


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8 JANUARY 1967

Hb6 ROKME
G-2

PERINTREP NO. 1-67



GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 III MAF
 DANANG, RVN
 8 January 1967
 Ser: 07867

PERINTREP NO. 1-67

Period Covered: 010001H - 072400H Jan 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - SOUTHERN DMZ. There was no significant enemy ground action reported from northern QUANG TRI (P). Light enemy activity was noted in the general area north of Route 9 between THON SON LAM to the west and GIO LINH to the east. On 4 January the GIO LINH outpost (YD 191739) received approximately 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire which fell outside of the outpost compound. No friendly casualties were reported. On 4 and 6 January two Air Observers, on separate missions, observed small groups of squad and possibly platoon size elements at (YD 055652) and (YD 135655). Artillery and air was called in and an undetermined number of KIA (probable) resulted. Ground reconnaissance north and northwest of THON SON LAM produced few sightings over the week, although, on 4 January in the vicinity of (YD 056652), a reconnaissance insert received heavy small arms and mortar fire from an estimated VC or NVA platoon. The patrol was extracted. Enemy casualties were undetermined. To the southwest of this contact and at (YD 035645), a reconnaissance patrol received automatic weapons fire from an estimated NVA platoon. Supporting fires were called for and eight NVA KIA (probable) resulted. Northwestern QUANG TRI (P) remained quiet and inclement weather precluded normal aerial photographic coverage of the northern area. The enemy situation within the DMZ remains basically unchanged from prior reporting periods. There continues to be no indications of imminent and major enemy offensive ground action, although possible enemy harassing and probing efforts may be forthcoming in northeastern QUANG TRI (P). In the eastern portion of the province in the vicinity of (YD 315545), a U.S. Army jeep carrying two U.S. Advisors and two ARVN was ambushed on 2 January by an estimated two squads of VC. One U.S. was WIA (DOW). The enemy accomplished the ambush through utilization of automatic weapons located on both sides of the road. No enemy casualties were reported. One RF company was eventually committed as a reaction force, however, results were negative. Elsewhere in QUANG TRI (P) enemy activity was limited to small scale harassing actions.

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b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There was a slight decrease in the tempo of enemy activity in northeastern coastal THUA THIEN (P) when compared to the last three reporting periods. Two incidents of sabotage occurred in this area on 1 and 2 January. In the 1st, an estimated VC platoon entered MY XUYEN (H) some eight kilometers southeast of HAI LONG (YD 485410) and destroyed 500 meters of protective fence. In the latter incident, a Marine truck detonated a mine approximately 15 feet off the road at (YD 532318). Casualties were eight WIA. On 31 December elements of the 1st Bn, 3rd ARVN Regt received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two platoons of VC at (YD 589429). ARVN returned the fire and the VC broke contact and fled. Casualties were minor. Ground reconnaissance in the general area (YD 5025) produced sightings totaling approximately 80 VC. This activity was noted in the same general area where last week, over 1,000 VC were observed. In the CHINOOK area of operations (YD 5330) two of the four ARVN soldiers who had previously been captured by the VC and then escaped, returned to 3rd Bn, 26th Marines on 5 January. Their interrogation revealed two main points. One - recent enemy activity in this portion of THUA THIEN (P) has been associated with an apparent major rice resupply effort involving main force units. Two - the large concentration of 1,000 VC observed by Marine reconnaissance on 31 December apparently sustained casualties as a result of our artillery and air which was subsequently brought to bear on the enemy. The other two escapees indicated essentially the same thing. South of the CHINOOK area at (YD 784135) elements of the 21st ARVN Ranger Bn deployed in night defensive positions received small arms fire from an estimated VC squad. The engagement resulted in two VC KIA and two captured. The captured VC were local guerrillas. A document taken from one of the dead indicated that the VC had been a psychological warfare officer of the 1st Co, 804th Main Force Bn. This association of Main Force to local guerrilla presents another possible indication of elements of Main Force Units operating with local guerrillas. The remainder of coastal THUA THIEN (P) was, comparatively speaking, quiet. Nothing of significance was reported between PHU BAI and DANANG. There was a drop in the number of VC initiated incidents within the PHU BAI TAOR and these occurred along the LOC.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance within the western portion of the DANANG TAOR reported light sightings of armed VC. Those elements south of the TAOR observed 25 VC and approximately 90 VCS at (AT 9537) on 6 January. A fairly significant contact was reported from the THOUNG DUC CIDG Camp on 6 January when a patrol engaged an estimated two platoons of VC east of the camp. This engagement resulted in three VC KIA and two weapons captured. Operation LINCOLN, in progress in the area (AT 8840), reported only light contact with the enemy. Low level agent reports covering the area just southeast of the DANANG TAOR indicated a slight increase in enemy movement; these reports are however unconfirmed. On 5 January a 20 man platoon from the 706th RF Co was

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attacked by an estimated company of VC. The RF sustained heavy casualties and a nearby OP was brought under mortar fire, but with negative results. Other enemy activity in southern QUANG NAM (P) was limited to isolated and small scale harrassing actions. The number of VC initiated incidents reported from within the DANANG TAOR remained the same as the last reporting period; when compared to the middle of December, the tempo of enemy activity was down and the intensity off. The pattern of activity returned to a familiar spread pattern wherein no high concentration of enemy action was noted. Enemy efforts continued at the same level in the eastern coastal sector. The dropping off of VC action is probably attributable to the continued heavy rain and the stand down period and to his inability at maintaining an intense effort for any protracted period of time. Local force units continued to be reported in normally accepted operating areas.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Enemy activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P) continued at a low level over the period. That action which was noted again occurred in the area north of the CHU LAI TAOR and in proximity to TAM KY City. On 3 January an estimated VC platoon raided PHU THAN (H) (BT 355245), about four kilometers northeast of TAM KY, and killed three Vietnamese civilians including the hamlet chief and a PF agent. On 7 January and in the same general vicinity, an unknown number of VC destroyed a culvert at (BT 359190) on Highway 1. Elsewhere in QUANG TIN (P) enemy activity was at a minimum. Those low level agent reports received placed enemy units in normally accepted operating areas. The 3rd Regt continued to be located in the area (AT 9250) and the 21st Regt in the general location (BT 1229). Marine ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings and minor contact along the line. The majority were located at the northwest end of the TAOR. The number of VC initiated incidents in the CHU LAI TAOR continued at a low level this week. The pattern was normal with a grouping noted in the southern portion and several toward the north along the LOC. Six incidents were reported from the Korean Marine area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Low level agent reports continued to locate the 1st VC Regt in the general area (BS 4580) southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR. Two recent VC ralliers placed an enemy detention camp and a dispensary within this area. Enemy activity in eastern QUANG NGAI (P) was for the most part centered in the SIERRA area in the central portion of coastal QUANG NGAI (P). Ground reconnaissance sightings, which totalled approximately 50 VC, were concentrated in this same vicinity over the period 4 through 6 January. On 4 January a platoon from the 1st Bn, 6th ARVN Regt in night defensive positions ambushed an estimated platoon at (BS 735550), resulting in 7 VC KIA (3 US Confirmed) and four weapons captured. On Highway 1 at (BS 870312) an unknown number of VC blew a culvert during the evening of 3 January. The culvert was a minor structure and the road remained passable to all traffic. Low level agent reports covering the area (BS 8455)

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concerned local movements of the 38th and possible 19th VC Bns. This general area is considered a normal operating locale for both units. Western and southwestern QUANG NGAI (P) remained quiet. Aerial photos flown over portions of northern BA TO (D) on 30 December revealed no increase in enemy activity, and trail movement through the same area was considered normal.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period again reflected a decrease when compared to the two previous periods. Incidents consisted of 18 mine/booby trap incidents, 106 small unit engagements, and 76 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strength and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d-e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
23 Dec	(BS 324762)	Arms Repair Factory	149th MI GP III MAF G-2: F-3
24 Dec	(BS 854407)	Weapons Cache	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F-3
26 Dec	(BS 699562)	VC Shelter Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F-3
26 Dec	(BS 322119)	CP, 76th Co	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F-6
29 Dec	(YD 935995)	VC Shelter Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F-3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 76 and reflected as approximate 50 per cent decrease from the previous period. However, 27 aircraft sustained 49 hits, representing an increase in each of these categories. Grid Squares of highest density were:

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(YD 0664), (ZC 2054), (AT 7950), (AT 9051), (BT 5703) and (BS 6754). One case of possible 12.7mm fire and three cases of unknown higher caliber fire were reported.

i-q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Sightings for the period were not particularly heavy but did point toward continued enemy activity. All of the sightings were made north of THON SON LAM and south of the DMZ. Two insertions attempted on 4 and 6 January were aborted due to very heavy enemy fire.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Sightings along the PHU BAI TAOR dropped off for the period. Restricted visibility resulting from inclement weather probably was, to a large extent, responsible for the drop in sightings. Several patrols noted small groups of VC moving through the general area (YD 5028).

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Few sightings were made by reconnaissance elements deployed within the western edge of the DANANG TAOR. Patrols located near the eastern edge of the NONG SON Valley (AT 9537) reported sightings of 25 VC and 90 VCS on 6 January.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Sightings were moderate over the period. Several sightings of small numbers of VC were made just northwest of the CHU LAI TAOR. Reconnaissance elements deployed in conjunction with Operation SIERRA in eastern central QUANG NGAI (P) also observed several small groups of VC. The majority of these were made east of the MINH LONG CIDG Camp.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated for the reporting period and totaled 5450 lbs:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts(lbs)</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
4Jan	DANANG TAOR (BT 059399)	1200	Marines
4Jan	PRAIRIE (YD 105497)	250	Marines
5Jan	CHINOOK (YD 599288)	2500 (1200 marked USAID)	Marines
7Jan	PRAIRIE (YD 098525)	1500	Marines

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

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c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 74 KIA, 202 KIA (prob). 362 VN's were detained and classified as follows: 20 VC PW, 27 civil defendants, and 113 innocent civilians, with 202 pending. Enemy weapons losses consisted of seven individual weapons captured.

f. Moral. No change.

g-h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. A moderate northeasterly flow dominated the weather during the period with ceilings ranging from 2,000 to 3,500 feet. Visibility was good. Light rain and fog conditions during the early morning hours predominated in the middle piedmont and highlands throughout I Corps. In mid-week, ceilings occasionally lowered to 1,000 feet with scattered rain showers along the coast and unfavorable flying conditions over the highlands. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	65	65	69	71
Low	59	58	62	65
Rainfall (total)	2.13	7.41	7.57	12.02
Visibility (miles)	4	2	5	5
Winds (knots)	10	8	8	11

k. Significant Agent, PW/Returnee and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 48, paragraph 5.c. of which should be changed to read: "The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities is as follows: (9), (6), (7), (5), (1), (4), (3), (2) and (8)."

R. H. Thompson
 R. H. THOMPSON
 Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, FW/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALINA TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CMC (CODE A02)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CICV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NR 1-67

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 072400H JAN 67.

	<u>NVA FORCE</u>		<u>VC MAIN FORCE</u>		<u>VC LOCAL FORCE</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>EST</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,250			8	2,950
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	12	4,480	6	2,300	35	16,984
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	3	1,030			13	3,480
Separate Companies			2	185	28	2,665	30	2,850
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,650		6,719		4,965		28,564
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				120		955		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								20,583
<u>GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH</u>								51,622
		17,150		7,069		6,820		

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 072400H JAN 67

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt #2	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

324B Div.	NVA	C	9,600 #3	Fair	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Fair	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80ct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10ct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99 #4	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	24Dec66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5221	18Dec66
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5431	22Dec66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K.105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 997532	26Aug66
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Que Son (D)	Que Son (D)	28Sep66
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	Duc Duc (D)	13Nov66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	300	Excel	AT 8364	Central Danang TAOR	30Nov66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	BT 0662	26Aug66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	6,700	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
21st Regt	NVA	C	2,000	Good	T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,450		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
TRA Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region 5	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	AS 9085	29Nov66
1st VC Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	29Nov66
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Tinh (D)	BS 452798	29Nov66
60th Bn	MF	C	200		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
40th Bn #5	MF	C	460		W Binh Son (D)	BS 4585	29Nov66
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4575	29Nov66
2d Regt (3d NVA Div)#6	MF	C	1,434		Quang Ngai		
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	450		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	314		BS 6431	BS 6431	28Dec66
95th Bn	MF	C	270		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	400		BS 6531	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 4268	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 7850	BS 5577	20Nov66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 3678	31Oct66
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 5892	8Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8125	BS 7745	31Oct66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #7	NVA	C	6,722		Binh Dinh		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	1,000		Binh Dinh		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh		
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	600		Binh Dinh		
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh		
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh		
18th Regt	NVA	C	865		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
7th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	165		Binh Dinh	BS 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,473		Binh Dinh	BR 7381	27Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	450		Binh Dinh		
7th Bn	NVA	C	339		Binh Dinh	BR 9499	7Nov66
8th Bn	NVA	C	347		Binh Dinh	BS 9010	19Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	337		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	28Dec66

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NOTES

- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. The 33rd Regt is accepted as a probable unit based on the statements of POW Nguyen Thi Luu (female guerrilla) captured on 18 Dec 66.
- #3. The 324B Div has not been reported in contact with large units since 9 Oct 66 and thus has had sufficient time to reequip and replace its losses. It is now considered to be at 100% strength.
- #4. Evaluation of recent agent reports and a rallier report indicates that the Hai Lang Co should be redesignated as the H.99 Co.
- #5. Evaluation of recent rallier reports indicates that the 80th Bn, 1st Regt should be redesignated as the 40th Bn.
- #6. The 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div is accepted as operating in southern Quang Ngai (P) based on the statements of POW's Pham Ngoc CUONG and Tran THANH.
- #7. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

The following units have been accepted as confirmed in the III MAF Order of Battle as of 072400 Jan 67:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
14th Co	Quang Tin	90	Conf
1506 Engr Bn	Quang Ngai	330	Conf

The following unit has been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 072400 Jan 67:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
K.3 Co	Quang Tri	100	Conf

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3. (C) ~~ALSO KNOWN~~ AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 072400H JAN 67DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)		
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong			
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn);			
	Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort	CO-An
			Unk-82mm Mort	
			Unk-MG's	
			Unk-AR's	
			Unk-CK's	
			Unk-B-40	
			Unk-B-90	
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL		
		32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 51.441 KT			CG-Gen Tran DO
	137th Div(?); Cong			XO-Chu Van DOI
	Troung 1/5; 330th			P0-Nguyen Tien LOI
	Brig(?); Con Truong			
	Long; Nong Truong			
	Agricultural Site 1May			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj Song THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn			
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn			
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Most Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU
7th Bn	D-7; K.37			
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14		2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG	CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co; Trieu Phong Co C.10 Co Cam Lo Co	5th Co; Tai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co V-50; 20-H; H-02; V-51; H-20 10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri Thua Thien H.30		1-MG 9-AR	CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAI XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG CO-NGHIA

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Station; North Div Hqtrs; Phua Phu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MGHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Maj Hoang CAM CO-SrCapt AN CO-Capt PHUNG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520		
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn; Una Troi Bn; C-1(?)			
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-SrCapt Le CHU XO-Capt THANH CO-Ton That THIET CO-Capt Huong THI
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)			

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Phu 18		1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 12-SMG	CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co		2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-Capt Hoang AN CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Nguyen DAM CO-THUYET CO-Xuan SAM
Huong Thuy Co Huong Tra Co C.117 Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17 D-2; X-3; C-115; X-5 Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bao Ha; Work- site-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH CO-Capt THAO CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh	20825		
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			
R.20	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR 3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Lam Bn; 5th Bn			CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
F.25 Bn				CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THIU PO-TOAN

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UNIT
402nd Sapper Bn
105th Bn

AKA
T-89th Special Eng Bn
3rd Bn, 5th Regt

LBW
21395 Gm
Dong Hai

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
3-81mm Mort
1-120mm Mort(?)
2-81mm Mort
4-60mm Mort
2-MG
2-57mm RR
9-AR

PERSONALITIES
CO-Nguyen Van TRAN
XO-SrLt THANH
CO-HOANG

Que Son Co
Dien Ban Co
Hoa Hieu Co
Duy Xuyen Co
Dai Loc Co
H.31 Co
H.54

D-20; H-53 Co; Dia
Ly A7
Dien Ban H-40 Co;
Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th
Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16;
H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co
H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co
H-42 Co
Hien Giang
C-70 Co est Dia Loc

CO-Le Tan QUANG
CO-Than Tien NAM
CO-Nguyen DOA
CO-Nguyen CHAU
CO-Phan Phong SAM
CO-Do THANH
CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)

Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; 20,601GM-
Agricultural Site #2; 20,925GM
Chi Lang Tag An

21st Regt (Hq)

BACH MA; Worksite 21;
36th; A-21; Cong Truong-
21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt;
A-21

17-81mm Mort
Unk-75mm RR
Unk-60mm Mort

CG-BG VIET
XO-BG DAO
PO-BG DO
CO-Pham KIET
XO-Dang Cong KICH
PO-TIEN

1st Bn
2nd Bn
3rd Bn
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)
RQ21 Bn (AA)

11th Workshop; 11th Bn
135 Bn; 22nd Bn
33rd Bn
195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA
Bn; Xuong 111; X-11; 19th
Bn

CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
CO-Nguyen Kaach THO

RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)

GK-32
RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th
Bn; GK-33

CO-Capt Nguyen Van
TUYEN
XO-Tran Van QUANG
PO-Nguyen Van HIEN

RQ20 Bn (SIG)

RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30;
RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C 1803/CH
Bai Cang 20

CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ24 Bn (ENGR)	CK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
72nd Bn				CO-Tran Van CAO
74th Co	V-74; V-20;		1-57mm RR (?)	CO-THANH
	74th Dist Force Co		Unk-M-79	XO-Tran TIEN
			Unk-K-50 SMG	PO-PHUONG
14th Co			1-60mm Mort	
			1-30 Cal MG	
706th Co	106th Co			CO-KHOA
A10 Co	K51; 107; F-14;		2-60mm Mort	XO-Nguyen THAN
	D-21; Thang Binh		1-57mm RR	PO-Anh VU
			6-MG	
A13 Co	D-22			
A16 Co	C-73		1-60mm Mort	CO-Hong LE
			2-MG	
A19 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co			
A21 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21			
	Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co				
Tra Son Co				
Tra Ha Co				CO-MANH

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;	20,100GM-	CO-LtGen Nguyen DON
	F-550; Co Hoa	21,900GM	XO-Col TA
		Bac Hien	
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800;		CO-Col Chan Khoi
	PS/40; 108(Alt Cmd		DICH
	Elm)		XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn;		CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG
	Ap Bac; 2006		XO-Hoang Xuan VINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND AMMUNITION	PERSONALITIES
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007	5645		CO-Maj Nguyen TUYEN XO-PHAM
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20	20,135GM- 20,139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn	Poss 408th Bn			CO-Capt KY
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20,141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG 1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 3-MG 18-AR	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
104th Bn	405th Bn			CO-Nguyen Hi CHAW; Nghia TUN
1506th Engr Bn 19th Bn	Poss 506th Bn; 571 Unit 109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn 96th Co 206th Co	Poss 315th Bn Minh Long Co Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-Ia TRI CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU CO-Dien MIEU CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
614th Co C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Son Ha Co Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co Ha To Co Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
				PO-MINH
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong			CO-TRAN
	Co			
Tra Bong Co	P-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10;	1500		CO: Le Truc (Sr Col) XO: Quang PO: Tran Van
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO: Capt. Thai Phu XO: Knuyent PO: SrCapt Tran Dau CofS: SrLt Nguyen Van Ty
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO: Le Van Duyet
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO: Vo Viet XO: Nguyen Dinh Kien PO: Nguyen Van Khiem CofS: Nguyen Kham
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO: Cu XO: Cim
600th Med Bn 2d VC Regt	Inter-Det 600; Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;	1548		CO: Khanh XO: Hoang PO: Ha CofS: Tri
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO: Dang Doan XO: Bong PO: Sinh

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS. AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO: Vinh XO: An PO: Ngoan CofS: Luong
97th Bn	703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164CM (new)		CO: Vinh CO: Binh PO: Oanh Asst PO: Thuong and Nghiep
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh	7173 DS or 21155 CM		CO: Tran Xuan- Soan XO: Bui-Duy-Nong PO: Le-Van-Tang CS: Diueu
7th Br	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4			CO: Hoang Nau Phia (SrCapt) XO: Doan Hung Sum (Capt) PO: Pham Hung Khoi (Capt) Asst PO: Nguyen Trong Mam
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523			CO: Nhuong (SrCapt) XO: Doan Tuong (Capt) PO: Tang CS: Luiong
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525			CO: Lon XO: Thang PO: Anh CS: Hoang

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS. AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt	21.141 VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO: Phuong AKA Biep (LTC) XO: Nguyen Van Duc (MAJ) or Khang PO: Loc of Xuan (CPT) CS: Thang (CPT) CO: Luyen (CPT) Tran Van Son XO: Hoang (LT) PO: Diem (CPT) CS: Khoi (CPT) CO: Pham Van Cac (CPT) AKA Vien PO: Phang Hoi (CPT) CO: Tin XO: Xung (CPT) PO: Khien (CPT)
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter-Gp 7			
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ
341ST DIV HQ
31ST REGT
32ND REGT
33RD REGT
324B DIV HQ
803RD REGT
90TH REGT
812TH REGT
808TH BN
814TH BN

6TH NVA REGT HQ
800TH BN
802ND BN
806TH BN
2ND DIV HQ
1ST VC REGT HQ
40TH BN
90TH BN
810TH BN
20TH BN
1506TH ENGR BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report:

1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre; 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader; 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre; 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16. Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison Man; 20. District Cadre.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

B. <u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
TAN HY (H)	LE BIET	30	1	9 ITT LE
BINH GIANG (V)	PHUONG BUNG	30	4	QUANG THO
BINH SON (D)	LE KHU	45	6	27 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
THON HAI (H)	THUONG	40	1	9 ITT Conso-
KY THANH (V)	TRUONG THI HO	20	6	lidated Rpt
LY TIN (D)	TRUONG QUAN	25	4	NGO THI HIEN
QUANG TIN (P)	CAU	35	6	TRAN COC
	TRAN LO	27	6/18	27 Dec 66 F/6
	NAO	20	3	
	HO	18	3	
	DUONG	20	3	
	HIEU	18	3	
	VAN	23	3	
	PHUONG	38	3	
	THAO	20	3	
	TIEN	34	3	
PHUOC MY (H)	TRUONG TRU	40	1/6	9 ITT NGUYEN MEO
DUC THAN (V)	TRUONG BAN	35	4	22 Dec 66 F/6
MO DUC (D)	HUYNH SINH	30	18	
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH BA	18	3	
	TRAN BA	20	3	
	NGUYEN NHUNG	20	3	
	TRAN HUAN	22	3	
	TRUONG THI TRU	22	3	
AN BA (H)	TRAN MAI	30	1	9 ITT NGUYEN TAN TAN
NGHIA THANH (V)	*HUYNH HUYEN	30	4	21 Dec 66 F/3
NGHIA HANH (D)	*HUYNH SAM	50	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	*HUYNH TEN	50	6	
	(AKA TRAN NUA)			
	HUYNH KHAI	21	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
AN BA (H)	TRAN MAO	30	1	9 ITT CAO LUONG
NGHIA THANH (V)	*HUYNH HUYEN	25	4	22 Dec 66 F/3
NGHIA HANH (D)	*HUYNH SAM	45	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH THEU	30	3	
	TUAN	23	3	
	*TRAN TUAN	22	3	
HANG BA (H)	NGHIA	31	10	3 ITT HUYNH CANH
NGHIA THANH (V)	AN	27	11	28 Dec 66 F/6
NGHIA HANH (D)	LOI		12	
QUANG NGAI (P)	CHINH	30	18	
	NGHIA	25	18	
	TAO	30	18	
	PHONG	20	18	
	THA	27	18	
XUAN DINH	CHINH	32	1	9 ITT HUYNH CHUNG
(AKA THUAN HOA) (H)	HUYNH HY	40		15 Dec 66 F/6
NGHIA THANH (V)	TRAN TUAN	40		
NGHIA HANH (D)	SANH	22	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	CAM	20	3	
	CHINH	20	3	
	MAO	24	3	
XUAN BA	TRUONG KINH	32	1	9 ITT NGUYEN HIEU
(AKA CHAU ME #3) (H)	DO PHUONG	35	4	15 Dec 66 F/6
HANH THINH (V)	NAM	18	3	
NGHIA HANH (D)	DANG	20	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	DUONG	19	3	
	THUAN	30	3	
	TAO	18	3	
AN BINH	SAM	40	1/6	9 ITT NGUYEN
(AKA PHUOC DIEN #1) (H)	NGON	50	1/6	TAN KHA
NGHIA THANH (V)	TRAM MAO	30	4	15 Dec 66 F/4
NGHIA HANH (D)	MEO	30	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	TUAN	30	3	
	DUONG	20	3	
	GIO	20	3	
	NAM THEU	30	3	
DAI THANH (H)	NGUYEN LY	45	17	3 CIT NGUYEN COI
LOC QUANG (V)	DOAN THUOC	35	17	27 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN CHAI	38	1	
QUANG NAM (P)	*NGUYEN MAI	35	4	
	*TRAN BON	40	11	
	NGUYEN LAT	45	6	
	MRS NHU	50	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	*DOAN NHO	40	3	
	HUYNH BAY	30	3	
	TRAN NAM	30	3	
	MAI LUOM	35	3	
	NGUYEN CUOC	20	3	
	*XOAI	23	3	
TAY GIA (H)	CHAU HIEP	50	1	3 CIT LE MANH
LOC HOA (V)	NGUYEN TRI	25	4/18	19 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	TRAN DU	25	5	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN DINH THANH	21	2/6	
	TRAN BONG	50	6	
	PHAM THI CAN	50	6	
	NGUYEN BON	20	3	
	PHAM CAN	20	3	
	DINH NOT	18	3	
	TRAN MAM	22	3	
QUANG DAI (H)	NGUYEN PHY	40	1	3 CIT LE VAN
LOC PHUOC (V)	NGUYEN NHI	40	5	20 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	LE QUON CHUOU	30	1/5	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN THUONG	34	4	
	TRAN DAI	34	6	
	PHAN LY	20	3	
	PHAN DO	24	3	
	NGUYEN TINH	25	3	
	NGUYEN AU	27	3	
	NGUYEN BA	23	3	
	LE NHI	20	3	
KY NGOC (V)	LE HUE		9	3 ITT HA THI BONG
DIEN BAN (D)	TRAN LIEN		1	2 Jan 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	LE CAO QUANG		4	
	NGUYEN HIEU		18	
	THAN HOA		3	
	THAN CHAU		3	
	NGO HUNG		3	
	THAN HO		3	
	NGUYEN THI TAM		3	
HA NONG (H)	NGUYEN CHA		1	3 ITT HA THI BONG
KY NGOC (V)				2 Jan 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				
LA THO (H)	*NGUYEN VAN CUOC	35	1	3 ITT Consolidated
THANH PHONG (V)	THAI BA TO	30	10/5	Rpt ITT #14C-12-66
DIEN BAN (D)	HAN	20	3	31 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN VAN HUNG	21	3	
	THAI HOANG	20	3	
	MICH	21	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	QUAY	35	3	
	KINH	18	3	
	THANH	20	3	
NGAN HA (H)	NGUYEN RINH	24	3	3 ITT NGUYEN TRIEU
THANH THUY (V)	NGUYEN DIEU	23	3	21 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN HUU	15	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN DAY	16	3	
	HUYNH PHUOC	14	3	
NGAN CAM (H)	NGUYEN SANH	35	1	3 ITT NGUYEN TRIEU
THANH THUY (V)	NGUYEN LEIU	35	6	21 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				
XUAN DIEM (H)	NGUYEN DA	20	3	3 ITT VCS
THANH SON (V)	NGUYEN CHAY	19	3	NGUYEN KHAI
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN THI THUONG	20	3	21 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN THI DAO	20	3	
	NGUYEN THI NHUT	20	3	
PHU PHONG #4 (H)	NGUYEN QUANG	35	1/5	3 CIT LE SO
PHU THUAN (V)	NGO CANH	36	6	26 Dec 66 F/6
DUC DUC (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				
LE BAC (H)	HO THE	35	1	3 ITT NGUYEN NHIEU
XUYEN LOC (V)	HO BA	22	11	26 Dec 66 F/6
DUY XUYEN (D)	NGUYEN LAN	20	18	
QUANG NAM (P)	HO DUC	24	3	
	TRAN TRINH	15		
	NGUYEN TAN	10		
	HO BA	10		
CAM THANH (V)	PHAM LA	45	1	3 ITT NGUYEN XIA
HIEU NHON (D)	TRAN MAO	30	7	1 Jan 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN SAM	27	11	
	TRAN HA	21	18	
	LE XOI	25	3	
	LE PHOA	25	3	
	TRAN CUT	30	19	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
AN BA (H)	*HUYNH SAM	28	1	9 ITT CAO TU
NGHIA THANH (V)	*HUYNH HUYEN	25	4	21 Dec 66 F/3
NGHIA HANH (D)	*TRAN TUAN	27	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	*TEN (AKA TRAN NUA)	35	6	
	NGUYEN TAN	18	3	
	NGUYEN THI NHAN	16	3	
	TRAN TUAN	23	3	
	TRAN TOAN	20	3	
	NGUYEN TAN TINH	21	3	
	TRAN PHI	20	3	
	NGUYEN TAN THEU	26	3	
	TRAN TOA	23	3	
	TRAN VO	24	3	
	TRAN LUON	23	3	

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS)
TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. ~~49~~ 1-67

1. 2d Regt, Yellow Star (3d) Div. PHAM NGOC CONG, MSgt, 2d Plt, 3d Co, 2d VC Regt, 3d NVA Div, rallied to MO DUC (D) Hq on 28 December 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. During October 1964, the 95th Bn moved to BINH DINH (P) (BS 660 130) to organize a regiment. The regiment was designated the 2d Regt and was composed of the 93d, 95th and 97th Infantry Bns. At the time CUONG returned, the CP of these battalions were located as follows: 93d Bn (BS 6144); 95th Bn (BS 5641) and 97th Bn (BS 5444).

b. The 95th Bn had engaged U.S. forces in (SUIO TUONG) HOAI AN (D) II CTZ in October 1966. After this engagement they moved to their present location.

c. CUONG knew of no future plans for the 95th Bn or the 2d Regt. At present they are training; included in the training is anti-helicopter defense. They are instructed to wait until the helicopter is approximately 200 meters off the deck, then to open fire on order.

d. Morale is poor and most of the men of his platoon are very tired of the hard life. He felt that if they heard his voice, telling them that he had been well treated, they too would defect.

e. CUONG was taken on an overflight in the company of an AO and was very helpful in that he understood terrain features and would draw these features to guide the AO. This is when he pointed out the battalion CP's.

f. He claims everyone in his platoon has some stage of malaria but that there is a large supply of quinine shots available. When an individual is ill he is given a shot of quinine and within 24 to 48 hours he can carry on. This quinine comes from NVN into QUANG NAM (P) and is further transported to the regiment. This is the same route over which their ammunition is transported.

2. T-89 Bn (AKA 402d Sapper Bn). HO THIN, Pvt, 2d Co, T-89 (402d) Sapper Bn, rallied to MOC BAI OP on 25 December 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The T-89 Bn's code name was HAM TU 21392 and the commanding officer was TRAN-BAO, a native of NVN. The strength of the T-89 totals 350 men and is organized into a headquarters and four companies; 302d, 303d, 304th, and 305th.

b. The weapons of the battalion consist of 12 - 82mm mortars, 12 - B-40's, four BAR's and normal individual weapons.

c. The battalion was located at DAI LOC mountain (AT 830615) in mid-September 1966 but was forced to move as a result of Marine operations. At present the battalion is located in the vicinity of TRA LINH (ZC 135250).

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At this location there is 11 paddy depots (estimated 10,000 Ang), seven rice warehouses (estimated 14,000 Ang) and two ammunition depots of 82mm mortar rounds. There is also 28 billets made of conic leaves for the troops.

d. In October, two companies moved to HOA LAN (V) (BT 040675), HOA PHUNG (V) (BT 055700) and THANH THUY (V) (BT 050650) in southeastern HOA VANG (D).

e. The battalion seized the opportunity during the truce, 24-25 December, to reconnoiter the area of DANANG main airfield and BO BO OP (Hill 55) (AT 970620) which they have scheduled to attack in the future. The VC have rehearsed this attack on sand table models. (G-2 Comment: F/3. Information related by the returnee is substantiated by other intelligence.)

3. GK/30 Bn (Information and Transportation Bn). NOAN THANH TAM, a soldier of GK/30 Bn (Information and Transportation Bn), rallied to ARVN on 26 December and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The Information and Transportation Bn, cover number GK/30 has the strength of 30 men and is commanded by NGUYEN BAI TUNG. The deputy commander is PHAM NHA. The battalion is organized into three companies, one Transportation company and two Information Companies.

b. The battalion was located at SON THACH (V) (AT 970230), SON LONG (AT 975310) on 15 December and moved to NGHI SON (BT 020398) for the purpose of studying and transporting foods such as rice, fish sauces and salt from PHU DIEN area (BT 095475) to temporary depots at SON TRUNG mountain area (BT 025410). (G-2 Comment F/3. The designation GK/30 Bn has been reported before as operating in the QUANG TIN area.)

4. Viet Cong Psy War Entertainment and Information Services. HO VAN BA, member of the VC PsyWar Entertainment and Information Services, was captured at (BT 001568) by 1st Bn, 1st Marines on 19 December 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. In May 1965 he was captured by the Viet Cong, given two months "Brainwashing" and then made a member of the VC PsyWar Entertainment Committee.

b. The VC took over control of KY NGOC (V) (BT 0168) in 1965. At this time they changed the name to DIEN PHUOC (V). The VC established local authority and instituted land reform policies based on individual ration. Each hamlet of the village has a squad of guerrillas and the village has a platoon size unit.

c. The VC set up the following policies within the DIEN PHUOC (V) area:

(1) Winter and Spring activities. This campaign began from early winter 1966 and will last to the end of spring 1967. The campaign consists

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of two sections: increasing crop production, and preparing the troops to fight Americans.

(a) Increased production is based upon the VC decision to reduce the amount of rice being planted and to increase the amount of sweet potatoes and manioc. The only reason given was because of the long growing time of rice and also the fact that at the present time the village is not secure.

(b) Preparing troops is being conducted in conjunction with the present vast VC recruiting drive. They are appealing to the people to join the guerrillas. They are using the technique of telling the people that if they join the ARVN, they will be suspected of being VC anyway so they may as well join the guerrillas.

d. The people are beginning to doubt the VC propaganda, partially because they are comparing the VC to the American. However, the people are extremely afraid of the Americans; afraid of the bombs and artillery.

e. The mission of the PsyWar Entertainment and Information Section is to organize, study and perform propaganda plays. The section is organized into two bands. One a propaganda and training band and the other a play-performance band. In addition, the VC select from the people and guerrillas, anyone who may have the potential of being an actor or singer. During peaceful nights, this troupe will go to the hamlets of DIEN PHUOC village and perform anti-American and ARVN propaganda plays. (G-2 Comment F-3. This is a common method of the VC to influence the populace.

5. The following translation is of a VC directive to step-up guerrilla warfare: (This document was captured by III MAF units at (BT 146595) on 10 December 1966).

DIRECTIVE

Strive to step up the Guerrilla Warfare to the fullest extent in order to foil the American Imperialists' and their Henchmen's Schemes and achieve more brilliant and decisive successes.

This document, prepared by the Political Officer of Military Region 5 in September 1966, consists of two parts:

PART I: The place of guerrilla warfare in the strategy of Military Region 5 and the requirements thereof.

PART II: Basic problems concerning the guidance of the present guerrilla warfare in the lowlands of Military Region 5.

PART I

A. The place of guerrilla warfare in the Strategy of Military Region 5 and the requirements thereof.

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1. The development of guerrilla warfare and its place in the strategy in the South Vietnam Theater of Operations in general, and in Military Region 5 in particular.

a. The struggle of our people and troops against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen is the most violent class struggle in the world, designed to do away with all the contradictions between our people and the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen and the contradictions between socialism and imperialism.

(1) It is now fully developed from what was nothing before.

(2) The political struggle lasted from 1954 to 1959 - NGO DINH DIEM's administration represented savagery. The 10/59 law and the guillotine were used to annihilate our revolutionary forces in the rural areas.

(3) Under the leadership of the Party, our people have clearly realized that violence is the only thing which can be used to meet violence.

(4) The South Vietnamese people activated the armed and para-military forces, which, in a very short time, broke the enemy's grip and crushed the NGO DINH DIEM administration. They made it possible for the armed and para-military forces to develop both in quality and quantity.

(5) From 1960 to 1964, to cope with the Revolutionary Movement in South Vietnam, the U.S. Imperialists increased their aid in money, equipment and personnel for the South Vietnam puppet government. They trained puppet troops with the objective of annihilating our forces. They used the "eagle flight" tactics, armored personnel carrier tactics, spear and net" tactics etc..... in order to destroy our forces and regain the areas lost to our control.

(6) The political struggle and military activities went hand in hand. The ever developing political struggle and armed and para-military forces not only supported the movement but also crushed large scale enemy sweep operations and helped defend liberated areas. The AO BAC battle (TN: The VC were credited with downing four U.S. helicopters in this battle) marked that new development - Military Region 5, from mid 1964 on liberated two thirds of the land and more than two million people.

(7) Since 1964, the movement, armed and para-military forces, developed rapidly - main force units took shape and made their appearance in BINH GIA, AN LAO and so on. Guerrilla warfare developed into mobile warfare. In the summer of 1965, the striking victories in ~~DEC~~ NHONG, VIET AN, BIEN HOA, PLEIKU, QUY NHON, DONG XOAI etc...basically set back the U.S. imperialist's war.

(8) The U.S. brought its troops to South Vietnam when the special war was doomed to defeat. We were on the offensive. Our armed forces had

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secured combat positions in the battle areas of the mountain regions, of the lowlands, and surrounding cities. The U.S. forces were encircled and split. Over thirty five thousand U.S. troops and fifty thousand puppet troops could not change the situation in PLEI ME, DANANG, CHU LAI, BAU BANG, LAT XUOT, NHA LO, BONG TRANG. Repeated brilliant successes in VAN TUONG, NUI THANH etc...constituted concrete evidence of this. It was, in particular, our people and troops who foiled the enemy's five-pronged dry season plan.

2. This development proves that the guerrilla warfare of our people has an important position both in the revolutionary and the strategic fields.

a. Regarding its militarily strategic position, from 1959 to this date, guerrilla warfare has been playing a political role and has shifted to mobile warfare to pave the way for a general offensive and uprising.

B. The four combat principles applied on the South Vietnam Theater of Operations and the position of guerrilla warfare at the present time.

1. Combat activities of main force units are conducted under the form of offensive and counter-offensive campaigns.

2. Guerrilla warfare activities are widespread and strongly developed in the areas and towns controlled by the presence of U.S. troops.

3. Attack and destroy enemy rear strategic installations, equipment depots and strategic roads. Fire at aircraft and mechanized vehicles.

4. Conduct appropriate armed activities around or inside cities in conjunction with the political struggle of the people.

(1) In reference to the above four combat principles, guerrilla warfare has a highly important position. If main force units know to coordinate closely with local and guerrilla units, they will assuredly achieve greater successes.

C. The present strategic role of guerrilla warfare in Military Region 5 is to:

1. Intensify combat activities of armed and para-military forces in order to destroy as many enemy puppet and U.S. troops as possible.

2. Counter all sweep operations in liberated areas.

3. Step up military and political activities; tighten the encirclement of enemy military bases.

4. Rapidly strengthen armed forces, with emphasis placed on main force elements.

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5. Strengthen and expand liberated areas and build solid mountain bases.

6. Protect movement corridors.

(a) Role

(1) Step up combat activities of local units, village and hamlet militia and guerrilla forces, continuously attack the enemy and actively counterattack in coordination with main force units.

(2) Resolutely protect the people's lives and property, crops and farm production in liberated and urban areas.

(3) On the basis of the "3 principles of staying close" TN: Possibly, stay close to the enemy, the people, and fortifications/ step up military, political and the troop - proselyting activities.

(4) Support the people's struggle and continue to destroy the remaining strategic hamlets.

(5) Attack the enemy supply store houses and rear bases in conjunction with sappers.

(6) Widely develop the movement of firing at enemy aircraft.

(7) Strive to defend transportation corridors.

(8) Be continually prepared for all contingencies, offensive and defensive, establish records of enemy strongholds and properly organize military intelligence networks.

(9) Develop guerrilla warfare movement in hamlets and villages.

(b) Properly perform missions assigned by higher echelons to meet the following three requirements.

(1) Frustrate all enemy clear-and-hold plans; steadily maintain and extend our control.

(2) Steadily maintain and expand our liberated areas.

(3) Wear down and destroy puppet enemy and US forces and maintain liberated areas.

(c) Properly perform missions assigned by higher echelons. Improve and intensify the guerrilla warfare in order to submerge the enemy in the flames of the people's war.

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D. In Summary: Guerrilla warfare plays a highly important role in the War of Liberation in South Vietnam. This must be brought to the attention of the entire Party, Army and population, so that guerrilla warfare can be developed to the fullest extent in order to achieve greater successes.

PART III

A. Basic problems concerning the guidance for guerrilla warfare in the lowlands of Military Region 5.

1. Evaluation of the characteristics of enemy and friendly troops, of the terrain in the lowlands of Military Region 5 according to the principles of guerrilla warfare.

(a) Military Region 5 has a very important strategic position with regard to the entire liberation war in South Vietnam.

(b) Military Region 5 can be divided into 3 areas; The jungle-covered mountainous regions, the plateau, and the coastal lowlands.

2. Fully understand combat guidelines and guerrilla warfare principles.

(a) It is necessary to fully understand combat ideology, to actively attack and counterattack the enemy.

(b) Having basically failed in the special war, the US imperialists are confused in the application of a suitable strategy. They have initiated an unsuccessful five-pronged dry season counter-offensive campaign in Military Region 5 in which a large, highly mobile enemy force participated. Friendly forces destroyed a large part of the enemy forces, and continued to counterattack and beat off the enemy's five-pronged attack.

(c) Attack and counterattack are closely related in defeating the enemy. The counterattack reflects our determination to resist the enemy attack upon our liberated areas.

(d) The counter clear-and-hold operation campaign, the offensive campaign and the counter-offensive campaign are characteristic of guerrilla warfare.

(e) Widely disseminate combat guidelines to the local armed and para-military forces and to the party and troops to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission.

3. Fully understand guerrilla warfare combat principles.

(a) Guerrilla warfare tactics constitute the main combat guideline. Efforts should be made to speed up mobile warfare.

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b. Basically, use guerrilla forces to conduct guerrilla warfare on a large scale to wear down and destroy the enemy.

c. Basically, use local forces in guerrilla warfare and in small scale mobile warfare. The local force will serve as the backbone for the guerrilla warfare movement (concentrate and disperse skillfully).

d. In the areas controlled by US troops, skillfully conduct guerrilla activities. Attack with a concentrated force when conditions permit and at the same time grasp the principles of using sappers in the attacks.

4. Fully understand combat guidelines of guerrilla warfare.

a. Promote the political superiority and gallantly, and aggressively attack the well-equipped enemy force with a numerically smaller and poorly equipped force.

b. Actively wear down and annihilate enemy forces; preserve and strengthen our forces.

c. Attack with sure success and adequate preparation and win the first battle.

d. Fight as independent units and fight with coordinated efforts and use mutual support.

e. Develop the skills of fighting at close quarters, fighting at night, fighting continuously and attacking the poorly defended enemy areas.

f. Emphasize an all-out attack, and close coordination between military, political and troop proselyting activities.

g. Take the initiative, exercise flexibility and use the element of surprise.

h. Resolutely comply with the "three principles of staying close" and motivate the people to fight the enemy continuously.

i. These eight principles constitute the art of guerrilla warfare and are easy to apply.

5. Resolutely fight the enemy steadily, maintain the control in the US areas.

a. Enemy schemes, ruses, operating procedures, strong and weak points.

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(1) The enemy is planning to build and hold military installations and step up their operations in an attempt to pacify the countryside situated in proximity to his installation, step up security belts for the defense of the major establishments, from which he will carry on the war of aggression in SVN and further expand his war of destruction against North Vietnam.

(2) To this end the enemy is resorting to such tactics as intensified military action, the subversive and deceptive "Chieu Hoi" policy, and the economic blockade.

(3) His strong points are well equipped strong points supported by artillery, armor, air power, and a highly mobile and superior force.

(4) His vulnerabilities are low morale, lack of a political motivation, disruption of his puppet government GVN, and his being subjected to friendly 3-prong attack.

b. Friendly guide lines drawn from experience.

(1) Be fully familiar with the protracted war principles and patiently try to adhere to the "3 hold" policy.

(2) Constantly motivate cadre, Party members, guerrillas and the people into harboring an intense hatred for the enemy, upholding a high sense of patriotism, class struggle, fighting spirit and revolutionary tradition.

(3) Properly motivate the popular organization as required by the situation.

(4) Employ to the fullest extent the "close 3-prong attack" tactics in the mountain and lowland areas.

(5) Energetically get rid of all GVN administrative personnel, spies, and "tyrants" with a view to "purifying" the population.

(6) Bolster the /Party/ Chapter's guidance and enhance the avant garde and exemplary role of the party and group members.

c. Construction of Combat Hamlets.

(1) The construction of combat hamlets has become a major strategy in that it constitutes the miniaturized picture of the militant and anti-US South Vietnam.

(a) Instill in the cadre, party members guerrillas and public at large, a high fighting spirit and make them familiar with the tactics of destroying the enemy while preserving our own force.

(b) Motivate the people and rely on them in the construction of combat hamlets.

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5. The US troops are very frightened of our close and night attacks.

6. The enemy often lands his troops in the high grounds that dot the lowlands of the MR5 area.

7. The US is waging an aggressive war in the neo-colonialist form, which is characterized by furious attacks coupled with delusive and demagogic tactics.

(b) Some experience on the friendly side:

1. Elaborate preparations-tactical and ideological are crucial in countering the enemy sweep operations.

2. It is imperative that the commanders exercise judicious leadership, be well aware of the enemy situation and be capable of solving different situations.

3. In a case where the main force is committed to action it is necessary that close coordination be effected among the three forces /main, local and guerrilla forces/.

4. Bring into play the most flexible and effective tactics.

5. The high anti-American spirit resulting from proper motivation was instrumental in bringing about military success despite the numerically superior US forces who were supported by air and artillery.

6. Last but not least, it behooves us to play up the on-to-the-victory propaganda, stabilize the situation, improve leadership, and proper commendations and awards.

e. Missions of the local forces

(1) The fundamental mission of the district and province forces is to serve as the core for the guerrilla warfare conducted in their own local areas. These specific missions are:

(a) Wear down the enemy strength.

(b) Provide guidance to the guerrilla in combat and in combat hamlet construction.

(c) Maintain coordination and cooperation with the main and guerrilla force.

(d) Make the necessary combat preparations for their own force and in support of the main force.

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(e) Provide security protection for the population and farm production.

(f) Actively engage in farming for subsistence.

(g) Conduct proselyting and propaganda activities with a view to regimenting the people in the implementation of the Party policies; provide assistance to the population in their farm work.

(h) Provide replacements to the main force when needed.

f. Principles of operation for the local force.

(1) Be flexible in troop concentration or dispersion.

(2) Place emphasis on troop (local force and also some elements of the main force) dispersion when the enemy is stronger, and when the local force meets with difficulties, the area of operation is restricted, the masses are not fully regimented, or the guerrillas are quantitatively and qualitatively inferior.

(3) When the enemy grows weaker and is driven to the defensive, we will expand our activities, refine the popular organizations, step up the guerrillas movement. Then will the local force gain a solid foothold and be able to concentrate its troops for military operations.

(4) It is to be remembered that concentration of dispersion should be very flexible and that no gradual transition from dispersion into concentration is required.

(5) Under no circumstances will dispersion or concentration be employed over extended periods of time.

6. Emphasis on the manufacturing and employment of rudimentary weapons.

a. The underlying principles of this popular war are the development of "political superiority", gallantry, attack by a smaller force on a larger force, the employment of rudimentary equipment versus the enemy's modern equipment. This by no means constitutes a shortage of materials but is closely connected with political factors, the viewpoints of a popular warfare, ideological outlooks, tactical and strategic guidance, guerrilla and mobile warfare.

(1) The effects exerted by rudimentary weapons are immense in that they can inflict major damage and destruction.

(2) Rudimentary weapons can be manufactured and used by every citizen thus constitute an "invincible army".

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a. At this juncture, when guerrilla warfare assumes a crucial strategic importance, it is imperative that the military operations be conducted continuously as our forces become stronger and more seasoned through combat. In this way are we able to achieve far greater success (one province battalion will be able to destroy one puppet /RVNAF/ battalion, one or two US companies, etc... One district company will be able to destroy one puppet company, one or two US platoons. Village and hamlet guerrillas will be capable of destroying, encircling and harassing smaller enemy elements everywhere.)

(1) When building up the local and guerrilla forces we should pay attention to the following considerations: Close coordination between building up the forces and waging combat.

(2) Emphasis on bolstering the guerrilla force and hamlet guerrilla units.

(3) Main link: Guidance agencies and command cadre must develop the political ideology as a basis. To develop village guerrillas, pay attention to hamlet guerrillas.

b. Train local and guerrilla forces as sapper units step by step.

(1) Enhance the political awareness.

(2) Improve combat tactical and technical skills.

(3) Improve the leadership and unit administration ability of military agencies and cadre at various echelons.

(4) Improve the procedures for assessing the enemy situation and draft sketches of enemy locations (strongholds).

(5) Establish combat operating procedures.

(6) Conduct political activities on a permanent basis.

(7) Establish procedures for training of cadre and soldiers.

(8) The guidance for development and training of units must be properly provided through combat leadership.

6. The following are names of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period.

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
HO VAN BA (C)	19DEC66	1/1	BT001568/Unk
HUYNH THI BAN (C)	19DEC66	Marines	BT060880/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAM BAY (C)	29DEC66	Recon Tm	BS749511/MO DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN BE (C)	26DEC66	C/1/5	BT399079/LY TIN(D) HQ
PHAM BE (C)	27DEC66	E/2/7	BS838423/2d Arvn Div
DO BEN (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO90608/Civ to G-5
VO THI BI (C)	29DEC66	E/2/7	BS835403/DUC PHO (D) HQ
NGUYEN BINH (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/Civ to G-5
HA THI BONG (C)	21DEC66	D/1/1	Unk/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN TAN CAN (C)	28DEC66	I/3/5	BT449086/Hold
NGUYEN MINH CHAU (C)	18NOV66	ARVN	HOA PHUNG(V) QUANG NAM(P)/ARVN
NGUYEN VAN CHAU (C)	19AUG66	ARVN	QUANG DIEN/ARVN
DO CHI (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO90608/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN CHU (C)	23DEC66	Unk	AT963598/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN COC (C)	24DEC66	C/1/5	BT352075/Civ to G-5
BUI CONG (C)	27DEC66	1/7	BS716948/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN CU (C)	27DEC66	H/2/1	AT967665/HOA VANG(D) HQ
PHAM NGOC CUONG (R)	28DEC66	ARVN	MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN CU (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/BINH SON(D) HQ
HUYNH CUONG (C)	27DEC66	A/1/7	BT643012/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN DAI (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO90608/Civ to G-5
NGO DAN (C)	28DEC66	D/1/7	BS638964/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN DAT (C)	29DEC66	Recon Tm	BS749511/MO DUC(D) HQ
BUI DE (C)	27DEC66	1/7	BS716948/Civ to G-5
LE VAN GIAO (C)	28DEC66	A/1/26	AT972645/Pending
TRAN HUU DUONG (C)	28DEC66	2/7	BS845406/2d ARVN Div
NGUYEN DUONG (C)	22DEC66	3/7	AT854794/Unk
LE VAN DUET (C)	30DEC66	ARVN	YD967174/ARVN
NGO THI HIEN (C)	24DEC66	C/1/5	BT352075/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN HOA (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/Civ to G-5
DANG HOAN (C)	3JAN67	A/1/7	BT647013/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN HOAN (C)	27DEC66	K/3/4	YD368673/15 CIT
NGUYEN TAI HOANG (C)	28DEC66	C/1/5	BT563019/Civ to G-5
DO HUC (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO90608/Civ to G-5
VO TAN HUYEN (C)	27DEC66	H/2/7	BS709545/MO DUC(D) HQ
PHAM AN HUYNH (C)	13OCT66	ARVN	SON TRUNG, QUANG NGAI/ARVN
TRAN HUU (C)	24DEC66	Unk	BT963598/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TONG KE (C)	27DEC66	1/7	BS716948/Civ to G-5
DUONG KEO (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI KHA (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN THI KHA (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO90608/Civ to G-5
TRUONG THI THIN (C)	JAN67	F/2/7	BS683537/MO DUC(D) HQ
DINH KY (C)	27DEC66	H/2/1	CAM NE(H) QUANG NAM(P)/HIEU
			DUC(D) HQ
TRAN YUAN LAI (C)	22DEC66	ARVN	YD544313/ARVN
NGUYEN LOC (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI PHUC LOC (C)	29DEC66	E/2/7	BS835403/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TONG LONG (C)	27DEC66	1/7	BS716948/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN MAY (C)	29DEC66	Recon Tm	BS749511/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN MUOI (ALIAS NGUYEN			
VAN LONG((C)	3JAN67	D/1/26	AT952597/Further Interr

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>LOC/DISCRPTION</u>
PHAM MUU (C)	23DEC66	Unk	AT963598/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
HUYNH NAM (C)	29DEC66	Recon Tm	BS749511/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN NGAI (C)	29DEC66	B/1/5	BT449149/LY TIN(D) HQ
BUI NHAM (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI NHI (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653039/Civ to G-5
HUYNH NGO (C)	29DEC66	3/1	Unk/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
DINH HUNG NHAM (C)	2JAN67	CIT	BT489096/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHAM (C)	28DEC66	G/1/5	BT563091/Civ to G-5
DO PHUNG (R)	16DEC66	Nat Police	QUANG NAM SECT
NGUYEN PHUONG (C)	13DEC66	Nat Police	PHUOC TRACH(H) QUANG NAM(P)
NGUYEN PHONG (C)	20DEC66	Marines	ATO61642/Unk
LE MINH QUANG (C)	20DEC66	Marines	AT809545/DAI LOC(D) HQ
NGO SAM (C)	28DEC66	D/1/7	BS638964/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN SANG (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO90608/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN SANG (C)	28DEC66	C/1/5	BT563019/Civ to G-5
DINH HONG SON (C)	2JAN67	CIT	BT489096/LY TIN(D) HQ
HUYNH TAM (C)	30DEC66	F/2/7	BS824423/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DOAN THANH TAM (R)	28DEC66	-----	Unk
CAO TAN (R)	21DEC66	Nat Police	THUONG DUC(D) Nat Pol HQ
DO THI THI (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO90608/Civ to G-5
LE QUANG THO (C)	27DEC66	A/1/7	BT647013/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN NGOC THINH (R)	3DEC66	ARVN	SON TINH(D) HQ
HO TINH (R)	25DEC66	-----	BT128489/ARVN
HUYNH THUAN (C)	28DEC66	2d Bde ROKMC	BS575636/Unk
HUYNH TO (C)	22DEC66	M/3/7	AT854794/Unk
NGUYEN TONG (C)	3JAN67	1/7	BT653093/BINH SON(D) HQ
THAN THI TRO (C)	28DEC66	2/1	ATO09608/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN DUC TRUNG (C)	21DEC66	Marines	AT827558/DAI LOC(D) HQ
HO THI SI (C)	28DEC66	Marines	AT950525/Hospital USOM
PHAN THANH SON (C)	28DEC66	A/1/7	Unk/Civ 1st Med Bn
NGUYEN VAN (R)	26DEC66	-----	MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN XANG (C)	21DEC66	Marines	AT809545/DIA LOC(D) HQ
NGUYEN XIA (C)	16DEC66	B/1/1	BT193567/HIEU NHCH(D) HQ
NGUYEN XUONG (C)	19DEC66	Marines	ZC554794/Unk

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 491-67

1. GENERAL. VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Items of interest included the translation of a VC Top Secret document originated by the SVNLF which was intended for limited distribution to labor party leaders, and the report of a reward being offered for the death of members of the 3rd Tank Battalion Civic Action Team.

2. ESPIONAGE.

QUANG NAM. A 4 January report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team, 1st Marine Division, related that the VC have inserted female cadre in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division Command Post who have been trained in espionage and assassination techniques. Reportedly, these females have taken a "Death Oath" to ensure accomplishment of their assigned mission. It was further reported that females are also operating in the vicinity of FHUOC TUONG (H) (AT 922747) and DA SON (H) (AT 960765) as prostitutes in order to gain information which is then reported to local VC battalions. (CI Comment: A report from another U.S. Intelligence Agency contained essentially the same information.)

QUANG TIN. A 28 December report from the 7th Counterintelligence Team, 1st Marine Division, related that a VC organization known as the "Work Group" has been formed in LY TIN (D) and is controlled by six professional intelligence men. The purpose of this organization is to handle informants and gather information concerning Allied units located in the CHU LAI area. (CI Comment: One of many reports of the VC organizing espionage nets to gather information on USMC units.)

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TIN	7Jan	Culvert destroyed	BT 359190
QUANG NGAI	2Jan	Culvert destroyed	BS 870312

4. POLITICAL

QUANG NAM. A 4 January report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team, 1st Marine Division, stated that the VC have organized a new political party named "VIET HUNG" (Vietnam Rehabilitation). The mission of this political party is to incite the people to rally against the Americans and disrupt the unity of the RVN Government.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 30 December report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that although government officials have requested the populace

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of CAM PHO (YD 240776), THUY BAN (YD 260797), LUONG GIANG (YD 260788) and CAT SON (YD 256805) villages to relocate to refugee camps, the VC of TRUNG LUONG (D) have appealed to the villagers not to move. The VC have distributed propaganda leaflets stating "The home is most precious, as it is the memorial of one's ancestors. The populace will not move." The VC have also threatened that those villagers who relocate will be assassinated once they reach the refugee camps.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 31 December report from a usually reliable source related that the VC in TRUNG LUONG (D) have placed a tax on agricultural products of the local populace and are taxing those families with sons or relatives in the ARVN/Government civil service a tax of 1,000 \$VN. The tax collectors have told the populace that the tax is to be used by the National Liberation Front to further their cause and to consider the money as a "loan" which will be repaid "double the amount" given when peace and unification comes. The VC plan to use this money to purchase rice, salt, shrimp, flints and other supplies in those areas under U.S. or GVN control.

A 31 December report from an intelligence source stated that on the night of 27 December, VC entered BA THUNG (H) (YD 117603) and forced the people to dig trenches in the hamlet area. The villagers were told that in the near future the National Liberation Front planned to attack American units in the CAM LO District area and that they would be expected to help during this attack by transporting VC wounded and supplying food. Prior to departing, the VC taxed the people for rice and stated that each family would be required to weave one hammock and one blanket within a week. To ensure compliance, VC were left behind to control production and the villagers were threatened that those who failed to produce would be branded as "Reactionaries".

A 2 January report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team, 3rd Marine Division, related that the HAI LANG VC District Committee has been ordered to form a VC assassination and "purge" unit. The mission of this unit will be to eliminate those VC cadre who have showed a lack of confidence or discouragement which has reportedly been caused by recent VC defeats.

A 2 January report stated that an estimated VC platoon entered MY XUYEN (H) (YD 485410) and destroyed approximately 500 meters of protective fencing around the hamlet.

QUANG NAM. A 31 December report from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, stated that a village elder had been shot twice by VC in the vicinity of (AT 942517).

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A 31 December report from a usually reliable source stated that the hamlet chief of VINH CHAU (H) (BT 125560) was killed by a VC sniper while walking from his home to his office.

A 3 January report stated that at the vicinity of (BT 039625) an unknown number of VC fired on a bus and wounded three civilians.

A 4 January report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team, 1st Marine Division, related that on 1 January three VC moved into MIEU NA (H) (AT 923811) with the mission of subverting the populace against U.S. personnel. On 2 January, at approximately 0200, the VC shouted "Down with Americans" and called for the people's help when the American troops moved into the village.

A 6 January report from an intelligence source stated that the VC in PHONG BAC (H) (AT 989708) have offered rewards up to the amount of 5,000 Piasters for the death of each member of the 3rd Tank Battalion Civic Action Team.

QUANG TIN. A 3 January report from a usually reliable source related that an estimated VC platoon raided PHU THAN (H) (BT 355244), killing three civilians including the hamlet chief.

QUANG NGAI. A 5 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that on 20 December 1966 the VC held an inter-province convention at BA MINH (H) (BS 440430) which was attended by representatives from QUANG NGAI, QUANG NAM, BINH DINH and the Inter-Highland Region. The purpose of this convention was to provide an understanding of an "appeal" by the SVNLF which was contained in a VC Top Secret document. The document, produced by the Central Development Convention of the SVNLF on 14 November 1966, contained eight acknowledgements and ten decisions which were prepared for limited distribution to Labor Party leaders. The complete document, as translated, is attached as Appendix I.

A 5 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that on 26 December 1966, a VC meeting, composed of village Chiefs, cadremen and Party members, was held in MINH TAN BAC (V) (BS 760570). Topics discussed at the meeting included plans for the development of an underground base (location unknown) and the sending of local forces to GVN controlled areas to join "underground" VC cadre.

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APPENDIX I (ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DECISIONS) TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE)
TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 491-67

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1. Upon completion of the Honolulu and Manila conferences, the Americans forced, through military and economic means, the Australian, South Korean, Tantan (New Scotland), Phillippine and Thailand forces to join the American forces in South Vietnam. Thus, the Americans were able to get out of their separated position and were able to reinforce with more troops in South Vietnam. They have also escalated the war in North Vietnam and are trying to destroy the North Vietnamese Social Communist movement and the South Vietnam revolution. They also appealed to the Imperial French and English governments to join the war. These have presented difficulty in the history of the fight for liberation.
2. The American and Puppet government were forced to pacify international opinion by establishing a puppet assembly which was elected by the people.
3. The American and puppet government were aware of SVNLF weak points and in response occupied South Central and Southern Vietnam's valleys and rice bases of the revolution.
4. The U.S. and RVN puppet governments have learned through experience, methods of political control.
5. The Americans want to quickly defeat us (SVNLF) in politics among the people, so they can press rural reconstruction projects to cover their aggression. They also oppress the just revolution of the people, Buddhism, students and workers. They also apply a plan to run long operations in the VC controlled area to destroy the economy and force the people to return to government controlled areas.
6. Mostly workers, factory and city, of our revolutionary struggle were oppressed because of poor control.
7. The revolutionary movement in Laos and Cambodia is very weak because the people's forces are separated. The VC must help this situation.
8. Our people (SVNLF) believe very much in Social-Fraternal Forces, but our people still go along the self liberation way and stay out of international war. We can defeat the U.S. and destroy the peace internationally but our forces are less than theirs.

DECISIONS

1. They must work to develop the party forces, change the name, separate into small areas of control, reorganize the SVNLF, to tighten the worker-party ties, control the people to struggle to reach the revolution's targets in cities, security areas and to volunteer to help the VC in their military tasks.

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2. They must appeal strongly to the youths and teenagers living in the liberation areas to volunteer to go to Laos and Cambodia to help the struggle there.
3. They must develop the long, hard Anti-American struggle in areas controlled by them and to develop a hate DIEN-NHU servants in the puppet government. The south-north war must throw over the military government.
4. All comrades of the Central Committee living in the liberation areas should organize the commercial liaison system between our and the enemy area to establish penetration.
5. We must promote a product camp to supply the troops with food.
6. We must organize a propaganda campaign among the people to struggle to get the DIEN-NHU servants discharged.
7. We must train the people to give the more motivation to hate American and puppet governments and provide support for leaders to continue the struggle in the enemy areas.
8. To explain to the people the ideology in believing in the revolutionary struggle-anti-cease fire and to held the movement and stand by to uprising and destroy the Americans and the puppet government.
9. To promote a tax and to carry the password "All for Anti-American". To keep secret the long range political base and economic base and to protest the long term revolution.
10. To quickly reorganize farms in the liberation areas to provide support to revolutionary forces (the poor man), to believe in the cause, and to try and try again to work for the revolution.

(Published 26 December 1966 by Propaganda, Training and Research Department in Eastern Region V, for limited distribution to Labor Party Leaders.)

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
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15 JANUARY 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO. 2-67

LABOR

TIL MAF PERINTREP # 2-67

8-14 8-11-67

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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PERINTREP NO. 2-67

Period Covered: 080001H - 142400H Jan 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - SOUTHERN DMZ. Enemy ground activity continued at a constant rate in the north central portion of QUANG TRI (P). Ground reconnaissance elements deployed in the general area (YD 0562) and along a north-south line due west of the north-south axis of Route 9 reported a rise in the number of enemy sighted and in contacts made. From 7 through 12 January a total of approximately 100 VC/NVA were reported in the vicinity of (YD 0562). On 3 January in the vicinity of (XD 902503), a reconnaissance patrol received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated NVA company in well fortified positions. Moving to the south and at (XD 932422), a platoon patrol from 1st Bn, 3rd Marines observed an estimated 200 VC in mixed uniforms moving east along Route 9. In each of the aforementioned incidents artillery fire was brought to bear on the enemy with excellent results. Northwest QUANG TRI (P) remained quiet. Reports received from the KHE SANH and LANG VEI CIDG operational areas disclosed only minor activity. Inclement weather precluded normal aerial photographic coverage of the northern area. The enemy situation within the DMZ remains unchanged. There are no indications of imminent and major enemy offensive ground action south of the DMZ. His actions in this area continue to point toward a screening and reconnaissance effort and when opportune, to launch harassing and probing actions against our positions. Enemy activity this week would seem to indicate a continuing capacity to reinforce his actions in this direction. On 10 January, a PF platoon in defensive positions, approximately four kilometers east of CAM LO, came under attack by an estimated VC company. Artillery fire was called and the attack promptly ceased. Casualties were minor. Eastern QUANG TRI (P) saw a drop in VC initiated activity. That action which was noted was limited to isolated and small scale harassing incidents.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. The enemy's effort in coastal THUA THIEN (P) increased slightly this week with three major VC initiated incidents reported. Two of the incidents occurred north of the PHU BAI TAOR and along Highway 1. On 9 January at (YD 736295) two PF platoons from the QUANG DIEN Sub-Sector and while occupying night defensive positions, were attacked by an estimated VC company. With support of artillery, the PF repulsed the attack. At (YD 308223) and on 11 January, an unknown number of VC entered the XUAN HOA (H) and assassinated the Hamlet Chief. A RF

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company was sent into the same area as a reaction force but failed to gain contact with the VC. The third incident occurred at the southern end of the PHU BAI TAOR where an unknown number of VC attacked and partially destroyed a highway and railway bridge at (YD 985048). This attack was made on 10 January and within 24 hours, a pontoon bridge had been installed. Reconnaissance elements in the area west of HUE City (YD 5225), reported sightings of the enemy which totalled approximately 70 VC for the entire week. There were several minor contacts in this vicinity and Marine patrols came upon two unoccupied VC food storage sites. Operation CHITNOOK continued in the area (YD 5330) but made only light contact with the enemy. Elsewhere in eastern THUA THIEN (P) enemy activity was confined to minor harassing actions directed against isolated outposts and security elements. Nothing of significance was reported from within the PHU BAI TAOR and several minor incidents along Highway 1 between PHU BAI and DANANG complete the picture for THUA THIEN (P).

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. There was a moderate increase in enemy activity immediately west of the DANANG TAOR in the area (ZC 1553). On 6 and 7 January at points both north and southeast of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp, CIDG patrols came in contact with squad and platoon size enemy elements. Air and artillery were called in with heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy. East of these locations and just within the TAOR, elements of 3rd Bn, 7th Marines encountered groups of VC numbering 20 to 40 per group. Again enemy casualties were substantial. Heavy ground reconnaissance south of the DANANG TAOR reported a total of approximately 190 VC sighted over the period. The majority of these sightings were made in the vicinity (ZC 2132) on 13 January. The number of VC initiated incidents reported from southeast QUANG NAM (P) increased slightly this week, the focus of enemy effort being directed against ARVN and RF/PF security elements in proximity to Highway 1. During the night of 10-11 January an unknown number of VC blew a culvert at (BT 116493) and on 11 January at a point just west of this location, the 4th Bn, 51st ARVN Regt made contact with an unknown number of VC. The ensuing action resulted in light casualties to the enemy. Enemy activity within the DANANG TAOR increased slightly this week. There was a rise in the incidence of enemy use of mines and booby traps; otherwise the intensity of enemy action remained fairly constant. Activity reported was spread quite evenly across the central portion of the TAOR and no distinct or heavy concentration was noted. Low level agent reports continued to report local force units in normally accepted operating areas.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Eastern QUANG TIN (P) saw a substantial increase in the tempo of enemy activity particularly along Highway 1. Eight major VC initiated incidents were reported along the LOC from a point close to the QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN border south to within the northern end of the CHU LAI TAOR. Four of the incidents involved the destruction or partial demolition of bridges or culverts over the period 7 through 12 January. Two concerned small groups of VC entering a refugee

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camp and a hamlet where they killed and wounded several Vietnamese and otherwise terrorized and threatened the inhabitants. The two other major incidents involved a VC attack and an ambush against both PF and RF units operating in the area (BT 2040). The latter ground action resulted in fairly heavy enemy casualties. In both cases the PF and RF elements successfully repulsed the VC attacks. West of Highway 1 and in the vicinity of the TIEN PHUOC CIDG Camp, two patrols made contact with light VC elements at points northwest and southeast of the camp. Casualties were insignificant. Of interest is a current ARVN analysis of this week's activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P). They conclude that the series of attacks against Highway 1 constituted a diversionary evolution designed to draw ARVN attention away from current VC rice resupply activity in the coastal region. The ARVN describe the activity as one involving small groups of VC, possibly 3 to 4 men per group, transporting rice westward across Highway 1 into the piedmont and the food storage areas located close to the present general operating locale of the 2nd NVA Div. Although evidence is not available to substantiate such a conclusion, there are indications that the VC have recently been involved in rather extensive rice resupply activity. There was a substantial jump in the number of VC initiated reported within the CHU LAI TAOR. Most of these occurred in the southern sector with a small concentration noted in the central portion. On 13 January at (BT 440084), 2nd Bn, 11th Marines positions were attacked by an estimated VC company. A VC captured during this action subsequently identified the enemy unit as the 70th Co, 409th Sapper Bn. Enemy casualties were 17 VC KIA (confirmed) and 4 KIA (probable) along with seven VC captured. Low level agent reports covering central and eastern QUANG TIN (P) produced little intelligence information of current interest.

e. QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. There was considerable enemy activity reported from the general area southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR and southeast of the TRA BONG CIDG Camp. Four separate CIDG patrols southeast of TRA BONG came in contact with company and platoon sized units over the period 8 through 12 January. Heavy ground reconnaissance in the same general area (BS 4080) reported total sightings over the period 10 through 13 January of approximately 750 VC. Most of this enemy foot traffic was observed as moving in an easterly or westerly direction. On 10 January the 7th Co, 3rd Bn, Korean Marine Brigade, was attacked by an estimated VC battalion at (BS 545868); heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. Two separate AO sightings made in the general vicinity of (BS 5782) reported approximately 300 to 400 VC moving in the open. Artillery fire was brought to bear in both of these cases with substantial enemy casualties. All of the aforementioned enemy activity occurred within or close to what has long been considered a normal operating area for the 1st VC Regt. On 13 January and off the east coast of the Korean Marine area of responsibility, a Korean Marine element observed 25 boats at (BS 672980). An estimated 70 VC were embarked aboard the craft and both air and artillery were called in on the enemy. Target coverage was excellent with 36 VC KIA (confirmed). Nineteen of the boats were destroyed. Eastern QUANG NGAI (P) south of the CHU LAI TAOR

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saw a moderate increase in enemy activity this week. On 8 January in the vicinity of (BS 692777), two PF platoons and one RF squad were attacked by an unknown number of VC. Heavy 60mm mortar fire preceded the attack and the PF/RF unit subsequently inflicted heavy casualties and drove off the VC. To the south in central QUANG NGAI (P) a platoon from 1st Bn, 6th ARVN Regt which was guarding a bridge at (BS 725561), underwent an attack by what was estimated to be a VC company. The VC were driven off with unknown enemy casualties. On 8 and 9 January and at (BS 717587) and (BS 783376) air strikes were called in on two groups of VC moving in the open. The first strike resulted in 25 VC KIA (confirmed) and although air actual count was not possible in the second, enemy casualties were thought to be substantial. Ground reconnaissance approximately 10 kilometers east of the MINH LONG CIDG Camp reported sightings of approximately 10 VC and Operation SIERRA continued with accumulative casualties as of 11 January of 110 KIA (confirmed) and 70 KIA (probable). Three minor contacts were reported by patrols out of the GIA VUC and BA TO CIDG Camps during the early part of the week. These engagements were with squad and platoon sized enemy elements and after relatively brief exchange of fire, the VC broke contact. Low level agent reports covering eastern QUANG NGAI (P) placed enemy units in normally accepted operating areas. Other intelligence revealed little of interest concerning this southern region.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 400 and consisted of three attacks, 17 assaults by fire, 30 mine/booby trap incidents, 157 small unit engagements and 193 cases of AA fire.

ROKMC incidents consisted of one assault by fire, eight small unit engagements and three incidents of mine/booby trap.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 8 Jan. 3d Bn, 26th Marines while on a search and destroy mission uncovered a cache of rice in bags (YD 575265). On top of the bags was a overturned "dishpan". Upon removing the pan, a snake was discovered under it. (G-2 Comment: Although this incident could have been unintentional, it also could have been VC initiated. This incident demonstrates the need for troops to be alert for booby traps of this nature).

- e. Negative.

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f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
9 Jan	(YD 4419)	VC Prison Camp	ARVN Escapee III MAF G-2: C/6

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Anti-aircraft fire incidents for the reporting period reflected an increase of over 100% when compared with the previous period. There was also a substantial increase in the number of aircraft sustaining hits and in the total number of hits. Incidents for the period totaled 193 and 39 aircraft sustaining 109 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9666), (BT 0366), (BT 3113) and (BS 5434). Two possible 12.7mm and three unknown large caliber fire were reported.

i-q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Sightings underwent a moderate increase over the period. On 13 January a patrol south of THON SON LAM discovered a fortified harboring site occupied by an estimated enemy company. On 12 January to the northeast of THON SON LAM, a patrol sighted approximately 95 NVA moving to the west.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Sightings of approximately 50 to 70 VC were made in the Operation CHINOOK area. Observed enemy movements and activity west and south of the PHU BAI TAOR was very light, especially when compared to the last two reporting periods.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Few sightings were reported from within the TAOR. Reconnaissance elements deployed south of the TAOR reported as increase in enemy activity. Sizeable groups of the enemy were observed south and west of NONG SON. These sightings totaled approximately 190 VC. Several reports were received concerning possible VC training sites in the vicinity of (AT 8242).

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). A significant increase in enemy sightings were made west of the Korean Marine portion of the CHU LAI TAOR. Total number of VC observed was approximately 750. The area to the east of the CIDG Camp at MINH LONG produced sightings of approximately 40 VC who were observed in small groups numbering four to six per group.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

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Date	Location	Amounts (lbs)	By Whom
8 Jan	CHINOOK (YD 575265)	500	3d Bn, 26th Mar
8 Jan	CHINOOK (YD 513247)	800	3d Recon Bn
11 Jan	DANANG TAOR (BT 089602)	8,000	1st Bn, 1st Mar
12 Jan	DANANG TAOR (BT 086602)	24,000	1st Bn, 1st Mar
12 Jan	CHU LAI TAOR (UNK)	200 bags (est 200 lbs)	2d Bn, 2d Bde, ROKMC

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 235 KIA, 300 KIA (Prob), 29 VC PW, one VC returnee, and one NVA returnee. Enemy weapons losses consisted of 51 individual weapons and one crew served weapon captured.

Enemy losses reported by the ROKMC for the reporting period consisted of 122 KIA, 95 KIA (Prob), two VC PW and 14 VC returnees. Two individual weapons were captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g-h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Over the period a strong northeasterly flow continued to control the weather pattern throughout I Corps. Extensive cloudiness and occasional periods of light rain and drizzle over the coastal lowlands and highlands best characterized the weather picture. On 11 December a backing of the monsoon flow created short periods of decreased cloudiness and increased visibility. This shift and subsequent change in flow caused temperatures to drop to the low 50's and 60's throughout I Corps. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Tempartures				
High	65	65	72	73
Low	57	60	64	66
Rainfall (total)	3.41	3.57	1.06	4.59
Visibility (miles)	5	3	6	5
Winds (knots)	10	8	7	11

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- k. Significant Agent, Interrogation, and Document reports. Annex B.
- l. Negative.
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP NO. 48.


R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALINA TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CMC (CODE AO2)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CICV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 2-67

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III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 142400H JAN 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,250			8	2,950
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	12	4,534	6	2,300	35	17,034
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	3	1,080			13	3,530
Separate Companies			2	185	28	2,665	30	2,850
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,650		7,049		4,965		28,664
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				120		955		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								20,641
<u>GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH</u>		<u>17,150</u>	<u>7,169</u>		<u>6,820</u>		<u>51,780</u>	

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 072400H JAN 67

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

324B Div	NVA	C	9,600 #2	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT</u> <u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	24Dec66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5221	18Dec66
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5431	22Dec66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 952597	3Jan67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 8248	31Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	AT 8364	ZC 135280	25Dec66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec65
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	AT 9858	16Dec66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	6,700	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
21st Regt	NVA	C	2,000	Good	T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		T. Binh/T. Phouc(D)	Vic BT 0321	19Dec66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,450		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region 5	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	AS 9085	29Nov66
1st VC Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Son Ha/Son Tinh (D) Border	Tra Bong/Son Tinh (D) Border	2Jan67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 452798	2Jan67
60th Bn	MF	C	250		Son Ha (D)	BS 3761	29Dec66
40th Bn #3	MF	C	460		Son Ha (D)	BS 4585	2Jan67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Son Ha (D)	BS 4378	2Jan67
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Ha (D)	BS 4575	2Jan67
2d Regt (3d NVA Div)#4	MF	C	1,434		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	450		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	314		BS 6431	BS 6431	28Dec66
95th Bn	MF	C	270		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	400		BS 6531	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760 #5	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 3678	31Oct66
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 5892	8Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8142	26Dec66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #6	NVA	C	6,722		Binh Dinh		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	1,000		Binh Dinh		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh		
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	600		Binh Dinh		
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh		
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh		
18th Regt	NVA	C	865		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
7th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	165		Binh Dinh	BS 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,473		Binh Dinh	BR 7381	27Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	450		Binh Dinh		
7th Bn	NVA	C	339		Binh Dinh	BR 9499	17Nov66
8th Bn	NVA	C	347		Binh Dinh	BS 7381	27Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	337		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	28Dec66

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. The 324B Div has not been reported in contact with large units since 9 Oct 66 and thus has had sufficient time to reequip and replace its losses. It is now considered to be at 100% strength.
- #3. Evaluation of recent rallier reports indicates that the 80th Bn, 1st Regt should be redesignated as the 40th Bn.
- #4. The 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div is accepted as operating in southern Quang Ngai (P) based on the statements of POW's Pham Ngoc CUONG and Tran THANH.
- #5. The location of the 48th Bn has been moved to (BS 4760). This location is based on information received from rallier Thuan on 25 Dec 1966 and on the fact that no contact has been made with the 48th Bn in Operation Sierra which is being conducted in the normal operating area of the 48th Bn.
- #6. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 142400H JAN 67

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt) 31st Regt (Hq)	E-341st Song Hong	31445(?) 31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		CO-Sr Capt BA
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG) PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	
15th Engr Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	
16th Sig Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
19th Med Bn				
808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri			
Cam Lo Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM-41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MCHUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO- Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA wpns Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90 3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DK2 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?)			CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-UYEN
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K-41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co				CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR 6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG 6-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5			CO-LE
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	Xi; CT3; Binh Minh	20825		CO-Capt THAO
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			CO-Capt THAU
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai			CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR 3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
402nd Sapper Bn	T-89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn	Dong Hai		XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			CO-Phan Phong SAM
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang	20,601GM- 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)				
RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn			CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
	GK-32			XO-Tran Van QUANG
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33			CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; RQ 20/B BN; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH H. Cang 20 A-14		
RQ20 Bn (SIG)				

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UNIT
RQ24 Bn (ENGR)
72nd Bn
74th Co

14th Co

706th Co
A10 Co

A13 Co
A16 Co

A19 Co
A21 Co

A34 Co
Tra Son Co
Tra Ha Co

AKA
GK-40

V-74; V-20;
74th Dist Force Co

106th Co
K51; 107; F-14;
D-21; Thang Binh

D-22
C-73

Tam Ky; D-23 Co
C-75; Phi Po A-21
Bn; Flying Tiger A-21

LBN

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

1-57mm RR (?)
Unk-M-79
Unk-K-50 SMG
1-60mm Mort
1-30 Cal MG

2-60mm Mort
1-57mm RR
6-MG

1-60mm Mort
2-MG

PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
CO-Tran Van CAO
CO-THANH
XO-Tran TIEN
PO-PHUONG

CO-KHOA
XO-Nguyen THAN
PO-Anh VU

CO-Hong LE

CO-MANH

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)

BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;
F-550; Co Hoa

20,100GM-
21,900GM
Bac Hien

1st VC Regt (Hq)

Cong Truong 1; H-800;
PS/40; 108(?)

60th Bn

Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn;
Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai
35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;
Chu Song; Truong Son
70; Inter-mt White
Tiger Bn; F-07; 103

70th Bn

3-81mm Mort
4-60mm Mort
5-MG
4-57mm RR

CO-LtGen Nguyen DON
XO-Col TA

CO-Col Chan Khoi
DICH
XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG
XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
CO-Nguyen Duc CONG
XO-SrCapt THUA
PO-Duan Cong THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007	5645		CO-Maj Nguyen TUYEN
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20	20, 135GM- 20, 139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 33	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; Poss 408th Bn	21 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20, 141GM- 20, 144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn 19th Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit 109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn 96th Co 206th Co	Poss 315th Bn Minh Long Co Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-Lu TRI CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU CO-Dien MIEU CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
614th Co C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Son Ha Co Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co Ba To Co Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong			PO-MINH
	Co			CO-TRAN
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10;	1500		CO: Le Truc (Sr Col) XO: Quang PO: Tran Van
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO: Capt. Thai Phu XO: Knuyent PO: SrCapt Tran Dau CofS: SrLt Nguyen Van Ty
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO: Le Van Duyet
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO: Vo Viet XO: Nguyen Dinh Kien PO: Nguyen Van Khiem CofS: Nguyen Kham
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO: Cu XO: Cim
600th Med Bn 2d VC Regt	Inter-Det 600; Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;	1548		CO: Khanh XO: Hoang PO: Ha CofS: Tri
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO: Dang Doan XO: Bong PO: Sinh

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO: Vinh XO: An PO: Ngoan CofS: Luong
97th Bn	703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164CM (new)		CO: Vinh CO: Binh PO: Oanh Asst PO: Thuong and Nghiep
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh	7173 DS or 21155 CM		CO: Tran Xuan- Soan XO: Bui-Duy-Nong PO: Le-Van-Tang CS: Diueu
7th Bn	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4			CO: Hoang Nau Phia (SrCapt) XO: Doan Hung Sum (Capt) PO: Pham Hung Khoi (Capt) Asst PO: Nguyen Trong Mam
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523			CO: Nhuong (SrCapt) XO: Doan Tuong (Capt) PO: Tang CS: Luiong
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525			CO: Lon XO: Thang PO: Anh CS: Hoang

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt	21.141 VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO: Phuong AKA Biep (LTC) XO: Nguyen Van Duc (MAJ) or Khang PO: Loc of Xuan (CPT) CS: Thang (CPT) CO: Luyen (CPT) Tran Van Son XO: Hoang (LT) PO: Diem (CPT) CS: Khoi (CPT) CO: Pham Van Cac (CPT) AKA Vien PO: Phang Hoi (CPT) CO: Tin XO: Xung (CPT) PO: Khien (CPT)
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter-Gp 7			
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ
341ST DIV HQ
31ST REGT
32ND REGT
33RD REGT
324B DIV HQ
803RD REGT
90TH REGT
812TH REGT
804TH BN
808TH BN
814TH BN

6TH NVA REGT HQ
800TH BN
802ND BN
806TH BN
2ND DIV HQ
21ST NVA REGT
1ST VC REGT HQ
40TH BN
48TH BN
20TH BN
1506TH ENGR BN
2ND VC REGT
810TH BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report:
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre;
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison
 Man; 20. District Cadre.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

B. <u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LAM PHUNG (H)	VO VIEN	31	1	3 ITT LE MINH
LOC QUANG (V)	NGUYEN TU	42	6	QUANG
DAI LOC (D)	VOI LAI	33	18	29 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
LAM PHUNG (H)	TRA	35	20	3 ITT GUYEN XANG
LOC QUANG (V)	VO HUAN	37	9	29 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN LY	40	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	VO DANG	--	--	
	NGUYEN KHAN	17	3	
	VAN NIEN	35	3	
	VO XICH	--	18	
	BUI TU	--	3	
LAM PHUNG (H)	PHAN THANH HUAN	32	9	3 ITT LE MINH
LOC QUANG (V)	HO CUC	35	11	29 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	KHOI	28	13	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN PHUNG	45	20	
	TAN	30	2	
	LE VAN HUONG	37	7	
	TAM	25	6	
	LE THI SAO	35	6	
	VO THI NGUYEN	40	6	
	PHAM UT	17	19	
CHAU LAU (H)	TRUONG TRAN	--	1	3 ITT Consolidation
KY MINH (V)	(AKA DON)			Rpt NGUYEN MAN, NGO
DIEN BAN (D)	HUYNH THOI	--	1	THI SAO, NGUYEN VAN
QUANG NAM (P)	(AKA TUAT)			DIEN 28 Dec 66 F/6
	CHUC	--	3	
	CAM	--	3	
	HOI	--	3	
	NGUYEN MINH	--	3	
	NGUYEN DANG	--	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
NA NONG TOY (H)	NGUYEN DINH VINH	1		3 ITT Consol-
KY NGOC (V)	NGUYEN DUC CHAT	1		idation Rpt
DIEN BAN (D)	THANH	3		NGUYEN MAN,
QUANG NAM (P)	DINH	3		NGO THI SAO,
	LEN	3		NGUYEN VAN DIEN
	NGUYEN VAN SAU	3		28 Dec 66 F/6
	NGUYEN VAN CU	3		
	NGUYEN VAN LO	3		
NONG SON (H)	HAI DIEM	1		3 ITT Consol-
KY NGOC (V)	LE SAM	3		idation Rpt
DIEN BAN (D)	LE BAN	3		NGUYEN MAN, NGO
QUANG NAM (P)	LE LUONG	3		THI SO, NGUYEN VAN
	LE KE	3		DIEN 28 Dec 66 F/6
	HO XU	3		
	LE DAY	3		
NONG SON (H)	LE HUC	1		3 ITT HO VAN BA
KY NGOC (V)	NGUYEN DINH TU	1		28 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN DINH LAN			
QUANG NAM (P)	LE CAU QUANG	4		
	NGUYEN DINH UN	4		
	NGUYEN THANH TRI	4		
	NGUYEN	12		
	TRAN CANH NGUYEN	12		
	NGUYEN DINH CHIN	12		
	TU NGOC	12		
	TRAN CONG LAI	13		
	NGUYEN SANH	18		
	LE CAU THICH	18		
	PHO	19		
	CHI	19		
KY QUANG (V)	NGUYEN NGAN	43	1	3 ITT PHAM MUU
DIEN BAN (D)	PHAM SUU	35	4	29 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	TRUONG VAN	28	3	
	TRAN NUI	35	3	
CAM VAN (H)	PHAM TRO	38	1	3 ITT PHAM MUU
KY QUANG (V)	TRUONG DINH	28	3	29 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGO HOI	25	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	PHAM MUU	25	3	
	NGO	20	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
CAM VAN #1 (H)	NGUYEN NGAN	43	1	3 ITT NGUYEN CHU
KY QUANG (V)	PHAM BUU	35	4	29 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	TRUONG VAN	28	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN VANG	40	6	
	TRAN DUC	35	3	
CAM VAN #2 (H)	PHAM	38	1	3 ITT NGUYEN CHU
LOC QUANG (V)	TRUONG DINH	28	3	28 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN LE	27		
QUANG NAM (P)	NGO HOI	25		
	NGO			
LA THO #1 (H)	NGUYEN NA		1	3 ITT Consolidation
THANH PHONG (V)	NGUYEN CHANH SACH		1	Rpt NGUYEN MAN,
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN QUANG		4	NGO THI SO, NGUYEN
QUANG NAM (P)	THAI DAO		3	VAN DIEN 28 Dec 66
	LE NHO		3	F/6
THANH SON (V)	NGUYEN BON	25	18	3 ITT TRAN HUU
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN TRUNG	25	18	28 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
CHAU SON (H)	PHAM CAT	40	1	3 ITT TRAN HUU
THANH SON (V)	NGUYEN MOT	30		28 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	HAN	25		
QUANG NAM (P)	MUA	24		
	KEO	24		
NGAN CAU (H)	HUYNH KHANG	28	3	3 ITT NGUYEN PHONG
THANH THUY (V)	HUYNH MUA	25	3	29 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	SAO TRU	24	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	HUCNH HIEN	40	1	
NGAN CAU (H)	NHAM	35	9	3 ITT NGUYEN PHONG
THANH THUY (V)	HUYNH TRAY	40	11	29 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	HUYNH HONG	25	13	
QUANG NAM (P)	XE	45	6	
	HUYNH DUNG	26	6	
	HUYNH THI DAO	24	6	
	HUYNH NHAN	19	6	
	BA MUOI	50	6	
	LE THUY	27	3	
AN TRACH (H)	NGUYEN BAO	17	3	3 ITT NGUYEN CU
HOA LOI (V)	NGUYEN CHIEN	27	3	29 Dec 66 F/6
HOA VANG (D)	NGUYEN LONG	20	3	
QUANG NAM (P)				

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
BINH KY (H)	PHUNG DUONG	22	3	3 ITT PHAM CUI,
HOA PHUNG (V)	TRAN TIEN	23	3	PHAN TRAN
HOA VANG (D)	PHAM SO	28	3	19 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
AN TRACH (H)	NGUYEN BON	35	1	3 ITT NGUYEN CU
HOI LOI (V)				29 Dec 66 F/6
HOA VANG (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				
TRUONG DO (H)	LUONG NHIEU	40	1	3 ITT NGUYEN NINH
LOC BINH (V)	NGO MEN	40	4	NGUYEN XUAN
THUONG DUC (D)	NGUYEN TINH	42	11	5 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGHIA	35	1	
	NGUYEN BAN	30	4	
	VO BANG	40	6	
	TRUONG	30	18	
BINH GIANG (V)	PHUONG BUNG	36	4	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH SON (D)	*NGUYEN TRAN	35	4	Rpt DUONG KEO, BUI
QUANG NGAI (P)	*LE QUANG BIET	38	1	NHAM, NGUYEN TONG,
	*PHUNG LAC	25	3	NGUYEN LOC, NGUYEN
	*TRAN MOA	22	3	CU, 3 Jan 67 F/3
	DONG TRINH TY	24	3	
	*BUI LIA	22	3	
	LE BI	20	3	
	LE XU	22	3	
	*PHAM SANH	25	3	
	(FNU) LANH		8	
THUONG HOA #5 (H)	NGUYEN HUYNH	30	1	9 ITT PHAM CHO, TRAN
BINH GIANG (V)	DOAN ANH	25	4	HANG 5 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN THONG	30	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	DANG HOA	30	3	
	NGO NONH	25	3	
	TRAN HANG	30	3	
TUYEN DIEM #2 (H)	*LE QUANG BIET	32	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH GIANG (V)	*NGUYEN TRANG	25	4	Rpt BUI KHA
BINH SON (D)	BUI LAON	50	6	BUI NHI
QUANG NGAI (P)	PHUNG SAT	30	3	NGUYEN BINH
	BUI LIA	30	3	NGUYEN HOA
	*NGUYEN TRAN	25	3	3 Jan 67 F/3
	SANH	28	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
PHUOC DUC #1 (H)	MRS CU	40	6	9 ITT TRUONG
DUC SON (V)	CHUNG	26	4	THI THIN
MO DUC (D)	MIEN	25	3	3 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	TRINH	24	3	
PHUOC MY (H)	THANH	40	1	9 ITT NGUYEN VAN
DUC THANH (V)	LAI	25	18	28 Dec 66 F/6
MO DUC (D)	GIAO	45	4	
QUANG NGAI (P)	TRUONG TRU	40	1	
	BAN	30	4	
	CHUC	16	3	
	THANH	25	3	
	HUNG	20	3	
	LUAT	30	3	
	TRUC	25	3	
	BON	16	3	
	XEN	20	3	
	TKOI	16	3	
	BA	15	3	
KY CHANH (V)	LE BANH	35	1	9 ITT NGUYEN BE
LY TIN (D)	KIEN	25		27 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG TIN (P)	THANH	35		
	NGUYEN CAI	28	18	
	BICH	18		
	LE NGHIA	25	18	
	DANG HUYEN	25	3	
	PHUNG	27	3	
	VINH	27	3	
GIA DANG III (H)	LE THANH	30	1	9 ITT DANG HOAN
TRIEU LONG (V)	NGUYEN THO	25	7	4 Jan 67 F/6
TRIEU PHONG (D)	NGUYEN HIEU	28	3	
QUANG TRI (P)	LE YEM	30	3	
	LE THANG	25	3	
	VO HUU	30	10	

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAF
PERINTREP NO. 2-67.

1. Medical Service. The following information was obtained through the interrogation of LE XUAN CHUYEN of the Medical Service, 5th VC Div and, although the 5th VC Div is not located in I CTZ, is believed to be pertinent:

a. The overall medical support planning prior to a battle or campaign was accomplished by the Military Staff Section of the division. Within this section, the Operations Section determined civilian labor requirements, primary and alternate locations of medical units and hospitals, medical evacuation routes and security measures to be taken to protect medical facilities. The Medical Section submitted estimates of technical medical requirements and medical supplies required to the Operations Section for incorporation into the overall logistical requirement planning effort.

b. As a general rule it was estimated that four to six civilian laborers were required for each estimated casualty.

c. Source stated that the following figures were used as a general guide for planning medical personnel facilities and requirements for a given size operation:

<u>Size of Unit in Operation</u>	<u>Operating Room</u>	<u>Doctors and Medical Technicians</u>
Battalion	1	1 - 2
Regiment	1 - 2	2 - 3
Division	3 - 4	6 - 8

Medical units were organic to either regiment or division. Therefore, regiment would provide medical facilities to subordinate battalions. Division would provide additional medical support to regimental sized operations.

d. Source stated that all medical personnel knew of alternate medical facilities prepared for use in an emergency, such as a ground or air attack on the primary facilities. Normally, the combat soldiers did not know of these alternate sites.

e. Source stated that on an average day, during the dry season, approximately six per cent of the personnel in the division were sufficiently ill to be excused from duty. This average rose to approximately eight per cent during the rainy season. Normally 60 to 70 per cent of the personnel in the division were sick, but not sufficiently ill to be excused from duty. This rate was primarily due to poor sanitation and personal hygiene discipline. These rates varied only slightly with location changes.

f. In November/December 1965, 80 per cent of the 5th Regt, 5th VC Div, was sufficiently ill with malaria to be immobilized.

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Five per cent of these were acutely ill with malaria. Because of this high malaria rate, several operations that had been planned for the regiment were cancelled. Source stated that many personnel stricken with malaria were not excused from duty if they were not immobilized by the disease.

g. Any soldier even slightly wounded on the battle field was considered WIA. Each company initiated one report immediately after the battle, and one follow-up report after returning to the base area. In the initial report, all casualties including those not requiring evacuation from the battlefield were listed indicating the extent and type of wound received by the casualties. Those casualties, indicated as WIA in the initial report, who died during evacuation were listed in the follow-up, which also described the circumstances of the death. These casualties were not considered KIA, as they had not died on the battle field, even though death was due to wounds received in combat.

h. Source stated that VC military planning included a projected casualty rate of 25 to 30 per cent. This was further broken down into an expected 80 per cent WIA to 20 per cent KIA ratio. Source stated that in his experiences, a 50 per cent WIA to 50 KIA ratio was closer to reality. However, the ratio varied primarily with the type of engagement in which a unit became involved (i.e. a planned defense or attack, defending against a surprise attack, etc.) He did not believe that the use of any specific weapon had any significant influence on the WIA/KIA ratio.

i. Based upon his experience he estimated that one to two per cent of WIA died during evacuation, or prior to reaching a hospital, one to two per cent of WIA died while in a hospital, and at most two per cent of WIA were permanently disabled and unable to fight again.

j. Source stated that the recovery of dead VC bodies from the battlefield had a high priority, due to the psychological and propaganda effect of heavy VC casualties on the population. The invincibility of the VC against RVNAF could not be explained against a background of heavy casualties. In the source's opinion all dead VC bodies that could be found would be recovered and buried in hidden locations, if the VC won a battle. If the battle was a "stand off", with neither side winning or losing decisively, the VC would be able to recover an average of 70 to 80 per cent of the VC dead. If the VC were defeated, 40 to 50 per cent of the VC dead were all that could possibly be recovered.

(G-2 Comment: F/2. However, the percentage figure represented in paragraph 1.i. is considered a very conservative estimate. Perhaps a more realistic figure would be obtained by adding 10 per cent to each percentage.)

2. 5th Sqd, 2d Plt, 2d Co, K-2 Bn. Private TRAN XUAN THIET, 5th Sqd, 2d Plt, 2d Co, K-2 Bn, was captured during Operation CHINOOK (YD 544313) by 3rd Bn, 26th Marines on 21 December 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. THIET was drafted into the NVA in October 1966 along with 45 other men from his home hamlet of THACH MINH (H), THACH BINH (V), THACH HA (D), HA TINH (P) in North Vietnam.

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They received 15 days training and then traveled by foot for 20 days to a NVA camp somewhere in a forest at the foot of an unknown mountain. At this point he was assigned to his present unit.

b. After 10 days with the 2d Plt he was sent with a group to take rice to another unit in an unknown delta in South Vietnam. Each man in his platoon carried 20 kilos of rice on their back. There was no mechanized form of transportation. He claimed no knowledge of any other mission. He stated they had traveled approximately 12 hours before contacting the U.S. Marines.

c. The K-2 Bn has an approximate strength of 480 men and is made up of five companies, 96 men per company. The personnel are armed with three types of weapons, AK's, CKC's and K-44's. All persons carry 50 rounds of ammunition. He claimed no knowledge of mortars or heavy guns.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. K-2 Bn is AKA for 802nd Bn. Strength information is substantiated by captive DANG VAN DONG, K-2 Bn, 6th NVA Regt, captured on 21 Dec (III MAF PIR No. 47). However, DONG reported the K-2 Bn was equipped with two 82mm mortars, two DK-57 RR, six 12.7mm AA guns and three 60mm mortars).

3. R.20 Bn. NGUYEN MUOI, a member of the R.20 Bn, was captured at (AT 952597) by D Co, 1st Bn, 26th Marines on 3 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. MUOI was a information cadre man and guerrilla of LOC CHANH (V) (AT 952597). As an information cadre man he spread propaganda to the villagers as directed by the autonomous chairman of CHU DONG (H) (AT 9462). In his guerrilla capacity his duties were to snipe at Americans from the vicinity of PHU DONG (H).

b. He received five days training at XUYEN THU (V) (AT 8446) and after training he was assigned to 2d Plt, 2d Co, R.20 Bn. His unit was constantly on the move from one district to another covering DAI LOC, DUC DUC, DIEN BAN and DUY XUYEN Districts, and occasionally HOA VANG (D).

c. The captive claimed that his unit had been in one engagement with U.S. troops at XUYEN THU (V) in August 1966. The platoon lost seven KIA and three WIA in the engagement.

d. He stated that when captured he was observing the American patrol routes and position; to determine weapon locations, number of weapons and number of troops in and around Hill 55.

e. He stated R.20 Bn CP is located at (AT 9955).

(G-2 Comment: F/2. This is the general area of operation of the R.20 Bn).

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4. VC Use of Civilian Laborers. The following is a 149th MI Group report obtained at DUY XUYEN (V), DIEN BAN (D) on 2 January 1967:

a. Prior to the day of conscription, the VC will convene a meeting for party members and backbone categories (i.e. guerrilla, subdistrict cadre) in which these people will be given the indoctrination lesson on "Three Tasks and Three Readiness." They will then be instructed to pretend to be volunteers in the coming meeting for an appeal to the laborers to volunteer by encouraging the morale of the people in attendance. The VC then will gather the inhabitants at a meeting in which they will bring out the urgency of their mission and spread propaganda on the significance of the labor service. Afterwards, the VC will appeal to the people to volunteer to take part in the labor groups. In the pending time, the VC cadre, who would have disguised themselves and mixed in with the crowd, will stand up and volunteer to be in the labor groups as models. The "Volunteers" will take turns in introducing a person among the crowd in such an appointing way that one dare not refuse. One who is not willing to participate in the labor service will be subject to a public criticism which will result in a public vote. Since the VC side always outnumber that of the inhabitants, they will win the vote and everybody will eventually be taking part in the labor group no matter whether he is willing or not. After collecting enough laborers, the VC will divide them into five or ten man teams. In each team there will be a VC cadre or a loyal person whose duty it is to supervise and watch the activities of other laborers. A labor group in a mission out of its own district will be commanded by a district cadre or by a province cadre if it is on a mission to another province. In addition, a subdistrict cadre will be assigned to the labor group in order to control laborers from his particular home sub-district.

People from 15 to 20 years of age, regardless of sex and class, will be subject to labor services. People living in VC areas must participate in the labor service. The VC point of view is that it is the mission of the citizen.

The laborers are divided by the VC into various categories: Male laborers will be classified in two categories:

(1) Laborers from 25 to 40 years old (strong men) will serve in long range missions from one province to another or, at times, will be used in combat service.

(2) Laborers from 15 to 24 and from 41 to 50 years old will only serve on missions within the district area. However, if the number of strong men do not fit the requirement of the mission, some in this category will be chosen.

Female laborers will also be classified in two categories:

(1) Laborers with children will serve on missions within five kilometers.

(2) Laborers without children will serve on missions within their own district perimeter.

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The length of service of laborers depends upon the requirement of the mission. It is usually up to one month. Sometimes the maximum length of service is three months (for male laborers) and sometimes it is only for around two days (for female laborers). No specified period of service is indicated to the people. They will have to serve from one mission to another until the war is over.

c. The strength of the labor force also depends on the requirements of the mission. For instance: To move a rice storage of one ton requires only 50 laborers. In attacking a post, the VC will use an adequate number of laborers, according to how many soldiers they think there are in the post, to support the battle in removing wounded soldiers and clearing the fighting site. Thus, the strength of labor force is indefinite. Sometimes they only need laborers of one sub-district, sometimes they have to organize laborers from three or four sub-districts. The laborers are used in tasks:

- (1) To support the battle field.
- (2) For construction (houses, storage tunnels, etc).

d. In the labor service, a laborer who is not loyal to the VC is not allowed to carry equipment or goods all the way to the VC areas. Such laborers will only have to transport to a pre-indicated place from which laborers loyal to the VC will replace and transport to the target. As for the combat utilization, strong laborers (from 25 to 40 years of age) will be used as support to the battlefield by removing wounded soldiers, carrying weapons and supplies. The laborers are not to be given training or political education. But an indoctrination course will be given to the laborers in order to encourage high morale, win their confidence and make them perform their duties with devotion and firmness.

e. In any labor conscription, the VC never inform the laborers as to the type of mission and the routes taken. However, the laborers can guess this according to how much food they are instructed to bring with them by the VC. By the same token, if the laborers are ordered to prepare stretchers, they guess that the VC will be attacking posts. If they are ordered to bring baskets with them, they know they will have to carry rice. If they are ordered to bring carrying poles and ropes, it means that they will have to transport ammunition.

f. The three tasks (for females from 18 to 35 years of age):

- (1) To replace the husband or brother in cultivating the land.
- (2) To serve on short-range labor missions.
- (3) To replace the family in doing social work.

g. The Three Readiness: (for people from 18 to 25 years of age particularly unmarried girls).

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- (1) Ready to join the army and to fight.
- (2) Ready to serve on long-range missions.
- (3) Ready to perform social work for the sake of duty.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. This procedure of recruiting laborers is not an uncommon practice among the VC forces or cadre).

5. The following translations are of captured VC/NVA reports regarding chemical agents and activity plan for the VN TET:

"REPORT ON CHEMICAL AGENTS"

1. ENEMY SITUATION (PAST AND FUTURE PLANS):

a. Because of the continuous change of the military and political situation and in the development of our army, the enemy's use of chemical toxic agents and plans also changes and can be divided into three phases.

(1) 1st phase: The enemy made maximum military effort to destroy our revolutionary forces. He used such insidious stratagems as sending spies and hiring merchants to drop toxic chemicals into wells and food, to poison those who were suspected. They also secretly killed those who were in their hands.

(2) 2d phase: This phase marked the widespread use of toxic chemicals by the enemy. Various types of aircraft like "caribou" helicopters, "Dakota" were used to spray tons of poisonous insecticides and defoliants with a high degree of concentration over rice fields and forests to destroy our crops and cattle. This was an effort to undermine our economy in the liberated and base areas. As preparation for larger scale chemical warfare, gas bombs and toxic gas were used in LONG AN. A fire-power demonstration (in which chemical devices were used) was organized with the participation of RVNAF military officers and soldiers (for training purposes).

(3) 3d phase: After the BINH GIA war campaign our armed forces grew rapidly. Our military bases in the mountainous and delta areas were quickly enlarged. In order to regain initiative on the battlefield and to save the US and puppet troops from disintegration, the US imperialists introduced toxic chemicals into the SVN battlefield. They ordered the use of toxic chemicals in combat. As evidence many chemical detachments have been brought into the battlefield during recent engagements. With the use of toxic chemicals, the enemy has caused great damage to our crops and killed hundreds of livestock. Hundreds of civilians were poisoned and died. This was a great psychological shock and consequently caused confusion among our soldiers and the people. However, it did not have the desired results.

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b. Enemy plans to use toxic chemicals: Threatened by the danger of our rapid increase in strength and our victories, the US imperialists introduced into the SVN battlefield their most modern weapons in the vain hope of reversing this dangerous situation. In order to turn the tide of war in favor of US and puppet troops, President Johnson has openly ordered his henchmen to use toxic chemicals in combat. Therefore hasty preparations for chemical warfare had already been made before the landing of US Infantry troops in SVN. Many signs show that chemical warfare is growing larger and larger everyday through the increasing use of chemical toxics and devices. Some examples follow:

(1) During 1966, the US aggressors brought into SVN approximately 3200 tons of toxic chemicals which were stored in chemical depots in BIEN HOA airfield, TAN SON NHUT airport and DONG XOAI (not including the large depot of the US 7th fleet).

(2) The US chemical teams recently sent to SVN have coordinated with the RVN infantry units in some sweep operations conducted in our liberated areas. They have engaged our armed forces several times.

(3) The equipping of the puppet troops with chemical weapons began in March 1965. More weapons have been brought to Saigon to equip various enemy divisions like the 5th, 7th, 9th, 22d and 25th.

(4) They also sent many Japanese chemists and bacteriologists to South Vietnam to study the use of toxic chemicals and weapons there.

(5) The use of chemicals was clearly stated in some captured documents and other forms of evidence:

(a) Some new types of highly concentrated toxic chemicals have been used. Documents that we hold show clearly that BZ1, BZ2 and CS chemicals have been used. We have discovered that the enemy uses bombs, grenades, smoke pots and containers to spray toxins.

(b) In populated areas, the enemy essentially uses defoliant chemicals such as 2, 4D, 2, 4-ST, DNC [sic].

c. From the above facts, we may conclude that:

(1) In the future the enemy may widely use some types of toxic chemicals of high destructive capacity to attack our bases, liberated areas, and armed forces.

(2) Their chemical teams may coordinate with other forces in some pacified areas for acquisition of immediate targets.

(3) The use of poisonous chemicals in combat reduces the combat capability of our troops. The second use of toxins is to provide security for enemy troops' installations.

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(4) In liberated and base areas, toxic chemicals can be used to undermine our economy. For the above reasons, protective means against toxic chemicals must be stressed.

2. PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE ENEMY'S TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS:

a. So far we have very few anti-chemical units in SVN. Their activities were not well organized, therefore, they had to operate separately. In some places particular attention was paid to the anti-chemical task while in other places it was not. The anti-chemical activities were then very limited. Recently, the Region Military [Party] Committee and the command staff of the Military Regions, alarmed by the increasing use of toxic chemicals by the enemy, have ordered their subordinate organizations to take proper counter measures.

b. Based on the present number of chemical technicians we have, the enemy situation, and the enemy's present and future plans, the following measures were prescribed by the Military Regions:

(1) In the province, the Assistant Staff Officer and another person in charge of training and operation and cultural affairs must take care of anti-chemical training (except BINH THUAN which has chemical technicians).

(2) In the district, this task must be trusted to an Assistant District Unit leader.

(3) In the village, it must be given to a Village Unit leader.

(4) Subordinate units: The Chief of Staff is in charge of battalion, the Company Executive Officer of the company and the Assistant Platoon Leader of the platoon.

3. ANTI-CHEMICAL MEASURES:

a. Organization: The anti-chemical organization must be based on the situation in the area surrounding the objective. Anti-chemical branches in various provinces, districts and villages must be established within this year.

b. Training:

(1) Training guidelines:

(a) The troops should be given training concerning the people's war.

(b) The training must be practical: though theory is considered an essential part of the training, practice and experience must be stressed.

(c) Training must primarily be reserved for cadre.

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(2) Training requirements and purposes:(a) Cadre must:

1. Thoroughly know the four main anti-chemical plans.
2. Know the characteristics and effects of the poisons as well as the antiseptic and first aid measures.
3. Be able to use every chemical instrument very well.
4. Organize training courses on the use of chemicals and anti-chemical instruments.

(b) Soldiers must:

1. Have a general idea about the characteristics and effects of the toxins, the methods of discovering poisons by smelling and the preventive measures and first aid measures.
2. Know how to use, maintain and make anti-chemical instruments. They are also required to learn the use, effects and methods of extinguishing flammable substances.

(c) Members of Chemical Units (not including TO&E) must:

1. Know the effects of toxic chemicals, and methods of discovering by the senses, various kinds of new and old toxic chemicals.
2. Know all antiseptic measures and be able to give medical first aid to the victims.
3. Know the structure and effects of each anti-chemical instrument.
4. Be able to use the US and home made anti-chemical instruments (for the protection of the skin).
5. Be able to observe and recognize toxic chemicals.

(d) Guerrillas and Militiamen must:

1. Have a general idea of the effects of toxic chemicals and the method of using them and detecting them by the senses.
2. Have good knowledge of the antiseptic and first-aid measures.
3. Be able to use local made anti-chemical instruments.
4. Know how to extinguish the fire caused by combustible substances.

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(e) The people must be briefed on:

1. Enemy use of toxic chemicals.
2. Effect of toxic chemicals, protective measures, and the first-aid given to the persons affected by commonly used toxins.
3. How to prevent and extinguish fire caused by combustible substances.

c. Training program for 1966:(1) Cadre must be trained on:

(a) Four main anti-chemical measures.

(b) Military toxic chemicals which consist of: Phosgene; CS gas; "Yperit" blister agent; BZ, VX, Tabun neurotoxins; and defoliants such as: 2, 3D, 2, 4ST, DCNC, calcium cyanamide, calcium arsenate.

(2) Infantrymen:

(a) Phosgene, CN, CS, DM, PH, 1BZ

(b) Toxins: Calcium cyanamide 2, 4D, 2, 4 5T, VX, DCNC, masks and individual decontaminant packets.

(3) Members of chemical units (not including TO&E):

(a) Such factors as terrain features and climate have great influence on the toxic chemicals.

(b) On the use of toxic chemicals and the anti-chemical instruments, these men are given the same training given cadre.

(c) Training on combustible substances is the same given cadre.

(d) Reconnaissance and observation of toxic chemicals.

(e) Military chemical activities (not including TO&E).

(4) The militiamen and guerrillas receive the same training as the infantry men.

(5) The people must be briefed on toxins, phosgene, and combustibles. Training on the following toxic chemicals must be given to them: BZ, CS, CN, DM, 2, 4D, 2, 4, 5T, DCNC.

(6) Chemical preventive operations:

(a) Increase the knowledge of cadre and soldiers on the anti-chemical operations.

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- (b) Increase the skills of leadership of cadre.
- (c) Train cadre on the use of anti-chemical devices: issue, procurement and practice.
- (d) Avoid being: pessimistic, subjective and too self-confident.

4. METHODS OF DETECTING AND SEIZING ENEMY'S CHEMICAL DEVICES, AND OF MAINTAINING THE WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM THE ENEMY:

a. Home made anti-chemical devices: Through various studies on the anti-chemical instruments and weapons, decontaminant packets and gas masks have been made and provided to various units subordinate to R for anti-chemical measures. The following samples of anti-chemical instruments and agents are sent to various units and organizations for study so as to increase our capability of countering and preventing toxic chemicals.

b. Materials:

(1) The following materials are needed to make gas masks or head covers: White nylon sheet; gauze (for mosquito nets); coal and lime-coated papers; charcoal; and absorbent cotton.

(2) For the making of individual decontaminant packets the following materials are needed: Powdered lime; powdered soap; absorbent cotton; potassium permanganate; and copper sulphate.

c. Gas masks:

(1) Characteristics.

(a) The mask should be effective against toxic gas, fog or smoke, with the exception of carbonic acid.

(b) The user of a mask can avoid being contaminated from five to 10 minutes.

(c) Everyone must practice wearing masks because respiration is very difficult when we wear masks.

(2) Use. The mask keeps the lungs, nose and throat from being contaminated by the toxic gas.

(3) Making of a mask. Use an oval sheet of nylon (60 X 40 cm) as the mask and a rubber band as the strap. Make a rectangular hole for the nose and mouth area. The rectangle should be 12 X four cm. Fasten eight pieces of light material to the rectangle (the dimensions of the material should be 14 X six cm). Four grams of cotton should be placed over two of the eight pieces of material. Between the layers of material, a pouch of approximately four grams of charcoal should be placed. Fasten these layers over the rectangular hole. After finishing, the mask should be placed in a nylon bag to keep it from being affected by humidity.

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(4) Preparation of charcoal. Fill up a pot with rice husk or coconut waste, seal the pot with dirt, then burn it. When it has been burned, remove the content and wait until it cools off. Use nitric acid to clean it (20 grams of acid for 100 grams of charcoal). After that, pour water over it several times. Dry it off and keep it in a nylon bag. Nylon sheet normally used as a rain coat or tent can also be used to cross through an area contaminated with toxic gas.

d. Individual decontamination kit: This is used to decontaminate liquid or powdered toxins spotted on the skin or on weapons and equipment. It cannot be taken orally. The decontamination kit includes five packs:

(1) Pack 1 = powdered lime (10 grams) to decontaminate poison affecting the nervous system.

(2) Pack 2 = Permanganate (5 grams) to decontaminate skin affected by toxin.

(3) Pack 3 = Powdered soap (5 grams) to support the two above substances and to clean the contaminated spot.

(4) Pack 4 = Copper sulphate (5 grams) to stamp out white phosphorous spotted on the skin, weapons, or equipment.

(5) Pack 5 = Cotton (5 grams) to absorb liquid toxin or to be filled with anti-poisonous medicine as required.

e. Decontamination: Decontamination should be done in an open space as soon as possible after contamination.

(1) If the toxin is a liquid, use pack 5 to absorb or clean it. Avoid spreading the poison. Then:

(a) Mix powdered lime with water (10% of water with 1% of lime); wash the contaminated spot with soap and lime water; after five or 10 minutes, use cotton to clean it up.

(b) Mix the permanganate in pack 2 with water (1% permanganate with 10% water), wash the contaminated spot two or three times; after five to 10 minutes mix the soap in pack three then clean the contaminated spot.

(c) When the skin or equipment is spotted with white phosphorus, smoke is seen. Use copper sulphate in pack 4, mix it with water (5cc in 100cc of water) and apply it to the contaminated spot. Repeat the operation until the smoke is completely stamped out.

(2) If phosphorus is eaten, dissolve copper sulphate (5%) in 200 grams of water and drink it.

(3) If eyes are contaminated with phosphorus, use 1% copper sulphate and 9% water to wash the eyes.

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f. Detection of toxic gas and chemical weapons of the enemy:

(1) Purposes. To counterattack the enemy. We have succeeded in seizing a quantity of chemical devices from the enemy. R has studied and produced (in doubt) weapons to attack the enemy with chemicals. Preventive measures is an important problem; attack is another one, therefore we should try to obtain the enemy's chemical devices.

(2) Two methods of detection:

(a) The reconnaissance, intelligence and secret agents will locate the enemy chemical depots and report to higher headquarters, then try to destroy these depots. If possible take a quantity of chemicals before destroying the depots.

(b) Observe the area when the enemy uses toxic chemicals, and report it to higher headquarters. Chemical cadre or specialists, medical and ordnance cadre should be assigned to the area to provide guidance in preventive measures, and at the same time, to discover the chemical devices used by the enemy and various types of toxins for study and counter action.

(c) At present the toxins are dispensed by bombs, grenades or smoke pots. The containers have a red circle in the center and the letters CS below and are made of cement with a layer of lead inside. The outside is marked with: IRRITANT - AGENT Co - 1.

(3) Other types will be discovered and disseminated later. When discovering poisonous chemicals, seize them and report the symbols to higher headquarters. Facilities and necessary instruments should be available to seize the poison and to keep the personnel from possible incident. The best means is the use of a nylon bag and wooden or metallic boxes.

(4) In phases where there are no chemical technicians, non organic cadre can be assigned. However, these cadre must have received special training.

5. DETERMINATION OF THE WORKING METHODS BETWEEN VARIOUS PROVINCES AND MILITARY REGIONS:

a. Periodic reports: Various provinces and subordinate units must submit a report once every three months. Contents of the report:

- (1) Enemy situation.
- (2) Friendly activity.
- (3) Subjects to be discussed.

b. Special report: Will be made when discovering the enemy's use of toxic chemicals. A report will be made when the enemy plans for use of toxic chemicals are discovered.

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Report should be made to the Military Region by radio. A detailed report should follow later. A province should set up regulations for various districts to implement.

c. Regarding the weapons and equipment seized from the enemy, they must be used in very limited areas and you are requested to collect as many chemical weapons and as much equipment as possible. In case of a new toxic chemical, use any means to send a sample of each type to the Region. The remaining toxic chemicals should be carefully preserved and should be used only with the authorization of higher echelon. In case of an old toxic chemical a sample is not needed but its type and quantity will be reported.

d. By order of the political and military commander, directives on anti-chemical measures should be disseminated to cadre and soldiers for implementation. The agency responsible for defense against toxic chemicals should issue specific plans to lower echelon cadre with the approval of the Political and Military Commander. Agency personnel must clearly understand the directives in order to effectively help the Commander in the control of various local units.

e. Technical subjects should be reported to the Region. Other problems should be reported to the Political and Military Commander, and to Military Region Chemical Section for investigation and appropriate action.

f. Above are some of the working procedures. Other regulations will follow.

g. Training in anti-chemical measures should be organized for cadre and soldiers as follows:

(1) Three to four days of training for the cadre.

(2) Two days of training for the infantry soldiers.

(3) Five days of training for non-organic cadre.

(4) One day of training for guerrillas.

(5) A half day of training for the people.

(6) This is a schedule to be used as a guide. The local situation should help determine a proper schedule for the trainees. Documents will be disseminated later.

6. ACTIVITY PLAN OF THE /LABOR YOUTH / GROUP DURING THE VN TET

a. To Subordinate Group Chapters:

(1) During the past year many students and youths - especially female - in the enemy controlled areas, were induced, bought by the American imperialists and their lackeys and used as security agents and spies to operate in our areas.

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(2) With deceptive propaganda theme for an illusive peace, they stated that the presence of the U.S. troops in South Viet Nam was due to the invasion of the hostile troops of North Vietnam. As a result, a number of students and youths were doubtful about the Revolution. During this Tet cease fire they will come from the capital and cities to enjoy the Tet in their villages and will have the opportunity to contact us in order to better understand the Revolution.

(3) The Tet will be therefore a good opportunity for Group Chapters, Group members and cadre to contact them, indoctrinate them, make them understand the policy of the Revolution, the duty of a citizen and to lay bare the plot of the imperialists and their henchmen.

(4) During the same period of the Tet, we must investigate the number of RVN security agents introduced by the enemy into our areas and select good individuals to strengthen the Revolution.

(5) The following suggestions are to be added to those of our comrades in local areas in order to bring indoctrination to good success:

(a) Meeting of Group Chapters to learn experience in organization, development, activities within various organizations, sabotage in strategic hamlets, building of combat villages, conscription, political and troop proselyting activities. After the meeting, each Group member must know the strong and weak points and overcome all difficulties to gain more achievements in the year to come.

(b) The plan places emphasis on the following actions:

1. Indoctrinate students and youths (male and female) coming from the capital and cities to establish contact with those in strategic hamlets and induce the latter to come and enjoy the Tet in our areas.

2. Investigate and classify students and youths coming from the cities into categories. Then, on this basis, organize them in accordance with proper methods.

3. Draft plan for Chapter Group Committee and Group members to make visits to families whose members operate full time for the Revolution, to war dead and wounded soldiers families, and offer gifts to wounded soldiers.

4. Take care of graves of the soldiers whose families are away.

5. Meeting of children for regimental activities and enjoyment of the Tet.

6. Designate Group members to indoctrinate a specific number of students and youths coming from cities that cannot provide themselves with favorable conditions to join us during Tet.

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b. Main substance of the indoctrination

(1) Lay bare the crimes of the imperialists and of the puppet government, their wicked plan of using students and youths in security organizations, their plan of conscription, of ideological corruption and division between youths in our areas and theirs.

(2) Indoctrinate in such a manner that students and youths thoroughly understand the friendly and enemy situation, recognize our victories and the defeats of the enemy.

(3) Duty of a patriot.

(a) Lay bare the plan of the American Imperialists, using female youths as toys.

(b) Indoctrination should be simple and comprehensible through conversation, talk and sympathy. Talk should be prepared and learned in advance by key cadre.

(c) Slogans should be based on those issued by the Current Affairs Committee of Eastern Nam Do Region.

(d) The above suggestions are to be contributed to the establishment of the plan of activity during Tet.

(e) We realize that the enemy bombardments and shelling will cause difficulties in gathering our cadre; however we must overcome them in order to accomplish our mission.

(f) Members of the District Group Committee assigned to specific areas during Tet should stay close to comrades in charge of local Chapter Group Committee to receive assistance while performing their duties.

(g) Reports on the progress of activities should be sent regularly to [Agency] 79 for additional suggestions of Current Affairs Committee. On the fifth day of the first month of the coming lunar New Year, a recapitulative report on the results of the activities of each group Chapter should be forwarded to 79.

15 November 1966

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7. The following are names of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports were reviewed for the period.

<u>CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNEE (R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
PHAM AI (C)	5JAN67	C/1/1	BT 904396/DUC DUC (D) HQ
TRAN DUC BA (R)	4JAN67		MO DUC (D) HQ
CONG BAN (C)	3JAN67	D/1/26	AT 952597/I CORPS CCC
TRAM CAM (C)	UNK JAN67	K/3/5	BT 464020/LY TIN (D) HQ
NGUYEN CAN (C)	9JAN67	3/7	LOC QUANG (V)/DAI LOC (D) HQ
NGUYEN CAU (C)	8JAN67	A/1/5	BT 309145/TAM KY (D) HQ
LE MINH CHAU (R)	5JAN67	ROKMC	NUITRON OP/ROKMC
VO VAN CHAU (C)	8JAN67	G/2/7	BS 628547/NGHIA HANH (D) HQ
PHAN THI CHIN (R)	15DEC66		UNK/DIE BAN (D) HQ
PHAM CHO (C)	UNK	1/7	UNK/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI CU (C)	5JAN67	A/1/7	BT 620012/BINH SON (D) HQ
PHAM CHUNG (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 785515/MO DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN DANG (D)	9JAN67	H/2/7	BS 527958/CIV TO G-5
NGUYEN THI DOI (C)	UNK	1/7	UNK/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRAN DONG (C)	5JAN67	A/1/7	BT 620012/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN GIOI	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 785515/MO DUC (D) HQ
TRAN HANG (C)	UNK	1/7	UNK/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN HO (C)	UNK	UNK	UNK/NGHIA HANH (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI HO (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 510939/CIV TO G-5
NGUYEN HOA (C)	9JAN67	H/2/7	BS 527958/CIV TO G-5
TRAN HOA (C)	5JAN67	A/1/7	BT 620012/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRAN HOAC (C)	1JAN67	L/3/1	BT 063059/PENDING
HUYNH HOI (C)	8JAN67	G/2/7	UNK/NGHIA HANH (D) HQ
PHAM THI HUN (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 510939/CIV TO G-5
BUI THI HUYNH (C)	2JAN67	CIT	BT 489096/HOLD CIT
LE TAI KIM (C)	9JAN67	3/7	LOC QUANG (V)/DAI LOC (D) HQ
PHAM KINH (C)	4JAN67	N/1/26	AT 963623/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
NGUYEN KINH (C)	6JAN67	I/3/5	BT 431095/CIV TO G-5
LE VAN LAM (C)	9JAN67	K/3/7	AT 811569/DAI LOC (D) HQ
VO THI LIEU (C)	9JAN67	3/7	LOC QUANG (V)/DAI LOC (D) HQ
NGUYEN BA LINH (C)	9JAN67	3/7	LOC HOANG (V)/DAI LOC (D) HQ
LE THI LOAN (C)	8JAN67	AGENTS	BS 628547/NGHIA HANH (D) HQ
PHAM LUC (C)	UNK JAN67	E/2/7	BS 566913/CIV TO G-5
HUYNH MAI (C)	7JAN67	A/1/7	BT 642018/BINH SON (D) HQ
PHAM MAI (C)	5JAN67	C/1/1	AT 904396/DUC DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN MIEN (C)	7JAN67	C/1/1	BT 079599/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
NGUYEN DUC MINH (C)	2JAN67	A/1/5	BT 346158/LY TIN (D) HQ
VO NGAN (C)	7JAN67	C/1/1	BT 079599/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
LE NGAN (C)	7JAN67	H&S/2/7	BS 784516/III MAF COMPOUND
VO NGAN (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 777527/MO DUC (D) HQ
NGO NGHI (C)	9JAN67	H/2/7	BS 527958/CIV TO G-5
HOANG NGHI (C)	30DEC66	I/3/26	YD 541290/CIV TO PHONG DIEN (D) HQ
PHAM NHAN (C)	5JAN67	I/3/5	BT 422092/CIV BY TIN (D) HQ
TRAN NGHIA (C)	5JAN67	A/1/7	BT 620012/BINH SON (D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNEE (R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
HO NGUYEN (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 785515/MO DUC (D) HQ
BUI NGUYEN (C)	UNK	E/2/7	BS 744515/MO DUC (D) HQ
DANG NHAT (C)	7JAN67	C/1/1	BT 079599/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
NGUYEN NHO (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 777527/MO DUC (D) HQ
LE NHON (C)	6JAN67	L/3/4	YD 235563/PENDING
DANG NO (C)	4JAN67	I/3/1	BT 094656/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
DONG NONG (C)	4JAN67	D/1/7	BS 642974/CIV TO G-5
NGUYEN QUANG (C)	8JAN67	K-35	BT 464020/LY TIN (D) HQ
PHAM QUE (C)	UNK	MAG-36	UNK/LY TIN (D) HQ
DINH THI QUY (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 510939/CIV TO G-5
NGUYEN QUYEN (C)	8JAN67	E/2/7	BS 568915/1ST MED BN
NGUYEN SANH (C)	9JAN67	E/2/7	BS 767558/1ST MED BN
NGUYEN TAI (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 745517/MO DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN TAI (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 777527/MO DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN TAM (C)	9JAN67	K/3/7	AT 811569/DAI LOC (D) HQ
NGUYEN THICH (C)	9JAN67	H/2/7	BS 527958/CIV TO G-5
TRAN XUAN THIET (C)	21DEC66	3/26	YD 544313/HUE HOSPITAL
LE QUANG THIEU (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 785515/MO DUC (D) HQ
PHAM THIEU (C)	2JAN67	C/1/7	BS 566003/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI TIN (C)	7JAN67	UNK	UNK/CIV TO G-5
NGUYEN THOI (C)	9JAN67	H/2/7	BS 527956/CIV TO G-5
TRINH THONG (REFUGEE)	31DEC66	UNK	REFUGEE/LY TIN (D) HQ
PHAM THU (C)	2JAN67	C/1/7	BS 566003/BINH SON (D) HQ
MAI THI TO (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 785515/MO DUC (D) HQ
LE TRINH (C)	29DEC66	C/1/1	BT 080596/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
TRUONG TRU (C)	8JAN67	G/2/7	UNK/NGHIA HANH (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI TRUYEN (C)	2JAN67	C/1/7	BS 566003/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRUONG TU (C)	8JAN67	G/2/7	UNK/NGHIA HANH (D) HQ
TRUONG TY (C)	6JAN67	H/2/7	BS 519941/CIV TO G-5
NGUYEN YAN (C)	UNK	UNK	UNK/CIV TO G-5
TAM VIEN (C)	7JAN67	H/2/7	BS 785515/MO DUC (D) HQ
DOAN VINH (C)	4JAN67	A/1/26	AT 963628/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
TRUONG XIN (C)	8JAN67	G/2/7	BS 628547/NGHIA HANH (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI XINH (C)	9JAN67	A/1/5	BT 299136/TAM KY (D) HQ
NGUYEN XU (C)	4JAN67	A/1/26	AT 963628/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI XUYEN (C)	9JAN67	3/7	LOC QUANG (V)/DAI LOC (D) HQ
VO YEN (C)	7JAN67	C/1/1	BT 079599/DIEN BAN (D) HQ

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 2-67

1. GENERAL. Although there was an increase in incidents involving sabotage, VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Items of interest included the use of a "cigarette shaped" sabotage device, the training of female cadre for the purpose of poisoning Americans, and the training of VC frogmen for sabotage missions.

2. ESPIONAGE. There were no reports of espionage activity during the period.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	11Jan	Railroad bridge destroyed	YD 985048
THUA THIEN	11Jan	Bridge destroyed	YD 985048
QUANG NAM	11Jan	Culvert destroyed	BT 116493
QUANG NAM	11Jan	Culvert destroyed	BT 118490
QUANG TIN	10Jan	Bridge destroyed	BT 195392
QUANG TIN	10Jan	Bridge destroyed	BT 219339
QUANG TIN	10Jan	Bridge destroyed	BT 230339

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 9 January report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that during the nights of 4 through 6 January a squad of approximately six VC entered the DOC KINH (H) (YD 099523) refugee settlement to collect rice, and ask the people for support in the VC effort. During the night of 6 January these same VC distributed propaganda leaflets which alleged that numerous atrocities were committed by U.S. Forces and called for GVN and RF/FF personnel to defect to the VC cause.

THUA THIEN. A 6 January report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that on 6 January propaganda statements, written in Vietnamese, were found on the walls of the THUY CAM Church (ZC 151983). These statements were: "Americans, get out of Vietnam. The Americans have destroyed this Church. All people must fight against the Americans."

A 9 January report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that at approximately 2200 on 8 January, 11 VC entered XOM BA TO (H) (ZC 156997) and forced the local populace to attend a propaganda lecture.

QUANG NAM. A 3 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that two VC propaganda leaflets were found in the DANANG area.

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The first leaflet, printed in English, stated that the Vietnamese people were not enemies of the American people and that the Vietnamese people love peace. This leaflet further related that this love of peace and freedom was the reason that they are rising up and taking arms to oppose the U.S. The second leaflet, printed in Vietnamese, told of American raids on villages, the raping of the wives of ARVN personnel, and asked the Vietnamese to turn their weapons on the Americans and kill them.

QUANG TIN. A 13 January report from the 7th Counterintelligence Team related that after a VC company attack, propaganda leaflets were found scattered throughout the defensive positions of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. Of the seven types of propaganda leaflets found; one entitled "It's a Hell of a Life" had not been previously sighted by U.S. units. This leaflet, printed in English, told of the heat, disease and dangers to U.S. Servicemen serving in Vietnam and, although poorly worded, stated substantially as follows: "Even your reluctant Allies, the South Vietnamese soldiers, will turn their guns on you as happened near Danang. After a day of tension, comes those dreaded lonely minutes when you long for your dear ones and realize the distance dividing you. When the shadows of night fall and you sense the horror of disasters which may catch you unaware. There is no safe place for you. You are being forced to fight an unjust war against the South Vietnamese people who are resolved to fight through to the end for National Liberation. Why sacrifice your youthful days. This country is not yours."

QUANG NGAI. A 11 January report from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, related that approximately 150 propaganda leaflets entitled "Why" were found in the vicinity of (BS 514946). The theme of this leaflet, which was printed in English and previously reported, contained the normal VC propaganda line in the form of "Questions" concerning the reasons why the U.S. Serviceman is in Vietnam.

A 12 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that on 5 January a VC unit of approximately 250 men were scattered in the vicinity of THE KHANH MY (H) (BS 550840) with the mission of escorting and defending an armed VC propaganda unit of the Province Committee.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. An 8 January report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that VC cadre operating in DONG HA (YD 228612) and DAI AN (YD 242587) Hamlets have directed the hamlet chiefs to resist the grave removal progress by using "delay" techniques. (Refer to III MAF PIRINTREP NO. 1-67). The report went on to state that the VC have covert agents in each hamlet to report the names of those villagers who give more than the minimum effort to remove the graves.

THUA THIEN. A 9 January report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that VC entered THUY YEN (H) (ZC 144995) and NUOC NGOT (H) (ZD 143007) and collected an unknown amount of rice tax.

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A 11 January report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that the VC have established a Frogman Team composed of 30 men who are now attending a school which commenced in December 1966 and will end sometime during January 1967. Upon completion of the training period, this team will have the mission of sabotaging bridges and docks. The same report also stated that a terrorist class composed of 20 people are being trained during the period 5 through 17 January in AN CU (H) (YD 898087).

A 11 January report from a usually reliable source stated that an unknown number of VC entered XUAN HOA (H) (YD 808288) and assassinated the hamlet chief.

A 12 January report from a usually reliable source stated that the VC District Commissars have issued instructions to their infrastructure elements in PHU VANG (D) and PHU THU (D), THUA THIEN (F) to draw up a list of "Tyrannical" village and hamlet cadre.

A 12 January report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that an armed VC "suicide" group, disguised as ARVN riot police, is allegedly operating in the vicinity of LOI NUNG (H) (YD 8419). Another report from the same source stated that captured VC documents indicate an increase in the VC counterintelligence effort to gather information on friendly intelligence organizations, with specific attention directed at the Revolutionary Development program. This report further related that the VC were given instructions to counter the friendly intelligence gathering capability by detecting and eliminating penetration agents. The following is a list of instructions issued: (1) Know the hamlet people; (2) Check people who have been absent, returned recently and opened shops; (3) Check on all new comers to the area; (4) Do not recruit new members without first checking family background.

QUANG NAM. A 9 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC are using a new sabotage device which is approximately three inches long, one quarter inch in diameter, and made to look like an ordinary cigarette. In addition to containing tobacco to make this device appear as a normal cigarette, the interior contains red phosphorous and potassium chlorate which "eats" through a soft piece of wood and ignites an explosive powder. Reportedly, the "cigarette" does not contain enough powder to be used as an assassination device and it appears to be a "delay element" when used to detonate a larger type explosive charge.

A 9 January report from an intelligence source stated that a VC MF platoon is located in HAI AN #2 (H) (BT 060682) and KHAI TAY (H) (BT 050685). The mission of this unit is to support local guerrillas in their efforts to harass and arrest those villagers who have collaborated with the VN Government or have relatives in the ARVN Forces.

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In addition, an indoctrination course commencing on 10 January will be held at VAN Family Shrine, AN HAI #2 (H) (BT 055675) for those villagers who refuse or have neglected to pay taxes.

A 10 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the QUANG DA Headquarters of the NLF have organized an English course composed of 70 female students from DIEN BAN (D) which began in early January and is expected to last approximately one month. Upon completion, these women will be provided with one bottle of poison and will be expected to earn their living as merchants or bartenders in order to come in contact with Americans for the purpose of poisoning them. The poison is a yellow liquid with an agreeable scent and when mixed with water, creates a foam similar to beer. (CI Comment: One of several reports of VC allegedly utilizing females to poison U.S. Servicemen.)

A 11 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that on 2 January the VC cadre of HOA VANG (D) held a conference at the home of NGUYEN KHACH in CAM HOA (H) (AT 970705). The purpose of the conference was to draft plans for the attack on the U.S. Armor compound and POL dump at HOA CAM (Coordinates unknown), and to sabotage the CAU DO (AT 998705) and CAM LE (BT 010715) bridges.


QUANG TIN. A 11 January report from a usually reliable source related that an estimated VC platoon raided the LY TRA (V) (BT 382174) Refugee Camp injuring four people, including the village chief. Prior to withdrawing, the VC warned the villagers that if they did not return to VC controlled areas, they would be killed and their village burned.

QUANG NGAI. A 9 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that during the night of 4 January the VC held a meeting in VINH LOC (H) (BS 545788) which was attended by one provincial chief and three district cadre. The purpose of this meeting was to have each family in the area make 20 punji stakes, reconstruct a combat village, donate 5 \$VN in order to purchase gifts for the VC during TET, and to ensure that the villagers trade in those areas under VC control and pass on information concerning ARVN activities

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22 JANUARY 1967

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PERINTREP NO. 3-67

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 22 January 1967
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PERINTREP NO. 3-67

Period Covered: 150001H - 212400H Jan 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
 ND 48-4, ND 49-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - Southern DMZ. Ground reconnaissance north of THON SON LAM and west of the north - south axis of Route 9 reported continued enemy activity in these areas. A total of approximately 70 NVA were observed in the general vicinity of (YD 0165). In addition to the sightings, several short contacts were made with small groups of the enemy. On 15 January, a reconnaissance insert engaged an estimated NVA platoon at (XD 9352) and, over the period, several relatively small harboring and supply sites were sighted and destroyed along the reconnaissance line west of Route 9. Farther to the west at (XD 8863), a patrol gained contact with an estimated 30 NVA; a sharp fire fight ensued and the patrol was extracted. In each of these contacts and sightings, supporting fires were called with resulting enemy casualties. Interpretation of aerial photography flown over the area directly north of KHE SANH, running up to the DMZ, revealed no significant change in enemy ground activity. Patrolling accomplished south of the BA LONG valley produced negative results. The enemy situation within the DMZ remains unchanged and his actions to the south continue to point toward the support of what has come to be considered a normal screening effort with occasional harassing and probing actions. At (YD 135619) on 16 January, M Co, 3rd Bn, 4th Marines received between 100 and 150 rounds of mortar fire. Four kilometers northwest of DONG HA an estimated VC squad entered PHU NGAN Hamlet (YD 195625) and assassinated the hamlet chief. To the north on 20 January, GIO LINH OP underwent a short VC ground attack followed by 42 rounds of mortar fire. The central and eastern central portions of QUANG TRI (P) saw an increase in the number of mortar attacks against both US and ARVN positions. Although of short duration, these attacks in toto represents a cumulative increase in this type of enemy activity, especially when compared to the last five or six reporting periods. Whether or not such enemy action pertends an increased enemy interest in this area remains to be seen. There was a distinct rise in enemy activity in eastern coastal QUANG TRI (P). Action was focused in the sector immediately north of the TRIEU PHONG (D) Headquarters (YD 3457). Within this general vicinity platoon and probable company sized VC elements made a series of attacks against PF positions and one manned by the 15th Rural Development Cadre Team. The TRIEU PHONG District Chief was killed during the fighting. ARVN reacted rapidly to the situation, contact was again made with the enemy and substantial casualties were inflicted on the VC. Subsequent interrogation of a VC captured in the latter action revealed his unit as the 808th Main Force Bn.

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Other enemy activity in the same coastal area consisted of light ground and mortar probes against more isolated U.S., RF/FF and ARVN positions.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There was a decrease in the tempo of enemy activity in northeastern THUA THIEN (P). No significant enemy action was reported along Highway 1. Little intelligence of interest was received concerning this coastal area. Aerial photography flown on 16 and 17 January over four sections of terrain north and south of (YD 5525) when compared to late October readouts over the same area revealed a light to moderate increase in enemy ground construction activity particularly in a section east and west of (YD 5523). Over this latter sector, enemy weapons positions and probable way stations were noted. Ground reconnaissance elements deployed 20 kilometers due west of HUE City reported enemy sightings totalling approximately 30 to 40 VC. On 18 January, in the same vicinity, patrols gained contact with an estimated VC platoon, small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged and the VC broke contact. There was a rise in the number of sightings made in the area directly south of the PHU BAI TAOR. Over the period, approximately 100 VC were sighted in the area and recon patrols made contact with small groups of VC. On 18 January elements of the 3rd Recon Bn on patrol in the vicinity of (YC 903997) captured a VC who stated that he was to have been a replacement for the 804th Bn. Along with 10 others in an infiltration group he had moved into RVN about 25 days before his capture. Three VC initiated incidents were reported within the PHU BAI TAOR. On 20 January, 30 to 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire were received in the PHU BAI support area close to the air strip (YD 888148). Other than this, enemy activity in the area was normal. No significant intelligence was received concerning the area between PHU BAI and DANANG. Only minor incidents were reported along Highway 1 between these two locations.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Enemy activity remained fairly constant in the eastern portion of the province. There was however a slight decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents within the TAOR. Continued enemy activity was noted in the area (ZC 2050). Patrols from the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp made several sightings of small groups of the enemy and on 17 January, a CIDG patrol observed 30 VC entering a village in the vicinity of (YC 172538). An airstrike was called on the VC with unknown results. Within the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR in the general vicinity of (AT 9447), an active ground reconnaissance effort reported substantial sightings for the period. Approximately 120 VC were observed in this area. Several brief contacts were also made with small groups of VC. About 10 kilometers south of the DANANG TAOR in the general area (AT 8535), recon elements reported total sightings of approximately 160 VC. Several rather substantial contacts were made with the enemy, one of which involved a group of 30 VC. This week's level of activity south of the TAOR represents a continuation of the enemy's effort of the previous week. East of this location and on 17 January, two RF companies in night defensive positions one kilometer south of the QUE SON District Headquarters were attacked by an estimated two VC companies. Small arms and automatic weapons fire were exchanged. The RF maintained their positions and following a short fire fight a VC broke contact and withdrew.

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In Eastern QUANG NAM an unknown number of VC destroyed an eight meter concrete bridge at (BT 102516). The structure was not guarded. On 19 January a Master Sergeant allegedly from the Rear Services Section, 21st NVA Regt turned himself in at the MAI BAI OP. He stated that the 21st NVA Regt moved south out of QUANG TIN (P) into QUANG NGAI (P) during December 1966. He further revealed that the 3rd NVA Regt would remain in QUANG NAM (P) and would "combine" with local force units in preparation for the forthcoming spring campaign. Enemy initiated incidents recorded within the TAOR dropped off this week. However, over 30 percent of the incidents involved mines and booby traps. This percentage is well in excess of the norm which generally runs to ten percent of the incidents reported regardless of the total number. On 15 January a platoon from M Co, 3rd Bn, 1st Marines was assaulted by an estimated VC company at (BT 051691). A captured VC taken during the engagement was identified as a North Vietnamese and purportedly a member of a company of the V.75 Mortar Bn, a unit new to the DANANG TAOR. Although unconfirmed this intelligence information again suggests utilization of main force assets within an environment normally thought more apropos for the guerrilla. Low level agent reports covering eastern QUANG NAM (P) produced nothing of consequence.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Enemy activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P) dropped off sharply especially when compared to last week's substantial action. Two relatively minor incidents occurred along Highway 1 within 10 kilometers of the QUANG NAM - QUANG TIN border where an ARVN and a RF OP were hit by mortar fire. Casualties were negligible. Ground recon north of the THIEN PHOUK CIDG Camp was negative. Activity south of the camp involved an attack on a PF platoon OP which was overrun. The attacking force was estimated as a possible VC battalion. Two reaction forces, one on the same day of the attack (14 January) and one the following day were ambushed approximately two kilometers southwest of the OP. Friendly elements at the outpost were extracted after suffering heavy casualties. Low level agent reports covering eastern QUANG TIN (P) indicated that the 72nd VC Bn was located in an area five to 10 kilometers northwest of TAM KY City. This is considered a normal operating area for the unit. There were scattered and small scale enemy harassing actions reported from northwest of the CHU LAI TAOR and other intelligence concerning this area was of no significance. Within the CHU LAI TAOR there was a drop in the number of incidents reported. The majority of these occurred in the southern sector with the remainder along the LOC. Four incidents were reported from the Korean Marine Brigade area of responsibility. Nothing of any significance was reported from the western portion of the province.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). For the second consecutive week considerable enemy activity was reported in areas southeast and northeast of the TRA BONG and HA THANH CIDG Camps. Six separate sightings along a north-south line between (BS 5488) and (BS 5476) by three AO's, one FO and two OP's were made of approximately 150 VC. In each case artillery was brought to bear and enemy casualties were heavy. Eight to ten kilometers west of these sightings ground reconnaissance elements also deployed in a north to south configuration observed approximately 200 VC at various points. Two patrols out of the TRA BONG CIDG Camp made contact with estimated VC squads on 15 January; fire was exchanged and the VC withdrew.

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On the same date the 236th RF Co, while deployed in night defensive positions in the vicinity of SON HA (BS 388665), was attacked by an estimated VC company. Mortar fire preceded the attack and friendly casualties were heavy. This location is directly south of the HA THANH CIDG Camp. Low level agent reports and interrogation results obtained from two ralliers now place the 21st NVA Regt in an area about 10 to 15 kilometers northeast of the HA THANH CIDG Camp. Additional agent reports, though unconfirmed, have moved subordinate elements of the 1st VC Regt to locations east and south of the HA THANH CIDG Camp. An analysis of the aforementioned intelligence information warrants consideration of the possibility of enemy attacks against isolated outposts, positions or units in this area southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR. Moving to eastern QUANG NGAI (P) enemy activity dropped off slightly along Highway 1. On 19 January an unknown number of VC destroyed a bypass on Highway 1 approximately six kilometers north of MO DUC at (BS 708618). The bridge had been guarded by two PF platoons. Ground reconnaissance centered on the area (BS 6755) reported total sightings of approximately 160 VC. Several sharp contacts with small groups of the enemy were made in this area over the period 14 through 16 January. Low level agent reports placed the 38th VC Bn in the area (BS 7060) and the probable 19th VC Bn east of this location toward the coast. Four incidents were reported from the BA TO and GIA VUC CIDG Camps. One on 17 January involved a mortar attack against BA TO and District Headquarters, the remainder were results of BA TO patrol activity in which squad and possibly platoon sized enemy units were encountered briefly. Early in the week, two CIDG patrols west of BA TO reported negative findings as a result of moving through an area thought to have been occupied by the 2nd VC Regt. Nothing of intelligence interest was received concerning western QUANG NGAI (P).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD: Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 305 and consisted of one attack, 12 assaults by fire, 26 mine/booby trap incidents, 93 small unit engagements and 173 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Tactics. On 21 January, M Co, 3d Bn, 26th Marines discovered a 60mm mortar round rigged as a booby trap. The round, significantly in-bedded so as to avoid movement, was positioned nose up. A distance above the nose of the round a rock was hanging with a trip wire attached. When the wire was tripped, the rock would drop and strike the nose of the round, detonating it. (G-2 Comment: First report of this type tactic.)

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f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
27 Dec	(ZC 135250)	T-89 CP and Supply Area	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F-3
31 Dec	(AT 998343)	Medical Aid Station	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F-3
31 Dec	(AT 970329)	VC Base Area/ Operations Center	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F-3
10 Jan	(BS 390450)	Arms and Explosive Factory	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F-3
12 Jan	(YD 0944) Hill 660	Rice Cache	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F-6
13 Jan	(BS 354834)	CP, 21st Regt	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F-3
15 Jan	(BS 505763)	CP, X-20 Bn. (AKA 409th Bn)	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F-3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents for the reporting period totaled 173 and reflected a slight decrease from the last period. Aircraft sustaining hits increased to 42, while the total number of hits decreased to 82. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9754), (BT 0154), (BT 0260), (BS 4187), (BS 4678) and (BS 4782). Four cases of 12.7mm were reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Sightings and contacts increased again this week. Observations of the enemy involved sightings in groups somewhat larger than normal. Enemy elements reported were in strengths of from 15 to 50 NVA, per group. Locations concerned were northwest, northeast and west of THON SON LAM. Enemy elements sighted appeared well armed and equipped and in one instant, were carrying what appeared to be two 12.7mm machineguns. In addition, small way stations were found to be west of THON SON LAM. 16 bolt action rifles and a case of CHICOM grenades were found at one station.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). The Operation CHINOOK area continued to produce sightings of the enemy. Most were small groups (5 to 10 VC). One estimated platoon sized contact was made. The area directly south of the PHU BAI TAOR produced substantial sightings of approximately 100 VC. One prisoner taken on 18 January in this area indicated that he was from the 804th VC Bn.

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(3) QUANG NAM (P). The area to the south of the TAOR continued to produce a high level of sightings along the SONG THU BON River south of NONG SON and within the NONG SON Valley proper. The area (AT 8035) appeared to be a VC training complex.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). The area to the southeast of the TRA BONG CIDG Camp and southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR continued for the second consecutive week to provide a substantial number of enemy sightings. Enemy personnel so observed appeared to be well equipped and the direction of movement was predominantly to the east.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
21 Jan	(YD 106508)	1400	2nd Bn, 3rd Marines

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 135 KIA, 276 KIA (Prob), and 11 VC PW. Weapons losses were 52 individual weapons and four crew served weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. From 12 through 15 December the passage of a cold front through I Corps brought extensive low cloudiness, rain and fog throughout the corps area. Ceilings during this initial period averaged 1500 feet with a low of 300 feet in the DONG HA - PHU BAI area. Portions of the coast and upper highlands were obscured with low stratus and fog. Temperatures remained below the norm. On 15 January a backing of the flow in the first 5000 feet to the northwest created a condition of decreasing cloudiness and an increase in visibility. Temperatures remained in the low fifties throughout I Corps. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

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	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	62	63	67	65
Low	56	54	59	60
Rainfall (total)	.90	3.97	.82	5.53
Visibility (miles)	6	5	7	5
Winds (knots)	8	8	7	11

k. Significant Agent, Interrogation, and Document Reports. Annex B.

1. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

a. Enemy Capabilities. VC/NVA forces can:

(1) Attack the KHE SANH - THON SON LAM - D5 - DONG HA area with up to two divisions (324B NVA and 341st NVA Divs).

(2) Attack the HUE - PHU BAI area with one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and two separate battalions (804th and 810th). *810th*

(3) Attack the DANANG combat base with one regiment (3d NVA Regt) and four separate battalions (R.20, V.25, 804th Infantry Bns and 402nd Sapper Bn).

(4) Attack the CHU LAI combat base with up to two regiments (1st - 2d Regt VC Regt and 21st NVA Regt) and five separate battalions (20th, 38th, 48th, and 72nd Infantry Bns and 409th Sapper Bn). *1516 Engr Bn*

(5) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one regiment (reinforced).

(6) Defend in present positions in and just north of the DMZ with two divisions (324B and 341st Divs).

(7) Defend elsewhere in I CTZ, including VC/NVA base areas, with forces locally available.

(8) Reinforce the forces presently in I CTZ within three to ten days with up to three divisions from NVN or from those forces transiting LAOS, and one division from II Corps (3rd NVA Div).

(9) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorist, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

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b. Analysis of Enemy Capability:

(1) Capability (1): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The probable mission of the 324B NVA Div during operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE (early stages) was to attack the CUA-CAM LO-DONG HA-QUANG TRI area; sanctity of the DMZ from ground attack facilities the enemy's massing of personnel, equipment and supplies close to possible objectives; the location of possible objectives vis-a-vis the DMZ permits rapid reinforcement by forces in NVN; enemy knowledge of our situation, based on extensive reconnaissance activities; And successful attack and temporary control of northern I CTZ would greatly enhance enemy political ambitions and truce table bargaining positions. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The heavy personnel and material losses suffered by the 324B NVA Div in past operations; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; existence of extensive fortifications in and north of the DMZ; decisive defeat of the attacking forces would lay the DMZ and NVN homeland open to invasion.

(2) Capability (2): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: Enemy knowledge of our situation, based upon extensive reconnaissance activities; successful attack and temporary control of any part of these areas would enhance the enemy's truce table bargaining positions; the city of HUE is an attractive historical, religious and political target which, if successfully attacked and temporarily held, would enhance greatly enemy prestige at home and abroad; and dissident Buddhists and remnants of the struggle movement in HUE could provide sympathizers and collaborators to the enemy. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: Enemy forces available are of insufficient strength to attack HUE-PHU BAI successfully; the enemy's past abstinence and probable future reluctance to attack any marine combat base or contiguous area except in overpowering strength; enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; HUE is located on an exposed coastal plain and the surrounding terrain is unfavorable for the enemy's tactics; and ~~enemy's losses during recent operations, including CHUNGKING,~~ and our deployments in the area.

(3) Capability (3): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: Enemy knowledge of our situation, based on extensive reconnaissance activities; successful attack and temporary control of any part of the area would greatly enhance the enemy's truce table bargaining positions; the city of DANANG, second largest metropolitan area in RVN, the airfield and the port of DANANG are substantial targets which, if successfully attacked, would seriously impair friendly military activity in I CTZ; and even a partial victory could seriously hurt vital facilities and contribute to a significant propaganda coup. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: Enemy forces are of insufficient strength to attack DANANG successfully; the enemy's past abstinence and probably future reluctance to attack a marine combat base or contiguous area except in overpowering strength; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; and the enemy's losses during recent operations.

(4) Capability (4): The following factors favor adoption of this capability: The strength, disposition and combat efficiency of available enemy units might appear to the enemy to be sufficiently favorable for risking an attack;

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the enemy's knowledge of our situation, based on extensive reconnaissance activities; and successful attack and temporary control of any of this area would enhance the enemy's truce table bargaining positions. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: The enemy's past abstinence and probable future reluctance to attack any marine combat base or contiguous areas except in over powering strength; enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; and enemy's losses during recent operations.

(5) Capability (5): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: The present dispositions of enemy units; isolated units and outposts offer the best targets for the least risk compared to the other attack capabilities, particularly if executed in inclement weather; the enemy's past success against isolated ARVN/CIDG outposts in I CTZ; most isolated outposts lie astride main enemy infiltration routes where the enemy may achieve a temporary superiority of force; and the practice of attacking relatively weak targets at a time and place of his choosing under favorable conditions, is a basic enemy tactic. The following factor militates against adoption of this capability: The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy buildups and to react rapidly to destroy them by supporting arms or by ground spoiling attacks.

(6) Capability (6): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: Our build-up in the area south of the DMZ and use of naval gunfire off the coast of NVN; heavy casualties suffered during operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE may dictate the enemy continue a temporary defensive posture in northern I CTZ; terrain and present dispositions favor the defender; continuing enemy efforts to improve and expand defensive positions and supply caches; and restrictions placed on friendly forces by existing rules of engagement. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: Enemy reluctance to stand and fight against US/FWMAF except under favorable conditions and at a time and place of his choosing; paucity of enemy supporting arms to adequately support a determined defensive posture; enemy knowledge of friendly offensive mobility and fire support capabilities against their static positions; and achievement of a much needed victory is unlikely by defensive actions.

(7) Capability (7): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy may choose to adopt a hasty defense and/or delay until command posts, vital installations and caches are displaced, concealed or dispersed; the enemy's requirement to protect vital base areas; and the enemy's desire to conserve forces in one area while exploiting an opportunity in another location. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: Reluctance to stand and fight against US/FWMAF except under favorable conditions and at a time and place of his choosing; the enemy may prefer not to defend occupied terrain if it is only an operating area and not a vital base area; the enemy has only a limited supporting arms capability; and the enemy will often evade direct contact with superior friendly forces by resorting to small unit operations, including harassment, ambushes, mining and the use of booby traps to inflict maximum casualties.

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(8) Capability (8): Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's desire to achieve a major victory against friendly forces; the relative freedom of movement through enemy controlled territory and the DMZ; and the enemy's capability to move units between I and II Corps. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge that the introduction of additional enemy forces into RVN would probably be matched by additional RVNAF, thus making a decisive enemy military victory unlikely; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces for movement; and the probability that reinforcing units would be detected and destroyed by friendly supporting arms fire.

(9) Capability (9): Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: This capability is a basic enemy tactic which has long been practiced in SVN; it provides an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms fire; VC knowledge of the terrain and of the local populace; the enemy's belief that successful application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued US force participation in SVN; and guerrillas and local force VC units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while VC main force and NVA units conduct large scale operations. There are no factors which militate against the adoption of this capability.

c. Vulnerabilities.

(1) Enemy forces, installations and lines of communication are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attack.

(2) Enemy forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations, enemy forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to surprise.

(4) The probable decrease in overall combat effectiveness of enemy forces has increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations. Contributing factors include: Increased reliance on conscripted, less highly motivated personnel; reduced training times and lower morale resulting from continued pressure of friendly operations, food and medical supply shortages, general hardships, and our psychological warfare operations.

(5) Enemy forces are becoming more dependent upon local resources for support. But the necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population.

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d. Relative Probability of Adoption. The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities are as follows: (9), (5), (6), (7), (4), (1), (3), (2) and (8).



R. H. THOMPSON
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, CAPTIVE/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKME	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CG 366TH TFW	1
CMC (CODE A02)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHEBON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CG 30TH NGR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORV	1	CG 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CG 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CG 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CG 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CG CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CG CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CG 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CICV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAP	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 3-67

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III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 212400H JAN 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,300			8	3,000
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	12	5,050	6	2,300	35	17,550
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	3	1,080			13	3,530
Separate Companies			2	185	28	2,665	30	2,850
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,650		7,615		4,965		29,230
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				120		955		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
MILITIA STRENGTH								20,641
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		17,150	7,735		6,820		52,346	

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 212400H JAN 67

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	BST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	24Dec66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5221	18Dec66
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5431	22Dec66
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5120	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6330		
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009		
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 952597	3Jan67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 8248	31Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	AT 8364	ZC 135280	25Dec66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	AT 9858	16Dec66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,000		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn(75mm RR)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Hq Military Region 5	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border		29Nov66
1st VC Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,410	Fair	Son Ha (D)	Son Ha (D)	2Jan67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 3461	2Jan67
60th Bn	MF	C	250		Son Ha (D)	BS 3761	29Dec66
40th Bn	MF	C	460		Son Ha (D)	BS 3461	2Jan67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Son Ha (D)	BS 3461	2Jan67
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Ha (D)	BS 3461	2Jan67
2d Regt (3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 6431	28Dec66
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
21st Regt #2	NVA	C	2,000	Good	Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3781	12Jan67
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 5076	13Jan67
1506 Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 2770	8Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 5370		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BBS 5477		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	120		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8142	26Dec66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20Oct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 370165	15May66
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 780875	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,100		Binh Dinh	BS 7303	1Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh	BR 7986	4Jan67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	1Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	28Dec66

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. The location of the 21st NVA Regt has been moved to the vicinity of Son Ha/Tra Bong District border area. This location is based on a rallier report and numerous low level agent reports.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 212400H JAN 67

DMZ/VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt) 31st Regt (Hq)	E-341st Song Hong	31445(?) 31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		CO-Sr Capt BA
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn 32nd Regt (Hq) 4th Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn) 270th Regt (?)	31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn 6th Bn 33rd Regt (Hq) 324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?)/307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH
				CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG)
				PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN
				XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH
				PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co Trieu Phong Co C.10 Co Cam Lo Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20 10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri H.30			CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM-41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO- Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA wpns Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90 3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DKZ 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?)			CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-THANH
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co				CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR 6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		6-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG	CO-LE

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh	20825		CO-Capt THAO
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			CO-Capt THAU
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
402nd Sapper Bn	T-89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC)
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn			XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			CO-Phan Phong SAM
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang	20,601GM- 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; 7th Regt(?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn; 75th Bn(?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
33rd Arty Regt (H)				
RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn			CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
	GK-32			XO-Tran Van QUANG
RQ22 Bn (75mm RR)	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33			CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ23 Bn (120mm Mort)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30; RQ 20/B BN; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Co 20 A-14		

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UNIT

RQ24 Bn (ENGR)

72nd Bn
74th Co

14th Co

706th Co
A10 CoA13 Co
A16 CoA19 Co
A21 CoA34 Co
Tra Son Co
Tra Ha CoAKA

GK-40

V-74; V-20;
74th Dist Force Co106th Co
K51; 107; F-14;
D-21; Thang BinhD-22
C-73Tam Ky; D-23 Co
C-75; Phi Po A-21
Bn; Flying Tiger A-21LBNARMS AND EQUIPMENT1-57mm RR (?)
Unk-M-79
Unk-K-50 SMG
1-60mm Mort
1-30 Cal MG2-60mm Mort
1-57mm RR
6-MG1-60mm Mort
2-MGPERSONALITIESCO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
CO-Tran Van CAO
CO-THANH
XO-Tran TIEN
PO-PHUONGCO-KHOA
XO-Nguyen THANH
PO-Anh VU

CO-Hong LE

CO-MANH

CO-LtGen Nguyen DON
XO-Col TACO-Col Chan Khoi DICH
XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
CO-Maj Nguyen TUYENCO-SrCapt Le LOUNG
XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
CO-Nguyen Duc CONG
XO-SrCapt THUA
PO-Duan Cong THANHQUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)

BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; 20,100GM-
F-550; Co Hoa 21,900GM
Bac Hien

1st VC Regt (Hq)

Cong Truong 1; H-800;
PS/40; 108th Regt
Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 5645
40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd
Bn; Phi Doi 2007

60th Bn

Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn;
Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai
35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;
Chu Song; Truong Son
70; Inter-mt White
Tiger Bn; F-07; 103

70th Bn

3-81mm Mort
4-60mm Mort
5-MG
4-57mm RR

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20,135GM 20,139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ BA HAO		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; Poss 408th Bn	HT 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20,141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Minh Long Co			CO-Lu TRI
206th Co	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU CO-Dien MIEU CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
614th Co	Son Ha Co			
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			
C.219	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			

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UNIT

T.18 Co

T.19 Co

T.20 Co

Tra Bong Co

AKA

Son Tinh Dong (West)

P.31 Co

C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong
Co

F-8 Co; 8th Co

LEN

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

CO-Pham TRAN

CO-LONG

XO-MINH

PO-MINH

CO-TRAN

CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUYET
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CIM
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600;	1548		
90th Engr Bn 2d VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN Cofs-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH Asst PO-THUONG and NGHIEP CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG Cofs-DIUEU
97th Bn	703 Intil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164GM (new)		
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21155 GM		
7th Bn	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANG Cofs-LUONG
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			

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LBN

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

22nd NVA Regt

Quyet Tam; 209th Infil
Gp; Code No 527; Cong
Doan; Song Hong (Labor
Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt

21.141 VM
Binh Dinh (P)

7th Bn

1st Bn; 517 Bn;
Inter-Gp 7

8th Bn

2d Bn; Bn 516;
Inter-Gp 8

9th Bn

3d Bn; Bn 514;
Inter-Gp 9

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PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Xuan
DIEP
XO-Maj Nguyen Van
DUC or KHANG
PO-Ho Si LOC
CofS-Capt THANG

CO-Capt LUYEN or
Tran Van SON
XO-Lt HOANG
PO-Capt DIEM
CofS-Capt KHOI
CO-Capt Pham Van CAC
AKA VIEN
PO-Capt Phang HOI
CO-TIN
XO-Capt XUNG
PO-Capt KHIEN

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NORTHERN SUB-REGION HQ
341ST DIV HQ
31ST REGT
32ND REGT
33RD REGT
324B DIV HQ
803RD REGT
90TH REGT
812TH REGT
808TH BN
814TH BN
810TH BN

6TH NVA REGT HQ
800TH BN
802ND BN
806TH BN
2ND DIV HQ
20TH BN
1506TH ENGR BN
2ND VC REGT
93RD BN
97TH BN
70TH BN
90TH BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report:
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre;
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison
 Man; 20. District Cadre; 21. NLF Cadre; 22. Intelligence Cadre; 23. Association
 Member.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

B. <u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LOC QUANG (V)	TIEN	29	1	3 ITT LE VAN LAM
DAI LOC (D)	TRUONG DUONG	33	4	10 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
LOC QUANG (V)	NGUYEN DUYN	30	1	3 ITT Consolidated
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN COI	30	18	Rpt #3C-1-67
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN THI XUYEN		2	11 Jan 67 F/6
	NGUYEN TIEN	22	2	
	VO LIEU	57	6	
	VO XICH	30	3	
	BUI TU	22	3	
	PHAM NGHIA	18	3	
	NGUYEN KHAN	18	3	
	NGUYEN THI HOANH	16	3	
	NGUYEN THI LE	16	3	
	DOAN NGOC BAY	16	3	
	NGUYEN THI BAY	18	14	
	NGUYEN TU	25	11	
LOC QUANG (V)	*MUOI	40	9	3 ITT NGUYEN DUONG
DAI LOC (D)	*NGUYEN KY	30	4	29 Dec 66 F/3
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN HY	29	13	
	*NGUYEN THUNG	35	6	
	*NGUYEN NHO	30	6	
	*PHAM THI LIEN	27	6	
LOC QUANG (V)	*MUOI	40	9	3 ITT HUYNH TO
DAI LOC (D)	*NGUYEN KY	30	13	29 Dec 66 F/3
QUANG NAM (P)	*NGUYEN THUNG	35	6	
	*NGUYEN NHO	30	6	
LOC QUANG (V)	*MUOI	40	4	3 ITT NGUYEN DUC
DAI LOC (D)	*NGUYEN KY	30	9	TRUNG 29 Dec 66 F/3
QUANG NAM (P)	*NGUYEN HY	34	13	
	*NGUYEN THUNG		6	
	*NHO	30	6	
	*PHAM THI LIEN	27	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
AN DINH (H)	LE VAN BAY	35	12	3 ITT NGUYEN TAM
LOC QUANG (V)	NGUYEN THANG	25	1	10 Jan 67 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	LE THIEM	27	4	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGO SU	30	6	
	NGUYEN HO	35	6	
	LE THI THON	35	6	
	DOAN O	20	3	
	PHAN TAI	30	3	
AN DINH (H)	NGUYEN CU	45	1	3 ITT Consolidated
LOC QUANG (V)				Rpt 3C-1-67
DAI LOC (D)				11 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
AN THANH (H)	NGUYEN TRA	36	1	3 ITT LE VAN LAM
LOC QUANG (V)	HUYNH NAM	36	6	10 Jan 67 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN KIM LINH	40	11	
QUANG NAM (P)	CAO SO	35	3	
	NGUYEN DIET	34	3	
	NGUYEN DONG	32	18	
	HO NHO		3	
HA THANG (H)	*DOAN CUONG	27	18	3 ITT NGUYEN DUONG
LOC QUANG (V)	*TRAN NAM	24	3	29 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	*DOAN KY	25	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	*TRAN DU	24	3	
	BUI TRUC	25	3	
	*DOAN HIEN	34	1	
	*NGUYEN TA	30	1/7	
HA THANG (H)	*DOAN CUONG	27	18	3 ITT HUYNH TO
LOC QUANG (V)	*DOAN KY	25	3	29 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	*TRAN NAM	24	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	*DOAN HIEN	34	1	
	*NGUYEN TA	30	1/7	
PHU HUONG (H)	DOAN NAM	35	18	3 ITT NGUYEN DU
LOC QUANG (V)	HUYNH CUE	25	3	TRUNG 29 Dec 66 F/3
DAI LOC (D)	TRUONG TU	24	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRUONG THUNG	26	3	
LOC QUI (V)	NGUYEN HOC	45	1	3 ITT TRAN THANH
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN CHUONG	35	11	16 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN MUOI	30	10	
	TRAN LIEN	20	13	
	TRAN TAN	20	18	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
AN DINH (H)	LE VAN BAY	35	12	3 ITT NGUYEN TAM
LOC QUANG (V)	NGUYEN THANG	25	1	10 Jan 67 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	LE THIEM	27	4	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGO SU	30	6	
	NGUYEN HO	35	6	
	LE THI THON	35	6	
	DOAN O	20	3	
	PHAN TAI	30	3	
AN DINH (H)	NGUYEN CU	45	1	3 ITT Consolidated
LOC QUANG (V)				Rpt 3C-1-67
DAI LOC (D)				11 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
AN THANH (H)	NGUYEN TRA	36	1	3 ITT LE VAN LAM
LOC QUANG (V)	HUYNH NAM	36	6	10 Jan 67 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN KIM LINH	40	11	
QUANG NAM (P)	CAO SO	35	3	
	NGUYEN DIET	34	3	
	NGUYEN DONG	32	18	
	HO NHO		3	
HA THANG (H)	*DOAN CUONG	27	18	3 ITT NGUYEN DUONG
LOC QUANG (V)	*TRAN NAM	24	3	29 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	*DOAN KY	25	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	*TRAN DU	24	3	
	BUI TRUC	25	3	
	*DOAN HIEN	34	1	
	*NGUYEN TA	30	1/7	
HA THANG (H)	*DOAN CUONG	27	18	3 ITT HUYNH TO
LOC QUANG (V)	*DOAN KY	25	3	29 Dec 66 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	*TRAN NAM	24	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	*DOAN HIEN	34	1	
	*NGUYEN TA	30	1/7	
PHU HUONG (H)	DOAN NAM	35	18	3 ITT NGUYEN DU
LOC QUANG (V)	HUYNH CUE	25	3	TRUNG 29 Dec 66 F/3
DAI LOC (D)	TRUONG TU	24	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRUONG THUNG	26	3	
LOC QUI (V)	NGUYEN HOC	45	1	3 ITT TRAN THANH
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN CHUONG	35	11	16 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN MUOI	30	10	
	TRAN LIEN	20	13	
	TRAN TAN	20	18	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	TRUNG HUAN	35	3	
	NGUYEN CHAU	33	3	
	HUYNH NAM	30	3	
	NGUYEN SAU	20	3	
	TRUONG DUOC	25	4	
CAM VAN (H)	NGUYEN CHUNG	37		3 CIT NGUYEN DO
KY QUANG (V)	NGUYEN TOAN	31	1	27 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN NGAN	31	18	
QUANG NAM (P)	PHAM SUU	40	4	
	NGUYEN DUNG	45	6	
	NGUYEN DINH	32	5	
	TRAN HIEP	20	3	
	NGUYEN DOA	25	3	
	NGUYEN CHIEN	18	3	
PHU THO (V)	PHAN PHU THI	40	1	3 ITT PHAN THI CHIN
DIEN BAN (D)	TRAN NGOC LOI	21	2	7 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
HAMLET #1 (H)	PHAN PHU TAT	35	1	3 ITT PHAN THI IN
PHU THO (V)	DANG KIM MY	22	4	7 Jan 67 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN VAN SAU	20	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	PHAN PHU KHA	27	3	
THANH SON (V)	PHAN BON	22	18	3 ITT HO CONG BAN
DIEN BAN (D)	DOAN VAN	24	18/7	5 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN SU	26	3	
	TRAN MOT	28	3	
	VO DEN	22	3	
	NGUYEN DOM	25	3	
	GO TRI	38	1	
	TONG THI CHUNG	38	11	
NGAN CHAU (H)	NGUYEN KHANH	43	1	3 ITT HUYNH THI BAN
THANH THUY (V)	NGUYEN BAI	25	18	29 Dec 66 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN HAI	26	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN TAN	25	3	
	TRAN CONG	28	3	
	NGUYEN SAT	18	3	
	NGUYEN CHUNG	20	3	
HAMLET #3 (H)	NGUYEN DUOC		18	3 CIT TRAN SOT
DIEN NGOC	HUYNH DANG	25	3	11 Jan 67 F/6
(AKA THANH THUY) (V)	HUYNH DINH	22	3	
DIEN BAN (D)	HUYNH VINH	25	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN NHO	23	3	
	LE THOM	21	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
HAMLET #3 (H)	HUYNH CAN		1	3 CIT TRAN SOT
DIEN VINH	TRAN NHU		4	11 Jan 67 F/6
(AKA THANH THUY) (V)	TRAN THI PHAM	25	6	
DIEN BAN (D)	TRAN LAU	40	11	
QUANG NAM (P)				
DIEN NGOC	TRAN NAI	31	1	3 CIT TRAN SOT
(AKA THANH THUY) (V)	NGUYEN PHU	40	7	11 Jan 67 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	PHUNG TIEM	35	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN HIEN	29	4	
	DANG SO	25	11	
	CHI BON	30	6	
HAMLET #1 (H)	NGUYEN SANH		1	3 CIT TRAN SOT
DIEN VINH	NGUYEN TU		18	11 Jan 67 F/6
(AKA THANH THUY) (V)	LE TY	40	18	
DIEN BAN (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				
VINH XUAN (V)	*VO KIET	37	1	Nat Pol Rpt
DIEN BAN (D)	CA	36	18	VO DIEU
QUANG NAM (P)	THI NGANG	31	7	30 Dec 66 F/3
QUANG LANG #1 (H)	VO KIET	40	1	3 CIT NGUYEN THI CHI
VINH XUAN (V)	VO PHUOC	30	4	3 Jan 67 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	DANG QUA	30	18	
QUANG NAM (P)	VO THI HONG	30	6	
	DANG DICH	25	3	
	VO DAN	22	3	
	DANG KICH	25	3	
	DANG BIEN	30	3	
	DANG MAY	20	3	
	DANG LU	25	3	
	DANG VAN	20	3	
	VO NHI	22	3	
	VO THI XIENG	25	3	
	DANG THI NHI	20	3	
QUANG LANG	VO MINH	40	1	3 ITT Consolidated
(AKA CO LUU #2) (H)	VO DUC		7	Rpt DANG PHAT,
VINH XUAN (V)	VO GIAC		5	VEN, VO NGAN, VO
DIEN BAN (D)	DAN THI LUC		5	KIEN, NGUYEN MIEN
QUANG NAM (P)	DANG VAN DAO		4	10 Jan 67 F/6
	DANG VAN DE		4	
	LE THI TAI		6	
	*LE BANG		6	
	ANH TRUNG		15	
	*VO CHIT		18	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	HAI CAM		19	
	VO THANH LONG (AKA VAN)		20	
	*VO KIET		1	
	VO UT		5	
	HO HIEN	30	18	
	VO HON		3	
	DONG QUA	25	3/5	
	VO DAI	35	3	
	VO CAU	25	3	
	DANG THE	20	3	
	VO TAM	20	3	
	VO VO	22	3	
	VO NOOT	18	3	
	VO LIEN	20	3	
	DANG KHAN	19	3	
QUANG LANG (AKA CO LUU#2) (H)	*VO CHIT	36	18/7	Nat Pol Rpt
VINH XUAN (V)	VO CA	41	18	VO DIEU
DIEN BAN (D)	VO DUNG	31	3	30 Dec 66 F/3
QUANG NAM (P)	*LE BANG	41	6	
CO LUU (H)	TRAN TRU		1	3 ITT LE TRINH
VINH XUAN (V)	LE ANH		1/7	5 Jan 67 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	LE MIEN		1/7	
QUANG NAM (P)				
VINH XUAN (V)	LE HOI		1	3 ITT LE TRINH
DIEN BAN (D)	LE NUOI		4	5 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	DANG PHUONG		11	
	VO NHU		13	
	LE CHAY		13	
	NGUYEN LUT		18	
	THAN NHAC		10	
	THAN THOI		3	
	THAN DU		3	
	THAN HOAC		3	
	DO QUA		3	
	LE CA		3	
	LE CHUT		3	
	NGUYEN BAY		3	
	VO CUNG		3	
	LE NUOI		3	
	LE BU		3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
SON THO (V)	*NGUYEN TRONG TOI	40	9	3 ITT VO BAN CHAN
DUC DUC (D)	*NGUYEN DAM	45	9	11 Jan 67 F/3
QUANG NAM (P)	*NGUYEN KIET	42	10	
	LE MINH	40	10	
	DO TAN HUNG	25	6	
	*PHAM VO	47	11	
	*NGUYEN LIEM	50	13	
	LUAN MAI	40	13	
	DUONG TRUU		6	
	*LE MINH		18	
SON THO (V)	*NGUYEN TRONG HOI		1	3 ITT LE ANH KIEM
DUC DUC (D)	*NGUYEN DAM		1/7	11 Jan 67 F/3
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN TUONG NHAN		9	
	NGUYEN HOUN		4	
	*LE MINH		4	
	DONG NHI		4	
	*PHAM VO		11	
	DO NGA		11	
	NGUYEN THONG		11	
	NGUYEN MINH		2	
	PHAN DANG		12	
	NGUYEN XUAN LANG		12	
	*NGUYEN KIET		20	
	*DO QUAN		19	
	NGUYEN HOI (AKA NGUYEN MAI HONG)		20	
	DO TAN HUNG		6	
	NGUYEN XOA		6	
	NGUYEN NGOC ANH		6	
	*NGUYEN LUOT		9	
	CAO KIEN		6	
	NGUYEN CHAU		6	
	*NGUYEN THI TRINH		6	
	HUYNH MAI		5	
	PHAN HUONG		2	
	NGUYEN CHAN LANG		18/9	
SAN THO (V)	*NGUYEN TRUONG HOI		9	3 ITT PHAM AI
DUC DUC (D)	*NGUYEN DAM		9/7	11 Jan 67 F/3
QUANG NAM (P)	*PHAM VO		11	
	*DO NGA		11	
	*LE MINH		4	
	*NGUYEN LIEM		13	
	*NGUYEN KIET		20	
	NGUYEN HOI		20	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	NGUYEN XUAN MAI		13	
	*NGUYEN LUOC		6	
	*NGUYEN THI TRINH		6	
	*DO QUAN		19	
	*LE MINH		18	
THO TAY (H)	*NGUYEN TAI		1	3 ITT VO BAN CHAN
SON THO (V)	*DUONG TRUU		6	11 Jan 67 F/3
DUC DUC (D)	NGUYEN HAO		18	
QUANG NAM (P)	*NGUYEN MOT	25	3	
	PHAN HOI	25	3	
	DUONG CAO	26	3	
THO TAY (H)	*NGUYEN TAI		1	3 ITT LE ANH KIEM
SON THO (V)	PHAN XANH		9	11 Jan 67 F/3
DUC DUC (D)	NGUYEN CHO		4	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN HIEP		4	
	*DUONG TRUU		6	
	PHAN QUI		6	
	NGUYEN QUOR		6	
	CAO SUU		18	
	*NGUYEN MOT		3	
	DUONG TAN		3	
	DUONG CAO		3	
	PHAN HOI		3	
	CAO TAN XUAN		3	
	CAO TAN KIEU		3	
	NGUYEN TOAN		3	
	NGUYEN QUANG		3	
THO TAY (H)	*NGUYEN HAO		18	3 ITT PHAM AI
SON THO (V)	*NGUYEN TAI		1	11 Jan 67 F/3
DUC DUC (D)	*DUONG TRUU		6	
QUANG NAM (P)				
CAM NE #3 (H)	PHAN TUU	25	1	3 ITT DINH KY
HOA LUONG (V)	NGO SAN	30	3	Alias: TUC DANH
HIEU DUC (D)	LE QUYEN	25	3	DOAN, 30 Dec F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	DINH TAT	25	3	
	PHAN DOI	30	3	
	PHAN DANH	23	3	
CAM AN (V)	NGUYEN PHUOC	35	1	Nat Pol Rpt
HIEU NHON (D)	NGUYEN AN	30	9	TRAN THI THANG
QUANG NAM (P)	NGO	40	1/7	2 Jan 67 F/3

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	TRAN NGO	38	13	
	CHAT	26	2	
	THUONG	27	6	
	LE THI PHAT	25	6	
	THI NHANH		6	
LOC BINH (V)	BA	40	10	3 ITT NGO VAN TU
AKA DAI LANH	LE TRUNG CHINH	40	1	13 Jan 67 F/6
THUONG DUC (D)	NAM	39	12	
QUANG NAM (P)	HIEM	20	6	
	CU	50	11	
	NGUYEN HUNG	39	11	
	ANH BON	45	4	
	BON	40	4	
	CAM	25	2	
LOC BINH	XA		18	3 ITT DO CHIN
AKA DAI LANH (V)	PHAO		18	13 Jan 67 F/6
THUONG DUC (D)	BIEN		18	
QUANG NAM (P)	BA		1	
	NHAN		11	
LOC BINH	XA		18	3 ITT THAI LAI
AKA DAI LANH (V)	PHAO	40	7	13 Jan 67 F/6
THUONG DUC (D)	NHAP	17	8	
QUANG NAM (P)	EM	16	7	
	MUC	16	8	
	THI DAN	19	7	
	DUOC	16	3	
	THI LAN	18	3	
TAI SON (H)	NGUYEN KIEM	27	1	3 ITT DO CHIN
LOC BINH (V)	NGUYEN BA	23	7	13 Jan 67 F/6
THUONG DUC (D)	NGUYEN CHAY	35	10	
QUANG NAM (P)	CAN	32	3	
	NAM	21	3	
THANH DAI #1	*VO HY	28	1	3 ITT CAO THANH
(AKA KAI NY) (H)	NGUYEN DAI	38	11	14 Jan 67 F/6
LOC BINH (V)	TONG DINH TUONG	43	2	
THUONG DUC (D)	NGUYEN THI LUYEN	50	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	PHAM THANH	24	12	
	PHAM THI BON	20	12	
	PHAM MAI	55	6	
	*LUONG DONG	25	18	
	PHAM TOAN	22	3	
	PHAM XE	18	3	
	TRAN LAM	25	3	
	NGUYEN HUE	23	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
THANH DAI #1	*LUONG DUONG	25	18/4	3 ITT NGUYEN DIEN
(AKA KAI MY) (H)	*VO HI	25	1	14 Jan 67 F/6
LOC BINH (V)	QUYEN	50	23	
THUONG DUC (D)	DANG THO	20	18	
QUANG NAM (P)	HUONG	18	3	
	LAM	25	3	
	DA	23	3	
	CONG	24	3	
THANH DAI #2 (H)	PHAM NHUNG	45	1/4	3 ITT NGO VAN TU
LOC BINH (V)	NGUYEN TAN CHAU	39	4	13 Jan 67 F/6
THUONG DUC (D)	LE KHAC BINH	40	2	
QUANG NAM (P)	LUONG CHINH	39	11	
	PHAM HOA	45	6	
	LE TRA	45	7	
	LE LUONG	45	3	
	NGUYEN LUC	19	3	
	YO HUYEH	39	3	
LOC VINH (V)	NGUYEN XEM	30	1	3 ITT NGUYEN XUONG
THUONG DUC (D)	PHAN VAN KY	31	1/7	29 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN NHAT	30	11	
	NGUYEN DUNG	35	4	
	TRAN HUNG	25	21	
	NGUYEN MAI	35	21	
	TRAN HUONG	35	13	
	NGUYEN DA	26	6	
	TRAN THI UY	23	6	
	PHAM MAI	25	18	
	TRAN NOM	22	7	
HA XI (H)	PHAM DONG	30	1	3 ITT NGUYEN XUONG
LOC VINH (V)	NGUYEN SANG	30	7	29 Dec 66 F/6
THUONG DUC (D)	NGUYEN CHIEU	30	18	
QUANG NAM (P)	LE DA	23	7	
TAM HIEP (H)	NGUYEN HANG	25	11	DET 109 SFG
LOC VINH (V)	NGUYEN KHANH NUA	22	1	NGUYEN VAN TRUONG
THUONG DUC (D)	LUU MY	29	3	30 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN KHANH DOI	30	3	
	BUOI PHAM	20	3	
	PHAN HANG	23	3	
	NGUYEN TINH	35	2	
	NGUYEN KHANH NAN	35	3	
	TRUONG BANH	38	3	
	NGUYEN SANH	28	3	
	VO AN	25	3	
	NGUYEN KHANH KHI	37	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
BINH ANH (V)	NGUYEN NGHI	38	1	9 ITT PHAM TAN ANH
BINH SON (V)	HUYNH BANG	35	4	14 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	(FNU) TUAN	25	2/9	
	HUYNH MAU	32	11	
	(FNU) CUC	32	18	
	(FNU) DO	30	18	
	TRANH THI NHI	25	18/7	
	LE DAU	25	3	
	PHAM DAU	25	3	
	(FNU) TUY	40	14	
AN THANH (H)	PHAN KHUYEN	25	4	9 ITT PHAM TAN ANH
BINH AN (V)	(FNU) TRI	35	2	14 Dec F/6
BINH SON (D)	(FNU) THU	38	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	LE MAO	40	11	
	PHAM MANH	30	18	
	PHAM LUONG	20	3	
	VO THUAN	30	3	
	PHAM HANG	20	3	
	VO DAI	30	3	
PHU LONG #4 (H)	TRAN LY	32	2	9 ITT NGO BAN,
BINH LANG (V)	NGUYEN CAU	18	3	NGO SAM
BINH SON (D)	DOAN TON	32	3	31 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
NAM BINH #6 (H)	PHAM AN		3	9 ITT NGUYEN THICH
BINH PHUEN (V)	NGUYEN NHAN		3	9 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	(FNU) THING		3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	(FNU) NGO		3	
TAY PHUOC #2 (H)	CHUAN	40	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH THUONG (V)	THOI	35	6	Rpt 9th ITT III MAF
BINH SON (D)	TOAN	35	6	24-67 7 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	THOA	20	3	
PHU XUAN (V)	HOANG NGOC	33	1	9 ITT Consolidated
DUC PHO (D)	DOAN DU	28	4	Rpt BUI PHUC
QUANG NGAI (P)	TO	40	15	VO THI BI
	QUAN	32	18	30 Dec 66 F/6
	TRAM	24	12	
	HUYNH THI LAN	30	14	
	TIEN (Female)	21	14	
	TIUOC (Female)	23	14	
	TAN	26	18	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
PHAN THAT (H)	TRAN LIEU	30	6	9 ITT HUYNH TAM
PHO XUAN (V)	NGUYEN AN	60	15	30 Dec 66 F/6
DUC PHO (D)				
QUANG NGAI (P)				
THACH THANG #2 (H)	NGUYEN PHUOC	45	1	9 ITT Consolidated
DUC PHUNG (V)	PHAM HIEN	50	1	Rpt III MAF 37-67
MO DUC (D)	TIEN	60	1	9 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	THAT	30	4	
	TRAN DUNG	30	4	
	DIEU	30	4	
	DIEM	38	6	
	HONG	23	6	
	DIEM (Female)	35	6	
	PHAM CAN	25	18	
	BINH	30	9	
	BUI THUC	30	3	
	NGUYEN MEN	23	3	
	NGUYEN AN	24	3	
	THE	30	3	
	HUNG	35	3	
	CHANH	23	3	
	NHIEU	30	18	
	BICH	20	3	
	QUI	30	3	
	SAU	30	3	
	BEN	30	3	
DUC THACH (V)	SACH	27	1/18	9 ITT TRAN DUC BA
MO DUC (D)	PHAN TRUC	27	7	6 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUNG	25	6	
	DUONG	25	7	
	GAC	20	7	
	ON	20	7	
	SAY	24	18	
	THANH	29	18	
	LAI	30	20	
	THANH	35	20	
	TRUNG	24	20	
	MY	20	14	
	NAM	19	14	
	HUNG	20	14	
PHUOC MY (H)	HUYNH SINH	30	1	9 ITT TRAN DUC BA
DUC THACH (V)	HANG	40	4	6 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	NGOC	35	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	TRU	41	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
DUC LUONG #1 (H)	DIEM	40	1	9 ITT LE NGAN
DUC THANG (V)	PHUOC	35	4	9 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	CAO SUU	50	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	LE TAN	25	18	
	GIOI	20	13	
	HUYNH LAN	30	18	
	TRANG THANH	30	18	
	HUYNH THANH	30	18	
	LE CHUONG	25	3	
	NGUYEN HEN	20	3	
	NGUYEN MEN	18	3	
	HUYNH TAI	28	3	
	PHAM LONG	30	3	
	TRAN BON	18	3	
	NGUYEN TA	25	3	
LAM HA (H)	*QUANG	40	1	9 ITT Consolidated
DUC THUAN (V)	*NGUYEN TINH	30	4	Rpt VO NGAN, NGUYEN
MO DUC (D)	*TUAN	40	6	NHO, NGUYEN TAI
QUANG NGAI (P)	*TRINH THAO	30	5	9 Jan 67 F/6
	*PHAN KIEN	30	18	
	TRAN LE	28	18/7	
	TRINH THEO	21	3	
	LE BA	27	3	
	PHUNG HANG	35	3	
	HAU	27	3	
	SAU	17	3	
LAM HA (H)	*QUANG	40	1	9 ITT NGUYEN TAI
DUC THUAN (V)	*NGUYEN TINH	30	4	9 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	*TUAN	40	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	*TRINH THAO	30	5	
	*KIEN	30	18	
	*TRAN LE	28	3	
	PHAM DUC	30	3	
	NGUYEN HUYNH	20	3	
	SANG	20	3	
THIET TRUONG (H)	NGUYEN HO	45	3	9 ITT BUI NGUYEN
DUC VINH (V)	DO DA	21	3	9 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	NGUYEN HAO	22	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	DOAN QUI	30	3	
THIET TRUONG #6 (H)	HUE	25	3	9 ITT Consolidated
DUC VINH (V)	CHI	25	3	Rpt HUYNH DAM,
MO DUC (D)	DANG	25	3	NGUYEN MAI, PHAM
QUANG NGAI (P)	HO	40	3	BAM, NGUYEN DAT

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
MY SON/ME SON (H)	*VO THI CHANH	35	6	9 ITT TRUONG TU
NGHIA THUAN (V)	VO PHU	35	6	8 Jan 67 F/6
NGHIA HANH (D)	VO QUOI	30	8	
QUANG NGAI (P)	*NGUYEN DAY	40	1/10	
	VO SANH	20	5	
	TRAN CUC	30	4	
	NGUYEN HIEP	20	18	
	NGUYEN TU	25	3	
	VO ICH	25	3/6	
	*VO NGO	18	3	
	HUYNH DOAI	18	3	
	NGUYEN NGAY	20	3/14	
MY SON/ME SON (H)	*NGUYEN DAY	50	1/6	9 ITT VO VAN CHAU
NGHIA THUAN (V)	*VO THI CHANG	40	6	8 Jan 67 F/6
NGHIA HANH (D)	MAI HIEP		18	
QUANG NGAI (P)	*VO NGO		3	
	HUYNH HOA		3	
	BA		3	
THON BAY (H)	LE TRUNG	25	1/5	9 ITT NGUYEN CAU
KY TRA (V)	THAI TA	25	4	9 Jan 67 F/6
TAM KY (D)	NGUYEN MAI	30	9	
QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN TAM THANG	25	6	
THON SAU	NGUYEN NGAU	30	1	9 ITT NGUYEN THI
(AKA PHU DUC #1) (H)	NGUYEN LUC	20	6	XINH 9 Jan 67 F/6
KY TRA (V)				
TAM KY (D)				
QUANG TIN (P)				
KY TRAN (H)	BUI DAN	32	1	Source Unk
BINH HAI (V)	PHAM TUNG	30	Unk	NGUYEN TOAI
THANG BINH (D)	NGUYEN PHUOC		2	6 Nov 66 F/6
QUANG TIN (P)	TRAN THI CHINH		6	
	PHAM THI ME		6	
	PHAM CUC	21	3	
	PHAM LAI	19	3	
	TRAN DAI	22	3	
DINH DIEN (H)	TRAN LUONG	22	1	7 ITT THAI VIET HAN
PHU THANH (V)	NGUYEN TOAN	21	7	16 Jan 67 F/6
BA LONG (D)	PHAM PHONG	28	3	
QUANG TRI (P)	TRAM LIEN	25	3	
	PHAM NGOC	30	3	
	PHAM CHICK	14	3	
	PHAM THANH	26	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	PHAM THIEN	27	3	
	PHAM HUONG	23	3	
	TRAN TOAN	30	3	
	PHAM HIEN	27	3	
	PHAM HOA	25	3	
	TRAN LUONG	28	3	
	PHAM THAO	24	3	
AI TU (H)	HOANG BAC	20	22	15 CIT 76V-66
TRIEU AI (V)	HOANG QUYEN	23	22	26 Dec 66 F/6
TRIEU PHONG (D)	LE THOAN	24	22	
QUANG TRI (P)	LE XUONG	21	22	
	LE THE	20	22	
	DANG TICH	18	22	
	HOANG HUNG	19	22	
	LE THI HIEN		22	
	LE KICH	21	22	
	LE BUONG	24	22	
	HOANG THI HONG		14	
	HOANG THI HOA		14	
	HOANG CONG		19	
	HOANG CACH		19	
	HOANG PHUNG		19	
	LE TANG		1	
	CAO KHUYEN		1	
	HOANG OAI		7	
	LE HOAI		9	
	HOANG NGO		11	
	HOANH DUONG		4	
	LE BAO		6	
	LE CON		6	
	HOANG QUE		6	
	LE NGO		6	
	LE DAN		6	
	DANG THI TIEN	21	14	
	LE THI DAT		14	
	HOANG THI THI		14	
	DANG CHAP		6	
	LE CON		6	
	HOANG CAAN		3	
	HOANG THI THIEP		15	
	HOANG THI NHO	18	15	
	HOANG CAU		6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
NAI CUU (H)	LE LY	40	7	15 CIT 76V-66
TRIEU AI (V)	NGUYEN DAN	45	1	26 Dec 66 F/3
TRIEU PHONG (D)	LE TU	19	9	
QUANG TRI (P)				
GIA DANG III (H)	LE THANH	30	1	7 ITT DANG HOAN
TRIEU LONG (V)	NGUYEN THO	25	7	8 Jan 67 F/6
TRIEU PHONG (D)	NGUYEN HEIU	28	3	
QUANG TRI (P)	LE YEM	30	3	
	LE THANG	25	3	
	VO HUU	30	10	
CO XUAN (H)	DANG	40	21	7 ITT HOANG NGHI
PHONG SON (V)	LANH		18	5 Jan 67 F/6
PHONG DIEN (D)	YEM	30	3	
THUA THIEN (P)	KHA	22	3	
	MINH	25	3	
	HOA (Female)	20	3	
XUAN LOC (H)	CAN	35		7 ITT THAI VAN THAC
PHONG SON (V)	TRAN VAN NAGON	30	1	17 Jan 67 F/4
PHONG DIEN (D)	THAI VAN YEM	30	18	
THUA THIEN (P)	TRAN VAN CHAC	22	3	
	TRAN VAN KHUU	20	3	
	TRAN VAN KHE	18	3	
	THAI VAN HOI		3	
	TRAN VAN THEM		3	
BINH AN (H)	HUYNH THI	20	3	1 CIT BUI VAN
LOC TU (V)	HO SUU	20	3	8 Jan 67 F/6
PHU LOC (D)	DINH	30	3	
THUA THIEN (P)	TRAN HOAI	25	3	
	NGUYEN MANH	30	3	
	HIEU	22	3	
	NGUYEN TRUONG	24	3	
	TRI	21	18	

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAP
PERINTREP NO. 3-67.

1. 60th Bn, (PHONG HAI Bn), 1st Regt, 1st Div. Corporal LE MINH CHAU, 1st Sqd, 1st Plt, 3d Co, 60th Bn, rallied at NUI TRON OP to 2d Bde, ROKMC on 5 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 60th Bn is currently known as "PHONG HAI" Battalion. According to the returnee, it is subordinate to the 1st Regt, 1st Div. Its present mission is to rebuild in order to take some objective.

b. The battalion's present strength is 250 men but it is continually understrength. The battalion suffered at least 50 killed and wounded in November at SON TINH (D) when engaged with the 2d Bde, ROKMC. CHAU claims that the 48th Bn was also in this engagement with the 2d Bde, ROKMC but that he knew nothing of their casualties. The VC have designated this battle as "MA TO" for reasons unknown. The 60th Bn had previously engaged the Americans in SON PHUONG (V), at the battle of "HOI DUC" in March 1966 and suffered 70 killed and wounded.

c. The battalion reportedly draws heavily on CVN for replacements and there are very few remaining NVN in the unit.

d. CHAU stated that there are four companies in the 60th Bn designated 1, 2, 3, and 4. Presently there are 50 men in each company.

e. This unit had undergone anti-helicopter training which was described as members of the battalion firing at a wooden mockup of a helicopter suspended high in the air. He contends that the battalion has downed two helicopters so far.

f. CHAU contends that there is a critical shortage of medicine, most notably quinine, penicillin and streptomycin. Food is short and the quality is poor. He insists there is no shortage of ammunition and the battalion is resupplied monthly.

g. The morale is low because of the food situation and the casualties suffered against the 2d Bde, ROKMC.

h. The CP of the 60th Bn at the time CHAU defected was (BS 378618). (G-2 Comment: F/2. In November the 60th and 48th Bn's were identified in contact with the 2d Bde, ROKMC in SON TINH (D). During Operation DRAGON EYE rallier WO HOANG HIEU (AKA NGUYEN XUAN), Supply Officer from the 60th Bn, stated that the 1st Regt consisted of the 40th, 60th, 70th and 90th Bn's. Other information contained in this report has been substantiated by intelligence sources. F/6 in regards to subordination of the 60th Bn, 1st Regt to the Div. This is the first report of such subordination; unit normally carried subordinate to 2d Div. This is first report of "PHONG HAI" as an AKA for the 60th Bn.)

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2. 2d Co, 48th Bn. HUYNH THUAN, 2d Co, 48th Bn, was captured by a PF patrol at (BS 480780) on 23 December and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He joined the 48th Bn during September 1966 and at the time the battalion was located in PHAM AM (V), DUC PHO (D), QUANG NGAI (P). Shortly thereafter, the 48th moved to PHO NHON (V), DUC PHO (D). For the next two months, after eight days at PHO NHON, the battalion moved between SON NAM, SON CHAU and SON PHUONG villages, staying in each four or five days.

b. On 16 November, a part of the 48th attacked the MA TO outpost (Korean OP). The rest of the battalion awaited in ambush positions to surprise the reaction force. THUAN stated that the 48th suffered 42 KIA's, 40 bodies were carried off and two were left behind.

c. Replacements are drafted from VC controlled villages, most draftees are between the ages of 17 and 30. New members are given seven days of political training and all other training is actual participation.

d. The 48th Bn is composed of four companies, 1st, 2d, 3d infantry companies (90 to 100 men) and the 4th Co which is a sapper company (three sapper platoons and one infantry platoon).

e. Food and supplies are taken from the people in the form of taxes.

f. The morale of the battalion is very low, they are in constant fear of air and artillery strikes and move continuously.

3. 89th Demolition Bn, DANANG City. HO NINH, soldier of 2d Co (AKA 302), 89th Demolition Bn, DANANG City, rallied at MOC BAI (D) on 25 December 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The night of 10 January 1966 he was captured, along with 11 youths, from his home in LO GIANG (H), HOA DA (V). He was sent to LOC HOA (V), DAI LOC (D) for five days of study and instruction, after which the VC sent him to the Production Branch Bn located at CAM MUON. He was sent on 1 July 1966 to the 2d Co, 89th Bn and worked as a cook. He escaped the VC on 25 December and reported to MOC BAI (D).

b. He was told that the T-89 Bn had been active since 1 February 1966 and is composed of 59% North Vietnamese and men who have returned from NVN and 40% are QUANG NAM local persons, mostly from DIEN BAN (D). (No explanation of missing 1%.) The strength of the battalion is 350 men divided into four companies: 1st Co (AKA 303), 2d Co (AKA 302), 3d Co (AKA 304), 4th Co (AKA 306). The battalion commander is TRAN BO and the political officer is NGUYEN DINH PHUNG.

c. The battalion was located at DAI LOC mountain area until September 1966, at which time it moved to SON LOI mountainous area, DUC DUC (D).

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d. On 25 December one company was sent to operate in the north wing of HOA VANG to attack U.S. helicopter airfield at AN HAI, DANANG and BO BO post in DIEN BAN (D). Two companies operate southeast of DANANG and one company northwest of HOA HIEU.

e. The 4th Co, with a number of cadre, is located at (ZC 135250). This is the SON LOI base of T-89 DANANG City Sapper Bn. Located in this area are 11 rice depots with a total of 70 tons of rice and seven depots with an estimated total of 14 tons of rice.

f. The T-89 Bn has 6700 ANG and 200 ANG of rice at DIEN BAN (D) and HUA VANG respectively that have not been moved to SON LOI as of the 27th of December.

(G-2 Comment: F/3 with regards to information pertaining to T-89 Bn, including locations of companies and mission. F/6 regarding SON LOI Base rice storage depots).

4. "HOANH's Unit" or 201st Province Force Co. TRINH THONG, a refugee from THON HAI (H) (BT 361088), was interrogated at LY TIN (D) headquarters on 31 December 1966. He stated the following during interrogation:

a. As of 31 December 1966 a Province Force Company designated as "HOANH's Unit" or 201st Co was stationed in THON HAI (H). He claimed that the V-14 unit moved from the hamlet and the 201st Co had reportedly been in THON HAI (H) for two months with a mission of providing security for KY THANH (V). According to THONG this company is composed of 100 men all of whom are stationed in THON HAI (H). Every seven to 10 days elements of the company send ambush patrols with the objective of overrunning the Vietnamese Special Forces at DIEM PHO #2 (H) (BT 408132).

b. The weapons of the company are reported as: one 60mm mortar and five AK's and K-44's.

c. The CP of the 201st is reportedly in the home of TRAN NIEM in THON HAI (H).

d. The morale of this company is low due to malaria, fatigue and personnel losses.

e. A 30-man reconnaissance platoon is also stationed in THON HAI (H). Its mission is to observe American troop movements in HY CHANH (V).

f. There is a 30-man platoon of village guerrillas operating in and around THON HAI (H). Its mission is to patrol in the vicinity of the hamlet during the night.

g. MF VC units live in the homes of the people of THON HAI (H) and take food from the people.

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(G-2 Comment: F/3. "HOANH's Unit" was previously reported in this vicinity with various unidentified units. HOANH has been reported three times as XO of 706th Co which operates in this area. There is no VN Special Forces camp at DIEM PHO #2. Reports have been received of a reconnaissance platoon in the THON HAI area. This reconnaissance is possibly from the 7th Co which has been operating northwest of THON HAI and has a reconnaissance platoon).

5. The following translation is an extract from a VC directive on recruiting of prisoners to serve in the army of liberation:

DIRECTIVE
CONCERNING THE RECRUITMENT OF PRISONERS
FOR USE AS REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL

In execution of the Region Party Committee directive concerning the recruitment of prisoners for use as replacement personnel.

In order to render the recruitment procedures more effective, this headquarters has the following specific instructions:

I. PRINCIPLES:

Recruitment must contribute to the development and victory of the liberation army, must maintain its nature and tradition and protect it from the penetration of and damage by bad and backward men, spies and reactionaries.

Recruitment also must consist of more political training, greater awareness of their social class and more ideological guidance for the prisoners to be made aware of and to voluntarily join the liberation army.

II. GUIDE LINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Keep the guide line "regularity and carefulness" during implementation.

III. CRITERIA FOR RECRUITMENT:

Prisoners meeting the following conditions can be accepted as recruits reinforcing the units:

The laboring class.

Those who joined the enemy army because of obligations, deception, political passion or economic misfortune.

Those whose duration of service in the enemy army was not long.

Those who have not yet committed crimes or committed only a few and do not yet have a blood debt with the people.

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Those who have not worked as intelligence agents, spies, secret affairs personnel, "Biet Kich" /Commando-type unit/ members or henchmen of reactionary and cruel officers.

Those who are not probationary or official members of reactionary political parties.

Those who have not worked for the puppet government, in the position of village representative or higher and who have not been interfamily chiefs. These men committed many crimes or have a blood debt with the people and the revolution.

Those who were not officers or NCO's of the puppet army, sergeants or higher in the regular forces and platoon leaders or higher in the regional forces.

IV. METHODS OF RECRUITMENT:

Presently, the main prey is RVN troops, the secondary is civil guard, self defense or popular troops. Especially, pay attention to the populace who have suffered many miseries caused by the enemy /RVN/, and the men whose families have relations with the revolution.

We cannot yet recruit personnel from the enemy marines, rangers, Biet Kich or Biet Kich reconnaissance agents and paratroopers.

We also cannot yet accept prisoners whose activities and political attitude are not agreeable to work for the revolution.

V. SOME GUIDELINES TO NOTE:

To regularly implement the above matter, the followings must be seriously noted:

1. For indoctrination: To aim at reaching the objective, it is necessary:

First, make the prisoners thoroughly aware of the aggressions of the Americans Imperialists and their henchmen and of the revolutionary mission of the people at this time to create the concept of social class, and hatred of Americans Imperialists and their henchmen. Love country and workers and understand the wrongs and crimes committed, and decide to recreate a new life and then work for the workers and for the social class ideology.

Second, make the prisoners understand well that the nature of the foreign army is mercenary, and that the liberation army is the people's armed force. Every one fights with and for the people.

Make the prisoners thoroughly aware of their old crimes and meanwhile know that the liberation army always excuses them and always helps them with social class love, wishes them to be happy and proud of being accepted to serve the revolutionary army.

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Also, guide the cadre and soldiers in the units served by the prisoners to be serious, intense and act properly to help the prisoners without prejudices, suspiciousness, mockery, etc. . . .

2. For organization: Units to receive prisoners, should organize an element consisting of training and propaganda, security guard, and medical and rear service agents to coordinate with the cadre in charge of administration for the province detention camp in the investigation and indoctrination of prisoners and in the solution of material and spiritual problems.

The prisoners who can be accepted as personnel should be carefully taken care of and assigned to three man cells. The number of these personnel cannot exceed 1/3 of the unit's strength. The scale of recruited prisoners can be reduced in the units whose number of key cadre is short.

3. Investigation and confirmation: It is necessary to carefully implement these works to eliminate damage from reactionaries and spies and to help the men who want to leave the re-education center.

Encourage prisoners to make a statement of their crimes and past activities. After that, it is necessary to make an investigation for each individual.

Generally, it is necessary to send letters to, or directly ask, the agencies of the native villages of prisoners or of areas they moved through when they were in the army /RVNAP/ about the details of their past activities to clearly confirm the category of the prisoners and to decide on the proper treatment.

4. For ideological leaderships: It is necessary to eliminate the fear of sacrifice, violence, misery, enemy terror to their families, homesickness, etc. . . .

The selection of prisoners for replacement of personnel is a new complex project. The 501st, 502d and 503d units must build a specific plan to help other units. For the "Nong Truong's and Cong Truong", after the province unit complies with the experiment, this plan will be spread.

APPENDIX

Additional explanations:

Besides landlords, rich farmers and private owners, other workers can be recruited.

Men forced, enticed or encouraged, etc . . . to work for the enemy /RVN/. This generally means those men do not oppose the concept of social class, do not hate and resist the revolution.

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Men who have not served the enemy armed forces for a long time, who have recently joined the army or have not yet re-enlisted in the armed forces. For men forced to re-enlist, the recruitment is based on other criteria and on their attitudes.

Crimes consist of violating women, burning people's houses and destroying the people's property. Blood debts, meaning killing the people, helping the enemy capture, put in prison, and kill the people and the cadre.

Men with one or two faults of no importance, will be easily recruited. If the crime is important, although they commit only one crime, we must carefully study the reason for committing it.

For the "Biet Kich", members of the Biet Kich Group, do not recruit them, although they work in local areas /areas controlled by the Viet Cong⁷, because these men were forced to join the above group and did not commit crimes yet or do not yet have a blood debt with the people. We must study in detail their cause for serving enemy and their attitudes.

6. The following translation is an extract from a VC directive on combat orders:

COMBAT ORDERS

Considering the observations of the district, and the reports of the "A" Squads, the M-64 Commander observed the following:

Concerning the Enemy: After the victories of the U.S. invaders and their lackeys, robbing and plundering the country peoples possessions, they might withdraw some units to raise morale and to prepare counterattacks against us in the dry season.

At present, they must replace their old troops with new ones and the majority of those are nervous and scared to die. At many places, these new troops ran from our guerrilla forces.

Concerning the Friendly Troops: In recent months, our village guerrillas have won many victories and ambushes plus captured many weapons. For example, we surrounded the enemy's posts; HA THANH, DAU SAU bridge. . . .

The M-64 Commander wants us all of the "A" squads to carry out the following orders:

1. All guerrilla forces must step-up their ambushes, especially attacking the areas of enemy formations in order to destroy the vital points.
2. They must surround and fight the enemy at vital points, especially at areas where the enemy can be channeled into enclosed places.

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3. Try very hard to destroy the communication roads and try to control areas at night (areas not previously controlled by the Viet Cong).
4. We must make plans to attack the mechanical points of the enemy such as: trucks, tanks . . .
5. Attack patrols, reconnaissance (use ambush tactics).
6. Shoot at all aircraft (any kind) when flying low to drop CHIEU HOI leaflets or any purpose. We must organize the youth to beat bamboo sticks to scare the enemy.
7. Try to recruit all young men and women to join the guerrilla force to drive the imperialistic Americans out of the fatherland.
8. In order to strengthen our forces, we must encourage the people to dig ditches, especially communication ditches and prevent water from reaching the trenches.

Commander of M-64

DUONG

7. The following are names of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports were reviewed for the period.

CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNEE (R)	DOC/DOR	CAPTURING UNIT	LOC/DISPOSITION
NGUYEN BA (R)	1JAN67		THUONG DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN BAO (C)	15JAN67	3/1	DANANG TAOR/UNK SENT MACV
VO BAN CHAN (C)	5JAN67	C/1/1	BT 904306/DUC DUC (D) HQ
BO CHIN (R)	24DEC66		THUONG DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN DIEN (R)	23DEC66		THUONG DUC (D) HQ
THAI VIET HAN (C)	12JAN67	K/3/3	YD 033449/UNK SENT MACV
PHAM HOA (C)	15JAN67	C/1/26	AT 963587/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
MAI HUNG (C)	9JAN67	ARVN	NGOC HO OP/UNK
CAO KHANH (C)	1JAN67	1ST MARDIV	ZC 114548/THUONG DUC (D) HQ
LE ANH KIEN (REFUGEE)	7JAN67		DUC DUC REFUGEE CTR
TRAN MINH SI (R)	2JAN67		SON HA
TRAN NGA (C)	12JAN67	2/5	AT 882518/DUC DUC (D) HQ
HO NINH (R)	25DEC66	ARVN	51ST ARVN REGT
TRAN PHIEN (R)	13JAN67		TRA BONG (D) HQ SENT MACV
NGUYEN PHUONG (R)	13JAN67	ARVN	2D ARVN DIV
NGUYEN QUE (C)	11JAN67	D/1/5	BT 294128/CIV TO G-5

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CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNEE (R)	DOC/DOR	CAPTURING UNIT	LOC/DISPOSITION
NGUYEN RAN (R)	25DEC66		THUONG DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN THANH TAM (C)	15JAN67	C/1/26	AT 963587/DIEN BAN (D) HQ
TRAN THANH (R)	15DEC66		DUC DUC (D) HQ
THAI VAN THAO (C)	15JAN67	A/3D RECON CO	YD 508275/PHONG DIEN (D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN TRUONG (R)	26DEC66		THUONG DUC (D) HQ
NGO VAN TU (C)	UNK	1ST MARDIV	ZC 0857/THUONG DUC (D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN XUAN (C)	12JAN67	2/5	AT 887518/DUC DUC (D) HQ
DANG YEN	13JAN67	F/2/1	AT 964662/HOA VANG (D)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 3-67

1. GENERAL. Although there was an increase in VC terrorist activities, items of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Significant reports received during the period revealed that the VC are continuing to train male and female low level espionage agents, villages and hamlets are being reorganized in order to align the populace with the VC goal, and an incident of VC wire tapping was reported by a U.S. unit located in II CTZ.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. An 18 January report from a usually reliable source related that the VC are attempting to establish a system to increase their military intelligence collection effort. After an intensive study, the QUANG DA Liberation Front concluded that women were the only sex that could collect such information, and ordered their district agents to recruit a number of attractive females to attend a training course. Women were selected from the villages of HOA DA (BT 035720), HOA LOI (AT 970653), HOA CHAU (BT 014697) and HOA THO (AT 998719) and sent to a secret zone for a 30 day training period on reconnaissance methods and military proselyting. Upon completion of this training, these women were reportedly assigned to operate in the area of HOA PHAT (V) (AT 994747) and HOA KHANH (V) (AT 960763) in order to carry out their espionage mission and lure Allied personnel to areas where they can be kidnapped or killed by the VC. It was further reported that these females will earn their living as prostitutes and each will have a temporary safe conduct pass in their possession. (CI Comment: This information was previously reported by the same source in III MAF PERINTREP NO. 1-67; however, this report contained additional details.)

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	12Jan	Road destroyed	YD 494365
THUA THIEN	14Jan	Culvert destroyed	YD 711248
QUANG NAM	16Jan	Bridge destroyed	BT 102516
QUANG NGAI	18Jan	Bridge destroyed	BS 707516

4. POLITICAL. There was no political activity reported during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG NAM. A 16 January report from the 1st Amphibian Track Battalion stated that VC propaganda leaflets, printed in English, were found in the vicinity of (AT 984713). The leaflets, which have been previously sighted within the ICTZ, contained the normal VC propaganda line directed at U.S. officers and men in order to subvert them against the U.S. Government.

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An 18 January report from the 11th Marines related that five VC propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of (AT 958760). Four of these leaflets, which have been previously sighted in the ICTZ, were printed in English and stressed that the SVNLF order for a cease fire over the Christmas and New Year's holidays would be adhered to. One leaflet was printed in Vietnamese and when translated, stated substantially as follows: "The Vietnamese people have basic rights such as peace, independence, ownership and unification of the whole country of Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam will take care of their affairs under the direction of the South Vietnam People's Liberation Front without the intervention of foreign countries."

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 14 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC gathered the populace of AT TRAM (XD 822299) together to talk about the problem of storing rice and "asked" the villagers to collect intelligence information for them.

A 17 January report from an intelligence source stated that the VC have organized the hamlets from HA LOI TRUNG (YD 320716) to CAN PHO (YD 270779) to ensure that all youths study the VC doctrine and those adults between 17 and 30 years of age join the guerrillas, combat youth organization, or enter the Army for the Liberation Forces. This report further related that the villagers are not permitted to spend excessive money for food or clothing and that they are to "donate" their funds to the VC cause. Should the villagers question these methods, the VC intend to send them to the "west war zone".

A 19 January report from a usually reliable source related that an estimated VC squad assassinated a VN Information Officer in the vicinity of (YD 195625).

A 20 January report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team stated that at approximately 2200 on 11 January an estimated VC squad entered MY HOA (H) (YD 205650) and kidnapped a male civilian. (CI Comment: This is the first reported kidnapping in CAM LO (D) since May 1966.)

A 19 January report from a usually reliable source stated that an estimated VC squad entered LANG TAY (H) (YD 430555) and gathered the inhabitants together for a propaganda lecture.

A 21 January report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that an unknown number of VC assassinated the deputy village chief of TRU LONG (V) (YD 289583).

A 22 January report from a usually reliable source related that an estimated VC company entered MOC DUC (H) (YD 185590) and assassinated the assistant to the Catholic priest.

THUA THIEN. A 15 January report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that on 13 and 14 January, approximately 25 VC entered PHU BAI #1 (H) (YD 903112) and gave the populace a political indoctrina-

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nation lecture. The people were told that they would have to furnish the VC with milled rice within five to seven days according to the following assessment: (1) Rich families, 500 kilograms; (2) Middle class, 400 kilograms; (3) Poor class, 300 kilograms; (4) Very poor class, 150 kilograms. This report further related that the VC told the villagers that four Americans were going to be killed in retaliation for a guerrilla who was killed in THUY PHU (V) (ID 880114) on 29 December 1966.

QUANG NAM. A 15 January report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team related that the VC are presently conducting re-education classes in XUYEN THO (V) (BT 189543) for Vietnamese prisoners and GVN sympathizers.

QUANG NGAI. A 15 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC have trained penetration agents in QUANG NGAI City who will be controlled by the VC QUANG NGAI Collection Investigation Section (Security Check Committee).

A 15 January report from an intelligence source related that the VC have a list of names of people in QUANG NGAI (P) who are to be kidnapped or assassinated.

An 11 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the phone lines leading to a bunker within the POL dump in PLEIKU (P) (II Corps) were "tapped" by the VC during a small arms and mortar attack. Substance of a phone call to this bunker was as follows: "Chow will be coming down shortly. By the way, which bunker is this? How many men are down there? How many men are in the other bunkers?" At this point the guard in the bunker became suspicious and, upon checking, found that no such call was made by U.S. personnel. An inspection of the telephone lines revealed that the line had been "tapped" for approximately 24 hours within the perimeter of the POL dump. (CI Comment: While wire tapping has not been reported in the I Corps area, all units are reminded that the VC do possess this capability.)

A 21 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that on 20 January approximately 60 VN proceeded from NUI DAU (V) DUC PHO (D) vicinity (BS 877310) toward (BS 867019) to protest against occupation of NUI DAU (V) by Allied Forces. This report also related that approximately 1,000 VN marched from (BS 790414) to the vicinity of (BS 797407) where they were dispersed. (CI Comment: The reason for the demonstration involving 1,000 VN was unknown at the close of the period. Available information indicates both demonstrations were incited by the VC and there were armed VC cadre among the demonstrators.)


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29 JANUARY 1967

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PERINTREP NO. 4-67



GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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Period Covered: 220001H - 282400H Jan 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13
 ND 48-4, ND 49-2, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. Aerial photography flown on 23 January over the far northeastern portion of the DMZ and immediately north of the area revealed no significant increase in enemy ground activity when compared to missions covering the same area flown on 21 December. Enemy initiated ground activity consisting of a series of short, probing and harassing actions, including mortar fire, was centered in the northeastern portion of the province south of and just within the DMZ. Light to moderate casualties also resulted in the deaths of two village chiefs. On 26 January the GIO LINH OP (YD 191739) received a light mortar attack; mortar and artillery fire was returned.

Southeast QUANG TRI (P) saw a drop in enemy initiated activity when compared to the prior reporting period. On 21 and 22 January, at (YD 420514) and (YD 431530), contacts were reported with enemy elements estimated in company strength. ARVN and PF units were involved, casualties were negligible and the enemy driven off. An incident of terrorism occurred on 22 January at (YD 185590) when an unknown number of VC entered MOC DUC (H) and assassinated the assistant to the local Catholic priest.

Substantial ground reconnaissance north and west of THON SON LAM reported total sightings of the enemy numbering approximately 100 VC/NVA. The enemy was observed in small groups numbering 10 to 20 men per group. Five sharp contacts were made along the reconnaissance line with substantial casualties inflicted on the enemy. On 26 January a reconnaissance insert in the vicinity of (XD 672529) gained contact with an estimated 35 to 40 VC northeast of KHE SANH. Fighting ensued and, during subsequent reinforcement of the initial element, three CH-46A's were downed. All personnel were successfully extracted early the next day.

The enemy continues to maintain a screening and reconnaissance effort south of the DMZ. His actions in northern QUANG TRI (P) would appear to bear this out. In addition, and with the advent of good weather in combination with an increasing need for replacement to the south, the enemy can be expected to continue his attempts toward stepping up his infiltration.

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of small groups of NVA. Recent interrogation reports point toward this as a possibility and FAC sightings reported a total of approximately 300 NVA on trails within the central portion of the DMZ. One group numbered approximately 200. Elsewhere in QUANG TRI (P) enemy activity was limited to isolated and small scale harassing actions.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There was a slight increase in the tempo of enemy activity in northeastern THUA THIEN (P). On 23 January, the 224th RF Co, approximately three kilometers northwest of HUONG DIEN (V), was attacked by an estimated two companies of VC. Although casualties were light and the VC subsequently driven off, there was a loss of seven individual weapons. Other enemy activity in this northeast sector included short mortar attacks against isolated RF and PF elements.

On 22 January, at (YD 565346), two platoons of the ARVN Black Panther Co successfully ambushed an estimated 50 VC. Enemy casualties were 19 KIA (Confirmed), one VCC and 12 individual weapons captured. Intelligence information which led up to this ambush had been obtained from a returnee who was formerly a member of the 802nd Bn.

Additional information acquired from two other returnees and a captive placed the Headquarters of the 6th Regt at (YD 5521) and the 802nd Bn at (YD 5723). Operation CHINOOK continued in the same general area with light contact and an increase in enemy use of mines and booby traps. On 24 January M Co, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines observed 45 VC in the vicinity of (YD 545291). Artillery fire was called with undetermined results.

Ground reconnaissance deployed west and south of the CHINOOK Operation area reported a total of approximately 120 VC; the majority were concentrated within the area (YD 5323). Several contacts were made with moderate to heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy. For the past three weeks enemy activity in the CHINOOK area has proceeded at a constant rate and a good portion of the intelligence information available regarding the area continues to indicate an enemy apparently concerned over the procurement of requisite rice supplies.

The number of VC initiated incidents within the PHU BAI TAOR increased this week. All incidents occurred along Highway 1 and were centered to the north. Low level agent reports covering eastern THUA THIEN (P) were concerned with local units placed in what is considered normal operating areas. Enemy activity along Highway 1 through PHU LOC and between PHU BAI and DANANG was insignificant. Enemy demolition attempts against the roadway were not productive; the highway remained passable to traffic.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Within the western portion of the DANANG TAOR and immediately west of it, in the vicinity of (AT 7955), the enemy maintained a moderately strong ground effort for the second consecutive week. On 22 January, at (AT 833554), H Co, 2nd Bn, 4th Marines made contact with an enemy force of undetermined size. Fire was exchanged; artillery and air brought in on the enemy with 15 VC KIA (Confirmed) and five KIA (Probable).

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Farther to the west and on 22 January in the vicinity of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp, a CIDG patrol in close pursuit of an enemy group numbering 30 to 50 VC drove the enemy into the open at (ZC 205545). An AO on station called in air and 44 VC KIA (Confirmed) resulted. Marine ground reconnaissance in the same area made sightings of approximately 70 VC. Two short contacts with the enemy were also reported. This particular sector has been active for the last three weeks.

Operation TUSCALOOSA in the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR (AT 9651) made significant contact with the enemy. The 2nd Bn, 5th Marines encountered what was tentatively identified as the R.20 Bn and one local force company; heavy action ensued. Enemy casualties up to 27 January were 79 KIA (Confirmed) and 64 KIA (Probable).

Reconnaissance deployed south of the DANANG TAOR reported sightings of approximately 50 VC over the period. On 22 January at (AT 860395), a PF platoon in ambush positions was attacked by an estimated VC platoon. Artillery fire was called and the VC withdrew.

The number of VC initiated incidents within the DANANG TAOR remained the same as the previous reporting period. A fair concentration of activity was centered in the eastern portion of DIEN BAN (D). A high number of mine and booby trap incidents was again noted. Southeastern QUANG NAM (P) saw continued small scale enemy harassing action against isolated ARVN and RF/PF elements.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. The tempo of the enemy activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P) remained down for the second consecutive week. Three attacks against ARVN and PF elements occurred in the northeast portion of the province and within five kilometers of Highway 1. Enemy casualties were heavy in two of the encounters. On 21 January, at (BT 267173) southwest of TAM KY City, a small group of VC entered DAI AN (H) and kidnapped two combat youths.

Ground reconnaissance elements covering the northwest approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported sightings of approximately 60 VC over the period. Within the CHU LAI TAOR the number of VC initiated incidents increased this week. The major portion of enemy activity centered in the southern sector. There has been a slight increase in the intensity of VC activity depicted by a rise, over the past two weeks, of incidents involving four to 15 VC. The Korean Marine Brigade reported five incidents from their area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). For the third consecutive week considerable enemy activity was reported from the general area southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR and southeast of the TRA BONG CIDG Camp. A total of approximately 300 VC were reported by ground reconnaissance elements deployed in this area. In several cases artillery fire was brought to bear on the enemy with excellent

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target coverage. At two locations east of TRA BONG (BS 443847) and (BS 436857) CIDG patrols gained contact with estimated VC squads. Following short exchanges of fire the VC broke contact and fled. On 27 January, a CIDG patrol northeast of the HA THANH Camp at (BS 427755) observed an estimated two company VC force. Approximately five kilometers southwest of the HA THANH CIDG Camp and on 24 January, patrols gained contact with separate groups of the enemy one of which numbered approximately 40 VC. A substantial number of low level agent reports, though unconfirmed, continue to locate elements of the 21st NVA Regt in an area about 15 kilometers north-east of HA THANH and the 1st VC Regt east of the camp.

A rallier from the 409th Sapper Bn stated that one company of this unit was with the 1st VC Regt at its current location, another company was within the CHU LAI TAOR in southeastern QUANG TIN (P) and the remaining companies at (BS 6436). With exception of the one company in the CHU LAI TAOR the remainder of the information is unconfirmed.

An analysis of all available intelligence concerning this area southwest of CHU LAI reflects a continuing possibility of enemy attack. Such action would occur when most opportune to the enemy and probably would be directed against isolated outposts and security elements, as well as other units in the area.

In eastern QUANG NGAI (P) enemy activity was limited to scattered harassing attacks against more remote security elements in the coastal districts of MO DUC and DUC PHO.

Aerial photography flown by VMCJ-1 on 21 January over portions of southeast QUANG NGAI (P) and DUC PHO (D) portrayed a significant increase in enemy ground construction activity. Interpretation was based upon comparison with late October readouts.

Southern and western QUANG NGAI (P) remained quiet; no significant intelligence information was received concerning these areas.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period consisted of one attack, one ambush, one hamlet harassment, four assaults by fire, 40 mine/booby trap incidents (a noteworthy increase), 119 small unit engagements and 242 incidents of AA fire, for a total of 408.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment. See paragraph 6 of Annex A.

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e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
12 Jan	(AT 960360)	VC PW Camp	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
13 Jan	(BS 379628)	1st Regt Hospital	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F/3
22 Jan	(YD 443186)	806th Bn Shelter Area	Interrogation Rpt III MAF G-2: F/6
27 Jan	(YD 238448)	VC Prison Camp	135th MI GP III MAF G-2: F/6

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Enemy initiated AA incidents for the reporting period increased substantially when compared to the last period and totaled 242. Aircraft sustaining hits and the total number of hits, despite the rise in incidents, reflected a slight decrease to 37 and 63 respectively. Grid squares of highest density were (XD 6752), (AT 9653), (BT 0646), (BS 7838) and (BS 7941). Fire cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). An increased level of VC and NVA activity continued over the week, however, the size of individual sightings was smaller than reported during the prior reporting period. The groups numbered between 10 to 20 enemy per group. Most of the activity was centered north of CAM LO and northwest of THON SON LAM. No discernible pattern of enemy activity was noted.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Ground reconnaissance deployed south of HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported insignificant sightings for the period. Sightings south of the CHINOOK Operation area were also down when compared to prior reporting periods but were still at a level indicative of a continuing enemy interest in this general area approximately 20 kilometers due west of HUE City.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Ground reconnaissance in the vicinity of (AT 8955) pointed toward continued enemy activity in this portion of the DANANG TAOR. Elements deployed south of the TAOR noted a drop in the number of enemy sighted when compared to the last reporting period. The low number of sightings apparently stems from a drop in enemy activity in the SONG THU BON River valley to the south of NONG SON. On 24 January a reconnaissance patrol gained contact with an estimated 25 to 40 VC in the vicinity of (AT 8261).

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(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Reconnaissance elements deployed northwest of the CHU LAI TAOR reported no significant enemy activity. A total of approximately 300 VC were noted in the area which falls southeast of the TRA BONG CIDG Camp. An additional concentration of enemy effort was also reported east of the HA THANH CIDG Camp and enemy movement was, for the most part, in a north and south direction. VC sighted appeared to be well equipped.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
24 Jan	(BS 315669)	2000	USSF
25 Jan	(BS 420876)	7300 (Destroyed)	USSF

t. Supply Activities.

(1) 20 January, ARVN MI Det. The VC have established a trading agency in DAI LOC (D), QUANG NAM (P) in order to pass goods to and from VC areas to those under GVN control. This agency is located at MY THUAN (H) LOC MY (V), (AT 880650) and is headed by LE BA TUAN. The exchange point is CHIN Bridge, LOC MY (V) (AT 865574). Daily from 0700 to 1800, merchants from VC controlled areas bring agricultural produce to exchange for salt, sauce, plastic, radios, flashlight batteries, medical supplies, etc. Exchange is through barter. It is believed that some of the merchants from GVN controlled areas are related to the PF personnel in DAI LOC (D).

(G-2 Comment: F/3. The dates, when this agency was operating, are unknown. The coordinates of MY THUAN (H), LOC MY (V) are apparently in error as they fall in HIEU DUC (D).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 303 KIA, 263 KIA (Prob) and five VC PW. Weapons losses were 49 individual weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

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i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Early in the week an inverted trough build up northeast of I Corps and by 23 January this situation again created conditions of light rain, drizzle and fog along most of the coastal lowland. Visibility was restricted and the highlands remained almost totally obscured. On 24 January the flow of air aloft weakened, causing a general diffusion of the weather picture particularly at lower altitudes. This condition continued to improve throughout I Corps and on 26 January average ceilings remained at 2,000 feet with virtually unrestricted visibility. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	72	71	77	75
Low	64	63	67	68
Rainfall (total)	.62	1.61	.75	2.68
Visibility (miles)	6	7	5	5
Winds (knots)	7	4	7	6

k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex C.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 3-67.


R. H. THOMPSON

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. FEBRUARY WEATHER BRIEF
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
GMC (CODE AO2)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CICV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 4-67

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III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 282400H JAN 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,300			8	3,000
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	12	5,050	6	2,300	35	17,550
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	3	1,080			13	3,530
Separate Companies			2	185	28	2,665	30	2,850
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,650		7,615		4,965		29,230
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				120		955		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								20,641
<u>GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH</u>								
		17,150		7,735		6,820		52,346

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 282400H JAN 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000 ^{#2}		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT.	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	160ct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	160ct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80ct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10ct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 329559	15Jan67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5720	20Jan67
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5534	24Jan67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	ZC 128957	6Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Vang (D)	YD 985155	9Aug66

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	Thang Binh (D)	19Dec66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 952597	3Jan67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 8248	31Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	AT 8364	ZC 135280	25Dec66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	AT 9858	16Dec66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,000		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border		29Nov66
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,140	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
40th Bn	MF	C	460		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
60th Bn	MF	C	250		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	2,000	Good	Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3781	12Jan67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 6431	28Dec66
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 6436	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 2770	8Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	130		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8142	26Dec66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20Oct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 370165	15May66
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 780875	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,100		Binh Dinh	BS 7303	1Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh	BR 7986	4Jan67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	1Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	28Dec66

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-2.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 282400H JAN 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt) 31st Regt (Hq)	E-341st Song Hong	31445(?) 31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		CO-Sr Capt BA
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn 32nd Regt (Hq) 4th Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn) 270th Regt (?)	31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn 6th Bn 33rd Regt (Hq) 324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG)
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	
15th Engr Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	
16th Sig Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
19th Med Bn				
808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van MAT
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri			
Cam Lo Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North	41,000FM-		CG-MG HUM
	Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu	41,300FM		XO-Nguyen Van THU
	Bac; K-500; Di Hai	Di Hai		PO-Le TRUONG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th			CO-Maj CUONG
	Worksite; Ham Tu			XO- Capt AN
800th Bn	K.1	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA wpns Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90 8-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DKZ 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	CO-Capt Nguyen DE
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?)			CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-THANH
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co				CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR	CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		6-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG	CO-LE

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	XI; CT3; Binh Minh	20825		CO-Capt THAO
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			CO-Capt THAU
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC)
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn			XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			CO-Phan Phong SAM
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>				
2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang	20,601CM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	XO-Tran Van QUANG
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN

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UNIT

RQ24 Bn (ENGR)

72nd Bn

74th Co

14th Co

706th Co

A10 Co

A13 Co

A16 Co

A19 Co

A21 Co

A34 Co

Tra Son Co

Tra Ha Co

AKA

GK-40

V-74; V-20;

74th Dist Force Co

106th Co

K51; 107; F-14;

D-21; Thang Binh

D-22

C-73

Tam Ky; D-23 Co

C-75; Phi Po A-21

Bn; Flying Tiger A-21

LBN

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

1-57mm RR (?)

Unk-M-79

Unk-K-50 SMG

1-60mm Mort

1-30 Cal MG

2-60mm Mort

1-57mm RR

6-MG

1-60mm Mort

2-MG

PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG

CO-Tran Van CAO

CO-THANH

XO-Tran TIEN

PO-PHUONG

CO-KHOA

XO-Nguyen THANH

PO-Anh VU

CO-Hong LE

CO-MANH

CO-LtGen Nguyen DON

XO-Col TA

CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH

XO-LtCol Chu An TAN

CO-Maj Nguyen TUYEN

CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG

XO-Hoang Xuan VINH

CO-Nguyen Duc CONG

XO-SrCapt THUA

PO-Duan Cong THANH

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)

BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;

F-550; Co Hoa

20,100GM-

21,900GM

Bac Hien

1st VC Regt (Hq)

Cong Truong 1; H-800;

PS/40; 108th Regt

40th Bn

Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 5645

40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd

Bn; Phi Doi 2007

60th Bn

Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn;

Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai

70th Bn

35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;

Chu Song; Truong Son

70; Inter-mt White

Tiger Bn; F-07; 103

3-81mm Mort

4-60mm Mort

5-MG

4-57mm RR

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Truong 7 (?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn; 75th Bn(?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135GM 20.139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ Ba Hao		CO-Mai KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; Poss 408th Bn	HT 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite	20,141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Minh Long Co			CO-Lu TRI
206th Co	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-TIEN XO-SUNG PO-MIEU CO-Dien MIEU CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
614th Co	Son Ha Co			
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			
C.219	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong			PO-MINH
	Co			CO-TRAN
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY CO-Le Van DUYET CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM CO-CU XO-CIM
300th Wpms Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600;	1548		
90th Engr Bn 2d VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN Cofs-LUONG
97th Bn	703 Intil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164GM (new)		CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH Asst PO-THUONG and NGHIEP CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG Cofs-DIUEU
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21155 GM		
7th Bn	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANG Cofs-LUONG
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt	21.141 VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC CofS-Capt THANG
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter-Gp 7			CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM CofS-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ
803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT
812TH NVA REGT

814TH NVA BN
810TH VC BN
800TH VC BN
806TH NVA BN
2ND NVA DIV HQ
1506TH VC ENGR BN
2ND VC REGT
93RD VC BN
95TH VC BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report:
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre;
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison
 Man; 20. District Cadre; 21. NLF Cadre; 22. Intelligence Cadre; 23. Association
 Member.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

B. <u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
GIANG HOA #2(H)	HUYNH LUY	40	1	3 ITT TRAN NGA 17 Jan 67 F/6
LOC QUI (V)	CUI	20	3	
DUC DUC (D)	EM	18	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	BON	20	3	
	TRUNG	20	3	
	TUONG	18	3	
GIANG HOA #2(H)	*HUYNH LUY	48	1	3 ITT NGUYEN VAN XUAN 17 Jan 67 F/3
LOC QUI (V)	TRAN KHANH		6	
DUC DUC (D)	LE THI NGOC	20	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	LE DUONG	30	18	
	TRAN HUI		7	
	DOAN KHOA		7	
	NGUYEN THI		7	
	HUYNH LONG		7	
	NGO TOAI	20	7	
	CUI		3	
	*VO BON	20	3	
	*EM	19	3	
XUYEN PHU (V)	NGUYEN BON	22	3	3 ITT 02H-C32766 Consolidated Rpt 23 Nov F/6
DUC DUC (D)	NGUYEN BAY	32	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN DUC	28	3	
	NGUYEN DUOC	26	3	
	TRAN HIEN	26	3	
	TRUONG HUAN	35	3	
	NGUYEN MEN	30	3	
	NGUYEN MINH	30	3	
	NGUYEN MUI	31	3	
	NUYNH NANG	30	3	
	NGUYEN SAU	20	3	
	TRAN TRANG	27	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
XUYEN PHU (V)	NGUYEN HOC	45	1	Nat Pol QN 89/4/66
DUC DUC (D)	NGUYEN CHUONG	40	7	TRAN THANH
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN MUOI	20	13	30 Dec 66 F/6
	TRAN KIEN	20	13	
	TRUONG DUOC	25	4	
	NGUYEN CAM	35	21	
	NGUYEN TAM	45	6	
	PHAM TAI	40	4	
	TRAN TAN	20	18	
	TRAN THAO	20	3	
	TRUONG HUAN	35	7	
	NGUYEN CO	22	3	
	TRAN DI	20	18	
	LUU TAM	18	3	
CAM AN (V)	THI THANG		6	Nat Pol NGUYEN
HIEU NHON (D)	DINH CHAT		2	CHUONG 3 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	TAM		6	
	PHUOC		18	
	THE		11	
	TRINH TIEN		4	
	THI		9	
AN BAN #1(H)	PHAM TINH		4	Nat Pol QN 81/2/65
CAM AN (V)	TRY		9	NGUYEN CHUONG
HIEU NHON (D)				3 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)				
HA NONG (H)	NGUYEN DUC MOT	40	3	3 CIT NGUYEN THI
KY NGOC (V)	DINH DUNG	42	3	THUY 21 Jan 67 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGO XAM	40	8	
QUANG NAM (P)				
TAN QUIT (H)	LE THU KHUONG	33	8	Nat Pol QN 79/2
THANH TRUONG (V)	TRUONG CONG LU	25	7	LE TU EM
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN HUU HO	32	18	15 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN HUU KIEM	30	1	
	LE TU NGU	28	3	
	NGUYEN HUU CHAM	24	3	
	NGUYEN HUU HO	25	3	
	LE TU CUU	27	3	
	LE TU LAN	30	3	
	NGUYEN HUU BIEU	22	3	
	LE TU HY	37	3	
	LE TU KHOAI	27	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LE BAC (H)	PHAN THU	30	1	3 ITT NGUYEN THI
XUYEN LOC (V)	NGUYEN SAU	20	2	SAU 19 Jan 67 F/6
DUY XUYEN (D)	NGUYEN THI NAM	22	6	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN NAM	22	3	
	NGUYEN BAY	23	3	
	NGUYEN VHN	18	3	
	TRAN THANH	25	3	
	PHAN BON	20	3	
	PHAN KIEN	20	3	
	NGUYEN SUNG	26	3	
	NGUYEN BA	22	3	
CAM AN (V)	NGUYEN DINH PHUOC	28	18	Nat Pol QN 55/2
HIEU NHON (D)	TAN	45	1	DUONG BA
QUANG NAM (P)	DO THU	23	3	13 Dec 66 F/6
	HAI	25	3	
	CHIEN	20	3	
	NGUYEN CHAM	21	3	
	PHONG	25	3	
	LE BIET	28	23	
	LE BO	25	3	
TAN THANH (H)	NGUYEN PHONG	30	1	Nat Pol QN 55/2
CAM AN (V)	NGO THUONG	28	6	DUONG BA
HIEU NHON (D)	CONG	27	23	13 Dec 66 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN XUAN	27	3	
	HOANG TON VU	24	11	
AN TRACH (H)	DANG DI	28	1	3 ITT DANG YEN
HOA LOI (V)	PHAM THUOC	27	18	17 Jan 67 F/6
HOA VANG (D)	DANG GIOI	25	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	DINH DANG	25	3	
	NGUYEN MA	30	6	
SON THANG (V)	DUONG THI	48	18	Nat Pol QN 64/3
QUE SON (D)	PHAM DUNG	46	7	NGUYEN TINH
QUANG NAM (P)	HUYNH BIEU	32	10	
	LE HUONG	23	3	
	LE LUC	23	3	
	NGUYEN TIEU	19	3	
	LUONG HY	19	3	
	LE THI CHAP	22	3	
	NGUYEN THI LAI	21	3	
	NGUYEN THI HOA	17	3	
	PHAM LAP	27	3	
	PHAM NGOC	20	3	
	PHAM LY	20	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	NGUYEN HUAN	20	3	
	NGO HUNG	20	3	
	NGO THI NGO	22	3	
	NGUYEN THI HUONG	19	3	
	PHAM PHO	20	3	
	LE DAO	19	3	
	LE QUACH	32	3	
	NHI	25	3	
	VO DINH THANH	37	4	
	HUYNH TAN THANH	30	4/8	
	LE VAN THONG	38	10	
	LE DAT	32	7	
	LE TRI	42	18	
	HO CONG	36	23	
	NGO TRAI	47	23	
	TRAN NGHI		7	
	HO LUYEN	47	11	
	LE QUANG	43	7	
	(AKA HUONG)			
	NGUYEN THI CANH	24	4	
	LE LUNG	38	7	
	NGUYEN TAN HUONG	48	8	
AN CUONG (H)	NGUYEN CHUY	40	1	
BINH THIEN (V)	(AKA AN)			
BINH SON (D)	HUYNH CUONG	38	4	
QUANG NGAI (P)	PHAM DU	30	2/9	
	NGUYEN KHIET	30	18	
	NGUYEN BON	28	3	
	NGUYEN CHON	27	3	
	LAM VAN	28	3	
	NGUYEN CONG	24	3	
	PHAN LAI	26	3	
	NGUYEN TAU	30	3	
	NGUYEN TIEP	26	3	
	NGUYEN NOI	27	3	
	VO PHAN	27	3	
	NGUYEN NGA	30	3	
	HUYNH DU	30	3	
AN CUONG (H)	LE DAU	50	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH THIEN (V)	NGUYEN THANH	30	4	Rpt III MAF 79-67
BINH SON (D)	HUYNH KINH	50	6	17 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
VAN BANG #4 (H)	DO TA	56	1	9 ITT NGUYEN COI
DUC HOA (V)	TRAN CHON	40	4	14 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	BUI VINH	45	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	VO TIA	50	11	
	BUI THI XU	60	6	
	TRAN HONG	30	6/18	
	TRAN DUONG	40	18	
	NGUYEN VAN NO	20	7	
	TRAN QUI	30	3	
	HAN	20	3	
	LANG	18	3	
	NGUYEN AN	30	3	
	CHIM	18	3	
	LA	19	3	
	XUAN	18	3	
	MAI	20	3	
	NGUYEN THI GA	20	3	
	TRAN THI NONG	20	3	
DAM THUY NAM (H)	HUYNH HIEN	47	1	9 ITT LE CHIEN
DUC LUONG (V)	NGHIAP	38	4	14 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	LE THANG	35	12	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN TUU	47	11/5	
	TRAN RAM	45	6	
	PHAM THAI	27	6	
	NGUYEN GIOI	60	6	
	THU	40	6	
	NGHIEP	38	4/18	
	NGUYEN TUU	18	3	
	PHAM TUU	18	3	
	LE DE	40	9	
DAM THY NAM (H)	NGUYEN CHIN	20	3	9 ITT Consolidated
DUC LUONG (V)	NGUYEN LAI	21	3	Rpt LE RANG, HO CU
MO DUC (D)	NGUYEN CHA	22	3	14 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
LAM HA (H)	TRINH DE	40	1	9 ITT Consolidated
DUC THUAN (V)	NGUYEN TINH	35	4	Rpt III MAF 61-67
MO DUC (D)	HO VUONG	30	12	14 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	TRINH TAO	35	6	
	TRAN LE	30	18	
	TRUONG BAN	27	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LAM THUONG (H)	LE THUAN	40	1	9 ITT Consolidated
DUC THUAN (V)	DINH HIEP	30	6	Rpt NGUYEN LUU
MO DUC (D)	TRUNG NEN	25	4	VO DUC
QUANG NGAI (P)	BINH	20	6/2	14 Jan 67 F/6
	TRUNG THIEN	70	6	
	TIET	25	18	
	MUNG	19	3	
	LOC	20	3	
	EM	25	3	
LAM THUONG (H)	*DINH HIEP	40	1	9 ITT TRAN DAU
DUC THUAN (V)	DINH THIEN	30	4	14 Jan 67 F/3
MO DUC (D)	NGUYEN MON	35	5	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN MAI	22	6	
	NGUYEN DAO	35	6	
	HUYNH NHE	60	6	
	NGUYEN CHAU	25	3	
	SAO	20	3	
	TRICH	35	3	
	TRAN SONG	25	3	
	PHAM DIEN	19	3	
THIET TRUONG (H)	*HO	40	3	9 ITT LE HIEN
DUC VINH (V)	*DO DA	30	3	16 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	CHI	30	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUE	37	3	
THANH TAN (H)	PHAM SANG	40	1	9 ITT MAI HUNG
(AKA VINH PHUC)	LE HAI	20	2	12 Jan 67 F/6
KY ANH (V)	NGUYEN QUANG	25	6	
TAM KY (D)	PHAM HAO	24	18	
QUANG TIN (P)				

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6. TACTICS

Information concerning tactics, primarily company tactics, was provided by rallier DOAN CONG KIEN, 2/Lt, who rallied to B Co, 8th Engr Bn, 1st Air Cav Div at (BR 802836) in Binh Dinh Province in II Corps. Lt KIEN was the executive officer of an infantry company but he did not participate in actual combat. The information, he furnished is, therefore, not a result of combat experience but is information he learned in an officer's training school. The basic tactics covered in this report include the following:

- a. Attack of a fortified fort, district or hamlet.
- b. Company defense.
- c. Company mobile attack.
- d. Surprise attack.
- e. Ambush of a convoy.
- f. Attack on a helicopter landing zone.

Attack of a fortified fort, district or hamlet:

The size of the attacking force is determined by the number of troops in the fortified area. If the fortified area is occupied by a platoon the enemy will attack with a company; if the area is occupied by a company the enemy will attack with a battalion.

The attacking unit of a fortified area is divided into four teams: a demolition team, a fire power team, an assault team, and a reserve team. The demolition team is composed of a wire cutting element, a bangalore torpedo element, a bamboo ladder or scaling element and a demolitions element. The fire power team consists of the mortar element, the recoilless rifle element, and the machinegun and automatic rifle elements.

The enemy will initially attempt to secretly penetrate the outer wire before launching the attack. If this is impossible the fire power team will fire into the fortified area as the demolition and assault teams crawl toward the objective. The recoilless rifles fire down the axis of attack at each of the fortified bunkers. The mortars are placed 1000 meters from the area, usually in a defilade position. The bangalore torpedo element blows the barbed wire, the ladder element breaches the trench network and the demolition element attempts to destroy the bunkers at each corner of the fortified area. The initial objectives of the attack are the headquarters and communications center, and then the trench networks inside the fortified area.


One company will move along each of the three axes of attack. One company, from another battalion, will be held in reserve 500 meters behind the battalion headquarters. All mortars are placed about 50 meters in front

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of the battalion headquarters. If the terrain is low at one corner of the fort the main enemy force will be directed along this axis in order to achieve the element of surprise. The attack is always conducted at night.



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
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Company Defense:

In the company defense three platoons are put on line and one platoon, from another company, is held in reserve. An advance recon team is sent out to harass and observe the oncoming force. The two platoons occupying the flanks of the company area are equipped with 57mm recoilless rifles. The platoon occupying the point of the defensive area is equipped with a recoilless rifle and also has a machinegun. The mortars are situated in the middle of the defensive area, about 50 meters behind the infantry platoon. The headquarters is located 50 meters behind the mortar position.



A secondary position is usually made in case the first defensive area is overrun. The headquarters is the first element to withdraw, then the mortar section and finally all three platoons, that were on line. The reserve platoon stays in its position in order to delay the opposing force until the retreating elements reach their secondary positions and then it too withdraws.


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Company Mobile Attack:

The company mobile attack involves nothing more than an offensive movement against an opposing force. The attack is started by a preparation of mortar and recoilless rifle fire. The three platoons attack on line and once the opposing force is retreating the two outer platoons attempt to envelop the withdrawing force. Reserve troops are again held behind the headquarters section and the mortars and recoilless rifles are positioned in front of the headquarters. Once the opposing force is retreating the weapons and headquarters section will be displaced forward in order to maintain effective fire and control.



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
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Surprise Attack:

The surprise attack is carried out during the night. A mortar and recoilless rifle preparation is fired on the target. During this preparation the infantry troops move into position. If the area contains one company, a battalion size attacking force will be used. The majority of the battalion will move in a column formation from the lowest point surrounding the desired target in order to maintain the element of surprise. Several squads flank the position in order to confuse the defense force or destroy any of them that may attempt to break out of the area. The main attacking element will attempt to destroy the headquarters first and then move on line to the out-lying pockets of resistance. The heavy weapons and headquarters are set up 1000 meters from the objective. The reserve remains behind the headquarters section.

Ambush of a Convoy:

A company will be used to attack 30-40 vehicles, a battalion to attack 100 or more vehicles. An observation post will inform the headquarters when the convoy has completely moved into the killing zone. The ambush is initiated in three ways: a mine can be used to destroy the first vehicle, mortar fire can be used to start the ambush, or recoilless rifle fire can be used. If recoilless rifle fire is used to destroy the first vehicle the troops prefer to be within 50-75 meters of the road to insure a good hit. Troops are usually 100-200 meters off one side of the road. A small blocking force is placed on the other side of the road to kill any troops that would use that direction as an exit of withdrawal. Once the ambush is initiated troops block the front and rear of the convoy to keep it within the kill zone. The ambush attack is usually carried out during daylight hours.




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
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Attack on a Helicopter Landing Zone:

The commander of the attacking unit studies the terrain and determines what areas may be used as landing zones. He will then place his platoon or companies in a triangular shape formation. The possible landing zones are located between each of the enemy units. The enemy units are dug in and remain 100-200 meters from the landing zone. If artillery is fired into the area the enemy will remain in his fortified position in order to maintain the element of surprise. Once helicopters have moved to one of the landing zones the two closest units will open fire. The third unit will function as the reserve. Just as the troops are leaving the helicopters the enemy units open fire at the troops and helicopters. While firing they move from their fortified positions toward the landing zone.



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7. UNIDENTIFIED DESIGNATIONS

A. LETTER BOX NUMBER

(1) Envelope captured at (YD 578226) on 10 Jan 1966 contained LBN
050 VK (B2).

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1. General Weather. The weather throughout I CTZ for the month of February will be generally poor. "Crachin" spells which began occurring in December, reach a maximum frequency in late February or early March. Long periods of low, overcast skies with drizzle or light rain and poor visibility will prevail over the coastal plains and penetrate the river valleys far into the interior of I CTZ.

2. Precipitation.

a. Throughout I CTZ, "Crachins" contribute significantly to the monthly rainfalls. Rainfall is generally light, never-the-less one to two days with rainfall greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ inch can be expected in I CTZ. Daily rainfall in excess of two inches is rare, but does occur, particularly in the area around HUE.

b. The mean number of days with measurable precipitation varies from five days south of HUE to the southern border of QUANG NGAI, to 10 days just south of HUE and north to the DMZ. The coastal area between DANANG and the DMZ can expect precipitation, usually in the form of drizzle, on one out of three days. As many as 17 days with measurable rainfall have been reported at DANANG during February.

c. Mean monthly precipitation amounts to one to three inches over most of I CTZ with the exception of around HUE, where it is three to six inches. BA NA, located south-southeast of HUE has the highest February rainfall, 8.5 inches.

d. The maximum monthly precipitation over most of I CTZ is five inches, except around HUE where the maximum is 10 inches. The record rainfall for the country is 11.0 inches at HUE.

e. Minimum monthly precipitation amounts over most of the I CTZ are zero; that is February has experienced no measurable rainfall in most regions of I CTZ. Here again the highest minimum is 1.7 inches at HUE.

f. Maximum 24 hour precipitation amounts are greater than three inches over most of I CTZ. However, DANANG to HUE have experienced in excess of six inches.

3. Thunderstorms. Primarily, thunderstorms occur during the afternoon, but where storms are held offshore by land breezes, dissipating storms may move onshore after sunrise. Less than one thunderstorm day can be expected over most of I CTZ. Areas around HUE may observe one to three days with thunderstorms.

4. Cloudiness.

a. Because of "Crachins", low overcasts generally can be expected over most of I CTZ on five to ten mornings. Convective clouds form over most of I CTZ during late morning hours, with ceilings hightening in the afternoon.

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b. Mean cloudiness varies from 60 percent from the southern QUANG NGAI border to HUE and 70 percent to 76 percent north of HUE to the DMZ.

c. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than $\frac{3}{10}$ varies from less than five days south of the DMZ to HUE to ten days from HUE to the southern border of I CTZ.

5. Visibility. Morning visibilities of less than three miles are frequent with "Crachin" conditions along the coast of I CTZ. These restrictions occasionally persist throughout the day. The general trend in February is toward better visibility.

6. Temperatures.

a. Mean daily maximum temperatures range from 75 degrees on the northern border to 80 degrees at the southern border of I CTZ.

b. Mean daily minimum temperatures range from about 60 degrees at the northern border to 70 degrees at the southern border.

7. Relative Humidity. Relative humidity is generally 85 to 90 percent throughout I CTZ.

8. General Flying Weather in I CTZ. "Crachin" frequency decreases slightly. Favorable days for low-level operations, ceiling 1000 feet or higher with visibility $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles or greater, will be about 18-22 days. Mid-level operations, ceiling 5000 feet or higher, visibility five miles or greater, will be about eight to 12 days. Drizzle, low ceilings and low visibilities still frequently obscure mountain terrain.

9. Sunrise, Sunset and Moonrise, Moonset Tables.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
1	0717	1845			1149
2	0716	1845	Last	0046	1232
3	0716	1845		0145	1318
4	0716	1846		0244	1408
5	0716	1846		0344	1501
6	0715	1846		0442	1557
7	0715	1847		0537	1645
8	0715	1847		0627	1750
9	0715	1848	New	0712	1843

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
10	0714	1848		0753	1935
11	0714	1848		0830	2024
12	0714	1849		0905	2110
13	0714	1849		0938	2157
14	0713	1850		1010	2243
15	0713	1850		1043	2330
16	0712	1850		1119	
17	0711	1850	First	1157	0019
18	0711	1851		1240	0111
19	0711	1851		1328	0206
20	0710	1852		1422	0303
21	0710	1852		1522	0402
22	0709	1853		1625	0500
23	0709	1853		1730	0545
24	0708	1853		1834	0646
25	0707	1854	Full	1936	0733
26	0706	1854		2037	0818
27	0706	1854		2137	0901
28	0705	1854		2237	0944

Duration of Civil Twilight is approximately 23 minutes.

DANANG local standard time is GCT plus eight hours.

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT) TO III MAF
PERINTREP NO. 4-67

1. 2d Co (AKA C-75), V-75 Mortar Bn. PFC NGUYEN VAN BAO, 6th Sqd, 2d Plt, V-75 Mortar Bn, was captured at (BT 105628) by 3d Bn, 1st Marines on 10 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. In June 1966, BAO joined the Q.75 Co, V-75 Bn and commenced infiltration that same month. The battalion arrived in DAI LOC (D), QUANG NAM (P) in October 1966. Upon arriving, the battalion established base camp in the mountains in CANH BAC jungle on the DAI LOC slope.

b. The 1st, 2d and 3d Co's, V-75 Mortar Bn left their base camp 11 January and proceeded generally east. Moving at night they reached DIEN THANG (V) on the 13th. On the night of 14 January, they moved to HOA LAN (V) where they rested twenty minutes prior to beginning the attack on the Marine positions.

c. The plan of attack was to get on line and storm the gate to the post. The captive was to infiltrate the perimeter and employ two grenades and one satchel charge against Marine positions. After the attack the battalion was to withdraw in small groups to the river bank where the villagers would be waiting to transport the wounded and dead. The battalion was to return to CANH BAC jungle by the same route previously traveled.

d. The captive maintained that the better soldiers in the battalion were picked to go inside the post while the others were to provide fire support. To the best of his knowledge, no other unit other than the six guerrillas from DIEN NGOC (VC name for THANH THUY (V)) participated in the attack.

e. The V-75 Bn is composed of three companies (total 360 men); each company has four platoons (total 120 men); each platoon has four squads (total 30 men). Battalion weapons include ten 81mm mortars, five 60mm mortars, three B-40 rocket launchers and normal individual weapons.

f. The captive claimed morale was fair but that the food was insufficient (rice, salt and fish sauce only). Ammunition was insufficient; 120 rounds small arms per man, five 81mm mortar rounds and three B-40 rounds per launcher. Medicine was insufficient; malaria pills and pain killers only. There were no antibiotics. 50 percent of the V-75 personnel suffer from malaria and about one percent of these cases are incapacitated.

(3-2 Comment: F/6. This is the first report of the V-75 Bn.)

2. DINH DIEN (H) (YD 035437) Guerrilla. THAI VIET HAN, a guerrilla of DINH DIEN (V), PHU THANH (V), BA LONG (D) QUANG TRI (P), was captured by RF Forces operating with K Co, 3d Bn, 3d Marines at (YD 033449) on 12 January gave the

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following information during interrogation:

a. Captive claims knowledge of the 1st Bn, 3d Regt, 4th NVA Div which he states is located in the jungle area vicinity (YD 1838) and (YD 1839). He reports the battalion has 60mm, 81mm or 82mm mortars and possibly two 120mm mortars. He states the 1st Bn has been in the BA LONG area for approximately six months. He had been told that the 1st Bn is moving in the near future to NHU LE (YD 3148).

b. In August 1966, a large group of NVA soldiers came to DINH DIEN (H) on Route 38 (corresponds with Highway 9) where they split into 15 small groups of 20 to 25 men. Each group was guided by a guerrilla along a different route. Captive guided his group along Highway 2 in the BA LONG Valley. He further stated that the DINH DIEN (H) guerrillas have never guided other NVA soldiers and that he has not seen any other group pass.

c. His mission was to stand guard, dig trenches, assemble people for meetings, plant mines, collect taxes and guide NVA units.

d. There are 15 DINH DIEN (H) guerrillas who are armed with assorted rifles. The morale of these men is low. There is no doctor and very little medical supplies for the guerrillas.

e. He told of a rice cache, (300 - five gallon cans) located in DONG NHON Mountain (Hill 660) (YD 0944) and the mountainous area east of THON VAN YAN (YD 1939).

f. Captive claims that when U.S. Forces came into his hamlet he showed them where his weapon was because he wanted to return to the RVN government.

(G-2 Comment: Overall rating F/3; F/4 as to 4th Div. There is no record of a 4th Div in the NVA OOB, although rallier BA stated that the 4th Div was located in the QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN area. An ARVN interrogation report indicates a possibility that the 4th Div may be an AKA for the 324B Div, however, there is nothing to substantiate this report.)

3. 21st Regt. TRAN PHIEN, Combat Support Co, 33d Bn, 21st Regt, defected at TRA BONG (D) Headquarters and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. After LIEN KET 52, the 21st Regt moved to (AT 980170) for a three month training course. After that, the regiment was prepared to attack QUE SON (D), but this plan was discovered and the regiment withdrew to THANG BINH (?). From here they moved south to (BT 210100) and received replacements. After obtaining these replacements the regiment moved into QUANG NGAI (P) (BS 354834). The order of movement was 33d Bn, 2d Bn, Regt 1 CP and the 11th Bn and the route was (BT 260100), (BT 165070), (BT 135010), (BS 110920) to (BS 308805). At this point the regiment made preparation for an attack on an unknown objective in the vicinity of CHU LAI TAOR. During early January 1967, the 21st Regt attacked the 2d Bde, ROKMC.

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b. The rallier defected shortly after this and, when he left, the regimental CP was located in the vicinity of (BS 354834), the 33d Bn was located in the vicinity of (BS 374814) and the two other battalions were located in the Delta area west of SON TINH.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. 21st Regt was reported several times by low level agents reports in this area. This is the first hard intelligence to substantiate these reports. Sightings and contacts numbered over 500 in the period 9-13 January within the 2d Bde, ROKMC TAOR. The 33rd Bn location is approximately two kms northwest where, on 11 and 12 January, over 600 VC were sighted (BS 383795). It is possible that the 21st Regt is in this area to participate in attacks reported to take place throughout QUANG NGAI (P) before TET.)

4. 70th Co, X.20 Sapper Bn. NGUYEN PHONG, 70th Co, X.20 Sapper Bn (possibly AKA for 409th Sapper Bn), was captured during the attack on 2nd Bn, 11th Marines on 13 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. Four days prior to this attack two three man cells scouted the 2nd Bn, 11th Marines position. They remained in the area over night and noted types and numbers of bunkers, weapons, obstacles, numbers of personnel and the vulnerability of the position.

b. On 11 January, the company received orders to attack (BT 441081) which was reported as being an American artillery unit near CHU LAI.

c. All the 70th Co took part in this attack. There were two assault groups, one of eight - three man cells and another three - three man cells, ten men to police the battlefield and a three man headquarters unit. The larger groups was to infiltrate and its mission was to destroy five bunkers and three troop billets. The smaller group was to infiltrate and destroy five other bunkers and two troop billets. Typical armament of these groups were: Two men had AK's and the third had two explosive charges (satchel and/or bangalore) and ten grenades. Each man was expected to commit suicide rather than be captured.

d. PHONG claimed that everything went smoothly throughout the attack until they reached the second strand of barbed wire. At this time, flares exploded and the cells were subjected to highly accurate machine gun fire and were unable to advance or withdraw. The attack failed because the Americans were not asleep as had been expected and their defenses were too strong.

e. There are five sapper companies subordinate to X.20 Bn (30th, 40th, 50th, 60th and 70th). The 30th and 50th Co's operate in northern BINH DINH (P); the 40th is located in SON NAM (V); the 60th is supposedly split between QUANG NAM (P) and QUANG TIN (P) and the 70th operates in TAM KY (D). The X.20 Bn CP is reportedly located in SON NAM (V) in the vicinity of (BS 505763).

(G-2 Comment: F/3 based upon present interrogation and assumption that the X.20 is possibly an AKA for the 409th Sapper Bn).

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5. Captured Documents. The following information has been obtained from the translation of captured enemy document:

a. "Plan of Troop Proselyting Activity Last Quarter of 1966"

I. REQUIREMENTS:

Troop proselyting cadre, cadre of various branches, and cadre of the armed forces must thoroughly understand the new requirements of the Party policy and the 1966 troop proselyting task.

The 1966 troop proselyting task aims at disintegrating and destroying the puppet armed forces so as to score immediate successes.

On the basis of the above mentioned requirements, try to strengthen and develop the permanent troop proselyting force, station cadre, secret cadre, and train specialized cadre in order to meet the requirements. We must try to strengthen the administrative machinery in hamlets and simultaneously attack the enemy and build-up our armed forces in order to ensure the strategic role of the troop proselyting mission in the South Vietnamese revolution.

The political and military activities must be closely coordinated to foil the enemy plan of conducting sweep operations, pacifying the rural areas and herding the population into strategic hamlets.

II. SPECIFIC PLAN OF ACTION:

Investigation and reconnaissance mission

Know thoroughly all types of enemy troops, unit designations and the attitude of enemy enlisted men and officers.

Investigate and uncover dissensions in the enemy ranks.

After establishing contact with an enemy soldier, we must study and make an attack plan and then begin to make contact with other enemy soldiers in time.

In late October 1966 villages must complete the investigation task in accordance with the above mentioned requirements and then report to the district troop proselyting section. The report must clearly state the necessity of attacking each type of troop and post.

District cadre must perform their duties in accordance with these requirements and then make a report to district in late October 1966.

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Indoctrination propaganda and motivation of the people and enemy soldiers to assume the troop proselyting task. It is necessary to help the people know that:

The U.S. imperialists are our enemy, the aggressor of our country.

The puppet government is a henchman who sells out the country.

As the mercenary of the U.S., the puppet army is the enemy of our people. Thus they must make every effort to kill the enemy for the sake of independence, freedom and peace.

Method

Coordinate rich farmers, middle-farmers, political investigation sections, propaganda and culture indoctrination sections and the armed forces; these branches should draw a coordinated plan of action.

Take advantage of the local situation to admit legal and illegal agents.

Aside from these methods, cadre in every location must create an effective propaganda method of their own.

Contents

Recapitulate the crimes of the U.S. armed forces, satellites and the puppet government.

Help the people know these cruel acts which take place in the rural area.

Unmask the enemy conspiracy. The pressgang policy, the pacification plan and the program for destroying hamlets, villages and crops. Then urge the people and families of soldiers to denounce the crimes of the U.S.

Unmask the deceitful propaganda theme of the enemy psy-war personnel such as the North Vietnam regime uses in its aggression in the South Vietnam, the good-will of the U.S. on the peace problem and other illusive facts.

Propagandize soldiers and their families about the policy of the Front.

Recapitulate the achievements accomplished by the people during a year, a quarter and a phase, and highlight the mission to disintegrate and kill the puppet soldiers.

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Make everybody believe in our capability of disintegrating the enemy ranks and at the same time, help the people solve difficult problems so that the people may carry out the mission more effectively.

In addition to opening meetings, cadre must propagandize every soldiers family on the above.

Besides the above contents, all cadre must read once again the contents of the plan for the 3d quarter 1966 (all cadre must study the contents in detail).

III. COOPERATION OF THE THREE PRONG ATTACK:

Political Cooperation

In association with the political struggle section, educational branches urge the people to assume tasks of winning the hearts of enemy soldiers, formulating themes and outlining methods of the proselyting task.

Use the troop proselyting force-including families of soldiers and the civilian force in the face to face struggle for propaganda slogans issued by the struggle section.

Live with the enemy force, our secret cadre must urge the enemy soldiers to study carefully the three prong attack and to associate with the people in the face to face struggle designed to score success.

Understand the attitude and the morale of the enemy soldiers well before launching the face to face struggle.

Criteria (to be carried out like the plan for September 1966).

Coordination of Armed Forces

Depending on the capability of each place, outline a plan of coordination of the armed forces.

Destroy the enemy strongholds and tyrants; break off the enemy grip and stage coup d'etats.

Make reports on enemy bivouacs, concentrations and the situation to our armed forces.

V. TEACH REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY TO THE ENEMY SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS:

Contents

Emphasis must be placed on the traditions of the people and the working class.

(See the contents of the September Plan).

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Also, this month it is necessary for villages to carefully study the ten propaganda principles in book No. 12 on troop proselyting experiences, already distributed to all comrades. This is described by higher levels.

Method

Use all propaganda forces and various propaganda methods.

Talks must be realized by sending letters, slogans, documents and magazines.

Conduct propaganda by megaphone to cause the public to talk about our activities, etc.

Criteria (to be carried out like the plan for September 66).

VI. MOTIVATION OF ENEMY SOLDIERS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STRUGGLE:

The key slogan is "let us associate with the people in the struggle against the U.S. and for national salvation". Depending on the change of the situation, use the following slogans:

Appeal to the troops to desert.

Call upon the troops to participate in the counter sweep-operations and pacification campaign. To refuse to perform reinforcement missions and commit acts of repression and terrorism.

Call upon the troops, to escape from their outposts and to protest against the upgrading and the transfer of position.

Induce troops to surrender to us when they are encircled.

Protest against the illegal acts and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. soldiers.

Disobey the U.S. Orders.

Attack and kill the U.S. soldiers.

VII. RECRUITMENT OF SERVICEMEN:

The recruitment of servicemen must be conducted parallel with the consolidation. Never assign missions without indoctrination. Recruit as many covert agents as possible to overt agents.

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In the latter part of October and November various agencies will establish contact with new agents and increase secret servicemen in accordance with the following plan: 85.P will restrict the recruitment but improve skills of existing agents and turn two key personnel into two agent network personnel and two sympathizers into two key personnel, 62P will turn two sympathizers into two key personnel and establish secret contact with other men.

82P has established contact with many men in the past few months- and especially in October and November it must select one key cadre and one sympathizer by means of secret contact. He has many friends.

48P tries by all means to establish contact with a man and turn him into a secret liaison agent.

Remarks

Secret agents are divided into two types:

Type I. Secret liaison agent (whose mission is to guide and teach cadre) various villages must make a list of names of old secret agents and then recruit more fifth columnists to meet the requirements. If a village has not yet developed the secret agent force, start to develop it in order to meet requirements.

Every place must build a propaganda station and enlist a cadre to take watch of activities on the enemy posts.

Recruitment

In response to the winter and spring victory, recruitment phrase by provinces, villages must:

Select young men who have a high revolutionary spirit.

(Do not let them know our concept)

Submit a list of biographical data to selected young men to districts in late November 1966.

VIII. MOTIVATION OF ENEMY OFFICERS: (See September Revolution)

IX. HAMLET ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY:

Thoroughly understand the two main missions:

(1) Recruitment of young men

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(2) Motivation of the enemy soldiers on the revolutionary ideology.

Daily tasks of troop proselyting section of villages:

Investigate the morale of the soldiers and officers and activities on posts in their respective village.

Recruit secret liaison agents and fifth columnists.

Enlist station cadre, permanent force and families of soldiers' dependents.

Assign civilians the missions of propagandizing enemy soldiers, of disseminating leaflets and of conducting propaganda session at the enemy posts.

Criteria

Generally speaking, all villages must understand clearly the two basic missions. Daily tasks must be carried out, depending on the situation in the rural areas. Districts must conduct short term classes for section chiefs and assistant section chiefs in order to improve their professional skills.

Permanent troop proselyting cells:

In each village there are at least from two to eight cells. Village must train these cells how to attack the enemy constantly.

If a village has none of these cells, please form from one to three cells before late November 1966. Villages in weak areas from one to three cells.

X. MISSION OF PROPAGANDIZING U.S. SOLDIERS:

The people, with the help of interpreters, sent leaflets directly to the American and FWMAF Soldiers.

Troop proselyting problem

Try to send leaflets to the American FWMAF and Vietnamese soldiers during the fight.

Make known the policy concerning prisoners and those who surrender in November 66 to District armed forces and village guerrilla forces.

Be responsible for the implementation of the above mentioned policy to high commanders of these armed units throughout district.

Make a monthly enemy proselyting report to Troop Proselyting Committee levels and maintain close contact with them.

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Guidance

Help all troop proselyting cadre understand thoroughly the new troop proselyting policy.

Remember that what should be done must be in accordance with the slogan "attack the enemy and develop our forces at the same time".

Make an all out effort to accomplish these three key missions.

Enlighten the enemy soldiers about our revolutionary ideology.

Recruit new fifth columnists and secret liaison personnel.

Develop and improve the administrative machinery of villages, secret liaison stations, and troop proselyting cadre of hamlets.

Establish contact with families of soldiers. All villages must send a troop proselyting report to districts every five days. Then, every seven days, districts make a report to provinces and disseminate experience gained from troop proselyting committee section.

6 October 66

CHAU DUC troop proselyting
staff section

Signature
HONG THANG

b. Excerpts of a speech made 20Dec66 by NGUYEN HUU THO, chairman of the NFLSVN Central Committee were extracted from a captured notebook. THO sets forth the five vital missions to be achieved in 1967 through 1968 as follows:

A better spirit of solidarity between all Parties, Regions, and Races within the country, regardless of individual political antecedents.

More efforts to extinguish the enemy's vital forces by development of guerrilla activities both in intensity and extent.

A determination to defend and expand the liberated area, to frustrate pacification plan, and to accelerate production growth.

A positive development of political potential, coupled with efforts to promote political contention in cities as well as in enemy controlled rural areas.

An intensification of military and enemy proselyting activities with emphasis to be placed on American and satellite troops, and on disorganizing RVN military and government structures.

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c. The following are extracts from the report of the 17 December 1966 meeting of "The Operations and Coordination Committee" and, although the comments were directed at the Eastern NAM BO Region THU DAU MOT (P) force, they are considered pertinent to the I CTZ:

Development of the people's guerrilla warfare

Thanks to the effort of the Province Party Committee and the Province Unit Operations and Coordination Committee, the activities of guerrillas, especially the village guerrillas, were stepped up. However, the leadership of the District and Village Party Committees was still poor. They did not clearly understand what the people's guerrilla warfare movement is.

Various agencies and groups did not concentrate separate guerrilla groups and directly participate in the movement.

In brief, various District and Village Party Committees failed to observe the Province guidelines.

Build up of units

Political indoctrination was conducted for all village and hamlet guerrilla units. At some places guerrilla units were activated. Prime consideration was given to the weak areas, especially to the activities in towns.

A large number of people were motivated to participate in the Winter - Spring campaign. The concentrated units as well as the village guerrilla units made a resolution in which they expressed their determination to successfully accomplish their military and political duties. They were also determined to correct their deficiencies.

However, some cadre and soldiers must continue to overcome their fear of a violent and protracted war, their corrupt and licentious behavior. They did not observe the disciplinary rules, were jealous with one another and failed to make self-critique reports. There even were a few cases of desertion. The strength decreased since the vacancies caused by casualties and desertions were not filled.

Plans for attacking the enemy in weak areas

The village guerrillas and district troops must be sent to the weak areas. According to the resolution, BEN CAT must send one half or at least one third of its troops to TAN AN and TUANG BINH HIEP Villages to operate there.

Special action and secret self-defense units must be activated in towns in order to maintain our control in these places.

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At the villages in the Liberated areas, we must urge demonstrations and ask for peace. We must also motivate them to protest enemy sweep operations; help our guerrillas in operations; and counter the enemy by constructing strong holds (at least three in each hamlet) with fortifications.

In addition, the guerrilla force must be reorganized to effectively counter enemy operations and to protect the base.

Implementation of the military plan

The Rear Service Section must draft plans designed to meet the increasing requirement of the present situation.

Weapons should be sufficiently provided to the encircling units and the guerrilla units in charge of counter-sweep operations to insure continuous action.

The Rear Service Section should hold a meeting under the guidance of the Province Unit to discuss weapon production and the capabilities of every district and village.

The immediate task is to gain an adequate quantity of weapons for 1967.

It is necessary to motivate all the people in the province to participate in the collection of enemy weapons and to organize cells and groups in charge of this collection.

The district and villages must carefully maintain the weapons collected.

Contents and requirements of the guerrilla warfare congress

Typical reports concerning the leadership of the guerrilla warfare movement in various villages by various Party Chapters will be read during the congress. The briefer will be political officers of village guerrilla units and Party Chapter secretaries.

Three villages will be selected to submit their reports:

One village in the liberated area which will have to submit a report on the leadership of the village people's guerrilla warfare and participation of various people's groups in this movement.

One village which has successfully opposed enemy pacification and attempt to encroach upon the land by the tactic of intensive military attack, intensive propaganda and intensive protest demonstrations.

One village which only has one unit of secret self-defense activated by higher echelon guerrilla forces.

One local force unit will have to report their capabilities in combined or separate attacks and in the support of the village guerrilla units.

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6. The following are names of Captive and Returnees on which interrogation reports were reviewed for the period.

CAPTIVE/RETURNEE(R)	DOC/DOR	CAPTURING UNIT	LOG/DISPOSITION
NGUYEN TRUONG AN (C)	22JAN67	I/3/5	BT431096/Civ to G-5
VO AN (C)	13JAN67	PCF Unk	E of MO DUC/Continued
NGUYEN BA (C)	22JAN67	I/3/6	BT431097/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN BAI (C)	7JAN67	C/1/1	Unk/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN BI (C)	21JAN67	D/1/7 Civ	BT646003/Civ to G-5
VO BINH (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS545896/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN THI CAC (C)	18JAN67	CAC 1-5 Civ Def	BT314172/LY TIN(D) HQ
VO ANH CAHU (C)	Unk	Unk Refugee	BS777527/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI CAM (C)	18JAN67	C/1/7 Civ Def	BS506942/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN CAU (Refugee)	Unk	1/5	Unk/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN VAN CAY (C)	23JAN67	Unk Civ	Unk/Civ to G-5
LE CHIEN (C)	8JAN67	H/2/7 Civ Def	BS770543/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHIN (R)	25DEC66	-----	THUONG DUC
LE CHUNG (C)	21JAN67	B/1/5 Civ Def	BT379249/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN COI (C)	10JAN67	F/2/7 Guerrilla PW	BS725626/III MAF Comp
NGUYEN CONG (C)	18JAN67	A/1/7 Civ Def	BT665003/BINH SON(D) HQ
HO CU (C)	8JAN67	H/2/7 Civ Def	BS770543/HO DUC(D) HQ
BUI CUC (R)	Unk	----- V-74	LY TIN CHIEU HOI CTR
NGUYEN CUC (C)	22JAN67	PW	BT440045/TAM KY(D) HQ
HUYNH DANG (C)	13JAN67	2/11 Guerrilla	BT441081/1st Med Bn
NGUYEN DANG (C)	13JAN67	B/1/7 Cadre	BS728934/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN TAM DAT (R)	7JAN67	-----	XA HUYNH OP/Unk
TRAN DAU (C)	8JAN67	H/2/7 Civ Def	BS770547/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN DAY (C)	23JAN67	Unk Civ	Unk/Civ to G-5
LE THI DAY (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS537895/Civ to G-5
TRAN DONG (C)	5JAN67	ROKMC PW 32d Bn	BS530822/2d ARVN Div
LUONG THI DU (C)	13JAN67	2/11 Civ	BT440080/Civ to G-5
VO DUC (C)	8JAN67	H/2/7 Civ Def	BS770543/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN DUONG (C)	22JAN67	2/4 Guerrilla	AT8355/ARVN Hosp
NGUYEN THI GAING (C)	20JAN67	PF	BT648020/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN GIOI (C)	Unk	Unk Refugee	BS777527/MO DUC(D) HQ
PHAM BIEN (C)	23JAN67	Coast Guard	BS8540/Civ to G-5
LE HIEN (C)	6JAN67	E/2/7 Civ Def	BS744515/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI HIEP (C)	Unk	Unk Civ	BT586028/Civ to G-5
LE HIEU (C)	13JAN67	2/11 70 Co, X-20	BT4410081/PW III MAF Comp
TRAN VAN HO (R)	24DEC66	-----	LOC VINH (V)
LE HOA (C)	21JAN67	D/1/7 Civ	BT654720/Civ to G-5
HUYNH HOANG (C)	13JAN67	2/11 70 Co, X-20	BT441081/PW III MAF Comp
LE HOC (C)	Unk	1/7 Civ Def	Unk/BINH SON(D) HQ
DO THI HONG (C)	20JAN67	A/1/5 Civ Def	BT305163/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN HUONG (C)	22JAN67	2/4	AT8355/ARVN Hosp
NGUYEN HUYNH (C)	13JAN67	L/3/5 Civ	BT525015/Civ to G-5

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CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)	DOC/DOR	CAPTURING UNIT	LOC/DISPOSITION
TRAN MINH HUNG (C)	21JAN67	B/1/5 Civ Def	BT363265/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN LA (R)	20JAN67	-----	DUC HOA (V)
VO KHIO (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS545896/Civ to G-5
DO HUYNH (R)	12JAN67	B/1/5 Civ	BT305144/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN XUAN KY (C)	17JAN67	F/2/7 Detainee	BS559973/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI LAM (C)	13JAN67	B/1/7 Cadre	BS728934/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN LIEN (C)	17JAN67	F/2/7 Civ Def	BS559973/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAM LIEN (C)	21JAN67	B/1/5 Civ Def	BT358279/TAM KY(D) HQ
LE TAN LONG (C)	Unk	Unk Refugee	BS777527/MO DUC(D) HQ
TRINH LUI (C)	17JAN67	E/2/7 Civ Def	BS573930/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN LUU (C)	8JAN67	H/2/7 Civ Def	BS770543/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN LY (R)	16JAN67	-----	BINH SON(D) HQ CHIEU HOI CTR
NGUYEN VAN MAO (R)	24DEC66	-----70 Bn, 1st Regt	NUI TRONG
PHAM MO (C)	13JAN67	B/1/7 Cadre	BS728934/BINH SON(D) HQ
HUYNH MAI (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7	BS545896/Civ to G-5
PHAN THI MAY (C)	23JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS499893/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN MUI (C)	23JAN67	B/1/7 Civ Def	BS702948/Civ Def 1st Med Bn
DO MY (C)	13JAN67	F/2/7 Civ	BS542996/Civ to G-5
PHAM NGHIA (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS546894/Civ to G-5
LUU XUAN NOA (R)	30DEC66	-----	DUC PHO(D)
NGUYEN THI NOA (C)	23JAN67	CAC 1/5 Civ	BT322174/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN THI NOAN (C)	18JAN67	C/1/7 Civ Def	BS506942/BINH SON(D) HQ
MAI XUAN NGU (C)	13JAN67	2/11 70 Co, X-20	BT4410081/1st Med Bn
BUI NGUYEN (C)	Unk	E/2/7 Civ Def	BS740515/MO DUC(D) HQ
VO THI NHO (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS545896/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN NIEM (C)	17JAN67	F/2/7 Civ Def	BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHAN (C)	13JAN67	2/11 70 Co, X-20	BT 441081/III MAF Comp
NGUYEN PHAN (C)	13JAN67	PCF Unk	Vic MO DUC/Continuing
VO THI PHI (C)	23JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS499893/Civ to G-5
TRAN PHIEN (R)	13JAN67	-----	TRA BONG(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHONG (C)	13JAN67	2/11 70th, X-20	BT441081/III MAF Comp
NGUYEN PHUONG (R)	13JAN67	-----1st Regt	SON TIEN(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHUNG (C)	21JAN67	B/1/5 Civ Def	BT355281/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN THE QUOC (C)	21JAN67	ARVN 3d Regt	BINH QUE(V)/Unk
NGUYEN THI QUOC (C)	21JAN67	Unk	Unk/2d ARVN Div
TRAN XUAN QUANG (C)	22JAN67	ARVN	PHONG DIEN(D)/PW III MAF Comp
LE RANG (C)	8JAN67	H/2/7 Civ Def	BS770543/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI SAU (C)	13JAN67	C/2/5 Civ Def	AT948535/DUY XUYEN(D) HQ
NGUYEN SONG (C)	17JAN67	A/1/7 Guerrilla	BT645026/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN SY (C)	13JAN67	D/1/7 Civ Def	BS665995/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN BA TAI (Unk)	Unk	ARVN Deserter	Continued
NGUYEN VAN TAM (R)	25DEC66	-----	THUONG DUC(D) Info Serv
NGUYEN TAM (C)	14JAN67	B/1/7 Civ Def	BS715963/BINH SON(D) HQ

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CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)	DOC/DOR	CAPTURING UNIT	LOC/DISPOSITION
NGUYEN TAO (C)	21JAN67	D/1/7 Civ	BT646003/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN THANH (C)	22JAN67	I/3/5 Civ	BT431097/Civ to G-5
LE VAN THANH (C)	14JAN67	F/2/7 Civ Def	BS552979/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE QUANG THIEN (C)	Unk	Unk	BS777527/MO DUC(D) HQ
PHAM THI THIEN (C)	20JAN67	A/1/5 Civ Def	BT306164/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN THIEN (R)	20JAN67	-----	YD503317/THUA THIEN(P) HQ
DOAN TICH (R)	5JAN67	-----90th LF Co	BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN TOAN (R)	6JAN67	-----19 Co Guerrilla	DUC SON Police
LE QUANG TRIEU (R)	7JAN67	-----	MO DUC(D) HQ
HUYNH THI TRI (C)	12JAN67	H/2/7 Civ Def	BS511930/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE QUANG THIEU (R)	Unk	Unk 48th Bn	BS785515/QUANG NGHI CHIEU HOI CTR
NGO THUA (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7 Civ	BS549891/Civ to G-5
NGUYEN TRA (C)	Unk	Unk Civ	BT586028/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN TRI (C)	24JAN67	Civ Def	BS565917/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN HONG TRONG (R)	23JAN67	PF 409th Sapper	NUOC AMN MKT/Unk
NGUYEN HONG TRONG (R)	23JAN67	-----	BINH SON(D) HQ
LE VAN TRUNG (C)	Unk	Unk Refugee	BS777527/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN TRUOC (C)	13JAN67	B/1/7 Cadre	BS728934/BINH SON(D) HQ
TONG VAN TU (C)	18JAN67	3d Recon Bn C-14 Bn, 804th	YC903997/Coll Pt III MAF
DANG TUU (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7	BS549891/Civ to G-5
NGO TUONG (C)	13JAN67	D/1/7 Guerrilla	BS665995/BINH SON(D) HQ
HO TUY (C)	13JAN67	B/1/7 Civ Def	BT716955/BINH SON(D) HQ
UNO VIEN (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7 Civ Def	BS525902/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO XOAI (C)	Unk JAN67	G/2/5 V-25 Bn	AT971531/Unk
PHAM THI XONG (C)	20JAN67	A/1/7 Civ	BT649011/Civ to G-5
HUYNH XOAN (C)	23JAN67	Coast Guard	BS8540/Civ 1st Med Bn
TRAN XUOC (C)	Unk	Unk Unk	Unk/Continuing

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ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 4-67

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period there was a decrease in sabotage activity while terrorism increased. The major act of terrorism was the killing of a twelve year old girl whose uncle is a KIT CARSON Scout. Espionage continues at a low level. However, there were reports indicating that the VC were conducting espionage training.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. A 21 January report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team related that a hamlet guerrilla captured during COUNTY FAIR 1-29 (AT 952597) admitted being recruited as an intelligence cadre in May 1965. Captive was sent to DANANG, where, from May 1965 to December 1966, under the cover of a laborer, he obtained funds for the VC. He was required to provide the VC with 200 Piasters a month and information on Allied forces.

QUANG NGAI. A 23 January report from a usually reliable source stated that four VC cadre were escorted from the villages of DUC LUONG (BS 673573) and DUC THUAN (BS 788529) to THACH THANG (H) (BS 780500), by twelve armed VC. The VC cadre had their hands tied behind their backs to give the appearance of prisoners. Reportedly, after receiving training in intelligence work, they are to be released and returned to government controlled areas to collect information for the VC.

3. SABOTAGE. The following act of sabotage was reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG NAM	28Jan	Bridge destroyed	AT 935888

4. POLITICAL. There was no political activity reported during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG NAM. A 23 January report from the 1st Marine Division reported finding several propaganda leaflets, printed in English, in the vicinity of (AT 982678). Signs in the same area, printed in Vietnamese on C-ration boxes, were interpreted to read "mines" while other signs had drawings of grenades and satchel charges.

QUANG NGAI. A 20 January report from a usually reliable source reported finding leaflets in the vicinity of (BS 505585), printed in Vietnamese, proclaiming the TET cease-fire. The leaflet requested all government and "puppet" troops to respect the cease-fire so that all people may celebrate TET. The leaflet, published 28 December 1965 by the Central Committee of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, also serves as a safe conduct pass.

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6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG NAM. A 23 January report from a usually reliable source stated that the deputy hamlet chief and a government health cadre from AN MY (H) (BT 230300) were kidnapped on 20 January.

A 23 January report from I Corps stated that two youths were kidnapped from DAI AN (H) (BT 267173) on 21 January by an estimated VC platoon.

A 25 January report from the 1st Marine Division related that on 15 January, the 12 year old niece of a KIT CARSON Scout was approached by four VC while walking with a girl friend near HOI AN (BT 2558). The VC asked, "Where is your uncle?", to which she replied she didn't know. The VC told her they knew that he worked for the Marines. A military truck approached at this time and the VC shot the girl and fled. The child died a short time later.

A 27 January report from a usually reliable source related that on 26 January, the CHAU (#2) (H) Headquarters (BS 587497) was destroyed by demolition by an estimated ten VC.

The following reports of radio interference were reported by the 1st Marine Division:

23 January - An unidentified station on G/2/4 TAC net transmitted four short laughs and said, "Do you want to die Marines of G/2/4, do you want to die tonight?" The transmission was spoken in very good English.

24 January - An unidentified station on G/2/4 TAC net whistled and said, "Golf 4 is dead." A few minutes later, it was repeated.

25 January - An unidentified station on G/2/4 TAC net transmitted five seconds of bells followed by two long whistles, and approximately five seconds of music. The sender then talked in Vietnamese. The only words discernable were "Dilly - Dilly".

QUANG NGAI. A 23 January report from a usually reliable source reported that two meetings were held by the VC on 18 January, as follows:

1. A district meeting was held in the village of TAN PHOUC (BS 474767) to discuss the sending of letters to ARVN troops requesting them to honor a seven day cease-fire during TET.

2. A meeting attended by personnel from province, district and village committees, was held at DAM THUY (BS 720542) to discuss setting up defense against Allied operations.

A 19 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related a penetration, and subsequent attack, on a command in PLEIKU (P), II CTZ. A hole had been cut in the concertina wire and the wire tied back. Trip flares located along the perimeter had been tied in a manner which prevented them from functioning. A camouflaged hole was discovered approximately 50 meters inside the perimeter. This hole had apparently been

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used for reconnaissance purposes. The subsequent attack was well planned with complete knowledge of the security system. (CI Comment: Periodic inspections of perimeters and barriers, and frequent changes in security procedures should be standard operating procedures.)

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
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5 FEBRUARY 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO. 5-67

III MAF PERINTREP #5-67

29 Jan - Feb 67

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

5 Feb.

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Copy _____ of _____ Copies
III MAF
DANANG, RVN
05 February 1967
Ser: 030167

PERINTREP NO. 5-67

Period Covered: 290001 Jan - 042400 Feb 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-51. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. There was no significant enemy ground action reported from northern QUANG TRI (P) in the general area south of the DMZ. Light enemy harassing action, including mortar fire, was noted in the north-eastern portion of the province, northwest of GIO LINH and just within the DMZ. Extensive aerial photography flown over the eastern half of the DMZ and the CON THIEN area on 28 January and 3 February revealed no significant enemy ground construction activity when compared to late December readouts.

The enemy situation within the DMZ remains basically unchanged from prior reporting periods. There continue to be no indications of imminent and major enemy offensive ground action although the enemy maintains an active screening and reconnaissance effort in northern QUANG TRI (P).

Ground reconnaissance deployed north and west of THON SON LAM (XD 989596) reported total sightings of approximately 40 VC or NVA centered in the vicinity of (XD 9453) directly west of the north - south axis of Route 9. Two contacts were also reported within the same location. Artillery fire was called with excellent coverage in both cases. Reconnaissance in the vicinity of the KHE SANH combat base and to the east along the northern side of the BA LONG Valley made negative sightings. On 1 February, at (XD 9645) east of KHE SANH, elements of K Co, 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines came in contact with an estimated 20 NVA. Following a brief exchange of fire the NVA fled. Light enemy casualties resulted. Southeast of this location an unknown number of the enemy partially destroyed a bridge on Route 9.

Over the period the enemy launched three minor harassing attacks against ARVN and PF elements in the coastal area of QUANG TRI (P). One of these at LA VANG, three kilometers south of QUANG TRI City, resulted in 20 Vietnamese being killed by enemy mortar fire. Low level agent reports covering the coastal region concerned units located in normally accepted operating areas.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There was a slight decrease in the tempo of enemy activity in northeastern THUA THIEN (P). On 1 February, a civilian bus detonated a mine on Highway 1, four kilometers northwest of

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PHONG DIEN (V). Five Vietnamese were killed and the bus destroyed. On 3 February, a PF platoon guarding a bridge on a secondary road approximately two kilometers southwest of QUANG DIEN City was attacked by an unknown number of VC. The PF held; casualties were light and no damage was done to the bridge.

Operation CHINOOK continued in the general area centered on (YD 5330). Light contact was maintained with the enemy. AT (YD 599267) on 1 February, K Co, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines made contact with an estimated 20 VC. A fire fight ensued and artillery was called in on the enemy with excellent target coverage. Ground reconnaissance elements deployed west and south of the CHINOOK area reported total sightings of over 100 VC in both locations. Air and artillery inflicted moderate casualties during several contacts with small groups of VC.

Aerial photography flown during late January and early February over the entire CHINOOK area revealed nothing of significance, except in the northern sector adjacent to the QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN border which portrayed a moderate increase in light ground fortification activity. The CHINOOK area remains a center of enemy effort in this portion of THUA THIEN (P).

Reconnaissance immediately west and south of the PHU BAI TAOR produced sightings of several small groups of VC during the early part of the week. Enemy movement has decreased in this sector when compared to patrol results of early January.

There was a slight decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the PHU BAI TAOR. These were centered in the north. Two incidents involving four to 15 VC were noted in the central western part of the TAOR. Enemy activity between PHU BAI and DANANG was focused on the LOC north of the DANANG TAOR and just north of the HAI VAN Pass. Two incidents occurred in this sector during the latter part of the week. An unknown number of VC blew the northern span of a fairly large railway bridge at (AT 844957) and, at (AT 908948), a platoon from the 606th RF Co was ambushed by a small enemy force. Low level agent reports covering the eastern portion of THUA THIEN produced order of battle information which placed local and main force units in normal operating areas.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Within the northern portion of the TAOR an unknown number of VC committed several acts of sabotage against Highway 1, south of the HAI VAN Pass. Several road culverts were blown and there was one mining incident. Ground reconnaissance deployed within the southwestern and southern boundaries of the DANANG TAOR reported significant enemy contact. A total of approximately 150 VC were observed by reconnaissance patrols in this sector. Several contacts were gained with the enemy in the area east of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp. On 1 and 3 February in the vicinity of (ZC 195550) and (AT 797538), two separate CIDG patrols made contact with small groups of the enemy. Fire was exchanged in both cases with undetermined casualties inflicted on the enemy. Further

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east and at (AT 880490) an AO spotted 40 VC in the open. Air was called in with heavy casualties inflicted on the VC. Operation INDEPENDENCE in progress in the southwest sector of the TAOR (ZC 2154) had, by 4 February, accounted for 55 KIA (Confirmed) and 33 KIA (Probable). Further to the west in the general vicinity of (BT 0060), elements of 1st Bn, 26th Marines and 2nd Bn, 1st Marines engaged sizeable groups of VC in moderate to heavy action. Substantial enemy casualties resulted.

Aerial photography made over the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR revealed no significant increase in enemy ground construction activity.

Heavy ground reconnaissance deployed along the southern approaches to the TAOR reported moderate enemy activity centered at (AT 8537) and (BT 0143). Approximately 20 VC were observed in the first location and 30 in the second, along with over 100 suspected VC.

Southeastern QUANG NAM (P) was again active this week. A series of minor harassing and sabotage actions were made against security elements along Highway 1 in this sector. The QUE SON (D) Headquarters (BT 045345) received 40 to 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Casualties were light.

Elsewhere in southern QUANG NAM (P) enemy activity was light and low level agent reports produced nothing of interest.

There was a sharp drop in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the DANANG TAOR. Those noted were largely concentrated southeast of Hill 55. The heavy casualties suffered by the enemy during recent Marine operations coupled with a VC inability to sustain such a high level of activity for an extended period might well account for the current drop in VC initiated action.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Eastern QUANG TIN (P) remained relatively quiet this week. Enemy activity was limited to isolated and small scale harassing actions directed against security elements located, for the most part, along the LOC.

Aerial photography over the northeast portion of QUANG TIN (P) revealed a light to moderate increase in enemy ground construction activity. Low level agent reports though unconfirmed placed subordinate elements of the 3rd NVA Regt as now being located somewhat more to the east at (BT 1032) and (BT 1829). On 29 January, a PF platoon located in the vicinity of (BT 289266) successfully ambushed an unknown number of VC. Results were one VC KIA (Confirmed), five detainees and two grenades captured. No significant intelligence was received from other parts of QUANG TIN (P).

Ground reconnaissance deployed along the northwest approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported both sightings of and contacts with the enemy. At (BT 1919), on 3 February, a reconnaissance insert made contact with approximately 40 VC. Heavy fire was exchanged and the patrol extracted.

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Enemy casualties were unknown. At (BT 329115) on 1 February a patrol from C Co, 1st Bn, 5th Marines gained contact with an estimated 30 VC. Fire was exchanged and artillery fire accounted for 11 VC KIA (Confirmed). Light sightings of the enemy were made by reconnaissance elements farther to the south and west of the CHU LAI TAOR.

There was a sharp drop this week in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the TAOR. The majority of these were reported in the southern sector. Nine incidents were reported from the Korean Marine Brigade area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). On 4 February at (BS 596927) an unknown number of VC attacked elements of the 936th RF Co and one PF platoon guarding the CHAU HO (BINH SON) Bridge. The bridge, a major structure on Highway 1, sustained major damage during the attack when the VC blew one of the main spans. Both friendly and enemy personnel casualties were moderate.

For the fourth consecutive week activity was reported from the general area southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR and east of both the TRA BONG and HA THANH CIDG Camps. Reconnaissance reported 36 armed VC in the vicinity of (BS 4283) over the week. At (BS 4572) a reconnaissance insert came under heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 200 VC. Fire was returned and the patrol extracted. Enemy casualties were unknown. On 2 February, an AO at (BS 514801) sighted and called fire on a VC platoon. Enemy casualties were substantial. Aerial photography over the sector east of the TRA BONG - HA THANH area revealed a moderate increase in enemy ground fortification activity. Other available intelligence pertaining to the general area northeast of HA THANH CIDG Camp continued to indicate enemy movement in this area.

Moving to the east and in the vicinity of (BS 7585) elements of 1st Bn, Korean Marine Brigade, while involved in a hydrographic survey security mission, made contact with platoon and company sized VC units. Heavy action followed and enemy casualties were substantial. South of this location and in the vicinity of (BS 733797), the 37th ARVN Ranger Bn made contact with a multi-company size VC force. Casualties to the enemy were light, to the Rangers moderate.

To the south in the general area (BS 7263) three separate ambushes were reported on 30 January and 2 February. RF, PF and RD elements were involved. Platoon and possibly company sized VC units accomplished the ambushes. Casualties to both sides were moderate. On 30 January in the vicinity of (BS 725564), a PF platoon guarding a bridge on Highway 1 was attacked by an estimated VC company. The PF held their ground and the bridge was not damaged.

South of this location and in the general vicinity of (BS 8241), Operation DESOTO continued with heavy contact with the enemy. By 4 February enemy casualties were 77 KIA (Confirmed) and 130 KIA (Probable). A good

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portion of the action involved attacks against an enemy occupying well fortified positions. Aerial photography flown in late January over the same area when compared to October and November missions revealed moderate to heavy enemy ground fortifications, particularly in the high ground west of the DESOTO area. Reconnaissance in the same vicinity and that further to the south at (BS 8525) reported sightings and heavy contact with sizeable VC elements.

Low level agent reports placed enemy units in normally accepted areas. A collation of available intelligence still points toward possible enemy attacks against more isolated friendly positions and/or moderate diversionary attacks within an organized and set battlefield designed to permit follow-up ambush of friendly reaction forces. No other intelligence information of interest was received from other portions of QUANG NGAI (P).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 466 and consisted of the following: 15 assaults by fire, 41 mine/booby trap incidents, 99 small unit engagements and 311 incidents of AA fire.

Enemy initiated incidents for the month of January are as follows:

Attacks	6
Ambushes	1
Assault by fire	34
Small unit engagements	557
Mine/booby trap	294
AA incidents	836

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) During a recent KMC operation, two thirds of the 74 VC casualties were wearing ARVN type camouflage uniforms with an embroidered patch on the breast pocket. Inscribed on the patch were the words: "Kill American Imperialists".

- e. Negative.

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f. Administrative Unit/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
21 Jan	(BS 620165)	VC Hospital	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
21 Jan	(BS 6020)	VC Hospital	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
27 Jan	(YD 786110)	Rice/Ammo Cache	CHIEU HOI Report III MAF G-2: F/3
29 Jan	(AT 968390)	VC Aid Station Supply Point	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
29 Jan	(AT 909399)	Rice Cache	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
1 Feb	(ZC 164262) (ZC 176313) (AT 843328) (AT 885357) (AT 788347)	Unit CP's, 3d Regt.	Nat'l Police Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Enemy initiated AA incidents for the reporting period again reflected a substantial increase when compared to the two previous periods. A total of 311 incidents were reported. 69 aircraft sustained 155 hits. Grids squares of highest density were (AT 9959), (BS 7586), (BS 8139), (BS 8140) and (BS 8339). No confirmed cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Reconnaissance sightings dropped over the reporting period. Fewer observations were made due to reduced visibility. The sightings reported occurred in the general vicinity of (XD 9252). These were not significant.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Enemy activity noted by reconnaissance patrols was centered in the CHINOOK area. Sightings made in proximity to the PHU BAI TAOR continued at a reduced level, especially when compared to the enemy activity reported during the latter part of December. The direction of enemy movement noted in the area (YD 6025) was predominantly to the east.

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The use of a camouflaged cape appeared to be a common characteristic of enemy uniforms in this area.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Ground reconnaissance within the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR and south of it produced reports of light enemy activity over the period. The NONG SON area saw scattered enemy movement of small groups of VC. Several sightings were made to the west of the Operation INDEPENDENCE area (west of AN HOA). A fairly heavy reconnaissance effort centered in the vicinity of (AT 8465) produced sightings and contacts with enemy groups numbering from four to 30 VC per groups.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Total sightings accomplished by patrols over these two regions produced a number less than the two previous periods. Moderate activity was reported along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR. Areas to the southeast of TRA BONG and east of HA THANH showed a drop in sightings. On the other hand, the enemy appeared determined to contact and, if possible, destroy the reconnaissance inserts. At least six contacts were reported with platoon and possibly company sized enemy units attacking the patrols. Reconnaissance deployed in conjunction with Operation DESOTO produced a large number of enemy sightings.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts(lbs)</u>	<u>By whom</u>
3 Feb	(BS 825384) DESOTO	200,000	3rd Bn, 7th Marines
29 Jan	CHINOOK	800	3rd Bn, 4th Marines
30 Jan	(YD 554291)	20	3rd Bn, 26th Marines

For the month of January, the total amount of rice captured was 95,105 lbs.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period totaled 471 KIA (Conf), 553 KIA (Prob), 42 VC PW, 16 VC Returnees and three NVA PW. 35 individual weapons were captured.

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Enemy personnel and equipment losses for the month of January are as follows:

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ROKMC</u>
KIA (Conf)	962	297
KIA (Prob)	1238	140
NVA PW	2	0
VC PW	107	6
NVA Returnee	0	0
VC Returnee	17	20
Individual Wpns	199	11
Crew Served Wpns	5	0

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. High pressure off the China coast created a southerly flow of air over I Corps. Ceilings increased and visibility over the low lands and piedmont became virtually unrestricted. On 1 February a cold front pass over I Corps produced increased cloudiness and decreased visibility. Light drizzle and fog prevailed over the midlands and highlands. Toward the end of the week a distinct flow of air aloft raised ceilings and otherwise created more favorable conditions. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	70	71	77	80
Low	60	61	68	68
Rainfall (total)	.27	.38	.42	.12
Visibility (miles)	6	5	10	6
Winds (knots)	9	7	7	9

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- k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex B.
- l. Negative.
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 3-67.

R. H. Thompson
R. H. THOMPSON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CG 366TH TFW	1
CMC (CODE A02)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CG 30TH NCR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SPG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORV	1	CG 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CG 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CG 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CG 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CG CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CG CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CG 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CICV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 67

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III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 042400H Feb 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,300			8	3,000
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	12	5,050	6	2,300	35	17,550
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	3	1,080			13	3,530
Separate Companies			2	185	28	2,665	30	2,850
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,650		7,615		4,965		29,230
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				120		955		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
MILITIA STRENGTH								20,641
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		17,150	7,735		6,820		52,346	

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 042400H Feb 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000 ^{#2}		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 329559	15Jan67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5720	20Jan67
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5534	24Jan67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 631330	22Jan67
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	ZC 128957	6Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	ZC 060925	1Nov66
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu THU (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	Thang Binh (D)	23Jan67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	500		AT 8454	AT 9621	26Jan67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 850487	26Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	ZC 135280	ZC 135280	25Dec66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Dien Ban Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	AT 9858	16Dec66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Dai Loc Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	Dai Loc (D)	18Oct66
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,000		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum		29Nov66
Al					(P) Border		
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,140	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
40th Bn	MF	C	460		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
60th Bn	MF	C	250		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	2,000	Good	Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3781	12Jan67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 6431	28Dec66
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 6436	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 2770	8Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	130		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8142	26Dec66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20Oct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 370165	15May66
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 780875	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,100		Binh Dinh	BS 7303	1Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh	BR 7986	4Jan67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	1Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	28Dec66

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-2.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 042400H Feb 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt) 31st Regt (Hq)	E-341st Song Hong	31445(?) 31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		CO-Sr Capt BA
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn 32nd Regt (Hq) 4th Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn) 270th Regt (?)	31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn 6th Bn 33rd Regt (Hq) 324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Troung 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cua Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG)
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cua Long Bn			PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cua Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	
15th Engr Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	
16th Sig Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
19th Med Bn				
808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM
C.10 Co	V-51; H-20			XO-Thi Bong AN
Cam Lo Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri			CO-Cao TUNG
	H.30			CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO- Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA wps Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90 3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DKZ 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?)			CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-THANH
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co				CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR	
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		6-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG	CO-LE

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh	20825		CO-Capt THAO
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2			CO-Capt THAU
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn	Dong Hai		XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THIU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Dien Ban Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Dai Loc Co	H-42 Co			CO-Phan Phong SAM
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang	20,601CM; 20,925CM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	XO-Tran Van QUANG CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ24 Bn (ENCR)	GK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO CO-THANH XO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUONG
72nd Bn	V-74; V-20;		1-57mm RR (?)	
74th Co	74th Dist Force Co		Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SMG 1-60mm Mort 1-30 Cal MG	
14th Co				
706th Co	106th Co		2-60mm Mort	CO-KHOA
A10 Co	K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Binh		1-57mm RR 6-MG	XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Anh VU
A13 Co	D-22		1-60mm Mort	CO-Hong LE
A16 Co	C-73		2-MG	
A19 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co			
A21 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co				
Tra Son Co				
Tra Ha Co				

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien	CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108th Regt		CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN CO-Maj Nguyen TUYEN
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 5645 40th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007		
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai		CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Hoang Xuan VINH CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103	3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Troung 7 (?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135GM 20.139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ Ba Hao		CO-Maj KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn (?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn (?)	HT 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa X2424 Bac Hien forward to Ba Hoa	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Minh Long Co			CO-Lu TRI
206th Co	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-TIEN
				XO-SUNG
				PO-MIEU
614th Co	Son Ha Co			CO-Dien MIEU
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			CO-THIN
C.219	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			CO-MAU
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
				PO-MINH
				CO-TRAN
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			CO-Dinh HUY
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY CO-Le Van DUYET CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM CO-CU XO-CIM
300th Wpas Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600;	1548		
90th Engr Bn 2d VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN CofS-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH Asst PO-THUONG and NGHIEP CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
97th Bn	703 Intil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164CM (new)		
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?) 263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn	7173 DS or 21155 CM		
7th Bn				CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANG CofS-LUIONG
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt	21.141 VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC CofS-Capt THANG
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter-Gp 7			CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM CofS-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEU
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA REGT
803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT
812TH NVA REGT

6TH NVA REGT
814TH NVA BN
800TH VC BN
402ND SAPPER BN
2ND NVA DIV HQ
1506TH VC ENCR BN
2ND VC REGT
93RD VC BN
97TH VC BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report:
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre;
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison
 Man; 20. District Cadre; 21. NLF Cadre; 22. Intelligence Cadre; 23. Association
 Member.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

B. Location	Name	Age	Position	Source/Eval
PHUONG TRUNG (H)	LE BA	45	3	3 ITT TRAN NGHIA
PHUONG TRACH (V)	PHAN TIEP	33	3	24 Jan 67 F/3
DAI LOC (D)	NGUYEN EM	18	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN CU	18	3	
	NGUYEN HAT	18	3	
	LE NGAY	18	3	
	NGUYEN HAI	20	3	
DIEN NGOC	TRAN LAI		1	3 CIT NGUYEN DON
(AKA THANH	*NGUYEN THUYEN		7/11	18 Jan 67 F/3
THUY) (V)	(AKA PHU)			
DIEN BAN (D)	*DANG SO		2/10	
QUANG NAM (P)	*NGUYEN HUU HIEN		4	
	PHUNG TIEM		6	
	*BON		6	
	BUI OANH		6	
HAMLET #1 (H)	NGUYEN TANH		1	3 CIT NGUYEN DON
DIEN VINH				18 Jan 67 F/3
(AKA THANH				
THUY) (V)				
DIEN BAN (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				
HAMLET #2 (H)	DANG SA		1	3 CIT NGUYEN DON
DIEN NGOC	PHAN CU		7	18 Jan 67 F/3
(AKA THANH	NGUYEN PHAP		6	
THUY) (V)				
DIEN BAN (D)				
QUANG NAM (P)				

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
HAMLET #3 (H)	*HUYNH CAN		1	3 CIT NGUYEN DON
DIEN VINH (AKA	LE THOM		7	18 Jan 67 F/3
THANH THUY) (V)	*TRAN CAM (AKA LAU)		11	
DIEN BAN (D)	TRAN PHANG		6	
QUANG NAM (P)	PHUNG TIEM		6	
	*TRAN THI PHAM		6	
	TRAN NHU		4/10/2	
	HUYNH TAI		6	
	NGUYEN TU		7	
	NGUYEN TU		18	
	HUYNH CUA		7	
HAMLET #3	*NGUYEN DUOC			3 CIT NGUYEN DON
(10th Sector) (H)	*HUYNH DANG			18 Jan 67 F/3
DIEN NGOC (AKA THANH	*HUYNH DINH			
THUY) (V)	*HUYNH VINH			
DIEN BAN (D)	*TRAN NHO			
QUANG NAM (P)	*LE THOM			
	LE PHUC (AKA TY)		1	
	NGUYEN TONG		7	
DUC KY (H)	PHU	48	1	3 ITT NGUYEN XINH
THANH SON (V)	DANG AO	35	9	24 Jan 67 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN DA	35	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	DANG QUAN	31	3	
	NGUYEN XUAN	25	3	
	PHAM MANG	37	3	
TAY LE (H)	MEG	40	1	3 ITT TRUONG THI
LOC SON (V)	DINH NEAC	45	4	DIEU 25 Jan 67 F/6
DUC DUC (D)	RANG	20	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	HUYNH TE	45	23	
	NGUYEN GAIO	40	23	
	THI	35	23	
	TAM	35	23	
	TUONG THANH	35	23	
LOC VINH (V)	BUI MIEN	37	18	3 ITT NGUYEN VAN
THUONG DUC (D)	NGUYEN NAM	23	7	TAM 24 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN BA	22	3	
	KHIEH	19	3	
	SAU	19	3	
DONG LO/DONG LE (H)	VO HUG	35	1	9 ITT NGO TUONG
BINH GIANG (V)	NGUYEN NHUT	23	3	15 Jan 67 F/3
BINH SON (D)	*NGUYEN HUNG	20	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)				

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
THUAN HOA #5 (H)	NGUYEN LAU	30	1	9 ITT LE HOC
BINH GIANG (V)	NGUYEN MO	20	4	22 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	TRAN HANG	21	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN PHAT	22	3	
	NGUYEN CAY	18	3	
	NGUYEN DON	20	3	
	NGUYEN LONG	25	3	
BINH THUONG (V)	THAI	30	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH SON (D)	MRS NHAN *	40	6	Rpt NGUYEN THI CAN,
QUANG NGAI (P)				NGUYEN THI NGAN
				18 Jan 67 F/6
HAI THUNG (H)	NGUYEN CHAN	25	4	9 ITT NGUYEN MUI
BINH THIEN (V)	BUI TAY	24	4	23 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN PHUOC	27	14	
QUANG NGAI (P)	BUI NGHIEN	22	18	
	BUI MAC	22	3	
	BUI TRUMEN	30	3	
TAY PHUOC (H)	TRINH HUY	50	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH THUONG (V)	PHUONG	30	4	Rpt NGUYEN THI CAN,
BINH SON (D)	TRUONG TY	50	6	NGUYEN THI NGAN
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN THOI	18	3	18 Jan 67 F/6
	LAM	25	3	
	NGUYEN THO	25	3	
	MRS TUAN	25	6	
	NGUYEN BINH	20	6	
TAN PHUOC #2 (H)	HO	18	3	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH TUY (V)	TRANG	40	6	Rpt NGO THUA, DANG
BINH SON (D)				TUU 25 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)				
TAN PHUOC #4 (H)	NGUYEN HOI	60	1	9 ITT UNG VIEN
BINH TUY (V)	*LE GAN	40	5	25 Jan 67 F/3
BINH SON (D)	UNG THI GIANG	30	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)				
TAN PHUOC #4 (H)	UNG LY	35	6	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH TUY (V)	*NGUYEN HOI	57	5	Rpt PHAM NGHIA
BINH SON (D)	PHAM CHU	35	4	PHAM CUI 25 Jan 67
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGO SO	21	3	F/3
	BUI XUNG	24	3	
	NGO THI THOAN	30	4	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
TAN PHUOC #4 (H) BINH TUY (V) BINH SON (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN BINH	50	5	9 ITT VO BINH 25 Jan 67 F/6
KHANH NAM (H) (AKA VINH XUAN) PHO THANH (V) DUC PHO (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	NGO NHAN LUOI DIEU CHAW TINH THO CO	50 35 17 40 19 18 16	4 6 6 6 18 3 3	9 ITT Consolidated Rpt PHAM HIEN HUYNH XUAN 23 Jan 67 F/6
BICH AN (H) KY BICH (V) LY TIN (D) QUANG TIN (P)	CHIN TUNG BA CUONG CUC BINH	30 25 22 20	1 6 6 3	9 ITT DO THI HONG 21 Jan 67 F/6
BICH AN (H) KY BICH (V) LY TIN (D) QUANG TIN (P)	MISS NGOC	35	6	9 ITT PHAM THI THIEN 21 Jan 67 F/6
BICH AN (H) KY BICH (V) LY TIN (D) QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN THI CHANH NGUYEN OI NGUYEN THIENG KHOUNG QUANG TUNG KIET	20 20 17 20 22 22 28	14 3 3 3 3 3 3	9 ITT NGUYEN TAN CAC 21 Jan 67 F/6
TRUONG AN (H) KY BICH (V) LY TIN (D) QUANG TIN (P)	SU VO THI LIEN THANG THANH QUAN NGOC TUNG THAN THONG	40 23 25 50 30 30 25 30 20	5 6 6 6 1 21 3 3 3	9 ITT NGUYEN THI NGA 24 Jan 67 F/6
THON MOT (H) KY PHU (V) TAM KY (D) QUANG TIN (P)	TRAN XICH TRAN MINH	35 35	1 4/12	9 ITT LE CHUNG 22 Jan 67 F/6

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
THON MOT (H)	NGUYEN NGOC	70	1	9 ITT TRAN MINH
KY PHU (V)	PHAM THAI	35	4	HUU 22 Jan 67 F/6
TAM KY (D)	TRAN NGA	35	12	
QUANG TIN (P)	MINH	30	5	
	DIEN	25	6	
	HIEU	25	6	
	THAI	18	6	
	*XICH	35	18	
	VO XIN	22	3	
	HUU	21	3	
QUY THUONG (H)	BINH LAC	35	1/6	9 ITT LUONG PHUNG
KY PHU (V)	BUI THI TAP	40	6	22 Jan 67 F/6
TAM KY (D)	TRAN TUONG	34	4	
QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN NGOC	49	3	
	NGUYEN TOAN	35	3	
	LY	43	3	
DINH DIEN (H)	TRAN KINH	45	1	15 CIT THAI VIET
PHU THANH (V)	PHAN HONG	49	21	HAN 16 Jan 67 F/5
BA LONG (D)	TRAN DUONG	35	21	
QUANG TRI (P)	TRAN DA	52	21	
	PHAN TUC	49	12	
	PHAN THI HIEP	52	6	
	PHAN THI SUNG	42	7	
	PHAN LUONG	21	18	
	TRAN TOAN	28	7	
	PHAN TOAN	22	3	
	PHAN THANH	25	3	
	PHAN THIEN	26	3	
	TRAN NGOC	23	3	
	TRAN PHUONG	27	3	
	PHAN THAO	30	3	
	TRAN LIEN	25	3	
	PHAN PHUNG	25	3	
	PHAN CHICH	27	3	
	PHAN PHUC	29	3	
	TRAN NGUONG	26	3	
	TRAN THI	28	3	
	TRAN BE	23	3	

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6. UNIDENTIFIED DESIGNATIONS

A. LETTER BOX NUMBER

(1) Below is a list of unidentified LBN's captured during a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of (YD 7809).

(a) 1517B
BK012

(b) G7T4
C4, Xuong
D10B

(c) Bac Do
Z2FT
ZT3
Z2F2
HG5A
HG5
HG6
Di Ba 3

(d) 2271 HS

(e) LBN 050VK (B2)

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATIONS AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP 5-67

1. 3d Sqd, 4th Co, C-14 Bn. Pvt TONG VAN TU, 3d Sqd, 4th Co, C-14 Bn, was captured at (YC 903997) on 18 January 1967 by 3d Recon Bn and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. C-14 Bn infiltrated from NVN in November to a location in the Pine Forest at which point according to TU the companies were dispersed and sent to other units as replacements. The battalion was composed of three companies, 2d, 3d, and 4th, and each company had about 118 men.

b. The captive and 10 other men from his unit were on their way to the K-4 Bn (AKA 804th) when they were ambushed and he was captured.

c. During infiltration each man carried a pack with clothes and some carried two rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition as resupply. They had very little medical supplies but each company had a corpsman; there were no doctors.

d. The food was not good; it consisted of rice with white sauce, with vegetables once in a while. Morale was fair. Half of the men wanted to fight and the other half didn't wish to come south.

(G-2 Comment: F/2. Members of this unit were probably being used as replacements for battalions of the 800 series.)

2. 48th Provincial Force Bn. Squad Leader LE QUANG THIEU, 1st Sqd, 3d Plt, 2d Co, 48th Bn, defected to MO DUC (D) Headquarters on 14 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 48th Bn moved from NGHIA HANH (D) to SON TINH (D) on 5 January 1967. This battalion is composed of five companies; three infantry companies, one fire support company and one supply company. Each company is armed with two 60mm mortars, two 30 cal machine guns, nine BAR's and individual weapons. There is sufficient ammunition for all weapons.

b. The battalion was located at PHU LOI (V) on 5 January 1967 and he had heard that the 506th Sapper Co was also in this area.

c. THIEU said the morale of the 48th Bn was very low, there wasn't enough food or medicine and 95 percent of the men have malaria.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. Location of unit is questionable. III MAF OOB presently carries 48th located vicinity MINH LONG/SON HA border area.)

3. 3d Plt, 803d Co, 551st Bn, 3d Div. Cpl LUU XUAN, 2d Sqd, 3d Plt, 803d Co, 551st Bn, 3d Div, defected to 2d ARVN Div on 17 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

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a. The 551st Bn was composed of four companies: A telephone company, a radio company, a sapper company and a supply company. The 803d is a Radio Co.

b. During the rainy season the company is reportedly planning an attack in QUANG NGAI (P), date and location unknown.

c. The battalion had 400 men when it infiltrated from NVN via LAOS in May 1965. At present there are only four men from NVN remaining, the rest are now from SVN.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. This is the first report of the 803d Co and the 551st Bn as a subordinate units of the 3d Div.)

4. 3d Plt, 40th Co, 409th Sapper Bn. NGUYEN HONG TRONG, assistant Platoon Leader, 3d Plt, 40th Co, 409th Sapper Bn, defected to the PF at NUOC AMN Market (BS 577973) on 23 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. In December, after the battalion executive officer returned from a MR5 staff meeting at SON HA (D), the 409th Bn split up. The 40th Co and an aid station is located with the 1st Regt (BS 3377), (BS 3477), (BS 3378), and (BS 3478). The X-20th Bn Hq, 30th, 50th and 60th Companies moved to (BS 6135), (BS 6136), (BS 6235) and (BS 6236).

b. On 8 January, TRONG, Co XO, a platoon leader and four privates of the 40th Co departed on a reconnaissance mission of the CHU LAI area. They arrived at BINH NGHIA (V) and reported to the VC Village Chief and were given a guerrilla guide.

c. On 24 January they were to reconnoiter in two groups to determine the location of the fastest jets, the division CP and LAAM Bn. (On the map the defector indicated the 7th Marines CP, not the division CP). This reconnaissance was to be completed and the groups were to assemble in an abandoned house at (BS 633955). From here they were to return to the 40th Co area.

d. The plan of attack, according to TRONG, was: Between three and five February three groups, 12 to 16 men suicide teams are to attack the south end of the largest strip. Each of these men will be armed with a rifle, grenades and satchel charges. Their mission is to destroy as many planes as possible. Another group of 12 to 16 men with two or three 82mm mortars will attack the division CP. At the same time the X-20 Co (Bn Hq Co), 30th, 50th, 60th companies with two regiments (one the 2d Regt) will attack BA TO (D) Headquarters.

e. The VC are ready to stand and fight as they expect the U.S. Forces to reinforce BA TO. He believes they will go through with their plans, even though he defected. The VC plan the success of this attack as a TET gift to HO CHI MINH.

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(G-2 Comment: F/3. The 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th and 60th Companies are all subordinate units of the 409th Sapper Bn. The 70th Co is also a subordinate unit, however it operates in QUANG TIN (P). The 1st Regt is believed to be to the south of HA THANH SF Camp. The 2d Regt of the 3d Div is believed to be in the area of VUC LIEM (H) (BS 6337). Any sapper support in S QUANG NGAI (P) on a large scale would probably come from the 409th Bn. The S-20 Bn is carried as an AKA for the 409th Sapper Bn.)

5. 2d Plt, 1st Co, 32d Bn. Pvt TRAN DONG, Sniper, 1st Sqd, 2d Plt, 1st Co, 32d Bn, was captured at (BS 530822) by the 2d Bde, ROKMC on 5 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 1st Co is a sniper company, as are the other two companies, having three platoons, 1st, 2d and 3d. The 1st Plt is presently operating in QUANG NAM (P). The 3d Plt's location is unknown. The 1st Co CP is located in SON CHAU (V) (BS 545815).

b. The 2d Plt is organized into nine (three man) cells (all NVN). Each cell is assigned to a specific village and has three local guerrillas assigned to the cell. When DONG was captured, five out of the nine cells of his platoon were inoperative because of malaria. This platoon is subordinate to the Province Chief.

c. DONG's cell was assigned to BINH BAC (H) (BS 530822) on 31 December 1966 and he believed it is still operating from this hamlet. Each man in his cell has a sniper rifle. The cell members live with their assigned guerrillas and patrol during the day using the guerrillas as guides. The cell's specific mission is to snipe at the Koreans.

d. DONG stated that he has not seen the 2d or 3d Co of the 32d Bn since infiltrating into SVN in mid 1966.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. There has been previous reports of the 32d Bn subordinate to the 21st Regt.)

6. 3d Co, 802d Bn. Private TRAN XUAN QUANG, 3d Plt, 3d Co, 802d Bn, was captured at PHONG DIEN (D) by the 1st ARVN Div, on 22 January 1967 and gave the following information under interrogation:

a. The 802d Bn is composed of three companies with a total strength of approximately 480. Each company has one 60mm mortar with 15 to 20 rounds of ammunition.

b. Company CP's are located as follows: 1st (YD 543214), 2d (YD 544220) and 3d (YD 544220). The 3d Plt CP was located at (YD 542233). Each platoon area has three squad huts and nine three man bunkers. The bunkers are 1½ meters deep, covered with large logs and two meters of dirt. There are no apertures or vents and the entrances face inboard toward the huts.

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c. Subject contended that there was insufficient food, only two milk cans or rice, with salt, a day. The rice is carried up from the lowlands.

d. QUANG has been sick with malaria since arriving in SVN and 30 to 40 other men have malaria. He was captured on his first mission. He had no military training, having joined the C30 Bn, his infiltrating unit, just 10 days before starting for SVN. There were about 300 men in the C-30 Bn and they carried individual weapons and equipment only.

(G-2 Comment: F/2. Information given by QUANG is substantiated by rallier NGUYEN VAN THIEN of 20 January 1967 and DANG VAN DONG of 21 December 1966, and is in agreement with III MAF OOB).

7. Captured Documents.

a. The following documents pertain to the organization of militia forces, and to ambush and sniping cells:

"Type of Militia Force" TO SAU AND B6

After reading your letter, T40 understands the matter clearly. Until now, the Village Unit has not yet known how to organize the militia force and understand its function. T40 admits his deficiency. The following is TB40's recommendation on the organization, equipment and mission of each type of militia force:

(1) Hamlet Guerrilla is a para-military force which combats within the hamlet. Hamlet Guerrilla forces counter sweep operations, exterminates reactionary elements in the hamlet and is a key element of the self defense militia force of the hamlet. The Hamlet Guerrilla force also performs labor, evacuates wounded soldiers and participates in the construction of Combat Villages.

The Hamlet Guerrilla force is a key force which counters enemy operations. Each squad is equipped with only three rifles and other weapons such as mines, grenades..... Mines are generally used by Hamlet Guerrilla forces.

Military training: Military training for Hamlet Guerrilla force is carried out according to the equipment. The Village para-military force must attend a training course every month in order to understand its missions so that it will enthusiastically fight the enemy.

(2) Secret Guerrilla: Secret Guerrilla force is equipped according to its combat capability (like Hamlet Guerrilla). Secret Guerrilla fights the enemy secretly and his political struggle with the enemy is legal. Secret Guerrilla forces are organized in the strategic hamlets and includes women and old men. Secret guerrilla forces stage a people's war. A comrade of the Village Unit Headquarters is in charge of organization, training [of Secret Guerrilla units] and establishing plan of combat according to

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the resolution of the Party Chapter and Military Affairs Section. Secret Guerrillas are trained to use mine and grenade tactics.

(3) A Militia member is from 16 to 55 years old. Men and women are eligible for joining the militia force. The militia forces establish Combat Villages, lay mines, grenades and spikes to fight the enemy. The militia and self-defense force also established gun pits, fortifications to counter air attack or shelling, performs laborer duty and serves the frontline. Members of this force assume various missions according to their ability and are divided into three types:

Old and weak people are to be organized into categories A and B (of this type of people) to carry out light missions in their hamlets...

People with average health condition will assume the establishment of Combat Villages and fortifications and do laborer tasks. People of this type are organized into categories A and B (party members are key elements of categories A and B).

Youths (male and female) of 15, 16 years old with good health will assume combat missions, and other heavy tasks. They must do laborer tasks in a far area, serve the frontline, side with hamlet guerrillas to fight the enemy or carry out sabotage activities, etc... Party members will guide the militia and self-defense force of types A and B.

The organization of militia force as stated above is not perfect because it does not include old people. Therefore we have not yet mobilized all the people to participate in the People's war motivated by our Party.

Practically, the above classification of militia force will help us easily mobilize every separate type of group for daily combat missions.

The Militia force of every hamlet is organized and commanded by the Hamlet Unit Headquarters.

Various Military missions in the hamlet are assigned by the Village Unit Headquarters according to the resolution of the Party Chapter and Military Affairs Section. The Militia force of the whole village is under the Command of the Village Unit Headquarters.

The Village Unit Headquarters appoints a Comrade in charge of Commanding the Village Guerrilla Unit. Other Comrades must be appointed to organize and guide the militia movement. At present, some Village Unit Headquarters have not yet properly organized the militia force.

This is to be corrected. At present many villages show the lack of equipping the hamlet guerrilla force. Tho recommends that the Villages should establish weapon producing Cells in every village when the guerrilla warfare movement develops.

The above recommendation of Tho is sent to brothers 9 and B6K. Various

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agencies may base on it to organize the militia units at the time when the guerrilla warfare movement is pushed forward and the establishment of our combat village and hamlet is perfectly accomplished.

In the next conference, T40 will discuss the matter with you and give more recommendations.

Every Victory to us

T40

SAU HOACH

"AMBUSH AND SNIPING CELL"

Purpose:

Training cadre on organization, assessment of the enemy's situation, selection of ambush sites and deployment of troops.

Training cell leaders' on the leadership responsibility of combat units.

Immediate Activities:

The proceedings of ambush and sniping cell are to conduct rapid and surprise attacks, to use a small number of troops to attack a larger force and inflict heavy losses.

1. Basic Principles of Ambush:

The basic principles of ambush are surprise, attack, rapidity in movement, deployment, and withdrawal.

2. Combat mission:

The cell leader assesses the enemy's situation, knows where they are from, the direction they will go, the time they will start, their movement, organization, strength, weapons and type of troops (regular, regional).

Selects ambush site where conditions are favorable for sheltering, attacking, withdrawing and disposing of weapons.

Knows the attitude of the people living in the place where the ambush is to be conducted.

Checks the cell's situation, strength, fighting spirit, weapons, food etc... Not only is the cell leader in charge of checking the cell's situation, but all cell members.

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3. Deployment:

Arriving at the place, the cell leader must deploy troops and weapons according to the terrain features. Then everything must be carefully camouflaged.

The ambush site, signal recognition, the area of concentration, the way to retreat and the resolutions concerning the wounded must be discussed in detail.

The cell leader can stay in any position where he can observe the enemy and his troops.

After the deployment, members must be patient and calm. The cell leader must control the members and motivate their fighting spirit.

4. Attack:

When the enemy is discovered, the cell leader and members must be warned at once for preparations. The cell leader must try to observe the enemy and decide the most favorable moment for the cell to launch the attack all at once (this is the most important factor).

When the cell leader orders the open fire, members must aim at the commander and those who carry machine guns and radio sets.

It is not necessary to attack the front or the rear of the enemy. The whole cell must open fire or throw grenades at the enemy all at once when they are ordered. Upon order of assault, all must bravely attack the enemy, using rifle stocks, bayonets etc...to kill them.

When the members are ordered to retreat, all must do rapidly and secretly. After that, the cell leader must observe the enemy's situation, deploy the troops again and conduct another attack.

8. The following captured VC instruction is the basis upon which C Co., 1st Bn, 1st Marines launched a raid on a village in the vicinity of (BT 015547) on 14 January which accounted for 61 VC KIA (Conf) and 75 KIA (Prob):

"Instruction"

Subject: Opening of the 1st Course of Sapper in order to replace - in order to meet progressing situation of revolution which is getting higher and higher every day - in order to elevate and stimulate the art and technique of combat of sapper tactics for the cadre and guerrillas.

Execute the instruction of superior concerning forming the sapper class for village level. The headquarters of 75th Unit decided to open one class for village level. The headquarters, 75th Unit decided to open one class of

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sapper for the village of CAT area. The period of class is 10 days organizing by district.

Attending class elements: Each village be provided your comrades consisting of: One village unit cadre, one village unit leader or assistant village unit leader of village concentrated element; two comrades of hamlet - chief level (remark: each village had to have one female cadre attend this class).

As for 75th B Unit there must be one team (consisting of your comrades) also a village or hamlet chief level or key-man to attend this class in order to teach their men after attending this class.

At 1200 hours sharp on 14th of January 1967 every unit must be present at BAI HAI religion church at DIEN PHONG (V). There will be someone coming to guide the way to destination (class site).

Food matter, each comrade must bring enough rice (two and a half can-tin per day) and four piasters. In the meantime the weapon and booby-trap must be carried along in order to dryrun.

Receiving this instruction, all village and the unit's must absolutely execute this instruction sending enough men of the quantity and standard mentioned above.

14th January 1967
TM6 Commander of 75th Unit
HONG SON

9. Captured enemy documents are beginning to reflect the possibility that the VC may be losing the support of the populace and that his proselyting efforts are showing evidence of an increased concern in ARVN pacification, revolutionary development and resettlement operations. The following extracts are but a few examples and, although the majority come from documents captured in the III Corps area, are indicative of a trend which probably is applicable to all of South Vietnam:

a. "Our action will be directed at the Rural Pacification cadre, officers, U.S. personnel....."

b. "Step up armed propaganda in our effort to destroy the RVN administrative personnel and bad people so as to create unrest at the enemy area."

c. "The enemy has begun to increase their demagogic propaganda and "Chieu Hoi" activities, using every insidious strategy to draw our soldiers to their side."

d. "The fiercety of the fighting, especially in the last months of 1966, considerably lowered the morale of the populace and caused many families to make an attempt to call back their members working for the revolution. The agricultural production was greatly affected by the war, and caused people to move to enemy controlled areas for a living and for security."

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e. "There is a shortage of political cadre, especially in certain districts where most cadre were women and overaged. It is necessary for the cadre to win the sympathy of the youth and organize them since youth always constitute the progressive elements and potential cadre for the revolution. The destruction of tyrants, the attack of the enemy by guerrillas, and construction of combat villages and hamlets should also be stepped up to battle the enemy in pacification plan."

f. "The mission of attacking and destroying strategic hamlets is also designed to oppose the enemy population resettlement efforts. In this connection, it behooves us to disrupt enemy restrictive administrative machinery. Based on the local situation, we should build fortifications, combat hamlets and villages; step up guerrilla warfare; motivate the people at large to take part in the military, political struggle and in proselyting action designed to win the people's heart and minds. Try to build while destroying, to get rid of the oppressors of the people and to motivate the people."

g. Additional evidence of the trends noted in paragraph 7 above is provided by the increasing emphasis on the guerrilla and guerrilla activities. The guerrilla is, of course, closely associated with the populace. But attrition of the guerrilla has increased proportionally to the increase in friendly operations. That enemy is fully aware of the assets of the guerrilla from a tactical, logistical, and "people to people" standpoint is evident from the following extracts from recently captured documents:

(1) "Thanks to the effort of the Province Party Committee and the Province Unit Operations and Coordination Committee, the activities of the guerrillas, especially the village guerrillas, were stepped up. However, the leadership of the District and Village Party Committees was still poor. They did not clearly understand what the people's guerrilla warfare movement is."

(2) "A large number of people were motivated to participate in the Winter-Spring campaign. The concentrated units as well as the village guerrilla units made a resolution in which they expressed their determination to successfully accomplish their military and political duties. They were also determined to correct their deficiencies."

(3) "The trend of activities from now until TET should be steered toward motivating the population to join local Guerrilla and Civilian Laborer Forces, as well as safeguard production, and attempt to frustrate the enemy's pacification plan."

(4) "In a speech made by NGUYEN HUU THO, Chairman of the NFLSVN Central Committee, on 20 December 1966, THO set forth the five vital missions to be achieved in 1967-1968 as follows:

(a) A better spirit of solidarity between all Parties, Regions, Races within the country, regardless of individual political antecedents.

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(b) More efforts to extinguish the enemy's vital force by development of guerrilla activities both in intensity and extent.

(c) A determination to defend and expand the liberated area, to frustrate pacification plan, and to accelerate production growth.

(d) A positive development of political potential, coupled with efforts to promote political contention in cities as well as in enemy controlled rural areas.

(e) An intensification of military and enemy proselyting activities with emphasis to be placed on American and satellite troops and on disorganizing RVN military and government structures."

(5) "Despite its development and its numerous achievements in recent times, our guerrilla force has not succeeded in keeping up with the situation."

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10. The following are names of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)	DOC/DOR	CAPTURING UNIT/STATUS	LOC/DISPOSITION
VO DUC ANH	Unk	E/2/7/Civ Def	BS545898/BINH SON(D) HQ
HUYNH CHANH (R)	18JAN67	-----Guerrilla	MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI CHIEN (C)	Unk	E/2/7/Civ Def	BS545898/BINH SON(D) HQ
CHA CHIN (C)	29JAN67	I/3/3/Guerrilla	BA THAN/2d ARVN Div
NGUYEN DI (C)	27JAN67	Swift Boat/Civ Def	Unk/TU NGHIA(D) HQ
NGUYEN DIEN (C)	Unk	CIDG	BS5838/BA TO(D) HQ
NGO DUONG (C)	29JAN67	M/3/1	Unk/ARVN Hosp
THANG HIEN (C)	29JAN67	I/3/3/Guerrilla	YD046443/2d ARVN Div
PHAM HUONG (C)	Unk	D/1/7/Civ Def	BS634971/BINH SON(D) HQ
THANG IN (C)	29JAN67	I/3/3/Guerrilla	YD046433/2d ARVN Div
NGUYEN NGOC KHUNG (C)	27JAN67	G/2/7/Civ Def	BS535960/BINH SON(D) HQ
LUONG LANG (C)	24JAN67	E/2/7/Civ Def	BS502907/BINH SON(D) HQ
THANG LAO (C)	29JAN67	I/3/3/Guerrilla	YD046443/2d ARVN Div
NUYGE THI LIEN (R)	3JAN67	H/2/5/Rallier	DANANG CHIEU HOI CTR
LE LIEN (C)	Unk	CIDG/Civ Def	BS5838/BA TO(D) HQ
HUYNH VAN LIEN (C)	25JAN67	PF/Civ Def	BT506105/QUANG NGAI Hosp
NGUYEN LIEU (R)	20JAN67	-----48th Bn	DUC HOA(V)/2d ARVN Div
NGUYEN THI LOAN (C)	10JAN67	H/2/7/Civ Def	BS733596/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN ME (C)	26JAN67	B/1/7/Civ Def	BS715975/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN NGHIA (C)	21JAN67	H/2/4	AT846553/DIA LOC(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHAN (R)	20JAN67	-----	DUC HOA(V)/2d ARVN Div
TRAN PHIEU (R)	12JAN67	-----	TRA BONG
IE PHUOC (C)	18JAN67	2/7/Civ Def	Unk/MO DUC(D) HQ
PHAN PHUU (C)	31JAN67	G/1/26/Guerrilla	AT980611/ARVN Hosp
TRAN TAN (C)	31JAN67	H/2 /1/Civ Def	BTO27602/ARVN
NGUYEN THO (C)	Unk	C/1/7/Civ Def	BT563002/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRINH TRI (C)	26JAN67	E/2/7/Civ Def	BS581921/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI THI TRI (C)	10JAN67	H/2/7/Civ Def	BS735600/MO DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI THANH (C)	26JAN67	C/1/7/Civ Def	BT563003/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO TRINH (C)	24JAN67	E/2 /7/Civ Def	BS502907/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN HONG TRONG (R)	23JAN67	-----	NUOC MAN OP/2d ARVN Div
PHAN XA (C)	28JAN67	G/2/4/Civ Def	AT956654/DAI LOC
NGUYEN XINH (C)	16JAN67	A/1/26/ARVN Deserter	DUC KY(H)/I Corps

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 5-67

1. GENERAL. Although there was a significant increase in incidents involving sabotage, VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Items of interest include the establishment of a VC training course for youths and a conference held by VC District Cadre which was attended by approximately 300 people.
2. ESPIONAGE. There were no reports of espionage activity during the period.
3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	29Jan	Bridge destroyed	XD 994445
THUA THIEN	29Jan	Bridge destroyed	YD 985048
THUA THIEN	31Jan	Bridge destroyed	YD 680264
THUA THIEN	1Feb	Culvert destroyed	YD 598309
THUA THIEN	3Feb	Bridge destroyed	AT 833995
THUA THIEN	3Feb	Bridge destroyed	AT 844995
THUA THIEN	3Feb	Bridge destroyed	AT 844957
QUANG NAM	28Jan	Bridge destroyed	AT 936906
QUANG NAM	28Jan	Bridge destroyed	AT 936903
QUANG NAM	29Jan	Bridge destroyed	BT 045579
QUANG NAM	31Jan	Culvert destroyed	BT 123484
QUANG NAM	1Feb	Culvert destroyed	BT 120489

4. POLITICAL

QUANG TRI. A 31 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC have organized cadre in Montagnard villages under their control. In RUOU (V) (XD 960428) there is a village chief, one village unit and one secret agent. In each hamlet there is a chairman, a leader of the hamlet unit, 15 guerrillas and two secret agents assigned.

QUANG NGAI. A 31 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that on 28 January, VC District cadre of BINH SON, SONG TINH, MO DUC, TU NGHIA and NGHIA HANH Districts held a conference which was attended by approximately 300 people in PHU KHUONG (V) (BS 590504). The following plans were formulated: (1) Pass out propaganda leaflets calling all ARVN soldiers to return to the VC; (2) Organize agents to penetrate the RVN military units, headquarters and rural construction units; (3) The use of a strong force to attack military and rural construction units within the province.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG NAM. A 1 February report from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, related that a VC propaganda leaflet containing "policies" of the SVN

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People's Liberation Front was found on 28 January in the vicinity of (BT 045645). (The complete translation of the leaflet is attached as Appendix 1).

A 1 February report from the 1st Military Police Battalion stated that four VC propaganda leaflets were found in AN MAI (H) (BT 043780). Two of the leaflets contained information pertaining to the VC TET cease fire conditions and the others were anti-U.S./RVN slogans. This report further related that three VC propaganda leaflets were found in HA KHE (H) (BT0078). One of these leaflets was a VC "CHIEU HOI" card and the others were directed at U.S. Servicemen.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG NAM. A 28 January report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the QUANG DA NLF has organized a seven day training course at BEN HUC (H) (AT 980980) for approximately 120 youths between 14 and 17 years of age. The objectives of this course are to train these youths to write proselyting letters to ARVN servicemen during the TET holidays, and to instill bravery and "trickery" in them.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 5-67

SUMMARY OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT
POLICIES OF
SOUTH VIETNAM PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT

PRINTED BY THE LIBERATION
DA NANG CITY

Policy toward those who are in the army and authority of South Vietnam:

All soldiers and officers who abandon their troops and return to their family and revolution, will be guaranteed their liberty, helped to earn their life, permitted to keep their own property, given their part of rice paddy and land reserve. The above favor will also be granted to soldiers who followed the false route but are now repenting.

For those who are working in military or civilian organizations in South Vietnam but making no harm to people, the Front doesn't consider them as enemy of people and is ready to hold hands with them against the Americans and their henchmen.

Those who were guilty for people but are repenting their crime, are being forgiven by people and are appealed to return to the people and to revolution.

Soldiers and officers, during combat, don't resist against Revolutionary Army or surrender, will be rendered liberty right away and will be helped according what they pretend.

Front will praise and give important position to the officers and soldiers who offer merits during the struggle against the imperial American and its henchmen association's domination.

As for the family of those who are in the army and authority of South Vietnam:

All soldiers' family who offer their merits by destroying South Vietnam troops, resisting against American Imperialists and its henchmen association, will be welcome and remembered by People's Front. If it is possible, they will be cited according to their merits.

All soldiers' family who have husbands, children and brothers killed due to resist against American imperialists and its henchmen association, will be taken care of by Front.

All soldiers' family who have husbands, children and brothers sacrificed due to support of the revolution, will be respected and will possess the same privileges as the families of revolutionary soldiers.

Policy toward all nations:

To guarantee equality among nations, all nations have the right to use and develop freely their language and their culture, to maintain and to change freely their customs and their habits.

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To eliminate the American and its henchmen's ill-treatment, obligation and Americanization. The front will help heartily all nations in all means during this period as well as after getting independence, in order to offer all nations sufficient effort to develop their politics, economy, culture and society up to a common level.

The Front is extremely opposed the separation conspiracy and the race-despised policy of the American and its henchmen.

Policy toward religion:

To respect and to protect the free faith of every religion, to execute religious equality. All religions have the freedom to celebrate their rites, to worship their Gods, to preach, to construct and repair their churches, their temples and their relics. The Front strictly forbids all action which would harm the relics and properties of any religion.

To forgive all kinds of religious people who were deceived by the American imperialists and their henchmen to follow them to harm people, to harm the revolution and to harm religions, but are now repenting.

To punish those who profit religions to be the enemy's henchmen to destroy the unification of religion and people who are fighting for saving their country and their religion.

Policy toward industrialists and merchants:

All industrialists and merchants are revolutionary force of the present South Vietnam. Their property obtains protection from the Front. Their sale and production, good for people, will be encouraged and helped by the Front.

Policy toward foreigners:

Toward Chinese people - Chinese people who are now living in South Vietnam, good citizens, executing Fronts' opinion and policy, obeying organization and rules, respecting regional customs and habits, are being helped with all necessary means by the people.

Those Chinese people who, voluntarily and self-consciously participate revolution along with South Vietnam people to resist against Americans and his henchmen, are allowed to benefit the same privilege of politics, economy, culture and society as the people. They are also allowed to be candidated in every organization of the Front.


Their life and property are respected by the people and are protected by the Front.

Toward French people - those who don't cooperate with the American imperialists and their henchmen to resist against the liberation movement of South Vietnam people, whose life is proposed by the Front to be respected and whose legal right of trading is to be protected.

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PERINTREP NO. 6-67



**GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS**

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711-0946 DEKINTRE 8-2-46-67

5-11-2011

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12 Feb
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III MAF
DANANG, RVN
12 February 1967
Ser: 036667

PERINTREF 6-67

Period Covered: 050001H - 112400H Feb 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (F) - DMZ. Commencing 8 February aerial reconnaissance over areas to the north of the DMZ reported substantial truck and boat traffic whose movement appeared focused on terminal points located in the vicinity of the DMZ and immediately north of it. Available intelligence information gives indication of an enemy having utilized the stand-down to cover a probable major resupply and personnel replacement effort. Aerial photography flown over the DMZ during the period 29 January through 5 February revealed a slight increase in enemy ground construction activity. Interpretation was based on comparison with late December readouts.

Heavy ground reconnaissance deployed both north and west of THON SON LAM (XD 989596) reported a total of approximately 400 VC or NVA. Six contacts were made with the enemy whose strength in one case was estimated at 150. On 10 February at (XD 825482) north of KHL SANH, a reconnaissance patrol was approached by an estimated 100 to 150 of the enemy. Artillery fire was called for and a series of secondary explosions resulted. Such enemy activity when considered on a cumulative basis represents a distinct increase over prior reporting periods and further suggests an opponent taking advantage of the stand-down to continue infiltration of relatively small groups and amounts of personnel and supplies south into the 1st Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy continued his screening and reconnaissance effort in northern QUANG TRI (F).

Enemy activity in the northeastern portion of the province and north of GIO LINH continued and coincided with a recently established pattern of mortar and small scale harassing attacks against friendly security elements.

Elsewhere in coastal QUANG TRI (F) enemy action was limited to small scale harassing actions against isolated RF and PF elements. Low level agent reports covering the eastern region placed units in normally accepted operating areas.

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b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There was a slight increase in the tempo of enemy activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P). On 8 February an unknown number of VC entered THE MY (H) in the vicinity of (YD 637453) and abducted the Hamlet Chief. On the same date and to the southwest of this location at (YD 590390), the ARVN 1st Airborne Bn gained contact with a sizeable VC force. Enemy casualties, as a result of the engagement, were 15 VC KIA (Confirmed), 25 KIA (Probable) and five VC captured. Friendly casualties were light.

Earlier in the week a captive taken during a VC attack against a RF element guarding a bridge revealed that he was from the 810th VC Bn which, according to the captive, had been deployed in the vicinity of the QUONG DIEN District Headquarters. This information represents the first intelligence received on this particular unit since August of last year. The area is considered a normal location for the battalion.

Operation CHINOOK underway in the general area (YD 5330) west of HUE City maintained light contact with the enemy and, in conjunction with ground reconnaissance deployed in the sector, reported an increase in the number of enemy sighted. Approximately 300 VC were observed over the period. The majority were reported from the vicinity of (YD 608212) on 10 February. To the east and some six kilometers southeast of HUE City at (YD 828177), an unknown number of VC blew a railroad bridge. The structure was heavily damaged.

West and south of the PHU BAI TAOR ground reconnaissance reported light sightings of the enemy. The sector between PHU BAI and DANANG was quiet. There was an increase in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the PHU BAI TAOR. Light incidents were recorded with seven located along the LOC in the northern sector. Low level agent reports covering the coastal lowland of THUA THIEN (P) again produced order of battle information which placed local and main force units in normal operation areas.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Substantial ground reconnaissance deployed along the length of the western approaches to the DANANG TAOR reported sightings of the enemy which were, for the most part, centered in the area (AT 8357) northeast of the THUCNG PUC CIEG Camp. Over the period approximately 315 VC were observed in this vicinity and action was noted south of this sector where elements of 2nd Bn, 5th Marines and 2nd Bn, 4th Marines made contact with the enemy. With it's termination on 9 February, Operation DEDL AND ICE had accounted for 139 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 184 (Probable). Enemy interest in this portion of the DANANG TAOR continues.

Heavy ground reconnaissance south and southwest of the TAOR reported total sightings of approximately 250 VC all along the line. This represents an increase over the past two reporting periods and again suggests an enemy taking advantage of a stand-down moratorium. Enemy activity in southeast QUANG NAM (P) continued at a constant rate. His actions were again aimed against small security elements located in proximity to Highway 1.

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There was a slight increase in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the DANANG TAOR. Activity was, for the most part, spread evenly across the center portion of the area. Recent intelligence information has indicated that elements of the R.20 Bn were in action in both Operation TUSCALOOSA and Operation INDEPENDENCE. The Q.14 local force company, which is normally carried in the vicinity of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp, was also identified as having participated in the latter operation. Both enemy units suffered heavy casualties. Further to the east and southwest of DIEN BAN a VC captured by 1st Bn, 51st ARVN Regt identified his unit as the V.25 Bn. The area is considered a normal operating locale for this VC unit. Elsewhere in QUANG NAM enemy activity was light.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. There was a fairly sharp rise in enemy activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P). Four incidents were noted along Highway 1 from the QUANG NAM border south to TAM KY City and the northern end of the CHU LAI TAOR. On 6 February at (BT 176434) an estimated five VC entered LIEU TRI (H) and assassinated the hamlet's male school teacher while he was home sleeping, and on 7 February a PF platoon guarding the CAM LU bridge at (BT 219359) was attacked by an estimated VC company. Artillery fire was called for and the VC driven off. The bridge was not damaged. To the south and in the vicinity of TAM KY City two incidents of sabotage were noted where both a bridge and culvert were destroyed. On the same date a series of short mortar attacks were also directed against installations in the TAM KY area. Damage was minor.

Aerial photography flown over the sector northwest of the THIEN PHOU8 CIDG Camp and immediately south of the QUANG NAM border revealed a moderate to heavy increase in enemy ground fortification activity when compared to October and November missions. Ground reconnaissance northwest of THIEN PHOU8 at (BT 0721) reported sightings of approximately 100 VC over 6 and 7 February. Contact was made and the patrols later extracted.

West of the northern portion of the CHU LAI TAOR reconnaissance also observed a rise in enemy activity with approximately 190 armed VC reported. When compared to the past two reporting periods this represents renewed enemy interest in this area. Information obtained from three returnees indicated that the 2nd Bn, 3rd NVA Regt now operates in the general area northwest of TAM KY City and west of Highway 1. This unit might possibly have been moved to this sector as a replacement for the 21st NVA which is now felt to be located in QUANG NGAI (P).

Other enemy activity in QUANG TIN (P) was limited to isolated and small scale harassing actions against more remote elements located close to the LOC. There was a continued drop in the number of VC initiated incidents reported from the CHU LAI TAOR. Three incidents were reported from the Korean Marine Brigade area of responsibility.

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e. QUANG NGAI (P). Ground reconnaissance southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR experienced sharp contact with small groups of the enemy. Approximately 100 VC were reported in the area east of both the TRA BONG and HA THANH CIDG Camps. Aerial photography of the same area flown on 8 February revealed a slight increase in enemy ground construction activity when compared to prior readouts.

Two substantial actions occurred at (BS 660603) and (BS 724575) located approximately seven kilometers north of MO DUC. On 7 February two outposts, one manned by ARVN, the other by PF elements, were attacked and temporarily overrun by sizeable VC units. Friendly casualties were heavy. The ARVN action, at the first location mentioned above, resulted in 35 VC KIA (Confirmed). This action likewise provided initial identification, through a captured document, of the participating unit - the 93rd Bn, 2nd Regt, 3rd NVA Div.

To the south and in the general vicinity of (BS 8241), Operation DESOTO continued. Cumulative casualties to date are 97 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 204 VC KIA (Probable). Ground reconnaissance deployed in conjunction with the operation also reported continued sightings of the enemy. Further to the west, CIDG patrols north and south of the BA TO CIDG Camp made contact with company sized enemy elements. In both cases air strikes were called in with moderate to heavy enemy casualties.

Aerial photography flown over the eastern portion of DUC PHO (D) and the sector west of Operation DESOTO, portrayed a moderate increase in enemy ground fortification construction and trail activity. Interpretation was based on comparison with late November readouts.

Other intelligence of interest concerned statements made by 11 recently defected VC, all from the QUANG NGAI area. Their statements pointed toward a gradually increasing popular dissatisfaction and resentment with VC methods and actions. An additional viewpoint concerned the current VC inability to successfully defeat ARVN and U.S. forces.

An analysis of all available intelligence covering QUANG NGAI (P) continues to indicate possible enemy attacks against more isolated friendly positions either in the central or eastern portions of the province. No other intelligence of interest was received from western QUANG NGAI (P).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 309 and showed a moderate decrease when compared to the last period. Incidents consisted of one ambush, four assaults by fire, 14 mine/booby trap incidents, 15 acts of sabotage, 131 small unit engagements and 144 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

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d - e. Negative.

f. Administrative Unit/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
6 Feb	(AT 800495)	Rice Cache	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
9 Feb	(BT 298096)	VC Reconstruction Camp	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/6

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents this reporting period when compared to the last two periods, reflected a significant decrease. This decrease can most probably be attributed to the TET stand-down. Incidents totaled 144 with 26 aircraft sustaining 46 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 8450), (BS 8141), (BS 8237), (BS 8339). One possible case of 12.7mm fire was reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). A strong reconnaissance effort north and west of THON SON LAM produced a sharp rise in the number of enemy sighted. Approximately 400 VC or NVA were observed over the period. A patrol north of the KHE SANH combat base at (XD 825482) was approached by an estimated 150 of the enemy. Artillery fire was brought to bear with numerous secondary explosions resulting.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Enemy activity observed by reconnaissance patrols in the CHINOOK area increased during the week. VC movement was centered in the general area (YD 608212). Approximately 300 VC were noted over the period. Sightings, accomplished in proximity to the western and southern approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR, continued at a reduced level and followed the pattern of the previous reporting period.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Substantial ground reconnaissance south and east of the THOUNG DUC CIDG Camp produced a distinct rise in enemy sightings. A concentration of activity was noted in the area (AT 8357). Heavy ground reconnaissance south of the DANANG TAOR reported total sightings of approximately 250 VC. The majority of these were reported to the east of the NONG SON area in vicinity of (AT 9535). Enemy activity south of the DANANG TAOR represented an increase over prior reporting periods.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity and movement reported by ground reconnaissance deployed in these two regions produced a cumulative increase over the previous three weeks. Enemy activity was observed northwest of THIEN PHOUC at (BT 0721). Several contacts were also made with small groups of VC. There was a modest rise in enemy movement noted west of the northern portion of the CHU LAI TAOR when compared to previous reporting periods.

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Although down from previous weeks, enemy movement in the area southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR still remained a point of close interest. Reconnaissance deployed in conjunction with Operation DESOTO continued to produce a large number of enemy sightings and it remains apparent that the enemy will, when opportune, attempt to destroy reconnaissance inserts.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
6 Feb	PRAIRIE	50	3rd Bn, 4th Marines

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Equipment Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period consisted of 209 KIA (Confirmed), 485 KIA (Probable), 55 VC PW, 19 VC returnees and one NVA returnee. Weapons losses were 31 individual weapons captured.
- f. Morale. No change.
- g - h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No change.
- j. Weather. For most of the reporting period the weather pattern over I Corps was dominated by a high pressure area centered over the southern portion of North Vietnam. Early morning fog and stratus occurred over the highlands during early morning hours but had dissipated by noon of each day. By 9 February the high had shifted to the east creating even more favorable conditions over the midlands and highlands. On 10 February a shear line characterized by an area of convergence moved through I Corps causing a general deterioration of the weather picture, particularly over the highlands. This situation prevailed for the remainder of the period. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	74	78	78	79
Low	63	63	55	65
Rainfall (total)	.53	.48	.05	2.01
Visibility (miles)	7	6	8	7
Winds (knots)	5	6	5	6

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- k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex B.
- l. Negative.
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAP PERINTREP 3-67.



B. S. READ Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CG 366TH TFW	1
CMC (CODE AO2)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CG 30TH NCR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORY	1	CG 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CG 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CG 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CG 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CG CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CG CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CG 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CICV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 6-67

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III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 112400H FEB 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,300			8	3,000
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	12	5,050	6	2,100	35	17,350
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	3	1,080			13	3,530
Separate Companies			2	185	28	2,665	30	2,850
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,650		7,615		4,765		29,030
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				120		955		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
								21,398
<u>MILITIA STRENGTH</u>								
GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH		17,150		7,735		6,620		52,903

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 112400H FEB 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000#2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	PO	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PO	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	160ct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	160ct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80ct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10ct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 329559	15Jan67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 4735	YD 5720	20Jan67
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5534	24Jan67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 631330	22Jan67
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	ZC 128957	6Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	YD 680312	3Feb67
K.41 Co	MF	C	95		YD 8402		
K105 Co	MF	C	90		YD 6931	YD 695315	10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu THU (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 TO BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN RECT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN RECT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	Thang Binh (D)	23Jan67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	300	Poor	AT 8454	AT 832543	6Feb67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 850487	26Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	ZC 135280	ZC 135280	25Dec66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	AT 9858	16Dec66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	AT 843490	5Feb67
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,000		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border		29Nov66
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,140	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 3054	31Jan67
40th Bn	MF	C	460		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
60th Bn	MF	C	250		Son Ha (D)	BS 3353	31Jan67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	2,000	Good	Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3781	12Jan67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 724575	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 6436	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 2770	8Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	130		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8142	26Dec66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20Oct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 370165	15May66
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 780875	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,100		Binh Dinh	BS 7303	1Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh	BR 7986	4Jan67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	1Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	28Dec66

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-2.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 112400H Feb 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt) 31st Regt (Hq)	E-341st Song Hong	31445(?) 31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		CO-Sr Capt BA
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn 32nd Regt (Hq) 4th Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn) 270th Regt (?)	31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn 6th Bn 33rd Regt (Hq) 324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Brig(?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Brig; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH
				CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG)
				PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN
				XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH
				PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co Trieu Phong Co C.10 Co Cam Lo Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20 10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri H.30			CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM-41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA wpns Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90 3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DK2 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?)			CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-THANH
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co		1847 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR 6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG 6-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG	CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5			CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			CO-LE

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn 2nd Bn 3rd Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh Binh Da; X2 Binh Thien; Mao Chu; Nguyen Trai	20825		CO-Capt THAO CO-Capt THAU CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indp Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-Nguyen Van LAM
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THIU PO-TOAN
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co			CO-MOI
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang	20,601GM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	XO-Tran Van QUANG CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ24 Bn (ENGR)	GK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
72nd Bn				CO-Tran Van CAO
74th Co	V-74; V-20;		1-57mm RR (?)	CO-THANH
	74th Dist Force Co		Unk-M-79	XO-Tran TIEN
			Unk-K-50 SMG	PO-PHUCNG
14th Co			1-60mm Mort	
			1-30 Cal MG	
706th Co	106th Co			CO-KHOA
A10 Co	K51; 107; F-14;		2-60mm Mort	XO-Nguyen THANH
	D-21; Thang Binh		1-57mm RR	PO-Anh VU
			6-MG	
A13 Co	D-22			
A16 Co	C-73		1-60mm Mort	CO-Hong LE
			2-MG	
A19 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co			
A21 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21			
	Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co				
Tra Son Co				
Tra Ha Co				

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;	20,100GM-		CO-LtGen Nguyen DON
	F-550; Co Hoa	21,900GM		XO-Col TA
		Bac Hien		
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800;			CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH
	PS/40; 108th Regt			XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
	Cuu Long Regt (?)			
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong			
	Bn; 40th Bn; Nam Hai,			
	3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007			
	Bau Ban (?)			
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st			CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG
	Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong			XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
	Hai; Bong Trang (?)			
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;		3-81mm Mort	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG
	Chu Song; Truong Son		4-60mm Mort	XO-SrCapt THUA
	70; Inter-mt White		5-MG	PO-Duan Cong THANH
	Tiger Bn; F-07; 103		4-57mm RR	
	Oanh Gia (?)			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Ninh (?)			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Troung 7 (?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135GM 20.139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ Ba Hao		CO-Maj KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn (?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn (?)	HT 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141GM- 20,144GM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa X2424 Bac Hien forward to Ba Hoa	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND AMMUNITION	PERSONALITIES
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Minh Long Co			CO-Lu TRI
206th Co	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-TIEN
				XO-SUNG
				PO-MIEU
614th Co	Son Ha Co			CO-Dien MIEU
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			CO-THIN
C.219	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			CO-MAU
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
				PO-MINH
				CO-TRAN
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY CO-Le Van DUYET CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM CO-CU XO-CIM
300th Wpms Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600;	1548		
90th Engr Bn 2d VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN Cofs-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH Asst PO-THUONG and NGHIEP CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG Cofs-DIEU
97th Bn	703 Intil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164GM (new)		
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21155 GM		
7th Bn	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANG Cofs-LUONG
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt	21.141 VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC CofS-Capt THANG
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter-Gp 7			CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM CofS-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA REGT
803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT
812TH NVA REGT
6TH NVA REGT

814TH NVA BN
800TH VC BN
804TH VC BN
806TH NVA BN
402ND SAPPER BN
2ND NVA DIV HQ
1506TH VC ENGR BN
2ND VC REGT
97TH VC BN
20TH VC BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report;
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre;
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison
 Cadre; 20. District Cadre; 21. NLF Cadre; 22. Intelligence Cadre; 23. Associ-
 ation Member.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

<u>B. Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
DUC KY #1 (H)	PHAN HUYNH	40	1	3 ITT PHAN PHUU
THANH SON (V)	DANG THANG	45	3	2 Feb 67 F/6
DIEN BAN (D)	NGUYEN DA	25	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN XUAN	22	3	
	NGUYEN NHO	32	3	
	NGUYEN TOAN	35	3	
	NGUYEN CUU	25	3	
	NGUYEN THIET	36	3	
AN KHUONG (H)	NGUYEN TRUNG	35	1	3 ITT HUYNH BICH
LOC SON (V)	VO KY	40	4	5 Feb 67 F/6
DUC DUC (D)	DUONG LE	37	11	
QUANG NAM (P)	HUYNH NGUYEN		6	
	LE THI TUU	37	6	
	TRAN KIEN	25	3	
	NAM	28	3	
	HUYNH CUOC	28	3	
LOC THANH (V)	*PHAN THANH (AKA	49	1	3 ITT Consolidated
DUC DUC (D)	PHAN VAN HOA)			Rpt 3C-2-67
QUANG NAM (P)	VO THO	50	7	5 Feb 67 F/6
	PHAM BINH	38	2	
	TRUONG DINH LANG	30	11	
	TRAN QUY	52	5	
LOC THANH (V)	*PHAN THANH (AKA	40	1	3 ITT NGUYEN XI
DUC DUC (D)	HOA)			4 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	*BA	30	4	
	VO LY	35	11	
	VO DOANG	35	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LOC THANH (V)	*PHAN THANH	38	1	3 ITT PHAN DINH
DUC DUC (D)	*TRAN VAN BA	27	4	KHOI 5 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	VO DOAN	35	11	
	VO RAN	45	6	
	PHAM BANG	25	18	
NAM AN (H)	HO TAN	40	1	3 ITT NGUYEN XI
LOC THANH (V)	HUYNH TUYEN	45	2	4 Feb 67 F/6
DUC DUC (D)	PHAM TUAN	30	4	
QUANG NAM (P)	HUA CHIEN	30	3	
	VO DUC	30	3	
	LE CHUU	25	3	
NAM PHUOC (H)	HO TAN	30	1	3 ITT Consolidated
LOC THANH (V)	TRAN DINH BUU	25	7	Rpt 3C-2-67
DUC DUC (D)	XUYNH BA	30	11	5 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	PHAN TUAN	20	2	
	NGUYEN SA	20	19	
	NGUYEN MUON	25	7	
	NGUYEN QUANG	40	18	
	XUAN		7	
PHU LOI (H)	TRAN QUY	35	1	3 ITT Consolidated
LOC THANH (V)	TRUONG DINH LANG	38	5	Rpt 3C-2-67
DUC DUC (D)	MAI THI LOI	25	6	5 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	VO RANG	45	11	
	*TRAN VAN BA	35	18/4	
	VO LY (AKA SI)	25	7	
	MUA LO		3	
	HUN CAN	21	3	
	MUA XUAN		3	
	HO NI	20	3	
	DUONG	29	3	
	SU	21	3	
	TRUONG SOC	17	3	
	NGUYEN THANH	17	3	
	DO	35	3	
	BUI CHIN	20	3	
PHU LOI (H)	TRAN VAN LONG	38	1	3 ITT PHAN DINH
LOC THANH (V)	TRAN KHE	35	4	KHOI 5 Feb 67 F/6
DUC DUC (D)	PHAN THE	40	11	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN HUU	35	6	
	HUYNH LOC	40	7	
	TRAN VAN LOI	26	18	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
PHU LOI (H)	TRUONG DINH LONG	35	1	3 ITT NGUYEN NGHE
LOC THANH (V)	NGUYEN MINH	28	3	5 Feb 67 F/6
DUC DUC (D)	NGUYEN DUC	27	3	
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN THINH	16	3	
PHAN THAT (H)	HUYNH DANG	41	1	9 ITT NGUYEN GIOI
PHO XUAN (V)	HUYNH MAN	35	4	31 Jan 67 F/4
DUC PHO (D)	HUYNH LIEU	25	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH MO	45	5	
	HUYNH SAO	27	9	
	HUYNH LIEP	25	6	
	HUYNH CHANH	30	18	
	HUYNH BA	18	3	
	DONG NGO	29	3	
	NGUYEN HOI	17	2	
	NGO NO	20	6	
THUONG HOA #1 (H)	DO MANH	35	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH GIANG (V)	DANG THUAN	35	6	Rpt III MAF 192-7
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN DUONG	35	21	2 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN THI LE	30	6	
	DOAN ANH (AKA DE)	30	4	
	VO HANH	30	22	
	DO MINH	30	18	
	NGUYEN THAN	50	9	
PHU LONG #4 (H)	THO	35	1	9 ITT DO DINH TU
BINH LANH (V)	DO SANG	40	6	2 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	THUAN	19	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)				
PHU LONG #4 (H)	THANH	43	1	9 ITT DO LIEN
BINH LANH (V)	BUT	44	1	2 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)				
QUANG NGAI (P)				
SUOI LUNG (SH)	PHAM THI LUNG	18	14/6	9 ITT NGO CHINH
PHU LONG (H)	NGUYEN TAN	18	6	31 Jan 67 F/6
BINH LANH (V)	NGUYEN HON	15	3	
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN CAU	16	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN BEN	25	3	
BINH YEN #2 (H)	HO THONG	22	18	9 ITT NGUYEN HUAN
BINH PHIEN (V)	MOT	18	3	4 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	HANH	18	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NHU (Female)	22	3	
	XINH (Female)	19	3	
	TUAN	20	3	
	LUAN	35	4	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
NAM BINH #6 (H)	NGUYEN TOI	35	3	9 ITT NGUYEN THICH
BINH PHUEN (V)	NGUYEN NHON	24	3	4 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	LUONG DOAN	55	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN THANH	18	3	
	NGUYEN DUONG	45	3/5	
	NGUYEN DUNG	35	1/3	
PHUOC THUAN #2 (H)	TRAN QUOI	18	3	9 ITT NGUYEN LU
BINH THANH (V)				30 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)				
QUANG NGAI (P)				
THANH THUY (H)	LAM	35	20	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH THIEN (V)	HIET	40	20	Rpt III NAF 153-7
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN THAO	32	1	26 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	PHAM LOI	30	4	
	TONG NO	31	9	
	*HUYNH TONG	33	5	
	NGO NAY	35	5	
	VO NHIEU	50	6	
	NGUYEN THI NHAT	45	6	
	*NGUYEN THAI	25	6	
	NGO TRIEU	30	18	
	*NGUYEN CAM	28	3	
	*VO KY	25	3	
	*NGUYEN CHO	35	18	
	TONG XE	28	3	
	NGUYEN HAI	30	3	
	*NGUYEN BEN	28	3	
	THANH	32	3	
	XUONG	32	3	
	XAY	25	3	
HOA TAY (H)	(FNU) BINH	38	1	9 ITT PHAM HUONG
BINH THUY (V)	(FNU) LOAN	40	4	27 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN TRUNG			
QUANG NGAI (P)	TRONG		21	
	PHUONG (AKA HON)	20	10	
	HON		3	
	BINH		3	
	LOAN		3	
TAN PHUOC #2 (H)	VO BINH	50	1	9 ITT NGUYEN VAN
BINH TUY (V)	VO QUANH	50	4	LANG 25 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	BANG	45	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	VO XAY	20	3	
	NGUYEN HONG	20	3	
	CUC (Female)	18	3	
	CUC (Female)	20	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
TAN PHUOC #3 (H)	VO THUA	55	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH TUY (V)	VO SI	35	4/9	Rpt III MAF 142-67
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN LONG	60	11	25 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN HUE	50	5	
	VO CHUY	36	6	
	NAM THI GIANG	40	1	
	NGUYEN NHIEU	60	6	
	NGUYEN TUAN	35	18	
TAN PHUOC #4 (H)	VO THUA	40	1	9 ITT VO NGO
BINH TUY (V)	VO HOANH	50	1	20 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	*NGUYEN HANH	40	4	
QUANG NGAI (P)	*TRINH CHUNG	30	4	
	*NGUYEN DOAN	46	6	
	*NGUYEN NUAI	50	6	
	*UNG THI GIANG	40	6	
TAN PHUOC #4 (H)	XAN	40	1	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH TUY (V)	LE CAN	65	1	Rpt III MAF 142-67
BINH SON (D)	UNG THI SI	18	14	25 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	*NGUYEN HANH	40	4	
	*TRINH CHUNG	35	20	
	*NGUYEN DOAN	42	6	
	*NGUYEN NUAI	50	6	
	*UNG THI GIANG	40	6	
VAN BANG #5 (H)	CHU	40	1	9 ITT NGUYEN LIEU
DUC HOA (V)	THOA	22	4	25 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	Y	30	2	
QUANG NGAI (P)	KIEU	26	18	
	SAO	20	7	
	TUOI	19	3	
	TAN	17	3	
	KIEN	18	3	
	CAC	20	3	
	TIEN	22	3	
	HOA (Female)		3	
	BINH	19	3	
	MAI (Female)		3	
	DONG	32	18	
	DUC	34	3	
VAN BANG #5 (H)	NGUYEN CHIEU	40	1	9 ITT HUYNH CHANH
DUC HOA (V)	NGUYEN HIEU	30	4	25 Jan 67 F/6
MO DUC (D)	NGUYEN DINH	26	18	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN VINH	28	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	MUOI	38	3	
	XAO	27	3	
	DUNG	25	3	
	QUYNH	34	3	
	KANH	34	3	
	VANG	26	3	
	DAI	23	3	
	HO	17	3	
	CHI	24	3	
	TY	40	3	
	TUOI	22	3	
	KIEU	30	3	
	TRAN XAO	26	3	
VAN BANG #5 (H) DUC HOA (V) MO DUC (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN TAY (AKA CHU)	30	1	9 ITT NGUYEN PHAN 25 Jan 67 F/5
PHUOC VINH (H) DUC SON (V) MO DUC (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	TRAN MINH	26	1	9 ITT LE PHUOC 25 Jan 67 F/6
PHU THAI (H) TAN AN (V) TRA BONG (D) QUANG NAM (P)	DO HOANH VO LY TRAN SON VO ME TRAN QUANG VO MONG TRAN NGUNG VINH VO THUY VO VAN VO TAN GIANG NGUYEN NHON TRAN TIEN VO MAI VO MINH HUYNH THOAN	45 43 30 40 31 47 47 40 20 45 45 25 25 20 20 45	1 1 12 4 4 5 6 6 6 18 18 3 3 3 3 3	9 ITT Special Consolidated Rpt III MAF 183-67 31 Jan 67 F/6
TRA HOA (V) TRA BONG (D) QUANG NGAI (P)	DOAN LAM SON TUYEN LU VIEN NHI NGUYEN TU	35 30 34 35 30 40 45	20 18 18 1/5 4 10 6	9 ITT Special Consolidated Rpt III MAF 171-67 30 Jan 67 F/6

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	KIET	22	6	
	THI CONG	35	6	
	NGUYEN KHUE	45	18	
	NGUYEN CHUA	22	7	
	NGUYEN THI EN	17	14/3	
	NGUYEN DIET	18	3	
	NGUYEN MINH	17	3	
	VO DAO	18	3	
	NGUYEN THI KIEU	18	3	
	LE VANG NGHIA	17	3	
	NGUYEN THI XUAN	17	3	
	NGUYEN CAN	16	3	
	LE NGUYEN	18	3	
BINH HOAI (H)	DOAN CUU KHANH	45	1	9 ITT Special
TRA HOA (V)	PHAN LONG	47	4	Consolidated Rpt
TRA BONG (D)	PHAM DINH CHAU	36	2	III MAF 184-67
QUANG NGAI (P)	DOAN TUE (AKA PHUONG)	35	11	31 Jan 67 F/6
	VO QUY LUONG	30	18	
	BINH	20	3	
	TOAN	25	3	
	HUNG	25	3	
	DAO	20	3	
	PHAM CUOC	25	1	
	PHANG PHUOC	45	18	
THON HAI #2 (H)	THUONG	30	1	9 ITT NGUYEN HUE
KY THANH (V)	HOA	40	4	2 Feb 67 F/6
LY TIN (D)	NGOC	35	11	
QUANG TIN (P)	HAI VUONG	20	7	
	SAU THAO	25	3	
	LAM DINH	19	3	
	UT ANH	18	3	
	BA THI PHUNG	21	3	
	HUE (Female)	18	3	
	BON THI CA	19	3	
	TAM GIAO	20	3	
	BA LO	20	3	
	BA TU	21	3	
	BON HEIU	21	3	
	BON HO	21	3	
	NAM THI TRAM	20	3	
HAMLET #7 (H)	NGUYEN HOANG	25	1	9 ITT DO MINH
KY TRA (V)	THAI TA	25	4	4 Feb 67 F/6
LY TIN (D)	NGUYEN DUC	22	3	
QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN AN	19	18	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	TRANH	24	3	
	DO TRAN	18	3	
	NGUYEN LIEN	19	3	
BICH NGO #2 (H)	*KIET	30	1	9 ITT VO BUOM
KY BICH (V)	KIEN	25	4	30 Jan 67 F/6
TAM KY (D)	NANG	60	6	
QUANG TIN (P)	HUONG	50	6	
BICH NGO #2 (H)	*KIET	32	1	9 ITT VO TOA
KY BICH (V)	TUNG	20	4	(AKA CAM)
TAM KY (D)	NGUYEN KHUONG	20	18	30 Jan 67 F/6
QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN QUANG	26	3	
BICH NGO #2 (H)	*TUNG	25	4	9 ITT DUONG TAT
KY BICH (V)	QUANG	30	21	HOANH 30 Jan 67 F/6
TAM KY (D)	*KIET	45	1	
QUANG TIN (P)	HUONG	25	6	
	THOAI	35	18	
	*NGUYEN KHUONG	25	2	
	NGUYEN THI CHANH	23	3	
	NGUYEN THI TOM	20	3	
	TRAN THI TUYEN	22	3	
	NGUYEN THI CHI	20	3	
DINH DIEN (H)	TIEN	39	1	7 ITT Consolidated
PHU THANH (V)	HUY	32	18	Rpt THANG IN, THANG
BA LONG (D)	LIEU (Female)	19	3	LAQ, THANG HIEN
QUANG TRI (P)	KE (Female)	20	3	3 Feb 67 F/6
	TI	32	3	
	TRUONG	18	3	
	THUONG	21	3	
	KINH	19	3	
	DUNG	22	3	
DONG DONG (H)	CHA RUN	21	3	7 ITT Consolidated
PHU THANH (V)	THUAT	24	3	Rpt THANG IN, THANG
BA LONG (D)	THANG	20	3	LAQ, THANG HIEN
QUANG TRI (P)	MUOI (AKA	25	3	3 Feb 67 F/6
	ANH NHA)			
	DOI	21	3	
	RAM	21	3	
	TA RANG	22	3	
	KHUN	30	3	
	BINH (AKA DOI)	21	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
GIA DANG I (H)	*MR AM		1	7 ITT TRAN TAI
TRIEU LONG (V)	DANG LIEU	18	3	5 Feb 67 F/6
TRIEU PHONG (D)	DANG VI	20	3	
QUANG TRI (P)	DANG THANG	19	3	
	DOAN SON	18	3	
	DANG TE	25	3	
	DOAN THANG	18	3	
	LE XA	18	3	
	DOAN THIET	19	3	
	*DANG THAI	22	3	
GIA DANG I (H)	*VO AM		1	7 ITT LE CHA
TRIEU LONG (V)	*DANG THAI		3	6 Feb 67 F/3
TRIEU PHONG (D)	TRAN KHAI		19	
QUANG TRI (P)	LE NHUNG		5	
	DOAN LY		3	
	LE NAT		3	
	DOAN PHAI		3	
	DANG TUQUET		3	
	DANG HANG		3	
	(THANG)		3	
	LE THIET		3	
	LE BIEN		3	
	DANG LIEU		3	
	LE XA		3	
	DOAN THIET		3	
	DANG VI		3	
	DANG TE		3	

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 6-67)

1. Rear Service, Worksite 21. PHAM XUAN TRINH, MSgt (Sgt Medic), Rear Service Worksite 21, defected to ARVN at BA-REN OP on 19 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. In February 1961, subject and 16 cadre infiltrated into SVN and were assigned to installation development in charge of HIEP-DUC (D) and QUE SON (D). In July 1965, he was named vice-chairman for Rear Service Worksite 21, reportedly with the rank of 1st Lieutenant.

b. He stated that the 21st Regt, with three battalions (11th, 22d and 33d Bn's), was subordinate to Agricultural Site 2.

c. TRINH provided information on other units as follows:

(1) 41st NVA Regt. This regiment was newly formed, infiltrated into QUANG NAM (P) in April 1966, and currently has units located in SON PHUC, SON TRUNG and SON KHANH villages.

(2) 31st Regt. This regiment infiltrated from NVN about February 1965 and operated at SON BONG, SON TAY, SON HOA and BINH DINH villages before December 1966.

(3) 70th Bn. His unit operated with this battalion at BINH DINH (V) prior to July 1966.

d. According to the planned program of the 5th Military Region, which was issued to the units subordinate to Agricultural Site 2, the mission is to train cadres and soldiers in order to gather power to open a big battle at Western piedmont (Probably the provinces in Central Highlands). Forces of Agricultural Site 2 have a mission to combine with NONG-TRUONG 1 and 3 (Agricultural Site) in order to participate in this battle. The rest of the force including 3d Regt (AKA 41st Regt, subordinate to Agricultural Site 2) will stay behind to combine with LF units to open battle on QUANG NAM battle field (AKA QUANG TIN) and QUANG DA with the mission to stop reinforcements into the western battle. The said plans will be started in the spring of 1967, called the "Dry Season" plan, and will be a battle to decide the victory or failure of the SVN war.

(G-2 Comment: F/2 as to units mentioned in this report, with the exception of the 41st Regt. Returnee states he defected from the 21st Regt when it moved south to QUANG NGAI (P). The move of the 21st Regt to western SONH TINH (D), QUANG NGAI (P) was reported by returnee TRAN PHIEN (12Jan67). The 3d Regt (AKA 31st Regt) is currently carried as operating in south-western QUANG NAM (P). The 70th Bn was carried as operating in THANG BINH (D), QUANG TIN (P) in July 1966. However, returnee NGUYEN HOANG (30Nov66) reported this battalion as having moved south to QUANG NGAI (P) and as being subordinate to the 1st Regt. The 70th Bn is currently carried as operating in western QUANG NGAI (P). F-6 with regards to the 41st Regt and to the planned combining of the 1st, 2d and 3d Divisions for a spring offensive.)

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2. 201st Co. TAM KY (D) Force. NGUYEN TOA, 201st Co, TAM KY (D) Force, defected to PF's at KY CHANH (V) on 28 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. TOA joined the 201st Co in March 1966 and has been with the company every since. From March until July 1966 he trained for one week a month and spent the remaining time growing food for the company. From July to December 1966 TOA stated he was ill with malaria and could not serve.

b. He contended that the 201st Co had fought in three battles since March 1966. In May or June 1966 the company engaged ARVN troops (location unknown) and suffered 10 WIA's. In August, 20 men of the 201st engaged the Americans at KY LOC schoolhouse and suffered four WIA's. In November the 201st Co again engaged the Americans at Number 2 (H), KY THANH (V), the casualties were one KIA and two WIA's.

c. The men of the company live with the people in Number 2 (H) and neither work or train with the local guerrillas.

d. Presently there are two platoons in the 201st Co, one with 20 men and the other with 16 men. TOA knew of no future plans for the 201st.

e. The morale of the company is presently low due to artillery shelling and air strikes. Ten men have malaria. TOA stated he defected because of insufficient food and medicine and a fear of artillery and air strikes.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. This is the first report of the 201st Co. The 74th Co attacked USMC/ARVN forces at KY LOC schoolhouse, near Highway 1, in late September 1966. Personalities that were mentioned in the report were the PO and Assistant PO of the 74th Co. The 201st Co is possibly a new AKA for the 74th Co.)

3. PHU LONG (H) Guerrillas. NGUYEN THI THANH, a female PHU LONG (H) guerrilla, was captured in the vicinity of (BS 658964) by D Co, 1st Bn, 7th Marines on 27 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. In January 1966 the VC forced her to join the guerrilla band of PHU LONG (H) and, having appointed her a second assistant platoon leader in charge of three women guerrillas, had her serve as a cook and rice collector until May 1966. In May the American force came to PHU LONG (H) and she felt she could no longer be forced to serve the guerrillas so she left.

b. While she served the guerrillas, she went around PHU LONG (H) under orders from the VC Economic Cadre to collect one ang of rice each day. The other three female guerrillas did the same. She said that when the rice was cooked it was fed to the guerrillas in two different homes. The guerrillas varied the homes that they used. They would divide into two groups of 10 males and two females for meals.

c. When she first joined these guerrillas, there were 20 of them but now there are only 15. One has become a Kit Carson scout, three were killed in a Marine ambush in July 1966 and one was killed on 24 January.

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d. She stated that the primary mission of the hamlet guerrillas is twofold: First to shoot at any passing aircraft from their location (BS 654935), second to snipe at any Americans seen from the bridge at CAU BI (BS 654954). Their withdrawal route is then south across the rice paddies onto the trail (BS 652949) and up the eastern finger of NUI PHO TINH Mt. (BS 664939). She felt that the best place to capture or kill the guerrillas, however, would not be on NUI PHO TINH Mt. but in DAI DUNG (H) (BS 656958) because this is a VC controlled safe area.

(G-2 Comment: Other recent reports of women participating in insurgent activities tend to substantiate VC recruiting problems. NGUYEN THI KIEM, a female guerrilla, was captured at (YD 185740) on 11 December 1966 and told of a GIO LINH Female Armed Platoon (K-400) composed of 25 women. Squads of this platoon operated in the vicinity of (YD 165750), (YD 165755) and (YD 170763). NGUYEN THI LUI, a female hamlet guard of AN XA (H) (YD 178750), was captured on 18 December 1966 and told of girls maintaining security posts in the vicinity of AN XA (H). They were to warn NVA troops of ARVN/US forces approaching. NGUYEN TAN DAT, a corpsman of the D-21 Independent Co, defected at XA HUYNH Outpost on 7 January 1967 and reported that the 3d Platoon of the D-21 Co was an all female platoon with over 40 women. DAT claims that they fight very poorly. TRAN VAN HO, a private of the Q-14 Co, defected to LOC VINH (V) Headquarters on 24 December 1966 and stated that the Q-14 is presently having a recruiting drive but are not being successful because of the lack of young men. They are presently forming a fourth platoon (B4) to consist of female members. Their present strength is 18; ages 15 to 21 years. They will be armed the same as the male soldier and dress the same. Their mission will be to fight against the US/ARVN forces and also serve as cooks. A recent captured document "Combat Orders" issued by the commander of M-64 (unknown unit designation in the I CTZ) directed certain step-ups of guerrilla activity and included the statement: "Try to recruit all young men and women to join the guerrilla force to drive the imperialistic Americans out of the fatherland". An 18 January report relates that the VC are employing females in their attempts to establish a system to increase their military collection effort. Women are being trained in reconnaissance methods and military proselyting. After training they are assigned to operate in order to carry out espionage missions, etc.)

4. 2d Bn, 3rd NVA Regt. NGHIEM THE QUOC, 1st Plt, 5th Co, 2d Bn, 3d NVA Regt, defected to the 5th ARVN Regt at QUANG TIN (P) on 21 January 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He joined the 3d Regt at HANOI in August 1964 when it was the capital guard. On February 1966 the 3rd Regt commenced infiltration into SVN. The regiment was split into four sections and departed NVN at 24 hour intervals. The route followed was from QUANG BINH (P) to LAOS then into SVN, and through QUANG NAM (P). There are 50 rest stations along the route, each located 24 travel hours apart. It required 80 days for his unit to infiltrate. The total loss to the regiment during infiltration was: Six or seven men died of malaria and 13 men deserted in LAOS. They arrived in SVN about 22 March 1966 and were located west of HIEP DUC (D), QUANG TIN (P).

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b. During the second week in May the 3d Regt moved into TIEN PHUOC (D) with the mission of attacking a company located in the vicinity of PHUOC SON (V) (BT 005227). However, this attack was called off due to insufficient knowledge of the situation.

c. On 20 July 1966 while the 2d Bn was located in SON THACH (V), QUE SON (D) they were struck with a B-57 air strike. He did not know the results.

d. The regiment moved back west of HIEP DUC (D), QUANG NGAI (P) and a portion of the personnel were sent to SON TAY (V), QUE SON (D) to train for an attack against TRUNG PHUOC (V).

e. A regimental size operation was launched on 10 October 1966; one battalion was used as the attacking force and the other two went into blocking ambush positions. The post was overrun and they stayed there for six days. They were hit with nine air strikes while there and suffered 22 KIA. They were then attacked by ARVN forces and suffered 200 KIA. The regiment then withdrew to an area west of HIEP DUC (D). After a short period the regiment moved into QUE SON - THANG BINH area where, according to QUOC, they will remain until around August 1967. Their mission while there will be to harass the Revolutionary Development program.

f. He stated that approximately 30 percent of the regiment has malaria. Food is provided by the guerrillas who take it from the people.

(G-2 Comment: F/2. Information given by the VC PW agrees with previous information on the 3d NVA Regt.)

5. Captured Documents.

a. An undated top secret letter captured on 21 January 1967 discusses the implementation of the NVN policy concerning the South Vietnam war. The letter reveals that the policy concerning the South Vietnam war was thoroughly discussed and approved by the Politburo and the LAO DONG Party, and, in regard to negotiation, the Politburo had been entrusted by Central Headquarters to make a timely decision when conditions permit. Nevertheless, the current policy is to defeat the Americans in SVN militarily. The letter states:

"NVN Policy in the SVN War"

"1. Current Situation:

The hypothesis reached by the Central Headquarters as revealed in the 9th and 11th Resolution called for: (1) Defeat of US "special war" in SVN; (2) Restrict the war in SVN; and (3) Prepare to cope with the participation in the war by American and Satellite [country] troops. The 11th Resolution also estimated that the US would bring in 300,000 or 400,000 troops if the "Special War" failed. However, the situation of the SVN war developed faster than expected. Victory was within reach [in 1965] prior to the arrival of large contingents of US troops which upset the situation.

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The reasons which precluded the [1965] victory were as follows: (1) "We were not as capable of inflicting a total disintegration of the Puppet [forces], therefore, we were only about to defeat the enemy but not to defeat the special war"; (2) "The US Imperialists, the international gendarme, was very obstinate in saving SVN"; and, (3) "The serious dispute within our side." [Communist bloc].

2. Basic Points of 12th Resolution:

a. Correct Assessment of US Capabilities:

Correct assessment of US capabilities has been a problem to the world, but the author believed that his Party had correctly assessed the strong and weak points of the Americans "one step at a time". The Party realized that US economic and military potentials are many times greater than those of [NVN] but the Americans have been defeated four times in Vietnam and will be bogged down in the present war. Escalation of the war will increase US casualties and, ultimately, the Americans will have no other choice than to accept a defeat with smaller losses.

b. Characteristics of SVN War:

The war was converted into a "limited war" after the direct participation by US troops. However, the Puppet troops [RVNAF] continue to play an important role (in legalizing the fighting position of US troops), therefore, there should be no discrimination between US and Puppet targets.

c. Can We [VC] Defeat the Americans Militarily?

The lessons drawn from the first engagements with US troops indicated the SVN people and Army can definitely defeat the American on the military aspect. The VAN TUONG Battle can be considered as the Stalingrad Battle of the Soviet Union. It proved that the Liberation troops are capable of defeating US units which had absolute superiority in equipment and firepower.

In the near future, the Americans will establish additional bases in the coastal zones, Western Highland, the Northern areas of Saigon and the border areas between Cambodia and Vietnam. They will concentrate forces to cope with the SVN Liberation Forces at strategic centers of operations, increase pacification efforts and attacks on the corridor to neutralize SVN from NVN. The US Imperialists and their satellite [countries] can increase their troops in SVN up to 400,000 men but will not defeat us [VC] in this aspect, because the reserve forces for SVN war are still in NVN. And in wars, ultimate victory will be with the party which has more reserve forces. If they escalate this war into a war between the two blocs [Free world and Communist] China and other countries will be our immediate reserve forces. The US Imperialist will not likely carry the war to central and lower LAOS, not because of political reasons, but because they do not have sufficient troops. However, if they do, they will be confronted with NVA main forces. All provinces of the former [Military] Region 4 will engage with the enemy and must fight him to the ocean. We [NVA] should also be prepared to fight an US invasion on NVN.

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d. Protracted War:

Formerly, our [VC] policy aims at a protracted war but the 9th Resolution favored the method of "availing opportunities" to achieve final victory in a short period of time. We now reaffirm the adaptation of the protracted war concept.

e. Military and Political Attacks:

The requirement is to defeat Americans both militarily and politically. At present, military victory is a decisive factor. However, to exploit the contractions between Vietnamese and Americans, efforts should be made to motivate the masses, particularly city dwellers, to engage in political movements.

f. Peace Talk:

The ultimate objective of the SVN war is to force the Americans to give up this war and leave SVN. (The letter discloses that the term "defeat American" only implies the destruction of a large part of US military capabilities in order to disrupt US military plans.) The Americans are proposing peace talk, but we will accept peace talk only when it meets our political ends."

6. The following VC directions to prevent FVMAF from detecting mines and caches was contained in a document addressed to the various Province Unit Command Committees and other units subordinate to Military Region.

"Lately the enemy troops have been using Mine Detectors (AN/PRS 3) in their sweep operations to discover all our weapons which are made of metal such as cartridges, detonators etc....

To stop the enemy detectors from finding our mines and arms caches, the effect and capability of a US detector seized by our forces, was tested and we have made the following procedures to be used:

Principle of protecting the mine detector.

All kinds of mines and weapons must be buried deeply.

The smaller the mass of metal, the less the enemy detectors can discover.

If the mass of metal is widely dispersed, they are less apt to be found.

Methods of good precautions.

If we bury the kind of mines which are metal, and then we cover them with rubber, leaves, nylon etc... they are still discovered by the enemy detectors.

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! To thwart the effect of mine detector, we should carry out the following measures:

Mine

If a mine container is made of wood and fastened with bamboo nails, it must be buried in the standing position at a minimum depth of 5cm, and electric mine wire is buried with the depth of 10cm. The nylon type mine is the best type.

Our anti-tank mines wrapped by metal must be buried at a minimum depth of 50cm.

As for Bazonin mines, we should not bury at a 50cm depth. We need only bury them with 10cm depth and plant a grenade to stop the enemy from removing our mines.

Our anti-personnel mines like the enemy's should not be buried deep; we should bury them at a depth of 5cm and should plant them with one grenade. The best measure is to plant mines on the branch of a tree and fasten wire to the tank so that the enemy does not pay attention and their detectors cannot discover them.

To deceive the enemy in our attempts to thwart their detection, we bury in different places along the road many pieces of iron and then we plant mines. We should also bury some iron around our mine.

Arms caches.

The instruments made of metal must be buried in very deep trenches and must be in various places. Each trench must not contain more than three rifles or three automatic rifles. These trenches must be located at least three meters apart.

Other instruments which do not have to be kept in metal containers should not be in metal containers. If we use wood containers which are fastened by iron nails or steel wire they must be buried at a minimum depth of 50 cm.

The best containers for documents are jars and bottles, but they must be protected from dampness.

If we use jars or wood containers fastened by bamboo nails to bury instruments which are not made of metal, we need only cover them with a thin bed of earth, but not too thin to prevent the enemy from discovering them.

Secret underground tunnels:

To prevent our tunnels from discovery by enemy detectors, we should employ these following measures:

The minimum depth of underground trenches is two meters.

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The lids of trenches can be made of sand, bamboo, wood, reed, etc... and must be fastened by bamboo or rattan strings but should not use steel or copper wire. The doors of underground trenches must be made of wood and fastened by bamboo nails.

The height of the earth bed above a tunnel must be 50cm or more.

While hiding in the underground trenches, soldiers must take off helmets and put them on the bottom of trenches. If soldiers carry rifles, automatic rifles, etc... these weapons should be leaned against the side of the trenches or put on the bottom of it.

In trenches, soldiers should sit down. If standing is necessary, cadre must hold their guns along their trunks.

Barrel up and stock down or carry them in their hand but should not carry them on their shoulder:

Above are some measures that comrades should study for use when planting mines, hiding documents and making tunnels. After using these measures, if comrades have any bad or adverse experiences, please report them to the military staff for study when countering the enemy mine detectors."

7. The following are names of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports were reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u> <u>BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
VO VAN ANH (C)	Unk	5th Sp For	Civ Def	Unk/TRA BONG(D) HQ
LE BAY (C)	2FEB67	2/5	Refugee	AT833483/AN HOA REF CTR
HIYEN BICH (C)	1FEB67	Unk	Civ Def	AT8346/DUC DUC(D) HQ
TRAN BINH (R)	24JAN67	---	---	TRA BONG(D) HQ
NGUYEN BON (C)	5FEB67	F/2/26	VC	AT832543/1st Med Bn
VO BUOM (C)	29JAN67	CAC 1/5	Civ Def	BT311175/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN CAM (C)	4FEB67	F/2/26	VC	AT830544/I CORPS CCG
DOAN CAN (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	Unk/DUC(D) HQ
LE VAN CHAU (C)	Unk	5th Sp For	Civ Def	Unk/TRA BONG(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHAY (C)	Unk	Swift Boat	Civ Def	---/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGO CHINH (C)	29JAN67	D/1/7	Civ Def	BS649964/BINH SON(D) HQ
SVOT VAN CHUC (C)	27JAN67	B/1/5	Civ Def	BT352027/TAM KY(D) HQ
VO CHUT (R)	22JAN67	ARVN	---	CHIEU HOI
NGO DA (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	Unk/DUC DUC (D) HQ
PHAM DAT (C)	31JAN67	C/1/1	Civ Def	BT152612/HIEU WHON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI DI (C)	28JAN67	D/1/7	Civ Def	BS640953/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN NGOC DIEN (R)	24JAN67	---	---	TRA BONG(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
VAN DIP (C)	3FEB67	F/2/26	Guerrilla	AT824429/I CORPS
TRAN DU (R)	2FEB67	Unk.	Guerrilla	---/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DUC (C)	31JAN67	C/1/1	Civ Def	BT152612/HIEU NHON(D) HQ
NGO DUONG (C)	1FEB67	A/1/1	Civ Def	AT8047/DUC DUC(D) HQ.
NGUYEN GIOI (C)	29JAN67	PCF 15	Civ Def	Unk/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM HAU (C)	Unk	1/7	Civ Def	BS634973/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE HIEN (C)	6FEB67	C/1/5	Civ Def	BT367148/LY TIN(D) HQ
LE THI HIEU (C)	4FEB67	M/3/1	Civ Def	Unk/HOA VANG(D) HQ
NGO HOA (C)	Unk	Unk	Deserter	Unk/DANANG SPL SECTOR
NGUYEN HOA (C)	2FEB67	C/1/5	21st Regt	BT322123/III MAF PW COMP
NGUYEN DUY HOA (C)	3FEB67	G/2/1	Civ Def	Unk/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
DO HOANG (R)	22JAN67	ARVN	-----	CHIEU HOI
DUONG TAT HOANH (C)	29JAN67	CAC 1/5	Civ Def	BT311175/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN HUAN (C)	2FEB67	F/2/7	Civ Def	BS518928/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN HUE (C)	30JAN67	PF	Det	Unk/LY TIN(D) HQ
DO HUNG (R)	22JAN67	ARVN	CHIEU HOI	CHIEU HOI
PHAN DINH KHOI (C)	1FEB67	2/4	Civ Def	AT812502/DUC DUC(D)HQ
PHAM KIEM (R)	18JAN67	-----	-----	TRA BONG(D) HQ
NGUYEN DUY KY (C)	3FEB67	G/2/1	Civ Def	Unk/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
DO LIEN (C)	31JAN67	G/2/7	Civ Def	BS644947/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN TAN LIEN (C)	3FEB67	G/2/1	Civ Def	Unk/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TO LIEU (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	Unk/DUC DUC(D) HQ
DO LOC (R)	22JAN67	ARVN	-----	CHIEU HOI
BUI LOC(AKA BUI CHAM)(C)	29JAN67	E/2/7	Unk	BS835403/12th DTA QUANG NGAI
HUYNH LOI (C)	2FEB67	3/1	Civ Def	BT075695/HOA VANG(D) HQ
PHU LOI (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	Unk/DUC DUC(D) HQ
PHAM LOI (C)	1FEB67	F/2/26	RF Deserter	AT812503/DANANG Spl Sect
NGUYEN LU (C)	29JAN67	E/2/7	Civ Def	BS558912/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO LUONG (R)	24JAN67	-----	-----	TRA BONG(D) HQ
VAN THI LY (C)	5FEB67	MF Co	Civ Def	Unk/PHUONG DIEN(D)HQ
DO MINH (C)	Unk	1/5	Civ Def	BT328102/LY TIN(D)HQ
NGUYEN NGHE (C)	3FEB67	Unk	Civ Def	Unk/DUC DUC(D) HQ
VO NGO (C)	24JAN67	2/7	Civ Def	BS562907/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO NGOC (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	AT322515/DUC DUC(D)HQ
LE VAN NGH (C)	Unk	Unk	Civ Def	Unk/DUC DUC(D) HQ
TRAN THI NIEM (C)	26JAN67	A/1/1	-----	BT007566/DIEM BAN(D) HQ
PHAM THI NUOI (C)	26JAN67	A/1/1	-----	BT007566/DIEM BAN(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
HA NGUY (R)	18JAN67	_____	_____	TRA BONG(D) HQ
HUYNH PHAT (R)	24JAN67	_____	_____	TRA BONG(D) HQ
PHAM PHUC (C)	2FEB67	2/5	Refugee	AT833483/AN HOA REF CTR
VO DANG QUANG (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	Unk/DUC DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN QUA (R)	24JAN67	_____	_____	TRA BONG(D) HQ
DOAN QUO (C)	27JAN67	CAC 1/5	Civ Def	BT352165/LY TIN(D)HQ
DO QUY (R)	18JAN67	_____	_____	TRA BONG(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI RA (C)	1FEB67	D/1/7	Civ Def	BS645973/BINH SON(D) HQ
UNK TAN (R)	22JAN67	ARVN	_____	CHIEU HOI
NGUYEN TAM SAU (C)	3FEB67	G/2/1	Civ Def	Unk/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
LAM DAN TAN (R)	24JAN67	_____	_____	TRA BONG (D) HQ
TRAN THANG (C)	4FEB67	G/2/4	Civ Def	AT847523/DUC DUC(D) HQ
PHAM THE (R)	3FEB67	F/2/5	_____	AT833483/DANANG CHIEU HOI
NGUYEN THI THANH (C)	27JAN67	D/1/7	Civ Def	BS658964/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THICH (C)	4FEB67	2/7	Civ Def	BS525957/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN THIEN (C)	Unk	5th Sp For	Civ Def	Unk/TRA BONG(D) HQ
NGUYEN TIEN (C)	1FEB67	G/2/7	Civ Def	BS642951/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THU (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	Unk/DUC DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN TOA (R)	28JAN67	_____	201st Co	Unk/LY TIN(D) HQ
VO TOA (C)	29JAN67	CAC 1/5	Civ Def	BT311175/TAM KY(D)HQ
DO DINH TU (C)	1FEB67	G/2/7	Civ Def	BS642951/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO KIM TUNG (C)	30JAN67	1/7	Guerrilla	BS629939/1st Med Bn
LE VUI (C)	3FEB67	2/5	Civ Def	AT825515/DUC DUC(D)HQ
NGUYEN XI (C)	3FEB67	Unk	Civ Def	AT822515/DUC DUC(D)HQ

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CONFIDENTIAL**ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 6-67**

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period, the number of acts of sabotage and terrorism increased greatly over the preceding period. There were 15 acts of sabotage involving lines of communications, six assassinations, and eight abductions. This is the largest number of abductions and assassinations reported in a one week period over the past five months.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG TRI. A 15th Counterintelligence Team report of 8 February related that the VC in the villages of CA LU (YD 015455) and CAM LO (YD 130598) have tasked the vendors in the vicinity of Marine units with the mission of drawing maps of Marine installations. The same report indicated that the VC have a "Pretty Girl Plan" which calls for the infiltration of ARVN/U.S. bases by females. These females have the mission of drawing maps of installations and preparing for sabotaging critical areas in support of future VC attacks. (CI Comment: This is the first report of VC utilizing vendors and females for espionage purposes in QUANG TRI (P).)

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	6Feb	Section of highway destroyed	YD 614311
THUA THIEN	6Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 604311
THUA THIEN	7Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	AU 833997
THUA THIEN	7Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	AJ 843957
THUA THIEN	8Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 828117
THUA THIEN	8Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	AT 844955
THUA THIEN	8Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	AT 833955
QUANG NAM	4Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	AT 945694
QUANG NAM	5Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 091552
QUANG NAM	6Feb	Culvert destroyed	BT 137470
QUANG NAM	6Feb	Culvert destroyed	BT 120488
QUANG NAM	6Feb	Culvert destroyed	BT 115494
QUANG NAM	6Feb	Section of highway destroyed	BT 118491
QUANG TIN	6Feb	Culvert destroyed	BT 359190
QUANG NGAI	4Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	BS 596927

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 15th Counterintelligence Team report of 8 February related that during the night of 4-5 February, an estimated VC platoon entered QUAT XA (H) (YD 096594) and distributed propaganda leaflets. These leaflets were of the postcard type. One side contained a multi-colored picture of a flower while the other side contained a brief pro-NLFVN statement (in English) allegedly made by a U.S. Army prisoner. Included on the card was the schedule for NLFVN's English language broadcast. The leaflet was of good quality paper with excellent coloring and printing.

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QUANG NAM. A 5 February report from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines stated that VC propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of (AT 850400) which encouraged RF/FP's to surrender. The leaflets indicated that those individuals carrying weapons slung upside-down or across their back would not be shot. In addition, those lying flat on the ground or raising their hands over their heads and walking towards VC positions would not be harmed.

A 7 February report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team reported that VC propaganda leaflets were found in KIM LIEN (H) (AT 923862). The leaflets contained the often reported anti-American themes and slogans.

A 9 February report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team stated that several types of VC propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of (AT 908785), (AT 900795) and (AT 897821). One of the leaflets contained a cease-fire TET message issued by the QUANG DA National Front for Liberation. The leaflet stated that the U.S. Officers and men must honor the TET truce ordered by the SVNFL, and demanded that peace be restored in Vietnam, and all U.S. troops be repatriated. The other leaflets contained the usual anti-American themes.

QUANG TIN. A 7 February report from ally reliable source stated that the VC had conducted a propaganda broadcast in the vicinity of (BT 226166). The broadcast requested the ARVN troops to extend the TET truce to seven days.

A 9 February report stated that approximately 150-200 propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of (BT 488103). The leaflets were written in English and stated "Merry Christmas, Happy New Year, and why are you fighting here?".

QUANG NGAI. A 8 February report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that on 3 February the VC entered VINH LOC (H) (BS 553795) and ordered the populace to gather bamboo and leaves in preparation for a propaganda show. Reportedly, the show was to take place on 9 and 10 February and would relate the results of the Liberation Army's campaigns and include the exhibition of Korean FOW's. Allegedly, the prisoners would confess their injustices to the Vietnamese people and the fact that they had been ordered by the U.S. "Imperialists" to fight and kill the people in BINH SON and SON TINH districts.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

THUA THIEN. A 6 February report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that on 30 January an estimated VC squad entered AP SACH CHU (H) (ZC 086995) and assassinated NGUYEN TOAN, (aka CON). A note was left on his body stating: "Mr. PHAN CON, 65 years old, living in DINH LOC (V), THU LOC (D), THUA THIEN (F), job: Laborer. The days that we (VC) fought against the French, Mr. CON would not join with us. Now he has helped the Popular Forces and Americans to ambush and kill two of our men. He has watched the villagers activity and reported

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it to District Intelligence to terrorize the villagers. So, according to the peoples' wishes, this man (PHAN CON) must be killed." The note was signed "DINH LOC, 30Jan67, Village Revolutionists of DINH LOC District." (CI Comment: This is the second report of assassination in the last two months in which the deceased allegedly provided information on VC activities. Refer to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 48.)

A 1st Counterintelligence Team report of 6 February stated that on 30 January an estimated VC squad entered NAM PHO CAN (H) (YD 960045) and abducted four people for being delinquent in paying their taxes. These persons were reportedly taken to the mountains for a VC indoctrination course. The report further related that on the same date a VC platoon entered NAM PHO HA (H) (YD 953066) and assassinated a NGUYEN THI CON, and abducted seven persons. Reportedly, CON was assassinated because she had refused to pay taxes.

A 9 February report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related at 2100 on 5 February, 15 VC entered the home of NHAN TRAN VAN, a Census Grievance Committeeman, and attempted to assassinate him. VAN was wounded as he fled from his house.

A 9 February report from a usually reliable source stated that on 8 February an unknown number of VC assassinated a Vietnamese policeman in the vicinity of (YD 834174).

A 9 February report from an intelligence source related that the hamlet chief of THE NE (H) (YD 637453) was abducted by an unknown number of VC.

QUANG NAM. A 6 February report from a usually reliable source reported that an unknown number of VC entered TUNG LAM (H) (BT 036702) and abducted the assistant hamlet chief.

A 6 February report from an intelligence source related that the CO MAN Hamlet Chief, (BT 030693), was abducted.

A 7 February report from a usually reliable source stated that six VC assassinated the village sub-chief of NIEU TACH SON (V) (AT 934818).

A 8 February report from a usually reliable source related that an unknown number of VC entered BO VAN (H) (AT 963694) and abducted a male civilian.

A 9 February report from an intelligence source stated that an unknown number of VC entered LAN CHAU (H) (AT 943661) and abducted a PF soldier.

A 9 February report from a usually reliable source stated that on 9 February two RD DUY XUYEN (D) intelligence agents were apprehended by an unknown number of VC 2 kilometers east of DUY XUYEN District Headquarters. The men were released the following day.

QUANG TIN. A 6 February report from a usually reliable source stated that five VC entered LIEU TRI (H) (BT 176434) and assassinated a school teacher.

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A 6 February report from an intelligence source related that the VC had recruited 40 youths by force. Fourteen of the youths had a basic knowledge of swimming and were in excellent health. Reportedly, these youths will be sent to DUC PHO (D), QUANG NGAI (P) for training. Upon completion of training, these youths will be assigned the mission of destroying U.S. Navy "boats" at MY A (H), DUC PHO (D) (BS 850402).

QUANG NGAI. A 5 February report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency reported that the VC in PHUOC LAM (V) (BS 455763) had asked families who have sons and brothers in the RVN military to appeal to their relations to return to VC controlled areas. In addition, it was reported that the VC were planning a demonstration, to force the Americans and General KY to respect the cease-fire during the New Year. Reportedly, this demonstration was to begin on 10 February and take place in TU NGHIA (D).


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19 FEBRUARY 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO. 7-67

III MAF PERINTREP # 7-67

12-18 Feb 67

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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Period Covered: 120001H - 182400H Feb 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. There was no significant enemy activity noted north of the DMZ as enemy resupply efforts of last week apparently terminated. Aerial photography scheduled for the DMZ sector was not flown because of poor weather although one mission was accomplished on 10 February over the northeast portion of the DMZ, north of GIO LINH. These photographs revealed no significant enemy movement and activity when compared to November readouts.

There was no major enemy ground action reported from northern QUANG TRI (P) in the general area immediately south of the DMZ. The enemy continues to maintain an active screening and reconnaissance effort in the same area.

Ground reconnaissance along an east-west line north of the KHE SANH combat base reported sightings of approximately 90 VC over the week. Two contacts were made with small groups of the enemy at (XD 7244) and (XD 7949) on 14 and 17 February. Enemy strength per group was an estimated 50 and 20 VC respectively. Artillery fire was brought to bear in both instances with unknown results. Operation PRAIRIE II continued with light contact with small and scattered enemy elements.

Within the northeastern portion of the province and at (YD 260738) a PF platoon on patrol east of GIO LINH was attacked by an estimated VC company. Artillery was called for and the VC broke contact. Friendly casualties were light; VC casualties unknown. Two incidents of sabotage were reported at (YD 224660) and (YD 298566) on 14 and 18 February. Situated along Highway 1, both involved partial demolition of bridges by VC estimated in company strength. The bridges were guarded by PF elements who sustained light to moderate casualties. Enemy casualties were unknown.

Elsewhere in coastal QUANG TRI (P) enemy activity was limited to more isolated harassing actions against small security elements. Local force units were reported from what is considered normal operating locations. When compared to more recent reporting periods, enemy activity in this northern province decreased over the past week.

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b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There was a slight decrease in the tempo of enemy effort in northeastern THUA THIEN (P). Three incidents occurred north of the PHU BAI TAOR during the middle of the week. On 17 February in the vicinity of (YD 604358) elements of I Co, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines ambushed an estimated 20 VC group with what was estimated to be moderate enemy casualties. The latter two incidents involved ARVN and PF contacts with estimated platoon and company sized VC elements. Supporting fires were utilized with the VC breaking contact and rapidly withdrawing. Casualties to both sides were light.

Ground reconnaissance deployed west and south of the CHINOOK area (YD 5330) and along the midland approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR reported total sightings of approximately 95 VC. Enemy activity observed was confirmed within the area immediately south of CHINOOK. This represents a rather sharp drop when compared to last week's total of over 300 VC sighted in the same vicinity.

On 11 February at (ZC 092997) elements of a Combined Action Company on reconnaissance one kilometer south of PHU LOC gained contact with a group of 20 VC. Small arms, automatic weapons fire and grenades were exchanged. The VC withdrew. To the east of this location and at (ZC 165995) elements of the 3rd Bn, 1st ARVN Regt hit a platoon of VC. There were no casualties reported and one VC was captured.

Two incidents were reported within the PHU BAI TAOR. One involved a contact between F Co, 2nd Bn, 9th Marines and an estimated VC platoon at (YD 963032). Light enemy casualties were reported. Other intelligence pertaining to coastal THUA THIEN (P) produced nothing of significance.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance deployed both within and immediately beyond the western boundary of the DANANG TAOR reported moderate sightings of the enemy. Approximately 40 VC were observed along this line and one light contact was made with a small enemy element. Substantial reconnaissance south and southeast of the DANANG TAOR reported major sightings of the enemy. Almost 500 VC were observed in the sector immediately adjacent to the southeast boundary of the TAOR. A series of contacts were made by reconnaissance patrols in this area with a considerable number of casualties being inflicted on the enemy by both fire from the patrols and supporting artillery and air. At (AT 9641) and on 12 February 127 VC were observed moving along a trail carrying 22 dead VC. For the second consecutive week ground reconnaissance has reported an increase in VC activity in the area south of the TAOR.

Two fairly major incidents were reported from the southern portion of the TAOR on 12 and 15 February. At (AT 909480) an unknown number of VC blew a small bridge and, in the vicinity of (AT 912577), an estimated two squads of VC attacked a refugee resettlement hamlet and wounded 30 civilians.

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Operation STONE underway to the northeast of these locations had by 18 February accounted for 69 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 62 KIA (Probable).

Southeastern QUANG NAM (P) saw continued enemy initiated activity. On 12 February, a PF platoon deployed in defensive positions one kilometer east of QUE SON was attacked by an estimated VC company. The PF stood their ground and repulsed the VC. On 15 February and further to the east an unknown number of VC blew a culvert on Highway 1. The enemy maintained his tempo of harassing actions against more isolated friendly elements in the coastal portion of the province as well as small scale action within the southeast sector of the TAOR in the vicinity of DIEN BAN (D).

There was a slight drop in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the TAOR this week. No discernable pattern was noted. The tempo of the enemy effort continues at a rather low rate as has been the case for the past three weeks. Low level agent reports produced no new significant intelligence information concerning eastern QUANG NAM (P).

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. When compared to the previous reporting period there was a sharp decrease in enemy activity reported from QUANG TIN (P), particularly from the eastern coastal sector and along Highway 1. The entire region was relatively quiet with the exception of several enemy initiated small scale harassing actions. On 14 February a CIDG patrol east of the TIEN PHOUC Camp at (BT 178162) made contact with an estimated three platoons of VC. Fire was exchanged and the enemy rapidly broke contact and withdrew. Other available intelligence concerning QUANG TIN (P) produced little of significance.

Forward of the western approaches to the northern end of the CHU LAI TAOR, ground reconnaissance observed approximately 20 VC over the period. This reflects a decrease in enemy movement in the area. Within the CHU LAI TAOR, a rise in the number of VC initiated incidents was reported and enemy movement west of the TAOR, when considered in light of reconnaissance reports, was less than that observed over recent reporting periods.

Other enemy activity in QUANG TIN (P) was limited to isolated and small scale harassing actions directed against well separated friendly elements located, for the most part, along the LOC and in the TAM KY area.

e. QUANG NGAI (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Commencing with 15 February enemy action was focused in the area just within and to the south of the CHU LAI TAOR (BS 5883). On this date at (BS 588833) the 11th Company, 3rd Bn, 2nd Korean Marine Brigade, in a stunning defensive action, rejected the assault of a multi-battalion VC force. See Annex A. Initial information obtained from two captured VC identified the force as the 40th, 60th and possibly the 90th Bn's of the 1st VC Regt. South and southwest of (BS 5883) a combined Allied operation RIO GRANDE/GIANT DRAGON/LIEN KIET 81 gained contact with what appeared to be sizeable enemy elements. On 17 February in the vicinity of (BS 551747), the ARVN 37th Ranger Bn made contact with an

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estimated company of the enemy. Enemy casualties were 12 VC KIA and the one VC PW stated that he was a member of the 21st NVA Regt. This information is however entirely unconfirmed. Following this action and on 18 February in the vicinity of (BS 4679), elements of the ARVN Airborne Task Force (LIEN KIET 81) gained contact with what appeared to be a reinforced VC company. Enemy casualties of 26 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 60 KIA (Probable) resulted. Captured enemy equipment included 21 individual weapons and one 81mm mortar. Friendly casualties were moderate.

Aerial photography flown over the area including (BS 5883) southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR on 14 February, revealed a heavy increase in enemy ground fortification activity. Interpretation was accomplished through comparison with late October readouts.

Analysis of all available intelligence concerning this eastern portion of QUANG NGAI (P) continues to point toward the possibility of enemy attack against small and isolated friendly elements.

To the east and on 13 and 15 February at (BS 707747) and (BS 693796), PF and RF elements were hit by estimated company sized VC units. In the first incident the SON HAO OP was temporarily overrun, casualties were heavy and the outpost was subsequently reoccupied by ARVN elements. In the latter case the PF's held back the VC; casualties were unknown. In the same locale and in the vicinity of (BS 7475), a reconnaissance patrol observed 55 VC. Artillery fire was called in and three VC KIA (Confirmed) and three KIA (Probable) resulted.

Ground reconnaissance in the area (BS 6556) reported light sightings of the enemy and on 17 February an unknown number of VC blew an unguarded culvert about a half kilometer northeast of MO DUC (V).

Operations DESOTO and DECK HOUSE VI continued in the DUC PHO (D) and maintained light contact with the enemy. Casualties to 18 February are DESOTO, 121 KIA (Confirmed), 292 (Probable), and DECK HOUSE VI, 62 KIA (Confirmed) and 65 (Probable). Reconnaissance deployed in conjunction with these operations also made moderate sightings of small groups of VC. Aerial photography flown over a sector west of DESOTO on 16 February portrayed only a slight increase in enemy activity when compared to January missions.

CIDG patrols both north and south of the MINH LONG CIDG Camp made contact with platoon and company sized enemy elements over the period 14 through 16 February. In each of these contacts air and artillery were called in and light to moderate casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

Other intelligence of interest relating to the QUANG NGAI region concerned gradually increasing difficulties currently being faced by the VC in acquiring a supporting civil labor force - a virtual necessity for their field operations.

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents during the reporting period totaled 289 and consisted of one ambush, six assaults by fire, 20 mine/booby trap incidents, seven acts of sabotage and 155 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex B.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex B.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex B.
- d. New Enemy tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Flamethrowers. During the recent attack on the 11th Co, ROKMC Bde, the VC were observed employing flamethrowers against weapons storages bunkers. Exploitation of one of the flamethrowers tentatively identified is as the Soviet Model LPO, the newest reported flamethrower in the Soviet inventory.

(G-2 Comment: This is the first report of the employment of flamethrowers in I Corps. A prior report was received from IV Corps 14 April 1966 wherein the VC employed flamethrowers against buildings in an attack on a compound in that area. An item of interest noted in both attacks, was the flamethrowers were directed against bunkers/buildings and not personnel.)

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
1 Feb	(YD 550190)	VC Harboring Site	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
12 Feb	(BS 428818)	21st Regt CP	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
14 Feb	(BS 640445)	VC Printing Office	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
13 Feb	(YD 487193)	VC Hospital	CHIEU HOI Returnee III MAF G-2: F/6

g. Negative.

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h. Air Defense. AA incidents for the reporting period reflected a slight increase when compared to the last period. Incidents totaled 155 with 37 aircraft sustaining 51 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (BS 7940), (BS 3041), and (BS 8239). There were no confirmed cases of 12.7mm fire, although two cases of unknown type large caliber fire were reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Ground reconnaissance along an east - west line north of the KHE SANH combat base reported light to moderate sightings of the enemy. A decrease over the last reporting period. Two contacts were made northwest of KHE SANH with groups of 25 and 50 VC respectively. Moderate casualties were inflicted on the enemy and an emergency extraction was accomplished in one case.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Enemy activity and movement reported by ground reconnaissance deployed west and south of the CHINOOK area and along the western approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR decreased this week. A small but spread grouping was noted south of CHINOOK. Generally speaking the period was the lowest of the last five reporting periods. Sightings due west of PHU BAI were negative.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Substantial ground reconnaissance southeast of the DANANG TAOR and along a line (AT 8535) northeast to (BT 0550) reported major sightings of the enemy. Approximately 500 VC were observed along the line with most of the enemy activity centered in the vicinity of (AT 9844). A series of contacts were made by reconnaissance patrols in this sector with a considerable number of casualties being inflicted on the enemy by both fire from the patrols and supporting artillery and air.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Ground reconnaissance deployed forward of the western approaches to the QUANG TIN (P) portion of the CHU LAI TAOR reported a total of 20 VC sighted in the general area (BT 3505). This was the extent of activity noted by reconnaissance in the province and reflects a decrease over prior reporting periods.

To the south and in QUANG NGAI (P) ground reconnaissance was deployed in four sectors, (BS 4590), (BS 5075), (BS 6356) and (BS 8035). Patrols reported light to moderate sightings of the enemy.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
12 Feb	(AT 946662)	550	2nd Bn, 4th Marines
13 Feb	(YD 387645)	30	3rd Bn, 4th Marines
13 Feb	(AT 935663)	4200	2nd Bn, 4th Marines

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
13 Feb	(BS 507914)	12,000-18,000(Dest)	2nd Bn, 7th Marines
18 Feb	(XD 903497)	100	3rd Bn, 3rd Marines
18 Feb	(BS 864842)	2000	1st Bn, 5th Marines

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Enemy Organization. Annex B.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex B.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex B.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex B.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel for the reporting period reflected a moderate increase when compared to the previous period and were: 393 KIA (Confirmed), 526 KIA (Probable), 33 VC PW, one NVA PW and 17 VC returnees. Weapons losses consisted of 46 individual weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. At the start of the period a zone of convergent flow aloft moved over the I Corps area. This condition produced low ceilings and a drop in visibility. A deteriorating weather picture brought excessive haze and cloudiness to the eastern edge of the highlands. On 14 February a surge in the monsoonal flow, preceding a rapidly moving cold front, moved through I Corps. Rain, gusty surface winds and low level turbulence resulted. On 16 February the northeasterly flow weakened and veered to the east. Cloudiness and occasional rain remained. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	64	68	75	73
Low	58	59	63	64
Rainfall (total)	1.36	4.94	.24	3.69
Visibility (miles)	5	4	7	6
Winds (knots)	9	7	5	8

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k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 3-67.



B. S. READ Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACK ON 11TH CO, 3D BN, 2ND BDE, ROKMC
- B. ORDER OF BATTLE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CMC (CODE A02)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CIGV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAF	10

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2	CTG 79.5	1
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1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
5	CO 30TH NCR	9
1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
40	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
9	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
45	CO 1ST MP BN	1
1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
1	DSA I CORPS	6
1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
1	CICV	4
1	I DASC DANANG	1
1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACK ON 11TH CO, 3D BN, 2ND BDE, ROKMC) TO III
MAF PERINTREP 7-67

CHRONOLOGY OF VC ATTACK**15-16 FEBRUARY 1967 IN 2D BDE ROKMC TAOR**

1. On 15 February 1967 at 0130H the 11th Co, 3d Bn, 2d Bde, ROKMC received a light probing attack (BS 589833) by an estimated VC platoon. This probing attack resulted in the fully alerting of the Korean Marines, a status they were maintaining when subsequently attacked.
2. Commencing at 0410H and lasting until 0515H the 11th Co position was subjected to intense mortar, recoilless rifle, rocket and rifle grenade fire. A total of approximately 600 rounds were received. In conjunction, an estimated VC force of two battalions launched a three pronged attack. Two diversionary attacks were launched from the south and southeast with the main effort from the southwest. The main effort succeeded in partially penetrating the defensive position. Once within the position, the VC employed flame throwers in an unsuccessful effort to ignite ammunition bunkers. A counterattack, supported by mortars and artillery, restored the defensive perimeter.
3. At first light, fixed wing aircraft were called in and dropped 4000 lbs of napalm and 8000 lbs of bombs on the withdrawing VC. Air observed the VC carrying dead and wounded in the vicinity of (BS 580838).
4. At 0800H, the 6th Co, ROKMC landed north of the 11th Co position and commenced sweeping west against sporadic fire. The enemy continued withdrawing in two directions (southeast - southwest) under continuous air strikes employing napalm and bombs.
5. The results of the action were as follows:
 - a. Casualties:
 - (1) 243 KIA (C)
 - (2) 60 KIA (P)
 - (3) 2 PW (WIA)
 - b. Weapons:
 - (1) 17 CHICOM/USSR Rifles
 - (2) 11 CHICOM Automatic Rifles

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- (3) 5 Grenade Launchers
- (4) 7 Rocket Launchers 40mm (RPG)
- (5) 3 Rocket Launchers (larger than U.S. 3.5)
- (6) 7 TSMG
- (7) 3 Flamethrowers (Soviet or CHICOM copy)
- (8) 1 LMG
- (9) 1 CHICOM M3 SMG
- (10) 1 USSR Pistol (VERY)
- (11) 1 Radio (Unknown type)
- (12) 1 60mm mortar
- (13) Large quantity of Bangalore torpedoes

6. A captive taken during the action described the participating enemy unit as the 40th and 60th Bn's of the 1st VC Regiment. A second captive later confirmed the participation of these two units.

7. On 16 February 1967 0050H an ROKMC artillery position received 25 to 30 mortar rounds of unknown caliber (reported by Koreans as 120mm). Shortly thereafter the position was probed by an unknown number of VC firing small arms. Countermortar fires and small arms fire were returned. The contact was terminated at 0140.

At 0210H, the 11th Co position was probed by an estimated two squads or a platoon. The ROKMC reported that it appeared that the enemy were attempting to surround the company's position. Perimeter suppressive fires were delivered by Spooky.

As of 0400H enemy withdrew and contact was broken.


APPENDIX 1 (Situation overlay)

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58 APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO III MAP PERINT 7-67.

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ANNEX B (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 7-67

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 182400H FEB 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,300			8	3,000
Battalions (Infantry)	17	10,200	12	4,740	6	2,100	35	17,040
Battalions (Other)	10	2,450	3	1,080			13	3,530
Separate Companies					28	2,665	28	2,665
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,650		7,120		4,765		28,535
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies			1	120	5	555	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH				120		955		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
<u>MILITIA #1</u>								
Guerrillas								17,141
Self Defense Forces								48,025
Secret Self Defense Forces								9,604
TOTAL MILITIA STRENGTH								74,770

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#1. The increased militia strength figures shown on page B-1 resulted from a reexamination of enemy militia strength potential and a detailed breakout of the several categories of militia forces (i. e., guerrilla, self-defense and secret self-defense forces, the latter two categories being paramilitary forces). There has been no increase in the enemy's strength in I CTZ.

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 182400H FEB 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000 #2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	160ct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	160ct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80ct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10ct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 329559	15Jan67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-4147	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720	YD 5720	20Jan67
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5534	24Jan67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 631330	22Jan67
804th Bn	LF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	ZC 128957	6Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	YD 680312	3Feb67
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PC	120		Phu THU (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 To BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh (D)	5Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	300	Poor	AT 8454	AT 832543	6Feb67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 850487	26Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	ZC 135280	ZC 135280	25Dec66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	Duc Duc (D)	18Oct66
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	AT 9858	16Dec66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70		AT 8551	AT 843490	5Feb67
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	E Hiep Duc (D)	26Sep66
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,000		Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	6Jul66
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	300		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	6Jul66
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	150		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	10Aug66
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border		29Nov66
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,830	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 3054	31Jan67
40th Bn	MF	C	200		Son Ha (D)	BS 5883	15Feb67
60th Bn	MF	C	200		Son Ha (D)	BS 5883	15Feb67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Good	Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
90th Bn	MF	C	400		Son Ha (D)	BS 3377	23Jan67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	2,000	Good	Tra Bong (D)	BS 4280	10Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3583	12Jan67
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		Son Tinh (D)	BS 4276	12Jan67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		Tra Bong (D)	BS 3781	12Jan67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 724575	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 6656	12Jul66
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4392	BS 6436	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 2770	8Dec66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	130		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8142	26Dec66
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20Oct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 370165	15May66
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 780875	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,100		Binh Dinh	BS 7303	1Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh	BR 7986	4Jan67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	1Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BS 8205	8Feb67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page B-3
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 182400H FEB 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung THANH
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	31445XB 31450XB 31450XB		CO-Sr Capt HAI
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH
				CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG)
				PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN
				XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH
				PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co Trieu Phong Co C.10 Co Cam Lo Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20 10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri H.30			CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XD-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XD- Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA wpns Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90 3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DK2 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?)			CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10			CO-Nguyen XUAN XD-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-THANH
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co		1847 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN.
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR	
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		6-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG	CO-LE

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20825		CO-Capt THAO
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2; K-2; 74th Bn (?)			CO-Capt THAU
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn (?)		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Nguyen Trai Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-CHI
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co			CO-MOI
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang	20,601GM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	XO-Tran Van QUANG CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ24 Bn (ENGR)	GK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
72nd Bn				CO-Tran Van CAO
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 74th Dist Force Co		1-57mm RR (?) Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SMG 1-60mm Mort 1-30 Cal MG	CO-THANH XO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUNG
14th Co				
706th Co	106th Co			
A10 Co	K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THAN PO-Anh VU
A13 Co	D-22			
A16 Co	C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co			
A21 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21			
A34 Co	Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
Tra Son Co				
Tra Ha Co				

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM- Bac Hien		CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108th Regt Cuu Long Regt (?)			CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Ban (?)			
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?)			CO-SrCapt Le LOUNG XO-Hoang Xuan VINH
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Ounh Gia (?)	3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR		CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Ninh (?)			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAN
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Troung 7 (?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135CM 20.139CM Bac Hien 2048; NQ Ba Hao HT 2416; Ba Bao		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38			CO-Maj KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn (?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn (?)		2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141CM- 20.144CM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa X2424 Bac Hien forward to Ba Hoa	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Minh Long Co			CO-Lu TRI
206th Co	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co		5-AR	CO-TIEN
				XO-SUNG
614th Co	Son Ha Co			PO-MIEU
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			CO-Dien MIEU
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP
C.219	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			CO-THIN
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-MAU
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			
				CO-Pham TRAN
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
				PO-MINH
				CO-TRAN
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUYET
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CIM
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600;	1548		
90th Engr Bn 2d VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PC-HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN Cofs-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH Asst PO-THUONG and NGHIEP CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG Cofs-DIUEU
97th Bn	703 Intil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164GM (new)		
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21155 GM		
7th Bn	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANG Cofs-LUONG
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt	21.141 VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC CofS-Capt THANG
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter-Gp 7			CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM CofS-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ
803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT
812TH NVA REGT
6TH NVA REGT

800TH VC BN
802ND VC BN
806TH NVA BN
804TH VC BN
814TH NVA BN
402ND SAPPER BN
2ND NVA DIV HQ
1506TH VC ENGR BN
20TH VC BN
409TH SAPPER BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report;
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre;
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison
 Cadre; 20. District Cadre; 21. NLF Cadre; 22. Intelligence Cadre; 23. Associ-
 ation Member.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

B. <u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
PHU LE #2 (H)	LE TRIEU	25	1/2/5	9 ITT TRAN TU
BINH THANH (V)	NGUYEN KIN	32	4	8 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN TI	28	11	
QUANG NGAI (P)				
AN LOC (H)	NGUYEN NAM	35	18	9 ITT NGUYEN KHANH
BINH THONG (V)	NGUYEN CANH	30	7	8 Feb 67 F/5
BINH SON (D)	DO MINH	20	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN TUY	28	3	
	NGUYEN MINH	28	3	
	NGUYEN SAN	22	3	
	NGUYEN THI NHU	22	3	
	NGUYEN THI TIEP	22	3	
	DO CAN	25	3	
	NGUYEN THI TIEP	25	18	
	NGUYEN TRON	30	3	
	NGUYEN PHAN	20	3	
	NGUYEN HIEN	25	3	
	DO TAN	20	3	
	NGUYEN CHUC	18	3	
	NGUYEN BO	35	3	
	NGUYEN TAN	20	3	
	NGUYEN ANH	30	3	
	NGUYEN LE	23	3	
	NGUYEN DAU	30	3	
	NGUYEN NHO	20	3	
	NGUYEN CAU	18	3	
	NGUYEN TRAN	18	3	
	NGUYEN PHUC	21	3	
	NGUYEN THI CHINH	25	3	
	NGUYEN THI HOA	20	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
PHUOC HOA #1 (H)	PHAM NIM	29	18	9 ITT LE THAM
BINH THONG (V)	NGUYEN CANH	30	3	8 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	PHAM	22	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NHUT	35	3	
	NGUYEN THI TIEP	20	18	
	TRON	22	3	
	ON	25	3	
	NGUYEN TUY	29	3	
	TRIEU		4	
	YE		4/7	
PHU LONG #1 (H)	BUI DAM		1	9 ITT NGUYEN SAT
BINH THONG (V)	NGO TIEN	50	19	7 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	DO TRUNG	40	19	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN SOAN	60	19	
	NGUYEN BU	45	19	
	NGUYEN DUG		18	
PHU LONG #2 (H)	DO KHCA	30	1	9 ITT NGUYEN
BINH THONG (V)	TRAN LUCI	40	4	CUONG 7 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN DAU	30	7	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN LUCNG	40	7	
TAY PHUOC (H)	*NGUYEN TOI	35	1/5	9 ITT LE TRI
BINH THONG (V)	(AKA THOI			8 Feb 67 F/3
BINH SON (D)	CHUAN	40	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	TE	60	6	
	DA UT	34	6	
	*BINH	15	18/6	
	*THOI	18	3	
	HON	18	3	
TAN PHUOC #2 (H)	*PHAM CHU	35	1	9 ITT VO DUC ANH
BINH TUY (V)	*PHAM VU	40	4/12	28 Jan 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	*CHAU DAN	45	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	*VO KHINH	50	5	
	*DINH THI QUAN	40	6	
	*NGUYEN TRI	40	7	
	PHAN CHAU	36	9	
	LO NGOC TRACH	40	2	
	*VO CUONG	20	3	
	*NGUYEN CUU	18	3	
	*DINH THI CU	18	3	
	*VO THI DIEP	18	3	
	LUONG TAC	20	3	
	NGUYEN LUC	18	3	
	*THAI THU	20	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
TAN PHUOC #2 (H)	*PHAM CHU	35	1	9 ITT NGUYEN
BINH TUY (V)	*PHAM VU	38	4	THI CHIEN
BINH SON (D)	*NGUYEN TRI	40	12	28 Jan 67 F/3
QUANG NGAI (P)	*VO KINH	50	5	
	*CHAU DAN	45	6	
	*DINH THI XUAN	40	6	
	NGU YEN TRI	40	9/2	
	*VO CUONG	18	3	
	*VO THI DIEP	17	3	
	*DINH THI DU	18	3	
	*NGUYEN CUU	20	3	
	TAO	20	3	
	*THAI KHU	17	3	
	HONG	17	3	
BICH KIEU	DOAN TON	28	3	9 ITT DOAN QUO
(AKA BICH NGO) (H)	DOAN QUIT	18	3	28 Jan 67 F/6
KY HA (V)	DOAN HUONG	16	3	
LY TIN (D)				
QUANG TIN (P)				
AN HAI (H)	HUYNH KINH	30	3	9 ITT HUYNH VAN
KY HA (V)	HUYNH LU	25	3	LIEN 26 Jan 67 F/6
LY TIN (D)	DO MO	18	3	
QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN TRIEM	29	3	
	NGUYEN SAU	30	3	
	BUI THUNG	35	3	
	LUU	20	4	
	MAI PHAM	30	3	
	TRINH CHUONG	40	3	
TINH THUY (H)	NGUYEN HO	30	21	9 ITT HUYNH NGOC
KY ANH (V)	NGUYEN LIEN	35	21	TRUCNG 8 Feb 67
TAM KY (D)	NGUYEN HO	40	6	F/5
QUANG TIN (P)	NGUYEN TRANH	24	6	
	HUYNH BIEU	37	6	
	NGUYEN DINH	25	6/18	
	NGUYEN HOANG	25	3	
	NGUYEN NHI	23	3	
	PHAN TA	26	3	
	NGUYEN KHANH	27	3	
	NGUYEN DIET	23	3	
	NGUYEN KHANH	26	3	

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAP PERINTREP NO. 7-67

1. VINH HAO (H) (BS 4884) Guerrillas. Five CHIEU HOI's, former guerrillas of VINH HAO (H), TRA HOA (V), TRA BONG (D), QUANG NGAI (P) defected to the 37th RVN Rangers on 22 January 1967. A consolidation of the information obtained from their interrogation is as follows:

a. These guerrillas, along with the other village guerrillas, join with the district forces upon command of the district commander to counter FVMAF operations. The village guerrillas are in constant contact with the district force and are kept informed of the district forces operations, including losses suffered, and there successes. All defectors agreed that the district force was composed of two platoons, 60 men total, and was excellent in combat effectiveness.

b. The district forces have remained near the NUI DAU DEN Mountain (BS 4282) since the B-52 raid, since they feel this area will not be hit again. The force usually leaves the area via a trail which parallels the SUOI TRA VOI stream and joins the main road at the bridge (BS 452847).

c. The guerrillas help operate a spy system, headed by NGUYEN TU, to gain information, both by military reconnaissance and by civilian agents. Their main concern is the activity in and around the TRA BONG Special Forces Camp. Information obtained is passed through NGUYEN TU directly to the district force liaison.

d. The village guerrillas have six carbines, eight K-44's and one BAR. Their ammunition supply consists of one magazine for each carbine, seven magazines plus two cases for the BAR, 13 to 15 rounds for each K-44 and one or two grenades per man. Resupply is through the TRA BONG (D) forces.

(G-2 Comment: F/3).

2. PHO HUNG (V) Guerrilla Platoon. TRA DU, a PHO HUNG (V) guerrilla, returned to the DUC PHO (D) Headquarters on 2 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The PHO HUNG (V) guerrilla platoon (30 men) is presently stationed in THUY TRIEU No. 1 (H) (BS 816403). This platoon has sustained over 10 KIA's since the American forces arrived in DUC PHO (D). At the present time these guerrillas are operating in conjunction with the C-219th Co (local force company), which has a strength of approximately 100 men. The C-219th Co is divided into four platoons, three infantry and one support weapons platoon. The weapons platoon reportedly has one 81mm mortar, with 14 rounds of ammunition, and three 60mm mortars, with 10 rounds of ammunition per tube.

b. The C-219th Co, reinforced by the guerrillas, is prepared to hold a line of 10 bunkers from (BS 812411), southeast to (BS 816404), and northeast to (BS 819408). These bunkers are reinforced with iron, wood, bamboo and are camouflaged. The bunkers are connected by a system of trenches and, in some cases, by tunnels. DU states they were built to resist armored attacks from the northwest, but are capable of firing 360 degrees.

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c. Three of these bunkers have been destroyed by artillery fire. There are no mines around the bunkers but there are many grenades and shot gun shells rigged as booby traps. Booby traps are especially heavy along all roads in THUY TRIEU (H).

d. DU claims that in DU QUANG No. 1 (H) (BS 828412) there is a Province Force Battalion. He didn't know the unit designation but stated the companies were designated 801, 802 and 803. All companies are infantry companies and at least one platoon of sappers is attached. These companies have been in the DUC PHO area since 29 January 1967.

e. After TET these units are supposedly to be reinforced but there are no plans for attack until such time as the reinforcements arrive.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. The 219th Co is a confirmed local force unit operating in this area. The 801st, 802nd and 803d are probably companies of the 38th Bn. Friendly troops operating in this area have found bunkers reinforced as DU stated.)

3. 2d Co, R-20th Bn. Cpl NGUYEN VAN CAM, 2d Co, R-20 Bn, was captured at (AT 830544) by F Co, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines on 4 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. In May 1966, CAM joined the 2d Co, R-20 Bn after having infiltrated from NVN with the 16th Co in March 1966. After arriving in SVN he was assigned to the R-20th Bn.

b. The mission of the R-20th was to defend the hamlet people for TET. The strength is about 200 men, with approximately 90 men in each of two companies.

c. About three months ago, the R-20th Bn attacked HOA THANH (V) (AT 913790); one month ago they attacked the Marines in GO NOI (H) (AT 9353 and BT 0654). On 4 February, the R-20th came in contact with the Marines in Operation INDEPENDENCE. The battalion suffered many losses in these contacts because the troops didn't fight well. They have had over 50 KIA, a large number wounded and lost 20 AKS, as well as 10 CKC's. All losses are made up from the local people who receive little training (training given in QUANG TIN (P)). They receive these replacements every two or three months.

d. Although there is sufficient individual weapons in the battalion, often there is a shortage of ammunition. It generally takes three months to resupply shortages of ammunition. The ammunition comes from NVN by car as far as the LAOTIAN border and is then carried to the units by coolie laborers. The last resupply of ammunition and equipment was two months ago.

e. The battalion is in need of medical supplies. Approximately every six months these medical supplies are restored from NVN. The last supply of medicine was received in early January 1967 and was insufficient.

f. The food supply is bad, the rice is rancid, and there is no variety, just rice, salt and potatoes.

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g. The morale of the R-20th Bn is poor because many of their number have been killed recently. The NVA and local guerrillas don't get along to well.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. Information provided as consistent with current OOB holdings.)

4. Captured Documents:

a. A translation of a VC directive, dated 11 January 1967, signed by HUU for K50 (IV Corps Area) outlines the VC Winter-Spring plans as follows:

This plan is disseminated to foil enemy pacification and counter-attack plans in the 1967 dry season.

Requirements:

Step up armed struggles.

Develop guerrilla attacks on a wider scale.

Form guerrillas, anti-American belts while promoting political and military proselyting activities and accomplishing 1966 - 1967 tax collection phase.

Specific Missions:

The District concentrated force must be rapidly assigned to villages to form a nucleus for guerrilla units.

Targets of attack for both South-Eastern and Western elements:

Self-defense [Regional] force.

Pacification Cadre.

BIET CHINH [Civic action groups], and American units on sweep operations into the jungle.

Communication routes and roads.

Exploit the contradiction between the American and Vietnamese troops.

Infiltrate cadre into enemy ranks, profiting by the occasions when they are recruiting self-defense corpsmen.

b. The translation of a captured supply directive by the NINH THUAN (P) Party Military Region IV states:

Due to the scarcity of food supplies in this area, the following measures were taken for the control and maintenance of food supplies, in an attempt to meet supply requirements [of 1967]:

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Purchase of food.

The quantity of rice, to be purchased by the province and district Finance and Economy Sections, should not exceed designated amounts. The districts were authorized to purchase their food after securing the province supply. Payment in kind should not exceed half of the bill.

Estimate of food requirement.

The estimate of food requirement should not include food supplies obtained by the units from farm production. All units would be issued rice substitutes (manioc, potatoes) which would be one third of the supply requested.

Improve food storage.Food storage and issue.

Local units were responsible for the maintenance of the province food store houses in their localities. Issue of food supplies from these store houses should only be approved by the province Finance and Economy Section.

Upon receipt of this directive, units were to conduct an inventory of food supplies and prepare their estimate of food requirements for 1967.

c. The following is a translation of the "Proposed Rear Service Plan" for the Winter - Spring Campaign for the period from December 1966 to 1967:

SVN LIBERATION ARMY

PROPOSED REAR SERVICES PLAN FOR WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN
FOR THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 1966 TO MARCH 1967

In compliance with the instruction of the Party Committee and the Canh [District or Area] Military Affairs Committee on the subject of initiating an Emulation movement for the "QUYET THANG spring" phase of activities:

In accordance with the supplementary Resolutions of the Party Committee.

A meeting was held by the Rear Services Party Committee on 23 November 1966 to evaluate the implementation of the Resolutions during the 4th Quarter, chiefly in October and November 1966, and at the same time to add further suggestions to the Resolutions of the Party Committee for the period from the last months of the 4th Quarter 1966 to the 1st Quarter 1967 concerning the issuing of an Emulation movement in answer to the QUYET THANG Winter-Spring Emulation Campaign of the CANH [District or Area]. The trend of activities is prescribed as follows:

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****GENERAL REQUIREMENTS IN LEADERSHIP:**

In keeping with the requirements of political indoctrination, particular attention is to be given to the ideological leadership in order to fulfill chief requirements in the forthcoming phase of activities.

Every individual must be determined to struggle to the last. Everybody must be upright in his speech and his actions and nobody should violate the established principles of organization.

Every individual must try to carry out well the three main tasks: medical, worksite and quartermaster develop individual initiative, improve agrarian technique, and increase agricultural production in order to fulfill the production norm-medical care. Material aid and spiritual consolation are to be devoted to the sick and wounded patients. Hospitals must strictly comply with the policy of war injured and war dead. Supplies must be delivered in time to meet the combat requirements of the phase.

We must:

Build up the sense of internal solidarity and unity of mind and develop the faculty of critique and self-critique among cadre. Develop internal organization on the basis of the three excellences prescribed for the building of the Party Chapter.

Try to avoid actions or words which are harmful to the internal solidarity and unity. Try to avoid such troubles as going to various organizations and agencies to ask for favors.

Build up a good sense of discipline among cadre, conduct regular briefings, try to get through with the missions assigned, strictly conform to the discipline and avoid such evils as alcoholic addiction and gambling which may lead to negligence of duty.

IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP:

In ideological leadership we must develop among cadre a sense of urgency in responsibility, self-sufficiency, self-reliance and the capacity to endure hardship and to overcome difficulties.

We must also encourage the sense of sacrifice and the determination to fulfill one's mission during the phase [of activities].

We must also encourage the virtue of thrift, the sense of struggle and responsibility in the protection and preservation of the [Party] property, as exemplified in the effort to keep it from being lost or damaged, and to avoid abuse, corruption and bribery; and for this purpose we must strictly comply with the policy of internal financial control.

SPECIFIC PROJECTS FOR EACH SEPARATE BRANCH OF SERVICE OFFICE:

Establish a financial inspection section which will be responsible for the organization of inspection trips to various branches subordinate to the Rear-Services.

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Recapitulate reports on available property losses and damages caused by war.

Re-establish registers and records on receipt and expenditures, especially on the issue of the instruments and equipment. Medicines, raw materials and chemical products must be well administered.

SUPPLY: Consolidate the five existing installations and proceed to establish transportation agencies in the area between the city and the liberated area.

Set up at least two new installations in the city area, chiefly in the port area. Manage to purchase anesthetics and various types of medicines on the prescription of the medical Units. Purchase other chemical products and raw materials needed by medical Units such as acids, mercury, alcohol, copper, and iron sheets.....

In brief, we must establish more supply installations to meet the medical and production requirements in a timely manner.

SUBSISTENCE SUPPLY CELL:

From now to the 1st quarter we must move our trade agencies in the newly-liberated area, purchase food and materials at low prices.

Try to meet urgent requirements for food and equipment and try to provide materials, subsistence and equipment for the first six months of 1967.

In addition, we must try to arrive at a proper solution to the problem of supply in various food storages and various types of foods in stock.

REMARK: It must be determined whether the prices are reasonable and whether the papers are proper.

TRANSPORTATION CELL: Be ready to cross the river on order; conduct at least two trips a month.

Goods must be kept in good condition and try to avoid losses and damages when delivering and receiving goods.

Boats and motor boats must always be maintained in good condition.

During the transportation trip, all personnel must be careful and must always keep secret all information which may turn disastrous if disclosed.

ARMAMENT CELL: Consolidate all food storages and remove all discovered depots to other areas. Make an inventory of unserviceable ordnance items to be moved to other areas.

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All ordnance items in storage must be always kept in good condition (Cleaning, oiling, etc...). And an inventory of all ordnance items in storage must be made. All mistakes or errors due to adsentmindedness or inattention must be corrected, and all irresponsible acts in the maintenance of weapons must be reproached.

The issue and consumption of goods must always be kept secret.

QUARTERMASTER:

Achieve the plan of storing rice and unhusked rice for 1967 in the three areas - Areas 1 and 2, and enemy-controlled area.

In the liberated area, rice must be stored in the three neighboring villages. Store 24,000 bushels of rice as planned for 1967.

Store items of goods necessary for combat, like salt, soya sauce, fat, according to the size of the population of the three areas 1, 2 and 3. Timely issue of rice to the requesting agencies and units at various levels.

Disperse the remaining depots in RUNG SAT area.

Food and instruments should be stored under good conditions.

The records and papers concerning the issue and delivery of foods and goods must be cleared. Avoid waste and corruption.

CLOTHING:

Provide C.306 with 270 sets of clothing and equipment such as ammunition bags and belts.

In the 1st Quarter, issue clothes and equipment to half of C.306 for use in the first six months of 1967.

In addition, try to solve problems of supply in case of emergency.

Sewing machines must be maintained in good condition and well concealed.

MEDICAL:

Conduct two medical training courses for medics and health personnel.

Continue to establish four secret tunnels for wounded and sick soldiers.

Instruct Area I to establish at least one secret tunnel which can accommodate four men to use in case of emergency.

It is requested that one more medical station be established in the liberated area of our friendly district so that we can use it when our base is discovered by the enemy (request higher echelon to supply us with materials).

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Recruit additional personnel who can help us buy medical equipment and medicine.

Try to ask various areas for help.

Submit a request for supplies such as anesthetic and dentistry instruments. Activate a dentistry cell.

Have on hand, boards, canvas and nylon sheets for burial of wounded or sick soldiers who die in the hospital.

Have on hand daily, used clothing, hammocks, mosquito nets for wounded and sick soldiers.

Be sure that the quantity of food reserved for wounded and sick soldiers is always sufficient for one month so that these soldiers can be fed during long enemy operations.

Be sure that all wounded and sick soldiers are carefully looked after and enjoying a diet in accordance with the criteria for each category of patient.

WORKSITE:

Establish two additional secret installations to use as quarters and storehouse for equipment. Build a new machine shop in PHUOC-LAI to reload mines, repair damaged equipment, reload ammunition cartridges for various types of weapons and repair weapons.

Production: DH10 mines : 40

DH5 mines : 20

DH10 [Claymore type] mines : 20

Grenades : 200

Trap grenades : 600

Instruct the areas to activate rudimentary weapons production cells.

B50 and B51 in particular, with the guidance of higher echelons are to carry out their missions. However, during the execution of missions, the following must be highly regarded:

Enthusiasm and activeness in carrying out missions. Determination to overcome difficulties.

Responsibility for all activities.

Maintenance of equipment and security.

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Distribution:

- K445 (For report)
- K62, 64a and b, 66a and b, B50 and B51
(For action)
- Comrade BA KIEM (For investigation).

24 November 1966
For A3/445
S/ VAN TU

5. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u> <u>BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN CUONG (C)	6FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS668962/BINH SON (D) HQ
PHAM DINH (R)	10FEB67	M/3/26	-----	YD498288/1ST ARVN DIV
DAO XUAN HOA (R)	5FEB67	-----	74/3D BN	THANG BINH (D) HQ
NGUYEN HOI (C)	5FEB67	C/2/7	CIV DEF	BS513967/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI HUONG (C)	4FEB67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT371151/LY TIN (D) HQ
NGUYEN KHANH (C)	6FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS661978/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN KIEU (C)	4FEB67	CAC 1-5	CIV DEF	BT311173/LY TIN (D) HQ
LE VAN LUM (R)	UNK	-----	60TH BN	QUANG NGAI CHIEU HOI (C)
NGUYEN VIET QUO (R)	10FEB67	M/3/26	-----	YD498288/1ST ARVN DIV
NGUYEN SAT (C)	6FEB67	D/1/7	GUER	BS665975/PW III MAF (C)
LE THAM (C)	6FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS661978/BINH SON (D) HQ
LE TRI (C)	6FEB67	D/2/7	CIV DEF	BS505954/BINH SON (D) HQ
HUYNH NGOC TRUONG (C)	7FEB67	PEF 17	CIV DEF	AT SEA/TAM KY (D) HQ
LE DANG TU (R)	10FEB67	M/3/26	ESCAPEE	YD498288/1ST ARVN DIV
NGUYEN VAN TUAN (C)	UNK	ARVN	810TH BN	YD495448/ARVN HOSP
NGUYEN UNG (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	BS665962/1ST MED BN

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 7-67**

1. GENERAL. During the reporting period incidents of a counter-intelligence interest continued at a low level. Significant items include the discovery of two mines tied to the pilings of a bridge and the abduction of a former communist who defected to GVN authorities in 1958.

2. ESPIONAGE. There was no espionage activity reported during the period.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	17Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 298566
THUA THIEN	17Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	ZD 128010
QUANG NAM	13Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	AT 909480
QUANG NAM	15Feb	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 135473
QUANG NAM	15Feb	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 102515
QUANG NAM	16Feb	Railroad bridge partially destroyed	AT 908481
QUANG NAM	17Feb	Road blocked	BT 135472
QUANG NGAI	16Feb	Highway culvert destroyed	BS 730550

On 16 February a report from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines related that a sabotage attempt was made against a bridge located at (AT 998703). Discovered in baskets, tied to the pilings of the bridge, were two friction type mines which were set to detonate when the tide went out. (CI Comment: The mines were disarmed and a search of the area for additional mines met with negative results.)

4. POLITICAL. There was no political activity reported during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 15 February report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that VC propaganda leaflets were found on Highway 9 between CAM LO (YD 130598) and DONG HA (YD 239609). The leaflets were printed in Vietnamese and contained an appeal from the NFLSVN for ARVN soldiers to return to their homes and to refuse to support GVN or U.S. forces.

QUANG NAM. A 13 February report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team stated that VC propaganda leaflets were found in KIM LIEN (AT 923853). These leaflets contained the usual anti-American propaganda themes.

A 14 February report from a usually reliable source related that VC flags and VC signs condemning the U.S. were found in the vicinity of (BT 041552).

A 16 February report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team stated that VC propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of HA DONG (H) (AT 995642). These leaflets contained the usual VC propaganda line of demanding that the U.S. serviceman put an end to the "Johnson-McNamara dirty war of aggression".

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6. MISCELLANEOUS

A 16 February report from a usually reliable source related that the VC are attempting to organize an infiltration attempt against FMAF installations by utilizing captured Americans. Reportedly, the Americans will be dressed as advisors and under close control of VC dressed in VN military uniforms, approach installations and attempt to attract the guards' attention. Should this tactic prove successful, a large VC force, which will be concealed nearby, will then attack the installation.

THUA THIEN. A 13 February report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that on 11 February 3 VC entered BANG MON (H) (YD 963078) and kidnapped HOANG DUONG who defected from the communist party in 1958 and revealed information concerning VC activities to GVN authorities. Between 1961 and 1963, DUONG was the assistant hamlet chief of BANG MON, and from 1964 until he was abducted, worked at the DANANG Airbase. Reportedly, DUONG was kidnapped because he had revealed information concerning VC activities and was employed by U.S. forces.

A 14 February report from a usually reliable source stated that an unknown number of VC entered KE SUNG (H) (YD 909272) and assassinated a Vietnamese civilian. The same report further related that an unknown number of VC entered AN HA (H) (YD 834246) and assassinated two residents.

QUANG NGAI. A 14 February report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC have established a printing office with 45 employees at TRUONG KHANH (V) (BS 640445). This printing facility consists of three houses, one of which is used for quarters and the other two contain printing machines. The mission of this printing center is to respond to the order for a political propaganda campaign during 1967.

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
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26 FEBRUARY 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO. 8-67



GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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26 Feb.

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III MAF

DANANG, RVN

26 February 1967

Ser 048667

PERINTREP 8-67

Period Covered: 190001H - 252400H Feb 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. There was no significant activity noted north of the DMZ. Aerial photography by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flown along an east - west line (YD 2588) to (XD 8188), portrayed several small groupings of enemy ground fortifications and equipment. At (YD 2388) in proximity to the coast four artillery pieces (85 or 100mm) were positioned facing seaward, and at (YD 0088), several possible light armored vehicles were reported. In addition, approximately twenty occupied AA positions were revealed from the same photography and in the same locations as stated above. This mission represents a first time readout as prior flights over the same general area were either of marginal activity or limited in specific coverage.

There was no major enemy ground action reported from northern QUANG TRI (P) immediately south of the DMZ. The enemy continues to maintain what has become a normal pattern of screening and reconnaissance activity. Ground reconnaissance elements deployed north of the KHE SANH combat base and west of the north - south axis of Route 9 reported light sightings of the enemy; one short contact occurred on 24 February. L Co, 3rd Bn, 3d Marines over 18 and 19 February came upon rather extensive enemy field base sites at three locations northeast of KHE SANH (XD 903497), (XD 905501) and (XD 903498). A large amount of ammunition and explosives were captured along with two 82mm mortars. The bunkered sites were destroyed. On 25 February a squad from B Co, 1st Bn, 9th Marines on patrol west of KHE SANH at (XD 8142), gained contact with an estimated 50 NVA. Following a heavy fire fight and supported by air the squad inflicted eight KIA (Conf) and two KIA (Prob) on the enemy. Enemy equipment captured included an 82mm mortar tube, three base plates, three bipods and 380 mortar rounds (82mm) with 100 fuzes. Reconnaissance along the BA LONG Valley produced nothing of significance.

Eastern QUANG TRI remained active with most of the enemy effort concentrated in the general area around QUANG TRI City, particularly to the east. On 18 and 22 February 1st Bn, 1st ARVN Regt and PF elements underwent separate attacks by estimated VC units in company and two company strength. During the first of the attacks at (YD 298566), the VC destroyed a bridge; ARVN repulsed the VC in the vicinity of (YD 408570) and in the third action a PF platoon was hit by the estimated two company enemy force

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(YD 460490). In the latter action and although the position was overrun, artillery and air were called in and the VC broke off the action. A RF reaction force was committed but did not make contact. Friendly casualties were heavy; enemy casualties 55 VC KIA. At (YD 426530) on 22 February elements of the 1st ARVN Regt attacked a VC company. One APC was destroyed by VC 57mm recoilless rifle fire and friendly casualties were light. One VC was killed; two taken prisoner.

To the north both the GIO LINH and CON THIEN OP's underwent mortar attacks which appeared to be more harassing than anything else. Casualties were light. At (YD 165683) approximately eight kilometers northwest of DONG HA an AO called in an artillery mission on 20 VC in the open, results: Five VC KIA (Conf), 11 KIA (Prob). Elsewhere in coastal QUANG TRI (P) enemy action was limited to small scale incidents.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. Enemy activity in THUA THIEN (P) was focused in the northeast sector. Operation CHINOOK II maintained light contact with the enemy. Elements of 1st Bn, 9th Marines gained contact with two platoons and one company sized enemy element over the period 21 through 23 February at (YD 578428), (YD 598398), and (YD 596397). On the latter date elements of the same battalion discovered a large cache of enemy rice and other food at (YD 583423). By 24 February CHINOOK II had accounted for 33 VC KIA (Conf) and 89 (Prob) along with 11 PW's.

Approximately ten kilometers northwest of HUE City, the 39th ARVN Ranger Bn and elements of the 1st ARVN Div sought contact and subsequently went against VC units of estimated company and battalion size. Friendly casualties were light and in each case the VC rapidly broke contact. Enemy casualties were likewise light. Further to the south and in the vicinity of (YD 607260) elements of 3rd Bn, 26 Marines observed a series of large secondary explosions precipitated by close air support directed against a bunker system. The target was apparently an ammunition dump of sizeable proportions.

Ground reconnaissance deployed northwest and west of the midland approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy for the second consecutive week. Enemy activity observed was confined to the section due west of HUE City in the general area (YD 5025). Only 11 VC were observed compared to 95 reported last week in the same area.

East of the PHU BAI TAOR at (YD 968153) on 23 February, the 742nd RF Co attacked elements of an estimated VC battalion. A heavy fire fight ensued and the ARVN Black Panther Company was rapidly committed as a reinforcing element. The VC broke contact and fled. Friendly casualties were light. Enemy casualties were unknown.

Other parts of coastal THUA THIEN (P) saw small scale attacks against isolated friendly security elements. Only one incident was reported from the PHU BAI TAOR and the sector between PHU BAI and DANANG remained relatively quiet.

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c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance within and west of the western boundary of the DANANG TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. No significant observations were reported. Aerial photography flown along an east-west line between (ZC 0055) and (AT 9455) during middle and late February revealed little of significance.

A heavy ground reconnaissance effort south of the TAOR and centered on (AT 9537) reported approximately 70 VC sighted over the period. Two contacts were noted and during the encounters moderate enemy casualties resulted from supporting artillery fire. When compared with the previous week there has been a distinct decrease in enemy activity in this area.

Operation STONE which terminated on 22 February produced substantial destruction of the enemy with casualties totalling 291 KIA (Conf), 112 (Prob), 65 VC PW and 23 weapons captured. Intelligence acquired from a PW indicated that the opposing enemy unit had been the R.20 Bn. Considering the casualties sustained by the VC unit during Operations TUSCALOOSA, INDEPENDENCE and just concluded STONE, the current effective strength of this battalion is now estimated at 150.

In the vicinity of THANH MINH (V) at (BT 045614) two VC shot and seriously wounded the Assistant Village Chief. To the north and at (AT 974676) elements of the 3rd Bn, 51st ARVN Regt engaged in clearing operations and inflicted substantial casualties on the enemy. ARVN casualties, on the other hand, were light to moderate.

The number of VC initiated incidents with the DANANG TAOR increased this week. There was a sharp rise in the number of mine and booby trap incidents reported. Almost 40 percent of the activity came under this category. No other discernable pattern was noted.

The tempo of the enemy effort in southeastern QUANG NAM (P) continued at a constant rate. The enemy retains a fairly high level of activity in this coastal sector. On 12 February the 759th RF Co, while manning an ambush position in the vicinity of (BT 155540), detected an estimated two VC companies attempting to infiltrate RF positions. The RF halted the attempt; a fire fight followed with both ARVN and Marine artillery firing in support. There were no friendly casualties. North of this location and at the CAM KUN OP approximately one kilometer south of HOI AN City an unknown number of VC attacked two RF units in night defensive positions. Heavy fire was exchanged and the VC were driven off. An additional incident occurred in the same area when an unknown number of VC blew an unguarded culvert.

Toward the southern portion of QUANG NAM (P) at (BT 052338) an estimated two platoons of VC attacked RF and PF elements protecting a new life hamlet. The VC were driven off with undetermined casualties. On 20 February a PF leader guided elements of F Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines into an ambush site from which heavy fire was brought to bear on approximately 32 VC. Ten VC

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KIA (Conf), 10 (Prob) and two VC PW resulted.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Enemy activity reported in QUANG TIN (P) was focused in the general vicinity west of TAM KY City. ARVN, RF and PF elements operating in this sector gained contact with platoon and possible one company sized enemy elements over the period. Friendly casualties were light and the VC suffered moderate casualties. None of the incidents were VC initiated. The remainder of the province was quiet and intelligence information received contained nothing of significance.

Ground reconnaissance northwest of the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy; these were located in an area centered on (BT 2511). Elsewhere in QUANG TIN (P) enemy activity was limited to small scale and isolated harassing actions.

There was a slight increase in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the CHU LAI TAOR. Though scattered, most of the incidents occurred in the southern sector. Eleven incidents were reported from the Korean Marine area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). ARVN action highlighted activity south of the CHU LAI TAOR. Commencing 19 February, the 1st, 7th and 8th ARVN Airborne Bn's in an extraordinary ground action severely mauled the enemy during Operation LIEN KIET 81 (BS 491792). An analysis of available intelligence indicates that ARVN had, over the period 18 through 19 February, engaged remnants of the 40th Bn of the 1st VC Regt moving away from that unit's 15 February defeat by Korean Marines. In addition the Vietnamese paratroopers fought and defeated subordinate elements of the 21st NVA Regt tentatively identified as the 1st, 2nd and possible 3rd Bn of that Regt. Total enemy casualties for LIEN KIET 81 were 810 VC KIA (Conf), 150 (Prob), 67 PW's and 157 weapons captured, including 33 crew served weapons.

Over the period 19 through 22 February approximately 80 VC were observed by ground reconnaissance elements deployed in the vicinity of (BS 6080) south of the TAOR. Reconnaissance farther to the west and along a line parallel to the southwestern boundary of the TAOR also produced light sightings of the enemy. CIDG patrols out of both TRA BONG and HA THANH on 19 and 20 February gained contact with small enemy elements. Fire was exchanged and in one case friendly casualties were heavy. Enemy casualties were unknown. At (BS 528786) on 20 February A Co, 1st Bn, 5th Marines captured a large quantity of native rice contained in 85 (55 gal) drums.

To the southeast and at (BS 620723) near QUANG NGAI City, a civilian Vietnamese employee of the 2nd ARVN Division Headquarters was wounded by a four man VC assassination team. More toward the coast and in the vicinity of (BS 720660) RF and PF elements manning blocking positions were probed by an estimated VC company. Friendly casualties were moderate; enemy casualties were unknown. Aerial photography flown over the central coastal sector of MU DUC (D) on 16 and 17 February revealed a slight increase in enemy ground construction activity when compared to late October missions of last year.

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Ground reconnaissance deployed in an area centered on (BS 6457) reported a total of approximately 150 VC moving in the area.

To the south and in conjunction with Operation DESOTO (BS 8040), reconnaissance elements also reported fairly substantial sightings of the enemy. Approximately 110 VC were observed and two contacts made with the enemy. Both Operation DESOTO and DECK HOUSE VI continued with light to moderate contact. As of 25 February DESOTO had accounted for 184 VC KIA (Conf), 473 (Prob) and DECK HOUSE VI 158 VC (Conf), 146 (Prob).

Aggressive patrolling out of the GIA VUC, BA TO and MINH LONG CIDG Camps produced six contacts with enemy elements, three of which were in company strength with one company sized contact occurring in each CIDG camp patrol area.

Other intelligence covering eastern QUANG NGAI (P) continued to indicate enemy movement or other activity of an unspecified nature. An analysis of intelligence concerning eastern QUANG NGAI (P) continued to indicate possible enemy attack against smaller and more isolated friendly units in the MO DUC and DUC PHO Districts.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 522 and consisted of three assaults by fire, 52 mine/booby trap incidents, eight acts of sabotage, 174 small units engagements and 285 AA fire incidents.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d - e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
1 Feb	(BS 182752)	Admin/Supply Camp	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/2
15 Feb	(BT 2908)	VC Dispensary	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
16 Feb	(ZC 2054)	Grenade Factory/ Supply Dump	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
16 Feb	(AT 813600)	Guerrilla Training Area	3d CIT Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/6

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
16 Feb	(BS 930250)	VC Supply Point	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/2
18 Feb	(AT 802567)	Rice Caches	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
23 Feb	(BS 703266)	Supply Cache	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Enemy AA incidents for the reporting period reflected a sharp increase over the previous period. A total of 285 incidents were reported with 63 aircraft sustaining 140 hits. Grids squares with the highest density of fire were (YD 5939), (AT 9959), (BS 4876), (BS 4975), (BS 7941) and (BS 8140). No confirmed cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Ground reconnaissance north of the KHE SANH combat base reported light sightings of the enemy. One contact with a small enemy element occurred in the same area. Ground reconnaissance deployed along BA LONG Valley produced nothing of significance.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). There was a decrease in enemy activity reported by ground reconnaissance northwest and west of the midland approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR. Observed activity was centered in the area (YD 5025). There has been a gradual decrease in enemy movement over the past three weeks from this sector approximately twenty kilometers west of HUE City. No contacts were reported over the period.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). No significant enemy activity was noted along the western approaches to the DANANG TAOR. Heavy reconnaissance south of the TAOR centered in the area (AT 9537) reported a distinct decrease in enemy movement when compared to the last reporting period. Where approximately 500 VC were noted last week only 70 VC were sighted over the current period. Two contacts were made with moderate casualties being inflicted on the enemy by supporting artillery and air.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity was again light in the sector west of the northwestern approaches to that portion of the CHU LAI TAOR located in QUANG TIN (P). This sector has been quiet for the last two weeks. A decrease in enemy movement was noted along a north-south reconnaissance line (BS 5585) to (BS 5574). Light contact was reported

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at the latter location. South of the TAOR in the vicinity of (BS 6080) approximately 80 VC were observed. To the south and in two sectors (BS 7457) and (BS 8035) patrols reported light to moderate sightings of the enemy.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
18 Feb	(BS 864842)	2,000	1st Bn, 5th Marines
19 Feb	PRAIRIE (XD 907499)	11,150 (Dest)	3d Bn, 3d Marines
20 Feb	(AT 955325)	2,000	2d Bn, 1st Marines
20 Feb	CHINOOK (YD 583423)	8,000	1st Bn, 9th Marines
21 Feb	(YD 588418)	300	1st Bn, 9th Marines
21 Feb	(YD 895217)	4,000	1st Bn, 9th Marines
22 Feb	DECKHOUSE (BS 824292)	200	1st Bn, 4th Marines
23 Feb	CHINOOK (YD 581423)	400	1st Bn, 9th Marines
24 Feb	CHINOOK (XD 583483)	60-100,000	1st Bn, 9th Marines

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period again increased when compared to the previous period and were 634 KIA (Conf), 721 KIA (Prob), 89 VC PW, one NVA PW and two VC returnees. Weapons losses were 63 individual and five crew served weapons captured.
- f. Morale. No change.
- g - h. Negative.
- i. Terrain. No change.
- j. Weather. From 18 through 20 February a low level northeasterly flow

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dominated the weather over I Corps. Restricted visibility and occasional haze, particularly during early morning hours, prevailed over the lowlands and midlands. The remainder of the period saw excellent weather over the entire northern region with the exception of early morning hours which saw light fog and morning stratus. These conditions had dissipated by midmorning. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	78	79	82	85
Low	66	67	69	70
Rainfall (total)	.03	.29	.02	.08
Visibility (miles)	5	5	6	7
Winds (knots)	4	2	6	7

- k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex C.
- l. Negative.
4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.
5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 3-67.


 B. S. READ Jr.
 Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. MARCH WEATHER BRIEF
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO 366TH TFW	1
CMC (CODE AO2)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG II FFORCEV	1	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CICV	4
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CTF 76	1	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 8-67

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 252400H FEB 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	1,700	2	1,300			8	3,000
Battalions (Infantry)	17	9,200	12	4,500	6	1,950	35	15,650
Battalions (Other)	10	2,110	3	1,080			13	3,190
Separate Companies					29	2,745	29	2,745
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		15,310		6,880		4,695		26,885
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					6	675	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						1075		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
<u>MILITIA</u>								
Guerrillas								17,141
Self Defense Forces								48,025
Secret Self Defense Forces								9,604
TOTAL MILITIA STRENGTH								74,770

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2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 252400H FEB 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000 #2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9569	20Sep66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9463	23Jul66
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 1272	23Sep66
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	UNK	7Jul66
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0162-YD 0262	25Jul66
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	160ct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	160ct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80ct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10ct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	YD 329559-YD 4147	15Jan67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 374496	1Aug66
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 3244	YD 3255-	20Dec66
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	YD 292588	5Nov66
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338		
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963-YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	NE Nam Hoa (D)	18Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720	YD 5720	20Jan67
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 5221 - 5717	18Dec66
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5534	24Jan67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 631330	22Jan67
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	ZC 128957	6Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 5320	YD 680312	3Feb67
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu THU (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 To BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	(AT 935325)	17Feb67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400		Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh (D)	5Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	150	Peer	AT 8454	AT 9849	15Feb67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	ZC 135280	ZC 135280	25Dec66
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 037310	20Feb67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	120		BT 0355	AT 9858	16Dec66
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	50	Poor	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq	NVA	C	100		E Hiep Duc (D)	BS 4876	17Feb67
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	Poor	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	220	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	200	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BS 4478	18Feb67
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	220	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	70	Ineff.	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	18Feb67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border		29Nov66
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 5273	17Feb67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 5273	17Feb67
40th Bn	MF	C	100	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 5883	15Feb67
60th Bn	MF	C	100	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 5883	15Feb67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 5576	16Feb67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 3366	23Jan67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	Poor	Tra Bong (D)	BS 4877	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 4877	17Feb67
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	Peer	Son Tinh (D)	BS 4877	17Feb67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	Peer	Son Tinh (D)	BS 5077	17Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	Poor	Tra Bong (D)	BS 5581	17Feb67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 724575	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 6654	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 6436	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 2870	BS 4876	17Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
96th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5053		
206th Co	LF	C	100		BS 5770		
614th Co	LF	C	130		BS 3065		
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8341	10Feb67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
T.19 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20ct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 370165	15May66
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 780875	26Dec66
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 7774	26Dec66
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8675	26Dec66
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7778	26Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,100		Binh Dinh	BS 7303	1Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	350		Binh Dinh	BR 7986	4Jan67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		Binh Dinh	BR 7887	1Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BS 8205	8Feb67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-2.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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3. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 182400H FEB 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung THANH CC-Sr Capt HAI
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?)/307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CC-Cen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH
				CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG)
				PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN
				XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH
				PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI CO-Van KIEN XO-Le Van HAT
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-LUONG
H.99 Co Trieu Phong Co C.10 Co Cam Lo Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20 10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri H.30			CO-Luong YEN PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN CO-Cao TUNG CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?)	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA Wpns Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90	
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?); 2nd Bn (?)		3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort	CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10; 3rd Bn(?)		3-DKZ 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-THANH
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co		1847 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR	
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		6-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG	CO-LE

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20825		CO-Capt THAO
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2; K-2; 74th Bn (?)			CO-Capt THAU
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn (?) Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-NG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-CHI
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co			CO-MCI
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang	20,601GM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN XO-Tran Van QUANG
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ24 Bn (ENGR)	GK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
72nd Bn				CO-Tran Van CAO
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 74th Dist Force Co		1-57mm RR (?) Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SNG 1-60mm Mort 1-30 Cal MG	CO-THANH XO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUNG
14th Co				
706th Co	106th Co			
A10 Co	K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THAN PO-Anh VU
A13 Co	D-22			
A16 Co	C-73			
A19 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A21 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
A34 Co				
Tra Son Co				
Tra Ha Co				
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>				
Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien		CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108th Regt Cuu Long Regt (?)			CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang			
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?)	20,735CT. An Giang		CO-PHUNG XO-Nguyen BAC
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Oanh Gia (?); Bong Trang		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Binh; Song Hong(?)			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM HDV MC COMC
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Troung 7 (?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135CM 20.139CM Bac Hien 2048; NQ Ba Hao HT 2416; Ba Bao		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN PHOT DICH
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38			CO-Maj KIM NASH DOV
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn (?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn (?)		2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-NG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141CM- 20.144CM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa X2424 Bac Hien forward to Ba Hoa	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MC	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn;			CO-Pham Van NGOC
307th Bn	120th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA
96th Co	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Lu TRI
206th Co	Minh Long Co		5-AR	CO-TIEN
	Tu Nghia Co; 75th Co			XO-SUNG
614th Co	Son Ha Co			PO-MIEU
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co			CO-Dien MIEU
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP
C.219	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19			CO-THIN
	Co			CO-MAU
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			CO-Pham TRAN
T.19 Co	P.31 Co			CO-LONG
				XO-MINH
				PO-MINH
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong			CO-TRAN
	Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUYET
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CID
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600;	1548		
90th Engr Bn 2d VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN CofS-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH Asst PO-THUONG and NGHIEP CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
97th Bn	703 Intil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21164GM (new)		
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?) 263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn	7173 DS or 21155 GM		
7th Bn				CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong HAM CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANG CofS-LUONG
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3d Regt	21.141 VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC CofS-Capt THANG
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter-Gp 7			CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM CofS-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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4. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ
803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT

812TH NVA REGT
6TH NVA REGT
800TH VC BN
806TH NVA BN
804TH VC BN
402ND SAPPER BN
20TH VC BN
409TH SAPPER BN
810TH VC BN

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5. VC MILITIA/INFRASTRUCTURE.

A. The following is a list of the position code numbers used in this report;
 1. Autonomous Chairman; 2. Information Cadre; 3. Guerrilla; 4. Security Cadre;
 5. Tax Collector; 6. Association Leader; 7. Assistant Leader; 8. Cell Leader;
 9. Secretary; 10. Political Cadre; 11. Finance Cadre; 12. Propaganda Cadre;
 13. Military Proselyting Cadre; 14. Medic/Corpsman/Nurse; 15. Labor Cadre; 16.
 Committee Chairman; 17. VC Sympathizer; 18. Guerrilla Leader; 19. VC Liaison
 Cadre; 20. District Cadre; 21. NLF Cadre; 22. Intelligence Cadre; 23. Associ-
 ation Member.

NOTE: The asterisks indicate personalities previously reported within a village structure.

B. <u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
LCC QUANG (V)	THANG	30	1	3 ITT TRAN PHONG
DAI LOC (D)	DIEU		4	13 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	DOAN HIEN		11	
AN DINH (H)	*NGUYEN THANG		1	3 ITT NGUYEN NGOC MAI
LCC QUANG (V)	DAO BONG		4	13 Feb 67 F/6
DAI LOC (D)	*PHANG TAI		18	
QUANG NAM (P)	DOAN C		3	
	NGUYEN CHIN		3	
	PHUNG		1	
	BO		4	
TRUNG GIANG (H)	PHAM THANH	30	1	3 ITT Consolidated
PHU HUNG (V)	DO QUANG	40	11	Rpt #5SC-2-67
DIEN BAN (D)	DO TRACH	30	4	19 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	LE QUY	35	2	
	PHAM DUCNG	50	1	
	LE CUU	40	11	
	LE CHU	50	11	
	LE LO	50	4	
	PHAM THI BON	25	14	
	PHAM DO	30	18	
	LE LUU TU	19	3	
	LE LUU CHU	25	3	
	PHAM THI NHU	20	3	
	NGUYEN TIEN	20	3	
	PHAM THI NI	20	3	
	PHAM LUU BAN	20	3	
	LE LUU BA	15	3	
	DO HOA	25	3	
	TRAN QUY	25	3	
	TRAN QUYEN	23	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
PHU THO (V) DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P)	PHAM PHU THE	36	1	3 ITT Consolidated Rpt #5SC-2-67 19 Feb 67 F/6
	PHAM PHU CHIEU	40	11	
	PHAM PHU THU	35	4	
	TRAN NGOC CO	25	2	
	LAI HOA	35	18	
	PHAM DUC HOA	18	3	
	PHAM THI HOA	16	3	
	PHAM PHU KINH	20	3	
	NGUYEN TAN MY	22	3	
	PHAM DAC DO	20	3	
	NGUYEN VAN SAU	20	3	
	PHAM THI MAI	16	3	
	NGUYEN VAN DAU	28	14	
	HO DAC KHA	30	3	
	NGUYEN VAN HUNG	25	3	
	NGUYEN VAN CUI	30	3	
	NGUYEN VAN THIET		3	
	NGUYEN VAN PHAY	25	3	
	PHAM PHU THAM	27	3	
	LAI CHUC	28	3	
	NGUYEN VAN XUYEN	25	3	
	LAI NAM	30	3	
	NGUYEN DI	30	3	
	NGUYEN TRONG HUNG	35	3	
	NGUYEN VAN SUY	35	3	
DONG BAN #2 (H) PHU THO (V) DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P)	LE DO	35	1	3 ITT Consolidated Rpt #5SC-2-67 19 Feb 67 F/6
	LAI TRUNG	35	4	
	LAI CAM		11	
	NGUYEN HAN	56	6	
	TRAN NGO	60	6	
	HUYNH THI HOANH	60	6	
	TRAN HOAN	40	6	
	NGUYEN DUC LONG	22	6	
	TRAN BAY	22	6	
	NGUYEN THI NHUNG	35	6	
	LAI VAN A	35	3	
	LAI VAN CHIEU	35	3	
	LAI CHUE	29	3	
	HUYNH THANH	40	3	
	NGUYEN LICH	38	3	
	NGUYEN THI THU	19	3	
	LE THI DAO	19	3	
	PHAM THI LIEU	21	3	
	NGUYEN DAC CHI	40	3	
	NGUYEN CHOI	35	3	
	PHAM PHU CA	26	3	
	DOAN BONG	22	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>		
DONG BAN #1 (H) PHU THO (V) DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P)	PHAM DAC LICH	37	1	3 ITT Consolidated Rpt #5SC-2-67 19 Feb 67 F/6		
	CU DINH TAM	35	4			
	PHAM PHU NAM	40	11			
	PHAM HUU TRI	40	6			
	VO LIEN	70	6			
	MRS. DUOC	50	6			
	PHAM PHU BUT	40	6			
	PHAM PHU BOI	35	3			
	TRAN CAM	37	3			
	HUYNH THAM	35	3			
	HUYNH THAN	30	3			
	PHAM PHU VAN	35	3			
	CU KE	35	3			
	HO DA	40	3			
	DONG BAN #4 (H) PHU THO (V) DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P)	HUYNH VAN HUNG	35		1	3 ITT Consolidated Rpt #5SC-2-67 19 Feb 67 F/6
PHAM PHU HAI		34	4			
PHAM PHU QUANG		40	11			
HUYNH AN		38	2			
PHAM PHU NIUT		40	11			
PHAM PHU KIEU			12			
PHAM PHU TAM			12			
NGUYEN TRONG HUNG		35	18			
NGUYEN VAN NUOI		30	3			
NGUYEN TAN SUOC		35	3			
HUYNH DAY		32	3			
HAMLET #4 (H) PHU THO (V) DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P)		BA VAN	35	1	3 ITT PHAM DAC QUAY 19 Feb 67 F/6	
		HUYNH THAN		4		
	PHAM PHU QUANG		4			
	HUYNH KIEM		11			
	HUYNH TAM	33	18			
	PHU DAC QUAY	31	3			
	PHU DAC LAU	35	3			
	NGUYEN TRONG TAM	35	3			
	NGUYEN VAN SUU	28	3			
	PHAM PHU DUC	35	3			
	NGUYEN TONG NUOI	24	3			
	NGUYEN VAN DAI	23	3			
	LE BAC #1 (H) PHU THO (V) DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN DU	40	1		3 ITT Consolidated Rpt #5SC-2-67 19 Feb 67 F/6
		NGUYEN DANH	35	11		
NGUYEN THI PHAM		18	14			
NGUYEN TY		25	4			
LE HUAN		20	14			
NGUYEN CHIU		20	3			
LE NICH		30	3			
NGUYEN CHAU		20	3			
VO LI		18	3			
THAI THI LAI		18	3			

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
KY LAM (H)	NGUYEN DINH BUI	40	1	3 ITT Consolidated
PHU THO (V)	DO PHU MINH	30	4	Rpt #5SC-2-67
DIEN BAN (D)	DO PHU NHUT	20	11	19 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	CHU	30	2	
	DO PHU NHU	22	3	
	NINH	27	3	
LOC QUY (V)	LE THIEN	45	1	3 ITT LE HO
DUC DUC (D)	NGUYEN BAN	35	10	18 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	TRAN THINH	27	4	
LOC QUY (V)	NGUYEN TAM		11	3 ITT Consolidated
DUC DUC (D)	TRAN MINH CHAU		4	Rpt #8C-2-67
QUANG NAM (P)	VO VAN (CONG) SAU		13	10 Feb 67 F/6
	HUYNH PHUNG		21	
	(AKA LE THIEN)			
	HUYNH PHUNG		7	
	DANG BON		9	
	VO CONG NAM		6	
	NGUYEN HUONG		6	
	(AKA HUYNH QUY)			
	LE SA		10	
LONG AN (H)	TRAN (VAN) MAU	25	18	3 ITT Consolidated
LOC QUY (V)	THINH			Rpt 8C-2-67
DUC DUC (D)	LE LUT	22	7	10 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	DOAN TRI	25	3	
	VO HUONG	25	3	
	PHAM SUA	22	3	
	NGUYEN NGO	24	3	
	DOAN SU	22	3	
	NGUYEN THANH	22	3	
	DOAN TU	25	3	
	PHAM LON	22	3	
PHU BINH (H)	TRAN DINH	40	1	3 ITT LE HO
LOC QUY (V)	TRAN THUAN	35	1/7	18 Feb 67 F/6
DUC DUC (D)	MUCI CHIEN	25	4	
QUANG NAM (P)	LE CHINH	20	3	
	LE BA	20	3	
	QUY	20	3	
	LE NGO	25	3	
	PHAN HIEN	30	3	
PHU PHAN (H)	NGUYEN THANH	30	1/11	3 ITT Consolidated
LOC QUY (V)	NGUYEN QUAN	35	7	Rpt #10C-2-67
DUC DUC (D)	TRAN KINH	40	4	11 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	NGUYEN TIEN	27	18	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
THANH TAM (H)	*HUYNH QUYNH	27	1	3 ITT DANG LUONG
CAM THANH (V)	*HUYNH A	30	3	(AKA THUONG)
HIEU NHON (D)	NGUYEN LOC	25	3	9 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	*VO MOI	30	3	
	*LE HUONG	25	3	
	*LE RIEU	25	4/18	
THANH TAM (H)	*HUYNH QUYNH	27	1	3 ITT Consolidated
CAM THANH (V)	HUYNH LI	40	6	Rpt #3SC-2-67
HIEU NHON (D)	*LE RIEU	27	4/18	9 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NAM (P)	*HUYNH A	30	3	
	NGUYEN LOC	25	3	
	*VO MOI	30	3	
	*LE HUONG	25	3	
QUY THIEN #3 (H)	PHAN BINH	35	1/6	9 ITT TRAN KIEN
PHO HIEP (V)	NGUYEN KHOI	29	3	16 Feb 67 F/6
DUC PHO (D)	NGUYEN LAO	25	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)				
TAN MY (H)	NGUYEN NGHIEM	33	1	9 ITT Consolidated
PHO TAN (V)	(AKA HIEP)			Rpt III MAF 202-67
DUC PHO (D)	HUYNH CAN	35	4	14 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	LUONG PHAO	47	6	
	LE THI THUNG	45	6	
	LONG	25	4	
	NGUYEN DUC CHE	34	11/5	
	LE THANH	25	18	
	LE TU	27	3	
	LE PHAN	20	3	
	(AKA HUYNH PHAN)			
	HUYNH PHU	25	3	
	HUYNH EM	21	3	
	HUYNH THOI	19	3	
	LE TAN	26	3	
	VUONG PHUEN	20	3	
PHO THANH (V)	DUC	30	4	9 ITT TRINH BAY
DUC PHO (D)	LIEN	35	1	18 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	PHI	30	6	
	TIEN	30		
THACH DONG (H)	CHINH QUANG ANH	32	1/10/5	9 ITT HO QUAN
PHO THANH (V)	(AKA CHANH MINH			16 Feb 67 F/6
DUC PHO (D)	CHAU)			
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN QUAN	24	6/4	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
	PHAN NAM	19	2	
	PHAM DAU	22	18	
	DO TUNG	27	3	
	HUYNH DUOC	25	3	
	NGUYEN TRONG BA	24	3	
	NGUYEN NHU	29	3	
	HO LO	17	3	
	DO TIEN	23	3	
THACH DONG (H)	NGUYEN CHAP	40	1	9 ITT TRINH BAY
PHO THANH (V)	TRINH CON	30	6/10/4	18 Feb 67 F/6
DUC PHO (D)	TO CONG CHANH	24	2/6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN LOAN	27	6	
	NGUYEN THI TRUC	40	6	
	HO THIN	37	18	
	LE BAY	25	3	
	NGUYEN HOANG	24	3	
	CAO BAY	20	3	
	LE HIEN	20	3	
	TO DUNG	30	3	
BINH GIANG (V)	NGUYEN PHUOC	30	18	9 ITT NGUYEN
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN GIANG	28	18/7	THUOC 15 Feb 67
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN THANH	45	1	F/6
	VO HANH	30	6	
	NGUYEN HO	40	4	
	NGUYEN BONG	22	2	
	NGUYEN LIEU	35	9	
DONG LO/DONG LE (H)	NHUT	23	18	9 ITT NGUYEN
BINH GIANG (V)	DOC	32	3	NGUYEN 12 Feb 67
BINH SON (D)	THON	20	3	F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	DANH	40	3	
	NGUYEN MINH	16	3	
DONG LO/DONG LE (H)	*VO HUE	40	1/5	9 ITT Consolidated
BINH GIANG (V)	*VO HOC	30	6	Rpt III MAF 278-67
BINH SON (D)	HUYNH THUA	29	11	12 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	TRAN MINH	40	1	
	NGUYEN LANH	30	2	
	HUYNH GIAU	32	18	
	NGUYEN PHAN	30	3	
	LIEN	20	3	
	*NGUYEN NHUT	28	3	
	HUYNH KHAM	25	3	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
TUYET DIEM #1 (H)	LE BIET	32	1	9 ITT NGUYEN LAI
BINH GIANG (V)	PHUNG BUNG	40	4	13 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)				
QUANG NGAI (P)				
TUYET DIEM #2 (H)	PHUNG BUNG	28	18	9 ITT TRAN KHUA
BINH GIANG (V)	PHAM SANH	35	3	13 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	PHAM HONG	22	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)				
TUYET DIEM #6 (H)	LE BIEC	30	18	9 ITT DONG TRINH
BINH GIANG (V)	SANH	20	3	DAY 13 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	LIA	30	3	
QUANG NGAI (P)	SAT	20	3	
DUC AN (H)	HUE	35	1	9 ITT NGUYEN GIOI
BINH PHUEN (V)	KHOA	37	4	14 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	LUCNG DUONG	40	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH SUOC	28	3	
	VO MINH	21	3	
	PHAM LUONG	20	3	
DUC AN (H)	KHOA	26	1	9 ITT HUYNH DANH
BINH PHUEN (V)	*LUONG DUONG	26	6	14 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	VO MUCN	26		
QUANG NGAI (P)				
DUC AN #1 (H)	LIEN		3	9 ITT VO THI CHUU
BINH PHUEN (V)	MAU	38	6	14 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	THOA	30	1	
QUANG NGAI (P)	MINH	28	4	
	XUOC	24	18	
	LONG	20	3	
	ROT	16	3	
	HUE	27	20	
DUC AN #1 (H)	VO MUCN	30	9	9 ITT VO DONG
BINH PHUEN (V)	NGUYEN KHOA	45	4	14 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN CHU	60	1	
QUANG NGAI (P)	VO MINH (ROT)	18	3	
	NGUYEN THAO	25	3	
	LUCNG DUCNG	40	6	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
DUC AN #2 (H)	HUYNH AU	50	1	9 ITT LUONG QUOC
BINH PHUEN (V)	VO MUON	35	4	13 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN KHOA	35	6	
QUANG NGAI (P)	HUYNH XUOC	30	3	
	HUYNH DUNG	25	3	
	VO LIEN	30	3	
	NGUYEN THAO	25	3	
PHUOC THUAN #2 (H)	PHU MINH	50	1	9 ITT NGUYEN THI
BINH PHUEN (V)	NGUYEN NHAI	50	3	LUNG 18 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	BICH	40	4	
QUANG NGAI (P)				
THANH TRA (H)	NGUYEN LAI	57	1	9 ITT BUI TAN
BINH PHUEN (V)	HUYNH THU	50	4	TUAN 16 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN NHAC	18	9	
QUANG NGAI (P)	PHAN THI TUAN	17	3	
	BUI THI NHU	17	3	
	VO THI XIN	16	3	
	NGUYEN HANH	17	3	
CHAU TU #3 (H)	DANG SI	20	3	9 ITT NGUYEN TAN
BINH THANG (V)	NGUYEN CAN	30	18	CHANH 14 Feb 67
BINH SON (D)	LE TO	30	3	F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	TINH	30	3	
BINH THONG (V)	NGUYEN TI	30	1	9 ITT TO TOAT
BINH SON (D)	NGUYEN KE	40	4	15 Feb 67 F/6
QUANG NGAI (P)	NGUYEN DAO	35	6	
AN LOC (H)	NGUYEN BAO	35	4	9 ITT TO TOAT
BINH THONG (V)	PHAM DAO	40	6	15 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)				
QUANG NGAI (P)				
PHUOC HOA #1 (H)	NGUYEN KE	36	4/5	9 ITT BUI DAM
BINH THONG (V)	NGUYEN TRI	35	1	15 Feb 67 F/6
BINH SON (D)	LE NHUT	40	4	
QUANG NGAI (P)				
XUAN NGOC (H)	NGUYEN HOA	30	1	9 ITT PHAM LONG
KY CHANH (V)	NGUYEN LUONG	25	1/7	19 Feb 67 F/6
LY TIN (D)	NGUYEN HUAN		16	
QUANG TIN (P)	THUAN	28	14	
	HOC	25	14	

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Source/Eval</u>
KY THANH (V)	PHAM TONG	39	1/11	9 ITT Consolidated
LY TIN (D)	(AKA THUONG)			Rpt III MAF
QUANG TIN (P)	VO DO	24	7	283-67 14 Feb 67
	NGUYEN LONG	32	4	F/6
	HO THONG	40	6	
	TRAN NAO	20	2	
	TRAN LO	22	18	
	TRAN THI HIEP	22	6	
	CHA PHUONG	18	3	
	BUI PHUONG	20	3	
	DANG VAN	23	3	
	NGU VAN TUAO	20	3	
THON MOT (H)	NGO QUANG TRI	31		9 ITT Consolidated
KY THANH (V)	HUYNH NHI	36	4	Rpt III MAF
LY TIN (D)	NGO QUANG DINH	23	1	283-67 14 Feb 67
QUANG TIN (P)				F/6

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6. UNIDENTIFIED DESIGNATIONS

A. LETTER BOX NUMBER

(1) Below is a list of unidentified LBN's captured during a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of (YD 596358).

(a) 41441 F.T.

(b) 1846

A-31

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7. In view of heavy contact with enemy units during operations, a reevaluation of enemy unit strengths and their overall effectiveness has been conducted. The following is a breakout of these units:

a. The R-20 Bn has sustained an estimated 350 casualties during operations TUSCALOOSA, INDEPENDENCE, and STONE. Of this total 250 are considered to be KIA. Present strength of the R-20 Bn is estimated to be 150. The R-20's combat efficiency is rated: peer.

b. The estimate of recent casualties sustained by the 1st VC Regt, 21st NVA Regt and the 2nd NVA Div support Bns is based on all intelligence sources available. Actual enemy KIA was 1053.

(1) 1st VC Regt - 800 estimated casualties, 1800 present effective strength.

Suberd Units	Before	Casualties	Present Str
Regt Hqs	800	0	800
40th Bn	460	360	100
60th Bn	350	250	100
70th Bn	500	0	500
90th Bn	490	190	300

(2) 21st NVA Regt - 1000 estimated casualties, 1000 present effective strength.

Suberd Units	Before	Casualties	Present Str
Regt Hqs	200	0	200
1st Bn	600	400	200
2nd Bn	600	400	200
3rd Bn	600	200	400

(3) 2nd Div Support Bns - 340 estimated casualties

Units	Before	Casualties	Present Str
RQ20 (Sig/Trans)	300	80	220
RQ21 (AA)	400	0	400
RQ22 (RR)	300	80	220
RQ23 (ARTY)	300	100	200
RQ24 (ENGR)	150	80	70

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ANNEX B (MARCH WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 8-67

1. General Weather. The weather forecast for I CTZ during the first part of March is for continued cloudiness and light precipitation, commonly referred to as "Crachin" weather. Periods of drizzle and rain associated with low stratus clouds frequently occur over the coastal area. After the middle of the month the weather normally improves and low stratus clouds are replaced with convective clouds.

2. Precipitation

a. Although March is a dry season month, rainfall increases over the average for February throughout I CTZ. Most local rainfall occurs as afternoon showers or thunderstorms, but, during surges of the northeast monsoon, "Crachin" contributes significantly to the monthly rainfall.

b. The mean number of days with measurable precipitation varies from two days, along the coast from the southern boundry to HUE, to about 10 days north of HUE. From HUE northward to the DMZ, precipitation, usually in the form of morning drizzle, can be expected on one of three days. As many as 18 days with measurable rainfall have been reported at HUE during March.

c. Mean monthly precipitation amounts are less than one inch over most of I CTZ.

d. Monthly maximum values range from near five inches in the southern portion of the I CTZ to 10 inches just north of HUE.

e. Minimum monthly precipitation amounts are zero over the entire I CTZ.

f. Maximum 24 hours precipitation values vary from three inches in the southern and northern portion to six inches in the area around HUE. A one-day rainfall of seven to eight inches has occurred in the HUE region.

3. Thunderstorms. In the region from the southern boundry I CTZ to area of HUE, thunderstorms are observed on one to three days. In the area of HUE north to the DMZ thunderstorms are observed on three to six days.

4. Cloudiness

a. Along the coast cloudiness decreases both in amount and persistency, but, because of "Crachins", overcasts generally below 1,500 feet can be expected one to eight mornings. Convective clouds form over most regions during the late morning hours, and afternoon ceilings, with bases 2,000 to 4,000 feet, become more common toward the end of the month.

b. Mean cloudiness over most of the country is between 60 and 80 percent with the maximum areas located north of HUE.

c. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 (widely scattered clouds) varies from less than five days over the northern portion to 14 days over the region south of HUE.

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5. Visibility. Morning visibilities of less than three miles are frequent with "Crachin" conditions along the coast throughout I CTZ. These restrictions occasionally persist throughout the day.

6. Temperatures

a. Mean daily maximum temperatures range about 80° in northern I CTZ to about 83° in the southern portion. The lowest mean maximum is 78° F at TIEN SHA, on Cape TOURANE just northeast of DANANG.

b. The mean daily minimum temperature over most of the I CTZ is 65°.

7. Relative Humidity. The relative humidity along the coast of the I CTZ continues to decrease slightly toward a mid-summer minimum. The mean relative humidity is between 80 and 90 percent.

8. Flying Weather. "Crachin" conditions normally decrease markedly during the latter part of the month resulting in improved flying conditions, I CTZ has 18 to 24 days favorable for low-level operations and 12 to 16 days favorable for mid-level operations. The low clouds will usually affect only the coastal ocean and eastern mountain slopes from DANANG northward. DANANG has its minimum monthly mean precipitation for the year with an average of 0.9 inches on an average of four days of the month. Precipitation is due primarily to light rain and drizzle. Average monthly temperature increases to 72° F at DANANG.

9. Sunrise, Sunset and Moonrise, Moonset Tables.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
1 Mar	0705	1855		2337	1028
2	0704	1855		----	1114
3	0704	1855	Last	0038	1204
4	0703	1855		0139	1257
5	0702	1855		0237	1353
6	0701	1856		0334	1449
7	0701	1856		0425	1545
8	0700	1856		0511	1639
9	0700	1856		0553	1731
10	0659	1856		0635	1820
11	0659	1857	New	0708	1907

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
12	0658	1857		0738	1953
13	0657	1857		0811	2039
14	0656	1857		0843	2126
15	0655	1858		1917	2214
16	0655	1858		0955	2305
17	0654	1858		1035	2357
18	0653	1858		1120	----
19	0652	1858	First	1211	0052
20	0652	1858		1307	0149
21	0651	1858		1407	0246
22	0650	1859		1509	0341
23	0649	1859		1612	0432
24	0648	1859		1714	0521
25	0647	1859		1816	0606
26	0646	1900	Full	1917	0650
27	0645	1900		2018	0734
28	0645	1900		2121	0818
29	0644	1900		2224	0905
30	0643	1900		2328	0955
31	0643	1900		----	1049

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP 8-67

1. K-7 Co, 810th Bn, THUA THIEN (P) Force. Pvt NGUYEN VAN TUAN, 6th Sq, 3d Plt, K-7 Co, 810th Bn, was captured at an unknown location by ARVN on 7 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 810th Bn is composed of the K-5, K-6, K-7 Infantry Co's and the K-9 Weapons Co. This battalion is an integral part of the THUA THIEN (P) forces and is normally disposed in the jungle of PHONG DIEN (D).

b. About once a year each company sends three men (total 12 or 15) to an unknown location to replenish equipment losses. About once a week an unknown number of civilians from PHONG DIEN (D), go to an unknown area in the jungle to bring medical and ammunition supplies which have come from NVN. Food is purchased by the members of the battalion from various villages in PHONG DIEN (D).

c. Morale is considered low and some personnel have deserted and others captured.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. This is the first information received on the 810th Bn since August 66.)

2. T-2 (AKA 803) Recon/Sapper Bn. Cpl NGUYEN VAN HIEN was captured at (YD 387645) by elements of the 3rd Marine Division on 13 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The T-2 Recon/Sapper Bn was designated G-31 in NVN and is an independent unit directly under the 4th Military Zone. It consists of a battalion headquarters and three companies which perform reconnaissance and sapper missions.

b. The battalion is located in the vicinity of (YD 2349). The base camp covers an area approximately 800 to 1000 meters in diameter. Ninety eight percent of the battalion personnel live in this area. Eighteen men have been sent to TAN VINH (V) (YD 243557), THIEN PHOUNG (D) to watch shipping.

c. The strength of the T-2 Bn is approximately 350 men. The battalion has no mortars or recoilless rifles but is armed with 27 B40 rocket launchers, one per squad, 139 AK-47, 18 pistols, grenades and two out of every three men has a satchel charge.

d. The mission of the T-2 Bn is to attack DONG HA at an unspecified future date.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. This is the first report of the T-2 Bn Recon/Sapper Bn. Armament described above is considered to be typical equipment for a sapper unit.)

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3. 7th Co, 21st Regt. Pvt VO MINH, 3d Sqd, 4th Plt, 7th Co, 21st Regt, defected to the 2d Bde, ROKMC at BINH SON on 10 February 1966 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He had only been a member of the 7th Co for 10 days prior to defecting. He contended he was a student in HOI AN although he was captured and forced to join the 21st Regt while he was at his home in VC controlled territory.

b. Training during the 10 days with the VC amounted to marksmanship training and foxhole construction. As a trainee MINH served as an ammunition carrier of the 7th Co.

c. The 7th Co, a heavy weapons company, is composed of approximately 50 men and is armed with two 60mm mortars, one heavy machine gun, one .30 cal. machine gun and two B40's. The majority of the personnel are NVN.

d. The members of his company had been training for an attack on the Korean outpost of NUI TRON.

e. He stated that the morale was low due to bombings and 80 to 90 percent of the regiment has malaria. There is a serious shortage of medicine. The 7th Co's relationship with the villagers is weak because they are forced to live with the people and to take food from them. The people's main complaint is that the presence of the VC MF draws artillery and bomb strikes against the hamlets.

f. The local guerrillas work well with the VC MF and act as guides whenever the MF units operate in their local area. There is a good relationship between the NVN and SVN members of the 7th Co.

(G-2 Comment: F/2 as to unit location. F/6 as to remainder of report.)

4. 2d Co, 40th Bn, 1st Regt. Pvt LAM VAN PHONG, 2d Co, 40th Bn, 1st Regt, was captured at (BS 589833) by the 2d Bde, ROKMC on 15 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. His battalion had planned the operation against the 2d Bde, ROKMC for over one month in cooperation with the 60th Bn. The overall control of the operation was under the 40th Bn CO.

b. Each of the companies of the battalion has two medium machine guns, three BAR's, M-1's and AKA's. There is no heavy support capability in the 40th.

c. The planned attack had the 40th Bn committed to the attack phase with the 60th in reserve. They had to walk all night prior to the attack.

(G-2 Comment: F/2. The attack was conducted on 15 February against the 11th ROKMC Co by the 40th and 60th Bns with the 90th Bn apparently in reserve.)

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5. 1st Co, 800th Bn, 6th NVA Regt. 2d Lt LE VAN LUONG, 1st Co, 800th Bn, 6th Regt, was captured at (YD 604358) by I Co, 3d Bn, 26th Marines on 17 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He and his men were in the area of AP BACH THANH to scout out the area and establish a route on which to travel. They were ambushed and three were killed, one fled and LUONG was captured.

b. The K-1 Bn's food supply has been very low, causing the unit to seek food from the local people. However, K-1 Bn has met resistance and was unable to obtain much food. They were able to get more food from the northern flatlands. The morale of the men is low because of the food and ammunition shortage.

c. This year, during the dry season, the mission of the 800th Bn as well as the entire 6th Regt is to defeat and destroy the Revolutionary Development of SVN. They will bring troops from the mountains into the villages and hamlets to inflict great losses to government troops (PF and RF). They will also try to enlarge their force and improve their economy. This plan includes all of THUA THIEN (P).

d. The 4th Bn, 6th Regt, an artillery battalion, is divided among, and travels with, the 1st, 2d and 3rd Bns. Each battalion has two 57mm RR, two 81mm mortars and two machine guns.

e. The 4th and 6th Bn's are located in QUANG NAM (P). 800th Bn is located in THUA THIEN (P). The 800th Bn CP is located at QUANG NINH (V) and QUANG DAI THAI (V) (coordinates unknown).

f. The 1st Co, 800th Bn is supposed to operate along Highway 1 from PHONG DIEN (D) to HUONG TRA (D), emplacing mines and booby traps and supporting the guerrillas.

(G-2 Comment: F/4 as to unit locations, none of which coincide with the present accepted locations of units cited. F/6 as to an artillery battalion subordinate to the 6th Regt. This is the first report of such a battalion.)

6. CK40 Co, 1st VC Regt. 2d Lt CAO XUAN, CK40 Co, 1st VC Regt, defected to the 12th Security Section, QUANG NGAI (P), on 18 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He was a private in an engineer company, 209th Bn, 312th NVA Div. He was sent to school, graduated, and was commissioned in July 1964. He moved to SVN with the 701st and 702nd Bn's in May 1965. In October 1965 he came to QUANG NAM (P) and was assigned to the 1st VC Regt.

b. The 2d Div is also known as the 2d Public Place Div. The CO of the 2d Div is Col RAN NGOC THACH.

c. The VC plans were:

1st Plan - 21st Regt will attack ROKMC forces.

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2d Plan - 1st Regt will attack ROKMC force.

3d Plan - Units will attack DUC PHO.

The plan for the Dry Season is to fight against FVMAF's operations, to take the road and mortar our airfields.

d. The morale of the guerrilla is as follows: In favor of communism 40 percent, neutral 30 percent, lazy 30 percent.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. GK40 is AKA for RQ-24 Engineer Bn, subordinate to the 2d NVA Div Hqs. TRAN NGOC THACH previously reported with 108th Regt AKA for 1st Regt.)

7. Agent Report. The report dated 4 February 1967 states the "VC Intentions to Infiltrate GVN Installations" as follows:

a. From 20 to 23 January 1967, the VC held two departure ceremonies at CON DOT (V) (ER 405295). There were 200 cadresmen and guerrillas in attendance. These ceremonies, part of the VC "Revolution Movement," were held to send a number of cadresmen and guerrilla to feign defection to the GVN.

b. The mission of these men after defecting will be to infiltrate GVN administrative and military installations by all possible means. They are then to collect information, propagandize in an attempt to create division among Allied organizations, and to motivate and guide agitation demonstrations and rebellions whenever possible.

(G-2 Comment: F/6 as to the source. However, infiltration of the GVN has been indicated as a VC method of countering the GVN Revolution Development Program.)

8. Captured Documents. A document compiled by the Propaganda-Training Section of CANH, was distributed as a guide for the cadre, Party members, Group members and others to answer a number of questions which are most common to the public under VC control and states as follows:

ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS
RAISED BY THE PUBLIC

I. Can we defeat the United States which is rich in money and weapons?

There is no denying the truth that the United States is a giant ring-leader who owns much money and many weapons.

There exists, however, another undeniable truth that, after six years of confrontation with the people, tired and poor but heroic of Vietnam, the American imperialists have suffered the most overwhelming defeat and are being bogged down just as the French were in the past. We have, from 1961 to late 1966, put out of action 1,500,000 US and puppet troops, liberated three fourths of the (SVN) territory and 10 million out of the 14 million people in South Vietnam, and downed approximately 1,700 ultra modern jet aircraft in North Vietnam. During the year 1966 alone, we put out of

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action nearly 370,000 US and puppet troops, of them 108,000 Americans, 10,000 South Koreans and Australians, downed 2,130 aircraft, and destroyed 3,300 assorted military vehicles.

The Americans' position is one which is going down hill, defensive and desperate.

Our position is on the rise. Our forces are gaining initiative, and are marching forward in order to achieve far greater success for the sake of the fatherland.

We are bound to gain eventual victory, while the enemy is doomed to defeat.

How can we say so: Because we have the four following advantages, while the United States is beset by the four following disadvantages:

A. Four Major Advantages

First: Ours is a patriotic war waged against aggression. For this reason, the just cause lies with us. Our entire people, who stand solidly united behind the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), are determinedly resisting the American aggression until the final victory. We are getting whole-hearted support from all the people of the world, including the American people, and especially those of the Socialist countries.

Second: Our peoples army is heroic beyond comparison and highly effective. Born from the people, it fights for the people. Our position in this peoples war is an invincible one, which means that the entire people wage the war on every front-military, political, economic, and cultural. We are motivated by a high sense of self-sufficiency, endurance, and are ready to carry on the war until complete victory. Such an army, which is backed by such a war policy, is bound to defeat any aggressor or any mercenary no matter how well equipped he is.

Third: We are fighting in our very own country, village, and fields. We are used to the climate, and are familiar with the terrain.

We are like "tigers" in the jungle, and fish in the water. Should the enemy enter here, he would be doomed. And the land on which we are traveling would be the site of his grave.

Fourth: We are backed by a large war area which is the heroic socialist North Vietnam. It constitutes a major factor for success which we did not have during the anti-French war. North and South Vietnam belong to the same country. North Vietnam provides us with everything we need, including man-power (literally: blood and bone). We still have the entire gigantic and powerful socialist camp behind us. We are never alone in our fight against the American for the country's salvation.

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First: The war now being waged by the United States is an aggressive one, devoid of just cause. For this reason, it is opposed by all progressive peoples, including the people of the United States.

Second: The US troops, being mercenaries, are not motivated by a just cause. How can they expect to confront us when they are committed to a remote and strange battlefield where they are not familiar with the terrain and climate. Even the French expeditionary troops, who were better trained and far more tactically superior, could not resist such an army as ours.

Third: Although the United States is rich and has many weapons (she cannot expect to win the war), success or failure in the war is dictated by the human factor - not by weapons. No matter how dreadful a weapon is, it is still less than a stick or a sword if it is handled by a demoralized soldier. Besides, although the United States is rich and has many troops, her ambition is too great. She has to spread her troops out over 2000 bases scattered all over the world. Whenever she pulls her troops out to send them to Vietnam to suppress the Vietnamese Revolution, the people invariably seize the opportunity to rise up against her.

For this reason, her power arranged against the revolution is limited. The troops and weapons introduced to Vietnam are not inexhaustible. This assumption is predicated on the fact that, after only one year of vicious fighting, she begins to complain about shortages of troops, aircraft, and ammunition. She has to extend the length of tour of duty of many of her troops from 12 to 18 months, call back to active duty 2,300 pilots aged over 45, solicit France to sell her obsolete skyraiders, and West Germany to sell her quantity of ammunition, etc.

Fourth: The Americans who fight against us in Vietnam are 20,000 kilometers away from their rear area. It takes almost a month to carry combat troops and weapons from the United States to Vietnam. In the meantime, the US logistical situation is getting critical. The United States cannot expect to carry all the materials necessary to fill the fast-expanding, aggressive war in Vietnam.

In view of the US disadvantages, and friendly advantages, the United States cannot but expect bitter defeat in Vietnam, even if she pours 5,700,000 men into Vietnam.

It goes without saying that, for our part, we will have to make more sacrifices, and endure further hardships as a result of the war. But the final victory will be far more glorious and the independence, democracy, and peace gained will be more secure.

II. When will the Resistance Succeed?

Our people are motivated by the splendid tradition of heroism. The more we fight, the stronger we become; and the stronger we become, the greater our victory.

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Ours is an advantageous position. We are gaining initiative on every front-military, political, economic, and cultural-and on every battlefield. The day of revolutionary success is not far off. When the Revolution attains success entirely depends on us, and is ours to decide. No one is capable of answering this question for us. Solidly united, we will push forward the resistance, deal staggering blows to the US imperialists on the military and political fronts. Then the Revolution will soon be brought to function.

Conversely, if we fail to make efforts, the revolutionary tasks will be slowed down and revolutionary success delayed.

III. Why Do We Turn Down Repeated US Peace Proposals?

The repeated US peace proposals, which are vicious in essence, are intended to erode our efforts, deceive world opinion with a view to cover up her increasingly furious and "criminal" war.

Should we accept her peace-surrender conditions, the US would gain supremacy over us and continue to maintain the presence of her expeditionary troops in Vietnam. Although we have fought continuously for 20 years, it might be said that there exists no people in this whole world who cherishes peace more than we do. As Chairman HO said, "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom." As peace is highly appreciated, peace should be accompanied by true and meaningful independence and democracy.

Absolutely, we can never accept the insolent and mischief peace conditions laid down by the US imperialists. Nor can we accept peace at any price, including the price of being servants of the US.

It would be absurd that, while we have made the sacrifice of our lives for so many years, liberated almost all (SVN) territory and are on the verge of victory, we let ourselves be discouraged by the furor of the war and fail to endure hardships for a little more. With a view to achieving true and lasting peace - peace in independence and democracy - we have no choice but to adopt the only course of action, to join the revolution, drive out the US imperialists, overthrow the puppet government, and turn over the reins of the government to the people.

As soon as the US troops are driven out to the sea, or are willing to accept conditions for withdrawal just as the French Expeditionary Forces did, peace will be immediately restored to our beloved country.

IV. Is North Viet Nam Bringing Troops to South Viet Nam?

South Vietnam and North Vietnam are of the same country. North Vietnam is a large and stable rear for South Vietnam. North Vietnam is providing us everything we need, including soldiers, to fight the Americans.

Why can't people of the same country help one another? Is it logical to say like the Americans and their lackeys that we are invaders because we are helping our compatriots to fight the Americans while almost 500,000 Americans and satellite troops who have come from the United States and satellite countries to devastate our country and massacre our compatriots are not called invaders?

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It is logical to say that they are defending the United States and the free World by doing so? This is purely the argument of the privates.

V. The puppet government of South Viet Nam is supported by the Americans while on our side Russia and China have fallen out. Does this discord effect the support given to us by the Socialist countries?

The discord between Russia and China is only a contradiction in arguments around problems concerning the improvement of Communism and the proper help for Vietnam. This does not effect the support to be given our country. Russia as well as China and other socialist countries are glad to supply us with whatever we need to fight the Americans and develop our country. There are volunteers in all socialist countries ready to come to Vietnam and fight by our side whenever we need them. Be confident that we always have behind us, the powerful and invincible socialist party.

VI. Why have we fought the puppet troops instead of fighting the Americans?

Though being Vietnamese, the puppets have sold their country to the Americans. They have aggressively massacred their compatriots. They are guilty before the Fatherland and the people.

Moreover, they are an instrument and a support used by the Americans in their invasion of South Vietnam. The American troops will carry on the aggressive war as long as the puppet troops exist. Thus, we should fight both American and puppet troops. To be successful, we must try to deprive the Americans of the puppet support. However, we should not attack puppet officers and soldiers if they prove to be reasonable, if they do not conduct harassing or sweep operations or if they no longer massacre the people.

If they rally, receive them with open arms. They will be listed as having achieved merits and not as guilty people.

VII. How are the living conditions of the people who live in North Viet Nam under the Socialist Regime?

North Vietnam has taken a giant step toward Socialism in 10 years. Socialism is a regime under which everyone is equal, free and happy. There is no longer exploitation between men. Women are entirely equal to men in every aspect. Children are sent to school. Old people are subsidized and well cared for. Under the socialist regime every citizen is the boss of the society.

The worker is the boss of the factory. The farmer is the boss of the ricefield and land, and boss of the cooperative. Intellectuals are properly employed. Each individual is allowed to work and earn with his capability. Those who work hard will earn more than those who work less. Labor is an obligation, and also an honor, for each citizen.

Private owners are allowed to invest and undertake business with the government. They have to work and have the same rights as other citizens. For this reason, the people of North Vietnam live happy.

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9. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
HA HAN BA (C)	17FEB67	B/1/7	GUER	BS689976/PW III MAF
TRINH BAY (C)	12FEB67	NAT POLICE	UNK	NAT POLICE HQ DUC PHU
LE BE (C)	5FEB67	UNK	UNK	AT870531/DANANG SPL SECT
LUONG BINH (C)	17FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS513946/BINH SON (D) HQ
NUYNH CHI (C)	15FEB67	M/3/5	CIV DEF	BS790415/DUC PHO (D) HQ
VO CHI (C)	18FEB67	2/7	CIV DEF	BS578964/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN CHUC (C)	14FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS676958/BINH SON (D) HQ
VO THI CHUU (C)	13FEB67	B/2/7	CIV DEF	BS503913/BINH SON (D) HQ
LE CHUY (C)	18FEB67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BS471883/ARVN
CHAU CHUY (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	BS652965/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN CUU (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (C) HQ
NGUYEN CU (C)	12FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS650997/BINH SON (D) HQ
BUI DAM (C)	13FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS660978/BINH SON (D) HQ
DONG TRINH DAY (C)	12FEB67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT653043/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN DIEN (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (C) HQ
NGUYEN DINH (C)	14FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS676958/DINH SON (D) HQ
TRAN DOC (R)	10FEB67	CAC 12	UNK	AT59574/UNK
VO DONG (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN DUOC (R)	13FEB67	1/7	---	CHIEU HOI QUANG NGAI
TRAN DUONG (R)	19FEB67	2/7	CIV DEF	BS534956/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGO THI GIAO (R)	---	---	GUER	UNK/LY TIN (D) HQ
NGUYEN GIOI (C)	13FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS519913/BINH SON (D) HQ
VO THI HEIN	15FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS713975/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN HIEN (C)	6FEB67	H/2/4	GUER	AT830544/1ST MED BN
LE HO (C)	4FEB67	A/1/1	GUER	AT870531/DUC DUC (D) HQ
NGO HOANH (R)	UNK	---	GUER	UNK/LY TIN (D) HQ
HO DAC HOI (C)	16FEB67	ROKMC	TRANS CO	UNK/ROKMC
PHAM HONG (C)	13FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS523904/BINH SON (D) HQ
DOAN HUA (R)	UNK	---	1ST REGT	TAM KY (D) HQ
NGUYEN HUE (C)	4FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC DUC (D) HQ
PHAM KHA (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
LUONG KHOA (C)	20FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS550914/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRINH KHOI (C)	15FEB67	CAC 1/5	CIV DEF	BT351105/TAN KY (D) HQ
TRAM KIEN (C)	14FEB67	M/3/5	CIV DEF	BS879335/DUC PHO (D) HQ
LUONG KHOA (C)	20FEB67	E/1/7	CIV DEF	BS550914/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN LAI (C)	12FEB67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON (D) HQ
HUYNH LIEU (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	UNK	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
HUYNH QUANG LONG (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
PHAM LONG (R)	15FEB67	---	CHIEU HOI	UNK
LE VAN LONG (C)	18FEB67	3/26	6TH REGT	YD604358/PW III MAF
DANG LUONG (C)	5FEB67	UNK	GUER	BT178558/PIC
NGUYEN THI LUNG (C)	15FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS713975/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN THI LIEU (C)	10FEB67	3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
DAM THI HAI (C)	13FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS499893/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN NGOC HAI (C)	10FEB67	CAC	CIV DEF	AT859574/DAI LOC (D) HQ
LE VAN MI (R)	8FEB67	---	9TH BN	DUC PHO (D) HQ
NGO VAN MIEN (C)	12FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS650998/BINH SON (D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNER (R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
DINH MINH (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
VO MINH (R)	10FEB67	ROKMC	21ST REGT	ROKMC BINH SON (D)
NGO NAM (C)	12FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS650998/BINH SON (D) HQ
LE THI NEN (C)	15FEB67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS713975/BINH SON (D) HQ
BUI MINH NGO (C)	19FEB67	L/3/26	PW	YD575282/MED HOS
PHAM NGO (C)	5FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT172556/HIEU NHON (D) HQ
NGUYEN NGUYEN (C)	12FEB67	D/1/7	GUER	BS650997/PW III MAF COMP
DINH NHAY (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	BS652965/BINH SON (D) HQ
LE NHO (C)	5FEB67	D/1/7	UNK	BS650998/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGO NHIEU (R)	UNK	---	20TH SUP CO	TAM KY (D) HQ
NGUYEN NHO (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DOC PHO (D) HQ
NGUYEN NIEN (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC DUC (D) HQ
PHAM NO (R)	10FEB67	PF	C-219 CO	DUC PHO (D) HQ
HUYNH NONG (R)	13FEB67	---	GUER	BINH SON (D) HQ
NUYNH SI CANH (C)	9FEB67	3/7	CIV DEF	BS827382/DUC PHO (D) HQ
LE VAN PHONG (C)	15FEB67	ROKMC	40TH BN	ROK HOSP/BINH SON
NGUYEN TAN PHU (C)	13FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS541946/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN QUI (C)	9FEB67	B/1/7	1ST REGT	UNK/PW III MAF COMP
HO QUANG (C)	UNK	NAT'L POL	GUER	BS807378/NAT'L POL, DUC PHO (D)
LUONG QUOC	12FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS514914/BINH SON (D) HQ
LE NGOC QUANG (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
PHAM MAC QUAY (C)	16FEB67	I/3/1	GUER	BT019553/I CORPS CCC
PHAN VAN PHUNG (C)	14FEB67	1/5	CIV DEF	BT433162/LY TIN (D) HQ
NGUYEN SAM (C)	14FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS676958/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN SAU (C)	15FEB67	2/5	R.20 BN	AT977496/ARVN HOSP
PHAM SI (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
BUY SON (C)	12FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS650997/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN NGOC SON (D)	14FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS676958/BINH SON (D) HQ
LE SUNG (C)	31JAN67	C/1/1	CIV DEF	BT144592/HIEU NHON (D) HQ
PHAM TAI (C)	---	B/1/7	CIV DEF	---/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN TAU (R)	12FEB67	---	GUER	LY TIN (D) HQ
HUYNH THAO (C)	12FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS650997/BINH SON (D) HQ
PHAM THEO (C)	12FEB67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS650997/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN THEM (C)	6FEB67	H/2/4	GUER	AT830544/1ST MED BN
NGUYEN THI (C)	6FEB67	H/2/4	GUER	AT830544/1ST MED BN
HGO THI THIET (C)	15FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS713975/BINH SON (D) HQ
HUYNH THINH (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
BUI VAN THONG (R)	9FEB67	ARVN	21ST REGT	BINH SON (D) HQ
NGUYEN THUOC (R)	14FEB67	D/1/7	PW	BS628872/PW CAMP III MAF
BO THONG (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
PHAM LOAN (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
TO TOAT (C)	14FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS676958/BINH SON (D) HQ
NGO THI TRAM (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/HOA VANG (C) HQ
NGO QUANG TRI (R)	UNK	UNK	GUER	UNK/LY TIN (D) HQ
LE VAN TRUNG (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
PHAM TU (C)	16FEB67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
BUI TAN TUAN (C)	16FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS524932/BINH SON (D) HQ

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CAPTIVE(G)/RETURNEE(R)DOC/DORCAPTURING
UNITUNITLOC/DISPOSITION

TRAN VAN (C)
DINH VAY (C)
TU VIET (C)
NUYNH VINH (C)
NGUYEN XAN (C)
HUYNH XUANG (C)

16FEB67 M/3/7
UNK UNK
18FEB67 2/7
9FEB67 3/7
G/2/7
16FEB67 M/3/7

CIV DEF UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
CIV DEF BS652965/BINH SON (D) HQ
CIV DEF BS515912/BINH SON (D) HQ
CIV DEF BS827382/DUC PHO (D) HQ
CIV DEF BINH SON (D) HQ
CIV DEF UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ

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ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 8-67

1. GENERAL. Although there was an increase in incidents involving VC terrorist activity, items of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Significant items include a report that the VC threw a hand grenade into a group of children and that the VC have reportedly taken photographs of a CAC unit located in the PHU BAI TAOR.

2. ESPIONAGE

THUA THIEN. A 18 February report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that the VC have repeatedly taken photographs of the H-6 CAC Compound located in the vicinity of (ZD 145007). (CI Comment: Personnel should be continuously reminded and alerted to VC low level espionage attempts.)

QUANG NAM. A 14 February report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that the VC have organized an English school at MY HOA (H) (AT 854545) which has been in operation for approximately one month. The students are females ranging in ages from 10 to 16 years of age, who, upon completion of the course, have the mission of penetrating U.S. installations in an attempt to gather information and draw overlays of the installations.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	22Feb	Highway culvert destroyed	YD 363504
QUANG TRI	22Feb	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 298566
QUANG TRI	22Feb	Highway culvert destroyed	YD 365804
THUA THIEN	22Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	AT 833995
THUA THIEN	22Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	AT 844955
THUA THIEN	22Feb	Railroad bridge destroyed	ZD 128010
QUANG NAM	21Feb	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 102516
QUANG NGAI	22Feb	Highway culvert destroyed	BS 730550

A 18 February report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that the VC made an unsuccessful attempt to sabotage a railroad bridge in the vicinity of (ZD 128011). Although there were three or four explosions, and VC were observed in the general area, there was no damage to the bridge.

4. POLITICAL. There was no political activity reported during the period.

5. PROFAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 19 February report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that during the night of 14 February a VC unit consisting of approximately 400 men was deployed in PHU LONG (V) (YD 346474). The mission of this unit was to "entertain" the local populace by telling stories of VC victories.

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QUANG NAM. A 20 February report from the 1st Military Police Battalion stated that VC propaganda leaflets were found in MY THI (H) (BT 055738). These leaflets were printed in English and contained the usual VC theme of demanding that the U.S. put an end to their "Dirty War of Aggression".

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG NAM. A 18 February report from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion related that four VC threw a hand grenade and fired into a group of children in the vicinity of VIEN TAY (H) (BT 041642) which resulted in seven VN children being injured.

A 20 February report from a usually reliable source stated that two VC disguised as civilians attempted to assassinate the assistant village chief of THANH MINH (BT 045614).

A 20 February report from a usually reliable source related that on 19 February a civilian was wounded by VC sniper fire in the vicinity of (BT 020368).

A 21 February report from an intelligence source stated that a VN female was killed when she detonated an anti-personnel mine in the vicinity of (BT 077514).

QUANG NGAI. A 19 February report from a usually reliable source related that six civilians were injured when a bus detonated two mines in the vicinity of (BS 628835).

A 21 February report from an intelligence source stated that a four man team attempted to assassinate a VN employed by the 2nd ARVN Division in the vicinity of (BS 620723).

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