 1000 rounds packaged in 100 round containers. Each soldier has four grenades. Morale is believed low in the 21st because of so much movement and little meat to eat. Movement between QUANG NGAI and QUANG TIN Province took eight days of night movement, one battalion began movement each day for three days. Sufficient provisions were carried because there was no resupply during movement. During battle, the 21st Regiment generally impresses 200-250 coolie laborers for stretcher bearers. In reference to the training of suicide units, the captive further stated he believed a company will be trained and a squad will be utilized as needed.

2. 90th NVA REGT, 324TH B DIV. I Corps interrogation report 1726-66. NGUYEN THANH BINH gave this information concerning the 90th NVA Regt following his capture on 9 July in QUANG TRI Province (YD 065543). During September 1965 he joined the intelligence Co of the 90th NVA Regt. He received training at DO LUONG, NGHE AN Province. In December his unit moved to QUANG LUU, QUANG XUAN, QUANG HINH Province where training continued. On 1 June 1966 they crossed the BEN HAI River to infiltrate South Vietnam. His unit arrived in the CUA area in July and seven days later the subject was captured while on an observation mission.

The captive further indicated that the 90th NVA Regt was in CAM LO area. However, because his unit preceded the regiment he didn't know infiltration dates of areas occupied. The strength of his company was about 90 men and armament was SKS's and AK's in unknown quantity. The Company Commander was PHU, no assistant was assigned; the Political Officer was CAN.

3. 812th NVA REGT, 324TH B DIV. I Corps message 100825Z July. Rallier 2dLt MAI HOANG who identified himself as assistant company commander of the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 812th NVA Regt gave the following information during initial interrogation.

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The 812th NVA Regt (AKA THU BAN 812), the 803 NVA Regt (AKA CUU LONG 803) and the 90th NVA Regt (AKA SONG HONG 90) are part of the 324th B Div which is located in the forward mountain area of CAM LO, QUANG TRI Province. He claimed that the 324th B Div will attack in force to "Liberate" the QUANG TRI area. The objectives are CUA (YD 1053), CA LU (YD 0246), CAM LO (YD 1359), BA LONG (YD 1740), and DONG HA (YD 2461). Forces presently located in THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI will attack all reinforcing troops coming from THUA THIEN to QUANG TRI. He claims also that one division (unidentified) will attack from LAOS along Highway 9, and cover the corridor of Highway 9, to transport food and weapons from North to South Vietnam.

812TH NVA REGT, 324TH B DIV. 3d IPT Report of 13 July. Private TRAN SI LY gave this information following his capture by the ARVN 1st Division. He was conscripted in June 1965 along with about 50 others from the same area. He was assigned to the 5th Battalion of 812th NVA Regt which was composed of about 50% volunteers. The unit underwent basic training in NGHE AN Province where training emphasis was placed upon the rifle, compass, grenades and small unit tactics. Mockups of fortified positions were used for day and night offensive tactics; political training lasted about one month. The training cycle lasted until March 1966, when the battalion began the trip to South Vietnam. The other battalions of the regiment were designated the 4th and 6th.

During March the entire 5th Bn and possibly the 4th and 6th moved towards South Vietnam on foot. Travel was done only at night. No artillery or aircraft fire was received during the march. About 10 men sickened from malaria and they recovered in from 10-12 days. The troops never knew where they were going until the trip, which took almost three months, was almost completed. The 5th Bn arrived in an area called DON CUO. Three days later the prisoner participated in a reinforced platoon ambush where he was wounded in the right leg by artillery fire and captured.

The prisoner also indicated that the 5th Bn has a strength of about 400 men. The 1st Company, of which he was a member, had three platoons, of three squads of nine men each, for a total company strength of about 100 men. His squad was equipped with two SK's, four K-44, two SMG's and one BAR. The support Co of the battalion was armed with two light MG's, two DK's and two 81mm mortars. The Regimental Commander is LtCol NGUYEN HE, the Battalion Commander is Capt NGUYEN VAN PHONG, the Company Commander, 1st Co, is Lt NGUYEN XUAN HOA.

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4. Co. 14. 9th ITT Report 3 July 1966. NGUYEN QUANG VINH joined Co-14 (AKA V-14) on 7 November 1965 at HAMLET 9, KY TRA (V) vicinity (BT 322 127). The captive received training for two months at KY TRA (V), Hamlet 9.

He received training in marksmanship with CHICOM red rifle at ranges of 100 and 300 meters. The captive stated that they dry fired at bamboo targets. He also received close combat training which consisted of three bayonet movements, a jab, and a parry like movement both left and right. The captive received training in the throwing of grenades (CHICOM potatoe masher type). There were two types that V-14 trained with. One is larger than the other and this is the one that is most popular with the troops due to accuracy. CONG, the NVN Company Commander of V-14, gave all instruction. Two other men joined with the captive. Both were killed by the Americans when the subject was captured.

The captive has been on two operations. The first at PHU KHE (H), KY HUONG (V) (coordinates unknown) against RF/PF troops. The fire fight lasted only 20 minutes. V-14 fired 10 rounds of 60mm mortar and used one machine gun and nine BAR's in the operation. V-14 had no casualties.

The second operation was at MY SON (H), KY SANH (V) (BT 361034) against RF/PF troops. The V-14 used 10 rounds of 60mm mortars, one machine gun and nine BAR's. This battle was in March of 1966. V-14 captured one BAR and one carbine and again sustained no casualties. The Company Commander said that in this battle they had killed 100 RF/PF.

Before the above two engagements each man was given a pack with a change of clothes, 30 rounds of ammunition, a poem and song book of NLF and a khaki hat. After the operation they were given an extra ration of food as a reward; two and one-half cans of rice is a daily ration. The captive stated the following are AKA's for units he knows of:

V-14=Co 14

V-18 AKA Independent Company=Co 75

V-75=Co 76

About February the 21st Regiment passed through Hamlet 9, KY TRA (V). At first they said they were from the NAM HAI TRUONG SON Regiment, later they said they were from the 21st NVA Regt. The captive stated the area of the 21st Regt is LIEN KHU 5, Central VN or Zone 5.

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5. KQ-616 SNIPER CO. III MAF INTSUM 192. NGUYEN VAN SINH Aspirant, Platoon leader indicated the following: The KQ-616 Sniper Co trained for a period of three months prior to infiltration into RVN. The first two months were devoted to firing with a standard rifle, and the last month training with the telescope. Six hours per day were devoted to dry firing. Trainees were allowed to fire only three rounds of live ammunition every five days. They practiced at ranges up to 1000 yards. Extensive training was also received in camouflage and movement. Firing at moving targets was confined to large targets such as trucks. One sniper platoon supports approximately four battalions. SINH stated that the morale of members of his unit was very high while they were undergoing training, Except for leaders, all members of his unit were volunteers. They possessed a great deal of spirit and enjoyed being considered elite. No mention was made of morale after infiltration. Members of the KQ-616 Sniper Co volunteered because by doing so their families received extra rice and farm land in NVN. Returnee stated that no significant problems were encountered with either the rifle or the telescope. He stated that his telescope never became fogged. He further stated that a primary mission of the company was to kill Americans although his platoon had not killed any Americans to date, it was reported to him that the platoon in THUA THIEN has killed eight U. S. Marines.

6. 706TH CO. 9th ITT Report 5 July 1966. NGUYEN TRUONG joined the C-215 Co in June 1965 in KY THINH (V), TAM KY (D) for training. This training consisted of firing the MAS-36 and the K-44, and throwing grenades for one week and three weeks of guerrilla warfare. The defector thought that the quality of training received with this unit was poor compared to the training he received while in the ARVN from February 1962 until February 1965. He also stated that he was forced to join the VC.

At about the middle of July 1965, the defector was transferred to the 706th Co in KY TRA (V). The 706th Co fought in three battles since the defector joined; in August 1965, March 1966, and 19 June 1966; the latter attack being against the Americans at KHUONG NHON 1 (H), KY KHUONG (V) (BT 4309). The defector, however, did not participate in the battle on 19 June 1966 because he and some 30 other were sick with malaria in THANH HOA 4 (H), KY TRA (V) (BT 310123). On or about 30 June 1966, while the 706th Co was in THANH HOA 4 (H), they were hit by bombs, so they fled to XUAN NGOC 2 (H) (AKA XUAN VINH) (BT 3911).

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At XUAN NGOC 2 (H) captive said they were also hit by air strikes, so on or about 3 July 1966 he deserted and went to a PF outpost near the KY CHANH market. The defector does not know of any future plans or future missions of the 706th Co.

The strength of the 706th Co is approximately 80 men. The mission of the 706th Co is to attack and destroy government and American outposts in TAM KY (D) (AKA TAM KY I) and LY TIN (D) (AKA TAM KY II).

The weapons of the 706th Co are as follows: one 60mm mortar, one .30 cal machine gun, six grenade launchers, seven BAR's, four Thompsons, four carbines, 22 K-44's, two M-14's, four M-1's, five sub-machine guns, and three pistols. The 706th Co held meetings before battle at which time the political advisors said that the VC always win and government forces and Americans always lose. They also said that the men should fight for their families and their country. However, the captive stated he knows these are lies because the defector had fought for the ARVN for three years.

The defector named the following personalities in the 706th Co: LE KHAC NGIA, Company Commander and THANH, Executive Officer. (G-2 Cmt: Statements about TO&E and personalities of the 706th Company, seem to substantiate statements made by rallier NGO VAN NGAN. (Refer to para 4. of Annex B. to III MAF PERINTREP No. 24)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO.24

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period there appeared to be a general increase in VC espionage activities. Reports indicate that the espionage effort is centered in the QUANG NAM Province area. Espionage indoctrination classes are being conducted in several areas in QUANG NAM and the use of female agents is again being stressed by the VC. There are indications that some types of poison may be available to the VC and they may attempt to introduce it into areas frequented by the Allied servicemen. The VC have also begun to circulate counterfeit 200\$VN piaster notes, probably pointing toward economic sabotage. Whether the VC have sufficient quantities of these counterfeit notes to effectively undermine the local economy is not known. Propaganda activities still remain centered in the THUA THIEN Province area, especially near HUE/PHU BAI. Interrogations of captives point to VC scheduling of periodic propaganda lectures in some hamlets and villages. Terrorism appears to have subsided somewhat, however, reports of incidents were received from four provinces during the period.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE.

QUANG NAM: The Headquarters, VC QUANG NAM LIBERATION FRONT COMMITTEE - DANANG, was located, as of 28 May 1966, in PHUOC CHAU Sub-district (AT 955123), HOU DUC District. The Committee Headquarters consists of over 40 political and military personnel, who are shifted periodically and often replaced by new cadre. This Headquarters communicates with and reportedly directs the activities of the subordinate organizations (district and sub-district committees) in QUANG NAM Province.

A 6 July report furnishes information that a "ten" man VC Main Force Company was located in LONG CHAU, Hamlet (BT 104549). This unit previously had a strength of 120 men. The mission of this unit is to operate in the area of the CAU LAU Bridge (BT 094548) (recently destroyed by the VC), and attack government convoys crossing by ferry and/or abduct military personnel and civil servants traveling in that area. The VC would be disguised as ARVN soldiers. (CI Cmt: This is the second report of possible VC units operating in this area).

A 9 July report indicates that 18 VC cadre were hiding in "Family Group #14", HOA PHU Hamlet, HOA MINH Village, HOA VANG District. These cadres were collecting taxes for a "Troop Fund", spreading anti-US propaganda, planning to assassinate RVN Government officials, and calling for the villagers to listen to the clandestine VC radio.

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The VC reportedly have organized an English class at THANH PHONG Village, DIEN BAN District, for female cadres. Upon completion of their training, these women will be sent to areas where US troops are deployed to collect information. They will seek positions such as prostitutes or salesgirls. Additionally, the VC are supplying some girls with small vials of poison; should the opportunity present itself, they will attempt to poison U.S. personnel. (CI Cmt: Reports received from ARVN sources indicates the VC have organized a course to teach techniques of poisoning. Participating elements are cadre youths legally living within Allied forces areas. Reports state that poison has been distributed in HOA HAI Hamlet, HOA VANG District, in a container described as a round tube ten centimeters long, one centimeter in diameter. Tubes are both yellow and white with black lettered words. When placed in water the poison has an effervescent effect and a "good" smell will be noticed. If drunk, fatalities could result. (CI Cmt: Previous reports indicated that Chinese poisons may have been brought into NAM THO area (BT 0608)).

A 9 July report furnished information that the VC SON TINH District Committee has sub-divided SON TINH into three area (or sub-districts). The VC are reportedly reorganizing the autonomous agencies of the villages for the purpose of introducing VC agents who would represent sub-districts in the forthcoming September elections. On 2 September a meeting is tentatively scheduled at which time VC actions to disrupt the September elections will be discussed. (CI Cmt: This is the first report of VC interest in the RVN elections, however, this appears to be logical step for the VC and attempts to influence the elections in this area are expected).

A captured document, dated 11 July, reveals information on a VC training course being conducted in VAN LY Hamlet, KY TAN Village, DIEN BAN District. The subjects taught are military proselytism, assassination of U. S. troops, and information collection. Women will be used as vendors to approach U. S. troops to collect information on unit strengths and weapons. Assassination and propaganda teams are reportedly supported by a VC Main Force battalion in the QUANG NAM Province area.

On 12 July another report of VC attempts to collect information in the area of the new FLSG Compound were received. Three suspect VC were observed with "map making equipment" in the vicinity of Red Beach (AT 947805). (CI Cmt: Several reports have been received of possible VC intelligence agents operating in this area).

An unconfirmed report received on 15 July, indicated that the VC are planning to sabotage the pier adjacent to the "White Elephant" (Headquarters of the U.S. Naval Support Activities, #52 BACH DANANG Street, DANANG).

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Reportedly this attempt would be a surprise attack by a "Suicide" VC cadre piloting a boat camouflaged as a fishing junk. This junk would carry 200 kg of TNT and would be crashed into the pier. (CI Cmt: No further reports have been received on this attempt)..

QUANG NGAI: The VC QUANG NGAI PROVINCE COMMITTEE has begun to circulate a number of counterfeit notes. These are reportedly in 200\$VN (piaster) denominations which have just been printed. The VC SON TINH Trading Branch (NFI) has issued the piasters to purchase rice, fish-sauce, salt, cloth, nylon, parachute cloth, parachute string and office equipment. The purpose is an attempt to corner the GVN economy and to decrease the value of the present GVN piaster. One characteristic of this counterfeit currency is that it has no cover stamp. The Committee is also issuing several "Resistance Bonds", valued from 100 to 10,000 piasters. The Bonds are sold to the Vietnamese in VC controlled areas where those villagers can be propagandized into purchasing them. (SA I Corps Cmt: This is the second report concerning counterfeit piasters but is not confirmation. The information relative to the VC use of "Resistance Bonds" has been reported many times; however, the result is not fully recorded).

3. PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSION

QUANG NAM: On 13 July, U. S. Marine units operating in the vicinity of (BF 0555) discovered numerous propaganda signs with the theme "America for Americans, Vietnam for Vietnamese". Several of these signs urged U. S. servicemen to defect and return to their homes.

A captured VCS, interrogated on 13 July, furnished information that the Autonomous Chairman of TU CAU Hamlet, THANH THUY Village, DIEN BAN District, has conducted propaganda classes and informed the villagers that "the Americans are in Vietnam to take control of the country, and that they will kill anyone who gets in their way". Another captive of LOC PHUOC Village, DAI LOC District related that the villages are required to attend propaganda meetings three times a month, usually held on the 10th, 20th and 30th. A third captive, interrogated on 15 July, relates that the inhabitants of AN HOI Village, HIEU NHON District, are forced to attend propaganda meetings once a month.

QUANG NGAI: On 13 July a member of the VC Farmers Association, MINH TAN (4) Hamlet, DUC LUONG Village, MO DUC District (RS 762570), was interrogated and furnished the following information on propaganda meetings. Reportedly these meetings are held at irregular intervals, sometimes once every three to five days. The people are instructed that they must support the VC by contributing rice and money and that the young people should join the VC Main Force.

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QUANG TIN: On 6 July, six VC entered the hamlets of KHUONG PHU (BT 441118) and KHUONG DAI (BT 452113), and expounded the following propaganda: "Youths should dodge the draft, draftees are mercenaries who fight for the American Imperialists: -

- sooner or later the Americans will withdraw from Vietnam - Vietnam will settle her disputes by herself and will be unified".

QUANG TRI: On 10 July, 100 VC entered LANG TA KUT (XD 740360) and held a propaganda rally and distributed leaflets. Villagers were told that a 15,000 man VC force is now positioned along the SE PONE River to render destruction in that area.

THUA THIEN: On 5 July approximately one platoon of VC entered AN NINH THUONG (YD 718218) and circulated a number of propaganda leaflets (themes unreported). On 10 July an unknown number of VC entered AN DUONG Hamlet (YD 783307) and circulated propaganda leaflets printed in English. (CI Cmt: Previous reports indicate that VC propaganda units will enter villages where U. S. units are operating, or expected to operate, and distribute English language propaganda).

On 11 July, propaganda leaflets, prepared by the SOUTH LIBERTY FRONT of QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN, were discovered by units of the 1st ARVN Division. The leaflets, 4 inches by 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, are directed toward the "Soldiers and Officers of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Regiments of the VNI - The traitors sent by THIEU and KY have entered the city of HUE - They fire at the people and anti-Government troops - They destroy temples, pagodas and oppress the monks and nuns - - - - We must not let the enemy terrorize our people and destroy our religion - We must not let them tread on this city, which is the center of the anti-American and anti-THIEU/KY movement - - - - The anti-THIEU and KY Troops must unite - - - - distribute weapons to the youths and keep the unity with the HUE STRUGGLE FORCE - - - -". (CI Cmt: Past reports have mentioned anti-RVN and anti-U.S. leaflets appearing in this area. The above propaganda appears to have been originated by the VC, but the SOUTH LIBERTY FRONT is unidentified, but may be synonymous with the NFLSV). Another English language leaflet discovered in the vicinity of (YD 398453), was addressed to the "American Serviceman" and states "Don't fire at and spray into our peoples air and cannon shelters - Don't destroy crops, kill domestic animals and plunder our peoples property - repression, terrorism, massacre, house burning, women raping - - - - are not the democratic Americans ideals - Stop spraying noxious chemicals in South Vietnam - Stop the war of aggression in South Vietnam! - Bloods of American and Vietnam Youths have been shed too much - Peace in South Vietnam and repatriation of all US Troops! " (CI Cmt: Previous reports have been received of English language leaflets being distributed degrading the U.S. Serviceman in immoral acts against the Vietnamese).

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A VC propaganda leaflet discovered in the vicinity of (YD 398453) entitled "Three South Vietnamese Puppet Government Officers captured in the KHE TRE Fight were Released". The leaflet continues to name the officers and their units and indicates that - "After they had been released they expressed gratefulness at the tolerance of the SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION FRONT and hatred toward the American Imperialists and their henchmen who have been bringing them into the path of crime, death and betraying the people and the country".

4. TERRORISM

QUANG NAM: On 9 July, an unreported number of VC apprehended one ARVN soldier from a civilian bus in the vicinity of (BT 049 604) and later killed him.

QUANG NGAI: On 11 July an unreported number of VC raided HUNG NHCN BAC Hamlet (BS 725715) and kidnapped a civilian. (CI Cmt: The identity of the individual kidnapped was not reported).

QUANG TIN: On 9 July, an unreported number of VC raided and assassinated a hamlet chief in the vicinity of (BT 484115) (possibly the hamlet of DONG XUAN).

THUA THIEN: On 5 July, an unreported number of VC entered DONG TAM (YD 835174) and assassinated one female resident. On 10 July, ten VC entered the village of SU LO (YD 832238) and destroyed the home of a Catholic Priest and burned two houses in the market area (YD 833236).

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 III MAP
 DANANG, RVN
 260800H, July 66
 Ser: 090666

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PERINTREP No. 25

Period Covered: 170001H - 232400H July 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - VIETNAM 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,
 NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND-49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the 11th DTA was characterized by an increase in large scale activity. Small scale harassing actions and missions were higher than usual and three bridges were destroyed along Highway 1 and the railroad north of DANANG.

(a) QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN-PHU BAI TAOR. Several contacts of multi-battalion size took place in Operation HASTINGS area with heavy loss to NVA units involved (See Para. 3. 1.(6)). During the operation prisoners were taken from the 812th Regt, 803d Regt, and 90th Regt, all NVA. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to small scale, isolated incidents.

(b) QUANG NAM-DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the emphasis being placed in the southern portion of the TAOR and Operation MACON area.

(c) QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI-CHU LAI TAOR. QUANG NGAI air field, two villages east of the airfield, and ARVN units operating in QUANG NGAI were subject to mortar and small unit attack during the period.

2. Enemy Operations During the Period. VC incidents for the reporting period consisted of 153 small unit engagements, 114 AA fires, 28 mine/booby trap, two hamlet harassments, two propaganda, one attack and one ambush, for a total of 301.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A

d. Negative

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years

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III MAP PERINTREP # 25

17-23 JUL 66

CONFIDENTIALf. Admin Units.

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(1) 9 July. TAM KY APA report of VC Hospital. The VC have a hospital and cave located in the vicinity of (BT 211,224). (G-2 CMT:F/6)

(2) 6 July. QUANG NGAI SMIAT agent report of VC School. A VC school is reportedly located at CA TINH (BS 293825). The school consists of two buildings, each five by sixty meters. Approximately 50 Montagnard children (ages 10-15) attend the school. Reportedly the VC also use the school for briefings. (G-2 CMT:F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 114. 19 aircraft were hit with a total of 32 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were (YD 0060-YD 9050-BS 3010). Intensity of fire was moderate. 23 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i.-j. Negativek. Artillery/Heavy Mortars.

(1) 20 July. DUC DUC District Headquarters report of 120 mortars. Two NVA Battalions are located in the vicinity (AT 825455). These Battalions are reportedly armed with an unknown quantity of 120 mm mortars. (G-2 CMT: F/3 as to units, third report of two Battalions in this area; F/6 as to 120mm mortars).

l.-s. Negative.3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Casualties. VC/NVA casualties for the reporting period consisted of 493 KBGF and 100 KBMA, for a total of 593; there were nine VCC and seven NVAC.

f. Morale. No change.

g. Negative.

h. Negative.

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i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Weather in I CORPS area consisted of partly cloudy skies and light rainshower activity during the reporting period. Temperatures ranged from an average 90 degrees high to 70 degrees low. Winds were mostly variable throughout at four to five knots. Visibility 7-12 miles.

k. Significant Agent, VCC/Returnee, Document Report. Annex B.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 9 July. TAM KY APA report of a Rice Storage Area. A VC rice depot is located in the vicinity of (BT 208235) with approximately 2400 kilos of rice. (G-2 CMT: F/6).

(2) 6 July. QUANG NGAI SMIAT agent report of a VC Weapons Repair Camp. There is a VC weapons repair camp located at (BS 463836). Trenches in the area are used to store weapons. (G-2 CMT: F/6).

(3) 9 July. QUANG NGAI agent report of a VC Storage Area. The VC recently established a storage area at TUAN HOA (BS 481457). A barn-like structure containing four rooms, each three by nine meters reportedly house the supplies. Periodically, laborers carry rice, salt and corn to the barn. A guerrilla platoon acts as security for the area. (G-2 CMT: F/6).

(4) 4 July. North DMZ agent reported results of Air Strikes. The air strikes conducted at PHUOC SON (YD 103767) and BEN THAN (YD 110766) on 1 July killed approximately 50 people, most of whom were new recruits. (G-2 CMT: F/5; A check of records held by this headquarters revealed no U.S. air strikes were made in this area on 30 June, 1 July or 2 July. This could possibly be an example of VC "plant" information).

(5) 18 July. HAU DUC District Recon agent report of four VC Camps. Four VC camps, three of which are used as treatment stations and the other as a medical storage depot, are located at (AT 973178), (AT 972170), (AT 988170) and (AT 986178). 150 VC wounded are being treated here. A rice storage depot was also reported to be located at (AT 976171). (G-2 CMT: F/6).

(6) Attack on 3d Bn 4th Marines. 3d Mar Div COC msg 190542Z. During Operation HASTINGS at about 1745 on 18 July, as the 3d Bn, 4th Marines withdrew from an area of operations in column, the battalion was hit by incoming mortar fire and the column became separated in several places. Two platoons of Co "K", serving as the rear guard of the battalion, were attacked in the area of the recently vacated

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battalion CP site by NVA units with an estimated strength of 1,000 men. The NVA assaulted the vacated position from four separate avenues of approach, using bugles and arm and hand signals for control. The NVA sustained heavy casualties from the two Co "K" platoons with a total of about 65 Marines. Artillery fires and air strikes were directed upon the attacking NVA as they became bunched. Napalm is reported to have been particularly effective against the NVA as the two platoons of Co "K" fought their way out of the position and were joined by Co "L", 3d Bn. The VC, who were dressed in green and khaki uniforms and wore helmets, sustained 138 KIA (confirmed) and 362 probable.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.
5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No Change.

F. H. FISHER
F. H. FISHER

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, VCC/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|--------------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| COMUSMACV | 2 | CG 2D BDE, ROK MC | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG I FORCEV | 2 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 5 |
| CG II FORCEV | 1 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG 3D MARDIV | 15 | CO FLC | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV C | 1 | CG 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN | 1 | CO 1ST MF BN | 1 |
| CG 173RD ABN BDE | 1 | CG CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CO, DET C-1, 5TH USSF | 2 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| COMNAVFORV REP DANANG | 1 | CICV | 1 |
| CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 | | |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 25

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HUE/PHU BAI

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | UNK | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-IMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. DANANG

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 130 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9762 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9863 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8859 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA, KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK. <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u> |

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|--|---|
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8734 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--|
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|----------|------|-----|---------|--|---------------------------------|
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 3411 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 3315 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR. | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAOR'S. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT A 3D REGT OF THE 620TH DIV MAY BE PRESENT IN THIS GENERAL AREA AND CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE PROBABILITY STATED ABOVE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT)
 PERINTREP NO. 25

1. 90Regt NVA 324th B Div. III MAF INTSUM 202. The initial interrogation of PHAM VAN VIET, captured during Operation HASTINGS in QUANG TRI Province (YD 022611) on 20 July, disclosed the following information. The NVA captive stated that he was from the 12th Feeding Unit (or Squad) of the 3d Co, 9th Bn, 90th Regt NVA, 324th B Div. Four days prior to his capture the feeding unit was moved to (YD 085631) so that cooking fires would not give away the battalion position. The battalion infiltrated one month ago, traveling as a unit at night time. The battalion crossed the BEN HAI River at an unknown location. However, the subject remembered being in the vicinity of HUO CON THIEN (YD 116201). The battalion was deployed along KHE CHAU stream near (YD 0950) with the mission of attacking or ambushing helicopter borne units in the KHE CHAU area. The morale of the battalion was low due to lack of military experience and fear.

The CO of the 3d Co is THANG, the assistant CO is NGUYEN CHI CUONG. The CO of the 9th Bn is HUNG and his assistant is HOAN. The battalion strength is approximately 400-500 men. The feeding unit is composed of eight men with one unit assigned to each company. The battalion has a four day supply of dry food and a food cache at CU DINH (YD 038641).

2. 803d Regt NVA 324th B Div. III MAF INTSUM 202. Initial interrogation of LE THANH TRI captured during Operation HASTINGS in QUANG TRI Province (YD 029616) on 20 July revealed the following information. The NVA Captive stated he was a member of the C14, 12.7 AA MG Co that was attached to the CU LONG Regt (AKA 803d Regt NVA). He last saw his company on 17 July when he and 14 other sick men were left in the vicinity of (YD 029616). He claims the company was moved to a suspected landing zone near the BEN HAI River. The captive stated that from 17 June until 17 July the C.14 Co was located within a two kilometer radius of (YD 029616) and that for two weeks preceding 17 July the Company was in the vicinity of (YD 021616). He also indicated that if the company was dug in on one hill and an adjacent hill was bombed or hit by artillery, after the fire ceased they would move immediately to that hill. If the hills around them were receiving fire, after the firing ceased the company would immediately move one or two kilometers away.

The captive was drafted into the NVA in February 1966. He spent one month at basic training and two months at anti-aircraft training. Infiltration was initiated on 15 June. While his company was infiltrating two infantry companies overtook his unit on the south side of the BEN HAI River.

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The 14B, 14.5 AA Co was seen with seven guns set up.

The subject heard that the CUU LONG Regt had two infantry units, one 12.7 AA Co and one 14.5 AA Co while one infantry unit remained in North Vietnam as a transport unit. The CO of the C.14 Co is Lt CHUONG and the political officer is CAM. The strength of the Company is 140 men; the company is armed with six 12.7 AA MG.

3. 21st Regt NVA. Special ITF report dated 14 July. Continued interrogation of NVA captive MSgt VUONG VAN GAN revealed the following detailed information. The captive went to North Vietnam and joined the 210th Regiment, re-entered South Vietnam in April of 1961 with "VU TRANG TUYEN TRUYEN" Battalion. There were three companies in this battalion. Upon entering South Vietnam the three companies were split up, with one company going to QUANG NAM (P), one company to QUANG NGAI (P), and one company to PHU YEN (P).

The captive joined the 1st Regt NVA in July of 1963 and remained with that unit until September of 1965. In September of 1965 the captive left the 1st Regt NVA to attend a school in AN LAO (D), BINH DINH (P) where he studied politics and how to politically indoctrinate coolie laborers. In late December 1965 the captive graduated from that school and left BINH DINH (P) to join the 21st Regt on or about 10 February 1966. The captive was in the Regimental Headquarters Group of the 21st Regt until on or about 10 July 1966, when he went on leave. His leave was to have expired on or about 17 July 1966.

The captive stated that the 21st Regt moves only on 2nd Div NVA orders unless they have men captured or deserters, in which case they move to avoid detection. Presently the 21st Regt is undergoing training in politics. The training day is six hours long, and the captive stated he did not know when this training would end.

The captive stated that, aside from the present mission of political training, the 21st Regt NVA will in the near future, organize a suicide type unit that will be approximately company size. This unit will be organic to the Headquarters Group of the 21st Regt and will be utilized as necessary, i.e., in case one squad is needed they will be detached and the rest of the company will remain with the Regimental Command Group; this would apply also to a platoon size unit from the "Suicide Company".

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The captive has participated in two battles since joining the 21st Regt on or about 10 February 1966. The first battle, the captive stated, was against a joint American and ARVN Force. This battle took place in March of 1966 in the SON CHAU area in QUANG NGAI (P). The captive stated that in this battle the 21st lost a lot of weapons. The captive stated he did not know the exact number of KIA's but they greatly exceeded the number of WIA's which was over 70. Most casualties were a result of air and artillery strikes. The wounded were carried to a temporary hospital in the jungle (location unknown). There was a recoilless rifle company known as DK-15 involved in this battle. The second battle was in April of 1966 against an ARVN Force that the captive believed to be the 3d Bn, 5th Regt, of an unknown ARVN Div. The captive stated he did not know the number of KIA's but there were almost 80 WIA's. Most of the casualties were as a result of napalm. This battle was at TU NGHIA (D). QUANG NGAI (P).

The captive joined the 21st Regt on 10 February 1966 in TAN AN (V), SON TIN (D), QUANG NGAI (P) where they remained until the battle of TU NGHIA (D). After the battle the 21st moved to PHUOC CAM (V), TIEN PHUC (D), QUANG TIN, where they stayed for 10 days in May of 1966. From there they moved to KY PHUOC (V), TAM KY (D), QUANG TIN (P) where they remained for 20 days in the month of June 1966. From KY PHUOC (V) the 21st Regt moved back to PHUOC CAM (V), TIEN MUOC (D) QUANG TIN (P) for a period of about 10 days. After this 10 day period of rest, the 21st moved to it's present location and arrived on or about 7 July 1966. The captive stated that movement in the 21st Regt is generally made by battalions. They move the entire regiment in three days, i.e., 11th Battalion leaves on Monday, 22nd Battalion on Tuesday and the 33d on Wednesday. The movement from QUANG NGAI (P) to QUANG TIN took eight days. The movement from QUANG TIN (P) to QUANG NAM (P) took two days. All movement is made at night.

When asked about supplies and ammunition the captive stated the following: Food is bought from the local populace. When the regiment moves they take enough food to last the duration of the movement so that they don't have to be re-supplied. Medicine and ammunition are brought from NVN through LAOS (point of entry into SNV unknown). The captive stated there are no ammunition dumps in the 21st Regt area and that he believed ammunition was obtained from 2nd Div NVA when needed.

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Morale in the 21st Regt is low, the captive stated, for the following reasons; there is not enough food; there is plenty of salt and rice, but no meat; and the only variation in diet they get is when they can individually buy a spinach like vegetable common to SVN. Most of the troops are complaining about moving all the time and never being in one place long enough to rest properly. When asked why he didn't defect if things were that bad the captive stated that in his billet he did not rate a weapon and that he thought he had to have a weapon to defect (OIC of SF A Team 102 stated that he had heard this from more than one captive). The captive stated that battalions of the 21st Regt are composed of the following companies: An Anti-Aircraft Company is composed of three platoons. Each platoon has three of either 12.7 or 12.8 MM Anti-Aircraft Guns for a total of nine Anti-Aircraft weapons of either Browning or MAS make. Three infantry companies composed of three 34 to 36 man platoons each. Battalion Headquarters Group (see below) Ammunition allocation for the men of the infantry battalions is as follows:

| | |
|------------------|------------|
| Sub-machine guns | 200 rounds |
| Rifles | 100 rounds |
| Machine guns | 500 rounds |
| BAR's | 300 rounds |

Each man carries 4 grenades

The 12.7 and 12.8 mm Anti-Aircraft Guns have 1,000 rounds of ammunition packaged in round boxes.

The Headquarters Group of the 21st Regt NVA is organized as follows:

| | |
|---------------------|----------------|
| COMMANDING OFFICER: | LtCol MINH NVN |
| EXECUTIVE OFFICER: | Major TU NVN |
| POLITICAL CADRES: | LtCol TIEN NVN |

STAFF SECTIONS

Plans

1stLt HOE NVN
and two officers

Operations

1stLt VU VN
and unknown officers

POLITICAL SECTION:

Capt THIEN NVN

COMMUNICATION SECTION

1stLt HOI CVN

MEDICAL SECTION:

Dr. NGO - higher than 1stLt, lower than Captain, NVN
Two Aspirant Doctors both NVN
12 Nurses (seven male, five female) trained in NVN

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CONFIDENTIALSUPPLY SECTION

Capt HIEU NVN
 WO LUONG NVN
 WO TUYEN NVN
 WO GANG NVN
 and 12 enlisted men

CONFIDENTIALWEAPONS SECTION

1stLt TUNG NVN
 and nine enlisted men.
 Weapons section comes
 under supply, and repairs
 weapons and issues
 ammunition.

Replacements for casualties usually come from village guerrillas, although they occasionally recruit District Force guerrillas.

The captive's job was to impress coolie laborers before a battle to carry wounded, but not dead. Captives are given a list of all eligible "B" laborers from District; they then go to the VC Village chief and get the men they need. The usual number of coolie laborers to carry wounded is 200 to 250 and they serve for a one month period.

The captive further stated that the 31st Regt is also in QUE SON (D), QUANG NAM (P) (location unknown) and that the code name of the 21st Regt NVA is "AN LONG".

INTERROGATORS COMMENTS:

This 44 year old captive was in very good physical condition, very alert and appeared to be of above average intelligence. He gave information freely and when asked the reason for this he stated he had fought too long and was tired of hiding in the jungle and constantly moving.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 25

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period there were no new developments in counterintelligence trends. Espionage continues to be employed by the VC, especially utilizing the low level agent. Sabotage remains a capability of the VC and some reports point to efforts by the VC to increase this capability. It appears however, that presently the VC will continue to use the untrained, low level, saboteur to harass, rather than target major installations. Propaganda remains centered in the THUA THIEN Province area. Both lectures and the distribution of leaflets continues in that area. There was no marked increase in terrorism during the reporting period.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE.

QUANG NAM. On 12 July, reports were received that swimmers had approached a boat which was anchored in the vicinity of (BT 287 568), CAU DAT River. The guard attempted unsuccessfully to shoot the intruder. (COMNAVFORCEV Comment: This is the third report of VC swimmer activity within four days, although the first from ICTZ. Previous two were from BINH DINH in northern II Corps. VC may intend to utilize swimmers in their efforts to destroy CG (Coast Guard) units and shipping such as in DANANG and NHA TRANG).

On 18 July, HOA VAN Sub-sector official advised that VC agents were able to penetrate local Allied defenses in the HUONG PHOC Hamlet area, (AT 901794), by intermingling with local residents. VN officials further advised that these agents exploit the failure of security personnel to prohibit women and children from entering various defensive positions, thus affording the VC agent access to important information. (CI Comment: It is a well known fact that the VC employ women and children as low level intelligence collectors. They rely on the U.S. attitude of compassion toward children and the weaker sex in order to infiltrate these agents into areas occupied by the US).

On 21 July, a confidential source reported that the VC are utilizing young men from ages 18 to 19, who have been taught English by the VC, to apply for jobs with US Forces and collect information. According to source, the VC have formed two such units from the HO VINH, HOA THANH, HOA LOC, HOA HIEP, HOA KHAN and HO MINH villages (Red Beach area). (CI Comment: Previous reports indicate that the VC have expressed interest in the new FLSG Compound in the Red Beach area. The above may be an attempt by the VC to infiltrate the labor force employed at this new FLSG site).

QUANG TIN. A captured prisoner, who has been a member of the Communist Party since 1950, revealed during interrogation that a political indoctrination course is conducted in AN LAO District, BINH DINH Province (II CTZ). He attended this course from September to December 1965, and was instructed in politics and the political indoctrination of "coolie laborers".

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The POW when captured was serving with the 21st (NVA) Regiment and relates, that aside from the present plans for political training scheduled for the 21st, in the near future, this Regiment will organize a "suicide" type unit that will be approximately company size. (see Para 3, Annex B).

THUA THIEN. On 17 July, an estimated one squad of VC attacked the HUU NGUAN District Administrative Office and the AN CUU Police Station in HUE. The room at the Administrative Office used to store documents was fifty-percent destroyed. (CI Comment: This may have been a VC attempt to retrieve certain documentary information stored at this area; however, there were no reports of documents taken. Other sources speculate that since explosives were used in the adjacent areas, these were diversions so that administrative records could be examined.)

3. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION.

QUANG NAM. A 17 July, report revealed that three VC cadre entered HOA VINH village (AT 900795) and attempted to collect information on a Combined Action Company operating in the area. They also distributed propaganda leaflets to the local populace (theme unreported).

A captive POW, interrogated on 14 July, related that he attended a three month's training course at a VC camp located approximately 50 kilometers west of DINH BAN District, QUANG NAM Province. He attended this training with 35 other Vietnamese, thirty-percent of whom volunteered; the rest attended under pressure. The following subjects were taught:

Life in DRVN ("which is supposed to be very good").

Treatment of POW's ("they must not be killed").

Treatment of villagers ("kindness").

Weapons (carbine model 1944).

Bayonet fighting.

After about three months of training the captive and 35 others were sent to QUE SON.

On 16 July, another captive, who was a member of the Youth Group in HUONG SON Hamlet, HOA LUONG Village, HUEU DUC District, QUANG NAM Province, related that the Youth Group in HUONG SON was responsible for organizing the villagers into various associations; Farmer's, Women's, Old men's and Teenagers, Associations; and also to organize labor.

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Once a month the Youth Group would assemble the villagers to attend propaganda meetings given by the VC. (CI Comment: The above report would substantiate other reports emphasizing the VC's continued use of young Vietnamese, at the grass roots level, to assist in organizing the local populace).

19 July report from a Vietnamese official relates that two VC squads are operating in the vicinity of CAM NE (AT 9869) and BEN NE (AT 9868) Hamlets; their mission is to propagandize the local populace, kidnap and assassinate GVN personalities, disrupt the forthcoming GVN elections, and conduct surveillance of U.S. and Allied installations. (CI Comment: Although the above missions are not new, this is the second report of VC interest in the forthcoming September elections.).

On 21 July, a VC cadre distributed propaganda leaflets in the villages of HOA VINH (AT 917800) and HOA THANH (AT 912774). The themes were a warning to Popular Forces in that area not to work with U.S. Forces. They were cautioned to remain clear of all U.S. units which would be shelled by them (VC).

THUA THIEN. On 16 July, one VC Platoon entered NGU TAY Hamlet (YD 775166) and assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture (theme unreported).

On 17 July, an estimated 30 VC entered HAI CAT Hamlet (YD 738153) and LA KHE BAI Hamlet (YD 745184) and assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture. The lecture reportedly centered on the celebration of 20 July. Prior to departing they distributed propaganda leaflets. (CI Comment: July 20th is the date of the Indo-Chinese Agreement-Geneva Accords 1954. In spite of the fact that this agreement divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel, it marked the victory of HO CHI MINH and the VIET MINH over the French and the day that all VIET NAM became a country ostensibly free from outside influence).

On 18 July, an estimated 80 VC entered LONG HO, (YD 702190), AN HOAT HUONG (YD 705203) and AN VAN (YD 629205) Hamlets, and distributed propaganda leaflets (themes unreported).

On 18 July, an estimated one platoon of VC entered PHU BAI Hamlet (YD 908112) assembled the residents and instructed them to refuse to take part in the forthcoming elections (CI Comment: See QUANG NAM 19 July, entry sub para).

4. TERRORISM

QUANG NAM. On 18 July, 18-20 VC moved through a Popular Force Hamlet in the vicinity of (AT 919589) and burned a total of nine houses and left some 27 families homeless. It was also established that the VC killed two Vietnamese who lived in the village of PHUC DONG (AT 936587). The dead were identified as NGUYEN CHUOC and NGUYEN BINH, the father and brother of NGUYEN THANG who rallied to the GVN on 7 July.

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The rallier is believed to be a former member of the attacking platoon.

QUANG NGAI. On 15 July, an unknown number of VC raided TAM DAI Hamlet (BS 725850) and kidnapped two Vietnamese civilians.

QUANG TIN. On 17 July an unknown number of VC raided a bus stop at TAM KY (BT 306231) and the KY HUONG Village Administration Office (ET 304233). Six Popular Forces and four members of the People's Action Team were killed and 15 Vietnamese civilians were wounded.

THUA THIEN. On 14 July an unknown number of VC entered THUY DIEN Village (YD 827267) and assassinated one resident. The identity of the person killed was unreported.

OTHER: On 17 July, a PAT Advisor reports the VC have instituted a "Youth Draftee Mobilization Plan". Reportedly this plan sets the manpower mobilization requirements of each district at 2,500 men. Village draft quotas would be proportionate to the number of inhabitants. The draft is compulsory for those 17 years or older; Volunteers under 17 are accepted. The quota (unreported) was to be gathered prior to 19 July. People who can afford it must donate money to feed the relatives of the draftees during a three month training period. (CI Comments: This is the first report of an organized mobilization of youths into the VC military units. It would appear that a three month training is planned, which would indicate these troops would be ready by mid-October 1966. The following reports reflect a possible move by the VC to recruit youths into their ranks:

a. A 9 July police report states that the P/FSVN has sent a number of cadre to HON TINH to propagandize for the recruiting of soldiers to reinforce provincial and regular forces. They have also recruited young girls, ages 16 to 25 to attend the 1st to 3d year school for "health training".

b. Another 9 July report indicates that VC held a youth meeting at (BS 440755) and (BS 444763). During these meetings 72 youths were reportedly taken to an unknown location for training (Source evaluates the information F/4).

c. A 15 July report reveals that one VC Battalion moved from the vicinity of (AT 984351) to (AT 969302) and (AT 988314). The reported mission is to recruit youths for the VC cause. Reportedly they have taken an unknown number of young men from the above locations.

Forthcoming dates of interest which may influence some actions of VC or dissident groups:

27 July - Wounded Soldiers and War Dead (1947) - similar to U.S. Veterans Day.

30 July - 1 August - Establishment of Russian Communist Party (1903).

1 Aug - Establishment of the Red Chinese Army (1927) Potsdam Treaty (1945).

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III MAF

DANANG, RVN

020800H August 1966

Ser: **096266**

PERINTREP NO. 26

Period Covered: 240001H - 302400H July 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16
NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone decreased during the reporting period as no large scale activity was reported. Small scale harassing actions and missions continued at the usual tempo throughout the zone.

(a) QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Operations in the HASTINGS area were limited to light contact. The presence of the 90th Regt NVA and 803d Regt NVA was confirmed and prisoners from all regiments of the 324th B Division were taken during the reporting period. On 24 July, in THUA THIEN Province, a VC/NVA ambush in estimated company strength was made against the 4th VN Marine Battalion. A bridge on Highway 1 in THUA THIEN Province was blown on 27 July. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to small scale, isolated incidents.

(b) QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR and Operation MACON area.

(c) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. VC/NVA activity was limited to small scale isolated incidents. A bridge on Highway 1 in QUANG TIN Province was blown on 27 July.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents during the reporting period totaled 223. Incidents consisted of 101 small unit engagements, 92 AA fires, 24 mine/booby trap, three acts of terrorism, one sabotage, one propaganda and one hamlet harassment.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.**CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF PERINTREP #26

24-30 Jul 66

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(1) Weapons, 82mm Recoilless Guns. Marine elements operating in the HASTINGS area, recovered a tail fin assembly which at the time indicated it was from an 82mm RG. On 24 July, Task Force Delta captured 11 82mm Recoilless Rifle rounds with propellants intact. Subsequent examination revealed the rounds are used in the Soviet 82mm Recoilless Gun, Model B-10. (G-2 Cmt: This is the first indication of this weapon being used in the I Corps Area).

(2) The following weapons and equipment were also found in the HASTINGS area: Soviet 12.7mm M1938/46 HMG, Soviet RP-46 HMG, CHICOM Model 55-625 Mine Detector and a Soviet Impermeable Protective Suit (G-2 CMT: This is the first recovery of these weapons and equipment in the Republic of Vietnam).

e. Negative.

f. Admin Units.

(1) 12 July. QUANG NGAI SMIAT agent report of a VC Training Camp. A VC Training Camp has recently been established at CHAU ME (BS 658564). Approximately 60 men are being trained by 50 VC. The Camp consists of many trenches. The training cycle lasts approximately one month. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Anti-aircraft fire incidents for the reporting period showed a 12% decrease over last. Of the 92 incidents reported, 18 aircraft were hit with 49 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were (YD 0060 - YD 5040 - BS 6090). Intensity of fire ranged from light to moderate. Seven cases of 12.7mm and three cases of possible 20mm fire were reported.

i-s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy personalities. Annex A.

e. Casualties. VC/NVA casualties for the reporting period totaled 383. 268 were KBGF, 97 were KBMA and 18 were KBNGF. Seven VCC and nine NVAC were reported as captured or returnees.

f. Morale. Interrogations of NVA captives taken during Operation HASTINGS have consistently provided reports of low morale in the 324th B Div.

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Reasons given for the dissatisfaction varied with individuals, but generally were attributed to two things. First, a number of the personnel are draftees, unhappy with the idea of leaving their families to fight in South Vietnam. The second common reason given for poor morale was a lack of supplies - particularly food and medicine.

g-h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Partly cloudy to cloudy skies, with some scattered rain showers constituted the weather in general for I Corps during the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 93° high and 80° low. Winds were mostly southwesterly from five to ten knots. Visibility ranged from 5 to 20 miles.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee, and Document Reports.
Annex B.

1. Other Significant Information.

(1) 18 July. QUANG TIN SMIAT agent rpt of a VC Rice Cache. From 10-15 July, a group of 30-50 civilians laborers were employed by the VC to move three tons of husked rice and six tons of unhusked rice from (BT 270130) to (BT 042004). The rice is stored in a house next to a large orchard of fruit and cinnamon trees. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 20 July, QUANG NAM SMIAT agent report of a VC Province Security Headquarters. A VC province Security Agency has its headquarters located in CAM SON (H) (BT 052461). Security for this agency is provided by a company of 59th regular battalion. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

28 July. QUANG NAM National Police report of VC Facilities. A VC hospital is located at (BT 191090), an above ground grenade factory at (BT 149 003) and another above ground factory facility in grid square (BT 1200). A prison compound was reportedly located between (BT 1500) to (BT 1600). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|-----------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 | CG 35THFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 | CG 2D BDE, ROK MC | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG I FORCEV | 2 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG 3D MARDIV | 15 | CO FLSC | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV C | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 173RD ABN BDE | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CO, DET C-1, 5TH USSF | 2 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CMDR, I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| | | CICV | 1 |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III NAF PERINTREP NO. 26

HUE/PHU BAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | UNK | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK -SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MM RR | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |

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DANANG TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 130 | AT 8654 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9652 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1 57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8859 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PC-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|--|---|
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8734 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|--|
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |
| 2. <u>RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).</u> | | | | | |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 3411 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 3315 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCES OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAOR'S. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT A 3D REGT OF THE 620TH DIV MAY BE PRESENT IN THIS GENERAL AREA AND CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE PROBABILITY STATED ABOVE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO 26.

1. 803d Regt NVA, 324th B Div. Interrogation of LE VAN HONG, NVA captive taken by Co "I", 3d Bn, 4th Marines on 17 July during Operation HASTINGS in QUANG TRI Province, indicated the following. The captive was drafted into the NVA around November 1965 at QUYNH HOA (H). He joined the 1st Bn (AKA T-1 Bn) of the 325th Div located at XIEM (V), THANH HOA Province. During training he was taught tactics for assaulting a post and basic military subjects. During March 1966, the battalion was told that they were going to "Liberate South Vietnam". There was a great deal of dissension among the troops upon learning this but none was publicly displayed. The battalion proceeded to HUONG KHI (D) in HA THINH Province where they joined the 803d Regt NVA (AKA GIU LONG Regt) of the 324th B Div. The regiment left HA THINH Province about 4 June and marched south by night while hiding by day. They reached a village called CON TIN and forded the BEN HAI River about 4 July. About 6 July the battalion arrived in the vicinity of (YD 0669) where they dug in and then rested. On 15 or 16 July the K-3 Co was hit by artillery and the captive deserted under fire. He was taken under fire on order of his Company Commander and wounded in the left foot by small arms fire.

The captive indicated that rice and salt were available to his unit but not meat or vegetables. Each rifleman was equipped with 100 rounds of ammunition with no known source of resupply. The medical supplies are insufficient but enough is available to combat malaria. He indicates that the morale is low because the men are tired of war and are homesick.

The captive's battalion is equipped with three 82mm mortars and nine 7.62 RP-46 or CHICOM type 58 machine guns. The 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, K-1 Co has two AK-47 Assault rifles and seven SKS carbines.

The political officer of the T-1 Bn is Capt NHU, the CO of the K-1 Co is 2dLt CANH, XO 2dLt BAN, Political Officer 2dLt LE VANG KHANH.

2. 812th Regt NVA, 324th B Div. Initial interrogation of NVA captive NGUYEN NGOC THANH captured during Operation HASTINGS in QUANG TRI Province revealed the following information. The captive claimed he served with the NVA from March 1953 - February 1960 and was discharged as a Sergeant. He was called back to duty on 1 May 1965.

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At the time of capture he was a member of the 2d Co, 6th Bn, 812th Regt NVA, 324th B Div. Most of the men in his company were draftees who received basic training in LAI AN (P) during a period of three months. In the course of infiltration, the 6th Bn departed HA-TINH on 14 May. The companies moved individually to CU-DINH on 3 June 1966. The 2d Company's mission upon arrival in South Vietnam included transporting rice to other companies of the 6th Bn from the Hamlet of CU DINH (YD 0265). Prior to 4 June the entire 6th Bn was assigned duties transporting supplies from depots in South Vietnam. After 4 June the battalion prepared for action and deployed in the vicinity of CU DINH.

The 6th Bn has three infantry companies and one heavy weapons company. The battalion is equipped with the following crew served weapons. Four 81mm mortars, four 57mm recoilless rifles and two 12.7mm machine guns, which were destroyed by artillery fire. The strength of the 2nd Co was approximately 87 men.

The CO of the 812th Regt NVA is Major TONG S. NGUY, the CO of the 6th Bn is Capt TRAN MINH DIEM, the XO of the 6th Bn is Capt BUI THANH MINH, and the Political Officer of the 6th Bn is Capt NGUYEN MINH HAI.

The captive indicated that 803d Regt NVA units located near CU DINH (YD 0265) suffered heavy casualties during a B-52 raid around 17-18 July, when about one platoon (probably 30 men) were killed and fifteen others were wounded. Additionally, a rice cache of 50 tons was destroyed, as well as two tons of small arms ammunition. The strike took place within one kilometer of his position and there was no advance warning.

3. 95th Regt NVA. An interrogation report of NVA Captive PHAM VAN VIET indicated the following information. Captive was from the 3d Co, 9th Bn, 95th Regt, 324th B Div. The companies of the 9th Bn apparently carry AKA's of A, B, and C. He referred to the 2d Co as "B" and stated his company's AKA was "C". Weapons for the 9th Bn are: 12 60mm mortar, 6 HMG, 40 AR, 50 SMG and LMG, and an unknown number of AK/SKS. The captive was drafted in June 1965. He was assigned to the 9th Bn training area with many other draftees. The captive stated the battalion was composed of draftees. They received training as a unit in ambushes, raids, attacking enemy positions and defense against landing force (helo-borne). No training was given in infiltration. The 9th Bn started moving south in January 1966. In late May 1966 they were told that in seven days they would go into South Vietnam. Captive stated that morale had been good up to this time, but after being told this, it dropped. He also stated that morale had been low in South Vietnam because they had nothing to eat but rice and salt. There was very little meat; one small can of chicken is issued to two men for one month. Upon arriving in South Vietnam the 90th Regt was given the name SONG HUONG and the other two Regts of the 324th B Div were given the names CUU LONG and THU BON.

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The companies have taken village names, the platoons have taken hamlet names, and the squads have taken sub-hamlet names. These are the names of hamlets, villages, etc., in which the unit is presently located. The officers and men of the 9th Bn wore rank insignia on their collars prior to crossing the DMZ. The captive describes the insignia as oblong red cloth patches with gold color stars and bars to indicate officer ranks in the infantry, and blue cloth patches with gold stars and bars to indicate security forces. One bar with four gold color stars is a senior captain. The enlisted men have yellow patches with red bars through the center. While in South Vietnam, about 9 July 1966, an aircraft dropped leaflets over the area where the 9th Bn was located. Captive picked up four of these leaflets (one described as a statement from North Vietnamese Lieutenant who rallied). Captive states he had talked with other men in his squad about deserting or rallying, but all of them were afraid that the promises of good treatment wouldn't be kept. The men are warned of punishment if they pick up and read these leaflets. Captive knows of no punishments so far.

4. 90th Regt NVA, 324th B Div. A follow-up interrogation report of DINH VAN TU (AKA NGUYEN DUY HOANG) gives the following information. The captive stated he was from the 3d Co, 7th Bn, 90th Regt, 324th B Div. (Previously captive stated he was from the 37th Div). The 7th Bn is composed of the 1st, 2nd and 3d Companies; the 90th Regt is composed of the 7th, 8th and 9th Bn's. He stated that in October 65 the units were redesignated, 3d Co (C.3), 7th Bn (D.7), 90th Regt (3d Regt). The captive did not know the reason for redesignation. He stated there was enough rice, meat, vegetables and salt for all soldiers. Morale was poor because 100% of the men were drafted into the Army and had to leave their wives and families behind and go fight in the war.

The captive further stated the following tactics were to be used: One was a direct frontal assault on American or ARVN Camps and observation posts. The second one was a direct assault on helicopters after all helicopters landed in the landing zone. All communication between units was by foot, using three messengers from the headquarters section. The captive was drafted into the service in June 65, along with about 100 other young men. The captive was assigned to the 3d Co, 7th Bn, 90th Regt, 324th B Div. Initial training was three months, June, July and August 65. Training included basic infantry tactics, care and cleaning and use of the M-1 rifle. After this training the captive was selected to begin medical training because of his seven years education. In May 66, the captive was told seven days prior to the move that the 90th Regt would infiltrate into South Vietnam.

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Infiltration took 30 days because traveling was done by foot; they moved during the day and at night. The captives unit infiltrated directly across the DMZ, traveled for five days until they set up defensive positions on hill 208 (YD 0364). The 3d Co remained in this area during June and July 66, until attacked by Americans on 16 July. Captive stated he had no knowledge of any artillery barrages, B-52 strikes or propaganda leaflet drops.

5. The following document captured during operation HASTINGS by Co "D" 1st Bn, 1st Marines on 20 July 1966 in the vicinity of (YD 049629), indicated principles of Anti-Aircraft defense taught during unit training in North Vietnam.

FIGHTING PLAN FOR COMPANY 14

1. Special characteristics and procedures of the enemy aircraft.

The types of aircraft are F-4H, F-105, F-8U, A-4D, and AD6. They usually fly at a height of 4,000 to 8,000 meters, whenever firing, they fly at an altitude from 1,000 to 2,000 meters.

When attacking, they fly in groups to two or three. They can fly from many directions and many angles. The speeds of the various types are; F series - 180 MPH, and the AD6 - 80 MPH.

The direction of attack of the enemy is from north to south. Methods of action: They are usually deployed thusly: Coming out of the sun to hit mountain hideouts, villages, river crossings and coming out of the clouds to strike unexpectedly, or to fly rapidly across the battlefield at an altitude of 8,000 meters, returning at an 180 degree angle to fire on the battlefield or our defenses.

Capabilities of the enemy aircraft's weapons when on the ground: they have no use, but we need to instruct the comrades on checking them and destroying them.

2. Leading with your weapons:

Selecting the target: Whichever aircraft or flight presents the greatest danger should be fired at, or whichever aircraft or flight is closest to your position should be fired at.

When to fire: Whenever the enemy aircraft is within range, fire. If it is an "F" or "D" type, the range is 2,400 meters, if it is an "H" type, the range is 1,500 meters, but if it is an "H" type at 3,000 meters and they are firing down, then return fire. Don't fire directly at them, lead them and then fire.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****3. Regulating the fire:**

Methods of firing: If the aircraft is firing, use anti-aircraft sights. In other situations, fire tracers. Fire according to the type of weapon.

When to fire: Whenever the aircraft cannot see the firing is best.

Types of Fire: If the aircraft is flying at less than 150 MPH or you do not have a sufficient amount of tracers, fire short bursts. If the aircraft is exceeding 150 MPH or when you do have enough tracers, fire long bursts.

4. Co-ordination:

When there is a militia unit participating in the fight, there will be one (machine gun) and a number of rifles.

When the enemy aircraft comes within range, we will fire first and then they will fire.

Anticipating a number of situations in order to be able to react.

| <u>SITUATION</u> | <u>REACTION</u> |
|---|---|
| 1. If the flight is higher than 3,000 meters. | Follow and prevent it from coming lower. |
| 2. If coming from many heights or many directions, | Fire at the nearest one or the one that presents the most danger. |
| 3. If many heights or different types. | Fire at the lowest ones and prevent the higher ones from coming down. |
| 4. Striking our positions from different levels and directions. | Organize a 360 degree defense and make sure everybody fires in a specified direction. |
| 5. If the enemy drops napalm. | Organize anti-aircraft defense in the areas not yet burning. |

Divide the defenses to cover a 360 degree area.

15 December, 1965

BUI VAN TU

((BUI VAWN TW))

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 26.

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period there were several instances of VC attempts to agitate the people in hopes of disrupting the upcoming elections. Such attempts will, in all probability, increase as the elections draw nearer. Sabotage and espionage at low level are still well within the capability of the VC and reports on the use of women, children and vendors for these purposes persist. Propaganda, both leaflets and VC conducted meetings continue, particularly in QUANG NAM and THUA THIEN Provinces. The leaflets appear to have become more varied in content although the basic theme remains the same. In some instances there has been a marked improvement in the degree of professionalism in producing the printed matter. There was no marked increase in terrorism during the reporting period.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE.

QUANG NAM. A report from a usually reliable source, dated 15 July, indicates that TRAN HOANG, a native of NAM MY Hamlet, who presently resides at NAM YEN Hamlet (no coordinates given) is attempting to gain employment with the U. S. Forces for the purpose of espionage.

A 23 July report related that two women (FNU) were utilizing a boat on the VU GIA River to scout local Marine positions.

A reliable source reported on 25 July that TRAN THEI DANG a resident of YEN BAC Hamlet (BT 985703) acts as a purchasing and liaison agent for the VC and makes regular trips to DANANG.

On 26 July, a usually reliable source warned that the VC are using women and children, vendors, and laborers for intelligence gathering and that any units wishing to hire laborers should check with the district chief to verify the authenticity of the prospective laborers. Source further related that the sentries should not allow vendors to loiter near the perimeters of U. S. Camps. (CI Comment: The basic sympathy of the average U. S. serviceman makes situations like the above ideal for the low level agent).

A 27 July report furnished information that the VC were using school children to sketch Marine positions in the vicinity of (AT 908828). Allegedly, these sketches are to be used for mortar attacks. A further report by the 3d Marines relates that the VC are questioning local wood cutters concerning Marine positions in this area.

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A recently interrogated rallier related that a well armed Sapper Bn is located in this vicinity of (AT 805605) (not confirmed). The battalion supposedly participated in actions against DANANG Air Base and other Marine installations. (CI Comment: A previous POW report indicates that the 21st (NVN) Regiment may have plans to form a "suicide" type company).

On 27 July the 1st Marines reported that a member of that command drank a soft drink purchased from a roadside vendor, slivers of glass were found in the liquid. The Marine suffered no harmful effects.

3. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION.

QUANG NAM. On 18 July, English language propoganda leaflets were found by elements of the 2nd Bn, 3d Marines. One expounded the "Yankee Go Home" theme. Another quoted two U. S. Senators as saying the Vietnam war was morally wrong, unjust and not worth U. S. blood and effort, and a third pamphlet quoted various Americans both military and civilians who have spoken out against the present conflict. (CI Comment: The statements of the U. S. Leaders were probably quoted out of context. However, the leadflets do reflect sophistication in printing and picture reproduction).

On 21 July it was reported that the VC are forcing the villagers of XUYEN PHUOC (BT 210540) to go into the mountains to grow food for the VC during their leisure hours. They were also given propoganda lectures. It was also reported that hamlets 3 and 4 of this village hold regularly scheduled propoganda meetings in the local school house.

In the village of DONG LONG (AT 940440), it was reported that an accelerated course will be given and will be attended by approximately 100 men (ages 16-35). Neither the nature nor duration of the course is known.

On 23 July, it was reported that an Anti-American sign was found nailed to a tree in the 1st Marines TAOR. (Information contained there was not reported).

On 26 July, at MY DONG Hamlet (coordinates unknown), the villagers have been organized by the VC into various standard organizations and everyone is required to attend a monthly propoganda meeting. Rice is collected periodically from each person.

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From XUAN THIEU, a reliable report of 27 July relates that several VC riding in the funeral truck of a deceased ARVN were passing out VC propaganda on the way to the cemetery.

The 1st Bn, 3d Marines report that the people of KHUE DONG area (BT 055706) are being forced to attend propaganda meetings given by the VC on an irregular basis. (CI Comment: Reports are still received of scheduled propaganda meetings being conducted in contested and VC controlled areas).

A HIEU DUC District report of 22 July furnishes information that VC political agents and members of other dissident political groups are infiltrating DANANG in the hopes of upsetting forthcoming elections. (CI Comment: First reports of possible attempts to infiltrate DANANG to disrupt elections - if true - they may attempt to incite rallies and demonstrations during campaign proceedings).

On 27 July, it was reliably reported that the VC are forcing the population of HOA BINH (AT 857770) to attend meetings and are using the village elders to convince the local population that the present government is responsible for all the hardships being endured. By this means they hope to influence the forthcoming elections. In HOA HAI village (Marble Mountain area) armed and uniformed VC are forcing villagers to attend propaganda meetings at least twice monthly.

QUANG TIN. On 24 July, it was reliably reported that the VC are conducting a school and are organizing against the forthcoming elections. Further the VC plan, during the projected election disorders, for elements of four VC regiments to attack in the 1st Marine Division TAOR. (CI Comment: There may be a marked increase in agitation directed against the forthcoming elections).

On 25 July, at (BT 128096) propaganda leaflets and safe conduct passes aimed at the Koreans were found. (CI Comment: This is the first evidence of anti-Korean literature (themes were not reported)).

QUANG TRI. On 23 July, it was reported that the VC entered HA LO Hamlet (YD 468427), assembled all the residents, and held a propaganda meeting, (theme not reported).

Propaganda leaflets found at (YD 421485) set the usual anti-American THIEU-KY themes and encouraged the people (Vietnamese) not to give up or retreat in the face of the Americans and their "lackies".

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The leaflet went on to condemn the forthcoming elections as a farce and a ruse manufactured by the present government. Another leaflet tells of the benevolency of the NLF for releasing three ARVN officers after they had expressed their "consternation" at having been led astray by the THIEU-KY GROUP who duped them into committing terroristic acts. Another leaflet of the group was directed toward the American servicemen and encouraged him to lay down his arms, defect, and demand repatriation. The leaflet went on to describe the dangers awaiting the serviceman "from snakes, booby traps and snipers in the bushes, or a well placed grenade in the local cafe". It encourages the Americans to stop fighting the unjust war. Further it references the "hell" of DANANG. Two pictures in the leaflet show a woman weeping over a flag draped coffin and an American servicemen weeping with the caption "In DANANG, hell, his nerves broke". (CI Comment: VC printed propaganda appears to becoming more sophisticated).

On 23 July, more propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of (XD 815371), apparently anti-American (contents not known).

QUANG NGAI. I Corps recently reported that a VC defector claimed the latest VC policy is to fight to the bitter end for ultimate victory. To achieve this they will occupy all small towns and surround the larger cities. Preparations consist of stock piling supplies, mobilizing all young men, developing larger guerrilla units and, during the coming rainy season, launch a three pronged attack (military, propaganda and political).

THUA THIEN. On 21 July, VC entered KE SUNG (YD 909272) in an attempt to distribute propaganda but were driven off by the Popular Forces.

On 23 July, at the pagoda located at (YD 906121) four VC males and one female, all uniformed, held a propaganda meeting. At the same time a security ambush was set up to protect the meeting. Anti-American literature was dispensed at the conclusion of the meeting.

During the period 24 - 26 July, it was reliably reported that at least six other propaganda meetings were held in various hamlets in THUA THIEN. These discussed recent VC victories at PHONG DIEN and QUANG DIEN (coordinates unknown) and urged support for future operations.

4. TERRORISM

QUANG NAM. On 19 July, a reliable source reported that the VC are teaching children to befriend U. S. personnel and to use the resulting friendship to throw grenades at them and run to safety.

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The same reports indicates that young girls are being taught to lure U. S. servicemen into ambush for the purpose of killing them.

On 22 July, DAI LOC District reports that the VC are utilizing children to lay mines and are training children to steal weapons from relaxed U. S. personnel.

Another report (unconfirmed) of 22 July reports the establishment of training course at KY LAM (AT 990563) to instruct in methods of poisoning Americans. The students were selected from "politically" trustworthy families in friendly areas occupied by U. S. troops.

Allegedly, 100 tubes of liquid poison were given to one PHAM THI DY, a native of HOA HAI Village, HOA VANG District. DY is listed in the report as VC cadre in charge of KHAI DONG, Marble Mountain area.

QUANG TRI. One act of terrorism was reported on 19 July in which two VN males were abducted by the VC at (YD 375560).

THU THIEN. Between 24-29 July four separate acts of terrorism were reported. Three instances involved the kidnapping and killing of four persons (one a doctor) for resisting the VC and aiding the ARVN or Marines. The fourth instance related that a plastic charge was detonated in the DONG KANH girl's high school in HUE. The school was to be the site for the HUE University Baccalarate degree examinations on 27-28 July. Prior to this act, the Buddhist Protective Committee distributed a leaflet urging absolute non-attendance at the examinations, a total market shopping strike, a strike of all workers and civil servants and a strike of all soldiers on the battlefield. The document also contained slogans to be used for parades and demonstrations. (CI Comment: The foregoing was not successful in that 85% of the students attended the examinations. There were no strikes or shut downs and the HUE situation appeared normal).

5. OTHER. On 25 July, it was reported that a fortified village at (BS 244630) was possibly being utilized as a detention camp for American prisoners.

A II FFORCEV report dated 25 July indicates that the VC Saigon/GIA DINH Special Zone committee met to study plans to sabotage the oil depots at NHA BE (XS 9582). (CI Comment: II FFORCEV comments are valid and applicable to this area. The VC are expected to use every possible means to revenge the bombing of HANGI and HAI PHONG).

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III MAF

DANANG, RVN

090800H August 1966

Ser: **0101166**

PERINREP NO. 27

Period Covered: 310001 July - 062400 August 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JCG (G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16
NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was characterized by small scale harassing actions and missions throughout the zone, with several small scale attacks against the north-south lines of communication.

a. QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Activity in the Operation PRAIRIE area was limited to light contact. In THUA THIEN Province a bridge on Highway 1 was damaged by a mine on 4 August and a bridge on the north to south railroad was blown on 6 August. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to small scale, isolated incidents.

b. QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR and in the Operation MACON area.

c. QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. VC/NVA activity was limited to light contact during the early hours of Operation COLORADO. Activity in QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI and the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to small scale, isolated incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents totalled 148, and consisted of one attack, 148 small unit engagements, 21 mine/booby traps and 77 AA fire incidents, one propaganda effort and one act of terrorism.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 29 July. A Special Forces Platoon reported the discovery of two 37mm AA shell casings at (XD 903393). Aircrews have reported receiving possible 37mm AA fire in this vicinity. (G-2 Comment: B/3; This is the first firm indication of 37mm AA guns in country, although no confirmation of actual guns has been made to date).

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III MAF PERINREP #27

31 Jul - 6 Aug 66

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(1) 29 July. QUANG NGAI, SON TINH (D) agent reported the VC have set up a Training Camp in the vicinity of (BS 485835 to BS 489841). It has been reported that 150 guerrillas are attending training at this facility. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(2) 23 July. QUANG NGAI SMIAT agent report indicated that the VC reportedly have established a PCV Camp at TRINH LANH (H) (BS 438455). The camp consists of 10 houses and it is concealed by heavy foliage. 60 Vietnamese, 20 Montagnards and three Americans are allegedly being imprisoned therein. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Incidents of anti-aircraft firing for the period totaled 77, showing a slight decrease from the last period. 13 aircraft sustained 28 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9050 - BT 0060 - BT 2010 - YD 0060). Intensity of fire was light and two cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i-s. Negative.3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of: 118 KIA, 111 KIA (Prob), eight WIA and 11 VCC. Enemy weapon losses for the period were 12 individual weapons.

f. Morale. No Change.g-h. Negative.i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. Partly cloudy to cloudy skies, with light rain and rain-showers, dominated the weather scene in I Corps for most of the reporting period. Temperatures averaged about normal at 90° high and 76° low. 1.60 inches of precipitation was recorded for the period. Winds were variable

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at five knots, visibility ranged from seven to ten miles.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee, Document Report. Annex B.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 29 July. QUANG NGAI, SON TINH (D) agent reports a VC Trading Agency has 20 tons of rice and cinnamon stored in the vicinity of (BS 448797). (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(2) 2 August. QUANG TIN SMIAT agent reports that on 20 May 1966, an important VC Secret Zone with a large arms cache was located in the southeastern portion of HAU DUC (D), QUANG TIN (P), near the border of QUANG NGAI (P). This zone and cache have been in active operation since 1964. The arms cache is a natural cavern in the side of a cliff overlooking the CA DA River (BS 097923). The cavern measures approximately 15 meters in width, four meters in height and has a floor space of about 1,000 square meters. An estimated 2,000 weapons of various types reportedly are hidden in the cavern. Two ammunition dumps are located in an underground tunnel running from the bank of the CHA NANG River at (BS 130916) to DU GONG Mountain (BS 120906) and approximately 1,000 cases of ammunition of various types reportedly are stored in these dumps. The weapons and ammunition were moved to the above locations by elephants from southern LACS through the area of DAKGLEY (coordinates unknown). Some items were also moved by laborers from the coast in the northern part of QUANG NGAI (P) up the TRA BONG River (BS 6093) and its extensions, TRA DONG AND TRA CO. Security for the VC Secret Zone is provided by a battalion designated as Work Site 100 (CONG TRUCNG 100). In an area forming a perimeter approximately two kilometers from the Secret Zone, the VC have placed anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, spiked traps and other obstacles. The zone is protected from aerial observation by a thick jungle canopy. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

a. Capabilities. The VC/NVA can:

(1) Attack CAM LO and DONG HA with one division, 324 B NVA Div, consisting of the 90th Regt, 803d Regt, and 812th Regt, reinforced by one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and one independent battalion (808th Br).

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(2) Attack the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR with two regiments (6th Regt and 95th B NVA Regt, reinforced by three independent battalions (802d, 804th and 810th).

(3) Attack the DANANG TAOR with one division (620th Div consisting of the 1st VC Regt, 21st NVA Regt and 3d NVA Regt reinforced by four independent battalions (70th, R20, 804th and 810th).

(4) Attack the CHU LAI TAOR with one Division (620th Div) reinforced by two independent battalions (70th and 72d).

(5) Attack isolated U.S./ARVN outposts and Government Headquarters in division strength in QUANG TRI, southern QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces, in regimental strength elsewhere.

(6) Harass U.S./ARVN units with sneak attacks, suicide attacks, and local guerrilla attacks.

(7) Continue to sabotage lines of communication.

(8) Conduct terror tactics against villages and hamlets, to include assassination, kidnapping and extortion.

(9) Employ subversive operations to infiltrate and influence local political factions in an effort to increase local unrest.

b. Conclusions.

(1) That the VC/NVA will concurrently exercise capabilities 6, 7, 8 and 9, as well as 5 with forces of up to regimental strength.

(2) The VC/NVA could execute capabilities 1 and 2 concurrently, in conjunction with either capability 3 or capability 4. While the 620th Div might be employed to attack either the DANANG TAOR or the CHU LAI TAOR, it is unlikely that elements of the 620th Div would attack the DANANG and CHU LAI TAOR's simultaneously.

c. Vulnerabilities.

(1) VC/NVA supply areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to reconnaissance and surveillance unless carefully concealed.

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
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(2) VC/NVA forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support in SVN and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations VC/NVA forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to the principal of surprise.

(4) Limited man power resources in North Vietnam and VC controlled areas of South Vietnam have required a dependency upon an extensive conscription program and limited basic type training in order to rapidly raise VC/NVA troop levels. The result has been a lowering of morale and increased vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

(5) VC/NVA forces have become more dependent upon local resources for support as the total VC/NVA strength increases. But the necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population under VC/NVA control.



C. A. SACHS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|-------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 | CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 | CG 2D BDE, ROK MC | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG 3D MARDIV | 15 | CO FLSG | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CO, DET C-1, 5TH USSF | 2 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CMDR, I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| | | CICV | 1 |

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DANANG TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 130 | AT 854 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1 57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 120 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 27

HUE/PHU BAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | UNK | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK -SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MM RR | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--|
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|----------|------|-----|---------|---|---------------------------------|
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 3411 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 3315 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18 AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 1ST VC AND 21ST NVA REGT AND OTHER U/I ELMS OF 620TH DIV ARE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCES OF THE CHU LAI AND THE DANANG TAOR'S. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT A 3D REGT OF THE 620TH DIV MAY BE PRESENT IN THIS GENERAL AREA AND CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE PROBABILITY STATED ABOVE.

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DANANG TAOR (CONTINUED)

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS. (WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|--|---|
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8734 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2 57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |

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The captive said that he deserted his unit on 24 July, while on a mission for the CO, 9th Bn, to find a way through the mountains out of KHE CHAU. He claims he surrendered to the first US troops he saw.

The captive indicates the strength of the 9th Bn was 556 officers and men. The 1st Co was about 125 total with 30 total in each platoon. The 1st Co was composed of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd platoons, a B-40 rocket launcher squad and a RP-46 7.62mm LMG. The Weapons Co of the 9th Bn was armed with four mortars, type and caliber unknown.

The mission of the 324th B Div was to "Liberate" Northern QUANG TRI (P) and to hold the area for future infiltrating units. Following infiltration of other units, the Division was to act as a transportation and supply unit. The mission of the 90th Regt NVA was to act as a blocking force for the rest of the 324th B Div and hold the high ground west of CAN LO. The mission of the 1st Co was to hold hill 110. The morale of the unit was indicated as being very low. Most of the men were draftees and they were afraid and didn't want to fight. Significant personalities are HAM LONG, General, CG 324th B Div; HONG, Maj, Div Political officer; MAI VAN PHUEN, Maj, CO 90th Regt; DO HOAT, Capt, XO 90th Bn, 90 Regt.

2. 812th REGT NVA, 324th B DIV. NGUYEN VAN SAN, a Private 2d class, was captured while acting as a sniper on 27 July 1966 by members of Co L, 3d Bn, 6th Marines in the vicinity of (YD 011617). During interrogation he revealed the following information. The captive stated that on 5 May the Village Chief of CAN LONG (V) took him to a NVA base near MINH CAN (H), in HA TINH Province, where he became a member of the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 812th Regt. Most of his time with this unit was spent firing a rifle, digging trenches and hand to hand combat training. In the area of the base, the NVA soldiers stayed in the houses of the people of MINH CAN (H). When in the jungles or other areas the men slept in shelter halves.

During early May the CO of the 2d Co, 3d Bn, told the members of his unit that they might soon travel to LAOS. During June the 2d Co received orders that they were going on an operation. After leaving their base in CAN MINH (V), the troops were surprised to arrive in SVN. The captive believes the 3d Bn arrived in SVN at an unknown location about 5-9 July. The equipment carried by each soldier during infiltration was one mosquito net, one blanket, one canteen, two uniforms and two bandages. Each squad had one small bottle of malaria medicine, which was insufficient. Each man received about one kile of cooked rice and two dried fish per day. During the Battle of QUANG TRI, about 13-16 July, the captive's squad carried rice and ammunition from an unknown location to another unknown location, which was about a seven hour march. The captive and the automatic rifleman for whom he carried magazines deserted the 2d Co and attempted to return to their homes in NVN. They wandered through the jungle for five days until they came upon Americans. The automatic rifleman was shot and killed, while the captive surrendered.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 27

1. 90TH REGT (NVA) 324TH B DIV. An interrogation of NVA Warrant Officer NGUYEN VAN HA revealed the following information. The captive was drafted into the NVA at NGHE Province on 26 April 1966 and was assigned to the 4th Army Corps HQ at NAM DANG District to attend a Political school for a period of 15 days. The course covered Communist Party organization, political organization, military unit organization, ideology of the NVA soldier, reporting of KIA and WIA, unit strength, how to assume duties as political officer and how to examine and control morale in a military unit.

Following the political schooling on about 10 May, the captive was assigned to the 9th CO of the 90 Regt. On about 14 May he attended a battalion briefing and was told that the units of the 4th Army Corps, the 325th Div and the 324th A Div., would infiltrate into SVN first. It was further indicated that the 108th Regt NVA of the 324th A Div had already infiltrated. The 325th Div and the 324 A Div would use the same route of infiltration as the 324th B Div except that after reaching the resupply routing point they would move west and go through LAOS along the HO CHI MINH Trail. About 13 June, the 325th Div and 324 A Div reached a rubber plantation which is a resupply and routing point. The 324th B Div reached this same point on 16 June. The QUYET THANG Cooperative Rubber Plantation, used as a resupply routing and rest station, is located 1.5 km to the east of highway 15 and five km north of the BEN HAI River.

The 324th B Div began infiltrating on about 28 May, when the Division left NAM DUONG (V) in groups of about battalion size. The units proceeded south along the coast to CAM LOC (D). They moved through open areas at night and covered areas by day. The 9th Bn stopped at AN LOC (V) QUYET Cooperative Center for resupply and rest. The other battalions of the 90th Regt NVA stopped at TINH COC (V) and PHUC LOC (V). An airstrike against the battalion in TINH LOC caused 4 KIA and 13 WIA. After two days rest the regiment continued their movement. On about 0500 on 18 June, the 324th B Div crossed the BEN HAI River into SVN. They waded across the BEN HAI River, using previously laid hand lines, and then proceeded to CU DINH (V).

The rallier stated that the numerical designation of the regiments were changed upon infiltrating. The names of rivers were used to designate regiments; the 90th Regt (NVA) became the CUU LONG Regiment. Battalions assumed a "K" designation to cause confusion, since "K" designations were used in the north to designate companies.

The captive gave the following information concerning draft ages and percentages: Draftees in the 17-21 age group are assigned for service in both NVN and SVN. This group makes up about 33% of draftees. Draftees in the 21-31 age group are assigned to units for service in South Vietnam only when practical.

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4. The following are excerpts from an NVA Document captured during Operation HASTINGS. As a result of a study of recent experience, the NVA published this estimate of "Good Points" and "Short Comings".

a. Good points:

They have managed to successfully complete their long trek over coordillera, preserve secrecy about the movement of a large size force and arrive safely at their destination according to plans. They have secured victory in their first battle, thus opening the way for breaking through the enemy defense line on Route 9 and expanding their liberated zone and corridor. The majority of their troops were full of enthusiasm in spite of constant movement, transportation of heavy loads of rice and ammunition, etc...

b. Shortcomings:

Some cadre did not fully realize the significance of immediate requirements. Anti-aircraft measures, counter intelligence and combat-readiness were still deficient. Discipline in combat was not strictly enforced. Troops avoided contact with the enemy forces (as in the case of "Village" 3, K.6, "THU BON").

They balked at hardships and feared the enemy air and artillery firepower. Policies toward the people's properties and wounded soldiers were not well implemented. VC soldiers lacked vigilance toward captives. The VC realized that if they failed to correct these shortcomings, they would meet with many difficulties in a large-scale engagement and would not be able to secure total victory.

As a result of the situation assessment as made above, the Command Committee of Werksite 1/5 (1 May) decided to immediately launch continuous all out attacks to encircle the enemy forces and draw them out of fortifications for annihilation. In addition, the VC were determined to hold, at all costs, the DAU MAU (?) liberated zone from which they intended secretly to build up their forces and prepare them to annihilate the main forces of their enemy.

Command cadre of frontline units (K,8 K.5, K.9) were directed to step up ideological indoctrination of their men and correct such weaknesses as fear of independent action, fear of enemy artillery and air firepower, etc...

Henceforth they must resolutely lead their men, continuously attack and draw the enemy forces out of their fortifications.

Command cadre of rear forces must insure the accomplishment of immediate missions which were rice and ammunition transportation and material preparation for large scale battles. All personnel were also reminded that maintenance of secrecy was imperative for success. Particular emphasis must also be placed upon preventive medicine and hygiene to insure physical fitness and readiness of the troops.

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The captive further indicated that the 2d Co participated in no action, was not bombed, received no artillery fire and suffered no casualties after leaving HA TINH Province. He claims the strength of the 3d Bn is 264 total and the other two battalions are about the same strength. His company's strength was a total of 81. He indicated morale was low, that the men don't wish to fight and the food was poor. Significant personalities are NGUYEN VAN DAI, CO 3d Bn, 812 Regt; NGUYEN VAN CHINH, CO 3d Bn; NGUYEN VAN KHA, Political Officer and TRAN THAO, XO 2d Co, 3d Bn.

3. Preliminary evaluation of approximately 6,000 documents (totaling approximately 80,000 pages) captured during Operation HASTINGS has revealed the following information. The 324th B Div, otherwise known as the "May 1st Worksite", infiltrated into SVN around June 1966. Advanced units reached QUANG TRI on or around 15 May. 324th B Div was broken down in the following manner: B1 was the military Staff, B2 was the Political Staff, and B3 rear services. The division had three infantry regiments. The 803 Regt, also known as the SONG HUONG, three battalions: K1, K2 and K3. Regarding battalion cover designations, "K", "D" and "T" are used interchangeably. The second regiment of the division was the 812th Regt, cover designation of "CUU LONG", which had the K4, K5 and K6 Bns. There were 2500 men in this Regiment. There were nine organic companies, in addition to the three battalions to the Regiment. These companies ranged from an AA company to engineer companies. The CO of the 812th Regt was Maj TUNG SI NGUY. The third regiment of the 324th B Div was the 90th, cover designation "THU BON", with the K7, 8 and 9 Bns. Documents also indicated that the 14th AA Co was organic to the 90th Regt, the 21st AA Co was attached to this particular regiment, and that the 324th B Div had an artillery battalion. According to JGS NVA OB Book, a NVA Div usually has three infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. At the present time, the documents are being evaluated to determine if the other two artillery battalions were in country and if so, their unit designations. The 90th Regt was also known by a unit number which was 5122 and 803d Regt was also known by number 5520. The sequence of numbers had a difference of four in the first two digits and two in the second digit. It seemed likely that the numerical cover designation of the third regiment of the Div was either 5921 or 4721.

Diaries indicate that the bulk of the division was assembled in QUANG BINH Province, MR 4, NVN. The elements were assembled there at the end of May and then moved south. Diaries also gave locations, terrain features of the places they moved through from day to day. But no documents revealed that any elements of 324th passed through the DMZ. They did mention being approximately five to ten kilometers from the DMZ on one day and then stated, on the following day, they arrived in SVN after crossing the BEN HAI River. Another significant point learned from the captured documents was that all rice receipts of rear service elements of the 324th B Div showed that all the food was being procured from NVN, that is, the division in QUANG TRI Province was being supplied with food from NVN. Documents indicated that the NVN troops crossed the river during the day. Diaries mentioned crossing of the BEN HAI River at 8:30 in the morning.

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On the 24th of Jun 66, an undesignated gun crew of the company was detached to K.12.

The register was kept by 2d Lt. LE DINH TOI since 1 Jan 66.

Personnel Register of 3d Company T.39

Key personnel:

- Co C.O.: 1st Lt DANG VAN TICH
- Co X.O.: 2d Lt. NGUYEN CHI CUONG
- Co Asst P.O.: Lt. NGUYEN KHAC HUNG

Strength of the Company during period Jan-Jun 66:

| <u>Type of personnel</u> | <u>Jan</u> | <u>Feb</u> | <u>Mar</u> | <u>Apr</u> | <u>May</u> | <u>Jun</u> |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Officer | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 |
| NCO | 12 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 15 | 13 |
| EM | 92 | 83 | 82 | 96 | 97 | 102 |
| | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | 113 | 107 | 106 | 122 | 120 | 125 |

Weapons:Amount:

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| AK Submachine gun | 21 |
| RPD Light machine gun | 2 |
| CKC Rifle | 13 |
| | ---- |
| Total: | 36 |

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Cadre at all levels must energetically contribute to the development of their units in combat and draw experiences after each engagement.

Upon receipt of this directive, the field grade political officers, the "Song's" and the political officers of the various "K" would take proper action to make their men realize the significance of immediate requirements and will report all progress to Worksite 1/5.
(TN: Document classified "Top Secret" by the NVA).

5. The following facts were extracted from NVA unit personnel registers captured during Operation HASTINGS.

Personnel Register of 2d Co, 9th Bn.

Key Personnel

- Co C.O.: 1st Lt. NGUYEN VAN DUNG
- Co P.O.: 1st Lt. NGUYEN XUAN HAI
- Co C.O.: 2d Lt. DONG VAN TRUNG
- Co Asst P.O.: NGUYEN VIET DAC

Strength of the Company during period Jan-Jun 66:

| <u>Type of personnel</u> | <u>Jan</u> | <u>Feb</u> | <u>Mar</u> | <u>Apr</u> | <u>May</u> | <u>Jun</u> |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Officer | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 |
| NCO | 13 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 15 | 15 |
| EM | 94 | 82 | 82 | 95 | 90 | 97 |
| | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | 117 | 107 | 107 | 122 | 114 | 122 |

The register was classified ABSOLUTE SECRET.

Personnel Register of 4th Company, 9th Battalion.

Key Personnel:

- Co C.O.: 1st Lt. BUIVAN VON (transferred to the Bn HQ since 29 March 1966)
- Co P.O.: 1st Lt. HOANG TRONG NHO (name crossed out for unknown reason)
- Co L.O.: 2d Lt. LE VAN KHUONG
- Co Asst P.O.: 2d Lt. PHAM HONG LU

Strength of the Company during the period Jan-Jun 66:

| <u>Type of personnel</u> | <u>Jan</u> | <u>Feb</u> | <u>Mar</u> | <u>Apr</u> | <u>May</u> | <u>Jun</u> |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Officer | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 10 |
| NCO | 15 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 34 | 34 |
| EM | 66 | 66 | 66 | 53 | 93 | 99 |
| | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | 88 | 91 | 91 | 77 | 136 | 143 |

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QUANG TIN: A report of 1 August states that the home of one CAN in TRUONG CUE Hamlet (BT 313147) is being used by the TAM KY District Military/Political Committee as its headquarters. Local VC agents report all collected information to this point.

THUA THIEN: Between 23 July and 4 August there were four separate incidents which may be classed as sabotage; two bridges were blown and two trains derailed as the result of VC mine action. In all cases repairs were effected and normal activity was restored.

3. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

QUANG NAM: HIEU NHON GVN officials reported on 28 July that the VC assembled a number of people for a propaganda meeting and took non-VC to XUYAN THO (BT 160560) for one week of political indoctrination. (CI comment: This is a second reported meeting in this area. The first was conducted on 19 July, and reports indicate that young boys and girls were recruited to attend a one week course preparatory to being sent to collect information in areas where U. S. Forces are stationed. The above mentioned course and the one week political indoctrination are probably one in the same.)

On 29 July, a QUANG NAM Province agent reported that a VC Rural Construction Team will start operations throughout QUANG NAM in the latter part of July to subvert the youth in villages and hamlets. Particular target will be those areas where U. S. operations are frequently conducted.

The DAI LOC District Chief reported that the VC are taxing the people of LOC QUANG (AT 805545) 400 lbs of rice. Allegedly the rice is to be delivered by the people to HUU NIEN (ZC 192485).

QUANG TIN: On 28 July, a defector related the VC held a recruiting ceremony at PHUOC THO (BS 430750) during 26-28 July. Recruited into the ranks were 123 male and female volunteers, plus 82 others from SON KIM. The defector further stated that the SON TINH District is hard pressed for recruits.

At (BT 425096) a female with anti-U.S. propaganda leaflets was apprehended. Content of the leaflets and disposition of the female are unreported at this time.

QUANG TRI: On 29 July, a VC platoon entered TRUNG CHOU Hamlet (YD 286597), assembled the villagers for a propaganda lecture, distributed leaflets and then departed. Content of lecture and leaflets is unknown.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 27.

1. GENERAL. Several more instances of the VC attempting to incite the people against the government and the upcoming elections occurred during the reporting period. Further attempts can be expected as the elections draw near. Continuing indications of the use of young people, both male and female, as low level agents comes from all areas within the ICTZ, and it is to be expected that this activity will continue. Propaganda efforts, both leaflets and VC conducted meetings and acts of terrorism continue, especially in THUA THIEN. Roadside vendors of coca-cola and other products continue to be sources of trouble that deserve the attention of all unit commanders. The espionage, sabotage and terrorism capabilities of these vendors is only limited by their equipment and ingenuity.

2. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

QUANG NAM. On 30 July, two separate incidents involving the use of roadside vendors for low level work occurred. The report concerning the first incident specifically stated that the VC encouraged the local population to sell coca-cola to U. S. and Government troops and report any information obtained. In the second incident two Vietnamese males selling coca-cola near friendly positions were identified as VC by local villagers. (CI comment: In view of past reports on contaminated coca-cola and reports of the VC using roadside vendors as low level agents, it is strongly recommended that all personnel be cautioned not to buy or conduct business with local roadside vendors.)

On 1 August, an intelligence source reported PHAN THUNG as being a VC security and liaison agent in the AN LUONG, XUYEN PHUOC area (HOI AN).

An official of HOA THAI village (coord unk) reported that a number of teenaged male youths dressed as girls in order to reconnoiter Marine positions for the VC.

On 3 August, an unrated report indicated that the VC are planning to send men into the DANANG and DONG GIANG areas. The plan is to infiltrate VC cadre into Buddhist organizations, GVN structure, rock quarry worker groups and U. S. installations. Former VC will be re-recruited if the opportunity arrives. (CI comment: Numerous reports have been received of VC attempts to infiltrate indigenous labor forces.)

A 4 August report from a fairly reliable source reflects that one PHAN VIT (45 years old) and his younger brother PHAN NAM are both VC agents. Reportedly, VIT is a supply and finance agent and NAM is a chief of an intelligence platoon (NFI). The two brothers operate among the woodcutters in the HAI VAN Pass area (AT 930890).

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On 1 August, a report from a usually reliable source relates that an unidentified armed VC unit of about 200 persons has appeared each evening at HOA LUONG (YD 800085). The unit has five nurses who treat the villagers while others of the group entertain the local population with music and plays. Others of the group question the villagers concerning military forces operating in the area. In the mornings they collect salt from the people and then depart. Stated mission is to secure lines of communication between KHE TRE (YD 811080) HUONG THUY (Coord unk) and NAM DONG (Coord unk). (CI comment: VC appear to have adopted "County Fair" tactics.)

4. TERRORISM

QUANG NAM: On 28 July, the 1st Marines reported the assassination, by ambush, of the KIM CHAU village chief and one of his assistants. (CI comment: The village chief in making his daily rounds never varied his habits or route taken to a given area.)

On 2 August, a 10 year old boy suspected of poisoning a local well (BT 159584) was apprehended by elements of the 1st Marines. After questioning, the boy led officials to the man who had given him the substance he had put in the water. Both are presently under investigation by the HOI AN National Police.

Another report from a usually reliable source indicated that a VC assassination squad disguised as civilians is located at BONG AN (BT 030577). Their mission is to assassinate GVN Cadre and "Servicemen" (not specified).

THUA TIEN: Between 27 July and 1 August there were four instances of assassination involving five victims. Two of the victims had notes pinned to their bodies indicating the VC's displeasures over the victim's lack of cooperation and understanding of the VC.

An intelligence source reported that on 30 July, in GIA LE (YD 819180) village, two U. S. military and one U. S. civilian were wounded and one Vietnamese female was killed when VC threw two hand grenades into the establishment the Americans were visiting and where the Vietnamese female worked. (CI comment: Recently a propaganda leaflet found in THUA THIEN related the dangers of an unexpected hand grenade being thrown into commercial establishments.)

5. OTHER: Between 30 July and 4 August there have been four separate reports of VC efforts to disrupt the coming elections from the following locations (BS 842420), (BS 753550), (BS 726575) and (AT 994755). The latter location is immediately adjacent to the DANANG Air Base where a propaganda leaflet calling on all "thinking Vietnamese" people to boycott the elections and to resist the efforts of the "THIEU-KY guys" and the insidious Americans who are behind the plot. The leaflet was signed "The DANANG Citizens Forces".

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QUANG NGAI: On 27 July, a usually reliable source related that the BINH SON VC Cadre intends to hold meetings between 28 August and 28 September at VINH TUY (BS 462822) for all VC cadre and platoon leaders. They will study NLF doctrine and the general military revolution of the 5th Zone.

On 29 July, a VC defector turned himself into the 1st ReconBn (BS 4786) and related that, as a hamlet guerrilla, he received 15 days political indoctrination consisting of anti-American, anti-government propaganda and the "right" of the NLF.

A 3rd ITT report of 31 July indicates a rallier turned himself in after entertaining doubts about the party due to the poor food and living conditions. He stated that while working as a Youth Cadre in NGHIA HANH (BS 648630) he read American propaganda leaflets that had been dropped and listened to aircraft broadcasts.

THUA TIEN: Between 26-31 July, VC held six propaganda meetings at the following locations: TU THUONG (YD 304356), NAM DUONG (YD 635336), AN TRUYEN (YD 815265), HUONG DIEN (YD 967050), THUNH LUONG (YD 681275) and CU CHANH (YD 749165). The theme of the meetings varied but generally boasted of VC victories at PHONG DIEN and QUANG DIEN. A memorial service was conducted for the departed, and the ever present anti-U.S., anti-GVN fare was expanded. (CI comment: Propaganda meetings using the same themes have been previously reported in this same area.)

On 27 July, a usually reliable source reported a training camp for young people is located in the vicinity of TA TRAU (YC 880865). Approximately 800 male and 200 females reportedly are attending courses in small arms and the usual cultural and political subjects; they sustain themselves by working in the fields one half of each day and at night when moonlight permits. (CI comment: PERINTREP #25 reported a "recruiting drive" aimed at obtaining 2,500 men from each district. Those who could not furnish sons were expected to furnish food to feed the "draftees". The recruiting ceremony in QUANG TIN on 28 July appears to be in concert with the foregoing entry. More activity along this line can be expected.

Also on 27 July the Coast Guard reported that due to VC draft activity in the HAI NHUAN and THE MY village areas, approximately 300 people have moved out of the villages and now sleep on their boats approximately 300 yards off shore (YD 6645).

Another propaganda lecture was delivered to the people of PHU BAI (XD 9011) on 31 July. The lecture concerned the Marines leaving the area soon; the local population was encouraged to help the VC make the Marines leave sooner. One of the speakers, a woman, is believed to have lectured in the area previously. (CI comment: There appears to be a VC Propaganda "Team" operating in the area, composed of three males and one female.)

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A recent 3rd Marine Regt comment is considered to be valid throughout the TAOR. "Unusual absence of people (especially children) and animals can be an indication of imminent local VC action. Villagers wishing to preserve their lives and their livestock have a tendency to stay away from impending firefights. **Conversely**, a conspicuous gathering of people can also be an indicator, as shown by a recent mining incident. The local population, knowing of a mine in the road, waited in the village until a Marine patrol detonated the mine, thus clearing the road for the villagers use."

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III MAF

DANANG, RVN

160800H August 1966

Ser: **0104566**

PERINTREP NC. 28

Period Covered: 070001 - 132400 August 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16
NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was characterized by a continued avoidance of large scale attack. Small scale attacks increased within areas of operation.

a. QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Activity in the Operation PRAIRIE area was relatively light during the period, although contact was made with a reinforced company size force on the night of 8-9 August. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to small scale, isolated incidents.

b. QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR and in the Operation MACON area. The most significant contact involved an attack on a reinforced squad of Co A, 1st Bn, 1st Marines by VC in about platoon strength at 1930, 12 August.

c. QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. VC/NVA activity increased in the area of Operation COLORADO. Several encounters with VC/NVA units in up to battalion strength took place during the period. The encounters were of short duration and were typified by VC/NVA avoidance of large scale attacks. Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to small scale, isolated incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC/NVA initiated incidents for the reporting period consisted of 188 AA fires, 154 small unit engagements, 18 mine/booby trap, one hamlet harassment and one act of terrorism for a total of 362.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - e. Negative.

f. Admin Units. 12 July. NGUYEN VAN KHOA, who was captured in THUA THIEN Province on 7 July, stated that a VC training camp for recruits is located in the vicinity of (XD 998596). The camp is composed of five barracks,

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III MAF PERINTREP #28

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each having a 100 man capacity. Training subjects covered include international and in-country politics, NFLSVN policy, use of grenades and use of the K-44 rifle. (G-2 Cmt: F-6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. 188 anti-aircraft fire incidents were reported during the period, an increase of 146% over the previous reporting period. 60 aircraft sustained a total of 229 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (BT 2020 - AT 9030 - BT 0020 - XD 9050) with intense fire being reported in many cases. 13 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i. - r. Negative.

s. Infiltration. 10 August, QUANG TRI. A coded CRD agent whose reliability is unknown, reported that a NVA Division, designated the 307th, infiltrated into RVN on 21 July by crossing the BEN HAI River in the vicinity of (YD 015703). He stated that 90mm recoilless rifles were organic to the division. (G-2 Cmt: F/6; 307th Div is possibly an AKA for the 324th B NVA Div. 90mm recoilless rifles referred to could be either B-10 82mm recoilless guns or B-90, 90mm rocket launchers. Both have been reported in the I Corps area.)

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. VC/NVA personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of: 284 KIA, 562 KIA (Prob), seven WIA, 26 VCC and one NVAC. A total of 15 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon were captured during the period.

f. Morale. No Change.

g. - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps for the reporting period consisted of partly cloudy to cloudy skies with occasional light rainshowers. Temperatures averaged 93° high and 77° low. Winds were mostly variable from five to eight knots. Visibility ranged from 10 - 20 miles.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

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1. Other Significant Information.

(1) 30 July. QUANG TIN Province agent reported that, since 20 April, the VC have been using an underground cache built into the bank of the TAM KY River to store rice. Entrance to the storage area is provided by two openings under the water level at (BT 308158) and (BT 311148). These openings lead to the cache (BT 307138). Security is provided by one guerrilla squad. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 24 July. A QUANG NGAI Province JTAD agent reported that the VC have set up a rice storage camp at NUOC NHIEU (BS 488516). 20 tons of rice is stored in 15 thatched roof houses (each four by six meters) comprising the camp. The houses are built under large trees to protect them from aerial observation. The camp reportedly was hit by airstrikes in June. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP NO. 27.

C. A. SACHS

C. A. SACHS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|-------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 | CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 | CG 2D BDE, ROK MC | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG IFFORCEV | 2 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CG IIFORCEV | 1 | CO 30TH MCR | 9 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG 3D MARDIV | 15 | CO FLSC | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CO, DET C-1, 5TH USSF | 2 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CMDR, I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| | | CICV | 1 |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 28

DONG HA/CAM LO AREA

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN AND WITHIN A 10 MILE RADIUS).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 324TH B DIV (HQ & SPT) NVA | CONF | 1,910 | YD 0262* | UNK | CO-GEN TRAN DO XO-CHU VAN DOI PO-NGUYEN TIEN LOI |
| 803RD REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,500 | QUANG TRI* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-MAJ VO THIET XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 812TH REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0352* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-LT COL NGUYEN MINH XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 90TH REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0567* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-CAPT MAI VAN CU |
| 4TH BN 270TH BRIG | CONF | 450 | DMZ/QUANG TRI | UNK | CO-MAJ HO TINH |

*LAST RPTD LOCATIONS. UNITS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO DMZ FOR REORGANIZATION.

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2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES RADIUS).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|----------------------|--|---|
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF | 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LE VAN HAT |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF | 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST. | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO-LT TUAN PO-2ND LT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN PO-DUNG |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50? | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH; PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK -SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MM RR | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT. (WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF | 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES THE 95TH "B" REGIMENT (NVA) IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DISTRICT VICINITY ZC0495. IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH REGIMENT (NVA), THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR, COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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DANANG TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE. (UNITS IN AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE TAOR)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HDQTRS | CONF | 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XC-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XC-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| | | | | | |
|--|------|------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 51ST BN | PRCB | 300 | AT 9069 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 5TH BN | PRCB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XC-THEI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18 SMC | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET |
| 2. <u>RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR)</u> | | | | | |
| 3RD REGT (NVA) | CONF | 1500 | QUE SON DIST | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XC KIEM PO THAN |
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XC-NGUYEN VAN LA PC-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PRCB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PRCB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO ANH BVU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR; 3-MG 18-AR | CO-CAPT DANG CAC KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18X12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6X75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6X120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" REGT (NVA), UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC ZC 0495 IN PHU LOC DISTRICT IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|----------------------------|--|---|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2000 | TAM KY/TIEN PHOUIC DIST | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MGS | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XC-SR CAPT LUU THANH DUC PO-NGUYEN ICH. |
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THANG |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 2810 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN; BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LNG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONF)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--|--------------|------------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XC-THANH PC-QUANG |
| TRA BONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |
| 2. <u>RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).</u> | | | | | |
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XC-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHCI |
| 20TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XC-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 5262 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-MAI KIM |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEM XO-SUNG PO-MIEU |
| 89 B CO | CONF | 90 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO-LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEN MIEU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 40 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MANH |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| A-13 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-MG | CO-HONG LE |
| A-34 CO | CONF | 40 | BT 0303 | UNK | UNK |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE 3RD REGIMENT (NVA) LOC IN QUE SON DIST AND THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITIONS BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 28.

1. 803d NVA Regt 324th B Div. Interrogation of NVA Sgt NGUYEN MANH HUNG captured during Operation HASTINGS disclosed the following information. The 1st Bn, 46th NVA Regt, 330 Div was shifted to the 803d NVA Regt following a year of unit type training. The 803d NVA Regt was stationed in NGHE AN (P) at that time. In April 1966 the 1st Bn began moving south. The movement was made entirely on foot with all traveling being done at night. It took approximately one month for the battalion to reach the BEN HAI River and cross into SVN near "Hill 333" (interrogator determined to be Hill 271 vicinity of (YD 013660)). Enroute south the unit purchased dogs from the local populace for food. A ten day supply of rice, salt, dried fish and canned beef was carried by each man. The food was old and much of it spoiled enroute. Each man also carried from 100 to 150 rounds of ammunition, six grenades, hammock, mosquito net, tent (shelter half), two uniforms and a back-pack. No infiltration training was given the unit nor was any special infiltration equipment issued.

After the 803d NVA Regt crossed into SVN it took the name SONG HUONG and the 324th B Div took the name MUNG MOI THANG NAM. After arriving in SVN the 1st Bn was hit by two airstrikes on about 12 July and 15 July. The unit was warned about two hours in advance of these strikes. The first raid missed the unit's location in the vicinity of (YD 0367). The captive did not know if anyone was killed or wounded in the bombing.

About 18 July an unknown element of the 1st Bn set up an ambush for an American patrol. The patrol apparently broke through the ambush and the NVA unit attempted to flee the area. Artillery and airstrikes were called resulting in approximately 20 KIA or WIA.

The captive rallied to American troops after a cell of the squad for which he was squad leader was hit by artillery while manning an OP on "Hill 333". He had a safe conduct pass in his possession. He picked up the pass several days before and concealed it under fear of punishment.

The strength of the 1st Bn, 803d NVA Regt was about 600 with 130 men in each of the three rifle companies and weapons company. The battalion had a transportation company of 70 men, an information platoon of 20 men, and a liaison squad of nine men. The recon squad he led had nine men assigned.

2. 803d NVA Regt 324th B Div. The following information was received from NVA PFC VO HUNG VAN of the C-18 Recon Co, 803d NVA Regt. The captive was a high school teacher before he was drafted into the NVA in May 1965. He received three months basic training at YEN THANIT (D), NGHE AN (P). The first month was devoted mainly to political subjects and discipline.

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The next two months were spent on small arms training and infantry tactics. At the completion of this training several of the teachers drafted with him were given commissions; however, since he was not a member of the Communist Party and his father was considered a rich man he could not become an officer. During July 1965 he was transferred to the C-18 Recon Co, 803d NVA Regt. He spent almost one year training in map reading and reconnaissance patrolling, as well as demolitions.

In April the 803d NVA Regt received orders to go to SVN. The C-18 Recon Co left by truck ahead of the regiment, one squad to a truck, and traveled south on Route 1. Upon reaching the BEN HAI River they turned to the right and followed the river bank for about 10 kms; it was here they left the trucks. The trucks returned the same way they came, while the C-18 Recon Co crossed the river and continued south.

The crossing was made in the vicinity of (YD 7176). During the remainder of May and into June the C-18 Recon Co found routes of march for the 803d Regt and later led them to Hill 402 in the vicinity of (YD 998617), where they dug defensive positions and prepared to ambush any ARVN or American units entering the area.

The 803d NVA Regt was bombed one time but no one was hurt. The thick canopy of trees caused the bombs to go off before hitting the ground. They also learned that whenever they saw an L-19 aircraft fly over their positions in about two hours they might receive an airstrike or artillery fire. They didn't fear the strikes or artillery fire because they were forewarned.

The captive gave the following frequency ranges for the radios used by his company: Type 71, 0 to 15 KCS; Type 72, 0 to 10 KCS; Type 75, 0 to 300 KCS. The captive indicated that he decided to rally after picking up a leaflet dropped on his home base in DO LUONG (D) NGHE AN (P) NVN. He also thinks that many other men picked them up and read them.

Some significant personalities indicated by the captive are: Major DIEP, CO 803d NVA Regt; Maj DUYET, XO, 803d Regt; and Maj DAM, Political Officer, 803d NVA Regt. The captive stated that the C-18 Recon Co strength was six officers armed with pistols and 84 men armed with AK-47s.

3. The following extracts are from documents captured during Operation HASTINGS. The explanations given originated at the Captured Documents Evaluation Center MACV.

"Rice Account Book kept by TRONG LUU listing quantities of rice issued, between 23 June and 14 July 1966, to the various elements of a unit identified as the 803d NVA Regt AKA "CUU LONG", 324th (B) Div. Strength of the regiment is estimated as 2,541 men, assigned as follows:

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- K.4: 557 men
- K.5: 545 men (four companies: Villages 1, 2, 3 and 4).
- K.6: 567 men
- Village 12: 125 men
- Village 13: 85 men
- Village 14: 132 men
- Village 15: 69 men
- Village 16: 96 men
- Village 17: 64 men
- Village 18: 121 men (Transportation)
- Village 19: 31 men (Surgical)
- Village 20: 149 men

Other recipient units were: "SONG" HQ, Worksite 1/5 [1 May] (rice loans), V.3/HQ, [Unit] 61, V.2/ HQ, "CUU LONG", HQ Guards."

"Status of equipment of 9th Bn, 90th NVA Regt, 324th B Div as of 26 Feb 1966 signed by LE VAN QUYNH, Bn Chief of Staff:

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Quantity</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|
| K51 pistol | 14 |
| K54 Pistol | 10 |
| GKC rifle | 117 |
| AK rifle | 133 |
| RPD Light MG | 25 |
| RP46 Light MG | 9 |
| Heavy MG | 6 |
| 82mm mortar | 6 |
| 82mm RR | 2 |

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|-------------------------------|-------------|
| B40 rocket launcher | 9 |
| Flare pistol | 2 |
| Compass | 7 |
| Field glasses 8 x 30 | 5 |
| Field glasses 6 x 30 | 5 |
| Mattock | 106 |
| Machete | 79 |
| Wire cutter | 9 |
| Grenade case (for 2 grenades) | 136 |
| Granade case (for 4 grenades) | 160 |
| K51 ammunition | 552rds |
| K56 ammunition | 85, 736 rds |
| K53 ammunition | 14, 715 rds |
| B40 shells | 36 shells |
| Mortar shells | 127 shells |
| RR shells | 30 shells |
| Grenades | 1,150 |
| Shovel | 12 |

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 28.

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period VC espionage efforts appear to have been centered in the QUANG NAM Province area, with particular attention to the DANANG TAOR. More reports of children being used for early warning of the approach of U. S. troops and for low level espionage is evident. One incident of the VC employing vendors to collect information on a forthcoming operation was reported. There was no major increase in VC sabotage trends. However, one report may indicate the employment of a large sum of money by the VC to entice the willing saboteur to interdict certain areas of Highway #1. Probably the most significant trend has been the VC's increased interest in the forthcoming elections. It now appears that the VC are in receipt of formulated plans and have scheduled meetings to extort and coerce the average Vietnamese into not voting. Presently this VC activity appears to be centered in the contested areas and will probably remain there. However, some attempts to demonstrate in major urban areas may also be manifested as the campaigning commences.

2. ESPIONAGE.

QUANG NAM. A 9 August report from a reliable source indicates that key VC cadre remain in hamlets disguised as Monks, or village elders, to escape detection by USMC. (CI Comment: There have been several reports of VC using disguises of Monks to escape detection and apprehension.)

A 8 August report from a usually reliable source states that a VC battalion is planning an attack on the Marble Mountain Facility. The battalion will be assisted in intelligence collection by children and women from an unidentified "Womens Intelligence Platoon". (CI Comment: VC tendency to use women and children as espionage agents is well established; however, this is the first report of a "Womens Intelligence Platoon", probably more properly defined as a number of women trained for espionage purposes.)

A 6 August report states that an espionage team composed of the following men: TRUONG NHAN, TRUONG LU, HUYNH TAN, DOAN BUT, TRAN TAO and LE HAI. TRAN TAO travels by boat from QUANG DONG (H) to THAI CAM (H) (AT 978629). At THAI CAM they collect information from VC "agents". All members of the "team" have Government of Vietnam Identification Cards and usually disguise themselves as a common Vietnamese and mix with the local people at QUANG DONG (H). (CI Comment: Past reports have indicated the VC have confiscated identification materials from local Vietnamese. If the above report is true, it appears that QUANG DONG (H) may also be a contact point for this net and the Vietnamese identification papers permit infiltration. Past reports also tend to substantiate a probable VC espionage net located in this area.)

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On 6 August a HIEU NHON government official reported the following information was obtained from a 12 year old VC suspect (NGUYEN PHUOC DUNG). The VC have taught the local villagers simple English phrases such as "Do you remember your home", "Do you remember your wife". If Marines enter the village seeking information on VC dispositions in the surrounding area, the children are taught to answer "No, the people here are good and make an honest living". Children are also taught to gather around U. S. troops as they enter a village and conduct conversations in an attempt to delay military actions as long as possible. Other children are taught to run up to the approaching troops and shout "Hello, Hello". This is a warning to VC. Children are also taught basic fundamentals of espionage and given the mission to observe the Marine's arms and strength. The VC have also indicated they would give children poison to mix with food stuffs and drinking water of the Marines. (CI Comment: Several agencies have reported similar systems taught to children. Increased activity by children, when entering areas on sweep or clear operations, may indicate presence of VC.)

On 10 August a patrol from the 3rd Engineer Battalion operating in the vicinity of (AT 880513) apprehended a 14 year old Vietnamese boy. The boy was asking a number of questions about Marine activity in the vicinity of Hill 65 (AT 878577), such as "How many patrols leave daily", "How many 81 mortars are there and where are they employed".

QUANG NGAI. On 4 August an intelligence source reported that the VC had received information of impending "Operation FRANKLIN" several days prior to its commencement. The VC had learned of the operation from merchants selling soft drinks, beer, trinkets, etc., to Marine and ARVN troops. Reportedly friendly troops freely discussed this forthcoming operation. (CI Comment: There are frequent reports of vendors being employed to gain information. This report, if true, would substantiate that these vendors do pass information to the VC.)

3. SABOTAGE.

QUANG NAM. On 5 August a usually reliable source reported that LUU MUON and LUU DINH, both from HOA VANG (D) will soon return from Saigon with 2,000,000 \$VN(piasters) currency. These persons will attempt to bribe ARVN and "others" to conduct acts of sabotage against bridges on Highway #1. (CI Comments: This is the first report of monies arriving from Saigon to be employed for a specific act of sabotage. If it is true, the VC may have designs, and apparently are willing to pay the price, to interdict particular sites along Highway #1.)

4. POLITICAL.

QUANG NGAI. On 6 August a usually reliable source reports that the VC District Chief, NGHIA HANH, has ordered a class to be conducted to instruct village cadres on special measures against the coming elections. The class

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will be taught by KIM SON and HO THI DUNG in the vicinity of coordinates (BS 610500) for a period of 4 days. (CI Comment: The special measures were not elaborated on, but this action does indicate that VC are calling special meetings to discuss plans to disrupt the forthcoming election vote.)

On 8 August an intelligence source reports that the VC have taken Identification Cards from the people in the area so they will not be able to vote in the forthcoming elections.

QUANG NAM. An intelligence source reported on 28 July that the VC held a meeting of villagers at HOA THAI (V) (AT 9668). The subject of the discussion was the forthcoming elections. The people were instructed not to vote and were told of VC assassination teams being brought into HOA VAN (D). These teams reportedly will assassinate government candidates and create general turmoil during elections.

A QUANG NAM National Police report of 3 August states that the VC Current Affairs District Committee has directed the following harassment campaign against the forthcoming 11 September National Elections: (1) Increase the military activity against the scattered outpost of Vietnamese and allied troops, lay mines to destroy bridges and interrupt traffic. The Special Operations Group to be prepared to lay mines, set up grenade traps at election sites, terrorize, kidnap, and murder anti-communist elements, and to produce chaos among the masses; (2) Organize meetings and training classes for the people who desire to oppose the elections, teaching them how to use propaganda to distort government intentions. Endeavor to induce the Buddhist element to firmly boycott the election but if they are required to vote because of their location, they should be instructed to cast blank ballots; (3) The local guerrilla forces will stop the people from going to the polls on election day and will break up groups of people congregating for campaign purposes preceding the election. They will be paying particular attention to the relatives of VC soldiers and cadre; (4) All guerrillas and cadre should attempt to register and obtain a constituent card in order to facilitate harassment activity on election day; and (5) Conduct a campaign to induce the refugees to return to their homes and support their soldiers.

THUA THIEN. On 3 August a VC squad entered HAM PHO HA (V) in the vicinity of coordinates (YD 955070) and assembled residents for a propaganda lecture urging the residents not to participate in the forthcoming elections.

CI Comments: In response to EEI's, reports of VC interest in the forthcoming elections have increased. Of immediate interest is the VC Current Affairs Committee directions to the QUANG NAM Province area. It now appears that the VC have definite plans to disrupt the voting procedures and will attempt, through coercion and terrorism, to dissuade local villagers from casting ballots. The collection of Identification Cards may have a two fold

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purpose, since these papers are one of the documents required for both registration and voting. The VC may collect identification cards to preclude locals from voting and/or introduce their own cadre to cast ballots. VC interest is expected to increase as the elections draw near, with emphasis on the contested areas.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

QUANG NAM. On 4 August, a usually reliable source reported that the VC Commissioner of DAI LOC District has instructed the villages of LE QUONG, LOC DON, LOC HOA, and LOC PHUOC to provide 20 bags of salt and the necessary porters to transport this item to the HUU NIEN mountain base in the vicinity of coordinates (ZC 192485). The salt is to be used for preserving food during the rainy season.

On 5 August the VC killed 14 people (six men, four women and four children) in CAM VANG vicinity (AT 965602). Some of the victims had been badly beaten. (CI Comment: This may possibly have been an act of reprisal because operations in that area had previously netted several ralliers.)

THUA THIEN. On 7 August an intelligence source reported one man had been shot six times at close range by two VC at (YD 899114).

On 7 August an intelligence source reported 30 Viet Cong entered the hamlet of AN NONG, vicinity (YD 925105), and held a forced meeting of the villagers. The VC demanded 3,000 - 7,000 \$VN or the villagers would be killed. Two of the VC were females armed with grenades. VC stated they would return later (date and time not specified) to collect the levy.

There was one incident of a Marine purchasing bottled soft drink from roadside vendors which, it is suspected, contained slivers of glass. The vendors, two females, were apprehended in HOA VANG District at (AT 94478). (CI Comment: It is again strongly recommended that all personnel be cautioned not to do business with roadside vendors.)

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 230800H August 1966
 Ser: **0111966**

PERINTREP NO. 29

Period Covered: 140001 - 202400 August 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000 sheets NE 48-16
 NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was characterized by avoidance of large scale attacks, except in QUANG NGAI Province where one battalion sized attack was reported. Small scale attacks against RF and PF units increased throughout the zone.

a. QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN-PHU BAI TAOR. Activity in the Operation PRAIRIE area increased slightly during the period. Contact was made with a company sized unit in ambush positions along Route 9 on 17 August and another company sized unit on 19 August. A railroad train was mined and tracks damaged at (ZD 178009) on 19 August as small scale attacks against lines of communication continued. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM-DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR and in the Operation MACON and SUWANNEE areas. The most significant contact involved an attack on the facilities in the area of the 3rd Tank Bn and 3rd AmTrac Bn by a platoon sized VC unit which employed 82mm and 60mm mortars, as well as small arms.

c. QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI-CHU LAI TAOR. VC/NVA activity decreased in the area of Operation COLORADO. Several VC attacks on RF and PF units in multi-company and battalion strength took place in QUANG NGAI on 14, 18, 19, and 20 August. Two refugee camps in QUANG NGAI (BS 625761) were destroyed by VC on 16 August leaving 900 homeless. A bridge on Highway 1 at (BS 724569) was blown on 14 August. Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 279, as follows: one assault by fire; 162 small unit engagements; 104 AA fires and 11 mine/booby trap incidents; and one act of terrorism.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

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III MAF PERINTREP # 29

14-20 Aug 66

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- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 19 August. The following information was extracted from I FFORCEV PERINTREP NO. 29:

a. "Booby-trap Cigarette Lighters: "Zippo" type lighters containing explosives have been discovered in PHONG DINH (P). According to EOD discription, the device measures 2.75" by 1.375" by 0.625". They may be chrome plated and/or bear an advertisement on the side. The explosive material is normally triggered by spinning the flint wheel, but may be rigged for detonation by other means. An EOD report claims these exploding lighters are capable of seriously injuring a person's hand and possibly causing blindness, if detonated near the face." (Source: J2MACV).

b. "VC Cigarette Packages: A VC anti-personnel mine recovered by the MSS, SADEC, IV CORPS, recently has been examined and evaluated by MACV Technical Intelligence and EOD personnel, who noted the following; The mine was contained in a soldered and crimped metal container which was concealed inside an "ARA" brand cigarette package (Cambodian cigarettes). The anti-personnel fragments were embedded in the explosive charge. The chemical delay fuze used an oxidizing agent (probably acid) to eat through a series of cardboard discs into a chemical pellet. The resulting chemical reaction produces sufficient heat to initiate the detonator booster component. The delay can be varied by adding or removing cardboard discs." (Source: J2MACV) (G-2 Cmt: Although these devices have not been reported in I Corps, the VC could employ them at any time.)

e. Negative.

f. Admin Units.

(1) 17 August. A QUANG NAM SMIAT agent reported that as of 1 August a VC training camp is located in a valley in the area of grid square (AT 9435). The camp is hidden under jungle canopy and consists of four thatched structures, each measuring approximately 8 x 15 meters in size. The camp can accomodate 200-300 trainees, but only 100 men wearing mixed uniforms have been observed. The area is well guarded by VC sentries and placed off limits to civilians. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

(2) 17 August. QUANG NAM agent report of a VC Nurses Training Course. Approximately 30 young female residents from various sub-districts in DUY XUYEN (D) which are pro-VC, have been assembled to attend a nurse training course at AN THANH (1) (BT 049453). The course began on 2 August 1966 and will last until the end of August. Upon completion of the nurse training course, the nurses will be assigned to various local main force guerrilla units in DUY XUYEN (D). (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

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(3) 3 August. QUANG TIN SMLAT report of a VC Detainee Camp. A detainee camp, established by the VC in 1964, is located in a densely wooded area at (BT 342081). The camp commander is HUYNH HA. Approximately 120 political and military detainees are in this camp. Interrogation of detainees is conducted by five VC security agents. An average of two detainees die every day from sickness and lack of food. The security of the camp is provided by one VC guerrilla platoon. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

(4) 8 August. A THUA THIEN agent reported the location of a VC communications base camp at HONG Mountain near LE Canyon (YD 353315). It consists of one leaf house and two canvas houses, all of which are furnished with radios. The houses are close together, and have antennas about four meters high emerging from their roofs. About 30 persons were seen working in the houses. The camp is guarded by about 150 troops. Many trenches have been dug from the base to the nearby jungle.

(5) 15 August. A QUANG NGAI agent reported that a VC hospital is located in the vicinity of (BS 406824). This facility is reportedly staffed with 38 aidmen. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

g. Negative.

h. Air Defenses. Anti-aircraft fire incidents for the reporting period decreased by 41% from the previous period. 21 aircraft received a total of 62 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (BS 7040) and (BT 1030). Intensity of fire was moderate. Eight cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i. - j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Hvy Mortars. 25 July. A QUANG TRI JTAD agent reported an unidentified regiment was deployed from (YD 165776) to (YD 110777). Among the weapons listed was a report of two 105mm mortars. (G-2 Cmt: There are no known 105mm mortars in the Sino-Soviet Bloc weapons inventory. The source could possibly be referring to 107mm mountain pack mortars, if so, it would be the first indication of this type weapon in the I Corps Zone.

l. - q. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

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c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Losses. VC/NVA personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 253 KIA, 471 KIA (prob), and 26 VCC. Two crew-served and 28 individual weapons were captured during the period.

f. Morale. No Change.

g. New Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Barriers, Obstacles, Defensive Works, Fortifications, and Booby Traps. 6 August. Air photo missions 4710 showed an increase in defensive fortifications in the SONG VE Valley (BS 5639) east of BATO. Previous coverage of this area was made on 1 July.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. In general the I Corps area experienced partly cloudy skies, with some overcast and light rain showers during the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 96° high and 80° low. Winds were mostly variable from five to ten knots. Visibility ranged from 7 to 12 miles.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee and Document Reports. Annex B.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 5 August. A QUANG NAM agent reported that the VC have a warehouse located at (BT 028430). Reportedly, 150 barrels of salted fish and 1,000 Ang of rice are stored here. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

(2) 11 August. The following information was obtained from a QUANG TIN agent and relates to a new VC plan of action. Current allied attacks against VC concentrations of forces in QUANG TIN (P) caused VC leaders to call a meeting which was held on 11 August at (BT 165048), and presided over by generals DAM QUANG TRUNG and HOANG THAO. A new plan was decided on by the VC as a result of the meeting. According to the new plan, regular and main force units would provide support for guerrilla units during the course of large scale allied operations by conducting such harassing actions as ambushes and raids. However, the regular and main force units would continue keeping track of all Allied forces as well as the area situation, and they would execute the initially planned attack against TAM KY City, QUANG TIN (P), as soon as the Allied forces concluded their sweep operations and withdrew from the area. The VC were planning to attack the province seat and occupy it for at least 24 hours in order to have enough time to destroy government installations there and capture important cadre.

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(3) 8 August. A THUA THIEN SMIAT agent reported the location of several VC Base Areas in the vicinity of (YC 9684). The Committee of THUA THIEN (P) is located at A XIEM, near KA RUM Canyon, (YC 965842). It consists of three leaf houses with antenna poles from roofs and antenna wires connecting the houses. The Regional Committee Headquarters is situated at DOC KHI Canyon (YC 985830) and is composed of four leaf houses and one canvas house. About 30 persons work there. At TRAU Canyon (YC 990865), there is a clinic composed of 10 houses grouped closely together. A generator for this clinic runs constantly. At DOI VONG (YC 955855), there is a very large leaf house and canvas house. Many large poles, about 10 meters high, stand in front of these houses with antenna wires strung between them. Work is being done on the road in this area in order to open a route between KHE TRE (YC 875900) and LOC MY (AT 810850). Between 2 and 8 August 1966, several groups of civilians were seen carrying wounded persons and food from QUANG NAM to the A XIEM area.

(4) 15 August. A TRA BONG (D) agent reported that 200 kilos of rice and many mines are stored in a VC cache located at (BS 402860). (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

(5) A report received from QUANG TIN SMIAT agent on 18 August stated that as of 20 July 1966, a total of 10 VC rice storage areas and one structure which stored an unknown number of bicycles, were located in the following areas: (BT 335093), (BT 336090), (BT 336094) and (BT 339091). An estimated 100 tons of rice has been taken from farmers in VC controlled areas and stored there as VC controlled agricultural products. The bicycles had been seized by the VC from civilians who were considered as pro-government or politically non-aligned individuals. Approximately 120 part-time guerrillas provided security for these storage areas. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

(6) 17 August. A QUANG NAM agent reported that as of 4 August a VC underground food cache was located at DON LAM (H) (BT 140485). The cache is made of concrete and measures six by eight meters. Supplies stored here include rice, salt, sauce, etc. (G-2 Cmt: F/6.)

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP NO. 27.

C. A. Sachs
C. A. SACHS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 |
| CG IFFORCEV | 2 |
| CG IIPFORCEV | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 |
| CG 3D MARDIV | 15 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST | 1 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 |
| CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 |
| CG 2D BDE, ROK MC | 1 |
| CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CO FLSC | 1 |
| CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CO DET C-1 5TH USSF | 2 |
| CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| CICV | 1 |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTEP NO. 29

DONG H/CAN LO AREA

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF TFOR)

| ORGANIZATION | CLASS | STR | LOCATION | EQUIPMENT | PERSONALITIES |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------------|--|--|
| 324TH B DIV (HQ & SPT) NVA | CONF | 1,910 | YD 0262* | TRK | OO-GEN TRAN DO XO-CHU VAN DOI PO-NGUYEN TIEN LOT |
| 503RD NVA REGT | CONF | 2500 | QUANG TINH* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | OO-MAJ VO THIEP XO-DUYEN PO-MAJ THUONG |
| 812TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2500 | YD 0352* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | OO-TRUOL NGUYEN MINH XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 90TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2500 | YD 0567* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | OO-THIEP XO-CHUNG PO-CAPT MAI VAN CU |
| 4TH BN, 270TH BATT TRU | CONF | 450 | DH/QUANG TRU | UNK | OO-MAJ HO TINH |

*LAST IPFD LOCATIONS. UNITS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO DMZ FOR REORGANIZATION ALTHOUGH CERTAIN UNIDENTIFIED UNITS OF AT LEAST BATTAL SIZE ARE BELIEVED LOCATED SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

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2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|---------------------|--|---|
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF | 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LE VAN HAT |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF | 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO- LT TUAN PO-2NDLT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MM RR | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF | 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES THE 95TH "B" REGIMENT (NVA) IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DISTRICT VICINITY ZC 0495. IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH REGIMENT (NVA), THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR, COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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DANANG TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HDQTRS | CONF | 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54 AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5 AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAT) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7 AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18 SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| U/I BN | PROB | 300 | BT 0764 | UNK | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| | | | | | |
|-------------|------|-----|---------|--|---|
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| DIEN BAN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0335 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-LMG; 18-SMG | CO-PHAN ANK MAN NGUYEN DINH KHIET |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 3RD REGT (NVA) | CONF | 1500 | QUE SON DIST | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PC-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PC-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PC-ANH VU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | ZC 0592 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR; 3-MG 18-AR | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18x12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6x75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6x120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" REGT (NVA), UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC ZC 0495 IN PHU LOC DISTRICT IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

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CHU LAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|--|--|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2000 | TAM KY/TIEN PHOUO DIST | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MGS | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SR CAPT LUU THANH DUC PO-NGUYEN ICH |
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THANG |
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-82MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO-NGUYEN TAM XO-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PO-QUYET |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW: NGHIA TUU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 2810 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN BAC |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |
| TRA BONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 20TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XO-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 5262 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-MAI KIM |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU |
| 89 B CO | CONF | 90 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO-LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEN MIEU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 40 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MANH |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| A-13 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-MG | CO-HONG LE |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| A-34 CO | CONF | 40 | BT 0303 | UNK | UNK |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE 3RD REGIMENT (NVA) LOC IN QUE SON DIST AND THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITIONS BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 29

1. 3d Regt (NVA) 620th Div. Initial interrogation of NVA captives Sgt TA VAN PAN, Pvt PHAM VAN TAN, Pvt NGUYEN HUU TA, and Pvt DANG VAN HUI, captured on 6 August during Operation COLORADO, disclosed the following information. The captives were laying wire for the 1st Bn of the 3d Regt (NVA) in the vicinity of (AT 989323) when they were captured. One captive indicated that the regimental CP was located 7 kms north of capture point. Another stated that the regimental CP was located at (AT 943339). A third claimed the CP was located two kms west of THACH TH VONG (V). The CP was reported as being underground with 40 VC as security for five high ranking cadre. All captives agreed that the three battalions of the regiment were widely dispersed from the regimental CP.

Most of the captives are ill with malaria and the captives estimate that about 90 percent of the 3d Regt (NVA) are afflicted with malaria. The 18th Company was reported especially hard hit. They report one nurse is assigned to each company. The captives disagreed on the date the unit left NVN, with estimates varying from three to seven months ago. The captives state they came through Laos to the high mountains of TRUNG LON. They "walked parallel to the delta" at night and through the jungle during hours of daylight. The 3d Regt (NVA) arrived in SVN intact. Their morale is evaluated as fair.

The 18th Signal Co consists of a wire platoon of 30 men, a messenger platoon of 30 men and a radio platoon of 10 men. The units equipment consists of telephones, a crank type radio, 5-2 watt radios and 2-15 watt radios. The mission of the unit is to provide communication for the regiment. Each man in the company carries a CKC rifle and 100 rounds of ammunition. Food is supplied by VC guerrilla forces.

Significant personalities include: LtCol VIET SON, CO 3d Regt (NVA); Capt LONG, CO 1st Bn; 1stLt DUNG, CO 18th Co; 2dLt HAQUY NHIEN, XO 18th Co; and 2dLt LAM, Comm Officer.

2. 90th Regt (NVA) 324th B Div. NVA Corporal BUI PHU NLTUONG captured during Operation HASTINGS gave the following information during detailed interrogation. The captive was drafted about 12 May 1965 at DA VIEN (D) HINH DINH (P) NVN. During the following six months he received training with the 324th B Div at the NGHE AN training center. His training emphasized ambushes, rifle firing, the use of the hand grenade, operation of the 82mm mortar and some tactics. Following the six months training, the 324th B Div moved to QUANG DINH training center where they received similar training.

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The 324th B Division departed for the south about 12 May 1966. The 90th Regt (NVA) left first, and the 803d and 812th Regts (NVA) were to leave later, at five day intervals. No infiltration training was given and the captive believes no one was left behind. The regiment traveled only at night. They were not attacked by either ground or air forces during the march. They had traveled about one month when they crossed the BEN HAI River. At the fording place the river was only 20 meters wide and knee deep. During the march the men were troubled with malaria and kidney disorders. The corpsmen had shots for the malaria but not for other disorders.

During the first battle his unit participated in, the subject was captured. He stated that morale was low and the men were mostly draftees who did not want to fight.

The captive indicated that the 7th Bn, 90th Regt (NVA) had a strength of about 550 and the 4th company of the 7th Bn had a strength of about 130, which included four officers and two scouts. The 4th Co lost 27 men through disease and desertion and an unknown number of combat casualties. The 4th Co was equipped with 20 AK-47, 28 K-44, four pistols, four 82mm mortars, two 75mm recoilless rifles and six 7.62mm belt fed medium machine guns.

Significant personalities include: Col NAM LONG, CO 324th B Div; Col NGUYEN TIEN LOI, XO 324th B Div; Maj DUOC, CO 90th Regt (NVA); Maj PHIEN, XO 90 Regt (NVA); Sr Capt NGUYEN VANH QUANT, CO 7th Bn; and Capt LY, XO 7th Bn.

3. 812th Regt (NVA) 324th B Div. NVA captive NGUYEN SI VINH captured during Operation HASTINGS gave the following information during detailed interrogation. He indicated that he was drafted into the NVA in May of 1965 in DO LUONG (D) NGHE AN (P). The 26 men of the 3d Plt, 4th Co were drafted with him. The 324th B Div was established at about that time and trained for about a year in DO LUONG (D). The training of his platoon consisted of aiming the 82mm recoilless rifle at prominent land features, aiming and shooting the SKS carbine, and political subjects. On one occasion the captive fired three rounds from the SKS carbine at a black silhouette target with a light spot in the center. The political subjects consisted of lectures on patriotism and propaganda for NVN and against Americans and ARVN. The captive knew before coming to SVN he would be fighting Americans and ARVN, but received no information concerning US or ARVN tactics.

About 1 May the 324th B Div moved to QUANG BINH (P), where one month was spent as a coastal defense unit. The unit then moved to HA TINH (P) to rest and strengthen their bodies. They learned at that time that they were to infiltrate to SVN shortly.

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The trip from HA TINH (P) to SVN took about 13 days. The division moved through jungles and over mountains keeping away from inhabited areas and main routes. The first significant terrain feature recognized during infiltration was the BEN HAI River, which they crossed near the end of June. The river at the fording point was knee deep and 50 meters wide.

The unit stayed near the BEN HAI River for seven days awaiting supplies before continuing on to CU DINH, which the captive believes to be a hill in QUANG TRI (P). The captive listened to an American plane with a loud-speaker telling how he could surrender and receive good treatment. He and two others deserted the 4th Co, 6th Bn on about 23 July. The other men were killed by mortar fire. The captive surrendered to Americans on about 24 July.

The captive stated that seven men had previously deserted the 4th Co. On or about 22-23 July aircraft caused about 50 KIA in the 4th Co. There have been no replacements in the 6th Bn and none are expected. Morale is low in the 4th Co because of the large number of draftees who miss their families and the lack of sufficient food as well as the poor quality of the food available.

Significant personalities include: Maj NGUY, CO of 812th Regt (NVA); Capt DIEU, CO 6th Bn 812th Regt; Capt NGUYEN CONG HAI, Political Officer 6th Bn; and 1stLt CHUONG, CO 4th Co.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 29.

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period normal counterintelligence events were overshadowed by the actions of both VC and dissident groups in attempts to thwart the forthcoming elections. Reports indicate that both the VC and other political groups are set to employ various tactics in attempts to disrupt this governmental process, near the end of August and during the first two weeks in September. Reports of espionage remain centered in the Danang TAOR, which either indicates that intelligence agencies are not receiving reports from other outlying areas or the VC have concentrated their efforts in QUANG NAM Province. There were no major changes in sabotage trends. Terrorism is increasing as two incidents were reported where large numbers of persons were recipients of VC terror acts. There were several incidents reported of VC propaganda directed at the U. S. serviceman.

2. ESPIONAGE.

On 13 August, a Village official of NAM O (V) apprehended two Vietnamese females in the vicinity of coordinates (AT 924854) who were sketching Marine positions. (CI Comment: Another report of VC using women for espionage.)

A 16 August report from an intelligence source states that a 12 year old boy was used to follow Marine patrols in the village of HOA DA (BT 023727) HOA VANH (D) and shout in Vietnamese "Down with American imperialism". Reportedly all children of the village are instructed to warn the VC of approaching Marines by shouting "Hello". (CI Comment: There have been many reports of children being trained to warn VC of approaching Marine units.)

A 16 August report from an intelligence source indicates that TANG TAN PHUONG has been replaced as the leader of an intelligence net in HOA MINH (V) (AT 975758) by DINH HOANH. PHUONG is reportedly being sent to a training school (type and location unknown). (CI Comment: There have been several reports of VC being sent to special training schools. DINH HOANH may be a replacement for a non-productive agent handler, or PHUONG temporarily relieved to receive further instructions.)

A report from a usually reliable source states that VC guerrillas disguised as civilians are mingling with vendors at HOA THAI (V) (AT 980687). Their purpose is to make friends with U. S. troops to determine strengths, weapons, and defensive positions.

THUA THIEN. A 7 August report states that a VC meeting was held at DUC THAI (H) vicinity (YD 948178) to plan an attack on the PHU THU Special Sector Headquarters. The plan is to have local residents infiltrate into HUE and struggle against the government. Reportedly an unknown number of women have already infiltrated into HUE to collect information.

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QUANG NGAI. On 14 August there were two reports of bridges being blown at (BS 649618) and (BS 736532).

THUA THIEN. A 15 August report states that the VC mined and destroyed a railroad culvert at (YD 828178).

4. POLITICAL. The forthcoming elections through Vietnam to form a constitutional assembly is an all important step in the forming of a stable democratic government for the Republic of Vietnam. During an election seminar held between 1-3 August, Premier KY urgently stressed the need for fair and free elections. He also urged that all the necessary protection and security be afforded the voters and the candidates to insure the widest participation in the coming elections.

Selection of candidates and the posting of candidate lists have been completed on schedule with a minimum of confusion. Some candidates have been rejected for various reasons, some have voluntarily withdrawn, while other challenged candidates have been upheld by the Central Election Council. The Council appears to have been scrupulously honest and painstaking in reviewing the cases of these candidates who were challenged.

For the ICTZ there are 17 seats in contention, which will be sought by a total of 69 candidates.

Reports indicate that in some of the more remote rural communities there is a lack of understanding of the purpose of the elections, however, this is expected to correct itself as the candidates campaign and the government increases its publicity efforts concerning the elections and the formation of a new constitution.

As an entity, the Buddhists hierarchy have stated an unwillingness to participate in the forthcoming elections under the present arrangements because they fear "repression of religion". They have authored several pamphlets/leaflets encouraging a boycott of the elections. Siding with the Buddhists, though not for the same reasons, Viet Cong, struggle groups and dissident students have all issued leaflets calling for opposition to the elections, the usual theme being "to vote is to betray your country because the THIEU-KY group is no different than the DIEM-NHU bunch, both are lackies of the United States".

The government hopes to combat these elements by publishing pre-election information and enforcing stringent security measures during the voting to protect both candidates and voters.

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As usual, the most active opposition centers are around HUE (Buddhists, student groups, and VC) and the MO DUC (QUANG NGAI) area (primarily VC). The DANANG area has and will continue to receive some active opposition to the elections but not on the scale of THUA THIEN or QUANG NGAI. QUANG TIN and QUANG TRI have remained comparatively quiet, from a political point of view.

Tactics to be utilized by the VC to disrupt the elections include: spreading rumors to discredit the candidates; coercion and force to prevent voting in contested areas; threat of death to anyone who votes; invalidating the voting ballots; attacking the polls or voting stations; infiltrating local struggle group to agitate; infiltrating trained personnel into villages to undermine the orderly process of voting; small scale attacks of strategic areas on election day; and sabotaging inter-city lines of communication leading to voting areas.

Indications from the HUE area are that the Struggle Forces and dissident student groups may disrupt the elections by agitation and propaganda. (CI Comment: These groups were to have started their activity on 15 Aug to coincide with the reopening of HUE University, but failed to do so.)

SUMMARY. From all the evidence gathered over the past few weeks it is obvious that dissident groups will apply agitation and propaganda to oppose the election. These actions are expected to continue up to and including election day. Each group has its own reasons for wanting the elections disrupted, postponed or cancelled.

Although they all wish to attain the same goal, it is doubtful that a unified effort towards this end will be made, due to individual ideological differences and aims.

On the other hand, the VC actions are expected to be coordinated and more militant in nature and are expected to include extortion and terrorism, especially in the MO DUC and HUE areas. Should the VC prove capable of effectively blocking the election, this would be a major victory for their propaganda program. It may be assumed that the majority of effort by the VC to disrupt the vote will be seen in the contested areas, with some attempts being perpetrated in the peripheries of the pacified areas.

5. PROPAGANDA.

QUANG NAM. A 15 August report from a usually reliable source states that on 10 August a VC platoon of approximately 19 people distributed propaganda leaflets in DUONG LAM (H) (AT 967698). The villagers destroyed most of the leaflets in fear of reprisal by U. S. Forces if leaflets were found in their possession. Partial text of the leaflets was "Americans do not fight in Vietnam, return to your homeland".

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A 13 August report from a usually reliable source states that on the night of 8 August a squad of VC came to CAM NAM (H) (BT 145563) and distributed approximately 1000 propaganda leaflets of various types.

THUA THIEN. A 10 August report states that a VC platoon entered the hamlets of BON TRI (YD 095217), BON PHO (YD 695220), and NHAM BIEU (YD 703204), assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture, and then purchased foodstuffs.

A 11 August report states that an unknown number of VC entered the hamlets of AN LUU (YD 822244) and MY LAM (YD 836235) and circulated a number of propaganda leaflets (contents unknown).

QUANG TIN. A 12 August report from a fairly reliable source indicates that on an unknown date VC distributed propaganda leaflets in KY NGHIA (V) (BT 260180). One of the leaflets was directed towards the Officers and Enlisted men of the 2nd Division, I Corps Tactical Zone. Another stated that on 6 July 1966 two soldiers defected from the 3d Division to the VC and that the VC always welcome defectors.

The 5th Marines found various types of propaganda leaflets during Operation COLORADO. These leaflets are printed in English, on a poor grade of $3\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ " paper, and appear to have been printed by a mimeograph process and lettered by hand. The texts are written in paragraph form and generally follow anti-U.S. themes, degrading the U.S. serviceman, and indicating that the Vietnamese war is not for America. (CI Comment: Similar leaflets have been found in various areas throughout I Corps. In view of the recent appearance of more sophisticated propaganda material, it appears that these leaflets may have been printed during the early phases of the war, or locally by VC propaganda units.)

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

QUANG NAM. A 15 August report from the DAI LOC District National Police states that a VC company located in the vicinity of (AT 045560) and (AT 985548) is making a concentrated effort to induce young people in the area to join the VC ranks and help fight the Americans. (CI Comment: VC seem to be having difficulties in their recruiting program.)

A 15 August report from the HOA THAI village chief states that approximately 20 VC guerrillas are collecting taxes in CAM NE (AT 9969). The guerrillas are 15-20 years old and all have Vietnamese ID Cards.

A 12 August report from the DAI LOC District Headquarters states that the VC District Chief has ordered all village chiefs to send 10 guerrillas to a training camp at HUU NIEN (ZC 200478). The guerrillas are to be given special training (type unspecified).

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A 12 August report states that two VC agents disguised as Buddhist Monks intend to assassinate other Buddhist Bonzes, and place the blame on the government or pro-government elements. This move is an effort to disrupt the forthcoming national elections.

THUA THIEN. A 15 August report states that on 10 August an unknown number of VC entered BO BIEH (H) vicinity (YD 617299), and assassinated two residents and wounded three others.

On 15 August two packages of explosives were thrown into a home in THUA LUONG (YD 837176), wounding three adults and one child. One of the wounded was the village chief.

On 17 August, plastic explosives were thrown by an unknown terrorist at a fair in THUONG BAC Square on the north side of the PERFUME River in HUE City. The explosion resulted in some dead and injured, but many more casualties resulted in the panic that followed as the people rushed for a single exit. National Police reports place the present total at 28 killed and 123 injured. (CI Comments: Much speculation can be made for reasons behind this particular act. However, until initial investigations are completed, the perpetrator and his reasons remain a mystery.)

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III MAF

DANANG, RVN

300800H August 1966

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PERINTREP NO. 30

Period Covered: 210001 - 272400 August 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000 sheets NE 48-16
NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was characterized by avoidance of large scale attacks, except in QUANG TIN (P) where a multi-battalion attack was conducted against TIEN PHUOC CIDG forces. Small scale attacks against Marine units conducting operations increased.

a. QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Activity in the Operation PRAIRIE area increased during the period. Contact was made with the enemy in company strength on 24-25 August and an enemy night attack in estimated two company strength supported by mortar fire was made at 0340 on 26 August. Interdiction of lines of communication in the northern part of the zone continued. In THUA THIEN (P), on 26 August, a train and track were damaged by a command detonated mine in the vicinity of (AT 946987) and Highway 1 was damaged by ditching at (YD 557319) and (YD 579310). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR and in Operation MACON and ALLEGHENY areas. The most significant contacts occurred in the Operation ALLEGHENY area on 24 August when contact was made with the VC in about platoon strength in the vicinity of a VC village and facility complex (AT 807605).

c. QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG TIN (P) on 25 August in the vicinity of (AT 1641232) a CIDG patrol from the S. F. Camp at TIEN PHUOC was attacked by VC in about battalion strength. Reinforcing units also encountered the enemy in at least battalion strength.

Two VC company sized attacks on RF/PF units took place on 23 and 26 August in QUANG NGAI Province. Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 261, as follows: 131 small unit engagements, 102 AA fire, 22 mine/booby trap incidents, three acts of terrorism, two hamlet harassments and one act of sabotage.

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III MAF

PERINTREP # 30

21-27 Aug 66

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- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. - e. Negative.
- f. Admin Units.

(1) 5 August. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent reported that the VC have set up a POW camp at the foot of CA DAM Mountain (BS 280806). Seven houses, each four by eight meters, comprise the camp. Approximately 200 Vietnamese and Montagnards are imprisoned here. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 12 August. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent reported that the VC have established a training camp at CHU TUONG (H) (BS 693584). About 60 VC are attending a one month class which began 8 August. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 12 August. QUANG TIN (P) JTAD agent reported a VC military training camp was located east of THACH BICH (H) at (AT 804299). There were approximately 200 trainees at this camp who were drafted by force from the various districts in QUANG NAM (P). On completion of a six month training course, these trainees will be assigned to various VC Main Force and guerrilla units. While at the camp, the trainees also have to engage in agricultural production to make this training camp self-sufficient, as well as providing food reserves for the future. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Anti-aircraft fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 102, showing a nine percent decrease from the previous period. 21 aircraft were hit with a total of 51 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were (XD 9050 - BT 1010 - AT 8060). Intensity of fire was moderate. 11 cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i. - j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars.

(1) 16 August. QUANG TIN (P), JTAD agent reported an unidentified VC/NVA unit with strength of approximately 2000 men is deployed along the northwestern slope of CHUA Mountain (BS 3595) at (BS 350960). Among the weapons reported was one 105mm Howitzer mounted on a two-wheeled carriage. (G-2 Cmt: F/6. As to unit this size located in this area. F-4. As to 105mm Howitzer).

l. - r. Negative.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**s. Communications.

(1) 17 August. Elements of Co C, 3d Recon Bn, on patrol in the vicinity of (AT 8264), received imitative deception broadcasts during the period 172100 - 180300H Aug. The imitative effort consisted of the enemy repeating the patrol's call sign in English, followed by an effort to say "ALFA SIERRA". At times the imitation was so effective that the patrol had to ask for confirmation from their parent company. When the imitative station keyed its transmitter it completely disrupted communications between the patrol and its parent unit. (G-2 Cmt: Numerous reports have been received concerning VC use of communications deception and jamming).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. VC/NVA personnel losses for the reporting period totaled 327 KIA, 620 KIA (Prob), 14 VCC and 2 NVAC. 96 individual and 2 crew served weapons were captured during the period.

f. Morale. No change.

g. New Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers, and Other Defense Works.

(1) Photo missions reveal:

(a) Heavy trail activity and possible base/storage area vicinity of (XD 8520) on 30 July.

(b) Extensive fortifications evidencing recent activity in area vicinity of (BT 1025) on 7 August.

(c) A slight increase in defensive positions in the SONG TRA KHUE valley vicinity of (BS 4876) on 7 August.

(d) Numerous foxholes and several AA/AW positions located along the ridges of the BARREN Mountains vicinity of (XD 9959) on 13 August.

h. Negative.i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Partly cloudy skies with intermittent rain activity constituted the general weather picture for I Corps during the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 94 degrees high and 77 degrees low. Winds were mostly variable from four to eight knots. Visibility ranged from 10 to 15 miles.

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k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee and Document Reports. Annex B.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) QUANG NAM (P) JTAD report of 24 August states that, as of 11 Aug a VC food supplies storage area was located on the western slope of DA TFANG Mountain (ZC 022465). The food supplies were stored in an unknown number of thatched structures, well hidden under the jungle canopy. The amount of food supplies being stored in this area is unknown. During the past 30 days, eight labor parties, each consisting of approximately 60 civilians, have moved these supplies either by foot or by small sampans up the CAI River from various government controlled areas. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) QUANG TIN (P) JTAD report of 30 July locates three VC food cache sites. The first is located in an old temple at (BT 184094). The temple is covered by thick foliage and surrounded by an eight foot wall made of rock. The temple building sits in the middle of an open ground of about hectare (2.5 acres) size. During the VIET MINH Resistance against the French, the place was used by the VIET MINH as a shop to manufacture weapons. The second cache is located near two streams at (BT 145138) in the DONG NGA area, and the third site is located at (BT 174087). The estimated total amount of food supplies being stored at the above locations are as follows: 40 tons of rice, 200 5-gallon cans of fish/shrimp sauce, 100 5-gallon cans of kerosene, 53 bags of dried and salted fish, and unknown quantity of tobacco. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 18 August. QUANG TIN Province JTAD report states that as of 25 July a VC supply installation consisting of nine troop barracks, 10 by 30 meters, and 10 rice storage houses containing approximately 150 tons of rice, were located at (BT 235068). Also in this area, a VC underground cache is located under an orchard in LONG SON (2) Hamlet (BT 227079). This cache measures approximately 30 meters long, two meters wide, and two meters deep. The cover for this cache is made of tin sheets, camouflaged with earth. Supplies stored here include approximately 100 cans of salt, 100 cans of shrimp/fish sauce, 80 cans of peanut oil, five tons of rice. These supplies are used primarily to support the VC units in TIEN PHUOC and HAU DUC Districts. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 27.

C. A. Sachs
C. A. SACHS
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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| CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CO FLSG | 1 |
| CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 30

DONG HA/CAM LO AREA

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|--|
| 324TH B DIV (HQ & SPT) NVA | CONF | 1,910 | YD 0262* | UNK | CG-GEN TRAN DO XO-CHU VAN DOI PO-NGUYEN TIEN LOI |
| 803RD NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | QUANG TRI* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-MAJ VO THIET XO-DUYET PO-MAJ THUONG |
| 812TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0352* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NGUYEN MINH XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 90TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0567* | UNK-82MM MORT- UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-CAPT MAI VAN CU |

*LAST RPTD LOCATIONS. UNITS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO DMZ FOR REORGANIZATION
ALTHOUGH CERTAIN UNIDENTIFIED UNITS OF AT LEAST ~~THE~~ ~~COMPANION~~ SIZE ARE BELIEVED LOCATED
SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| 4TH BN, 270TH BRIG | CONF | 450 | DMZ/QUANG TRI | UNK | CO-MAJ HO TINH |

2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|------|-----|---------------------|--|--|
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF | 500 | YD 3 757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LE VAN HAT |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF | 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG- 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO-LT TUAN PO-2NDLT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | YD 5320 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC* DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIEP |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MM RR | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |

*ELMS OF THIS BN BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN PHU VANG DISTRICT.

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF | 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES THE 95TH "B" REGIMENT (NVA) IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DISTRICT VICINITY ZC 0495. IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH REGIMENT (NVA), THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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DANANG TAOR

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HDQTRS | CONF | 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54-AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO- | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 5-AR | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI (AKA KHOAI) |
| HOA HIEU CO | CONF | 120 | AT 9166 | 2-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-NGUYEN DOA |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18-SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-PHEI PO-TOAN |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 3RD REGT (NVA) | CONF | 1,500 | QUE SON/HIEP DUC DIST | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18x12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6x75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6x120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" REGT (NVA), UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC ZC 0495 IN PHU LOC DISTRICT IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|---|--|--|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG TIN/ QUANG NGAI BORDER AREA | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MGS | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SR CAPT LUU THANH DUC PO-NGUYEN ICH |
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THANG |
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-82MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO-NGUYEN TAM XO-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PO-QUYET |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW: NGHIA TUU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 2810 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN: BAC |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)**CONFIDENTIAL**

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |
| TRA BONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 20TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XO-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 5262 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-MAI KIM |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYING THANH MY |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU |
| 89 B CO | CONF | 90 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO-LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEN MIEU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 40 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MANH |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| A-13 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-MG | CO-HONG LE |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| A-34 CO | CONF | 40 | BT 0303 | UNK | UNK |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE 3RD REGIMENT (NVA) LOC IN QUE SON DIST AND THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITIONS BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)
TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 30.

1. 3d NVA Regt 620th Div.

a. A returnee who identified himself as PFC LE XUAT NGOAI (I Corps interrogators believe he is using false name and rank) turned himself in to LAC SON (BT 0128). The returnee gave the following information: He is a member of the 3d NVA Regt, 2d Div (AKA 620th Div). He indicates that if ARVN Marines had landed 800 meters further west during Operation COLORADO, they would have taken the 3d NVA Regt CP instead of the Signal Co area. During Operation COLORADO the 3d NVA Regt reassembled in the vicinity of (AT 965255) after USMC units left the area. Shortly thereafter the Regimental Commander attended a meeting and returned with orders to take the regiment to QUANG NGAI for operations.

b. The 3d Bn, 3d NVA Regt and an engineer company crossed a river on 20 August at (AT 895240). The remainder of the regiment crossed the following day and moved to an unknown location the night of the 21st. The returnee was sent to the east of LAC SON to procure salt and sugar and was told that the regiment might move before his return. If so he could expect a guide to assist him in his return to the regiment.

c. The returnee indicated that a friend had told him that his regiment (possibly the 48th NVA Regt or 52nd NVA Regt) had just infiltrated and was enroute to the area of PHUOC TIEN (BT 1711). During the rainy season, operations would increase and attack would be made on the AN HOA industrial complex, as well as a seizure of LAC SON and QUE SON. Highway 16 (HIEP DUC-THANG BINH) is to be cleared so that "Rocket Launchers" may be moved on this road. Rocket launchers were reported as both infantry and anti-aircraft type. To the returnees knowledge, only the infantry type has been seen. He further states that he heard that the DANANG, CHU LAI and TAN SON NHUT air facilities were to be knocked out during the northeast monsoon season, regardless of price. He was told that significant major victories must be achieved to prevent President Johnson's reelection.

d. The returnee further stated that he heard the 21st NVA Regt was located between (BT 232400) and (BT 170225). The 33rd Arty Regt composed of the 120mm mortars, 12.7 AA MG and 75mm RR Bns of the 2d Div (AKA 620th Div) was located in the vicinity of (AT 945270), (AT 955268), (AT 935270) and (AT 955240). The division dispensary was at (BT 905137).

ANALYSIS

e. Initial interrogation of defector PFC LE XUAN NGOAI corresponds in many areas with the information obtained from ralliers 1stLt NGUYEN VIET

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of the 3rd Regt, who rallied on 6 July at THANG BINH (D) Headquarters, and Senior Lt DINH LONG TRUONG of the 3rd Regt, who also rallied on 6 July at THANG BINH (D) Headquarters. It should be noted prior to comparing the following information from these ralliers that all three were members of the same unit and that all three have rallied in the same area:

(1) ROCKET BATTALION:

(a) NGUYEN VIET stated that on 30 June, one unit armed with four rocket launchers of unknown type infiltrated into the HIEP DUC area. It was to coordinate with a 120mm mortar element to shell DANANG and CHU LAI Airfields during the rainy season.

(b) DINH LONG TRUONG stated that on 28 June a rocket battalion, newly infiltrated into South Vietnam, crossed NHON TRACH Ferry vicinity (AT 815263) and headed for HIEP DUC(D). He stated that the Rocket Battalion is assigned as reinforcement to MR-5 and will coordinate with the 120mm mortar unit to attack DANANG and CHU LAI in the coming days.

(2) 33RD ARTILLERY REGIMENT.

(a) Rallier NGUYEN VIET also stated that an artillery regiment subordinate to the 620th Div had been formed by combining the RQ-21 AA Bn, RQ-22 75mm RR Bn and the RQ-23 120mm Mortar Bn.

(3) INFILTRATION OF NEW UNITS.

(a) Subject mentions a 48th and 52nd Regt. Neither of these units are carried in the NVA OCB. NGUYEN VIET also mentioned a 52nd Regt, and stated that it was in the process of infiltration. It should be noted that the numerical designations of units mean very little, since infiltrating units change their designation. A 52nd Regt has been reported in KONTUM (P) and a 48th Regt has been reported three times in QUANG NGAI (P) in late 1965 and early 1966. In regards to infiltration into QUANG TIN (P) the only new units reported in this area are a 65th Regt and a TL-5 AA Bn. The 65th reportedly moved from the LAOS border into the HIEP DUC/TIEN PHOUC area on 4 August. No other information has been received regarding this unit. However, in QUANG NGAI (P) many reports have been received concerning new unit identifications.

(4) EVALUATION.

(a) That the VC/NVA forces in this area possess a surface-to-surface missile capability. F/6.

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- (b) That an additional regiment has infiltrated and joined the 620th Div (AKA 2nd Div). F/3.
- (c) That an artillery regiment has been formed subordinate to the 620th Div (AKA 2nd Div). F/2.
- (d) That elements of the 620th Div are currently moving or have moved south into QUANG NGAI (P). F/2. (Probably the 1st VC Regt and/or the 3rd NVA Regt).
- (e) That additional units have infiltrated QUANG NGAI (P). F/2.

2. 803d NVA Regt 324th B Div.

a. Initial interrogation of captive NVA Sgt BUI HIEN LUONG revealed the followings: The 3d Bn, 803d NVA Regt left HANOI "30 marching days ago". He has had three months of training and the men of his unit have had little training and are new to combat. The food and ammunition supply of his unit is low. He claimed that the NVA planned to attack CAM LO but at 0400 on 24 Aug his unit was ordered to retreat.

b. The captive was a team commander from the Machine Gun Platoon, 4th Co and had the mission of observing Marine helicopters and attempting to shoot them down. His machine gun platoon was in support of the 2d Co, 3d Bn located in the vicinity of (XD 965565). The 1st Co and 3d Co are located in the vicinity of (XD 950570) and (XD 970571) respectively and each has a strength of 116 men.

c. The captive indicated that the 803d NVA Regt has three infantry Bns, plus one Engineering Co, a Mortar Co, a Recoilless Rifle Co, a Recon Plt and a Machine Gun Co. Weapons include four CHICOM 53 LMG, two CHICOM type 57 HMG, two 120mm mortars, four 82mm mortars and two DK recoilless rifles.

3. Other Captives.

- a. 5th Demo Co., 571st (possibly AKA for 409th Sapper Bn).

(1) A captive identified as NGUYEN VAN DUC (Rank unknown) gave the following information:

(2) Subject is from HA TAY (P), unknown location, NVN. He joined the NVA in July 1965. Received his training in demolitions emplacement, converting artillery duds into mines and counter mine detection. He stated that salt spread completely around a mine when emplaced will prevent detection.

(3) Subject stated that he left the training center in NVN on 31 December 1965 for SVN. He traveled 12 days by truck and 18 days walking, 3 of which were in LAOS. He entered SVN 5 March 1966 in the vicinity of KON HUM (P) believed to be KONTUM (P). He further stated that 90% of his unit were said to have contracted malaria during infiltration.

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(4) According to the captive the mission of the 5th Co is to destroy bridges, roads and vehicles. The 6th Co. is a construction company and one squad received orders to operate in BINH SON REA (unknown location) for three months. The 571 is said to be independent and located in SE QUANG NGAI (P) (unknown coordinates).

This information is evaluated as F-3.

b. 2d Co., THU BON Bn., 1st May Regt., 325th NVA Div.

(1) BUI VAN THU, PFC, NVA infantryman was captured in the Operation PRAIRIE area gave the following information.

(2) That he had received eight months training, mostly in ambush and attack tactics in addition to normal weapons training. His unit was located at HA TINH (P) (NVN unknown location) until moved into SVN, 25 May 1966. Stated that his unit moved from HA TINH to QUANG BIEN (P) by night and from QUANG BIEN to SVN, crossing the DMZ, by day.

(3) Captive admitted there was a few cases of malaria in his unit although there were sufficient medical supplies. He claimed there was insufficient food, its quality was poor and that the unit ate mostly rice and peanuts.

(4) Stated the morale was poor because the men didn't like being in SVN. That his unit didn't fight well as the commanders were not good leaders. He said 56 had defected/deserted from his unit and although the TO was 105 men there was only 45 on 23 August. At DAU MAU (unknown location) on 15 July his unit fought a defensive action and suffered 8 KIA and 5 WIA. His unit has received no replacements since entering SVN. (III MAF G-2 Comments: THU BON is AKA for 812th Regt; 1 May is reported to be AKA for 324th B Div. This captive is believed to be from the 324th B Div. vice 325th Div. This information is evaluated as F-3).

4. Situation Report. Translated 3 Aug 1966 MACJ 214 Bulletin 767. Situation Report, dated 28 May 1966, by LE VU of Current Affairs, Province Party Committee, covering the general situation in I CTZ, RVN and providing guidelines for VC exploitation of this situation, particularly the one in HUE and QUANG TRI. The following information was extracted from the VC reports:

"At present, the internal situation in the I CTZ is tense. The anti-THIEU-KY force in the I Corps area is growing rapidly. The anti-THIEU-KY elements in the RVN Armed Forces in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces are entering military posts and turning the troops against THIEU-KY. However, in the I CTZ, the opposition force has been weakened because the large U. S. Force there has intervened and helped the THIEU-KY faction to re-occupy DANANG.

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Our immediate plan is to motivate the people, supported by the breakaway armed forces, to rise and destroy the strategic hamlets and break the enemy's administrative grip on all parts of the countryside close to towns and provinces.

However, our troops should be advised not to attack the enemy during this phase of unrest, regardless of his vulnerability, otherwise the opposition force would come to terms with THIEU-KY who will take advantage of the situation, will cut off supplies to the area and send troops to attack the opposition force and resume full control of TRI THIEN Province.

We are authorized to fight the enemy in this area at the present time only when he takes the initiative and attacks us or when he oppresses the people beyond endurance. This is our policy. If we properly implement it, we will have the capability of breaking down the enemy strength and concentrate all our forces to destroy THIEU-KY regime.

Give assistance to all opposition units which are blockaded by the Americans and are short of food supplies so that they can continue their resistance against the THIEU-KY regime.

Utilize all occasions, when an opposition force badly needs the assistances of a People's Movement to infiltrate cadre and personnel into a situation to direct the resistance. Motivate the people to participate in the struggle which must be turned into a People's Self-defense Revolutionary Movement.

Let the opposition force know that we only fight the Americans and THIEU-KY clique.

Motivate the people to appeal to their sons to leave the enemy ranks and come back home to live as civilians and perform military proselyting missions".

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 30.

1. GENERAL. Reports continue to be received on actions and activities planned by the VC to disrupt the forthcoming elections. The VC intended programs have run the gauntlet from propaganda and threats of terrorism on those individuals who would vote - to indications of major military operations against U. S. Forces during the first two weeks in September. Recent terrorist acts perpetrated against government installations and candidates indicate that the VC are capable of performing certain overt terrorist acts, within some urban areas. At the same time it appears that the VC are propagandizing for various acts and incidents which are not within his capability. Certainly, the VC operating within the contested areas are capable of carrying out the majority of these terror acts, but the pacified areas present a challenge, and it is doubtful he will attempt major overt military acts in these areas. Espionage is still reported to be increasing. Many reports appear to substantiate that classes are being conducted by the VC to train the low level agent. Infiltration of U. S. installations, primarily by females, appears to be the present modus operandi. Most reported acts of terrorism were confined to THUA THIEN Province, however, the major incident in the area was the terrorist attack on the NCO Club ("Take Ten") in DANANG. It appears that this incident may have been VC inspired and VC directed.

2. ESPIONAGE.

QUANG NAM. A 24 August report from a fairly reliable source indicates the following: (1) The VC are organizing a training course for young boys and girls at XUYEN THO (BT 189543). Upon completion of the school the graduates will be sent to villages and hamlets near U. S. and Government installations for espionage purposes; (2) VC have given orders for guerilla platoons in pacified areas to split into three man cells and engage in espionage; (3) VC intelligence agency of QUANG DA (V) is stationed at XUYEN TRA township (BT 055448) and a branch of this agency is located at MAU HOA (BT 080480). The mission of this agency is to coerce young men in pacified areas to join the VC or to move into VC controlled areas.

On 20 August, a fairly reliable intelligence source reported that there were three VC cadre hiding in a natural tunnel at NON NUOC (BT 070705). During the day, they disguise themselves as monks and collect order of battle information. At night they plan to go into HOA LONG (V) (BT 057745) HOA VANG (D) and assassinate government personalities residing in the village (CI Comment: There have been numerous reports of VC disguising themselves as monks in order to engage in espionage and assassinate local government officials.)

A 24 August report from a fairly reliable source states that the VC have established an English class at CHAU LAU (H) (AT 977607). The class hours are from 2000-2200 hours every night. Young men and women attend the classes, while local guerrillas provide security. (CI Comment: It is believed that the graduates of this school will be sent to U. S. troop locations to seek employment for espionage purposes.)

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THUA THIEN. A report from a usually reliable source states that the VC have established a training camp for girls at KHE NGHE (Coord unk) and HIEN LUONG (Coord unk), NAM HOA (D) for the purpose of infiltrating the various offices in HUE to obtain intelligence information. (CI Comment: This is the second report of an espionage school for girls being established.)

A 20 August report from a LOC AN (YD 959056) village official states that the VC will use the monsoon season to extend indoctrination classes for the local populace. They are also expected to increase tax collection and espionage efforts.

3. SABOTAGE.

THUA THIEN. On 18 August a bridge was blown at (ZD 015027). On 19 August four cars of a train were derailed at (ZD 178009). On 24 August a train hit a mine at (ZD 013027).

QUANG NGAI. On 19 August bridges were blown at (BS 705705) and (BS 712702).

4. POLITICAL.

QUANG NAM. On 25 August a fairly reliable source reports that the VC held an organizational meeting recently in HOA CUONG (V) (BT 040718), HOA VANG (D) and made plans for anti-government propaganda in the ensuing days prior to the forthcoming elections. The theme of the propaganda campaign will be that the government officials represent the government and not the people. All VC personnel attending the meeting were in possession of government ID cards and papers.

On 24 August, a report was received from the QUANG NAM Special Sector, dated 23 July 1966, which indicated the VC current affairs section of DANANG has issued orders to all cadres in charge of districts, city and township committees to carry out the following: (1) Maneuvers against USMC and government troops; (2) Destruction of bridges and obstruction of traffic on Highway #1; (3) Organization of struggles, riots and strikes to promote disorder; and (4) Kidnappings and murder of government officials. The source of this information commented that the VC may have formulated this plan to hinder or defeat the forthcoming elections and create chaos among the people.

A QUANG NAM National Police report states that on 9 August a political class of approximately 80 students was formed in the home of TRAN TA vicinity (BT 080480) for all (DUY XUYN (D)) autonomous admin committee members. This class was conducted by NGUYEN BUYNH and DOTAN QUYNH. The course of study was the methods of thwarting the government constitutional elections.

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A QUANG NAM National Police report states that on 9 August 1966, a number of Buddhist representing BUDDHIST VILLAGE REUNIFICATION ASSOCIATION of DUY XUYEN (D) held a meeting at CHIEM SON (H) (BT 012516). The discussion of the meeting was as follows: (1) Means of agitating Buddhists against the government because of government oppression of Buddhist movements; (2) Plans for stopping Buddhist from voting during the 11 September elections; and (3) Plans for organization of continuous demonstrations.

A 20 August report from an intelligence source indicated the Buddhist factions in DANANG and QUANG NAM (P) plan to make an all out effort in opposing the forthcoming national elections. They are organizing youth groups which will have the mission of talking to people and discouraging them from voting. Reportedly there are groups already at work in the HAI CHAU section of DANANG and in HOA MINH (V) (AT 975750). The Buddhist are publishing a weekly magazine called the Danang Buddhist, whose prime purpose is to oppose government and U. S. policies. The Buddhist are also rumored to be planning anti-government demonstrations in the near future.

A 22 August report from the QUANG NAM Special Sector indicates the VC have continued military and political activities, they have also increased the male and female youth military proselyting groups, propaganda cells and hamlet education groups.

On 23 August, a report from an intelligence source states that on 15 August the VC held a meeting at HAI AN (H) (BT 0172). The topic of the meeting was plans to attack the Marble Mountain Air Facility, DANANG Air Base, Engineer Battalion (DANANG EAST), and the Naval Hospital (DANANG EAST). The date of this attack will be sometime between 16 August and 11 September 1966. The alleged primary purpose of the attack is to disrupt the elections and cause anxiety among the soldiers for their families, so they won't return home and vote. Reportedly the VC also have volunteers who will set off explosives in attempts to keep the people from voting. (CI Comment: Many reports have been received indicating that the forthcoming elections would be the catalyst for increased military action by the VC.)

On 19 August, the DAI LOC (D) Agency reported that a VC company located in the vicinity of (AT 799561) had forced the villagers to attend a meeting at which the villagers were instructed not to participate in the national elections.

On 20 August, a report from an intelligence source indicates that a VC battalion (designated V.25) has the mission of attacking the voting polls located in DIEN BAN (D) during the coming elections. This battalion reportedly also has the support of 20 suicide cadre and approximately 100 guerrillas in PHU THO (BT 025560) and PHU LOC (BT 060555) villages. (CI Comment: This unit is presently believed to be located in DAI LOC (D) and could, if moved, be employed in the manner reported above.

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THUA THIEN. A 19 August report from an intelligence source indicates the VC can be expected to; hold counter-political meetings and use terror tactics to discourage the people from voting, and attempt to persuade the people not to participate and boycott government political meetings.

QUANG NGAI. An 18 August report from the MO DUC National Police states that the VC have encouraged the people of the MO DUC area to demonstrate against the forthcoming elections in QUANG NGAI City.

On 8 August, a VN government agency reported that at DUC HOAI (V) (BS 720580), the VC have sent guerrillas into the village to spread propaganda against the coming elections. The VC reportedly have threatened to punish villagers who participate in the elections. The villagers are to send their ID cards (required prior to receiving a ballot) to the VC Self-Administrative Board prior to the election. The ID cards reportedly will be returned after the election.

On 11 August a VN government agency reported that, on 29 July, at 2000 hours, the people of BINH KY (V) met to listen to an address given by Dr. NGUYEN BINH. BINH, a native of BINH SON (D), had just returned from North Vietnam. BINH told the people to trust the VC armed forces and support them and that QUANG NGAI (P) would be liberated in the near future.

On 18 August a VN government agency reported that the VC will increase harassment and assassination attempts to frustrate the coming elections.

A 17 August report relates that the VC have organized a suicide team in the villages of BINH NAM and KY ANH (BT 3030). It was reported that this team tried to enter TAM KY City and THANG BINH (D) to assassinate candidates and disrupt voting proceedings.

On 19 August a VN Government Agency reported that the VC, in order to prevent the coming elections on 19 August, opened an "Achievement Campaign". They plan to:

- (1) Concentrate the district guerrilla forces, with the support of regular forces, to attack refugee camps, burn houses, kill cadre, and drive the people to the VC controlled areas.
- (2) Mix with the people in the cities, districts, or near outposts to plant explosives in crowds both to "worry and confuse" the people and to destroy offices, markets, school rooms, and kill high ranking cadre to disrupt the elections.
- (3) Exploit the differences and disagreements between Buddhists and the government to harass the elections.
- (4) Concentrate, in force, to attack many outposts.

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THUA THIEN. A 17 August report from an intelligence source states that during the night of 16 August, approximately six VC entered GIA LE (H) (YD 819178) and distributed propaganda leaflets written in both English and Vietnamese. The leaflets written in English were directed towards the American serviceman.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

QUANG NAM. A 23 August report from the QUANG NAM Special Sector states that the VC District Committee of HOA VANG (D) called a meeting of the HOA TRNG (Coord unk) SOLDIERS MOTHERS ASSOCIATION for the purpose of electing a new executive committee. Reportedly the new committee will be tasked with collecting and contributing rice to the troops mess. The old committee had not functioned satisfactory. (CI Comment: The VC food collection effort appears to be expanding and intensifying as the rice harvest approaches.)

A 23 August report from Vietnamese Government Official states that the VC are forcing the people of AN DINH (H) (AT 885831) to market their produce at NAM O (V) (AT 933833) and return with supplies for the VC.

On 20 August, at 2100 hours, five hand grenades were thrown into the "Take Ten" NCO Club in DANANG injuring 12 patrons (6 servicemen), one seriously. One VC subsequently died as a result of wounds received by Vietnamese guards at the "Take Ten". Investigations have led to the arrest of several other suspects and indications now point to this act being directed by VC terrorists. The investigation is continuing.

A 24 August report from the DAI LOC District Headquarters states that a VC company of approximately 90 men moved into LOC AN (V) (AT 858545). Self administered cadres and guerrillas were supporting the VC by collecting food and money from the local populace. These gifts are called "Victory Gifts" for the VC that have just returned from the battlefield.

A 24 August QUANG NAM Special Sector report dated 27 June 1966 indicates that the VC have instructed all cadre to contact dissidents and suicide youths of the recent political struggle who are still hiding and attempt to entice them into working for NLFSVN. (CI Comment: Recent reports from the HUE area indicate that the STRUGGLE FORCES may be attempting to reorganize. This indication, coupled with the NLFSVN attempts to contact other dissident and youth groups, may be part of a longer program by the VC to attempt to direct the movements of these groups. If the VC manage to infiltrate and reorganize these groups they would become lucrative sources of information.)

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A 18 August report from the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines states that seven women and three children were apprehended in the vicinity of (AT 902572) carrying an excessive amount of salt. (CI Comment: There have been several reports of women and children having excessive amounts of salt in their possession. This tends to indicate that the VC need salt for preserving food and are using women and children to transport it.)

On 21 August an unknown number of VC threw grenades into the DUONG LAM (H) vicinity (AT 944693) injuring two civilians.

QUANG TRI. A 16 August report indicates that during the period of 25 August - 11 September terrorist activity will increase in the form of sniping, ambushes, road mining, assassinations, and general harassment of the local populace in order to disrupt voting in the national elections.

THUA THIEN. on 22 August, the VC destroyed the PHONG AN (V) Council House at (YD 618299).

On 19 August, an unknown number of VC entered a hamlet in the vicinity of (YD 643306) and killed the village chief and one health worker. One teacher was also reported injured by the blast.

On 11 August a fairly reliable source reported that the VC cadre in PHU LOC (D) have been ordered to direct the district populace to contribute rice to VC military units. As a result the local cadre have requested that indigent families contribute 60 milk can (size unknown) of rice and that wealthy families contribute 120 cans of rice.

On 17 August, there was a report from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines that a Marine purchased a bottled soft drink from a young Vietnamese female which contained glass slivers. (CI Comment: Reports of similar events have been received. Due to the frequency and diversified location of these incidents and the complete lack of reports concerning training classes for this type of incident, it is felt that these incidents may originate at the bottling plant rather than in the field.)

Some VC activity has reportedly been planned for 2 September. The period 19 August through 2 September commemorates the date, in 1945, when the Vietnamese chose to oppose any Japanese forces entering Vietnam. 2 September 1945 is the date HO CHI MINH proclaimed the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 2 September is believed to be a significant date on which the VC may conduct terrorist activities.

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III MAF

DANANG, RVN

060800H Sep. 66

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PERINTREP NO. 31

PERIOD COVERED: 280001 AUG - 032400 SEP 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,
NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was characterized by complete avoidance of large scale activity. VC interdiction of lines of communication continued, although the level of small scale attacks dropped throughout the zone.

a. QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN-PHU BAI TAOR. Activity in the Operation PRAIRIE area was limited to reported sightings of NVA, with no significant contact. In QUANG TRI (P), a company of the 2d Bn, 1st ARVN Regt, was ambushed on 30 August by VC in estimated platoon strength. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM-DANANG TAOR. Small scale activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents again occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR and in the Operation MACON area. The most significant action occurred on 3 September when Company I, 3d Bn, 9th Marines encountered VC in company strength while in pursuit of a VC squad sized unit during Operation MACON.

c. QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Activity in the CHU LAI was limited to isolated small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC/NVA initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 255 and consisted of: 167 small unit engagements, 63 AA fire and 14 mine/booby trap incidents, and one act of terrorism.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d-e. Negative.

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PERINTREP #31

28 Aug - 5 Sep 66

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**f. Admin Units.

(1) 18 August. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent reported the VC have established a hospital at TRINH LANH (H) (BS 426447). The facility consists of ten thatch covered house, each housing 20 men. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 21 August. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent report of 7 August stated that a VC hospital is located at SUOI LA (H) (BS 417843). Two houses comprise the camp and each has a tunnel beneath it for storing medicines. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 28 August. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent reported that on 21 August, a VC hospital was observed in the vicinity of PHU KHUONG Mountain (BS 610470). The hospital area is composed of three houses, each six by fifteen meters, in size with a 50 meter intervals between houses. An additional house is used as nurses quarters and a storage place for medicines. At the time of the sighting, approximately 50-60 VC were being treated. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(4) 29 August. A QUANG TIN JTAD agent reported that a VC recruit training camp was located on the southwestern slope of BA SU Mountain (BT 186038). An unknown number of large, long, thatched structures comprise the camp. Approximately 300 recruits are presently undergoing training. The training course began 10 Aug and is scheduled to last for 10 weeks. Upon completion of this training, the recruits are to be assigned to various VC units to prepare for combat operations during the forthcoming northeast monsoon season. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. The 63 AA fire incidents during the period represented a 38 percent decrease over last period. A total of 18 aircraft sustained 26 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (BT 0060)-(YD 4050)-(BS 4070)-(AT 8060). The intensity of fire was considered moderate. One case of 12.7mm fire was reported.

i-n. Negative.o. Guerrillas.

(1) 26 August. A QUANG TIN (P) JTAD agent reported that as of 13 August a VC guerrilla training center was located at HDN YEN Mountain (BT 040198). The center consisted of several buildings which are used as classrooms and living quarters, two structures used to store water, and an underground ammunition and weapon storage area. This training center is used for training guerrillas from various districts in QUANG TIN (P).

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Each training cycle is four weeks and is attended by 50-70 trainees. The trainees receive training in tactics on attacking outposts, and use of various types of weapons, including grenades. The classes are conducted from 0500 to 0900 hours and from 1900 to 2300 hours. The training center is enclosed by bamboo fences and pits throughout the perimeter of the center and has three gates for entrance and exit from the compound. The security of the training center is provided by three squads whose armament includes two 60mm mortars, three automatic rifles, one M-79 grenade launcher and individual weapons. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

p-q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance.

(1) A report of a mission flown 22 Aug 66 revealed a slight increase in enemy activity in the area (YD 0974)-(YDL272)-(YD.060666)-(YD 0166).

(2) A report of a mission flown 24 Aug 66 revealed a slight increase in enemy activity in the area (YD 0742)-(YD 1245) -(YD 0160)-(XD 9556).

s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consist of: 153 KIA, 163 KIA (Prob), 5 VCC, and two ralliers. Weapons losses were 16 individual weapons.

f. Morale. No Change.

g-h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Partly cloudy to cloudy skies with afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers constituted the weather picture for the I Corps

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area throughout most of the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 90 degrees high to 76 degrees low. Winds were variable from 5-15 knots. Visibility ranged from seven to ten miles. 2.27⁰⁰ of precipitation was recorded for the period.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee, and Document Reports. Annex B.

l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 21 August. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent reported that on 25 July, the VC constructed a camp consisting of four houses at SUOI CAU (H) (BS 372847). Generators are in the compound and electric lights are used at night. A continual noise is heard coming from the compound. (Possibly printing presses). (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(2) 23 August. A TRA BONG (D) agent reported 130 VC and ten houses are located in vicinity of (BS 400835, BS 398842). Two of the houses have underground bunkers reportedly containing 3,000 kilos of rice, 500 kilos of salt, a large quantity of ammunition, and important records. Seven cadre work at this location with typewriters and printing machines. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(3) 29 August. QUANG TIN (P) JTAD agent reported that as of 15 August, a salt storage area was located in the jungle at THANH HOA (H) (BT 336112). Five tons of salt reportedly is being stored in a six by ten meter thatched building. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

(4) 13 August. THUA THIEN agent reported the location of five houses filled with rice about 300 meters north of MO O Canyon (YD 624185). Some of the rice, which was transferred from other warehouses, was burned as a result of airstrikes. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

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(1) Attack CAM LO and DONG HA with one division (324 B NVA Div), consisting of the 90th Regt, 803d Regt, and 812th Regt, reinforced by one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and one independent battalion (808th Bn).

(2) Attack the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR with two regiments (6th Regt and 95th B NVA Regt), reinforced by two infantry battalions (804th and 810th).

(3) Attack the DANANG TAOR with three regiments (95th B NVA Regt, 21st NVA Regt and 3d NVA Regt) reinforced by three independent battalions (70th, R20 and 804th).

(4) Attack the CHU LAI TAOR with one Division (620th NVA Div) reinforced by five independent battalions (70th, 72d, 48th, 38th and 409th Sapper).

(5) Attack isolated U.S./ARVN outposts and Government Headquarters in division strength in QUANG TRI, southern QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces, in regimental strength elsewhere.

(6) Harass U.S./ARVN units with sneak attacks, suicide attacks, and local guerrilla attacks.

(7) Sabotage lines of communication.

(8) Conduct terror tactics against villages and hamlets, to include assassination, kidnapping and extortion.

(9) Employ subversive operations to infiltrate and influence local political factions in an effort to increase local unrest.

b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities:

(1) Capabilities (1), (2), (3) and (4): Indications which favor the adoption of these capabilities are: The present disposition of these units contiguous to the likely areas of attack; enemy knowledge of the terrain; the probability that enemy logistic support has been stockpiled in his operating areas; and enemy knowledge of our situation based on frequent probe and reconnaissance activities. Indications which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: The losses the enemy sustained in past operations; the enemy predisposition not to mass forces; Our operations which have forced the enemy to displace against his will at times of our choosing; our destruction of his logistic support in past operations; and our air supremacy and uninterrupted aerial reconnaissance hindered only by four weather.

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(2) Capability (5): Indications which favor adoption of this capability are those noted in subparagraph (1) above, plus the enemy need for a victory for psychological purposes. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability include the enemy predisposition not to mass forces, and enemy lack of fire support facilities necessary to breach encampments.

(3) Capabilities (6), (7), (8) and (9): Indications which favor these capabilities are those noted in subparagraph (1) above, plus the need by the enemy for popular help or support in the form of personnel, food and materials. All of these capabilities weaken governmental control and hence, by default, strengthen the guerrilla. No indications militate against adoption of these capabilities.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption.

(1) That VC/NVA forces will concurrently exercise capabilities (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) with forces of up to regimental strength.

(2) That VC/NVA forces will exercise capability (5) with forces of up to division strength during the northeast monsoon season, in conjunction with capabilities (6), (7), (8) and (9).

(3) That VC/NVA forces will exercise capability (1) in conjunction with capabilities (6), (7), (8) and (9).

(4) That VC/NVA forces will execute capabilities (1), (2), (3) or (4) singly or in combination and in conjunction with capabilities (6), (7), (8) and (9).

d. Vulnerabilities.

(1) VC/NVA supply areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to reconnaissance and surveillance unless carefully concealed.

(2) VC/NVA forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support in SVN and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations VC/NVA forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to the principal of surprise.

(4) Limited manpower resources in North Vietnam and VC controlled areas of South Vietnam have required a dependency upon an extensive conscription program and limited basic type training in order to rapidly raise VC/NVA troop levels. The result has been a lowering of morale and increased vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

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(5) VC/NVA forces have become more dependent upon local resources for support as the total VC/NVA strength increases. But the necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population under VC/NVA control.



R. H. THOMPSON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

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| CG IFFORCEV | 2 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | CMDR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CO FLSG | 1 |
| CG 3D MARDIV | 15 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101 ST | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 | CO DET C-1 5TH USSF | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CMDR I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CICV | 1 |
| CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 | | |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 31

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|--|--|
| 324TH B DIV (HQ & SPT) NVA | CONF | 1,910 | YD 0262* | UNK | CC-GEN TRAI DO XC-CHU VAN DCI PC-NGUYEN TIEN LOI |
| 803RD NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | QUANG TRI* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-1G | CC-MAJ VO THIET XC-DUYET PC-MAJ THUONG |
| 612TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0352* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-1G | CC-LTCOL NGUYEN MINH XC-MINH LONG PC-MAJ BONG |
| 90TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0567* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-1G | CC-THIEP XC-CHONG PC-CAPT MAI VAN CU |

*LAST RPTD LOCATIONS. UNITS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO DMZ FOR REORGANIZATION
ALTHOUGH CERTAIN UNIDENTIFIED UNITS OF AT LEAST BATTALION SIZE ARE BELIEVED LOCATED
SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| 4TH BN, 270TH BRIG | CONF 450 | DMZ/QUANG TRI | UNK | CO-MAJ HO TINH |

2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)

| | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|------------------|--|--|
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-IG | CO-VAN KIEN XC-LE VAN HAT |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-IG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XC-LT TUAN PC-2NDLT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO (LF) | CONF 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-IG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF 80 | YD 3244 | 1-IG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XC-DUNG |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | YD 5320 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK - SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC* DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MM RR | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |

* ELMS OF THIS BN BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN PHU VANG DISTRICT.

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES THE 95TH "B" REGIMENT (NVA) IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA TIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DIST VICINITY (ZC 0495). IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH REGIMENT (NVA), THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR COULD, WITH MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TROOP AND WITHIN 10 KILOMETERS OF TROOP).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN H. PRS | CONF | 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54-AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XC-XUAN LAN, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XC-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-TY, LE VAN HIEU |
| DIA LOG CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18-SMG | CO-RIAN PHONG SANH |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-FRAN DINH XC-VO CONG TANH PC-DUONG DO |

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CONFIDENTIALDANANG TAOR (CONT)**CONFIDENTIAL**

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 5TH BN | PROB | 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO=QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO=THEI PC=TOAN |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 3RD REGT (NVA) | CONF | 1,500 | QUE SON/HIEP DUC DIST | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO=LTCOL VIET SON XO=KIEM PO=THAN |
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO=SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO=NGUYEN VAN LA PO=CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2MG; 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO=HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PC-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PC-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PC-ANH VU |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIST |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 KILOBYTES OF DANANG TAOR) TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18x12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6x75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6x120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" REGT (NVA), UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC (ZC 0495) IN PHU LOC DISTRICT IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCE'S LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|---|--|--|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG TIN/ QUANG NGAI BORDER AREA | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MGS | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XC-SR CAPT LUU THANH DUC PO-NGUYEN ICH |
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THIANG |
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-82MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO-NGUYEN TAM XC-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PC-QUYET |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAM; NGHIA THU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6837- | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XC-MINH PO-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 2810 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN BAC |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)**CONFIDENTIAL**

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-160 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |
| TRA DONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR.)

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 20TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XO-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 5262 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-MAI KIM |

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| <u>Serial Number</u> | <u>Class</u> | <u>Qty</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Inventory</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|----------------------|--------------|------------|-------------------|--|--|
| 70411 BH | CO.F | 500 | MEMO BINH DISP | 3-31111 KOPT 4-60111 KOPT 5-11G 4-57111 RR | OO-DUONG VAN CHAU NO-SR GAMP TRUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49111 BH | PROB | 500 | BT 0/30 | 7-31111 KOPT 15-60111 KOPT 5-57111 RR 3-11G 24-11R | OO-DUONG VAN CHAU NO-SR GAMP TRUA |
| 206111 00 | CO.F | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-11R | OO-THAM NO-SR GAMP NO-SR IUP |
| 89 B 00 | CO.F | 90 | DS 5063 | UFR | OO-LP CAN |
| 614111 00 | CO.F | 120 | TS 3065 | UFR | OO-SR GAMP |
| 111111 00 | CO.F | 40 | DS 1499 | UFR | OO-THAM |
| 110 00 | CO.F | 150 | BT 1535 | 2-60111 KOPT 1-57111 RR 6-11G | OO-THAM NO-SR GAMP NO-SR IUP |
| 113 00 | CO.F | 150 | BT 1017 | UFR | UFR |
| 116 00 | CO.F | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60111 KOPT 2-11G | OO-KONG LE CONFIDENTIAL |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| A-34 CO | CONF | 40 | BT 0303 | UNK | UNK |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE 3RD REGIMENT (NVA) LOC IN QUE SON DIST AND THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN MIEP DUC DISTRICT COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITIONS BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO 31.

1. 1st of May Regt 325th Div. Detailed interrogation of NVA captive PFC
BUI VAN THU revealed the following information:

a. He was summoned by the hamlet chief of KIEN VINH (H) to report for a physical examination on or about 25 September 1965. The examination was conducted by the doctor at KIEN VINH (H) and on 30 September the hamlet chief gave him a notice which stated that he had been drafted into the NVA. The captive indicated that this is the usual system for implementing the draft in NVN.

b. The captive was sent to the HA TINH (P) Training Center where he became a member of the 2d Co (no battalion or higher designation given). His unit was told at a muster, prior to infiltration, that the 2d Co was part of the "THU BON Bn, 1st of May Regt, 325th Div" (THU BON is an AKA for the 812th Regt (NVA) and 1st of May is an AKA for the 324th B Div).

c. The captive further indicated that training emphasis was placed on tactics concerned with ambushes, withdrawals and the attack of RVN posts. Ambush tactics favored the "U" type ambush employing three elements which ranged from three cells to three battalions, depending upon the size of the enemy unit for which the ambush was planned. Withdrawal tactics favored leaving one element in contact with the enemy while two elements withdrew. The engaging element would then withdraw while another element engaged the enemy. This maneuver would continue until all three elements reached a safety zone. The tactics taught for the attack on RVN posts consisted of surrounding the post with superior forces, followed by the employment of all available fire-power and finally over-running the post.

d. Around mid-April the 2d Co was told by the CO that the THU BON Bn was ordered to infiltrate to SVN and no special training would be needed. When the battalion began the movement south the captive was equipped with two uniforms, a camouflaged cap, one pair of sandals (rubber) one pair of rubber boots (described as being high-topped tennis shoes), one mosquito net, one blanket and one entrenching tool. He was armed with an SKS rifle and 100 rounds of ammunition. During the movement south the captive received what he considered an inadequate quantity of food; the ration consisted of rice, salt fish, milk, canned meat and peanuts. The captive claimed that during infiltration he and many other men had malaria, while many others were afflicted with typhoid fever. He was given three pills of an unknown type for several days, while those with typhoid fever were given injections of an unknown type.

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e. Although the captive was unable to read a map well, he estimates that the 2d Co crossed the BEN HAI River somewhere in the vicinity of (YD 9870 to YD 0270), after spending approximately 15 days moving south. The point where they crossed the BEN HAI River was only 50-75 meters wide and one meter deep. The company proceeded to the area of the "DAU MAU POST" in the vicinity of grid squares (YD 0154 and YD 0254). On about 10 August the captive heard that the regiment, except for the 2d Co, was engaged in a major battle and retreated back to NVN, possibly back to HA TINH Training Center, for replacements. On 23 August the captive was on a reconnaissance type patrol to spot and estimate enemy force when his cell became engaged with an American patrol and he was wounded.

f. Personalities identified by the captive include: 1stLt AN, CO, 2d Co, WO KHA, XO, HOL, Plt Ldr, 3d Plt, 2d Co.

2. CAM LO (D) Co. A Warrant Officer captive TRAN BIEN taken during Operation Prairie gave the following information. He is a member of a Local Force Company and was guiding 10 members of the THU BON (probably the 812th Regt (NVA)) in the attack against "G" Btry, 3d Bn, 12 Marines' positions on 26 August. The CO and XO of the CAM LO District Force Co lead both the political cadre and local force company. The CAM LO unit operates under a normal organization of nine men per squad, three squads per platoon and three platoons per company. Presently the Company strength is between 49 to 63 men. The platoon and squad leaders are armed with K-44 and German mauser rifles. The company uses no special tactics but is taught defense and use of three to four man teams to harass positions. Usually ten men from the unit are constantly going to VINE/LINH (YD 1587) NVN for food. Every three months they go for ammunition.

3. 810th Battalion. The Political Officer of the 810th Bn, Captain LE VAN DUNG, captured on 10 August, 10 km north of HUE, gave the following information. He was captured while looking into a morale problem of the 810th Battalion. The company wanted to return to the mountains to rest because of the serious situation, difficulties in being able to operate, lack of food and sleep, sickness and decreasing morale. Following heavy losses in the PHU THU Battle (Feb66) the 107th and 108th Companies were disbanded and assigned to the 105th and 106th companies. The 810th Bn is now composed of three companies, the 105th, 106th and 109th. He did not know the strength of the other companies but stated the K.105th Co had 85 men. The mission of the 810th Bn was to operate in the PHONG DIEN and QUANG DIEN areas to support the local political cadre who were operating to enlarge the "Liberated" area. (Information received from other interrogation reports indicates that the 810th Bn moved from PHU LOC (D) to operate in QUANG DIEN and HUONG TRA Mountain area about 30 July 1966. This is the first indication of the K.105 Co being incorporated into the 810th Bn.)

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4. 802nd Bn 6th Regt (NVA). A Pvt PHAM ANH of the 3rd Co, 802nd Bn, 6th Regt (NVA) was wounded and captured on 19 August by the 918th RF Co. He stated under initial interrogation that the 6th Regt (NVA) was composed of three battalions, the 800th, 802nd and 806th. He further stated that these battalions were mobile and operated in the mountain area of PHANG DIEN (D) and HAI LANG (D) QUANG TRI (P). This information is rated as F/3. Other interrogation reports and agent reports indicated that the 812th Bn has been disbanded and the 803rd has replaced the 812th Bn in the 6th Regt (NVA). PHONG DIEN (D) and HAI LONG (D) are the normal operating areas of the 6th Regt (NVA).

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CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIALANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 31

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period, numerous reports were received from throughout the I Corps area indicating VC plans and preparations to disrupt the forthcoming National Elections. With the exception of five assassinations and four acts of sabotage, VC activity was confined primarily to passive measures directed against the election, i.e., indoctrination of the voters in boycotting the election, instructions to VC cadre and preparations for active measures to disrupt the voting.

2. ESPIONAGE.

QUANG TIN. A 22 August report from an intelligence source indicates the VC are using children and vendors to gather information and steal equipment from Marines. A VC cadre, BUI TRONG THIEN, reportedly has organized an espionage team of three children with the following mission: (1) Make reconnaissance of Marines positions; (2) steal weapons, ammunition, and equipment; (3) observe Marine positions and report on U. S. or ARVN troops moving in the area; (4) watch Marine positions at night and signal (by hitting pieces of wood together, or using lights) if the Marines move out of position. (CI Comment: One of many reports that the VC are using children and vendors for espionage purposes.)

QUANG NGAI. On 21 August a BINH SON agent reported that a VC recon team, disguised as civilians, was sent to BINH LIEN and BINH HOANG to probe the situation of ROK troops.

On 22 August a TAM KY reported stated that NGUYEN THANH, KY THINH (V) District cadre, often uses ARVN military uniforms or European dress in his movements throughout the area.

3. SABOTAGE.

THUA THIEN. During the period of 21 August to 1 September there were four reports of VC sabotage directed against the railroad line from DANANG to HUE. These incidents occurred at (AT 951895), (YD 811189), (YD 809189) and (ZD 013026). There were also two reports of highway bridges being destroyed at (YD 809248) and (YD 570314). (CI Comment: Acts of sabotage may increase as the national elections draw near).

QUANG NAM. A 25 August report from a fairly reliable Vietnamese source indicates the VC have ordered their suicide squads to destroy American installations and billets. To accomplish this they intend to buy or rent building adjacent to American billets and offices. Once these areas are

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occupied they plan to plant and detonate explosive charges when the facilities are in maximum use. (CI Comment: Source report did not indicate the exact locations or times these attempts were to be made. It is unlikely that the VC are presently capable of renting or buying buildings in built-up areas, but probably would contract through a local national).

4. POLITICAL. Numerous reports have been received of intended VC actions to disrupt the forthcoming elections. Present indicators point to what appears to be some type of coordinated plan. This plan evidently emanates from a higher level and calls for the disruption of the election proceedings from 10 August to 15 September. It includes operations to sabotage lines of communications, assassinate government officials in the election program, and confiscate identification cards to prevent the people from voting, as well as a terror campaign directed towards the prospective voters. In addition it can be expected that the VC will make every attempt to renew struggle force activities in both QUANG NAM and THUA THIEN Provinces, probably centered in DANANG and HUE cities. The struggle force activities can be expected to take the form of denunciation of U. S. foreign policy in RVN and boycotting the elections. The latter will probably be typified by the publication of magazines, leaflets, posters, and demonstrations by Vietnamese agitators. (CI Comments: Previous reports have indicated the VC have the capability to accomplish the above listed acts in varying degrees. It is still expected that the majority of VC actions will be in the contested areas.)

QUANG TIN. On 17 August, a QUANG TIN report stated that the VC closed the "first phase" of an indoctrination course on 31 Jul 66. The "second phase" of the course was to run from 20 August to 11 September. The purpose of the course is to guide the people against the coming elections. The VC have reportedly sent young boys and girls to GVN controlled areas for the purpose of locating ballot boxes which will later be mined.

On 24 August a report from a Vietnamese intelligence source states that the VC in QUANG TIN (P) are taking positive measures to disrupt the national elections on 11 September. Reportedly, demolition units and explosives are being infiltrated into TAM KY, the province capital. Information is being collected on the polling places and guidance is being given to cadre on action to be taken prior to the elections. VC action is to be divided into two phases, 1-19 August and 20 August-11 September. Meetings are being held in the outlying areas to get the populace to boycott the elections.

QUANG NAM. A 19 August report from an intelligence source indicates the VC have planned an extensive campaign against the upcoming national elections. This campaign will include terrorism, assassinations, and demonstrations. The "Struggle Force" are also campaigning against the elections, popularizing the "blank vote" idea.

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The VC have also planned an extensive terror campaign between 19 August and 11 September. This campaign will consist of attacks on USMC units and American installations in DANANG. Everything possible will be done to frighten the populace of DANANG and keep them from voting. The VC also plan a propaganda campaign to get the people to vote blank ballots, and attempt to steal ballot boxes and grenade polling sites.

QUANG TRI. A 27 August report from an intelligence source states that the VC in QUANG TRI (P) continue to stress propaganda efforts in their anti-election campaign. The VC campaign in QUANG TRI still appears limited to whispering campaigns, distribution of leaflets, and threats to confiscate voter ID cards and registration cards.

THUA THIEN. A 27 August report from an intelligence source states that the VC in THUA THIEN (P) will continue with their propaganda campaign against the ensuing elections and are holding classes to instruct their cadres on operations to undermine the elections and possibly sabotage the ballot boxes themselves.

QUANG NGAI. A 20 August report from an intelligence source states that the MO DUC VC District Chief has distributed a number of HO CHI MINH photos to pro-VC in VC controlled areas and to their undercover agents in pacified areas. Reportedly, these photos will be dropped into ballot boxes on election day. Additionally, the VC have sent their cadre into resettlement camps to spread anti-GVN propaganda against the elections. There have been several reports of the Buddhist boycotting the national elections. It is believed that the Buddhist will not vote in this area unless they are forced to by the government. If they are forced to vote, there are indications that they will cast a blank ballot. (CI Comment: This appears to be in keeping with the present National Buddhist policy.)

On 22 August, a QUANG NGAI National Police report stated that the VC have reportedly ordered their sapper cells to penetrate QUANG NGAI City to assassinate the National cadre from 19 August to 11 September. The VC will then claim that the political parties liquidated each other to disrupt the coming elections. The VC will reportedly disguise themselves as ARVN Forces.

On 22 August, a QUANG NGAI National Police report stated that in order to disrupt the coming elections, the VC plan to print ballot sheets with HO CHI MINH's picture on them and secretly put them in the ballot box.

On 22 August, a QUANG NGAI National Police report stated that on 12 August, the VC of TAU MY (H) (BS 747717) held a meeting to discuss ways of disrupting the coming elections.

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On 26 August, a SON THIN agent reported that the VC 409th Battalion, reportedly located vicinity of (BS 555774), (BS 560765), intends to increase strong activities in the area west of SON THIN (D) to disrupt the coming election.

5. PROPAGANDA. On 19 August a report from a Vietnamese intelligence agency provided a VC propaganda report which stated that, if the government fails to win the peoples support, it cannot win, even if it has a strong military force. The only reason the government organized the election is because the dissention between the government and the people was becoming more and more profound. Under the DIEM regime the Vietnamese people had already elected a National Assembly and a President. The Vietnamese people are now aware of what is fraudulent election and what is a puppet assembly. If the government has not won the hearts of the people and their confidence, it is not time to organize an election. Due to these causes and the current serious political and economical crisis, all religious citizens blocks and religious have unanimously decided the following: (1) Not to recognize and not to attend the elections as organized by KY's government; (2) To ask for the establishment of a Civilian Transitive Government supported by the people in order to organize the elections; (3) To call for the unity of all the people and military to achieve the goal of exterminating Communism and saving the nation.

A 19 August report of VC propaganda states the following: (1) That President JOHNSON's government and their blind support to THIEU, KY and their party has the aim to oppress and kill the people as well as to dominate and rule the nation; (2) The puppet government of THIEU and KY has no right and no reason to stay and organize the election because it has committed the crime of taking human life and selling the country.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

THUA THIEN. A 23 August report from a fairly reliable source indicates that the VC in the PHU LOC (D) have forced each family to "contribute" between 2,000\$VN and 7,000\$VN towards feeding their troops. The VC have been attempting to organize a campaign called "Collect Rice from the Coming Crop for the Troops".

On 26 August an unknown number of VC entered THO LAN (H) (YD 780231) and assassinated four people.

On 28 August report from the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines reveals that villagers of LOC AN (V) (YD 961045) stated that approximately 18 VC operate in the area. They hold propaganda sessions and give the villages money to buy food for them. When the food is gathered the VC gather about 50 forced laborers to transport the food for them. Also a group of three VC enter the village daily at about 1600 and, if there are no Marines or ARVN troops in the area, the remaining 15 VC enter around 2000 and leave before daylight.

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A 29 August report states that approximate 30 well armed VC entered DINH MON (H) (YD 785117) and assembled the residents for a lecture. Before the VC left the village they "urged" the villagers to reserve rice for the rainy season.

QUANG NAM. A 23 August report from a fairly reliable source states that on 16 July 1966, the VC had selected guerrillas who are good marksmen with the purpose of organizing a sniper team to kill government officers, civilian officials, and Allied personnel during operations, while traveling on the highways, and in the city of DANANG.

On 25 August the VC raided a refugee camp at (AT 930578). The VC fled leaving 20 homes burning.

On 25 August a VC company infiltrated a refugee housing area at HOAN MY (H) (Coord unk) and burned 80 homes.

On 26 August the Village Chief of VINH XUAN was assassinated in his home in the vicinity of (BT 106579).

A 27 August report from a government official indicates that two VC companies moved into LOC THANH (V) (AT 810507) to coordinate with the local guerrillas of LOC PHUOC (V) (AT 870550) and LOC HOA (V) (AT 883550). They also instructed the people to travel government controlled areas and buy food and supplies.

On 27 August a VCS was apprehended at (BT 077605) while using a drum to signal the presence of Marine troops in the area.

A 28 August report from the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines indicates the VC are using women to purchase supplies. The VC are using LA THAP (H) (AT 9541) as a market to secure needed supplies. Using the women of CHU BAN (H) (AT 9358) to frequent the LA THAP market, they in turn buy and sell supplies to the women of PHU LAC (H) (AT 9252). The women of PHU LAC then transport the supplies to designated areas and sell them to the VC. (CI Comment: There have been several reports of the VC utilizing women to buy foodstuffs in pacified areas and transporting it to VC units.)

QUANG TIN. A 21 August report states that the VC held a meeting of Province and District level cadres to work out plans for the harassment of government elections. The 72nd Battalion was ordered to raid the TU HIEP resettlement center and KY HUONG (V) (Coord unk).

On 22 August, a QUANG NGAI report stated that the people of SON BAC (V) were required to pay 15\$VN to purchase anti-asphyxiating gas masks to protect themselves during the reported operation that the US troops will launch in western SON TINH (D) to protect the Constituent National Assembly election and to reoccupy BA GIA outposts. (CI Comment: Refers to Operation JACKSON).

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On 24 August a CI source reported that when government troops enter the hamlet of DIEM PHO (BT 418123), TON QUANG CUONG and TON QUANG MINH (father of CUONG) disguise themselves as Buddhist monks and go to a nearby pagoda.

On 24 August, a CI source reported that the people in Hamlet #7, KHU SANH (V) (BT 445028), who have relatives in NVN or in the VC ranks, have been given the following assignments by the VC:

- (1) Old men are to keep watch on Marine activities.
- (2) Old women are to watch for those who sell merchandize to the Marines, follow government officials working for the Marines, and if the opportunity permits, poison them.
- (3) The young men and girls are to supply the VC with salt, rice, and fish.
- (4) The children are to sell drinks to the Marines, and if the opportunity arises, steal their weapons, ammunition and gear.

On 27 August, 100 VC cadre and guerrillas crossed the SON TRA BONG River at (BS 515869). The VC heard about the operation two days ago. They left 1 guerrillas behind for harassment. (CI Comment: Refers to Operation JACKSON.)

A 30 August report states that the home of NGUYEN LAN in QUE PHUONG (H) (BT 164070) has been used as a "safe house" for high ranking VC cadre. VC personnel who have utilized the "safe house" include military and political cadre of Inter-Region and District Party level. The house is also used as a medical station and supply point for the VC. NGUYEN LAN has also been reportedly acting as the manager of the VC exchange system for TIEN PHUCC (D).

QUANG NGAI.

On 18 August, JTAD, QUANG NGAI, reported that on the evening of 18 August the VC cadre of QUANG NGAI (P) held a meeting at YEN NGUA (V) BS 510620. The purpose of the meeting was to inform the cadre of the steps to be taken to harass the people and keep them from voting in the coming elections. The steps reportedly include the bombardment and attack of camps, burning refugee camps, throwing hand grenades at the people who come to vote, and carrying plastic explosives to the polling places to destroy them.

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
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III MAF DANANG, RVN

13 September 1966

PERINTREP NO 32



III MAF PERINTREP NO 32

4-10 Sep 66

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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III MAFDANANG, RVN
130800H Sept 66Ser: **0125866**

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PERINTREP No. 32

Period Covered: 040001 - 102400 Sept 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,
NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was of lines of communication continued at a reduced pace while the level of small scale attacks increased throughout the zone.

a. QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Activity in the Operation PRAIRIE are increased. Contacts with NVA units in company strength were made on 8 September at (YD 142701) and 9 September at (YD 130708); also in QUANG TRI (P) ARVN units made contact with a VC company on 10 September in the vicinity of (YD 197622). In THUA THIEN (P) the National Railroad was damaged when a train hit a contact mine (ZD 170009). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Activity in the Operation MACON area increased. The most significant contact occurred on 5 Sept when USMC and ARVN units made contact with an estimated VC battalion in the vicinity of (AT 959524). On 9 September, elements of the 2nd Bn, 1st Marines encountered the VC in estimated company strength in the vicinity of (BT 018549) and (BT 028544). Small scale activity continued through the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring as usual in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. ARVN units in QUANG NGAI (P) contacted an estimated two VC battalions on 6 September during Operation QT 334. In QUANG TIN (P) on 7 September the VC in estimated platoon strength attacked a PF guarded refugee camp at (BT 315214). On 9 September the 713th Co was ambushed in the vicinity of (BS 561623). Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated small scale incidents.

2. Enemy Operations During the Period. VC/NVA initiated incidents for the reporting period totalled 316 and consisted of: 153 small unit engagements, 132 AA fire and 26 mine/booby trap incidents, four acts of terrorism and one hamlet harassment.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

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d - e. Negative.

CONFIDENTIALf. Administrative Units.

(1) 22 August. QUANG NGAI, JTAD agent report. The VC have set up a hospital at GOI GIA (H) (BS 515405). The hospital is composed of four buildings. Two of the structures, each 6 by 15 meters, have an 60 bed capacity and are presently treating 60 patients. The remaining two buildings serve as quarters for the staff and medical storage. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(2) 28 August. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent reported that the VC have established a hospital at HO NUOC LINH (H) (BS 460584). Three houses compose the camp. Two of the three are used for patients and the third for staff quarters. There are 50 patients reportedly being treated here. A nearby trench is used for storing medicine. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(3) 31 August. QUANG NAM JTAD agent report. As of 21 August, a VC military hospital was located in a valley with a thick jungle canopy near AN LONG (4) (H), QUE SON (D) (AT 945305). The hospital consisted of two thatched structures with approximately 100 patients under treatment. The majority of the patients were North Vietnamese troops. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. The 132 AA fire incidents during the period reflected a 52 percent increase over last period. 35 aircraft sustained 53 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9050) - (BT 0050) - (BT 2020) - (BT 0060). Intensity of fire ranged from light to moderate.

i - r. Negative.

s. Negative.

3. Other Intelligence Factors.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of: 546 KIA, 407 KIA (Prob), and 10 VCC. Weapons losses were 30 individual and one crew-served weapon.

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CONFIDENTIALf. Morale. No change.g. New Enemy Defenses, Barriers, Obstacles, Fortifications, Booby Traps and Other Defensive Works.

(1) 3 September, MACV report. VC are reported to be making holes in trees, inserting a grenade and placing an anti-government poster over it with the spoon of the grenade taped to the rear of the poster in such a manner that an individual pulling down the poster would detonate the grenade. A similar method was also reported and involved placing a quantity of anti-government material stacked on top of a grenade with pin removed. Removal of the materials would detonate the grenade.

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Evening thunderstorms and showers coupled with partly cloudy skies characterized the weather for the I Corps area during the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 91 degrees high to 76 degrees low. Winds were mostly variable from five to ten knots. Visibility ranged from 7 to 15 miles. Rainfall for the period amounted to .56 inches.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee and Document Report. Annex C.l. Other Significant Information.

(1) 27 August. A QUANG NAM JTAD agent reported that the VC moved five cases of explosives into the house of LE HIEP in CHIEN SON (H) (BT010516). Each of the five cases contained 20 bars (5 by 5 by 40 cm) of plastic explosive. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(2) 21 August. USSF agent, QUANG NGAI (P) rated (C-3). Four caches containing over 10,000 kilos of rice are located at (BS 404834) - (BS 404835) - (BS 404836). These caches are guarded by one company which reportedly utilizes daily patrols in performing their guard duties. (G-2 Comment: F/6).

(3) 30 August. NVA captive NGUYEN VAN DUC gave the following information concerning mines and mining procedures: A previously untraced directional-type mine was brought into SVN by his unit. This weapons has an effective range of 100 meters and is shaped like a plate of serrated metal eight to ten inches in diameter, with a slim metal spike six to eight inches long attached to the edge. The captive also indicated that the mines employed for the destruction of two vehicles on 23 August at (BS 585925) were copies of the Russian TM 41 anti-vehicular mine. His unit is equipped with the Z-10 AP mine which was designed with less than a one second delay.

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One of the techniques employed by the captive's unit to supposedly avoid detection of AT mines is to cover the mines with 1/2 inches of salt and three inches of soil. The salt is supposed to preclude the mine being detected by electronic mine detectors. The captive also related the following information concerning VC mining procedures. When the VC mine a trail, they use a metal cover for the mine and it is activated by 80 kilograms (approx 176 lbs) of pressure. No sign is used to warn of the mine since Vietnamese are light enough to walk safely over an 80 kilometer pressure mine. However, when mining a road, they generally place a sign 500 meters on either side warning the Vietnamese of the danger to vehicular traffic. He stated the sign is in Vietnamese and the Americans pay no attention to it. The sign reads "CAM XE KHACH O CHAY-NGUY HIEM." One hour is required to lay a pressure type mine and properly camouflage it. (G-2 Comment: F/6. The technique of using salt to avoid detection was tested by the 1st Engineer Battalion, and the salt was reported to have no effect on the capability of the organic electronic mine detectors).

4. Counterintelligence. AnnexD.
5. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 31

R. H. Thompson
R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
B. CLIMATOLOGY DATA FOR MONSOON SEASON
C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 | CG 2D BDE, ROKMC | 4 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | COMNAVSUPACT DANG | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | CMR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CO FLSG | 1 |
| CG 3RD MARDIV | 15 | CO 70TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAF | 15 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 | CO DET C-1 5TH USSF | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CMR I CORPS ADV GRP | 5 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CICV | 1 |
| CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 | | |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 32.

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------|--|--|
| 324TH B DIV (HQ & SPT) NVA | CONF 1,910 | YD 0262* | UNK | CG-GEN TRAN DO XO-CHU VAN DOI PO-NGUYEN TIEN LOI |
| 803RD NVA REGT | CONF 2,500 | QUANG TRI* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-MAJ VO THIET XO-DUYET PO-MAJ THUONG |
| 812TH NVA REGT | CONF 2,500 | YD 0352* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NGUYEN MINH XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 90TH NVA REGT | CONF 2,500 | YD 0567* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-CAPT MAI VAN CU |

*LAST RPTD LOCATIONS. UNITS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO DMZ FOR REORGANIZATION ALTHOUGH CERTAIN UNIDENTIFIED UNITS OF AT LEAST BATTALION SIZE ARE BELIEVED LOCATED SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONF)

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| 4TH BN, 270TH BRIG | CONF | 450 | DMZ/QUANG THI | UNK | CO-MAJ HO TINH |

2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|------|-----|---------------------|--|--|
| 806TH BN (LF) | CONF | 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RB 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RB 5-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LE VAN HAT |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF | 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO-LT TUAN PO-2NDLT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------------|------------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF 400 | YD 5320 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK - SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF 400 | PHU LOC* DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |
| 802ND BN | CONF 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MM RR | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |

* ELMS OF THIS BN BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN PHU VANG DISTRICT.

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES THE 95TH "B" REGIMENT (NVA) IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DIST VICINITY (ZC 0495). IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH REGIMENT (NVA), THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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DANANG TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54-AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-TY, IE VAN KHOI |
| DIA LOG CO | CONF 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 18-SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 51ST BN | PROB 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 5TH BN | PROB 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THAI PO-TOAN |
| 402ND SAPPER BN | CONF 300 | AT 8064 | 2-81MM MORT 4-LMG 16-AR 12-B40 170-AR | CO-HUYEN VAN TRAN |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | |
|-----------------|------------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 3RD REGT (NVA) | CONF 1,500 | QUE SON/HIEP DUC DIST | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB 500 | RQ 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYING THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| 804TH BN | CONF 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THESE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (16X12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6X75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6X120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" REGT (NVA), UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC (ZC 0495) IN PHU LOC DISTRICT IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

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CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG TIN/QUANG NGAI BORDER AREA | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MGS | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SR CAPT LUU THANH DUC PO-NGUYEN ICH |
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THANG |
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-82MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO-NGUYEN TAM XO-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PO-QUYET |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 2810 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN BAC |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| A-21 CO | CONF 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 706TH CO | CONF 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |
| TRA BONG CO | CONF 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | |
|-----------------|------------|-----------------------------|---|--|
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 20TH BN | CONF 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XO-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF 400 | BS 6654 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-MAI KIM |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

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| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU |
| 89 B CO | CONF | 90 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO-LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEN MIEU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 40 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MANH |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| A-13 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-MG | CO-HONG LE |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| A-34 CO | CONF 40 | BT 0303 | UNK | UNK |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 3RD REGIMENT (NVA) LOC IN QUE SON DIST AND THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HLEP DUC DISTRICT, COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITIONS BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (CLIMATOLOGY DATA FOR MONSOON SEASON) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 32.

The month of September marks the beginning of the wet season in this area and will last until January. Rainfall accumulated in September and October is two or three times as much as that accumulated in the previous three months. This can be attributed to the increased typhoon frequency, the low level flow becoming more Easterly in this area.

Air reaching Viet Nam during the Northeast Monsoon, originated in China, flows southward over the South China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin and arrives over Viet Nam as a cool, moist, Northeast wind. This Northeast flow, in its passage over warm waters, has gained moisture which is lost over the coastlands.

Thunder showers are rare. Persistent rain and drizzle are characteristic of the Northeast Monsoon.

Typhoon and tropical storms are most likely to effect Eastern Viet Nam and adjoining waters from July to November and least likely in January through March. The peak months for the DANANG area are September and October.

SWELLS DURING MONSOON SEASON

The highest sea and surf conditions along the coast occurs during the Northeast Monsoon Season, when the coast line comes under the influence of the Northeasterly flow. The fetch area is of sufficient mileage to allow wind waves of six to eight feet to be common just South of HAINAN ISLAND. These same waves diminish rapidly as they come in contact with the bottom of the shallow coastal waters with a slope averaging 1:50. Wave heights in the surf zone in excess of six feet can be expected during periods of prolonged Easterly flow.

The greatest swells and surf conditions are those as a result of a tropical storm. Caution should be exercised in small craft operations during any tropical storm situation regardless of its distance and movement. Long period swells emanating from these storms often move undetected through the South China Sea and can cause unexpected high surf conditions.

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DANANG CLIMATIC BRIEF ON MONSOON SEASON

TEMPERATURES

| AUG | SEP | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------------|
| 102 | 99 | 96 | 90 | 87 | 94 | 98 | Extreme Max |
| 93 | 88 | 83 | 80 | 76 | 75 | 78 | Mean Max |
| 84 | 82 | 79 | 76 | 75 | 69 | 72 | Mean |
| 75 | 75 | 73 | 71 | 68 | 65 | 68 | Mean Min |
| 70 | 68 | 63 | 56 | 56 | 52 | 58 | Extreme Min |

MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION

| AUG | SEP | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 12 | 13 | 22 | 20 | 19 | 14 | 8 |

MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH THUNDERSTORMS

| AUG | SEPT | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB |
|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 8 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

PRECIPITATION IN INCHES

| AUG | SEPT | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------------|
| 13.2 | 46.3 | 49.5 | 38.0 | 21.3 | 12.4 | 10.4 | Monthly Max |
| 4.7 | 15.7 | 23.3 | 15.1 | 8.7 | 4.2 | 1.8 | Monthly Mean |
| 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 3.8 | 1.6 | .6 | 1.0 | Monthly Min |
| 5.9 | 12.8 | 11.0 | 10.7 | 12.6 | 10.1 | 6.8 | 24 Hourly Max |

WINDS

| AUG | SEPT | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | |
|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| E | N | N | N | N | N | E | Prevailing Dir |
| 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 7 | Prevailing speed |
| 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Mean Speed |
| 28 | 28 | 40 | 30 | 36 | 36 | 28 | Max Speed |

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO 32.

1. 810th Battalion. A VC captive from the 810th Bn revealed the following information under interrogation. In February 1964 he was a member of the Popular Forces of THUONG HOA (V) when that village was attacked and he was taken prisoner. Along with six other PF prisoners he was taken to a VC training area in the vicinity of (YD 750065) for indoctrination training for a period of about 15 days. Following this training, the captive and two other captives were sent to a HUONG HU Training Center in the HAM HOA Mountain area for additional military training. The remainder of the former PF members were returned to the area of their capture as guerrillas. In January 1965 the captive was selected to attend a medical course in the northern area sub-region in the vicinity of (YQ 142972). In October 1965 he was returned to the 106th Co, 810th Bn. He indicated that the 810th Battalion sustained heavy casualties in the DUONG NONG (H) area of PHU THU sub-sector (February). In June the battalion moved from the PHU LOC Mountain area to the PHONG DIEN Mountain area (YD 550200) to reorganize. In the course of reorganization the 107th and 108th were disbanded and the members used as replacements in the 106th and 109th. A separate company, the 105th, also joined the battalion. Following the reorganization the units of the battalion were dispersed to operate in the PHONG DIEN (D), QUANG DIEN (D) and HUONG DIEN (D) areas with the mission of organizing installations and supporting political teams who were building combat villages in VC controlled areas.

2. 5th Co, Unit 571 (NVA). NGUYEN VAN DUC, a captive from the 5th Co, Unit 571 (NVA), a two company engineering unit, gave the following information under interrogation. He joined the NVA on 31 July 1965 at SON TAY (P) training area where he became a member of the 5th Co, which at that time had a strength of 72. After basic training his company was instructed in mine laying procedures for roads, bridges and fences and the use of pressure and wire trip mines. He later received training for one month on converting artillery shells into mines. Practical application in this type of training was carried out on the highways of NVN. The 5th Co trained extensively along with the 6th Co in varied terrain throughout HA TAY (P), where both companies together were known as Unit 1015. Training emphasis for the 6th Co was on construction work at that time. The unit training which took place over a period of five months also included rifle repair, rifle firing techniques, camouflage, infantry tactics and demolitions. The unit began their movement south around 31 December 1965. They traveled 12 days by truck and walked 18 days; all of this travel was done during the day, with heavy emphasis placed on the use of camouflage. Following this period an additional 33 days were spent infiltrating

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during daylight hours through LAOS. The unit designation was changed to 57¹ shortly after the unit entered SVN at KONTUM on 5 March. The unit was initially unable to participate in any major action because practically everyone had contracted malaria.

The captive was placed under the care of a medical unit bearing the designation C-21 (Provincial Medical Unit), which operated a 120 bed hospital of four buildings. The hospital area is believed to be in the vicinity of (BS 343790). The captive indicated the well camouflaged hospital area was situated above ground on a high mountain. At that time the hospital was quite filled with patients, 10 of whom were from his unit.

Following his hospitalization the captive's cell was ordered to three months duty in the BINH THANH (V) area while the other cell of the squad was sent to the BINH THANH (V) area. The remainder of the captive's unit is located in a heavily jungled area of southeastern QUANG NGAI (P). The captive claimed that on 21 August his cell destroyed a 2 ton truck and a larger truck with a mine placed on a road in the TIEN DAM (H) area. He heard the explosion and was told by the villagers that six men were killed by the mine.

3. The following is a translation of a document captured during Operation HASTINGS:

OUTLINE OF IMPORTANT POINT TO REMEMBER ON VC POLICY

Seven points to remember on wounded or dead soldier policy:

1. To properly implement the casualty policy is to intensify the struggle of the social class, support the standpoint of the party and express the love of the comrades "survive or die together".
2. We should evacuate all wounded and dead soldiers to a scheduled point, without any fear of difficulty or danger and not leave any on the battlefield to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
3. We should carefully bury the dead, mark their graves and preserve all their possessions.
4. We should help wounded soldiers with all our devotion.
5. We should classify wounded soldiers for the purpose of transporting seriously wounded soldiers first, lightly wounded soldiers second and follow the scheduled route to assure the security of wounded soldiers.
6. We should submit all letters of introduction issued by the party and groups to the authorities of dispensaries where we send wounded soldiers for treatment.

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7. We must try to endure our wounds. If we are lightly wounded, we should bandage ourselves and go on fighting. If we are seriously wounded we should automatically take refuge and wait for the wounded transportation team.

Five points to remember on war booty policy:

1. Trophies belong to the nation and the army. We have to exchange our hardships and our dangers for them. For this reason, we should collect all of them and preserve them well. But we should never prefer trophies to destruction of the enemy.

2. When clearing the battlefields, we should give priority to documents, weapons, etc..

3. We should absolutely observe the trophy discipline. We should automatically turn in our booty to the authorities and not keep them.

4. We should beware of chemical poisons or explosives mixed in with trophies. We are not allowed to use them, if we have no orders.

5. The units, the combat forces, including wounded soldiers under treatment should have equal rights in using trophies.

Seven points to remember in POW and surrender policy:

1. We should seize all weapons, documents and other clothing and equipment of captives; then guard against escape and bad incidents.

2. US captives and enemy officers even though wounded, should be evacuated to the rear.

3. We should not treat captives carelessly.

4. We should not receive gifts or barter for any personal effects of captives. In case of keeping their money or their personal effects we should explain to them and sign receipts.

5. We should follow the scheduled route for evacuating captives to our base, avoid important headquarters depot, densely populated areas and do not stop at our bases. If captives are carried on soldiers' backs, we should divide into many groups and each group has to follow a different route.

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6. We should welcome and indoctrinate the soldiers who have the enemy's rank to return to our ranks.

Seven points to remember in the ethnic minority policy:

1. Properly comply with the basic principles of our party toward the ethnic minority policy, union, equality and solidarity.

2. When located in their area, we should respect the customs and the habits of the people.

3. Do not touch people's property hidden in forests, in rice-fields, or in their own cemetery.

4. Do not ask the relatives of the family in local areas if we need to borrow or to beg something or if we should want to barter or deal with them.

5. Do not tease the women.

6. Do not defecate in ricefields, near the roads, beside graves or streams.

If we are careless and do anything contrary to the habits and customs of the local people we should tell cadre to ask pardon from the people and not pretend to forget them.

Six points to remember in combat discipline:

In movement, we should:

1. Resolutely keep secret the missions of our units and not tell anybody, even our relatives, our parents, wives, children, brothers or sisters.

We should not leave any traces on the axis of advance, even our tools, provisions or clothes, etc., to allow enemy intelligence agents or planes to discover our location, forces and purposes.

We should not prove less ideological and open fire while we are on guard.

In fighting:

2. Absolutely obey the orders of the commanders, valiantly overcome difficulties to fulfill our combat duties. We should not automatically leave our positions or our combat missions.

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3. Properly comply with the wounded and dead soldiers, trophy captive and ethnic minority policies.

4. Diligently keep our documents and weapons in good condition and prevent them from falling into enemy hands.

In withdrawal:

5. We should properly obey the orders to clear-up the battlefield and withdraw. We should make a sure, quick, tidy, orderly clean up of the battlefield and give priority to wounded, dead soldiers, weapons and document, etc...

6. We should beware of shelling and airstrikes during withdrawal and be ready to fight against enemy reinforcements.

Documents on civilian proselyting activity to indoctrinate cadres:

The past struggle on politics and arms issued from the South liberation troops. For this reason, the relation between the people and the soldiers is the same as that of fish and water. To strengthen and unanimity between the people and soldiers is one of the principles of activation of our troops and a foundation of the civilian proselyting activity of the south liberation troops.

How to create unanimity between the people and soldiers:

- The unanimity should depend on the social class struggle. The soldiers should understand that they come from the people, struggle for the people's interest and think of the people's interests as their own interests.

On an understanding of the people's requirements should be laid the foundation of unanimity. We should be indoctrinated on the people's war policy to understand the characteristics of the people's army.

The above points of civilian proselyting activity should be disseminated throughout the South liberation troops when we are complying with political policy, operating on the battlefield, in the areas which are under the enemy grip and in liberated areas. We should apply the policy towards the ethnic minority people and the people of various religions as follows:

In the enemy gripped areas, we should activate armed propaganda groups to mingle with the people. These groups will gradually indoctrinate the people and join their former groups. Then, we support the people to join our party. In addition, we should help the people to build additional combat hamlets and step up the guerrilla war.

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In the liberated areas, we should not only defend the liberated areas, but try to apply the party policy on the division of land, reformation for a new life, activation of guerrilla, militia and self-defense troops to supply the present guerrilla war as well as the activation of other people's groups.

In South Vietnam, there are over ten Montagnard groups of 2 million population over two-thirds of the south, they constitute the strategic base of the South Vietnamese and Indo-Chinese revolution. The South Montagnard races are guided by indomitable and valiant tradition, have high spirit and are filled with resentments of the enemy. To properly implement the civilian proselyting activity, we should have three togethers (eat together, sleep together, and work together), respect the customs and habits of each race of Vietnamese people to develop good morale and the customs of each race. The concept of the people's equality and the mutual origin of the people in the highlands and in the plains should be spread far and wide.

Besides the mission of indoctrination of the ethnic minorities, we should help them to activate their armed forces and train ethnic minority cadre.

Thanks to the proper implementation of the ethnic minority policy we should strengthen their organization and their lives will change considerably. The U. S. imperialists and their henchmen have used up all their plots such as the peace and the three togethers to master the situation in the highlands which failed when faced with our party policy and our proper implementation.

Religion is a grave problem in South Vietnam. There are over 10 religions which claim over 10 million people. In the past, the relation between catholic and non-catholic, between religions and our party has cause many difficulties. We should combine the religious campaign activity, with the civilian proselyting activity to gain victories.

Towards the people of various religions, we should properly comply with the religious union policy of our party and our front. We should mingle our cadre among the followers and induce the leaders of the religions to join our party. We should gain visible spiritual and material interests toward the basic class of people to promote social ideology among the basic class of people and the followers of religions.

The civilian proselyting activities of the party have gained many experiences such as:

- The frequent indoctrination of cadre and soldiers on the characteristics of the people's troops and inspiration among them of the thought that troops come from the people and struggle for the interests of the people.

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Frequent information on the general situation of the revolutionary troops in each period, each area and the spreading of the guide lines of the party to help the cadre to master the situation of their area of concern.

-Proof of the people's war and the people's troops to indoctrinate cadre and soldiers to understand their roles and their missions in this war.

-The building of a class struggle, to raise a valiant spirit and to sacrifice for the people.

-The indoctrination and proper implementation of the people's discipline to promote confidence in the people and to make them love and admire us.

-The countering of feudalism and disdain among the people so that they may adore our troops as the savior of the people. We should not know only the good achievements of the troops and disregard the good achievements of the people and the important role of the people and the local groups. We should not keep ourselves away from the people, despise and consider lightly the civilian proselyting policy. In addition, we should not lack belief in the party, patience in the revolution, use power towards the people to violate their religions, the ethnic minority policy of our party or break the people's discipline

POLITICAL OFFICE OF 324TH DIVISION

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ANNEX D COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) to III MAF PERINTREP No. 32

1. General. During the reporting period there were numerous reports of VC plans to disrupt the forthcoming elections by means of extortion, terror, collection of ID cards, interdicting communication routes to polls, propaganda, and military attacks on Allied Forces. However, the VC has largely confined his anti-election moves to the contested areas. Some indications that sabotage activity is increasing is predicated on the recent discovery of a large cache in DANANG. Espionage continues to be low level and increased reports are probably due to the VC interest in the GVN elections.

2. ESPIONAGE.

1. QUANG NAM. A 8 September report from the Government authorities states that there are seven VC cadre operating in the vicinity of VINH HA (V) (BT 085598), VINH XUAN (V) (BT 065560), VINH XUONG (V) (COORD UNK), DIEN BAN (D). They have the mission of conducting espionage against the villages of VINH XUONG, VINH HA, and XUYEN TRUONG. The VC usually hide in secret caves located in the homes of LE THU, LE CUOC, NGUYEN THI BON, who live in TAU MY (H) VINH XUONG (V).

A DAI LOC District Headquarters report indicates the VC village chiefs of LOC QUANG (AT 810543) and LOC TAN (AT 856540) held a meeting on 6 September. It was decided to send VC women to gather information on election polling sites in US/GVN controlled area. (CI Comment: One of many reports of VC using women for espionage activities).

A 1 September report from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, states that a patrol ambush position at (BT 077705) was approached by a group of three VC preceded by a 13 year old boy. The boy detected the ambush and said something in Vietnamese and then shouted in English "Hello Marine, give me some chow". The VC dispersed and fled. The youth was apprehended. (CI Comment: There have been several reports of the VC using children speaking English as a warning of US/RVN presence in the area).

A 29 August report from a Vietnamese intelligence source indicates that PHUNG CHUNG, 18 years old, is operating as a VC intelligence agent in HOA HUNG (V) (AT 930690) HIEU DUC (D). At the present time CHUNG is in DANANG for the purpose of gathering information on the organization and procedures of the forthcoming elections.

On 25 August, a QUANG NGAI National Police report stated that the VC plan to mount a number of intelligence and special operations to send people into controlled areas under the pretence of surrendering.

On 29 August, A THANG BINH report stated that VC cadre are employing the cover of wood-cutters to transport firewood between TIEN DAO (BT 250401) and BINH SA (BT 250390) Villages for the purpose of observing GVN positions.

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3. SABOTAGE**CONFIDENTIAL**

QUANG NAM. A 4 September report from a U. S. intelligence agency states that on the night of 3 September a combined team of CRD, National Police and a USMC EOD Team discovered an arms cache in a house in DANANG. The cache consisted of 2 P-38 pistols, 1 .38 calibre pistol, 2 sub-machine guns, 47½ pounds of C-4, 52 ChiCom grenades, 1 M-26 grenade and 500 rounds of assorted ammunition. One VCS was apprehended. (CI Comment: It has not been determined to what use these explosives were intended; investigation continues.)

THUA THIEN. A 5 September report from the HUE National Police states that eight people were apprehended in the city of HUE. Reportedly these people had been assigned the mission of sabotaging parts of the city of HUE and assassinating election candidates. A ninth person was subsequently apprehended with the reported mission of sabotaging the Marine landing facilities at HUE. From investigation it was also learned that women and children are to be used in the sabotage against U. S. installations. (CI Comment: How and in what manner women and children were to be employed was not determined.)

On 7 September the engine and two cars of the DANANG to HUE train were derailed when the train struck a mine located in the vicinity of (ZD 170009).

An 8 September report from the 1st CIT states that on 3 September a squad of VC sabotaged the Voice of Freedom Site at (YD 836177). An electrical conduct support pole was destroyed.

4. POLITICAL

Examination of reports from U. S. intelligence sources indicate that the VC have devised a three phase attack on the elections. The three phases are as follows: (1) During the campaigning, ask difficult questions, expound on candidates short-comings, bad morals, disclaim the worthiness of the candidates, disrupt speeches by making noises, start whispering campaigns against the candidates. (2) The voters: Just prior to the elections declare that ID cards were lost, pretend sickness, demand a democratic right not to vote, get the people to initiate blank ballots or put more than one ballot in the same envelope, claim the VC secretly control the balloting booths. (3) Election Day, get the people to say that ARVN soldiers beat them and throw grenades into the polling places. Other actions to be taken are military operations against US/FW and ARVN Forces, assassinations of candidates and an extensive whispering campaign against U. S. Aggression.

THUA THIEN. A 4 September report from the QUANG DIEN National Police states that an unknown number of VC entered NAM DUONG (H) (YD 633336) and confiscated ID cards of some 80% of the residents. (CI Comment: This is the first indication of the VC having any real success with their plan of confiscating ID cards.)

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
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III MAF DANANG, RVN

18 September 1966

PERINTREP NO 33



III MAF PERINTREP NO 33

11-17 Sep 66

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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III REF

DANANG, RVN

180800H Sep-66 - -

Ser: **0129288**CONFIDENTIAL

PERINTREP NO. 33

PERIOD COVERED: 110001 - 172400 SFP 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,
NE 49-15, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. General Enemy Situation. VC/NVA activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was characterized by an increase in both large scale and small scale contacts. At the same time, VC interdiction of north to south lines of communication continued.

A. QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. Activity in the Operation PRAIRIE and DECKHOUSE IV areas increased with several contacts involving VC/NVA units in company and battalion strength taking place from 15 to 17 September. In THUA THIEN (P), on 12 September, the National railroad was damaged at (YD 628177) and (XD 170009) when track and culverts were blown. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

B. QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale activity in southern QUANG NAM (P) increased during the period with several small scale attacks and an ambush conducted on USMC, CAC and PF units on 12, 14 and 16 September respectively. On 17 September a train was damaged by mining at (AT 958904). Small scale activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

C. QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. Several VC attacks, varying in size from platoon to battalion strength, were made against military facilities in QUANG TIN (P) and QUANG NGAI (P) on 11, 13 and 15 September. The most significant of these was a VC attack in battalion strength on NUI DANG outpost beginning 0445H on 13 September. The VC overran the outpost but withdrew when subjected to the combined fire of attack aircraft and naval gunfire. On 11 September a Highway 1 bridge at (BS 996927) was damaged when the center span was blown. Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC/NVA initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 304 and consisted of: 185 small unit engagements, 108 AA fire and 17 mine/booby trap incidents, and two acts of terrorism.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

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- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment. Rallier VO VAN NOI stated that during a mortar attack on the 25th Infantry Division Camp on 26-27 July, the VC attempted to mislead US countermortar fire by flashing lights timed to coincide with each mortar firing. Lights were placed 2000 meters from actual mortar positions. (Source II FFORCEV PERINTREP No. 24 of 30Aug66. G-2, II FFORCEV advises that this is the first report of such deceptive measures being employed against II FFORCEV units.)

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Type</u> | <u>Source & Evaluation</u> |
|-------------|----------------------------|--|--|
| 29Aug | (BS 494651) (BS 497637) | Rice storage areas | US Agency Report III MAF G-2: F/6 |
| 31Aug | (BS 671875) | Rice storage tunnel | US Agency Report III MAF G-2: F/6 |
| 31Aug | (BS 487835) | Ammo storage tunnel | US Agency Report III MAF G-2: F/6 |
| 9Sep | (BT 056442) | Ordnance shop | QUANG NAM (P) info report III MAF G-2: F/6 |
| 13Sep | (BS 168758) | Underground factory, ammo equipment. | USSF Agent: C-3 |
| 14Sep | (BT 035190) | Hospital | USSF Agent: F-6 |
| 16Aug | (BT 205144) | Base area | JTAD Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3 |

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. The 112 AA fire incidents during the period reflected an 11% increase over last period. 27 aircraft sustained 63 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (BT 0512) - (BT 0609) - (BT 2107) - (BT 9906). Intensity of fire ranged from light to moderate.

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i-j. Negative.

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k. Artillery/Hvy Mortars. 12 Sept. The 1st Bn, 4th Marines CP located at (XD 975505) was subjected to 120mm mortar fire during an attack at 101530H. An estimated five rounds were fired, one of which was recovered intact. The angle at which the round impacted indicated a very high angle of fire. An estimate of between 3000-4000 meters between the point of firing and the point of impact was determined. The mortar position was located in the vicinity of (YD 962592).

l-q. Negative.

r Reconnaissance. (Significance of Reconnaissance activity)

(1) The most significant contact in QUANG TRI (P) occurred on 11 September in the vicinity of (YD 0466) where a reconnaissance element made contact with an estimated VC/NVA Plt.

(2) In QUANG NAM (P) several groups of VC ranging from 3 to 23 men were sighted south of the SONG THU BON river.

(3) In QUANG NGAI (P) reconnaissance sightings of 43 VC were made on 17 September in the vicinity of (BS 4483).

s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of: 179 KIA, 231 KIA (Prob), and one rallier. A total of 15 individual weapons were captured.

f. Morale. A VC captive MAI NHU of the V-13 Co, 1st VC Regt indicated that the morale of the V-13 Co is poor and that a large number (80%) of the unit have threatened to leave if conditions do not improve. He indicates that practically everyone in the unit has malaria and medicine, as well as food, is in short supply.

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
g-i. Negative.

j. Weather: There were no significant trends in the weather picture during the week, compared with the previous week. Partly cloudy to cloudy skies with afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers were experienced in the I Corps area during most of the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 91 degrees high to 76 degrees low. Winds were variable in direction at 3 to 6 knots. Visibility ranged from 7-15 miles. .59" of precipitation was recorded for the period.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee and Document Report, Annex B.l. Other significant information.

(1) 6 September: A USMC CI Source reported an underground tunnel at MINH-HOI (SH) THAM-HOI (H) BINH-HOANG V. The tunnel was constructed by VC guerrillas and cadre from November 1965 to June 1966. The tunnel is about 300 meters in length and has three entrances. One entrance is located at the home of HUYNH-TRACH (AKA THAN) (BS 675876), BINH-SON (D) cadre, one at the home of HUYNH-TUAT (BS 674877), and one about 100 meters from the home of HYNH-TUAT (BS 675875). The tunnel is used as a rice storage area and as a hiding place for VC.

(2) 3 September: A USMC CI Source reported that 1000 kilos of rice was stored at the BINH-AN Village School (BS 727873). The VC are reportedly planning to move 500 kilos to an unknown destination but will leave 500 kilos at the school.

4. Counterintelligence, Annex C.5. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities, See III MAF PERINTREP No. 31.

 R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISPATCHES:

| | |
|---------------------------------|----|
| LACV J231-21 | 1 |
| LACV J234-22 | 1 |
| CG FLEPMAC | 1 |
| CG I FFORCSEV | 2 |
| CG II FFORCSEV | 1 |
| CG 1ST MA. DIV | 15 |
| CG 3RD MA. DIV | 15 |
| CG 1ST MA. ← CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV | 15 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE. 101ST ABN DIV | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 |
| CG 9TH MA. B | 1 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 |
| CG 35TH TFW (LOI) DANANG | 1 |
| CG 2D BDE ROKMC | 6 |

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| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| CG 2D BDE, ROKMC | 6 |
| CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| COMNAV SUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CG 30TH NCR | 0 |
| COMR CSC DANANG | 1 |
| CG FLC | 1 |
| CG 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 9TH MP BN | 1 |
| CG 5TH COMF BN | 1 |
| CG CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG DET C-1 5TH USMF | 2 |
| DSA I CORPS | 5 |
| CTCV | 1 |
| CG 1ST MA. B | 2 |

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CTG 76.5

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
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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 33

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-  VC
-  PROBABLE

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DMZ N/CZ 10 AREA

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------------|--|--|
| 324TH B DIV (HQ & SPT) NVA | CONF 1,010 | YD 0262 | UNK | CG-GEN TRAN SO XO-CHU VAN DAI PO-NGUYEN THIE LOC |
| 805TH REGT (NVA) | CONF, 2,500 | QUANG TRI* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-MAJ VO THIEP XO-DUYET PO-MAJ THUONG |
| 812TH REGT (NVA) | CONF 2,500 | YD 0352* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NGUYEN MINH XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 817TH REGT (NVA) | CONF 2,500 | YD 0567* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-CAPT MAI VAN CU |

* LAST KNOWN LOCATIONS. UNITS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO DMZ FOR REORGANIZATION. THROUGH CERTAIN UNIDENTIFIED UNITS OR AT LEAST BATTALION-SIZED ARE BELIEVED LOCATED SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

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| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| 4TH BN, 270TH BRIG | CONF 450 | DMZ/QUANG TRI | UNK | CO-MAJ HO TINH |
| CAM LO CO (LF) | PR 80 | YD 1063 | UNK-60MM MORT | CO-NGHIA XO-CHAM |

2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)

| | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|------------------|--|--|
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LE VAN HAT |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO 'T TUAN PO-2NDLT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO (LF) | CONF 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG |

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| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---------------|------------------|------------------|--|----------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CC-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CC-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CC-PHAM TINH PHU |
| 810TH BN | CONF 400 | YD 5320 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CC-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF 400 | PHU LOC* DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-5.40 | CC-TON THAI THIEP |
| 802ND BN | CONF 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 2-57MMRR | CC-CHAN-TRONG MOT |

*ELMS OF THIS BN BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN PHU VANG DISTRICT.

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AMS/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>REFERENCE</u> | <u>LOC. REF.</u> | <u>AUT. REF.</u> | <u>PERIODICITY</u> |
|---------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|
| 15 DEC 68 (L) | CONF 100 | YD 6530 | 2-GOMH 104 9-AR | CC-THUAN XC-TINH PO-THUAN |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES THE 95TH "B" REGIMENT (NVA) IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LCC DIST VICINITY (ZC 0495). IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH REGIMENT (NVA), THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE ZONE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR ZONE, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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UNCLASSIFIED~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DANANG TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 402ND SAPPER BN | CONF 300 | AT 8064 | 2-81MM MORT 2-LMG 1 12-B40 | CO-NGUYEN VAN TRAN |
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG; 54-AR | UNK |
| R-21 CO | CONF 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG; 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR; 16-SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CC-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |

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| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 51ST BN | PROB 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |
| 5TH BN | PROB 500 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 16-AR | CO-QUANG NAM (AKA LU) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| 402ND SAPPER BN | CONF 300 | AT 8064 | 2-81MM MORT 4-LMG 16-AR 12-B4C 170-AK | CO-NGUYEN VAN TRAN |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | |
|-----------------|------------|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 5RD REGT (NVA) | CONF 1,500 | QUE SON/HIEP DUC DIST | 19-82MM MORT 12 -75MM MORT 1-60 MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO-LTCOL VLET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AA MG UNK-MG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN V TINH XC-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG; 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|------------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PC-DUAN CONG THIEP |
| 49TH BN | PROB 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUNG VAN CHAU PC-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PC-ANH VU |
| 80TH BN | CONF 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIEP |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, ONE (1) ARMY REGT HQ & WITH THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18X12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (PCSS 6X75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6X120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" REGT (NVA), UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC (ZC 0495) IN PHU LOC DISTRICT IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

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CHU LAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY MAINTAINED (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>ST</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|-----------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG TINH/QUANG NGAI BORDER AREA | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MGS | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XC-SR CAPT LUU THANH DUC PC-NGUYEN ICH |
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THANG |
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-82MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO-NGUYEN TAN XC-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PC-QUYET |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG; 18-RR | CC-NGUYEN BI CHAW; NGHIA TUU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XC-MINH PC-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CC-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BT 2810 | UNK | CC-NGUYEN YEN BAC |

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UNIT LAI TAO (CONF)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-60 MG | CO-LE MIAC NGHIA XO-THUEN CO-CHUNG |
| TRU BONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TACK).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-------------------------------|--|---|
| 21ST REGT (NVA) | CONF | 2,000 | TRANG BINH/ QUANG SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM MG UNK-LMG | CO-SR CAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH CO-NGUYEN VAN LA CO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOCI |
| 20TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-LMG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XO-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 6654 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-LMG 24-RR | CO-MAI KIM |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-IG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SR CAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-IG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYUNG THANH MY |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU |
| 89 B CO | CONF | 50 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO-LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEN MIEU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 40 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MANH |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-IG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| A-13 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-IG | CO-HONG LE |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| A-34 CO | CONF | 40 | BT 0303 | UNK | UNK |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 3RD REGIMENT (NVA) BELIEVED LOC IN HIEP DUC DIST AND ONE (1) ARTY REGT (HDQ) WITH THREE (3) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT, COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITIONS BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT EVENTS, CAPTURES/RECOVERIES, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
 III MAP POLINTREP H- 33

1. V-13 Co 72nd Bn.

a. A recent VC Returnee PHU THI who was a member of a "Reconnaissance/Suicide Squad" gave the following information under interrogation. His squad was attached to the V-13 Co which he claims is attached to the 72nd Bn, 1st VC Regt. The V-13 Co has a present strength of 125 men and is organized into three platoons and a company headquarters, with the reconnaissance/suicide squad attached. The 72nd Bn consists of four infantry companies and a heavy weapons company armed with 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, and 57mm recoilless rifles.

b. The captive gave the following information concerning his specialized training. He received three months training in weapons and grenades, followed by the use of mine/detectors and techniques of disarming mines and booby traps to prepare the way for attacking infantry. He was taught demolition procedures and escape and evasion methods following a demolition mission. The men selected for this training were picked because of their courage and willingness to execute a mission regardless of cost. The reconnaissance/suicide units were considered elite and the members enjoyed special privileges. When on a mission the members wear only shorts and paint their bodies the color of earth. They are armed with either a sub-machine gun and about 150 rounds of ammunition or 20 to 30 grenades.

c. The captive has heard that the 1st VC Regt and 21st NVA Regt are in QUANG NGAI Province and the 3d NVA Regt is located in QUANG TIN Province. The mission of the V-13 Co is to attack the NVA LAI New Life Hamlet (BT 130127) during the rainy season; during the same period the 1st VC, 21st NVA and 3d NVA Regts will attack NVA PHUOC GIENG camp.

d. The captive indicated that the morale of the V-13 Co is poor and 80% of the company have threatened to leave if conditions did not improve. Practically everyone in the unit has malaria and medicine as well as food is in short supply. Personalities identified by the captive were: CAM, CO of 72nd Bn, THAN, PO of 72nd Bn, PHUONG, CO V-13 Co, HA XU of V-13 Co and TIEG, PO of V-13 Co.

2. R-25 Co.

a. VC captive NGUYEN KHU THIEN, a corpsman in the R-25 Local Force Co, gave the following information under interrogation. The R-25 Co is located in the area of TRUNG KHU (4) (AF 9467), PHU THI (4), PHU THI (4) (P). The present company strength is about three officers and 125 enlisted men with a strength of about 35 in each of the three platoons of the company. The R-25 Co is one of three companies of a battalion heading a destination PHUOC. The other two companies are organized in a manner similar to the R-25 and designated the R-23 Co and R-24 Co.

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He indicated that he heard that three men from the 3d Plt, of which he was a member, were killed by American artillery about 20 August and another three men were lost about 5 August due to malaria.

b. The captive gave the following information concerning his recruitment and training with the VC. He had helped a number of sick people of Hamlet #1, KY TAN (V) before he joined the VC on 1 September. Around 1 June he was taken into the VC and told that he was going to be a corpsman with the R-25 Co. The captive left Hamlet #1 with a group of recruits and for the next three and a half days journeyed into a mountain area. The group moved only at night and used camouflage; other men joined the column as they moved along. During the movement the column received one artillery round which caused no casualties. The group arrived at a training area where huts had been built previously and, along with 62 other persons, underwent a three month course of medical instruction. The primary instructor was named HONG KHAN, whom he believed was a North Vietnamese doctor. The course of instruction included the treatment of various diseases, treatment of wounds and giving inoculations.

c. Personalities identified by the captive were: BAY, CO of R-25 Co, LIEN, Plt Cdr 3d Plt, R-25 Co, HONG KHAN, instructor at the medical training center and PHAM MAI, Hamlet #1 autonomous chief.

3. Translation of an enemy document captured by the 3dMarDiv on 24 July in the vicinity of (AT 929579) follows:

"To: Local authorities and units. In compliance with the policy of higher headquarters, effective immediately, U. S. and ROK soldiers captured in action by guerrilla or local units would be treated according to this regulation. They must be properly detained and timely evacuated to higher headquarters. Unreasonable shooting, killing or torturing because of difficulty (s) met in the process of evacuation or, because of (unfavorable) enemy situation, are inconsistent with the principles of the regulation and absolutely forbidden. Violator(s) of this directive will be answered to higher headquarters for their action (s).

On the other hand, effort should be made to obtain bodies of US soldiers killed in action, and all papers, pictures, insignia will be removed before burying them secretly. The case will then be (timely) reported to higher headquarters. Thus, the enemy KIA's will then be listed by the enemy (US/ROK) forces as missing or captured.

(Party) Committee echelons of local and main force units should disseminate this urgent and important directive to cadre and soldiers of the military and para-military forces for proper implementation. The matter should be kept absolutely secret."

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J2 MACV Comment: The above is a full translation of the document. The obvious intention of the Viet Cong is to mislead the allied authorities from maintaining accurate statistics on the number of personnel killed or captured. The directive was possibly originated from HQ 7th VC Division, distribution to local authorities and units of QUANG NAM (P). Request wide dissemination of subject information.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE), VC III MAP PERIMETER NO. 33

1. GENERAL. VC anti-election activities reportedly were to have dominated the scene in the ICTZ on 11 September. There were some VC inspired incidents, as was to be expected, but the voting for the new Constituent Assembly was for the most part quiet and orderly. There have been numerous reports of the VC propagandizing the local populace and English language leaflets, expounding anti-U.S. themes, have been found. VC terror activities were again directed toward the refugee camps, as two camps were victimized and partially destroyed by fire.

2. ESPIONAGE.

QUANG NAM. On 8 September the 1st Bn, 1st Marines reported that a female VCS was apprehended during a County Fair Operation. This female was reported to be a squad leader of a girls unit that is used to warn the VC of the presence of US/ARVN forces in the area. (CI Comment: The female was turned over to the HOI AN District officials and as of this date no additional information has been received. However, there have been several reports which indicate the formation of women's units by the VC. These units could possibly be larger type cells or a special unit, formed by the VC for a particular purpose).

3. SABOTAGE.

THUA THIEN. During the reporting period there were six reported acts that can be classified as sabotage. These acts consisted of bridges being destroyed at (YD 826179), (YD 905115), (YD 907117), and (YD 899116). A railroad culvert was mined in the vicinity of (YD 795195). There was also a report of an electrical pole being destroyed by plastic explosives in the vicinity of (YD 826179).

QUANG NAM. A 10 September report received through Vietnamese military channels indicates that the VC may have devised a "Bamboo Tube" mine which is intended to be employed in harbor areas. This mine is reported to be approximately 144 millimeters in diameter, 1 meter in length, and weighs 20 to 30 pounds. It is reported to be detonated on contact and is primarily designed to be used against light barges and personnel boats. The mine is reported to be generally emplaced along the shore and camouflaged with seaweed. (CI Comment: Source indicates that these mine devices have been in use since 1 August. The VC may be attempting to emplace these devices in the harbor of Danang. This Headquarters has received no reports of discoveries to date.)

4. POLITICAL. The 11 September National elections were conducted with relatively little harassment from the VC. Incidents ranged from reports of small arms fire to small probing attacks on voting sites. There were approximately twenty VC inspired incidents, most of which took place in the contested areas and on TAOR peripheries.

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THUA THIEN. On 9 September the National Police reported that two VN youths were apprehended while passing out anti-government leaflets in HUE.

QUANG NAM. A 31 CIT report states that two anti-U.S. propaganda leaflets were found in PHU HOA (E) (AT 953102). A translation of the leaflets is as follows: Leaflet #1, "Down with American Imperialism", Oppose American Imperialism in Vietnam, the soldiers of the Republic must turn back with the people to attack the American and save the country so we can have true peace." Leaflet #2 was directed towards the officers and men of the ARVN. Propaganda leaflets written in English were found on 11 September in HOA VANG (D) QUANG NAM (P). The leaflets were aimed at bringing discredit upon the presence of U. S. in Vietnam. The leaflet stated that, "When the Americans opposed British Imperialism that was a just war, approved by the American people and supported by the people of the world, Now the Americans are in South Vietnam to carry out the Johnson-McNamara war of aggression, countering the Vietnamese people's aspirations for freedom and independence. This is an unjust war and is protested against by the American people, and the peace loving people".

QUANG TIN. A 7 September report states that during an attack on a refugee camp the VC propaganda leaflets. The leaflets were directed at the people to keep them from voting in the national elections. (CI Comment: See QUANG TIN miscellaneous for terrorism details).

On 7 September a 7th CIT report states that two propaganda leaflets were found in QUANG TIN (P). Both were aimed at the American Serviceman; one was degrading and the other urged him to refuse to fight and demand that the U. S. Government withdraw from South Vietnam. (CI Comment: There have been several reports of the use of propaganda leaflets to degrade the U. S. Serviceman.)

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

THUA THIEN. A 1st CIT reports states that four VC entered THUY THUONG NOT (H) (YD 792199) on 9 September and assassinated a villager when he refused to join the VC.

On 9 September an intelligence source states that a lone VC shot and seriously wounded a policeman at (YD 7619).

On 9 September a Vietnamese government official stated that on 7 September four VC entered the home of the Assistant Hamlet Chief of PHU BAI (5) (H) and killed him. It is believed that he was killed because of his refusal to furnish money and rice to the VC.

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On 10 September a report from the 4th Marines stated that an unknown number of VC women and girls, acting as waitresses and bar girls, are armed with small arms and have the mission of assassinating USMC personnel in the HUE-PHU BAI area. Reportedly these individuals have forged identification papers. (CI Comment: This is the second report of VC women assassination teams.)

On 14 September an unknown number of VC entered PHU MY (V) (YD 812252) and burned the council house.

QUANG TIN. A 8 September report from a Vietnamese intelligence agency states that during the night of 7 September an estimated company of VC attacked VON LAI Refugee Camp located on the outskirts of TAM KY City and burned 96 thatch type houses. Four refugees were killed and six wounded. The chief of TAM KY Sub District was shot through the throat and is reported to be in serious condition. (CI Comment: There have been several reports recently of VC directing their efforts to terrorize and destroy refugee camps. It appears that some notable change in VC terror operations may be in the making. The VC want to prove that the refugee camp sites are not protected areas and attempting to indicate a false sense of security.)

QUANG NAM. During the reporting period there were three acts of VC terrorism. These acts consisted of the killing of the Police Chief of HOA THAI (V) (BT 002729), his wife and one of his children; the destruction of the HOA THO village office (AT 999711) and damage to the PHONG BAC (H) school (AT 998717); and the burning of 50 homes in a refugee camp located in the vicinity of (BT 05510).

A Vietnamese government agency report, dated 7 September 1966, revealed that the VC in DIEN BAN (D) have been furnished a "Yellow Poison". They have been instructed to use this poison against U. S./ARVN troops, and in refugee camps. They intend to propagandize that the U.S. is poisoning the refugees. The would be poisoners are reported to have sufficient legal documentation to allow them to pass as merchants and move undetected through USMC and government controlled areas. (CI Comment: There have been numerous reports that the VC are planning to use poison against USMC/ARVN troops. This is the first reported incident of the VC plans to blame the poisoning attempts on the U.S. There is no substantial information of physical presence of poisons within this area, however, sufficient reports have been received to indicate that VC may possess this capability. "Yellow Poison" mentioned above is believed to be the same as previously reported in III MAF PERINTREP No. 24).

U. S. Military Personnel in Vietnam have been receiving unsolicited mail from BILE ADLER BOOKS, INC. 10 East 30th Street, New York, N. Y., listing the managing editor as DAVID CURTIS. The letter requests that the addressee return a letter or article describing his experiences in VIETNAM. BOOKS, INC intends to publish the letters received as a book. (CI Comment: While the real purpose behind the solicitation is unknown, letters of the type requested could be to the detriment of the U. S. Military. USMC units attention is invited to FMFPac Order 03350.2A of 22 July 1966).

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
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III MAF
DANANG, RVN

25 SEPTEMBER 1966

PERINTREP NO 34



III MAF PERINTREP 34

18-24 K10 66

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 DANANG, RVN
 250800H SEP 1966
 Ser: 01340-66

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PERINTREP NO. 34

PERIOD COVERED: 180001H - 242400H Sep 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: JCG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,
 NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. General Enemy Situation.

a. QUANG TRI - PHUA MIEN - PHU BAI TAOR. In the Operation PRALINE and DECK HOUSE IV areas, the most significant contacts occurred on 21 September when C/1/26 made contact with an estimated NVA company reinforced or two NVA companies in the vicinity of (YD 135715) to (YD 138720) and on 24 September when element of 2/7 made contact with an estimated NVA battalion in the vicinity of (AD 957587). The national railroad was damaged on 19 and 23 September when culverts were blown at (YD 801192) and (AU 848006). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. Small scale attacks in QUANG NAM (P) decreased considerably during the period. Interdiction of lines of communication continued as a highway bridge on Route 1 at (BT 042620) was blown on 18 September and a train on the national railroad was derailed with tracks damaged at (AI 958904) on 19 September. Small scale activity continued through the DANANG TAOR with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI - CHU LAI TAOR. VC small scale attacks of company size or less continued in QUANG NGAI (P). PF platoons were ambushed at (BS 599788) on 18 September and at (BS 670750) on 21 September by the VC in platoon strength. On 19 September the VC attacked and overran RUONG-VIEN OP vicinity (BS 378692). On 21 September, during Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, A/1/7 was attacked by an estimated two VC platoons. On 21 September the airstrip at CHU LAI was hit by 25-30 rounds of 60mm mortar fire; other activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. Enemy Operations During the Period. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totalled 301 and consisted of: 160 small unit engagements, 113 AA fire and 23 mine/boby trap incidents, two hamlet harassments, two acts of sabotage and one act of terrorism.

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- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Training in small unit tactics within the 324th B Div has emphasized the need to rapidly close with Allied units during an engagement so that supporting arms cannot be employed against the NVA without endangering Allied units. Application of this tactic has been evident during Operations HASTINGS, PRAIRIE AND DECK HOUSE IV.

(2) A Marine equipped with an infra-red scope (power source on) reported spotting what he believed was an infra-red emission from a small concentrated light source at (BT 502020). No friendly troops were in the area. (G-2 Cmt: This is the first report by III MAF units of possible VC/NVA employment of infra-red equipment).

- e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations.

| (1) <u>DATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>SOURCE AND EVALUATION</u> |
|-----------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 5 Sep | (BS 892358) | VC Storage Area | JTAD Report III MAF G-2 F/6 |
| 8 Sep | (DS 445785) | Rice Storage Area | JTAD Report III MAF G-2 F/6 |
| 10 Sep | TU LA (1) (AT 910200) | VC Hospital | JTAD Report III MAF G-2 F/6 |
| 10 Sep | AN MY (1) (BT 055495) | Food Storage Area | JTAD Report III MAF G-2 F/6 |
| 13 Sep | (AT 925426) | VC Hospital | JTAD Report III MAF G-2 F/6 |
| 20 Sep | (YD 975660) | Rice Storage Area | INAC III MAF G-2 F/6 |
| 22 Sep | (AT 802557) | Rice Storage Area | DAL LOG (D) Report III MAF G-2 F/6 |

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| <u>DATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>SOURCE AND EVALUATION</u> |
|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| 22 Sep | AI NHA (H) (AT 907544) | VC Hospital | DAI LOC (D) Report 111 MAP G-2 E/6 |

(2) Administrative Units. The following units have been accepted as confirmed units in the DMZ area: 14th NVA Signal Bn, 19th NVA Med Bn. See Annex A for details.

g. Negative.

n. Air Defense. Anti-aircraft fire incidents for the reporting period showed a slight increase over the previous period. A total of 113 incidents were reported including seven air to air fires; no aircraft sustained or hit. Grid squares of greatest density were (XD 950) - (XD 960) - (XD 960) - (XD 960) - (XD 960) - (XD 960). Incidents of fire were not reported.

(1) The 14th NVA ad bn has been accepted as a confirmed unit in the DMZ area. See Annex A for details.

i-j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars.

(1) 16 Sept. Report of 120mm mortars. A USF agent in HANG BHI (P) reported that one regiment (unidentified) was located in the vicinity of (XS 9548) - (XS 9548). This unit is reportedly armed with one 120mm mortar along with normal weapons. (G-2 Comment: E/6).

(2) 15 Sept. A USF agent in HANG BHI (P) reported an unidentified Battalion armed with two 105mm howitzers is located in the vicinity of (BS 525440) - (BS 525435) and (BS 543445). (G-2 Comment: E/6; this is the first report of 105's in this area.)

(3) The 13th NVA Artillery Bn has been accepted as a confirmed unit in the DMZ area. See Annex A for details.

l-m. Negative.

n. Engineers. The 15th NVA Engr Bn has been accepted as a confirmed unit in the DMZ area. See Annex A for details.

o-p. Negative.

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(1) The 5th NVA Regt is believed to have moved from QUANG THIE (P) to northern QUANG NGAI (P). See Annex A for units presently capable of reinforcing the 5th NVA Regt.

(2) The 914th NVA Bn has been accepted as a confirmed unit operating in HAI LANG (D). See Annex A for details.

(3) The V-25 Bn (LF) has been accepted as a confirmed unit operating in the vicinity of (AF 8755) DAKH (1). See Annex A for details.

r. Reconnaissance.

(1) The most significant sighting in the Operation PHALAI - DUCK HOUSE IV area occurred on 29 September, when a 120mm mortar and 60 NVA were sighted at (XD 917494).

(2) In QUANG NGAI (P) several sightings of small groups of VC (3-6) were made west of the DAMANG PAOR and in AN-HOA industrial complex.

(3) In the area 5-10 kilometers west of the 2d Brigade, KOPHIC PAOR, several sightings were made of groups of 15-30 VC/NVA. Some 200 VC/NVA were sighted in the same area on 24 September; they were wearing heavy packs, camouflaged uniforms, and carrying crew served as well as individual weapons.

s. VC/NVA Warning Systems. See Annex B.

3. Other Intelligence Factors.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 415 KIA and 397 KIA (prob), 24 VCC, one NVAC and one rallier. A total of 30 individual and five crew served weapons were captured.


f. Morale. No change.

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j. Weather. Weather in I Corps during the reporting period reflected the approach of the northeast monsoon season; the area experienced partly cloudy to cloudy skies, thunderstorms and showers, diminishing visibility and generally lower temperatures. Temperatures for the reporting period ranged from an average 89 degrees high to 70 degrees low, winds were mostly northerly from four to six knots, and visibility averaged seven miles.

k. Significant Agent, Captive/returnee and Document Reports. See Annex C.

l. Negative.4. Counterintelligence. See Annex D.5. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 31

 R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. WARNING SYSTEMS
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 | CG 2D BDE, ROINIC | 6 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | CTG 79.5 | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | JTG 76.5 | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CG 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG 3RD MARDIV | 20 | CG FLC | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CG 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV | 1 | CG 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CG 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV | 1 | CG CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 | CG 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 | CG DET C-1 5TH USAF | 2 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | DSA I CORPS | 5 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | CICV | 1 |
| CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 | III MAF | 5 |


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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERLINTREP NO 34

I CORPS



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DCNG HA/CAP: LO AREA1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|---|--|
| 324TH B NVA DIV (HQ & SPT) | CONF | 1,910 | YD 0262* | UNK | CO-GEN TRAN DO XO-CHU VAN DCI PC-NGUYEN TIEN LOI |
| 803RD NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | QUANG TRI* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-MAJ VO THIET XO-DUYET PO-MAJ SONG |
| 812 NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0352* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NGUYEN MINH XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 929TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | YD 0567* | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-THIEP XO-CUCNG PO-CAPT BAI VAN CU |
| 13TH NVA ARTY BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | 12-120MM MORT** | UNK |
| 14TH NVA AA BN | CONF | 300 | DMZ AREA | 18-12.7MM AAMG** | UNK |
| 15TH NVA ENGR BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | 18-7.62MM LMG** | UNK |
| 16TH NVA SIGNAL BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | UNK | CO-CAPT LOI XO-SRLT TAI |
| 19TH NVA MED BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | UNK | UNK |

*LAST RPTD LOCATIONS. UNITS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO DMZ FOR REORGANIZATION ALTHOUGH CERTAIN UNIDENTIFIED UNITS OF AT LEAST BATTALION-SIZE ARE BELIEVED LOCATED SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

**WEAPONS LISTED ARE THE NORMAL TOE WEAPONS FOR THESE PARTICULAR UNITS. HOWEVER, CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THESE BATTALIONS ARE OPERATING AT LESS THAN NORMAL STRENGTH, A REDUCTION IN TOE WEAPONS IS PROBABLE.

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--|--------------|------------|------------------|--|--|
| 4TH BN 270TH BRIG | CONF | 450 | DMZ/QUANG TRI | UNK | CO-MAJ HC TINH |
| CAM LO CO (LF) | PROB | 80 | YD 1063 | UNK-60MM MORT | CO-NGHIA |
| <u>2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)</u> | | | | | |
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF | 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LA VAN HAT |
| 814TH NVA BN | CONF | 500 | HAI LANG DIST | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 1-B40 2-UNK MG | CO-THANH XO-LUONG |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF | 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO-LT TUAN PO-2NDLT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO(LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG |

HUE/PHU BAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

| | | | | | |
|---------------|------|-----|---------|--|-------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH PHU |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT).

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | YD 5320 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHULOC* DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF | 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |

*ELMS OF THIS BN BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN PHU VANG DIST.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES THE 95TH "B" NVA REGT IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DIST VICINITY (ZC 0495). IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH NVA REGT, THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

DANANG TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-----|---------|--|--|
| 402ND SAPPER BN | CONF | 300 | AT 8064 | 2-81MM MORT 2-LMG 12-B.40 | CO-NGUYEN VAN TRAN |
| V.25 BN (LF) | CONF | 400 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR | CO-QUANG LAN (AKA LUC) XO-THAI PO-TOAN |
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54-AR | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR 18-SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DC |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|---|---|
| 21ST NVA REGT | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-SRCAPT NGUYEN VA TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|--|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SRCAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUNG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHCA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE 33RD NVA ARTY REGT HQ (PROB) WITH THREE (3) (CONF) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18X12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6X75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6X120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" NVA REGT, UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC (ZC 0495) IN PHU LOC DISTRICT IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

CHU LAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG NGAI | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SRCAPT LUU THANH PO-NGUYEN ICH |
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THANG |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-81MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO-NGUYEN TAM XO-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PO-QUYET |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG 18-AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW: NGHIA TUU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG XC-MINH PC-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 2810 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEN |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG |
| TRA BONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|---------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 21ST NVA REGT | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM MG UNK-MG | CO-SRCAPT NGUYEN VAI TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3RD NVA REGT | CONF | 1,500 | NORTHERN QUANG NGAI | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |

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CHU LAI TACR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 20TH BN | CCNF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XC-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 6654 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-PAI KIM |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XC-SRCAPT THUA PC-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUCNG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEN XC-SUNG PC-KIEU |
| 89TH B CO | CONF | 50 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO-LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEM MIU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 140 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MAHN |
| A-10 CO | CCNF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XC-NGUYEN THANH PC-ANH VI |
| A-13 CO | CCNF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-MG | CO-HONG LE |

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BT 0303

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IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE 33RD LVA ARTILLERY REGT (HDG)(PRCB) W/THREE
(3) CONFIRMED WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN)
AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT, COULD WITH MINOR
CHANGES IN DISPOSITION BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (WARNING SYSTEMS) TO III MFP RIITREP NO. 34

VC/NVA Warning Systems

1. Though they lack sophisticated technical equipment, the VC/NVA forces have developed simple but effective systems to disclose the approach of Allied troop units and aircraft. The most commonly encountered methods are those employed to warn of the approach of Allied troop units to VC controlled hamlets. Within the I Corps Tactical Zone, the most frequently employed methods consist of the following:

- a. Beating bamboo sticks together.
- b. Beating on a gong.
- c. Discharge of a weapon.
- d. Recon patrols.

2. The following is a compilation of known VC/NVA warning systems that have been reported throughout South Vietnam:

a. Children Reporters. The VC/NVA are making increasing use of children for early warning purposes. Children are trained to continually shout "Hello" in villages as a signal of approaching Allied troops. Similarly, children have given warning by shouting "Hello Marine, give me some chow." A related method is the beating of infants and small children to make them wail, particularly at night.

b. "Wooden Fish." A small hollow stick, normally bamboo, that is beaten to warn VC. Three known codes are: striking the stick together three times indicates Allied presence; striking together nine times warns of Allied deployment in the immediate area; and a steady beat signifies attack.

c. Air Sentinel Chamber. These are conical echo chambers dug five feet into the ground with walls sloping at a 50 degree angle. They are used to detect approaching aircraft and determine the direction of flight.

d. Lights. Various types of lights have been reported. The most common is a "cats eye" lantern used as a signal by VC guard posts.

e. Smoke. Smoke from grenades or from burning material has been reported as a warning device.

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f. Fires. The lighting of large fires has frequently been reported as a VC warning signal.

g. Trip Type Devices. Cans or other sound-producing debris attached to the end of vines, ropes or wire strung across paths or routes into villages, to be activated by tripping.

h. Hat Signal. The removal and waving of head coverings by VC sympathizers has been reported as a signal to VC that Allied troops are approaching.

i. Wooden board. Boards painted either white or black are used in one Corps area. White boards indicate all clear, black signifies danger.

j. Scout Dogs. Dogs reportedly have been used on occasion with recon patrols for early warning during hours of limited visibility.

k. Whistles. Common wooden or metal whistles are used; varying numbers of blasts with the whistle have different meanings.

l. Drum or Gong. Signals are given either by beating on a drum/gong in code or with a constant beat. Gongs are common in villages or occupied areas and temple gongs are not uncommonly used as signals. Horns and/or bugles may also be used as warning signals.

m. Messengers. VC/NVA frequently use runners to relay warnings to adjacent units and higher headquarters.

n. Radio/Telephone Communications. These means are more commonly employed by organized units in notifying adjacent units and/or higher headquarters. Wire communications is the most commonly used.

o. Communication Posts. Posts on major routes of travel are manned by women and children who report to the VC on the movement of friendly troops in the area. These may be found at province, district, and village level.

p. Tree-top Watchtowers. Troops with binoculars are placed in tall trees to scan the skies and notify messengers of approaching aircraft.

q. Friendly Troop Preparations. VC/NVA rationalize that air recon, artillery movements or bombardment, and air strafing are friendly preparation for troop movement into an area. Such activity causes VC/NVA to either withdraw or prepare for attack.

r. Mines. Mines are employed as a warning device, as well as for casualty producing purposes.

s. Recon Patrols. Recon patrols are used to search the area of influence for Allied troops. The alert is given to VC/NVA troops by ground messenger.

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 34.

1. T-89 Bn (AKA 402d Sapper Bn). VC returnee Sgt HUYNH DANG, a member of the 2d Co of the T-89 Bn, gave the following information under interrogation:

a. The mission of the battalion is to attack ARVN and US installations within a seven km radius of DANANG with the following order of priority: (1) airfields; (2) artillery positions; (3) tanks and heavy equipment; and (4) fuel and ammo dumps. During the current monsoon season many missions are planned against ARVN and US forces. A mission against an unknown US artillery position was scheduled for 232300H September; an infantry company was to attack each of two separate gun positions, while the command post was to be subjected to 81mm mortar fire. The battalion has been training to operate any 105mm howitzers captured.

b. The T-89 Bn has a strength of 350 and is composed of six companies. The 1st, 2d and 3d are infantry companies, the 4th Co is a 60mm Mort Co, the 5th Co is a headquarters company and the 6th Co is an 81mm Mort Co. Subordinate to the T-89 Bn is the "DANANG City Liberation Army" which has a strength of 150 and is assigned the mission of conducting acts of terrorism in DANANG.

c. During Operation ALLEGHENY, the barracks and bunker complexes for the 1st, 3d and 6th companies and 1st Co training area were destroyed by Marines. A number of training areas, barracks and bunker complexes and rice storage areas for the DANANG City Forces and QUANG NAM Provincial Forces were undetected and undamaged. The T-89th Bn losses during Operation ALLEGHENY were 20 KIA and 23 WIA. About 27 or 28 August the Battalion returned to their positions in the vicinity of (AF 8060) and began rebuilding the destroyed facilities.

d. The captive indicated that the morale of the battalion is good and the food, ammunition and medical supply situation is good. Personalities identified by the captive were: Capt Y, CO, T-89th Bn; Capt KIM HUNG, PO T-89th Bn; 1stLt NGUYEN VAN THAN, XO, T-89th Bn; 1stLt BI, Asst PO, T-89th Bn; 2dLt PHAM NHO HIEN, Recon O, T-89th Bn; and 2dLt XUYEN, CO, 2dCo.

2. 90th NVA Regt 324th B Div. Initial interrogation of NVA captive Cpl DANG VAN DOUG, a member of the 8th Sqd, 3d Plt, 4th Co, 9th Bn, 90th NVA Regt, 324th B Div, captured in the Operation PRAIRIE area, revealed the following information:

a. The assembly area of the 90th NVA Regt is in the vicinity of (XD 985668). The 7th Bn of the regiment is located in the vicinity of (XD 9765), deployed along the trail which leads to KNI Canyon (XD 973678), and the 9th Bn is believed located at (YD 0260). A rice storage area is located in the vicinity of (YD 974710).

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b. The strength of the 9th Bn is approximately 500 men, some of whom are veterans of Operation HASTINGS. The infantry companies each have 116 men, while the support company has approximately 100 men and is equipped with two 82mm mortars, two 82mm recoilless rifles and two 7.62mm MG. The mission of the 90th NVA Regt was to transport rice from the 4th Bn storage point vicinity of (XD 9753) to a supply point in the CU CINH area vicinity of (YD 010612).

c. The captive was formerly a member of the 3d Co, 4th Bn, 7th NVA Regt, 341st Div located at CAU LOC (location unknown) when he received orders to report to the 22d Infiltration Group at YEN THANY (D), NGHE AN (P) in August 1966. This group had 400 men, all from the 341st Division. The infiltration group departed YEN THANH during August 1966 arriving in CAMH LAC (V) CAM XUYEN (D), HA TINH (P) where they received a refresher course on 25 August 1966. They departed CAMH LAC (V) and moved through the jungle and over the HOANH SON Mountains to QUANG TRACH, crossed the GIANG River via MINH LE ferry, then to NGAI SON. They used a tactical route to the LONG DAI ferry site and crossed to the LE THUY area in QUANG BINH (P). At this location the captive and 37 men were assigned to the 9th Bn of the CU LONG Regt (90th NVA Regt). On 10 September 1966 the 9th Bn departed TAN THAI, LE TUY, QUANG BINH (P) and followed Route 15 and arrived at the BEN HAI River on 12 September 1966. The 9th Bn arrived in the vicinity of CU DINH (YD 020620) on 16 September 1966.

d. The captive identified the following personalities of the 9th Bn 90th NVA Regt: Bn Cdr, HUNG; Bn XO, HOAN; Admin O, SON; CO, 4th Co, CHI; Asst PO, LAM; MG Plt Ldr, THE.

e. Interrogators comment: Captive is rather unreliable due to an inability to read maps; however, he described the area with moderate knowledge.

3. The following is a translation of a VC document which reveals VC plans for destruction of communication routes:

IMPORTANCE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNICATION ROUTES:

The destruction of communication routes is an important subject relative to strategy. It forces the enemy to be in a defensive position, causes him difficulties in the movement of fire-power and reinforcements and greatly affects his supply of food and weapons.

Moreover it gives us opportunity to exterminate the enemy, isolate him, encircle his position and force him to surrender...

Because of this importance and the requirements of the activity phase, province unit headquarters has decided to realize a violent and continuous destruction of communication route 13 to meet the following purposes.

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Cut off the traffic on road 13 from ... to ... by the following sabotage:

Destroy bridges and aqueducts.

Dig trenches, build earth mounds, lay mines and grenades and fight with armed forces.

Attack the enemy with guerrillas, secret guerrillas, province and district troops and other specialized units to destroy mechanized units and reinforcement convoys.

Moreover attack the enemy in position along the route 13 to exterminate his troops.

Rely on the destruction of route 13 to intensify all activity so as to build up and consolidate people's installations and guerrilla warfare, break the grip in strategic hamlets, build earth mounds and consolidate combat villages.

Moreover districts and villages along routes 2 and 14 must lay down a plan for the destruction of these routes.

4. The following translation of a VC document outlines general principles of VC sniper employment:

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The sniping tactic is mainly designed to wear down or pin down the enemy forces, limit or create difficulties to enemy activities, and facilitate the frustration of enemy plans.

The sniping tactic consists of conducting a small attack. The attacking unit is usually divided into 3-man cells (sometimes 1 or 2 man cells) or 5-man squads equipped with light weapons on hand. The cells must coordinate the use of explosives and rudimentary weapons and take advantage of all kinds of terrain and weather to stay close to any type of enemy to wear him down.

The sniping tactic is very appropriate for our various types of military and paramilitary forces in the present situation to counter enemy sweep operations. As it is not limited by any kind of terrain or weather, and does not require high capabilities from the troops. The guerrilla units can successfully wear down the enemy strength or repel his attacks, with their self-made weapons such as bows, crossbows, etc. ... While only concentrated units equipped with adequate weapons and well trained troops can conduct large scale attacks.

The sniping tactic is mostly used by the guerrilla or concentrated units on separate missions. To successfully apply this tactic, the troops

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must be courageous and stay close to the enemy during his sweep operation, forcing him to be continuously on the defensive. Apart from wearing down enemy strength and preventing the enemy from pillaging the people, the snipers can cause the following difficulties to the enemy: By wounding a soldier, they can demoralize the whole enemy squad and make every one anxious. If the snipers succeed in eliminating the commanding officers, the enemy will have to give up his operation. They can also drive the enemy in complete confusion if the spies who are in charge of guiding the enemy troops are eliminated. In brief the purposes of snipers are to make the enemy afraid by wearing down his strength during this sweep operation and increase the dissention between enemy troops and officers, thus forcing the enemy to give up his operation.

Since our strength is limited, we must use the sniping tactic in order to be able to cope with an enemy, one hundred or one thousand times as numerous as our forces, equipped with modern weapons. We must apply the essential principle of this tactic, which consists of wearing down the enemy step by step, pinning him down, limiting his act of pillage and arousing difficulties to each small enemy unit. If this principle is followed, the sniping attack will certainly be successful.

In brief, a sniping attack is successful if the snipers can: wear down the enemy strength; pin down enemy units; and limit enemy acts of pillage and arouse difficulties to slow down enemy activities.

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AN EX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTRLP 'O. 34

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period the VC appear to have concentrated their efforts on extorting rice from local villagers, particularly in QUANG NAM Province. There are some indications of VC military movements to these areas, probably for the purpose of providing security for personnel collecting "their share" of the harvest. Espionage directed toward low level collection remains one of the VC's prime interests. There were several reports of English language propaganda efforts which carried the usual anti-U. S. themes. Terrorism, including the extortion of rice, appeared to be centered in QUANG NAM Province.

2. ESPIONAGE.

QUANG NAM. A 13 September report from an intelligence source states that two female VC intelligence agents, NGUYEN THI LOC, age 20, a native of HOA LOC (V), (AT 905571), HIEU MUC (D), and LE THI XUYEN, age 33, a native of HOA THUOC (V), (Coord Unk), HOA VANG (D), are operating in the hamlet markets of TAN HANH, GIANG NAI, TAN THO and HIEU CONG, HOA PHUOC (V), (BT 018678). (CI Comment: Although it cannot be determined whether these individuals are part of a larger espionage net, the report tends to substantiate the VC's dependence on females to collect low level intelligence).

An 18 September report received from Vietnamese military sources relates that a possible espionage cell is operating in DUNG DE (H), vicinity of (AT 994725). Reportedly their mission is to obtain information on the Naval Supply Activity fuel dump which is located at (AT 990720). (CI Comment: This installation would be a logical espionage target for the VC, and there may be attempts to acquire the necessary information for future sabotage efforts).

On 22 September elements of the Third Tank Battalion recovered a note book from a dead VC which contained a study, conducted over a two and a half week period, of USMC patrol routes and ambush sites. In addition, the note book contained a list of the Vietnamese workers employed by the Tank Battalion and a list of material distributed by that unit's civil affairs section. (CI Comment: Fact reports indicate that the VC are attempting to place agents among indigenous employees hired by U. S. Forces. The list of names appearing in this note book may be the result of a successful penetration effort on the VC's part).

QUANG TIN. An intelligence source reported on 19 September that one squad of VC had infiltrated into PHAI NHON (H), KY KHUONG (V), vicinity of (BT 433080). Reportedly the VC had intermingled with local villagers for the purpose of establishing an "underground" (espionage) operation to collect information on Allied forces. (CI Comment: If the above report is true, these VC may be main force reconnaissance elements or security for one or two members of an intelligence unit. If "underground" (covert) operations are to be established, it may also be assumed that some trained agents may be present).

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3. SABOTAGE.

THAU THIEN. There was one report of anti-U.S. slogans being found written on walls of buildings in the vicinity of (YD 0452).

QUANG NAM. Propaganda leaflets were found along the road in the vicinity of (BT 171581) on 16 September.

On 15 September an intelligence agency reports the finding of propaganda leaflets which were directed at ARVN officers and soldiers. This leaflet states in part "Blood is pouring. Don't you see what the Americans have done in the THU BON River area. They have burned villages, homes, mined shelters, dug up hundreds of acres of rice fields, taken thousands of tons of foods, killed hundreds of oxen and buffaloes, killed hundred of old persons and children and they rape old women and young girls. Let's turn our guns on them and end to all these tragic scenes and kick them out of our country. (CI Comment: One of many reports of VC utilizing propaganda to degrade Americans and attempts to divide U. S. and ARVN loyalties).

QUANG TIN. There were two reports of propaganda leaflets being found in QUANG TIN Province. The first leaflet contained an anti-U. S. theme and was found in KY NGHIA (V), TAM KY (D) in the vicinity of (PT 309209). It asked the people to struggle against the U. S. for peace, independence and neutrality. "Vietnam is for the Vietnamese people. The problem must be solved by the Vietnamese people. The U. S. and their servants invaded Vietnam but they also call for peace in Vietnam. It is not peace if the U.S. stays and occupies Vietnam. The real peace will come when the U. S. withdraws."

The second leaflet was found at the same location and its theme was the recent national elections. It stated that the people of Saigon were threatened if they, "did not vote they would not receive ration cards." The leaflet further stated that the people were against the elections and showed their dislike by tearing up their ballots, fighting with the police, and claiming that the police could not put two million people in jail.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

THUA THIEN. On 20 September a VC mine exploded in the vicinity of (YD 655367) killing one school child and injuring four others.

On 11 September 20 VC entered LOC AN (V) in the vicinity (YD 961045), and collected taxes from the villagers. They succeeded in extorting approximately 25 pounds of rice and 5,000 Piasters.

On 15 September a report from an intelligence source states the following information concerning the alleged assassination plans directed against Americans by cyclo drivers in HUE City and THUA THIEN Province. One LE HAY, recently conducted a meeting of the Cyclo Drivers Association Group in HUE.

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An unknown number of bar girls attended the meeting, which was held in the vicinity of the DIE DE Pagoda on an unknown date.

Reference previous report of possible attempts by bar girls in HUE to infiltrate and assassinate U. S. personnel (PERINTREP No. 33): Vietnamese sources report that these girls may attempt to infiltrate "vital areas" by the use of forged Revolutionary Development Program Passes. Reportedly, these passes may be identified by diagonal red and yellow stripes on 8x10 paper. The official seals are also imprinted in an upside down and backward position. (CI Comment: The passes described do not appear to be valid, however, the VC are quite capable of forging various GVN or U. S. passes which to the untrained eye may allow the girls entrance to various U. S. installations).

QUANG NAM. A 18 September Vietnamese government official report received by USMC units related that on 16 September approximately 20 VC entered PHOU BAC (H) in the vicinity of (AT 991700) for the purpose of collecting taxes.

A 19 September report received by a USMC unit relates that an indigenous worker, employed aboard a USMC installation, and his son have been warned by the VC to leave their home within 36 hours or both would be executed. The employee stated that there are many VC in the area of his home and they are intimidating the local villagers. (CI Comment: This is the first report of a direct threat placed on employees working for USMC).

A 20 September report received by USMC units indicates that a VC company, estimated at 120 men, was located in the vicinity of (AT 882538), (AT 882535), and (AT 890537), with the mission to collect rice from the local villagers. Reportedly the VC will transport this rice to HUU NIEN Mountain in the vicinity of (ZC 1948). (CI Comment: This area has been used in the past by the R. 20 Battalion as a regrouping area. The fall harvest is now commencing in this area. The HUU NIEN area has been previously reported as being a possible VC supply area).

On the 20 September a report was received which stated that the VC had kidnapped three women and two children in the vicinity of (BT 0121568).

On 21 September a report states that two VN children were killed when they detonated a surprise firing device along the side of the road at (AT 985628). The booby trap was described as a peanut can containing a M-26 grenade.

A 21 September report received from a Vietnamese government official relates that a VC company is located in LOC TAN (V) in the vicinity of (AT 833541-AT 839543), with the mission to supervise the local VC cadre and collect taxes. Reportedly the VC DIA LOC District Chief has issued instructions to collect as much rice as possible during the October rice harvest. (CI Comment: It appears that the VC may be deploying military forces to those areas where there is some assurance of collecting the much needed rice).

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A 22 September report from Vietnamese sources indicates that an estimated VC company is presently located in CU LOC (V) in the vicinity of (AT #255), with the mission to collect rice from the local villagers of LOC TAN. Reportedly the VC have already collected some 1,000 pounds of rice which is presently stored in LAM THUNG (H) in the vicinity of (AT #02557). In addition, the VC have captured 15 local civilians and are holding them prisoner in HA NHA (H) hospital in the vicinity of (AT #07544).

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| | | |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|
| BA HI | (YD 152316) | Hill Crossing |
| DOC MIEU | (YD 200310) | Through Village |
| SON MY CHANH | (YD 320297) | River Crossing |
| SONG O LAU | (YD 379276) | River Crossing |
| AM VA | (YD 515155) | HQ, Sanctuary |
| DOC SOI | (YD 502258) | Hill Crossing |
| CT-6TH NVA REGT | (YD 490230) | 806th Bn Area |
| Province VC | (YD 215329) | Sanctuary |

3. The following is a translation of portion of a VC document and outlines general principles and conduct of squad reconnaissance patrols.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

When setting out on a reconnaissance mission, a squad or a cell should comply with the following general principles:

1 - Utilize formations in movement consistent with different types of terrain; act flexibly and properly; and discover the enemy quickly.

2 - Take advantage of favorable terrain.

3 - Upon discovering the enemy, deploy the troops quickly, stay close to him secretly and constantly, and send report to the unit commander in time.

4 - Uncover any enemy gap in order to capture the enemy soldiers for information.

5 - Follow the axis of advance prescribed by the commander. If there is any difficulty which requires that the axis of advance be changed, send a report to the commander for approval.

6 - When making contact with the enemy or running into an ambush do not run in disorder or lump together. Instead the troops should be dispersed to occupy high positions, and should use their own firepower to fight against the enemy. If the enemy is superior in number, the men should fight the enemy and at the same time support the others to pull out of the area. If the enemy is inferior in number or is not aggressive, we should try to attack his flank and then assault to destroy him.

To carry out the above principles effectively, all reconnaissance teams should be aggressive, valiant, determined to fight without any fear of fighting alone. Any action of each team member should be closely coordinated. In his intelligence mission, every individual should utilize his ears, eyes and nose effectively. Whenever anything suspicious, such as a burning smell, a sound, the rustle of branches of trees,

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etc... is noticed, everybody should quickly take position and be ready to open fire at the suspicious points.

Under no circumstances will the men of the reconnaissance team underestimate the enemy and balk at difficulties and hardships during the search for the enemy. The team and all of its members should always be highly alert, and be ready for fighting at any time.

OPERATION

An intelligence squad is often broken down into three 3-man cells numbered 1st, 2d, and 3d cells. When a cell operates separately, it may be reinforced by one or two more comrades to serve as messengers for contact with the rear. The following formations are applied during an intelligence operation for detecting the enemy:

- Squad in column formation.
- Squad in line formation.
- Squad in wedge formation.
- Squad in V-formation.
- Squad in echelon formation.

Every formation has its own characteristics. Depending on the specific terrain and enemy situation a squad or cell leader uses a proper formation flexibly and in time.

The following are some formations frequently used in the terrain features where the battles often take place. These formations serve as the basis for the other formations.

Crossing Common Terrain.

It is a type of terrain located deep in our bases, the terrain to which, in our bivouacs, an intelligence team of a forward unit is usually assigned as a "warning" element posted some distance away. In these areas, we grasp the overall enemy situation and we are familiar with the terrain. In order to maintain a good speed of an operational movement and to preserve the health of members, intelligence squads and cells, upon receiving orders of departure, should advance in column formation along main lines of communication.

In any situation, an intelligence team should be camouflaged carefully to avoid detection by enemy aircraft or ground troops.

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The formation is arranged as follows:

In the first cell, which moves ahead, the intervals between the cell members are 15 meters in day time and from two to five meters at night. The first cell is responsible for detecting the enemy in the front. Within the cell, each member should be designed to observe the front, the right or the left side and to contact friendly cells at the rear. The order in the cell is the 1st member, then comes the cell leader, and at last the 2d member.

The squad leader moves from 20 to 30 meters behind the 1st cell. He is followed by the 2d cell which moves in the following sequence: cell leader, 1st and 2d members. The intervals between one another are the same as above. The 2d cell usually is responsible for the right flank of the squad. Every cell member should be assigned to observe the front, right and left sides and the rear.

Behind the 2d cell from 20 to 30 meters is the 3d cell which moves in the sequence: cell leader, 1st member and 2d member. The intervals between the men may be shortened. This cell is usually responsible for protecting the left flank and the rear of the squad.

The intervals between the cell members or cells may be lengthened or shortened depending on the weather and terrain. However, all members should maintain visual contact and provide mutual fire support during engagements with the enemy. After a long march, if the 1st cell is tired, the squad leader should order the 2d cell to replace the 1st cell. The march sequence will then be the 2d, 3d and 1st cells.


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III MAF DANANG, RVN

2 October 1966

PERINTREP NO 35



III MAF PERINTREP # 35

25 Sep - 1 Oct 66

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Copy ___ of ___ copies
 III MAF
 DANANG, RVN
 020800H OCT 66
 Ser: 0139966

PERINTREP No. 35

Period Covered: 250001 Sep66 - 012400 Oct66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,
 NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The VC/NVA avoided large scale activity during the reporting period, while VC interdiction of lines of communications and small scale attacks continued.

a. QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN-PHU BAI TAOR. In the Operation PRAIRIE area contacts with NVA units in up to company strength were made on 25, 27, 28 and 30 September. On 26 September contacts with VC/NVA units in company strength were made by a CIDG platoon at (XD 975406) and an ARVN battalion at (YD 718220). The National Railroad was damaged on 30 September when six sections of track were blown at (AU 812010). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM-DANANG TAOR. Small scale attacks continued in QUANG NAM (P), the most significant of which was a VC platoon size ambush at (AT 934516) on 27 September and a convoy ambush along Route 1 at HAI VAN Pass (AT 900956) on 29 September. Small scale activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI-CHU LAI TAOR. Small scale attacks in QUANG NGAI (P) continued with VC company size attacks on a CIDG patrol on 25 September and outposts of the HA THANH CIDG Camp on 29 September. Three culverts along Route 1 were destroyed in QUANG TIN (P) (BT 113397) on 28 September. Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents during the reporting period totaled 362 and consisted of 110 small unit engagements, 121 AA firing incidents, 10 mine/booby trap incidents, and one act of terrorism.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

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d - e. Negative.

f. Negative.

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. The 121 AA fire incidents during the reporting period reflected a six percent increase over the last reporting period. 20 aircraft sustained 48 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (BT 0060) - (BT 2010) - (XD 9050) - (XD 9060). Four cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Heavy Mortars.

(1) 24 Sept. A report received from a QUANG TIN (P) agent stated that on 12 Sept the 104th VC Bn was deployed in a forest along a stream at (BT 379004). Among the weapons listed in the report was a 105mm Howitzer which was towed by two elephants. (G-2 Cmt: F/5: Unlikely the 104th Bn, which is composed of mostly local guerrillas, would have this type weapon).

l - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance.

(1) The most significant sightings in the Operation PRAIRIE Area occurred in the BALONG Valley south of CA LU on 29 Sep where 10-15 VC/NVA were sighted at (YD 047432). Sightings to the south and west of the PRAIRIE area decreased.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). The most significant sighting during the reporting period occurred west of HUS at (YD 709158) on 27 Sep when a total of 50 VC and two bunkers were sighted.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Sightings increased this week with most occurring in two general areas. The first area is the vicinity of (ZC 1772) where multiple sightings of 2 to 12 VC were made in addition to a hut complex. The AN HOI industrial area was the second area and multiple sightings of from 5 - 45 VC were made to the west and south of the industrial complex.

(4) QUANG TIN (P). The most significant sightings of VC during the reporting period occurred between the GEDG Camp at THIEN PHOUC and the northwest corner of the CHU LAI TAOR where multiple sightings of small groups of three to six VC were reported.

s. Negative.

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3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 258 KIA, 484 KIA (Prob) and four VCC. Enemy weapons losses totaled 26 individual and eight crew served weapons.

f. No change.

g. New Enemy Defenses, Barriers, Obstacles, Fortifications, Booby Traps and Other Defensive Works.

(1) A JTAD agent reported that as of 24 September, a tunnel, reinforced with concrete was located behind a small temple at (BT 043435). The entrance is located in the temple. The tunnel contains an unknown type of signal equipment. (G-2 Cmt: F/6).

h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. Weather in the I Corps area for the reporting period consisted of mostly cloudy skies with rain storms and showers. Temperature averaged 85 degrees high to 72 degrees low. Winds were mostly northerly at five knots. Visibility six to seven miles. Precipitation amounted to 3.99 inches.

k. Significant Captive, Agent/VCS, returnee and Document Reports. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. Counterintelligence. See Annex C.**CONFIDENTIAL**

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5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.**a. Enemy Capabilities: VC/NVA forces can:**

(1) Attack the KHE SAN-THON SON LAM-D5-DONG HA area with up to two divisions (324th B NVA Div and 341st NVA Div).

(2) Attack the HUE-PHU BAI area with up to two regiments (6th NVA Regt) and (95th B NVA Regt) and two separate battalions (804th and 810th).

(3) Attack the DA NANG combat base with one division (620th NVA Div), one regiment (95th B NVA Regt) and six battalions (R.20, V.25, 70th, 72nd, 402nd Sapper and 804th Bns).

(4) Attack the CHU LAI combat base with one division (620th NVA Div) and five separate battalions (70th, 72nd, 48th, 38th Infantry and 409th Sapper Bns).

(5) Concurrently with Capability A1, A2, A3 or A4, to interdict National Route 1 and other surface routes to delay friendly reinforcement and resupply of northern I CTZ or HUE-PHU BAI, DA NANG or CHU LAI areas.

(6) Attack isolated US/ARVN outposts and district headquarters with up to division strength.

(7) Defend in present positions in and just south of the DMZ with two divisions (324th B NVA Div and 341st NVA Div).

(8) Defend elsewhere in the I CTZ, including VC/NVA base areas, with forces locally available.

(9) Reinforce the forces presently in I CTZ within two to ten days with up to three divisions from NVN or from those NVN forces transiting LAOS or one division from II Corps (610th NVA Div).

(10) Independent of or in conjunction with capabilities (1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8) or (9), continue unconventional and psychological warfare, by stressing current guerrilla tactics of concurrent small unit operations, to include small scale attacks, ambushes, harassment, terrorism, sabotage and the use of mines and booby traps.

b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Capabilities (1), (2), (3) and (4): Factors which favor the adoption of these capabilities are: The present disposition of these units contiguous to the likely areas of attack; enemy knowledge of the terrain; the probability that enemy logistic support has been stockpiled in his operating areas; the enemy knowledge of our situation based on frequent probes;

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the probability that enemy logistic support has been stockpiled in his operating areas; and the enemy knowledge of our situation based on frequent probes and reconnaissance activities. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: The losses the enemy sustained in past operations; the enemy predisposition not to mass forces; our operations which have forced the enemy to displace against his will at times of our choosing; our destruction of his logistic support in past operations, and our air supremacy and uninterrupted aerial reconnaissance hindered only by foul weather.

(2) Capability (5): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: This would be a logical mission for enemy units positioned between the northern battlefield and friendly reinforcements, and the enemy has demonstrated this capability many times in the past for purposes of sabotage and general harassment, or to delay friendly reaction forces. The following factor militates against this capability: The superiority of supporting arms, particularly naval gunfire, are extremely favorable to friendly forces in relatively flat and open areas.

(3) Capability (6): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: Offers an opportunity for a badly needed victory; isolated outposts/headquarters offer the best targets for the least risk, compared to the other attack capabilities shown above, particularly if executed in inclement weather; and the large scale enemy attack conducted against the isolated outpost at A SMAU was successful, as were many small scale attacks against isolated ARVN/CIDG outposts in I CFZ. The following factors militate against the adoption of this capability: The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy buildups and to react rapidly to destroy them by air strikes or by ground spoiling attacks; such attacks, when conducted against CIDG Camps, might reasonably be considered by the enemy to invite too much friendly attention to areas surrounding isolated outposts and district headquarters, lead to a rapid build-up of friendly forces in areas controlled or contested by VC/NVA forces, and result in effectively causing the dislocation of VC/NVA forces from the piedmont into the highlands; and enemy's losses during recent operations.

(4) Capability (7) and (8): Factors which favor adoption of these capabilities are: Heavy casualties suffered during Operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE may dictate the assumption of a defensive posture for 30-60 days in order to take advantage of attacking during the worst of the northeast monsoon season as set forth in capability a.(1); terrain and present disposition favor the defender; continuing enemy efforts to improve and expand defensive positions and supply caches, and increasing willingness of enemy forces, particularly NVA to attempt to hold their positions and, when conditions are favorable, to counterattack. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: Reluctance to stand and fight against US/FMMA forces except under favorable conditions

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at a time and place of their choosing; the enemy may prefer not to defend occupied terrain if it is only an operating area and not a vital base area; the enemy has only a limited supporting arms capability, and the enemy will often evade direct contact with superior friendly forces by resorting to small unit operations, including harassment, ambushes, mining and the use of booby traps to inflict maximum casualties.

(5) Capability (9): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's desire to achieve a major victory against friendly forces; the relative freedom of movement through enemy controlled territory and the DMZ, and the enemy's capability to move units between I and II Corps. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge that the introduction of additional enemy forces into RVN would probably be matched by additional FVMA forces, thus making a decisive enemy military victory unlikely; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces for movement; and the probability that reinforcing units would be detected and destroyed by friendly supporting armsfire.

(6) Capability (10): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: This capability is a basic enemy tactic which has been long practiced within SVN; it provides an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms fires; guerrillas and Local Force VC units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while VC Main Force and NVA units conduct large scale operations; the VC knowledge of the terrain and of the local populace and the enemy's belief that successful application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued U.S. Force participation in RVN. There are no factors which militate against this capability.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption.

- (1) That the VC/NVA will exercise capability (10).
- (2) That the VC/NVA will exercise capability (6).
- (3) That the VC/NVA will exercise capability (1).
- (4) That the VC/NVA will exercise capability (4).

d. Vulnerabilities.

(1) VC/NVA supply areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to reconnaissance and surveillance unless carefully concealed.

(2) VC/NVA forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support in SVN and the limited availability

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of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations VC/NVA forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to the principal of surprise.

(4) Limited manpower resources in North Vietnam and VC controlled areas of South Vietnam have required a dependency upon an extensive conscription program and limited basic type training in order to rapidly raise VC/NVA troop levels. The result has been a lowering of morale and increased vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

(5) VC/NVA forces have become more dependent upon local resources for support as the total VC/NVA strength increases. But the necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population under VC/NVA control.

R. H. Thompson
R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 | CG 2D BDE, RVN MC | 6 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | CTG 79.5 | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | CTG 76.5 | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG 3RD MARDIV | 20 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 9TH MP BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO CAMP WHEELER | 2 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 | CO DET C-1 5TH USSF | 2 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 | DSA I CORPS | 5 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CICV | 1 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | III MAF | 5 |
| CG 35TH TFW (BOI) DANANG | 1 | | |
| CG FLC | 1 | | |


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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO ILL MAP REFERENCE NO 35

I CORPS



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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------|---------------------|---|--|
| 324TH B NVA DIV (HQ & SPT) | CONF | 1,910 | YD 0076 | UNK | CG-GEN TRAN DO XO-CHU VAN DOI PO-NGUYEN TIEN LOI |
| 803RD NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | QUANG TRI OR DMZ | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-MAJ VO THLET XO-DUYET PO-MAJ SONG |
| 812 NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | YD 1272 | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NGUYEN MINH XO-MINH LONG PO-MAJ SONG |
| 90TH NVA REGT | CONF | 2,500 | XD 9868 | UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-CAPT MAI VAN CU |
| 13TH NVA ARTY BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | 12-120MM MORT* | UNK |
| 14TH NVA AA BN | CONF | 300 | DMZ AREA | 18-12.7MM AAMG* | UNK |
| 15TH NVA ENGR BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | 18-7.62MM LMG* | UNK |
| 16TH NVA SIGNAL BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | UNK | CO-CAPT LOI XO-SRLT TAI |
| 19TH NVA MED BN | CONF | 200 | DMZ AREA | UNK | UNK |

*WEAPONS LISTED ARE THE NORMAL TOE WEAPONS FOR THESE PARTICULAR UNITS. HOWEVER, CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THESE BATTALIONS ARE OPERATING AT LESS THAN NORMAL STRENGTH, A REDUCTION IN TOE WEAPONS IS PROBABLE.

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| 4TH BN 270TH BRIG | CONF | 450 | DMZ/QUANG TRI | UNK | CO-MAJ HO TINH |
| CAM LO CO (LF) | PROB | 80 | YD 1063 | UNK-60MM MORT | CO-NGHIA |

2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|------|-----|------------------|--|--|
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF | 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LE VAN HAT |
| 814TH NVA BN | CONF | 500 | HAI LANG DIST | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 1-B40 2-UNK MG | CO-THANH XO-LUONG |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF | 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO-LT TUAN PO-2NDLT THIFN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO(LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG |

HUE/PHU BAI TACR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

| | | | | | |
|---------------|------|-----|---------|---|-------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 2-SMG | CO-PH.M KINH PHU |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | YD 5320 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO HY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC* | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIEU |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT | CO-THAN-TRUNG HOI |
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF | 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN AO-TINH PO-THUAN |

*ELMS OF THIS BN BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN PHU VAN DIST.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, THE 95TH "B" NVA REGT IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DIST VICINITY (ZC 0495). IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH NVA REGT, THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR, COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

DANANG TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR.)

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-----|---------|--|--|
| 402ND SAPPER BN | CONF | 300 | AT 8064 | 2-81MM MORT 2-LMG 12-B.40 | CO-NGUYEN VAN TRU |
| V.25 BN (LF) | CONF | 400 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR | CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LUC) AO-THAI PO-TOAN |
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54-AR | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR 18-SMG | CO-PUAN PHONG SA |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TINH PO-DUONG DO |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 21ST NVA REGT | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM HMG UNK-MG | CO-SRCAPT NGUYEN VAN TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN HOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|---|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SRCAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THAM |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUNG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THUAN PO-ANH VU |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIEP |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 33RD NVA ARTY REGT HQ (PROB) WITH THREE (CONF) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) FOR EMPLOYMENT IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN (18x12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (1CS 6x75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6x120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" NVA REGT, UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LA RPTD VIC (ZC 0495) IN PHU LOC DISTRICT, IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

CHU LAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------|--------------|------------|------------------------|---|--|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG NGAI | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SRCAPT LUU THANH |
| 3RD NVA REGT | CONF | 1,500 | NORTHERN QUANG NGAI | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-FG | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|--|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SRCAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUNG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN TIEN PO-ANH VU |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIEP |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 33RD NVA ARTY REGT HQ (PROB) WITH THREE (CONF) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) FOR EMPLOYMENT IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN (18x12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (LOSS 6x75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6x120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" NVA REGT, UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LA RPTD VIC (ZC 0495) IN PHU LOC DISTRICT, IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

CHU LAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------|--------------|------------|------------------------|---|--|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG NGAI | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SRCAPT LUU THANH |
| 3RD NVA REGT | CONF | 1,500 | NORTHERN QUANG NGAI | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-1.5 | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR 18-SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAU |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG SANH PO-DUONG DO |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 21ST NVA REGT | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM HMG UNK-MG | CO-SRCAPT NGUYEN VA TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN HOAI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|---|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|--|
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO-HOANG VAN THANG |
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-81MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO-NGUYEN TAM KO-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PO-QUYET |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG 18-AR | CO-NGUYEN BI CHAW NGHIA TUU |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6887 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO-LONG KO-MINH PO-MINH |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO-TRAN |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 2810 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN YEN BAC |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO-NGUYEN LIEM |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO-LE KHAC GIA KO-THANH PO-QUANG |
| TRA BONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO-DINH HUY |
| 2. <u>RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).</u> | | | | | |
| 21ST NVA REGT | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM MG UNK-MG | CO- SP CAPT NGUYEN VAI TING KO-NGUYEN VAN CA PO-CAPT LAI VAN HOI |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 20TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XO-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 6654 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-MAI KIM |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SRCAET PHUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MMRR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUONG THANH |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU |
| 89TH B CO | CONF | 50 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO- LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEN MIEU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 140 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MAHN |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHUA XO-NGUYEN THAI PO-ANH VU |
| A-13 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-MG | CO-HONG LE |

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IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 33RD NVA ARTY REGT HQ (PROB) WITH THREE CONFIRMED WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT, COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITION, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERTINENT NO.35

1. 812TH NVA REGT, 324 B DIV. NVA Captive PHAN VAN CU, a cook with the 2d Co, 4th Bn, 812th NVA Regt, gave the following information after his capture by members of the 1st Bn, 26th Marines on 23 Sept. During Operation PRAIRIE:

a. The 4th Bn is composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d companies, which are infantry companies with a strength of approximately 120 men each, and the 4th Co, which is a heavy weapons support company with a strength of about 100 men. The 4th Co is armed with 12-82mm Mortars, 6-CHICOM type 57 MMG's and 9-AA MG's. The 812th NVA Regt is composed of the 4th Bn, the 5th Bn, which is now in SVN, and the 6th Bn which was transporting rice in SVN.

b. The mission of the 4th Bn, 812th NVA Regt is to defend the area of AN NHA in the vicinity of (YD 1272). The 2d Co, with attachments of mortars, heavy machine guns, and anti-aircraft machine guns, is located in the vicinity of (YD 1272). The 1st Co and the 3d Co are located one to two kilometers to the west of NHA. There are also mortar positions believed to be at (YD 129725) and anti-aircraft machine gun positions at (YD 112730).

c. The 4th Bn departed its training area in HA TINH (P) on 25 July 1966 and proceeded to THYEN HOA (D) QUANG BINH (P), where the members of the battalion rested for two days, then proceeded to AN NHA in the vicinity of (YD 1272). It is believed that after crossing the BEN HAI River the 4th Bn took the trail from (YD 082753) south southeast to (YD 114721) at AN NHA.

d. The 4th Bn had been in SVN about 10 days and had received rice supplies only once. That particular rice shipment was carried from NVN by members of the 6th Bn. The morale of the 4th Bn has been low since it was formed in June 1966 because many of its members were forced into the Army, the food is poor, and its members did not want to fight in SVN.

e. Personalities identified by the captive are: Sr Capt THUC, Bn CO, 4th Bn; 1st Lt TINH, Bn PC, 4th Bn; 2d Lt NGUYEN PHUC, CO 2d Co; 2d Lt NGUYEN DUONG, XO 2d Co and WO GIA, 3d Plt Ldr, 2d Co.

2. 806TH BN, 6TH NVA REGT. NVA captive Sgt TRAN ZUAN LY, a rallier from the 6th NVA Regt, gave the following information under interrogation:

a. The 6th NVA Regt is presently composed of the 800th, 804th, and 806th Bns, each of which has a strength of approximately 450 men.

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The 806th Bn is composed of three infantry companies, the 1st, 2d and 3d each with strength of approximately 130 men. The 4th Co is a heavy weapons support company with a strength of 108 men and is armed with four 81mm mortars, one 57mm RR, one 85mm RR and four CHICOM 7.62mm AA MG, one 60mm mortar, K44 and K50 SMG's and various other small arms.

b. The mission of the 6th NVA Regt during the monsoon season is to control Highway 9 with one battalion, while the two remaining battalions conduct operations in THUA THIEN (P) and QUANG TRI (P). In the event one battalion is insufficient to gain control of Highway 9, then the remaining two battalions will cease operations and move to support the primary mission.

c. The captive was a member of the 806th Bn when it arrived in SVN in Feb 1965. The morale of the battalion during the first three months in South Vietnam was considered very good; however, it is presently considered very low for the following reasons: Artillery, fighter aircraft and B-52 strikes have killed many men; food is in constantly short supply with a fluctuation in rations between one and two and one half cans of rice issued per day, and a total lack of medical supplies necessitates only the basic medicines being used on badly wounded soldiers; many of whom die because of a lack of adequate medical supplies.

d. Personalities identified include: LtCol GIANG, VC Sector Chief; Capt LI CHU, Bn CO, 806th Bn; 1stLt NGUYEN QUOC KHANA, BnOpsO; 2dLt PHAM KIM UYEN, BnLogO; 1stLt TRAN QUANG, CO, 1st Co; 1stLt TRAN CAU, CO, 2dCo; 1stLt NHI, CO 3dCo; 1stLt NHI, CO 4th Co; 1stLt HUANG MINH KHAM, Bn PO, 806th Bn.

e. An infiltration route for NVA units is outlined by the following sequence of points:

| | | |
|--------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| BEN QUANG | (YD 045832) | River Crossing |
| TRAM NR 1 | (XD 950703) | 1st Supply Point |
| DON CONG AN | (XD 953700) | Supply Point |
| SONG BEN HAI | (XD 958690) | River Crossing |
| TRAM NR 2 | (XD 935655) | 2d Supply Point |
| KHE KHI | (XD 930642) | Stream |
| DO 350 | (XD 920625) | Hill |
| SONG CAM LO | (XD 934600) | Wire Bridge Crossing |
| TRAM NR 3 | (XD 935598) | 3d Supply Point |
| DO 513 | (XD 934587) | Hill |
| BAN COL | (XD 918478) | Supply Point |
| Highway 9 | (XD 980535) | Crossing Point |
| TRAM NR 4 | (XD 998518) | 4th Supply Point |
| SONG BALONG | (YD 110417) | River Crossing |
| TRAI CA | (YD 040363) | 806th Bn Operating Area |
| TA LOU | (YD 090328) | QUANG TRI Supply Area |

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERDVTREP No 35

1. General. During the reporting period the VC increased their efforts to extort rice from the populace. Reports reflected an increase in terrorism, including assassinations and kidnappings, and indicated that the VC may use terror tactics against Vietnamese Nationals employed by USMC. Espionage activity still appears to be aimed at the low level agent.

2. ESPIONAGE.QUANG NAM.

A 21 September report from an intelligence source states that the villagers of HOA VINH are selling refreshments to Marines in the LAI BAI mountain area, HOA MY (V) (AT 896808). These villagers are also making sketches of the Marine positions in the area. (CI Comment: Units are cautioned against dealing with local vendors. This is the second report of vendors being utilized by VC to observe and sketch Marine positions).

A 23 September report from a usually reliable source states that there are two VC intelligence platoons located in the vicinity of (RT 954000) and (AT 961685). Both of these platoons are organized into cells, with the mission of collecting information on Allied and Vietnamese units in the area. (CI Comment: One of many reports of intelligence platoons operating in this area).

QUANG TIN. A 28 September report from a fairly reliable source indicates that on 23 September an espionage training session was held for women members of the VC political cadre at KY NGHIA sub-District, TAM KY (D). The meeting was presided over by one HOANG TRAM, VC District Cadresman with the following women present: NGUYEN THI THANH, age 30; NGUYEN THI THANG, age 20; NGUYEN THI ANH, age 25; NGUYEN THI XUAN, age 25, and (FFU) TRU, age 45. These women were given instructions on methods of obtaining information, and how to draw sketches and maps of ARVN installations and strategic points. (CI Comment: Although this is one of many reports of espionage classes being established, this is the first indication of the thoroughness of the training).

QUANG NGAI. An intelligence agency reports that a three man VC Counterintelligence Team is located in LAM LOO (H) (BS 574711) SON TINH (D) consisting of the following individuals: VO NGON; PHAM QUYEN; and VO CHUC. (CI Comment: This is the first report of the VC having a counterintelligence team in this area).

3. SABOTAGE.

TUUA THIEN. During the reporting period there was one act that could be classified as sabotage, namely, the destruction of a railroad bridge at (AN 818006).

4. POLITICAL. There was no political activity reported.

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A 27 September report from an intelligence agency states that an unknown number of VC entered THIEM (V) (XD 742282) and gathered the people together for a propaganda lecture. The context of the meeting was to instruct those present to work hard and prepare for the next rice crop. The VC further stated that the people should not move from their villages, because this would be a very unhappy and dangerous thing to do.

A 27 September report from an intelligence agency states that VC were sent to villages near PE RIANG (XD 709172). The local populace was instructed to increase their rice production during the next harvest. The VC also stated that they would shoot at U.S. planes flying in the area so they could work the fields safely.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.QUANG NAM.

A 23 September report from a Vietnamese Government official states that during the night of 22 September three VC entered the hamlets of MINH AN #3 vicinity (AT 912709) and THANH AN vicinity (AT 917711) and instructed the people to advise their sons in ARVN and PF units to report home and join the VC or acts of reprisal would be taken against their families. The source also stated that the VC had assassinated his uncle in AN TAN (AT 916704). (CI Comment: There have been many reports of the VC threatening acts of reprisals against families of ARVN soldiers and probably some terror acts have been perpetrated against ARVN families. This may be an indication of new terror developments).

A 24 September report from an intelligence source states that on 19 September, at 2100 hours, an unknown number of VC entered AN TAN (H) (AT 924706) HOA THUONG (V) (AT 947662) and assassinated the village chief. The following day the VC returned to the village and talked to the people.

On 24 September an intelligence source reports that, at approximately 2100 hours on 19 September, an unknown number of VC captured NGUYEN TUAT, hamlet chief of QUA GIANG (H) (AT 015665) and VO LOC hamlet chief of NHOAN #2 (V) (AT 017657). It is rumored that both hamlet chiefs had been enticed from the village areas by an unidentified woman.

A 25 September report from the 1st Marines states that an unknown number of VC came to HA DONG (H) (AT 9664) with loudspeakers and warned the villagers not to help the Marines in any way or they would be killed. (CI Comment: First report of VC warning the local populace not to help USMC units).

A 27 September report from a Vietnamese official states that an estimated 20 VC have been going into the village of LOC HAN with the mission of collecting rice taxes and 80 piasters from each family. The source further stated that the collection is going to continue through the current harvest.

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A 24 September reports from Vietnamese officials state that the VC captured THANH TAY, chief of CAM CHAW (V) (BT 175505). (CI Comment: Initial report; details will be reported as acquired).

THUA THIEN.

A report from a Vietnamese official states that one of his assistants found an 11 year old girl crying in front of ME LINH School in HUE. When she was questioned the girl said that a young man had given her 100 piasters and a hand grenade, and asked her to throw the grenade into a house occupied by an American. The girl had refused and was beaten by the man. (CI Comment: First report of VC attempting to use children for terrorism purposes in this area).

A 23 September report from an intelligence source states that a VC company is using harrasing tactics in an attempt to collect taxes in the THUY LUONG (V) (YD #217) area. The VC tax collectors entered SAU HAI (H# (2D 090008) and collected the equivalent of 5,000 piasters per family in money and merchandise. The VC are attempting to buy all available rice in the GIO LINH and TRUNG LUONG Districts. Threats of punishment have been made to any villager who sells rice to anyone but the VC.

A 22 September report from an intelligence source states that at approximately 1300 on that date five VC detonated a charge of TNT at the GI LL Hospital resulting in the death of one Marine guard and injuring one VN child.

A 22 September report from an intelligence source states that the VC have stated that there would be acts of reprisal if the Vietnamese National did not stop working for the Americans. (CI Comment: This is the second indication that the VC, through threats, may terrorize U.S. indigenous employees).

A 24 September report received from the 4th Marines states that on the night of 23 September an estimated 30 VC entered the village of PHU LAM #1 (YD 939118) with the mission of kidnapping young Vietnamese males for VC recruits. The VC seized 11 youths ranging in age from 12 to 21 years.

A 28 September report states that a grenade was thrown into a vehicle in HUE injuring four people.

A report from an intelligence agency states that an indoctrination school conducted by 12 VC cadre was held in A XIEM (YC 980832). Some 120 men and women attended the nine day class. The students were divided into four phases: First Phase, "Three Self-Methods - this method was designed to teach self-discipline, self-reasoning, and self-thinking." The instructors also taught writing to those who could not write. Second Phase, the goals of the NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM and its present policies; Third Phase, an indoctrination on competition to produce food in the students village so each village could be self-supporting; Fourth Phase, a discussion of what the students had learned during the period.

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A 23 September report from an intelligence agency states that the VC District Committee issued a directive to their cadres of PHUOC - LONG (V), KY AN (V), and KY MY (V) to support the VC economic program by diminishing the daily food ration. Previously each person received 20 kilos of rice per month, now they receive only 14 kilos.

The average family must sell two ang and a rich family must sell four ang of rice for 65 piasters each month. (CI Comment: There have been several reports of the VC food supply running short).

A report from an intelligence agency states that a document was passed to VC cadre by high ranking VC officer. The document was prepared by the Central Workers Party of Vietnam and outlines steps to be taken by all VC in furthering the Communist cause in South Vietnam. The document states that, in order to end the war in South Vietnam and because of the stepped up war in North Vietnam, the Central Workers party has decided to "stand up" and give political power back to the Vietnamese people. The program consists of five points: Economy; Military Affairs; Political Military; Proselyting; and Civilian Labor.

QUANG NGAI.

A 25 September report from the 1st Marines states that five Vietnamese refugees were injured when they approached a booby-trapped gate in the vicinity of (BS 766512).

A 28 September report states that VC burned refugee villages located at (BS 414738) and (BS 388724).


Recent reports from intelligence agencies, dated 19 September, give the VC and NVA the capability to monitor friendly radio transmissions to determine the location and plans of friendly units.

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III MAF DANANG, RVN

9 OCTOBER 1966

PERINTREP NO 36



III MAF PERINTREP #36

2-8 0266

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Copy ____ of ____ copies
 III MAF
 DANANG, RVN
 090800H OCT66
 Ser: 0142566

PERINTREP No. 36

Period Covered: 020001 - 082400 Oct66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In QUANG TRI (P), contacts with NVA units in up to company strength were made on 2, 4, 6 and 7 October in the area north of TAN SON LAM - CAM LO. On 4 October ARVN TF 48 units made contact with what was estimated as an NVA regiment in the vicinity of (YD 148703). In THUA THIEN (P) on 20 October a National Railroad bridge was blown at (ZD 127010). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. In QUANG NAM (P) RF and PF elements encountered the VC in platoon strength on 3 October in the vicinity of (AT 821552). Small scale activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Small scale attacks in QUANG NGAI (P) continued with VC attacks of platoon and company strength in central QUANG NGAI (P) against PF and PAT elements on 2, 6 and 7 October. On 5 October a VC attack in platoon strength was made against an outpost (BS 390714) of the HA THANH CIDG Camp. Interdiction of lines of communication continued as a culvert on Route 1 in QUANG TIN (P) (BT 181412) was blown on 3 October. Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. VC/NVA initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 206 and consisted of: 105 small unit engagements, 91 AA fire incidents and 10 mine/booby trap incidents.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and reinforcements. Annex A.

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 Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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d. - e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>SOURCE & EVALUATION</u> |
|-------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 23Sep | (YD 448146) | Installation (unknown type) | JTAD report III MAF G-2: F/3 |
| 24Sep | (YD 485355) (YD 440385) | Rice Storage | JTAD report III MAF G-2: F/3 |
| 25Sep | (BS 444798) | Aid Station | JTAD report III MAF G-2: F/3 |
| 28Sep | (YD 635058) | Logistics Base | JTAD report III MAF G-2: F/6 |
| 28Sep | (YD 670048) | "Economic" Base | JTAD report III MAF G-2: F/3 |
| 29Sep | (BT 043433) (BT 045499) | Rice Storage | JTAD report III MAF G-2: F/3 |

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 91 and reflected a substantial decrease in incidents compared with the previous period. The 31 aircraft which sustained 69 hits reflected a substantial increase in each of these categories. Grid squares of highest density were (XD 96) - (YD 17) - (YD 61) - (AT 95) - (BT 06).

i. - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Reconnaissance sightings in northern QUANG TRI (P) were limited to two sightings of small groups of VC/NVA during the reporting period in the area southwest of the D-5 base.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Sightings to the west and southwest of HUE have shown a significant increase in VC/NVA unit movement in the piedmont area. Patrols also discovered bunkers, trenches and fighting holes.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Sightings during the period remained significantly high to the west and south of the AN HOA industrial complex. On 6 October one patrol sighted a total of 58 VC west of AN HOA; artillery fire was called and resulted in 28 KIA (Conf) and 20 KIA (Prob).

(4) QUANG TIN (P). A perceptible increase in sightings occurred northwest of the CHU LAI TAOR. The most significant sighting occurred on 4 October, when a group of 35 VC/NVA were observed.

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
3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of: 195 KIA, 173 KIA (Prob) and four VCC. Weapons losses for the period were 41 individual weapons and one crew served weapon captured.
- f. Morale. No change.
- g. New Enemy Defenses, Barriers, Obstacles, Fortifications, Booby Traps and other Defensive Works.

(1) 29 Sep. CAC-31 reported discovering a booby trap in the vicinity of (AT 953687) which consisted of M-26 grenades secured to a bamboo tree on each side of a trail and placed about five feet above ground. The pins had been almost completely removed and small branches from a bush (positioned on the trail) were hooked to the rings. Anyone attempting to remove this bush from the trail would detonate the grenade.

- h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No change.
- j. Weather. Weather in the I Corps area during the reporting period reflected little change from the last period. Cloudy skies with rain showers and storms prevailed. Temperatures averaged 85° high and 74° low. Winds were mostly light and variable. Visibility ranged from six to seven miles. Precipitation amounted to 3.58".
- k. Significant Captive Agent/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.
- l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 35.


 R. H. THOMPSON
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|------------------------------|---|
| MACV J234-21 | 1 | CG 2D BDE, HOK MC | 6 |
| MACV J234-22 | 1 | CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 | COMNAVSUPACT DANANG | 1 |
| CG I FFORCEV | 2 | CTG 79.5 | 1 |
| CG II FFORCEV | 1 | CTG 76.5 | 1 |
| CG 1ST MARDIV | 15 | CO 30TH NCR | 9 |
| CG 3RD MARDIV | 20 | CO 7TH ENGR BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST MAW | 15 | CO 9TH MT BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV | 1 | CO 5TH COMM BN | 1 |
| CG 1ST INF DIV | 1 | CO CAMP BUTLER | 2 |
| CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV | 1 | CO 1ST MP BN | 1 |
| CG 25TH INF DIV | 1 | CO DET C-1 5TH USSF | 2 |
| CG 173D ABN BDE | 1 | DSA I CORPS | 5 |
| CG 9TH MAB | 1 | CICV | 1 |
| COMNAVFORV | 1 | III MAF | 5 |
| CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG | 1 | | |
| CG FLC | 1 | | |

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III LAF PERINTERP NO. 36

DOING N. / C.M. LA 350A

1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOC. POINTS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONNEL</u> |
|--------------------------------|--------------|------------|-------------------------|---|---|
| 324TH B IVL DIV (R. & LEFT) | CCIF | 1,910 | YD 1970 | UNK | CC-GEN TRAN DU CC-CHP VAN BA I CC-NYEN TU LOI |
| 803RD NVA REGT | CCIF | 2,500 | QUANG TRI QUANG BINH | UNK-803RD REGT UNK-751TH BR UNK-601TH BATT UNK-12.7MM MG UNK-12 | CC-MAJ VO THUAT CC-LUYEN CC-MAJ NGOC |
| 812 NVA REGT | CCIF | 2,500 | YD 1970 | UNK-803RD REGT UNK-751TH BR UNK-601TH BATT UNK-571TH BR UNK-12.7MM MG UNK-12 | CC-LANG NGOC CC-DETH LONG CC-MAJ NGOC |
| 902ND NVA REGT | CCIF | 2,500 | XD 1970 | UNK-803RD REGT UNK-751TH BR UNK-601TH BATT UNK-571TH BR UNK-12.7MM MG UNK-12 | CC-THUAT CC-NGOC CC-MAJ CHAI VAN QUANG |
| 13TH NVA ARTY BN | CCIF | 300 | DIEU HANG | 12-120TH BATT* | UNK |
| 14TH NVA ARTY BN | CCIF | 300 | DIEU HANG | 12-12.7MM MG* | UNK |
| 15TH NVA ENGR BN | CCIF | 300 | DIEU HANG | 12-7.62MM MG* | UNK |
| 16TH NVA SIGNAL BN | CCIF | 300 | DIEU HANG | UNK | CC-GEN LOI CC-CHP BA I |
| 19TH NVA MED BN | CCIF | 300 | DIEU HANG | UNK | UNK |

*UNITS LISTED ARE THE NORMAL COMBAT STRENGTH FOR THESE UNITS. HOWEVER, COMBAT STRENGTH MAY VARY DURING OPERATIONS AS WELL AS DURING NORMAL STRENGTH, A REDUCTION IN STRENGTH MAY OCCUR.

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DCONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| 4TH BN 270TH BRIG | CONF | 450 | DMZ/QUANG TRI | UNK | CO-MAJ HO TINH |
| CAM LO CO (LF) | PROB | 80 | YD 1063 | UNK-60MM MORT | CO-NGHIA |

2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|------|-----|------------------|--|--|
| 808TH BN (LF) | CONF | 500 | YD 3757 | 4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG | CO-VAN KIEN XO-LE VAN HAT |
| 814TH NVA BN | CONF | 500 | HAI LANG DIST | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 1-B40 2-UNK MG | CO-THANH XO-LUONG |
| C-55 CO (LF) | CONF | 75 | TRIEU PHONG DIST | 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR | CO-CUONG XO-LT TUAN PO-2NDLT THIEN |
| TRIEU PHONG CO(LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 2245 | 1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR | CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY |
| HAI LONG CO (LF) | CONF | 80 | YD 3244 | 1-MG 9-AR | CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG |

HUE/PHU BAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

| | | | | | |
|---------------|------|-----|---------|--|-------------------|
| HUONG TRA CO | PROB | 100 | YD 7512 | UNK | CO-THUYET |
| HUONG THUY CO | PROB | 50 | YD 8009 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN THAM AI |
| K.41 CO | CONF | 95 | YD 8402 | 1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG | CO-PHAM KINH PHU |

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HUE/PHU BAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 810TH BN | CONF | 400 | YD 5320 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG | CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC* DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT PHIST |
| 802ND BN | CONF | 400 | YD 6318 | 3-81MM MORT | CO-THAN-TRONG MOT |
| QUANG DIEN CO (LF) | CONF | 100 | YD 6530 | 2-60MM MORT 9-AR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |

*ELMS OF THIS BN BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN PHU VAN DIST.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FORCES, THE 95TH "B" NVA REGT IS LISTED AS UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE. LAST REPORTED LOCATION WAS IN PHU LOC DIST VICINITY (ZC 0495). IT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE PHU BAI TAOR. THE 6TH NVA REGT, THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR, COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

DANANG TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-----|---------|--|--|
| 402ND SAPPER BN | CONF | 300 | AT 8064 | 2-81MM MORT 2-LMG 12-B.40 | CO-NGUYEN VAN TRAN |
| V.25 BN (LF) | CONF | 400 | AT 8753 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR | CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEI PO-TOAN |
| R-20 BN HQTRS | CONF | 100 | AT 8454 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54-AR | UNK |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|--------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| R-21 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9354 | 1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG | CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC |
| R-22 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 9053 | 2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR | CO-DE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT |
| R-23 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8655 | UNK | CO-NGUYEN SUNG |
| R-24 CO | CONF | 100 | AT 8554 | 1-60MM MORT 1-LMG 7-AR 30-SMG | CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI |
| DIA LOC CO | CONF | 70 | AT 8551 | 1-60MM MORT 9-AR 18-SMG | CO-PHAN PHONG SAM |
| DUY XUYEN CO | CONF | 120 | BT 0152 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT | CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO |
| 51ST BN | PROB | 300 | AT 9089 | 1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR | UNK |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------|-----------------------------|---|---|
| 21ST NVA REGT | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH/ QUE SON DIST | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG | CO-SRCAPT NGUYEN VA TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI |
| 3D BN, 5TH REGT | PROB | 400 | AT 8737 | 2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR | CO-HOANG |

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|---|--|
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | QUE SON DIST | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SRCAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUNG VAN CHAU PO-THUYING THANH MY |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU |
| 804TH BN | CONF | 400 | PHU LOC DIST | 4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40 | CO-TON THAT THIET |

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 33RD NVA ARTY REGT HQ (PROB) WITH THREE (CONF) WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT) ARE AVAILABLE (WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR) FOR EMPLOYMENT IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18X12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6X75MM RR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6X120MM MORT). THE 95TH "B" NVA REGT, UNLOCATED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, LAST RPTD VIC (ZC 0495) IN PHU LOC DISTRICT, IS POSSIBLY WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR.

CHU LAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|------------------------|---|---|
| 1ST VC REGT | CONF | 2,000 | QUANG NGAI | 8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AA MG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MG | CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SRCAPT LUU THANH PO-NGUYEN ICH |
| 3D NVA REGT | CONF | 1,500 | NORTHERN QUANG NGAI | 19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AA MG 13-MG | CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN |

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 72ND BN | CONF | 300 | BT 2224 | 2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30 CAL MG 1-50 CAL MG | CO- <u>HOANG VAN THANG</u> |
| 409TH SAPPER BN | CONF | 400 | BS 4382 | 3-81MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG | CO- <u>NGUYEN TAM</u> XO- <u>NGUYEN XUAN BINH</u> PO- <u>QUYET</u> |
| 104TH BN | PROB | 300 | BS 6692 | 1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG 18-AR | CO- <u>NGUYEN BI CHAU:</u> <u>NGHIA TUI</u> |
| T-18 CO | CONF | 60 | BS 6882 | UNK | UNK |
| T-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 5784 | UNK | CO- <u>LONG</u> XO- <u>MINH</u> PO- <u>MINH</u> |
| T-20 CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5082 | UNK | CO- <u>TRAN</u> |
| A-19 CO | CONF | 140 | BS 2810 | UNK | CO- <u>NGUYEN YEN BAC</u> |
| A-21 CO | CONF | 100 | BT 2718 | 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG | CO- <u>NGUYEN LIEN</u> |
| 706TH CO | CONF | 80 | BT 3113 | 1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG | CO- <u>LE KHAC NGHIA</u> XO- <u>THANH</u> PO- <u>QUANG</u> |
| TRA BONG CO | CONF | 80 | BS 3190 | UNK | CO- <u>DINH HUY</u> |

2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

| | | | | | |
|---------------|------|-------|------------|---|---|
| 21ST NVA REGT | CONF | 2,000 | THANG BINH | 17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM MG UNK-MG | CO-SRCAFT <u>NGUYEN VAT</u> <u>TINH</u> XO- <u>NGUYEN VAN LA</u> PO-CAPT <u>LAI VAN KHOI</u> |
|---------------|------|-------|------------|---|---|

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CHU LAI TACR (CONT)

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLASS</u> | <u>STR</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 20TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 2864 | 3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG | CO-DINH CHANH NHA XC-DINH PHONIA |
| 38TH BN | CONF | 400 | BS 6654 | 1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR | CO-MAI KIM |
| 70TH BN | CONF | 500 | THANG BINH | 3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR | CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XC-SRCAPT THUA PC-DUAN CONG THANH |
| 49TH BN | PROB | 500 | BT 0730 | 7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR | CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY |
| 206TH CO | CONF | 100 | BS 5770 | 5-AR | CO-TIEN XC-SUNG PC-MIEU |
| 89TH B CO | CONF | 50 | BS 5863 | UNK | CO-LT CAN |
| 614TH CO | CONF | 120 | BS 3065 | UNK | CO-DIEN MIEU |
| TRA HA CO | CONF | 140 | BS 1499 | UNK | CO-MAHN |
| A-10 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1536 | 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG | CO-KHOA XC-NGUYEN THANH PC-ANH VU |
| A-13 CO | CONF | 150 | BT 1017 | UNK | UNK |
| A-16 CO | CONF | 120 | BT 1516 | 1-60MM MORT 2-MG | CO-HONG LE |

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CONF 40

BT 0303

UNK

UNK

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 33RD NVA ARTILLERY REGT (HDQ)(PROB) W/THREE
CONFIRMED WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM HR BN)
AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT COULD, WITH MINOR
CHANGES IN DISPOSITION, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAF PERTINENT NO. 36.

1. 806th Bn, 6th NVA Regt. NVA captive Sgt NGUYEN XUAN LOC, who rallied on 11 August from the 2d Co, 806th Bn, 6th NVA Regt, gave the following information under detailed interrogation:

a. The 6th NVA Regt is composed of three Battalions, the 800th Bn, 802d Bn and 806th Bn. The 806th Bn had a strength of about 300 men in late July and was composed of four companies. The 2d Co strength was approximately 81 men, organized into three platoons of three squads each and a 10th squad equipped with 2-60mm Mortars.

b. The mission of the 6th NVA Regt was to conduct operations in the lowlands to annihilate PF and RF units, expand the "Liberated" area, and annihilate ARVN and US Forces in QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P). In June the 806th Bn was given the mission to liberate PHONG CHUONG (V), PHONG BINH (V) and THANH HUONG (V), and annihilate PF and RF units at these villages.

c. Prior to his service with the 6th NVA Regt the captive was a member of the VINH LINH Area Public Security Unit. Approximately 15 January 1966 the captive was among 300 men from this unit transferred to the SONG LAM Infiltration Regt (SONG LAM is an AKA for the 101st NVA Regt) where he became a member of the C-17 AA Co. On or about 16 February the 1st Bn of the SONG LAM Regt including the C-17 Company, began the infiltration movement into SVN. They were followed by the regimental headquarters and the 2d Bn and 3d Bn. The regiment moved from BO TRACH (D) QUANG BINH (P) following Highway 15 across the NHAI-IE River to IE THUY (XE 905010) where they proceeded south to BANG XOI (XD 975921). The unit was guided to HO (V) (XD 910965), continued to Hill 1001 (XD 715755), and then moved into LAOS. They reached Highway 9 at (XD 527393) and crossed the XE-PON River at (XD 514382). On 5 March the C-17 AA Co arrived at A TUC (XC 105980) where they remained for two days.

d. The SONG LAM Regt, with other units, attacked the CIDG Post at ASHAU in March and withdrew to NVN following the attack. The captive was separated from his unit during the withdrawal, but with the assistance of Montagnards rejoined members of the 6th NVA Regt. He was later transferred from the headquarters of the 6th NVA Regt to the 2d Co, 806th Bn where he served as a squad leader in the 2d Plt.

e. Personalities identified by the captive are: SON, Bn CO, 806th Bn; NITI, Bn XO; KHAM, Bn PO; MIEN, CO, 2d Co, DONG, XO 2d Co; CUONG, PO, 2d Co.

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2. 21st NVA Regt. Captive TRAN DUA, a locally recruited member of the 1st Plat, 7th Co, 22d Bn, 21st NVA Regt, gave the following information under interrogation:

a. The 21st NVA Regt is composed of three battalions, 11th Bn, 22d Bn and 33d Bn; each of the battalions is composed of four companies. The 22d is composed of the 5th Co, 6th Co, 7th Co and 8th Co. The 7th Co has a strength of approximately 90 men; weapons include 2-60mm mortars, 2-B40 AT rocket launchers, 9-RPD MG's, 24-AKs, and 18-SKS carbines.

b. One of the future missions of the 21st NVA Regt is to attack CHU LAI during the monsoon season possibly during October or November. The present position of the regiment is unknown.

c. The captive joined the VC in February after having been a member of the VC Youth Group Association. He attended basic training somewhere in HIEP DUC (D) and following that he was transferred to SON TINH (D), QUANG NGAI (P) where he joined the 7th Co in March. He deserted from the 21st NVA Regt on or about 12 August and rallied at THANG BINH (D) Headquarters a month later.

3. 22d NVA Regt 610th Div. NVA Sgt NGUYEN XUAN PHONG, a member of the signal company of the 22d NVA Regt (AKA 3d Regt) of the 610th Div (AKA 3d Div) gave the following information under interrogation:

a. The 22d NVA Regt is one of three infantry regiments of the 610th Div. The other two regiments of the division are known as the 1st and 2d Regts. The 1st Bn, 2d Bn and 3d Bn constitute the major units of the 1st Regt while the 4th Bn, 5th Bn and 6th Bn are the major units of the 2d Regt. The 22d NVA Regt is made up of the 7th Bn, 8th Bn, 9th Bn and the TRO CHIEN Bn which contains the signal Co, an infantry Co, supply, transportation, engineer and medical units and has the responsibility of protecting and maintaining the Regimental C.P. The present strength of the 22d NVA Regt is approximately 1600 men and the strength of the signal company is 115 men. The weapons in the regiment include: one RPD in each squad, two HMG's for each company, AK's SKS's and two CHICOM grenades per man.

b. The 22d NVA Regt has undertaken a training program to attack MO DUC, NUI DAU, THACH TRU, NUI DANG and several places in BINH DINH (P). Sand tables have been prepared for each location for quick review when a specific location is to be attacked. The captive heard the regimental commander say that the regiment would fight until the middle of 1967 and if not successful by then they would use "Our MF against their MF". The 22d NVA Regt and the TRO CHIEN Bn CP location was at (BT 839220) since 21 September, while the 7th Bn CP was at (BS 832218). The 1st Regt of the 610th Div is operating in PHU CAT (D) and PHU MY (D) in BINH DINH (P),

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while the 2d Regt is supposed to be operating in the AN KHE area of BINH DINH. CP of the division is approximately two to four days by foot west of the 22nd NVA Regt CP.

c. The captive joined the regiment in February 1965 in LUONG SON (D), HOA BINH (P) NVN. At that time the unit was known as the 32d Regt. On or about 16 June 1965, with one day's notice, the regiment departed for SVN. While en route to SVN through LAOS, the regiment used the designation 4th Regt; the designation was changed to the 3d Regt on arrival in SVN about 13 September 1965. The initial place of entry into SVN was in KONTUM (P). From there they proceeded to BA DONG (V), BA TO (D) QUANG NGAI (P) and finally to BINH DINH (P).

d. Some of the special equipment used by the regimental signal company includes: five AN/PRC-10 radios, three 15 watt radio sets with hand generators, and five 71B CHICOM radio sets. Two of the AN/PRC-10 radios are with the regimental CP, while each of the battalions has one. The three 15 watt radios and the five 71B CHICOM radios are maintained within the regimental CP and are used only during battle. At other times messengers and runners are employed. The battalion AN/PRC-10 radios are used for inter-battalion communication, while regimental AN/PRC-10 radios are used to monitor ARVN and US radio nets; the operators have the capability of speaking and understanding English. Through the use of an AN/PRC-10 radio the regimental commander gains knowledge of oncoming B-52 airstrikes two to three minutes before the strikes take place.

e. Personalities identified by the captive include: Senior Colonel NGUYEN THONG TRUC, CO, 620th Div; Major HO SILOC, XO and PO, 22d NVA Regt; and 2nd Lt TO, Chief of Staff, 22d NVA Regt.

4. The following is a full translation of a Communique, dated 22 August 1966, to be signed by DANG VAN KY (possibly Regimental Political Officer) of Group 94; it pertains to a B52 Raid on Group 94 on 22 August 1966:

DIRECTIVE

This morning, the enemy used B52's to bomb the base area of our entire unit. Although no damage was caused to us, we still have to remain very vigilant against the enemy conspiracy.

As a result, the cadre of all levels, particularly the responsible cadre, must thoroughly train their men in preserving secrecy concerning this B52 raid. Whenever they are asked about bombing they must reply that they do not know the area bombed by the enemy, or say that the bombing took place in a distant area.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

NOTE: Instruct the comrades who maintain relations with the people such as those assigned to transportation missions in the hamlets or those on TDY.

22 August 1966

Group Commander
DANG VAN KY

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP No. 36

1. GENERAL. There was a marked reduction in VC activity during the reporting period, although the VC continued their efforts to extort rice from the villagers. Several acts of terrorism were reported, and there was one report of a six month espionage class for women.

2. ESPIONAGE. A 7 October report received from an intelligence source stated that the VC were organizing a spy net, composed mostly of women, to operate in the QUANG NAM (P) area. (CI Comment: One of many reports on the VC utilizing females for espionage purposes).

3. SABOTAGE. Two possible acts of sabotage of lines of communication were reported. One of these involved the destruction of a railroad bridge at (ZD 126011), and the other the destruction of a road culvert on Highway #1 at (BT 181412).

4. POLITICAL. No political activity was reported.

5. PROPAGANDA. No propaganda was reported.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

QUANG TIN. A 27 September report from a U. S. Intelligence Agency indicated that the VC are preparing for their winter-spring campaign. A directive has been issued to exchange cells to purchase the necessary supplies, including rice, fish sauce, and salt. The VC plan to locate their troops in the contested areas and operate close to government controlled areas in order to avoid air reconnaissance and bombings. During the rainy season, VC plan attacks on isolated outposts, lines of communication, and important installations.

A 27 September report from an intelligence agency stated that the VC have not completed collecting the rice tax in KY ANH (V) and KY PHU (V). The VC collect 20% of the rice production and levy taxes on numerous other items. Families who do not have the 20% rice tax are forced to buy rice from other families or go into government controlled areas and buy rice.

A 28 September report from an intelligence agency indicated the VC have mobilized the number one coolies in TIEN PHUOC (D) and are compelling them work for a period of one month.

QUANG NGAI. A 29 September report stated that an unknown number of VC infiltrated the villages of DEO GIO (BS 413747) and PHONG KHAI (BS 388704) and burned 118 houses.

A 29 September report stated that the VC District cadre held a conference at SUOI LA (H) (BS 105823). The purpose of the conference was to get the "NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM" to unite with the people of SON TINH (D) in a campaign to kill Americans.

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This campaign will be known as "TRAN VON ON" and will consist of attacks on Allied Forces in northern SON TINH (D) sometime between the 4th and 20th of October

THUA THIEM. A 1 October report stated that a well armed VC platoon entered PHUOC LOC (H) (ZD 183023) and kidnapped four women. The ages of the women ranged from 14 to 21 years.

QUANG MAH. A 1 October report from a U. S. Intelligence Agency indicated that the VC are planning to consolidate their forces in an unpopulated village in DUY XUYEN (D). The mission of this force is to mobilize the population, conduct psychological warfare, and induce the villagers to conduct demonstrations at Vietnamese and Allied installations. The VC plan to infiltrate suicidal cadres and agents armed with grenades, small arms, and mines into the demonstrations with the mission of performing terroristic acts. These actions are to be implemented throughout the month of October.

A 5 October report from an intelligence source stated that a VC guerrilla company was located at (BT 035680), (BT 037669), (BT 045679). The company's mission is to collect taxes from the residents in the area. The VC have issued instructions to the local populace in the area of (AT 960690), (AT 967867) and (AT 955677) to leave the area between the hours of 1700-1800 daily.

A 7 October report received from an intelligence agency stated that 32 women completed a six month course at the GO QUAN DA Office. DIEN BAN (D). The course included English language training, techniques of getting information from soldiers, and techniques of subversion. The group is led by HOANG KIM HONG and HO THI BONG and is presently in THANH TRUNG (V), DIEN BAN (D). Reportedly the VC intend to send these women to "all areas" in the near future.

QUANG TRI. A 2 October report stated that two VC guerrilla platoons were deployed to control a hamlet and market located in the vicinity of (YD 470516). The VC had also forbidden the local populace to enter the DIEN SANH Market at HAI THO (V) (coord unknown) or to travel to QUANG TRI City.

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