

OUTGOING MESSAGES

- ~~1. CG III MAF 030534ZOct66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
Exclusive for LtGen. KRULAK from Col. BRECHNER~~
2. CG III MAF 271342ZOct66 (SECRET) *Gp-4*
Exclusive for Gen. GREENE and LtGen. KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Visit of the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF at CAM RANH BAY
3. CG III MAF 060416ZNov66 (UNCLAS)
Personal for LtGen. KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Recommendation for Award; case of Col. CHAISSON
- ~~4. CG III MAF 080540ZNov66 (UNCLAS)
Personal for Capt. R. G. GOSSON, USN from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Congratulations on assuming Command of a Ship.~~
- ~~5. CG III MAF 080542ZNov66 (UNCLAS)
Personal for Capt. E. H. MAHER, USN, from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Thank You message to Capt. MAHER and Crew of USS REPOSE~~
6. CG III MAF 080928ZNov66 (SECRET) *Gp-6*
Personal for Gen. WESTMORELAND from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Diverse elements located at KHE SANH; Artillery Batteries
7. CG III MAF 080938ZNov66 (SECRET) *Gp-4*
Personal for LtGen. MOMYER from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Threat to Electronic Installations, DONG HA
8. CG III MAF 081312ZNov66 (SECRET) *Gp-4*
Personal for MajGen. ROBERTSHAW and MajGen. KYLE from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Threat to Electronic Installations, DONG HA
- ~~9. CG III MAF 100206ZNov66 (UNCLASS)
Personal to LtGen. LARSON from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Thank You for Marine Corps Birthday Message~~
10. CG III MAF 140525ZNov66 (SECRET) *Gp-4*
Personal for Gen. WESTMORELAND from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Army Hq for Admin Support of USA Units in ICTZ
11. CG III MAF 140710ZNov66 (SECRET) *Gp-4*
Personal for MajGens. NICKERSON and KYLE and BGen LEE from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Protection for Helicopters
12. CG III MAF 140720ZNov66 (SECRET) *Gp-4*
Personal for Gen. GREENE, Gen. WESTMORELAND and LtGen. KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
Subj: Detonation of Conex Box Locker and Explosion in area of CG Quarters

OUTGOING MESSAGES

13. CG III MAF 160630ZNov66 (SECRET) *gp-4*
 Personal to MajGen. NICKERSON and MajGen. KYLE from LtGen. WALT
 Subj: Serious Incidents Involving Vietnamese Civilians
14. CG III MAF 171018ZNov66 (CONFIDENTIAL) *gp-4*
 Personal for Gen. WESTMORELAND from LtGen. WALT
 Subj: Three Serious Incidents that may have not been report to MACV Hq.
15. CG III MAF 190746ZNov66 (CONFIDENTIAL) *gp-4*
 Personal from LtGen. WALT to MajGen. NICKERSON, MajGen. ROBERTSHAW,
 MajGen. KYLE and BGen. HERBOLD
 Subj: Reporting of Serious Incidents
16. CG III MAF 270116ZNov66 (CONFIDENTIAL) *gp-4*
 Personal for MajGen. NICKERSON, MajGen. ROBERTSHAW, MajGen. KYLE and
 BGen. HERBOLD Info Gen. GREENE and LtGen. KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
 Subj: Training of our Younger Leaders; regard to Serious Incidents
17. CG III MAF 220616Z Nov66 (SECRET) *gp-4*
 Personal for Gen. GREENE and LtGen. KRULAK from LtGen. WALT
 Subj: Shortage of Merchandise is AAFES DANANG
18. CG III MAF 290216Z Nov66 (SECRET) *gp-4*
 SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. KRULAK from MajGen. JONES
 Subj: Measurement of Progress in Pacification and Revolutionary Development
- ~~19. CG III MAF 291012Z Nov66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
 Personal for BGen. THRASH from LtGen. WALT
 Subj: Submission of Fitness Report on Col. BARRETT~~
- ~~20. CG III MAF 300349Z Nov66 (UNCLASS)
 Personal for MajGen. WEEDE from LtGen. WALT
 Subj: Readdressed of CG III MAF Message to MajGen. WEEDE in lieu of BGen. THRASH~~
21. CG III MAF 300608Z Nov66 (UNCLAS)
 Personal for MajGen. NICKERSON, MajGen. ROBERTSHAW and MajGen. KYLE from LtGen. WALT
 Subj: Under SECNAV recommendations to SECNAV concerning the Department's Policies
 and Procedures for Awarding Decorations and Medals

126

007

300608Z

NOV. 66

CG III MAF

**(PERSONAL FOR)
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for*

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CG III MAF

300608Z NOV 66

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letter*

*Copy #2
to Gen Elwood
3 Dec 66*

300608Z NOV 66

#21

DE RUMMF 2340 3340608
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 300608Z NOV 65
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG 1ST MARDIV
 CG 1ST MAW
 CG 3RD MARDIV

**HAS BEEN SENT
 (PERSONAL FOR)**

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

PERSONAL FOR MGEN NICKERSON, MGEN ROBERTSHAW, AND MGEN KYLE
 FROM LGEN WALT

1. UNDER SECNAV HAS FORMED A COMMITTEE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO SECNAV CONCERNING THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR AWARDING DECORATIONS AND MEDALS.
2. A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAS ASKED FOR MY VIEWS ON THE FOLLOWING:
 - A. ARE NAVY POLICY AND PROCEDURES RELATIVE TO AWARDS AND DECORATIONS TOO CONSERVATIVE OR UNDULY RESTRICTIVE?
 - B. IN CONTRAST TO POLICIES OF SISTER SERVICES, DO NAVY POLICIES MERIT MODIFICATION?
 - C. WHAT DEGREE OF DECENTRALIZATION IS DESIRABLE IN OUR PROCEDURES FOR DECORATIONS AND AWARDS?

PAGE TWO RUMMF 2340 UNCLAS E F T O

- D. TO WHAT DEGREE DO DECORATIONS AND AWARDS AFFECT MORALE AND WILLINGNESS TO MAKE MILITARY SERVICE A CAREER?
 - E. WOULD ANY LIBERALIZATION OF NAVY DEPARTMENT POLICIES BE INTERPRETED AS BREAKING FAITH WITH MILLIONS WHO HAVE SERVED UNDER MORE CONSERVATIVE POLICIES IN PAST YEARS?
3. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THESE QUESTIONS TO HELP ME TO MAKE A REPLY THAT WILL BE MOST BENEFICIAL TO THE COMMITTEE AND TO THE MARINE CORPS. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE AN EARLY REPLY, SO I MUST HAVE YOUR VIEWS BY 3 DEC. REGRET SHORT FUZE.
- BT

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290216Z

NOV 66

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DTG 290216Z NOV 66 MONTH

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SECRET

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FM CG III MAF
TO CG FUPFAC
BT

SECRET

SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRILL. FROM MAJ GEN JONES
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT

A. YR 240057Z TO LGEN GALT

1. MATTERS RAISED IN REFERENCE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN
DETAIL WITH MAJ JOHN P. ROOPE III USMC, THE SOLE MARINE
OFFICER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT DIRECTORATE (RDS-1).

2. MR ALLEN AND COL CLARK ARE WORKING AT THE REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THEY WILL
REMAIN IN VIETNAM FOR ANOTHER THREE WEEKS SUBSEQUENT TO
PRESENTATION OF THEIR STUDY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE MISSION COUNCIL. CURRENT THINKING IN RDS-1 IS THAT
ALLEN-CLARK PROPOSALS WILL NOT BE BOUGHT BY MISSION COUNCIL
AS THEY ARE TOO DIFFICULT TO APPLY IN PRESENT FORM, I.E.,
TO MANY QUALIFIERS, AND TO MANY DETAILED INDICIA FOR THE
VARIOUS FACTORS. RDS-1 IS ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP A COUNTRY
PROPOSAL WHICH IS NOT YET IN THE ROUGH DRAFT STAGE.

3. CURRENT THINKING HERE SUPPORTS HAMLET RATHER THAN VILLAGE
AS BASIC UNIT OF MEASURE. REASONS GIVEN FOR THIS VIEW ARE
AS FOLLOWS:

A. HAMLET IS THE BASIC DE FACTO COMMUNAL ENTITY. IT HAS REGULAR
STRUCTURE AND HAMLET CHIEF.

B. V.C. INFRASTRUCTURE STARTS WITH HAMLET LEVEL.

C. USE OF HAMLET PERMITS GREATER ACCURACY THAN VILLAGE.

D. VILLAGE CONSIDERED UNDERSTANDS UNITIES WHICH DO NOT
NECESSARILY CORRESPOND TO CULTURAL/SOCIAL ENTITIES.

4. VILLAGE IDEA IS BEING REEVALUATED ALTHOUGH I AM SCEPTICAL
AS TO HOW SUCCESSFUL IT MAY BE. BELIEVE THAT USE OF VILLAGES
AS UNIT OF MEASURE COULD BE TIED TO COMING UNLAGE AND VILLAGES
ELECTIONS WHICH SHOULD PRODUCE REPRESENTATIVE VILLAGE CHIEFS
AND VILLAGE COUNCILS FOR US TO WORK WITH.

5. WE WILL STAY WITH THIS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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220616Z

NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

FROM: LTGEN WALT

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CG III MAF

220616Z NOV 66

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4 Nov 66*

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#17

SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2**(PERSONAL FOR)**
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DE DDKE 1761 3260616
ZNY SSSSS
P 22061Z NOV 66
FM CG III MAF
TO WUND/CMC
TO ZEN/CG FMFPAC
BTSECRET PERSONAL TO GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT
SHORTAGE OF MERCHANDISE IS AAFES DANANG1. ALTHOUGH III MAF IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF AAFES STOCKS,
I FELT YOU SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS SINCE THEY
HAPPENED IN THE DANANG TAOR.2. IT APPEARS THAT OVER 300,000 CASES OF BEER IS MISSING FROM OPEN
STORAGE OF THE DANANG REGIONAL AAFES DEPOT. AAFES STORAGE IS GUARDED
BY HIRED NUNG GUARDS. THERE IS NO U.S. SECURITY.3. ON 19 NOV THE BEER STORAGE AREA WAS PLACED UNDER CID SURVEILLANCE
BY THE III MAF PMO. DURING THAT NIGHT, TWO VNAF AIRMEN AND ONE VN
CIVILIAN WERE APPREHENDED AFTER PAYING 30,000 PIASTRES TO NUNG GUARDS
TO TAKE ONE TRUCKLOAD OF BEER. INVESTIGATION INDICATED PREVIOUS
THEFTS ON NITES OF 14 NOV AND 15 NOV.4. JOINT INVESTIGATION BY USMC, ARMY CID, AIR FORCE OSI, NATIONAL
POLICE AND MACV J-1 IS CONTINUING.PAGE TWO DDKE 1761 SECRET
VERY RESPECTFULLY, LEW
GP-2
BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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270116Z

NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

FROM: LTGEN WALT

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NOV 66

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CG III MAF

270116Z NOV 66

CONFIDENTIAL

270116Z NOV 66

#16

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR FOLLOWUP

PP YNA WWND
 DE DDKE 2104 3310116
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 P 27011Z NOV 66
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FORLOGCOMD
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HAS BEEN SENT**(PERSONAL FOR)**

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL FOR MGEN NICKERSON, MGEN ROBERTSHAW,
 MGEN KYLE AND BGEN HERBOLD INFO GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM
 LTGEN WALT.

OUR NUMBER ONE PROBLEM:

1. I KNOW THAT ALL OF YOU ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AND ARE TAKING THE ACTIONS YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE TO MEET THE PROBLEMS REFLECTED IN THE SHARP RISE OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS WITHIN YOUR COMANDS. IN PLANNING YOUR EFFORTS, THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS APPEAR TO ME TO BE WORTHY OF YOUR CONSIDERATION.
2. IT IS AN OVER SIMPLIFICATION TO LAY THE BLAME ON THE QUALITY OF OUR LEADERSHIP, AT LEAST NOT AS A BLANKET INDICTMENT AS IT IS USUALLY

PAGE TWO DDKE 2104 CONFIDENTIAL
 EMPLOYED. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT PERHAPS THE FOCUS OF OUR LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN TOO SHARPLY CONCENTRATED ON OUR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND WE MAY NEED TO REORIENT AND BROADEN THIS FOCUS TO DEVOTE MORE TIME AND ATTENTION TO THE TRAINING OF OUR YOUNGER, LESS MATURE LEADERS AND TO MORE EYE BALL TO EYE BALL TALKS WITH ALL OUR TROOPS. WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH A PERIOD OF ACUTE SHORTAGES IN OUR COMPANY OFFICERS. WE HAVE HAD TO RELY FREQUENTLY UPON INEXPERIENCED NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN POSITIONS OF GREAT RESPONSIBILITY. TO OVERCOME THE EFFECTS OF THIS, WE NEED A PERIOD OF INTENSIVE PERSONAL EFFORT BY OUR MATURE, EXPERIENCED OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO COUNSEL AND TRAIN THEIR JUNIORS. FORMAL SCHOOLS ARE NOT PRACTICAL IN OUR PRESENT TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS, BUT FREQUENT INFORMAL SESSIONS ARE POSSIBLE AND OFFER POTENTIALLY RICH REWARDS. WE NEED DISCUSSIONS OF SUCH FUNDAMENTAL SUBJECTS AS ARE ILLUSTRATED IN THE MATERIAL PUBLISHED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PERSONAL RESPONSE STUDY. RECENT EVENTS OFFER CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IS MANIFESTLY POOR AND MUST BE CHANGED. THERE ARE ALSO STRONG INDICATIONS THAT WE NEED PERSONAL ATTENTION TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF LEADERSHIP AND VIGOROUS EFFORTS TO WEED OUT THOSE WHO ARE INEFFECTIVE.

3. IN COORDINATION WITH THESE EFFORTS, I BELIEVE WE CAN ELIMINATE SOME

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE THREE DDKE 2104 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 OF OUR FUTURE PROBLEMS BY SCREENING OUR COMMANDS TO SEPARATE THOSE MEN WHOSE RECORDS DEMONSTRATE THEIR UNFITNESS OR UNSUITABILITY FOR RETENTION, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE DEMANDS OF OUR SERVICE CALL FOR SELF DISCIPLINE IN A GREATER MEASURE THAT EVER BEFORE. TO ILLUSTRATE THE POINT, ONE OF OUR MEN WHO IS FACING TRIAL FOR MURDER HAS SIX NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENTS IN HIS RECORD. TRUE, THERE ARE OTHERS FACING SERIOUS CHARGES WHO HAVE NO DISCIPLINARY RECORDS, BUT JUDICIOUS SCREENING MAY ELIMINATE SOME OF OUR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS.

4. A MORE CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF OUR DISCIPLINARY REPORTS AND INCREASED EFFORTS TO MAKE OUR TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS AS PROMPT AS WE CAN MAKE THEM, WITHIN THE LAW, OFFERS ANOTHER AREA FOR ATTACK AGAINST A SITUATION THAT WE ALL RECOGNIZE IS NOT GOING TO BE RESOLVED BY ANY ONE MAGIC FORMULA.

5. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT OUR MEN FULLY UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE HOW DISASTROUS THEIR SOMETIMES THOUGHTLESS ACTIONS CAN BE TO OUR EFFORTS HERE. ONE MAN, THROUGH CRIME, OR JUST PLAIN WANTON DISREGARD OF HUMAN DIGNITY, CAN UNDO IN A FEW MINUTES THE PROLONGED EFFORTS OF A REINFORCED BATTALION. WE MAKE PROPAGANDA FOR THE ENEMY WITH EVERY HEEDLESS ACT TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE AS A PEOPLE AND AS INDIVIDUALS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE UNDO ALL THE GOOD THAT HAS BEEN DONE. WE MUST GET THIS

PAGE FOUR DDKE 2104 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 MESSAGE ACROSS.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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NOV 66

CG III MAF

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CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUMMF 1525 323074G

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P 19074Z NOV 66

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FORLOGCMD

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FROM LIGEN WALT TO MGEN NICKERSON, MGEN ROBERTSHAW, MGEN KYLE
AND EGEN HERBOLD

REPORTING OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS

A. MCO 05740.2

B. CG FMF PAC 17190Z NOV 66

C. FORCE ORDER 3480.1A

D. III MAF 18104Z NOV 66

1. I'M SURE YOU ARE ALL AWARE OF THE INTENSE INTEREST IN THE REPORTING OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS. WE MUST EXAMINE OUR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND PROCEDURES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE REFERENCES. HOWEVER, WE MUST ALSO ESTABLISH REASONABLE SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE THAT WE HAVE THE BASIC FACTS ESSENTIAL TO AN ACCURATE REPORT, BEFORE A

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PAGE TWO RUMNMF 1525 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 REPORT IS MADE. IN OUR EFFORT TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS FOR SPEED,
 WE SHOULD NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, PLACE THE BLAME ON OUR MARINES FOR INJURIES
 OR DEATHS THAT ARE LATER FOUND TO HAVE BEEN INFLICTED BY THE VC. THERE
 WILL NOT BE TIME, BEFORE REPORTING A SERIOUS INCIDENT, FOR A DELIBERATE
 INVESTIGATION OF THE TYPE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT DISCIPLINARY ACTION,
 BUT OUR PROCEDURES MUST INCLUDE A REQUIREMENT FOR A CHECK OF THE
 BASIC ACCURACY AND VALIDITY OF A REPORT BY A SENIOR OFFICER, BEFORE
 THE REPORT IS PUT ON THE AIR OR ON THE WIRE.

2. III MAF HAS ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY TO INFORM MACV ON SERIOUS
 INCIDENTS, WHETHER THEY ARISE AS A DIRECT RESULT OF OUR OPERATIONAL
 ACTIVITY OR AS A RESULT OF INDIVIDUAL WRONGDOING. IN ORDER TO MEET
 THIS RESPONSIBILITY, I ASK THAT EACH OF YOU ENSURE THAT MY HEADQUARTERS
 IS PROMPTLY INFORMED, BY MESSAGE TO III MAF COMMAND OPERATIONS CENTER,
 OF ANY REPORTS OF THIS NATURE THAT YOU SUBMIT THROUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE
 CHAIN OF COMMAND IN COMPLIANCE WITH REFERENCES A OR B.

3. I NEED NOT DWELL ON THE NEED FOR PROMPT AND ACCURATE REPORTING TO
 OUR SENIOR COMMANDERS AND THE IMPORTANCE TO THE GOOD NAME OF THE MARINE
 CORPS AND OUR RESPECTIVE COMMANDS THAT THE REPORTS BE AS ACCURATE AS
 WE CAN POSSIBLY MAKE THEM. THE MATTER IS OF SUCH GRAVE CONCERN TO THE
 COMMANDANT THAT I ASK EACH OF YOU TO GIVE IT YOUR CAREFUL PERSONAL

PAGE THREE RUMNMF 1525 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 ATTENTION.

GP-4
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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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171018Z

NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

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FROM: LTGEN WALT

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CG III MAF

171018Z NOV 66

CONFIDENTIAL

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4 Nov 66*

171018Z NOV 66

#14

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO RUNNMF 1374 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COMMAND. SCHULTZ WAS TRIED BY GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL ON 14-15 OCTOBER, CONVICTED OF PREMEDITATED MURDER, HE WAS SENTENCED TO DD AND CONFINEMENT AT HARD LABOR FOR LIFE. THE RECORD OF TRAIL IS NOW UNDER REVIEW BY THE STAFF LEGAL OFFICER, 1ST MARINE DIVISION.

B. ON 23 SEP 66, AN AMBUSH PATROL COMPOSED OF EIGHT MEMBERS OF COMPANY B, 1ST BN FIFTH MARINES, ALLEGEDLY RAIDED NINE VIETNAMESE HOUSES AT KYCHANH VILLAGE, BT 471140. FIVE VIETNAMESE ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED AND ONE 18 YEAR OLD FEMALE RAPED. A COMPLETE REPORT OF THIS INCIDENT WAS FORWARDED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 14 NOVEMBER, UPON OUR RECEIPT OF THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. THE RECORD OF THE FORMAL PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION RUNS TO OVER 600 PAGES AND IS STILL BEING TYPED. ALL ACCUSED HAVE MILITARY LAWYER COUNSEL AND IT IS HOPED THAT TRIAL, WHERE APPROPRIATE, WILL BEGIN DURING DECEMBER.

C. ON 22 SEPTEMBER, A TEN MAN SQUAD PATROL FROM 3D BN, SEVENTH MARINES, APPROACHED A DWELLING IN TRI BINH HAMLET, BINH THANG VILLAGE, BIN SONH DISTRICT. CPL STANLEY J. LUCZKO AND PFC CHARLES W. KEENAN, ALLEGEDLY ENTERED THE DWELLING AND SHOT AN ELDERLY WOMAN. HER BODY WAS PLACED ON A HAYSTACK WHICH WAS SET AFIRE. AS THEY MOVED AWAY, THEY ENCOUNTERED AN ELDERLY MAN IN THEIR PATH WHOM THE SAME TWO MEN ALLEGEDLY SHOT AND KILLED

PAGE THREE RUNNMF 1374 C O N F I D E N T I A L
A THIRD MAN, PFC RONALD PIATKOWSKI, IS ALLEGED TO HAVE CUT AN EAR FROM THE DECEASED. INVESTIGATION INTO THIS INCIDENT WAS INITIATED UPON RECEIPT OF A REPORT FROM AN ARVN LIAISON OFFICER WHO HAD LATER HEARD VERSIONS OF THE STORY FROM VILLAGERS. A FORMAL PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THE RECORD IS NOW BEING EXAMINED BY THE STAFF LEGAL OFFICER, 1ST MARINE DIVISION. TRIAL BY GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL WAS RECOMMENDED, BUT HAS NOT BEEN ORDERED PENDING REVIEW AND CONSIDERATION BY CG, 1ST MARDIV. A FULL REPORT OF THE INCIDENT WAS FORWARDED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 16 NOVEMBER.

3. I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THESE INCIDENTS, AS I KNOW YOU WILL BE. I HAVE DIRECTED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS THAT I FEEL CERTAIN WILL PRODUCE RESULTS.

4. THE BASIC FACTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO MY SUPERIORS IN THE MARINE CORPS CHAIN OF COMMAND AND MY COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU HAS BEEN ALERTED, BUT NO INQUIRIES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.

5. I WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH YOU AT THE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ON SUNDAY, SHOULD YOU DESIRE.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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160630Z

NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

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CG III MAF

160630Z NOV 66

TRANSMITTED 1DIV #001 AT 161550H
TRANSMITTED 3DIV #613 AT 162030H

*#2 barack
4 dec 68*

#13

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM - SECRET

3d MarDiv 2100/3
DE RUMMFF 1227 5200630

ZNY SSSSS

P 162630Z NOV 66

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T

PERSONAL TO MAJGEN NICKERSON AND MAJGEN KYLE FROM LTCEN WALT

SERIOUS INCIDENTS INVOLVING VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS

1. I AM GREATLY DISTURBED, AS I AM SURE YOU ARE, BY THE NUMBER OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF FELONIES BY MARINES AGAINST VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. THESE INCIDENTS SEEM TO OCCUR FOR THE MOST PART, DURING PATROLS. ALTHOUGH THESE ACTIONS ARE THE WORK OF BUT A VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF OUR MARINES, THEY REFLECT DISCREDIT OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF OFFENDERS AND DO VERY GRAVE DAMAGE TO OUR EFFORTS HERE.

2. YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS IS DIRECTED.

A. OUR COMPANY OFFICERS MUST BE ALERT TO DETECT SIGNS OF CALLOUS DESREGARD FOR OR ANTI-FATHY TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. WHERE EVIDENCE OF SUCH APPEARS, THE INDIVIDUAL MUST BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSELING AND SHOULD BE RELIEVED OF PATROL DUTIES PENDING SUCH EFFORTS.

PAGE TWO RUMMFF 1227 **S E C R E T**

B. SELECTION OF MEMBERS FOR COURTS-MARTIAL MERITS THE COMMANDER'S CAREFUL ATTENTION TO ENSURE THAT EACH HAS THE JUDGEMENT, MATURITY, EXPERIENCE, AND JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE IN THIS IMPORTANT DUTY.

C. YOUR SPECIAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE ATTITUDE RESPONSE PROGRAM DIRECTED IN FORCE ORDER 01782.3A OF 31 OCT 1966 CAN PAY RICH DIVIDENDS IN THIS AREA OF CONCERN.

D. PROMPT REPORTING OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS WHEN THEY OCCUR IS ESSENTIAL TO EFFORTS BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS TO PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TIMELY RESPONSE TO INQUIRES FROM CONGRESS, PARENTS, AND THE PRESS.

3. YOUR THOUGHTFUL SUGGESTIONS OF OTHER METHODS OR PROCEDURES FOR EFFECTIVE ATTACK ON THIS PROBLEM ARE EARNESTLY SOLICITED.

GP-4

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NOV 66

CG III MAF

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TRANSMITTED SAIGON 447 AT 141708H
TRANSMITTED FMFPAG 727 AT 141715H

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4 Nov 68

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2**(PERSONAL FOR)**CO RUECEM RUMKM
DE RUMNMF 106 3130720
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C 140720Z NOV 66
FM CG III NAF
TO RUECEM/CNC
ZEN RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMKM/CG PNFPAC
BT**HAS BEEN SENT****S E C R E T**PERSONAL FOR GEN GREENE, GEN WESTCHELAND AND LTGEN KRULAK
FROM LTGEN WALT

1. THIS MORNING AT 2215, A DEMOLITION CONEX BOX LOCKER AT THE NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT COMPOUND ADJACENT TO MY QUARTERS WAS DETONATED BY SOME UNKNOWN MEANS. THE CONEX BOX CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 500 POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES AND WAS LOCKED FROM THE OUTSIDE. IT HAD BEEN INSPECTED SHORTLY BEFORE THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED. THE EXPLOSION WAS OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO DESTROY THE CONEX BOX AND ADJACENT BUILDING AND DID HEAVY DAMAGE TO TWO OTHER BUILDINGS IN THE VICINITY. THE CEMENT WALL BETWEEN THE COMPOUND AND MY QUARTERS APPARENTLY PREVENTED TOTAL DAMAGE TO MY QUARTERS AND SURROUNDING BUILDINGS. HOWEVER, THE BLAST FORCE OVER THE TOP OF THE WALL RIPPED OFF

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 106 S E C R E T

A PART OF THE ROOF OF MY QUARTERS TEARING HOLES IN THE CEILINGS AND CURLED DOWN INTO THE QUARTER AND BLEW OUT ALL THE WINDOW AND DOORS. I WAS BLOWN OUT OF BED BUT WAS NOT HURT PHYSICALLY EXCEPT FOR A LOUD RINGING IN MY EARS FOR A TIME.

2. I REPORT TO ALL OF YOU ON THIS BECAUSE THE EXPLOSION WAS OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AT THE NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT AS TO BLOW THE DOORS OPEN AT THE PRESS CENTER ACROSS THE RIVER FROM III NAF HEADQUARTERS. AND SOME OF THE REPORTERS WERE IMMEDIATELY INQUISITIVE AS TO WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I'M MAKING EVERY EFFORT NOT TO LET THEM KNOW OF THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO MY QUARTERS. THEIR NEWS REPORTS, I'M SURE, WILL DEAL WITH THE NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT EXPLOSION WHICH, AS I SAID, DID CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DAMAGE, BUT THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

3. THE SENIOR ADVISOR AT THE NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT IS CONFIDENT THAT THE DETONATION WAS AN INSIDE JOB.

4. A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION IS UNDERWAY WHICH I HOPE WILL GIVE US MORE DETAILS. VERY RESPECTFULLY, LEW.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGESCOPY 2 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

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63

HAS BEEN SENT

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140710Z

NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

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CG III MAF

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140710Z NOV 66

TRANSMITTED 1DIV 549 AT 141720H
WITH TAREING INSTRUCTIONS TO 2D BDE ROKMC

TRANSMITTED 3DIV 100 AT 141735H

*Copy #3 forwarded
To Maj Gen Robertshaw
CG 1STMAW
15 Nov 66*

#11

SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/z**(PERSONAL FOR)****HAS BEEN SENT**RR RUMNLA
DE RUMNMF 1067 3180710
ZNY SSSSS
R 140710Z NOV 66
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMNLA/CG SECOND BDE ROKMC
ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR MGENS NICKERSON AND KYLE AND BGEN LEE
FROM LTGEN WALT
THE HELICOPTER HAS BECOME ONE OF OUR MOST VALUABLE ASSETS IN THIS WAR
IN VIETNAM. THIS ASSET MUST BE UTILIZED JUDICIOUSLY AND MUST BE
PROTECTED AT ALL COSTS. I HAVE BECOME QUITE CONCERNED OVER THE ALARMING
RATE AT WHICH OUR HELICOPTERS ARE BEING HIT BY SMALL ARMS FIRE,
ESPECIALLY DURING THAT PERIOD JUST PRIOR TO LANDING AND JUST AFTER
TAKE OFF. THIS SEEMS TO STEM FROM THE FACT THAT FRIENDLY TROOPS IN THE
AREAS OF LIFTOUT ARE NOT ENSURING SECURITY OF THE AREA AND ARE NOT
UTILIZING ROUND SUPPRESSION FIRE TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT DURING THESE
VULNERABLE PERIODS. IN MANY INSTANCES, THESE HELICOPTERS HAVE
RECEIVED HITS FROM SMALL ARMS IN A SUPPOSEDLY SECURE AREA. APPROXIMATELY
60 PERCENT OF THE HELICOPTERS HIT HAVE BEEN HIT ON TROOP LIFT,
RESUPPLY AND MED-EVAC MISSIONS. I FELL THAT PROPERLY EMPLOYED FIRE

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 1067 S E C R E T
SUPPRESSION TACTICS COULD WELL HAVE PRECLUDED THE MAJORITY OF THESE
INCIDENTS. ANOTHER AREA OF CONCERN IS THE APPARENT MISUSE OF HELICOPTERS
IN OTHER THAN NECESSARY AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. HELICOPTER ASSETS
WITHIN III MAF ARE NOT ADEQUATE TO SATISFY ALL REQUIREMENTS.
THEREFORE, ONLY BY MAINTAINING CLOSE SUPERVISION OF THEIR USE
WILL WE BE ABLE TO REALIZE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF OUR HELICOPTERS.
OUR PILOTS ARE WELL TRAINED AND READY TO RESPOND TO OUR NEEDS. WE CAN
BEST HELP THEM BY PLANNING OUR RESUPPLY MISSIONS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS
AND PERIODS OF GOOD WEATHER IF POSSIBLE AND PROVIDING THEM WITH
REASONABLY SECURE LANDING ZONES. YOUR COOPERATION IN ASSISTING
WE IN THIS EFFORT IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. REGARDS LTGEN WALT
GP-4
BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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140525Z

NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

FROM: LTGEN WALT

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CG III MAF

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140525Z NOV 66

CG *[Signature]*

Jim

Route 15 G. 3 *[Signature]*

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4/10/68*

140525Z

NOV 66

#10

SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

////////////////PERSONAL FOR FOLLOWS////////////////////////////////

PERSONAL FOROO RUMSMA
DE RUMMF 1061 3180523
ZNY SSSSS
O 140525Z NOV 66
FM CG IIE MAF
TO COMUSMACV
BT**HAS BEEN SENT**SECRET PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LEGEN WALK
ARMY HQ FOR ADMIN SUPPORT OF USA UNITS IN ICTZ

1. YOU INDICATED ON YOUR LAST VISIT YOUR DESIRE TO ESTABLISH IN ICTZ AN ADMINISTRATIVE HQ WHOSE FUNCTION WOULD BE TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT TO USA UNITS IN THIS AREA. IT WAS AND REMAINS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH A HQ, WHEN ESTABLISHED, WOULD OPERATE UNDER OPCOM OF THIS HEADQUARTERS AND WOULD FULFILL ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE, LOGISTIC, AND DISCIPLINARY TYPE FUNCTIONS.

2. TWO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS APPEAR TO RELATE TO THIS NEW HEADQUARTERS AND ARE NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE YOU INTENDED FOR IT.

3. ON 11 NOVEMBER TWO OFFICERS, ONE FROM USARV AND ONE FROM IMA TRANG (DEPUTY FORV ARTY CDR) PAID A STAFF VISIT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW COMMAND. THESE OFFICERS WERE ORIENTED TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP HEADQUARTERS, NOT AN ADMINISTRATIVE HQ. A FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP HEADQUARTERS HAS ONLY A

PAGE TWO RUMMF 1061 SECRET

TACTICAL CONTATION FOR ME, AND EVEN SHOULD ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE LIMIT ITS FUNCTIONS, ITS NAME COULD ONLY LEAD TO CONTINUING MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO ITS FUNCTION.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF HQ, USMACV COMMAND STAFF CONFERENCE ACTION MEMO NO 36-79 DATED 9 NOVEMBER. THIS DOCUMENT INDICATES ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN TO "FORM A PROVISIONAL GROUP HQ FOR USA ARTILLERY UNITS IN I CTZ; COMMANDER TO DETERMINE REQUES FOR O-1 AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT USA ARTILLERY BATTALIONS".

3. I SEE NO NEED FOR A HQ AS CONTEMPLATED IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

4. CLARIFICATION IS REQUESTED. REGARDS, LW

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BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

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E. Glump

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION 3DIV Ø8221ØH

(Handwritten initials)

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4 Nov 68*

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NOV 66

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2**(PERSONAL FOR)**

////////////////// P E R S O N A L F O R F O L L O W S //////////////////

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DE RUMMF 648 3121312

ZNY 55555

O 281312Z NOV 66

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMAV

CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E TPERSONAL TO MAJGEN ROBERT LEAV AND MAJGEN KYLE FROM LTGEN WALT
THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM CG III MAF TO CG TEN AIR FORCE PASSED
FOR YOUR INFORMATION

THREAT TO ELECTRONIC INSTALLATIONS, DONG HA

1. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES ENEMY CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY ARMY OF UP TO
122MM CALIBRE WITH RANGES UP TO 21,000 METERS FROM POSITIONS IN NORTHERN
SECTOR DMZ. THIS CAPABILITY POSES THREAT TO INSTALLATIONS IN AND NEAR
DONG HA, TWO OF THE MOST CRITICAL OF WHICH ARE MARINE CORPS TPO-10
AND USAF MSQ-77.2. IN VIEW OF ABOVE I HAVE DIRECTED FIRST MAJ TO SELECT ASAP PRIMARY
AND ALTERNATE SITES FOR TPO-10 SOUTH OF E-W GRID LINE 56.3. SUGGEST YOU MIGHT WANT TO RELOCATE YOUR MSQ-77. IF SO, FURTHER
SUGGEST OUR PEOPLE AT DONG HA WORK TOGETHER ON THIS PROJECT.
REGARDS LEV.

PAGE TWO RUMMF 648 S E C R E T

GP-4

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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080938Z

NOV 66

CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

FROM: LTGEN WALT

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CG III MAF

080938Z NOV 66

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NOV 66

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

PERSONAL FOR FOLLOWS

(PERSONAL FOR)

PP RUMSAL
DE RUMNMF 617 312038
ZNY SSSSS
P 080938Z NOV 66
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSAL/CG 7TH AF
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET PERSONAL TO LTGEN HOUVER FROM LTGEN WALT
THREAT TO ELECTRONIC INSTALLATIONS, DONG HA
1. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES ENEMY CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY ARTY OF UP TO
122MM CALIBRE WITH RANGES UP TO 21,000 METERS FROM POSITIONS IN
NORTHERN SECTOR DMZ. THIS CAPABILITY POSES THREAT TO INSTALLATIONS
IN AND NEAR DONG HA, TWO OF THE MOST CRITICAL OF WHICH ARE MARINE
CORPS TPQ-10 AND USAF HSO-77.
2. IN VIEW OF ABOVE I HAVE DEREGIED FRST MAW TO SELECT ASAP PRIMARY
AND ALTERNATE SITES FOR TPQ-10 SOUTH OF E-W GRID LINE 96.
3. SUGGEST YOU MIGHT WANT TO RELOCATE YOUR HSO-77. IF SO, FURTHER
SUGGEST OUR PEOPLE AT DONG HA WORK TOGETHER ON THIS PROJECT.
REGARDS LEW
GP-4
BT

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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NOV 66

CG III MAF

PERSONAL FOR

FROM: LTGEN WALT

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CG III MAF

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PERSONAL FOR FOLLOWS

MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2**(PERSONAL FOR)**
HAS BEEN SENTPP RUMSMA
DE RUMNMF 616 3120928
ZNY SSSSS
P 080928Z NOV 66
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
BT

S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN WALT
 A. CG III MAF 070828Z NOV
 1. DURING YOUR VISIT TO THE KHE SANH AREA ON 6 NOV WE DISCUSSED
 A. COORDINATION OF THE EFFORTS OF THE DIVERSE ELEMENTS LOCATED
 AT KHE SANH.
 B. PROBLEMS INCIDENT TO REGISTRATION OF 175MM FIRES IN THE KHE
 SANH AREA.
 C. PREPARATION OF A STUDY OF EFFECTS OF ENEMY ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES
 FROM POSITIONS IN NORTHERN SECTOR OF DMZ.
 2. IMPLEMENTING ACTION ADDRESSED TO THE COORDINATION PROBLEM WAS
 TAKEN BY REF A.
 3. THE FOLLOWING RECAPITULATES THE COMPLETION OF 175MM GUN BN
 REGISTRATION:
 A. BTRY C, 6TH BN 27TH ARTY REGISTERED IN KHE SANH AREA ON 7 OCT.
 B. THIS BTRY WAS ATTACHED TO 2D BN 94TH ARTY 231200H OCT, WHICH
 USED C BTRY REGISTRATION DATA UNTIL 3 NOV WHEN EFFORTS TO REGISTER

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 616 **S E C R E T**
ENTIRE BN COMMENCED.C. 3 NOV-REGISTRATION EFFORTS CANCELLED DUE FAILURE TO PROCURE
CLEARANCE TO FIRE IN AREA.

4 NOV-OBSERVATION A/C COMMUNICATION FAILURE.

5 NOV-FIRING PRECLUDED DUE FRIENDLY TROOP ACTIVITIES IN AREA.

6 NOV-LIAISON PARTY DISPATCHED TO KHE SANH FOR COORDINATION
OF PROBLEM.

7 NOV-REGISTRATION OF ALL BATTERIES COMPLETED.

D. DIRECT AND POSITIVE COMMUNICATIONS KHE SANH - DONG HA USING
RADIO RELAY AND PRC 47 ESTABLISHED 7 NOV FOR EXCLUSIVE ARTY CONTROL.4. THE STUDY DESCRIBED IN PARA 1C ABOVE IS PROCEEDING ON AN
URGENT BASIS. RESULTS WILL BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED.

REGARDS, LEW

GP-4

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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NOV 66

CG III MAF

FOR CG FMFPAC

(PERSONAL FOR)

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*Copy #2 to BGen Chaisson
17 Nov 66*

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(PERSONAL FOR)

OO RUHKM
 DE RUMNMF 403 3100416
 ZNY EEEEE
 O 06041GZ NOV 66
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM /CG FMFPAC
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT

1. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT COLONEL JOHN R. CHAISSON, USMC, BE AWARDED A GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF A SECOND LEGION OF MERIT FOR SERVICE AS SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING CITATION:
 FOR EXCEPTIONALLY MERITORIOUS CONDUCT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OUTSTANDING SERVICE AS ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, DURING THE PERIOD 24 JANUARY TO 7 NOVEMBER 1966. THROUGHOUT THIS NINE-MONTH PERIOD COLONEL CHAISSON EXHIBITED SUPERIOR PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE AND RESOURCEFULNESS IN PLANNING, COORDINATING AND SUPERVISING THE OPERATIONS OF THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. THESE EXTENSIVE TACTICAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDED SOME THIRTY-NINE MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE I CORPS AREA WHICH INFLICTED EXTREMELY HEAVY CASUALTIES AGAINST ORGANIZED ENEMY UNITS. THEY ALSO INCLUDED AN INTENSIVE PROGRAM OF THOUSANDS OF

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 403 UNCLAS E F T O

SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS WHICH CAUSED EQUALLY HEAVY CASUALTIES AMONG ENEMY GUERRILLAS AND WAS LARGELY INSTRUMENTAL IN EXPANDING MARINE AREAS OF INFLUENCE OVER SOME SEVEN HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE SQUARE MILES OF TERRITORY PREVIOUSLY DOMINATED BY INSURGENT COMMUNIST FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, COLONEL CHAISSON SKILLFULLY COORDINATED THE INTRODUCTION TO VIETNAM OF MANY MARINE UNITS TOTALING SOME 18,000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS. HIS ABILITY TO WORK HARMONIOUSLY WITH OFFICERS OF OTHER U.S. SERVICES AND WITH OFFICERS OF ALL VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES PLAYED A HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE WAR IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD COLONEL CHAISSON CONTINUALLY VISITED FORWARD POSITIONS TO SEE FIRST HAND THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY FRONT-LINE UNITS. DURING APRIL AND MAY, WHEN DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OPPOSED FORCES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, COLONEL CHAISSON SERVED AS A NEGOTIATOR ON FOUR OCCASIONS WITH VARIOUS LEADERS. IN THREE OF THESE FOUR CASES, EACH OF WHICH WERE FRAUGHT WITH PERSONAL DANGER AND IN ONE OF WHICH HE CAME UNDER TANK AND AIRCRAFT FIRE, HE WAS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH

Copy 3 of 3

#3

PAGE THREE RUMNMF 403 UNCLAS E F T O
ENSURED THE SAFETY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS AND REDUCED
THE PROBABILITY OF BLOODSHED BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY
VIETNAMESE COMBATING OTHER VIETNAMESE. COLONEL CHAISSON'S STAMINA,
INTYRING DEDICATION TO DUTY, DISTINGUISHED PROFESSIONAL SKILL,
SUPERIOR LEADERSHIP AND GREAT PERSONAL COURAGE WERE AN
INSPIRATION TO ALL WITH WHOM HE SERVED, AND WERE IN KEEPING
WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE U.S. NAVAL SERVICE.
COLONEL CHAISSON IS AUTHORIZED TO WEAR THE COMBAT "V".
2. PREVIOUS DECORATIONS INCLUDE THE LEGION OF MERIT (1945) AND
BRONZE STAR MEDAL (1944).
3. REQUEST REPLY IN TIME TO PERMIT PRESENTATION OF AWARD AT 071000Z.
REGARDS, LEW
BT

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EXCLUSIVE

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3dMarDiv - 2100/2

O 271342Z OCT 66

FM CG III MAF

TO CMC

CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRETEXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT
VISIT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT CAM RANH BAY

1. AT 0730 ON THE MORNING OF 26 OCTOBER, I RECEIVED WORD THAT THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WOULD BE COMING INTO CAM RANH BAY ON THE 26TH INSTEAD OF INTO DANANG ON THE 27TH AS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY PLANNED. WE WERE ASKED TO FURNISH A PORTION OF THE HONOR GUARD, OUR PORTION TO CONSIST OF 200 MARINES IN COMBAT UNIFORM, TOGETHER WITH THE DIVISION AND WING COMMANDERS, ALL OF WHOM WERE TO BE AT CAM RANH BAY NOT LATER THAN 1500 ON THE 26TH. I WAS GIVEN ORDERS TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO CAM RANH BAY TO MEET WITH WESTY CONCERNING FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCCASION.

2. AT THIS MEETING, WESTY SADDLED BILL JONES WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING THE ENTIRE OPERATION. SWEDZ

PAGE TWO

LARSON WAS GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY. MOMYER WAS GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MOVING TROOPS IN FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY, A TOTAL OF ABOUT 800 FOR THE HONOR GUARD. I VOLUNTEERED TO MOVE OUR TROOPS BY OUR OWN AIRCRAFT. THIS MEETING BROKE UP AT 1115 AND I FLEW BACK TO DANANG TO PASS OUT INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING OUR CONTRIBUTION FOR THE OCCASION.

3. ALL KEY COMMANDERS WERE ASSEMBLED BY WESTY AT THE CAM RANH BAY HEADQUARTERS BRIEFING ROOM ABOUT 1545. AMBASSADOR LODGE AND OTHER CIVILIANS WERE PRESENT. THE PLAN OF THE CEREMONY WAS LAID OUT, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WERE DELEGATED TO MEET THE PRESIDENT AT PLANE-SIDE AND ALSO TO SIT WITH HIM ON THE REVIEWING STAND. THIS GENERALLY INCLUDED ALL 3-STAR GENERALS AND ABOVE AND REAR ADMIRAL WARD. A SIZEABLE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION SHOWED, INCLUDING THIEU, KY, VIEN AND CO. THEY WERE PLACED AT THE HEAD OF THE RECEIVING LINE AT PLANE-SIDE. THE HONOR GUARD AND CEREMONY WERE HELD ON ONE OF THE PARKING APRONS OF THE AIRFIELD.

4. AT 1635 THE PRESIDENT AND MR RUSK ARRIVED WITH AN OFFICIAL PARTY OF ABOUT 15 AND AT LEAST 100 NEWSMEN. AFTER THE PLANE-SIDE FORMALITIES, WE MOVED DIRECTLY TO THE REVIEWING STAND

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3dMarDiv - 2100/2

PAGE THREE

WHICH CONSISTED OF CHAIRS ON A LOW-BOY. HONORS WERE RENDERED, THE PRESIDENT TROOPED THE LINE, AND RECEIVED THE HONOR GUARD WHICH WAS MADE UP OF ALL U.S. SERVICES. HE THEN PINNED DECORATIONS ON THREE ARMY PERSONNEL, ONE MARINE (GYSGT COFFMAN), AND AN AIR FORCE CAPTAIN. HE THEN RETURNED TO THE REVIEWING STAND AT WHICH TIME PRESIDENT THIEU MADE A SHORT WELCOMING SPEECH AND TOLD HOW MUCH SOUTH VIETNAM APPRECIATED WHAT THE U.S. HAD DONE AND WAS DOING FOR THEM. AFTER THIS, PRESIDENT JOHNSON SPOKE FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES. IT WAS A VERY WARM ADDRESS DIRECTED AT THE TROOPS AND WAS EXCEPTIONALLY WELL RECEIVED.

5. PRESIDENT JOHNSON THEN WENT WITH A SMALL PARTY TO THE HOSPITAL TO VISIT SOME COMBAT CASUALTIES. FROM THERE, HE WENT TO AN ENLISTED MESS FOR DINNER.

FOLLOWING THIS, HE CAME TO THE OFFICER'S CLUB WHERE HE AND MR RUSK TOOK OFF COAT AND TIE AND RELAXED WITH A DRINK IN HAND FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES WITH THE GENERAL OFFICERS. AT THIS TIME PRESIDENT JOHNSON AGAIN SPOKE FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES STATING HOW PROUD AND GRATEFUL HE WAS FOR THE LEADERSHIP THAT HAD BEEN SHOWN HERE IN VIETNAM, AND NOW HE CONSIDERED

PAGE FOUR

GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONE OF THE FINEST LEADERS THE ARMY EVER HAD. (I FORGOT TO MENTION THAT HE HAD ALREADY PINNED A DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL ON GENERAL WESTMORELAND AT THE REVIEWING STAND AND SAID MANY WORDS OF PRAISE FOR THE WORK HE HAD DONE AND THE LEADERSHIP HE HAD SHOWN IN THE VIETNAM WAR.)

6. AFTER THE SHORT SESSION WITH THE GENERAL OFFICERS, DURING WHICH MR RUSK ALSO SPOKE FOR ABOUT FIVE MINUTES ON THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE ARE DOING HERE, THE PRESIDENT AND PARTY WENT BACK AND BOARDED THEIR AIRPLANE. THIS WAS NEARLY 2-1/2 HOURS FROM THE TIME THEY HAD LANDED. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND MR RUSK SEEMED IN EXCELLENT MOOD. I HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF A PERSONAL CONVERSATION WITH THEM IN WHICH THEY LAUDED THE WORK THAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN I CORPS.

7. GOING BACK TO THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL, AS SOON AS THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION ARRIVED AT THE AIRFIELD BOTH PRESIDENT THIEU AND PRIME MINISTER KY CAME OVER TO WHERE I WAS STANDING ON THE SIDELINES AND EXPRESSED TO ME GREAT ENTHUSIASM FOR WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AT MANILA. PRIME MINISTER KY STATED THAT HE HAD TAKEN SEVERAL MINUTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S

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PAGE FIVE

TIME IN MANILA TO COMPLIMENT THE MARINES IN I CORPS FOR THE JOB THEY WERE DOING, NOT ONLY IN FIGHTING THE ENEMY, BUT FOR WHAT WE WERE DOING FOR THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THIEU MADE SIMILAR REMARKS. THESE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THIEU AND KY WERE ENTIRELY VOLUNTARY. I ASKED THEM NO QUESTIONS. CLEARLY WE MUST AT LEAST HAVE THE BACKING OF GENERAL NAM IN OUR EFFORTS HERE AND THIS, OF COURSE, IS ENCOURAGING. VERY RESPECTFULLY, LEW.
GP-4

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