

TOP SECRET

*C/S - please send copies to Sw & Army India. M →*

RCN : 161

FILLER

DTG : 070521 MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY

FILE : COPY RECEIPT OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES

REF : RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 070521

RECEIVED BY : \_\_\_\_\_ DATE/TIME \_\_\_\_\_

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

*# 2 burned 2doubt*

DTG MONTH 8

070521 FEB 67

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORP EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

O 070521Z FEB 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO CG III MAF  
 BT

TOP SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, FROM LTEN KRULAK.  
 MARINE CORP EYES ONLY.

1. WHILE IN WASHINGTON I TALKED TO A LOT OF PEOPLE IN THE POLICY-  
 MAKING BUSINESS. FROM THEM I DERIVED A FEW SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSIONS:  
 A. MOSTLY, THEY ARE AWARE THAT WE ARE WINNING, AND FACE UP TO THE  
 FACT THAT THE PROCESS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE DRAMATICALLY FAST.

HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ALMOST INDESCRIBABLE HUNGER FOR EVIDENCE  
 OF PROGRESS.

B. A FEW, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PARTICULARLY, ARE BECOMING MIND-  
 FUL OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GUERRILLA ENEMY, AND OF THE GREAT  
 PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN FIGHTING HIM. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SAID THAT  
 HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THE VC DID NOT START BEARING DOWN ON GUERRILLA  
 OPERATIONS A YEAR AGO.

C. THERE IS NO GREAT DISPOSITION, ON THE PART OF THE MOST INFLUEN-  
 TIAL CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, TO INCREASE GREATLY OUR COMMITTED TROOP  
 STRENGTH. IN FACT, THERE SEEMS TO ME TO BE A STRONG DESIRE TO TRY  
 AND MANAGE ON WHAT WE HAVE, OR VERY LITTLE MORE. THIS VIEW DOES  
 NOT HAVE ANY MILITARY SUPPORT.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAST POINT MADE ABOVE, MY OWN FORECAST  
 IS THAT WE WILL NOT SEE GREAT TROOP INCREASES, BUT THAT THERE WILL  
 BE SOME SMALL RELIEF. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS PLAIN THAT III MAF IS  
 MORE THAN FULLY EXTENDED TO DO THE JOBS THAT NEED DOING IN ICTZ.  
 YOUR FLEXIBILITY IS LARGELY GONE, BECAUSE OF THE 200 MILE FRONT  
 AND THE FIXED OBLIGATION - DMZ, BASE SECURITY, REVOLUTIONARY  
 DEVELOPMENT, ETC. I EXPLAINED THIS, WHEREVER THERE WAS AN AUDIENCE.  
 HOWEVER, AT OSD, I GOT VERY LITTLE FAVORABLE REACTION. ONE TINY  
 EXCEPTION; AFTER HEARING MY PITCH ON CACS, MCNAMARA SAID HE WOULD  
 GIVE US AS MANY MARINES AS WE NEED FOR THE CAC PROGRAM.

HAPPY TET.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CGN: 163

PULL OFF 25

DTG: Ø71851Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

**(PERSONAL FOR)**

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

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NOTE: THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS IMMEDIATE AND AN IMMEDIATE REPLY IS NECESSARY

DTG MONTH Ø71851Z FEB 67

*Copy #2 G-3 8 Feb 67*

*#8*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

X Q YVV DDKA669VV YYNA457 NAB697  
OO DDKE  
DE YYNA 1222 0381851  
ZNY CCCCC  
O 071851Z FEB 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
BT

**(PERSONAL FOR)**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK  
COMBINED ACTION UNITS IN III MAF (U)

- A. ADMINO FMFPAC 300032Z/JAN (C)
- B. CG III MAF 021352Z/(C)
- C. CG III MAF 050828Z/(C)
- D. CG III MAF 280616Z/JAN (C)

1. REF A WAS A REQUEST FOR ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION CONCERNING COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES/PLATOONS TO SUPPORT A REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL MARINES IN THIS PROGRAM. REF B, IN ANSWER TO THIS REQUEST, PROVIDED SOME OF THE INFORMATION NEEDED. REF C, OUTLINED AND BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE PF REORGANIZATION FOR 1967 AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE CAC PROGRAM IN I CTZ. REF D, GIVES THE LOCATION AND TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE 9 COMPANIES AND 58 PLATOON SIN THE CAS PROGRAM.

*G-3 has a copy for archive*

PAGE 2 YYNA 1222 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

2. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A MUCH MORE DETAILED INSPECTION INTO ALL ASPECTS OF THE CAC PROGRAM. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE PAPER I AM DEVELOPING IS TO SHOW HOW SOUND THE IDEA IS, BY A RECITAL OF WHAT THE CAC'S HAVE DONE, IN HARD TERMS. THIS MUST BE RELATED TO PACIFICATION IN ALL OF ITS RAMIFICATIONS. SO YOUR REPLY SHOULD ADDRESS, BUT BY NO MEANS BE LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING:

A. SPECIFICALLY, WHAT HAVE THE COMBINED ACTION UNITS ACCOMPLISHED BY AREA (PHU BAI, DANANG, CHU LAI)? THIS EVALUATION SHOULD BE IN CONCRETE TERMS AND SHOULD RELATE TO PACIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS; THE CAUSE AND EFFECT RELATIONSHIP IS A KEY POINT.

B. WHEN WERE THE UNITS LISTED IN REF D FIRST ORGANIZED - SPECIFIC DATES ? WHAT WAS THE PERCENTAGE PACIFICATION IN THE HAMLET/VILLAGE AT THE TIME OF ORGANIZATION? HOW HAS THE UNIT ASSISTED THE HAMLET/VILLAGE IN REACHING A HIGHER LEVEL OF PACIFICATION? WHAT HAS THE UNIT DONE THAT IS SPECIFICALLY NOTEWORTHY? HOW HAVE THE UNITS BEEN RECOGNIZED OR REWARDED? IT MUST BE SHOWN WHAT IT HAS MEANT TO HAVE THE UNITS IN THESE AREAS.

*See note*

**PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**

#8

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PAGE 3 YXNA 1222 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE DE-ACTIVATION OF A UNIT? HOW MANY HAVE BEEN DE-ACTIVATED? IN WHAT AREAS? HAS THE PF ELEMENT OF THE DEACTIVATED CAC REMAINED IN THE AREA? HOW IS THE DECISION REACHED TO FORM A NEW UNIT? WHAT COORDINATION MUST BE EFFECTED?

3. REF B INCLUDED A TABLE SHOWING THE PROJECTED EXPANSION OF CAC HQ AND CAPS DURING CY67. WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS FOR EMPLOYMENT IF THIS EXPANSION IS EFFECTED? WHERE WILL THE UNITS BE ASSIGNED AND WHY?

4. WHAT IS YOUR ESTIMATE IN TERMS OF REGULAR MARINE UNITS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE SAME SECURITY IN THE AREAS CURRENTLY BEING OCCUPIED BY THE COMBINED ACTION UNITS?

5. AS YOU MAY GUESS, THIS DOPE RESPONDS TO A SPECIFIC DIRECTIVE I RECEIVED FROM SECDEF, WHILE IN WASHINGTON, AND THE NEED IS CONSEQUENTLY AN URGENT ONE. APPRECIATE ALL YOU CAN DO TO HELP. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

NNNN

*now will probably stay on as US representation in hamlet/village as long as needed!*

*M*

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#8

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DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

*M*

CGN: 189

FILIP 44

CTG: 080416<sup>01</sup> COMM FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG EMEPAC

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

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4/26/68*

DTG/MONTH 080416<sup>01</sup> FEB 67

SECRET #9

SECRET



VV NAB 765  
PP RUMMF  
DE RUHLBP 1340 0390401  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 080401Z FEB 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMMF/CG III MAF  
BT

PERSONAL FOR

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR LIGEN WALT FROM LIGEN KRULAK

1. FOLLOWING IS EXTRACTED FROM A MSG WHICH HAS COME INTO MY POSSESSION, INDICATING THE NATURE AND LEVEL OF WASHINGTON INTEREST IN VIETNAM AFFAIRS:

QUOTE:

1. (C) THE PERIODIC POLITICAL CONCERN ABOUT SECURITY OF OUR SVN INSTALLATIONS IS ONCE AGAIN RECEIVING HEADLINE ATTENTION. THE PRESENT UPROAR SEEMS TO BE CAUSED BY THE RELEASES CONCERNED WITH TOTAL AIRCRAFT LOSSES (ABOUT 1,800) AS WELL AS THE LONG BINH AMMO DUMP ATTACKS.

2. (S) AFTER PUBLICATION OF SENATOR RUSSELL'S REMARKS IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON STAR, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE CHAIRMAN AND SECDEF WILL BE QUERIED CONCERNING "SECURIZZZOF US FACILITIES IN SVN. EXTRACTS OF STAR PRESS REPORT FOLLOW:  
QUOTE

*Recommended  
by Dir & Wing  
Lt Col. R. G.*

PAGE 2 RUHLBP 1340 SECRET

CHAIRMAN RICHARD B. RUSSELL OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SAID TODAY THE MILITARY IS GUILTY OF "GREAT DERELICTION IN SECURITY" IN GUARDING U.S. AIRFIELDS AND AMMUNITION DUMPS IN VIETNAM.

RUSSELL SAID THE PENTAGON'S ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY NEARLY DOUBLING THE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED TOLL OF U.S. AIRCRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA INDICATED A SECURITY GAP.

"OUR OPERATING CONDITIONS AT OUR AIRFIELDS ARE NOT GOOD," RUSSELL SAID. "WE HAVE NOT INSTALLED THE BUNKER SYSTEM WE USED IN WORLD WAR II TO SEPARATE PARKED PLANES FROM EACH OTHER AND THUS DIMINISH DAMAGED FROM ATTACK.

"THERE HAS BEEN GREAT DERELICTION IN SECURITY AT OUR AIRFIELDS AND AMMUNITION DUMPS WHICH HAS PERMITTED THE VIET CONG TO MAKE DAMAGING, SNEAK ATTACKS ON THEM. THIS MUST BE CORRECTED."

THE GEORGIA DEMOCRAT SAID THAT WHILE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN USED TO GUARD AIRFIELDS, AMMUNITION DEPOTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ATTACKED ARE GUARDED BY U.S. TROOPS. MANY OF THE NEWLY LISTED AIRCRAFT WERE PLANES OR HELICOPTERS DESTROYED OR IRREPARABLY DAMAGED BY VIET CONG ATTACK ON AIRSTRIPS.

THE PANTAGON SAID YESTERDAY THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PREVIOUSLY

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PAGE 3 RUHLBP 1340 S E C R E T

ANNOUNCED LOSSES OF 622 ATTACK PLANES KNOCKED DOWN BY COMMUNIST  
ANTI-AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES, 550 PLANES HAVE BEEN LOST ON AIR  
STRIPS, IN OPERATIONS OUTSIDE VIETNAM OR FOR OPERATIONAL CAUSES.

THE 550 PLANES, WORTH AN ESTIMATED \$500 MILLION, WERE SAID  
TO RANGE FROM SINGLE-ENGINE ARMY OBSERVATION PLANES TO JET BOMBERS.  
THE LOSSES OUTSIDE VIETNAM INCLUDED APR FORCE FIGHTER-BOMBERS  
WHICH CRASHED IN LAOS WHILE BOMBING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION  
ROUTES AND PLANES DOWNED IN THAILAND EN ROUTE TO MISSIONS IN  
NORTH VIETNAM.

THE ANNOUNCED TOLL OF 255 HELICOPTERS WILL SOON BE MORE THAN  
DOUBLED BY ADDING IN THE NON-ATTACK CATEGORIES OF LOSS,  
OFFICIALS ALSO INDICATED.

RUSSELL SAID HE BELIEVES THE LOSSES OF 1,172 FIXED-WING  
PLANES EXCEEDS THE RATE FOR SIMILAR LOSSES IN THE KOREAN WAR.

RUSSELL SAID HE AND HIS COMMITTEE KNEW THE LOSSES WERE CLEARLY  
DOUBLE THOSE OF THE PREVIOUSLY POSTED 622. HE INDICATED HE SAW  
NO NEED FOR ANY NEW INVESTIGATION OF THE MATTER EXCEPT FOR A  
POSSIBLE INQUIRY INTO TIGHTENING SECURITY.

UNQUOTE

2. I AM HAPPY THAT OUR RECORD IN AIRFIELD SECURITY IS

PAGE 4 RUHLBP 1340 S E C R E T

VERY GOOD, CONSIDERING THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED. I  
SHOULD BE SURPRISED, HOWEVER, IF YOU AND BEN WERE NOT  
QUERIED ON THE SUBJECT BY THE PRESS. REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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DTG: 082308Z FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

(PERSONAL FOR)

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*Key*  
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*2/19/67  
Gen Chwood has  
a copy of this*

MESSAGE IS OF PRIORITY PRECEDENCE

*Joe  
G-3 has copy Returned  
22 Feb 67*

DTG MONTH 082308Z

SECRET

#10

SECRET

PP RUMHAW RUMHLA RUMHMF RUMNVP  
 DE RUHLBP 1526 0392308  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 082308Z FEB 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV (W024)  
 RUMNVP/CG THIRD MARDIV (R031)  
 RUMHMF/CG FORLOGCMD (B030)  
 BT

*g-1 E*  
*g-3*

PERSONAL FOR

*W*  
*Action completed*  
*E*

SECRET

PERSONAL FROM LTGEN KRULAK TO LTGEN WALT AND  
 BGENS VAN STOCKUM AND METZGER; INFO: MAJGEN  
 ROBERTSHAW, MAJGEN NICKERSON, MAJGEN KYLE  
 AND EGEN HERBOLD.

VISIT OF MR. D. SILKWOOD AND PARTY (U)

1. MR. SILKWOOD IS ASSIGNED TO THE LAND FORCES  
 TEAM WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
 OF DEFENSE (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS). HE HAS PRIMARY  
 COGNIZANCE OVER MARINE CORPS MATTERS, AND GREAT

PAGE 2 RUHLBP 1526 SECRET

INFLUENCE IN THE AREAS OF STRENGTH AND FORCE LEVELS. HE  
 HAS ONLY LIMITED BACKGROUND ON OUR FUNCTIONS, BUT IS  
 LEARNING FAST. NOW IS SEEKING DETAILED INFORMATION UPON WHICH  
 VERY IMPORTANT DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN.

3. YOUR PREPARED BRIEFINGS FOR HIM SHOULD FOCUS ON ORGANIZATION,  
 FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS, ALL AS THEY RELATE TO REQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION YOU SHOULD ANTICIPATE  
 ANALYTICAL TYPE QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION AND  
 UNIT EFFECTIVENESS. HERE ARE A FEW TOPICS IN WHICH HE  
 HAS REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED INTEREST:

A. ORGANIZATION AND EFFICIENCY OF MAJOR COMMAND  
 STAFFS.

B. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED  
 WITH NON EFFECTIVE STRENGTHS.

C. ORGANIZATION/FUNCTIONAL CHANGES THAT MIGHT  
 EVOLVE AS A RESULT OF OPERATIONS IN SEA. (INCLUDES  
 BALANCE OF VARIOUS TYPE SUPPORT AND COMBAT SUPPORT  
 UNITS).

D. CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION  
 SYSTEMS DESIGN AND USE OF COMPUTERS.

*6-3*  
*6-1 ques.*  
*2.*  
*FLC/MAW*

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHLBP 1526 S E C R E T

E. METHODS FOR MINIMIZING PEACETIME ACTIVE PERSONNEL STRENGTH, WHILE MAINTAINING COMBAT READINESS AND CAPABILITY FOR RAPID EXANSION.

F. IMPACT ON CONTINGENCY RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVIDING FOR AREA ORIENTED MEF OR PORTIONS THEREOF.

G. WISDOM OF PROVIDING EACH MEF WITH ORGANIC CAPABILITY TO FLESH OUT THREE SEPARATE MEB'S FOR RESPONSE TO A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES.

2. WILL GIVE YOU A READOUT OF OUR EXPERIENCE WITH SILKWOOD HERE AT FMFPAC, AS FURTHER BACKGROUND.

GP-4

BT

2,  
DMA

SECRET

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270

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120751Z

FEB 67

CG FMFPAC

**(PERSONAL FOR)**

CATEGORY

**SECRET**

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DTG MONTH 120751Z FEB 67

#11

SECRET

VV PPKS290VV IIC810  
 PP RUMHAW RUMHLA RUMHMF  
 DE RUM.BP 2197 9430751  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 120751Z FEB 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV (W006)  
 RUMNVP/CG THIRD MARDIV (R007)  
 RUMHMF/CG FORLOGCMD (B010)

*Action completed*  
*all note*

(PERSONAL FOR)

BT  
SECRET

PERSONAL FROM LT GEN KRULAK TO LT GEN WALT AND BGENS VAN STOCKUM AND METZGER, INFO: MAJGEN ROBERT SHAW, MAJGEN NICKERSON, MAJGEN KYLE AND BGEN HERBOLD VISIT OF MR. D. SILKWOOD AND PARTY (U) . FOLL OWING AN 15 MINUTE PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH MR. SILKWOOD DURING WHICH I LEARNED OF HIS PRIMARY INTERESTS, THE STAFF PRESENTED HIM A FIVE TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR BRIEFING COVERING:  
 A/ COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS/FUNCTIONS

*To*

PAGE 2 RUM.BP 2197 SECRET

- B. INTELLIGENCE
  - C. FMFPAC DEPLOYMENTS AND OPERATIONS
  - D. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
  - E. LOGISTICS
  - F. PERSONNEL
  - G. INFORMATION SYSTEMS
  - H. POST RVN FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND DISPOSITIONS.
2. THE TOPICS IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED INTEREST ARE THESE:

- A. THE BARRIER. HE RAISED THE QUESTION, AND IT WAS GRATIFYING THAT HE SUPPORTED OUR POSITION. BRIEFLY, HE SAID THAT HE HAS MADE HIS OWN EVALUATION/COMPUTATIONS ON THE CONCEPT. HIS CONVICTION IS APPARENTLY THAT THE BARRIER IS AN INORDINATELY EXPENSIVE AND NOT A NECESSARILY EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.
- B. THE CAC PROGRAM. IN THIS REGARD, A VISIT TO A CAC IS ESSENTIAL. HE SHOULD BE TOLD WHAT THE CACS HAVE DONE, WHAT IS BEING DONE NOW AND WHAT WE EXPECT FOR THE FUTURE.
- C. HIS INTEREST WAS HIGH IN OUR LOGISTICS ESTABLISHMENT INCLUDING THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE THIRD FSR. HIS EXPOSURE TO THE THIRD FSR SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO INSURE THAT

*standby*

*G-3*

*f.c.*

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHLBP 2197 S E C R E T

HE GAINS A CLEAR FEEL FOR THE MAGNITUDE OF ITS TASKS. INCLUDE AN EQUALLY GOOD LOOK AT THE WHOLE USMC PHYSICAL PLANT ON OKINAWA, INCLUDING CAMP BUTLER'S TRANSIENT AND BAGGAGE FACILITIES. OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE KUSHI WAN AIRFIELD PROJECT AND ITS PRESENT STATUS, ALTHOUGH NOT A PART OF THE FORMAL BRIEFING, WAS BROUGHT UP AND CAPTURED HIS IMAGINATION. BE SURE TO TOUCH ON THIS AGAIN.

D. HE WAS ENTHUSIASTIC OVER OUR EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN, AND OUR PLANS TO MAKE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF THE POTENTIAL OFFERED BY NEW DATA PROCESSING FACILITIES. SEVERAL EXAMPLES, INCLUDING THE HISTORICAW REPORT, WERE EXPLAINED. HE WAS GIVEN COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS INVOLVED. IT WOULD BE WELL TO GIVE HIM EVIDENCE OF YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND INTEREST IN THIS WHOLE FIELD.

E. HE WAS ATTENTIVE TO THE RATIONALE FOR INCREASING WESTPAC PERSONNEL ALLOWANCES TO COMPENSATE FOR NON-EFFECTIVES, AND REQUESTED A COPY OF OUR CHART WHICH DEPICTED THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES/NUMBERS AS OF 31JAN67. LEW AN HIS PEOPLE CAN EXPECT MORE QUESTIONS/INTEREST IN THIS.

F. OVERALL, HIS INTEREST IS MAINLY DIRECTED IN THE AREA OF

*Fe/S/naaw  
G-1.*

PAGE 4 RUHLBP 2197 S E C R E T

POST RVN HOSTILITIES FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND DISPOSITIONS. D INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE PAPER YOU HAVE FROM US ENTITLED QUOTE POST VIETNAM POSTURE OF FMFPAC (FIRST REV) OF SJAN67 UNQUOTE PROVIDES INFORMATION FOR USE IN DISCUSSIONS. FORCE STRUCTURE IS PERHAPS HIS MAJOR CONCERN, AND HE PLANS TO STOP HERE ON HIS WAY BACK TO TALK FURTHER ABOUT IT.

3. IN SUMMARY, HE IS OBVIOUSLY BRIGHT AND HAS DONE HIS HOMEWORK. HE GAVE EVERY EVIDENCE OF A KEEN, PROFESSIONAL INTEREST IN OUR AFFAIRS AND POSITIONS, AS WELL AS A SINCERE AND HUMBLE APPROACH.

GP-4  
BT

*CG has seen  
20 Feb 67  
→ Grant to all Chris  
M*

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#11

SECRET

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SECRET

ICN: 317

FILLER 44

DTG: 140422Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

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MESSAGE IS FOR THE EYES OF GEN WALT ONLY.

MESSAGE IS OF PRIORITY PRECEDENCE.

AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS NOT REQUIRED.

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4 Nov 68*

DTG/MONTH 140422Z FEB 67

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

SECRET

#12

DECLASSIFIED

CG FMFPAR 140422Z FEB.

Para 3, DTG TO READ 070512Z VICE 070412Z

PARA 4: <sup>CHANGE</sup> UNDERLINED WORD BELEIVED TO READ

MY ESTIMATE THAT

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

O 140422Z FEB 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION BELIEVED TO  
BE CORRECT. MSG IS ON SVC.

*CG has seen  
E*

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN WALT FROM  
LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.  
LOGISTIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENT FOR III MAF.

1. I HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE WHOLE MATTER OF FLOATING SUPPORT FOR  
DE SOTO, INCLUDING EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD WHEN I  
WAS ON THE MAINLAND. TO GIVE YOU MY REACTION TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM I  
WILL HAVE TO TALK TO SEVERAL BASIC, ALTHOUGH RELATED, POINTS.  
2. FIRST, THERE IS THE UNDENIABLE FACT THAT III MAF IS STRETCHED  
THIN; THAT THE SITUATION IS TOUGHER NOW THAN IN THE PAST BECAUSE  
OF THE BURDEN YOU HAVE ASSUMED FROM THE ARVN TO RELEASE THEM FOR RD  
WORK, WITHOUT GETTING ANY CORRESPONDING RELIEF YOURSELF. I HAVE  
NOTED THAT NOW YOU HAVE, PRETTY MUCH TIED DOWN IN THE DMZ AREA, THE  
EQUIVALENT OF ABOUT THREE BATTALIONS THAT CANNOT BE LOOKED ON AS  
TRUE MANEUVER FORCES, BECAUSE OF THEIR SECURITY DUTIES. ADDING THESE  
TO THE FORCES YOU HAVE FIRMLY NAILED DOWN ELSEWHERE IN BASE SECURITY  
AND OTHER FIXED ASSIGNMENTS, MAKES PLAIN THAT YOUR ELBOW-ROOM IS  
VERY LIMITED.

A. AS TO HELICOPTERS, THE INCREASE IN LIFT OVER THE PAST YEAR  
(ABOUT 130 PERCENT) HAS NOT KEPT PACE WITH THE INCREASE IN DEMAND  
FOR THEIR SERVICES. AND ROAD CONSTRUCTION HAS LIKEWISE FALLEN SHORT  
OF THE GROWTH IN DEMAND. A YEAR AGO, OUR FRONTAGE WAS PRETTY MUCH  
PHU BAI TO CHU LAI; 100 MILES. TODAY IT IS KHE SANH - NUI DAU;  
240 MILES, AND INTER - AREA MOVEMENT IS STILL LARGELY BY AIR,  
BECAUSE OF THE INSECURITY OF THE INTERSTICES AND THE INADEQUACY OF  
ROADS.

3. AS TO FORCES, I TOLD YOU IN MY <sup>676512Z</sup> ~~670412Z~~ THAT I JUDGED IT UNLIKELY  
THAT WE ARE GOING TO GET ANY SUBSTANTIAL IN-COUNTRY CEILING INCREASE.  
I AM MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER OF THIS TODAY. IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO  
HIS QUESTION, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT WE NEEDED 40,000 MORE MARINES  
IN RVN TO DO ALL THE JOBS ASSIGNED US WITH ACCEPTABLE RAPIDITY AND  
CREDITING THE ARVN WITH A REASONABLE, BUT NOT OVER-SANGUINE CAPABILITY.  
I HAVE SINCE HAD INFORMAL ADVICE THAT MY COMMENTS ON THIS MATTER  
DID NOT GREATLY MOVE HIM.

4. ALL OF THIS BACKGROUND IS BY WAY OF SAYING THAT, UNLESS WE ARE  
LUCKY AND COME BY SOME FORM OF MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH - EITHER IN MORE

*2092*

*#12*  
COPIES

SECRET

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SECRET

MY ESTIMATE THAT

FORCES OR IN FAVORABLE CHANGES IN THE SITUATION - THERE IS GOING TO BE FAR MORE TO DO IN ICTZ THAN III MAF CAN DO SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE COULD FIND OURSELVES INVOLVED IN A SORT OF BROAD-BASE HOLDING ACTION, ADDRESSING IMPORTANT PROBLEMS IN MANY PLACES BUT SOLVING NONE OF THEM COMPLETELY, BECAUSE THE DECISIVE POWER IS JUST NOT THERE; JUST AS NOW WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR DESOTO IN SOUTHERN QUANG TRI, WHILE THERE IS STILL A PROBLEM RESPECTING FREE AND UNDISTURBED TRAVEL BETWEEN HOI AN, AND TAM KY. IT IS CONSEQUENTLY ~~BELIEVED~~ CIRCUMSTANCES ARE GOING TO FORCE US TO TAKE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS UP IN SEQUENCE; ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE TOOLS ARE NOT AT HAND TO DO THEM ALL AT ONCE.

5. THIS BRINGS ME TO CINCPACFLT AND LPH/LPD FOR SUPPORT OF DE SOTO AND SIMILAR TASKS. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE WHOLE MATTER WITH HIM, IN DETAIL AND OFTEN. HIS POSITION IS THAT HE HAS NO LPD OR LPH THAT HE CAN COMMIT TO THE TASK OF SERVING AS A FLOATING HELO BASE FOR ICTZ. HE STATED THAT HE HAS ONE IN EASTPAC, WHICH HE NEEDS FOR ROTATIONAL PURPOSES. TODAY, WHEN I BROUGHT THE SUBJECT UP, HE MADE THESE TWO OBSERVATIONS:

A. IT LOOKS LIKE MACV HAS GOTTEN III MAF EXTENDED FARTHER SOUTHWARD THAN ITS LOGISTICS CAN MANAGE, BUT I CANNOT DO MORE THAN SEVENTHFLT HAS ALREADY DONE TO HELP.

B. DECKHOUSE VI WILL PROVIDE BOTH HELICOPTERS AND A HELO PLATFORM FOR THE PERIOD OF THE EXERCISE AND, FOR THIS PERIOD, AT LEAST, THEY OUGHT TO BE ALL RIGHT.

6. MY READING OF THE BEST THING I CAN DO RIGHT NOW TO HELP YOU IN THE TOUGH SITUATION FACING YOU IS TO GET TWO SLFS AFLOAT AND SUPPORT YOUR EVERY REQUEST FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT IN ICTZ, WHICH WILL GIVE YOU TWO ADDITIONAL BLTS AND TWO ADDITIONAL HMM. BEYOND THIS, I WILL MISS NO OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS BOTH SHARP AND WESTY TO REDEPLOY THE ROK DIVISION TO YOUR COMMAND.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

# 12

SECRET

COPY OF COPIES

SECRET

CCN: \_\_\_\_\_

FILLER \_\_\_\_\_ 44 \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: 140609Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG THIRD MARDIV

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

64

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG THIRD MARDIV MESSAGE 140609Z

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PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY.

Received copy #2 this date 16 Feb 67

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4 dec 68

A.S. Parley  
G-4

DTG MONTH 140609Z FEB 67

SECRET

#18

SECRET

E K SH  
 VV 3DIVN R3 63  
 33 47.0; 3207D 0452609  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 140609Z FEB 67  
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THIRD MARDIV

A. THIRD MARDIV LOGSUM JAN 67 DTD 6FEB67

PERSONAL FROM MGEN KYLE TO LTGEN WALT

1. REF A, THE THIRD MARDIV LOGSUM FOR THE MONTH OF JAN 67, HIGHLIGHTS MANY OF THE CURRENT AND CUMULATIVE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS THAT CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THIS DIVISION.

2. SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO CERTAIN AREAS IN WHICH I FEEL IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE MADE:

A. CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. CONSTR MATERIALS OVERALL REMAIN IN SHORT SUPPLY AS FAR AS THEIR AVAILABILITY TO US IS CONCERNED. 2X 4 LUMBER AND PLYWOOD, THE BASIS OF MOST CONSTRUCTION EFFORT, ARE PRACTICALLY NON-EXISTENT IN THE DIVISION AND SUPPORTING FORLOGCMD ELMS IN THIS AREA AS WE EMERGE FROM THE MONSOON SEASON MANY OF OUR TROOPS STILL CONTINUE TO LIVE LITERALLY IN THE MUD WITHOUT BENEFIT OF

PAGE TWO RUMNVP 3207D SECRET

TENT DECKS TO SAY NOTHING OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL HOUSING. ON THE OTHER HAND I NOTE THE CONTINUING CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVED FACILITIES IN OTHER AREAS OF III MAF.

B. CAC PROGRAM. THIS IMPORTANT PROGRAM CONTINUES TO GROW. HOWEVER, OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE ITS MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS HAS NOT KEPT PACE. AS YOU WELL KNOW FROM OUR REPORTS, OUR REQUIREMENTS, ALL ON PRI 02 REQUISITIONS, SHOW LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS. OUTFITTING OUR CACS STILL CONTINUES BY DRAWING EQUIP FROM OTHER DIV UNITS PARTICULARLY FROM INF BNS. THIS ACTION IS NECESSARY DUE TO THE TYPE OF EQUIP REQUIRED. THE RESULTANT DRAWDOWN, OFTEN OF ITEMS WHICH ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY, CAN ONLY DEGRADE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE DIV UNITS.

C. GENERATORS/FORKLIFTS. LACK OF TIMELY AND ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR GENERATORS AND FORKLIFTS CONTINUES TO HAMPER OUR OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, THE HEAVY DEADLINE RATE OF MME IN FORLOGCMD SUPPORT ELMS RESULTS IN DECREASED SUPPORT FOR THE DIVISION AND THE NECESSITY TO ASSIST THEIR OPERATIONS WITH OUR OWN VERY LIMITED CAPABILITIES OFTEN AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

D. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT. THE CAPABILITY OF THE FOR-

SECRET

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#13  
COPIES

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMVP 3207D S E C R E T  
 LOGCMD TO ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE DIV. HAS NOT KEPT PACE WITH OUR GROWING NEEDS. DURING THE MONSOON SEASON SHORTAGES OF ALL TYPES OF SUPPLIES WERE COMMON PLACE. IN ESSENCE, EXISTANCE WAS FROM HAND TO MOUTH AND FROM INVENTORY ALREADY ON HAND. THE PRESENT TRENDS ARE SHOWING SLOW IMPROVEMENTS IN MANY AREAS OF SUPPLY BUT CONTINUED EMPHASIS IS REQUIRED TO INSURE A GREATER RATE OF IMPROVEMENT WHICH IS FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH OUR PRESENT AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT. TO THIS END I RECOMMEND THE RAPID FORMATION OF A FLSG WITH AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY.

3. IN SUMMARY, WHILE I RECOGNIZE THE INHERENT PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION WITHIN ICTZ I RECOMMEND THAT PARTICULAR ATTENTION BE DIRECTED TO SOLVING THESE PROBLEMS WHICH HAMPER OUR OPERATIONS. THE SOLUTIONS MUST PROVIDE NOT ONLY THE MINIMUM ESSENTIALS BUT ALSO A SUPPORT EFFORT WHICH IS COMPARABLE TO OTHER AREAS IN ICTZ.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

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#13  
COPIES

CCN: 329

FILLER 25

DTG: 142022Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES #2&3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 142022Z FEB 67

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4/20/68*

DTG MONTH 142022Z FEB 67

#14

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NPA 455CA554PHA259VV KMC 131  
 RF RUMHMF  
 DE RUHLBP 2484 0452022  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 142022Z FEB 67

FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

**(PERSONAL FOR)**

PERSONAL FROM LTGEN KRULAK TO LTGEN WALT.

1. I NOTED WITH CONCERN PARA 2 OF YOUR 110310Z/FEB, WHICH SAYS THAT IT TOOK TWELVE DAYS FOR AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE, NY 120003Z/JAN, TO REACH YOU.

2. AN INVESTIGATION TURNS UP THE REPORT THAT THE MESSAGE WAS ACTUALLY RECEIPTED FOR BY THE III MAF COMM CENTER AT 120600Z, CONFIRMATION

OF THIS WAS SUPPLIED BY SSGT BOCELLI OF III MAF COM CENTER ON 13 FEB. EVEN SO, I WISH YOU WOULD CHECK TO MAKE SURE THAT I HAVE MY FACTS STRAIGHT, SINCE, IF THE COM PERFORMANCE HERE BREAKS DOWN, I WANT TO CORRECT IT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

NNNN

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

#14

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CCN: 333

FILLFR 25

DTG: 150437Z FEB 67 MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

*For C.G.  
E  
Have passed  
1 copy to G-2  
to prepare  
reply.  
V.R.  
E*

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 150437Z FEB 67

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*15 Feb 67  
Received copy #2 this date*

*Return 16 Feb 67  
RJA*

DTG MONTH 150437Z FEB 67

*G-2*  
*Copy #2 burned  
4/10/68*

*# 15*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

VV DDKA183VV YVNA602VV NAB523  
 PP DDYE  
 DE YVNA 2584 0460437  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 150437Z FEB 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
 BT

**(PERSONAL FOR****C O N F I D E N T I A L**

PERSONAL FOR LIGEN WALT FROM LIGEN KRULAK

1. THERE IS MUCH TALK HERE ABOUT WHAT THE ENEMY DID DURING TET. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR OPINION AS TO WHAT THE ENEMY REALLY ACCOMPLISHED. ANY HARD FACTS YOU HAVE TO SUPPORT THAT OPINION WOULD BE USEFUL.

2. YOUR HISTSUM FOR 12 FEB REPORTED THAT IN OPERATION CHINOOK, SEVEN MARINES WERE KILLED WHEN AN ONTOS DEDICATED FOUR 155MM ROUNDS RIGGED AS A MINE; AND THAT ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS, COMPANY M/3/26 DISCOVERED 250LB BOMBS RIGGED AS MINES. THESE INCIDENTS, IF TYPICAL, COULD POSSIBLY POINT TO AN ACTIVE MINING EFFORT DURING TET. CAN THESE, OR OTHER INCIDENTS, BE POSITIVELY RELATED TO ENEMY ACTIVITIES DURING THE CEASE FIRE?

3. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR APPRAISAL. GP-4  
 BT

NNNN\$

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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COPY 3 OF 3 #15 COPIES

**SECRET**

361

PULLER 19

DTG: 162014Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY **(PERSONAL FOR)**


*For C.G.  
1 copy pulled for  
staffing. *

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 162014Z FEB 67

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4/20/68*

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DTG MONTH 162014Z FEB 67

**SECRET**

#16

SECRET

SR THE YVNA 2865 0472014

ZNY SSSSS  
 P 162014Z FEB 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

SECRET PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM LT GEN KRULAK  
 A. CG III MAF 150843Z/FEB67

1. IN READING YOUR ACCOUNT OF THE HEROIC ACTION  
 FOUGHT BY 11TH CO, 3D BN, 2D BDE ROKMC REPORTED  
 IN REF A, THE THOUGHT OCCURS TO ME THAT  
 THE POTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BENEFITS SHOULD BE EXPLOITED.  
 I HAVE IN MIND SUCH THINGS AS:

A. PHOTO COVERAGE, IN DETAIL, OF THE  
 AFTERMATH, IN TERMS OF ENEMY DEAD AND MATERIAL LOSSES.  
 THIS COULD BE REPRODUCED IN LEAFLET FORM AND THE LOCAL AREA  
 SATURATED WITH THE LEAFLETS.

B. PRESS COVERAGE, KEYED TO THE DISASTROUS RESULTS  
 TO THE VC.

C. RECOGNITION OF THE HEROISM OF THE ROKMC PARTICIPANTS.  
 2. NEW SUBJECT: YOUR MESSAGE ON ANALYSIS OF THE CAC  
 PROGRAM HAS BEEN RECEIVED. THANKS TO ALL WHO WORKED ON IT.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

NNNN

# 16

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

423

PILLER 25

DTG 210130Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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COPIES OF COMUSMACV MESSAGE 210130Z FEB 67

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NOTE: THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY,  
NO ANSWER IS REQUIRED.

*#3 burned  
4 double 8*

DTG MONTH 210130Z FEB 67

#17

NNNNVUMFB864MAP721  
 PP RUMHMF  
 DE RUMSMA 3120B 0520157  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 P 210130Z FEB 67 ZFD  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMNVH/SA I CORPS  
 INFO RUMNVH/SA 2D INF DIV  
 RUMKMF/CG III MAF  
 RUMKLA/CG 2 ROK MARINE BDE  
 ZEN/CHIEF JGS  
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

UNCLAS 06154 FROM MQCJ20  
 WESTMORELAND SENDS FOR MG LAM, MG DONG, COL TOAN, & GEN WALT.  
 SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

THE BRILLIANT SUCCESS OF LIEN KET 81 IN QUANG NGAI IS  
 OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF A WELL PLANNED AND VIGOROUSLY EXECUTED  
 COMBINED OPERATION. 1ST, 7TH, AND 8TH ARVN AIRBORNE BATTALIONS  
 ATTACKED WITH AGGRESSIVENESS AND ENTHUSIASM AS ENEMY FORCE  
 WAS BLOCKED BY ARVN APCJS, SUPPORTED BY ROK ANN U.S.  
 MARINES. RELENTLESS PRESSURE BY THE AIRBORNE AND SUSTAINED  
 USE OF TACTICAL AIR HAVE TAKEN A TREMENDOUS TOLL OF THE ENEMY,  
 ALL BUT DESTROYING A FORCE OF TWO NVA BATTALIONS. MY  
 HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL CONCERNED FOR THEIR PART IN THIS

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3120B UNCLAS  
 GREAT VICTORY.  
 BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

2 of 3

#17

408

PULLER 25

DTG 211919Z FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY

(PERSONAL FOR)

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

*CG has seen.  
Eg*

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 211919Z FEB 67

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NOTE: THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS IMMEDIATE,  
AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS REQUIRED.

DTG MONTH 211919Z FEB 67

*M*  
*#2 burned & destroyed*  
*1/2 211011 Returned*  
*#18*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

VV PAC354  
 OO RUMHMF  
 DE RUMHMF 3746 2521919  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 211915Z FEB 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 BT

**CONFIDENTIAL (PERSONAL FOR)**  
 PERSONAL, DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN WALY, FROM  
 LTGEN KRULAK

1. I LEARNED OF DR. FALL'S DEATH AT 211435Z FROM CINCPACFLT AND FROM CINCPAC WHO HAD BEEN ADVISED OF IT BY MESSAGE FROM COMUSMACV. SUBSEQUENTLY, I RECEIVED INQUIRIES ON THE MATTER FROM WASHINGTON. YOUR COMMAND CENTER, QUERIED BY MY HEADQUARTERS AT 211515Z, WOULD NOT VERIFY THE FACT THAT FALL WAS DEAD, OR EVEN THAT HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT. YOUR 211655Z MESSAGE REPORT REACHED MY COMMAND CENTER AT 211721Z.
2. THIS SITUATION, LIKE THE SIMILAR ONE DESCRIBED IN MY 210257Z YESTERDAY, HAS HAPPENED ALL TOO OFTEN. IT NEEDS IMMEDIATE AND POSITIVE CORRECTION.

PAGE 2 RUMHMF 3746 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. AS A SEPARATE MATTER, I WOULD LIKE ASAP TO HAVE AS MUCH INFO AS POSSIBLE ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED UP TO FALL'S PRESENCE AT THE POINT WHERE HE WAS KILLED, AS WELL AS FULL DETAILS ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING HIS DEATH.

GP-4  
 BT

NNNN

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 3 #18 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ICN: 442

FILLER 25

DTG: 252031Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMEPAC

**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

**TOP SECRET**

FILE: COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES

*To file.  
G-3 instructed me!  
journal reports underlined  
E*

*(W)*

REF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES #1&2 OF 2

COPIES OF CG FMEPAC MESSAGE 252031Z FEB 67

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NOTE: THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS IMMEDIATE,  
NO ANSWER IS REQUIRED.

*#2 burned  
2 docs*

DTG/MONTH 252031Z FEB 67

*(9)*

TXXDE PAC SUPVR T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR FOLLOWS *M*

VV PAC588  
OO DDKE  
DE YNA 4484 0562031  
ZNY TTTT  
O 252031Z FEB 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

T O P S E C R E T  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN. WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK.  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. THE PERMISSION TO FIRE ARTILLERY INTO AND NORTH OF THE DMZ APPARENTLY CAME PRETTY HARD. CMC WAS A MAJOR PARTICIPANT IN PROCURING IT. NOW, WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO HEAR SOME FALL-OUT AS TO WHETHER IT REALLY WAS NECESSARY OR USEFUL.

2. WITH THIS IN MIND, PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT EVERY USE OF ARTILLERY IN THIS ROLE IS FULLY REPORTED IN YOUR ROUTINE REPORTS. I WILL SEE THAT CMC HAS THE FACTS, SO THAT HE MAY ANSWER QUERIES ON THE MATTER.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

*E*

NNNN

*only*  
*J M*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CON: 012

FILLER 19

DTG 260430Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CO 1 CORPS ADV GR DNG RVN

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

*WR*

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

*For C.G. 3*

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF CO 1 CORPS ADV GP BNG RVN MESSAGE 260430Z FEB 67

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THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS IMMEDIATE. NO ANSWER IS REQUIRED.

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DTG /MONTH 260430Z FEB 67

*#A*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MFA 698AA 14  
MHCHV

OHRV  
OO RUMHMF  
DE RUMNVH 5625 0570445  
TNY CCCCC

O 260430Z FEB 67  
FM CO I CORPS ADV GP DNG RVN  
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV SGRVH  
INNO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
BT

**(PERSONAL FOR)**

C O N F I D E N T I A L MACTN-ICIC 8600 PERSONAL FOR GEN WETMORELAND  
FROM COL TAMBLN.

SUBJ: PH INTERR REPT CONCERNING INFILTRATION OF NVA THROUGH LAOS (C).

1. (U) REF I CORPS A  
P GP MSG 2594 DTG 242025Z SUBJ AS ABOVE
2. (C) IN RESPONSE TO YOUR RGST FOR AN INTERR REPT REGARDING VEH  
INFILTRATION OF NVA UNITS THROUGH LAOS, A RE-INTERR OF RETURNEE

LT CAO SANG, AGE 27, ENGR SECT, 2 NVA DIV, WAS CONDUCTD ON 25 FEB.  
3. (C) SUBJ CLAIM TO HAVE DEPARTED HANOI OA 3 MAR 65 WITH A GROUP  
OF 20 NVA OFF & NCO'S BY ACFT AND LANDED IN A SMALL TOWN IN CHINA  
ON THE SAME DAY. THE HIGHEST RANKING ONF IN THE GP WAS A SR CAPT.  
OA 5 MAR 65 THE GP DEPARTED CHINA FOR SVN BY "HOOKGT" HCPTR. THE GP  
MADE TWO OR THREE STOPS AT LANDING ZONES ALONG THE WAY AND WERE  
FINALLY TRFD TO A TRI-MOTORED ACFT FOR THE LAST LEG OF THE FLT.  
SUOJ STATES THE LAST AIRSTRIP WAS LOC. OMEWHEJE NEAR THE KONTUM  
PROVINCIAL BORDER EITHER IN LAOS OR CAMBODIA. HE CLAIMS THE AIRSTRIP

PAGE 2 RUMNVH 5625 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
WAS SURFACED WITH CEMENT, BUT UNABLE TO TEST ITS LENGTH. THE AIRFIELD  
APPEARED TO BE GUARDED BY A PLATOON OF SOLDIERS AND WAS SURROUNDED  
BY BARBED WIRE. THE ONLY OTHER ACFT ON THE FFIELD WREITWO WELL  
CAMOUFLAGED HOOK HCPTS. SHORTLY AFTER LANDING, THE GP WAS MET BY A  
"MOLOTOV" TYPE TRUCK WHICH CAME OUT OF A NEARBY WOODS. SUBJ STATED  
THAT CONVERSATION WITH THE DRIVER INDIC THAT OTHER TRUCK WERE  
PARKD IN THE VIC. THE GP LOADED ONTO THE TRUCK AND WERE DRIVEN FOR  
THREE HOURS ALONG A NARROW UNIMPROVED ROAD, SUITABL ONLY FOR  
ONE WAY TRAFFIC. THE ROAD RAN UNDER TREECOVER AND FORDED SEVERAL  
SMALL STREAMS ABOUT A FOOT IN DEPTH. WHEN THE GP ARRIVED AT THE  
BORDER, ON 5 MAR 65, THEY WERE MET BY A GUIDE WHO ESCORTED THEM  
INTO KONTUM PROVINCE TO A WAY STATIONS.

4. (C) THY TRAVELED ON FOOT DURING THE DAY ALONG TREE COVERED  
TRAILS IN THE DAK KON-DAK SUT AREA OF KONTUM. ONCE ST WAS NEC T CROSS  
A HWY AND THE GP WAS REQUIRED TO WAIT UNTIL IT WAS DETERMINED TO BE  
SAFE TO CROSS. DURING THIS TIME SOURCE SAW FIVE TRUCKS AND WAS  
TOLD THEHTURE USED TO TRAVNS RICE. THE P. TRVELED ONTO MR-S HQ WHERE  
THEY REMAINED FOR A PD OF APROX 5 DAYS TO RECEIVE ASGMT ORDERS. SUBJ  
WAS ASGD TO THE 2D NVA DIV ALONG WITH MOST OF THE GP MEMBERS. FROM  
HRE THEY SET OUT FOR QUANG NAM WHERE THEY JOINED THE 2  
NVA DIV.

**PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES****CONFIDENTIAL**

COPY 2 OF 3 COPI

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 3 RUMNVH 5625 C O N F I D E N T I A L

5. (C) THE INFILTRATION LASTED ABOUT 40 DAYS. SUBJ WAS FIRST ASGD AS A SQD LDR IN THE ENGR PLT OF THE 1ST VC REGT. IN OCT 65 SUBJ WAS REASGD AS A MBR OF THE GK 40 ENGR BN OF THE 2D NVA DIV. IN MAY 66 SUOR WAS SENT TO A ENGR TNG CEN IN QUAN NGAI WHERE HE REMAINED UNTIL JAN 67. ON 20 JAN 67 SUBJ WAS RECALLED TO THE ENGR SECT OF THE 2D NVA DIV LOC IN SON NAM VILLAGE, SOUTH OF NUI TRON, QUANG NGAI. UPON HIS RTN SUBJ WAS ASGD THE MISSION OF PROVIDING FERRY SVC ACROSS THE TRA KHUC RIVER FOR ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST VC REGT. IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS SCHED FOR MID FEB 67.

6. (C) ALTHOUGH SUBJECT'S REPT CONCERNING HIS INFILTRATION IS POSSIBLE, IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT AIR TRANS WOULD BE EMPLOYED FOR SUCH LOW RANKING PERS.

7. (C) RETURNEE CAO SANG IS PRESENTLY LOC AT I CORPS HQ IN DANANG AND CAN BE MADE AVAIL FOR FURTHER INTERR IF DESIRED.

GP 3  
BT

NNNNVV

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES #19

*For Gen Walt only*

CCN : 450

FILLER 25

DTG : 272221Z MONTH FEB 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

**TOP SECRET**

FILE : COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES *(Signature)*

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 272221Z FEB 67

RECEIVED BY : \_\_\_\_\_ DATE/TIME \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS IMMEDIATE,  
NO ANSWER IS REQUIRED. DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN WALT.

*#2 burned  
700008*

DTG/MONTH 272221Z FEB 67

*10*

O 272221Z FEB 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

# MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SEE AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE FROM WESTY TO WHEELER. EXCEPT FOR ADM SHARP, NOBODY ELSE HERE HAS SEEN IT, AND I THEREFORE ASK THAT YOU KEEP THIS INFO PRIVY TO YOURSELF ALONE.

2. THE ESSENCE OF THE MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. WESTY GIVES A REPORT FOLLOWING 24 HOUR VISIT TO THE FIELD, SAYING THAT WE NOW HAVE THE INITIATIVE, HAVING HURT THE ENEMY IN 66; BUT THAT HE IS FAR FROM DEFEATED. HE NOTED THAT OUR EFFECTIVE GUERRILLA EFFORT IS JUST GETTING STARTED, THAT THERE ARE MANY MAIN FORCE AND NVA UNITS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN HURT IN MONTHS, THAT SOME ARE HIDING IN THE SANCTUARIES AND OTHERS IN THE MOUNTAINS. HE COMMENTED THAT WHILE WE CANNOT EXPECT TO CUT OFF ALL THE ENEMY SUPPLIES BY AIR, A LOT MORE COULD BE DONE IF SOME OF THE RESTRICTIONS WERE REMOVED.

B. IN ADDRESSING WHAT MORE MIGHT BE DONE, HE SAID THAT THE WAR CANNOT BE ACCELERATED BEYOND THE CURRENT PLAN. THE LIMITATIONS ARE FOUND IN INTELLIGENCE, TROOP AVAILABILITY AND HELO AVAILABILITY. CONCERNING TROOP NEEDS, HE COMMENTED THAT WHEREVER WE OPERATE, WE MUST GO IN AND STAY, SEARCHING OUT EACH AREA METHODICALLY, BECAUSE THE ENEMY PLANS LITERALLY TO GO UNDERGROUND AND STAY THERE UNTIL WE PASS BY. HE THEN REITERATED HIS NEED FOR MORE FORCES; - BATTALIONS, HELOS AND SUPPORTING UNITS.

C. HE NOTED THAT HIS STATED CY67 REQUIREMENTS WERE CONSIDERABLY GREATER THEN PROGRAM IV; THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR TWO ADDITIONAL REGIMENTS FOR QUANG NGAI, PLUS A DIVISION AND AN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT FOR THE DMZ AREA TO RELIEVE THE MARINES FOR OTHER MORE PROFITABLE PURSUITS. HE SAID, IF PROGRAM IV IS TO BE REOPENED, THAT HE WOULD WANT TO RE-THINK THE PROBLEM, BUT WOULD PROBABLY WANT TWO ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS.

D. THEN, APPERENTLY RESPONDING TO AN EARLIER QUERY FROM WHEELER AS TO WHETHER THE MARINES WERE PRODUCING AS EFFECTIVELY

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AS COULD BE EXPECTED IN ICTZ, HE DODGED A DIRECT ANSWER. INSTEAD, HE SAID THAT THE WEATHER IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE MARINES, AS ARE THE POPULATION DENSITY, THE WEAK LOGS AND A SHORTAGE OF HELOS. HE CONTINUED TO SAY THAT IN NOVEMBER 66 HE HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER FURTHER TO REINFORCE I CORPS, OR TO ACCEPT A HOLDING ACTION THERE. HE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN THE MARINES ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY, BUT COULD NOT GIVE THEM MORE FORCES WITHOUT COMPROMISING OTHER MORE CRITICAL AREAS. CONSEQUENTLY, AND AFTER SOME DELIBERATION, HE CONCLUDED IT BEST TO CONDUCT A HOLDING ACTION IN ICTZ, WHICH IS THE SITUATION AT THE PRESENT TIME.

3. OBVIOUSLY, THE CRITICAL ELEMENT IS IN SECOND. ABOVE, WHERE WESTY TELLS WHEELER (AND SHARP) THAT THE DECISIVE AREA IS ELSEWHERE, AND THAT HE LOOKS TO YOU ONLY TO DO A HOLDING JOB. CERTAINLY, YOU HAVE YOUR OWN DEEP VIEWS ON THIS, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THEM NEXT WEEK WHEN WE ARE TOGETHER.

WARM REGARDS.

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DELIVER ONLY TO GEN GREENE. INFO LTGEN WALT. LTGEN KRULAK SENDS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY BY ENEMY SHELLING ACTION, DANANG, 27FEB (U).

1. IN TERMS OF WORLD AND U. S. PUBLIC OPINION, NOTHING HAS BROUGHT MORE CONDEMNATION OF THE U. S. BOMBING EFFORT AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM THAN THE ENEMY'S EXPLOITATION OF ALLEGED DAMAGE INFLICTED BY U. S. BOMBING ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY. THE RELATIVELY SMALL LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE HAS BEEN TURNED BY THE ENEMY INTO A MAJOR PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE.

2. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE OFFERED LITTLE TO COUNTER THIS PROPAGANDA, ALTHOUGH THE RAW MATERIAL IS AT HAND IN SOUTH VIETNAM. SEEMINGLY, OUR PRESS HAS COME TO REGARD AS SIMPLE HAZARDS OF WAR THE CONSIDERABLE DAY - TO - DAY LOSS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIFE AND PROPERTY BY DIRECT ENEMY ACTS OF TERROR AND VIOLENCE. NOW, HOWEVER, THE ENEMY, BY HIS ACTIONS AGAINST THE DANANG AREA ON 27 FEB, HAS PRESENTED US WITH ANOTHER CHANCE TO USE HIS OWN PROPAGANDA THEME, IN TERMS THAT THE PRESS CANNOT IGNORE. ALTHOUGH THE FACTS ARE NOT COMPLETE AT THIS TIME, WE ALREADY KNOW THAT THIS SINGLE INDISCRIMINATE ATTACK HAS BROUGHT EXTENSIVE LOSS OF LIFE AND DAMAGE TO AN INNOCENT CIVILIAN COMMUNITY NEAR DANANG.

3. UNLIKE THE SALISBURY REPORTING WHICH WAS BASED LARGELY ON SECONDARY SOURCES (NORTH VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION), THE RESULTS OF THE DANANG INCIDENT, IN ADDITION TO OFFICIAL COVERAGE, ARE READILY VISIBLE TO THE PRESS.

4. IT IS ACCORDINGLY RECOMMENDED THAT YOU PRESS FOR A POLICY THAT WILL EXPLOIT FULLY THE PROPAGANDA THEME PROVIDED BY THE ENEMY ATTACK ON CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY AT DANANG.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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