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2 FEB 1967

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF ltr 3/JEF/eew
over 3480 Ser: 0019267 of 22Jan67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

1. Forwarded.

W. E. Barrineau
W. E. BARRINEAU
By direction

304189

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Fm 67 0951

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/JEF/ew

3480

0019267

22 JAN 1967

670114Z JAN 67

~~_____~~ - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251942Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology
for November 1966

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure is
submitted herewith.

R. B. Neville

R. B. NEVILLE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATION DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDING

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR PERIOD 1-30 NOVEMBER 1966

CHIEF OF STAFF	BGEN JONAS M. PLATT, USMC
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	COL ROBERT B. NEVILLE, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1	COL JOHN L. MAHON, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2	COL ROY H. THOMPSON, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3	COL JOHN R. CHAISSON, USMC(1-8Nov) COL DREW J. BARRETT, JR, USMC(9-30Nov)
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4	COL JOSEPH F. QUILTY JR, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5	COL ERIC S. HOLMGRAIN, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6	LTCOL MARVIN D. VOLKERT, USMC
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OFFICER	COL ROBERT R. READ, USMC
SUPPLY OFFICER	COL ARTHUR T. HILL, USMC
FORCE ENGINEER OFFICER	COL CHARLES H. HORN, USMC
ADJUTANT	MAJOR JOHN T. REVILLE, USMC
COMPTROLLER	LTCOL MELVIN W. SNOW, USMC
CHAPLAIN	CAPT EARL V. LYONS, USN
COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU	COL THOMAS M. FIELDS, USMC
OIC COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER	LTCOL ALEXANDER S. RUGGIERO, USMC
FOOD SERVICES OFFICER	MAJOR WILLIS P. HALL JR, USMC

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LEGAL OFFICER

CHIEF SURGEON

FORCE DENTAL OFFICER

MOTOR TRANSPORTATION OFFICER

ORDNANCE OFFICER

PROTOCOL OFFICER

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

TRANSPORTATION/EMBARKATION
OFFICER

FORCE INSPECTOR

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1ST MARINE DIVISION

3RD MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND

7TH ENGINEER BATTALION

9TH ENGINEER BATTALION

11TH ENGINEER BATTALION
(ARR IN COUNTRY 30NOV66)

SUB UNIT #1, FIRST RADIO
BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE
COMPANY, III MAF

COL ROBERT B. NEVILLE, USMC

CAPT HOWARD A. BAKER, USN

CAPT KENNETH L. MORGAN, USN

LTCOL CHARLES A. TONNAKLIFF, USMC

LTCOL JOHN C. THOMAS, USMC

MAJCR JOHN A. LIVINGSTONE, USMC

COL CARL A. SACHS, USMC

MAJOR EUGENE A. SILVERTHORN, USMC

COL CLAY A. BOYD, USMC

COMMANDERS

MGEN HERMAN NICKERSON, JR, USMC

MGEN WOOD B. KYLE, USMC

MGEN LOUIS B. ROBERTSHAW, USMC

BGEN JAMES E. HERBOLD, USMC

LTCOL FRANK W. HARRIS, III, USMC

LTCOL RICHARD W. CRISPEN, USMC

LTCOL ROSS L. MULFORD, USMC

CAPT RUSSELL W. RADER, USMC

MAJOR VERNON L. SYLVESTER, USMC

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PART TWO
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. INTRODUCTION.

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A. GENERAL. During November III MAF Headquarters was located at (BT 041784) in East Danang, Republic of Vietnam. The average personnel strength for November was 63,661 an increase of 2,562 over the previous month.

B. ACTIVITIES. III MAF continued to be guided by COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966 in the pursuit of III MAF objectives for November.


II. OVERALL EVALUATION.

A. During November the number of small unit operations increased by 1,000 over the average number of such operations conducted in the previous three months. This marked increase of small unit patrols and ambushes resulted in a larger number of enemy KIA (Confirmed) than did the major unit operations for the same period.

November also presented a high increase in the number of VC/NVA captured. The 88 VC/NVA captured during the month represented the highest number for a single month in the last six month period. This increase was compatible with the 162 returnees which represent the third highest month in the history of the defector inducement program.

B. Heavy seasonal monsoon rains continued to plague III MAF forces during November. Extensive flooding of the littoral plain rivers and streams created conditions tending to hinder movement and therein presented obstacles to all types of operations.

C. The 1st Battalion (-) (Rein) ADA AW(s) 44th Artillery (USA) arrived and was assigned under the operational control of the CG, III MAF during November. This air defense unit will be used in a ground support role and will provide additional strength to the air defense organization in I Corps. The establishment of an FSCC, for coordination of all fire support for the Chu Lai TAOR, was made possible on 30 November with the arrival of the Headquarters, 1st Field Artillery Group, USMC. The 11th Engineer Battalion arrived on 30 November and was placed under the operational control of the CG, III MAF.

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A. DISCUSSION. During November III MAF continued to pursue three major objectives: 1. Destruction of Enemy Forces; 2. Revolutionary Development; 3. Base Defense.

(1) Destruction of Enemy Forces:

(a) Throughout November, III MAF conducted 6 major unit operations. Two of these, Prairie and Pawnee III, were continued from October. III MAF conducted 11,605 small unit operations resulting in 919 small unit contacts. III MAF forces, in all operations inflicted 443 enemy KIA confirmed and 1077 KIA probables. Of the total enemy confirmed KIA, 266 were inflicted during small unit operations.

(b) There were 305 infantry battalion days recorded by III MAF forces in November as compared to 306 in October and 204 in September.

(2) Revolutionary Development: The 11,605 small unit operations (patrols, ambushes, clearing) saturated the areas of guerrilla activity in support of I CTZ revolutionary development operations. There were four (4) County Fair operations during November in areas made secure by small unit operations. These operations resulted in 21 VC KIA confirmed, 14 VC captured, 8 weapons captured and 5224 Vietnamese were screened. MEDCAP treatment was given to 1,234 Vietnamese during these County Fairs.

(3) Base Defense: The 1st MP Battalion continued to provide security for the Danang Air Base Complex. The Chu Lai Defense Command performed a like function for the Chu Lai Air Base Complex. The small unit operations mentioned in paragraph (1) also continued to be extremely important to the defenses of both complexes.

B. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

(1) Major Operations:

a. PRAIRIE: During 1-30 November 1966, Operation Prairie continued with light contact. This is a search and destroy operation in northern Quang Tri Province and was limited to contact with enemy squad or smaller sized units during this period. On 5 November 1966, Company F/2/5thMar while in an ambush position observed 4 NVA, fired small arms and automatic weapons resulting in 2 NVA KIA (confirmed), 2 packs and 2 AK 47 rifles were captured. Squad and platoon size patrols and ambushes were conducted throughout this period within 1000 meters of the DMZ. On 16 November 1966, Company G/2/9thMar

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received small arms fire from an estimated NVA company. Company H/2/5thMar moved into a blocking position and made contact. Company G/2/9thMar reinforced with tanks assaulted the position. Contact continued until 2230. Results: 28 NVA KIA (confirmed), 15 NVA KIA (probable); TSMG and 5 K-50s captured. On 20 November 1966, Company M/3/3rdMar received small arms fire from 2 VC, small arms fire returned and VC were pursued, 4 houses, 2 bunkers, tools, ammunition and rice were destroyed. On 21 November 1966, Company K/3/3rdMar platoon reconnaissance patrol destroyed an enemy base camp. On 29 November 1966, Company D, 3d Recon Bn, squad patrol observed 3 NVA, called in an artillery mission resulting in 3 NVA KIA (confirmed). During the period 1-30 November, 12,035 artillery missions were fired, 5,991 helicopter lifts were flown, 53 Naval Gunfire missions were performed and 885 tactical air sorties were flown. Results of this period are: USMC: 8 KIA, 61 WIA; Enemy: 74 KIA (Confirmed), 37 KIA (Probable), 2 VCC, 31 VCS, 24 weapons captured. Cumulative results for Operation Prairie from 3 August to and including 30 November 1966 are: USMC: 177 KIA, 826 WIA, 1 MIA; Enemy: 1276 KIA (Confirmed), 1563 KIA (Probable), 3 NVAC, 5 VCC, 1 Returnee, 32 VCS, and 179 weapons captured.

b. PAWNEE III: During the period 1-30 November 1966 this search and destroy operation was conducted in Thua Thien Province near Phu Loc and continued throughout the period with light contact. On 1 November a recon patrol observed 5 VC and called in an artillery mission resulting in 2 VC KIA (confirmed). On 3 November a squad patrol from Company B, 3d Recon Bn observed 10 VC and called in an artillery mission resulting in 7 VC KIA (confirmed). The majority of contacts that were made during this period were in the general vicinity of Thon Phu Hai and the low saddle area between Nui Tron and Nui Da Kep. On 17 November, 2dBn, 26thMar on Lang Co Peninsula apprehended 51 VCS and 1 VCC, confiscating 330 gallons of petrol, 900 pounds of rice, 2 cartons of blasting caps and communications wire. On 23 November a recon patrol observed a supply boat being unloaded. Air strike was called in and the boat was sunk. On 23 November a recon patrol observed 2 VC enter a cave. The cave was destroyed resulting in 2 VC KIA (probable). Company E continued to search the area of the cave and found 100 pounds of rice, 50 blasting caps, a box of military clothing, and individual equipment. During the period 1 November through and including 30 November, 984 artillery missions were fired, 30 helicopter lifts were flown, 17 Naval Gunfire missions were performed and 14 tactical air sorties were flown. Results

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of the period were: USMC: 1 KIA, 10 WIA; Enemy: 25 KIA (Confirmed), 46 KIA (Probable), 1 VCC, 51 VCS, and 3 weapons captured. Cumulative results for Operation Pawnee III from 29 October to and including 30 November 1966 were: USMC: 1 KIA, 10 WIA; Enemy: 25 KIA (Confirmed), 52 KIA (Probable), 1 VCC, 51 VCS and 3 weapons captured.

c. SHASTA: During the period 5-19 November, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines (-) (Reinf) conducted a search and destroy operation within its own TAOR in an area 25 kilometers southwest of the City of Danang. Contact was generally light throughout the entire operation. The operation was characterized by platoon size combat patrols and company size sweep operations with contact being made in the area along Route 14 up to 300 meters south of the highway and in the area to the north of it, bordered on the north by the Song Ai Nghai. During the Operation 41 artillery missions were fired and 6 tactical air sorties were flown by USMC F8 and A6 aircraft. The operation terminated on 19 November 1966 with the following results: USMC: 14 KIA, 57 WIA; Enemy: 25 KIA (Confirmed), 53 KIA (Probable), 3 VCC, 11 VCS, and 5 weapons captured.

d. ARCADIA: During the period 9-14 November 1966, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Reinf) conducted a search and destroy designed to search out and destroy enemy personnel and supplies in the vicinity of Cam Jai Village and Viem Dong Hamlet. At 111750H Companies C and D at Ha My Tay (1) destroyed 12 tunnels and caves, captured 30 pounds of medical supplies, VC propaganda leaflets, one transistor radio, 4 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, and 2 VC who indicated that the hamlet was used as a VC training and staging area. Contact during the operation was extremely light, and on 14 November 1966 Operation Arcadia terminated with the following results: USMC: 1 KIA, 4 WIA; Enemy: 4 KIA (Confirmed), 12 KIA (Probable), 15 VCC, 8 VCS, and 1 weapon captured.

e. RIO BLANCO: During the period 20-27 November 1966, a coordinated USMC, ARVN, ROKMC, CIDG search and destroy operation was conducted in Quang Ngai Province south of the Chu Lai TAOR. The center of the operation was located on the Song Tra Khuc 17 kilometers west of Quang Ngai City. The Song Tra Khuc runs through the center of the area in a general east-west direction, dividing the operational area into a northern and a southern half. One battalion (reinf) of the 7th Marines attacked eastward using the Song Tra Khuc for its northern boundary while the 2d ARVN Division attacked eastward using the

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Song Tra Khuc as its northern boundary. CIDG forces established blocking positions along a ridgeline located 2 kilometers west of the Song Tra Khuc and 4,000 meters northeast of the Ha Tranh Special Forces Camp. ROKMC forces coordinated their maneuvers in Operation Dragon Eye with Rio Blanco. On 21 November 1966, Company M, 3dBn, 7thMar observed a group of VC and fired 10 rounds resulting in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed), 3 VCS, 4 pounds of rice, and one gray uniform captured. At 220950H, Battery H, 3dBn, 11thMar fired a mission on 15 VC resulting in 5 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 7 VC KIA (Probable). At 221305H Battery H, 3dBn, 11thMar fired a mission on 4 sampans carrying 11 VC, resulting in 11 VC KIA (Confirmed). On 25 November the 1stBn, 7thMar blocking force received small arms fire and eight rounds of 81MM mortar fire, and observed 100 VC attempting to break through the blocking position. The blocking force returned small arms fire, 60MM mortar fire, and called in 81MM Mortar fire. The VC were caught in a rice paddy filled from the recent rainfall. This contact resulted in 2 USMC KIA, 24 USMC WIA. Enemy losses during this contact were: 23 VC KIA (Confirmed), 40 VC WIA (Probable), 5 VCC, 1 VCS. During this operation 257 artillery missions were fired, 242 tactical air sorties flown by USMC F4, F8, F9, A4 and A6 aircraft, 1613 helicopter sorties, and 5 naval gunfire missions. Operation Rio Blanco was terminated on 27 November 1966. Results for this operation were: USMC: 6 KIA, 45 WIA; Enemy: 51 KIA(Confirmed), 28 KIA(Probable), 8 VCC, 1 VCS, and 22 weapons captured.

f. MISSISSIPPI: During the period 29-30 November the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (-) and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (-) conducted a search and destroy operation south-southwest of the Danang TAOR in Que Son District. This operation continued into the month of December and contact was generally light. The operation was characterized by platoon and company size sweep operations. During this operation 58 artillery missions have been fired, 19 tactical air sorties have been made by 2 A4 aircraft on direct air support, expending 3 tons of ordnance. Results for the period 29-30 November 1966 were: USMC: 3 KIA, 6 WIA; Enemy: 5 KIA (Confirmed), 7 KIA (Probable), 3 VCC, 1 VCS.

IV. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

A. General Enemy Situation. During November, the intensity and size of enemy contacts, as well as enemy casualties continued at the October level, which was much lower than the tempo established during July, August, and September. Cumulative enemy casualties for the period were 443 VC/NVA KIA (Confirmed), and 1077 KIA (Probable). 88 VC/NVA personnel were captured during the period, which was double the October tally. Enemy initiated harassing fire incidents dropped 10% for the October

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figures; enemy AA fire increased by 18%, although their accuracy diminished since less aircraft were hit.

B. Quang Tri - Thua Thien - Phu Bai TAOR. Operation Prairie continued with light contact. The largest enemy force encountered was an estimated NVA company north of Cam Lo on 16 November. All other contacts during the period were with squad or smaller size units. Enemy casualties for this operation during the period were 74 KIA (confirmed), and 37 KIA (probable). Cumulative enemy casualties at the end of the period were 1276 KIA (confirmed) and 1563 KIA (probable). Operation Pawnee III in the Phu Loc area continued with light contact involving squad and smaller size enemy forces. Results for the period were 25 VC KIA (confirmed) and 46 VC KIA (probable). ARVN contacts during the period included two engagements with enemy forces estimated at two companies each and numerous company and platoon contacts. VC initiated activity in the Phu Bai TAOR was limited to isolated, small scale incidents.

C. Quang Tin - Quang Ngai - Chu Lai TAOR. Operation Rio Blanco was conducted in conjunction with ROKMC and ARVN forces in an area 17 kilometers west of Quang Ngai City between 20-27 November 1966. The most significant engagement occurred on 25 November when 100 VC attempted to break through Marine positions and were driven into a flooded paddy. This encounter resulted in 23 VC KIA (confirmed) and 40 VC WIA (probable), and 5 VCC. Cumulative casualties for the operation were: 51 KIA (confirmed) and 28 KIA (probable). The 48th LF Battalion sustained 82 KIA (confirmed) and 25 KIA (probable) on 20 November during the ROKMC's Operation Dragon Eye. ARVN/RF/PF forces met battalion size enemy units on four occasions during the period. Only minor VC initiated incidents occurred in the Chu Lai TAOR during the period.

D. Quang Nam - Danang TAOR. Operation Shasta, conducted in Dien Ban District between 5-19 November, encountered light opposition and accounted for 25 KIA (confirmed) and 53 KIA (probable). Operation Arcadia accounted for 4 VC KIA (confirmed) and 12 KIA (probable) from 9-14 November. Operation Mississippi commenced on 29 November in Que Son District, casualties included 5 VC KIA (confirmed) and 7 KIA (probable) at the close of the period. On 8 November a RF/PF company made contact with an estimated VC company at (ZC 108570). All other ARVN and Marine contacts involved platoon or smaller units. Small scale VC initiated activity continued at usual levels throughout the Danang area with the majority of incidents occurring in the southern portion of the TAOR.

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E. Mine and Booby Trap Incidents. Mine and booby trap incidents during November increased 6% from October's record low but continued well below other 1966 monthly levels.

F. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Anti-Helo Tactics. Late Report. During Operation Kern (20-25 October) a report was received of what appeared to be a series of 36 poles strung with wire. A patrol determined that the poles, five to ten meters above the tree tops were an anti-helicopter entanglement. Wire was strung from pole to pole for a distance of approximately 2,000 meters along the high ground. On the ground below was barbed wire and numerous punji stakes eight to ten feet high.

(2) Tactics. On 9 November, the VC forced women and children to screen an attack against CAC-21 and the hamlet of An My (#) (AT 925608). (G-2 Comment: This is the first time women and children have been used in the I CTZ for this purpose, although animals (Bullocks) have been employed for similar intentions).

G. Anti-Aircraft Incidents Occurring in I CTZ.

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>Pct Change</u>
Incidents	410	498*	+18%
Aircraft Hits	108	99**	-8.3%
*(378 Helo, 120 F/W)			
**(89 Helo, 10 F/W)			

H. Enemy Statistics. Statistics pertaining to enemy activities in Marine operating areas, including combat bases, for October and November are compared below:

Enemy Initiated Incidents

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Attack	0	3
Harassing Fire	545	492
Mines and Booby Traps	49	52
Sabotage	4	7
Terrorism	1	2
AA Fire	410	498
Totals:	<u>1009</u>	<u>1054</u>

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Enemy Casualties

	<u>October</u>		<u>November</u>	
	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>
KBGF	509	343	316	447
KBMA	148	333	93	530
KBMTOWS	120	83	34	100
Totals:	<u>777</u>	<u>759</u>	<u>443</u>	<u>1077</u>
VCC/NVAC	45		88	
VCS	328		487	
Returnee	1		1	
Weapons				
Individual	92		76	
Crew Served	7		1	

I. Weather. The weather for November in I CTZ continued to be characterized by cloudy skies, with moderate monsoon rainfall at the beginning of the period and light drizzle towards the end. During the latter half of the period, the weather was influenced by tropical storm Nancy with attendant lower ceilings, high gusty winds and increased shower activity. Trafficability was hampered by inundation, road and bridge washouts, and mud. Flight operations on many days were restricted by varying periods of reduced visibility. Weather data for the period follows:

	<u>Dong Ha</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>
Temperature (Average degrees)				
High	84	81	82	82
Low	70	71	72	74
Rainfall (Total inches)	17.11	22.46	14.18	15.99
Visibility (Average miles)	6	6	6	6
Winds (Average Knots)	7	6	7	7

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J. Enemy Order of Battle.(1) Changes to Confirmed and Probable Units.

(a) No new confirmed or probable enemy units were added to the ICTZ Order of Battle during November.

(b) The following units have been dropped:

1 812th NVA Bn, previously confirmed in Quang Tri Province with a strength of 300.

2 51st LF Bn, previously carried as probable in Quang Nam Province with a strength of 300.

3 G.55 MF Co, previously confirmed in Quang Tri Province with a strength of 75.

(c) The strength of the 324B NVA Division has been reduced to 70% of its October strength.

(2) Unit Recap as of 30 November 1966.

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>
1 Military Region Hq	1 Regiment Hq
1 Military Sub-Region Hq	4 Battalions
2 Division Hq	5 Separate Companies
7 Regiment Hq	
32 Infantry Battalions	
14 Support Battalions	
30 Separate Companies	

(3) Comparison of October/November Estimated Enemy Strength in I CTZ.

	<u>As of 31 October</u>	<u>As of 30 November</u>
Confirmed VC/NVA Units	30,580	27,305
Probable VC/NVA Units	2,485	2,205
Guerrillas	20,121	20,597
Totals:	53,186	50,107

K. Counterintelligence.

(1) Propaganda and Subversion. VC propaganda and subversion activities showed a slight decline during the reporting period. VC propaganda was directed primarily toward

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officers of the 1st ARVN Division in the Hue Area. The themes of the propaganda leaflets were in the form of appeals to ARVN officers to defect with their families and join the National Liberation Front.

(2) Terrorism. A slight increase in the number of acts of terrorism occurred during November. A major incident occurred in Thua Thien Province where 16 persons with ARVN relatives were kidnapped. One other major incident of terrorism took place at Chieu Hoi Center in Quang Ngai Province, when three VC dropped an explosive charge into a house, resulting in one VN killed, 25 injured and nine missing.

(3) Espionage and Sabotage. The month of November continued to show a general decrease in espionage while the number of sabotage incidents remained relatively stable. Several reports were received, however, to indicate that the VC are continuing to train personnel in the art of espionage. Upon completion of training, one such group is to pose as refugees, infiltrate government controlled areas, and gather information for use in future VC actions. Lines of communications continued to be the prime target of sabotage with attention directed towards the destruction of culverts and bridges along the National Highways and Railroad.

(4) Civil Disturbances. No major civil disturbances were reported.

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V. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION.

A. STRENGTH. Table VIII outlines the average personnel strength for III MAF during November 1966:

TABLE VIII

Average Personnel Strength
III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters

	<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED</u>		
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>
HQ III MAF	150	10		293	6	
H&S Company	10			262	3	
29th Civil Affairs Co (Attached)			30			88

III Marine Amphibious Force

<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
4,078	407	55,630	2,141

B. CASUALTIES. III MAF casualties are shown in Table IX:

TABLE IX1. Battle.

<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
84	2	700	22	8	0	2	0

2. Non-Battle.

<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
21	2	156	10

C. SPECIAL SERVICES.

1. Shows:

(a) Martha Raye arrived on 29 October 1966 and departed 4 November 1966. Martha Raye is scheduled to return on 16 or 17 December.

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(b) Jennifer JONES arrived on 5 November 1966 and departed on 8 November 1966.

(c) The Baseball Players arrived on 8 November 1966 and departed on 11 November 1966.

(d) Francis LANGFORD show arrived on 16 November 1966 and departed on 20 November 1966.

(e) The TRAVELLERS were scheduled for 20 thru 26 November 1966, but the show was cancelled.

(f) The Sig SACKOWIZ show arrived on 27 November 1966 and departed on 1 December 1966.

2. China Beach:

(a) A total of 644 In-Country R&R personnel utilized the facilities at China Beach for the month of November 1966.

(b) The Chapel has been completed. Chairs are available but the altar has not arrived.

(c) All huts have been completed. Steel bunks and mattresses have been purchased and are enroute from Okinawa.

(d) The Amphitheater has been completed except for the seats.

3. Chu Lai:

(a) An Amphitheater is being constructed with high priority so it may be ready for the Bob Hope Show.

(b) A site is being considered for in-country R&R for ROKMC personnel to include messing facilities.

4. Recreation Area (Hill 327):

(a) The Barber shop has been completed and is in operation.

(b) The indoor theater is under construction.

(c) Restaurant and Snack Bar is under construction.

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5. R&R Program (Out-of-Country):

(a) The following are the statistics of the total III MAF R&R usage for each out-of-country R&R site:

TABLE X

Bangkok	694
Hong Kong	869
Singapore	319
Manila	212
Okinawa	277
Taipei	750
Kuala Lumpur	309
Penang	0
Hawaii	253
Tokyo	<u>1018</u>
Totals:	4701

D. CHAPLAIN.

1. 18-24 - Captain John H. CRAVEN, CHC, USN, FMFPAC Chaplain visited the command for the purpose of visiting the Chaplains serving in III MAF.

2. 23-24 November - Archbishop IAKAVOS, Primate of the Greek Orthodox Church in North America visited the command. He was entertained at dinner by the Commanding General. He conducted the Divine Liturgy on 24 November for Eastern Orthodox personnel in the area.

3. 28 November - The Headquarters Chapel, III MAF was dedicated with the Commanding General, Headquarters Commandant, and Chaplains of the four major religious faiths in III MAF participating.

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VI. LOGISTICS.

A. Logistic effort during the month was directed toward support of the northward shift of forces, maintaining mobility and flexibility in the face of monsoon conditions. The bulk fuel farm at the mouth of the Cua Viet was increased to 120,000 gallons each of JP-4 and AvGas, and 60,000 gallons each of MoGas and Diesel.

B. FISCAL.

(1) Thirty letters of recognition by CG, III MAF were prepared for various units achieving 75-84% participation in the U. S. Savings Bond Program.

(2) Fiscal data was compiled for inclusion in the HQMC General Officer Review.

(3) 30,000,000\$ VN were made available for procurement of crushed rock for use by III MAF.

(4) Authorization was received to increase the III MAF Local National Civilian ceiling from 1034 to 2070; unit ceilings were increased accordingly.

(5) The following reports to higher headquarters were prepared:

(a) Quarterly CY-67 Projected Piaster Expenditure Report to COMUSMACV.

(b) Reports required by SECNAVINST 7020.9 on procurements made in RVN and other foreign countries for submission to CMC.

(c) Number of Local National Civilians currently employed to CG, FMFPAC.

(d) Routine monthly reports required by COMUSMACV relating to the piaster spending limitation program.

(e) A one-time report on programs to reduce piaster spending in III MAF to COMUSMACV.

(f) MPC transactions to COMUSMACV.

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C. ORDNANCE.

(1) Functional requirements for a Class V/V(A) storage area in Danang were studied during the month; among them were: compatibility of the storage area with handling equipment currently in use; arrangement of storage pads to permit maximum access; traffic control based on simplicity and quick access; and provision of decontamination showers in proximity to storage areas for CS munitions and liquid propellants.

(2) During the period 8-15 November, a visiting U. S. Army team introduced "Beehive" munitions by briefing and demonstrations in Danang, Chu Lai, and Dong Ha. Live firing demonstrations were conducted in each of the TAOR's, using the 106mm RR "Beehive" round.

(3) CG III MAF message 140536 Nov66 established the following ASR's:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ASR</u>
A475	Ctg.45 Ball	.33/pistol; 2.35/SMG
B568	Ctg 40mm HE	1.2
C226	Ctg 81mm Illum	2.2 (CMC directed)
C444	Ctg 105mm HE	32 (including substitutes)
D544	Proj 155mm HE	17
L312	Sig Illum WSP	MarDiv: 13/InfBn; Other:.17/100 indiv.
L495	Trip Flare	MarDiv: 6/InfBn;other: .06/100 indiv.
M756	Chg Assy Demo	.3 Engr Sqd Set; .1 Engr Ind Set

(4) Commencing 16 November, the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions began daily reporting on the status of all artillery weapons, for inclusion in the G-4's briefing for the Commanding General.

(5) A technical assistant team from USAWECOM arrived on 23 November to assist in isolating and correcting existing problem areas on the M109 SP 155mm Howtizer. In addition to supplying technical assistance and limited quantities of small high usage parts, the team provided excellent technical instruction.

D. ENGINEER.

(1) General. As in the previous month, engineer operations in November consisted mainly of an all-out effort to keep the land routes of communication open. The continuation

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of the monsoon caused considerable flooding which closed roads and bridges for several days at a time. The need for construction or repair of bridges and culverts was an almost daily occurrence.

(2) Significant Events.

(a) 1 Nov - A 67' M4T6 Float Bridge was installed at AT 916593.

(b) 5 Nov - A 60' M4T6 Float Bridge was installed at AT 906745.

(c) 7 Nov - The advance party of the 11th Engineer Battalion arrived in-country. Two platoons of the 3d Bridge Company deployed to Dong Ha and Phu Bai, and elements of the 1st Bridge Company returned to Danang.

(d) 10 Nov - The center section of the "Dickie Chapelle" Memorial Hospital was completed.

(e) 11 Nov - M4T6 Bridge at YD 235598 was replaced with a class 40 timber trestle. The bridge at AT 914577 was repaired.

(f) 13 Nov - A platoon of the 1st Bridge Company was placed in direct support of Task Force X-Ray.

(g) 14 Nov - A class 60 M4T6 fixed ramp was installed for LST unloading on the Danang River Landing.

(h) 18 Nov - M4T6 fixed spans were installed at AT 995688 and AT 920598. A class 60 non-standard bridge was constructed at AT 922602.

(i) 26 Nov - Due to flooding, Route one was closed at the My Chanh (YD 460400) and Pho Trach (YD 519348) bridges, and for several kilometers between Danang and Tam Ky. An Hoa was cut off from land communications due to flooding of routes 1D, 5, 14, and Liberty Road.

(j) 28 Nov - Route one was opened between Danang and Dong Ha. The first elements of the main body of the 11th Engineer Battalion arrived in-country.

E. SURGEON.

(1) The daily average patient load for the two Medical Battalions and the 1st Hospital was 240, with a total of 1676 patients admitted.

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- (2) 464 patients were evacuated out of country.
- (3) 1413 pints of whole blood were expended to use.
- (4) Company D, 3d Medical Battalion set up in Dong Ha with an initial in-patient capacity of 25 beds.
- (5) The 1st Hospital Company began limited operations on 22 November, admitting their first patients. Until the operating rooms are completed, this fixed medical facility will admit only medical patients.
- (6) The USS REPOSE departed RVN on 9 November for upkeep at Subic Bay and returned on 24 November to furnish logistic support in ICTZ. The weekly operating schedule is as follows:

Off Danang	-	Saturday, Sunday and Monday
Off Chu Lai	-	Tuesday and Wednesday
Off Dong Ha	-	Thursday
Off Phu Bai	-	Friday

(7) A Medical Team consisting of two Medical Officers and one Marine Officer from the Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory, Camp Lejeune, N. C., arrived at III MAF on 19 November. The purpose of this visit was to supervise the administration of a field test, under combat conditions, of a silicone compound to retard immersion foot. This month the team has field tested the compound during Operations Rio Blanco and Mississippi.

(8) The Force Surgeon chaired I Corps Public Health meetings on 8 and 22 November.

F. SUPPLY.

(1) Various actions were taken to expedite receipt of critically needed supplies, including the following:

(a) Sharply increased requirements for BA-404 radio batteries were experienced by 1st Radio Battalion as a result of additional equipment received and conversion from external power to battery operation. Special air shipments obtained through FMFPac from Camp Pendleton met immediate requirements and action is underway to increase operating stocks to meet the increased requirements.

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(b) As a result of continuous emphasis on resupply of GP tents, these are now being received in quantity - an estimated 600-800 during November. They are being released to using units as quickly as they can be identified and cleared from staging areas.

(2) A complete rewrite of the supply portion of the III MAF Logistics SOP is underway. This project has been extended to include a complete review of all outstanding Force Orders and Bulletins and all message directives previously issued. These are being consolidated, incorporated into the SOP, cancelled or other appropriate action taken.

(3) Other Planning actions included:

(a) Evaluation of MUMMS/MILSTRIP training classes conducted on Okinawa, and planning for additional classes in conjunction with the G-3 Training Officer.

(b) A request to major units for planning data on special requirements for the tropic summer season beginning in about June.

(c) Attendance at the NSA Danang sponsored Area Logistics Conference on 28 November 1966.

(d) Continued review of stock status of light-weight utilities and tropical boots to evaluate present inventory control policies which restrict issue of these items.

(4) Efforts to improve and simplify reporting information as a basis for supply planning included:

(a) Assumption by Force Supply Section of responsibility for appropriate portions of the monthly Logistics Summary (LogSum) Report. It is planned to integrate this more closely with other logistic readiness reports.

(b) Action to obtain full status information from using units on individual weapons, individual equipment and gas masks.

(5) Red Ball Summary:

(a) Action is proceeding to convert to a new and greatly improved reporting format which will provide weekly status information on Red Ball items and, as a by-product, measures of system performance.

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(b) Recap of Red Ball during the month of November:

Total line items on Red Ball 1 Nov 66	794
Total line items added during Nov 66	238
Total line items deleted during Nov 66	328
Total line items on Red Ball 30 Nov 66	704

(6) Various actions have been taken to acquire rights to real estate necessary to the mission of III MAF, including a new ASRT site in Quang Ngai and arrangements to improve the airport an An Hoa.

(7) Other Significant Events.

(a) 3 Nov - Published Force Bulletin on Conservation of concertina wire.

(b) 8 Nov - CG III MAF msg 080730Z Nov authorized one time issue of 150 pairs of tropical boots to 1st MP Bn.

(c) 8 Nov - CG III MAF msg 080136Z Nov directed FLC to establish one month stock level of Ration Supplement Sundries Packets and to return excess to NSA, Danang.

(d) 9 Nov - Published Force Order on Class II and IV Common Item Support from NSA, Danang.

(e) 9 Nov - Published Force Order regarding repair/renovation of Body Armor.

(f) 12 Nov - CG III MAF msg 121058Z Nov submitted III MAF FY67 Deepwater Fording Kit requirements to MCSA Phila.

(g) 13 Nov - CG III MAF msg 130558Z Nov submitted initial storage facilities space report to COMUSMACV.

(h) 16 Nov - Conducted III MAF Logistic Conference in preparation for Pac Conference 15-16 December at Okinawa.

(i) 18 Nov - Extended cancellation date of Force Bulletin regarding supply and maintenance discipline.

(j) 29 Nov - FMFPac Supply Officer arrived for a five day visit.

(k) 29 Nov - Wrote speedletter to 1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing giving guidance for preparation of inquiries for shipment of personal effects.

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G. EMBARKATION AND PORT OPERATION.

(1) 42 MSTs ships and 20 US Navy ships debarked/embarked cargo at Danang, and 33 LST's moored at Chu Lai.

(2) Surface cargo throughput for the month was as follows:

	<u>Total</u>		<u>Daily Average</u>	
	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
Danang	127,637	213,588	4,255	7,119
Chu Lai	34,389	55,857	1,146	1,862
Phu Bai	6,706	10,845	223	361
Dong Ha (incoming in 108 LCU's)	8,350	15,599	278	520

(3) Fixed wing airlift during the month in support of USMC forces was as follows: (cargo in pounds)

	<u>USAF Aircraft</u>		<u>USMC Aircraft</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Pax</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Pax</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Pax</u>
To Danang (from ICTZ)			2,047,011	8,195	2,047,011	8,195
To Chu Lai			1,026,670	4,461	1,026,670	4,461
To Phu Bai			879,784	6,525	879,784	6,525
To An Hoa	1,074,744	818			1,074,744	818
To Khe Sanh	410,736		1,607,959	518	2,018,695	518
To Dong Ha	433,754		1,572,335	6,240	2,006,089	6,240
			<u>Grand Total</u>		<u>9,052,993</u>	<u>26,937</u>

(4) GREEN BAY VICTORY arrived in Danang with equipment and cargo for the 3d Bridge Company.

(5) Elements of VMCJ-3 arrived in Danang aboard the LST-891.

(6) Elements of the 1st Armored Amphibious Tractor Company arrived aboard LST's 891, 344, 525 and 1082.

(7) 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery (US Army) arrived by airlift and aboard the SS MAYO LYKES, SS SHELDON LYKES, and SS AMARILLO VICTORY.

(8) G Battery, 65th Air Defense Artillery arrived by air and aboard the SS SHELDON LYKES.

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(9) Elements of the 11th Engineer Battalion arrived aboard the USS POINT DEFIANCE (LSD 31) and USS CARTER HALL (LSD 3).

(10) LST 1157 arrived at Chu Lai with elements of the 1st FAG.

(11) BLT 2/4 embarked and departed for Okinawa aboard the LST 1166, USS VALLEY FORCE, USS HENRICO, AND USS GUNSTON HALL.

(12) Retrograde cargo shipments were made aboard the SS GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE, SS COASTAL RAMBLER, LST 1032 AND LST 1161 as follows:

For Subic	59 Short Tons
For CONUS	525 Short Tons
For Japan	239 Short Tons
For Okinawa	469 Short Tons

(13) BLT 2/5 was airlifted from Dong Ha to An Hoa.

(14) 640 ROK Marine Corps replacements arrived aboard the USNS BLATCHFORD on 9 November, and 621 rotatees departed aboard the same ship.

(15) USNS GORDON arrived in Danang with 1215 USMC replacement personnel.

(16) Representatives of the Embarkation Officer attended a TMA conference in Saigon, and the Quarterly Scheduling Conference at Cubi Point.

H. MOTOR TRANSPORT.

(1) Headquarters 9th Motor Transport Battalion was transplanted to Dong Ha on the 1st of November.

(2) The first group (25) of the 90 M51A2 multifuel dump trucks arrived in-country on the 29th.

I. DENTAL.

(1) During the month, the Force Dental Officer visited dental units at Chu Lai, Phu Bai and Dong Ha.

(2) A meeting of Commanding Officers of III MAF Dental Companies was held to discuss dental matters in I Corps Tactical Zone.

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(3) The Administrative Officer, Force Dental Office, FMFPac visited III MAF to discuss dental administrative and professional matter.

(4) Dental Civic Action conducted in the Republic of Viet Nam by III MAF Dental Companies was as follows:

Patients treated - 3120 Dental Procedures - 5352

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VII. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. A continued increase in total message traffic through the III MAF Communications Center was noted during November. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>Increase</u>
Incoming	41428	43375	
Outgoing	47340	51147	
Total	88768	94522	5754

B. Message traffic through COC Communication Center showed a slight decrease. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Incoming	2899	2808	
Outgoing	3557	3012	
Total	6256	5820	430

C. The displacement to the III MAF CP of additional staff members from the First MAW CP allowed the Parchment Rear switchboard to be disestablished. Retermination of lines was accomplished through coordination with commands involved.

D. With completion by contractors of the room on the III MAF CP water tower, installation of radio and radio relay equipment to provide emergency backup facilities were commenced.

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VIII. CIVIC ACTION.

A. OBJECTIVES. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civil Affairs Program remained the same during the month of November.

B. I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE. The Council met five times during November.

(1) The Region I Representative from the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) presented a summary of the activities and capabilities of the organization and discussed, in some detail, the basic food commodities (rice and salt) and the standard CARE kits which are available for distribution in coordination with and through the US Military Civic Action programs. Special CARE equipment of many types for specific projects was indicated as being available. Major problems which directly affect CARE operations, lack of transportation and warehousing, were discussed and USAID and III MAF agreed to assist in seeking possible solutions to these problems.

(2) Organization of Provincial level Joint Coordinating Councils continued to be of interest. The I Corps Council considered the question of receiving activity reports from Provincial Councils. It was decided that the Provincial Councils would not be asked to submit reports to the I Corps Council. This will insure autonomy of action. The I Corps Council received reports that four of the Provincial Councils have been formed to date.

(3) An announcement was made to the I Corps Council regarding the critical need of 10,000 tons of fertilizer in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces. This fertilizer will increase the rice yield in these provinces three or four times provided it can be made available to the farmers in a timely manner. This increased rice production is expected to help offset the large rice tonnage imported into the rice deficient area in I Corps. A request was made for assistance in transporting the fertilizer to Chu Lai for further distribution to Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces. ComNavSupAct, Danang offered lighterage and port facilities to assist in the movement of this commodity from Danang to Chu Lai. Approximately 600 tons of fertilizer was transhipped by this means.

(4) It was announced to the I Corps Council that a special briefing team had been formed for the purpose of informing III MAF units of the GVN Revolutionary Development Plan for CY 1967. Team membership consists of representatives from USAID, JUSPAO, CSD, I Corps Advisory Group and III MAF. The team expects to take to the field during mid-december.

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C. JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL COMMITTEES. Three Committees of the I Corps Council met during November.

(1) Commodities Distribution Committee. The Commanding Officer, 11th CA Company (ARVN) reported to the Committee on the Companies Civic Action and Psychological Warfare activities. The major operations are coordinated with Province and District and are designed to provide food for refugees, supplies and labor for repair and construction of local schools, wells, etc. One such operation was scheduled to take place in Quang Nam Province during November. In a related subject, it was announced to the Committee that the Refugee Team (VA-16) of the 41st CA Company (USA) will no longer be involved in large scale commodity distributions and warehousing as before. Reliance will have to be placed upon ARVN units, such as the 11th CA Company, to support the refugee camps. The Team VA-16 will continue assisting in Civic Action activities however, particularly in surveying areas of need. It was announced to the Committee that there will be no Christmas Trains and Trucks (ACTT) campaign this year. Donations of items will continue to come from CONUS via Project Handclasp.

(2) Education Committee. Of primary interest to the Committee was the formulation of plans to sponsor attendance of needy children in schools. Planning calls for school teachers to indicate students who are deserving but who are from families too poor to send the child to school. It is anticipated that a Marine battalion will sponsor one or more schools depending upon the number of the students qualifying for aid. Students who are designated for sponsorship will receive 250\$VN per month toward continuing school. The persistent problem caused by the drafting of school teachers was also discussed. Most seriously effected are the secondary schools where the majority of the teachers are male. This problem was presented to the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council.

(3) Public Health Committee. The question of out-of-country medical training for Vietnamese was brought before the Committee. It was indicated that the percentage of Vietnamese returning to RVN after receiving such medical training was very low. The Committee felt that a plan now being formulated, whereby American Physicians would be brought to Vietnam's medical training centers, would provide a greater assurance that the trained doctors would remain in Vietnam. Concern was expressed by the Region I Inspector-General, Ministry of Health over the growing VD rate in Danang. Several potential solutions were considered by the Committee but no firm resolution

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was made. The VD problem is still undergoing study for possible remedial actions. Cooperation on the part of U. S. Forces was proffered to GVN-MOH to assist in implementation of any reasonable VD control program. Latest plague outbreak in Danang was discussed. During November, three confirmed cases of plague were clinically diagnosed and some twenty persons were hospitalized for treatment of plague-like symptoms. Efforts were reported underway to organize inhabitants of infected area for mass immunizations. At least one diazine dusting was completed in the same area during the month.

D. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. Fifty-five MEDCAP Teams operated in 210 locations during November and provided medical and dental treatments to 103,229 Vietnamese civilians. Fifty-five health workers, including nurses, received informal on-the-job training during November. MEDCAP teams inoculated some 6041 persons as a preventive medicine measure. As a future measure, 29 spray insecticide operations were conducted, primarily in Danang East.

E. CARE. During November, CARE provided III MAF with 100 bags of rice (100 kilo/bag), 17,500 school kits, 600 sewing kits, 50 sets of agricultural hand tools, 150 midwifery kits, 10 resettlers kits and 20 sewing machines. All of these items were required to support the III MAF Civic Action Program.

F. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUMMARY. During November, the III MAF Civil Affairs program decreased somewhat from the high points achieved during August and September of this year. The month was not without its bright spots however. The distribution of 265,918 pounds of food in all TAORs was an increase of some 47.0% over October activity and the 103,229 people receiving medical/dental assistance represents an increase of .4%. Other indices which are representative of III MAF Civic Action activity are: distribution of 6,919 pounds of clothing, down 4.5% and distribution of 8,122 pounds of soap, down 22.7%. Construction, both new and repaired or renovated, also experienced a decrease during November. While a recession is indicated, the November level of Civil Affairs Activity still exceeds the average monthly activity to date by a noticeable degree. As an example, the number of persons receiving medical/dental treatment is some 14.1% above the 1966 monthly average. Extensive flooding of the low altitude rice lands, particularly in the Danang TAOR/RAOR, effectively isolated large portions of this heavily populated area from contact with the III MAF Civil Affairs program. A continuing shortage of supplies, such as MEDCAP supplies and building materials, has also exerted an inhibiting influence on Civic Action. Several changes were underway during November that should improve the availability of supplies:

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(1) MEDCAP supplies are being programmed for direct shipment to Danang from CONUS, rather than through the time-consuming delays of transshipment from Saigon.

(2) Procurement of some building supplies is now possible through the military supply system.

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IX. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

A. 162 ralliers were reported in I Corps during the month of November which represents the third largest monthly returnee figure reported in I Corps. PSYOP support in the form of printed materials, air/ground loudspeaker broadcasts, POET activities and the "Kit Carson" scouts working with Marine units continued to be the major PSYOP effort by III MAF units.

B. Audio-Visual Teams of the 244th Psy Op Company provided PSYOP support for 13 Marine operations and activities. Approximately 22,450 people were contacted through these events in support of small unit tactical operations, civic action, and County Fairs. Total broadcast time: 166 hours 55 minutes; total motion picture time: 65 hours.

C. A total of 22 Psychological Operation Exploitation Teams were dispatched during the month of November. Their efforts resulted in the production of 22 new leaflets, 11 taped messages and 1 poster.

D. November leaflet activity consisted of 5,238,200 total basic leaflet units, and 23,300 posters printed by the 244th Psy Op Company. The 5th Air Commando Squadron dropped 38,397,000 leaflets in support of USMC units, of which 16,975,000 were in support of the Chieu Hoi program. JUSPAO and MACPD continued to supply the bulk of standard leaflets used to support the Chieu Hoi and NVA campaigns. 110 aircraft sorties were flown to distribute leaflets, pamphlets, and JUSPAO newspapers.

E. The employment of the "Kit Carson" Scouts with Marine units proved to be a valuable tactical asset. The familiarity of these scouts with Viet Cong operations is an asset previously unavailable to infantry commanders. A scout attached to the First Marines lead a company unfamiliar with the terrain, at night, to the company's objective, which resulted in the surprise and capture of 15 VCC.

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X. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU.

A. BACKGROUND. During November 1966, 325 escorted visits were accomplished by the Combat Information Bureau. The escorts covered operations, civic action, and various other subjects of interest to the press. The Danang Press Center hosted 196 newsmen and VIPs during this period.

B. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION. Present transportation was adequate. However, two vehicles were deadlined during part of the month, but by combining transportation runs, CIB was able to meet the correspondents' requirements.

C. PHOTOGRAPHY. During the month of November, 19,053 feet of motion picture footage was forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps (Code A03P), despite curtailment by weather. Of this 56.5% was exposed on operations, 4.8% was exposed on Civic Action and 38.7% on miscellaneous. Operations which were covered were Dover, Bravo and Delta 1/5 Operation; Shasta, Rio Blanco, Duck Bowl and Arcadia. Of special interest is the dedication of the Dickey Chapelle Memorial Hospital on which 1,893 feet were exposed, & the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral D. L. MCDONALD's visit to Vietnam on which 975 feet were exposed.

D. RADIO/TV. During the month of November, this section has made a total of 152 releases. This included 2 Radio Features and 150 Fleet Home Town interviews.

E. ESCORTS. During November 325 escorted visits were accomplished. Included were Operations Prairie and Rio Blanco; combat patrols, civic action, CAC units, mine school, Sentry Dogs, and various activities. Notable media representatives and VIP's who visited the CIB during the month included: Ward JUST, Washington Post; Philip GEYELIN, Wall Street Journal; Hugh MULLIGAN, AP; David REED, Readers Digest; Michael A. PADEO, Arizona Republic; Ray MALONEY, ABC; Jim LUCAS, Scripps-Howard; Stuart ALSOP, Saturday Evening Post; Tom BRADDEN, Oceanside Blade Tribune; Ronald EVANS, Newspaper Publishers Syndicate; Haward MOFFETT, Newsweek; Purvis NAGHIBI and Ayub KLANTRAN, Ettelant; John BERTHELSEN, Newsweek; John FLYNN, CBS; Willaim MCWHIRTER, Time; Jonathan C. RANDLE, New York Times; Reuben MONSON, JUSPAO; Icanus PAPPAS, CBS; John VAN DOORN, Newsday; Max FRANKEL, New York Times; Herman SIMON, Badische Leitung; Phillip JONES, WCCO-TV; Leslie SALIN, WCCO-TV; Meannosuke TODA, KOKU-FAN Avialion Magazine(Japan); Ramon K. LINAN, and Oscar H. MANUEL, Philippion Radio/Television; Ron MILLIGAN, Westinghouse Broadcasting Corporation; Ted SELL, Los Angeles Times; James C. DUNN, Knight Newspaper;

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Louis CIOFFI and Bob JENNINGS, ABC; Lloyd WENDT, Editor, Chicago American; Marvin MILES, Los Angeles Times; J. D. COHEN, Fairchilds Publishers; Lee TELESCO, and Hal BRAUN, Philippino Herald.

F. PRESS RELEASES. During the month of November, the press section processed and forwarded to news media, a total of 309 releases. Of this total, 176 were accompanied by/or photographic releases. Thirty-eight (38) of the releases concerned civic action. In addition, 8,099 releases were forwarded to Fleet Home Town News Center. Photographs accompanied 172 of these releases. The total for the month represents a new high in FHTNC coverage (previous record was 6,233 during month of July).

G. PRESS CENTER. A total of 196 correspondents and VIP's checked in at the Press Center during the month of November.

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XI. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (RVNAF).

A. GENERAL. ARVN activities for the month of November were highlighted by Lien Ket 70, a coordinated ARVN/USMC/ROK Marine Operation west of Quang Ngai; by detailed provincial planning for the 1967 RD Program; and by some improvement in the overall logistical situation. Enemy activity decreased to the lowest point of the year in spite of an anticipated monsoon offensive.

During the month Quang Nam Sector and Danang Special Sector were organized under one central military command, Quang Da Military District. The Commander of Quang Da Military District reports directly to CG, I Corps.

B. OPERATIONS. I Corps conducted 34 battalion size operations during November as compared to 43 last month. There were 5 combined and 4 heliborne operations included in the above figures. Contact was made with the VC/NVA in 21 of these operations. ARVN/RF/PF losses were 335 KIA and 1139 WIA as compared to 220 KIA and 612 last month. Enemy losses were 847 KIA and 83 VCC as compared to 916 KIA and 94 VCC last month. ARVN captured 318 weapons and lost 119 as compared to 171 captured and 172 lost last month.

Three significant operations took place in I CTZ in November. Lam Son 325, Phase II, a 7th Armored Cavalry Regiment controlled combined search and destroy operation was conducted east of Quang Tri from 27 October to 5 November. Friendly losses were 12 KIA and 59 WIA. Enemy losses were 66 VC KIA, 19 VCC and 45 weapons captured.

Lien Ket 68, a 2d Division controlled heliborne search and destroy operation was conducted northwest of Tam Ky from 6 to 8 November. Friendly losses were 70 KIA and 92 WIA including 1 US Advisor. There were 44 weapons and one AN/PRC-10 radio lost. Enemy losses were 125 KIA, 63 VC KBA Probable, and 23 weapons captured.

Lien Ket 70, a coordinated 2d Division/USMC/ROK Marine controlled operation was conducted west of Quang Ngai from 19 to 26 November. ARVN losses were 3 KIA and 15 WIA. Enemy losses were 217 KIA, 195 KBA Probable, 23 VCC, 1 NVAC, 20 weapons and 1 radio captured.

C. ENEMY ACTIVITY. The number of VC initiated incidents in November dropped to the lowest level of 1966 with 132 incidents reported, as compared to 194 in October and 310 in September.

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Two significant aircraft incidents occurred in the 11th DTA. On 9 November a US Air Force O1-E was downed by 6 hits from .50 caliber anti-aircraft fire near the Khe Sanh Special Forces Camp. On 11 November approximately 15 miles west of Dong Ha, two F4C's, one A1E, and one F8 aircraft were shot down in the DMZ.

In Quang Da Military District there were three noteworthy incidents reported. On 9 November two Marine vehicles were ambushed in the Hai Van Pass, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. On 16 November a combined action platoon received mortar fire and a ground attack while manning a night defensive position northwest of Danang. Friendly casualties were 1 USMC KIA, 2 PF KIA, 3 USMC WIA, and 2 PF WIA. On 17 November VC penetrated positions of a Political Action Team near Hieu Duc resulting in 1 PF and 2 civilians killed and 16 PAT members and 2 civilians wounded.

There were three important incidents reported in the 12th DTA. On 8 November the Chieu Hoi Center in Tu Nghai was sabotaged with explosives resulting in 2 KIA, 28 WIA, and 13 MIA. The same day the VC destroyed a 21 meter bridge south of Thong Vien. An Air America C-46 was shot down by .30 caliber machine-gun fire near the Tam Ky runway on 17 November.

Agent reports and aerial photography confirmed that in the DMZ the enemy received replacements, supplies, and equipment; conducted training; and constructed SAM sites, anti-aircraft emplacements, bunkers, and entrenchments. Low level agent reports and information from a returnee indicate the 341st Division will replace the 324B Division in SVN in December. Additional agent reports and information indicate the 324B Division withdrew to an area within or north of the DMZ to receive replacements and equipment, and to restore morale.

Two significant observations for the month of November are the enemy's obvious effort to avoid contact with friendly forces, and the absence of a monsoon offensive. The enemy remains capable of launching multi-regimental attacks in the 11th DTA, regimental attacks in Quang Da Military District and the 12th DTA, small unit harassing operations against isolated units and outposts, interdicting lines of communications, and terrorizing the local population throughout much of the I CTZ.

D. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. During November the Minister of Revolutionary Development; CG, I Corps; and the Minister's RD Team met with each Province's officials, the Mayor of Danang, and ARVN leaders, to discuss, finalize, and approve all RD plans for 1967. I CTZ RD plans have the goals of developing 110 new

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life hamlets, consolidating 101 hamlets, and constructing 25 hamlets. Plans presented to the I Corps Commander provided for two ARVN battalions in support of RD in the Provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. Quang Nam will initially have 4 ARVN battalions and 1 RF battalion in support of RD.

In Quang Nam Province 5 hamlets with a total population of 5,120 were upgraded to the secured category. In Quang Tin Province 9 hamlets with a total population of 15,212 were upgraded to the secured category.

E. PSYOPS/CIVIC ACTION. In November the ARVN 10th Polwar Battalion and 11th Civil Affairs Company began an operation in the Danang East refugee centers to repair public facilities, give medical aid, distribute relief commodities, and acquaint the refugees with sanitary measures. The operation has been effective in demonstrating the government's concern for the people and has resulted in several wells dug or repaired, schools being repaired, a long drainage ditch being constructed, and a general cleanup of the areas. Foodstuffs, toys, and carpenter tool sets were distributed to the refugees.

ARVN presses produced 1,815,000 leaflets and newspapers during the month, compared to 2,100,00 last month. VNAF flew 26 leaflet sorties dropping a total of 2,325,000 leaflets compared to 8 sorties and 850,000 leaflets last month. The number of ralliers increased for the third straight month with a total of 162 compared to 145 last month, 109 in September, and 99 in August.

F. REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE. The I Corps RF/PF Command Structure was physically integrated into the I Corps Staff and Quang Da Military District Staff on 15 November. There were 110 officers and men assigned to the I Corps Staff and 54 officers and men assigned to the Quang Da Staff.

The Motivation Indoctrination Program continued with an additional platoon completing the course. To date, 370 platoons totaling 14,060 soldiers have been trained. During November 384 tons of foodstuffs were distributed to PF personnel compared to 522 tons last month. Over 60,000 recipes for preparation and 3 tons of soap and mouthwash were distributed to PF personnel.

G. LOGISTICS. The overall logistics situation in I CTZ showed an improvement during the month of November. Approximately 45 tons of CONUS direct shipment medical supplies were received in November. A shipment of 105 vehicles was received from Saigon and is now being processed for issue. Issue of these vehicles

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will slightly reduce the overall vehicle shortage in I CTZ. Low stock levels continued in selected items of ammunition, fortification materials, and repair parts for vehicles. The shortage of transportation to move supplies from Saigon to I CTZ continues to be a serious problem.

H. ENGINEER. The number of enemy attacks against roads and bridges in the I CTZ decreased from 32 in October to 19 in November. ARVN engineer reaction time continued to be excellent. National Highway 1 was open from the DMZ to Quang Ngai 70 percent of the month in spite of heavy seasonal flooding.

There were three enemy attacks against the railroad in the I CTZ during November. The railroad was open from Danang to Hue 60 percent of the month.

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CHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
1-2Nov66	Victor H. KRULAK	LtGen USMC	CG, FMFPac
1Nov66	H. N. WALLIN	RAdm USN	Dep Comdr for Facilities Engr
1-2Nov66	Mr Frank BARTIMO	GS-18	Asst Gen Counsel DOD
2Nov66	J. J. HYLAND	VAdm USN	COMSEVENTHFLT
2-4Nov66	William MCMILLAN	GS-18	Mbr Research and Engineering, DOD
3Nov66	C. H. DUNN	MGen USA	CofS for Logistics
2-4Nov66	Robert R. WOODING	RAdm USN	Comdr 3d NCR Bde
3-4Nov66	G. E. PICKETT	MGen USA	Dep Director for DCS, DCA
4Nov66	Joe M. BLUMBERG	BGen USA	Dir, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
5Nov66	F. SAMPSON	BGen USA	Dep Chief of Chaplains
6Nov66	William C. WESTMORELAND	Gen USA	COMUSMACV
6Nov66	Bruce K. HOLLOWAY	Gen USAF	Vice CofS, USAF
8Nov66	LGen VIEN	LGen RVN	Chairman JCofS RVN
8-9Nov66	Donavon F. SMITH	BGen USAF	Comdr USAF Adv Grp
8-9Nov66	George G. RYFFEL	Col USMC	Head, Southeast Asia Branch Office of JCS
9-10Nov66	Dr Stephen ENKE	GS-17	Deputy Asst Secretary DOD
9Nov66	LGen TENG	LGen	Sr Chinese Mil Adv
11Nov66	James A. HEBBELER	BGen USA	Dir, CBR and Nuclear Operations
12-13Nov66	F. J. BLOUIN	VAdm USN	Comdr Amphib ForPac
13-15Nov66	William E. GENTNER	VAdm USN	Comdr US Taiwan Defense Command

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
14Nov66	Sam L HUEY	BGen USAF	MACV J-6
16-17Nov66	Roy L. JOHNSON	Adm USN	CINCPACFLT
16-17Nov66	LGen LEK Nafomali	LGen RTA	Dir of Opns, Supreme Comd and Sr Thai Officer
16-17Nov66	Sir Michael CARVER	LGen	Comdr Far East Land Forces
16-17Nov66	His Excellency Peter WILKINSON		British Ambassador to RVN
16-17Nov66	J. N. EWBANK	MGen USAF	
16Nov66	R. G. STILWELL	MGen USA	
16-17Nov66	T. B. WHITEHOUSE	MGen USA	
19-23Nov66	Ronald VANSTOCKUM	BGen USMC	CG, FMFPac (FWD)
20-21Nov66	Marshall CARTER	LGen	
20-21Nov66	Mr. Oliver KIRBY	GS-18	
20Nov66	Mr. Phil BOHART	GS-16	Mbr Joint Civilian Employment Adv Grp
20Nov66	Mr. METSKER	GS-16	Mbr of Joint Civilian Employment Adv Grp
22-23Nov66	Victor H. KRULAK	LGen USMC	CG FMFPac
23-24Nov66	Frederick E. JANNEY	RAdm USN	CTF-73
23-24Nov66	Archbishop LAKOVOS		Primate of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America
24Nov66	Hon. Edward P. BOLAND (Dem. Mass.)		Mbr, House Appropriations Committee
24Nov66	Hon. Silvio O. CONTE (Rep. Mass.)		Mbr, House Appropriations Committee
24Nov66	Mr. Aubrey A. GUNNELS		Staff, House Appropriations Committee

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
24Nov66	Ernest C. BETTS		Deputy Asst Sec for Admin U. S. Treasury
24Nov66	T. J. FABIK	RAdm USCG	COMWESTAREACG
24Nov66	Frederick E. JANNEY	RAdm USN	CTF-73
24Nov66	M. A. WHALEN	RAdm USCG	Cofs USCG
25-26Nov66	Mr. Vorley M. REXROAD	GS-18	Professional Staff Mbr Senate Comm on Appropriations
25-26Nov66	Mr Lyle E. SEEMAN	MGen USA(Ret)	Consultant, Senate Preparedness Invest- igating Sub-Com- mittee
26Nov66	Lucien MCDONALD	RAdm	Comdr MSTs, Far East
27Nov66	Milton R. YOUNG	Senator	Mbr Senate Appro- priations Committee
27Nov66	Mr. W. H. DARDEN	GS-17	Professional Staff Member
27Nov66	Mr. Kenneth BARSQUET	GS-17	Professional Staff Member
28Nov66	Adm CLARK	Adm (Ret)	
30Nov66	U.S. Grant SHARP	Adm	CINCPAC
30Nov66	William C. WESTMORELAND	Gen USA	COMUSMACV
30Nov66	Mr. Robert A. FEARY		POLAD to Adm SHARP

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

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 November - Operation Prairie Continuing
Operation Pawnee III Continuing
- 5 November - Operation Shasta Initiated
- 9 November - Operation Arcadia Initiated
- 14 November - Operation Arcadia Terminated
- 19 November - Operation Shasta Terminated
- 20 November - Operation Rio Blanco Initiated
- 27 November - Operation Rio Blanco Terminated
- 29 November - Operation Mississippi Initiated

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PART FOUR

REFERENCES

- (A) 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, November 1966
- (B) 3rd Marine Division Command Chronology, November 1966
- (C) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, November 1966
- (D) Force Logistics Command Chronology, November 1966

ENCLOSURES

- (1) 7th Engineer Battalion (-)(Rein) Command Chronology, November 1966
- (2) 9th Engineer Battalion Command Chronology, November 1966

Added: (3) MALARIA Epidemiology of Opn HASTINGS. 18 Nov 1966

Enclosure (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO, San Francisco 96602

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6230
Ser: 0171466

19 NOV 1966



- Unclassified when enclosures are removed

From: Commanding General
To: Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (Code 72)

Subj: Malaria Epidemiology of Operation Hastings

Ref: (a) BUMEDINST 6220.3

- Encl: (1) Narrative report covering subject matter
 (2) General Area Map of Operation Hastings (Figure I)
 (3) Statistical charts and graphs covering subject matter (Figures II thru VII)
 (4) Summary of malaria cases by area (Table I)

1. Enclosures (1) thru (4) represent a comprehensive epidemiology report on the incidence of malaria in Quang Tri Province, RVN, during Operation HASTINGS for period 7 July - 3 August 1966.

R. B. Neville

R. B. NEVILLE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

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MALARIA EPIDEMIOLOGY OF OPERATION HASTINGS*

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE UNIT
U. S. NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
DANANG
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

* The information contained herein concerning troop strength and movements was not obtained from Regimental or Division sources, but was compiled from data gathered by interviews with Battalion and Company S-3 Officers. There may be some inconsistencies between this report and the actual after-action statistics of Operation Hastings.

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MALARIA EPIDEMIOLOGY OF OPERATION HASTINGS

BACKGROUND: Operation Hastings, a major military effort in the mountainous regions just south of the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam, took place from 7 July to 3 August, 1966. During this period, approximately 5,500 Marine Corps personnel were involved in various aspects of the operation. Of these 4,300 were in the field and had varying degrees of exposure to malaria. The epidemiology of the resulting cases of malaria is the subject of this report.

TOPOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY: To clarify troop concentrations in relation to geography, the area of Operation Hasting and its support activities is best divided into six areas (See Fig.1). Area (1) is Dong Ha, the location of the airstrip which was the staging area for the Operation. It is located in the inner coastal region, and is surrounded by a fairly numerous Vietnamese population. It is not considered a malarious area, despite seepage areas to the west which could provide breeding sites for some Anopheles mosquitoes. Area (2) is the coastal region in which Operation Deck House II took place on the 16th and 17th of July. Because of the proximity to Operation Hastings plus the fact that the 3rd Battalion 5th Marines was involved in both operations, this area is included in the present report. The land is flat, sandy, not very populated and is not considered a malarious area. Area (3) surrounds Cam Lo, a village 10 miles west of Dong Ha. This approaches the foothills, and was the site of the Regimental Command Post plus supporting artillery batteries. The civilian population, located along the rivers in the area, has significant malaria, and GVN authorities are attempting chloroquine prophylaxis in some villages. Area (4), the "Rockpile", is in the mountains and was considered a highly malarious area. A multitude of small streams flow from the surrounding hills and mountains. Battalions rotated through this area, usually spending a week or so at the base of the larger hills. The civilian population is extremely sparse. Area (5) encompasses the mountain ridges to the northeast of Area (4), along which several battalion size "sweeps" took place. Area (6) is a valley heading northwest from Cam Lo, where the initial helilift of troops took place opening the Operation. This is more hilly than Area (3) and has fewer civilians. However, it was also considered a relatively high risk malarious region.

VECTOR SURVEY: The only data obtained before the Operation began was that from larval dipping southwest of Cam Lo. Anopheles minimus was included in the find. The "Rockpile", or Area (4), was too insecure for survey at that time, although since the Operation, larval dipping there has yielded both A. minimus and A. aconitus.

RESERVOIR: The source of the Hastings malaria cases is a bit enigmatical.

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Most were contracted in an area almost devoid of civilians. The conclusion appears to be that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops who had been in the area for some time constituted the reservoir. This is based solely on conjecture, however, as the incidence of malaria among those troops is unknown. But in future operations this possibility must be given serious consideration whenever enemy strongholds are breached.

ANALYSIS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS: All battalions, with the exception of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines which was on Operation Buck House II when called to assist in Hastings, were initially located at Dong Ha for a varying number of days. They were then helilifted into mountainous areas where they remained for approximately 10 days in Areas (4), (5), and (6). Some units were rotated through Cam Lo (Area (3)) to protect the Regimental Command Post and artillery located there. At the end of the Operation, the troops were helilifted from the mountains to Dong Ha or Cam Lo, from which they were rapidly moved to their rear positions in Phu Bai, Chu Lai, or DaNang. (The exception is the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, which remained at Dong Ha). In general, it may be said that the involved battalions all went from very low malarious areas to Operation Hastings, and then returned to the same areas from whence they came. Although the Operation theoretically lasted from 7 July to 3 August, most field activity occurred from 15 to 31 July, midway in the I Corps malaria season which spans the months of March through October.

OVER-ALL ANALYSIS OF MALARIA CASES: 4,310 troops were at various times in Areas (2-6) which were considered as presenting the areas of possible significant malaria exposure. 78 cases, all due to P. falciparum, resulted. Fig. (2) shows the frequency distribution of cases from the entire operation. All battalions, however, were not in the same areas together, and some arrived several days after others. Consequently Fig. (3) shows the distribution of cases corrected to correspond to a hypothetical situation in which all battalions entered areas (2-6) on the same date. The average exposure time was 15 days. The abrupt onset of cases, to be expected if a population is placed suddenly into such a malarious area, emerges on the second graph. Likewise, assuming a relatively constant exposure, the rate of cases should be constant for a period of time equal to the length of exposure, and, with the variable incubation period noted when malaria occurs in personnel on prophylaxis, taper off slowly. Given the many variables inherent in case reporting (e.g., estimation of the actual date of onset of symptoms), Fig. (3) follows roughly the expected trend, whereas Fig. (2) suggests a period of greatest exposure midway in the Operation, which in fact did not occur.

As mentioned above, the cases are graphed according to onset of symptoms. A collection of 6 cases is noted to occur from 24 to 26 July on Fig. (3). Analysis of these cases reveals that 5 of the 6 were probably contracted during Operation Nathan Hale, which took place in the Central Vietnam highlands at the end of June. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was involved in that operation. Three of the 5 patients admitted to missing malaria prophylaxis since Nathan Hale. The sixth patient had diarrhea for 2 weeks prior to diagnosis of malaria, and it is felt that the reporting Preventive Medicine Technician mistakenly considered this as the

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initial malaria symptoms. In effect, Operation Hastings' cases appear to start abruptly on the 16th day after exposure to a highly malarious area. This is most likely the average incubation period of P. falciparum malaria in personnel on chloroquine prophylaxis, as opposed to the 11-12 day incubation of P. falciparum in non-immunos on no prophylaxis. The longest incubation period could have varied from 26 to 37 days, as the last reported case occurred 37 and 26 days, respectively, after the ho-lilift into and out of the malarious area. These figures correspond nicely with previous PMU estimates. The average incubation period up to Hastings was assumed to be about 15-16 days, and U. S. Army figures from the Saigon area reveal a 16.5 day incubation. It appears that the incubation period for P. falciparum in U. S. personnel is seldom shorter than 15-16 days, (although a long period of missed prophylaxis may alter this), and may be as long as 1 month.

The ultimate attack rate for the entire operation, assuming a constant exposure of all battalions for the same period of time (in many ways an inaccurate assumption) was 574 cases/1000 troops/year. The overall attack rate due to malaria was 1.6%. In other terms, had the same number of troops been exposed in the same situation for one month, approximately 210 cases of malaria would have developed. Of the 78 cases, one death occurred from malaria on board the USS Princeton.

ANALYSIS OF CASES BY BATTALION: A striking disparity of cases among battalions was noted, as can be seen in Fig. (4) which represents the 6 battalions with the largest number of men exposed to malaria. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, with a total of 37 cases, was hardest hit. That this was not due to a greater number of men in the field can be seen from Fig. (5), which rates the Battalion at almost 1000 cases/1000 men/year. The other Battalion which approached this was 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. However, only 3 cases developed in this battalion as a result of a 4 day exposure, so the attack rate of about 750 cases/1000/year is not felt to be statistically significant.

The reasons for the disparity of cases among the battalions are not known. Too many variables prohibit incrimination of one battalion as being more lax in malaria discipline than others. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines was bivouacked under jungle canopy for some time in Area (4), and this may have been the telling factor in its high rate of malaria.

ANALYSIS OF CASES BY COMPANY, 2ND BATTALION, 1ST MARINES: The 5 companies of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines sustained a total of 37 cases. Figure (6) describes both cases per Company and attack rates in cases/1000/year. Although H&S Company had by far the greatest number of cases, it had the next to the lowest attack rate, whereas the highest attack rate occurred in "Foxtrot" Company.

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Other companies with very high attack rates included "Golf" Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (727 cases/1000/year) and "Echo" Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (1,935 cases/1000/year). A scattering of cases also occurred in other units, such as 1st Force Recon. ("Bravo" Company, 3rd Plt.) and "Bravo" Company, 3rd Engineer Battalion, but the small numbers preclude appropriate analysis.

MALARIA POTENTIAL OF AREAS TRAVERSED: Table (1) lists the number of cases resulting from each of the six areas previously described based on a strict 16 day incubation period. Dong Ha produced no cases, as expected. The coastal Area (2), where Operation Deck House II took place, was tagged with 5 cases, but from the foregoing analysis plus the fact that such a region should not have sufficient amounts of malaria, it is felt that these cases resulted from Operation Nathan Hale. Area (3), Cam Lo, was felt to be the site of contraction of 8 cases on the basis of a 16 day incubation, but it is likely that many of these were contracted in mountainous areas and merely had a more prolonged incubation period. Nevertheless, this may be an unwarranted assumption, and this Cam Lo was considered as a moderately malarious region. Area (4) was the "hotbed" of malaria. Two battalions were situated here for a week or more, sending company size patrols out 2-3 kilometers in all directions. It is impossible to say whether most cases were contracted at the "Rockpile" (Ton Son Lan) or on patrol. Areas (5) and (6) produced expected malaria, the latter having few cases because of the short time it was occupied by troops.

CARE OF MALARIA PATIENTS: The cases of malaria from 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines have been revised, and reveal that an average of 3.0 days lapsed from the time of onset of symptoms until the patient appeared at the Battalion Aid Station. During this interval, symptomatic treatment was given by the Company Corpsmen. 0.7 days lapsed from the time a patient was sent to sick call until he arrived at a medical facility capable of confirming the diagnosis of malaria, and initiating treatment. The total delay was 3.7 days. All other units, when averaged, revealed 3.5 days total delay in reaching a hospital or medical company after onset of symptoms. The time required to make a confirmed diagnosis of malaria is not known on these cases, but certainly most are diagnosed within 24 hours, and many are diagnosed on admission.

VECTOR CONTROL EFFORTS: On 18 July the Preventive Medicine Unit Vector Control Team utilized helicopter aerial dispersal of insecticide (Malathion) to attempt control of malaria bearing mosquitoes in the Cam Lo area. Fig (1) shows the area covered by the spray mission. The effectiveness of this effort is unknown, because no baseline of prior malaria from that area in U. S. personnel was available. The number of cases which possibly developed there were so few that any valid statistical evaluation is impossible, although there appeared to be no difference in rate of new cases before and after spraying (Fig. 7).

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TABLE 1

MALARIA CASES FOR JUNE
COVERED IN OPERATIONAL HISTORIES

Area 1	-	0 Cases
Area 2	-	5 Cases
Area 3	-	8 Cases
Area 4	-	33 Cases
Area 5	-	25 Cases
Area 6	-	3 Cases


* These are based on 16 day incubation periods, and do not necessarily mean that the malaria cases unequivocally came from one particular area. Attack rates for each area were not able to be calculated because troop movement was too erratic.

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FIGURE II:
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION, MALARIA CASES, OPERATION HASTINGS




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CORRECTED FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION, MALARIA CASES, OPERATION HASTINGS

Dates of entrance into and exit from malarious areas for each of the line battalions is noted at right. Entrance date was corrected for all battalions to 15 July, and all cases of malaria correspondingly altered.

3rd Bn., 5th Mar. - 15 July to 28 July
 1st Bn., 1st Mar. - 16 July to 29 July
 3rd Bn., 4th Mar. - 15 July to 3 Aug.
 2nd Bn., 9th Mar. - 26 July to 28 July
 2nd Bn., 4th Mar. - 15 July to 25 July
 2nd Bn., 1st Mar. - 15 July to 30 July



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FIGURE IV
MALARIA, INCIDENCE AND
RATE PER BATTALION





FIGURE V
MALARIA, INCIDENCE AND
RATE PER BATTALION



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FIGURE VII
MALARIA CASES, CAM LO AREA, RELATIONSHIP TO SPRAY OPERATION





FIGURE VI
MALARIA RATES, BT COMPANY, OF 2ND BN., 1ST MAR.



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