

CCN 018

FILLER 007

DTG 040045Z MONTH DEC 66

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

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DTG 040045Z MONTH DEC 66 #58

SECRET/NOFORN  
**EXCLUSIVE**

P 040045Z DEC 66  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO CG III MAF  
 INFO CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT AND MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW FROM LTGEN KRULAN,  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT (U)

A. CG III MAF 220032Z NOV.

B. CG FMFPAC 240222Z NOV.

1. REF A STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL LIGHT FIXED WING  
 OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM AVERAGE AVAILABILITY OF 12.  
 THE NEED FOR 24 O-1'S IS CONSIDERED A VALID REQUIREMENT AND WAS  
 SO STATED TO CMC IN PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE. YOU WILL RECALL, HOWEVER,  
 WHEN GIVEN THE CHOICE BETWEEN 12 UH-1E'S AND 12 O1E'S IN THE SECOND  
 INCREMENT OF VMO-3, THE UH-1E'S WERE SELECTED BECAUSE OF THE  
 FLEXIBILITY ADVANTAGE ENJOYED BY THE UH1E OVER THE O-1.

2. I PROPOSE TO TRY AGAIN FOR 14 MORE O1'S, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME  
 INTENSIFYING OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR FIRST  
 MAW'S PRESENT ALLOCATION OF O-1'S.

3. REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, THERE IS PROBABLY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF  
 OUR GETTING MORE O-1S, BECAUSE THE AVIATION PERSONNEL SITUATION IS,  
 AND PROMISES TO CONTINUE TO BE, EXTREMELY TIGHT. THEREFORE YOU ARE  
 GOING TO BE FACED WITH A CONTINUING SHORTAGE IN YOUR TAO/TAC(A)  
 CAPABILITY UNLESS YOU:

A. CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT ARMY AND AIR FORCE O-1 RESOURCES, WHICH I  
 REGARD AS AN UNDESIRABLE PRACTICE; OR

B. DIMINISH THE RELIANCE ON UH1E AS A CLOSE AIR SUPPORT WEAPON.

4. I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE O1E FRONT.

REGARDS.

GP-4

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090652Z

DEC 66

CG 9TH MAB

EXCLUSIVE

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NONE

NONE

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CG 9TH MAB

090652Z DEC 66

FOR BGEN RYAN

49

090652Z DEC 66

#60

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

P 090652Z DEC 66

FM CG 9TH MAB

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM BGEN RYAN.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. CG FMFPAC 052141Z DEC 66

1. PROPOSED COMUSMACV CONCEPT FOR FORTHCOMING ARG/SLF JAN CPN, NOT YET APPROVED BY GEN WESTMORELAND, INCLUDES FOLLOWING:

A. SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF SHIPPING (US IS IMPLIED HERE) AND CONCURRENCE OF APPROPRIATE V/N AUTHORITIES BN OF VMMC WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE ARG/SLF TASK ORGANIZATION.

B. ARVN FORCES CONDUCT A CONCURRENT BUT SEPARATE REGIMENTAL SIZED OPERATION IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE WEST OF AOA TIMED TO COMMENCE APPROXIMATELY 48 HOURS PRIOR TO THE LANDING.

2. IF OFFICIAL CONCEPT RECEIVED AS ABOVE PROPOSE TO COMMENT TO SEVENTH FLEET THAT AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE AND SIZE OF AREA INDICATE THAT VMMC BN WOULD CONTRIBUTE MATERIALLY TO SUCCESS OF OPERATION.

3. HAVE INFORMED COL WORKMAN THAT IF A DESIRABLE SCHEME OF MANEUVER FOR ARVN FORCES ON A CONCURRENT BUT SEPARATE OPERATION CALLED FOR OPERATIONS IN AOA WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESS THAT THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED.

4. ANTICIPATE THAT THE AOA WILL EXTEND IN A 10 MILE ARC FROM CENTER OF COAST AT 80-88 MAP VIET NAM 1:50,000 SHEET 6340 IV SERIES L701. THANH PHU. GENERAL CONCEPT AT THIS TIME SLF CONCENTRATE ON AREA EAST OF WATERLINE RACH EO LON 72-88, KINH EO LOI 75-91, RACH BANG CUNG 77-96. ANY VIETNAMESE FORCES IN AOA, MARINE OF ARMY, WEST AND NORTH OF THAT LINE. ABOVE SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON DEFINITE FORCES TO TAKE PART IN THE OPERATION AS WELL AS FIRM HYDROGRAPHIC DATA.

GP-4

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007

111025Z

DEC 66

CG THIRD MARDIV

(PERSONAL FOR)

*G-2 Anthony*

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*12/12/66  
Gen Walt has one  
copy. JWS*

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CG THIRD MARDIV

111025Z DEC 66

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111025Z DEC 66

#61

SECRET

DE RUMNVP 1437D 3451025

ZNY SSSSS

O 111025Z DEC 66

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM MAJGEN KYLE

SUBJ: FORCE REQUIREMENTS, 3D MARDIV

1. QUANG TRI AREA.

A. RECENT ACTIVITY IN AREA NORTH OF "ROCKPILE" AND COLLATERAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION STRONGLY INDICATES POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI BY 3245 AND 341ST NVA DIVISIONS. THE END OF THE HEAVY RAINFALL PERIOD OF NORTHEAST MONSOON AND REDUCED VISIBILITY EXPECTED FOR NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS NOW FAVORS SUCH OPERATIONS.

B. THE INFANTRY UNITS DEPLOYED IN OPERATION PRAIRIE ARE MINIMAL TO INSURE SUCCESSFUL INITIAL DEFENSE OF ALL VITAL TARGETS IN THE AREA.

THE FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT IS CONSIDERED OPTIMUM FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE WITH FORCES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE:

(1) ARVN UNITS, INCLUDING GENERAL RESERVE TASK FORCE, ASSIGNED OPERATING AREA TO EAST OF GRIDLINE 16.

(2) ONE USMC INFANTRY BATTALION ASSIGNED OPERATING AREA AROUND CON

PAGE TWO RUMNVP 1437D SECRET

THIEN. THIS FORWARD DEPLOYMENT IS NECESSARY TO DEFENSE OF VITAL DONG HA COMBAT BASE.

(3) ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (-) ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF DONG HA AND INSTALLATIONS MOUTH CAU VIET RIVER.

(4) ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (-) ASSIGNED DEFENSE OF CAMP CARROLL, COVERING APPROACHES FROM NORTHEAST AND SOUTH/SOUTHWEST.

(5) ONE INFANTRY BATTALION ASSIGNED DEFENSE OF "ROCKPILE" AREA.

(6) THE ABOVE LEAVES A GAP TO NORTHWEST OF CAM LO. THIS GAP PARTIALLY FILLED BY PROVISIONAL BATTALION OF TWO COMPANIES BASED NORTH OF CAM LO. THESE TWO COMPANIES TAKEN FROM BATTALIONS AT DONG HA AND CAMP CARROLL.

2. THUA THIEN (NORTH OF HUE)

A. VC ACTIVITY HAS INCREASED IN AREA BETWEEN HUE AND QUANG TRI IN PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES AT PHO TRACH, XY CHANH AND ATTACK ON ARVN BATTALION AND BRIDGE AT AN LO INDICATES MAJOR AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO CUT LOC BETWEEN HUE/PHU BAI AND DONG HA. THIS ACTIVITY POSSIBLY PART OF OVERALL PLAN FOR FUTURE ATTACK IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI.

3. CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT OPERATIONS BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN HUE AND QUANG TRI TO DESTROY VC FORCES THAT AREA AND TO PROTECT LOC. A MINIMUM TWO USMC INFANTRY BATTALIONS WITH NORMAL REINFORCEMENT REQUIRED TO

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#61

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PAGE THREE RUMNVP 1437D S E C R E T

CONDUCT OPERATIONS WEST OF NATIONAL ROUTE NR 1 BETWEEN AND LO AND MY CHANH. FORCES FOR THIS MISSION ARE NOT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE WITHIN 3D MARINE DIVISION.

3. THUA THIEN (SOUTH OF HUE)

A. VC ACTIVITY SOUTH OF HUE HAS BEEN DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD INTERDICTION OF ROAD AND RAILROAD. RECENTLY, RAILROAD BRIDGE AT AU 148009 AND HIGHWAY BRIDGE AT PHU LOC BOTH DESTROYED IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF RF/PF UNITS.

B. EFFECTIVE THIS DATE, 2DBN, 26TH MARINES HAS BEEN REDEPLOYED ALONG ROUTE NR 1 TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY TO LOC. SEARCH AND CLEAR MISSION SUBORDIANATED TO LOC SECURITY MISSION. ONE COMPANY OF 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES BEING SIMILARLY DEPLOYED IN SOUTHERN AREA OF TAOR.

C. IT IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY THAT ONE INFANTRY BATTALION REMAIN DEPLOYED BETWEEN PHU BAI AND LANG CO BRIDGE UNTIL ARVN UNITS ARE DEPLOYED TO THAT AREA AND ADDITIONAL CAC IS IN PLACE.

4. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, FOLLOWING MEASURE BEING INITIATED THIS DATE

A. ONE 155MM HOW (TOWED) BATTERY WILL BE MOVED TO PK 17 TO PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTIVE FIRE IN CO 31-THANH TAN VALLEY AREA AND TO SUPPORT RECON.

B. ONE AT COMPANY WILL BE MOVED FROM DONG HA TO PHU BAI FOR EMPLOYMENT

PAGE FOUR RUMNVP 1437D S E C R E T

WITH 2DBN, 26TH MARINES ON LOC SECURITY.

C. HQ, 4TH BN, 12TH MARINES WILL BE MOVED FROM DONG HA TO PHU BAI TO COMMAND ARTILLERY THIS AREA.

D. ACTION BEING INITIATED WITH CO, 1ST ARVN DIVISION AND PROVINCE CHIEF TO MOVE ALL CIVILIANS OUT OF AREA BETWEEN DMZ AND GRID LINE 76 IN VICINITY OF CON THIEN. THIS VC INFESTED AREA SERVES AS SUPPLY BASE FOR NVA FORCES AND SERIOUSLY HANDICAPS EFFORTS TO DEFEND THAT AREA.

5. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THREE ADDITIONAL INFANTRY BATTALIONS WITH NORMAL REINFORCEMENT ARE REQUIRED IN 3D MARINE DIVISION AREA TO ACCOMPLISH PRESENTLY ASSIGNED MISSIONS:

A. ONE BATTALION TO BE EMPLOYED NORTHWEST OF CAM LO TO CLOSE THE GAP THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS IN THAT AREA.

B. TWO BATTALIONS TO BE EMPLOYED NORTH OF HUE FOR SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WEST OF ROUTE NR 1. SUCH OPERATIONS ARE BELIEVED ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY OF LOC.

6. RECOGNIZE THAT FORCES PRESENTLY AVAILABLE TO III MAF ARE NOT ADEQUATE TO PERMIT ABOVE ASSIGNMENT. HOWEVER, BELIEVE SITUATION SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS TO WARRANT REQUEST TO HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR THE ADDITIONAL FORCES. RECOMMEND DISCUSSION ALONG ABOVE LINES DURING 12 DECEMBER VISIT COMUSMACV.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

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34

131335Z

DEC 66

CG THIRD MARDIV

**(PERSONAL FOR)**

FOR: LTGEN WALT

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CG THIRD MARDIV

131335Z DEC 66

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*14 Dec 66  
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131335Z DEC 66

#62

SECRET

VV 3 DIV 606  
 DE RUMNVP 1811D 3471335  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 131335Z DEC 66  
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

BT

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM MAJGEN KYLE

1. COL TROUNG VISITED MY CP THIS MORNING. HE IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY OF THE AREA BETWEEN AN LO (YD 6230) AND PHO TRACH (YD 5134). ALSO, HE HAS INFORMATION THAT VC PLAN TO CONDUCT ANOTHER AMBUSH AGAINST MAJOR SIZE CONVOY BETWEEN HUE AND QUANG TRI. I AM EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS AREA.

2. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION WE ARRIVED AT FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION WHICH ARE MUTUALLY AGREEABLE.

A. 3D MARDIV WILL MOVE ONE BATTALION (REIN) FROM PRAIRIE AREA TO VICINITY OF YD 5231. THIS UNIT WILL CONDUCT RECON IN FORCE OPERATIONS IN AREA WEST OF ROUTE NR 1 BETWEEN SONG BO AND SONG O LAU. 3D MARDIV WILL GIVE UP AREA AROUND CON THIEN.

B. 1ST ARVN DIVISION WILL ASSIGN CON THIEN AREA TO VN MARINE TASK FORCE.

C. THE ABOVE RETAINS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME STRENGTH IN THE PRAIRIE

PAGE TWO RUMNVP 1811D SECRET  
 AREA ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

3. IT IS MY INTENTION TO MOVE 3DBN 26TH MARINES (REIN) TO VICINITY YD 5231 IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. XACT AOA NOT YET DETERMINED. DIVISION RECON UNITS WILL OPERATE IN MOUNTAINS WEST OF CO BI - THANK TAVAS WEATHER PERMITS. IF SUITABLE TARGET CAN BE DEVELOPED, 2DEN, 26TH MARINES WILL BE MOVED NORTH TO PARTICIPATE IN OPERATIONS, LEAVING ONE COMPANY IN THE PAWNEE AREA. 1ST ARVN DIVISION WILL PARTICIPATE IN OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

4. 3D BN 26TH MARINES WILL BE MOVED SOUTH OVER THE ROAD. ONLY MINIMAL HELICOPTER SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED AFTER BATTALION BEGINS OPERATIONS.  
 5. DETAIL PLAN IS BEING PREPARED AND WILL BE PROVIDED LATER.

GP-4

BT

*CG has seen*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL****(PERSONAL FOR)**

DE RUMSMA 2736M 3521432  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 181421Z DEC 66 ZEL  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMMNF/CG III MAF SA I CTZ  
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ  
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ  
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ  
 BT

COMM NOTE: MESSAGE RECEIVED  
 FOR FIRST TIME AT  
 212036H

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 53722 FROM MACRDS.  
 FOR LTCS WALT, LARSEN, SEAMAN AND BG DESOBRY FROM GEN WESTMORELAND  
 1. (C) I HAVE JUST CONCURRED IN A SPECIAL JOINT REPORT TO BE  
 PREPARED BY THE CORPS SENIOR ADVISOR OR HIS DEPUTY AND THE REGIONAL  
 DIRECTOR FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS. THE REPORT IS DESIGNED TO GIVE AN OVER-  
 VIEW OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TO INCLUDE OVERALL IMPRESSIONS,  
 IMPORTANT INNOVATIONS, MAIN AREAS OF PROGRESS, PRINCIPAL UNSOLVED  
 PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE. THE REPORT WILL BE  
 SUBMITTED DIRECT TO AMBASSADOR PORTER AND TO MACV RDS.  
 2. (C) AN EVALUATION OF ARVN'S PERFORMANCE IN SUPPORT OF RD IS  
 INCLUDED IN THE REPORT. IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THIS  
 SUBJECT, I WANT TO ENSURE THAT ANY COMMENTS YOU MAKE ABOUT ARVN  
 ARE FACTUAL AND PLACED IN THE PROPER CONTEXT. I HAVE INDICATED MY

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2736M C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN  
 CONCERN TO AMBASSADOR PORTER ABOUT SINGLING OUT " ARVN EFFECTIVE-  
 NESS" TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER EQUALLY IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES SUCH  
 AS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL POLICE, RD CADRE, LAND REFORM,  
 CORRUPTION AND THE GENERAL INEPTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT ADMINI-  
 STRATORS FROM HAMLET TO SAIGON LEVEL. I ASK THAT EACH OF YOU  
 ENSURE THAT THE JOINT REPORT THAT YOU FORWARD BE ALL INCLUSIVE.  
 GP4.  
 BT

*Call M.G. Brown.*

*Note to Francis - 22 Dec.  
 seeking original.*

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144

007

220825Z

DEC 66

CG FIRST MARDIV

(PERSONAL FOR)

CG III MAF

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CG FIRST MARDIV

220825Z DEC 66

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220825Z DEC 66

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMHLA 2252E 3560825

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P 220825Z DEC 66

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT

AERIAL OBSERVATION

1. DURING THE PERIOD 17-21 DECEMBER, THE AERIAL OBSERVATION U OF THIS COMMAND OPERATING IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF FIRST MARDIV ELEMENTS IN DANANG TAOR/RAOR FLEW A TOTAL OF 40 FLIGHTS FOR 95.6 HOURS. MANY OF THESE MISSIONS WERE OF THE NORMAL, YET VITAL PART OF AERIAL OBSERVATION, SUCH AS : SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE ENTIRE AREA INCLUDING A CONSTANT CHECK ON STATUS OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, VISUAL RECON AND RADIO RELAY MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF GROUND RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS, HAND-HELD INTELLIGENCE PHOTOGRAPHY, AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE COVERAGE OF ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS, VISUAL CHECKS OF SELECTED AREAS IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS DURING OPERATIONS, ARTILLERY REGISTRATIONS, ECT.

2. OTHER AO FLIGHTS FLOWN IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF INFANTRY ELEMENTS

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2252E C O N F I D E N T I A L

IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY CONDUCTED 6 ARTILLERY FIRE MISSIONS, CONTROLLED 25 AIR STRIKES OF 48 AIRCRAFT DROPPING 38 TONS OF BOMBS, 27 FFAR ROCKET PODS, 3,900 X 20MM AND 4 ZUNI ROCKETS FOR A NET SURVEILLANCE/BDA OF: 7 KBA CONFIRMED, 49 KBA PROBABLE, 23 STRUCTURES DESTROYED, 13 STRUCTURES DAMAGED, 1 GUN POSITION DESTROYED AND 200 METERS OF TRENCHES DESTROYED. ADDITIONALLY, IN COORDINATION WITH FLARE SHIPS, THE AO'S FLEW NIGHT OBSERVATION MISSIONS DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD WHEN INFANTRY ELEMENTS WERE ORGANIZING NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND WERE, DURING ALL HOURS OF DARKNESS, PREPARED TO LAUNCH AS REQUIRED.

3. AIRCRAFT FOR THESE MISSIONS WERE PROVIDED BY THE 01-C DET OF H&MS 16 OF MAG 16 AND THE 3RD PLATOON, 220TH AVIATION COMPANY, U.S. ARMY.

4. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXTENDED MY PERSONAL WELL DONE BY MESSAGE TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THESE UNITS AND I RECOMMEND THEM TO YOU FOR A PAT ON THE BACK. I CAN ASSURE YOU "THEIR PICTURES ARE ON MY PIANO". MAJ GEN NICKERSON SENDS.

GP-4

BT

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240952Z

DEC 66

CG FMFPAC

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240952Z DEC 66

#65

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 240952Z DEC 66  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO CG III MAF  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 CG FORLOGCWD  
 BT

*M*  
 EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, MAJGEN NICKERSON, MAJGEN KYLE,  
 MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW, BGEN VAN STOCKUM AND BGEN HERBOLD FROM LTGEN KRULAK  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. STRAWS IN THE WIND AT YEAR'S END.
  - A. PRESSURE FOR A STRECHED OUT STAND-DOWN IN RVN IS GREATER UNDER THE SURFACE EVEN THAN THAT WHICH IS VISIBLE. PARTICULARLY POWERFUL ARE THE INFLUENCES RELATED TO DEFERRING THE RESUMPTION OF AIR OPERATIONS IN NVN. BETTING IS ALMOST EVEN THAT THE BOMBING PAUSE WILL BE EXTENDED. IF SO, I KNOW WHAT IT WILL MEAN TO OUR PEOPLE NEAR THE DMZ, IN TERMS OF INCREASED ENEMY BUILD-UP.
  - B. TROOP INCREASES IN RVN, BEYOND THOSE NOW PROGRAMMED, ARE HARDER AND HARDER TO GENERATE AND JUSTIFY. I HAVE A STRONG FEELING THAT HIGH LEVEL DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO TRY AND MANAGE ON A STRENGTH BASE NO FAR ABOVE WHAT WE HAVE NOW.
  - C. I SENSE A CORRESPONDING TIGHTENING OF MONEY, BUT SEE NO LIKELIHOOD THAT WE SHALL BE LEFT WANTING IN ANY AREA EXCEPT, OF COURSE, THE LONG LEAD TIME ITEMS (FORKLIFTS, GENERATORS, ETC) THAT EVEN MONEY CANNOT BUY. HOWEVER, OUR SUPPLY PIPELINE IS ALMOST SURE TO BE CUT BY 30 DAYS, WHICH IS GOING TO PUT A PREMIUM ON EFFICIENCY IN REQUISITIONING, DISTRIBUTION AND ELIMINATION OF EXCESSES.
  - D. THERE IS DISSATISFACTION IN WASHINGTON WITH THE VALIDITY OF THE MACV ORDER OF BATTLE FIGURES ON BOTH NVN AND VC. THEY QUESTION THE VOLUME OF INFILTRATION AND ENEMY LOSSES, WITH THE UNSTATED BUT OBVIOUS IMPLICATION THAT THEY FEEL INFILTRATION IS OVER-STATEMENT WHILE LOSSES DUE TO ILLNESS ETC ARE UNDER-STATEMENT.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

E. IT IS BECOMING PLAIN TO A LOT OF PEOPLE THAT THE ENEMY HAS TAKEN A MAJOR DECISION TO ALTER HIS TACTICS; TO SLIDE BACK INTO PHASE II AND TO BEAR DOWN ON GUERILLA WAR. I THINK HE WILL KEEP HIS MAIN FORCES DISPERSED, READY TO CONVERGE IF WE GIVE HIM A TARGET, BUT REMAINING HOPEFUL OF SUCKING US DEEP INTO THE MOUNTAINS NEAR THOSE BORDERS WHERE HE HAS SOME SANCTUARY. BUT MOST OF ALL I BELIEVE WE WILL FIND MORE GUERILLA PRESSURE ON THE PEOPLE AND ON US EVERYWHERE, AND THIS IS BAD NEWS BECAUSE IT NEUTRALIZES OUR SUPPORTING ARMS. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE ARE NOT SHARED BY EVERYONE. SOME STILL BELIEVE THAT THE BIG TRICK IS TO GO OUT AND BEAT UP ON THE MAIN FORCE REGIMENTS. AS USUAL, WE HAVE A SELLING JOB.

F. THERE CONTINUES TO BE A LOT OF TALK ABOUT OPERATIONS IN THE MEKONG DELTA, BUT I DO DETECT SOME INDICISIVENESS AT HIGH LEVELS. I BELIEVE THAT SOME PEOPLE PERCEIVE THE REALITY THAT, WHILE THE DELTA IS OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR AT LARGE, THIS IS NOT THE TIME FOR THE U. S. TO GO IN THERE. UNTIL THE 43 ARVN BATTALIONS IN IV CTZ GET INTERESTED IN FIGHTING OFF GUERILLAS AND PROTECTING THE PEOPLE, THERE IS NO POINT IN THE U.S. TRYING TO DO IT ALONE. IN ANY CASE THE MAIN IDEA, WHICH JUST REPEATS THE FRENCH MISTAKES, IS COMING IN FOR A FEW SECOND THOUGHTS NOW. ALL OF THIS IS PRELIMINARY TO SAYING THAT MARINES MAY STILL, AND ON SHORT NOTICE, BE TASKED FOR DELTA EMPLOYMENT, IN WHICH EVENT IT IS PLAIN THAT OUR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY NEEDS TO BE KEPT ALIVE AND HIGHLY POLISHED, PARTICULARLY BY NINTH MAB.

G. OSD HAS REALLY SIGHTED IN ON OUR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, TURNING THUMBS DOWN ON REPLACEMENT FOR OUR C-54S AND C-117S, WHILE SERVING NOTICE THAT OUR KC-130S ARE NEXT. WE HAVE SET UP A PROGRAM TO ACQUIRE STATISTICS WHICH EXHIBIT PLAINLY THE GENUINE NEED WE HAVE FOR ALL OF THESE AIRCRAFT. YOU ALL - PARTICULARLY BEN - ARE GOING TO HAVE TO PROVIDE ME THE HARD FACTS THAT WILL MAKE OUR CASE MEANINGFUL.

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SECRET

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SECRET

FURTHER, IN THE AERO-NAUTICAL LINE, IS THE PREDATORY ATTITUDE WITH WHICH OUR A-6 AIRCRAFT ARE BEING APPRAISED BY OTHERS. WE NEED TO MAKE AND KEEP A GOOD RECORD OF THEIR PERFORMANCE, EMPHASIZING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THEIR SYSTEMS CAPABILITY TO OUR OWN AFFAIRS.

H. OUR PERSONNEL PROSPECTS CONTINUE TO LOOK BETTER. BARING SOMETHING UNFORSEEN, ALL UNITS SHOULD REMAIN OVER MANNING LEVEL, IN TOTAL NUMBERS. HOWEVER, THE SKILL LEVELS ARE STILL GOING TO BE LOW, AND THE FALL-OUT FROM RAPID PROMOTIONS WILL REMAIN WITH US. ABUNDANCE OF COMMAND SUPERVISION IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED. I KNOW THAT YOU ALL FEEL SOME DEFICIENCIES IN YOUR CURRENT T/O'S. AS YOU SEND THEM IN I WILL TRY AND GET ADDITIONAL SPACES FOR THOSE IN WHICH I CONCUR, ON A PROVISIONAL T/O BASIS.

I. THE FIELD OFFICERS' SLATES ARE BEING LABORED OVER IN WASHINGTON NOW. I REALIZE THAT WE NEED TO KNOW THE OUTCOME SOON, SINCE RIGHT NOW THERE ARE VERY FEW FIELD OFFICERS SCHEDULED TO COME OUT IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

2. MERRY CHRISTMAS AND BEST WISHES TO YOU ALL.

GP-4

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SECRET

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007

271404Z

DEC 66

CMC

(PERSONAL FOR)

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CMC

271404Z DEC 66

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#66

SECRET

(PERSONAL FOR)

PP DDKE  
 DF WWDN 3614 3611404  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 271404Z DEC 66  
 FM CMC  
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
 BT

SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN VALT FROM GEN GREENE  
 RVN BILLET FOR LTCOL KEEVER (U)  
 (A) CG III MAF MSG 200234Z DEC (S)  
 I AM PREPARED TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY THE RELEASE OF LTCOL  
 KEEVER TO OCO. WILL ADVISE YOU FOLLOWING CALL BY MR.  
 LATHRAM.  
 GP-4.  
 BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

SECRET

021

34

290656Z

DEC 66

COMSEVENTHFLT

(PERSONAL FOR)

*W*

FOR: COMMANDERS

#1

3

#2 & #3

3

COMSEVENTHFLT

290656Z DEC 66

*W*

THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS ROUTINE.  
A IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS NOT REQUIRED.....

*Copy #3 burned  
4/26/68 [Signature]*

290656Z JAN. 66

#67

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUAUBUL 043 3630656  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 29065Z DEC 66  
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
 TO DDKCF/CTF 77  
 DDKCF/CTG 77.0  
 DDKCF/CTG 77.4  
 DDKCF/CTG 77.8  
 DDKCF/CTG 77.9  
 DDKCF/CTG 70.8  
 DDKCF/CTF 76  
 DDKCF/CTF 73;  
 INFO RUMFA/COMNAVBASE SUBIC  
 RUAUNJ/COMNAVFORJAPAN  
 RUMFKB/COMNAVFORV  
 DDKE/CG III MAF  
 RUMNNA/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
 RUMFM/COMNAVPHIL  
 BT  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS  
 UNDERSECNAV VISIT (U)

W  
 (PERSONAL FOR)

PAGE TWO RUAUBUL 043 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. FOLLLOWING INFO AND GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN DESIGN AND CONDUCT OF BRIEFINGS FOR UNDERSECNAV ROBERT H.B. BALDWIN DURING FORTH-COMING WESTPAC VISIT:

A. BASIC CONNSIDERATION IN ALL CONTACTS IS TO AVOID GIVING UNDERSECNAV INFO HE ALREADY HAS AS VERY ACTIVE PARICIPANT IN NAVY AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ACTIONS/DELIBERATIONS. CONCENTRATE ON LOCAL MATTERS AND LOCAL (FLEET, TF, TG) ASPECTS OF PROBLEMS, ACHIEVEMENTS, PLANS. HE IS THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE BIG PICTURE AT DOD AND UNIFIED COMMAND LEVEL.

B. AVOID LONG AND/OR DULL PRESENTATION, E.G., ORGANIZATION CHARTS, OVERALL INTELSUM, DETAILED FLEET DISPOSITION.

C. USE MEANINGFUL STATISTICS IN VISUAL FORM BUT DO NOT READ THEM TO HIM; HE HAS WELL DEVELOPED FACULTY FOR ABSORBING NUMBERS RAPIDLY AND WILL ASK FOR AMPLIFICATION ON APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES OR MATTER OF INTEREST TO HIM.

D. DO NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO GIVE HIM GOOD NEWS ONLY, BUT IN OUTLINING PROBLEM AREAS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HIS FAMILIARITY WITH BIG PICTURE AND, IF KNOWN, HIS OR HIGHER AUTHORITY ACTION AIMED AT SOLUTION OR IMPROVEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, HVE IS CURRENT AND INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH PAST AMMO/BOMB SHORTAGE AND CURRENT STATUS, BUT WILL BE INTERESTED IN TACTICAL LIMIT-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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PAGE THREE RUAUBUL 043V C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 ATIONS FORMERLY IMPOSED ON DAILY OPERATIONS DURING SHORTAGE AND  
 INFLUENCE OF WEATHER ON RECENT ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES LEVEL.

E. SUBJECTS OF EXPECTED INTEREST INCLUDE:

- (1) SPAREE/REPAIR PARTS STATUS NOW AND CHANGE IN STATUS SINCE UNDER  
 VSECNAV VISIT IN DEC 65. (SHIP AND AIRCRAFT).
- (2) HABITABILITY IMPROVEMENTS AFLOAT (E. G. SPOT AIR CONDITIONING  
 IN CVA) IN PAST YEAR.
- (3) SHIP MANNING LEVELS AND CHANGES INCL AND REEXAMINATION AIMED  
 AT REDUCING NUMBERS. ESP APPLIES TO CVA. HE WAS NOT CONVINCED IN DEC 65  
 VISIT THAT NUMBERS OF MEN THEN ON BOARD WERE NEEDED.
- (4) A GA PERFORMANCE. UNDERSECNAV BRIEFED ON EARLY A GA PROBLEMS BY  
 INDEPENDENCE AT NORFOLK. SUBSEQUENT IMPROVEMENTS IN HARDWARE AND  
 TACTICS PLUS RECORD OF VA 65V AND VA 35 WILL BE OF INTEREST. SUGGEST  
 SQUADRON AND AIR GROUP COMMANDERS BRIEF.
- (5) NEED FOR INCREASED COD SUPPORT TO FLEET. SPECIFICALLY, NEED FOR  
 FULL BUY OF C2A. PLANS FOR UTILIZATION OF C2A.
- (6) SEA DRAGON OOPS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS ON NGFS.
- (7) IMPROVED SAFETY MEASURES IN CVAS.
- (8) NEED FOR REPLACEMENT FOR A-1 AIRCRAFT RESULTING FROM CHANGE IN  
 AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT; FUTURE ROLE FOR A-1.

PAGE FOUR RUAUBUL 043 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (9) PILOT RETENTION. INFLUENCE OF CURRENT PILOT ROTATION AND  
 RESTRICTED AIR OPS ON RETENTION, IF ANY.
  - (10) GENERAL TEMPO OF FLEET OPERATIONS AND EFFECT OF SHIP CONDITION  
 AND ROTATION BY SHIP TYPES.
  - (11) EXTENT OF INTER-SERVICE COOPERATION AND AGREEMENT ON ANALYSIS  
 ANDDD METHODS OF OPERATIONS.
2. BALDWIN DOES NOT NEED TO BE SOLD ON THE NAVY. HE DOES NEED AIR TIGHT  
 CASE FOR ANY REQUEST WE WISH HIM TO CARRY UP THE LINE TO DOD.  
 THEREVFORE, WASTE NO TIME ON EMOTIONAL, SUBJECTIVE OR TRADITIONAL  
 VAPPROACHES. UNASSAILABLE FACTS ONLY. USEFUL WEAPON FOR THIS TASK.
  3. WHEREEVER POSSIBLE USE OFFICER MOST INTIMATELY COVNCERNED TO CONDUCT  
 BRIEFINGS. UNDERSECNAV VALUES AND DESIRES VIEW OF SENIOR COMMANDERS  
 BUT APPRECIATES OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR FROM ACTION OFFICER DIRECTLY AS WELL  
 VNE SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNCHAPERONED CONVERSATION WITH  
 ENLISTED MEN. MEAL IN CREWS MESS AND CPO MESS RECOMMENDED.
  4. THIS VISIT MERITS CAREFUL PREPARTION AND OFFERS EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY  
 FOR INPUTS FROM TACTICAL LEVEL TO BE CONVEYED DIRECTLY AND FORCEFULLY  
 TO A RECEPTIVE, KEENLY INTERESSTED, AND EFFECTIVE SPOKESMAN FOR THE NAVY  
 IN WASHINGTON COUNCILS.

VADM JOHN J. HYLAND

VGP-4

BT

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

# 68

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023

FILLER 25

DTG 302258Z MONTH DEC 66

ORIGINATOR CMC

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY

FILE COPY FILLER OF 5 COPIES

*For CIA*  
*g*

RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2 OF 5  
COPIES OF CMC MESSAGE 302258Z DEC 66

RECEIVED BY: DATE/TIME:

GEN KRULAK'S AIDE COPY 3 OF 5 COPIES TIME

FMAW COPIES 4,5 OF 5 COPIES TIME

*Gen Walt Copies 1 & 2*

THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS ROUTINE  
AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS NOT REQUIRED

*W*  
*Copy #2 burned  
9/20/68*

302258Z DEC 66

*#68*

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

R 302258Z DEC 66

FM CMC

TO YVNA/CG FMFPAC

DDKE/CG III MAF

MMSA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK, LTGEN VALT AND MGEN ROBERTSHAW FROM LTGEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. VISIT OF MR HERBERT ROSENZWEIG (U)

A. SECDEF 192355Z NOTAL DEC 66

B. CG FMFPAC 150200Z DEC 66

C. CG III MAF 190634Z DEC 66

1. REF A HELD BY III MAF ANNOUNCES SUBJ VISIT MR ROSENZWEIG (CG 27) WHO OCCUPIES POSITION IN OSD (SA) TACAIR PROGRAMS FORMERLY HELD BY MR PATRICK PARKER. DETAILED SCHEDULE NOT YET AVAIL HOWEVER ROSENZWEIG PLANS ONE DAY VISIT FMAW ABOUT 12/13 JAN.

2. MR ROSENZWEIG GIVEN ORIENTATION BRIEF BY DC/5 AIR 28 DEC ON COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION FMAW UNITS PLUS GENERAL OVERVIEW OF OPNS INCLUDING FMAW AIR CONTROL AGENCY AND CAPABILITIES. BRIEFING LIMITED BY TIME WHICH PROVIDED LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DETAILS SEVENTH AF/FMAW RELATIONSHIP OR DISTRIBUTION SORTIE EFFORT. STATISTICAL DISPLAY OF SORTIE DISTRIBUTION BRUSHED OFF AS AVAILABLE PENTAGON. COPY MACV DIRECTIVE 94-4 BEING PROVIDED TO HIM.

3. MR ROSENZWEIG EXPRESSED DESIRES AS FOLLOWS:

A. NO FORMAL BRIEFINGS

B. VISIT VMCJ FOR FAMILIARITY EQUIP AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES TO INCLUDE MISSION ASSIGNMENTS (FRAG ORDERS) AND A COORDINATION WITH AIR FORCE AND FLEET OPNS.

C. VISIT ALL SITES SUPPORTING TACTICAL FIXED WING OPNS.

D. EXPRESSED POSITIVE DISINTEREST IN HELD AND TRANSPORT OPNS.

4. WITH RESPECT 3 B ABOVE ROSENZWEIG HAS BEEN DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH UNSUCCESSFUL USMC EFFORT TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL EACH ACG. APPARENTLY SYMPATHETIC TO REQUIREMENT. STATED ELECTRONIC WAREFARE AS PRIME MATTER OF INTEREST ON VISIT. HAS BEEN PROVIDED COPIES REF B AND C.

5. REGARDING PARA 3 C ABOVE EXPECT QUERIES RELATED TO JUSTIFICATION FOR NUMBERS OF ACFT HELD IN ALERT STATUS. ALTHOUGH DISCUSSED AT BRIEF IT WAS APPARENT THAT IMPORTANCE THIS CAPABILITY TO GROUND OPNS PARTICULARLY IMMEDIATE SURGE RQMTS NOT FULLY APPRECIATED.

6. WITH RESPECT PARA 3 D ABOVE IMPORTANCE TRANSPORT OPNS STRESSED. EMPHASIZED THAT KC-130 ESSENTIAL TO BOTH AIR AND GROUND OPNS OF MAF. OBJECTIVE IS TO STIMULATE INTEREST IN TRANSFER OF COGNIZANCE OF USMC TRANSPORT ACFT FROM AIRLIFT/SEALIFT BRANCH OF OSD (SA) TO TACAIR BRANCH.

GP-4

BT

*For C. Gen. Krulak has received his*

*copy*

*copy I have retained 1 copy to support for Mr. Rosenzweig's visit.*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

*copy #2 Returned 14 Jan 67 RJC #68*

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