

041447

NOV 66

CMC

**EXCLUSIVE** FOR LTGEN WALT

FILLER

*M*  
1 2

THERE IS NOT A STATEMENT IN THE MESSAGE REQUIRING AN IMMEDIATE REPLY, BUT THIS MESSAGE IS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO LTGEN WALT.

041447Z

NOV 66

32

# 49

**CONFIDENTIAL**

P 041447Z NOV 66

FM CMC

TO CINCPAC

CG MACV

CINCPACFLT

INFO COMSEVENTHFLT

CG FMFPAC

CG III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL SHARP, GENERAL WESTHOORN AND ADMIRALS JOHNSON AND KYLAND AND GENERALS KRUEK AND WALK FROM GENERAL WALLACE W GREENE

I HAVE RECOMMENDED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE CORPS GENERAL OFFICERS WITHIN THE FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC AND THE MACV STAFF. I PLAN TO EFFECT THESE CHANGES BETWEEN NOW AND MID-DECEMBER. BGEN W K JONES FROM MACV STAFF TO HQMC. BGEN N P RYAN FROM CG NINTH MAF TO ADC THIRD MARDIV. BGEN LOUIS METZGER, FORMERLY ORDERED TO DUTY AS ADC, THIRD MARDIV, NOW TO CG NINTH MAF. BGEN J R CHAISSON FROM III MAF TO MACV STAFF AS RELIEF FOR GEN JONES. GEN CHAISSON BEING DETACHED III MAF IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND WILL HAVE 30 DAYS LEAVE CONES, REPORTING BACK ABOUT 15 DEC. NO DECISION ON NEXT ASSIGNMENT OF BGENS JONAS E PLANE AND LOWELL E ENGLISH HAS BEEN MADE. I AM PERSONNALLY INFORMING EACH OF THE GENERAL OFFICERS CONCERNED. HOWEVER, AN OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASE HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE.

BP-4

**EXCLUSIVE**

Ø38

34

Ø72341Z

NOV 66

CG THIRD MARDIV

(PERSONAL FOR)

FOR LTGEN WALT

1

3

ØØØØØ

#2 & #3

3

CG THIRD MARDIV

Ø72341Z NOV 66

*J. Canzone*

DATE/TIME: 080955

THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY.  
AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS NOT REQUIRED.....

*JW CG has seen*

*33*

Ø72341Z

NOV 66

#50

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Ch. Recommended routing  
WR-3  
Jm*

RNNKZ  
VV 3DIVE59

DE RUMMF 346D 5112341  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 072341Z NOV 66  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

**PERSONAL FOR**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT

SUBJ: SEPARATE 175MM GUN FIRING FROM BATTERY C, 6TH BN, 27TH ARTILLERY AND 2DNBN, 94TH ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SANH AREA

REF: A. CG III MAF 061454Z NOV 66

1. BATTERY C, 6TH BN, 27TH ARTILLERY USA FIRED 10 ROUNDS ON 2 OCTOBER AT SUSPEITED ENEMY MOVEMENT (XD 953446) IN SUPPORT OF RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT IN THE KHE SANH AREA.
2. BATTERY C, 6TH BN, 27TH ARTILLERY REGISTERED IN THE KHE SANH AREA (XD 771533) ON 7 OCTOBER.
3. BETWEEN THE PERIOD OF 2 OCTOBER AND 25 OCTOBER BATTERY C FIRED 73 ROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH.
4. BATTERY C, 6TH BN, 27TH ARTILLERY USA WAS ATTACHED TO 2DNBN, 94TH ARTILLERY AT 230012H OCTOBER.
5. REGISTRATION DATA FROM BATTERY C REGISTRATION CONTINUED IN EFFECT

PAGE TWO RUMMF 346D **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

UNTIL ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER 2DNBN, 94TH ARTILLERY ON 3 NOVEMBER. RESULTS FROM THAT DATE ON ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- 3 NOVEMBER - REGISTRATION CANCELLED BY FAILURE TO PROCURE CLEARANCE
- 4 NOVEMBER - CLEARANCE GRANTED, BUT AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATION FAILURE PREVENTED REGISTRATION.
- 5 NOVEMBER - CLEARANCE REQUESTED, BUT NOT GRANTED *due To DELTA TEAMS*
- 6 NOVEMBER - LIAISON PARTY DISPATCHED TO KHE SANH TO WORK OUT COMMUNICATION AND CLEARANCE PROBLEM WITH REGARDS TO REGISTRATION.

6. REGISTRATION OF EACH OF THE THREE BATTERIES OF THE 2DNBN, 94TH ARTILLERY WAS COMPLETED IN THE KHE SANH AREA AT 272945 NOVEMBER. DIRECT AND POSITIVE COMMUNICATIONS WITH KHE SANH USING RADIO RELAY A D PRC 47 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THIS DATE FOR EXCLUSIVE ARTILLERY CONTROL.

GP-4  
BT

RNNN

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#50

CON 044

FILED 34

DTG 080333Z MONTH NOV 66

*W*

ORIGINATOR CG 3D MARDIV

CATEGORY **PERSONAL FOD!**

FOR LTGEN WALT

FILE: COPY #1 OF 3 COPIES

MAPS RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES #2 & ~~3~~ OF 3  
COPIES OF CG 3D MARDIV MESSAGE 080333Z NOV 66

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AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS NOT REQUIRED....

*JW*

*34*

080333Z NOV 66 #51

**CONFIDENTIAL**

VV 3DIV120

DE RUMMF 8620 3120333

ZNY CCCCC

P 080333Z NOV 66

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT

(PERSONAL FOR)

SUBJ: SEPARATE 175MM GUN FIRING FROM BATTERY C, 6TH BN, 27TH ARTILLERY AND 2DBN, 94TH ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SANH AREA.

REF: A. CG 3DMARDIV 072341Z NOV 66

1. THIS IS ADDENDUM TO REF (A).
2. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT CO, 2DEBN, 94TH ARTILLERY BN WAS NOT DENIED AIR SUPPORT FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES EXCEPT ON TWO OCCASIONS WHEN AVAILABLE O-1 AIRCRAFT WERE DIVERTED FOR CONDUCT OF AIR STRIKES.
3. PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS IN REGISTRATION DUE TO DIFFICULTY OBTAINING CLEARANCE FROM MULTIPLE AGENCIES IN KHE SANH AND THE WEATHER. THERE IS A GENERAL SHORTAGE OF OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT FOR USE BY AO'S, TACA'S AND FO'S IN ALL AREAS, WHICH IS WELL KNOWN.
4. CONSIDER THAT THE NEW COMMAND ARRANGEMENT AT KHE SANH WILL ASSIST IN RESOLVING CLEARANCE PROBLEM THIS AREA.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~TOP SECRET~~

16 3-19  
FOLDER 007

REF 111311Z

NOV 66

INFORMATION COMUSMACV

(PERSONAL FOR)

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REF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3  
COPIES OF COMUSMACV MESSAGE 111311Z NOV 66

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111311Z NOV 66

TOP SECRET

65

Ø7

140835Z

NOV 66

7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN

(PERSONAL FOR)

1

3


7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN

2-~~20~~

3

140835Z NOV 66

THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY  
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140835Z NOV 66

#52

**SECRET**MESSAGE FORM - SECRET  
3d MarDiv - 2100/2PP RUMNMF  
DDE RUMSAL 12100 3180845  
ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO  
P 140835Z NOV 66  
FM 7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN  
TO RUMNMF/CG III MAF DANANG AB RVN  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
BT**(PERSONAL FOR**

S E C R E T / C 00773 NOV 66.

//PERSONAL TO GEN WALT INFO GEN WESTMORELAND FROM GEN GOMYER//. DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

SUBJ: THREAT TO ELECTRONIC INSTALLATIONS, DONG HA (S).

1. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER ENEMY CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY ARTILLERY AGAINST INSTALLATIONS IN THE DONG HA COMPLEX. MY STAFF HAS STUDIED THE ADVISABILITY OF RELOCATING THE AF RADAR INSTALLATIONS AND CONCLUDED:

A. A LENGTHY PERIOD WOULD BE REQUIRED TO RELOCATE THE RADARS.

B. SECURITY ASPECTS AT OTHER POSSIBLE LOCATIONS NEGATE ANY ADVANTAGES GAINED IN MOVING FROM DONG HA.

C. ALL-WEATHER SUPPORT WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DEGRADED DURING MOVEMENT OF MSQ-77.

D. SOUTHJNMOVEMENT OF THE AC&amp;W SITE SERIOUSLY LIMITS RADAR EFFECPVENESSIN SUPPORT OF OUR NORTHERN OPERATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 12100 S E C R E T

E. PRESENT REVENMENT OF MSQ-77 SITE AT DONG HA REQUIRED A DIRECT HIT TO DESTROY THIS UNIT.

3. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE WE MUST, FOR THE TIME BEING, ASSUME THE RISK TO THE MSQ-77 AND AC&amp;W SITES IN THEIR PRESENT LOCATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF SUPPORT. I AM TAKING MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF BOTH THE MSQ AND AC&amp;W SITES SO AS TO IMPROVE THEIR SURVIVAL PROBABILITY FROM A DIRECT HIT. THESE ACTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. A CONTINUED EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO LOCATE AND SURVEY ALTERNATE SITES FOR THESE UNITS, AND PLANS ARE BEING REVIEWED TO RAPIDLY EVACUATE THE SITES IF THE ENEMY SITUATION DICTATES.

4. SHOULD YOUR CONTINUED ON THE SPOT ANALYSIS INDICATE A CHANGE IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, I WILL APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE.

GP-4.

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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DECLASSIFIED#52  
**SECRET**

FILLER

DTG

MONTH

072

34

COORDINATOR

160335Z

NOV 66

CATEGORY

(PERSONAL FOR)

FOR: LTGEN WALT

THIS

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#1

OF

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COMUSMACV

MESSAGE

160335Z NOV 66

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160335Z

NOV 66

# 53

**CONFIDENTIAL**

B588  
 KAA 101  
 VV MAD 968  
 PP RUMNMF  
 DD RUMSMA 3357U 3200340  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 160335Z NOV 66 ZFF 4  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMNMF/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMSVA/CG USARV  
 BT

**PERSONAL END**

CONFIDENTIAL 49704 FROM MACJ322  
 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND  
 SUBJECT: ARMY HQ FOR ADMIN SUPPORT OF USA UNITS IN I CTZ (U)  
 REF: A, CG, IIINMAF MSG, DOG 140525Z NOV 66 (S). (NOTAL)  
 B. NMACV COMMAND/STAFF CONFERENCE ACTION MEMORANDUM  
 NO/8 66-79, DATED 9 NOV 66 (S).

1. (C) REF A EXPRZFSED CONCERN OGER THE E. KABLISHMENT  
 OF A PROVISIONAL ARMY HEADQUARTERS IN I CTZ. AS NOTED IN REF B,  
 IT IS MY INTENT TO HAVE USARV FORM A PROVISIONAL GROUP HEAD-  
 QUARTERS TO HANDLE ADMINISTRATIVE, LOGISTIC, AND DISCIPLINARY  
 MATTERS FOR THE USA ARTILLERY UNITS UNDER YOUR OPCON.  
 2. (C) USARV PRESENTLY IS ORGANIZING A HEADQUARTERS, BUT  
 HAS NOT SUBMITTED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. IT WILL BE FOR ADMINI-  
 STRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT BST NOT A TACTICAL FA GROUP HEAD-  
 QUARTERS. IT IS TO BE UNDER YOUR OPCON.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3357U CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) IN SHORT, IT CONTINUES TO BE MY AIM TO  
 FACILITATE YOUR CONTROL AND UTILIZATION OF THE ARMY ARTILLERY ASSETS  
 IN QUESTION. I BELIEVE THE ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED ABOVE WILL  
 CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO FULFILLMENT OF THIS AIM.  
 4. (U) THE STAFF OFFICERS WHO VISITED YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON  
 11 NOVEMBER HAVE COMEENDEED THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROVIDED BY  
 III MAF TO THE ARMY ARTILLERY UNITS. NEEDLDSS TO SAY, I APPLAUD  
 THIS SPLENDID EXAMPLE OF MACV TEAMWORK.

RGP-4  
 RBT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

RNNND

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF 2100/1

#53

89

FILE NO 007

DTG 181135Z

NOV 66

ORIGINATOR AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

(PERSONAL FOR) *W*

1 COPY OF 3 COPIES *JV*

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COPIES OF AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE MESSAGE 181135Z NOV 66

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THIS MESSAGE NOT READDRESSSED AS A PERSONAL FOR BUT  
HANDLED AS SUCH, BELIEVE MESSAGE SHOULD BE GIVEN  
TO G-3

39

#54

**SECRET**MESSAGE FORM - SECRET  
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

PP RUMNMF  
DE RUMSMA 289ZL 3241104  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 20061Z NOV 66  
FM VOMUSMACV  
INFO ZEN/JOD  
ZEN/SOG  
RUMNMF/CG III MAF  
R 181135Z NOV 66  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO COMUSMACV  
STATE GRNC  
BT

SECRET LIMDIS VIENTIANE 3111  
FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN  
SUBJECT: SUPPORT OF BV 33

1. YOU WILL RECALL OUR BRIEF DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT DURING MY LAST VISIT SAIGON. FOLLOWING IS CURRENT STATUS:
2. ONHOUR ADVICE FAR CINC, GENERAL QUANE, HAS CANCELLED PLANS TO REPLAVE BV 33 BY SPECIAL GUERRILLA UNIT FOR TIME BEING. HE INTENDS, AND WE CONCUR, REINFORCE 900 MAN GARRISON WITH A PATROL UNIT FOR COVERAGE HIGHWAYS 92 AND 9 OUTSIDE PERIMETER.
3. WE UNDERSTAND FROM COLONEL SIESAOSTH, BV 33, TODAY, THAT

PAGE TWO RUMSMA 289ZL SECRET LIMDIS

2-175MM GUNS NOW EMPLACED AT XOM CHAM (XD 8542). FROM THIS POSITION GUNS COULD SUPPORT BOTH PERIMETER BV 33 AND LOCAL PATROLS. BV 33 WOULD NEED FORWARD OBSERVER WHO COULD COMMUNICATE EITHER DIRECTLY WITH BATTERY WITH OWN RADIO OR THRU ARVN LIAISON TEAM, WHO HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE IN CALLING INHAPR STRIKES FOR PAST FIVE MONTHS.

4. BV 33 GETS ALL POL, AMMO AND APPROX HALF THEIR RATIONS BY TRUCK FROM ARVN. FAR MR III PROVIDES REMAINDER SUPPORT BY AIR.

5. RECOMMEND:

- A. 175 S BE TASKED SUPPORT BV 33.
- B. FWD OBS BE PROVIDED.
- C. CURRENT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BE CONTINUED.

SULLIVAN.

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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DECLASSIFIED

#54  
**SECRET**

*CG: MACV has asked  
for our comments.  
or*

CGN 88

FILLER 007

DTG 202030Z

MONTH NOV 66

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY

**EXCLUSIVE**

FILE: COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1 OF 6

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 202030Z NOV 66

RECEIVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE/TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

DTG 202030Z

MONTH NOV 66

#55

**CONFIDENTIAL**

P 202030Z NOV 66  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO CG III MAF  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FORLOGCMD  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, MAJGEN NICKERSON, MAJGEN KYLE,  
 MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW, BGEN VANSTOCKUM, BGEN RYAN, BGEN HERBOLD,  
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (U)

1. WE HAVE BEEN HAVING A LOT OF ADMINISTRATIVE TROUBLES OF LATE - ALMOST EPIDEMIC PROPORTIONS, AND COVERING THE ENTIRE ADMINISTRATIVE SPECTRUM. FURTHERMORE, NO UNIT SEEMS COMPLETELY IMMUNE.
2. HERE ARE SOME OF THE THINGS THAT ARE CAUSING REAL TROUBLE - DAILY:
  - A. CASUALTY REPORTING - ERRONEOUS OR DILATORY REPORTS.
  - B. SERVICE RECORDS - DELAY IN FORWARDING, OR MISDIRECTING THEM, TO THE END THAT THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE SUFFERS IN THE END.
  - C. REPORTS ON SHIPMENT OF REMAINS - FAILURE TO REPORT TIMELY AND ACCURATE INFORMATION. THIS SHORTCOMING HAS GIVEN CMC SOME ROUGH MOMENTS.
  - D. REPORTS ON SERIOUS INCIDENTS - FAILURE TO MAKE THEM ON A TIMELY AND COMPLETE BASIS. THIS HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF MUCH TRAFFIC RECENTLY.
  - E. ORDERS ON ROTATEES - IMPROPER PROCESSING OF MARINE CORPS AND FMFPAC SPECIAL ORDERS.
  - F. RTD CARDS - FAILURE TO SUBMIT THEM, OR SUBMIT THEM LATE.
  - G. CHAIN OF COMMAND - FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE CHAIN OF COMMAND WITH CONSEQUENT DELAY IN HANDLING CORRESPONDENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.
  - H. UNIT DIARIES - INACCURATE ENTRIES.
  - I. CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST CORRESPONDENCE - FAILURE TO RESPOND PROMPTLY.
3. I DON'T PROPOSE TO IDENTIFY THE ABOVE WITH ANY SPECIFIC COMMAND, BUT RATHER TO TELL YOU ALL THAT, BUSY AS YOU ARE, IT'S TIME TO BEAR DOWN ON ALL OF THESE AREAS, AND TO ACHIEVE SOME OVERALL IMPROVEMENT. I KNOW, WITHOUT YOUR TELLING ME, THAT ONE SHORTFALL IN YOUR SYSTEM IS IN SKILLED ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL. I HAVE PLAYED THIS TUNE LOUDLY AND OFTEN TO HQMC, AND AM CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE OUR FULL SHARE OF WHAT ADMINISTRATIVE TALENT THE MARINE CORPS POSSESSES. I DO NOT LOOK TO SEE THE SITUATION IMPROVE GREATLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPROVEMENTS ACHIEVED ARE GOING TO HAVE TO COME WITH THE RESOURCES WE NOW HAVE. BEST REGARDS TO ALL.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES



SECRET

P 240057Z NOV 66  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, REQUEST PASS TO  
MAJGEN JONES, FROM LTGEN KRULAK.  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (M)

1. INTERDEPARTMENTAL ACTION, INVOLVING STATE-DEFENSE-AND-OSD, HAS  
RESULTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SYSTEM FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF  
PROGRESS IN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. THE NEW APPROACH ATTEMPTS TO  
REMOVE THE UNDESIRABLE ASPECTS OF A SUBJECTIVE RATING, WHICH IS  
FOUND IN SOME SYSTEMS TODAY. THE CONCEPT EVOLVED BORROWS FREELY FROM  
THE PACIFICATION PROGRESS REPORT SYSTEM UTILIZED IN THE FMFPAC  
MONTHLY UPDATE OF MARINE OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM.

2. IN ESSENCE, THE SYSTEM ENVISIONS USE OF THE HAMLETS AS THE BASIC  
MEASUREMENT UNIT AND THE NUMBER OF SECURE OR DEVELOPED HAMLETS AS THE  
BASIC INDICATOR OF PROGRESS. THE HAMLET RATING WOULD BE ARRIVED AT BY  
GRADING THE HAMLET ON SIX FACTORS:

VIET CONG MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE HAMLET;  
VIET CONG TERRORIST SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES;  
FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES;  
ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT;  
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE DEVELOPMENT;  
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

WITHIN EACH FACTOR THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DETAILED INDICIA WHICH ARE  
OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OR ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH MUST BE REACHED IF THE HAMLET  
IS TO RECEIVE A PARTICULAR GRADE FOR THAT FACTOR. THE RATING WILL BE  
ASSIGNED BY THE SUB-SECTOR ADVISOR AND BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE  
SECTOR ADVISOR.

3. THOUGHT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO WEIGHTING SOME OF THE SIX FACTORS. THE  
RATIONALE BEHIND THIS IS THAT IF ALL FACTORS ARE GIVEN EQUAL WEIGHT,  
THE OVERALL HAMLET RATING WILL BE DRAWN DOWN BY THE SOCIO-  
ECONOMIC FACTORS (THE LATTER THREE ABOVE) BECAUSE THEY ARE SLOW TO  
DEVELOP UNTIL A HIGH DEGREE OF LOCAL SECURITY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.

4. OUR POSITION ON THE NEW EVALUATION CONCEPT HAS BEEN ONE OF  
CONCURRENCE WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. WE VIEW THE NEW CONCEPT AS TIMELY AND  
RESULTING IN A MORE UNIVERSAL YARDSTICK FOR ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY  
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS. SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE OBJECTED TO THE USE OF THE  
HAMLET AS THE BASIC UNIT OF MEASURE, PREFERRING THE VILLAGE, AND  
OBJECT TO ANY WEIGHTING OF THE SIX FACTORS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

A. THE HAMLET IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE, SINCE HAMLETS OFTEN MERGE AND THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN THEM CAN CHANGE OFTEN AS HUTS ARE BUILT OR RAZED. IN ADDITION, THERE IS NO COMMON SOURCE DOCUMENT ESTABLISHING THE SIZE AND LOCATION OF ALL THE HAMLETS IN VIETNAM, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE VILLAGE IS THE LEGAL GOVERNMENTAL SUBDIVISION OF A DISTRICT AND CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY PRACTICALLY EVERY SPOT IN VIETNAM. FURTHERMORE, THE USE OF THE HAMLET WILL PRODUCE THREE OR FOUR THOUSAND SUBDIVISIONS FOR I CORPS ALONE. THIS, RATHER THAN MAKING THE REPORTING SYSTEM MORE PRECISE, WOULD INTRODUCE CONFUSION.

B. ASSUMING THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM BEARS MORE THAN A ROUGH CORRELATION TO OUR PRESENT MARINE SYSTEM, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE COUNTERBALANCE ALREADY CONTAINED WITHIN THE DETAILED INDICATORS. THEREFORE, WEIGHTING OF THE FACTORS IS UNNECESSARY.

5. SECNAV HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON THE SYSTEM AND UNDERSTANDS OUR VIEWS ON THE MATTER. THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION FROM THE JOINT STAFF OR JCS, NOR IS ANY ACTION EXPECTED UNLESS THERE ARE REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE FIELD.

6. THE ABOVE POSITION WAS PRESENTED TO THE JOINT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SPONSORING AGENCIES, MR. GEORGE ALLEN AND COL CLARKE (US ARMY), DURING THEIR VISIT TO CINCPAC ENROUTE TO SAIGON. THEY CONCUR, BUT HAVE ADOPTED THE POSITION THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THE DECISION OF THE MISSION COUNCIL ON THE HAMLET VERSUS VILLAGE POINT. THEIR OBJECTIVE IN TRAVELLING

TO SAIGON IS TO EXPLAIN AND DISCUSS BOTH THE CONCEPT OF THE NEW REPORT AND THE MECHANICS OF ITS OPERATIONS, AND TO ASSIST IN CONDUCTING A PILOT TEST IN THREE OR FOUR PROVINCES. SITES OF THE TEST WILL BE SELECTED IN CONCERT WITH THE MISSION COUNCIL. MR. ALLEN AND COL CLARKE DEPARTED HAWAII ON 18 NOVEMBER AND WERE SCHEDULED TO PROCEED DIRECT TO SAIGON.

7. MR. ALLEN AND COL CLARKE INTEND TO VISIT III MAF AT SOME TIME DURING THEIR VISIT TO RVN TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN MORE DETAIL. DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS, EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT THE CHECK LISTS FOR THE SYSTEM CONTAIN STATEMENTS THAT ARE AS UNEQUIVOCAL AS POSSIBLE. USE OF QUALIFYING WORDS SUCH AS "SUBSTANTIALLY", "SOMEWHAT" OR "LARGELY" SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED. DESIRE THAT THIS HEADQUARTERS BE ADVISED OF THE OUTCOME OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, PLUS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MAY BE AVAILABLE IN SAIGON, AS IT DEVELOPS, ON ACCEPTANCE OR MODIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT.

GP-4

BT

↑  
Action

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES #56

CGN 020

FILLER 34

DTG 042122Z MONTH DEC 66

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

**EXCLUSIVE**

FOR: LTGEN WALT

FILE: COPY \_\_\_\_\_ FILLER \_\_\_\_\_ OF X2 2 (TWO) COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1 OF 2  
COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 042122Z DEC 66

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THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY.  
AN ANSWER IS REQUIRED.

*UB*

DTG 042122Z MONTH DEC 66

#57

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**EXCLUSIVE**

P 042122Z DEC 66  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRUL  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. ON NOVEMBER 15, 1966, THE HUNTLEY-BRINKLEY REPORT INCLUDED A FILM  
PURPORTING TO SHOW A VIET CONG PRISONER BEING INTERROGATED BY MEANS  
OF WHAT KENNETH GALE, THE NARRATOR, SAID WAS AN HOUR OF KARATE CHOPS  
AND KICKS ADMINISTERED BY A SOUTH VIETNAMESE ACCOMPANYING THE  
PRISONER'S CAPTORS, DELTA CO., 1ST BN, 1ST MARINES.

2. REQUEST ADVISE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, YOU CAN LEARN ABOUT THIS MATTER.  
REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

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PAGE    / OF    / PAGES

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