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P 011118Z (Aug 68)  
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SECRET  
SUBJECT: ICC OBSERVATION OF NVN ACTIVITY IN DMZ (C)

FOR GEN WALT FROM GEN JONES

1 (C) QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED BY AMEMB AS TO CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING OPPORTUNITY FOR MEMBERS OF ICC TO OBSERVE NVN ACTIVITY IN DMZ FOLLOWING IS QUOTE OF ONE PARA OF EMBTEL WHICH EXPLAINS PROPOSITION (NOTE: IN ORDER TO FORESTALL GENERATION OF UNFAVORABLE ICC MESSAGE TO CO-CHAIRMAN (AND ALSO TO COUNTER EXPECTED NVN PROPAGANDA BARRAGE) CANADIANS WANT TO HAVE ICC TEAM 76AT GIO LINH SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO SITES OF B-50 OR OTHER STRIKES IN DMZ (BUNKERS, CACHES, BODIES, ETC) OF NVN PRESENCE IN DMZ POLES WOULD REFUSE TO JOIN INSPECTION,

PAGE TWO UNSE 823 SECRET

RI INDIANS INDICATE THEY WILL GO ALONG CANADIANS COULD BE PREPARED IMMEDIATELY SPECIAL REPORT (WHICH POLES AND PROBABLY DETAILS WOULD NOT PERMIT TO BE RELEASED HERE) AND SEND IT TO OTTAWA WHICH WOULD RELEASE IT WE ARE TAKING STEPS WITH U S FORCES AND ARVN TO MAKE TEAM 76 MAKE SUCH INSPECTION IN NEXT FEW DAYS IF POSSIBLE, BUT AT PRESENT IT LOOKS IMPROBABLE DUE TO NVN PRESENCE IN VICINITY OF SITES INDIANS AT PRESENT SEEM DISPOSED TO OVERLOOK LEGAL NICETIES OF ICC TEAM RID

2 (C) IN GVN HELICOPTERS OVER DMZ (A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF 1954 AGREEMENTS) UNQUOTE

3 (C) REQUEST YOUR VIEWS AS TO FEASIBILITY OF OBSERVATION INTO DMZ FROM GROUND LOCATIONS SOUTH OF DMZ OR FROM AIRCRAFT FLYING SOUTH OF DMZ ANY THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE WITH RESPECT TO AN ACTUAL VISIT TO OR AIRIAL OBSERVATION OF SITES INSIDE DMZ WOULD ALSO BE APPRECIATED

3 (C) PLEASE RESPOND TO MACV COC, ATTN: BGEN JONES

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BT

1 of 4

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PASS	To Col Chausson		
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SECRET 06535 WESTMORELAND SENDS

SUBJECT: AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

1 ON 1 AUGUST I DISCUSSED THE AN HOA PROJECT WITH THE US MISSION COUNCIL I STIPULATED THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE AND THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WITHIN A WEEK WHETHER OR NOT THE GVN PROPOSE TO GIVE THIS PROJECT SUPPORT BEFORE COMMITTING TROOPS TO OPEN THE ROAD

2 USAID IS EXAMINING THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM OPENING THE LOCS WITHOUT, AT THIS TIME, OFFERING ADDITIONAL US FUND SUPPORT TO THE INDUSTRIAL PROJECT FOLLOWING THIS DETERMINATION, AMBASSADOR PORTER WILL APPROACH THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY TO GAIN GVN REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL.

IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE WILL RAISE THIS MATTER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO GAIN TOP-LEVEL GVN SUPPORT

3 I HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE VISIT AN HOA AND TO ENCOURAGE THE PRIME MINISTER TO DO SO. THE

PAGE 2 LUNSA 1933U SECRET

MINISTER OF ECONOMY IS LIKEWISE BEING ENCOURAGED TO VISIT THE AREA

4 I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED ON THE PROGRESS BEING MADE TOWARD THESE ENDS

GP-4  
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SECRET CG61 RPT CG61  
 PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM LT GEN KRUMHAK  
 RF: (A) CG III MAF 011204Z

1. I KNOW YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN GLADIFIED TO SEE THE GROWING APPRECIATION IN WASHINGTON OF OUR PART IN PACIFICATION, AS IT FITS IN WITH THE REST OF THE WAR. BY NO MEANS EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS IT, AND SOME DO NOT AGREE WITH IT, HOWEVER, IT IS TAKING FIRM HOLD WITH A LOT OF VERY IMPORTANT PEOPLE, AND I DID ALL I COULD TO FERTILIZE THE PROCESS.

2. AMONG THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN THE IDEA THERE WERE MANY QUESTIONS-- THE USUAL HUNGER FOR DETAILS, AND I WANT TO TRY AND SATISFY A LITTLE OF THIS HUNGER IN THE NEXT FMFPAC MONTHLY UPDATE. SPECIFICALLY, I PLAN TO TELL MORE OF THE COUNTY FARM STORY. FOR THIS PURPOSE THE FACTS WE ALREADY HAVE WILL BE USEFUL, AS WILL THE STATISTICS YOU FORWARD IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A. HOWEVER-- IN ADDITION, WE WILL NEED THE FOLLOWING:

- A. A DESCRIPTION OF THE GVN PACIFICATION ORGANIZATION, AND HOW IIIMAF TIES IN WITH IT, AT EACH GVN LEVEL IN I CTZ.
- B. AN OUTLINE OF YOUR CONCLUDING PLANS FOR COUNTY FARM:
  - (1) HOW VILLAGES ARE CHOSEN.
  - (2) WHAT AREAS ARE TO RECEIVE THE PRIORITY ATTENTION.
  - (3) WHAT YOU EXPECT TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS.
  - (4) WHAT YOU ARE GOING OR PLAN TO DO TO ENSURE THE VILLAGES YOU CLEAN OUT ARE NOT REINFECTED.
  - (5) ANYTHING ELSE YOU CAN ADD THAT WILL EXHIBIT YOUR EFFORT, TO ORGANIZED AND COORDINATED ONE.

3. WE ARE WORKING ON THE UPDATE NOW, SO THE SOONER WE CAN HAVE THE ABOVE THE BETTER.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

**CG:**

1. G-3 HAS GONE TO DIVS FOR ANSWERS TO PAR 2B
2. G-5 WILL HANDLE PARA 2A
3. I SET A DEADLINE OF 051800H.

*page 1 of 1 page*

*Jm*

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AUGUST

CG FMAW

(PERSONAL FOR)

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CG FMAW

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*J.W. Schaner*

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AUGUST

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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FM CG FMAW  
 TO RUKBP/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

BT  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L / L M D I S  
 FOR FMFPAC (F-012)

ABSENTEES (U)

PERSONAL FOR LT GEN KIER, INFO LT GEN WALT

A. ADMINO FMFPAC 290653Z JULY 66

B. COMUSMACV 230439Z JULY 66

C. CG, III MAF 260626Z JULY 66

L. IAW REF (A), FOL. INFO FURN.

2. REF (B) REQ CG, III MAF TO REPORT, ON SHORT NOTICE,  
 STATISTICAL DATA ON AWOL'S AND DESERTERS FOR FIRST HALF

PAGE TWO RUMNAV 078 C O N F I D E N T I A L / L M D I S  
 CY 66

3. THE INFORMATION FOR FMAW, AS REPORTED IN REF(C), INCLUDED  
 OFFENSES OF ART 36 WHICH WERE HANDLED AT NJP OR BY COUNTS-  
 MAINTIAL. ALL BUT ONE WERE FOR ABSENCES OF ONLY A FEW HOURS,  
 MOSTLY OFFENSES OF ALERT OR LIBERTY REGULATIONS.

4. THESE OFFENSES DID INCLUDE THOSE OF JAPAN/OKINAWA BASED  
 UNITS AS FOLLOWS:

JAN 7  
 FEB 4  
 MAR 6  
 APR 2  
 MAY 8  
 JUNE 3

5. THE ALERT/LIBERTY REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN CLARIFIED AND  
 MEASURES TO CREATE DIVERSIONARY ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INITIATED.  
 INCREASED RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZED VISITS TO  
 OTHER ENCLAVES ON MONDAYS, WEDNESDAYS AND FRIDAYS OF EACH  
 WEEK WERE INITIATED IN JUNE.

BT-4

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PERSONAL FOP

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT PROD LTGEN KRUMER.

1. THIS QUOTES, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, AN ARTICLE APPEARING IN LAST SATURDAY'S WASHINGTON POST. IT CAUSED A CONSIDERABLE FLAP HERE, PARTICULARLY THE COMMENTS FROM MARINES IN THE LAST THREE PARAGRAPHS. SECDEF HIMSELF REQUESTED A BRIEFING ON THE SUBJECT.

QUOTE:

MORE MARINES ASSIGNED TO S. VIETNAM

BY WILLIAM TUOHY, LOS ANGELES TIMES.

DANANG, SOUTH VIETNAM, JULY 31--A UNIT OF THE NEWLYFORMED U. S. 5TH MARINE DIVISION HAS ARRIVED IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC FOR USE WITHIN DAYS IN VIETNAM, IT WAS LEARNED HERE TODAY.

THE NEW 5TH DIVISION IS BEING ORGANIZED AND TRAINED AT CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOWHERE NEAR FULL STRENGTH, MANPOWER DEMANDS FOR MARINES IN VIETNAM ARE SUCH THAT A BATTALION LANDING TEAM HAS BEEN DISPATCHED HERE.

PAGE 2 YVNA 628 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE BATTALION WILL SERVE AS THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ABOARD THE HELICOPTER ASSAULT CARRIER EUS JEMA, CRUISING OFF SHORE TO BEEF UP THE MARINE COMMAND IN VIETNAM WHERE 57,000 TROOPS ARE SPREAD UNCOMFORTABLY THIN THROUGH THE FIVE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES.

THE TWO OTHER MARINE DIVISIONS ARE ALREADY HERE: THE 1ST DIVISION IN CHU LAI AND THE 3RD IN DANANG.

ALTHOUGH MARINES PUBLICLY INDICATE THE SITUATION IS WELL UNDER CONTROL, PRIVATELY, MANY COMMANDERS STRESS THE IMMEDIATE NEED FOR MORE TROOPS AND HELICOPTERS.

MANY MARINES FEEL THAT THEY ARE NOW BEING OVERTAXED IN THEIR MISSION IN VIETNAM. OPERATION HASTINGS, WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN FIGHTING NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN NORTHERNMOST QUANG TRI PROVINCE, PROVES THEIR POINT, THEY SAY. OVERALL AMERICAN CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT, BUT SOME UNITS SUFFERED HEAVILY.

THE MARINES ORIGINALLY ARRIVED IN VIETNAM IN MARCH 1965, TO PROVIDE BASE SECURITY FOR THE HUGE DANANG AIRBASE COMPLEX. THEY THEN ASSUMED THE SAME FUNCTION AT THE PHU DOI AIRFIELD IN THE NORTH, AND CHU LAI TO THE SOUTH.

AS THEY MOVED OUT FROM THOSE PERIMETERS, THE MARINES ASSUMED THE ADDED NECESSARY BURDEN OF PROVIDING PROTECTION TEAMS AND

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PAGE 3 YVNA 628 C O N F I D E N T I A L

IN THE HUNDREDS OF HAMLETS WITHIN THEIR "HEAVY" TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

THEY ALSO MOUNTED STRIKES AGAINST THE VILLAGES, AS IN THE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL OPERATION STARLIGHT LAST AUGUST, BUT THESE TASKS DEMANDED MANPOWER.

THE MANPOWER EQUATION WAS SEVERELY DISRUPTED IN RECENT MONTHS WHEN NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS BEGAN THEIR BUILDUP IN THE 1ST CORPS AREA. THE MARINES WERE THEN FORCED TO SUPPLY A LARGE NUMBER OF STRIKE FORCE TROOPS, PULLING THEM AWAY FROM OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES.

MANY MARINE COMPANIES AND BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN HIT BY THE DOUBLE BARRELLED IMPACT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES AND ROTATION OF THEIR MOST EXPERIENCED VETERANS. MARINES SPEND FROM 12 TO 13 MONTHS HERE, AND SINCE THE GREAT BULK OF THE FORCE ARRIVED LAST SUMMER, MOST OF THE BATTLE SEASONED TROOPS ARE GOING HOME.

THUS, IN THE BITTER, EXHAUSTING FIGHTS OF OPERATION HARKINS, MANY MARINE UNITS WERE BELOW STRENGTH; 1000-MAN BATTALIONS WERE DOWN TO 600, 200-MAN COMPANIES DOWN TO 125.

FOR THIS REASON, SAY MANY MARINES, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FIGHTING AS EFFECTIVELY AS THEY COULD WITH FULL-STRENGTH UNITS.

TO SOLVE THE MANPOWER SHORTAGE, MANY MARINES WOULD LIKE TO SEE

PAGE 4 YVNA 628 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THEMSELVES REMOVED FROM STATIC DEFENSE AND GIVEN A STRICTLY OFFENSIVE STRIKE ROLE.

THEY ENVY THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION WITH ITS FLEET OF HELICOPTERS AND FREE WHEELING FLEXIBILITY.

AS ONE MARINE VETERAN IN VIETNAM PUT IT, "WE'RE STILL CHAINED TO A CONVENTIONAL ROLE, ROLLING IN ON TRUCKS AND THEN WALKING FOR FIVE DAYS. WHAT WE NEED TO DO IS HIT 'EM, HIT 'EM, HIT 'EM. FOR THAT WE NEED MORE TROOPS AND MORE MOBILITY. IF WE HAD MORE MEN AND MORE HELICOPTERS, WE COULD REALLY WORK 'EM WELL OUT OF THEM."

UNQUOTE.

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**SECRET**

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 CG NINTH MAB

BT

S E C R E T

EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN WALT, NGENS FIELDS, ROBERTSHAW AND KYLE, AND  
 NGENS VAN STOCKUM AND RYAN FROM LTGEN KRILAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING ARE A FEW HIGHLIGHTS DISTILLED FROM MY BRIEF VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
2. THE SELECTION BOARDS. THE JOY FELT BY ALL AT THE GOOD PEOPLE CHOSEN WAS GREATLY TEMPERED BY THE REALIZATION THAT THIS TIME, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER TIME OF RECENT KNOWLEDGE, SOME TREMENDOUS PEOPLE WERE LEFT BEHIND. THE LEGISLATION FOR MORE GENERALS (PROBABLY UP TO A TOTAL OF 78) LOOKS MOST PROMISING. IT IS THROUGH THE HOUSE, AND GAO IS QUITE CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL GET THROUGH THE SENATE, PERHAPS WITHIN THE MONTH. IF THIS EVENTUATES HE WILL SELECT MORE GENERALS IMMEDIATELY, AND THOSE WHO WERE NOT IN THE FORTUNATE GROUP THIS TIME SHOULD TAKE HEART THAT THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE A QUICK FREE RIDE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
3. THE PERSONNEL SITUATION IS GHEM. THERE IS NO REAL PROSPECT OF IT GETTING BETTER FOR NEXT NINE MONTHS OR SO. THE MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL EFFORT IS ORIENTED OVERWHELMINGLY TOWARD THE SUPPORT OF OUR FORCES IN WESTPAC BUT, UNLESS SOME BASIC COMMITMENTS ARE ALTERED, THERE IS LITTLE MORE THAT GAO CAN DO FOR US THAT IS BEING DONE NOW. WE WILL LOOK BETTER IN NUMBERS DURING THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS, BUT THE SKILL SITUATION IS NOT GOING TO IMPROVE. WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO HELP OURSELVES, THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF REENLISTMENT AND OVERSEAS EXTENSION.
4. THE MATERIAL SITUATION IS GENERALLY PRETTY GOOD, WITH MAJOR EXCEPTIONS IN LONG LEAD TIME ITEMS, PARTICULARLY AIRCRAFT. NO REAL IMPROVEMENT NEED BE EXPECTED IN THE AIR FRAME SITUATION FOR OVER A YEAR, AND THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO TO ACCELERATE THE DELIVERY OF HELICOPTERS. A FAVORABLE NOTE, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE CH-53 IS COMING ALONG FINE AND SHOULD MAKE ITS DEPLOYMENT DATE ON SCHEDULE. AERONAUTICAL SPARE PARTS FOLLOW THE SAME PATTERN AS THE END ITEMS; - IN LIMITED SUPPLY AND LITTLE PROSPECT OF EARLY IMPROVEMENTS.
5. MONEY. I SENSED A TIGHTENING DOWN ON MONEY; A REQUIREMENT THAT EVERYTHING WE ASK FOR BE JUSTIFIED BY GAO SEVERAL TIMES. I WILL WORRY ABOUT THE DETAILS OF OUR JUSTIFICATION, BUT WILL BE CALLING ON YOU FOR HELP FROM TIME TO TIME.
6. AMMUNITION. THERE IS GOING TO BE A LITTLE SQUEEZE ON ARTILLERY AMMUNITION, PARTICULARLY 105MM, WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. THE CLASS VA SITUATION OUGHT TO BE REASONABLY CLEANED UP; THERE SHOULD BE ENOUGH TO DO ANYTHING WE MAY NEED TO DO.

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7. THE GAO. THERE IS A POWERFUL GAO PROGRAM UNDER WAY TO LOOK INTO EVERY DETAIL OF SUPPLY HANDLING AND OPERATION IN ALL OF THE SERVICES. AS THOSE OF YOU IN GERMANY KNOW, IT HAS ALREADY BEGUN. AT THE OUTSET IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE GAO WOULD NOT GO INTO RVN; HOWEVER, I WAS TOLD IN WASHINGTON THAT THIS DECISION MIGHT BE CHANGED. I PRAY, FOR THE GOOD OF YOU WHO ARE FIGHTING THE WAR IN RVN, THAT THIS ALBATROSS DOES NOT SHOW UP ON YOUR DOORSTEP.

8. MARINE COMBAT PERFORMANCE. I WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE AN IMPRESSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT OUR AIR/GROUND FORCE IN RVN IS DOING, AND HOW IT IS DOING IT. HIGH OFFICIALS, FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN, EXPRESSED A KEEN INTEREST IN, AND DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF, PACIFICATION, ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATION, CIVIC ACTION, AND ALL THAT GOES WITH THEM. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF PLAYED BACK ON OWN MUSIC TO ME IN SAYING THAT THE GUERRILLA IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ENEMY SOLDIER IN THE WAR. ALL OF THEM WERE KEENLY INTERESTED IN MORE DEPTH ON WHAT WE ARE DOING AND HOW WE ARE DOING IT. SECNAV HAD BEEN KIBBLER KAW BY SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES ON THE BASIS THAT THE MARINES ARE NOT DOING ENOUGH. I HAD SENT HIM A NOTE ON THE SUBJECT AND WHEN I TALKED TO HIM, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAS USED IT TO GOOD EFFECT. HOWEVER, I FOUND THAT THE MAIN GIMMICK NOW IS TO COMPARE THE MISERABLE, OPEN-MINDED FIGURE "BATTALION DAYS" OF THE ARMY WITH THAT OF THE MARINES, NOW THE COMMON TALE IS THAT THE ARMY DOES ABOUT AS "BATTALION DAYS" A MONTH AND THE MARINES DO 3 TO 5.

OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE TO BRING OUR REPORTING SYSTEM INTO SOME FORM OF ALIGNMENT WHICH KEEPS US FROM LOOKING SO BAD. ALL TOLD, HOWEVER, THERE ARE A LOT OF IMPORTANT PEOPLE WHO ARE COMING TO BELIEVE PROFOUNDLY IN OUR PROGRAM. REGARDS TO ALL.

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM VADM WYLAND  
REPOSE OPERATING SCHEDULE (U)

A. YOUR 031314Z AUG 1966

1. APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN OVER ABSENCE OF REPOSE FROM RVN DURING PERIODS OF HIGH THREAT. CAN RESKED TO MEET YOUR NEEDSSN REPOSE SKEDS ARE DRAWN WITHOUT BENEFIT OF ANTICIPATED REQUIREMENTS FOR USE AND WILL REMAIN FLEXIBLE TO MEET NEEDS FOR HOSPITAL SUPPORT IN RVN. WHEN POSSIBLE HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT REPOSE BE ASSIGNED AN OFFSHORE PERIOD INPORT AFTER ABOUT ONE MONTH ON LINE IN RVN, BUT THIS IS ALSO FLEXIBLE. HOWEVER, MOST SEASCA PORTS REQUIRE SEVERAL WEEKS NOTIFICATION OF PENDING SHIPS VISITS. REQUEST YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE BEST AFTER 26 AUG FOR REPOSE TO BE ABSENT FROM RVN FOR ABOUT 10 DAYS FOR UPKEEP AND PORT VISIT.

2. BEST REGARDSSSN

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*page 1 of 4 page*

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**SECRET**

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FROM: CG, IMAF  
 TO: CG, NINTH MAF  
 CG, COMMAC (FWD)

INFO: CG, IIX MAF

**SECRET**  
 CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS AIR OPS IN IZ (U)

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE, AND LIGEN  
 WALT FROM MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW)

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FURNISHED FOR YOUR POSSIBLE USE IN YOUR FORTH COMING VISIT TO MACV HEADQUARTERS IN SAIGON.
2. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE COMMANDER 7TH AF, LIGEN MONYER, HAS UNDERSTOOD, AND WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE, POSITIVE MEASURES TO ALTER EXISTING COMMAND/CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS WHICH VITALLY AFFECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AVIATION WITHIN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.
3. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 CAREFULLY SPOLLS OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IIX MAF COMMANDER IN THE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF MARINE AVIATION OPERATING IN SAZ WITHIN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. ANNEX B TO THIS DIRECTIVE DIRECTS CG IIX MAF TO: QUOTE CONDUCT OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, INTERDICTION, RECONNAISSANCE, MAINTENANCE OF AIR SUPERIORITY, AIR TRANSPORT, AND OTHER SUPPLEMENTAL AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED UNQUOTE. THIS DIRECTIVE FURTHER STATES THAT THE MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM QUOTE WILL EXERCISE POSITIVE CONTROL OVER ALL USMC AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS AND OVER OTHER AIRCRAFT AS MAY BE ASSIGNED IN SUPPORT OF SUCH OPERATIONS UNQUOTE.
4. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DIRECTIVE HAVE PERMITTED THE CONDUCT OF MARINE AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR WELL ESTABLISHED AND TIME PROVEN DOCTRINE. IT APPEARS THAT LIGEN MONYER IS DETERMINED TO CHANGE ALL THIS.
5. A RECOUNT OF HIS RECENT ACTIONS FOLLOWS:

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A. ON 23 JUN I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM NEE WHICH INDICATED HE NO LONGER DESIRED THE TWO MARINE F-4 AIRCRAFT ON 15 MINUTE ALERT WHICH HAVE AUGMENTED THE AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AT DANANG. THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THAT ALERT. THIS FACT MAY NOT APPEAR SIGNIFICANT BY ITSELF, BUT, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HIS OTHER ACTIONS, INDICATES THE DESIRE IS TO LIMIT MARINE CORPS AIR PARTICIPATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

B. ON THE EVENING OF 4 AUG, <sup>France,</sup> AIR FORCE ESCOL, OIC OF I CORPS BASS, CALLED TO ADVISE THAT AIR FORCE OR AIRCRAFT WHICH HAVE BEEN USED AS FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS (ANGCORNE) FOR MARINE AIR STRIKES WOULD NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE FOR CONTROLLING MARINE STRIKES AGAINST PREPLANNED TARGETS IN I CORPS WHICH WERE OUTSIDE OF MARINE TAORS. THIS RESTRICTION IS TO APPLY ONLY TO THOSE AIR STRIKES WHICH ARE PLANNED AND FRANGED BY THE PLAN AND PLOAN BY MARINE AIRCRAFT. AIR FORCE OR F-4(S) WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE TO CONTROL MARINE STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS OUTSIDE OUR TAORS WHICH ARE PLANNED AND COORDINATED BY THE AF AGENCIES. THE SOURCE OF THE DIRECTIVE WAS ATTRIBUTED AS AFRM MOYER.

C. ON THE NIGHT OF 4 AUG I CALLED GEN MONTER TO VERIFY THAT IN FACT THE OR AIRCRAFT WERE BEING RESELECTED IN OUR SUPPORT. HE VERIFIED THIS, BUT DID AGREE THAT THE SUPPORT SHOULD BE PERMITTED FOR ANOTHER TWO DAYS IN ORDER FOR US TO DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CONTROL.

6. I FEEL THAT GEN MONTER IS PUSHING THE AIR FORCE POINT OF VIEW THAT THE OPTION OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS IS RIGHTFULLY AN AIR FORCE RESPONSIBILITY REGARDLESS OF THE SERVICE SOURCE OF THE AIR OPERATIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE OF THE SERVICE INVOLVED. CONFINEING MARINE AIR STRIKES TO OUR VERY LIMITED TAORS WOULD RELEASE MANY MORE STRIKES TO THE AIR FORCE FOR COORDINATION AND FOR THEIR USE. THIS IS HIS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE. THE PORTION OF MACV DIR 95-4 QUOTED ABOVE IS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO RESIST THE INROADS THE AIR FORCE ARE ATTEMPTING. MOREOVER, I THINK IT JUSTIFIED THAT AIR STRIKES ARE WHEED IN I CORPS BE CONSIDERED AS VITAL TO THE EFFORTS OF OUR COMBAT Bases, AND FOR THE SUPPORT OF OUR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. TO RESTRICT US TO THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF ALL STRIKES TO ONLY OUR TAORS

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WOULD BE TO SEVERELY LIMIT OUR AIR/GROUND CAPABILITY, AND IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY PRESCRIBED BY MACV 95-4.

7. MACV 95-4 IS WRITTEN TO SUPPORT OUR AIR/GROUND ORGANIZATIONS AND OUR DOCTRINE.

8. THESE SUBJECTS MAY COME UP FOR DISCUSSION DURING YOUR SCHEDULED VISIT AT MACV HEADQUARTERS.

*[Signature]*  
DRAFTER: E. J. DOYLE, CCL.  
G-3                      MOMENT 3

*[Signature]*  
RELEASED: L. B. ROBERTSHAW, MAJGEN  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
OFFICE 6

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**SECRET**

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COMUSMACV

PERSONAL FUND

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COMUSMACV

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J.W. Schaner

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SECRET

VEGZOSE/941VV PHN997VV SWH235VV PHN566VV MAH055

PP RUMINF  
DE RUMSMA 1986U 21001370  
ZNY 88888  
P 270107Z AUG 66 2104  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO ZEN/DCG USARP TSM  
RUMINF/CC III MAF DAMANG  
ZEL/COMR 7AF TSN  
ZEC/COMNAVFORV SAIGON  
INFO RUMHHS/CINCPAC  
RHEKDA/SECDEF  
RHAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

*Action in work*  
*Jwo*

SECRET 27259 FROM MAJGCO  
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN ENGLER, LT GEN WALT, LT GEN MONYER, AND  
ADM WARD FROM GEN WESTMORELAND  
SUBJ: UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION (U)  
REF: VMAC 42/66, 110122 MAY 66

1 (S) THE REPEATED DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO  
NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES MUST CEASE. DESPITE THE REFERENCE VMAC  
ON THIS SUBJECT, INSTANCES CONTINUE TO OCCUR WHICH ARE TOO BLATANT  
TO BE ANYTHING BUT DELIBERATE. FUTURE VIOLATIONS THE SEVEREST DISCI-  
PLINARY ACTION IS INDICATED BECAUSE THESE LEAKS TO NEWSMEN HAVE

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1986U SECRET TSM

JOPARDIZED THE LIVES OF MEN IN COMBAT OR MEN HELD CAPTIVE BY THE  
ENEMY, AND COULD HAVE ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF MILITARY  
OPERATIONS.

2 (S) THERE MUST BE NO UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF UNEVALUATED  
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS, SUCH AS HIGH KILLS, SAM SIGHTINGS, ESTIMATED  
ENEMY KILLED, FRIENDLY CASUALTIES, PRISONER INTERROGATIONS AND  
PERSONNEL RETURNED TO FRIENDLY CONTROL THROUGH PAR OR E&E AND  
RECOVERY. ALL CONCERNED MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IN ADDITION TO SECUR-  
ITY CONSIDERATIONS, POLICY EGP NATIONAL INTEREST INVARI-  
ABLY ARE RELATED WITH EVENTS IN VIETNAM. SELDOM ARE SUCH POLICY AND  
NATIONAL INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS KNOWN IN THE FIELD, AND COORDINA-  
TION WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY MAY BE NECESSARY BEFORE COMUSMACV CAN  
RELEASE THE INFORMATION.

3 (U) THE RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE RELEASE OF  
INFORMATION TO THE PRESS IN VIETNAM ARE CLEARLY STATED IN CINCPAC  
INSTRUCTION 3720.4A, PARAGRAPH 100(2)(B) OF THAT DOCUMENT STATES:  
"UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF JUSPAC AND CINCPAC, COMUSMACV HAS SOLE  
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLEARANCE AND RELEASE OF ALL  
INFORMATION ON US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RVN AND INFORMATION OF  
GENERAL NEWS INTEREST ON ANY AND ALL US MILITARY UNITS AND PER-

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*page 1 of 2 pages*

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**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUNSMA 1956U S E C R E T  
 PERSONNEL PHYSICALLY IN RVN. ALL SUCH NEWS RELEASES ON OPERATIONS  
 AND OTHER SUBJECT MATTER OF GENERAL INTEREST NEWS NATURE WILL BE  
 CLEARED BY, RELEASED UNDER THE IMPRENT AND DATESLINE OF, AND  
 DISSEMINATED BY COMUSMACV." FURTHER, PARAGRAPH 10D(2)(D) STATES:  
 "WHEN OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA INVOLVE US FORCES OTHER THAN, OR IN  
 ADDITION TO, THOSE BASED IN RVN, COMMANDERS OF FORCES INVOLVED  
 WILL PROVIDE COMUSMACV WITH INFORMATION FOR RELEASE IN SAIGON....."

4. (U) COMUSMACV AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE  
 RELEASE OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MILITARY OPERATIONS IN  
 VIETNAM WILL NOT BE USURPED. VIOLATIONS WILL BE INVESTIGATED TO  
 DETERMINE THE MISDEED OR GUILTY INDIVIDUALS, AND APPROPRIATE  
 DISCIPLINARY OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

5. (S) PLEASE TAKE EARLY AND POSITIVE ACTION WITHIN YOUR COMMANDS  
 TO REVIEW THE PROCEDURES IN EFFECT TO PREVENT THE UNAUTHORIZED  
 DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO NEWSMEN AND, WHERE NECES-  
 SARY, ESTABLISH ADEQUATE CONTROLS TO ENSURE THAT SUCH DISCLOSURES  
 WILL NOT OCCUR.

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
PERSONAL FOR LTJEN WALT FROM LTJEN KRULAK  
ASSIGNMENT OF LEGAL OFFICER (U)

A. YOUR 050408Z/JUL66

B. MY 122135Z/JUN66

C. MSGO 08-66 OF 11 MAY 66

1. REF A REFERS. UNFORTUNATELY CAPTAIN DRAPER IS NOT EXCESS TO PROGRAMMED LAWYER INPUT. REF B DISCUSSED ONLY FIELD GRADE INPUT. COMPANY GRADE INPUT IS STILL CRITICAL AND THE TOTAL INPUT OF LAWYERS TO EACH DIVISION REMAINS BELOW THE MINIMAL FIGURE OF 9, IN ADDITION TO SHORTAGE OF EXPERIENCED FIELD GRADE.

2. UNTIL OUR INCREASE M/L REQUEST FOR LAWYERS CAN BE MET, CONSIDER MINIMUM OF 9 IN EACH DIVISION, 4 IN FLC, 5 IN WING AND 3 IN BUTLER SHOULD BE ATTAINED BEFORE LAWYERS ARE ASSIGNED ELSEWHERE.

3. MAJ C. E. SPENCE ASSIGNED TO WBSIPACAIR BY REF C, TO REPORT DURING SEPTEMBER AS RELIEF FOR MAJ C. W. COLLIER WHO IS DUE FOR

PAGE 2 YVNA 1189 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
ROTATION IN DECEMBER. OVERLAP MAY PROVIDE YOU SOME TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE.

REGARDS

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*page 1 of 1 page*

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*J.W. Schaner*

*101800*

*a/s. JWB*

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P 032220Z AUG 66  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO CG FIRST MAW  
INFO CG III MAF  
BT

TOR: 01432/18 AUG 66/a2

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

PERSONAL FOR NGEN ROBERTSHAW INFO LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK,  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

AVIATION SURVEY CONTACT TEAM (U).

A. CG FMFPAC 020632Z/SEP 65 NOTAL.

B. CG FMFPAC 150728Z/MAY NOTAL.

C. CG FMFPAC 060912Z/JUN NOTAL.

1. REFS A THROUGH C, TAKEN TOGETHER, REFLECT CG, FMFPAC POLICY ON THE  
CONSERVATION OF AVIATION RESOURCES.

2. I REALIZE THAT A LARGE EFFORT IS BEING EXPENDED ON THIS  
PROBLEM, IN THE AREA OF COMMAND ATTENTION. HOWEVER, THE AIRCRAFT  
ACCIDENT RATE CONTINUES TO RISE. I ACKNOWLEDGE MY RESPONSIBILITY  
IN THE MATTER, AS I KNOW YOU WOULD THEREFORE, ON THE BASIS THAT EVERY  
COMMANDER IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR  
WITHIN HIS UNIT REGARDLESS OF ANCILLARY CAUSES, AS WELL AS TO DETERMINE  
AND REMOVE THE CAUSES, OR TO SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.  
I AM SENDING AN AVIATION SURVEY TEAM TO THE FIRST MAW FOR A PERIOD OF  
ABOUT TWO WEEKS. THE TEAM WILL EXPLORE, FIRST HAND, THE UNDERLYING  
CAUSES OF THE CURRENT ACCIDENT RATE, AND DETERMINE THOSE AREAS IN  
WHICH THIS OR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS CAN BE OF ASSISTANCE TO YOU.

MAJOR AREAS TO BE EXPLORED ARE:

- A. ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL.
- B. AVIATION SAFETY/NATOPS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.
- C. ADEQUACY OF PRE-RUN PILOT TRAINING.
- D. MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS.
- E. AERO-MEDICAL PROBLEMS.
- F. SUPPLY SUPPORT PROBLEMS.

3. TEAM WILL DEPART THIS HQ ABOUT 1600 10 AUG 66, PRIOR TO ARRIVAL  
OF THE TEAM IN RVN PLEASE COMPILE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, ALONG  
WITH ANY OTHER BACKGROUND YOU CONSIDER MAY BE HELPFUL:

A. PERSONNEL - SQUADRON COMMANDER EXPERIENCE LEVEL AND TURN  
OVER RATE. PILOT EXPERIENCE LEVEL IN-TYPE. FORMS COVERING EXPERIENCE  
LEVEL OF PILOTS WERE DISTRIBUTED BY CAPT HCGAW OF THIS HQ IN LATE  
JULY.

B. MAINTENANCE. ENLISTED PERSONNEL EXPERIENCE LEVEL AND  
IN-TYPE SCHOOLS ATTENDED, INCLUDING QUALIFICATIONS OF LINE  
CREWS AND PLANE CAPTAINS.

C. TRAINING. VIEWS ON ADEQUACY OF PRE-RUN PILOT TRAINING  
PROGRAM, TRAINING COMMAND, REFRESHER SQUADRONS AND CONUS WINGS.

A. MEMBERS OF THE TEAM ARE COL F. GILHULY LTCOL L. F. BLASS CAPT C. T.  
DOUDNA, MC, USN MAJ R. L. ROBINSON LTCOL C. B. ARMSTRONG, JR.  
MAJ E. R. HOWARD.  
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 INFO CG III MAF  
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COMM NOTE: PAGE #5,  
 UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED.

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EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MANGRUN, INFO LTGEN WALT, FROM LTGEN KRULAK.  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

WESTMOPELAND BRIEFING (U)

1. WESTY BRIEFED SHARP, THE COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND ME TODAY ON THE  
 SITUATION IN RVN AS HE SEES IT. HE HAD A NUMBER OF PREPARED REMARKS  
 BUT THE BULK OF HIS COMMENTS WERE OFF THE CUFF. HERE ARE THE MAJOR POINTS  
 WHICH HE COVERED:

- A. DIAGNOSIS OF ENEMY STRATEGY
- B. DESCRIPTION OF OUR STRATEGY
- C. FUTURE PLANS (1) KANZUS (2) OPERATIONS
- D. ARVN
- E. MORE ON STRATEGY (1) ROAD RUNNER (2) LONG RANGE RECON
- F. B-52 STRIKES
- G. DESTRUCTION OF FORESTS
- H. SLF/ARG
- I. FORCE STRUCTURE
- J. EXTENDED TOURS

THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS SUMMARIZE WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT EACH TOPIC.

2. DIAGNOSIS OF ENEMY STRATEGY. -- HE SAID THAT THE ALLEGED VC  
 MONSOON OFFENSIVE, DESIGNED TO START IN NOV AND CONTINUE UNTIL FEBRU-  
 ARY, IS NOT A MATTER OF FICTION. THE ENEMY PLANNED THE DECEMBER TO  
 MAY PERIOD TO PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELD (POSITION LOGISTIC SUPPORT;  
 NAMELY RICE, ARMS AND MUNITIONS) AND TO POSITION TROOPS. THEY WERE  
 SUCCESSFUL IN MOVING LARGE BODIES OF TROOPS INTO POSITION, BUT NOT  
 SUPPLIES BECAUSE OF THE TIGER HOUND INTERDICTION. FROM A STRUCTURE  
 OF ZERO DIVISIONS, TWENTY ONE REGIMENTS AND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX  
 BATTALIONS IN DECEMBER, BY 1 AUGUST THE ENEMY STRENGTH HAD GROWN  
 TO SIX DIVISIONS, THIRTY TWO REGIMENTS AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY BAT-  
 TALIONS. HOWEVER, THE STRUCTURE IS NOT FLESHED OUT IN ALL UNITS;  
 RUNNING FROM LESS THAN 50 PER CENT TO ABOUT 80 PER CENT.

WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD, ALTHOUGH THEIR  
 DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES BY PORTER FELL FAR SHORT, THEIR EXPENDITURES  
 HAVE BEEN LOW, AND THEIR SUPPLY LEVELS ARE GROWING. THEY HAVE HAD  
 TROUBLE WITH THEIR RICE SUPPLY, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF OUR OPERATIONS.  
 AS A RESULT THEY HAVE DEALT WITH CHINESE MERCHANTS IN PHNOM PENH AND  
 HONG KONG AND AS A RESULT ARE NOW RECEIVING SOME RICE FROM CAMBODIA.

A. USING A MAP, WESTY DESCRIBED THE AREAS WHICH THE ENEMY EXPECTED TO  
 DOMINATE BY AUGUST IN PHASE 1 OF HIS OFFENSIVE, AND THE UNITS HE WAS  
 PLANNING TO USE. FROM NORTH TO SOUTH, THEY INCLUDED (UNITS IN PAREN-  
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(1) THE WESTERN HALF OF QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES (324B NVA DIV).

(2) THE WESTERN HALF OF KON Tum PROVINCE IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA (324NVA AND 630 NVA DIVS), WITH A LONG FINGER RUNNING DOWN INTO THE CENTER OF BINH DINH WITH THE DO ZA AS A WART ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE FINGER (612 NVA DIV).

(3) A SEMICIRCLE COVERING WESTERN DAN LAC (121ST NVA REGT), AND QUANG DUC AND NORTHERN PHUOC LONG PROVINCE (1TH VC DIV).

B. THEN WESTY DESCRIBED THE OBJECTIVES AND UNITS FOR PHASE II OF THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE. HE SAID THAT, WHILE SAIGON IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE, AS THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND POPULATION CENTER OF THE COUNTRY, THESE ARE PHASE II MILITARY OBJECTIVES:

(1) TO THE EAST OF SAIGON, SOUTHERN LONG KHANH AND NORTHERN PHUOC THY PROVINCES (5TH VC DIV).

(2) TO THE WEST OF SAIGON, THE PLAIN OF REEDS (7TH VC DIV).

(3) PHU YEN PROVINCE (612TH NVA DIV).

(4) QUANG TIN PROVINCE ( 620TH NVA DIV).

3. DESCRIPTION OF OUR STRATEGY.

HAVING SET THE STAGE, WITH THE ENEMY SITUATION AND PROGRAMS, WESTY CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT OUR STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO HIT THE ENEMY BEFORE HE GETS SET. HE SAID THAT HIS SCHEME IS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENEMY'S ONE SLOW, FOUR QUICK DOCTRINE, THE ONE SLOW BEING THE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD, POSITIONING OF TROOPS AND PLANNING; AND THE FOUR QUICK APPLYING TO ATTACK, PURSUE, CLEAR THE BATTLEFIELD AND WITHDRAW. DURING THE SLOW STEP HE IS VULNERABLE TO OUR SPOILING ATTACKS, BY WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISRUPT PHASE I PLANS. IN THIS REGARD WESTY REFERRED FAVORABLY TO EL PASO AND AUSTIN IV IN QUANG DUC AND PHUOC LONG, NATHAN HALE IN PHU YEN, PAUL REVERE II AND HAWTHORNE IN KON Tum, ABILENE AND NEW TOLEDO EAST OF SAIGON AND COLORADO IN QUANG TIN. HE SAID THAT, IN THE NORTH THE ENEMY HAD PLANNED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN QUANG TRI FROM LAOS BUT, BECAUSE OF TIGER HOUND AND LOSS OF TRUCKS, HE HAD DECIDED IN DEFEERATION TO LAUNCH PHASE II BY SENDING THE 324B DIV DIRECTLY ACROSS THE DMZ. THIS PRECIPITATED HASTINGS WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL SPOILING ATTACK.

4. FUTURE PLANS.

A. KANZUS. HE BELIEVES SINCE THE ENEMY HAS ONCE VIOLATED THE DMZ, HE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, AND CONSEQUENTLY WESTY HAS PLANNED HIS

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DISPOSITIONS TO GIVE EARLY WARNING OF ENEMY CROSSING THE DMZ. HE RATIONALIZED THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AS A DEFENSIVE MECHANISM TO DRAMATIZE THE ENEMY VIOLATION OF THE DMZ. THE KANZUS FORCE, IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE FIRST ARVN DIV, WOULD BE A BRIGADE SIZE TASK FORCE COMMANDED BY A MARINE BRIGADIER GENERAL. THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND WOULD BE FROM MACV TO III MAF TO THIRD MARDIV TO KANZUS. IT WOULD CONSIST OF TWO MARINE BATTALIONS, ONE KOREAN BN, PLUS AUSSIES AND NEW ZEALANDERS, THE LATTER EVEN IF ONLY AN FC TEAM. TWO BATTALION STRONG POINTS WOULD BE FORWARD AND ONE IN RESERVE. THE STRONG POINTS WOULD SECURE CRITICAL TERRAIN, PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE ARTILLERY, AND BE USED AS PATROL BASES. HE VISUALIZES HAVING 155'S IN THE SPECIAL FORCES CAMP AT KHE SAN AND MORE IN THE EASTERN STRONG POINT, WITH AN 8 INCH BATTERY IN THE CENTER. IN THIS CONNECTION HE SAID HE WANTED TO TALK TO ME ABOUT PROVIDING THE 8 INCH BATTERY. ALL OF THE RF/PF/ARVN AND CIDG WOULD BE INTEGRATED IN THE DEFENSES BUT WOULD NOT BE A PART OF THE COMBINED FORCE. FINALLY, III MAF WOULD PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS AS NECESSARY.

B. COMMENTS ON OPERATIONS. -- THESE WERE BRIEF AND NOT TOO WELL ORGANIZED.

(1) NAVAL GUNFIRE. HE REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO SEE NGF SUPPORT NORTH OF THE DMZ. SHARP AGREED.

(2) HE IS PLANNING AN OPERATION WITH 1ST CAV IN NORTHERN BINH DINH AGAINST THE SIXTH NVA DIV.

(3) HE IS PLANNING EXTENSIVE USE OF B-52 STRAKES. HE COMMENTED THAT THE B-52'S ARE USED NOT ONLY IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES, THEY ARE ALSO USED WHERE INTELLIGENCE SHOWS WE HAVE A TARGET BUT WHERE WE CANNOT AFFORD THE TROOPS TO ATTACK IT.

(4) HE SAID THAT MARKET TIME OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IT COSTLY FOR THE VC TO USE THE SEA FOR RESUPPLY. A YEAR AGO THEY WERE ABLE TO USE THE SEA EASILY; NOW THEIR USE IS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED.

(5) HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAS A VERY GOOD SLY TARGET IN IV CORPS.

5. ARVN. -- HE HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR HALF AN HOUR AND HAD NEVER MENTIONED THE ARVN. SO I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD SAY A WORD ABOUT THEM. HE SAID THAT THEY HAVE GREATER CONFIDENCE NOW THAN EVER BEFORE, AND THEY HAVE BETTER COMMANDERS. HE SAID THAT HE TRIES TO INVOLVE ARVN IN ALL OF OUR OPERATION, BUT SOMETIMES THEY ARE NOT AVAILABLE, OR TOO SLOW, OR ARE NOT USED IN THE INITIAL PHASES OF OUR OPERATIONS FOR SECURITY REASONS. HE THEN MADE RATHER A DRAMATIC STATEMENT, TO THE EFFECT THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO MOVE MORE AND MORE ARVN INTO PACIFICATION.

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MISSIONS, TO ASSIGN 50 PERCENT OF THE ARVN BATTALIONS TO SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, WHILE U.S. FORCES TAKE UP THE MAJOR BURDEN OF OFFENSIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE MAIN ENEMY FORCES. HE SAID THAT THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN PLAN WHICH HE IS DRAWING UP WITH THE ARVN ASSIGNS THE U.S. THE PRIMARY ROLE IN OFFENSIVE ACTION AND THE ARVN THE PRIMARY ROLE IN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. (AT THIS POINT I RECALLED MCNAMARA SAYING THAT WE MUST NOT END UP IN A POSITION WHERE WE EXPEND MOST OF THE BLOOD IN CARRYING THE MAJOR OFFENSIVE BURDEN, WHILE THE ARVN CONTENTS ITSELF WITH LESS COSTLY ACTIVITIES. SO, I SHOULD SAY THAT WESTY IS A LITTLE OUT OF FOCUS WITH THE HIGH COMMAND).

C. MORE ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS. HE THEN RAMBLED, SPEAKING TO WHAT ARE PROBABLY SOME OF HIS PET CONCERNS. HE MADE THESE POINTS:

A. THE VC HAVE BEEN AVOIDING CONTACT UNTIL THEY CAN CHOOSE THE TIME AND PLACE OF BATTLE, BUT IF WE MOVE INTO ONE OF THEIR BASE AREAS, THEY EITHER HAVE TO DEFEND THEIR SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT OR ABANDON THEM.

B. THE VC AND NVN HAVE A LARGE FORCE WITH GRANDIOSE PLANS BUT THEY HAVE BEEN KICKED IN THE TEETH RECENTLY. THIS MIGHT MISLEAD PEOPLE INTO THINKING THAT THEY DIDN'T HAVE SIZEABLE FORCES IN THE FIRST PLACE. ACTUALLY, WE HAVE BEEN STRAINED TO THE HINDEST TO STOP THEM, AND ARE STILL BUYING TIME, WHILE WAITING FOR OUR FORCE TO BUILD UP.

C. SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR, THE NVN HAS INFILTRATED AT LEAST 5000/ MONTH; IN MARCH, ALMOST 10,000 INFILTRATED. ALL TOLD THERE HAVE BEEN ABOUT 54,000; 30,000 CONFIRMED AND 24,000 REPORTED. THEY ARE HAVING

PROBLEMS WITH DESERTION AND MALARIA. THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF AMMO AND NOT MUCH SHORTAGE OF FOOD, BUT THEY ARE SHORT MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

D. OUR STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO PREVENT ANY NVN SUCCESS WITH EMPHASIS ON TACTICAL OPERATIONS, BUT NOW WE ARE MOVING TOWARD REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD). THE MARINES HAVE ALREADY BEEN COMBINING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITH RD; IT IS IMPLICIT IN THEIR MISSION, AND FIT THEIR PARTICULAR SITUATION OF TERRAIN AND POPULATION AND DEFENSE OF THEIR BASES.

E. ROAD RUNNER. THIS IS THE NAME APPLIED TO THE OPENING AND USING OF ROADS. IT IS AN EXCELLENT PROGRAM. SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES ARE THAT THE PEOPLE SEE THE ROADS IN USE AND THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE WINNING; THE AVAILABILITY OF THE ROADS HELPS THE ECONOMY AND RD.

F. LONG RANGE RECON. WE HAVE MADE HEADWAY IN THIS PROGRAM BUT IS NOT YET SATISFIED. RECON IS EXCELLENT FOR ACQUIRING INTELLIGENCE AND FOR SAVING TROOPS. THE RECON PEOPLE CAN DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO MOVE MORE TROOPS TO A TARGET AREA.

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HE NOTED THAT WE HAVE MADE MISTAKES BY GOING INTO DRY HOLES IN THE PAST.

6. B-52 STRIKES. HE WAS MORE THAN EFFUSIVE ON THIS ONE, SAYING THAT THE IMPACT OF THE B-52'S ON THE GROUND WAR IS NOT FULLY REALIZED. HE SAID THAT THE B-52'S HAVE CONDUCTED SPOILING ATTACKS WHICH HAVE NOT ONLY DISRUPTED THE ENEMY BUT DECEIVED HIM AS TO OUR INTENT. HE NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO SUCCESS IN FINDING HUMANS UNDER A TRIPLE CANOPY, IF WE RUN A B-52 STRIKE CLOSE ENOUGH IT CAUSED THE ENEMY TO MOVE, AND IT MAKES HIM THINK WE KNOW MORE THAN WE PROBABLY DO. IT ALSO MAKES HIM EXPEND CONSIDERABLE EFFORT IN BUILDING UNDERGROUND SHELTERS. WESTY THEN PAUSED AND SAID THAT IN SPITE OF ALL THIS FINE PERFORMANCE, HE IS STILL DISSATISFIED, BECAUSE THE B-52'S SPEND TOO MUCH TIME IN THE AIR, POINTING OUT THAT WE NEED BASES CLOSER THAN GUAM. HE EXPRESSED THE NEED TO BE ABLE TO PUT ONE HUNDRED BOMBERS OVER ONE TARGET, OR TO RUN A B-52 STRIKE IN THREE HOURS BASED ON A PATROL LEADER'S REQUEST.

7. DESTRUCTION OF FORESTS. WESTY NEXT SAID THAT HE DESIRED TO EXPOSE AN IDEA. HE NOTED THAT THE VC HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE IN USING JUNGLE AREAS FOR HIDING, AND THAT WE REALLY NEED TO DESTROY THOUSANDS OF SQUARE MILES OF FORESTS. HE SAID THAT THE KING RANCH PEOPLE HAVE A TECHNIQUE FOR TEARING DOWN FORESTS; EQUIPMENT SPECIALLY DESIGNED TO PULL TREES UP BY THE ROOTS. THE PLAN FOR FOREST DESTRUCTION WOULD PROVIDE LAND FOR AGRICULTURE, PROVIDE LUMBER, AND ELIMINATE THE VC AND THE REQUIREMENT TO USE TROOPS AND BOMBS TO CLEAR THEM OUT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD PLAN TO ORGANIZE SPECIAL FOREST CLEARING COMPANIES WITH THEIR OWN T/O AND E. EVENTUALLY THE ARVN WOULD TAKE OVER AND WE WOULD PHASE OUT. I GUESS HE WAS SERIOUS.

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8. ARG/SLF. ROY JOHNSON ASKED WESTY WHAT HE THOUGHT OF GETTING SOME SPECIAL BOATS FOR THE ARG/SLF AND USING IT IN IV CORPS. WESTY ASKED IF THAT WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON GETTING THE NDMAF. WHEN JOHNSON SAID NO, WESTY SAID HE WAS ALL FOR IT. AT THAT POINT SHARP ASKED JOHNSON IF WE WERE GOING TO HAVE A SECOND ARG/SLF. JOHNSON SAID YES, AS FAR AS THE NAVY IS CONCERNED. WESTY SAID THAT WAS VERY INTERESTING, AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO LEARN MORE ABOUT IT.

9. FORCE STRUCTURE. SHARP SAID, WITH RESPECT TO REVALIDATION OF FORCE REQUIREMENTS, THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO DO IT QUICKLY AND THOROUGHLY; THAT WASHINGTON WAS IN NEUTRAL. HE URGED THAT EVERYONE GIVE REVALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS A HIGH PRIORITY. HE SAID TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR CONSTRUCTION MONEY, AND THAT EVERYTHING IS WAITING FOR THE REVALIDATION. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT TO AVOID LOSING OUR 66 ADD-ON AND S7 PROGRAM; THAT WE HAVE TO TELL WASHINGTON WHY WE CAN'T WIN WITH WHAT WE HAVE. WESTY SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN STUDYING COURSES OF ACTION, TO MEET SITUATIONS ALL THE WAY FROM NEGOTIATION TO ESCALATION, AND WORKING UP A FORCE STRUCTURE FOR EACH ALTERNATIVE; ALSO A LEVEL-OFF FORCE STRUCTURE WHICH WILL SUSTAIN ITSELF INDEFINITELY, TO FIGHT A WAR OF ATTRITION WITH A MINIMUM EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY, AVOIDING MOBILIZATION, AND AVOIDING MOVEMENT OF FORCES FROM EUROPE. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT HIS STATED REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN REASONABLE, BUT THAT HE COULD TRADE OFF AN EXTENSION OF THE WAR AGAINST NOT GETTING MORE TROOPS.

10. EXTENDED TOURS. WESTY PUT IN A PLUS FOR EXTENDED TOURS, AND FOR CONTINUITY IN ABOUT 150 KEY POSITIONS TO INCLUDE SECTOR ADVISORS. HE EXPLAINED THAT OF THE LATTER HE WOULD EXTEND ONLY THOSE WITH SOMETHING EXTRA TO OFFER.

11. MY REACTIONS TO WESTY'S TWO AND A HALF HOUR PERFORMANCE:

A. AFTER HE GOT PAST HIS INITIAL DESCRIPTION OF HOW WE HAVE FARED IN THE PAST FOUR MONTHS, HE RAMBLER.

B. HE REALLY DOES NOT HAVE A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN IN HIS MIND OR ON PAPER YET.

C. HE IS MOVING SLOWLY TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF OUR APPROACH TO THE WAR, BUT IS CERTAINLY NOT THERE YET.

D. HIS EXTRAORDINARY ELUSIVENESS EVEN B-52'S AND HIS PLAYING DOWN OF TACTICAL AIR CAN PREPARE A COMING ARMY POSITION THAT ALL THEY NEED IS B-52'S FOR MASS SUPPORT, AND THEIR IMPROVED GENERATION OF ARMED HELOS FOR CLOSE SUPPORT. REGARDS

BP-1

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET

3d MarDiv - 2100/2

P 172232Z AUG 66

FM CG FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN FIELDS FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

KANZUS FORCE (U).

A. COMUSMACV 150250Z MAY (PASEP).

1. WHEN WESTMORELAND WAS HERE, HE STATED THAT YOU WERE ALREADY WORKING ON PLANS TO ORGANIZE THE SUBJECT FORCE. AM IN POSITION TO INFLUENCE CINCPAC ON THE PROPOSED FORCE, AND NEED YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON REF A ASAP, TO INCLUDE COMPOSITION OF ALL USMC ELEMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS.

2. REQUEST THAT YOU NOT EMPHASIZE ROTATIONAL ASPECTS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MACV, SINCE HE MIGHT DECIDE TO ROTATE ARMY BATTALIONS INTO FORCE. HOWEVER, I WOULD SEE SOME BENEFIT IN ASKING FOR ARMY HELICOPTER SUPPORT AS THEIR CONTRIBUTION .

GP-4

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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CG informed S/S

NGEN FIELDS 8/20/66

Returned 9 Sep 66

# 23

**SECRET**MESSAGE FORM - SECRET  
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

P 182075Z AUG 66

FM CG FMFP: C  
TO CG III MAF  
CG FIRST MA7SECRET SPECIALLY EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN FIELDS AND MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW  
FROM LTJEN KRULAK, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

AIR SUPPORT (U)

A. CG III MAF 060016Z

B. MY 230005Z JUL

C. JCS MEMO J3M-1133-66 OF 12 JUL 66

D. CG III MAF 240333Z JUL

E. CG III MAF 270333Z JUL

1. I HAVE PUT A LOT OF TIME INTO ANALYZING THE CONTENT OF REF A,  
AND FIND THAT IT DOES NOT GIVE ME ALL THE ANSWERS WHICH I HAVE BEEN  
LOOKING FOR. IN SOME RESPECTS, MY ANALYSIS INTENSIFIES THE  
APPREHENSIONS EXPRESSED IN REF B, AND HEIGHTENS MY DESIRE FOR ANSWERS  
TO THE FOLLOWING BASIC QUESTIONS IMPLICIT THEREIN:

Q. ARE ANY FIRE SUPPORT TASKS BEING DISCHARGED BY ARMED HELOS, WHICH  
COULD BETTER BE DONE BY FIXED WING

QUES IF SO, WHY

QUES IF NOT, THEN DO WE NEED MORE ARMED HELOS AND FEWER FIXED WING

QUES WHAT THE CURRENT PROPORTION OF MISSIONS GOVERNED-OR IN ANY WAY  
INFLUENCED- BY COMPARATIVE REACTION TIMES OF HELOS AND FIXED  
WING

QUES IF SO, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT

QUES ARE THERE WEAKNESSES IN OUR AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

QUES IF SO, WHERE

QUES ARE USMC STEEL TIGER AND ROLLING THUNDER EFFORTS RESULTING IN  
UNDESIRABLE REDUCTIONS IN FIXED WING CAS AVAILABILITY

QUES WHY IS THERE SO MUCH VARIATION IN OUR STATISTICS, AND WHICH  
SOURCE IS BEST

2. ABOVE ARE EXAMPLES OF WHAT IS ON MY MIND AND, AS YOU CAN SEE, THEY  
ARE CERTAINLY FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS. THE ANSWERS TO THEM, VALIDATED  
BY THE RECORD WE ARE NOW GENERATING, ARE GOING TO AFFECT DIRECTLY  
THE STRUCTURE OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION IN THE FUTURE, AND THIS IS WHAT  
WORRIES ME, BECAUSE I FEEL THAT THE RECORD WE ARE BUILDING UP COULD  
GIVE ASSISTANCE TO THOSE WHO WOULD WISH TO SEE OUR FIXED WING  
STRENGTH REDUCED, A STEP WHICH I REGARD AS INIMICAL TO THE BEST  
INTERESTS OF THE MARINE CORPS.

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#23

**SECRET**MESSAGE FORM - SECRET  
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

HIT VC BUNKERS... DURING ATK NUMEROUS TRENCHS AND BUNKERS WERE UNCOVERED REVEALING MANY VC BODIES..." SO IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE IMPORTANT QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE FIXED WING ORDNANCE VASTLY OUTWEIGHS THE HELOS'S ROCKETS - WHICH OF COURSE IT DOES - BUT WHETHER THE RIGHT ORDNANCE WAS USED IN EACH CASE.

D. PARA 5 OF REF A COULD BE GETTING NEAR TO THE HEART OF THE MATTER, WHERE IT SAYS THAT HELOS AND FIXED WING WERE PROPERLY USED": WITHIN CONSIDERATIONS OF ACFT AVAIL ON-CALL AND URGENCY OF REQUEST," COULD IT BE THAT RESPONSIVENESS IS A BIG FACTOR; THAT GROUND COMMANDERS PREFER AN ARMED UH-1E--ALBEIT LIGHTLY ARMED-- AVAILABLE WITHIN A FEW MINUTES, TO FIXED WING SUPPORT AVAILABLE IN 30 MINUTES OR MORE QUES THIS RAISE THE QUESTIONS OF HOW EXTENSIVELY WE HAVE BEEN MAINTAINING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT ON STATION AT TIMES OF CRISIS, AND WHETHER ANYTHING MORE CAN BE DONE IN THE AIR CONTROL AREA TO DIMINISH RESPONSE TIMES.

E. REFERRING AGAIN TO PARA 5, I SEE SOME EVIDENCE OF A PROBLEM DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE DEFINITION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY HELOS VERSUS FIXED WING. ALTHOUGH ONE IS CALLED "CLOSE-IN SUPPRESSIVE PRES" AND THE OTHER CAS, IN FACT THEY ARE THE SAME, TO THE EXTENT THAT BOTH MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH THE FIRE AND MANEUVER OF THE GROUND COMMAND.

F. I AGREE COMPLETELY WITH PARA 6, WHERE IT CONCLUDES THAT WE NEED 24 UH-1E PER VMO, BUT I BELIEVE THESE 24 AIRCRAFT ARE NEEDED PRIMARILY FOR VMO PURPOSES; FAR LESS FOR USE IN THE ATTACK ROLE.

4. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE ARE NOT SPEAKING HERE OF THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR PEOPLE. THIS IS NOT IN ISSUE AT ALL. FROM TOP TO BOTTOM THEIR PERFORMANCE IS CONSISTENTLY SUPERB, WHETHER IN OPERATION OF JETS OR HELOS. RATHER WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE POST-WAR SURVIVAL OF A BALANCED AND EFFECTIVE FLEET MARINE FORCE, AND THE NEW ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH IT WILL HAVE TO BE JUSTIFIED. YOU BOTH KNOW AS WELL AS I THAT WHEN HO CHI MINH IS LICKED WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO DEFEND OUR FORCE STRUCTURE WITH ARGUMENTATION; FACTS ALONE WILL TALK, AND THE STATISTICAL RECORD WILL GET THE GREATEST WRINGING OUT WE HAVE EVER SEEN.

5. I WILL BE COMING OUT TO RVN IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS. AT THAT TIME, I WANT TO GO INTO THIS WHOLE SUBJECT IN DEPTH, AND COME OUT WITH SUBSTANTIVE, DOCUMENTED AND SATISFYING ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED HEREIN. WARM REGARD.

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#23

CGN 270

FILLER 007

DTG 261832 Z MONTH AUG 66

ORIGINATOR CG FMEPAC

*J.*

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REMARKS RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPY 2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG FMEPAC MESSAGE 261832Z AUG 66

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
 WIRE NOTE

PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN FIELDS FROM LIGEN YBUDAK  
 IF YOU KNOW THAT THE FIRST TWO DIV COVERED THE  
 III MAF COUNTY FAIR IDEA. TODAY I RECEIVED A  
 COPY OF A MEMO, WHICH FOUND ITS WAY TO THE  
 WHITE HOUSE, CONTRASTING THE FIRST TWO DIV'S  
 PERFORMANCE WITH OUR OWN. IT IS QUOTED HEREWITH:

QUOTE  
 MEMO: COUNTY FAIR AND HAMLET FESTIVAL

1. COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS ARE DESIGNED BY THE U.S. MARINES AS A  
 METHOD OF STRIKING AT LOCAL GUERRILLA AND INTERFERING WITH THE  
 OPERATION OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL APPARATUS. THE OPERATION  
 PLACES A MARINE SEAL ON THE HAMLET FOR A PERIOD OF 1 TO 3 DAYS.  
 ALL OF THE POPULATION IS EXTRACTED FROM THE AREA AND BROUGHT TO  
 AN ASSEMBLY AREA PERHAPS 2 OR 3 KM DISTANCE. GVN FORCES SEARCH

PAGE 2 RUHLBP 5825 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

THE HAMLET AND IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS AND  
 INTERROGATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE. THE ASSEMBLY AREA CONSISTS OF  
 A BARBED WIRE ENCLOSURE.

DURING THE MONTHS OF MAY AND JULY OF THIS YEAR A WITNESS TO  
 ONE OPERATION DURING EACH OF THOSE MONTHS REMARKED THAT THERE  
 WERE NO LATRINE OR FRESH WATER FACILITIES. PEOPLE WERE APPREHENSIVE  
 ABOUT THE FATE OF THEIR PERSONAL BELONGINGS WHICH WERE LEFT IN THE  
 HAMLET. GVN OFFICIALS WERE NOT SYMPATHETIC TO THE CONDITION OF THE  
 PEOPLE AND REGIONAL FORCE SOLDIERS WERE OBSERVED BEING BELLIGERENT  
 AND STRIKING PEOPLE. ENTERTAINMENT IS PROVIDED, SOMETIMES BY A  
 MARINE BAND. ENTERTAINMENT OF THAT KIND IS ALIEN TO THE HAMLET  
 DWELLER AND HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND OR APPRECIATE ITS PRESENCE. THE  
 OPERATION LIPS TO A DREARY CONCLUSION AS ALL PEOPLE RETURN TO THEIR  
 HOMES. THERE IS NO FOLLOW UP AND THE WHOLE IMPRESSION IS ONE OF  
 AN INTERESTING CONCEPT FOR WHICH THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REFINEMENT  
 AND PRE-PLANNING. AS EXECUTED THE COUNTY FAIR REPRESENTS  
 CONSIDERABLE INCONVENIENCE FOR THE POPULATION AND MAY BE A MINOR  
 ANNOYANCE TO THE VC.

2. HAMLET FESTIVAL OPERATIONS ARE DESIGNED BY THE U.S. 1ST INF DIV  
 AS A METHOD FOR NEUTRALIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENEMY POLITICAL

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUHLBP 3823 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 APPARATUS AND STRIKING AT THE LOCAL GUERRILLA. PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL  
 OPERATION THERE IS EXTENSIVE PREPARATION WITH THE GVN PROVINCE AND  
 DISTRICT AUTHORITIES. A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE  
 UNITS RESPONSIBLE FOR POLITICAL ACTION.  
 VIETNAMESE SEARCH AND INTERROGATIONS UNITS HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY  
 TRAINED TO PARTICIPATE. THE OPERATION COMMENCES WITH A BN OF THE  
 U. S. 1ST INF PLACING A SEAL ON THE HAMLET. UNITS OF THE VN 5TH LNB  
 MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE. MOST OF THE POPULATION IS EXTRACTED AND  
 BROUGHT TO AN ASSEMBLY AREA IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE HAMLET.  
 EACH FAMILY IS REQUESTED TO LEAVE SOME ONE IN THE HOME TO WATCH  
 PERSONAL POSSESSIONS AND CARE FOR LIVE STOCK. GVN FORCES SEARCH  
 THE HAMLET AND TALK WITH THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE REMAINED IN THE  
 HOMES. THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA  
 ARE IN A LARGE ROPE ENCLOSED PIECE OF TERRAIN WHICH HAS BEEN  
 PREVIOUSLY ORGANIZED TO INCLUDE FRESH WATER AND LAIRINE POINTS,  
 MEDICAL STATION, INFORMATION STATION, AGRICULTURAL DISPLAY, FOOD  
 DISTRIBUTION POINT, AND INTERROGATION FACILITIES. APPROXIMATELY A  
 QUARTER OF THE PEOPLE ARE SELECTED FOR PROCESSING THROUGH THE  
 INTERROGATION FACILITY. EVERY ONE HAS IDENTITY CARDS CHECKED AND  
 IF NECESSARY TEMPORARY CARDS ARE ISSUED. PEOPLE WHO ARE SUSPECT

PAGE 4 RUHLBP 3828 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 ARE BROUGHT TO PROVINCE POLICE HQ FOR A FURTHER CHECK. IN THE  
 ASSEMBLY AREA ENTERTAINMENT IS PROVIDED BY VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATIONS.  
 FOLLOWING THE OPERATION WHICH IS CONCLUDED IN ONE DAY THERE IS A

FOLLOW THROUGH AS CADRE UNITS AND INTERROGATIONS SPECIALISTS LATER  
 RETURN TO THE SAME HAMLET.

AS EXECUTED THE HAMLET FESTIVAL REPRESENTS MINIMAL INCONVENIENCE  
 FOR THE POPULATION AND CONSIDERABLE ANNOYANCE TO THE VC.

3. THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE ARE:

1. THE EXTENT OF PRIOR PLANNING IN WHICH GVN AUTHORITIES PARTICIPATE AND IN FACT GUIDE.
2. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE WELL FARE OF THE PEOPLE IS CONSIDERED.
3. THE FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE OPERATION AND PURSUIT OF RESULTS THROUGH MAINTAINING LIAISON WITH COOPERATIVE INDIVIDUALS.

2. I AM OBLIGED TO COMMENT ASAP. I CAN SEE THROUGH MOST OF THE ABOVE, BUT WANT TO GO BACK HARD AT MY INFORMANT, WITH SOME SPECIFICS. SO, WILL YOU PLEASE SEND ME A QUICK AND FACTUAL CRITIQUE OF THE MEMO BY IMMEDIATE MESSAGE, SO THAT I CAN GET OFF A REPLY AT ONCE. REGARDS.

GP-4  
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TOP SECRET

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CG 1ST MAW  
CG 3RD MARDIV

S/S R.S. SUTTER

COMUSMACV

211310Z Aug

AUG66  
PERSONAL FOR MAJGENS ROBERTSHAW AND KYLE FROM MAJGEN FIELDS  
PREVENTION OF DISCLOSURES OF CERTAIN INFO (U)

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
Pacific Amphibious Force  
APO San Francisco, California 94120

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FM COMUSMACV  
TO ZEN/COM 7TH AF  
RUMSDN/CG III NAF  
INFO RUMFUL/COM 7TH FLEET  
RUMBAN/COMUSMACVHAI  
BT

T O P S E C R E T 29211 FROM MACJOC  
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN MOMYER AND MAJ GEN FIELDS FROM  
GEN WESTMORELAND.

SUBJ: PREVENTION OF DISCLOSURES OF CERTAIN INFO (U)  
ON (S) TO THE FOLLOWING QUOTED FROM A PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM GENERAL WHEELER, CHAIRMAN OF JCS, EXPRESSES  
HIS CONCERN OVER REVELATIONS OF INFORMATION CONCERNING  
ENEMY AIR DEFENSE AND SUCCESSES OR FAILURES THEREOF:

"IN THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS WE HAVE RECEIVED TWO  
SEPARATE REPORTS OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET ATTACHE  
PERSONNEL AND WESTERN MILITARY PERSONNEL. BOTH SOVIET  
OFFICERS STRESSED THE INTENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT  
TO SUPPLY NORTH VIETNAM WITH MORE AND IMPROVED EQUIPMENT

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2121U T O P S E C R E T  
AND, IN PARTICULAR, MENTIONED THE PROVISION OF MORE  
MODERN SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES OF INCREASED EFFECTIVE-  
NESS. AS YOU KNOW, THE PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET-PROVIDED  
SA-2'S AGAINST OUR MANNED AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN EXTREMELY  
POOR. MOREOVER, THEIR POOR RECORD HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED  
TO THE WORLD BY STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM OPTICAL  
SOURCES, TO INCLUDE REVELATIONS THAT WE ARE USING ECM  
AND OTHER ADVANCED COUNTERMEASURES TO DEGRADE SA-2  
PERFORMANCE. AMBASSADOR KOHLER HAS POINTED OUT THAT  
SUCH INFORMATION RELEASES BY US COULD WELL GOAD THE  
SOVIETS INTO PROVIDING ADVANCE EQUIPMENTS TO NORTH  
VIETNAM.

"I AM CONCERNED THAT INDISCRETIONS IN MAKING PUBLIC  
THE NUMBERS OF SA-2 MISSILES LAUNCHED, VERSUS AIRCRAFT  
DOWNED BY THEM AND OUR STATEMENTS CONCERNING OUR CLEVER-  
NESS IN DEVSING EFFECTIVE SAM COUNTERMEASURES, WILL  
RESULT IN GREATER HAZARDS TO OUR AIR CREWS AND INCREASE  
OUR AIRCRAFT LOSSES TO SAMs.

ACCORDINGLY, I REQUEST THAT YOU REVIEW CURRENT  
OPERATIONAL POLICY REGARDING THE FLOW OF INFORMATION CON-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
 Air Force  
 TPO 512 10000, California 9430

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 2121U T O P S E C R E T  
 CONCERNING ENEMY ANTI-AIR DEFENSES AND THE SUCCESS OR  
 FAILURE THEREOF WITH A VIEW TO ELIMINATING INFORMATION  
 WHICH WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO ENEMY DEFENSE EFFORTS. IN  
 PARTICULAR, I REQUEST YOU CONVEY TO XSUR OPERATIONAL  
 COMMANDERS MY DEEP CONCERN THAT WE ARE PROVIDING  
 VALUABLE INFORMATION TO THE ENEMY BY DISCLOSING THE  
 EXISTENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CERTAIN TECHNICAL  
 EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES. IN SUMMARY,  
 I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ADOPT A POLICY OF CAUTION IN  
 DISCUSSING MILITARY OPERATIONS OR TECHNIQUES WITH OTHER  
 THAN THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE A POSITIVE NEED-TO-KNOW."  
 2. (S) I SHARE GENERAL WHEELER'S GRAVE CONCERN.  
 PLEASE TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO PREVENT DISCLOSURES OF  
 THE NATURE NOTED BY THE CHAIRMAN. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY,  
 NO REPEAT NO PUBLIC INFORMATION RELEASE WILL BE MADE OF:

- A. SAM SIGHTINGS.
- B. FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT LOSSES TO SAM.
- C. EVASIVE MEASURES, TECHNIQUES, OR TECHNICAL  
 EQUIPMENT USED TO AVOID SAMs.
- D. THE TYPE MISSION AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN WHEN

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2121U T O P S E C R E T  
 LOST. ALL LOSSES, I.E., SAR, RESCAP, RECON AND OTHERS,  
 WILL BE INCLUDED IN TERM "AIRCRAFT LOST IN CONNECTION  
 WITH STRIKE OPERATIONS."

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

RR DCHX  
 DE YVNA 3887 2390222  
 ZNY 88888  
 R 272822Z AUG 66  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO DDNE/CG III MAF  
 BT

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR MAGGIE FIELDS FROM LEGON KRULAK CG, FMFPAC  
 VISIT TO WWPAC 28AUG-7SEP66 (1)

A. CG, FMFPAC 280422Z/AUG66 (8)

1. PARAGRAPH 20 (5) OF REFERENCE (A) INCLUDES BATTALION  
 DAYS REPORTING AS A DISCUSSION ITEM FOR THE SUBJECT TRIP. I  
 WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT THE PROBLEM, AS WE SEE IT HERE, FOR  
 YOUR THINKING PRIOR TO MY VISIT.

2. ON 12 JULY 1966 CINCPAC HELD A CONFERENCE ON GROUND  
 OPERATIONS REPORTING. THIS CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY  
 REPRESENTATIVES OF JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, AND THIS  
 HEADQUARTERS. IT WAS THEN THAT THE FORMATS WERE  
 DEVELOPED FOR THE PRESENT GROUND OPER-5 SYSTEM IMPL-  
 MENTED BY CINCPAC ON 31 JULY.

3. ONCONSIDERABLE INTEREST AT THE CINCPAC CONFERENCE  
 WERE THE DEFINITIONS OF LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS AND

PAGE 2 YVNA 3887 S E C R E T

BATTALION DAYS OF OPERATIONS. THESE ARE QUOTED AS:

"LARGE UNIT OPERATION - A BATTALION SIZE OPERATION  
 OR ONE INVOLVING THREE OR MORE COMPANIES OF LINE TROOPS  
 (ARVN, RF, PF, CIDG, RANGERS, AIRBORNE, MARINES OR  
 ARMOR) WHICH THE REPORTING UNIT CONTROLLED."

BATTALION DAYS OF OPERATIONS - THE NUMBER OF DAYS  
 A BATTALION IS ON AN OPERATION OR A FIGURE OBTAINED BY  
 DIVIDING THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES EMPLOYED IN A LARGE  
 UNIT OPERATION BY THREE AND MULTIPLYING THE RESULT BY  
 THE NUMBER OF DAYS THE OPERATIONS LASTED."

4. A FIRST IMPRESSION IS THAT THE BATTALION DAYS  
 PROBLEM IS PRINCIPALLY A DRILL IN SEMANTICS AND DEFIN-  
 ITIONS; THAT IS THE WAY I FEEL. NEVERTHELESS, IT COULD  
 BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT; POSSIBLY EVEN AFFECTING  
 APPROPRIATIONS AND FORCE LEVELS.

5. ONE PROBLEM, WHERE WE ARE CONCERNED, SEEMS TO BE  
 JUST WHICH UNITS EMPLOYED ON A NAMED OPERATION DO WE  
 COUNT IN ARRIVING AT THE BATTALION DAYS OF OPERATIONS  
 FIGURE. ANOTHER, AND PERHAPS A MORE SIGNIFICANT  
 FACTOR, IS JUST WHICH OPERATIONS SHOULD BE REPORTED

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**SECRET**

PAGE 3 YVNA 3887 S E C R E T

AS NAMED OPERATIONS. ARMY UNITS PURPORTEDLY COUNT ONLY BATTALION DAYS FOR OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THEIR TACTICAL AREAS; HOWEVER, THEIR TACTICAL AREAS ARE VERY SMALL BY COMPARISON WITH OURS. ADDITIONALLY, WE NOTE THAT THE ARMY IS COUNTING RICE HARVEST SECURITY, ROUTE CLEARING, ROUTE SECURITY, SEARCH AND CLEAR, BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND SOME RECONNAISSANCE AS LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS, WHILE THE MAJORITY OF OUR LARGE UNIT REPORTING HAS BEEN CONFINED TO SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS.

6. AT PRESENT WE ARE REPORTING A MUCH GREATER NUMBER OF SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS THAN IS THE ARMY. IN THIS WE HAVE A GREAT ADVANTAGE, SINCE WE CAN OPERATE BY AND REPORT ON FIRE TEAMS, WHILE THE SMALLEST ARMY UNIT IS THE SQUAD. THIS RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO SURRENDER THE ADVANTAGE WE HAVE IN REPORTING SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS, BY COMBINING SOME OF THE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS WE NOW REPORT INTO BATTALION DAYS FOR THE PARENT BATTALIONS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, IT SEEMS THAT THE THINGS WE NEED TO

PAGE 4 YVNA 3887 S E C R E T

STUDY ARE:

A. THE UNITS TO BE CONSIDERED IN BATTALION DAYS REPORTING; WHETHER WE SHOULD REPORT FOR BATTALIONS IN RESERVE, RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS, TANK BATTALIONS, ETC; AS WELL AS THE ACTIVELY ENGAGED INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

B. WHETHER THERE IS JUSTIFICATION FOR, OR WISDOM IN, INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NAMED OPERATIONS.

C. WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE OR PROPER TO INCREASE BATTALION DAYS OPERATION BY COMBINING ACTIONS PRESENTLY REPORTED AS SMALL UNIT ACTIONS AND REPORTING THEM AS BATTALION SIZED OPERATIONS.

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**SECRET**

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