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
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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, III MAF ltr 3/JEF/sbc over 3480  
Ser: 0036467 dtd 12 February 1967

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

1. Forwarded.

  
M. C. DALBY  
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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3/JEF/60  
3480  
HEADQUARTERS III MAP  
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12 Feb 1967

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology  
for December 1966

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1)  
is submitted herewith.

*R. B. Neville*

R. B. NEVILLE  
Deputy Chief of Staff

GROUP 1  
Downgraded at 3 year interval  
Declassified after 12 years

Copy 1 of 7 copies

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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

DECEMBER 1966

GROUP - 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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PART ONE - ORGANIZATION DATA  
PART TWO - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS  
PART THREE - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS  
PART FOUR - REFERENCES/ENCLOSURES

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATION DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDING

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR PERIOD 1-31 DECEMBER 1966

CHIEF OF STAFF

BGEN JONAS M. PLATT, USMC  
1-5 DECEMBER 1966

BGEN HUGH M. ELWOOD, USMC  
6-31 DECEMBER 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

COL ROBERT B. NEVILLE, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

COL JOHN L. MAHON, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

COL ROY H. THOMPSON, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

COL DREW J. BARRETT, JR. USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4

COL JOSEPH F. QUILTY, JR. USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5

COL ERIC S. HOLMGRAIN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6

LTCOL MARVIN D. VOLKERT, USMC

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OFFICER

COL ROBERT R. READ, USMC

SUPPLY OFFICER

COL ARTHUR T. HILL, USMC

ENGINEER OFFICER

COL CHARLES H. HORN, USMC

ADJUTANT

MAJOR JOHN T. REVILLE, USMC

COMPTROLLER

LTCOL MELVIN W. SNOW, USMC

CHAPLAIN

CAPT EARL V. LYONS, USN

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

COL THOMAS M. FIELDS, USMC

Encl

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OIC COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER

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FOOD SERVICES OFFICER

LEGAL OFFICER

SURGEON

DENTAL OFFICER

MOTOR TRANSPORTATION OFFICER

ORDNANCE OFFICER

PROTOCOL OFFICER

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

TRANSPORTATION/EMBARKATION OFFICER

INSPECTOR

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1ST MARINE DIVISION

3RD MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND

7TH ENGINEER BATTALION

9TH ENGINEER BATTALION

11TH ENGINEER BATTALION

SUB UNIT #1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY,  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

LTCOL ALEXANDER S. RUGGIERO, USMC  
1-21 DECEMBER 1966

LTCOL ROBERT E. YOUNG, USMC  
22-31 DECEMBER 1966

MAJOR WILLIS P. HALL, JR. USMC

COL ROBERT B. NEVILLE, USMC

CAPT HOWARD A. BAKER, USN

CAPT KENNETH L. MORGAN, USN

LTCOL CHARLES A. TONNACLIFF, USMC

LTCOL JOHN C. THOMAS, USMC

MAJOR JOHN A. LIVINGSTONE, USMC

COL CARL A. SACHS, USMC

MAJOR EUGENE A. SILVERTHORN, USMC

COL CLAY A. BOYD, USMC

COMMANDERS

MGEN HERMAN NICKERSON, JR. USMC

MGEN WOOD B. KYLE, USMC

MGEN LOUIS B. ROBERTSHAW, USMC

BGEN JAMES E. HERBOLD, JR. USMC

LTCOL FRANK W. HARRIS, III USMC

LTCOL RICHARD W. CRISPEN, USMC

LTCOL ROSS L. MULFORD, USMC

CAPT RUSSELL W. RADER, USMC

MAJOR VERNON L. SYLVESTER, USMC

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PART TWO  
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. GENERAL. During December III MAF Headquarters was located in East Danang, Republic of Vietnam. The average personnel strength for December was 71,582 an increase of 7,921 over the previous month.

B. ACTIVITIES. III MAF continued to be guided by COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966 in the pursuit of III MAF objectives for December.

II. OVERALL EVALUATION.

A. In December the number of small unit operations increased by 7,702 over the average number of such operations conducted during the past three months. This is an increase of 71%, reflecting the increased emphasis placed upon counter-guerilla operations in the month of December. This expansion of small unit operations resulted in the fourth highest number of contacts realized during small unit operations since July 1966. A total of 1007 contacts, resulting in 270 KIA (Confirmed).

December continued to reflect a high rate of VC/NVA captured in III MAF operations. The 141 VC/NVA captured during the month is the highest number for a single month in the last seven months period. It is the second highest monthly rate of capture attained during operations in 1966.

During the Christmas "truce" period III MAF maintained its posture of readiness to react to enemy action while holding defensive positions. During this 48 hour period there were a total of 49 VC initiated truce violations. Of these, 33 incidents occurred against units or personnel on the ground and 16 were initiated against aircraft. These resulted in friendly losses of 1 USMC KIA, 14 USMC WIA, 1 PF KIA, 2 civilians killed and 5 civilians wounded. Enemy casualties were 13 KIA (Confirmed) and 14 KIA (Probable).

The New Years "truce" period began on 31 December and on that day a major sighting of approximately 1,000 well armed VC, carrying mortars and machine guns, was made in Thua Thien Province. This force was observed for several hours and at 1900H 31 December air strikes and artillery fire was called in. No assessment of damage could be made due to poor visibility in the area. During the New Years truce period there were a total

of 61 violations committed by the VC in I CTZ. These resulted in 6 USMC KIA, 6 USMC WIA, 1 PF KIA and 1 civilian wounded. Enemy casualties were 12 VC KIA (Confirmed), 3 VC KIA (Probable), 3 VC WIA (Probable), 4 PW's and 1 detainee.

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OPERATIONS.

A. DISCUSSION. During December III MAF continued to pursue three major objectives: 1. Destruction of enemy forces; 2. Revolutionary Development; 3. Base Defense.

(1) Destruction of enemy forces:

(a) Throughout December III MAF conducted 12 major unit operations. Two of these, Prairie and Pawnee III were continued from November. III MAF conducted 18,602 small unit operations resulting in 1007 small unit contacts. III MAF forces, in all operations inflicted 628 enemy KIA confirmed and 825 KIA probables.

(b) There were 351 infantry battalion days of operation recorded by III MAF forces in December. This total compares with 305 infantry battalion days in November and 306 in October.

(2) Revolutionary Development: The 18,602 small unit operations (patrols, ambushes, clearing) saturated areas of guerrilla activity in support of I CTZ revolutionary development operations. Of the 12 major unit operations conducted, 5 were within the Danang TAOR in areas of substantial guerrilla activity. These operations inflicted heavy damage to VC ability to restrict the progress of revolutionary development operations.

There were 5 County Fair operations during December in areas made secure by III MAF operations. These operations resulted in 5 VC KIA confirmed, 14 VC captured, 6 weapons captured and 6,032 Vietnamese civilians were screened. MEDCAP assistance was given to 1,496 Vietnamese during these County Fairs.

(3) Base Defense: The 1st Military Police Battalion continued to provide security for the Danang Air Base complex. At Chu Lai, the Chu Lai Defense Command performed this function. The small unit operations mentioned in paragraph (1) above contributed greatly to the accomplishment of base defense in all TAOR's.



B. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

## (1) Major Operations:

UNCLASSIFIED (a) PRAIRIE: During 1-31 December 1966, Operation Prairie continued with numerous small unit contacts and infrequent significant contacts. At 090900H Platoon from H/2/3dMar observed and fired SA at 12 VC, VC returned fire and withdrew. The area was searched resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf). Again on 9 December Co M/3/3dMar received SA from an enemy squad, returned SA and AW fire with unknown results. At 091633H 3/3 Rock Pile OP observed 13 NVA, called in artillery with unknown results. At 100005H 3/4 CP received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, called in artillery with unknown results. At 110606H 3/26th Marines became OpCon to 3rdMarDiv (Fwd) and joined Operation Prairie. At 121000H 2/9th Marines chopped from Operation Prairie. At 131415H Recon Team observed 30 NVA, called in artillery with unknown results. At 200915H E/2/3d Marines engaged a VC squad armed with SA and AW, resulting in 3 VC KIA (Conf), 5 VC KIA (Prob). At 250600H Prov Bn was disbanded. At 251015H 4thMar chopped OpCon to CG 3dMarDiv. At 251505H, 3/3 OP and Squad patrol received 57mm fire followed by 107 rounds of unknown caliber mortar fire, called in 81mm mortars and artillery on suspected enemy position. At 282245H Btrys I/3/12thMar and W/1/13thMar received between 100 and 150 rounds of unknown caliber mortar fire. Artillery and 81mm mortar fire was called in with unknown results. Results for the period 1-31 December were as follows: USMC: 39 KIA, 231 WIA; Enemy: 42 VC KIA(Conf), 47 VC KIA(Prob), 2 NVAC, 2 VCC, 19 VCS, 26 weapons captured. Cumulative results for period 3 August 1966 to and including 31 December 1966 were: USMC: 216 KIA, 1052 WIA, 1 MIA; Enemy: 1318 KIA(conf), 1610 KIA(prob), 5 NVAC, 7 VCC, 1 Returnee, 51 VCS, 205 weapons captured.

(b) PAWNEE III. During the period 1-24 December 1966, Operation Pawnee III continued with very light contact. At 090815H Company H/2/26thMar found 3900 lbs of rice. At 090830H this same unit discovered and destroyed a booby trapped Punji pit containing 4 81mm mortar rounds with additional charges below ground. On 11 December 1966, Company H/2/26thMar found 3 tons of rice and assorted ammunition. During this period 16 tactical air sorties, 21 Naval Gunfire, and 1942 artillery missions were utilized. Operation Pawnee III was terminated on 24 December 1966. Cumulative results for Operation Pawnee III from 29 October to and including 24 December were: USMC: 1 KIA, 19 WIA; Enemy: 32 VC KIA(Conf), 60 VC(Prob), 16 VCS, and 5 weapons.

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(c) MISSISSIPPI. During 1-7 December, Operation Mississippi was continued with generally light contact. On 1 December 1966, Company G/2/5thMar searching a building found enough uniforms and clothing for approximately one platoon. Company G/2/5thMar in an area near Dai Phong hamlet captured 9 VC in a tunnel in that area. One VC was an english speaking school teacher. On 2 December Company M/3/7thMar escorted 1221 refugees to Khuong Binh (2) and undertook arrangements for food and shelter. On 4 December Companies H/2/5thMar and F/2/5thMar were guided to a cache of 30 tons of rice by Duc Duc District Agents. The operation was characterized by platoon and company size sweep operations. 87 artillery missions were fired. 32 tactical air sorties were flown on direct air support. No NGF missions were fired. Results of this operation were: USMC: 3 KIA, 6 WIA; Enemy: 8 KIA (Conf), 9 KIA (Prob), 18 VCC, 13 Ralliers, 15 VCS and 3 weapons captured. Operation Mississippi was terminated on 7 December 1966.

(d) SUTTER. During the period 1-6 December, Operation Sutter was conducted in Quang Tin Province. Contact during the entire operation was generally light. On 1 December 1966 Company K/3/5thMar searched a group of houses and captured a small assortment of equipment. On 2 December Company D/1/5thMar squad ambush patrol observed 6 VC in a harboring site. Squad opened fire resulting in 5 VC KIA (Conf). Company C/1/5thMar found a propaganda center containing 3000 leaflets directing propaganda against US and ARVN. Company C/1/5thMar platoon combat patrol found a hamlet of 15 newly constructed huts, 2, tunnels, newly dug bomb shelters and fighting holes. On 6 December the caretaker of a church pointed out a cache of 1000 lbs of rice. Operation Sutter was terminated on 6 December 1966. Results for the operation were: USMC: 1 KIA, 14 WIA; Enemy: 13 VC KIA (Conf), 1 VCC, 6 VCS, and 11 weapons captured. There were no tactical air sorties or NGF missions provided.

(e) TRINIDAD I. On 7 December 1966 Operation Trinidad I was conducted in Quang Nam Province in the Southern Section. There was no significant contact in the area of operations. There were no tactical air sorties or NGF missions provided. Operation Trinidad I was terminated on 7 December 1966. Results for this operation were: 13 VCS.

(f) CORTEZ. During the period 7-12 December 1966 Operation Cortez was conducted in Quang Tin Province northwest of the Chu Lai TAOR. Contact during this period was very light. Marine casualties were results of a variety of booby traps. There

Enclosure (1)

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were four tactical sorties flown in support of Operation Cortez, and one artillery mission fired. Results for this operation were: USMC: 2 KIA, 4 WIA; Enemy: 1 VCC, 4 VCS, 2 weapons captured.

(g) TRINIDAD II. During the period 8-11 December 1966 Operation Trinidad II was conducted in Quang Nam Province. During the operation contact was generally significant. On 8 December D/1/1stMar received heavy SA fire and mortar fire from an unknown number of VC. Company D returned SA fire and called in an 81mm mortar mission with unknown results. Company C/1/1stMar observed a group of VC, fired SA and searched the area, 6 VC KIA (Conf). Small unit patrol and reconnaissance actions accounted for 27 VC KIA (Conf). Two tactical air sorties were flown in support of the operation. Results of the operation were: USMC: 1 KIA, 20 WIA; Enemy: 33 VC KIA (Conf), 10 VC KIA (Prob), 27 VCC and 6 VCS.

(h) STERLING. During the period 11-16 December 1966 Operation Sterling was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact during the entire period was insignificant. On 13 December A/1/26thMar discovered and destroyed 4 caves. During the period numerous booby traps were discovered and destroyed. There were no tactical air sorties or NGF missions provided during the operation. One artillery mission was provided. Results for this operation were: USMC: 1 WIA; Enemy: 16 VCS.

(i) SIERRA. During the period 12-31 December 1966 Operation Sierra was conducted in Quang Ngai Province. Contact during the first 9 days of this operation was light, but increased during the period 21-31 December to significant. At 211200H a platoon in the vicinity of BS720540 encountered an estimated VC Company (-) consisting of approximately 70 VC armed with M-1 Rifles and BARs, also observed were 2 VC squads vicinity BS747615 and two VC squads vicinity BS738613. Artillery was called in on all of the above enemy units resulting in 26 VC KIA (Conf) and 1 VCC. At 231645 Company H/2/7thMar observed 25 VC, called in artillery with unknown results. At 261215H 3d Platoon, Force Recon observed 100 VC moving north to hamlet. VC had packs, helmets and rifles. Called in artillery and an air strike resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf). At 261500H Recon OP observed 100 VC and called in artillery and NGF missions. 2/7thMar requested helilift to exploit the area. At 261730H helilift was complete. Company F/2/7thMar commenced sweep and received SA fire and grenades, returned SA, M-26 grenades and 12 rounds M-79 resulting in 15 VC KIA (Conf), 30 VC KIA (Prob) and 2 weapons captured. At 271420H a Recon Team observed 60 VC, called in artillery,

Enclosure (1)

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 resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf). At 271450H a Recon Team observed 22 VC and called in artillery resulting in 2 VC KIA(Prob). At 290400H a Recon Patrol observed 20 VC and called in artillery resulting in 7 VC KIA(Conf). Operation Sierra was characterized by numerous small unit actions and patrols. Results for the period 12-31 December 1966 were: USMC: 8 KIA, 34 WIA; Enemy: 89 KIA(Conf), 53 KIA (Prob), 13 VCC, 1 Rallier, 27 VCS, 12 weapons captured.

(j) GLENN. During the period 17-21 December 1966 Operation Glenn was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact during the period was light. The operation was characterized by squad and platoon size patrols. Marine casualties resulted largely from punju pits and booby traps. There were no air sorties or NGF missions provided. Results for the operation: USMC: 10 WIA; Enemy: 3 KIA (Conf), 3 KIA (Prob), 7 VCC, 8 VCS.

(k) SHASTA II. During the period 20-21 December 1966 Operation Shasta II was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact during the period was light. The operation was characterized by platoon patrols. On 20 December Company D/1/26th Mar observed 4 VC attempting to cross the river. Fired 1 M-79 round resulting in 1 VC KIA(Prob). On 20 December Company C/1/1stMar platoon combat patrol observed 2 VC on trail, fired SA resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf). There were no tactical air sorties or artillery missions in support of the operation. No NGF was provided. Results for this operation were: USMC: 3 KIA, 35 WIA; Enemy: 11 KIA (Conf), 2 KIA (Prob), 2 VCC, 14 VCS and 1 weapon captured.

(1) CHINOOK. During the period 20-31 December 1966 Operation Chinook was conducted in Thua Thien Province. Contact during the period was significant. On 21 December, Companies 1, L, M, 3dBn, 26thMar received simultaneous mortar attacks with minor casualties. Counter mortar fire was returned and resulted in 59 VC KIA (Conf). On 22 December, an enemy attack launched against 3dBn, 26thMar position resulted in 23 VC KIA(Conf). On 22 December, Company K/3/26thMar found 3500 lbs of rice and 1 VC; 1 VC KIA(Conf); then encountered a large enemy force of unknown size resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf). On 22 December, 4 VC were observed moving toward a Claymore Mine, mine was detonated resulting in 4 VC KIA(Conf). On 29 December, Company L/3/26th Mar received SA fire, returned SA fire resulting in 3 VC KIA (Conf), swept village, and observed 6 VC, fired SA and 3.5 WP Rocket, resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf) and 4 VC KIA (Prob). During the period covered Recon forces in support of the operation called

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for and adjusted artillery fires on enemy observed, resulting in an additional 63 VC KIA (Conf). During this period 7,366 artillery rounds were fired and 9 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Operation Chinook. Results for this period were: USMC: 4 KIA, 73 WIA; Enemy: 160 VC KIA (Conf), 235 VC KIA (Prob), 5 VCC, 58 VCS and 42 weapons captured.

#### IV. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

A. General Enemy Situation. During December there was a distinct increase in enemy activity in eastern Thua Thien Province and within the Danang TAOR. These two regions saw the enemy intensify his actions against lines of communication and his attempts, through the local guerrilla, toward control of high population and food producing areas. There was a moderate rise in the use of mortar fire as a tactic in the enemy's continuing mission of harassment and other small scale action directed against US, Korean and ARVN units. Enemy activity in the other three provinces of the ICTZ continued at a fairly moderate rate and an analysis of available intelligence information suggests an enemy currently faced with ever rising problems involving recruitment and replacement of personnel to cover battle casualties and in procuring necessary food supplies.

B. Quang Tri Province and the DMZ. For the month of December there were no significant reports of enemy contact or movement in northern Quang Tri Province, including that area in immediate proximity to the southern portion of the DMZ. The enemy continued to avoid any major ground action. That action which was of note consisted of light to moderate harassing activity and occasional brief but heavy mortar attacks. Enemy ground activity south of the DMZ was attributed to a general screening and reconnaissance effort. Enemy efforts within and just north of the DMZ remained unchanged. They proceeded at a constant rate and appear to represent a fairly well established pattern of resupply, gradual replacement of personnel and light ground fortification construction. Evidence in the form of "hard" intelligence, does not support a change in this pattern or any apparent intensification of effort. Extensive aerial photographic coverage of both eastern and western portions of the DMZ, accomplished by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during the period 13 through 18 December, revealed no significant increase in enemy activity. Recent low level agent reports covering the northern GIO LINH sector state that current NVA efforts have shifted and are now pointed toward the upgrading and improvement of the local guerrilla organization.

C. Thua Thien Province and the Phu Bai TAOR. For the period 4 through 31 December, there was a substantial increase in enemy

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activity in the eastern Thua Thien Province. Enemy initiated incidents included platoon, company and two incidents of battalion size attacks against (ARVN), security elements located along Highway 1. The majority of these attacks were preceded by light to moderate mortar fire. When compared to the month of November the incidence of enemy action in Thua Thien would certainly seem to conform with his mission of attacking, where possible, our lines of communication. VC activity within the Phu Bai TAOR was insignificant for the entire month. Operation Chinook in progress in the general area (YD5330) resulted in heavy action against what was identified as the 802nd VC Battalion. As of 31 December, enemy casualties totaled 160 KIA (Confirmed) and 235 KIA (Probable). Noteworthy from the standpoint of enemy effort was the heavy and sustained mortar fire brought to bear against the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines on 21 through 23 December and the continuity of enemy action which was maintained for this three day period. Considering the extent and depth of the action, it is felt that other elements of battalion sized units subordinate to the 6th Regiment were engaged. A captured VC stated during interrogation that the 6th Regiment, consisting of four battalions, was located in the area (YD5519). The same VC further described the mission of the 802nd as one of protecting, at all costs, the rice supply routes running into this suspected base area from eastern coastal rice regions. Over the period 11 through 31 December there was a sharp increase in reconnaissance sightings west of Hue City and the Phu Bai TAOR. On 31 December a major sighting of approximately 1,000 well armed VC were reported in the vicinity of (YD511254). In addition to small arms, the VC were carrying mortars and machine guns. This concentrated enemy group was held under observation for several hours and at 1900 artillery and air strikes were called. Results were undetermined by the end of the period. Nothing of significance was reported between Phu Bai and Danang.

D. Quang Nam Province and the Danang TAOR. In Quang Nam Province the enemy effort was sharply focused on the Danang TAOR. From 4 through 24 December there was a gradual increase in the intensity of VC activity, particularly toward the southern portion of the TAOR. For the week 18 through 24 December substantial action was reported from the general area (AT9752), where the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines encountered VC elements tentatively identified as the R.20 Battalion. VC activity was heaviest from this vicinity north through Hill 55 to a point some 6,000 meters southwest of the Danang Airfield. For the week 18 through 24 December there was a distinct increase in VC use of mines and booby traps, particularly mines. The last week of the month saw a general falling off of VC initiated activity. A collation of available intelligence information points toward possible future

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emphasis on the part of the enemy to augment and enlarge his guerrilla effort through the fragmentation and integration of larger units into purely local effort. Such stress would be aimed at centers of population density. The area south of Danang might well be an example of this shift. Whether the VC can maintain his effort to such a high degree is problematical. Past events tend to indicate that he has been unable to carry an intense effort for any long period of time. For the week 24 through 31 December ground reconnaissance teams reported moderate sightings immediately southwest of the Danang TAOR. This area was relatively quiet for the first two weeks of the month. Elsewhere in Quang Nam local force units were reported in normally accepted operating areas.

E. Quang Tin Province and the Chu Lai TAOR. Over the month ground reconnaissance located along the western approaches to the Chu Lai TAOR made sightings of small groups of VC with a fairly moderate concentration noted in the general area (BT3110), five to six kilometers directly south of Tam Ky City. These sightings may be associated in some manner with recent VC action in the same vicinity and along Highway 1 close to this location. From about the middle of December on there had been a light to moderate increase in the tempo of enemy activity in eastern coastal Quang Tin, especially in the area north of the Chu Lai TAOR, and to a lesser extent along Highway 1, northward to the Danang TAOR. Of the five major incidents occurring in the Tam Ky area four involved attacks by VC in estimated company strength and one by an estimated battalion (probably the 72nd). Such activity appears to follow an accepted direction of enemy effort, that of attacking small but isolated ARVN outposts and those security elements guarding bridges and relatively minor facilities along the line of communication and in areas where we are not deployed in force. The attacks are those which the VC feel will be successful and from which he can quickly disengage and withdraw rapidly. A returnee to the ARVN on 19 December indicated that the 3rd NVA Regiment was located in the general area south of the Danang TAOR and just north of the Quang Tin border. He went on to point out that the unit had suffered the loss of one battalion during past operations in the Nong Son area. Enemy casualties sustained during Operation Kern and action involving the 51st ARVN Regiment during the middle of October were 219 KIA (Confirmed) and 330 KIA (Probable). These figures would tend to support the validity of the returnees statements. The 21st Regiment continues to be located in the general area (BT1229), along with the headquarters of the 2nd NVA Division. Low level agent reports covering other portions of Quang Tin have for the most part produced little of significance with the exception of

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the VC initiated activity along Highway 1, the remainder of the province was relatively quiet.

F. Quang Ngai Province. Enemy activity in eastern Quang Ngai Province remained relatively quiet for the period. The exception was the week 4 through 11 December which saw an increased enemy effort involving company or platoon size attacks against isolated ARVN units and small regional security elements operating along and close to Highway 1. A greater portion of this action occurred in the area south of Quang Ngai City and in the northern part of the Mo Duc District. Operation Sierra in northern Mo Duc had inflicted casualties of 61 KIA (Confirmed) and 44 KIA (Probable). The Mo Duc sector represents a normal operating locale of the 38th VC Battalion and possibly of the 48th Battalion. It is conceivable that the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines in this operation may have been in contact with elements of the 38th or small enemy local forces units screening the 38th. It is felt that this particular area represents one of the main points of egress from the coastal plain where the VC obtain their rice and salt supplies. On 29 November a defector, purportedly from the 3rd NVA Regiment, 3rd NVA Division in referring to the enemy situation in southeastern Quang Ngai, stated that his unit had recently moved north into this section from Binh Dinh Province for rest and refit following unsuccessful action with U. S. Army units in the northern portion of the II CTZ. Low level agent reports had likewise pointed toward a gradual northward movement of the enemy for the same reasons just mentioned. On 28 December a patrol from the Ha Thanh CIDG Camp gained contact with an estimated reinforced VC company west of the camp. Elsewhere in Quang Ngai local force units remained in normally accepted operating areas. The identification of the 1st VC Regiment in the general area southwest of the Chu Lai TAOR has been a constant factor from several sources of intelligence for the past two months.

G. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Demolition Device. An interrogation report of Ho Trung, 13 years old, from Nam My (H) (AT904823), captured by elements of the 503rd Infantry at (AT901820) on 30 November, revealed a new VC approach toward the construction of a demolition device. The pin of an M-26 grenade is pulled and a string tied around the spoon handle. The end of the string is tied to a corner of a piece of sticky paper wrapped around the grenade. Upon use of the device, the paper is unwrapped and laid over the grenade so that the prop blast of a helo will blow the paper off the grenade, thereby unwrapping the string and releasing the safety

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lever of the grenade. (G-2 comment: First report of this type tactic).

(2) Weapons. 3 December. An official of an ARVN MI unit relayed the following information pertaining to possible future employment of the Russian KDG 66 (175mm RL) in SVN. This weapon is a 175mm recoilless cannon with an aluminum or plastic smooth bore barrel, which reportedly makes the weapon light and easily maneuverable. The cannon also has an electric firing mechanism. Maximum range is reportedly 10,000 meters with an effective range of 3,000 meters. (G-3 comment: F/5. First report of this type weapon; improbable).

(3) New Tactics.

(a) On 7 December in the northern portion of the Danang TAOR (AT928895), an estimated VC squad wearing ARVN type uniforms attacked a USMC squad patrol. In an attempt to authenticate the incident ARVN units in the vicinity were queried on the matter. All such units denied any ARVN activity in the patrol area.

(b) On 26 December, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines found a haystack in a deserted stone building (YD512341). Buried within the haystack were several burlap sacks, contained in the sacks were four bags (450 lbs) of rice and one bag with two parts of batteries. One battery part (3"x3"x10") looked like 1/3 of a PRC-10 battery with two wire leads. The other (3"x3"x6") had one wire going into the larger battery. The batteries had no markings. Also found was a wooden coffin with a few grains of rice, possibly indicating rice being transported, concealed in the coffin. (G-2 Comment: Possible the VC are using haystacks as concealment for the storing of rice and equipment. First report of coffins being used as possible rice transportation vehicles).

(c) 21 December, an official of the RVN intelligence community reported, through an informant, that the VC Thua Thien Province Chief Commissioner made the recommendation to his superiors in NVN that the VC in Thua Thien Province should revert to guerrilla tactics, and avoid engaging in any battles involving large numbers of troops. The recommendation was reportedly disapproved. The tactic to be employed in military engagements is to utilize human wave tactics when fighting Vietnamese troops, and limit attacks on US troops to mortar attacks.

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H. Enemy Action Statistics.

(1) Facts pertaining to enemy activities in US and Korean Marine operating areas, including combat bases, for November and December are as follows:

	<u>Enemy Initiated Activity</u>	
	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>
Attacks	3	3
Ambush	0	4
Assault by Fire	0	1
Harassing Fire	492	562
Mine/Booby Traps	52	79
Sabotage	7	0
Terrorism	2	3
Anti-Aircraft Fire	<u>498</u>	<u>415</u>
Totals	1054	1067

	<u>Enemy Casualties</u>		<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>
	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>		
	<u>November</u>		<u>December</u>	
KBGF	316	447	496	584
KBMA	93	530	124	215
KBMTOWS	<u>34</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>26</u>
Totals	443	1077	628	825
VCC/NVAC	88		141	
VCS	487		640	
Returnee	1		1	
Weapons				
Individual	92			
Crew Served	7			

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I. Weather. The weather for the beginning of December in ICTZ was characterized by cloudy skies; light monsoon rainfall and several relatively clear days. During the beginning of the second half of the period, an area of high pressure over the Gulf of Tonkin created conditions of rather extensive low cloudiness, considerable drizzle and early morning fog with afternoon cumulus buildup in the highlands and unfavorable weather over the piedmont and coast. A recurring surge in the northeasterly monsoonal flow brought typical "Grachin" weather toward the latter part of the month; fair conditions persisted during this short period of time but ceased with the approach of tropical storm "Pamela" when conditions of low cloudiness and moderate to heavy precipitation prevailed throughout I Corps. Weather data for the period follows:

	<u>Dong Ha</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>
Temperature (Avg Degrees)				
High	82.5	80.7	80.5	80.7
Low	68.7	69	72	71.9
Rainfall (Total Inches)	10.07	14.03	22.82	10.64
Visibility (Total Miles)	7	6.2	6.7	6.7
Winds (Avg Knots)	5.7	5.7	5.2	5.7

J. Enemy Order of Battle.

(1) Changes to Confirmed and Probable Units.

(a) The following enemy unit was added to the III MAF Order of Battle as of 31 2400 Dec 1966:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Category</u>
74thCo	Quang Tin	50	Confirmed

(b) The following units have been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 10 2400H Dec 1966:

Binh Son TransBn	Quang Nam	1,490	Confirmed
Nam Son TransBn	Quang Tin	700	Confirmed

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Category</u>
49th Bn	Quang Tin	500	Probable
109th Bn	Quang Ngai	300	Possible
37th Bn	Quang Ngai	400	Possible

(c) The following unit has been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 17 2400H Dec 1966:

104th Bn	Quang Ngai	300	Probable
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(d) The strength of the 324thB NVA Division is estimated at 90% of 9,600.

(2) Enemy Unit Recapitulation as of 31 December 1966.

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>
1 Military Region Hq	1 Regiment Hq
1 Military Sub-Region Hq	2 Battalions
2 Division Hq	6 Separate Companies
7 Regiment Hq	
32 Infantry Battalions	
12 Other Battalions	
31 Separate Companies	

(3) Comparison of November/December Estimated Enemy Strength in I CTZ.

	<u>As of 30 Nov</u>	<u>As of 31 Dec</u>
Confirmed VC/NVA Units	27,305	25,160
Probable VC/NVA Units	2,105	1,450
Guerrillas	<u>20,597</u>	<u>20,583</u>
Totals	50,107	47,193

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K. Counterintelligence.

(1) Propaganda and Subversion. Propaganda and subversion activity on the part of the VC showed a slight increase during the reporting period. Most propaganda discovered was in the form of leaflets and, as normal, the themes were directed towards Allied forces in order to attempt subversion. One such leaflet, found during the latter part of December, stressed that the VC would obey the cease-fire over the Christmas and New Year's period. During early December a VC psychological warfare center was discovered in Quang Tin Province which contained approximately 3,000 VC propaganda leaflets. The paper used to produce the leaflets was considered to be of better than average quality and the printing was of good type, which indicates more sophisticated VC propaganda activity.

(2) Terrorism. During the reporting period there was a slight increase in the number of acts of terrorism directed at local Vietnamese officials and families of ARVN soldiers. One major incident took place in Thua Thien Province where a woman was assassinated because she was suspected of providing information to Allied forces. A form letter was found on the body stating that she had been indoctrinated against such activities and had been sentenced to death by the Thua Thien National Liberation Front.

(3) Espionage and Sabotage. The month of December continued to show a general decrease in espionage activities, while the number of sabotage incidents showed a marked increase. Those espionage activities reported were considered low level and consisted of personnel warning VC units of approaching Allied patrols and the training of female and male low level agents to be used to infiltrate U. S. and ARVN military compounds.

Sabotage activities continued to be directed against lines of communications with emphasis placed on destruction of culverts and bridges along the National Highways and the railroad.

(4) Civil Disturbances. There were no major civil disturbances reported during the period.

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**SECRET**V. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION.

A. STRENGTH. Table VIII outlines the average personnel strength for III MAF during December, 1966:

TABLE VIII

Average Personnel Strength  
III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters

	<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED</u>		
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>
Hq III MAF	151	10		334	6	
H&SCo	11			269	4	
29th Civil Affairs Co (Attached)			30			88

III Marine Amphibious Force

<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
4,324	375	63,604	2,476

B. CASUALTIES. III MAF Casualties are shown in Table IX:

(1) Battle

<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
116	5	917	42	14	0	1	0

(2) Non-Battle

<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
16	0	210	5

C. SPECIAL SERVICES.(1) SHOWS:

(a) The Black Patches, a country style musical variety show, consisting of four soldiers and one airman departed I Corps on 13 December 1966 after touring the area for one week.

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(b) The Johnny Grant Show was in I Corps from 22 December 1966 to 26 December 1966. The show returned on 28 December 1966 and departed I Corps on 29 December 1966.

(c) The Vietnamese Cultural Show, a local group of 20 entertainers ranging in age from 11 - 22 years of age performed seven times in the Danang area during the period 22-26 December 1966.

(d) Martha Raye arrived 23 December 1966 and departed 26 December 1966. Miss Raye performed two times during that period.

(e) The Australian Show arrived on 29 December 1966 and departed 31 December 1966. They performed four times.

(f) The Bob Hope Show arrived on 28 December 1966 and performed to an estimated audience of 15,000 troops. No major problems developed and the show departed on schedule.

(g) Martha Raye will return to I Corps on 7 January 1967 and will depart on 10 January 1967. She is scheduled for six performances.

(h) The Gary Ellison Show arrives on 15 January 1967 and departs 20 January 1967. This is a musical group of 4 females and one male. They are scheduled for eight performances.

(2) China Beach:

(a) The Amphitheater seats were being cemented in.

(b) The Library reading room was given a partial coat of paint.

(c) Bedding is now available for 400 in-country R&R personnel. There were 398 personnel who enjoyed the R&R facilities during the last two weeks. A total of 1,670 personnel have used the R&R facility since 3 October 1966.

(d) Public Works assumed the maintenance support on 1 January 1967.

(e) The bridge between China Beach and Elephant Beach was completed.

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(3) Chu Lai: The construction of the amphitheater was sufficiently completed to permit the Australian Show to put on a performance to 4,000 approving troops. Construction will continue however, the heavy rainfall has slowed the progress.

(4) Recreation Area (Hill 327):

(a) The shell for the theater was about 75% completed on 31 December. The concrete deck has been laid. Plumbing and electrical work is in progress. Arrangements are being made to start installation of the 35mm projection equipment about 1 February 1967.

(b) The footing was poured for the library. The building is at the site.

(c) The buildings for the gymnasium and the hobby shops are in 30th NCR storage. Work orders have been issued to start construction.

(d) The Beer Garden and Band Stand are progressing. The concrete forms have been poured.

(e) The modifications to the Red Cross building are underway. The new 15 ton air conditioner is being installed. The modification of the interior of the building will increase the total working space by 1500 square feet.

(5) R&R Program (Out-of-country):

(a) The following are the statistics of the total III MAF R&R usage for each out-of-country R&R site:

TABLE X

Bangkok	984
Hong Kong	1492
Singapore	488
Manila	376
Okinawa	334
Taipei	1016
Kuala Lumpur	431
Hawaii	1405
Tokyo	1755
TOTALS	8281

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**SECRET**D. CHAPLAIN

(1) 21-26 December - Rear Admiral James W. KELLY, Chief of Chaplains, U. S. Navy visited the Command for the purpose of visiting over the Christmas Season and to meet with the Chaplains serving within III MAF. Chaplain KELLY dedicated 6 Chapels in III MAF and participated in three Church Services.

(2) 25 December - Dr. Billy GRAHAM, Evangelist, visited the Command for the purpose of preaching at an outdoor Worship Service Christmas afternoon in the III MAF Amphitheater. Other participants included the Commanding General, LtGen L. W. WALT, USMC and Chaplain J. W. KELLY, Chief of Chaplains, U. S. Navy.

(3) 26 December - His Eminence Francis Cardinal SPELLMAN, Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Military Ordinariate visited the Command for the purpose of conducting an outdoor Mass in the III MAF Amphitheater.

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**SECRET**VI. LOGISTICS.

A. Logistic effort continues to be directed primarily to our forces in the north, and maintaining of stock levels in isolated areas despite the adversities of monsoon weather conditions.

B. Dental

(1) Dental Civic Action was conducted in the RVN by III MAF Dental Companies during the period 1-31 December 1966.

Patients Treated - 2800  
Dental Procedures - 5794

(2) 14 December 1966 - III MAF Compound Dental Clinic officially opened. LtGen Lewis W. WALT was the first patient.

(3) 23 December 1966 - Force Dental Officer conducted monthly meeting of the Commanding Officers of III MAF Dental Companies to discuss matters in I Corps Tactical Zone.

C. Embarkation.

(1) During the month 71 MSTs Ships and 23 U. S. Navy Ships debarked/embarked cargo and/or personnel at Danang and 37 LST's and one deep draft ship moored at Chu Lai. In addition 91 LCU and 6 LCM-8 trips were completed to Dong Ha and 76 LCU trips to Hue.

(2) Surface Cargo throughout for the month was as follows:

	<u>Total</u>		<u>Daily Average</u>	
	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
Danang	151,921	251,707	4,901	8,120
Chu Lai	34,877	52,618	1,125	1,698
Dong Ha	8,432	19,256	252	621
Phu Bai	7,050	12,479	228	403

(3) Fixed Wing airlift (in cargo pounds) during the month in support of USMC forces was as follows:

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	<u>USAF Aircraft</u>		<u>USMC Aircraft</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Pax</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Pax</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Pax</u>
To Danang (From ICTZ)	179,500	653	1,656,904	9,025	1,836,404	9,678
To Chu Lai			1,379,051	7,969	1,379,051	7,969
To Phu Bai			2,399,910	8,836	2,399,910	8,836
To An Hoa	1,000,549	302			1,000,549	302
To Khe Sanh	150,523		1,367,412	1,001	1,517,935	1,001
To Dong Ha	734,333		1,616,045	6,111	2,350,378	6,111
Grand Total					10,484,227	33,897

(4) All sea operations were curtailed in the I Corps during 5 days in December because of high seas. Weather conditions halted air operations into Khe Sanh for a total of 14 days.

(5) A grand total of 71,290 bags of cement were moved by both commercial trucks and surface craft to Hue/Phu Bai.

(6) Retrograde cargo shipments were made aboard the LST's 1159, 1157, 1169 and 525 as follows:

For Japan	207 S/T
For Okinawa	777 S/T

(7) LST 1157 offloaded Headquarters, 1st Field Artillery Group at Chu Lai on 1 December 1966.

(8) On 4 December 1966 the airlift of the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, U. S. Army from Danang to Bien Hoa was completed.

(9) On 3 December 1966 HMM-262 was disembarked and joined the First Marine Aircraft Wing.

(10) APA-97 completed offloading elements of the 11th Engineer Battalion at Cua Viet on 10 December 1966.

(11) Commenced movement of BLT 3/26 into country off the USS LENAWE, USS WASHBURN and the USS COMSTOCK on 11 December 1966.

(12) Embarkation of BLT 1/4 for Okinawa aboard the USS WASHBURN was completed on 17 December 1966.

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(13) USNS GAFFEY debarked the December replacement draft of approximately 1309 personnel and detachments of the 11th Motor Transport Battalion and the 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Company on 28 December 1966.

(14) USNS ELTINGS debarked remainder of replacement draft and elements of the 11th Motor Transport Battalion and the 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Company totaling approximately 2039 personnel.

D. Engineer

(1) The quantity of rain that fell in ICTZ during December 1966 was three times the normal. Due to this fact engineer operations mainly consisted of maintaining, in a passable condition, land routes of communication. Although many of the roads became extremely muddy, none were closed for any extended periods of time during the month. The 11th Engineer Battalion commenced providing sorely needed combat engineer support in the Prairie area. All of the 7th Engineer Battalion's assets are now located in the Danang TAOR.

(2) The significant events in chronological order during the month, with regards to engineer operations, are as follows:

(a) 4Dec66 - A 5-Float M4T6 Raft was installed at coordinates BT 498067.

(b) 6Dec66 - A 5-Float M4T6 Raft was installed at coordinates BT 379175.

(c) 8Dec66 - A 30' M4T6 Fixed Span was installed at coordinates AT 945694.

(d) 10Dec66 - Ten bridges on Route #1 were damaged in varying degrees by enemy attack. Eight of the sites were rendered impassable.

(e) 12Dec66 - A 30' M4T6 Fixed Span was installed at coordinates BT 100518 and AT 939877.

(f) 15Dec66 - A 135' M6 Fixed Span was installed at coordinates AT 998699.

(g) 16Dec66 - A 600' M4T6 Float Bridge was installed at coordinates YD 623303.

(h) 28Dec66 - My Chan (YD 460400), Pho Trach (YD 519348) and An Lo (YD 623303) bridges had their approaches washed out and were closed. Railroad was open from Danang to Hue.

(i) 30Dec66 - Route 1 was open from Danang to Phu Bai.

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**SECRET**E. Fiscal

(1) The Comptroller staffed and prepared the following III MAF Orders:

(a) Force Order 7043.1 Subj: Restricted purchase of Commodities in RVN.

(b) Force Order 7302.1 Subj: Control of Piaster Expenditures.

(c) Force Order 5120.1A Subj: United States Savings Bond and Savings Deposit Program.

(2) Routine monthly reports relating to reduced piaster spending were submitted to COMUSMACV.

(3) The Comptroller allocated and obligated all available AIK funds for projects programmed by major III MAF Commands.

F. Food Service

(1) Visits were made to FLC, FLSC-B, Chu Lai and NSA concerning improving procedures in supplying FLSC-B with subsistence supplies.

(2) A milk plant will be established in the Danang area on 27 January 1967. Liaison has been made with major subordinate commands to determine equipment needed to store, transport and dispense the products. Request for the equipment has been made to FMFPac.

(3) On 13 December 1966 the III MAF Subsistence Operation Analysis Report was submitted to CMC for November 1966. The issue of "A" and "B" rations totaled \$2,159,010.26. The number of messes in operation is 181.

G. Motor Transport

(1) Twenty-six M8A2 Decontamination Apparatus arrived in RVN for the establishment of centralized vehicle cleaning stations. In addition five 6000 gallon water sprinkling semi-trailers arrived.

(2) The advance party of the 11th Motor Transport Battalion arrived in RVN.

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**SECRET**H. Ordnance

(1) III MAF moved closer to the assumption of 5.56mm ammunition support of the USN Mobile Construction Battalions. Two courses of action were proposed:

(a) That Navy assets be transferred to the Marine Corps at Headquarters level in order that the assets might be introduced into the Marine Corps pipeline.

(b) That Force Logistic Command requisition from Navy sources through Naval Support Activity, Danang. It was suggested that the latter course could be more quickly implemented and with minimum risk to the III MAF position.

(2) On 5 December 1966 an M109 Technical Assistance Team from the U. S. Army Materiel Command Project Manager's Office departed ICTZ after spending 12 days working with III MAF using units. As reported last month, the team of technical specialists supplied limited quantities of small repair parts, in addition to instruction and technical assistance. Reports from Force Logistic Command and the assisted units indicated that the team made a significant contribution to III MAF. A Letter of Appreciation was sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Materiel Command.

(3) Based on information supplied by the M109 TA Team, action has been initiated to improve the status of these weapons within III MAF:

(a) On 17 December 1966 a letter was sent to CMC requesting that current Army Modification Work Orders (MWO) be reviewed and that those applicable be converted to Marine Corps Modification Instructions for application to Marine Corps vehicles. It was requested that three of the MWO's be approved immediately.

(b) A speedletter was sent to Commanding General, MACV requesting that action be taken to obtain an improved, more rugged version of the M117 Panoramic Telescope for the M109. It had been reported by the TA Team that the Army was modifying the current high - mortality telescope at Frankfort Arsenal.

(4) On 9 December 1966 Force Order 4440.2 was published to provide policy and guidance on Class V Discipline in III MAF. The order charges Commanders with the responsibility of:

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- (a) Protecting against indiscriminate expenditures.
- (b) Eliminating any practices which contribute to the damage or deterioration of ammunition or ammunition components.
- (c) Reducing storage waste to an absolute minimum.
- (d) Indoctrinating newly assigned personnel in the principles of proper handling and use of ammunition.

(5) The 1st Marine Division was directed by the Commanding General, III MAF letter of 12 December 1966, to conduct the Field Evaluation of STONER 63-A Weapons System. General test requirements, as promulgated by FMFPac, were stated as were report requirements and recommended test units. The test is scheduled to start approximately 1 February 1967, dependent upon receipt of the weapons.

(6) CG, III MAF ltr 8/RSC/qnm 8097 Ser: 0198766 dated 23 December 1966 reported to CMC on the effectiveness of the 12 gauge "Beehive" ammunition. Based on user reports and a wound assessment submitted by 3rd Medical Battalion, the report concluded that the 12 gauge "Beehive" ammunition is sufficiently lethal for combat employment and should be retained in the Class V inventory.

(7) Action was initiated by III MAF on 30 December 1966, at the request of COMNAVSUPPACT, to assume the support of Market Time operations with respect to specified common items of ground munitions. FMFPac has given tentative approval, subject to CMC concurrence, and requested that CINCPACFLT transfer Market Time allocations of requested munitions to NOF Sasebo, marked for Marine Corps stocks.

#### I. Surgeon.

(1) The total daily average patient load for the two Medical Battalions and 1st Hospital Company was 277, with a total of 2252 patients admitted; 435 patients were evacuated out of country; and 1181 pints of whole blood expended.

(2) The 1st Hospital Company is still admitting only medical type patients with a monthly high census of 92 patients on 29 December 1966. Construction of this fixed medical facility continues.

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(3) 3rd Medical Battalion: The CO of this Battalion moved to Phu Bai on 24 December 1966 with a small staff. Company B(-) has been directed to relocate from Danang to Phu Bai and merge with remainder of Company B when physical facilities are available.

(4) 1st Medical Battalion: The CO and detachment of his staff of this battalion moved from Chu Lai to Danang on 24 December 1966. Company B(-) has been directed to relocate to Danang when billeting space is available. A detachment of H&SCo (-) is in Chu Lai.

(5) The USS REPOSE continued in support of ICTZ until 24 December 1966, then departed for Hong Kong. Estimated time of return off Vietnam is 3 January 1967.

(6) The USAF 22nd Casualty Staging Unit, Danang, began operations on 10 December 1966. This unit is a 100 bed facility whose mission is to receive and process patients for aeromedical evacuation, provide emergency treatment, prepare patient manifests, load patients aboard aircraft, assist flight crews in configuration of aircraft for patient evacuation, maintain communications with other elements of the air evacuation system and with appropriate ground forces medical facilities.

(7) The BUMED/CMC sponsored team of 2 medical officers and 1 Marine Corps officer on TAD to field test the use of a silicone compound to retard immersion foot under combat conditions continued their assigned project during December in operation GLENN and with various Reconnaissance units. They departed on 26 December 1966 to join task group 79.5 and Operation DECKHOUSE V. Additional Cdr W. MILLS, MC, USNR, an Orthopedic Surgeon attached to III MAF Headquarters, joined task group 79.5 and Operation DECKHOUSE V to evaluate immersion foot injuries from an orthopedic viewpoint.

(8) The Force Surgeon attended, as Chairman, the I Corps Public Health meetings on December 7 and 21, 1966.

(9) Three medical department officers of III MAF attended the RVNAF Medical Symposium held at the Military Medical School, Saigon 27-30 December 1966.

#### J. Supply

(1) There were several indications of improvement in supply status during this period. For example:

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(a) Additional medium GP tents have been received, sufficient to meet all urgent requirements for tentage and to begin to replace "X" coded tents which have been retained for lack of replacements.

(b) Receipt of nearly 300 new typewriters in III MAF has overcome a chronic shortage of that item. Total MAF T/E shortages now stand at less than 50. In addition, a re-build program has been instituted to upgrade condition of the machines now on hand.

(c) Stocks of tropical boots are rapidly reaching the point where present restrictions on issues can be relaxed somewhat to provide a second pair for each infantryman and one pair to everyone else in III MAF.

(2) There were still critical shortages which demanded extraordinary action, however. Typical was the requirement to expedite delivery of 2,500 rifles during December and an additional 2,500 during January to provide for increases in total personnel strength during this period.

(3) Continued emphasis was placed on planning and definition of policy. Typical actions included:

(a) Attendance at the FMFPac Periodic Logistic Conference on Okinawa and conduct of a III MAF Supply Conference.

(b) A new and improved Red Ball report has been implemented which provides an improved management tool for this program; 3rd FSR was notified of the change.

(c) A review of the policy and procedures for FRC 55 (Special Construction Materials) is underway.

(4) Recap of Red Ball during the Month of December 1966:

Total line items on Red Ball 1 December 1966	704
Total line items added during December 1966	104
Total line items deleted during December 1966	388
Total line items on Red Ball 31 December 1966	420

(5) The following Orders and Bulletins were published during this reporting period:

(a) Force Order 4450.1 - Report of Storage Facilities.

(b) Force Bulletin 4010 - Recovery of Expended Cartridge and Shell Casings.

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(6) The following significant correspondence was released during the reporting period:

(a) CG III MAF msg 120224Z Dec66 - Unit of issue date for requisitioning purposes to all major commands.

(b) CG III MAF msg 130302Z Dec66 - Requirements for 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions and FLC report receipts of CAC items.

(c) CG III MAF msg 161242Z Dec66 - 3rd Marine Division and FLC to requisition gas mask shortages priority 02. FLC to expedite actions to obtain requirements.

(d) CG III MAF msg 180540Z Dec66 - To III MAF calling command attention to safeguarding government property.

(e) CG III MAF msg 230858Z Dec66 - Required III MAF Commands to requisition M-14 rifle requirements on priority 02 immediately.

(f) CG III MAF msg 260630Z Dec66 - To COMUSMACV stating this command had not purchased steel or cement from Hong Kong or Singapore.

(g) CG III MAF msg 270134Z Dec66 - Advised III MAF Commands to practice judicious use of MIL/strip priorities

(h) CG III MAF ltr 21/rca over 7300 dated 19 December 1966 - Assigned H&SCo III MAF as accountable unit for Sub Unit #1 1st ANGLICO.

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**SECRET**VII. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. A slight decrease in total message traffic through the III MAF Communication Center was noted during December 1966. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>DECREASE</u>
Incoming	43375	41681	
Outgoing	51147	48585	
Total	94522	90266	4256

B. Message traffic through the COC Communication Center showed a significant increase. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
Incoming	2808	3306	
Outgoing	3012	4274	
Total	5820	7580	1760

C. Additional AN/TRC-97 systems were installed during the month. Presently five systems are installed representing 55 voice channels. Two systems each are emplaced Danang to Chu Lai and Danang to Phu Bai. One system emplaced Phu Bai to Dong Ha. These systems have released several AN/MRC-62 systems from long haul use and made them available for tactical use.

D. Activation of Danang Interim Relay by U. S. Army Stratcom has provided III MAF with a local relay thereby lessening our dependence on Nha Trang relay. Interim Relay allows III MAF to conduct closer coordination with the facility providing vital communications services to III MAF thus increasing the reliability and effectiveness of III MAF communications.

E. An additional 25 pair cable was installed between 31 Test Frame (Vic 1stMAW CP) and Red Beach to increase capability to Force Logistic Command.

F. Emergency back up communications system was installed in III MAF water tower. Circuits have been tested individually. Continued tests are planned in order to maintain capability.

G. Submitted a request to CG, FMFPac for an increase of 1290 telephones, model 500 and 198 telephones, model 510.

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H. Received an approval from CG, FMFPac to extend for six months the loan of AN/PRC-25 radios to 2nd Brigade ROKMC.

I. Provided special communications facilities for Cardinal SPELLMAN, Billy GRAHAM and Bob HOPE.

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**SECRET**VIII. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civil Affairs Program remained unchanged during the month of December 1966.

B. I Corps Joint Coordinating Council. The Council met four times during December. Of primary interest to the council were reports regarding reorganization of all U. S. civilian agencies supporting Revolutionary Development (RD), establishment of a Census Grievance office in Danang, support and special training of personnel involved in Revolutionary Development, and the 24 December 1966 crash of the Flying Tiger Aircraft in the heavily populated area surrounding the Danang airfield.

(1) During December, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was established for the purpose of coordinating and controlling the activities, throughout Vietnam, of all U. S. civilian organizations and agencies whose mission is to support the GVN RD program. Ambassador Koren was appointed Director of Civil Operations for Region I. Copies of the instructions for implementing this newly created organization were distributed to members of the Council. The reorganization, which effected USAID, Combined Studies Division (CSD) and JUSPAO, was not expected to change the membership or alter the participation of these civilian agencies in the activities of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council.

(2) A Census Grievance Office was established in Danang City during December 1966. Personnel who were to staff the office underwent training in Saigon early in the month and returned to Danang during the week of 12-18 December 1966 to begin the work of establishing the Census Grievance Office. This office will conduct the People's Aspiration Program in Danang and will refer appropriate grievances to the Mayor of Danang.

(3) It was announced to the Council that preparations within ICTZ for support of the GVN RD plan for CY 1967 were progressing as scheduled. I Corps will redeploy a number of military units to actively support the RD program. A special training period, accomplished by Mobile Training Teams, will be conducted for all personnel of all units involved in this role. Ultimately, each such unit will receive two weeks of detailed instruction which will cover the entire concept of the RD program. A briefing team, composed of representatives from USAID, JUSPAO, CSD, MACV Advisory Group and III will conduct briefings for USMC division, regimental and battalion personnel who will be concerned with the RD Program.

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(4) The 24 December 1966 crash of the Flying Tiger aircraft caused lengthy discussions which centered around establishment and payment of claims, and emergency procedures to be instituted at time and scene of any future aircraft accidents. Questions regarding settlement of claims arising from two previous accidents (Khe Trung (4) and Go Roc hamlets) were asked. Both combat claims are still being processed through GVN channels. Neither claim has been paid to date. The Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps was asked by the Council to prepare a recommended list of emergency procedures to be implemented in the event of future accidents. Recommendations were expected to consider Vietnamese customs on movement of bodies and other matters.

(5) A lesser point of interest was the announcement to the Council that the GVN Radio Station in Danang was to present a twenty minute Christmas Program, in English, for the U. S. military forces in the area. The program's purpose was to thank these forces for the many contributions made during their stay in Vietnam.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. Five Committees of the I Corps council met during the month of December 1966.

(1) Commodities Distribution Committee. Several points of interest were brought before the Committee:

(a) USAID reported that a chartered C-46 cargo aircraft which frequently transported cargo from Saigon to Danang was available, on short notice, for the movement of commodities to other points throughout the I Corps area. III MAF took advantage of this offer several times during the month to move Civic Action type commodities to Phu Bai, Chu Lai and Dong Ha in what proved to be an effective and timely manner.

(b) Inquiries were made as to the use of PL-480 commodities in food for work projects. For funded self-help projects, up to fifty percent of labor cost could be absorbed by PL-480 commodities; in unfunded self-help projects, one hundred percent.

(c) The III MAF cement blockmaking project at Red Beach was discussed at length. This project, sponsored by the 7th Engineer Battalion, has three CINVARAM blockmaking machines in operation. Operated by refugees, the system turns out about 400 bricks daily for use in III MAF Civic Action projects. III MAF is currently studying the feasibility of having additional CINVARAM machines made locally.

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(2) Education Committee. Of primary interest to the Committee was the explanation of the Marine Scholarship program. At present, the Marine financed program is open to elementary schools only. Units throughout I Corps, depending on size, are expected to support from one to seven scholarship students, selected on basis of previous scholastic attainment and financial need. This program is designed to reduce the percentage of drop-outs occurring in the second and first (4th and 5th U. S. equivalent) grades.

(3) Port Coordinating Committee. The Committee discussed two training programs currently in progress. First was the port pilotage program whereby Naval Support Activity, Danang is giving commercial ship pilots necessary experience to bring deep draft vessels to berth alongside the NSA deep draft facility. The commercial pilots board vessels along with the NSA pilots to observe and assist as required. When training is completed and further requirements are met, the deep draft pilotage operation shall incorporate the commercial pilots from Danang. Second was the program to train Vietnamese civilians, who are not stevedores, to operate and maintain material handling equipment. This latter training program is not intended to create competition by NSA for workers.

(4) Public Health Committee. Discussions on the plague outbreak in Danang East and on Venereal Disease control measures continued during December. Efforts to organize the population of the plague infected area for mass immunizations proved effective. Some 8,400 Vietnamese from three hamlets received plague shots during the month. Vector control efforts did not enjoy the same success however as people did not respond to the control means employed (trapping/killing rats). Danang Medical Hospital was proposed as a possible site for a VC control clinic. III MAF is currently working up a program for treatment for VD which will be available in the near future. This treatment will be used in conjunction with GVN efforts when a treatment center is finally established as a preventive medicine measure.

(5) Road Committee. ARVN engineer responsibility for emergency repair to major routes of communication was outlined. Though GVN Public Works retains routine maintenance of roads, ARVN engineers are responsible for keeping the roads open for military traffic. Public Works is supposed to follow up expedient repairs with more permanent work.

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D. Medical Assistance. Sixty-four MEDCAP Teams operated in 115 locations during December 1966 and provided medical aid and dental treatments to 86,512 Vietnamese civilians. Twenty-three health workers, including nurses, received informal on-the-job training during the month; 5,700 persons received inoculations as a preventive medicine measure.

E. CARE. During December, CARE provided III MAF with 2,440 bags of rice (50 kilo/bag) and 6,000 bags of cement to support the Civil Affairs program.

F. HANDCLASP. During December, III MAF received 200,000 pounds of assorted Handclasp items. Shipments consisted primarily of soap, mouthwash, toys, clothing and miscellaneous medical supplies.

G. Civil Affairs Summary. III MAF Civic Action program continued the downward trend of the past four months. Indices which are frequently used to reflect trends in III MAF Civic Action activity are: Medical treatments administered to 82,183 people, down 15.7%, distribution of 5,932 pounds of soap, down 26.9% and distribution of 166,105 pounds of food, down 37.4%. An unexpected heavy rainfall during December continued the inundation of the low altitude rice lands in all TAOR/RAOR's. Roadways were made impassable to essentially all type of transportation, except tracked vehicles. The combination of flood conditions and impassable roads effectively isolated large portions of heavily populated areas from any contact with the III MAF Civic Action Program. Many units whose MEDCAP teams were able to reach the site of their MEDCAP activity reported that few if any Vietnamese turned out because of the inclement weather. During December, III MAF received a shipment of MEDCAP supplies from Saigon, which were immediately distributed to using units. This shipment filled nearly all requirements of the MEDCAP teams and provided adequate assets for the teams to continue their activity.



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**SECRET**IX. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A. Chieu Hoi Campaign. During the month of December 1966, 171 VC/NVA personnel rallied, the 1966 high was attained during the month of October 1966 with a rate of 172. An increase occurred in Thua Thien Province; however the southern part of the ICTZ continues to provide the bulk of the ralliers. Ralliers continue to use both the National Safe Conduct Pass and other Chieu Hoi leaflets when rallying.

B. The Psychological Operations Exploitation Team (POET) covered 23 exploitable incidents during December resulting in the production of 23 new leaflets, 5 special tape recorded messages and 3 posters. Reports indicate that quick reaction POET operations are effective in countering VC propaganda that Ralliers were killed by allied forces.

C. Leaflets Produced within ICTZ.

(1) The 244th PsyOp Co. printed 7,344,331 basic leaflet units and 50,161 posters during December

(2) Total U. S. Presses 10,797,050 leaflets.

D. Air Operations.

(1) Leaflet dissemination:

(a) The 5th Air Commando Squadron dropped a total of 29,195,500 leaflets in ICTZ of which 20,391,000 were dropped in support of USMC units. 14,234,000 were directed at NVA and VC urging them to join the Chieu Hoi Program. A total of 323 aircraft sorties were flown to distribute various type of propaganda and JUSPAO newspapers. 263 aircraft sorties were cancelled due to bad weather, nonavailability of aircraft and maintenance problems.

(b) Leaflet drops in support of Operation "Four Winds" totaled 2,056,000.

E. Ground Operations.

(1) Total leaflets hand delivered by U. S. Forces: 117,500.

(2) Total number hours ground/waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts U. S. Forces: 71:20.

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(3) Total movies shown U. S. Forces: 60

(4) Total PsyWar material hand delivered in Operation  
"Leisurely Ride" 3rd Marine Division: 4000 per week.

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X. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU.

A. Background. During December 1966, 311 escorted visits were accomplished by the Combat Information Bureau. The escorts covered operations, civic action, hometowners and various other subjects of interest to the press. The Danang Press Center hosted 162 correspondents during this period.

B. Motor Transportation. Constant deadlining of vehicles and monsoon weather hampered the overall response to press vehicle requirements. The press center station wagon has been in the III MAF motor pool since the early part of the month awaiting parts. Spare parts for the M-151 jeeps are particularly hard to come by since they are no longer a part of the Marine Corps vehicle inventory. Paper work has been initiated to eventually replace these four vehicles with standard M-38 jeeps which can be more readily maintained. A full time mechanic in addition to two regularly assigned drivers would greatly assist the preventative maintenance program. A request has been initiated to meet this requirement.

C. Photography. During the month of December, 21,083 feet of motion picture footage was forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps. Of this, 25.7% was exposed on Operations, 22.2% on civic action and 52.1% on technical, VIP and miscellaneous. Operations covered were PRAIRIE, SIERRA, CHINOOK and MISSISSIPPI. An interesting note is that 800 feet was exposed concerning Cardinal Spellmen's visit. Two County Fairs were covered with 1500 feet of film.

D. Radio/Television. During the month of December, this section made a total of 175 releases. This included 25 Radio Features and 150 Fleet Home Town interviews.

E. Escorts. During December, 311 escorted visits were accomplished. Included were operations PRAIRIE, TRINIDAD II, MISSISSIPPI, evacuation of 2,500 refugees, Operation CHINOOK, Lieutenants General CHAPMAN and KRULAK's press conferences. Notable media representatives and VIP's who visited CIB during the month included: Marvin Miles, L. A. Times; Lee Telesco, Philippine Herald; David Burrington, NBC; Adam Raphael, CBS; Peter Kent, CPCN-TV Canada; John Value, New England Press; James Pringle, Reuters; Jacques Amalric, France; Emile Bur Graff, Germany; Walter Cabus, Belgium; Timothy Coogan, Ireland; Arni Cunarseen, Iceland; Pontti Heimolainen, Finland; Rafael Mulero, Spain; John Johnson, Norway; Clas Johnson, Sweden; Francis Landraff, Switzerland; Ferdnando Moutinifo, Portugal; Stevan

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Tatic, Yugoslavia; Larry Howes, USIA Escort; Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard; Bob Gassaway, AP; Martin Russ, Athenia Publications; Peter Arnett, AP; Robert Considine, Hearst Publications; William Randolph Hearst, Hearst Publications; Milton Kaplan, Hearst Publications; Tom Tiede, NEA; Eiichi Kimurna, NHK; John R. HART, CBS; Ester Clark, Phoenix Gazette; Edward Hymoff, CHL Inc., Jo Ann Hardee, Detroit News; Deitmar Gaiser, Der Allgaver; Buck Lanier, Long Beach Telegram; Al Webb, UPI; Thomas F. S. Buckley, New York Times; Sanford Zalburg, Honolulu Advertiser; Ronald M. Ross, Minneapolis Tribune; Bob Erlandson, Baltimore Sun; William McWhirter, Time Magazine; M. Wm. Broekmijer, Major General Netherlands;

F. Press Releases. During the month of December, the press section processed and forwarded to news media a total of 390 releases. Of the total, 62 releases concerned civic action by the Marines, and 232 photographs accompanied these releases. A total of 7,903 releases, including 165 photographs, were forwarded to Fleet Home Town News Center for processing. This total was exceeded only by the record 8,099 FHTNC releases processed during the month of November 1966.

G. Press Center. A total of 162 correspondents and VIP's checked in at the Press Center during the month of December 1966.

Sidelight: CIB established a "satellite section" of two 4300 and one 4600 personnel at the Force Logistic Command.

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**SECRET**XI. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (RVNAF).

A. GENERAL. ARVN activities for the month of December 1966 were highlighted by Lien Ket 78, a 4th Regiment operation west of Mo Duc; by continued improvement in civic action projects and Revolutionary Development planning; and by a marked increase in the resupply effort. Enemy activity showed a slight increase in total incidents with attacks on bridges along Highway 1 the principal objective.

B. OPERATIONS. I Corps conducted 42 battalion size operations during December as compared to 34 last month. There were 7 combined and 1 heliborne operations included in the above figure. Contact was made with the VC/NVA in 24 of these operations. ARVN/RF/PF losses were 227 KIA and 639 WIA as compared to 335 KIA and 1139 WIA last month. Enemy losses were 359 KIA and 121 PW/VC as compared to 847 and 83 last month. ARVN captured 143 weapons and lost 195 compared to 318 captured and 119 lost in November.

One significant operation took place in the I CTZ in December. Lien Ket 78, a 4th Regiment controlled search and destroy operation, was conducted west of Mo Duc from 26 December to 31 December. Friendly losses were 26 KIA and 65 WIA including 2 U. S. advisors. Enemy losses were 37 KIA and 6 PW/VC.

C. ENEMY ACTIVITY. The number of VC initiated incidents reported in December was 171 compared to 132 in November.

One significant incident occurred in the 11th DTA. On 10 December a multi-company enemy force attacked the 3/3 at An Lo and destroyed two 19 meter spans of the An Lo bridge on Highway 1. Friendly casualties were 22 ARVN and 1 U. S. Advisor KIA, 75 ARVN and 2 U. S. Advisors WIA and 12 ARVN MIA. There 92 weapons and 8 radios lost and two 1/4 ton trucks destroyed. Enemy losses were 10 KIA and 4 weapons captured.

In Quang Da Special Zone there were two noteworthy incidents reported. On 20 December the Provincial Headquarters at Hoi An received eight rounds of mortar fire. Friendly casualties were 14 civilians wounded. On 21 December a train was derailed by the enemy near Phu Loc. Four rail cars were damaged.

There were three important incidents reported in the 12th DTA. On 14 December a multi-company size enemy force conducted simultaneous attacks on the Ba Duc bridge security, the 3/6 west of Tam Ky, and a POL dump near Tam Ky Provincial Headquarters. Friendly casualties were 34 ARVN KIA, 10 PF KIA, 39 ARVN WIA, 1

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U. S. Advisor WIA, 2 PF WIA. Enemy losses were 26 VC KIA. On 18 December a subsector patrol was ambushed west of Thang Binh. Friendly casualties were 11 RF KIA. On 26 December, west of Mo Duc, a 2½ ton truck carrying personnel from the 37th Ranger Battalion was destroyed by a mine made from an estimated 700 pound bomb. Friendly casualties were 16 KIA and 7 WIA.

Enemy activity in the DMZ in December continued in the same manner as November. The 808th Local Force and 814th Main Force Battalions were reported to be operational in southern Quang Tri Province, but were short replacements, food, and medical supplies. Increased VC sapper training was reported in western Quang Nam Province. Latest intelligence indicate elements of the 3rd NVA Division are located in southern Quang Ngai Province.

The enemy remains capable of launching multi-regimental attacks in the 11th DTA, regimental attacks in Quang Da Special Zone and the 12th DTA, small unit harassing operations against isolated units and outposts, interdicting lines of communication, and terrorizing the local population throughout much of I CTZ.

D. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD). During December work on Corps, Division, and Province RD plans continued. Integration of the old political cadre and Peoples Action Teams into 59 man RD cadres started during the month. RD Mobile Training Teams completed a two week course in Saigon during the month and will start training selected ARVN battalions on 2 January 1967. No hamlets were secured in December.

E. PSYOPS/CIVIC ACTION. In December the ARVN 10th Polwar Battalion and 11th Civil Affairs Company completed the Danang East refugee operation. The operation resulted in eight houses and one school repaired, six new wells dug, ten old wells repaired, fifteen families relocated, and 11,000 refugees receiving relief supplies. In late December the above units started operation HUNG QUANG I in Hoa Vang District. Three hamlets received the major effort. The operation has resulted in two schools, eight wells and a flag pole repaired; one new well dug; foodstuff for 530 families, 600 school kits, 14 medical kits, and 14 tool kits distributed.

ARVN presses produced 1,115,000 leaflets and newspapers during the month compared to 1,815,000 last month. VNAF flew 9 leaflet sorties dropping a total of 1,000,000 leaflets compared to 26 sorties and 2,325,000 leaflets last month. Airborne loud-speaker time for the month totaled three hours. Ground loud-speaker time totaled 272 hours. The number of ralliers increased for the fourth straight month with a total of 171 compared to 162

Enclosure 71  
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last month, 145 in October, 109 in September and 99 in August.

F. REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE. The Motivation Indoctrination Program for PF continued with an additional 25 platoons completing the course. To date, 426 platoons totaling 16,188 soldiers have been trained. One RF company from Quang Ngai Province completed training at Hoa Cam Training Center during the month. During December 340 tons of foodstuffs were distributed to PF personnel compared to 384 tons last month. MEDCAP teams treated 3,800 patients during the month.

G. PERSONNEL. The assigned Strength/Authorized Strength percentages in December for the 1st Division, 2d Division, and 51st Regiment were 94, 93, and 91 respectively compared to 93, 95, and 100+ in November. Present for Duty/Authorized Strength percentages in December for the same units were 87, 82, and 88 respectively compared to 86, 81 and 90 last month. The Desertions for the 1st Division, 2d Division and 51st Regiment in December were 101, 201, and 78 respectively compared to 116, 228, and 141 last month. On 12 December 400 officer candidates obtained from screening draft personnel were transported to Saigon for further processing.

H. LOGISTICS. The overall logistics situation showed continued improvement during December. Direct shipments of medical supplies and signal batteries were received from CONUS. A shipment of barbed wire and concertina reduced the critical shortage of fortification materials. Low stock levels continued in selected items of ammunition and repair parts for vehicles. I ALC stock levels for 43 line items of individual clothing and equipment dropped to zero balance during the month. Resupply almost doubled during December as 7305 short tons were moved compared to 3870 short tons last month. The shortage of transportation to move supplies from Saigon to the I CTZ continued to be a problem.

I. ENGINEER. The number of enemy attacks against roads and bridges in the I CTZ increased from 19 in November to 28 in December. ARVN engineer reaction time continued to be excellent. National Highway 1 was open from the DMZ to Quang Ngai 85 percent of the month in spite of increased enemy interdiction and heavy seasonal flooding.

There were eight attacks against the railroad in I CTZ during December. The railroad was open from Danang to Hue 45 percent of the month.

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**SECRET**CHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE/BILLET</u>
1Dec66	The Honorable Henry Cabot LODGE	Ambassador of the United States to the Republic of Vietnam
1Dec66	John A. HEINTGES	LtGen, U. S. Army DEPCOMUSMACV
1Dec66	Edwin R. CHESS	MajGen, U. S. AirForce Chief of Chaplains, USAF
1-2Dec66	Clarence J. LANG	BGen, U. S. Army Director of Logistics, U.S. Strike Command
2Dec66	Adriel WILLIAMS	BGen, U. S. Air Force Director of Transportation, U. S. Air Force
2Dec66	William P. JENNINGS	Representative (Dem. Va.) Member, House Ways & Means Committee
2Dec66	Graham PURCELL	Representative (Dem. Tex.) Member, House Agriculture Committee
3-4Dec66	Jonathan B. BINGHAM	Representative (Dem. N.Y.) Member, House Administration Committee and Interior and Insular Affairs
5Dec66	Sir John WILTON	LtGen KBE, CBE, CB, DSO Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Australian Forces
5Dec66	K. MACKAY	MajGen, Commander, Australian Force, RVN
5-6Dec66	Mr. R. H. HEARST	Civilian, Distinguished Member of the Press
5-6Dec66	Mr. M. KAPLAN	Civilian, Distinguished Member of the Press

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5-6Dec66	Mr. R. CONSODINE	Civilian, Distinguished Member of the Press
6Dec66	Commander John E. DAVIS	National Commander, The American Legion
6Dec66	David LAMBERT	RAdm, U. S. Navy COMTRAPAC
6-8Dec66	Henry M. JACKSON	Senator (Dem. Wash) Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services
6-8Dec66	Mr. Glenn A. SMITH	GS-18, Professional Staff Member Senate Sub-Committee on Preparedness Investi- gation
6Dec66	The Honorable Henry KOREN	Deputy Assistant Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
7-8Dec66	Strom THURMOND	Senator (Rep. S.C.) Member, Armed Services Committee, Banking and Currency Committee and Republican Policy Committee
7-8Dec66	Mr. Charles KIRBOW	Chief Clerk, Senate Armed Services Committee
7Dec66	Mr. George ALLEN	Special Emissary, Department of State
7-8Dec66	Mr. V. C. MOORE	Canadian Ambassador to Republic of Vietnam
7Dec66	BGen LINDBERG	BGen, U. S. Air Force Deputy Commander, AAFEX-NY
8-11Dec66	Leonard F. CHAPMAN	LtGen, U. S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff, U. S. Marine Corps
8-11Dec66	Raymond L. MURRAY	MajGen, U. S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, U. S. Marine Corps

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8Dec66	Mr. Allen E. PUCKETT	GS-18, Executive Vice-President Hughes Aircraft
8Dec66	Mr. Fred P. ADLER	GS-18, Vice-President, Hughes Aircraft
8Dec66	Mr. Nicholas YARU	GS-18, Vice-President, Hughes Aircraft
8Dec66	Mr. Theodore W.J. WONG	GS-18, Associate Manager, Hughes Aircraft
8Dec66	Mr. Robert W. DEHAVEN	GS-18, Manager, Flight Test Division, Hughes Aircraft
8-9Dec66	Dr. MENKES	GS-16, Institute of Defense Analysis
9Dec66	Strom THURMOND	Senator (Rep, S.C.) Member, Armed Services Committee, Banking and Currency Committee and Republican Policy Committee
10Dec66	Ernest F. HOLLINGS	Senator (Dem.S.C.)
12-14Dec66	Colonel MEDRANO	Colonel, Director of Intelligence, El Salvador
12Dec66	William G. WESTMORELAND	General, U. S. Army COMUSMACV
13-14Dec66	The Honorable Henry KOREN	Deputy Assistant Ambassador to Republic of Vietnam
13Dec66	Mr. LEONHART	
15-16Dec66	CHAE Myung Shin	LtGen, Commander, ROK Forces, Vietnam
16Dec66	L. W. THORNTON	LtGen, CBE, Chief Defense Staff, New Zealand
16Dec66	Mr. Leon ANDERSON	Commander, American Veterans Organization

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17Dec66	Mr. J. W. UNGER	National Commander, Disabled American Veterans
17-18Dec66	M. J. B. BROCKMEIER	MajGen, Netherlands Air Force
19-20Dec66	RAdm GOODFELLOW	RAdm, U. S. Navy CTG 70.8 Naval Gunfire Support
19Dec66	George S. BLANCHARD	BGen, U. S. Army ADC, 1st Cavalry Division
19-20Dec66	Mr. John STEINBECK	Distinguished Author and Writer
21-26Dec66	James W. KELLY	RAdm CHC, U. S. Navy Chief of Chaplains, U. S. Navy
24-26Dec66	Nguyen Huu CO	LtGen, Minister of Defense
24-27Dec66	Mrs. Albert THOMAS	Congresswoman (Dem. Tex.)
25Dec66	Dr. Billy GRAHAM	Evangelist
26-27Dec66	George W. GRIDER	Representative (Dem. Tenn.) Member, District of Columbia Committee and Judiciary Committee
26-27Dec66	John O. MARSH	Representative (Dem. Va.) Member, House Appropriations Committee
26Dec66	Francis Cardinal SPELLMAN	Archbishop of New York & Vicar of U. S. Armed Forces
28Dec66	Harold K. JOHNSON	General, U. S. Army Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
28Dec66	Mr. Bob HOPE	Entertainer
29Dec66	James O. LINDBERG	BGen, U. S. Air Force, Deputy Commander, AAFEX-NY

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30Dec66

Dr. Clark KERR

President,  
University of California

30-31Dec66

Victor H. KRULAK

LtGen, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding General, Fleet  
Marine Force, Pacific

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PART THREE**SECRET**CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 December - Operation PRAIRIE Continuing
  - Operation PAWNEE III Continuing
  - Operation MISSISSIPPI Continuing
  - Operation SUTTER Initiated
- 6 December - Operation SUTTER Terminated
- 7 December - Operation MISSISSIPPI Terminated
  - Operation TRINIDAD I Initiated and Terminated
  - Operation CORTEZ Initiated
- 8 December - Operation TRINIDAD II Initiated
- 11 December - Operation TRINIDAD II Terminated
  - Operation STERLING Initiated
- 12 December - Operation SIERRA Initiated
  - Operation CORTEZ Terminated
- 16 DECEMBER - Operation STERLING Terminated
- 17 December - Operation GLENN Initiated
- 20 December - Operation SHASTA II Initiated
  - Operation CHINOOK Initiated
- 21 December - Operation GLENN Terminated
  - Operation SHASTA II Terminated
- 24 December - Operation PAWNEE III Terminated

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**SECRET**PART FOURREFERENCES

- (A) First Marine Division Command Chronology, December 1966.
- (B) Third Marine Division Command Chronology, December 1966.
- (C) First Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, December 1966.
- (D) Force Logistic Command Command Chronology, December 1966.

ENCLOSURES

- (1) III Marine Amphibious Force, Command Directory, December 1966.
- (2) December 1966 Editions, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Newspaper: "SEA TIGER". *Removed. A record copy of "Sea Tiger"*  
*is maintained in HCSB Library.*

*Added (3) III MAF Campaign Plan #1-67, 26 Dec 66 [5.0-302 668]*

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO San Francisco California 96602

7/1/67  
11 Dec 1966

COMMAND DIRECTORY

<u>SINLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBERS</u> <u>"PARCHMENT" OR</u> <u>AS INDICATED</u>	<u>REF</u>
<u>COMMAND SECTION</u>				
CG III MAF	LtGen	WALT, L. W.	6, Danang 6100	6/67
Aide	Capt	LEE, W. F.	6, Danang 6449	6/67
Aide	Capt	SRAMEK, J. S. Jr.	6, Danang 6449	4/67
Aide	1stLt	SHOFF, J. R.	CG's Quarters	6/67
Political Advisor	Nc.	FRANCIS, A. A.	Danang 6293	1/67
Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	ELDREDGE, T. G.	109	5/67

CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION

Chief of Staff	BGen	H. M. ELWOOD	5, Danang 6383	1/67
Dep Chief of Staff	Col	NEVILLE, R. B.	305, Danang 6405	1/67
Staff Secretary	LtCol	CANZONIERI, J. V.	38, Danang 6383/6100	1/67
Admin Asst to the	2dLt	SCHAUER, T. W.	5	1/67
Chief of Staff				

G-1 SECTION

Asst C/S G-1	Col	MAHON, J. L.	1/Danang 6383	6/67
Asst G-1	LtCol	HOLT, T. J.	1	1/67
ASST TMO	LtCol	JOHNSON, J. C.	153 Motley	1/67
Asst G-1	Maj	FOLSOM, C. A.	101	7/67

G-2 SECTION

Asst C/S G-2	Col	THOMPSON, R. H.	2, Danang 6511	1/67
Int Plans/Ext Off	LtCol	CHAPLIN, D. D. III	702	1/67
Ext Intel Ops Off	LtCol	FRAZIER, P. N.	202	1/67
Ext Ops Off	LtCol	FRENCH, H. D.	202	1/67
Ext Intel Off	LtCol	CREBA, P. A.	102/6309	1/67
Ext G-1	LtCol	MATTHEWSON, D. E.	2, Danang 6511	1/67
Ext Plans/Ext Off	LtCol	FAVEL, W. A.	702	1/67
Ext Analyst Off	LtCol	BRITTON, L. C.	102	1/67
Ext G-1	LtCol	GIULIATO, J. J.	102	1/67
Ext G-1	LtCol	HERNAN, C. C.	102	1/67

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G-2 SECTION (Con't)

Intel Watch Off	Capt	MUNDY, C. E.	COC 102	12/67
AsstSpecIntelOff/ASSO	2dLt	HARTMAN, D. W.	402	2/67
Admin/Intel Off	2dLt	HAYWARD, T. E.	2, Danang 6512	8/67
Asst TIO	2dLt	JOHNSTON, B. J.	202	2/67
Asst Staff CI Off	2dLt	SCOTT, J.	702, Danang 6309	11/67
Elec Warfare Off	WO-1	MORGAN, R.	402	9/67
Signal Intel Off	WO-1	TERRY, L. W.	402	11/67
Aerial ReconPhotoO	2dLt	AILSTOCK, J. W.	102	12/67
Aerial ReconPhotoO	2dLt	DEFRANK, J. W.	102	3/67
Aerial ReconPhotoO	2dLt	MORRIS, C. A.	102	4/67

G-3 SECTION

Asst C/S G-3	Col	BARRETT, D. J. Jr.	3, Danang 6232	7/67
Oper Off	Col	RADICS, E. J.	303, Danang 6489	10/67
Ln Off	Col	WEST, R. E.	448 (TIGER)	5/67
Asst G-3	Col	WILSON, R. W.	3, Danang 6232	7/67
R&D Officer	LtCol	BAERISWYL, L. Jr.	803	9/67
AsstPlans Off	LtCol	COFFMAN, H. L.	603	3/67
ABDC/RF/PF	LtCol	HEWLETT, M. N.	603	8/67
Ops Off Gnd	LtCol	JACKSON, M. C. Jr.	403	8/67
COC Watch Off	LtCol	LIVINGSTON, G. M. B.	COC 103	8/67
LnO 2d Brig ROKMC	LtCol	PARADIS, E. J.	COC Chung Yung	9/67
Ln Off 7thAF	LtCol	PRESTRIDGE, J. G.	31163 (Saigon)	10/67
OinC COC	LtCol	RUGGIERO, A. S.	COC 103	7/67
Asst Ops Off	LtCol	SUMERLIN, E. "B" Jr.	303	1/67
Ops Off Gnd	LtCol	SHRADER, P. A.	503	9/67
Plans/Pro Off	LtCol	VOLKERT, M. D.	603	8/67
MCIFDALNO	Maj	DEMONT, T. J. *	803	2/67
MCIFDALNO	Maj	SNEPICKA, A. A. *	803	2/67
Asst Ops Off	Maj	ANDERSON, T. A.	503	2/67
Admin Off	Maj	BARSTOW, C. A.	103	10/67
AsstAirOff	Maj	CARDWELL, R. E.	303, Danang 6489	3/67
Historical Off	Maj	FAHEY, J. E.	43	8/67
AirOps Off	Maj	FISICH, M. J. Jr.	303, Danang 6489	3/67
Asst Ops Off Gnd	Maj	FRIDRICH, P. B.	503, Danang 6489	3/67
Asst Ops Off Air	Maj	GOWDY, R. J.	303, Danang 6489	3/67
Asst Ops Off Gnd	Maj	HUTCHISSON, W. R.	503, Danang 6489	3/67
Asst Ln Off 7thAF	Maj	PRITCHETT, L. C.	31163 (Saigon)	7/67
Trng Off	Maj	ROBINETT, H. M.	803	7/67
COC Watch Off	Maj	SAMPLE, E. J.	505, Danang 6582	3/67
NOPO	1Cdr	LEASE, M. D.	403	7/67
Ln Off to MACV	Maj	START, R. J.	448 (TIGER)	7/67
SitRep/HisRep Off	Capt	COLLINS, F. A.	COC 903	7/67
COC Watch Off	Capt	ESAY, R. E. Jr.	COC 103	7/67
OpsAnal Off	Capt	JOHNSON, B. R.	803	7/67
AsstHist Off	Capt	ROSS, R. A.	43	7/67
ChC Drafting	2dLt	WELSON, D. H.	903	7/67
COC Watch Off	CWO-3	KENNEDY, J. E.	COC 103	7/67

G-4 SECTION

Asst C/S G-4	Col	QUINCY, J. F.	4, Danang 6504	
Asst G-4	Col	CLINE, B. J.	4, Danang 6504	



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G-4 SECTION (Con't)

LogPlansO	LtCol	SNAPPER, J. N.	204	3/67
LogOpnsO	LtCol	BAILEY, A. S.	304	8/67
AsstLogOpnsO	LtCol	JONES, C. T.	304	7/67
AsstLogOpnsO	Major	JONES, R. D.	304	7/67
AsstLogPlansO Air	Maj	JOHNSON, L. E.	204	3/67
AsstLogPlansO Gnd	Maj	DUTTON, T. A.	204	7/67
AsstLogOpnsO Gnd	Maj	CHARRON, D. H.	204	12/67

G-5 SECTION

Asst C/S G-5	Col	HOLMGRAIN, E. S.	301, Danang 6419	2/67
Asst G-5	Col	ROSS, G. O.	301, Danang 6419	7/67
Opns Off	LtCol	EVANS, D. L. Jr.	46, 301	3/67
RptsConOff	Capt	DOUGLAS, D. M.	46	3/67
Admin Off	Capt	GREMMELS, N. H.	301, Danang 6419	3/67
Medical Monitor	LCdr	NOURIGAT, E. R.	46	10/67

ADJUTANT SECTION

Adjutant	Major	REVILLE, J. T.	7/207	8/67
Asst Adj/Perso	WO-1	OAKES, M. A.	207	5/67
OIC S&C	2dLt	MATTOX, L.	107	10/67

CEO SECTION

CEO	Col	HILL, J. B.	10	4/67
Asst CEO	Maj	KYLE, D. N.	110	2/67
Asst CEO	Maj	BAILEY, G. R.	410	6/67
Asst CEO	Maj	HULL, R. R.	210	3/67
Asst CEO	Maj	COLLINS, G. L.	410	9/67
Asst CEO	Maj	FRASER, J. H.	310	8/67
Asst CEO	Capt	BORDERS, J. F.	310	3/67

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Force Chaplain	Capt	LYONS, V. E. Jr.	19	10/67
AsstForChaplain	Cdr	HERSHBERGER, J. R.	19	5/67

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

FISO	Col	FIELDS, T. M.	Danang 6259
MACV Lno	LtCol	WILLIAMS, J. F.	Saigon 92026
Asst FISO	Maj	HAIGHT, W. P.	Danang 6259
Press Rel Off	Capt	STACKPOLE, H. C.	Danang 6259
Press Off	2dLt	ARNOLD, R. E.	Danang 6259
Club Mngr	2dLt	JARRELL, R. Jr.	Danang 6259
Escort Off	CWO	COMBS, R. J.	Danang 6259
Photo Off	WO	CORNUET, G. S.	Danang 6259

COMPTROLLER SECTION

Asst C/S Compt	LtCol	SNOW, M. W.	50	7/67
Asst Comptroller	2dLt	CROCKFORD, R. K.	50	7/67

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DATA PROCESSING SECTION

Data Processing Off	Capt*	KENT, G. D.	Kit Carson 777	9/67
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ENGINEER SECTION

Force Engineer	Col	HORN, C. H.	15	9/67
Asst Force Engr	LtCol	BABE, G. A.	15	8/67
CEC Officer	LCdr	MULDER, W. H.	15	7/67
EngrOpsO	Capt	FLESSNER, M.	15	8/67
Engr UtilitiesO	Capt	NELMS, R.	15	9/67
Plans Officer	2dLt	WILLIAMS, L. R.	115	4/67

EMBARK/TRANS SECTION

Embark Off	Maj	SILVERTHORN, E. A.	39	7/67
Asst Embark Off	Maj	FICHTER, J. A.	39	2/67
Asst Embark Off	Capt	REVES, S. S.	39	8/67
Asst Embark Off	Capt	SAYE, D. A.	39	12/67
Asst Embark Off	2dLt	RHODES, D. L.	39	4/67

FOOD SERVICES SECTION

Food Services Off	Maj	HALL, W. B.	58 Moment	9/67
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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Headquarters Cmdt	Col	BOYD, C. A.	32	6/67
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LEGAL SECTION

Legal Off	Col*	NEVILLE, R. B.	305	8/67
NAV&MC JUDACT RVN	LtCol	WANDER, W. W.	117	5/67
Asst Legal Off	Capt	DEMARCO, J. R.	17	8/67

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

For MT OFF	LtCol	TONNACLIFF, C. W.	35	8/67
MT Opn Off	Maj	TASHJIAN, R. C.	35	10/67
MT Maint Off	1stLt	PEARCE, D. B.	35	4/67

DENTAL SECTION

Force Dental Off	Capt	MORGAN, K. L.	40	4/67
Admin Asst	Lt	NEILL, G. S.	40	2/67

MEDICAL SECTION

Force Surgeon	Capt	BAKER, H. A.	16	5/67
Admin Asst	Cdr	BROULIK, F.	16	7/67

ORDNANCE SECTION

Force Ordnance Off	LtCol	THOMAS, J. C.	8/108	8/67
Asst Ordnance Off	Capt	COULTER, R. S.	108/8	7/67
GrndOrdO	2dLt	BIGLER, D. P.	108/8	2/67

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POSTAL OFFICER

Postal Off	Maj	COURTNEY, J. R.	7/207	7/67
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PROTOCOL SECTION

Protocol Off	Maj	LIVINGSTONE, J. A.	62	10/67
Asst Protocol Off	Capt	PIERZCHALA, R. R.	62	6/67

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

PMO	LtCol	SULLIVAN, C. H.	27	9/67
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SECTION

Psy Opns Off	Col	READ, R. R.	401	8/67
Admin/Intel0	Maj	ARMSTRONG, S. A.	401	2/67
Opns Off	Capt	LUCKEY, S. A.	Danang 6293	4/67

REPRODUCTION SECTION

Repro Off	CWO-3	SPIKES, A. W.	307	3/67
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RED CROSS SECTION

Red Cross Rep	Mr	JOYCE, R. E.	119	
			Nites and Sun 119 Moment	

SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

SplServ0	Col	SACHS, C. A.	37	7/67
AsstSplServ0	LtCol	PLASKETT, W. Jr.	37	9/67
AsstSplServ0	Maj	DREBUSHENKO, W.	37	8/67
R&R Officer	Capt	GUINN, W. R.	144/241	8/67
OinC China Beach	Capt	BROOKS, H. H.	341	2/67
Custodian	Capt	DIETRICH, R. H.	37	2/67
Escort Off	WO	BURNETT, L. H.	37	12/67

SUPPLY SECTION

Force Sup0	Col	HILL, A. T.	21	7/67
Asst ForSup0	LtCol	ROURKE, R. E.	21	8/67
Asst Sup0	Maj	WEILAND, J. K.	121	10/67
Asst Sup0	Maj	LYNCH, T. K.	121	10/67

29th CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY

Commanding Off	LtCol	STEVENS, L. A.	80	6/67
Admin Off	Capt	TENNANT, D. D.	180	6/67
Opns Off	Capt	KOLBE, J. E.	280	7/67

H&S COMPANY

Commanding Off	Maj	SYLVESTER, V. L.	34	10/67
Executive Off	Capt	SINCLAIR, D. K. Jr.	34	10/67
Admin Off	WO	DESHOTEL, B. J.	34	7/67
S-3/S-4	Capt	BINCH, W. B.	34	6/67

H&S COMPANY (Con't)

ATO	Capt	CASPER, W. R.	135	12/67
Supply Off	Capt	ASH, D. I.	221	12/66
Food Serv Off	Capt	HANSON, J.	57	2/67
Clubs Off	Capt	PAVLOVSKIS, V. V.	58	5/67
Diso Off	2dLt	CLARK, C. V.	18	2/67
Security Off	2dLt	EVANS, M. J.	27	7/67

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION

Ops Anal Off	Maj	ABERNATHY, T. R.	108	9/67
Ass Ops Anal Off	Capt	JOHNSON, R. R.	108	7/67

SUB-UNIT #1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION


Commanding Off	Capt	RADER, R. W.	53/453	2/67
Ops Off	Capt	DIFFEN, R. I.	82	1/67

244TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY

Commanding Off	Capt	MCCAIG, T. H.	85	9/67
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\*Denotes additional, joint or attached duty.

Report errors, changes and/or omissions in writing to the Force Adjutant.

  
J. A. REVILLE  
Force Adjutant

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## III MAF



## CAMPAIGN PLAN

I - 67

*Hist*

GROUP-4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years

302668

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III MAF  
DANANG, VIETNAM  
260800H Dec 66

00199166

Campaign Plan 1-67

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014, Scale: 1:50,000  
(b) MACV and RVN JGS Combined Campaign Plan 1967, AB 142 (S)  
(c) CG III MAF LOI 6-66 of 29Nov66 (S)  
(d) CG III MAF LOI 7-66 of 8Dec66 (S)  
(e) CG III MAF LOI 3-66 of 24Dec66 (S)  
(f) CG III MAF LOI 4-66 of 21Aug66 (S)  
(g) CG III MAF LOI 5-66 of 17Aug66 (S)  
(h) Force0 P4000.5 of 13Mar66 (SOP for Logistics)(U)  
(i) Force0 P02000.1A of 27Jul66 (III Marine Amphibious Force Communication-Electronics Plan; Vietnam)(C)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: As prescribed.

## 1. (S) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.--Annex A (Intelligence).b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Commander, U. S. Seventh Fleet, provides shore bombardment and gunfire support to forces operating ashore in South Vietnam and may employ the ARG/SLF in amphibious operations as directed.
- (2) Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, in coordination with Commander VNN, destroys or otherwise immobilizes confirmed and designated enemy military waterborne traffic; detects and destroys enemy craft attempting waterborne infiltration in coastal and contiguous waters of RVN from the 17th Parallel to the Cambodian border in the south and beyond as authorized by the Rules of Engagement; conducts mine countermeasures

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operations; conducts operations on inland waterways to enforce curfews and interdicts attempts by the enemy to infiltrate or distribute personnel or material; provides protection for shipping in coastal harbors; conducts psychological operations; and, supports Revolutionary Development through military civic action where practical and appropriate.

- (3) Commander, VNN, in coordination with COMNAVFORV, maintains a seaborne anti-infiltration screen along the coast of RVN and establishes and maintains liaison with I ARVN Corps for the purpose of coordinating seaborne anti-infiltration operations with ground operations; conducts and supports amphibious operations anywhere along the coast of RVN as directed; secures the seaward approaches to the principal coastal logistics and operational bases; conducts mine counter measures operations in waterways accessible to and navigable by ocean going ships; defends the national waters of RVN; conducts psychological operations; and supports Revolutionary Development through military civic action where practical and appropriate.
- (4) Commander, 7th Air Force, in coordination with Commander, VNAF, supports ground action in I CTZ as requested; provides airlift support as requested; conducts aerial mining operations as directed; and is responsible for the air defense of SVN.

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- (5) Commander, VNAF, in coordination with Commander, 7th Air Force, provides close air support to RVNAF ground and amphibious operations; provides air logistic support as required; interdicts enemy infiltration routes; and, conducts the air defense of RVN, as directed.
- (6) CG, I ARVN Corps, in coordination with CG, III MAF, in I CTZ, supports Revolutionary Development Program; actively defends provincial capitals, district towns, logistic and operational bases and other significant political and economic centers; opens and secures LOC's; conducts operations to protect and control national resources; assists and/or reinforces the National Police, as required, to identify and eliminate the VC infrastructure; establishes an active program to disrupt VC tax collection efforts; maintains active surveillance of the LAOS border and the southern boundary of the DMZ and known land and sea infiltration routes into I CTZ; conducts operations to destroy VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces within area designated for priority of military offensive operations; conducts sustained, coordinated, unilateral, or combined offensive ground operations against VC/NVA forces, bases, and supply distribution points outside the area for priority of military offensive operations, utilizing reserve forces available; conducts psychological

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operations; conducts military civic action in coordination with province and district officials; coordinates with and provides support as required to CIDG camps within I CTZ; maintains liaison with CG, II ARVN Corps for the purpose of coordinating all operations in the vicinity of the I ARVN Corps - II ARVN Corps boundary; and conducts other operations in accordance with schedules published by RVNAF JGS and USMACV.

- (7) MACV Advisory Groups provide advice to RVNAF and perform liaison functions between RVNAF and U. S. and FWMAF.
- (8) CG, 1st ARVN Division conducts operations and supports Revolutionary Development Program in 11th DTA, which consists of QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces, by positioning one battalion each at PHU LOC, GIO LINH, PK 17, QUANG TRI CITY and DONG HA to provide security for static facilities; two battalions each in the vicinity of QUANG TRI CITY and HUE to function in direct support of the Revolutionary Development Program; one battalion each at LA VANG and PK 17, as the division reserve force for operations; and, maintains one battalion in a training status.
- (9) CG, 2d ARVN Division conducts operations and supports Revolutionary Development Program in 12th DTA, which consists of QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces, by

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positioning one battalion each at HILL 159 (Near TAM KY), HILL 29 (Near THANG BINH) and MO DUC to provide security for static facilities; two battalions at TAM KY and one battalion in the vicinity of QUANG NGAI as mobile task forces for operations; two battalions each in the vicinity of TAM KY and QUANG NGAI to function in direct support of the Revolutionary Development program; maintains one battalion in a training status; and, provides one battalion to Commander, Quang Da Special Zone for support of Revolutionary Development Program in QUANG NAM Province.

- (10) Commander, Quang Da Special Zone, conducts operations and supports Revolutionary Development Program in QUANG NAM Province by employing five ARVN battalions and one RF battalion in direct support of the RD program in the National Priority Area.
- (11) CO, 10th Political Warfare Battalion, ARVN, conducts psychological operations in I CTZ.
- (12) CO, Detachment C-1, 5th Special Forces Group, and subordinate detachments, advises, assists and supports Vietnamese Special Forces and selected district headquarters at Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps throughout I CTZ.

2. (S) MISSION

III MAF, in coordination with I ARVN Corps, on a priority basis,

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conducts sustained, coordinated unilateral or combined ground and air operations to destroy VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces, and neutralize bases and supply distribution points within the area designated for priority of military offensive operations; conducts operations to support Revolutionary Development activities in established TAOR's and in other areas; conducts sustained offensive operations, based on hard intelligence, against enemy forces located outside the area for priority of military offensive operations; opens and secures lines of communications; assists RVNAF in the conduct of operations to protect and control national resources; maintains an active air and ground surveillance of the LAOS border and southern boundary of the DMZ and known land and sea infiltration routes into I CTZ; maintains an active reconnaissance program, particularly long range patrols, to locate VC/NVA main forces and their base areas, and conducts operations to destroy forces and bases positively located; assists RVNAF to establish an active program to disrupt the VC tax collection efforts; provides combat support to I ARVN Corps and FWMAF as required; conducts psychological operations; maintains liaison with I FFORCEV for the purpose of coordinating operations in the vicinity of the I Corps - II Corps boundary; conducts military civic actions in coordination with province and district officials; coordinates with and provides support, as required, to CIDG camps within I CTZ; conducts other operations in accordance with schedules published by USMACV; and,

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continues advisory effort to I ARVN Corps, and its subordinate elements to assist in the accomplishment of tasks assigned to I ARVN Corps.

3. (S) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.--Annex B (Concept for Support of Revolutionary Development Program in I CTZ) to this plan.

b. 1st MarDiv.

(1) In addition to those tasks assigned in reference (c), accomplish the following tasks in support of the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned area of responsibility:

- (a) Establish and maintain combat bases, in conjunction with Regional Forces, at or in the vicinity of LOC SON and VIET AN and at or in the vicinity of NUI DAU and NUI DANG.
- (b) Conduct sustained, coordinated unilateral or combined operations to destroy VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces, and neutralize bases and supply distribution points within the area designated for priority of military offensive operations.
- (c) Conduct operations to support Revolutionary Development Program in established TAOR's and in such other areas as directed.
- (d) Maintain an active reconnaissance program, particularly long range patrols, to locate VC/NVA

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main forces and their base areas and conduct operations to destroy forces and bases positively located.

- (e) Conduct sustained offensive operations, based on hard intelligence, against enemy forces located outside the area for priority of military offensive operations.
- (f) Open and secure lines of communications.
- (g) Assist RVNAF in the conduct of operations to protect and control national resources.
- (h) Assist RVNAF to establish an active program to disrupt the VC tax collection efforts.
- (i) Conduct psychological operations within assigned area of responsibility.

c. 3d MarDiv.

- (1) In addition to those tasks assigned in reference (d), accomplish the following tasks in support of the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned area of responsibility:
  - (a) Establish and maintain combat bases, in conjunction with Regional Forces, at or in the vicinity of KHE SANH, CA LU, D5 BASE and BA LONG.
  - (b) Conduct sustained, coordinated unilateral or combined operations to destroy VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces, and neutralize bases and supply

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distribution points within the area designated for priority of military offensive operations.

- (c) Conduct operations to support Revolutionary Development Program in established TAOR and in such other areas as directed.
- (d) Maintain an active reconnaissance program, particularly long range patrols, to locate VC/NVA main forces and their base areas and conduct operations to destroy forces and bases positively located.
- (e) Conduct sustained offensive operations, based on hard intelligence, against enemy forces located outside the area for priority of military offensive operations.
- (f) Open and secure lines of communications.
- (g) Assist RVNAF in the conduct of operations to protect and control national resources.
- (h) Assist RVNAF to establish an active program to disrupt the VC tax collection efforts.
- (i) Conduct psychological operations within assigned area of responsibility.
- (j) Maintain an active ground surveillance over the southern boundary of the DMZ in order to detect and destroy NVA personnel infiltrating into I CTZ.

d. 1st MAW.

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- (1) In addition to those tasks assigned in reference (e), accomplish the following tasks in support of the

Revolutionary Development Program:

- (a) Maintain an active air surveillance of the LAOS border and over the southern boundary of the DMZ in order to detect NVA infiltration into northern I CTZ.

- (b) Provide other support as required.

e. 2d Brigade, ROKMC.

- (1) In addition to those tasks assigned in reference (f), request the following tasks in support of the

Revolutionary Development Program be accomplished:

- (a) Conduct operations to support Revolutionary Development Program in assigned TAOR and in such other areas as requested.
- (b) Open and secure lines of communication within assigned TAOR.
- (c) Assist RVNAF in the conduct of operations to protect and control national resources.
- (d) Assist RVNAF to establish an active program to disrupt VC tax collection efforts.
- (e) Conduct psychological operations within assigned TAOR.

- f. FLC.--Continue support as required.

- g. 1st MP Bn.--Provide support as required.

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- h. 7th Engr Bn.---Provide support as required.
- i. 9th Engr Bn.---Provide support as required.
- j. 11th Engr Bn.---Provide support as required.
- k. 244th PsyOps Co., USA.

- (1) Provide ground loudspeaker support for combat operations, audio-visual support as requested in support of military civic action, leaflets and other printing support as requested in support of the Revolutionary Development Program.
- (2) Conduct special psychological operations within I CTZ as directed by this Headquarters.

1. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) This campaign will be characterized by a spirit of cooperation and coordination, and a free exchange of assistance, support, advice and information between all RVNAF and US/FWMAF.
- (2) Be prepared to provide support to CIDG camps throughout I CTZ in accordance with the provisions of reference (g).
- (3) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and for execution on 1 January 1967.
- (4) Annex C (Restoration and Protection of Road, Rail and Water LOC's).
- (5) Annex D (National Resources Control).
- (6) Annex E (Psychological Operations).

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(7) Annex F (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas).

(8) Annex G (Coordination of RVNAF and US/FWMAF Operations).

4. (S) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. See reference (h).

b. Support of other US/FWMAF in I CTZ in accordance with existing arrangements and as directed by CG, FMFPac.

c. Transportation.

- (1) Use surface LOC's to the maximum with a corresponding decrease in the dependence on airlift support.
- (2) Primary dependence for logistic movement will be on the coastal sealift system to move supplies from logistic base areas to minor ports close to the base locations of major tactical forces. Land LOC's will be used to the maximum extent possible for the movement of supplies from ports forward in an effort to reduce dependence on airlift capability. Logistic airlift will be employed, as necessary, as backup to surface LOC's for resupply of major forces; and as a primary LOC for emergency requirements and support of isolated tactical units and detachments. In-country movement of FWMAF personnel and material shall be handled in the same manner as for U. S. forces. Out-of-country transportation, beyond the capability of FWMAF, will be provided by U.S. forces in accordance with established arrangements.

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5. (U) COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

See reference (1).

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



H. M. ELWOOD

Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Concept for Support of Revolutionary  
Development Program in I CTZ
- C - Restoration and Protection of Road,  
Rail and Water LOC's
- D - National Resources Control
- E - Psychological Operations
- F - Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas
- G - Coordination of RVNAF and US/FWMAF Operations
- H - Distribution

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## Annex A (Intelligence) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

## 1. (S) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Background.

- (1) The strategic plan of the NVN Lao Dong Party remains the political and military conquest of SVN. The first phase of their plan, in essence, called for the establishment of a firm political and military base. Once having forced the RVN forces into a defensive posture, the Communists would then be ready for the final phase, the annihilation of the enemy and the establishment of a Communist government subservient to HANOI. By mid-1964, the NVN supply routes through LAOS and CAMBODIA had been improved, indications were that the sea infiltration was being used extensively, the VC logistic system and base areas were established and the VC infrastructure was in position.
- (2) A major consideration in the Communist plan has always been the attainment of "strategic mobility." Strategic mobility is the Communist answer to FWMAF tactical mobility. Their objective is to amass a sufficient number of maneuver battalions to pose a threat in widely separated areas which will not only tie a large number of friendly troops in static defensive roles, but will also permit the VC to destroy

A-1

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selected targets at a time of their own choosing. In order to attain the force structure necessary to improve "strategic mobility" and to move into the annihilation phase, HANOI decided to introduce regular NVA troops into SVN. First indications of this decision can be traced back to April, 1964, when the 325th NVA Division, in the vicinity of DONG HOI in NVN, began an accelerated training program in anticipation of deployment to SVN.

b. Recent and present significant activities.

- (1) The growth of the enemy force through the infiltration of new units, the upgrading of existing units, especially the establishment of divisions, considerably improves his overall capability and should improve his operational effectiveness.
- (2) The recent unsuccessful attempt to establish a bridgehead south of the DMZ by the 324B Division, would have provided a far shorter and more direct route into the northern portion of SVN and given the enemy more flexibility in the infiltration of personnel and supplies. This attempt is the first confirmed instance of a unit crossing directly from NVN to SVN using this direct route. Until the move of the 324B Division, personnel infiltration normally moved down the infiltration routes existing in eastern LAOS and western SVN.

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- (3) Further indications of the enemy's determination to continue his protracted war of attrition can be seen in his growth rate during the past 20 months. The general accelerated buildup rate is probably due to several factors, the primary one being NVN's revision of their estimate of the force needed to maintain "strategic mobility" in view of the expected buildup of US and FWMAF. Other factors include the apparent need of HANOI and the VC for a military and psychological victory and their belief that they will win by continuing their protracted war of attrition designed to make the US war weary and willing to negotiate on terms favorable to HANOI, as well as their belief that they can subvert and eventually control the government of SVN.
- (4) Enemy composition and disposition of forces indicate that the enemy considers the main battle area to be Military Region 5, in view of the important military, political, and economic objectives therein. Its mountains and heavy jungle, and the close proximity to LAOS and RVN make this battle area more favorable to the movement, security and resupply of his forces. In this concept, the enemy would create a holding area between the highlands and the coastal plain and maintain sufficient forces in this holding area to

A-3

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pose a sufficient threat to prevent the GVN, US and FWMAF from reinforcing the main battle area. The coastal plain, as a support area, would continue to provide manpower and logistics.

- (5) The enemy has continued his campaign of subversion, terrorism, sabotage and psychological warfare.

c. Probable enemy courses of action which can adversely affect our mission:

- (1) Attack south through the DMZ, within three to ten days after the decision to do so is made, with a force of up to two infantry divisions to destroy friendly forces, equipment and facilities, and to seize and hold QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces.
- (2) Attack to seize and hold HUE, with up to one regiment and two separate battalions.
- (3) Continue attempts to isolate and dominate the high-lands, concurrent with attacks in up to division strength, to disrupt Revolutionary Development in the National Priority Area and to tie friendly troops to their bases.
- (4) Continue the buildup of forces by in-country recruitment/conscription and infiltration of both replacements and units across the LAOS border.
- (5) Increase well coordinated small-scale attacks and terroristic activities against individuals, e.g.,

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officials, political candidates, and Chieu Hoi re-  
turnees, and increase sabotage against selected targets.

- (6) Increase number and size of attacks against airfields, military bases, logistic and communication installations, CIDG/ARVN camps, and important population centers.
- (7) Continue to expand and extend his government, inserting his illegal government where possible, into areas currently under GVN control.

d. Vulnerabilities.

- (1) Enemy forces are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attack and to vertical envelopment.
- (2) Due to limitations inherent in the enemy's logistic system, those units geographically located in SVN where sanctuary in LAOS and NVN can be denied them are vulnerable to sustained friendly operations.
- (3) The enemy's logistic system is vulnerable to ground, sea and air interdiction due to the length of his lines of communication and dependence on the local populace for labor and security.
- (4) Enemy main force extensive attack preparations plus inflexibility in execution are vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling attacks.
- (5) Enemy base areas and supply caches are numerous, not mutually supporting and subject to destruction in detail.

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(6) The VC are dependent to a great extent upon the people.

Continued pressure on the enemy will increase VC pressure on the people who in turn will be more susceptible to psychological operations.

(7) The illegal VC insurgency base must remain in place to control the people. Individual members, therefore, are vulnerable to detection and apprehension. These trained individuals are absolutely essential to the entire VC war effort. Capturing, defecting, or killing these personnel at all levels, particularly at province and higher levels, would deal the insurgency a crippling blow.

(8) The enemy is vulnerable to use of chemical agents to include riot control agents, defoliation and food crop destruction.

(9) Enemy forces are vulnerable to malaria and pulmonary diseases due to their being forced to live in the open in the forests and swamps.

2. (S) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Will the Chinese Communists or any other nation or group overtly enter the war on the side of NVN? If so, when and in what magnitude?
- b. Will NVN attack through the DMZ and/or over the border from LAOS? If so, when, where, and in what strength?
- c. Will a SVN dissident group attempt to seize control from

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the present government? If so, what group(s) and when?

- d. Will NVN commit its Air Force in strikes against military installations and centers of population, or support military operations in I CTZ? If so, when, where, and in what strength?
- e. Will the enemy use chemical or biological agents? If so, what agents, when, how and where?
- f. Will the enemy alter or modify his objectives in SVN, to include acceptance or initiation of negotiations for a peaceful solution to the present conflict? If so, when and under what conditions?
- g. Will Pathet Lao troops reinforce or support a NVN attack into SVN over the SVN-LAOS border? If so, where and in what strength?
- h. What are the personnel strengths and the amounts of all classes of supply infiltrated overland into I CTZ? By what methods and over what routes?
- i. What is the enemy's in-country supply distribution system? Special attention to organization, personnel strength, routes, methods of transportation, way stations and location of storage areas.
- j. Will NVN renew their attempts at sea infiltration of personnel and supplies? If so, which landing sites will be used and what routes will be taken?
- k. Will NVA forces introduce tube artillery or other heavy

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ordnance in sufficient strength to materially affect current firepower ratios? If so, what type of weapons, in what numbers and in which areas?

1. Will NVA forces introduce AA weapons in sufficient strength and effectiveness to materially affect friendly helicopter and fixed-wing operations in I CTZ?
  - m. Who are the members of the VC infrastructure; what are their positions and locations?
  - n. Will the enemy implement a planned major effort specifically aimed at neutralizing or defeating stepped-up GVN Revolutionary Development activities? If so, when, how, where and to what extent?
  - o. What changes have or will occur in VC Regional and Provincial organization to include, chain of command, organizational strength at each level of command and unit organization?
3. (U) RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS
- No change
4. (U) MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND CAPTURED MATERIAL
- Captives, returnees, suspects, captured documents and captured material will be processed in accordance with appropriate III MAF directives.
5. (U) MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS
- Standard reference maps.

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- (1) 1:250,000 Series 1501 JOG(G)
  - (2) 1:250,000 Series 1501 JOG(A)
  - (3) 1:50,000 Series L7014
6. (S) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- a. Military Security.--Commanders will take necessary measures to insure the security of military information, installations, and troop movements.
  - b. Civil Security.--Necessary measures will be taken to screen for and support GVN registration of inhabitants of newly cleared or secured areas. Commanders will prevent entry and, where possible, observation of troop areas and installations by unidentified persons. GVN civil security measures in secure areas, such as curfew, will be supported.
  - c. Port, Frontier and Travel Security.
    - (1) Port Security.--Commanders will insure coordinated efforts to detect and prevent enemy infiltration into port areas.
    - (2) Frontier Security.--Commanders responsible for the security of areas or installations which could be used for hostile entry by land, water, or air will take appropriate action, in coordination with civil authorities, to insure surveillance and reporting of suspect persons or material.
    - (3) Travel Security.--Commanders will take measures to coordinate with civil authorities, to insure the

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screening of travellers in their areas of responsibility.

d. Special Operations.

Counterintelligence organizations will continue to accomplish the following tasks:

- (1) Development of current counterintelligence target lists and dissemination of personality lists.
- (2) Penetration and neutralization of enemy espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorists organizations.

7. (U) REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

In accordance with appropriate III MAF directives.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



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Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

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Annex B (Concept for Support of Revolutionary Development Program  
in I CTZ) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (U) GENERAL

This Annex outlines the principles upon which the Revolutionary Development Program is based, objectives of the campaign, and sets forth the concept as to how this program will be supported in I CTZ.

2. (S) PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

- a. Revolutionary Development is the integrated military and civil program to restore, consolidate, and expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout I CTZ. It consists of those coordinated military and civil actions to liberate the people from VC control, restore public security, initiate political and economic development, extend effective GVN authority, and win the willing support of the people toward these ends.
- b. The focal point of RD is the people in the hamlets. The RD program aims at transforming VC controlled hamlets in order that a new life will be developed for the people within a secure environment and with improved political, economic and social standards of living for all.
- c. The civil aspects of RD are conducted initially in selected individual hamlets that are co-located within an overall area that is free of overt VC aggression. Later, local RD civil activities are expanded to include additional hamlets

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and, subsequently, entire villages. The ultimate goal of RD is to secure and develop sufficient hamlet and village areas throughout I CTZ so that communist influence no longer can thrive or pose a threat to the Central Government's effort to build a free nation.

- d. The role of military forces in RD is to attain and maintain a requisite level of security in and around selected hamlet and village areas so that RD civil actions and, subsequently, nation building can proceed. Within areas selected for RD, military forces conduct clearing and securing operations to establish and maintain local security. Concurrently, other military forces are employed in surrounding areas to establish a protective screen against VC/NVA main forces that seek to enter the inner area where RD is in progress.
- e. Because RD is both a military and civil undertaking, joint planning and supervision is exercised at all echelons. This is carried out as follows:
- (1) Revolutionary development councils, composed of both military and civil representatives, function at national through district level. US/Free World and/or military assistance elements give appropriate advice and assistance at each echelon.
  - (2) At the national level, the Central RD Council develops policies for and manages the overall program. Civil activities are administered through the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and implemented at provincial

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level. Military activities are administered through the Ministry of Defense and implemented by RVNAF at division and sector level in accordance with established provincial RD plans.

- (3) Regional, area, provincial and district RD councils coordinate RD activities within their respective areas of influence. This includes the responsibility to coordinate RD activities between geographical subdivisions where two or more areas or provinces are involved and the requirement exists to coordinate military and civil RD activities that are carried out by subordinate echelons. The responsibility for developing and executing detailed RD plans is decentralized to province/sector level with guidance from the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and the various RD councils at region and area level.

c. Within specific areas selected for RD, joint military and civil RD actions are conducted in two successive stages as follows:

- (1) Restoration of Security.--The purpose of this stage is to eliminate the VC influence, establish local protection against the return of VC influence, and constitute an initial local government at the hamlet level so that development projects can be initiated.

B-3

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During this stage, clearing and securing operations are conducted.

(a) Clearing

1. Clearing operations are conducted to rid the area of organized VC/NVA main forces in order to eliminate permanently the threat of overt VC interference with RD actions that are to follow. The objective is to clear a relatively large zone so that a defense in depth can be established against VC/NVA main force units. As a guide, an area is considered to have been cleared when VC/NVA main forces of company size or larger have been destroyed or ejected. Furthermore, military forces must be present in and around the area that are capable of maintaining and enhancing the security status already achieved.
2. During the conduct of clearing operations, the area is saturated with mobile friendly military forces for an extended period with emphasis on small-unit patrolling, hamlet searches, ambushes, and quick reaction by larger units to exploit intelligence or initial contact. Extensive night operations are conducted in order to make it unsafe for the VC to move and

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enter hamlets at night.

2. ARVN regular forces, augmented by regional forces (RF), when available, have the primary responsibility for clearing operations. These forces normally will be employed in direct support of the provincial RD effort. However, where required to achieve unity of effort, and when agreed in advance between the division commander and sector commander concerned, sector commanders should exercise operational control over the ARVN units. III MAF units will engage in clearing operations within their assigned TAOR's. National Police will assist and support the military effort within their capabilities; particularly by supplying intelligence and, in close coordination with military authorities, handling and interrogating VC suspects.
4. Where appropriate, joint military-civil operations will be aimed at eliminating the VC infrastructure and local guerrillas. In these operations, the government's interest in and concern for the people will be emphasized through simple and tangible military civic

B-5

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actions, such as medical treatment and distribution of relief supplies.

5. Concurrently, psychological operations are directed at the VC and uncommitted people in the area. Against the VC, the object is to sow dissension and to demoralize and confuse him. Efforts are made to communicate to the individual VC the hopelessness of his cause and persuade him to rally through the Chieu Hoi program. However, the primary objective of psychological operations is to dissuade the population from supporting the VC. To this end, disciplined, well-behaved military forces showing a friendly, sincere interest in the people and respect for individual rights and property will have a major psychological impact on the local population.

(b) Securing

1. The purpose of securing is to establish an area under firm government control, free of communist influence. An area is considered to have been secured when all hamlets within the area meet the six-point criteria for a secured hamlet, as outlined in Appendix 1 (Hamlet Six-Point Criteria) to this Annex,

B-6

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and sufficient military forces are available to prevent the VC from conducting operations beyond individual acts of terrorism and sabotage. Ideally, village administrative structures will have been formed; however, this is not an absolute criteria.

2. Military forces conduct operations adjacent to and within the area to provide for a militarily secure climate for the accomplishment of civil activities. ARVN regular forces and/or US/FWMAF forces will operate on the periphery of the area to prevent VC/NVA main forces from returning to interfere with RD actions within the area. Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) will replace regular forces within the area and assume primary responsibility for security operations. Regional forces, operating under the control of the sector commander, seek out and destroy VC guerrillas and protect sensitive areas and critical lines of communication. Popular forces, operating under the control of the sub-sector commander, provide local security for villages and hamlets and perform other local static security tasks. National Police, within capabilities, augment the RF/PF in these

B-7

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tasks. In areas where RF/PF are understrength and cannot be recruited or are ineffective, ARVN regular forces will remain to perform the required tasks. In these operations, primary emphasis remains on small unit activity, both day and night, to saturate the area with patrols, ambushes, checkpoints and outposts.

2. As the requisite security is established, i.e. there are sufficient military forces to cope with VC guerrillas that might attack a particular village or hamlet, RD cadre groups which have been trained at national level by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development are introduced. These cadre operate under the control of district chiefs, principally within hamlets, to establish initial government administration, organize the people for self-defense, assist in gathering and reporting information on the VC infrastructure, and initiate simple economic and social development projects to win the confidence and loyalty of the people. When available, a limited number of technical cadre from the various technical ministries also are introduced to assist. These technical cadre devote their efforts to long-range and more complex

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development projects.

4. People's self-defense forces, made up of able bodied people in the hamlets, are organized and trained by the cadre. Self-defense forces function primarily to give warning in case of VC attack. Although some members of these forces are armed, they do not have the capability to resist an organized VC attack without outside assistance.
5. National Police initiate and maintain population and resources control, maintain law and order, prevent and control riots and sabotage of public security and, in conjunction with military forces and RD cadre, identify and eliminate the VC infrastructure.
6. Information and psychological operations are directed at the entire population. Action and intentions of the government are explained, and the aspirations and grievances of the people are determined and satisfied. Information to publicize the Chieu Hoi program is aimed at families having relatives with the VC. Effective security by disciplined military and National Police forces provide the foundation for effective psychological operations.

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7. Military civic action is continued by all military elements in coordination with province and district officials. The use of military management and technical skills is emphasized.

(2) Developing.--The purpose of the developing stage is to complete the development of real New Life Hamlets, establish permanent hamlet and village government administration, and expand complete civil authority over the area.

- (a) The Revolutionary Development cadre, aided by technical cadre when available, assists the people to form local government administration and continue to strengthen the people's self-defense forces. The cadre also promotes long-range and more complex development projects, e.g., education, health and welfare, agriculture and land reform, road construction, and rural electrification.
- (b) National Police relieve RF and, if still present, ARVN regular forces of the responsibility for local security. Thereafter, National Police, assisted by people's self-defense forces, operating under the control of village and district chiefs, provide local security for hamlets and



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villages and protect sensitive areas and lines of communication. In this respect, RF and/or ARVN regular forces are relieved of the responsibility to provide local security only when National Police and other constabulary type forces are adequate for the task.

- (c) Regional Forces, and ARVN regular forces required to augment RF, continue to conduct clearing or search and destroy operations in adjacent areas and are employed as reserve/reaction forces to prevent VC/NVA main forces from penetrating the area under development.

### 3. OBJECTIVES AND TASKS

The basic objectives and related tasks of the 1967 RD campaign are as follows:

a. To defeat organized VC/NVA forces.

- (1) Conduct sustained, coordinated, unilateral or combined offensive operations against VC/NVA forces and base areas.
- (2) Conduct a continuous harassing and destructive air offensive against enemy forces and base areas.
- (3) Interdict VC/NVA land and water LOC's through ground, sea and air operations.
- (4) Conduct intelligence, counter-intelligence, border surveillance, cross border as authorized, and counter-

B-11

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infiltration operations.

- (5) Conduct psychological operations against VC/NVA personnel and civilians under the influence of the VC.

b. To extend GVN control in I CTZ.

- (1) Conduct military clearing and securing operations to establish and maintain local security for areas undergoing RD.
- (2) Identify and eliminate the VC guerrilla and communist infrastructure.
- (3) Conduct military civic action to win the support of the people in I CTZ.
- (4) Provide relief, reorientation, rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees.
- (5) Establish, maintain and secure military installations and supporting LOC's as necessary.
- (6) Secure the major political, economic, food producing and populated centers.

4. CONCEPT

- a. The RD campaign will be conducted in consonance with political, economic and sociological programs of GVN and US/FW agencies. RVNAF and III MAF forces will be employed to accomplish the mission in accordance with objectives established and tasks assigned for the campaign. RVNAF will have the primary mission of supporting RD activities, with

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priority in and around National Priority Areas and other areas of critical significance, defending governmental centers, and protecting and controlling national resources, particularly rice and salt. III MAF forces will reinforce RVNAF; and, as necessary, conduct unilateral operations. The primary mission of III MAF forces will be to destroy VC/NVA main forces, base areas, and resources and/or drive the enemy into the sparsely populated and food-scarce areas; secure TAOR's; and, clear in the vicinity of established bases. In addition, III MAF forces will assist in the protection and control of national resources, as directed.

- b. Throughout the campaign increased emphasis will be devoted to identifying and eliminating the VC infrastructure and to small unit operations designed specifically to destroy the guerrilla force. These operations will be characterized by saturation patrolling, ambushes, and an increase in night operations by both RVNAF and III MAF.
- c. Surface LOC's will be used to the maximum in support of all operations with a corresponding decrease on the dependence on airlift support. Rapid spoiling attacks will be conducted against enemy units confirmed by hard intelligence. Emphasis will be placed on all types of reconnaissance, especially long range patrols, to acquire the necessary hard intelligence.

B-13

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- d. The systematic neutralization of the enemy's base areas will be pursued aggressively during this campaign. By directing priority of effort to the neutralization of those base areas which directly affect the National Priority Areas, key population and economic centers, and vital communications arteries, the accomplishment of both objectives will be facilitated.
- e. Although RVNAF is assigned the primary responsibility for supporting RD and III MAF is assigned the primary mission of destroying the main VC/NVA forces and bases, there will be no clear cut division of responsibility. RVNAF General Reserve and ARVN Corps Reserve units will conduct unilateral operations and participate in coordinated and combined search and destroy operations. III MAF will continue to provide direct support and aid to RD activities.
- f. The people are the greatest asset to the enemy and control of the people is the enemy's goal. With them, the enemy has most of the ingredients needed for success, i.e. food, supplies, money, manpower, concealment and intelligence. Every effort will be made to deny these assets to the enemy. Appendix 2 (Priority Areas) to this Annex reflects the National Priority Area, Provincial Priority Areas and the areas for priority of military offensive operations in I CTZ. These priority areas cover a large majority of the population, food producing land and critical lines of

B-14

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communication within I CTZ. The priority areas are areas of major significance where critical civil and military resources will be focused on a priority basis for RD. The purpose of designating the area of priority of military offensive operations, in conjunction with the priority areas, is to focus the attention and effort of RVNAF and III MAF to those areas where operations will destroy or drive the enemy into sparsely populated and food-scarce areas; insure the protection of the population; control of resources; and, provide unrestricted use of major lines of communication. When accomplished, follow-on RD will be facilitated. Spoiling attacks to frustrate VC strategy will continue to be conducted in other areas as directed.

- g. Civic action programs will be emphasized at all times, and psychological operations will be intensified with the primary targets being the VC/NVA personnel and the civilians under the influence of the VC as well as those personnel living under friendly control. The primary objective will be to dissuade the population from supporting the enemy.
- h. During 1967, RD will be continued in areas where initial government control has been established. In addition, RD will be started in other areas where the population is most dense; there is a potential for beneficial economic, social, and political development; and there are sufficient military and civil resources available to accomplish

B-15

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assigned goals. Specific goals for 1967 have been developed within provinces by province chiefs, with guidance from the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and, as appropriate, RD councils at regional and area level. These goals are set forth in provincial RD plans. Approved 1967 provincial plans are the basis for implementation of the RD program.

1. Within provinces, the priority of effort is to provincial priority areas as established by provincial RD councils with guidance from higher echelons. The overall priority for the input of resources to the RD program is as follows:
  - (1) National priority areas, i.e. areas of major significance at the national level where critical resources are focused, to include funds, military forces, cadre, materials, and managerial attention.
  - (2) Areas for priority of military offensive operations where follow-on RD will occur.
  - (3) Other areas outside the national priority areas.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WAIT



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Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Hamlet Six-Point Criteria
- 2 - Priority Areas

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B-16

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Appendix 1 (Hamlet Six-Point Criteria) to Annex B (Concept for Support of Revolutionary Development Program in I CTZ) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. PURPOSE

This Appendix outlines the six-point criteria for a secured hamlet.

2. CRITERIA

An intermediate goal in the evolution of hamlet status is the secured hamlet, one that meets the following six-point criteria:

- a. A census of residents has been completed, the VC infrastructure has been identified and destroyed or neutralized, and an intelligence net has been established to deter its recurrence.
- b. Adequate popular forces and/or para-military forces have been recruited, trained, armed, and are qualified and available for operations.
- c. Hamlet security is effective with an integrated defensive system to include methods of requesting reinforcements.
- d. Hamlet inhabitants have been questioned and have expressed their grievances and aspirations, and some economic and social development projects have been initiated to satisfy people's desires.
- e. Hamlet inhabitants have been organized for self-defense and development tasks.
- f. Hamlet chiefs have been elected or appointed, trained and

B-1-1

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are supported by the majority of the people in the hamlet.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT

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H. M. ELWOOD

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Chief of Staff

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B-1-2


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Appendix 2 (Priority Areas) to Annex B (Concept for Support of Revolutionary Development Program in I CTZ) to Campaign Plan 1-67

1. (S) This Appendix indicates the National Priority Area and the area selected for priority of military offensive operations in support of the Revolutionary Development Program during 1967:



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Annex C (Restoration and Protection of Road, Rail and Water LOC's)  
to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (S) SITUATION

The VC have disrupted military and commercial use of the Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS), roads, and waterways throughout I CTZ by destroying rails and bridges, ambushing traffic, and collecting transportation taxes. Restoration of, and free movement on, vital road, rail and water systems is essential for economical transport of military and commercial material.

a. Enemy Forces.--Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Joint General Staff, RVN

- (a) In coordination with MACV, exercises overall supervision over tactical and security operations related to restoration of road, rail and water LOC's within SVN.
- (b) In coordination with MACV, USAID, and the Minister of Public Works, allocates resources for the construction and restoration of national and provincial roads, VNRS and, where necessary, a security road parallel to the VNRS.
- (c) Develops and coordinates, with the Minister of Public Works and MACV, plans for road and bridge maintenance and upgrading by Public Works and

C-1

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ARVN construction forces, and defines areas and task assignments for these forces.

(2) COMUSMACV

- (a) In coordination with JGS, exercises overall supervision of tactical and security operations related to restoration of road, rail and water LOC's within SVN.
- (b) In coordination with JGS, GVN and USAID, establishes priorities for upgrading roads throughout SVN and allocates resources for the construction and/or restoration of roads, access roads and rail spurs.

(3) CG, I ARVN Corps

- (a) Develops and executes integrated plans, employing ARVN, National Police, RF and PF, to destroy VC/NVA units located astride main rail, road and water LOC's and to accomplish military security goals set forth in this Annex.
- (b) Provides security forces to protect operable and, as feasible, inoperable portions of the VNRS, national and provincial roads, and the material assets associated therewith.
- (c) Performs emergency repairs to principal roads and bridges required to support ARVN tactical operations in I CTZ.

C-2

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Condition GREEN. Security Condition GREEN is in effect when the segment of rail line between two terminals is physically open; RVN/US/FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that trains can operate during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment; armed escort not required; and, isolated incidents may occur.

2. Restoration goals for segments of the VNRS are as follows: 1Jan67-30Jun67 - DANANG to BA REN; 1Jul67-31Dec67 - BA REN to QUANG NGAI. Security goals for the above segments and the segment from DONG HA to DANANG is Condition AMBER. Security Condition AMBER is in effect when the segment of rail line between two terminals is physically open; security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required for all trains; and frequent incidents may occur.
3. Security Condition RED is in effect when the rail line between two terminals does not meet the criteria for the GREEN or AMBER classification.
4. Restoration of the VNRS segment between

C-4

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QUANG NGAI and the I/II CTZ Boundary is scheduled to commence during CY67. Completion will occur in CY68.

(b) Roads

1. By the end of CY67, the security goal to be attained is Condition GREEN for all roads in the National Priority Area, Route 5 from DANANG to AN HOA, and Route 1 from DONG HA to QUANG NGAI. The criteria for Condition GREEN is that the road is controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures required and that isolated incidents may occur.
2. During the same time frame as above, Condition AMBER is the security goal for Route 9 from DONG HA to THON SON LAM, Route 1 from DMZ to DONG HA, and Route 1 from QUANG NGAI to the I/II CTZ Boundary. Condition AMBER indicates that the road may be used by RVN/US/FWMAF employing thorough security measures and frequent incidents may occur.
2. Condition RED exists when the road has been closed either by VC/NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Major operations or engineering efforts are

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required in order to open the road.

b. 1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv and 2d Brigade, ROKMC

- (1) Develop integrated plans to accomplish the military security goals set forth in paragraph 3a of this Annex.
- (2) Conduct operations which will assist RVNAF to protect operable and, as feasible, inoperable portions of the VNRS, roads, and material assets thereof to avoid the necessity for additional reconstruction and/or replacement of equipment.
- (3) Perform emergency construction, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges that are required to support tactical operations.

c. 7th, 9th and 11th Engineer Battalions, FMF

- (1) Provide backup engineer support to 1st MarDiv and 3d MarDiv for construction, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges required to support tactical operations.
- (2) Construct, repair and maintain roads and bridges required to support III MAF operations, as directed.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



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C-6

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Annex D (National Resources Control) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (C) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.--Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) GVN civilian agencies, assisted by U. S. civilian agencies, are assigned primary responsibility for resources and population control.

(2) CG, I ARVN Corps, in coordination with CG, III MAF, in I CTZ:

(a) Develops and executes plans for the control of salt, rice and waterways in accordance with the appropriate appendices to this Annex.

(b) Maintains a current plot of up-dated data on VC LOC's; interdicts these LOC's via air, sea, riverine, ground and artillery operations; and, conducts raids and long range ambush operations to further restrict VC utilization of LOC's.

(c) Conducts unilateral and combined operations to seize and/or destroy VC storage, logistic and factory areas; extracts and/or destroys captured supplies and equipment in accordance with guidelines detailed in Appendix 1 (Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies) to this Annex; and accurately and

D-1

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completely identifies all captured material in after action reports.

- (d) Conducts operations to extract or destroy rice mills in VC controlled areas and relocates extracted rice mills in secure areas.
- (e) Conducts periodic thorough searches in hamlets to uncover VC caches.
- (f) Conducts joint and combined checkpoint operations, assisted by the National Police in contested areas, and assists the National Police in conducting checkpoint operations in secured areas.
- (g) Conducts unilateral and combined operations against VC tax collection points as detailed in Appendix 2 (Checkpoints) to this Annex.
- (h) Conducts joint and combined operations designed to identify and eliminate VC extortion and smuggling network in contested areas and assists appropriate GVN agencies in similar operations in secure areas.
- (i) Assisted by the National Police, carries out population control measures, i.e., determining and enforcing curfews, periodic checking for draft dodgers and deserters, and protecting the people against terrorist acts in contested areas and assists the National Police in carrying out

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similar measures in secure areas.

- (j) Insures the development of an integrated, coordinated plan for economic warfare operations and tasks subordinate division and sector commanders to prepare appropriate plans for economic warfare and monitors and evaluates the execution of these plans.
- (k) Insures that an effective Resources Control Committee, comprised of representatives of the appropriate military and civilian agencies, is in operation at the I ARVN Corps level and insures that this Committee:
  - 1. Insures close coordination and cooperation among military and civilian agencies involved in economic warfare activities.
  - 2. Develops methods of operation and control for all economic warfare operations.
  - 3. Develops policies for economic warfare operations.
- (1) Insures that all sector commanders support the resources and population control program.
- (3) MACV, USAID, OSA and JUSPAO representatives advise and assist the I ARVN Corps Resources Control Committee.
- (4) MACV advisors assist their counterparts in preparation

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of appropriate plans and in monitoring and evaluating their execution.

2. (C) MISSION

To assist in the destruction or rendering ineffective the VC's economic ability to wage war and to counter the VC's efforts to disrupt the economy of the RVN.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) National resources control operations will be directed at specific targets and attainable goals. National resources control can be broadly defined as economic warfare. Emphasis will be placed upon realistic planning, particularly in allocating resources to economic warfare.
- (2) All military and civilian agencies will emphasize gathering, collating and evaluating information and intelligence applicable to economic warfare. Particular attention will be paid to the following: identification of items critical to the VC war effort; strengths and weaknesses of the VC financial and logistic system and their organization; and, plans and operations of the VC to disrupt the RVN economy.
- (3) Economic warfare operations will be conducted throughout I CTZ with emphasis on the National Priority Area and those adjacent areas. Operations to deny critical

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items to the VC will feature strict resource control and destruction of VC logistic capability. The VC financial structure will be destroyed by elimination of the VC extortion network and denial of financial assets. Counter-programs will be established by military and civilian agencies to thwart VC efforts to disrupt the RVN economy.

b. 1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv, 2d Brigade, ROKMC, in coordination with RVNAF commanders within assigned areas of responsibility will:

- (1) Develop and execute plans for control of salt, rice and waterways in accordance with the appropriate Appendix to this Annex.
- (2) Interdict VC LOC's through air, sea, riverine, ground and artillery operations in accordance with established priorities and conduct raids and long range ambushes to further restrict VC utilization of LOC's.
- (3) Conduct operations to seize and/or destroy VC storage, logistic and factory areas. Supplies and equipment seized will be extracted whenever possible. Extraction and/or destruction of captured materials will be accomplished in accordance with procedures contained in Appendix 1 (Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies)

D-5

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to this Annex. Care will be taken to accurately and completely identify all captured materials in after action reports.

- (4) Assist RVNAF and appropriate GVN agencies in conducting periodic, thorough searches in hamlets to uncover VC caches.
- (5) Assist RVNAF and appropriate GVN agencies in conducting checkpoint operations if US/FWMAF traffic is significant.
- (6) Assist RVNAF and appropriate GVN agencies in conducting operations against VC tax collection points.
- (7) Assist RVNAF and appropriate GVN agencies in conducting operations designed to identify and eliminate the VC extortion and smuggling network.
- (8) Establish procedures for the handling, processing and accounting for all detained personnel, i.e., civil dependents, suspects, returnees, doubtful cases, etc., which are in conformance with the provisions of appropriate directives and regulations.
- (9) Develop separate, but integrated, plans for control of rice, salt and waterways and elimination of VC tax collection points.
- (10) Appendix 3 (Rice Control Plans) and Appendix 4 (Salt Control Plans) to this Annex provide additional

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guidance in respective areas.

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APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of  
Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies
- 2 - Checkpoints
- 3 - Rice Control Plans
- 4 - Salt Control Plans

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D-7

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Appendix 1 (Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies) to Annex D (National Resources Control) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (C) GENERAL

a. Private Property and Food Supplies.

- (1) When performing combat operations in VC controlled areas, all practicable measures must be taken to minimize the destruction of both public and private property. Procedures must provide for proper control, disposition and safeguarding of such property. People who have lived under VC control are not necessarily hostile, and might not have chosen to be under VC control. To treat them indiscriminately as the enemy, to destroy their property, or to deny them essential resources is incompatible with long term GVN and US objectives to extend government influence throughout South Vietnam.
- (2) Continuing command emphasis will be directed to the protection of private property and supplies, especially food stocks, to ensure the population is not deprived of their property and means of livelihood. Unnecessary destruction of property will embitter the population, give credence to VC propaganda relative to US/FWMAF and make the attainment of long range goals more costly.

D-1-1

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## (3) Policy

- (a) Destruction of private property and supplies will be avoided whenever possible. Appropriate psychological operations will be planned to exploit this effort to the credit of the GVN.
- (b) Disposition of private property and supplies is the responsibility of GVN officials.
- (c) Civilian dwellings or private property, including livestock, will not be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat actions.
- (d) The destruction of dwellings and livestock, as a denial measure, is the responsibility of GVN officials. Requests for US/FWMAF to accomplish destruction of private property as a denial measure will be referred to this Headquarters for the personal decision of CG, III MAF, or, in his absence, the Chief of Staff, III MAF.

## b. Captured Material and Supplies

Securing or destruction of property or supplies captured from the VC/NVA forces is considered as a separate measure. Such property or supplies will be handled in a manner which will preclude use by the enemy, and to support GVN/US/FWMAF efforts.

## (1) Policy

- (a) Large captured food caches, obviously over and above the needs of the local population as

D-1-2

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determined by local GVN officials, will be extracted and redistributed under supervision of province and district officials, using Vietnamese resources and transportation to the extent practicable. A receipt system should be established by GVN authorities to be utilized where private ownership is claimed. General security for extraction operations and the furnishing of packaging materials for transportation may be provided by GVN or US/FWMAF agencies or both. Operation plans should provide for destruction or securing of captured stocks.

- (b) Captured material and supplies are to be considered a valuable asset that will be extracted if at all possible. The final decision on destruction of captured supplies will be made only after the procedure to obtain assistance for extraction, as outlined later in this paragraph, has been accomplished. Final decision on the destruction of large food caches will be made by MACV and/or JGS only.
- (c) Captured or abandoned medical supplies will not be destroyed. Article 33, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, prohibits

D-1-3

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the intentional destruction of medical stores and material. These supplies will be used for care and treatment of enemy sick and wounded, if such use is under the supervision of enemy medical personnel. They will not be used by US medical personnel except in accordance with current and appropriate directives. If medical supplies cannot be extracted, they will be left intact and in place.

(2) Procedures

- (a) In the event extraction of captured supplies require resources beyond those available to the tactical commander, requests for assistance detailing requirements will be forwarded to that level of command possessing or capable of allocating the necessary resources (up to and including JGS and MACV).
- (b) Requests for assistance referred to above, will contain the following items of required information:
  - 1. Type and amount of supplies.
  - 2. Location(s).
  - 3. Transportation and manpower requirements for extraction.
  - 4. Tactical situation, to include security forces required for an extraction operation.

D-1-4

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5. Other factors which might affect the operation, i.e., attitude of local populace and GVN officials.

(c) The following data concerning captured supplies will be recorded and reported:

1. Items.
2. Date and place of capture.
3. Quantity and manufacturer.
4. How packed when captured (original cartons, sacks, vials, etc.)
5. Identifying markings.
6. Any other information which will assist in tracing the supplies to the point of origin.

2. (C) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.--Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) GVN officials provide assistance as capable.
- (2) CG, I ARVN Corps, in coordination with Sector Commanders, and within I CTZ:
  - (a) Ensures every effort is made by RVNAF units to minimize destruction of property.
  - (b) Ensures that procedures, to include the provision of security, transportation and labor, are developed and coordinated with US/FWMAF commanders for the extraction of captured supplies.

D-1-5

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- (c) Develops an accountability system to be followed when private ownership of captured supplies is claimed.
- (d) Develops procedures for the proper distribution of captured supplies to refugees or other needy groups and plans psychological operations to exploit these efforts and enhance the image of the GVN.
- (e) Ensures that proper procedures, as outlined in paragraph 1 of this Appendix, are carried out before the destruction of captured supplies is permitted.

### 3. (C) EXECUTION

- a. 1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv and 2d Brigade, ROKMC will:
  - (1) Ensure that every effort is made to minimize destruction of property.
  - (2) Ensure that every effort is made to extract captured supplies and that those supplies which are excess to local needs are used to enhance the GVN image.
  - (3) Ensure appropriate coordination between III MAF units and GVN officials on the control and disposition of supplies identified as excess.
  - (4) Ensure that appropriate procedures, as outlined in paragraph 1 of this Appendix, are followed before captured supplies are destroyed.

D-1-6


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- (5) Ensure that every effort is made to record and report source data on supplies captured.

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D-1-7

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Appendix 2 (Checkpoints) to Annex D (National Resources Control)  
to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (U) PURPOSE

This Appendix outlines the techniques and tactics to be used for checkpoint operations.

2. (C) MANNING OF CHECKPOINTS

The National Police have the authority and responsibility, by law, for the control of resources to deny manpower and material to the VC. This includes the authority to detain military personnel and military vehicles. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is recommended that checkpoints be manned by Joint Control Teams. Joint Control Teams should include National Police and Military Police, both ARVN and/or US/FWMAF (where US/FWMAF traffic exists), supported by Regional and Popular forces as necessary.

3. (U) TREATMENT OF PEOPLE

Two types of checkpoints, fixed and mobile, are common to counter-insurgency operations (both land and water). Mobile, rather than fixed, checkpoint operations will be conducted to maintain an offensive posture with a system in effect to relocate at inconsistent intervals. A reaction force should be readily available to exploit any large scale success of mobile checkpoint operations. One important feature of checkpoint operations is the requirement for absolute control in the search

D-2-1

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area so that personnel and vehicles can be efficiently searched and processed. On heavily traveled roads and waterways, only a selected number of vehicles can be thoroughly searched so as not to delay the normal traffic flow any longer than necessary. Personnel not subject to thorough inspections should at least have their identity established. Vehicles and boats not thoroughly searched should be given a cursory check and permitted to proceed. The selection rate for complete inspection should be changed frequently in order not to establish a pattern.

#### 4. (C) CHECKPOINT DEFICIENCIES

The appropriate authorities, assisted by U. S. advisors, will insure that deficiencies are prevented through frequent and thorough inspections. The following deficiencies have been found in checkpoint operations in the past:

- a. Inefficient search of vehicles and personnel by checkpoint personnel.
- b. A lack of operational procedures to move traffic quickly in order to help the public and assure the search objectives.
- c. Poor location of checkpoints where security during the search could not be maintained.
- d. Failure to search loaded buses thoroughly because of the trouble that would be involved.
- e. A lack of trained and qualified personnel and equipment.
- f. A marked lack of supervision, discipline and initiative.
- g. Checkpoint personnel sleeping on post during night hour operations.

D-2-2

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- h. No coordinated effort with the adjacent provinces.
- i. The acceptance of bribes and gratuities by some check-point personnel.
- j. Checkpoints located in the same area as traffic control points and GVN tax collection points.

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D-2-3

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Appendix 3 (Rice Control Plans) to Annex D (National Resources Control) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (C) GENERAL

- a. The development and execution of an effective rice control plan in I CTZ will reduce materially the VC's capability to conduct sustained operations.
- b. The following represents the total yearly production, in metric tons, during 1965-66 and the prime rice harvest months in I CTZ:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>PRODUCTION</u>	<u>HARVEST MONTHS</u>
QUANG TRI	43,000	April, June, September
THUA THIEN	109,000	March, April, August, September, October, November
QUANG NAM	111,000	January, March, April, September, October, November, December
QUANG TIN	66,000	January, March, April, September, October, November
QUANG NGAI	141,000	January, March, April, September, October, November, December

c. Rice control plans must provide for the following:

- (1) A phased program with established priorities which will bring the maximum amount of rice into secured areas.
- (2) Adequate forces to secure the area and provide security during the harvest and transportation of the rice to

D-3-1

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secure areas.

- (3) Adequate storage space within secure areas for the harvested rice.
- (4) A system to control the rice once it is in storage.
- (5) Appropriate psychological operations before, during and after the harvest in order to motivate the people and to gain their cooperation in the control of the rice.
- (6) An effective convoy system to transport rice from one secure area to another.
- (7) Strict controls over rice shipments. These controls should be designed to preclude VC exploitations but should not be applied in a manner that would inhibit the movement of rice being shipped to urban areas.
- (8) A program of crop destruction for rice harvests which cannot be secured. If the rice needs of the local population cannot be provided for by provincial authorities, monitored and assisted by U.S. members of provincial teams, the rice should not be destroyed.

2. (C) SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces.---Annex A (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces.

(1) CG, I ARVN Corps:

- (a) Develops and executes rice control plans in accordance with the procedures outlined in paragraph 1 above.

D-3-2

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- (b) Develops, in coordination with Sector Commanders, a system to inventory the rice harvest at the time of harvest and at specified intervals afterwards until the rice is all sold or under government control.
  - (c) Develops, in coordination with Sector Commanders, an effective convoy system using specific LOC's, that is responsive to the needs of the rice shippers, for the transportation of rice to secure areas or from one secure area to another.
  - (d) Develops, in coordination with Sector Commanders, and executes, where appropriate, plans for herbicide operations to destroy rice harvests which cannot be secured.
- (2) Sector Commanders, RVNAF, in coordination with CG, I ARVN Corps, develops a system to inventory the rice at harvest time, an effective convoy system for secure transportation of rice, and, where appropriate, plans for herbicide operations to destroy rice harvests which cannot be secured.

### 3. (C) MISSION

To provide assistance to RVNAF in the preparation and execution of rice control plans.

### 4. (C) EXECUTION

- a. 1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv and 2d Brigade, ROKMC, will assist

D-3-3

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RVNAF commanders in preparing and executing rice control plans in accordance with the techniques outlined in paragraph 1 above.

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D-3-4

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Appendix 4 (Salt Control Plan) to Annex D (National Resources Control) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (C) GENERAL

a. Salt control plans must provide for the following:

- (1) Salt beds will be assigned priorities for protection during salt harvest in order to insure that the maximum amount of salt is brought into secure areas.
- (2) Adequate forces to secure salt beds permanently or to secure them for the period of the salt harvest and to provide security during transportation to secure areas.
- (3) Adequate storage space for the salt which is harvested.
- (4) A system to control salt once it is harvested and is in storage.
- (5) Appropriate psychological operations before, during, and after the salt harvest to motivate the people to assist in the control of salt.

b. The following represents the total yearly production, in metric tons, during 1964 (the latest year for which data is available) and the prime salt harvest months in I CTZ:

<u>PROVINCE/ LOCATION</u>	<u>AREA (Hectares)/ IN PRODUCTION</u>	<u>PRODUCTION</u>	<u>HARVEST MONTHS</u>
QUANG TRI (Cat Son)	7/		February, March, April, May, June, July
QUANG NGAI (Sa Huynh)	116/73	993	January, February, March, May, June, July, August

D-4-1

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## 2. (C) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.--Annex A (Intelligence).b. Friendly Forces.

(1) CG, I ARVN Corps, in coordination with Sector Commanders, will:

(a) Develop and execute plans to control salt harvests in accordance with procedures outlined in paragraph 1 above.

(b) Develop procedures and techniques for the destruction of salt beds and execute destruction when salt beds or the salt harvest cannot be secured. (Determination of the salt needs of the local populace will be made and if these needs cannot be met through other means, salt beds will not be destroyed.

(2) Province Chiefs develop and execute a strict accountability system to control salt once it is harvested and is in storage.


## 3. (C) MISSION

To assist RVNAF commanders in developing and executing plans to secure the salt harvest.

## 4. (C) EXECUTION

a. 1st MarDiv and 3d MarDiv assist RVNAF commanders in developing and executing plans to secure the salt harvest within

D-4-2



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their areas of responsibility.

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D-4-3

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## Annex E (Psychological Operations) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

## 1. (C) SITUATION

This Annex contains guidance for conducting psychological operations in support of III MAF operations within I CTZ, establishes specific tactical psychological operations campaigns within the guidelines set forth by higher authority, supports the priority tasks listed by higher authority, and organizes these tasks as tactical campaigns.

a. Enemy Forces.--Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) MACV provides policy guidance and conducts psychological warfare against NVN and VC/NVA personnel and civilians under the influence of the VC and psychological operations including military civic action in conjunction with military offensive and revolutionary development operations.
- (2) Office of Civil Operations, Region I, (USAID and JUSPAO Offices) provides psychological operations support to III MAF.
- (3) CO, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, U.S. Army, provides backup psychological operations support to III MAF.
- (4) CO, 10th Political Warfare Battalion, ARVN, conducts psychological operations in I CTZ.

E-1

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- (5) CO, Flight "A", 5th Air Commando Squadron, USAF, conducts airborne psychological operations including loudspeaker and leaflet operations as requested; provides information, technical assistance and advice as requested; within capability, provides air transport to propaganda teams and air transport for propaganda materials as requested; and conducts special airborne psychological operations within I CTZ as requested.

2. (C) MISSION

III MAF conducts psychological operations to lower the morale of, cause disaffection within and desertion from NVA and local and main force VC units operating within I CTZ; assists local and provincial and regional GVN officials in establishing and expanding their influence and control over the population; and facilitates the occupation of VC controlled areas by giving information and instructions to the local population.

3. (C) EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations.--III MAF conducts tactical psychological operations in support of strategic psychological operations, combat operations, military civic action and revolutionary development operations utilizing all resources and media available to accomplish the priority tasks listed in Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.

b. 1st MarDiv.

- (1) Plan and conduct tactical psychological operations in

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support of strategic psychological operations, combat operations, military civic action and revolutionary development operations utilizing all resources and media available to accomplish the priority of tasks listed at Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.

- (2) Emphasize immediate exploitation of tactical situations and incidents of an exploitable nature to gain maximum psychological impact upon local civilian population, VCS, VC, and NVA personnel.
- (3) Conduct special psychological operations to gain maximum face-to-face communications between GVN officials and VC families and VCS.
- (4) Conduct special psychological operations on a regular basis utilizing all available media to communicate news, information, entertainment and propaganda into VC/NVA controlled areas.
- (5) Plan and conduct psychological operations against specific tactical VC/NVA units exploiting known vulnerabilities.
- (6) Conduct special psychological operations designed to enhance the friendship and understanding of USMC personnel and Vietnamese civilians.

c. 3d MarDiv.

- (1) Plan and conduct tactical psychological operations in assigned area of responsibility in support of combat,

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military civic action, and revolutionary development operations to accomplish priority tasks listed in Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.

- (2) Emphasize immediate exploitation of tactical situations and incidents of an exploitable nature to gain maximum psychological impact upon local civilian population, VCS, VC and NVA personnel.
- (3) Conduct special psychological operations to gain maximum face-to-face communications between GVN officials and VC families and VCS.
- (4) Conduct special psychological operations on a regular basis utilizing all available media to communicate news, information, entertainment and propaganda into VC/NVA controlled areas.
- (5) Plan and conduct psychological operations against specific tactical VC/NVA units exploiting known vulnerabilities.
- (6) Conduct special psychological operations designed to enhance the friendship and understanding of USMC personnel and Vietnamese civilians.

d. 1st MAW.

- (1) Conduct propaganda leaflet operations to increase the shock effect of heavy ordnance and air power directed against VC/NVA units.
- (2) Conduct information leaflet operations to inform

E-4

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civilian population of areas subject to repeated air strikes.

- (3) Conduct other leaflet and loudspeaker operations as directed.
- (4) Within capability, conduct special psychological operations to assist in accomplishing the priority tasks at Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.

e. 2d Brigade, ROKMC.

- (1) Conduct psychological operations in coordination with and with the support of this Headquarters within assigned area of responsibility as requested.

f. FLC.

- (1) Within capability conduct special psychological operations to assist in accomplishing the priority tasks listed in Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.
- (2) Emphasize special psychological operations to gain maximum face-to-face communications between GVN officials and local population.
- (3) Emphasize special psychological operations to enhance the friendship and understanding of USMC personnel and Vietnamese civilians.

g. 1st MP Battalion.

- (1) Within capability, conduct special psychological operations to assist in accomplishing the priority tasks listed in Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.

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- (2) Emphasize special psychological operations to gain maximum face-to-face communication between GVN officials and local population.
- (3) Assist combined action companies in conducting special psychological operations to enhance relations between CAC's and local population.
- (4) Conduct other psychological operations as directed.

h. 244th Psychological Operations Company, USA.

- (1) Provide leaflet and other printing support as requested in support of priority tasks at Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.
- (2) Provide combat ground loudspeaker support for combat operations as requested in support of priority tasks at Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.
- (3) Provide audio-visual support as requested in support of military civic action, revolutionary development (Phases II and III) as requested in support of priority tasks.
- (4) Provide information, advice and technical assistance as requested.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) To gain maximum effectiveness, psychological operations will be integrated into combat operations, military civic action and revolutionary development.
- (2) All specific psychological operations will be coordinated

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with appropriate hamlet, village, and province GVN officials; sector and sub-sector U. S. Army advisors; province level representatives of JUSPAO and USAID; and other ARVN/US International Volunteer Services engaged in civic action and/or revolutionary development.

- ✓(3) Regional level psychological operations will be coordinated by this Headquarters.
- (4) Submit requests for psychological operations support to this Headquarters, ATTN: OIC, III MAF PSC, not later than 36 hours prior to operation.
- (5) Plan leaflet drops and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts ten days in advance. Submit plans and requests to this Headquarters, ATTN: OIC, III MAF PSC, through liaison officers, 244th Psychological Operations Company.
- (6) Submit emergency and quick action requests for psychological operations support to this Headquarters, ATTN: OIC, III MAF PSC, by most expeditious means of communication available, as needed. In the event of communications failure at PSC, submit requests to III MAF COC.
- (7) Upon approval of requests for psychological operations support from this Headquarters concerning 244th Psychological Operations Company, CO, 244th Psychological

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Operations Company and CO, requesting unit are authorized direct liaison.

- (8) Necessary action will be taken to insure that all personnel are aware of the psychological objectives, tasks, and themes of this Command. All personnel will be briefed on the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program to the point that they understand that ralliers (Hoi Chanh) are not POW's and will be processed in accordance with appropriate Chieu Hoi directives. Each individual will be informed of the psychological impact that his personal conduct has on the accomplishment of the overall national objectives of the U. S. and Republic of Vietnam.
- (9) Submit requests for non-standard items of supplies and equipment in support of psychological operations to this Headquarters, ATTN: Force Psychological Operations Officer/G-4.
- (10) Rallier participation in psychological operations will be emphasized and subordinate units are authorized direct liaison with Chieu Hoi Centers for rallier support. Submit requests to this Headquarters, ATTN: OJC, III MAF PSC, for rallier support beyond the capability of local Chieu Hoi Centers.
- (11) The hiring of local national personnel to augment psychological operations staffs/units with necessary linguistic and cultural knowledge capabilities.

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Submit requests, with justification, to this Headquarters, ATTN: G-1/Force Psychological Operations Officer.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



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Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Campaigns
- 2 - Themes

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E-9

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Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to Annex E (Psychological Operations) to  
Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (C) CAMPAIGNS

Priority tasks will be accomplished by the following campaigns:

a. Pro-GVN Campaign.

- (1) Convince all target audiences that the victory of GVN is inevitable because of its overwhelming strength.
- (2) Convince all target audiences that the fastest way to end the war and achieve peace and security is to support a free Vietnam.
- (3) Convince all target audiences that SVN will not compromise with appeasement and neutralism.
- (4) Convince all target audiences that SVN represents the true Vietnamese revolution.
- (5) Convince all target audiences that the U.S. is in Vietnam as a result of external aggression and will withdraw when the threat to Vietnamese independence ceases.
- (6) Convince all target audiences that minority population groups are a part of the Republic and should and will share in its success on equal terms and that their culture and beliefs will be respected by the Republic.

b. Viet Cong Campaign.

- (1) Convince the VC that they have alienated the people

E-1-1

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and have violated the principles of revolutionary warfare by relying on terror as a substitute for popular support.

- (2) Convince the VC that they are conducting an isolated, futile struggle against the overwhelming strength of the GVN, US and FWMAF.
- (3) Convince the VC that they are agents of a foreign power.
- (4) Convince the VC that they face death for a cause that cannot achieve either the national expectations of the Vietnamese people or the personal aspirations of any Vietnamese individual.

c. NVA Campaign.

- (1) Convince the NVA of its futile efforts in South Vietnam.

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Appendix 2 (Themes) to Annex E (Psychological Operations) to  
Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

## 1. (C) THEMES

The following themes support the priority tasks listed in  
Appendix 1 (Campaigns) to this Annex.

a. Pro-GVN Campaign

- (1) The present government is the legitimate government of SVN.
- (2) The GVN provides for the basic needs of the people.
- (3) The GVN offers peace, prosperity and order under traditional Vietnamese culture.
- (4) The GVN represents the true people's revolution of progress and prosperity and it is the just cause.
- (5) To support the GVN is to work for the revolution, peace and prosperity; to support the VC is to work for misery, poverty, destruction and subversion of the Vietnamese culture.
- (6) The GVN possesses overwhelming strength - victory is inevitable.
- (7) Support the GVN and put a stop to useless death and destruction.
- (8) The GVN will not accept less than absolute freedom and independence from all alien philosophies, such as communism.

E-2-1

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- (9) ARVN, US and FMAF are here to protect the people.
- (10) Allied forces are in Vietnam at the request of the GVN.
- (11) The GVN will help build a better life for those who rally to the just cause.
- (12) Provide information to GVN officials and military forces concerning VC activities to prevent useless injury to innocent persons.

b. Viet Cong Campaign.

- (1) VC have lost the support of the people and must rely on force and terrorism as a substitute for popular support.
- (2) The VC have been duped by agents of a foreign power - Communist China.
- (3) VC cadre destroy the youth of Vietnam by using them as cannon fodder.
- (4) VC who die on the battlefield will not be given a decent burial by VC cadre.
- (5) VC suffer many hardships living in the jungle.
- (6) VC are forced to neglect their families by VC cadre.
- (7) VC constantly suffer from sickness because of shortage of medical supplies.
- (8) Many VC are forced to go hungry because of food shortages.
- (9) VC force the people to pay unjust taxes and to perform unjust labor.

E-2-2

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- (10) Many VC are rallying to the GVN - the just cause.
- (11) VC desire to replace the traditional Vietnamese culture with alien and false beliefs that have been tried and failed in other countries.
- (12) VC face inevitable defeat.

c. NVA Campaign.

- (1) The NVA has not been welcomed by the people of South Vietnam as liberators.
- (2) The leaders of the NVA lied when they stated that the people of SVN would welcome them.
- (3) NVA soldiers who die on the battlefield will not be given a decent burial by NVA cadre.
- (4) The GVN/US/FWMAF have offered peace to all peoples in Vietnam under honorable conditions - the leaders of NVN have refused this offer.
- (5) The GVN cannot be defeated and will not compromise with neutralism or communism.
- (6) NVA soldiers suffer many hardships living in the jungle.
- (7) Many NVA units do not have adequate food and medical supplies.
- (8) Many NVA soldiers will never see their families or homeland again.
- (9) Many NVA soldiers are rallying to the GVN - the just cause.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALK

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E-2-3

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## Annex F (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas) to Combined Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

## 1. (C) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.--Annex A (Intelligence).b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Commander, VNN, in coordination with COMNAVFORV, supports base area neutralization as appropriate.
- (2) COMNAVFORV, in coordination with Commander, VNN, supports base area neutralization as appropriate.
- (3) CG, I ARVN Corps, utilizing reserve forces available, assists CG, III MAF in neutralization of base areas in I CTZ.

## 2. (S) MISSION

III MAF develops plans for and conducts operations to locate and systematically neutralize VC/NVA base areas in I CTZ.

## 3. (S) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) VC/NVA base areas are numerous, not mutually supporting, and are subject to defeat in detail. Their systematic neutralization directly supports both objectives of this campaign. Primarily, the destruction of the enemy's command, control, and logistic facilities will contribute directly to his eventual defeat. The neutralization of these bases also will require the enemy to place greater demands on the people of

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SVN for financial, logistics and manpower support.

As these demands increase, the people will become increasingly disillusioned and more susceptible to friendly psychological operations. This will support the objective of extending GVN control.

- (2) Priority of effort will be directed to the neutralization of those bases which threaten the National Priority Area, key population and economic centers, and vital communication arteries.
- (3) Maximum use will be made of air strikes and other fire support, with rapid follow-up by ground forces to complete the neutralization. For those bases where complete neutralization and permanent denial to the enemy is not possible, repeated air strikes with random pattern ground operations will be conducted to create insecurity, disrupt command channels, and prevent stationing and movement of VC/NVA main force units in these bases.
- (4) For those bases determined to be habitual safehavens for the enemy, and which are of such importance to warrant total destruction, techniques will be employed to destroy by cutting and clearing or otherwise eliminating the jungle growth which provides the cover and concealment necessary for these areas to be of value to the enemy.

F-2

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- (5) Intelligence data indicates several bases are normally clustered in the same general area and, even though one of them is considered more important than the others, it is desirable to neutralize the entire cluster. Otherwise, the enemy can shift operations to other nearby bases and continue operating within the general geographical area concerned.
- (6) Appendix 1 (Priority Listing of Base Areas) to this Annex lists 13 base areas in I CTZ and in their relative order of priority. This list also clusters bases into general geographical areas. The priority is based on estimated value of the base to the enemy and the estimated effect its continued use would have on friendly operations.

b. 1st MarDiv.

- (1) Conduct sustained ground and air operations to neutralize base area clusters 1 and 2.
- (2) Schedule repeated air attacks in other base areas, with coordinated ground operations as feasible.

c. 3d MarDiv.

- (1) Conduct sustained ground and air operations to neutralize base area cluster 3.
- (2) Schedule repeated air attacks in other base areas, with coordinated ground operations as feasible.

F-3

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c. 1st MAW.---Provide support as required.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Recommend newly discovered base areas as additions to Appendix 1 (Priority Listing of Base Areas) to this Annex, as determined by hard intelligence.
- (2) Justify and recommend adjustment of priorities assigned existing base areas in Appendix 1 (Priority Listing of Base Areas) to this Annex.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



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APPENDIX:

1 - Priority Listing of Base Areas

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F-4

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Appendix 1 (Priority Listing of Base Areas) to Annex F (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas) to Campaign Plan 1-67

UNCLASSIFIED Ref: (a) MACV Ltr of 3Sep66 (VC/NVA Logistical Bases and LOC's)(S)  
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1. The following is a listing of VC/NVA base areas in I CTZ, individual priority of each base area, and the relative priority of cluster groupings:

<u>BASE AREA NUMBER</u>	<u>INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY</u>	<u>CLUSTER PRIORITY</u>
119	1	1
116	2	
118	3	
120	4	
121	5	
117	6	
125	7	2
124	8	
123	9	
122	10	
113	11	3
114	12	
115	13	

2. Reference (a) provides amplifying data regarding each of the above listed base areas.

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F-1-1

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Annex G (Coordination of RVNAF and US/FWMAF Operations) to Campaign Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (U) SITUATION

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This Annex prescribes the procedures which will be followed in coordinating the activities of RVNAF and US/FWMAF in the accomplishment of the objectives of this Plan.

2. (U) MISSION

To conduct combined/coordinated and unilateral operations to accomplish the military and revolutionary development goals set forth in this Plan.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.---Combined/coordinated operations will be the norm since they permit maximum flexibility in using available resources, make US/FWMAF mobility and firepower resources available to RVNAF, and serve to instill mutual respect and confidence between RVNAF and US/FWMAF personnel.

b. The following procedures will apply to combined/coordinated RVNAF and US/FWMAF operations:

- (1) CG, I ARVN Corps and CG, III MAF will meet periodically to exchange pertinent information concerning current and contemplated combined and/or unilateral operations. Combined and unilateral operations schedules will be published following these meetings. When combined or coordinated operations are planned, agreement will be

G-1

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reached as to the purpose, overall objectives, forces to be committed and general timing. This agreement will be published in writing as a guide for staffs and subordinate commanders.

- (2) At the earliest practicable time following the above meetings and agreements, designated staff officers will meet to plan the operation in detail. This planning will accomplish the following:
  - (a) Develop specific objectives, tasks, forces, phasing and timing.
  - (b) Define areas of responsibility or other control measures, as appropriate.
  - (c) Provide detailed request and control systems for air, artillery, naval gunfire and other combat and combat service support.
  - (d) Provide detailed arrangements for immediate and continuous exchange of intelligence information.
  - (e) Provide detailed arrangements for psychological and civic action operations to support the military operation.
  - (f) Produce directives and related instructions for subordinate commanders.
- (3) Special measures will be taken to insure the security of the operation.
- (4) Subordinate commanders and their staffs will be informed

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of the operation in time to permit necessary planning and coordination and to adopt effective security measures to prevent compromise.

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- (5) When practicable, RVNAF and US/FWMAF will establish co-located command posts to facilitate the highest order of coordination, cooperation, mutual assistance and decision making. The command post should include a combined fire support coordination center (FSCC) with the personnel and equipment necessary to coordinate and control artillery, air and naval gunfire.
  - (6) Liaison officers should be exchanged between RVNAF and US/FWMAF headquarters to assist in the planning and conduct of operations when headquarters are co-located.
  - (7) When combat operations directly or indirectly support revolutionary development activities, coordination with appropriate GVN authorities will be effected at the earliest practicable date. For US/FWMAF this coordination will be effected through appropriate US advisory teams.
  - (8) A task force type headquarters should be established to coordinate and control all aspects of a combined/coordinated operation conducted in conjunction with revolutionary development activities. The task force should include representatives of RVNAF, US/FWMAF,

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GVN civil authorities, appropriate US advisors and  
interested US civilian agencies, such as USAID and  
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G-4

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1ST MAW	76-80
FLC	81-85
DSA I CORPS	86-95
5TH SFG (ABN)	96-100
1ST MP BN	101-102
7TH ENGR BN	103-104
9TH ENGR BN	105-106
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