


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5 MARCH 1967

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PERINTREP NO. 9-67



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GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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TIT MAP PERINTREP #9-67

26 Feb 4/1967

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Copy of 210 Copies
 III MAP
 DANANG, RVN
 05 March 1967
 Ser: 053267

PERINTREP 9-67

Period Covered: 260001H Feb - 042400H Mar 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
 ND 48-4, ND-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. There were no significant reports of enemy units north of or in the DMZ area, although there probably were small concentrations in both locations supporting units active in the Operation PRAIRIE area. Aerial photographic missions flown in the eastern DMZ and just north of the DMZ during the period revealed the following new installations: Two possible communication antennas in the DMZ, and 24 occupied AA positions, 79 unoccupied AA positions, one probable electronics site, three possible supply areas, five vehicles, one fortified area, 11 bunkers, one cave and numerous foxholes just north of the DMZ. Aerial photography flown in and along the western DMZ boundaries revealed no significant changes as compared to previous mission readouts.

Activity in northeastern QUANG TRI was dominated by heavy, though inaccurate, mortar attacks against the newly established Provisional Artillery Group site, the GIO LINH OP, the CON THIEN OP and the THUONG HUONG (D) Headquarters. Two bridges on Highway 1 were attacked by enemy units of platoon size on 28 February at (YD 224661) and on 2 March at (YD 219636); the first attack was repulsed by an alert ARVN reaction force, while 75 percent of the bridge was destroyed in the second attack.

Several significant contacts in north central QUANG TRI were precipitated by a USMC reconnaissance patrol ambush sprung in the vicinity of (YD 0761) on 27 February resulting in four NVA KIA (Conf). Shortly thereafter an enemy unit estimated to be of company size attempted to surround the patrol resulting in the patrol withdrawing to the south toward friendly lines. A short time later, elements of the 2nd Bn, 3d Marines and the 3d Bn, 4th Marines engaged enemy elements of estimated regimental size, with at least two battalions of the 812th Regt of the 324B NVA Div, in contact reinforced by artillery (mortar) and engineer elements. After initially engaging friendly units from well-fortified positions and inflicting moderate friendly casualties, primarily as a result of 82mm mortar fires, the enemy was eventually driven off by concentrated air, artillery and USMC infantry pressure abetted by the 39th ARVN Ranger Bn occupying a blocking position to the northeast. By 3 March, the enemy had become disorganized and was moving back rapidly toward

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his sanctuary in and north of the DMZ. Enemy casualties at the end of the reporting period totalled 413 KIA (Conf) and 296 KIA (Prob). Captured weapons and equipment included both 60mm and 82mm mortars, machine guns, gas masks, mines, blasting caps, TNT and grenades.

Ground reconnaissance elements operating north of KHE SANH (XD 903 497) and west of the north-south axis of Route 9 sighted only small groups of enemy. On 2 March, the KHE SANH camp received a total of 70 rounds of mortar fire causing minor personnel casualties and damaging one HU-1E and two CH-46 helicopters. On 3 March, a patrol from B Co, 1st Bn, 9th Marines received sniper fire from an estimated enemy squad at (XD 845 416) and returned fire inflicting three enemy KIA (Prob).

There were no sightings in either the BA LONG or DALCROMG River Valleys during the reporting period. Aerial photography missions flown in southern and coastal QUANG TRI (P) revealed numerous foxholes (YD 2941), four unoccupied probable antiaircraft positions (YD 4238) and several trenches (YD 3763).

A PF squad guarding a bridge at (YD 331510) was attacked by an unknown number of VC during the night of 26 February resulting in total destruction of the bridge. Enemy losses were two VC KIA (Conf), one VC PW and two AK-47 captured. Additionally, a PF platoon received five rounds of mortar fire at (YD 524484) on 1 March resulting in light PF casualties.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. Enemy activity in THUA THIEN (P) during the reporting period was again concentrated in the northeast section. USMC elements of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines received a total of 15 rounds of mortar fire and insignificant small arms fire at four different locations in the vicinity of (YD 5939) on 26 February. Counter-mortar and artillery fire was returned resulting in 17 VC KIA (Prob). Additionally, a PF platoon at (YD 5940) received 10 rounds of mortar fire on the same night.

Operation CHINOOK II maintained light to moderate contact with the enemy during the reporting period. On 27 February, at (YD 418366), elements of the 3d Bn, 26th Marines engaged a company size force, resulting in two VC KIA (Conf) and one VC KIA (Prob), and a patrol from the same unit sighted 12 VC on a trail, sprung an ambush which accounted for 10 VC KIA (Conf) and two VC PW. Again on the same day, a patrol from the same unit received light sniper fire as it approached a position at (YD 580277). In assaulting the position, the unit captured one VC and discovered a cache containing 15 60mm mortar rounds, five 81mm mortar rounds, five M-26 grenades and 1000 50 caliber rounds. Further south in the vicinity of (YD 573257), on 2 March, an AO sighted 13 VC in two boats and called artillery fires resulting in six VC KIA (Conf) and the destruction of both boats. Total enemy casualties for CHINOOK II during the reporting period totaled 30 VC KIA (Conf) and 76 VC KIA (Prob).

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Just east of the CHINOOK operating area, an ARVN APC detonated a mine on 27 February resulting in moderate casualties. Along Route 1 at (YD 597308) on 2 March, an unguarded culvert was completely destroyed by a VC sabotage squad. On 28 February, DONG BEE (H) (YD 652312) was penetrated by three VC who assassinated a district health cadre and one PF Intelligence Sergeant, and wounded the Deputy Hamlet Chief and two civilians.

Just north of the PHU BAI TAOR on 28 February, elements of ARVN 2nd Bn, 3d Regt engaged 20 VC in a firefight resulting in two VC KIA (Conf) and two weapons captured. In the same area on 3 March, an exchange of fire between a 2d Bn, 9th Marines CAC unit and an estimated VC squad resulted in five VC KIA (Conf). Southeast of the TAOR in the vicinity of (ZD 041024), a civilian truck was ambushed by an estimated 10 VC resulting in 10 civilians killed and two wounded.

Ground reconnaissance deployed just west of the PHU BAI TAOR had no significant sightings during the period. Activity in the PHU BAI TAOR itself remained extremely light with only two minor incidents reported.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. There were no significant reconnaissance sightings or contacts in the areas adjacent to the northern, western or south-western portions of the DANANG TAOR. Noteworthy is the fact that there has been no enemy activity of consequence in these areas since the termination of the INDEPENDENCE and STONE Operations.

Just south of the TAOR in the vicinity of (BT 038517), the 325th RF Co was attacked by an estimated platoon of VC on 28 February. The attack was decisively repulsed although enemy casualties unknown. Further east and just south of HOI AN, harassing enemy mortar fire was directed at the BA REN OP (BT 102510) on 2 March and at a 706th RF Co OP (BT 145544) on 3 March.

Activity within the DANANG TAOR involved a total of 70 incidents and included the rocket attack conducted against the DANANG Airfield on the morning of 27 February. A brief description of this incident is contained in Annex A. Mortaring incidents within the TAOR involved DUC DUC (D) Headquarters and the AN HOA Airstrip.

There were several incidents of terrorism in the DANANG TAOR: Nine civilians were killed and 35 injured when a civilian truck detonated a mine in the vicinity of (AT 943666); two hand grenades and SAF directed at an RF Headquarters at (BT 001689) resulted in two RD cadre WIA; and a mine detonated by civilians in the vicinity of (BT 018648) resulted in injury to five civilians. There was also one incident of sabotage involving a 7th Engineer Bn crane being substantially damaged by a satchel charge.

Significant incidents involving Operation LAFAYETTE included extensive damage to a tank as a result of striking a mine in the vicinity of (BT 075 618) and the killing of three female guerrillas in a firefight with an unknown number of VC in the vicinity (BT 114648). Total enemy casualties for Operation LAFAYETTE during the period included 55 VC KIA (Conf) and 13 VC KIA (Prob).

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d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Enemy activity in QUANG TIN (P) was extremely light in comparison to previous weeks. In northern QUANG TIN in the vicinity of (BT 194358) on 1 March, a PF platoon was ambushed by an estimated VC platoon size unit. The PF platoon quickly reacted to the ambush, returned fire and the VC withdrew. To the west, a CIDG patrol from TIEN PHUOC sighted two VC on 2 March, pursued and killed the VC and discovered two separate caches containing a total of 1100 kilos of rice.

There were no significant reconnaissance sightings along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR during the period. Just south of the TAOR, a Forward Air Controller sighted an estimated VC company and called an artillery mission resulting in 15 VC KIA (Conf) and 20 VC KIA (Prob). On 2 March, an unknown number of VC attacked a PF platoon OP in the vicinity of (BS 597795).

There were a total of 35 incidents within the CHU LAI TAOR during the reporting period. A 26 February attack by a VC platoon against a ROKMC position at (BS 631829) resulted in six VC KIA (Conf), plus capture of four grenades, two AP mines and one bangalore torpedo. On 2 March, a VC squad entered LY TIN (V) at (BT 449072) murdered one civilian, wounded two civilians and kidnapped a young woman. A USMC patrol under attack by an estimated VC squad in the vicinity of (BS 5389) on 3 March called an air strike which resulted in three VC KIA (Conf) and six VC WIA (Prob).

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Central and northern QUANG NGAI remained relatively quiet in comparison to past weeks. On 3 March, the QUANG NGAI Airfield received a total of 25 mortar rounds resulting in minor damage to the airfield. Further south in the vicinity of (BS 598638) on the same date, PF Platoons also received mortar fire. They reacted by rapidly moving toward the mortar position, setting up an ambush along a likely withdrawal route, and killing two of their attackers. To the east along Route 1 on the same date, the MO DUC Subsector Headquarters received mortar fire and 57mm recoilless rifle fire from an unknown number of VC. Still further south in the vicinity of (BS 732542) on the same date, a PF Platoon was attacked by an estimated VC company. After a heavy fire fight, the enemy attack was repulsed.

An extremely large number of light contacts occurred during the reporting period in the area of Operations DESOTO, DECKHOUSE VI, and LIEN KET 90. On 27 February, "F" Co, 2d Bn, 7th Marines encountered heavy small arms fire upon entry into a landing zone in the vicinity of (BS 789380). The company rapidly dispersed and attacked the enemy resulting in eight VC KIA (Conf) and five VC KIA (Prob). Also on 28 February, in the vicinity of (BS 771405), elements of the 1st Bn, 5th Marines conducting a sweep operation discovered and destroyed a large enemy tunnel complex 300 meters long, 8-10 feet underground with numerous offshoot tunnels, plus an 18 inch reinforced concrete blockhouse 15 feet by 15 feet by 18 feet. Still further south in the vicinity of (BS 9030), an unknown number of enemy attempted to draw a

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patrol from the 1st Bn, 4th Marines (SLF), into an ambush. The patrol reacted by out-flanking the ambush position and trapping the rapidly withdrawing VC. Results of this contact were 10 VC KIA (Conf) and 11 VC KIA (Prob).

There were numerous reconnaissance sightings of small groups of enemy in southern QUANG NGAI during the period. The only sizeable sighting involved 100 VC in the vicinity of (BS 6456) on 26 February. An airstrike was called resulting in 40 VC KIA (Conf) and 20 VC KIA (Prob). Enemy casualties for Operations DESOTO and DECKHOUSE VI during the period totaled 182 VC KIA (Conf) and 109 VC KIA (Prob).

CIDG elements from the five CIDG Camps in QUANG NGAI (P) continued normal patrolling operations during the period with only a few relatively minor squad size contacts.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 421 and consisted of one ambush, three attacks, two hamlet harassments, five acts of sabotage, 49 mine/booby trap incidents, 156 small unit engagements and 205 incidents of AA fire.

Enemy initiated incidents for the month of February are as follows:

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ROKMC</u>
Attacks	1	2
Ambushes	2	0
Assault by fire	25	2
Small unit engagements	468	14
Mine/booby trap	163	5
AA fire	840	

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex B.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex B.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex B.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment

(1) New Weapon. Soviet 140mm rocket. See Annex A.

(2) The increased number of mortarings and the substantial number of rounds fired in northern QUANG TRI (P) during the period provided ample evidence of enemy resupply during the Tet standdown.

e - g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Enemy AA fire incidents for the reporting period reflected a moderate decrease when compared to the previous period. A total of 205 incidents were reported with 42 aircraft sustaining 85 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (BS 6557) and (BS 7639). No confirmed cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

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1 - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Vigorous reconnaissance efforts north of THON SON LAM and CAM LO resulted in several enemy sightings and contacts. A patrol ambush of four NVA at (YD 0761) on 27 February touched off some of the heaviest ground action yet encountered in PRAIRIE II.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Reconnaissance sightings in the CHINOOK II area and on the western and southwestern approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR decreased sharply during the week. No significant sightings or contacts were made.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Intensive reconnaissance efforts to the south and southwest of the DANANG TAOR continued to produce sightings of small groups of VC. No pattern of movement was noted.

(4) QUANG TIN (P). Enemy activity to the west of the CHU LAI TAOR continued at a steady, light pace. Most sightings by reconnaissance patrols were of groups of three to 10 VC with no particular pattern of movement noted.

(5) QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity noted by patrols during the week continued at a steady pace. Reconnaissance elements continued to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy using artillery fires and fixed wing air strikes.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
26 Feb	PULASKI (AT 808570)	2000	2nd Bn, 4th Marines
26 Feb	PULASKI (AT 879580)	12,000	2nd Bn, 4th Marines
2 Mar	PRAIRIE II (YD 443311)	200	3d Bn, 26th Marines
2 Mar	(BT 158174)	4,400	USSF
4 Mar	(BT 095613)	400	1st Bn, 1st Marines

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex B.
- b. Enemy Identification. Annex B.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex B.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex B.

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e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period again reflected a marked increase when compared with the two previous periods. Losses were as follows: 866 KIA (Conf), 644 KIA (Prob), 14 NVA PW's, 24 VC PW's and one VC returnee. Weapons losses reported were 62 individual and 21 crew served weapons captured.

Enemy personnel and equipment losses for the month of February are as follows:

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ROKMC</u>
KIA (Conf)	1721	389
KIA (Prob)	2258	229
NVA PW	7	1
VC PW	202	26
NVA Returnee	1	0
VC Returnee	54	66
Individual Weapons	152	53
Crew Served Weapons	7	2

f. Morale. No change.

g. - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Two distinct fronts moved through I Corps during the period, one beginning on 25 February and the other on 27 February. These fronts produced ceilings of 1000 feet and below from HUE northward and 1500 to 3500 feet south of HUE. By 2 March, winds gradually veered to the southeast causing improved visibility from DANANG southward. Low stratus and morning fog however continued to hamper air operations in support of ground forces in the PHU BAI - DONG HA areas and to the west. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	70	71	77	78
Low	60	62	67	67
Rainfall (total)	.10	.52	--	.47
Visibility (miles)	7	4	7	7
Winds (knots)	6	5	6	8

k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex C.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.

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5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES:**a. Enemy Capabilities. VC/NVA forces can:**

- (1) Attack the KHE SANH-THON SON LAM-D5-DONG HA area with up to two divisions (324B NVA, 341st NVA Divs).
- (2) Attack the HUE-PHU BAI area with one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and two separate battalions (804th and 810th).
- (3) Attack the DANANG combat base with one regiment (3d NVA Regt) and four separate battalions (R.20, V.25 and 804th Infantry and 402nd Sapper Bn).
- (4) Attack the CHU LAI combat base with remnants of two regiments (1st VC and 21st NVA Regts) and six separate battalions (20th, 38th, 48th and 72nd Infantry Bns, 409th Sapper Bn and 1506th Engr Bn).
- (5) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one regiment (reinforced).
- (6) Defend in present position in and just north of the DMZ with up to two divisions (324B and 341st NVA Divs).
- (7) Defend elsewhere in I CTZ, including VC/NVA base areas, with forces locally available.
- (8) Reinforce the forces presently in I CTZ, including the 2nd VC Regt, within three to 10 days with up to two divisions from NVN or from those forces transiting LAOS, and elements of one division from II Corps (3d NVA Div (-)).
- (9) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorist, sabotage, and propaganda activities, and the use of mines and booby traps.

b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities:

(1) Capability (1). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The probable mission of the 324B NVA Division during operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE I (early stages) was to attack the CUA-CAM LO-DONG HA-QUANG TRI area; the sanctity of the DMZ from ground attack facilitates the enemy's massing of personnel, equipment, and supplies close to possible objectives; the location of possible objectives vis-a-vis the DMZ permits rapid reinforcement by forces in NVN; the enemy's knowledge of our situation based upon extensive reconnaissance activities; the recent (TET) movement of supplies and possible replacement personnel southward into the DMZ area; the recent appearance of a possible third division in the DMZ area; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success to complement his political effort in countering the RVN RD Program; and successful attack and temporary control of northern I CTZ would greatly enhance enemy political ambitions and "truce table" bargaining position. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The heavy personnel and

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material losses suffered by the 324B NVA Division in past operations; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; the existence of extensive fortifications in and north of the DMZ; and a decisive defeat of the attacking forces would lay the DMZ and NVN homeland open to invasion.

(2) Capability (2). Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge of our situation based upon extensive reconnaissance activities; successful attack and temporary control of any part of these areas would enhance the enemy's "truce table" bargaining position; the city of HUE is an attractive historical, religious and political target which, if successfully attacked and temporarily held, would greatly enhance enemy prestige at home and abroad; dissident Buddhists and remnants of the struggle movement in HUE could provide sympathizers and collaborators to the enemy; and the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success to complement his political efforts to counter the RVN RD Program. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The enemy forces available are of insufficient strength to attack HUE-PHU BAI successfully; the enemy's past abstinence and probable future reluctance to attack any marine combat base or contiguous area except in overpowering strength; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; the fact that HUE is located on an exposed coastal plain where surrounding terrain is unfavorable for the enemy's tactics; and the enemy's losses during recent operations and our deployments in the area.

(3) Capability (3). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge of our situation based on extensive reconnaissance activities; the successful attack and temporary control of any part of the area would greatly enhance the enemy's "truce table" bargaining position; the city of DANANG (second largest metropolitan area in RVN), the airfield and the port of DANANG are substantial targets which, if successfully attacked, would seriously impair friendly military activity in I CTZ; even a partial victory could seriously hurt vital facilities and contribute to a significant propaganda coup; and the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success to complement his political efforts to counter the RVN RD Program. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: Enemy forces are of insufficient strength to attack DANANG successfully; the enemy's past abstinence and probably future reluctance to attack a marine combat base or contiguous area except in overpowering strength; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; and the enemy's losses during recent operations.

(4) Capability (4). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The necessity to recoup recent defeats to maintain their prestige in the eyes of the populace; the enemy's knowledge of our situation based on extensive reconnaissance activities; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success to complement his political efforts to counter the RVN RD Program; and a successful attack and temporary control of any of this area would enhance the enemy's "truce table" bargaining position. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: The enemy's past abstinence and probable future reluctance to attack any marine combat base or contiguous areas except in over powering strength; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; and the enemy's losses during recent operations.

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(5) Capability (5). Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: The present disposition of enemy units; isolated units and outposts offer the best targets at the least risk compared to other potential attack objectives; the enemy's past successes against isolated ARVN/CIDG outposts in I CTZ; most outposts lie astride main enemy infiltration routes where the enemy may achieve a temporary superiority of force; the practice of attacking relatively weak targets at a time and place of his choosing under favorable conditions is a basic enemy tactic; and the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success to complement his political efforts to counter the RVN RD Program. The following factor militates against adoption of this capability: The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy build-ups and to react rapidly to destroy them by supporting arms or by ground spoiling attacks.

(6) Capability (6). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: Our strength and fire power in the area south of the DMZ and use of naval gunfire off the coast; terrain and present dispositions favor the defender; and the enemy's continuing efforts to improve and expand defensive positions and supply caches. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The paucity of enemy supporting arms to adequately support a determined defensive posture; the enemy's knowledge of friendly offensive mobility and fire support capabilities against their static positions; and achievement of a much needed victory is unlikely by defensive actions.

(7) Capability (7). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy may choose to adopt a hasty defense and/or delay until command posts, vital installations and caches are displaced, concealed or dispersed; the enemy's requirement to protect vital base areas; and the enemy's desire to conserve forces in one area while exploiting an opportunity in another location. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The enemy's reluctance to stand and fight against US/FWMAF's except under favorable conditions and at a time and place of his choosing; that the enemy may prefer not to defend occupied terrain if it is only an operating area and not a vital base area; the enemy has only a limited supporting arms capability; the enemy will often evade direct contact with superior friendly forces by resorting to small unit operations including harassment, ambushes, mining and the use of booby traps to inflict maximum casualties; and achievement of a much needed victory is unlikely by defensive actions.

(8) Capability (8). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's desire to achieve a major victory against friendly forces; the relative freedom of movement through enemy controlled territory and the DMZ; the enemy's capability to move units between I and II Corps; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success to complement his political efforts to counter the RVN RD Program. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge that the introduction of additional enemy forces into RVN would probably be matched by additional FWMAF's, thus making a decisive enemy military victory unlikely; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces for movement; and the probability that reinforcing units would be detected and destroyed by friendly supporting arms fire.

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(9) Capability (9). Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: This capability is a basic enemy tactic which has long been practiced in SVN; it provides an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms fire; VC knowledge of the terrain and of the local populace; the enemy's belief that successful application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued US force participation in SVN; guerrillas and local force VC units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while VC Main Force and NVA units conduct large scale operations; and this capability is indicated by numerous intelligence sources as the tactic to be emphasized to counter the RVN RD Program. There are no factors which militate against the adoption of this capability.

c. Vulnerabilities.

(1) Enemy forces, installations and lines of communication are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attack.

(2) Enemy forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations, enemy forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to surprise.

(4) The recent decrease in overall combat effectiveness of enemy forces, especially in QUANG TRI (P) and QUANG NGAI (P), has increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations. Contributing factors include: Recent decisive defeats, particularly in QUANG NGAI (P); increased reliance on conscripted, less highly motivated personnel; reduced training time; lower morale by reason of fear of our supporting arms, shortages of food and medicine, sickness, and general hardships; and our increased psychological warfare operations.

(5) Enemy forces are becoming more dependent upon local resources for support. However, this necessity for increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the communist cause with the population.

d. Relative Probability of Adoption. The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities are as follows: (9), (5), (6), (7), (4), (1), (3), (2) and (8).



B. S. READ Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG AIRFIELD
- B. ORDER OF BATTLE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMNAVFORV	1	CG 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	45	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CG 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CG 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CG 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CG 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CG CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CG CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG PROJECT OREGON	1	CG 282D AVN CO	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CG 8TH RR FU	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 9TH MAB	1	I DASC DANANG	1
		III MAF	10

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
CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX A (ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG AIRBASE) to III MAF PERINTREP 9-67**

1. At 0310H and for some two minutes thereafter on the morning of 27 February 1967, the Danang Air Base was subjected to an attack by fire of 140mm Rockets. The attack marked the first occasion in which the enemy has employed this type weapon in SVN.
2. The impact area for the total of 51 rounds fired was generally along the eastern side of the airfield complex and adjacent Vietnamese village of AP BO (BT 021751), with the majority of rounds falling within three general areas centered on (BT 008765), (BT 018759), and (BT 014742). See Appendix 1 for graphic depiction.
3. The rockets were launched from GS (AT 9669) approximately 8,800 meters from the farthest point of impact, which reportedly is the maximum range of the 140mm rocket. There were a total of 126 individual firing positions organized into two groups of 66 and 60 positions respectively. Each of these groups consisted of a series of six-position firing sites--11 in the former grouping, 10 in the latter grouping. All positions were aligned generally perpendicular to the airfield complex.
4. Two launching tubes, 25 rockets, and numerous cannisters were found in the vicinity of the launch site. A number of the rounds were recovered by divers from the SONG YEN River. There was evidence that several of the rockets had failed to fire and that the enemy had made a hasty departure.
5. The 140mm rocket (Russian) is 42 5/8 inches long and weighs 84 pounds, with a 39 1/2 pound warhead. It is an electrically initiated, spin stabilized, point detonating round with fuze settings of super quick, instantaneous, and delay (only super quick fuze was used in the attack). The rocket may be fired singly or by phasing a series of rockets to a single firing point. See Appendixes 2 and 3.
6. The rocket launcher is a single metal tube mounted on a wooden board with very simple elevation and deflection mechanisms. See Appendix 4.
7. Individual firing positions were located approximately three meters apart and consisted of shallow holes 18-20 inches wide, 36-48 inches long, and some eight inches in depth, with a parapet forward to provide basic elevation and an aiming stake aft. See Appendix 5.
8. Interrogation of one PW and one returnee and examination of captured documents has revealed that the R-20 Bn was involved in the attack, probably as laborers in transporting the rockets, and that an unidentified, specially trained NVA unit was responsible for the actual firing of the rockets.

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GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF DANANG ROCKET ATTACK




APPENDIX 1

ARMED BARREL SOCKET W/CA GLETER




APPENDIX 2


SOVIET BARRAGE ROCKET W/CANNISTER



APPENDIX 3



ROCKET LAUNCHER USED IN ATTACK ON DANANG AIRFIELD



SKETCH OF POSITIONED LAUNCHER

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ANNEX B (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 9-67

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 042400H MAR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	7	2,000	2	1,300			9	3,300
Battalions (Infantry)	20	9,950	12	4,500	6	1,950	38	16,400
Battalions (Other)	10	2,110	3	1,080			13	3,190
Separate Companies					29	2,665	29	2,665
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,360		6,880		4,615		27,855
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	UNK					1	UNK
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					6	675	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						1075		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
COMBINED TOTAL STRENGTH		16,860		6,880		6,590		30,330

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2. (C) ESTIMATED MILITIA STRENGTH AS OF 17 FEB 67.

<u>PROVINCES</u>	<u>GUERRILLA FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
QUANG TRI	2,274	4,687	937	7,898
THUA THIEN	2,807	7,988	1,597	12,392
QUANG NAM	4,601	13,026	2,606	20,233
QUANG TIN	3,324	8,809	1,761	13,894
QUANG NGAI	4,134	13,516	2,703	20,353
TOTAL STRENGTH	17,140	48,026	9,604	74,770

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3. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 042400H MAR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000 #2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	7km Radius YD 0573	1Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 045700	1Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 0365	1Mar67
5th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 085653	1Mar67
6th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 085653	1Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist. and coastal area	24Feb67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 4054 - YD 4259	24Feb67
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	24Feb67
Cam Le Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720	YD 5720	20Jan67
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	Northern Phong Dien	17Feb67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	YD 5534	24Jan67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 480430	24Feb67
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	YC 904998	18Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 7030	YD 596358	20Feb67
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu THU (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 To BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 935325	17Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	150	Poor	AT 8454	AT 9860	21Feb67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		BT 0354	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	ZC 135280	BT 094643	28Feb67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 037310	20Feb67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	Poor	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	50	Poor	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov65

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		E Hiep Duc (D)		
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		Quang Tin (P)	AT 9818	26Sep66
					W Son Tinh (D)		
					Quang Ngai (P)	BS 4877	17Feb67
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	Poor	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	220	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	200	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BS 4478	18Feb67
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	220	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	70	Ineff.	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	18Feb67
2nd Bn,(3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	Fair	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh (D)	5Feb67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov65
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	12 KM SW Hau Duc (D) HQ AS 9080	12Feb67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 5273	17Feb67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 5273	17Feb67
40th Bn	MF	C	100	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 5883	15Feb67
60th Bn	MF	C	100	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 5883	15Feb67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 5576	16Feb67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 3366	23Jan67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	Poor	Tra Bong (D)	BS 4877	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 4877	17Feb67
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	Peer	Son Tinh (D)	BS 4877	17Feb67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	Peer	Son Tinh (D)	BS 5077	17Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	Poor	Tra Bong (D)	BS 5581	17Feb67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 724575	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,050		BS 7135	BS 7135	17Feb67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		BS 7135	BS 7135	17Feb67
7th Bn	NVA	C	300		BS 7135	BS 7135	17Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		BS 7135	BS 7135	17Feb67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 7135	BS 7135	17Feb67
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	BS 4382	BS 6436	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Son Tinh (D)	W Son Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 8341	10Feb67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #4	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20Oct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BR 5887	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 785643	5Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 5984	3Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8165	10Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7864	5Jan67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page B-3.
- #3. The 70th Bn was identified as taking part in the attack on the 11th Co, 2nd BDE, ROKMC on 15 February. The 40th, 60th and 70th Bn strengths have been changed to reflect the enemy casualties. 70th Bn casualties have been estimated at 200.
- #4. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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4. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 042400H MAR 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung TILANH CO-Sr Capt HAI
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt 4th Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-Sr Capt THUONG
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			PO-1st Lt TINH CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG)
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH CO-Capt Tran Minh DIEN XO-Capt Bui Thanh MINH PO-Capt Nguyen Minh HAI
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI CO-Van KIEM XO-SANH
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO- SAM
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Vo BA PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist. Force			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri		Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47	CO-Cao TUNG
Cam Le Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41,000FM- 41,300FM Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO- Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu			
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?)	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm Mort Unk-75mm Mort Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 Unk-80mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-AA Wpns Unk-57 RR Unk-B-90 3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DKZ 1-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-60mm Mort 2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 1-B-40 24-SMG 6-AR	
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?); 2nd Bn (?)			CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10; 3rd Bn(?) 80.T Bn			CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			CO-THANH
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI
K.41 Co	C-106; D-6; F.18; Pho 18; K-106			CO-Pham Kinh PHU
K.105 Co		1847 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Hoang AN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR 6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG 2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG; Unk-K-50	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5			CO-SON XO-THU
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20825		CO-Capt THAO
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn (?) Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-CHI
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THU PO-TOAN
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co X-64 (?)			CO-MOI
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dia Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>				
2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai	20,601GM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn	Nam Hai 20800GM	18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ24 Bn (ENGR)	CK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAC CO-Capt THAU
72nd Bn				
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2; K-2; 74th Bn (?)			
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 74th Dist Force Co		1-57mm RR (?) Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SMG 1-60mm Mort 1-30 Cal MG	CO-THANH XO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUNG
14th Co	A-14; V-14			
706th Co	106th Co			
A10 Co	K51; 107; F-14; D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THAN PO-Anh VU
A13 Co	D-22			
A16 Co	C-73		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
A19 Co	Tam Ky; D-23 Co			
A21 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21			
A34 Co	Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			
Tra Son Co				
Tra Ha Co				
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>				
Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM- 21,900GM Bac Hien		CO-MANH CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; PS/40; 108th Regt Cuu Long Regt			CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang			
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh-Gia	20,735CT. An Giang		CO-PHUNG XO-Nguyen BAC

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UNIT

70th Bn

90th Bn

21st Regt (Hq)

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

2nd VC Regt

93rd Bn

95th Bn

97th Bn

22nd NVA Regt

AKA

35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;
Chu Song; Truong Son
70; Inter-mt White
Tiger Bn; F-07; 103
Ounh Gia (?); Bong

Trang
Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son
Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn;
Phi Doi 2008; Thuan
Binh; Song Hong(?)
Bach Ma; Worksite 21;
36th; A-21; Cong Truong
21; 2nd Regt; 36th
Regt; A-21; Cong Troung
7 (?)

11th Workshop; 11th Bn
135th Bn; 22nd Bn
33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)
Quyet Chien; Worksite II;
Song Ba; Trom Phuoc 600;
Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song
Hong; 1st Regt;
707th Infil Gp;
Chi Ba (Sisters Three);
H-21 Bn
705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam;
H.58; Ba Minh; Thong
Rang 260

703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn
in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23;
H.25
Quyet Tam; 209th Infil
Gp; Code No 527; Cong
Doan; Song Hong (Labor
Union); Song Ba; 3rd
Regt

LBN

6240

6340TL (old)
21164GM (new)
21.141VM
Binh Dinh (P)

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

3-81mm Mort
4-60mm Mort
5-MG
4-57mm RR

17-81mm Mort
Unk-75mm RR
Unk-60mm Mort

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PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Duc CONG
XO-SrCapt THUA
PO-Duan Cong THANH

CO-Ho Thanh THI
XO-Vo Ngoc CAM

CO-Pham KIET
XO-Dang Cong KICH
PO-TIEN

CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
CO-KHANH
XO-HOANG
PO-HA
Cofs-TRI
CO-Dang DOAN
XO-BONG
PO-SINH
CO-VINH
XO-AN
PO-NGOAN
Cofs-LUONG
CO-VINH
CO-BINH
PO-OANH
CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP
XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or
KHANG
PO-Ho Si LOC
Cofs-Capt THANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEN CofS-Capt KUCI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KIEN CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		CO-Maj KIM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135GM 20.139GM Bac Hien		
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ Ba Hao		
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Work- site; 2nd Bn (?)	HT 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141GM- 20.144GM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa X2424 Bac Hien for- ward to Ba Hoa 1289	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit			CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU
21st Co	T-21; H-40	22,422	2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR	

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UNIT

506 "A" Sapper Co
506 "B" Sapper Co

AKA

Unit 506
H-42

LBN

Hom Thu 21618M

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

6-Carabines
3-BARS
6-Carabines
Unk-SMG
Unk-K-40

PERSONALITIES

CO-MY
CO-CHUNG
XO-NAM
PO-ANH

CO-Nguyen DIEP
CO-THIN
CO-MAU

C.17 Co
C.212 Co
C.219 Co

Mo Duc Co; C-217 Co
Ba To Co
Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19
Co

T.18 Co
P.31 Co

Son Tinh Dong (West)
T.19 Co

T.20 Co

C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong
Co

Tra Bong Co

F-8 Co; 8th Co

CC-Pham TRAN
CO-LONG
XO-MINH
PO-MINH
CO-TRAN

CO-Dinh HUY

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div

Nong Truong 3;
Thon An 510; 610th Div;
Office Command; Front
A-1; Inter-Prov 10;
Yellow Star Div;
(Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3;
Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10;
Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10
D-518 Infil Gp

1500

CO-SrCol Le TRUC
XO-QUANG
PO-Tran VAN

200th AA Bn

1535; 1534
10th Airport

CO-Capt Thai PHU
XO-KNUYENT
PO-SrCapt Tran DAU
CofS-SrLt Nguyen
Van TY

300th Wpns Bn
400th Mort Bn

513 Infil Gp
Sao Vang Bn;
33rd Bn (120mm Mort);
32nd Bn (120mm Mort);
Infil Gp 511

1538
1541

CO-Le Van DUYET
CO-Vo VIET
XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN
PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM
CofS-Nguyen KHAM
CO-CU
XO-CIM

500th Trans Bn

Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn

1544

600th Med Bn
90th Engr Bn

Inter-Det 600

1548

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
18th NVA Regt	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21155 GM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
7th Bn	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAN CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANG CofS-LUIONG
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter-Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****5. III MAF Unit Watch List**

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ

803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT
812TH NVA REGT
6TH NVA REGT
804TH VC BN
20TH VC BN
2ND DIV HQ

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAP
PERINTREP NO 9-67

1. 60th Bn, 1st VC Regt. Pvt NGUYEN QUI, 2d Plt, 3d Co, 60th Bn, 1st Regt, rallied to a KIT CARSON Scout of C Co, 1st Bn, 7th Marines in the vicinity of TUYET DIEM (H) on 9 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He deserted from his unit on 27 January 1967 because of the hardship involved living under the VC, the malaria, lack of food and general discouragement. During the month of January, almost one platoon, approximately 30 men, deserted the 60th Bn.

b. He made his escape while on a working detail hauling salt from the vicinity of SONG BE and SONG TRA KHUK Rivers to an unknown location.

c. In December 1966, the 60th Bn was engaged in a fire fight against a ROKMC unit in the SON TINH (D) and suffered approximately 70 KIA.

d. The battalion has no medical platoon as such, however, each company has two nurses in assistance. At the time he deserted, about 33 percent of the battalion suffered from malaria.

e. He was in the hospital (location unknown) during November and December for a month and a half with mange and psoriasis. Treatment consisted of two shots of penicillin and two pills of "diasume" each day. There were 90 patients in this hospital, all from the 1st VC Regt. The patients were attended by two doctors, seven or eight nurses and about 10 administrative personnel, all of who spoke with a CVN dialect.

f. When asked about the VC MF dealings with the people, he stated that the people liked the 1st VC Regt but are afraid that their presence in the hamlet will cause Allied retaliation. He stated that he had seen the people in the hamlets on occasions ridicule the VC MF for their lack of fighting power.

(G-2 Comment: F/4 as to OOB information.)

2. 60th Bn, 1st Regt. Pvt DOAN HUA, 1st Co, 60th Bn, 1st VC Regt, a CHIEU HOI to TAM KY (D) Headquarters in February 1967, gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He deserted on 22 December 1966 because of problems that he had experienced with the 60th Bn Political Officer.

b. The mission of the 1st VC Regt is to destroy Allied units. There is no schedule for missions but all orders assigning missions originate from MR level. Air strikes and artillery have been successful in keeping the 60th Bn from accomplishing its missions.

c. Whenever a unit is employed in a operation the unit is moved to another area afterwards. When a unit is moved from an area, provincial or district forces replace them.

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d. Prior to an operation, cadres are contacted in the area so that they may have the people prepare shelters. Most objectives are engaged between either 1800 to 1900 or 0200 to 0300, the hours when troops are either eating or sleeping. The 60th Bn employs raid type tactics for the most part.

e. There is a hospital in NGHAI LAM (V) designed B-21 and one designated B-23 at SON CHAU (V); each hospital has a 100 patient capacity.

f. All replacements are acquired from either district or provincial forces.

g. Eight to 10 days prior to an operation the men are well fed, but the rest of the time the supplies are inadequate and of poor quality. The supplies come from the mountain area in QUANG NGAI but he did not know the location.

h. The morale of the 60th Bn is usually high, although immediately after a battle the battalion loses from eight to 15 percent of its strength as a result of desertions.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. Mission assignments originating from military region level has been previously reported. This is the first report of hospitals in the area cited.)

3. XO-75 Company. Pvt NGO NHIEU, XO-75 Company, rallied at the TAM KY (D) Headquarters on or about 8 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He was a cook for the 20th Sapper Co from July 1966 to January 1967, when he was transferred to the XO-75 Co.

b. The 20th Sapper Co operates independently with its base of operations in TUAN YEN (H) (BT 280080). The 20th consists of a headquarters of seven men, armed with three pistols and two carbines, and two platoons totaling 38 men armed with BAR's, AK's, GEC's and carbines. He never accompanied the 20th Bn on an operation.

c. The XO-75 Co is an infantry unit consisting of a Headquarters, medical squad, and three platoons of two squads each. He denied knowing the strength of the XO-75 Co but said the medical squad consisted of one doctor, two medics and two assistant medics. He said the company CP is within a two kilometer radius of CAM KHE market (BT 2323). He disclaimed any knowledge of the 1st or 3rd Platoons but the 2d Platoon consisted of CO, XO, 1st Squad (10 men) and 2d Squad (eight men). Squad weapons consisted of one BAR or one French automatic rifle, two M-1's, one TSMG, one carbine and grenades (CHICOM).

d. NHIEU said both companies are low on supplies and the food is inadequate and poor. Training consists of swimming, stealthy movements, crawling and marksmanship (dry firing). He denied knowing the location of the training camp as well as any knowledge of replacements, intelligence, tactics or communications.

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(G-2 Comment: F/2 as to the 20th Sapper Co which is probably the 74th LF Co (AKA U.20). F/6 as to this first report of the XO-75 Co, although the unit may be an AKA for 75A Co reported by a returnee on 20 September 1966.)

4. 1st Sqd, 3d Plt, Q-14-B Co (X-64). Pvt TRAN MIN TAM, Asst Sqd leader, 1st Squad, 3d Plt, Q-14-B Co (X-64), subordinate to DAI LOC (D) Committee, rallied to the DAI LOC (D) Headquarters on 18 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The Q-14 Unit consists of the Q-14-A Co (Political Section of 30 men) and Q-14-B Co (Military Section of 132 men). The Q-14-B Co consists of four platoons of three squads each. The company has one 60mm mortar, one M-60 MG, seven BAR's, two RPD LMG's, four M-79 grenade launchers, M-1 rifles, M-14 rifles, carbines, K-50's and K-44's. The Q-14-A Co was in the vicinity of (AT 828542) and the Q-14-B Co was in the vicinity of (AT 831490). The mission of the Q-14-B Co was to ambush, cut off, and defeat ARVN and Marine units moving through the area. One company of the V-25 Bn is operating in the Q-14's general area.

b. Food is sufficiently supplied by local villagers. Ammo is supplied from NVN and also picked up from the battlefield. There are no medical supplies available. Morale is very poor and the villagers are turning against the VC movement due to air strikes and artillery fires occurring whenever the VC are in the area.

c. To hide rice from ARVN and US Forces, the VC give extra rice to the villagers to hold for them and, if questioned, the villagers claim the rice is theirs. During Operation INDEPENDENCE, the Q-14B Co broke up into platoon, and then squad sized units and moved into secret tunnels. The tunnels were constructed in open areas because the VC feel that the US Forces will not search open areas as thoroughly. Chicken or buffalo manure or pepper is smeared on bamboo air vents to prevent detection by sentry dogs. Vents face east and west so that the time can be estimated by the amount of light entering openings.

d. NVA personnel have been assigned to the company from Main Force units for specific missions. The planned ambush at MY HOA (V) (AT 8555) was to be conducted by a battalion sized unit that is normally responsible for attacking the DANANG Air Base. This unit had four 81mm mortars, four HMG's and six DKZ RR's. This unit was scattered by air strikes that hit MY HOA.

(G-2 Comment: F/2. Elements of the Q.14 Co were contacted in Operation INDEPENDENCE. First report of elements of the V.25 Bn operating with the Q.14 Co. The Q.14 Co was previously reported as being organized in two elements by rallier MUU on 11 December 1966. First report that one element is the Political Branch. Ambush planned at MY HOA possibly involved the R.20 Bn which was contacted in this vicinity during Operation INDEPENDENCE.)

5. 81st Plt, V-11 (3d Co) Co, 105th Bn. Pvt TRAN PHUONG, 2d Sqd, 81st Plt, V-11 Co, 105th Bn, was captured at (BT 037310) by F Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines on 20 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

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a. The 105th Bn is an independent battalion, QUE SON (D) Force. There are three companies in this battalion and three platoons in each company.

b. On 10 February 1967, the V-11 Co was located in SON THUAN (V) (ZC 220342) and when he was captured his platoon was operating independently. He stated he believed his entire platoon was killed during an ambush on 20 February.

c. His squad had the mission of ambushing Americans at SON LOC (V) (BT 059329).

d. There were very few medical supplies and ammunition was in very short supply and that which was available fired badly. The supply of rice was fairly good but there was insufficient fruit. According to the captive the company provided their own food.

e. Replacements came from local guerrillas who are pressed into the service by the VC and morale is not very high because they have to work for the VC.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. Elements of this unit previously reported as operating in this vicinity.)

f. A captured document, "Sapper and Engineer Training Plan for 67" by the Engineer Section, Military Staff, MR IV, dated 13 December 1966, signed by the Commander, Engineer and Sapper Section, Military Staff, MR IV, relates the following:

Item 1: People's Engineer Training Plan for 67, consists of the following parts:

a. Mission:

The development of the People's Engineers [Guerrilla Engineer] was one of the most urgent requirements for the defeat of the Americans and the RVNAF, by increasing attacks on communication axis and rear base installations.

b. Standards:

Making of simple AP and AT mines, and laying of mines, explosive devices, and booby traps.

c. Training time and subjects:

15 to 20 days would be required for training.

Emphasis was to be placed on demonstration and practical work.

Cadre of H4 [Proselyting Section, Military Staff, MR IV] and H5 would assume the training.

Item 2: Directive on Engineer Training for 67, consists of the following parts:

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a. Situation:

In 1966, significant successes were gained in the destruction of the pacification plan but in order to face the far more intensive struggle anticipated for 67, and to secure successes, units were to use every opportunity to train.

b. Mission and training:

The mission consists of wearing down and destroying Americans and RVNAF, and their pacification plan, and gaining control over more people.

The training should be realistic, based on equipment available and the specific missions of units. Personnel of districts would become specialized in the following operations:

Attacks on moored and moving ships.

Mine attacks on pacification personnel, and mechanized units.

Destruction of bridges and communication axes.

Attacks on training, infantry and mechanized units.

Attacks on mechanized units.

c. Training time and subjects:

Time required: 480 hours or 60 days [intermittent training].

The subjects include demolition blocks, trip, electric, non-electric and water mines, charges, fuses and firing devices.

Personnel of H5 to assist units in the training when necessary.

7. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports were reviewed during the period.

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN ANH A (C)	20FEB67	1/5	CIV DEF	BS523794/2D ARVN DIV
HUYNH BAN (C)	7FEB67	UNK	DESERTER	BT056645/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRUONG BAI (C)	19FEB67	D/1/1	UNK	AT986599/I CORPS
PHAM BON (C)	21FEB67	B/1/4	CIV DEF	BS875268
NGUYEN GA (C)	19FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS925265/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE CAC (C)	21FEB67	D/1/1	GUERR	AT979608/I CORPS
PHAN MINH CAM (C)	10FEB67	D/1/1	GUERR	BT001595/CIT
DOAN CANH (C)	19FEB67	CAC	CIV DEF	BT632023/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHEN (C)	22FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS555906/BINH SON(D) HQ
DANG CONG CHIEN (C)	7FEB67	3/1	UNK	BT057745/FURTHER INTER
HUYNH VAN CHU (C)	7FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT056645/DIEN BAN(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
LE CO (C)	26FEB67	I/3/7	CIV DEF	BS797415/QUANG NGAI HOSP
PHAM CUU (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT960590/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
LE VIET CUU (C)	19FEB67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BT458075/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN CU (C)	19FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS925265/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRUONG CUNG (C)	19FEB67	D/1/1	UNK	AT983600/I CORPS CCC
NGUYEN VI DA (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT997556/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
DOAN DE (C)	19FEB67	CAC AT 4	CIV DEF	BT632025/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI DIEU (C)	20FEB67	A/1/5	CIV DEF	BS525786/SON TINH(D) HQ
NGUYEN THE DIEM (C)	25FEB67	M/3/26	2D BN MF	YD451345/RETAINED
NGUYEN VAN DIEM (C)	19FEB67	1/1	UNK	AT988603/I CORPS CCC
THAI VAN DIEM (C)	19FEB67	D/1/5	CIV DEF	BS511792/2D ARVN DIV
VO THI DINH (C)	25FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS504958/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN DINH DIET (C)	19FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT989578/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN DU (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	DE GIO(H)/SON HA(D) HQ
LE DOAN (R)	18FEB67	B/1/7	GUERR	BS646967/QUANG NGAI
DONG DUONG (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT960590/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN DU (C)	19FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS925265/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE DUC (C)	19FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS925265/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI HANG (C)	19FEB67	CAC	CIV DEF	BT653041/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN HIEN (C)	19FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS925265/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM THANH HOANG (R)	19FEB67	---	7 CO	BS490769/2D ARVN DIV
NGUYEN THANH HOAI (C)	24FEB67	3/26	277TH BN	YD449341/A MED
NGO HOAN (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT960950/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THANH HOAI (C)	24FEB67	3/26	UNK	YD449341/FURTHER INTER
TRAN THI HOA (C)	21FEB67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BT455041/LY TIN(D) HQ
DI HOI (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT997556/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
VO HOI (C)	20FEB67	1/5	CIV DEF	BS523794/2D ARVN DIV
LE HUAN (C)	3FEB67	C/1/1	CIV	BT125603/HIEU NHON(D) HQ
NGO THI HUONG (C)	23FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS539908/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGO KHANG (C)	19FEB67	3/1	GUERR	BT067625/ARVN
LE KHOA (C)	16FEB67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN KIEM (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT960590/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN KIEM (C)	20FEB67	G/2/4	CIV DEF	AT942648/HIEU DUC(D) HQ
PHAM KINH (C)	7FEB67	3/1	UNK	BT065631/QUANG NAM SPL SEC
HOANG VAN KHOA (C)	19FEB67	ARVN	22D BN	BS490780/2D ARVN DIV
LE LAM (C)	21FEB67	D/1/1	GUERR	AT979608/I CORPS CCC
HUYNH THI LE (C)	17FEB67	RECON	PW	BS804382/PW III MAF
NGUYEN PHUOC LE (C)	19FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS925265/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHUNG LICH (C)	23FEB67	PCF 16	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON(D) HQ
HO LINH (C)	18FEB67	A/1/5	CIV DEF	BT435173/TAM KY(D) HQ
PHAM PHU LOC (C)	20FEB67	D/1/1	Q15	AT986586/III MAF COL PT
TRUONG LONG (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT995597/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
HUYNH MAI (C)	6FEB67	3/1	UNK	BT065632/ARVN
VO MIM (C)	6FEB67	E/2/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DAI LOC(D) HQ
HUYNH MO (C)	23FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS564937/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGO MOI (C)	21FEB67	B/1/4	CIV DEF	BS875268/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN MU (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT960590/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAM NAM (C)	19FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS925265/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM PHAM (C)	25FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS531939/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN PHUONG (C)	20FEB67	F/2/1	V-11, 105BN	BT037310/ARVN HOSP

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
TRAN XUAN QUANG (C)	21FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	BTO40261/1ST MED
NGUYEN QUAN (C)	23FEB67	1ST RECON	CIV DEF	AT943304/USCM HOSP
HO QUYEN (R)	11FEB67	UNK	GUERR	UNK
CAO SANG (R)	18FEB67			QUANG NGAI
BUI TA (C)	23FEB67	PCF 16	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI TAM (C)	25FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS504958/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THANH TAM (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT960950/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN MINH TAM (C)	18FEB67	UNK	Q14	UNK/DIA LOC(D) HQ
TRUONG TAM (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT995597/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAM THANG (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT960590/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
VO THINH (C)	24FEB67	2/7	CIV DEF	BS571947/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHUNG THU (C)	23FEB67	PCF 16	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO THI TIET (C)	23FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS539908/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN DUC THAM (C)	19FEB67	2/1/1	CIV DEF	AT992600/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN DIEN TRU (C)	20FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ

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CONFIDENTIAL**ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 9-67**

1. GENERAL. Although incidents of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level, there were several significant acts of terrorism during the reporting period. Items of interest include a report concerning the reorganization of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) during 1967, the discovery of an "Assassination Notice" on a VC victim and the VC planned use of floating mines to destroy a bridge.

2. ESPIONAGE. There were no reports of espionage activity during the period.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	1Mar	Highway bridge partially destroyed	YD 175615
QUANG TRI	2Mar	Highway culvert destroyed	YD 597308
QUANG TRI	1Mar	Highway bridge partially destroyed	YD 165611
QUANG TRI	2Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 220634
QUANG TRI	2Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 219636

QUANG NAM. A 26 February report from the 7th Engineer Battalion related that an M-36 crane was partially destroyed by a satchel charge in the vicinity of (AT 971621).

4. POLITICAL. A 25 February report from an intelligence source related that as the result of the loss of key terrain and personnel through both military and political setbacks, the NFLSV has instructed its leading political cadres to change the political line for the coming year. During 1967 the following actions are to be taken:

(1) Those hamlet level agencies which have been destroyed in the past few months will be reorganized; (2) Key cadres will infiltrate every hamlet, village and district administration; (3) Security committees will be established in hamlets and villages to control the peoples' activity and to conduct propaganda programs; (4) Intelligence units shall be established among the people; (5) Guerrilla forces will concentrate for attacks on Revolutionary Development Teams operating in hamlets and villages; (6) As many cadres as possible will be infiltrated into the cities; and (7) Assassination teams will be organized to assassinate or kidnap people acting against the VC.

5. PROPAGANDA. A 26 February report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that VC propaganda leaflets written in Vietnamese were discovered in the vicinity of TAN VINH (H) (YD 248554). The leaflets contained the usual anti-U.S./ARVN themes.

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A 4 March report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that at 2100 on 1 March an unknown number of VC entered TAM LANG (H) (YD 182605) and gathered the local populace for a propaganda lecture. Upon leaving the hamlet the VC partially destroyed highway bridges at (YD 165611) and (YD 175615).

THUA THIEN. A 27 February report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that on 25 February the VC assassinated a villager in AN BANG (H) (ZD 145005). Near the body was an assassination notice signed by the Liberation Front in PHU LOC. (CI Comment: This is the second report of a charge sheet being left by the VC. See Appendix 1.)

A 27 February report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that an unknown number of VC entered TAM VANG (H) (YD 180606) and abducted two villagers. The report went on to state that two civilians were also abducted from CAM VU (H) (YD 185616).

A 28 February report from a usually reliable source related that three VC armed with a rifle, carbine and a sub-machine gun entered DONG HAO (H) (YD 652312) and assassinated a district health cadre and a PF Intelligence Sergeant. In addition, the VC also wounded the deputy hamlet chief and two civilians.

A 1 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that at 0030 on 26 February approximately 20 VC entered VINH VI (H) (YD 945065) and abducted TRUONG LACH, the father of a PF soldier. The village chief stated that LACH had never revealed any information pertaining to VC activity and feels that LACH was abducted because he has a son in the PF's or possibly because he refused to pay VC taxes.

A 2 March report from an intelligence source stated that an estimated VC squad entered CU LAI (H) and assassinated two civilians.

QUANG NAM. A 26 February report revealed that a VN commercial bus detonated a pressure type mine in the vicinity of (AT 943665) which resulted in nine civilians being killed and 35 injured.

A 2 March report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team related that the VC plan to employ floating mines to destroy the bridge located in the vicinity of (AT 946699). (CI Comment: The VC have employed this tactic previously in an attempt to interdict lines of communication.)

QUANG TIN. A 2 March report from an intelligence source related that an estimated VC squad entered a hamlet in the vicinity of (BT 455084) and assassinated one civilian and abducted a VN female.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 9-67

ASSASSINATION NOTICE

NAME: Nguyen The, age 40

POB: Dong Lam (H), Present Address: Thuy Yen (H) (ZD 143002), Loc
Thuy (V), Phu Loc (B), Thua
Thien (P)

Nguyen The is guilty of the following crimes:

a. Under the French rule from 1947 to 1954, he was a cruel soldier of the French. He killed the people, raped the women, and burned the people's houses.

b. Under Diem Nhu, he was a fighting youth cadre. He continued such crimes as threatening the people, killing the people who love the country, and he shot Mr. Chi.

c. Recently he took people's property by telling them he was part of the Liberation Forces, and thus slandering the Liberation Forces.

d. He shamed the Liberation Forces by making the people give him shovels and telling them the shovels would be used in a jungle food production camp for the Liberation Forces.

e. He supports the enemy with information on our situation.

f. He spreads propaganda for the enemy about their pacification program.

According to the people's opinion: Nguyen The committed many crimes.

The Liberation Forces have ordered to punish him.


The Liberation Front in Phu Loc

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12 MARCH 1967

LEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO.10-67



GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

III MAF PERINTREP #10-67

5-11 Mar 67

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III MAF
DANANG, RVN
12 March 1967
Ser: 059667

PERINTREP 10-67

Period Covered: 050001H - 112400H Mar67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheet NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
ND 48-4, ND-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. There were no significant reports of major enemy movements north of or within the DMZ. Enemy activity immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone was centered in three general areas: CON THIEN (YD 1170), southwest of CON THIEN and adjacent to the DMZ, and in the vicinity of Camp CARROLL. A majority of the contacts reported during the week and in the areas mentioned were generated more by Marine and ARVN action than by the enemy.

A total of 26 contacts and sightings were noted exclusive of those resulting from our reconnaissance effort. Of this number, three involved the NVA in estimated company strength and three consisted of separate heavy mortar and rocket attacks against Camp CARROLL. See Annex A for details and Annex B for additional information on rockets. CON THIEN OP was also hit by mortar fire on five separate occasions. The remainder of the ground contacts were with enemy elements of up to platoon size.

A portion of the enemy ground movement appeared residual in nature, although elements of the 812th NVA Regt continued their withdrawal toward the DMZ following last weeks heavy action with Marine units. During the period, Operation PRAIRIE II accounted for 84 KIA (Conf), and 66 (Prob); additionally 14 individual and two crew served weapons were captured.

Aerial photography flown north of the DMZ and along a line (YD 0387) to (YD 1679) on 24 February portrayed continued enemy construction of ground defensive works consisting chiefly of AA positions and underground bunkers. Interpretation was based on comparison with an early February mission.

Extensive ground reconnaissance deployed along a line northeast of THON SON LAM to the KHE SANH combat base reported several sightings and contacts with the enemy. The largest was centered in an area (XD 9962) north and northwest of THON SON LAM where contact was gained with 20 and 70 man NVA groups respectively. On 5 March the KHE SANH combat base was lightly probed from three directions by small elements of the enemy.

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Aerial photography over a sector centered on (YD 2639) southwest of QUANG TRI City revealed what is probably a small enemy bivouac area.

In coastal QUANG TRI (P), three incidents occurred during the reporting period. Two involved attacks by VC units of unknown strength against small PF and RD elements (YD 285673) and (YD 392543). In both cases the enemy broke contact following brief action. Friendly and enemy casualties were moderate. The third incident at (YD 337549) involved the destruction on 10 March of a small road bridge.

Elsewhere in eastern QUANG TRI (P) enemy action appeared directed against the local GVN RD Program in a continuing attempt to disrupt this effort.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. A continuing analysis of intelligence information obtained chiefly from PW interrogation, captured enemy documents and the more reliable agent reports reveals an increasing enemy concern over the effects of local GVN RD Programs. These reports point toward areas such as eastern QUANG TRI (P) and eastern THUA THIEN (P). As an example, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, in a directive aimed at VC guerrilla activity for the year 1967 in the mentioned coastal areas, states, in part, "guerrilla forces will concentrate for attacks on revolutionary development teams operating in hamlets and villages and for support of VC propaganda and political activity." Recent VC initiated activity particularly in the coastal lowland of THUA THIEN (P) appears to bear out such information.

On 7 March the QUANG DIEN (D) Headquarters defended by two RF companies was attacked by an estimated multi-company VC force. Though friendly casualties were light, the District Chief subsequently died of his wounds. In response to this attack an ARVN Operation (LAM SON 23) was initiated. The following action took place at (YD 690313) and (YD 648311) over 8 and 9 March and resulted in 49 VC KIA (Conf), and three PW's; additionally, 18 individual and one crew served weapons were captured.

Further to the south and adjacent to the northwest boundary of the PHU BAI TAOR, VC elements of unknown size blew two bridges on 4 March at (YD 787210) and (YD 759175). Both bridges were guarded by small numbers of PF's. Friendly casualties were heavy; the enemy unknown.

Operation CHINOOK II continued with minor or negative contact with the enemy. Ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported light sightings and contact with the enemy. VC activity in this sector has gradually decreased over the past five reporting periods.

At (YD 903186) and on 11 March, a PF platoon manning defensive positions at the PHU THU Sub-Sector Headquarters was attacked by an estimated VC battalion. The headquarters was overrun and destroyed, and friendly casualties were heavy.

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A RF Company and elements of 2/7 APC were committed as a reaction force and the headquarters was reoccupied approximately three hours after the first attack. Enemy casualties were unknown. VC initiated activity within the PHU BAI TAOR was limited to two minor incidents toward the southern portions of the TAOR. The sector between PHU BAI and DANANG remained relatively quiet.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance within the northern boundary of the DANANG TAOR reported sightings of approximately 30 VC and a contact with 20 VC which resulted in the enemy sustaining four KIA (Conf) as a result of artillery fire.

Farther to the south and east of the THOUNG DUC CIDG Camp an unknown number of VC attacked the THOUNG DUC (D) Headquarters at (ZC 164535) on 11 March. The attack was accompanied by mortar fire and friendly casualties were moderate. The headquarters was destroyed. In the same vicinity and at (ZC 175529), a CIDG patrol made contact with a small VC element in the vicinity of a suspected mortar position. An RF company in the same area also received several rounds of mortar fire.

A substantial ground reconnaissance effort south of the DANANG TAOR reported a distinct increase in enemy activity. A total of approximately 240 VC were observed at various points in this area. Artillery fire was called for in six cases with a total of 33 KIA (Conf) resulting. At (AT 8439) on 8 March an AO brought air strikes against an estimated 300 VC, resulting in 25 VC KIA (Conf).

Southeastern QUANG NAM (P), between the southeastern end of the DANANG TAOR and the QUANG TIN (P) border, saw an increase in the tempo of enemy activity. The VC effort was centered south of DIEN BAN and HOI AN Districts. Ten incidents were reported from this area. Three in the vicinity of HOI AN City involved attacks against RF and PF elements on 7 and 9 March. The engagements were short and enemy casualties light. In the same area three major mining incidents occurred and the PHU PHONG bridge (BT 062512) was partially destroyed. On 10 March at (BT 123478), the MOC BAI OP defended by elements of the 72nd RF Co was attacked by an estimated two VC companies. The RF's drove off the attack with moderate casualties to themselves; enemy casualties were unknown.

Other enemy activity in the same area was limited to more minor harassing actions which included several light mortar attacks. This area south of HOI AN has for the past four reporting periods witnessed a gradual increase in the intensity of enemy activity and represents a focal point of the VC effort in this region.

There was slight decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the DANANG TAOR. No precise pattern of activity was noted although the number of mine and booby trap incidents remained high. Elsewhere in QUANG NAM (P) enemy activity was limited to small scale and isolated harassing actions.

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d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Enemy activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P) remained light. Action noted occurred between TAM KY City and the QUANG NAM (P) border along Highway 1. On 7 and 8 March at (BT 166406) and (BT 176432), four VC were unsuccessful in an attempt to assassinate an RD cadre member and to the east a PF platoon successfully ambushed a VC squad with two VC KIA (Conf). To the south and at (BT 212273), a PF squad patrol was ambushed by a VC platoon on 8 March. Friendly casualties were light; enemy casualties unknown. The other two incidents occurred in the vicinity of TAM KY City. One involved the demolition of a Buddhist living quarters and the other an attempt to blow a bridge. There were no friendly casualties in the first incident and the VC were driven off in the second with light casualties. The bridge was not damaged. Other enemy activity in QUANG TIN (P) was limited to more isolated harassing actions. Light ground reconnaissance west of the CHU LAI TAOR reported negative sightings.

On 5 March Marine Aircraft Group 12 received 52 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in proximity to the CHU LAI air strip. Friendly casualties were light and one aircraft was slightly damaged. There was a decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents within the CHU LAI TAOR. The majority occurred in the southern sector, certainly a normal pattern for this area. Six incidents were recorded in the Korean Marine area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). South of the CHU LAI TAOR and on 6 March a PF platoon at (BS 621788) in defensive positions was attacked by an estimated VC company. The PF called in artillery and the VC were driven off.

The remainder of significant enemy activity in QUANG NGAI (P) was centered west of MO DUC City. In this vicinity on 5 March the NGIA HANH Sub-Sector Headquarters (BS 599640) was attacked by an unknown number of VC. Two small OP's manned by elements of the 715th RF Co were also overrun. The RF's withdrew but subsequently reoccupied their positions and the VC broke contact. Casualties were light.

Extensive aerial photography flown over the eastern portion of the MO DUC (D) and the southern end of the CHU LAI TAOR during late February and early March revealed light to moderate enemy ground construction activity when compared to November and December readouts.

Ground reconnaissance centered in the area (BS 6357) reported light sightings of the enemy. On 6 March a 150 man CIDG patrol north of the MINH LONG Camp was ambushed by a sizeable VC force. A CIDG reaction element committed on the same day was likewise ambushed in the same vicinity. Friendly casualties were heavy. Information obtained from a PW taken during the MINH LONG reaction operation, coupled with information obtained from another returnee, indicates the possibility that elements of the 1st VC Regt took part in the MINH LONG ambush.

Farther to the south, Operation DESOTO continued with light contact with the enemy. Other intelligence covering eastern QUANG NGAI (P) continued to indicate enemy movement or activity of an unspecified nature. The tempo of the enemy effort in the MO DUC (D) area, though down this week, still

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gives every indication of increasing in the future through attacks on smaller and more isolated friendly units.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents during the reporting period dropped almost 50 percent when compared to the last period. The total of 283 incidents consisted of one attack, one ambush, eight acts of sabotage, 13 assaults by fire, 43 mine/booby trap incidents, 102 small unit engagements and 115 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex C.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex C.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex C.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.
 - (1) New Rocket. See Annex A for details.
 - (2) Report of 175mm Rockets. See Annex B.
- e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
27 Feb	(BS 456830)	VC 18th Aid Station	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
1 Mar	(AT 8421)	Storage Area	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3
1 Mar	(BS 428730)	Training Center	Agent Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents decreased substantially when compared to the previous reporting period. A total of 115 incidents were reported with 30 aircraft sustaining 77 hits. The grid square of highest density was (YD 1268). No confirmed cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i. - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Extensive ground reconnaissance north of the KHE SANH combat base and southeast of CON THIEN reported a slight increase

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in enemy sightings over that noted for the previous period. Most of the enemy activity noted was centered in two areas (XD 9361) and (YD 0563). This involved a total of approximately 90 NVA/VC. Several light contacts were also made with small elements of NVA. Ground reconnaissance deployed along the northern slopes of the BA LONG Valley produced nothing of significance.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Reconnaissance elements deployed due west of HUE City and the northwest approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR reported insignificant sightings. Activity in the CHINOOK II area was also very light. Following a four week trend this sector has remained relatively quiet.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Light reconnaissance within the northwest portion of the DANANG TAOR in the vicinity of (AT 8582) reported sightings of the enemy totalling approximately 50 VC. One contact, in the same vicinity, was also made with an estimated 20 man VC element. A heavy reconnaissance effort south of the DANANG TAOR reported a sharp increase in enemy activity when compared to previous reporting periods. A total of approximately 240 VC were observed and, at (AT 8439), an AO called in by a reconnaissance insert spotted a group of approximately 300 VC. The AO directed several air strikes on this group with 25 VC KIA (Conf) resulting.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity was again very light in the area west of the northwestern approaches to that portion of the CHU LAI TAOR located in QUANG TIN (P). This sector has now been quiet for the last five reporting periods. South of the TAOR and west of MO DUC City (BS 6357) ground reconnaissance reported light sightings of the enemy. A reduced reconnaissance effort carried out in conjunction with Operation DESOTO produced little of significance.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the area indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
6 Mar	(BS 420293)	40,000 (Destroyed)	USSF

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex C.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex C.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex C.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex C.
- e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses declined sharply during this reporting period when compared to last weeks record high and included 279 KIA

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(Conf), 243 KIA (Prob), 16 VC PW and one VC returnee. Weapons losses were 28 individual weapons and two crew served weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g. - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. On 5 March a cold front passed over I Corps producing a generally unfavorable weather picture. Drizzle and fog predominated with fairly long periods of reduced visibility and extensive low ceilings covering a major portion of the tactical zone.

On 8 March a shifting of the cold front brought a general clearing throughout the Corps area and again on 9 March an increase in the speed of the flow aloft created unfavorable weather over a major portion of the central Corps area particularly in the lowlands and central piedmont. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	64	66	73	72
Low	58	59	66	66
Rainfall (total)	.67	1.03	.03	2.97
Visibility (miles)	4	4	7	4
Winds (knots)	11	7	3	5

k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex D.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex E.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 9-67.

B. S. Read Jr.

B. S. READ Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ATTACK ON CAMP CARROLL
- B. REPORT OF 175MM ROCKET IN SVN
- C. ORDER OF BATTLE
- D. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE BOKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO 366TH FTW	1
CME (CODE A02)	2	CO RLT 26	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 76.4	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG PROJECT OREGON	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 8TH RR FU	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 9TH MAB	1	I DASC DANANG	1
		III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (MORTAR/ROCKET ATTACK ON CAMP CARROLL) TO III MAF PERINTREP 10-67

1. On 6-7 March 1967, artillery positions at Camp Carroll (YD 082543) were subjected to three separate attacks by fire of 82mm mortars and two types of rockets, as follows: First attack between 062358H and 070058H consisted of 350-400 rounds of mortar/rocket fire; second attack between 070407H and 070510H consisted of 35 rounds of mortar/rocket fire; and third attack between 070630H and 070648H consisted of 35-50 rounds of mortar/rocket fire. These attacks marked the second occasion in which the enemy has employed large caliber rockets in I CTZ. See III MAF PERINTREP 9-67.

2. The estimated total of 420-485 mortar/rocket rounds received saturated the area with no discernible pattern or center of impact. Of this total, 209 rounds are attributed to rocket fire.

3. The mortars/rockets were launched from an unknown number of positions north and northwest of Camp Carroll. During the attacks, muzzle flashes were observed at (YD 0061), (YD 007578), (YD 035575), (YD 045570), (YD 050574) and (YD 056574). Counter mortar fire resulted in at least one secondary explosion. For graphic depiction, see Appendix 1.

4. A brief description of the two types of rockets employed by the enemy in the attack on Camp Carroll is as follows:

a. Round 1 - Folding fin-type rocket with a motor casing diameter of 4.85 inches (approximately 121mm) and a warhead(base) and fin assembly diameter of 5.275 inches (approximately 134mm). The motor casing is made of aluminum alloy or light weight metal harder than aluminum. The warhead has a streamlined point detonating fuze with plastic nose tip. The nozzle has seven straight venturi arranged with one centrally located and the other six equidistant around the circumference. The nozzle adapter throat has a heat resistant liner. Cyrillic letter (D, G, L, P) inspection marks are stamped on rocket motor components. A total of 88 of these rockets impacted in the Camp Carroll area, 83 of which were within the perimeter. See Appendix 2.

b. Round 2 - Fin stabilized 100mm rocket similar to the U.S. 4.5 inch barrage rocket with eight canted venturi in the nozzle. The casing is stenciled with Chinese characters (translation: "Flaming Arrow"), "TNT" and "1953-9". A total of 121 of these rockets impacted in Camp Carroll area, 73 of which were within the perimeter.

5. At 070840H, an AO reported sighting a group of 20 enemy moving north at (YD 056665) and carrying 3.5 inch rocket tubes. At 070925H, another AO reported sighting a group of 10 enemy moving north at (YD 0565) and carrying a blue-grey tube.


APPENDIXES:

- 1 - GRAPHIC DEPICTION
- 2 - ARTIST CONCEPTION OF ROCKET

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GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF CAMP CARROLL ATTACK




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**ARTIST CONCEPTION OF NEW ROCKET
EMPLOYED IN ATTACK ON CAMP CARROL 6-7 MAR 67**



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ANNEX B (REPORT OF 175MM ROCKET IN SVN) TO III MAF PERINTREP 10-67

1. Information concerning the possible infiltration of units to RVN equipped with surface to surface rockets and the basic characteristics of the type rocket involved was contained a CMIC report of 7 October 1966, as follows:

"Source was drafted on 10Jan66. He had never served in the Army previously due to ill health and a weak heart. Source received basic training in QUINH WU (V), NINH BINH (P). The duration of this training was two weeks and he was then transferred to the 724B Regt which was located in CAM BOI (D), HOA BINH (P) (exact location unknown). Source remained here until he began infiltration. Here he received two weeks of political indoctrination and three days of training on the DKZ 66 recoilless rifle. He was then allowed to rest for one month prior to beginning infiltration.

Source later admitted that this recoilless rifle was actually a type of surface to surface rocket. He did not know why they called it a DKZ 66, but the cadre had told them that it was a new weapon that they had only acquired in 1966. The three days training on the DKZ 66 only included the basic characteristics of the weapon. He stated that he had never seen this weapon fired but that one week prior to his arrival his battalion had fired one. Source also stated that only members of his unit were allowed in the area where they received training. He was told that the rocket had a minimum range of four kilometers and a maximum range of 10 kilometers. The rocket had a destruction radius of 50 meters and it exploded into 1000 pieces of shrapnel. His friends told him that when triggered this rocket left a trail of fire and smoke three kilometers along, and when firing it the team had to sit in a trench or foxhole three meters away. He did not know the speed of this rocket or the altitude at which it traveled. Training received on this weapon was from 1Lt NGUYEN VAN SUI, who was also the company political officer. Source did not know where Lt SUI had received his training. Source stated there were no foreign advisors present during the training and he did not know the manufacturer of this rocket. There were no markings on the rocket or launcher, but there was some writing which looked like Russian on the box in which the launcher came.

The tripod and launcher were made of cast iron and they weighed 27 kgs each (see Appendix 1). The projectile was made of some type of aluminum similar to that which is used to make planes, was silver colored and had three fins. The rocket also had a nose on it which was black. The rocket weighed 45 kgs.

The launcher was round like a cannon and had one stabilizer bar on the inside to stabilize the rocket after it was inserted. The bore was smooth except for one groove which spiralled in a long arc making one complete revolution inside. The launcher was open on both ends and the rocket was loaded through the back. The launcher had an elevation and traverse adjusting mechanism. The projectile had three fins which were depressed into the rocket and were held in this position by a cord. Upon loading the rocket, the cord was automatically cut and one of the fins inserted into the groove. In the rear of the rocket were two terminals to which were attached two wires. These wires were attached to a battery (voltage unknown)

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and to a small triggering device which was about the size of a pack of cigarettes. This triggering device had some numbers on it, but source did not know how it operated (see Appendixes 2 and 3).

Source stated he had only seen a dummy projectile and he did not know what type of fuel it used. The rocket could not be controlled in flight. The distance between the launcher and the targets was obtained by a reconnaissance squad about a week prior to the attack. Each company had a six man reconnaissance squad. Source's battalion had 18 rocket launchers and there was one 14-man squad for each launcher. There were four men to fire the weapon, four men to dig emplacements, one cook and five guards and ammo bearers. Source was an ammo bearer. The four men who fired the rocket had received additional training to enable them to compute the distance between the launching site and target. Source was told that it takes approximately five minutes to load the rocket and fire it. During an attack the reconnaissance squad was supposed to be located near the target and maintain radio contact with the company command post, who in turn would be in touch with the platoon leader, who would relay the messages to the rocket crews.

Source began infiltration with this battalion in March 1966 and they carried launchers to RVN. It took two men to carry each launcher and two men to carry each tripod. Source stated they did not bring the rockets with them and he did not know if they were already in RVN or would come later. They infiltrated through LAOS and CAMBODIA by foot and arrived in PLEIKU (P), RVN in Aug 66. Here source had malaria. He stated his battalion left him here and continued south. Source saw an American helicopter flying by and he waved to it and it came and picked him up. He was then taken to the PLEIKU CHIEU HOI Center. He did not know where his battalion was going to be located in RVN but he had heard it was going to a place called X-9 near the HAI YEN Secret Zone. While in CAMBODIA source saw the 1st Bn of the 724B Regt. They also had the same type of weapons. Source did not know how many battalions had these type of weapons.

Interrogators Comments: Interrogator was told about this source by returnee NGUYEN NGOC QUE. QUE stated that NGHI had told him, while at the PLEIKU CHIEU HOI Center, that this rocket weighed 70kgs, its length was 4m 50cm, it had a minimum range of 10km and a maximum range of 20km, that source's regiment had a Chinese LTC with it, that the destruction radius of this rocket was 500m, that source's battalion was coming to the area west of SAIGON and BIEN HOA, that the source was a Sgt and not a Pvt, that the rockets had been sent ahead of the launchers by truck to RVN and that the source had seen this weapon test fired in NVN. Upon further interrogation, source stated that he had not told QUE anything pertaining to the rocket and he was telling the interrogator the truth."

2. Source of the above information was Pvt NGUYEN DAC NGHI, 4th Sqd, 2d Plat, 5th Co, 24th Bn, 724B Regt, 351st Div. CMIC evaluated the report as F-6.

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(G-2 Comment: The rocket described by source bears certain similarities to the rocket reconstructed from fragments recovered at Camp CARROLL. Although of smaller size (approximately 134mm vice 175mm), the latter rocket appeared to be made of "some type of aluminum similar to that which is used to make planes, was silver in color and had three fins." It also had seven vents in the rear, positioned as shown in Appendixes 3 and 4.)


APPENDIXES:

- 1 - ROCKET LAUNCHER
- 2 - ROCKET AND TRIGGERING DEVICE
- 3 - ROCKET AND LAUNCHER
- 4 - SKETCH OF ROCKET VENTS

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
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
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ROCKET



TRIGGER DEVICE



ROCKET (NOT TO SCALE)

- A. FIN (APPROX) 4cm
- B. ELECTRICAL TERMINALS
- C. ALUMINUM CASING
- D. NOSE (BLACK COLORED)

TRIGGERING DEVICE:
APPROX SCALE SIZE

- A. ELECTRICAL TERMINALS
- B. NUMBERS
- C. METAL CASING

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

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
ROCKET AND LAUNCHER

ONE FULL
RIFLING TURN



TRIGGERING
INPUT
TERMINALS

CONNECTING
TERMINALS




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SKETCH OF ROCKET FROM THE REAR, APPROX
SCALE SIZE (WITH FINS RETRACTED).

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ANNEX C (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 10-67

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 112400H MAR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	7	2,494	2	1,300			9	3,794
Battalions (Infantry)	20	9,040	12	4,500	6	1,950	38	15,490
Battalions (other)	10	2,190	3	1,275			13	3,465
Separate Companies					29	2,665	29	2,665
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,024		7,075		4,615		27,714
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	Unk					1	Unk
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					6	675	6	675
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						1,075		1,075
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
COMBINED TOTAL STRENGTH		16,524		7,075		6,590		30,189

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2. (C) ESTIMATED MILITIA STRENGTH AS OF 17 FEB 67.

<u>PROVINCES</u>	<u>GUERRILLA FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
QUANG TRI	2,274	4,687	937	7,898
THUA THIEN	2,807	7,988	1,597	12,392
QUANG NAM	4,601	13,026	2,606	20,233
QUANG TIN	3,324	8,809	1,761	13,894
QUANG NGAI	4,134	13,516	2,703	20,353
TOTAL STRENGTH	17,140	48,026	9,604	74,770

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3. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 112400H MAR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000 #2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	180ct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	210ct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	Good	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
003rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt #3	NVA	C	1,984	Poor	3km Radius YD 0572	3km Radius YD 0572	4Mar67
Regt Hq and Support	NVA	C	794		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0864	2Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	250	Ineff.	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 063682	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C				YD 102632	1Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
3rd Co	NVA	C				YD 081665	4Mar67
4th Co (Support)	NVA	C					

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
5th Bn	NVA	C	470		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 070685	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C					
2nd Co	NVA	C					
3rd Co	NVA	C					
4th Co	NVA	C				Area YD 0768	4Mar67
6th Bn	NVA	C	470		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0768	4Mar67
U/I Wire Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	Good	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280		DMZ Area	YD 0768	4Mar67
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500		YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist. and coastal area	24Feb67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500		Hai Lang (D)	YD 4054 - YD 4259	24Feb67
H.99	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	24Feb67
Cam Le Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400	Fair	Thua Thien (P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720	YD 5720	20Jan67
800th Bn	MF	C	300	Good	Phong Dien (D)	YD 690342	7Mar67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400	Poor	YD 6318	ZC 0595	24Feb67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400	Good	YD 5642	YD 402578	28Feb67
804th Bn	MF	C	400	Good	Phu Loc (D)	YC 904998	18Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 7030	YD 690342	7Mar67
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu THU (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	Fair	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 To BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 935325	17Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	150	Fair	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	ZC 2070	2Mar67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400		Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	Excel	ZC 135280	BT 094643	28Feb67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 037310	20Feb67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	Poor	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	50	Poor	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67
H.31 Co	LF	PR	125		ZC 2149		
H.54 Co	LF	PR	200		AT 8658	AT 8658	2Nov66

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460	Fair	Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		E Hiep Duc (D)		
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		Quang Tin (P)	AT 9818	26Sep66
					W Son Tinh (D)		
					Quang Ngai (P)	BS 4877	17Feb67
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	Poor	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	220	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	200	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BS 4478	18Feb67
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	NVA	C	220	Poor	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	70	Ineff.	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	18Feb67
2nd Bn, (3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	Fair	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh (D)	5Feb67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	Good	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	MF	C	90	Good	Tam Ky (D)	BT 441081	13Jan67
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov66
A10 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
A13 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
A16 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
A19 Co	LF	C	140		BT 2810		
A21 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		
A34 Co	LF	C	40		BT 0303		
Tra Son Co	LF	C	50		AS 8799		
Tra Ha Co	LF	C	40		BS 1499		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/Kontum (P) Border	12KM SW Hau Duc (D) HQ AS 9080	12Feb67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,800	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775-BS 5273	19Feb67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 4775-BS 5273	19Feb67
40th Bn	MF	C	100	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775-BS 5273	19Feb67
60th Bn	MF	C	100	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775-BS 5273	19Feb67
70th Bn	MF	C	500	Fair	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775-BS 5273	19Feb67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	Poor	Son Ha (D)	BS 5560	5Mar67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	Poor	Tra Bong (D)	BS 4877	19Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 5581	19Feb67
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	Poor	Son Tinh (D)	BS 4877	19Feb67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	Poor	Son Tinh (D)	BS 5077	19Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	Poor	Tra Bong (D)	BS 5581	19Feb67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2km RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 724575	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,050		BS 7135	BS 7135	26Feb67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		BS 7135	BS 7135	26Feb67
7th Bn	NVA	C	300		BS 7135	BS 7135	26Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		BS 7135	BS 7135	26Feb67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 7135	BS 7135	26Feb67
20th Bn	MF	C	400	Excel	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	Excel	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	Fair	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	595	Excel	BS 6436	BS 6436	23Jan67
20th Co (Bn Hq)	MF	C	105	Excel	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
30th Co	MF	C	120	Excel	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
40th Co	MF	C	90	Excel	BS 3377	BS 3377	23Jan67
50th Co	MF	C	100	Excel	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
60th Co	MF	C	90	Excel	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Son Tinh (D)	W Son Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 7743	2Mar67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #4	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	CR 032695	20Oct66
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BR 5887	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 785643	5Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 5984	3Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8165	10Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7864	5Jan67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page C-3.
- #3. Strength figures are adjusted as estimated losses for the 812th Regt in contact with friendly units 27 Feb - 4 March. Adjustments are approximate and will be changed as new information is received. See paragraph 7 of this annex for summary of contact.
- #4. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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4. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 112400H MAR 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung THANH
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	31445XB 31450SB 31450XB		CO-Sr Capt HAI
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cua Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt 4th Regt K.4 Bn; Cua Long Bn		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn				CO-Nguyen KHUONG XO-Bui Dinh PHONG
1st Co	Doan-1			CO-1st Lt Le TIEN XO-Linh Xuan TIEU PO-Vo Dinh HOI
2nd Co	Doan-2			
3rd Co	Doan-3	31623		CO-1st Lt Tran Xuan TOAN XO-Le Minh KOANH PO-Nguyen Ngo CHUNG
4th Co (Hvy Wpns Support)	Doan-4		12-82mm Mort 6-HMG Chicom 7.62mm Type 57 9-AAMG Unk-B-10 DK-RR(82mm)	

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UNIT

5th Bn

6th Bn

2nd Co

3rd Co

4th Co (Hvy
Wpns)
90th Regt (Hq)

AKA

K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn

K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn;
Cuu Long Bn
Doan-2

Doan-3

Doan-4

Song Houng(or Hong);
3rd Regt; Cong Truong
3; Song Chu; Song Chu
Long; Cuu Long; Cua
Viet

LDN

31634 K.T.

5330(?)

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

Unk-82mm Mort
Unk-75mm RR
Unk-60mm Mort
Unk-57mm RR
Unk-12.7mm AA MG
Unk-MG

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PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Van
PHONG (PHUNG)
PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van
BICH
CO-Cao Xuan HAI

CO-1st Lt AN
XO-W.O. KHA
PO-1st Lt TRUC
CO-1st Lt MAI
XO-Lt Thai Van LAP
CO-1st Lt CHUONG

CO-THIEP
XO-CUONG
PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	
13th ARTY Bn				CO-Luu Van MAN CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
14th AA Bn				
15th Engr Bn				
16th Sig Bn				
19th Med Bn				
808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Van KIEM XO-SANH
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO-SAM
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Vo BA PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist. Force 10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri H.30		Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47	CO-Cao TUNG CO-NGHIA
C.40 Co				
Can Lo Co				

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North	41,000FM-		CG-MG HUM
	Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu	41,300FM		XO-Nguyen Van THU
	Bac; K-500; Di Hai	Di Hai		PO-Le TRUONG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th			CO-Maj CUONG
	Worksite; Ham Tu			XO- Capt AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?)	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-75mm RR Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40	CO-Capt Nguyen DE
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?); 2nd Bn (?)		4-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 6-AA Wpns 2-57 RR 6-B-90 4-82mm Mort	CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10; 3rd Bn(?) 80.T Bn		3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG	CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DK2	CO-THANH XO-NHON
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		CO-Capt Huong THI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR 6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG 2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG; Unk-K-50	
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5			CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			CO-SON XO-THU

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20825		CO-Capt THAO
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn (?) Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20		1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-CHI
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?)	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn	2116 Quang Da	1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co X-64 (?)			CO-MOI
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dai Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai	20,601GM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn GK-32	Nam Hai 20800GM	18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT

RQ24 Bn (ENGR)

72nd Bn

2nd Bn

14th Co

74th Co

70th Co, (409th
Sapper Bn)

706th Co

A10 Co

A13 Co

A16 Co

A19 Co

A21 Co

A34 Co

Tra Son Co

Tra Ha Co

AKA

GK-40

Binh Da; X2; K-2;

74th Bn (?)

A-14; V-14

V-74; V-20;

74th Dist Force Co

7th Co; X-70 Co

106th Co-

K51; 107; F-14;

D-21; Thang Binh

D-22

C-73

Tam Ky; D-23 Co

C-75; Phi Po A-21

Bn; Flying Tiger A-21

LBN

P.O. 20142

F.G.M.

Bac Hien

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

1-60mm Mort

1-30 Cal MG

1-57mm RR (?)

Unk-M-79

Unk-K-50 SMG

2-60mm Mort

1-57mm RR

6-MG

1-60mm Mort

2-MG

PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG

CO-Tran Van CAO

CO-Capt THAU

CO-THANH

XO-Tran TIEN

PO-PHUONG

CO-Nguyen DUOC

XO-Vo Ly TA

PO-Nguyen MAI

CO-KHOA

XO-Nguyen THAN

PO-Anh VU

CO-Hong LE

CO-MANH

CO-LtGen Nguyen DON

XO-Col TA

CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH

XO-LtCol Chu An TAN

CO-PHUNG

XO-Nguyen BAC

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)

BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;

F-550; Co Hoa

20,100GM-

21,900GM

Bac Hien

1st VC Regt (Hq)

Cong Truong 1; H-800;

PS/40; 108th Regt

Cuu Long Regt

Thanh Mai; Bach Dong

Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai,

3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007

Bau Bang

60th Bn

Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st

Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong

Hai; Bong Trang (?)

Binh-Gia

20,735CT.

An Giang

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UNIT

70th Bn

90th Bn

21st Regt (Hq)

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

2nd VC Regt

93rd Bn

95th Bn

97th Bn

22nd NVA Regt

AKA

35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;
Chu Song; Truong Son
70; Inter-mt White
Tiger Bn; F-07; 103
Ounh Gia (?); Bong
Trang

Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son
Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn;
Phi Doi 2008; Thuan
Binh; Song Hong(?)

Bach Ma; Worksite 21;
36th; A-21; Cong Truong
21; 2nd Regt; 36th
Regt; A-21; Cong Treung
7 (?)

11th Workshop; 11th Bn
135th Bn; 22nd Bn
33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)
Quyet Chien; Worksite II;
Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600;
Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song
Hong; 1st Regt;

707th Infil Gp;
Chi Ba (Sisters Three);
H-21 Bn

705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam;
H.58; Ba Minh; Thong
Rang 260

703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn
in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23;
H.25

Quyet Tam; 209th Infil
Gp; Code No 527; Cong
Doan; Song Hong (Labor
Union); Song Ba; 3rd
Regt

LBN

6240

6340TL (old)
21164GM (new)

21.141VM
Binh Dinh (P)

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

3-81mm Mort
4-60mm Mort
5-MG
4-57mm RR

17-81mm Mort
Unk-75mm RR
Unk-60mm Mort

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PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Duc CONG
XO-SrCapt THUA
PO-Duan Cong THANH

CO-Ho Thanh THI
XO-Vo Ngoc CAM

CO-Pham KIET
XO-Dang Cong KICH
PO-TIEN

CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
CO-KHANH
XO-HOANG
PO-HA

CofS-TRI
CO-Dang DOAN
XO-BONG
PO-SINH
CO-VINH
XO-AN

PO-NGOAN
CofS-LUONG
CO-VINH
CO-BINH
PO-OANH

CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP
XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or
KHANG
PO-Ho Si LOC
CofS-Capt THANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM CofS-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516; Inter-Gp 8			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		CO-Maj KIM
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135CM 20.139CM Bac Hien 2048; NQ Ba Hao HT 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38			
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Work- site; 2nd Bn (?)			
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141CM- 20.144CM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa X2424 Bac Hien for- PO 20142 AGM Bac Hien PO 20142 BGM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
20th Co	X-20; 2d Co			CO-BUU
30th Co	3d Co; V-30 Co			CO-Dinh Dieu PHAN XO-Trinh LANH PC-NHUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Co	4th Co; V-40 Co	PO 20142 CGM Bac Hien		CO-GIAO XO-Tuan KIET PO-Ngoc BINH CO-VAN XO-HUNG PO-LOC
50th Co	5th Co; V-50 Co	PO 20142 DGM		XO-CONG PO-Nguyen Van LUC CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC
60th Co	6th Co; V-60 Co	PO 20142 EGM Bac Hien		
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-He Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU CO-MY CO-CHUNG XO-NAM PO-ANH
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn		2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 6-Carabines 3-BAR's 6-Carabines Unk-SMG Unk-K-40	CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn	22,422		
21st Co	T-21; H-40			
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hem Thu 21618M		
C.17 Co	Me Duc Co; C-217 Co			
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			
T.18 Co	Sen Tinh Dong (West)			
P.31 Co	T.19 Co			
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Sen Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Beng Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn 400th Mort Bn	513 Infil Gp Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1538 1541		CO-Le Van DUYET CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CIM
600th Med Bn 90th Eng Bn 18th NVA Regt	Inter-Det 600 Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?) 263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn	1548 7173 DS or 21155 GM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
7th Bn				CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-SrCapt NHUONG XD-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANH Cofs-LUONG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			CO-LON XD-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG

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The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ
803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT

6th NVA REGT
800th VC BN
2ND DIV HQ
3RD NVA REGT
21ST REGT HQ
1ST BN, 21ST REGT
70TH BN, 1ST REGT
409TH SAPPER BN
1506TH ENGR BN

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6. During the period three units were added to the Order of Battle as confirmed units. Three units were changed from confirmed to reported status.

a. Units confirmed.

(1) The 506 "B" Sapper Company is accepted as a confirmed unit.

(a) Sources: LE QUANG TAM, 36th Bn, (defected to Duc Quang (V), Me Duc (D), 27 Feb 66). PHAM DAO, 409th Sapper Bn, (defected to Son Trung (V), Son Tinh (D), 31 Oct 66). NGUYEN PHUOC RAN, 21st Co, (defected to 2nd ARVN Div, Quang Ngai City, 21 Nov 66). NGUYEN DUC THANG, 139th Bn, (defected to Tu Thuan (V), Tu Nghia (D), 12 Dec 66). HUYNH CONG BA, 19th Co, (defected to Phuoc Duc (H), Me Duc (D), 14 Dec 66). TRAN VAN CONG, 506 "B" Sapper Co, (defected to Tra Binh (H), Son Kim (V), Son Tinh (D)).

(b) AKA's: H.42 Co.

(c) Structure: 506 "B" Sapper Co, Str: 80.

1. C.O. - CHUNG
2. X.O. - NAM
3. P.O. - ANH
4. 1st Plt Ldr - THUAN
5. Asst Plt Ldr - AN (KIA)
6. 2nd Plt Ldr - THANH
7. Asst Plt Ldr - MINH

(d) Weapons: Three BAR's, six Carbines, SMG's and K-50's.

(e) LBN: Hoan Tu, 21618M, Ba Had

(f) Unit History:

1. Early 1965 - Operated in Tu Nghia, Son Tinh, and Binh Son districts. Attacked Nui Gioi outpost
2. Nov 65 - Attacked Nui Gioi outpost again

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3. 19 Dec 65 - Camped at (BS 570795)
4. 19 Feb 66 - Moved to An Loc vic (BS 705750)
5. Late Mar 66 - Moved to Son Tinh (D) to defend against ARVN/USMC operations (Operation Indiana)
6. 4 Apr 66 - Moved to Thuan (V)
7. 8 Nov 66 - Attacked Chieu Hoi Center (BS 662699) in Quang Ngai (P)

(2) The 506 "A" Sapper Company is accepted as a confirmed unit

(a) Sources: LE QUANG TAM, 38th Bn, (defected to Duc Quang (V), Mo Duc (D), 27 Feb 66). TRAN LOI, 48th Bn, (captured at Dinh Duc (V), Binh Son (D), 9 Apr 66). NGUYEN THONG, 506th Co, (defected to Tu Thuan (V), Tu Nghia (D), 10 May 66). NGUYEN PHUOC RAN, 21st Co, (defected to 2nd ARVN Div, Quang Ngai City, 21 Nov 66). NGUYEN DUC THANG, 139th Bn (defected to Tu Thuan (V), Tu Nghia (D), 12 Dec 66).

(b) AKA's: Unit 506.

(c) Structure: 506 "A" Sapper Co, Str: 90.

1. C.O. - MY
2. X.O. - HAC
3. P.O. - TRUOC
4. Med.O. - CHINH
5. 1st Plt Ldr - AN
6. Asst Plt Ldr - LONG

(d) Weapons: Six Carbines, three BAR's, SMG's and K-50's.

(e) Unit History:

1. Mar 66 - Reconned Nui Dat outpost (BS 735470)
2. 2 Apr 66 - Attacked Nui Dat outpost
3. Jul 66 to date - Operating in Mo Duc District

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(f) 506 "A" Sapper Co currently carried as operating in Me Duc (D) at approx coord (BS 7057).

(3) The 21st Independent Company is accepted as a confirmed unit.

(a) Sources: NGUYEN NGOC TRINH, 3rd Sqd, 1st Plt, 21st Independent Company, (defected to Son Tinh (D) on 21 Nov 66). NGUYEN PHUOC RAN, Asst Admin NCO, H-40 Company, (defected to 2nd ARVN Div, Quang Ngai City on 5 Dec 66). HA VAN BA, T-21 Company, (captured on 17 Feb 67 vic (BS 689976)).

(b) AKA's: H-40 Company; T-20 Company.

(c) Structure: 21st Independent Company, Str: 130.

1. C.O. - HO KHANH DU
2. X.O. - HA THANH LIEM
3. P.O. - NGUYEN VAN HU
4. 1st Plt Ldr - MINH
5. 2nd Plt Ldr - KY
6. 3rd Plt Ldr - THANH

(d) Weapons: Two 60mm Mortars, two LMG's, nine AR's, K-50's and K-44's.

(e) LBN: 22,422.

(f) Unit History:

1. Nov 64 - Attacked Son Quang (H) (BT 715824)
2. Feb 65 - Attacked Son My (H) (BS 732782)
3. Oct 65 - Attacked Binh Key (H) (BS 705925)
4. Jan 66 - Attacked Binh Thuy (H) (BS 630935)
5. Jan 66 - Attacked Binh Van (H) (BS 618945)

(g) 21st Independent Company is currently carried as operating in Eastern Son Tinh/Binh Son districts vic (BS 690895) to (BS 712945).

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b. The following three VC units are changed from a confirmed to a reported status:

(1) UNIT	STRENGTH	CATEGORY	LAST REPORT
96th Company	100	C	25 Aug 66
206th Company	100	C	24 Oct 65
614th Company	130	C	27 Feb 66

(2) No hard intelligence has been collected on these units from interrogation reports or captured documents for the past year.

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7. The following report is a summary and evaluation of reports received on the 3rd Mar Div and ARVN contacts with enemy forces in the northern Quang Tri/DMZ area (between Route 9 and the DMZ west of Con Thien) during the period 28 Feb - 4 Mar.

a. As of 10 March interrogation reports have been received and evaluated on the following PW's:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE CAPTURED</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>REPORT</u>
NGUYEN KHAC MINH	1 Mar	YD 133606	2nd Co, Engr Bn, 324B Div (attached to 4th Bn)
TRAN DUY CHIN	1 Mar	YD 102632	1st Co, 4th Bn, U/I Regt, 324B Div
PHAN VAN THI	3 Mar	YD 075665	Mortar Co, 812th Regt
HOANG NHO	3 Mar	YD 075665	2nd Flt, Comm. Co., 812th Regt
LE THONG HAI	3 Mar	YD 075665	2nd Co, 4th Bn, 812th Regt
PHAM VAN THANG	4 Mar	YD 083644	1st Co., 15th Engr Bn, 812th Regt, (attached to 6th Bn)
CHU QUANG LAM	4 Mar	Approx YD 070680	3rd Co, 5th Bn 812th Regt
NGO DUC KHUONG	4 Mar	YD 065680	3rd Co, 4th Bn, 812th Regt
LE VAN HAO	4 Mar	YD 065680	3rd Co, 4th Bn, 812th Regt
LE VAN TAO	4 Mar	YD 081665	3rd Co, 4th Bn, 812th Regt

b. The following significant sightings and contacts were made with the enemy during the period.

<u>REPORT</u>	<u>COORDINATE</u>	<u>DTG</u>
Recen OBS 4 NVA on trail. Then contacted est 150.	YD 073614	270956H

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Contacted 20 NVA	YD 098614	271430H
Contacted 40 NVA	YD 088615	271445H
AO sighted 50 NVA	YD 101617	280635H
Contacted estimated Co	YD 075622	280930H
AO sighted 200 NVA	YD 0665	281510H
Contacted unknown number NVA	YD 101618	281815H
Contacted 30 NVA	YD 106634	010445H
Sighted 40-50 VC	YD 102639	011530H
Contacted unknown number NVA	YD 101612	012316H
Contacted NVA Co	YD 104636	021250H
Contacted NVA Co	YD 085645	021730H
AO sighted 200 NVA	YD 055688	030702H
AO sighted 200 NVA	YD 084663	030702H
AO sighted 250 NVA	YD 071668	030730H
Contacted 50 NVA	YD 076667	031245H
Contacted 60 NVA	YD 076667	031345H
AO sighted 30-40 NVA	YD 071689	040720H
Contacted NVA Co	YD 065680	040800H

c. Unit Identifications. The captives identify their units in the 812th Regt as the 4th Bn, (5 POW's), 5th Bn (1 POW), 6th Bn (1 POW attached from Engr Bn), U/I Mortar Co (1 POW) and Wire Plt, Comm Co (1 POW). Identification was also made on the 15th Engr Bn, 324B Div (2 POW's).

d. Total KIA (C) were reported as 516 for the five day period. It appears that the 4th Bn sustained the brunt of the fighting and therefore has been assessed the majority of the casualties.

The KIA (C) are assessed as follows: (NOTE: There is no hard intelligence to confirm this estimated breakdown).

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Regt HQ	15
4th Bn	300
5th Bn	80
6th Bn	80
Support Units	41

e. For an estimate of approximate total WIA, not returnable to the battlefield, a 1.5 factor of the KIA (C) is used. The total WIA estimate is 774. These casualties are not assessed to any unit.

f. Conclusions.

(1) The 812th Regt Hq was probably located in area YD 082645 to YD 073665 during the period 1-3 March respectively. All three battalions were engaged by friendly forces, with the 4th Bn absorbing the majority of the action.

(2) The 812th Regt with its battalions has retreated into the DMZ in the area approximately eight kilometers west of Con Thien. However, some unknown elements are still believed to be on the flanks of the combat area.

(3) Inflicted casualties, KIA (C) were 516. WIA (not returnable to the battlefield) are estimated at 774.

(4) Overall combat effectiveness of the 812th Regt is rated as poor. The 4th Bn is rated as ineffective. The 5th and 6th Bn's are rated as fair.

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ANNEX D (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO III MAP
PERINTREP 10-67

1. 506th Sapper Co. A medic, TRAN CONG VAN, 506th Sapper Bn, defected to ARVN at QUANG NGAI City on 21 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. Initially VAN joined the SON TINH (D) Forces on 8 January 1965. He was given three months training in TINH BINH (H) which consisted of political orientation, marksmanship, farming and production. He remained with the district force for one year until he was transferred to the 506B Sapper Co, letter box number HOM THU 21618M BA HAO, also called H42.

b. The 506B is a Sapper Co and not a Sapper/Infantry unit. It is organized into a company headquarters and two platoons of three squads each. The strength of the company is approximately 80 men.

c. The company headquarters is composed of the C.O., I.O., Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, one supply chief, one medic, one cook, one messenger and one armorer.

d. The mission of the 506B Co is to attack military posts and airfields. It's subordinate mission is food production.

e. The 506B Co is a separate unit subordinate only to SON TINH (D) Forces.

f. The 506B Co has suffered seven KIA's and 10 WIA's since November 1965. The WIA's were evacuated to a secure area and then to a hospital (exact location unknown). The 21st and 25th hospitals are located southeast of the BAN SON River, in TU NGHIA (D).

g. Food is in short supply and of poor quality. Ammunition and other supplies are inadequate. Although 506B has some medical supplies, they are short on anti-biotics, morphine, malaria pills and medicine to reduce bleeding.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. 506 "B" Sapper Co (AKA H-42) has been reported numerous times in this area.)

2. MY HOA (H) Guerrilla Platoon. HO QUYEN, a 14 year old member of the MY HOA (H) Guerrilla Platoon, rallied to the DAI LOC (D) Headquarters on 11 February 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He is a claymore mine operator with the guerrilla platoon whose mission is to act as a defense force in the MY HOA (H) area.

b. Replacements are drawn from the hamlet and village Youth Associations. He received seven days of basic military training which was conducted in LOC TAN (V) by the village guerrilla leader.

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c. The Q-14 B Co operates continuously in the MY HOA (H) - LOC TAN (V) area. He has seen NVN troops in the LOC TAN area and these troops are from the Provincial VC Forces.

d. When the Q-14 Co is operating north of the SONG VU river, the company breaks down into squad sized units and disperses throughout the LOC QUANG (V) - LOC PHUOC (V) area. There are usually some soldiers staying in the LAM PHUNG (H) area (AT 798557). He believes that these soldiers are from a Provincial force unit as many of them are NVN. These soldiers move in and out of LAM PHUNG (H) in squad size groups. At the church in PHU PHUONG 1 (H) (AT 825555) and the schoolhouse near the market at HA NHA (V), the VC have fortified the areas with trenches and spider holes. Both of these areas are used as ambush positions.
(G-2 Comment: F/3. The Q-14 Co is known to operate in the area indicated.)

3. Engineer Section, 2d VC Division. 2dLt CAO SANG, Engineer Officer, 2d NVA Div turned himself in to a member of the Hamlet Security Force who took him to the ARVN Military Security Service, QUANG NGAI (P). He provided the following information during interrogation:

a. SANG was drafted into the NVA in April 1962 and received training in basic military subjects and engineering which included boat building and demolitions. He departed NVN on 3 March 1965 and travelled via LAOS to SVN where he arrived in May 1965 and reported to the 2d NVA Div. Since that time, he has worked in Quang Nam (P), Quang Tin (P) and Quang Ngai (P).

b. On 13 February 1967, SANG made arrangements to ferry elements of the 1st Regt across the SONG TRA KHUC River (crossing at BS 552763) in 16 boats owned by local people. Each boat carried five men and it took from 1900 to 0530 to transport 1200 men of the 70th Bn across the river. The 40th, 60th and 70th Bns participated in the 15 February attack on the ROKMC but he did not know where the 40th and 60th were located.

c. On the night of 16 February, the 70th returned with approximately 100 WIA's. SANG heard there were approximately 200 KIA's but thought there were more as it took only four hours to ferry the unit back across the river. He stayed at the crossing site until the afternoon of 17 February because he was to also transport the 21st Regt across the river. The villagers had to be forced to assist in transporting the troops.

d. The 2d NVA Div command post was located vicinity of (BS 481767), but planned to displace soon to DUC PHO (D). It is guarded by one company and the 571st Bn. The 571st Bn consists of one company of approximately 300 personnel and has a mission to prepare emplacements and conduct reconnaissance missions. Though not actually sappers, the 571st has a sapper capability. The 2d NVA Div is composed of the 1st Regt (CO: HAI), 21st Regt (CO: TIEN), 31st Regt and an Engineer Battalion (CO: KINH). The 2d NVA Div is commanded by THACH and the Engineer Bn Political Officer is LE NGUYEN. The primary means of communication within the 2d NVA Div is by courier. The Headquarters is divided into two sections.

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The first section commands and stays with the 31st Regt, while the second section commands and stays with the 1st and 21st Regt which moved to QUANG NGAI (P) in January 1967.

e. Division weapons consist of four DK 75mm, four 75mm pack howitzers, four portable flame throwers, four 120mm mortars, eight Czech 12.7mm quad BBL machine guns, various types of automatic rifles, Soviet machine guns (unknown type), CKCs and AKs.

f. SANG gave as his reasons for defecting a desire to live in freedom, the ARVN, Koreans and U.S. Marines were much stronger than the VC forces, and the VC forces are being defeated.

(G-2 Comment: F/3 as to 70th Bn in the ROKMC attack. F/5 as to the 70th Bn having a strength of 1200. SANG possibly transported the 40th, 60th and 70th Bns though thinking he ferried only the 70th. F/6 as to 571st (AKA 1506th) Engineer Bn being with the 2d NVA Div CP. This unit is considered to be an independent battalion subordinate to MR-5. First report of the 2d NVA Div CP displacing to the DUC PHO area.)

4. 4th Bn, 4th Regt, 324B Div. PFC TRAN DUY CHIN (AKA TRAN DUY LINH), 2d Sqd, 1st Plt, 1st Co, 4th Bn, 4th Regt, 324B Div, was captured at (YD 102632) by I Co, 3d Bn, 3d Marines on 1 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The mission of the 4th (THU BON) Regt is to attack US and ARVN installations in the DONG HA (City) area on an unknown day in March 1967. The attack is to commence at 0500 when elements of the 4th Regt will employ raid tactics to surround and attack the outposts near DONG HA. When the outposts are secure the company CO's will radio the regiment who in turn will contact the mobile artillery unit. The artillery will commence a barrage that the captive claimed would last until the infantry moved in to occupy the area.

b. On the north side of the BEN HAI River, in VINH LINH Special Zone, (unknown location), there is a mobile artillery unit of about regimental size. The unit is equipped with an unknown number of prime movers, six three wheeled 105mm guns (unidentified) six two wheeled 175mm guns (unidentified) and five 120mm (Russian) mortars.

c. The 324B Div is composed of three infantry regiments called 4th (THU BON), 5th (CUU LONG), and 6th (SONG HUONG) plus a mobile artillery unit of approximately regimental size. Each regiment has three infantry battalions and a heavy fire battalion.

d. The 4th Bn, 4th Regt has a base camp at CU DINH (V) (YD 0365), and the 5th and 6th Bns are located in and around PHUONG PHU (H) (YD 085653). The heavy fire battalion (AKA SONG HONG) of the 4th Regt is at an unknown location, approximately eight kilometers north of CON THIEN.

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e. Communications equipment of the 4th Bn headquarters is one 15W radio, type ANK, one CHICOM 71 radio, one TAI 43 (Russian) telephone and one CHICOM 10 switch board. Each company has one CHICOM 71 Radio and one TAI 43 Telephones. Telephones are used within the battalion and radios are used for contacting other units.
(G-2 Comment: F/3. First report of 4th Regt as name for 812th Regt. First report of 5th and 6th Regts as possible names for 803d and 90th Regts of 324B Div. First report of Mobile Artillery Regt which possibly is the 14th Artillery Regt reportedly subordinate to the 324B Div. Doubtful that there are 175mm guns with the 324B Div. Doubtful this unit has wheeled 105mm Howitzers; possible these are 57mm auxillary powered AT guns.)

5. 4th Bn, 812th Regt, 324B Div. Pvt LE TRONG HAI, 8th Sqd, 2d Co, 4th Bn, 812th Regt, 324B Div, was captured at (YD 075665) by A Co, 1st Bn, 9th Marines on 3 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The mission of the 4th Bn is to draw the Marines out to fight and annihilate them, with the help of the 5th and 6th Bns, in the vicinity of Hill 161 (Hill 148 on US Maps) (YD 035669).

b. The 4th Bn is operating in the CAM LO Plateau area and the 5th and 6th Bns are in the vicinity of Hill 161.

c. The 324B Div is composed of the 4th, 5th, 6th Bns. The 4th Bn has four companies numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4. The first three are infantry companies, while the 4th company is the heavy weapons company. The weapons company has only two platoons, an 82mm mortar platoon and a 12.7mm heavy machine gun platoon. Each of the company headquarters has an independent 60mm mortar squad.

d. The 2d Co had a strength of approximately 120 men but there has been many casualties, how many he didn't know. His squad consisted of nine men; however, five became sick with malaria, three were wounded and one was killed.

e. The company was issued 12 kilos of rice in VINH TRUNG (V), NVN, for use during the operation near CAM LO. He also carried one small can of pork, 200 grams of salt and 200 grams of nhoc mam (fish sauce). The operation was supposed to last approximately 15 days, after which the units were to return to QUANG BINH (P).

f. There were not sufficient medical supplies for the wounded personnel that the platoon sustained.

g. Morale in the 2d Co is very low as most of the soldiers do not want to fight in SVN. Many soldiers try to desert and return to their homes. The captive was drafted into the army in September 1963 and deserted on the way to basic training. He was drafted a second time in 1964 and deserted again after seven days. In May 1965 he was drafted and deserted the same day. In October 1966 the captive was again drafted and has been unable to desert from the army since that time.

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(G-2 Comment: F/2. Correlation of information received from seven captives from the 812th Regt indicates that HAI's information is probably true.)

6. An agent report dated 13 February 1967 evaluated B-C/3 reported the following:

a. On 13 February 1967, the TT-37 Workshop, which manufactured several types of munitions, was located at (BS 046977). The workshop had been designated T-42 under the VIET MINH regime. This workshop was currently commanded by an engineer, NGUYEN TANH, and by Lt DAI of the VC Engineering Corps, and has been in operation since 20 December 1966.

b. The workshop produced 60mm and 81mm mortar shells, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles shells, "bazooka" rounds, rifle ammunition and forged rifle cartridges.

c. Six well camouflaged shelters composing the workshop were scattered in an area approximately 1,000 meters in circumference. Roofs of the shelters were made of rattan leaves. Equipment includes three small engines and one large engine operated by charcoal (SIC).

d. About 200 troops of the VC engineering corps were working at the workshop. The site was protected by a regular battalion of the 3d Regt, 2d Div. The battalion headquarters was located at (BS 038967). Major HUNG, a NVN, commanded the battalion. The 400 members were deployed not farther than 1,500 meters from the workshop. The battalion was well armed and had three anti-aircraft machine guns (SIC) mounted at (BS 025977), (BS 057986), and (BS 057965). The troops of the battalion kept people away from the area. The workshop was surrounded by an undetermined number of mines, booby trapped grenades, and "whip" traps.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. First report of a munitions workshop in this area.)

7. The following document prescribes the norm of production for various agricultural sites and provinces:

"Self-Sufficient Norms for Units"

At present, our forces have been developing. But food production is limited because the enemy has destroyed our crops. If we do not make an effort in the production task, we will have great difficulties in the forth coming period. Therefore, Military Region proposes a plan for self-sufficiency for units in 1966 and 1967 as follows (production is not made as before):

In the lowlands: Main Forces of the Military Region must be self-sufficient for one month and a half.

Province Units for three months.

District Units for four months.

In mountainous areas: Main Forces of the Military Region for three months.

Units for four months.

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Province units for six months.

District units for eight months.

All Units must carry out this plan and seek measures for the production task. Some measures are presented. They will be studied carefully and executed by units. Units must closely coordinate with local self-sufficiency councils to make plans for working together with the people in the rainy season in August and October when the harvest comes in order to be distributed food. This work is to sow rice plants, to weed and to drain the water from the ricefield. Also, units must coordinate with guerrillas and local youths in the production task to receive rice and food from owners. When rice is not enough, weeds and unusable plants are burned down. The land is reserved for corn, beans, bananas, manioc, peanuts and vegetables. When units change positions, they should consult with local production councils so that the latter can entrust these plans to the people. If possible, they will return back to participate in production tasks themselves. Units stationed near the border or in mountainous areas must increase their self production to help others who spend time building up their strength and who cannot produce much.

Units stationed in mountainous areas: All plans must be cut down until the middle of June to sow rice plants.

Rice must be sown together with corn, manioc and beans. In villages, where rice is lacking, corn, beans, manioc, bananas and vegetables must be planted in order to obtain enough food for units.

The cultivation must be made in areas where the people are living. These plans will be entrusted to the people when the unit changes position. In general, in lowland or mountainous areas, units must be self-sufficient. The foods made by the units themselves is accounted by price and reported to the Military Region Financial Section so that the latter can reduce the money which it furnishes to the unit. Because units must achieve combat tasks and ensure good production, they have great difficulty. To overcome the difficulty, all Committee Echelons and unit leaders will do their best to direct the production task and to motivate all units in this task. The following are quantities of foods to be produced by each unit. Based on this plan, higher units assign production tasks to lower units so that the latter can guarantee this plan:

Agricultural Site /NONG TRUONG/ 1: 1,008 tons

Agricultural Site 2: 315 tons

Agricultural Site 3: 346 tons

Agricultural Site 5: 126 tons

DARLAC 306.000 tons

KONTUM 205.200 tons

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GIA LAI 248,400 tons

QUANG DA 151,200 tons

QUANG TIN 106,200 tons

QUANG NGAI 214,200 tons

BING-DINH 214,200 tons

PHU YEN 136,800 tons

KHANH HOA 209,500 tons

THUA THIEN 162,000 tons

QUANG TRI 147,600 tons

DANANG 50,400 tons

8. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOB</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
PHAM THI AN (C)	6MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS638958/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN AN (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO (D) HQ
LE BAU (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VAN BAY (C)	1MAR67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN BEN (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN BIEN (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894315/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE BON (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852389/PW CHU LAI
VAN BUT (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM CHAU (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE CHI (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHIEN (C)	2MAR67	D/1/5	CIV DEF	BS775427/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN CHINU (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS889325/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHONG (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894319/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN CO (C)	2MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DO CONG (C)	4MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS713955/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRUONG CUU (C)	1MAR67	B/1/4	CIV DEF	BS812456/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE DANG (C)	27FEB67	E/3/7	CIV DEF	BS778390/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DAC (C)	4MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS627972/BINH SON(D) HQ
HUYNH DAY (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DAN (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH NGOC DANH (C)	2MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DAU (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894315/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DEU (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN DIEN (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE DIEP (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DOC (AKA CAO) (C)	UNK	4TH MAR	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
THACH KHANH DOI (C)	27FEB67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS767389/DUC PHO(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN DON (C)	27FEB67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT654041/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN DUONG (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM GAM (C)	28FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS666958/BINH SON(D) HQ
CHAU GIA (C)	27FEB67	D/1/26	CIV DEF	BT398118/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN GIANG (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852389/CHU LAI
PHAM GIOI (C)	17FEB67	D/1/7	PW	BS628972/PW III NAF COMP
THANH HAI (C)	27FEB67	ARVN	2D BN (AKA 9TH)	BS728396/ARVN PW
NGUYEN HANG (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH HANH (C)	2MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TO HANH (C)	4MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS627972/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN HAU (C)	1MAR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BS303427/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN HIEN (C)	1MAR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BS803427/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH THI HOANG (C)	2MAR67	D/1/5	GUERR	BS773423/1ST MED BN
VO HOI (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN HUONG (C)	22FEB67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS879337/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN LAI (C)	2MAR67	H/2/7	CIV DEF	BS537896/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGO LAN (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN LANG (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRI LE (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
BUI LE (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE THI LIEU (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LO LIEU (R)	23FEB67	-----	-----	DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI LIEU (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THOI LINH (C)	27FEB67	F/2/7	TAM REGT	BS786377/PW CHU LAI
VAN LUC (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NUI LY (C)	1MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT436145/LY TIN(D) HQ
VO LY (C)	24FEB67	C/1/26	CIV DEF	BS889325/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM KHANH (C)	2MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN KHOA (C)	4MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS627972/BINH SON(D) HQ
THI KIEN (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM KIEM (C)	2MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BT662012/BINH SON(D) HQ
DOAN KIET (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS889325/DUC PHO(D) HQ
BACH THI KINH (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894315/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DANG LOC (C)	25FEB67	NAT POL	GUERR	SA HUYNH/NAT POLICE
NGUYEN LUONG (C)	27FEB67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS767389/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH MAN (C)	1MAR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BS803427/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TROUNG MAU (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894315/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN MAU (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS870355/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TIEU MAU (C)	1MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS719959/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAM MAU (C)	22FEB67	A/1/4	CIV DEF	BS886280/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN MINH (C)	20FEB67	D/1/4	CIV DEF	BS928264/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TO MINH (C)	4MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS627972/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN NAP (C)	24FEB67	1/9	UNK	YD597396/UNK
PHAM NGOC (C)	28FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS666958/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN HUU NGUYEN (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHAN (C)	6MAR67	9TH ENGR	CIV DEF	UNK/6TH REGT TAM KY
VO NHAN (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894315/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHAN (C)	25FEB67	NAT POL	GUERR	SA HUYNH/NAT POLICE

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NIEN (C)	22FEB67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS879337/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM NOI (C)	28FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS802489/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NUA (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHO (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/1ST MED BN
HUYNH PHUONG (C)	1MAR67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	BS812412/DUC PHO(D) HQ
BACH THI SING (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894315/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM SO (C)	28FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS666958/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAN NGOC SON (C)	2MAR67	D/1/5	CIV DEF	BS784418/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM TINH TAM (C)	1MAR67	B/1/4	CIV DEF	BS812456/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TO TAN (C)	4MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS627972/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THAM (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852389/CHU LAI
TRUONG THANG (C)	1MAR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BS803342/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE MINH THANH (C)	3MAR67	C/1/9	812TH REGT	
				YD083644/RET FURTHER INTER
LE THUA (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
BUI THUAN (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852389/CHU LAI
TRAN THUAN (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN THUC (C)	UNK	D/1/7	PW	BS638958/III MAF COMP
PHAN VAN THI (C)	3MAR67	A/1/9	812TH REGT	
				YD075665/PW COL PT
TRAN VAN THONG (C)	2MAR67	D/1/5	CIV DEF	BS784418/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THIEN (C)	21FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	BS913267/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VO THINH (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DUONG TIEP (C)	4MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS699955/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN TINH (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TO TOAN (C)	27FEB67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS778374/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN TOI (C)	27FEB67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT654041/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGO TOI (C)	28FEB67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS666958/BINH SON(D) HQ
TO TON (C)	4MAR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS627972/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN TRON (C)	24FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS894315/DUC PHO(D) HQ
BUI TRUNG (C)	27FEB67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT654041/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE TU (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN TU (C)	27FEB67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS767389/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VO TUI (C)	UNK	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT660026/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN TUONG (C)	27FEB67	1/4	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN THI TY (C)	27FEB67	D/1/26	CIV DEF	BT398118/LY TIN(D) HQ
TRAN QUAN (C)	22FEB67	C/1/4	CIV DEF	BS903294/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE VAN (C)	2MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS868358/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN CONG VAN (R)	UNK	-----	-----	QUANG NGAI
BUI VANG (C)	1MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS719950/BINH SON(D) HQ
DO PHU VIEN (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT997556/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI XE (C)	25FEB67	G/2/7	CIV DEF	BS504958/BINH SON(D) HQ
HUYNH XONG (C)	22FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS555906/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN XU (C)	UNK	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT995597/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI XUNG (C)	23FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS539908/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI YEN (C)	23FEB67	E/2/7	CIV DEF	BS539908/BINH SON(D) HQ

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ANNEX E (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 10-67

1. GENERAL. VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Items of interest included the forming of an all-women company with the mission of sabotaging the Rural Development Program, a plan for VC cadre to infiltrate cities for a large scale sabotage campaign in February and March, and a report concerning the reorganization of VC provincial boundaries.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG TRI. A 6 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that during the period 24-27 February a group of six VC cadre entered QUANG TRI City to collect information concerning U.S. and RVN installations. Specific attention was given to the QUANG TRI (P) Headquarters, the residence of the Province Chief, MACV Compound, and the Soccer field located in the vicinity of (YD 335536). These cadre also sketched a map of QUANG TRI City clearly defining all streets, and the numbers of all the houses.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG NAM	3Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 04661A
QUANG NAM	5Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 062512
QUANG NAM	6Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	AT 914604
QUANG NAM	6Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	AT 924604
QUANG NAM	6Mar	Culvert destroyed	BT 121487
QUANG NAM	8Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 113497
QUANG NAM	8Mar	Highway bridge partially destroyed	BT 091552
QUANG TIN	7Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 259288

4. POLITICAL

QUANG TRI. A 3 March report from a usually reliable source related that VC personnel changes in QUANG TRI (P) has resulted in the assignment of a province cadre to each district party committee, under the title, "Leadership Current Affairs Cadre," who apparently will have considerable command authority over the district committee. Although there are no firm indications of a general purge of VC political cadre in QUANG TRI (P), several reports have been received that tell of warnings, reduction in rank and even replacement of cadres who have violated the VC rules of conduct or whose morale has been below an acceptable level. Most of the VC cadres in the province are natives, and although there is no evidence of their replacement by northerners, there has been unconfirmed reports that the VC plan to infiltrate an increasing number of southerners who regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954. The VC have allegedly dissolved or plan to dissolve the northern sub-sector, QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces, called TRI THIEN by the VC, and attach the area directly to MR IV, which comprises the southern

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part of North Vietnam. Within QUANG TRI (P), the VC have already consolidated three districts in GVN HUONG HOA (D) into two, comprising the area north and south of Route 9 respectively.

5. PROPAGANDA

THUA THIEN. A 6 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that two VC propaganda leaflets printed in Vietnamese were discovered in the vicinity of (YD 761130). The first leaflet asked the people to unite and fight the pacification conspiracy of the American and Puppet governments. The second leaflet stated that the previous "Strategic Hamlet" conspiracy was completely defeated and that the present "pacification" conspiracy would surely be smashed. The leaflet went on to ask the ARVN soldiers to leave their units and return home.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 8 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC are organizing training classes in military and political subjects for Autonomous Administrative cadre and local guerrillas of TRUNG LUONG and GIO LINH Districts. The first class will consist of cadre and guerrillas from TRUNG GIANG and TRUNG HIA Villages who will be separated into four groups and trained at CAT SON (YD 245815), THUY BAN (YD 260800), CANH GIANG (YD 247787) and CAM PHO (YD 245770) Hamlets.

THUA THIEN. A 6 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that on 3 March a civilian rice truck was ambushed by VC in the vicinity of (ZD 021026). The driver and passenger were wounded.

A 5 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that nine newly trained VC frogmen, chosen for their proficiency, will be sent to North Vietnam. The reason for the men being sent to North Vietnam is not known. (Refer to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 2-67.)

QUANG NAM. A 3 March report from a usually reliable source stated that the VC have formed an all-women company in DIEN BAN (D) composed of 120 women under the command of PHAN THI THIN. This company has the mission of sabotaging the Rural Development Program. (CI Comment: This is the first report of an all-female company; however, there have been numerous reports pertaining to the sabotaging of the RD program.)

A 6 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC are planning to initiate a large scale sabotage campaign in February and March 1967. VC Sapper Cadre will reportedly infiltrate DANANG, HOI AN, VINH DIEN, and HOA VANG Cities by bus with explosives concealed on the top of the vehicle. Primary targets are government and Allied installations and military bases.

A 6 March report from a usually reliable source related that a VC platoon entered MY DONG (H) (BT 037360) and abducted seven civilians.

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QUANG TIN. A 10 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the Vietnamese Information Service Office in TAM KY City was partially destroyed by demolition charges.

QUANG NGAI. A 8 March report from an intelligence source related that four VC threw a hand grenade into the home of a Rural Development Cadre in the vicinity of (BT 164406). Although the RD Cadre was not hurt, one civilian was killed and two were injured.

E-3


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19 MARCH 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO.11-67



**GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS**

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DECLASSIFIED

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 III MAF
 DANANG, RVN
 19 March 1967
 Ser: 065067

PERINTREP 11-67

Period Covered: 120001H - 182400H Mar67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheet NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
 ND 48-4, ND-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. Extensive and detailed aerial photography flown by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the USAF, which covered the eastern sector north of the DMZ, revealed continued enemy construction of ground defensive works. Readouts portrayed emphasis upon AA and AW positions and underground bunkers. Above ground positions were, with very few exceptions, unoccupied.

Enemy initiated activity immediately south of the DMZ was again centered in the CON THIEN area and in the sector northwest of QUANG TRI City. Other enemy movement consisted of the maintenance of a general reconnaissance and screening effort in northern QUANG TRI (P). On 11 March the ARVN Airborne Task Force gained contact with an estimated two NVA battalions at (YD 185716). Heavy action followed with substantial enemy casualties resulting. The next day, and southwest of the airborne contact, two ARVN infantry battalions encountered an estimated battalion sized enemy force. Enemy casualties were moderate. Other enemy activity noted in the CON THIEN area consisted of several AO sightings of 20 to 30 man NVA groups. In each case artillery fire was brought to bear with enemy casualties resulting. In addition three short but fairly heavy mortar attacks were reported from the same sector.

Ground reconnaissance deployed along a line from the KHE SANH combat base northeast to THON SON LAM and the DMZ reported a total of approximately 180 NVA and VC over the period. NVA company and battalion sized harboring sites were discovered and two helicopter inserts were aborted due to heavy ground fire. On 16 March, two Marine platoons inflicted heavy casualties on an estimated company sized enemy unit encountered at (XD 802444). Friendly casualties were also heavy. A reconnaissance contact with a small NVA element occurred at (YD 1846) on 15 March. For the period Operation PRAIRIE II continued with light to moderate contact with the enemy.

Moving to eastern QUANG TRI (P) and at (YD 325584) on 17 March, RD Team 14 was attacked by an estimated VC company. Second Bn, 1st ARVN Regt moved in as a reaction force and subsequently requested Marine assistance. K Co, 3rd Bn, 4th Marines responded and in the action that followed inflicted moderate casualties on the enemy. South of this engagement and on the same date ARVN units gained contact with a sizeable

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VC force. Enemy casualties were heavy. In the same vicinity the VC concentrated their efforts against three additional RD teams protected by RF and PF elements. In the latter action, the VC were successfully repulsed. The enemy approach in this area of high population density remains directed against the GVN RD program.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. The tempo of VC initiated activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P) continued at a constant rate and followed a pattern comparable to that reported for the last two weeks. On 13 March, the PHONG DIEN Sub-Sector Headquarters (YD 540340) received approximately 50 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. Friendly artillery was called for with undetermined results. There were no friendly casualties. Interrogation of two PW's taken on 8 March by the 1st ARVN Regt revealed their unit to be the 1st Co, 806th VC Bn. They located the headquarters of the unit as being at (YD 445264).

Immediately north of HUE City and along Highway 1, a PF element guarding a bridge was attacked by an unknown number of VC who attempted to destroy the bridge. Although the decking of the bridge was damaged the main structure remained intact. Other VC activity was primarily centered in the area southwest of HUE City. Two incidents occurred on 12 March, one of which involved three ARVN battalions in a contact with an estimated reinforced VC Company. Following a sharp action the enemy broke contact. Enemy casualties were moderate.

Elsewhere in northeastern THUA THIEN (P) the enemy effort was limited to small scale harassing actions directed against more isolated RF, PF and RD elements. Three minor incidents were reported from the northern end of the PHU BAI TAOR. Ground reconnaissance deployed west of HUE and PHU BAI produced light sightings of the enemy.

Three short mortar attacks were reported over the period 16 and 17 March in the vicinity of PHU LOC between DANANG and PHU BAI. CAC elements were in two of these attacks, while the third was against the PHU LOC Sub-Sector Headquarters. In the latter action, air and artillery were called for and two VC mortar positions were destroyed. Other incidents along Highway 1 north of the DANANG TAOR consisted of mining and light harassing activity.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Within the northern portion of the DANANG TAOR, a freight train was mined approximately eight kilometers northwest of DANANG City (AT 924850). Six tank cars were derailed and a 150 meter stretch of track destroyed. Ground reconnaissance deployed within the western boundary of the TAOR reported light to moderate sightings of the enemy. VC movement observed equivocated that noted last week in the same western sector. On 11 March four kilometers southwest of the THONG DUC CIDG Camp an estimated VC platoon attacked an RF OP. The VC were driven off and no casualties were reported. Ground reconnaissance deployed south of the DANANG TAOR reported sightings in this area of approximately 330 VC over the period. This number represents a slight increase over last week in the same region.

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There was a slight increase in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the DANANG TAOR. No concentration was noted and the number of mine and booby trap incidents remained high. On 15 March the DANANG Airbase complex received an estimated eight to ten rounds of 140mm rocket fire. A brief description of this incident is contained in Annex A. There was a rise in the number of minor probes made against RF and PF elements particularly in the area centered on (AT 934688).

Southeastern QUANG NAM (P) in the area south of HOI AN City witnessed a substantial increase in both the intensity and volume of VC initiated activity. For the reporting period this specific area experienced the heaviest concentration of enemy initiated activity of any in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Twenty one incidents were reported over the period 12 through 17 March. By category these included one assassination, one mining, four mortar attacks, three probing actions, nine lesser harassing actions and three ground attacks. The most significant ground action occurred on 13 March when an estimated VC company employing a full range of infantry weaponry attacked the HIEU NHON District Headquarters (BT 168573). The VC displayed unusual brutality while inflicting heavy casualties on the defenders.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. There was a slight rise in VC initiated activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P). The incidents were centered in an area immediately northwest of TAM KY City. Three of these were of significance. At (BT 283251) on 13 March, a PF Squad guarding a bridge on Highway 1 was attacked by an estimated VC company. Artillery was called for and the VC driven off. Enemy casualties were unknown. On 12 March in the vicinity of (BT 2627) on Highway 1, VC elements attacked two bridge sites. One was unguarded and promptly destroyed; the other was defended by two RF platoons and remained undamaged. The latter incident resulted in 20 VC KIA (Prob). Other enemy activity in this same vicinity consisted of several short mortar attacks against RF and PF positions.

At (BT 084254) north of the THIEN PHOUIC Camp, the 929th RF Company was attacked by an estimated two companies of VC. Following a short fire fight, the VC broke contact and withdrew. Enemy casualties were light.

Aerial photography flown over the area south of the camp on 3 March revealed a slight increase in enemy ground fortification activity when compared to late February readouts. Ground reconnaissance deployed along the northwest approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. There was a fairly sharp increase in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the CHU LAI TAOR. The greater number were reported in the southern sector. Increased enemy activity in the BINH SON area will be reviewed in the following paragraph under QUANG NGAI (P). Seven incidents were reported from the Korean Marine area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). The BINH SON, SON TINH and northern MO DUC Districts of QUANG NGAI (P) witnessed an increased enemy effort consisting of

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a series of relatively small scale harassing, demolition and probing attacks. A good portion of the VC effort was centered in the BINH SON area (southern portion of the CHU LAI TAOR) and appeared to be directed against RD elements. Eight incidents were reported in this vicinity of which two were of significance. On 14 March at (BS 666979), a PF platoon in night defensive positions and affording protection to RD Teams 20 and 25 was attacked by an estimated VC company. The VC were driven off with light casualties. Friendly casualties included two RD cadremen WIA. On 15 March, a VC demolition team destroyed a house within BINH SON City (BS 601920) killing three civilians and wounding nine.

To the east and in the vicinity of (BS 7290), a 100 foot steel trawler beached itself following a chase by MARKET TIME vessels. The trawler was then destroyed by its own crew; the explosion scattering it's cargo. An examination of the contraband items revealed approximately 1200 Chinese Communist carbines, a small number of automatic and crew served weapons and various quantities of other military supplies. It is felt that the trawler's destination had been QUANG NGAI (P).

On 12 March, at (BS 642750) north of QUANG NGAI City, an estimated VC company attacked the SON BAY Provincial Training Center. Two RF companies attending the RD training course sustained heavy casualties as a result of the attack. Four additional incidents were reported in the same sector. These consisted of two mortar attacks and two lesser actions involving light harassing small arms fire. Aerial photography flown over the southern half of the CHU LAI TAOR revealed continued enemy ground activity. A heavy increase was noted in the area centered on (BS 6597) when compared to prior missions over the same sector.

Scattered VC action was reported north of MO DUC where small scale attacks were directed against RF and PF security elements. Ground reconnaissance centered on two sectors (BS 6558) and (BS 7438) reported moderate sightings of the enemy. Operation DE SOTO continued with light to moderate contact with the enemy and at (BS 828330) on 16 March, a PF platoon manning positions four and one half kilometers south of DUC PHO City was attacked by an estimated VC company. The PF's dropped back and called in artillery and naval gunfire. Enemy casualties were heavy. Elsewhere in the same area enemy action was limited to small scale harassing and probing attacks.

Aerial photography over an area north of the BINH DINH (P) border revealed nothing of significance. A major contact was reported in the vicinity of the GIA VUC CIDG Camp on 17 March when a CIDG patrol was ambushed by an estimated VC battalion. Friendly casualties were heavy.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents during the reporting period rose over 40 percent when compared to the last period. The total of 400 incidents consisted of two attacks, three ambushes, five assaults by fire, 145 small unit engagements, 46 mine/booby trap incidents, 185 incidents of AA fire and 14 acts of sabotage.

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- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex B.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex B.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex B.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) On 17 Mar 67 a USMC squad, manning an OP near NUI YA (H) nine kilometers south of TAM KY City, found a booby trapped helicopter pad. Although not the first report of this nature, it is considered unique inasmuch as 50 helicopter stakes, five 105 howitzer rounds, 20 pounds of composition "C", 1250 pounds of bomb casings and one U/I artillery round, all booby trapped, were found on the pad.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
9 Mar	(YD 165892)	Food Storage Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
9 Mar	(YD 0583 - 9574)	Rice Storage Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
9 Mar	(YD 0085)	Ammo Storage Area	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Enemy AA fire incidents reflected a moderate rise, increasing to 185 for the reporting period. 36 aircraft sustained 125 hits. The grid square of highest density was (BS 7838). Three cases of possible 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - l. Negative.

m. Biological, Chemical, Electronic or Radiological Warfare.

(1) On 14 March elements of the 1st Bn, Fifth Marines located 10 kilometers south of TAM KY City in QUANG TIN (P) (BS 329105), received harassing fire from an unknown number of enemy, including small arms fire, three grenades and two detonations suspected to be from 60mm mortars. The Marines experienced irritation of the eyes and running of the nose, indicating the use of tear gas. The gas, lasting for 10 minutes, drifted to the southeast and reaction was noted among local civilians. (In November, 1966, 60 Chicom gas grenades were captured in II Corps area. See III MAF PERINTREP No. 41).

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n - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Ground reconnaissance deployed along a line running from the KHE SANH combat base northeast to (YD 0464) reported moderate sightings of NVA and VC.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Light reconnaissance deployed west of the CHINOOK II operating area reported insignificant sightings of the enemy. The same situation existed due west and south of the PHU BAI TAOR. This portion of eastern THUA THIEN (P) continues to remain relatively quiet.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). The western portion of the DANANG TAOR produced light sightings of the enemy. A heavy ground reconnaissance effort south of the TAOR reported a total of approximately 330 VC over the period. This number represents a continuation of the pattern set last week when this sector witnessed an overall increase of enemy activity and movement.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Reconnaissance elements deployed northwest and immediately west of the CHU LAI TAOR reported very light sightings of the enemy. Although two concentrations of reconnaissance activity at (BS 6558) and (BS 7438) produced moderate sightings of the enemy, this area remained relatively quiet for the sixth straight week.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured during the period in the areas indicated:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
11Mar67	(BT 047196)	1500	USSF
13Mar67	(LAHM SAN 21)	4000	ARVN
14Mar67	(YD 495335)	500	2/9
17Mar67	(BT 331314)	2050	2/6 ARVN
18Mar67	(YD 052644)	150	1/9
18Mar67	(AT 940500)	2000	2/5
18Mar67	(AT 9281)	1000	2/26

t. Communications. The following information was obtained from the interrogation of WO HOANG TRUNG NHO, Plt Ldr, Communications Platoon, 4th Bn, 812th NVA Regt. HOANG was captured on 3 March at (YD 075665). The communications platoon operates on from two to 12 megacycles (15 watt radio) and 1.9 to 7.2 megacycles (two watt radio). The unit was given

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lists of frequencies to be used for 30 days. After 30 days the radio operators exchange lists among themselves and continue to do this every 30 days. Call signs change every day and frequencies change daily at various times through the day, e.g., the first frequency would be used for an hour, the second for three hours and the third for one hour, etc.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Organization. Annex B.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex B.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex B.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex B.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period reflected a slight increase when compared to the previous period and were 310 KIA (Conf), 300 KIA (Prob), two NVA PW's and two VC PW's. Weapon losses for the period consisted of 34 individual weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Over the period 12 through 18 March, a southeast flow of air at lower altitudes topped by a dry southwesterly wind dominated the weather pattern throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone. This situation produced fairly low stratus and fog which formed in the highlands during late evening and over the lowlands during early morning. By mid-day both conditions had dissipated with unrestricted visibility prevailing throughout the Corps Zone. Limited ground haze was reported 15 through 17 March.

On 18 March, a weak trough extending from a low pressure center over the Gulf of TONKIN created a generally poor weather picture. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	79	81	81	83
Low	68	68	69	69
Rainfall (total)	00	00	00	.01
Visibility (miles)	7	8	7	7
Winds (knots)	4	4	5	5

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- k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex C.
 - 1. Negative.
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 9-67.



B. S. READ Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. SECOND ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG AIR BASE
- B. ORDER OF BATTLE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO 366TH FTW	1
CMC (CODE AO2)	2	CO RLT 26	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 76.4	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	50	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
CG 3RD MARDIV	9	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	1
CG PROJECT OREGON	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 8TH RR FU	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 9TH MAB	1	I DASC DANANG	1
		III MAF	10


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ANNEX A (SECOND ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG AIR BASE) TO III MAF
PERINTREP 11-67

1. Early in the morning of 15 March 1967, the DANANG Air Base underwent a second attack by fire of 140mm rockets. An estimated eight to 10 rounds impacted in an area centered on the runways (BT 011758).
2. At the time of the attacks, flashes from suspected firing positions were observed at (AT 9567). Counter battery fire commenced within two minutes with thirteen missions (213 rounds) fired into the area (AT 956673). Artillery batteries subsequently fired a total of 616 rounds into the same general vicinity. Two flareships, a C-47 and a C-130, were also on station and fired at suspected firing positions. A UH1E gunship was also utilized.
3. Ground reaction forces moved rapidly to seal off the area and these elements quickly located the launch site. Twenty four rocket firing points were found with two launchers still in position. Later in the day, an additional 31 launchers, together with eleven 140mm rockets and eight cannisters, were recovered in and along the banks of the SONG YEN River. Rockets were inserted in five of the launchers found.
4. The ground reaction force reported fresh craters within the rocket launch site. It appears probable that the initial counter battery fire interrupted the enemy fire mission, thereby accounting for his hasty departure from the area.

APPENDIX:

1 - GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF ATTACK



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ANNEX B (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 11-67

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORP'S TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 182400H MAR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	2,194	2	1,300			8	3,494
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,290	12	4,580	6	2,050	35	14,920
Battalions (other)	10	2,190	3	1,275			13	3,465
Separate Companies					26	2,535	26	2,535
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		14,974		7,155		4,585		26,714
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	Unk					1	Unk
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					4	350	4	350
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						750		750
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
COMBINED TOTAL STRENGTH		15,474		7,155		6,235		28,864

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2. (C) ESTIMATED IRREGULAR FORCES STRENGTH AS OF 17 FEB 67.

	<u>GUERRILLA FORCES</u> <u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SELF DEFENSE FORCES</u> <u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES</u> <u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
<u>PROVINCES</u>				
QUANG TRI	2,274	4,687	937	7,898
THUA THIEN	2,807	7,988	1,597	12,392
QUANG NAM	4,601	13,026	2,606	20,233
QUANG TIN	3,324	8,809	1,761	13,894
QUANG NGAI	4,134	13,516	2,703	20,353
TOTAL STRENGTH	17,140	48,026	9,604	74,770

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3. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 182400H MAR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	8,000 ^{#2}		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 950695	20Sep66
1st Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 110715	18Oct66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 092536	6Nov66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt	NVA	C	1,500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	Unk		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	500		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	1,500		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	500		Unknown		
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	C-2	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661-XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,984	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	3km Radius YD 0572	4Mar67
Regt Hq and Support	NVA	C	794		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0864	2Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	250	C-4	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 063682	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C				YD 102632	1Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
3rd Co	NVA	C				YD 081665	4Mar67
4th Co(Support)	NVA	C					

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
5th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 070685	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C					
2nd Co	NVA	C					
3rd Co	NVA	C					
4th Co	NVA	C				Area YD 0768	4Mar67
6th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0768	4Mar67
U/I Wire Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280		DMZ Area	YD 0768	4Mar67
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	XD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500	C-2	YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist. and coastal area	24Feb67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500	C-2	Hai Lang (D)	YD 4054 - YD 4259	24Feb67
H.99 Co	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	24Feb67
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66
K.400 Co	LF	C	120		Gio Linh (D)	YD 3172	17Feb67

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		Thua Thien (P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720	YD 540195	21Feb67
800th Bn	MF	C	300		Phong Dien (D)	YD 620464	17Feb67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400		YD 6318	ZC 0595	24Feb67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400		YD 5642	YD 635348	8Mar67
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YC 904998	18Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 7030	YD 690342	7Mar67
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu THU (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	C-2	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 To BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 935325	17Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	250	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 956563	10Mar67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	C-2	ZC 135280	BT 094643	28Feb67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 0848	6Mar67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460		Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai (P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		E Hiep Duc (D)		
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		Quang Tin (P)	AT 9818	26Sep66
					W Son Tinh (D)		
					Quang Ngai (P)	BS 4877	17Feb67
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	C-3	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	220	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
RQ23 Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BS 4478	18Feb67
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	70	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9920	18Feb67
2nd Bn, (3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	C-2	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh (D)	5Feb67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	C-2	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	MF	C	90	C-2	Tam Ky (D)	BT 441081	13Jan67
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov66
K.51	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.52	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
K.54	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.55	LF	C	100		BT 2718		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/KONTUM (P) Border	12KM SW Hau Duc (D) HQ AS 9080	12Feb67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,880	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775 - BS 5273	19Feb67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 4775 - BS 5273	19Feb67
40th Bn	MF	C	280	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 655576	28Feb67
60th Bn	MF	C	200	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775 - BS 5273	19Feb67
70th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775 - BS 5273	19Feb67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 5560	5Mar67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	C-3	Tra Bong (D)	BS 4877	19Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 5581	19Feb67
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	Son Tinh (D)	BS 4877	19Feb67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	Son Tinh (D)	BS 5077	19Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	C-3	Tra Bong (D)	BS 5581	19Feb67
RQ23 Bn(2nd NVA Div)	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 4478	BS 4478	18Feb67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2KM RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 724575	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	C-2	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	595		BS 6436	BS 6436	23Jan67
20th Co (Bn Hq)	MF	C	105	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
30th Co	MF	C	120	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
40th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 3377	BS 3377	23Jan67
50th Co	MF	C	100	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
60th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Sen Tinh (D)	W Sen Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 7743	2Mar67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4889	12Nov66
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #4	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 732079	27Feb67
300th Wpis Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7610	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 785643	4Jan67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 5984	3Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8165	10Jan67
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 7864	5Jan67
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,050		BS 9005	BS 9005	Feb67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh		
7th Bn	NVA	C	300		BS 9305	BS 9305	11Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		BS 9104	BS 9304	13Feb67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 8808	BS 8808	18Feb67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page B-3.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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4. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 182400H MAR 67

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung THANH CO-Sr Capt HAI
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong	31445XB 31450XB 31450XB		
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong			
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn)		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN ED-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn)			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?)/307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CC-Gen Tran DO ED-Chu Van BOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMS AND AMMUNITION	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cua Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj VO THIEP XD-DUYET PO-Maj THONG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-TUONG
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN XD-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN CO-Lt Col Nguyen Minh HE XD-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt 4th Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cua Long Bn			CO-Nguyen KHUONG XD-Bui Dinh PHONG CO-1st Lt Le TIEN XD-Linh Xuan TIEU PO-Vo Dinh HOI
1st Co	Doan-1			
2nd Co	Doan-2			
3rd Co	Doan-3	31623		CO-1st Lt Tran Xuan TOAN XD-Le Minh KOANH PO-Nguyen Ngo CHUNG
4th Co (Hvy Wpn Support)	Doan-4		12-82mm Mort 6-HB G Chicom 7.62mm Type 57 9-AAMG Unk-B-10 DK-RR(82mm)	

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UNIT

5th Bn

6th Bn

2nd Co

3rd Co

4th Co (Hvy
Wpns)
90th Regt (Hq)

AKA

K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn

K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn;
Cuu Long Bn
Doan-2

Doan-3

Doan-4

Song Houng(er Hong);
3rd Regt; Cong Truong
3; Song Chu; Song Chu
Long; Cuu Long; Cua
Viet

LDN

31634 K.T.

5330(?)

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

Unk-82mm Mort
Unk-75mm RR
Unk-60mm Mort
Unk-57mm RR
Unk-12.7mm AA MG
Unk-MG

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PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Van
PHONG (PHUNG)
PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van
RICH
CO-Cao Xuan HAI

CO-1st Lt AN
XO-W.O. KHA
PO-1st Lt TRUC
CO-1st Lt MAI
XO-Lt Thai Van LAP
CO-1st Lt CHUONG

CO-THIEP
XO-GUONG
PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN ED-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM ED-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG ED-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	
15th Engr Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Luu Van MAN CO-Capt LOI ED-Sr Lt TAI
16th Sig Bn				
19th Med Bn				
808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk NG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Van KIEM ED-SAN
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH ED-SAN
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-So BA PO-DUNG
Trien Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist. Force			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM ED-Thi Bong AN
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri		Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47	CO-Cao TUNG
Cam Lo Co	H.30			CO-NGHIA
K.400 Co	4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Armed Co		3-60mm Mort 2-B-40 6-BAR's	CO-1st Lt BAN

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMS AND AMMUNITION</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hqtrs; Phan Kim Bac; K-500; Di Hai Cong Truong 6; 6th Morinitze; Nam Tu K.1; 1st Bn (?)	41,000TH- 41,300TH Di Hai 1520; Q40,70057		CE-10 HBM XD-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le THANG CO-Maj CUONG XD-Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq				
800th Bn			81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-75mm RR Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40 4-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 6-4A Wpus 2-57 RR 5-B-90 4-82mm Mort 2-75 RL 3-42G 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DKZ	CO-KHANH CO-Nguyen XUAN XD-Capt THANH CO-THANH XD-NHON CO-Capt Huong THI
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Hoa Troi Bn C-2 (7); 2nd Bn (?)			
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; B-10; 3rd Bn(?) 80.T Bn			
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74			
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha		

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 3-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Khuong Thuy Co	D-4; K-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-ENG 4-AR 6-AR 3-ENG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG 2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG; Unk-K-50	
Huong Tra Co	D-2; K-3; C-115; K-5			CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Yang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			CO-SON XO-THU

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	XI; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20825		CO-Capt THAO
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn (?)		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Nguyen Trai Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Gang 20 B.20; Viet Bang	21341SM Ba Ha	1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR 3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-LAM XO-THAI PO-CH
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn	2116 Quang Da		CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-HOANG
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; Q-15; H-35; H-55; 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co		2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co X-64 (?)			CO-MOI
H.31 Co	Hien Giang			CO-Do THANH
H.54 Co	C-70 Co of Dai Loc			CO-Nguyen TAM

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai	20,601GM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XD-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)		Nam Hai 20800GM		
RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn	GK-32		12-75mm RR	
RQ23 Bn	RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33		6-120mm Mort	CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ24 Bn (ENGR)	CK-40			CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG CO-Tran Van CAO CO-Capt THAU
72nd Bn				
2nd Bn	Binh Da; X2; K-2; 74th Bn (?)			
14th Co	A-14; V-14; A.19; K.53		1-60mm Mort 1-30 Cal MG 1-57mm RR (?) Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SMC	CO-THANH CO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUONG CO-Nguyen DUOC XO-Po Ly TA XO-Nguyen MAI
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 74th Dist Force Co			
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	7th Co; X-70 Co	P.O. 20142 P.G.M. Bac Hien		
706th Co	106th Co			
K.51	K51; 107; F-14; A.10 D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Anh VU
K.52	D-22; A.13			
K.54	C-73; A.16		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
K.55	C-75; Phi Po A-21; A.21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa	20,100GM 21,900GM Bac Hien 6000-6199	CO-LtGen Nguyen DON XO-Col TA
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Qua Long Regt; Steel Regt		CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung ST	CO-Nguyen MUOI
50th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; An Bac; 2006 Phung Hai; Dong Trung (?) Binh Gia	20,735CT. An Giang	CO-SrCapt Nguyen Xuan PHONG

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UNIT

70th Bn

90th Bn

21st Regt (Hq)

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

2nd VC Regt

93rd Bn

95th Bn

97th Bn

AKA

35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;
Chu Song; Truong Son
70; Inter-mt White
Tiger Bn; F-07; 103
Oanh Gia (?); Bong
Trang

Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son
Bn; 51st Bn; 13rd Bn;
Phi Doi 2008; Thuan
Binh; Song Hong(?);
Bach Ma; Worksite 21;
36th; A-21; Cong Truong
21; 2nd Regt; 36th
Regt; A-21; Cong Troung
7 (?)

11th Workshop; 11th Bn
135th Bn; 22nd Bn
33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?);
Quyet Chien; Worksite II;
Song Ba; Tren Phuoc 600;
Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song
Hong; 1st Regt;
707th Infil Gp;
Chi Ba (Sisters Three);
H-21 Bn

705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam;
H.58; Ba Minh; Thong
Rang 260

703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn
in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23;
H.25

LBN

6240

6340TL (old)
21164CM (new)

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

3-81mm Mort
4-60mm Mort
5-MG
4-57mm RR

17-81mm Mort
Unk-75mm RR
Unk-60mm Mort

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PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Duc CONG
XO-SrCapt THUA
PO-Duan Cong THANH

CO-Ho Thanh THI
XO-Vo Ngoc CAM

CO-Pham KIET
XO-Dang Cong KICH
PO-TIEN

CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
CO-SrCapt Le Huy BINH
CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
CO-KHANH
XO-HOANG
PO-HA
Cofs-TRI
CO-Dang DOAN
XO-BONG
PO-SINH
CO-VINH
XO-AN
PO-NGOAN
Cofs-LUONG
CO-VINH
CO-BINH
PO-QANH

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135GM 20.139GM Bac Hien 2048; NQ Ba Hao HT 2416; Ba Bao		CO-Capt Binh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi La 38			CO-Maj KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Work- site; 2nd Bn (?)		2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141GM- 20.144GM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa; X2424 Bac Hien For- ward to Ba Hoa	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
20th Co	X-20; 2d Co	PO 20142 AGM Bac Hien		CO-BUU
30th Co	3d Co; V-30 Co	PO 20142 BGM Bac Hien		CO-Dinh Dieu PHAN XO-Trinh LANH PO-NHUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Co	4th Co; V-40 Co	PO 20142 CGM Bac Hien		CO-GIAO XO-Tuan KIET PO-Ngoc BINH CO-VAN XO-HUNG PO-LOC
50th Co	5th Co; V-50 Co	PO 20142 DGM		
60th Co	6th Co; V-60 Co	PO 20142 EGM Bac Hien		XO-CONG PO-Nguyen Van LUC CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			
21st Co	T-21; H-40	22,422	2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 6-Carabines 3-BAR's 6-Carabines Unk-SMG Unk-K-40	CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU CO-MY CO-CHUNG XO-NAM PO-ANH
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hom Thu 21618M		CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
C.17 Co	Me Duc Co; C-217 Co			
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			
P.31 Co	T.19 Co			
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN CO-Dinh HUY

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prow 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Mai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10 D-518 Infil Gp	1500		CO-SrCol Le THUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn		1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KINDYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAN Cofs-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUET
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM Cofs-Nguyen KHAM
200th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CIA
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		
90th Ingr Bn	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21155 GM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG Cofs-DIUREU
18th NVA Regt	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAN
7th Bn				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANH Cofs-LUIONG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt	21.141VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC Cofs-Capt THANG CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM Cofs-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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5. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ
803RD NVA REGT
90TH NVA REGT
814TH MF BN
6TH NVA REGT

804TH NVA REGT
2ND NVA DIV HQ
3RD NVA REGT
409TH SAPPER BN
1506TH ENGR BN
2ND VC REGT HQ
93RD VC BN, 2ND REGT
95TH VC BN, 2ND REGT
97TH VC BN, 2ND REGT
20TH MF BN

CONFIDENTIAL**CRITERIA FOR MEASURING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY UNIT****(1) Measurement Rating Scheme.**

- A. C-1 (Fully combat effective).
- B. C-2 (Combat effective).
- C. C-3 (Marginally combat effective).
- D. C-4 (Not combat effective).
- E. Unk (Unknown).

(2) Measurement Area

- A. Personnel.
- B. Equipment/Supplies on Hand.
- C. Training and Leadership.
- D. Morale, Discipline and Political Reliability.

(3) Overall Rating

A. The overall rating of the unit is the lowest known rating assigned for any of the four measurement areas in paragraph (2) above, except in instances of two or more unknown ratings. In these instances, the overall rating will be unknown. (Examples: A battalion is rated C-2 in one area, unknown in two areas, and C-4 in equipment/supplies on hand. The battalion's overall rating is unknown).

(4) Rating Criteria**A. Personnel.**

C-1 - Not less than 90 percent of T/O attached, including 90 percent of essential ranks and MOS's. Unit has ability to maintain readiness, including the ability to operate and maintain all weapons, weapons systems and other equipment. Unit mission is not significantly impaired.

C-2 - Not less than 80 percent of T/O attached including essential ranks and MOS's. Unit capability to execute all missions for which organized is not significantly reduced.

C-3 - Not less than 70 percent of T/O attached including essential ranks and MOS's. Unit capability to execute all missions for which organized is significantly reduced.

C-4 - Less than criteria for C-3.

CONFIDENTIAL**B. Equipment/Supplies on Hand**

C-1 - No deficiencies exist in equipment and supplies (Food and Ammunition) on hand or within ready access which would restrict the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

C-2 - No important deficiencies exist in equipment and supplies (Food and Ammunition) on hand or within ready access. These deficiencies would substantially restrict the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

C-3 - Some important deficiencies exist in equipment and supplies (Food and Ammunition). These deficiencies would substantially restrict the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

C-4 - Less than criteria for C-3.

C. Training and Leadership

C-1 - Not less than 85 percent of personnel available for duty have had at least two months basic training or combat experience and there are no deficiencies in leadership.

C-2 - No less than 75 percent of personnel available for duty have had at least two months basic training or combat experience and there are no important deficiencies in leadership.

C-3 - Not less than 50 percent of personnel available for duty have had at least two months basic training or combat experience. There are important but not vital deficiencies in leadership. These deficiencies would substantially restrict the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

C-4 - Less than criteria for C-3.

D. Morale, Discipline and Political Reliability

C-1 - No deficiencies exist which would restrict the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

C-2 - No important deficiencies exist which would restrict the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

C-3 - Important, but not vital, deficiencies exist. These deficiencies substantially restrict the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

C-4 - Less than criteria for C-3

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7. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN I CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 120001H TO 182400H MAR 67.

a. Quang Tri

(1) Operation PRAIRIE II

(a) Elements of 324B Div are still believed in contact south of the DMZ. It appears possible that units of the 31st Regt, 341st Div are also operating south of the DMZ. PW LY, captured on 13 March at (YD 164686) stated that he was from the 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div. He further stated that his unit was moving from the Cam Lo (D) area to an area north of the Ben Hai River and Hill 360 (XD 9766).

(2) Other

(a) The 808th Bn was identified through PW TRANH HOI, captured on 17 March at (YD 334573). He indicated that emphasis is still being placed on destruction of the Revolutionary Development effort in the Hai Lang, Trieu Phong (D) by the 808th Bn.

(b) The T-2 Recon Bn has been identified in the eastern portion of Quang Tri. During the interrogation, PW HIEN stated that the unit had been trained and infiltrated from NVN in February 1967. Its mission was stated as performing reconnaissance missions in Quang Tri. Dong Ha was one city specifically mentioned as being the responsibility of a 15 man team of the D-31 unit.

(c) The K.400 Company has been accepted as a confirmed unit operating in the Gio Linh (D) area. See III MAF INTSUM 77 for all information.

b. Thua Thien

(1) Operation CHINOOK. No identifications.

(2) Other. Phu Thu Sub-sector Headquarters was attacked on 11 March. Although not confirmed, it appears that elements of the 804th MF Bn were involved in the attack.

c. Quang Nam Province

(1) Operation YUBA. No identifications.

(2) Other.

(a) Due to lack of information and contacts, the H.31 Co and the H.54 Co were changed from a confirmed status to a reported status.

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d. Quang Tin Province

(1) Operation TIPPECANOE. No identifications.

(2) Other.

(a) The Tra Son Co, Tra Ha Co and the A.34 Co were changed from a confirmed status to a reported status. This was because of a lack of information and contacts.

(b) Reevaluation of unit names in Quang Tin resulted in the following name changes:

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
A.10	K.51
A.13	K.52
A.16	K.54
A.21	K.55

The A.19 Co was found to be the same unit as the 14th Co. Therefore the A.19 Co name was assigned as an AKA for the 14th Co.

e. Quang Ngai Province

(1) Operation DE SOTO. No identifications.

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAP PERINTREP 11-67

1. 15th Bn (Engr), 324B Div. PFC PHAM VAN THANG, 1st Sqd, 2d Plt, 1st Co, 15th Bn (Engr), 324B Div was captured at (YD 083644) by M Co, 3d Bn, 4th Marines on 4 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The captive's mission was to support the 3d Bn, unknown regiment, 324B Div and to emplace three TM41 anti-tank mines along Highway 9. He did not know the mission of the 3d Bn.

b. The 15th Bn (Engr) is composed of two companies, each company has three platoons. The strength of the battalion is approximately 280 men.

c. There are two rice caches at an unknown location approximately one kilometer apart and one kilometer north of the BEN HAI River where they were to be resupplied. His squad had carried south 12 kilos of rice, one can of pork and 1/2 kilo of salt.

d. The morale in the engineers is high because the soldiers want to help re-unite North and South Vietnam. The morale in the 3d Bn was lower than that in the engineers.

(G-2 Comment: F/2 as to OOB information. It is believed that the 3d Bn referred to by THANG is the third battalion of the 812th Regt, numerical designation 6th Bn or K-6 Bn.)

2. 219th Co, KIM GIAO (H), QUANG NGAI (F). HUYNH THI HOANG, 17 year old female attached to the 219th Co, was captured at (BS 773423) by D Co, 1st Bn, 5th Marines on 2 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. She was wounded by Marine rifle fire when she, five men and another woman attacked the Marines at KIM GIAO (H) (BS 773423).

b. HOANG admitted that she had been a hamlet guerrilla since December 1966 and was attached to the 219th Co. Eleven members of the company had come to KIM GIAO (H) from the mountains where they had dispersed when the Allied forces came. The group she was with had the mission to attack TRAC AN sub-hamlet in KIM GIAO (H), approximately 50 meters from CHIEU Market. After their attack they had planned to return to THANH DIEN (H) (BS 771425) and assume the identity of civilians.

d. There is an assembly area for guerrillas in VAN LY (1) (H) (BS 725432). Guerrillas meet here on the 16th of every month (Lunar Calendar).

(G-2 Comment: F/3. Locations given are normal operation areas of the 219th Co.)

3. DINH TANG Co. DINH NIET, VMC, squad leader, DINH TANG Co, was captured on 7 March 1967 in the vicinity of (BS 539555) by a MINH LONG CIDG element and gave the following information during interrogation:

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k. The DINH TANG Co is a 50 man Montagnard company that was attached to a 200 man NVA unit identified as NVA Unit No. 1 commanded by a NVA named TU. The NVA unit's headquarters was at (BS 499590). There are 20 huts in LANG REN (V) (BS 499590) where rice is stored. There were other elements of NVA Unit No. 1 in the area making the overall strength approximately 500, mostly NVA. He did not know the location the other elements of NVA Unit No. 1.

b. The mission of the DINH TANG Co was to ambush any reaction force that came to the assistance of the outpost at (BS 555605) when it was attacked. They waited two days and nights in the ambush site. 80 men participated in the ambush and the remainder of the unit (approximately 170 men) waiting in the mountains. Their orders were to hit the reaction force for exactly one hour and then withdraw to a safe area at NHAIA PHU (V) (BS 610483). They remained longer because a second reaction force was sent after the first was ambushed.

c. The unit was armed with one DK, two 81mm mortars, two 60mm mortars, four BAR's, three MG's, 200 TSMG's and 117 carbines. The unit was dressed in black PJ's, khakis, grey uniforms, jungle fatigues and tiger suits. Most were carrying packs and bandoleers. There was no weapons cache as all personnel carried their weapons continuously even in their safe areas.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. First report of DINH TANG Co which is possibly an element of the 20th Montagnard Bn. NVA Unit No. 1 is possibly the 1st VC Regt which has previously used VMO units to attack OP's while elements of 1st Regt ambush reaction forces.)

4. 5th Co (AKA K-400). TRUNG SON (H). KINH MON (V). TRUNG LUONG (D). QUANG TRI (P). NGUYEN QUANG CHAU, 1st Sqd, 1st Plt (AKA 401st), 5th Co, surrendered himself to the Rural Pacification Committee, TRUNG SON (V) TRUNG LUONG (D), QUANG TRI (P) on 30 December 1966. He was questioned sometime later as a CHIEU HOI and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. During an attack on TAN AN (V), late September 1966, he was wounded and evacuated back to NVN (across the DMZ) to the E-270 Regt's Hospital in the VINH LINH Special Sector. On 20 December 1966, he left the hospital to return to his unit. He arrived in RVN for the second time on 26 December 1966 and, instead of returning to his unit in GIO LINH (D), he surrendered himself to RVN.

b. While in the Regt's Hospital, source saw a US aircraft (identified as an F-40 from photographs) shot down at 1400, 11 November 1966, near Hill 74, VINH THUY (V), HO XA (D). He saw the pilot eject from the burning aircraft. He heard that on the same day three other jet aircraft and one L-19 (O1E) aircraft were shot down in HO XA (D) by 12.7mm or 37mm air defense weapons. One pilot of these four aircraft was unable to eject from his aircraft and was killed, but the three other pilots landed safely and were captured. After three days of interrogation these pilots were taken north to HANOI by military truck.

c. Source saw three Communist Chinese personnel in HO XA (D), VINH LINH Special Zone. He was told they were advisors for air defense artillery.

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He heard that almost all air defense units in RVN had Communist Chinese advisors assigned to them, and that they actually operated the air defense weapons.

d. While in the hospital, the source received a briefing on future plans of the VC by the hospital political officer. The political officer said that the Labor Party in HANOI claims that US troops will land in QUANG TRI (P) and QUANG BINH (P) in 1967. In response to this, the people in these areas have recently begun digging tunnels from village to village. These tunnels are 12 meters underground and two meters in height. All inhabitants are required to participate in this digging and the dirt from these tunnels is hidden in dense areas to avoid detection. Water from the tunnels is pumped out with electric pumps.

e. Relating to the plans for RVN in 1967, the following statements were made during political training:

(1) Five NVA/VC regiments will be sent to areas south of the DMZ.

(2) There will be an attempt to occupy and liberate the QUANG TRI (P) area, which will be that time have 160,000 US troops. Concentration will be on GIO LINH and CAM LO Districts.

(3) The NVA/VC will set up ambushes against reinforcements during attacks in these areas.

(G-2 Comments: F/2 as to the aircraft incidents on approximately the date indicated. F/6 pertaining to the remaining position of the report.)

5. 4th Bn, 812th Regt, 324B Div. WO HOANG TRUNG NHO, Plt Ldr, Comm Plt, 4th Bn, 812th Regt was captured at (YD 075665) by the 1st Bn, 9th Marines on 3 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. Along with the known elements of the 324B Div, there is a special unit known as DAC CONG. Size is unknown but the personnel try to get jobs on military installations, and conduct sabotage activities and fight from within when the installation is attacked. The mission of D-11 (K-21), 120mm Mortar Bn and the D-12 (K-22), 105mm Howitzer Bn was to attack CAM LO, BA DOG, CON THIEN, Hill 241 and other major Marine bases. After the artillery attack, the 4th Bn was to attack some of these installations but they were spotted by aircraft and forced to fight before the artillery units could attack.

b. The D-12 Bn did not bring their 105's with them because they were too heavy. Instead they brought a new weapon made in Communist China. This weapon has a maximum range of seven kms and fires a round weighing 22 kilos (48.4 lbs). The barrel of the weapon is six to seven inches in diameter. Six barrels can be mounted in two groups of three which can be mounted side by side, or one group over the other. It takes two men to carry each barrel group, eight men to carry the legs and an unknown number to carry an unknown number of other parts.

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c. The strength of the 324B Div is unknown but the average strengths of subordinate units are as follows: Infantry regiments - 2600; infantry battalions - 450 to 500; companies - 130; platoons - 40; and squads - nine.

d. The 325C Div is located approximately five kms southwest of DONG HOI (XE 7231) in an area known as the DE NINH Working Area on the border of LU TAY (D) and QUANG NINH (D). The SONG HONG (31st) Regt, 341st Div is located in GIO LINH (D) and TRIEU PHONG (D), QUANG TRI (P).

(G-2 Comment: F/3. It is possible that the D-12 Bn fired the rockets on Camp CARROLL and that elements of the 31st Regt are located in QUANG TRI (P). First report of 325C Div.)

6. A 7th CIT source (C-6) reports that the VC in BINH SON (D), QUANG NGAI (P) are recruiting children and sending them to the mountains to be trained as low level intelligence collection agents. The children, ages 10 through 14 years, will be dressed in green pajamas, carry grenades, and approach Allied positions/outposts in order to observe friendly activities and collect information. These youth groups have been named "Suicide Youth" and in some instances will attack Allied positions with the grenades.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. However, captured documents continue to exhort local cadre to recruit youth.)

7. An agent report (C-3) received 6 March 1967 from 1st CIT stated as follows:

a. Nine frogmen chosen for their proficiency will be sent to NVN during March 1967. The remaining 10 frogmen will continue their mission in the DANANG harbor area.

b. The VC have one junk, disguised as a fishing boat, operating in the TAM GIANG Lagoon (YD 650400). This junk is equipped with a radio for communications.

c. Seven to nine VC have been sighted at (YD 775312). The VC have placed a pole below the surface of the water at this point and another directly in line with the first pole on the opposite side of the river. A submerged cable has been extended between the two poles and there is a possibility that mines are attached to the cable.

d. The present location of the headquarters, 122d VC Regt is in the vicinity of (YD 8725). This regiment is a Main Force unit under control of the 1st Regional Force. The regiment is also known as "DAM THANG" and the "YEN THE" Regiment. Subordinates of the regiment are:

Battalions

032
034
036

Special Units:

Assault Groups
Sabotage Platoon
Liaison Platoon
Intelligence Platoon
Junk Boat Team

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(G-2 Comment: F/6 except for information pertaining to the 122d VC Regt, which is evaluated F/3. A document captured on 15 February 1967 (coordinate unknown) identified the 122d VC Regt. The document mentioned the 032d Bn and Assault Groups A-11 and A-22 in reference to an attack. This is the first report of a 1st Regional Force, Special Local Regt, "DANG THANG" Regt, and "YEN THE" Regt. There have been several recent contacts in the PHU THU (D) area, but none that have identified any units.)

8. A captured document, dated 27 January 1967, outlines the training techniques of the engineers for 1967 as follows:

DIRECTIVE ON TRAINING OF COMBAT ENGINEERS IN 1967

I. Characteristics of the Situation:

Enemy: Particularly in attention in 1966 was that the puppet troops were shattered to the extent that they were unable to control local areas. They could not realize their scheme of encroachment and pacification. America and her satellites' troops have replaced the puppet troops in a number of battlefields in the Military Region.

An extremely fierce struggle has occurred in 1966 between us and the enemy, and the prospects of the situation in 1967 is that we will gain many bigger victories, the enemy will face heavier defeats and the degree of fierceness will be higher.

Our Side: In 1966 we gained many significant victories in military as well as in politics. Liberated areas and guerrilla bases were not only well secured but were also expanded deep into the enemies territory. The guerrilla-war campaign is rapidly and strongly developing not only in base areas and in the border but also in city areas.

As to military branches, they have, in the past year, been able to fulfill the mission of training and fighting and thus G.10 and its elements have been able to complete a number of missions such as destruction of communication, bridges, conducting counter-sweep operations, attacks on boats, mechanized units and outposts and attacks with claymore mines and grenades by sappers.

But in comparison, we have not yet met constructive requirements. We still have a number of shortcomings such as having not yet been able to overcome scattering tendencies and the Party's policy which is a train with whatever equipment that is available, to attack with what we have on hand and to take advantage of any opportunities to heighten all phases of the fighting quality and quantity.

There were comrades who were still reluctant before difficulties, and liked to relax and other comrades were still objective, conservative and have skipped many good training opportunities.

Therefore we must see to the fact that to gain victories we must be constructive in ideology and technique so as to complete all major missions and to be able to fight continuously.

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As to the capacity in 1967, it is noticed that the war trend will be fiercer and more difficult. The mission of the branches is to deepen (into enemy' territory) and to fight continuously.

In comparison with the situation and mission, it is noticed that the standards of the units in the present area are still weak and have not yet met the requirements. It is requested that cadre should study the training for their detachments so as to make a new advance in order to be sufficient in strength to complete all military missions in 1967.

II. Training Mission and Motto in 1967:**Military mission:**

Destroy the enemy's energy as much as possible, including that of the American and the Puppet forces. Continue to secure and develop population in order to expand battlefields.

Destroy all pacification plans, sweep operations, concentration of population and destroying of crops of the enemy, aiming at securing and expanding liberated zones and base areas which protect the potential forces and guarantee man and material powers provided to the resistance.

To realize the aforementioned mission, we must:

Intensify guerrilla war in all places.

Strongly and continuously attack communication and waterways.

Strongly attack the enemies rear base installations, eliminate their war energy and potential.

Actively counter sweep and encroaching activities, break the enemy's plan and attack both American and puppet forces, infantry and mechanized units.

Common mission:

Educate and heighten political vigilance and class level.

Enhance the hatred towards the American imperialists and their stooges.

Heighten the standards of administration, organization, discipline and confidence in the victory of the revolution and the determination of our troops.

Heighten the fighting technique for our cadre and soldiers.

Successfully attack and sabotage communication routes and waterways.

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Training motto: In a good political and military education, the Party's four standpoints should be realized:

(1) Standpoint on People's war: Three types of troops should be trained, no armed forces are underestimated.

(2) Standpoint on the population: Mobilize all cadre and soldiers to voluntarily participate in political and military study with a desire to learn, realizing a creative democracy.

(3) Standpoint on practicality: Training should be made closely with the struggle mission in order to yield good results, and sabotage is aimed at eliminating as many American and puppet troops as possible. Training is the employment of enemy instruments and weapons, at transforming enemy bombs and mines into deadly weapons used to destroy them. Reports should be made so that experiences can be extracted for supplementary training.

(4) Standpoint on self-sufficiency: In the circumstances of the resistance, our supplies and equipment are limited, thus cadre and soldiers must heighten their spirit to overcome difficulties to endure and develop initiatives in the task of preparation for training, to employ to the utmost all local material capacity for training and to save the funds as much as possible.

Training method requirements: The training should be agreeable to the motto which emphasizes practical work and avoid unpractical theory. The training should be in consonance with the situation and mission, in other words cadre and soldiers can fight while they are under training.

Military Region Engineers:

Water guerrilla: The water platoon is responsible for destruction of bridges and roads in accordance with the requirements, heightening the level of specialisation in conducting attacks on water and land, technique of infiltration to attack moored boats, technique of conducting raids and employment of water mines. Specialize in under water guerrilla technique, guarantees attacks on moored boats and infiltration to conduct sabotage of bridges.

Construction platoon: Specialize in the technique of attacking communication axis (mechanized units and destroying bridges and roads). Heighten the technical level of attacking mechanized units with mines. Have in hand the technique of disposing of mine fields. Know how to make mines.

Engineer Regiment:

Sapper: Heighten the technical level of sapper (attacks on outposts, clearing of roads with explosives and raids on enemy force with mines - covert and overt).

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Construction: Specialize in the technique of destroying communication, bridges, roads and clearing roads from obstacles with explosives. Guarantee the crossing of rivers and simple bridges for infantry. Specialize in the technique of attacking with mines. Guarantee field breastworks for command post.

Engineer Elements: Specialize in the technique of conducting raids with mines and grenades. Destruction of communication and waterways with mines (claymore mines) and torpedoes. Specialize in conducting sabotage of bridges and roads with capacity available. Making of mines. Training of militia in MR on the technique of conducting sabotage of bridges, roads, conducting raids with mines and attacks on enemy mechanized units. Importance of the elements are as follows: Conduct mine raids on pacification personnel. The people's engineers of military villages have their own plan and time schedules.

The time for training in one year is 60 days which is equally divided into five days in each month, eight hours a day and 480 hours in total, with the exception of intermittent review training.

Date 13 December 1966
Commander of H5
s/ TRAN MY THUAT

9. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOB</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN AN (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM BA (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH BAN (C)	28FEB67	7TH ENGR	CIV DEF	UNK/HOA VANG(D) HQ
TRAN CONG BIEN (C)	18FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
DANG BINH (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE BON (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852398/III MAP
TRAN BONG (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN VAN CAN (C)	19FEB67	UNK	GUERRA	AT9859/I CORPS
NGUYEN CHAY (C)	15FEB67	F/2/4	CIV DEF	AT981533/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI CHIN (C)	18FEB67	UNK	GUERRA	BT030600/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
VUONG THI CHIN (C)	18FEB67	UNK	GUERRA	BT005570/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHUNG (C)	9MAR67	I/3/5	CIV DEF	BT423013/CIV TO G-5
LE CO (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DINH QUONG (C)	19FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT993591/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAM GUONG (C)	UNK	D/1/7	PW	BS638955/III MAP
DO DAM (C)	7MAR67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS639954/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN DANG (C)	18FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI DINH (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DOI (C)	15FEB67	H/2/4	CIV DEF	AT985536/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
LE DUNG (C)	19FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT981594/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI DUYEN (C)	8MAR67	I/3/5	CIV DEF	BT412096/LI TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN GIANG (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852398/III MAP
NGUYEN VAN GIAP (C)	18FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT985595/DIEN BAN(D) HQ

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CAPTIVE (C)/RETURNER (R)	DOB/DSN	CAPTURING UNIT	UNIT	LOC/DISPOSITION
NGUYEN HAO (C)	7MAR67	KIT CARSON	CIV DEF	BS639954/BINH SON(D) HQ
SUI DUC HUAN (C)	21FEB67	C/1/1	PW	AT983594/I CORPS
DUONG MAI HUONG (C)	11MAR67	6TH ARVN	PW	XD173174/DIED "A" MED
NGUYEN HUY (C)	21FEB67	C/1/1	CIV DEF	AT989592/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
VO KHA (C)	19FEB67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT653041/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN TUAN KHANH (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM VAN KHOI (C)	21FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN KHOE (C)	UNK	L/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN KIEM (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN KY (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM DAO LAU (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN LE (C)	4MAR67	UNK	GUERR	BT063604/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN LIEN (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
DAO VAN LIEN (C)	4MAR67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	BS809414/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE THI LOAN (C)	21FEB67	C/1/1	CIV DEF	AT985593/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAM THI LUAN (C)	6MAR67	CAO L-1	CIV DEF	BT612983/BINH SON (D) HQ
TRAN LY (C)	2FEB67	UNK	UNK	AT815555/QT
TRA THANH MAI (C)	20FEB67	D/1/1	GUERR	UNK/I CORPS
PHAM MANH (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI MANH (C)	19FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT9859/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
HUYNH HAI (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI NAM (C)	21FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT9859/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
HUYNH HAI (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI NAM (C)	21FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	AT991592/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAM NAM (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TON TICH NGHE (C)	11MAR67	6TH ARVN	PW	XD173714/A MED
HOANG TRUNG NGOC (C)	3MAR67	A/1/9	812TH HSBT	YD075665/FURTHER INTER
NGUYEN NGOCAT (C)	6MAR67	3/5	CIV DEF	BT445040/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHI (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHIEM (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHIEM (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHO (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH NHO (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HOANG TRUNG NHO (C)	3MAR67	A/1/9	8th REGT	YD075665/FURTHER INTER
NGUYEN NOI (C)	7MAR67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS639954/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN VAN PHANH (C)	28FEB67	7TH ENGR	CIV DEF	UNK/HOA VANG(D) HQ
DO PHUONG (C)	4MAR67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	BS809414/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN PHUOC (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN QUANG (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGO RANG (C)	9FEB67	H/2/5	CIV DEF	AT885509/DUY XUYEN(D) HQ
PHAM HUONG (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
LE THI SAU (C)	18FEB67	UNK	GUERR	AT955575/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
LE SON (C)	4MAR67	A/1/1	CIV DEF	BT068609/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
HUYNH TAM (C)	2MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT073643/FURTHER INTER
NGUYEN VAN TAM (C)	19FEB67	D/1/1	GUERR	AT983602/I CORPS
LE THI TAN (C)	24FEB67	3/1	CIV DEF	AT955584/DAI LOC(D) HQ
NGUYEN THAM (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852389/ITI MAP
DAO THE (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRUNG THI THE (C)	21FEB67	C/1/1	CIV DEF	AT989592/DIEN BAN(D) HQ

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CAPTIVES(C)/RETURNEES(R)	DOC/DCR	CAPTURING		LOC/DISPOSITION
		UNIT	UNIT	
DANG THI TIET (C)	18FEB67	UNK	UNK	UNK/CTT
TRAN CONG THU (C)	18FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
BUI THUONG (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS852389/IIT MAP
PHAM THUNG (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CTV DEF	BS853389/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VU QUOC TOAN (C)	9MAR67	D/1/9	HA BAC CO	YD268555/"A" MED
LE THI TOI (C)	24FEB67	3/1	CIV DEF	AT955584/DAI LOC(D) HQ
NGUYEN TRA (C)	7MAR67	KIT CARSON	CIV DEF	BS639954/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE TRA (C)	11FEB67	CAC 22	UNK	AT854574/DAI LOC(D) HQ
DANT TRANG (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DINH TRU (C)	20FEB67	D/1/1	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN DINH THUONG (R)	1MAR67	-----	R-20	AT935664/FURTHER INTER
NGUYEN TUNG (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAM TUOI (C)	3MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS853398/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM DINH TY (R)	9FEB67	-----	CHIEU HOI	TAM KY
NGO VUI (C)	4MAR67	H/2/5	CIV DEF	AT889523/ARVN HOSP
LE NGOC VY (C)	24FEB67	3/1	CIV DEF	AT955584/DAI LOC(D) HQ
NGUYEN Y (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN YEN (C)	19FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
DAO THI XUONG (C)	18FEB67	UNK	UNK	BT005570/FURTHER INTER

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ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 11-67

1. GENERAL. Although VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level, there was a significant increase in acts of sabotage and terrorism. Items of interest included the establishment of a VC English language school and an ambush carried out by the VC to rob a bus carrying 12 Vietnamese Nationals.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. 9 March report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team related that the 200 VC Cadre are attending a special English language school in a camouflaged cave located in the vicinity of PHUOC HOI #1 and PHUOC HOI #2 (H) (ZG 188305). Reportedly, the school will be three months in duration and the graduates will be sent to New Life Hamlets to gather intelligence information on U.S. military facilities.

A 15 March report from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines stated that two Vietnamese Nationals were apprehended in the vicinity of (AT 912667). It was suspected that these individuals were informing the VC of USMC activity in the area.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

Province	Date	Incident	Location
QUANG TRI	10Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 337549
QUANG TRI	17Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 218708
THUA THIEN	13Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 711248
THUA THIEN	15Mar	Railroad bridge destroyed	YD 828177
THUA THIEN	15Mar	Railroad bridge destroyed	ZD 128010
THUA THIEN	15Mar	Railroad bridge destroyed	AT 833995
THUA THIEN	15Mar	Railroad bridge destroyed	AT 844958
QUANG NAM	12Mar	Highway partially destroyed	BT 119489
QUANG NAM	12Mar	Highway partially destroyed	BT 122484
QUANG TIN	14Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 282251
QUANG TIN	17Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 197391
QUANG TIN	17Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 219359
QUANG TIN	17Mar	Highway bridge partially destroyed	BT 256294

QUANG NAM. A 15 March report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that a fuel train was derailed by a mine in the vicinity of (AT 926855) which resulted in three Regional Forces personnel being wounded. The explosion blasted one track apart and left a crater of approximately five to six feet in diameter and four feet deep. Upon investigation, two nine volt transistor batteries and approximately one hundred feet of communication wire were found under the derailed cars.

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4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG NAM. A 14 March report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that the VC have established a propaganda training course in the vicinity of KY MINH (V) (AT 983600). This course will be presided over by NGUYEN THE NGO, a VC propaganda and training cadre, and will consist of a review of ideological reasoning and an anti-American lecture.

A 14 March report from the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines stated that a bulletin board containing anti-American propaganda was found in the vicinity of (AT 992618). The theme of the propaganda is unknown at this time.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

THUA THIEN. A 15 March report from a usually reliable source related that at approximately 1800 on 14 March, 12 VC, dressed in camouflaged utilities, ambushed and robbed a bus carrying 12 people. Reportedly, the VC took 20,500 Piasters and one identification card. (OI Comment: This is the first report of VC actually robbing civilians. Usually a "tax" is levied or other pretenses are used to obtain funds from the civilian populace.)

A 16 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that an unknown number of VC entered BAN MON Hamlets (YD 9607), (YD 9707), (YD 9807) and abducted eight civilians who have sons serving in the ARVN forces. Reportedly, these people will be taken to the mountains for indoctrination.

A 17 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that at approximately 2000 on 15 March, 18-20 VC entered NAM PHO CAN #1 (YD 9605), NAM PHO CAN #2 (YD 9504), and NAM PHO (YD 9606) hamlets and abducted nine civilians. No reason for the abductions were given.

QUANG NAM. A 11 March report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team stated that a VC document was found on a Vietnamese shrine located in the vicinity of (AT 943671). A translation of the document is as follows: "On order of Superior Local Liberation Forces Headquarters, those people who live close to American, satellite, lackeys' barracks, are to disperse to areas far from the enemy. The people shall not ride on empty cars, sampans, ferries, or go into enemy military zones. People in the enemy concentration centers shall disperse far from Strategic Hamlets. This is to prevent damage to the people in the Liberation Force attacks."

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A 12 March report from a usually reliable source related that an unknown number of VC entered a hamlet in the vicinity of (AT 840477) and attempted to assassinate the hamlet chief.

A 13 March report from the 3rd Tank Battalion stated that a three-foot by five-foot raft with a white package was observed on the river in the vicinity of (AT 974699). Three rounds were fired at the raft, which resulted in a secondary explosion. (Refer to III MAF PERINTREP NO. 9-67.)

A 12 March report from a usually reliable source related that five VC entered XUYEN THU (V) (AT 870477) and threw three grenades into the home of HUYNH CAU, killing him and injuring three civilians. CAU was the exiled hamlet chief of PHUOC LAM (H) (ZC 1652) and reportedly was assassinated because he had been identifying VC personalities in the area.

A 13 March report from a usually reliable source stated that during the attack on HIEU NHON (D) Headquarters, the VC killed and mutilated the bodies of the District Chief and his family.

A 13 March report from an intelligence source related that a VC platoon entered PHAN MY (H) (BT 080596), abducted a Vietnamese woman, and assassinated her. Reportedly, the woman was killed because she was a Vietnamese Government Agent.

A 17 March report from an intelligence source related that an unknown number of VC penetrated AI MAU VHAN (H), assassinated the hamlet chief, and abducted five civilians.

QUANG TIN. A 18 March report from an intelligence source related that an unknown number of VC entered KY SANH (H) (BT 447028) and assassinated the son-in-law of the hamlet chief.


QUANG NGAI. A 13 March report from a usually reliable source stated that a house in the vicinity of (BS 601920) was destroyed by a VC demolition team which resulted in three civilians being killed and nine injured.

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26 MARCH 1967

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PERINTREP NO.12-67



III MAF PERINTREP #12-67

19-25 1967

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 DANANG, RVN
 26 March 1967
 Ser: 071267

PERINTREP 12-67

Period Covered: 190001H - 252400H Mar67

Ref: (a) Maps: JCG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheet NE 48-16, NE 49-13
 ND 48-4, ND-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. Aerial photography made up of 13 separate sorties and flown 14 through 22 March along the length of the DMZ and to the northeast of it revealed enemy ground fortifications consisting primarily of anti-aircraft and automatic weapons positions, underground bunkers and associated field fortifications. Comparison with early March photography revealed slight to moderate increases in enemy construction activity. A concentration of ground positions was noted within a five kilometer radius of (YD 2387). A total of 13 light armored vehicles mounting machine guns of undetermined caliber were positioned under camouflage at (YD 089876 - YD 098740 - YD 087874).

There was a distinct increase in the intensity and tempo of enemy ground activity in northern QUANG TRI (P). The enemy effort was, for the most part, centered in the northern CON THIEN/GIO LINH sector where 29 mortar attacks were reported. Although the majority of incoming was 82mm mortar fire, the attack on GIO LINH on the night of 20-21 March also involved 105mm artillery fires, plus artillery fire of undetermined caliber.

Ground action in the CON THIEN area consisted of three Marine contacts with NVA company sized elements and a series of engagements with smaller groups of the enemy. In several cases the fighting was best described as heavy and the enemy response tenacious. For the period 19 through 25 March Operation BEACON HILL (northern CON THIEN) accounted for 231 NVA KIA (Conf), 433 KIA (Prob) and 26 weapons captured, two of which were crew served. Comparable combat occurred at two additional locations (YD 1266) and (YD 0762) where Marine rifle units southwest of CON THIEN and north of Route 9 and CAMP CARROLL encountered squad to platoon sized enemy elements. In the general vicinity of (YD 0762) over 19 and 20 March, units of the 3rd Marines located 121-102mm spin stabilised rockets with three launchers. The positions were from seven to nine kilometers north of CAMP CARROLL. Operation PRAIRIE III reported enemy casualties of 85 KIA (Conf), 190 KIA (Prob) with 41 individual and 5 crew served weapons captured for the period 19 through 25 March.

Ground reconnaissance deployed from (YD 1060) southwest toward KHE SANH reported total sightings of approximately 140 NVA and VC, the majority of

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which took place within a three kilometer radius of (YD 0666) adjacent to and south of the IMZ. Patrols gained several contacts in this area, the largest on 24 March with an estimated NVA company. West and northwest of the KHE SANH combat base two Marine squads successfully ambushed small enemy elements in separate actions.

Eastern QUANG TRI (P) saw a continuation of VC initiated action against ARVN, RF, PF and RD elements. At (YD 369527) southeast of GIO LINH and on 21 March, the 4th Bn, 1st ARVN Regt providing village security was attacked by an estimated VC company. The VC were driven off. To the south and in the vicinity of (YD 305555) northwest of QUANG TRI City on 22 March, a commercial bus detonated a mine with heavy civilian casualties. In the same area and during the next day, Marine units engaged in short fire fights with small groups of VC. Enemy casualties were moderate. In the coastal lowland due east of QUANG TRI City enemy activity was limited to small scale harassing actions reported in conjunction with the ARVN Operation, LAM SON 142.

Other intelligence of interest concerned the continuing interrogation of an NVA Captain captured 13 March in Operation PRAIRIE II. He revealed that Marine units had been in contact with elements of the 31st Regt, 341st Div as well as subordinate units of the 812th Regt, 324B Div. See para 1, Annex C.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. Enemy initiated activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P) retained essentially the same pattern as that of the two prior reporting periods. Activity noted consisted primarily of harassment and terrorism, including the use of mines. At (YD 609312) on 21 March, an unknown number of VC blew three culverts on Highway 1. To the east and on the same date, two platoons of VC entered BAT PHUONG Resettlement Camp approximately six kilometers southeast of PHONG DIEN (C) and destroyed 150 homes, abducted three civilians, including the Hamlet Chief's wife, and left 880 homeless.

Northwest of HUE City at (YD 6925), 3rd Bn, 3rd ARVN Regt gained contact with two companies of VC. Two VC were killed and six weapons captured. Other enemy activity was centered east of HUE City and immediately north of the PHU BAI TAOR, particularly in the vicinity of (YD 8724). Individually the incidents were relatively minor and consisted of mining, harassing and light probing activity. Four incidents of no significance were reported within the PHU BAI TAOR.

Ground reconnaissance deployed west of HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported approximately 60 VC in the general vicinity of (YD 5524) and approximately 15 VC at (YD 7906). Other intelligence pertaining to central THUA THIEN (P) indicated an increase in enemy activity of an unspecified nature, especially in the region southwest of the CHINOOK II operating area.

One incident of terrorism was reported on 23 March at (YD 987056) where 12 VC entered QUI LOC (V) and abducted six civilians. The other occurrence

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on the same date involved the mining of an ARVN element. One sighting was reported by L Co, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines at (ZC 155976), between PHU BAI and DANANG, when approximately 20 armed VC accompanied by 50 laborers carrying heavy loads were observed proceeding into the mountains. Elsewhere in the vicinity of PHU LOC enemy action was limited to minor and scattered harassing actions.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance deployed in the northwestern sector both within and to the west of the DANANG TAOR made only light sightings of the enemy. There was a slight increase in the number of VC initiated incidents occurring within the TAOR. The number of mine and booby trap incidents remained very high. Reconnaissance activity due south of the TAOR in the vicinity of (AT 8540) gave indication of a sharp drop in enemy ground movement when compared to the last two reporting periods.

Operation NEW CASTLE underway in the sector (AT 8549) approximately ten kilometers due south of Hill 65 gained significant contact with the enemy. Elements of 2nd Bn, 5th Marines engaged an estimated enemy battalion; heavy action ensued with VC casualties for the period 22-25 March listed at 70 KIA (Conf) and 88 KIA (Prob).

Enemy action in QUANG NAM (P) remained sharply focused in the area between HOI AN City and the QUANG TIN (P) border, with 32 separate incidents reported. Mining, sabotage and terrorism incidents were reported along with relatively minor small scale harassing and probing actions. On the evening of 24 March in the vicinity of (BT 113497) south of the BA REN Bridge, an ARVN convoy made up of approximately 96 vehicles was attacked by a sizeable VC force. An ARVN reaction unit was committed and artillery fire was brought to bear. Air strikes were likewise flown against the enemy. Results of the enemy attack were 26 trucks destroyed, 45 with varying degrees of damage and 25 undamaged. Personnel casualties were relatively light. A Marine convoy preceding the ARVN also was attacked; three vehicles were lost, one to mining which temporarily stopped the convoy and the remaining two by enemy fire.

To the south and at (BT 021309), elements of F Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines observed an estimated VC platoon. Contact was subsequently gained and the enemy sustained 7 VC KIA (Conf), 10 KIA (Prob) and 2 PW's captured.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. Four major incidents were reported in eastern QUANG TIN (P) along Highway 1. These actions represent an increase in enemy activity over the past two reporting periods. The first two, on 19 and 20 March, concerned the partial destruction of a bridge and culvert at (BT 236339) and (BT 182410) by unknown numbers of VC. Both bridges were unguarded. At (BT 213282) on 20 March, two RF platoons manning an OP were hit by an estimated two company VC force. Supporting artillery was called for and the VC hastily broke contact and withdrew. At (BT 270268) on 19 March, a platoon from the 929th RF Co was attacked by an estimated company of VC. Following a short fire fight the enemy withdrew. U.S. counterpart opinion concerning this action pointed toward the engagement as a cover for the VC moving across Highway 1 toward the west.

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Other enemy activity in QUANG TIN (P) was centered in the vicinity of (BT 2517) just west of TAM KY City. Four minor harassing incidents were reported.

Ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. One contact with nine VC occurred at (BT 2510) on 18 March.

There was a decrease in the number of incidents reported from the CHU LAI TAOR. A small concentration was noted in the northern sector. Seven incidents were reported from the Korean Marine area of responsibility. Elsewhere in southern QUANG TIN (P) enemy activity was limited to more isolated and small scale harassing actions.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). There was a slight decrease in enemy activity in the eastern QUANG NGAI (P) region. South of the CHU LAI TAOR at two locations, (BS 595643) and (BS 595630), on 23 March, the ARVN 37th Ranger Bn returning to their base camp at NGHIA HANH gained contact and promptly attacked an estimated VC battalion. Assisted by RF and PF elements the attack forced a rapid enemy withdrawal leaving 15 VC KIA (Conf). On 20 March elements of the 713th RF Company manning the AN SON OP (BS 579641) beat off an attack by a multi-company VC force. Casualties were moderate. At (BS 695765) north-east of QUANG NGAI City and on 23 March, a PF platoon on patrol made contact with a platoon of VC. A fire fight followed and the VC withdrew.

Ground reconnaissance centered in two areas (BS 6458) and (BS 7535) reported moderate sightings of and several contacts with the enemy.

Operation DESOTO continued with light to moderate contact. Enemy casualties resulting from the operation for the period 19 through 25 March were 20 VC KIA (Conf) and 40 KIA (Prob). On 24 March at (BS 814383), the 3rd Bn, 7th Marines CP and elements of 3rd Bn, 11th Marines received an estimated 220 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar and 57mm RR fire. Counter mortar fire was returned. Within the LSA, the fuel dump was hit and burned. Two 105mm howitzers were slightly damaged but rapidly put back in action.

To the south on 18 March, an RF company manning the SA HUYNH OP (BS 920219) was overrun by an estimated VC company. The RF's fled the area. The nearby village of SA HUYNH was partially burned by the VC. Elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Div, USA occupied the OP until an ARVN reaction force arrived. Friendly casualties were light, although a number of weapons were lost. Documents taken from enemy dead identified them as members of the 93rd Bn, 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div.

To the west and in the vicinity of the GIA VUC CIDG Camp, VC probed the camp utilizing mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire. A ground attack against the camp did not occur. Friendly casualties were light, the enemy unknown.

On 22 March west of the BA TO CIDG Camp, a FAC called in air strikes against a large group of VC in the open. Results were 106 VC KIA (Conf).

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Other intelligence covering eastern QUANG NGAI (P) continued to indicate enemy activity of an unspecified nature, particularly in the areas southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR and north of BINH DINH border.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents during the reporting period dropped slightly when compared to the last period. The total of 374 incidents consisted of six attacks, one ambush, seven assaults by fire, 118 small unit engagements, 44 mine/booby trap incidents, 188 incidents of AA fire and 10 acts of sabotage.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex B.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex B.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex B.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) On 19 March 67 the VC employed a new type of explosive device. One 60mm mortar round and one M-26 grenade were attached to each other by a wire and placed approximately six feet apart. When the mortar round detonated, the force of the explosion released the attached wire leading to the grenade resulting in a secondary explosion four to six seconds later.

This is the first report of the use of this device in our area, however, during WWII similar devices were employed. The devices were located in places of likely cover used by engineer personnel when destroying mines and booby traps. If the mines or booby traps were not checked closely for possible pull wires and/or primer cords attached to other devices, they would inflict casualties on personnel in a supposedly safe area.

(2) On 16 March 67, a PF, CAC H-3 volunteered the information that the VC remove their trousers and tie the legs around their necks so that they can identify each other at night.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
20 Feb	(BS 470718)	VC Aid Station	Agent III MAF G-2: F/3
28 Feb	(BS 169598)	VC Broadcast Station	Agent III MAF G-2: F/6
5 Mar	(YC 950960)	VC Training Inst.	Agent III MAF G-2: F/3
10 Mar	(YC 968664) (YC 986667)	Rice Storage	Agent III MAF G-2: F/3

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
17 Mar	(BS 925254)	Supply Port	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(AT 9418)	Main Ammunition Dump	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(BS 685779)	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(BS 461804)	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(BS 671565)	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(BS 465830)	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(AT 862210)	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(AT 849250)	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(AT 960278)	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3
17 Mar	(BS 3980)	PW Camp (For ARVN only)	Interrogation Report III MAF G-2: F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. There were 188 incidents of AA fire during the reporting period, with 38 aircraft sustaining 61 hits. Four cases of possible 12.7mm fire were reported. Two cases of hand grenade and one case of 82mm mortar fire were also reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Ground reconnaissance elements deployed along a southwest line from a point just south of the DMZ (YD 0667) to the KHE SANH combat base sighted approximately 140 NVA and VC during the week. The greater portion of enemy activity was centered immediately south of (YD 0667), where on one occasion a patrol gained contact with an estimated NVA company.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Reconnaissance due west of HUE City reported a slight increase in the number of enemy sighted during the period. This area has, however, remained relatively quiet since the week of 5-11 February. Sightings west and south of the PHU BAI TAOR continued to be insignificant.

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(3) QUANG NAM (P). Light enemy activity was reported by reconnaissance elements in the western and northwestern portions of the DANANG TAOR. Intensive reconnaissance to the south of the TAOR reported a sharp drop in enemy movement and activity particularly when compared to the last two reporting periods.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Ground reconnaissance immediately west of the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. To the south reconnaissance centered in two areas, (BS 6458) and (BS 7535), reported moderate sightings of and several contacts with small groups of the enemy.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
19 Mar	(BT 075020)	1050	USSF
21 Mar	(BT 085598)	600	1/1
25 Mar	(BT 586004)	10,956	1/7

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Organization. Annex B.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex B.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex B.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex B.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy losses for the reporting period reflected a sizeable increase when compared to the previous period and were 550 KIA (Conf), 881 KIA (Prob) and eight VC PW's. Weapon losses for the period were 94 individual weapons and seven crew served weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. During the week weather over the I Corps Tactical Zone was dominated by a low level southeasterly flow topped by relatively dry southwesterly winds. This pattern remained consistent resulting in stratus and considerable surface fog, particularly during the early morning hours. The fog dissipated by late morning or early afternoon, although moderate to heavy haze remained. The afternoons saw short periods of restricted visibility. Toward the latter part of the week a low overcast developed and again restricted visibility. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

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	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	82	83	82	88
Low	72	71	73	74
Rainfall (total)	.24	00	.01	00
Visibility (miles)	5	5	6	6
Winds (knots)	4	5	5	9

k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex C.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 9-67.

B. S. Read

B. S. READ
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. APRIL WEATHER BRIEF
- B. ORDER OF BATTLE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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CG II FFORCEV
COMNAVFORV
CG 1ST MARDIV
CG 3RD MARDIV
CG 1ST MAW
CG 5TH MARDIV
CG 1ST INF DIV
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV
CG 9TH INF DIV
CG 25TH INF DIV
CG PROJECT OREGON
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG
CTF 76
CG 9TH MAB

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CG 2D BDE ROKMC
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF
CG FLC
CO 366TH FTW
CO RLT 26
CTG 79.5
CTG 76.5
CTG 76.4
COMPHIERON SEVEN
CO 30TH NCR
HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)
CO 7TH ENGR BN
CO 9TH ENGR BN
CO 5TH COMM BN
CO 1ST MP BN
CO CAMP BUTLER
DSA I CORPS
CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP
CO 282D AVN CO
CO 8TH RR FU
CICV
I DASC DANANG
III MAF

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ANNEX A (APRIL WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 12-67

1. General Weather. April may be called the transition month between the dry air of the northeast monsoon and the moist air of the southwest monsoon. The weather, in general, is favorable to tactical operations and in I CTZ April is considered a dry season month.

2. Precipitation

a. Most local rainfall in I CTZ is produced by afternoon and evening showers or thunderstorms. Precipitation occurs on two to five days along the coast.

b. The average precipitation amounts for the month are two inches inland, less along the immediate coastal areas.

c. Maximum monthly precipitation values range from five inches, in the area around HUE, to 10 inches elsewhere.

d. Minimum rainfall amounts are zero over most of I Corps, except for the area around HUE where the minimum value is one inch.

e. Recorded maximum 24-hour precipitation amounts are from three point six to six or seven inches, between DANANG and HUE.

3. Thunderstorms. The maximum activity, four to eight days with thunderstorms, occurs over the coastal region and interior highlands of I Corps.

4. Cloudiness

a. Cloudiness is decreased to the annual minimum along the coast.

b. Convective clouds form over most regions in the morning, and afternoon ceilings, with bases 2,000 to 4,000 feet, become common toward the end of the month.

c. The mean cloudiness ranges from 50 per cent in the southern portion of the I CTZ to 60 per cent north of DANANG. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 (widely scattered clouds) varies from five days inland to 10 days over the coastal area.

5. Visibility. Morning fog in the mountain valleys and along and near the major river valleys occasionally restricts visibility to less than three miles during early morning hours.

6. Fog. Fog occurs on less than five days over most of I Corps. However, five or six days of fog may be expected in the area around DANANG.

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7. Sunrise, Sunset, and Moonrise, Moonset Tables

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
1	0643	1900	Lt Qtr	0029	1146
2	0642	1900		0128	1243
3	0642	1900		0222	1342
4	0641	1900		0310	1435
5	0641	1900		0353	1527
6	0640	1901		0432	1617
7	0640	1901		0507	1704
8	0639	1901		0540	1750
9	0638	1901	New	0612	1836
10	0637	1901		0645	1922
11	0636	1901		0719	2011
12	0635	1901		0755	2100
13	0635	1901		0834	2152
14	0634	1901		0917	2247
15	0633	1901		1005	2343
16	0633	1902		1058	
17	0632	1902	1st Qtr	1156	0038
18	0631	1902		1255	0132
19	0631	1902		1356	0223
20	0630	1903		1457	0311
21	0630	1903		1557	0356
22	0629	1903		1656	0439
23	0629	1904		1757	0522
24	0628	1904	Full	1859	0605

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
25	0627	1904		2003	0651
26	0627	1905		2108	0740
27	0626	1905		2213	0834
28	0626	1905		2315	0932
29	0625	1905			1031
30	0624	1905		0013	1130

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ANNEX B (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTERP NO. 12-67.

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 252400H 1 AR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	2	1,500					2	1,500
Regiments (Hq)	6	2,194	2	1,300			8	3,494
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,290	12	4,580	6	2,050	35	14,920
Battalions (other)	10	2,240	3	1,275			13	3,515
Separate Companies					26	2,535	26	2,535
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		15,024		7,155		4,585		26,764
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	Unk					1	Unk
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					4	350	4	350
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						750		750
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
CONFIRMED TOTAL STRENGTH		15,524		7,155		6,235		28,914

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2. NUMBER OF VC/NVA BATTALIONS BY TYPE (CONFIRMED ONLY)

	<u>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</u>		<u>COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS</u>							<u>TOTALS</u>
	<u>INF</u>	<u>SAPPER</u>	<u>ARTY</u>	<u>MORT</u>	<u>AAA</u>	<u>RR</u>	<u>ENCR</u>	<u>SIG</u>	<u>MED</u>	
NVA	17	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	27
VC MF	12	2					1			15
VC LF	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTALS	35	2	1	1	2	1	3	2	1	48

Note: Totals include units of 324B Div and 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div.

3. (C) ESTIMATED IRREGULAR FORCES STRENGTH AS OF 17 FEB 67.

<u>PROVINCES</u>	<u>GUERRILLA FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
QUANG TRI	2,274	4,687	937	7,898
THUA THIEN	2,807	7,988	1,597	12,392
QUANG NAM	4,601	13,026	2,606	20,233
QUANG TIN	3,324	8,809	1,761	13,894
QUANG NGAI	<u>4,134</u>	<u>13,516</u>	<u>2,703</u>	<u>20,353</u>
TOTAL STRENGTH	<u>17,140</u>	<u>48,026</u>	<u>9,604</u>	<u>74,770</u>

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4. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 252400H MAR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	9,875 ^{#2}		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Vinh Linh SS.	13Mar67
1st Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 164686	13Mar67
1st Co(K-1)	NVA	C	180				
2nd Co(K-2)	NVA	C	140				
3rd Co(K-3)	NVA	C	140				
4th Co(K-4)	NVA	C	140				
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 9661 (Hill 360)	13Mar67
5th Co(K-5)	NVA	C	180			Cua Valley	13Mar67
6th Co(K-6)	NVA	C	140			XD 7834	13Mar67
7th Co(K-7)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
8th Co(K-8)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 1072	13Mar67
9th Co(K-9)	NVA	C	180				
10th Co(K-10)	NVA	C	140				
11th Co(K-11)	NVA	C	140				
12th Co(K-12)	NVA	C	140				
32nd Regt	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Nghe An (P) (?)	13Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	2,625		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	825		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	C-2	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661 - XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,984	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	3 km Radius YD 0572	4Mar67
Regt Hq and Spt	NVA	C	794		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0864	2Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	250	C-4	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 063682	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C				YD 102632	1Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
3rd Co	NVA	C				YD 081665	4Mar67
4th Co(Support)	NVA	C					
5th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 070685	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C					
2nd Co	NVA	C					
3rd Co	NVA	C				Area YD 0768	4Mar67
4th Co	NVA	C					
6th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0768	4Mar67
U/I Wire Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280		DMZ Area	YD 0768	4Mar67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	YD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	500	C-2	YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist and coastal area	24Feb67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500	C-2	Hai Lang (D)	YD 4054 - YD 4250	24Feb67
H.99 Co	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	24Feb67
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66
K.400 Co	LF	C	120		Gio Linh (D)	YD 3172	17Feb67

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		Thua Thien (P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720	YD 540195	21Feb67
800th Bn	MF	C	300		Phong Dien (D)	YD 620464	17Feb67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400		YD 6318	ZC 0595	24Feb67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400		YD 5642	YD 635348	8Mar67
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YC 904998	18Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 7030	YD 635348	8Mar67
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Thu (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,500	C-2	Que Son (D)	AT 9631 To BT 0239	19Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 935325	17Feb67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	AT 9236	13Jan67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	250	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 956563	10Mar67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	C-2	ZC 135280	BT 094643	28Feb67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 0848	6Mar67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460		Que Son (D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai(P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		E Hiep Duc (D)	AT 9818	26Sep66
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		Quang Tin (P)		
					W Son Tinh (D)	BS 4877	17Feb67
					Quang Ngai (P)		
33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	C-3	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
RQ21 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
RQ22 Bn	NVA	C	220	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
RQ20 Bn	NVA	C	220		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
RQ24 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	120	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 902215	16Mar67
2nd Bn, (3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	C-2	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh (D)	5Feb67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	C-2	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	MF	C	90	C-2	Tam Ky (D)	BT 441081	13Jan67
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov66
K.51 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.52 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
K.54	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.55	LF	C	100		BT 2718		

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha (D)/KONTUM (P) Border	12KM SW Hau Duc (D) HQ AS 9080	12Feb67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,880	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 4775 - BS 5273	19Feb67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Son Ha (D)	BS 5580 - BS 5676	11Mar67
40th Bn	MF	C	280	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 5580 - BS 5676	11Mar67
60th Bn	MF	C	200	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 5580 - BS 5676	11Mar67
70th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 5580 - BS 5676	11Mar67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	Son Ha (D)	BS 5580 - BS 5676	11Mar67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	C-3	Tra Bong (D)	BS 4877	19Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		Tra Bong (D)	BS 5085 - BS 5180	11Mar67
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	Son Tinh (D)	BS 5085 - BS 5180	11Mar67
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	Son Tinh (D)	BS 5085 - BS 5180	11Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	C-3	Tra Bong (D)	BS 5085 - BS 5180	11Mar67
RQ23 Bn(2nd NVA Div)	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 4478	BS 4478	18Feb67
2d Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		Quang Ngai	2KM RAD BS 655315	28Dec66
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 6531	BS 6531	28Dec66
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6431	BS 724575	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6532	BS 6532	28Dec66
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 6631	BS 6631	28Dec66
20th Bn	MF	C	400	C-2	E Son Ha (D)	BS 2864	15Nov66
38th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	595		BS 6436	BS 6436	23Jan67
20th Co (Bn Hq)	MF	C	105	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
30th Co	MF	C	120	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
40th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 3377	BS 3377	23Jan67
50th Co	MF	C	100	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
60th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Son Tinh (D)	W Son Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 7743	2Mar67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)	BS 763257	Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 732079	27Feb67
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7610	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BS 8716	20Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 8716	20Mar67
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BS 8716	20Mar67
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8579	6Mar67
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BS 8716	20Mar67
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,050		BS 9005	BS 9005	Feb67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh		
7th Bn	NVA	C	300		BS 9305	BS 9305	11Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		BS 9104	BS 9104	13Feb67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 8808	BS 8808	18Feb67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page B-3.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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5. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (ANA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 252400H MAR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ANA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31445(?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung THANH CO-Sr Capt HAI
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong; Cong Troung 1/5	31445XB 31442XB 31450SB		
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong; Cuu Long; K101	31450XB 31443XB		
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn); K100; Song Huong		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn); Thu Bong; K103			
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31445XBL 32445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Troung 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO- Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt 4th Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cua Long Bn			CO-Nguyen KHUONG XO-Bui Dinh PHONG
1st Co	Doan-1	31621		CO-1st Lt Le TIEN XO-Linh Xuan TIEU PO-Vo Dinh HOI
2nd Co	Doan-2	31622 RT		CO-1st Lt Tran Xuan
3rd Co	Doan-3	31623		XO-Le Minh KOANH PO-Nguyen Ngo CHUNG
4th Co (Hvy Wpns Support)	Doan-4	31624 RT	12-82mm Mort 6-170G Chicom 7.62mm Type 57 9-AANG Unk-B-10 DK-RR(82mm)	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG) PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH CO-Cao Xuan HAI
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn			CO-1st Lt AN XD-W.O. KHA PO-1st Lt TRUC CO-1st Lt MAI XO-Lt Thai Van LAP CO-1st Lt CHUONG
2nd Co	Doan-2			
3rd Co	Doan-3			
4th Co (Hvy Wpns)	Doan-4	31634 K.T.		
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(er Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; ~~Song Chu~~ Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XD-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Luu Van MAN CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG 9-AR	CO-Van KIEM XO-SANH
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO- SAM
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Vo BA PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist. Force			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri		Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47	CO-Cao TUNG
Cam Le Co K.400 Co	H.30 4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Armed Co	41344 FQ(?) 41346 FQ(?)	3-60mm Mort 2-B-40 6-BAR's	CO-NGHIA CO-1st Lt DAM

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North	41,000FM-		CG-MG HUM
	Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu	41,300FM		XO-Nguyen Van THU
	Bac; K-500; Di Hai	Di Hai		PO-Le TRUONG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th			CO-Maj CUONG
	Worksite; Ham Tu			XO- Capt AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?)	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-75mm RR Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40	CO-Capt Nguyen DE
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?); 2nd Bn (?)		4-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 6-AA Wpns 2-57 RR 6-B-90 4-82mm Mort	CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10; 3rd Bn(?) 80.T Bn		3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA	CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74		Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG	CO-THANH XO-NHON
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DKZ	CO-Capt Huong THI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR 6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG 2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG; Unk-K-50	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5			CO-SON XO-THU
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co			

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?) X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20825		CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn (?)		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Capt THAO
3rd Bn	Nguyen Trai			CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20 B.20; Viet Dung	21341GM Ba Ha	1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR 3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?) 1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-LAM XO-THAI PO-CU
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21395 Gm Dong Hai		CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn	2116 Quang Da		CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR	CO-KY XO-THANH PO-UT
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; X.55(?); Q-15; H-35; H-55; 75(?); 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co	2105	2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co			CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co X-64 (?)			CO-MOI

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai	20,601GM; 20,925GM Tay An		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
33rd Arty Regt (Hq) RQ21 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn	Nam Hai 20800GM	18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUYEN
RQ22 Bn RQ23 Bn	GK-32 RQ 33 Bn; RQ 330 Bn; 7th Bn; GK-33	1828/CN Hai Cang 20 1803/CH	12-75mm RR 6-120mm Mort	CO-Nguyen Van HUYEN
RQ20 Bn (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; GK-30 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	Hai Cang 20		

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UNIT

RQ24 Bn (ENGR)
72nd Bn
2nd Bn (3rd Regt)

14th Co

74th Co

70th Co, (409th
Sapper Bn)

706th Co
K.51

K.52
K.54

K.55

AKA

GK-40

Binh Da; X2; K-2;
74th Bn (?)
A-14; V-14; A.19; K.53

V-74; V-20;
74th Dist Force Co

7th Co; X-70 Co

106th Co
K51; 107; F-14; A.10
D-21; Thang Binh

D-22; A.13; V.13(?)
C-73; A.16

C-75; Phi Po A-21; A.21
Bn; Flying Tiger A-21

LBN

P.O. 20142
F.G.M.
Bac Hien

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

1-60mm Mort
1-30 Cal MG
1-57mm RR (?)
Unk-M-79
Unk-K-50 SMG

2-60mm Mort
1-57mm RR
6-MG

1-60mm Mort
2-MG

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PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
CO-Tran Van CAO
CO-Capt THAU

CO-THANH
XO-Tran TIEN
PO-PIHUONG
CO-Nguyen DUOC
XO-Vo Ly TA
PO-Nguyen MAI

CO-KHOA
XO-Nguyen THAN
PO-Anh VU

CO-Hong LE

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)

BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;
F-550; Co Hoa

20,100GM-
21,900GM
Bac Hien
6000-6199

1st VC Regt (Hq)

Cong Truong 1; H-800;
108th Regt; Cuu Long
Regt; Steel Regt

5645 Quang
Trung ST

40th Bn

Thanh Mai; Bach Dong
Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai,
3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007
Bau Bang

60th Bn

Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st
Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong
Hai; Bong Trang (?)
Binh-Gia

20,735CT.
An Giang

CO-LtGen Nguyen DO
XO-Col TA

CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH
XO-LtCol Chu An TAN

CO-Nguyen MUOI

CO-SrCapt Nguyen Xuan
PHONG

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UNIT

70th Bn

90th Bn

21st Regt (Hq)

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

2nd VC Regt

93rd Bn

95th Bn

97th Bn

AKA

35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;
 Chu Song; Truong Son
 70; Inter-mt White
 Tiger Bn; F-07; 103
 Ounh Gia (?); Bong

Trang

Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son
 Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn;
 Phi Doi 2008; Thuan
 Binh; Song Hong(?)

Bach Ma; Worksite 21;
 36th; A-21; Cong Truong
 21; 2nd Regt; 36th
 Regt; A-21; Cong Troung
 7 (?)

11th Workshop; 11th Bn

135th Bn; 22nd Bn

33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)

Quyet Chien; Worksite II;

Song Ba; Trom Phuoc 600;

Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song

Hong; 1st Regt;

707th Infil Gp;

Chi Ba (Sisters Three);

H-21 Bn

705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam;

H.58; Ba Minh; Thong

Rang 260

703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn 6340TL (old)
 in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; 21164GM (new)
 H.25

LBN

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

3-81mm Mort

4-60mm Mort

5-MG

4-57mm RR

17-81mm Mort

Unk-75mm RR

Unk-60mm Mort

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Duc CONG

XO-SrCapt THUA

PO-Duan Cong THANH

CO-Ho Thanh THI

XO-Vo Ngoc CAM

CO-Pham KIET

XO-Dang Cong KICH

PO-TIEN

CO-Capt Ha Van MAG

CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH

CO-Nguyen Kaach THO

CO-KHANH

XO-HOANG

PO-HA

CofS-TRI

CO-Dang DOAN

XO-BONG

PO-SINH

CO-VINH

XO-AN

PO-NGOAN

CofS-LUONG

CO-VINH

CO-BINH

PO-OANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135GM 20.139GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ Ba Hao		CO-Maj KIM
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Work- site; 2nd Bn (?)	HT 2416; Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141GM- 20.144GM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa; X2424 Bac Hien For- ward to Ba Hoa	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
20th Co	X-20; 2d Co	PO 20142 AGM Bac Hien		CO-BUU
30th Co	3d Co; V-30 Co	PO 20142 BGM Bac Hien		CO-Dinh Dieu PHAN XO-Trinh LANH PO-NHUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Co	4th Co; V-40 Co	PO 20142 CGM Bac Hien		CO-GIAO XO-Tuan KIET PO-Ngoc BINH CO-VAN XO-HUNG PO-LOC
50th Co	5th Co; V-50 Co	PO 20142 DGM		
60th Co	6th Co; V-60 Co	PO 20142 EGM Bac Hien		XO-CONG PO-Nguyen Van LUC CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 120th Bn			
307th Bn	Poss 315th Bn			
21st Co	T-21; H-40	22,422	2-LNG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 6-Carbines 3-BAR's 6-Carbines Unk-SMG Unk-K-40	CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU CO-MY CO-CHUNG XO-NAM PO-ANH
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hom Thu 21618M		CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-THIN CO-MAU
C.17 Co	Me Duc Co; C-217 Co			
C.212 Co	Ba To Co			
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			
T.18 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West)			
P.31 Co	T.19 Co			
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN CO-Dinh HUY

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrCol Le TRUC XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUYET
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CIM
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		
90th Engr Bn	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21155 GM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
18th NVA Regt	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-SrCapt NEUCNG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANH Cofs-LUIONG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt	21.141VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC Cofs-Capt THANG CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM Cofs-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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7. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN I CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 190001H TO 252400H MAR 67.

a. Quang Tri

(1) Operation PRAIRIE II (terminated 182400H Mar).

(2) Operation PRAIRIE III (commenced 190001H Mar - continuing).

(a) Captured documents and interrogation reports reveal that friendly forces were in contact with elements of the 812th Regt, 324B Div between Con Thien and Helicopter Valley during the period 28 Feb to 7 Mar. PW Ly, captured on 13 Mar, revealed that in addition to the 812th Regt, the 31st Regt, 341st Div was in contact with friendly forces during the same period in the area between Con Thien and Gio Linh. Documents captured on 6 Mar give evidence that elements of the 6th Co, 2nd Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div were in the area of (XD 9462).

(3) Operation BEACON HILL (commenced 201335H Mar - continuing).

(a) No identifications.

(4) Other.

(a) There are three recent PW's from the 808th Bn. Two of the PW's were captured on 17 Mar, the other on 18 Mar. No further information was available on the initial interrogation report.

b. Thua Thien

(1) Operation CHINOOK II (commenced 160001H Feb - continuing).

(a) No identifications.

c. Quang Nam

(1) Operation NEW CASTLE (terminated 251800H).

(a) No identifications.

(2) Operation EARLY (commenced 240630H Mar terminated 241800H Mar).

(a) No identifications.

(3) Other.

(a) Documents and overlays taken from the body of an NVA KIA on 16 Mar identify the 3rd Bn, 3rd NVA Regt as being deployed at the following locations: Bn CP (AT 856548), C-9 Co (AT 846556), C-10 Co (AT 852549), C-11 Co (AT 867552), C-12 Co (AT 861546).

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d. Quang Tin

(1) Other.

(a) The GK-40 (AKA RQ-24) Engr Bn has been identified in Quang Tin (P). Rallier Nguyen Loi stated that on 11 Mar the unit was located at (AT 902315).

e. Quang Ngai

(1) Operation DE SOTO (commenced 262000H Jan - continuing).

(a) No identifications.

(2) Operation PERRY (commenced 250900H Mar - continuing).

(a) No identifications.

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8. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ
NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
271ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
34TH NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ
803RD NVA REGT
812TH NVA REGT

90TH NVA REGT
814TH MF BN
6TH NVA REGT
804th MF BN
810TH LF BN
2ND NVA DIV HQ
1ST BN, 3RD NVA REGT
2ND BN, 3RD NVA REGT
1506TH ENGR BN
20TH MF BN

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
III MAF PERINTREP NO. 12-67

1. 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 341st NVA Div. Sr. Capt. NGUYEN MINH LY, Political Officer for 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 341st NVA Div, was captured, after he and five other men walked into a K/3/4 ambush at (YD 164686) on 13 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. His duties were to indoctrinate all troops politically through the company political officers and help to maintain morale.

b. The mission of the 31st Regt, 341st NVA Div, from the time they departed NGHE AN (P) about 1 July 1966, until moving into SVN in October 1966, was to protect the VINH LINH Special Zone from invasion from the south.

c. On 25 October 1966 the 1st Bn, 31st Regt crossed into SVN and assumed the responsibility of transporting 3000 kilos of rice from Hill 360 (XD 9766) to CAY TRE (XD 9661).

d. On approximately 1 November 1966, the 1st Bn was ordered to combine with guerrilla units, conduct joint counter sweep operations and to train guerrillas. On 16 November 1966, the 3d Co, 1st Bn was dispatched to TRAM CA, CAM LO (D) to join local force units, carry out the above mission and to protect the cadre working in the area. They operated in that area until the end of the rainy season. They were ordered to return to BAI HA area not later than 18 March 1967.

e. The Bn Hq, 1st, 2d and 4th Co's left the PHUONG XUAN, AN NHA, AN HUONG (H) complex (YD 1272) on 9 March 1967 to proceed to Hill 360 and then return north across the BEN HAI River to BAN HAI. The 3d Co, 1st Bn was to proceed to Hill 360 independently and follow the rest of the battalion after receiving the order from the captive.

f. His mission prior to capture was to relay orders to the 3d Co, 1st Bn to proceed to BAI HA, VINH LINH Special Zone, approximately 15 km north of the BEN HAI River. He was captured after completing his mission while returning to PHUONG XUAN (H) (YD 1587).

g. The 341st Div (AKA HONG HA) was organized in May 1965 with four regiments, the 31st Regt (AKA SONG HONG), 32d Regt (AKA SONG THAO), 271st Regt (AKA SON MA), and the 34th Regt (AKA SONG CAU). The 31st Regt has three battalions, numbered 1st, 2d and 3d (AKA D-1, D-2, and D-3 and 101, 102 and 103). The 32d Regt has three battalions numbered 4th, 5th and 6th. The 271st Regt has four battalions, three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. These battalions are numbered 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th, respectively. The artillery battalion is the coastal defense battalion for NGHE AN (P). The 34th Regt has four artillery battalions, numbered 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th. The infantry battalions have three infantry companies with one and two power squads and a heavy fire company. The heavy fire company consists of four platoons; two 82mm mortar platoons, one heavy machine gun platoon and one DK platoon.

h. The staff sections of the 31st Regt consist of the following:

(1) Chemical Sub-Section

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- (2) Combat Training Sub-Section
- (3) Communication Sub-Section
- (4) Reconnaissance Sub-Section
- (5) Engineer Sub-Section
- (6) Artillery-AA Sub-Section
- (7) Political Section

i. The political section is composed, in part, of a propaganda - training cell. This cell contains a propaganda cadre, emulation cadre, propaganda-training cadre, a club (special services) officer and a security officer.

j. The 31st Regt has the following letter box numbers:

- 31442 XB - 31st Regt
- 31443 XB - 1st Bn, 31st Regt
- 31444 XD - 1st Co, 1st Bn
- 31445 XB - 2d Co, 1st Bn
- 31446 XD - 3d Co, 1st Bn
- 31447 XD - 4th Co, 1st Bn

(G-2 Comment: F/2 for information that can be evaluated against present OOB holdings. F/6 for information reported for the first time, i.e., codes, AKA's, and an infantry artillery regiment.)

2. 18th Transportation Co. 812th Regt. 324B NVA Div. Sgt NGUYEN MINH HOA, Sqd Ldr, 9th Sqd, 3d Plt, Transportation Co, 18th Bn, 812th Regt, 324B NVA Div, surrendered to Co 148, CIDG, at CON THIEN on 17 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He has made seven trips from VINH LINH to a rocket launch unit, located 45 minutes walk from (YD 076673) toward (YD 063653), to resupply the unit with food.

b. The rockets are five to six feet long and are launched from 12 tubes grouped together. There are two sections (24 tubes) located in this area. The tubes can be broken down into four groups of three, plus the base assembly, for transportation. When broken down each group is a four man load. The rockets are referred to as "Flaming Arrows". The unit was last known at this location on 14 March 1967 when HOA last transported food to the unit.

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c. HOA escaped from his unit while escorting 13 wounded soldiers to the DMZ. In the last two weeks he has personally seen over 100 KIA's and over 70 WIA's from his regiment. The reasons he gave for deserting were: his fear of air and artillery bombardments; wants to go back north; he doesn't want to die; and he has been hungry during his entire time in SVN.

d. The troops were told that they were being sent to liberate SVN from the American grip and that they would free QUANG TRI (P) by the dry season.

e. He named the 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th Bns of the 812th Regt. The 4th had returned to NVN about one week ago and the 6th about the night of 15 March. The 5th and 9th Bns were located around CON THIEN (YD 1170) and have the mission of attacking the CON THIEN OP. According to HOA, the 3d Military District sent some troops to attack DONG HA but he had heard nothing of them for about a month.

f. His company was responsible to transport food, ammunition and miscellaneous items south. He knew of no cache points other than 48Q (YD 165675) (ARVN overran this area on 17 March and found 48-120mm mortar rounds plus assorted equipment). All items were picked up in VINH LINH and transported by way of CA CAO route (unlocated). There was no contact with civilian guides and contact was made primarily by radio.

g. He has passed four 75mm pack howitzers in the southern DMZ but could not describe where they were located.

h. Morale is bad due to casualties and poor food. The troops always complain among themselves about having to come to SVN.

i. KIA's are usually buried in the immediate vicinity of death, and since he has seen only walking wounded, he thinks that his officers are killing all wounded not able to move by themselves. Replacements for casualties are received frequently.

(G-2 Comment: F/3, except F/6 for the first time report of 75mm Pack Howitzers and subordinate battalions of the 812th Regt.)

3. C-6 Co. TAY NINH (Indep) Bn. MR4. PFC TON TICH NGHE, 1st Plt, C-6 Co, TAY NINH (Indep) Bn, MR4, was captured at (YD 173714) by the 6th ARVN Air-born Bn on 11 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The TAY NINH (Indep) Bn is composed of four companies, C-5, C-6, C-7 and C-8 and a secret battalion headquarters section. C-6, C-6 and C-7 are infantry companies and C-8 is a heavy weapons company. Each infantry company is composed of three platoons of three infantry squads, one 60mm mortar squad and a company headquarters. The C-8 Co consists of three platoons DK, mortar and MG platoons.

b. The strength of each infantry company is approximately 109 men but for reasons unknown to the captive these companies are not up to strength. Infantry squads use only AK's and SKS's because of logistical ease in replenishing M1943 (Soviet) ammunition.

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c. Captive carried an RPD with 400 rounds of ammunition, eight kg of rice, peanuts and salt from HA TINH (P) to QUANG BINH. He received eight more kg of rice at QUANG BINH prior to entering SVN. He had no knowledge of logistical replenishment.

d. The mission of the battalion was to assault an unknown hill as a part of the overall effort to liberate SVN. He had no knowledge as to why the hill was important.

e. Since entry into SVN, about 5 March 1967, the C-6 Co has remained at the base of an unknown hill (possibly (YD 163713)) and dug trenches/tunnels for air and artillery defense.

f. Captive was trained in assault, withdrawal, bayonet, security and grenades. Although they were given no training in anti-aircraft tactics, they were taught that during engagements airplanes have priority over infantry as targets.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. First report of the TAY NINH (Indep) Bn.)

4. C-9 Co, 3d Bn, SONG GIANH Regt. Pvt DUONG MAI HUONG, a cook, 3d Plt, C-9 Co, 3d Bn, SONG GIANH Regt, was captured at (YD 173714) by the 6th ARVN Airborne Bn on 11 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The 3d Bn, SONG GIANH Regt is composed of three infantry companies and two fire power companies, one recoilless rifle and one mortar/MG. The fire power companies are called C-7 (DK) and C-8 (Mortar/MG) and are located in LAOS. The infantry companies are C-5, C-6 and C-9 are all in SVN. Each company is composed of three platoons of three squads each and a company headquarters.

b. C-9 Co has 101 men, each platoon has 32 men and all squads have nine men.

c. The mission of the C-9 Co is to combine with and train the GIO LINH (D) guerrilla forces toward the liberation of SVN.

d. The C-9 Co crossed the DMZ into SVN via Route 1, about 8 or 9 March 1967 and set up positions at the base of a hill near where HUONG was captured (YD 163713).

e. Rice was transported by infantry soldiers from NVN and he did not know when, where or how it was replenished. Ammunition resupply is accomplished by sampans sailing along the NVN coast and down the BEN HAI River, to pre-designated locations (unknown to the captive).

(G-2 Comment: F/6. First report of a SONG GIANH Regt. Information from this PW was received immediately after surgery and PW was in severe pain, therefore reliability of information cannot be judged.)

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5. Q-15 LF Co. LY CONG, Supply Man, Hdq Section, Q-15 LF Company was captured at an unknown place subsequent to TET and gave the following information:

- a. The Q-15 Co has a normal complement of 124 men but, due to casualties and a shortage of weapons, only 65 men are combat ready. The company has three platoons each comprised of three squads. Each squad has three two, three or four men cells depending upon type of weapons. The company has two 60mm mortars and three .30 cal MG's (one unserviceable). The remainder of personnel are armed with K-44's, K-50's, SMG's, MAS-36's, carbines, M-1's, M-14's and French BAR's.
 - b. Food is adequate but there is an insufficient supply of ammunition and a general shortage of weapons due to losses during combat operations. In the six months preceeding TET, the company had 50 to 60 KIA's and many WIA's. There is one corpsman for each platoon. Replacements come from the village guerrilla platoons as volunteers.
 - c. The company continually moves from village to village in DIEN BAN (D). It has no base camp but GO NOI Island is sometimes used as a rally point and is considered a safe area. The area just south of Hill 55 is also considered as a safe area because the Marines seldom operate south of the river.
 - d. The Q-15 Co conducts counter sweep operations and reinforces Province Force units as required. The company never operates as a complete unit. Sometimes a platoon will be attached to the R-20 Bn or V-25 Bn, for offensive operations. If the company decides the unit cannot stand and fight, they dig a large hole, bury their weapons and disperse with the rally point being the village they were operating from at the time. The weapons cache is marked usually with a stone at one end and the other end near the base of a prominent tree or other landmark.
 - e. The Q-15 Co uses LBN 2105. X-55 and Unit 75 are AKA's for the company.
- (G-2 Comment: F/3. Other ralliers/PW's have confirmed some elements of information in this report. First report of X-55 and X-75 as AKA's for Q-15, and of LBN 2105.)

6. The following is a translation of a captured letter which pertains to VC plans in DIEN BAN (D), QUANG NAM (P):

To all comrades
DIEN TUENG, DIEN HAI (V) Unit H&S

We, People's Army, DIEN BAN (D) Unit H&S, have received a decision of Province Unit and T.V.E. 45. From now on the services of two villages are handed over to DIEN BAN (D). In the blooming victory of our community (work site), the enemy is in passive situation and defeated desparately. Although the enemy hasn't committed more troops but their scheme is more and more cruel, increasing the attacks, invading our zone. They dominated our political situation, exerting all their efforts, menacing, frightening

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our people who have been escaping to the city in order that they may herd the people easily. On the other hand, they were surrounding, sweeping us brazenly, raking the peoples into their concentration point. They also used the scheme: surrounding, sweeping, hammer and anvil tactics, sudden night, day raids in our security areas, to break off our movement. The most sinister conspiracy is "open arms program", propagandizing by the means of loud speakers, passing out the leaflets, setting up the propaganda infiltrator to propagandize deeply into our ranks and interior organizations. They seduced our men by the means of money, made the naive traitors surrender.

As regard to enemy's conspiracy, we have to heighten our vigilance, and should not be subjective, satisfied, we have to state that the actions are so strong, but our soldier and peoples haven't been afraid of them. We should be afraid of the enemy's cruel conspiracy. Consider the situation carefully to rival with the enemy's conspiracy, and take all opportunities in this period. The field is quite favorable to us to lure the enemy. We should struggle for opening a movement with the absolute decision, defeating American invaders to the last by all cunning "active attack".

Dear Comrades: We are busy to fulfill our duty, having no opportunity to meet you, to consider the problems and to console you in the setting up of organizations, annihilating the enemy.

At present time, we have a plant of arsenal to make all kinds of defensive rounds, grenades, anti-tank mines, individual mines, booby traps and all necessary things can help you in preparing the attacks against the American and Puppet Government soldier's sentries. That in the general solution of superior, given to you, now we would like to remind you some of guidelines rates to be put in order in the common villager, on the A.B. zone. You can base on it and the solution, described by City Unit, to apply methodically.

Enemy Annihilate Guideline Ratios

From January to March 1967, each village have to kill 300 enemies; annihilate one American Bn with arms or blow up 15 cars, various kinds; shoot down 12 planes, various kinds; blow up three American sentries, with arms; killing three tyrants; break off one American Bn or one puppet Government Co sweeping force.

Whenever the enemy stay back the villages in their sweeping operations, we have to organize a raid to attack right into their CP, by tactical and technical sapper.

Capture one American alive by using the techniques of kidnapping or proselyting.

Cut off all the enemy's communication roads.

Reconstruct the strong, combat villages and hamlets, be particular in establishing the pilot hamlet, in violated areas.

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Base on the terrain, set up the battleground used for the desparate battle.

Create the conditions to fight with enemies at any place, on the ground or in the air, in any circumstance.

Expand all kinds of rudimentary arms such as; mines, punji stakes.

Reconstruction

Guarantee the recruiting of six per cent of guerrilla among the total of residents. That means the recruiting of six guerrillas among every 100 people.

Set up one guerrilla concentrate B Unit (village) 30 to 36 among 1/3 of which is female guerrillas.

One engineer cell be set up for each village unit and each hamlet unit to make the rudimental arms and explosive.

In each village there is one smithy, managed and planned by Village Party Chapter.

Guarantee the guerrilla recruiting for Village or Hamlet Unit, 100 per cent of guerrilla must be **valiant** soldiers, 1/3 hamlet guerrilla must be valiant soldiers.

Recruit one or two children unit for each village, titled; NGUYEN VAN TROI, secret childish guerrilla.

Set up one military intelligence system from low echelons up to District Unit.

Training

Guerrilla platoon training course must get through the tactics of firing and of the sappers, except the training for the cadre from zone unit up to District Unit, will be supervised by District.

Training for three female sapper cells who live **legally** in the village, is case we get difficulty to use this cell.

Apply all the politics towards wounded men, death soldiers, war prisoners, surrenders.

Execute fastly all the errands and messages of superiors.

We have reminded you a number of problems so you study and plan it together to be harmony with your local situation. The corridors, spring boards, become difficult, you have to contact with communication road carefully, between DIEN DUONG and DIEN NAM area. In urgent case, send your messenger through here, if you want to ask for the opinions and

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consultations of District Unit or R.V. you should go along the communication system to get BA LA IAN, CHAU LAN (H), DIEN THE (V). The people will show you.

At the first step, we wouldn't get through the situation of DIEN DUONG and DIEN HAI (V), that our guideline is not so effective.

Is there anything to be proposed, write to us.

Jan 1st, 1967

Cordially,

THU TRUONG : HONG CHAU

7. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u> <u>BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN THI BA (C)	5MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS844373/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM BAI (C)	6MAR67	1/1	CIV DEF	BT058619/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI BIEN (C)	10MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN VAN BON (C)	11FEB67	H/2/4	CIV DEF	AT859574/THUONG DUC(D) HQ
PHAM BUI (C)	6MAR67	A/1/1	CIV DEF	BT058618/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TO THI CAM (C)	8MAR67	F/2/7	CIV DEF	BS844373/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH CANH (C)	21FEB67	2/1	CIV DEF	BT014266/THANG BINH(D) HQ
DANG CHIEU (C)	3MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT084607/CIT FURTHER INT
LY CONG (C)	UNK	3/1	UNK	UNK/CIT
NGUYEN CU (C)	11FEB67	H/2/4	CIV DEF	AT859574/DAI LOC(D) HQ
PHAM DAM (C)	10MAR67	M/3/5	CIV DEF	BS477938/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO DANH (C)	11MAR67	USS BRISTER	CIV DEF	BS783819/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRUONG DAU (C)	7MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS805344/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DAY (C)	UNK	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS833389/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRAN DICH (C)	20FEB67	D/1/6	CIV DEF	AT986586/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
VO DIEN (C)	4MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT083604/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THIEM (C)	10MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BT317145/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN GIAC (C)	12MAR67	M/3/5	REFUGEE	BINH SON(D) HQ
NGO THI HAI (C)	6MAR67	A/1/1	CIV DEF	BT075625/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAN HIEN (C)	6MAR67	1/1	CIV DEF	BT058618/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN HOA (C)	15MAR67	1/5	CIV DEF	BT337103/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN HOANG (C)	12MAR67	M/3/5	REFUGEE	BS479920/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THOI LINH (C)	27FEB67	F/2/7	PW	BS786377/III MAF COMP
NGUYEN VAN LO (C)	10FEB67	B/1/26	R20	AT956563/1ST MED BN
BANH LONG (C)	10MAR67	M/3/5	PW	BS477938/III MAF COMP
DAU LUC (C)	11FEB67	H/2/4	CIV DEF	AT859574/DAI LOC(D) HQ
TRAN THI LUOI (C)	15MAR67	1/5	CIV DEF	BT337103/TAM LY(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI MANH (C)	10MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAN MUA (C)	21FEB67	2/1	CIV DEF	BT014266/THANG BINH(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
DANG NGA (C)	1MAR67	K/3/1	ARVN DEST	BTO95645/I CORPS
LE THI NGOC (C)	3MAR67	2/1	CIV DEF	BT015628/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHO (C)	20FEB67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT113496/HIEU NHON(D) HQ
MAN NOI (C)	UNK	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS833389/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN PHI(C)	2MAR67	C/1/1	CIV DEF	BT109637/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN QUY (C)	7FEB67	3/1	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN QUYEN (C)	16FEB67	1/1	CIV DEF	BT055530/I CORPS
TRAN RE (C)	11MAR67	USS BRISTER	CIV DEF	BS783819/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRUONG RUA (C)	8MAR67	CAC 1-2	CIV DEF	AT862573/DAI LOC(D) HQ
LUONG SANH (R)	9MAR67	CAC B2-2	GUERR	AT862573/DAI LOC
NGUYEN AUU SOI (C)	8MAR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT958582/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
VO TAM (C)	10FEB67	CAC 22	CIV DEF	AT859574/DAI LOC (D) HQ
NGUYEN TAO (C)	11MAR67	1/5	CIV DEF	BT352157/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGO THI THAI (C)	10MAR67	B/1/5	CIV DEF	BT317145/LY TIN(D) HQ
BANG THANH (C)	2MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT068639/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI THANH (C)	15MAR67	1/5	CIV DEF	BT337103/TAM KY(D) HQ
LE THEM (C)	15MAR67	1/5	CIV DEF	BT337103/TAM KY(D) HQ
HUYNH MINH THU (C)	11MAR67	L/3/7	PW	BS826388/1ST MED BN
NGUYEN TAN THUAN (C)	10FEB67	CAC 22	CIV DEF	AT859574/DAI LOC(D) HQ
PHAM TRA (C)	6MAR67	A/1/1	CIV DEF	BT058618/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN TRINH (C)	6MAR67	1/1	CIV DEF	BT058619/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
LE THI TRUOC (C)	10MAR67	B/1/5	CIV DEF	BT317145/LY TIN(D) HQ
DO THI XI (C)	10MAR67	B/1/5	CIV DEF	BT317145/LY TIN(D) HQ

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ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 12-67

1. GENERAL. Although items of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level, VC incidents of terrorism and sabotage continue to occur at a significant rate. Items of interest include VC plans to disrupt the GVN Hamlet and Village elections which are scheduled to commence on 2 April throughout SVN, and NFLVN plans to increase both military and political activity to counter the Revolutionary Development Program. See Appendix 1.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. A recent report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC will attempt to obtain documents concerning the Rural Pacification Program from those Vietnamese officers who have attended lectures or training sessions on this subject in Saigon. Additionally, the VC intend to compile background information on the officers and their families in order to exert influence on them, thereby defeating the Rural Pacification Program.

A 21 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that the VC are in the process of establishing an espionage training course for teenagers between the ages of 10 and 15. Upon completion, it is anticipated that nine to eleven man teams will be established in order that they may observe ARVN/U.S. troop movements and act as lookouts for the VC. It is also planned to use these teenagers to assess the damage and casualties caused by VC attacks.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	20Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	ZD 070013
THUA THIEN	21Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 599309
THUA THIEN	21Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 605310
THUA THIEN	21Mar	Highway culvert destroyed	YD 609312
THUA THIEN	21Mar	Highway partially destroyed	YD 612313
QUANG NAM	20Mar	Highway partially destroyed	BT 115494
QUANG NAM	21Mar	Highway partially destroyed	BT 135475
QUANG NAM	24Mar	Highway partially destroyed	BT 113495
QUANG NAM	25Mar	Highway partially destroyed	BT 118492
QUANG NGAI	21Mar	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 182408

4. POLITICAL. See Appendix 2.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. A 21 March report from the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, related that VC propaganda leaflets were discovered in the vicinity of (YD 099528). The theme of the leaflets was not reported.

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QUANG NAM. A 20 March report from an intelligence source related that on 17 March the VC distributed a number of propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of HOI AN (BT 145570) which were printed in Vietnamese by a stencil duplicating machine. When translated, the leaflets contained the following notice: "The HOI AN Town National Liberation Front gives the order prohibiting the people, workers, civil servants, and students from going to the public services, markets, schools, congregating at bus and boat stations, moving to and from densely populated streets from the period of 1900 on 20 March to 0700 on 22 March 1967. The National Liberation Front will not take the responsibility of injuries to anyone who does not obey this order."

A 20 March report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team stated that VC propaganda leaflets entitled "My Opinions on the Vietnam War" were found in the vicinity of (BT 102482). (CI Comment: These leaflets, which are reportedly the opinions of Captain W.F. EISENBRAUN, a VC POW, have been sighted within the ICTZ on previous occasions.)

A 21 March report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team stated that a VC propaganda leaflet was found in the vicinity of (AT 979746). The leaflet was entitled "American Service Man" and carried the usual VC anti-American theme.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 22 March report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that two civilian buses detonated a mine in the vicinity of (YD 305555) which resulted in two ARVN and four civilians being killed and ten civilians being injured.

THUA THIEN. A 17 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that three VC entered PHU BAI #1 (H) (YD 903113) and demanded that the villagers "contribute" rice and money to the VC cause by 21 March. (CI Comment: The VC have not yet returned to the hamlet nor have they collected the rice and money.)

A 21 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that a VC "Warning Order" was found in the vicinity of (ZD 202012). Upon translation, the document read as follows: "Warning Order, 17 March 1967. The National Liberation Front orders drivers of every civilian vehicle driving on Highway 1 from today (17th) to stay off this highway, so the NLF will be able to damage U.S./ARVN vehicles. If the civilians keep utilizing this highway, the NLF will not be responsible for anything that happens."

A 21 March report from the 4th Marines related that two VC platoons entered the BAU THU refugee camp in the vicinity of (YD 611312) and abducted two males, the hamlet chiefs wife, and destroyed 117 homes. The VC threatened that if the people did not return to their homes, they

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would return and kill the entire hamlet populace. (CI Comment: This is the first report of VC raiding refugee camps in THUA THIEN (P).)

A 22 March report from a usually reliable source stated that an estimated two platoons entered a village in the vicinity of (YD 683280), assassinated one civilian and abducted four others.

A 22 March report from a usually reliable source related that a VC platoon entered a village in the vicinity of (YD 779189), assassinated one civilian and kidnapped one ARVN soldier.

A 23 March report from a usually reliable source stated that 12 VC entered QUE LOC (V) (YD 987056) and abducted six civilians. No reason for the abductions was reported.

QUANG NAM. A 18 March report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team related that a VC document was found in the vicinity of (BT 055555) which revealed that the VC will attack VINH DINH (V) (BT 068576) and other neighboring areas. The document further instructed the populace in these areas to evacuate their homes or dig foxholes for protection.

A 20 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that the VC QUANG NAM Province Committee has ordered several VC District and Village Committees to select a number of young men in order that a "Suicide Battalion" may be organized. Reportedly, this battalion will operate in DIEN BAN (D) and have the mission of neutralizing the government pacification program in the Marble Mountain area (BT 075710).

A 21 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the Danang City unit of the Peoples' Revolutionary Party Committee is attempting to infiltrate a number of hard core sapper cadre into the Danang area for the purpose of sabotaging U.S. billets.

A 22 March report from an intelligence source stated that the VC are planning to sabotage the New Life hamlets of GIANG DONG (BT 006676) and QUA GIANG (BT 026667) in the near future.

A 22 March report from a usually reliable source related that the VC QUANG DA Province Committee has issued an order to the District, Village Fronts to complete "the operation" and make arrangements to celebrate the 77th birthday of HO CHI MINH during the period 19 March through 19 May 1967. This order contained the following plans: (1) Organize the people in order to struggle against the Americans and resist emigration to government areas; (2) To slander the refugee settlement camps and New Life hamlets; (3) To carry out attacks on outposts of GVN and Allied Forces; (4) To lay mines, destroy bridges, and culverts on the lines of communications; (5) To attack District Headquarters in order to suppress the morale of the troops and broaden the Liberated areas; and (7) To increase the collection of taxes.

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A 22 March report from an intelligence source related that the VC will confiscate the land left by those villagers who return to government controlled areas and utilize it to grow food for VC troops.

A 23 March report from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, related that the VC attempted to recruit a civilian to the VC cause in the vicinity of (AT 946698). The civilian, who refused to be recruited, was beaten and shot in the head by the VC.

QUANG TIN. A 20 March report from a usually reliable source stated that an unknown number of VC infiltrated a village in the vicinity of (BT 226273) and wounded two civilians.

QUANG NGAI. A 19 March report from an intelligence source stated that seven VC entered NUC MON (H) (BS 570970) and assassinated one VN male. Reportedly, the man was a former VC who had recently been working as a government agent.

A 22 March report from a usually reliable source related that four cases of explosives were placed on a piling of the SONG TRA KHUC bridge (BS 642747). Each case consisted of 30 kilograms of TNT and electrical detonators which were not connected.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTEP NO. 12-67

1. A study received from a U.S. Intelligence Agency reveals that captured documents and agent reports indicate an increasing VC concern with U.S./GVN Programs and military actions designed to break up the VC mass political base - the people under their control in rural areas. VC strategy for 1967, as analysed from captured documents, calls for increased emphasis on guerrilla warfare and civilian proselyting activities in order to consolidate their hold on the countryside and reverse the successes achieved by the U.S./GVN pacification effort. As the heart of the pacification effort, the Revolutionary Development (RD) Program will be the VC's prime target. The VC have admitted that RD has caused some damage to them and apparently arrived at a decision in late 1966 to make a determined effort to disrupt the program. Numerous reports of VC plans against RD have been received, and the number of anti-RD incidents reported thus far in 1967 are substantially greater than the number reported in all of 1966. Specific plans against RD call for increased proselyting and propaganda activities, recruitment and infiltration of cadres into the program, large-scale attacks on areas where RD is having success, kidnapping and assassination of RD cadres, and terrorism designed to prevent the populace from cooperating with the program. The following has been compiled which reflects the emphasis the VC are placing on disruption of the RD Program:

a. QUANG NAM (P). On 1 January 1967, the PRP Committee issued an operational plan for 1967, the primary aim of which was to sabotage the RD program. This plan calls for propaganda lectures and indoctrination courses on the anti-American aspects of RD, and the use of armed force, including main force, irregulars and assault youth groups. In another report, VC cadres were instructed to obtain training documents and family and personal data on Vietnamese officers who attend RD training courses in Saigon. Command elements of the ARVN 51st Regiment are especially singled out for this action.

b. QUANG NGAI (P). VC in SON TINH (D) are mobilizing forces as of 29 January 1967 to attack New Life hamlets and RD workers. In NGHIA HANH (D), families with members in the RD program were warned that their homes would be destroyed unless relatives working in RD defected.

c. QUANG TIN (P). The VC reportedly concentrated troops in TIEN PHUOC (D) in February 1967 to counter RD programs and associated military activities in seven villages.

d. QUANG TRI (P). VC regular units are scheduled to move back to coastal areas after TET to conduct attacks during the Spring campaign to disrupt the RD program.

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*. THUA THIEN (P). VC cadres in HUONG TRA (D) planned, as of January 1967, to kill or kidnap RD hamlet workers, PF members, suspected GVN informants, and GVN sympathizers. Plans also include attacks on New Life hamlets.

2. CONCLUSION. At the present stage of the war, the VC are believed to have the determination to present a serious threat to the RD program. Since one of the primary aims of the RD program is to identify and eliminate the communist apparatus in the villages and hamlets, where the VC derive their support, the VC view RD as a life and death struggle and can be expected to use every weapon in their arsenal to destroy it. Their most effective weapon will be terrorism designed to harass and demoralize RD workers and to intimidate the population from operating with the program. The VC will also make determined efforts to subvert the RD program by substantially increasing the level of their proselyting activities against RD workers and their families. Where adequate security is provided, either by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) or by Free World Forces, in support of RD, the VC will probably rely on propaganda, selective terrorism, and armed attacks by small-size units. Where security is inadequate, the VC will use local and main force units in company and battalion size.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 12-67

GVN VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS

1. Commencing on 2 April and continuing through June 1967, elections of hamlet and village officials will be held throughout SVN in those areas considered secure by GVN authorities. The forthcoming elections bring representative processes to rural Vietnam and are a link in the progression towards a democratic government throughout the country at all levels. It is therefore apparent that the NLFSV will attempt to disrupt these elections by utilizing various terrorist methods and/or introducing VC sponsored candidates. During the reporting period, a document received by a U.S. Intelligence Agency relates that the VC have formulated plans to disrupt these elections in four of the five provinces within the ICTZ. The following are tactics which may be employed by the VC in those provinces and districts indicated:

- a. QUANG NGAI. Intimidation of candidates through fear of assassination or other reprisals. Use of penetration agents to recruit candidates favorable to the VC cause.
- b. QUANG TIN. Threats of death not only to the candidates in LY TIN (D), but also to anyone participating in any manner in the elections.
- c. THUA THIEN. VC of HUONG THUY, PHU LOC, and VINH LOC Districts have announced their intentions to kidnap and assassinate candidates for office.
- d. QUANG TRI. VC intend to dissuade the populace from participating in the elections and/or use VC cadre to select candidates for office.

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
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2 APRIL 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO. 13-67



GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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III MAF PERINTREP #13-67

26 Mar - 1 Apr 67

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 2 April 1967
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PERINTREP 13-67

Period Covered: 260001H Mar - 012400H Apr 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (G)-Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1 and ND 49-5.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. There was a decrease in the tempo of enemy ground activity reported in northern QUANG TRI (P). A heavy contact did occur at (YD 105656) on 30 March when an estimated NVA company hit I Co, 3rd Bn, 9th Marines with two mortar attacks followed by two ground assaults, one of which was supported by mortar fire. Enemy casualties resulting from this action were heavy. Northeast of this location and within the northern portion of the CON THIEN sector, elements of the 4th Marines made contact with an NVA company on 25 March and encountered enemy forces of squad and platoon size in a series of engagements. In addition, a reconnaissance patrol engaged an estimated 20 NVA in a short fire fight at (YD 0864) north of CAM LO. For the period 26 March through 1 April, Operation BEACON HILL inflicted enemy casualties of 103 KIA (Conf) and 90 KIA (Prob), while Operation PRAIRIE III accounted for 120 KIA (Conf) and 63 KIA (Prob). A total of 45 weapons were captured in the two operations, four of which were crew served.

The northern CON THIEN and GIO LINH areas saw a distinct drop in both the intensity and number of enemy mortar attacks. A total of 392 rounds were received during the period, compared to 2155 rounds last week. The majority of the incoming was 82mm mortar fire.

Aerial photography flown on 26 March immediately south of the eastern portion of the DMZ and north of it revealed no significant enemy ground activity when compared to early March readouts. Photographic interpretations of a north/south strip from (XD 7775) to (XD 7730) gave indication of a moderate increase in enemy construction of field fortifications, possible supply points and other associated but lesser facilities. Again comparison was based upon early March photography and the activity so noted was centered in the vicinity of (XD 7555).

A substantial ground reconnaissance effort northwest of the KHE SANH combat base and west of the north/south axis of Route 9 reported light sightings of the enemy for a total of approximately 60 VC. One contact was reported at (XD 7854) northwest of KHE SANH.

Enemy activity in eastern QUANG TRI (P) was centered in an area approximately four to eight kilometers northeast of QUANG TRI City. One mining incident was noted and two VC initiated attacks occurred.

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One involved action on 26 March against RD Teams 2 and 13. PF elements providing security for the RD engaged the enemy and inflicted casualties of nine VC KIA (Conf). VC concern over the GVN RD Program may be seen in his recent attempts to thwart this program, especially in the coastal regions of both QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces.

Other enemy action in southeastern QUANG TRI (P) was limited to small scale harassing and probing attacks against more isolated friendly security elements. LAM SON 142 continued with light contact with the enemy.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. Enemy activity in northern THUA THIEN (P) dropped off this week and Operation CHINOOK II continued with only light contact with local force enemy elements. The remainder of coastal THUA THIEN (P) witnessed a rise in terrorism reflected through an increase in VC use of mines.

On 29 March at (YD 598309) a civilian truck detonated a mine on Highway 1 and on the next day a VC squad entered a village at (YD 710285) and assassinated a 60 year old village elder who had apparently expressed strong anti-communist sentiments. North of the PHU BAI TAOR at (YD 836215) elements of the 1st Bn, 1st ARVN Regt gained contact with an estimated VC squad which immediately broke and ran.

Ground reconnaissance deployed along a line west of HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. A greater portion of the observed enemy movement took place in the vicinity of (YC 8297) where two contacts were made with small groups of VC. Artillery support subsequently accounted for several enemy casualties.

There was a rise in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the PHU BAI TAOR. The majority of these occurred in the southern portion.

Seven major incidents took place in the vicinity of (ZD 011031) immediately east of the southern end of the PHU BAI TAOR. Four minings, an assassination, an ambush and one incident of sabotage were reported. With the exception of the sabotage incident all others constituted terrorism directed against civilians travelling in commercial vehicles and represents a renewed effort to intimidate the populace in this locale. One action was reported between PHU BAI and DANANG on 31 March when elements of M Co, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines fired on a group of six VC, killing two and capturing three weapons.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Reconnaissance elements along the western portion of the DANANG TAOR reported sightings of approximately 30 VC. At (AT 805546) on 30 March, H Co, 2nd Bn, 4th Marines was attacked by an estimated VC company. The enemy was driven off and suffered moderate casualties. On the same date and directly south of the THUONG DUC OIENG Camp, a patrol gained contact and attacked an estimated 20 VC. Following an exchange of fire the VC withdrew. Enemy casualties were moderate.

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A substantial ground reconnaissance effort south of the DANANG TAOR reported total sightings of approximately 240 of the enemy. Contacts between reconnaissance inserts and the VC, coupled with artillery fire called as a result of enemy sightings, resulted in significant losses to small enemy elements. VC movement noted in this general area may well have been associated with recent major actions which have taken place to the east in the sector south of HOI AN City. For the past three weeks the enemy has concentrated his effort in the southeastern portion of QUANG NAM (P), although the current period has seen a fairly sharp drop in the intensity of his actions. The one exception occurred on 29 March when an estimated enemy battalion attacked the 21st ARVN Ranger Bn (BT 102511). Heavy action followed. Light losses were sustained by the Rangers, but a SPOOKY aircraft was shot down. Air strikes were flown against the enemy and a reaction force called for. The VC sustained heavy casualties.

Prisoners of war captured as a result of the engagement revealed that the attacking unit was the 1st Bn, 3rd NVA Regt. These prisoners further stated that the 24 March attack against a USMC and ARVN convoy on Highway 1 in the QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN border area was conducted by the 2nd Bn, 3rd NVA Regt reinforced by two companies of the R.20 Bn, with the 1st Bn, 3rd Regt in reserve.

There was a moderate decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the DANANG TAOR. The number of mine and booby trap incidents remains very high. No significant pattern was noted.

Elsewhere in QUANG NAM (P) enemy action was limited to isolated small scale harassing and probing actions directed against friendly security elements.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. There was a distinct decrease in enemy activity in coastal QUANG TIN (P). A series of small scale harassing actions was centered in the vicinity of (BT 2622) approximately five kilometers west of TAM KY City. On 26 March elements of the 3rd Bn, 5th ARVN Regt, while on a sweep through a village (BT 264224), captured 10 female VC's, all of whom stated that they had been forced into enemy service.

Ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. No significant movement or action was noted.

There was a sharp drop in the number of VC initiated incidents within the CHU LAI TAOR. Five incidents were reported from the Korean Marine area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). The last week saw a moderate decrease in the tempo of enemy activity south of the CHU LAI TAOR and in the eastern portion of QUANG NGAI (P). At (BS 692796) and (BS 720779) on 29 March, RF and PF were attacked by small groups of VC. In both cases supporting artillery fires assisted in forcing the enemy to withdraw. Light casualties were inflicted on the enemy. In the vicinity of QUANG NGAI City and on 28 March, a three-man RF reconnaissance patrol discovered two bamboo rafts each

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floating a case of explosives without detonators. The demolitions were apparently intended for use on a nearby railway or highway bridge. On 29 March in the vicinity of (BS 5864), three light actions were reported against both ARVN and RF elements. In each case the VC were driven off with moderate casualties.

Other enemy activity was centered north of MO DUC where, for the most part, action was limited to minor probing attacks against friendly patrols and smaller security elements. At (BS 717548) on 26 March, three VC entered VINH THANH (H) and assassinated the hamlet chief and wounded his daughter. In the same area two USAF sorties flew immediate air strikes against small groups of VC working on field and village fortifications. Moderate enemy casualties were reported.

Ground reconnaissance deployed in two sectors (BS 6457) and (BS 8035) reported light to moderate sightings of the enemy and Operation DESOTO continued with moderate contact.

Inland and to the north significant contact was reported in the vicinity of the HA THANH CIDG Camp. On 28 March a CIDG patrol gained contact with lead elements of an estimated enemy battalion west and northwest of the camp. Supporting fires were called in with unknown results. On 31 March patrols again gained contact with enemy elements in estimated company strength northwest of HA THANH and in one case an assisting air strike called in on a group of the enemy resulted in 80 VC KIA.

Aerial photography flown over the sector immediately southwest of the CHU LAI TAOR, and over the eastern portions of MO DUC and DUC PHO Districts during late March revealed slight increases in enemy activity when compared to late February readouts, particularly in the area in the vicinity of (BS 6352) which portrayed an emphasis upon extensive ground field fortifications.

On 25 March an NVA Major assigned to the MR-5 Headquarters turned himself in to ARVN. He revealed the locations in central QUANG NGAI (P) of subordinate units of the 2nd NVA Div and several supporting base areas. See Annex B for details concerning information obtained from this individual.

f. Trends. Close perusal of a considerable number of captured enemy documents acquired over the past four months provides an even better insight into the more pressing problems currently facing the enemy. Of prime concern to him is the serious burden of personnel replacement. Document translation augments intelligence information of a more tactical nature which specifically provides evidence of the use of women in direct combat and, what has now become relatively common, a secondary combat support role. In addition, the utilization as combat guerrillas of male youngsters, 13 to 15 years of age, vividly illustrates the enemy's dilemma. A second more subtle trend reveals a lesser incidence of enemy misreporting and premeditated alteration or absence of fact in documents passing between lower field echelons and higher headquarters. Notwithstanding the enemy's usual dialectic approach in reporting rhetoric, there now appears the occasional need of describing obvious setbacks as hard won triumphs.

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Examples of this do not fall on the obvious nor on any specific document, but represent an impact gained from assimilating many such types of official papers. The eventual implications of this sort of thing are difficult to project, but if not kept under control by the enemy could result in a warped decision making process within his higher command echelons.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents during the reporting period reflected little change when compared to the last period. The total of 347 incidents consisted of one attack, two ambushes, 106 small unit engagements, 51 mine/booby trap incidents, 184 incidents of AA fire and three sabotage incidents. Enemy initiated incidents for the month of March are as follows:

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ROKMC</u>
Attacks	12	0
Ambushes	7	0
Assault by fire	28	1
Mine/booby trap	206	27
AA fire	772	13
Small unit engagements	545	0

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d - e. Negative.
- f. Administrative Units/Installations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
9 Mar	BS 660460	VC Base Camp	Agent Report; F/3
10 Mar	BS 400780	Food Storage	Agent Report; F/3
12 Mar	YD 822018	VC Installation	Agent Report; F/3
16 Mar	YD 588096	VC Installation	Agent Report; F/3
16 Mar	BS 763385	District Cadre School	Interrogation Report; F/3
16 Mar	BS 763385	Rice Storage	Interrogation Report; F/3
17 Mar	BS 439838	VC Hospital	Interrogation Report; F/3

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
20 Mar	AT 828540	VC Weapons Repair Factory	Interrogation Report; F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. There were 184 incidents of AA fire during the reporting period, with 21 aircraft sustaining 68 hits. One case of possible 12.7mm fire was reported, along with one case of possible mortar (airburst) and one case of grenade. One aircraft was downed and destroyed. Grid squares of highest density of fire were: (AT 8651), (BT 0260), (AT 9428), (BT 0161), (BS 5489), (YC 8049), (YD 0666) and (YD 1437).

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities

(1) QUANG TRI (P). There was a shift in the disposition of reconnaissance activity in western QUANG NGAI (P). Patrols were generally deployed on a north-south line west of Route 9 and to the north of the KHE SANH combat base. Two contacts were made with small groups of the enemy and the number of enemy sighted was relatively light. No concentration or significant pattern of enemy movement or activity was noted.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy, primarily centered in the vicinity of (YC 8297). Sightings south of the TAOR were insignificant.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Light enemy activity was observed by ground reconnaissance deployed along the western portion of the DANANG TAOR. A substantial reconnaissance effort south of the TAOR to a point along the QUANG TIN (P) border reported sightings of the enemy which totalled approximately 240 VC. Air and supporting artillery subsequently inflicted moderate casualties on the enemy.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity remained light along the western and southwestern approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR. In QUANG NGAI (P) reconnaissance elements disposed within two general locations (BS 6457) and (BS 8035) reported light to moderate sightings of the enemy. One contact at (BS 7739) accounted for 15 VC KIA (Conf) and six KIA (Prob) and the capture of six individual weapons.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
27 Mar	YD 447595	500	3d Bn, 4th Marines
27 Mar	ZC 195494	5000	US3F
30 Mar	YD 421373	500	2d Bn, 9th Marines

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3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.
- b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.
- c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy losses for the reporting period reflected a decrease when compared to the previous period and were 454 KIA (Conf), 307 KIA (Prob), four NVA PW's and five VC PW's. Weapon losses for the period were 83 individual weapons and four crew served weapons captured. Enemy personnel and equipment losses for the month of March are as follows:

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ROKMC</u>
KIA (Conf)	2159	14
KIA (Prob)	2144	0
NVA PW	16	0
VC PW	51	1
NVA Returnee	0	1
VC Returnee	3	6
Individual Weapons	266	0
Crew Served Weapons	31	1

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. For the entire week the weather picture over the I Corps Tactical Zone was dominated by a light but low level southeasterly flow of air. This condition was topped by dry southwesterly winds which maintained fair weather over the region. Clear skies predominated with some early morning stratus and fog which dissipated by late morning or early afternoon. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	94	92	89	94
Low	73	74	74	73
Rainfall (total)	0	0	0	0
Visibility (miles)	7	7	6	7
Winds (knots)	6	5	6	7

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k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES

a. Enemy Capabilities: VC/NVA forces can:

(1) Attack the THON SON LAM-D5-DONG HA area with up to two divisions (324B and 341st NVA Divs).

(2) Attack the HUE-PHU BAI area with one regiment (6th NVA Regt) and two separate battalions (804th and 810th Bns).

(3) Attack the DANANG combat base with one regiment (3d NVA Regt) and four separate battalions (R.20, V.25 and 804th Infantry Bns and 402nd Sapper Bn).

(4) Attack the CHU LAI combat base with remnants of two regiments (1st VC and 21st NVA Regts) and six separate battalions (20th, 38th, 48th and 72nd Infantry Bns, 409th Sapper Bn and 1506th Engr Bn).

(5) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one regiment (reinforced).

(6) Attack selected key installations with medium and/or heavy mortars, artillery and rockets up to 140mm.

(7) Defend in present positions in and just north of the DMZ with up to two divisions (324B and 341st NVA Divs).

(8) Defend elsewhere in I CTZ, including VC/NVA base areas, with forces locally available.

(9) Reinforce the forces presently in I CTZ, including the 2nd VC Regt, within three to 10 days with up to two divisions from NVN or from those forces transiting LAOS, and elements of one division from II Corps (3d NVA Div (-)).

(10) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorist, sabotage, and propaganda activities, and the use of mines and booby traps.

b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

(1) Capability (1). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The recent (TET) movement of supplies and possible replacement personnel southward into the DMZ area; sanctity of the DMZ from ground attack facilitates the enemy's massing of personnel, equipment, and supplies close to possible objectives; the location of possible limited objectives vis-a-vis the DMZ permits rapid reinforcement by forces in NVN; the enemy's

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knowledge of our situation based upon extensive reconnaissance activities; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success; and successful attack and temporary control of northern I CTZ would greatly enhance the enemy's political ambitions and "truce table" bargaining position. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The heavy personnel and material losses suffered by the 324B NVA Div and elements of the 341st NVA Div in past operations; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; the existence of extensive fortifications in and north of the DMZ; and decisive defeat of the attacking forces would lay the DMZ and NVN homeland open to invasion.

(2) Capability (2). Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge of our situation based upon extensive reconnaissance activities; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success; successful attack and temporary control of any part of these areas would enhance the enemy's political ambitions; the city of HUE is an attractive historical, religious and political target which, if successfully attacked and temporarily held, would greatly enhance enemy prestige at home and abroad; and dissident Buddhists and remnants of the Struggle Movement in HUE could provide sympathizers and collaborators to the enemy. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The enemy's losses during recent operations; the enemy forces available are of insufficient strength to attack the HUE-PHU BAI area successfully; the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; and the fact that HUE is located on an exposed coastal plain where surrounding terrain is unfavorable for the enemy's tactics.

(3) Capability (3). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge of our situation based on extensive reconnaissance activities; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success; successful attack and temporary control of any part of the area would greatly enhance the enemy's political ambitions; and the City of DANANG, together with its airfield and port facilities is a substantial target which, if successfully attacked, would seriously impair friendly military activity in I CTZ and could result in a significant propaganda coup. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The enemy's losses during recent operations; and the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces.

(4) Capability (4). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The necessity for the enemy to recoup recent defeats and to maintain his prestige in the eyes of the populace; the enemy's knowledge of our situation based on extensive reconnaissance activities; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success; and successful attack and temporary control of any of this area would enhance the enemy's political ambitions. Factors which militate against adoption of these capabilities are: The enemy's losses during recent operations; and the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces.

(5) Capability (5). Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: The present disposition of the enemy units; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success; isolated units and out posts offer the best targets at the least risk, compared to other potential attack

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objectives; the enemy's past successes against isolated ARVN/CIDG outposts in I CTZ; and the practice of attacking relatively weak targets, at a time and place of his choosing and under favorable conditions, is a basic enemy tactic. The following factors militate against adoption of this capability: The enemy's reluctance to mass his forces; and the demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy buildups and to react rapidly to destroy them by supporting arms or by ground spoiling attacks.

(6) Capability (6). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: Lucrative targets can be hit from a distance with less risk of detection than ground attack; the enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success; VC knowledge of the terrain and local populace; the enemy's past limited successes in mortar/rocket attacks against key installations; and the practice of striking quickly, at a time and place of his choosing and under favorable conditions, is a basic enemy tactic. There are no factors which militate against this capability.

(7) Capability (7). Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: Terrain and present dispositions favor the defender; the enemy's continuing efforts to improve and expand defensive positions and supply caches; and our strength and fire power in the area south of the DMZ and use of naval gunfire off the coast. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: The paucity of enemy supporting arms to adequately support a determined defensive posture; the enemy's knowledge of friendly offensive mobility and fire support capabilities against their static positions; and achievement of a much needed victory is unlikely by defensive actions.

(8) Capability (8). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy may choose to adopt a hasty defense and/or delay until command posts, vital installations and caches are displaced, concealed or dispersed; the enemy's requirement to protect vital base areas; and the enemy's desire to conserve forces in one area while exploiting an opportunity elsewhere. Factors which militate against adoption of this capability are: Reluctance to stand and fight against US/FWMAF's except under favorable conditions and at a time and place of his choosing; the enemy may prefer not to defend occupied terrain if it is only an operating area and not a vital base area; the enemy has only a limited supporting arms capability; the enemy will often evade direct contact with superior friendly forces; and achievement of a much needed victory is unlikely by defensive actions.

(9) Capability (9). Factors which favor adoption of this capability are: The enemy's desire to achieve a tactical success; the enemy's ability to move with relative freedom through enemy controlled territory and the DMZ; and recent severe attrition of enemy forces in the southern portion of I CTZ may demand reinforcement of those forces in order to insure collection of a sizeable portion of the rice harvest in that area. Factors which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy's knowledge that the introduction of additional enemy forces into RVN would probably be matched by additional FWMAF's, thus making a decisive enemy military victory unlikely; and the enemy's reluctance to mass his forces for movement.

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(10) Capability (10). Factors which favor the adoption of this capability are: This is a basic enemy tactic which has long been practiced in SVN; it provides the enemy an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms fire; VC knowledge of the terrain and of the local populace; the enemy's belief that successful application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued US force participation in RVN; guerrillas and local force VC units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while NVA and VC main force units conduct large scale operations; and this capability is indicated by numerous intelligence sources as the tactic to be emphasized to counter the RVN RD Program. There are no factors which militate against adoption of this capability.

c. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, installations and lines of communication are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attack.

(2) Enemy forces are generally weak in total combat power because of the absence of air support and the limited availability of supporting arms and ammunition.

(3) During offensive operations, enemy forces have displayed a rigidity of tactical doctrine and dependency upon detailed planning and rehearsal that renders them vulnerable to surprise.

(4) The recent decrease in overall combat effectiveness of enemy forces, especially in QUANG TRI (P) and QUANG NGAI (P), has increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations. Contributing factors include: Recent decisive defeats; increased reliance on conscripted, less highly motivated personnel; reduced training time; lower morale by reason of fear of our supporting arms, shortages of food and medicine, sickness, and general hardships; and our increased psychological warfare operations.

(5) Enemy forces are becoming more dependent upon local resources for support. The resulting increased pressure on these resources has served to jeopardize the enemy's standing with the local populace.

d. Relative Probability of Adoption. The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities are as follows: (10), (6), (5), (7), (8), (1), (4), (3), (2), and (9).

B. S. Read

B. S. READ
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO 366TH FTW	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CO RLT 26	1
CMC (CODR AO2)	2	CTG 79.5	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 79.4	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 76.4	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
CG 1ST MARDIV	50	HQ 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
CG 3RD MARDIV	30	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	3
CG PROJECT OREGON	1	CO 282D AVN CO	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 8TH RR FU	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 9TH MAB	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5	III MAF	10

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 13-67.

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 012400H APR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	150					1	150
Divisions (Hq)	3	2,000					3	2,000
Regiments (Hq)	6	2,194	2	1,300			8	3,494
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,140	12	4,520	6	2,050	35	14,710
Battalions (other)	10	2,240	3	1,275			13	3,515
Separate Companies					26	2,535	26	2,535
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		15,374		7,095		4,585		27,054
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	Unk					1	Unk
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					4	350	4	350
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						750		750
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
COMBINED TOTAL STRENGTH		15,874		7,095		6,235		29,204

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2. NUMBER OF VC/NVA BATTALIONS BY TYPE (CONFIRMED ONLY)

	<u>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</u>		<u>COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS</u>							<u>TOTALS</u>
	<u>INF</u>	<u>SAPPER</u>	<u>ARTY</u>	<u>MORT</u>	<u>AAA</u>	<u>RR</u>	<u>ENGR</u>	<u>SIG</u>	<u>MED</u>	
NVA	17	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	27
VC MF	12	2					1			15
VC LF	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTALS	35	2	1	1	2	1	3	2	1	48

Note: Totals include units of 324B Div and 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div.

3. (C) ESTIMATED IRREGULAR FORCES STRENGTH AS OF 17 FEB 67.

<u>PROVINCES</u>	<u>GUERRILLA FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
QUANG TRI	2,274	4,687	937	7,898
THUA THIEN	2,807	7,988	1,597	12,392
QUANG NAM	4,601	13,026	2,606	20,233
QUANG TIN	3,324	8,809	1,761	13,894
QUANG NGAI	<u>4,134</u>	<u>13,516</u>	<u>2,703</u>	<u>20,353</u>
TOTAL STRENGTH	17,140	48,026	9,604	74,770

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4. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 012400H APR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	9,875 ^{#2}		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Vinh Linh SS.	13Mar67
1st Bn	NVA	C	456		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 164686	13Mar67
1st Co(K-1)	NVA	C	108				
2nd Co(K-2)	NVA	C	106				
3rd Co(K-3)	NVA	C	108				
4th Co(K-4)	NVA	C	100				
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 9661 (Hill 360)	13Mar67
5th Co(K-5)	NVA	C	180			Cua Valley	13Mar67
6th Co(K-6)	NVA	C	140			XD 7834	13Mar67
7th Co(K-7)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
8th Co(K-8)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 1072	13Mar67
9th Co(K-9)	NVA	C	180				
10th Co(K-10)	NVA	C	140				
11th Co(K-11)	NVA	C	140				
12th Co(K-12)	NVA	C	140				
32nd Regt	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Nghe An (P) (?)	13Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	2,625		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	825		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	C-2	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661 - XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,984	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	3 km Radius YD 0572	4Mar67
Regt Hq and Spt	NVA	C	794		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0864	2Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	250	C-4	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 063682	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C				YD 102632	1Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
3rd Co	NVA	C				YD 081665	4Mar67
4th Co(Support)	NVA	C					
5th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 070685	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C					
2nd Co	NVA	C					
3rd Co	NVA	C				Area YD 0768	4Mar67
4th Co	NVA	C					
6th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0768	4Mar67
U/I Wire Co	NVA	PO				YD 075665	3Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280		DMZ Area	YD 0768	4Mar67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	YD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	440	C-2	YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist and coastal area	24Feb67
814th Bn	NVA	C	500	C-2	Hai Lang (D)	YD 4054 - YD 4250	24Feb67
H.99 Co	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	24Feb67
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66
K.400 Co	LF	C	120		Gio Linh (D)	YD 3172	17Feb67

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		Thua Thien (P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720	YD 540195	21Feb67
800th Bn	MF	C	300		Phong Dien (D)	YD 620464	17Feb67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400		YD 6318	ZC 0595	24Feb67
806th Bn	NVA	C	400		YD 5642	YD 465330	18Mar67
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc (D)	YC 904998	18Jan67
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 7030	YD 635348	8Mar67
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 653314	10Jan67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412		
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Thu (D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,350	C-2	Que Son (D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son (D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	400		Que Son (D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	250		Que Son (D)	AT 8554	16Mar67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	250	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	BT 1149	24Mar67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	C-2	ZC 135280	BT 094643	28Feb67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 0848	6Mar67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	C-3	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
GK31 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
GK32 Bn	NVA	C	220	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
GK30 Bn	NVA	C	220		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
GK40 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	120	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 902215	16Mar67
2nd Bn, (3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	C-2	Thang Binh (D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	C-2	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	MF	C	90	C-2	Tam Ky (D)	BT 441081	13Jan67
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov66
K.51 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.52 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
K.54 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.55 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha(D)/KONTUM (P) Border	BS 1382	25Mar67
2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460		Que Son(D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai(P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		Tra Bong(D) BS 3782	BS 3782	25Mar67
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		Son Ha(D) BS 4356	BS 435566	25Mar67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,880	C-3	S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 579498	25Mar67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Minh Long(D)	BS 579498	
40th Bn	MF	C	280	C-3	BS 644553	BS 644553	25Mar67
60th Bn	MF	C	200	C-3	BS 579498	BS 579498	25Mar67
70th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 561673	BS 561673	25Mar67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 665421	BS 665421	25Mar67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	C-3	N. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 470745	25Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
11th Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
22nd Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
33rd Bn	NVA	C	400	C-3	BS 519832	BS 519832	25Mar67
GK-33 Bn(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 4478	BS 4478	18Feb67
3rd Div Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		BS 7528	BS 7528	25Mar67
2nd Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 629364	25Mar67
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	
95th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
20th Bn	MF	C	400	C-2	E Son Ha (D)	Son Ha(D)	25Mar67
38th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	595		BS 6436	BS 6436	23Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
20th Co (Bn Hq)	MF	C	105	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
30th Co	MF	C	120	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
40th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 3377	BS 3377	23Jan67
50th Co	MF	C	100	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
60th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Son Tinh(D)	W-Son Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 7743	2Mar67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 4789	12Nov66
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #3	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 732079	27Feb67
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7610	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
18th Regt	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 9876	12Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BR 9876	12Mar67
7th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8579	6Mar67
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8579	6Mar67
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 9788	6Mar67
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,050		BS 9005	BS 8716	20Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 8716	20Mar67
7th Bn	NVA	C	300		BS 9305	BS 9305	11Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		BS 9104	BS 8716	20Mar67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 8808	BS 8716	20Mar67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-3.
- #3. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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5. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 012400H MAR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31.445 (?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung THANH CO-Sr Capt HAI
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong; Cong Troung 1/5	31.442 XD		
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong; Cuu Long; K101	31.443 XB		
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn); K100; Song Huong		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn); Thu Bong; K103	31.455 XB(?)		
K9 Co		31.456 XB		
K10 Co		31.457 XB(?)		
K11 Co		31.458 XB(?)		
K12 Co		31.459 XB(?)		
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31.445 XB 32.445		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Troung 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam	51.441 KT		CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CC-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; 2nd Indep Trans Regt(?); Doc Lap; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; Cua Thuan; Co Dong (mobile) Regt 4th Regt		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cua Long Bn	31.620 RT		CO-Nguyen KHUONG XO-Bui Dinh PHONG CO-1st Lt Le TIEN XO-Linh Xuan TIEU PO-Vo Dinh HOI
1st Co	Doan-1	31.621 31.621 RT		
2nd Co	Doan-2	31.622 RT 31.625 RT		
3rd Co	Doan-3	31.623		
4th Co (Hvy Wpns Support)	Doan-4	31.624 RT	12-82mm Mort 6-HMG Chicom 7.62mm Type 57 9-AANG Unk-B-10 DK-RR(82mm)	CO-1st Lt Tran Xuan TOAN XO-Le Minh KOANH PO-Nguyen Ngo CHUNG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND AMMUNITION	PERSONALITIES
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Song Huong Bn			CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG) PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van RICH CO-Cao Quan MAI
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Don Bn;	31.630		
2nd Co	Cuu Long Bn	31.631		CO-1st Lt AN XC-V.O. PHA PO-1st Lt TRUC CO-1st Lt MAI XO-Lt Thai Van LAP CO-1st Lt CHUNG
3rd Co	Doan-2	31.632		
4th Co (Hvy Wpns)	Doan-3	31.633		
90th Regt (Hq)	Doan-4	31.634 KT		
	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K.37; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TRUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; K.38; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	K.39; D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Luu Van MAN CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam 41.338 EQ	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG	CO-Van KIEM XO-SANH CO-THANH XO- SAM
814th Bn	K.14			
H.99 Co Trieu Phong Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist Force			CO-Vo BA PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri H30; 30H		Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47	CO-Cao TUNG
Cam Lo Co K.400 Co	4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Armed Co	41.344 FQ(?) 41.346 FQ(?)	3-60mm Mort 2-B-40 6-BAR's	CO-NGHIA CO-1st Lt DAM

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North	41.000FM-		CG-MG HUM
	Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu	41.300FM		XO-Nguyen Van THU
	Bac; K-500; Di Hai	Di Hai		PO-Le TRUONG
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th			CO-Maj CUONG
	Worksite; Ham Tu			XO- Capt AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?)	1520; Q40.700ST	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-75mm RR Unk-B-90 Unk-B-40	CO-Capt Nguyen DE
802nd Bn	K.2 Bn: Una Troi Bn C-2 (?); 2nd Bn (?)		4-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 6-AA Wpns 2-57 RR 6-B-90 4-82mm Mort	CO-KHANH
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D-10; 3rd Bn(?) 80.T Bn		3-75 RL 3-HMG 3-DK-57 72-SMG 4-AA	CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
804th Bn	K.4; VQ-74		Unk-57 RR Unk-B-40 Unk-K-50 SMG	CO-THANH XO-NHON
810th Bn	6th; K-10; 310(?)	1852 Bac Ha	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-60mm Mort 3-DKZ	CO-Capt Huong THI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort; 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR	
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG; Unk-K-50	CO-SON XO-THU

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20.825		CO-Capt THAO
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn (?) Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20 B.20; Viet Dung	21.341 BM Ba Ha	1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-LAM XO-THAI PO-CU
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21.395 GM Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?)	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn	2116 Quang Da	1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-KY XO-THANH PO-UT
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; X.55(?); Q-15; H-35; H-55; 75(?); 104th; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co	2105	2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co	2103 (?)		CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co X-64 (?)	2104 (?)		CO-NOI

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

33rd Arty Regt (Hq)		Nam Hai 20.800 GM		
GK.31 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn; 38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn; RQ21 RQ22		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN
GK.32 Bn GK.30 (SIG)	RQ 20/A Bn; RQ.20 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C X.72; RQ.24	1803/CH Hai Cang 20 GM 20.039	12-75mm RR	
GK.40 Bn (ENGR)		Tay An Nam Hai 21.993 Mrs Hanh		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
72nd Bn				CO-Tran Van CAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn (3rd Regt)	Binh Da; X2; K-2; 74th Bn (?)			CO-Capt THAU
14th Co	A-14; V-14; A.19; K.53		1-60mm Mort 1-30 Cal MG 1-57mm RR (?) Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SMG	
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 706 74th Dist Force Co			CO-THANH XO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUCNG CO-Nguyen DUCC XO-Vo Ly TA PO-Nguyen MAI
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	7th Co; X-70 Co	P.O. 20.142 F.G.M. Bac Hien		
706th Co K.51	106th Co K51; 107; F-14; A.10 D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Anh VU
K.52 K.54	D-22; A.13; V.13(?) C-73; A.16		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	CO-Hong LE
K.55	C-75; Phi Po A-21; A.21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa; H-601; F-102 KW;	20.100 GM 21.900 GM Bac Hien	CO-Maj Gen Hoang Van THAI XO-LtCol Nguyen Chanh (AKA BINH) PO-Gen Thai ALSO Asst. PO-LtCol Tran Ba KHUE CofS-Col Le TRUC Dep CofS-LtCol Nguyen LIEN CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2	20.601 GM 20.925 GM Tay An; 41.910 KP	
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt	6000-6199	CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung ST		CO-Nguyen MUOI
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh-Gia	20.735 CT An Giang		CO-SrCapt Nguyen Xuan PHONG
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Ounh Gia (?); Bong Trang		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Binh; Song Hong(?)			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Troung 7 (?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
1st Bn	11th Workshop; 11th Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
2nd Bn	135th Bn; 22nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
3rd Bn	33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
GK-33 Bn	RQ23; RQ33; RQ330 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60.620 CM Tay An	6-120mm Morts	CO-Le Van CAN XO & CofS-Nguyen KINH PO-Ho Dac HOI CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI
2nd VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Trom Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt;			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN CofS-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			
97th Bn	703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.23; H.25	6340TL (old) 21.164 GM (new)		
20th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120th Bn	20.135GM 20.139GM Bac Hien 2048; NQ Ba Hao HT 2416; Ba Bao		CO-Maj KIM
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38			CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Work- site; 2nd Bn (?)		2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141GM- 20.144GM Bac Hien 1291-KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa; X2424 Bac Hien For- ward to Ba Hoa PO 20.142 AGM Bac Hien PO 20.142 BGM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
20th Co	X-20; 2d Co			CO-BUU
30th Co	3d Co; V-30 Co			CO-Dinh Dieu PHAN XO-Trinh LANH PO-NHUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Co	4th Co; V-40 Co	PO 20.142 CGM Bac Hien		CO-GIAO XO-Tuan KIET PO-Ngoc BINH CO-VAN XO-HUNG PO-LOC
50th Co	5th Co; V-50 Co	PO 20.142 DGM		
60th Co	6th Co; V-60 Co	PO 20.142 EGM Bac Hien		XO-CONG PO-Nguyen Van LUC CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC
1506th Engr Bn	506th Bn(?); 571 Unit	1289		
19th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn;			
307th Bn 21st Co	Poss 315th Bn T-21; H-40	22,422	2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 6-Carabines 3-BAR's 6-Carabines Unk-SMG Unk-K-40	CO-Dinh Re HOA CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU CO-MY CO-CHUNG XO-NAM PO-ANH
506 "A" Sapper Co 506 "B" Sapper Co	Unit 506 H-42	Hom Thu 21.618M		CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-Dinh TAC CO-MAU
C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Me Duc Co; C-217 Co Ba To Co Duc Pho Co; Poss C-19 Co			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN
T.18 Co P.31 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West) T.19 Co			
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10 D-518 Infil Gp	1500		CO-SrLt Vo THU XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn		1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUYET
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CIM
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		
90th Engr Bn	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21.155 GM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
18th NVA Regt	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAM
7th Bn				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
8th Bn	803K Infil Cp; Inter-Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-SrCapt NHUNG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANH Cofs-LUONG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			CC-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt	Quyét Tam; 209th Infil Cp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt	21.141VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC Cofs-Capt THANG CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM Cofs-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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6. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN I CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 260001H MAR TO 012400H APR 67.

a. Quang Tri

(1) Operation BEACON HILL I (commenced 20133H Mar - terminated 010200H Apr). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation PRAIRIE III (commenced 190001H Mar - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(3) Other. Information on the 808th and 814th Bns.

(a) The low lands of Trieu Phong, Mai Linh and Hai Lang Districts are the areas in which emphasis is being placed on the Revolutionary Development program. This area is also considered to be the normal operating areas for the 808th VC Bn and the 814th NVA Bn and the area in which VC/NVA units obtain rice during the rice harvest.

(b) Prisoners of war taken in this area, primarily from the 808th and 814th Bns, have indicated that the primary mission of the 808th and 814th Bns is the disruption of the Revolutionary Development program. On 17 March 1967 there were five incidents reported against Revolutionary Development Teams. Four of these were harassing type and the fifth was an estimated company size contact in the vicinity of (YD 325584).

(c) A consolidated interrogation report of LE HUY HOI, captured on 17 March 1967 (YD 293610) and NGUYEN VUNG, captured on 18 March 1967 at (YD 353597), from the 808th Bn reveals the following information:

1. The 808th Bn has been engaged in three battles, two in January 1967 and one in February 1967. During these battles the 808th Bn suffered heavy casualties.

2. The 808th Bn uses the Hai Lang Jungle for rest and recuperation. The 814th would replace and assume the mission of the 808th Bn, should the latter suffer heavy casualties. It is presently unknown if the 814th Bn is supplying personnel replacements to the 808th Bn or if it is just assuming the 808th Bn's mission as stated above.

(d) On 17-18 March 1967, the 1st ARVN Regt discovered a mass grave which contained 58 bodies. The grave was relatively new and was in the same general area (YD 3357) in which the 808th Bn was in contact with ARVN elements on 2 March 1967. As a result of this report, a strength reduction of 58 has been assessed against the 808th Bn. Combat effectiveness is rated as C-2 (80%) as a result of this report.

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b. Thua Thien

(1) Operation CHINOOK II (commenced 20133H Mar - continuing).
No identifications during the period.

c. Quang Nam

(1) Other.

(a) Prisoners of war captured on 29 March 1967 by the 21st Ranger Bn during an enemy attack on that battalion at (BT 098508) revealed that the attacking unit was the 1st Bn, 3rd NVA Regt. These prisoners further revealed that the 24 March attack against a USMC and an ARVN convoy on highway 1 in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin border area was conducted by the 2nd Bn, 3rd NVA Regt reinforced by two companies of the R.20 Bn, with the 1st Bn, 3rd NVA Regt in reserve.

d. Quang Tin

(1) No identifications.

e. Quang Ngai

(1) Operation DE SOTO (commenced 262000H Jan - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation PERRY (commenced 250900H Mar - terminated 271800H Mar). No identifications during the period.

(3) Other. Huynh Cu, 39 year old Major, Training Officer, MR-5 assigned to 2nd NVA Div returned to Son Truong CP Son Tinh (D), Quang Ngai (F), on 25 March 1967. He revealed the following information concerning enemy unit locations and strengths:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
MR-5 HQ	BS 1382	Not reported
2ND NVA DIV CP (Forward)	BS 435566	Not reported
2ND NVA DIV CP (Rear)	BS 3782	Not reported
1ST VC REGT CP	BS 579498	160
40TH VC BN	BS 644553	190

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60TH VC BN	BS 579498	50
70TH VC BN	BS 561673	150
90TH VC BN	BS 665421	90
21ST NVA REGT CP	BS 470745	250
11TH NVA BN	BS 470745	190
22ND NVA BN	BS 470745	180
33RD NVA BN	BS 519832	280
3RD NVA DIV CP	BS 7528	Not reported
2ND VC REGT	BS 629364	Not reported

Returnee Cu further reported that the 1st VC Regt was scheduled to receive 500 replacements on 1 April 1967 and that the 70th Bn was a 2nd NVA Div independent battalion attached to the 1st VC Regt.

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7. **ENEMY TACTICS.** I Corps special information report number 3537/QDI/TM2/TL/K discusses the tactical employment of the enemy forces during the period 15 - 19 February 1967 in their attacks against ROKMC and ARVN forces in QUANG NGAI Province. The information was derived from WO Nguyen Van Binh, a PW from the 22nd Bn, 21st Regt and Asst Plt Ldr Tran Mai Xu, a returnee from the GK-33 Mortar Bn.

a. The enemy forces employed in these attacks were from the 2nd NVA Div and included the following units:

- (1) 1st VC Regt.
- (2) 21st NVA Regt.
- (3) GK-33 Bn (120mm, 82mm and 81mm Mortars).
- (4) GK-32 Bn (75mm RR).
- (5) GK-31 Bn (12.7mm MG).
- (6) Engineer, Transportation, Medical, Rear Services and other supporting elements.

b. The concept of the attack was for the 1st Regt and mortar units to attack ROK units at Son Kim Post (BS 588834) and for the 21st Regt and AA units to attack the heliborne reinforcements. (See Appendix 1).

c. The 1st Regt launched the attack on Son Kim at 0420 on the morning of 15 February 1967. The GK-33 and GK-32 Bns used mortars and recoilless rifles to fire on Nui Vo (BS 622844) to suppress the ROK artillery.

d. The entire 21st Regt and GK-31 AA Bn were deployed to attack the heliborne reinforcements as follows:

- (1) 11th Bn (BS 567787).
- (2) 22nd Bn (BS 550784).
- (3) 33rd Bn (BS 563767).

e. The 2nd Div staff section anticipated the locations of landing zones to be used by the RVNAF and Allied forces. These landing zones were located as follows:

- (1) LZ A - (BS 556792) (Chop Non Hill).
- (2) LZ B - (BS 560789) (Phouc Binh (V)).
- (3) LZ C - (BS 563773).
- (4) LZ D - (BS 557777).

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f. Depending on the landing zone used, the following tactics would be used

(1) If LZ A was used, the 22nd Bn would occupy the high ground and hold while the 11th Bn would move to attack the right flank. The 33rd Bn would then deploy to the south.

(2) If LZ B was used, the 22nd Bn would move to this area to attack while the 11th Bn attacked the right flank. The 33rd Bn would then move to this area to reinforce the attack.

(3) If LZ C was used, the 33rd Bn would attack while the 11th Bn moved to attack from the east and the 22nd Bn would move to attack from the west.

(4) If LZ D was used, the 22nd Bn would move to the north and attack. The 11th Bn would draw the enemy into the rice paddy so that the 33rd Bn could destroy him.

Note: Annex A of PERINTREP 7-67 (19 Feb 67) discusses the chronology of the enemy attack on 14-15 February 1967 and reflects the considerable difference between the enemy's plans and the actual conduct of the attack.

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8. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.


III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

NSR HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ
31ST NVA REGT
32ND NVA REGT
33RD NVA REGT
34TH NVA ARTY REGT
271ST NVA REGT
324B NVA DIV HQ
803RD NVA REGT

90TH NVA REGT
808TH MF BN
814TH NVA BN
6TH NVA REGT
800TH MF BN
806TH NVA BN
804TH MF BN
810TH LF BN
1506TH ENGR BN
CK-33 BN

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT) TO
III MAF PERINTREP 13-67

1. Training Officer, MR-5. Major HUYNH CU, Training Officer, MR-5 assigned to the 2d NVA Div, rallied to SON TRUONG OP, SON TINH (D), QUANG NGAI (P) on 25 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. The following are the probable locations of units subordinate to MR-5:

(1) MR-5 Base area - QUANG NGAI-KONTUM border (AS 8869), (AS 8874), (AS 9169) and (AS 9174).

(2) MR-5 Cadre - (BS 1382).

(3) MR-5 Officer Schools: (BS 691279) and (BS 709270).

(4) 2d NVA Div Forward CP - (BS 435566).

(5) 2d NVA Div Rear Base Area - (BS 3782).

(6) 1st VC Regt CP and 60th Bn - (BS 579498).

(7) 40th Bn, 1st Regt, 2d Div - (BS 644553).

(8) 70th Bn, 1st Regt, 2d Div - (BS 561673).

(9) 90th Bn, 1st Regt, 2d Div - (BS 665421).

(10) 21st Regt CP, 11th and 22d Bns - (BS 470745).

(11) 33d Bn, 21st Regt, 2d Div - (BS 519832).

(12) 3d VC Bn (SAO VANG) CP - (BS 7528).

(13) 2d VC Regt, 3d Regt, 3d Div - (BS 629364).

b. In accordance with the communist bloc strategy for the annexation of SVN and to unify the regions under the same socialist region (1959 - 1965), the territorial division of MR-5 was in two phases:

(1) Phase I (1959 to June 1965): During this phase MR-5 was composed of QUANG TRI (P), THUA THIEN (P), QUANG NAM (P), QUANG NGAI (P), BINH DINH (P), PHU YEN (P), KHANH HOA (P), GIA LAI (P), KONTUM (P) and DARLAC (P).

(2) Phase II (June 1965 to date): The territory was further subdivided as follows:

(a) TRI THIEN - Central LAOS MR, provinces unknown. Commanded by BrigGen LE CHUONG.

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(b) Western Highland - Western Low LAOS MR is composed of GIA LAI, KON TUM and DARLAC. Commanded by BrigGen CHU HUY MAN.

(c) MR-5 is composed of QUANG TIN (P), QUANG NGAI (P), BINH DINH (P), PHU YEN (P) and KHANH HOA (P). Commanded by Gen HOANG VAN THAI.

These three military regions are directly subordinate to the People's High Command in HANOI.

c. MR-5 normally establishes three CP's for their seasonal campaigns; for example, during the Winter-Spring Campaign there was a Rear CP (Basic CP) and two forward CP's. One forward CP was in charge of QUANG NAM (P), QUANG NGAI (P) and BINH DINH (P), the other was in charge of PHU YEN (P) and KHANH HOA (P).

d. The units subordinate to MR-5 and their assigned areas are: the 2d Div, QUANG NAM (P) and QUANG TIN (P); the 3d Div, QUANG NGAI (P) and BINH DINH (P); and the 5th Div, KHANH HOA (P).

e. Combat effectiveness of the subordinate units of the 2d NVA Div was rated as follows: 1st Regt is the most effective and the 60th Bn the best subordinate of that regiment; the 90th was the most effective until February (probable due to losses in 15 February 1967 engagement with the 2d Bde, ROKMC, III MAF PERINTREP No 7-67); and the 21st Regt and 3d Regt are understrength, but are capable of launching small scale attacks.

f. MR-5 concept of employment for the dry season involves a Main Objective, South QUANG NGAI (P) and North BINH DINH (P), and a Secondary Objective, QUANG TIN (P) and QUE SON (P). It is proposed that the 3d VC Div will be responsible for the Main Objective while the 2d VC Div simultaneously disperses to achieve the Secondary Objective. The campaign is scheduled to commence on or about 15 April 1967.

g. The sappers will be responsible for immediate activity objectives and are to attack as soon as preparation is made and need not follow the planned campaign. Areas designated are: GIO HUYNH (BS 584726), CAU CHAY (BS 623865), NUI TRON (BS 515780) and SON TRUONG (BS 582770).

h. The tactics for the summer campaign will be to attack posts, intercept reinforcements and to destroy SVN government forces. These tactics will be applied to BA TO, SON HA and TIEN PHUOC.

i. To support the campaign, reinforcements are to be sent from NVN, where the present troop strength is to be reduced. NVN is depending upon reinforcements from China in the event of attack. Reportedly China has agreed to allow NVN to recruit soldiers for the NVA from its southern provinces of KWANG TUNG, KWANG SI and YUNNAN.

j. Province forces are assigned as follows: QUANG NGAI (P), two battalions, 803d Bn in charge of DUC PHO area and an unknown battalion in charge of SON LINH area; QUANG TIN (P), two battalions, 72d Bn and a newly activated battalion; QUANG NAM (P), two battalions, a heavy weapons battalion and a battalion activated in August 1966; DANANG City, three

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battalions, 402d Sapper Bn, another sapper battalion activated in August 1966, and one heavy weapons battalion activated in August 1966; BINH DINH (P), two battalions; PHU YEN (P) and KHANH HOA (P) one battalion each.

k. In July 1966 NVN infiltrated 10 AA battalions with a total of eighty 12.8mm AA guns. These units were located along the central corridor from north of the 17th Parallel to KONTUM (P) (THONG NHAT Route).

l. MR-5 planned to improve the infiltration of units from NVN in order to provide replacements to existing units; no new units are to be activated. In late April 1967, the 1st Work Site will receive 500 NVA soldiers from NVN.

m. MR-5 normally was informed six to 12 hours prior to a B-52 bombings. The information was sent by radio message but CU did not know the source. Based upon the message, MR-5 would know the take-off time of the B-52's and was responsible to relay this information over the whole of SVN. The bombings were very effective on DUONG YEN and HIEP DUC because 50 per cent of the bombs were underground bursts. Later bombings were not so effective because they were airbursts.

n. In February 1967, MR-5 ordered a four cadre team to conduct a reconnaissance of the U.S. Advisor Base and the 2d Inf Div Headquarters in QUANG NGAI. This mission was accomplished in 10 days and the team decided to position four 81mm mortars and four 75mm RR in the vicinity of (BS 655745). It was decided to employ concentration of fire for destruction of the two bases. This plan was approved by MR-5 for execution in March or April 1967.

o. In 1965 and 1966 more than 50 per cent of VC/NVA supplies came by sea. In 1966 three trawlers attempted to bring supplies to MR-5 area, however only one was successful. The other two were destroyed, including one off the coast of QUANG TIN (P). From 1965 and 1966 the main port of entry for MR-5 was HOA HIEP (V), PHU YEN (P). Other ports of entry were along the coast of QUANG NGAI (P), vicinity of CAPE BATANGAN, DUC PHO and SA HUYNH. Recent supply activities have centered around PHUONG (V) (BS 8344), QUANG NGAI (P). This was the destination of the recently destroyed trawler. This year most of the supplies have been transported over land routes through LAOS; only 20 to 30 percent are now sent by sea, and only an estimated one third of this amount gets through.

(G-2 Comment: F/2.)

2. GK 40 Co, 33d Regt. Pvt NGUYEN LOI, GK 40 Co, 33d Regt, a CHIEU HOI to TAM KY (V) on 16 March 1967, gave the following information during interrogation:

a. LOI was recruited collectively with 20 other youths in March 1966. He was given one month of training in demolitions, wiring of demolitions, river crossing, boatsmanship, bridge building and river width and depth analysis. This training was conducted in PHUOC SON (H) in the vicinity of (AT 848214).

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d. In April 1966, he was transferred to GK 40 Co where he remained until he deserted on 11 March 1967.

c. The GK 40 Co is subordinate to the 33d VC Regt, which is subordinate to the 2d VC Div. The regiment is composed of: GK 38, Dispensary Unit; GK 33, Artillery Co; GK 35, Recon Co; GK 37, Sapper Co; GK 40, Engineer Co; and Headquarters Section.

d. GK 40 Co is organized into four platoons, each with a platoon leader and three squads. The platoons are numbered and assigned missions as follows: B-1 and B-2, demolitions and destruction of bridges and roads in the lowlands; B-3, fortifications when needed; and B-4, river crossings.

e. When LOI deserted on 11 March 1967, his unit was located in THON BA (H), SON HIEP (V), HIEP DUC (D), QUANG TIN (P) (AT 904215) and has been in this area since December 1966.

f. The GK 40 Co operates separately but LOI did not know its area of responsibility. He claimed that the company remains in the area of THON BA (H) and billets its men in private homes with the people. Morale of the men of the GK 40 Co is very low.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. The organization of the 33d Regt and the designations of the subordinates, as stated by LOI, differ significantly from present OOB holdings. However, these could be AKA's, since frequent change of unit designations is a VC policy.)

3. 1st Co, GK-33d Bn. WO TRAN MAI XU, Asst Plt Cdr, 1st Co, GK-33d Bn rallied on 17 February 1967 to the DANANG CHIEU HOI Center and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. He joined the VIET MINH in 1952 and made sergeant before being discharged in 1956 because of sickness. In 1965, he was forced to join the NVA. With approximately 500 other conscriptees, he was assigned to the 7th Bn, 22d Separate Bde. The morale in this unit was very low as everyone was conscripted and they had no choice. In 1965, there was a great mobilization underway and everyone served or they were severely punished.

b. During three months of training in NVN they never left the villages because to build a camp was to ask to be hit by air strikes. They learned artillery techniques, use of 81/82 and 120mm mortars, rifle training, infantry tactics and evacuation of wounded and dead.

c. The unit was changed to the RO-23d Bn when they came to SVN in October 1965. Their mission was to shell airfields, major installations and support infantry battalions. Since coming to SVN, the unit has been under strength and, at present, there is a shortage of trained artillery personnel.

d. The battalion has six 120mm, six 81mm and six 82mm mortars. There is a shortage of equipment due to loss and breakage, and the five month delay in resupply from NVN. The supplies are transported by sea to SA HUYNH Beach (BS 925524) and then by laborers to various supply depots.

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"K-7" is the main ammunition dump for MR-5 and is two days walk up stream from AN MY #1 (H) (AT 9418). This area contains small arms and all types of ammo including 57mm RR to 120mm mortars. There is another ammo storage area near (BS 374794). Rice is stored in various places and is never taken from the same place more than twice in a row. Some of the rice storage areas are (BS 685779), (BS 461804), (BS 671565), (BS 465830), (AT 862210), (AT 849250) and (AT 960278). There is a shortage of all supplies and food is especially bad.

e. There is a POW camp used only for ARVN by the river near (BS 3980) and a hospital about one and one half hours walk to the northeast from SON HONG (V) (BS 461804).

f. The 2d Div has 6,000 men (down from 8,000 due to losses) and the GK-33 Bn has 500 to 550 men. The battalion has one 15 watt radio, eight two watt radios and 16 EE8's.

g. The following new designations were given:

- (1) GK-30 Bn for RQ-20 Comm Bn.
- (2) GK-31 Bn for RQ-21 AA Bn (12.7).
- (3) GK-32 Bn for RQ-22 75mm RR Bn.
- (4) GK-33 Bn for RQ-23 120mm Mort Bn.
- (5) GK-37 Co for RQ-27 Co.
- (6) GK-40 Co for RQ-30 Co.
- (7) DG-42 Co for Flame Co.

h. He knew nothing about the rocket attack on DANANG airfield (rallied on 17 February 1967) but his company shelled it with 120mm mortars around 23 February 1966.

i. XU rallied because of the harsh VC treatment, bad food, lack of comfort items and because he is sick of the war and feels that, having once served with the VIET MINH, he should not be in SVN.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. GK-33 (AKA RQ-23) previously reported in attack on ROKMC. Recent PWs indicate the designations of 2d NVA Div support units have been changed from RQ to GK. SA HUYNH is a known sea supply terminal point.)

4. HA GIA Hamlet Guerrilla. HO TU, 13 years old, a HA GIA Hamlet guerrilla captured by 1/1 at (BT 1063) on 11 March 1967 gave the following information during interrogation:

a. His duties were to emplace mines, booby traps and punji pits. He was aided by a 14 year old, NGUYEN TRAN.

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b. The hamlet contained two cells of VC, three men per cell. One cell was on its way to NVN to receive medals for killing so many Americans with mines and booby traps. Approximately 27 February, six NVN soldiers came to the hamlet to act as guides for the cell. The trip is supposed to take three months.

c. The people in his area support the VC willingly. One reason for this is the popular VC tactic of dressing as ARVN troops, entering the hamlet and harassing the people to discredit the government in the eyes of the people. VC from other areas are always used because they are unknown to the local population. One month previously, VC dressed as ARVN troops came into HA GIA (H) and burned down a house. The next day the local VC came in and rebuilt the house, telling the people that they were there to help and protect them from the government troops. Fifteen days before his capture, VC dressed as ARVN came into the hamlet and stated they were looking for VC. They then proceeded to take food, including chickens and ducks from the people and left. The VC told TU that this was really "counter-propaganda" against government gains in the area.

(G-2 Comment: F/6.)

5. The following captured document pertains to VC/NVA mining techniques:

a. Anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines presently used by friendly forces (VC/NVA):

(1) Anti-vehicle mines. The sizes of these mines vary with the types of vehicles and capabilities of explosives. These mines are also used to destroy heavy guns and architectural constructions (such as installations, roads, bridges, etc.). These mines are often round in shape, have a container made of tin and are exploded with an electric detonator.

(2) Anti-personnel mines:

(a) Anti-personnel mines include stick grenades, booby trap mines, electrical detonator and primer. These anti-personnel mines are often exploded with a primer.

(b) Generally speaking, there are two methods of exploding mines: Electrical detonator and primer. There are two types of mines which, when exploding, can give a blast or throw metal fragments in various directions. Booby trap mines have no time fuze while others have. The local worksite can manufacture trap grenades exploding with a primer and with a time fuze.

(c) Mines are often used to destroy enemy vehicles. They must be laid at certain points where enemy vehicles slow down, such as slopes, bridges, curves, railway stations, towns, posts, etc...

1. Electric ignition must be considered during the movement of vehicles.

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2. Centrifugal force must be considered during the movement of vehicles on curves.

3. The mines must be buried no deeper than 15 centimeters under the surface of the road.

4. Electric wires must be rough to prevent them from being broken under the wheels. To ensure security, the wires may be buried.

5. The detonation station must be located at a point from which we can easily observe our target before it approaches close.

6. Careful camouflage is always of paramount importance.

(d) Concave mines:

1. To reduce the cost of a mine, we manufacture concave mines. These mines have a concave side from which, when exploding, the mines give off extreme heat and a high burst. These mines are loaded with Cheddite explosive which has, on exploding, a velocity of 30,000 meters per second and gives off a heat of 4000 C.

2. Factors that may influence the perforating power of the mine:

- a. Explosive.
- b. Concave side.
- c. Booster.
- d. Type of metal used to manufacture the concave cover of the mine.
- e. Shape of the concave side.
- f. Location of the mine (if we have a 90-degree angle $[?]]$ we will have an effective range $F=1.31 [?]]$).

3. Notable guidelines for users of concave mines:

- a. Try to lay the mine so that the direction of the burst forms a right angle with the target.
- b. If it is necessary, the range F may be 1.6 meters $[?]]$.
- c. In the direction of the burst there must not be any strong obstacles (such as boulders, sand mounds, tree trunks etc...) within a radius of 10 meters.

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(e) Automatic mines modified from those exploded with an electric detonator:

1. In the present situation we must know how to take advantage of all the materials we can find (such as explosives in dud shells of heavy guns, dud rockets or bombs, etc...) left by friendly or enemy units, to manufacture mines to destroy the enemy. To ensure our job, we must fully understand the characteristics of these waste items and know how to assemble and disassemble them. Patience and precautions are therefore required.

2. There are different methods of taking explosives out of the above items: Cut them with a saw or make a hole and empty them. The explosives must be carefully wrapped up and then put into a wooden box (each box must have two covers). Connect it with a detonator (automatic or controlled by electricity). Several such boxes must be fastened together to increase their bursting power.

3. One must clearly lay the mines so that when they explode, the entire blast from them will be directed at the target. Thus we can be sure that the enemy vehicle will be destroyed and its occupants killed.

4. There are five methods of modifying a mine exploded with electric detonating cords into a booby trap mine exploding automatically.

- a. Use a tripping device with a trip wire.
- b. Connect a trip wire directly to the primer of the mine.
- c. Use chemicals (a strong acid for instance).
- d. Use a trip wire to connect the primer of the mine with a tree branch.
- e. Use a detonating watch.

(f) How to set a mine field with anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines:

1. Anti-vehicle mine field. Mines must be laid in series and connected with one another by a mine wire and several secondary wires. To connect the wires, we use two methods in which we have the following kinds of wires:

- a. Standard wire [?] and secondary wires.
- b. Standard wire [?], main wire and secondary wires.

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2. Anti-personnel mine field. These mines explode when a trip wire is pulled. This wire is often five or seven meters long. These mines are often connected in two series leading in two different directions. A two or three man cell is assigned the mission of laying these mines. One man is in charge of making stakes and stretching trip wires between them. The other man watches to see if the enemy approaches.

3. To ensure the result, we must explode: 500 mines (rate: 1/2, range: 1000 meters); 1000 mines (rate: 1, range: 1000 meters) and; 2000 mines (rate: 2, range: 1000 meters). [sic]

a. The mines are laid in a series. The interval between two series is two or four meters. Locations of the mines must be marked and made known to everybody in the cell. The mines must be laid in accordance with terrain features and on the movement routes of the enemy because mines are often used in present tactics.

b. Each cell consists of three or four men (including a cell leader) and each team consists of five or seven men equipped with pickaxes, shovels, knives, flashlights, compass, maps, electric wires, batteries and detonators. We must give each man a mission in accordance with his equipment.

c. Action must be taken promptly and in accordance with enemy operating procedures so that security can be maintained.

d. We must take advantage of landmarks and support fire to enable our mine attack. Before taking action, we must make thorough preparations and proper assignments, and be sure that it will be taken in harmony with the plan.

e. Mines must be laid on roads, in villages and base areas where the enemy may land his troops or drop his paratroopers.

(g) Maintenance:

1. Mines must be kept in dry places. Do not put them near the fire or in the sunshine.

2. Mines of each type must be put together in a certain place.

3. Handle them with care: Do not pile them on one another.

4. Periodical checks and reports must be made.

5. Reports must be submitted when there is any damage.

6. Mines must be carefully checked before being distributed to various units.

7. Precautions must always be taken against all accidents.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 13-67

1. GENERAL. VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level, although incidents involving terrorism continued at a significant rate. Items of interest included the discovery of a booby trapped propaganda sign, a report concerning the VC use of an ammunition box as a booby trap device and continued reports of VC plans to disrupt the forthcoming GVN hamlet and village elections.

2. ESPIONAGE. There were no reports of espionage activity during the period.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
THUA THIEN	29Mar	Highway partially destroyed	YD 598309
THUA THIEN	30Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	ZD 073016
THUA THIEN	31Mar	Highway bridge destroyed	ZD 013027

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

THUA THIEN. A 26 March report from a usually reliable source related that 20 to 30 VC distributed propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of (ZC 089998). The theme of the leaflets was not reported.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A 25 March report from an intelligence source stated that the populace in the VC controlled area of GIO LINH (D), which borders the DMZ, are being forced to use North Vietnamese currency.

A 29 March report from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, related that a sign which read, "Kill Americans to save Country", was found booby-trapped in the vicinity of (YD 467583). Rigged to the lower portion of the sign post was a grenade which was set to detonate when the sign was pulled from the ground.

THUA THIEN. A 25 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that 40 VC returned the body of BUI THI SONG who had been abducted on 14 March 1967. SONG was assassinated in NAM PHO CAM (H) (YD 9964054) reportedly because she had been providing the local PF's with information on VC activity.

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A 26 March report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that approximately 20 VC assassinated four civilians in the vicinity of (YD 817174). Reportedly, these people were killed because they would not cooperate with the VC and were suspected of informing ARVN/USMC units where the VC were located.

A 27 March report from a usually reliable source stated that a civilian truck detonated a mine in the vicinity of (ZD 009032), resulting in one civilian being injured. The report further related that a civilian bus detonated a mine in the vicinity of (ZD 011031) which resulted in two civilians being killed and two injured.

A 27 March report from an intelligence source stated that 20 VC abducted five civilians in the vicinity of (YD 978067). Reportedly, these civilians were abducted to attend a VC indoctrination course.

A 29 March report from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, related that a VN male civilian, with his hands tied behind his back, was found assassinated in the vicinity of (YD 465355).

A 31 March report from a usually reliable source related that an estimated squad of VC entered THON AN THUAN (V) (YD 710285) and assassinated a 60 year old civilian who reportedly had expressed strong anti-communist views.

QUANG NAM. A 25 March report from an intelligence source related that the VC have ordered the populace of HOI AN (V) (BT 145575) to stay away from GVN/U.S. installations.

A 25 March report from a usually reliable source stated that on 19 March, 15 VC stopped a civilian bus on Highway 1 and warned the passengers that as of 20 March, bus traffic on Highway 1 would be prohibited.

A 26 March report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that VC held a meeting in the home of NGUYEN KHACH in CAM HOA (H) (AT 966705) and discussed the following plans: (1) Sabotage bridge 12, "Red Bridge", (BT 014718) located on Highway 1; (2) Mortar the gas storage area in HOA CAM (BT 9772); (3) Destroy the New Life Hamlet of CAM NAM (BT 016708); (4) Snipe at vehicles and lay mines from MIEU DONG (H) (BT 018677) to CAM LE (H) (BT 014719); and (5) Immediately seek out and eliminate those VC who have betrayed the cause.

A 27 March report from a usually reliable source related that the VC district committee of HOA HIEU, CHOA VAN and HIEU DUC districts have outlined a plan to disrupt the building of the HOA BINH resettlement located at (AT 940690). Reportedly, the VC will use their forces in the area to attack and burn the settlement in order to instill fear in the populace.

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A 28 March report from an intelligence source stated that the VC held a meeting in XUYEN TRA (V) (BT 060590) and discussed the following subjects: (1) Methods to disrupt the hamlet and village elections; (2) VC victories at XUYEN TRA and HIEU NHON; and (3) Plans to force those families who have sons serving in the ARVN to appeal to their sons to defect to the VC cause.

A 31 March report from a usually reliable source related that two VC proselyting cadre conducted a meeting in the vicinity of (BT 173592) to discuss plans for conducting terrorist activity against candidates for office during the CAM CHAU (V) (BT 163568) elections. It was further reported that the VC plan to send penetration agents into the village to sabotage the polling places.

A 31 March report from an intelligence source related that the DUY XUYEN District VC committee plans to assign a district force platoon to XUYEN HIEP (BT 023490), XUYEN TRA (BT 060590), XUYEN TRUONG (BT 025512), XUYEN MY (BT 090520) and XUYEN KHUONG (AT 957523) villages for the purpose of increasing terrorist activity during the forthcoming GVN hamlet and village elections.

A 31 March report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that as preparations for the forthcoming GVN hamlet and village elections are being made, VC cadre are increasing their attempts to infiltrate their choices for village chiefs into the local administration in order to control or capitalize on the RVN Government political platform. The VC will propagandize against anti-VC candidates by telling the people that the candidates are pro-American imperialists or tyrants and also disseminate rumors and false information to deceive the people, create terror in local areas, disrupt the economy, and attempt to monopolize the politics.

QUANG NGAI. A 27 March report from a usually reliable source related that on 25 March an unknown number of VC entered PHU QUE (V) (BT 380255) and abducted three families of PF personnel.

A 27 March report from a usually reliable source stated that three VN were injured in the vicinity of (BS 926225) when a VC threw a hand grenade at them. Reportedly, these civilians were terrorized because they had provided assistance to wounded PF personnel during an engagement with the VC.

A 29 March report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that during the night of 27 March, a VC sapper squad infiltrated into QUANG NGAI City. Reportedly, this unit has the mission of assassinating ARVN cadre, destroying office buildings and sabotaging the SONG TRA KHUC bridge.

A report received from another U.S. Intelligence Agency on 29 March

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related that during December 1966, the 540th Ordnance Disposal Group, found a booby trap in the Tra Noc area, PHONG DINH Province (IV Corps), fashioned from a 30 caliber ammunition box. Inserted in the ammunition box was a small tin box, containing approximately 5.2 pounds of TNT and numerous small metal fragments separated by a thin sheet of tin. The tin box had a hole in the lid, where the detonator was inserted, and a parachute cord leading from the detonator to the underside of the cover of the ammunition box. When the cover of the ammunition box is lifted, the cord ignites the detonator and the TNT charge. (CI Comment: This booby trap is easily transported within and between cities by bus or cyclo, as it is made to resemble a tool box. The device may be a local invention of PHONG DINH (F); however, it is likely to get wide dissemination by the VC.)


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PERINTREP NO. 14-67

TII MAF PERINTREP #14-67

2-8 Apr 67

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 G-2 Section, III MAF
 DANANG, RVN
 9 April 1967
 Ser: 090067

PERINTREP 14-67

Period Covered: 020001H - 082400H Apr 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheet NE 48-16, NE 49-13,
 ND 48-4, ND-49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. Aerial photography flown over the eastern half of the DMZ during the latter part of March and early April revealed no new or significant enemy ground activity when compared to prior read-outs of the same area. Photographic interpretation of a northeastern sector approximately ten kilometers north of the DMZ portrayed a slight increase in construction of field fortifications. A comparison was based upon February to March photography. Extensive late March and early April photographic coverage of western QUANG TRI (P) revealed nothing of significance.

Enemy ground activity in northeastern QUANG TRI (P), particularly in the CON THIEN/GIO LINH sector was light and represented a significant decrease when compared to enemy actions of the four previous reporting periods. Enemy mortar fire directed at the GIO LINH OP also dropped off; a total of 254 rounds were received over the period 2 through 8 April.

A substantial ground reconnaissance effort north of THON SON LAM, south of the western portion of Route 9 and west of the KHE SANH combat base produced sightings of the enemy totaling approximately 150 NVA or VC. Sixty-eight were observed in the general vicinity of (XD 9060) and three contacts were made in the same sector with small groups of the enemy. West of the KHE SANH combat base, 52 of the enemy were reported over the period in an area centered on (XD 7543). At (XD 9132) a reconnaissance patrol gained contact with a 30 man NVA element.

At (YD 011453) and on 5 April, 49 Montagnards turned themselves in to the CA LU OP. They stated that life with the VC was most difficult and that for this reason they had returned.

At (YD 201389) on 5 April, K Co, 3rd Bn, 9th Marines discovered an enemy weapons cache. The equipment, mostly small arms and automatic weapons, was heavily oiled and in serviceable condition. The cache was located within VC Base Area 113.

There was a distinct increase in the tempo and intensity of enemy activity in eastern QUANG TRI (P). On 6 April a series of mortar and ground attacks were made against friendly installations in QUANG TRI City, at LA VANG (YD 345505) and at HAI LANG and TRIEU PHONG District Headquarters in the same area. These actions included entry, by an unknown

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number of VC, into the QUANG TRI City Provincial jail where over 200 prisoners were set free. At LA VANG, enemy action consisted of a short mortar attack followed by a ground assault. Friendly elements stood their ground, firing 105mm howitzers at point blank range and calling artillery down on their own positions. Casualties to both sides were heavy. The 4th Bn, 2nd ARVN Regt moving in as a reaction force gained contact with an estimated VC company, inflicting moderate casualties on the enemy. One of the three PW's taken in this action - the only one who was not seriously wounded - stated that he was a member of the ONG KY Bn which had recently infiltrated into the eastern portion of QUANG TRI (P). An additional report obtained from the QUANG TRI Province Chief indicated that the 814th Bn had participated in the action along with several local force units. Recent interrogation of other PWs taken during February and March when considered with the previously mentioned information tends to confirm the location of the 814th Bn in this general area. In the vicinity of (YD 3260) on 7 April, the 2nd Bn, 1st ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated enemy battalion which appeared to be withdrawing from the scene of the previous days action. A fire fight followed but the VC broke contact and fled. Elsewhere in coastal QUANG TRI (P) the enemy maintained pressure through small scale harassing attacks against more isolated RF, PF and RD elements.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. There was a definite increase in the tempo of enemy activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P), especially when compared to the level of action noted in the same area over the past four weeks.

On 4 April in the vicinity of (XD 615390) during Operation BIG HORN, elements of 1st Bn, 9th Marines engaged an estimated VC company. Following a sharp fight the VC withdrew. Enemy casualties were six VC KIA (Conf) and 40 VC KIA (Prob). Two mining incidents were reported at (YD 674370) and (YD 599303) on 5 and 7 April; one involved an ARVN element, the other a civilian bus. The latter incident resulted in heavy civilian casualties. At (YD 610313) on 6 April, an unknown number of VC destroyed an unguarded bridge on Highway 1.

On 6 April an estimated enemy battalion hit PK 17 (YD 645277). The action, following a familiar pattern, involved a preliminary mortar attack preceding a ground assault which eventually penetrated the position. The VC were subsequently forced to withdraw. Moderate enemy casualties resulted while friendly casualties were heavy. Documents found after the attack identified the 800th Main Force Bn of the 6th Regt. In addition the C.12 Sapper Co was listed as a supporting element.

On 3 April, in HUE City, an unknown number of VC assassinated four civilians, one of whom was a hamlet chief, two were ARVN soldiers and the fourth a former GVN employee. East of HUE City on the same date, the 1st Bn, 3rd ARVN Regt (LAM SON 142) gained contact with an estimated VC company. Heavy fire was exchanged and the VC broke contact and withdrew. Enemy casualties were moderate. On 5 April in the vicinity of (YD 729201), the LONG PHU RF/PF Training Center received 60 rounds of mortar fire followed by a ground attack in which the VC utilized satchel charges after

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penetrating the compound. Although a reaction element moved promptly, contact was not gained with the VC who had hastily withdrawn. Elsewhere in the same general vicinity, VC initiated activity was limited to light harassing action against small security elements.

Ground reconnaissance deployed west of HUE City and along the western approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR reported insignificant sightings of the enemy.

There was an increase of enemy small scale harassing activity within the PHU BAI TAOR which reflected an overall rise in the tempo of enemy action along the THUA THIEN coastal lowland.

Southeast of the TAOR between PHU BAI and DANANG the enemy maintained his approach to terrorism through use of mines. Three such incidents occurred on 3 and 4 April in the vicinity of (2D 013028). To the east of this location and at (2D 197010) small numbers of VC attacked RF and PF elements guarding two bridges along Highway 1. In both cases the VC were driven off. Two acts of sabotage occurred at (AU 808010) and (AT 876952) where unknown numbers of VC blew two railway bridges.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance deployed within the northwest portion of the DANANG TAOR and west of the boundary reported negative enemy activity. Reconnaissance south of the TAOR reported total sightings of approximately 50 of the enemy. This number represents a sharp drop over last week when 240 VC were sighted. Reconnaissance patrols called artillery fire which inflicted moderate casualties on the enemy.

Operation DIXIE underway in the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR (AT 9641) reported light contact with the enemy.

There was a slight decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the DANANG TAOR. No hard pattern or concentration of activity was noted although the number of mine and booby trap incidents remained high.

The sector south of HOI AN continued to be active though not at the level experienced two and three weeks ago. The majority of incidents centered in this locale were minor and consisted of small scale harassing and probing attacks against RF and PF elements. One mining incident occurred at (BT 120488) on 3 April. A civilian bus was destroyed; one civilian was killed and one wounded.

Operation CANYON continued in the vicinity of (BT 2151) and for the period 2 through 8 April had accounted for 64 VC KIA (Conf) and 10 KIA (Prob).

On 3 April a CIDG patrol out of the KHAM DUC Camp made contact with an estimated VC platoon at (2C 109219). The enemy sustained one VC KIA (Conf) and one PW as a result of the contact. The captive, a young Vietnamese woman, stated that she had been a VC prisoner and that, on 30 March, she had observed approximately 200 or 300 NVA soldiers moving east through the same general area. She further stated that villagers in the vicinity had

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referred to the group as the 1st or 2nd Regt. There is no intelligence available which would either confirm or deny the woman's statement.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. The tempo of enemy activity in eastern QUANG TIN (P) remained essentially the same as that reported last week. At (BT 185455) on 6 April and in proximity to the 39th ARVN Ranger Bn, an AO brought in an airstrike against approximately 50 VC. Following the strike a ranger element swept the area and confirmed 17 VC KIA.

Other significant activity was centered in the vicinity west of TAM KY City. On 2 April a platoon from the 925th RF Co while guarding a bridge was attacked by an estimated company of VC (BT 276262). On the same date and to the south two companies of the 3rd Bn, 5th ARVN Regt in night defensive positions three kilometers west of TAM KY City were attacked by an estimated two VC companies. Following a heavy fire fight the VC pulled back. Friendly casualties were moderate, enemy casualties 50 VC KIA (Conf). ARVN reported that documents taken during the action indicated the enemy unit as the 72nd VC Bn supported by local force elements. This particular sector is considered a normal operating area for the unit. To the east and at (BT 346270) on 2 April, a PF platoon carried out a night raid on a small number of the enemy. The VC sustained five KIA (Conf) and two individual weapons were captured. In TAM KY City a small group of VC detonated an explosive next to the house of a GVN employee. Five Vietnamese were wounded and several houses damaged. During their withdrawal the VC abducted two civilians.

Ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy.

There was a slight decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the CHU LAI TAOR. At (BT 486096), (BS 575940) and (BS 496932), RD Teams 11, 16 and 25 were harassed by small numbers of the enemy. Friendly casualties were light, the enemy unknown.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Over the reporting period there was a sharp increase in enemy initiated activity in eastern QUANG NGAI (P). The sector immediately southeast of the CHU LAI TAOR in eastern SON TINH (D) witnessed a small concentration of enemy harassing and probing activity against ARVN and RF elements. West of this location and approximately five kilometers west of SON TINH (V) one company of the 1st Bn, 7th ARVN Regt was ambushed by an estimated VC company. A heavy fire fight ensued and an airstrike was called in which resulted in 30 KIA (Conf). The sector in northern MO DUC (D) saw a concentration of enemy action. At (BS 695685) in the vicinity of TU NGHIA (V) an unknown number of VC abducted a village council candidate and while leaving the area attempted to destroy two small bridges. To the south and on 7 April two PF squads guarding a bridge were attacked by an estimated VC company. Artillery was fired in support of the PF's and a fire fight followed. The VC were successful in destroying the bridge. Friendly casualties were moderate, the enemy unknown.

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At (BS 660603) the HOA VINH OP manned by an RF company was attacked and temporarily overrun by an estimated enemy battalion. The VC reportedly employed tear gas and utilized a flame thrower. Supporting artillery and air were called in resulting in 80 VC KIA (Conf). A document taken off a dead VC identified the participating unit as the 95th Bn, 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div. It now appears that elements of the 2nd Regt are operating in the northern MO DUC and NGHIA HANH Districts. Other enemy activity in this same general vicinity consisted of light probing and harassing actions against friendly security elements.

Ground reconnaissance deployed within a four kilometer radius of (BS 6556) in northern MO DUC (D) reported total sightings of approximately 130 VC. Again supporting artillery inflicted moderate casualties on the enemy. Operation DESOTO continued with light contact until its termination on 7 April. On 6 and 7 April at (BS 660603) and (BS 810372), two RD teams were attacked by small enemy elements. Friendly casualties were light, the enemy unknown.

CIDG patrols from the GIA VUC Camp engaged platoon sized enemy elements on 5 and 7 April at (BS 405270) and (BS 421273). Enemy casualties were unknown.

An analysis of intelligence information pertaining to QUANG NGAI (P) continues to indicate the presence of sizeable enemy force and a continuing possibility of further enemy action.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period totaled 367 and consisted of two assaults by fire, three attacks, three ambushes, 63 mine/booby trap incidents, 142 small unit engagements, eight acts of sabotage and 146 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) 70mm Japanese Howitzer Round. On 19 March and again on 31 March, a booby trapped 70mm round was discovered in the Operation CHINOOK area at (YD 537267). These are the first such rounds reported in I Corps. Characteristics of the round are as follows:

- (a) Manufacturer: Japan (type 92)
- (b) Diameter of round: 70mm.
- (c) Length: Nine and one quarter inches.
- (d) Weight: Eight and three quarter lbs.

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(e) Fusing: Type 88 (brass).

(f) Color: Black with red band (with one copper rotating band).

(g) Delivery Weapon: Howitzer.

Although no reports have been received of the VC employing the Japanese howitzer in I Corps, an exact CHICOM copy does exist and is reportedly in the VC weapons inventory.

The round discovered by 2nd Bn, 9th Marines on the 31st had the nose fuse removed and replaced with a pull type release mechanism which was to be activated by a trip wire. The 70mm round is very easily armed and does not require firing to do so, making it easily adaptable as an explosive device against troops and light vehicles.

(2) VC Tilt Rod Mine. For details see Annex B.

e. Negative.

f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
29 Mar	(YD 464242)	Political Prison Camp	Interrogation Report; F/3
29 Mar	(YD 497254)	Liaison Station	Interrogation Report; F/3
3 Apr	(BT 017417)	Ammunition/Food Storage	Agent Report; F/3
3 Apr	(BT 048448)	VC Hospital and Rest Camp	Agent Report; C/6

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Enemy AA fire incidents decreased during this reporting period when compared to the last. A total of 146 incidents were reported with 36 aircraft sustaining 68 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9568), (BS 7288), (BS 7786), (BS 7883), (BS 7884) and (BS 7885). No confirmed cases of 12.7mm fire were reported.

i - l. Negative.

m. Biological, Chemical, Electronic or Radiological Warfare.

(1) A report received from I FFORCEV revealed that, between 0050H and 0140H on 6 April, the mortar platoon of the 3d Bn, 8th Inf, 4th Inf Div, located at (YA 775223) was attacked by an enemy employing chemical agents.

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Limited laboratory analysis, smell, color and effects on personnel identified the agent employed as CS. A sweep of the area resulted in the discovery of 12 dark gray plastic packages (four inches by six inches) and four VN soft drink bottles. A white powder with a greenish tint was contained in both the packages and bottles. It appeared that the packets were opened and the powder shaken into the wind. A piece of paper found near the CS pouches contained the following instructions in Vietnamese: "This toxic chemical should be stored in a dry and cool place. During shipment avoid friction because this container is easily torn. When using pay attention to direction of wind to ensure safety."

n - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities

(1) QUANG TRI (P). A substantial reconnaissance effort was concentrated north of THON SON LAM, south of the western portion of Route 9 and west of the KHE SANH combat base. A total of approximately 150 NVA or VC were sighted at scattered points over the period. Four contacts were gained by patrol elements, three in an area centered on (XD 9060), in proximity to the DMZ, and the fourth at (XD 9132) south of Route 9.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Ground reconnaissance deployed along the western approaches to HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported very light sightings of the enemy.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Negative activity was reported by reconnaissance patrols in the northwest portion of the DANANG TAOR and west of the TAOR boundary. Reconnaissance patrols south of the TAOR reported a total of approximately 50 VC throughout the area. This number represented a sharp decrease in enemy activity in this general area particularly when compared to the sightings and contacts which have occurred over the past five weeks.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy movement and activity noted all along the western approaches to the CHU LAI TAOR continued to be light. Nothing of significance was reported. Ground reconnaissance centered in the vicinity of (BS 6556) reported a total of approximately 130 VC. Supporting artillery inflicted moderate casualties on the enemy. VC sightings in the vicinity of (BS 7545) remained light.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured in the areas indicated during the reporting period:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
6 Apr	(YD 456355)	176 (destroyed)	2nd Bn, 9th Marines
8 Apr	(BT 212532)	2000	1st Bn, 1st Marines

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3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORSa. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period were substantially less than during the previous reporting period and were 260 KIA, 343 KIA (Prob), 72 VC PW, one NVA PW and two VC returnees. Weapons losses were 70 individual and three crew served weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. From 1 through 3 April light southwesterly winds aloft produced clear weather conditions over the entire I Corps Tactical Zone. Moderate haze restricted visibility to a minor extent. On 4 April a low level convergence with an approaching but weak cold front joined with a shallow low east of CHU LAI. This condition created extensive cloudiness over the entire coastal portion of the I CTZ. For the remainder of the period a stratus and fog condition persisted during the morning and early afternoon. By the middle of the afternoon a rise in temperature resulted in general clearing. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	86	89	86	86
Low	72	73	74	74
Rainfall (total)	.02	.00	.00	.00
Visibility (miles)	6	5	7	7
Winds (knots)	7	6	6	6

k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex C.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.

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5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 13-67.

a. Change paragraph 5.d. of III MAF PERINTREP 13-67 to read: "The relative probability of adoption of these capabilities is as follows: (10), (6), (5), (7), (8), (2), (1), (4), (3) and (9)."



B. S. READ
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. VC TILT ROD MINE
- C. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG FLC	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CO 366TH TFW	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO RLT 26	1
COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CTG 79.5	1
CMC (CODE AO2)	2	CTG 79.4	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CTG 76.4	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
CG 1ST MARDIV	50	CO 525TH MI GP	3
CG 3RD MARDIV	30	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	3
CG TASK FORCE OREGON	5	CO 282D AVN CO	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 8TH RR FU	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 9TH MAB	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5	III MAF	10
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1		

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO.14 -67.

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 082400H APR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE			
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	TOTAL	TOTAL
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	885					1	885
Divisions (Hq)	3	2,000					3	2,000
Regiments (Hq)	6	2,194	2	1,300			8	3,494
Battalions (Infantry)	17	8,033	12	4,631	6	2,050	35	14,714
Battalions (other)	10	2,240	3	1,275			13	3,515
Separate Companies					26	2,535	26	2,535
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		16,002		7,206		4,585		27,793
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	Unk					1	Unk
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					4	350	4	350
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						750		750
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
COMBINED TOTAL STRENGTH		16,502		7,260		6,235		29,933

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2. NUMBER OF NVA/VC BATTALIONS BY TYPE (All Battalions)

<u>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</u>				<u>COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS</u>											
		<u>INF</u>	<u>SAPPER</u>	<u>ARTY</u>	<u>MORT</u>	<u>AAA</u>	<u>RR</u>	<u>AT</u>	<u>ENGR</u>	<u>TRANS</u>	<u>SIG</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>Sub-totals</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>	
NVA:	Confirmed	17	0	1	1	2	1		2		2	1	27		
	Probable	0	0										0		
	Possible	0	0					1		1			2		
	NVA Totals													29	
VC MF:	Confirmed	12	2						1				15		
	Probable	0	0										0		
	Possible	0	0										0		
	VC MF Totals													15	
VC LF:	Confirmed	6	0										6		
	Probable	0	0										0		
	Possible	2	0										2		
	VC LF Totals													8	
<u>GRAND TOTALS</u>														52	

NOTE: Totals include units of 324B Div and 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div.

3. (C) ESTIMATED IRREGULAR FORCES STRENGTH AS OF 17 FEB 67.

PROVINCES	GUERRILLA FORCES EST STRENGTH	SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH	SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES EST STRENGTH	TOTAL STRENGTH
QUANG TRI	2,274	4,687	937	7,898
THUA THIEN	2,807	7,988	1,597	12,392
QUANG NAM	4,601	13,026	2,606	20,233
QUANG TIN	3,324	8,809	1,761	13,894
QUANG NGAI	4,134	13,516	2,703	20,353
TOTAL STRENGTH	17,140	48,026	9,604	74,770

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4. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 082400H APR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECT</u>	<u>ACCEPTED LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST VALID REPORT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
341st Div #1	NVA	C	9,875#2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Vinh Linh SS.	13Mar67
1st Bn	NVA	C	456		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 164686	13Mar67
1st Co(K-1)	NVA	C	108				
2nd Co(K-2)	NVA	C	106				
3rd Co(K-3)	NVA	C	108				
4th Co(K-4)	NVA	C	100				
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 9661 (Hill 360)	13Mar67
5th Co(K-5)	NVA	C	180			Cua Valley	13Mar67
6th Co(K-6)	NVA	C	140			XD 7834	13Mar67
7th Co(K-7)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
8th Co(K-8)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 1072	13Mar67
9th Co(K-9)	NVA	C	180				
10th Co(K-10)	NVA	C	140				
11th Co(K-11)	NVA	C	140				
12th Co(K-12)	NVA	C	140				
32nd Regt	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Nghe An (P) (?)	13Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
33rd Regt	NVA	PR	2,625		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	825		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	C-2	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661 - XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,984	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	3 km Radius YD 0572	4Mar67
Regt Hq and Spt	NVA	C	794		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0864	2Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	250	C-4	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 063682	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C				YD 102632	1Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
3rd Co	NVA	C				YD 081665	4Mar67
4th Co (Support)	NVA	C					
5th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 070685	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C					12Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C					
3rd Co	NVA	C				Area YD 0768	4Mar67
4th Co	NVA	C					
6th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0768	4Mar67
U/I Wire Co	NVA	PO				YD 075665	3Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		31Mar67
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280		DMZ Area	YD 0768	4Mar67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	YD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	440	C-2	YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist and coastal area	18Mar67
814th Bn	NVA	C	493#3	C-2	Hai Lang (D)	Area YD 3350	6Apr67
H.99 Co	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	10Mar67
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66
K.400 Co	LF	C	120		Gio Linh (D)	YD 3172	17Feb67

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	885#4		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
C.11 Intel Co	NVA	C	105		Base 114		27Jun66
C.12 Sapper Co	NVA	C	100		Base 114	YD 645277	6Apr67
C.13 Comm Co	NVA	C	150		Base 114		27Jun66
C.14 Engr Co	NVA	C	140		Base 114	Phong Dien(D)	27Jun66
C.15 AA Co	NVA	C	80		Base 114	YD 455240	21Feb67
C.16 Mort Co	NVA	C	70		Base 114		6Jan67
C.17 RR Co	NVA	C	90		Base 114		6Jan66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,465		Thua Thien(P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		YD 5720		
800th Bn	MF	C	311#5		Phong Dien(D)	YD 645277	6Apr67
1st Co	MF	C	82			YD 645277	6Apr67
2nd Co	MF	C	80			YD 645277	6Apr67
3rd Co	MF	C	67			YD 645277	6Apr67
4th Co	MF	C	82			YD 645277	6Apr67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400		YD 6318	ZC 0598	24Feb67
1st Co	MF	C	100				
2nd Co	MF	C	100				
3rd Co	MF	C	100				
4th Co	MF	C	100				

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
806th Bn	NVA	C	400		YD 5642	YD 465330	18Mar67
1st Co	NVA	C	100				
2nd Co	NVA	C	100				
3rd Co	NVA	C	100				
4th Co	NVA	C	100				
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc(D)	YC 904995	18Jan67
1st Co	MF	C	100			Phu Loc(D)	29Dec66
2nd Co	MF	C	100			YD 923210	29Dec66
3rd Co	MF	C	100			Phu Loc(D)	29Dec66
4th Co	MF	C	100			YD 935995	29Dec66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 700300	YD 700304	26Mar67
K.105th Co	LF	C				YD 700304	26Mar67
K.106th Co	LF	C				YD 700304	26Mar67
K.107th Co	LF	C					3Feb67
K.109th Co	LF	C					10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	100		YD 6530	YD 640314	26Mar67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412	Huong Tra(D)	28Dec66
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Thu(D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,250	C-2	Que Son(D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son(D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	300		Que Son(D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	250		Que Son(D)	AT 8554	16Mar67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	250	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	BT 1149	24Mar67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	C-2	ZC 135280	AT 921673	31Mar67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 0848	6Mar67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Hoa Hieu Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	C-3	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
GK31 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
GK32 Bn	NVA	C	220	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
GK30 Bn	NVA	C	220		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
GK40 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	120	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 902215	16Mar67
2nd Bn, (3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	C-2	Thang Binh (D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	C-2	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	MF	C	90	C-2	Tam Ky (D)	BT 441081	13Jan67
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov66
K.51 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.52 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
K.54 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.55 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha(D)/KONTUM (P) Border	BS 1382	25Mar67
2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460		Que Son(D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai(P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		Tra Bong(D)	BS 3782	25Mar67
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		Son Ha(D)	BS 435566	25Mar67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,880	C-3	BS 4356	BS 579498	25Mar67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 579498	
40th Bn	MF	C	280	C-3	Minh Long(D)	BS 644553	25Mar67
60th Bn	MF	C	200	C-3	BS 579498	BS 579498	25Mar67
70th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 561673	BS 561673	25Mar67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 665421	BS 665421	25Mar67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	C-3	N. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 470745	25Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
11th Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
22nd Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
33rd Bn	NVA	C	400	C-3	BS 519832	BS 519832	25Mar67
GK-33 Bn(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 4478	BS 4478	18Feb67
3rd Div Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		BS 7528	BS 7528	25Mar67
2nd Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 629364	25Mar67
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		N Mo Duc/Nghia Hanh	BS 7257	7Feb67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		N Mo Duc/Nghia Hanh	BS 660603	6Apr67
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
38th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
120th Bn #6	MF	C	500	C-2	E Son Ha (D)	Son Ha (D)	25Mar67
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	595		BS 6436	BS 6436	23Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
20th Co (Bn Hq)	MF	C	105	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
30th Co	MF	C	120	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
40th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 3377	BS 3377	23Jan67
50th Co	MF	C	100	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
60th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Son Tinh(D)	W Son Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 7743	2Mar67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS505910	31Mar67
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE #7

3rd Div #8	NVA	C	6,150		Binh Dinh		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 732079	27Feb67
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Nov66
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7610	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
18th Regt.	NVA	C	750		Binh Dinh	BR 9876	12Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300	C-3	Binh Dinh	BR 9876	12Mar67
7th Bn	NVA	C	145	C-3	Binh Dinh	BR 8579	6Mar67
8th Bn	NVA	C	145		Binh Dinh	BR 8579	6Mar67
9th Bn	NVA	C	160		Binh Dinh	BR 9788	6Mar67
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,050		BS 9005	BS 8716	20Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 8716	20Mar67
7th Bn	NVA	C	300		BS 9305	BS 9305	11Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	250		BS 9104	BS 8716	20Mar67
9th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 8808	BS 8716	20Mar67

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- #1. Strength figures of 341st Div are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-3.
- #3. Strength totals are adjusted for the 814th Bn to reflect the loss of 7 KIA (confirmed) during the attack against the Quang Tri area on the night of 6-7 April.
- #4. The strength total for NSR Hq has been increased by 735 NVA personnel. This increase is because of the addition to NSR Hq of its supporting companies (C-11 through C-17). These companies are confirmed.
- #5. Strength totals are adjusted for the 800th Bn to reflect the loss of 54 (51 KIA confirmed and 3 PW's) personnel during the attack against the PK-17 area on the night of 6-7 April.
- #6. MR-5 rallier Huynh CU stated the 20th VMC Bn designation was now 120th Bn. VC rallier Tran Minh SI also referred to 20th Bn as 120th VMC Bn.
- #7. Information current as of 11 March 67. IFFORCEV PERINTREP 10-67 is used as reference.
- #8. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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5. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES OF 082400H Apr 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31.445 (?)		CO-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-LtCol Nguyen Trung THANH CO-Sr Capt HAI
31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong; Cong Troung 1/5	31.442 XD		
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong; Cuu Long; K101	31.443 XB		
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn); K100; Song Huong		Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	CO-AN XO-Capt TRUAT PO-SrLt TANG
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn); Thu Bong; K103	31.455 XB(?)		
K9 Co		31.456 XB		
K10 Co		31.457 XB(?)		
K11 Co		31.458 XB(?)		
K12 Co		31.459 XB(?)		
32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			
4th Bn		31.445 XB(?) 32.445 (?)		
5th Bn				
6th Bn				
33rd Regt (Hq)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?)/307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Troung 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam			CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
803rd Regt (Hq)	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn			CO-TUONG
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn			CO-Capt Tran CAN
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; 4th Regt; Ba Vi (new)		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cua Long Bn	31.620 RT		CO-Nguyen KHUONG
1st Co	Doan-1	31.621 31.621 RT		XO-Bui Dinh PHONG CO-1st Lt Le TIEN XO-Linh Xuan TIEU PO-Vo Dinh HOI
2nd Co	Doan-2	31.622 RT 31.625 RT		
3rd Co	Doan-3	31.623		CO-1st Lt Tran Xuan TOAN XO-Le Minh KOANH PO-Nguyen Ngo CHUNG
4th Co (Hvy Wpns Support)	Doan-4	31.624 RT	12-82mm Mort 6-HMG Chicom 7.62mm Type 57 9-AAMG Unk-B-10 DK-RR(82mm)	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn			CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG) PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH CO-Cao Xuan HAI
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn	31.630		
1st Co	Doan-1	31.631		
2nd Co	Doan-2	31.632		CO-1st Lt AN XO-W.O. KHA PO-1st Lt TRUC CO-1st Lt MAI XO-Lt Thai Van LAP CO-1st Lt CHUONG
3rd Co	Doan-3	31.633		
4th Co (Hvy Wpns)	Doan-4	31.634 KT		
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Luu Van MAN CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam 41.338 EQ	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG	CO-Van KIEM XO-SANH CO-THANH XO-SAM
814th Bn	K.14			
H.99 Co Trieu Phong Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist Force			CO-Vo BA PO-DUNG CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN
C.10 Co Cam Lo Co K.400 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri H30; 30H 4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Armed Co	41.344 FQ(?) 41.346 FQ(?)	Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47 3-60mm Mort 2-B-40 6-BAR's	CO-Cao TUNG CO-NGHIA CO-1st Lt DAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North	41.000 FM-		CG-MG HUM
	Div Hqtrs; Phan Khu	41.300 FM-		XO-Nguyen Van THU
6th NVA Regt Hq	Bac; K-500; Di Hai	Di Hai		PO-Le TRUONG
	Cong Truong 6; 6th			CO-Maj CUONG
	Worksite; Ham Tu;			XO-Capt AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1	1520;	9-82mm Mort	CO-Capt Nguyen DE
		Q40.700 ST	8-60mm Mort	
			3-57mm RR	
			8-B-90	
			9-B-40	
			6-MG's	
			4-75mm RR's	
1st Co	C.1	1520A BK	2-60mm Mort	CO-DE
		HAI; Q42.700ST	2-B-90	XO-Lt NHAT
		1510	2-B-40	
			5-AR	
			8-SMG	
2nd Co	C.2	Q44.700ST	2-60mm Mort	CO-Lt BIEN
		1530	2-B-40	XO-W.O. Ho Xuan DAU
			2-B-90	
			5-AR	
			8-SMG	
3rd Co	C.3	Q46.700ST	3-60mm Mort	CO-Lt HAI
		1540	2-B-90	XO-2nd Lt THANH
			2-B-40	
			5-AR	
			1-HMG	
4th Co	C.4	V.500 Di Hai	4-81mm Mort	CO-GIANG
		Q48.700ST	1-75mm RR	XO-2nd Lt NGUYEN
			4-57mm RR	
			4-MG	
802nd Bn	K.2; Van Troi Bn	Q52.700 Bac Do	4-81mm Mort	CO-THANH
	C-2; 2nd Bn(?)	1522 BK Di Hai	12-60mm Mort	
			2-75mm RR	
			3-57mm RR	
			6-B-90	
			10-B-40	
			6-AA	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co		1522 BK Di Hai	2-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 1-AA 6-B-40 2-B-90 9-AR	CO-DONG
2nd Co			1-80mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-B-40	
3rd Co			2-60mm Mort 8-B-40 3-LMG's	
4th Co				CO-W.O. CAN PO-SOAN
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D.10; 3rd(?) 80.T Bn		3-81mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 3-HMG 3-75mm RR 3-57mm RR 4-B-90 12-B-40 29-AR	CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH
1st Co	The Cong		3-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-1st Lt HUYEN PO-1st Lt CUONG
2nd Co	Truong Son		2-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-1st Lt MIEU XO-Lt DONG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Co	Ba To	41.290 BK Di Hai	1-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-Tran TOAN XO-2nd Lt CHUONG
4th Co	Bun Dien (?)	1596 BR Di Hai	3-81mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 4-81mm Mort 8-60mm Mort 4-AA 4-RR 8-B-40 1-B-90	CO-Lt HOE PO-1st Lt LUAT
804th Bn	K.4; VQ74		2-60mm Mort 9-AR 1-MG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 1-MG 1-60mm Mort 7-AR	CO-CHIE XO-Capt HUNG PO-LUYEN
1st Co				CO-THANG XO-HOANG
2nd Co				
3rd Co				CO-THANG XO-1st Lt TIEN CO-DIEN XO-2nd Lt LAC CO-Nguyen THI XO-Capt GIOI
4th Co				
810th Bn	K.10; 3rd(?)	1852 Bac Ha	3-81mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG	
K.105 Co	C.105; D.3	1847 Bac Ha 41.441 House #S.02. 900ST	3-60mm Mort 6-AR 24-SMG 2-B-40	CO-Lt Vo THONG XO-DUNG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.106 Co	C.106; K.116; K16; 106	42.442	3-60mm Mort 9-AR 3-HMG 1-B-40 1-B-90	CO-KIM XO-2nd Lt CANH
K.107 Co K.109	K.117; K.17; 107 K.119; K.19; 109	1853 Bac Ha	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-MG	CO-Nguyen Van TAI CO-1st Lt KHUONG XO-2nd Lt MINH
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG	CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		4-AR 6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH PO-SON
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG Unk-K-50	CO-SON XO-THU PO-SAM

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20.825		CO-Capt THAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn(?)		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Nguyen Trai Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung	21.341 BM Ba Ha	1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-LAM XO-THAI PO-CU
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21.395 GM Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?)	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn	2116 Quang Da	1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57mm RR 9-AR	CO-KY XO-THANH PO-UT
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Lv A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; X.55(?); Q-15; H-35; H-55; 75; 104th; X.65; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co	2105	2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Hoa Hieu Co	Hoa Hien H-41 Co; Q-16; X.66(?); H-56; 100 Co; Q-16-B Co; 76			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d; Co; Q.13; X.63; 73	2103 (?)		CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co; X-64; 74	2104 (?)		CO-MOI

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

33rd Arty Regt (Hq)	Nam Hai			
GK.31 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn;	20.800 GM	18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
GK.32 Bn GK.30 (SIG)	38AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn; RQ21 RQ22 RQ 20/A Bn; RQ.20 RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C X.72; RQ.24	1803/CH Hai Cang 20 GM 20.039 Tay An Nam Hai 21.993 Mrs Hanh	12-75mm RR	CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
GK.40 Bn (ENGR)				CO-Tran Van CAO CO-Capt THAU
72nd Bn 2nd Bn(3rd Regt)	Binh Da; X2; K-2; 74th Bn (?) A-14; V-14; A.19; K.53			
14th Co			1-60mm Mort 1-30 Cal MG 1-57mm RR (?) Unk-M-79 Unk-K-50 SMG	CO-THANH XO-Tran TIEN PO-PHUONG CO-Nguyen DUOC XO-Vo Ly TA PO-Nguyen MAI
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 706 74th Dist Force Co			
70th Co (409th Sapper Bn)	7th Co; X-70 Co	P.O. 20.142 F.G.M. Bac Hien		CO-KHOA XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Anh VU
706th Co K.51 Co	106th Co K51; 107; F-14; A.10 D-21; Thang Binh		2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 6-MG	CO-Hong LE
K.52 Co K.54 Co	D-22; A.13; V.13(?) C-73; A.16		1-60mm Mort 2-MG	
K.55 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21; A.21 Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa; H-601; F-102 KW	20.100 GM 21.900 GM Bac Hien		CO-Maj Gen Hoang Van THAI XO-LtCol Nguyen Chanh (AKA BINH) PO-Gen THAI (same as CO) Asst. PO-LtCol Tran Ba KHUE CofS-Col Le TRUC Dep CofS-LtCol Nguyen LIEN

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UNIT

2nd Div (Hq)

1st VC Regt (Hq)

40th Bn

60th Bn

70th Bn

90th Bn

21st Regt (Hq)

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

GK-33 Bn

AKA

Ham Tu 2; 620th Div;
Agricultural Site #2
Chi Lang; Ta-310;
Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2
Cong Truong 1; H-800;
108th Regt; Cuu Long
Regt; Steel Regt
Thanh Mai; Bach Dong
Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai,
3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007
Bau Bang
Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st
Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong
Hai; Bong Trang (?)
Binh-Gia
35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009;
Chu Song; Truong Son
70; Inter-mt White
Tiger Bn; F-07; 103
Oanh Gia (?); Bong
Trang
Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son
Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn;
Phi Doi 2008; Thuan
Binh; Song Hong(?)
Bach Ma; Worksite 21;
36th; A-21; Cong Truong
21; 2nd Regt; 36th
Regt; A-21; Cong Truong
7 (?)
11th Workshop; 11th Bn
135th Bn; 22nd Bn
33rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)
RQ23; RQ33; RQ330
7th Bn

LBN

20.601 GM
20.925 GM
Tay An;
41.910 KP
6000-6199

5645 Quang
Trung ST

20.735 CT
An Giang

1828/CN Hai
Cang 20; 60.620
CM Tay An

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

3-81mm Mort
4-60mm Mort
5-MG
4-57mm RR

17-81mm Mort
Unk-75mm RR
Unk-60mm Mort

6-120mm Mort

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PERSONALITIES

CG-BG VIET
XO-BG DAO
PO-BG DO

CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH
XO-LtCol Chu An TAN

CO-Nguyen MUOI

CO-SrCapt Nguyen Xuan
PHONG

CO-Nguyen Duc CONG
XO-SrCapt THUA
PO-Duan Cong THANH

CO-Ho Thanh THI
XO-Vo Ngoc CAM

CO-Pham KIET
XO-Dang Cong KICH
PO-TIEN

CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
CO-Le Van CAN
XO & CofS-Nguyen KINH
PO-Ho Duc HOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN CofS-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH CO-Maj KIM
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			
97th Bn	703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.21; H.25	6340 TL (old) 21.164 GM (new)		
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn	2048; NQ		
48th Bn	83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38 408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn (?) Q-20; X-20; T-20; 20th Bn	Ba Hao HT 2416 Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
120th Bn		20.135 GM 20.139 GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141 GM 20.144 GM Bac Hien 1291 KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa; X2424 Bac Hien Forward to Ba Hoa PO 20.142 AGM Bac Hien PO 20.142 BCM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
20th Co	X-20; 2nd Co			CO-BUU
30th Co	3rd Co; V-30 Co			CO-Dinh Dieu PHAN XO-Trinh LANH PO-NHUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Co	4th Co; V-40 Co	PO 20.142 CGM Bac Hien		CO-GIAO XO-Tuan KIET PO-Ngoc BINH CO-VAN XO-HUNG PO-LOC
50th Co	5th Co; V-50 Co	PO 20.142 DGM		XO-CONG PO-Nguyen Van LUC CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC CO-RI
60th Co	6th Co; V-60 Co	PO 20.142 EGM Bac Hien		
1506th Engr Bn	571 Unit	1289		CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU CO-MY CO-CHUNG XO-NAM PO-ANH
19th Bn 307th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 315th Bn(?); 705th Bn(?); T-21; H-40	22,422	2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 6-Carbines 3-BAR's 6-Carbines Unk-SMG Unk-K-40	CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-Dinh TAC CO-MAU
21st Co	T-21; H-40			
506 "A" Sapper Co 506 "B" Sapper Co	Unit 506 H-42	Hom Thu 21.618M		
C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Mo Duc Co; Ba To Co Duc Pho Co;			
T.18 Co P.31 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West) T.19 Co			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN
T.20 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co			
Tra Bong Co	F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	1500		CO-SrLt V. T. D. XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUYET CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM CO-CU XO-CIM
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		
90th Engr Bn	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)	7173 DS or 21.155 CM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
18th NVA Regt	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAN

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UNIT	ANA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
8th Bn	803k Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Nguyen 32; N 32; N 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANH Cofs-LUONG
9th Bn	N 9; N 33; Nguyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt	21.141VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC Cofs-Capt THANG CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM Cofs-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****6. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN I CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 012400H APR TO 082400H APR 67.****a. Quang Tri**

(1) Operation BEACON HILL (commenced 201335H Apr - terminated 010200H Apr). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation PRAIRIE III (commenced 190001H Mar - continuing).

(a) On 1 April 67 DO MAC THANG rallied to Con Thien CIDG Camp and stated he was from the 1st Plt, 1st Co, 6th Bn, 812th Regt, 324B Div.

(b) THANG stated that his company infiltrated into SVN on 12 March 67 with Group #22. Their mission was to engage U.S. Marines. On 29 March 67 his unit engaged U.S. Marines at Hill 120 (YD 065640). After the engagement, his company withdrew to the north, (approximately 292400 Mar 67). At this time THANG became separated from his unit and was lost for three days. He did not know what his unit's plans were upon withdrawal to the north of Ben Hai River.

(c) THANG gave the following information:

1. 6th Bn, 812th Regt - Located "Quyet-Thang" agricultural site, vicinity (XD 9871), Vinh-Linh Province.

2. SONG HONG unit (31st Regt, 341st Div) - Located Vinh-Linh Chap mountainous area, Vinh-Linh Province. This unit will move to Nghe-An Province for recuperation.

3. SONG-HUONG unit (90th Regt, 324B Div) - will infiltrate to SVN to replace THU BON unit (812th Regt, 324B Div), which had to go back to Quang Binh Province for recuperation.

(3) Other. Information on 814th Bn, 808th Bn, H-99 Co, C-10 Co and Trieu Phong Co.

(a) PW DI THANH HAI, captured 20 March at (YD 457490) revealed that he was a member of the 814th Bn. He was captured while looking for his unit, after becoming lost. On 19 March the battalion was located in the vicinity of (YD 495505). The battalion's present location is unknown.

(b) HAI also stated that the 814th Bn has coordinated with the 808th Bn and the H-99 Co. Their missions are to attack the Popular Forces and the Rural Pacification units and to protect the delta area.

(c) PW HAI's statement that the 808th Bn and H-99 Co are coordinating with the 814th Bn is further substantiated by the statements received from a combined interrogation report of NGUYEN VUNG and LE HUY HOI, PW's from the 808th Bn. VUNG and HOI stated that the mission of the 808th Bn was to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program.

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(d) PW PHAT captured on 24 Feb 67 at (YD 427518), stated that the 808th Bn is supported by the Trieu Phong District Force Co, the 814th Bn is supported by the H-99 Co and the C-10 Sapper Unit is divided as necessary to augment units operating the low lands area of Quang Tri Province.

(e) At 0030 on 6 April a multi battalion attack was directed against units in La Vang, Quang Tri Provincial Headquarters and the Quang Tri Citadel. A late report on 8 April from the Quang Tri Province chief stated that a document identified the 814th Bn. It appears that this action is a result of a coordinated effort of all the battalions and Local Force Companies in Trieu Phong, Mai Linh and Hai Lang Districts.

(f) Considering the information derived from the previous paragraphs, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Mission is the destruction of the Rural Development Program.

2. Coordinated planning did occur between battalions and Local Force companies in the Quang Tri area of interest.

b. Thua Thien

(1) Operation CHINOOK II (commenced 160001 Feb - terminated 042400 Apr). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation BIG HORN (commenced 050001 Apr - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(3) Other. At 0055 on 6 April 67 PK.17 vicinity (YD 645278) was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. Documents found after the attack identified the 800th MF Bn of the 6th NVA Regt and the C.12 Sapper Co, a support company under NSR, as having participated in the attack.

c. Quang Nam

(1) Operation CANYON (commenced 060700H Apr - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation DIXIE (commenced 071000H Apr - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(3) Other.

(a) Prisoners of war captured on 29 March 1967 by the 21st Ranger Bn during an enemy attack on that battalion at (BT 098508) revealed that the attacking unit was the 1st Bn, 3rd NVA Regt. These prisoners further revealed that the 24 March attack against a USMC and an ARVN convoy on highway 1 in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin border area was conducted by the 2nd Bn, 3rd NVA Regt reinforced by two companies of the R.20 Bn, with the 1st Bn, 3rd NVA Regt in reserve.

d. Quang Tin

(1) No identifications.

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(1) Operation DESOTO (commenced 26200 Jan - terminated 071200 Apr 67). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation BOONE (commenced 010700H Apr - terminated 071200 Apr 67). No identifications during the period.

(3) Other. Information on 2nd VC Regt, 3rd NVA Div.

(a) The 248th RF Co, manning an outpost at (BS 660603) was attacked and overrun by an estimated battalion. A document taken from a dead VC identified him as an assistant platoon leader of the 2nd Co, 95th Bn, 2nd VC Regt, 3rd Div.

(b) The 93rd Bn, 2nd VC Regt was identified in contact by captured documents on 7 Feb 67 at Thi Pho Outpost (BS 724575).

(c) The 2nd VC Regt had been believed to be located in the area of Base 123 since Jan 67. It appears that the regiment has relocated further north to the borders of northern Mo Duc and Nghia Hanh Districts.

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7. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

NSR HQ	6TH NVA REGT HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ	810TH LF BN
32ND NVA REGT	GK-31 BN
33RD NVA REGT (POSS 271ST REGT)	1506TH ENCR BN
34TH NVA ARTY REGT	GK-33 BN
324B NVA DIV HQ	48TH BN
803RD NVA REGT	409TH SAPPER BN

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX B (NEW WEAPON, "TILT ROD" MINE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO 14-67.**

1. The VC homemade Tilt Rod Mine was originally found on 9 December 1966 in the TAY NINH and CU CHI areas but has since become more common.
2. It is a land mine (anti-vehicular or anti-helicopter), cylindrical in shape measuring nine inches in diameter and five and one - quarter inches in height and is usually dull grey in color. This mine is of local VC construction and the filler is probably extracted from duds or captured US ordnance. The body is of light sheet metal construction and all seams are soldered. See Appendix 1.
3. The fuze, top center of the mine, is threaded into the mine (See Appendix 2) and is a tilt rod cocked striker type fuze. The fuze body is made of cast aluminum with all other parts, except the primer detachment assembly, made of steel. The fuze is armed by the removal of a safety pin. When the tilt rod is subjected to lateral movement approximately eight to 10 degrees out of the vertical position, the holding claws of the striker holding assembly releases the striker head. The striker spring draws the striker into the primer which in turn initiates the primer, detonating the explosive train. See Appendix 3.
4. The mine and the fuze are simply and efficiently constructed. The primer detonator is made from a .30 caliber carbine cartridge case with a standard U.S. No. 8 blasting cap inserted. The tilt rod has been found to have been made of either a steel rod or a bamboo stick 18 to 25 inches in length. It is considered that the sensitivity of the fuse can be increased by spreading the claws of the striker holder assembly so that they are barely holding the head of the striker. It is possible to adjust to such a sensitivity that the prop wash of a helicopter will move the rod sufficiently to trigger the mine.
5. The mine, if discovered, should be blown in place if possible. If for some reason it can not be detonated, the following steps may be taken:
 - a. Take standard mine and booby trap precautions.
 - b. Visually check to insure tilt rod is not attached to striker holder assembly. If rod is free, carefully lift the rod vertically out of the striker holder assembly.
 - c. Determine if positive safety pin hole is clear for insertion of a safety wire (approximately the size of a paper clip).
 - d. If the safety pin hole is blocked by the striker and after checking for additional booby traps, remove the mine to a safe area and detonate.

APPENDIXES


- 1 - VC TILT ROD MINE
- 2 - TILT ROD FUSE
- 3 - FUSING NOMENCLATURE

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APPENDIX 1 (VC TILT ROD MINE) TO ANNEX B TO III MAF PERINTREP 14-67



B-1-1


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APPENDIX 2 (TILT ROD MINE FUSE) TO ANNEX B TO III MAF PERINTREP 14-67



B-1-2


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APPENDIX 3 (FUSING NOMENCLATURE) TO ANNEX B TO III MAF PERINTREP 14-67



1 - STRIKER HOLDER ASSEMBLY

2 - FUSE BODY

3 - STRIKER SPRING

4 - STRIKER

5 - PRIMER DETONATOR

6 - BOOSTER

7 - SAFETY PIN

B-1-3

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ANNEX C (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION, DOCUMENT REPORT) TO III MAF
PERINTREP 14-67.

1. HAT-1, K-9 Bn, SONG HONG Regt. MSgt TRAN VAN SINH, a squad leader, HAT-1 Co, K-9 Bn, SONG HONG Regt, was captured at (YD 1065) by I Co, 3d Bn, 9th Marines on 31 March and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. His unit had the mission of attacking I Co, 3d Bn, 9th Marines position (30 March) in the vicinity of (YD 1065) immediately after the enemy's mortaring of the position. SINH was wounded during the first attack and was separated from his unit.

b. Prior to his capture his platoon was located in the vicinity of Hill 544, vicinity (YD 019594). On 30 March 1967, the HAT-1 Co and K-9 Bn was in the vicinity of DAU MAU outpost (location unknown) near a burntout Montagnard village eight or nine kilometers from Route 9.

c. SINH thought the SONG HONG Regt had four battalions and each battalion had four companies. The companies of the K-9 Bn were designated HAT-1, 2, 3 and 4.

d. The companies had 150 to 160 men each but that strengths varied because of casualties. He did not know the strength of the battalion. Each company had five light machine guns and three medium machine guns. The medium was an unknown type but described as follows: The barrel is fully perforated with a flash hider and bipod at the end; the receiver is square and loads by a flip top cover much like US .30 cal LMG and is belt fed. The exact caliber was unknown but stated to be larger than 7.62mm. The weapon was of Russian or Chinese manufacture.

e. He was drafted into the service and taken to HANOI in August 1954 and remained there until 1963. While in HANOI he was trained as a cook. He was sent to LAOS and joined the 15th Bn, Middle LAOS Regt where he cooked until four months prior to coming to SVN. Also at that time he was given a squad and promoted to MSgt. He was not given a more responsible job because he lacked field experience. The platoon of which he was a member in LAOS was composed of 12 men from SVN and 33 from NVN. Their mission was to fight with the LAOS force in the COM COT (D) and MAHASAY area.

f. He received orders along with three other NCO's to report to SVN. On 1 March he and 30 other men departed LAOS and arrived in the DAU MAU Region on 6 March. They remained in that vicinity until 27 March, at which time his platoon moved to positions on Hill 544. His platoon remained there until 29 March and then proceeded to the vicinity of (YD 1065).

g. He stated morale was low but could give no reason.

(G-2 Comment: F/6 for overall report because of insufficient information to adequately evaluate. However, F/3 for the information pertaining to the PW's organization, K-9 Bn (AKA 9th Bn), 90th Regt, 324B Div. According

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to rallier NGUYEN MINH HOA, C-18th Transportation Co, 812th Regt, 324B Div, there is a 9th Bn operating with the subordinate battalions (4th, 5th and 6th) of the 812th Regt.)

2. 1st Co, 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 1st Div. Pvt DINH VAN CHAM (Plt Corpsman), 2d Sqd, 1st Plt, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 1st Div was captured on 29 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. CHAM received 18 months of training in three stages after voluntarily joining the NVA in HANOI in February 1965. The first three months of stage one covered general first aid practices and was held in the HANOI center. The second part of stage one consisted of three months of infantry training in HUNG YEN (P), NVN. The second stage consisted of six months training in night attacks and mountain fighting which was conducted in HOA BINH (P), NVN. The third stage commenced in January 1966 as the unit (7th Bn, 64th Regt, 320th Div) started moving south through LAOS. This training consisted of attacking fortified positions, ambushes and jungle fighting. While moving through LAOS, everyone brought full field packs, clothing, food and weapons. All required food supplies were purchased from the people. The unit was never bombed but there were large quantities of leaflets all along the route. Highway 9 was only used for about 15 days of the trip, and trails and streams were followed for the remainder.

b. After arriving in QUANG NGAI (P) (BS 424772) in late May or early June 1966, the unit, consisting of approximately 500 men, was designated the 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 1st Div. In late June 1966, the unit moved to QUANG NAM (P) (AT 9136) and operated from various locations within a six kilometer radius until late 1966. During January and February 1967 the battalion reorganized and trained in the jungle at an unknown location. They moved to BINH DINH (V) (location unknown) and then conducted the recent engagement against the ARVN Rangers (BT 102511) on 29 March 1967.

c. When the battalion breaks contact from an operation, it exfiltrates in small groups to SON TAY (V) (AT 950280) and SON PHUC (V) (AT 918365) to regroup prior to moving to the jungle (location unknown) to prepare for subsequent operations. There is an ammunition dump in SON TAY (V) but the main ammo dump is at an unknown location in the jungle. All weapons and equipment come from the north to this point and all broken equipment is sent there for repair. Medical supplies come from CHINA and NVN to a central distribution point (location unknown) and then distributed to smaller depots.

d. The strength of the 1st Bn was 250 to 300 men. The company normally has 100 to 120 men. There are three regiments in the division, three battalions in a regiment, four companies in a battalion, four platoons in a company and three squads per platoon. The 4th Company is a mortar unit and each of the 4th platoons is a fire support platoon. The 1st Co has six BAR's, six SMG's, six 60 and 61mm mortars and six B-40's. The 2d Co has four 82mm mortars, five or six 61mm mortars and two 81mm mortars. The 1st Bn has two MG's, 18 60 and 61mm mortars, two 75mm DKZ's and an unknown number of B-40's.

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e. The 1st Bn is in upper QUANG TIN and lower QUANG NAM Provinces for the support of QUANG NAM (P). The 1st Co is located in SON TONG (V) (AT 970302) and SON KHANH (V) (AT 978370). The 2d Co is located in SON TAY (V) (AT 970280). The 3d Co is in THUAN TONG (V) (location unknown). The companies are spread out one or two hamlets apart. The 3d Bn is located in SON PHUC (V) (AT 918365) and SON THACH (V) (AT 956322). AKA's are 1st Div - NOUNG TRUONG; 31st Regt - CONG TRUONG and XUONG; and 1st Bn - 2805 HK or HL. LBN's use the parent battalion designator and add the company number on the end, e.g., 1.1 - 1st Co, 1st Bn; 1.2 - 2d Co, 1st Bn.

(G-2 Comment: F/3. Possible that all battalions of the 3d Regt are under-strength. Organization of the 1st Bn is believed to be three companies although there has been one other report of four companies. First report of AKA's and LBN'S.)

3. TRUNG LUONG (D), QUANG TRI (P) Guerrilla. LE DONG (AKA LE XUAN CHU), a TRUNG LUONG (D) guerrilla, rallied to ARVN at GIO MON (H) (YD 2275) on 29 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. DONG was a member of a liaison team sent to CAM PHO (H) (YD 2376) to collect guerrilla and VC administrative rosters. His units mission was to fight when the enemy comes to TRUNG GIANG (V).

b. The TRUNG GIANG (V) guerrillas are located in CAT SON (H) (YD 250800) and all the hamlets of this village have guerrillas. There are 60 village guerrillas, three groups of 20 men each.

c. He had 35 days of training which included political indoctrination, civil affairs, weapons, crawling, digging and camouflage.

d. He saw one company NVA (100 men) on 28 March 1967 armed with six 82mm mortars (one damaged). Each man carried three rounds of 82mm ammunition.

e. There are 18 hamlet guerrillas armed with K-44s and one SMG in CAM PHO (H) (YD 2376). Prepared positions, possible mortar locations for future attacks, are located at (YD 231769), (YD 229767) and (YD 235762).

f. Food is in short supply and guerrillas must borrow rice from the people. Guerrillas have no medicine.

(G-2 Comment: F/3.)

4. An agent report, from a coded source evaluated as B-3, refers to a VC meeting for company, battalion commanders and administrative representatives of QUANG TRI (P) held at (YD 248420) on 16 March 1967. During the meeting the following orders were given:

a. All the bridges on Highway 1 between MY CHANH (YD 460400) and DONG HA are to be destroyed.

b. Allied units are to be attacked separately.

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c. Some guerrillas are to be selected and transferred to main force units and some self defense members are to be selected and transferred to guerrilla units.

d. The VC 808th and 814th Battalions are to coordinate and attack Allied military posts throughout QUANG TRI (P).

(G-2 Comment: F/3 for the overall report, except that portion pertaining to the 808th and 814th Bns which is F/2. These units are reportedly responsible for the attacks on QUANG TRI CITADEL, MACV Compound (QUANG TRI), LA VANG and PK 17, early on the morning of 6 April.)

5. An agent report evaluated as F/3 related that the VC QUANG NAM (P) Committee has ordered several VC District and Village Committees to select a number of young men to establish a suicide battalion. The activities of these men will take place in DIEN BAN (D), QUANG NAM (P). The mission is to neutralize government pacification operations in the Marble Mountain and prosperous QUANG NAM (NGU HANH SON) areas.

(G-2 Comment: F/6.)

6. The following communique was captured at (AT 805545) by units of the 1st Marine Division on 17 March 1967 and pertains to use of GRAVEL:

Sent to: Farm 31 (division/regiment possibly) and all V's belonging to the farm (Div).

At the present, the enemy are using planes to drop triangle shaped mines (60 by 80 by 100 cm), wrapped with green cotton in order to blend with the trees.)

They have a cover that explodes. The big part of it will explode if it meets with friction or if one kicks it, it will explode and the killing area is from the knee to the foot.

Solution, method of: When there is an airplane (fighter) flying around and you can hear a sound resembling an airplane up above but cannot see it dropping bombs but when it can be seen you should immediately don't go rushing around but organize in order to investigate.

When finding a mine, one can take another route and bypass it, organize to explore it or take it away. When trying to take it away, use a small shovel with a three meters length handle, dig in with it carefully. The shovel must go in deep so as not to touch it with the explosive bag. After that, lay the explosive bag on one side then carefully fill that hole back. You can use one three meter length stick, in standing or prone position and hit that mine to make it explode. The injury effective radius of the mine is from one and a half to two meters. At the present, there is a unit that has used that method to clear the mine and had results.

Thus, the council of the II Farm (Div) announced to all units how to protect themselves, putting to use those measures in order to clear the mines and then report to higher headquarters.

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All units receiving this communique, publicise it to all soldiers so they can have it in order to act.

7. A document taken from a VC KIA as a result of a G Co, 2nd Bn, 4th Marines ambush at (AT 921673) on 31 March reveals the plan of attack on HOA CAM ARVN Training Center, as follows:

a. Purpose:

(1) According to the requirements of the QUANG DA area, we must support the political struggles of HOA VANG area and revenge for people who were killed by the American empire.

(2) Attack them at the rear, make them unable to defend. Make them move to the north so we can attack them at the east.

b. Request: Transmit this order. Work hard to complete this problem very soon. Be united while fighting or withdrawing. Do not leave any casualties (killed or wounded) and especially weapons.

c. Problems: Most of the new troops are very slow while moving and fighting. Near by the enemy locations, they usually set up ambushes and their airplanes, artillery, etc. are ready. Also, we do not have many people like villagers. We do not have any support units.

d. Superiorities: We have a big campaign about soldier training so everyone wants to fight. We won the battles so many times.

e. Duties:

(1) Use three 81mm mortars and some of the 120mm rounds to shoot at the area of HOA CAM Training Center of DONG HOA (H), HOA THO (V), trained by American advisors. Destroy some of their recruits, houses, instruments.

Width: 200 meters

Length: 400 to 500 meters

(2) They have four Ranger companies to defend about 500 trainees. Six 105mm recoilless rifles are there. The height of houses is 1.2 meters. They are training from 0600H to 1630H daily. Each gun has 42 rounds, one of them has 43.

8. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN AN (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN ANH (C)	28MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS879335/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN BINH (R)	24MAR67	RETURNEE		PHO BINH(V) HQ
TRAN BOI (C)	22MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/USOM HOSP
NGUYEN CAM (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DING CHAI (C)	2APR67	CAC	CIV DEF	BT613011/BINH SON(D) HQ
DING VAN CHAM (C)	29MAR67	UNK	1ST DIV	UNK/PW III MAF
NGUYEN CHANG (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHAU (C)	27MAR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT383238/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHO (C)	27MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS794387/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHUNG (C)	13MAR67	B/1/1	CIV DEF	BT118629/I CORPS CCC
PHAM CO (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN CU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DUONG CUNG (C)	24MAR67	F/2/1	CIV DEF	BT062283/I CORPS CCC
LE DAN (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DAN (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN DINH (C)	24MAR67	F/2/1	CIV DEF	BT062283/FURTHER INTER
NGUYEN DU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DI GIAI (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRUONG NANG (C)	26MAR67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	BS832392/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN HAU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE HIER (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE TAN HIEP (C)	29MAR67	H/2/7	CIV DEF	UNK/9 ITT
NGUYEN HOANH	25MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT072612/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN VAN HOC (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRUONG HOE (C)	26MAR67	1/5	CIV DEF	HILL 54/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI HUYNH (C)	30MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS702948/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN KAN (C)	31MAR67	1/7	CIV DEF	AN LOC/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI KE (C)	26MAR67	H/2/7	CIV DEF	BS550910/BINH SON(D) HQ
DOUNG KHANH (C)	29MAR67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	TUYET DIEM(D)/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE KIA (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN LANG (C)	25MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT0748/QUE SON(D) HQ
NGO THI LAM (C)	25MAR67	PF	CIV DEF	BS563907/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN LAM (C)	29MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BS8434/1ST MED BN
HO LE (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN LIEN (C)	31MAR67	H/2/7	CIV DEF	BS505910/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN LUC (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
MAI LUONG (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VO LUC (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN MINH LY (C)	13MAR67	UNK	341ST DIV	YD164686/SAIGON
NGUYEN MAN (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN MAN (C)	25MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS864363/DUC PHO(D) HQ
BA XUAN MANH (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN CHANH MINH (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN MOI (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN DUC MOT (C)	24MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT003544/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI MUC (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DANG THI MUON (C)	27MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	LAM BINH/DUC PHO(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN THI NAY (C)	29MAR67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	TUYET DIEM(H)/BINH SON(D)HQ
LE VAN NGHIA (C)	30MAR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS698955/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE NGHIEU (C)	25MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHA (C)	27MAR67	E/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
LE NHU (C)	27MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS794387/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DON HUNG (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NUT (C)	25MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS864363/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HO PHONG (C)	25MAR67	M/3/1	CIV DEF	BT084450/QUE SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHUC (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN VAN PHO (C)	25MAR67	E/3/7	CHIEU HOI	BS502947/CHIEU HOI QNAM
DINH QUA (C)	29MAR67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	TUYET DIEM(H)/BINH SON(D)HQ
HUYNH THI QUA (C)	25MAR67	PF	CIV DEF	BS563907/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN QUI (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
CU THI RAY (C)	25MAR67	PF	CIV DEF	BS653907/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHA XUAN RI (C)	UNK	UNK		CHIEU HOI NUI DAU
PHAM SANH (C)	27MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN SAU (C)	27MAR67	L/3/7	CIV DEF	LAM BINH/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HO SON (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS658351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM TAI (C)	UNK	7TH ENGR BN	DET LABOR	UNK/UNK
HO TANH (C)	25MAR67	PF	CIV DEF	BS563907/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGO BAN TAM (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
DANG TAU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN THANG (C)	25MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	UNK/DOC PHO(D) HQ
BIEN THON (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VO TIEN (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN TIEP (C)	25MAR67	M/3/1	CIV DEF	BT076473/QUE SON(D) HQ
TRUONG TIER (C)	25MAR67	I/3/7	CIV DEF	BS879335/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH HGOC THACH (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN THE (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VO THIEU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRINH THOI (C)	25MAR67	PF	CIV DEF	BS563907/BINH SON(D) HQ
HUYNH TO (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VO THOI (C)	26MAR67	H/2/7	CIV DEF	BS550910/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI THU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
VO TINH (C)	27MAR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT383238/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN TINH (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
HUYNH TO (C)	29MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BS8434/1ST MED BN
NGUYEN VAN TRU (R)	UNK	CHIEU HOI		CHIEU HOI/NUI DAU
PHAM TRU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN TRUNG (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN TUNG (C)	26MAR67	B/1/5	CIV DEF	BS690925/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN THI TUYET (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN VACH (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAM XIN (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN XINH (C)	29MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BS8434/1ST MED BN
VO XU (C)	27MAR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS835351/DUC PHO(D) HQ

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ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREF NO. 14-67

1. GENERAL. VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level, although incidents involving terrorism continued at a significant rate. Major acts of terrorism included the kidnapping of thirteen candidates for the hamlet elections, the assassination of four individuals, and the burning of a refugee village.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. A 3 April report from the 1st Military Police Battalion related that on 30 March the VC had sent twelve female cadre to HOA VANG (D) and DANANG City. Reportedly, the women speak excellent English. (CI Comment: While the mission of these cadres is unknown, many previous reports have indicated that the VC were giving female espionage agents English language training.)

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	6Apr	Highway partially destroyed	YD 350512
THUA THIEN	1Apr	Highway partially destroyed	ZD 014028
THUA THIEN	2Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	AU 808010
THUA THIEN	2Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	AU 814009
THUA THIEN	2Apr	Highway culvert destroyed	YD 610312
QUANG NAM	6Apr	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 122483
QUANG TIN	2Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 276262
QUANG NGAI	6Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	BS 685658

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

THUA THIEN. A 2 April report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that several VC propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of (YD 963065). The leaflets were printed in Vietnamese and contained the general theme that the Americans were forcing the populace to live in detainee camps and were making prostitutes of the young girls and women. In addition, the leaflets appealed to the PF's to turn against the Americans and defect to the Liberation Forces.

QUANG NAM. A 5 April report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that during the night of 3-4 April an unknown number of VC entered KIM LIEN (H) (AT 924857) and distributed VC propaganda leaflets. The leaflets contained the usual anti-American themes.

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6. MISCELLANEOUS

THUA THIEN. A 2 April report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that on 1 April a civilian truck detonated a mine in the vicinity of (ZD 013027) resulting in four civilians being injured.

A 3 April report from a usually reliable source stated that the QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN and HUE Liberation Forces had issued a notice forbidding civilian traffic on Highway #1 during the hours of 0500-1300. However, after 1300 traffic would be permitted provided civilian vehicles did not remain close to military convoys.

A 3 April report from an intelligence source related that an unknown number of VC entered a village (YD 774208) and assassinated four people.

A 6 April report from the 4th Marines stated that an unknown number of VC burned a refugee village in the vicinity of (YD 613313).

A 7 April report from the 3rd Marine Division related that the VC mortared a village in the vicinity of (YD 857163) resulting in 2 VN's being wounded.

QUANG NAM. A 28 March report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team stated that numerous reports have been received stating that the VC have issued instructions to villagers to kill all dogs. The reason for killing the dogs was that the dogs' barking warned U.S./ARVN units of VC in the area.

A 1 April report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that the VC have organized and are training young boys and girls between the ages of 14 to 16 years to steal weapons from U.S. troops. The children are taught English, use of various weapons and methods on how to make friends with U.S. troops. Reportedly, these children are also taught how to poison food.

A 1 April report from a usually reliable source related that a platoon of VC warned the populace in the area of (BT 075525) not to participate in the hamlet and village elections.

A 2 April report from a fairly reliable source stated that on the night of 1 April an estimated two platoons of VC entered TRIEM TAY (BT 098575), TRIEM NAM (BT 091559), TRIEM DONG (BT 116564), TRIEM TRUNG (BT 105572), TRANH TRIEM (Coord Unk) hamlets and kidnapped twelve VN nationals who were candidates in the village and hamlet elections.

A 4 April report from the 3rd Counterintelligence Team related that eight VC entered PHUONG BANH (H) (AT 858440) and forced the populace to attend a meeting. During the meeting the village committeemen were threatened with death if they went near the polling places.

A 6 April report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team stated that

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the VC Provincial and Zone Cadre operating in DIEN BAN, HIEU DUC and HOA VANG districts have been assigned the following missions: (1) Organize political training for hamlet and village cadre; (2) Instruct the people on methods of disrupting the government's RD efforts and the forthcoming elections; (3) Commencing 26 March, tax each family 1,000 to 5,000 \$VN; (4) Collect rice from those people who did not contribute in 1966; and (5) Instruct the Autonomous Committees to assemble labor forces.

QUANG NGAI. A 5 April report from a usually reliable source related that during the night of 4-5 April an estimated VC platoon entered TU AN (H) (BT 695685) and kidnapped Mr. DANG KIM HUNG WN, a candidate for village council.


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16 APRIL 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO. 15-67



FWMAF PERINTREP # 15-67

15 Apr 67

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

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DANANG, RVN
16 April 1967
Ser: X099967

PERINTREP 15-67

Period Covered: 090001H - 152400H Apr 67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheet NE 48-16, NE 49-13
ND 48-1, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. Aerial photography flown north of the eastern portion of the DMZ on 10 April revealed a moderate increase in enemy ground positions when compared with late March coverage over the same area. Additional photography of the DMZ itself and of portions of western QUANG TRI (P) produced nothing of significance.

Ground reconnaissance deployed within a four kilometer radius of (YD 1364) and south of CON THIEN resulted in sightings of approximately 20 NVA and the discovery of a probable company bivouac site. Supporting artillery produced moderate enemy casualties during two brief contacts. Reconnaissance elements disposed along an east-west line (XD 7550 to YD 0164) north of the KHE SANH combat base reported light sightings of the enemy over the period. The same situation prevailed in the area south of the western half of Route 9 where nothing of importance was noted.

Enemy activity in northeastern QUANG TRI (P) was light for the second consecutive week. Enemy mortar fire directed at friendly units and facilities in the CON THIEN/GIO LINH sector was insignificant.

West of CAM LO at (YD 095593) and on 9 April, a CAC element gained contact with an estimated 50 VC moving south. A short fire fight ensued and one VC KIA (Conf) and nine VC KIA (Prob) resulted.

The southeastern sector remained the focus of enemy effort in QUANG TRI (P) with most of the action taking place in and near QUANG TRI City. Two mining incidents were reported on 9 April at (YD 369605) and (YD 285573). Both involved ARVN elements; personnel casualties were light, damage to equipment negligible.

Early in the morning of 13 April the QUANG TRI Citadel received approximately 36 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Although ARVN casualties were light, eight civilians were killed and 10 wounded when a civilian structure close to the citadel was hit. A reaction force subsequently discovered the mortar positions one kilometer north of the city on the bank of the SANG THACH HAN River. South of QUANG TRI City and on the

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same date, RF elements guarding a railway bridge at (YD 326520) were attacked by an unknown number of VC. Although the RF's succeeded in driving off the enemy, the bridge was destroyed. In the same vicinity but to the south at (YD 344488) and on 13 April, a PF platoon in night defensive positions received small arms and mortar fire from a small group of the enemy. The VC were driven off with unknown results. Other enemy activity in coastal QUANG TRI (P) was of a harassing nature and still appeared directed toward the disruption of GVN RD program.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. The tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P) dropped off slightly this week. Enemy efforts remained centered in the northeastern portion of the province and east of the southern end of the PHU BAI TAOR. Aerial photography flown on 26 March over the eastern QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN border sector revealed a slight increase in enemy construction activity when compared to early March readouts.

On 11 April at (YD 519348) 300 meters northwest of the PHONG DIEN (D) Headquarters, a PF squad guarding a bridge was attacked by an unknown number of VC. With the assistance of supporting artillery, the PF's drove off the enemy. No casualties were reported. Further to the south and at (YD 581310), a Marine tank detonated a mine and on 13 April at (YD 656308) an unknown number of VC entered DONG BA (H) and assassinated a Vietnamese civilian. The reason behind the shooting has not been determined. On 10 April at (YD 712286), RF and PF elements discovered a trench containing 47 VC bodies. The enemy had apparently been killed by either artillery fire or air strikes. Just to the east and approximately eight kilometers north of HUE City, elements of the 2nd Bn, 3rd ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated two companies of VC. Heavy action followed before the VC broke contact and fled. Six VC were killed and five weapons were captured, one of which was crew served. Friendly casualties were light.

Operation BIG HORN continued with light contact with the enemy.

Ground reconnaissance deployed forward of the western approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR reported a significant rise in the number of enemy sighted. A total of approximately 180 VC were observed. A greater portion of this number were sighted in proximity to the CO BI THANH TAN area. Several contacts were made by the patrols and supporting artillery fire inflicted substantial casualties on the enemy. At (YD 604250) elements of the ARVN Airborne Task Force discovered a small ammunition and food cache which had apparently been occupied by the VC shortly before the arrival of the airborne unit.

The number of VC initiated incidents decreased slightly within the PHU BAI TAOR. Of the ten reported, seven occurred in the northern portion just southeast of HUE City.

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Southeast of the TAOR between PHU BAI and DANANG the enemy continued to initiate small scale harassing attacks against friendly security elements located close to Highway 1. On 9 and 10 April two mining incidents were reported at (ZD 021025) and (ZD 005036) along the LOC. Both involved the destruction of commercial busses with heavy civilian casualties. Over the period 10-11 April in the vicinity of (ZC 092999), three contacts took place between CAC elements and small groups of VC. Fire was exchanged in each incident with light enemy casualties resulting. The last three reporting periods have witnessed renewed enemy interest in eastern PHU LOC (D).

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Ground reconnaissance deployed in the northwest portion of the DANANG TAOR and west of the boundary reported negative sightings of the enemy. A substantial reconnaissance effort south of the TAOR reported a sharp drop in the number of enemy sighted. Approximately 80 VC were observed this week in comparison to the 240 sighted over the last reporting period and in the same general area. Supporting artillery fire again inflicted moderate casualties on the enemy.

Within the TAOR and at (AT 928842), VC demolition personnel destroyed a center pier on the NAM O Bridge, dropping two 70 meter spans. In the vicinity of (BT 0462) on 12 and 13 April, mine and sabotage incidents occurred. The mining incident involved an ARVN convoy and damage was minor. The other resulted in the destruction of a small culvert on Highway 1.

To the southwest and at (AT 926596) on 14 April F Co, 2nd Bn, 5th Marines engaged an estimated 30 VC. Employing the full spectrum of supporting fires, the Marine rifle units inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Ten VC KIA (Conf) and 15 VC KIA (Prob).

To the east and in the vicinity of (BT 005583) on 9 April, a reconnaissance patrol contact precipitated action between elements of 1st Bn, 26th Marines and an estimated 40 of the enemy. Subsequent fighting utilized both air and artillery support. Enemy casualties were 25 VC KIA (Conf), eight detainees and an assortment of equipment captured. On 11 April at (BT 093560), an unknown number of VC penetrated VINH THO (V) southeast of DIEN BAN (C) where they assassinated four civilians. In addition to the incidents just mentioned there was a slight rise in VC initiated activity within the TAOR. No precise pattern was noted however a small concentration was centered immediately east of Hill 55. The use of mines and booby traps again remained high.

Elsewhere in southeastern QUANG NAM (P) the enemy maintained a centralized effort particularly in the area south of HOI AN (C). Though not of the intensity noted three and four weeks ago, the VC in this sector continued to conduct small scale harassing and probing attacks against more isolated friendly security elements.

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d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. There was a decrease in the tempo of enemy activity reported from eastern QUANG TIN (P). The level of action in this coastal area has remained essentially the same for the last three reporting periods.

PF and Marine elements located at (BT 164414) on 9 April received an estimated 65 rounds of 82mm mortar fire while in night defensive positions. Artillery and mortar fire were placed on suspected enemy locations with undetermined results.

At (BT 198372) four kilometers southeast of THANG BINH on 13 April a PF platoon along with RD Team No. 1 were attacked by an estimated two companies of VC. The PF and RD returned fire, one RD cadreman and a hamlet chief were killed and several others wounded. Enemy casualties were moderate. East of this location and on the same date the 895th RF Co gained contact with an unknown number of VC. Four VC were killed and one individual weapon captured. There were no friendly casualties.

VC initiated action in the vicinity of TAM KY (C) dropped off sharply over the week. Enemy activity in the area north of the CHU LAI TAOR was limited to small scale harassing action against more isolated friendly security elements.

Six kilometers southwest of the TIEN PHUOC CIDG Camp a RF company engaged an estimated company of VC. Following a short fire fight the VC broke contact and withdrew. Six VC were killed, friendly casualties were light.

Ground reconnaissance deployed west of the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy over the period.

There was a moderate increase in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the CHU LAI TAOR. The majority of these occurred in the southeast sector. On 12 April the CHU LAI Airstrip received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire which impacted at the south end of the air strip. Damage was light. One incident was reported from the Korean Marine area of responsibility.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). There was a decrease in the tempo of enemy activity in eastern QUANG NGAI (P). At (BS 675775) on 12 April two platoons of PF's manning an OP three kilometers east of SON THINH (C) were attacked by an unknown number of VC. The PF's stood their ground and drove off the attackers. Casualties were minor.

At (BS 575725) two U.S. Army Advisors were wounded on 14 April when their vehicle detonated a mine. West of this location and seven kilometers northeast of the HA THANH CIDG Camp at (BS 441759) an immediate airstrike was called in on approximately 200 VC in the open. A FAC on station reported 35 VC KIA (Conf) and 45 KIA (Prob).

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Thirteen kilometers southeast of QUANG NGAI (C) the 3rd Co, 3rd Bn, 4th ARVN Regt in night defensive positions was attacked by a multi-company VC force. Heavy action followed and the VC were driven off. Friendly casualties were heavy. Enemy casualties were 23 KIA (Conf) and five individual weapons captured.

Ground reconnaissance centered on (BS 6357) reported light sightings of the enemy over the period.

Aerial photography flown over the western MO DUC (D) and DUC PHO (D) on 8 and 9 April revealed a heavy increase in enemy ground construction activity. Comparison was made with March readouts. In northeastern QUANG NGAI (P) enemy activity was limited to isolated harassing actions. Eastern coastal QUANG NGAI (P) though relatively quiet this week remains an area of probable future enemy activity.

f. Trends. Two weeks ago the subject was covered of a noticeable increase in enemy misreporting and alteration of fact as contained in his reports and other official correspondence moving from the field to higher VC command echelons. Continued examination of recent captured documents provides strong evidence of such malpractice.

On 29 March a VC after-action report concerning enemy participation in Operation ATTLEBORO was taken during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The top secret document was destined for HQ, National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. It contained an accurate listing of U.S. Order of Battle and a fairly authentic account of what transpired during the action. The latter part of the report concerned a statement of damage and casualties inflicted on U.S. Army forces. Where the sequence of tactical events was, for the most part within reason, the VC summation of U.S. casualties went well beyond.

The report listed 3719 Americans as having been killed. Operation ATTLEBORO which covered the period 14 September through 25 November 1966, resulted in 111 U.S. KIA. It would appear that gross misrepresentation to the degree mentioned might well have an adverse effect on the enemy's decision making process particularly at the higher command level.

A second item relates to VC recruiting accomplished within the I Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy appears chiefly concerned with the replacement of casualties sustained by both main force and local force units as well as the local hamlet guerrilla. Although infiltration from NVN does provide a partial replacement source for selected NVA and main force formations, it is still the local VC organization which must perform the initial recruiting task. Current intelligence information has likewise pointed toward the increasingly difficult problem of providing the necessary labor force which renders virtually direct service support to enemy ground operations.

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The bulk of the enemy's recruiting process takes place in the coastal regions of high population density and it is specifically within these contested areas that the VC is now facing what may be legitimately described as a replacement problem of fair proportions.

Available intelligence is now persistent in its indication of a gradual receding reservoir of well motivated male youths who represent the prime VC prospect. Enemy casualties now appear to be straining the local replacement capability. Vietnamese youngsters of less than 16 years of age are being assimilated into the VC combat force. There are now certain indications of a greatly increased use of women in field support roles. The seeming apathy and resentment with VC methods and actions now noted in portions of the lowland peasant population presents the VC with the occasional necessity of impressment in lieu of voluntary entry. The rationale and explanation behind such feeling is varied. In some cases it is simply a desire to avoid destruction by ARVN and Allied Forces. In others a more positive acceptance of the GVN way of doing things. With some it is undoubtedly the choosing of what they feel is the lesser of several evils. The above does not mean imminent VC collapse but does imply a diminution of his capacity to fight.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents for the reporting period reflected a slight decrease when compared to last period. Incidents consisted of one ambush, two assaults by fire, three attacks, 53 mine/booby trap incidents, 107 small unit engagements, seven acts of sabotage and 137 incidents of AA fire for a total of 310.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment

(1) VC Anti-Aircraft Tactics. MACV J-2 Technical Intelligence Branch provided the following information. Recent agent reports and pilot sightings indicate that the VC are continuing to use claymore type mines against low flying aircraft and helicopters. Reports mention the VC construct manikins, dress them as VC and place them along treelines to lure aircraft within range of claymores in tree branches. Poles 30 to 40 feet high, mounted with claymores and placed in open areas with VC movement as a lure, are also used.

- e. Negative.

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f. Administrative Units/Installations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
24 Mar	(YC 685998)	Ammo Storage	Interrogation Rpt; F/3
24 Mar	(BS 753409)	U/G Supply Store	Interrogation Rpt; F/3
28 Mar	(YD 0370, 0470, 0570)	Ammo Storage	Interrogation Rpt; F/6
29 Mar	(AU 830075)	Rice/Ammo Storage	Interrogation Rpt; F/3
7 Apr	(YC 795795)	Supply Depot	Agent Report; F/6
8 Apr	(YC 986667)	Rice Storage Area	Agent Report; F/3
9 Apr	(BS 564449)	VC Training Area	Agent Report; F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. Enemy initiated AA fire incidents for this reporting period reflected little change when compared to the previous period. Incidents totaled 137 with 28 aircraft sustaining 49 hits. Grid squares of highest density were (YD 6026), (AT 9756), (BT 1632) and (BT 2511). No confirmed cases of 12.7/50 cal fire were reported.

i - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance Activities

(1) QUANG TRI (P). Ground reconnaissance centered in the vicinity of (YD 1364), between CON THIEN and Route 9, produced light sightings of the enemy. Two short contacts occurred and a probable company bivouac site was discovered. To the west reconnaissance elements were disposed along an east-west line (XD 7550 - YD 0164) north of the KHE SANH combat base. Again light sightings were reported. South of the western portion of Route 9 reconnaissance patrols reported insignificant enemy activity.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). An increased reconnaissance effort due west of HUE City and forward of the western approaches to the PHU BAI TAOR produced a sharp rise in the number of enemy sighted. A major portion of the total of 180 VC observed were located in or close to the CO BI THANH TAN area. Reconnaissance elements deployed south of the PHU BAI TAOR made negative sightings.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Reconnaissance of the northwest portion of the DANANG TAOR and west of the boundary produced negative sightings of the enemy. Elements deployed south of the TAOR reported a substantial decrease in the number of enemy sighted. Approximately 80 VC were seen this week as compared to the 240 sighted last week and in the same area.

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(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Ground reconnaissance deployed west of the CHU LAI TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy during the reporting period. The same situation held true for patrols centered in the area (BS 6357) where insignificant enemy activity was observed.

s. Captured Grain. The following amounts and types of grain were captured/destroyed during the period in the areas indicated:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
9 Apr	(YD 834196)	10,000	corn	3d Bn, 26th Marines
9 Apr	(YD 831196)	2,000	rice (dest)	3d Bn, 26th Marines
9 Apr	(YD 834196)	700	wheat (dest)	3d Bn, 26th Marines
12 Apr	(YD 604250)	220	rice	8th Abn, ARVN
14 Apr	(ZC 101191)	1,100	rice (dest)	KHAM DUC CIDG Camp
14 Apr	(YD 100648)	200	rice (dest)	3d Recon Bn

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Organization. Annex A.

b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.

c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.

d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period again showed a significant decrease when compared with the two previous periods. Losses were: 175 KIA (Conf), 210 KIA (Prob), and 50 VC PW. Weapons losses consisted of 32 individual weapons and two crew served weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. Throughout the week the weather condition in the I GTZ was characterized by stratus and fog east of the western highlands. This situation was acute during early morning hours, however rising temperatures toward the middle of the morning and early afternoon resulted in a general clearing. Late afternoon and early evening witnessed rain showers and thunderheads over the highlands.

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On 13 April a moderate convergence over I Corps resulted in partial cloudiness and scattered rain showers. With the weakening of this condition low level winds became southeasterly and weather conditions cleared, however a convective cloud formation persisted over both the coast and western highlands. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	84	85	88	92
Low	72	72	74	75
Rainfall (total)	.48	.19	.01	.01
Visibility (miles)	5	6	7	7
Winds (knots)	6	5	4	5

k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex B.

l. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 13-67.

B. S. Read
 B. S. READ
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

A. ORDER OF BATTLE

B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMUSMACV (MACV 233)
 COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)
 COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)
 COMUSMACV (J221)
 CMC (CODE A02)
 CG FMFPAC
 CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 CG I FFORCEV
 CG II FFORCEV
 COMNAVFORV
 CG 1ST MARDIV
 CG 3RD MARDIV
 CG 1ST MAW
 CG 5TH MARDIV
 CG 1ST INF DIV
 CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV
 CG 9TH INF DIV
 CG 25TH INF DIV
 CG TASK FORCE OREGON
 COMNAVSUPACT DANANG
 CTF 76
 CG 9TH MAB
 CG 2D BDE ROKMC
 CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF

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CG FLC
 CO 366TH TFW
 CO RLT 26
 CTG 79.5
 CTG 79.4
 CTG 76.5
 CTG 76.4
 COMPHIBRON SEVEN
 CO 30TH NCR
 CO 5TH SFG (ABN)
 CO 525TH MI GP
 CO 7TH ENGR BN
 CO 9TH ENGR BN
 CO 5TH COMM BN
 CO 1ST MP BN
 CO CAMP BUTLER
 DSA I CORPS
 CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP
 CO 282D AVN CO
 CO 8TH RR FU
 CIGV
 I DASC DANANG
 III MAF

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 15-67.

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III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 152400H APR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH		
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	885					1	885
Divisions (Hq)	3	2,000					3	2,000
Regiments (Hq)	8	3,844	2	1,300			10	5,144
Battalions (Infantry)	23	11,262	12	4,484	6	2,050	41	17,796
Battalions (Other)	10	2,240	3	1,275			13	3,515
Separate Companies					26	2,485	26	2,485
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		20,881		7,059		4,535		32,475
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	Unk					1	Unk
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					4	350	4	350
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						750		750
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
COMBINED TOTAL STRENGTH		21,381		7,059		6,185		34,625

NOTE: Totals include units of 324B Div, 31st and 32nd Regts of 341st Div and 2nd VC Regt of 3rd NVA Div.

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2. NUMBER OF NVA/VC BATTALIONS BY TYPE (All Battalions)

		<u>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</u>					<u>COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS</u>						<u>Sub-totals</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
		<u>INF</u>	<u>SAPPER</u>	<u>ARTY</u>	<u>MORT</u>	<u>AAA</u>	<u>RR</u>	<u>AT</u>	<u>ENGR</u>	<u>TRANS</u>	<u>SIG</u>	<u>MED</u>		
NVA:	Confirmed	23	0	1	1	2	1		2		2	1	33	
	Probable	0	0										0	
	Possible	0	0					1		1			2	
	NVA Totals													35
VC MF:	Confirmed	12	2						1				15	
	Probable	0	0										0	
	Possible	0	0										0	
	VC MF Totals													15
VC LF:	Confirmed	6	0										6	
	Probable	0	0										0	
	Possible	2	0										2	
	VC LF Totals													8
GRAND TOTALS														58

NOTE: Totals include units of 324B Div, 31st and 32nd Regts of 341st Div and 2nd VC Regt of 3rd NVA Div.

3. (C) ESTIMATED IRREGULAR FORCES STRENGTH AS OF 5 APR 67.

	<u>GUERRILLA FORCES</u>	<u>SELF DEFENSE FORCES</u>	<u>SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES</u>	<u>TOTAL IRREGULARS</u>
<u>PROVINCES</u>				
QUANG TRI	2,250	4,687	937	7,874
THUA THIEN	2,800	7,988	1,597	12,385
QUANG NAM	4,600	13,000	2,600	20,200
QUANG TIN	3,300	8,800	1,750	13,850
QUANG NGAI	4,150	13,516	2,700	20,366
TOTAL	17,100	47,991	9,584	74,675

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4. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 152400H APR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	9,875#2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
K.25 Sapper Co #3	NVA	C			E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt #4	NVA	C	2,447		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Vinh Linh SS.	13Mar67
1st Bn	NVA	C	422		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 164686	13Mar67
1st Co(K-1)	NVA	C	108				
2nd Co(K-2)	NVA	C	106				
3rd Co(K-3)	NVA	C	108				
4th Co(K-4)	NVA	C	100				
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 9661 (Hill 360)	13Mar67
5th Co(K-5)	NVA	C	180			Cua Valley	13Mar67
6th Co(K-6)	NVA	C	140			XD 7834	13Mar67
7th Co(K-7)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
8th Co(K-8)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 1072	13Mar67
9th Co(K-9)	NVA	C	180				
10th Co(K-10)	NVA	C	140				
11th Co(K-11)	NVA	C	140				
12th Co(K-12)	NVA	C	140				
K-16 RR Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-17 Mort Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-18 Sig Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-19 Engr Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-20 Med Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-21 AA Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-22 Trans Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-23 Recon Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-24 Sec & Guard Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt #4	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Nghe An (P) (?)	13Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
33rd Regt #5	NVA	PR	2,625		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	825		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
34th Arty Regt	NVA	PO			NVN	Nghe An (P)	13Mar67
271st Regt #5	NVA	C			NVN	Nghe An (P)	13Mar67
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	C-2	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661 - XD 9861	27Jul66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,984	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	3 km Radius YD 0572	4Mar67
Regt Hq and Spt	NVA	C	794		3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0864	2Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	250	C-4	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 063682	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C				YD 102632	1Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
3rd Co	NVA	C				YD 081665	4Mar67
4th Co(Support)	NVA	C					
5th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 070685	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C					12Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C					
3rd Co	NVA	C				Area YD 0768	4Mar67
4th Co	NVA	C					
6th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0768	4Mar67
U/I Wire Co	NVA	PO				YD 075665	3Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	16Oct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	16Oct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	8Oct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10Oct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		31Mar67
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280		DMZ Area	YD 0768	1Mar67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	YD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	340	C-3	YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist and coastal area	18Mar67
814th Bn	NVA	C	300	C-4	Hai Lang (D)	Area YD 3350	6Apr67
H.99 Co	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	10Mar67
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66
K.400 Co	LF	C	120		Gio Linh (D)	YD 3172	17Feb67

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	885		YD 4724	YD 495125	16Jan67
C.11 Intel Co	NVA	C	105		Base 114		27Jun66
C.12 Sapper Co	NVA	C	100		Base 114	YD 645277	6Apr67
C.13 Comm Co	NVA	C	150		Base 114		27Jun66
C.14 Engr Co	NVA	C	140		Base 114	Phong Dien(D)	27Jun66
C.15 AA Co	NVA	C	80		Base 114	YD 455240	21Feb67
C.16 Mort Co	NVA	C	70		Base 114		6Jan66
C.17 RR Co	NVA	C	90		Base 114		6Jan66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,364		Thua Thien(P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Base 114	YD 540195	21Feb67
800th Bn	MF	C	264		Phong Dien(D)	YD 645277	6Apr67
1st Co	MF	C	71			YD 645277	6Apr67
2nd Co	MF	C	68			YD 645277	6Apr67
3rd Co	MF	C	57			YD 645277	6Apr67
4th Co	MF	C	68			YD 645277	6Apr67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400		YD 6318	ZC 0598	24Feb67
1st Co	MF	C	100				
2nd Co	MF	C	100				
3rd Co	MF	C	100				
4th Co	MF	C	100				

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
806th Bn	NVA	C	400		YD 5642	YD 465330	18Mar67
1st Co	NVA	C	100				
2nd Co	NVA	C	100				
3rd Co	NVA	C	100				
4th Co	NVA	C	100				
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc(D)	YC 904995	18Jan67
1st Co	MF	C	100			Phu Loc(D)	29Dec66
2nd Co	MF	C	100			YD 923210	29Dec66
3rd Co	MF	C	100			Phu Loc(D)	29Dec66
4th Co	MF	C	100			YD 935995	29Dec66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 700300	YD 700304	26Mar67
K.105th Co	LF	C				YD 700304	26Mar67
K.106th Co	LF	C				YD 700304	26Mar67
K.107th Co	LF	C					3Feb67
K.109th Co	LF	C					10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	50		YD 6530	YD 640314	26Mar67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412	Huong Tra(D)	28Dec66
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Thu(D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,250	C-2	Que Son(D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son(D)	IN REGT AREA	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	300		Que Son(D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	250		Que Son(D)	AT 8554	16Mar67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	250	C-4	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	BT 1149	24Mar67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 8453	18Feb67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	350	C-2	ZC 135280	AT 921673	31Mar67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 0848	6Mar67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Q.16 Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66
Duy Xuyen Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	C-3	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
GK31 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
GK32 Bn	NVA	C	220	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
GK30 Bn	NVA	C	220		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
GK40 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	120	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 902215	16Mar67
2nd Bn, (3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	C-2	Thang Binh (D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	C-2	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
14th Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3211	24Nov66
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	MF	C	90	C-2	Tam Ky (D)	BT 441081	13Jan67
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov66
K.51 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.52 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
K.54 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.55 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha(D)/KONTUM (P) Border	BS 1382	25Mar67
2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460		Que Son(D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai(P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		Tra Bong(D)	BS 3782	25Mar67
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		BS 3782 Son Ha(D)	BS 435566	25Mar67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,880	C-3	BS 4356 S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 579498	25Mar67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Minh Long(D)	BS 579498	
40th Bn	MF	C	280	C-3	BS 644553	BS 644553	25Mar67
60th Bn	MF	C	200	C-3	BS 579498	BS 579498	25Mar67
70th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 561673	BS 561673	25Mar67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 665421	BS 665421	25Mar67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	C-3	N. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 470745	25Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
11th Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
22nd Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
33rd Bn	NVA	C	400	C-3	BS 519832	BS 519832	25Mar67
OK-33 Bn(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 4478	BS 4478	18Feb67
3rd Div Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		BS 7528	BS 7528	25Mar67
2nd Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 629364	25Mar67
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		N Mo Duc/Nghia Hanh	BS 629364	25Mar67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		N Mo Duc/Nghia Hanh	BS 660603	6Apr67
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
38th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
120th Bn	MF	C	500	C-2	E Son Ha (D)	Son Ha (D)	25Mar67
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	595		BS 6436	BS 6436	23Jan67
20th Co (Bn Hq)	MF	C	105	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
30th Co	MF	C	120		BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
40th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 3377	BS 3377	23Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
50th Co	MF	C	100	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
60th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Son Tinh(D)	W Son Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 7743	2Mar67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS505910	31Mar67
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #6	NVA	C	6,215		Binh Dinh		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 732079	27Feb67
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Mar67
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BS 7610	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
700th Field Hosp	NVA	C	90		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		Dec66
18th Regt	NVA	C	775		Binh Dinh	BR 9875	12Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300	C-3	Binh Dinh	BR 9875	12Mar67
7th Bn	NVA	C	150	C-3	Binh Dinh	BR 9878	12Mar67
8th Bn	NVA	C	150		Binh Dinh	BR 9363	21Mar67
9th Bn	NVA	C	175		Binh Dinh	BR 9788	6Mar67
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,150		BS 9005	BR 9005	Feb67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 9005	Feb67
7th Bn	NVA	C	325		BS 8716	BS 8716	13Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 9104	BS 9104	13Feb67
9th Bn	NVA	C	325		BS 8716	BS 8716	20Mar67

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- #1. Strength figures of the 341st Div, except for the 31st and 32nd Regts, are not carried in the I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-3.
- #3. The K.25 Sapper Co has been accepted as a support company of the 341st Div.
- #4. The strength figures of the 31st and 32nd Regts (confirmed) of the 341st NVA Div have been added to the I Corps strength totals. These two regiments are believed operating in the DMZ area.
- #5. The 33rd and the 271st Regts are possibly the same regiment, but no hard intelligence is currently available to confirm this.
- #6. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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5. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 152400H APR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31.445 (?)		CO-Col Luong THINH Dep Cdr-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-Col Nguyen Hong DAC APO-Unknown CofS-LtCol Cao LONG CofPol Sect-LtCol LUU CofRear Ser-Maj HUNG
K.25 Sapper Co 31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong; Cong Troung 1/5	31.442 XD		CO-Col Nguyen Ngoc HUNG (AKA HAI) XO-SrCapt Hoang PO-Col Nguyen TRUNG APO-Col AN C. Gen Staff-SrCapt LE Trng Cadre-SrCapt CHI CofRear Ser-SrCapt HAI Prop Trng-SrCapt Nguyen Tan CUNG CofArty-SrCapt HO Log Off-SrCapt THAI CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van LAM XO-Capt Tran Van LAI PO-SrCapt Nguyen Minh LY APO-Capt Tran Ha TIEN Staff Chief-TAI Comm Plt Ldr/Liaison-2nd Lt Tran Dinh PHI Trng Cadre-2nd Lt DUC ADJ-1st Lt NAM Med Off-Cpl Le Ngoc HUONG
1st Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong; Cuu Long; K101	31.443 XB		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K1 Co				CO-SrCapt Dinh Van THANH XO-2nd Lt LAO PO-1st Lt KHUE APO-Lt Phan Trong VIEN CO-1st Lt Vo Trong HUONG XO-Asp. Pham THANH PO-1st Lt Ho Van NANG APO-2nd Lt Nguyen Cong VUONG CO-SrLt Nguyen Hoa DIEU XO-2nd Lt Ho Kiem CHI PO-1st Lt Minh SON APO-2nd Lt Tran Van THU CO-SrLt Nguyen Kinh LONG XO-2nd Lt Trin QUOC PO-Nguyen Dinh THANH APO-Possibly THANH CO-SrCapt AN XO-WO THINH
K2 Co				
K3 Co				
K4 Co				
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn); K100; Song Huong	31.450	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-MG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	
K5 Co		31.451		
K6 Co		31.452		CO-Nguyen Hum HUY ADJ-WO Nguyen Dinh VIEM APO-TY
K7 Co		31.453		
K8 Co		31.454		
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn); Thu Bong; K103	31.455 XB(?)		XO-WO NHI
K9 Co		31.456 XB		
K10 Co		31.457 XB(?)		
K11 Co		31.458 XB(?)		
K12 Co		31.459 XB(?)		
K-16 RR Co				CO-1st Lt MA CO-1st Lt NGU CO-1st Lt LIU CO-1st Lt T
K-17 Mort Co				
K-18 Sig Co				
K-19 Eng Co				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND AMMUNITION	PERSONALITIES
K-20 Med Co K-21 AA Co 32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)			CO-1st Lt TRACH CO-1st Lt KHOAN CO-Maj TINH PO-Maj QUE
4th Bn 5th Bn 6th Bn 33rd Regt (Hq) 7th Bn 8th Bn 9th Bn 34th Arty Regt		31.445 XB(?) 32.445 (?)		
271st Regt (Hq) (Poss)				PO-Maj TRANG CofS-Capt BINH CO-Maj LUONG PO-Maj Sau DOAN CO-Cen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Truong 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1 May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THOUNG
803rd Regt (Hq)				
1st Bn 2nd Bn 3rd Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			CO-TUONG CO-Capt Tran CAN XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN CO-LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO-Minh LONG PO-Maj SONG
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; 4th Regt; Ba Vi (new)		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn	31.620 RT		CO-Nguyen KHUONG XO-Bui Dinh PHONG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co	Doan-1	31.621 31.621 RT		CO-1st Lt Le TIEN XO-Linh Xuan TIEU PO-Vo Dinh HOI
2nd Co	Doan-2	31.622 RT 31.625 RT		
3rd Co	Doan-3	31.623		CO-1st Lt Tran Xuan TOAN XO-Le Minh KOANH PO-Nguyen Ngo CHUNG
4th Co (Hvy Wpns Support)	Doan-4	31.624 RT	12-82mm Mort 6-100mm Chicom 7.62mm Type 57 9-AA MG Unk-B-10 DK-RR(82MM)	
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn			CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG) PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH CO-Cao Xuan HAI
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn	31.630		
1st Co	Doan-1	31.631		
2nd Co	Doan-2	31.632		CO-1st Lt AN XO-W.O. KHA PO-1st Lt TRUC CO-1st Lt MAI XO-Lt Thai Van LAP CO-1st Lt CHUONG
3rd Co	Doan-3	31.633		
4th Co (Hvy Wpns)	Doan-4	31.634 KT		
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
8th Bn	108th Bn; D-8; K.8			
9th Bn	D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn 13th ARTY Bn 14th AA Bn 15th Engr Bn 16th Sig Bn			12-82mm RR(?) 12-120mm Mort(?) 16-37mm AA Gun(?) 18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Luu Van MAN CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
19th Med Bn 808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam 41.338 EQ	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG	CO-Van KIEM XO-SANH
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO- SAM
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Vo BA PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist Force			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAM XO-Thi Bong AN
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri		Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47	CO-Cao TUNG
Cam Lo Co 4.400 Co	H30; 30H 4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Armed Co	41.344 FQ(?) 41.346 FQ(?)	3-60mm Mort 2-B-40 6-BAR's	CO-NGHIA CO-1st Lt DAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hq; Phan Khu Bac; K-500; Di Hai	41.000 FM-41.300 FM-Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Lt Nguyen Nam TRUC XO-Lt Nguyen THEM CO-SrLt LONG XO-HUNG CO-HUNG CO-LUAN
C.11 Recon Co	11th Co; Intell Co		74-K-50 18-K-44 Unk-K-50	
C.12 Sapper Co	12th Co	Q.72,700 Bac Do		
C.13 Comm Co	13th Co			
C.14 Engr Co	14th Co	Q.90,700 Bac Do		
C.15 AA Co	15th Co; Bach Danh; PK 12 LY; 404 C	1515 BK	4-12.7mm HMG 8-K-44 5-MAT 49 SMG's 9-81mm Mort 20-K-50 9-AR's 45-K-44's 4-75mm RR's 3-57mm RR's	CO-Nguyen Kim LUONG XO-SAM PO-KHANH CO-SrCapt LONG PO-Capt QUANG
C.16 Mort Co	16th Co; 82mm Mort Co			
C.17 RR Co	17th Co			CO-SrLt BA PO-SrLt VUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu; K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1	1520; Q40.700 ST	9-82mm Mort 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 8-B-90 9-B-40 6-MG's 4-75mm RR's 2-60mm Mort 2-B-90 2-B-40 5-AR 8-SMG 2-60mm Mort 2-B-40 2-B-90 5-AR 8-SMG	
800th Bn				
1st Co	C.1	1520A BK HAI; Q42.700ST 1510		CO-DE XO-Lt NHAT
2nd Co	C.2	Q44.700ST 1530		CO-Lt BIEN XO-W.O. Ho Xuan DAU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Co	C.3	Q46.700ST 1540	3-60mm Mort 2-B-90 2-B-40 5-AR 1-HMG	CO-Lt HAI XO-2nd Lt THANH
4th Co	C.4	V.500 Di Hai Q48.700ST	4-81mm Mort 1-75mm RR 4-57mm RR 4-MG	CO-GIANG XO-2nd Lt NGUYEN
802nd Bn	K.2; Van Troi Bn C-2; 2nd Bn(?)	Q52.700 Bac Do 1522 BK Di Hai	4-81mm Mort 12-60mm Mort 2-75mm RR 3-57mm RR 6-B-90 10-B-40 6-AA	CO-THANH
1st Co		1522 BK Di Hai	2-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 1-AA 6-B-40 2-B-90 9-AR 1-80mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-B-40 2-60mm Mort 8-B-40 3-LMG's	CO-DONG
2nd Co				
3rd Co				
4th Co				
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D.10; 3rd(?) 80.T Bn		3-81mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 3-HMG 3-75mm RR 3-57mm RR 4-B-90 12-B-40 29-AR	CO-W.O. CAN PO-SOAN CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co	The Cong		3-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-1st Lt HUYEN PO-1st Lt CUONG
2nd Co	Truong Son		2-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-1st Lt MIEU XO-Lt DONG
3rd Co	Ba To	41.290 BK Di Hai	1-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-Tran TOAN XO-2nd Lt CHUONG
4th Co	Bun Dien (?)	1596 BR Di Hai	3-81mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 4-81mm Morts 8-60mm Morts 4-AA 4-RR 8-B-40 1-B-90	CO-Lt HOE PO-1st Lt LUAT
804th Bn	K.4; VQ74		2-60mm Mort 9-AR 1-MG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 1-MG 1-60mm Mort 7-AR	CO-CHIEU XO-Capt HUNG PO-LUYEN
1st Co				CO-THANG XO-HOANG
2nd Co				
3rd Co				CO-THANG XO-1st Lt TIEN CO-DIEN XO-2nd Lt LAC CO-Nguyen THI XO-Capt GIOI
4th Co				
810th Bn	K.10; 3rd(?)	1852 Bac Ha	3-81mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG 3-60mm Mort 6-AR 24-SMG 2-B-40	
K.105 Co	C.105; D.3	1847 Bac Ha 41.441 House #S.02. 900ST		CO-Lt Vo THONG XO-DUNG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.106 Co	C.106; K.116; K16; 106	42.442	3-60mm Mort 9-AR 3-HMG 1-B-40 1-B-90	CO-KIM XO-2nd Lt CANH
K.107 Co K.109	K.117; K.17; 107 K.119; K.19; 109	1853 Bac Ha	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-MG	CO-Nguyen Van TAI CO-1st Lt KHUONG XO-2nd Lt MINH
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR	CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH PO-SON
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG Unk-K-50	CO-SON XO-THU PO-SAM

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)

64th Regt; Bac Ha;
Worksite-3; Factory
10; 31st Regt; 46th
Regt; 51st Regt;
323rd Regt (?)
X1; CT3; Binh Minh;
K-1; 64 Bn (?)

20.825

CO-LtCol Viet SON
XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN
PO-Trung THANH

1st Bn

CO-Capt THAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn(?) Nguyen Trai		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung	21.341 BM Ba Ha	1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-LAM XO-THAI PO-CU
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn	21.395 GM Dong Hai	3-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?)	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; R.25(?)	2116 Quang Da	1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THIEU PO-TOAN
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR	CO-KY XO-THANH PO-UT
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Lv A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; X.55(?); Q-15; H-35 H-55; 75; 104th; X.65; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co	2105	2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Q.16 Co	X.66; Q-16-B Co; 76; Hoa Vang Co			CO-Nguyen DOA
Duy Xuyen Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d; Co; Q.13; X.63; 73	2103 (?)		CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co X-64; 74	2104 (?)		CO-MOI
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>				
33rd Arty Regt (Hq)		Nam Hai 20.800 GM		
GK.31 Bn (AA)	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn;		18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
GK.32 Bn	38AA Bn; Xuong 111;			
GK.30 (SIG)	19th Bn; RQ21			
GK.40 Bn (ENGR)	RQ22	Hai Cang 20	12-75mm RR	
	RQ 20/A Bn; RQ.20	1803/CH		
	RQ 20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	Hai Cang 20		
	X.72; RQ.24	GM 20.039		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
72nd Bn		Tay An Nam Hai		
2nd Bn(3rd Regt)		21.993 Mrs Hanh		CO-Tran Van CAO
	Binh Da; X2; K-2;			CO-Capt THAU
	74th Bn (?)			
14th Co	A-14; V-14; A.19; K.53	2004	1-60mm Mort	
			1-30 Cal MG	
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 706		1-57mm RR (?)	CO-THANH
	74th Dist Force Co		Unk-M-79	XO-Tran TIEN
			Unk-K-50 SMG	PO-PHUONG
70th Co (409th Sapper Bn)	7th Co; X-70 Co	P.O. 20.142		CO-Nguyen DUOC
		F.G.M.		XO-Vo Ly TA
		Bac Hien		PO-Nguyen MAI
706th Co	106th Co			
K.51 Co	K51; 107; F-14; A.10		2-60mm Mort	CO-KHOA
	D-21; Thang Binh		1-57mm RR	XO-Nguyen THAN
			6-MG	PO-Anh VU
K.52 Co	D-22; A.13; V.13(?)			
K.54 Co	C-73; A.16	2002	1-60mm Mort	CO-Hong LE
			2-MG	
K.55 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21; A.21			
	Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;	20.100 GM	CO-Maj Gen Hoang Van THAI
	F-550; Co Hoa; H-601;	21.900 GM	XO-LtCol Nguyen Chanh
	F-102 KW	Bac Hien	(AKA BINH)
			PO-Gen THAI (same as CO)
			Asst. PO-LtCol Tran Ba
			KHUE
			CofS-Col Le TRUC
			Dep CofS-LtCol Nguyen
			LIEN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2	20.601 GM 20.925 GM Tay An; 41.910 KP 6000-6199		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung ST		CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN CO-Nguyen MUOI
40th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh-Gia	20.735 CT An Giang		CO-SrCapt Nguyen Xuan PHONG
60th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Oanh Gia (?); Bong Trang		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
70th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Binh; Song Hong(?) Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Truong 7 (?)			CO-He Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
90th Bn	11th Worksite; 1st Bn 135th Bn; 2nd Bn 3rd Bn; 75th Bn (?) RQ23; RQ33; RQ330; 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60.620 GM Tay An	17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
21st Regt (Hq)				CO-Capt Ha Van MAG CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH CO-Nguyen Kaach THO CO-Le Van CAN XO & CofS-Nguyen KINH PO-Ho Dac HOI
11th Bn				
23rd Bn				
33rd Bn				
GK-33 Bn			6-120mm Morts	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA Cofs-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN Cofs-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-QANH CO-Maj KIM
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			
97th Bn	703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.21; H.25	6340 TL (old) 21.164 GM (new)		
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ Ba Hao		
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn (?)	HT 2416 Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
120th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 20th Bn	20.135 GM 20.139 GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141 GM 20.144 GM Bac Hien 1291 KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa; X2424 Bac Hien Forward to Ba Hoa PO 20.142 AGM Bac Hien PO 20.142 BCM Bac Hien	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
20th Co	X-20; 2nd Co			CO-BUU
30th Co	3rd Co; V-30 Co			CO-Dinh Dieu PHAN XO-Trinh LANH PO-NHUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Co	4th Co; V-40 Co	PO 20.142 CGM Bac Hien		CO-GIAO XO-Tuan KIET PO-Ngoc BINH CO-VAN XO-HUNG PO-LOC
50th Co	5th Co; V-50 Co	PO 20.142 DGM		
60th Co	6th Co; V-60 Co	PO 20.142 EGM Bac Hien		XO-CONG PO-Nguyen Van LUC CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC CO-RI
1506th Engr Bn	571 Unit	1289		CO-He Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU CO-MY CO-CHUNG XO-NAM PO-ANH
19th Bn 307th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 315th Bn(?); 705th Bn(?); T-21; H-40 T-21; H-40	22,422	2-LMG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 6-Carabines 3-BAR's 6-Carabines Unk-SMG Unk-K-40	CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-Dinh TAC CO-MAU
21st Co	Unit 506 H-42	Hom Thu 21.618M		
506 "A" Sapper Co 506 "B" Sapper Co	Me Duc Co; Ba To Co Duc Pho Co;			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN
C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West) T.19 Co			
T.18 Co P.31 Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY
T.20 Co				
Tra Bong Co				

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Div	Hong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10 D-518 Infil Gp	Hon Thu 20.110 GM; 20 845 GMT 10 Airfield 10		CO-SrCol Vo THU XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn		1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KHUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpas Bn 400th Mort Bn	513 Infil Gp Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1538 1541		CO-Le Van DUYET CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAM CO-CU XO-CIM
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		
600th Med Bn 90th Engr Bn 18th NVA Regt	Inter-Det 600 Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?) 263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn	1548 7173 DS or 21.155 GM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN XO-Bui Duy NONG PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
7th Bn				CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-SrCapt NHUONG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANH CofS-LUIONG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			CO-LON XO-THANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt	21.141VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			PO-Ho Si LOC CofS-Capt THANG CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516			XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM CofS-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN

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6. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN I CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 082400H APR TO 152400H APR 67.

a. Quang Tri

(1) Operation PRAIRIE III (commenced 190001 Mar - continuing).

(a) Information on 67th Sapper Company.

1. A notebook captured on 3 March 1967 in the vicinity of YD 0864 contains an entry on the 67th Sapper Co. Another entry indicates that the 82mm Mortar Co, reinforced with one platoon (6 tubes), two engineer squads, one recon squad, and a 15 watt radio station were enroute (to an unknown area) along with K4 which was reinforced by one assistant for artillery, one for engineering and two political officers. (G-2 Comment: On 27 February 67, the 812th Regt contacted friendly elements at YD 0864. The three battalions (4th, 5th, 6th) and supporting elements of the 812th Regt were contacted. One of these supporting elements, the 15th Engr Co, was identified through the interrogation of PW Pham Van Thang, 1st Co, 15th Engr Bn, who was captured on 4 March at YD 083644. Thang stated that the mission of his unit was to mine Highway #9, then return to Quang Binh Province. On 1 March 67 another PW, Nguyen Khac Minh, was captured at YD 133606. Minh stated that he was a member of the 2nd Co, Engr Bn, 324B Div. He did not know the designation of the Engr Bn to which he was assigned. It is possibly the 15th Engr Bn. It should be noted that although the document which mentions the 67th Sapper Co was discovered in the same area that the contact took place with elements of the 812th Regt, none of the interrogation reports of the PW's captured in this area mention this unit. This is the first report of the 67th Sapper Co.)

(2) Other.

(a) PW Thanh Lien, from the 814th Bn, captured on 31 March 1967, revealed the following information: He has served with both the 814th and 808th Bns. He heard that the 808th Bn had sustained more than 100 KIA as a result of contact with ARVN forces at Ha My (possibly contact at YD 3357 on 17 March 1967) and had then moved back to the Hai Lang Jungle in the area of YD 382360. The 814th Bn presently has a strength of 300 men. Its battalion rear is located at Troung Phouc YD 385400 and the main part of the battalion is operating in Hai Lang (D). He further stated that the 808th Bn and the 814th Bn would alternate operating areas from time to time. (G-2 Comment: The report that the 808th Bn recently lost 100 men and the present strength of the 814th Bn is 300 is evaluated as probably true. The strength of the 808th Bn is adjusted to 342 and the combat effectiveness is decreased to C-3. The adjusted strength of 300 for the 814th Bn shows a loss of 193 men, thus causing the combat effectiveness to be lowered to C-4).

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(b) The following support companies of the 341st Div Hq and 31st Regt are accepted as confirmed in the DMZ area. The unit designators are considered organic to the NVA division. The units were all reported by PW Nguyen Minh LY, captured on 13 March 67 in the Con Thien area.

1. K-25 Sapper Co, 341st Div.
2. K-16 Recoilless Rifle Co, 31st Regt.
3. K-17 Mortar Co, 31st Regt.
4. K-18 Signal Co, 31st Regt.
5. K-19 Engineer Co, 31st Regt.
6. K-20 Medical Co, 31st Regt
7. K-21 Anti Aircraft Co, 31st Regt.
8. K-22 Transportation Co, 31st Regt.
9. K-23 Reconnaissance Co, 31st Regt.
10. K-24 Security and Guard Co, 31st Regt.

b. Thua Thien

(1) Operation BIG HORN (commenced 050001 Apr - continuing).
No identifications during the period.

c. Quang Nam

(1) Operation CANYON (commenced 060700H Apr - terminated 101200H Apr).
No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation DIXIE (commenced 071000H Apr - terminated 101600H Apr).
No identifications during the period.

(3) Operation HUMBOLDT (commenced 131000H Apr - continuing).
PW (name unknown) captured vic BT 043660 on 14 Apr 67 stated he was from an element of the T.89 Bn.

(4) Other.

(a) The Hoa Hieu Co in Quang Nam (P) has been redesignated the Q.16 Co with AKA's of Hoa Vang, X.66, 76 and Q.16B.

d. Quang Tin

(1) Other.

(a) The 14th Co in Quang Tin (P) has been redesignated the K.53 Co with the following AKA's: A.14 Co, V.14 Co, A.19 Co, 14th Co.

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Considerable information has been received in the past three months from captured documents and interrogation reports of the names of personalities of enemy units operating in the Quang Tri Province/DMZ area. The information has been compared and evaluated with previously held information. The accepted personalities are listed below. Some discrepancies in the spellings of names have been noted between the various interrogation reports of PW Nguyen Minh LY. The selected name was that which was evaluated as most reliable. These discrepancies are being checked.

a. 341st Div Hq

<u>Billet</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Source</u>
CO	Col	Luong THINH	1
Deputy Cdr	Col	Nguyen Quoc TRI	1, 5
PO	Col	Nguyen Hong DAO	1
AP0		Unknown	
Chief of Staff	LtCol	Cao LONG	1
Chief of Political Sect	LtCol	LUU	1
Chief of Rear Services	Maj	HUNG	1

b. K-25 Sapper Co, 341st Div

CO		HAU	1

c. 31st Regt Hq, 341st Div

CO*	Col	Nguyen Ngoc HUNG AKA HAI	1
XO	SrCapt	HOANG (returned to NVN due to poor physical condition)	1
PO	Col	Nguyen TRUNG	1
AP0	Col	AN	1
Chief Gen Staff	SrCapt	LE	1
Training Cadre (O & T Officer)	SrCapt	CHI	1
Chief Rear Services	SrCapt	HAI	1
Propaganda Training Officer	SrCapt	Nguyen Tan CUNG	1, 8
Chief of Artillery	SrCapt	HO	1
Logistics Officer	SrCapt	THAI	1

Note: * PW LY has reported CO as Le Ngoc HUNG and also Nguyen Ngoc HUNG. Recent captured documents indicate that the PO, Nguyen TRUNG is the CO. This information is being checked.

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d. 1st Bn Hq, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	SrCapt	Nguyen Van LAM	1
XO	Capt	Tran Van LAI	1
PO	SrCapt	Nguyen Minh LY (Captured on 13 Mar 67)	
AP0	Capt	Tran Ha TIEN	1, 3
Staff Chief		TAI	3
Comm Plt Ldr/Liaison	2dLt	Tran Dinh PHI	1
Training Cadre	2dLt	DUC	1
ADJ	1stLt	NAM	1
Medical Officer	Cpl	Le Ngoc HUONG	1

e. 1st Co, 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	SrCapt	Dinh Van THANH	1, 4
XO	2dLt	LAO	1
PO	1stLt	KHUE	1
AP0		TY	2

f. 2nd Co, 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	1stLt	Vo Trong HUONG	1, 3, 6
XO*	Asp.	Pham THANH	1, 3
PO	1stLt	Ho Van NANG	1, 6
AP0*	2dLt	Nguyen Cong VUONG	1, 6

Note: * PW LY stated that the XO was Pham THANH. The captured document lists the AP0 as Cao Ngoc THANH. Another captured document lists VUONG as AP0. This information is being checked.

g. 3rd Co, 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO*	SrLt	Nguyen Hoa DIEU	1, 4
XO	2dLt	Ho Kiem CHI	1
PO	1stLt	Minh SON	1, 7
AP0	2dLt	Tran Van THU	1

Note: * PW LY stated CO's name as Nguyen Ngoc DIEU. The captured document lists the name as Nguyen Noa DIEU. This information is being checked.

h. 4th Co, 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO*	SrLt	Nguyen Kinh LONG	1, 4
XO	2dLt	Trin QUOC	1
PO		Nguyen Dinh THANH	1
AP0		Possibly THANH	3

Note: * PW LY stated CO's name as Tran Dinh LONG. The captured document lists the name as Nguyen Kinh LONG. This information is being checked.

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i. 2nd Bn Hq, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	SrCapt	AN	1
XO	WO	THINH	1

j. 6th Co, 2nd Bn, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO		Nguyen Huu HUY	9
ADJ	WO	Nguyen Dinh VIEM	9, 10

k. 3rd Bn Hq, 31st Regt, 341st Div

XO	WO	NHI	1

l. K-16 RR Co, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	1stLt	MA	1

m. K-17 Mort Co, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	1stLt	NGU	1

n. K-18 Sig Co, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	1stLt	LIET	1

o. K-19 Eng Co, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	1stLt	TRINH	1

p. K-20 Med Co, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	1stLt	TRACH	1

q. K-21 AA Co, 31st Regt, 341st Div

CO	1stLt	KHOAN	1

r. 32nd Regt, 341st Div

CO*	Maj	TINH	1
PO*	Maj	QUE	1

Note: * Names as furnished by PW LY are conflicting. Re-interrogation has been requested to clarify these personalities.

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PO	Maj	TRANG	1
CofS	SrCapt	BINH	1

t. 271st Regt, 341st Div (Poss 33rd Regt)

CO	Maj	LUONG	1
PO	Maj	Sau DOAN	1

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1. PW Nguyen Minh LY. Captured on 13 Mar 67 at (YD 164686). 7th ITT/III MAF reports 66, 66B, 66C - 67. I Corps report (no number) dated 25 Mar 67. 3rd ITT/III MAF report 278-67, 6499th Spt Grp (USAF) report dated 26 Mar 67.

2. Captured document. Captured at (YD 164686) on 13 Mar 67. 3rd ITT Batch Number R-18-2, Item #4. Transfer order of TY to K1.

3. Captured document. Captured at (YD 164686) on 13 Mar 67. 3rd ITT Batch Number R-18-1. The document is a 1st Bn Cadre listing, undated.

4. Captured document. Captured at (YD 164686) on 13 Mar 67. 3rd ITT Batch Number R-18-7. The document is a promotion list to SrLt for four officers in 1st Bn. The document is dated 15 Jan 67.

5. Rallier Tran Than Binh. Rallied on 5 Nov 1966.

6. Captured document. Captured at (YD 164686) on 13 Mar 67. 3rd ITT Batch Number R-18-14. The document is a party fees list.

7. Captured document. Captured at (YD 164686) on 13 Mar 67. 3rd ITT Batch Number R-18-8. The document is a message dated 11 Mar 67 on the 3rd Company's combat actions for the period 6-9 March.

8. Captured document. Captured at (XD 940625) on 6 March 67. 3rd ITT Batch Number R-11-6 and CDEC Bull 3356 Log #03-3261-67.

9. Captured document. Captured at (XD 940625) on 6 Mar 67. 3rd ITT Batch Number R-11-8. Document dated 10 Feb 67.

10. Captured documents. Captured at (XD 940625) on 6 Mar 67. 3rd ITT Numbers R-11-1, R-11-9, R-11-10, R-11-12. Most recent document dated 10 Feb 67.

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8. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ	806TH NVA BN
N3R HQ	804TH MF BN
341ST NVA DIV HQ	810TH LF BN
32ND NVA REGT	V.25 LF BN
33RD NVA REGT (POSS 271ST REGT)	GK-31 BN
34TH NVA ARTY REGT	1506TH ENGR BN
324B NVA DIV HQ	GK-33 BN
803RD NVA REGT	70TH MF BN
812TH NVA REGT	48TH LF BN
90TH NVA REGT	1ST MF REGT HQ
808TH MF BN	2ND MF REGT HQ
6TH NVA REGT HQ	409TH SAPPER BN
800TH MF BN	
802ND MF BN	

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT) TO III MAF
PERINTREP 15-67

1. Headquarters, 3d NVA Div. Lieutenant NGUYEN NGOC ANH, Personnel Officer, 3d NVA Div rallied to the ARVN on 7 February 1967 and was interrogated by the 3d ITT on 6 April 1967. He provided the following information:

a. He arrived in SVN in February 1966 and was assigned to the 80th Bn, 3d Div where he remained until transferred to Division Headquarters in August 1966. In November 1966, he was sent to QUANG NGAI (P) to recruit personnel and return deserters. He was to report to the 3d Div, located near NGHIA DIEM (V), BINH DINH (P), during December 1966.

b. The only supply areas he has heard of are K-7, K-5 and K-3. K-7 and K-5 handle weapons and ammunition as well as a repair factory for defective equipment which is located deep in QUANG NAM (P). K-3 handles signal and electronic equipment and is located somewhere in the GIA LAI Jungle. Resupply is done several ways. Sometimes submarines carry supplies to several points along the coastline where they are unloaded at sea and brought ashore in small craft. Landing points are the TAM QUANG River, BINH DINH (P), BINH DUC firth between SON TINH and BINH SON (D), QUANG NGAI (P) and SA HUYEN Beach in the vicinity of (BS 925254). Medical supplies come from the north and CHINA every three months and are of meager quantity and poor quality. The last submarine came in December 1966. The supplies are carried to K-3, K-5 and K-7 by Montagnards. Rice and food are transported by truck through LAOS on Highway 9.

c. Frequently the 3d Div has lost many people; the replacements come from a recruiting school on the SONG TRANH River, BINH DINH (P). The recruits are taught basic military subjects and political training during a three month period. Replacements are well trained and supplied on an "as needed" basis.

d. The division always receives advance warning by radio of an air-strike 12 to 24 hours prior to the strike. The messages were dependable and only once during 1966 did anyone come close to being hit. They also receive warning of defoliation missions. All VC know that the defoliation chemical is harmless but propagandize the people to make them believe that it is poisonous.

e. ANH has never heard of an artillery regiment but does know of a rocket battalion which arrived in MR-5 early in January 1967. The battalion strength of 120 to 180 men is split into separate units and stationed near major airfields. The VC called the battalion a "fire arrow" battalion.

f. During June 1966, ANH accompanied two CHICOM advisors to BINH DINH (P) to study the terrain and plan tactics in the event that CHINA sends troops to support the Vietnamese cause. They went from PHU CAT (D) to HOI AN, PHU MY, HOAI NHON and AN TAO Districts. The two advisors remained about one month and returned (presumably to NVN). They told ANH that CHICOM troops are in NVN to help defend the capital and Russian advisors are in HANOI to teach rocket techniques and train pilots. ANH has never seen a Russian in SVN.

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(G-2 Comment: F/3. Elements of information partially substantiated by ralliers HUYNH CU (25 March 1967) and TRINH TRONG TUAN (AKA: BA) (20 October 1966).)

2. H-1 Co, K-6 Bn, THU BON (812th) Regt, 324B Div. Pvt DO MAC THANG, 2d Sqd, 1st Plt, H-1 Co, K-6 Bn, THU BON Regt, 324B Div rallied to the 1st Bn, 2d Regt, 1st ARVN Div in the vicinity of (YD 150680) on 1 April 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. THANG was drafted into the NVA in September 1966 and received two months training consisting of dry firing, digging, laying ambushes, throwing grenades and political indoctrination at the THO XUAN Camp, NAU XUAN (D), TAM JOA (P), NVN. He left the training camp in December 1966 and, after walking 45 days, stopped in a rest camp at QUANG TRACH (D), QUANG BINH (P). After a two day march on Highway 1 to the QUYET Agricultural Site, VINH LINH (D), he joined the H-1 Co and crossed the BEN HAI River in the vicinity of (YD 0875). After reaching the BEN TAT area (YD 0874), he followed the BAC TIEN Road east to Route 76 where he turned and walked south for two hours and then in a westerly direction for three hours to Hill 120 (possibly YD 067655).

b. The H-1 Co has about 120 men broken down into a headquarters section, three rifle platoons and an attached mortar platoon. Each rifle platoon has one RP-46 LMG (1200 rds ammo), three RPD LMGs (500 rds ammo each), nine AK-47s (200 rds ammo each) and 18 SKS rifles (90 rds ammo each). The mortar platoon has two 60mm mortars (approximately 200 rds ammo), one RP-46 LMG (600 rds ammo) and an unknown number of AK-47s and SKS'.

c. The mission of the company was to conduct raids and set up an ambush on Hill 202 (XD 990691). They were to withdraw north across the BEN HAI River by 292400H March 1967.

d. Ammo is plentiful and resupplied as needed. Food is adequate and the company carries rations for 10 days. Food is resupplied every 10 days by a 12 man group from the Battalion Transportation Co.

e. The company has one telephone (unknown type) and a wire line. Runners are used for intra-company communications.

f. The company has one corpsman and one medic. Each man was issued 100 vitamin tablets prior to coming south. The corpsman has quinine pills.

g. The morale was good until the company was subjected to artillery fire and wartime hardships. THANG believes some of the men want to surrender.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. The information is considered insufficient to evaluate adequately.)

3. Guerrilla, CAM HAI (V), HIEU NHON (D), QUANG NAM (P). PHAM DA, VC Corpsman, CAM HAI (V) guerrilla was captured at HA BAI #1 (H) (BT 115633) on 27 March 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

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a. The district force unit known as THI XA and Q-12 has changed its unit designation to F-12. This unit has approximately 120 men and the headquarters is normally located in Hamlet #1, CAM THANH (V) (location unknown).

b. The village guerrillas receive information and intelligence from the F-12 unit but do not receive advance warning of forthcoming US operations in the area.

c. The VC tell the village guerrillas and main force members that anyone captured by the Americans is beaten and killed. A similar fate awaits ralliers under the CHIEU HOI program who are turned over to the ARVN. The people are forbidden to read leaflets and, if caught, are taken away for brainwashing.

d. The village guerrillas have suffered heavy casualties since TET, including 15 KIA. Morale is low because of casualties and they no longer feel safe when hiding from sweep operations because the people divulge the locations of secret tunnels. They are afraid of air and artillery, and especially the large sweep operations.

e. There are no young men left in CAM HAI (V) to serve as replacements for the VC. It is unknown where replacements will come from but there has been no NVA in the area.

f. PHAM DA attended a 24 day training course in bandaging wounds and prevention of malaria in a school at XOM TRUNG #5 (H), CAM HAI (V). The instructor was NGUYEN DUC, Chief Corpsman of the VC District Force. The village aid station was in the same building but since the Americans started operating in the area, there is no fixed location. The seriously wounded are carried across the river toward DUY XUYEN (D) by local people. The location of the aid station is unknown but the trip takes a day and a night.

g. An American was captured by a squad of the Q-12 Co in the vicinity of (BT 135624) during 1966. He was treated well and taken to an unknown location.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. The Q-12 Co is carried as a reported unit. First report of THI XA and F-12 as AKAs for the Q-12 Co.)

4. 7th Flt, 30th Co (Independent). Infantryman DONG VAN CONG, 1st Sqd, 7th Flt, 30th Co (Independent), was captured at (YD 336472) by ARVN on 6 April 1967 and gave the following information during interrogation:

a. His unit was a part of the blocking force to prevent possible reinforcements from arriving to assist forces at LA VANG. He was wounded and picked up during a search of the area after the attack.

b. He had left NVN 1 January 1967, crossed the BEN HAI River, and arrived in the assigned area of operations on 4 or 5 March 1967. Their company area of operations was the flat land south of the river (YD 510471), which separates QUANG TRI from THUA THIEN, and east of Highway 1.

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c. On the night of the attack the company crossed the OGAING River in the vicinity of (YD 458445) in a boat which held about 40 men, and moved west to cross Highway 1 at (YD 422440), then proceeded northwest to the area of attack. After the attack the captive's unit was to withdraw one kilometer to the southeast to regroup. After regrouping captive did not know where they were supposed to go.

d. The 30th Co is composed of three infantry platoons, one weapons squad, and a mortar squad. The infantry platoons are numbered 7th, 8th, 9th and composed of three infantry squads, a weapons squad and two mortar (60mm and 82mm) squads. At the time of the attack the company's strength was approximately 100 men.

e. When he left NVN each man was issued a weapon, ammunition, two green uniforms, one set of black PJs, one canteen, a cartridge belt, one mosquito net, a blanket, one round rim hat, one pair of sandals and one pair of rubber boots.

f. Enroute south they stopped at caves along the trail, which were guarded by a couple of men armed with SKS's and they were given food. In THUA THIEN the company was given food by the villagers but he didn't know what compensation they received. They had not received ammunition since their arrival in SVN.

g. The 30th Co had only one corpsman but every squad leader helped in medical care.

h. Morale was high. His unit had not been in action prior to this attack and had never been subjected to artillery or air attacks. The men of the 30th Co were somewhat fascinated by their weapons and looked forward to using them.

(G-2 Comment: F/6. First report of 30th Co. Information appears consistent with other information for this area.)

5. A captured operation plan for a VC attack on the CAU MO Sub-Sector, VINH BINH (P) revealed the following:

a. Assembly Plan:

(1) For the operation in which different units are to concentrate at the SON TRANG Road Junction.

(2) Order of movement is as follows: Units 509, 58, 61, 57; units 5 and 2, medical and captured equipment element.

(3) Sampans will be at the former Command Post which is UT XUM's house.

(4) Route of movement is prescribed as follows: Route 1: 61 + 57 + units 5 and 2; Route 2: 58 + 50; Route 3: 509 and subordinate elements.

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(5) All sampans must be carefully camouflaged and soldiers are not allowed to smoke.

(6) When arriving at the place, sampans must be docked on one side of the river and not in the middle.

(7) At 0930 hours reconnaissance agents in the east must go back to sampan landing place to report.

(8) At 0800 hours the reconnaissance agents must lead the commander to the command post position.

(9) At 0900 hours there must be report on the final information so that the elements subordinate to 61 + 57 can start their movement.

(10) The following course of action will be observed:

(a) 0600 hours: Units arrive at assembly area at SON TRANG.

(b) 0800 hours: Arrive at sampan landing place and take up positions.

(c) 0700 hours: Company commanders report to the pagoda [Church] to receive additional instructions.

(d) 0830 hours: Unit start moving to the operation area.

(e) 1130 hours: Arrive at the assault points and report location to command post.

(f) 1130 hours: Order for assault is given.

(g) Open fire and assault by the order of D.

b. Designations:

(1) A7: 1 Pyrotechnic signal tube.

(2) A7: 1 bugle.

(3) Pass word: QUYET THANG [will to win].

(4) Dress: Every soldier is only allowed to wear black shorts at night and camouflage himself with tree leaves during the day.

(5) Challenge: Raise the left hand with a tree branch and circle it three times.

(6) Reply: Raise and lower the tree branch three times.

(7) Fire is opened when two pyrotechnic signals are fired.

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(8) After taking up position, the unit must fire a blue pyrotechnic signal.

(9) Various elements of the operation recognize each other by dimming the flash light three times (or make a noise three times).

(10) The order to destroy the objective will be given by circling the flash light and then pointing it straight to the front.

(11) The order for withdrawing will be orally or by firing two red pyrotechnic signals.

(12) A7: 12 sampans.

(13) Nine THIEN medical sections.

(14) Surgical operation station is at SON TRANG road junction.

(15) Prisoners are brought to the pagoda where the sampans are docked.

(16) C must assign someone to watch the sampans during the operation.

c. Purposes:

(1) To conduct a first attack to disrupt the enemy pacification in the vicinity of MAN THICH River. Our Regional Party Committee's purposes are to disrupt the enemy pacification program and at the same time stop them from activating the CAU MO sub-section which is also called MAN THICH sub-section.

(2) Our D has just been assigned the mission to conduct the attack on the enemy when he comes to our area of operation. This counter sweep operation complies with our Party Committee's directive concerning the activity during the past six months.

(3) If we win the coming battle, we will meet with the requirements of our Party Committee's directive. That is to destroy 2D in six months. This D must be the second one destroyed in six months.

(4) To contribute to our victory, we must win this battle.

(5) In this operation, we must closely cooperate with friendly units in order to accomplish the common mission which is to achieve victory. Unit C509 has very much experience on the surprise attack tactic and we must try to learn from them.

e. Our advantages:

(1) The military region will command our unit in the operation and Comrade SAU is in charge.

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(2) During past battles, we had many outstanding achievements. However, we must try to gain more to meet with the requirements.

(3) Our troops were enthusiastic after the training course and the emulation movement. At the same time our C's were experienced in using the surprise attack tactic.

(4) Our cadre thoroughly understood the enemy's situation. However, we still have to face some difficulties.

f. Difficulties:

- (1) Cadre of C and B have poor health.
- (2) We also have a shortage of personnel.
- (3) Some comrades in the unit have no experience.
- (4) The moonlight is also one of four difficulties.

g. Ideological leadership:

(1) We should make the cadre and soldiers of every cell and "A" thoroughly be aware of their duties.

(2) We must assault at the same time to fully utilize our strength. We must also try to strongly, rapidly and deeply attack the enemy in order to successfully carry out the missions assigned by the higher echelon. We must try to overcome our weak points.

(3) In this operation the enemy troops operated in the MAN THICH area and enemy artillery units operated weakly. However, our soldiers were not calm and, consequently, would have few combat achievements.

(4) We must try to attack the enemy strongly and accomplish all our missions. It is also very necessary for us to have solidarity and coordination in every fight.

(5) When we attack an enemy post, we must destroy it completely in order to seize much war booty.

Policy concerning the treatment of disabled veteran and war dead and seizure of good war booty.

5. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u> <u>BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
PHANG AI (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS768862/QUANG NGAI
VO ANH (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN NGOC ANH (R)	UNK	UNK	3D DIV	CHIEU HOI
TRUONG TAN BA (C)	3APR67	JUNK FLT	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN BAN (C)	22MAR67	UNK	VC	BT125635/III MAF COMP
VO BA BAY (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN CANH (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
PAM CHIEN (C)	5APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAN CHIEM (C)	20MAR67	UNK	GUERR	BT126625/I CORPS CCC
NGUYEN CHIU (R)	4APR67	---	RTNEE	BS765388/DUC PHU(D) HQ
HUYNH CHO (C)	3APR67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS767861/QUANG NGAI
PHAM CHUC (C)	3APR67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS767861/QUANG NGAI
PHONG VAN CHONG (C)	4APR67	RECON	PW	BS745856/III MAF COMP
PHAM CHUNG (C)	3APR67	JUNK FLT	CIV DEF	UNK/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN CUC (C)	3APR67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT624008/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAM DA (C)	27MAR67	UNK	VC	BT130618/I CORPS CCC
LE DANH (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS768862/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN KHANH DINH (C)	5APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS7683/SON TINH(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN DO (C)	UNK	ARVN	31ST REGT	UNK/I CORPS
TRUONG LOI (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN DOI (C)	5APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO DONG (C)	2APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS730899/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN DUT (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
DINH TRI DUNG (C)	5APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN BAI (C)	17MAR67	C/1/1	CIV DEF	BT142620/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
TRAN THI MAT (C)	5APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE HIEN (R)	4APR67	---	RTNEE	DUC PHO(D) HQ
TRUONG HOT (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS758852/QUANG NGAI
VO THI HONG (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
BUI VAN ICH (C)	5APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS756853/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN KHOA (C)	3APR67	C/1/7	CIV DEF	BS767861/QUANG NGAI
LE KHUYEN (C)	3APR67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS767861/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN KY (C)	27MAR67	2/1	CIV DEF	BTO94654/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAL LAP	UNK	ARVN	31ST REGT	UNK/I CORPS
NGO LE (C)	2APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS730899/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN LINH (C)	2APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS730899/QUANG NGAI
TRUONG LOI (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS758852/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN LUA (C)	2APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS730899/QUANG NGAI
PHAM VAN LUU (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS758852/QUANG NGAI
VO LY (C)	2APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS730899/QUANG NGAI
BUI MANH (C)	2APR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS725877/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN MAI (C)	5APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAM MAM (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
TONG MANH (C)	1APR67	B/1/7	PW	BS707889/III MAF
PHAN MUI (C)	2APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS730899/QUANG NGAI
TRUONG MY (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN VAN MY (R)	4APR67	---	RTNEE	DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN NHAN (C)	2APR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS725877/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN NHON (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS758852/QUANG NGAI
TRAN NHUOC (C)	4APR67	CIT	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI NHONG (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
VO NHUT (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS768862/QUANG NGAI
BUI NI (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI PHAM (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHI (C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/DUC DUC(D) HQ
NGUYEN PHU (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS745853/QUANG NGAI
LE BA PHUOC (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE QUE (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN QUYEN (C)	1APR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS715893/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN SEN (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN SI (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
NGUYEN SY (C)	29MAR67	F/2/1	CIV DEF	BT039261/I CORPS CCC
NGUYEN THI TAN (R)	2APR67	F/3/7	CIV DEF	BS777412/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN TAM (C)	24MAR67	UNK	CIV DEF	BT052593/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGO THI TAN (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
PHAM THI TAU (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE THANH (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS758853/SON TINH(D) HQ
PHAM THANH (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS745853/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN THE (C)	2APR67	K/3/7	CIV DEF	BS765393/DUC PHO(D) HQ
PHAN THI (C)	5APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
DANG THOA (C)	3APR67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS750871/QUANG NGAI
PHAM THUONG (C)	4APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
VO TRINH (C)	3APR67	1/7	CIV DEF	BS767861/QUANG NGAI
PHAN TRO (C)	17MAR67	C/1/1	CIV DEF	BT142620/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
PHAN TU (C)	1APR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS718900/QUANG NGAI
BUI TU (C)	5APR67	D/1/7	CIV DEF	BS745856/BINH SON(D) HQ
THUONG TRUNG (C)	27MAR67	UNK	GUERR	BT128620/I CORPS CCC
NGUYEN XE (C)	1APR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS700905/QUANG NGAI
NGUYEN XIM (C)	4APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS745853/QUANG NGAI

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAP PERINTREP NO. 15-67

1. GENERAL. VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Significant reports received during the period concerned the escape of 11 VN who were abducted by the VC because of their candidacy for the local GVN elections, a report of VC use of counterfeit 500 \$VN bills and VC exploitation of the QUANG TRI City attack for propaganda purposes.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. A 12 April report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that six VC intelligence agents are operating in the DANANG area with the mission of drawing maps of the DANANG Airbase, POW facilities and other U.S. positions in the area. Reportedly, the agents make contact with their sources in the HOA SON barge area near the TRINH MINH Bridge (BT 035758) and in SON THUY (H) (BT 080714).

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	12Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 098576
QUANG TRI	12Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 103576
QUANG TRI	12Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	YD 326520
THUA THIEN	15Apr	Highway partially destroyed	ZD 068012
QUANG NAM	12Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	AT 928842
QUANG NAM	12Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	BT 046613
QUANG NAM	13Apr	Road culvert destroyed	BT 182412

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

QUANG TRI. An 8 April report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that propaganda leaflets issued by the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, QUANG TRI, were found along Highway #9 in the vicinity of CAM LO (V) (YD 131594). The leaflets, which were printed in English, warned that if Marines expected to stay alive and return to their families, they were to protest the "Aggressive War" of the Johnson Administration and demand peace and repatriation. The content of the leaflets further related that Route #9 was a "graveyard" for U.S. Marines and that during February and March, the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines were annihilated.

An 8 April report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that a VC platoon entered CAM HIEU (V) (YD 182603) and distributed propaganda leaflets which contained the usual anti-U.S. theme.

An 11 April report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team stated that a platoon of VC entered NGHIA AN TUY (H) (YD 214614) and left

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propaganda leaflets telling of the recent VC "victories" in QUANG TRI (P).

QUANG NAM. A 9 April report from the 1st Tank Battalion related that VC propaganda leaflets entitled "Our Resounding Victories" and "Why" were found in the vicinity of (AT 984707). As reflected by the title, this type propaganda has been discovered on previous occasions within the I CTZ.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

QUANG TRI. A report received on 12 April from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that the VC are planning to confiscate rice from the XOM CON TONG Refugee Village (YD 3269) which was given to the villagers by a U.S. agency.

An 11 April report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team stated that at approximately 2100 on 10 April a platoon of VC entered DAM SON (H) (YD 092534) and abducted six villagers.

An 11 April report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that an estimated VC platoon entered DINH HA (H) (YD 183596), assembled the populace, and instructed them not to vote in the forthcoming GVN local elections.

An 11 April report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team stated that an estimated squad of VC entered PHU NGAN (H) (XD 200622) and destroyed the village headquarters.

An 11 April report from the 15th Counterintelligence Team related that on 10 April the VC conducted propaganda meetings in DAU KINH (H) (YD 322582) and TRA LIEN TAY (H) (D 305587) in order to propagandize the VC "victory" in QUANG TRI. The VC also requested each family who attended the meeting to contribute a bag of candy which was to be given to those VC who participated in the battle of QUANG TRI City.

THUA THIEN. An 11 April report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that on 9 April approximately 12 VC entered DONG TOM (H) (YD 823175) and assassinated CAO THUYET, who refused to pay his share of a "tax" levied on the villagers.

QUANG NAM. A 13 April report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC have organized a reeducation course in Chieu Market, TU CAU (H) (BT 036663) entitled "U LI" (Slow Progress). Reportedly, the course is designed for those villagers who are not fully convinced that the VC cause is legally just and for those persons suspected of aiding GVN forces.

An 11 April report from a source considered usually reliable stated that in the vicinity of (AT 089555) the VC assassinated a candidate for Hamlet Chief, a former Buddhist Office Chief for DUY XUYEN (D), a former ARVN NP member and a Strategic Youth Cadre from VINH THO (V). This report further related that the 11 of the 12 candidates who were kidnapped by the VC on 2 April escaped and returned to their villages when U.S. artillery and air strikes hit the vicinity of BINH LUONG (V),

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THANG BINH (D) (BT 215494) where they were held captive. (CI Comment: Refer to III MAF PERINTREP No. 14-67. Upon return to their villages, the captives withdrew as candidates for the local GVN elections.)

QUANG NGAI. A report received on 12 April from a U.S. Intelligence Agency stated that as of late January 1967, the VC in SON TINH (D) were entrusting "tradesmen" with counterfeit 500 \$VN bills which were to be used to buy food and other supplies in government controlled areas.


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23 APRIL 1967

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

PERINTREP NO. 16-67



THE MAP PERINTREP # 16-67

16-22 April 67

GROUP 4
 UPGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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 G-2 Section, III MAF
 DANANG, RVN
 23 April 1967
 Ser: 0107167

PERINTREP 16-67

Period Covered: 160001H - 222400H Apr67

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG(G) - Vietnam 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13
 ND 48-4, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. QUANG TRI (P) - DMZ. There were no reports of significant enemy movement north of or within the DMZ. Aerial photography flown north of the eastern portion of the DMZ on 9 and 13 April revealed continued enemy construction of ground field fortifications. A comparison was based upon March coverage over the same area.

The tempo of the enemy effort in QUANG TRI (P) remained relatively light for the third consecutive week. Activity noted was centered in the GIO LINH/CON THIEN sectors, in an area within a 15 kilometer radius of the KHE SANH combat base and in southeastern QUANG TRI (P).

Ground reconnaissance deployed along a line running from (YD 1065) north of CAM LO southwest to the KHE SANH combat base reported sightings of the enemy which totalled approximately 160 NVA and VC. Three contacts were reported. At (YD 1065) on 16 April, a reconnaissance patrol gained contact with an estimated NVA platoon. Supporting fires were called for and the enemy withdrew with unknown casualties. On 20 April in the same vicinity, a reconnaissance element discovered a hut containing 200 assorted mortar rounds, 25 individual weapons and a large quantity of grenades and flares.

At (XD 8752) northeast of KHE SANH on 21 April, contact was made with an estimated 50 man NVA element. The enemy was observed wearing black helmets. Artillery fire was called in with one NVA KIA resulting. On 20 April at (XD 7346) west of KHE SANH, a reconnaissance element contacted approximately 56 NVA. Small arms and artillery fire accounted for four NVA KIA.

At (XD 818455) and (XD 804466), northwest of KHE SANH on 16 and 17 April, elements of 1st Bn, 9th Marines gained contact with small groups of NVA. With the support of artillery the Marine rifle elements killed several of the enemy, reported a series of secondary explosions and discovered several new graves containing three enemy dead.

Reconnaissance south of the western portion of Route 9 was negative.

Two kilometers north of QUANG TRI City a civilian bus detonated a mine killing two Vietnamese civilians. Immediately to the south at (YD 327521) the TRIEU HONG Village Chief was killed when he detonated a mine.

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In eastern QUANG TRI (P) and in the sector south of QUANG TRI City, reconnaissance elements reported sighting a total of approximately 60 VC. Two contacts were made with the enemy in the area, one of which was with an estimated enemy platoon on 21 April.

A PW taken at (YD 313477) on 15 April stated he was from the 14th Co, 6th Regt and that his unit was located four days walk southeast of his place of capture. This could have placed the 14th Co in the vicinity of Base Area 114. A C.14th Engr Co is currently carried by III MAF as a unit subordinate to the Northern Sub-Region Headquarters.

At (YD 343444) on 17 April, patrol elements of 1st Bn, 9th Marines discovered three new graves which produced seven recently killed VC.

Elsewhere in the southeastern portion of the province enemy activity consisted of minor harassing and probing actions against friendly security elements located, for the most part, along Highway 1.

b. THUA THIEN (P) - PHU BAI TAOR. The tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity in eastern THUA THIEN (P) dropped off slightly over previous reporting periods. At (YD 613278) on 21 April, an unknown number of VC attacked a PF platoon guarding a railway bridge. The PF's returned fire however, the enemy was subsequently able to destroy two spans of the bridge. Enemy casualties were unknown.

To the southeast on 17 April, PK-17 (YD 645267) received approximately 30 rounds of mortar fire none of which fell within the positions. Fire was returned but with unknown results.

During the early morning hours of 17 April, the THUA THIEN Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and RD Teams 5 and 8 sustained simultaneous ground attacks approximately five kilometers northeast of HUE. The reconnaissance unit was returning from a successful ambush launched against three enemy sampans, which had resulted in 17 VC KIA, and joined forces with RD Team 8 against the enemy. RD Team 5 withdrew from contact. ARVN forces reacted rapidly and by noon RD Team 8 had linked up with the 1st Bn, 3rd ARVN Regt in a counterattack. By late afternoon the enemy had increased in strength to an estimated reinforced battalion; however, effective USMC and ARVN supporting fires contained the enemy and, by early evening, contact ceased with the enemy withdrawing. The determined and aggressive stand made by participating units contributed to the defeat of a large enemy force. Total enemy casualties were 71 VC KIA, 14 individual weapons and one crew served weapon captured. Documents taken during the encounter indicated that elements of the 808th Bn had participated in the action.

To the east and at (YD 935240) on 17 April, four Vietnamese children detonated an explosive device while moving along a road. Two were killed, two were wounded.

In the same locale a PF platoon manning night defensive positions was attacked by an estimated platoon sized enemy unit. The PF's returned fire

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and withdrew. No casualties were reported.

Ground reconnaissance deployed west of HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported a drop in the number of enemy sighted when compared to that reported last week. Two contacts occurred, one with an unknown number of the enemy on 17 April and the second with an estimated 10 VC.

There was a decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the PHU BAI TAOR. Those reported all occurred in the northern portion close to the LOC.

The enemy continued to initiate harassing attacks against friendly elements located southeast of the PHU BAI TAOR between PHU BAI and DANANG. An unknown number of VC entered BAI SON (V) (ZD 007034) west of PHU LOC (V) and kidnapped a Vietnamese civilian. The reason behind the abduction remains unknown.

Two mining incidents occurred at (ZD 028025) and (ZD 071011) on 18 April. Both involved ARVN vehicles. Casualties were minor and damage to the vehicles slight.

On the same date and in the general vicinity of (ZD 085006), CAC patrols made three contacts with enemy elements ranging from squad to platoon size. Aggressive action by the CAC resulted in 20 VC KIA.

The last four reporting periods have seen continued enemy interest in the area east of PHU LOC (V).

Aerial reconnaissance of the ALUOI - ASHAU road revealed use of the road by the enemy. Five trucks were sighted on 18 and 19 April. The trucks were subsequently hit by air and at least three damaged.

c. QUANG NAM (P) - DANANG TAOR. Aerial photography flown during late March and early April between (AT 8285) and (ZC 0584) west of the DANANG TAOR revealed a slight increase in enemy ground activity when compared to early March readouts.

Ground reconnaissance within the northwestern portion of the DANANG TAOR reported a sighting of 80 to 100 Vietnamese on 19 April at (AT 8380). A probability exist that a portion of this number were VC.

There was a slight decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the DANANG TAOR. Action was diffuse and as a continuing factor the number of mine and booby trap incidents remained high. At (AT 8785) on 21 April, a squad ambush of G Co, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines was attacked by an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. Heavy fire was exchanged and a reaction force committed. The enemy sustained eight KIA (Prob).

South of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp, Marine reconnaissance elements gained contact with small groups of the enemy over the period 18 and 19

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April. Friendly fire resulted in three VC KIA.

A heavy reconnaissance asset deployed south of the DANANG TAOR produced sightings of approximately 250 of the enemy. This number represents a sharp rise over the 80 VC reported last week in the same area.

To the south and in DAI LOC (D) on 19 April, a CAC element in night defensive positions three kilometers north of DAI LOC (V) was attacked by an estimated VC company. The VC managed to penetrate the perimeter and destroyed several bunkers before being forced to withdraw. One VC was killed during the action.

Enemy initiated activity in southeastern QUANG NAM (P) continued to be centered in the sector south of HOI AN City and along or in proximity to Highway 1. Four minings, an assassination, an abduction and the partial destruction of a culvert were reported over the week. With the exception of the blown culvert the other incidents were directed against the civilian populace.

From 16 through 20 April the enemy also conducted a series of probing and harassing actions against RF and PF security elements located in the same area. The heaviest of the attacks occurred on 16 April when the 706th RF Co manning the CAM KIM OP (BT 132561), one kilometer south of HOI AN City, was assaulted by an estimated VC company. Thirty VC were killed during the engagement. RD Team 7 with a protecting PF element was also attacked by an unknown number of VC in the same vicinity. Casualties were negligible. Other incidents in the same area consisted of harassing small arms and light mortar fire.

On 21 April elements of F Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines in the vicinity of NUI LOC SAN (BT 0530), gained contact with an estimated enemy company. Subsequent action grew in intensity with reaction forces being committed. Contact continued and by 22 April the enemy force was estimated to be at reinforced battalion strength. Casualties were 115 VC KIA, 100 KIA (Prob), five PW's and one crew served weapon captured.

d. QUANG TIN (P) - CHU LAI TAOR. The tempo of enemy activity reported from eastern QUANG TIN (P) remained the same as the last reporting period. Four mining incidents occurred, one in the north close to the QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN border, the remaining three in the vicinity of (BT 2525) northwest of TAM KY City. An unknown number of VC blew an unguarded culvert at (BT 2333) on 19 April. At (BT 182409) the VC left several warning signs advising the populace to avoid travelling on Highway 1 due to the danger of mines.

On 20 April a CIDG patrol contacted an unknown number of VC approximately five kilometers northwest of the TIEN PHUOC CIDG Camp. Fire was exchanged and the VC withdrew. Five VC were killed.

Elsewhere in eastern QUANG TIN (P) enemy activity was limited to small scale harassing actions against friendly security elements, with the majority occurring in the vicinity of TAM KY City.

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Ground reconnaissance disposed west of the northern end of the CHU LAI TAOR reported a total of approximately 40 VC sighted along the reconnaissance line. One minor contact occurred early in the week.

There was a slight decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents reported within the CHU LAI TAOR. At (BS 610950) on 17 April, a PF platoon was attacked by an estimated company of VC. Artillery was fired in support and the VC broke contact and fled. No casualties were reported. Four incidents were reported from the Korean Marine area responsibility.

Recent enemy activity in the vicinity of NUI LOC SAN raises the possibility of future enemy action in the northern portions of QUANG TIN (P). Intelligence information is available, though entirely unconfirmed, which points toward possible redeployment of elements of the 2d NVA Div out of QUANG NGAI (P) into QUANG TIN (P) as part of his forthcoming summer campaign.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). There was a noticeable decrease in both the tempo and intensity of enemy activity reported from eastern QUANG NGAI (P).

At (BS 730740) a junk from the 16th Coastal Surveillance Group was ambushed by an unknown number of VC. Following an exchange of fire the VC withdrew. Two mining incidents were reported at (BS 619686) and (BS 718597) early in the week. The first occurred four kilometers southwest of QUANG NGAI City and involved a Lambretta bus in which 14 Vietnamese civilians were killed. The second resulted in minor damage to an ARVN military vehicle on Highway 1.

At CHAU TU (V) (BS 590549) on 18 April, an estimated VC squad shot a village elder.

On 22 April at (BS 7742), elements of the 1st Bn, 35th Inf US Army received small arms and 75mm recoilless rifle fire from an unknown number of the enemy. Action continued at the end of the reporting period, and enemy casualties were 20 KIA and five individual weapons captured.

Elsewhere in coastal QUANG NGAI (P) there was a moderate decrease in the number of enemy actions directed against the GVN RD program, especially when compared to actions reported over the past four weeks.

Ground reconnaissance in the vicinity of (BS 6357) reported light sightings of the enemy.

On 18 April a CIDG patrol west of the GIA VUC CIDG Camp gained contact with an estimated enemy company. Fire was exchanged and the VC broke contact and hastily withdrew.

Though relatively quiet this week eastern QUANG NGAI (P) remains an area of possible future enemy activity.

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated incidents, when compared to the previous period, decreased slightly and totaled 279. Incidents consisted of two attacks, two assaults by fire, 36 mine/booby trap incidents, 91 small unit engagements, seven acts of sabotage and 141 incidents of AA fire.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment

(1) New booby trap. The following information was received from I FFORCEV concerning the discovery of a new type VC booby trap tactic. The booby trap consisted of three devices set in a triangular formation 25 meters apart, in a sandy open area between two bamboo thickets. The three devices consisted of a 155mm howitzer shell, a five inch naval gun shell, both buried nose up just below the surface, and a metal bucket filled with metal scrap surrounding a core of explosive. The bucket was also buried just below the surface. All three devices were connected by detonating cord so that if one was tripped it would trigger all three.

(2) New HEAT Grenade. Five PG-7G HEAT grenades were recovered in the vicinity of the now closed ASHAU CIDG Camp on 21 April. CMEC reports the PG-7G is a new AT grenade that replaces the older PG-2. It is basically a "Panzerfaust" grenade like the earlier model, except for the addition of a rocket assist motor. The normal propellant charge launches the grenade and the rocket motor ignites several meters beyond the muzzle. This gives the projectile greater range, a flatter trajectory and increased accuracy. Characteristics are as follows:

(a) Caliber	80mm
(b) Weight	5.1 lbs
(c) Muzzle velocity	328 FPS
(d) Maximum velocity	984 FPS
(e) Effective range	500 meters
(f) Armor penetration at 0°	11.8 - 12.6 inches

- e. Negative.

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f. Administrative Units/Installations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Source/Evaluation</u>
20 Mar	(BS 493454)	VC Military Agency	Agent Report; F/6
21 Mar	(BS 589659)	VC Hospital	Agent Report; F/3
2 Apr	(BS 570740)	Food Storage Area	Agent Report; F/3
3 Apr	(YD 665095)	VC Rest Station	Agent Report; F/6
4 Apr	(BS 642374)	VC Workshop	Agent Report; F/3
4 Apr	(BS 699485)	Ammo Storage Area	Agent Report; F/3
6 Apr	(BS 604490)	VC Aid Station	Agent Report; F/3
6 Apr	(BS 465665)	VC Hospital	Agent Report; F/3
7 Apr	(BS 408792)	Weapons Repair Site	Agent Report; F/3
8 Apr	(BS 440795)	Guerrilla Training Center	Agent Report; F/6
10 Apr	(BS 533306)	VC Military Clinic	Agent Report; F/4
11 Apr	(BS 322614)	Provincial Base Area	Agent Report; F/3
11 Apr	(BS 656455)	Food Storage Area	Agent Report; F/3
12 Apr	(XD 748075)	VC Hospital	Agent Report; F/6
19 Apr	(BS 6740)	Weapons Storage Area	Interrogation Report; F/3

g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire incidents totaled 147 for the reporting period, showing a slight increase when compared to the last period. A total of 36 aircraft sustained 141 hits, one of the highest hit totals on record. Grid squares of highest density were (AT 9960), (BT 0428), (BT 0528) and (BT 0630). No confirmed cases of 12.7mm fire were reported during the period.

i - q. Negative.

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r. Reconnaissance Activities.

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(1) QUANG TRI (P). Reconnaissance patrols deployed north of CAM LO, northwest and northeast of the KHE SANH combat base and southwest of QUANG TRI City, reported total sightings of approximately 220 of the enemy. Ground reconnaissance in the general area north of Route 9 and KHE SANH made three contacts over the period with estimated platoon sized enemy elements at (YD 1065), (XD 8752) and (XD 7346). On 20 April at (YD 094654), a reconnaissance patrol discovered a hut containing 200 assorted mortar rounds, 25 individual weapons and a quantity of grenades and flares.

Reconnaissance south of the western portion of Route 9 was negative.

South of QUANG TRI City reconnaissance patrols reported light sightings of the enemy totaling was 60 VC. Two contacts occurred, one of which at (YD 2635) on 21 April with an estimated enemy platoon.

(2) THUA THIEN (P). Ground reconnaissance elements deployed forward of the western approaches to HUE City and the PHU BAI TAOR reported a decrease in the number of enemy sighted when compared to last weeks results. Two minor contacts were made with small groups of the enemy. Reconnaissance south of the PHU BAI TAOR produced negative results.

(3) QUANG NAM (P). Ground reconnaissance disposed within the northwest portion of the DANANG TAOR reported one sighting of 80 to 100 Vietnamese civilians on 19 April at (AT 8380). Patrol members felt that a portion of this number were VC.

South of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp Marine reconnaissance patrols gained contact with small groups of the enemy over the period 18 through 19 April.

Reconnaissance deployed south of the DANANG TAOR and in considerable strength produced total sightings of approximately 250 of the enemy. When compared to the 80 VC reported last week the number represents a distinct increase.

(4) QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI (P). Light enemy activity was reported by ground reconnaissance deployed west of the CHU LAI TAOR. A total of approximately 40 VC were sighted and one minor contact was noted.

Ground reconnaissance in the vicinity of (BS 6357) reported light sightings of the enemy.

s. Captured Rice. The following amounts of rice were captured during the period in the areas indicated:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amounts (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
16 Apr	(YD 788113)	75	3d Bn, 26th Marines

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16 Apr	(YD 781119)	40	3d Bn, 26th Marines
18 Apr	(BT 007606)	500	2d Bn, 1st Marines
19 Apr	(BT 013603)	300	2d Bn, 1st Marines

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORSa. Enemy Organization. Annex A.b. Enemy Identifications. Annex A.c. Enemy Equipment. Annex A.d. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy personnel losses reflected a moderate increase for the reporting period when compared to the last period and consisted of 225 KIA (Conf), 308 KIA (Prob), and three VC PWs. Weapons losses were 63 individual and two crew served weapons captured.

f. Morale. No change.

g - h. Negative.

i. Terrain. No change.

j. Weather. For most of the week a series of weak troughs passing over I Corps produced broken and layered ceilings throughout the area. Late afternoon and evening thunderstorms over the mountains and portions of the piedmont and coastal lowland, produced isolated rainshowers. On 21 April an increase in the southeast flow of air at lower altitudes caused a partial clearing over I Corps, although isolated rainshowers continued over portions of the western highlands. The following are weekly averages for the areas indicated:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperatures				
High	80	81	85	83
Low	71	72	73	74
Rainfall (total)	5.45	1.25	.25	1.84
Visibility (miles)	7	7	8	7
Winds (knots)	5	5	5	5


For May weather brief, see Annex C.

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- k. Significant Agent, Interrogation and Document Report. Annex B.
- l. Negative.
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex D.
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. See III MAF PERINTREP 13-67.



B. S. READ
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. ORDER OF BATTLE
- B. SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT
- C. MAY WEATHER BRIEF
- D. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CG FLC	1
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COMUSMACV (J221)	1	CTG 79.5	1
CMC (CODE A02)	2	CTG 79.4	1
CG FMFPAC	1	CTG 76.5	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1	CTG 76.4	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	COMPHIERON SEVEN	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO 30TH NCR	9
COMNAVFORV	1	CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
CG 1ST MARDIV	50	CO 525TH MI GP	3
CG 3RD MARDIV	30	CO 7TH ENGR BN	1
CG 1ST MAW	45	CO 9TH ENGR BN	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST MP BN	1
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV	1	CO CAMP BUTLER	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA I CORPS	6
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO CO "C" 5TH USSF GP	3
CG 196TH LT INF BDE	5	CO 282D AVN CO	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CO 8TH RR FU	1
CTF 76	1	CICV	4
CG 9TH MAB	1	I DASC DANANG	1
CG 2D BDE ROKMC	5	III MAF	10
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1		

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 16-67.

III MAF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (C) ESTIMATED STRENGTH AS OF 222400H APR 67.

	NVA FORCE		VC MAIN FORCE		VC LOCAL FORCE		TOTAL	TOTAL
	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	UNITS	STRENGTH
	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>								
Military Region V (Hq)	1	650					1	650
Northern Sub-Region (Hq)	1	885					1	885
Divisions (Hq)	3	2,000					3	2,000
Regiments (Hq)	8	3,844	2	1,300			10	5,144
Battalions (Infantry)	23	11,262	12	4,484	6	2,050	41	17,796
Battalions (Other)	10	2,240	3	1,267			13	3,507
Separate Companies					26	2,485	26	2,485
TOTAL CONFIRMED STRENGTH		20,881		7,051		4,535		32,467
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>								
Divisions								
Regiments (Artillery Hq)	1	Unk					1	Unk
Battalions (Infantry)					1	400	1	400
Battalions (Other)								
Separate Companies					4	350	4	350
TOTAL PROBABLE STRENGTH						750		750
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>								
Regiments (Hq)								
Battalions (Infantry)					2	780	2	780
Battalions (Other)	2	500					2	500
Separate Companies					1	120	1	120
TOTAL POSSIBLE STRENGTH		500				900		1,400
COMBINED TOTAL STRENGTH		21,381		7,051		6,185		34,617

NOTE: Totals include units of 324B Div, 31st and 32nd Regts of 341st Div and 2nd VC Regt of 3rd NVA Div.

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2. NUMBER OF NVA/VC BATTALIONS BY TYPE (All Battalions)

<u>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</u>				<u>COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS</u>										
		<u>INF</u>	<u>SAPPER</u>	<u>ARTY</u>	<u>MORT</u>	<u>AAA</u>	<u>RR</u>	<u>AT</u>	<u>ENGR</u>	<u>TRANS</u>	<u>SIG</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>Sub-totals</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
NVA:	Confirmed	23	0	1	1	2	1		2		2	1	33	
	Probable	0	0										0	
	Possible	0	0					1		1			2	
	NVA Totals													35
VC MF:	Confirmed	12	2						1				15	
	Probable	0	0										0	
	Possible	0	0										0	
	VC MF Totals													15
VC LF:	Confirmed	6	0										6	
	Probable	0	0										0	
	Possible	2	0										2	
	VC LF Totals													8
<u>GRAND TOTALS</u>														58

NOTE: Totals include units of 324B Div, 31st and 32nd Regts of 341st Div and 2nd VC Regt of 3rd NVA Div.

3. (C) ESTIMATED IRREGULAR FORCES STRENGTH AS OF 5 APR 67.

PROVINCES	GUERRILLA FORCES	SELF DEFENSE FORCES	SECRET SELF DEFENSE FORCES	TOTAL IRREGULARS
QUANG TRI	2,250	4,687	937	7,874
THUA THIEN	2,800	7,988	1,597	12,385
QUANG NAM	4,600	13,000	2,600	20,200
QUANG TIN	3,300	8,800	1,750	13,850
QUANG NGAI	4,150	13,516	2,700	20,366
TOTAL	17,100	47,991	9,584	74,675

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4. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 222400H APR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
341st Div #1	NVA	C	9,875#2		E Vinh Linh S.		
Div Hq	NVA	C	150		YD 0993		
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,850		E Vinh Linh S.		
K.25 Sapper Co #3	NVA	C			E Vinh Linh S.		
31st Regt #4	NVA	C	2,447		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Vinh Linh SS.	13Mar67
1st Bn	NVA	C	422		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 164686	13Mar67
1st Co(K-1)	NVA	C	108				
2nd Co(K-2)	NVA	C	106				
3rd Co(K-3)	NVA	C	108				
4th Co(K-4)	NVA	C	100				
2nd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	XD 9661 (Hill 360)	13Mar67
5th Co(K-5)	NVA	C	180			Cua Valley	13Mar67
6th Co(K-6)	NVA	C	140			XD 7834	13Mar67
7th Co(K-7)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
8th Co(K-8)	NVA	C	140			XD 9957	13Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 1072	13Mar67
9th Co(K-9)	NVA	C	180				
10th Co(K-10)	NVA	C	140				
11th Co(K-11)	NVA	C	140				
12th Co(K-12)	NVA	C	140				
K-16 RR Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-17 Mort Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-18 Sig Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-19 Engr Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-20 Med Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-21 AA Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-22 Trans Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-23 Recon Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
K-24 Sec & Guard Co	NVA	C			E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
32nd Regt #4	NVA	C	2,625		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	Nghe An (P) (?)	13Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	825		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
4th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 123725	21Oct66
5th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		
6th Bn	NVA	C	600		E DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
33rd Regt #5	NVA	PR	2,625		Unknown	YD 1775	20Dec66
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	825		Unknown		
7th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
8th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
9th Bn	NVA	PR	600		Unknown		
34th Arty Regt.	NVA	PO			Unknown		
271st Regt #5	NVA	C			NVN	Nghe An (P)	13Mar67
324B Div	NVA	C	9,600	C-2	NVN	Nghe An (P)	13Mar67
Div Hq	NVA	C	110		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Div Hq Spt	NVA	C	1,290		DMZ/Vinh Linh S.	YD 045640	12Jul66
803rd Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	DMZ/Vinh Linh S.		12Jul66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	27Jul66
1st Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 998617	27Jul66
2nd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 991612	28Sep66
3rd Bn	NVA	C	700	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 9661 - XD 9861	27Jul66
812th Regt	NVA	C	1,984	C-3	N Quang Tri (P)	XD 969564	28Aug66
Regt Hq and Spt	NVA	C	794		3km Radius YD 0572	3 km Radius YD 0572	4Mar67
4th Bn	NVA	C	250	C-4	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0864	2Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C			3km Radius YD 0572	YD 063682	4Mar67
1st Co	NVA	C				YD 102632	1Mar67
2nd Co	NVA	C				YD 075665	3Mar67
3rd Co	NVA	C				YD 081665	4Mar67
4th Co(Support)	NVA	C					
5th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 070685	4Mar67
Bn Hq	NVA	C					
1st Co	NVA	C					
2nd Co	NVA	C					
3rd Co	NVA	C					12Mar67
4th Co	NVA	C				Area YD 0768	4Mar67
6th Bn	NVA	C	470	C-3	3km Radius YD 0572	YD 0768	4Mar67
U/I Wire Co	NVA	PO				YD 075665	3Mar67
90th Regt	NVA	C	2,400	C-2	N Quang Tri (P)	N Quang Tri (P)	160ct66
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 126666	160ct66
7th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 097705	80ct66
8th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 115719	10ct66
9th Bn	NVA	C	700		N Quang Tri (P)	YD 020620	16Sep66
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200		DMZ Area		31Mar67
13th Arty Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
14th AA Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280		DMZ Area	YD 0768	4Mar67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
16th Sig Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area	YD 902690	20Jul66
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300		DMZ Area		
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		DMZ Area		
808th Bn	MF	C	340	C-3	YD 3757	Trieu Phong Dist and coastal area	18Mar67
814th Bn	NVA	C	300	C-4	Hai Lang (D)	Area YD 3350	6Apr67
H.99 Co	LF	C	80		YD 427518	YD 427518	24Feb67
Trieu Phong Co	LF	C	80		YD 2245	Trieu Phong (D)	24Feb67
C.10 Co	LF	PR	120		YD 3338	Hai Lang (D)	10Mar67
Cam Lo Co	LF	PR	80		YD 1058	YD 0963 - YD 1260	31Aug66
K.400 Co	LF	C	120		Gio Linh (D)	YD 3172	17Feb67

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Northern Sub-Region Hq	NVA	C	885		YD 4724	YD 313477	15Apr67
C.11 Intel Co	NVA	C	105		Base 114	YD 313477	15Apr67
C.12 Sapper Co	NVA	C	100		Base 114	YD 645277	6Apr67 27Jun66
C.13 Comm Co	NVA	C	150		Base 114		
C.14 Engr Co	NVA	C	140		Base 114	YD 313477	15Apr67
C.15 AA Co	NVA	C	80		Base 114	YD 455240	21Feb67
C.16 Mort Co	NVA	C	70		Base 114		6Jan66
C.17 RR Co	NVA	C	90		Base 114		6Jan66
6th Regt	NVA	C	1,364		Thua Thien(P)	Northern Thua Thien	17Feb67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Base 114	YD 540195	21Feb67
800th Bn	MF	C	264		Phong Dien(D)	YD 645277	6Apr67
1st Co	MF	C	71			YD 645277	6Apr67
2nd Co	MF	C	68			YD 645277	6Apr67
3rd Co	MF	C	57			YD 645277	6Apr67
4th Co	MF	C	68			YD 645277	6Apr67
802nd Bn	MF	C	400		YD 6318	ZC 0598	24Feb67
1st Co	MF	C	100				
2nd Co	MF	C	100				
3rd Co	MF	C	100				
4th Co	MF	C	100				

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
806th Bn	NVA	C	400		YD 5642	YD 465330	18Mar67
1st Co	NVA	C	100				
2nd Co	NVA	C	100				
3rd Co	NVA	C	100				
4th Co	NVA	C	100				
804th Bn	MF	C	400		Phu Loc(D)	YD 805250	16Apr67
1st Co	MF	C	100			Phu Loc(D)	29Dec66
2nd Co	MF	C	100			YD 923210	29Dec66
3rd Co	MF	C	100			Phu Loc(D)	29Dec66
4th Co	MF	C	100			YD 935995	29Dec66
810th Bn	LF	C	300		YD 700300	YD 603255	1Apr67
K.105th Co	LF	C				YD 700304	26Mar67
K.106th Co	LF	C				YD 700304	26Mar67
K.107th Co	LF	C					3Feb67
K.109th Co	LF	C					10Aug66
Quang Dien Co	LF	C	50		YD 6530	YD 640314	26Mar67
Huong Thuy Co	LF	PR	50		YD 8009	YD 781091	16Dec66
Huong Tra Co	LF	PR	100		YD 7412	Huong Tra(D)	28Dec66
C.117 Co	LF	PO	120		Phu Thu(D)	YD 907184	18Jan67

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,250	C-2	Que Son(D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300		Que Son(D)	BT 1050	19Dec66
1st Bn	NVA	C	300		Que Son(D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
3rd Bn	NVA	C	250		Que Son(D)	AT 8554	16Mar67
R.20 Bn	LF	C	250	C-4	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	BT 1149	24Mar67
V.25 Bn	LF	C	400	C-3	Dien Ban/Dai Loc(D's)	AT 8453	18Feb67

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Unit	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
402nd Sapper Bn	MF	C	342	C-2	AT 8060	BT 043660	14Apr67
105th Bn	LF	PR	400		AT 8737	BT 0848	6Mar67
Que Son Co	LF	C	110		BT 0132	BT 0043	16Dec66
Q.13 Co	LF	C	120		BT 0152		
Q.14 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	AT 8551	AT 8249	18Feb67
Q.15 Co	LF	C	70	C-3	BT 0355	Dien Ban (D)	21Feb67
Q.16 Co	LF	C	120		AT 9166	AT 9170	6Dec66

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

33rd Arty Regt	NVA	PR	820	C-3	Hiep Duc (D)		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	Unk		Hiep Duc (D)		
GK31 Bn	NVA	C	400		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	BT 1418	6Jul66
GK32 Bn	NVA	C	220	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 9402	18Feb67
GK30 Bn	NVA	C	220		Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 7923	18Feb67
GK40 Bn (ENG)	NVA	C	120	C-3	Hiep Duc/T Binh (D)	AT 902215	16Mar67
2nd Bn, (3rd Regt)	NVA	C	400	C-2	Thang Binh (D)	BT 1050	29Mar67
72nd Bn	LF	C	300	C-2	BT 2224	BT 3817	14Dec66
70th Co, (409th Sapper Bn)	MF	C	90	C-2	Tam Ky (D)	BT 441081	13Jan67
74th Co	LF	C	50		BT 2807	BT 283084	22Nov66
706th Co	LF	C	80		BT 3113	BT 305110	16Nov66
K.51 Co	LF	C	65		BT 1536	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.52 Co	LF	C	150		BT 1017	BT 0506	9Sep66
K.53 Co	LF	C	90		BT 3111	BT 3112	4Feb67
K.54 Co	LF	C	130		BT 1516	BT 3817	14Dec66
K.55 Co	LF	C	100		BT 2718		

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650		W Son Ha(D)/KONTUM (P) Border	BS 1382	25Mar67
2nd Div	NVA	C	7,460		Que Son(D)/Quang Tin, Quang Ngai(P)		
Div Hq(Rear)	NVA	C	(?)		Tra Bong(D)	BS 3782	25Mar67
Div Hq(Forward)	NVA	C	100		BS 3782 Son Ha(D)	BS 435566	25Mar67
1st Regt(2d NVA Div)	MF	C	1,880	C-3	BS 4356 S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 579498	25Mar67
Regt Hq	MF	C	800		Minh Long(D)	BS 579498	
40th Bn	MF	C	280	C-3	BS 644553	BS 644553	25Mar67
60th Bn	MF	C	200	C-3	BS 579498	BS 579498	25Mar67
70th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 561673	BS 561673	25Mar67
90th Bn	MF	C	300	C-3	BS 665421	BS 665421	25Mar67
21st Regt(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	1,000	C-3	N. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 470745	25Mar67
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200		BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
11th Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
22nd Bn	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 470745	BS 470745	25Mar67
33rd Bn	NVA	C	400	C-3	BS 519832	BS 519832	25Mar67
GK-33 Bn(2d NVA Div)	NVA	C	200	C-3	BS 4478	BS 4478	18Feb67
3rd Div Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	500		BS 7528	BS 7528	25Mar67
2nd Regt(3d NVA Div)	MF	C	2,000		S. Quang Ngai (P)	BS 629364	25Mar67
Hq & Spt Unit	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
93rd Bn	MF	C	500		N Mo Duc/Nghia Hanh	BS 629364	25Mar67
95th Bn	MF	C	500		N Mo Duc/Nghia Hanh	BS 660603	6Apr67
97th Bn	MF	C	500		BS 629364	BS 629364	25Mar67
38th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 8341	BS 8341	10Feb67
48th Bn	LF	C	400	C-2	BS 4760	BS 4760	25Dec66
120th Bn	MF	C	500	C-2	E Son Ha (D)	Son Ha (D)	25Mar67
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	595		BS 6436	BS 6436	23Jan67
20th Co (Bn Hq)	MF	C	105	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
30th Co	MF	C	120	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
40th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 3377	BS 3377	23Jan67

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECT	ACCEPTED LOCATION	LAST VALID REPORT	DATE
50th Co	MF	C	100	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
60th Co	MF	C	90	C-2	BS 6135	BS 6135	23Jan67
1506th Engr Bn	MF	C	330		BS 4876	BS 4876	17Feb67
19th Bn	LF	PO	400		BS 7554		
307th Bn	LF	PO	380		BS 8432		
21st Co	LF	C	130		BS 7194	BS 7194	17Feb67
506 "A" Sapper Co	LF	C	90		BS 7057	Mo Duc (D)	12Dec66
506 "B" Sapper Co	LF	C	80		Son Tinh(D)	W Son Tin (D)	21Feb67
C.17 Co	LF	C	140		BS 7055		
C.212 Co	LF	C	100		BS 6136		
C.219 Co	LF	C	100		BS 8042	BS 7743	2Mar67
T.18 Co	LF	C	60		BS 6687		
T.20 Co	LF	C	100		BS 5082		
P.31 Co	LF	C	120		BS 5784	BS 505910	31Mar67
Tra Bong Co	LF	C	80		BS 3190		

BINH DINH PROVINCE

3rd Div #6	NVA	C	6,215		Binh Dinh		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh	BS 7504	19Nov66
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 732079	27Feb67
300th Wpns Bn	NVA	C	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
400th Mort Bn	NVA	C	100		Binh Dinh	An Lao Valley	2Mar67
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh	BS 7610	3Feb67
551st Sig Bn	NVA	PR	400		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		25Jan67
600th Med Bn	NVA	C	200		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		
700th Field Hosp	NVA	C	90		Binh Dinh (Unloc)		Dec66
18th Regt	NVA	C	775		Binh Dinh	BR 9875	12Mar67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300	C-3	Binh Dinh	BR 9875	12Mar67
7th Bn	NVA	C	150	C-3	Binh Dinh	BR 9878	12Mar67
8th Bn	NVA	C	150		Binh Dinh	BR 9363	21Mar67
9th Bn	NVA	C	175		Binh Dinh	BR 9788	6Mar67
22nd Regt	NVA	C	1,150		BS 9005	BR 9005	Feb67
Hq & Spt Units	NVA	C	300		Binh Dinh	BS 9005	Feb67
7th Bn	NVA	C	325		BS 8716	BS 8716	13Feb67
8th Bn	NVA	C	200		BS 9104	BS 9104	13Feb67
9th Bn	NVA	C	325		BS 8716	BS 8716	20Mar67

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- #1. Strength figures of the 341st Div, except for the 31st and 32nd Regts, are not carried in the I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.
- #2. Strength of 341st NVA Div is an estimate of the total division strength and is not necessarily the sum of the figures shown on page A-3.
- #3. The K.25 Sapper Co has been accepted as a support company of the 341st Div.
- #4. The strength figures of the 31st and 32nd Regts (confirmed) of the 341st NVA Div have been added to the I Corps strength totals. These two regiments are believed operating in the DMZ area.
- #5. The 33rd and the 271st Regts are possibly the same regiment, but no hard-intelligence is currently available to confirm this.
- #6. Strength figures of the 3rd NVA Div elements operating in Binh Dinh (P) are not carried in I Corps totals in paragraph 1 above.

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5. (C) ALSO KNOWN AS NAMES (AKA), LETTER BOX NUMBERS (LBN), EQUIPMENT AND PERSONALITIES AS OF 222400H APR 67.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
341st Div (Hq/Spt)	E-341st	31.445 (?)		CO-Col Luong THINH Dep Cdr-Col Nguyen Quoc TRI PO-Col Nguyen Hong DAO APO-Unknown CofS-LtCol Cao LONG CofPol Sect-LtCol LUU CofRear Ser-Maj HUNG
K.25 Sapper Co 31st Regt (Hq)	Song Hong; Cong Troung 1/5	31.442 XD		CO-Col Nguyen Ngoc HUNG (AKA HAI) XO-SrCapt Hoang PO-Col Nguyen TRUNG APO-Col AN C. Gen Staff-SrCapt LE Trng Cadre-SrCapt CHI CofRear Ser-SrCapt HAI Prop Trng-SrCapt Nguyen Tan CUNG CofArty-SrCapt HO Log Off-SrCapt THAI CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van LAN XO-Capt Tran Van LAI PO-SrCapt Nguyen Minh LY APO-Capt Tran Ha TIEN Staff Chief-TAI Comm Plt Ldr/Liaison-2nd Lt Tran Dinh PHI Trng Cadre-2nd Lt DUC ADJ-1st Lt NAM Med Off-Cpl Le Ngoc HUNG
1st. Bn	H-1 (Hvy Fire Bn); Song Hong; Cuu Long; K101	31.443 XB		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K1 Co				CO-SrCapt Dinh Van THANH XO-2nd Lt LAC PO-1st Lt KHUE APO-Lt Phan Trong VIEN CO-1st Lt Vo Trong HUONG XO-Asp. Pham THANH PO-1st Lt Ho Van NAMC APO-2nd Lt Nguyen Cong VUCNG CO-SrLt Nguyen Hoa DIEU XO-2nd Lt Ho Kiem CHI PO-1st Lt Minh SON APO-2nd Lt Tran Van THU CO-SrLt Nguyen Kinh LONG XO-2nd Lt Trinh UOC PO-Nguyen Dinh THANH APO-Possibly THANH CO-SrCapt AN XO-VO THINH
K2 Co				
K3 Co				
K4 Co				
2nd Bn	H-2 (Infantry Bn); K100; Song Huong	31.450	Unk-81mm Mort Unk-82mm Mort Unk-NG's Unk-AR's Unk-CK's Unk-B-40 Unk-B-90	
K5 Co		31.451		
K6 Co		31.452		CO-Nguyen Huu HUY ADJ-VO Nguyen Dinh VIEN APO-TY
K7 Co		31.453		
K8 Co		31.454		
3rd Bn	H-3 Bn (AA Bn); Thu Bong; K103	31.455 XB(?)		XO-VO NHI
K9 Co		31.456 XB		
K10 Co		31.457 XB(?)		
K11 Co		31.458 XB(?)		
K12 Co		31.459 XB(?)		
K-16 RR Co				CO-1st Lt MA CO-1st Lt NGU CO-1st Lt LIET CO-1st Lt TRINH
K-17 Mort Co				
K-18 Sig Co				
K-19 Eng Co				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
K-20 Med Co K-21 AA Co 32nd Regt (Hq)	270th Regt (?)	31.445 XB(?) 32.445 (?)		CO-1st Lt TRACH CO-1st Lt KHOAN CO-Maj TINH PO-Maj QUE
4th Bn 5th Bn 6th Bn 33rd Regt (Hq) 7th Bn 8th Bn 9th Bn 34th Arty Regt				PO-Maj TRANG CofS-Capt BINH CO-Maj LUONG PO-Maj Sau DOAN CG-Gen Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI
271st Regt (Hq) (Poss)				
324B Div (Hq/Spt)	312 Div (?) / 307 Div(?); 137th Div(?); Cong Troung 1/5; 330th Bde (?); Con Truong Long; Nong Truong Agricultural Site 1 May; 4th Div; Mot Thing Nam Cuu Long; 1st Regt; 330th Bde; Cong Truong 2; Song Huong; Cua Tung		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-Maj Vo THIEP XO-DUYET PO-Maj THUONG
803rd Regt (Hq)				
1st Bn 2nd Bn 3rd Bn	T-1 Bn; K.1 Bn T-2 Bn; K.2 Bn T-3 Bn; K.3 Bn			CO-TUONG CO-Capt Tran CAN XO-Capt Nguyen Thanh AN CO-LtCol Nguyen Ninh HE XO-Ninh LONG PO-Maj SONG
812th Regt (Hq)	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong Truong; 1 May Regt; 4th Regt; Ba Vi (new)		Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	
4th Bn	K.4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn	31.620 RT		CO-Nguyen THUONG XO-Bui Dinh PHONG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co	Doan-1	31.621 31.621 RT		CO-1st Lt Le TIEN XO-Linh Xuan TIEU PO-Vo Dinh HOI
2nd Co	Doan-2	31.622 RT		
3rd Co	Doan-3	31.623		CO-1st Lt Tran Xuan TOAN XO-Le Minh KOANH PO-Nguyen Ngo CHUNG
4th Co (Hvy Wpns Support)	Doan-4	31.624 RT	12-82mm Mort 6-HMG Chicom 7.62mm Type 57 9-AA MG Unk-B-10 DK-RR(82MM)	
5th Bn	K.5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn			CO-Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG) PO-2nd Lt Nguyen Van BICH CO-Cao Xuan HAI
6th Bn	K.6-D.6; Thu Bon Bn; Cuu Long Bn	31.630		
1st Co	Doan-1	31.631		CO-1st Lt AN XO-W.O. KHA PO-1st Lt TRUC CO-1st Lt MAI XO-Lt Thai Van LAP CO-1st Lt CHUONG
2nd Co	Doan-2	31.632		
3rd Co	Doan-3	31.633		
4th Co (Hvy Wpns)	Doan-4	31.634 KT		
90th Regt (Hq)	Song Houng(or Hong); 3rd Regt; Cong Truong 3; Song Chu; Song Chu Long; Cuu Long; Cua Viet	5330(?)	Unk-82mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort Unk-57mm RR Unk-12.7mm AA MG Unk-MG	CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt Maj Van CU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	D-7; K-7			CO-Vu Van XUAN XO-LY
8th Bn	108th Bn; D-8; K.8			PO-Le Van XUAN CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-Sr Capt TROUNG CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG
9th Bn	D-9; K.9			
12th AT Bn			12-82mm RR(?)	
13th ARTY Bn			12-120mm Mort(?)	
14th AA Bn			16-37mm AA Gun(?)	
15th Engr Bn			18-7.62mm LMG	CO-Luu Van MAN CO-Capt LOI XO-Sr Lt TAI
16th Sig Bn				
19th Med Bn				
808th Bn	K.8; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Force; 9th Indep Bn	1708 TQ Bac Nam 41.338 EQ	4-81mm Mort 2-75mm RR 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG 2-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 2-57mm RR 1-B40 2-Unk MG 1-MG	CO-Van KIEM XO-SANH
814th Bn	K.14			CO-THANH XO- SAM
H.99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co			CO-Vo BA PO-DUNG
Trieu Phong Co	V-50; 20-H; H-02 V-51; H-20; 20th Dist Force			CO-Nguyen Xuan LAN XO-Thi Bong AN
C.10 Co	10th Sapper Co of Quang Tri		Unk-Pistols Unk-AK-47	CO-Cao TUNG
Cam Lo Co	H30; 30H			CO-NGHIA
K.400 Co	4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Armed Co	41.344 FQ(?) 41.346 FQ(?)	3-60mm Mort 2-B-40 6-BAR's	CO-1st Lt DAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Northern Sub-Region Hq	Tri Thien Sector; North Div Hq; Phan Khu	41.000 FM- 41.300 FM- Di Hai		CG-MG HUM XO-Nguyen Van THU PO-Le TRUONG CO-Lt Nguyen Nam TRUC XO-Lt Nguyen THEM CO-SrLt LONG XO-HUNG CO-HUNG CO-LUAN
C.11 Recon Co	Bac; K-500; Di Hai 11th Co; Intell Co		74-K-50 18-K-44 Unk-K-50	
C.12 Sapper Co	12th Co	Q.72,700 Bac Do		
C.13 Comm Co	13th Co			
C.14 Engr Co	14th Co	Q.90,700 Bac Do		
C.15 AA Co	15th Co; Bach Danh; PK 12 LY; 404 C	1515 BK	4-12.7mm HMG 8-K-44 5-MAT 49 SMG's 9-81mm Mort 20-K-50 9-AR's 45-K-44's 4-75mm RR's 3-57mm RR's	CO-Nguyen Kim LUONG XO-SAM PO-KHANH CO-SrCapt LONG PO-Capt QUANG
C.16 Mort Co	16th Co; 82mm Mort Co			
C.17 RR Co	17th Co			CO-SrLt BA PO-SrLt VUONG CO-Maj CUONG XO-Capt AN CO-Capt Nguyen DE
6th NVA Regt Hq	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu;			
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1	1520; Q40.700 ST	9-82mm Mort 8-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 8-B-90 9-B-40 6-MG's 4-75mm RR's 2-60mm Mort 2-B-90 2-B-40 5-AR 8-SMG 2-60mm Mort 2-B-40 2-B-90 5-AR 8-SMG	
1st Co	C.1	1520A BK HAI; Q42.700ST 1510		CO-DE XO-Lt NHAT
2nd Co	C.2	Q44.700ST 1530		CO-Lt BIEN XO-W.O. Ho Xuan DAU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Co	C.3	Q46.700ST 1540	3-60mm Mort 2-B-90 2-B-40 5-AR 1-HMG	CO-Lt HAI XO-2nd Lt THANH
4th Co	C.4	V.500 Di Hai Q48.700ST	4-81mm Mort 1-75mm RR 4-57mm RR 4-MG	CO-GIANG XO-2nd Lt NGUYEN
802nd Bn	K.2; Van Troi Bn C-2; 2nd Bn(?)	Q52.700 Bac Do 1522 BK Di Hai	4-81mm Mort 12-60mm Mort 2-75mm RR 3-57mm RR 6-B-90 10-B-40 6-AA	CO-THANH
1st Co		1522 BK Di Hai	2-60mm Mort 1-81mm Mort 1-AA 6-B-40 2-B-90 9-AR 1-80mm Mort 1-60mm Mort 1-B-40 2-60mm Mort 8-B-40 3-LMG's	CO-DONG
2nd Co				
3rd Co				
4th Co				
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D.10; 3rd(?) 80.T Bn		3-81mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 3-HMG 3-75mm RR 3-57mm RR 4-B-90 12-B-40 29-AR	CO-W.O. CAN PO-SOAN CO-Nguyen XUAN XO-Capt THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co	The Cong		3-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-1st Lt HUYEN PO-1st Lt CUONG
2nd Co	Truong Son		2-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-1st Lt MIEU XO-Lt DONG
3rd Co	Ba To	41.290 BK Di Hai	1-60mm Mort 1-B-90 3-B-40 9-AR	CO-Tran TOAN XO-2nd Lt CHUONG
4th Co	Bun Dien (?)	1596 BR Di Hai	3-81mm Mort 3-57mm RR 3-MG	CO-Lt HOE PO-1st Lt LUAT
804th Bn	K.4; VQ74		4-81mm Morts 8-60mm Morts 4-AA 4-RR 8-B-40 1-B-90	CO-UYEN XO-LONG PO-CHIEU
1st Co			2-60mm Mort 9-AR 1-MG	CO-THANG XO-HOANG
2nd Co			2-60mm Mort 9-AR 1-MG	
3rd Co			1-60mm Mort 7-AR	CO-THANG XO-1st Lt TIEN CO-DIEN XO-2nd Lt LAC
4th Co				CO-Nguyen THI XO-Capt GIOI
810th Bn	K.10; 3rd(?)	1852 Bac Ha	3-81mm Mort 6-60mm Mort 3-RR 18-AR 3-MG	
K.105 Co	C.105; D.3	1847 Bac Ha 41.441 House #S.02. 900ST	3-60mm Mort 6-AR 24-SMG 2-B-40	CO-Lt Vo THONG XO-DUNG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.106 Co	C.106; K.116; K16; 106	42.442	3-60mm Mort 9-AR 3-HMG 1-B-40 1-B-90	CO-KIM XO-2nd Lt CANH
K.107 Co K.109	K.117; K.17; 107 K.119; K.19; 109	1853 Bac Ha	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 2-MG	CO-Nguyen Van TAI CO-1st Lt KHUONG XO-2nd Lt MINH
Quang Dien Co	D-3; P-15; 3rd Co; C-114	1847 Bac Ha	2-60mm Mort 9-AR	CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN
Huong Thuy Co	D-4; X-4; C-116; P-17		Unk-K-44 2-60mm Mort Unk-HMG 4-AR	CO-Capt XUAN
Huong Tra Co	D-2; X-3; C-115; K-5		6-AR 2-HMG 2-60mm Mort Unk-SMG	CO-Le Ngoc BACH PO-SON
C.117 Co	Phu Vang; D-7; P-18; Phu Thu Armed Co		2-60mm Mort 4-AR Unk-30 cal MG 10-SMG Unk-K-50	CO-SON XO-THU PO-SAM

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

3rd NVA Regt (Hq)	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite-3; Factory 10; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; 323rd Regt (?)			CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN PO-Trung THANH
1st Bn	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1; 64 Bn (?)	20.825		CO-Capt THAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84 Bn(?)		5-82mm Mort 6-60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TIEP
R.20 Bn	Nguyen Trai Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung	21.341 DN Ba Ha	1-81mm Mort 3-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR 2-MG; 5-50 Cal MG(?) 54-AR	CO-LAM XO-THAI PO-CU
402nd Sapper Bn	T.89th Special Eng Bn; YH.9 (?)	21.395 GM Dong Hai	6-81mm Mort 1-120mm Mort(?)	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; R.25(?)	2116 Quang Da	1-81mm Mort 2-60mm Mort 1-57mm RR	CO-Quang LAM (AKA LUC) XO-THEU PO-TOAN
105th Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Regt		2-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 2-MG 2-57MM RR 9-AR	CO-KY XO-THANH PO-UT
Que Son Co	D-20; H-53 Co; Dia Ly A7			CO-Le Tan QUANG
Q.13 Co	H-52; Tan Lap Co; 103d Co: Q.13; X.63; 73	2103 (?)		CO-Nguyen CHAU
Q.14 Co	H-42 Co; Dai Loc Co; X-64; 74	2104 (?)		CO-LOI
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban H-40 Co; X.55(?); Q-15; H-35; H-55; 75; 104th; X.65; Q.15B; Dien Ban Co	2105	2-60mm Mort	CO-Than Tien NAM
Q.16 Co	X.66; Q-16-B Co; 76; Hoa Vang Co			CO-Nguyen DOA

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

33rd Arty Regt (Hq)	Nam Hai		
GK.31 Bn (AA)	20.800 GM	18-12.7mm MG	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN
	195AA Bn; 519AA Bn;		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
GK.32 Bn	38AA Bn; Xuong 111;			
GK.30 (SIG)	19th Bn; RQ.21			
GK.40 Bn (ENGR)	RQ.22	Hai Cang 20	12-75mm RR	
	RQ.20/A Bn; RQ.20	1803/CH		
	RQ.20/B Bn; Ham Tu 2/C	Hai Cang 20		
	X.72; RQ.24	GM 20.039		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG
72nd Bn		Tay An Nam Hai		
2nd Bn(3rd Regt)	Binh Da; X2; K-2;	21.993 Mrs Hanh		CO-Tran Van CAO
	74th Bn (?)			CO-Capt THAU
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 706;		1-57mm RR (?)	CO-THANH
	74th Dist Force Co		Unk-M-79	XO-Tran TIEN
			Unk-K-50 SMG	PO-PHUONG
70th Co (409th Sapper Bn)	7th Co; X-70 Co	P.O. 20.142		CO-Nguyen DUOC
		F.G.M.		XO-Vo Ly TA
		Bac Hien		PO-Nguyen MAI
706th Co	106th Co			
K.51 Co	K51; 107; F-14; A.10;		2-60mm Mort	CO-KHOA
	D-21; Thang Binh		1-57mm RR	XO-Nguyen THAN
			6-MG	PO-Anh VU
K.52 Co	D-22; A.13; V.13(?)			
K.53 Co	A-14; V-14; A.19;	2004	1-60mm Mort	
	14th Co		1-30 Cal NG	
K.54 Co	C-73; A.16	2002	1-60mm Mort	CO-Hong LE
			2-MG	
K.55 Co	C-75; Phi Po A-21; A.21			
	Bn; Flying Tiger A-21			

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Military Region 5 (Hq)	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55;	20.100 GM	CO-Maj Gen Hoang Van THAI
	F-550; Co Hoa; H-601;	21.900 GM	XO-LtCol Nguyen Chanh
	F-102 KW	Bac Hien	(AKA BINH)
			PO-Gen THAI (same as CO)
			Asst. PO-LtCol Tran Ba
			KHUE
			CofS-Col Le TRUC
			Dep CofS-LtCol Nguyen
			LIEN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Div (Hq)	Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2 Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2	20.601 GM 20.925 GM Tay An; 41.910 KP 6000-6199		CG-BG VIET XO-BG DAO PO-BG DO
1st VC Regt (Hq)	Cong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt			CO-Col Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai, 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung ST		CO-Nguyen MUOI
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh-Gia	20.735 CT An Giang		CO-SrCapt Nguyen Xuan PHONG
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Ounh Gia (?); Bong Trang		3-81mm Mort 4-60mm Mort 5-MG 4-57mm RR	CO-Nguyen Duc CONG XO-SrCapt THUA PO-Duan Cong THANH
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Binh; Song Hong(?)			CO-Ho Thanh THI XO-Vo Ngoc CAM
21st Regt (Hq)	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; A-21; Cong Truong 7 (?)		17-81mm Mort Unk-75mm RR Unk-60mm Mort	CO-Pham KIET XO-Dang Cong KICH PO-TIEN
11th Bn	11th Worksite; 1st Bn			CO-Capt Ha Van MAG
22nd Bn	135th Bn; 2nd Bn			CO-SrCapt Le Huy DINH
33rd Bn	3rd Bn; 75th Bn (?)			CO-Nguyen Kaach THO
CK-33 Bn	RQ.23; RQ.33; BQ.330; 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60.620 CN Tay An	6-120mm Mort	CO-Le Van CAN XO & CofS-Nguyen KINH PO-Ho Dac HOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd VC Regt	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt			CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Gp; Chi Ba (Sisters Three); H-21 Bn	6240		CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-SINH CO-VINH XO-AN PO-NGOAN CofS-LUONG CO-VINH CO-BINH PO-OANH CO-Maj KIM
95th Bn	705th Infil Gp; Chi Nam; H.58; Ba Minh; Thong Rang 260			
97th Bn	703 Infil Gp; 207th Bn in NVN; Chi Bay; H.21; H.25	6340 TL (old) 21.164 GM (new)		
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38	2048; NQ Ba Hao		
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 408th Bn(?); 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn (?)	HT 2416 Ba Bao	2-81mm Mort 2-57mm RR 3-60mm Mort 3-MG	CO-Capt KY XO-Capt TRINH PO-SrCapt DU
120th Bn	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 20th Bn	20.135 GM 20.139 GM Bac Hien		CO-Capt Dinh QUYEN
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20 575th Bn; A-58	20.141 GM 20.144 GM Bac Hien 1291 KW Bac Hien Ba Hoa; X2424 Bac Hien Forward to Ba Hoa	3-81mm Mort 7-60mm Mort 3-57mm RR 7-30 Cal MG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Nguyen Xuan BINH PO-QUYET
20th Co	X-20; 2nd Co	PO 20.142 AGM Bac Hien		CO-BUU
30th Co	3rd Co; V-30 Co	PO 20.142 BCM Bac Hien		CO-Dinh Dieu PHAN XO-Trinh LANH PO-NHUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
40th Co	4th Co; V-40 Co	PO 20.142 CGM Bac Hien		CO-GIAO XO-Tuan KIET PO-Ngoc BINH CO-VAN XO-HUNG PO-LOC
50th Co	5th Co; V-50 Co	PO 20.142 DGM		
60th Co	6th Co; V-60 Co	PO 20.142 EGM Bac Hien		XO-CCNG PO-Nguyen Van LUC CO-Nguyen Huy KINH XO-SrLt DAO PO-SrLt THANH CO-Pham Van NGOC CO-RI
1506th Engr Bn	571 Unit	1289		
19th Bn 307th Bn	109th Bn; 42nd Bn; 315th Bn(?); 705th Bn(?); T-21; H-40			
21st Co	T-21; H-40	22,422	2-LNG 2-60mm Mort 9-AR 6-Carabines 3-BAR's 6-Carabines Unk-SMG Unk-K-40	CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU CO-UY CO-CHUNG XO-NAM PO-ANH
506 "A" Sapper Co 506 "B" Sapper Co	Unit 506 H-42	Hom Thu 21.618M		CO-Nguyen DIEP CO-Dinh TAC CO-THU
C.17 Co C.212 Co C.219 Co	Mo Duc Co; Ba To Co Duc Pho Co;			
T.18 Co P.31 Co	Son Tinh Dong (West) T.19 Co			CO-Pham TRAN CO-LONG XO-MINH PO-MINH CO-TRAN
T.20 Co Tra Bong Co	C-20 Co; Son Tinh Dong Co F-8 Co; 8th Co			CO-Dinh HUY

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BINH DINH PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMS AND AMMUNITION</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Div	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Lien Tinh 10	Hon Thu 20.110 GM; 20 845 GMT 10 Airfield 10		CO-SrCol Vo THU XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infil Gp	1535; 1534 10th Airport		CO-Capt Thai PHU XO-KNUYENT PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY
300th Wpns Bn	513 Infil Gp	1538		CO-Le Van DUYET
400th Mort Bn	Sao Vang Bn; 33rd Bn (120mm Mort); 32nd Bn (120mm Mort); Infil Gp 511	1541		CO-Vo VIET XO-Nguyen Dinh KIEN PO-Nguyen Van KHIEM CofS-Nguyen KHAN
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-CIN
600th Med Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		
90th Engr Bn	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803d Infil Gp;	7173 DS or 21.155 GM		CO-Tran Xuan SOAN
18th NVA Regt	Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Sao Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt (?)			XO-Bui Duy NGOC PO-Le Van TANG CofS-DIUEU
7th Bn	263d Bn (Infil); H7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi-4; Phan Doan 4; Unit 521; Xom 4; 4th Bn			CO-SrCapt Hoang Nau PHIA XO-Capt Doan Hung SUN PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI Asst PO-Nguyen Trong MAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
8th Bn	803K Infil Gp; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lien Doi-5; Huyen 32; H 32; H 8; Unit 523; 5th Bn			CO-SrCapt NGUNG XO-Capt Doan TUONG PO-TANH Cofs-LUONG
9th Bn	H 9; H 33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn			CC-LON XC-THANG PO-ANH Cofs-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Gp; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt	21.141VM Binh Dinh (P)		CO-Nguyen Xuan-DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC Cofs-Capt THANG CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM Cofs-Capt KHOI CO-Capt Pham Van CAC AKA VIEN PO-Capt Phang HOI CO-TIN XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517 Bn; Inter Gp 7			
8th Bn	2d Bn; Bn 516			
9th Bn	3d Bn; Bn 514; Inter-Gp 9	4739/TA		

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6. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN I CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 160001H APR TO 222400H APR 67.

a. Quang Tri

(1) Operation PRAIRIE III (commenced 190001 Mar - terminated 192400 Apr). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation PRAIRIE IV (commenced 200001 Apr - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(3) Other.

(a) PW THACH, captured 15 April in the vicinity of (YD 313477), stated he was from the 14th Co of the 6th Regt and that his unit is located four days walk southeast of his place of capture. This would put the 14th Co in the vicinity of Base Area 114. A C.14th Engineer Co is carried as subordinate to the Northern Sub-Region Hq.

(b) Document dated 10 Apr 67, captured on 15 Apr 67 at (YD 313477) identified K.200, which is believed to be the Rear Service Section of the Northern Sub-Region Hq. The document was a letter signed by VAN THU, K.400 commander. K.400 is believed to be the Staff Section of the Northern Sub-Region Hq. A NGUYEN VAN THU is carried as XO of the Northern Sub-Region Hq. Also identified was the C.11 Intelligence Co of the Northern Sub-Region. The document was a letter of commendation on a printed form of the Liberation Troops of K.500, Northern Sub-Region Hq, dated 10 Dec 66.

b. Thua Thien

(1) Operation BIG HORN (commenced 050001 Apr - terminated 212400H). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation SHAWNEE (commenced 220001H Apr - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(3) Other. On 16 Apr 67 a company from the 804th Bn was identified in contact with RD cadre vic (YD 805250). Documents found indicated a company of the 804th Bn had the mission of ambushing RD personnel in Thua Thien.

c. Quang Nam

(1) Operation YELL (commenced 180700H Apr - terminated 201200H Apr). No identifications during the period.

(2) Operation HUMBOLDT (commenced 131000H Apr - terminated 171800H Apr). PW's DUC TO and HOAN CONG DOAN were captured on 14 Feb 67 in the vicinity of (BT 043660). Both stated they were from the H.44 Co (AKA V.4), T.89 (AKA 402nd) Bn.

(3) Operation GRAND (commenced 211045 Apr - continuing). No identifications during the period.

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(4) Operation UNION (commenced 221000H Apr - continuing). No identifications during the period.

(5) Other.

(a) The Duy Xuyen Co in Quang Nam (P) has been redesignated the Q.13 Co with AKA's of Duy Xuyen and X73.

(b) The accepted location of the 402nd Sapper Bn has been changed from (ZC 135280) to (AT 8060). This relocation is based on the interrogation of PW's HOAN CONG DOAN and DUC TO who were captured on 14 April 1967 at (BT 041659).

d. Quang Tin

(1) Operation LAWRENCE (commenced 170800H Apr - terminated 191600H Apr). No identifications during the period.

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8. III MAF Unit Watch List

The III MAF unit watch list is a listing of enemy units, particularly regiments and separate battalions, towards which an intensified collection effort as well as accelerated reporting is directed. Enemy units included in the unit watch list are those for which more complete identification is required to confirm or deny a unit's existence and presence in the I CTZ, re-confirm a unit's location if it has not been reported for a period of two weeks, and to determine the location of a unit in the event it has moved out of its normal operating area.

III MAF UNIT WATCH LIST:

MR-5 HQ	CK-31 BN
NSR HQ	2ND NVA DIV HQ
341ST NVA DIV HQ	1506TH ENGR BN
31ST NVA REGT	CK-30 BN
32ND NVA REGT	CK-32 BN
33RD NVA REGT (POSS 271ST REGT)	CK-33 BN
34TH NVA ARTY REGT	CK-40 BN
324B NVA DIV HQ	21ST NVA REGT HQ
803RD NVA REGT	11TH NVA BN
812TH NVA REGT	22ND NVA BN
90TH NVA REGT	1ST MF REGT HQ
808TH MF BN	90TH MF BN
814TH NVA BN	2ND MF REGT HQ
6TH NVA REGT HQ	97TH MF BN
800TH MF BN	409TH SAPPER BN
V.25 LF BN	

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENT, INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT REPORT) TO III MAF
PERINTREP 16-67

1. Major HUYNH CU, Training Officer, MR-5 (Annex B III MAF PERINTREP 13-67) gave the following information during a follow-up interrogation:

a. The main attack on BA TO District Headquarters will be conducted by the 2d Regt, 3d NVA Div and that the other two regiments (designation unknown) will be in reserve. (CU corrected his previous statement concerning this attack; he said earlier that 1st and 3d Regts would be in reserve).

b. The general plan of operation in counterattacking GVN or U.S. reaction forces is to hit the force on its flanks. The VC plan to set up approximately one kilometer away from the reaction force's route of march as a precaution against expected enemy preparatory fires preceding the force. Once the preparatory fires have lifted and the force commences movement, the VC close on both flanks and strike the center of the unit, while positioning the major portion of their troops on the flank offering the most probable avenue of escape. On occasions when the reaction forces land by helicopters, the VC select three likely landing zones prior to arrival of the reaction force. They then deploy the majority of their troops to surround two of the landing zones and emplace machine gun teams in the vicinity of the third. By placing intense machine gun fire on one LZ, the VC channelize the attacking forces into LZ's where the majority of their troops are awaiting. If all helicopters attempt to land and disembark troops simultaneously, the VC commence firing when the helicopters are approximately 10 meters off the ground. If the helicopters enter the LZ in sequences of one or two, the VC wait until at least 70 percent of the total force has disembarked prior to commencing fire.

c. Pyrotechnic signals are used by VC regular forces of battalion size or greater. Occasionally, provincial force VC have access to pyrotechnics. Equipment consists of three to five flare guns per battalion, along with a limited assortment of red, green and yellow flares. Presently the supply of flares is extremely scarce. A standard system of signals has not been developed; however, signals are predetermined before an attack by unit commanders. Flares may be employed as signals to: Commence an attack; start the assault phase; signal adjacent units; shift or lift support fires; and commence a withdrawal.

d. Normal procedures used in withdrawal after attack are to split up units into companies, with each company taking a separate route. Separate routes are also used for casualties, prisoners and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. Under no circumstances will routes used for arriving at any objective be used in the withdrawal phase. If the units base camp is fairly close to the objective, companies will remain separated until reaching their destination. If the base camp is a long distance away from the objective, an assembly area may be designated and used to regroup companies prior to continuing to the base camp. Security forces always accompany the withdrawal of the dead, wounded and PW's, at a ratio of one to 10.

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e. In movement to or withdrawal from an attack, VC often use river banks as routes. This is especially true when the river banks provide more cover than other overland routes of relatively similar distances.

f. MR-5 has directed that more attacks be conducted against air bases for the following reasons:

(1) There has been an increase of air attacks on NVN targets.

(2) Bombings of VC installations in SVN have the greatest effect in lowering morale.

(3) Small sapper units (40 to 50 men) can inflict considerable damage to air installations while suffering relatively minor casualties.

(4) Tactical air capabilities can be reduced.

(5) Attacks on air bases have the effect of lowering US/ARVN troops morale by demonstrating that even seemingly safe rear areas are vulnerable.

(6) Successful attacks on air bases tend to increase the prestige of communist forces.

g. In any offensive operation the taking of prisoners is always as a secondary mission. Since the end of TET, 44 prisoners (all Vietnamese) have been captured by the VC. The 1st VC Regt captured 26 prisoners during offensive actions in MINH LONG (D), 15 to 25 March. All prisoners are turned over to QUANG NGAI (P) PW camp located in the vicinity of (BS 419632). This camp presently has about 100 captives (about 80 civilians for rehabilitation/propaganda training and 20 military PW).

2. Lieutenant NGUYEN NGOC ANH, Personnel Officer (Annex B, III MAF PERINTREP 15-67) gave the following information during a follow-up interrogation:

a. About July 1966, Major THANH, 3d Div artillery commander revealed that a rocket unit was going to infiltrate in order to shell airfields. On 13 December 1966, Major TRAN MANH HUNG, commander of the rocket battalion, and three men infiltrated by boat and landed at SA HUYNH (V), QUANG NGAI (P). Major HUNG studied in Russia for seven years and returned to NVN in 1964. The ship, also transported rockets and communications equipment. The remainder of the rocket battalion infiltrated on foot to a mountainous jungle region in QUANG TIN (P). The strength of the battalion was approximately 200 men. The battalion was subordinate to MR-5 and fragmented to sapper battalions adjacent to military airfields.

b. All NVA divisions in SVN are reinforced with one company of 37mm AA guns. Each infantry regiment is reinforced with approximately 45 men who are trained in AA artillery techniques, but are equipped with only 12.7mm AA guns.

c. The 3d Div receives military draftees infiltrated from NVN as well as personnel recruited in SVN. Females are used to replace NVN soldiers

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who have been assigned combatant duties. In October 1966, the 3d Div received 320 males and 172 females from the QUANG NGAI Recruiting School. In December, 210 men were received from local forces of BINH DINH (P) and QUANG NGAI (P), and 360 men came from NVN, including 15 cadre ranking from Second Lieutenant to Senior Captain.

d. During 1966, the 3d Div lost 3,417 killed, wounded, captured and deserted of which 47 were cadre, including two field grade officers.

e. During 1967, MR-5 plans to use the 2d and 3d Divs to attack and occupy QUANG NGAI (P) using war of attrition tactics, and also attack QUANG NAM (P) and thrust sharply to HUE. The 324B Div and two provincial force units from QUANG TRI (P) and THUA THIEN (P) will attack and occupy QUANG TRI (P), and then link-up with the 2d and 3d Divs at HUE. MR-5 can bring a reserve division from LAOS to replace the 3d Div when it leaves QUANG NGAI (P) to link-up with the 2d Div.

(G-2 Comment: F/2. First recent report of 37mm AA guns. Some other elements of information have been previously reported.)

3. Based upon a compilation of documents the following is a broad summarization of the VC/NVA postal system:

a. General. By order of a directive, dated 1 July 1966, from the Current Affairs of the Region Committee, the Postal Transportation and Communication Section was merged into the Army on 20 July 1966. The Military Region was charged with the administration of this branch and promulgated the following coordinating instructions:

(1) Mission:

(a) The Postal Transportation and Communication Branch was established according to the policy of the armed forces. Each station on the communication route is a combat unit but is not necessarily formed into platoons or companies.

(b) Postal Transportation and Communications Sections in Regions, Provinces, Districts and Villages affiliated with the Army are called Army Post Offices and have their own command committee composed of one chief, one assistant and one political officer. Letter distribution depends on local conditions.

b. Transmittal of Mail

(1) Procedures for passing mail and important documents have been established through the use of an effective runner system. At a scheduled time, a liaison agent will leave one station heading north or south, depending upon his instructions, and will meet another agent halfway to the next station. Materials are exchanged and the agents return to their respective stations with the exchanged materials.

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(2) In this manner postal materials are transmitted along the infiltration routes through various liaison stations, which are reportedly eight to ten hours walking time apart, until they reach their destination.

c. Postal Regulations

(1) During the latter part of 1965, intelligence sources indicate that there were no limitations imposed on the number of letters that an individual could send. However, a captured directive dated 9 September 1966 states, "Each comrade may send only one letter per month and its contents should be written on thin paper sheets".

(2) This directive further states, "Letters and parcel posts must be wrapped into a package and every parcel post may not be heavier than two kg (4.4 lbs)."

(3) There are indications that all mail is censored and that censorship is the responsibility of the Postal Transportation and Communication Section.

d. Receipt of Mail. There is no concrete intelligence regarding mail delivery time factors between SVN and NVN. However, interrogation reports indicate that there is no definite schedule and the receipt of mail is sporadic.

4. A recently captured document appears to represent the Party's directive to correct the existing deficiency: "Providing sufficient food to it's combat units." The document outlines three phases for coordinating the establishment of the Food Supply sub-section of the Rear Service installations, as follows:

a. Phase I (To be completed by March 67). The Supply Councils and Rear Service will train cadre in:

(1) Conducting political indoctrination and awarding of civilian transportation for movement of food supplies.

(2) Construction of storehouses and the protection thereof.

(3) The purchasing and requisition of food.

b. Phase II (To be completed in June 67). This is the storage of food in the local areas and the transportation of food from weak areas to relatively secure areas. Responsibilities for food transportation are as follows:

(1) Villages for the transportation of food within villages.

(2) Districts for the transportation of food from one village to another.

(3) Province and Rear Service for the transportation of food from one district to another.

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(4) Rear Service for the transportation of food from one province to another.

c. Phase III.

(1) Determine the criteria and estimate the quantity of rice produced in the locality and draft a plan, in conjunction with the Farmer's Association Finance Section, to urge the people to produce in accordance with the needs of armed units.

(2) Plan for the purchase and distribution of rice to villages within the district or province.

(3) Estimate and administer the funds, and settle the accounts according to the system of NAM THUONG to the Village Supply Councils.

(G-2 Comment: Food is becoming an increased problem with the VC/NVA.)

5. The following is a list of captives and returnees on which interrogation reports have been reviewed during the period:

<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u> <u>BY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
NGUYEN VAN AN(C)	8APR67	CAC I,1-5	CIV DEF	BT321187/TAM KY(D) HQ
TRAN NGOC ANH(C)	8APR67	CAC I,1-5	CIV DEF	BT321187/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN NGOC ANH(C)	7FEB67	UNK	UNK	UNK
NGUYEN THI BA(C)	31MAR67	CAC D-7	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN VAN BONG(C)	8APR67	CAC I,1-5	CIV DEF	BT321187/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI BAY(C)	10APR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT943614/I CORPS CCC
TRANG QUANG CHUONG(C)	8APR67	CAC I,1-5	CIV DEF	BT321187/LY TIN(D) HQ
DANG THI CUU(C)	10APR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT943614/I CORPS CCC
DANG DUC(C)	2APR67	2/1	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THANH DINH(C)	5APR67	L/3/5	CIV DEF	BS763832
NGUYEN DAT(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT348160/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN DANG(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT348160/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN DIEM(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT349163/LY TIN(D) HQ
PHAM DINH DU(C)	8APR67	G/2/1	CIV DEF	BT009301/ARVN HOSP DANANG
DO DE(C)	30MAR67	E/2/1	PW	AT790550/I CORPS CCC
DO NA(C)	UNK	2/26	PW	UNK/I CORPS CCC
MAI HUY(C)	6APR67	M/3/7	CIV DEF	BS838388/DUC PHO(D) HQ
NGUYEN HANH(UNK)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/QUANG NGAI,1ST HOSP CO
NGUYEN THI HOA(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT354156/LY TIN(D) HQ
LE THI HOA(C)	10APR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT943614/I CORPS CCC
TRAN THI KIEU(C)	10APR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT943614/I CORPS CCC
NGUYEN THI KIEM(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT349163/LY TIN(D) HQ
TRAN NGOC LINH(C)	8APR67	CAC I,1-5	CIV DEF	BT321187/TAM KY(D) HQ
HUYNH LOAN(C)	8APR67	CAC I,1-5	CIV DEF	BT321187/TAM KY(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI LAP(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT349163/LY TIN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI MAI(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT354156/LY TIN(D) HQ
LE THI MAI(C)	11APR67	A/1/5	CIV DEF	BT175317/TRANG BINH(D) HQ
HO NHU(C)	30MAR67	CAC D-7	CIV DEF	UNK/DIEN BAN(D) HQ

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<u>CAPTIVE(C)/RETURNEE(R)</u>	<u>DOC/DOR</u>	<u>CAPTURING UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOC/DISPOSITION</u>
TRAN NGAI(C)	28MAR67	B/1/26	PW	UNK/III MAF COMP
TRAN THI PHU(C)	10APR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT943614/I CORPS CCC
LE PHUNG(C)	10APR67	E/2/1	PW	BT042633/I CORPS CCC
NGUYEN THI QUYEN(C)	10APR67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT655035/BINH SON(D) HQ
LE TA(C)	UNK	UNK	CIV DEF	UNK/USOM HOSP
VO THI TIEN(C)	9APR67	H/2/7	CIV DEF	BS534916/BINH SON(D) HQ
TRAN THI THI(C)	11APR67	A/1/5	CIV DEF	BT175317/THANG BINH(D) HQ
NGUYEN TRU(C)	10APR67	A/1/7	CIV DEF	BT655035/BAN SON(D) HQ
HO THI THAI(C)	10APR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT943614/I CORPS CCC
NGUYEN THUAN(C)	8APR67	I/3/1	PW	BT218508/I CORPS CCC
HUYNH THANG(C)	30MAR67	E/2/4	PW	AT790550/I CORPS CCC
VO TRO(C)	8APR67	I/3/1	PW	BT218508/I CORPS CCC
HO THI VAN(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT348160/LY TIN(D) HQ
PHAM THI VAN(C)	10APR67	C/1/5	CIV DEF	BT348160/LY TIN(D) HQ
PHAN XO(C)	10APR67	B/1/7	CIV DEF	BS669952/BINH SON(D) HQ
DOA THI XUNG(C)	10APR67	1/26	CIV DEF	AT943614/I CORPS CCC
DANG XAY(C)	8APR67	I/3/1	PW	BT318508/I CORPS CCC
DANG XI(C)	10APR67	1/26	PW	AT943614/DIEN BAN(D) HQ
NGUYEN THI YEN(C)	11APR67	A/1/5	CIV DEF	BT175317/THANG BINH(D) HQ

ANNEX C (MAY WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP 16-67.

1. General Weather. Weather conditions during May will be generally favorable for tactical operations throughout the I Corps area.

2. Precipitation

a. May is a dry season in the coastal areas of I CTZ, while rainfall increases in the mountainous areas. Most rainfall is produced by afternoon and evening showers or thundershowers. Precipitation is generally light.

b. The mean number of days with measureable precipitation is approximately 10 throughout I CTZ.

c. Mean monthly precipitation amounts are three inches in southern QUANG NGAI Province and in the DANANG and HUE areas, and six inches over the rest of I CTZ.

d. Maximum monthly rainfall values range from 10 inches north of HUE to 18 inches over the rest of the I CTZ.

e. Minimum monthly precipitation amounts are less than one inch over the entire area.

f. Maximum 24 hour precipitation amounts are three to six inches over most of the area.

3. Thunderstorms. The mean number of days with thunderstorms is 10 to 12 throughout I Corps.

4. Cloudiness. Cloudiness reaches its annual minimum in the I CTZ during May.

5. Visibility. Early morning fog may occasionally restrict visibility in the interior valleys to less than three miles. Slant range visibility is at its best during May.

6. Fog. Fog is observed along the coastal areas in the I CTZ on one day or less during the month.

7. Temperatures. The mean maximum temperatures are in the low 90's; the highest mean maximum is 93°F at QUANG NGAI (elevation 56 feet). The mean minimum temperature is 70° to 75°F.

8. Sunrise, Sunset, and Moonrise, Moonset Tables

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
1	0623	1906	Last QTR	0106	1228
2	0623	1906		0151	1322

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
3	0622	1906		0231	1413
4	0622	1907		0308	1501
5	0621	1907		0342	1548
6	0621	1907		0415	1623
7	0620	1907		0447	1720
8	0620	1908		0520	1807
9	0619	1908	New	0555	1856
10	0619	1908		0633	1948
11	0619	1908		0716	2043
12	0618	1909		0803	2138
13	0618	1909		0855	2234
14	0617	1909		0950	2328
15	0617	1910		1049	---
16	0617	1910		1148	0020
17	0617	1910	1st QTR	1247	0108
18	0616	1911		1345	0152
19	0616	1911		1443	0234
20	0616	1911		1541	0315
21	0616	1912		1640	0357
22	0616	1912		1742	0440
23	0615	1912		1846	0527
24	0615	1913	Full	1952	0618
25	0615	1913		2057	0714
26	0615	1913		2158	0814
27	0615	1914		2255	1015

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
28	0615	1914		2344	1015
29	0614	1914		----	1112
30	0614	1915		0028	1206
31	0614	1915	Last QTR	0107	1256

ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTRLP NC. 16-67

1. GENERAL. Although VC acts of terrorism continued at a significant rate, VC activity of a counterintelligence interest continued at a low level. Items of interest include the establishment of a VC village for "liberated families", and a report concerning the use of women in VC guerrilla units.

2. ESPIONAGE

QUANG NAM. An 18 April report from an intelligence source related that the VC have established a training course for selected teenagers at an unknown location in QUANG NAM (P). Reportedly, these youths will receive an indoctrination course, espionage and sabotage training, and be taught the techniques of assassination. Upon completion of this course, the students will be sent to VINH DIEN (V) (BT 055588) and HOI AN City where they will pose as students or seek employment as a cover for the assigned missions.

3. SABOTAGE. The following acts of sabotage were reported:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Location</u>
QUANG TRI	16Apr	Highway culvert destroyed	YD 386489
THUA THIEN	21Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	ZD 014026
THUA THIEN	21Apr	Railroad bridge destroyed	YD 613278
QUANG NAM	20Apr	Highway bridge destroyed	AT 858408
QUANG NAM	20Apr	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 123484
QUANG TIN	19Apr	Highway culvert destroyed	BT 258288
QUANG TIN	20Apr	Highway partially destroyed	BT 232337

4. POLITICAL. There were no reports of political activity during the period.

5. PROPAGANDA

THUA THIEN. A 13 April report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of LOC DON (V) (YD 927104). The theme of the leaflets included a plea for the SVN forces to rise up against the U.S. forces and also related VC intentions to disrupt the hamlet and village pacification program.

A 13 April report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team stated that VC propaganda leaflets boasting of recent VC victories were found in the vicinity of (YD 932094). These leaflets further related that the VC were determined to punish the Americans and THIEN-XY "henchmen".

QUANG NAM. A 21 April report from the 5th Counterintelligence Team related that VC propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of YEN NL #3 (H) (AT 982682). These leaflets denounced the U.S. use of bombs to kill innocent people, and called for the populace and RVN soldiers to turn their weapons against the Americans.

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6. MISCELLANEOUS

THUA THIEN. A 14 April report from a usually reliable source stated that an estimated 30 VC entered a hamlet in the vicinity of (ZD 183007) and assassinated a civilian.

A 16 April report from an intelligence source related that an unknown number of VC entered BAT SON (H) (ZD 007034) and abducted a civilian.

A 17 April report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that a civilian bus detonated a mine in the vicinity of (ZD 075011) resulting in one civilian being killed and four injured.

A 17 April report from a usually reliable source stated that two children were killed and two were injured when the water buffalo they were riding detonated a mine in the vicinity of (YD 935240).

A 17 April report from the 1st Counterintelligence Team related that on 11 April the VC assassinated NGUYEN DUY in the vicinity of (AU 809019). Reportedly, DUY was assassinated because he was friendly with the Marines in the area.

A report received on 19 April from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC have established a village for "liberated families" in NAM HOA (D), for those cadre who have deserted from the government. Reportedly, there are approximately 100 families living in the village at the present time. This report further related that the VC circulated leaflets in the HUE area degrading the pacification program, ridiculing the participation of Vietnamese troops in this program, and appealing to the people to support the NFLSV in fighting the pacification program. These leaflets also called for the destruction of the resettlement hamlets in order that the populace may return to their native villages.

QUANG NAM. A 16 April report from a usually reliable source stated that an estimated squad of VC entered CAM HA (V) (BT 120570) and assassinated an election candidate, one child and wounded three civilians.

A 16 April report from an intelligence source related that a civilian bus detonated a mine in the vicinity of (BT 120487) resulting in nine people being killed and 12 injured.

A 17 April report from a usually reliable source stated that two civilians were killed and four were injured when the jeep they were riding in detonated a mine in the vicinity of (AT 942687).

A 20 April report from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines related that a Vietnamese disguised as a priest and carrying medical supplies was apprehended in the vicinity of (AT 864574).

QUANG NGAI. A 18 April report from a usually reliable source stated that an estimated squad of VC shot and killed an inter-family chief in CHAU TU #2 (H) (BS 590549).


A report received on 20 April from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC are utilizing women for espionage, propaganda, and recruitment throughout I Corps (Refer to Appendix 1).

APPENDIX 1 (VC USE OF WOMEN) TO ANNEX D (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III
MAF PERINTREP NC. 16-67

1. Throughout I Corps, low level agent reports have indicated VC use of women in the collection of information, dissemination of propaganda, organization of study groups, recruitment for the VC cause and active participation in guerrilla warfare. The following, received from another intelligence agency, reflects the VC use of women in various provinces within the I CTZ:

a. QUANG TRI. Reportedly, a number of women joined local guerrilla units in the TRUNG GIANG and TRUNG HAI areas of TRUNG LUCNG (D). In HAI LANG (D) the VC plan to send women under the guise of "funeral processions" to various villages to collect information and conduct military proselyting. In addition, the VC in TRUNG LUCNG (D) have established a system for exempting women from labor and/or taxes as a reward should they persuade their husbands, sons or brothers to desert the ARVN forces and join the VC cause.

b. THUA THIEN. A platoon composed of approximately 20 women will reportedly operate in HUONG THUY (D) with the mission of disseminating propaganda, furnishing food to VC units, recruiting of youths for the MLFVN and actively participating in guerrilla warfare.

c. QUANG NAM. It has been reported that the VC are preparing to send women and children to live in government controlled areas in order to collect information. In addition, women have been recruited to care for the ill and wounded VC and to supply food for regular units.

d. QUANG NGAI. Reportedly, women will participate in guerrilla operations to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program. Additionally, the VC are training attractive women in the English language in order that they may be employed to collect information from U.S. units.

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