

III MAF PERINTREP #46, 11-17 Dec 66 (Probably dated 18 Dec 1966)  
NIF [NOT IN FILE]


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# III MAF DANANG, RVN

16 Oct 1966

# PERINTREP NO 37



III MAF PERINTREP #37

9-15 Oct 66

GROUP - 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Copy 104 of 150 Copies  
 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 160800H Oct 66  
 Ser: 0148166

PERINTREP No. 37

Period Covered: 090001 - 152400 Oct 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - VIETNAM 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,  
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The VC/NVA avoided large scale activity during the reporting period, while VC attacks on lines of communication increased and small scale attacks continued.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In QUANG TRI (P) contacts with NVA units in up to company strength were made on 12, 13 and 14 October in the area north of PHAN SON LAM - CAM LO. On 10 Oct ARVN units on a rice protection operation made contact with a VC/NVA company in the vicinity of (YD 397545) in THUA THIEN (P), a culvert was destroyed on Route 1 at (YD 806196), and two cars were derailed on the National Railroad in the vicinity of (YD 8714). On 12 October a bridge was destroyed at (ZD 127010) and 140 meters of track were destroyed at (ZD 161010). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. On 10 October a culvert was destroyed on Route 1 in southern QUANG NAM (P) at (BT 113497). On 13 October the THOUNG DUC CIDG Camp (ZC 143541) was attacked by VC in two company strength. Small scale activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. On 12 October an RF unit made contact with a VC platoon in QUANG NGAI (P) in the vicinity of (BS 704570). On 14 October three bridges on Route 1 were destroyed in QUANG TIN (P) at (BT 268273), (BT 276261) and (BT 359190). On 15 October a TIEN PHOUC CIDG Outpost was attacked and overrun and the HAU DUC (D) Headquarters was attacked and overrun; both attacks were conducted by an unknown number of VC. Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. Enemy Operations During The Period. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 236 and consisted of 129 small unit engagements, 85 AA fire incidents, 11 mine/booby trap incidents and one act of sabotage.

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- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d - e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
28 Sep	(BS 195786)	weapons Repair Facility/Propaganda Production Unit.	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
29 Sep	(BS 140773)	VC Provincial Headquarters	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
29 Sep	(BS 390830) (BS 414814)	VC Secret Zone/ Hospital (Poss)	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
29 Sep	(BT 136290)	Supply Storage Area	ARVN Report III MAF G-2: F/3
3 Oct	(YD 850020) (YD 848023) (YD 850025)	Rice Storage Area Admin Unit Rice Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
5 Oct	(BS 504776)	Rice Milling and Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
7 Oct	(AT 970380)	VC Training Center	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
11 Oct	(AT 885935)	VC Basic Training Center	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 85. 29 aircraft sustained a total of 46 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (YD 17) - (BT 06) - (BT 22) - (AT 86).

i - g. Negative.

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r. Reconnaissance.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Reconnaissance sightings in northern QUANG TRI (P) were limited to three sightings of small groups of VC/NVA in the area south of THAN SON LAM.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Sightings of numerous small groups of VC/NVA to the west and southwest of HUE have continued during the reporting period.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Sightings during the period remained significantly high to the southwest of the AN HOA industrial complex. On 10 October a patrol discovered a VC harboring site in the vicinity of (AT 8361).

(4) QUANG NGAI (P). Sightings of small groups of VC to the west of the 2nd Bde ROKMC TAOR were made during the reporting period. The most significant contact occurred on 10 October in the vicinity of (BS 6055) where contact was made with 50-60 VC/NVA.

s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identification. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 110 KIA, 57 KIA (Prob), 26 VCC, three NVAC and one NVA rallier. Weapons losses were 37 individual and three crew served weapons.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Weather in I Corps during the reporting period reflected little change in comparison with the previous period. Although initially rain was prevalent, no precipitation was recorded for the last four days of the reporting period. Temperatures averaged 90° high to 70° low. Skies were partly cloudy to cloudy, winds were generally variable from five to seven knots, and visibility ranged from four to ten miles. 4.54" of precipitation recorded.

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k. Significant Captive, Agent/Returnee and Document Reports. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. No change.

R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

A. ORDER OF BATTLE

B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:


MACV J234-21	1	CG 2D BDE, ROK MC	6
MACV J234-22	1	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE	1
CG FMFPAC	1	COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1
CG I FFORCEV	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 3RD MARDIV	20	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	15	CO 9TH MT BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	2
CG 173D ABN BDE	1	DSA I CORPS	5
CG 9TH MAB	1	CICV	1
COMNAVFORV	1	III MAF	5
CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG	1		
CG FLC	1		

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO  
III MAF PERINTREP NR 37

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**I CORPS**  
ORDER OF BATTLE



-  NVA
-  VC
-  PROBABLE

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 37

DONG HA/CAM LO AREA1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS WITHIN 10 MILES OF AREA)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
324TH B NVA DIV (HQ & SPT)	CONF	1,910 YD	0076	UNK	CO-GEN TRAM DO XO-CHU VAN DOI PO-NGUYEN TIEN LOI
803RD NVA REGT	CONF	1875*	NOTE 1	UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG	CO-MAJ VO THIEP XO-DUYET PO-MAJ SONG
812 NVA REGT	CONF	1875*	NOTE 1	UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG	
90TH NVA REGT	CONF	1875*	NOTE 1	UNK-82MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT UNK-57MM RR UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-CAPT MAI VAL CU
13TH NVA ARTY BN	CONF	200	DMZ AREA	12-120MM MORT**	UNK
14TH NVA AA BN	CONF	300	DMZ AREA	18-12.7MM AAMG**	UNK
15TH NVA ENGR BN	CONF	200	DMZ AREA	18-7.62MM LMG**	UNK
16TH NVA SIGNAL BN	CONF	200	DMZ AREA	UNK	CO-CAPT LOI XO-SPLT TAI
19TH NVA MED BN	CONF	200	DMZ AREA	UNK	UNK
341ST DIV	CONF	UNK	NORTH OF DMZ	UNK	UNK
CAM LO CO (LF)	PROB	80	YD 1058	UNK-60MM MORT	CO-NGHIA

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONT)

\*STRENGTH ESTIMATED AT 75% OF T/O DUE TO CONTACTS IN OPERATIONS HASTINGS AND PRAIRIE.

\*\*WEAPONS LISTED ARE THE NORMAL TOE WEAPONS FOR THESE PARTICULAR UNITS. HOWEVER, CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THESE BATTALIONS ARE OPERATING AT LESS THAN NORMAL STRENGTH, A REDUCTION IN TOE WEAPONS IS PROBABLE.

NOTE 1. THE BELOW LISTED BATTALIONS ARE POSSIBLY LOCATED AT THE COORDINATES LISTED. THESE POSITIONS ARE BASED ON INTERROGATION REPORTS OR CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. THE 2ND, 5TH AND 6TH BATTALIONS ARE CARRIED UNLOCATED IN THE NORTHERN QUANG TRI-DMZ AREA.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1ST BN 803RD REGT	XD 9961
3RD BN 803RD REGT	XD 9658
4TH BN 812TH REGT	YD 1272
7TH BN 90TH REGT	YD 0970
8TH BN 90TH REGT	YD 1171
9TH BN 90TH REGT	YD 1676

2. RESERVES AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF AREA)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
808TH BN (LF)	CONF	500	YD 3757	4-81MM MORT 2-75MM RR 8-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 3-MG	CO-VAN KIEN XC-LE VAN HAT
814TH NVA BN	CONF	500	HAI LANG DIST	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 1-B40 2-UNK MG	CO-THANH XC-LUONG
C-55 CO (LF)	CONF	75	TRIEU PHO-NG DIST	4-60MM MORT 2-MG 8-AR	CO-CUONG XC-LT TUAN PC-2NDLT THIEN

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DONG HA/CAM LO AREA (CONT)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
TRIEU PHONG CO (LF)	CONF	80	YD 2245	1-60MM MORT 6-MG 3-AR	CO-NGUYEN VAN THI PO-THUY
HAI LONG CO (LF)	CONF	80	YD 3244	1-MG 9-AR	CO-LUONG YEN XO-DUNG

HUE/PHU BAI TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR)

HUONG TRA CO	PROB	100	YD 7412	UNK	CO-THUYET
HUONG THUY CO	PROB	50	YD 8009	UNK	CO-NGUYEN THAM AI
K.41 CO	CONF	95	YD 8402	1-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-60MM MORT 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-PHAM KINH PHU
810TH BN	CONF	400	YD 5320	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG UNK-SMG	CO-CAPT DANG CAO KY
804TH BN	CONF	400	PHU LOC DIST	4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40	CO-TON THAT THIET
302ND BN	CONF	400	YD 6318	3-81MM MORT	CO-THAN-TRONG MOT
QUANG DIEN CO (LF)	CONF	100	YD 6530	2-60MM MORT 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH

THE 6TH NVA REGT, THOUGH CURRENTLY OPERATING BEYOND THE 20 MILE RADIUS OF THE PHU BAI TAOR, COULD, WITH A MINOR SHIFT IN DISPOSITIONS, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE OF THE TAOR.

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DANANG TAOR1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
402ND SAPPER BN	CONF	300	AT 8364	2-81MM MORT 2-LMG 12-B.40	CO-NGUYEN VAN TRAN
V.25 BN (LF)	CONF	400	AT 8753	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR	CO-QUANG LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEI PO-TOAN
B-20 BN HQ	CONF	100	AT 8454	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54-AR	UNK
B-21 CO	CONF	100	AT 9354	1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-LMG	CO-DOAN NGHIA XO-XUAN LAM, NGUYEN DUC
B-22 CO	CONF	100	AT 9053	2-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-AR	CO-LE MIEN XO-TRAN CAT
B-23 CO	CONF	100	AT 8655	UNK	CO-NGUYEN SUNG
B-24 CO	CONF	100	AT 8859	1-60MM MORT 1-LMG 7-AR 30-SMG	CO-TY, LE VAN KHOI
DIA LOC CO	CONF	70	AT 8551	1-60MM MORT 9-AR 18-SMG	CO-PHAN PHONG SAM
DUY XUYEN CO	CONF	120	BT 0152	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT	CO-TRAN DINH XO-VO CONG TANH PO-DUONG DO
51ST BN	PROB	300	AT 9089	1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 26-AR	UNK

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DANANG TAOR (CONT)2. RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENT (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
21ST NVA REGT (NOTE 2)	CONF	2,000	THANG BINH QUE SON DIST	17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM AAMG UNK-MG	CO-SRCAPT NGUYEN VA TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI
3D BN, 5TH REGT	PROB	400	AT 8737	2-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
70TH BN	CONF	500	QUE SON	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SRCAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH
49TH BN	PROB	500	BT 0730	7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR	CO-DUNG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY
A-10 CO	CONF	150	BT 1536	2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THAN PO-ANH VU
804TH BN	CONF	400	PHU LOC DIST	4-81MM MORT 8-60MM MORT 4-AA GUNS 5-B.40	CO-TON THAT THIET

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 33RD NVA ARTY REGT HQ (PROB) WITH THREE WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS, LOCATED IN HIEP DUC DISTRICT, IS AVAILABLE WITHIN 20 MILES OF DANANG TAOR FOR EMPLOYMENT IN A SUPPORTING ROLE. THESE ARE RQ 21 AA BN, (18x12.7MM AA MG), RQ 22 75MM RR BN (POSS 6x75M VRR), RQ 23 120MM MORT BN (6x120MM MORT).

(NOTE 2) MACV ESTIMATES 620TH DIV 75% COMBAT EFFECTIVE

CHU LAI TAOR

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1. FORCES LOCALLY AVAILABLE (UNITS IN TAOR AND WITHIN 10 MILES OF TAOR).

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
1ST VC REGT (NOTE 2)	CONF	2,000	NORTHERN QUANG NGAI	8-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR 10-60MM MORT UNK-12.7MM AAMG UNK-57MM RR UNK-MG	CO-LTCOL NAM TRAN XO-SECAPT LUU THANH PO-NGUYEN ICH
3D NVA REGT (NOTE 2)	CONF	1,500	NORTHERN QUANG NGAI	19-82MM MORT 12-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 4-12.7MM AAMG 13-MG	CO-LTCOL VIET SON XO-KIEM PO-THAN
72ND BN	CONF	300	BT 2224	2-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 1-30CAL MG 1-50CAL MG	CO-HOANG VAN THANG
409TH SAPPER BN	CONF	400	BS 4382	3-81MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG	CO-NGUYEN TAM XO-NGUYEN XUAN BINH PO-QUYET
104TH BN	PROB	300	BS 6692	1-81MM MORT 3-60MM MORT 3-MG 18-AR	CP-NGUYEN BI CHAW NGHIA TUU
T-18 CO	CONF	60	BS 6887	UNK	UNK
T-19 CO	CONF	140	BS 5784	UNK	CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH
T-20 CO	CONF	100	BS 5082	UNK	CO-TRAN
A-19 CO	CONF	140	BT 2810	UNK	CO-NGUYEN YEN BAC
A-21 CO	CONF	100	BT 2718	1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO-NGUYEN LIEN
706TH CO	CONF	80	BT 3113	1-60MM MORT 1-M60 MG	CO-LE KHAC NGHIA XO-THANH PO-QUANG

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
TRA BONG CO	CONF	80	BS 3190	UNK	CO-DINH HUY
<b>2. <u>RESERVE AND/OR REINFORCEMENTS (UNITS WITHIN 10 TO 20 MILES OF TAOR).</u></b>					
21ST NVA REGT	CONF	2,000	THANG BINH QUE SON DIST	17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT 9-12.7MM MG UNK-MG	CO-SRCAPT NGUYEN VAI TINH XO-NGUYEN VAN LA PO-CAPT LAI VAN KHOI
20TH BN	CONF	400	BS 2864	3-81MM MORT 6-60MM MORT 3-75MM RR 3-57MM RR 9-MG	CO-DINH CHANH NHA XO-DINH PHONIA
38TH BN	CONF	400	BS 6654	1-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR UNK-MG 24-AR	CO-MAI KIM
70TH BN	CONF	500	QUE SON DIST	3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG XO-SRCAPT THUA PO-DUAN CONG THANH.
49TH BN	PROB	500	BT 0730	7-81MM MORT 15-60MM MORT 5-57MM RR 3-MG 24-AR	CO-DUONG VAN CHAU PO-THUYNG THANH MY
206TH CO	CONF	100	BS 5770	5-AR	CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU
614TH CO	CONF	120	BS 3065	UNK	CO-DIEN MIEU
TRA HA CO	CONF	140	BS 1499	UNK	CO-MAHN
A-10 CO	CONF	150	BT 1536	2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-NGUYEN THANH PO-ANH VU

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CHU LAI TAOR (CONT)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
A-13 CO	CONF	150	BT 1017	UNK	UNK
A-16 CO	CONF	120	BT 1516	1-60MM MORT 2-MG	CO-HONG LE
A-34 CO	CONF	40	BT 0303	UNK	UNK

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE 33RD NVA ARTILLERY REGT (HQ) (PROB) W/THREE CONFIRMED WEAPONS SUPPORT BATTALIONS (RQ 21 AA BN), (RQ 22 75MM RR BN) AND THE (RQ 23 120MM MORT BN) LOCATED IN HLEP DUC DISTRICT COULD, WITH MINOR CHANGES IN DISPOSITION, BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN REINFORCING DISTANCE.

(NOTE 2) MACV ESTIMATES 620TH DIV 75% COMBAT EFFECTIVE

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO  
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 37

1. 803d NVA Regt, 324th B Div. NVA Sgt BUI HIEN LUONG who rallied on 23 August from the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 803d NVA Regt gave the following additional information during detailed interrogation.

a. The 803d NVA Regt is composed of three infantry battalions, the 1st Bn, 2d Bn and 3d Bn; each of the battalions has a strength of about 500 men and is composed of four companies. Three of the companies are infantry companies and the remaining company, a heavy weapons company, is equipped with 4-82mm mortars, 6-7.62 HMG and 2-80mm DKZ recoilless rifles.

b. The mission of the 324th B Div, is to "embroil" 10,000 U.S. and ARVN troops in QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P) so that the VC may enjoy freedom of action elsewhere. It includes expanding the "Liberated Area" of QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P) and destroying the defense perimeter in the "HIEN-LUONG River area". Subordinate missions include attack of U.S. and ARVN units in such areas as CUA "outpost" (YD 050530), DAU MAU "outpost" (YD 022558) and outposts in the vicinity of Route 9.

c. The 3d Bn of the 803d NVA Regt was formed at YEN THINH (D) and began training there. The training both military and political was undertaken by the company and platoon cadre until the companies were well trained, at which time the battalion cadre undertook battalion military and political training. In May 1966, the battalion along with other units of the 803d NVA Regt began infiltrating to SVN. The battalion reached the BEN HAI River on 26 June and crossed the river at (XD 980702). The 4th Co had lost 11 men as deserters up to that point. The battalion moved to (YD 015653) and rested there for a 15 day period, then returned to the area of the BEN HAI River. From the river the unit moved to (YD 020650).

d. In late July, the 90th NVA Regt fought with Marine units in the vicinity of (XD 030640). The regiment with its supply points was eventually surrounded. With the assistance of the 803d NVA Regt and 820th NVA Regt, the 90th NVA Regt managed to slip through the encirclement. The 1st Bn of the 803d NVA Regt sustained heavy casualties during this action, including 150 KIA; among these were the Bn PO, Sr Capt THANH, a Sr Capt SON of the division political section and two senior lieutenants.

e. A supply point for the 803d NVA Regt containing three tons of rice is located at (XD 962379). Other rice supply points are located at (XD 998620) and (XD 960510). A shortage of food existed in the regiment and this, along with fear of death, lowered morale considerably.

f. Personalities identified by the captive are: Major PHAN THIEP, CO, 803d NVA Regt; Major DAM, PO, 803d NVA Regt; Sr Capt TRANG, C/S, 803d NVA Regt; Sr Capt TRAN CAN, CO, 3d Bn; Capt NGUYEN THANH, XO, 3d Bn and Capt HA XUAN HAI, PO, 3d Bn.

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2. CAM LO (D) Force. VC WO TRIUH BIEN (AKA TRAN BIEN) gave the following additional information during detailed interrogation:

a. He withheld information initially but, because of the kindness shown him at the CHIEU HOI Center and the III MAZ collection Point, he was convinced of the "Greatness" of the Government of SVN and the free world forces and desires to be helpful.

b. The captive was a weapons instructor in NVN. Upon assignment to the CAM LO (D) Force, he was assigned to the CAM LO (D) proselyting cadre where his duties included caring for prisoners and attempting to proselyte ARVN captives. He was responsible to see that all prisoners were well fed and well treated. He provided safe conduct passage for captives that were released and transportation arrangements for those sent to QUANG TRI (P) POW camps. He wasn't aware of the locations of these camps, since this was closely guarded information. Liaison cadre were assigned, one to each district force headquarters. These liaison cadre were aware of the location of the POW camps and escorted the captives to the camps, or made arrangements to have troops from the camps escort the captives. Captives were usually held by the CAM LO (D) Force about 20 days and were subject to interrogation and propaganda lectures.

c. The captive was told by NVA troops from the 812th NVA Regt that their unit would soon be replaced by elements of the 351st Div, which is actually two divisions under one command headquarters. One of the divisions is an artillery division, the other is an infantry division. The 81st NVA Sapper Bn was located in the vicinity of (YD 125545) and has the mission of attacking DONG HA airstrip during the monsoon season. He believes the DONG HA attack will be conducted by the whole battalion supported by elements of the 324th B Div. The 270th Brig (341st Div) is in the VINH LINH area and is composed of the 270th NVA Regt and the 271st NVA Regt. The regiments are organized along triangular lines, with an artillery battalion equipped with 105 mm Howitzers assigned to each regiment. The captive heard that this brigade was upgraded to division size but is unaware of the new designation.

3. The following translation from a "Liberation Army" document outlines passive defensive measures to be taken in VC hamlets and troop locations:

In the past as well as present, the enemy has attempted to conduct fierce attacks on friendly penetration bases with air strikes, artillery shellings and ground operations.

Experience gained from past operations conducted by F.25 show that the enemy operations, artillery shellings and airstrikes are always preceded and followed by air reconnaissance with observation aircraft. These aircraft fly at a low altitudes to detect our routes and locations. Recently, enemy artillery shellings and air strikes have been relentlessly conducted against

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our routes and combat fortifications. Sites of repeated attacks by enemy forces are frequently used assembly areas, such as road junctions and intersections, quarters, exposed locations with clothes drying in the open, uncamouflaged trenches, etc. Also recently the enemy bombarded and shelled villages in which our presence was suspected.

To cope with the enemy actions and in the meantime to protect our lives and avoid the destruction of our trenches and fortifications, the following measures will be taken:

1. To prevent the enemy from bombarding the villages, we must use deception by setting up dummy troop locations in little frequented areas, far away from roads and hamlets. These dummy positions must be camouflaged but not thoroughly enough to make it impossible for the enemy to see them. A dummy antiaircraft position will be set up 200 or 300 meters away in order to attract the enemy fire and avoid his destruction of villages and hamlets.

Meanwhile, hamlets and troop locations must be carefully camouflaged. Routes must be constantly camouflaged and efforts will be made to cover the clothes being dried or anything that may be seen from the air. Vigilance will be heightened during movements and antiaircraft fire should not be delivered from troop locations and hamlets. When the enemy observation planes hover at a low altitude to attract our fire and detect our positions, or when his fighters strike, we must move out of the hamlets and head for preplanned firing positions to fire back. It is strictly forbidden to fire at aircraft from the hamlets and troop locations. If we keep firing from the hamlet without moving to the outside, the enemy will know that we are trying to deceive him. The troops deployed along helicopter landing zones will destroy the aircraft at any cost.

2. Underground tunnels and communication trenches will be dug away from the hamlets and in a line far from the site of previous battles so that we can intercept the enemy at a distance and prevent the destruction of trenches and tunnels in the hamlets.

The mouth of each underground tunnel must be thoroughly camouflaged. Combat positions and covers against toxic chemicals must be consolidated and improved. Assignment of duties must be made in advance so that each man knows what he has to do. Upon an alert, everyone must enter the tunnel and no one should loiter at its mouth. Personnel will be assigned to watch the tunnel mouth. When the tunnel is detected by the enemy, the personnel inside it must fight, and they must under any event cover the tunnel mouth to protect it against bombs and toxic chemicals.

Combat trenches will be dug far from underground tunnels and where there is a covered passage leading to the underground tunnels. Each tunnel must have several covers. (Such tunnels can be rapidly dug with little manpower and easily repaired. They can also be used for combat and can avoid enemy detection). It is preferable to use grenades in combat trenches. When weapons are deemed necessary, combat trenches should be dug in accordance with the above requirements.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP No. 37

1. GENERAL. VC initiated activity during the reporting period continued at a low level. One act of terrorism and several acts classified as sabotage were reported during the period.

2. ESPIONAGE.

QUANG NAM. A 12 October report received from an intelligence source indicated that two females, NGUYEN THI LIEU, and TRAN THI LAI, are conducting liaison with guerrilla units located in the vicinity of Hill 55. The women pose as vendors and sell fruit and other items to Marine units located in the vicinity of Hill 55. Their assigned mission is to gather information which will be used in a future attack on Hill 55.

A 13 October report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that 32 women had just completed a VC espionage course (Refer to III MAF PERINTREP No. 36). Reportedly each woman has been issued two small vials. One vial contains a type of cold medicine, and the other, while resembling scented water sold on the local market, actually contains a sleeping potion. The women will reportedly work in the bars and houses of prostitution in and around the City of Danang.

3. SABOTAGE.

THUA THIEN. Railroad bridges at (YD 798193) and (2D 127010), and culverts at (YD 80619) and (YD 60310), were destroyed, as was 140 meters of railroad track in the vicinity of (2D 161010).

A 11 October report from an intelligence source, reported an attempt to sabotage the railroad bridge at (YD 748212) in the City of Hue. Two packages of plastic explosives, each wrapped in two layers of light weight green colored plastic material similar to that used in raincoats were retrieved from the river upstream of the bridge. The package contained a white plastic explosive similar to Composition C-4. However, the explosive lacked the characteristic odor of C-4 and would not burn. The individual packages were 16 inches long, 10 inches wide and approximately five inches thick. The two packages were bound together by hemp line and weighed approximately 88 pounds. Four pull type detonators made of soldered copper and similar to those used in Chinese Communist grenades were inserted into the package. Attached to the detonators pull cords was a single strand communication wire. A second wire was attached to the package. Both wires led to the river bank about 35 yards upstream of the bridge. The wire attached to the package was, in all probability, utilized to guide the package downstream, while the wire attached to the detonator's pull cord was rigged to set off the detonators once the package was emplaced against the bridge.

QUANG NAM. A road culvert on Highway 1 located in the vicinity of (BT 113497) was destroyed.

QUANG TIN. A bridge located at (BT 230339) was destroyed.

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4. POLITICAL. No political activity was reported.

5. PROPAGANDA. A 5th Marine intelligence report of 8 October reported the discovery of a Bulletin Board at (YD 100700) containing anti-U.S. propaganda.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

QUANG NAM. A 7 October report from a usually reliable source stated that a VC platoon had entered PHANG BAC (H), (AT 997707) and collected food and money.

A 9 October report stated that approximately 16-20 VC had entered CAM NAM (H), (BT 016708) and assassinated one VC defector. In addition 150 meters of protective fence was destroyed.

A 10 October report from a U.S. Intelligence agency stated that the VC District Committee in DIEN BAN (D) has ordered the local populace to weave bamboo baskets. These baskets were to be approximately 23.8 inches long and covered with a waterproof substance. The VC plan to place explosives in these baskets and place the baskets in the water in order to destroy the bridges crossing the waterways.

A 10 October report from a usually reliable source stated that VC agents working in U.S. agencies and installations have been ordered to carry out the following missions: (1) place poison in meals and beverages; (2) place explosives in bedrooms and in storage areas; (3) create division among the workers. In addition, these agents have been instructed to bribe NUNG guards in order to facilitate escape in the event sabotage plans are discovered.

A fairly reliable source reported a sabotage school being held in HOI AN (AT 9876). The mission of the school is to prepare agents for acts of sabotage in the vicinity of HOA MY (AT 9777).

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
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# III MAF DANANG, RVN

23 October 1966

# • PERINTREP NO 38



III MAF PERINTREP #38

16-22 Oct 66

GROUP - 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
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 III MAF  
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PERINTREP NO. 38

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Period Covered: 160001 - 222400 Oct 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,  
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In QUANG TRI (P) BAO CONG OP (YD 2846) was attacked on 16 October by VC/NVA in multi-company strength. In the Operation PRAIRIE area a platoon of H/2/7 was attacked on 17 October by NVA in platoon strength. On 18 October the 39th Ranger Bn made contact with VC in battalion strength east of the PHU BAI TAOR at (YD 970170). The VC battalion was identified as the 804th Bn. On 21 October in the same area a PF platoon made contact with the VC in platoon strength at (YD 867220). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. On 17 October RF, PF and ARVN (elements of 51st Regt) in the NONG SON OP area (AT 848392) of southern QUANG NAM (P) were attacked by NVA units in multi-battalion strength; intermittent contact continued until 21 October. The unit was identified as the 3rd NVA Regt. Small scale activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. On 17 October a CIDG patrol in QUANG NGAI (P) was attacked by a VC platoon at (BS 366694) and a VC company at (BS 344635). On 21 October the 37th Ranger Bn was attacked by the VC in unknown strength at (BS 576787). Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 231 and consisted of 121 small unit engagements, 96 AA fire incidents, 12 mine/booby trap incidents, and two acts of sabotage.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

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d - e. Negative

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
28 Sep	BS 414819	VC Medical Facility	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-2
5 Oct	BT 0724	Administrative/ Recruiting Center	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F-3
7 Oct	ZC 123968	VC Dispensary	CI Report III MAF G-2: C-3
8 Oct	BS 480710	Rice Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-3
14 Oct	BS 460585	Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-4

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 96. 25 aircraft sustained 37 hits. Two possible cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - j. Negative.

k. Artillery/Hvy Mortars.

(1) On 13 Oct a QUANG TRI JTAD agent reported that during the night of 8 Oct, an enemy artillery unit of approximately 400 men moved from (YD 105765) to (YD 114773) north of the DMZ. The unit reportedly carried four 105mm howitzers. Upon arriving at the above location, the unit dug circular holes to hide the howitzers and camouflaged them with leaves, during the day. The holes were approximately four meters in diameter and two meters in depth. At night, the weapons are removed from the holes via a rampway dug into the ground and put into position. A soldier stated the unit was part of the 118th VC Artillery Bn. (III MAF G-2 Comment: C-3; On 1 Oct, an unidentified artillery regiment was reported located from (YD 114782) to (YD 164776) with six 120mm mortars. The 341st NVA Div has a confirmed unidentified subordinate artillery regiment. This regiment has an unidentified artillery battalion with 105mm howitzers and another unidentified battalion with 120mm mortars. Although the 118th Arty Bn is not listed in the NVA OOB, it is possible that it is subordinate to the unidentified regiment of the 341st NVA Div).

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l - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Reconnaissance sightings in northern QUANG TRI (P) were limited to a few sightings of small groups of NVA made near the DMZ to the north and northwest of THON SON LAM.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Sightings to the west and southwest of HUE were significantly less than the previous period and consisted of one sighting of eight VC on 17 October.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Recon sightings were at a low level during the period. The most significant sightings occurred west of the Operation KERN area on 21 October, where one group of 15-20 VC/NVA and a second of 40-50 VC/NVA were sighted.

(4) QUANG NGAI (P). Groups of 120, 20 and eight VC/NVA were sighted on 18 October in the area east of MINH LONG CIDG Camp.

s. Commerce.

(1) 12 Oct. A QUANG NGAI JTAD agent report that on the night of 7 Oct about 15 boats landed at PHU LOI (BS 830445) and unloaded about 30 cases of supplies destined for the VC. These boats are part of an organized shipping trade from cities in the south. There are about 40 boats involved in the trade manned by VC guerrillas. Each boat carries an identification number to identify it as a regular trading vessel. (G-2 Cmt: F-3).

3. Other Intelligence Factors.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 101 KIA, 146 KIA (Prob) and 20 VCC. Weapons losses were nine individual weapons and one crew served weapon.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

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j. Weather. The weather picture along the coastal plain of the I Corps area was characterized by cloudy skies and heavy north east monsoon rainfall. Road trafficability conditions were hampered by mud, flooding, bridge washouts, and in the HAI VAN Pass area, by mud slides. Flight operations on most days were limited by extended periods of reduced visibility. Weather data as follows:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature (Average)				
High	88	87	89	85
Low	73	73	74	73
Rainfall (Total)	5.10	2.48	11.76	13.12
Visibility (Average)	6 mi	9 mi	8 mi	6 mi
Winds (Average) Knots	5 kts	4 kts	4 kts	5 kts

k. Significant Captive, Agent/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

1. Negative.

4. Counterintelligence. Annex C.

5. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 35.

R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

MACV J234-21	1	CG 2D BDE, ROKMC	6
MACV J234-22	1	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE	1
CG FMFPAC	1	COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1
CG I FFORCEV	2	CTF 76	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 79.5	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CTG 76.5	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	20	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MAW	15	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO 9TH MI BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	2
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 173D ABN BDE	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	2
CG 9TH MAB	1	DSA I CORPS	5
COMNAVFORV	1	CICV	1
CG 35TH TFW (DOI) DANANG	1	III MAF	5
CG FLC	1		


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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO  
LII MAP PERINTREP NR 38

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**I CORPS**  
ORDER OF BATTLE



 NVA  
 VC  
 PROBABLE

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2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 222400H Oct 66

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST PROB LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
324B Div (Ho&Spt) <sup>#1</sup>	NVA	C	1,430 <sup>#2</sup>	Pair <sup>#3</sup>	N Quang Tri (P)	YD0262	23Jul66
803rd Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	28Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	XD9961	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (F)	N Quang Tri (P)	28Sep66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	XD9658	24Aug66
812th Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	10Oct66
4th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	YD1272	28Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	10Oct66
6th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	10Oct66
90th Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	N DMZ YD0973	8Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	YD0970	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	YD1171	28Sep66
9th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	YD1676	8Oct66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200	Unk <sup>#4</sup>	DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200	Unk <sup>#5</sup>	DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
808th Bn	NF	C	500		YD3757	Hai Lang	19Sep66
812th Bn <sup>#6</sup>	NVA	C	500		YD4143	Quang Tri (P)	22Sep66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD3542	9Sep66
K.3 Co	NF	C	100		YD0220	ZC1597	23Jun66
C.55	NF	C	75		Trieu Phong (D)	Trieu Phong (D)	Dec65
Hai Lang Co	LF	C	80		YD3244	YD3854	75Sep66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD2245	YD2244	20Aug66
C.10 Co	NF	PR	120		YD3338	YD4734	30Jun66
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD1058	YD0452	19Aug66

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO PERINTREK No. 38

III NAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 222400H Oct 66

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL UNITS	TOTAL STRENGTH
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	2,010					2	2,010
Regiments (Hq)	6	2,000	1	800			7	2,800
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	3	2,800	9	3,200	33	14,200
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	4	2,890			14	5,340
Separate Companies			4	860	27	2,570	31	3,430
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		<u>17,460</u>		<u>6,850</u>		<u>6,270</u>		<u>30,580</u>
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)			1	330	4	1,500	5	1,830
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			2	200	4	455	6	655
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				<u>530</u>		<u>1,955</u>		<u>2,485</u>
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)	1	500			1	200	2	700
Battalions (Infantry)	3	1,500			6	2,280	9	3,780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		<u>2,500</u>				<u>2,600</u>		<u>5,100</u>
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		<u>19,960</u>		<u>7,380</u>		<u>10,825</u>		<u>38,165</u>

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST PROF LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD4724	YD4723	4Jan66
6th Regt Hq	NVA	C	300	Good	YD4735	YD5218	31Jul66
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD3334	12Jul66
803rd Bn #6	MF	C	400	Good	YD6318	Quang Dien (D)	19Aug66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD5642	YD3228	12Jul66
95th R Regt (Hq)	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien (P)	Unlocated	22Aug66
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien (P)	Unlocated	22Aug66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien (P)	Unlocated	22Aug66
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien (P)	Unlocated	22Aug66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YD7904	13Aug66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD5320	YD5520	23Aug66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD2402	YD8402	1Dec65
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD6931	Quang Dien (D)	23Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD6530	YD5124	1Dec65
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD8009	YD8522	21Dec65
Huong Tra Co	MF	PR	100		YD7412	YD7910	11Feb66
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Yang (D)	YD8620	6Sep66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

Binh Son Trans Bn	MF	C	1,490		YC6035	YC6035	31Dec65
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500	Unk #7	AT8454	AT8054	14Sep66
70th Bn	LF	C	500	Good	Que Son (D)	BT2212	18Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		AT8753	BT0354	16Sep66
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	300	Excel	AT8364	AT8060	27Aug66
51st Bn	LF	PR	300		AT9089	ZC2080	3May66
5th Regt (Hq)	MF	PO	200		Que Son (D)	Que Son (D)	16Feb66
2nd Bn	LF	PO	300		AT9556	BT0365	14May66
3rd Bn	LF	PR	400		AT8737	BT0667	18Sep66
23rd Bn	LF	PO	500		BT0162	BT1262	26Mar66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT0132	BT1342	31Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT0355	BT0662	21Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST PROB LOCATION	DATE
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT9146	BT0660	5 Jul 66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT0152	BT1452	24 Jan 66
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT8551	AT8447	19 Feb 66
H. 31 Co	LF	PR	125		BT1774	BT1455	31 Dec 65
H. 54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT8458	AT8867	11 Jun 66

QUANG BIN PROVINCE

620th Div (Hq)	NVA	C	100		Hiep Duc (D)	Quang Tin (F)	26 Apr 66
21st Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	200		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT0455	15 Sep 66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT0427	12 Sep 66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT0026	26 Aug 66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh	BT2101	10 Aug 66
33rd Arty Regt. (Hq)	NVA	PR	100		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	Hiep Duc (D)	24 Aug 66
R021 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT0005	13 Jul 66
R022 Bn (25mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT8402	6 Jul 66
R023 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT7924	6 Jul 66
R020 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT8421	6 Jul 66
R024 Bn (SMG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT8422	6 Jul 66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT2224	BT3320	10 Sep 66
Nam Son Trans Bn	LF	C	700		BT0170	ZR0007	24 Oct 65
40th Bn	LF	PR	500		BT0740	BT1341	12 Sep 66
70th Co	LF	C	80		BT5113	BT3210	15 Sep 66
A10 Co	LF	C	150		BT1576	BT2734	28 Aug 66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT1017	BT0906	23 Sep 66
A16 Co	LF	C	120		BT1516	BT1618	11 Sep 66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT2810	BT3609	27 May 66
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT2913	BT5316	Feb 66
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT0303	AS0596	24 Oct 66
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS8799	AS8799	24 Oct 66
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS1400	BS1400	24 Oct 66

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<u>UNITS</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST PROB LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>							
Hq Military Region V	NVA	C	650		RS1275	RS1294	25Feb66
1st VC Regt (Hq)	MF	C	800	Good	N Quang Ngai (P)	S Tra Bong (D)	12Oct66
60th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai (P)	S Tra Bong (D)	12Oct66
80th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai (P)	S Tra Bong (D)	12Oct66
90th Bn	MF	C	400		N Quang Ngai (P)	S Tra Bong (D)	12Oct66
3rd NVA Regt (Hq) <sup>#8</sup>	NVA	C	300	Good	N Quang Ngai (P)	SW Son Tinh (D)	Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		N Quang Ngai (P)	SW Son Tinh (D)	Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		N Quang Ngai (P)	SW Son Tinh (D)	Sep66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		N Quang Ngai (P)	SW Son Tinh (D)	Sep66
20th Bn	LF	C	400	Good	RS2864	RS3765	19Sep66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	RS6654	RS7753	16Sep66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	RS7850	RS7550	16Sep66
409th Sapper Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	RS4382	RS5483	15Sep66
104th Bn	LF	PR	300		RS6692	BT3700	12Sep66
1506th Eng Bn	MF	PR	330		RS2870	RS3470	13Sep66
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		RS5370	Son Tinh (D)	20Oct66
109th Bn	LF	PO	300		RS7283	RS3093	10Jul66
37th Bn	LF	PO	400		RS5360	Nghia Fanh	28Sep66
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		RS5477	RS7383	25Aug66
96th Co	LF	C	100		RS5053	RS5754	13Jun66
206th Co	LF	C	100		RS5770	RS5770	24May66
614th Co	LF	C	120		RS3065	RS3764	24Feb66
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		RS7055	RS6753	7Sep66
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		RS6136	RS6133	22Jun66
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		RS8125	RS8145	15Sep66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		RS6687	RS7483	15Sep66
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		RS5082	RS5579	15Sep66
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		RS5784	RS6392	17Sep66
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		RS3190	RS4087	22Aug66

NOTES

- #1. The battalions are probably located in the vicinity coordinates listed. These positions are based on interrogation reports or captured documents. The 2nd, 5th and 6th Battalions are carried unlocated in the northern QUANG TRI-DMZ area.

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- #2. Strength of 324 B units estimated at 75% of T/O due to contacts in Operations FASTINGS and PRAIRIE.
- #3. Denotes entire division.
- #4. Believed to be operating at half strength with 6X120mm MORT.
- #5. Believed to be operating at half strength with 9X12.7mm AA MG.
- #6. On 1 Jul VCC stated that the 802nd Battalion had replaced the 912 Battalion in the 6th Regiment and that the 912th Battalion had been disbanded. On 22 Sep rallier stated that 912th was subordinate to 6th Regt. Since insufficient information is available on the current status of the 912th Battalion, it will be carried as a separate battalion subordinate to the northern Sub-Region No.
- #7. R.20 has been suffering extensive casualties during Operation FACON.
- #8. VCC interrogation on 21 Oct revealed that the 3rd NVA Regt had moved from an unknown area (possibly southern QUANG BIN/northern QUANG NAM Provinces) to southern QUANG NAM, for an attack on VONG SON coal mine area. (See para 3 of ANNEX B, interrogation report, TEAM DUC DIA).

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 22 Oct 66

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3243 Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div(?); 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?) Cong Truong Lon; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May	51.441 KT	Unk	CG-Gen Tran BO XC-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XC-DUYET PO-Maj SONG THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn			
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn			
812th Regt	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen MINH HE XC-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Huong (or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XC-CUONG PO-Capt Mai Van CU
7th Bn	D-7; K.32			
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9			
12th AT Bn			12-120mm Mort #1	
13th Arty Bn			18-120mm AA MG #1	
14th AA Bn				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG #1	CO-Capt LOI XO-Srit TAI
19th Med Bn 803th Bn	K.2; K.14	1708-TO Bac Nam	4-21mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
812th Bn 814th Bn	K.12 K.14		2-21mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-240 2-Link MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
K.3 Co C.55 Co	B03 Co DOI (Group 1); Quang Tri Prov Indep Co		4-60mm Mort 2-MG 8-AR 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Hac Dac PHU XO-Lt THANH PO-2nd Lt THIEM CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
Hai Lang Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; H.99			CO-NHIA
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02; V-51; H-20			
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien.			
Cam Lo Co	H.30			

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai			CO-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt Phung
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn 802nd Bn	K.1 K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-2(?)	1520		CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH CO-LtCol TRUONG
806th Bn	2nd Infiltration Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			
95th B Regt (Hq)				

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBV</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
804th Bn 810th Bn K.41 Co	K.4; V.24 6th; K-10; 310(?) C-106; D-6; F.18; Phe 18		1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-Ion That THIEP CO-Capt Huong THI CO-Phan Kinh PHU
K.105 Co Quang Dien Co	D-3; F-15; 3rd Co		2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-Capt Hoang AN CO-THIAN XC-TINH FC-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co Huong Tra Co C.117 Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17 D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5 Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			CO-Nguyen DAM CO-THUYET CO-Xuan SAM
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>				
Binh Son Transport Bn R.20	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20;		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 5-AR	CO-TRI CO-Nguyen Van LAM
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Lam Bn; 5th Bn		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XC-SrCapt THIA PO-Duan Cong THANH
V.25 Bn				CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XC-THU PO-TOAN
402nd Sapper Bn	T-80th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XC-SrLt THANH CO-Nguyen Ba PHAT
51st Bn	Nguyen Ba Phat Bn; 137 Bn; 184 Bn; 42nd Bn		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 26-AR	
5th Regt (Hq)				CO-Tran CAM
3rd Bn			2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG

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UNIT  
23rd Bn

Que Son Co

Dien Ban Co

Hoa Hieu Co

Duy Xuyen Co

Dai Loc Co

H. 31 Co

H. 54

AKA  
27th Bn; 27th Nung Bn;  
Chi Nguyen Quan Bn;  
93d Regt; 7th Bn  
DL20; H-53 Co; Dia  
Ly A7  
Dien Ban H-40 Co;  
Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th  
Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16;  
H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co  
H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co  
H-42 Co  
Hien Giang  
C-70 Co of Dia Loc

LBN

EQUIPMENT  
3-81mm Mort  
4-60mm Mort  
4-AG

PERSONALITIES  
CO-Maj Le LUYEN

CO-Le Tan QUANG

CO-Tran Tien NAM

CO-Nguyen DOA

CO-Nguyen CHAU

CO-Phan Phong SAN

CO-Do THANH

CO-Nguyen TAN

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

620th Div (Hq)

Ham Tu 2; 2nd Div;  
Agricultural Site #2;  
Chi Lang; (12 Sep 66-  
MACV rpts 620th at 75%  
combat effectiveness)

21st Regt (Hq)

BACH HA; Worksite 21; 36th;  
A-21; Cong Truong-21; 2nd  
Regt; 36th Regt; A-21  
11th Workshop; 11th Bn  
135 Bn

17-81mm Mort  
Hak-25mm RR  
Unk-60mm Mort

CO-NG VIET  
CO-EG DAC  
PO-TO DO

CO-Pham KIET

CO-Dang Cong HIEU

PO-TIEN

CO-Capt Ha Van MAG

CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH

CO-Nguyen Kaach THO

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

33rd Arty Regt (Hq)

RQ21 Bn (AA)

195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA  
Bn; Xuong 111; X-11; 19th  
Bn

CO-Capt Nguyen Van  
TIEN

XO-Tran Van QUANG

PO-Nguyen Van HIEM

RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)

RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)

GK-32  
RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th  
Bn; GK-33

CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN

RQ20 Bn (SIG)

RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; 1803/CH  
RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C Hai Cang 20  
GK-40

CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG

CO-Tran Van CAO

RQ24 Bn (ENG)

72nd Bn

Nam Son Trans Bn

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
40th Bn			7-81mm Mort 15-60mm Mort 5-57mm RR 3-NG 24-AR	CO-Duong Van CHAU PO-Thuyng Thanh MY
706th Co A10 Co	V-14 Co; 106th Co Thang Bin; F-14; D-21; K51; 107		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-NG	CO-KHOA CO-Nguyen THANH PO-Anh VU
A13 Co A14 Co	D-22 C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-NG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co A21 Co	Tan Ky; D-23 Co C-25; Phi Po A-21			
A34 Co Tra Son Co Tra Ha Co	Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			

CO-MAHN

PHANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region V (Hq)	RTI/K-5; H-800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa			CO-LtGen Nguyen DON CO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108(Alt Cnd Elm)			CO-Col Chau Choi DIN CO-LtCol Chu An TAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006			CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG CO-Hoang Xuan VINH
80th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007			CO-Maj Nguyen TIEN CO-PHAM
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI CO-Vo Ngoc CAM
3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Work- site-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt			CO-LtCol Viet SON CO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEM
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh			CO-Trung THANH
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			CO-Capt THAO
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
20th Bn 38th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38; Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn	2048; NQ BA HAC		CO-Capt Dinh QUYNH CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn 409th Sapper Bn	Poss 408th Bn Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite		3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG 1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 3-MG 18-AR	CO-Capt KY CO-Nguyen TAM XC-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET  CO-Nguyen Hi CHAW; Nghia TUN
104th Bn	405th Bn			
1506th Engr Bn 19th Bn	Poss 506th Bn 109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Tuy KINH CO-Pham Van NGOC
109th Bn	200th Bn; B.17 Bn; T.17th Bn; B-8			CO-Rui Kim BONG
37th Bn 307th Bn 96th Co 206th Co	Poss 315th Bn Minh Long Co Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-Maj Tran Duc DUC CO-Dinh Re HUA CO-Lu TRI CO-TIEN XC-SUNG PO-TIEN CO-DIEN MIEN CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XC-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN CO-DINH HUY
614th Co C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co T.18 Co T.19 Co	Son Fa Co Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co Ba To Co Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co Son Tinh Dong (west)			
T.20 Co Tra Bong Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co F-8 Co; 8th Co			

NOTE #1. Weapons listed are the normal TOE weapons for these particular units. However, considering the fact that these battalions are operating at less than normal strength, a reduction in TOE weapons is probable.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/REFUGEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)  
To JIJ MAP PERTUREI No. 38

1. 1st VC Regt. NGUYEN PHU QUYN, a rifleman who rallied on 12 October from the 1st Co, 40th Bn, 1st VC Regt gave the following information during initial interrogation:

a. The 1st VC Regt is an independent regiment and no longer a part of the 620th Div. It is composed of four battalions, the 40th Bn, 60th Bn, 70th Bn and 90th Bn, and one artillery battery equipped with the following weapons: 2-57mm RR, 2-21mm mortars, 2-12.7mm AA MG, 1-75mm RR and 2-840's.

b. The 1st VC Regt is responsible for conducting operations in QUANG NGAI (F) and QUANG TINH (F). The present location of the regiment is in QUANG NGAI (F) in the area of the district line between SON HA (D) and SON TINH (D). The regiment has been in that area since the end of September. He heard that the regiment is preparing an attack but knew nothing of the time, location, or other particulars. The 21st NVA Regt is presently operating in QUANG TINH (F).

c. In dealing with the people he finds that they are not as sympathetic to the VC cause as they once were. When coolie laborers are conscripted the people openly complain and are quarrelsome. Occasionally they will also refuse to feed the troops. These difficulties are not limited to relations with the civil population; NVA soldiers and VC do not get along well together.

d. VC morale is presently very low due to bombing, lack of food, medicine, proper combat supplies and the coming monsoon season. About 10 days ago the men of the 1st Co read and discussed some propaganda leaflets in spite of the VC's who required the men to tear up the leaflets. The captive believes that most of the men would defect if they had the opportunity.

e. Personalities identified by the captive are: Major NGUYEN THUYEN, CO, 40th Bn; PHAN, VC, 40th Bn; VAN, IC, 40th Bn; NGUYEN HAI, Asst PO, 40th Bn; NGUYEN PHUONG, CO, 1st Co, 40th Bn.

2. G-710 Unit (AKA 1st Volunteer Youth Group Works) Captive 2nd Lt. LE KHANH TRA, a medical doctor with the G-710 Unit, gave the following information during initial interrogation.

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a. The G-710 Unit is one of three 400 man volunteer youth groups of the N-223 Unit, which is of regimental size. The N-223 Unit functions as a transport unit and its members serve as coolie laborers transporting equipment and supplies in QUANG TIN (P).

b. The G-710 Unit operates from BINH YEN (H) in the vicinity of (BT 0415) south along the SONG TRAM. They could use the river crossing at (AT 913229) turn south and sometimes walk into the mountains. The 2nd group operates west of SONG TRAM and south of HIEP DUC (D) headquarters. He didn't know the operational area of the 3rd group; however, all three subordinate groups of the N-223 Unit are located approximately one day's travel apart.

c. He heard the following number of doctors from the countries indicated are working in support of the VC: 20-Russia, 2-3 Romania, 15-Communist China, 20-East Germany, 5-North Korea and 20-Czechoslovakia; there are nurses and specialists assigned as well.

d. The G-710 Unit lacks food and medicine. There is a constant turnover of personnel and about 30% of the unit has malaria.

3. 3d NVA Regt 620th Div. THAM DUC DUA, a rifleman of the 1st Co, 1st Bn, 3d NVA Regt, captured in the attack of the NONG SON area of QUANG NAM (P) on 18 October, gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 3d NVA Regt is part of the 2d Div (AKA 620th Div, NONG TRUONG). The captive does not know the composition of the other units of the Division; however, the 3d NVA Regt is composed of three battalions, 1st Bn, 2nd Bn and 3rd Bn. The 1st Co, 3d Bn had a strength of over 100 men when the unit began infiltration, but is down to about 70 men as a result of losses from sickness and bombing.

b. The regiment spent the month prior to the attack on NONG SON OP resting and training for the attack in an area believed to be in the vicinity of (BS 08). The regiment marched from the rest area to the NONG SON area and conducted the attack the night of their arrival, with the 1st Bn and 2d Bn as the attacking force and the 3d Bn in reserve. Only the 1st Co of the 1st Bn conducted the attack with one platoon assaulting the PF positions and two platoons assaulting the RF position. After seizing the positions the intention was to occupy and patrol the area.

c. The captive was aware of the attack on a USMC recon platoon patrol on 15 June and the VNMC attack in the QUE SON (D) area on 6 August during Operation COLORADO.

d. The morale of the 3d NVA Regt is termed average. The 1st Co has had no desertions. The men of the unit do not know of the Chieu Hoi Program and they do not desert because they have no where to go.

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e. Personalities identified by the captive are: LtCol VIET SON, CO, 3d NVA Regt; Major THAO, CO, 1st Bn; GIAU, former PC, 1st Bn.

4. 804th Bn. Pvt NGUYEN VAN HOAN, a rifleman of the 1st Co, 804th Bn, captured on 18 October, gave the following information under interrogation:

a. The 804th Bn has a strength of about 380 men and is composed of three infantry companies and a support company, armed with the following weapons: 2-57mm mortars, 3-60mm mortars, and 2-10's. The strength of the 1st Co is about 92 men.

b. On 17 October the 804th Bn was ordered to prepare two full bundles of rice per man and the three infantry companies were reinforced with attachments from the 1st Co for the purpose of conducting operations in the PHU THU DEB area. The object of these operations was to counter US/ARVN operations and enlarge the "liberated" area. The battalion divided into three reinforced infantry companies of about 120 men each and left the mountain area of PHU THU (D) at 171730H. They arrived in the PHU THU area in the vicinity of (2D 955120) and deployed. At 180000H his unit made contact with ARVN units; the captive was wounded and subsequently captured during the engagement.

c. The captive was drafted in 1961 and following one month of basic training was assigned to the 200th Infiltration Group. The strength of the group was 250 men, all of whom were armed with the M-50 SIG or K-44 SMG. The 200th Infiltration Group left NVN in December 1965 and arrived in the mountain area of PHU THU (D) in February of 1966, where the captive was one of 30 men assigned to the 804th Bn as replacements.

d. Personalities of the 804th Bn identified by the captive are: Lt TIN, CO, 1st Co; DUCNG, XC, 1st Co.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREF NO. 38

1. GENERAL. VC activity continued at a low level during the reporting period. Sabotage of lines of communications continued and one act of terrorism was reported, although it is not known whether this action was VC initiated.

2. ESPIONAGE. A 13 October report from the 1st Marines stated that a VN female was apprehended in the vicinity of (BT 116633) while warning the VC of the approach of a patrol. (CI Comment: One of many reports of the VC utilizing women and children as "lookouts".)

A U.S. Intelligence Agency reported that the VC in QUANG NAM (P) were organizing and training an intelligence group composed of youths ranging in ages from 11 to 15 years. Upon completion of training the youths will be divided into groups of three and sent to live in government controlled areas. These youths have been instructed to befriend Allied forces and become accepted members of the community in order to wander freely about the area without arousing suspicion. The group's main objective is to conduct reconnaissance of friendly areas in order to determine troop strength, disposition of forces, and the location of local defenses, including fixed automatic weapons. (CI Comment: One of many reports of VC establishing espionage schools for youths.)

3. SABOTAGE.

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	18Oct66	bridges destroyed	ZD 127010 YD 006035
	18Oct66	Railroad track (30 meters) destroyed	AU 818007 ZD 161010
QUANG NAM	17Oct66	Highway culverts destroyed	BT 113498 BT 153497 BT 110500
QUANG NGAI	19Oct66	Bridge destroyed	BS 633811

4. POLITICAL. No political activity reported.

5. PROPAGANDA. No propaganda activity reported.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

QUANG NAM. A 17 October report from an intelligence source stated that three VC entered VAN DUONG #1 (H) in the vicinity of (AT 907#07) and demanded 1000 \$VN from each family. The VC indicated they would return within five days to collect the money.

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A 17 October report from an intelligence source stated that at 1730 hours a VC squad entered PHAI NAM sub-hamlet, QUAN NAM (H) vicinity of (AT 906904), and confiscated 75 ang of rice (approximately 1500 pounds). The VC informed the villagers that when the Americans left the area, the HOA LAC (V) resettlement area would be destroyed by the VC.

A report from a U.S. intelligence agency stated that the VC are reportedly establishing several "front" organizations whose goal will be to stop the spread of foreign culture in Vietnam. (CI Comment: These "fronts" may be autonomous committees renamed, and reorganized under the present infrastructure. At the present time, it is unlikely the VC will attempt the formation of new "fronts" whose autonomy are independent of the infrastructure).

A U.S. intelligence agency report of 17 October stated that the VC District Committee of HIEU DUC (D) held a meeting of all political and military cadres. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss means of increasing the effectiveness of intelligence and the Armed Forces, and to closely monitor the situation at settlement camps at AN TAN (H) (AT 929706), LA CHAU (H) (COORD UNK), THANH BO and HA BANG (H) (COORD UNK).

A 17 October report received from a U.S. intelligence agency stated that one LE LAI, VC District Commissioner, held a meeting at XUYEN TRA (V) (BT 06 0509) DUY XUYEN (D) on 15 October. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following: (1) methods to be used in collecting rice and money for the troop support fund; (2) strengthening of security at XUYEN TRA (V); and (3) how to get the refugee families who had left the area to return by the end of October. Threats of reprisal are to be made against those who do not return.

QUANG NGAI. A 14 October report stated that the VC burned a village in the vicinity of (BS 643917). The village was destroyed because the inhabitants refused to contribute taxes.


QUANG TRI. At 2100 hours on 17 October a grenade was thrown into a crowded theatre in QUANG TRI City, resulting in six ARVN killed, 38 ARVN wounded and nine civilians injured. (CI Comment: At the present time, it is not known whether this incident was VC initiated).

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III MAF  
DANANG, RVN  
30 OCTOBER 1966

# PERINTREP NO 39



III MAF PERINTREP # 39

23-29 Oct 66

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 300800H OCT 66  
 Ser: 0154966

PERINTREP NO. 39.

Period Covered: 230001H - 292400H Oct 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1;250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The VC/NVA avoided large scale activity during the reporting period; local VC units initiated relatively minor attacks on lines of communications and other small scale attacks continued at a decreased level.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In QUANG TRI (P) contact with VC/NVA units was limited to a single contact on 26 October, when F/2/9 and G/2/9 caught a reinforced NVA platoon in a crossfire. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR and in the Operation MACON area.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG TIN (P) on 26 October a PF unit encountered the VC in platoon strength at (BT 152358). On 28 October elements of an ARVN battalion ambushed an estimated VC platoon in the vicinity of (BT 002279). In QUANG NGAI (P) PF units encountered the VC in platoon strength at (BS 598940) on 25 October and on 26 October in company strength at (BS 406874). On 28 October ARVN elements encountered the VC in platoon strength at (BS 568760). Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period reflected a moderate decrease when compared with the previous period. 196 incidents were recorded and consisted of 94 small unit engagements, 91 AA fire incidents, five mine/booty trap incidents, and six acts of sabotage.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

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(1) Tactics. Recent intelligence has indicated that the use of heliborne reinforcements may have forced a change in the enemy's preferred tactic of attacking reinforcements for a beleaguered outpost by placing ambush forces along ground routes of approach. The VC must often turn to meet heliborne reinforcements, thereby revealing their positions and being subject to air strikes. Now a large reserve is held back to attack the reinforcements once they have landed. For example, during the attacks on the HA THANH CIDG Camp outpost in QUANG NGAI (P) on 29 September and 5 October, the 1st VC Regt was in reserve waiting in the GI LANG area. The plan was to attack the reaction force, defeat it and then clear out the area.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
21 Oct	(BS 440795)	Storage area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
22 Oct	(BS 743590)	Tunnel used for storing weapons and supplies	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/2

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 91 and reflected little change from the previous period. 26 aircraft sustained a total of 37 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 95) and (AT 96). One case of 12.7mm fire was recorded.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Reconnaissance sightings in northern QUANG TRI (P) continued to be light during the reporting period. There were no sightings made in the area southwest of THON SON LAM.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Sightings and contacts to the west and southwest of HUE were moderately heavy during the period. Most sightings made in this area were of groups of two to four VC/NVA; however, there were three sightings of 19, 30-50 and 75-100 VC/NVA respectively. The VC/NVA sighted were well armed and for the most part uniformed.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Sightings were moderately heavy during the reporting period, with the majority involving large groups of 80-100 VC/NVA in the NONG SON area.

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(4) QUANG NGAI (P). Sightings were light during the reporting period and occurred west of the 2nd EDE ROKMC TAOR, and immediately south of the MINH LONG CIDG Camp. The majority of sightings made involved small groups of two to five well armed and equipped VC/NVA.

s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy Personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 150 KIA, 222 KIA (Prob) and 15 VCC. Weapons losses were 25 individual weapons and one crew served weapon.

f. Morale. No Change.

g. - 1. Negative.

i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. The weather picture along the coastal plain of the I Corps area was characterized by cloudy skies and heavy monsoon rainfall at the beginning of the period and light rainfall towards the end. Trafficability conditions continued to be hampered by flooding, mud and road washouts. Flying weather varied from fair to good. However, in the mountain areas low stratus clouds and fog during the morning hours and cloud buildups in the afternoon occasionally obscured the higher elevations and delayed close air support missions.

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature (Average <sup>o</sup> )				
High	88	85	86	87
Low	75	75	75	76
Rainfall (Total inches)	7.61	4.15	7.76	5.75
Visibility (Average inches)	7	8	8	6
Winds (Average knots)	6	4	2	4

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k. Significant Captive, Agent/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

a. Enemy Capabilities. VC/NVA forces can:

(1) Attack the KHE SANH - THON SON LAM - D5 - CAM LO - DONG HA area with up to two divisions (324th B NVA Div and 341st NVA Div).

(2) Attack the HUE-PHU BAI area with up to one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and two separate infantry battalions (804th and 810th).

(3) Attack the DA NANG combat base with up to one regiment (21st NVA Regt) and six battalions (R.20, V.25, 70th, 72nd, 804th Infantry Bns, and 402nd Sapper Bn).

(4) Attack the CHU LAI combat base with up to one division (620th NVA Div) and six separate battalions (38th, 48th, 70th and 72d Infantry Bns, 409th Sapper Bn, and 1506th Engr Bn).

(5) Attack isolated US/ARVN outposts and district headquarters with up to division strength.

(6) Defend in present positions or launch limited objective attacks south of the DMZ with up to two divisions (324th B NVA Div and 341st NVA Div).

(7) Defend elsewhere in the I CTZ, including VC/NVA base areas, with forces locally available.

(8) Reinforce forces presently in I CTZ within three to five days with up to two divisions (325th NVA Div and an unidentified division) from NVN.

(9) Continue unconventional and psychological warfare, stressing current guerrilla tactics of concurrent individual and small group/unit operations, to include small scale attacks, ambushes, harassment, terrorism, sabotage and the use of mines and booby traps.

b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Capabilities (1), (2), (3) and (4): Factors which favor the adoption of these capabilities are: The present disposition of enemy units contiguous to likely areas of attack; enemy knowledge of the terrain; the probability that enemy logistic support has been stockpiled in his operating areas; and the enemy knowledge of our situation, based on frequent probes and reconnaissance activities. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are:

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The heavy losses in personnel, equipment, and supplies sustained by the enemy in past operations; the enemy predisposition not to mass forces; our operations which have forced the enemy to displace against his will at times of our choosing; our destruction of his logistic support in past operations; and our air supremacy and uninterrupted aerial reconnaissance hindered only by foul weather.

(2) Capability (5): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: It offers an opportunity for a badly needed victory; isolated outposts/headquarters offer the best target for the least risk, compared to the other attack capabilities shown above, particularly when executed in inclement weather; the large scale enemy attack conducted against the isolated outpost at A SHAU was successful, as were many small scale attacks against isolated ARVN/CIDG outposts in I CTZ; and the present dispositions of enemy. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy build-ups and to react rapidly to destroy them by air strikes or by ground spoiling attacks; such attacks, when conducted against CIDG Camps, might reasonably be considered by the enemy to invite too much friendly attention to areas surrounding isolated outposts and district headquarters, lead to a rapid build-up of friendly forces in areas controlled or contested by VC/NVA forces, and result in effectively causing the dislocation of VC/NVA forces from the piedmont into the highlands; and enemy losses during recent operations.

(3) Capabilities (6) and (7): Factors which favor adoption of these capabilities are: Heavy losses in personnel, equipment, and supplies during Operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE may dictate that the enemy assume a defensive posture for 15-30 days in order to take advantage of attacking during the worst of the northeast monsoon season; terrain and present dispositions favor the defender; our massive build-up in the area south of the DMZ; continuing enemy efforts to improve and expand defensive positions and supply caches; and increasing willingness of enemy forces, particularly NVA, to attempt to hold their positions and to counterattack when conditions are favorable. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: Enemy reluctance to stand and fight against US/FWMA forces except under favorable conditions and at a time and place of his choosing; the enemy may prefer not to defend occupied terrain if it is only an operating area and not a vital base area; the enemy has only a limited supporting arms capability and will usually avoid direct contact with superior friendly forces and rely on small unit operations, including harassment, ambushes, mining and the use of booby traps, to inflict maximum casualties; and the enemy is unlikely to achieve even a limited victory while in an essentially defensive posture.

(4) Capability (8): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's desire to achieve a major victory against friendly forces; the relative freedom of movement through enemy controlled territory and the DMZ; and the enemy's capability to move units between I and II Corps. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's reluctance to mass his forces for movement; and the probability that reinforcing units would be detected and destroyed by friendly supporting arms fire.

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(5) Capability (9): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: This capability is a basic enemy tactic which has long been practiced within SVN; it provides an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms fires; guerrillas and Local Force VC units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while VC Main Force and NVA units conduct large scale operations; the VC knowledge of the terrain and of the local populace; and the enemy's belief that successful application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued U.S. Force presence in SVN. There are no factors which militate against this capability.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption. The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities is as follows: (9), (5), (6), (7), (1), (4), (3), (2) and (8).

d. Vulnerabilities.

(1) VC/NVA supply areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to reconnaissance and surveillance unless carefully concealed.

(2) VC/NVA forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support in SVN and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations VC/NVA forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to the principal of surprise.

(4) Limited manpower resources in North Vietnam and VC controlled areas of South Vietnam have required a dependency upon an extensive conscription program in order to maintain VC/NVA troop levels. The result has been a lowering of morale, reduced training time, decreased combat effectiveness, and increased vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

(5) VC/NVA forces have become more dependent upon local resources for support as the total VC/NVA strength increases. But the necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population under VC/NVA control.

  
R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REFERENCE
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	1	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
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CG FMFPAC	1	CG FLC	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG I FFORCEV	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 76.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	15	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	15	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	3
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 232D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	1
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	III MAF	10
CG 173D ABN BDE	1		


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A NEXT ORDER OF BATTLE TO THE MAP PERCENTAGE BR 39

# CONFIDENTIAL I CORPS ORDER OF BATTLE



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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO PERINTREP No. 30

III MAP VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 292400H OCT 66

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL UNITS	TOTAL STRENGTH
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	2,010					2	2,010
Regiments (Hq)	6	2,000	1	800			7	2,800
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	2	2,700	9	3,700	33	16,600
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	4	2,800			14	5,250
Separate Companies			4	360	27	2,520	31	2,980
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		<u>17,460</u>		<u>6,850</u>		<u>6,270</u>		<u>30,580</u>
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)			1	330	4	1,500	5	1,830
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			2	200	4	455	6	655
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				<u>530</u>		<u>1,955</u>		<u>2,485</u>
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)	1	500			1	200	2	700
Battalions (Infantry)	3	1,500			6	2,280	9	3,780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		<u>2,500</u>				<u>2,600</u>		<u>5,100</u>
GUERRILLA STRENGTH								<u>20,121</u>
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		<u>19,960</u>		<u>7,380</u>		<u>10,825</u>		<u>98,286</u>

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2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 292400H Oct 66

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST PROB LOCATION	DATE
324B Div (Hq&Spt) #1	NVA	C	1,430 #2	Fair #3	N Quang Tri (P)	YD0262	23Jul66
803rd Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	28Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	XD9961	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	28Sep66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	XD9658	24Aug66
812th Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	10Oct66
4th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	XD1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	10Oct66
6th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	10Oct66
90th Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	W DMZ YD0973	8Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	YD0970	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	YD1171	23Sep66
9th Bn	NVA	C	525		N Quang Tri (P)	YD1676	8Oct66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200	Unk #4	DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200	Unk #5	DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	DMZ	13Aug66
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD3757	Hai Lang (D)	19Sep66
812th Bn #6	NVA	C	500		YD4143	Quang Tri (P)	22Sep66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD3542	9Sep66
K.3 Co	MF	C	100		YD0220	ZC1597	23Jun66
C.55	MF	C	75		Trieu Phong (D)	Trieu Phong (D)	Dec65
Hai Lang Co	LF	C	80		YD3244	YD3854	7Sep66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD2245	YD2244	20Aug66
C.10 Co	MF	PR	120		YD3338	YD4734	30Jun66
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD1058	YD0452	19Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST PROB LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD4724	YD4723	22Jan66
6th Regt Hq	NVA	C	300	Good	YD4735	YD5218	31Jul66
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien(D)	YD3334	12Jul66
802nd Bn #6	MF	C	400	Good	YD6318	Quang Dien(D)	13Aug66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD5642	YD3228	12Jul66
95th B Regt (Hq)	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien(P)	Unlocated	22Aug66
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien(F)	Unlocated	22Aug66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien(P)	Unlocated	22Aug66
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Thua Thien(P)	Unlocated	22Aug66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc(D)	YD7904	13Aug66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD5320	YD5520	23Aug66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD8402	YD8402	1Dec65
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD6931	Quang Dien(D)	23Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD6530	YD5124	1Dec65
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD8009	YD8522	21Dec65
Huong Tra Co	MF	PR	100		YD7412	YD7910	11Feb66
G.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang(D)	YD8620	6Sep66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

* 3rd NVA Regt (Hq) #7	NVA	C	300	Good	Que Son(D)	W Que Son(D)	21Oct66
* 1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son(D)	W Que Son(D)	21Oct66
* 2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son(D)	W Que Son(D)	21Oct66
* 3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son(D)	W Que Son(D)	21Oct66
Binh Son Trans Bn	MF	C	1,490		YC6035	YC6035	31Dec65
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500	Unk #8	AT8454	AT8054	14Sep66
70th Bn	LF	C	500	Good	Que Son(D)	BT2212	18Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		AT8753	BT0354	16Sep66
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	300	Excel	AT8364	AT8060	27Aug66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST PROB LOCATION	DATE
51st Bn	LF	PR	300		AT9089	ZC2080	3May66
5th Regt (Hq)	MF	PO	200		Que Son(D)	Que Son(D)	15Feb66
2nd Bn	LF	PO	300		AT9556	BT0365	14May66
3rd Bn	LF	PR	400		AT8737	BT0667	18Sep66
23rd Bn	LF	PO	500		BT0162	BT1262	6Mar66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT0132	BT1342	11Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT0355	BT0662	21Sep66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT9166	BT0669	5Jul66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT0152	BT1452	24Jan66
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT8551	AT8447	19Feb66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC2149	ZC1455	31Dec65
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT8658	AT7967	11Jun66

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

620th Div (Hq)	NVA	C	100		Hiep Duc(D)	Quang Tin(P)	26Apr66
21st Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	200		Que Son/T Binh(D)	BT0035	15Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh(D)	BT0927	12Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh(D)	AT9926	26Aug66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh	BT2323	10Aug66
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	Hiep Duc(D)	24Aug66
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	BS2785	13Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT9221	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT9222	6Jul66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT2224	BT3329	19Sep66
Nam Son Trans Bn	MF	C	700		ZB1079	ZB0992	24Oct65
49th Bn	LF	PR	500		BT0730	BT1341	13Sep66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT3113	BT3210	15Sep66
A10 Co	LF	C	150		BT1536	BT2734	28Aug66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT1017	BT0506	9Sep66
A16 Co	LF	C	120		BT1516	BT1918	11Sep66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT2810	BT3609	27May66
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT2718	BT3416	Feb66
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT0303	AS9596	24Oct66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST PROB LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS8799	AS8799	24Oct66
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS1499	BS1499	24Oct66

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region V	NVA	C	650		BS1275	BS1294	25Feb66
1st VC Regt (Hq)	MF	C	800	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	S Tra Bong(D)	12Oct66
60th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	S Tra Bong(D)	12Oct66
80th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	S Tra Bong(D)	12Oct66
90th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	S Tra Bong(D)	12Oct66
20th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS2864	BS3765	19Sep66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS6654	BS7753	16Sep66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS7850	BS7550	16Sep66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS4382	BS5483	15Sep66
104th Bn	LF	PR	300		BS6692	BT3700	12Sep66
1506th Engr Bn	MF	PR	330		BS2870	BS3470	13Sep66
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS5370	Son Tinh(D)	7Oct66
109th Bn	LF	PO	300		BS7283	BS3993	10Jul66
37th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS5860	Nghia Hanh(D)	28Sep66
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS5477	BS7383	25Aug66
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS5053	BS5754	18Jun66
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS5770	BS5770	24May66
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS3065	BS3764	24Feb66
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS7055	BS6753	7Sep66
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS6136	BS6133	22Jun66
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS8125	BS8145	15Sep66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS6687	BS7583	1Sep66
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS5082	BS5579	15Sep66
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS5784	BS6392	17Sep66
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS3190	BS4087	23Aug66

NOTES

- #1. The battalions are probably located in the vicinity coordinates listed. These positions are based on interrogation reports or captured documents. The 2nd, 5th and 6th Battalions are carried unlocated in the northern QUANG TRI-DMZ area.

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- #2. Strength of 324 B units estimated at 75% of T/O due to contacts in Operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE.
- #3. Denotes entire division.
- #4. Believed to be operating at half strength with 6X120mm MORT.
- #5. Believed to be operating at half strength with 9X12.7mm AA MG.
- #6. On 1 Jul VCC stated that the 802nd Battalion had replaced the 812th Battalion in the 6th Regiment and that the 812th Battalion had been disbanded. On 22 Sep rallier stated that 812th was subordinate to 6th Regt. Since insufficient information is available on the current status of the 812th Battalion, it will be carried as a separate battalion subordinate to the northern Sub-Region Hq.
- #7. NVAC interrogation on 21 Oct revealed that the 3rd NVA Regt had moved from an unknown area (possible southern QUANG TIN/northern QUANG NGAI Provinces) to southern QUANG NAM, for an attack on Mong Son coal mine area.
- #8. R.20 Bn suffered extensive casualties during Operation 4400N.
  - \* Unit information changed since PERINTREP NR 38.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 292400H OCT 66

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div(?); 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?) Cong Truong Lon; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May	51.441 KT	Unk	CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIEP XO-DUYET PO-Maj Song THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn			
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn			
812th Regt	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUCNG PO-Capt Mai Van CU
7th Bn	D-7; K.37			
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9			
12th AT Bn				

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG#1	CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
812th Bn 814th Bn	K.12 K.14		2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
K.3 Co C.55 Co	803 Co DCI(Group 1); Quang Tri Prov Indep Co		4-60mm Mort 2-MG 8-AR 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Hac Dac PHU XO-Lt TUAN PO-2ndLt THIEN CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
Hai Lang Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; H.99			CO-NGHIA
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02; V-51; H-20			
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien			
Gam Lo Co	H.30			
<u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>				
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai			CG-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt PHUNG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520		
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-1(?)			
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
95th B Regt (Hq) 804th Bn 810th Bn K.41 Co	K.4; VQ-74 6th; K-10; 310(?) C-106; D-6; F.18; Phe 18		1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-LtCol TRUONG CO-Ton That THIET CO-Capt Huong THI CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co		2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-Capt Hoang AN CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Nguyen DAM CO-THUYET CO-Xuan SAM
Huong Thuy Co Huong Tra Co C.117 Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17 D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5 Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>				
*3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Work- site-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH CO-Capt THAO CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP
*1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh			
*2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			
*3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			
Binh Son Transport Bn R.20	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO-TRI CO-Nguyen Van LAM
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-nt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Lam Bn; 5th Bn		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH  CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THUU PO-TOAN
V.25 Bn				

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	T-89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-Nguyen BA PHAT
51st Bn	Nguyen Ba Phat Bn; 137 Bn; 184 Bn; 42nd Bn		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 26-AR	
5th Regt (Hq) 3rd Bn			2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-Tran CAM CO-HOANG
23rd Bn	27th Bn; 27th Nung Bn; Chi Nguyen Quan Bn; 93d Regt; 7th Bn D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 4-MG	CO-Maj Le LUYEN
Que Son Co				CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th			CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			CO-Phan Phong SAM
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54	G-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>				
620th Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 2nd Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang			CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
21st Regt (Hq)	BACH MA; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong-21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-FIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135 Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn				CO-Nguyen Kaach THO

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; X-11; 19th Bn			CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN XO-Tran Van QUANG PO-Nguyen Van HIEN
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR) RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33			CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO
RQ24 Bn (ENG) 72nd Bn Nam Son Trans Bn 49th Bn	GK-40		7-81mm Mort 15-60mm Mort 5-57mm RR 3-MG 24-AR	CO-Duong Van CHAU PO-Thuyng Thanh MY
706th Co A10 Co	V-14 Co; 106th Co Thang Bin; F-14; D-21; K51; 107		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THAN PO-Anh VU
A13 Co A16 Co	D-22 C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co A21 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co Tra Son Co Tra Ha Co				CO-MAHN
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>				
Military Region V (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; P-550; Co Hoa			CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>TLBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
1st VC Regt (Rq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108(Alt Cmd Elm)			CO-Col Chaw Choi DI XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006			CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
80th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007			CO-Maj Nguyen THYEN XO-PHAM
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20			CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai FIM
48th Bn	Poss 408th Bn			CO-Capt KY
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite		3-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 2-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
104th Bn	405th Bn		1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 2-MG 18-AR	CO-Nguyen Hi CHAW: Nghia TUN
1506th Engr Bn	Poss 506th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			CO-Pham Van NGOC
109th Bn	209th Bn; B.17 Bn; T.17th Bn; B-8			CO-Bui Kim BONG
37th Bn				CO-Maj Tran Duc DUC
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Minh Long Co			CO-Lu TRI
206th Co	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU
614th Co	Son Ha Co			CO-Dien Ha MIEU
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			CO-THIN
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			CO-MAU

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<u>INIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co T.19 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

NOTES

#1. Weapons listed are the normal TOE weapons for these particular units. However, considering the fact that these battalions are operating at less than normal strength, a reduction in TOE weapons is probable.

\*Unit information changed since PERINTREP NR 38.

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## 4. RESUME OF 324B DIVISION AS OF 28 OCT 66

a. Organization. The 324B Div, an offspring of the 324th Div, has been operating in the northern portion of QUANG TRI Province and the DMZ. It has attempted to infiltrate SVN and liberate QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces. This division has under its command the 803rd, 812th, and 90th Regiments. The 803rd Regt consists of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions; the 812th Regt consists of the 4th, 5th, and the 6th Battalions; and the 90th Regt consists of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions.

There are seven support battalions directly subordinate to the division headquarters. Five of these seven battalions are considered to be in the confirmed category and two are considered as possible. The seven battalions are:

- (1) 12th Anti-Tank Bn, (Poss)
- (2) 13th Arty Bn, (Conf)
- (3) 14th AA Bn, (Conf)
- (4) 15th Engineer Bn, (Conf)
- (5) 16th Signal Bn, (Conf)
- (6) 17th Transportation Bn, (Poss)
- (7) 19th Medical Bn, (Conf)

b. Disposition. It is accepted that the division headquarters and main organizations of the division are in the DMZ with elements operating south of the DMZ. Contacts by USMC and ARVN since Operation PRAIRIE began and documents recovered from a dead soldier indicate the probability that elements of the 803rd, 812th, and the 90th Regiment are operating south of the DMZ.

The last reported locations of these units are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
2/(7 Bn)/ 90th Regt	(YD 126666)	12Oct66	NVA Pack w/tag
7/90th Regt	(YD 097705)	30Oct66	Document
8/90th Regt	(YD 115719)	10Oct66	Document
9/90th Regt	(YD 162760)	50Oct66	Coded Agent
812th Regt	(YD 062522)	10Aug66	Agt Report
803rd Regt	(YD 119688)	8Aug66	Agt Report
1/803rd Regt	(XD 991612)	28Sep66	Document
*4/32nd Regt	(YD 097705)	8Oct66	Document
*2/1/31st Regt	(YD 115719)	18Oct66	Document
*1/31st Regt	(YD 126666)	12Oct66	Document

\*Note: The 31st and 32nd Regts are subordinate to the 341st Div. It is not known if the 31st and 32nd Regt's are in a reinforcing role or being used as lateral replacement units, however indications are that the personnel are being used in a lateral replacement role.

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c. History. The 324B Div has no known history prior to entering SVN. The 324B Div was first reported on 19 May 1966 by returnee, Bui Thang, PFC, from the topographic group, 324B Div. He stated that on 15 May 1966, his group (200 men) infiltrated through the DMZ. The mission of the group was to survey the terrain in the BA LONG District and to seek a location for the division to occupy while an attack on that district was being planned.

On 9 July 1966, Rallier MAI HONG NHI, (Lieutenant, XO, 3rd Co, 5th Bn, 812th Regt, 324B Div) related information concerning the division's plans. The 324B Division intended to coordinate with other units from the Northern Sub-Region to carry out the following:

(1) Cut off National Highway #9 to protect the infiltrating corridor across this area.

(2) Deploy troops to counter RVNAF Operations and annihilate RVNAF heliborne forces in CUA Area (10km South West of CAM LO) with the 5th Bn, 812th Regt and 8th Bn, 803rd Regt. (G-2 Comment: 8th Bn is subordinate to the 90th Regt, not to the 803rd as the rallier indicated.)

(3) Attack CUA and CA LU Post, CAM LO and BA LONG District seats and DONG HA town with infantry and sapper units.

Marine reconnaissance teams reported numerous contacts during early July. These contacts initiated Operation HASTINGS on 7 July 1966. 3 August 1966 marked the end of HASTINGS and the beginning of Operation PRAIRIE, which is still in progress.

d. Current Situation. Reconnaissance and air crews have reported extensive supply activity in the DMZ area, including dispersed supply points, road traffic and movement of material by sea. Numerous secondary explosions resulting from friendly air strikes in or north of the DMZ also indicate an NVA logistics base.

Anti-aircraft fire was received during Operation HASTINGS and has continued during Operation PRAIRIE. There have been no contacts or sightings of these anti-aircraft units, therefore, no connection can be made with the 324B Div.

e. Combat Effectiveness. Contact by units participating in Operation PRAIRIE indicates battalion strength outpost and reconnaissance elements are operating south of the DMZ. Indications are that these units are serving as an Outpost Line of Resistance for main elements. It is estimated that a total force equivalent to three battalions may be operating south of the DMZ.

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Combat Losses For 324B Division since 7 July are:

## OPERATION

	<u>HASTINGS</u>	<u>PRAIRIE</u> (28 Oct)	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA (Conf)	785	1200	1985
KIA (Prob)	864	1524	2388
TOTAL	1649	2724	4373

By using a WIA ratio (non-returning wounded) of 120% of KIA (Conf), the WIA totals 2480, therefore, KIA confirmed and WIA total are 4465 from 7 Jul to 28 Oct 1966.

After the termination of Operation HASTINGS, PRAIRIE continued to erode the division and has delayed its capabilities to fully recover.

The morale and state of training are considered to be below the standards of an NVA infantry division. This low state of morale is apparent throughout interrogation reports. Some of the reasons presented are:

- (1) Insufficient food.
- (2) Most men were drafted and did not want to come to SVN to fight.
- (3) Afraid of air strikes and artillery.
- (4) They saw for themselves that they were not winning the war as they were told by the cadre in the north.
- (5) Sickness and lack of medical supplies.

Interrogation reports also indicate the lack of training prior to infiltrating SVN. Some units went into combat with "Green" troops and when they were hit by air, artillery and infantry, the cadre lost complete control of their men. One report stated that the cadre were the first to panic. There were reports of desertions and personnel faking sickness so that they wouldn't have to fight.

Ground and air action during Operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE have significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the 324B Div. The division as a whole is rated as marginally effective. The 324B Div is capable of conducting a determined defense on favorable terrain, or executing limited offensive actions up to regimental strength.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)  
TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39

1. G-710 UNIT (AKA 1ST VOLUNTEER YOUTH GROUP WORKS). Captive 2d Lt LE KHANH TRA, a medical doctor with the G-710 unit, gave the following additional information during interrogation:

a. From January 1955 until October 1959, the captive attended a Vietnamese language school in DAP CAU, BAC NINH (P), NVN to prepare him for future medical study. He achieved a medical degree and became a doctor and a 2d Lt after graduating from a medical school in HANOI in December 1962. He was then employed by the Health Department in HANOI until April 1965 when he was informed that he would shortly be assigned to infiltrate into SVN. From May to June 1965 he was given a political indoctrination course along with some NBC instructions.

b. During the course of instruction on NBC warfare a class was given on the function and use of a Russian made survival suit, to be used in the event of NBC warfare. The upper unit consists of a gray pull-over type gas mask, with a hose, canister and an oxygen bottle which contains a five hour supply that is dispensed by a demand type regulator. The complete head gear unit weighs approximately 1/2 Kilogram or about one pound. The lower portion of the unit is a green rubberized section which is available in three types; Type 1 weighs two pounds, Type 2 weighs four pounds and Type 3 weighs six pounds.

c. There are only one or two special troop units in NVN who are equipped with these NBC survival units. The captive knew nothing of the NBC warfare potential of these special units, nor did he know where they were located.

(G-2 Cmt: The information concerning the Russian made survival suit is consistent with previously reported information and is rated F/3).

2. The following recently translated document published by the 324th B Div gives the NVA interpretation of the situation and the assignment of a plan and mission to the division prior to operation HASTINGS.

"I. SITUATION:

a. Enemy: The enemy has recently suffered continuous losses on all battlefields in SVN (especially Route 13, BAC NHA, KONTUM, QUANG NAM, QUANG NGAI and TRI THIEN).

Therefore, they have become more and more confused. Even on our battlefield, the enemy officers and enlisted men also show that they are worried. Although, we completely destroyed their position at DAU MAU, broke through the defensive line on Highway 9 and deeply penetrated their rear areas ... they have made no considerable reactions.

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The enemy believes completely in air and artillery activities and only attaches importance to the build-up of fortifications. That is why we have not yet carried out our intention of annihilating them outside their bases. If we do not make efforts now to positively fight the enemy, we will commit a great error of omission, that is to give them enough time for consolidation and preparation. We should work against time in order to be able to coordinate with our comrades fighting on other battlefields.

However, at present, we cannot apply the tactics of "attack of strongholds".

We should be composed, wise and patient in carrying out our guidelines. In all ways, we are determined to urgently and positively force the enemy to cope with us. By doing so, we will have favorable conditions for annihilating them. At the same time we can coordinate with other battlefields in time.

b. Friendly: In the execution of operation orders, we have achieved many great victories.

In the long term operation of "crossing over the mountains to destroy the US and puppet troops", we have kept our large strength secret, assured security for units, carried out the plan at the proper time and fought resolutely during fierce battles.

In accordance with the guidelines suggested by higher echelons, we have won the first battle quickly. This has greatly encouraged our soldiers to begin their activities, break through the defensive line on Route 9, develop our liberated areas and corridors, and threaten the enemy rear bases. This has exerted a great influence on the people.

Generally speaking, at present, our soldiers' still have a fighting spirit and it is raised frequently. Although they have to go on operations, fight, and evacuate the people ... on a permanent basis, they still lack enthusiasm. In spite of sickness, many comrades have performed their missions ardently. Everybody is willing to fight and assume the heaviest responsibilities. Soldiers have urgently complied with operations orders and closely collaborated with one another in the execution of missions. Cadre have been conscious of their responsibilities towards the units. Most of the Party members and Group members have deserved their exemplary and important positions. The majority of Party members working in various districts and villages are good.

## II. GENERAL PLAN AND MISSION OF THE UNITS:

Based upon the enemy and our situation cited above, the following plan is established by the Command Committee of the May 1st Worksite.

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Be enthusiastic in continuously attacking and encircling the enemy by means of various combat ruses to make them confused and be in a defensive state, thus facilitating our annihilation of them outside fortifications. Be determined to defend the liberated area at DAU MAU in order to facilitate the enlargement of the corridor. Preserve the secrecy of the large strength. Make preparations for the destruction of enemy main forces.

The units must consider their specific missions as orders.

III. COMMAND MISSIONS:

To perform the above plan and mission, attention should be directed toward the following points:

Have a thorough knowledge of the situation, mission and guidelines of operation, especially of the immediate and future specific mission of the unit to observe weak and strong points. Keep one's decision unchanged. Correct all errors to properly carry out the mission.

It is necessary to thoroughly understand the enemy and our situation. This is the plan of the Worksite Command Committee and specific missions of the unit assigned to all cadre and soldiers.

Check the situation of the unit. Evaluate weak and strong points to find the main cause. Decisions must be firmly taken. Responsibility must be clearly prescribed for the new mission.

Regarding the units in the front of (KO,5,9), attention should be directed toward brightening the leadership to overcome the fear of attacking the enemy.

Develop the heroic tradition of our army. Have good leadership to properly observe the guidelines. Take any opportunity to destroy the enemy outside his fortifications. Heighten the spirit of coordination between us and friendly forces. Overcome the fear of artillery and aircraft in the lowlands. Stay close to the enemy to conduct close attacks to annihilate the enemy and help the people construct their installations."

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## ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39

1. GENERAL. VC activity during the reporting period increased slightly, although remaining at a comparatively low level. Several reports were received indicating that the VC plan to disrupt GVN celebrations for National Day (1 November). Other reports of interest were those involving a number of VN nationals accused of informing the VC of friendly activities, VC sabotage of lines of communication, and reports of renewed propaganda activity.

2. ESPIONAGE.

THUA THIEN. A U.S. Intelligence Agency reported that an espionage ring composed mainly of females, was operating in the HUE area.

QUANG NAM. A 1st Battalion, 1st Marines report of 22 October stated that one VN male was apprehended in the vicinity of (BT 121603) while warning the VC of an approaching USMC patrol.

QUANG NGAI. On 23 October the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines reported that one VN was apprehended in the vicinity of (BT 539902) while warning the VC of Allied Forces in the area.

On 21 October the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines reported the apprehension of VN youths who had been informing the VC of USMC movements.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage against lines of communication were reported during the period:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>INCIDENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
THUA THIEN	28Oct66	Highway culvert destroyed	YD 811187
QUANG NAM	28Oct66	Bridge destroyed	BT 027134
QUANG NAM	24Oct66	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 101517
QUANG NAM	22Oct66	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 283325
QUANG TIN	22Oct66	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 283251
QUANG NGAI	21Oct66	Bridge destroyed	BS 726563

QUANG TIN. On 25 October a U.S. Intelligence Agency reported that a VC sapper platoon plans to sabotage the electrical power house at TAM KY prior to 1 November 1966.

A 29 October report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency reported that the VC had ordered a sapper company into the general area of DAKANG. The mission of this company was: (1) destroy government buildings, waterfront facilities and U.S. installations in the City of DANANG; (2) destroy the I Corps Bridge (BT 0376); (3) commit sabotage at DANANG Air Base; (4) conduct a mortar attack against the Marble Mountain Air Facility; (5) possibly a mortar attack against HUI AN. This series of attacks would reportedly occur between the period 29 October - 1 November in order to disrupt the National Day celebration. (CI Comment: A previous report of 28 October from another intelligence agency reported the same general information).

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4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

THUA THIEN

A 25 October report from an intelligence source stated that at 0300 on 24 October a squad of VC gave propaganda lectures to the people of THANH LAM (H) (YD 834174).

A U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that on 14 October VC propaganda leaflets were found in THUY THUONG (V) (YD 880170). Three of the leaflets were directed at the American Servicemen telling them to stop raids, massacres, plunder, house burning and the raping of women. The other leaflet emphasized the U.S. student riots over the U.S. war policy in Vietnam.

QUANG NAM

A U.S. Intelligence Agency reported that a VC propaganda platoon is operating in the vicinity of (AT 839801). The mission of the platoon is to disseminate propaganda leaflets in the general area of U.S. units.

An 18 October report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency reported finding a VC safe conduct pass in the vicinity of HOA LAC (V) (AT 903825). The leaflet stressed the usual VC propaganda theme of, "The sadness of the American War effort in Vietnam and the capitalist exploitation of the American Serviceman." The leaflet indicated that the pass would ensure safety when presented to the Liberation Army or People's Armed Forces and a safe trip to the individuals homeland.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

THUA THIEN. On 25 October an intelligence source reported an attempted demonstration in the City of HUE. Approximately 50 elderly persons were directed to the HUONG THUY District Headquarters when they attempted to march to the Headquarters of the 1st ARVN Regiment, in the City of HUE. Most of the elderly people were parents or relatives of ARVN soldiers. (CI Comment: It is believed that most of the participants were innocent people who were persuaded to demonstrate by the VC).

A 25 October report from an intelligence source indicated that the VC will offer poison fish to the Marines in the PHU BAI area (YD 920120), (CI Comment: It is recommended that personnel be cautioned against buying or accepting foodstuffs from any Vietnamese.)

QUANG NAM

An intelligence source reported that the VC in government controlled areas are supplying merchants with money to buy flour bags which will be used as rice containers. In addition, the VC are requiring the people in these areas to donate gray cloth, salt, dried fish, shrimp, milk and similar staples.

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QUANG NAM

An intelligence source reported on 24 October that in the villages of DAI LOC (D), HOA VANG (D) and DIEM BAN (D), the VC are collecting a rice tax in areas controlled by them, while in government controlled areas a monetary tax is collected.

QUANG NGAI

A report of 23 October stated that on 17 October an unknown number of VC raided LAM BINH (H) vicinity of (BS 8536) and kidnapped a public worker.

A 23 October report stated that a civilian, PHAN NHAM, was kidnapped by the VC in the vicinity of (BS 665959). Reportedly, NHAM was kidnapped in order to pressure his brother to stop selling goods to the USMC.


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6 NOVEMBER 1966

# PERINTREP NO 40



III MAF PERINTREP # 40

30 Oct - 5 Nov 66

GROUP-4  
LOWGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 060800H NOV 66  
 Ser: 0160066

PERINTREP NO. 40

Period Covered: 300001H Oct - 052400H Nov 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,  
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In QUANG TRI (P) significant activity was limited to a single contact on 3 November in which ARVN units engaged two VC/NVA Companies at (YD 448598) during Operation LS 325. In THUA THIEN (P), on 30 October, the 13th RR Security Co was attacked by an estimated VC Platoon at (ZD 006034). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG NGAI (P), on 30 October and 3 November, RF/PF elements were attacked by VC in platoon strength at (BS 803387) and (BS 718595). On 4 November the 937th RF Co was attacked by two VC Companies at (BS 766464), a VC battalion attacked THACH THU (V) (BS 757470), and an estimated VC battalion attacked two PF platoons at a bridge site and outpost in the vicinity of (BS 813339). Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 260 and consisted of 141 small unit engagements, 94 AA fire incidents, 21 mine/booby trap incidents, one attack and three acts of sabotage.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. The 74th NVA Recon Bn in NVN reportedly is undergoing training personnel in the following techniques:

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(a) Reconnaissance Technique. A reconnaissance cell consists of three men who are provided with one pair of binoculars, one pencil, one notebook and one watch. The cell will normally select observation positions such as hills, trees tops, temples, or pagoda roofs and other points distant from the facility to be observed. While one member of the cell observes with binoculars and notes details concerning the activities observed, the other two members provide local security. Observation positions are changed every three days.

(b) Infiltration Technique. An infiltration cell also consists of three men with the mission of infiltrating defense perimeters to conduct close reconnaissance. A cell will normally be armed and equipped as follows: one submachine gun, six three-foot bamboo poles, 12 pieces of bamboo with one end painted white, one pair of "scissors" (probably wire cutters), one metal probe about two and a half feet long and one dagger. The members are clothed only in shorts. During infiltration the lead member of the cell will use bamboo poles to "support" the barbed wire, mines are detected with the probe and the pieces of bamboo with the white markings are placed for the second member to follow. The third member acts as security outside the defense perimeter. After performing the reconnaissance mission the cell will obliterate any signs of infiltration and withdraw through the perimeter at the original infiltration point.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Installation</u>	<u>Source/ Evaluation</u>
24 Oct	(BS 380820)	VC safe area, and weapons and rice storage area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/2
28 Oct	(BS 530880)	Storage area in safe zone	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/6

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 94. 12 aircraft sustained hits. Grid squares of highest density were (YD 71), (BT 07), (ZC16), (AT 96) and (BS 69).

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Reconnaissance sightings in northern QUANG TRI (P) continued to be light during the reporting period, with only minor sightings west of TON SON LAM.

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(2) THUA THIEN (P). Sightings to the west of HUE near the SONG BO River were moderately heavy during the period. Several minor sightings were made of groups of two to four VC/NVA west and northwest of the PHU BAI TAOR.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Sightings were from a low to moderate level with most sightings concentrated in the southwestern part of the DANANG TAOR south of AN HOA. One patrol operating west of the NONG SON area (AT 7948) on 31 October sighted a total of 64 NVA in several groups moving generally north.

(4) QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P). Sightings were light during the reporting period and were limited to the area around the CIDG Camps at TIEN PHOUC, HA THANH and MINH LONG.

s. Negative.

### 3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 106 KIA, 246 KIA (Prob), and nine VCC. Weapons losses consisted of 15 individual weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. The weather picture along the coastal plain of the I Corps area was characterized by cloudy skies and light monsoon rainfall during the reporting period. Trafficability conditions improved as washouts on major highways were repaired and flood waters receded. Flying weather varied from fair to good. In the mountain areas low stratus clouds and fog conditions continued, along with occasional cloud buildups that obscured higher terrain and delayed close air support missions. Weekly averages for the areas indicated are as follows:

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
	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	85	82	84	85
Low	71	71	71	75
Rainfall (total)	1.49	.08	.81	1.82
Visibility (miles)	4	4	4	5
Winds (knots)	8	8	8	7

k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.



R. H. THOMPSON  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

A. ORDER OF BATTLE

B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	1	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	1	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CG FLC	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG I FFORCEV	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 76.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	15	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	15	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	15	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	3
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	1
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	III MAF	10
CG 173D ABN BDE	1		

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO PERINTREP NO. 40 (CHANGE 1 TO PERINTREP 39 (EFFECTIVE 052400H OCT 66))

1. For paragraph 1, page A-2 make following change:

a. Replace page A-2 (CHANGE 1 052400H NOV 66) paragraph 1 dated 292400H with new page A-2 attached.

2. For paragraph 2, pages A-3 through A-7, make the following changes:

a. Page A-3.

(1) Change 324B Div (Hq & Spt) Est Strength to 1340.

(2) Change 803rd Regt (Hq), 812th (Hq) and 90th Regt (Hq) Est Strength to 890.

(3) Change 324B Div battalions 1st through 9th Est Strength to 490.

b. Page A-4.

(1) Delete entire lines of 95th B Regt (Hq) and subordinate 4th, 5th and 6th Bns. The 95th B Regt has been deleted because:

(a) There has been complete lack of hard intelligence since Apr 66.

(b) Recent information in I FFORCV CTR (II Corps) indicates that 95th B Regt is probably located in vicinity of DJERENG Special Forces Camp in PLEIKU Province.

(2) Change 70th Bn TYPE to MF.

c. Page A-5.

(1) Delete entire line of 2nd Bn, 5th Regt. The battalion is deleted because:

(a) There has been a complete lack of information concerning the battalion since 1 JUN 1966.

d. Page A-7

(1) Change numeral 75% in Note #2 to 70%.

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3. For paragraph 3, pages A-7 through A-14, make the following changes:

a. Page A-10.

(1) Delete 1 line pertaining to 95th B Regt (Hq).

4. Common change applying to more than one page.

a. Change numerical designation of 620th Div to 2nd Div. This change appears on pages A-1, A-5 and A-11. Substitute 620th Div under AKA column for 2nd Div on page A-11. This change is made in order to standardize the division's numerical designation within COMUSMACV Forces.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO PERINTREP No. 39

## III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 052400H NOV 66.

	<u>NVA FORCE</u>		<u>VC MAIN FORCE</u>		<u>VC LOCAL FORCE</u>		<u>TOTAL UNITS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,920					2	1,920
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,940	1	800			7	2,740
Battalions (Infantry)	17	9,885	8	3,300	8	3,200	33	16,385
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	4	2,890			14	5,340
Separate Companies			3	285	27	2,570	30	2,855
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		<u>16,995</u>		<u>7,275</u>		<u>5,770</u>		<u>30,040</u>
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)			1	330	4	1,500	5	1,830
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			2	200	4	455	6	655
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				<u>530</u>		<u>1,955</u>		<u>2,485</u>
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)					1	200	1	200
Battalions (Infantry)					5	1,980	5	1,980
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		<u>500</u>				<u>2,300</u>		<u>2,800</u>
<u>GUERRILLA STRENGTH</u>								
								<u>20,121</u>
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		<u>17,495</u>		<u>7,805</u>		<u>10,025</u>		<u>55,446</u>

A-2 (Change 1 052400H NOV 66)

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## 4. Miscellaneous.

## A. New unidentified unit designations.

(1) ARVN translation of documents captured by G/2/5, 3rd Mar Div on 11 Oct 1966 at YD110715 revealed the following:

(a) Twenty sheets of paper (medical records) of unit LANG 2, K.101.

(b) One tag with printed words TRAN-N-CHUOC, (name possibly garbled), postal box (LBN) 31446 LANG 2, K.101 designated SONG HONG.

(2) Translation of documents captured by E/2/9, 3rd Mar Div on 21 Oct 1966 at XD924503 revealed the following identifications:

(a) 11th Co, 3rd Bn. 71st Regt. (III MAF G-2 has no record of this unit).

(b) LBN 8469A. (III MAF G-2 has no record of this LBN).

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO  
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 40

1. 3d NVA Regt 620th Div. PHAM DUC DUA, a rifleman of the 1st Co, 1st Bn, 3d NVA Regt, captured in the attack of the NONG SON area of QUANG NAM (P) on 18 October, gave the following additional information during detailed interrogation:

a. The 3d NVA Regt (AKA 31st NVA Regt) was known as the 64th NVA Regt until its arrival in the QUANG TIN (P) area, at the end of April 1966. The regiment is composed of three battalions, the 1st, 2d and 3d Bns and the following separate companies: C-13 Recon Co, (?) AA Co, (?) 57mm RR Co, C-18 Comm Co, C-19 Engr Co and (?) Med Co. The 1st Bn has a strength of about 260 and consists of three rifle companies and a combat support company. The battalion is equipped with the following crew served weapons: four 82mm Mort, two 75mm RR, three 12.7mm MG and six LMGs.

b. The primary area of operation of the 3d NVA Regt is in HIEP DUC (D), QUANG TIN (P) and DUC DUC (D) and QUE SON (D), QUANG NAM (P). In regard to the mission the 3d NVA Regt, the captive was told by cadre that the regiment was engaged in the destruction of outposts during the monsoon season.

c. Prior to the attack of the 3d NVA Regt on the TRUNG HAN Outpost (AT 858402) in the NONG SON area an operation order was given on 14 October. Everyone was ordered to carry five days rations, which consist of two days dry rations and three days rice ration. The regiment moved out the same day with the 1st Bn in the lead, followed by the 2d Bn, 3d Bn, the regimental command group and the separate companies. At 1800 the units began crossing the river at (ZC 200240) using 10 small boats. The regiment continued to move along the river and rested at (AT 830330). At 1700 on 15 October the regiment continued to move northeast.

d. At 1800 on 16 October, the regiment reached the vicinity of (AT 865375), where it crossed the line of departure at 2300. The 1st Bn deployed in a bow formation from coordinates (AT 845391) to (AT 851392), while 2d Bn surrounded the outpost at (AT 858402). The 82mm Mort Co was deployed in the vicinity of (AT 858391) to support the attacking units, and the 3d Bn assumed a position as the regimental reserve in the vicinity of (AT 861387). The regimental CP was located at (AT 865375). About 2400 the attack began and continued for an hour when the 1st Co seized the outpost. The following morning at 0900 the outpost was attacked by air; however the attacking force found safety in newly constructed bunkers. At 1700 on 17 October, counterattacking ARVN units made contact with the 3d Bn. Shortly after that the 1st Bn withdrew and the captive became separated and was subsequently captured. It was assumed that the 3d NVA Regt moved back to a prearranged assembly area at (AT 853394) and from

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that point to MAN KONG (H) (AT 840365) and THACH BICH (V) (AT 800300). (G-2 Comment: Information given by the captive differs from previous reports of the regimental support companies being organic to a 4th Bn and the captive does not identify the 17th Mort Co or a 15th Transport Co previously reported. Other information corresponds with III MAF holdings and is rated as C/3).

2. The following is a translation of a document which indicates a VC assessment of the situation in the area of eastern QUANG NAM (P) and establishes VC tasks for the last six months of 1966.

ACKNOWLEDGED SITUATION:

The Enemy Conspiracy. They have reinforced and expanded military activity that aims at extending defenses around DANANG. There will be an increase in search and destroy operations. Operations will be fierce full scale and force the population to their will in the extended areas. They will consolidate strategic communication axis and control essential places in the province surrounding our sources of support. Our districts are within the enemy's pacification area. The enemy is searching for weaknesses in our youth (fear of dying, difficulties, suffering, and our material deficiencies). Persuade our youth in the revolution by increasing the efforts and strength of the party, in respect to combat and production. The war level will be fiercer, difficulties, casualties among our people and youth will increase, therefore endurance is necessary. Manpower and material is needed in more than the usual amounts.

ADVANTAGE

The enemy's ability is limited because they have many weak points and much contradiction. The Americans and their henchmen are trying to support a politically isolated government which gives us an advantage in the political struggle. Therefore, we must attack in two directions, political and combat, which we are sure will push them into a more difficult and passive situation.

Our Situation. Our abilities have become stronger and stronger. We have much fighting and constructive experience. Our party has very good cadres and everyone is behind the revolution. We have a solid Northern backing and a great many liberated areas in the South. We also have world wide support, especially among the people of Marxian Countries.

Establish Forces. Increase duties of Armed Forces of the group and the guerrilla by 100% in the case of cadre, 80% for youth, 50% for female youth, 15% to 20% for children and increase strict control of leadership.

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Establishing Combat Villages and Hamlets. Consolidate and reinforce all combat villages and hamlets. Repair all communication trenches, caves and bunkers. The combat morale of villages and hamlets of K Zone is now correct. The outlook of AB Zone must be corrected in regard to administration and responsibility.

Urge Youth to Join Army. This is very important to our group. The draft schedule is divided in two:

The first half should be completed by 23 Sep 1966 and the second half prior to the end of 1966. The youth should be drafted except for those comrades whose absence will cause difficulties to the area. It will be a big credit if any group can draft youth in enemy controlled areas. Besides the above mentioned schedule, youth should stay in villages and keep producing. All missions of sub-groups should be properly finished and regulations strictly carried out. Physical and political condition of draftees should be regarded, and in order to maintain combat quality, the strength of suicide squads must always be sufficient:

Reinforcing suicide squads and concrete sub-group:

*DIEN-XUAN	1	DIEN CHINH	2	DIEN-VAN	2	DIEN HOA	1	DIEN HONG	2
QUANG	3	TAN	1	THIEN	1	THAI	1	THANG	1
PHONG	1	NHON	1	THU	1	SON	1	AN	1
PHUONG	2	NGOC	1	VINH	2	NAM	1	CHUOG	2
TRUNG	2	THANH	1	MINH	2	BINH	1	TOTAL	..... 34

\*NOTE: These are probably names of squad members.

Mission against draft by the Government. This is a very important tactical mission of the party and the group. It not only prevents the enemy from reinforcing their troops but also stops our youth from falling into a system full of guilt. Therefore, in order to prevent the youth from joining the enemy, we should by all means persuade them not to go to the enemy's area, not to join enemy.

Mission of Political Struggle and Military Proselyting. First, we have to recruit cadre. Group members and youth should understand how important political struggle and proselyting are to the present revolution.

Request. Our group should reflect an example to other units by not being afraid of being captured or showing fear of weapons. Fight bravely against the enemy. Political and military proselyting should be managed well. All sub-groups and military proselyting sections must set up an English teaching system for female youth by the end of year. All female youth should be able to speak common English, a factor which is necessary to the struggle.

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Mission of Production and Protection of Production. The youth should stay in rice paddies to produce and protect the harvest and, besides rice, they should produce secondary vegetables and cattle. All planting and harvesting should be done at the same time by groups of families. Establish the storage of food to stop famine. Urge youth to join the Farmer's Association. Set up typical groups for the rest to use as example. Employment of wounded soldiers to assist in the production preparations against sweeps should be made, and the ideals of youth should be corrected.

Education Mission. The youth must have a correct outlook towards the enemy, be faithful to the people, help people without conditions. Continuous study is necessary to become a forward youth and a model of a party member. Overcome mistakes, make clear the differences between the enemy and us, between the revolution and the anti-revolution, beware of the Chieu-Hoi Plot. Search for the enemy and records to be used in psy warfare. Program and set up an educational system for the youth. Missions should be carried out for the party and the group as follows:

Youth of QUANG DA should study the letter of Ho and fight until the last man. Study five things you should do and five things you should not do. Fulfill the missions in the best method possible. Muster the ideals of youth. Propaganda should agree with the age and educational standards of the youth. Set up a good educational system for youth to study; mention heroes who have died for our cause. This system should prevail in all local areas. Entertainment group activities should continue no matter what the circumstances. Fight and fight against the Americans with correct ideals.

GENERAL DUTIES

Mobilize all youth in the party; strictly enforce Ho Chi Minh's struggle ideas, and obey the summons of the Front. Continue the valiant resistance against sweeps. In order to carry out the above duties all cadre should be aware of the following. Mobilize the fighting morale for a decisive victory over the American invaders. Attack the enemy on three fronts. Keep strictly to the above methods and lengthen the fight awaiting victory. Motivate political education. Use the forward looking youth as examples. Combine the efforts of liberated youth to educate all youth for the revolution.

CONCRETE MISSIONS

Killing Enemy. Strengthen the will to kill the enemy. So far our youth have a good record during the first six months of the year. Therefore, use it as an example for the rest to study. Decide to fight Americans and victory will be ours. Establish suicide cells in each village. Male and female youths should be trained with at least similiar weapons. Fight against the enemy with sapper tactics on the spot. Capture as many enemy weapons as possible, and take hold of each village in all respects.

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EXPENDITURE

For the youth of 'B Zone: Each comrade should kill four enemy, every four children kill one enemy and each village must capture four weapons. For the youth of K Zone: Each comrade should kill two enemy, every 10 children should kill one and each village capture two weapons. District suicide squads are to penetrate deep into enemy areas to conduct their activities. For youth around installations, each comrade should kill one enemy.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 40

1. GENERAL. VC activity during the reporting period decreased slightly, although there was a slight increase in the number of acts of terrorism. Items of interest included three reported kidnappings, one assassination, and four acts of sabotage directed against the lines of communication.

2. ESPIONAGE. There were no reports of espionage activity during the period.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage against lines of communication were reported during the period:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>INCIDENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
THUA THIEN	3Nov66	Railroad Bridge Destroyed	ZD 074010
THUA THIEN	3Nov66	Highway Bridge Destroyed	ZD 070011
THUA THIEN	29Oct66	Railroad Bridge Destroyed	AU 809008
QUANG NAM	29Oct66	Highway Culvert Destroyed	BT 048517

QUANG NGAI. A 28 October report stated there were 30 VC sabotage agents located in the vicinity of (BS 579749). These agents reportedly operate during the hours of darkness in the vicinity of THUAN MY (V) (BS 583729).

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A report on 30 October from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that the VC officials of QUANG TRI Province Headquarters gathered the people of TRIEU THOUANG (V) (YD 324518) and gave them a political indoctrination lecture on the policies and ideals of the North Vietnamese Communist Government. The local populace were asked to contribute material and labor, and the VC stressed the use of females for transporting supplies and moving wounded soldiers.

A report received on 30 October from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that the VC Chairman of CAM LO (D) had recently held a meeting in the vicinity of CAM LO (D) (YD 167659). Included in this meeting were propaganda speeches, explanations concerning VC losses during recent operations, the need for reorganizing communication systems, and the organization of businessmen. Additionally, each hamlet was instructed on the establishment of an observation post, the need for employing guerilla tactics on a more frequent basis, firing of mortars, and methods to destroy communication systems.

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THUA THIEN. A 29 October report stated that an estimated VC squad entered IRAN HUNG DAO (H) (YD 780189) and distributed an unknown number of propaganda leaflets. The subject of the leaflets was an appeal to soldiers of the 1st ARVN Division to desert and join the National Liberation Front.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

THUA THIEN. A 30 October report stated that an unknown number of VC entered GIA LE GOT (H) (YD 810240) and assassinated NGUYEN DINH HOANG, the hamlet chief.

A 30 October report stated that an estimated VC platoon entered HA TRUNG (H) (YD 985136) and kidnapped BUI THI THIA, 60 year old mother of a member of the Rural Development Cadre.

A 28 October report stated that at 0300 hours on 28 October an estimated VC platoon entered a hamlet in the vicinity of (YD 095545) and kidnapped four villagers.

A 28 October report from an intelligence source stated that an unknown number of VC entered NAM PHO CUM (H) (YD 964055) at 2300, 25 October and kidnapped six elderly parents of ARVN soldiers.

A 28 October report stated that approximately 50 meters of a protective fence was destroyed in the vicinity of (YD 817184).

A 28 October report from an intelligence source stated that the VC collection rates in the NUCC NGOT (ZD 1400) area of PHU LOC (D) consisted of a payment of 1000 \$VN for each house owner, and 1000 \$VN for those Vietnamese with sons in the RVN Armed forces or a daughter employed outside the home.


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13 NOVEMBER 1966

# PERINTREP NO 41



III MAP PERINTREP #41

6-12-1966

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 130800H Nov 66  
 Ser: 0165466

PERINTREP No. 41

Period Covered: 060001H - 122400H Nov 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,  
 NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI (TAOR). There were three significant contacts in the northern area during the period. In QUANG TRI (P), on 9 November, ARVN elements engaged an estimated platoon to company size VC force at (XD 778562) and, on 11 November, elements of the 3d Marines made contact with an estimated VC platoon in the vicinity of (XD 964668). In THUA THIEN (P), on 9 November, a patrol from 3d Force Recon Co made contact with an estimated VC platoon at (ZC 980970). Other activities included sabotage of two bridges at (YD 559309) and (YD 673267) on 10 November and limited small scale incidents. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM - DANANG TAOR. In QUANG NAM (P) there were three significant contacts outside the DANANG TAOR: On 8 November a CIDG/RF/PF Company made contact with an estimated VC company at (ZC 108570); and, on 9 November, a reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Marine Division engaged an estimated 10 to 20 VC at (YC 988967) and a CAC unit at AN MY (3) (H) (AT 925608) was attacked by an estimated VC platoon. There were three significant contacts within the DANANG TAOR, all of which occurred on 12 November: A reinforced platoon from Co I, 3d Bn, 1st Marines, located at (AT 966662), was attacked by sapper elements using grenades and satchel charges; W Btry, 1st Bn, 11th Marines positions at (AT 977670) was attacked by an unknown number of VC; and the defensive positions of Co D, 1st Bn, 26th Marines, in the vicinity of (AT 962608), were attacked by a VC unit of unknown strength. In addition, small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG TIN (P) ARVN units made contact with an estimated VC battalion on 6 November and on 6, 7 and 8 November PF/RF elements encountered VC platoon sized units at (BT 182234), (BT 028052), and (ZC 140142). In QUANG NGAI (P) activity consisted of harassment of PF/RF units and the civilian population, and small scale incidents.

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In the CHU LAI TAOR the most significant contact occurred in Operation DRAGONEYE, when the 7th Co, 2d Bde, ROKMC engaged a VC platoon at (BS 555792). Activity elsewhere in this area consisted of isolated, small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period total 286 and consisted of three attacks, 129 small unit engagements, 138 AA fire incidents, 15 mine/booby trap incidents, and two acts of sabotage.

- a. Strength and Dispositions. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NR 39.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NR 39.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NR 39.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. On 9 November the VC forced women and children to screen an attack against CAC E-21 and the hamlet of AN MY (3) (AT 925608). (G-2 Comment: This is the first time women and children have been used in I Corps for this purpose, although animals (bullocks) have been employed for similar purposes).

- e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Installation</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
2 Nov	(BS 533895)	VC Training Class and Supply Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-6
7 Nov	(BT 124223)	Food/Weapons Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-3
8 Nov	(BS 414834)	Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-2

- g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period reflected a substantial increase in both total incidents and aircraft sustaining hits when compared with the previous period. There were a total of 138 incidents, with 35 aircraft sustaining 61 hits. Grids squares of highest density were (YC 99), (AT 95), (AT 96), (BT 05), (BT 06), (BS 47), (BS 57), (BS 58), (BS 68) and (ES 69). One case of unknown large caliber fire was reported.

- i - 1. Negative.

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 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 130800H Nov 66  
 Ser: 0165466

PERINTREP No. 41

Period Covered: 060001H - 122400H Nov 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JCG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,  
 NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

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a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI (TAOR). There were three significant contacts in the northern area during the period. In QUANG TRI (P), on 9 November, ARVN elements engaged an estimated platoon to company size VC force at (XD 77856E) and, on 11 November, elements of the 3d Marines made contact with an estimated VC platoon in the vicinity of (XD 964668). In THUA THIEN (P), on 9 November, a patrol from 3d Force Recon Co made contact with an estimated VC platoon at (ZC 980970). Other activities included sabotage of two bridges at (YD 559309) and (YD 673267) on 10 November and limited small scale incidents. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

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c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG TIN (P) ARVN units made contact with an estimated VC battalion on 6 November and on 6, 7 and 8 November PF/RF elements encountered VC platoon sized units at (BT 182234), (BT 028052), and (ZC 140142). In QUANG NGAI (P) activity consisted of harassment of PF/RF units and the civilian population, and small scale incidents.

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- a. Strength and Dispositions. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NR 39.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NR 39.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NR 39.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. On 9 November the VC forced women and children to screen an attack against CAC B-21 and the hamlet of AN MY (3) (AT 925608). (G-2 Comment: This is the first time women and children have been used in I Corps for this purpose, although animals (bullocks) have been employed for similar purposes).

- e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Installation</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
2 Nov	(BS 533895)	VC Training Class and Supply Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-6
7 Nov	(BT 124223)	Food/Weapons Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-3
8 Nov	(BS 414834)	Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F-2

- g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period reflected a substantial increase in both total incidents and aircraft sustaining hits when compared with the previous period. There were a total of 138 incidents, with 35 aircraft sustaining 61 hits. Grids squares of highest density were (YC 99), (AT 95), (AT 96), (BT 05), (BT 06), (BS 47), (BS 57), (BS 58), (BS 68) and (BS 69). One case of unknown large caliber fire was reported.

- i - 1. Negative.

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m. Biological, Chemical, Electronic or Radiological Warfare. Co C, 1st Bn, 28th Regt (US Army) reported capturing a cache of weapons in the vicinity of (XT 422672) (II Corps Area) among which were 00 CHICOM gas grenades. Tests indicated that the fuses were timed to detonate within three seconds. The grenades produced an aerosol cloud (CN or CS mixture) approximately 20 meters wide. (G-2 Comment: No reports have been received of this type weapon being used in I Corps.)

n - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). There were no reconnaissance sightings or contacts during this period.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). The total sightings for the week decreased from the previous period. Most of the sightings were small groups of VC to the west and south of the PHU BAI TAOR. On 8 November, a patrol operating approximately 15 kilometers to the west of HUE sighted a total of 68 VC during a three hour period. A patrol operating south of the TAOR on 9 November was attacked by an estimated VC platoon and was extracted under fire.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Sighting during this period continued at a moderate level. Most were of small groups of VC (3 to 5) and occurred on the ridgeline to the south of the SONG THU BON River. There were eight sightings made from the ridge south of the NONG SON Valley in the vicinity of (AT 8436).

(4) QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P). Sightings were considered moderately high for this period and there was a shift in the locale of sightings. The area to the west of the 2d Bde, ROKMC TAOR produced fewer sightings than usual. The area to the northwest of the TIEN PHOUC CIDG Camp and northeast of MINH LONG produced the most sightings for this period. On 9 November a patrol operating approximately 10 kilometers to the northeast of TIEN PHOUC sighted a total of 87 VC during the day. Many were carrying heavy packs and bundles slung on poles. Some were carrying stretchers and at least two men were observed with their hands tied behind them. This may have been the VC unit that was attacked by the ARVN 2d Division west of the Pineapple Forest (BT 2522) two days earlier.

s. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39.

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d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 137 KIA, 244 KIA (PROB) and 16 VCC. Weapons losses consisted of 27 individual weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. The weather for the reporting period along the coastal plains continued to be characterized by cloudy skies and light to moderate rainfall. Trafficability conditions along major highways continued to improve. Flying weather varied generally from fair to good. Mountain areas reflected the usual fog, haze and low stratus clouds. Weekly averages for each area were as follows:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	88	85	83	83
Low	70	68	72	73
Rainfall (total)	.26	Trace	2.18	1.03
Visibility (miles)	7	10	7	7
Winds (knots)	5	5	5	5

k. Significant Captive, Agent/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39.



R. H. THOMPSON  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	1	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	1	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CG FLC	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG I FFORCEV	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 76.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	25	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	3
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	1
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	III MAF	10
CG 173D ABN BDE	1		

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO PERINTREP NO. 41 (CHANGE 2 TO PERINTREP NO. 39 EFFECTIVE 122400H NOV 66)

1. For paragraph 1, no change.
2. For paragraph 2 page A-2, make the following change:
  - a. Insert page A-2-a (CHANGE 2 TO PERINTREP NO. 39, 122400H Nov 66) paragraph 2, behind page A-3.
3. For paragraph 3, no change.

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A-1

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**4. Miscellaneous.****a. Possible New Cover Names.**

(1) Source, captured documents screened at CDEC, Saigon. A note book of an U/I VC captured w/other documents concerning the 803d, AKA SONG HUONG Regt, 324B Div, revealed possible change of cover designations for elements of the 324B Div. The information, dated approximately early Sept 1966, is as follows: SONG HUONG AKA 803d Regt changed to CUA TUNG, SONG THU BON AKA 812th Regt, changed to CUA THUAN, SONG CUA LONG AKA 90th Regt changed to CUA VIET. All battalion, company, platoon and squad units previously known as "d", LANG, XA, and XOM are now called "K", KIP, DOAN and DOI respectively.

**b. New Place Names.**

(1) CUA TUNG, CUA THUAN and CUA VIET are place names in the vicinity of the DMZ.

A-2

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## 2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 122400H NOV 66 (CHANGE 2 TO PERINTREP NO 39 122400H NOV 66)

QUANG TRI PROVINCE (DMZ VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST PROB LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div (Hq&Spt)	NVA	C	2,000		YD 0993		
31st Regt (Hq)	NVA	P	500		E DMZ		
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ		
2nd Bn	NVA	P	500		E DMZ		
3rd Bn	NVA	P	500		E DMZ		
32nd Regt (Hq)	NVA	P	500		E DMZ		
4th Bn	NVA	P	500		E DMZ		
5th Bn	NVA	P	500		E DMZ		
6th Bn	NVA	P	500		E DMZ		
33rd Regt (Hq)	NVA	P	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		
7th Bn	NVA	P	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		
8th Bn	NVA	P	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		
9th Bn	NVA	P	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		

The 341st Division is carried as confirmed in the NVN OOB. It is located outside of the I CTZ but has been added to the III MAF OOB because of recent contacts which indicate elements of it are located in areas where they can directly influence III MAF operations. These contacts are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1/31st Regt	(YD 125662)	12 Oct 66	Document
2/1/31st Regt	(YD 115719)	18 Oct 66	Document
2/1/31st Regt	(YD 109724)	15 Oct 66	Document
5/2/31st Regt	(YD 092535)	6 Nov 66	Rallier
4/32nd Regt	(YD 122721)	21 Oct 66	Document
2/4/32nd Regt	(YD 095702)	8 Oct 66	Document

The document from the 1/31st Regiment captured on 12 October 1966 and a pack belonging to a member of the 90/324B Division were captured at the same location and date. The document from the 2/4/32nd Regiment captured on 8 October 1966 and a document from the 7/90th Regiment were captured at the same location and date. This indicates that elements of the 341st Division are possibly in a lateral replacement role.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT, AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III  
MAF PERINTREP NO. 41

1. 806th Bn, 6th NVA Regt NGUYEN LUNG, a cell leader of the 3d Co, 806th Bn, 6th NVA Regt, gave the following information during initial interrogation:

a. The 6th NVA Regt consists of three infantry battalions, the 800th Bn, 802d Bn, and 806th Bn. The 806th Bn consists of four companies and has a strength of between 350-400 men. The battalion is equipped with the following weapons: 4-81mm Mort, 3-60mm Mort, 2-57mm RR, 2-HMG, 8-B40 and B90, 9-LMG, CKC, AK and MAT-49; each man is also equipped with four grams of TNT.

b. The area of operation of the 806th Bn is PHONG DIEN (D) and QUANG DIEN (D). On 30 October the 3d Co, 806th Bn was located at (YD 506223) and was preparing to coordinate operations with local guerrillas to counter future ARVN operations. The captive along with his platoon leader NGUYEN BA TUNG and NGUYEN DANG TIN, a VC from NIEM (H) (YD 500427), were discovered and captured by ARVN troops in a hide-out in the vicinity of (YD 497433).

c. Personalities of the 6th NVA Regt identified by the captive are: LtCol NGUYEN VAN CAN, CO, 6th NVA Regt; Maj DAN, PO, 6th NVA Regt; Maj VUNG, Asst PO, 6th NVA Regt; Sub-Capt SON, CO, 806th Bn; Sub-Capt NHI, XO, 806th Bn; Sub-Capt SOAN, PO, 806th Bn; 2d Lt TRAN TOAN, CO, 3d Co; WO CHUANG, XO, 3d Co; and CHUANG, PO, 3d Co.

(G-2 Comment: This is the third recent report of the 802d Bn operating in this area and the first report since July of the 810th Bn operating in the area. OOB holdings indicate that the 4th Co of the 806th Bn is a heavy weapons company and is probably equipped with more weapons than is indicated by the captive. This is an initial report of the personalities named by the captive. This report is rated F/3.)

2. 802d Bn, 6th NVA Regt PFC TRAN BA LONG, a member of the 802d Bn, 6th NVA Regt, gave the following information during initial interrogation:

a. The 802d Bn is composed of four companies and is equipped with the following weapons: 4-60mm Mort, 8-B40, 4-B90, 12-"Grenade Guns", 1-57mm RR, 1-75mm RR and 9-MG. The battalion is also equipped with a radio described as type C/9 (probably AN/GRC-9) and 4-AN/PRC 10 radios. The battalion was originally known as the 32d Bn when it was formed in NVN. It was changed to the 2d Bn and finally changed to the 802d Bn.

b. The captive believes that the 802d Bn, the K/4 Bn (AKA 804th Bn) and the K/10 Bn (AKA 810th Bn) are now operating in the mountains of the PHU LOC (D) of THUA THIEN (P). The 802d Bn is located in the NUI-TRUOI mountain area (YC 942965), while the 804th Bn is located in the vicinity of (YC 925965) and the 810th Bn is located in the vicinity of (YC 935965).

c. Personalities identified by the captive are: 2d Lt NUOI, CO, 1st Co, 802d Bn; WO DAU; PO, 1st Co; 2d Lt HY, CO, 2d Co; WO PHAT, XO, 2d Co; 2d Lt CHUONG, CO, 3d Co; WO MAI, XO, 3d Co; and WO CAN, CO, 4th Co.

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(G-2 Comment: Present OOB holdings indicate that the 4th Co of the 806th Bn is a heavy weapons company. The 4-81mm Mort, 2-57mm RR and the 2-HMG mentioned by the captive are probably assigned to the 4th Co. This is an initial report of the personalities named by the captive. The report is rated F/3).

3. 31st NVA Regt, 341st Div Cpl TRAN THAM BINH, a rallier from the K.5 Co, H-2 Bn, 31st NVA Regt, 341st Div, gave the following information during initial interrogation:

a. The 341st Div is composed of three regiments, the 31st NVA Regt, 32d NVA Regt and 33d NVA Regt. The 31st NVA Regt is composed of three battalions, the H-1 Bn (known as "the heavy fire battalion"), the H-2 Bn (an infantry battalion) and the H-3 Bn (an antaircraft battalion). The three battalions have the same basic formation; however they have different combat missions and therefore have different secondary titles. Each of the battalions is composed of four companies, the 1st Co (an infantry company), 2d Co (a HMG company), 3d Co (a mortar company) and the 4th Co (a headquarters company); all four companies utilize a triangular organization.

b. The mission of the 341st Div was to support the 324th Div as it withdrew across the BEN HAI River. Presently there are only three companies of the 31st NVA Regt in SVN; they are the 1st Co, 2d Co and 3d Co which were redesignated, K.5 Co, K.6 Co and K.7 Co respectively after their arrival in SVN. The mission of the K.5 Co and at least one of the other two companies is to gather food, prepare storage areas, organize guerrillas, distribute propaganda and prepare for major activity of the 341st Div which will infiltrate into SVN during December of 1966.

(G-2 Comment: Present OOB holdings are consistent with the designation of the regiments outlined by the captive; this portion of the report is rated F/2. The types of companies in the 31st Regt are inconsistent with NVA tables of organization and obvious requirements; this portion of the report is rated F/5. The remainder of the report is rated F/3).

4. The following translated document outlines details concerning the establishment of infiltration routes within MR-5.

"The communication and transportation corridors represent one of the most important links of the present front line supply system. They have a great influence on combat leadership and guidance and production to serve front line. It is advisable to immediately overcome all difficulties in this field.

The front line supply requirements increase every day. With the advent of the rainy season, roads will certainly be destroyed and bridges will be washed away or collapse. The disruption of traffic will create a lot of difficulties to our activities. Various addressees are reminded to properly solve the following problems:

1. Urgently and actively enlist as many personnel as possible to form specialized teams, e.g., bridge and road construction teams,

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pack bicycle transportation teams, horse drawn carriage transportation teams, vehicle transportation teams, etc... Each transportation corridor must have at least a bridge construction team, with approximately 1,000 workers, who will be available on a permanent basis, with sufficient equipment and food to meet unexpected requirements.

Take 3 stations as a criterion for drafting a manpower distribution plan (remember to estimate the quantity of rice to be supplied to transportation workers at various stations). Resolutely purchase transportation facilities and intensively use them on road sections which can be used even for a few hours. Submit a plan and estimated expenditures to V.423 for timely consideration and issue of funds. This highly important and decisive problem requires our full attention and due efforts.

2. It is necessary to formulate a specific plan to ensure smooth movement on corridors. Make available permanent worker teams in charge of construction and protection of roads and bridges. Assign areas of responsibility for each team along the corridors, with emphasis placed on the construction of roads and bridges to support activities of various kinds. Make sure that ferry boats, with sufficient personnel in charge, are available at the fords along the corridors. Ensure that the corridors of obstacles under all circumstances. Alternate corridors are to be made available to avoid bad situations.

3. Prepare sufficient tools and material for supply to specialized teams, such as shovels, pickaxes, iron bars, chopping axes, carpenter's kits, resin, gasoline, oil and equipment for transportation facilities sufficient for immediate and future use. It is necessary to set up black-smith and carpenter shops, boat and vehicle (especially ox cart in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh) building shops, bicycle repair shops, medical systems near transportation stations and specialized teams. Improve the material life of workers.

4. Properly take action to enlist sufficient personnel to perform specialized services and train sufficient qualified command cadre on corridors. Make plans to protect the corridors, supply storehouses and camps. Ensure the proper activities of youth and women. Establish associations in specialized units and step up the patriotic emulative movement in units, in order to improve the technical level, increase output, promote internal solidarity and ensure the proper observance of internal regulations and discipline. Carefully conduct ideological indoctrination for newly enlisted workers, infuse them with hatred of the enemy and patriotism and urge them to correctly implement policies.

These are basic and essential problems of an immediate and long range nature. Various addressees are enjoined to carefully study their importance, oppose that ideology, which has no overall goal, enthusiastically draft specific actions plans in various fields, provide effective guidance, and submit reports on time. The budget for the project is unlimited. However reports on estimated costs must be submitted for approval. Efforts should be made to oppose waste and corruption, to recruit personnel into the specialized service without restriction and take precautions against saboteurs infiltrating into our ranks.

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V.423 has decided that the various provinces should submit monthly reports on the above matter to V.423 on the 25th of each month and command cadre of province councils in charge of the transportation corridor should return to V.423 every two months from the 25th to the 30th of the month, to report the situation.

This is a matter of principle and discipline to be taken into account by the provinces.

Try, under all circumstances, to reach the 3 station criterion at the terminal station to ensure success for the overall activities".

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## ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 41

1. GENERAL. There was slight increase in VC terrorism activity during the reporting period. The major act of terrorism occurred at a CHIEU HOI Center in QUANG NGAI where an explosive charge was thrown into a billet area. Other reports included four kidnappings and five acts of sabotage against major lines of communications.

2. ESPIONAGE

THUA THIEN. An 8 November report from an intelligence source reported that during the nights of 5 and 6 November a VC intelligence team, consisting of five people, conducted a reconnaissance in the vicinity of (YD 734 236), (YD 729235), (YD 735237), and (YD 735236) in an effort to observe the actions of a Popular Forces unit guarding the AN HOA Bridge and the HUONG SO Village headquarters.

QUANG NGAI. A 5 October report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that the VC had called together the lower cadre to initiate a special training class in the BINH THI (V) area (BS 585895). The purpose of this class was to instruct men in those skills required in the successful operation of an espionage net. Upon completion of their training the students will supposedly defect to government forces in order to act as VC "sleeper" agents.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	11Nov	Bridge destroyed	YD 599309
THUA THIEN	10Nov	Bridge destroyed	YD 673267
THUA THIEN	3Nov	Bridge destroyed	ZD 070011
QUANG TIN	8Nov	Bridge destroyed	BT 201384
QUANG TIN	6Nov	Bridge destroyed	BT 201304

4. POLITICAL

QUANG NAM. A report on 8 November stated that during the period 27 October to 5 November, the VC assembled the populace of XUYEN THANH (AT 970 519), XUYEN HOA (AT 920516), and XUYEN LOC (AT 944528) Villages for a political indoctrination course. The subject of this course was "Aims of the National Liberation Front", and methods to be utilized in creating unrest and distrust against the Constitutional Assembly.

5. PROPAGANDA

THUA THIEN. A report on 7 November from an intelligence agency stated at 2200 hours on 2 November, an estimated VC platoon entered QUE CHU (H) (YD 670 258) and assembled the inhabitants for a propaganda lecture. The VC left at 0400 on 3 November after purchasing food supplies.

A report on 5 November from an intelligence source stated that a VC platoon is operating in the area of PHU HAI (H) (AU 8104).

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The platoon has the mission of giving propaganda lectures and collecting the rice tax from the inhabitants of the area.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. An 11 November report stated that an estimated VC squad entered XUAN MY (H) (YD 242798) and kidnapped four youths.

A 5 November report stated that a civilian bus detonated a mine on highway #1 in the vicinity of (YD 364504) resulting in seven civilians killed, six civilians injured, and three ARVN wounded.

THUA THIEN. A 12 November report received from a usually reliable source stated that during the night of 10 November a number of VC cadre entered LAM (H) in the vicinity of (YD 832239) and assembled the residents for a meeting. The VC indicated that each family owning a cottage must contribute 500 \$VN to 1,600 \$VN and those families in the tile row houses must contribute 1,000 \$VN to 5,000 \$VN. The VC stated that the money would be collected in the near future.

A 10 November report stated that a grenade was thrown into a home in THACH BINH (H) (YD 694345) resulting in injury to three civilians.

A 9 November report from an intelligence source stated that on November 8, the VC assembled the residents of VINH AN (H) (YD 497466) and HOA VIEN (H) (YD 488442) and ordered 100 men and women to meet at the VINH AN bridge, located in the vicinity of (YD 49447), for the purpose of transporting rice to a VC storage area.

A 10 November report from an intelligence source stated that on 6 November two platoons of VC entered PHU BAI #1 (H) (YD 9010) and kidnapped ten villagers. The same report also stated that on 8 November two platoons of VC entered PHU BAI #2 (H) (YD 9010) and kidnapped six villagers. (CI Comment: In both kidnappings some of the victims had relatives in the ARVN).

QUANG NAM. An 11 November report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that all the refugees living in TAN THAI (H) (BT 055808), NAM THO (H) (BT 060802), MAN QUANG (H), (Coordinates unknown), and MY KYE (V) (BT 052772) who had previously lived in the VC controlled areas must contribute a "tax" of 100 \$VN to the VC. In that many of these refugees still have members of their families residing in VC controlled areas, those who pay the "tax", will be allowed to visit their relatives in VC controlled areas.

A 10 November report received from the 1st Marines stated that three VC entered NUI KIM SON (V) (Coordinates unknown) and kidnapped a village official.

A 7 November report stated that one civilian was killed and 14 injured when three VC threw a hand grenade into a civilian bus in the vicinity of (BT 073707).

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QUANG NGHI. A 10 November report from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines stated that XU BAI, a village Chief living in MY HUE #1 (H) (BS 615983) was kidnapped and assassinated by an unknown number of VC on 8 November.

A 10 November report stated that on 8 November an unknown number of VC kidnapped three civilians, two of whom were GVN officials, in the vicinity of DONG TRUC LAM (H) (BS 596635).

A 9 November report from a usually reliable source stated that at 2245 hours on 8 November, three VC dropped an explosive charge through the window of the CHIEN HOI Center located at (BS 662699) resulting in one person killed, 25 persons injured, and nine persons listed as missing. (CI Comment: This is the first report of the VC utilizing terrorism on a CHIEN HOI Center although there have been several reports of attacks on refugee camps).


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20 NOVEMBER 1966

# PERINTREP NO. 42



III MAE PERINTREP # 42

13-19 Nov 66

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Copy 57 of 140 Copies  
 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 200800H Nov 66  
 Ser: 0170266

PERINTREP No. 42

Period Covered: 130001H - 192400H Nov 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16,  
 NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In QUANG TRI (P) significant activity was limited to a series of contacts on 16 November by G/2/9 with VC/NVA units of approximately company size in the vicinity of (YD 1152). In THUA THIEN (P), on 14 November, the 327th RF Co made contact with an estimated two VC/NVA companies in the vicinity of (YD 598 474). A bridge (YD 985049) guarded by a PF unit was attacked by two VC platoons on 14 November. On 15 November the CAC 10 Company located at (YD 966064) and a railroad station in the same area were each attacked by VC in platoon strength. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR. On 19 November the 3/9 CP in the vicinity of AN HOA (AT 8547) was subjected to a 82mm mortar attack.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG TIN (P), on 17 November, an ARVN platoon (later reinforced by two companies) encountered the VC in battalion strength at (BT 235173). In QUANG NGAI (P), on 19 November elements of ARVN 2/5 contacted a VC platoon in the vicinity of (BS 573748). Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to, isolated small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 277 and consisted of two attacks, 120 small unit engagements, 142 AA fires, ten mine/booby trap incidents, and three acts of sabotage.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.

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d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. The VC Sapper attack on 12 November against a reinforced Marine platoon perimeter position at AN TRACH (H) (AT 966662) was a carefully planned and well coordinated attack, employing VC "Surprise Raid" tactics. A mortar attack was made on the 81mm battalion mortar position 1000 meters from the main VC objective. Simultaneously the VC attacked the AN TRACH (H) position. The ground attack was quickly and effectively directed toward the command/communication bunker, the supply bunker, 81mm mortar position and 106mm RR position. The attacking force of 25 to 50 VC used available concealment to good advantage in launching the attack at 0130 during a heavy downpour. The VC employed satchel charges, grenades, B-40s, home made box mines and what appeared to have been 81mm mortar rounds rigged as mines. No supporting fire was received from outside the perimeter of the objective prior to or during the attack.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE INSTALLATION</u>	<u>SOURCE EVALUATION</u>
7 Nov	(BT 105239)	Weapons Storage Area	JTAD Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/6
9 Nov	(AT 870270)	Weapons Repair and Mine Workshop	JTAD Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/6
10 Nov	(BS 459849)	Weapons Repair and Grenade Manufacturing Plant	JTAD Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
14 Nov	(BS 324818)	VC Training Center	District Agent Rpt III MAF G-2: F/3
16 Nov	(AT 820598)	VC Training Camp	District Agent Rpt III MAF G-2: F/4

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 142, reflecting little change from the previous period. 27 aircraft sustained 39 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (YD 15), (ZC 15), (AT 85), (AT 95), (AT 96), (BT 11), (BT 21), (BS 57), and (BS 58). Two cases of unknown large caliber fire were reported.

i - q. Negative.

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r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) In QUANG TRI (P) reconnaissance sightings continued to be light during the reporting period with a single sighting of five VC north of THON SON LAM.

(2) In THUA THIEN (P), several small groups of two to five VC/NVA were sighted in each of two areas, one approximately 15 kilometers west of HUE and the other south of the PHU BAI TAOR.

(3) In QUANG NAM (P) sightings during the period continued at a moderate level with an unusually large concentration of sightings noted to the east of NONG SON in the vicinity of (AT 9536). The VC sighted appeared to be local force members with no discernable pattern of movement. Several groups of 20 or more VC were noted.

(4) In QUANG NGAI (P) sightings were light during the reporting period and were predominately small groups of three to five VC/NVA concentrated east of the CIDG Camp at MINH LONG on or near the SONG VE River.

s. VC Militia/Infrastructure.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Name/Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
CAM VAN #1(H), KY QUANG (V), DIEN BAN (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN TIEN 40	1	Consolidated interrogation Report of three captives. F/4
	NGUYEN SANH UNK	6	
	TRAN DUC 25	3	
	(unk) KHAN 20	3	
	SAM HOI 26	3	
	NGUYEN HA 22	3	
LUC GIAP #3 (SH), THANH TRUONG (V), DIEN BAN (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN LAM 22	3	Consolidated interrogation Report of nine captives. F/6
	DO DOI 30	3	
	NGUYEN MICH 30	3	
	NGUYEN TRONG QUAN 35	3	
	DO HANH 28	3	
	DO PHUC 25	3	
	NGUYEN TU 27	3	
PHAN KIEN 30	1		
PHUOC THUAN or PHUOC THIEN (H), BINH THIEN (V), BINH SON (D), QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN BI 40	1	Interrogation Reports of two captives. F/3
	NGUYEN BU 47	4	
	TRAN RAN 30	2	
	TROUNG DIEN 33	3	
	NGUYEN NA 40	3	
	PHAM GIAU 27	3	
	NGUYEN TIEN 22	3	
	HUYEN SUONG 30	3	
	NGUYEN TRUNG 17	3	
TRAN DUC DUNG 30	2		

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TAN PHUOC #1(H),	VO NHU 25	1	Interrogation report of captive. F/4
BINH THIEN (V),	VO TAN 26	4	
BIEN SON (D),	TRAN LIEU 26	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	LO CHUC 30	6	
	DAM THU 26	5	
	VO THI CUOC 30	6	
	VO CUONG 20	3	
	THAI TAO 22	3	
	LE THI SUONG 18	3	
	THOI NHU 16	3	
	HUYNH SANG 20	3	
	VO THI TUYET 20	3	
	TRAN HUNG 17	3	

Note: 1 Autonomous Chairman; 2 Information Cadre; 3 Guerrilla; 4 Security Cadre; 5 Asst Leader; 6 Association Leader

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.
- e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personel losses for the reporting totaled 125 KIA, 329 KIA (Prob), 21 VCC and one VC Rallier. 15 individual weapons and one crew served weapon were captured.
- f. Morale. No change.
- g - h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No change.
- j. Weather. The weather picture along the coastal plain of the I Corps area was characterized by cloudy skies with ceilings adveraging 1500 ft or lower most of the period, with moderate monsoon rainfall at the beginning of the period and light rainfall toward the end. Trafficability was hampered by flooding, mud and road washouts, although these conditions were improving at the end of the period. Flying weather varied from fair to poor as low stratus clouds and fog occurred during the morning hours in the mountain areas, with cloud buildups in the afternoon that obscured the higher elevations and effected close air support missions. Weekly averages for each area were as follows:

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	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	80	80	81	83
Low	69	73	73	74
Rainfall (total)	8.59	5.80	3.91	2.55
Visibility (miles)	6	5	6	6
Winds (knots)	6	5	6	6

k. Significant Captive, Agent/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 39.

*R. H. Thompson*  
R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE  
B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS  
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	1	CG 173D ABN BDE	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	1	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
CG FMFPAC	1	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CG FLC	1
CG I FFORCEV	2	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 79.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	25	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	1
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO PERINTREP NO. 42 (CHANGE 3 TO PERINTREP NO. 39 EFFECTIVE 192400H NOV 66)

1. For paragraph 1, no change.
2. For paragraph 2, no change.
3. For paragraph 3, no change.

4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the ICTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

The unit watch list is designed to guide an intensified collection effort toward those units about which information is incomplete or outdated. The results of this intensified effort should be forwarded by the most expeditious means not only to permit determination of the unit's current location but to permit a determination as to whether or not the unit continues to exist.

The III MAF unit watch list will be published in the III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report.

III MAF Unit Watch List:

MR-5 HQ	21ST REGT
NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ	6TH REGT
341ST DIV HQ	20TH BN
31ST REGT	R.20TH BN
32ND REGT	V.25TH BN
33RD REGT	72ND BN
324B DIV HQ	808TH BN
803RD REGT	814TH BN
812 REGT	1506TH BN
90TH REGT	BIN SON TRANS BN
2ND DIV HQ	NAM SON TRANS BN

## 5. RESUME OF 1ST VC REGT, 2ND NVA DIV AS OF 8 NOVEMBER 66

a. Organization. The major maneuver elements of the 1st VC Regt are the 60th, 80th and 90th Bns. In addition, it is believed the 70th Bn is attached to the 1st VC Regt when that regiment is operating in QUANG TIN (P).

There are nine support companies directly subordinate to the regimental headquarters. These companies are:

- (1) 801st Medical Co.
- (2) 804th Anti-Aircraft Co.
- (3) 806th Engineer Co.
- (4) 807th Signal Co.
- (5) 808th Reconnaissance Co.
- (6) 809th Transportation Co.
- (7) U/I 75mm RR Anti-Tank Co.
- (8) U/I 81mm Mortar Co.
- (9) U/I Training Co.

b. Disposition. The 1st VC Regt operates in QUANG TIN (P) and QUANG NGAI (P); its presently accepted location is in north central QUANG NGAI (P). This location is based on a rallier report of 12 October and documents captured in early October.

The last reported locations of battalions subordinate to the 1st VC Regt are as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
60th Bn	ET 220075	11Oct66	JTAD
80th Bn	BS 695845	4Nov66	2nd ARVN DIV
90th Bn	BS 728780	13Sep66	National Police

c. History. The 1st VC Regt, was activated in February 1962. In October 1962, it was using the cover designation of THON HAI 400. It was redesignated as THI XA 500 in March 1963. In July 1963, the regiment was reinforced by the 502nd Infiltration Bn which infiltrated from NVN. Early in 1964, after the establishment of QUANG TIN (P) by the government of SVN, MR-5 decided to break down the 1st VC Regt into two elements; the Rear Command Post and the Forward Command Post.

Rear Command Post: This command post was composed of two-thirds of the strength of the former regiment. It was commanded by LtCol NAM TRAN and composed of elements of the 60th, 80th and 90th Infantry Bns and the 400th Artillery Bn.

Forward Command Post: This command post was composed of one-third of the strength of the former regiment. Its organization was relatively similar to the rear command post. The 70th Bn, which had earlier been subordinate to the 1st VC Regt, was separated from the regiment and integrated into the VC QUANG NAM (P) Force.

From 1964 through July of 1965 the regiment operated in both QUANG TIN (P) and QUANG NGAI (P). In July 1965 it attacked and overran the government post of BA GIA. After the attack, it moved east to the coastal area of BINH SON (D) of QUANG NGAI (P). In August of 1965 elements of the 3rd MarDiv engaged the 1st VC Regt in Operation STARLIGHT. Reports received after the operation indicated the majority of the 60th Bn, two companies of the 80th Bn and one company of the 400th Artillery Bn were destroyed in this operation. The remaining elements of the regiment exfiltrated southwest from the battle area into western SON TINH (D) of QUANG NGAI (P) and then northward into QUANG TIN (P). Because of the defeat suffered during STARLIGHT, it was concluded that morale was low and that the regiment was ineffective as a regimental force. It was further estimated that it would be six to eight weeks before the regiment could be re-equipped and trained to conduct a major attack. The 400th Artillery Bn was disbanded in September of 1965. The companies of this unit became directly subordinate to the regimental headquarters.

The 1st VC Regt overran HIEP DUC (D) Headquarters in November of 1965.

From 8-20 December 1965, elements of the 3rd MarDiv engaged and seriously hurt (estimated 150 casualties) the 80th Bn of the 1st VC Regt in Operation HARVEST MOON in northern QUANG TIN (P). During the operation it was learned that the 195th AA Bn (NVA) had infiltrated from NVN to provide anti-aircraft support for the 1st VC Regt.

On the 4th of March 1966 reports indicated that the 1st VC Regt was moving southward from northern QUANG TIN (P) into QUANG NGAI (P). On the 10th of March it was accepted as being located in SON TINH (D). From the 20th to the 25th of March the 60th and 80th Bns of the 1st VC Regt were encountered in Operation TEXAS in northern QUANG NGAI (P). Casualties were 473 (conf) KIA and 530 (prob) KIA. There were 3 VCC and 27 weapons captured.

Contact was made with elements of the 1st VC Regt in Operation HOT SPRINGS in southeastern QUANG TIN (P) from 21-24 April 1966. The operation resulted in 349 (conf) KIA.

From the 1st of June to the 15th of July 1966 reports indicated that the 1st VC Regt moved west through SON TINH (D), northwest through TRA BONG (D), and entered QUANG TIN (P). The regiment was then believed to be located in the vicinity of BT 1712, with the 60th, 80th, and 90th Bns and support companies deployed in western TIEN PHUOC (D) and southern TAM KY (D). The 70th Bn, which moved north to QUANG NAM (P) in March when the remainder of the regiment moved south, was believed to have returned to QUANG TIN (P) and was located in THANG BINH (D). In August 1966 the regiment moved back to QUANG NGAI (P) into the area along the SONG TRA KHUC in western SON TINH (D).

d. Current Situation. The 1st VC Regt is presently carried in SON TINH (D) of QUANG NGAI (P). This location is based on numerous agent reports, captured documents and a defector (NGUYEN PHU CANH) from the 80th Bn.

e. Combat Effectiveness. Although the 1st VC Regt has suffered heavy casualties in the past, sufficient time has elapsed to replace and train a force large enough to bring it up to 85% strength.

Morale of the regiment is reported to be very low due to the bombings, lack of food, medicine, and proper combat equipment, and the effects of the rainy season. The defector, NGUYEN PHU CANH, stated most of the men would defect if they had the chance. He also stated that the NVA and VC soldiers do not get along well because the NVA soldiers believe that they are carrying the largest part of the war.

Training consists of disassembly and assembly of Russian and Chinese weapons, individual camouflage, raiding houses, employment of ambushes, moving through an open area and moving at night. Time period for this training is not known but estimated to be from four to six weeks.

The 1st VC Regt is rated as 85% effective. It is capable of conducting a determined defense on favorable terrain, or of executing limited offensive actions in up to regimental strength.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)  
TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 42.

1. Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Div. Lt KIN HUU CHI, an NVA rallier and platoon leader of a reconnaissance platoon subordinate to the 2d Div, gave the following information during initial interrogation:

a. The 2d Div consists of three worksites: WORKSITE I (AKA 1st VC Regt); WORKSITE 21 (AKA 21st NVA Regt); and WORKSITE 31 (AKA 3d NVA Regt). The division also has an artillery battalion known as Bn GK30 which consists of three combat companies armed with two 120mm mortars each and a fourth company with unspecified functions. The division has a signal battalion known as Bn GK33, consisting of one wire company, a radio company, and a foot liaison company. Other divisional units include a 75mm RR battalion known as Bn GK32 and an anti-aircraft battalion. No details were known concerning these units.

b. During the coming winter spring campaign, the 2d Div is required to conduct three or four successful attacks on objectives ordered by the command of MR-5. These objectives are not known by the captive, however, the TIEN PHOUC (D) Headquarters has been surveyed for an attack, and the results submitted to the 2d Div. An attack in TIEN PHOUC (D) was expected in November. A survey of LAC SON post is presently being made and a survey of TAM KY is scheduled for the future. The attack would probably be three pronged with an effort made at Hill 211 where two 105mm guns are emplaced, another at the Special Forces Training Center, where three 105mm guns are emplaced, and the third towards PHUOC LAM (V) in HAU DUC (D).

c. The mission of the captives' reconnaissance platoon was to reconnoiter selected possible objectives for future attack. In the course of a reconnaissance, the objective was studied in detail, an overlay was produced and submitted to the headquarters 2d Div, and the platoon awaited orders for another mission. One of the past objectives reconnoitered by the platoon was HA THANH in SON HA (D). This area was subsequently attacked.

d. The captive joined the NVA in April 1958 as a Private. In July 1958 he was promoted to the rank of Corporal and in January 1958 was sent to a surveyor officer course conducted by the 351st Arty Command. Following graduation he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant and assigned as platoon leader to the surveyor platoon of the 270th Brigade at VINH LINH. Six months after this assignment he was discharged and returned to his home as a school teacher. In February 1963 he was recalled to service in the NVA and given a months training preliminary to infiltration.

e. The captive was assigned to infiltration group G 512/VC which consisted of 120 cadre varying in grade from Master Sergeant to Captain. The group departed NVN 15 June 1963, crossed into LAOS where it followed

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the ANNAMITE CHAINE to BAC AN station in the northwest of QUANG NAM (P) near THUA THIEN (P) where it arrived in March 1964. The group was then divided into three smaller groups; one was assigned to QUANG NGAI (P), another to QUANG NAM (P), and the third remained in the area for six months preparing for duty at CAU MAU.

f. Weapons and ammunition are currently being supplied from NVN in new cases bearing red Chinese markings. Rice is purchased locally at the price of 32 Piastres per can. VC soldiers and cadre received a daily rice allowance of one half milk can per day and an additional allowance of five Piastres per day for soldiers and nine Piastres per day for Lieutenants and above.

(G-2 Comment: Present III MAF OOB holdings indicate that the regiments subordinate to the 2d Div (AKA 620th Div) are the 21st NVA Regt, 3d NVA Regt and the 1st VC Regt; this portion of the report is rated F/2. The information given by the captive concerning support battalions of the 2d Div is at variance with III MAF holdings (Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39) and is rated F/3. The remainder of the report is rated F/3.

2. SON HONG Bn (Possible AKA for 1st Bn, 31st NVA Regt 341st Div). PVT LE VAN TRONG, a member of the 2d Co SONG HONG Bn, gave the following information during initial interrogation:

a. The three infantry companies of the SONG HONG Bn range in size from 90 to 100 men, with each company organized along triangular lines (No mention is made of a battalion weapons company). There are five doctors in the battalion and three or four corporals with each of the companies. Recently the battalion received about 100 recruits one of whom was the captive.

b. The captive was unaware of the mission of his unit, however, the battalion CP area had been located 800 meters north of the point of capture (YD 108720) for a period of ten days.

c. Food supplies have been plentiful and the quality of the food was good. Clothing and equipment were adequate and ammunition was not lacking. Morale among the men is very low because of a desire to return home and a fear of being killed.

Personalities identified by the captive are: THANH, CO, 2d Co; VUONG, PO, 2d Co; and LONG, Plt Ldr, 3d Plt, 2d Co.

(G-2 Comment: LE VAN TRONG was at first believed to be from the 324th B Div; however, documents and statements of the captive indicate he is a member of the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 31st NVA Regt, 341st Div. (The captive sustained a serious head wound and a possibility of brain damage exists.) A document captured on 11 October 1966 in the vicinity of (YD 110715) contained a roster of soldiers from the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 31st NVA Regt, 341st Div and the captive's name was on the roster. The report is rated F/4.)

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3. The following translated document outlines VC combat guidelines:

"GUIDELINES FOR COMBAT IN THE PEOPLE'S WAR

1. Make an all-out effort to kill the enemy and at the same time strengthen our forces.

a. The highest aim of the war is to destroy the enemy and his reserve forces.

b. Improve the balance of power.

The two above mentioned points must be closely connected with each other. Our main objective is to destroy the enemy. Is the strengthening of our forces aimed at these guidelines? Pay attention to the importance of indoctrination and the present duty. Take this first guideline as a basis for the following guidelines.

2. Prepare the battlefield and launch a systematic attack so that we can easily gain victory. Remember that the first victory must be ours. Try to gain the first victory so as to inspire confidence in the people, to demoralize the enemy, and to widely spread victorious pride. Have the will to fight, thoroughly understand the enemy force and ours and equip ourselves fully with skill and material.

3. Closely coordinate among the main force, the local force and the guerrilla force.

a. Expand on fighting potential which is considered as a guideline for combat.

b. All must understand clearly the Party line. Realize the duty of our unit and of our comrade's unit in accomplishing the duty of every unit.

4. Concentrate all forces on annihilating the separate units of the enemy.

a. Make fire power, techniques and deception the primary basic military requirement for each individual, especially for those in the local and guerrilla forces.

What steps should be taken for the pursuit of the war? We should apply defensive measures, make an anti-enemy plan, and secretly arrange our positions.

5. Launch successive attacks. Be courageous when holding defensive positions. Conduct a quick and systematic attack. Be able to concentrate strong points and take advantage of opportunity.

Conduct a quick and all out attack. Use strategy. Have reserve troops available. Quickly manage all activities under any circumstances.

B-3

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When needed, make a plan immediately. Hold a training course. Get rid of timidity and self-satisfaction.

The following are seven guidelines for defense: Take advantage of the terrain. Position fire power. Organize the area of the battle in detail. Deploy a platoon around each critical position and have a strong reserve. Launch a counterassault when the enemy retreats. Coordinate the main force and the local force with the self defense force. Counter non-aggressive ideology.

6. Deploy forces around critical positions and at the same time have strong reserve troops. Form reserve troops and occupy critical positions. Concentrate main forces on critical positions. Cadre must understand the guidelines thoroughly. Reserve troops include artillery, mortar, tank and infantry forces. When do we use the reserve forces? We can use the reserve forces when the situation requires. Request that the reserve forces be hidden secretly, and ready to act under any circumstances.

7. Launch isolated fighting. Hold the offensive positions by combined forces. Emphasis must be placed on the combination of forces. Forces, including various branches, must cooperate.

8. Develop the advantages of close-in attack, night attack and successive attack. These are the current methods of attack.

9. Aggressive, positive, creative, secret and surprising are the features that commanders must understand, if not, they will make mistakes in their mission.

10. Closely coordinate the military, political and military proselyting activities.

11. Expand on the position of political strength and courageous fighting spirit, and take fullest advantage of victories over the well equipped enemy."

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## ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 42

1. GENERAL. VC activity during the reporting period continued at a low level with only two acts of espionage being reported. However, there was a slight increase in the number of acts of sabotage and these were, as in the past, directed against major lines of communications rather than against installations.

2. ESPIONAGE. An intelligence source reported on 19 November that two youths, a boy 16 and a girl 15, are gathering information on the POL supply point vicinity (AT 988706) in preparation for a future mortar attack. (CI Comment: This is the second report of the VC utilizing youths to gather information on the POL supply point).

A 19 November report from an intelligence source stated that a new VC cadre had moved into PHONG BAC (H) (AT 995710). The cadre consists of nine young men and three young women who have just completed their training. They all speak English and will work in HOA THO (H) (BT 006724) and DANANG. The cadre's mission is to target government sympathizers for assassination.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	18Nov	Bridge destroyed	YD 205761
THUA THIEN	14Nov	Railroad track destroyed	YD 816184
THUA THIEN	11Nov	Bridge destroyed	YD 678267
QUANG NAM	18Nov	Culvert destroyed	BT 119489
QUANG NAM	16Nov	Culvert destroyed	BT 049606
QUANG NAM	12Nov	Railroad track destroyed	AT 960920
QUANG TIN	18Nov	Culvert destroyed	BT 257292
QUANG TIN	15Nov	Bridge destroyed	BT 203381
QUANG NGAI	17Nov	Bridge destroyed	BS 732545
QUANG NGAI	17Nov	Bridge destroyed	BS 723569

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 16 November report stated that a VC propaganda lecture was held in the vicinity of (YD 37757) on 12 November.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

THUA THIEN. A report from an intelligence source stated that during the night of 9 November five VC entered BAN MON (H) (YD 978073) and assassinated a woman reportedly friendly with U.S. and ARVN forces.

A 15 November report stated that on 12 November three VC entered THANH THUY CHANH Market vicinity (YD 825223) and assassinated the hamlet chief of THANH THUY CHANH. In addition the VC threw a grenade into the home of a villager resulting in serious injury to the occupant.

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QUANG NAM. A 16 November report stated that on 11 November an estimated platoon of VC entered XUYEN THO (V) (BT 185525) and forced an unknown number of villagers to cut rice in the vicinity of (BT 210562).


QUANG NGAI. A 16 November report from an intelligence source reported that four women from AN HOA (V) (BS 459875) were kidnapped by the VC and taken to the vicinity of (BS 511876). The women were questioned about the strength of military units and types of equipment in the AN HOA area. On 17 November one woman from this group was released.

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27 NOVEMBER 1966

# PERINTREP NO. 43



III MAP PERINTREP # 43

20-26 Nov 66

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Copy \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ Copies  
 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 270800H Nov66  
 Ser: 01749-66

PERINTREP NO. 43

Period Covered: 200001H - 262400H Nov 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,  
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In QUANG TRI (P) on 24 November, ARVN elements made contact with a VC company in the vicinity of (YD 410535). In THUA THIEN (P) on 24 November an RF company made contact with the VC in estimated two platoon strength in the vicinity of (YD 675242). Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

b. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Small scale VC activity continued throughout the DANANG TAOR, with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

c. QUANG TIN (P) - QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG NGAI (P), on 20 November, during Operation DRAGON EYE, the 9th Co, 3d Bn, 2d ROKMC Bde was attacked by the VC in estimated battalion strength. The VC sustained 82 KIA (Conf) and 25 KIA (Prob) from what was later identified as the VC 48th Bn. On 24 November the 248th RF Co was ambushed at (BS 727610) by the VC in estimated company strength. During Operation RIO BLANCO on 25 November, VC in estimated company strength were encountered by elements of A/1/7 blocking force. During subsequent action the VC were driven into a rice paddy area and sustained 23 KIA (Conf). Activity in the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to, isolated small scale incidents.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 254 and consisted of two attacks, 102 small unit engagements, 141 AA fires, eight mine/booby trap incidents and one radio jamming.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Smoke Tactics. At approximately 231020H, A Marine AO while flying in the vicinity of (AT 952355) called an airstrike on 11 VC.

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Upon commencement of the airstrike, a series of smoke fires started at (AT 933346) and progressed to the southeast on a ridgeline running southeast. A second fire was located at (AT 943321) followed by a third fire at (AT 940305). The last two fires were separated by 30 meters. A larger fire was also noted in the valley at (AT 958302). When the fire at this location was ignited all other fires were extinguished immediately. (G-2 Comment: This type tactic is believed to be employed by the VC as either a signal warning of approaching aircraft or as a means to avoid detection from aerial observation. The tactic was initially reported in III MAF PERINTREP NO. 7 and subsequently in III MAF PERINTREP NO's. 15 and 21.

(2) Anti-Helo Tactics. During Operation KERN (20-25 Oct) a report was received of what appeared to be a series of 36 poles strung with wire. A patrol determined the poles, five to 10 meters above the tree tops, to be an anti-helicopter entanglement. Wire was strung from pole to pole for a distance of approximately 2000 meters along the high ground. On the ground below this were numerous punji stakes eight to ten feet high and barbed wire entanglements.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE/EVALUATION</u>
20 Nov	(BS 450820)	VC Training Camp	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents totaled 141 for the reporting period. Aircraft sustaining hits dropped considerably from the previous reporting period as 11 aircraft were hit with 13 rounds. Grid squares of highest density were (YD 04), (AT 96), (BT 21), (BS 47), (BS 56), (BS 57) and (BS 58). For general areas of enemy AA fire, see Annex B.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) In QUANG TRI (P) reconnaissance sightings continued to be light during the reporting period. Four reconnaissance element insertions were aborted on the ridge north of the BA LONG Valley during the period because of heavy small arms automatic weapons.

(2) In THUA THIEN (P) sightings reflected a lower level of enemy activity during the period. Several small groups of three to five VC/NVA were sighted south of the PHU BAI TAOR.

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(3) In QUANG NAM (P) sightings continued at a moderate level and were concentrated in the area south of the AN HOA. The sightings and contacts indicate the presence of both local and main force units in this area.

(4) In QUANG NGAI (P) sightings were light during the reporting period and were predominately small groups of two to four VC located in the area north and east of the CIDG Camp at MINH LONG and in the Operation RIO BLANCO area.

s. Negative.

### 3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period were 97 KIA, 366 KIA (Prob), and 45 VCC. Weapons losses consisted of 18 individual weapons captured.

f. Morale. A MACV analysis of over 90 interrogations indicate that NVA units in SVN may be having some leadership problems. Apparently the rank and file have lost confidence in their squad leaders, friction has developed between northern and southern cadres and there is a shortage of replacements qualified to fill command positions. Company commanders are apparently efficient but squad leaders are only fair to poor, because they lack both training and experience. The keystone of enemy strength has been well trained, dedicated cadre who have been able to sustain efficiency even in the face of weakened morale. If quality of cadre has been dropping and continues to do so, communist military capabilities will be seriously affected.

g. - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. The weather picture along the coastal plain of the I Corps area was characterized by northeasterly flows aloft and scattered showers. During the latter part of the period the weather was gradually influenced by tropical storm Nancy and heavy rainfall resulted. Trafficability was hampered by flooding, mud and road washouts. Low ceilings and scattered rain showers obscured the higher elevations and, intermittently, the coastal plain during most of the period with lower ceiling and decreased visibility limiting air operation towards the end of the period.

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For December weather brief, see Annex C. Weekly averages for each area were as follows:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	77	76	79	78
Low	67	70	70	74
Rainfall (total)	3.24	8.29	6.05	4.26
Visibility (miles)	6	5	6	6
Winds (knots)	9	6	8	9

k. Significant Captive, Agent/Returnee and Document Report. Annex D.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex E.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP NO. 39.

*R. H. Thompson*  
 R. H. THOMPSON  
 Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. AREAS OF ENEMY AA FIRE
- C. DECEMBER WEATHER BRIEF
- D. SIGNIFICANT CAPTIVE, AGENT/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	2	CG 173D ABN BDE	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
CG FMFPAC	1	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CG FLC	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 79.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	25	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	III MAF	10


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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO  
LII MAP PERINTREP NR 43

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**I CORPS**  
ORDER OF BATTLE



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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO PERINTREP No. 43

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 262400H NOV 66.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL UNITS	TOTAL STRENGTH
	NO.	EST STRENGTH	NO.	EST STRENGTH	NO.	EST STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,440					2	1,440
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,640	1	800			7	2,440
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,310	8	3,300	7	2,700	32	14,310
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	4	2,890			14	5,340
Separate Companies			3	285	27	2,690	30	2,975
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		14,640		7,275		5,390		27,305
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)			1	330	3	1,200	4	1,530
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			2	220	4	455	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				550		1,655		2,205
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					4	1,480	4	1,480
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				1,600		2,100
<u>GUERRILLA STRENGTH</u>								
								20,597
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		15,140		7,825		8,645		52,207

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2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 262400H NOV 66

QUANG TRI PROVINCE (DMZ VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST RPTD CONTACT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div (Hq&Spt)	NVA	C	2,000		YD 0993		
31st Regt (Hq)	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20 Sep 66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18 Oct 66
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6 Nov 66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21 Oct 66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt (Hq)	NVA	PO	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		VINH LINH SP SECT		

The 341st Division is carried as confirmed in the NVN OOB. It is located outside of the I CTZ but is carried in to the III MAF OOB because of recent contacts which indicate elements of it are located in areas where they can directly influence III MAF operations. These contacts are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
7/31st Regt	(YD 121722)	7 Nov 66	Captive
1/31st Regt	(YD 125666)	12 Oct 66	Document
2/1/31st Regt	(YD 110715)	18 Oct 66	Document
2/1/31st Regt	(YD 108720)	14 Oct 66	Captive
2/1/31st Regt	(YD 109724)	15 Oct 66	Document
5/2/31st Regt	(YD 092536)	6 Nov 66	Rallier
4/32nd Regt	(YD 123725)	21 Oct 66	Document
2/4/32nd Regt	(YD 095702)	8 Oct 66	Document

The document from the 1/31st Regiment captured on 12 October 1966 and a pack belonging to a member of the 90/324B Division were captured at the same location and date. The document from the 2/4/32nd Regiment captured on 8 October 1966 and a document from the 7/90th Regiment were captured at the same location and date. This indicates that elements of the 341st Division are possibly in a lateral replacement role.

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST RPTD CONTACT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
324B Div (Hq&Spt)	NVA	C	1340 <sup>#1</sup>	Fair <sup>#2</sup>	N Quang Tri (P)	YD 045640	12Jul66
803rd Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Jul66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	22Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	24Aug66
812th Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	490		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
008th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 285403	13Jul66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
K.3 Co	MF	C	100		YD 0220		
Hai Lang Co	LF	C	80		YD 3244		
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 392588	5Nov66
G.10 Co	MF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST RPTD CONTACT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	24Dec65
6th Regt Hq	NVA	C	300	Good	YD 4735		
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien(D)	YD 330345	12Jul66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Good	YD 6318	YC 942965	1Nov66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 320285	12Jul66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc(D)	YD 970170	19Oct66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	MF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang(D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	300	Good	Que Son(D)	AT 865375	19Oct66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son(D)	AT 867375	19Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son(D)	AT 958402	19Oct66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son(D)	AT 861387	19Oct66
Binh Son Trans Bn	MF	C	1,490		YC 6035		
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 997532	26Aug66
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Que Son(D)	Que Son(D)	28Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	Duc Duc(D)	13Nov66
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	300	Excel	AT 8364	AT 9666	19Nov66
3rd Bn/5th Regt	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc(D)	18Aug66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	BT 0662	26Aug66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc(D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT</u> <u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST RPTD</u> <u>CONTACT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
2nd Div (Hq)	NVA	C	100		Hiep Duc(D)	Quang Tin(P)	26Sep66
21st Regt (Hq)	NVA	C	200		Que Son/T Binh(D)	BT 249054	13Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh(D)	BT 2223	10Aug66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh(D)	BT 1533	11Aug66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh(D)	BT 230236	10Aug66
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT 9823	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh(D)	AT 9920	10Aug66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	Quang Tin(P)	3Mar66
Nam Son Trans Bn	MF	C	700		ZB 1079		
49th Bn	LF	PR	500		BT 0730		
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1536		
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
A16 Co	LF	C	120		BT 1516	Tien Phuoc(D)	16Nov66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region V	NVA	C	650		BS 1275	AS 9686	200ct66
1st VC Regt (Hq)	MF	C	800	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	W Son Tinh(D)	120ct66
60th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	BS 4870	9May66
80th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	BS 4075	120ct66
90th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	N Quang Ngai(P)	BS 7080	14Apr66
20th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 2864		

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST RPTD CONTACT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 7850	BS 5577	20Nov66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 3678	31Oct66
104th Bn	LF	PR	300		BS 6692		
1506th Engr Bn	MF	PR	330		BS 2870	BS 5892	24Aug66
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
109th Bn	LF	PO	300		BS 7283		
37th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5860		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8125	BS 7745	31Oct66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

NOTES

- #1. Strength of 324B units estimated at 70% of T/O due to contacts in Operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE.
- #2. Denotes entire division.

The following units have been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 262400H Nov 66:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
812th NVA Bn	Quang Tri	500	Conf
C.55 MF Co	Quang Tri	75	Conf
23rd LF Bn	Quang Nam	500	Poss
51st LF Bn	Quang Nam	300	Prob
5th MF Regt (Hq)	Quang Nam	200	Poss

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 262400H NOV 66

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div(?); 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?) Cong Truong Lon; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May	51.441 KT	Unk	CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj Song THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn			
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn			
812th Regt	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng (or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Mai Van CU
7th Bn	D-7; K.37			
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9			
12th AT Bn				

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14		2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
K.3 Co Hai Lang Co	803 Co 5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; H.99		1-MG 9-AR	CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02; V-51; H-20			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien			
Cam Lo Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt PHUNG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520		
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-1(?)			
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH CO-Ton That THIET CO-Capt Huong THI
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)			

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EQUIPMENT

PERSONALITIES

K.41 Co

C-106; D-6; F.18;  
Phe 18

1-81mm Mort  
2-57mm RR  
2-60mm Mort  
2-LMG  
12-SMG

CO-Pham Kinh PHU

K.105 Co  
Quang Dien Co

D-3; P-15; 3rd Co

2-60mm Mort  
9-AR

CO-Capt Hoang AN  
CO-THUAN  
XO-TINH  
PO-THUAN  
CO-Nguyen DAM  
CO-THUYET  
CO-Xuan SAM

Huong Thuy Co  
Huong Tra Co  
.117 Co

D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17  
D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5  
Phu Vang; D-7; P-18;  
Phu Thu Armed Co

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)

64th Regt; Bac Ha; Work-  
site-3; Factory 10; 31st  
Regt; 46th Regt

CO-LtCol Viet SON  
XO-Maj Tranh Anh  
KIEN  
PO-Trung THANH  
CO-Capt THAO  
CO-Capt THAU  
CO-Nguyen TIEP

1st Bn  
2nd Bn  
3rd Bn

X1; CT3; Binh Minh  
Binh Da; X2  
Binh Thien; Mao Chu;  
Nguyen Trai

CO-TRI

Binh Son Transport Bn

20,265GM-  
20,268GM  
Bac Hien

CO-Nguyen Van LAM

2.20

Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc  
Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20

1-81mm Mort  
1-60mm Mort  
1-57mm RR  
2-MG  
54-AR  
3-81mm Mort  
4-60mm Mort  
5-MG  
4-57mm RR  
1-81mm Mort  
2-60mm Mort  
1-57mm RR

CO-Nguyen Duc CONG  
XO-SrCapt THUA  
PO-Duan Cong THANH  
CO-Quang LAM  
(AKA LUC)  
XO-THU  
PO-TOAN

70th Bn

35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;  
Chu Song; Truong Son  
70; Inter-mt White  
Tiger Bn; F-07; 103  
Lam Bn; 5th Bn

V.25 Bn

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UNIT

402nd Sapper Bn

3rd Bn

Que Son Co

Dien Ban Co

Hoa Hieu Co

Duy Xuyen Co

Dai Loc Co

H.31 Co

H.54

AKA

T-89th Special Eng Bn

D-20; H-53 Co; Dia  
Ly A7

Dien Ban H-40 Co;  
Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th

Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16;  
H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co

H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co  
H-42 Co

Hien Giang

C-70 Co eB; Dia Loc

LBN

21395 Gm  
Dong Hai

EQUIPMENT

2-81mm Mort  
4-60mm Mort  
2-MG  
2-57mm RR  
9-AR

PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Van TRAN  
XO-SrLt THANH  
CO-HOANG

CO-Le Tan QUANG

CO-Than Tien NAM

CO-Nguyen DOA

CO-Nguyen CHAU

CO-Phan Phong SAM

CO-Do THANH

CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)

21st Regt (Hq)

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

33rd Arty Regt (Hq)

RQ21 Bn (AA)

RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)

RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)

RQ20 Bn (SIG)

Ham Tu 2; 620th Div;  
Agricultural Site #2;  
Chi Lang

BACH MA; Worksite 21;  
36th; A-21; Cong Truong-  
21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt;  
A-21

11th Workshop; 11th Bn  
135 Bn

195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA  
Bn; Xuong 111; X-11; 19th  
Bn

GK-32

RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th  
Bn; GK-33

RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30;  
RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C

20,601GM-  
20,925GM  
Tay An

17-81mm Mort  
Unk-75mm RR  
Unk-60mm Mort

CG-BG VIET  
XO-BG DAO  
PO-BG DO

CO-Phan KIET  
XO-Dang Cong KICH  
PO-TIEN

CO-Capt Ha Van G  
CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH  
CO-Nguyen Kaach THO

CO-Capt Nguyen Van  
TUYEN  
XO-Tran Van QUANG  
PO-Nguyen Van HIEN

CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
BQ24 Bn (ENG) 72nd Bn Name Son Trans Bn	GK-40		20,269GM- 20,272GM Bac Hien	CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO
49th Bn			7-81mm Mort 15-60mm Mort 5-57mm RR 3-MG 24-AR	CO-Duong Van CHAU PO-Thuyng Thanh MY
106th Co A10 Co	V-14 Co; 106th Co K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Bin		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KBOA XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Anh VU
A13 Co A16 Co	D-22 C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co A21 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co Tra Son Co Tra Ha Co				CO-MANH

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region V (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; P-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien	CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108(Alt Cmd Elm)		CO-Col Chan Khai DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006		

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
80th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007			CO-Maj Nguyen THYEN XO-PHAM
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20	20,135GM- 20,139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn 409th Sapper Bn	Poss 408th Bn Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20,141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG 1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 3-MG 18-AR	CO-Capt KY CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
104th Bn	405th Bn			CO-Nguyen Hi CHAW; Nghia TUN
1506th Engr Bn 19th Bn	Poss 506th Bn 109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH CO-Pham Van NGOC
109th Bn	209th Bn; B.17 Bn; T.17th Bn; B-8			CO-Bui Kim BONG
37th Bn 307th Bn 96th Co 206th Co	Poss 315th Bn Minh Long Co Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-Maj Tran Duc DUC CO-Dinh Re HO CO-Lu TRI CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU CO-Dien MIEU CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
614th Co C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Son Ha Co Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co Ba To Co Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co T.19 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West) P.31 Co			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

NOTE

The following units have been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 262400H Nov 66:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
812th NVA Bn	Quang Tri	500	Conf
C.55 MF Co	Quang Tri	75	Conf
23rd LF Bn	Quang Nam	500	Poss
51st LF Bn	Quang Nam	300	Prob
5th MF Regt (Hq)	Quang Nam	200	Poss

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List:

MR-5 HQ	2ND DIV HQ
NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ	21ST REGT
341ST DIV HQ	6TH REGT
31ST REGT	R.20TH BN
32ND REGT	72ND BN
33RD REGT	808TH BN
324B DIV HQ	814TH BN
803RD REGT	1506TH BN
812TH REGT	BINH SON TRANS BN
90TH REGT	NAM SON TRANS BN

5. VC Militia/Infrastructure.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
TUYET DIEM #3(H), BINH GIANG (V), BINH SON (D), QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN BA	55		Interrogation Report NGUYEN CUU. F/3
	LE BIEG	35	1	
	PHUONG BUNG	40	4	
	HUI LIA	30	3	
	BUI SOC	30	3	
	BUI TAI	25	7	
	NGUYEN TOI	24	3	
TUYET DIEM #3(H), BINH GIANG (V), BINH SON (D), QUANG NGAI (P)	LE QUANG BICH	40	1	Interrogation Report NGUYEN HO. F/6
	NGUYEN BON	18	3	
	PHUONG BUNG	40	4	
	NGUYEN DO	20	2	
	NGUYEN DUOC	18	3	
	NGUYEN GIOI	25	6	
	NGUYEN HOI	18	3	
	HUYNH LANH	28	3	
	NGUYEN LANH	50	3	
	UNK LIA	20	3	
	DUONG THI ME	25	3	
	DUONG THI NGHIEN	25	3	
	TA PHI	30	7	
	DUONG TINH	18	3	
	DUONG TUOI	30	6	
	DONG TRINH TY	20	3	
	TO THI VAN	28	6	
NGUYEN PHU	17	3		
NGO TIEN	17	3		
NGO TRUNG	18	3		

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BINH GIANG (V),  
 BINH SON (D),  
 QUANG NGAI (P)

HUYNH AI	36	1
PHAN DUTH BA	34	2
LE BICH	31	1
PHUONG BUNG	45	4
NGUYEN MANH	35	4
PHAN NHAN	32	7
TRAN TUAN	36	5

Interrogation Report  
 NGUYEN TO TON. F/6

BINH GIANG (V),  
 BINH SON (D),  
 QUANG NGAI (P)

PHAN BON	27	3
TRAN BUT	22	3
NGUYEN CAN	27	3
PHAN DUONG	30	3
NGUYEN GIAC	23	3
NGUYEN HIEP	30	3
NGUYEN LOC	30	3
HUYNE MINH	25	3
NGUYEN NIET	34	3
NGUYEN NIMB	22	3
NGUYEN NO	22	3
HUYNH PHUOC	27	3
NGUYEN SUNG	24	3
PHAN THAI	22	3
PHYNH TRI TRA	22	3

Interrogation Report  
 NGUYEN TAI TON. F/6

DUC AN #2(H),  
 BINH PHIEN (V),  
 BINH SON (D),  
 QUANG NGAI (P)

UNK CHU	50	1
VO LAM	18	3
VO MINH	15	3
UNK TAS	30	2
LUONG THANH	27	3
NGUYEN THO	21	3
HUYNH XUOT	30	3

Interrogation Report  
 NGUYEN THI THANH. F/3

TUYET DIEM #2(H),  
 BINH GIANG (V),  
 BINH SON (D),  
 QUANG NGAI (P)

LE QUANG BIEC	35	1
UNK BON	20	3
PHUNG BUNG	40	4
UNK DUOC	20	3
UNK GIONG	20	3
NGUYEN KHOI	20	6
UNK LAC	25	3
UNK LANG	25	3
UNK LIA	25	3
DUONG THI ME	21	3
UNK TINH	20	3

BINH GIANG (V),  
 BINH SON (D),  
 QUANG NGAI (P)

PHAM BIEC	30	4
NGUYEN DUC	29	3
NGUYEN HAC	37	9
NGUYEN LANH	30	1
NGUYEN TAI	25	2
NGUYEN TY	37	3

Interrogation Report  
 VO TANG. F/4

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THUAN PHUOC (H),	NGUYEN CAT	40	4	Interrogation Report VO TANG. F/4
BINH GIANG (V),	DUONG DIEU	27	3	
BINH SON (D),	AU DU	25	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	PHAM EM	27	3	
	PHAM LAU	23	3	
	PHAM LUC	27	3	
	NGUYEN LUC	29	3	
	NGUYEN MAO	54	1	
	TO DINH MAU	39	3	
	LE QUANG NHI	25	3	
	NGUYEN NINH	32	6	
	PHAM TIEN	27	3	
	HOUVEN THE	25	3	
	PHUNG TOA	37	3	
	NGUYEN VAN TRINH	41	2	
	NGUYEN VANG	37	9	
VINH XUAN (V),	KIEN DUYNH	27	8	Interrogation Report TRAN CHAM. F/6
DIEN BAN (D),	TRAN NHI	20	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	THAN PHE	28		
			Civil	
	THAN THUONG	25	3	Affairs
	NGUYEN XU	25	7	
XUYEN HIEP (V),	NGUYEN BA	22	3	Interrogation Report PHAM N NGOC. F/3
DUY XUYEN (D),	VAN BA	19	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	VO CUONG	20	3	
	VAN DU	25	9	
	VAN HIEN	30	4	
	NGUYEN HIEP	30	1	
	NGUYEN HUA	17	3	
	NGUYEN HUNG	20	3	
	VAN QUANG	25	3	
THON TAM (H),	UNK CHAU	35	1	Interrogation Report HUYNH THUNG. F/4
KY TRA (V),	UNK DEN	53	6	
TAM KY (D),	UNK DUONG	30	9	
QUANG TIN (P)	UNK MAI	40	4	
	NGUYEN THUONG	30	3	
	NGUYEN TRUONG	25	3	
PHU XUAN (H),	UNK CONG	30	3	Interrogation Report HO CHIEN. F/4
DONG SON (V),	UNK HUE	27	3	
PHU VANG (D),	UNK LONG	25	3	
THUA THIEN (P)	UNK THANH	30	3	
	NGUYEN NGOC	40	3	

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
HUONG THO (V),	BUI CHAU	20	3
NAM HOA (D),	NGUYEN DO	19	3
THUA THIEN (P)	TRUONG DUNG	35	1
	PHAN KANH	28	6
	UNK LY	33	3
	MAI PHUONG	25	1
	NGUYEN DO	25	7
THIET TRANG (H),	LAM BANG	26	3
CAM CHINH (V),	NGUYEN BON	28	3
CAM LO (D),	NGUYEN HIEU	28	3
QUANG TRI (P)	NGUYEN KNOAN	30	3
	NGUYEN LU	30	3
	NGUYEN LUAN	17	3
	PHAM LIEU	30	3
	TRUONG TUONG	17	3

CI Spot Report #207  
P/6

Interrogation Report  
LAM DINH DUNG. P/3

NOTE: 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla;  
4. Security Cadre; 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader;  
7. Secretary; 8. Finance Cadre; 9. Propaganda Cadre.

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ANNEX C (DECEMBER WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43

**1. General Climatic Brief.**

a. During the month of December the area is completely under the influence of the northeast monsoon. However, compared with the May to October southwest monsoon, the northeast monsoon is relatively cool and dry.

b. During the northeast monsoon, most frequent cloudiness and precipitation occur on the windward slopes of the ANNAMITE CHAIN, along the east coast and the RVN. Locations in these regions average 8-20 inches of precipitation on a 10 to 20 day period, and as much as 50 inches in one month and 12 inches in one day are recorded.

c. North Vietnam and the east coast of RVN have typically poor overall weather. There are many days with light rain or drizzle, low cloudiness, and poor visibility generally referred to as "Crachin" weather.

**2. Precipitation.**

a. The mean rainfall amounts continue to decrease over the entire area. Most precipitation falls as afternoon and evening showers or thunderstorms; drizzle falls from "Crachin" stratus along the coastal areas of RVN and NVN. Showers are generally intense, but of short duration.

b. The principal factor influencing precipitation amounts is exposure to the moist wind flow. Coastal regions exposed to onshore flow, especially those backed by mountain ranges, have the majority of rainy days and the larger rainfalls.

c. The mean number of days with precipitation is 15 to 20 days. The mean precipitation amounts is highest along the coast, and includes the area within the I CTZ. The highest mean value is 41 inches at BA NA, 30 miles south of HUE.

d. Maximum December rainfall is 20 to 30 inches from southern QUANG NGAI (P) to the DMZ.

e. Minimum precipitation amounts for the month are less than 0-1 inches along the coast in the I CTZ.

f. Maximum 24 hour rainfall varies in the I CTZ from 6-18 inches. DANANG records a one day rainfall of 13 inches.

**3. Cloudiness**

a. In December there is an increase in mean cloudiness, particularly below 5,000 feet in the I CTZ area.

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b. During surges of the northeast monsoon "crachin" cloudiness, ceilings below 2,000 feet can also be expected. These early morning clouds usually break up by midmorning to become scattered to broken cumulus, with bases 3,000 to 4,000 feet during the afternoon, but these may reform and lower at night.

c. Cloudiness in the I CTZ increases and reaches an annual maximum. "Crachin" stratus occurs along the coast on 3 to 7 days. Mean cloudiness is between 70% to 82% at DANANG. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 five days along the coastal area.

4. Visibility. The poorest visibilities occur in fog and drizzle along the coast of the I CTZ during fresh surges of the northeast monsoon. In general, surface visibilities are best during the afternoon and air-to-ground visibilities are best between 0800 to 1100 LST; but when "crachin" weather occurs, visibilities in affected areas can be restricted throughout the day. Visibilities generally increase to five miles after 1000 LST.

5. Fog.

a. Fog forms during predawn hours and dissipates rapidly after sunrise. It is normally light and nonpersistent except in the deeper valleys where it may form earlier and persist through the morning.

b. Most locations in the I CTZ observe fog on five days or less.

6. Temperatures. During December, mean maximum and minimum temperatures are at or near their annual minima. In general, decreases in temperatures in comparison, range from five degrees to eight degrees Fahrenheit in the I CTZ. Mean daily maximum temperatures range from 74° to 80° F along the coastal regions. Mean daily minimum temperatures range from 65° to 70° F.

7. Relative Humidity. During December the mean relative humidity increases slightly. Mean relative humidities range from 80% to 90%.

8. Sunrise, Sunset and Moonrise, Moonset Tables (DANANG). The following are the sunrise/sunset and moonrise/moonset times for the month of December:

December  
Sunrise/Sunset - Moonrise/Moonset  
Tables for Danang

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
1	0659	1813	2109	0948	
2	0659	1813	2211	1045	
3	0700	1814	2311	1136	
4	0700	1814	----	1224	
5	0701	1814	0011	1306	Last

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
6	0701	1814	0108	1347	
7	0702	1815	0205	1428	
8	0702	1815	0301	1510	
9	0703	1815	0359	1551	
10	0704	1815	----	----	
11	0704	1816	----	----	
12	0705	1816	----	----	New
13	0706	1817	----	----	
14	0706	1817	----	----	
15	0707	1818	0956	2116	
16	0707	1818	1041	2210	
17	0708	1819	1122	2303	
18	0708	1819	1200	2351	
19	0709	1820	1234	----	
20	0709	1820	1307	0038	First
21	0710	1821	1340	0122	
22	0710	1821	1413	0209	
23	0711	1822	1455	0257	
24	0711	1822	1527	0347	
25	0712	1823	1611	0440	
26	0712	1823	1700	0537	
27	0713	1824	1756	0637	
28	0713	1824	1857	0737	Full
29	0714	1825	2000	0836	
30	0714	1825	2104	0931	
31	0715	1825	2205	1020	

Duration of Civil Twilight is approximately 23 minutes

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ANNEX D (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)  
TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 43

1. 72nd Bn. Ballier WO NGUYEN HUNG KIET (AKA DUC HLEN), signal officer of the 72d Bn gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 72d Bn is a "QUANG NAM (P)" military unit with a strength of about 300. At the time of activation, the strength of the battalion was approximately 400. In addition to the 72d Bn the following three separate companies are under province control: The 16th Recon, Intell, and Sapper Co, located in TINH PHUOC (D) with a strength of 80 men; the 74th Sniper Co, located in the CHU LAI area and the 706th Mobile Infantry Co, located at KY TRA (V), TAM KY (D). The 70th Bn is subordinate to the 1st VC Regt, however, the captive knew very little concerning this regiment and nothing concerning the 21st NVA Regt.

b. The 72d Bn is equipped with the following weapons: one-81mm mort, one-82mm mort, three-57mm RR, six-IMG, nine-BAR and an unknown quantity of M-1 rifles, carbines, MATs, K.50s, Thompsons and French "Tulle" SMGs. The unit is also equipped with 600 locally made concussion grenades and 30 US fragmentation grenades.

c. The plans for the battalion called for training and rest during November and attack missions during December. Training and rest areas are located at PHUOC LONG (V) and KY AN (V); assembly areas are not fixed. A food production area is located at Hamlet (5) PHUOC LONG (V) TIEN PHUOC (D).

d. The battalion communication section is organized as follows: Two crypto officers, a repairman, two AN/GRC-9 operators, four generator operators and a seven man AN/PRC-10 squad. The crypto officers, repairman, AN/GRC-9 operators are trained in NVN. The AN/PRC-10 squad is trained and billeted with the battalion and during operations is deployed with the subordinate companies. Call signs and frequencies for the AN/PRC-10 radios are changed daily. At one time the battalion used the call sign SONG DANH with the companies using SONG MA, SONG HONG, SONG LO and SONG CAI and the collective call TRUONG SON. The frequencies most used were within the 38-42 megacycle range. They were not restricted to these frequencies but attempted to avoid frequencies near those of ARVN units. The assignment of call signs and frequencies to the units of the battalion is the responsibility of the battalion signal officer. Primary and secondary frequencies are both known and used by the operators. The assignment of call signs and frequencies for the AN/GRC-9 is made by the province military unit signal officer and in the battalion only the AN/GRC-9 operators know them. The AN/GRC-9 is operated using C-W with schedules at 0700H and 1700H daily. All incoming and outgoing traffic is processed only by the two crypto officers. Their books for encryption and decryption were brought from NVN. The captive does not know where the books are changed.

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The books never leave their possession and regardless of rank or position, no one else has access to these crypto books. For emergency destruction, incendiary devices are carried. They are about the size of a pack of cigarettes with pull activators.

c. Personalities identified by the captive are: TUC, CO, 72d Bn; DONG, CO, 16th Recon, Intell, Sapper Co; Lt NGHIA, CO, 706th Mobile Infantry Co; Capt GIAU, CO, unknown battalion or company, 1st VC Regt. (G-2 Comment: According to VC province designations "QUANG NAM (P)" compares closely with what is called QUANG TIN (P) by the RVN Government. III MAF OOB holdings indicate that the 72d Bn is a QUANG TIN (P) local force unit. This is the first report of TRUC as CO of the 72d Bn. The 16th Recon, Intell, Sapper Co is believed to be the A-16 Co. This is the 1st report of DONG as CO of A-16. The 74th Sniper Co is possibly the 74th Recon Co. III MAF OOB holdings indicate that both the A-16 and the 74th Recon Co are in the CHU LAI area. The "Tuille" SMG AKA MAT-49 is a French 9mm submachine gun (M1949). The 70th Bn is believed to be attached to the 1st VC Regt when it operates in QUANG TIN (P). The report is rated F/3).

2. 48th Bn. Captive PHAN TUNG, a laborer with the 48th Bn (LF), gave the following information following his capture by the 2d Bde, ROKMC on 20 November 1966:

a. The 48th Bn consists of four companies with a strength of 400 men and 300 laborers. The mission of the battalion on the date the captive was taken was to attack the 2d Bde ROKMC units engaged in Operation DRAGONEYE. The battalion was equipped with the following weapons: four-60mm mortars, four-MG's, 16-BAR's and various types of individual weapons. The battalion was equipped with AN/PRC-10 radios for contact between battalion and company.

b. To carry out its attack mission, the 48th Bn was divided into two groups for an enveloping attack on the 2d Bde ROKMC units. One group moved to attack from (BS 552807) toward the eastern slope of Hill 23, while the other group moved to attack the western slope of the hill. The rallying point following the attack was in the vicinity of (BS 552813).

c. The 48th Bn was badly demoralized during the attack. Prior to the attack the morale of the unit was low because of the high incidence of malaria and other diseases. A shortage of medicine precluded treatment of all the sick. The battalion was also generally short of supplies.

(G-2 Comment: At 200400H the 3d Bn, 2d Bde ROKMC was in contact with an estimated battalion size unit (later identified as the 48th Bn, according to captured documents). The report is rated F/3.)

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3. The following translated document outlines conscription and recruiting policy in VC controlled areas:

On the Drafting of Youth

In compliance with higher echelons' directives, VX2 is planning to institute a campaign directed at the public at large - elders, farmers, women, young men - with a view to impressing young men and women between the ages 16 to 35 to volunteer into the service to kill the Americans and save the country.

In view of the above, the following actions should be taken:

1. Motivate Young Men to Enlist:

It is necessary to acquaint cadre, and party members with the Party policy and make them realize the importance and urgency of recruiting the youth to save the country. Each Party chapter should carefully study VX2's directive concerning the motivation of youths to join the service and take corrective action for remedying the erroneous concepts and unrighteous acts on the part of the cadre and Party members.

Cadre and Party members should attend classes for studying chairman Ho's appeal which will serve as a basis for shaping the masses' outlook.

Cadre and Party members should be the first volunteers into the service to fight the Americans and save the country. The Party chapters should devise plans to have their members enlist in order to set examples for the masses to follow. (These Party members will then be made the core of the recruit groups). Each Party chapter will have to urge 30 percent of its (Labor) Youth Group members and 15 percent of its Party members aged 18 - 35 to volunteer for the service. The volunteer individual Party member, in turn, will try to persuade other people to enlist. The elderly Party members will persuade their progeny and the youths residing in their hamlets to join the service and at the same time devise plans to provide assistance to the draftees' families left behind. Women Party and Group members should particularly set good example in order to motivate other women.

The Party chapters should resolutely send their members, including hamlet and village cadre, into the service. Under no circumstance, will they feign to send their members into the service in order to set examples for the other persons to enlist and then pull these members back.

Concurrently, the Party-Chapters should try to make the most of the women's force in the village and hamlet work with a view to developing the women's role.

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The Party chapters should try to encourage volunteers among their members and cadre to enlist to destroy the Americans and save the country.

Draftees' rosters should be submitted to TX4 for further "collective motivation." Concurrently, chapters will submit reports and comments on any erratic ideological outlook and unexemplary act on the part of the cadre and members, such as draft dodging or reluctance to send their children into the service.

This spontaneous crucial task for the month of October should be thoroughly understood by all Party and Group members, who will spare no effort to solve their current problems so as to be able to defeat the US aggressors.

2. Recruit new (Party and Group) Members:

This phase of the conscription is a crucial test. The Party Chapters should keep an eye on this phase of the conscription in order to uncover the enthusiastic persons for propaganda purposes and for recruiting new members.

Those persons eligible for admission into the Party during this phase who have volunteered to enlist should be permitted to join the Party prior to their conscription.

Party Chapters should endeavor to provide all necessary Party ID cards and papers for the draftees to take along with them.

In sum, the recruitment of new Party members will be proceeded with as usual. Especially at this time, Party Chapters should place emphasis on conferring Party membership to the "elite elements" who have volunteered for military service or who have "in an exemplary manner" urged their husbands and sons to enlist in order to kill the Americans and save the country.

3. Train cadre and improve the organization:

With a view to meeting the present requirements, Party Chapters should devise plans for training village and hamlet cadre. They should not hesitate to employ women cadre in all branches of village activity to fill the gap caused by the men's induction into the service.

Upon receipt of this circular, "P's" are requested to disseminate it to all Party Chapters and to supervise its implementation. Reports on cadre and Party and Group members who volunteer for military service for current phase will be submitted on time to TX4.

25 September 1966  
Staff Section of TX4  
/S/ CHUNG

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## ANNEX E (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 43

1. GENERAL. VC activity during the reporting period continued at a low level. Significant changes included a marked decrease in the number of incidents involving sabotage and greater emphasis being placed on propaganda. Other items of major interest includes a conference to indoctrinate VC who had deviated from the cause and the sending of VC cadre not fully indoctrinated to a center for further training.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. A report from an intelligence source stated that the VC are training a number of people who will eventually infiltrate government controlled areas as refugees. The mission of these personnel will be to collect intelligence information and to act in support of VC "Stay behind Cadre."

QUANG NGAI. A 21 November report stated that the VC selected 50 young women from QUANG NGAI (P) and took them to VAN THIEN (H) vicinity (BS 700800) for special training in the use of mines, grenades, and pistols. Upon completion of their training these women will have the mission of collecting intelligence information from Allied Forces. (CI Comment: One of many reports of VC utilizing women for espionage purposes).

3. SABOTAGE. The following act of sabotage was reported.

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG NAM	24Nov	Culvert destroyed	BT 062512

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 25 November report stated that on 20 November an estimated VC platoon entered PHU AN (H) (YD 283580) and gave a propaganda lecture to the local populace and appealed for tax payments.

A report of 25 November stated that an estimated two VC platoons entered XUAN HOA (H) (YD 198809) to deliver a propaganda lecture and distribute a number of leaflets (theme unknown).

A 25 November report from an intelligence source stated that an unknown number of VC entered QUAT XA (H) (YD 093582) and gave a propaganda lecture.

THUA THIEN. A 20 November report from a usually reliable source stated that on 17 November the VC circulated propaganda leaflets in HUE.

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The leaflets contained an appeal to the officers of the 1st ARVN Division to stop fighting the Liberation troops and stated that the officers and their families would be welcomed should they join the National Liberation Front. (CI Comment: On 29 October it was reported that an estimated VC squad entered TRAN HUNG DAO (H) (YD 780189) and distributed propaganda leaflets. These leaflets also contained an appeal to the 1st ARVN Division to desert and join the National Liberation Front).

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 25 November report stated that an unknown number of VC entered TAN AN VAN (H) (YD 183718) and in addition to collecting rice, forced the villagers to plant potatoes and banana trees.

A 21 November report from an intelligence source stated that an estimated VC squad entered DONG BAO (H) (YD 395567) and kidnapped three civilians.

THUA THIEN. A 21 November report from an intelligence source stated that two VN females and a young boy were injured in an explosion resulting from a booby trapped table in the GIA LE Market place (YD 817184).

QUANG NAM. A 21 November report from a usually reliable source stated that the markets of NHUAN (V) (BT 114545) and BAN THACH (V) (BT 148531) are being utilized as a "go-between" for foodstuffs and supplies that are being passed to the VC.

QUANG NGAI. A 22 November report from a usually reliable source stated that the VC held a conference at PHU DINH (H) (BS 787525) for 40 cadre and guerrillas of MO DUC (D). The purpose of the conference was to "return" those guerrillas and cadre who had deviated from the cause; to send cadre not fully indoctrinated to a center for further indoctrination training; to control and observe merchants and vendors in the government and VC controlled areas; and to stop government secret agents from infiltrating the Liberation area.

A 21 November report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that a VC enemy cadre composed of 40 men entered VINH HIEN (H) (BS 775445) and other neighboring hamlets to levy taxes. A 50 percent tax was levied on rice, 40 percent on cigarettes and 30 percent on fish sauce, salt, and other food items.


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4 DECEMBER 1966

# PERINTREP NO. 44



III MAF PERINTREP 44

27 Nov - 3 Dec 66

GROUP 4  
 DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Copy 167 of 175 Copies  
 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 040800H Dec 66  
 Ser: 0181866

PERINTREP NO. 44

Period Covered: 270001H Nov - 032400H Dec 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,  
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - SOUTHERN DMZ. There were no significant reports of enemy contact and movement in northern QUANG TRI (P) including that area in immediate proximity to the southern portion of the DMZ. The enemy continued to avoid any major ground action. That light contact and ground activity which did occur is again attributed to a general screening and reconnaissance effort. As an example, on 28 November, two separate contacts were made with estimated VC or NVA squad sized elements at (YD 115515) and (XD 988594). In both cases and, following a short exchange of fire, the enemy hastily withdrew. Enemy activity within the DMZ remains unchanged; his actions proceed at a constant rate and appear to represent a fairly well established pattern of resupply, gradual replacement of personnel and light ground fortification construction. Enemy activity in western QUANG TRI was of little consequence and that activity in the eastern and coastal portion of the province was limited to isolated, small scale harassing actions. Local force VC units in southeastern QUANG TRI continue to operate in normally accepted locations. Poor weather again precluded any adequate aerial photographic coverage of these northern areas.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. Eastern THUA THIEN (P) remained relatively quiet. Little intelligence information was received covering this coastal area. Aerial photographic coverage of portions of western THUA THIEN revealed nothing of significance. Activity within the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to what has been accepted as a normal number of isolated, small scale incidents.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. The tempo and intensity of VC activity eased off slightly in QUANG NAM (P). One major incident of sabotage occurred between PHU BAI and DANANG along the National Railway. An unknown number of VC blew a portion of a railway bridge located at (ZD 148010). This point is approximately six kilometers east of PHU LOC. The entire coastal area between PHU BAI and DANANG was otherwise quiet and produced nothing in the way of significant intelligence. The considerable VC sightings of two and three weeks ago, made by ground reconnaissance elements south of the DANANG TAOR, have not been in evidence during OPERATION MISSISSIPPI currently underway in the same general area.

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Aerial photography flown over the southern portion of the TAOR and south of the TAOR itself was essentially negative; no significant enemy activity was noted. Enemy action in the southeastern part of QUANG NAM was also limited to small scale harassing action. There was a slight drop in the number of VC initiated incidents within the DANANG TAOR.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Only light enemy activity was reported throughout QUANG TIN (P). Along Highway 1 and through the eastern coastal region, enemy action for the third consecutive week has been limited to light harassing actions. A moderate amount of intelligence information was received concerning main force and local force VC units which have been operating in normally accepted areas. Ground reconnaissance west of the CHU LAI TAOR reported only minor sightings of armed VC. No other intelligence of any consequence was received concerning QUANG TIN.

e. QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. The number of VC initiated incidents reported within the CHU LAI TAOR remained the same this week. The bulk of these occurred in the southern sector. An overall recapitulation of intelligence information acquired through and as a result of recent Allied ground action southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR has identified three subordinate battalions of the 1st VC Regt (60th, 80th and 90th) and the local force 48th VC Bn. Generally speaking, these units had been deployed in operating areas previously accepted by III MAF in the general area southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR. Of these units, the 60th Battalion of the 1st VC Regt and the 48th VC Bn were encountered and virtually routed in action. Enemy activity in the eastern QUANG NGAI coastal area was very light and again was confined to isolated, small scale harassing actions. On 29 November a defector, purportedly from the 3rd NVA Regt, in referring to the current enemy situation in southeastern QUANG NGAI along the BINH DINH border, stated that his unit recently moved into southeastern QUANG NGAI for rest and refit. Although this information remains unconfirmed, other reliable intelligence information has indicated an increase in enemy activity in southern and western QUANG NGAI.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents reflected a considerable decrease for the reporting period. Incidents consisted of 76 small unit engagements, 68 AA fire incidents, seven mine/booby trap incidents and two acts of terrorism.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Demolition Device. An interrogation report of HO TRUNG, 13 years old, from NAM MY (H) (AT 904823), captured by elements of the 503rd Infantry at (AT 901820) on 30 November, revealed a new VC approach toward the construction of a demolition device.

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The pin of an M-26 grenade is pulled and a string tied around the spoon handle. The end of the string is tied to a corner of a piece of sticky paper wrapped around the grenade. Upon use of the device, the paper is unwrapped and laid over the grenade so that the prop blast of a helo will blow the paper off the grenade, thereby unwrapping the string and releasing the safety lever of the grenade. (G-2 Comment: first report of this type tactic).

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
28 Nov	(BS 305603)	Rice Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
28 Nov	(AT 876494)	Guerrilla Training Course	135th INTC GP III MAF G-2: F/4
29 Nov	(BT 023399)	VC Training Center	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period decreased substantially from the previous period and totaled 68. 13 aircraft were hit with a total of 16 rounds. There were no instances of 12.7mm AA fire. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 93), (BS 57) and (BS 58).

i-q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) The QUANG TRI (P) reconnaissance sightings continued to be very light during the reporting period. The only sighting of any consequence was made on 29 November when 35 NVA were observed within the DMZ and immediately north of THON SON LAM.

(2) In THUA THIEN (P) sightings continued to reflect a low level of enemy activity over the week. The sightings fell into two familiar clusters—one just south of the PHU BAI TAOR and the other immediately southwest of HUE City.

(3) In QUANG NAM (P) sightings dropped off sharply over the period. Poor weather produced an almost constant situation of low visibility with the resultant decrease in observations and sightings.

(4) In QUANG TIN (P) and QUANG NGAI (P) sightings remained at a very low level. There was no discernable pattern or apparent significance noted in the reconnaissance reports covering these two provinces.

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s. Negative.3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 43.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period totaled 76 KIA, 67 KIA (Prob), eight VCC and one NVAC. Weapons losses were 19 individual weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g-h. Negative

i. Terrain. No change

j. Weather. A moderate to strong northeasterly flow aloft prevailed over I Corps throughout most of the reporting period. During the early part of the week conditions were generally favorable for small unit operations. Later in the week a northeasterly surge ahead of a cold front created unfavorable flying conditions over the coast and inland mountains with ceilings ranging from 500 to 1000 feet. Visibility was frequently restricted to one mile and less during rain, fog and intermittent showers. Winds frequently gusted to 25 knots and occasionally stronger in more exposed areas and in mountain passes. Over the mountains, ceilings averaged 1,000 to 2,000 feet, with intermittent conditions of 400 to 600 feet, and visibility down to one mile in rainshowers and fog. As a result of the weather, fixed wing operations were drastically limited during the latter part of the reporting period. On the ground trafficability was occasionally hampered by flooding, mud and road washouts. Following are the weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANAENG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	72	72	77	77
Low	64	67	69	70
Rainfall (total)	4.83	5.47	3.40	5.45
Visibility (miles)	5	3.5	7	8.5
Winds (knots)	10	8	7	9

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k. Significant Captive/Returnee Agent and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

a. Enemy Capabilities. VC/NVA forces can:

(1) Attack the KHE SANH - THON SON LAM - D5 - DONG HA area with up to two divisions (324B NVA Div and 341st NVA Div).

(2) Attack HUE - PHU BAI area with one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and two separate battalions (804th and 810th).

(3) Attack the DANANG combat base with up to two regiments (3d and 21st NVA Regt) and six separate battalions (R.20, V.25, 70th, and 804th Infantry Bns and 402nd Sapper Bn)

(4) Attack the CHU LAI combat base with one regiment (1st Regt) and five separate battalions (20th, 38th, 48th, and 72d Infantry Bns and 409th Sapper Bn).

(5) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one regiment (reinforced).

(6) Defend in present positions in and just north of the DMZ with two divisions (324B Div and 341st NVA Div).

(7) Defend elsewhere in I CTZ, including VC/NVA base areas, with forces locally available.

(8) Reinforce the forces presently in I CTZ within three to five days with up to two divisions from NVN or from those forces transiting LAOS, and one division from II Corps (3d NVA Div).

(9) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare operations, to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's terrorist, sabotage and propaganda activities, and the use of mines and booby traps.

b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Capabilities (1), (2), (3) and (4): Factors which favor the adoption of these capabilities are: The present disposition of enemy units contiguous to likely areas of attack; enemy knowledge of the terrain; the probability that enemy logistic support has been stockpiled in his operating areas; and the enemy knowledge of our situation, based on frequent probes and reconnaissance activities.

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Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: The heavy losses in personnel, equipment, and supplies sustained by the enemy in past operations; the enemy predisposition not to mass forces; our operations which have forced the enemy to displace against his will at times of our choosing; our destruction of his logistic support in past operations; and our air supremacy and uninterrupted aerial reconnaissance hindered only by adverse weather.

(2) Capability (5): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: The present dispositions of enemy units; isolated units and outposts offer the best target for the least risk, compared to the other attack capabilities, particularly when executed in inclement weather; and the enemy's past successes against isolated ARVN/CIDG outposts in I CTZ. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The heavy losses sustained by the enemy in past operations; the demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy build-ups and to react rapidly to destroy them by air strikes or by ground spoiling attacks; and such attacks, when conducted against CIDG Camps, might reasonably be considered by the enemy to invite too much friendly attention to areas surrounding isolated outposts and district headquarters, lead to a rapid build-up of friendly forces in areas controlled or contested by VC/NVA forces, and result in effectively causing the dislocation of VC/NVA forces from the piedmont into the highlands.

(3) Capabilities (6) and (7): Factors which favor adoption of these capabilities are: Our build-up in the area south of the DMZ; heavy losses in personnel, equipment, and supplies during Operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE may dictate that the enemy assume a temporary defensive posture in northern I CTZ; terrain and present dispositions favor the defender in most of I CTZ; continuing enemy efforts to improve and expand defensive positions and supply caches; and increasing willingness of enemy forces, particularly NVA, to attempt to hold their positions and to counterattack when conditions are favorable. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: Enemy reluctance to stand and fight against US/FWMAF except under favorable conditions and at a time and place of his choosing; the enemy may prefer not to defend occupied terrain if it is only an operating area and not a vital base area; the enemy has only a limited supporting arms capability and will usually avoid direct contact with superior friendly forces and rely on unconventional and psychological warfare operations to inflict maximum casualties; and the enemy is unlikely to achieve even a limited victory while in an essentially defensive posture.

(4) Capability (8): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's desire to achieve a major victory against friendly forces; the relative freedom of movement through enemy controlled territory and the DMZ; and the enemy's capability to move units between I and II Corps. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's reluctance to mass his forces for movement; and the probability that reinforcing units would be detected and destroyed by friendly supporting arms fire.

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(5) Capability (9): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: This capability is a basic enemy tactic which has long been practiced within SVN; it provides an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms fire; guerrillas and Local Force VC units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while VC Main Forces and NVA units conduct large scale operations; the VC knowledge of the terrain and of the local populace; and the enemy's belief that successful application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued U.S. Force presence in SVN. There are no factors which militate against this capability.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption. The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities are as follows: (9), (5), (6), (7), (1), (4), (3), (2), and (8).

d. Vulnerabilities.

(1) VC/NVA supply areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to reconnaissance and surveillance unless carefully concealed.

(2) VC/NVA forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support in SVN and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations, VC/NVA forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to the principal of surprise.

(4) Limited manpower resources in North Vietnam and VC controlled areas of South Vietnam have required a dependency upon an extensive conscription program in order to maintain VC/NVA troop levels. The result has been a lowering of morale, reduced training time, decreased combat effectiveness, and increased vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

(5) VC/NVA forces have become more dependent upon local resources for support as the total VC/NVA strength increases. But the necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population under VC/NVA control.

*R. H. Thompson*  
R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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## ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT CAPTIVE/RETURNEE, AGENT AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

## DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 173D ABN BDE	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CG FLC	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 79.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 76.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	25	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CICV 236	4
CTF 76	1	III MAP	10
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1		

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAP PERINTREP NR 44

III MAP VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 032400H DEC 66.

	<u>NVA FORCE</u>		<u>VC MAIN FORCE</u>		<u>VC LOCAL FORCE</u>		<u>TOTAL UNITS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,440					2	1,440
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,640	1	800			7	2,440
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,580	8	3,300	7	2,700	32	14,580
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	4	2,890			14	5,340
Separate Companies			3	285	27	2,690	30	2,975
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		14,910		7,275		5,390		27,575
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)			1	330	3	1,200	4	1,530
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			2	220	4	455	6	75
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				550		1,655		2,205
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					4	1,480	4	1,480
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				1,600		2,100
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								
								20,597
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		15,410		7,825		8,645		52,477

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2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 032400H DEC 66

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div#1	NVA	C	8,000		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	PO	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715#2	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536#3	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PO	1,500		Unknown		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

324B Div	NVA	C	8,700#4	Fair	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,230		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT</u> <u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1st Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Jul66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	22Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	24Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	23Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80ct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10ct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 285403	13Jul66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
K.3 Co	MF	C	100		YD 0220		
Hai Lang Co	LF	C	80		YD 3244		
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
G.10 Co	MF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	24Dec66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Good	Thua Thien (P)		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735		
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 330345	12Jul66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Good	YD 6318	YC 942965	1Nov66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 320285	12Jul66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YD 970170	19Oct66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Good	Que Son (D)	AT 865375	19Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	AT 865375	19Oct66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 867375	19Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 958402	19Oct66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 861387	19Oct66
Binh Son Trans Bn	MF	C	1,490		YC 6035		
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 997532	26Aug66
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Que Son (D)	Que Son (D)	28Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	Duc Duc (D)	13Nov66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	300	Excel	AT 8364	AT 9666	19Nov66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Aug66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	BT 0662	26Aug66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	6,700	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai: (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
21st Regt	NVA	C	1,400		Thang Binh (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Thang Binh (D)	BT 249054	13Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT 2223	10Aug66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT 1533	11Aug66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT 230236	10Aug66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,450		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9823	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	Quang Tin (P)	3Mar66
Nam Son Trans Bn	MF	C	700		ZB 1079		
49th Bn	LF	PR	500		BT 0730		
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1536		
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
A16 Co	LF	C	120		BT 1516	Tien Phuoc (D)	16Nov66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region 5	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	AS 8812	29Nov66
1st VC Regt	MF	C	1,800	Pair	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	29Nov66
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Tinh (D)	BS 452798	29Nov66
60th Bn	MF	C	200		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
80th Bn	MF	C	400		W Binh Son (D)	BS 4585	29Nov66
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 4268	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 7850	BS 5577	20Nov66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 3678	31Oct66
104th Bn	LF	PR	300		BS 6692		
1506th Engr Bn	MF	PR	330		BS 2870	BS 5892	24Aug66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
109th Bn	LF	PO	300		BS 7283		
37th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5860		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8125	BS 7745	31Oct66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

NOTES

- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Only the 2nd Co of the 1st Bn is confirmed in this general area. Locations of the remaining companies of the battalion are unknown.
- #3. Only the 5th Co of the 2nd Bn is confirmed in this general area. It is probable that another company is in the area. Locations of the remaining companies are unknown.
- #4. Strength of the 324B Div is estimated at 90% of 9,600. One-half of the estimated past losses have been added since 27 October because of lack of contact in the past 30 days. The infantry battalions of the division are estimated at 75% of T/O strength (75% of 700).

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 032400H DEC 66

DMZ/VINH LINE SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)	Unk	Unk
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)	Unk	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-An
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)	Unk	Unk	Unk
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)	Unk	Unk	Unk
4th Bn	Unk	31445XBL 32445	Unk	Unk
5th Bn	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
6th Bn	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
33rd Regt (Hq)	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?); 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Cong Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May	51.441 KT	Unk	CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj Song THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn			
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn			
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Most Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU
7th Bn	D-7; K.37			
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Capt LOI XO-Srlt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14		2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
K.3 Co Hai Lang Co	803 Co 5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; H.99		1-MG 9-AR	CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02; V-51; H-20			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien			
Cam Lo Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA
<u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>				
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt PHUNG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn 802nd Bn	K.1 K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-1(?)	1520		
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH CO-Ton That THIET CO-Capt Huong THI
804th Bn 810th Bn	K.4; VQ-74 6th; K-10; 310(?)			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Phe 18		1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co		2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-Capt Hoang AN CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co Huong Tra Co C.117 Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17 D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5 Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			CO-Nguyen DAM CO-THUYET CO-Xuan SAM

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Work- site-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH CO-Capt THAO CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh			
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			
Binh Son Transport Bn		20,265GM- 20,268GM Bac Hien		CO-TRI
R.20	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CON XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THAN
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn		1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THU PO-TOAN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	T-89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-HOANG
3rd Bn			2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th			CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU CO-Phan Phong SAM CO-Do THANH CO-Nguyen TAM
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			
H.54	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang	20,601GM- 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
21st Regt (Hq)	BACH MA; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong- 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG CO-SrCapt Le Huy D CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
2nd Bn	135 Bn			
3rd Bn				
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)				
RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Kuong 111; X-11; 19th Bn			CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN XO-Trañ Van QUANG PO-Nguyen Van HIEN
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	GK-32			
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33			
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		CO-Nguyen Van HUYNH

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
RQ24 Bn (ENG) 72nd Bn Name Son Trans Bn	GK-40	20,269GM- 20,272GM Bac Hien		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO
49th Bn			7-81mm Mort 15-60mm Mort 5-57mm RR 3-MG 24-AR	CO-Duong Van CHAU PO-Thuyng Thanh MY
706th Co A10 Co	V-14 Co; 106th Co K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Bin		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THAN PO-Anh VU
A13 Co A16 Co	D-22 C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co A21 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co Tra Son Co Tra Ha Co				CO-MANH
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>				
Military Region V (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien		CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108(Alt Cmd Elm)			CO-Col Cham Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
80th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007			CO-Maj Nguyen THYEN KO-PHAM
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI KO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20	20,135GM- 20,139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn	Poss 408th Bn			CO-Capt KY
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20,141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM KO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
104th Bn	405th Bn		1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 3-MG 18-AR	CO-Nguyen Hi CHAW; Nghia TUN
1506th Engr Bn	Poss 506th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			CO-Pham Van NGOC
109th Bn	209th Bn; B.17 Bn; T.17th Bn; B-8			CO-Bui Kim BONG
37th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Maj Tran Duc DUC
307th Bn	Minh Long Co			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-Lu TRI
206th Co				CO-TIEN
614th Co	Son Ha Co			KO-SUNG
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			PO-MIEU
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			CO-Dien MIEU
C.219 Co	Dac Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP
				CO-THIN
				CO-MAU

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
T.20 Co	G-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong			PO-MINH
	Co			CO-TRAN
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List:

MR-5 HQ	2ND DIV HQ
NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ	3RD NVA REGT
341ST DIV HQ	21ST REGT
31ST REGT	6TH REGT
32ND REGT	R.20TH BN
33RD REGT	808TH BN
324B DIV HQ	814TH BN
803RD REGT	1506TH BN
90TH REGT	20TH VMC BN
812TH REGT	

5. VC Militia/Infrastructure.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
DIEN BINH (H)	DANG CA	23	2	Interrogation Report Dang VAN MAN F/3
THANH THUY (V)	DANG KIM NGON		6	
DIEN BAN (D)	NGO SACH	37	4	
QUANG NAM (P)	DANG THUY	40	8	
	DANG VINH	29	6	
	DANG XU	26	3	
KY CHANH (V)	UNK CHEN	22	3	Interrogation Report LE DOAN F/6
LY TIN (D)	NGUYEN NINH HIEN	28	3	
QUANG TIN (P)	UNK LANG	27	3	
	UNK PHI	28	3	
	UNK PHUC	23	3	
	RUI VAN QUY	24	3	
	UNK THOANG	23	3	
	UNK TRO	28	3	
	UNK VINH	26	3	
HAMLET #1	NGUYEN HIEN	28	3	Interrogation Report LE DOAN F/6
KY THANH (V)	UNK LANG	27	3	
LY TIN (D)	RUI VAN QUY	24	3	
QUANG TIN (P)	UNK PHI	28	3	
	UNK VINH	26	3	
	UNK CHEN	22	3	
	UNK THOANG	22	3	
	UNK PHUC	23	3	
	UNK TRO	28	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LY TIN (D) QUANG TIN (P)	UNK ANH	30	10	
	NGUYEN BA	18	3	
	UNK CHUNG	27	3	
	PHAM DUNG	20	3	
	NGUYEN HONG	17	3	
	UNK HOP	28	10	
	UNK LINH	28	3	
	UNK NAM	28	3	
	VO PHO	27	3	
	NGUYEN PHUOC	24	3	
	UNK PHUONG	31	10	
	NGUYEN SA	27	3	
	UNK SO	21	3	
	UNK TAM	19	3	
	UNK THANLL	28	3	
	UNK THUONG	32		
	UNK TOAN	27	3	
	NGUYEN TUAN	24	3	
	AN KIM (H) SON TAY (V) SON TINH (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK CHUNG	20	3
UNK DAN		19	3	
UNK DE		20	3	
UNK DUC		24	3	
UNK DUONG		45	5	
UNK DUONG		23	3	
UNK HONG		18	3	
UNK LAI		21	3	
UNK LANH		23	3	
UNK MUI		30	2	
UNK NGAI		28	3	
BA NGEE		40	4	
UNK NGOC		35	1	
UNK TAN		25	3	
UNK THAN		21	3	
UNK THANH		23	3	
UNK THIEN		45	0	
MUCI THUAN		39	0	
UNK THUONG		19	3	
UNK TRONG		22	3	
UNK TRUC	32	3		
VINH LOC #3(H) SON LOC (V) SON TINH (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	BUI DE	52	1	
	UNK HIEN	10	3	
	TU HUE	49	1	
	UNK MAN	18	3	
	UNK NHAM	20	3	
	UNK NHAM	27	3	
NGUYEN NHUNG	60	5		

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	UNK SIA	25	3	
	UNK THAI	17	3	
	NGUYEN TRINH	65	5	
PHUOC AN (H)	NGUYEN CUONG	40	4	Interrogation
BINH THUONG (V)	PHAM THI CUU	55	6	Report PHAN
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN LANG	37	3	TOAN F/3
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN PHAO	30	10	
	LE TRIEU	22	1	
	NGUYEN YEN	45	6	
AN HOA #3(H)	UNK BE	22	4	Interrogation
SON TAY (V)	UNK BE	20	3	Report NGUYEN
SON TINH (D)	UNK BUU	40	6	SOAN F/4
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK CONG	30	4	
	UNK DAN	18	3	
	UNK DIEN	18	2	
	UNK DUC	20	4	
	UNK DUC	20	3	
	HAI KIM	35	2	
	UNK LOI	38	1	
	UNK MUOI	45	7	
	UNK NGOC	40	1	
	RON THOI	30	9	
SONG DONG (V)	NGUYEN CHAP	35	4	Interrogation
SON TINH (D)	NGUYEN HAI	18	3	Report NGUYEN
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN MAI	17	3	NUOI F/6
	BUI MY	40	6	
	BUI MY	35	6	
	NGUYEN MY	40	3	
	NGUYEN NE	40	4	
	NGUYEN NGUON	30	9	
	PHAN THI NGUYEN	40	6	
DONG NHAM #2(H)	DANG BIEU	30	3	Interrogation
SON DONG (V)	NGUYEN CHANH	25	3	Report NGUYEN
SON TINH (D)	HONG LUONG	35	6	VIEN F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN KIM	22	3	
	NGUYEN MUI	35	3	
	HONG NHO	35	3	
	NGUYEN THAI	40	1	
	PHAM TIEN	45	4	
	PHAM TY	35	3	

NOTE: 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla;  
 4. Security Cadre; 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Secretary;  
 8. Finance Cadre; 9. Propaganda Cadre; 10. Political Cadre.

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6. New Unit Identifications

A. The following information obtained from captured documents and interrogation reports pertains to the 341st Div:

- (1) LBN 31445 is associated with the 341st Div.
- (2) LBN 31445XB is possibly associated with the 31st Regt/341st Div.
- (3) LBN 31445XBL has been reported as the LBN of the 4th Bn/32nd Regt.

B. Translation of document captured by G/2/9 at YD 123524 on 19 Nov indicates the KQ 008 unit has a LBN of 41131.

C. The following unit designations were reported by VCC NGUYEN XUAN MAI who was captured on 7 Nov at (YD 989907):

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>CODE NR</u>	<u>LBN</u>
BC - 13 (Staff)	Z1 FT	41411 FT
BC - 15 (Political)	Z2 FT	41412 FT
BC - 17 (Rear)	Z3 FT	41413 FT

Viet Cong Cover Designation manual indicates that the letters BC refer to the northern two provinces, QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO  
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 44

1. Leader of the TAM KY District Economic Section, DINH CHO SANG, who rallied to the ARVN at TAM KY District Headquarters on 22 November 1966, gave the following information during interrogation:

a. SANG, a VC MF platoon leader in 1953, was selected (1954) and sent to NVN for an administrative job. He joined the Communist Party in 1956 and was assigned to work as an assistant captain of a ship in the fleet of a fish canning company.

b. He was sent to Red China, 1956, and given instructions in the political situation in SVN, the conditions of the SVN people and the effective use of propaganda. He returned to HANOI in 1960 where he was assigned as captain of a VT 102 ship. He served in that capacity for two years, he then returned to SVN and became the leader of the TAM KY (D) Economic Section.

c. There are six district economic cadres directly responsible for the collection and distribution of rice and money for the TAM KY (D). Each harvest time approximately 6,000 piastres were collected by the village economic cadre and turned over to SANG. He then turned the money over to the District Secretary of the Autonomous Committee, who in turn gave it to the District Administrative cadres to buy foodstuff and equipment.

d. All district economic cadre from LY TIN (D) and TAM KY (D) meet at (BT 310750) on the 20th of every month. At the 20 November 1966 meeting it was decided that, from the present through February 1967, KY CHANH (V), KY KHUONG (V) and CHU LAI would be attacked by arms, propaganda and ralliers using the combined forces of three district force companies. However, no definite times or places were decided upon.

e. On 24 November 1966 SANG was taken on an overflight by helicopter and pointed out the following positions: 74th District Force Headquarters (BT 283084) and (BT 285078); 14th and 76th District Force Companies (BT 323110); rice storage area (BT 348072); hospital complex (BT 358068); and the location of the meeting place of the district and village cadre (BT 352075). He stated the rice storage area after each harvest contained approximately 45,000 kilos of rice, but at the present time there was only about 7,500 kilos stored.

f. During further interrogation SANG indicated the location of a VC reconstruction camp (BT 345056) and the strong point of VC activity in the LY TIN and southeast TAM KY Districts. This strong point is the area bound by grid squares (BT 3407), (BT 3408), (BT 3507) and (BT 3508).

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SANG stated that this area has over 600 district force soldiers, village guerrillas, cadre of all levels and various VC personalities. He further stated that it is to this point the VC flee when American operations commence in the area.

(G-2 Comment: F-3. The 14th Co is possibly the D.14 MF Co (AKA 14th VC Regt Co), and the B.14 (D) MF Co. All three companies have been reported operating in this area. This is the first report of the VC reconstruction camp and stronghold at (BT 3407), (BT 3507) and (BT 3508). There have been several reports that units in this area planned to attack KY CHANH and KY KHUONG.)

2. 60th Bn, 1st VC Regt, 2nd NVA Div. WO HOANG HIEU (alias NGUYEN XUAN), S-4, Hq, 60th Bn, who rallied to the ROKMC (BS 516779) on 24 November, gave the following information during follow-up interrogation:

a. He joined the NVA in March 1959 and reported to the 10th Co, 7th Bn for nine months of training in the techniques of employing 81mm mortars. Following training he was ordered to the 17th Co (heavy weapons) attached directed to the 165th Regt. Rallier was a squad leader in charge of YUGOSLAV 120mm type VB M52 mortars. In March 1961 HIEU moved to Hq's, 165th Regt as supply sergeant and in March 1964, was promoted to WO and transferred to the 40th Bn, 1st Regt as supply officer. Also in March 1964 the 40th Bn was designated NAM HAI (China Sea) Bn, and began infiltration into SVN. The 40th Bn was comprised of 600 men upon departure from NVN. The Bn travelled by truck for the first two days and walked for the remainder of the trip. He did not carry a weapon during infiltration but did carry dried food, three sets of civilian clothes, one hammock, one mosquito net, one set of khaki and one sweater. At times the battalion did not have enough food and they were forced to confiscate food from the people. Reportedly, no one deserted during the trip. However, 98% of the battalion contracted malaria and they were forced to spend ten days recuperating just north of the DMZ. No medicine for treatment of the malaria was available. On 29 April 1964 the 40th Bn reached TRA MY (D), QUANG TIN (P). From then until September 1964 the unit gathered provisions.

b. On 9 September 1964 the 40th Bn ambushed an ARVN Co at THON NAM (H), KY TRA (V) and decimated it, while suffering no casualties. On 9 November 1964 the battalion gained its largest victory by reportedly destroying CHOP CHAI OP, TAM KY (D) and two 105mm howitzers. On 3 February 1965 the battalion reportedly attacked and destroyed VIET AN OP and an additional two 105mm howitzers. He claims the battalion took no part in minor battles nor sustained heavy losses during 1966. The battalion moved from QUANG TIN (P) to QUANG NGAI (P) on 15 March 1965 to harass the 2nd ARVN Div.

c. HIEU could give no information on supply storage areas.

d. Prior to February 1966 the 1st VC Regt consisted of only three battalions but in February 1966 the QUANG NGAI (P) Force Bn was redesignated the 70th Bn and attached to the 1st VC Regt.

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The 1st reportedly was going to build up a division sized unit, hence attachment of the 70th Bn "BINH GIA" (name of province in SVN); the 60th Bn "BONG TRANG" (name of a flower); and the 90th Bn, "THUAN NINH" (name of province in NVN). The 1st Regt as a whole was known as the "NIGHT DRAGON" Regt.

e. The subject was transferred to the 60th Bn on 8 September 1966. There were five men making up the regimental headquarters; one battalion CO, two political officers, and two assistant political officers. The five companies of the 60th Bn were designated one through five. HIEU claimed the 60th Bn was located at (BS 538779) on 20 November.

(ITT Comment: It is felt by the interrogator that this "CHIEU HOI" has been counseled on how much information to divulge.)

(G-2 Comment: This report seems basically valid. This is the first report of the QUANG NGAI (P) Force Bn (unit designation unknown) being redesignated the 70th Bn. The 70th Bn which is carried in QUANG TIN (P) has been previously reported as subordinate to the 1st VC Regt).

3. 74th District Force Company (AKA V-20). Returnee TRAN VAN CHUNG, a squad leader of the 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, 74th District Force, defected to the ARVN on 22 November 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 74th DF Co, has 50 men and is organized into a company headquarters (nine men) and two platoons, each with two squads of nine or 10 men each. This company frequently operates in coordination with the 14th and 76th (AKA 706th) DF Co's. Normally these companies operate in and around Hamlet #8 and #9 (BT 324113), KY TRA (V) and THON HAI (H), KY THANH (V) (BT 348083).

b. The VC have a policy to conscript local males into their district force companies, in order to swell their ranks until they have enough men to call the unit a battalion or a regiment. So far the returnee knows of no district force that has recruited a sufficient number of men to be redesignated a battalion.

c. The morale of the 74th DF Co is low because of insufficient food and medical supplies. There are no doctors and only four aidmen in the company. Nine of the personnel of the 74th have malaria.

d. CHUNG was in good health and eager to supply any information. In an overflight in a helicopter, accompanied by an AO and interrogator, he identified several enemy locations.

(G-2 Comment: F-3. 74th DF Co has been previously reported by two ralliers. On 21 October 1966 MAI DAU defected. He was a member of 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, 74th Co. VO NGUYEN mentioned a 74th Sniper Co this area. 706th Co carried on OOB as confirmed this area. An A/14 Co has been reported this area numerous times).

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4. The following translated document establishes medical procedures:

Medical Activity Plan for the Last Six Months 66

Because of the failure of the dry season plan which was intended to compete with our rainy season attack plan, the enemy has been launching many sweep operations to confound us.

It has been reported that shortcomings are still to be found in various activities, especially in working procedures and the attitude of cadre.

These shortcomings must be immediately corrected. If not, they will be responsible for fewer successes in the last six months of the year.

In addition to shortcomings, we will be confronted with many difficult problems and tasks.

We have not yet been able to handle hard tasks because we lack cadre; the number available is too small compared with the ever increasing task.

The number of wounded will increase more rapidly in the last six months of this year than it did in the first six months.

There is a shortage of transportation facilities, equipment and medicines.

The enemy is using numerous dangerous chemical agents while the protective methods used by us against gas are out of date.

The number wounded will increase during the last six months of this year.

The leadership mission initiating a campaign of disease prevention, and the distribution of medicine must be carried out as required.

There may be a shortage of medicine during the last six months of this year. The most significant thing is that one agency occasionally received a small amount of medicines. Sometimes, one agency had to produce medicines for itself. In the provinces, various key activities were assigned to low level cadre. The medical equipment used by all companies was distributed in limited quantity each of the first six months of this year. Frankly speaking we could not provide full support in medical equipment for the various medical units.

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Despite the above shortcomings, we found that our medical cadre were aware of their shortcomings as well as their strong points during the implementation of tasks. They thoroughly understood what their plan of activity was because they had received political training. In carrying out their tasks they received help from technical cadre and civilians.

We were confident that they would contribute their first-hand knowledge to the implementation of the medical task.

Guidelines:

- Thoroughly understand the guidelines of the protracted revolution.
- Promote self-sufficiency and the prevention of diseases throughout the branches.
- Provide medicine and first aid and train cadre.
- Be aware of the importance of a sense of responsibility and discipline.
- Implement the plan carefully.
- Try to thoroughly understand the position of responsibility.
- Improve working procedures and methods.
- All activities must be directed by the Party and civilian commanders absolutely.
- Hold physical examinations.
- Motivate those who are aware to take part in all tasks.

Organic cadre:

Reorganize organic cadre. Increase the number of cadre. Train new cadre in the implementation of services.

In each unit, select from one to two outstanding individuals then recommend them to provinces and sections so that agencies can make known their outstanding achievements in their jobs.

Issue certificates of medics in the entire province.

Open two training courses: One for 40 advanced medical cadre and one for 24 medics. These are to be held by districts and sections to meet 100% of the requirements by early 1967.

Try to carry out the plan of professional improvement in the treatment of external diseases.

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Open a 15-day training course for medics of K-D before the end of the 3d quarter.

K-200 and K-202 will continue their advanced medical training courses to train advanced medical students as medics to meet requirements.

Other D and K will try to train two, three or five medics themselves at their office and then assign them to units promptly.

Prevention of disease:

Record names of sick soldiers.

Make daily, weekly and monthly reports on the health of the entire unit to military and civilian commanders.

Call upon the people to take care of their health so as to reach 98% of the criteria.

Take steps against malaria.

Record the names of those who have contracted malaria.

Use the standard anti-malaria methods suitable for all places.

Urge the people to use mosquito nets and insect repellants.

Indoctrinate and instruct the people on the causes of malaria and methods to take against the disease, so that they will seek new methods to counter it and be willing to use mosquito nets and insect repellants.

Try to reduce the number of patients by eight percent.

Treat patients carefully, serious cases should be immediately evacuated to province hospitals. Don't let anyone die from malaria.

Protection against poison gas.

Funds supplied by higher echelon are used to make decontaminant packets to protect the people against poison gas.

Check the decontaminant packets every month. Every day the people must practice using them for at least 15 minutes, and they must know how to treat a person with decontaminant medicines.

Distribute these first aid packets limitedly to C's and D's because they are only to be used for serious cases.

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Learn the methods of treatment.

Be ready to serve the people if it is necessary.

Prevention of diseases (cholera, plague, typhoid fever and the grippe).

Indoctrinate and instruct the people on the causes and prevention of diseases as required.

Heighten vigilance with regard to health.

Prevent the spread of all contagious diseases if possible.

Discover diseases among soldiers and the population as fast as possible and then devise a plan of effective treatment.

For serious cases, we must immediately carry the patients to K for treatment.

Use oriental medicines for treatment.

Inoculate the people against plague, cholera and typhoid fever during the 3rd quarter of 1966.

Anti-plague, cholera and typhoid fever injections must be given within 15 days intervals.

Drug distribution must be made twice a month.

Safeguard against the injection of the wrong medicines.

Motivate the people to see a medic once a month.

A meeting must be held for two to 10 days at a time to review the role of medics, to study the medical mission further, to exchange experiences and to correct shortcomings promptly.

Hygiene and sanitation as combat support.

Prevention of fatigue.

Make a report on the physical condition of all cadre.

Record the names of those who have bad health.

Promote physical exercise among the people.

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Rest when tired.

Build well aired trenches and shelters.

Be hygienic.

Eat hot meals.

Keep the neck and chest warm during the rainy season and when carrying out sapper and reconnaissance missions.

Carry pills along.

Be conscientious in bathing, as a precaution against diseases.

First aid treatment.

First aid at the front line:

Open first-aid training courses for every unit and individual.

Issue medical certificates to medical trainees who meet requirements.

Promote the implementation of first aid among the people.

Medic and first-aid cadre must thoroughly understand the five main skills and have complete medical facilities for evacuating the wounded to the nearest rear area. But when unable to carry the wounded to the rear, we must take care of them and continue to try to evacuate them to the rear by all means.

Do not leave the wounded or dead alone on the battlefield without the care of a medic because the mission of the medic is to treat the wounded out of danger.

The medical officer must be responsible for his task at the front line. He must cooperate with the surgical unit immediately when he is with a serious case.

The mission of the surgical unit is to move to the front line for the surgical mission, to use medical for treatment promptly and to evacuate the wounded to the rear for treatment.

The task of the rear:

The task of the rear is to provide sufficient beds for the wounded coming from the front line and to make preparations for surgical operations whenever the wounded are evacuated there. Every dispensary, must comprise at least 100 beds for 80 wounded and 20 sick soldiers.

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Physical examinations must be held three times a month as defined in the general policy to take care of the health of soldiers.

If the wounded do not recover their health, please do not allow them to go on combat missions.

The Treatment:

Make a proper diagnosis.

Treat cases of the same disease together.

Pay attention to the correct use of medicine.

Take precautions against the injection of the wrong medicine.

Avoid infections caused by injections.

Be aware of the responsibilities of the profession.

Try to decrease the number of infections from injections by one third.

Use both western and oriental medicines.

Cure dysentery, tuberculosis, malaria, fever etc.....

Take medicines from the people and the enemy to use for treatment.

With K, carry out medical tasks in accordance with the administrative regulations.

Be sure to record the patients case history carefully and check the records regularly and often.

Know the principles of a surgical operation.

Treat the wounded carefully so that they can leave the dispensary as rapidly as possible.

The period for treating seriously wounded cases should be no more than 28 days and for the lightly wounded, no more than 15.

Distribution of medicine: Plan the requirements for the next quarter and the allocation of medicine by the 20th day of the 3rd month of the quarter.

The distribution of medicine must be made between the 5th and the 10th of the first month of the quarter.

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Use medicines in accordance with the standards prescribed by sections. On the basis of medical certificates, give one syringe and one thermometer to each company, four syringes to each battalion, and from four to eight syringes to each village depending on the total number of beds.

Maintenance: Precautions should be taken to avoid damage, breakage and loss. A critique will be held later and an accounting made. If anyone lacks proper responsibility he will be held to account by his unit and forced to pay for his negligence. As a result, regulations of maintenance must be observed.

Use: There must be a plan for collective use and it must be approved by the unit commander.

Settlement: An accounting must be made promptly and accurately every quarter on the 30th day of the 3d month.

Self-provided medical supplies and instruments:

Units must provide surgical instruments for themselves.

Make the most advantageous use of medicines of the people.

Try to prepare medicine to be used for the treatment of fevers, coughs and wounds.

Medicine will be issued on a limited basis. The provinces must provide 100% of their medicine, K [ Sic ] 70%, agencies 50% and district units 30%.

With issued money, the battalions must buy sufficient bandage (100%) and surgical instruments.

Establish laboratories to prepare medicines of all kinds such as quinine for injection, atropine, morphine and serum to be issued to units.

Efforts should be made to recover 90% of the bottles issued when empty.

Policy on booty: Seize as much booty as possible and submit an accurate report on the booty captured. Distribute booty to units in the province. Outstanding units and individuals will be commended and awarded and units and individuals failing to observe this policy, punished.

Statistics:

Every day and month, wounded and sick soldiers must be recorded and checked to facilitate the drafting of quarterly, semiannual and annual reports.

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It is requested that monthly statistic reports be accurate and submitted on time. In addition, the account book must be closed on the 30th day of the month.

We have met with difficulties in the implementation of the plan of the last six months because we have been living in a state of the medical branch in the provinces responsible to the Party and the masses, it is requested to make every effort to accomplish its tasks, contribute to the consolidation of our combat forces and achieve brilliant successes in the days to come.

8 July 1966  
Medical Service 3-H

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## ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO.44

1. GENERAL. VC activity during the reporting period continued at a low level. Major items of interest included the apprehension of two Vietnamese males who were engaged in espionage activities within a U.S. Installation, the report of a VC election held in QUANG NGAI Province, and a plan to subvert ARVN soldiers.

2. ESPIONAGE.

THUA THIEN. A U.S. Intelligence Agency reported on 1 December that two Vietnamese males, formerly employed by a U.S. Installation in HUE, were apprehended for espionage activity. One man was employed as a telephone line repairman and had knowledge of the U.S. telephone system in the HUE area. The other was employed as a dishwasher and had knowledge of general activity within the U.S. Installation. Both Vietnamese were reportedly receiving payment from the VC for information passed.

A 30 November report from a source considered usually reliable related that the Vietnamese kidnapped by the VC from KE SUNG (H) (YD 909272) and PHONG DIEN (H) (YD 942248) during October 1966 were given espionage training and a VC political indoctrination course. The youths were ordered to report to the local government authorities and claim they had been forced by the VC to attend political training. Upon release from the government authorities, their mission was to conduct espionage activities in the local area.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	30 Nov	Culvert destroyed	YD 363504
THUA THIEN	2 Dec	Railroad bridge destroyed	ZD 148010

4. POLITICAL.

QUANG NGAI. A 1 December report from an intelligence source stated that on 20 November a meeting was held by the party Executive Committee, SON KIM (V) (BS 686842), in order to elect a village Party Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Commerce Committee member, and Information Committee members. Approximately 30 VC participated in the election which was presided over by Van Thuy, a representative from the VC District Committee.

5. PROPAGANDA.

QUANG TRI. A report of 2 December stated that an unknown number of VC entered KINH THI (H) (YD 170740) and distributed propaganda leaflets. The theme is unknown.

THUA THIEN. A 2 December report from a usually reliable source stated that during the past few nights VC political cadre have entered BINH DIEN (H) (YD 757128), and assembled the residents for a propaganda lecture.

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The lecture included an appeal from HO CHI MINH for the people to contribute rice and money to the Liberation troops and an appeal from the National Liberation Front for the ARVN soldiers to return home. The VC also warned the local populace that they were forbidden to provide information to the government forces.

A 29 November report from an intelligence source related that a VC local force company is operating in PHU LOC District. Normally groups of ten men from this company go to LOC TU (V) (ZD 203013) and LOC HAI (V) (AT 865945) to gather rice from the villagers and give propaganda lectures. The VC have warned the villagers not to provide information to the ARVN or U.S. Forces and advised them to abandon their villages and, with their possessions, join the VC in the mountains.

#### 6. MISCELLANEOUS.

QUANG TRI. A 2 December report from an intelligence source stated that during the night of 28 November approximately 20 VC entered HA THUONG (H) (YD 225725) and kidnapped a Vietnamese woman.

On 2 December an intelligence report related that on 28 November an unknown number of VC entered HA LOI TRUNG (H) (YD 219720) and kidnapped one civilian.

THUA THIEM. A 27 November report stated that approximately ten VC stopped a civilian bus in the vicinity of (YD 556320) and killed two civilians and injured one.

A 2 December report from a usually reliable source stated that on 1 December the VC district units of NAM HOA (D), HUONG THUY (D), and HUONG TRA (D) held a meeting in DINH MON (H) (YD 787114) to instruct sapper units and female cadre in the use of explosives. Intentions are to use these units to sabotage installations and throw explosives into troops assemblies.

QUANG NAM. A 29 November report related that on 27 November six VC kidnapped the Hamlet Chief of SONG BINH (H) (AT 875582).

QUANG TIN. A 2 December report from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines stated that a VC psychological warfare center was discovered at (BT 341088). The center contained 3,000 propaganda leaflets of various types which were to be directed at U.S. and ARVN Forces.

QUANG NGAI. A 1 December report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that the VC presented a plan to subvert ARVN personnel in the villages of DUC HOAI (BS 740590), DUC LUONG (BS 673573), DUC THUAN (BS 788529), DUC SON (BS 670520) and DUC MY (BS 750490). Through the use of propaganda leaflets, the VC will strive to change the opinions of ARVN personnel and call upon them to return to the VC cause. Intentions are to permit the local populace to travel between VC and Government controlled areas, providing they carry these leaflets and pass them on to the families of ARVN soldiers.

A 30 November report from an intelligence source related that the VC had established an office to handle finance in AN THACH (H) (BS 795470).


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RELEASABLE TO FVMAF AND RVNAF

11 DECEMBER 1966

# PERINTREP NO. 45



III MAF PERINTREP #45

4-10 Dec 66

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GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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III MAF

DANANG, RVN

110800H Dec 66

Sert: 0186966

PERINTREP NO. 45

Period Covered: 040001H - 102400H Dec 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13  
ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-51. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - SOUTHERN DMZ. There were no reports of substantial enemy activity in QUANG TRI (P). That action which was noted consisted of seven relatively light contacts with enemy squad or platoon sized elements. Five of these contacts were north of Route 9 and in proximity to the eastern portion of the DMZ. One of these involved the mortaring of the GIO LINE District Headquarters (YD 2273). The latter two of the seven contacts were reported from the eastern and southeastern portion of the province. When compared to the last four reporting periods a discernible increase in the tempo of enemy activity becomes apparent, however the enemy continues to avoid any major ground action. Enemy efforts within, and just north of, the eastern end of the DMZ have increased, particularly during the last 72 hours of the reporting period. Nevertheless his actions have been proceeding within a previously established pattern and continue to point toward resupply, replacement of personnel losses and construction of ground fortifications. Poor weather again prevented normal aerial photographic coverage of critical portions of the northern area. As a result of contact between an RF Company and an estimated VC platoon at YD 310485, documents were taken from a dead VC which identified him as a political officer of the 808th Bn. Such intelligence further confirms the location as the accepted operating area of this main force unit.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There were four major VC initiated incidents reported in the eastern THUA THIEN (P) coastal area. All were directed against the line of communications - Highway 1. In the vicinity of the AN LO Bridge (YD 6130), two companies of the 3rd Bn, 3rd ARVN Regt, standing security guard on this major facility, were attacked by an estimated VC battalion. The attack, supported by heavy mortar fire, subsequently overran the 3rd Bn Command Post. Simultaneously with the attack, the VC hit the bridge and destroyed approximately 30 meters of the northernmost span. Having completed the demolition, the VC then rapidly withdrew. The remaining attacks and/or sabotage were also directed against bridges and culverts. An unguarded culvert was blown at (YD 6925) on 6 December by an unknown number of VC. Further south and in the vicinity of PHU LOC (ZD 8900) a portion of a small bridge was blown during the early hours of 10 December and finally, on the same date, a small bridge north of the summit of HAI VAN Pass (AT 9393) was destroyed. Other enemy

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activity in the eastern THUA THIEN (P) region consisted of harassing actions against isolated outposts and security elements. When compared to previous reporting periods the incidence of enemy action during the past week has increased but would certainly seem to conform with his mission of attacking, where possible, our lines of communication. No other intelligence of any consequence was received covering coastal THUA THIEN (P). Activity within the PHU BAI TAOR was again limited to what is considered as a normal number of small scale incidents.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Enemy contacts in eastern QUANG NAM (P) increased substantially over the reporting period. There was a rather sharp rise in the tempo and intensity of VC activity. Operation MISSISSIPPI south of the DANANG TAOR resulted in the seizure of over 45 tons of VC rice and, of further intelligence interest, was the reception of over 2400 Vietnamese refugees who were apparently desirous of removing themselves from a VC controlled area. Low level agent reports covering central and eastern QUANG NAM (P) produced little of intelligence interest. Within the DANANG TAOR there was a rise in the number of VC initiated incidents. Analysis of intelligence information received over the past four weeks has, for the most part, consistently indicated a possible rise in the intensity of VC activity within the TAOR. A current and recurring theme noted in recently captured enemy documents pertaining to the primary direction of their war effort has been an increasing VC insistence upon even more determined efforts, by all subordinates, to bring a greater number of Vietnamese under complete VC control and to reduce the GVN influence in this regard. This intensification of a key military effort coupled with what they regard as essential political objectives will probably result in even greater enemy harassment within the DANANG TAOR, an area of very high population density. Elsewhere in eastern QUANG NAM, VC demolition resulted in five bridge-culverts being damaged to varying degrees in the HAI VAN Pass (AT 9393). Three of these structures were located to the north of the HAI VAN Summit and two to the south. Enemy action in the south-eastern part of QUANG NAM remained limited to small scale and isolated harassing actions.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. QUANG TIN (P) was relatively quiet this week, with enemy activity limited to isolated and small scale local harassing actions. Available intelligence continued to indicate that local force units were operating in normally accepted areas. Enemy activity all along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR dropped off sharply. The lack of activity might well be indicative of an enemy currently involved in reorganization and resupply following recent action southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR where elements of the 48th Bn, and the 1st VC Regt were largely defeated. The number of VC initiated incidents increased within the CHU LAI TAOR and there were several indications that the intensity of the VC activity had increased slightly. On 10 December the Headquarters Company of the Artillery Battalion, Korean Marine Brigade was attacked by an unknown number of VC in the vicinity of (BS 630858). The unit received approximately 50 rifle grenades and over 1000 rounds of enemy fire.

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e. QUANG NGAI (P). There was a distinct rise in the tempo of enemy activity in eastern QUANG NGAI, especially along Highway 1. Six major incidents occurred in this eastern portion of the province. On 7 December an unknown number of VC attacked a small PF outpost guarding a bridge 11 kilometers southeast of QUANG NGAI City. The bridge was partially destroyed and the VC were subsequently driven off by the PF. Two incidents of terrorism occurred in the same vicinity, one involved a mining along Highway 1 and the other an abduction of an RF soldier. In the same area at (BS 7961) and approximately two kilometers northwest of MO DUC, a PF platoon guarding a bridge along Highway 1, was attacked by an estimated VC company. No casualties were sustained and only minor damage was done to the bridge. On 9 December, in the vicinity of (BS 8138), a platoon from the 91st RF Co was attacked by an estimated VC company. The attack was repulsed with insignificant casualties to the RF. In the same vicinity an estimated VC squad blew an unguarded bridge. Aerial photography flown over sections of southeastern and western QUANG NGAI, when compared to November missions over the same areas, failed to reveal any indication of significant enemy activity. Other available intelligence pertaining to southern and western QUANG NGAI did, however, indicate an undetermined amount of light enemy activity. No further information was received concerning the unconfirmed movement of the 3rd NVA Regt reported last week as possibly having moved into southern QUANG NGAI from BINH DINH (P).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 331 and consisted of 156 AA fire incidents, one attack, two ambushes, 152 small unit engagements, 19 mine/booby trap incidents, and one act of terrorism.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Weapons. 3 Dec. An official of an RVN MI unit relayed the following information pertaining to possible future employment of the Russian DKG 66 (175mm RL) in SVN. This weapon is a 175mm recoilless cannon with an aluminum or plastic smooth bore barrel, which reportedly makes the weapon light and easily maneuverable. The cannon also has an electric firing mechanism. Maximum range is reportedly 10,000 meters with an effective range of 3,000 meters. (G-2 Comment: F/5. First report of this type weapon; improbable).

(2) New Tactic. On 7 December in the northern portion of the DANANG TAOR (AT 928895), an estimated VC squad wearing ARVN type uniforms attacked a USMC squad patrol. In an attempt to authenticate the incident ARVN units in the vicinity were queried on the matter. All such units denied any ARVN activity in the patrol area.

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e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

DATE	LOCATION	TYPE UNIT	SOURCE/EVALUATION
25 Nov	(BS 437651)	Admin Unit	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
26 Nov	(AT 856553)	VC Hospital	135th MI GP III MAF G-2: F/4
28 Nov	(BS 305603)	Rice Storage Area	JTAD Report III MAF G-2: F/3
1 Dec	(YC 9893)	VC Prison Camp	ARVN Escapees III MAF G-2: F/4
7 Dec	(AT 830540)	VC Training Center	135th MI GP III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period reflected an increase of over 100% when compared to the previous period. Incidents totaled 156 with 43 aircraft sustaining 107 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (XD 95), (AT 83), (AT 95), (AT 96), (BT 05), (BT 06), (BT 11), (BT 20), (BT 21), and (BS 58). No cases of 12.7mm or higher caliber fire were reported.

i - q Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) The QUANG TRI (P) reconnaissance sightings remained very light during the period. Approximately 15 NVA/VC were observed in the general area west of THON SON LAM and several unoccupied camp and VC harboring sites were observed during the latter part of the period.

(2) In THUA THIEN (P) sightings and observations again reflected a very low level of enemy activity. No pattern was established this week due to essentially negative sightings.

(3) In QUANG NAM (P) a low number of reconnaissance team insertions again resulted in essentially negative sightings. There were no reports of any consequence.

(4) In QUANG TIN (P) and QUANG NGAI (P) sightings remained at a very low level. Nothing of significance was reported.

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s. VC Operations. On 30 Nov, the VC reportedly held a meeting in HOA HAI (V) (BT 0867). The purpose of this meeting was to discuss operations on Christmas day. Among operations planned during the truce period are:

- (1) Making liaison with families having sons in the VC.
- (2) Attempting to enlist young men in the VC, particularly known deserters or draft dodgers.
- (3) Attempting to establish liaison with personnel working for U.S. forces.
- (4) Organizing many small teams for harassing activity throughout all areas.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period totaled 64 KIA, 218 KIA (Prob), 18 VCC and one NVAC. Weapons losses consisted of 18 individual weapons captured.
- f. Morale. No change.
- g. - h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No change.
- j. Weather. A strong northeasterly flow dominated the weather pattern over I Corps throughout most of the reporting period, with associated low stratus (500 - 1500 ft along the coast, 200 - 500 ft over the mountains). Drizzle and fog hampered fixed wing operations early in the period. On the 5th, the strong low level flow began to weaken gradually with improved flying conditions on the 6th and 7th over the coast in the afternoons. Cloud conditions remained low over the mountains throughout the daylight hours. Over the coast, low cloudiness with restricted visibility due to drizzle and fog prevailed. The following are the weekly averages for the areas indicated:

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	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures	83	82	82	80
High	83	82	82	80
Low	66	66	71	70
Rainfall (total)	1.78	1.17	.02	1.09
Visibility (miles)	7	7	8	7
Winds (knots)	5	6	5	6

k. Significant Captive, Agent/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 44.

*R. H. Thompson*  
R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AGENT AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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## DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 173D ABN BDE	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CG FLC	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 79.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 76.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	COMPBIBRON SEVEN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	25	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 3D MARDIV	9	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO DET C-1 5TH USSF	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CICV 236	4
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NR 45

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 102400H DEC 66.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL UNITS	TOTAL STRENGTH
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,440					2	1,440
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,640	1	800			7	2,440
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,580	8	3,300	7	2,700	32	14,580
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	2	700			12	3,150
Separate Companies			3	285	27	2,690	30	2,975
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		14,910		5,085		5,390		25,385
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions							1	UNK
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK			2	700	4	1,030
Battalions (Infantry)			1	330				
Battalions (Other)					4	455	6	675
Separate Companies			2	220				
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				550		1,155		1,705
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Infantry)							2	500
Battalions (Other)	2	500			1	120	1	120
Separate Companies								
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								
								20,597
<u>GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH</u>								
		15,410		5,635		7,445		49,087

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2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 102400H DEC 66

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div#1	NVA	C	8,000		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	PO	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715#2	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536#3	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PO	1,500		Unknown		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

324B Div	NVA	C	8,700#4	Fair	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,230		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCUMULATED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Jul66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	22Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	24Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	23Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 285403	13Jul66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (B)	YD 374496	1Aug66
K.3 Co	MF	C	100		YD 0220		
Hai Lang Co	LF	C	80		YD 3244		
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
S.10 Co	MF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST. STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Good	Thua Thien (P)		24Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735		
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 330345	12Jul66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Good	YD 6318	YC 942965	1Nov66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 320285	12Jul66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Lee (D)	YD 970170	19Oct66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
G.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Good	Que Son (D)	AT 865375	19Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	AT 865375	19Oct66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 867375	19Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 958402	19Oct66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 861387	19Oct66
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 997532	26Aug66
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Que Son (D)	Que Son (D)	28Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	Duc Duc (D)	13Nov66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn #5	MF	C	300	Excel	AT 8364	Central Danang TAOR	30Nov66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Aug66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	BT 0662	26Aug66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

## QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	6,700	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai: (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
21st Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Good	Thang Binh (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Thang Binh (D)	BT 249054	13Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT 2223	10Aug66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT 1533	11Aug66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Que Son/T Binh (D)	BT 230236	10Aug66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,450		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9823	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	Quang Tin (P)	3Mar66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1536		
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
A16 Co	LF	C	120		BT 1516	Tien Phuoc (D)	16Nov66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region 5	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	AS 8812	29Nov66
1st VC Regt	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	29Nov66
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Tinh (D)	BS 452798	29Nov66
60th Bn	MF	C	200		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
80th Bn	MF	C	400		W Binh Son (D)	BS 4585	29Nov66
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 4268	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn #6	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 7850	BS 5577	20Nov66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 3678	31Oct66
104th Bn	LF	PR	300		BS 6692		
1506th Engr Bn	MF	PR	330		BS 2870	BS 5892	24Aug66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8125	BS 7745	31Oct66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66

NOTES

- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Only the 2nd Co of the 1st Bn is confirmed in this general area. Locations of the remaining companies of the battalion are unknown.
- #3. Only the 5th Co of the 2nd Bn is confirmed in this general area. It is probable that another company is in the area. Locations of the remaining companies are unknown.
- #4. Strength of the 324B Div is estimated at 90% of 9,600. One-half of the estimated past losses have been added since 27 October because of lack of contact in the past 30 days. The infantry battalions of the division are estimated at 75% of T/O strength (75% of 700).
- #5. Numerous low level agent reports for the period 20 Nov to 10 Dec have stated that the 402nd Sapper Bn has been reinforced with additional personnel and is planning for attacks on installations in the DA NANG TAOR. These reports about the 402nd Bn have been related to other newly reported units named the T.89 Bn (AKA for the 402nd), T.87 Sapper Bn (Poss K.40 Sapper Bn), T.88 Bn and the A.40 Bn. All of this information is presently unconfirmed.
- #6. Interrogation of a VC laborer, PHAN TUNG, and information from captured documents revealed that the 48th VC Bn was contacted at BS 5577 on 20 Nov 66 by the 2nd ROKMC Bde in Operation DRAGON EYE. Estimated enemy casualties were 82 KIA (Confirmed), 25 KIA (Probable).

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The following units have been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 102400H Dec 66:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
Binh Son Trans Bn	Quang Nam	1,490	Conf
Nam Son Trans Bn	Quang Tin	700	Conf
49th Bn	Quang Tin	500	Prob
109th Bn	Quang Ngai	300	Poss
37th Bn	Quang Ngai	400	Poss

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 102400H DEC 66

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)	Unk	Unk
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)	Unk	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-An
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)	Unk	Unk	Unk
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)	Unk	Unk	Unk
4th Bn	Unk	31445XBL	Unk	Unk
5th Bn	Unk	32445	Unk	Unk
6th Bn	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
33rd Regt (Hq)	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?); 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Cong Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May	51.441 KT	Unk	CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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1st Regt (Hq)

AKA

Cuu Long; 1st Regt;  
330th Brig; Cong Truong  
2

LBN

EQUIPMENT

Unk-82mm Mort  
Unk-75mm RR  
Unk-60mm Mort  
Unk-12.7mm AA MG  
Unk-MG

PERSONALITIES

CO-Maj Vo THIEP  
XO-DUYET  
PO-Maj Song THOUNG

1st Bn  
2nd Bn  
3rd Bn  
812th Regt (Hq)

T-1 Bn  
T-2 Bn  
T-3 Bn  
Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd  
Indep Trans Regt(?);  
Doc Lap; Cong Truong;  
1 May Regt

Unk-82mm Mort  
Unk-75mm RR  
Unk-60mm Mort  
Unk-57mm RR  
Unk-12.7mm AA MG  
Unk-MG

CO-1st Col Nguyen Minh  
HE  
XO-Minh LONG  
PO-Maj SONG

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4th Bn  
5th Bn  
6th Bn  
90th Regt (Hq)

K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn  
K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn  
K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn;  
Cuu Long Bn  
Song Houng (or Hong);  
3rd Regt; Cong Truong  
3; Song Chu; Song Chu  
Long

5330(?)

Unk-82mm Mort  
Unk-75mm RR  
Unk-60mm Mort  
Unk-57mm RR  
Unk-12.7mm AA MG  
Unk-MG

CO-THIEP  
XO-CUONG  
PO-Capt Maj Van CU

7th Bn  
8th Bn  
9th Bn  
12th AT Bn  
13th ARTY Bn  
14th AA Bn

D-7; K.37  
108th Bn; K.38; D-8  
K.39; D-9

12-82mm RR(?)  
12-120mm Mort(?)  
16-37mm AA Gun(?)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Capt LOI XO-Srlt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14		2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
K.3 Co Hai Lang Co	803 Co 5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; H.99		1-MG 9-AR	CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-E; H-02; V-51; H-20			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien			
Cam Lo Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA
<u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>				
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac;	41,000FM- 41,500FM		CG-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG
6th NVA Regt Hq	K-500; Di Hai Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu	Di Hai		CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt PHUNG
800th Bn 802nd Bn	K.1 K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-1(?)	1520		
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn 810th Bn	K.4; VQ-74 6th; K-10; 310(?)			CO-Ton That THIET CO-Capt Huong THI

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Phe 18		1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co		2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-Capt Hoang AN CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Nguyen DAM CO-THUYET CO-Xuan SAM
Huong Thuy Co Huong Tra Co C.117 Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17 D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5 Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Work- site-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH CO-Capt THAO CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh			
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			
R.20	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; P-07; 103		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn		1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
402nd Sapper Bn	T-89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-HOANG
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th			CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			CO-Phan Phong SAM
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54	C-70 Co at Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>				
2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang	20,601GM- 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
21st Regt (Hq)	BACH MA; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong- 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135 Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Hu DINH
3rd Bn				CO-Nguyen Kaach PHO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)				
RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; X-11; 19th Bn			CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	GK-32			XO-Trah Van QUANG
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33			PO-Nguyen Van HIEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	GK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO
72nd Bn				
706th Co	V-14 Co; 106th Co			
A10 Co	K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Bin		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KBOA XO-Nguyen THAN PO-Anh VU
A13 Co	D-22			
A16 Co	C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co			
A21 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co				
Tra Son Co				
Tra Ha Co				CO-MANH

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien		CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108 (Alt Cnd Elm)			CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong			PO-MINH
	Co			CO-TRAN
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

NOTE

The following units have been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 102400H Dec 66:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
Binh Son Trans Bn	Quang Nam	1,490	Conf
Nam Son Trans Bn	Quang Tin	700	Conf
49th Bn	Quang Tin	500	Prob
109th Bn	Quang Ngai	300	Poss
37th Bn	Quang Ngai	400	Poss

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UNIT	AKA	NAME	EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
80th Bn	Thanh Hai; Beach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007			CO-Maj Nguyen THIEP XO-PHAN
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Bo Thanh THI XO-Yo Ngoc CAN
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20	20,135CM- 20,139CM Bao Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
30th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; HQ BA HAO		CO-Maj KIM
40th Bn	Poss 408th Bn	20,141CM- 20,144CM Bao Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm ER	CO-Capt KY CO-Nguyen TAN XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Beach Son Worksite		7-30 Cal MG 1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 3-MG 18-AR	CO-Nguyen HI CHAM; Nghia TUN
104th Bn	405th Bn			
1506th Engr Bn	Poss 506th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Bay KINH CO-Pham Van NGOC
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Bo HOA CO-La TRI CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-XIEU
56th Co	Minh Long Co			CO-Mem MIEU CO-Nguyen MIEU CO-FUUS CO-NUC
206th Co	Ta Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	
614th Co	Son Ba Co			
C.17 Co	No Doc Co; C-217 Co			
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			
C.219 Co	Doc Tho Co; Pocs C-19 Co			

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List:

MR-5 HQ	6TH REGT HQ
NORTHERN SUB REGION HQ	800TH BN
341ST DIV HQ	806TH BN
31ST REGT	804TH BN
32ND REGT	808TH BN
33RD REGT	810TH BN
324B DIV HQ	V.25 BK
803RD REGT	20TH VMC BN
812TH REGT	72ND BN
90TH REGT	104TH BN
2ND DIV HQ	
3RD NVA REGT	

5. VC Militia/Infrastructure:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Entry</u>
AN HOA (H)	PHAM DE	18	3	Interrogation Report VJ F/6.
SON TAY (V)	UNK DUC	25	4	
SON TIN (D)	NGUYEN GIAU	21	4	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN HANH	20	3	
	NGUYEN HIEP	40	1	
	PHAM HIEN	45	6	
	NGUYEN HOA	35	3	
	PHAM LANH	20	3	
	NGUYEN LOC	45	6	
	PHAM MUI	28	2	
	UNK NGHIA	20	3	
	UNK NGOC	38	1	
	NGUYEN NHO	28	2	
VO NHUNG	18	3		
NGUYEN TRI	20	3		
NGUYEN XUNG	45	4		
AN HOA (H)	UNK DONG	25	3	
SON TAY (V)	UNK DUC	30	3	
SON TIN (D)	UNK HONG	23	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK LUAN	30	3	
	UNK NGA	23	3	
	BA NGHE	45	1	
	UNK NGHIA	23	3	
	UNK NGUYEN	25	3	
	UNK THANH		3	
	CHINH UT	42	1	
	CU VA (H)	BA CHUC	65	1-4-5
SON TAY (V)	UNK LANH	34	3	
SON TINH	UNK LUONG	30	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK NGUYEN	32	3	Interrogation Report DUNG HOA F/6.

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
DUC AN #1 (H)	HUYNH CU	60	1	Interrogation
BINH TUY	LJONG DUONG	40	6	Report LE
BINH SON (D)	UNK HUE	30	1	BACH F/4.
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN KHOA	40	4-5	
	VO MUON	25	2-9	
	UNK SUOT	35	3	
	UNK THI	40	6	
HUNG NHUONG (H)	HONG ANH	45	3	Interrogation
SONG DONG (V)	PHAM BINH	18	3	Report TRAN
SON TINH (D)	NGUYEN CHAP	50	1	HOI F/3.
QUANG NGAI (P)	DAM CHAU	45	6	
	NGUYEN CHAU	45	4	
	NGUYEN EM	20	3	
	NGUYEN HAI	20	3	
	LE LAP	30	7	
	NGUYEN HIEN	35	4	
	NGUYEN NGUON	28	2	
	NGUYEN TIEN	35	5	
	BUI THINH	43	1	
	NGUYEN TU	20	3	
HUNG NHUONG (H)	UNK BINH	17	3	Interrogation
SON DONG (V)	UNK CHAU	40	5	Report Con-
SON TINH (D)	UNK DAU	38	3	solidated F/6.
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK HIEN	37	4	
	BUI MY	20	3	
	UNK THINH	43	1	
	UNK TU	20	3	
MINH KHANH (H)	BAY BEN	40	4	Interrogation
SON NAM (V)	UNK CAU		3	Report DA
SON TINH (D)	UNK RO	60	1	VE F/4.
QUANG NGAI (P)				
MINH KHANH #2 (H)	TRUONG BINH	40	4	Interrogation
SON NAM (V)	KIEU CONG	45	4	Report NGUYEN
SON TINH (D)	NGUYEN DIEU	30	1	THANH F/3.
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN DONG	45	1	
	NGUYEN HAO	30	7	
	BUI LU	45	3	
	LE DINH MAI	26	2-7	
	LE QUYNH	30	2	
	PHAM THANG	60	1-5	
PHUOC AN (H)	NGUYEN THI CHI	32	5	Interrogation
BINH PHIEN (V)	NGUYEN HOA	33	6	Report NHAN
BINH SON (D)	UNK HUONG	37	4	DIEN F/4.
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN TANH	20	6	
	UNK THIET	32	9	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
HAMLET #3	MALE SQUAD:			
SON PHUC (V)	HO CHUNG	25	3	Interrogation
DUC DUC (D)	HO COC	19	3	Report NGUYEN
QUANG NAM (P)	HU CU	35	3	VAN HOAN F/6.
	LAI DOI	30	3	
	NGUYEN DO HO	28	3	
	NGUYEN HOI	35	3	
	NGUYEN DINH HOE	17	3	
	HA XUAN HUONG	21	3	
	LAI NHON	25	3	
	PHAM THU	21	3	
	PHAM SON	18	3	
	NGUYEN TAN THUONG	21	3	
	VO SITHANH	35	3	
	DAO DUY TRINH	35	3	
	FEMALE SQUAD:			
	HUYNH THI BA	20	3	
	NGUYEN THI DUNG	23	3	
	PHUNG THI GIAM	24	3	
	NGUYEN THI HUONG	17	3	
	HA THI HUE		3	
	HO THI KHUE	21	3	
	PHAM THI LANH	20	3	
	HA THI LIEN	17	3	
	NGUYEN THI SI	20	3	
	HO THI TIEU	21	3	
	NGUYEN THI VINH	16	3	
	NGUYEN THI VUI	19	3	
HAMLET #4	UNK DIEN	27	3	Interrogation
SON PHUC (V)	NGUYEN EM	17	3	Report TRAN
DUC DUC (D)	DANG HAC	25	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	UNK HUY	18	1	
	SO KHOA	25	3	
	NGUYEN PHONG		3	
	DANG TIEN	27	3	
	DANG TRA	25	3	
	NGUYEN TUONG	25	3	
SON PHUC (V)	NAM CUONG	28	1	Interrogation
DUC DUC (D)	DANG KHUYEN	27		Report TRAN
QUANG NAM (P)	DANG PHI		7-9	LIEN F/4.
	DANG THI SI	29	6	
	DANG Y	26	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
PHUOC THO #1 (H)	BA CU	40	4	Interrogation Report VAN MINH F/6.
SON TAY (V)	UNK DUC	45	3	
SON TINH (D)	UNK HONG	18	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK LANH	27	3	
	UNK LUAN	29	3	
	BA NGHE	45	1	
	UNK NGHI	25	3	
	UNK THANH	19	3	
	UNK NGA	23	3	
	CHINH UT	42	1	
PHUOC THUAN #1 (H)	VO GHANH	45	4	
BINH THANH (V)	VO DOAN	18	3	
BINH SON (D)	UNK DUC	20	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK HIEN	25	6	
	VO KHA	20	3	
	UNK LY	20	3	
	VO NAM	30	2	
	UNK NHAN	20	3	
	UNK RI	23	6	
	TRINH THONG	45	1	
	TRINH TRUNG	45	6	
PHUOC THUAN #2 (H)	VO CHUONG	60	1-5	Interrogation Report DO TUY F/3.
BINH TUY (V)	LUONG KHUC	28	2	
BINH SON (D)	CHAU MAI	35	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH TON	36	6	
	CHAU VEN	25	4	
THON MOT (H)	UNK BUONG	22	6	Interrogation Report TON THI HOA F/3.
TU PHUOC (V)	UNK BINH	30	6	
TU NGHIA (D)	UNK CONG	20	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK DAY	18	3	
	UNK LANH	40	1	
	UNK SU	30	6	
	UNK TAN	24	6	
	UNK THIET	30	6	
THON TU (H)	BA BEN	40	4	Interrogation Report NGUYEN TIEN F/6.
KY SANH (V)	UNK HIEN	50	3	
LY TIN (D)	HAI PHONG	15	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	UNK SON	45	1	
AP MOT #1 (H)	PHAM LY	50	8	Interrogation Report NGUYEN VAN MINH F/3.
SON PHUC (V)	PHAM HONG MAI	50	6	
DUC DUC (D)	GIONG HUU NGOC	21	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	VO DINH SUM	21	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
THON HAI (H)	UNK BE	30	4	Interrogation Report HO HUNG F/6.
KY THANH (V)	PHAM HOA	40	6	
TAM KY (D)				
QUANG TIN (P)				
HAMLET #9	UNK ANH	25	3	Interrogation Report HO THI HOA F/6.
KY TRA (V)	UT CHUNG	45	7	
TAM KY (D)	UNK HOANH	25	3	
QUANG TIN (P)	UNK MAI	24	3	
	UNK MY		3	
	UNK NGOC	19	4	
	HO THI THANH	20	3	
	UNK VIET	25	6	
KY TRAN (H)	TRAN TRI CHINH		3	Interrogation Report NGUYEN TOAI F/3.
BINH HAI (V)	PHAM CUC	21	1	
THANG BINH (D)	BUI DAN	32	3	
QUANG TIN (P)	TRAN DAI	22	3	
	PHAM THI ME		3	
	PHAM LAI	19	3	
	NGUYEN PHUOC		2	
	PHAM TUNG	30	3	
TRUNG LOC #2	NGUYEN CUU	50	8	Interrogation Report Con- solidated F/6.
SON PHUC (V)	UNK DUOC	20	3	
DUC DUC (D)	TRUNG HOI	40	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	HO KHOA	38	1	
TRUNG LOC #4	NGUYEN CUU	30	8	Interrogation Report Con- solidated F/3.
SON PHUC (V)	TRAN VAN DIEN	35	1	
DUC DUC (D)	TRAN DIEU	30	1	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRUONG CONG DUOC	23	3	
	TRUONG VAN DUOC	32	3	
	TRUONG THI HOA	22	3	
	TRAN LUOT	18	3	
	HUYNH THI NHUNG	22	3	
	TRAN PHUOC	24	3	
	NGUYEN THI SO	22	3	
	VAN THI Y	23	3	

NOTE: 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre; 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Secretary; 8. Finance Cadre; 9. Propaganda Cadre; 10. Political Cadre.

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**6. New Unit Identifications**

A. The following units were identified from death certificates captured by the 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines vicinity (YD 107507) on 3 Dec 1966:

- (1) 2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div.
- (2) 5th Co, 2nd Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)  
TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 45

1. 17th Co. (K-2), 1st Regt. NGUYEN HOANG, who rallied to the 2d Bde, ROKMC at (BS 516779) on 30 November 1966, gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He was recruited by a cadre of the 1st Regt at VINH AN (H) (BT 610003) in October 1965 and sent to the mountains in BINH SON (D). Here he was assigned to the 17th Co (K-2), 1st Regt and underwent one month training to become a wireman. His training did not include marksmanship instruction. After one month the 17th Co, along with the 1st Regt, moved to QUANG NAM (P). At this time the morale of the 17th Co was reported very low due to lack of equipment, poor living conditions, disease and lack of medicine to treat malaria.

b. In January 1966 the regiment moved back to QUANG NAM (P); at this time there were only three battalions in the 1st Regt (the 40th, 60th, and 90th Bns). A former QUANG NGAI (P) force company was re-designated the 70th Bn and joined the 1st Regt in April 1966. HOANG was unable to provide details regarding the 70th Bn, and, as far as he knew, it had not been separated from the rest of the regiment in QUANG NGAI (P).

c. HOANG and five other men were responsible for maintaining communications between the regimental CP and the 40th Bn and a six man squad was assigned to the other battalions for the same purpose. The call sign and code name for the units were: 1st Regt, "CUU LONG" (ME KONG River); 40th Bn, "BAU BANG"; 60th Bn, "BINH GIA"; 70th Bn, "BONG TRANG"; and 90th Bn, "THUAN NINH".

d. In March 1966 the 40th and 90th Bns engaged the American Forces at SON CHAU (V) (BS 555795). HOANG was unable to supply the details on the outcome of the battle, but stated that as far as he knew this was the only battle that elements of the 1st Regt had engaged in. He had heard of no battles that elements of the 1st Regt had participated in during November 1966.

e. He stated that there were several other support companies in addition to K-2 which were directly responsible to the 1st Regt. K-1 is a reconnaissance company with an unknown number of men. K-4 is a mortar battery with four 81mm mortars. K-5 is a RR company with two CHICOM 57mm RR's and two 75mm RR's. There were two other companies with a K prefix but he could not remember their numerical designation. One was a sapper company.

f. The 17th Co has 80 men and is reportedly organized into three platoons with either three or four squads in each platoon. There are generally six men in each squad. There are nine radio operators, 28 wiremen, 15 messengers, and the remainder of K-2 is composed of cooks, medics and radio technicians. K-2 has five CHICOM radios, type 71B, and nine field telephones. HOANG claimed "some of the radios are good" but there is a definite shortage of batteries.

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g. He said that the supply situation in K-2 is critical. Batteries and wire for radios are at a premium. The company changes batteries every month and a half. There are 15 carbines for the 80 men in K-2. Each man receives two and a half cans of rice per day and in addition five piasters with which to purchase meat or vegetable supplements. The morale of the 1st Regt is very low due to air-strikes and lack of medical supplies.

h. There are four companies, designated as 1, 2, 3 and 4, in the 40th Bn, three infantry and one weapons company. There are three or four platoons in each infantry company and three platoons in the weapons company. The weapons company reportedly has three 81mm mortars, type L16A1, and two MG (type unknown). HOANG could not give a breakdown on the strength of the 40th Bn.

i. He stated that the 1st Regt, including all battalions and supporting units, had spent most of November in NGHIA LAM (V), TU NGHIA (D). However, on 27 November these CP's moved in a general northwesterly direction. He could not track the course on a map.

j. HOANG admitted that the 1st Regt has an extremely high desertion rate because it is now primarily made up of SVN troops. He defected because he could no longer live in misery and felt that the Allies are growing too strong for the VC.

(G-2 Cmt: F-2. 17th Co (AKA K-2) possibly a new designation for the 807th Signal Co (AKA Q-2). First report of all call signs and code names. First report of K designation. All previously reported as Q, however, all numbers match except K-4 which was previously Q-6 Co. Two and a half cans of rice and five piasters has been previously reported as daily ration for VC).

2. 1st Economic Squad, Technique and Production Platoon. Pvt BUI VAN THANG, captured by 3/3 at (YD 107507) on 3 November 1966, stated the following during interrogation:

a. The mission of his type unit was to teach improved methods of agriculture to the villagers. His squad was responsible for MAI DAM (H), CAM CHINH (V), CAM LO (D), QUANG TRI (P).

b. the captive's squad had been split into two sections, one under the command of the squad leader (six men) and the other under command of the platoon manager. His group lived and worked in MAI DAM (H) and the other group is currently working in HAI LANG (D).

c. The normal strength of the captive's squad is eight men who are armed with five AK-47's and three SKS rifles. The platoon is composed of three squads of eight men each and a platoon headquarters of four men.

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d. They received their food from the MAI DAM (H) guerrillas and their ammunition was brought from NVN, but it had never been necessary to resupply since the squad was a non-combatant type unit. Medical supplies are sufficient and were brought with the unit from NVN.

e. The captive's squad had high morale while located in NVN but upon arrival in SVN the morale has lowered to fair.

f. THANG was drafted into NVA on 6 September 1965 and was sent to HOA BINH (P) for basic training which consisted of political indoctrination, marksmanship and the throwing of grenades. After two months of basic training the captive and 27 others were sent to an agricultural school 30 Km east of HOA BINH City that lasted from November 1965 to February 1966. He stated that all instructors were military personnel. In this school, emphasis was placed on the growing of rice, corn, and onions.

g. Upon completion of the agriculture courses the captive was given 15 days leave after which his unit was ordered to report to the sub-region headquarters in the mountains of THUA THIEN (P) SVN for further instructions. The platoon departed HOA BINH City on foot to HA DONG. The trip lasted approximately one month. The platoon then went by train to DO LEN (V). They departed on foot from DO LEN and passed through TANH HOA, NGHE AN, HO TINH, QUANG BINH, QUANG TRI provinces and reported to sub region headquarters in THUA THIEN (P). The orders received were to rest and to review the agricultural subjects that they had been taught. The entire trip lasted from March to June 1966. The platoon rested in THUA THIEN for four days before going to their new camp which was located five days walk NW of MAI DAM (H). The 1st Squad was assigned to MAI DAM (H) in latter October 1966.

h. Escape routes had been planned from MAI DAM (H) in order that the squad could escape to the mountainous area SSE of the hamlet (YD 100512), regardless of the direction that Marines approached. In this mountain area his squad had dug anti mortar and bomb trenches.

i. THANG claimed that he had no knowledge of other NVA units in the vicinity of MAI DAM (H), however there were local guerrillas in the area.

(G-2 Cmt: F-4. It is doubtful if THANG is from Economic Squad, Technique and Production Platoon. Subject was captured in the same area where contacts with up to company size units have been reported. It is possible that the subject is from an element of the 31st Regt which is believed to be in this area).

3. The following translated document establishes the Party Committee's planned activity:

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## Plan of Activity of the Party Committee

Headquarters through December 1966. On the basis of:

- The resolution from COSVN and Region Party Committee.
- The resolution from the Region Party Committee concerning our missions.
- The review of the friendly and enemy situation, and the resolution from COSVN (5, 6, 7 and 8).

We are determined to meet with all requirements of the following missions and achieve the greatest victory.

a. Continue to develop the people's armed struggle in three areas. Attach importance to the improvement of combat capabilities in liberated areas. Initiate and develop the people's movement rapidly in disputed areas around towns, municipalities or adjacent to lines of communication, in order that we may be able to counter the enemy's operations and conduct attacks on him. Rapidly develop the armed struggle in weak areas, towns, municipalities and the Holy See area. All cadre, party members, group members and association members are requested to really participate in armed organizations (guerrilla, militia, underground guerrilla, combat hamlets, and part-time guerrilla). Counter the enemy operations at once, and when he withdraws to his post, encircle him. Reconstruct the main lines of communication which have been destroyed or cut off by the enemy. Suppress pacification cadre of the puppet government and annihilate the enemy units that are controlling the people in every area. Support the people to stand up against the local authorities until they completely liberate their area. Motivate the people to contribute their property to the fight.

Initiate the movement of fighting and annihilating the US and puppet troops, destroying mechanized vehicles, downing aircraft and suppressing all (RVN) pacification cadre. This year, we must carry out and exceed the norm prescribed by the Military Region for our province. D14 should out do PHU LOI, TB, GD, CT and C-61 in combat missions. Various village guerrilla units must keep abreast of AN TINH.

One guerrilla squad must be activated in each hamlet, and two in each village. Parallel with this development, we should pay attention to the improvement of them. All village and hamlet units must be capable of counter operations and defending the people. Rapidly activate many more self-defense militia forces in various areas.

District and province troops especially in TB, GD, CT and DMC, must provide sufficient personnel for battalions in any cases of shortage, in accordance with the resolution promulgated early in the year. Various battalion party committees should administer their subordinate units successfully and carry out the guideline "let nobody desert his unit".

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District and province troops must be the most loyal, and most crack forces, in charge of carrying out political missions, protecting the people and destroying all relocation areas and strategic hamlets (set up by the puppet government).

Committee echelons should closely and effectively command their troops and armed forces. Various branches are advised to positively take part in military activities and make contributions to the establishment of armed forces in the province.

b. Push forward the political struggle and troops proselyting and coordinate them with military activities more closely.

Make efforts to develop the movements of TRANG BANG and CHAU KHANH in CT, GB, TT, BC, TX districts and in two disputed villages of AN HOA and GIA BINH. The most important questions are to patiently instruct the people on the present role of our political struggle, frustrate all plots of evacuating and herding the people by air and artillery activities, smash all anti-revolutionary arguments and annihilate the puppet troops,..etc. With a strong will, we are determined to defeat the enemy and regain control in various areas. In the present situation, to rapidly obtain good results, members of the political struggle forces must realize their substantial rights and the new requirements of the political mission. At the same time, we must have strong armed forces in every hamlet and village to defend other struggle forces. Prescribe responsibilities and rights conspicuously for various struggle sections in hamlets and villages. Instruct key forces on the command of the struggle. Legal party members, or group members must be the key individuals in the political struggle.

Initiate the face to face struggle among the people in the areas temporarily controlled by the enemy and in disputed areas. In liberated areas, motivate the people to take in the missions carried out on the spot and the face to face struggle.

In troop proselyting, excite the anti-American thoughts of everybody, and stimulate them to suppress wicked men and annihilate the the enemy with troop proselyting, we positively support the political and armed struggle forces. The subject of troop proselyting must be the same as those of the present political struggle. Troop, civilian and Cao daist proselyting should be carried out simultaneously.

By political struggle, troop proselyting and combat activities, we gradually liberate relocation areas and strategic hamlets, either remaining or newly established.

c. Rural mission.

In weak areas: Carry out the three attack plan frequently in order to turn these areas into disputed ones. Create favorable conditions for various forces operating here.

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Motivate the people to suppress wicked men, break out of all encirclements, and contribute materiel and manpower to the fight. All activities should be done for the above three arrows (political struggle, troop proselyting and combat operations.)

In dispute areas: Make efforts to liberate these areas, or use them as springboards to conduct attacks upon weak ones. The guerrilla warfare must be very strong and the maintenance of security is most necessary. Key forces should operate regularly, and we are well advised to attach importance to the improvement of the people's health.

In liberated areas: Make efforts to consolidate these areas in all aspects, protect the people, and motivate them to do their best in production missions and fighting. Various forces must counter operations effectively. Such missions as production, fighting, public health, social welfare, maintenance of security, and development and consolidation of revolutionary organizations must be frequently carried out by motivating the people to directly take part in the fight, production, and improvement of their lives. (A plan for motivating the people will be drafted later).

Cadre in three areas are requested to initiate a movement of resistance and national salvation and make an appeal to the people's aid in materiel and manpower (especially in weak and disputed areas).

d. Caodaist mission. The whole Party Committee Headquarters and various branches should concentrate all efforts to frustrate the new enemy plots carried out in the Caodaist Holy See area. We are determined to prevent the enemy from controlling this area, and to motivate the people to fight against the Americans and their henchmen and positively take in the resistance in order to liberate themselves from the puppet government.

We should carry out the following main points for the Caodaists, especially for those who live in the Holy See area:

Propagandize and instruct the people on the Americans and their henchmen's plots, the national interests, our general and religious policies. All cadre and soldiers operating here, must consider the propaganda and indoctrination most important. In addition, we should activate many armed propaganda teams to bring the light of our just cause to the entire people.

Take care of the substantial interests of the people. Besides the above spiritual activities, attach importance to production, land organization, public health, social welfare, and especially to the training of Caodaist cadre and the treatment and prevention of diseases (a civilian dispensary will be set up for Caodaist). In addition, push forward the struggle to demand democratic rights for the people and resist conscription. Incite Caodaists to desert their ranks.

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Motivate the people to suppress wicked men, stand up against the puppet local authorities, fight the enemy armed forces, destroy pacification cadre (RVN), political and semi-armed organizations. The people's armed forces must closely coordinate with one another to carry out the three front attack plan.

Develop the revolutionary forces, party and group chapters among Caodaists. Avoid assembling the people in semi-official organizations. Attach particular importance to the development of Caodaist armed forces (underground guerrilla or part-time guerrilla). The strength of the two local troops in TT and BC districts may be increased limitlessly.

Make efforts to train Caodaist cadre in TT and BC districts and pay special attention to the improvement of Caodaist party members. (A civilian training school and a party member training school will be set up).

e. Civilian proselyting.

From now to the end of the year, the entire party and army should make efforts to carry out the civilian proselyting in order to push forward the movement. Try to foil all the enemy plots and plans of activity, at the same time, overcome difficulties in fighting and construction. These are the most important points for developing our movement, the most fundamental missions of the whole Party Committee Headquarters in any situation.

To motivate the people (a plan of motivating the people will be drafted) means to propagandize and instruct them on politics and correct their erroneous thoughts at the proper time. By doing so, the people will positively take part in the fight against the enemy. Cadre and soldiers of various branches are responsible for directly propagandizing and indoctrinating the people.

Make a specific plan of activity and try to motivate the people to carry it out. The plan should aim at reunification, production, and fighting.

Always supervise, develop and consolidate popular organizations. To meet with the requirements of the combat mission, we should successfully mobilize 70% of the population (from 14 years old upwards) in liberated areas; 50% in disputed areas; 30% in weak areas; 15% in towns and municipalities and 10% in inner-citadel areas. Make efforts to motivate 70,000 persons to work for our various liberation troops in the province, and 30,000 for semi-legal organizations in towns, municipalities and the Holy See area. Reorganize the executive committees of various societies in accordance with the guideline: Consolidate villages, simplify districts and reinforce provinces and pay particular attention to the sub-cells. Party members are responsible for motivating the people to resist the enemy effectively.

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One third of the party members in the village headquarters and one third of the key cadre in the district and province headquarters must have specific working procedures.

Assign one cadre to take charge of civilian proselyting. The various province headquarters should establish their own agencies as soon as possible and assign cadre to take charge of administration, finance, production, and organization, social welfare, public health and youth. All militia members in the Current Affairs Committee should closely coordinate with troops on the same level.

The sub-cells in various hamlets are advised to clearly inform the people of the situation and missions, preach hatred towards the US aggressors and their henchmen, make the people believe in their capabilities and traditions and at the same time, motivate them to improve their lives, and protect their property. (By doing so, the people are motivated in three aspects: fighting, support of battlefields, and production). Due to the above activities, the popular organizations will be more closely related to us.

The various branches, especially the military branch and armed forces should attach particular importance to civilian proselyting and severely criticize all actions or arguments in contradiction with the civilian proselyting policy of the Party.

One half of the civilian proselyting plan in our province is Caodaist proselyting. In addition, we will carry out Cambodian proselyting in CHAU THANH and BEN CAU. Therefore, various branches must study the Caodaist proselyting policy in detail, and assign cadre to the Holy See area to perform missions. Caodaist proselyting must be considered most important in the Holy See area, BEN CAU and DMC (?).

Besides that, the province and district headquarters should overcome all difficulties to train a large number of civilian cadre (a training school will be set up at each district, village and hamlet, and training documents will be issued later.)

f. Missions to be carried out in towns, municipalities and the Holy See area:

During the present critical situation, we should try to rapidly carry out the three front attack plan to make the enemy fail to stabilize his rear areas, and drive him into the defensive. We should also frustrate all the enemy plots of evacuating and herding the people to the areas under his control.

The following main tasks should be performed: Propagate and instruct the people on political ideology, regain sovereignty step by step, attack the enemy in the political field, smash all reactionary arguments; lead the people to incessantly attack the enemy on three fronts (political struggle, military activities and propaganda), stand up against the enemy control, and always preserve forces.

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Cadre are requested to take part in military activities, under all forms. Develop and consolidate Party Chapters, keep abreast of the people through underground and semi-official organizations to instruct and command them in their struggle. Develop the popular organizations (especially liberation cells). The labor and poor class is the foundation of the revolution.

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## ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 45

1. GENERAL. VC activity during the reporting period continued at a low level. Changes include a marked increase in the number of sabotage incidents in all provinces except QUANG TRI and QUANG TIN, while there was a significant decline in espionage activity. Other items of interest included a continued effort by the VC to distribute propaganda leaflets and the formulation of a "new" VC campaign in QUANG NGAI Province.

2. ESPIONAGE. There were no reports of espionage activity during the period.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	3Dec	Bridge destroyed	ZD 148010
THUA THIEN	6Dec	Culvert destroyed	YD 680264
THUA THIEN	10Dec	Bridge destroyed	YD 623303
THUA THIEN	10Dec	Bridge destroyed	YD 519349
THUA THIEN	10Dec	Bridge destroyed	ZD 099006
QUANG NAM	5Dec	Railroad track destroyed	AT 959897
QUANG NAM	6Dec	Bridge destroyed	AT 945694
QUANG NAM	10Dec	Bridge destroyed	AT 936906
QUANG NAM	10Dec	Bridge destroyed	BT 113496
QUANG NGAI	6Dec	Bridge destroyed	BS 559640
QUANG NGAI	7Dec	Bridge destroyed	BS 706619
QUANG NGAI	10Dec	Bridge destroyed	BS 728555
QUANG NGAI	10Dec	Bridge destroyed	BS 725563

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA. A 6 December report from an intelligence source related that VC propaganda leaflets (theme unknown) were discovered in CAM HOA (H) (AT 965703).

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG NAM. A 10 December report from an intelligence source related that on 1 December the wife of a VC returnee was kidnapped by the VC at the THANH QUE Ferry Docks (BT 110570).

QUANG NGAI. A 5 December report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that on 30 November the VC of QUANG NGAI City formulated a plan for a new campaign called, "Flower is Blooming at the Center". This plan, which consists of the following four phases, is to be implemented during the month of December at military bases in DAMANG, CHU LAI, and PHU BAI: (1) Distribution of propaganda leaflets to U.S. and Korean forces which will term the Vietnamese war, "A Plot of the U.S. and Korean Presidents"; (2) Use of females to make friends with interpreters and Allied soldiers in order to collect intelligence information; (3) Use of "Underground Cadre" to infiltrate those VN personnel who are employed by the Allied Forces; (4) Attacks on Allied Forces in those areas mentioned above.

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A 5 December report from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines related that on 4 December, 6 VC assassinated a Vietnamese civilian at (BS 579927).

A 4 December report from an intelligence source related that the VC assassinated an ARVN soldier and seriously wounded his wife and child while they were traveling on Highway #1 in the vicinity of (BS 718592).

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
25 DECEMBER 1966

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF

# PERINTREP NO. 47



III MAF PERINTREP #47



18-24 Dec 66

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Copy \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ Copies  
 III MAF  
 DANANG, RVN  
 250800H Dec 66  
 Ser: 0197966

PERINTREP NO. 47

Period Covered: 180001H - 242400H Dec 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13  
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - SOUTHERN DMZ. Over the past week there has been a moderate increase in the tempo of enemy ground activity in the northern and eastern portions of QUANG TRI (P). Several light probing and harassing actions, either separate or in conjunction with short, sporadic mortar attacks, were reported northwest of THON SON LAM, also in the vicinity of the CON THIEN OP (YD 115701) and in the GIO LINH area. Extensive aerial photographic coverage of both eastern and western portions of the DMZ accomplished by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during the period 13 through 18 December revealed no significant increase in enemy activity. Interpretation was based upon comparison of these photographs obtained over the same areas on 15 October and 18 November. The enemy's posture within the DMZ remains unchanged from the last reporting period. His actions immediately south of this line consist chiefly of light reconnaissance. He continues to avoid any sustained group contact. Ground reconnaissance northwest of THON SON LAM reported light sightings of NVA or VC. In eastern QUANG TRI (P), three incidents of sabotage were reported on 19 December in proximity to Highway 1 approximately eight kilometers northwest of QUANG TRI City. These involved the partial demolition of one secondary bridge and two culverts by small groups of VC. On 21 December in the same general vicinity an estimated company of VC attacked a PF platoon; artillery fire was called for and the attack broken up. Casualties were minor. On 20 December a HAI LONG Sub-Sector RF Company, using Claymore mines, triggered an ambush against two platoons of VC in the vicinity of (YD 403487). This action produced a VCC who subsequently identified the participating enemy units as part of the 808th Bn. Two other minor VC attacks were also reported from this same general area. Several low level agent reports covering the northern GIO LINH sector state that current NVA efforts have shifted and are now pointed toward the upgrading and improvement of local guerrilla organization.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. In northeastern THUA THIEN (P) the LUONG MAI OP (YD 528438) located about 17 kilometers southeast of QUANG TRI City was attacked twice over the period 21 and 22 December. During the first encounter the OP was temporarily overrun; artillery was called for and the VC withdrew. The second attack was successfully repulsed. Casualties were moderate. On 21 December the PHO TRAC bridge OP (YD 519349) and the PHONG DIEN District Headquarters (YD 524349) were both mortared. No casualties were reported. OPERATION CHINOOK currently in progress in the area (YD 5330) resulted in heavy action against what was identified as the 802nd VC Bn.

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As of 24 December, enemy casualties totaled 154 KIA (Confirmed) and 231 KIA (Probable). Noteworthy from the standpoint of enemy effort was the heavy and sustained mortar fire brought to bear against U.S. Marine elements and the continuity of enemy action which was maintained for a three day period. Considering the extent and depth of the action it is felt that other elements of battalion size and subordinate to the 6th Regt were engaged. A captured VC stated during interrogation, that the 6th Regt consisting of four battalions, was located in the general area (YD 5717) to (YD 5121). The same VC further described the mission of the 802nd as one of protecting, at all costs, the rice supply routes running into this suspected base area from eastern coastal rice regions. Reconnaissance screening the western approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR, reported moderate sightings of the enemy. Enemy activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P) and east of the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to isolated and small scale harassing actions. There were very few incidents reported within the TAOR. Enemy activity between PHU BAI and DANANG was limited to one incident of sabotage against the National Railway at (ZD 185009) where an unknown number of VC blew several sections of track.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Enemy activity in QUANG NAM (P) was concentrated in the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR where the number of VC incidents continued to rise and was most noticeable in the sharp advance in VC use of mines and booby traps, particularly mines. Substantial action was reported from the general area (AT 9752) where the 2nd Bn, 5th Marines went against VC elements tentatively identified as the local force V.25 Bn. From this vicinity north through Hill 55 to a point some 6000 meters south west of the DANANG airfield, VC activity was the heaviest. Enemy activity was also concentrated just south of Hill 55. The eastern coastal sector of the TAOR was relatively quiet when compared to the last two reporting periods. An analysis of available intelligence points toward a possible future emphasis on the part of the enemy to augment and enlarge his guerrilla effort through the fragmentation and integration of larger units into the purely local effort. Pointed toward the dense population centers, such a shift could complicate operations within the DANANG TAOR. Southeastern QUANG NAM (P) was fairly quiet, only light harassing actions being recorded. Low level agent reports continue to report projected enemy activity in the area south of the DANANG TAOR; such reports are however, unconfirmed. On 19 December a returnee to the MOC BAI OP indicated that the 2nd NVA Regt was located in the vicinity (BT 033214). He further stated that the 3rd NVA Regt was located in the area (AT 9434) and that this unit had suffered the loss of one battalion during past operations in the NONG SON area (AT 848392). Enemy casualties sustained during OPERATION KERN and action involving the 31st ARVN Regt during the middle of October were 219 KIA (Confirmed) and 330 KIA (Probable). These figures tend to support the returnee's statement.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. VC activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P) decreased slightly this week. There were four major incidents reported along and in proximity to Highway 1. On 18 December a THANG BINH Sub-Sector patrol was ambushed by an unknown number of VC in the vicinity of (BT 153433). There were friendly casualties of 11 KIA and although unconfirmed, VC casualties were reported as heavy.

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On 19 December an unknown number of VC destroyed an unguarded culvert about six kilometers northwest of TAM KY. Two other attacks against ARVN security elements on 19 December were also reported from this same area. This location between TAM KY and the northern end of the CHU LAI TAOR has been the focus of VC action for the past three weeks. Few agent reports were received concerning central and southern QUANG TIN (P). Other available intelligence was negative. Ground reconnaissance running west of the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of small numbers of VC. Intelligence continues to locate the 1st VC Regt in the general area southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR. The identification of the 1st VC in this location has been a constant factor from several sources of intelligence for the past three months. Contacts within the CHU LAI TAOR dropped off sharply and no significant pattern of action was apparent.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity in eastern QUANG NGAI (P) remained relatively quiet this week. OPERATION SIERRA continued with light but insignificant contact. On 22 December a USMC convoy moving along Highway 1 was mined and ambushed by an estimated platoon of VC in the vicinity of (BS 720585). Aerial photography flown over portions of HGHI HANH and MO DUC Districts in eastern QUANG NGAI (P) depicted no enemy activity of any significance. No other information of any interest was received covering this eastern coastal region. Local force units continue to be reported as being in normally accepted operating areas. Western and southern QUANG NGAI (P) remained quiet.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

Enemy initiated incidents for the report period totaled 278 and consisted of 141 AA firings, 136 small unit engagements and 21 mine/booby trap incidents.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d - e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
15Dec66	(YD 045528)	C19CP Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/6
15Dec66	(YD 029519)	C19 Training Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/6
16Dec66	(BS 623515)	Rice Storage Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3

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10Dec66	(YD 0849)	VC Safe Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/6
15Dec66	(BS 615581)	Rice Storage Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
15Dec66	(BS 585587)	VC Hospital	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/6

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period increased moderately when compared to the previous period. Incidents totaled 141. 35 aircraft sustained 57 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (XD 7863), (AT 9554), (AT 9753), (BT 0260), (BS 5588), (BS 6789) and (BS 8139). No cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) The QUANG TRI (P) reconnaissance sightings increased slightly, though insignificantly over the period, particularly in that area immediately northwest of THON SON LAM.

(2) In THUA THIEN (P) sightings west of HUE City were in conjunction with OPERATION CHINOOK. These were moderate in number and certainly were more a result of the operation than of any other factor. Sightings made in an area south of the HUE and just outside and south of the PHU BAI TAOR were in the moderate to heavy category. The location south of HUE appears to be a base area as a patrol that entered the vicinity on 21 December found an extensive cave complex in which were stored explosives, ammunition and medical supplies.

(3) In QUANG NAM (P) ground reconnaissance teams operating along the western and southern portion of the DANANG TAOR reported relatively few sightings. Approximately 30 VC were sighted at several points south of the TAOR otherwise observations were relatively light.

(4) III MAF PERINTREP NO. 45, para 2. r. (3) and 2. r. (4) are amended to read as follows:

(a) Para 2. r. (3). In QUANG NAM (P) reconnaissance teams insertions resulted in sightings of eight VC for the reporting period.

(b) Para 2. r. (4). In QUANG TIN (P) reconnaissance teams operating in the CHU LAI area reported sightings of 12 VC for the period.

(5) In QUANG TIN (P) and QUANG NGAI (P) ground elements running along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported sightings of small groups of VC all along the line. The highest number were observed in the vicinity of (BT 3215). The latter area, directly south of TAM KY City, has been active for the past three weeks.

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s. Negative.3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period were 314 KIA, 409 KIA (Prob), and 24 VCC. Weapons losses consisted of 65 individual and three crew served weapons captured. These figures, when compared with the last reporting period, reflect a substantial increase, caused primarily by Operation CHINOOK taking place in the vicinity of (YD 5330).

f. Morale. No Change.g. Negative.h. Negative.i. Terrain. No Change.

j. Weather. A light southeasterly flow aloft dominated the weather over I Corps for the reporting period. An exception to this clear weather situation occurred during early morning hours when stratus and light ground fog covered portions of the coastal and highland areas. On 21 December the winds aloft gradually returned to a light easterly to northeasterly monsoonal flow. An increase or surge in the speed of this flow caused a general lowering of ceilings and a shortening of visibility over the coast and inland piedmont. The latter conditions resulted in unfavorable flying conditions for fixed wing operations. The following are the weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	85	83	81	83
Low	74	72	73	73
Rainfall (total)	1.58	2.58	10.44	3.94
Visibility (miles)	7	7	6	6
Winds (knots)	7	4	6	5

k. Significant Captive/Agent, Returnee and Document Report. Annex C.**CONFIDENTIAL**  
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1. Negative.
4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.
5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 44.

  
R. H. THOMPSON  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

## ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. JANUARY WEATHER BRIEF
- C. SIGNIFICANT CAPTIVE/AGENT, RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 173D ABN BDE	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG FMFFAC	1	CG FLC	1
CG FMFFAC (FWD)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 79.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CTG 76.5	1
COMNAVFORV	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CIGV	4
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NR 47

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 242400H DEC 66.

	<u>NVA FORCE</u>		<u>VC MAIN FORCE</u>		<u>VC LOCAL FORCE</u>		<u>TOTAL UNITS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST</u>		
	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,440					2	1,440
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,640	1	800			7	2,440
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,580	8	3,300	7	2,700	32	14,580
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	2	700			12	3,075
Separate Companies			3	285	27	2,615	30	2,975
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		14,910		5,085		5,315		25,310
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)			1	330	1	400	2	730
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			2	220	4	455	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				550		855		1,405
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								20,597
<u>GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH</u>		<u>15,410</u>		<u>5,635</u>		<u>7,070</u>		<u>48,512</u>

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## 2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 242400H DEC66

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div#1	NVA	C	8,000		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715#2	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536#3	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PO	1,500		Unknown		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

324B Div	NVA	C	8,700#4	Fair	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,230		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1st Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
K.3 Co	MF	C	100		YD 0220		
Hai Lang Co	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147 AREA	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
6.10 Co	MF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT</u> <u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	24Dec66
6th Regt #5	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5117	22Dec66
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 330345	12Jul66
802nd Bn #5	MF	C	400	Peer	YD 6318	YD 5431	22Dec66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 660360	19Aug66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YD 970170	19Oct66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt #6	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 997532	26Aug66
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Que Son (D)	Que Son (D)	28Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	Duc Duc (D)	13Nov66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn#7	MF	C	300	Excel	AT 8364	Central Danang TAOR	30Nov66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	BT 0662	26Aug66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	6,700	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai: (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
21st Regt	NVA	C	2,000	Good	T. Binh/T. Phouc (D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		T. Binh/T. Phouc (D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc (D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc (D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc (D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,450		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9823	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
72nd Bn#8	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co#8	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
A16 Co#8	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region 5	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	AS 9085	29Nov66
1st VC Regt	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	29Nov66
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Tinh (D)	BS 452798	29Nov66
60th Bn	MF	C	200		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
80th Bn	MF	C	400		W Binh Son (D)	BS 4585	29Nov66
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 4268	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 7850	BS 5577	20Nov66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 3678	31Oct66
1506th Engr Bn	MF	PR	330		BS 2870	BS 5892	8Dec66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8125	BS 7745	31Oct66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66

NOTES

- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Only the 2nd Co of the 1st Bn is confirmed in this general area. Locations of the remaining companies of the battalion are unknown.
- #3. Only the 5th Co of the 2nd Bn is confirmed in this general area. It is probable that another company is in the area. Locations of the remaining companies are unknown.
- #4. Strength of the 324B Div is estimated at 90% of 9,600.
- #5. Probably true reports from 2 NVAC state that the 802nd VC MF Bn, 6th NVA Regt has been engaged in heavy fighting in Operation CHINOOK during the period 21-23 December. Confirmed enemy casualties through 23 December are 154 KIA (Conf) and 231 KIA (Prob). 3rd Marine Division evaluation of the three day engagement is that there is contact with another battalion, possibly of the 6th Regt. Therefore all casualties cannot be assessed against the 802nd Bn. Combat effectiveness of the 802nd Bn is reevaluated as POOR.
- #6. The 3rd NVA attacked the NONG SON outposts (Coord area AT 8439) on 17 October 1966. On 19 December 1966 Rallier NGUYEN HONG PHONG stated that the 3rd Regt attacked TRUNG PHUOC, east of NONG SON and suffered approximately one battalion of KIA and WIA. III MAF enemy casualty estimates were 219 KIA (Conf) and 264 WIA for the dates 17-25 October. The combat effectiveness of the regiment is rated as FAIR to POOR.

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- #7. Numerous low level agent reports for the period 20 Nov to 18 Dec have stated that the 402nd Sapper Bn has been reinforced with additional personnel and is planning for attacks on installations in the DANANG TAOR. These reports about the 402nd Bn have been related to other newly reported units named the T.89 Bn (AKA for the 402nd), T.87 Sapper Bn (Poss K.40 Sapper Bn), T.88 Bn and the A.40 Bn. All of this information is presently unconfirmed.
- #8. An ARVN interrogation of a VCC, revealed that the A-16 Co, strength 130, the A-10 Co (AKA THANG BINH), strength 65, and the heavy weapons company (designated B-4) of the 72nd Bn attacked the 3rd Bn, 6th Regt, 2nd ARVN Div at KY PHU outpost on 14 December 1966. It is possible that the 72nd Bn backed the attack.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 242400H DEC 66

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)	Unk	Unk
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)	Unk	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-An
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)	Unk	Unk	Unk
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)	Unk	Unk	Unk
4th Bn	Unk	31445XBL 32445	Unk	Unk
5th Bn	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
6th Bn	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
33rd Regt (Hq)	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?); 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Cong Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May	51.441 KT	Unk	CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj Song THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn			
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn			
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Most Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU
7th Bn	D-7; K.37			
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14		2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
K.3 Co Hai Lang Co	803 Co 5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; H.99		1-MG 9-AR	CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02; V-51; H-20			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
C.10 Co Cam Lo Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien H.30			CO-NGHIA
<u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>				
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van T PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt PHUNG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn 802nd Bn	K.1 K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-1(?)	1520		
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH CO-Ton That THIET CO-Capt Huong THI
804th Bn 810th Bn	K.4; VQ-74 6th; K-10; 310(?)			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Phe 18		1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co		2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-Capt Hoang AN CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co Huong Tra Co C.117 Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17 D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5 Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			CO-Nguyen DAM CO-THUYET CO-Xuan SAM

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Work- site-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH CO-Capt THAO CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh	20825		
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			
R.20	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn		1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	T-89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-HOANG
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th			CO-Thanh Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU CO-Phan Phong SAM CO-Do THANH CO-Nguyen TAM
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			
H.54	C-70 Co est Dia Loc			
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>				
2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang	20,601GM- 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
21st Regt (Hq)	BACH MA; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong- 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
2nd Bn	135 Bn; 22nd Bn			
3rd Bn	33rd Bn			
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)				
RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Kuong 111; X-11; 19th Bn			CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN XO-Tran Van QUANG PO-Nguyen Van HIEN  CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	GK-32			
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33			
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
RQ24 Bn (ENG) 72nd Bn 706th Co A10 Co	GK-40 V-14 Co; 106th Co K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO  CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THAN PO-Anh VU
A13 Co A16 Co	D-22 C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co A21 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co Tra Son Co Tra Ha Co				CO-MANH

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien		CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108(Alt Cmd Elm)			CO-Col Chan Khoi DIGH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bao; 2006			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
80th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007			CO-Maj Nguyen THYEN XO-PHAM
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20	20,135GM- 20,139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn	Poss 408th Bn			CO-Capt KY
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20,141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG 1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 3-MG 18-AR	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
104th Bn	405th Bn			CO-Nguyen Hi CHAW; Nghia TUN
1506th Engr Bn 19th Bn	Poss 506th Bn; 571 Unit 109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn 96th Co 206th Co	Poss 315th Bn Minh Long Co Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-Iu TRI CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU CO-Dien MIEU CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
614th Co C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Son Ha Co Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co Ba To Co Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong			PO-MINH
	Co			CO-TRAN
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

## III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ  
 NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ  
 341ST DIV HQ  
 31ST REGT  
 32ND REGT  
 33RD REGT  
 324B DIV HQ  
 803RD REGT  
 90TH REGT  
 812TH REGT

2ND DIV HQ  
 1ST VC REGT HQ  
 60TH BN, 1ST VC REGT  
 70TH BN, 1ST VC REGT  
 90TH BN, 1ST VC REGT  
 804TH BN  
 800TH BN  
 806TH BN  
 810TH BN  
 20TH BN

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**5. VC Militia/Infrastructure.**

Note: The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report:  
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerilla; 4. Security Cadre;  
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;  
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;  
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.  
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerilla Leader.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LOC HOA (V), DAI LOC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	LE BA	15	3	3 ITT Captive
	TRAN DINH GIOI	20	3	NGUYEN NAM
	LE SAU	17	3	18 Dec 66 F/6
	NGUYEN CUI	14	3	
	TRAN DINH GAN	18	3	
	TRAN DINH TAN	16	3	
	TRAN DINH BA	20	3	
	NGUYEN THANH	19	3	
PHU TAY (H), PHU MY (V), DIEN BAN (D), QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN NGOC CAU	45	1	3 ITT Captive
	LE THANG	40	5	TRAN THUONG
	THAI DE	30	3	15 Dec 66 F/6
	THAI QUA	32	3	
	THAN BONG	29	3	
	TRAN VAN HUY	27	3	
	TRAN SAU	25	3	
SON PHUC (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	LE BA HOANH	25	1	3 ITT Captive
	NGUYEN PHI HUNG	20	4	LE CHON
	NGUYEN TIEN QUANG	25	13	10 Dec 66 F/6
	HQ KINH	24	11	
	HO XUNG	50	10	
	NGUYEN TIEN QUANG	-	18	
	TRAN DIEU	45	1	3 CIT Inter-Ept
	LE BA HOANH	30	7	NGUYEN PHOC HOI
	HO TRUNG TA	25	9	6 Dec 66 F/6
	VO PHI HUNG	25	4	
	NGUYEN QUY	60	6	
	PHAM THU	60	5	
	GIANG LV	45	11	
	SON PHUC (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN DIEU	56	1
HUYNH, AKA HAC		61	16	QUANG HUY
LIU VAN CHUC		19	3	13 Dec 66 F/6

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	QUI	29	3	
	NGAN	26	3	
	TAN	19	3	
	TRAN DIEU	40	1	3 CIT-TRAN
	NGUYEN THO	35	4	DINH LONG
	NGUYEN PHI PHUNG	25	4	7 Dec 66 F/3
	NGUYEN LU	38	5	
	DANG VAN XUAN	22	5	
	NGUYEN DINH SEN	34	2	
	(FNU) NGHI	22	6	
	NGUYEN DINH HY	38	9	
	(FNU) LIEN	27	3	
	(FNU) QUANG	35	3	
	NGUYEN DINH SON	23	3	
	NGUYEN PHOUC NHON	22	3	
HAMLET #1 (H), SON PHUC (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN TU	50	1	3 CIT INTER HPT
	PHAM HAI	45	4	NGUYEN PHOC HOI
	NGUYEN DUC DAI	45	11	6 Dec 66 F/6
	PHAM LY	50	6	
	DANG VAN XUAN	25	6	
	MRS. HAI	60	6	
	MAI CHAN	40	3	
	LUONG DUC CHAN	30	3	
	VO THO	25	3	
	NGUYEN THI TANG	25	3	
	PHAM THI QUAN	25	3	
	LE VAN BA	18	3	
	LUU THI NHAN	20	3	
	PHAM QUY	25	3	
	NGUYEN HUONG	25	3	
	NGUYEN DINH SON	25	3	
	NGUYEN DINH BA	30	3	
	NGUYEN DINH PHO	25	18	
PHUC PHONG (H), SON PHUC (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	GIANG LU	43	1	3 ITT PHAM
	NGO	44	4	QUANG HUY
	NGUYEN MAI	39	11	13 Dec 66 F/6
	NGUYEN DAI	38	13	
	LU	57	6	
	QUI	44	6	
	NGAI	47	6	
	NGUYEN DINH SUM	20	8	
	GIANG TAN NGOC	20	7	
	DANG VAN XUAN	23	6	
	LUU DU CHAU	26	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	THO	25	3	
	TAI	27	3	
	NHAN	19	3	
	CHI	24	3	
PHUC PHONG (H), SON PHUC (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN LU	-	1	3rd CIT
	NGUYEN DUC DAI	-	1/11	TRAN DINH LONG
	NGUYEN TU	50	1	7 Dec 66 F/3
	PHAM NGO	40	4	
	NGUYEN DINH PHO	26	4	
	NGO THI	40	3	
	NGUYEN THUAN	45	5/11	
	DANG VAN TRI	30	12	
	DANG VON XUAN	22	6	
	GIANG TAN NGOC	20	6	
	NGUYEN THI MAI	40	6	
	NGUYEN BAY	19	3	
	LUU DUC CHAU	25	3	
	(FNU) HOANG	28	3	
TRUNG LOC (H), SON PHUC (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN TU	45	1	3 ITT Captive
	PHAM HONG MAI	40	7	IE CHON
	NGUYEN DINH PHO	20	18	10 Dec 66 F/6
	DANG SO	25	3	
	DANG CHAU	20	3	
	VO HOANH	21	3	
SON THO (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN HOI	40	1	3 ITT-DO
	NGUYEN DAM	50	1/7	PHUNG
	NGUYEN TUONG NHAN	37	9	14 Dec 66 F/3
	NGUYEN QUE	52	4	
	NGUYEN HOAN	37	4/7	
	DONG NHI	40	4/7	
	LUONG QUOC	35	4/9	
	NGUYEN LOUC	53	6	
	DO HONG NGA	32	11	
	NGUYEN CHAU	40	7	
	PHAN VAN RAN	27	2	
	NGUYEN MINH	42	2	
	LANG	35	2	
	DO TAN HUNG	27	6	
	NGUYEN THI YANG	35	6	
	NGUYEN THI DIEN	36	7	
	NGUYEN THI TRINH	32	7	
	THO, AKA PHAN VO		11	
	NGUYEN TAN HAM	40	14	
	NGUYEN TAU	45	15	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	NGUYEN AN	40	7	
	DO TY	30	6	
	NGUYEN TANG	35	7	
	DANG THU	27	10	
	DO THI	27	6	
	NGUYEN MINH	22	3	
	LE VAN MINH	40	6	
	PHAN KINH	45	7	
SAN THO (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN HOI	40	1	3 ITT TRAN BINH
	NGUYEN QUE	55	4	13 Dec 66 F/3
	NGUYEN DAM	50	5	
	NGUYEN BON	27	3	
	NGUYEN MINH	20	3	
	DANG THU	25	3	
SON MINH (H), POSS AKA PHUOC BINH (H), SAN THO (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	DANG HO	45	1	3 ITT TRAN BINH
	NGUYEN LUN	50	7/4	13 Dec 66 F/3
	DO TRANG	45	10	
	DANG TRO	35	5	
	DANG TRUNG	25	3	
	DANG KIEN	20	3	
	DO HUNG	18	3	
	NGO TUAN	30	3	
	NGUYEN SAU	25	3	
XUYEN MY (V), DUY XUYEN (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN DANG PHUC	30	1	3 ITT Rallier VAN-CONG-THANH
	VO MY	32	4	(AKA VAN-CONG-XI)
	NGUYEN RI	23	3	14 Dec 66 F/6
	TAI	30	10	
XUYEN DONG (H), XUYEN MY (V), DUY XUYEN (D), QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN XE	35	1	3 ITT Rallier VAN-CONG-THANH (AKA VAN CONG XI)
				14 Dec 66 F/6
CAM AN (V), HIEU NHON (D), QUANG NAM (P)	PHAM LE	35	18	3 ITT Rallier TRAN LANG
	LE BUONG	17	3	14 Dec 66 F/3
	PHAM THI MOT	17	14	
AN BAN #1 (H), CAM AN (V), HIEU NHON (D), QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN NGO	30	1	3 ITT Rallier TRAN LANG
	TRINH TIEN	30	4	14 Dec 66 F/3
	NGUYEN CAO	36	11	
	NGUYEN PHUOC	35	3	
	TRAN NGO	35	3	
	NGUYEN QUET	22	3	
AN MY (H),	XICH	40	1	3 ITT DINH

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
CAM HA (V), HIEU NHON (D), QUANG NAM (P)	LE DINH	35	7	THO
	BO	25	3	14 Dec 66 F/6
	SAM	35	4	
	LE DINH	30	3/7	
	NGUYEN SO	30	3	
	DIEP	28	3	
LOC BINH (V), THUONG DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN NHAN	38	1	NGUYEN HOI
	NGUYEN MUON	40	4	17 Dec 66
	NGUYEN NHAN	41	10	
	NGUYEN BAY	26	3	
	NHUYEN HOA	19	3	
	NGUYEN PHAO	25	3	
	NGUYEN HOI	19	3	
TIEU DONG TAY (H), LOC BINH (V), THUONG DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P)	TRUONG BAY	28	1	3 ITT
	NGUYEN NGANG	35	7	NGUYEN GOI
	NGUYEN GIA	18	3	17 Dec 66 F/3
	NGUYEN NAM	22	3	
	VO XE	20	3	
	HA RANG	19	3	
	TRUNG DINH	25	3	
	BUI MAI	20	3	
	NGUYEN TAM	25	3	
	NGUYEN KIEM	12	3	
	NGUYEN NGHE	22	3	
	NGUYEN TAM	17	3	
	VO MAI	24	3	
	NGUYEN CHIEU	25	3	
	NGUYEN QUAN NHAT	35	1	3rd ITT
	NGUYEN HUONG	32	10	Consol Rpt
HUYNH HOP	31	4	17 Dec 66 F/3	
HUYNH DUONG	30	11		
HO CHAU	19	3		
NGUYEN SAU	18	3		
NGUYEN BAN	21	3		
NGUYEN CHIEN	19	3		
NGUYEN SAU	20	3		
TAM HIEP (H) LOC VINH (V) THUONG DUC (D) QUANG NAM (P)	HO CHAU	20	3	3rd ITT
	NGUYEN XU	20	3	Consolidated Rpt
	NGUYEN NHE	18	3	17 Dec 66 F/3
	NGUYEN KIM	18	3	
	HUYNH MOI	31	3	
	NGUYEN CHO	16	3	
	NGUYEN NHO	20	3	
	NGUYEN DUNG	24	3	
	NGO LAI	18	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	NGUYEN CANH	30	1	
	HUYNH	27	10	
SON CHAU (V)	NGUYEN HUNG	35	18	3ITT Ballier
QUE SON (D)	NGUYEN DU	30	7	LUONG MUC alias
QUANG NAM (P)	PHAM MUN	27	7	LUONG CUONG
	NGUYEN HONG	27	3	18 Dec 66 F/6
	NGUYEN THI GIAO	20	3	
	TRUC TROP	20	3	
	DONG LONG	20	3	
	NGUYEN THOA	18	3	
	NGUYEN THI	15	3	
	NGUYEN THI EM	18	3	
	NGUYEN THI LANG	15	3	
	LUONG SAU	15	3	
	LUONG GAP	25	14	
	NGUYEN TU	25	3	
	HA THI LIEN	22	3	
	HA THI VIET	20	5	
	HA THI TAP	18	3	
	NGUYEN VIET	15	3	
	NGUYEN MIEN	20	3	
	HA LUOC	25	3	
	NGUYEN LAO	23	3	
	NGUYEN NHAN	20	3	
	NGUYEN THI BAI	18	3	
	NGUYEN TA	18	5	
	TRUONG THI THOA	20	3	
	TRONG CONG	15	3	
	NGUYEN TAN	40	1	
	TRAN THO	45	4	
	NGUYEN KY	40	4	
	TRUONG PHAN	50	11	
	LE NGHIEN	37	11	
	NGUYEN DUOC	40	18	
	LUONG TAO	35	13	
	TRUONG PHAN	27		
	LUONG TRI	40	15	
	LUONG QUE	54	8	
	NGUYEN VUI	30	3	
	NGUYEN MOI	45	6	
	LE CONG	18	6	
MY HUNG (H)	PHAM BANG	42	1	9th ITT Captives
NGHIA THANH (V)	(FNU) MY	60	1	NGUYEN DANG THUN
NGHIA HANH (D)	TAM DANG	30	4	NGUYEN CONG
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH TOI	25	2	NGUYEN DANG NGON
	HUYNH DUONG	40	6	15 Dec 66 F/6

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	PHAM CONG TINH	20	3	
	NGUYEN VAN BE	23	3	
	NGUYEN DAN	20	3	
	TRAN KHANH	18	3	
XUAN BA (H)	CONG			
AKA CHAU ME #3 (H)	IE	40	3	9th ITT Captive
HANH THINH (V)	DU	45	4	NGUYEN THI LAN
NGHIA THANH (D)		50	4	14 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
THON BA (H)	VO TUONG	55	1	
PHUOC TAN (V)	VO GIAU	47	4	9th ITT
TIEN PHUOC (D)	DINH	48	10/6	VO CHON
QUANG NGAI (P)	TRUONG MINH TRUC	37	9	10 Dec 66 F/3
	THAI XUAN MAI	35	3	
	DUNG MAI	30	3	
	VO NHO	27	3	
	VO HOC	30	3	
	VO LOC	30	3	
PHUOC BINH (H)	HUYNH LUON	30	1	
BINH THANH (V)	NGUYEN SO	30	5	9th ITT
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN TANG	20	3/6	PHAM NGUYEN
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN HAI	17	3	13 Dec 66 F/6
	NGUYEN CAI	15	3	
	HUYNE QUA	17	3	
	PHAM QUAN	16	3	
	HUNYH HOA	27	3	
	HOA	35	1	9th ITT
	TANG THI TRO	30	6	PHAM TRUNG BINH
	VO CHUONG	28	12	12 Dec 66 F/6
	HIEP	29		
	TRINH THI HO	27	6	
	VO TINH	26	3	
	DOAN CONG	17	3	
	SU	18	3	
	THIEN	15	3	
TUYET DIEM #3 (H)	LE BIEC	35	1	9th ITT
BINH GIANG (V)				IE HUU
BINH SON (D)				16 Dec 66 F/2
QUANG NGAI (P)				
DONG LO (H)	VO HUE	20	17	
BINH GIANG (V)	VO HOC		17	9th ITT
				VO NGOC CHI

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
BINH SON (D) QUANG NGHI (P)				13 Dec 66 F/6
	NGUYEN HUNG	16	3	9th ITT Captive TRON VON 14 Dec 66 F/6
HAI CAT (H) THUONG DIEN (V) NAM HOA (D) THUA THIEN (P)	EM TRAN VAN THEO MAI VAN QUA NGUYEN THONG TRAN VAN MOI SANG NGUYEN THO DAO	35 26 27 45 41 30 27	3 4 3 3/6 1 1 6	7th ITT TRAN VAN PHIEU F/3
XUAN AU (H) PHU XUAN (V) PHU THU (D) THUA THIEN (P)	DANG TRIEU	35	3	7th ITT Captive PHAM LAN
DICH TAY (H) PHUOC TAN (V) TIEN PHUOC (D) QUANG TIN (P)	VO PHU CUONG VO NGOC TRANH (PHU) PHUNG VO TIEP NGUYEN SACH NGUYEN LOI NGUYEN THI LUONG NGUYEN DIEN *VO CAU DUONG TRUONG *VO VAN DIEU *DUONG KHAI HO LUONG NGUYEN DIET NGUYEN MO VO CHUC PHAM LAM *BUI HOI NGUYEN HUNG BHOANG THI EM *NGUYEN THI NHUNG	30 43 30 40 40 30 20 30 40 40 30 50 39 40 45 50 50 20 20 20 25	1 1/4 2/9 11 3 3 3 1 11/4 2/4/9 6 6 8 8 8 8 3 3 3 3	9th ITT LUONG THUY 13 Dec 66 F/6
THON HAI (H) PHUOC TAN (V) TIEN PHUOC (D) QUANG TIN (P)	*VO CAU *VO DIEU HUU NGHIA DUONG KHAI BU TRI BUI HUNG BUI HOI	40 33 37 45 60 18 18	1 4/6 12 6 6 3 3	9th ITT NGUYEN THIN 12 Dec 66 F/6

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	HUYNE THI NHUNG	20	3	
	TRIEU THI PHUNG	23	3	
BINH TRUC (H)	PHAM TAN	35	1	3rd ITT Ballier
BINH SA (V)	CAO	30	4	LE TRUONG
THANH BINH (D)	VO KHOI	35	11	16 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG TIN (P)	HANG	40	11	
	HUNG	25	9	
	CHAU	33	3	
	QUYEN	30	6	
	HAI (AKA PHAM) TAN	35	1	3rd ITT Ballier
	CAO	30	4	PHAM THI HUONG
	HANG	40	11	16 Dec 66 F/6
	HUNG	25	3	Wife of LE TRUONG
	TE	23	3	
KY CHANH (V)	TAI	25	3	9th ITT PHAM
LY TIN (D)	BANG	27	1	THONG 16 Dec 66
QUANG TIN (P)	KIEN	24	3	F/6
	PHI	25	3	
	DUNG	28	3	
	HUE	26	3	
	PHAP	22	3	
	PHUONG	25	3	
	THANH	27	3	
MAI DAM (H)	NGUYEN DUAT	30	3	3rd MarDiv
CAM CHINH (V)	NGUYEN VAN LANG	25	3	DH 6-12-66
CAM LO (D)	HOANG THI RO	32	3	TRAN DUC KHUE
QUANG TRI (P)	LE VAN HOC	35	3	9 Dec 66 F/3
	TRAN VAN KHOA	20	3	
	TRAN TRONG TRIEU	20	3	
	NGUYEN VAN DIEM	35	3	
	TRAN VAN TAN	19	3	
	NGUYEN VAN CAU	33	3	
	TRAN THI VI	35	6	
	TRAN THI THUAN	35	11	
	TRAN DONG	25	1	
	TRAN VAN TRACH	20	4	
	HOANG THAN	40	11	
	TRAN DE	40	11/7	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Positions</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	LANG	25	11/3	3rd MarDiv
	TAN	30	3	DA 1-12-66 BUI VAN THON (AKA NGUYEN VAN MAI) 03/Dec/66 F/3
MAI LOC (H)	NGUYEN VAN HIU	21	3	3rd MarDiv
CAM CHINH (V)	NGUYEN VAN THING	19	3	NGUYEN VAN
CAM LO (D)	NGUYEN VAN SI	23	3	(Alias DUC)
QUANG TRI (P)	HOANG VAN VIET	18	3	KHAN or 24 Nov 66.
	TRAN VAN KHOA	19	3	F/6
AN NHA (H)	NGUYEN BE	25		3rd MarDiv
	NGUYEN HE	25		HO7-12-66
GIO LINH (D)	NGUYEN CHAU	25	3	PHAM DIEM F/2
QUANG TRI (P)	NGUYEN DUONG	38		
	HO CAM	40	3	
	NGUYEN HEIU	50	3	
	PHAN THAI	32	3	
	NGUYEN PHONG	25	3	
HA THOUNG (H)	GA NAY	40	3	3rd MarDiv
GIO LE (V)	UNK SUNG	30	10	ITT 044-12-66
GIO LINH (D)	UNK NGUYEN	30	10/11	Captive LE DOI
QUANG TRI (P)	UNK TRO	25	13	#6 12 Dec 66
	NGHIA	26	3	
	UNK SO	18	3	
	LE DONG	21	3	
	LE THU	26	3	
	UNK LIEU	21	3	
	UNK TAM	25	14	
	SINH NAY	30	3	
	TRU YEN	17	3	
	UNK GIAN	30	3	
AN XA (H)	LANG	23	3	3rd MarDiv
TRUNG SON (V)	THO	20	3	DH5-12-66
TRUNG LUONG (D)	NGAN	19	3	NGUYEN THI KIEM
QUANG TRI (P)	KUONG			(AKA-KIEM CON;LY)
	LY		3	11 Dec 66 F/6
	GIAO		3	
	AI		3	
	THAM		3	
	NGAN		3	
	NGHIA		3	
	NAM		3	
	SAN		3	
	HIEU		3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	TRONG			3
	LUONG			3
	THAM			3
	LE			3
	THIET			3
	THI			3
	HAO			3
	GIANG			3

NOTE: Asterisk (\*) indicates personalities previously reported within village structure or personalities reported in more than one interrogation report for this period.

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ANNEX B (JANUARY WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 47

1. General Weather Brief.

a. During January the northeast monsoon develops to its fullest extent. However, compared with the May to October southwest monsoon, the northeast monsoon is relatively cool and dry. During the northeast monsoon, most cloudiness and precipitation occurs on the windward slopes of the Annam Range and along the east coast of North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam.

b. North Vietnam and the eastern coastlands of the Republic of Vietnam have generally poor overall weather. There are many days with light rain or drizzle, low cloudiness, and poor visibility, generally referred to as "crachin" weather.

c. January is the coldest month of the year in North Vietnam and along the east coast of Republic of Vietnam.

2. Precipitation.

a. January is a dry season month over all regions except the eastern coast north of QUANG NGAI, where January is the last month of the rainy season. The "crachins" contribute significantly to the monthly rainfall along eastern coastal plains and windward mountain slopes. The east coast can expect one or two days with rainfall exceeding one inch. A daily rainfall in excess of two inches is rare.

b. Along the east coast from DANANG northward, precipitation, usually in the form of drizzle, can be expected on half of the days. As many as 23 days with measurable rainfall has been reported at both HUE and DANANG during January.

c. The mean rainfall exceeds three inches over coastal areas north of 15°N latitude. The highest mean monthly precipitation values are recorded near HUE, where several locations have reported means above 10 inches.

d. The highest maximum monthly precipitation is recorded for the country at QUANG NGAI, 15.1 inches, however, higher values have undoubtedly occurred.

e. The January mean number of days with precipitation is 10 days in the greater portion of I CTZ. Just south of HUE to the DMZ it is 15 days.

f. The mean precipitation in inches in the I CTZ varies from three to 15 inches, but is six inches over the greatest portion of the area.

g. The maximum monthly precipitation is 15 inches over most of the I CTZ. The minimum monthly precipitation is 0.6 to one inch.

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3. Cloudiness.

a. "Crachin" cloudiness occurs along the eastern coastal area north of 12° latitude. Ceiling are usually below 1500 feet and cloud tops are 5000 to 6000 feet. There is little cloudiness, other than cirrus, in the dry air above. Early morning clouds usually break up during mid-morning hours to become scattered to broken cumuliform clouds with bases 3000 to 4000 feet during the evening, however, they occasionally persist through the day.

b. The eastcoast cloudiness decreases from December's maximum, because of "crachins". Low overcasts generally below 1500 feet can be expected over the eastcoast and windward slopes on one to eight mornings, increasing from NHA TRANG to the northern border.

c. Mean cloudiness varies from less than 30% over mountains north PLEI KU to more than 70% over the eastcoast. The highest reported values of mean cloudiness is 79% at QUANG TRI.

d. The mean number of days with total cloud cover is five to 10 days. January mean cloudiness is approximate 73% over the entire coastal area of I CTZ.

4. Visibility.

a. In general, surface visibilities are best during the afternoon and slant range visibilities best between 0800 and 1100 LST, but when "crachin" weather occurs in NVN and SVN, visibility in affected areas may be restricted throughout the day.

b. Visibility of less than three miles can be expected with early morning valley fogs. These visibility restrictions rarely persist after 0900 LST. Morning visibilities of less than three miles are frequent with "crachin" conditions along the coast north of 15°N. These restrictions occasionally persist through the day.

5. Fog. Fog generally forms around 0400 LST and dissipates by 0900 LST, but in the I CTZ where reinforced by "crachin" conditions it may persist longer. Mean number of days with fog are five days for most I CTZ and eight days in the DANANG area.

6. Temperature. Mean daily maximum temperatures range from 72°F around DANANG to 75 F in vicinity of HUE and north to DMZ. The mean daily minimum temperatures range from 60° to 65° in the I CTZ.

7. Sunrise, Sunset and Moonrise, Moonset tables. The following is the sun and moon data for January 1967:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
1	0715	1826		2304	1105

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
2	0715	1826		----	1148
3	0716	1827	Last	0001	1228
4	0716	1828		0057	1308
5	0716	1828		0154	1349
6	0717	1829		0251	1413
7	0717	1830		0350	1521
8	0717	1830		0451	1631
9	0717	1831		0551	1708
10	0718	1831		0649	1805
11	0718	1832	New	0743	1903
12	0718	1833		0835	1959
13	0718	1833		0917	2052
14	0718	1834		0956	2142
15	0718	1834		1032	2230
16	0718	1835		1106	2316
17	0718	1836		1138	----
18	0718	1836		1224	0002
19	0718	1837	1st	1246	0049
20	0718	1837		1322	0138
21	0718	1838		1404	0229
22	0719	1838		1449	0323
23	0719	1839		1542	0420
24	0718	1839		1642	0520
25	0718	1840		1743	0620

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
26	0718	1841	Full	1848	0717
27	0718	1842		1951	0810
28	0718	1842		2053	0859
29	0718	1843		2153	0943
30	0718	1844		2251	1026
31	0718	1844		2348	1107

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ANNEX G (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III  
MAF PERINTREP No. 47

1. 30th Bn, 2d Regt, 3d Div. MAI DINH KY, a member of a squad of corpsmen with this battalion, rallied to NUI TRON Outpost on 9 December 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The location of the 30th Bn when he defected was BINH DINH (P). This battalion is an artillery battalion, but in the two months he was with the battalion, he never saw a weapon larger than a rifle. He said he heard that the battalion has two 105mm RR's and three DK 75mm RR's, however he has never seen these either.

b. Since he joined the VC in July 1965 until defecting in December 1966 he has spent all of that time with the exception of four months as a laborer in rice fields.

c. The four months that he was not working in the rice fields he spent studying to be a corpsman. He claimed that he studied in AN HOA (V), AN LAO (D), BINH DINH (P).

d. KY said that he was forced to join the VC in July 1965. He was sent to the 650th training Bn in BA TO (D), QUANG NGAI (P), where he was put in the rice field to work. He had no basic military training. He stayed with the Training Battalion until March 1966 when he was sent to AN HAO (V) to corpsman school. The training there consisted of administering first aid and treatment for malaria.

e. Upon completion of corpsman school he returned to the 650th Training Bn to work in the fields again until October when he joined the 30th Bn in BINH DINH (P). When he arrived at the 30th Bn he was again put in the fields where he remained until he defected. For the two months he was with the 30th Bn, the battalion was never in battle and he was never given an opportunity to treat anyone.

f. He stated the mission of the 30th Bn at the present time is to raise food. The battalion has very little rice, no meat or vegetables and poor clothing. These also were reasons why he defected.

g. He had no knowledge of the location of the battalion and he knew nothing of the 2d Regt or the 3d Div. (G-2 Cmt: F-3. First report of the 30th Arty Bn. This is possibly an AKA for 300th Arty Bn. The 300th Arty Bn was last reported 30 Dec 65 located (BS 215175). QUANG NGAI (P) first report of the 650th Training Bn in QUANG NGAI (P). First report of 105 RR's in this area. The only 105 RR on present listing is Swedish made.)

2. 69th Co, MO DUC District Force. HUYNH CONG BA who rallied to USMC forces at (BS 679528) on 14 December 1966, gave the following information during interrogation:

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- a. The A-1st Sqd, 19th Co, MO DUC (D) Forces is presently located in DUC SON (V), vicinity (BS 698530), and is there to assist and train the guerrillas of the village. This squad is composed of 12 men, armed as follows: one French Automatic Rifle M1924/M29, one Soviet Rifle 7.62mm with scope, one M-1 Carbine and several K44's.
- b. The secondary mission of this squad is the snipe at US/ARVN forces from a bridge in the vicinity of (BS 698532).
- c. There is a new unit, Recon Plt, forming in DUC SON (V). It's mission will be two fold. First to plant booby traps in and around the village, and second to protect the village autonomous committee. There are presently ten men in this platoon.
- d. The headquarters for this Recon Plt, the village guerrillas and the Autonomous Committee is PHUOC VINH (H) (BS 689542). In addition, there are ten village guerrillas in PHUOC DUC #2 (H) (BS 679528).
- e. BA saw the 83rd Bn (AKA 38th Bn) QUANG NGAI (P) force on 28 November moving from vicinity of PHUOC LUONG (F) Southwest into the mountains. There he saw three companies, approximately 300 men.
- f. In January 1966 BA was taken to a reconstruction company in the mountains, unknown location, where he worked carrying rice and making baskets eight hours a day for three months. During this period he had one can of rice a day, approximately eight ounces, and the only vegetables were derived from potato vines. There was no meat in the daily diet.
- g. The reasons he gave for defecting were: he was treated as a prisoner; wasn't trusted as a guerrilla; never given a weapon; treated poorly in general and he believed the VC cause is hopeless. (G-2 Cmt: F-3. 19th Co AKA C.19 Co reported this area numerous times. 83rd Bn is AKA for 38th Bn which normally operates in this area. First report of the 506B Sapper Co. 506B Sapper Co previously reported in this area numerous times. F-2 as to 48th Bn moving to SON TINH (D). 48th Bn was in contact with ROK Marines in SON TINH (D) on 20 Nov. It is believed that the 48th Bn has moved back to its normal operating area of eastern MO DUC (D). F-6 as to personalities (first report).

3. 4th Plt (Female Guerrillas). NGUYEN THI KIEM (alias KIEM CON or KY), member of the TRUNG LUONG (D) armed guerrilla force (4th Plt), was captured by the 1st ARVN Div at (YD 185740) 11 December 1966 and stated the following during interrogation:

- a. That her units mission was to organize the women of AN XA (H) (YD 180750), TRUNG SON (V), TRUNG LUNG (D), QUANG TRI (P).
- b. The unit, 4th Plt, is composed of three squads and these squads are identified by the names of the squad leaders. This platoon is composed of 21 females, armed with four K43's, four MAT 497's, three SKS's and ten M-1 Carbines.

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c. The platoon is located in AN XA (H), and about once a week some of the members travel to TAM HA (H) (YD 185740) to attempt to organize the women of that hamlet.

d. Her unit has a sufficient supply of ammunition, there has never been a demand for more. She knew of no ammunition caches.

e. Ten members of the unit go for rice once a month. The rice storage area is located at (YD 083753) (NGUYEN VAN LUU another captive stated his unit drew rice at a location in grid square (YD 0778). (G-2 Cmt: F-6. This is the first report of 4th Plt and of the all female organization).

4. 33d Regt, 341st NVA Div. NGUYEN THI LUI, a AN XA (H) (YD 178750) hamlet guard, was captured at AN XA by Provincial Recon Unit, on 18 December 1966. She was reportedly signaling NVA soldiers where apprehended. She stated the following during interrogation:

a. Four girls maintain a post outside AN XA (H) in order to warn of the approach of the Americans or ARVN. The girls stand guard from 0800 to 1700 Wednesday, Thursday, Saturday and Sunday. On Monday, Tuesday and Friday during the same hours, the post is manned by NVA soldiers. Every night from 1900-daylight NVA soldiers man the post. However this post is not manned between 1700-1900 and dawn-0800.

b. She stated that there are more than 200 NVA soldiers billeted in the woods around AN XA (H). She was told by an NVA soldier that these troops were members of the 33d Regt. They wore khaki uniforms, soft camouflaged hats and rubber sandals or tennis shoes. They were armed as follows:

50 PPSH SMG; 30 K50 SMG; 30 MAT 49 SMG; 20 M36 rifles; 30 MAS 36 rifles; 30 K44's; 20 AK47's; five TOKAREY pistols.

c. The NVA soldiers have occupied the AN XA (H) area since about July 1966. In September 1966, an unknown NVA soldier came to AN XA (H) to recruit guards. Young girls were threatened with death if they refused. All young men had left AN XA prior to the arrival of the NVA. In October 1966, the same soldier entered AN XA (H) and ordered the population to construct a tactical fence. The fence is nine feet high, made of bamboo and extends for an unknown distance around the hamlet. Shortly thereafter, the people were forced to sharpen 100 punji stakes per individual. These stakes were placed on both sides of the fence.

d. She saw the same unknown soldier frequently and around October 1966, he told her that about 100 of the 200 soldiers were leaving AN XA (H) for about five days and would be temporarily replaced by 100 new soldiers from the north until their return. The captive heard that this procedure was repeated on about 1 November and 15 November.  
(G-2 Cmt: F-3. Low level agent reports of 5, 6, and 8 December state that up to two company size units are operating in this area. A low level agent reported (Eval F-4) on 4 December that two regiments of the 341st Div were located vicinity (YD 2079).

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5. K-2 Bn, 6th NVA Regt. Private DANG VAN DONG, 4th Sqd, 2d Plt, 2d Co, K-2 Bn, 6th NVA Regt, was captured at (YD 544313) by I/3/26 on 21 December 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. That he was born in 1940 (exact date unknown) in LOC PHUC (H), LOC PHUC (V), PHUC THO (D), HA TAY (P), NVN, and was drafted in the "THANH NIEN XUNG PHONG" (Youth Group) the 11th of April 1964 in LOC PHUC (V). The responsibilities of this unit, which had a strength of 100 men, was to carry supplies along the BAC SON Road from LANG HO (V), NGHE AN (P), NVN to the LAOTIAN Border for an infiltration unit believed to be the 35th Regt. His youth group was designated as the 8th Transportation Company and he was a member of the 8th Squad, 3d Platoon. After crossing into LAOS in 1964, the 8th Company set up headquarters at THA KHET (V) LAOS and from there supported the units in the northern part of SVN by bringing supplies to designated points in the jungle in collaboration with Montagnard worker, who would in turn carry the supplies to other unknown points. However, he remembers hearing of an area by the name of LAO BAO in SVN as an infiltration and supply route. Around July 1965, this captive became the platoon leader of the 3d Platoon but he never ranked as an officer. In August 1966, the 8th Co., infiltrated to SVN to join the K-2 Bn as combat troops on the outskirts of LANG THAI (V) (Vic. YD 5717). This is an abandoned Montagnard village located along the stream approximately 500 meters from the SONG BO (River). The K-2 Bn has been operating out of this area since August 1966, according to the captive. Upon joining the K-2 Bn, the captive was told of a successful ambush of 25 ARVN trucks convoy along Route 1 in PHONG DIEN (D) sometime in July 1966. The K-2 Bn had lost only 10 men and the success of that operation was the cause of the high morale 70% of the Battalion displayed. When wounded, the captive had been on what was thought to be a training operation on NUI DONG LAM (2 company size) vicinity of (YD 5231).

b. The K-2 Bn has approximately 480 men and is a part of the CONG TRUONG SAU Regiment which is supposed to have three other battalions (K-1, K-4 and K-6). This Regiment is supported by one mortar company and three anti-aircraft companies. According to the captive, the CONG TRUONG SAU Regiment operating in THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI Provinces and the overall strength of the CONG TRUONG SAU is estimated at around 2,000 men. The captive also heard of the K-8 Bn operating in QUANG TRI (P) and the K-10 Bn operating in THUA THIEN (P). It is believed there is a battalion operating in HUE City (designation unknown). The strength of other battalions besides the K-2 is not known but is believed to be also 480 men per battalion.

c. The K-2 Bn was located at LANG THAI (YD 5717) on the 18th of December 1966. Also, on that same date the Regimental Headquarters was sighted on DOC O (slope) believed to be the southern slope of Hill 674 (YD 5121). The K-1, K-4 and K-6 Battalions are believed to be located somewhere between Hill 674 and LANG THAI. The supporting companies location are unknown but are believed to be in the same area, with the AA companies occupying the key terrain features. The battalion operating in HUE City is believed to be carrying hand weapons and operating in civilian clothes with certain elements traveling about the city as ARVN troops.

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The K-8 Bn is operating in QUANG TRI. The K-10 Bn in THUA THIEN and both of these battalions are highly mobile. Exact location unknown.

d. The mission of the K-2 Bn is to attack outposts along Highway #1 in THUA THIEN (P). At the time of capture, the captive knew of an attack to take place at the LUONG MAI Post on 20 or 21 December 1966 and an attack at the DONG LAM crossing of Highway #1 (YD 5432) in the near future. The K-2 Bn also had plans to move to PHU LOC (D) THU THIEN (P) in the near future. Attacks on the Highway #1 positions are expected to increase in order to weaken the enemy and make way for the major operation (outline in paragraph h).

e. The K-2 Bn has a total of two 82mm mortars, two DK-57 recoilless, six 12.7mm AA guns, six B-40's, three 60mm mortars, 48 AK automatic rifles. The men carry KKC rifles and two CHICOM grenades each. A mortar company has six 82mm mortars and an AA company has six 12.7mm AA guns. The CONG TRUONG SAU Regiment is believed to have four or five 120mm artillery pieces in caves of Hill 2000 in the jungles of THUA THIEN, five days' walk westward of Hill 674 (YD 5121). Exact weapons of other battalions was unknown but believed to be similar to the K-2 Bn. The equipment on hand and viewed by the captive was considered in good shape and no shortages of ammo or equipment were noticed.

f. The K-2 Bn has one 15 watt radio with which it communicates with the CONG TRUONG SAU Regimental Headquarters frequencies and call signs unknown to this captive.

g. There seems to be a shortage of food and the food on hand is of poor quality and confined to rice, salt, buffalo meat and only once were they served pork. The men were told that reserves were being stock-piled for days to come and that food had to be rationed out. Medical supplies are considered sufficient for field use but no clinic was sighted. Each company has three corpsmen and the K-2 Bn has one doctor.

h. Three months ago high ranking officers gathered at the 12th Committee Meeting (location unk) and received the following information which was later handed down to the soldiers through the chain of command and by political cadres:

In the dry season of 1967, the NVA will move to SVN concentrating on the provinces south of and including QUANG NAM. NVN will be guarded by Chinese Communist troops with SAM sites along the NVN coast and key avenues of approach. The units presently operating in QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P) will not be reinforced but will operate as follows: One division plus (designation unk) will attempt to lure the enemy in the vicinity of Highway #9 (West QUANG TRI) and destroy it, after which, this division-plus will move to THUA THIEN (P) to join forces with all the local units including the CONG TRUONG SAU Regiment where they intend to overrun PHU BAI and HUE City. When this is accomplished, all of these forces will be formed in two groups with one group holding ground at the THUA THIEN (P) and QUANG NAM (P) border and the other group sweep north to the DMZ to destroy the remaining enemy units.

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To facilitate this operation, it was pointed out that presently all of the ARVN bases and outposts in QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P) are infiltrated by the VC and that the VC operate in all hamlets, villages and cities. With stepped up activities all over the country, the ARVN and allied forces will be too busy to defend everywhere and the people will be too busy protecting their own hamlet, villages and cities to provide reinforcement to the military. Victory is insured.

i. The morale of the men of the K-2 Bn is considered 70% good and 30% poor. The good morale is attributed to excessive indoctrination and the successful battle of July 1966 mentioned in the captive's statement. The poor morale is attributed to the new troops who have been drafted from SVN and NVN, who would like to return home and do not like to fight. Most of these are students.

j. PERSONALITIES.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
KHANH	Capt	38	CO, K-2Bn.
AN	Unk.	32	XO, K-2Bn.
TRAM	2dLt.	30	CO, 2dCo.
THAT	2dLt.	22	XO, 2dCo.
THO	1stLt.	32	Political Cadre, 2dCo.
XIM	WO	32	Asst. Pol. Cadre, 2d Co.
DIEN	WO	22	2dPlt. Leader
DEN	1stSgt.	26	Asst. 2dPlt. Ldr.
MANH	Sgt.	26	4thSqd. Leader
NGHIEN	Cpl.	25	Asst. 4thSqd Leader
THUAN	Pvt.	22	Mbr. 1stSqd, 1stPlt, 2dCo.

(Interrogator's Comments. This captive could not identify locations on a map but through interrogation and maptracking, the locations contained herein were found to be the most coinciding with all available knowledge. The captive seemed to have a fear of being killed after he has given information. He was cooperative and seemed to be of higher than average intelligence although he claims to have received no education.)

(G-2 Comment: F/3. K-2 is AKA for 802d Bn, 6th NVA Regt. K-1 is AKA for 804th Bn and K-6 is AKA for 806th Bn. CONG TRUONG SAU is possibly AKA of 6th NVA Regt. K-8 is AKA for the 808th Bn and K-10 is AKA for the 810th Bn.

This is the first indication of four battalions subordinate to the 6th NVA Regt. III MAF OOB carries 800th, 802d and 806th subordinate to the 6th NVA Regt. III MAF OOB carries the units that the captive mentions in the same general area as the captive states, with the exception of the 804th Bn which is normally carried in PHU LOC (D), THUA THIEN (P).

The weapons that the captive mentions are organic to MF and NVA units. The CO (KHANH) and XO AN ORE carried by III MAF OOB as CO and XO of 802d AKA K-2 Bn. This is the first report of TRAM, THAT and THAO).

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6. The following translations are of VC directives for countering FVMAF actions:

**"DIRECTIVE"**

Guidance for the Group Combat Emulation.

The directive No. 165/CT concerns the emulation from 2 September to 19 December, which has a second military objective as follows.

Step up combat activities within our Group in an attempt to destroy many enemy troops, protect property, supply agencies and actively fight the enemy during the coming dry season.

Following are the guides for the achievement of the second objectives:

**In Combat**

The counter-sweep operation plans must focus on the following points:

On the basis of terrain features, anticipate the enemy main and secondary directions of attack to deploy troops and fire power, place mines and obstacles and build solid and appropriate fortifications.

The combat plans include five main parts:

- a. Fight while on patrol and stay close to the enemy on the patrol corridor of the unit.
- b. Fight when the enemy approaches the base and supply store house area. In this case, establish combat positions with well camouflaged fortifications, intended to greatly wear down enemy forces and disarrange the enemy plan of combined action right at the beginning.
- c. Fight in solid fortifications (when the enemy attacks our base and supply store houses) to destroy many enemy troops and blunt the enemy brunt of attack.
- d. Make a plan of withdrawal and a plan of sticking to combat positions to continue the fight.
- e. Coordinate with friendly agencies and units, provide information, conduct patrols, provide mutual support when attacked by the enemy and anticipate all possible events.

The general requirement of the combat plan is to destroy many enemy troops, counter sweep operations, actively and violently fight the enemy when he operates in our base and supply store houses. In this way, it is necessary to deploy sufficient fire power and especially coordinate mines with direct fire weapons.

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The combat plans must be carefully studied and disseminated to all members of the unit in order that they fully understand their specific combat mission and the mission of each unit.

The regular activities include patrol and reconnaissance to preserve security for us and detect enemy "Biet Kich" (commando-type force) and reconnaissance agents trying to probe our base and discover traces of us.

The purpose of the base establishment

Establish bases with obstacles, spikes, solid air and artillery shelters. If the bases are within the range of enemy artillery fire, dig underground trenches to provide security for the unit.

The bases must have from 1 to 3 roads leading in 3 different directions and select alternate location areas to hide the enemy should the need arise. Construct dispensaries in alternate location areas in advance and dig a number of trenches for wounded soldiers. Agencies and units must have shovels and pickaxes so that they can dig fortifications quickly right after their arrival at a new location.

Make a specific plan to hide property, equipment, tools and documents in different places.

Establishment of supply store houses.

Military provision personnel must make a plan to establish dispersed and well camouflaged store houses in secret places. A store house must not contain more than 5000 liters [of rice] and must be defended by fortifications and mine booby traps (set mine booby traps upon approach of the enemy).

Supply store houses of units and agencies must make a plan to keep the supplies in different places. Each store-house must not contain more than 2,000 liters [of rice] in other words, the rice supply of each store house is sufficient for the units consumption for three months.

Generally speaking, supply store houses must be well defended against the enemy attack during the dry season, by means of fortifications and must be built scatteredly.

Presently and in the coming dry season, the enemy is planning to intensify his subversive activities, reconnaissance, and espionage activities. He will actively attack us with every type of force, especially and often by air, artillery and "Biet Kich". The enemy has also emphasized attacks on our supply store houses.

To cope with the enemy and fulfill our mission, the entire unit must be aware of the new combat concept and have a high determination to violently fight the enemy in order to preserve ourselves.

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Organization of related combat areas.

On the basis of the relations between units and the nature of units, the Group has prescribed combat areas and the combat organization as follows:

Area T consists of 3 sectors

C134 will coordinate with units of T10 and C125

C125-T36-K76B-A15 will coordinate with units of Q4 and HD, PMy villages, T10 station and Phuoc-Thai village.

K16-K1 will coordinate with the local area.

Area D includes 2 sectors

C200, Group Headquarters, C100, T36A and 40

50, T36A, K76A will coordinate with the guerrillas of area B, Cham and with Group 89 and 40 to conduct patrols.

Area K5 with the surrounding villages and hamlets.

B1 with.....

B2 with.....

B3 with.....

K1A will coordinate with T20 and the nearest units of the province.

Area K2 will coordinate with H4, particularly Long Nguyen 2 will coordinate with hamlet guerrillas and K16.

Area K3 will coordinate with H2.

Area K7 will coordinate with the local area.

Area K8, the office of 210 and K76C will coordinate with the local area.

Unit C134, K1A, K2, K3, K5, and K7 will make independent combat plans and designate personnel to coordinate with the local areas.

In other areas, the Group will ask the headquarters of C125 to hold a meeting with T36 and K761B.

B1/the Group headquarters to hold a meeting with 200, C1001, T36A (comrade Tan) to hold a meeting with X50.

210 to hold a meeting with K76C and K8.

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K1 to hold a meeting with K16 and X50 with T36A (Comrade Tan)

The purpose of the meetings is to:

- a. Standardize the plan of mission assignment, inspection, reporting information and combat on the adjacent corridors.
- b. Discuss the plan of providing reinforcement, within one's capabilities, in accordance with the combined action plan.
- c. Assign missions to friendly units and local areas.

Independent units and areas.

Due to the situation, independent units and areas perform their mission in different areas therefore. They are required to formulate a general plan of action, a combat and base construction plan for each specific element. The plans must be clear and put in a report form.

Experiences gained after a counter-sweep operation.

After each [RVN] sweep operation, the units, on the basis of the prescribed plan, will summon a meeting to gain experience, review strong and weak points on leadership, on the unit and individual combat plans and on the results of combined action reported to the Group.

Upon receipt of this directive, unit headquarters will carefully draft specific plans and disseminate them to units for indoctrination in order to help the individual soldiers understand their combat mission, the implementation of the prescribed combat plans and the violent nature of the fight. In addition, they will have to initiate an emulation in scoring combat achievements in accordance with the Group directive.

Submit combat plans not later than 30 September.

B, is responsible for guiding units in properly implementing this directive.

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**6. TACTICS OF SAPPER UNITS.**

Entrance into Fortified Areas through natural and artificial barriers of the enemy. Movement to destroy enemy targets.

Introduction. The ideas of, tactical value of, and the techniques of infiltration into enemy held fortified areas. The movement to the infiltration point forms the tactical basis for success in the assault or defense phase. The basis for tactical success, is to damage the enemy's front and rear and to annihilate the enemy's strong points. In the attack phase we must cross the barriers of the enemy and nature; mountains, rivers, streams, houses, villages, etc., and the spot lights, sentry posts, mines, of the enemy. As a result the sapper must have within himself the most flexible techniques of infiltration under any given circumstance, to appear invisible to the enemy, and to provide protection for himself and his compatriots in their assault on the eventual enemy target. We must have the ability to observe the enemy target without revealing to the enemy our mission. Immediacy is the key to successful completion of the mission, without revealing ourselves or our desired target to the enemy. So the sapper must prepare himself thoroughly with constant practice of his self discipline and his techniques for the accomplishment of his present and future missions.

The Main points to emphasize in the infiltration through enemy and natural barriers.

- a. Infiltrate Unexpectedly.
- b. He must at all times be aware of the direction to his target.
- c. He must be aware of the characteristics of the civilian populace in the target area.
- d. He must visualize all eventualities in the mission.
- e. He must consider the weather, darkness, rain, fog, drizzle, to chose the most oportune moment.
- f. His camaflouge must blend with the appearance of his terrain, (Camaflouge is of primary importance) to observe and not to be observed by the enemy is the key to success.
- g. He must keep his mission secret. He must leave no markings or indications of his route to the infiltration point.
- h. The equipment the sapper carries must blend with his natural body image. His required equipment is pistol, submachine gun, grenades, binoculars, map, wire clippers, bandages, and stakes (for moving under barbed wire etc.).
- i. The characteristics of a successful sapper are:

- (1) Being accustomed to the difficulties involved.

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- (2) Sense of Responsibility.
- (3) Self- Discipline.
- (4) Courage.
- (5) Technical excellence.

3. Individual movement through natural and enemy barriers at the infiltration point.

a. Night Infiltration

(1) Manuevering without weapons.

(a) Movements of infiltration.

1. The sapper must form a low profile.
2. He advances by tip-toe, he doesn't move his other foot until the weight is solidly planted on the first.
3. His eyes must constantly be scanning the horizon and his target must be kept insight.
4. When the sapper is in fear of being seen he must stop and lie down. He must check his immediate area for traps and try to reach the closest hiding place unobservable by the enemy.
5. When getting up from a lying position while under enemy searchlights he must place his left hand on his left hip draw his right leg under his buttocks sitting on his right heel, with his left knee drawn up in a kneeling position he places his right hand on his right leg to help support his weight and cover his eyes with his left hand to observe the enemy. While lying under a spot light he must keep his back to it.

(2) Manuevering with weapons.

(a) There is no basic difference in the manuevering with weapons and those without other than the fact the sapper has the ability to protect himself.

1. When carrying a sub-machine gun and preparing to reach the firing position a man must transfer the sling from his left shoulder to around his neck with his elbows locked into his sides with his right hand grasping the grip and his left hand holding the magazine. The left foot is planted approximately 18 inches to the left and the front of the rear. The man must lean his body weight into the weapon. He must remember when lying down or moving while suspecting enemy observation the submachine gun must remain unobservable and blend with his natural body outline.

2. The movements with a rifle are basically the same

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(firing position, lying position and movement positions).

b. Infiltration through enemy held terrain.

(1) The equipment must be thoroughly prepared and silent while being carried.

(2) While infiltrating to the target, a sapper must choose a hiding place prior to moving from his present one, he must observe his front and both sides prior to movement then move on to the next hiding place. He must know the amount of time it will take to reach his next hiding place if the enemy discovers him.

(3) There are 3 ways of maneuvering from one hiding place to another.

(a) On tip-toe, low profile.

(b) Running while on tip-toe, low profile.

(c) By placing the rifle against his body and rolling.

(4) Maneuvering while under a spotlight and on a hard surface.

(a) Walking on the hands and feet with the body paralalled to the ground without having the stomach touch the ground.

(5) Maneuvering while wading through shallow water (knee high).

(a) A sapper must step very high without making waves or noise, lifting his legs slowly and shifting his body weight slowly. He must retain his balance at all times. When crossing a swiftly moving stream he must travel with the current and not against it.

(6) Maneuvering through mud.

(a) A sapper must avoid making any noise he must transfer his body weight very slowly, and stepping high. Upon reaching the bank he must remove all the mud from his body and feet, and leave absolutely no traces of his passage in the mud.

(7) Maneuvering through a dry rice paddy.

(a) A sapper must move between the rows of rice.

(8) Maneuvering on the sand.

(a) When close to enemy outposts a sapper must move on his two hands and feet. He must wipeout every trace of a foot print each time he steps farther.

(9) Maneuvering through thick and thin jungle areas.

(a) A sapper must make holes in the dead leaves with his hands. He moves forward on his hands and his feet. He places his feet

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in the holes created by his hands. He must maintain absolute silence.

(10) Manuevering under barbed wire.

(a) A sapper must wear tight clothing. He must observe for booby traps, mines, signal flares, etc. He must carry sticks from 9 to 12 inches long for removing the barbed wire from his body. If the wire is very low he must observe the wire for signalling devices, then he uses the sticks to prop up the wire. If only one sapper is infiltrating he needs only 2 sticks if many men are infiltrating they must use many sticks. Every strand in the wire must be observed. The stick must be set at angle for easy withdrawal after passing the strand. In infiltrating barbed wire he must go head first in withdrawing he must go feet first so he will be able to observe the enemy. When he withdraws the sticks he lifts the wire slightly and pulls out the stick carefully, wiping out all traces of it's presence. If many infiltrators are required they are divided into teams of 3 men (1 leader, 2 sappers.) They must take sticks, hooks, wire clippers (large and small), and gloves. If there are 3 teams available one team is in support. The other 2 teams accomplish the mission. The number 2 and 3 man in each team takes the sticks, strings, clippers, gloves, and K-Bars. The team leader observes the terrain and enemy, he gives instructions to the #2 and #3 man. When the first team gets through the barbed wire the 2nd team enters the barbed wire. The team leader provides security for the 2nd and 3rd man.

(11) The cutting of barbed wire.

(a) The instruments of wire cutters, gloves, weapons and suitable camouflouge.

(b) Prior to entering the barbed wire the team leader must detect flares, mines, trip wires, etc. He must act with patience and not be hurried.

(c) Place the clippers at a 90° angle to the wire and cut. Use one hand to hold the wire, the other to cut. the wire. If 2 men are available one holds the wire while the other cuts. He must keep the wire from springing. The distance between his hands is approximately 4 inches. Each man roles the wire to his respective pole, wrapping the wire around the pole. In the case of three men, 2 men hold the wire while the 3rd man cuts.

(12) How to break through a single strand fence.

(a) The sapper must cut the bottom most wire first, then the second, then the 3rd, then the forth. If crosswires are interlocked they must be cut first and then cut the wires paralleled to the ground.

(13) How to penetrate 2 parallel wire fences connected at the top.

(a) The crosswires at the bottom must be cut first, then cut the bottom most horizontal wire then gradually cut the 2nd, 3rd and

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4th horizontal wires. Follow cutting the second fence the same as the 1st. Cut the 2 crosswires at the top at the last. Always cut all other crosswires first. Then wait until the desired time of infiltration.

(14) How to infiltrate through bamboo fences, trenches with bamboo punji stakes, bamboo groves, iron stake infiltration, and booby traps.

(a) Use bamboo or rope ladders 3 to 4 meters long.

(b) How to cross bamboo groves and the camouflaged to be used in crossing these groves.

1. Push 2 bamboo plants aside step through and then realign the plants to their original position. If a bamboo can't be moved pull it from the ground (by shaking and pulling at an angle) step through and replace it in its original hole.

(c) In some cases trenches are crossable, in some cases it is impossible.

1. If the trench is extremely deep one man lies on his back with his head towards the trench, the other man grabs his wrists and gradually lowers himself into the trench. The 2nd man then comes down on the 1st man's shoulders. They push aside any stakes and then reach the otherside of the trench. On reaching the trench wall one man braces himself while the other climbs out on his shoulders.

(d) Use of bamboo ladders in crossing trenches.

1. One man observes while the other lowers the ladder into the trench. The 1st man then holds the ladder while the 2nd lowers himself into the trench. The 1st man then removes all traces of them being in the area. He then lowers himself to the ladder being held by the 2nd man.

(e) How to cross by using a rope ladder.

1. They use the same basic methods as used by a bamboo ladder except for these difficulties they use the knots in the ropes rather than rungs in the ladder. They must carry their rifles over their shoulders during this maneuvering.

(f) How to cross a bamboo fence.

1. He must use the strength of his arms to crawl over a bamboo fence. He must remember to keep a low silhouette on the horizon.

2. If 2 or more men are available, one man braces himself while the others go on up over his shoulders and over the fence. After all have went over the last man helps pull the first over the fence.

3. One man may hold a ladder with the rungs perpendicular to the fence. He then steps through the ladder and supports it

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with his arms and legs while the others cross over the fence.

(15) How to infiltrate through mine fields by hand.

(a) If a wire is discovered he must squat in front of it, lift the wire slowly in each hand and pass it very slowly up his body, over his head and back to the ground. He must constantly search the immediate area a head of himself with his hands and then follow through with his body. A sapper must travel very slowly on all fours checking the field constantly, trying to keep his weight evenly distributed on his hands and feet. He must search the terrain carefully, avoiding any suspicious looking spot or path not pull any wires he discovers. Avoid any thing metal, cans, pictures, batteries, ammo and clothing. A sapper must be patient, he mustn't hurry, he must avoid any suspicious looking areas.

(16) How to remove a mine.

No matter how many infiltrators there are only one man proceeds to the mine. Remove the camouflauge covering the mine, place a safety into the fuse, check the trip wire to see if there are booby traps or not and then cut the trip wire. Be careful because some mines explode when the trip wire is cut. When removing the camouflauge care must be taken because sometimes the enemy booby traps the mine. If a grenade is used as a booby trap place a safety into the grenade. Before removing a mine a sapper must identify the type of mine, how it was planted, and how it is detonated. During cold weather never touch a trip wire. When removing the mine the sapper must cut slowly and carefully. If while manuevering and encounting a wire he must lift it slightly pass his body under the wire very carefully, moving the wire as little as possible. A needle may be used as a safety by holding the fuse with one hand and the needle being grasped by the thumb and forefinger with the other he places the needle into the safety hole within the fuse to disarm it. Then follow the wire to see if there are any more mines on the wire. After that return to the infiltrators hiding place. If a man discovers a time bomb he must immediately turn the hands on the watch backward, then remove the fuse and lift the mine out. While removing a mine he must press on the top of the mine with one hand and with the other using a knife probe the area around the mine until he is able to clear all the ground away from the mine.

Remarks:

- a. Before removing the fuse place the safety in the mine.
- b. Do not remove the mine when trembling.

(17) How to carry explosives in the infiltration to the target.

(a) This depends on the amount of explosives to be carried (can it be carried on the back or shoulders); is it too heavy to be carried by hand. Will it explode upon collision with other objects. Take nylon packs to protect the explosives from rain or humidity. When reaching the final team assault point take advantage of the existing terrain to

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camouflage the explosives. Observe the explosives position (where the mine will be placed on the target) and the enemies activity - while lying in an unobservable position hold the explosives in the right hand under the body, hold the detonating device in the left hand while bracing the body on the left elbow. A sapper must use the following positions to reach the explosives eventual position, standing, stumping, crawling on the side.

(18) Planting of the satchel charge against a low target.

(a) Locations to place the explosives.

1. In towns or cities place it near an important building near the center of the built up area.

2. When blowing a wall place the explosives at the corner of the structure.

3. When blowing a pill box place the explosive approximately 20 centimeters from the pill box or if possible in an opening.

4. When blowing an underground tunnel if there is a closed entrance blow the entrance first and then blow the tunnel.

5. A building should be handled the same as a tunnel blow the entrance first and then place the explosives against the target.

6. In blowing a 2 story house use from 50 to 100 grams of explosives against the doorway on the ground floor.

(19) Different positions to be used in carrying the explosives.

(a) Standing

(b) Crawling

(c) Kneeling

(d) Lying

(20) To blow a fence with concrete poles, place the explosives against a pole by using a hook placed over the wire and against the pole. If the posts are not concrete use the hook in the center to blow the wires.

(21) To blow 2 parallel fences with a roof on top you use a short satchel charge for one roof a 2 roof fence requires a long satchel charge. You must remember to place the satchel parallel to the wire.

(22) In blowing concentina place a large quantity of explosives next to a pole in the fence.

(23) To blow mines or booby traps place the explosives in a

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piece of bamboo use a supplementary fuse with a long trip wire.

(24) When using dynamite (super charge) have between 1 meter and 1 meter - 20 centimeters long tubes to blow houses, bunkers, and tunnels. Be patient and work carefully. Take advantage of the terrain to move to the desired target. If the 1st charge doesn't explode place another as quickly as possible.

(25) A sapper when possible should carry 1 submachine gun with 200 rounds, 2 hand grenades, one satchel containing 2 kilos of high explosives, one satchel containing B-40. While in the waiting position the sapper must observe his target and await his final orders. Avoid the confusion of other targets.

(26) How to blow a bunker.

(a) Do not run across the opening.

(b) Run to the nearest corner. Crawl up under the opening. Kneel with the sub-machine gun in his left hand and toss the satchel charge with his right, overhead into the opening. The sapper then returns to the hiding point as quickly as possible. Avoid crossing in front of the opening. If after waiting 6 to 12 seconds and there is no explosion, if possible toss another satchel charge into the bunker. If there is a barrier on the opening use the one lb. satchel to blow the opening and then another satchel to blow the bunker.

(27) How to attach trenches which lead from one bunker to another.

(a) This depends on the type of terrain, the distance from one bunker to another, the branches off of the trenches.

(b) The sapper can lay down a field of fire over the trench with his sub-machine gun, gradually working in at an angle and mop-up the trench ahead of himself. Or he can throw grenades into the branching off trenches. When a sapper doesn't have enough ammo he may use grenades. When using a sub-machine gun fire in short bursts do not waste ammo. When using grenades in trenches you have to take the angle of the trench into account. When coming to curve in the trench the sapper must press his body against the corner wall to avoid enemy fire, he must move quickly. While maneuvering in a trench the sapper must remain absolutely silent. If there are sentry posts along the trench, destroy the sentry post first and then use this position to fire into the trenches. If there are foxholes along the trench they take priority in destruction over the trench itself. then use the foxholes to fire into the trench. Proceed step by step.

(28) How to attack an underground tunnel.

(a) Usually the bunker in the middle is the C.P. The tunnels may lead from one bunker to another. When an infiltrator gets into a tunnel the enemy usually closes in from both sides. In this case the infiltrator must use all his fire power on the enemy

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on one side to face the enemy from the tunnel then use a satchel charge from 1 to 5 kilos to destroy the tunnel.

(b) How to attack underground rooms in the tunnel. Use a sub-machine gun to clear the room if returning fire is too heavy toss a grenade. Once the room is cleared use a 1 lb. super charge to blow the room.

(29) How to attack sand bagged emplacements.

(a) It's usually preferable to destroy an enemy installation close to the emplacement rather than the emplacement itself. If the emplacement must be attacked concentrate all the fire power on one corner. After attacking we must check all the rooms in the emplacement.

(30) In the attack phases we must know when to use the sub-machine guns, when to use grenades and when to use explosives. Using these three attacking instruments we can destroy the enemy's effectiveness.

26 July 1966

(Handwritten)

In any situation report to me on the activities of the platoon from January 1966 to now, especially the 2 sneak attacks in BINH MY and BINH SON.

Send to this address:

Sector 10 Belonging to HG

31/7/66

Yours truly,

THANH LAI

SNEAK ATTACK AND  
PSYCHOLOGY WARFARE  
SECTION IN BINH SON (D)

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## ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 47

1. GENERAL. Although reports indicate an increase in VC activity during the reporting period, incidents of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Items of interest includes the formation of an "English Language School" in order to train personnel for espionage missions, the discovery of a floating propaganda raft and the formation of VC assassination teams with the mission of terrorizing villagers who have been friendly with USMC personnel.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. A 17 December report from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines related that a female was apprehended for warning the VC of an approaching USMC patrol.

A 21 December report from a usually reliable source stated that the National Liberation Front of QUANG DA District (Danang) has initiated a course in the English language for their "Advanced Young People" in the DAI LOC area (AT 905570). Upon completion of this course these personnel will be sent to villages in groups of four, to gather information on U.S. and ARVN units.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	19Dec	Culvert destroyed	YD 219637
QUANG TRI	20Dec	Bridge destroyed	YD 333614
THUA THIEN	21Dec	Railroad track destroyed	ZD 190009
THUA THIEN	22Dec	Railroad track destroyed	ZD 183009
THUA THIEN	22Dec	Railroad track destroyed	ZD 185009
THUA THIEN	22Dec	Railroad track destroyed	ZD 187009
THUA THIEN	22Dec	Railroad track destroyed	ZD 186005

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

THUA THIEN. A 22 December report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that two VC propaganda leaflets, originated by the Chairman of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, were found in the vicinity of (YD 927103). The general content of the leaflets included a statement that the Liberation Army Forces would obey the cease fire over the Christmas and New Year's periods. In addition, the leaflets went on to say "JOHNSON" and "McNAMARA" were deceiving the American Serviceman.

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QUANG NAM. A 20 December report from the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines related that the populace of KIM LIEN (V) (AT 922857) reported an estimated squad of VC entered the village and distributed propaganda leaflets. The theme is unknown.

A 22 December report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team revealed that a raft was discovered floating down the CAU DO River (AT 998705) covered with propaganda leaflets. The general theme of this propaganda was the "Four Point Position of the National Liberation Front" and an order for all VC units to observe the Christmas and New Year's truce.

QUANG NGAI. A report of 22 December from an intelligence source stated that two propaganda leaflets were found near a village in the vicinity of (BS 664972). One leaflet pertained to procedures for handling U.S. POW's held by the National Liberation Front and the other contained comments concerning the Vietnam war which were attributed to a captured U.S. Advisor. (CI Comment: Both leaflets are identical to those found in a VC psychological warfare center. Refer to III MAF PERINTREP No. 44.)

#### 6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 21 December report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that the QUANG TRI VC Party Committee has ordered their agents and cadre to investigate the "Good Will Society Organization of Students". The VC hope to penetrate this organization in hope of using it as a front for their operations in QUANG TRI City. (CI Comment: This Society has just been formed and the true purpose of the organization is not known at this time.)

THUA THIEN. A 19 December report from an intelligence source stated that an unknown number of VC entered VINH HA (V) (YD 962145) and assassinated the retired village Chief.

QUANG NAM. A 19 December report from an intelligence source related that 12 VC kidnapped the island Chief in the vicinity of (AT 928837) because he was friendly to USMC personnel.

A 20 December report from the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines related that 30 to 40 VC have formed assassination teams in the vicinity of (AT 916716) and (AT 923713) to terrorize those villagers who have been friendly to USMC personnel in the area.

A 23 December report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the villagers of KY MINH (V) (AT 978599), KY QUANG (V) (AT 960587), KY NCOC (V) (Coord Unk), and THANH PHONG (V) (BT 010610) are forced by the VC to live under the following conditions: (1) Evacuate in case of sweep operations by USMC or ARVN units; (2) Youths are required

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to join guerrilla forces; (3) Use of women as guards; (4) Girls of the villages are required to take part in military proselyting activities, sell public treasure bonds in the city of Danang and to make anti-U.S. and anti-VN Government propaganda leaflets.

QUANG NGAI. A 20 December report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that a VC printing plant with approximately 40 workers is located near LIGN (H) (BS 145579). This plant is believed to be a branch office of the Liberation Associated press and is composed of two houses in which there are five printing machines, four mimeograph machines and eight typewriters. With this capability, the plant publishes a daily and weekly newspaper, magazines, and other printed matter for distribution among the VC controlled areas. Within this complex there is also a large radio set which is used to communicate with Military Region V Headquarters.

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
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RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF

1 JANUARY 1967

# PERINTREP NO. 48



THE MAF PERINTREP # 48

25-31 Dec 66

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF

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Copy 188 of 190 Copies  
 III MAP  
 DANANG, RVN  
 1 January 1967  
 Ser: 02167

PERINTREP NO. 48

Period Covered: 250001H - 312400H Dec 66

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,  
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - Southern DMZ. There were no significant reports of enemy movement in northern QUANG TRI (P) and in the area immediately south of the DMZ. Significant enemy ground action consisted of three heavy mortar attacks made against US and Vietnamese Marine units. One attack was directed against the CON THIEN outpost (YD 115701), which was manned by elements of the 5th Vietnamese Marine Bn. Approximately 200 rounds of 82mm mortar fire was received at this location. No subsequent ground action was reported. The second attack involved elements of 3rd Bn, 3d Marines located at a point about four kilometers north of THON SON LAM (XD 989596). An estimated 107 rounds of an unidentified caliber were received. The third attack consisting of 100 to 150 rounds, was made against artillery positions of the 3rd Bn, 12th Marines one kilometer northeast of CAM LO (YD 145616). Again, no ground attacks were made in conjunction with the mortaring. Inclement weather precluded aerial photographic coverage of the northern area. The enemy situation within the DMZ remains unchanged from the prior reporting period; there are no indications that enemy offensive ground action is imminent. Northwest QUANG TRI (P) was quiet with the exception of three rounds of mortar fire received outside of the LANG VEI CIDG Camp. No enemy activity of any significance was reported from the eastern portion of the province; enemy action in this area was limited to small scale incidents.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. The tempo of enemy activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P) and along Highway 1 through the TAOR and north of HUE City increased significantly this week. Reconnaissance teams screening the western approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR reported major sightings and several contacts with small groups of VC; sightings totaled approximately 1130 over the period 25 through 31 December. On 31 December a major sighting of approximately 1000 well armed VC was reported in the vicinity of (YD 511254). In addition to small arms the VC were carrying mortars and machine guns. The well concentrated enemy group was held under observation for several hours and at 1900 hours artillery and air strikes were called in. Results were undetermined by the end of the period. These sightings represent a rather sharp increase over recent reporting periods and tend to reflect continued enemy interest in the CHINOOK area of operations (YD 5330) and in the western and southern approaches to HUE City. On 27 December, a PF platoon guarding a government building just northwest of HUE (YD 700288) was attacked by an estimated VC company. The PF returned fire and called in artillery.

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Before a reaction force could arrive, the VC had withdrawn. Casualties were light. On 29 December, light mortar attacks were directed against the LUONG MAI (YD 544434) and BA LONG (YD 899234) outposts and a PF bridge security element (YD 668320) two kilometers southwest of QUANG DIEM. Casualties were minor. No ground action was involved. Two incidents of sabotage were reported. On 26 December, an unknown number of VC placed demolition charges in the company of the 111th ARVN Trans Co at (YD 781209) in the outskirts of HUE City. There was minor damage to equipment and casualties were light. The second incident of sabotage involved the destruction of 20 meters of the Natl RR. track at (YD 919111). Two separate acts of terrorism on 24 and 26 December resulted in a Vietnamese woman and one PF soldier being shot by VC snipers. A captured VC, purportedly from the 802nd VC Bn, stated that the 804th Bn was now a part of the 6th NVA Regt and, further, that the bulk of the regiment was located in the general area (YD 5519) as of 18 December. Enemy activity within the PHU BAI TAOR increased slightly over the period. All of the incidents were centered along Highway 1. Nothing of significance was reported between PHU BAI and DANANG.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Reconnaissance teams deployed to the southwest of the DANANG TAOR reported fairly substantial enemy movement. A total of approximately 100 VC were observed over 29 and 30 December. This activity, when considered with other available intelligence covering the same local, indicates a continued emphasis by the enemy toward the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR and in areas directly south of it. Eastern QUANG NAM (P) outside the TAOR was comparatively quiet and enemy action in the southeastern portion of the province was limited to isolated and small scale harassing actions. This week saw a distinct drop in the number of VC initiated incidents within the TAOR. The pattern of the enemy effort was diffused with no particular concentration noted, although there was a rise in VC activity in the eastern coastal sector. This area has been virtually devoid of enemy activity for the last three weeks. Three incidents involving VC platoon sized units or larger were reported. The dropping off of VC action is probably attributable to the recent heavy rain and stand down and also to the enemy's incapacity to maintain a continuous and intense effort for a protracted period of time. Local force units were reported in normally accepted operating areas and low level agent reports produced little of significant intelligence interest.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. VC activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P) decreased again this week. One major incident was reported on 29 December from (BT 2518), approximately six kilometers southwest of TAM KY City, where road clearing teams from the 4th Bn, 5th ARVN Regt were ambushed by an estimated VC squad. Casualties were minor. Several low level agent reports, though unconfirmed, placed the 3rd Regt within the area (AT 9250) and the 21st Regt in the general location (BT 1229). These basically are the currently accepted areas of operation for both units, although it is felt that the 3rd Regt is possibly further north with elements in QUANG NAM (P) to the south of the DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported sightings of over 90 VC concentrated within the area (BT 3110). This location south of TAM KY City and in the northern portion of the CHU LAI TAOR has continued to represent an area of VC activity. This has been the case for the past month. Contacts within the CHU LAI TAOR increased slightly this week with a greater intensity of activity occurring within the southern portion of the TAOR and in the Korean Marine area of responsibility. The remainder of the province was quiet.

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e. QUANG NGAI (P). A substantial number of low level agent reports continued to locate subordinate elements of the 1st VC Regt in the general area (BS 4580). Aerial photography flown over the region southwest of the TAOR and east of the HA THANH CIDG Camp on 25 December, gave indication of a slight increase in enemy ground activity, when compared to photography of late November. Enemy activity in eastern coastal QUANG NGAI (P) and along Highway 1 continued at essentially the same level as that reported last week. Two incidents were reported in proximity to Highway 1 and in northern MO DUC (D). One concerned the ambush of a sub-section Political Action Team by an estimated VC platoon, and the other, a serious mining of an ARVN truck carrying troops from the 37th Ranger Bn. The latter incident resulted in 16 ARVN KIA, while the former saw only minor casualties. Reconnaissance teams deployed in eastern QUANG NGAI (P) reported fairly substantial enemy movement. Although no precise pattern was established, it appeared that much of the VC activity had been generated by Operation SIERRA currently in progress in the central portion of coastal QUANG NGAI (P). The 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div was reported at two separate locations north and east of the BA TO CIDG Camp. This specific information as well as reports of enemy activity in the southern part of the province and just north of the BINH DINH border, remains entirely unconfirmed. On 28 December, CIDG elements made contact on two separate occasions with an estimated VC company five kilometers west of the HA THANH CIDG Camp (BS 335705). Immediate air strikes were called in and the VC broke contact. One incident of .50 caliber AA fire was reported from the vicinity of (BS 7639). Local force units continue to be reported as being in normally accepted operating areas. Western and southwestern QUANG NGAI (P) remained quiet.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents dropped slightly when compared to last week. Incidents consisted of one assault by fire, 91 small unit engagements, three harassments, and 147 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. On 26 December, the 2nd Bn, 26th Marines found a haystack in a deserted stone building (YD 512341). Buried within the haystack were several burlap sacks containing four bags (450 lbs) of rice and one bag with two parts of batteries. One battery part (3" X 3" X 10") looked like 1/3 of a PRC-10 battery with two wire leads. The other (3" X 3" X 6") had one wire going into the larger battery. The batteries had no markings. Also found was a wooden coffin with a few grains of rice possibly indicating rice being transported, concealed in the coffin.

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(G-2 Comment: Possible the VC are using haystacks as concealment for the storing of rice and equipment. First report of coffins being used as possible rice transportation vehicles).

(2) 21 December. An official of the RVN intelligence community reported, through an informant, that the VC THUA THIEN (P) Chief Commissioner made the recommendation to his superiors in NVN that the VC in THUA THIEN (P) should revert to guerrilla tactics, and avoid engaging in any battles involving large numbers of troops. The recommendation was reportedly disapproved. The tactic to be employed in military engagements is to utilize human wave tactics when fighting Vietnamese troops, and limit attacks on US troops to mortar attacks.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
1 Dec	(AT 958398) (AT 960400) (AT 961401) (AT 958404)	Rice Warehouses	ARVN Report III MAF G-2: F/2
12 Dec	(BS 615581)	Rice Storage Site	Captive Interrogation III MAF G-2: F/3
19 Dec	(BT 2802) (along river bank)	Hospital	Captive Interrogation III MAF G-2: F/3
20 Dec	(BS 390450)	Explosive Manufacturing Factory	149th MI GP III MAF G-2: F/6
21 Dec	(YD 251360)	Ammo Storage Area	Captive Interrogation III MAF G-2: F/3
26 Dec	(AT 825530)	Supply Area	Captive Interrogation III MAF G-2: F/3
26 Dec	(AT 842527)	Hospital	Captive Interrogation III MAF G-2: F/3
26 Dec	(BT 025410)	Supply Depot	Captive Interrogation III MAF G-2: F/2

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period reflected a slight increase and totaled 147. 22 aircraft sustained 44 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (ZC 1845), (AT 9134), (AT 9853) and (BS 8339). Although no cases of 12.7mm AA fire were reported, nine cases of unknown higher caliber was reported for the period.

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1 - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Inclement weather was a significant factor restricting ground reconnaissance over the period. It had an effect both on visibility and on the ease of making helicopter insertions. Some 40 NVA troops were observed in three sightings in the area northwest of THON SON LAM.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). The CHINOOK area of operations to the west of HUE City produced major sightings throughout the period. In addition to the 31 December sighting of 1000 VC most of the other VC sighted were moving in groups of 10 or more which is somewhat larger than normal for this area. Sightings south of HUE fell off when compared to prior periods. The situation likewise held true for the area south of the PHU BAI TAOR. Visibility was again a problem in this area.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). The area to the south and west of AN HOA continued to provide sightings of groups of VC ranging from six to 30.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). The area to the northwest of the CHU LAI TAOR and south of TAM KY City produced several sightings of small (two to six) groups of VC. Patrols operating to the west of Operation SIERRA made sightings of 100 VC and 22 VC over 26 and 27 December respectively. There was one emergency extraction in this area during the period.

s. Recon Training.

(1) A 23 December RVN MI unit report states that the 74th VC Recon Bn now located at HA DONG (coord unk), HANOI (P), NVN, is training their recon cadre by the following methods:

**Observers:** Each group consists of three members, is equipped with one pair of binoculars, one notebook, one pencil, and one wristwatch. The observers much take positions on top of hills, in high trees, or on the roof of a house, church or pagoda, not too far from military bases or activities they wish to observe. The observation position must be changed every three days. When they carry out an observer mission, one man will use the binoculars to observe, and will draw plans or sketches of the military activity. The other two men will provide security for the observer.

**Infiltrators:** Each group consists of three men whose mission is to infiltrate into military installations at night, to make certain the plans drawn by the observer teams are correct. They will be equipped with one submachine gun with 30-rounds, six bamboo sticks (tied together in pairs) to be used for lifting barbed wire, one set of wire cutters, one sharp steel rod (to be used as a mine prober), one bayonet, and several small pins to be used to fasten mine fuses to render them safe. They will wear only shorts or loincloths, and camouflage these and their bodies.

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They will operate as follows: First, one man will crawl up to the barbed wire fence, use the bamboo sticks to hold the wire up, then go under the fence and begin probing for mines. The second man will follow the first through the fence, and the third man will provide security at the entrance. When the first two men enter close enough into the installation, they will observe the defense positions very closely, then withdraw back the way they came, being careful to remove all traces of their entry.

(G-2 Comment: F/6 as to 74th Recon Bn; this unit is not held in III MAF OOB or NVA OOB. F/3 as to training).

### 3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period were 137 KIA, 290 KIA (Prob) and 17 VCC. Weapons losses consisted of 24 individual weapons captured.
- f. Morale. No change.
- g - h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No change.
- j. Weather. A surge in the northeasterly monsoonal flow, preceding the passage of a cold front through northern Vietnam, brought typical "Crashin" weather, low stratus clouds, rain and fog to I Corps for the reporting period. Conditions unfavorable for air operations persisted throughout the period with the only breaks occurring on the 25th and the 29th. In spite of the low ceilings and visibilities on the 26th, all-weather aircraft completed a large percentage of their missions. On the afternoon of the 29th, the flow aloft gradually weakened and weather conditions were favorable for low level fixed wing operations over I Corps. As tropical storm "PAMELA" approached the central Vietnamese coast at the end of the period, low cloudiness and precipitation prevailed once again throughout I Corps. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

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	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	77	77	78	79
Low	65	69	73	72
Rainfall (total)	6.60	10.09	9.08	3.85
Visibility (miles)	5	4	6	7
Winds (knots)	10	9	8	8

- k. Significant Agent, Captive/Returnee and Document Report. Annex E.
- l. Negative.
4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.
5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.
- a. Enemy Capabilities. VC/NVA forces can:
- (1) Attack the KHE SANH - THON SON LAM - D5 - DONG HA area with up to two divisions (324B NVA and 341st NVA Divs).
  - (2) Attack the HUE - PHU BAI area with up to one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and two separate battalions (804th and 810th).
  - (3) Attack the DANANG combat base with up to two regiments (3d and 21st NVA Regts) and five separate battalions (R.20, V.25, 70th, 804th Infantry Bns and 402nd Sapper Bn).
  - (4) Attack the CHU LAI combat base with one regiment (1st VC Regt) and five separate battalions (20th, 38th, 48th, and 72nd Infantry Bns and 409th Sapper Bn).
  - (5) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one regiment (reinforced).
  - (6) Defend in present positions in and just north of the DMZ with two divisions (324B and 341st Divs).
  - (7) Defend elsewhere in I CTZ, including VC/NVA base areas, with forces locally available.
  - (8) Reinforce the forces presently in I CTZ within three to five days with up to two divisions from NVN or from those forces transiting LAOS, and one division from II Corps (3rd NVA Div).
  - (9) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorist, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****CONFIDENTIAL****b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.**

(1) Capability (1). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The probable mission of the 324B NVA Div during operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE (early stages) was to attack the CUA-CAM LO-DONG HA-QUANG TRI area; sanctity of the DMZ from ground attack facilities, massing of personnel, equipment, and supplies close to possible objectives; the location of possible objectives VIS-A-VIS the DMZ permits rapid re-inforcement by forces in NVN; enemy knowledge of our situation, based on extensive reconnaissance activities; and successful attack and temporary control of northern I CTZ would greatly enhance enemy political ambitions and truce negotiation positions. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The heavy personnel and materiel losses suffered by the 324B NVA Div in past operations; the enemy's predisposition not to mass his forces; the existence of extensive fortifications in and north of the DMZ; and decisive defeat of the attacking forces would lay the DMZ and the NVN homeland open to invasion.

(2) Capabilities (2), (3) and (4): Factors which favor the adoption of these capabilities are: The present disposition of enemy units contiguous to likely areas of attack; the probability that enemy logistic support has been stockpiled in his operating areas; the enemy's knowledge of our situation, based on extensive reconnaissance activities, and successful attack and temporary control of any part of these areas would greatly enhance the enemy's truce table bargaining positions. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: The heavy losses in personnel and materiel sustained by the enemy in past operations; the enemy predisposition not to mass his forces; and our operations which have forced the enemy to displace against his will at times of our choosing.

(3) Capability (5): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: The present dispositions of enemy units; isolated units and outposts offer the best targets for the least risk, compared to the other attack capabilities, particularly if executed in inclement weather; and the enemy's past success against isolated ARVN/CIDG outposts in I CTZ. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The heavy losses sustained by the enemy in past operations; the demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy buildups and to react rapidly to destroy them by supporting arms or by ground spoiling attacks; and such attacks, when conducted against CIDG Camps, might reasonably be considered by the enemy to invite too much friendly attention to areas surrounding isolated outposts and district headquarters; lead to a rapid build-up of friendly forces in areas controlled or contested by VC/NVA forces, and result in effectively causing the dislocation of VC/NVA forces from the piedmont into the highlands.

(4) Capabilities (6) and (7): Factors which favor adoption of these capabilities are: Our build-up in the area south of the DMZ and use of NGF off the coast of NVN (Capability (6) only); heavy losses in personnel and materiel sustained by the enemy in past operations may dictate the adoption of an essentially defensive posture, at least temporarily throughout I CTZ; terrain generally favors the enemy;

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continuing enemy efforts to improve and expand defensive positions and supply caches; and the continuing willingness of enemy forces, particularly NVA, to attempt to hold their positions and to counterattack when conditions are favorable. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: Enemy reluctance to stand and fight against US/FWMAF except under favorable conditions and at a time and place of his choosing; the paucity of enemy supporting arms to support adequately a determined defense; enemy knowledge of friendly offensive capabilities against static positions; and achievement by the enemy of a much needed victory is unlikely by defensive actions.

(5) Capability (8): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's desire to achieve a major victory against friendly forces; the relative freedom of movement through enemy controlled territory and the DMZ; and the enemy's capability to move units within the locale with minimum risk of detection. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge that the introduction of additional enemy forces into SVN would probably be matched by additional FWMAF, thus making a decisive enemy military victory unlikely; the enemy's reluctance to commit most of his strategic reserve, thus stripping the homeland of defense and retraining capability; and the probability that reinforcing units would be detected and destroyed by friendly supporting arms.

(6) Capability (9): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: This capability is a basic enemy tactic which has been long practiced in SVN; it provides an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms fire; the VC knowledge of the terrain and of the local populace; and the enemy's belief that successful application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued US force participation in SVN. There are no factors which militate against the adoption of this capability.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption. The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities are as follows: (9), (6), (7), (5), (8), (1), (4), (3) and (2).

d. Vulnerabilities.

(1) Enemy forces, installations and lines of communication are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attack.

(2) Enemy forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations, enemy forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to surprise.

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(4) The probable decrease in overall combat effectiveness of enemy forces has increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations. Contributing factors include: Increased reliance on conscripted, less highly motivated personnel; reduced training time; and lower morale resulting from continued pressure of friendly operations, food and medical supply shortages, general hardships, and our psychological warfare operations.

(5) Enemy forces are becoming more dependent upon local resources for support. But the necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population.



R. H. THOMPSON  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

**ANNEXES:**

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CTG 79.5	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 76.5	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	COMPIERON SEVEN	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CG 173D ABN BDE	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NR 48

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 312400H DEC 66.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL UNITS	TOTAL STRENGTH
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,440					2	1,440
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,640	1	800			7	2,440
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,580	9	3,500	6	2,300	32	14,380
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	2	700			12	3,150
Separate Companies			3	285	28	2,665	31	2,950
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		<u>14,910</u>		<u>5,285</u>		<u>4,965</u>		<u>25,160</u>
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)			1	330			1	330
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				<u>450</u>		<u>955</u>		<u>1,450</u>
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		<u>500</u>				<u>900</u>		<u>1,400</u>
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								
								<u>20,583</u>
<u>GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH</u>								
		<u>15,410</u>		<u>5,735</u>		<u>6,820</u>		<u>48,548</u>

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## 2. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 312400H DEC66

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div#1	NVA	C	8,000		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715#2	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536#3	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PO	1,500		Unknown		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

324B Div	NVA	C	8,700#4	Fair	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,230		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT</u> <u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1st Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,840	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	280		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	520		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
K.3 Co	MF	C	100		YD 0220		
Hai Lang Co	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147 AREA	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
8.10 Co	MF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	24Dec66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5221	18Dec66
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5431	22Dec66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 997532	26Aug66
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Que Son (D)	Que Son (D)	28Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	Duc Duc (D)	13Nov66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	300	Excel	AT 8364	Central Danang TAOR	30Nov66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	BT 0662	26Aug66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	6,700	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
21st Regt	NVA	C	2,000	Good	T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,450		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
TRA Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region 5	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	AS 9085	29Nov66
1st VC Regt	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	29Nov66
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Tinh (D)	BS 452798	29Nov66
60th Bn	MF	C	200		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
80th Bn	MF	C	400		W Binh Son (D)	BS 4585	29Nov66
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 4268	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 7850	BS 5577	20Nov66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 3678	31Oct66
1506th Engr Bn	MF	PR	330		BS 2870	BS 5892	8Dec66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8125	BS 7745	31Oct66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

NOTES

- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Only the 2nd Co of the 1st Bn is confirmed in this general area. Locations of the remaining companies of the battalion are unknown.
- #3. Only the 5th Co of the 2nd Bn is confirmed in this general area. It is probable that another company is in the area. Locations of the remaining companies are unknown.
- #4. Strength of the 324B Div is estimated at 90% of 9,600.

The following unit has been added to the III MAF Order of Battle as of 312400 Dec 66:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
74th Co	Quang Tin	50	Conf.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 312400H DEC 66

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)	Unk	Unk
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong	Unk	Unk	Unk
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)	Unk	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-An
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)	Unk	Unk	Unk
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)	Unk	Unk	Unk
4th Bn	Unk	31445XBL 32445	Unk	Unk
5th Bn	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
6th Bn	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
33rd Regt (Hq)	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?); 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Cong Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May	51.441 KT	Unk	CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj Song THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn			
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn			
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Most Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU
7th Bn	D-7; K.37			
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14		2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
K.3 Co Hai Lang Co	803 Co 5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; H.99		1-MG 9-AR	CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02; V-51; H-20			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Gao TUNG
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien			
Cam Lo Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA
<u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>				
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt PHUNG
800th Bn	K.1	1520		
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-1(?)			
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH CO-Ton That THIET
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)			CO-Capt Huong THI

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Phe 18		1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co		2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-Capt Hoang AN CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co Huong Tra Co C.117 Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17 D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5 Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			CO-Nguyen DAM CO-THUYET CO-Xuan SAM

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Work- site-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH CO-Capt THAO CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh	20825		
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			
R.20	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR 3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103		1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn			CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEW</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	T-89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-HOANG
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th			CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			CO-Phan Phong SAM
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54	C-70 Co est Dia Loo			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang	20,601GM- 20,925GM Tag An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
21st Regt (Hq)	BACH MA; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong- 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van
2nd Bn	135 Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)				CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; X-11; 19th Bn			XO-Tran Van QUANG PO-Nguyen Van HIEN
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	GK-32			CO-Nguyen Van HUYNH
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33			
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ2L Bn (ENGR) 72nd Bn 74th Co	GK-40  V-74; V-20; 74th Dist Force Co.		1-57mm RR (?) 2-Rifle Grenade Adapters Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SMG	CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO CO-THANH XO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUONG
706th Co A10 Co	V-14 Co; 106th Co K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Anh VU
A13 Co A16 Co	D-22 C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co A21 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co Tra Son Co Tra Ha Co				CO-MANH
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>				
Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien		CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108(Alt Cmd Elm)			CO-Col Chua Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Heang Xuan VINH
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
80th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007	5645		CO-Maj Nguyen TUYEN XO-PHAM
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20	20,135GM- 20,139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
36th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn 409th Sapper Bn	Poss 408th Bn Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20,141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Capt KY CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
104th Bn	405th Bn		1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 3-MG 18-AR	CO-Nguyen Hi CHAW; Nghia TUN
1506th Engr Bn 19th Bn	Poss 506th Bn; 571 Unit 109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn 96th Co 206th Co	Poss 315th Bn Hinh Long Co Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-La TRI CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU CO-Dien MIEU CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
614th Co C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Son Ha Co Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co Ba To Co Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				KO-MINH
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			PO-MINH
				CO-TRAN
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

## III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ  
NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ  
341ST DIV HQ  
31ST REGT  
32ND REGT  
33RD REGT  
324B DIV HQ  
803RD REGT  
90TH REGT  
812TH REGT

2ND DIV HQ  
1ST VC REGT HQ  
810TH BN  
20TH BN  
814TH BN  
3RD REGT

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report:  
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerilla; 4. Security Cadre;  
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;  
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;  
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.  
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerilla Leader. The asterisks  
 indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

<u>B. Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LOC QUANG (V)	TRAN PHUNG			3 ITT Conso-
DAI LOC (D)	LE DIEU		1	lidated Rpt
QUANG NAM (P)	VO HUAN		11	LE BA TUNG
	DIEP			LE BA HUYEN
	NGUYEN MO			NGUYEN QUAN
				TRAN SON
				22 Dec 66 F/6
LAM PHUNG (H)	NGUYEN VAN MY		1	3 ITT Conso+
LOC QUANG (V)	NGUYEN CU		7	lidated Rpt
DAI LOC (D)	VO XICH		18	LE BA TUNG
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN XANG		3	LE BA HUYEN
	BUI TU		3	NGUYEN QUAN
	NGUYEN KIEM		3	TRAN SON
				22 Dec 66 F/6
DAI THANH (H)	DINH CHAI	30	1	3 ITT NGUYEN COI
LOC QUANG (V)	NGUYEN MAI	32	4	23 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	TRAN BON	40	11	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN NAM	35	3	
	XOAI	30	3	
	NGUYEN THOC	20	3	
	DOAN NHO	42	3	
KY MINH (V)	*HO NGOC	35	1	3 ITT Captive
DIEN BAN (D)				LE PHIM
QUANG NAM (P)				20 Dec 66 F/6
GANG LA/GIANG LA	*NGUYEN HONG	50	1	3 ITT LE PHIM
KY MINH (V)	NGUYEN THI MUOI	45	6	20 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	PHAN THI SAM	70	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN DONG	50	6	
	LE SO	25	3	
	NGUYEN MOT	18	3	
LA HUAN (H)	*HO NGOC		3	3 ITT VCS NGUYEN
KY MINH (V)	PHU NHU		3	THI GIAO
DIEN BAN (D)	LE MUOI		3	22 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
NONG SON (H)	MAI DIEM		1	3 ITT THAN
KY NGOC (V)	TRAU		3	THI SAM
DIEN BAN (D)	XU		3	24 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	DAY		3	
THANH PHONG (V)	NGUYEN VAN TRUOC	30	1	3 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt ITT #8C-12-66 20 Dec 66 F/5
DIEN BAN (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				
LA THO (H)	NGUYEN VAN CUOC	35	1	3 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt
THANH PHONG (V)	NGUYEN VAN LE	20	3	ITT #8C-12-66
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN VAN KINH	20	3	20 Dec 66 F/5
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN VAN HOANG	20	3	
	NGUYEN VAN HAN	25	3	
	NGUYEN CHANH NAM	25	3	
	THAI NAM	30	3	
CHAU SON (H)	HO SON	25	1	3 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt
THANH SON (V)	VO NGOC TRINH	25	4	HO GIOI 40
DIEN BAN (D)	TONG BON	20	18	HO CUONG 32
QUANG NAM (P)	LE TRUNG	22	3	NGUYEN XANG 38
	DOAN VAN	28	3	20 Dec 66
	LE VANG	18	3	
TIEN DAO # 1 (H)	TRINH THONG	35	1	9 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt
BINH THANH (V)	PHAM TRIEN	36	7	NGUYEN THI LOAN
BINH SON (D)	DOEN MINH	40	4	MAI THI BINH
QUANG NGAI (P)	LUNG HOI	36	6	TRINH THI NIEN NGUYEN THI HUE 9 Dec 66 F/6
BAN TUONG (H)	NGUYEN LINH	35	1	9 ITT Captive
BINH THIEN (V)	NGUYEN TUONG	27	9	BUI BO
BINH SON (D)	LE THIEP	27	12	19 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN LANG	25	6	
THAN THUY (H)	HUYNH TONG	30	1/5	9 ITT Captive
BINH THIEN (V)	NGUYEN TRI	45	4	NGUYEN KY
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN LOI	27	10	19 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH BA	50	9	
	VO THI HOA	45	6	
	PHAN TUAT	40	6	
	NGUYEN THAI	28	6	
	NGUYEN CHO	35	18	
	NGUYEN BEN	27	3	
	LE TRI	30	3	
	NGUYEN CAM	28	3	
	VO KY	24	3	
	NGUYEN SUONG	35	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
THANH THUY (H) BINH THIEN (V) BINH SON (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	NGO TRIEU	28	1	9 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt NGUYEN NHUONG NGUYEN PHO 8 Dec 66 F/6
	PHAM LOI	26	4	
	LE TRI	30	3	
	NGUYEN CAM	24	3	
LE THUY #2 (H) BINH THONG (V) BINH SON (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	LE HONG	40	3	9 ITT Captive TIEU MAI, AKA MUON 6Dec66 F/6
	(FNU) KE	38	3	
TAN PHUOC #1 (H) BINH TUY (V) BINH SON (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	LE GAN	40	1	9 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt PHAM TU VO TAC VO TRIEU 8 DEC 66 F/6
	NGUYEN HANH	30	4	
	VO PHU SEN	27	10/12	
	VO CHUU	30	6	
	HUYNH MAU	27	3	
	HUYNH HOA	18	3	
	PHAM LE	18	3	
	LUONG TAO	25	3	
	NGUYEN CUU	30	3	
VO BANG	27	3		
TAN PHUOC #4 (H) BINH TUY (V) BINH SON (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	VO CUONG	50	1	9 ITT Captive CAO TY 19 Dec 66 F/6
	CHAU Y	35	4	
	(FNU) ANH	35	2	
	LE GAN	45	9	
	VO BANG	45	6	
	CU THI DAU	30	6	
	NGUYEN CUU	25	18	
PHAM DAY	25	3		
HANH THIEN (V) NGHIA HANH (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN CO	30	1	9 ITT Captive LE QUYNH 18 Dec 66 F/6
	TRUONG	34	11	
	NGUYEN TU	42	6	
	NGUYEN TAM	39	15	
	HO GIAI	23	4	
	NGUYEN THANG	30	18	
	NGUYEN CHI	28	7	
	LEN	18	3	
	DI	18	3	
	TRUYEN	20	3	
	THANH	18	3	
	THIET	20	3	
	NGA	20	3	
	MAI	22	3	
	NGUYEN VAM	19	3	
LAC	20	3		

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
ME SON (H)	TUU	40	1	9 ITT Captive
HANH THIEN (V)	HUYNH HUNG	45	6	LE QUYNH
NGHIA HANH (D)	QUE	33	4	18 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	CHUONG	40	11	
	PHAN	25	18	
VAN XUAN (H)	NGUYEN CHOT	25	1	9 ITT Captive
HANH THIEN (V)	TRAN VAN HOA	33	6	LE QUYNH
NGHIA HANH (D)	VO MUOI	33	4	18 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	VO TRUNG	38	15	
	NGUYEN TAM	38	7	
	LE HONG QUAN	40	11	
XUAN BA (AKA CHAU ME #3) (H)	CONG	40	3	9 ITT Captive
HANH THINH (V)	LE	45	4	NGUYEN THI LAN
NGHIA THANH (D)	DU	50	4	14 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
CHAU ME #2 (H)	MR. A	45	1	9 ITT Captive
HANH THINH (V)				NGUYEN KIEU
NGHIA HANH (D)				17 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
DONG DIA (H)	NGUYEN LUONG	24	3	9 ITT Captive
NGHIA PHU (V)	NGUYEN NGOC	25	3	DOAN NGOAN
NGHIA HANH (D)	NGUYEN NGONG	35	1	17 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
NON LOCH/NHCN LOCH (H)	CANH	41	1	9 ITT Captive
NGHIA PHU (V)	PHUONG	22	4	DO DIEU
NGHIA HANH (D)	BACH	19	3	17 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	LAN	40		
	BIEN	25		
	TAN	30		
	LAO	24		
	LIEN	42		
	TOAN	50		
	GICI	61		
	LAN	72		
PHU THO (H)	VO MUI	31	1	9 ITT Captive
NGHIA PHU (V)	TE	35	4	NGUYEN CHANH TRIET
NGHIA HANH (D)	VAN	25	10	
QUANG NGAI (P)	OANH	30	18	
	DANG	25	3	
	TINH	25	3	
	NHAN	30	3	
	VANG	28	3	
	MINH	27	3	
	CHAU	32	3	
	BOA	24	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
KY CHANH (V) LY TIN (D) QUANG TIN (P)	*PHAM BANG	28	1	9 ITT PHAM TRA
	HOA	21	18	8 Dec 66 F/3
	*PHAM PHI	30	3	
	NGUYEN VINH	30	3	
	PHAM THONG	20	3	
	TOAN	28	3	
	TRO	30	3	
	PHUC	20	3	
	QUI	21	3	
	KIEN	18	3	
	THUAN YEN #1 (H) KY YEN (V) TAM KY (D) QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN UU	45	1/6
NGUYEN LON		25	4	7 Dec 66 F/3
NGUYEN TAI		38	12	
NGUYEN DOI		40	9	
NGUYEN THI VIET		20	6	
DUONG NGOC TOAN		25	6	
PHAM SINH		70	6	
NGUYEN LAN		28	3	
NGUYEN DINH		20	3	
LE TAM		25	3	
THON BA (H) PHUOC TAN (V) TIEN PHUOC (D) QUANG TIN (P)	VO THI NHI	40	6	9 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt NGUYEN THI KIEN TRUONG CHINH 7 Dec 66 F/6
	*VO CAO	45	1	9 ITT Conso- lidated Rpt
	DUNG EM	40	9	VO SAU NGUYEN XUAN
DICH AN#2 DICH YEN (H) PHUOC TAN (V) TIEN PHUOC (D) QUANG TIN (P)	DUNG TRUONG	45	4	
	TRUONG HUONG	40	5	
	*BUI HUU NGHIA	30	12	
	DUNG DONG	70	6	
	DUONG MINH LUU	25	6	
	DUNG THI PHUNG	35	3	
	*DUNG THI EM	30	3	
	TRUONG RONG	25	3	
	TRUONG HOI	35	3	
	*NGUYEN THI NHUNG	25	3	
	*VO VAN DIEU	30	3	
	*BUI HOI	20	3	
	VO HUNG	16	3	
	BAT NHI (H) VINH XUAN (V) DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P)	LE CAO QUANG		1

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO  
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 48

1. V-14 Co, Mobile Force Co. BUI NHU AN, V-14 Co, Mobile Force, was captured at (BT 458088) by the National Police on 19 December 1966 and stated the following during interrogation:

a. He joined V-14 Co in THUAN YEN (H) (BT 280080), KY YEN (V) one month ago. He received 10 days training in military tactics and hand to hand combat prior to joining. There were 50 ex-guerrillas and district force members from TAM KY that also took this training. During training he was armed with a 30 cal. English rifle, which was returned to the KY SANH guerrillas when his training was completed. The training he received was set up for attacking the American outpost at KY KHUONG. An NVN by the name of THANH was in charge of the training. Communism, the proper staff of morale for a VC soldier and the deteriorating position of the ARVN and Allied forces was also taught.

b. After his training, he and the 50 men were issued K-44 rifles and 50 rounds of ammunition each. Although the V-14 Co was in the same area, the recruits trained separately and not with this unit. The recruits lived in houses (permanent) in the mountains 2000 meters west of THUAN YEN (H). These houses were for military use only. They were five meters wide by 15 meters long and well camouflaged.

c. When he first joined the company there were 50 persons in it, the morale appeared low, six to 10 men had malaria and many had mange. He stayed 10 days in THUAN YEN (H) with V-14 in a permanent housing area 100 meters northwest of the hamlet. These 10 days were used as a relaxing period and a period for the new men to become acquainted with the veterans.

d. After this period they walked for two days, during daylight hours, to an assembly area from which they were to attack KY KHUONG. From this area they moved very swiftly, passing a Marine unit in KY TRA (H). They moved for two hours to reach their assault point at KY KHUONG. During the early phases of the attack the captive was wounded. The troops were instructed that if wounded, they would be carried back to V-14 base camp where there was a central Vietnamese medic. He saw no heavy weapons during the attack. His squad had the mission of attacking three bunkers north of the Marine outpost.

e. AN said there are 20 village guerrillas in KY SANH (V) armed with MAS-36's, K-44's and one submachine gun. Each man carries two grenades. These guerrillas normally operate out of THON BAY (H) (BT 445020). They flee to the mountains west of the hamlet if the Americans approach. They eat in the homes of the villagers.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. Although the V-14 Co has been previously reported (LE DCAN; DINH CAO SANG), no information in III MAF COB other than that related in this interrogation report).

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2. AN BA (H) Guerrillas. CAO TU and NGUYEN TAN TAN; AN BA (H), both hamlet guerrillas, were captured at (BS 679569) by F Co, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines on 20 December 1966 and stated the following during interrogation:

a. There were 10 guerrillas in AN BA (H) and there are insufficient weapons (TU stated they were armed with four MAS-36's, one M-1 and two shot guns; TAN stated they only had three MAS-36's). During the daylight hours the guerrillas work in the fields and at night the hamlet squad goes on patrol around AN BA (H).

b. Upon warning of approach of American/ARVN units (three shots) the hamlet cadre, autonomous committee and guerrillas flee to the southwest.

c. NGHIA THANH (V) has a 30 man village guerrilla platoon.

3. 2d Co, Q-14 Unit, DAI LOC District Force. VO TAM, (alias VO THANH TRUNG) an infantry cell cadre, 3d Cell, 1st Sqd, 1st Plt, 2d Co, Q-14 Unit, DAI LOC District Force captured at (AT 842544) by I/3/7 on 22 December 1966 and stated the following upon interrogation:

a. The strength of Q-14 was 270 men and was organized as follows: three platoons per company, three squads per platoon and each squad has 12 men (three cells).

b. The three companies of the Q-14 unit normally operate separately with individual command posts. The Q-14 unit command post under normal conditions is located at MY HOA (AT 850550). The unit is mobile and capable of constant movement throughout the units' operating area. The commanding officer lives in LOC VINH (V). The company CP's are located as follows: NGOC KINH (H) (ZC 195545), THANH DAI (H) #1 (ZC 105565) and LAM PHUNG (H) (AT 805555).

c. The Q-14's mission is to defend against operations conducted by ARVN and U.S. forces in their area of operation. There are 30 village guerrillas from LOC QUANG (V) that sometimes work for and with Q-14.

d. The Q-14 unit has suffered heavy losses during the month of December, 10 KIA by artillery, 20 WIA by artillery, 15 KIA and seven WIA during fire fights with US/ARVN forces on 8-9 December. All replacements are recruited from guerrilla rank of LOC VINH, LOC BINH, LOC QUANG and LOC QUI Villages. The morale is very low and the men constantly fear artillery and air bombardments.

e. There were 20 NVA soldiers in the Q-14. Seven were killed by artillery at MY HOA Hamlet in October. The remaining 13 are still operating with the unit. These men are not advisors but are trained soldiers operating with the unit. The NVA troops carry AK-47's which they brought with them when they infiltrated. There has been no NVA replacements since he's been with the Q-14.

f. The 3d Co of Q-14 has a 15 man sapper squad composed of 13-15 year olds. This squad is highly dedicated, well motivated and composed of volunteers.

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All sappers are armed with SMGs, TNT charges and a number of grenades. The squad wears dark blue uniforms for camouflage during night attacks. This squad was used on an attack of LOC CHANH (V), near DAI LOC (D) headquarters, two months ago.

g. The food resupply for the Q-14 comes from LAC THANH mountains (AT 825530). There is not enough food and that which is on hand is of poor quality.

h. Ammunition is sufficient but resupply is difficult. Normal resupply is every three or four months. The source of supply is unknown. Medical supplies are insufficient and of poor quality. There is very little medicine. There is a hospital located at LOC THANH mountain near TAN MY (H) #2 (AT 842527). He has never been to the hospital but has seen VC wounded being evacuated there.

i. The Q-14 unit uses boats from BAN TAN (H) (AT 825552) to cross the river from MY HOA (H) (AT 850550) to (AT 848552). Another boat crossing is located at HA VI (ZC 198557) to (ZC 197556). When crossing the river at MY HOA the unit marches from (AT 848552) to Route 1 at (AT 840561); from this point they march west to BAN TAN (AT 823555); they leave the road here and proceed northwesterly to LAM PHUNG (H) (AT 803555); from here they move to HA VI (ZC 198557) where there's another river crossing.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. First report of Q-14 unit being this large. Previous rallier, DO MJU, stated its strength was 80 and that it consisted of two companies of two platoons each. Weapons and general locations agree with current OOB. First report of all personalities except ANH. He has been previously reported as PO of this unit.)

4. The following, received by this headquarters 28 December 1966, was obtained by an agent and is a VC directive for combining and directing the self-administration and front committee of villages.

"VC Policy - QUANG NAM Area"

a. MILITARY: Appealing the male and female youths from 15 to 35 years old to enlist and save the nation.

Campaign the people to participate in the labor phase of activity.

Organize "THAY MANG" for reserving a number of good youths for reinforcement.

Increase the local forces for replacing troops to the provincial and district main-force units which suffer casualties.

Push overall battlefield, aiming to attack essential locations, scattered camps and posts.

Organize plans in every locality for destroying and cutting essential communications. Isolate the enemy in every domain.

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**b. POLITICS:**

Push the movement studying cadres, and people for developing anti-American spirit. Perfect the political operation.

Oblige the people to study document "security maintenance". Discover the enemy organization in the rear areas, keep pressure on security and take precautions against reaction men and the enemy relatives.

Campaign the people, at the local level to raise youth spirit to destroy the enemy.

**c. ECONOMY:**

Cadres must follow the masses for increasing the production, for future reasons.

Organize training courses for explaining to the people the tax policy of merchandise and articles from 50% to 100%.

Oblige the merchant to gather agricultural taxes for supporting the resistance.

Settle agricultural taxes at the end of December 1966.

Increase taxes; openly campaign the people in the area under mixed control, that area that is contested.

**COMMENTS:**

The VC above mentioned policy was branch escalated with the wide plan in the DONG XUAN battlefield at the present time. VC sent many cadres to localities for realizing this plan.

5. The following are the names of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNEE (R)</u>	<u>DATE/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
BUI NHU AN (C)	19DEC66	Nat. Police	BT 458088/Unknown
BUI BO (C)	18DEC66	B-1-7	BS 714957/BINH SON (D) HQ
HUYNH CANH (R)	26DEC66		CHIEU HOI CTR DANANG
NGUYEN COI (C)	21DEC66	M/3/7	ZC 213555/Further Interr
PHAN CUI (C)	14DEC66	L/3/1	Unk/HOA VANG (D) HQ
HO CUONG (C)	15DEC66	1/26	AT 970645/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
VO VAN DANG (C)	21DEC66	C/1/5	BT 431168/Civ to G-5
TRAN THANH DI (C)	21DEC66	Unk	AT 809545/DAI LOC (D) HQ
XUAN DIEM (C)	17DEC66	A/1/26	AT 9663/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
DANG VAN DONG (C)	21DEC66	I/3/26	YD 544313/Further Interr

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<u>CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNEE (R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>LOG/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN THI GIAO (C)	21DEC66	1/26	Unk/USOM Hosp.
HO GIOI (C)	15DEC66	1/26	AT 970645/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
VO GOC (C)	21DEC66	A/1/7	BT 654043/BINH SON (D) HQ
DUONG HOA (R)	23DEC66	-----	DIEN BAN (D) HQ
LE BA HUYEN (C)	18DEC66	Unk	AT 797556/DAI LOC (D) HQ
NGUYEN KY (C)	18DEC66	B/1/7	BS 713943/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRAN YUAN LAI (C)	22DEC66	I/3/26	YD 544515/Further Interr
NGUYEN DUC LANG (C)	14DEC66	H/2/1	AT 962678/HOA VANG (D)
HA LONG (C)	27DEC66	ARVN	BT 053592/Unknown
CAO LUONG (C)	20DEC66	F/2/7	BS 679569/2d ARVN Div
NGUYEN THI LUY (C)	18DEC66	A/1/7	BT 657034/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN MEO (C)	21DEC66	ARVN	BS 712548/2d ARVN Div
NGUYEN TAN NHAN (C)	20DEC66	F/2/7	BS 679569/2d ARVN Div
NGUYEN NHIEU (C)	23DEC66	H/2/5	AT 965935/DUY XUYEN (D) HQ
NGUYEN NINH (R)	3DEC66	-----	LOC BINH (H)
CAO PHE (C)	20DEC66	2/7	BS 677565/2d ARVN Div
LE PHIM (C)	18DEC66	D/1/26	AT 9759/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
NGUYEN QUAN (C)	18DEC66	Unk	AT 797556/DAI LOC (D) HQ
PHAM SAU (C)	20DEC66	E/2/7	BS 565939/BINH SON (D) HQ
THAN THI SAM (C)	19DEC66	1/1	BT 005574/Unknown
DUONG SAU (C)	21DEC66	A/1/7	BT 654043/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRAN SON (C)	18DEC66	Unk	AT 797556/DAI LOC (D) HQ
LE KHAC TAP (C)	21DEC66	M/3/7	AT 808545/CHIEU HOI CTR DANANG
NGUYEN TAM (R)	23DEC66	-----	CAM HA (V)
NGUYEN TAN TAN (C)	20DEC66	F/2/7	BS 679569/CHU LAI Col Pt.
PHAM TAN TAI (C)	18DEC66	A/1/7	BT 614016/Civ to G-5
VO TAM (R)	Unknown	I/3/7	Unk/Further Interr
NGUYEN MINH THAT (C)	21DEC66	3/26	YD 544313/HUE Hosp.
PHAM THOANG (C)	22DEC66	M/4/11	Unk/BINH SON (D) HQ
DONG TIA (C)	21DEC66	A/1/7	BT 645054/Civ to G-5
TRAN THUAN (C)	21DEC66	A/1/7	BT 645054/Civ to G-5
PHAM VAN TINH (C)	20DEC66	E/2/7	BS 565939/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN TRIEU (C)	20DEC66	F/2/1	BT 0562/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
DAM TRAC (C)	22DEC66	M/4/11	Unk/Civ to G-5
PHAN TRAN (C)	14DEC66	L/3/1	Unk/HOA VANG (D) HQ
CAO TU (C)	20DEC66	F/2/7	BS 679569/CHU LAI Col Pt.
LE BA TUNG (C)	18DEC66	Unk	AT 797556/DAI LOC (D) HQ
CAO TY (C)	19DEC66	E/2/7	BS 552913/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN XANG (C)	15DEC66	1/26	AT 970645/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
VINH XUAN (C)	20DEC66	1/1	VINH XUAN (V)/DIEN BAN (D) HQ

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## ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 48

1. GENERAL. VC activity during the reporting period continued at a low level. Items of interest include the discovery of a propaganda agency belonging to MR-5 and the assassination of a woman who had provided information to U.S. and ARVN forces.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. A 21 December report from an intelligence source stated that the VC cadre of HIEU NHON (D) have organized espionage training classes. During late December, an unknown number of female graduates will be sent to HOI AN with the mission of obtaining information on U.S./ARVN units during the cease-fire period and to persuade ARVN soldiers to desert to the VC.

A 26 December report from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines related that a VN female was apprehended at (AT 922791) while asking about the units' strength.

3. SABOTAGE. The following act of sabotage was reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	26Dec	Railroad track destroyed	YD 916114

4. POLITICAL

QUANG NGAI. A 23 December report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that a VC election was held in SON PHUONG (V) (Coord Unk), SON TINH (D). A list of 29 names was distributed, ballot boxes were placed in each hamlet and the people were called upon to vote. After the election the VC announced that 17 of the 29 candidates had been elected to the SON PHUONG Village People's Council.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 21 December report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that a group of 10 VC entered PHUOC MY (H) (YD 284575) with the mission of collecting rice and holding a propaganda meeting.

QUANG NAM. A 26 December report from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines stated that a VC flag and anti-American propaganda leaflets were found on a gate in the vicinity of (BT 116590). The theme of the propaganda leaflets is unknown.

QUANG NGAI. A 29 December report from an intelligence source stated that the VC have established a propaganda sub-branch information agency

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with approximately 50 workers at LUOI CAY (BS 400800) belonging to MB-5. The agency consists of two houses which contain two printing machines and five pulping machines, used to manufacture paper. In addition to documents, magazines and assorted paper work, this agency publishes 500 papers per month under the name of "CO GIAI PHONG" (Liberation Flag) which are distributed to all provinces in MB-5.

#### 6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 21 December report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team stated that the VC of TRIEU AI (V) (Coord Unk) have the mission of indoctrinating the local populace, collecting taxes, recruiting new followers, and to snipe and lay mines along Highway 1 from DONG HA (YD 243609) to QUANG TRI City (YD 329520). These VC will be supported by a VC Sapper Cell consisting of five men who will also have the mission of placing mines in the sand dune area from (YD 300564) to (YD 399541), which are locations for U.S. Army and USMC vehicles to load sand.

THUA THIEN. A 24 December report from a usually reliable source stated that an unknown number of VC assassinated one FF, two civilians and wounded three civilians at (YD 966064).

A 26 December report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that VC military personnel are evading Allied military sweeps by taking up residence in the rural homes of families of ARVN personnel. The VC threaten that should they be discovered during sweep operations the entire family of the ARVN soldier will be kidnapped or assassinated. The same report also stated that in order to escape capture the VC have constructed hollow spaces between the walls of huts with mud and bamboo. The wall material is then "boxed together" to give the appearance of being from five to seven inches thick which can conceal as many as four or five VC.

A 28 December report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that three VC assassinated a 24 year old woman, LE THI SAO, DONG TAM (H), THUY PHUONG (V), HUONG THUY (D) (YD 830170), because she had provided information to U.S. and ARVN forces in the area. Found on her body was a letter signed by the THUA THIEN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT which stated that SAO had provided information to the enemy and even though she had been indoctrinated and warned of her activities, she continued to work for the enemy. See Appendix I (Charge Sheet).

QUANG NAM. A 26 December report stated that two civilians were wounded by VC sniper fire in the vicinity of (BT 033345).

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APPENDIX I (CHARGE PAPERS) TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III  
MAF PERINTREP NO. 48

CHARGE PAPERS

NAME: LE THI SAO

AGE: 24

PLACE OF BIRTH: Thanh Lam Hamlet, My Thuy Village, Huong Thuy District

PRESENT ADDRESS: Same

POSITION: Spy in Huong Thuy District

## HER WICKED CRIMES

I Many times she let the enemy know about Liberation Force information. The result of her information was many people were captured and beaten up by the enemy.

II She followed the Liberation Force situation and furnished supporting information to the enemy.

With her guilt (LE THI SAO), many times the people in the National Liberation Front gave her indoctrination lessons but she still kept working for the enemy, Anti-Liberation Front.

Following the people's opinion, the Thua Thien Liberation Front decided to sentence to death LE THI SAO. Thus stopping the people who want to work with the enemy.

The Local Force and the National Liberation Front carry out this order.

DATE: 24 Dec 1966

Thua Thien National Liberation Front

NOTE: This appeared to be a "Form Letter" with the name and pertinent information filled in as needed.

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