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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF ltr 3/JEF/sbc over
3480/3 Ser: 00104667 of 22Apr67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: III MAF Command Chronology for February 1967

1. Forwarded.

M. C. Dalby
M. C. DALBY
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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3480/3
Ser:
22 APR 1967

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HEADQUARTERS III MAF
00104667

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From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: III MAF Command Chronology for February 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) III MAF Command Chronology, February 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is herewith submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when removed from enclosure (1).

R. B. Neville
R. B. NEVILLE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

GROUP 4
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After 12 years.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February 1967 to 28 February 1967

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Enclosure (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

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1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

III Marine Amphibious Force

Lieutenant General
Lewis W. WALT, U. S.
Marine Corps
4Jun65-28Feb67SUBORDINATE UNITS

First Marine Division

Major General
Herman NICKERSON, Jr.
U. S. Marine Corps
1Oct66-28Feb67

Third Marine Division

Major General
Wood B. KYLE, U. S.
Marine Corps
18Mar 66-28Feb67

First Marine Aircraft Wing

Major General
Louis B. ROBERTSHAW,
U. S. Marine Corps
16May66-28Feb67

Force Logistics Command

Brigadier General
James E. HERBOLD, Jr.
U. S. Marine Corps
3Oct66-28Feb67

7th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel
Frank W. HARRIS, III
U. S. Marine Corps
8Aug66-28Feb67

9th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel
Richard W. CRISPEN
U. S. Marine Corps
1-6Feb67Lieutenant Colonel
George A. BABE,
U. S. Marine Corps
7-28 Feb 1967

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11th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel
Ross L. MULFORD
U. S. Marine Corps
16Aug66-28Feb67

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Sub Unit #1, First Radio Battalion

Captain Francis A. LOSIK,
U. S. Marine Corps
29Jan67-28Feb67

Headquarters and Service Company

Major Vernon L. SYLVESTER,
U. S. Marine Corps
29Sep66-28Feb67

ATTACHED UNITS

29th Civil Affairs Company, USA

Lieutenant Colonel
Lawrence A. STEVENS,
U. S. Army

2. LOCATION

1-28 February 1967, Danang, Republic of Vietnam

3. STAFF OFFICERS 1-28 February 1967

Chief of Staff

Brigadier General
Hugh M. ELWOOD, U. S.
Marine Corps
6Dec66-28Feb67

Deputy Chief of Staff

Colonel Robert B.
NEVILLE, U. S. Marine
Corps
5Aug66-28Feb67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Colonel John L. MAHON,
U. S. Marine Corps
8Jun66-28Feb67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Colonel Roy H. THOMPSON,
U. S. Marine Corps
7Sep66-13Feb67

Colonel Benjamin S. READ,
U. S. Marine Corps
14-28Feb67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Colonel Drew J. BARRETT,
Jr. U. S. Marine Corps
9Nov66-28Feb67

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Colonel Joseph F. QUILTY,
Jr. U. S. Marine Corps
21May66-28Feb67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Colonel John T. HILL,
U. S. Marine Corps
1-28Feb67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6

Lieutenant Colonel
Marvin D. VOLKERT, U. S.
Marine Corps
28Jul66-28Feb67

Psychological Operations Officer

Colonel Robert R. READ,
U. S. Marine Corps
1Aug66-28Feb67

Supply Officer

Colonel Arthur T. HILL,
U. S. Marine Corps
6Oct66-28Feb67

Communications-Electronics Officer

Colonel Jake B. HILL,
U. S. Marine Corps
23Mar66-28Feb67

Engineer Officer

Colonel Charles H. HORN,
U. S. Marine Corps
21Aug66-28Feb67

Adjutant

Major John T. REVILLE,
U. S. Marine Corps
30Jul66-28Feb67

Comptroller

Lieutenant Colonel
Melvin W. SNOW, U. S.
Marine Corps
19Jun66-28Feb67

Chaplain

Captain Earl V. LYONS,
U. S. Navy
11Oct66-28Feb67

Combat Information Bureau

Colonel Thomas M. FIELDS,
U. S. Marine Corps
1-8Feb67

Colonel Don G. DERRYBERRY,
U. S. Marine Corps
9-28Feb67

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Officer in Charge, Combat
Operations Center

Lieutenant Colonel
Robert E. YOUNG,
U. S. Marine Corps
22Dec66-28Feb67

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Food Services Officer

Major Willis P. HALL, Jr.
U. S. Marine Corps
23Aug66-28Feb67

Legal Officer

Colonel Robert B. NEVILLE,
U. S. Marine Corps
30Jul66-28Feb67

Surgeon

Captain Howard A. BAKER,
U. S. Navy
17Jun66-28Feb67

Dental Officer

Captain Kenneth L. MORGAN,
U. S. Navy
31Aug66-28Feb67

Motor Transportation Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Charles
A. TONNACLIFF, U. S. Marine
Corps
9Jul66-28Feb67

Ordnance Officer

Lieutenant Colonel John
C. THOMAS, U. S. Marine Corps
21Jul66-28Feb67

Headquarters Commandant

Colonel Jack R. RHOADES,
U. S. Marine Corps
16-28Feb67

Protocol Officer

Major John A. LIVINGSTONE,
U. S. Marine Corps
17Sep66-28Feb67

Special Services Officer


Colonel Carl A. SACHS,
U. S. Marine Corps
7Sep66-28Feb67

Transportation/Embarkation Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Eugene
A. SILVERTHORN, U. S.
Marine Corps
3Jul66-28Feb67

Inspector

Colonel Clay A. BOYD,
U. S. Marine Corps
12Jun66-28Feb67

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PART IISIGNIFICANT EVENTSI. INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL. During February III MAF Headquarters was located in East Danang, Republic of Vietnam. The average personnel strength for February was 79,503 an increase of 2,302 over the month of January.

B. ACTIVITIES. III MAF continued to be guided by COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (L013-66) dated 30 March 1966.

II. OVERALL EVALUATION.

A. In February the number of small unit operations conducted by III MAF forces continued to show increase over the totals for such operations for previous months. February small unit operations totaled 22,521 for another record month. This represents an increase of 1,594 over the number of such operations conducted during January. The volume of such operations has resulted in 784 contacts with the enemy. On these small unit operations 553 KIA (Confirmed) resulted.

February's rate of NVA/VC captured continues to reflect a high rate and an increase over the month of January. The 209 VC/NVA captured during February is the highest monthly rate realized by U. S. Marine Forces in Vietnam.

During the February "TET" period, 8-12 February, III MAF maintained its posture of readiness to react while holding defensive positions. During this four day truce period there were a total of 141 Viet Cong truce violations. Of these, 113 incidents were directed against units or personnel on the ground and 28 violations were initiated against aircraft. These violations resulted in friendly losses of 2 USMC KIA and 37 USMC WIA. Enemy casualties were 34 KIA (Confirmed), 29 KIA (Probable), 1 PW and 1 Detainee.

III. OPERATIONS.

A. DISCUSSION. During February III MAF continued to pursue three major objectives: 1 Destruction of Enemy Forces; 2. Revolutionary Development; 3. Base Defense.

(1) Destruction of Enemy Forces:

(a) During February III MAF conducted 13 battalion or larger sized operations. Two of these CHINOOK and DESOTO continued from January. Operation PRAIRIE terminated at 2400H on 31 January and was reinstated at 0001H on 1 February in the same geographical operating area.

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III MAF conducted 22,521 small unit operations resulting in 784 small unit contacts. III MAF in all operations, inflicted 1721 enemy KIA (Confirmed) and 2258 enemy KIA (Probable).

(b) There were 380 infantry battalion days of operation recorded by III MAF forces in February. This total compares with 354 infantry battalion days in January and 351 in December.

(2) Revolutionary Development:

(a) The 22,521 small unit operations (patrols, ambushes, clearing) saturated areas of guerrilla activity in support of ICTZ Revolutionary Development. Of the 13 major unit operations conducted in February, 7 were within TAOR's of substantial guerrilla activity. The damage inflicted upon the guerrilla during these operations restricted his ability to interfere with the progress of revolutionary development operations.

(b) There were 6 County Fair operations conducted during the month of February in areas made safe by III MAF operations. These operations resulted in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed), 3 VC KIA (Probable), 2 Detainees and 3849 Vietnamese Civilians screened. MEDCAP assistance was also provided to 2264 Vietnamese during these operations.

(3) Base Defense:

(a) The 1st Military Police Battalion continued to provide security for the Danang Air Base Complex. On 27 February the Danang Air Base was subjected to an attack by 140mm Rockets. This marked the first occasion in which the enemy employed this weapon in SVN. (Annex "A"). At Chu Lai, the Chu Lai Defense Command continued to provide security for that installation. The small unit operations mentioned in paragraph 1.a. above contributed greatly to the success of base defense in TAOR's.

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III. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

A. PRAIRIE II. During the period 1-28 February 1967, Operation PRAIRIE II continued in Quang Tri Province. During the period 1-27 February contact was light; however, on 28 February heavy contact was made with an estimated NVA Battalion, reinforced. Heavy contact continued throughout the day with Marine units receiving heavy mortar and small arms fire. Artillery and airstrike missions were called on enemy positions resulting in 3 NVA KIA (Confirmed) and 15 NVA KIA (Probable). Results for the period were: USMC: 12 KIA and 140 WIA; Enemy: 58 KIA (Confirmed), 58 KIA (Probable), 242 Detainees, 6 PW/VC, 2 PW/NVA, 21 Civil Defendants, 208 Innocent Civilians and 36 weapons captured.

B. DESOTO. During the period 1-28 February 1967, Operation DESOTO was conducted in the vicinity of Duc Pho. Contact during the period was light to moderate. At 011015H "A" Company, 1st Recon Battalion, platoon, observed 9 VC, called in artillery, resulting in 7 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 011410H this same unit observed 10 VC, called in artillery resulting in 6 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 021400H Co M/3/7th Mar FAC Team directed an airstrike on 30 VC near a hamlet. The VC ran into huts upon being observed. Results of this airstrike were 30 VC KIA (Probable), 14 Structures destroyed, 17 damaged, and 1 secondary explosion. At 061245H Co D, 1st Recon Bn, squad observed 15 VC, called in artillery, resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 281115H Co F/2/7th Mar search and destroy received heavy small arms fire, fire returned, airstrike and artillery called resulting in 8 VC KIA (Confirmed). Results for the period 1-28 February were: USMC: 20 KIA, 238 WIA; Enemy: 176 KIA (Confirmed), 437 KIA (Probable), 43 Detainees, 26 Civil Defendants, 7 Innocent Civilians, Cumulative results for Operation DESOTO for period 26 January 1967 to 28 February 1967 were: USMC: 31 KIA, 299 WIA; Enemy: 213 KIA (Confirmed), 484 KIA (Probable), 43 Detainees, 7 Innocent Civilians, 26 Civil Defendants, and 1 Weapon captured.

C. DECKHOUSE VI. At 200001H February 1967 operational control of Operation DECKHOUSE VI was passed to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force. Task Force X-Ray was designated as the control headquarters for this operation by the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force at 200001H February 1967. Contact during this period was light to moderate. At 200245H Co D/1/4th Mar received small arms and automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned and artillery was called

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in resulting in 6 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 11 VC KIA (Probable). At 201715H Co A/1/4th Mar patrol received moderate small arms fire. Fire was returned resulting in 5 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 211545H Co C/1/4th Mar platoon received fire from two directions, fire was returned, resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 222215H Co D/1/4th Mar platoon ambushed 12 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 3 VC KIA (Probable). At 241410H Co B/1/4th Mar search and destroy received 10 rounds of small arms fire, returned small arms fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 5 VC KIA (Probable). At 250930H Co A/1/4th Mar received 200 rounds of small arms fire, returned 600 rounds small arms fire, resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 4 VC KIA (Probable). At 251700H Co D/1/4th Mar moving into night defensive position received intensive small arms and automatic weapons fire, returned small arms fire and unit maneuvered so air and artillery could be called in on enemy positions. Later search of area revealed 18 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 271130H Co B/1/4th Mar search and destroy received 150 rounds of small arms fire from 15 VC. Small arms fire returned resulting in 10 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 280945H Co D/1/4th Mar observed an estimated 25 enemy in a trenchline. Co fired small arms and automatic weapons and LAAW resulting in 6 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 281110H a 1/4th Mar Aerial Observer in support of Co D/1/4th Mar observed 25 VC. Co D blocked while AO called in an airstrike. Results of this airstrike were 12 VC KIA (Confirmed). During the period 1-28 February 1967 there were 87 tactical air sorties, 99 Naval Gunfire missions and 9 artillery missions provided in support. Results for this period were: USMC: 5 KIA, 64 WIA; Enemy: 241 KIA (Confirmed), 165 KIA (Probable), 20 Detainees, 1 PW/VC, and 1 Weapon captured.

D. CLAY. During the period 1-3 February 1967, Operation CLAY was conducted in Quang Tin Province. Contact during this period was light. At 011355H Co C/1/5th Mar observed 18-20 armed enemy and received 400 rounds of small arms fire, returned 1000 rounds small arms fire, 28 rounds of 60mm Mortar, 15 rounds of M-79 and 2 rounds of 81mm Mortar, resulting in 7 USMC WIA (6 MEDEVAC). Enemy losses were: 1 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 1 VC KIA (Probable). This operation was characterized by company size combat patrols. There were no artillery, Naval Gunfire, or air sorties provided. Final results of this operation were: 10 USMC WIA; Enemy: 1 VC KIA (Confirmed), 2 VC KIA (Probable) and 2 Detainees.

E. SEARCY. During the period 1-9 February 1967, Operation SEARCY was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact

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during the period was light. At 061230H Co L/3/1st Mar received 2 rounds of M-79 and 100 rounds of small arms fire and automatic weapons fire. Returned 300 rounds of small arms fire, 5 rounds M-79 and called in artillery mission. During this operation several caves and tunnels were destroyed. Marine casualties resulted chiefly from booby traps and punji pits. Final results for this operation were: USMC: 16 WIA; Enemy: 7 KIA (Confirmed), 1 KIA (Probable), 18 PW/VC, 8 Civil Defendants, 10 Innocent Civilians and 44 detainees and 3 weapons captured.

F. INDEPENDENCE. During the period 1-9 February 1967, Operation INDEPENDENCE was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact during this operation was light to moderate. At 011600H Co A/1/26th Mar found a cave complex containing 7 VC. Enemy refused to leave the cave and an airstrike was called in resulting in destruction of the cave and 7 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 031445H Co B/1/1st Mar observed 15-20 VC, called in artillery resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed), at 031515H this same Co observed 40 enemy, called in an airstrike, resulting in 9 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 051105H Co H/2/4th Mar squad received a heavy volume of small arms fire, returned fire with all organic weapons resulting in 23 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 062350H Co B/1/26th Mar with TPS-21 noted movement of approximately 27 enemy, called in artillery mission, no further movement noted, results of this contact were: 4 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 23 VC KIA (Probable). During the period 071300H-071900H, a Recon unit reported 20 sightings of approximately 70 enemy in Grid Square (AT 8157). Directed a total of 85 rounds of 105mm and 2 air strikes. Aerial Observer observed 2 secondary explosions and 2 VC KIA (Confirmed), and 51 VC KIA (Probable). During this operation numerous tunnel and cave complexes were destroyed. Cumulative results of this operation were: USMC: 9 KIA, 35 WIA; Enemy: 139 KIA (Confirmed), 184 KIA (Probable), 20 PW/VC, 11 Returnees, 86 Detainees, 10 Civil Defendants and 12 Weapons captured.

G. CHINOOK. During the final period of Operation CHINOOK contact with the enemy was light. Numerous platoon and squad combat patrols were conducted during this period. Operation CHINOOK terminated on 16 February 1967. At 011645H a platoon from Co M/3/26th Mar observed 25-30 VC moving north. This force was taken under fire by Ontos and small arms fire. An Aerial Observer observed 1 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 1 VC KIA (Probable). At 021515H Co K/3/26th Mar OP called artillery mission on 5 VC, resulting in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed), 1 VC KIA (Probable). At 021534H same OP called artillery mission on 8-10 VC attempting to recover bodies, resulting in 5 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 2 VC KIA (Probable). At 061915H Co K/3/26th

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Mar OP observed 25 VC, called in an artillery mission, resulting in 20 VC KIA (Probable). At 062130H Co K/3/26th Mar FO and FAC observed 22 VC. Area was illuminated and a strafing mission was called utilizing C-47 aircraft with mini-gun, resulting in 22 VC KIA (Probable). At 081050H a 2 man recon element received 10 rounds of small arms fire from 7 VC. Returned small arms fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 101730H a platoon from Co M/3/26th Mar observed 3 VC. When the VC closed to within 15 yards the platoon opened fire with small arms. Platoon received small arms and 60mm Mortar fire. Approximately 30-40 VC attempted to advance under cover of mortar fire but were pinned down by heavy volume of small arms, 60mm mortar, 3.5" Rocket and M-79 fire, resulting in 5 VC KIA (Confirmed), and 8 VC KIA (Probable). At 121200H Co M/3/26th Mar observed 4 VC in a bunker. Artillery mission was called resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed) and a bunker destroyed. Results for the period 1-16 February 1967 were: USMC: 11 KIA, 22 WIA; Enemy: 43 KIA (Confirmed), 118 KIA (Probable), 19 Detainees, 5 PW/VC, 121 Innocent Civilians and 10 Weapons captured. During the 137 battalion days of this operation there were 19 Naval Gunfire missions, 7,533 artillery missions and 272 tactical air sorties provided. Cumulative results for this operation were: USMC: 25 KIA, 185 WIA; Enemy: 261 KIA (Confirmed), 528 KIA (Probable), 706 Detainees, 5 PW/VC, 10 Civil Defendants, 685 Innocent Civilians and 58 weapons captured.

H. STONE. During the period 12-22 February 1967, Operation STONE was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact during the period was light to moderate. The operation was characterized by company, platoon, and smaller size sweep operations and patrols. At 171730H Co I/3/1st Mar platoon sweep force observed and received fire from 12 VC. Two hundred rounds of small arms fire was returned, resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 181350H Co D/1/1st Mar blocking force observed 7 VC, fired 20 rounds of small arms fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 1 VC KIA (Probable). At 181600H Co D/1/1st Mar platoon sweep force observed 8 VC, fired 200 rounds small arms resulting in 8 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 181630H Co E/2/1st Mar blocking force observed 12 VC, fired 100 rounds small arms resulting in 5 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 2 VC KIA (Probable). At 191530H Co E/2/1st Mar blocking force observed 10 VC, fired 100 rounds of small arms and 4 rounds M-79 resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 191800H Co C/1/1st Mar sweep force found fresh graves containing 42 Vietnamese males, 42 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 191630H Co B/1/1st Mar sweep force observed 45 VC with automatic weapons and 3 machine guns. Small arms fire was exchanged, resulting in 15 VC KIA (Probable). At 191600H Co D/1/1st Mar sweep force found 5 VC hiding in the grass, and fired small arms, resulting in 5 VC KIA (Confirmed). At

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192130H Co E/2/1st Mar blocking force observed 10 VC, fired small arms, 19 rounds of M-79 resulting in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 3 VC KIA (Probable). During this operation 48 tactical air sorties, 25 Naval Gunfire missions and 294 artillery missions were provided. Results for this operation were: USMC: 9 KIA, 77 WIA; Enemy: 291 KIA (Confirmed), 112 KIA (Probable), 125 Detainees, 65 PW/VC, 43 Civil Defendants, 30 Innocent Civilians and 23 Weapons captured.

I. RIO GRANDE. During the period 17-22 February 1967, Operation RIO GRANDE was conducted in Quang Ngai Province. Contact during the entire operation was light. At 191115H Co C/1/5th Mar observed 1 VC, fired small arms resulting in 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 201045H Co A/1/5th Mar Fire Team patrol received 9 rounds small arms fire from 3 VC, returned small arms fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 201845H Co D/1/5th Mar search and sweep found a cave with 3 VC inside. Two VC refused to come out of the cave. One M-26 grenade was thrown into the cave, resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 1 Detainee. During this operation 99 tactical air sorties and 269 artillery missions were provided in support. Cumulative results for this operation were: USMC: 4 KIA, 16 WIA; Enemy: 7 KIA (Confirmed), 7 KIA (Probable), 9 Detainees and 2 Innocent Civilians.

J. CHINOOK II. During the period 17-28 February 1967, Operation CHINOOK II continued in Thua Thien Province. During the period contact was light to moderate. At 172025H Co I/3/26th Mar platoon ambushed 15-20 VC, utilizing small arms and grenades, resulting in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 201730H Co L/3/26th Mar squad called an artillery mission on 4 VC, resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 201835H 3/26th Mar OP called an artillery mission on 4 VC, resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 211640H a platoon of Co A/1/9th Mar on a sweep east of the "Street Without Joy", accompanied by Dr. Bernard FALL detonated an unknown type mine resulting in the death of Dr. FALL and a Marine Combat Correspondent. At 240730H Co M/3/26th Mar platoon fired on 11 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA (Confirmed). At 251215H Co M/3/26th Mar ambushed 12 VC, resulting in 10 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 2 PW/VC. At 270710H Co M/3/26th Mar observed an estimated 110 VC moving south in groups of 10-15, fired small arms and called in artillery mission, resulting in 2 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 15 VC KIA (Probable). Results for this period were: USMC: 9 KIA, 60 WIA; Enemy: 48 KIA (Confirmed), 145 KIA (Probable), 94 Detainees, 12 PW/VC, 4 PW/NVA, 68 Innocent Civilians and 22 Weapons.

K. PULASKI. During the period 24-27 February 1967, Operation PULASKI was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact during this period was light. At 261850H a platoon from Co

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H/2/4thMar received 8 rounds of small arms fire, returned 20 rounds of small arms fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf). At 261030H Co H/2/4thMar sweep force found a rice bin containing 5 tons of rice. At 261600H Co F/2/4thMar sweep force while searching a tunnel complex found 8 enemy bangalore torpedoes, pressure fuses and 250 feet of time fuse. At 261300H 2/4thMar CP personnel found and destroyed 22 bunkers. Cumulative results for this operation were: USMC: 2 KIA, 3 WIA; Enemy: 1 KIA (Conf), 1 KIA (Prob), 2 Detainees, 1 Returnee and 1 Civil Defendant.

L. LAFAYETTE. On 26 February 1967 Operation LAFAYETTE commenced, in Quang Nam Province, continuing through 28 February 1967. Contact during this period was light. At 261850H a platoon from Co A/1/1stMar observed enemy in a boat attempting to leave the cordoned area, 3 rounds of 90mm were fired on the enemy, and a direct hit caused a secondary explosion, resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf). At 280930H Co A/1/1stMar platoon sweep force received 5 rounds of small arms fire. Twenty-five enemy were observed running north from sweep force, sweep force fired 125 rounds of small arms resulting in 18 VC KIA (Conf), and 11 Detainees. At 281130H Co K/3/1stMar platoon sweep force found 2 camouflaged fighting holes. Smoke grenades were thrown into the holes but were thrown out by the enemy. Enemy ran from the holes and were fired upon by the sweep force, resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf). At 281630H Co K/3/1stMar sweep force found 3 spider holes, each containing 1 VC. CS grenades were thrown in to the holes with negative results. M-26 grenades were then utilized, resulting in 3 VC KIA (Conf). Results for this period were: USMC: 1 KIA, 4 WIA; Enemy: 34 KIA(Conf), 1 KIA(Prob), 25 Detainees, 3 Innocent Civilians and 1 PW/VC.

M. LANOKE. During the period 26-28 February 1967 Operation LANOKE was conducted in Quang Nam Province. Contact during this operation was insignificant. There were several incidents of Marine units receiving small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy snipers. Marine casualties resulted from small arms fire and booby traps. Results for this operation were: USMC: 5 WIA; Enemy: 2 Detainees.

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IV. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

A. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. During the month of February, the enemy's primary efforts were again concentrated in northern Quang Tri Province, within the Danang TAOR, and in eastern Quang Ngai Province. The several major attacks during the latter part of the month, together with the marked increase in the number and severity of mortar attacks, reflects the major stockpiling of supplies accomplished by the enemy during the TET cease fire. In the north, his active screening and reconnaissance of the central and eastern sectors reflected gradually increasing strength and culminated in the southerly movement of a probable regimental size force into the area west northwest of Cam Lo. At the same time, small scale enemy infiltration activity, particularly in the western sector, continued at a fairly steady rate.) Enemy efforts within the Danang TAOR were highlighted by the first-time employment of the 140mm Rocket in an attack on the Danang Air Base, (See Annex A), although the southeastern portion of the TAOR continued to reflect substantial enemy activity aimed at maintaining control of the densely populated food-producing region. In Quang Ngai Province, the enemy committed probable regimental size forces in separate attacks against ROKMC and ARVN units during mid-month, while maintaining a high level of harassing activity in the Mo Duc and Duc Pho areas. Elsewhere in I CTZ, enemy activity consisted of more limited harassing actions against small and isolated units located, for the most part, along the major lines of communication. Interrogation reports continued to indicate that the enemy is facing serious morale problems and food shortages, and increasing difficulty in replacing personnel losses.

B. QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND THE DMZ AREA. Enemy activity in northern Quang Tri Province and the DMZ area varied from light to moderate during the early and middle parts of the month to surprisingly heavy during the latter part of the month. Of special significance north of the DMZ were the aerial observation and photographic readouts which revealed substantial truck and boat traffic conducted in that area during the TET truce period (8-12 February). It is suspected therefore that the enemy took advantage of this period to enhance his resupply and personnel replacement effort to support future operations, particularly in northern I Corps.

The most significant contacts in north central Quang Tri took place approximately two weeks after the truce period and were precipitated by a USMC reconnaissance patrol ambush sprung on 27 February which resulted in 4 NVA KIA (Confirmed).

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Shortly thereafter an enemy unit estimated to be of company size attempted to surround the patrol resulting in the patrol withdrawing to the south toward friendly lines. Within a short time, elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines became heavily engaged with elements of estimated regimental size enemy forces, with at least two battalions of the 812th Regiment of the 324B Division in contact, reinforced with engineer and artillery (mortar) elements. After initially engaging friendly units from well fortified positions and inflicting moderate friendly casualties, primarily as a result of 82mm mortar fires, the enemy was eventually driven off toward his sanctuary in the DMZ by concentrated air, artillery and USMC infantry pressure, abetted by the 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion occupying a blocking position to the northeast. During the pursuit, the enemy left numerous bodies behind, some of them booby-trapped and many of them stripped of all clothing and weapons. Casualties among the disorganized enemy continued to mount and after six days of contact totaled some 536 KIA (Confirmed) and 312 KIA (Probable). Captured weapons and equipment included both 82mm and 60mm mortars, several light machine guns, one .50 caliber machine gun, gas masks, grenades, mines and blasting caps.

Activity in northeastern Quang Tri was also quiet until the latter part of the month when heavy, though inaccurate mortar fires were delivered against the newly established Provisional Artillery Group, the Con Thien OP, the Gio Linh OP and the Trung Luong District Headquarters.

Ground reconnaissance sightings in northwestern Quang Tri above the Khe Sanh area varied from light to moderate during the month tapering off toward the end of the month. There were no significant sightings or contacts in the Ba Long or Da Krong River valleys. Activity in coastal Quang Tri continued to consist mainly of harassing mortar and small unit ground actions against ARVN and PF units. Additionally, sabotage efforts were directed against six different highway bridges resulting in substantial damage to 2 bridges and partial damage to 2 others.

Additional aerial photography flown during the latter part of the month revealed the following new installations; two communication antennas in the northeastern DMZ and 4 artillery pieces, 44 occupied LAA positions, 79 unoccupied LAA positions, one probable electronics site and three possible supply areas just north of the DMZ.

C. THUA THIEN PROVINCE AND THE PHU BAI TAOR. Activity throughout the province and especially in the Phu Bai TAOR

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continued to be light to moderate during the entire month. Although the enemy continued his platoon and company size harassing attacks primarily against ARVN, RF and PF units along major lines of communications, the duration and intensity of these actions were extremely limited in scope. Sabotage efforts were directed against three bridges and one culvert during the month causing substantial damage to 2 of the bridges. Incidents of terrorism continued to be aimed at village and hamlet chiefs resulting in several assassinations. Two civilian buses were also victimized by mining incidents causing moderate personnel casualties.

Operation CHINOOK II continued with minor contact, most of it generated through friendly rather than enemy actions. Reconnaissance sightings predominated to the west of the CHINOOK II operating area and involved small groups of enemy in most cases.

D. QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND THE DANANG TAOR. Enemy activity in Quang Nam Province and the Danang TAOR continued at a moderate to heavy pace during the month and was highlighted by the 27 February rocket attack against the Danang Air Base. (See Annex A).

Other activity within the TAOR was highlighted by Operation INDEPENDENCE which was conducted in the southwestern part of the TAOR, and Operation STONE which was conducted in the southern part of the TAOR. These operations, which terminated on 9 and 22 February 1967 respectively, accounted for 430 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 296 VC KIA (Probable). Noteworthy is the fact that enemy activity in these areas have been extremely limited since the termination of these operations. Over 40 percent of the VC initiated incidents within the TAOR involved the use of mines and booby traps. One incident of particular interest involved the killing of three female guerrillas in an engagement between elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and an unknown number of VC.

Ground reconnaissance sightings during the month were extremely heavy and predominated below the south and southwestern sections of the TAOR. Most of these involved the spillover of fleeing VC from the INDEPENDENCE and STONE operating areas who, upon being sighted, were taken under fire by Marine artillery and airstrikes.

Terrorist and sabotage activities continued to be more prevalent in Quang Nam than in any other province. Several

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village officials were assassinated during the month and one refugee village was attacked by two VC squads resulting in 30 refugees being injured. Additionally, several bridges and culverts were extensively damaged by enemy sabotage efforts and a USMC crane was extensively damaged by a satchel charge.

E. QUANG TIN PROVINCE AND THE CHU LAI TAOR. Enemy activity in all of Quang Tin Province and within the Chu Lai TAOR continued at a comparatively low level during the period. Most of this limited activity was focused on the Tam Ky area which received several harassing type mortar and ground attacks resulting in light personnel casualties and structural damage. Ground reconnaissance sightings along the TAOR periphery varied from light to moderate throughout the period with no significant trends noted.

Sabotage and terrorism continued at a normal pace with several bridges and culverts in the Tam Ky area being temporarily put out of commission and two village officials being assassinated during the period.

F. QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. Activity in Quang Ngai Province continued at a moderate pace during the period and was highlighted by the stunning defeat the enemy suffered in attempting to overrun an isolated company of the 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade of the ROKMC on 15-16 February. After subjecting the company to an intense mortar and recoilless rifle attack during the early morning hours of 15 February, an estimated VC force of three battalions launched a three pronged attack with the main effort from the southwest. Though the company perimeter was initially penetrated, a vicious Korean counter-attack supported by mortar and artillery fire eventually restored the defensive perimeter and forced the VC into a hasty withdrawal where they were taken under fire by fixed wing aircraft utilizing some 4000 pounds of napalm and 8000 pounds of bombs. Of particular significance was the enemy use of flamethrowers in an unsuccessful attempt to ignite ammunition bunkers once the perimeter was penetrated. Final results of this action were 243 VC KIA (Confirmed), 60 VC KIA (Probable), 28 Rifles, 5 Grenades, 10 Rocket Launchers, 3 Flamethrowers, 1 60mm Mortar, several Machine Guns and a large quantity of Bangalore Torpedoes captured. Prisoners confirmed the participating enemy units to be the 40th, 60th and the 70th Battalions of the 1st VC Regiment.

A few days later, on 18-19 February, ARVN elements of the 1st, 7th and 8th Airborne Battalions participating in Lien Ket 81 intercepted the remaining remnants of the 40th VC Battalion withdrawing from the Korean contact and again severely mauled this enemy unit plus portions of the 21st NVA Regiment. Total enemy casualties in this operation during the period were;

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810 VC KIA (Confirmed), 157 VC KIA (Probable), 67 PWs and 157 weapons captured, including some 33 crew served weapons.

Operations DESOTO and DECKHOUSE VI continued in southern Quang Ngai and were emphasized by an extremely large number of light contacts. It is evident that the enemy is unwilling to surrender his hold on this area without a fight.

Elsewhere in Quang Ngai Province, enemy activity continued at a moderate pace. Ground reconnaissance sightings were most predominate to the northwest of the DESOTO area and continued to indicate heavy enemy activity in this area. CIDG patrols operating from Tra Bong, Ha Thanh, Minh Long and Ba To all encountered company size contacts during the month with the Ba To contacts resulting in substantial enemy casualties.

Mortar attacks during the period were delivered against the Quang Ngai airfield and the Mo Duc Subsector Headquarters inflicting only minor damage and casualties in both incidents. RF and PF units throughout the province were subjected to harassing type ground attacks during the period resulting in two PF positions being overrun and substantial friendly casualties.

Sabotage and terrorism also continued at a normal pace throughout the province with several bridges and culverts receiving substantial damage and several village/hamlet officials were assassinated.

All available intelligence continued to indicate that the enemy will maintain a high level of activity throughout Quang Ngai with emphasis on harassment type attacks against isolated outposts and security elements.

G. NEW ENEMY TACTICS, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

(1) During a KMC operation conducted on 5 February, some two-thirds of the 74 VC casualties were wearing ARVN type camouflage uniforms with an embroidered patch on the breast pocket inscribed with the words "Kill American Imperialists."

(2) During an attack against the 11th Company, ROKMC Brigade, the VC were observed employing flamethrowers against storage bunkers. Several of these flamethrowers were captured and identified as the Soviet Model LPO, the newest flamethrower in the Soviet inventory. This was the first report of the employment of flamethrowers in I Corps. Noteworthy was the fact that all were targeted against bunkers/buildings and not

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personnel.

(3) On the morning of 27 February the rocket attack on the Danang Air Base marked the first occasion in which the enemy employed the 140mm Soviet Rocket in SVN. (See Annex A).

H. ENEMY ACTION STATISTICS. Statistics pertaining to enemy activities in USMC and Korean Marine Corps operating areas including combat bases for January and February are as follows:

	<u>Enemy Initiated Activity</u>	
	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>
Attacks	6	1
Ambushes	1	2
Assaults by Fire	34	25
Harassing Fires	557	468
Mines/Booby Traps	294	163
Sabotage	18	36
Terrorism	12	13
Anti-Aircraft Fire	<u>836</u>	<u>840</u>
TOTALS	1758	1548

	<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	
	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>
KIA (Conf)	962	1721
KIA (Prob)	1238	2258
Detainees	1371	1200
NVA PW	2	7
VC PW	107	202
NVA Returnees	0	1
VC Returnees	17	54
Civil Defendants	145	129
Innocent Civilians	1093	1134
Individual Weapons Captured	199	152
Crew Served Weapons Captured	5	7

I. WEATHER. From 1 through 5 February a high pressure area off the China Coast created a southerly flow of air resulting in a cold front which produced extreme cloud cover and limited visibility with light drizzle and fog predominant over most of I Corps. By 5 February, the high pressure area had moved over the southern portion of North Vietnam resulting in early morning fog and stratus over the highland areas of I Corps which usually

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dissipated by noon. By 9 February, this high pressure area had shifted eastward creating favorable conditions and unrestricted visibility throughout most of the I Corps area. However, beginning on 14 February, another cold front moved in causing rain, gusty winds and low level turbulence which severely limited normal air operations. By 16 February this front had veered to the northeast causing restricted visibility and occasional haze during the morning hours and generally excellent weather conditions during the remainder of the day. During the remainder of the month, excellent weather persisted over the entire northern part of I Corps with the exception of light fog and stratus during the early morning hours. Weather data for the period is as follows:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	72	74	78	79
Low	62	63	64	67
Rainfall(Total inches)	.55	1.52	.18	1.48
Visibility (Average miles)	6	5	8	7
Wind (Acg knots)	7	6	6	8

J. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

(1) Changes to Confirmed and Probable Units.

(a) The following units have been dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle as of 282400H Feb67:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
K41 Company	Thua Thien	95	Confirmed
K105 Company	Thua Thien	90	Confirmed

(2) Enemy Unit Recapitulation as of 28 February 1967:

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>
1 Military Region Hq	1 Regiment Hq
1 Military Sub-Region Hq	1 Infantry Battalion
2 Division Hq	6 Separate Companies

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8 Regiment Hq
 35 Infantry Battalions
 13 Other Battalions
 29 Separate Companies

(3) Comparison of January/February Estimated
 Enemy Strength in I CIZ.

	<u>As of 31 Jan</u>	<u>As of 28 Feb</u>
Confirmed VC/NVA Units	29,230	26,885
Probable VC/NVA Units	1,075	1,075
Guerrillas	20,641	17,141

K. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Propaganda and Subversion. Propaganda and subversive activity showed a slight increase during the reporting period with propaganda leaflets carrying the usual VC themes of demanding the U. S. put an end to the "Johnson-McNamara, dirty war of aggression". Additionally many leaflets were found which directed that the VC must honor the TET (8-12 February) truce.

(2) Terrorism. There was an increase in the number of terrorist acts committed during the period. These acts continued to be directed against village and hamlet officials. Significant items of interest included the assassination of a Vietnamese National who had refused to fight against the French and was accused of providing information on VC activities to U. S. Forces, and the abduction of a former communist party member who had defected to the GVN authorities in 1958 and was reportedly providing Allied Forces with information on the VC.

(3) Espionage and Sabotage. The month of February showed a sharp increase in the number of sabotage incidents, which continued to be directed against the lines of communications. Espionage activity continued to be of the low level variety.

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V. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION.

A. STRENGTH. The average personnel strength for III MAF during February 1967 was:

1. III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters

	OFFICERS			ENLISTED		
	USMC	USN	USA	USMC	USN	USA
HQ III MAF	148	10		317	6	
H&S Company	10			273	3	
Sub Unit #1						
1st Radio Bn	7			140		
29th CA Company			30			88
244th PsyOps Co.			15			47

2. III Marine Amphibious Force

USMC	OFFICERS			USMC	ENLISTED		
	USN	USA	USAF		USN	USA	USAF
4,438	362	232	16	68,467	2,532	2,338	24

B. CASUALTIES. III MAF Casualties were:

1. Battle

KIA		WIA		DOW		MIA	
USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
119	6	1047	56	21	0	1	0

2. Non-Battle

DEATHS		INJ/ILL	
USMC	USN	USMC	USN
4	0	120	5

C. SPECIAL SERVICES.

1. Recreation Hill (Hill 327)

(a) Indoor Theater. The structure is completed except for the sound proof baffles and the air conditioning. Both have been ordered but are not at the site. Theater seats are being installed. Present plans are to officially open the theater at 1330 on 18 March 1967.

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(b) Library. The library building is about 99 percent completed. Metal book shelves are on order. The supply of books has not arrived but the shipping status is being determined. The problem of obtaining experienced personnel to operate the library remains however, assistance for organizing the library has been requested from COMUSMACV.

(c) Beer Garden and Bandstand. The beer garden and bandstand were officially opened at 1400 on 26 February 1967. It is planned to have weekly band concerts.

(d) Handball Courts. The handball courts have been opened and are available for use.

(e) Hobby Shops. The shells are about 80 percent completed. Equipment for photographic labs, ceramics, lapidary crafts is being ordered.

(f) Bowling Alley. The footings are being poured. The air conditioner has been ordered but there is no shipping data available.

2. China Beach. The refreshment stand at the Beach is open and has proven to be very popular. They sell hot dogs peanuts, soft drinks and beer.

3. Chu Lai in-country R&R Center. Sites for all structures at the Center have been approved and work will commence in the near future.

4. Phu Bai/Dong Ha Areas. The priority listing for military construction of recreational facilities has been received.

5. R&R Program (Out-of-Country):

(a) The following are the statistics of the total III MAF and I Corps R&R usage for each out-of-country R&R site:

<u>SITE</u>	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>I CORPS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	968	418	1386
Hong Kong	955	474	1429
Singapore	294	84	378
Manila	273	153	426
Okinawa	231	39	270
Taipei	972	395	1367

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Kuala Lumpur	357	107	464
Hawaii	885	344	1229
Tokyo	790	373	1163

D. CHAPLAIN.

1. 10-11 February - Bishop Thomas Wright, Episcopal Bishop of Wilmington, North Carolina visited the command for the purpose of meeting with the Episcopal Chaplains serving in I Corps and visiting Civic Action Projects. Bishop Wright was entertained at Dinner 10 February 1967 by the Commanding General.

2. 17-18 February - Dr Harry Wood, Executive Secretary of the Department of Chaplains and Service Personnel, United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America visited the command for the purpose of meeting with the Presbyterian Chaplains serving in I Corps and to visit Civic Action Projects. Dr Wood was entertained at Dinner 17 February in the III MAF Officers Mess.

3. 25-28 February - Dr Robert Humphrey and LtCol J. Leydon USA, of the Eighth Army Research Unit, Seoul, Korea, visited the command and conducted briefings to staffs working on the Personal Response Project.

4. An attitude study conducted amongst members of ARVN, Popular Forces, and Marines attached to Combined Action Units was completed.

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VI. LOGISTICS.

A. The passing of the northeast monsoon was the most significant factor affecting logistics in the past month. Operations in Southern ICTZ necessitated the use of helicopters to off load LST type shipping in replenishing our southern most LSA at Duc Pho. The tonnages shipped to Northern ICTZ ports by shallow draft shipping increased due to improved weather. A greater use of land LOC was made possible during the month due to improved weather. Of note was the opening of the Liberty Road from Danang to An Hoa. During the period particular emphasis has been placed on the utilization of land LOC's for logistic purposes on a regular basis.

B. Dental

(1) Dental civic action was conducted in ARVN by III MAF Dental Companies during the period 1-28 February 1967.

Patients treated - 3,277
Dental Procedures - 6,913

(2) A mobile dental trailer (with airlift capability) developed at MCAF, New River is currently undergoing field tests with units engaged in Operation DeSoto.

C. Embarkation

(1) During the month 48 MSTs ships, 21 Navy ships debarked/embarked cargo and/or personnel at Danang and 44 LST's moored at Chu Lai.

(2) Surface operations along the coast and in Danang Harbor were stopped for 5 days during the month, due to adverse weather conditions. Air operations to Khe Sanh were halted 3 days during the period because of poor weather.

(3) A total of 93 LCU trips to Dong Ha and 98 LCU trips to Hue were conducted during the month in support of forces in Northern ICTZ.

(4) Surface cargo throughout for the month was as follows:

	TOTAL		DAILY AVERAGE	
	S/T	M/T	S/T	M/T
Danang	141,195	241,203	5,043	8,614
Chu Lai	41,354	64,645	1,477	2,308

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(c) The transportation of M8A1 matting to upgrade the An Hoa airfield began by air and road.

(d) On 18 February 1967 a bridge was blown, coordinates YD 298565, closing Route #1; the following day a 98' M4T6 bridge was installed opening the Route.

(3) A 45' M4T6 fixed span was installed on 26 February 1967 at coordinates YD 229623.

E. Fiscal

(1) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller prepared Force Order 5420.4, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program and Force Bulletin 5120 of 12 February 1967, Subj: Savings Bond/Savings Deposit Participation, for publication.

(2) An allocation of 25,283,000 piasters was prepared for the Commanding General, Force Logistic Command for procurement of rock for use in all III MAF areas. A message was prepared requesting the Commanding General, Force Logistic Command to submit a request to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for \$400,000 for procurement of rock from RMK and other sources during FY-67.

(3) An allocation of an additional \$800.00 was requested from CG, FMFPac for OI community relations funds during 3rd Quarter FY-67.

(4) Budget estimates were prepared for submission to CG, FMFPac concerning Claims Defense Funds and OI Community Relations Funds for FY-67, 68 and 69.

F. Food Service

(1) During February 150 milk dispensing machines were distributed in the Danang area. The distribution listing for the remaining 264 machines was submitted to Force Logistic Command.

(2) On 17 February, the III MAF Subsistence Operational Analysis Report was submitted to CMC for the month of January. The issue of "A" and "B" rations totaled \$2,664,800.61 and the cost of MCI's was \$1,364,581.70. The number of messes in operation was 180.

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G. Motor Transport

(1) The initial shipment of M35A2C, 2½ ton cargo trucks arrived in RVN. Distribution of vehicles to units concerned will start immediately.

H. Ordnance

(1) Available Supply Rates were updated during February. The ASR's in effect are as follows:

DODAC	ITEM	ASR
C226	81mm Illum	2.2
C444 & Subs	105mm HE	32
D544	155mm HE	17
L312	Sig Illum WSP	MarDiv 7.4/InfBn other .1/100 Indiv
L495	Trip Flare	MarDiv 18.5/Inf Div .21/100 Indiv

(2) The Force Ordnance Officer and Assistant Force Ordnance Officer attended a ground Ordnance conference at Camp Courtney Okinawa 15-17 February 1967. Major topics discussed were: Phase-in of the M-16 Rifle/Evacuation of the M-14 Rifle; Class V reporting; Class V allowances; Cannons and tubes for artillery weapons; and 106mm Recoilless Rifle malfunctions.

(3) The 286 modified Stoner weapons to be field tested by units of the First Marine Division arrived in RVN on 19 February 1967. The weapons have been distributed to "L" Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Division as well as to elements of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. Guided by a plan of test issued by MCLFDC. These units will evaluate the modified Stoner weapons under combat conditions. Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines completed training and moved into the field on 1 March 1967.

(4) Based on the continuing incidence of unintentional firings of the Ontos mounted 106mm Recoilless Rifles, a Force Order was proposed on 28 February 1967 which sets forth guidance on inspection and employment of the Ontos.

I. Surgeon

(1) The total daily average patient load for the two medical battalions and the 1st Hospital Company was 312 with a

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total of 1,648 patients admitted, 367 patients were evacuated out of country and 1,022 pints of whole blood expended to use.

(2) The 1st Hospital Company, Chu Lai is still admitting only medical type patients due to non-completion of operating room facilities. The average daily census was 54 for a month, with length of patient stay per discharge of 3 days.

(3) The 3rd Medical Battalion units are situated as follows:

Dong Ha:	Co D(-)	30 Bed capacity
Phu Bai:	Co A	60 Bed capacity
Danang:	Co C	60 Bed capacity

(4) The 1st Medical Battalion units are situated as follows:

Operation DeSoto:	Co B(-)	
Danang:	Co A & B(-)	90 Bed capacity
Chu Lai:	Co C & D	120 Bed capacity

(5) The USS REPOSE supported Operation DeSoto 1-8 February 1967. The REPOSE returned to RVN from Subic Bay on 22 February 1967 and resumed its normal schedule. The average daily load for the REPOSE was 333 with a length of patient stay per discharge of 25 days.

J. Supply

(1) As part of the effort to improve supply procedures the following Force Orders were published in February 1967:

(a) Force Order 4440.1A, Garrison Property Control Procedures.

(b) Force Order 4050.1B, Shipment of Personal Effects and Baggage.

(2) The supply status of tropical boots has improved rapidly. Infantry, Reconnaissance and Engineer units have now been issued two pair per individual and FLC has invited requisitions from using units to equip other III MAF organizations, with one pair per individual. The situation with regards to lightweight utilities remains tight, with issues limited to Infantry, Reconnaissance and Engineer units; however, greatly increased shipments are expected in 90 days.

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(3) The Force Supply Officer, attended the FMFPac Periodic Logistic Conference in Hawaii, 23-25 February 1967.

(4) The following significant correspondence was released during this reporting period:

(a) III MAF msg 031150Z Feb67(C) passed requirement to III MAF Commands to clear procurement actions in Singapore through channels.

(b) III MAF msg 031438Z Feb67 furnished CG, FMFPac with specification for Emergency Ration.

(c) III MAF msg 101116Z Feb67 requested FMFPac relax requirement to segregate brass and steel cartridge cases being returned to CONUS.

(d) III MAF msg 170838Z Feb67 published change to Force Bulletin 4010 regarding new reporting procedure for recovery and disposition of empty cartridge cases.

(e) III MAF msg 170840Z Feb67 advised FLC to submit report of M2A1 ammo boxes to COMUSMACV on the 5th of each month until further notice.

(f) III MAF ltr 21/ecm 4050 of 21 Feb 1967 stressed importance of timely shipment of personal effects by III MAF Commands.

(g) III MAF msg 231232Z Feb67 required III MAF Commands to report status of tent stocks and requirements.

(h) III MAF msg 261048Z Feb67 summarized Body Armor Rehabilitation within III MAF and requested commanders to continue command attention to turn-ins.

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VII. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. A decrease in total message traffic through the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center was noted during February. Traffic totals follow:

I	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>DECREASE</u>
Incoming	43822	42652	
Outgoing	47988	46028	
Total	91810	88680	3130

B. Message traffic through the COC Communication Center showed a significant increase during February. Traffic totals follow:

	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
Incoming	4110	3908	
Outgoing	2936	4237	
Total	7046	8145	1099

C. The significant event during February was the early morning rocket attack on Danang on 27 February. Several rounds landed in the 37th Signal Battalion compound which contained the Danang Interim Relay and Danang Technical Control. The relay was completely destroyed. Five Marine teletype circuits were affected. Wire and cable in the compound was damaged. Although all teletype circuits except to 3rd Marine Division were out, restoral was prompt and disruption was minimal. Emergency systems were activated and contact maintained with all units except 2nd Brigade ROKMC. Contact was reestablished via TF-XRAY with 2nd Brigade ROKMC in the interim. Within 24 hours 95% of damage to cable had been repaired and circuits restored.

D. III Marine Amphibious Force CEO representatives attended conferences in Saigon on Autodin, Danang Permanent Relay, Long Lines Communication Channel Requirements.

E. Continued efforts to improve communication center capability in III MAF resulted in the distribution of additional fixed plant teletype equipment and spare parts.

F. A report on final test of AC Power Supply for the AN/PRC-25 radio was submitted to CG, FMFPac.

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VIII. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civil Affairs Program remain the same.

B. I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL. The council met four times during February. Discussions regarding Revolutionary Development Teams, procuring and stowage of fertilizer, and the City of Danang were of primary interest to the council.

(1) The council received a report that, in order to support the increased emphasis on RD by the GVN, the U. S. mission created the Office of Civil Operations to supervise and coordinate all U. S. Government civilian support of the RD program. Prior to the establishment of OCO, civilian agencies supported the RD plan as individual agencies and coordinated their efforts through mutual agreement, when required. The three principal civilian agencies effected by this consolidation are the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and the Combined Studies Division, MACV (CSD). Essentially these agencies will continue their former functions under the management direction of OCO. The OCO organization of ICTZ includes the Regional Offices in Danang, OCO Representatives in each province, and currently a program to provide OCO Representatives for selected districts has been implemented.

(2) The council received a report that plans were being made to provide technical training for cadre elements of the Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams, located within Quang Nam Province. It was also announced that a visit to Hoi An by III MAF G-5 and the OCO Regional Agricultural Representative was planned to assist with the establishment of this program. The program will begin with the training of Agricultural Cadre and then be later extended to provide technical training in other functional areas. Quang Nam Province plans to implement this plan as a pilot program. Other provinces will be expected to implement similar programs, based upon techniques developed in Quang Nam. OCO Representatives have been alerted to assist with the development of this program.

(3) OCO Regional Agricultural Representative briefed the council on the current status of the joint project of supplying fertilizer for use in ICTZ in support of the winter rice-planting season. This project, initiated in mid-November, has resulted in delivery of 5,700 tons to Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces and 4,000 tons to the 3 northern provinces.

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The project was conducted under the very adverse conditions attendant to the monsoon season. It is anticipated that the ICTZ spring rice crop yield will be increased by 20-30 thousand tons as a result of this successful project. Plans have been made to program import of 5,000 tons of fertilizer per month into ICTZ, during July-December of this year, to be used the next winter planting period, thereby avoiding the problems experienced during the past few months. A major bonus effort was achieved during execution of the project in that the GVN National Agricultural Credit Organization (NACO) representatives received invaluable experience in moving sizeable amounts of fertilizer through the port of Danang. Prior to this time NACO contended that movement of 200 tons through the port in one day was the limit of its capability; on 2 February, NACO moved 860 tons through the port. During a 7 day period, which included a weekend and a half day holiday, an average of 600 tons per day was achieved. This experience illustrates the excellent training obtained, and further points out the excellent team-work which was developed between the OCO Representatives and their Vietnamese counterparts. A shipment arriving in Danang on 13 February completed fertilizer imports for this period, and no further shipments are scheduled until July 1967. The Danang NACO warehouse was filled to capacity, and space for storage of the fertilizer for 2-3 months was requested from and provided by I Corps G-4.

(4) Officials of the City of Danang held a meeting on 20 February and results were reported to the council. The officials discussed the problems attendant to disposal of trash within the city. A central dump site has been selected by the Mayor. A lake will be used as a dump site and subsequent plans provide for this area to become a land reclamation project. Sites have been selected and plans made for the construction of thirty large concrete bins for temporary storage of garbage. These bins will not fulfill the requirements of the entire city but they should provide a basis for further development. OCO representative for the city of Danang requested OCO Saigon to provide seven trucks for use by the city of Danang for the disposal of trash and garbage within the city.

(5) The OCO Agricultural Program for development of three vegetable farms in ICTZ was discussed. These farms could produce the amount and variety of vegetables required to support the U. S. Military needs in this area. One 7 hectare farm is currently in operation near Hue, which if successful will be extended to 40 hectares. Two similar sites are needed in order

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to start the other two planned farms. It was suggested that this concept could possibly conflict with the policy for curtailment of piaster spending, but members of the council expressed the idea that the economic benefits to be gained would off-set the danger of this planned piaster spending. It was pointed out that many local farmers who will be working these farms will receive invaluable training in modern farming methods; that new food items will be introduced to this area, which will aid in the crop diversification program; that a source of income will be provided for many presently unemployed persons; that a portion of the crops will undoubtedly be sold in Vietnamese markets, thereby creating a demand by the local populace which will remain after the military demand is diminished or ceases altogether; that increased use of the vegetables by the local people will undoubtedly improve public health; and that prices of vegetables in the local markets should be considerably reduced, since many varieties of vegetables currently must be imported into ICTZ from other sections of the country.

(6) III MAF G-5 reported that the SOP for Emergency Relief had been published. The SOP provides for immediate reaction in the event of accident or disaster situations.

(7) It was also announced that the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Operations Order, which establishes an Air-Mobile Contingency Reaction Force for response to emergency situations, has been promulgated. It is planned to use this force as the initial reaction unit in conjunction with the SOP for Emergency Relief.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. Five committees and subcommittees of the I Corps council met during February.

(1) Commodities Distribution Committee

(a) The committee was informed that as a general rule PL 480 commodities may be used as payment for workmen for labor on projects beneficial to their families and the community. Use of foods as payment to a contractor is not permissible. The issue was raised regarding use of food as payment for labor and the effect this would have on "unfunded" self-help projects wherein villagers work on a community betterment project without receiving any payment. In view of the complex issues involved it was recommended that an official from the Food For Peace Office, Saigon be invited to attend the next CDC meeting on 15 March.

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(b) The committee also received a report that an Oregon lumberman who is an advisor to the Secretary of Agriculture is assessing lumbering possibilities in several areas in Vietnam. A portable sawmill will arrive shortly in Danang and will be available for use wherever needed. Discussions have been held with Special Forces for use of the sawmill in their camp areas where timber is available. OCO will be open for requests for placement of the sawmill.

(2) Public Health Committee. Of primary importance to the Public Health Committee was the appearance of Plague in the I Corps area. The known plague situation was summarized as follows:

(a) Thua Thien Province - January and February 1967.

17 Laboratory confined cases
21 Suspected cases
1 Confirmed case died
1 Suspected case died

(b) Hoa Cuong Village, Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province - 25 January through 12 February 1967.

10 deaths characterized by high fever, blood in sputum. Very rapid death.

No confirmed cases.

(c) Hoa Cuong Village, Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province - 23 February through 28 February 1967.

24 Suspected cases
0 Laboratory confined cases
16 Suspected cases died

(d) Duy Xuan District, Quang Nam Province - February 1967.

12 Suspected cases
0 Laboratory confirmed
2 Suspected cases died

(e) Danang - January and February 1967.

21 Laboratory confirmed cases
70 Suspected cases
2 Suspected cases died

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(3) Road Committee

(a) It was announced that the sawmill planned for ICTZ would be in operation in one month. The mill is to be located near Quang Tri City and its primary purpose is in support of Revolutionary Development. Availability of lumber for other uses is expected to be very limited.

(b) Eiffel Bridging, ordered last month has arrived.

(c) A road reconnaissance of Route #1 was conducted to the II Corps Boundry. The road was found in very bad condition south of Mo Duc to the II Corps boundry. Practically no bridges or culverts are left and in many places ditches 4 feet wide and 6 feet deep have been dug across the road. It was estimated that one battalion of the 10th Engineer Group, reinforced, could open this section of road to traffic in six weeks providing adequate security was provided.

(d) Suggestions were solicited on how to keep excessive loads off light bridges. Bridge guards are not and cannot enforce vehicles to stay within weight limitations. The majority of bridges do not have classification posted. In addition many vehicles do not have classification.

(4) Port Coordinating Committee

(a) The Port Authorities Anchorage proposal has been received and the committee received an NSA proposal that recommended one minor change. This proposal, designating anchorage areas, was satisfactory to the port officials from an harbor defense and security viewpoint. It was recognized that during periods of adverse sea conditions ammunition ships would be required to shift to move sheltered anchorages to permit offloading operations to lighterage.

(b) There was a discussion concerning confusion that recently arose as a result of NSA discharging ARVN rice from a USAID ship. It was explained that the U. S. Department of Defense had recently assumed responsibility from the U. S. State Department for the offload of USAID cargoes. The off-loading procedures are not yet clearly defined and the availability of funds for hiring VN stevedores is not yet fully known. It is not NSA's intention to compete with the local harbor workers and optimism was expressed that the problem would soon be resolved.

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(5) Psychological Warfare Subcommittee

(a) The subcommittee received a report of the operations and functions of OCO and the importance of PsyOps within the context of OCO operations were pointed out. The present situation in Vietnam was described as basically a political war in which every effort must be directed to assisting the Vietnamese build a strong and viable nation. The importance of the Chieu Hoi program in nation building was pointed out and the opinion expressed that the program required the assistance of PsyOps to be successful. In the larger context of Revolutionary Development on rural construction, PsyOps plays an equally important role in explaining the RD program and its objective to the people.

(b) The subcommittee was informed that the Chieu Hoi campaign would be extended through March 25th and the subcommittee was congratulated on their efforts connected with the TET Chieu Hoi campaign just completed.

(c) The subcommittee was briefed on the status of the Chieu Hoi centers, Chieu Hoi Villages and Armed Propaganda Teams.

D. Medical Assistance. Sixty-nine MEDCAP teams operated in 276 locations and provided medical and dental assistance to 113,388 Vietnamese civilians during February. Seventy-six health workers received informal training during February.

E. CARE. During February CARE provided III MAF with 823 carpentry kits, 50 refills for classroom supply kits, 2 garden kits, 465 masonry kits and 2,500 sewing kits for use in support of Civil Affairs program.

F. Civil Affairs Summary

(1) III MAF Civic Action receded slightly, in areas of medical and dental treatments, during the month of February after beginning an up-swing in January. Medical and Dental treatments were down from expected participation due to the observance of TET. Although MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS were held, the people did not avail themselves of these services regularly during the celebrations. Medical treatments reached a total of 84,787 persons, compared to 102,322 persons in January and February's dental treatments totaled 4,404 compared to an all

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time high of 6,424 persons treated in January. Other indications of the III MAF Civic Action Activity are:

Distribution of 9,738 pounds of soap
Distribution of 5,537 pounds of clothing
Distribution of 395,975 pounds of food

(2) Although people did not participate in MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS during TET celebrations, they were apparently eager to receive food during the season. This month's food distribution exceeded that of January's by 294,440 pounds.

(3) Good weather continued to prevail and roads continued to dry, permitting the movement of Civic Action personnel through their assigned areas. More effort is being put forth in setting up DENTCAPS through the III MAF CA/AOR and dental treatment is expected to rise in following months.

(4) Several ARVN hospitals were visited by the Commanding General of III MAF during TET. Numerous comfort kits were distributed and the patients were visibly impressed.

(5) Increased emphasis on GVN participation in Civic Action through the use of RD Cadre Teams was undertaken during the month. This approach has helped maintain the rate of civic action progress during the month and will hopefully increase progress hereafter. The people seem to be more receptive to help from their own National Forces and there is little or no language barrier.

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IX. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

A. Chieu Hoi Program. 279 personnel rallied to the GVN during February. The Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Nam were high for the period with 115 and 74 respectively. Ralliers are consistent in reporting that they have heard loudspeaker appeals and seen leaflets explaining the program. They have shown a deeper understanding than in the past of the advantages offered by the Chieu Hoi program. The following is a breakdown of returnees turning into Marine TAOR's and by Province for the reporting period:

<u>**TAOR</u>	<u>TO USMC</u>	<u>TO GVN</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>POL</u>	<u>NVA</u>	<u>*OTHER</u>
Dong Ha	0	8	Quang Tri	17	11	4	0
Phu Bai	1	1	Thua Thien	30	14	8	3
Danang	29	0	Quang Nam	74	41	16	0
Chu Lai	11	0	Quang Tin	43	33	10	0
			Quang Ngai	115	80	18	3
Total	41	9					
			Total	279	179	56	6
							38

*Nurses, etc. ** TAOR figures are included in Province figures.

B. Ground Operations

(1) The Psychological Exploitation Team (POET) of the 244th PSYOP Co. exploited 18 incidents during the reporting period. From these incidents a total of 27 leaflets, 3 posters and 5 tapes were produced and disseminated. Representative leaflets and posters developed are contained in ANNEX (A).

(2) The Danang Armed Propaganda Platoon under the supervision of the 244th PSYOP Company conducted an attitude survey for the First Marine Division at the Phuoc Tuong Hamlet. The Platoon is presently engaged in supporting the 51st ARVN Infantry Regiment at Ye Ne Hamlet in the relocation of 20,000 people.

During Operation CHINOOK II the APT aided the Marines by teaching them where to look when searching buildings and general areas, making a more detailed search possible. They also assisted Marines in locating VC positions and directing fire. Although none of the APT could speak English, an effective communication was worked out between squad leaders and the APT by the use of sign language and pointed phrases. On one occasion a platoon and the APT were sent to search a village for VC reported to be in the area. This was accomplished effectively producing two VC.

(3) Ground Operations:

(a) 652,901 leaflets were hand distributed by patrols, MEDCAPS and check points during the month of February.

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(b) Ground PSYOP was conducted in support of County Fairs and Tactical operations in the form of leaflet drops, audio/visual teams, combat loudspeaker teams and Armed Propaganda Teams.

(c) The 1st Military Police Battalion continued its program of movie festivals conducted by its CAC units.

(d) Total movies shown: 329

(e) Total Cultural Drama Team Performances: 59

C. Air Operations

(1) Leaflet Dissemination

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NO/HRS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
344	Leaflet	97,784,000	9th ACS
251	Aerial Broadcasts	170 hrs, 5 min	9th ACS

(2) Total Campaign leaflets dropped:

(a) NVA Campaign leaflets dropped: 8,001,000

(b) B-52: 4,975,000

(c) Safe Conduct Passes dropped: 1,986,000

(3) A total of 922 leaflet and aerial broadcast targets were hit during the reporting period.

D. Leaflets Printed in ICTZ. The 244th PSYOP Company printed 12,980,525 leaflets and posters during the month of February. 4,981,200 of the above figure were printed in support of the Chieu Hoi Program.

E. Kit Carson Scout Program. The Kit Carson Scouts have, employed with the First Marine Division, proved to be invaluable in directly supporting Marine tactical units to identify VC with whom they formerly associated.

(1) Major Accomplishments

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>MONTHLY TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL FROM 1Nov66</u>
PW	20	75
Detainee	4	47

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Returnee	4	5
Weapons	2	7
Grenades	1	20
Mines	1	15
Booby traps	2	6
Caves	24	25
Tunnels	1	12
Supply caches	1	4
Weapons caches	1	1
Patrols guides	197	286 (from 1Jan67)
Broadcasts	9	56
VC KIA	0	8

(2) The KCS are teaching Marines how to read trail signs indicating VC mines and booby traps. For example, a bamboo tree bent over a trail with a small amount of paint on the back side is reported to indicate the trail is booby trapped from that point onward.

(3) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the Kit Carson Scout Program is included in ANNEX (B).

F. PSYOP Exploitation of 2nd Bde ROKMC Victory, 15 February. 380,000 Standard leaflets were dropped and one hour aerial broadcast the morning of 16 February exploiting the ROKMC victory. Themes used were:

- (1) The VC cannot win because of American and ARVN might.
- (2) That Just Cause and Powerful Might Win.
- (3) Reward appeal for the VC to return to GVN with their weapons.
- (4) Safe Conduct Pass.

Leaflets were produced from photos received from the PSYWAR Officer, 2nd Brigade ROKMC of enemy dead and captive weapons. Representative general leaflets used in initial PSYOP exploitation and leaflets produced from photos taken are included in ANNEX (C).

G. III MAF Monthly PSYOP Orientation Course: The second orientation course was conducted 15-17 February with a total of 25 students for the months of January and February. The syllabus for this course is contained in ANNEX (D).

H. TET Campaign Activities Report.

- (1) Phase I, 1Jan-4Feb67.

(a) Leaflets. Leaflets utilized in this phase were:

1 TET Mix #1

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- a' SP 979, The GVN is Winning the War
- b' SP 1542, Chieu Hoi, September Election
- c' SP 1547, New Progress is Coming to Vietnam
- d' SP 1548, New Progress is Coming to Vietnam
- e' SP 1549, New Progress is Coming to Vietnam
- f' SP 938A, TET Chieu Hoi Appeal
- g' SP 1389, Chieu Hoi Instructions

2 SP 695B, NVA Poem

(b) Leaflet Drops by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>TET MIX #1</u>	<u>SP 695B</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	1,577,215	90,000	1,667,215
Thua Thien	2,997,951	225,000	3,222,951
Quang Nam	5,485,111	795,000	6,280,111
Quang Tin	2,605,279	0	2,605,279
Quang Ngai	5,299,444	450,000	5,749,444
TOTAL	17,965,000	1,560,000	19,525,000

(c) Loudspeaker Hours by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>TAPE 78</u>	<u>TAPE 82</u>	<u>TAPE 84</u>	<u>TAPE 85</u>	<u>TAPE 92</u>	<u>TAPE 94</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	0	0	2:50	0	0	0	2:50
Thua Thien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quang Nam	1:50	0	2:00	6:40	1:20	2:00	12:50
Quang Tin	0	0	1:15	2:50	1:30	0	3:35
Quang Ngai	1:45	1:30	1:45	1:05	1:25	0	5:30
TOTAL	1:35	1:30	5:50	10:35	3:15	2:00	24:45

(2) Phase II, 5-9Feb67

(a) Leaflets. The leaflets utilized in this phase were:

- 1 TET Mix #2

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- a' SP 918A, Appeal to Return
- b' SP 1252, Chieu Hoi means Love, Friendship
- c' SP 1544, TET Chieu Hoi Appeal
- d' SP 1545, Appeal to Family
- e' SP 1546, Appeal to VC's Wives and Mothers
- f' SP 1233A, Chieu Hoi Appeal (Rally Instructions)

2 SP 893, Safe Conduct Pass

(b) Leaflet Drops by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>TET MIX #2</u>	<u>SP 893</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	1,134,800	1,060,000	2,194,800
Thua Thien	483,200	512,000	995,200
Quang Nam	2,956,571	1,011,429	3,968,000
Quang Tin	438,858	377,142	816,000
Quang Ngai	4,364,571	2,161,429	6,526,000
TOTAL	9,378,000	5,122,000	14,500,000

(c) Loudspeaker Hours by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>(Tapes</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	0	6:30	0	1:45	0	1:45	1:50	6:30	15:20	
Thua Thien	0	1:30	0	0	0	2:15	2:05	0	5:50	
Quang Nam	1:30	8:10	10:00	0	0	0	6:40	0	25:20	
Quang Tin	1:30	1:30	3:00	1:50	0	0	1:15	0	5:05	
Quang Ngai	2:30	0	4:50	1:30	1:30	0	3:15	0	11:35	
TOTAL	3:30	16:40	17:50	2:05	1:30	3:00	13:05	6:30	63:10	

(3) Phase III, 10-13 Feb 1967

(a) Leaflets. Leaflets utilized in this phase were:

- 1 SP 1543, TET Greeting
- 2 SP 893, Safe Conduct Pass

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(b) Leaflet Drops by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>SP 1543</u>	<u>SP 893</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	100,000	650,000	750,000
Thua Thien	100,000	650,000	750,000
Quang Nam	460,059	1,301,176	1,761,235
Quang Tin	23,882	67,648	91,530
Quang Ngai	336,059	881,176	1,217,235
TOTAL	1,020,000	3,550,000	4,570,000

(c) Loudspeaker Broadcasts by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	0	0	0	0
Thua Thien	0	0	0	0
Quang Nam	6:15	5:40	6:40	18:35
Quang Tin	1:30	0	0	1:30
Quang Ngai	1:45	0	0	1:45
TOTAL	8:30	5:40	6:40	20:50

(4) Phase IV, 14-28 Feb 1967. Current to 25Feb67

(a) Leaflets. Leaflets utilized in this phase were:

- 1 SP 1539, How to Defect
- 2 SP 1389, How to Defect
- 3 SP 893, Safe Conduct Pass

(b) Leaflet Drops by Province

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<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>SP 1539</u>	<u>SP 1389</u>	<u>SP 893</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	0	600,000	910,000	1,510,000
Thua Thien	0	0	100,000	100,000
Quang Nam	0	0	350,000	350,000
Quang Tin	0	133,333	656,666	789,999
Quang Ngai	0	466,667	3,609,334	4,076,001
TOTAL	0	1,200,000	5,626,000	6,826,000

(c) Loudspeaker Hours by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	1:00	1:30	0	0	0	2:30
Thua Thien	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quang Nam	0	3:25	0	0	2:30	5:55
Quang Tin	0	0	2:00	2:00	0	4:00
Quang Ngai	0	0	2:00	1:40	0	2:40
TOTAL	1:00	4:55	4:00	2:40	2:30	15:05

(5) Totals for the four phases by Province

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>PHASE I</u>	<u>PHASE II</u>	<u>PHASE III</u>	<u>PHASE IV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	1,667,215	2,194,800	750,000	1,510,000	6,122,015
Thua Thien	3,222,951	995,200	750,000	100,000	5,068,151
Quang Nam	6,280,111	3,968,000	1,761,235	350,000	12,359,346
Quang Tin	2,605,279	816,000	91,530	789,999	4,302,808
Quang Ngai	5,749,444	6,526,000	1,217,235	4,076,001	17,568,680
TOTAL	19,525,000	14,500,000	4,570,000	6,826,000	45,421,000

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<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>PHASE I</u>	<u>PHASE II</u>	<u>PHASE III</u>	<u>PHASE IV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	2:50	15:20	0	2:30	20:40
Thua Thien	0	5:50	0	0	5:50
Quang Nam	12:50	25:20	18:35	5:55	62:40
Quang Tin	3:35	5:05	1:30	4:00	13:10
Quang Ngai	5:30	11:35	1:45	2:40	21:30
TOTAL	24:45	63:10	20:50	15:05	123:50

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X. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU.

A. Background. During February 1967, 373 escorted visits were accomplished by the Combat Information Bureau. The escorts covered civic action, combined action platoons, combat operations and various other subjects of interest to the Press. The Danang Press Center hosted 167 correspondents.

B. Motor Transport. All 8 CIB vehicles were returned to operation giving the Press Center one (1) station wagon, one M-37 Personnel Carrier, four M-151 Jeeps and two M-38 Jeeps operational.

C. Photography. During the period covered, 19,345 feet of motion picture footage was forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3P) for processing. Of this, 52% was exposed on operations, 28 % on civic action and 20% on miscellaneous. Operations covered were the search and destroy missions of Hotel and Fox Companies, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines; Echo and Fox Companies, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines; INDEPENDENCE, STONE, RIO GRANDE, CHINOOK II AND DESOTO. Of special interest are the 300 feet that was shot at the time of Doctor FALL's death.

D. Radio/TV. During the month of February, this section made a total of 28 features and 101 Fleet Hometown interviews. In addition to the routine activities of the CIB and III MAF radio section's, a new live TV series was inaugurated on 6 February. The first program was of necessity on Monday evening, and featured Lieutenant General WALT and Major General LAN, in a discussion with LtCol STARK of the year then ending - "Tet a Tet". Beginning with 4 March, the program will be seen regularly each week on Saturdays at 1845, for fifteen minutes. Also undertaken during the last week of the month, at the direction of General WALT, was a color motion picture to be produced for CARE. Working from a script approved by General WALT, LtCol STARK is Project Officer.

E. Escorts. During the month of February, despite its shortness, 373 escorted visits were accomplished. Major Operations covered by the News Media reached a new high in numbers as PRAIRIE II, INDEPENDENCE, SEARCY, CLAY, TRINITY, DESOTO, CHINOOK II, STONE, DECKHOUSE VI, RIO GRANDE and two allied operations, LIEN KET 81 and the Korean Marine Brigades GIANT DRAGON received varying degrees of coverage. Staff briefings increased as the G-5 and CAC officers and CG, III MAF contributed heavily to telling the III MAF stories via the

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interview method. Notable media representatives who visited the CIB during the month included: Dick Swanson and Don Weadon, Time-Life; Lloyd Norman, Newsweek; Chalmers Roberts, Washington Post; Mary McCarthy, London Observer; Bob Ohman, AP; Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard; Bill Wordham, NBC, Sandy Gall, ITN; John Apple, N.Y. Times; Bill Brannigan, ABC; Werner Meyer, Abend Zeitung, Munich, Germany; Jason McManus, Time; Bill Tuohy, L. A. Times and the late Dr. Bernard Fall. Dr. Fall was killed by a VC land mine on 21 February in the "Street without Joy" area during the course of Operation Chinook II.

F. Press Releases. During February, a total of 445 releases were processed by the press section. Of these 45 concerned civic action. Releases were accompanied by 320 photographs during the month. Individual news releases processed and forwarded to Fleet Home Town News Center for further release and distribution during the month totaled 6903, including 108 photographs.

G. Press Center. A total of 167 correspondents and VIP's checked in at the Press Center during February 1967.

H. Miscellaneous.

(1) The Korean Marine Corps Commandant and Korean Prime Minister visited I Corps on 16 and 17 February. Lieutenant General WALT received 4 decorations from the Republic of Korea.

(2) Colonel D. G. DERRYBERRY relieved Colonel T. M. FIELDS as Force Informational Services Officer on 9 February 1967.

(3) The Sea Tiger produced the first CAC supplement in February along with a Vietnamese language print translated by I Corps Advisors for the Popular Force members.

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CHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE/BILLET</u>
2Feb67	William C. WESTMORELAND	General, U. S. Army, COMUSMACV
3-6Feb67	R. D. TERRY	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, CG, 1st Signal Bde
4Feb67	W. B. ROSSON	Major General, U. S. Army Chief of Staff, MACV
4-5Feb67	Theodore H. ANDREWS	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff, Far East Division J-5
5-6Feb67	Thomas J. WALKER	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy COMCARDIV Three
7 Feb67	Thomas J. MC INTYRE	Senator, Democrat, N.H.
7-8Feb67	William S. MAILLIARD	Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy(Ret) Congressman (Rep-Calif)
9Feb67	Dr. Stefan POSSONY	Director, International Studies Program of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace
10-11Feb67	John G. TOWER	Senator, Republican, Texas
10-11Feb67	Bishop Thomas WRIGHT	Bishop of Wilmington, N. C.
11-13Feb67	Frank W. VANNOY	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy COMPHIBGRU One
13-14Feb67	John P. MC CONNELL	General, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, USAF
15-16Feb67	Ki Chun KANG	Lieutenant General, ROKMC Commandant, ROKMC
15-16Feb67	Young Kook KIM	Major General, ROKMC Director of Plans Bureau ROKMC

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

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SECRET

17-18Feb67	Dr. Harry WOOD	Executive Secretary of the Department of Chaplains & Service Personnel, United Presbyterian Church in the United States
18Feb67	Mr. Norman REAM	Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
18-19Feb67	Maurice R. WEISNER	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy Prospective Assistant Chief of Personnel Control, BUPERS
19-20Feb67	Dr. G. W. JOHNSON	Director of Navy Laboratories
19-20Feb67	Dr. G. T. BING	GS-18, Special Consultant to MACV Science Advisor
19-23Feb67	Mr. Darold SILKWOOD	Systems Analyst General Purpose Forces Division
20Feb67	Paul F. FREEMAN	General, U. S. Army CG, CONARC
24-25Feb67	John B. MC PHERSON	Major General, U. S. Air Force, USAF J-3
24-25Feb67	F. A. BARDSHAR	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy USN J-5
24-25Feb67	William D. DUNHAM	Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force, DCS for Operations 7th Air Force
24Feb67	Hal C. PATTISON	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army
26-28Feb67	Paul R. TYLER	Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, Quartermaster General, U. S. Marine Corps

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

27Feb67	U. S. Grant SHARP	Admiral, U. S. Navy CINCPAC
27-28Feb67	Frank B. JAMES	Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force, Hq, NSAPac
28Feb67	Mr. Richard S. CESARO	GS-18, OSD, Advance Research Projects Agency
28Feb67	Dr. Albert RUBENSTEIN	GS-18, OSD, Advance Research Projects Agency

SECRET

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 February - Operation DESOTO - Continuing
Operation PRAIRIE II - Initiated
Operation SEARCY - Initiated
Operation CLAY - Initiated
Operation INDEPENDENCE - Initiated
- 3 February - Operation CLAY - Terminated
- 9 February - Operation SEARCY - Terminated
Operation INDEPENDENCE - Terminated
- 12 February - Operation STONE - Initiated
- 16 February - Operation CHINOOK - Terminated
Operation DECKHOUSE VI - Initiated
- 17 February - Operation CHINOOK II - Initiated
Operation RIO GRANDE - Initiated
- 22 February - Operation STONE - Terminated
Operation RIO GRANDE - Terminated
- 24 February - Operation PULASKI - Initiated
- 26 February - Operation LAFAYETTE - Initiated
Operation LANOKE - Initiated
- 27 February - Operation PULASKI - Terminated
- 28 February - Operation LANOKE - Terminated

SECRET

PART FOURREFERENCES

- (A) First Marine Division Command Chronology, February 1967
- (B) Third Marine Division Command Chronology, February 1967
- (C) First Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, February 1967
- (D) Force Logistic Command Command Chronology, February 1967

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- (1) ANNEX "A" to Part Two, Section III, III MAF Command Chronology, February 1967
- (2) ANNEX "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E" to Part Two, Section IX, III MAF Command Chronology, February 1967
- (3) III Marine Amphibious Force, Command Directory, February 1967
- (4) February 1967 Editions, III Marine Amphibious Force Newspaper: "SEA TIGER" *[Removed & destroyed. Record copy maintained in AOSD Library]*

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX A (ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG AIRBASE) to III MAF PERINTREP 9-67**


1. At 0310H and for some two minutes thereafter on the morning of 27 February 1967, the Danang Air Base was subjected to an attack by fire of 140mm Rockets. The attack marked the first occasion in which the enemy has employed this type weapon in SVN.
2. The impact area for the total of 51 rounds fired was generally along the eastern side of the airfield complex and adjacent Vietnamese village of AP B0 (BT 021751), with the majority of rounds falling within three general areas centered on (BT 008765), (BT 018759), and (BT 014742). See Appendix 1 for graphic depiction.
3. The rockets were launched from GS (AT 9669) approximately 8,800 meters from the farthest point of impact, which reportedly is the maximum range of the 140mm rocket. There were a total of 126 individual firing positions organized into two groups of 66 and 60 positions respectively. Each of these groups consisted of a series of six-position firing sites-11 in the former grouping, 10 in the latter grouping. All positions were aligned generally perpendicular to the airfield complex.
4. Two launching tubes, 25 rockets, and numerous cannisters were found in the vicinity of the launch site. A number of the rounds were recovered by divers from the SONG YEN River. There was evidence that several of the rockets had failed to fire and that the enemy had made a hasty departure.
5. The 140mm rocket (Russian) is 42 5/8 inches long and weighs 84 pounds, with a 39 1/2 pound warhead. It is an electrically initiated, spin stabilized, point detonating round with fuse settings of super quick, instantaneous, and delay (only super quick fuzing was used in the attack). The rocket may be fired singly or by phasing a series of rockets to a single firing point. See Appendixes 2 and 3.
6. The rocket launcher is a single metal tube mounted on a wooden board with very simple elevation and deflection mechanisms. See Appendix 4.
7. Individual firing positions were located approximately three meters apart and consisted of shallow holes 18-20 inches wide, 36-48 inches long, and some eight inches in depth, with a parapet forward to provide basic elevation and an aiming stake aft. See Appendix 5.
8. Interrogation of one PW and one returnee and examination of captured documents has revealed that the R-20 Bn was involved in the attack, probably as laborers in transporting the rockets, and that an unidentified, specially trained NVA unit was responsible for the actual firing of the rockets.

A-1

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX "A", Part II, Section III

GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF DANANG ROCKET ATTACK



SOVIET BARRAGE ROCKET W/CAWISPER




412

APPENDIX 2


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SOVIET BARRAGE ROCKET W/CANNISTER




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ROCKET LAUNCHER USED IN ATTACK ON DANANG AIRFIELD

DECLASSIFIED



SKETCH OF POSITIONED LAUNCHER

DECLASSIFIED

TITLE: MARBLE MOUNTAIN Incident
CAMPAIGN: Anti-VC/Support GVN
TARGET: Civilian Population

NC

(FRONT)

three different fronts, all with one picture of victim of
VC grenade at Marble Mountain on 6 Nov 66.

(BACK)

23 INNOCENT CIVILIANS KILLED!
32 INNOCENT CIVILIANS WOUNDED AND MUTILATED!

In the last two weeks there have been 23 civilians killed and 32 wounded victims of VC murderers. These acts of terrorism have happened in the provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien and new DaNang. Last Sunday, 6 Nov 66, three grenades were detonated under a civilian bus by VC terrorists. This happened near Marble Mountain. A boy was killed and 7 people were wounded. Were they your relatives? If they were not, when will your children or your wife fall victim to the VC assassins? Tomorrow? The next day? To this problem there is only one answer: report all VC activity to the GVN forces or the Marines in the area. Report where the VC have placed mines and booby traps. Report known VC in your area.

The GVN and the Marines are here to protect you and your loved ones by eliminating the Viet Cong terrorists. Do not hesitate in giving your help. Your loved ones may be the VC's next victims.

3/1

First Mardiv

ANNEX (A)
~~ENCLOSURE (L)~~
PART II, SECTION IX
244-93-67

DECLASSIFIED



**DETACHMENT C-1 MEDICAL OFFICER CONDUCTS
EXAMINATION DURING MEDSTRAC III**

ENCLOSURE (1)

C-1 DET, 5TH Special Forces APL

109-67



**SSG Burke Juneau, 244th Psychological Operations
Company hands out some of the 2, 500 CA gift items
and selected psyops printed material
distributed during MEDSTRAC III**

ENCLOSURE (1)

109-67

DECLASSIFIED



**5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP DENTAL SURGEON
CONDUCTS EXTRACTION DURING MEDSTRAC III
AT KHE SANH 17-20 OCT 1966**

ENCLOSURE (1)

109-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED




**US NAVY SURGEON TREATS LOCAL MOUNTAGNARD
GIRL, WITH CHILDS MOTHER LOOKING ON.**

ENCLOSURE (1)
109-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



**AUDIO-VISUAL TEAM FROM 244TH PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS COMPANY ERECT SCREEN FOR
NIGHTLY MOVIES DURING MEDSTRAC III**

ENCLOSURE (1)

109-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



**LOCAL KHE SANH MISSIONARY INTERPRETS FOR
DETACHMENT C-1 MEDICAL OFFICER**

ENCLOSURE (1)

109-67

DECLASSIFIED



**LOCAL MISSIONARY PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO
DENTAL SURGEON. PATIENT IS LOCAL ARVN SOLDIER
STATIONED NEAR MEDSTRAC SITE.**

ENCLOSURE (1)

109-67

TITLE: Dai Loc Bus Incident
CAMPAIGN: Anti-VC Support GVN (black&white)
TARGET: general I-Corps

NC

(FRONT)

any of four different photos: 3 of victims or one showing blown-up bus (4 were printed)

(BACK)

On November 30th at 8 in the morning, on the way to Dai Loc, a bus loaded with civilians fell victim to another Viet Cong crime. Many of the passengers were wounded, three of which are seriously mutilated. One lost a leg; a woman may not see again and a man may be dead by the time you read this. They were: Tran Xa, age 35, Nguyen Trinh, and Tran Thi Vinh Thanh, a 30-year-old woman. What military objective did this crime achieve? None! Why do they keep on murdering innocent people? The answer is because they are like madmen. They know they have lost their communist struggle in South Vietnam because they do not care about the lives of the people. The Viet Cong are defeated everywhere and, in their dying moments, they resort to viciousness, like a rabid dog.

While the Viet Cong kills, the Government of Viet Nam and the Allies abide by the true principles of a revolution: helping and caring for the people.

The people of South Vietnam must join together against the VC dogs for their own protection. The end of this war and the peace of Viet Nam is in the hands of the people. Help eliminate the VC. Help the GVN and the Allies end this war. The destiny of Viet Nam is in your hands. Help the GVN and Allies eliminate the rabid dog.



Ngày 30 tháng 11 vào lúc 8 giờ sáng, một chuyến xe hàng chở đầy thương dân, trên đường đi về Đại-Lộc lại một lần nữa bị mìn của Việt-Cộng. Nhiều binh-biệt bị thương tích, đây có ba người bị nặng hơn cả. Một người đã mất một chân, một người đã mất cả tay phải và trong khi họ đang cố gắng chạy, người đã mất tay phải bị mất một chân nữa. Ba nạn nhân số trên là: ông TRẦN-XA, 35 tuổi, ông NGUYỄN-TRINH và bà NGUYỄN-THỊ-VINH-THANH.

Mục đích quân sự gì lại bắt giết một số ác như thế? Không! Vì sao Việt-Cộng lại nhẫn tâm đến vậy? Các tài liệu để nói là vì Việt-Cộng hãy giờ như một người đi đui. Chúng ta biết rằng họ sắp thất bại cuộc chiến-tranh ở miền Nam Việt-Nam. Vì thế mà Việt-Cộng không ngần ngại đến tận cùng của dã tâm. Chúng ta biết họ sắp thất bại, vì trong lúc tiếp cận ngày nay, chúng ta biết họ đang đi vào ngõ cụt của chúng ta như một con chó dại. Chúng ta hãy Việt-Cộng giết chóc nhân-dân thì Chính-phủ Quốc-Gia Việt-Nam và Quân-Đội Đồng-Minh đang thực hiện một chương-trình cứu-mạng họ; giúp đỡ và lo lắng cho dân.

Vậy nhân-dân miền Nam hãy tập hợp lại để chống lại chính phủ Việt-Cộng để tự bảo vệ cho mình. Cuộc chiến-tranh này được kết thúc vì hòa-hành được vẫn thì ở Việt-Nam là ở trong tay Đồng-bào. Vì đồng-bào hãy giúp đỡ Chính-phủ Quốc-Gia Việt-Nam và Quân-Đội Đồng-Minh để chấm dứt cuộc chiến-tranh này. Vì nhân nước Việt-Nam ở trong tay Đồng-bào. Đồng-bào hãy giúp đỡ Chính-phủ và Đồng-Minh để loại-bỏ loài chó dại.

2004-12-8-67

ENCLOSURE (1)
244-128-67

First Mardie

TITLE: Rallier Lam Dinh Dung
CAMPAIGN: Chieu Hoi (black & white)
TARGET: VC

NC


(FRONT)
picture of rallier

(BACK)

My name is Lam Dinh Dung, VC guerrilla. Being duped, I had followed the VC for a long time. However, I always sought my freedom and today I found it. I left the VC line and returned to the free area where I was welcomed by the Government authorities. Once having reached freedom, I thought of you, my dear friends. I hope that you will repent and return to the National Government, in order to participate in the reconstruction of a prosperous nation. Besides you, I remember a lot of young men such as Phan-Lieu, Nguyen Luan, Truong-Tuong. I advise these men to leave the VC line, in order to avoid a senseless death.

I hope you will hasten to return to the National Government.

LAM DINH DUNG



Handwritten Vietnamese text, likely a letter or message, written in a cursive style. The text is oriented vertically on the page.

ENCLOSURE ()

244-126-67

Handwritten signature or initials, possibly 'III MAF'.

TITLE: VC Trainees
 CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
 TARGET: VC Trainees in Ba Tra Hamlet

NC

(FRONT)

vivid drawing of bleeding fallen VC

(BACK)

TO THE VC TRAINING IN BA TRA HAMLET:

Study hard! The North Vietnamese need you. Who else can they use for their cannon-fodder? You, that's who! What is your reward for the life of misery and sacrifice that lies ahead of you? Only pain and death. Those of the Viet Cong ranks that have rallied are no longer living like hunted animals in the mountains and the jungles, murdering innocent women and children for the communist masters in Hanoi and Peking. Those that rallied are healthy, living in peace, helping to build a new and better Vietnam. They have married, have children and do an honest man's work. They do not destroy and kill anymore.

There is still a chance for you to rally before it is too late. Once you are in the battlefield, it will be too late.

The time for a wise decision is now!



CÙNG CÁC CÁN-BINH VIỆT-CỘNG ĐANG ĐƯỢC HUẤN-LUYỆN Ở THÔN
 BA-TRÀ

Chắc các bạn phải học cực khổ lắm. Vì miền Bắc đang cần các bạn. -Ai là người làm bia đỡ đạn cho chúng ? ? ? -Chính là các bạn chứ còn ai nữa !!! Các bạn đã được ăn-huê gì mà phải hy-sinh cuộc đời cho lầm than cực khổ và chết chóc ?

Và đây là những bạn trong hàng ngũ Việt-Cộng đã trở về qui-chánh. Họ không còn sống như những con thú bị săn đuổi trong rừng sâu, -những con thú hãy giết hại dân bà và trẻ con vô tội theo lệnh của quan thầy Cộng-sản ở Hà-nội và Bắc-kinh. Các người hồi chánh hiện nay đang sống khỏe mạnh, yên lành. Họ đang giúp sức xây dựng một nước tân Việt-Nam tươi đẹp. Có những người đã lập gia-đình ; họ có con cái và đang sống một cuộc đời lương thiện. Họ không còn phá hoại hay ám-hại một người nào nữa.

Bạn cũng còn dịp may để trở về qui-chánh. Một khi đã ra trước mặt trận thì là một sự đã muộn rồi.

Giờ quyết định sự khôn ngoan của bạn là ngay từ bây giờ. 244-125-67

ENCLOSURE (1)

244-125-67

First Mardiv

DECLASSIFIED

TITLE: VC Rally Leaflets
CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
TARGET: VC

(FRONT)

four drawings with the following translations

- A. Return to the right cause. This warm house welcomes you. You will have food every day and when you sick medical care is at your disposal.
- B. Where do you run to avoid the sunlight? Where do you hide to avoid the bombings: the best way is to hasten rallying.
- C. Many of you fight and die to lie in an unknown grave. For what purpose? For what end? The resolution of the GVN makes your only destiny Death or defeat.
- D. Its sad to find pictures of your loved ones in your dead comrades' pack. How long until their loved ones give up hope? RALLY TO THE GVN AND LIVE IN PEACE.

(BACK)

all four leaflets will have the same translation

Why should we waste our time telling you about the pain of your existence? You know all the reasons for your misery. The endless nights.... the bombs that seem to follow you wherever you go... the troops that keep growing and never give up hunting for you... the hunger... the sickness... the desperate desire to see your loved ones. Yes, you know the reason for the pain in your heart very well. So we dont want to throw our words in the wind.

We just want to let you know of the good and happy life led by thousands of Viet Cong who have rallied. Thousands who thought that hope was lost. People who did not have any future in life, now are together with their loved ones living in peace under the GVN. The government has helped with money, land, and technical training. The government helped by curing their sickness and healing their wounds. The government helped by giving these ex-Viet Cong another chance in life.

Why should we throw our words in the wind telling you about the pain in your heart? You are living in that hell, you know better than us. The life you are living is your own. You must make the choice... the desperate life you have now or a new and peaceful life with the GVN. Rally now! Before it is too late.

ENCLOSURE (1)

244-130-67 A,B,C,D

OCOPAD

DECLASSIFIED

VÌ LẼ GIỜ chúng tôi đã phí mất thì giờ để nói về sự thống-khổ của đời bạn? Hằng bạn đã biết rõ về sự đầy dọa này!... Kia những đêm dài vô tận... Kia những quả bom như cứ đuổi theo bạn dù bạn chạy đi đâu!... Đoàn quân càng ngày càng săn đuổi theo bạn không ngớt... Và đói khát... và đau ốm... và chúng-chường khi nhìn thấy những người thân yêu của bạn. Vâng, bạn đã biết nhiều về sự thống-khổ này. Như thế chúng tôi khỏi phải gửi lời theo gió!!!

Chúng tôi muốn các bạn có một cuộc đời tốt đẹp và hạnh-phúc như hàng ngàn đồng-chí của các bạn đã trở về qui-chánh. Hàng ngàn người đó đã tưởng rằng mất hết hy-vọng rồi. Họ đã tưởng tương-lai của họ bị hư-hỏng, nhưng bây giờ họ đã trở về sống an lành bên những người thân yêu của họ tại miền Nam Việt-Nam. Chính-phủ đã giúp đỡ họ tiền bạc, đất đai và nếu họ muốn thì được đến học tập tại một trại huấn-nghiệp. Chính-Phủ còn giúp đỡ họ thuốc men khi đau ốm, băng bó các vết thương khi bị thương tích. Chính-phủ cũng giúp đỡ những người trước kia là Việt-Cộng có những cơ hội để xây dựng lại cuộc đời.

Tại sao chúng tôi phải gửi lời theo gió để kể những nỗi thống-khổ của đời bạn. Các bạn đang sống trong hòa-ngục, hằng các bạn biết hơn chúng tôi. Vẫn biết đời sống của các bạn là đời sống niềng tư, thì các bạn cứ chọn... hoặc một cuộc đời đầy tuyệt-vọng mà các bạn đang theo đuổi, hoặc một đời sống thanh-bình bên Chính-phủ Quốc-Gia Việt-Nam.

CÁC BẠN HÃY QUI-HỒI NGAY BÂY GIỜ!

DỪNG ĐỂ LẬU QUÁ MUỘN!

244 - 130 - 67

(BACK)

224-130-67 A

224-130-67 B

224-130-67 C

224-130-67 D




A



B



C



D

TITLE: VC Snakes Blow School
CAMPAIGN: Anti-VC/Support GVN
TARGET: Civilian Population

NC

(FRONT) (pic)


AT 9:00 ON THE EVENING OF 3 DECEMBER, THE VC SNAKES SHOWED AGAIN THEIR COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM

(BACK)

At 9:00 on the evening of 3 December, the VC once again showed their complete disregard for the lives and future of the people of SVN. A number of VC entered Gia Lie Village and destroyed their school, knowing that such an act would deprive the village children of their education; an education which serves to defeat communism through knowledge. Communism has no weapon to combat education except that of terrorism and destruction. The main weapon of communism is lies and deceit; but knowledge of the truth renders all its falsehoods and deceitful indoctrination useless.

It is evident to these criminals that if the children become educated, the VC have even less hope of continuing their futile struggle in SVN; for with an education, children learn to think for themselves and tell truth from lies. The future of Vietnam is in the hands of you and your children. What you do today determines how you will live in the future and what kind of life you'll have.

You must support your government and Allied Forces to drive the VC murderers from your land. Expose all locations and activity of the VC so that they may be eliminated, preventing them from attacking your children, by destroying your schools and places of learning. Join together now. Protect your children, so that soon they will enjoy the rewards of peace.



Một số Việt-Cộng đã đột nhập vào làng Gia-Lê cướp phá trường học; chúng nghĩ rằng bằng công như thế là gây cho trẻ con làng không có nơi học hành, - sự học hành sẽ mang lại hiểu biết để đánh bại chủ-nghĩa Cộng-Sản. Chủ-nghĩa Cộng-Sản không có một thứ khí giới nào đánh bại được sự học hành, ngoài trừ sự khùng-bố và phá-hoại. Loại khí giới chính của chúng là lừa dối và phân-phái; nhưng sự hiểu biết về sự thật sẽ gây cho sự lừa dối và chủ-nghĩa phân-phái trở nên vô hiệu quả.

Bạn sát-nhân này dĩ-nhiên hiểu rằng nếu những chú trẻ kia được giáo dục thì bọn Việt-Cộng ít có hy-vọng tiếp-tục cuộc chiến đấu vô gia-trí ở miền Nam Việt-Nam; bởi vì nhờ sự học hỏi mà trẻ con sẽ hiểu biết về mình và phân biệt được phải trái. Tương-lai của Việt-Nam ở trong tay con cái của đồng-bào. Vậy đồng-bào hãy giữ lấy quyết-định thế nào để ngày mai có một đời sống mong mỏi.

Đồng-bào hãy ủng-hộ Chính-phủ Quốc-Gia Việt-Nam và Quân-đội Phòng-Không để thế giới có bọn Việt-Cộng giết người ra khỏi vùng của mình. Hãy chỉ chế-ăn mìn của Việt-Cộng và bắt cóc mọi hoạt-động của chúng chủ nhà chức trách để diệt trừ chúng, ngăn ngừa chúng không cho sát hại trẻ con và tàn phá trường học hoặc những nơi học hành. Chúng ta hãy sát cánh cùng nhau ngay bây giờ, để bảo vệ trẻ con, và như thế con cháu ta chẳng bao lâu sẽ được hưởng hòa-kình sung sướng.

ENCLOSURE (1)

OCO P0D

244-132-67

TITLE: VC Snakes B1 Up School
 CAMPAIGN: Anti-VC/Sport GVN
 TARGET: Civilian Population

TC

(pic)

AT 9:00 ON THE EVENING OF 3 DECEMBER, THE VC SNAKES SHOWED AGAIN THEIR COMPLETE
 DISREGARD FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM

At 9:00 on the evening of 3 December, the VC once again showed their complete disregard for the lives and future of the people of SVN. A number of VC entered Gia Lie Village and destroyed their school, knowing that such an act would deprive the village children of their education; an education which serves to defeat communism through knowledge. Communism has no weapon to combat education except that of terrorism and destruction. The main weapons of communism are lies and deceit; but knowledge of the truth renders all its falsehoods and deceitful indoctrination useless.

It is evident to these criminals that if the children become educated, the VC have even less hope of continuing their futile struggle in SVN; for with an education, children learn to think for themselves and tell truth from lies. The future of Vietnam is in the hands of you and your children. What you do today determines how you will live in the future and what kind of life you'll have.

You must support your government and Allied Forces to drive the VC murderers from your land. Expose all activities and locations of the VC so that they may be eliminated, preventing them from attacking your children, by destroying your schools and places of learning. Join together now. Protect your children, so that soon they will enjoy the rewards of peace.

ENCLOSURE (1)

244-138-67

Third Mardiv

NGÀY MÔNG 3 THÁNG 12, LÚC CHÍN GIỜ TỐI, BẠN VIỆT-CỘNG LẠI MỘT LẦN NỮA PHƠI BẦY HOÀN DÃ TÂM CỦA CHÚNG KHÔNG ĐÉM XỈA ĐẾN MANG SỐNG VÀ TƯƠNG-LAI CỦA NHÂN-DÂN MIỀN NAM VIỆT-NAM.



Một số Việt-Cộng đã đột nhập vào làng Gia-Lê đập phá trường học; chúng nghĩ rằng hành động như thế sẽ gây cho trẻ con làng không có nơi học hành, - sự học hành sẽ mang lại hiểu biết để đánh bại chủ-nghĩa Cộng-Sản. Chủ-nghĩa Cộng-Sản không có một thứ khí giới nào đánh bại được sự học hành, ngoại trừ sự khùng-bố và phá-hoại. Loại khí giới chính của chúng là lửa gạt và phình-phổ; nhưng sự hiểu biết về sự thật sẽ gây cho sự lừa đảo và chủ-nghĩa phình-phổ trở nên vô hiệu quả.

Bạn sát-nhân này dĩ-nhiên hiểu rằng nếu những đứa trẻ kia được giáo dục thì bạn Việt-Cộng ít có hy-vọng tiếp-tục cuộc chiến đấu vô gia-trí ở miền Nam Việt-Nam; bởi vì nhờ sự học hỏi mà trẻ con sẽ hiểu biết về mình và phân biệt được phải trái. Tương-lai của Việt-Nam ở trong tay con cái của đồng-bào. Vậy đồng-bào bây giờ hãy quyết-định thế nào để ngăn mai có một đời sống mong mỏi.

Đồng-bào hãy ủng-hộ Chính-phủ Quốc-Gia Việt-Nam và Quân-đội Đồng-Minh để tổng cộng bạn Việt-Cộng giết người ra khỏi vùng của mình. Hãy chỉ chờ ăn khắp của Việt-Cộng và bắt cóc mọi hoạt-động của chúng chỗ nhà chú tránh để diệt trừ chúng, ngăn ngừa chúng không cho sát hại trẻ con và tàn phá trường học hoặc những nơi học hành. Chúng ta hãy sát cánh cùng nhau ngay bây giờ, để bảo vệ trẻ con, và như thế con cháu ta chẳng bao lâu sẽ được hưởng hoà bình sung sướng.

244-133-67

TITLE: Rallier Nguyen Dang Hong
CAMPAIGN: Chieu Ho
TARGET: VC

NC

(FRONT)
pic
(BACK)


TO MY FRIENDS IN THE 571st ENGINEERS:

I, Nguyen-Dang-Hong, a member of this unit, have returned to the National Government.

I appeal to all of you that are still with the unit to return to the National Government also as soon as possible. Happiness and safety awaits you. If you do not return, you will eventually die as a victim of disease or from the bombs and the shooting

Dear Kinh. I have some words for you. While in the unit, I was beaten up by our leader, MO. He likes mistreating people. He will mistreat many more from the unit. He will not stop doing this ever.

NGUYEN DANG HONG,
alias DI



ENCLOSURE (1)

244-147-67

G-5, Task Force X-ray, Chu Lai

TITLE: Rallier Cuc
CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
TARGET: VC

BC

(FRONT)
pic

(BACK)


TO THE VC SOLDIERS:

My name is Cuc and I belong to V43/K52. Now I have rallied, and I was welcomed warmly by the National Army. If you remain with the VC, you will be destroyed by the US Air Force. You don't have enough food. You have no medicine when you are sick.

I write these words and sincere thoughts for you. I hope you will return as I have. You'll be taken care of by the government. I hope you will hasten to decide to rally.

In rallying you shall be united with your wife and children.

CUC



ENCLOSURE (1)

C-1 DET, 5TH Special Forces Group 244-246-67

TITLE: Rallier HUYNH-QUANG-TAM
CAMPAIGN: Chien-Hoi
TARGET: VC

MC


(FRONT)
pic

(BACK)

To my friends in the VC ranks:

My name is Huynh-Quang-Tam, Economy-Member from Son-Tinh district. On 8 Dec 66 I rallied at the Chien-Hoi center in Quang-Ngai. I was warmly welcomed by the administrative and military authorities and was treated kindly by them. Now I have faith in your judgement and I appeal to you to leave the VC ranks and hasten to return to the National Government, or to the Allied Forces. You will be warmly welcomed. Don't hesitate! Hasten to rally and you are sure to be happy.

HUYNH-QUANG-TAM, alias DU



ENCLOSURE (1)

244-145-67

G-5, Task Force Xray, First Marine, Chu Lai

TITLE: VC Dead in Thu Thien
CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
TARGET: VC

NC

(FRONT)

(pic) MANY VC SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN KILLED ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF SVN, LIKE THE SOLDIER
IN THIS PICTURE

(BACK)

Now the VC face tragedy in all battles in SVN. They cannot resist the strong GVN and Allied Forces which are destroying the VC.

On 7 Dec 66 at 2025 hours in Thua-Thien province, Vietnamese and Allied Forces ambushed 60 VC. This is a picture of one of the two killed, which lie in unmarked graves.

You must not sacrifice yourself for the communists. You will be unjustly killed, as was this man in the picture.

GVN and Allied Forces welcome you at any time; they will gladly help you with your problems.

Come back to the GVN. You will reconstruct your new life and rebuild a powerful Vietnam in freedom and prosperity.

Hiện nay Việt Cộng đang thảm bại nặng nề trên khắp miền-trung miền Nam. Họ không thể đương đầu với lực lượng VNCH và Đồng-Minh qua hàng hậu đàng quyết tâm tiêu diệt bọn xâm lược bằng bất cứ giá nào.

Mỗi ngày vào lúc 20 giờ ngày 7-12-66 tại Thua-Thien, Quân-đội VNCH và Đồng-Minh trong một trận phục kích đã loại trên 60 Việt-Cộng và một trong 2 tên chết tại trận đã chụp như hình này.

Chúng tôi tin rằng các bạn không đợi gì oán than mãi vào cuộc chiến-tranh phá nghĩa của Cộng-Sản gây nên, để rồi chết một cách oan uổng như hình ảnh này.

Các cơ quan quân-chính địa phương và Đồng-Minh lúc nào cũng sẵn sàng tiếp đón các bạn một cách niềm nở vì giúp đỡ các bạn trong tình huống you ruột thịt.

Trở về với Chính-Nghĩa Quốc-Gia các bạn sẽ tạo lập lại cuộc đời và cũng góp phần xây dựng một nước Việt-Nam hùng-vĩ-đo và thịnh vượng. 244-142-67



Hàng vạn binh sĩ VC đã chết một cách thảm trên chiến trường miền Nam như hình này

ENCLOSURE (1)
244-142-67

S-5, Hoi An

TITLE: Dental Assistance (yellow hat)
CAMPAIGN: Civil Affairs
TARGET: Civilians


(FRONT)

DO YOU NEED DENTAL TREATMENT FOR TOOTH DECAY?

(BACK)

DO YOU NEED DENTAL TREATMENT FOR TOOTH DECAY?

If you or your children have tooth-decay, tomorrow you and your children should go to your hamlet school between 9 AM and 11 AM to be treated by our dental personnel.

<p>BẠN CÓ RĂNG ĐAU VÀ CẦN</p>  <p>PHẢI CHỮA KHÔNG?</p> <p>244-141-67</p>	<p>NẾU BẠN HOẶC CON EM CỦA CÁC BẠN CÓ RĂNG ĐAU NHƯ, BẠN VÀ CON EM CỦA CÁC BẠN, SẴNG MAI HÃY ĐẾN NGỒI TRƯỜNG TRONG ẤP CỦA BẠN ĐỂ NHẬN VIỆN NHA-KHOA CHÚNG TÔI CHỮA-TRỊ CHO (TỪ 09 GIỜ ĐẾN 11 GIỜ).</p>
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ENCLOSURE (/)
244-141-67

S-5, Hoi An

TITLE: Bounty on Rats (health poster)
CAMPAIGN: Civil Affairs
TARGET: Civilian Population

1. REWARD

2. Prevention is much better than cure.

Flies, mosquitoes and especially rats carry many diseases.

Mosquitoes give you malaria; flies give you many kinds of stomach diseases and rats are the cause of deadly plagues.

There have been epidemics already in Quang-Nam province caused by rats. They cause Bubonic Plague which kills men, women and children by the hundreds.

To save your loved ones from dying a horrible death, as victims of the plague, you must eliminate the rats right away.

A reward of 100 grams of rice is offered for every rat, dead or alive, that you take to your village-chief. So in addition to eliminating the great danger of the rats, you will have rice to reward your efforts.


Help the children, men and women of this community live free of disease. Bring as many rats as you can catch. You will be rewarded 100 grams of rice for every rat you bring to the village-chief.

ENCLOSURE (1)

244-140-67

29TH C.A. Company

THƯỞNG



BẠN SẼ LĨNH 100 GRAM GẠO TẠI VĂN PHÒNG XÃ-TRƯỞNG, KHI BẠN MANG NỘP MỘT CON CHUỘT TẠI ĐÂY.

Phòng bệnh hơn chữa bệnh.

Ruồi muỗi và nhất là chuột thường mang các chứng bệnh đến cho ta.

Muỗi gây ra bệnh sốt rét, ruồi gây ra nhiều chứng bệnh cho bao tử và ruột, còn chuột thì gây ra bệnh dịch hạch, nguy hiểm hơn hết.

Ở Quảng-Nam đã có lần có bệnh dịch hạch do chuột gây ra, làm chết hàng trăm người.

Vậy muốn cho bà con ta khỏi lâm vào tai-họa khủng-khiếp đó, đồng bào hãy thẳng tay diệt trừ chuột.

Khi bắt được chuột, dù còn sống hay chết, hãy mang đến nộp cho Trưởng-Ấp. Bạn sẽ được thưởng : 1 lon gạo đánh đổi một con chuột.

Đồng bào hãy cố gắng diệt trừ chuột, vừa được thưởng vừa tránh cho bà con lối xóm mắc phải chứng bệnh nguy hiểm do chuột mang lại.

244-140-67

TITLE: Rallier Leaflet
CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
TARGET: Civilian Population

(BACK)

picture of family boarding a U.S. Marine helicopter

(FRONT)

My name is LUU-CHI. I now live in Hamlet I of Son-Phuc Village.

I can no longer live in an area of misery and starvation controlled by the Viet Cong. I have taken my family of five children and have rallied to the National area. With the help of the National Government, my family and I now have as happy and peaceful life as ever.

3 December 1966
LUU-CHI

	<p>Tôi tên là Lưu Chi, ở Ấp I xã Sơn Phúc.</p> <p>Trời không khí nóng bức chúng tôi không thể sống được ở vùng này. Chúng tôi đã rời bỏ quê hương để tìm kiếm cuộc sống mới. Chúng tôi cũng 5 con và gia đình - bị lãnh sự Việt Nam Quốc gia - đi tìm kiếm cứu trợ. Chúng tôi đã rời bỏ quê hương để tìm kiếm cuộc sống mới. Chúng tôi đã rời bỏ quê hương để tìm kiếm cuộc sống mới.</p> <p>Ngày 3-12-66 Lưu Chi</p> <p>ENCLOSURE (1)</p>
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First Marine Division

244-138-67

TITLE: ROK Marines Welcome VC to Rally
CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi
TARGET: VC

NC

(FRONT)
picture of VC dead
(BACK)

DEAR VC CADRE:

Recently, on 20 Nov, about 400 VC, in hiding at Phuoc Loc were attacked unexpectedly by ROK Marines. We, the ROK Marines occupy the strong and durable locations. As you know, we have succeeded gloriously in destroying the VC, causing them many heavy defeats of personnel, weapons and equipment.

We recommend: all glorious victories of Allied forces will never end. We and all other forces stationed all over SVN will continue fighting and winning.

We do not want you to die a disgraceful and poor death without proper burial; without a weapon; on the battlefields, in jungles, high mountains or in dark caves.

You don't have to cause yourselves misery and worthless, useless sacrifice. You must hurry to leave your cause and return to the Free World, to prosper and enjoy a truly happy life.

This is your last chance to choose for your lives. This also is the only way, and an opportunity for you. Don't pass up a good opportunity. You have to return through the Chieu-Hoi Program of your beloved country. Your family, friends and loved ones are hopefully waiting for your return.

ROK Marines are happy to welcome you warmly. You must stop your cruel activities which you have been performing. Hand over your weapons. Return to the National Just Cause, with a safe conduct pass which will be honored by ARVN and Allied forces.

We promise to reserve a safe area for you to enjoy a peaceful, happy life in the Free World.

CÁC BẠN CÁN BỘ VIỆT-CỘNG !

Ngày 20 tháng 11 vừa qua, hơn bốn trăm Việt-Cộng trú ẩn tại Phú-Lộc đã bị Thủy quân Lục-chiến Đại-hiến tấn công bất ngờ.

Chúng tôi Thủy-quân Lục-Chiến Đại-hiến trong những vị trí phòng thủ vững chắc và kiên cố. Chắc các bạn đã biết: Chúng tôi đã thành công rực rỡ trong việc tiêu diệt Việt-Cộng, gây cho chúng nhiều tổn thất nặng nề về mọi mặt: người cũng như vũ khí và quân trang quân dụng.

Chúng tôi hy-vọng rằng:

Những chiến thắng về vang của tất cả các lực lượng Việt-Nam và Đông-Nam vẫn không giới hạn. Chúng tôi và tất cả các lực lượng hiện đồn trú trên khắp mọi nơi tại miền Nam Việt-Nam vẫn tiếp tục chiến đấu và chiến thắng.

Chúng tôi không muốn các bạn phải chết một cách dễ bề, không khổ, không làm quân manh áo che thân, không vũ-khí, trên những sườn đường chiến đấu, trong những rừng thẳm núi sâu, những nơi đèo heo hút gió, hay những hầm hang đen tối.

Các bạn không nên dấy dọ cuộc sống quý giá của các bạn như thế; mà hãy nghĩ một cách vô ích không xứng đáng!

Các bạn hãy mau mau rời bỏ hang ổ của chúng trở về với Thế-giới tự-do và thịnh vượng để tận hưởng một cuộc đời sung-sướng thực sự.

Đây là giây phút cuối cùng cho các bạn quyết định số phận của mình. Đây cũng là con đường và cơ hội duy nhất đến với các bạn. Đừng để lỡ cơ hội tốt, các bạn hãy trở về theo tiếng gọi của chính sách Chieu-hoi của quốc gia thân yêu các bạn. Gia đình, bạn hữu và những người thân yêu của các bạn đang hết lòng chờ đón mong đợi các bạn.

Thủy-quân Lục-Chiến Đại-hiến sẵn sàng mừng đón các bạn trở về với tất cả tấm lòng ưu ái. Các bạn hãy chăm chú những hành động độc ác mà các bạn đang làm. Hãy gọi cao vũ-khí. Trở về với Chính-quyền Quốc-gia, với những tên gây những hành động có giá trị với Quân-đội VNCH và cả Quân-đội Đông-Nam.

Chúng tôi hứa sẽ dành cho các bạn một nơi, có an ninh, để các bạn được sống một cuộc sống đầy Thành hạnh, hạnh phúc trong Thế-giới tự-do.

135-67



ANNEX (C)

T II

R.O.K. Marine Corps, Chu Lai

244-135-675

de

III MAF PSYOP ORIENTATION COURSE
 244TH PSYOP CO
 22 - 24 Mar 1967

22 Mar 1967 0800-0830 Greeting and scope by Company Commander and Force
 PSYOP Officer

0830-0930 III MAF PSC & Co. Operation Orientation

0930-1030 Intelligence Operations Orientation

1030-1100 Coffee break

1100-1200 Reproduction Operations Orientation

1200-1400 Open time.

1400-1500 Use of Printed Matter in PSYOPS

1500-1600 Concept of Propaganda

1600-1700 Intelligence for Psychological Operations

23 Mar 1967 0800-1000 Development of a leaflet

1000-1200 Utilization of PSYOP Aircraft

1200-1400 Open time.

1400-1600 Familiarization with Chieu Hoi Program

1600-1700 A-V Orientation

1700-1800 Chow

1800-2000 A-V Mission in Support of M3

24 Mar 1967 0730-1100 Combat Loudspeaker Operation at Hill 55

1100-1400 Open time

1400-1600 Preparation of PSYOP Plan and Annex

1600-1700 Closing remarks by Company Commander and Force
 PSYOP Officer

ANNEX (D)
~~ENCLOSURE (4)~~
 PART II, SECTION IX

DECLASSIFIED

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT) 1 JULY 66 - 31 DEC 66

1. On 1 July 1966 the psychological operations section was a part of G-5. The section consisted of one officer and one SNCO, Capt S. A. LUCKEY and SSgt G. HANDZO. PSYOP support was provided to III MAF by the 244th PSYOP Company, U.S. Army and Det 1, 5th USAF.
2. The 244th PSYOP Company was organized into two provisional detachments and company headquarters. The detachment at Quang Ngai was located in the I Corps Advisory compound under the control of the Senior U.S. Sector Advisor. The detachment supported the 2nd ARVN Division and the 1st Marine Division. The OIC also acted as advisor to the ARVN POLWAR Company located there.
3. The detachment at Danang was co-located with the 3rd ARVN POLWAR Battalion along with the Company Headquarters and supported III MAF and ARVN Forces in the northern three provinces. The Company Commander served as advisor to the 3rd ARVN POLWAR Battalion.
4. Operational control of the 244th PSYOP Company was assigned to CG III MAF Senior Advisor I Corps by COMUSMACV letter MACPD; subj: Employment of the U.S. Army 6th PSYOP Battalion (Tactical) dtd 30 May 1966. The activities of the Company were normally directed by the I Corps G-5 Advisor although the III MAF G-5 occasionally directed the Company to provide support to III MAF units for specific operations.
5. Colonel R. R. READ was assigned as III MAF Psychological Operations Officer on 1 August 1966. Force Order 5300.1 (Encl (1)) established the III MAF Psychological Operations Section as a special staff section directly under the III MAF Chief of Staff. It also established a provisional T/O of three officers and four enlisted for the section.
6. A staff study (244th PSYOP Company; Operational control of) was submitted to CG III MAF by Force PSYOP Officer on 29 August 1966 (Encl (2)). The recommendations in the study were approved by Major General FIELDS as CG III MAF (acting) specifically assigning OPCON of the Company to CG III MAF.
7. Force Order 3410.2 of 18 September 1966, Employment of the 244th PSYOP Company, (Encl (3)) assigned operational control of the 244th PSYOP Company to CG III MAF with staff responsibility assigned to the Force Psychological Operations Officer. Command of the Company, less operational control, remaining with the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical).
8. Logistic support of the company was the responsibility of the 6th PSYOP Battalion which due to the distance involved (Saigon - Danang) resulted in excessive down time and delays in maintenance of equipment. A cross - servicing agreement was executed with USARV and reflected in Ch 1 to ForO 3410.2.

ANNEX (E)
PART II, SECTION IX

DECLASSIFIED

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9. The III MAF Psychological Operations SOP, Force Order 3410.1 was published on 18 August 1966 (Encl (4)).

10. The first III MAF monthly PSYOP conference was held on 31 August 1966 with representatives from all III MAF commands, U.S. Advisory Group, Naval Advisory Group, JUSPAC, USAID, and Det 1, 5th ACS. Presentations were made by Mr. H LMS (JUSPAO), G.O. 244th (Major NETHERLIN), Major OZAKI (MACV Chieu Hoi Liaison Officer), and Major PELICHOFF (G.O. Det 1, 5th ACS). These conferences have been held each month and have been an excellent means of exchanging information, ideas and discussing plans and problems of the various commands.

11. The first III MAF Psychological Operations Newsletter was published in September 1966 (Encl (5)) with one being published each succeeding month. (Encl (6), (7), (8)).

12. Capt S. A. LUCKEY initiated a program for employing Chieu Hoi returnees for PSYOP and intelligence screening operations. On 22 October 1966 six returnees from the Danang Chieu Hoi Office were selected to act as scouts. They were provided with uniforms, equipment and weapons and taken to units of the 1st Marine Division by Capt LUCKEY for assignment. The detailed development of the program is contained in enclosure (9).

13. The III MAF Psychological Operations Support Center (PSC) was established 1 November 1966 under the direction of the Force PSYOP officer. The Commanding Officer 244th PSYOP Company is the OIC of the Center. The functions of the center are:

- a. Receive, process and assign priorities to requests received for PSYOP support from III MAF commands, U.S. Agencies, other U.S. Forces, FVMAF and ARVN.
- b. Coordinate scheduling, assign targets and brief pilots of the Flight "A" 5th ACS; Coordinate air/ground operations.
- c. Coordinate III MAF PSYOP with ARVN (PCC), U.S. Forces and agencies, and FVMAF.
- d. Maintain PSYOP statistics and records and prepare PSYOP reports.
- e. Coordinate distribution of leaflets received from external sources to all forces and agencies in I Corps.

14. Standard PSYOP request forms were developed to expedite preparation and processing requests and to facilitate submitting telephonic requests. Three request forms were printed (Aircraft, Printing, and A/V support) and distributed to all Commands. Copies of the forms are contained in PSYOP Newsletter 3-66 (Encl (7)).

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 5300.1
50/rhj
5 Sep 1966

FORCE ORDER 5409.2

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Establishment of the Psychological Operations Section

Encls: (1) Psychological Operations Section T/O

1. Purpose. To announce the establishment of a Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force Psychological Operations Section.

2. Background. The nature of the conflict in Vietnam places an ever-growing emphasis on the importance of an effective psychological operations program. It has long been recognized that military success alone in Vietnam is of little permanent value, unless we are equally successful in winning the loyalty and support of the people in the cause of freedom in South Vietnam. The magnitude of this task is such as to warrant the establishment of a Psychological Operations Section.

3. Action

a. The mission of the Psychological Operations Section will be:

(1) To reduce the combat efficiency of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces.

(2) To further the effort of the Government of Vietnam in re-establishing its effective control over the population by modifying or manipulating attitudes and behaviour of special audiences.

(3) To facilitate the rural construction efforts of the Government of Vietnam by coordinating this command's psychological operations with its civic action program.

(4) To obtain the cooperation and assistance of villagers in the Government of Vietnam's effort to quell the Viet Cong insurgency.

ENCLOSURE (1)

ForO 5300.1
5 Sep 1966

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS T/O PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SECTION

<u>BILLET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	
			<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
ForcePsyOpsOff	Col	Air/Ground (9906/9907)	1	
PsyOpsAdmin/IntelOff	Major	Ground (0302)	1	
PsyOps Operations Off	Capt/Lt	Air/Ground (0107)	1	
PsyOpsNCO	SSgt	0239		1
Interpreter (VietLang)	Sgt	8611		1
Admin Clerk	Cpl	0251		1
Admin Clerk/Driver	LCpl	0141		1
TOTAL			3	4

ForO 5300.1
5 Sep 1966

b. The Table of Organization of the Psychological Operations Section is set forth in enclosure (1).

c. The Head, Psychological Operations Section will report directly to the Chief of Staff on all matters pertaining to that function.

R. B. Neville

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq, III MAF (27)
CG, 1stMarDiv (6)
CG, 3dMarDiv (6)
CG, 1st MAW (6)
CO, FLC (3)

R. B. NEVILLE
Deputy Chief of Staff

8/31

CC

I recommend approval of
all recommendations in
this fine study.

James

For C/S

D/CB - 11

ENCLOSURE (2)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Commanding General

DATE: 29 Aug 1966

FROM : PayOpsO

SUBJECT: U.S. Army 244th Psychological Operations Company, operational control of

GENERAL

1. In my initial staff visit to I Corps the G-5 Advisor, LtCol Becker raised the question of opcon of the 244th. He indicated that opcon of the company has actually been exercised by the I Corps Advisory Staff and that this control should continue. He felt that this was further substantiated by the fact that the efficiency rating of the company commander has been marked by the I Corps PayOps Advisor and reviewed by the G-5. He asked that he be informed of any change in this situation.
2. In order to avoid any misunderstanding and to maintain the best possible relations with the Advisory Staff it is considered that the situation should be clarified. It is for that purpose that the following information is submitted.

BACKGROUND

1. MACV letter of 5 October 1965 (Tab A), contained plans for expansion of U.S. PsyOps forces in Vietnam. Generally, the plan for I Corps was to organize the 244th PsyOps Company from 1st PsyOps Field Support Detachment (Prov), which was located in I Corps under the opcon of CG, III MAF, the 27th PsyOps Detachment scheduled to arrive in Vietnam about 1 November 1965 and a command and control team and four (4) loudspeaker teams which had been requested from CONUS. The plan stated that the company would be placed under the opcon of CG, III MAF as part of the I Corps USMACV Advisory Group.
2. The concept of employment (par 4. (c) Tab A) envisioned that the U.S. PsyOps program would be closely integrated with the ARVN PsyOps effort. It further stated that U.S. tactical psyops companies would be under the opcon of the Senior Advisor who would be responsible for encouraging and supervising this integration. It should be noted that this statement contradicts the plan to assign opcon of a psyops company to CG, III MAF, contained in par 3.a. of the same letter.
3. CG, III MAF was designated as Senior Advisor on 10 December 1965.
4. The 244th PsyOps Company was organized on 10 February 1966 in I Corps. (Verbal information received from the CO of the Company, Major NETHERLAND).
5. The III MAC Command Chronology for February 1966 contained an entry

(Tab B) which stated that the company was formed on 15 February 1966. It further stated that the company would support U.S. and ARVN psychological operations in I Corps.

6. MACV letter of 30 May 1966; subj: Employment of the U.S. Army 6th Psy Ops Co. (Tactical) (Tab C) delegated operational control of the 244th Psy Ops Company to the Commanding General, III MAF/SA I Corps.

7. The 244th was listed as a unit of III MAF on the June Task Organization published in July.

Force Order 1600.1c lists the PsyOps Officer as the rater for the efficiency report of the Commanding Officer of the 244th PsyOps Company.

There is a detachment of the 244th at Quang Ngai located in the 2d ARVN Division compound. They are equipped with a light mobile printing press, two audio-visual teams, two loudspeaker teams, intelligence personnel and interpreters. There is an ARVN PsyOps company located there with similar equipment except that it does not have a printing press. The 244th detachment provides printing, loudspeaker and audio-visual support to the 1st MarDiv, ARVN Div, Special Forces and Koreans. Requests for this support is generally submitted directly to the OIC of the detachment and coordination is accomplished on the spot with the 1st MarDiv Liaison Officer and 2d ARVN Div Advisors. This information was obtained from the OIC of the 244th Detachment during my visit to Quang Ngai on 28 August.

10. I visited the MACV Psychological Operations during the period 12-14 August and a report of the trip is at (Tab D). The command relations was discussed with the director and his staff and there appeared to be no question that the 244th PsyOps Company is under the opoon of CG, III MAF and control could be exercised by III MAF staff. It was noted that their (MACV) directives for the 244th were sometimes forwarded through CG, III MAF, through Deputy Senior Advisor and sometimes direct. I indicated that directives for the 244th should be addressed to CG, III MAF since the Company is under his opoon.

11. Plans for expansion of PsyOps forces in Vietnam (Tab B of my trip report) will provide a U.S. PsyOps Company for each U.S. Division which in the case of I Corps, would consist of a psyops battalion with two (2) companies. The proposed build-up is currently being staffed in MACV Hq.

12. The command relations in II and III Corps are as follows:

a. In III Corps the 246th PsyOps Company, which I visited, is under the opoon of the III Corps G-5 Advisor. The Commanding Officer of the 246th indicated that the company provided printing support for U.S. and ARVN but that the loudspeaker and audio-visual teams were committed almost entirely in support of U.S. forces in III Corps.

b. In II Corps, the MACV letter on employment of the U.S. Army 6th Psy Ops Battalion (Tab B), delegates opcon of the 245th PsyOps Company to the Commanding General, I Field Force Victor/SA II Corps similar to the delegation of opcon in I and III Corps. The Commanding General, I Field Force Victor is, however, exercising control through the I FForceV Staff (G-3). This information was received from the PsyOps Directorate Staff.

DISCUSSION

1. There was a significant build-up of U.S. PsyOps Forces in Vietnam during the fall of 65 and spring of 66. This coincided with a massive build-up of the other U.S. Military Forces and could be construed to mean that the psyops capability was intended for support of increased U.S. military operations.
2. The initial planning letter from MACV was contradictory in that it assigned opcon of the 244th to CG III MAF as a part of the Advisory Group while the concept of employment delegated opcon to the Senior Advisor. The letter was written prior to the date that CG, III MAF was designated CG, III MAF/SA of I Corps which may have had some influence on the way it was written, MACV letter of 30 May actually assigned opcon of the 244th to the CG III MAF/SA. It also assigned opcon of a psyops company in the II and III Corps to CG of I and II FForceV/SA. Opcon in these areas is being exercised through the Advisory Staff in III Corps and through the I FForceV Staff in II Corps.
3. The III MAF command chronology Feb 1966 noted information of the 244th PsyOps Company in I Corps on 15 Feb 1966. The listing of the 244th on the III MAF Task Organization indicates that opcon of the company rests with CG, III MAF. However, the fact that this control has been exercised infrequently by this headquarters tends to strengthen the I Corps G-5 Advisor impression that opcon of the company rests with the Advisory Staff.
4. Major commands of the III MAF have very limited resources for conduct of psychological operations. Since increased emphasis is being placed on expanding and improving the effectiveness of psyops in the III MAF, commanders must be provided with the means to accomplish this task.
5. The 244th does not have a maintenance capability and is, in theory, dependant upon the 6th PsyOps Bn. in Saigon. This matter was discussed with the Commanding Officer, 6th PsyOps Bn. and the PsyOps Directorate, both of whom recognize the problem. Efforts are being made to modify the companies TO&E to provide them with a maintenance capability. This problem has been discussed with the III MAF G-4 and the Company Commander has been requested to write a letter requesting maintenance support.
6. The 244th PsyOps Company and the 10th ARVN PsyWar Bn. are located adjacent to each other in Danang. The 10th Bn has three (3) companies and has received some new equipment. It has received a number of new personnel since the political unrest occurred and I understand its capability has increased rapidly since its re-organization. The 244th has provided back-up support to the ARVN.

7. The question of opcon of the 244th was discussed with LtCol Becker (G-5 Advisor) and he is strongly opposed to opcon being exercised by Gen Walt through the III MAF Staff. His main justification was the MACV planning letter which indicated that the 244th would be assigned opcon CG, III MAF as a part of the I Corps Advisory Group. He also indicated that psyops in I Corps was the responsibility of General Lam, that it should be an integrated effort, that the ARVN should make the predominate effort and that this can be accomplished more effectively if opcon of the 244th is exercised through Advisory Staff. We parted friends but not in agreement.

8. The I Corps G-5 established a propaganda coordination center (PCC) about 15 July which was to be manned by ARVN and U.S. Advisory personnel. This was done with the tacit approval of III MAF. My impression of the purpose of the center is that of coordination and control of psyops resources within I Corps including the 10th ARVN Bn and 244th PsyOps Company. Requests from III MAF were to be submitted to the PCC who would then assign a priority and the requirement to the 244th or 10th Bn. There were no instructions published on the PCC and LtCol Becker (I Corps G-5 Advisor) indicated that instructions are being prepared. In actual practice the PCC has not been manned at all times by U.S. representative and requests have been delivered directly to the 244th by telephone, when it is operating, but mostly by messenger. These problems with the PCC can be solved by assignment of adequate personnel and equipment. However, if a PCC is to be established and utilized by both III MAF and ARVN it should be a joint center operating continuously. This would require an increase in the number of personnel assigned to the psyops effort by III MAF performing functions which can be performed by the CGC, JCC, the psy ops sub-committee of the JCC and close staff liaison with the ARVN and U.S. Advisors.

9. The efficiency report of the Company Commander has in the past been marked by the G-5 I Corps Advisory Group and as a result, on these occasions III MAF exercised opcon he was serving two bosses. MACV letter on the subject of efficiency reports for unit commanders indicated that it should be marked by the officer assigned op-control of the unit.

10. COMUSMACV has directed that command attention be given to psychological operations and that it be exploited to the maximum. This directive has been accompanied by plans to expand the U.S. psychological resources in Vietnam and this increase is intended primarily for support of U.S. combat forces.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The MAVC Directives on OpCon of the 244th PsyOps Company, are ambiguous and subject to interpretation. However, it is clear that General WALT has opcon of the 244th and can exercise it through either the III MAF or U.S. Advisory Staff.

2. There is a need for coordination of the ARVN and III MAF psychological operations. This can be accomplished by one or more of the following:
 - a. A standing committee such as the JCC or its psyops sub-committee.
 - b. Scheduling/coordinating conference, weekly or monthly.
 - c. Daily liaison between commands.
 - d. Joint manning of a PCC.
3. The co-location of the 244th and the ARVN Bn is advantageous in that back up support is readily available to both units. This also applies to the co-location of the 244th detachment at Quang Ngai with the ARVN PsyOps Company. This would have to be reviewed at such time as a U.S. Army PsyOps Bn is assigned to I Corps.
4. The primary mission of the 244th is support of U.S. Forces and it is expected that these support requirements will increase. It is considered that this mission can be performed more effectively if opcon of the company is exercised through the III MAF Staff (PsyOps).
5. ARVN support requirements can be requested and coordinated by the Commanders and advisors at the various echelons in the same manner that support from other U.S. Forces is obtained.
6. CG, III MAF should issue a Force Order on the employment of the 244th setting forth command relations, mission and support responsibilities. OpCon of the company also includes responsibility for making of the Company Commanders efficiency report. This responsibility has been assigned to the III MAF PsyOps Office by Force Order 1600.1c of 21 August 1966.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That OpCon of the 244th PsyOps Company be exercised through the III MAF Staff.
2. That a Force Order be published on the subject of the employment of the 244th PsyOps Company to include logistic, maintenance and comm support responsibilities.
3. That coordination of the III MAF and ARVN psychological operations be accomplished through III MAF PsyOps Section, the JCC and the III MAF/ARVN Commanders and U.S. Advisors in their respective areas. Additional coordination will be effected through normal staff liaison at the various echelon.
4. That the III MAF PsyOps Section be represented on the JCC and appropriate sub-committee whenever psyops matters are being considered.
5. That if opcon of the 244th is to be exercised through III MAF Staff, that the Commander of the psyops company be assigned additional duty as special assistant to the PsyOps Officer for propaganda matters.

[Handwritten signature]
R. H. READ

Recommendation 1.

JW APPROVED Fields
DISAPPROVED _____

Recommendation 2.

JW APPROVED Fields
DISAPPROVED _____

Recommendation 3.

JW APPROVED Fields
DISAPPROVED _____

Recommendation 4.

JW APPROVED Fields
DISAPPROVED _____

Recommendation 5.

JW APPROVED Fields
DISAPPROVED _____

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO US Forces 96243

Ser No. 00892
 5 October 1965

MACPD
 SUBJECT: Employment of U.S. Psyops Units (U)

TO: See Distribution

OS 144
 RWA

1. (C) General. The current introduction of US psychological operations units into RVN is designed to provide a major stimulus to the overall US/GVN psyops program in SVN and to insure that US tactical units are provided adequate and timely psyops support. This letter describes the phase in of units, prescribes command relationships, and indicates the concept of employment of US psyops units.

2. (S) Psyops Force Buildup Objectives. The ultimate US military psyops buildup objective in RVN consists of a US Army tactical psyops battalion and a USAF air commando squadron (psyops). Elements of both these units are now in country and operational. Final JCS approval of the integration of the programmed US Army elements into a battalion organization has not been received but is assumed in the discussion which follows.

3. (S) Phase in of US Army Psyops Bn. The US Army tactical psyops battalion will consist of a headquarters and headquarters company, stationed in Saigon, and a tactical psyops company in I, II, and III CTZ's. Each tactical psyops company will consist of two (2) field support detachments, a command and control team, and four (4) loudspeaker teams. Their phase in is indicated below.

a. I CTZ.

(1) The 1st Psyops Field Support Detachment (Prov) is currently located in I CTZ and under the OPCON of CG III MAF. The detachment is assigned to USABVAPAC, a USARYIS unit with duty station in RVN. A request has been forwarded to CINCPAC to have 1st Psyops Detachment assigned to USARV as part of the projected tactical psyops battalion.

(2) A similarly organized detachment (27th Psyops Det) is programmed to arrive o/a 1 November.

(3) A command and control team and four loudspeaker teams have been requested from CONUS to permit organization of a tactical psyops company in I CTZ. Upon notification of the arrival of these teams this hq will request CG USARV to organize the company and will concurrently place the company under the OPCON of CG III MAF as part of the I Corps USMACV Advisory Group.

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 -IC-2899-65-
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 DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

TAB "A"

~~SECRET~~

MACPD

SUBJECT: Employment of U.S. Psyops Units (U)

b. II CTZ.

(1) 24th Psyops Detachment, assigned USARV, is currently under the operational control of CG F Force V.

(2) 25th Psyops Detachment, now arriving in country and assigned USARV, is hereby placed under the OPCON of the US Senior Advisor II CTZ.

(3) A command and control team and four loudspeaker teams have been requested from CONUS to permit organization of a tactical Psyops Company in II CTZ. Upon notification of the arrival of these teams this headquarters will request CG USARV to organize the company and will concurrently place the company under OPCON of the US Senior Advisor II CTZ.

c. III CTZ.

(1) 28th Psyops Field Support Detachment (Prov) is currently located in III CTZ, attached to USARV. Effective with this letter unit is placed under OPCON US Senior Advisor III CTZ. Request has been forwarded to CINCPAC for this unit to be transferred to USARV.

(2) The 26th Psyops Detachment is scheduled to arrive by sea from CONUS o/a 23 October. It will be assigned USARV, under the OPCON of Senior Advisor, III CTZ.

(3) A company level command and control team and four loudspeaker teams have also been requested from CONUS for III CTZ. When these teams arrive III CTZ assets will be integrated into a tactical psyops company assigned to USARV, and under the OPCON SA III Corps.

d. Saigon.

(1) USAHVAPAC VN Detachment is currently stationed in the Saigon area attached to USARV and under OPCON COMUSMACV. Personnel assigned to this detachment are programmed to form the cadre of the headquarters and headquarters company of the tactical psyops battalion. The headquarters and headquarters company will be assigned USARV and will be under the operational control of COMUSMACV.

4. (C) Employment Concept.

a. Within Corps Tactical Zones the US military psyops program will be closely integrated with the ARVN psyops effort. US tactical psyops companies are placed under the OPCON of Senior Advisors who are responsible

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

MACPD

SUBJECT: Employment of U.S. Psyops Units (U)

for encouraging and supervising this integration. The US units will support the ARVN psyops effort by providing advice and assistance on a continuing basis, thereby energizing and raising the ARVN battalions to a higher professional level. The ARVN units, on the other hand, with their knowledge of the country, people, and language can be of invaluable assistance to US psyops units.

b. To maximize the capabilities of each unit, ARVN and US, this headquarters desires the establishment within each CTZ of one or more propaganda support centers (PSC) which will have as their primary objectives the integration and management of US and RVNAF military psyops resources. The propaganda support center is visualized as a common facility, jointly manned by US and GVN psyops personnel and supporting all US/RVNAF operations within the CTZ according to priorities mutually agreed to by the ARVN Corps Commander and the Senior US Commander in the CTZ.

c. Essential to the propaganda support center concept is the co-location of functionally related US and RVNAF personnel and equipment. The side by side physical relationship will facilitate coordination of effort, cooperation and exchange of information and assistance. Specifically it is desired that US and RVNAF light mobile printing presses be placed in close-proximity to each other and that there be an integrated psyops planning research, and intelligence effort. Thus one or both of the detachments which constitute the US psyops company will be physically co-located with the headquarters and technical companies of the ARVN psywar bn of the CTZ. When conditions in a CTZ require dispersion of the US psyops company into two detachments, the other detachment which does not remain at the ARVN battalion headquarters location should, if possible, be co-located with one of the support companies of the ARVN psywar battalion.

d. It is also desired that the command and control apparatus for the CTZ PSC be a coordinated effort among personnel who usually work in the same facility and participate in solving the same problems. Key personnel who should routinely work closely together to organize and direct the overall military psyops effort in the CTZ include the commanders of the ARVN and US psyops units and their staffs, USMACV Psywar/CA Advisors, the MACV Psywar/CA Advisors to the ARVN psywar battalion, and depending on location, US tactical headquarters and unit psywar officers. Other personnel who will be concerned with psyops coordination and will be frequent visitors to the PSC are the ARVN G5 and his US Advisor and JUSPAO regional and province representatives.

e. The propaganda support center in the CTZ has the overall mission of coordinating all military psyops in the CTZ in accordance with priorities mutually agreed to by the ARVN Corps Commanders and the Senior US Commander in the CTZ, including that initiated by US and ARVN

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MACPD

SUBJECT: Employment of U.S. Psyops Units (U)

special forces units and the psyops support provided within the CTZ by the USAF and VNAF psyops capabilities. All requirements for tactical psyops support not within the capability of US or ARVN tactical units will be submitted through appropriate channels to the PSC. Support will be provided by attachment of loudspeaker teams, allocation of loudspeaker equipped aircraft, or by preparation and delivery of printed materials. Requests for support beyond the resources of the propaganda support center will be forwarded to this headquarters directly from CTZ PSC's.

f. Staff supervision over the US military psyops effort in RVN is exercised at the USMACV level by the Political Warfare Advisory Directorate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



HOWARD D. SCHULZE

Captain, AGC

Asst AG

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HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO US Forces 96243

Ser No 574
 25 January 1966

MACPD

SUBJECT: Downgrading of Classified Correspondence

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference:

- a. Section VII, AR 380-5.
- b. Paragraph 37, Section IV, MACV Directive 380-5, 5 January 1966.

2. Letter this headquarters, MACPD, subject: Employment of U.S. PsyOps Units (U), serial 00892, dated 5 October 1966, is downgraded from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL effective this date.

3. Provisions of paragraph 59a, AR 380-5 apply for appropriate annotation on downgraded documents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


 HOWARD D. SCHULZE
 Captain, AGC
 Asst AG

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO 96243

MACPD

30 May 1966

SUBJECT: Employment of the US Army 6th PsyOps Battalion (Tactical)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: Letter, Serial No. 00892 MACPD, this Headquarters, 5 October 1965, Subject: "Employment of U.S. PsyOps Units (U)".

2. Purpose: This letter confirms the arrival of US Army PsyOps units and their operational assignments as forecast by the referenced letter.

3. The 6th PsyOps Battalion (Tactical) is assigned to USARV. USARV exercises command, less operational control, of the 6th PsyOps Battalion (Tactical). Operational control is exercised by COMUSMACV.

4. Delegation of Operational Control of 6th PsyOps Battalion (Tactical):

a. Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 6th PsyOps Battalion functions under the direct operational control of COMUSMACV. Staff supervision is exercised by the Director, Political Warfare Advisory Directorate.

b. COMUSMACV delegates operational control of subordinate elements of the 6th PsyOps Battalion as indicated below:

(1) Operational control of 244th PsyOps Company to Commanding General III MAF/SA I Corps.

(2) Operational control of 245th PsyOps Company to Commanding General I FForceV/SA II Corps.

(3) Operational control of 246th PsyOps Company to Commanding General II FForceV/SA III Corps.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Howard D. Schulze
HOWARD D. SCHULZE
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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TAB "B"

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MACPD

30 May 1966

SUBJECT: Employment of the US Army 6th PsyOps Battalion (Tactical)

DISTRIBUTION:

5 CG USARV
2 CDR 7th AF
5 CG III MAF/SA I Corps
5 CG I ForceV/SA II Corps
5 CG II ForceV/SA III Corps
2 SA IV Corps
10 CO 6th PsyOps Bn
2 JUSPAO

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1 SJS
1 J-1
1 J-2
3 J-3
1 J-4
1 J-5
10 MACPD

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EXCERPT FROM III MAF COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FEBRUARY 1966

1. On 15 February 1966, the 1st Psy Ops Field Support Detachment (U. S.) in DaNang, and the 27th Psy Ops Field Support Detachment (U. S.) in Quang Ngai, were reorganized under one headquarters to form the 244th Psychological Operations Company. The Company will maintain facilities in both locations with the DaNang detachment supporting U. S. and ARVN psychological operations in the northern three provinces of I Corps, while the Quang Ngai detachment will support Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The company headquarters is located in DaNang, and is responsible for the administrative and logistics support for the company. The headquarters section is comprised of a Company Commander (Major), First Sergeant (E-6), Supply Sergeant (E-5), and Clerk/Typist (E-4).

TAB "C"

MEMORANDUM

21 August 1966

SECRET

From: Psychological Operations Officer
 To: Chief of Staff
 Via: Deputy Chief of Staff

Subj: Report of visit to MACV Psychological Operations Directorate

- Tab: (a) Itinerary for subject visit
 (b) MACV Programmed and Planned additional PSYOP Resources
 (c) Employment of the 26th Psy Op detachment
 (d) MACV proposed Psy Ops Staff Augmentation for FForce, division and brigade TO&E
 (e) Hamlet Festival sequence of events (1st Infantry Division USA)

1. The most significant information received was the proposed increase of psy ops resources in VN, Tab (b). This is presently being staffed in MACV headquarters. The plan would provide a psy ops Bn. for III MAF and a large increase in the number of psy ops aircraft in VN.
2. There are also certain increases in psy ops resources which have or will arrive in the near future. Two (2) additional C-47's have arrived which should normally make it possible to have one available in each Corps continuously. Seven (7) audiovisual teams are scheduled to arrive VN in Jan 67. Present plans will assign two (2) of these teams to III MAF which increases the number assigned from four (4) to six (6).
3. A heavy duty press has been installed at Nha Trang and should become operational during September. This unit will provide printing back up to I and II Corps, Tab (c).
4. MACV has submitted a proposed TO&E to the Department of the Army, Tab (d) for augmentation of Field Force, Division and Brigade staffs with psy ops personnel. It is expected that the proposed T/O for this section will be similar to that proposed for the Army Field Force. III MAF units will be requested to submit personnel requirements and T/O changes at an early date.
5. The Hamlet Festival conducted by the 1st Infantry Division, Tab (e) was the result of destroying a village astride their main LOC. The villagers would not cooperate in eliminating the VC from the village and after several warnings they were evacuated and the village destroyed. A new village is being constructed at same distance from the LOC and in the meantime, the villagers are being housed in a temporary camp.
 The people were being photographed and data cards filled out on each family. They were interrogated and families of the VC urged to write letters, make statements or tape recordings asking husband's to return home. Attached to the sequence of events is a temporary refugee pass printed on a JUSPAO leaflet blank. The cover design is already on one side and the other side is blank to be filled in or printed by one of the psy ops units.

Ready
 R. R. [Signature]
 TAB "D"
 SECRET

PSYOPS DIRECTORATE
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO 96243

MACPD

10 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIV
ADVISORY DIV
6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BN

Subject: Orientation for III MAF Psychological Operations Officer

1. Col Reid has been assigned as Psychological Operations Officer in the III MAF G-5 section. He will arrive in Saigon on 11 or 12 August. MACPD will conduct an orientation program for Col Reid during the afternoon of 12 August and on 13 and 14 August. Col Reid will attend the MACV-JUSPAO-AID Advisors conference from 15 through 19 August 1966.

2. The following itinerary will be followed in providing an orientation program for Col Reid:

- 12 Aug - 1330-1345 Meet with Director MACPD
- 12 Aug - 1400-1630 Visit GPWD -
PayMar Compound and other sections of GPWD if desired.
Col Marshall - Escort officer
- 13 Aug - 0730-0900 Briefing by JAO Division staff members on U.S. psychological operations and civic action.
Escort officer - Lt Col Watson
- 13 Aug - 0900-1030 Accompany Col Peals to JUSPAO weekly staff meeting.
- 13 Aug - 1045-1130 Visit 6th PsyOps Bn. Col Moulis - Escort Officer.
- 13 Aug - 1330-1630 Visit 1st 6th PsyOps Company at Bien Hoa, and Dep Sr. Advisor G-5 section.
Escort officer - Col Moulis or designate.

Col Reid - III MAF Psychological Operations Officer

Taf (a)

MACFD

10 August 1966

SUBJECT: Orientation for III MAF Psychological Operations Officer

14 Aug - 0900 - 1130

Informal discussions with P&O
Division staff members.
Escort officer - Lt Col Watson

14 Aug - 1330 -

Visit to J-3 and J-2 - Escort
officer - LCDR Cooper.

3. LCDR Cooper is appointed escort officer for Col Reid. It will not be necessary to accompany Col Reid during the entire itinerary, but only to ensure that contact is made with individual escort officers listed above for specific orientation periods. Col West, III MAF Liaison Officer (40595) should be contacted to confirm that transportation is being provided for Col Reid, and to work out any other details of the orientation program.

4. Specific clearances or arrangements for portions of the orientation program will be obtained by the following officers:

- | | |
|--|--------------|
| a. Any necessary GFD approval for visit to Psywar Dept | Col Marshall |
| b. Notification of visit to:
II FForceV, III CTZ Deputy Senior
Adviser and CO 246th PsyOps Company | Col Houlis |
| c. Arrangements for visit to J-3 and J-2 | LCDR Cooper |

James H. Feals, Jr.
JAMES H. FEALS, JR.
Colonel, GS
Director

Info:

Col West - III MAF Liaison Officer

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT
 GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES
 Office of the United States Advisor

MAC/30

17 August 1966


SUBJECT: Orientation of Colonel Reid, Paywar Officer, III MAF.

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. On 12 August 1966 Colonel Reid, Paywar Officer, III MAF, will visit and be briefed on activities of GPWD and PWD. The following will be the itinerary for Colonel Reid during his visit.

1400 - 1415	Travel to Hong Thap Tu	Col Marshall
1415 - 1445	Briefing on GPWD	Col Marshall
1445 - 1500	Visit Colonel Quang - Col Quang's Office	
1500 - 1510	Briefing, PWD - Major Van Strien	
1510 - 1525	Briefing, Radio - Lt Williams	
1525 - 1535	Briefing, PGC - Capt Mott	
1535 - 1550	Briefing, Mopic - Capt Dickerson	
1550 - 1610	Briefing, Printing - Capt Boulton	

2. Personnel responsible for briefing Colonel Reid at the various activities will be present and ready for their briefing with counterparts at least 15 minutes prior to time shown above. As has happened many times in the past, questions arise during the visit which cause a disruption of the itinerary. Therefore, briefers will attempt to stay within the allotted time, and at the same time answer questions as completely as possible.


 JAMES H. VAN STRIEN

Major, GS
 Senior Advisor

DISTRIBUTION

Col Marshall
 Lt Col Safar-Col Quang
 Maj Van Strien
 Lt Williams
 Capt Mott
 Capt Boulton
 Capt Dickerson

MACPD

13 August 1966

SUBJECT: Programmed and Planned Additional PSYOP Resources.

TO: Col Read

PROGRAMMED

(Over and above the current 6th PsyOp Bn & its three PsyOp Cos.)

1. (C) 19th PsyOp Co. - arrive Oct 66 - positioned at Can Tho (IV CTZ) - some of the Audiovisual and loudspeaker teams will be spread to the other existing Psyops Co's, exact distribution to be determined - Co will be redesignated "247th PsyOps Co" upon arrival - Co organization will be same as 244th PsyOps Co in I CTZ.
2. (C) 26th PsyOps Det - see attached letter.
3. (C) 7 audiovisual teams - arrive Jan 67 (we hope) - III MAF/244th PsyOps Co will receive 2 of these teams if current plans are executed.
4. (C) Six additional C-47's or equivalent aircraft have been requested for the 5th Air Commando Sqdrn - action being taken to speed delivery, arrival date unknown. Currently on hand are 4 C-47's with two additional C-47's due in this month (Aug). Hopefully we will be able to position one C-47 in each of the four CTZ's in the near future. Where needs for psyops aircraft exceed the available resources (this happens quite often) commander's have been requested to use their organic helicopters and suitable fixed wing aircraft to conduct loudspeaker and leafleting operations. III MAF has been issued 6 portable loudspeaker systems which can be mounted on wheel, track or aerial platforms. You will find that III MAF is making good use of these loudspeaker systems.

Tab (B)

MACPD

13 August 1966

SUBJECT: Programmed and Planned Additional PSYOP Resources.

PLANNED

(The data presented below is currently in the preparation stage and has not been approved by COMUSMACV as yet)

1. (S) Expansion of the 6th PsyOp Battalion from a HQ & HQ Co w/4 Psyops Companies to a group headquarters with 4 psyops battalions (One battalion per CTZ). Each battalion would have two psyop companies. Each company would have two detachments. Each detachment would have a printing press, 2 audiovisual teams and 2 loudspeaker teams ^{plus other necessary ~~elements~~ personnel elements}. A detachment would be capable of providing direct support to a division by physically deploying with that division during combat operations, thus being quickly responsive to psychological opportunities that arise. One loudspeaker and one audiovisual team should be with each brigade/regiment during combat operations. The press could be located wherever it could best accomplish its mission (either at home base or with the committed division) but it must have access to psyop intelligence, POW's, ralliers, etc.

2. (C) Action has been initiated to increase the 5th ACS inventory of U-10 or suitable substitute type aircraft from its present 16 to a total of 40. Indications are that 7th Air Force considers an additional 16 aircraft to be sufficient - MACPD feels 24 additional aircraft are needed. Our concept is 2 STOL psyops aircraft to support each US division (total 14), one STOL aircraft to support each US separate brigade/regiment (total 5) and 11 aircraft to be spread among the four CTZ's to support ARVN, RMAF and sector psyops activities. This totals 30 STOL aircraft in position at all times, therefore, considering a 75% aircraft availability (in service) rate, 40 STOL aircraft would be required.

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HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO 96243

MACPD

8 July 1966

SUBJECT: Employment of the 26th PsyOps Detachment (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) GENERAL. The rapid buildup of US Forces, activation of Propaganda Support Centers, accelerated leaflet campaigns, and the increased number of major tactical operations has created a requirement for psyops support beyond the capability of current resources. The demands are such as to necessitate deployment of additional psyops units into the Republic of Vietnam to reinforce the psychological operations efforts of existing elements. This letter constitutes a warning order relative to the arrival and stationing of the 26th PsyOps Detachment and describes the planned phase-in, command relationships and concept of employment.

2. (C) PHASE-IN. The 26th PsyOps Detachment (2 Off, 20 EM, Total 22), activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, will depart CONUS o/a 23 July 1966. It is anticipated that the unit will travel via surface transportation. ETA ~~unknown~~. Unit is programmed to be stationed at Nha Trang.
 20 Aug 66.

3. (C) COMMAND RELATIONSHIP. The 26th PsyOps Detachment will be attached to the 245th PsyOps Company and, will be under the OPCON of CG I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM. This unit will provide printing back-up support for COMUSMACV when requested.

4. (C) CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT.

a. The 26th PsyOps Detachment has the same high speed printing capability as that of the printing section, Headquarters Company, 6th PsyOps Battalion located in Saigon. It is envisioned that the 26th PsyOps Detachment will be employed to provide printing back-up support to both I and II CTZ's, thus alleviating some of the requirements now placed on the 6th PsyOps Battalion's heavy mobile printing section. Quick reaction psyops printing requirements, to support combat operations, will continue to be provided by light mobile press sections located in the respective CTZ's.

b. CG I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM will establish procedures for processing and fulfilling printing requests from CG/SA III MAF. Printing priorities for I and II CTZ's requirements will be established by CG I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM. COMUSMACV retains authority to place printing requirements on the 26th PsyOps Detachment when the demands of the command exceed the capability of other available resources.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

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8 July 1966

MACPD

SUBJECT: Employment of the US 26th PsyOps Detachment (U)

c. The concept includes relocation of a light mobile printing section of the 245th PsyOps Company from Nha Trang to Ban Me Thuot after the 26th PsyOps Detachment becomes operational. The present command relationship between the relocated light mobile printing section and the 245th PsyOps Company will continue. In the interest of integrating US and RVNAF PsyOps resources, it is intended that this printing section will be collocated with the 3rd ARVN PSYOPS Company at Ban Me Thuot for the purpose of providing mutual support and assistance. Advantages of this arrangement include availability of ARVN personnel who can provide linguistic capability and an understanding of Vietnamese Society. Also because of closer proximity to areas of military operations in the highlands, leaflet printing requirements of tactical units can be fulfilled more rapidly. A coordinated US/RVNAF effort, working within the framework of the Propaganda Support Center concept, is considered to allow optimum utilization of resources.

5. (U) Additional information will be forwarded as received.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for *C. Carmichael*
 W. C. CARMICHAEL
 Lt Col, AGC
 Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

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 3 CG IFFV
 3 CG III MAF
 2 4TH PSYOPS BN
 3 MACPD
 3 MACJ3

Copies Furnished:

2 DSA I CTZ
 2 DSA II CTZ

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Subject: Major Staff Augmentation of Existing Brigade Division and
 (Ref: 100 000)

2. Since the introduction of major US Combat Forces into Vietnam, there has been a tremendous increase in emphasis on, subsequently, requirements for psychological operations. These requirements have exceeded a need for staff functions not provided for in TCH's as currently written. The below listed changes to Brigade, Division and Force TCH's have been approved by CINCUSC and forwarded to you for final approval for incorporation in units closing RVN at a later date. In-country units are being handled by USMNV by separate action. Changes follow:

a. Brigade	Capt E-6 E-4	Psywar Officer Intel Analyst Clerk/Driver	9305 9603W 71120
b. Division	Major Capt E-7 E-4	Psywar Officer Asst Psywar Off Intel Analyst Clerk/Driver	9305 9305 9603W 71120
c. Force	Lt Col Major Capt E-6 E-4	Psywar Officer Asst Psywar Off Asst Psywar Off Opn Intel Sgt Clerk/Driver	9305 9305 9305 9605W 71120

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Tab (d)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96345

WDE-CA

10 Aug 1966

MEMO FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Hamlet Festival on 14 Aug 1966.

1. SEQUENCE:

- 0730 Band arrives Lai Kho airfield, moves to collection point for Hamlet Festival elements.
- 0745 Hamlet Festival assembles (Capt Horn, Capt McGrady) Road Opans (Ede S-3)
- 0800 Festival element crosses IP
VIS and District sets up loudspeaker system and movie tent, stage for team and band, signs on tents. Health officer on location. Rice husks on tent floors, fences up.
- 0820 Festival arrives (Band starts as soon as set up)
- 0825 Collection of people begins (Police/AF, VIS)
- 0845 Festival starts with a speech by District Chief
- 0900 Festival elements open, VIS starts movies for children, culture team entertains, Radio begins, ID issue begins, Youth service starts, VIS display tent opens
- 0945 Bulger team starts preparations
- 1000 Refreshments served, Band plays
- 1030 Bulger demonstration begins. Band departs for Lai Kho (S-4)
- 1100 Rice distribution begins under CASEE banner
- 1200 Final show by culture team

2. NOTES:

Hamlet Festival net will be 62,00

Capt Horn- Dancy 420

Capt McGrady- Dancy 42

Changes will be coordinated with the undersigned.

Jerry R. Horn
JERRY R. HORN

Capt, AFM

Festival Coordinator

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 3410.2
50/rej
18 Sep 1966

FORCE ORDER 3410.2

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution list

Subj: Employment of the 244th Psychological Operations Company,
(Tactical), U. S. Army

Ref: (a) IACPD ltr of 30 May 1966 subj: Employment of the U. S.
Army 6th Psy Ops Battalion (Tactical)
(b) Force Order 3410.1 Psy Ops SOP

Incl: (1) U. S. Army 244th Psy Ops Company Organization
(2) U. S. Army 244th Psy Ops Company Capabilities

1. Purpose. To describe the organization and capability and to provide guidance and policy on the employment of the 244th Psy Ops Company (Tactical) U. S. Army.

2. General. Operational control of the 244th Psy Ops Company was assigned to this command by reference (a). Staff responsibility is assigned to the Force Psychological Operations Officer, III MAF. Command of the Company, less operational control, is vested in the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical).

3. Mission. To provide psychological operations support, advice, and technical assistance to III MAF forces; to advise and assist the 10th ARVN Psy War Battalion and conduct such other operations as may be directed.

4. Organization

a. The organization is contained in enclosure (1). It consists of four (4) major elements:

- (1) Command, control and support.
- (2) Intelligence, research and analysis.
- (3) Printing and processing, light mobile propaganda operations.

ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED

Form 3/10/2

(4) Audio-visual, loudspeaker, light mobile propaganda team.

b. A description of the capabilities of the Company is contained in enclosure (2).

c. The authorized strength of the 244th Psy Ops Company is 15 Officers and 45 Enlisted personnel.

5. Concept of employment

a. The company headquarters and functional teams will be retained under the operational control of this headquarters. These elements will be available on request to provide support to subordinate commands, Free World and RVN Forces and agencies within the ICTZ.

b. Requests for support by III MAF Commands will be in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).

c. Requests for support by other forces and agencies will be through appropriate advisory and/or command channels.

d. In the event of conflicting requirements, priorities will be determined by this headquarters.

e. It is considered that close coordination with the 10th ARVN Psy War Battalion will be mutually beneficial and highly desirable. Technical assistance and advice will be provided to the 10th ARVN Psy War Battalion to the maximum extent practicable.

6. Logistics. To be provided by separate directive.

R. B. Neville

R. B. NEVILLE
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: **Case 1JA Plus:**

2nd ROKMC Brigade	(10)
CTG 79.5	(2)
Det C, 5th Spl Forces	(5)
1 Corps Adv Grp	(2)
Naval Adv Grp	(1)

244TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY
ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

1. Team AA (Command and Control) (Company)

a. Capabilities: Provide command, administration, and logistical support for all elements under its command.

b. Team deployment: The AA Team has its command post co-located with the Provisional Detachment 1.

c. Team personnel authorized: 1 Officer
3 Enlisted Men

d. Major items of equipment: None.

2. Team FC (Propaganda-Current Intelligence)

a. Capabilities:

(1) Process intelligence information for use in psychological operations to determine targets, vulnerabilities, and methods of exploitation.

(2) Develops psychological operation plans and programs to include objectives, tasks, themes, and media guidance.

b. Team deployment:

(1) Half the team is deployed to support Provisional Detachment 1.

(2) Half the team is deployed to support Provisional Detachment 2.

c. Team personnel authorized: 2 Officers
6 Enlisted Men

d. Major items of equipment: None

3. Team FD (Propaganda Research and Analysis)

a. Capabilities:

(1) Develops ideas and material for exploitation by appropriate media.

(2) Analysis of allied and enemy propaganda.

b. Team deployment:

ForO 3410.2

(1) Half the team is deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 1.

(2) Half the team is deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 2.

c. Team personnel authorized: 2 Officers
4 Enlisted Men

d. Major items of equipment: None.

4. Team HB (Light Mobile Loudspeaker Operations)

a. Capabilities:

(1) Plans and conducts live audio propaganda broadcasts.

(2) Prepares text for loudspeaker appeals and advises the commander on the employment of sound equipment.

b. Team deployment:

(1) Two teams are deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 1.

(2) Two teams are deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 2.

c. Team personnel authorized: 2 Enlisted Men

d. Major items of equipment: 1 ea Amplifier Audio Freq AM-864-N
1 ea Publ Adrs Set AN/UIH-5
1 ea Rec-Repro Set AN/UNH-10

5. Team HC (Light Mobile Printing and Processing)

a. Capabilities:

(1) Prints propaganda leaflets and news sheets according to given specifications.

(2) Prepares artwork and copy layout for printing.

(3) Prints 5,000 - 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 16 inch sheets per hour in two colors.

(4) Cuts, packages, rolls, loads, and distributes printed propaganda material for dissemination by aircraft, tube artillery, and other means.

ENCLOSURE (2)

2

Form 3410.2

b. Team deployment:

(1) One team is deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 1.

(2) One team is deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 2.

c. Team personnel authorized: 3 Enlisted Men.

d. Major items of equipment: None.

6. Team HD (Light Mobile Operations - Propaganda)

a. Capabilities:

(1) Prepares psychological operation plans and operation orders.

(2) Prepares material for propaganda contingencies to include:
Leaflets, news sheets, ground/airborne loudspeaker appeals.

b. Team deployment:

(1) One team is deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 1.

(2) One team is deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 2.

c. Team personnel authorized: 1 Officer
5 Enlisted Men

d. Major items of equipment:

1 ea Printing Plant - Spec Warfare
1 ea Camera Set Still Picture KS-4A(2)
1 ea Projector Set Still Picture AP-9

7. Team HE (Propaganda Audio-Visual)

a. Capabilities:

(1) Conducts sound and film propaganda appeals.

(2) Distributes leaflets, posters, magazines, and other propaganda items.

ForO 3410.2

(3) Gathers information on local attitudes and opinions.

b. Team deployment:

(1) Two teams are deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 1.

(2) Two teams are deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 2.

c. Team personnel authorized: 1 Officer
2 Enlisted Men

8. Team IA (Mobile Radio Operation)

a. Capabilities:

(1) Provides technical assistance to allied radio stations.

(2) Provides guidance for radio propaganda appeals to include programming and scheduling.

b. Team deployment:

(1) One team is deployed as part of Provisional Detachment 1.

ENCLOSURE (2)

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 3410.2 Ch 1
 4C/rlm
 24 Oct 1966

FORCE ORDER 3410.2 Ch 1

From: Commanding General
 To: Distribution List

Subj: Employment of the 244th Psychological Operations Company,
 (Tactical), U. S. Army

1. Purpose. To publish a pen change to the basic order
2. Action. Delete present paragraph 6 and substitute the following in lieu thereof:

"6. Logistics. The following procedures are hereby established for the logistic support of the 244th Psychological Operations Company, U. S. Army.

a. Supplies

- (1) All Class I and III and common item Class II and IV supplies will be provided by the Naval Support Activity, Danang.
- (2) Class V common supplies will be provided by III MAF. Requisitions citing the appropriate reporting unit code, job order number and accounting data, may be submitted to Force Logistic Command.
- (3) U. S. Army peculiar supplies will be provided by the 1st Logistic Command, U. S. Army.
- (4) All supplies furnished to the 244th Psychological Operations Company by III MAF and/or Naval Support Activity will be provided on a reimbursable basis.

b. Services. The following services will be provided to the 244th Psychological Operations Company:

(1) Maintenance Support

- (a) III MAF will provide maintenance support on all common items of equipment, through Force Logistic Command.

ForO 3410.2 Ch 1

(b) Maintenance support of U. S. Army peculiar items of equipment will be provided by the 1st Logistic Command, U. S. Army.

(c) Maintenance support provided by III MAF, including all supplies and materials consumed in the maintenance function, will be furnished on a common service basis. Inter-service Supply Support Agreements will be executed by Force Logistic Command to reflect the range and scope of the service to be rendered and the non-reimbursable aspect of the agreement."

R. B. Neville

R. B. NEVILLE

Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 1A plus:	
2d Brigade ROKMC	(10)
CTG 79.5	(2)
Det C, 5 SF Group	(5)
I Corps Adv Grp	(2)
Naval Adv Grp	(1)
244th PsyOpsCo	(10)

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RETURN TO III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 3410.1
13/edm/mar
18 August 1966

FORCE ORDER 3410.1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Psychological Operations

Ref: (a) FM 33-5
(b) 1st PsyOps FldSptDet (Prov) Leaflet Catalogue, BVA/AT1, dtd
18 October 1965 (with current revisions)

Encl: (1) PsyWar Support Request Form
(2) Weekly PsyOps Activity Report Form
(3) Sample PsyWar Annex
(4) Definition Annex

1. Purpose. To standardize procedures for conducting and reporting psychological operations within the III Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Definitions of PsyWar Terminology. Enclosure (4) provides a list of terms and definitions commonly used in psychological operations.

3. General

a. Psychological Warfare is a continuous process that is waged before, during and after an engagement. The effects of a psywar operation are seldom immediately apparent and success or failure is often learned months after the actual execution of efforts has ceased.

b. In order to conduct a successful psychological operation, the best information available about the target audience must be obtained. All exploitable weaknesses must be discovered and every opportunity must be taken to arrive at an effective approach. The cultural background of the people and their prior exposure to both friendly and enemy propaganda must be considered. The information below is designed to provide psychological officers in the III Marine Amphibious Force with sufficient background and guidance to enable them to conduct successful psychological operations.

4. Objectives. The objectives of the command's psychological operations are as follows:

a. To reduce the combat efficiency of the Viet Cong forces.

ENCLOSURE (4)

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ForO 3410.1

b. To further the efforts of the Government of Vietnam in re-establishing its effective control over the population by modifying or manipulating attitudes and behaviour of special audiences.

c. To facilitate the rural construction efforts of the Government of Vietnam by coordinating this command's psychological operations with its civic action program.

d. To obtain the cooperation and assistance of villagers in the Government of Vietnam's efforts to quell the Viet Cong insurgency.

5. Themes. Psychological themes are subjects, topics, or lines of persuasion used as a means of accomplishing a psychological objective, through the exploitation of existing vulnerabilities. Themes must be consistent with the Government of Vietnam's basic doctrines, with its political and military policies, and with the psychological activities of other agencies. They must be timely, exploiting the current situation, and they must be credible and still be convincing to the target audience. The basic themes of this command's psychological operations at this time are the following:

a. That the Government of Vietnam offers peace, security and freedom for the villagers to live their lives in the manner of their choice, whereas the Viet Cong offer only tyranny, regimentation and exploitation without freedom to live their lives in the manner of their choice.

b. That the strength of the Government of Vietnam, as assisted by other free nations throughout the world, is such that it will bring inevitable defeat to the Viet Cong even though they are being guided and assisted by Communist foreigners.

c. That continued Viet Cong activity in an area deprives villagers of security, food and governmental services that would normally enable them to live wholesome lives apart from the fear and harassment forced on them by the Viet Cong.

d. That Viet Cong soldiers and followers will be well-treated by the Government of Vietnam if they voluntarily surrender and they will be given occupational training and guidance under the Chieu Hoi program.

6. Methods. This command will utilize all available media in carrying out its psychological operations. Commanders at all levels are encouraged to use their initiative and imagination in suggesting variations and modifications for effecting results. Media to be utilized include the following:

a. Individual Marine. The use of the individual Marine as a medium for psychological operations cannot be overemphasized. The actions of each Marine, whether in battle, in camp, or on liberty must convey the message that the U.S.M.C. is here only to help our friends defeat their enemy, the

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Viet Cong. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, ranging from exemplary personal conduct to active participation in distributing propaganda material.

b. Face-to-face meetings. These should be arranged in coordination with leaders and serve to reinforce other media used previously in accomplishing this unit's psychological operations mission.

c. Audio media. Loudspeakers utilizing taped and live broadcasts, both on the ground and airborne, can be used to reach large groups and are particularly effective in tactical or emergency situations. Radio is another audio media that can be effectively used.

d. Visual media. Leaflets, handbills and posters will be the most commonly used type of visual media. They can be used to disseminate news summaries, civic action directives, control regulations, announcements and meetings, and general propaganda. Newspapers are also an advanced media to communicate visual propaganda and appeal to the masses.

7. Intelligence. Psychological Warfare Officers must coordinate with their unit Intelligence Officer to obtain pertinent data relating to target audiences and any information indicating results of past psychological operations. A list of essential elements of information (EEI) should be submitted on a standing basis. A Psychological Operator must be aware of the basic cultural background of his target audience. In addition to this basic information, the following specific points should be added to the knowledge of the psychological operator:

- a. Recent history, to include political control, and economic state.
- b. Exposure to friendly and enemy propaganda.
- c. Vulnerabilities based on enemy atrocities, friendly victories, personal hardships, and instances where enemy propaganda has lost its credibility.
- d. Status of enemy morale, with specific reference to events or circumstances which have effected morale.

8. Coordination

a. This command's psychological operations will be closely coordinated with the psychological operations of all Government of Vietnam and third country agencies operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Overall coordination will be effected through the I Corps Joint Psywar/CA Center. Representatives of all Vietnamese and American psychological warfare agencies are members of this center.

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b. The I Corps Joint PsyWar/CA Center is located at the 3d PsyWar ARVN Bn Headquarters. The mission of the center is to coordinate all psychological warfare activities in I Corps Tactical Zone. The purpose of such coordination is to avoid contradiction, duplication, and misinformation. The center is organized into four (4) functional sections; Propaganda/Intelligence, Operations, Reproduction, and Logistics. Liaison with the center is maintained at III Marine Amphibious Force level.

c. Unit Psychological Warfare Officers will coordinate local activities with GVN officials and sub-sector advisors to insure continuity with particular propaganda themes which have been stressed, or avoided, in their areas.

g. Resources Available. In addition to those resources available to unit PsyWar Operations Officers at their own level, the following support can be provided upon request:

a. Audio/Visual PsyWar Team. The 244th Psychological Operations Company (U.S. Army), augmented by personnel from the 3d PsyWar Battalion (ARVN), are available to support both strategic and tactical psychological operations conducted by III MAF units. These teams normally use a 3/4 ton truck equipped with a loudspeaker system which has both a voice broadcast and tape recorder capability, along with movie equipment for showing entertainment and propaganda films. These teams can be employed in several capacities which include, but are not limited to the following:

(1) General psyops campaigns within the TAOR. These teams have developed standard programs for presentation at hamlet rallies using a variety of media. Normally speeches are presented by both Vietnamese psyops personnel and local officials. Propaganda and entertainment films are shown, and leaflets and magazines are distributed. These programs are flexible enough to be adjusted to the particular psychological climate of the area, and particular themes that unit PsyOps Officers desire to have presented.

(2) Occasions of special significance. Audio/Visual Psywar Teams can be successfully employed during celebrations and ceremonies of special significance to the Vietnamese people. The festivities following the completion of a large civic action project is a common example of this type of utilization. The opening of a new school, completion of a well, or any similar construction projects provide excellent opportunities to utilize Psywar teams. The programs should be built around the significance of the event, and the influence of the Government of Vietnam should be exploited during these projects.

(3) During Tactical Operations. Tactical employment of Audio/Visual Psywar Teams has proven to be a highly effective means of exploiting timely psychological targets. The increased psychological pressures

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of actual combat provide the propagandist with a readily susceptible audience, and having a psywar team with him on the ground provides him with the flexibility to react to fast-moving situations. In addition to the employment of the team against enemy audiences, friendly and neutral civilian audiences can be given instruction on refugee control measures, and be exposed to propaganda lectures.

b. Printed Material. The majority of the printed materials used by PsyOps Officers will be provided by sources external to the Marine Division. The I Corps Joint PsyWar/CA Center possesses three (3) presses capable of producing one (1) million leaflets per week each under ideal conditions. Leaflets are also supplied through the Political Affairs Officer. JUSPAO also provides leaflets, posters, and magazines for use by III MAF PsyOps Officer.

c. PsyWar Aircraft. Two sources of aircraft support are available to III MAF; the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Detachment 1, 5th Air Commando Squadron.

(1) Detachment 1, 5th Air Commando Squadron presently possesses four U-10 psywar aircraft. These aircraft contain an integral loudspeaker system with a tape recording capability. These aircraft are available to III MAF units for both loudspeaker and leaflet drop missions. These aircraft are capable of carrying up to 200,000 leaflets on one mission.

(2) First Marine Aircraft Wing Aircraft can be requested through normal operations channels to support psychological operations. Both helicopters and C-117 aircraft can be utilized for leaflet drops, and to carry loudspeaker systems organic to infantry regiments. The use of assigned resupply aircraft is encouraged whenever possible.

10. Requesting PsyWar Support. The III MAF PsyWar Support request form is designed to avoid delays which have been encountered by units requesting psywar support external to their own organizations. To facilitate expeditious handling of each request, individual forms should provide complete and accurate information as indicated. Instructions for completion and forwarding of the subject form are provided below.

a. In order to insure that all requests are filled in completely and accurately, the following guidance is provided:

(1) Leaflets. Most leaflets can be ordered by catalogue number using the 1st PsyOps Field Support Detachment Leaflet catalogue as a reference. If the material desired is not included in the catalogue, a brief, but clear, description of the printed matter should be provided.

Form 5410.1

For example, "Hong Kong Magazine, issue #25". Quantity desired should be based on whether leaflets are to be hand delivered, or dropped from PsyWar aircraft, with regard to the size of the target. A due date should be indicated in all cases. "ASAP" will not be used. Many of the catalogued leaflets are designed to be compatible to typical situations and by changing a name or a few words, the leaflets can be directed to a particular place or group of people. These are ordered by catalogue number including the appropriate change(s) requested.

(2) Audio/Visual PsyWar Team. When a psywar team is requested, it is very important that full details be provided to insure that the team arrives on time, at the right place, prepared to accomplish the desired objectives. Date and time should be written as a date time group. For example "161000H" April. The name and rank of the contact officer should be provided. The location to which the team is to report must be pinpointed exactly. Unit designation of the command post, or the name of the Harlet, and coordinates are essential. A general description of the program desired can be indicated by checking the appropriate blocks under paragraph II, C. of the Form. Additional information on particular themes to be stressed, or avoided, should be included in the remarks section.

(3) Aircraft Support. Aerial leaflet drop and loudspeaker support is available utilizing aircraft from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and aerial loudspeakers for live voice or tape capability, can be called on to support psychological operations. One (1) C-47 Aircraft, located at the Headquarters of 5th Air Commando Squadron in Nha Trang, is on call for larger missions. Aircraft will be assigned on the basis of the priority of the mission requested, individual aircraft capabilities, and availability of each type of aircraft. Date and time desired should once again be submitted as a date time group. The target area should be designated with the coordinates of the four (4) corner points. Be sure to include the prefix letter identifier to the coordinate number group; i.e. AT962456.

(4) Remarks. Any information which may be helpful in amplifying the data provided in the first three (3) sections of the report should be included in the Remarks Section.

b. Procedures for Forwarding Requests

(1) Danang and Phu Bai TAGRS. PsyWar Support Request Forms will be forwarded directly to the Commanding General, III MAF (Psy Ops). Information copies of the request will be simultaneously forwarded to all intermediate commands.

Approval at all levels will be assumed by III MAF unless request

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is cancelled by telephone (Parchment 401) or other means. Intermediate commands must insure that they notify III MAF of any cancellation by the fastest available means. It will be the responsibility of the requesting unit to insure that intermediate commands receive their copy of all requests in time to monitor same.

(2) Chu Lai TAOR. Initial requests will be made to Commanding General III MAF (Psy Ops). Copies of each request will be forwarded to intermediate commands. Upon approval, direct liaison with the Quang Ngai detachment of the 244th Psychological Operations Company will be authorized.

c. Utilization of special and/or non-standard psywar material

(1) Expedient employment of psychological warfare is often essential to success of an operation. Therefore, in order to provide a unit with capability for immediate response in a particular situation, approval is authorized for psywar application in following situations:

a. Utilization of any standard approved, catalogued leaflet, poster or recorded broadcast.

b. Application of Chieu Hoi information through any available medium in keeping with any of current themes published in Chieu Hoi Bulletins.

c. Exploitation of acts involving VC terrorist tactics and incidents in which exploited means follow current policies of ARVN/FMMAF in RVN.

(2) Any deviation from catalogued or previously approved psywar material which may conflict with current COMUSMACV policy requires prior approval by Commanding General, III MAF (Psy Ops). Information copies of request will be simultaneously forwarded to all intermediate commands. In order to expedite processing of requests, approval at all intermediate levels will be assumed by III MAF unless request is cancelled via telecon (Parchment 401) or other means.

11. Reporting. Due to the wide variation in activities which may be continued in a particular psychological operation, a standard form is not a practical means of reporting these activities. However, enclosure (2) provides an organized format for each reporting and will be used for all weekly reports.

a. Weekly reports will be initiated from battalions or equivalent level in ground units, and at group or separate/detached squadron level in aviation units involved in psychological operations. Reports will be forwarded via the chain of command to this headquarters, (Attention PsyOps.) The reporting period will be from 0001 on Sunday of week to 2400 the following Saturday. Reports will arrive at III MAF no later than 1200 on the first Monday after the reporting period. Psychological operations

or

headquarters senior to those mentioned above may be submitted as separate reports, or as endorsements to the reports of subordinate

order to insure that all weekly reports are complete and accurate the following guidance is provided.

In any category of the report where an area is listed, both latitudes and coordinates will be provided.

If leaflets or other printed materials are distributed which are not contained in the standard catalogue, a brief but complete description of the material will be provided in the narrative summary.

(3) In paragraphs 2.B. and 2.C. (Aerial Broadcasts and Psywar Teams), as many subparagraphs as necessary to provide a complete list of the activities in these categories.

(4) When listing message themes for aerial broadcasts, it is not necessary to give the verbal text of the message. However, enough information should be provided to give a full indication of the intent of the message and target audience.

(5) Activities of psywar teams should be listed as to media used, message presented, target audience, and any related events.

(6) The Narrative Summary portion of the weekly report should provide any information necessary to amplify the statistical data. Any information relating to target analysis that will explain the reasons for the selection of a particular group or area should be entered here. Details concerning the following items will be provided:

- (a) Psychological objectives in each area where operations were conducted.
- (b) Feedback from past psychological operations with reference to past report(s).
- (c) Problems encountered.

c. In order to keep this headquarters apprised of the more intense psychological operations conducted in support of tactical operations, the activities for each day will be reported in the last special situation report for that day. This report will include the total number of leaflets dropped, hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, activities of ground psywar teams, themes presented, new material developed, and any immediate

Negative reports will be submitted for those periods during which no psychological activities occurred.

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12. PsyWar Annex to Operation Plan. The Psychological Warfare Officer is responsible for the PsyWar Annex to an Operation Plan. Enclosure (3) (which indicates the essential items for typical PsyWar support to an operation) provides a guide for this purpose.


J. M. PLATT
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
CASE 4

ForO 3410.1

PsyWar Support Request Form
III MAF FORM NO. 3410

From:
To: I Corps Joint PsyWar/CA Center
Via: CG, III MAF (Psy Ops)

1. Leaflets

A. Catalogue No.*	B. Quantity Desired	C. Due Date
(1)		
(2)		
(3)		
(4)		
(5)		
(6)		
(7)		
(8)		
(9)		
(10)		

*If not standard leaflet, describe printed material desired in remarks section.

II. Audio/Visual PsyWar Team:

a. Date/Time Desired: _____

b. Report to (1) _____ at
(Name)

(2) _____
Name of CP/Hamlet and coordinates

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c. Program to include:

- (1) Films
- (2) News Tape
- (3) Speech by Local official
- (4) Leaflet distribution

III. Aircraft Support

- a. (1) Leaflet drop
- (2) Loudspeaker

- b. Target Area (4 coordinates to enclose area) (1) _____
- (2) _____
- (3) _____
- (4) _____

IV. Remarks

ENCLOSURE (1)

ForO 3410.1

From:
To:
Via:

Subj: Weekly PsyOps Activity Report

Ref: (a) Force Bulletin 3410 etd

1. In accordance with ref (a), the subject report is hereby submitted.

2. Type of Activity

A. Leaflet dissemination

	(1) CATALOGUE NO.	(2) VOLUME	(3) AREA	(4) DATE
(A)				
(B)				
(C)				
(D)				
(E)				

B. Aerial Broadcast

(1) Date:

(a) Type Broadcast:

(b) Theme of Message:

(c) Area:

(2) Date:

(a) Type Broadcast

(b) Theme of Message:

(c) Area:

(3) (etc.)

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C. PsyWar Team.

(1) Date:

(a) Team Composition:

(b) Activity of Team:

(c) Area:

(2) (etc.)

3. Narrative Summary.

ENCLOSURE (2)

ForO 3410.1

SAMPLE PSYWAR ANNEX FORMATAnnex x (Psychological Warfare) to Operation Plan XXX-XX

1. Target Analysis. Include here intelligence information concerning the target audience. This involves military, social, political and economic background. Particular psychological strengths and weaknesses should be enumerated.

2. Friendly Forces. List all organizations and personnel who will participate directly in the psychological operation, including leaflet disseminators, speaker broadcasters, and personnel conducting leaflet drops.

3. Mission. Write here a clear concise statement of the mission to be accomplished by psychological warfare in order to give maximum support to the overall mission of the command. Include themes, objectives, and tasks.

4. Execution.

a. Concept of operation. Give the general concept of the psychological operation. This includes development and phasing.

b. In separate lettered subparagraphs, give the specific task of each subordinate unit charged with the accomplishment of a psychological warfare task.

c. List here any coordination instructions between two or more unit and related sections.

5. Administration and Logistics. Include instructions concerning administrative matters and logistical arrangements for the conduct of the operation.

6. Command and Communication.

a. Statement of the unit responsible for control of the psychological warfare team.

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DEFINITION ANNEX

1. Propaganda. Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group, in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.
2. Agitation. Incitement, an appeal for action. It is based on the existence of a grievance, an impelling situation, or the occurrence, often by design, of a dramatic or atrocious incident.
3. Psychological operations. Psychological activities and psychological warfare, encompassing those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral or friendly groups, the emotions, attitudes, or behaviour favorable to the accomplishment of Government of Vietnam policies and objectives.
4. Psychological objective. A military, political, economic, or other objective; the attainment of which is to be achieved or facilitated by the employment of psychological operations. Examples of military objectives are:
 - (a) To reduce the combat efficiency of the Viet Cong forces;
 - (b) To further the war effort by modifying or manipulating attitude and behaviour of special audiences;
 - (c) To facilitate the rural construction program of the Government of Vietnam in coordination with civic action programs.
 - (d) To obtain the cooperation of villagers in the war effort.
5. Psychological task. A particular project whose accomplishment will contribute to the achievement of a psychological objective.
6. Psychological theme. A subject or topic of propaganda used as a means of accomplishing a psychological task.
7. Psychological action. A specific political, economic, military, or ideological policy, course of action, rally, meeting, or demonstration used as a means of accomplishing a psychological task.
8. Psychological goal. A type of desired behavioral or mental effect which, if secured, will help achieve a psychological operation's objective.

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9. Psychological opportunity. Any social, political, economic, military, or ideological circumstance or condition within a society which may be favorably exploited for psychological purposes.
10. Appeal idea. A line of persuasion designed to accomplish a task of psychological operations.
- (a) A persuasive appeal idea is designed to lead the members of a special audience to think, feel, or act in a manner which would facilitate the accomplishment of the psychological operations task.
- (b) A boomerang appeal idea is designed to evoke negative or adverse effects (damaging to the accomplishment of the desired military purpose) in the special audience to which it is primarily directed even under optimum conditions.
11. Key symbol. The element, verbal or graphic, in an appeal which is especially significant in evoking the desired effect.
12. Special audience. An aggregate of persons who share certain predispositions which, when successfully manipulated, may lead to mental or behavioral reactions that will assist in the accomplishment of a psychological operation's task.
13. Audience effectiveness. The degree to which a group can influence the aims, objectives and capabilities of the nation of which it is a part.
14. Susceptibility. The degree to which a group can be influenced by psychological operation's appeals to respond in ways that will assist in the accomplishment of psychological operations tasks:
- (a) Sensitivity, which involves the nature and strength of the feelings of the members of a special audience with regard to their own economic, political and social status in the society, and about their relationships with other groups.
- (b) Responsiveness to source, which involves the nature and strength of the feelings of the members of a special audience about the basis for the psychological operations methods.
15. Potentials. The degree to which a group can assist in the accomplishment of a psychological operations goal. This is a function of the effectiveness and susceptibility of the group.

ENCLOSURE (4)

ForO 3410.1

16. Chieu Hoi Program. GVN Open Arms returnee program established 17 April 1963 by President Ngo Dinh Diem. Literal translation of Chieu Hoi is "invitation to return".
17. May Chanh. Any military or civilian member of the Viet Cong or NVN army who voluntarily turns himself in to the RVN or Free World Forces in response to the Chieu Hoi appeal.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS NEWSLETTER #1-66

Sept 1966

ITEM: Psychological Operations Conference 31 August 1966

1. General PIATT opened the conference and indicated the special emphasis placed on psychological operations by the CG III MAF. He briefly outlined the important part that Psy Ops has in the development of a free National Government for Vietnam and the defeat of Communist aggression.
2. Colonel READ discussed the organizational structure of the III MAF Psy Ops Section and outlined the objectives and programs for psychological operations in support of Marine Operations in ICTZ. The latest plans and developments were also discussed with regard to support requirements and available resources.
3. Major SZAKI (MACV J-2 Chieu Hoi Liaison O) gave a report on the employment of ralliers in tactical operations and complimented the Marines for the most effective utilization of Quy Chanh in Vietnam. He also discussed the development of the Armed Propaganda Teams in the various provinces in I Corps and possible employment. He stressed the value of the Quy Chanh as a source of intelligence for tactical and Psy Ops.
4. Mr. Sherwin HELMS (regional JUSPAO Representative) gave a thorough brief of the organization of JUSPAO, its roles in Vietnam, and the available resources in support of psychological operations. An exhibit of printed materials was presented with examples of the many booklets, pamphlets, magazines, and other printed material available through JUSPAO. Mr. HELMS discussed his responsibility as a Psy Ops coordinator and indicated that JUSPAO resources are available to units and extended an invitation for Psy Ops Officers to contact himself or any of his area representatives throughout the ICTZ.
5. Major NEATHERLIN presented the organization and capabilities of the 244th Psy Ops Company. Examples of leaflets, pamphlets, and posters printed by the 244th were displayed and a sample catalogue was distributed. Suggestions were made on key items desired when submitting a request for Psy Ops support, leaflets or teams.
6. Major KOLICHOFF, (5th Air Commando Squadron) briefed the organization of the 5th ACS along with its' organic equipment and capabilities. The projected increase in A/C use discussed along with some problem areas encountered in Psy Ops aerial support in ICTZ. Recommendations were made regarding communications between 5th ACS A/C and FSCC in order to coordinate artillery, naval gun fire, and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. Plans are being made for a visit to the Marine DASC by pilots of the squadron.

ENCLOSURE (5)

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7. Captain WYLY (1st MARDIV) briefed on highlights and successful techniques used in Psychological Operations conducted in the Chu Lai area. The personal contact method of propaganda dissemination utilizing Marines, VIS, District and Village personnel was emphasized as being a very effective method. The family was pointed out as a strong target for influencing VC to rally and as a vulnerability when aiming propaganda directly at the individual VC. Techniques of employing A/C effectively in both day and night support and the designing of leaflets was discussed with regard to the target audience (local paper). It was suggested that broadcasts be made in the local dialect. Plans for Psy Ops during the Monsoon Season were also mentioned.
8. 1stLt LUCKEY (III MAF) discussed the Psy Ops SOP, a copy of which was in the hands of each member of the conference. The mission, methodology, and themes were highlighted. The weekly Psy Ops report was discussed and a recommendation made to eliminate it. A study will be made of reports now being received to determine if adequate information is available in them on III MAF Psy Ops. The method of stock piling frequently used leaflets would provide a Psy Ops reserve channel much material through routine lines of communications, and make the presses more available for "Operational Immediate" priorities. All echelons were requested to re-evaluate their outstanding requisitions.
9. Major WALTON (3rd MARDIV) comments included the following:
- a. Modify broadcasting equipment so that it would be compatible for use in all vehicles and rotary wing aircraft.
 - b. Coordination among aircraft, FSCC, and engaged units was essential in aerial Psy Ops missions.
 - c. Units Psy Ops Officers should have Psy Ops as a primary billet assignment.
- 1stLt STONE (9th MAR) discussed County Fair Operations delineating some specific problem areas; Coordination, Equipment, Planning, and Control.
10. Colonel READ (III MAF) outlined the support requirements essential to the execution of a Psy Ops plan. The salient points of the conference were reviewed and an open discussion followed.
11. The open discussion included many personal observations and concepts which generally reinforced the main ideas previously presented. However, some new ideas were brought up which included:
- a. Protection of Hallyers and their families.
 - b. Associating ARVN with the humanitarian programs so that a greater bond is developed between the people and their army.
 - c. The County Fair should be invested with our very best assets.

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d. That all friendly troops must have a reputation for humane treatment of killers, prisoners, or Suspected VC.

e. That cleavage between the VC and the communist leadership is probably best pursued through the family.

12. 1stLt PATTERSON (244th) demonstrated the jeepster audio-visual truck with movie projector, tape recorder, 2 way screen and loudspeaker equipment. Portable equipment employed when areas are inaccessible by vehicles was also demonstrated with the directional speaker system. The capabilities and limitations of the equipment were explained and provided the audience with information needed to plan for employment of these units in the field.

13. The next scheduling conference is tentatively planned for 26 September 1966 08:30 - 11:30.

ITEM: Monsoon Season. It is expected that all operations will be restricted and plans must be flexible enough to permit full exploitation of all resources during periods of good weather. Alternate plans will be a necessity. JUSPAO regional representative, Sherm HELMS, has been requested to investigate the feasibility of printing certain type leaflets on plastic or cellophane for use in the monsoon season.

ITEM: Intelligence for Psy Ops is an ever present problem and must be an all hands effort. Psy Ops EEI's have been prepared by most units and provided to Intelligence Sections and Interrogation Translation Teams. The 1st MARDIV Psy Ops Officer has also developed a list of EEI's for the audiovisual team to obtain when conducting Psy Ops. I.S.O. personnel may also be a good source of information and photos.

ITEM: Psy Ops Officers are urged to review outstanding requests for leaflets, posters and equipment in order to insure that a valid requisition does exist.

ITEM: A request has been submitted to establish a program to provide school trained Psy Ops Officers down to Battalion level.

ITEM: Recommendations for changes to the unit T/O-T/E will be requested soon.

ITEM: III MAF units are requested to submit ideas and articles to this Headquarters for inclusion in the Psy Ops Newsletter.



R. R. READ
Colonel USAF

Force Psy Ops Officer

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 4

3

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

50/rej
3400
6 Oct 1966

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS NEWSLETTER 2-66

ITEM: CHIEU HOI CAN REAP EVEN MORE QUY CHANH (Submitted by 1st MARDIV)

It is considered by many that the Chieu Hoi program can reach its maximum effectiveness only when the family and friends of the prospective Quy Chanh take an active part in the program. A bonus effect may be derived when the returnees themselves agree to aid in the recruiting effort. This is the basis of a forthcoming program that will receive maximum effort within the expanded Psychological Operations Branch of the G-5 Section, 1st Marine Division.

Preparations are underway to distribute several thousand brochures urging the families, the sweethearts, and the friends of known Viet Cong to contact their loved ones and ask him to return to his home. The brochure will consist of several pages, well illustrated, explaining the Chieu Hoi program in considerable detail. A section of the brochures will be detachable and of a size that will facilitate mailing. In addition to a detailed description of the benefits to be found in a Chieu Hoi center, a safe conduct pass will be included to facilitate rapid movement of the returnee once he reaches friendly lines. Specific location of the centers in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces will be provided.

Once the initial step has been successfully accomplished--the return of the individual VC to government control--the second prong of the operations will be launched. A close liaison will be maintained with the District Chief at the reception centers and with the Province Chief at the training/rehabilitation center. A determined effort will be made to obtain deliberate, freely given statements from as many of the Quy Chanh as possible.

It is apparent that the text of the message should be one that will either be suitable for reproduction on leaflets, or could be suitably illustrated by a personal photograph or by photos of the center itself. The good food, clothing, shelter and monetary assistance that may be obtained by simply heeding the cry of open arms will be pictured in glowing detail. It is anticipated that tapes may be made of some of the voluntary statements, which in turn will be broadcast to those remaining in the area from which the returnee came.

One returnee, Nguyen Quang Vinh, has already made a tape. The message he agreed to have broadcast to his former comrades was as follows:

"I am Nguyen Quang Vinh of Company V14. Why do you fight for the Cong? I have given up the cong. He has brought Communism and brought damage to our villages. He has deceived us to kill our own people. Since I was captured by the U.S. Marines, I have decided never to go back to the Viet Cong. My friends, I urge you to stop fighting and join the government of Vietnam".

ENCLOSURE (6)

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In closing he wished them to "Have good luck", and he would see them at Tam Ky. A number of variations on this theme may be played, in leaflets, posters, movies and tapes, but in each of them the same strain is called upon for reprise. "Come to the Chieu Hoi center. We want you. This is a good place. You will live in peace here. Have good luck!"

ITEM: USE OF COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES (CAC) IN SUPPORT OF PSY OPS

The CAC's offer an excellent means of communicating with the people. The PF membership can be informed so that they can better advertise the meaning of the Revolutionary Development now taking place in Vietnam. Those men can clearly show how the VC are attempting to convert the real revolution under Communist Chinese domination. Leaflets, movies, broadcasts, and testimonies can be introduced through the CAC's because of their proximity to the people. At the next Psy Ops Conference the use of the CAC's will be a subject of discussion. Ideas and techniques are encouraged not only then, but now so that they can be shared and field tested.

ITEM: CHIEU HOI LEAFLET DROPS

Safe Conduct Passes dropped in known VC areas should be accompanied by a Chieu Hoi instruction leaflet explaining how and where to return. Much information collected indicates that many VC/NVA are willing to return but just aren't sure exactly how to do it. It is not difficult to imagine the fears and anxieties of the unknown that are keeping many VC/NVA in a fighting status. The VC/NVA must feel that returning is the easiest course of action open to him.

ITEM: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS EXPLOITATION TEAM (POET)

The purpose of POET is twofold. First to provide immediate reaction for the exploitation of tactical situations with psychological operations; secondly, to provide rapid exploitation of POW's and ralliers who are of immediate value to psychological operations. The key to the concept is immediate reaction to exploitable situations and information. POET will not be used in routine psychological operations planning nor is it envisioned that POET will remain with units after its immediate reaction mission.

POETs are not in existance as permanent teams; they are formed for specific quick reaction missions from intelligence, operations, and interpreter personnel assigned to the 244th PSYOPS Company. Ideally, employment of POET should result in timely psy ops through the media of airborne and ground loudspeaker messages and leaflets, or any combination of these media.

The success of POET depends upon all psy ops personnel recognizing situations in which POET may be used and immediately requesting a team through psy ops channels.

ITEM: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONFERENCE 28 SEPTEMBER 1966

1. Colonel READ opened the Conference and briefly reviewed the progress made

since the last Psy Ops Conference on 31 August 1966.

2. Mr. GEBEUR (JUSPAO), Lieutenant Colonel LIVELY (MACPD), and Mr. OSBORNE (USAID) explained the significance of the Chieu Hoi program. The value of the rallier as a source of information and a witness of the Chieu Hoi program was discussed. Explained was the need of the rallier to have a simple, secure way of returning to the friendly side.

3. A question and answer period followed, where in the need for simplified procedures for obtaining intelligence and services of returnees was discussed.

4. Mr. Robert KELLY (JUSPAO Quang Nam) discussed the Vietnamese Information Service with regard to capabilities and employment in their role as the official VN propaganda agency. He brought out some of the problem areas such as the loss of many experienced people that were replaced after the recent political crisis and the fact that the new replacements were for the most part, untrained and have just recently started to become effective in many areas. The availability of the VIS Teams for County Fair Operations was pointed out. Request for VIS Teams may be made by contacting your closest JUSPAO Representative. Cultural Drama Teams consisting of guitar players and singers who perform national songs are also available. Mr. KELLY reported the warm reception and success of these groups in the past.

5. Major NEATHERLIN (244th Psy Ops Co.) discussed the current resources of the 244th. The fourth printing press has been received and printing support will be provided 24 hours a day when required. The Audio-Visual Teams have been kept busy during September supporting tactical operations. Action is under way to provide a quick reaction capability which will provide immediate response whenever exploitable incidents occur. This includes a plan to obtain standard leaflets from the 6th Psy Ops Bn. and JUSPAO whenever possible, leaving the 244th's presses free to print quick reaction material. However, there still remains the need for timely reporting and recording of exploitable incidents.

6. Major PANZER (I Corps G-5 Psy Ops Advisor) explained the structure and function of the ARVN Political Warfare Staff. The tasks of the various sections of this staff were explained.

7. Captain MARSH (1st MARDIV) reviewed the Divisions Psy Ops programs. It was reported that September has seen the greatest Psy Ops effort the Division has previously made in any month. Included was exploitation of the success of the election and the Golden Fleece Operations by means of leaflet and aerial broadcasts.


8. Lieutenant Colonel WILSON (3rd MARDIV) briefed the conference on the organization of the newly formed 3rd Marine Division Psy Ops section and the mission of giving full support to units in the field. Emphasis was placed on the command interest to get effective psychological support in the field in support of tactical operations. A need for fact reaction propaganda and close liaison with intelligence to exploit vulnerabilities and incidents was outlined.

9. Major GOBRECHT (5th Air Commando Squadron) described the equipment and capabilities of Detachment 1 of the 5th ACS in Danang. Both the U-10 and C-47 Aircraft

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utilization were discussed along with leaflet delivery techniques and broadcast equipment. The speaker system presently used in the 5th ACS Aircraft has been tested and found effective to a maximum broadcast altitude of 7,500 under ideal conditions. He noted certain discrepancies in mission planning such as: Target areas far smaller than the assigned Aircraft is capable of covering and the number of leaflets requested for a mission are much less than the aircraft is capable of delivering. The planning figure for leaflets to cover 1 square mile of typical VN terrain is 45,000. A U-10 will carry up to 100,000 leaflets and a C-47 will carry up to 1,500,000 per mission.

10. Colonel READ (III MAF) explained the three priorities planned for use in requesting Psy Ops Support: Immediate, Priority, and Routine. Immediate requests are reserved for exploiting transient vulnerabilities in support of combat operations. Priority requests are to be used when a rapid response, not in support of combat operations, is required. In both Immediate and Priority requests the requesting agency will designate the desired method of delivery. The need for a rapid response to exploitable situations was stressed. A County Fair check off list was passed out; all present were invited to review the list and submit recommendations.


R. R. READ

Colonel USMC
Force Psy Ops Officer

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HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

50/1rd
 3400
 10 Nov 1966

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS NEWSLETTER 3-66

ITEM: OBTAINING STATEMENTS FROM RALLIERS (244th PSYOP Co.)

It is to your advantage when securing a letter from a rallier or POW to instruct the man on what he should write, it is not recommended that you write the letter yourself and have the source sign it. Experience has taught us that letters could have been greatly improved if the source had been properly oriented. All letters to be used for making leaflets should be written with black ink on white unruled paper.

ITEM: DETERMINING LEAFLET DENSITY (244th PSYOP Co.)

It is recommended that units requesting aerial leaflet drops specify the area and let the PSC calculate the number of leaflets required. However, in the event this is not feasible the following information on determining leaflet density is included.

AREA DENSITY/CIVILIAN: A John Hopkins University study reveals that on the average a figure of 18 leaflets per 1000 square meters of target area can be used for village, town, and city type targets. This figure may range from six to as much as 30 per 1000 square meters depending on the individual target.

LEAFLET DENSITY/POPULATION: With a known population a ratio of 6 - 10 leaflets per individual should be used as a rule of thumb, i.e. In the case of village with a population of 600, the recommended number of leaflets to be dropped should range from 3,600 to 6,000.

AREA DENSITY/MILITARY: The University study also revealed that on the average, a figure of 14 leaflets per 1000 square meters of target area can be used for most field military targets. This figure may range from six to as much as 22 per 1000 square meters depending on the individual target.

ITEM: PROPAGANDA MATERIAL

All units should be made aware of the continuing requirement for intelligence, ideas, reports, and pictures for development of new and more effective propaganda material. Units gathering such material should forward it expeditiously to the PSYOP SUPPORT CENTER (PSC) for use by the 244th PSYOP Co.

ENCLOSURE (7)

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ITEM: STANDARD PSYOP SUPPORT REQUEST FORMS.

New forms have been developed to standardize and expediate procedures for requesting PSYOP support from the III MAF PSC. The new forms are being distributed through the 244th PSYOP Co. liaison teams and will replace the request forms contained in III MAF PSYOP SOP. Additional forms may be obtained from the PSC as required.

There are three types of request forms:

1. PSYOP AUDIO/VISUAL REQUEST FORM
2. PSYOP PRINTING REQUEST FORM
3. PSYOP AIRCRAFT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM

A copy of each of the request forms is attached.

Precedence is assigned by the requesting unit in accordance with the following:

(a) IMMEDIATE. Assigned to requests for support of combat operations which demand immediate reaction to exploit a significant vulnerability or tactical situation. These will be given priority over all other requests.

(b) PRIORITY. Assigned to requests requiring quick reaction to a fleeting or transient vulnerability or situation not in support of combat operations. These will be given priority over routine requests.

(c) ROUTINE. Assigned to all other support requests and will be filled in the order received.

Immediate and priority requests may be submitted by telephone to the PSC or to the III MAF COG if required. They should contain the information indicated on the appropriate request form.



R. R. READ

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Force Psy Ops Officer

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Combat photographs of the enemy and pictures of VC caused incidents and terrorism are very valuable, as are letters and pictures of Chieu Hoi returnees.

Certain aspects of VC atrocities, minings and other incidents can be exploited for psyop purposes. Since these are negative occurrences and to some extent weaken the psyop theme that the CVN protects the people, they should be exploited on a local level - where they are generally known. Concentrate on getting the Vietnamese involved (observers or injured, relative, etc.) to make both a tape and a statement. Take pictures of the casualties and the damage. Play the tape in the area of the incident as soon as possible using local equipment. Send the pictures and statements to the III MAF PSC by the most expeditious means available, along with the target coordinates. 244th PSYOP Company will prepare leaflets based on the statement and pictures. They can be sent back to the requestor for distribution or dropped by the 5th ACS.

ITEM: TACTICAL PSYOPS

Tactical PSYOP is an effective means of assisting the commander in accomplishing his military mission. To be effective it must be directed at specific VC/NVA units and must be integrated into the planning and conduct of the specific tactical operations it is to support. It can be used to accomplish several objectives, (1) To lower the morale and combat efficiency of VC/NVA units, (2) To cause desertion or possible surrender when used in conjunction with combat fire power and maneuvers, (3) Exploit the effect of heavy ordnance and massed fires, (4) Facilitate the occupation of VC controlled areas by giving specific directions to the local people, (5) Create a favorable image of Marines in the eyes of the local people, and (6) Confuse the enemy.

Tactical PSYOP because of the difficulty in obtaining intelligence has its limitations, but these limitations can be minimized by contingency planning. In order to obtain maximum effectiveness of tactical psyop, leaflets and tapes should be prepared and kept on hand to exploit anticipated opportunities. A standard surrender appeal tape and leaflet should be available at all times.

The essential elements for employment of tactical PSYOP are (1) Minimum intelligence necessary to act, (2) Determine the PSYOP theme, (3) Select the best available media, (4) Insure troop orientation, (5) Evaluation; ask specific questions from POW/Ralliers about your programs, and (6) Control the release of propaganda. (FM 33-5 Psychological Operations).

ITEM: RETURNEE EMPLOYMENT

The utilization of Hoi Chanh (Returnee) in psychological operations and as "Kit Carson" Scouts in tactical operations is currently underway in the 1st MAR DIV, as a pilot project, with six former VC who have been placed in the field with units on a semi-permanent basis. These men have worked with Marines on several short operations in the past and have proven to be one of the best assets available. The ralliers aid in identifying VC from recognition when employed in areas where they worked

with VC units. These men will be employed for both psychological and tactical operations on a continuing basis. Using units are responsible for the care and support of the Hoi Chanh "Kit Carson Scouts". They are performing a valuable service which may save many lives through their knowledge of VC tactics and techniques. The ralliers have been very aggressive in the past and have earned the respect of those with whom they have worked.

ITEM: JUSPAO PUBLICATIONS (III MAF)

1. The Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) publishes "Guidances" and "Field Memorandums" on a continuous basis. These publications are the result of considerable research and are an excellent reference for psychological operations planning. It is recommended that Commands involved in PSYOP planning maintain a file of these publications.

2. The latest JUSPAO GUIDANCES is issue Number 22 and the latest JUSPAO FIELD MEMORANDUM is Number 27.

3. Commands missing any editions may obtain them by notifying the Force PSYOP Officer, listing the issue number of the "Field Memorandum" and/or "Guidances" required.

ITEM: CAC PSYOP EFFORT

The 1st M. P. Bn has been using their Combined Action Companies (CAC's) as a media for Psychological Operations. Patrols are used to distribute newspapers, leaflets, and posters. There is a wide variety of leaflets handed out which include hygiene, sanitation, etc. (See leaflet 244(D) - 1-67, 2-67, 3-67, 4-67, etc.) In addition to written material, movies are shown in the villages. The program begins at twilight and the hamlet chief is invited to speak. A cartoon is then shown followed by talks by one or two ralliers. The ralliers tell about (1) VC life, (2) why they rallied, and (3) their new life. After the short talk by the ralliers a full length movie is shown. One of the best ways to program a PSYOP Campaign is to plot the plans on a map. Paper routes can be developed as well as target areas. From a tactical viewpoint the actual routes should never become a pattern that would invite an ambush but should pin point targets to be hit weekly. One objective of this effort is to impress on the people that we like them, a second objective is to sell the Chieu Hoi program to families who have members in the VC. When possible these families should be approached and spoken to once a week on the fate of VC. There are numerous cases, where VC have rallied because of letters from home urging them to come home via Chieu Hoi program.

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

50/wko
 3400
 24 Dec 1966

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS NEWSLETTER 4-66

ITEM: CHIEU HOI ARMED PROPAGANDA UNITS

The Concept, Mission, and Organization of these Units contained in the USAID/FO "Informations and Guidelines" for "The Chieu Hoi Program" dtd April 1966 is quoted for information:

Concept

During the summer of 1964 the Chieu Hoi Ministry conceived the idea to better exploit the experience and knowledge of selected Chieu Hoi returnees, following their classification and political indoctrination. They decided to use returnees to go back into Viet Cong controlled or disputed areas to talk to the people, relate their experiences on both sides, discuss the policies and aims of the GVN and tell the people about the Chieu Hoi Program. This would not only place the returnee in a positive position to help the GVN but at the same time show the people that those who have seen both sides, recognize the communist cause as unjust and desire to fight against it. These returnees, formed into units would receive additional political, psywar and military training to assist in accomplishing their mission. They would be lightly armed for self protection rather than offensive combat with the most active unit being a five-man cell. (Whether or not they are actually armed is at the discretion of the Province Chief.) The first two Chieu Hoi Armed Propaganda companies were organized in October 1964.

Mission

Primary: To move among the people at village and Hamlet level to propagate the policies and aims of the government and the Chieu Hoi Program and induce defection from the Viet Cong.

Secondary: To participate in Armed Operations in coordination with the military.

Organization

The largest Chieu Hoi Armed Propaganda element is the Company. The Company consists of 2 platoons, each with 2 squads and each squad with 3, 5-man cells. Each Company is authorized 74 men,

ENCLOSURE (8)

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including the Company Commander and his assistant. Each platoon is authorized 36 men, including the platoon leader and his assistant. Each squad is authorized 17 men including the squad leader and his assistant. The Unit is controlled by the Province Chief and detailed to District Chiefs for specific missions, The most active element is the 5-man cell.

Propaganda units are authorized for each province. Commanders should coordinate with the appropriate Province or Chieu Hoi Chief to insure that these units are being fully utilized in support of PSYOPS.

ITEM: PSYOP AND CA MAKE A GOOD TEAM

A successful program has been started by the 9th Marines which not only increases the local crop production, but has significantly added to the rapport between Marines and the civilian population. The incident rate in this area is among the highest in the ICTZ and the people have long been subjected to strong VC influence.

Realizing that a better relationship with the people in close proximity to the CP was necessary, the 9th Marine's PSYOPS Officer instituted a program that would demonstrate a genuine interest in the people on the part of the Marines and National Government. The province Headquarters in Hoi An assisted by providing a Vietnamese agriculture expert. Loudspeaker broadcasts preceeded the arrival of the expert in Bich Bac by two days. A "Kit Carson" Scout visited the residents to inform them of the farmers meeting.

The meeting itself was highly successful. Techniques of growing better rice, types of seeds, and use of fertilizer were among the topics discussed. The agriculture expert answered many questions; he told the people that the Marines would help them to get fertilizer. During the meeting, a scout mixed with the people, took care of the children and acted as a corpsman during a medcap. Cold drinks and soup were served following the meeting.

The farmers expressed their appreciation and were delighted that the government had enough interest to help them with their crops.

Since the meeting, the people have demonstrated a different attitude and have assisted Marines by providing tactical information. Communications with the farmers are maintained on a daily basis.

Too many civic action projects are not advertised and go unnoticed. The beneficial efforts and favorable impressions available through amplifying C/A projects are countless. The employment of loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and films in conjunction with regular and special C/A programs will increase the desired effect several times. Let's capitalize on these many opportunities by properly employing PSYOP with C/A.

ITEM: TACTICAL PSYOP SUPPORT

The 244th PSYOPS Co has combat loudspeaker team (HB) available for close support of tactical units. These teams consist of a team leader and one equipment operator. They are equipped with a portable loudspeaker with a range of 4,000 meters. They are dependent upon the supported unit for transportation, 28 volt power source and interperter if required. Teams may be obtained by submitting a request (PSYOP Audio/Visual Request Form, III MAF Form No 3410.1) to the III MAF PSYOPS support center.

Possible employment includes broadcasting instructions for movement or control of civilians; surrender appeals and procedures to VC/NVA; and Chieu Hoi appeals to suspected VC/NVA positions. An Army Division recently credited one of these teams with talking 19 NVA from an encircled battalion into surrendering.

One of the team leaders jobs is that of advising the commander on the capabilities and employment of the team. Use of the teams, however, must be planned in the same manner as any other supporting arm if they are to be employed effectively. Attention is invited to Force Order 3040.2 of 13Dec66, which requires PSYOPS and Civic Action annexes for all operation orders.

ITEM: PROJECT "FOUR WINDS"

Project "Four Winds" is designed to extend the leaflet coverage in ICTZ by utilizing Marine and Army helicopters on admin, logistic, recon and similiar flights to make leaflet drops. A stock pile of leaflets is maintained at the helicopter field by the 244th Psy Ops Company liaison teams. The helicopters are loaded with bundles of mixed leaflets which are dropped at random by the crew any time during the flight except over large cities. The intent is to cover small size targets such as squad sized units and hamlets or small villages.

ITEM: PSYOPS TRAINING

PsyOps training is available at the 244th PsyOps Company on a limited basis. Subjects and length of training can be adjusted to meet individual requirements. Submit requests for training to the III MAF PSYOP Support Center (PARCHMENT 85) or this Headquarters (PARCHMENT 401).



R. R. READ
Colonel USMC
Force Psy Ops Officer

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RETURNEE EXPLOITATION; THE KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Psychological Operations has very few indicators to evaluate the success of propaganda. Perhaps that is the reason why it is such a challenging field in which to be involved. There does exist, however, one very concrete evaluator and that lies within the major PSYOP effort in Vietnam; the Chieu Hoi Program. Chieu Hoi (pronounced Chew Hoy) means "Open Arms" in its literal translation and is a vast defector inducement program extending over the entire country of S. Vietnam. The Viet Cong or NVA member who voluntarily returns to government control is called a returnee or "Hoi Chanh" (pronounced Hoy Chun). The returnees represent the success of the enormous psychological effort directed at the enemy through many varied media and this effort is continuously advertising a better life for those who rally to the cause.

The returnees represent a storehouse of information in which many opportunities exist to further the allied effort and defeat the enemy. The returnee's attitude is completely different from any enemy captive and every effort is made to maintain this favorable atmosphere. A returnee is greeted as a brother and is never to be treated as a prisoner or confined other than for his own protection. He voluntarily returned to the Government of Vietnam for a reason, is ready for a new life, and nearly always has a fresh knowledge of some useful intelligence.

The new returnee is transferred as soon as possible to one of the many Chieu Hoi Centers. Here he eats, rests, gets new clothes, and undergoes a rehabilitation program which lasts up to 45 days. The returnee is available for interrogation and voluntary exploitation at any time during this period. Returnees have consistently been one of the most valuable sources of useful intelligence information available to Marine tactical units in the ICTZ. When the returnee completes his rehabilitation, the GVN officials in the Chieu Hoi Center assist him in finding a job or he joins the ARVN. Either way, he is accepted as a citizen of the Government of Vietnam.

The psychological operations process is not complete when a member of the Viet Cong rallies. On the contrary, this is where it really begins. New returnees are interrogated by PSYOP personnel as well as the Chieu Hoi officials in the various centers. Third Country National Chieu Hoi advisors joined the I Corps program in October 1966 and these Philippine Nationals work closely in all aspects of returnee processing. New returnees are asked if they would like to urge any of their friends in the VC to rally, and very few of them fail to cooperate. Many returnees are extremely enthusiastic and eager to do anything possible to spread the word of their new life. These men are given the opportunity and assistance to write letters to their old VC outfit and pictures are taken. The letter and picture become a leaflet which is scientifically prepared, screened, and tested by the 244th PSYOP Company located in Danang. Many returnees record messages on tape and call by name many of their friends, providing them with a brief explanation of their success in making the decision to rally. These tapes are played over the target area designated by the returnees as being the location of their old VC unit.

If a returnee comes in and for some reason his message must reach the target as soon as possible, he is taken up in an aircraft to make a live loudspeaker broadcast in a 9th Air Commando Squadron U-10B "Helio Courier" aircraft. An interpreter accompanies the returnee to monitor his message.

ENCLOSURE (9)

In May, 1966, The III MAF Headquarters Psychological Operations staff consisted of Captain S. A. LUCKEY. PSYOP was part of the G-5 section headed by assistant Chief of Staff Colonel E. HOLMGRAIN. The printing and audio/visual support for PSYOP was provided by the 244th PSYOP Co. (USA) which was under operational control of Senior Advisor, I Corps.

The Danang City Chieu Hoi Office served as both a GVN Chieu Hoi officiating agency and an unofficial processing center with a maximum capacity of approximately 25 returnees. The Danang City office is headed by a young, capable and most aggressive Vietnamese Chieu Hoi Service Chief, Mr. VO CONG. Mr. CONG is an outstanding individual and is well liked by the returnees. He has an acute understanding of the Viet Cong and their operations and is aware of the US/FWMAF problems connected with combating the guerrilla. Many sources of intelligence information have been established by him to aid in the inducement of defectors. Mr. CONG speaks fluent English as a result of his regular studies in pursuit of a law degree and attending several Vietnamese American Association English classes.

In the course of action connected with normal psychological exploitation of returnees, Captain LUCKEY established good rapport with Mr. CONG and they became close friends. As a result of many conversations, it was decided that the best method of establishing credibility for the Chieu Hoi Program was to have the returnees personally contact as many people in VC controlled and VC influenced areas as possible. The major handicap connected with the Chieu Hoi Program appears to be that people have little trust in the new government as yet and certainly are reluctant to believe that an enemy soldier or guerrilla would ever be received with "Open Arms" as advertised. A returnee, especially one that is personally known by the people, would represent living proof that the Chieu Hoi program was sincere in all respects.

The audio/visual teams from the 244th PSYOP Company became a standard item at all Marine "County Fair" operations. They hand distributed leaflets, showed films, and arranged for local and higher level government officials to make speeches to the people. The people are actually a captive audience at a "County Fair" and since everyone from the local hamlet is present, they are all exposed to the same information.

After participating in several operations of this type, it was decided to have returnees give testimonials in their old VC operational localities. Mr. Jim KELLY, USAID Chieu Hoi Regional Representative, agreed that this was a good idea and said that returnees had made speeches in Danang and Hue cities in the past. Mr. CONG asked for volunteers and nearly every one of the returnees in the Danang Center agreed to go. Considerable effort was then made to insure that the returnee's families were located in a safe area prior to exposing them to the general VC population.

The Hill 55 area, occupied by the 9th Marine Regiment, has always been an active area of intensive VC guerrilla operations. The 9th Marines developed the "County Fair" concept and have always been one of the most active Marine units employing extensive psychological warfare and civic action. The hamlets around the hill itself are saturated with VC cadre and the incident rate in the hill area has always been among the highest in the First Corps Tactical Zone. The terrain consists of a series of heavily populated hamlets, typical of the fertile coastal plain rice growing areas

of S. Vietnam. The guerrillas depend on the people for food, taxes, and security, realizing that the dense civilian population prevents massive destruction and indiscriminate employment of artillery and bombing. The VC have operated extensively in this area for years and have vast hidden tunnel complexes throughout the hamlets. When the first returnees were used on "County Fair" operations in June 1966, Colonel D. J. BARRETT Jr. commanded the 9th Marine Regiment and Lt. Col JONES commanded the First Battalion, 9th Marines, which was assigned the responsibility for the tactical area comprising Hill 55 and the surrounding hamlet. 1/Lt J. STONE was the 9th Marine S-5 and Psychological Operations Officer. Lt STONE was very aggressive in conducting his civic action and PSYOP programs and was most eager to use returnees whenever possible.

Mr. CONG provided returnee volunteers for "County Fair" operations and Mr. KELLY assisted in transporting them to the Hill 55 area. The returnees were an immediate success in establishing rapport with the people and made several testimonial speeches on their personal rallying story and the good treatment received. The people were interested and appeared eager to talk with the returnees after the speeches were over. The returnees would informally mix with the people at the collection point and would assist in distributing civic action commodities and propaganda. The same group of returnees were used repeatedly and became quite professional at talking over the loudspeaker to groups numbering up to nearly 2,000 people.

A most significant break in the field of returnee exploitation occurred for Captain LUCKEY on 1 July, when NGO VAN BAY, age 28, walked into Alpha Company, 1/9 CP with an M-1 rifle and 12 clips of ammunition. He was leaving the VC after serving as a main force VC guerrilla and reaching the position of squad leader in two years. BAY is big as Vietnamese standards go; strong and very enthusiastic. He is a natural leader which can readily be detected in a short period of observation. BAY was turned over to ARVN military channels and since he contained a vast knowledge of VC activity and was prepared to help the allies, he was taken to I Corps Headquarters for top level Vietnamese debriefing. The next step would be probable transfer to the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon. This is where the most important returnees are eventually sent for extensive interrogation and exploitation.

On the evening of 2 July 1966, it was learned from a highly reliable Vietnamese source that a VC propaganda squad was operating extensively in Mr. BAY's home hamlet, CAM VAM #2, immediately south of Hill 55. The VC assembled the people from the surrounding hamlets and a verbal picture was painted for them of BAY's capture by Marines. The enemy propagandists told of BAY being severely tortured in order to extract information about his unit. The Marines were then reported to have allegedly killed him after the lengthy torture session. The VC propagandists went from one area to another in order to cover all areas in which Mr. BAY regularly operated with his VC Main Force unit, spreading the contrived tale of capture by Marines as they went.

The 3d of July was a Sunday and it is hard to locate any Vietnamese officers during their weekly day of rest. BAY was in the I Corps Compound and it would be difficult to get him out and obtain permission to use him in a psychological operation which may require follow-up measures.

However, the opportunity of actually going into the hamlet with Mr. BAY immediately after the VC had told the phoney story of his death, destroying their credibility, was indeed too good an opportunity to pass up.

Mr. KELLY was contacted along with Mr. DONG. The 9th Marine CO, Colonel BARRETT, gave the go-ahead and said that he would provide security for the patrol. 1/Lt STONE started setting things up on Hill 55 and Capt LUCKEY proceeded to attempt locating the I Corps G-2 officer (ARVN) along with Mr. KELLY. Mr. KELLY said that he had a good idea where the ARVN Colonel lived and his house was located. After a few cups of tea and some old fashioned "back porch" rapport was established, the ARVN officer decided to release BAY to Captain LUCKEY's custody.

The group lost no time in getting to hill 55 and everything was already set up to get the PSYOP patrol on its way. A loudspeaker was picked up at the S-2 bunker and the patrol made its way down Liberty Road and across the pontoon bridge which spanned the SONG AI NGHIA River. After crossing the river the patrol received two rounds of sniper fire. No casualties resulted and the patrol was soon approaching the thatched dwellings of CAM VAN #2.

A middle-age Vietnamese male, clad in the traditional peasant summer white pajamas, hurriedly approached the patrol at a half run - half walk pace. He excitedly pointed to the hamlet and one of the interpreters translated his story that many VC were waiting in ambush at the hamlet. Two interpreters were taken along on this patrol which provided one Vietnamese that spoke English and one Vietnamese speaking Marine. Something is always lost in a translation and by getting an objective viewpoint from both sides, a more realistic evaluation can be made of a Vietnamese text.

The patrol dispersed tactically and carefully approached the hamlet, which was nearly hidden within the dense thickets of bamboo and thick jungle foilage. The jabbering Vietnamese male was the hamlet chief and he repeatedly tried to urge Mr. BAY, who was at the point, to return to hill 55. The patrol moved on.

Two other returnees also accompanied the patrol. They were from adjacent areas and had been through this hamlet before but did not operate here on a regular basis. They had been local force VC cadre and with the exception of a few special night patrols, they had operated in the vicinity around their home hamlets. These men were becoming reluctant to go on and appeared hesitant to enter the hamlet in response to the Hamlet Chief's actions.

Mr. BAY, on the contrary, continued to gesture to the man in the white pajamas to step aside. BAY increased his pace and the Marines entered the hamlet from three sides. There were no shots fired but a lot of movement in a nearby cane field was indicated by Mr. BAY to probably be the local VC guerrillas moving away from the hamlet. BAY said that there were only a few VC that normally lived in this hamlet and they would be very foolish to attempt any contact.

BAY took the loudspeaker microphone and proceeded to address his friends of CAM VAN #2. When the patrol first entered the hamlet, there was very little activity. A few old women were busily preparing meals and children were playing under the shade of the thatched canopies protruding from the "hooches". Only a handful of people were visible but indications

were everywhere that many people had recently been in the hamlet. Tools were left untended, muddy trails in the small rice paddies led into the jungle, and food for many people was being prepared.

Soon people started appearing. An old man came up with some fish and tobacco for BAY. Mr. BAY continued to talk. He addressed the VC and told them that he knew they could hear him. He asked the people to come and see the man the VC had said was killed by Marines; to look at his new clothes and see how he is unmarked and comes here of his own choice. Relatives appeared among the group that was forming and some cried with joy when they saw he was alive. The ice was broken and the villagers began to show up from all quadrants of CAM VAN #2. The other returnees made speeches of their experiences in the Chieu Hoi Program and they also were well received by the attentive audience. Mr. BAY circulated freely among the people. On the way back to the hill, he casually made brief visits to many "hooches". He gave out cigarettes and told the people that Marines are good people and that their sons and husbands in the local VC units could rally to the government with no fear.

Everyone that returned to Hill 55 that day from the PSYOP patrol had that enlightened feeling that can only be associated with a sense of accomplishment. The Village Chief had tried to keep Mr. BAY from entering the hamlet. He may have been a VC and chances are he was at least sympathetic to their cause. The fact remains that the chief is alive and being exposed to constant VC activity in a VC infested area certainly places a local official at their mercy. Perhaps he only wanted to avoid trouble in his hamlet and not place any of its inhabitants' lives in danger. At any rate, the credibility of VC propaganda in the Hill 55 area would be extremely questionable after Mr. BAY's visit at CAM VAN #2.

As the weeks moved on into August, returnee speeches and assistance at "County Fair" operations became routine. Many problems were encountered transporting the returnees from the Danang Chieu Hoi Office into the field. Some of them completed their training and had found jobs in Danang. They never failed to volunteer their services though whenever a "County Fair" was coming up and always were happy to go.

They were never told where the operation was being held for security reasons and at no time did they ever receive monetary compensation for their work in the field. A few of the returnees asked to go on operations with Marines regularly. One such man was Mr. CHAU. CHAU served as a corpsman for several years with the VC operating throughout a large area south of Danang between Highway 1 and the mountains to the west.

DANG NAM was another regular fan of all Marine units. NAM liked anything that was Marine Corps. He was given a utility cover with metal insignia that he literally never took off.

Mr. NAM had an interesting background as nearly all ex-VC Chieu Hoi returnees do. He was 21 years old when he came to the Chieu Hoi center and had been a VC regular for over 3 years. He had been sent into Danang City a year before rallying with the mission of getting a job in which he could handle money. The more money the better. NAM hunted around the city and soon located work in one of the many bars that thrived before Danang was placed off limits to military personnel. Gaining trust and confidence would be a prime requisite for pulling off the caper and the woman he worked for was no slouch. This one would take time.

Eventually the opportune moment presented itself. NAM had been charged with the responsibility of closing the bar for several nights and he would carry out the cash box and take it to the owners residence. It was Saturday night and there was over 35,000 piasters in the till. NAM decided this was the right moment and he made it back to his unit with the new haul.

Mr. BAY and NAM have similar stories to tell about why they left the Viet Cong. As they grew up, they heard nothing but anti-government stories from the people around them. They had heard that the country is run by the wealthy for the wealthy. The farmer and average Vietnamese citizen have no chance to really get ahead. The National Government has always been unstable in the past and you can really only count on having the material things which are in your presence at the moment. Even the government armed forces were said to be the enemy of the people. Officers come from educated families. It takes money to go to any advanced level schools and the peasant children have no time for school. What they eat tomorrow depends on how hard they work today. Mr. NAM and BAY's fathers and uncles fought with the Viet Minh. They had beaten the French with sheer determination.

The Viet Cong seemed to be the answer to everything. The elders looked on it merely as a continuation of the proud force that defeated the French and drove the Japanese out before them. The leaders who came to talk with the people and get men for the VC forces say that the Americans came to take over the land and exploit the people. The propagandists in the VC talk of how many sacrifices must be made and how much better things will be after the next big VC offensive. They talk of Communism, land reform, and prosperity under the communal system of government. They call it the peoples government. At last here is something that recognized the peasant, the farmer, the low income family. Goals are set for the next year and this tax collection is the last one of its kind. Taxes will get less, families will become more prosperous and the Americans will be driven from the land.

The good things never came. Taxes increased. The Americans took nothing from the people. The VC collected rice and taxes at more frequent intervals. The conscripted guerrillas got younger. Healthy young women were soon selected to carry weapons. Young children must learn to plant demolitions and even the old men and women must dig tunnels, fighting holes, and trenches. The able ones must serve as coolies and make more and more frequent trips into the mountains to ferry out supplies that are brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the North to feed the war effort. Punji stick making takes up the remainder of the free time. Families are assigned mines which they must quickly plant when Marine patrols are approaching. They must be taken up after they pass. Children and valuable domestic animals are frequently injured in accidents with mines and booby traps and overall, things are constantly getting worse instead of better.

The people themselves began to tell the VC that they really weren't capable of defeating the Marines and government forces on the battlefield. The only thing they are good for is to bring bombs and artillery in on innocent people that can't escape the war.

During the summer months, command interest in the employment of psychological operations picked up considerably. Requests for more printed materials and special leaflets requirements taxed the 24th PSYOP Co. production capability and standard leaflets from JUSPAO augmented the requests. Enough returnees were being utilized at this time to meet requirements for "County Fairs" in nearly all areas south of Danang to the SONG THU BON River. S/Sgt HANDZO had joined the III MAF PSYOP staff in late June and immediately assumed duties as operations chief. Sergeant HANDZO exerted considerable effort at filling requirements for returnees requested in the field and arranging transportation from the Danang Chieu Hoi office to field units.

After rallying, Mr. NAM spent a few weeks at the Chieu Hoi Office in Danang. One day when he was walking in city, the woman he worked for spotted him and told the National Police that he was the one that had stolen her money. NAM was apprehended. It took much convincing on the part of Mr. CONG and Mr. KELLY talking to the National Police, to convince them that NAM had taken the money under orders from the VC. He didn't take the money as an individual gesture for personal gain but as a VC guerrilla under orders.

Mr. NAM was released to Mr. CONG with the agreement that NAM would help the police apprehend as many VC as possible in Danang through personal recognition. NAM faithfully worked the market places in which he knew VC operated and in five weeks he produced 14 confirmed VC.

Every time the VC lose a member it is a moral defeat. When they defect it is a psychological morale factor that could destroy their entire organization if the trend to rally snowballed. When a defector openly fingers a VC in public, their privilege of openly transiting the countryside in populated areas is denied and it tightens the noose that threatens their neck just one more notch.

Captain LUCKEY, along with Lt STONE, decided that since Mr. NAM was so successful in pointing out VC in the city, why not run a series of screening operations. The screening operations would consist of selecting an area that could be cordoned off as effectively as possible in order that no one could escape. Marines would push through the area in a thorough search of all hamlets and assemble the people at a collection point strategically located to expeditiously process the people through a filter. This filter would be composed of returnees from the area being searched and would select VC from the groups of people as they entered the collection point.

The idea was presented to Colonel HOLMGRAIN and he agreed to talk to Colonel BARRETT at Hill 55 and discuss the possibilities of the program. This was accomplished and Colonel BARRETT set up a "County Fair" operation while Mr. CONG selected the returnees with the approval of Mr. KELLY. It was decided to hold the sweep in an area bounded by the railroad passing through AT 995615, and the SONG LA THO and SONG AI NGHIA Rivers which meet at AT 974612. The triangular shaped area was ideal for the operation. The collection point was designated in an area immediately south of Hill 55 where a narrow pontoon foot bridge crossed the SONG AI NGHIA River. This would be an ideal screening point because the people would have to cross

the river at this point in single file. The bridge was also near the apex formed by the river intersection and the entire terrain situation acted as a natural funnel to direct the people to the collection point.

Mr. BAY and Mr. NAM, along with four other returnees, were taken to the 9th Marine CP the afternoon prior to the operation. The returnees were billeted with the VN popular Force personnel that were living on the hill with the Marines. Captain LUCKEY, SSgt HANDZO and SSgt TOKETOMA, an interpreter provided by G-5, set up the last minute details with Lt. STONE.

That evening the VC mortared a finger on hill 55 around 2100. Sporadic probing continued and the mortars were coming from the area to be swept in the morning. Several artillery missions were fired during the night.

Delta Company, First Battalion, Ninth Marines was given the job of sweeping the area and the sweep was started at 0500. A Marine H-34 was outfitted with the 500 watt portable loudspeaker set assigned to the 9th Marine PSYOP Officer and two missions were flown dropping Chieu Hoi leaflets and broadcasting instructions to the people to go to the collection point. An audio/visual team from the 2nd PSYOP Company set up their equipment on high ground over looking the collection point and instructions were given to the people by a Vietnamese interpreter that was with the A/V team. The people were told to bring their valuables and assemble at the collection point.

Tents were set up for the "County Fair" at first light and everything was ready when the people began closing the area. The returnees assembled at the bridge approach and people began to come in. Among the first to arrive was three young men that had recently been wounded. Two were carried in by relatives and one walked in by himself. One had a large fragmentary wound in the small of his back and the other carried-wounded was shot through the chest. The third man walked in with the aid of a hastily constructed bamboo cane. It was remarkable that the man could still walk. He had taken three small arms rounds through the mid-section resulting in a total of five holes. The men were given immediate medical attention and evacuated. The returnees knew all of them and indicated their respective jobs in the VC.

Seldom are many young Vietnamese men ever confronted on a sweep or patrol. As a rule, the majority of healthy young males encountered are either VC or draft dodgers and it wouldn't be long until the draft dodgers were conscripted by the VC. So as a result, the women and children outnumber the males in the average collection point by 10 to 1 or more. However, this was definitely not the case today. Many young men were forced out of the jungle in the Delta Company sweep. The natural, well covered boundaries made escape nearly impossible.

During the day, the returnees selected 19 VC cadre members out of the group of nearly 1000 people that arrived at the collection point. Members of the 3d Marine Division Interrogation - Translation Team arrived at the collection point and were successful in getting immediate confessions from 12 of the 19 that they were definitely VC. One VC member went back into the swept area and pointed out a hidden weapon. The astonished look of the VC when they came face to face with the returnees was classic. Some had been picked up as detainees and had slipped through the interrogation as innocent farmers in the past. Others had freely moved along the roads and through rice paddies while unknowing Marines looked on. Now it was all over. No longer could the VC move undetected through screening points.

Another successful PSYOP - Intelligence screening operation was conducted the following week on the west side of Liberty Road about one-half mile south of the newly constructed Liberty Road bridge. This was a short operation but resulted in three female VC captives. One was a propagandist and two had been picked up as suspicious detainees in the past and released. Now they were facially identified by three returnees. The composition of this group was typical; no young men. The Marine sweep force available was small the area fairly large with a natural boundary only on one side. The guerrillas either hid or most likely left the area as the cordon was being inserted.

In August Capt LUCKEY was designated as the III MAF Chieu Hoi action officer responsible for maintaining liaison with the various aspects of the Chieu Hoi program and returnee exploitation. Returnees who had been working with Marines on a fairly regular basis and started going on short patrols in conjunction with "County Fairs" with Capt LUCKEY. They naturally had an amazing knowledge of everything in the area. Their lack of fear during firefights was very noticeable, even though they were unarmed. At one of the several tunnel complexes that were encountered, Mr. BAY indicated that he wanted to go in and check it out. The only known entrance was a very small and dropped straight down about 6 to 8 feet and then went in both directions. Captain LUCKEY gave BAY his pistol and BAY slipped out of his boots. He placed his arms straight up over his head, gave a short hop and disappeared down the hole. He was down there for quite a while and soon came scrambling back out of another hole nearby which had a woven bamboo cover camouflaged with dirt. BAY said the hole had recently been used and that it was still under construction.

Lt. Col. JONES, Commanding 1/9, said that he would use all the returnees he could get. Mr. KELLY agreed to let three of them stay on the hill for short periods of no more than a few days. While on the hill, they would help in medcaas and other civic action projects but this was not the answer to successful employment.

During September, nearly everyone that worked with the returnees agreed that they would be a definite asset if allowed to work with Marines on a permanent basis. There were six real aggressive ones that knew the area between Highway 1 and the mountains. They wanted to go to work. Mr. KELLY said that he would get money from a source in USAID to finance a trial project to see if it would work. They needed to be armed, clothed and oriented. Soon a magnitude of small complications developed but they were handled, at least temporarily, as they arose.

Colonel R. R. READ was appointed the III MAF Force PSYOP Officer and the section grew considerably in size. On 1 Aug 66, PSYOP became a special staff section directly under the Chief of Staff, III MAF. An increase in personnel was allocated and the 24th PSYOP Company was closely integrated into the III MAF PSYOP organizational structure.

Major B. A. MONTGOMERY, III MAF Counter-Intelligence, set up a fund for PSYOP with Captain LUCKEY as the custodian. The fund would provide monetary remuneration for individual contributory accomplishments of returnees when working with Marine units in the field.

Major John OZAKI, MACV J-2 Chieu Hoi representative to I Corps, was most instrumental in providing assistance to get the returnees into the field on a permanent basis. He accompanied Captain LUCKEY into the field on several occasions prior to the returnees joining the Marine units,

suggesting methods of employment and selling the program.

On 10 October 1966, the First Marine Division moved north from Chu Lai and took over the Danang TAOR. Colonel MOORE, First MarDiv G-5 and Major KRAUSS, 1st MarDiv PSYOP Officer, gave their full cooperation to the promotion of the program and suggested the returnees go to the field on a permanent basis as soon as possible. Col MOORE said that he would look into payment of the returnees out of any available funds on division level.

Mr. KELLY obtained 30,000 piasters for the pilot project and said the money problem was solved. Major OZAKI obtained uniforms and some personal combat gear from Office of Special Activities. Capt LUCKEY contacted U.S. Special Forces, Detachment C-1 and obtained some serviceable M-1 carbines and ammunition to arm the returnees on a defensive basis. The returnees were given an initial briefing by Major OZAKI and Capt LUCKEY at Mr. CONG's office on 22 October 1966. The scouts salary was arbitrarily set at 5000\$VN piasters a month, subject to change if necessary. They received an initial 1000\$VN piasters and were sent into the field to join Marine units. Scouts BAY, HIET, and VUI were sent to the First Marines and DAU, NAM and CHAU went to the Ninth Marines.

Captain Gary COOPER, the Ninth Marines S-5, came up on Hill 55 from commanding a rifle company to be Lt STONE's relief. Capt COOPER was a natural for the job of handling the scouts and took a most personal interest in their welfare. This is extremely important to the success of the program for many reasons. The returnees are being placed in a completely new environment with strange surroundings, a completely new diet, and foreign customs. They have a language barrier and must adopt to Marine methods of operating. Capt COOPER did an outstanding job of making the transition as easy and most effective as possible. He let them stay on the hill getting used to the Marine routine and diet. The scouts would work at learning English in the evenings and would help Capt COOPER with Vietnamese in return. They started "earning their salt" by going out on patrols and whenever they were back at the regimental CP the lessons would continue.

Captain Sam BLACK was the First Marine PSYOP Officer and welcomed the scouts in a similar manner. They had a few days to get accustomed to living with Marines and then were sent out to live and work with Marines at company level. The First Marine S-2 Major BURTHA, assumed control of the scouts for the First Marines with SSgt's B. C. HAYES and E. E. ROBINSON working out the mechanics of the program.

One of the largest problems initially occurring was centered around the lack of communications between Marines and the scouts. Interpreters were very scarce and the scouts became frustrated at times when trying to pass information on to the Marines. On a few occasions, the interpreters would protest having to go into the field. When in the field, the interpreters would not always pass on the information which the scouts told them to pass. The interpreters apparently wanted to avoid getting into a firefight.

Mr. AY could not understand why the Marines didn't always listen to him and he soon returned to the Chic Hoi Center. He told Mr. CONG that the Marines didn't believe what he told them and that he was wasting his time by working for them. BAY went into great detail describing some of the dangers around the Marine unit CP that were very apparent to him

but were overlooked by Marines. He described the many vendors that hung around the camp and the danger of having women and children in the proximity of the CP.

SSgt HAYES checked into BAY's story and discovered the lack in communications which was remedied and BAY returned to work with the First Marines. It wasn't long until things were straightened out and BAY soon was not only getting the point across but was teaching classes on VC tactics to Marines through an interpreter.

SSgt HAYES was another "natural" at handling the new scouts and effecting a good adjustment for them. He was assigned responsibility for them from the Regimental S-2 and took the "bull by the horns" right away. The scouts worked for him a little harder than expected because they developed a great deal of respect for him. SSgt HAYES is a "recon Marine" and is noted for doing a better job with challenging new projects when they are out of the ordinary than with any normal routine assignment. He can readily adjust to uncommon situations and improvise necessities to make the adjustment. The scouts were introduced to the company commanders by him and he would go to great length describing their merits and techniques of employment.

SSgt ROBINSON used the scouts to make PSYOP speeches and distribute propaganda in the First Marine area. When BAY was first interviewed he related many VC tactics. SSgt ROBINSON and HAYS had BAY record a tape through the interpreter, and it is used as part of the First Marine briefing for newly arrived officers.

The Marines naturally had some apprehensive ideas initially about having ex-VC living in their camp. It didn't take long though until alot of respect was developed for these little guys who not only demonstrated amazing knowledge but have alot of courage to match. The initial apprehensions were gone and soon you couldn't pry a scout away from a unit with a crowbar. Patrol leaders fought over who would get the scouts and didn't want to go out without them.

General NICKERSON, Commanding General of the First Marine Division, was briefed on the success of the scouts in their first week of action. The pilot period was over almost before it started and he directed that as many scouts be placed in the field as could be made available. Colonel MOORE passed on the General's request and two of the second six scouts to be hired joined units of the 7th Marines in the Chu Lai TAOR. The other four were sent to increase the number of scouts in the First and Ninth Regiments. The returnees received a name; they were called "Kit Carson Scouts" by General NICKERSON.

The reception of the scouts and endorsement by commanders was better than anyone expected. The scouts need time to be trained and must under-go extensive screening before they are considered for selection as scouts. Mr. KELLY was asked to provide more funds and he replied that his source of funds was a one shot affair. The initial money problem was now bigger than ever.

Colonel R. R. READ, III MAF, Force PSYOP Officer, immediately started the wheels turning by outlining the success of the program in a message to MACV J-2 and General McCHRISTIANSEN recommended utilizing the present reward fund (C&F) to finance the scout program. In reply, Major MONTGOMERY, who had set up the initial PSYOP reward fund from this source, provided the

required funds to keep the program in operation and asked for enough money to support the program for 1967. His request was approved and the first allotment arrived by courier.

It was decided to pay the returnees on a monthly basis in the same manner as Marines. The payroll would be made up by III MAF PSYOP and a regimental psy officer would be designated to pick up the payroll for his units' scouts at the monthly PSYOP conference. Signed payment receipt vouchers are sent back to III MAF where the master account is kept.

Major OZAKI and Captain LUCKEY picked up more weapons from the I Corps G-2 section. The majority of these were servicable and the others were used for parts to repair other weapons.

In Chu Lai, Colonel SNODDY, Commanding Officer of the Seventh Marines, prescribed the formation of a 4 man team concept for the employment of scouts. This team concept consists of one Vietnamese speaking Marine interpreter, a regular Marine scout and two Kit Carson Scouts. This appears to be one of the best employment methods observed. Two scouts should be placed together whenever possible in order for them to have someone to talk to and to share mutual problems with.

Guidance for scout employment was the next problem to attack. An SOP was written by Captain LUCKEY and Major OZAKI. After many changes it was ready for reproduction. The SOP covers everything from scout procurement to replacing scouts that no longer are of any value to tactical units. Each scout has his own record book which is similar to the regular service record book. It contains the history of the scout, record of awards, and other pertinent information. The record book is transferred from unit to unit along with the scout.

The scout programs' success is centered around the precept that they be employed in an area in which they lived and operated with VC units. In these areas, they can facially identify members of the local VC organization. They know the routes of escape in event of attack as well as the likely hiding places. Initially they will have alot of fresh information regarding hidden caches of supplies, ammo, and weapons. This information will soon grow outdated, however, and then a scout's value will depend upon his ingenuity and aggressiveness in locating mines and booby traps and safely avoiding VC ambushes. The scouts future is usually determined at this point with regard to his remaining with the Marines or returning to civilian life. The scouts have so far worked out very well, even after the initial knowledge of VC hiding places is exhausted. It doesn't take long for the VC to find out who the scouts are working for and to re-locate all of their old caches, etc.

The scout has probably grown up in the area in which he worked with the VC. He knows the people well and he knows which families have sons or husbands in the VC organization. A good scout can be instrumental in getting these people to rally by psychologically applying pressure through the families. By approaching the family of a VC member, the scout has indicated to the family that the VC relative is a marked man and it is just a matter of time before he will be killed or captured if he doesn't rally.

An example of this type of action occurred during the 1967 TET holidays at Chu Lai. A scout from the 7th Marines went home on leave to get married and enjoy the TET festivities with some friends. When he returned to his Marine unit, he brought back two VC guerrillas who wanted

to rally to the government of Vietnam through the Chieu Hoi program. Not only did these two rally but they knew where two more were hiding near TAM KY that would rally if they had the opportunity. The scout took the new returnees to the rendezvous point and successfully effected the return of two more VC to the National Cause.

The target for the 1967 scout program is to have 50 armed scouts in the field by 1 April and 100 by 1 July. The funds have been provided by COMUSMACV and Captain LUCKEY has obtained one hundred M-1 carbines with accessory equipment and magazines from the Navy at Camp TIEN SHA. Uniforms, boots and other equipment is being obtained through both USAID and Marine channels.

General NICKERSON solved the recruiting problem for the First Marine Division by specially selecting highly qualified staff non-commissioned officers to work at the Chieu Hoi Centers at TAM KY, HOI AN, and QUANG NGAI. Their job is to screen all returnees and observe them while they are undergoing processing. They select likely prospects for the Kit Carson program and recommend the returnees to be placed in the field on a trial basis. SSgt's SPIRES, FRANKS, and LISTER have been selected to serve as scout recruiters and started working as of February 1967. They live at the MACV compounds located in the vicinity of the Chieu Hoi Centers and work full time in scout procurement.

When a likely prospect for the scout program is selected, a record book is started and the first page, recording his personal history, is completed before he ever leaves the center. A name-trace-action form is filled out also and he is processed through GVN National Intelligence channels. The scout is placed into the field as soon as the forms are completed and he preferably joins experienced scouts. He undergoes a complete evaluation in the field and at the same time becomes oriented to his new way of life. The acid test is performed at the first opportunity to expose him to fire and he goes on several patrols. If he is a good man, likes the job, and volunteers to become a scout, his name is submitted for approval and he is placed on the payroll. The ratio of scouts to the number of returnees that come into the centers is very small. The screening process is a thorough one and the program is strictly voluntary.

During the first few months in the field, the returnees accomplished the following:

1. Apprehended 45 Viet Cong suspects.
2. Captured 70 confirmed Viet Cong.
3. Located 18 enemy caves.
4. Located 11 enemy tunnels
5. Captured 5 VC weapons.
6. Captured 19 VC grenades.
7. Discovered 18 VC mines and booby traps.

8. Located 4 VC supply caches
9. Killed 3 Viet Cong guerrillas
10. Guided 214 Marine Patrols

A scout averted a major ambush while acting as point on a company size troop movement near AN HOA. The VC had carefully clipped off the lower bamboo tips along both sides of the road to clear fields of fire. They took the tips to a forward position and utilized them to camouflage several automatic weapon positions forming a deadly ambush site. When the Marine column was within 150 meters of the ambush site, the scout suddenly motioned them to quickly take cover. They were taken under fire almost immediately but the warning was ample and no friendly casualties were sustained. The scout later said that the wrong or underside of the bamboo leaves was facing outward and this was very unnatural with no wind blowing. Everyone in the column had no doubts about what would have resulted if they had moved another 50 meters toward the ambush site.

The responsibility and courage of the scouts was demonstrated in another incident in which a platoon size patrol was taken under fire and forced back to a tree line to make a stand. The platoon commander was the last one to withdraw and was hit in the chest by a mortar fragment. The scout that was guiding the patrol saw the lieutenant fall and despite heavy fire, he raced to the wounded officers' side. He first tried to pick him up and carry him but being unable to do this, he dragged him to a small protective depression and layed on him until the mortars were silenced.

The first Kit Carson Scout was killed in action while participating with Lima Company, Third Battalion, First Marines on Operation Stone south of Marble Mountain, vicinity of BT 006553. His name was DINH NGOC THIET and he rallied to the Government of Vietnam at the Danang Chieu Hoi Office on 8 May 1966. He was selected to be a scout in October after participating in several Marine activities on a temporary basis. THIET was a main force guerrilla and operated extensively with the VC from hill 55 to the South China Sea, south of Marble Mountain. He was one of the first six scouts placed with Marine units on a permanent basis and was assigned to the First Marine Regiment.

On 16 February 1967, scout THIET was with Lima Company when they apprehended a Viet Cong and THIET determined the location of a tunnel which allegedly contained some other members of the local VC force. The cave was located and THIET was getting two guerrillas out of the tunnel when one exploded a grenade in the air at the mouth of the hole. THIET was killed instantly from multiple fragmentation wounds which covered all of his body and severed several fingers of his left hand. The Marine closest to him was also killed and eight others wounded in the explosion.

THIET was wrapped in a poncho and his body was evacuated by helo to the First Medical Battalion in Danang. The unit was engaged in heavy combat and no one was available to accompany the body back to Danang.

The First Marine Division notified Captain LUCKEY of the scout's death in early evening of 16 February and Major KRAUSS, 1st MarDiv, PSYOP, said

That he was trying to get confirmation on the body location on the telephone along with circumstances surrounding the death of the scout. Captain LUCKEY checked the various staff sections in III MAF in an attempt to ascertain any official guidance which was available in this case. Nothing in writing was available which would apply to this situation directly.

Major OZAKI, upon learning of the scout's death, contacted OCO Headquarters in Saigon in an attempt to obtain funds for solatium for THIET's dependent wife and small daughter. A message was sent by Colonel HEAD to COMUSMACV requesting 30,000\$VN be provided from the C&CIF Funds, which are used to pay the scouts wages. The request came back approved.

Early on the morning of the 17th of February, Captain LUCKEY went to the Chieu Hoi Office in Danang and told Mr. CONG of THIET's death. Mr. CONG got the ball rolling with the suggestion that we locate the body as soon as possible. The First Division said that THIET had been taken to the ARVN hospital because he was Vietnamese, was wearing a military uniform, and they had no other information to go on.

Since one of the first things to be done was to notify THIET's wife, she had to be located. Mr. CONG knew she lived near HIEU DUC District Headquarters but had no idea in which hamlet. Captain LUCKEY went to the First Marine Regiment CP where BAY was already waiting to come to the funeral. He was fresh out of the field and was participating on operation Stone with THIET but was not with him when he was killed.

Mr. BAY had never shown any emotion whatsoever in the past. He was an aggressive, sincere scout and highly motivated to do the best he could. When he learned of THIET's death he was extremely broken-up. BAY was picked up and the First Marines S-5 interpreter, an ARVN Staff sergeant, volunteered to accompany BAY to HIEU DUC where BAY said he would take us to THIET's house. Captain LUCKEY, BAY and the interpreter drove to HIEU DUC District to a small hamlet near the MACV advisory compound. The "hooch" was located off the beaten path at the end of a narrow trail which led to the edge of the hamlet. It was a typical Vietnamese thatched dwelling with hard packed dirt floor and furnished in the typical utilitarian manner with the barest essentials for modest living. A very old lady was the only visible inhabitant and she showed no emotion when BAY told her of the recent tragedy. She told BAY that Mrs. THIET had moved close to Danang to be with BAY's wife, only a few days prior to our visit. It was obvious that the inhabitants of this hamlet did not frequently come in contact with Americans due to the cool reception noted upon arrival.

The next stop was a hamlet located at the base of Marble Mountain where BAY's wife was located. Mrs. THIET, her daughter and THIET's teenage brother were in the house when BAY arrived and he wasted no time in telling them what had happened. Mrs. THIET, along with her baby and brother-in-law were loaded into the jeep and taken into Danang.

The ARVN hospital had no record of THIET and on a hunch, the crude morgue located at the Danang Surgical Hospital was checked. This morgue consists of one small unscrubbed room with four concrete blocks provided for the remains of fatalities occurring at or brought into the Danang Surgical Hospital. THIET was discovered still wrapped in a Marine poncho and not a very pleasant sight. BAY became very emotional and threw his pack on the concrete floor of the morgue, kicked it around and screamed of vengeance to the VC for killing THIET.

Captain LUCKEY called SSgt HANDZO from the hospital and told him to notify First Division that the body had been located and to get an extra jeep and 6x6 truck for tomorrow's funeral. BAY went to pick up a casket and was provided 6,000\$VN to cover material expenses for procurement of necessary items for burial.

Major CAHILL and Mr. CONG went to the morgue later in the evening and assisted in making arrangements for the funeral. Rice wine was purchased to wash off the body and BAY hired some of the local Vietnamese, who apparently tended to these tasks frequently, to prepare the body. White sand was hauled in on a litter and the floor of the red painted casket was covered with approximately 4" - 6" of sand. Some white muslin cloth was purchased along with a pillow and two small geometric "L" shaped bags. These were also filled with white sand and the body was placed in the casket and red Buddhist funeral paper was placed on top of the sand. The lid was then nailed shut, covered with a Vietnamese flag and incense and candles were placed on top. The family requested to stay with the casket all night and BAY asked to get started for an early funeral the next morning.

Mr. CONG discussed burial details with BAY and Mrs. THIET and they did not know where to bury him. Mr. CONG suggested the big cemetery near Namu Bridge by 30th Naval Construction Regiment gate on Red Beach. The family consented and some returnees from the Danang office agreed to dig the grave. A popular force relative of THIET's was down in Hieu Duc and Mrs. THIET wanted him to be there. Major CAHILL volunteered to take THIET's brother and pick up the relative in the morning while Captain LUCKEY was getting the grave dug at Namu. SSgt HANDZO would handle the truck details and preparations for the trip to the grave site.

Since a Kit Carson Scout lives, eats, and sleeps with Marines and fights as a Marine, it is only fitting the Marines provide military honors at the burial. GySgt RAUBINGER has the III MAF Drum and Bugle Corps and was contacted late in the evening to provide field music for the morning of the 18th. He already had a commitment but said that he would provide a bugler regardless. SSgt HANDZO contacted Lt. EVANS, III MAF Security Officer, and he provided a six man firing squad which volunteered for the detail. All of these arrangements were effected at the very last minute with immediate response on the part of everyone involved.

First Division was notified of the burial plans and they indicated that General NICKERSON wanted to attend the funeral if at all possible.

Early on the morning of the 18th, Major CAHILL headed for Hieu Duc with THIET's brother and Captain LUCKEY went to the Chieu Hoi Office where he picked up the necessary tools and six returnees to start digging the grave at Namu.

Upon reaching the office, scout NAM was waiting to help out in the funeral also. He was in the hospital with pneumonia but heard of THIET's death and insisted on being released. Everyone piled into a jeep and headed for Namu where permission had to be granted by the local government officials for burial. One of Mr. CONG's cadre took care of these details and a suitable grave site was selected. The returnees started to dig in the drizzling rain and NAM and Captain LUCKEY headed back to the morgue where SSgt HANDZO was waiting with a truck and the funeral procession.

Upon arriving at the morgue, BAY and Mrs. THIET had become a lot more rational and they decided to bury him on the farm down in Hieu Duc. Major CAHILL arrived with the PF relative and we proceeded to change the plans. Mr. CONG sent a returnee to Namu to tell the grave diggers to return to the city and the truck was loaded up. The funeral procession consisted of the 6x6 truck and two jeeps.

Upon arriving at Hieu Duc, the procession moved through THIET's home hamlet and up a very narrow trail to the village chiefs house where a second grave sight was selected. The casket was carried into the office and the remaining 3 hours of the morning consisted of a pay- your-respects period for all the hamlet residents who quietly filed in and out of the room.

The sight was finally selected and Major CAHILL procured digging tools from the local PF unit which was relaxing with a mid-morning beer. The grave was dug and some Vietnamese bread and seed-coated candy were provided for the Marines lunch along with some local bananas.

The sand-filled casket weighed about 500 pounds and the Marines loaded and unloaded it from the truck twice along with having to carry it about 200 meters to the grave which was not accessable by vehicle.

A local elder was chosen to select the exact spot the body was to be burried and to lay out a north - south line to orient the casket in ancient Buddhist tradition. The elder had a compass which was mounted in a fairly large wooden block approximately 8" square. Several symbols were drawn on the compass face so that it gave the general appearance of a Mexican Aztec calendar. This must have been the chosen profession or at least the cherished privilege of the old man because he accomplished the task with much pomp and ceremony. A piece of hand woven hemp rope connected two stakes which served as the center line for the grave diggers and to orient the body when the casket was placed in the hole.

Marines carried the casket up the jungle trail, heavily lined by very dense hedgrows of 10' high cactus type vegetation, to a small open clearing. Rice patties joined the clearing from both directions and presented a panoramic view of hill 327 looking across the river to the northwest. Large pieces of paper with silver and gold tin-foil symbols were dropped along the trail in front of the Marines to rid the area of evil spirits. When the Marines entered the clearing with the casket, a long pole was waiting with more hemp rope to secue the casket for lowering into the hole. The pole was tapered slightly at each end and had a natural bend from several years of supporting heavy sand-filled caskets as they were lowered into the grave.

Banana tree logs supported the casket at all times when it was lovered to the ground and these were carried along with the red box wherever it was taken.

SSgt HANZO assembled the firing squad about 60 feet from the grave and the bugler positioned himself at the end of the grave. Modifications to the normal military burial service were made in accordance with the requests of the family and the situation. A few lumps of dirt that had fallen into the hole were taken out by some of the returnees and the people lowered the casket into the hole with Vietnamese flag in place. The pole was removed and the casket was oriented with the hemp rope serving as the north-south line.

One of the ropes got stuck under the casket and the PF relative jumped on the casket and pulled it loose. Mr. CONG read a three page summary of

THIET's life with emphasis on the job he was doing and service to his county and Marines. Taps was sounded. SSgt HAN DZO gave the commands which produced three volleys of fire from the six man firing squad. Live ammunition was used, primarily because it was all that was available and the presence of the small number of Marines in "Indian Country".

When the Marine firing squad finished the last volley, scout BAY fired a long burst from his K-50 sub-machine gun into the air and tears rolled down his cheeks.

The grave was covered and earth piled over it in the familiar donut shaped dome fashion which indicates the presence of a Vietnamese grave even after it has been left untended and gets covered with tall grass. The soil was smoothed by patting it with shovels. The funeral was over.

Some of the relatives came up and thanked the Marines after the ceremony was over. Mr. CONG said that the people were very impressed and grateful for the Marines part in the funeral. He stated that the people couldn't understand why the Marines went to so much trouble to bury a Vietnamese. Especially one who had fairly recently fought against them with the VC. The Marines had questions also like why did they bury the flag with the casket? Maybe someday they won't bury it but in doing so, they weren't trying to indicate any disrespect for the country.

The Marines returned to Danang that evening with quite an experience under their belt. It is a difficult concept to grasp that here in the space age, they had just taken a comrade-in-arms, placed him in a box and buried him without the aid of an undertaker or chaplain. There is something very impressive and very final about a funeral.

A few days later, Captain LUCKEY, Major KRAUSS and Mr. CONG went to visit Mrs. THIET down in Hieu Duc. They took a few big bags of rice and a talking doll provided by the civil affairs program. The family had accepted the fact that THIET was gone and although they were still in mourning, the shock and grief stricken appearance had worn off. The family altar was decorated with some of THIET's personal possessions. His utilities hung on the wall and his sunglasses, with one lens broken out, were on the table. His wallet was there also with a fragment hole completely through one corner.

The family had some tea and La Rue beer to serve and insisted that the noon meal be shared with the visitors who were warmly welcomed. Many of the neighborhood children appeared seemingly out of no where and began to play with the doll. The doll "spoke" English but they didn't seem to really mind too much.

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HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

7B/den

FEB 8 1967

COMMAND DIRECTORY

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBERS "PARCHMENT" OR AS INDICATED</u>	<u>RTD</u>
<u>COMMAND SECTION</u>				
CG III MAF	LtGen	WALT, L. W.	6, Danang 6100	6/67
Senior Aide	Capt	LEE, W. F.	13, Danang 6449	6/67
Admin Asst	Capt	SRAMEK, J. S. Jr	13, Danang 6449	4/67
Junior Aide	1stLt	SHOFF, J. R.	13, Danang 6449	6/67
VN Aide	Capt	QUY, VoDinh	6, Danang 6449	
Political Advisor	Mr	COLEBAUGH, H.	Danang 6168/6169	
Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	ELDREDGE, T. G.	109	5/67
<u>CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION</u>				
Chief of Staff	BGen	ELWOOD, H. M.	5, Danang 6383	5/67
Dep Chief of Staff	Col	NEVILLE, R. E.	305, Danang 6405	8/67
Staff Secretary	LtCol	CANZONIERI, J. V.	38, Danang 6383/6100	9/67
Admin Asst to the Chief of Staff	2dLt	SCHAUER, T. W.	5	3/67
<u>G-1 SECTION</u>				
Asst C/S G-1	Col	MAHON, J. L.	1, Danang 6583	6/67
Asst G-1	LtCol	HOLT, T. L.	1	9/67
MACV TMO	LtCol	JOHNSON, J. C.	153 Motley	12/67
Asst G-1	Maj	FOLSOM, C. A.	101	
<u>G-2 SECTION</u>				
Asst C/S G-2/SSO	Col	THOMPSON, R. H.	2, Danang 6512	9/67
Asst G-2/ASSO	Col	READ, E. S.	2, Danang 6512	7/67
IntelPlans/Est Off	LtCol	CHAPLIN, D. D. III	702	9/67
AsstIntelOpsOff	LtCol	FRAZIER, P. N.	202	8/67
Intel Ops Off	LtCol	FRENCH, H. D.	202	8/67
Intel Coll Off	LtCol	GREEN, F. A.	102/6309	8/67
Deputy G-2/ASSO	LtCol	WATTERSON, D. E.	6512/2	7/67
Coll Analyst Off	Maj	DANIELSON, D. C.	102	11/67
OOB/ASSO	Maj	GIUBILATO, J. J.	202	10/67
SpecIntelOff/ASSO	Maj	HUNTER, M.	402	7/67
AirIntelReconOff	Maj	KRAVET, R. D.	102	2/68
IntelWatchSupvr	Maj	MCCOART, J. J.	000 102	4/67
Staff CI Off	Maj	MONTGOMERY, B. R.	6309/702	9/67
Grd Recon Off	Maj	REHFUS, R. A.	102	8/67

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G-2 SECTION (CONT)

AsstIntelPlans/EstOff	Maj	SPARKS, J. A.	702	9/67
IntelWatchOff	Capt	COLLINS, W.	COC 102	3/67
TIO	Capt	FASSLER, C. D.	202	12/67
AsstOOBOff	Capt	HAVEN, T. W.	202	8/67
IntelWatchOff	Capt	KIRKHAM, J. H.	COC 102	5/67
IntelWatchOff	Capt	MUNDY, G. E.	COC 102	12/67
AsstSpecIntelOff/ASSO	2dLt	HARTMAN, D. W.	402	3/67
Admin/IntelOff	2dLt	HAYWARD, T. E.	6512/2	8/67
Asst TIO	2dLt	SHANDOR, J. P.	202	2/68
Asst OOB Off	2dLt	MCCALL, W. D. Jr	202	1/68
AsstStaffCIOff	2dLt	SCOTT, J.	6309/702	11/67
ElecWarfareOff	WO-1	MORGAN, R.	402	9/67
AsstStaffCIOff	2dLt	JOELS, D. K.	6309/702	1/68
SignalIntelOff	WO-1	TERRY, L. W.	402	11/67
AerialRecon/PhotoOff	2dLt	ATLSTOCK, J. W.	120	12/67
AerialRecon/PhotoOff	2dLt	DEFRANK, J. W.	102	8/67
AerialRecon/PhotoOff	2dLt	MORRIS, C. A.	102	4/67
5th CI Team Off	Capt	NARDO, J. F.	380	9/67
Operations Off	2dLt	MCMAKIN, J. F. Jr	380	9/67
CI Officer	2dLt	VORONIN, B. B.	380	9/67
CI Officer	WO-1	CARSON, E. M.	380	9/67
CI Officer	WO-1	BUSKO, A. H.	380	9/67

G-3 SECTION

Asst C/S G-3	Col	BARRETT, D. J. Jr	3 Danang 6232	7/67
Operations Off	Col	SNODDY, L. F.	303 Danang 6489	8/67
LnOff MACV	Col	WEST, R. E.	3158 TIGER	5/67
Asst G-3	Col	WILSON, R. W.	3 Danang 6232	7/67
R&D Officer	LtCol	BARRISWYL, L. Jr	803	9/67
Asst PlansOff	LtCol	COFFMAN, H. L.	603	3/67
ABDC/RF/PF	LtCol	DONABEDIAN, H.	603	2/68
COC Watch Off	LtCol	LIVINGSTON, G. M.	103 (COC)	8/67
Asst PlansOff	LtCol	NORTON, R. J.	603	9/67
LnOff 2d Bde ROKMC	LtCol	PARADIS, E. J.	COC ChungYung	9/67
LnOff 7th AF	LtCol	PRESTRIDGE, J. C.	31163 SAIGON	10/67
Asst Operations Off	LtCol	SUMERLIN, E. "B"	303	11/67
Operations Off Gnd	LtCol	SHRADER, P. A.	503	9/67
Plans/ProjOff	LtCol	VOLKERT, M. D.	603	8/67
OIC, COC	LtCol	YOUNG, R. E.	103 (COC)	8/67
Asst Operations Off	Maj	ANDERSON, T. A.	503 Danang 6489	2/67
Asst Operations Off	Maj	BARSTOW, C. A.	503	10/67
Asst Ops Off Gnd	Maj	THOMPSON, W. A.	503	10/67
Asst Air Off	Maj	CARDWELL, R. E.	303 Danang 6489	3/67
Asst Historical Off	Maj	DAVIS, G. A.	43	9/67
COC Watch Off	Maj	ESAU, R. H. Jr	103 (COC)	8/67
Air Operations Off	Maj	FIBICH, M. J.	303 Danang 6489	2/67
Historical Off	Maj	FAHEY, J. E.	43	8/67
Asst OpsOff Gnd	Maj	HUTCHINSON, W. R.	503 Danang 6489	3/67
Asst OpsOff Air	Maj	GOWDY, R. J.	303 Danang 6489	4/67
Asst LnOff 7th AF	Maj	PRITCHETT, L. C.	31163 SAIGON	3/67
Training Officer	Maj	ROBINETT, H. M.	803	3/67
LnOff to MACV	Maj	START, R. J.	3158 TIGER	6/67
Hist Team Ldr	Capt	ROSS, R. A.	43	11/67
Sitrep/HispepOff	Capt	DYER, E. G.	103 (COC)	2/67
Asst RF/PF Off	Capt	LUCAS, A. F.	603	10/67

G-3 SECTION (CONT)

COC Watch Off	Capt	TAYLOR, B. C.	103 (COC)	2/68
COC Watch Off	Capt	WILDPRETT, W. R.	103 (COC)	2/68
DirVietLangScol	1stLt	LENT, H. G.	119	6/67
Hist Team Ldr	WO	COMBS, R. J.	43	9/67
COC Watch Off	CWO-3	KENNEDY, Jo E.	103 (COC)	8/67
NGFO	LCdr	LEASE, M. D. (USN)	403	6/67
ROKMC Ln Off	LtCol	LEE, Myong Bok	24	
ARVN Ln Off	LtCol	KHUY, Lai-Van	224	
ROKMC Ln Off	Maj	YOON, Won Jun	24	
ARVN Ln Off	Capt	CHUNG, Ha-Ba	224	
ARVN Ln Off	1stLt	LIEM, Chau-Kim	224	
ARVN Ln Off	2dLt	TUYEN, Nguyen-Van	224	

G-4 SECTION

AC/S G-4	Col	QUILTY, J. F.	4	6/67
Deputy G-4	LtCol	BAILEY, A. S.	4	8/67
Log Plans Off	LtCol	SNAPPER, J. N.	204	3/67
Asst Log Plans Off (Ground)	Maj	DUTTON, T. A.	204	7/67
Asst Log Plans Off (Air)	Maj	WHALLEY, A.	204	1/68
Log Operations Off	LtCol	JONES, C. T.	304	7/67
Asst Log OpnsOff	Maj	JONES, R. D.	304	7/67
Asst Log OpnsOff	Maj	CHARRON, D.	304	12/67
Log Liaison Off	Maj	NELSON, F. N.	304	10/67

G-5 SECTION

Asst C/S G-5	Col	HILL, J. T.	301/6419	2/68
Asst G-5	Col	ROSS, G. O.	301/6419	7/67
Operations Off	LtCol	EVANS, D. L.	46/301	3/67
Civic Action Off	Maj	BARKER, W. H.	46/301	8/67
Reports Control Off	Capt	DOUGLAS, D. M.	46	3/67
Admin Off	Capt	GREMELS, N. H.	301/6419	3/67
Med Monitor	LCdr	NOURIGAT, E. R.	46	10/67

COMPTROLLER SECTION

Asst C/S Compt	LtCol	SNOW, M. W.	50	7/67
Fiscal Off	2dLt	CROCKFORD	50	9/67

ADJUTANT SECTION

Force Adjutant	Maj	REVILLE, J. T.	7/207	8/67
Asst Adjutant	2dLt	ANDERSON, W. L.	7/207	2/68
Asst Adj/OIC S&C	2dLt	MATTOX, L.	107	10/67
Asst Adj/Pers Off	WO	OAKES, M. A.	207	5/67

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Force Chaplain	Capt	LYONS, E. V.	19	10/67
Asst Force Chaplain	Cdr	HERSHBERGER, J. R.	19	9/67

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COMM/ELECT SECTION

CEO	Col	HILL, J. B.	10	4/67
Asst CEO Avionics Off	Maj	KYLE, D. N.	110	2/67
Asst CEO Avionics Off	Maj	ANDERSON, J. L.	110	2/68
Asst CEO	Maj	HULL, R. R.	210	3/67
Asst CEO	Maj	COLLINS, G. L.	410	9/67
Asst CEO	Maj	FRASER, J. H.	310	8/67
Asst CEO	Capt	BORDERS, J. F.	310	4/67

DENTAL SECTION

Force Dental Off	Capt	MORGAN, K. L.	40	4/67
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EMBARK/TRANS SECTION

Embark Off	LtCol	SILVERTHORN, E. A.	39	7/67
Asst Embark Off	Capt	SAYE, D. A.	39	12/67
Asst Embark Off	Capt	REVES, S. S.	39	8/67
Asst Embark Off	2dLt	RHODES, D. L.	39	1/67

ENGINEER SECTION

Force Engineer	Col	HORN, C. H.	15	9/67
Asst Force Engr	LtCol	TIMME, W. G.	15	2/68
CEC Off	LCdr	MULDER, W. H.	15	7/67
Engr Opns Off	Capt	FLESSNER, M.	15	8/67
Engr Utilities Off	Capt	NELMS, R.	15	9/67
Plans Off	1stLt	WILLIAMS, L. R.	115	4/67

FOOD SERVICES SECTION

Food Services Off	Maj	HALL, W. B.	58 Moment	9/67
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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Headquarters Cmdt	Maj*	SYLVESTER, V. L.	34	10/67
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INFORMATION SECTION (CIB)

Force ISO	Col	FIELDS, T. M.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	2/67
Asst ISO	Col	DERRYBERRY, D. G.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	2/68
Asst ISO	LtCol	STARK, R.S.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	2/68
LnOff MACV	LtCol	WILLIAMS, J. F.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	11/67
Asst ISO	Maj	HAIGHT, W. P.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	6/67
Asst ISO	Capt	STACKPOLE, H. C.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	9/67
Press Center Off	1stLt	JARRELL, R. Jr	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	5/67
Asst ISO	2dLt	ARNOLD, R. E.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	10/67
Combat Artist	2dLt	DERMOTT, L. H.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	12/67
Photo Off	WO	CORNUET, G. S.	86, DNG 6259, Motley227	7/67

INSPECTOR SECTION

Force Inspector	Col	BOYD, C. A.	32	6/67
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LEGAL SECTION

Force Legal Off	Col*	NEVILLE, R. B.	305	8/67
NAVMC Jud Act Off	LtCol	WANDER, W. W.	117	5/67
Asst Legal Off	Capt	DEMARCO, J. R.	17	8/67
Asst Force Legal Off	Capt	TOSI, G.	17	12/67

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

Force MT Off	LtCol	TONNACLIFF, C. W.	35	8/67
MT Opns Off	Maj	SHAY, J. M.	35	1/68
MT Maint Off	1stLt	PEARCE, D. B.	35	4/67

MEDICAL SECTION

Force Surgeon	Capt	BAKER, H. A. (USN)	16	5/67
Med Admin Asst	Cdr	BROULIK, F. (USN)	16	7/67

ORDNANCE SECTION

Force Ordnance Off	LtCol	THOMAS, J. C.	8/108	8/67
Ground Ordnance Off	Capt	COULTER, R. S.	8/108	7/67
Trac Veh Anal Off	2dLt	BIGLER, D. P.	8/108	2/67

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION

Opns Anal Off	Maj	ABERNATHY, T. R.	108	9/67
Asst Opns Anal Off	Capt	JOHNSON, R. R.	108	8/67

POSTAL SECTION

Postal Off	Maj	COURTNEY, J. R.	7/207	7/67
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PROTOCOL SECTION

Protocol Off	Maj	LIVINGSTONE, J. A.	62	10/67
Asst Protocol Off	Capt	PIERZCHALA, R. P.	62	6/67

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

Provost Marshal	LtCol	SULLIVAN, C. H.	27	9/67
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SECTION

Psy Ops Off	Col	READ, R. R.	401	7/67
Asst Psy Ops Off	Maj	CAHILL, E. D.	401	1/68
Asst Psy Ops Off	Capt	LUCKEY, S. A.	401	4/67

REPRODUCTION SECTION

Repro Off	CWO-3	SPIKES, A. W.	307	3/67
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RED CROSS SECTION

Red Cross Rep	Mr	JOYCE, R. E.	119 Nights & Sun Moment	119
Red Cross Rep	Mr	SMITH, R. W.	119 Nights & Sun Moment	119

SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

Spl Serv Off	Col	SACHS, C. A.	37	7/67
Asst Spl Serv Off	LtCol	PLASKE, T. W. Jr	37	9/67
Asst Spl Serv Off	Maj	DREBUSHENKO, W.	37	8/67
R&R Off	Capt	GUINN, W. R.	144/241	8/67
OIC China Beach	Capt	BROOKS, H. H.	341	3/67
Escort Off	WO	BRECKE BRIDGE, L. L.	37	1/68

SUPPLY SECTION

Force Sup Off	Col	HILL, A. T.	21	7/67
Asst Force Sup Off	LtCol	ROURKE, R. E.	21	8/67
Asst Sup Off	Maj	WEILAND, J. K.	121	10/67
Asst Sup Off	Maj	LYNCH, T. K.	121	10/67

H&S COMPANY

Commanding Off	Maj	SYLVESTER, V. L.	34	10/67
Executive Off	Capt	SINCLAIR, D. K. Jr	34	10/67
MT Off	Capt	CASPER, W. R.	135	12/67
S-3/S-4	Capt	BINCH, W. B.	34	6/67
Food Services Off	Capt	HANSON, J.	58	2/67
Club Off	Capt	PAVLOVSKIS, V. V.	59	6/67
Disbursing Off	1stLt	DOWD, O. H.	18	6/67
Supply Off	1stLt	INGRAHAM, C. H.	221	6/67
Company Off	2dLt	CLARK, C. V.	16	2/67
Security Off	2dLt	EVANS, M. J.	127	7/67
Admin Off	WO	DESHOTEL, B. J.	34	7/67

SUB-UNIT #1 1ST RADIO BATTALION

Officer-In-Charge	Capt	LOSIK, F. A.	53/453	2/68
Opns Off	Capt	JONES, T. E.	82	2/67

29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY


Commanding Off	LtCol	STEVENS, L. A.	80	6/67
Executive Off	Maj	BURT, G.	80	12/67
Admin Off	Capt	TENNANT, D. D.	180	6/67
Opns Off	Capt	FLYNN, J. E.	280	2/67

244TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY

Commanding Off	Capt	MCCAIG, T. H.	85	9/67
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* Denotes additional, joint or attached duty.

Report errors, changes and/or omissions in writing to the Force Adjutant.


J. F. REVILLE
Force Adjutant

Opn Lewis

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OPERATION PLAN

w/ Annexes A & B

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 DANANG, VIETNAM
 120800 Feb 1967

Operation Plan 1-67 (LEWIS)

Ref: (a) Maps: (1) Indochina and Thailand, AMS Series JOG(G) and
 JOG(A) 1501, Scale: 1:250,000, Sheets ND 48-4,
 ND 48-8, ND 49-1 and ND 49-5
 (2) Vietnam, AMS Series L7014, Scale: 1:50,000
 (b) MACV LOI 3-67 of 5Feb67 (Operation LEWIS)(S)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

1st MarDiv

MGen NICKERSON

5th SFGA RTF

LtCol NORMAN

Company B

Mobile Guerrilla Force 876

USASF Det B-24

USASF Det A-242

USASF Det A-244

USASF Det A-245

USASF Det A-246

USASF Det B-50

Project Omega

USASF Det B-52

Project Delta

403rd SOD (GS)

Company C

Mobile Guerrilla Force 759

USASF Det A-102

USASF Det A-103

USASF Det A-104

USASF Det A-105

USASF Det A-106

USASF Det A-107

USASF Det A-108

281st Avn Co (GS)

483rd Troop Carrier Wing (GS)

Signal Company (GS)

1st MAW

MGen ROBERTSHAW

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1. (S) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces:--Annex A (Intelligence).b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Commander, 7th Air Force provides tactical air support and conducts imagery and electronic intelligence collection as requested by CG, III MAF.
- (2) Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam conducts reconnaissance of coastal area of QUANG NGAI Province and riverine approaches from coastal area to AO and, within capabilities, conducts intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in the coastal areas of QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI and BINH DINH Provinces in support of this plan and in response to CG, III MAF.
- (3) CG, IFFORCEV releases operational control of Project Omega and Mobile Guerrilla Force to CO, 5th SFGA for use with 5th SFGA RTF upon implementation of reference (b); provides normal tactical and airlift support to Project Omega and II CTZ Mobile Guerrilla Force while participating in Operation LEWIS; and conducts normal intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in II CTZ area of intelligence interest in support of this plan.
- (4) CO, 5th SFGA passes OPCON of 5th SFGA RTF to this Headquarters upon implementation of reference (b) and conducts normal intelligence activities in area of interest in support of this plan.
- (5) CO, 509th Radio Research Group provides support as requested.
- (6) CO, 131st Aviation Company conducts visual reconnaissance as requested.
- (7) CO, 525th Military Intelligence Group conducts normal covert and clandestine intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in area of interest in support of this plan.
- (8) CO, U.S. Element, Combined Military Interrogation Center, on order, dispatches Forward Interrogation Teams; and establishes, on a priority effort, a program to interrogate all knowledgeable sources relative to EEI's.

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(9) CG, U.S. Element, Combined Document Exploitation Center, on order, dispatches Forward Document Exploitation Teams; and establishes, as a priority program, the identification and translation of documents relative to EMI's.

c. Attachments and Detachments.--See Task Organization.

d. Assumptions.

(1) That VC/NVA control within the AO is such that no support by indigenous personnel inhabiting the area will be available to USASF elements.

2. (S) MISSION

Commencing on D-Day, III MAF assumes operational control of 5th SFGA Reconnaissance Task Force; provides normal tactical and airlift support to 5th SFGA RTF elements (less Project Omega and II CTZ Mobile Guerrilla Force which will remain the responsibility of CG, IFFORCEV); coordinates reconnaissance to locate enemy base areas and lines of communication within AO in order to obtain intelligence to support a campaign in AO; and nominates Arc Light strike targets as appropriate.

3. (S) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.--Annex B (Concept of Operations).

b. 1st MarDiv.

(1) On order, assume OPCON of 5th SFGA RTF.

(2) On assumption OPCON, control and coordinate reconnaissance mission assigned 5th SFGA RTF.

c. 5th SFGA RTF.

(1) Conduct reconnaissance operations as outlined in Annex B (Concept of Operations).

(2) Submit detailed plan, to include time phasing and operating areas, for execution of reconnaissance operations to this Headquarters prior to 14 February, 1967.

d. 1st MAW.--Provide support as separately requested.

e. Coordinating instructions.

(1) This plan effective for planning on receipt and execution on order.

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- (2) D-Day tentatively 15 February 1967. To be confirmed.
- (3) Notify this Headquarters immediately upon commitment of organic reaction forces.
- (4) Submit spot report, FLASH precedence, immediately upon occurrence of event.
- (5) Submit situation report, FLASH precedence, twice daily to CG, III MAF and CG, 1st MarDiv at 1200 and 2400, as of 0600 and 1800 respectively. First situation report due at 1200 on D-Day.
- (6) COMUSMACV, CG, I FFORCEV, COMNAVFORV and CIGV will be included as information addressees for all spot reports, situation reports, intelligence reports, and other reports as required.
- (7) Direct liaison authorized between units.
- (8) Annex C (Operations Overlay).

4. (S) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Initial logistic support in accordance with MACV Directive 701-9.
- b. Emergency logistic support to be provided by III MAF within capabilities.
- c. Other administrative details to be published when available.

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. (1) Insure positive communications available.
- (2) This Headquarters will provide operations codes (KAC-PX) and Authentication/Numerical Codes (KAC-QT) to 5th SFGA. These codes effective within III MAF and will be provided for coordination between Reconnaissance Task Force Headquarters and III MAF units. 5th SFGA RTF provide codes for internal use.
- (3) Submit communication requirements in excess of capability to this Headquarters as soon as possible.
- b. Command Posts.

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- (1) 5th SFGA RTF establish Command Post vicinity QUANG NGAI airfield. Notify this Headquarters of exact location.
- c. Upon receipt OPCON of 5th SFGA RTF by this Headquarters, OPCON will be passed to CG, 1st MarDiv.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



H. H. EEROOD
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Concept of Operations
- C - Operations Overlay
- D - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex D (Distribution) to Operation Plan 1-67

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Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 1-67

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, series L 7014, sheets 6539 I, II, III, IV; 6639 I, II, III, IV; 6739 I, II, III, IV
 (b) HQ MACV Intelligence Estimate of the Situation, Do Xa and Vicinity of 30 December 1966
 (c) CIGV Base and Operational Area Update Study of October 1966
 (d) CIGV Tactical Scale Study Base Areas 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 of 14 December 1966
 (e) CIGV Tactical Scale Study Base Areas 122, 123, 124, 225 of December 1966
 (f) III MAF Force Order P 3800. ; Standing Operating Procedure for Intelligence (to be issued)

Time Zone: H

1. (U) SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. See references (b) and (c), and III IAF ISUIS and PERTHREPS.
2. (U) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. See references (d) and (e).
3. (S) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION
 - a. Determine enemy strength, disposition, composition, and unit identification in the area.
 - b. Determine the location of base camps, command and control facilities, and logistic support activities. Special attention to determination of AR-5 facilities.
 - c. Determine if enemy forces will fight to preserve base camps or if they will withdraw. If they will fight, determine with what forces, where, and with what supporting arms. If they will withdraw, determine to where and by what routes and using what means of transporting equipment.
 - d. Determine if the enemy will reinforce his forces already in the area. If so, when, from where, and with what forces. Special attention to the 2d NVA Division, including the 3d, 21st, and 1st Regiments, and the 3d NVA Division, specifically the 2d VC and the 22d Regiments.
 - e. Determine if enemy forces will deny LZ's, trails, and avenues of approach to our recon forces and NGF's or if he will permit landings and then seek to engage these forces.

- f. Determine the use of trails, roads, and waterways with respect to type traffic, volume, destinations and origins, and frequency.
- g. Determine HLZ's and resupply drop zones. Determine if existing zones are mine, booby-trapped, or defended.
- h. Determine the attitude of the local populace to enemy presence and to our operations. Determine if any element of the local populace will oppose our operations. If so, how, when, in what strength, and with what forces.

4. (S) INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS AND REQUESTS

- a. General. It is the responsibility of all subordinate commands to collect information concerning the enemy's major units, bases, supply lines, infiltration routes, and reinforcement capabilities in the area of operations. Efforts should be made to improve the effectiveness of district and province intelligence agencies and to insure the expeditious passage of information to other interested commands at all levels.
- b. Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
 - (1) Reconnaissance elements of 7th AF conducts photographic, infra-red, and signal intelligence collection. Visual surveillance will be conducted by organic O-1 resources.
 - (2) Areas shown in Appendix 1 will receive twice monthly photographic and weekly IR coverage. Visual surveillance will be conducted at a frequency consistent with resources available for this purpose. ARDF missions will be conducted in response to separate MACV tasking.
 - (3) Request for immediate missions and preplanned missions will be submitted to CG, III MAF (ATTN: G-2).
 - (4) Immediate interpretation will be performed by Army-Air Force Team at 13 RFS and detailed interpretation by CIGV.
 - (5) Distribution of imagery and information derived from reconnaissance and surveillance will be disseminated by most expeditious means.
- c. Other commands and higher, adjacent, and cooperating commands and agencies are requested to provide assistance and support in the fulfillment of III MAF information needs.

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5. (S) INTERROGATION OF PERSONNEL AND EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL

- a. Captured persons, documents and material will be exploited and evacuated in accordance with reference (f).
- b. Emphasis will be placed on the development of intelligence dealing with the enemy situation in the area of operations and the surrounding environs of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Kontum provinces, particularly with regard to the 2nd and 3rd AVA Divisions and HQ, MR5.

6. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. General. See reference (f).
- b. Military Security. Commanders will take all active and passive measures to preserve the security of this operation. Measures to be taken will include, but not be limited to:
 - (1) Limitation of the number of personnel with knowledge of the mission and area(s) of operation to those with a need to know.
 - (2) Strict adherence to established procedures concerning the handling of classified documents and material.
 - (3) Insuring maximum security of staging areas prior to the initiation of operations.
 - (4) Insuring that indigenous personnel have access to installations connected with the operation do not gain knowledge of the operation.
- c. Communications Security
 - (1) All electrical communications between US units, pertaining to the preparation phase of this operation, will have, as a minimum, Encrypt for Transmission Only (ETO) protection.
 - (2) Only those cryptographic systems and codes authorized by US national authority will be used for electrical communications requiring protection.
- d. Special Operations. In the event of capture of enemy personnel of counterintelligence interest, maximum effort will be made to evaluate them and insure their rapid return for intelligence exploitation.

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e. Counterintelligence Requirements.

- (1) To determine which enemy units or elements with an intelligence and/or counterintelligence mission operate within the area of operations.
- (2) To determine enemy location, strength, mission, organization, and subordination.
- (3) To determine the intelligence and/or counterintelligence organization of VC Military Region 5, both military and infrastructure.

f. Counterintelligence Support. Commanders will insure that sufficient numbers of counterintelligence personnel are requested to properly support the mission.

7. (U) MAPS

- a. General. See reference (f).
- b. Standard reference map. See reference (a).

8. (S) REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

- a. Submission. See reference (f).
- b. Addressees. 5th SFGA RTF will transmit, by most expeditious means, all spot reports, situation reports, intelligence reports as required, to CG, III MAF and CG, 1st MARDIV as action addressees and to other interested commands including COMUSMACV; CG, IFFORCIV; COMNAVFORV; and CIGV as information addressees.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



H. M. ELWOOD

Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX:

1 - Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Areas

DISTRIBUTION: Annex D (Distribution) to Operation Plan 1-67

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Appendix 1 to (Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Areas) to Annex A
(Intelligence) to Operation Plan 1-67

Ref: (a) JOG (G) 1501 Sheets NE 48-4, ND 48-8, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

Time Zone: H

1. (S) The following areas are designated to receive twice monthly
photography and weekly IR coverage under the MACV In-Country Reconnaissance
Plan. Recce plan target number is shown at left for ready reference:

<u>TARGET NR</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
a. R1060, P1213	BT 1203, BT 2803, BT 1210, BT 2810
b. R1069, P1246	BS 4075, BS 4975, BS 4090, BS 4990
c. R1070, P1247	BS 0470, BS 1470, BS 0487, BS 1487
d. R1071, P1248	BS 1470, BS 2470, BS 1487, BS 2487
e. R1072, P1249	AS 8070, AS 9070, AS 8087, AS 9087
f. R1073, P1250	ZB 0088, ZB 0788, ZB 0096, ZB 0796
g. R1074, P1251	ZC 0005, ZC 1005, ZC 0014, ZC 1014
h. R1041, P1234	BS 4775, BS 5060, BS 5670, BS 4166

2. (S) Base area 608 in Laos is receiving the same coverage under Yankee
Team requests XLM-V282, V283, V284, and XLM-C255, C286, and C287.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT

H. M. Elwood

H. M. ELWOOD

Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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Annex B (Concept of Operations) to Operation Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. (S) MISSION

Commencing on D-Day, III MAF assumes operational control of 5th SFGA Reconnaissance Task Force; provides normal tactical and air-lift support to 5th SFGA RTF elements (less Project Omega and II CTZ Mobile Guerrilla Force which will remain the responsibility of CG, IFFORCEV); coordinates reconnaissance to locate enemy base areas and lines of communication within AO in order to obtain intelligence to support a campaign in AO; and nominates Arc Light strike targets as appropriate.

2. (S) CONCEPT

a. See Annex C (Operations Overlay).

b. Reconnaissance will be conducted within the following areas:

- (1) Base Areas 100, 201, and 117 through 124, inclusive.
- (2) Along the LAOS border opposite Base Area 608, in the vicinity of the KONTUM/QUANG TIN Province boundary, and the routes of approach from the border to the AO.
- (3) Coastal area of QUANG NGAI Province and riverine approaches from coast to AO.

c. Reconnaissance objectives are to:

- (1) Fix Headquarters, Military Region 5.
- (2) Develop enemy situation in AO.
- (3) Determine most efficient routes of approach to and egress from the AO.
- (4) Determine drop zones, landing zones and objectives for follow-on operations.
- (5) Satisfy EEI's and OIR's set forth in Annex A (Intelligence).

d. Conduct of operations:

- (1) Maximum use of stealth, deception, and varied techniques of insertion will be made to insure security of reconnaissance forces and mission.

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- (2) Contact with the enemy will be avoided when possible, but not at expense of mission.
- (3) Maximum effort will be made to locate HQ MR 5 and targets in Base Area 119.
- (4) Maximum use of Arc Light strikes will be made to prepare infiltration areas for reconnaissance teams.
- (5) Reconnaissance teams will perform BDA of Arc Light strikes when feasible and will recommend targets for strikes when suitable targets are discovered.
- (6) In the course of reconnaissance operations, small "stay behind" teams will be left to report enemy reaction to friendly operations.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT



H. M. ELWOOD

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Chief of Staff

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