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28 MAR 1967


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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG IIMAF ltr 3/JEF/sbc
over 5750 Ser: 0059467 dtd 13Mar67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 January 1967 to
31 January 1967

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

~~REDACTED~~
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FMPac

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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S&C FILES

3/J HEADQUARTERS
5750
Ser **0059467**
18 MAR 1967

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From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 January 1967 to
31 January 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and
(b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon the
removal of enclosure (1).

R. B. Neville
R. B. NEVILLE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

306 473

GROUP 4
Downgraded, at 3 year
intervals. Declassified
after 12 years.

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III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 January 1967 to 31 January 1967

INDEX

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- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT
EVENTS
- PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

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DESIGNATION

III Marine Amphibious Force

COMMANDER

Lieutenant General
Lewis W. WALT, U. S.
Marine Corps

SUBORDINATE UNITS

First Marine Division

Major General
Herman NICKERSON, Jr.
U. S. Marine Corps

Third Marine Division

Major General
Wood B. KYLE, U. S.
Marine Corps

First Marine Aircraft Wing

Major General
Louis B. ROBERTSHAW,
U. S. Marine Corps

Force Logistics Command

Brigadier General
James E. HERBOLD, Jr.
U. S. Marine Corps

7th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel
Frank W. HARRIS, III
U. S. Marine Corps

9th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel
Richard W. CRISPEN
U. S. Marine Corps

11th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel
Ross L. MULFORD
U. S. Marine Corps

Sub Unit #1, First Radio Battalion

Captain Russell W.
RADER, USMC (1-28Jan67)

Captain Francis A.
LOSIK, USMC (29-31Jan67)

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~~_____~~
Headquarters and Service Company

Major Vernon L. SYLVESTER,
U. S. Marine Corps

ATTACHED UNITS

29th Civil Affairs Company, USA

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence
A. STEVENS, U. S. Army

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2. LOCATION

1 - 31 January 1967, Danang, Republic of Vietnam

3. STAFF OFFICERS 1 - 31 January 1967

Chief of Staff	Brigadier General Hugh M. ELWOOD, U. S. Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff	Colonel Robert B. NEVILLE, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Colonel John L. MAHON, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Colonel Roy H. THOMPSON, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Colonel Drew J. BARRETT, Jr. U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Colonel Joseph F. QUILTY, Jr. U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Colonel Eric S. HOLMGRAIN, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6	Lieutenant Colonel Marvin D. VOLKERT, U. S. Marine Corps
Psychological Operations Officer	Colonel Robert R. READ, U. S. Marine Corps
Supply Officer	Colonel Arthur T. HILL, U. S. Marine Corps
Communications-Electronics Officer	Colonel Jake B. HILL, U. S. Marine Corps

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Engineer Officer

Colonel Charles H. HORN, U. S. Marine Corps

Adjutant

Major John T. REVILLE, U. S. Marine Corps

Comptroller

Lieutenant Colonel Melvin W. SNOW, U. S. Marine Corps

Chaplain

Captain Earl V. LYONS, U. S. Navy

Combat Information Bureau

Colonel Thomas M. FIELDS, U. S. Marine Corps
1 - 24 January 1967

Colonel Don G. DERRYBERRY, U. S. Marine Corps
25 - 31 January 1967

Officer in Charge, Combat Operations Center

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. YOUNG, U. S. Marine Corps

Food Services Officer

Major Willis P. HALL, Jr. U. S. Marine Corps

Legal Officer

Colonel Robert B. NEVILLE, U. S. Marine Corps

Surgeon

Captain Howard A. BAKER, U. S. Navy

Dental Officer

Captain Kenneth L. MORGAN, U. S. Navy

Motor Transportation Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. TONNACLIFF, U. S. Marine Corps

Ordnance Officer

Lieutenant Colonel John C. THOMAS, U. S. Marine Corps

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Protocol Officer

Major John A.
LIVINGSTONE, U. S.
Marine Corps

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Special Services Officer

Colonel Carl A. SACHS,
U. S. Marine Corps

Transportation/Embarkation Officer

Lieutenant Colonel
Eugene A. SILVERTHORN,
U. S. Marine Corps

Inspector

Colonel Clay A. BOYD,
U. S. Marine Corps

Historian

Major John E. FAHEY,
U. S. Marine Corps

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq III MAF	159	331	10	6		
H&SCo III MAF	11	266		3		
29th Civil Affairs Co					30	88
III MAF	4564	68672	376	2685		

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PART TWO
SIGNIFICANT EVENTSI. INTRODUCTION.

A. GENERAL. During January III MAF Headquarters was located in East Danang, Republic of Vietnam. The average personnel strength for January was 77,201 an increase of 5,619 over the previous month.

B. ACTIVITIES. III MAF continued to be guided by COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966, in the pursuit of III MAF objectives for January.

II. OVERALL EVALUATION.

A. In January the number of small unit operations conducted by III MAF forces continued to reflect an increase over the totals for such operations for previous months. January small unit operations totaled 20,927 for the highest total of any single month since the arrival of U. S. Marine forces in Vietnam. This represents an increase of 7,297 over the average number of such operations conducted during the past three months period. This large increase continues to reflect the emphasis placed upon counterguerrilla operations by III MAF. This expansion of small unit operations resulted in 1109 contacts with the enemy. This was the highest number of contacts for a single month since August 1966. On these small unit operations 632 KIA (Confirmed) resulted. This also was a new high reflecting the highest total enemy KIA's realized on small unit operations since the arrival of U. S. Marine forces in Vietnam.

January's rate of VC/NVA captured, while not as high as December's, continued to remain at a high level. A total of 109 VC/NVA were captured during the month.

III. OPERATIONS.

A. DISCUSSION. During January III MAF continued to pursue three major objectives: 1. Destruction of Enemy Forces; 2. Revolutionary Development; 3. Base Defense.

(1) Destruction of enemy forces:

(a) During January III MAF conducted 8 major unit operations. Three of these; Prairie, Chinook and Sierra were continued from December. III MAF conducted 20,927

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small unit operations resulting in 1109 small unit contacts. III MAF forces, in all operations, inflicted 962 enemy KIA Confirmed and 1238 enemy KIA Probables.

(b) There were 354 infantry battalion days of operation recorded by III MAF forces in January. This total compares with 351 infantry battalion days in December and 305 in November.

(2) Revolutionary Development:

(a) The 20,927 small unit operations (patrols, ambushes, clearing) saturated areas of guerrilla activity in support of ICTZ Revolutionary Development. Of the 8 major unit operations conducted in the period, 4 were within TAOR's in areas of substantial guerrilla activity. These operations inflicted damaging blows to the Viet Cong's ability to restrict the progress of revolutionary development operations.

(b) There were 13 County Fair operations in January in areas made secure by III MAF operations. These operations resulted in 12 VC KIA (confirmed), 9 PW VC, 85 Detainees, 1 weapon captured and 8,351 Vietnamese Civilians were screened. MEDCAP assistance was provided to 1,496 Vietnamese during the operations.

(3) Base Defense: The 1st Military Police Battalion continued to provide security for the Danang Air Base Complex. At Chu Lai, the Chu Lai Defense Command performed this function. The small unit operations mentioned in paragraph (1) above contributed greatly to the accomplishment of base defense in all TAOR's.

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

A. PRAIRIE. During the period 1-31 January 1967 Operation PRAIRIE continued in Quang Tri Province with light contact. During this period action was characterized by Company, Platoon and Squad size patrols. At 051245H Co M/3/4 patrol located an enemy strong point containing 60 fighting holes and 6 mortar positions. Area plotted for H&I fires. At 051515H Air Observer called artillery mission on a group of VC resulting in 6 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 2 VC KIA (Probable). At 071515H Air Observer observed 20 NVA, called in artillery mission resulting in 1 NVA KIA (Confirmed). At 071510H patrol from Co E/2/3 found 1 M-1 Rifle, 1 grenade launcher sight, and 1500 lbs of rice. At 082030H a recon patrol observed 15 NVA, called in artillery resulting in 8 NVA KIA (Confirmed) and 3 NVA KIA (Probable). At 111125H 3d Platoon, Co E/2/3 observed 2 NVA, fired small arms resulting in 2 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 2 AK-47's, 7 magazines, 6 ChiCom grenades and assorted equipment and food captured. At 130835H Co K/3/4 received probe by estimated 12 VC firing small arms, returned small arms, 3 VC KIA (Confirmed), 1 VC KIA (Probable), 1 AK-47, 1 K-50 Burp Gun and 1 B-40 captured. At 170245H Co M/3/4 received 100-150 rounds of mortar fire. On 21 January a squad combat patrol from Co E/2/3 found 1400 lbs of rice. On 23 January while a helicopter was lifting from a landing zone 1 VC was observed sitting in the brush. VC was taken under fire by helicopter crew chief with an M-16, 1 VC KIA (Probable). On 24 January, 3d Recon Battalion patrol observed 14 NVA in vicinity (YD 025608), all well armed. Patrol called in artillery resulting in 10 NVA KIA (Confirmed) and 4 NVA KIA (Probable). On 26 January a recon team made contact with an estimated 35 VC in vicinity (XD 672529). Reaction force inserted at 2030H. On 27 January at 0715H heavy enemy contact was made with an estimated VC Company. At 0830H emergency extraction commenced and was completed at 0930H. Final results of this engagement was 10 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 290850H Co G/2/3 found 94 kegs of TNT in vicinity (YD 111406). 89 kegs were destroyed in place and the remainder forwarded to 3d Marine CP. At 312400H, 3d Marine Division terminated Operation PRAIRIE which began on 3 August 1966. During this period of 1,073 battalion days of operation there were 14,228 helicopter sorties and 5,190 tactical air sorties flown, 223 Naval Gunfire missions and 33,330 artillery missions provided. Final results of this multi-battalion search and destroy operation were: USMC: 225 KIA, 1159 WIA, 1 MIA; Enemy: 1397 KIA (Confirmed), 1713 KIA (Probable), 7 PW/NVA, 20 PW/VC, 1105 Detainees, 64 Innocent Civilians, 10 Civil Defendants and 248 weapons captured.

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B. CHINOOK. During the period 1-31 January 1967, Operation CHINOOK continued in Thua Thien Province with light contact. Small unit operations comprised the bulk of the offensive actions. At 021930H Co H/2/26 ambush observed 2 VC, fired small arms resulting in 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 051115H, Co K/2/26 sweep of a village found 2500 lbs of rice, 1200 lbs in bags labeled USAID. At 111025H a Sniper Team observed 2 VC, fired small arms resulting in 1 VC KIA (Probable). At 131125H, Co I/3/26 OP observed 6 VC, called in artillery resulting in 6 VC KIA (Probable). At 141225H, Co L/3/26 platoon patrol found 2 fresh graves, 2 NVA KIA (Confirmed). At 141410H Co I/3/26 OP observed 6 VC, fired small arms and M-79 and called in artillery resulting in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 190815H, Co M/3/26 observed 25 VC, called in 81mm Mortars and artillery resulting in 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 240830H, Co M/3/26 received fire from an estimated 45 VC in vicinity of (YD 545291). VC broke contact and were pursued resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed). On 26 January, Co K/3/26 found a 250 lb bomb rigged as a booby trap with a pull pressure type device. EOD personnel destroyed the bomb in place. At 271645H a recon patrol observed 42 VC in vicinity of (YD 463255), called in artillery mission and air strike resulting in 20 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 20 KIA (Probable). Cumulative results for this operation were: USMC: 14 KIA, 163 WIA; Enemy: 218 KIA (Confirmed), 410 KIA (Probable), 687 Detainees, 5 PW/VC, 10 Civil Defendants, 564 Innocent Civilians and 48 weapons captured.

C. SIERRA. During the period 1-21 January 1967, Operation SIERRA continued in Quang Ngai Province with very light contact. The operation was characterized by platoon and squad size patrols. There were numerous artillery missions utilized during this period. Small unit contacts plus the artillery accounted for all the enemy casualties. Friendly losses resulted from a variety of booby traps, sniper and mortar fire. At 161700H, Co G, sqd patrol found 2 grass huts containing 18 weapons, assorted weapon parts and a small cache of ammunition. During the complete period of this operation, which was terminated on 21 January 1967, a total of 537 artillery missions and 33 Naval Gunfire missions were fired. 99 tactical air sorties were flown. Cumulative results for Operation SIERRA were: USMC: 10 KIA, 50 WIA; Enemy: 111 KIA (Confirmed), 71 KIA (Probable), 10 PW/VC, 30 Civil Defendants, 66 Detainees, 1 Returnee/NVA, 6 Returnee/VC, 13 Innocent Civilians and 30 weapons captured.

D. LINCOLN. During the period 5-9 January 1967, Operation LINCOLN was conducted in Quang Nam Province in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR. Contact during the entire operation was light. Company size search and destroy operations characterized this operation. At 061100H Co G/2/5 destroyed one M-16A1

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Bouncing Betty type mine. At 061100H Co F/2/5 observed 8 VC who appeared to be setting up a heavy weapon. Fired small arms and called in artillery, 2 VC KIA (Probable). At 070800H, Co G/2/5 received 1 grenade from 2 VC, returned small arms fire, 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). On 7 January Company G/2/5 sweep of village found 3 tons of rice. At 081400H Co F/2/5 received heavy small arms fire from estimated VC squad, returned small arms and M-79 fire and called in an artillery mission, resulting in 6 VC KIA (Probable). During this operation there were 40 artillery missions fired in support. Cumulative results for Operation LINCOLN were: USMC: 5 WIA; Enemy: 1 VC KIA (Confirmed), 8 VC KIA (Probable), 1 PW/VC, 2 Detainees and 1 Weapon.

E. CLEVELAND. During the period 24-25 January 1967, Operation CLEVELAND was conducted in Quang Nam Province in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR. There was no contact with enemy forces during this operation. There were 2 Marine casualties resulting for a punji pit and a mine detonation, both were MEDEVAC. At 211640H, Co F/2/4 found 1 105mm Dud and an enemy bunker, both were destroyed. Cumulative results for Operation CLEVELAND were: USMC: 2 WIA; Enemy: None

F. TUSCALOOSA. During the period 24-28 January 1967, Operation TUSCALOOSA was conducted in Quang Nam Province in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR with significant contact. The operation was characterized by company, platoon and squad size actions. At 251300H Co F/2/5 observed 6 VC, fired small arms, resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 261150H and AO observed VC mortar position manned by 3 VC and called in an air strike resulting in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 261700H a platoon from Co H/2/5 was sent to assist Co F/2/5 then under a heavy volume of fire, VC unit was attacked from the rear resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 261755H Co's F and H 2/5thMar and a sparrow hawk with tank unit continued to advance to the west. An enemy force, estimated to be 1 battalion was observed. Air strikes, artillery and 90mm tank fire was called in. By 1830H heavy contact subsided to light sporadic small arms fire. There were 79 tactical air sorties and 43 artillery missions provided for this operation. Cumulative results for Operation TUSCALOOSA were: USMC: 17 KIA, 52 WIA; Enemy: 79 KIA (Confirmed), 64 KIA (Probable), 2 Detainees, and 17 weapons captured.

G. DESOTO. During the period 26-31 January 1967, Operation DESOTO began in the southern section of Quang Ngai Province in the vicinity of Duc Pho. During this period contact was light to moderate. At 271530H Naval Gunfire Spot team called in 11 rounds of 5"/38 naval gunfire on 5 VC in a trench. An Aerial Observer confirmed 1 VC KIA. At 290915H a recon patrol called in an air strike resulting in 7 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 11 VC KIA (Probable). At 291055H Co K/3/7 squad patrol called naval gunfire mission of 20 rounds on a group of VC, resulting in 5 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 8 VC KIA (Probable). At 0900H, 30 January Co M/3/7 observed 1 VC on

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on river bank, fired 20 rounds of small arms, resulting in 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 301040H, Co M/3/7 during search of a hamlet found an M-79 booby trap, 1 dud 81mm Mortar round, 500 lbs of cut shrapnel metal, 700 lbs of large cut metal and 3 metal molds. All destroyed in place. At 311545H Naval Gunfire spotter observed 6 reinforced bunkers and 1 .50 caliber machine gun emplacement, directed 88 rounds of naval gunfire onto the positions and all were destroyed. At 312200H 3/7 CP received arms fire and a mortar attack. Co L/3/7 security for the CP received a heavy probe from an estimated 20 VC. VC fired approximately 500 rounds of small arms and 3 to 5 rifle grenades. Perimeter defense returned approximately 1000 rounds of small arms fire and repelled the attack. At the same time 3/7 CP received 40 rounds of mortar fire, believed to be 82mm. Thus far in the operation, 63 tactical air sorties, 96 Naval Gunfire missions and 70 artillery missions have been provided. Cumulative results for this period were: USMC: 11 KIA, 61 WIA; Enemy: 37 KIA (Confirmed), and 47 KIA (Probable).

G. TRINITY. During the period 30 January- 1 February 1967, Operation TRINITY was conducted by the 1stBn, 7thMar in coordination with the 2dBn, 2d Bde, ROKMC in Quang Ngai Province. Contact during the entire operation was light. The operation was characterized by company sized patrols. At 301830H Co C/1/7 in a blocking position observed 7 VC, fired small arms, 60mm mortars and M-79 resulting in 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 011015H Co G/2/7 observed 5 VC and received fire. Small arms fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 011121H Co G/2/7 made contact with VC, 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). Final results for this operation were: USMC: 6 WIA; Enemy: 3 KIA (Confirmed), 3 PW/VC, 3 Detainees, and 3 weapons captured.

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IV. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY SITUATION.

A. General Enemy Situation. During the month of January the enemy centered his major effort in three separate areas within the I Corps Tactical Zone. He energetically maintained his screening and reconnaissance asset south of the DMZ through a gradual reinforcement of this activity. Intelligence information further suggested a moderate increase, during the latter part of January, in the infiltration of small groups of NVA south into the northern provinces. Southeastern Quang Nam including the Danang TAOR saw a continuation of a substantial enemy effort in attempting to gain control of a high population and food producing region. Further to the south considerable enemy activity was noted southwest of the Chu Lai TAOR and several sources of intelligence indicated the possibility of enemy attack against isolated outposts, security elements and other units located at more remote points in the eastern half of the province. Elsewhere in I CTZ enemy activity consisted of limited harassing action against small and isolated ARVN, RF/PF and Allied units which were, for the most part, located along the LOC. Available intelligence further indicated an enemy facing fairly serious morale problems, an increasing inability to adequately replace personnel losses and rather serious food supply shortages.

B. Quang Tri Province and the DMZ. For the month of January the enemy continued to avoid any major ground action against ARVN and U. S. units deployed in the northern portion of Quang Tri. Throughout the period the enemy engaged in rather extensive and well dispersed small unit reconnaissance south of the DMZ. To this extent, there was a moderate increase in the number and size of contacts made with the enemy particularly over the period 8-28 January. In addition, and with the advent of good weather in combination with an increasing need for personnel replacement to the south, it appears that the enemy has stepped up his attempts at infiltration of small groups of NVA into the northern provinces.

Between 22 and 28 January the enemy initiated a series of short probing and harassing actions, the majority of which were centered in the northeastern portion of the province south of and just within the DMZ. Although of relatively short duration, these attacks in toto represented a cumulative increase in this type of enemy action which when compared to November and December. The latter activity was focused in the general area north of Gio Linh (YD 191739).

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Aerial photographic coverage of the northeast sector by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing over 23 January revealed no significant increase in enemy ground activity when compared to missions covering the same area flown on 21 December. Over the period 15-21 January there was a rise in enemy activity in eastern coastal Quang Tri. Action in this sector culminated in company sized VC units making a series of short attacks against ARVN, PF and RD elements in the vicinity of Trieu Phong (YD 3457). ARVN reacted rapidly and substantial casualties were inflicted on the VC. Subsequent interrogation of a VC captured in the latter action revealed his unit as the 808th Main Force Battalion, a unit carried by III MAF as normally operating in this coastal area.

Low level agent reports covering Northern Quang Tri continued to point toward VC plans for the eventual improvement and up grading of local guerrilla organizations.

C. Thua Thien Province and the Phu Bai TAOR. Over the month there was a moderate decrease in enemy activity in the eastern portion of the province, especially along Highway 1. Although the enemy continued platoon and occasional company sized attacks against LOC and other more isolated RF and PF elements within the coastal region, there was a decrease in the size and intensity of his actions.

Operation CHINOOK continued through the period and most of the activity noted in this locale (YD 5330) was generated more by our own actions rather than by the enemy. There was a distinct decrease in the number of reconnaissance sightings reported from points south of CHINOOK when compared to December and the latter part of November. On the other hand there was a gradual rise in enemy activity south of the Phu Bai TAOR commencing 15 January and leveling off toward the end of the period. Intelligence information acquired from captured VC and enemy document translation coming from the Operation CHINOOK area revealed the possible presence of elements of the 804th Main Force Battalion. As an example, a VC captured by a patrol from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion in the vicinity of (YD 903997) stated that he was to have been a replacement for the 804th Battalion. Along with 10 others in an infiltration group he had moved into RVN about 25 days before his capture on 18 January. Additional information obtained from returnees and captives placed the possible location of the Headquarters of the 6th Regiment at (YD 5521) and the 802nd Battalion at (YD 5723).

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Southeast Thua Thien remained relatively quiet and nothing of major significance was reported between Danang and Phu Bai.

D. Quang Nam Province and the Danang TAOR. In Quang Nam the enemy effort remained centered within the southern portion of the Danang TAOR. The first week of the month saw a dropping off of VC action which was probably attributed to the heavy rain and stand down period during the last of December. For the remainder of January the enemy gradually increased both the tempo and intensity of his effort. From 8 through 28 January there was a sharp rise in the incidence of enemy use of mines and booby traps; over 30 percent of the VC initiated incidents recorded within the TAOR involved the use of these devices. Furthermore, there was an increase in the size of individual enemy elements in contact with our forces, these grew from rather small one to three VC teams to a greater number of elements numbering 4 to 15 VC per group.

On 15 January a platoon from Company M, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines was assaulted by an estimated VC company at (BT 051691). A captured VC taken during the engagement was identified as a North Vietnamese and purportedly a member of a company of the V.75 Mortar Battalion, a Unit new to the Danang TAOR. Although unconfirmed, this intelligence information again suggests utilization of main force assets within an environment normally thought more apropos for the guerrilla.

For the entire month one focus of enemy activity has been a concentration of effort in the general area east of the Thuong Duc CIDG Camp and into the western edge of the Danang TAOR. CIDG patrols in the vicinity of the camp came in contact over the month, with squad and platoon sized enemy elements ending with significant contact on 22 January where a CIDG patrol in close pursuit of an enemy group, numbering 30 to 50 VC, drove the enemy into the open at (ZC 205545). An AO on station called in air and 44 VC KIA (Confirmed) resulted. Marine reconnaissance in the same vicinity also reported numerous sightings for the month. This particular sector has been active for the entire month.

Operation TUSCALOOSA in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR (AT 9651) made significant contact with the enemy. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines encountered what was tentatively identified as the R.20 Battalion and one local force company; heavy action ensued. Enemy casualties to 27 January were 79 KIA (Confirmed) and 64 KIA (Probable).

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Moderate sightings were reported from south of the TAOR by ground reconnaissance. Though down from December, the enemy still remain active in this portion of Quang Nam. During the early part of January the enemy stepped up his harassing actions in southeastern Quang Nam; such activity continued to be directed at isolated ARVN and RF/PF security elements particularly those along Highway 1.

E. Quang Tin Province and the Chu Lai TAOR. Enemy activity in eastern Quang Tin has, for the most part, continued at a low level over the period. The exception was the week 8-14 January when a substantial increase in enemy initiated incidents involving attacks and sabotage were reported. This activity was centered at two locations. One, in the north along Highway 1, and in proximity to the Quang Nam/Quang Tin Border, the other to the south between Tam Ky City and the northern boundary of the Chu Lai TAOR. The sector northwest of the Chu Lai TAOR also represented an area of small scale harassing action and of moderate sightings reported by Marine reconnaissance deployed in the area. On 14 January, a PF platoon manning an OP south of the Thien Phouc CIDG camp, was overrun. The enemy was estimated as a possible multi-company force. Two reaction forces, one on the same day of the attack and one the following day, were ambushed approximately two kilometers southwest of the OP. Friendly elements were extracted after suffering heavy casualties.

Low level agent reports covering eastern Quang Tin indicated that the 72nd VC Battalion was located in an area 5 to 10 kilometers northwest of Tam Ky City.

The second week of January also saw an increase in the number of VC initiated incidents within the Chu Lai TAOR. On 13 January at (BT 440084), 2d Battalion, 11th Marines positions were attacked by an estimated VC company. A VC captured during this action subsequently identified the enemy unit as the 70th Company, 409th Sapper Battalion. Enemy casualties were 17 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 4 KIA (Probable) along with seven VC captured.

Low level agent reports covering central Quang Tin have, in most cases, produced little of significance. With the exception of the VC activity described above the remainder of the province was relatively quiet.

F. Quang Ngai Province. Commencing with 8 January and for the remainder of the month enemy activity in eastern Quang Ngai increased sharply over the month of December. There

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was considerable activity reported from the general southwest of the Chu Lai TAOR and southeast of the Tra Bong CIDG Camp. Heavy ground reconnaissance in the vicinity of (BS 4080) reported substantial sightings of VC; well over 1000 individual VC observed for the period 8-28 January. Most of the enemy foot traffic was observed moving in an easterly or westerly direction. Additional sightings accomplished by AO's, FO's and several OP's along a north-south line between (BS 5488) and (BS 5476) likewise reported sizeable sightings. CIDG patrols southeast and northeast of the Tra Bong and Ha Thanh Camps reported enemy movement and several contacts with both squad and platoon sized enemy elements.

On 10 January the 7th Company, 3d Battalion, Korean Marine Brigade, was attacked by an estimated VC battalion at (BS 545868); heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. On 15 January the 236th RF Company, while deployed in night defensive positions in the vicinity of Son Ha (BS 388665), was attacked by an estimated VC company. Mortar fire preceded the attack and friendly casualties were heavy. This location is directly south of the Ha Thanh CIDG Camp.

Low level agent reports and interrogation results obtained from two ralliers now place the 21st NVA Regiment in an area about 10 to 15 kilometers northeast of the Ha Thanh Camp. Additional agent reports, though unconfirmed, have moved subordinate units of the 1st VC Regiment to locations east and south of Ha Thanh. On 27 January, a CIDG patrol northeast of Ha Thanh at (BS 427755) observed an estimated two company VC force. On 24 January approximately five kilometers southwest of Ha Thanh patrols gained contact with separate groups of the enemy, one of which numbered approximately 40 VC.

Finally, a rallier from the 409th Sapper Battalion stated that one company of this unit was with the 1st VC Regiment at its current location, another company was within the Chu Lai TAOR in southeastern Quang Tin, and the remaining companies at (BS 6436). With exception of one company in the Chu Lai TAOR the remainder of this information is unconfirmed.

An analysis of all available intelligence concerning the area southwest of the Chu Lai TAOR reflects a continuing possibility of enemy attack. Such would occur when most opportune to the enemy and probably would be directed against isolated outposts and security elements, as well as other units in the area. Enemy activity in the eastern coastal Quang Ngai area south of the Chu Lai TAOR consisted of attacks by platoon and occasional company sized elements against ARVN and RF/PF units located, for the most part, along Highway 1 through Mo Duc and the northern portion of Duc Pho Districts.

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Substantial contact was gained with the enemy during Operation SIERRA in the central portion of eastern Quang Ngai. Activity in the southern portion of the province during the latter part of the month consisted of relatively light probes against the Gia Vuc and Ba To CIDG Camps.

Low level agent reports covering eastern Quang Ngai placed enemy units in normally accepted operating areas. Other intelligence revealed nothing of significance from the western part of Quang Ngai Province.

G. New Enemy Tactics.

(1) On 8 January, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines while on a search and destroy mission uncovered a cache of rice in bags at (YD 575265). On top of the bags was an overturned "dishpan". Upon removing the pan, a snake was discovered under it. (G-2 Comment: Although this incident could have been unintentional, it also could have been VC initiated. This incident demonstrates the need for troops to be alert for booby traps of this nature).

H. Enemy Action Statistics.

(1) Facts pertaining to enemy activities in U.S. and Korean Marine operating areas including combat bases, for December and January are as follows:

	<u>Enemy Initiated Activity</u>	
	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Attacks	3	6
Ambush	4	1
Assault by Fire	1	34
Harassing Fire	562	557
Mine/Booby Traps	79	294
Sabotage	0	18
Terrorism	3	12
Anti-Aircraft Fire	<u>415</u>	<u>836</u>
Totals	1067	1758

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	<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	
	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
KIA (Conf)	628	962
KIA (Prob)	825	1238
Detainees	717	1371
NVA/PW	0	2
VC/PW	76	107
NVA/Returnees	0	0
VC/Returnees	1	17
Civil Defendants	0	145
Innocent Civilians	0	1093
Individual Weapons Captured	148	199
Crew Served Weapons Captured	4	5

I. Weather. From 1 through 12 January the weather was best characterized by a strong northeasterly flow which controlled the weather pattern throughout I Corps. Extensive cloudiness and occasional periods of rain and drizzle over the coastal lowlands and highlands created generally unfavorable conditions. On 15 January a backing of the flow aloft, in the first 5000 feet to the northwest, created a condition of decreasing cloudiness and increased visibility with less rain in the piedmont and lowland. By 23 January an inverted trough built up northeast of I Corps and again created conditions of light rain, drizzle and fog along most of the coastal lowland. Visibility was restricted and the highlands remained almost totally obscured. On 24 January the flow of air aloft weakened, causing a general diffusion of the weather picture at lower altitudes. This condition then continued to improve through the remainder of the month. Weather data for the period is as follows:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature (Average Degrees)				
High:	66	66	71.2	71
Low:	59	58.7	63	64.7
Rainfall (Total inches):	7.06	16.56	10.2	24.8

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Visibility (Average miles)	5.2	4.2	5.7	5.7
Winds (Average knots)	8.7	7	7.2	9.5

J. Enemy Order of Battle.

(1) Changes to Confirmed and Probable Units.

(a) The following units have been accepted as confirmed in the III MAF Order of Battle as of 312400 Jan67:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
14th Co	Quang Tin	90	Confirmed
1506 EngrBn	Quang Ngai	330	Confirmed

(b) The following units have been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 312400 Jan67:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
K.3 Co	Quang Tri	100	Confirmed

(c) The strength of the 324th B NVA Division is estimated to be at 100 percent, i.e., 9,600.

(2) Enemy Unit Recapitulation as of 31 January.

Confirmed

1 Military Region Hq
 1 Military Sub-Region Hq
 2 Division Hq
 8 Regiment Hq
 35 Infantry Battalions
 13 Other Battalions
 30 Separate Companies

Probable

1 Regiment Hq
 1 Battalion
 6 Separate Companies

(3) Comparison of December/January Estimated Enemy Strength in I CTZ.

	<u>As of 31 Dec</u>	<u>As of 31 Jan</u>
Confirmed VC/NVA Units	25,160	29,230

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Probable VC/NVA Units	1,450	1,075
Guerrillas	<u>20,583</u>	<u>20,641</u>
Totals	47,193	50,946

K. Counterintelligence.

(1) Propaganda and Subversion. Propaganda and subversive activity continued to show a slight increase as previously reported during December 1966. Propaganda in the form of lectures were delivered to Vietnamese Nationals in order to subvert them to the VC cause. Additionally, leaflets found were directed at Allied and ARVN Forces in an attempt to degrade the U. S. and/or create subversion within the military ranks.

(2) Terrorism. There was an increase in terrorist activities during the reporting period which was directed at Vietnamese village and hamlet officials. Significant was one assassination and one kidnapping carried out in Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, which was the first such report received since May 1966. It is noted that Marine units moved to this area during November 1966.

(3) Espionage and Sabotage. The month of January showed a sharp decline in the number of sabotage incidents. Of those incidents reported, all were directed at the lines of transportation, i.e. bridges and culverts. Reports of VC using low level agents to collect intelligence information continued. The reports implied the continued use of female agents who act as prostitutes and intice U. S. Servicemen to reveal information of military value.

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V. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. CASUALTIES. III MAF casualties are shown in Table IX:

TABLE IX1. Battle

<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
108	10	1044	69	11	1	0	0

2. Non-Battle

<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
23	0	214	2

B. SPECIAL SERVICES.1. Shows:

(a) Professional football players Don Meredith, quarterback from the Dallas Cowboys; Larry Wilson, halfback from the St. Louis Cardinals; and Dick Bass, halfback from the Los Angeles Rams visited I Corps 29-31 January 1967.

2. China Beach:

(a) General. NSA has assumed the responsibility for maintenance and operations of the facilities at China Beach. All construction started by III Marine Amphibious Force has been completed. However, NSA is working on additional structures for clubs at the beach.

(b) Amphitheater. The amphitheater has been completed, including dressing rooms, seats and a projection booth. Movies are shown to R&R personnel each evening when weather permits.

3. Chu Lai: The priority list for construction of recreation facilities at Chu Lai has been received from the 1st Marine Division. Copies will be forwarded to Naval Construction Regiment for action on the projects.

4. Recreation Area(Hill 327):

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(a) Indoor Theater. The shell is about 95 percent completed. An engineer from Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service (A&AFMPS) will inspect the structure on 4 February 1967 to evaluate the feasibility of installation of projector equipment. When the building has been accepted, a request will be made to air ship the equipment from Japan.

Theater seats are being manufactured in Hong Kong and should be finished about 15 February 1967 at which time they will be air shipped to Danang. Estimate for the opening date of the theater is about 15 March 1967.

(b) Library. The shell is about 75 percent completed. Some furniture is available, however, the majority of the internal equipment including metal book shelves will not arrive until the end of February. A few sets of encyclopedias for the library have arrived; other books have been shipped. Latest estimate of the opening of the library is 1 March 1967.

(c) Gymnasium. Initial layout and grading has commenced. The buildings are available but considerable grading will be required at the gym site due to its location on the hill.

(d) Hobby Shop. Two buildings are being erected. Arrangements are being made to obtain photo processing, ceramics, and small woodworking equipment as a starter.

(e) Bowling Alley. A purchase order has been let for the 20 lane bowling alley. Grading and layout has been completed, and the buildings are available (3 Butler-type structures). The critical item is the air conditioner which has been ordered but no shipping documents have been received. Details for constructing bowling alleys are quite elaborate. For example, before technicians install the alleys the concrete must have cured for 5 weeks and the air conditioner must have been in operation for about 3 weeks. It takes about 45 days using 6 personnel to complete the alleys after arrival of the equipment at the site. No accurate estimate of completion date can be made, but a rough estimate would be sometime in late May or June.

(f) Beer Garden. The beer garden has been completed, including concrete patio. It will open as soon as arrangements with the Exchange Officer are completed.

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(g) Handball Courts. The handball courts (2) are about 90 percent completed. Estimate for opening the courts is 15 February 1967.

(h) Bandstand. The bandstand has been completed and is ready for use. Force Special Services will coordinate requests for the bandstand.

(i) New Red Cross Hut. The new building is about 95 percent complete. An additional billiard table has been ordered and 2 table tennis tables are available for the new structure. The renovation of the old Red Cross building is complete. The Red Cross facilities will be adequate to handle all the planned programs.

5. R&R Program (Out-of-Country):

(a) The following are the statistics of the total III MAF R&R usage for each out-of-country R&R site:

1 Corps

TABLE X

Bangkok	1400
Hong Kong	1313
Singapore	418
Manila	379
Okinawa	394
Taipei	1341
Kuala Lumpur	458
Hawaii	1196
Tokyo	1256
Total:	<u>8155</u>

O. CHAPLAIN.

1. 6-15 January - Captain E. V. LYONS, Jr., CHC, USN accompanied Colonel R. R. READ to 8th Army Headquarters in Korea to observe the program of troop - community relations carried on in that Command.

2. 9-10 January - The Reverend Ruben YOUNGDAHL, Pastor Mt. Olive Lutheran Church of Minneapolis, Minnesota, largest Lutheran Congregation in the United States visited the Command for the purpose of meeting with the Lutheran Chaplains serving in III MAF and visiting Civic Action Projects. Pastor YOUNGDAHL was entertained at Dinner on 9 January by the Chief of Staff.

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3. 25-26 January - Bishop Angie SMITH, President of the Methodist Commission of Chaplains and the Armed Forces, and Bishop of Oklahoma, New Mexico and West Texas, visited the Command for the purpose of meeting Methodist Chaplains serving in I Corps and to visit Civic Action Projects. Bishop SMITH was entertained at Dinner on 25 January by the Commanding General.

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VI. LOGISTICS.

A. The most significant factor affecting our logistic effort in the past month has been the continuation of the northeast monsoon; rainfall during January greatly exceeded the average. In spite of the poor weather, tonnage moved by air increased over the past reporting period. Coastal shipping however, proved more difficult, particularly to the northern I Corps ports. Shallow draft coastal shipping was unable to move for 10 days during the month. Adverse weather also affected our Engineer effort in that engineer operations were primarily directed at the maintenance of land routes of communications and keeping them in a passable condition despite the heavy rainfall. Although adverse weather did degrade our capabilities to move supplies and equipment, adequate stock levels were successfully maintained at all logistic support facilities.

B. Dental.

(1) Dental Civic Action was conducted in the Republic of Vietnam by III MAF Dental Companies during the period 1-31 January 1967:

Patients treated - 3,897
Dental Procedures - 7,494

(2) The Force Dental Officer conducted the monthly meeting of the Commanding Officers of III MAF Dental Companies on 20 January 1967. Discussions pertaining to dental matters in I Corps Tactical Zone were held.

C. Embarkation.

(1) During the month 61 MSTs and 28 U. S. Navy ships debarked/embarked cargo and/or personnel at Danang and 39 LSTS and 1 deep draft ship moored at Chu Lai.

(2) Surface operations along the coast and in Danang Harbor were curtailed for 10 days during the month, due to the adverse weather conditions. Weather conditions also halted air operations into Khe Sanh for a total of 7 days.

(3) Surface cargo throughout for the month was as follows:

	<u>S/T</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>M/T</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>	
				<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
Danang	138,873	238,299	4,480	7,687	
Chu Lai	37,621	58,367	1,214	1,883	

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Dong Ha	6,038	10,799	195	348
Hue/Phu Bai	4,348	7,500	142	242

(4) Fixed Wing Airlift (in cargo pounds) during the month in support of USMC forces was as follows:

	USAF A/C		USMC A/C		TOTAL	
	Cargo	Pax	Cargo	Pax	Cargo	Pax
To Danang (from ICTZ)			2,021,800	7,905	2,021,800	7,905
To Chu Lai	639,018	194	2,134,800	7,338	2,773,818	7,532
To Phu Bai	468,560	200	1,673,000	7,194	2,141,560	7,394
To An Hoa	1,216,685	28				
To Khe Sanh	179,110		1,479,600	733	1,658,710	733
To Dong Ha	794,189	30	1,514,600	5,792	2,308,798	5,822
To Qui Nhon				132		132
TOTAL:	3,297,562	452	8,823,800	29,094	12,121,362	29,546

(5) Retrograde shipments for the month were as follows:

RVN to Okinawa	-	1589 S/T Cargo and Vehicles
RVN to Subic Bay	-	18 S/T Cargo
RVN to Japan	-	189 S/T Cargo and Vehicles
RVN to Japan	-	4 CH-46H Helicopters
		1 CH-34D Helicopter
RVN to CONUS	-	14 Tanks

(6) The USNS WALKER debarked 2038 personnel on 25 January 1967 for the January replacement draft.

(7) The 11th Motor Transport Bn, 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Company, VMO-3, HMM-463, BLT 2/4 and HMM-362 arrived in-country during the month of January. BLT 3/9 and HMM-363 were rotated out of country on U. S. Navy Shipping.

(8) The USNS GAFFEY debarked 170 ROK Marine Corps personnel replacements at Danang and embarked 130 ROK Marines rotating to Korea.

D. Engineer.

(1) The continuation of the northern monsoon during January 1967 and sporadic enemy interdictions, (11 bridges and culverts were successfully attacked), forced the emphasis on engineer operations to remain primarily on maintaining land routes of communication in a passable condition. Once

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again many of the roads became extremely muddy. However, most roads remained open.

(2) The significant events in chronological order during the month with regards to engineer operations are as follows:

- (a) 3 Jan - A 50' class 35 timber-pile bridge was constructed. Coordinates (BT 028732).
- (b) 5 Jan - Completed deliberate reconnaissance of Route 9. Coordinates (YD 241610 to YD 001452).
- (c) 12 Jan - A light tactical raft bridge was installed. (Coordinates YD 985049).
- (d) 13 Jan - A 60' M6 fixed span was installed. (Coordinates XD 981543).
- (e) 14 Jan - A 75' M6 fixed span was installed. (Coordinates XD 981532).
- (f) 15 Jan - Completed deliberate reconnaissance of Route 1. (Coordinates YD 241610 to YD 205761).
- (g) 16 Jan - A 352' M4 flot bridge was installed. (Coordinates AT 989641).
- (h) 27 Jan - A 165' class 60 timber-pile bridge was constructed. (Coordinates AT 946700).

E. Fiscal.

- (1) Routine monthly reports relating to reduced piaster spending were submitted to COMUSMACV.
- (2) Published a Force Bulletin on U. S. Savings Bonds/Savings Deposit Program.
- (3) Received III MAF piaster ceiling from COMUSMACV for 1st Quarter FY-67.
- (4) Allocated 1st quarter FY-67 AIK funds to major commands as previously requested in their annual budgets.
- (5) Allocated 3d quarter FY-67 Project 01 (Community Relations) Funds to Commanding Generals of major commands.

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(6) Briefing given MACV and Component Command Comptrollers in Saigon on plaster spending reduction programs.

(7) Message sent to all major commands concerning paying of TET bonus to housemaids/houseboys.

(8) Requested additional project OI Community Relations Fund from CG, FMFPac.

F. Food Services.

(1) Visited FLC to discuss procurement and delivery of local produce for FLSG "B".

(2) FLSG "B" furnished a Food Service Instruction Team for approximately one month, to assist the ROK Marines in food preparation, sanitation, and maintenance of field messing equipment. It was recommended that this team be assigned for an additional month.

(3) On 20 January, the III MAF Subsistence Operational Analysis Report was submitted to Headquarters, Marine Corps for the month of December. The issue of "A" and "B" Rations totaled \$2,596,618.50. Total pounds of bread produced was 661,805. Total gallons of ice cream manufactured was 17,678. The number of messes in operation totaled 191.

G. Motor Transport.

(1) The 11th MT Bn arrived in the RVN on 10 January 1967 and was assigned under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division.

(2) The redistribution of M-76 Otter assets was accomplished during the month of January. The 1st Marine Division retained 31, the 3d Marines Division 15. Eleven of these vehicles were turned over to FLC for cannibalization.

(3) Ninety M51A2 multifuel dump trucks arrived in country this month. Eighty four of these vehicles were assigned to the 7th Engineer Bn, six to FLSG A, two to the maintenance float.

H. Ordnance.

(1) COMUSMACV requested that III MAF assume Class V

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support of U.S. Army 220th and 131st Aviation Companies, on a financial reimbursement basis. CG III MAF 150022Z Jan67 stated that the requested ground support could be provided, but on a non-reimbursable basis. It was requested that Headquarters, USARV make the necessary cross-service arrangements with CG, FLC, if the aforementioned support conditions were agreeable.

(2) CG III MAF 221050Z Jan67 established the following ASR's:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ASR</u>
B568	Ctg 40mm HE	1.2
C226	Ctg 81mm Illum	2.2
C444 (and subs)	Ctg 105mm HE	32
D544	Proj 155mm HE	17
L312	Sig Illum WSP	MarDiv 7.4/InfBn other .1/100 indiv
L495	Trip Flare	MarDiv 6/InfBn other .1/100 indiv

(3) CG III MAF 281304Z Jan67 in response to an FMFPac query regarding III MAF requirements for the CTG 40mm White Star parachute (B535) and the CTG 40mm White Star Cluster (B536), stated: "III MAF desires 100 percent allocation of the White Star Parachute because of its flexibility as a signal and illuminant. There is not a requirement in III MAF for the White Star Cluster".

(4) COMUSMACV 241240 Jan67 stated that complex technical production difficulties and high unit costs were being encountered in efforts to supply the M217 Fuze for the M26A2 point detonating hand grenade. COMUSMACV requested that III MAF reexamine its requirement for the M26A2 in view of the aforementioned difficulties and make an appropriate recommendation that would be considered in continuing or discontinuing production of the M217 fuze. CG III MAF 291006Z Jan67 stated that the dual functioning feature of the M217 fuze was highly desirable, but that any related decision must necessarily be made by CMC, because of the possible effects on total Marine Corps requirements for the M26A2 grenades and the ability of the Marine Corps to support higher unit costs.

(5) In response to the 3d Marine Division's request for guidance relative to Class V support of RVNAF, III MAF reemphasized and made applicable the policy previously applied to Class I: "Logistic support is a national responsibility

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Where governmental agreements include United States aid to other national forces, specific channels are established for provision of such support." III MAF further stated that Class V support required by RVNAF should be submitted to this Headquarters through IALC channels to permit full review of total I Corps assets and requirements, and, wherever possible, should be based on a program providing for replacement-in-kind.

(6) A shipment of 112 XM546 105mm Beehive rounds was received 24 January 1967 from USARV. These are the first 105mm Beehive rounds received by III MAF. The rounds were allocated to the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions in direct proportion to the number of 105mm Howitzers under the OPCON of each Division.

(7) The Force Ordnance Section is coordinating with G-3 and G-4 in the planning of the M-16 rifle phase-in, scheduled to begin in March. The first increment of 24,000 rifles will be used to equip the infantry and reconnaissance units during March, with follow-up shipments to be allocated to the remainder of III MAF in accordance with a priority to be established. Sufficient ammunition is presently available to support the initial increment of weapons.

(8) Extensive discussions were held during the month of January relative to the relocations and establishment of adequate Class V/V(A) storage in Danang and Chu Lai. A pressing requirement exists for coordinating the location of Marine Corps, Air Force, ARVN and VNAF Class V/V(A) assets in Danang. Base Development, NSA, FLC, and III MAF have been working with Air Force representatives toward this end.

I. Supply.

(1) Management control for the Marine Corps Red Ball program was transferred to CG, Force Logistics Command on 25 January. CG, III MAF continues to monitor this program and to submit monthly Red Ball reports to CG, FMFPac based on input data from the Force Logistics Command. Additionally, CG, III MAF continues to submit Navy Red Ball reports to CG, FMFPac.

(2) The following out of country trips/liaison were made:

(a) Force Supply Officer - To Tokyo, Japan to purchase a commercial 6,000 lb forklift truck for G-5, III MAF.

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(b) Assistant Force Supply Officer - To 3d Force Service Regiment, Okinawa, to discuss the phase-in of the M-16 rifle; discuss special handling of priority O2 requisitions; coordinate revision of requisition tracer procedures; review procedures for conducting quarterly obligation reconciliations; discuss continuation of MUMMS training for III MAF personnel and the ramifications of the slippage in the MUMMS implementation date.

(3) A III MAF Supply conference was held at Headquarters, Force Logistics Command on 18 January 1967.

(4) III MAF recommendation for allowances of disposable mess gear was submitted to CG, FMFPac on 12 January 1967. Usage data for this item was estimated at 300,000 sets per month.

(5) Complete III MAF inventories of M-14 rifle assets to include spare parts, and of individual equipment were conducted by CG, FMFPac.

(6) Recap of Red Ball during the month of January:

Total line items on Red Ball 1 Jan 1967	-	420
Total line items added during Jan 1967	-	134
Total line items deleted during Jan 1967	-	76
Total line items on Red Ball 31 Jan 1967	-	478

(7) The following Orders and Bulletins were published during the reporting period.

(a) Force Order 4030.1 was published to provide procedures to control the movement and return of Conex shipping containers.

(b) Force Order 4400.6 which provides for reporting unit locations by RUC numbers was published.

(c) Change 1 to Force Bulletin 4100 regarding the conservation of concertina, extended the self cancellation date to 30 April 1967.

(8) The following significant correspondence was released during the reporting period:

(a) CG, III MAF ltr 21/ecm 10120 of 9 January 1967 provided information to III MAF commands clarifying authority to issue lightweight utilities and tropical boots to CAC's.

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(b) CG, III MAF msg 091326Z Jan67 advised COMUSMACV that CG, FMFPac would have to approve proposals to increase issue of DMS boots.

(c) CG, III MAF ltr 21/ecm 4700 of 11 January 1967 provided special guidance to FLC regarding FRC-55 material.

(d) CG, III MAF msg 110546Z Jan67 requested permission from CG, FMFPac to deviate from MCO 4520.2 in handling of expended brass shell casings.

(e) CG, III MAG msg 150526Z Jan67 provides comment to COMUSMACV regarding new classes of supply proposed in CINCPACFLT 280431Z Dec66.

(f) CG, III MAF msg 150812Z Jan67 provided guidance to III MAF commands regarding acquisitions of individual clothing.

(g) CG, III MAF msg 161242Z Jan67 advised HQMC; FMFPac; MCLFDA Quantico; and FLC of difficulties regarding receipts of RDT&E material.

(h) CG, III MAF msg 200220Z Jan67 sent to III MAF commands prescribing stockage criteria in preparation for MUMMS conversion.

(i) CG, III MAF msg 230250Z Jan67 published change to III MAF 150812Z Jan67 regarding acquisition of individual clothing.

(j) CG, III MAF msg 231132Z Jan67 provided details of body armor shortage to CG, FMFPac.

(k) CG, III MAF msg 231152Z Jan67 submitted agenda items to CG, FMFPac for February Logistic Conference.

(l) CG, III MAF ltr 21/ecm 10120 of 24 January 1967 forwarded CG, FMFPac ltr to III MAF commands authorizing open purchase of special mess clothing.

(m) CG, III MAF msg 270634Z Jan requested FLC to procure 50 bottle fed electrically cooled water dispensers.

(n) CG, III MAF msg 270032Z Jan67 issued instructions to FLC and Divisions regarding disposition of Pallets w/cover for linear demo charges.

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(o) CG, III MAF ltr 21/ecm 4440 of 29 January 1967 requested CMC to provide III MAF with a copy of the Controlled Item Inventory Report.

(p) CG, III MAF msg 300736Z Jan67 required III MAF commands to report receipts of Body Armor to FSR and FMFPac.

(q) CG, III MAF msg 301400Z Jan67 established criteria for procedure to furnish minimum of 4,000 upper torso body armor to the rehabilitation program each month.

J. Surgeon.

(1) The total daily average patient load for the two Medical Battalions and 1st Hospital Company was 314, with a total of 2056 patients admitted, 340 patients were evacuated out of country and 1339 pints of whole blood expended to use.

(2) The 1st Hospital Company, Chu Lai is still admitting only medical type patients and had an average census of 79 for the month with length of patients stay per discharge of 4 days.

(3) 3d Medical Battalion. Elements of this Battalion are located as follows:

H&S Company	-	Phu Bai
Company A	-	Phu Bai
Company B	-	Phu Bai
Company C	-	Danang
Company D	-	Dong Ha

(4) 1st Medical Battalion. Elements of this Battalion are located as follows:

H&S Company	-	Danang
Company A	-	Danang
*Company B (-)	-	Danang
Company C	-	Chu Lai
Company D	-	Chu Lai

* Remainder of this Company in support of Operation DESOTO as of 28 January 1967

(5) Bed Capacities. Bed capacities by TAOR are as follows:

Dong Ha	-	25
Phu Bai	-	90
Danang	-	150

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Chu Lai (C&C Co) - 120
 Chu Lai (Hosp Co) - 100

(6) The USS REPOSE returned on station to support ICTZ on 3 January and was employed on the following schedule for the remainder of January:

Thursdays - At Dong Ha
 Fridays - At Phu Bai
 Saturdays,
 Sundays and
 Mondays - At Danang
 Tuesdays and
 Wednesdays At Chu Lai

The Naval Hospital aboard the USS REPOSE had an average census of 327 for the month with the length of patient stay per discharge of 22 days.

(7) The Medical Administrative Assistant to the Force Surgeon attended a seminar on Casualty Management on Okinawa presented by FMFPac from 10-14 January 1967.

(8) The Force Surgeon made two trips to Saigon, one to confer with the MACV Surgeon on medical matters, the other for a PacCom Medical Conference.

(9) The Force Surgeon attended, as Chairman, the I Corps Public Health meetings on 3, 17 and 31 January 1967.

(10) Statistics for the month of January for Marine patients hospitalized in other than I Corps Medical Facilities are as follows:

	<u>Average Census</u>	<u>Average Length of Patient Stay</u>
12th USAF Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay	55	15 days
6th Convalescence Center, Cam Ranh Bay	15	20 days

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VII. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. A slight increase in total message traffic through the III MAF Communication Center was noted during January. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
Incoming	41681	43822	
Outgoing	48585	47988	
Total	90266	91810	1544

B. Message traffic through the COC Communication Center showed a slight decrease during January. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>DECREASE</u>
Incoming	3306	4110	
Outgoing	4274	2936	
Total	7580	7046	534

C. Published emergency communications plan for circuit restoral in Danang area. This plan employs radio relay facilities installed in III MAF Water Tower. It provides emergency backup systems to 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistics Command, Naval Support Activity, and 5th Communication Battalion.

D. Correlated test information concerning the AC power supply for AN/PRC-25 radios. Recommendations forwarded to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

E. Reviewed proposed T/E changes for various organizations and submitted comments to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

F. Monitored program to equip 2nd Brigade ROKMC special company with AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-10 radios.

G. Monitored efforts to obtain spare parts for fixed plant teletype equipment.

H. Provided recommendations to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 for distribution of PU-392 Motor Generators.

I. Compiled data on present and projected density of AN/TRC-97 radios in country. Provided data to Force Logistic Command.

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J. Provided VIP communication services to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Army, Under Secretary of the Navy, Major General GOLDWATER, General Maxwell TAYLOR and General Dwight BEACH.

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VIII. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civil Affairs Program remained the same during the month of January.

B. I Corps Joint Coordinating Committee. The Council met five times during January.

(1) The Council was presented with a detailed briefing concerning the TET Chieu Hoi Campaign plan. TET is considered to be the most important holiday of the year and a time when families traditionally reassemble. Appeals will be made to families to encourage those members associated with the Viet Cong to rally to the side of the GVN. An effort will be made to point out the benefits to be gained by rallying, and the disadvantages of supporting the VC. Reception and care of returnees will be arranged by each province. Existing facilities are not adequate, therefore supplementary facilities must be set aside. Guidance on how to appeal to potential Chieu Hoi's was provided, but specific instruction on how to receive, process and retrain them are lacking. I Corps has not yet received instructions from Saigon regarding support it is to provide for the TET Chieu Hoi campaign, however, authorization has been given by ICTZ authorities to form a special committee to monitor and coordinate activities necessary to ensure successful execution of the TET Chieu Hoi campaign Plan in ICTZ.

(2) The Quang Nam Province Chief outlined the Province RD plan for CY 1967. Emphasis will be on quality, rather than quantity of accomplishments. Hamlets selected for consolidation and development as Real New Life have been carefully selected so that security will be assured throughout the program. 39 hamlets will be developed. 27 of these will be developed as Real New Life hamlets. 25 RD Cadre teams will be assigned to this program. 20 of the 39 hamlets are currently rated at 0% of development. The total population of the 39 hamlets is 66,925. 99,667,877\$VN has been requested as the RD budget. Only 61,579,400\$VN has been approved. The reduced budget will primarily affect the project areas of education, self-help, Public Works and Public Health. The committee was informed of the continuous problem which arises when budgeted funds are converted to local materials. The Saigon budget allocates funds for both materials and labor at local Saigon prices. Both material and labor are generally higher in Quang Nam Province. To secure more funds for the completion of any project requires a request to Saigon, which is generally approved in two or more months, causing the loss of valuable time and an untimely delay in the completion of projects. The committee

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was informed that the authority to transfer funds from one category to another is very limited.

(3) The Council agreed that many members of the Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams are insufficiently trained in technical aspects of completely developing a hamlet in accordance with plans. It was suggested that Province Technical Cadre conduct technical courses within each province. This would provide fundamental technical knowledge to the teams and acquaint them with the system whereby technical advice can be requested from higher authority.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. Five Committees of the I Corps Council met during January.

(1) Commodities Distribution Committee. The Committee received a report that OCO has C-46 cargo planes arriving frequently from Saigon. These planes could be used to carry cargo from Danang to points in the area. Use of the planes can be arranged through USAID Regional Office. Users should furnish their own laborers to load and unload planes. The committee also discussed the III MAF cement block making project at Red Beach. The project is operated by refugees and sponsored by the 7th Engineers. Using 3 CINVA-RAM block-making machines, the refugees turn out about 400 blocks of superior quality per day. The blocks are used by III MAF for Civic Action projects. Villagers work for two weeks then a new crew is used. It is hoped that a wide market for these blocks will develop and more machines will become available. The ARVN machine shops may be able to manufacture CINVA-RAM block-making machines and a local construction firm may be another prospect of obtaining one. CARE reported that 60 machines are on order from the USA and a local machinist is experimenting to see if the machines can be produced locally. The committee held a discussion of Food for Work projects using P.L.-480 commodities. The general intent of such projects is to assist the people in undertaking worthwhile community projects, and to insure that they actually work on such projects instead of receiving commodities and remaining idle.

(2) Education Committee. Of primary interest to the Education Committee was the progress of the Danang Poly-Technical refugee school. A total of 472 refugees have received vocational training through the program and a new class of 250 will soon convene. Training in Masonry and Plumbing will be added to the training courses now offered. Funding problems for the refugee program have been solved by additional funds from the Refugee Development program.

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(3) Public Health Committee. The trapping of rats declined during January. The weather was considered adverse to the program. A survey was conducted to determine if the reward of (100 grams of rice per rat) was sufficient. The adults claimed it was not, but the children who do most of the trapping, seemed satisfied. The committee considered giving incentives orientated toward children if the rate declined further. The trapping was later halted because of the appearance of 17 confirmed cases of plague. Tuberculosis has been detected among the children at the World Evangelization Conference Orphanage at China Beach. 115 children were given PPD tests and 37 were found positive. The 37 were X-rayed and 10 were confirmed cases. These children were isolated and treatment was started.

(4) Road Committee. The committee received a report on the availability of bridge-building material. 600 meters of 36" culvert have been requested. 6 sets of Eiffel bridge material ~~was~~ missing in shipping channels. 21 other sets of Eiffel bridging ~~was~~ sent from Saigon. Both the ARVN and USMC are interested in removing the float bridge from Than Quit. It was decided that the float bridge would be removed when the approaches are ready for a more permanent bridge. The committee was also informed that a OCO sawmill was planned for ICTZ and that ARVN could purchase lumber from the mill.

(5) Port Committee. The committee continued with plans to expand and improve the commercial Port of Danang. Construction on the project was already underway to extend the north end of the port 100 meters. Plans also are to enlarge warehouse door entrances and wire the area for lights to permit night operations. A new source of water supply has become available with the completion of an OCO dam at North Tien Sha. A training program is now underway for commercial ship pilots at Danang. This training will enable them to bring deep draft vessels alongside the NSA deep draft facility at Tien Sha.

D. Medical Assistance. Seventy-one MEDCAP teams operated in 249 locations and provided medical and dental assistance to 115,672 Vietnamese civilians. Fifty-four health workers received informal training during January.

E. CARE. During January CARE provided III MAF with 261 woodworking kits, 2500 school kits, 1600 sewing kits and miscellaneous building supplies.

F. Civil Affairs Summary.

(1) The III MAF Civic Action Program enjoyed an upswing after five months of recession. The number of persons

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receiving dental treatment reached the highest number recorded (6,424). This was an increase of 48.5% over December. Other indices of III MAF Civic Action are:

- (a) Medical Treatments to 102,322 people.
- (b) Soap Distribution - 4,810 lbs.
- (c) Clothing Distribution - 7,351 lbs.
- (d) Food Distribution - 101,535.

(2) A break in adverse weather during the month assisted in starting the upswing. Roadways dried sufficiently to permit the passage of MEDCAP and other Civic Action teams to pass through their areas of responsibility. The people are responding to the action of the teams. The total number of people receiving aid increased by 20% over the previous month.

(3) Projects were undertaken during the month to introduce new economic bases into several village/hamlet areas. These projects include organization of Farmers Associations and hog production. A planned Fishing project did not get underway during January. These projects are being pursued by sponsoring units and success is probable.

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IX. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

A. Chieu Hoi Campaign. 238 Chieu Hoi returnees rallied to U. S. and GVN agencies during the month of January. Although activities were hampered throughout the month by adverse weather conditions, the number of ralliers increased far above any previously reported monthly figure for the ICTZ. The majority of ralliers came from the provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai with the most significant increase in Quang Nam. This is believed to be due to a combination of weather conditions and military action in the area with the Chieu Hoi Program providing the escape.

The following is a breakdown of returnees by province for the month of January:

Quang Tri	-	8
Thua Thien	-	38
Quang Nam	-	84
Quang Tin	-	28
Quang Ngai	-	80

B. The Psychological Exploitation Team (POET). This team exploited 15 incidents during the month of January. From these incidents a total of 25 leaflets, 1 poster and four tapes were produced and disseminated.

C. Leaflets Produced within ICTZ. The 244th PSYOP Company printed 9,185,600 leaflets, 56,000 posters and 35,000 brochures during the month of January. Representative leaflets and posters developed for III MAF commands are contained in ANNEX (A).

D. The 1967 TET Campaign. This campaign began 1 January in accordance with a joint MACV/JUSPAO plan contained in MACV letter MACPD of 17 December 1966; "PSYWAR Campaign". The campaign is divided into four phases:

<u>PHASE</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>NO. LEAFLETS PROGRAMMED</u>
I	1 Jan - 4 Feb	13,500,000
II	5 Feb - 9 Feb	15,000,000
III	10 Feb - 13 Feb	
IV	14 Feb - 28 Feb	

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Plans for implementing a combined I Corps campaign were firmed up at a joint meeting on 30 December, covered by the III MAF PsyOps Officer, Colonel R. R. READ at the III MAF PsyOp Support Center (PSC). Representatives from the major III MAF Commands, I Corps POLWAR Officer, I Corps PSYWAR Advisor, C.O. 10th POLWAR Bn, Naval Advisory Group, and C.O. Flight "A" 5th ACS attended. As a result of the meeting targets were selected by ARVN and U. S. Commands and submitted to the III MAF PSC where they were plotted and aircraft of Flight "A" 5th ACS were scheduled to hit the targets with appropriate leaflets and aerial broadcasts. A total of 22,123,000 TET leaflets were dropped during phase I of the campaign on 108 targets and 15 hours and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made.

Banners, TET greeting cards and posters were printed by the 244th PsyOp Company and distributed to III MAF units through the PSC.

E. Air Operations.

(1) Leaflet Dissemination:

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NO./HRS. UNIT</u>	<u>**</u>
100	Leaflet	23,206,887	5th ACS
9	Aerial BDCST	30 hrs, 30 min,	5th ACS
UNKNOWN	Leaflet	1,000,000	1st MAW *

* Operation "Four Winds" dropped by aircraft on administration, logistic, etc. flights not a primary mission.

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NO./HRS. UNIT</u>
TOTAL	261	Leaflet	
I CORPS	87	Aerial BDCST	*48:15

** Includes support of III MAF units only.

Tactical I Corps Leaflet Drops	-	41,756,600
Aerial BDCST	-	48 hrs. 15 min.

F. Ground Operations.

(1). Total number of leaflets delivered by III MAF units: 585,000.

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(2) Total number of hours ground/waterborne loud-speaker broadcasts: U.S. Forces, 113 hours, 55 minutes.

(3) Total number of movies shown: 301

G. III MAF Monthly PsyOp Orientation Courses: The first orientation course was conducted 16-18 January with 20 students. This course is designed to provide battalion and regimental PsyOp personnel basic training in tactical PsyOp and provide information on the PsyOp support that is available from the 244th PsyOp Company and Flight "A" 5th ACS. The syllabus for this course is contained in ANNEX (A). The second course will be conducted during 15-17 February.

H. CG, III MAF directed his commanders to implement operation "Home Front" in a letter dated 28 January 1967. The purpose of the program is to expand and intensify ground psychological operations and the use of radio as a mass communication media. Details of this program are included in ANNEX (A).

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UNCLASSIFIEDX. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU.

A. Background. During January 1967, 307 escorted visits were accomplished by the Combat Information Bureau. The escorts covered major and small unit operations, civic action, the Combined Action Company program, hometowners, dog platoon and various other subjects in interest to the press. The Danang Press Center hosted 141 correspondents during the period.

B. Motor Transport. The station wagon was returned to us. One M-38 jeep was deadlined due to transmission difficulties and is at FLSGA for repair. One M-151 is deadlined awaiting spare parts. Then end of January found 4 jeeps, 1 PC and 1 station wagon operational.

C. Photography. During January 1967, the Press Center shot 17,760 feet of motion picture footage and forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03P) for processing. Of this, 24.9% was exposed on operations, 8.4% on Civic Action and 66.7% on miscellaneous. Operations covered was the search and destroy mission at Ban Than II and Chinook. Of special interest was the 4200 feet of film exposed on the Commandant's visit to Vietnam. Still production totaled 6,122 prints and 2,316 negatives.

D. Radio/Television. During this period, CIB made a total of 229 releases. This included 26 features and 203 Fleet Hometown interviews.

E. Escorts. During the month of January, 302 escorted visits were accomplished. Operations covered were PRAIRIE, CHINOOK and Tuscaloosa. Press Conferences reached a new high as 9 were held. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General KRULAK, Under Secretary of the Navy BALDWIN and Chief of Naval Operations were the VIP's interviewed by the Press. Naval Gunfire, members of a Marine Company raid, Lieutenant SILER, Recon Team Leader, and helicopter pilots extracting a Recon platoon were all subjects of press conference's at the Press Center. Marine Air was heavily emphasized during the month with First Wing A-4's at Chu Lai featured, a Navy Cross award, A-6 Intruder and CH-53A helicopter arrivals, plus the 10,000th combat sortie of VMA-311, received outside and internal press coverage. CAC's and Civic Action received feature coverage by both CBS and NBC plus Time and the New York Times. Reconnaissance work was covered by NBC and two networks covered the "CL-44 crash" village reconstruction. Notable Media

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representatives and VIP's who visited the CDB during the month included: Lee Telesco, Philippine Herald, Bill McWhirter, Time; Frank McCullough, Time; Johnathan Randal, New York Times; Murray Fromson, CBS; Rembert James, Copley News; Keichi Yamaguchi, Fukui Press; Bill Wordham, NBC; Bill Stout, CBS; Bill Brannigan, ABC; Bob Ohman, AP; Doug Kennedy, True Magazine; Howard Sochurek, Life Magazine; Reuben Cotelo, Uruguay, El Pais; Thomas Wicker and John Apple, New York Times; Sims Fentress and Dick Clurman, Time; Bob Gassaway, AP; Al Webb, UPI; Bob Moskin and Jim Hansen, Look Magazine.

F. Press Releases. During January, the Press Section processed a total of 416 news releases; of this total 59 concerned civic action. The releases were accompanied by 290 photographs. A total of 7,638 releases were processed and forwarded to the Fleet Home Town News Center during the month. Art was included with 247 of these releases.

G. Press Center. A total of 151 correspondents and VIP's checked in at the Press Center during January 1967.

H. Miscellaneous. First Marine Aircraft Wing coverage increase and the New ISO Section at the Force Logistic Command were most notable advancements during the month.

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CHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE/BILLET</u>
1-2Jan67	Victor H. KRULAK	LtGen, U. S. Marine Corps Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
1-2Jan67	Joseph Y. RESNICK	Congressman (Dem. N.Y.)
4Jan67	KIM, Yun Sang	BGen, ROKMC, Commanding General, 2d Brigade, ROKMC
4Jan67	Edward H. DESAUSSURE	BGen, U. S. Army, Commanding General, INFORC-V (Artillery)
5-6Jan67	Marshall W. WHITE	RAdm, U. S. Navy, COMFAIRWESTPac
6-10Jan67	Wallace M. GREENE, Jr.	General, U. S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps
6Jan67	THIEU, Nguyen Van	LtGen, Chief of State, Republic of Vietnam
6Jan67	Ambassador SHIN	Korean Ambassador to Vietnam
6-10Jan67	Foster C. LAHUE	BGen, U. S. Marine Corps Military Secretary for the Commandant of the Marine Corps
9-10Jan67	Reverend Reuben YOUNGDAHL	Lutheran Minister
10Jan67	Earle G. WHEELER	General, U. S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
11-13Jan67	Robert H. B. BALDWIN	Under Secretary of the Navy
11Jan67	Colonel SWINBURN	Colonel, Australian Military Attache to Republic of Vietnam
11Jan67	Colonel MAXWELL	Colonel, Australian Military Attache to Republic of Vietnam
12Jan67	The Honorable Harold BROWN	Secretary of the Air Force

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE/BILLET</u>
12Jan67	James FERGUSON	General, U. S. Air Force Commander AFSB
12Jan67	Hewitt T. WHELESS	LtGen, U. S. Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force
12Jan67	George B. SIMLER	MajGen, U. S. Air Force Deputy Director of Operations, U. S. Air Force
12Jan67	Eugene B. LEBAILLY	MajGen, Director, AAF - OI
12Jan67	Mr. Herbert ROSENWEIG	Director Tactical Air Programs Office, Dept ASD(SA)
12Jan67	Robert PETIT	BGen, U. S. Air Force, Deputy Director Forces Hq, U. S. Air Force
14-16Jan67	W. PEARSON	BGen, U. S. Army, Commanding General, 1stBde, 101st Airborne Division
15Jan67	Stanley R. RESOR	Secretary of the Army
17-19Jan67	Arthur L. WEST	MajGen, U. S. Army, Head of the Department of the Army Evaluation of USA Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations
18Jan67	Barry GOLDWATER	MajGen, U. S. Air Force (Ret)
19Jan67	William C. WESTMORELAND	General, U. S. Army, COMUSMACV
23Jan67	Maxwell D. TAYLOR	General, U. S. Army (Ret) Consultant to the President
24Jan67	Dr. William G. MCMILLAN	(GS-18), Science Advisor to COMUSMACV
24Jan67	Leonard SULLIVAN	(GS-18), Office of the Department of Defense Research and Engineering

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE/BILLET</u>
24Jan67	Mr. B. K. BUFFHAM	GS-18, National Security Agency
25-26Jan67	Dwight E. BEACH	General, U. S. Army CINCUSARPAC
25-26Jan67	Bishop Angie SMITH	Methodist Bishop of the Armed Forces
26-30Jan67	John S. COWAN	RAdm (MC), U. S. Navy CINCPACFLT Medical Officer
27-30Jan67	Harry HULL	RAdm, U. S. Navy, Director, Shore Activities Development and Control
28-29Jan67	RAdm JOHNSON	RAdm, U. S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Foreign Military Assistance Logistics and Administration, CINCPAC
28-30Jan67	Alexander HUSBAND	RAdm, U. S. Navy, Chief, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy
30Jan67	Alfred STARBIRD	LtGen, U. S. Army, Director, Defense Communications Planning Group
30Jan67	Dr Victor K. HEYMAN	GS-16, Director, SEA Programs Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis

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PART THREE
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 January - Operation PRAIRIE Continuing
 Operation SIERRA Continuing
 Operation CHINOOK Continuing
- 5 January - Operation LINCOLN Initiated
- 9 January - Operation LINCOLN Terminated
- 24 January - Operation CLEVELAND Initiated
 Operation TUSCALOOSA Initiated
- 25 January - Operation CLEVELAND Terminated
- 26 January - Operation DESOTO Initiated
- 28 January - Operation TUSCALOOSA Terminated
- 30 January - Operation TRINITY Initiated
- 31 January - Operation PRAIRIE Terminated
- *1 February - Operation TRINITY Terminated

*Summary of Operation TRINITY included in the January 1967 Command Chronology. This Operation was terminated at 012000H February 1967 with light contact throughout the day.

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PART FOUR

REFERENCES

- (A) First Marine Division Command Chronology, January 1967
- (B) Third Marine Division Command Chronology, January 1967
- (C) First Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, January 1967
- (D) Force Logistics Command Command Chronology, January 1967

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- (1) Annex "A" to Part Two, Section IX, III MAF Command Chronology, January 1967
- (2) ^{copy of "S"} III Marine Amphibious Force, Command Directory, January 1967
- (3) ✓ ^{copy of "S"} January 1967 Editions; III Marine Amphibious Force Newspaper: "SEA TIGER". *Destroyed. Record copy in AOSD Library.*

Enclosure (1)

TITLE: Marines Challenge the Sappers
 CAMPAIGN: Allied Forces
 TARGET: Viet Cong

(FRONT)
 picture of Viet Cong dead

ANNEX "A"

(BACK)
 HEADLINE: US MARINES CHALLENGE THE SAPPERS OF THE 409TH BATTALION
 AND THE VIET CONG IN THE CHU LAI AREA

The Viet Cong have been defeated numerous times in Chu Lai, but to camouflage their weakness with a veil of words, they tell the people they will overrun the Marine defenses in the Chu Lai base.

But in reality the Viet Cong forces, especially those in the 409th Sapper Battalion, do not have enough courage to assault the Chu Lai base.

If you want to see proof of our words evidenced by the Viet Cong bodies lying around the Chu Lai base, please tell the Viet Cong the following:

THE MARINES ARE AWAITING THIS FANTASTIC OVERRUNNING BY
 THE VIET CONG



ĐẠI-ĐỘI ĐẶC CÔNG 70 CỦA VIỆT-CỘNG SAU TRẬN TẤN
 CÔNG VÀO CĂN CỨ CHU-LAI NGÀY 13 THÁNG GIÊNG
 NĂM 1967

THỦY QUÂN LỰC CHIẾN HOA-KỲ TẠI CHU-LAI LÚC NÀO
 CÙNG SÀN SÀNG PHẢN ỨNG BỌN ĐẶC CÔNG VC Ở TD/409

Việt-Cộng đã nhiều lần thảm bại tại Chu-Lai nhưng vẫn cố
 tình che dấu sự yếu hèn của mình bằng cách rêu rao láo khoét
 rằng chúng coi thường lực lượng phòng thủ của Quân-đội Đồng-
 Minh tại Chu-Lai để đánh lạc hướng những ai nghe dạ dễ tin.

Sự thật thì bất cứ một lực lượng nào của Việt-Cộng kể cả bọn
 Đặc công thuộc Tiểu-Đoàn/409 của V.C. cũng chẳng bao giờ
 giám đương đầu, đụng độ với Quân đội Đồng-Minh tại Chu-Lai
 nữa.

Nếu đồng bào lại còn muốn thêm một lần nữa được chứng kiến
 tận mắt xác VC phơi đầy tại Chu-Lai như đạo nào thì xin nhận
 với Bọn V.C rằng: Chúng tôi sẵn sàng đợi chúng đến tấn công
 căn cứ của chúng tôi.

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Task Force X-Ray 1st MARDIV.

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TITLE: Attention Villagers of Thanh Quit
CAMPAIGN: Anti-Viet Cong/ Support GVN
TARGET: Civilian Population

(FRONT)

illustration with caption
THIS CAN HAPPEN TO YOU

(BACK)

ATTENTION VILLAGERS OF THANH QUIT!

The Viet Cong, disregarding the safety of the population, installs mines and booby-traps in your rice paddies, trails and in your villages. On 21 Jan. 1967 these mines killed one of your neighbors and wounded three others. Was this a military victory for the Viet Cong?

Again they have shown their true face by killing innocent people. This time the villagers of Thanh Quit!

The GVN forces and the Marines are here to protect the lives and property of the Vietnamese people. They are here to protect you from the pain, misery and sorrow of the Viet Cong actions. In order to stop this abuse, you must report to the Marines or the GVN troops when the Viet Cong are operating in your area.

You must help the GVN and the Marines- they are here to help you.



1st MAR DIV

244-206-67

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ĐỒNG BÀO XÃ THANH-QUÍT LƯU Ý :

Bọn Việt-Cộng không thêm đếm
đến sự an-ninh cho dân chúng.
Nên đã gài mìn, dặt bẫy, dặt chông
trong ruộng lúa, trên đường mòn trong
làng của đồng bào.

Ngày 21 tháng 1 năm 1967, những
quả mìn của chúng đã giết chết một
người ở làng bên cạnh và làm bị thương
ba người khác.

Phải chăng đó là một thắng lợi về
quân sự của Việt-Cộng ?

Một lần nữa chúng đã phơi bày bộ
mặt thực giết người vô tội của chúng.

Đồng bào xã Thanh-Quít !

Lực lượng quân-sự của Chính-phủ
Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và của Thủy-Quân
Lục-Chiến đến đây để bảo vệ sinh mạng
và tài sản của đồng bào Việt-Nam. Họ
đến đây để làm nhẹ bớt cảnh đau khổ,
lâm than và tủi hận của đồng bào do
Việt-Cộng gây ra.

Để chặn đứng sự lạm dụng của
Việt-Cộng đối với nhân-dân, đồng bào
xã Thanh-Quít hãy báo cáo với Thủy-
Quân Lục-Chiến hay Quân-đội Việt-
Nam Cộng-Hòa khi nào thấy bọn chúng
gài mìn hay dặt bẫy trong khu vực của
mình.

Quân-đội Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và
Thủy-Quân Lục-Chiến đến đây để giúp
đỡ đồng-bào, vây đồng-bào hãy nên
giúp họ một tay.

24-206-67

DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

TITLE: Happy New Year
CAMPAIGN: Civil Affairs
TARGET: Civilian Population

(FRONT)
illustration

(BACK)

"THE ALLIED FORCES WISH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE A HAPPY NEW YEAR."



244-205-67

1st Mar Div

TITLE: Viet Cong Defeated in the Truoi Mountain Area
 CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
 TARGET: Viet Cong

(FRONT)
 picture of dead Viet Cong

(BACK)

On 18 January 1967, in the vicinity of Xa Thuong Lo Village in Nam Hoa District, Thua Thien Province, thirty-five Viet Cong met ten US Marines in combat and twelve of your comrades were killed and one captured. What chance do you have when you outnumber the Allied Forces and the GVN and still they defeat you?

This is only the beginning of the continuing operations in this area that bring you death and misery. You will know the bombings and find the terror in your heart when the artillery shells rain upon you as the rains of the monsoon, bringing death and destruction. What are your chances of survival?

Your only chance is to rally to the government, the GVN Government of the people, that welcomes ralliers with open arms and provides the opportunities for building a new life. Your choice is a clear one. Rally to the Government or face the overwhelming strength of the Allies- and death.



Sự thất bại của Việt-Cộng tại núi Truoi.

Vào ngày 18 tháng giêng năm 1967 chung quanh Xa Thuong Lo, quận Nam-Hoa, tỉnh Thua-Thiên, 35 tên Việt-Cộng đã đụng độ với Thủy-Quân Lục-Chiến Hoa-Kỳ. Kết quả: 12 tên bị chết và một tên bị bắt. Các bạn chúng có một chút may-mắn khi bọn Việt-Cộng không có đủ lực-lượng chống lại Chính-phủ V.N.C.H. và quân-đội Đồng-Minh.

Đây chỉ là một vụ đụng độ đầu tiên. Cuộc hành quân sẽ còn tiếp diễn trong vùng này và sẽ đưa các bạn đến chết chóc và khổ sở. Các bạn còn sẽ bị dội bom. Các bạn sẽ còn bị pháo kích như mưa. Và sẽ không tránh khỏi chết. Như thế thì các bạn được may mắn gì?

Sự may mắn của các bạn để được sống còn là trở về qui chính với Chính-phủ. Chính phủ luôn luôn mở rộng cánh tay chào đón qui-chính viên đối với từ tế với họ và còn cung cấp nhiều phương tiện cho họ để xây dựng lại cuộc đời.

Thế là sự quyết định của các bạn đã rõ ràng rồi! Hãy trở về với Chính-phủ hay chống lại lực lượng hùng hậu, của quân-đội Đồng-Minh để phải chết.

30 MAR DIV

DECLASSIFIED

TITLE: US Marine Victory at Chu Lai
CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
TARGET: Viet Cong

(FRONT)
pictures of dead Viet Cong

(BACK)
HEADLINE: THE COMMUNIST CADRE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS OF THESE
YOUNG MEN

DATE: 13 January 1967, 3 AM
PLACE: Near Ky Khuong Village, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province
ACTION: Members of a Viet Cong sapper unit tried to penetrate a
Marine position.
RESULT: Thirty-five Viet Cong killed and many weapons and grenades and
a great deal of ammunition were captured from the Viet Cong.

Thirty-five Viet Cong killed while only two Marines were wounded!
This is without doubt another defeat for the Viet Cong. Thirty-five spirits
will now wander throughout the mountains and jungles of Quang Tin Province
never to find peace. Whose fault was it? The answer is clearly the
communist cadre.

Many Viet Cong have rallied because they have seen through the
lies of their communist cadre. They were given a chance to begin a new
life in the Republic of South Vietnam and are now happy, free and alive.
It is with great sorrow that the Vietnamese people hear of the Viet Cong
defeats, day after day, and of the many Viet Cong who die because their
eyes were blinded by the lies of their cadre. These men could have re-
built their lives, but they are now dead.

We appeal to those young men now in the Viet Cong ranks to take
advantage of the GVN Chieu-Hoi program before it is too late. They still
have the opportunity of building a new life, without fear, and be happy.
The GVN welcomes returnees.

TRP IS A MING- WHY DON'T YOU RALLY NOW?

Chiến thắng của Thủy-quân Lục-chiến Hoa-Kỳ tại Chu-Lai

Ngày 13 tháng giêng năm 1967, vào khoảng 3 giờ sáng.
Nơi: Gần làng Kỳ-Khuong, quận Lý-Tin, Tỉnh Quảng-Tin.
Sự việc xảy ra: Một đơn-vị đặc-công VC đã cố gắng đột nhập vào một vị trí
dòng quân của Thủy-Quân Lục-Chiến Hoa-Kỳ.
Kết-quả: 35 VC chết tại chỗ.
Ta tịch thu nhiều vũ-khí, lựu đạn cùng nhiều đạn dược của VC.
Có 35 VC bị giết trong khi chỉ có 2 lính Thủy-quân Lục-Chiến Hoa-Kỳ bị
thương. Không còn nghi ngờ gì nữa, đây lại là một thất bại nữa của VC, 35 lính
hồn đó sẽ vất-vưởng nơi núi rừng Quảng-Tin với nỗi uất hận không bao giờ phai.
Những lỗi lầm do ai gây ra? Câu trả lời rất dễ dàng. Do là lỗi lầm của những
cán-bộ Cộng-sản.
Nhiều cán-binh VC đã trở về qui chánh vì họ đã hiểu được những lời léo-
khoét của cán-bộ CS. Những qui-chánh-viên này đã bắt đầu một cuộc đời mới tại
Miền-Nam Việt-Nam. Bây giờ họ được sung-sướng tự-do, vì họ may-mắn còn sống.
Dân tộc Việt-Nam lấy làm đau đớn khi thấy những người cán binh này vâng nghe lời
tuyên-truyền láo-khuyết của bọn cán bộ VC nên mù quáng dẫn thân vào cõi chết,
trong khi họ có thể sống để tạo lập một cuộc đời tốt đẹp.
Chúng tôi kêu gọi những thanh niên trong hàng ngũ VC đừng để quá muộn
hãy nắm lấy cơ-hội thuận-tiện theo tiếng gọi Chieu-Hoi trở về với Chính phủ VN
CH. Các bạn vẫn còn cơ-hội để tạo lại cuộc đời mới, khỏi lo sợ và sẽ được sung
sướng. Chính-Phủ VNCH đang chờ đón các bạn.
Tết sắp đến! Các bạn còn chần-chờ gì nữa mà chưa hồi chánh?

244-199-67

2/11 1ST MARR DIV



244-199-67

DECLASSIFIED

TITLE: Evacuation Notice
CAMPAIGN: Instructions to Civilian Population
TARGET: Civilian Population

(FRONT)

In order to bring peace and security to your area, the US Marines and local Popular Forces are removing the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, the Viet Cong often use your homes as shelter from which to fight. If you desire to leave the area, follow the TAM-KY River north to the TAM-KY airfield. You will receive shelter, food and medical attention until you can be relocated in a secure area provided by the GVN.

Follow these instructions: Follow the TAM-KY River to the TAM-KY airfield, quickly!

Vì muốn đem lại thanh-bình và an-ninh cho đồng bào,
Thủy Quân Lục-Chiến Hoa-Kỳ phối hợp với Địa-Phương-Quân
đánh đuổi Việt-Cong ra khỏi vùng này. Những chàng may
bạn Việt-Cong thường dùng nhà đồng-bào làm nơi trú-ân
để chôn lại quân Chính-Quyền và Đồng-Minh. Vậy chúng
tôi yêu cầu đồng bào rời khỏi khu-vực này bằng cách dùng
đường thủy từ phía Bắc TAM-KY để xuống tới sân bay TAM-KY
Đồng-bào sẽ được cung cấp nơi ăn chốn ở, vật-thực phẩm men
cho đến khi đồng bào có được một nơi định cư an-toàn do
Chính-Phủ VIET-NAM chu cấp.

Vậy xin đồng-bào hãy theo lời chúng tôi hướng dẫn,
hay theo sông Tam-Kỳ để tới sân bay Tam-Kỳ.

Đồng bào hãy gấp lên!

244-188-67

1st MAR DIV

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

50:1rd
 3410
 24 December 1966

From: Commanding General
 To: Distribution List

Subj: PSYWAR Campaign

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV msg 140243Z Dec 66

Encl: (1) MACV ltr MACPD of 17Dec66; "PSYWAR Campaign".

1. COMUSMACV and JUSPAO PSYWAR Campaign plans for the 1967 TET holiday are contained in Enclosure (1) and are forwarded for appropriate action.
2. Commanders will coordinate TET PSYWAR operations with appropriate ARVN, GVN, and U.S. Agencies as indicated in reference (a) and enclosure (1) to ensure maximum effectiveness of the campaign.
3. Leaflet distribution will be accomplished by the III MAF PSC through the 244th liaison teams.

R. R. Read
 R. R. READ
 By direction

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 1stMarDiv (PsyOp)	(10)
CG 3rdMarDiv (PsyOp)	(10)
CG 1stMAW (PsyOp)	(5)
CG FLC (PsyOp)	(3)
CG 2nd ROK MarBde (PsyOp)	(3)
CO 1stMP Bn (PsyOp)	(2)
CO 244th PSYOPSCO	(2)
INFO COPY:	
DSA I CORPS	(2)
COMNAVADVGRU(DANANG)	(2)
Det C-1 5thSFG	(2)
Flt "A", 5thACS(DANANG)	(2)
JUSPAO (DANANG)	(2)

ANNEX "A"

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

MACPD

17 December 1966

SUBJECT: PSYWAR Campaign*

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. General.

a. Encouraged by the record number of Hoi Chanh (returnees) reported for February and March 1966, following the GVN/US combined Tet Campaign in January, all GVN/US/RMAF propaganda agencies will capitalize again upon the Tet holiday period to increase the number of returnees through Chieu Hoi appeals, utilizing all available media.

b. Indications are that lack of food and medicine, repeated defeats, general war weariness, and an intensification of nostalgia at this particular time of the year make the VC and the NVA forces highly susceptible to Chieu Hoi persuasion during the periods prior to, during, and immediately following Tet.

c. The general objective of the 1967 Tet Campaign is to induce large scale disaffection and defection or desertion among the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam.

d. This letter provides information on the PSYWAR campaign and instructions for subordinate commands relative to their specific participation in and support of the 1967 Tet Campaign.

e. This campaign has been approved by the US Mission Council, and it will receive first priority PSYOP support at all levels.

2. Situation.

a. The holiday period for Tet (the lunar new year) in SVN will last $3\frac{1}{2}$ days (9 - 12 February). By custom, this most important Vietnamese holiday is more sacred and sentimental than a marriage. It is steeped in traditions which emphasize the solidarity of family and the reverence of ancestors. The days just prior to Tet are full of merry making, much noise and excitement, but the first day of Tet brings silence and the profound respect of a family gathered at the altar of its ancestors. It is during this period that the pull of family ties is most strong, and thus, it is a time when frightened, hungry, ill, homesick VC and NVA soldiers are most vulnerable to the Chieu Hoi appeal.

*This letter constitutes the MACV Annex to the 1967 Tet Campaign Plan.

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MACPD

17 December 1966

SUBJECT: PSYWAR Campaign

b. The enemy is well aware of the telling effect of propaganda directed toward him during Tet and can be expected to launch a campaign to counter this propaganda and tighten his control over his troops and the people in his area of control. It is believed, however, that the more drastic his countermeasures, the greater will be the loss of morale among his troops and the people in his area; also, he will tie up many of his most trusted personnel attempting to prevent defection and desertion. Commanders/Senior Advisors are urged to watch for indications of unpopular counteractions taken by the enemy and to capitalize on them in preparing leaflets and loudspeaker appeals. Quick reaction to returnee information can prove extremely effective during this campaign.

3. Objectives of US/PWMAF Support.

- a. To reinforce the Republic of Vietnam Tet Campaign, with priority emphasis upon the Chieu Hoi appeal.
- b. To enhance the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their government.
- c. To erode the confidence of the VC and NVA forces in ultimate victory and convince them they should rally to the GVN.

4. Conduct of the PSYWAR Campaign.

- a. Management of the US support to the RVN PSYWAR campaign will be accomplished through a US Mission task force.
- b. Campaign phasing for leaflet drops is described in detail in the JUSPAO Annex to 1967 Tet Campaign Plan (Inclosure 1).
- c. This campaign will be characterized by centralized policy planning and centralized development and production of standard Tet communications materials with decentralized operational planning and execution at the lowest feasible level. Commanders/Senior Advisors, in conjunction with their counterparts, will be responsible for target selection, leaflet dissemination, exploitation of results, and evaluation of effectiveness. They will produce leaflets and loudspeaker appeals to follow up the standard Tet leaflets and tapes and take advantage of combat operations and local intelligence.
- d. The campaign will be conducted in four phases, as follows:
 - (1) Schedule I (1 January - 4 February)
 - (2) Schedule II (5 February - 9 February)

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MACPD

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SUBJECT: PSYWAR Campaign

(3) Schedule III (10 February - 13 February)

(4) Schedule IV (14 February - 28 February)

e. Tet leaflets will be printed and delivered to the following units:

(1) 244th PSYOP Company - Da Nang

(2) 245th PSYOP Company - Nha Trang and Pleiku

(3) 246th PSYOP Company - Bien Hoa

(4) 247th PSYOP Company - Can Tho

f. The following distribution plan for leaflets will be carried out in accordance with the four phases of the campaign:

(1) Schedule I:

(a) Seven leaflets (SP-979, SP-1542, SP-1547, SP-1548, SP-1549, SP-938A, SP-1389) will be printed and packed mixed, to be dropped simultaneously on selected VC/NVA targets. These leaflets will be identified as Mix Number 1. The first shipments will arrive at the receiving units by 23 December.

(b) One leaflet (SP-695B) will arrive by 30 December. This leaflet is designed for airdrop on NVA units.

(c) The following quantities will be shipped:

1. Mix Number 1: 11 million to Da Nang, 11 million to Nha Trang, 5 million to Pleiku, 11 million to Bien Hoa, and 20 million to Can Tho.

2. SP-695B: 2.5 million to Da Nang, 2.5 million to Nha Trang, 2.5 million to Pleiku, and 2.5 million to Bien Hoa.

(2) Schedule II:

(a) Six leaflets (SP-1252, SP-1233A, SP-918A, SP-1544, SP-1545, SP-1546) will be printed and packed mixed, to be dropped simultaneously on hamlets in VC controlled areas and areas undergoing clearing. These leaflets will be identified as Mix Number 2. The first shipments will arrive by 1 February.

(b) The Safe Conduct Pass is being revised. If approval of the new design is expedited, the new pass will be introduced during the Tet

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SUBJECT: PSYWAR Campaign

Campaign. If approval is delayed, the present pass will be used. First shipment for Tet will arrive by 1 February.

(c) The following quantities will be shipped:

1. Mix Number 2: 9 million to Da Nang, 9 million to Nha Trang, 2 million to Pleiku, 9 million to Bien Hoa, and 16 million to Can Tho.

2. Safe Conduct Passes: 6 million to Da Nang, 6 million to Nha Trang, 2 million to Pleiku, 6 million to Bien Hoa, and 10 million to Can Tho.

(3) Schedule III:

(a) One leaflet (SP-1543) will be printed and will arrive by 5 February. It is designed to be airdropped on VC/NVA units and delivered by hand to families of VC.

(b) Additional Safe Conduct Passes will arrive by 7 February.

(c) The following quantities will be shipped:

1. SP-1543: 1 million to Da Nang, 1 million to Nha Trang, $\frac{1}{2}$ million to Pleiku, 1 million to Bien Hoa, and 2 million to Can Tho.

2. Safe Conduct Passes: 4 million to Da Nang, 4 million to Nha Trang, 1 million to Pleiku, 4 million to Bien Hoa, and 7 million to Can Tho.

(4) Schedule IV:

(a) One leaflet (SP-1389) will be printed and will arrive by 10 February. It will be airdropped on VC/NVA units.

(b) Additional Safe Conduct Passes will arrive by 10 February.

(c) The following quantities will be shipped:

1. SP-1389: 2 million to Da Nang, 2 million to Nha Trang, $\frac{1}{2}$ million to Pleiku, 2 million to Bien Hoa, and 3.5 million to Can Tho.

2. Safe Conduct Passes: 8 million to Da Nang, 8 million to Nha Trang, 2 million to Pleiku, 8 million to Bien Hoa, and 14 million to Can Tho.

5. Command Information. Commanders at all levels are directed to insure that the provisions of this letter are brought to the attention of all personnel assigned. Command Information Pamphlets 13-66 and 1-67 may be used to insure full

MACPD

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SUBJECT: PSYWAR Campaign

understanding of the Tet holiday and the Chieu Hoi Program. "With Open Arms", a 16 minute troop information film, will be available for showing. The instructions on the "How to Rally" leaflet (SP-1389) should be reviewed to insure that all personnel are familiar with the procedure a rallier may follow and the treatment he may expect. Each member of ground combat units and USMACV Advisory Teams must be indoctrinated thoroughly on the overall Tet Campaign; be able to recognize the Safe Conduct Pass and understand its purpose; and be conversant with procedures for reception, treatment, and subsequent evacuation of returnees. All personnel will be instructed prior to 1 January. An explanation of the Chieu Hoi Program and the Safe Conduct Pass will be included in all replacement processing.

6. Support of the PSYWAR Campaign by Commanders/Advisors.

a. Dissemination of Tet leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts will be the prime responsibility of the 5th Air Commando Squadron (PSYOP); however, Commanders/Senior Advisors will provide leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker broadcast support as necessary.

b. Commanders/Senior Advisors, in coordination with their counterparts, will be responsible for selecting suitable targets for leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker broadcasts within the time frame of the four phases of the Tet PSYWAR Campaign. They will be alert to the possibility of exploiting the success of the campaign with PSYOP resources under their control (see paragraph 4c). Information obtained from ralliers should be used promptly as the basis for loudspeaker appeals and quick reaction leaflets against the units from which the ralliers came.

c. The success of the Tet PSYWAR Campaign is dependent on effective military pressure to generate the proper psychological climate to make leaflet and loudspeaker appeals meaningful. The combination of military pressure and propaganda tends to make defection as a Chieu Hoi returnee the most attractive alternative to the VC/NVA soldier.

d. Parallel instructions will be issued through Vietnamese channels. It is requested that advisors be alert for these instructions and assist in the RVNAF orientation for this campaign.

e. During last years's Tet Season, US troops in some localities decided to support the celebration of Tet by displaying banners that proclaimed, in English and Vietnamese, best wishes of the troops to their Vietnamese friends for a successful Tet and a Happy New Year. Such banners were appreciated highly by the Vietnamese who saw them. Individual actions of this sort are to be encouraged by personnel at all levels.

MACPD
SUBJECT: PSYWAR Campaign

17 December 1966

7. Reports. Established monthly reporting procedures for evaluating the results of the Chieu Hoi Campaign will be followed as specified in MACV Directive 10-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



M. K. WHEELER
Captain, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

I-A

Less COMUSMACV, Spec Asst to COMUSMACV, DEPCOMUSMACV, DEPOCOMUSMACV for Air Op, SJS, HC, IG, Dir of Const, Military History, AFTU, OSD/ARPA, TMA, 8-J2

Plus 25-MACPD, 10-NAG, 1-J5, 7-Dir Tng

II-C

Less 8-Dir SOG, 63-CH USAF Adv Gp, 2-SA II ALC, 8-SA III ALC, 8-SA IV ALC, 4-SA V ALC, 18-SA CMD, 11-SA Abn Bde, 3-SA RW Scty Adv Det

III-A

Plus 8-7th AF, 60-III MAF

IV-B

Plus 10-5th Sp Forces

V-A

Less 9th APS, VN Regional Exchange, COMSTSO, 5-NAVSUPPACT Dd Nang

Plus 40-6th PSYOP Bn

VI-C

Plus 25 FWMAO

Copies furnished:

3-JUSPAO	2-OSD LNO
1-USAID	1-MAI
1-AMEMB	4-SACSA, OJCS
4-CINCPAC	4-JFK USA Sp War Cen
2-USMACTHAI	1-OSD, AFI&E

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1 9 6 7

T E T / C H I E U H O I C A M P A I G N P L A N :

Annex A "
Incl 1

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JUSPAO
October 17, 1966

1967 TET/CHIEU HOI CAMPAIGN PLAN

1. SITUATION

a. The Tet holiday period is the most important Vietnamese holiday. In 1967 it lasts 3 1/2 days (9-12 February) and by custom is more sacred and sentimental than the marriage day. It is the traditional time of returning to earlier memories, the family and family gatherings where old ties are renewed. Thus, this holiday period provides a golden opportunity to convince families by deed and words that the VC are losing the war; that the fastest way to end the miseries of the conflict is for the people under VC/NVN control to rally to the GVN; that the Tet holiday period is a unique and ideal time to take advantage of travel opportunities and of the safety and good treatment guaranteed by the GVN's Chieu Hoi program.

b. Survey of 1966 Tet/Chieu Hoi Returnees, See Enclosure #1.

c. Assumptions on Combined GVN-US Planning Requirements, See Enclosure #2.

2. MISSION

a. To plan and prepare for the conduct of an effective US/FWMAF Tet/Chieu Hoi campaign in support of the 1967 GVN Tet/Chieu Hoi campaign with the broad objective of producing the maximum number of VC/NVA defections and the maximum reduction in VC/NVA effectiveness.

b. Specific Objectives

(1) To enhance the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their government.

(2) To erode the confidence of the VC/NVA in their leadership and cause.

(3) To convince the greatest number of people under VC/NVA control that they should use the Tet holidays to come over to the winning side under the provisions of the Chieu Hoi program.

(4) To gain national support for the Chieu Hoi program.

3. OPERATIONS

a. Concept

(1) All U. S. Agencies will participate under the framework of the "National Psychological Operations Plan", the JUSPAO Guidance No. 16, "Chieu Hoi Inducement Program", and the JUSPAO-MACV "Memorandum of Agreement on Direction and Supervision of U. S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam" dated 10 August 1966.

(2) The Tet campaign will be characterized by centralized policy planning as directed by a Task Force and decentralized supporting operational planning and execution at the lowest feasible level.

(3) Media will stress and publicize the mechanics of how people can safely turn themselves in under the Chieu Hoi program.

(4) Media will be developed to the maximum extent feasible at the province level to fit the different situations in the different provinces and Corps areas.

(5) Leaflets will be the principal medium used to deliver the Tet/Chieu Hoi message to the VC and NVA controlled people. The Tet/

Chieu Hoi Campaign Task Force will give first priority to developing leaflets for nationwide usage.

(6) An intensive national and local informational campaign should be generated to convey knowledge of the Chieu Hoi Program to the entire population of SVN and to gain maximum support.

(7) Maximum effort will be made to integrate US Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign planning with GVN planning and execution. See Enclosure #2, Assumptions.

(8) Concurrently with the Tet/Chieu Hoi execution phase (29 January - 18 February) an intensive US (and GVN) Troop Information and Education program must be conducted to insure troops understand the Chieu Hoi Program.

b. Phases of the campaign

(1) Campaign Phase 1 is the broad planning phase. Broad areas of responsibility must be established. This is the responsibility of the Planning Office, JUSPAO.

(2) Campaign Phase 2 is the preparations phase. During this phase supporting plans and media must be developed, pre-tested, produced and insofar as possible stockpiled at the lowest level from which distribution can be made. Also during this phase media materials must be married with the delivering agencies. The Associate Director for Field Services JUSPAO is assigned responsibility for this phase which tentatively extends from 5 October 1966 to 25 January 1967.

(3) Campaign Phase 3 is the execution phase. This phase of the

campaign will be conducted from 29 January 1967 to 18 February 1967.

The Associate Director for Field Services is responsible for the conduct of this phase of the operation.

(4) Campaign Phase 4 is the post-campaign evaluation phase.

During this phase results and effectiveness must be determined and tabulated. The Chief of the Planning Office is responsible for this phase.

c. Target Audiences in order of Priority

(1) Members of the VC military forces :

(a) VC guerrillas

(b) VC soldiers and lower level cadre of regular VC forces.

(c) Higher cadre of regular VC forces.

(2) Families with members in the VC and persons with friends in the VC.

(3) VC sympathizers in all areas .

(4) Populations of VC-controlled areas and GVN contested areas contiguous to VC-controlled areas.

(5) NVA troops and cadre.

(6) The national population of South Vietnam.

d. Participating Media

(1) Leaflets

(a) Air dropped

(b) Distributed by hand or by military, RF/PF, Police,

Revolutionary Development cadre, or armed propaganda teams, or others.

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- (2) Radio and TV
 - (a) Radio Saigon and affiliated stations
 - (b) Provincial radio stations
 - (c) Voice of America
 - (d) VNTV
- (3) Loudspeaker broadcasts
 - (a) Airborne loudspeakers
 - (b) Vehicle mounted speakers
 - (c) Stationary speakers on outposts
- (4) Newspapers
 - (a) Provincial newspapers circulated in VC controlled or contested areas.
 - (b) Mimeographed district and other news bulletins.
- (5) Display materials
 - (a) Posters
 - (b) Banners
 - (c) Slogans on walls
- (6) Publications
 - (a) Pamphlets
 - (b) Magazines
- (7) Other Media
 - (a) Messages
 - (b) Face-to-face contacts
 - (c) Letters

- (d) Drama teams
- (e) Films
- (f) Signs
- (8) Events
 - (a) Musical programs
 - (b) Dramatic programs
 - (c) Art exhibits
 - (d) Weapons exhibits
 - (e) Conventions of returnees
 - (f) Conventions of armed propaganda teams
 - (g) Public meetings and rallies
 - (h) National contests

e. Thematic phasing :

Themes

- (1) Pre-Tet Phase 1
(10 January -
5 February)

- The GVN is winning
- The GVN social revolution is working.

- Contrast improved living conditions in GVN to deteriorating living conditions and increased hardships under VC.

(Note : 1966 Tet survey indicated 61% rallied because of increased hardships and poor living conditions under VC)

- Election exploitation of mistaken judgment of VC leaders in opposing people's desire to elect

true leaders. Act now. Stop listening to the bad orders of commanders who make mistakes. Leave the ranks of those who are wrong. Come over to the people of Vietnam.

(2) Pre-Tet Phase 2
(6-9 February)

- GVN appeals to return to the national just cause --with emphasis on a warm welcome and individual safety guarantees by the GVN (1966 Tet Survey indicated 66% were impressed by this appeal)

- Begin intensive Safe Conduct Pass distribution.

Themes

(3) Tet Phase 3
(10-12 February)

- Tet greetings to the people from the GVN.

- Instructions from Corps, Province and other local officials on "How" to return safely.

- Continue Safe Conduct Pass distribution.

(4) Post-Tet Phase 4
(13-18 February)

- Continue the "Come Home-Safety Guaranteed" Theme.

- Continue to instruct on mechanics of how to safely turn themselves in.

f. U. S. Organization for Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign

(1) The following initial task force is established for the Tet

Psywar Campaign, 1967 :

Executive Chairman: Associate Director, Field Services, JUSPAO

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Deputy Chairman : Chief of Field Development - JUSPAO

Assistant Chairman : Director, MACVPD

Member, Inter-Agency Coordinator for Chieu Hoi, Embassy

Member, Chieu Hoi Project Manager, USAID

Member, Field Reps Division, JUSPAO - 1

Member, Field Development, JUSPAO - 1

Member,* Information Division, JUSPAO - 1

Member,* Cultural Division, JUSPAO - 1

Member,* Technical Services,JUSPAO - 1

Member,* Northern Affairs Division, JUSPAO - 1

Member,* Executive Office, JUSPAO

(2) Task force will meet on call of the Chairman.

g. Separate supporting integrated plans will be developed by participating agencies and JUSPAO Regional Directors and upon review by Tet Task Force be appended as annexes to this plan.

h. Separate, but integrated annexes/appendices will be developed for media used in this campaign as directed by Task Force Chairman.

i. A maximum effort will be required of all agencies participating in the campaign to achieve coordinated and integrated planning and execution. Special coordination with out-of-country psywar plans will be necessary to establish thematic credibility.

* On call

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. JUSPAO administration and logistical support will be a coordinated integrated effort between the Executive Office and the Field Rep Division.

b. Supporting units will provide their own administrative and logistical support.

c. An administrative and logistical annex will be prepared for Phase 3 of this campaign as directed by the Task Force Chairman.

5. SUPERVISION AND REPORTING

Overall supervision will be exercised by the Director, JUSPAO through the Executive Chairman of the Tet Psywar campaign 1967 Task Force, who will report to the Director, JUSPAO, weekly on the progress of the execution phase of the campaign. A final report of the campaign will be made not later than 1 April 1967.

ANNEXES :

JUSPAO (to be developed)

MACV Psywar Directorate (to be developed)

Other units (to be determined and developed)

Media - to be developed with appendices for :

1. Leaflets
2. Loudspeakers
3. Radio and TV

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4. Press
5. Publications
6. Displays
7. Armed Propaganda Teams
8. Films
9. Dramatics, Musical and Arts Programs
10. Others

Administration and Logistics (to be developed)

Northern Tet Campaign 1967 (to be developed)

DISTRIBUTION : Special

Enclosure #1 (Survey of 1966 Tet/Chieu Hoi Returnees)

Enclosure #2 (Assumptions on Combined GVN-US Planning Requirements)

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**ANALYSIS
OF
SURVEY OF 1966 TET/CHIEU HOI RETURNEES**

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SURVEY OF 1966 TET/CHIEU HOI RETURNEES

ABSTRACT

TET - and its traditionally sentimental implications for the Vietnamese - is important for the timing of a Chieu Hoi appeal, especially if supported by relatives Leaflets stand out as most effective medium, particularly when they stress warm welcome and guaranteed safety and are backed by safe conduct passes ... Hardship, insufficient food, poor health - especially malaria - inadequate medical care, rather than ideological or moral disaffection, are principal reasons for rallying Nevertheless VC leaders have strong propaganda and disciplinary hold on troops Returnees say existing tendencies to rally must be capitalized by increasing Chieu Hoi leaflet appeals and by providing better rallying opportunities through intensified military operations causing VC to disperse.

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ANALYSIS OF SURVEY OF 1966 TET/CHIEU HOI RETURNEES

I. INTRODUCTION

This analysis is based upon a survey of 510 returnees at Chieu Hoi Centers in 34 provinces. They were sought out with a particular view at the 1966 Tet period as the time of their rallying and were interviewed individually in accordance with a structured questionnaire containing seventy-seven questions. The interviews were conducted between January 24 and February 10, 1966 by small teams from the Saigon Center for Vietnamese Studies. This analysis concentrates upon the significant variables and their relationships as found in the tabulated responses and should provide many interesting guidelines for future Tet / Chieu Hoi campaigns.

II. SAMPLE BACKGROUND DATA

Half of the returnees had served in village/hamlet guerrilla or militia units, one-fifth as civilian personnel performing various duties and about one-tenth each in the main and local forces of the Liberation Army; only two-tenths of one percent belonged to the NVA--i. e. one single interviewee.*

About half were privates or of other basic enlisted rank; one-seventh were NCOs and only three percent were officers.

Seven-in-ten were between the ages of 16 to 30 when interviewed.

* At that point in the history of the Chieu Hoi program, less than 100 members of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces had defected to the GVN over a period of three years.

About two-thirds had been farmers; one-fourth had been laborers; only 3% had been students.

Three-in-ten had no schooling or up to one year at best; four-in-ten had one to three years and about one-fourth had four or more years.

Nearly half of returnees are Buddhists, two-tenths Ancestral worshippers, one-tenth Cao Dai; only 6% are Catholics.

Two-thirds are married, one-third single.

More than half (57%) had joined their units after January 1965.

About half say they were drafted by the VC in one way or another; one-fourth had joined on their own for various personal reasons, but only one-sixth say they joined for ideological reasons. Nearly one-fifth say they had been captured by the VC and forced to join at gun point or induced by devious means, such as blackmail, etc.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES OF RALLYING

When ? - Half of the returnees rallied during the week of January 21-26, 1966, i. e. the first week after Tet; one-fourth rallied between January 27 and February 1; the balance is fairly divided among the preceding and the following weeks.

Where ? - The two largest proportions, about thirty percent each, rallied in the areas of II and IV Corps; next in line are III Corps (25%), I Corps (11%) and the Saigon area (5%).

Why ? - The majority (61%) rallied because of hardship and poor living conditions in VC units, whereas only 37% state ideological or moral disaffection toward the VC and their cause. As to the reasons for the time they chose, nearly four-in-ten give reasons

associated with the Tet holidays and these reasons increase in frequency with the levels of education. Half of the better educated returnees state reasons associated with the Tet holidays, as compared to less than three-in-ten of the uneducated.

How ? - About half of the returnees escaped to either district or provincial towns and later reported to Chieu Hoi centers or local GVN authorities. Although four-in-ten say they were encouraged or assisted by relatives, only two-in-ten claim they rallied while visiting their native villages. (It should be noted in this connection, however, that half of all returnees state they had been assigned to duty as village/hamlet guerrillas or militia and that a number of them presumably may have carried out these duties right in their native villages/hamlets.)

One-fourth mention favorable conditions at the time of their rallying, e.g. lax security or lack of supervision. Seven-in-ten say in fact that they encountered no difficulties in rallying.

IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDIA

The survey clearly points up the effectiveness of leaflets, regardless of the returnees' educational level. During the six months preceding their rallying, nine-in-ten returnees (91%) learned of GVN or U. S. propaganda appeals through leaflets and half of them name leaflets as the most effective means of making the men in their former units lose faith in the VC. While almost nine-in-ten (86%) learned about the appeals through loudspeaker messages from aircraft, only one-in-eight deem them the "most effective" means of making the men in their former units lose faith in the VC. *

* These and related findings correspond to previous interviews which indicated that loudspeaker messages from aircraft, while heard, were not always clearly understood. Some measures have since been taken to correct this and a maximum of 25 seconds has been set for individual loudspeaker messages.

Four-in-ten returnees say they learned about the GVN or U. S. appeals from other people and three-in-ten mention radio broadcasts as their source.

Uppermost in the returnees' minds--as expressed by two-thirds--is the appeal to return to the nest or to the national just cause, with emphasis on the warm welcome and individual safety guaranteed by the GVN. Offers of better living conditions impressed four-in-ten. Family-centered appeals are mentioned by one-third of all returnees.

A plurality of four-in-ten suggest that the most important thing to be done in order to have more men in their units rally would be to drop more leaflets. One-in-ten, however, urge the importance of fulfilling all the promises in the leaflets. One-in-eight suggest more rallying opportunities, such as more intensified bombardments or more military operations to cause the VC to disperse.

Exploring the utility of leaflets in some depth, the survey revealed that two-thirds of the interviewees had seen at least five of the twenty-six different leaflets shown to them by the interviewers. (A list of these is available upon request). About half of the sample had seen SP-893 "Safe Conduct Pass" and SP-888 "Compatriots in the VC"; four-in-ten had seen SP-889 "To soldiers in VC Ranks"; smaller, yet, substantial proportions had seen SP-918 "Which Spring Do You Choose" (14%) and SP-917 "To You in the VC Ranks" (10%).

The relatively largest proportion, one-sixth of the sample, say that SP-893 "Safe Conduct Pass" contributed most to their decision to rally. Nearly half of all returnees in fact say they had brought it with them when they rallied. Nine percent listed

SP-888 "Compatriots in the VC" as having contributed most. Other effective leaflets are SP-889 "To Soldiers in VC Ranks" (8%), SP-887 "Ballad Prayer for Tet" (7%), SP-894 "To the Mothers and Wives" (7%), VNT-12 "General Ky Message" (5%) and SP-807 "VC Kill Innocent People" (5%).

V. ANTI-RALLYING PROPAGANDA IN VC UNITS

Only one-in-ten returnees recall that their former leaders ever mentioned the Tet/Chieu Hoi campaign specifically. But as to rallying in general, between half and three-fourths say their leaders told them that returnees would be jailed, tortured and even killed by the GVN. One-fifth mentioned ideological appeals by their leaders. Another major theme, as recalled by about one-sixth of the returnees, asserted that they would be drafted by the GVN and sent far away from their families. Anti-U.S. propaganda seems to have been conspicuously rare in this context. Only about three percent of the returnees quote their former leaders as saying that ralliers would be shot on sight by U. S. troops.*

VI. VC MEASURES TO PREVENT RALLYING

As recalled by four-in-ten returnees, preventive measures involved 3-man cells watching each other and special details to pick up leaflets and to mine possible escape routes. One-fourth mention threats of VC retaliation against recaptured ralliers or against their families, but only very few (2%) know of such actions having been carried out.

* It is reasonable to assume, however, that there has been an increase in anti-U. S. propaganda during the past ten months.

A plurality of twenty-seven percent say that the lack of favorable circumstances and the VC's rigid control measures have so far prevented potential ralliers in their former units. Yet, they seem somewhat skeptical as to how many potential ralliers there were.

VII. MORALE FACTORS

Little more than half of the returnees claim not to have known what they were fighting for, but merely obeyed VC orders. The balance are almost evenly divided in having believed they were fighting for the betterment of the poor, for the welfare of the nation and for freedom from foreign (American) imperialism and aggression.

Half of the returnees refer to the population as having given little or no support to their former units. Almost nine among ten who do recall such support mention rice or money, whereas only one-in-seven mention morale-boosting support, such as victory cheering or troop entertainment.

But most of the other men in their former units, half of the returnees say, felt like fighting until the GVN and U.S. forces were defeated. Almost three-in-ten do not know how their former comrades felt about the war and only one-sixth say the rank and file favored a negotiated settlement.

More than half of the returnees assert they and their comrades had insufficient food, whereas only about one-tenth say they had enough.

Adequate medical care was not available to the men in their units, nine-in-ten returnees state. A plurality of four-in-ten describe their own health at the time of their rallying as poor,

one-third as only fair and about one-fifth as good. Their recollection in regard to the health of the other men in their units runs essentially along the same lines.

Malaria gave their units excessive trouble, as pointed up by one-third of the returnees. One-tenth mention gastro-intestinal diseases as excessively troublesome and almost that many mention cold and influenza. Other diseases seem to have given the units less trouble.

Other responses also indicate the major problem posed by malaria and it is particularly noteworthy that three-fourths of the returnees say they were not given any special pills or other medicines for the prevention of malaria.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO 1967 TET/CHIEU HOI CAMPAIGN PLAN

Assumptions on Combined GVN-US Planning Requirements

1. To achieve maximum advantage of the Tet holiday period in 1967 there must be coordination and integration between all Vietnamese, U. S., FWMAF, capabilities both military and civilian.

2. Accordingly, this will require the establishment of Combined 1967 Tet/Chieu Hoi Task Force at the National level and Comined Coordinating Committees at lower levels so that coordinated and integrated supporting plans can be developed and executed in unison. Suggested membership on the Combined Task Force and various Coordinating Committees are :

a. National Level Combined Tet/Chieu Hoi Task Force :

Co-Chairman : GVN

Co-Chairman : U. S. Associate Director, Field
Services, JUSPAO

Members : Inter-Agency Coordinator for Chieu Hoi,
Embassy

: Chief of MACV Psyops Directorate

: Chief of Psywar Section, MACV Polwar
Directorate

: Representative of GVN's GPWD

: Representative of MICH (Chieu Hoi side)

- : Representative of MICH (Information side)
- : Chief of Field Development Division, JUSPAO
- : Chief of JUSPAO Technical Services
- : USAID Chieu Hoi Project Manager

(JUSPAO-MACV POLWAR, MICH-GPWD establish their own task forces at the National level.)

b. Regional/Corps Coordinating Committees (4)

Co-Chairman : GVN

Co-Chairman : U. S. JUSPAO Regional Director

Members : USAID Chieu Hoi Advisor
MACV Corps G-5 Advisor
Regional Director, VIS
Chieu Hoi Inspector
GVN Corps G-5 and/or PsyWar Representative
III MAF, I FFV, II FFV Representatives as
appropriate

c. Province/Sector/Division Coordinating Committee

Co-Chairman : GVN

Co-Chairman : U. S. JUSPAO Province Rep

Members : USAID Chieu Hoi Advisor
Provincial Director, VIS
Chief of Chieu Hoi Service
Sector S-5

Sector S-5 Advisor

U. S. Division psyops officers

GVN PW psyops officers

3. Supporting Plans

a. At the National level, coordinated supporting plans will be

developed by :

JUSPAO
GPWD
MACV Psyops Directorate
MICH Information (VIS)
MICH Chieu Hoi
USAID

b. At the Regional level, coordinated supporting plans, based

on province/sector plans will be developed by :

G-5
VIS
Chieu Hoi Inspector
JUSPAO Director

c. At the Province level, coordinated supporting plan will be

developed by :

JUSPAO Prov Rep
Sector S-5
Chieu Hoi
VIS Chief

4. Combined Media annexes or plans should be developed by the Combined Task Force based on lower level media plans as follows :

- a. Leaflets
- b. Loudspeakers
- c. Radio & Television
- d. The press

- e. Publications
 - f. Displays
 - g. Armed Propaganda Teams and Hoi Chanh
 - h. Films
 - i. Dramatic, musical and art programs
 - j. Others as appropriate
5. Combined Administrative and Logistical Annexes should be developed at the National level and Region/Corps level.

JUSPAO ANNEX TO 1967 TET/CHIEU HOI CAMPAIGN PLAN*I. GENERAL

A. This paper is an annex to the Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign Plan issued by JUSPAO on October 17, 1966. For the U.S. Mission, JUSPAO has overall supervision for the psychological operations of the campaign under the direction of the Associate Director (Field Services). As noted in the concept of the Campaign Plan, the psyops will be characterized by centralized policy planning with decentralized operational planning and execution at the lowest feasible level. Further, JUSPAO Saigon will develop and mass produce communications materials for local distribution in accordance with tactical needs determined in the field.

B. As in the 1966 campaign, leaflets will be the core of the psyops effort. Loudspeaker tapes will follow closely as a principal medium. Other materials will include posters, a song, poetry, a game, a diary, Tet envelopes, etc.

C. National planning includes the setting of campaign phases and thematic emphasis. Local planning, development, and execution includes the identification of audiences, their location, and within the broad campaign time phases, the scheduling of deliveries.

D. Enclosed is the 1967/Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign Plan with its enclosures: (1) Survey of 1966 Tet/Chieu Hoi Returnees, and (2) Assumptions on Combined GVN-US Planning Requirements.

II. MISSION

A. To provide maximum support to the 1967 Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign utilizing JUSPAO resources, in coordination and integration with other agencies and the GVN, to produce the maximum number of VC/NVN defections and to reduce VC/NVA effectiveness.

B. Objectives (as stated in the Campaign Plan)

1. To enhance the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their government.
2. To erode the confidence of the VC/NVA in their leadership and cause.
3. To convince the greatest number of people under VC/NVA control that they should use the Tet holidays to come over to the winning side under the provisions of the Chieu Hoi Program.
4. To gain national support for the Chieu Hoi Program.

*This Annex supports the GVN Tet Campaign Plan.

III. OPERATIONS

A. Concept

JUSPAO, Saigon, will develop and mass produce media for local distribution in accordance with estimated and planned field requirements. These program production activities will be divided into four JUSPAO time schedules.

B. JUSPAO Schedule I (January 1 - February 4)

1. Leaflets - eight to support themes of the Campaign Plan.
 - a. SP-979 -"The GVN is Winning; the VC Offer Only Broken Promises" 10 million
 - b. SP-1542 -"The People are Right: the VC Were Wrong--Also on the Election" 10 million
 - c. SP-1547 -Three leaflets with RD Success
 SP-1548 Stories - You, Too, Can Be
 SP-1549 Successful 30 million
 - d. SP-938A -You Will Have A Warm Welcome 10 million
 - e. SP-1389 "How to Defect" 10 million
 - f. SP-695B -Poem
 2. Cliches of all leaflets to provincial newspapers
 3. Loudspeaker tapes - seven to match above leaflets
 4. Posters - three for nationwide use
 5. Tet Song - Agreement reached with composer Tran Buu Duc for new song in traditional style. Song to be recorded for tapes and records, published in sheet music and leaflet form, produced with orchestra and chorus for movie short and TV.
 6. Game - Simple yet intriguing "parchesi" game with Hoi Chanh competing to reach Chieu Hoi Center. Printed on poster paper for easy use.
 7. Motion Pictures - See Tet Song. Also review "The Leaflet" for reissue in original versions; also short of Tet Song for 1966.
- Two Chieu Hoi films are ready for release. "Return to Happiness" (28 minutes) is designed to enlist popular support and

- 3 -

understanding of the program. It is scheduled for both commercial and non-theatrical distribution. "With Open Arms" (16 minutes) is a troop training and education film and has sound tracks in English, Vietnamese, and Korean. Both films will have wide showing backed by extensive use of other media materials.

8. Radio - Spot announcements.

a. Step up TI&E spots on AFRS and get same style on ARVN radio schedule.

b. Blanket VTN and other stations with Chieu Hoi spots

c. Special programs for VTN and other stations

d. Special programs for VOA and VOF

C. JUSPAO Schedule II (February 5-9)

1. Leaflets - Six to support themes of the Campaign Plan.

a. SP-918A - Appeal to Return 10 million

b. SP-1252 - Chieu Hoi Means Love - 10 million
Friendship

c. SP-1544 - Three leaflets with Appeals
SP-1545 to Families
SP-1546 30 million

d. SP-893 - Safe Conduct Pass 40 million
(revised)

e. SP-1233A- What is Chieu Hoi? 10 million

2. Same as JUSPAO Schedule I (January 1 - February 4)
(paragraphs III B2 - 7).

3. Plastic envelopes - These will be slightly larger than the Safe Conduct Pass. Showing through on one side will be the pass; on the other, Tet greeting (SP-1543) (100,000).

Inserted between the two, and not visible, will be a local leaflet on how to defect in that area and the traditional little red Tet envelope used for giving small amounts of money to children.

4. Tet diary - Comparable to 1966 version; a pocket diary featuring economic and social development and military success, an almanac with traditional astrological predictions and anti-VC cartoons (200,000).

D. JUSPAO Schedule III (February 10-13)

1. Leaflets - Two appropriate to the season
 - a. SP-1543 - Tet greeting 10 million
 - b. SP-893 - Safe Conduct Pass 20 million
(revised)
2. Continue with Tet Song exploitation

E. JUSPAO Schedule IV (February 14-28)

1. Leaflets - Three final appeals to defect
 - a. SP-1539 - "How to Defect" -- 90 million
Printed stationery sheets with one side blank for
local printing of map and instructions by province
and district.
 - b. SP-1389 - "How to Defect" 10 million
 - c. SP-893 - Safe Conduct Pass 40 million
revised

F. Program Execution (In coordination with MACV and GVN as appropriate)

1. National leaflets will be printed and stored in advance through elements of 6th Psyops Battalion and G-5 in IV Corps:
 - a. 244th Psyops Company - Danang
 - b. 245th Psyops Company - Nha Trang and Pleiku
 - c. 246th Psyops Company - Bien Hoa
 - d. G-5 Advisor, IV Corps, Can Tho
 - e. JUSPAO Field Reps - selected leaflets
2. Posters for national distribution will be channeled in normal allotment patterns through JUSPAO Field Representatives.
3. Plastic envelopes will be channeled to JUSPAO Field Representatives according to VC population figures for further distribution through VIS, Armed Propaganda Teams, and other GVN cadre as appropriate. As necessary, air drops will supplement hand distribution, the preferred approach.

4. Van Tac Vu teams will feature campaign materials in their programming during JUSPAO Schedules.

G. Chief, Field Development Division will have overall responsibility for:

1. Developing JUSPAO media (except for Northern Campaign).
2. Determining the media requirements.
3. Coordinating the media production.
4. Developing of Leaflet and Loudspeaker Appendices in coordination with Chief, Field Reps Division (and MACVPD) and the Media Annexes to the 1967 Tet Psywar Plan.
5. Coordinating the preparation of JUSPAO Regional Tet Plan.
6. Coordinating the media requirements for Regional Tet Plans.
7. Coordinating the distribution plans of the media in Regional Tet Plan.
8. Coordinating the execution phase of the 1967 Tet Psywar Campaign.

H. Each JUSPAO Regional Director will be responsible for the preparation, coordination, submission and execution of Regional Tet plans.

I. Chief, Technical Services Division, will be responsible for printing of materials in accordance with a schedule approved by Tet task forces.

J. Chief, Information Division (assisted by Chief, Cultural Division) will prepare a supporting plan for other media in support of Tet 1967.

K. Chief, Northern Campaign, will assist as directed and prepare separate annex for Northern Tet Campaign.

L. Chief, Field Services Division, and Executive Officer will jointly prepare the appendix on Administrative and Logistical support of Tet 1967 campaign and act as executive chairmen to prepare the same annex for the overall Campaign Plan.

M. Chief, Planning Office, will be prepared to pre-test media upon request.

N. JUSPAO Field Representatives are enjoined to generate as much indigenous local interest and support of this campaign as possible, including the development of local plans and materials.

O. Coordination instructions: A maximum effort will be made to seek out counterparts (in GVN and U.S. agencies) and bring about optimum coordination and integration of both military and civilian resources to increase the effectiveness of the Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC INSTRUCTIONS

To be prepared under the joint supervision of Administrative Officer; Chief, Field Reps Division; Chief, Field Development Division; and JUSPAO Publications Officer.

V. REPORTING PROCEDURES: Separate instructions will be issued.

ZORTHIAN

OFFICIAL

BROWNFIELD
11/21/66

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APPENDICES:

- I. Regional Director's Tet Plan - I Corps (to be developed)
- II. Regional Director's Tet Plan - II Corps (to be developed)
- III. Regional Director's Tet Plan - III Corps (to be developed)
- IV. Regional Director's Tet Plan - IV Corps (to be developed)
- V. Distribution Plan, Tet Leaflets - Enclosed
- VI. Loudspeaker Plan (to be developed)
- VII. Other Media Plans (to be developed)

Enclosure:


1. 1967 Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign Plan
2. Distribution Plan, Tet Leaflets

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LEAFLET DESIGNATION:

SP-979 - The GVN is Winning the War

Size : 2 7/8 x 8 1/2 inches (Black & White)



**TẠI SAO
VIỆT CỘNG KHÔNG
GIỮ LỜI HỨA ?**

**VÌ CHÍNH PHỦ
V.N.C.H. ĐANG
CHIẾN THẮNG**

Các lãnh tụ Việt-Cộng thường khoe với thuộc hạ của họ là họ đang chiến thắng lớn lao. Những lời hứa hẹn của họ về việc xây dựng trường học, cấp phát đất đai, mang lại thịnh vượng cho xứ sở văn vân... nghe rất hấp dẫn. Họ gạt gẫm những người đi lính cho họ khiến những người này tin rằng gia đình mình sẽ được bảo-vệ và giúp đỡ.

Nhưng rồi họ chẳng giữ một lời hứa nào cả.

Bị thất bại về quân sự và bị dân chúng oán ghét, bọn lãnh tụ Việt Cộng sẽ còn tiếp tục hứa hẹn thêm nữa. Nhưng những thất bại chồng chất của họ khiến ta biết rằng họ không hy-vọng gì giữ được một lời hứa nào thêm như họ đã từng bội hứa trắng trợn trong quá khứ.

Chắc bạn đã nhận biết những lời hứa của Việt Cộng không thể nào đạt mấy may tin tưởng. **BẠN CÒN THEO HỌ LÀM GÌ?**

SP-979

FRONT SIDE :

WHY HAVEN'T THE VC KEPT THEIR PROMISES?

Translation of slogans from left to right.

- Victory of 1963
- Distribution of land to the people
- Support for the people's aspirations
- Help for soldiers families
- Victory of 1965
- Moonsoon campaign
- The general attack plan
- Help from democratic nations

BACK SIDE :

BECAUSE THE GVN IS WINNING THE WAR

The VC leaders have told their followers year after year that their victory was imminent. They have made grandiose promises of schools and land and prosperity. They have deceived draftees into thinking that their families would be protected and supported.

They have kept none of these promises.

The VC leaders will continue to promise wonderful things because they are becoming desperate in the face of military failures and dwindling popular support. But these failures prove that they will not be able to keep their new promises any better than they kept any of their old ones.

You have seen for yourself that their promises cannot be believed. Why do you follow such leaders?

SP-979

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1542 - Tet Chieu Hoi Appeal highlighting
September election

Size: 3" x 6", one color

**LUNG
CHUC
TAN
XUAN**



Trong cuộc bầu cử Quốc Hội Lập Hiến tháng Chín vừa qua hơn bốn triệu người (hơn 80 phần trăm dân chúng) đã đi bầu chúng tỏ nhân dân ủng hộ thường lối lãnh đạo của Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và không chấp nhận chế độ Cộng-Sản tại miền Nam Việt Nam.

Giờ là lúc dứt khoát rời bỏ hàng ngũ Việt Cộng. Dân chúng đã không còn tin tưởng nơi họ. Bạn còn theo họ làm chi? Hãy theo ý nguyện của toàn dân, trở về với dân tộc xây lại cuộc sống mới vào dịp Tết này. Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa sẽ đón tiếp bạn nồng hậu.

SP-1542

In last September's Constituent Assembly election, the freely cast ballots of over 4 million Vietnamese--more than 80 per cent of those eligible--registered the support of the masses of the people for the leadership and guidance of the GVN and their rejection of the VC in South Vietnam.

Now is the time to leave the failing cause of the VC. They were wrong about the people. Why trust them any longer? Listen to the voice of the masses and start a new life during this Tet season. Return to the cause of the people. The GVN will welcome you with open arms.

SP-1542

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1547 - New Progress is coming to Vietnam

Size : 2 3/4 x 8 1/4 - One color



**TẠI SAO ÔNG
HỒ HỮU NGÂN
HĂNG HẢI HOẠT ĐỘNG?**

VÌ XÚ SỬ ĐANG ĐƯỢC

TIỆN BỘ LỚN LAO

Ông Hồ Hữu Ngân, Chủ tịch Xã Trung An thuộc Tỉnh An Giang đã thấy lợi ích của trường học, đường sá, điện khí, bệnh xá và nhà bảo sanh tại Xã do những nỗ lực mới của Chính Phủ V. N. C. H. nhằm đem lại sự tiến bộ cho những vùng quê. Trong cuộc thảo luận với viên chức Chính Quyền Tỉnh ông nhận thấy rằng "Chẳng những chính quyền đã nghe giải bày mà cũng hiệp ý với những đề nghị xây dựng". Tương phản với hình ảnh xây dựng do Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa, trong trí ông Ngân vẫn còn nhớ đến căn nhà mình bị Việt Cộng đốt và phần nhà hiện nay còn lại vẫn như một kỷ niệm u buồn nhắc nhở trong lòng mọi người.

Bản cũng có thể hưởng được lợi ích của sự tiến bộ hiện đang được thực hiện trên khắp vùng quê Việt Nam, sự tiến bộ đã mang lại ích lợi cho ông Ngân và thôn xóm của ông. Hãy trở về phía Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và góp phần vào công cuộc xây dựng vĩ đại hiện đang phát triển trên toàn quốc.

SP-1547

WHY IS HO HUU NGAN SO ENTHUSIASTIC ?

BECAUSE GREAT NEW PROGRESS IS COMING TO VIET NAM

Ho Huu Ngan, the elected village chief of Trung An in An Giang Province, has seen schools, roads, power installations, dispensary and a maternity come to his village through the GVN's new efforts to bring development and progress to rural areas.

In discussions he has carried on with provincial officials, he found "the officials not only listened to us, but agreed to our proposals." By contrast to the emphasis on construction by the GVN, Ngan vividly remembers that the VC burned his own house, and part remains gutted as a reminder to the people.

You too can share the exciting progress that is taking place in rural Viet Nam and that has brought help to Ho Huu Ngan and his neighbors. Return now to the side of the GVN and join in the great work that is transforming Viet Nam,

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1548 - New Progress is coming to Vietnam

Size : 3 x 6 inches, One color

VÌ XỨ SỞ ĐANG ĐƯỢC TIẾN BỘ LỚN LẠO

Ông Trần Văn Vi và gia đình đã trốn thoát khỏi ách khủng bố Việt Cộng. Khi đến nơi an toàn, họ được Chính-Quyền Việt Nam Cộng Hòa giúp cho một miếng đất rộng 50x30 thước và số tiền 5.900\$ để dựng một căn nhà. Nhờ làm ruộng ông Vi kiếm đủ số gạo ăn trong sáu tháng tới và bây giờ ông đang dành dụm để mua vài con heo. Ông cũng dự định sẽ trồng chuối và khoai.

Bạn cũng có thể hưởng được lợi ích của sự tiến bộ hiện đang thực hiện trên khắp vùng quê Việt-Nam, sự tiến bộ kỳ diệu đã mang lại hạnh phúc và an lành cho gia đình ông Trần Văn Vi. Hãy trở về ngay bên phía Chính Phủ Quốc Gia và góp phần vào cuộc xây dựng vĩ đại hiện đang phát triển trên toàn quốc.



TẠI SAO GIA ĐÌNH ÔNG TRẦN VĂN VI Tươi SÁNG?

SP-1548

Front : WHY IS TRAN VAN VI'S FAMILY HAPPY ?

Reverse : BECAUSE GREAT NEW PROGRESS IS COMING TO VIET NAM

Tran Van Vi and his family are refugees from VC terrorism. On reaching a free and secure area, they received a warm welcome from the GVN which provides a plot of land 50 by 30 meters and 5,900\$VN to build a home. Now working as a farm laborer, Vi has put aside enough rice for the next six months and is saving to buy a few pigs. He also plans to grow bananas and potatoes.

You too can share the exciting progress that is taking place in rural Viet Nam and that has brought happiness and security to Tran Van Vi and his family. Return now to the side of the GVN and join in the great work that is transforming Viet Nam.

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1549 - New Progress is coming to Vietnam

Size : 2 3/4 x 8 1/4 - One color



TẠI SAO CỤ

PHAN-NHO

VUI MỪNG ?



**VÌ XỨ SỞ ĐANG
ĐƯỢC TIẾN BỘ
LỚN LAO**

Cụ Phan Nho 71 tuổi, lúc trước đã rời bỏ quê nhà tại Ấp Bá Canh tại Bình Định để đi tỵ nạn Cộng Sản, nay đã trở về khi nghe Chính Quyền Quốc Gia thiết lập an ninh tại thôn ấp của cụ. Giờ đây cụ ra sức giúp bà con xây dựng lại thôn ấp. Đoàn Cán Bộ Chính Phủ đã giúp dân làng một trường học, một cái cầu, một con đê, một con đường và những nhà chẽ tạo thủ công nghệ. Hợp tác chặc chẽ với nhân dân trong công tác xây dựng, Cụ Nho đã nói "tôi phải để lại một cái gì cho con cái tôi và ... đây là cơ hội cuối cùng ..."

Bạn cũng có thể hưởng được lợi ích của sự tiến bộ hiện đang thực hiện trên khắp vùng quê Việt-Nam, sự tiến bộ đã mang lại hạnh phúc và an lành cho cụ Phan Nho và bà con trong thôn xóm của Cụ. Hãy trở về phía Chính Phủ Việt-Nam Cộng-Hoà và góp phần vào cuộc xây dựng vĩ đại hiện đang phát triển trên toàn quốc.

SP-1549

Front : WHY IS PHAN NHO SO HAPPY ?

Reverse : BECAUSE GREAT NEW PROGRESS IS COMING TO VIETNAM

Formerly a refugee from his home hamlet of Ba Canh in Binh Dinh Province, 71-year-old Phan Nho returned when word reached him that the GVN had reestablished control. He now does all he can to help his neighbors to rebuild and improve his hamlet. Assisting the villagers is a group of specially trained government cadres. Their joint efforts have provided a new school, a bridge, an irrigation ditch, a widened road, and new handicrafts industries. "I must leave something good for my children," says Nho, as he works alongside his neighbors, "and this is my last chance."

You too can share the exciting progress that is taking place in rural Viet Nam and that has brought happiness and security to Phan Nho and his neighbors. Return now to the side of the GVN and join in the great work that is transforming Viet Nam.

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-938A - Tet Chieu Hoi Appeal

Size : 3 1/2 x 5 inches - One color



**Gởi các bạn cán binh
trong hàng ngũ Việt Cộng**

Gia đình và đồng bào đang mở rộng tình thương để tiếp nhận những người con lầm lạc trở về. Quốc gia sẽ mở rộng đôi tay niềm nở đón tiếp các bạn, các bạn sẽ được đổi đời từ tẻ. Cơm no, áo ấm được ân cần săn sóc và một đời sống mới đang chờ đón các bạn.

Trong dịp Tết, các bạn hãy sớm thức tỉnh trở về với Chính Phủ Quốc Gia về với đại gia đình dân tộc hầu làm tròn bổn phận người con yêu của Tổ Quốc.

Chúng tôi chúc bạn một cái Tết vui vẻ.

To Soldiers in the VC ranks,

Your family and people welcome their misled sons with love.

The nation is opening its arms to welcome you with good treatment, food, clothing and a new life which is awaiting you.

On the occasion of Tet, awake and return to the GVN and to the great family of the nation to fulfill your duty as a cherished son of the country.

We wish you a Happy Tet !

DECLASSIFIED

Loneliness in the heart of the Truong Son range,
O mother, I miss our home,
I miss the blue smoke, the gourd arbor,
The little butterflies, the old
Temple roof, O how I miss them all.
So I am here on strangers' soil
But the South is also our country.
Here, I saw the same green-leafed coconut trees,
The same roads perfumed with the scent of rice paddies.
The same blue smoke filling the evening sky,

Reverse :

The buffalo returning to its shelter,
The sound of the flute which make one feel homesick.
As I got over my feeling of estrangement,
I began to look around and wondered
What there was here to liberate?
The markets were crowded with people in gay mood,
The rice field was green with paddies.
From a curve-roofed pagoda came
The sounds of a worship bell.
The classrooms were full of
Cheerful children singing a song in chorus.
And in a plot of garden the
Small butterflies were busy on the
Yellow cabbage flowers.
Peace and happiness reigned
Throughout the country.
But why they ordered me to burn
The villages, destroy the bridges,
Explode the mines and sow death around?
Often my hand trembled
When I had to lay a mine
Only to later witness people blown up
And blood sprayed around.
Whose blood it was?
It was the blood of people like you, mother, and myself.
That night, my eyes were filled with tears
And my sleep was interrupted by nightmares.

THE ABOVE LETTER IN POETRY FORM WAS FOUND ON THE BODY OF A
DEAD SOLDIER OF THE HANOI REGIME KILLED IN THE DUC-CO BATTLE.

SP-695B

DECLASSIFIED

LEAFLET DESIGNATION :
SP-1252 - The real meaning of Chieu Hoi
Size 3x6 inches (Black +White)

CHIÊU HỒI THẬT SỰ CŌ NGHĨA GÌ ?



Chiêu Hồi cõ nghĩa là được sum
họp lại với những người thân
yêu và thoát khỏi cảnh cô-độc
ghê gớm ...

SP-1252

Front side :

WHAT DOES CHIEU HOI REALLY MEAN?

1. Chieu Hoi means being reunited with your loved ones.¹
It means escape from a terrible loneliness.

Back side :

WHAT DOES CHIEU HOI REALLY MEAN?

1. Chieu Hoi means friendship and a chance to serve the fatherland.

CHIÊU HỒI THẬT SỰ CŌ NGHĨA GÌ ?



Chiêu Hồi cõ nghĩa là tìm được tĩnh
bạn vĩa cơ hội gõp phần phục vụ tổ quốc

SP-1252

SP-1252

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1233A - Chieu Hoi Appeal (Rally instructions)

Size : 4 x 5 inches (Black + White)



1. Chủ-trương Chính-Sách Chiêu-Hối được thể hiện bằng một chương-trình thiết thực khoan hồng và xây dựng cho những người lầm đường trở theo Việt-Cộng trở về với Chính-Nghĩa Quốc-Gia.

2. Nếu bạn là một Hối-Chánh-Viên bạn sẽ được đối đãi tử-tế, được bảo-đảm tánh mạng trong tình thương dân-tộc và tổ-quốc.

3. Bạn sẽ được giúp-đỡ phương-tiện khi hoàn lương để sum họp với gia-đình nếu lãnh bạn là nơi được an-ninh hoặc một nơi sinh sống khác tùy theo nguyện-vọng của bạn.

a. Nếu bạn muốn, bạn sẽ được huấn-luyện một nghề thích hợp. Trong bất-cứ trường-hợp nào, Chính-Phủ sẽ giúp đỡ bạn để trở thành công dân tốt trong xã-hội tự-do dân chủ.

b. Bạn sẽ được ưu-tiên nhận lãnh thực-phẩm, tiền bạc và cả những người trong gia-đình cũng sẽ được đối xử tử-tế.

c. Bạn sẽ được trọng thưởng xứng đáng về những tin tức hay vũ khí hồi chánh; từ 800\$ cho súng lục đến 30.000\$ cho súng đại bác 75 ly.

4. Bạn nhớ dấu kỹ truyền đơn này và chờ cơ hội thuận tiện để về trình diện với Quân-Đội Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa hoặc chánh quyền địa phương hay lực lượng Đồng-Minh. Hãy ra trình diện vào ban ngày và đưa hai tay lên khỏi đầu. Nếu có giấy Thông-Hành của Chính-Phủ nhớ mang theo. Bạn có thể dấu vũ-khí một chỗ hoặc mang theo khi về trình-diện. SP-1233A

FRONT:

WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT CHIEU HOI PROGRAM?
 HOW WILL I BE TREATED AS A RETURNEE?
 WHAT WILL THIS PROGRAM DO FOR ME?
 HOW DO I GO ABOUT RALLYING TO THE GOVERNMENT RIGHT CAUSE?

BACK :

1. The Chieu Hoi Program is a plan by which a person can rally to the Government Right Cause after having actively supported the VC.
2. As a returnee you will be treated well, and your life will be guaranteed by the people and the fatherland.
3. You will be given the opportunity to rejoin your family. You will be returned to your native home if it is in a secure area, or to some other area of your choice.

A. If you desire, you will receive vocational training. In any case the Government will assist you to become a good citizen in a free democratic society.

B. You will receive special allowances for food and expenses. Members of your family will also be treated well.

C. You will receive rewards for information and weapons you bring with you--from 800\$VN for a pistol, up to 20,000\$VN for SKZ 75mm.

4. Wait for the opportunity to report to any ARVN unit or Government office, or Allied Force. Report only during daylight. When you report raise your hands above your head. If you have a safe conduct pass, carry it with you. Hide your weapons in a place where they can be found later.

SP-1233A

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-918A - Tet Chieu Hoi Appeal

Size : 2 7/8 x 8 1/2 inches - One color

**HAI MÙA XUÂN**

Có một mùa xuân có khói lửa, tang tóc, thương đau, cảnh sống đọa đày trong núi cao rừng thâm, một mùa xuân ly biệt gia đình và chẳng có ngày mai... MÙA XUÂN CỦA VIỆT CỘNG, mùa xuân của khổ đau chẳng bao giờ dứt.

Cũng có một mùa xuân có khói lam chiều yên lành nơi đất Mẹ miền Nam, một mùa xuân tự do trong tình thương gia đình, ấm áp trong đôi tay Chiêu Hồi rộng mở của Chính Phủ, một mùa xuân mà bạn có thể tìm lại những gì quý giá đã mất, bạn có thể bắt đầu xây dựng những gì đã từ lâu ôm ấp trong lòng... MÙA XUÂN CỦA TÌNH THƯƠNG DÂN TỘC, chẳng hề phai nhạt trong lòng dân đất Việt.

Bạn chọn mùa xuân nào? HÃY TRỞ VỀ VỚI GIA ĐÌNH, VỚI ĐẤT NƯỚC ĐỂ XÂY DỰNG LẠI CUỘC ĐỜI.

SP-918A

Front : WHICH SPRING DO YOU CHOOSE ?

Reverse : Two Springs

There is a Spring with smoke and fire, suffering and mourning, and a life of exile in deep jungles and high mountains; a Spring of family separation, a Spring without a future ... THE SPRING OF THE VC, an unending Spring of deprivation.

There is also a Spring with smoke from peaceful cooking fires rising up from the Southern Motherland, a Spring in which you can enjoy true freedom in the love of your family, when you can feel secure in the Open Arms of the GVN, a Spring when you can start building a future you yearn for in your minds and in your hearts ... THE SPRING OF A PEOPLE'S LOVE ... which has never faded from the inner self of the Vietnamese people.

Which Spring do you choose ? COME BACK TO YOUR FAMILY, COME BACK TO YOUR COUNTRY TO START A NEW LIFE.

LEAFLET DESIGNATION
 SP-1544 - Tet Chieu Hoi Appeal
 Size : 3 x 6 inches - One color



**NHÂN GỖI CÁC ÔNG BÀ CỐ CON
 CHIẾN ĐẤU TRONG HÀNG NGŨ
 VIỆT CỘNG**

Lòng cha mẹ lúc nào cũng lo
 lắng cho số phận con mình.

Chết bất đắc kỳ tử cho một chủ
 thuyết vô hy vọng thật là đau xót.
 Bây giờ phải làm gì?

- Hãy khuyên con mình chọn lấy
 lối thoát danh dự. Trở về theo đường
 lối Chiếu Hồi nhân đạo để được tiếp
 đón tử tế.

Tết là cơ hội có thể cứu con khỏi
 cảnh chết vô nghĩa.

Tết là cơ hội làm lại cuộc đời.

**40 NGÀN VIỆT CỘNG ĐÃ HỒI
 CHÁNH.**

Chính Phủ VNCH và các lực
 lượng Đồng Minh bảo đảm đời sống,
 sự tự do và đời dài tử tế tất cả những
 người trở về. Hãy khuyên con cái
 đồng bào nhân Chánh Sách Chiếu Hồi
 mà trở về vào dịp tết này.

Hãy chỉ dẫn cho họ: Về ban ngày
 -- Giấu khi giới một chỗ mang theo
 một truyền đơn hoặc thông hành của
 Chính Phủ.

Đến trình diện tại bất cứ đồn bót
 hay 1 cơ quan nào của Chính Phủ.
 Con Bà sẽ được đối xử tử tế!

**HÃY KHUYẾN CON CÁI ĐỒNG
 BẢO HUƠNG ỦNG CHÁNH SÁCH
 CHIẾU HỒI NHÂN ĐẠO MÀ TRỞ VỀ
 VÀO DỊP TẾT NÀY !**

SP-1544

**TO MOTHERS AND FATHERS WITH A SON FIGHTING
 WITH THE VIET CONG**

Your hearts must be filled with fear for his life
 To die so young for a lost cause would be tragic
 What can you do ?

Convince him that there is an honorable way out : he will be well treated
 under the humanitarian Chieu Hoi program.

TET is the time to save your son from needless death
 Tet is the time to make a new beginning.

.....

DECLASSIFIED

40,000 FORMER VIET CONG HAVE ALREADY RETURNED

The GVN and its allies guarantee life, good treatment and liberty for all returnees. Tell your sons to take advantage of the humanitarian Chieu Hoi policy this Tet season !

Tell them how : Surrender in daytime - Hide weapons, carry this leaflet or a Safe Conduct Pass

- Surrender to any Government post or any Government agency. Your sons will be well treated.

TELL YOUR SONS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE
CHIEU HOI POLICY THIS TET SEASON !

DECLASSIFIED

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1545 - Appeal to VC's Wives and Mothers

Size : 2 3/4 x 8 1/4 - One color

**Các Bà có người
thân yêu trong
hàng ngũ
Việt Cộng!**

ĐỪNG THẤT VỌNG -- Tết
là dịp có thể chấm dứt nỗi buồn
khó của các bà !

Họ sẽ được đổi xử tử tề và
tính mạng cùng sự tự do của họ
sẽ được bảo đảm !

Hãy nói cho những người
thân yêu của mình biết tại sao
họ cần phải trở về ...

... Vì Cộng Sản không có
chính nghĩa trong khi lực lượng
Việt Nam Cộng Hòa cùng Đồng
Minh ngày một lớn mạnh.

... Vì thời gian đã thay
đổi ... chính Chính Phủ Việt-
Nam Cộng Hòa hiện đang thực
hiện lời hứa đem lại đời sống
no ấm, tiến bộ, thanh bình có
công bằng và tự do cho nhân
dân chứ không phải Việt Cộng.

Hãy chỉ dẫn cho họ cách
trở về. ...

-- Họ có thể trình diện
với bất cứ một đơn vị, đồn bót
hoặc Quận nào của Chính Phủ
Việt Nam Cộng Hòa vào ban
ngày.

-- Họ nên giấu khi giới
một chỗ (sau này có thể lấy
khi giới ra để lãnh thưởng) và
trình ra tờ thông hành của
Chính Phủ hoặc tờ truyền đơn
này. Nếu trở về không có
truyền đơn cũng được. Hãy noi
gương 40 ngàn người đã trở về
với Chính Phủ Quốc Gia.

SP-1545



WIVES AND MOTHERS who have loved ones with the Viet Cong !

DO NOT DESPAIR -- Tet can bring an end to your suffering !

Life, liberty and good treatment are guaranteed !

Tell your loved ones why they should return ...

--- because the Communist cause is lost, and the power of the GVN
and its allies is growing daily.

... because the times have changed, and now it is the GVN not the VC

...

which holds out the promise of a better life, peace, progress, justice and freedom.

Tell them how they can return ...

... during the daytime they can report to any military unit, government post or district town.

... they should hide their weapons (for which rewards can later be received) but show the Safe Conduct Pass, or this leaflet. Even without a leaflet they can return, as 40,000 Hoi Chanh have already done !

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1546 - Appeal to VC's Wives and Mothers

Size : 3 x 6 inches - One color



**NHẬN GỢI CÁC BÀ CÓ CHỒNG
HOẶC CONTRONG HÀNG NGŨ
VIỆT CỘNG**

Tết là thời gian sum họp của gia đình.

Tết cũng là lúc nên kêu gọi chấm dứt cảnh giết chóc vô nghĩa !

Nhân dân không chấp nhận chủ nghĩa Cộng Sản và những chánh sách khủng bố, hiêu chiến. Nhân dân đang chen vai sát cánh xây dựng một ngày mai tươi sáng vẫn không quên đưa tay chờ đón người anh em ở bên phía hàng ngũ Việt Cộng trở về.

Đồng bào hãy khuyến khích người thân yêu của mình nên trở về vào dịp Tết này. 40 ngàn người hồi chánh đã chứng minh cho chánh sách Chiêu Hồi của Chính Phủ.

Hãy khuyến khích người thân yêu của đồng bào bước qua phía Chính Phủ Quốc Gia vào dịp Tết này. Họ sẽ được tiếp đón nồng hậu trong tình thương yêu ruột thịt.

SP-1546

WIVES AND MOTHERS

Tet is the time for family reunion

Tet is the time to call for an end to the needless slaughter

The masses of the people have rejected communism, terrorism and war. While they work for a better future they do not forget to hold out their hand to their brothers on the Viet Cong side.

Tell your loved ones to return during this Tet. 40,000 Hoi Chanh are living proofs of the Chieu Hoi policy !

Tell your loved ones to take their place with the mass of the people on the Government side this Tet ! They will be warmly welcome in brotherly love.

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1543 - Tet Greetings

Size : 3 x 6 inches - 2 colors (Red & Black)

CUNG CHỨC TÂN XUÂN

Xuân lại về với quê hương và dân tộc. Chúng ta may mắn được sống trong vùng do lực lượng Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh bảo vệ khỏi mọi sự phá hoại của Việt Cộng. Đang khi chuẩn bị ăn Tết với gia đình và những người thân yêu, lòng chúng ta không khỏi quặn thắt nghĩ đến nỗi khổ cực mà đồng bào vẫn còn phải chịu dưới ách thống trị của Việt-Cộng.

Mong ước năm mới này sẽ là một năm đầy hạnh phúc cho toàn thể đồng bào, và trước cuối năm có thể được giải thoát khỏi mọi gánh nặng và mọi nỗi lo sợ do Việt Cộng gây nên để sống trong thanh bình và tự do.

CHÚC ĐỒNG BÀO ĐƯỢC VẠN
SỰ NHƯ Ý,

SP-1543



HAPPY NEW YEAR

Spring has again returned to our country and people. We are fortunate enough to live in territory protected from VC incursions by the strength of the GVN and our allies. As we prepare for the joyous festivities of Tet with our families and loved ones, our hearts are saddened by the thoughts of the hardships which the people must still endure under VC domination.

It is our hope that the new year will be a fortunate one for you and that before the year ends you too will be freed from the burdens and fears imposed on you by the VC and come to live in peace and freedom.

GOOD LUCK TO YOU ALL

LEAFLET DESIGNATION

SP-1389 - Chieu Hoi Instructions

Size : 2 7/8 x 8 1/2 - One color

Hãy theo những lời chỉ dẫn sau đây để trở về với hàng ngũ Quốc Gia. Bạn có thể đến tiếp xúc với một viên chức hay 1 đơn vị Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa. Bạn cũng có thể liên lạc với binh sĩ Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa hay Đồng Minh. Họ sẽ sẵn sàng đón tiếp bạn.

Trong mọi trường hợp, vì lý do an ninh, bạn nên theo những lời chỉ dẫn sau đây:

1. Giấu vũ khí một chỗ. Ra trình diện, sau sẽ dẫn binh sĩ Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa trở lại chỗ giấu để lãnh thưởng
2. Khi đến tiếp xúc tại một đơn vị hay với một viên chức có vũ trang, nên đến ban ngày, nên giơ tay lên để tỏ thiện chí của bạn. Nếu có giấy thông hành hay truyền đơn của Chính Phủ Quốc Gia hãy xuất trình.
3. Dầu không có truyền đơn bạn vẫn có thể trở về với Chính Phủ Quốc Gia. Bạn chỉ cần đưa hai tay lên giúp binh sĩ Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh hiểu rõ ý muốn trở về của bạn.



CÙNG CÁC BẠN TRONG HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CỘNG

Khi các bạn trở về với Chính Nghĩa Quốc-Gia, Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa cam kết sẽ tiếp đón các bạn một cách nồng hậu, và sẽ đối xử tử tế. Bạn sẽ được trở về đoàn tụ với gia đình. Nếu bạn và gia đình cần thuốc men hay một sự trợ giúp nào khác Chính Phủ sẽ đặc biệt giúp đỡ. Các bạn sẽ được lãnh thưởng từ 800 đến 20 ngàn đồng tùy theo loại vũ khí bạn mang về.

SP-1389

Front: Follow these instructions to return to the National Just Cause.

You may report to any GVN official at any GVN outpost. Or you may come in to GVN or Allied soldiers; they will readily welcome you.

In any case, follow these instructions for security reasons !

1. Hide your weapons. Later you can lead RVNAF soldiers to the weapons and receive your reward.
2. When reporting to any unit or official whom you can expect to be armed, report only in the daytime; you should hold up your hands to show your good will and display a safe conduct pass or any other leaflet if you have one.
3. Even if you do not have a leaflet, you still can rally. When you come to report, all you have to do is just hold both hands upright to help the GVN and Allied troops understand that you intend to return to the Just Cause.

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Reverse : TO OUR FRIENDS IN THE VIET CONG'S RANKS

On your return to the National Just Cause, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam promises you a warm welcome and good treatment. You will have the opportunity to return to your family, and if you or your family need medical care or other special treatment this will be provided. Special rewards are provided for any weapons brought in, ranging from 800\$ to 20,000\$.

DECLASSIFIED

STATIONERY DESIGNATION

SP-1539 - Chieu Hoi instructions

Size : 3 1/2 x 5 1/4 - One color, reverse blank

(9 leaflets per 10 1/2 x 16 in. sheet)

HÃY THEO NHỮNG CHỈ DẪN SAU ĐÂY ĐỂ TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHÍNH NGHĨA QUỐC GIA



SP-1539

Bạn có thể đến trình diện với 1 viên chức hay 1 đồn bót Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa. Bạn cũng có thể liên lạc với binh sĩ Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa hay đồng minh. Họ sẽ sẵn sàng đón tiếp bạn.

Trong mọi trường hợp, vì lý do an ninh, bạn nên theo những chỉ dẫn sau đây:

1. Giấu vũ khí một chỗ - Ra trình diện, sau sẽ dẫn binh sĩ Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa trở lại chỗ giấu để lãnh thưởng.
2. Khi đến trình diện một đơn vị hay một viên chức có vũ trang, nên đến ban ngày, và nên giơ tay lên để tỏ thiện chí của bạn - Nếu có giấy thông hành của Chính Phủ hay truyền đơn, hãy xuất trình.
3. Dầu không có truyền đơn bạn vẫn có thể ra trình diện. Khi đến trình diện chỉ cần đưa hai tay cao lên để giúp binh sĩ Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh hiểu rõ ý muốn trở về chính nghĩa của bạn.

FRONT

FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO RETURN TO THE NATIONAL JUST CAUSE.

You may report to any GVN official at any GVN outpost. Or you may come in to GVN or Allied soldiers; they will readily welcome you.

In any case, follow these instructions for security reasons !

1. Hide your weapons. Later you can lead RVNAF soldiers to the weapons and receive your reward.
2. When reporting to any unit or official whom you can expect to be armed, report only in the daytime; you should hold up your hands to show your good will and display a safe conduct pass or any other leaflet if you have one.
3. Even if you do not have a leaflet, you still can rally. When you come to report, all you have to do is just hold both hands upright to help the GVN and Allied troops understand that you intend to return to the Just Cause.

REVERSE

(Blank - for local maps or messages)

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III MAF PSYOP ORIENTATION COURSE
244TH PSYOP CO.
15 - 17 Feb 1967

15 Feb 1967 0800-0830 Greeting and scope by Company Commander and Force PSYOP Officer

0830-0930 III MAF PSC & Co. Operation Orientation

0930-1030 Intelligence Operations Orientation

1030-1100 Coffee break

1100-1200 Reproduction Operations Orientation

1200-1400 Open time

1400-1500 Use of Printed Matter in PSYOPS

1500-1600 Concept of Propaganda

1600-1700 Intelligence for Psychological Operations

16 Feb 1967 0800-0900 Utilization of PSYOP aircraft

0900-1100 Development of a leaflet

1100-1200 Sources and Agencies

1200-1400 Open time

1400-1500 Familiarization with Chieu Hoi Program

1600-1700 A-V Orientation

1700-1800 Chow

1800-2000 A-V Mission in Support of CAC

17 Feb 1967 0730-1200 Combat Loudspeaker Operation at Hill 55

1200-1400 Open time

1400-1600 Preparation of PSYOP Plan and Annex

1600-1700 Closing remarks by Company Commander and Force PSYOP Officer

~~ANNEX "A"~~

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OPERATION "HOME FRONT"

1. Purpose. To establish a face-to-face psychological operations program aimed at the Vietnamese communities which includes direct appeals to the VC; appeals to the VC through their families; and a program designed to deny or reduce support provided to the VC by the people, and to obtain maximum support for our forces and objectives.

2. Discussion. Extensive use is being made of aerial leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts, distribution of propaganda material by hand, use of loudspeaker and audio visual teams of the 244th PSYOPS Company, various types of festivals such as Elder's Day, Mother's Day and Movies to achieve the objectives indicated in paragraph 1.. This effort must be expanded and systematized in order to ensure the best possible program and the most effective use of available resources.

3. Action

a. Commanders will establish a face-to-face PSYOPS campaign which will encompass each hamlet or village within his area of operation or influence. Media employed will include as many of the following as possible:

(1) Hand distribution of propaganda and news material. Use of returnees, armed propaganda teams, and VIS personnel is highly desirable.

(2) Loudspeaker programs with organic equipment or 244th PSYOPS Company loudspeaker teams. These programs should include taped or live speeches by GVN officials, returnees and appeals based on specific information or situation in the particular locale.

(3) Movie programs in conjunction with (1) and (2) to include a balance of entertainment and propaganda material.

(4) Special festivals which incorporates elements of (1), (2), and (3) as appropriate and live entertainment when available, and honors a particular group, holiday or occasion.

b. Particular emphasis will be placed on reaching hamlets or villages with known VC families and VC sympathizers on a recurring basis as frequently as possible in accordance with Force Order 3410.3.

c. These programs will be coordinated with and utilize whenever possible, the resources of the GVN and US agencies.

d. Audio Visual teams of the 244th PSYOPS Company are available to conduct surveys and assist in the development of PSYOP Campaign plans.

ENCLOSURE (4)

4. Radio stations. The radio stations in I Corps are being improved rapidly and can be a powerful influence on the Vietnamese Communities. Although not a part of the face-to-face media for operation "Home Front" it is essential that full advantage of this capability be realized in achieving the objectives contained in paragraph 1.. Therefore, commanders will determine the availability of radio receivers in their area of responsibility. Operation "Home Front" will include plans to provide radio reception of GVN stations to the number of hamlets and villages. Requirements for radio receivers and radio receiver/loudspeaker system will be submitted to this Headquarters by 1 March initially as occurring thereafter.

5. Reports

- a. Submit copies of operation "Home Front" plans to this Headquarters (Attn: PSYOP).
- b. Include resume of campaign in daily, weekly and monthly PSYOP reports as appropriate.
- c. Submit requirements for radios as indicated in paragraph 4..

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONFERENCE

25 JANUARY 1967

0830-1130

III MAF CONFERENCE ROOM

DANANG EAST, VIETNAM

Tab A - General Agenda

Tab B - Battalion Level TAOR PSYOP
Campaign Plan

Tab C - Operation "Home Front"

Tab D - Vietnamese New Year (TET)

UNCLASSIFIED

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The following is a partial listing of personnel attending the conference. A written roster was not obtained and the tape recording of the conference did not include the names of all personnel attending.

Col R. R. READ	III MAF PSYOPS
LtCol DAUSMAN	1ST MARDIV
Maj E. D. CAHILL	III MAF PSYOPS
Maj KRAUSS	1ST MARDIV
Maj SPLEAN	3RD MARDIV
Maj BROWN	5TH ACS
Maj PANZER	MACV
Capt LUCKEY	III MAF PSYOPS
Capt BLACK	1ST MARINES
Capt COOPER	9TH MARINES
Capt DARCY	3/7
Capt AUSTIN	1/7
Capt PALMER	244TH PSYOPS
Capt McCAIG	244TH PSYOPS
Capt GAFFNEY	USAF
Lt (JG) HORNESIAN .	NSA
1ST Lt RICE	244TH PSYOPS
Lt BEERS	3RD MARDIV
Lt MORTZ	4TH MARINES
Lt BURNS	1/3
Lt DALES	unk
LT MORGAN	4TH MARINES
Lt BCAKEY	1/26
W.O. HARRIS	3RD ST
GySgt WILLIAMS	unk
GySgt McLEAN	1ST MARINES
SSgt ROBINSON	1ST MARINES

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SSgt FAST

2/4

SSgt KENNEDY

1ST MARINES

L/Cpl WALSH

1ST MARINES

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Colonel R. R. READ opened the meeting with a word of welcome. He covered in general the development of written plans for the ground employment of psychological operations.

Captain McCAIG - 244TH PSYOP CO - TAOR PSYOP Planning

Capt McCAIG noted that we have been working to a greater degree in the use of leaflets via airdrop than we have in developing ground (face-to-face) employment of psychological operations.

We must develop plans for the greater employment of ground support and increase the use of the HE & HB teams.

To his knowledge no psyops plan has been developed for Battalion level operations. Today he presented a concept for developing a Battalion psychological operations plan based on the situation as it exists.

The following items were covered:

SURVEY:

Coordinate with all agencies available i.e.: G-2/S-2, translators, village and province officials, propaganda platoon. Sample the population. Control your survey. Without controls a survey will be useless.

DEVELOP AN OBJECTIVE:

Use common sense in developing your objective. Through your survey you should deduce a psychological objective to be accomplished.

ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE:

Consider all the resources available to you in gaining your objective. Concentrate on the key opinion makers in your area; i.e. officials, associations, village elders, etc.. Use all the media available to reach the people.

EVALUATE YOUR PLAN:

Once the plan is developed - stop - evaluate your plan to insure the objective is valid.

TROOP INFORMATION:

Inform the troops of your plan - let the troops know what the objective of the plan is. This is critical - if the troops don't understand the objective you will not be able to reach it.

RECORDS:

Complete records must be maintained. Without complete data your relief will not know what has been accomplished and would have to start a complete program again. Complete records in a turn over file will insure continuity.

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab B was issued for information.

Tab C was issued for information

DISCUSSION:

The following items were discussed after Captain McCaig concluded his remarks:

1. Vietnamese Information Service in your area may be useful in developing/exploiting an objective.
2. Armed Propaganda Teams training and usefulness, where available, was reviewed.
3. JUSPAO assistance must be coordinated.
4. PSYOPS will assist wherever possible. Let us know your requirements.
5. Include broadcasting in your survey. III MAF PSYOPS will work on getting commercial receivers in your areas when your requirements are known.
6. JUSPAO has printed material available but it is costly and must be closely controlled.

Lt BUNN - NAVSUPACT, DANANG - NSA PSYOPS IN DANANG

Lt BUNN was unable to attend the conference. Lt HURNESIAN discussed very briefly the NAVSUPACT program in Danang. PSYOPS has been considered a part of Civic Action by this organization. NAVSUPACT is assisting in the support of the Chieu Hoi Center in Danang.

Capt McCaig - 244TH PSYOPS CO - PSYOPS in Support of Revolutionary Development

Revolutionary Development consists of three phases:

1. Clearing operations
2. Pacification
3. Nation Building

PSYOPS in phase 1 are being conducted daily by U.S. Marines. Psyops in phase 2 and 3 are the primary responsibility of the Vietnamese. We should be prepared to support their efforts as required.

The RD teams are trained and orientated toward building good will toward the government rather than working to destroy the image of the V.C.

The ARVN is being indoctrinated in the aims of the government program and training is aimed at getting the average soldier to win the people to the side of the government through fair and just treatment.

DISCUSSION:

Coordination of effort is difficult. We must, wherever RD programs are in effect, initiate action to insure coordination. R.D. personnel will seldom if ever initiate action to coordinate.

Major SPLEAN - 3RD MARDIV - 3RD MARDIV PSYOPS

Face-to-face contact has been established in this area through use of road blocks. Highway 1 has had check points established for some time. The Provost Marshall cooperates by using the check points to distribute JUSPAO Newspapers and leaflets. A fear was expressed that the program would create a litter problem but this fear has proven false. During the period 21Dec66 thru 25Jan67 only two leaflets were picked up on the highway. It is considered this method of distribution is very effective. People are accepting and retaining leaflets and/or safe conduct passes where person to person contact is made.

Capt LUCKEY - III MAF PSYOPS - KIT CARSON SCOUTS

Capt LUCKEY reviewed the history of the "Kit Carson" Scout program. A discussion of the procurement, use, and payment of scouts followed. Problems of handling i.e. rank, privileges, etc. were discussed with the general conclusion that scouts were individuals and the local problems could be handled by a variety of means.

The III MAF SOP on procurement and handling of scouts has been staffed and will be distributed to the field within the next two weeks.

Major KRAUSS - 1ST MARDIV - 1ST MARDIV PSYOPS

Liaison personnel are being screened to work with the Chieu Hoi centers in the Kit Carson Scout Program. These personnel will select individual returnees who seem likely candidates.

Chieu Hoi personnel can be used as trainees, without pay, to further screen them and determine their qualifications for the program.

Battalions using scouts should report weekly on their activities.

Suggest we review the leaflets in the system with a view toward reducing the number available and improving the content of the reduced quantity.

Capt PALMER - 244TH PSYOPS - TET CAMPAIGN

Capt PALMER - reviewed the 4 phases of the 67 TET Campaign and reviewed the leaflet drops to date. He reminded the conferees that target requests for phase two are due now.

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Major BROWN - 5TH ACS - AIR SUPPORT

Major BROWN discussed aircraft availability to support the PSYOPS of the MAF. He reminded the personnel the "DOL" drops were available and if desired to note same on drop request. (DOL is a delayed dispersion of leaflets thru the use of a small explosive device. It can be set for any altitude desired). A replacement aircraft for the U-10 should be in by late June which will increase the squadrons capability for all weather operations.

Col READ - III MAF PSYOPS - GENERAL DISCUSSION

Cultural Drama Teams are preferable in County Fair operations vice the Drum and Bugle Corps. Liaison is being made with JUSPAO to guarantee availability of teams when needed.

Loudspeaker systems are still in short supply. Items to activate all loudspeaker systems are due in 9Feb67.

Indoctrination of troops on how to handle ralliers is extremely important. Spot checks indicate laxity in this regard. Re-emphasize the Chieu Hoi program.

A system of reporting returnees must be established. III MAF PSYOPS will review the present procedure and establish a standard.

The monthly PSYOPS report was discussed. More detail was requested in the narrative portion of the report.

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO San Francisco California 96602

7B/jrl

7 JAN 1967

COMMAND DIRECTORY

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBERS</u> <u>"PARCHMENT" OR</u> <u>AS INDICATED</u>	<u>RTD</u>
<u>COMMAND SECTION</u>				
CG III MAF	LtGen	WALT, L. W.	6, Danang 6100	6/67
Senior Aide	Capt	LEE, W. F.	13, Danang 6449	6/67
Admin Asst	Capt	SRAMEK, J. S. Jr	13, Danang 6449	4/67
Junior Aide	1stLt	SHOFF, J. R.	13, Danang 6449	6/67
VN Aide	Capt	QUY, VoDinh	6, Danang 6449	
Political Advisor	Mr	FRANCIS, A. S.	Danang 6293	1/68
Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	ELDREDGE, T. G.	109	5/67
<u>CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION</u>				
Chief of Staff	BGen	H. M. ELWOOD	5, Danang 6383	5/67
Dep Chief of Staff	Col	NEVILLE, R. E.	305, Danang 6405	8/67
Staff Secretary	LtCol	CANZONIERI, J. V.	38, Danang 6383/6100	9/67
Admin Asst to the Chief of Staff	2dLt	SCHAUER, T. W.	5	3/67
<u>G-1 SECTION</u>				
Asst C/S G-1	Col	MAHON, J. L.	1, Danang 6583	6/67
Asst G-1	LtCol	HOLT, T. J.	1	9/67
MACV TMO	LtCol	JOHNSON, J. C.	153 Motley	12/67
Asst G-1	Maj	FOLSOM, C. A.	101	7/67
<u>G-2 SECTION</u>				
Asst C/S G-2/SSO	Col	THOMPSON, R. H.	2, Danang 6512	9/67
IntelPlans/Est Off	LtCol	CHAPLIN, D. D. III	702	9/67
AsstIntelOpsOff	LtCol	FRAZIER, P. N.	202	8/67
IntelOpsOff	LtCol	FRENCH, H. D.	202	9/67
IntelCollOff	LtCol	GREEN, F. A.	102, Danang 6309	8/67
Asst G-2/ASSO	LtCol	WATTERSON, D. E.	2, Danang 6215	7/67
AsstPlans/EstOff	Maj	BAKER, W. H.	702	1/67
CollAnalystOff	Maj	DANIELSON, D. C.	102	11/67
OOB/ASSO	Maj	GIUBILATO, J. J.	202	10/67
SpecIntelOff/ASSO	Maj	HUNTER, M.	402	7/67
IntelWatchSupvr	Maj	MCCOART, J. J.	COC 102	4/67
Staff CI OFF	Maj	MONTGOMERY, B. R.	702, Danang 6309	9/67
Grd Recon Off	Maj	REHFUS, R. A.	102	8/67
AsstIntelPlans/EstOff	Maj	SPARKS, J. A.	702	

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G-2 SECTION (CONT)

IntelWatchOff	Capt	COLLINS, W.	COC 102	3/67
TIO	Capt	PASSIER, G. D.	202	12/67
AsstOOBOff	Capt	HAVEN, T. W.	202	8/67
IntelWatchOff	Capt	KIRKHAM, J. H.	COC 102	5/67
IntelWatchOff	Capt	MUNDY, C. E.	COC 102	12/67
AsstSpecIntelOff/ASSO	2dLt	HARTMAN, D. W.	402	3/67
Admin/IntelOff	2dLt	HAYWARD, T. E.	2, Danang 6512	8/67
Asst TIO	2dLt	JOHNSTON, B. J.	202	2/67
AsstOOBOff	2dLt	MCCALL, W. D. Jr	202	1/68
AsstStaffCIOff	2dLt	SCOTT, J.	702, Danang 6309	11/67
Elec Warfare Off	WO-1	MORGAN, R.	402	9/67
Signal Intel Off	WO-1	RICHARDSON, H. A.	402	1/68
Asst Staff CI Off	2dLt	JOELS, D. K.	702, Danang 6309	1/68
Signal Intel Off	WO-1	TERRY, L. W.	402	11/67
Aerial Recon/PhotoOff	2dLt	AILSTOCK, J. W.	102	12/67
Aerial Recon/PhotoOff	2dLt	DEFRANK, J. W.	102	8/67
Aerial Recon/PhotoOff	2dLt	MORRIS, C. A.	102	4/67
5th CI Team Off	Capt	NARDO, J. F.	380	9/67

G-3 SECTION

Asst C/S G-3	Col	BARRETT, D. J. Jr	3, Danang 6232	7/67
Oper Off	Col	RADICS, E. J.	303, Danang 6489	10/67
Ln Off MACV	Col	WEST, R. E.	TIGER 448 Saigon	5/67
Asst G-3	Col	WILSON, R. W.	3, Danang 6232	7/67
R&D Officer	LtCol	BAERISWYL, L. Jr	803	9/67
AsstPlans Off	LtCol	COFFMAN, H. L.	603	3/67
ABDC/RF/PF	LtCol	HEWLETT, M. M.	603	8/67
Opns Off Gnd	LtCol	JACKSON, M. C. Jr	403	8/67
COC Watch Off	LtCol	LIVINGSTON, G. M. B.	103	8/67
Ln Off 2d Bde ROKMC	LtCol	PARADIS, E. J.	COC Chung Yung	9/67
Ln Off 7thAF	LtCol	PRESTRIDGE, J. C.	31163 Saigon	10/67
Asst Opns Off	LtCol	SUMERLIN, E. "B" Jr	303	11/67
Opns Off Gnd	LtCol	SHRADER, P. A.	503	9/67
Plans/Pro Off	LtCol	VOLKERT, M. D.	603	8/67
OIC COC	LtCol	YOUNG, R. E.	COC 103	8/67
Asst Opns Off	Maj	ANDERSON, T. A.	503, Danang 6489	2/67
Asst Opns Off	Maj	BARSTOW, C. A.	503	10/67
COC Watch Off	Maj	BAILEY, G. R.	COC 103	7/67
Asst Air Off	Maj	CARDWELL, R. E.	303, Danang 6489	3/67
Asst Hist	Maj	DAVIS, G. A.	43	9/67
Historical Off	Maj	FAHEY, J. E.	43	8/67
Air Opns Off	Maj	FIBICH, M. J. Jr	303, Danang 6489	2/67
Asst Opns Off Gnd	Maj	FRIEDRICH, P. B.	503, Danang 6489	9/67
Asst Opns Off Air	Maj	GOWDY, R. J.	303, Danang 6489	4/67
Asst Opns Off Gnd	Maj	HUTCHISSON, W. R.	503, Danang 6489	8/67
Asst LnOff 7thAF	Maj	FRITCHETT, L. C.	31163 Saigon	3/67
Training Off	Maj	ROBINETT, H. M.	803	3/67
LnOff to MACV	Maj	START, R. J.	448 TIGER	6/67
COC Watch Off	Maj	ESAU, R. H. Jr	COC 103	8/67

G-3 SECTION (CONT)

Sitrep/Hisrep Off	Capt	COLLINS, F. A.	COC 903	4/67
Asst RF/PF Off	Capt	LUCAS, A. F.	603	10/67
Hist Team Ldr	Capt	ROSS, R. A.	43	11/67
DirVietLangScol	2dLt	LENT, H. G.	119	6/67
OIC Drafting	2dLt	MELSON, D. H.	903	6/67
COC Watch Off	CWO-3	KENNEDY, J. E.	COC 103	8/67
Hist Team Ldr	WO	COMBS, R. J.	43	9/67
NGFO	LCdr	LEASE, M. D. (USN)	403	6/67
ROKMC In Off	LtCol	LEE, Myong Bok	24	
ARVN In Off	LtCol	KHUY, Lai-Van	224	
ROKMC In Off	Maj	YOON, Won Jun	24	
ARVN In Off	Capt	CHUNG, Ha-Ba	224	
ARVN In Off	2dLt	LIEM, Chau-Kim	224	
ARVN In Off	2dLt	TUYEN, Nguyen-Van	224	

G-4 SECTION

Asst C/S G-4	Col	QUILTY, J. F.	4	6/67
Asst G-4	Col	CIBIK, S. J.	4	2/67
Log Opns Off	LtCol	BAILEY, A. S.	304	8/67
Log Liaison Off	LtCol	JONES, C. T.	304	7/67
Log Plans Off	LtCol	SNAPPER, J. N.	204	3/67
AsstLogPlansOffGnd	Maj	DUTTON, T. A.	204	7/67
AsstLogPlansOffAir	Maj	WHALLEY, A.	204	1/68
Asst Log Opns Off	Maj	JONES, R. D.	304	7/67
Asst Log Opns Off	Maj	CHARRON, D.	304	12/67

G-5 SECTION

Asst C/S G-5	Col	HOLMGRAIN, E. S.	301, Danang 6419	2/67
Asst G-5	Col	ROSS, G. O.	301, Danang 6419	7/67
Opns Off	LtCol	EVANS, D. L.	46, 301	3/67
Reports Control Off	Capt	DOUGLAS, D. M.	46	3/67
Admin Off	Capt	GREMELS, N. H.	301, Danang 6419	3/67
Medical Off	LCdr	NOURIGAT, E. R.	46	10/67

COMPTROLLER SECTION

Asst C/S Compt	LtCol	SNOW, M. W.	50	7/67
Fiscal Off	2dLt	CROCKFORD, R. K.	50	9/67

ADJUTANT SECTION

Force Adjutant	Maj	REVILLE, J. T.	7, 207	8/67
Asst Adj/OIC S&C	2dLt	MATTOX, L.	107	10/67
Asst Adj/Pers Off	WO	OAKES, M. A.	207	5/67

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Force Chaplain	Capt	LYONS, V. E. Jr	19	10/67
Asst Force Chaplain	Cdr	HERSHBERGER, J. R.	19	9/67

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COMM/ELECT SECTION

CEO	Col	HILL, J. B.	10	4/67
Asst CEO/Avionics Off	Maj	KYLE, D. N.	110	2/67
Asst CEO	Maj	HULL, R. R.	210	3/67
Asst CEO	Maj	COLLINS, G. L.	410	9/67
Asst CEO	Maj	FRASER, J. H.	310	8/67
Asst CEO	Capt	BORDERS, J. F.	310	4/67

DENTAL SECTION

Force Dental Off	Capt	MORGAN, K. L. (USN)	40	4/67
Admin Asst	Lt	NEILL, G. S. (USN)	40	2/67

EMBARK/TRANS SECTION

Embark Off	Maj	SILVERTHORN, E. A.	39	7/67
Asst Embark Off	Capt	SAYE, D. A.	39	12/67
Asst Embark Off	Capt	REVES, S. S.	39	8/67
Asst Embark Off	2dLt	RHODES, D. L.	39	4/67

ENGINEER SECTION

Force Engineer	Col	HORN, C. H.	15	9/67
Asst Force Engr	LtCol	BABE, G. A.	15	8/67
CEC Off	LCdr	MULDER, W. H.	15	6/67
Engr Opns Off	Capt	FLESSNER, M.	15	8/67
Engr Utilities Off	Capt	NELMS, R.	15	9/67
Plans Off	1stLt	WILLIAMS, L. R.	115	3/67

FOOD SERVICES SECTION

Food Services Off	Maj	HALL, W. B.	58 Moment	9/67
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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Headquarters Cmdt	MAJ	SYLVESTER, V. L.	34	10/67
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INFORMATION SECTION (CIB)

Force ISO	Col	FIELDS, T. M.	Danang 6259	2/67
MACVOI III MAF In Off	LtCol	WILLIAMS, J. F.	92026 Saigon	11/67
Asst ISO	Maj	HAIGHT, W. P.	Danang 6259	6/67
Asst ISO	Capt	STACKPOLE, H. C.	Danang 6259	9/67
Asst ISO	2dLt	ARNOLD, R. E.	Danang 6259	10/67
Photo Off	WO	CORNUET, G. S.	Danang 6259	7/67

LEGAL SECTION

Force Legal Off	Col*	NEVILLE, R. B.	Danang 4409	8/67
Asst Force Legal Off	Capt	DE MARCO, J. R.	Danang 4405	8/67

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

Force MT Off	LtCol	TONNACLIFF, C. W.	35	8/67
MT Opn Off	Maj	TASHJIAN, R. C.	35	10/67

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION (CONT)

MT Maint Off	1stLt	PEARCE, D. B.	35	4/67
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MEDICAL SECTION

Force Surgeon	Capt	BAKER, H. A. (USN)	16	5/67
Admin Asst	Cdr	BROULIK, F. (USN)	16	7/67

ORDNANCE SECTION

Force Ordnance Off	LtCol	THOMAS, J. C.	8, 108	8/67
Ground Ordnance Off	Capt	COULTER, R. S.	108, 8	7/67
Trac Veh Ord Off	2dLt	BIGLER, D. P.	108, 8	2/67

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION

Opns Anal Off	Maj	ABERNATHY, T. R.	108	9/67
Asst Opns Anal Off	Capt	JOHNSON, R. R.	108	8/67

POSTAL SECTION

Postal Off	Maj	COURTNEY, J. R.	7, 207	7/67
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PROTOCOL SECTION

Protocol Off	Maj	LIVINGSTONE, J. A.	62	10/67
Asst Protocol Off	Capt	PIERZCHALA, R. P.	62	6/57

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

Provost Marshal	LtCol	SULLIVAN, C. H.	27	9/67
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SECTION

Psy Ops Off	Col	READ, R. R.	401	7/67
Asst Psy Ops Off	Maj	ARMSTRONG, S. A.	401	1/67
Asst Psy Ops Off	Capt	LUCKEY, S. A.	401	4/67

REPRODUCTION SECTION

Repro Off	CWO-3	SPIKES, A. W.	307	3/67
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RED CROSS SECTION

Red Cross Rep	Mr	JOYCE, R. E.	119 Nites & Sun	119
Red Cross Rep	Mr	SMITH, R. W.	119 Moment	

SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

Spl Serv Off	Col	SACHS, C. A.	37	7/67
Asst Spl Serv Off	LtCol	PLASKETT, W. Jr	37	9/67
Asst Spl Serv Off	Maj	DREBUSHENKO, W.	37	8/67

SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION (CONT)

R&R Off	Capt	✓ GUINN, W. R.	144, 241	8/67
OIC China Beach	Capt	BROOKS, H. H.	341	2/67
Custodian	Capt	✓ DIETRICH, R. H.	37	2/67
Escort Off	WO	BURNETT, L. H.	37	12/67

SUPPLY SECTION

Force Sup Off	Col	HILL, A. T.	21	7/67
Asst For Sup Off	LtCol	ROURKE, R. E.	21	8/67
Asst Sup Off	Maj	WEILAND, J. K.	121	10/67
Asst Sup Off	Maj	LYNCH, T. K.	121	10/67

H&S COMPANY

Commanding Off	Maj*	SYLVESTER, V. L.	34	10/67
Executive Off	Capt	SINCLAIR, D. K. Jr	34	10/67
Admin Off	WO	DESHOTEL, B. J.	34	7/67
S-3/S-4	Capt ✓	BINCH, W. B.	34	6/67
Motor Transport Off	Capt	CASPAR, W. R.	135	12/67
Food Services Off	Capt	HANSON, J.	57	2/67
Clubs Off	Capt	PAVLOVSKIS, V. V.	58	5/67
Disbursing Off	2dLt	CLARK, C. V.	18	2/67
Security Off	2dLt	EVANS, M. J.	27	7/67
Maintenance Off	2dLt	DOWD, O. H.	84	6/67

SUB-UNIT #1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION

Commanding Off	Capt	RADER, R. W.	53, 453	2/67
Opns Off	Capt	JONES, T. E.	82	2/67


29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY

Commanding Off	LtCol	STEVENS, L. A.	80	6/67
Executive Off	Maj	BURT, G.	80	12/67
Admin Off	Capt	TENNANT, D. D.	180	6/67
Opns Off	Capt	FLYNN, J. E.	280	2/67

244TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY

Commanding Off	Capt	MCCAIG, T. H.	85	9/67
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* Denotes additional, joint or attached duty
Report errors, changes and/or omissions in writing to the Force Adjutant.


J. T. REVILLE
Force Adjutant