

OUTGOING MESSAGES

1. CG III MAF 021202ZAug66 (CONFIDENTIAL) *gp-4*
Personal for Gen. WESTMORELAND from LtGen. WALT
Subj: AN HOA Industrial Complex, *unpacking material*
2. CG III MAF 031314ZAug66 (CONFIDENTIAL) *gp-4*
Personal for Adm. HYLAND from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Repose Operating Schedule
- ~~3. CG III MAF 040036ZAug66 (UNCLAS)
Personal for Gen. WESTMORELAND from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Delivery of U. S. Mail~~
4. CG III MAF 060016ZAug66 (SECRET) *gp-4*
SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Fixed Wing Sorties Rate Per Bn. in HASTING
5. CG III MAF 060842ZAug66 (SECRET) *gp - not shown*
SPECAT Exclusive Readdressal of CG FMAWC51246ZAug66 to
Personal for LtGen. KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Control of Marine Corps Air OPs in SVN
- ~~6. CG III MAF 101212ZAug66 (SECRET)
Exclusive for LtGen. KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Verbal briefing given Gen. WESTMORELAND by LtCol BELL, 4/4 on
28 July 1966 in the HASTINGS area~~
- ~~7. CG III MAF 101206ZAug66 (TOP SECRET) *Removed, placed in TS folder*
SPECAT Exclusive for Gen. GREENE, LtGen. KRULAK from MajGen. FIELDS
Subj: Complete Texts of Messages from Gen. WESTMORELAND in Hanoi
to LtGen. ROSEN in Saigon~~
- ~~8. CG III MAF 204426ZAug66 (SECRET)
SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. KRULAK from MajGen. FIELDS
Subj: KANGHAI FORCE~~
- ~~9. CG III MAF 250726ZAug66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
Personal for LtGen. LEE from MajGen. FIELDS
Subj: Reschedule of Ceremony~~
10. CG III MAF 271124ZAug66 (CONFIDENTIAL) - *gp-4*
Personal for LtGen. KRULAK from MajGen. FIELDS
Subj: County Fairs
- ~~11. CG III MAF 290216ZAug66 (SECRET)
Personal for LtGen. KRULAK from MajGen. FIELDS
Subj: Gen. WESTMORELAND visit 27 August~~

OUTGOING MESSAGES

12. CG III MAF 301500ZAug66 (CONFIDENTIAL) *gp-4*
Personal for Gen. WESTMORELAND from MajGen. FIELDS
Subj: Platoon, Co B, 501th MP Bn
13. CG III MAF 280038ZAug66 (CONFIDENTIAL) READD of CG III MAF 271121ZAug66 *gp-4*
Personal for MajGens. ROBERTSHAW and KYLE BGen. STILES
Subj: County Fairs

279

44

271124Z AUG

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

1 3

2-3 3

CG III MAF 271124Z

2F

READD BY CG III MAF TO FMAW
1ST MARDIV
3RD MARDIV

AS: 280058Z

271124Z AUG

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:
1ST MARDIV: 28/1018H
1ST MAW: 28/1002H
3RD MARDIV: 28/1005H

HAS BEEN SENT

SKI -
FILE !
Σ

#13

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUMNMF 046 2400038

ZNY CCCCC

O 280038Z AUG 66

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MAW

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG THIRD MARDIV

O 271124Z AUG 66

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION ONE OF TWO
PERSONAL FOR MAJGENS ROBERTSHAW AND KYLE AND BGEN STILES
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN FIELDS

A. CG FMFPAC 261832Z AUG 66

B. CG III MAF 020712Z APR 66 (NOTAL)

1. VERY FEW OF THE CRITICISMS OF III MAF COUNTY FAIRS QUOTED IN
REFERENCE (A) HAVE ANY VALIDITY. MOST OF THE ACCUSATIONS ARE
INACCURATE OR DELIBERATELY MISLEADING. COMMENTS BELOW ARE
PROVIDED ON STATEMENTS IN THE QUOTED MEMO IN THE ORDER THEY
APPEAR.

2. TO DEFINE COUNTY FAIRS AS QUOTE A METHOD OF STRIKING AT LOCAL
GUERRILLAS AND INTERFERING WITH THE OPERATION OF THE COMMUNIST
POLITICAL APPARATUS UNQUOTE IS TO MISS THE POINT. FIRST AND
MOST SUCCESSFULLY, THESE OPERATIONS UPROOT AND DESTROY THE
HAMLET POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE. SECONDLY THEY
PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR GVN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
OFFICIALS TO BEGIN CIVIC ACTION AND INDOCTRINATION ON GVN

PAGE 2 RUMNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

OBJECTIVES FOR THE PEOPLE. THIS LATTER IS DONE VIA THE BEST
POSSIBLE MEDIUM -FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION.

3. THE STATEMENT THAT THE ASSEMBLY AREA IS QUOTE PERHAPS 2
OR 3 KM UNQUOTE FROM THE HAMLET IS ENTIRELY ERRONEOUS. THE
PEOPLE ARE ALWAYS ASSEMBLED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE
HAMLET, IN THE MOST COMFORTABLE AREA THAT CAN BE FOUND.

4. THE ASSEMBLY AREA IS NORMALLY DEFINED BY A SINGLE OR
DOUBLE STRAND OF BARBED WIRE. TO DESCRIBE THIS AS A QUOTE
BARBED WIRE ENCLOSURE UNQUOTE IS MISLEADING.

5. REGARDING THE LACK OF A LATRINE ON THE TWO OCCASIONS
WITNESSED BY THE DEPONENT IT CAN ONLY BE STATED THAT THE
VILLAGERS ARE PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE ENCLOSURE TO ANSWER
CALLS OF NATURE. LATRINES HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AND ARE
FREQUENTLY NOT USED, DUE TO THE SIMPLE FACT THAT THE MORE
BACKWARD VILLAGERS HAVE NEVER LEARNED TO USE A LATRINE. THUS
NO HARDSHIP IS IMPOSED, AND THE BEGINNING OF EDUCATION ON
HYGIENE IS FREQUENTLY THE COUNTY FAIR ITSELF.

6. FRESH WATER HAS NEVER BEEN LACKING AT A COUNTY FAIR,
ALTHOUGH IT HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN DIFFICULT TO BRING IN. AT
THAN QUIET (BT 053635) FOR EXAMPLE, WATER WAS A PROBLEM BECAUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUNNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

OF TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES. IT DID ARRIVE BY 1600 ON 26 APRIL (THE FIRST DAY) HOWEVER, AND DRINKING WATER WAS PROVIDED FROM LOCAL WELLS BY CARRYING PARTIES PRIOR TO THAT TIME.

7. APPREHENSION ON THE PART OF VILLAGERS FOR PERSONAL BELONGINGS IS SOMETIMES JUSTIFIED--A FACT OF LIFE REGARDING MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS IN VN. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT THE VN TROOPS WITH WHOM COUNTY FAIRS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED HAVE IMPROVED STEADILY IN RESPECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY. FOR EXAMPLE, CO 51ST ARVN REGT HAS

CONSTANTLY FOUGHT TO ELIMINATE PILTERAGE. IN ADDITION, ONE PERSON FROM EACH HOUSEHOLD IS PERMITTED TO REMAIN IN EACH DWELLING DURING THE INITIAL SWEEP OF THE AREA BY VN TROOPS. THIS SEEMS TO HELP ESTABLISH THE IDEA THAT THE BELONGINGS IN EACH HOUSE ARE A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE PEOPLE, AND IMPRESSES THE MEMBERS OF THE CLEARING FORCE TO SOME EXTENT.

8. VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SHOWN INCREASING SYMPATHY TOWARD THE PEOPLE. THE BETTER DISTRICT CHIEFS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED BY COUNTY FAIRS TO DISCUSS GRIEVANCES WITH VILLAGERS AND TO TRY TO CORRECT ABUSES.

9. REGIONAL FORCE AND OTHER SOLDIERS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY TREATED

PAGE 4 RUNNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PEOPLE HARSHLY ON OCCASION. THE COMMANDERS WITH WHOM WE DEAL ARE CONSTANTLY STRIVING TO PREVENT SUCH ACTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN MANY CASES THE VN FORCE IS LENIENT TO THE POINT OF ACCEPTING ANY EXCUSE FROM THE VILLAGER FOR REMAINING IN HIS DWELLING, THUS FAILING, IN SOME CASES, TO SEPARATE VILLAGER FROM VC.

10. ENTERTAINMENT OF SEVERAL TYPES IS ALWAYS PROVIDED; FREQUENTLY A MARINE BAND IS A PART OF THE PROGRAM. THEY ALWAYS BEGIN WITH THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ANTHEM, WHICH CONSTITUTES A FIRST LESSON IN CITIZENSHIP AS THE VN AND US MILITARY STAND AT ATTENTION. WHILE IT IS FULLY REALIZED THAT WESTERN MUSIC IS STRANGE TO ORIENTAL EARS, WE HAVE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SHOW IS APPRECIATED FOR ITS NOVELTY, AND SUCCEEDS IN DISTRACTING THE PEOPLE FROM THEIR WORRIES AND DESPAIR. THE BULK OF ENTERTAINMENT AT COUNTY FAIRS IS ALWAYS VIETNAMESE, AND IT IS SOMETIMES LIVE.

11. THE STATEMENT QUOTE THERE IS NO FOLLOW-UP UNQUOTE IS ERRONEOUS. WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY LIKE TO LEAVE A PF PLATOON IN EACH LOCATION FOLLOWING THE OPERATION, BUT THIS IS OF COURSE IMPOSSIBLE. WHAT IS DONE IS ESTABLISHMENT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 5 RUNNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONTACT THROUGH MEDCAP AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WHICH CONTINUE IN THE LOCALITY. FURTHER, THE CONTACT WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUES EXCEPT IN THE HARDEST CORE HAMLETS WHERE CONTINUED CONTACT REQUIRES MILITARY PROTECTION. IN APPROPRIATE CASES SUCH HAMLETS HAVE HAD ADDITIONAL CLEARING OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF INFORMATION ENGENDERED DURING COUNTY FAIRS.

12. THE ACCUSATION THAT QUOTE LITTLE REFINEMENT AND PRE-PLANNING UNQUOTE EXISTS IS HIGHLY ERRONEOUS. DURING THE MONTHS THESE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED THE US/GVN PLANNING AND COOPERATION INVOLVED HAS BEEN ONE OF THE BRIGHTEST SPOTS IN THE WAR. THE OPERATIONS ARE SUPPORTED FROM THE CIVIC ACTION SIDE WITH UTMOST EFFICIENCY, AND ON THE MILITARY SIDE WITH DISPATCH AND EFFECTIVENESS THAT HAS PAID OFF IN PROVABLE AND TANGIBLE RESULTS, WHICH ARE ENUMERATED BELOW.

13. THAT THESE OPERATIONS CONSTITUTE AN QUOTE INCONVENIENCE UNQUOTE FOR THE PEOPLE IS HELD IRRELEVANT IN VIEW OF THE NECESSITY FOR UPROOTING VC INFRASTRUCTURE. THE INCONVENIENCE IS RESENTED TO LESSER EXTENT THAN MIGHT BE IMAGINED. MEDCAP, FOR EXAMPLE IS UNIVERSELLY ACCEPTED AND APPRECIATED, BY

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUMNMF 047 2400058

ZNY CCCCC

O 280238Z AUG 66

FM CG I I I MAF

TO CG FIRST MAF

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG THIRD MARDIV

O 271124Z AUG 66

FM CG I I I MAF

TO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF TWO
PERSONAL FOR MAJGENS ROBERTSHAW AND KYLE AND BGEN STILES
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN FIELDS,
AND LEADS TO FOLLOW-ON CONTACTS.

14. THE GRATUITOUS SLUR TO THE EFFECT THAT COUNTY FAIR'S QUOTE
MAY BE A MINOR ANNOYANCE TO THE VC UNQUOTE IS BEST ANSWERED
BY THE VC THEMSELVES (REFERENCE (B), A CAPTURED DOCUMENT PASEP)
AND BY THE STATISTICS.

15. IT IS NOT BELIEVED APPROPRIATE TO COMMENT AT LENGTH ON
HAMLET FESTIVALS EXCEPT TO POINT OUT THAT THE ELABORATE
PREPARATIONS DESCRIBED MUST ELIMINATE THE INGREDIENT OF SURPRISE
WHICH I I I MAF HAS FOUND NECESSARY IF VCs ARE TO BE CAUGHT, BY ANY
TYPE OF OPERATION.

16. RESULTS OF COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS CONDUCTED THROUGH
26 AUGUST 1966:

A. NR CONDUCTED-54

B. VC KIA -124

I I I MAF 2100/1

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PAGE 2 RUMNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. VC KIA (PROB) -5

D. VC MIA (PROB) -10

E. VCS - 166

F. VCS DETAINED - 333

G. ARVN DESERTERS CAPTURED - 3

H. WPNS CAPTURED, INDICES - 2000

I. PERSONS SCREENED - 3,615

J. CHIEU HOI'S - 2

K. LBS OF RICE DISTRIBUTED - 8,049

L. USMC CASUALTIES - 1 KIA, 10 MIA

M. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS NOTED:

13-15MAR 66 NR 9-2 1597 PERSONS SCREENED

12-14JUL 66 NR 1-6 25 VCC CAPTURED,

14-16JUL 66 NR 1-7 1118 PERSONS SCREENED.

16JUL 66 NR 5-4 76 VCS DETAINED.

13-15JUL 66 NR 1-3 1700 CAPTURED.

9-12AUG 66 NR 1-9 21ND WPNS CAPTURED.

20AUG 66 NR 5-5 THIS OPN PLUS RECENT DETECTION OF 7 VC
GUERRILLAS AND EVN PLANS FOR LOCAL DEF
FORCE AND DEF STRUCTURES HAVE THOROUGHLY

PAGE 3 RUMNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHAKEN THE LOCAL VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND
RENDERED IT RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE.

17. CONCLUSIONS CONTAINED HEREIN ARE BASED ON OBSERVATIONS BY
OFFICERS WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN SP COUNTY FAIRS. WE HAVE BEEN
UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT SPECIFIC COUNTY FAIRS ARE DEFERRED TO IN

REF A.

RESPECTFULLY, JEFF

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

289

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301500Z

AUG 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

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2-~~1~~

3

CG III MAF

301500Z

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HAS BEEN SENT

301500Z

AUG 66

PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS: PRIORITY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION: 31/0022H

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMSMA RUMNVH
DE RUMNMF 314 2421500
ZNY CCCCC
P 301500Z AUG 66
FM CG CII MAF/SA ICTZ
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
INFO RUMNVH/CO I CORPS ADV GRU
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
SUBJ: PLATOON, CO B, 504TH MP BN
A. COMUSMACV 060610Z AUG
B. MY 151614Z AUG

1. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RELEASE OF PLATOON CO B 504TH MPBN TO PARENT COMPANY PLEIKU, O/A 5SEP66. REF B CONTAINS MY COMMENTS AND STRONG RECOMMENDATION TO CONTINUE ASSIGNMENT THIS PLATOON TO DANANG AND HUE INDEFINITELY. NO FURTHER OFFICIAL INFORMATION HAS REACHED THIS HQS.
2. PLATOON COMMANDER AND MP DETACHMENT DEPARTING 31 AUG FROM HUE TO RENDEZVOUS WITH DANANG DETACHMENT ENROUTE TO PLEIKU BASED ON ORDERS OF THE 504TH MP BN. NO CO COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN FURNISHED THIS HQS DIRECTING THIS PREMATURE ACTION.
3. REMARKS CONTAINED REF B STILL VALID. IN ADDITION POSSIBILITY OF

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 314 C O N F I D E N T I A L
VC TERRORISM IN THESE TWO LARGE METROPOLITAIN AREAS MAKE IT UNWISE TO REDUCE OR SHIFT MP FORCES AT THIS UNFORTUNATE TIME. LIMITED III MAF MP RESOURCES ARE TOTALLY COMMITTED TO AIRBASE DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF OTHER CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS AND CONTROL OF MACV POW COMPOUND. REMAINDER PROVIDES MINIMAL MP FUNCTIONS IN DANANG AND POPULATED AREAS OF OTHER IAGRS. RESPECTFULLY, FIELDS.
GP-4
BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

4/2

275

007

271124

AUG 66

7

CG 111 MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

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~~2~~

CG 111 MAF

271124Z AUG 66

[Handwritten Signature]

280720

HAS BEEN SENT

271124Z

AUG 66

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUNNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L
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25 APRIL (THE FIRST DAY) HOWEVER, AND DRINKING WATER WAS
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BELONGINGS IS SOMETIMES JUSTIFIED--A FACT OF LIFE REGARDING
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NOTED THAT THE VN TROOPS WITH WHOM COUNTY FAIRS HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTED HAVE IMPROVED STEADILY IN RESPECTING PRIVATE
PROPERTY. FOR EXAMPLE, CO DIST ARVN REGT HAS
CONSTANTLY FOUGHT TO ELIMINATE PILFERAGE. IN ADDITION, ONE
PERSON FROM EACH HOUSEHOLD IS PERMITTED TO REMAIN IN EACH
DWELLING DURING THE INITIAL ENTER OF THE AREA BY VN TROOPS.
THIS SEEMS TO HELP ESTABLISH THE IDEA THAT THE BELONGINGS
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PAGE 4 RUNNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L
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FROM VC.
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FREQUENTLY A MARINE BAND IS A PART OF THE PROGRAM. THEY
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CONSTITUTES A FIRST LESSON IN CITIZENSHIP AS THE VN AND US
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WESTERN MUSIC IS STRANGE TO ORIENTAL EARS, WE HAVE AMPLE
EVIDENCE THAT THE SHOW IS APPRECIATED FOR ITS NOVELTY, AND
SUCCEEDS IN DISTRACTING THE PEOPLE FROM THEIR WORRIES AND DESPAIR.
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AND IT IS SOMETIMES LIVE.
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PLATOON IN EACH LOCATION FOLLOWING THE OPERATION, BUT THIS
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PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 5 RUMNWF DES C O N F I D E N T I A L
CONTACT THROUGH WEDCAP AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WHICH
CONTINUE IN THE LOCALITY. FURTHER, THE CONTACT WITH GOVERN-
MENT OFFICIALS CONTINUES EXCEPT IN THE HARDEST CORE HANLEYS
WHERE CONTINUED CONTACT REQUIRES MILITARY PROTECTION. IN
APPROPRIATE CASES SUCH HANLEYS HAVE HAD ADDITIONAL CLEARING
OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF INFORMATION EMERGED DURING
COUNTY FAIRS.

12. THE ACCUSATION THAT QUOTE LITTLE EFFORT AND PLAN-
PLANNING UNQUOTE EXISTS IS HIGHLY SPURIOUS. OVER THE
MONTHS THESE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED THE
PLANNING AND COOPERATION INVOLVED HAS BEEN ONE OF THE BRIGHTEST
SPOTS IN THE WAR. THE OPERATIONS ARE SUPPORTED FROM THE CIVIC
ACTION SIDE WITH VIGOROUS EFFICACY, AND ON THE MILITARY SIDE
WITH DISPATCH AND EFFECTIVENESS THAT HAS PAID OFF IN PROVABLE
AND TANGIBLE RESULTS, WHICH ARE ENUMERATED BELOW.

13. THAT THESE OPERATIONS CONSTITUTE AN QUOTE INCONVENIENCE
UNQUOTE FOR THE PEOPLE IS FULLY IRRELEVANT IN VIEW OF THE NECESSITY
FOR UPROOTING VC INFRASTRUCTURE. THE INCONVENIENCE
IS RESSENT TO LESSER EXTENT THAN MIGHT BE IMAGINED.
WEDCAP, FOR EXAMPLE IS UNIVERSEALLY ACCEPTED AND APPRECIATED.
BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

VV NFFGSS

OO RUMLEP
DE RUMUMF 026 208124
ZNY 00000
O 271124Z AUG 66
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMLEP/CG FMIPAC
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L. FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS
PERSONAL FOR LITER KILLER FROM HAPPED FIELDS
AND LEADS TO FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS.

14. THE GRATUITIOUS SLUR TO THE EFFECT THAT COUNTY FAIRS QUOTE
MAY BE A MINOR ANNOYANCE TO THE VC WHOSE IS BEST ANSWERED
BY THE VC THEMSELVES (REFERENCE 09), A CAPTURED DOCUMENT PAPER
AND BY THE STATISTICS.

15. IT IS NOT BELIEVED APPROPRIATE TO COMMENT AT LENGTH ON
HAMLET FESTIVALS EXCEPT TO POINT OUT THAT THE ELABORATE
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WHICH III MAF HAS FOUND NECESSARY TO VC ARE TO BE CAUGHT, BY ANY
TYPE OF OPERATION.

16. RESULTS OF COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS CONDUCTED THROUGH

- 26 AUGUST 1966:
- A. NR CONDUCTED - 54
- B. VC KIA - 124

PAGE 2 RUMUMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- C. VC KIA (PROP) - 5
- D. VC KIA (PROB) - 12
- E. VCS - 165
- F. VCS DETAINED - 335
- G. ARVN DESERTERS CAPTURED - 3
- H. WPNS CAPTURED, 100/00 - 36/0
- I. PERSONS SCREENED - 3,615
- J. CHILD HOI'S - 2
- K. LBS OF RICE DISTRIBUTED - 3,848
- L. USMC CASUALTIES - 1 KIA, 10 MIA
- M. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS #0100:

- 13-15MARG 66 NR 5-4 1877 PERSONS SCREENED
- 12-14MAY 66 NR 1-6 10,500 CAPTURED.
- 14-16JUL 66 NR 1-7 1110 PERSONS SCREENED.
- 16JUL 66 NR 5-4 13,700 DETAINED.
- 18-19JUL 66 NR 1-3 1700 CAPTURED.
- 9-12AUG 66 NR 1-9 1400 WPNS CAPTURED.
- 24AUG 66 NR 5-5 THIS OPV PLAN REVEAL DEFECTION OF 1 VC
SUBVERTING AN GVN PLAN FOR LOCAL DEF
FORCE AND DEF STRUCTURES HAVE THOROUGHLY

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUNNMF 026 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHAKEN THE LOCAL VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND
RENDERED IT RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE.

17. CONCLUSIONS CONTAINED HEREIN ARE BASED ON OBSERVATIONS BY
OFFICERS WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN 10 COUNTY FIRMS. WE HAVE BEEN
UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT SPECIFIC COUNTY FIRMS ARE REFERRED TO IN
REF A.

RESPECTFULLY, JEFF

GP-4

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

R IMMEDIATE

CCN: 373

060 112 Z
LOEN KRUIAN OF VMPAC
PERSONAL

s/s

R. S. SUTTER

01 PMAN

051214Z

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY • CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS AIR OPS IN SVN (U)


060842Z
051246Z

AUG

CG FMAW

EXCLUSIVE

RECEIPT



CG FMAW

051246Z


1&2

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070640

NOTE: READD BY CG III MAF AS 060842Z



SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

051246Z

AUG

SECRET

O 450842Z
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
O R 051246Z
FM CG FNAW
TO CG NINTH MAJ
CG FMFPAC (FMDD)
INFO CG III MAF
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS AIR OPS IN SVN (U)
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE, AND LTGEN
WALT FROM MAGGEN ROBERTSHAW.

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FURNISHED FOR YOUR POSSIBLE USE IN
YOUR FORTH COMING VISIT TO MACV HEADQUARTERS IN SAIGON.

2. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE COMMANDER
III AF, LTGEN MONYER, HAS UNDERTAKEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE,
POSITIVE MEASURES TO ALTER EXISTING COMMAND/CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS
WHICH VITALLY EFFECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AVIATION WITHIN I
CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

3. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 CAREFULLY SPELLS OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE III MAF COMMANDER IN THE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION
OF MARINE AVIATION OPERATING IN SVN WITHIN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.
ANNEX B TO THIS DIRECTIVE DIRECTS CG III MAF TO: QUOTE CONDUCT
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT, INTERDICTION, RECONNAISSANCE, MAINTENANCE OF AIR
SUPERIORITY, AIR TRANSPORT, AND OTHER SUPPLEMENTAL AIR SUPPORT AS
REQUIRED UNQUOTE. THIS DIRECTIVE FURTHER STATES THAT THE MARINE
CORPS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM QUOTE WILL, EXERCISE POSITIVE
CONTROL OVER ALL USMC AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF MARINE CORPS
OPERATIONS AND OVER OTHER AIRCRAFT AS MAY BE ASSIGNED IN SUPPORT
OF SUCH OPERATIONS UNQUOTE.

4. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DIRECTIVE HAVE PERMITTED THE CONDUCT
OF MARINE AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR WELL
ESTABLISHED AND TIME PROVEN DOCTRINE. IT APPEARS THAT LTGEN MONYER
IS DETERMINED TO CHANGE ALL THIS.

5. A ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT ACTIONS FOLLOWS:

A. ON 23 JULY I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HQM WHICH INDICATED HE NO LONGER DESIRED THE TWO MARINE F4U AIRCRAFT ON I-5 MESSAGES ALERT WHICH HAVE AUGMENTED THE AIR FORCE'S AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AT DANANG. THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN REQUESTED SINCE THAT AFTER. THIS FACT MAY NOT APPEAR SIGNIFICANT BY ITSELF, BUT, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HIS OTHER ACTIONS, INDICATES THE DESIRE IS TO LIMIT MARINE CORPS AIR PARTICIPATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

B. ON THE EVENING OF 4 AUG, MAJ GEN HANCOCK, CIG OF I CORPS PASS, CALLED TO ADVISE THAT AIR FORCE OF AIRCRAFT WHICH HAVE BEEN USED AS FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS (ARCS) FOR MARINE AIR STRIKES WOULD NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE FOR COORDINATING MARINE STRIKES AGAINST PREPLANNED TARGETS IN I CORPS WHICH WERE OUTSIDE OF MARINE ZONES. THIS RESTRICTION IS TO APPLY ONLY TO THOSE AIR STRIKES WHICH ARE PLANNED AND MANAGED BY THE REAR AND FRONT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT. AIR FORCE OF-100(A)'S WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE TO CONTROL MARINE STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS OUTSIDE OUR TACOS WHICH ARE PLANNED AND COORDINATED BY THE AF ELEMENTS. THE SOURCE OF THE DIRECTIVE WAS IDENTIFIED AS MAJ GEN MONROE.

C. ON THE NIGHT OF 4 AUG I CALLED GEN MONROE TO VERIFY THAT IN FACT THE TWO AIRCRAFT WERE BEING REDIRECTED IN OUR SUPPORT. HE VERIFIED THIS, BUT DID AGREE THAT THE SUPPORT SHOULD BE PERMITTED FOR ANOTHER 300 DAYS IN ORDER FOR US TO DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CONTROL.

6. I FEEL THAT GEN MONROE IS PURSUING THE AIR FORCE PETARD THAT THE ORIGIN OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS IS EXCLUSIVELY AN AIR FORCE RESPONSIBILITY REGARDLESS OF THE SERVICE SOURCE OF THE AIR OPERATIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE OF THE SERVICE INVOLVED. COORDINATING MARINE AIR STRIKES TO OUR VERY LIMITED TACOS WOULD RELEASE MANY MORE SORTIES TO THE AIR FORCE FOR COORDINATION AND FOR THEIR USE. THIS IS HIS FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION. THE PORTION OF MACV COM 95-4 QUOTED ABOVE IS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO RESIST THE INTRUDE THE AIR FORCE ARE ATTEMPTING. MOREOVER, I FEEL HE IS JUSTIFIED THAT ALL STRIKES ARE UNDER I-5 CORPS BE CONSIDERED AS VITAL TO THE DEFENSE OF OUR COMBAT BASES, AND FOR THE SUPPORT OF OUR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. TO RESTRICT US TO THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF AIR STRIKES TO ONLY OUR TACOS

WOULD BE TO SEVERELY LIMIT OUR AIR/GROUND CAPABILITY, AND IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY PRESCRIBED BY MACV 95-4.

7. MACV 95-4 IS WRITTEN TO SUPPORT OUR AIR/GROUND ORGANIZATIONS AND OUR DOCTRINE.

8. THESE SUBJECTS MAY COME UP FOR DISCUSSION DURING YOUR SCHEDULED VISIT AT MACV HEADQUARTERS.

Doyle
DRAFTER: F. J. DOYLE, COL.
G-3 MOMENT 2

L. B. Robertson
RELEASEE: L. B. ROBERTSON, MAJGEN
COMMANDING GENERAL
MOMENT 6

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CG III MAF

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CG III MAF

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4 AUG 1966

S P E C I A L I N C L U S I V E

FROM: CG III MAF

060016Z

TO: CG CINCPAC

INFO: CG FIRST MAF

**SECRET FOR MARCORPS EYES ONLY. SPECIAL EXCEL FOR LTGEN KRULAK
FROM LTGEN WALK**

III MAF SORTIES (U)

- A. CG CINCPAC 250805Z JULY 66
- B. CINCPAC INST 005440.1E
- C. 1ST WING ORDER P3310.4 OF 22 MAY 66

1. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON FIXED WING VS ARMED HELO SUPPORT FOR OPR HASTINGS AND EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH LEVEL OF FIXED WING SUPPORT IN SORTIES/BN/DAY AND WITH ORD EXPEND RATE.

2. REF A ERRONEOUSLY STATED THAT THERE WERE 94 BATTALION-DAYS IN HASTING THRU 21 JUL. THERE WERE ACTUALLY 48 BN-DAYS THRU 21 JUL SUPPORTED BY 423 SORTIES FOR A RATE OF 8.8 SORTIES/BN/DAY. ALL JUL HASTING OPERATIONS INCLUDED 115 BN-DAYS WITH A TOTAL OF 1164 FIXED WING TACTICAL SORTIES FOR A RATE OF 10.1 SORT/BN/DAY.

3. IN JULY, 1052 ARMED HELO SORTIES WERE FLOWN FOR HASTINGS. THE MAJORITY OF THESE WERE HELO ESCORT. REF B DEFINES AN ARMED HELO ESCORT SORTIE AS ONE ACFT MAKING ONE TAKEOFF AND MOVEMENT TO A LZ WHETHER OR NOT A LANDING IS MADE. THE RETURN FLIGHT COUNTS AS ANOTHER SORTIE. EACH ADDNL LANDING AND TAKEOFF ON THE MISSION IS ANOTHER SORTIE. EACH HELO ON SUCH A MISSION RECEIVES CREDIT FOR AT LEAST TWO SORTIES AND POSSIBLY MORE IF ADDNL LANDINGS ARE MADE. THEREFORE THE NUMBER OF ARMED HELO SORTIES REPORTED REPRESENT AT LEAST TWO FOR EACH ACFT MISSION. APPROX ONE HALF OF THE REPORTED HELO SORTIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN COMPARING WITH SIMILAR FIXED WING SORTIES. EACH FIXED WING ACFT RECEIVES CREDIT FOR JUST ONE SORTIE PER MISSION. A BETTER INDEX OF HELO ACTIVITY IS TASKS.

4. A COMPARISON OF ORD EXPENDED BY FIXED WING AND BY ARMED HELOS ILLUSTRATES THE COMPARATIVE COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED. FOR HASTINGS IN JUL, FIXED WING ACFT DELIVERED 1176 TONS OF BOMBS, NAPS AND ROCKETS; ARMED HELOS DELIV 6.2 TONS OF ROCKETS. IT IS OVVIOUS THAT DEL OF ORD WAS ASSIGNED TO FIXED WING ALMOST ENTIRELY. ARMED HELOS WERE NOT USED AS SUBSTITUTE FOR ATTACK AIRCRAFT.

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FOR MARCORPS EYES ONLY

5. CONSIDER ARMED HELOS AND FIXED WING ACFT PROPERLY UTILIZED IN HASTINGS WITHIN CONSIDERATIONS OF ACFT AVAIL ON-CALL AND URGENCY OF REQUEST. ARMED HELO CAN DELIVER VERY LIMITED SUPPRESSIVE FIREPOWER AND ARE NOT USED WHEN HEAVY ORD IS CALLED FOR. ARMED HELOS DO PERFORM CERTAIN CLOSE ESCORT AND TAC(A) TASKS LESS APPROPRIATE FOR FIXED WING. FIXED WING ESCORT OF HELOS IS EXTENSIVELY USED IN CONNECTION WITH ESCORT BY ARMED HELOS AS CALLED FOR IN REF C. RELATIVELY LITTLE ORD IS EXPENDED ON HELO ESCORT SORTIES. ARMED HELOS ARE USED FOR CLOSE-IN SUPPRESSIVE FIRE THROUGHOUT LANDINGS BUT PREPPING LZ'S, CAS, DAS AND ATTACK COVER ARE PERFORMED BY FIXED WING ACFT (REF C).

6. FIXED WING SORTIES RATE PER BN IN HASTING IS HIGHEST YET FOR ANY OPER. CONSIDER PRESENT USE OF ARMED HELO AND FIXED WING TO BE APPROACHING PROPER BALANCE. INDICATIONS ARE THAT 24 UH-1E'S SHOULD BE RETAINED IN EACH WMO SQUADRON IN ADDITION TO THE OV-10/ O-1C ACFT PLANNED FOR EACH WING.

7. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES FOR JULY WERE:

15
10.1

<u>BOMB</u>	<u>NUMBER AUTH TO EXPEND JULY</u>	<u>NUMBER AUTH TO EXPEND PLUS JUNE CARRY OVER</u>	<u>NUMBER EXPENDED</u>
MK 81	8,832	10,974	7,416
MK 77/79	1,250	1,721	1,319
MK 82	5,070	5,743	5,787
ARM 64	1,366	2,166	1,499
MK 83	1,579	2,007	1,754

LOW INVENTORIES OF SELECTED MUNITIONS DURING JUNE AND EARLY JULY REQUIRED CONSERVATION OF ASSETS. EARLY JULY EXPENDITURES WERE REDUCED Awaiting OFFLOADING AND DISTRIBUTION OF MUNITIONS RECEIVED FIRST TWO WEEKS JULY. THE ABOVE FIGURES INDICATE THAT OUR WEAPONING AND MANAGEMENT METHODS ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. POSITIVE MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN TO MATCH AUTH EXPEND. THIS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT DURING THE NEXT MONTHS OCT-JAN. ACFT LOADINGS WILL BE AT MAX COMPATIBLE WITH OPER CONDITIONS.

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FOR MARCORPS EYES ONLY

8. WITH ADEQUATE STOCKS ON HAND AND HEAVY ENGAGEMENT OF HASTINGS, THE REQUIREMENT FOR ALLOCATED AVN ORD WAS CERTAINLY GENUINE. FURTHER, WE EXPECT TO GENERATE VALID DMEP SUPPORT TARGETS IN SUPT OF III MAF COUPLED WITH REGULAR OPS WHICH WILL RESULT IN EXPEND RATES JUSTIFYING OUR POSITION.

R.D.11

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PERSONAL FOR VADM HYLAND FROM LT GEN WALT
REPOSE OPERATING SCHEDULE
REF: CTF 73 27083 W JUL 66

1. THE ABSENCE OF HSS REPOSE FROM 25 AUG TO 7 SEP GIVES ME CAUSE FOR CONCERN.
2. AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE ONE MVA DIVISION IN I CORPS AND ANOTHER JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ. WE ALSO ARE AWARE OF THE VC/MVA DESIRE TO DISRUPT THE FORWARDING ELECTRONS. THE RESULT COULD BE ANOTHER HASTINGS AND REPOSE WOULD BE SOLELY NEEDED.

REGARDS, WLT
SP-4
BT

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CG III MAF

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CG III MAF

By Sgt D. L. Rose

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PERSONAL FOR GEN WESIM ORELAND FROM LG GEN WALT
AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
REF: YOUR 0113 02Z

1. APPRECIATE REF A. WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE AMBASSADOR LODGE VISIT AN HOA. ALSO THE PRIME MINISTER, AND MINISTER OF ECONOMY.
2. YOU WILL RECALL GEN LAN REMARKING LAST SUNDAY THAT THERE WAS PRESSURE IN SAIGON TO DIVERT EQUIPMENT earmarked FOR AN HOA TO OTHER USE. WE FOLLOWED THROUGH ON THIS. MR CAN SAYS THAT APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS AGO THE MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY INFORMED MR. KINH (ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL, AN HOA HONG SONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, SAIGON) THAT EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED FOR AN HOA WOULD BE DIVERTED TO CAN RANH AND BIEN HOA BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF SECURITY AT THE AN HOA COMPLEX. SINCE THAT TIME MR. KINH HAS TRIED TO OBTAIN FROM THE MINISTER OPERATING FUNDS FOR 1966 AND PRIORITY FOR THE SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT FROM SAIGON TO AN HOA. MR. CAN FURTHER STATED THE MINISTER HAS NOT AUTHORIZED THE SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT STATING THAT AN HOA COMPLEX IS STILL INSECURE. ADDITIONALLY, MR KINH HAS REQUESTED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS AUTHORIZATION TO USE FOREIGN SHIPS TO TRANSPORT THE EQUIPMENT FROM SAIGON

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PAGE TWO RUMMF 128
TO DA NANG, HOWEVER, THE MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY WILL NOT APPROVE THIS REQUEST DUE TO THE LACK OF FOREIGN FUNDS. THE EQUIPMENT CONSISTS OF MACHINERY AND SUPPLIES NECESSARY FOR THE INSTALLATION OF AN ELECTRICAL POWERHOUSE AND A NITROGEN FERTILIZER PLANT. TO DATE NO EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN DIVERTED.

3. THE STATEMENTS MADE BY MR. CAN HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY MR. LAN, MANAGER OF THE DA NANG OFFICE OF THE AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. MR LAN FURTHER STATED THAT MR. KINH IS PRESENTLY IN SAIGON AND WOULD MEET WITH THE MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY ON 1 AUGUST IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE 1966 OPERATING FUND AND AUTHORIZATION FOR SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT OR DETERMINE WHAT THE FUTURE OF THE COMPLEX WILL BE IF FUNDS AND EQUIPMENT ARE NOT MADE AVAILABLE.

4. MY CONCERN IN THIS MATTER IS NOT DELAY IN SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT BUT ITS DIVERSION. I REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE GREAT POTENTIAL OF AN HOA. I WOULD HATE TO SEE IT STYMIED FOR LACK OF EQUIPMENT ONCE SECURITY IS ASSURED. RESPECTFULLY, LEW.

GP-4
BT

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HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF

Subj: Visit of General WESTMORELAND to An Hoa

1. General WESTMORELAND was scheduled to visit An Hoa from 1100-1130 this date. He arrived at 1125, accompanied by General WALT, General LAM, Dr. CHI (Province Chief), his aide and Colonels HAMLIN and ROBERTS (Army).
2. General W[REDACTED] was briefed by Mr. CAN, and asked numerous questions. Mr. CAN stressed two of his major problems, priority of shipping from Saigon to Danang for his equipment; and his perennial one of draft deferments for his skilled workers. The General questioned Mr. CAN closely on these matters, and made individual notes on both. The extensive questions extended the briefing from 10-12 to over 35 minutes. Both Dr. CHI and General LAM participated in the discussions which occurred during the briefing.
3. General WESTMORELAND took additional time to make a brief tour of the area, including the diesel power plant and the industrial training classes.
4. On his departure, General WESTMORELAND made a little talk to Mr. CAN's people, and was obviously and genuinely impressed by the complex as a whole. He assured me as he left of his interest, and said he would press all he could for support of the complex in Saigon.
5. During the tour of the complex, following Mr. CAN's briefing, General WESTMORELAND asked me what forces I felt would be necessary to secure the Liberty Road after completion. My reply was that we intended to secure it by using the forces we are now using, elements of two Marine companies and part of 2/51st ARVN Battalion on the South side, and elements of two Marine companies of our 1st Battalion on the North side of the river.
6. A disturbing element arose during the briefing. General LAM indicated (if I understood him correctly) that some pressures were being exerted in Saigon to use some An Hoa earmarked equipment now there for projects elsewhere. I did not have an opportunity to discuss this with General WALT, so have raised the question in a memo to him, copy attached.

7. Overall reaction of General WESTMORELAND to his An Hoa exposure was, I believe, overwhelmingly favorable. He was visibly impressed, and did not depart until 12:30.

Respectfully,

Jim Barrett
J. J. BARRETT JR.

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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~~27~~ Jul 1966
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
MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer
To: Lieutenant General L. W. WALT

Subj: An Hoa visit of COMUSMACV

1. I was disturbed by some remarks made by General LAM at today's briefing of General WESTMORELAND, if I heard and understood General LAM correctly.
2. I may have misunderstood, but I got the impression that there are efforts being made in Saigon to divert some of the equipment and material destined for the An Hoa complex to other purposes. If I understood correctly, and General LAM's information is well founded, the effects on the An Hoa operation could be serious. These possible effects could include, although this is probably remote, adverse psychological effects on Mr. CAN himself. He is under tremendous pressures already.
3. Since there wasn't time to raise these fears with you at An Hoa, I thought I'd better use this method, just in case you heard General LAM the same way I did.
4. I felt General WESTMORELAND's visit was most successful; I know Mr. CAN was pleased to have him come, to exhibit the interest he did and to prove it by staying as long as he did.

Sincerely,


D. J. BARRETT JR.

HEADQUARTERS
I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP
Advisory Team #1
APO 96337

MACTN-IC

1 August 1966

SUBJECT: An Hoa Industrial Complex

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Walt
Senior Advisor

1. Per your instructions 30 July 1966, action was taken to verify the remarks presented by Mr. Can, Director of the An Hoa Industrial Complex to General Westmoreland and yourself on 28 July 1966 at the complex.
2. On 31 July 1966, Lt Col Becker, G-5 Advisor, I Corps contacted Mr. Can concerning shortage of equipment. Mr. Can stated that approximately six months ago the Minister of Economics informed Mr. Kinh, Administrator General, An Hoa Nong Son Industrial Complex, 31 Rue Han-Thuyen, Saigon, that equipment previously scheduled for the An Hoa complex would be diverted to Cam Ranh and Bien Hoa because of the lack of security at the An Hoa Industrial Complex. Since that time Mr. Kinh has tried to obtain from the Minister, operating funds for 1966 and priority for the shipment of equipment from Saigon to An Hoa. Mr. Can further stated the Minister has not authorized the shipment of equipment because the An Hoa Complex is still insecure. Additionally, Mr. Kinh has requested on numerous occasions, authorization to use foreign ships to transport the equipment from Saigon to Da Nang, however, the Minister of Economics, will not approve this request due to the lack of foreign funds.
3. The equipment consists of machinery, posts and supplies necessary for the installation of an electrical powerhouse and a nitrogen fertilizer plant. To date no equipment has been diverted.
4. The statements made by Mr. Can were confirmed by Mr. Lan, Manager of the Da Nang office of the An Hoa Industrial Complex. Mr Lan further stated that Mr Kinh is presently in Saigon and will meet with the Minister of Economics today in an attempt to obtain the 1966 operating fund and authorization for shipment of equipment or determine what the future of the complex will be if funds and equipment are not made available.
5. It is apparent that the Minister is apprehensive concerning the security of the An Hoa Industrial Complex.

A. L. Hamblen, Jr.
for
A. L. HAMBLÉN, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding