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26 MAY 1967

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF ltr 3/JEF/sbc over  
3480/3 Ser: 00123367 dtd 8May67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: III MAF Command Chronology 1-31 March 1967

1. Forwarded.

*M. C. Dalby*  
M. C. DALBY  
By direction

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**UNCLASSIFIED** **COMMAND CHRONOLOGY**



**MARCH 1967** 309 511

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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Ser:  
8 MAY 1967

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) III MAF Command Chronology, March 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is herewith submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when removed from enclosure (1).

*R. B. Neville*  
R. B. NEVILLE  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

GROUP-4  
Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals. Declassified  
after 12 years.

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III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 March 1967 - 31 March 1967

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

III Marine Amphibious Force

Lieutenant General  
Lewis W. WALT, U. S.  
Marine Corps  
4Jun65-31Mar67SUBORDINATE UNITS

First Marine Division

Major General  
Herman NICKERSON, Jr.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
10Oct66-31Mar67

Third Marine Division

Major General  
Wood B. KYLE, U. S.  
Marine Corps  
18Mar66-31Mar67

First Marine Aircraft Wing

Major General  
Louis B. ROBERTSHAW  
U. S. Marine Corps  
16May66-31Mar67

Force Logistic Command

Brigadier General  
James E. HERBOLD, Jr.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
30Oct66-31Mar67

7th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel  
Frank W. HARRIS, III  
U. S. Marine Corps  
8 Aug 1966 - 31 Mar 1967

9th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel  
George A. BABE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
7Feb67-31Mar67

11th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel  
Ross L. MULFORD  
U. S. Marine Corps  
16Aug66-31Mar67

Sub-Unit #1, First Radio Battalion

Major Willard I. CRUMBACK,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1-31Mar67

Headquarters and Service Company,  
III Marine Amphibious Force

Major Vernon L. SYLVESTER,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
29Sep66-26Mar67

Major Robert E. FINNEY  
U. S. Marine Corps  
27-31Mar67

ATTACHED UNITS

29th Civil Affairs Company, U. S.  
Army

Lieutenant Colonel  
Lawrence A. STEVENS  
U. S. Army

244th Psychological Operations  
Company, U. S. Army

Major T. H. MC CAIG,  
U. S. Army

2. LOCATION

1-31 March 1967, Danang, Quang Nam Province, Republic  
of Vietnam

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff

Brigadier General  
Hugh M. ELWOOD, U. S.  
Marine Corps  
6Dec66-31Mar67

Deputy Chief of Staff

Colonel Robert B. NEVILLE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
5Aug66-31Mar67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Colonel John L. MAHON,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
8Jun66-31Mar67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Colonel Benjamin S. READ,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
14Feb-31Mar67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Colonel Drew J. BARRETT, Jr.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
9Nov66-31Mar67

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~~██████████~~  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Colonel Joseph F. QUILTY, Jr.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
21May66-31Mar67

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Colonel John T. HILL,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1Feb-31Mar67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6

Lieutenant Colonel  
Marvin D. VOLKERT, U. S.  
Marine Corps  
28Jul66-31Mar67

Psychological Operations Officer

Colonel Robert R. READ,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1Aug66-31Mar67

Supply Officer

Colonel Arthur T. HILL,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
6Oct66-31Mar67

Communications-Electronics Officer

Colonel Jake B. HILL,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
23Mar66-31Mar67

Engineer Officer

Colonel Charles H. HORN,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
21Aug66-31Mar67

Adjutant

Major John T. REVILLE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
30Jul66-31Mar67

Comptroller

Lieutenant Colonel  
Melvin W. SNOW, U. S.  
Marine Corps  
19Jun66-31Mar67

Chaplain

Captain Earl V. LYONS,  
U. S. Navy  
11Oct66-31Mar67

Combat Information Bureau

Colonel Don G. DERRYBERRY,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
9Feb-31Mar67

OinC, Combat Operations Center

Lieutenant Colonel  
Robert E. YOUNG, USMC  
22Dec66-31Mar67

~~██████████~~  
Food Services Officer

Unassigned 1-31Mar67

Legal Officer

Colonel Robert B. NEVILLE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
30Jul66-31Mar67

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Surgeon

Captain Howard A. BAKER,  
U. S. Navy  
17Jun66-31Mar67

Dental Officer

Captain Kenneth L. MORGAN,  
U. S. Navy  
31Aug66-31Mar67

Motor Transport Officer

Lieutenant Colonel  
Charles A. TONNACLIFF,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
9Jul66-31Mar67

Ordnance Officer

Lieutenant Colonel  
John C. THOMAS, U. S. Marine  
Corps  
21Jul66-31Mar67

Headquarters Commandant

Colonel Jack R. RHOADES,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
16Feb-31Mar67

Protocol Officer

Major John A. LIVINGSTONE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
17Sep66-31Mar67

Special Services Officer

Colonel Carl A. SACHS,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
7Sep66-31Mar67

Embarkation Officer

Lieutenant Colonel  
Eugene A. SILVERTHORN,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
3Jul66-31Mar67

Inspector

Colonel Clay A. BOYD,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
12Jun66-31Mar67

Force Historian

Lieutenant Colonel  
John E. FAHEY, U. S.  
Marine Corps  
28Jul66-31Mar67

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~~SECRET~~PART IISIGNIFICANT EVENTSI. INTRODUCTION.

A. GENERAL. During March 1967 III MAF Headquarters was located in East Danang, Republic of Vietnam. The average personnel strength for March was 80,310, and increase of 807 over the previous month.

B. ACTIVITIES. III MAF continues to be guided by COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966, in pursuit of III MAF objectives for March.

II. OVERALL EVALUATION.

A. In March the number of small unit operations conducted by III MAF continued to reflect an increase over the totals for such operations for previous months. March small unit operations totaled 30,179, the highest total of any single month for Marine Forces in Vietnam. This represents an increase of 9,496 over the average number of such operations conducted during the past three months period. These small unit operations resulted in 1,252 contacts with the enemy; this also is a new high for III MAF. The enemy lost, as a result of these operations, 450 KIA (Confirmed).

The March rate of VC/NVA captured, 74, was the lowest total for a single month during the last three months period. Casualty totals of 2,159 KIA (Confirmed) and 2144 KIA (Probable) were however the highest overall result for the same period of time.

III. OPERATIONS.

A. DISCUSSION. During March III MAF continued to pursue four major objectives: 1. Destruction of NVA/Main Force VC; 2. Destruction of Guerrillas; 3. Revolutionary Development; 4. Base Defense.

(1) Destruction of NVA/Main Force VC. During March III MAF conducted a total of thirteen major unit operations; however the number of these operations was not as significant as were the results; U. S. Marine Forces accounted for 1549 enemy KIA (Confirmed) in major unit operations. This is a new high for enemy KIA in major unit operations for a one month

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period.

There were 400 infantry battalion days of operation recorded by III MAF forces in March. This total compares with 380 in February and 354 in January.

(2) Destruction of Guerrilla Forces. As stated in Overall Evaluation above, the high density of small unit operations conducted by III MAF totaled 30,179 for March. The high rate of contact, 1,252, and the results of 450 KIA (Confirmed) continued the trend of destruction of the guerrilla force. Two Special Operations categories, County Fairs and Sting Rays, also provided destruction of the enemy by attaining 160 enemy KIA (Confirmed).

III MAF, in all operations, inflicted 2,159 enemy KIA (Confirmed) and 2,144 KIA (Probables).

(3) Revolutionary Development.

(a) The 30,179 small unit operations (patrols, ambushes, clearing) saturated areas of guerrilla activity in support of ICTZ Revolutionary Development. Of the thirteen major unit operations conducted in March, seven were within TAOR's in areas of substantial VC activity. These operations served to restrict or eliminate the VC capability of interdiction upon Revolutionary Development operations.

(b) There were three County Fair Operations in March in areas made secure by III MAF Operations. These resulted in 3 VC KIA (Confirmed), 8 Detainees, and 2,036 Vietnamese civilians were screened. MEDCAP assistance was provided for 1,672 Vietnamese during these County Fair Operations.

(4) Base Defense.

(a) The First Military Police Battalion continued to provide security for the Danang Air Base Complex. On 15 March the Danang Air Base was subjected to an attack by 140mm Rockets. This marked the second attack upon this base using that type of weapon. (ANNEX A).

At Chu Lai, the Chu Lai Defense Command continued to provide security for that installation. The small unit operations, reported in paragraphs II. A. and III. A. (2) above, contributed greatly to the success of base defense in TAOR's.

A significant aid to operations in Quang Tri Province was provided when on 27 March Route #9 from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh was

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opened after a considerable engineer effort by the 11th Engineer Battalion. This major communication/supply route had been closed since a time prior to U. S. Marine arrival in Vietnam. Although traversable only by armed convoys and vehicles up to 5 ton, from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh, the opening of Route #9 will not only aid military operations in that area but, it will also greatly aid the Revolutionary Development program. The first Rough Rider from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh on 27 March met with no incident enroute.

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III. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

A. PRAIRIE II. During the period 1-18 March 1967, Operation PRAIRIE II continued in Quang Tri Province. The heavy enemy contact initiated on 28 February 1967 continued with enemy forces estimated to be 3 NVA battalions. Two additional U. S. Marine Battalions, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines and 1st Battalion (-), 9th Marines, were moved to the battle area to reinforce. At 030720H an Aerial Observer sighted two groups of approximately 250 NVA, each in the open, and called air strikes and artillery fires upon them resulting in 76 KIA (Conf) and 75 KIA (Prob). Contact with enemy in the area north of Cam Lo continued to be heavy until 8 March 1967 when contact reduced. Results of the action from and including 28 February to 8 March was 531 KIA (Conf), 288 KIA (Prob), 10 PW/NVA and 78 weapons captured. At 162010H Co M/3/4 received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from 8-10 enemy. Return fire and artillery resulted in 5 KIA (Conf) and 2 KIA (Prob). At 170705H AO observed 20 enemy in an open field. Called artillery mission resulting in 7 KIA (Conf). At 181830H AO observed 40-50 enemy at vicinity YD 109660, called artillery mission. Search of the area of the sighting revealed 20 KIA (Conf) and 10 KIA (Prob). During Operation PRAIRIE II, 624 tactical air sorties were flown and 15,420 artillery missions were provided. Results for this period were: USMC: 81 KIA, 343 WIA, 1 MIA. Enemy: 635 KIA (Conf), 423 KIA (Prob), 46 Detainees, 12 PW/NVA, 1 Civil Defendant, 38 Innocent Civilians and 101 weapons. Cumulative results of the operation were: USMC: 93 KIA, 483 WIA, 1 MIA. Enemy: 693 KIA (Conf), 481 KIA (Prob), 288 Detainees, 6 PW/VC, 14 PW/NVA, 22 Civil Defendants, 246 Innocent Civilians and 137 weapons captured.

B. CHINOOK II. During the period 1-31 March 1967, 4th Marines continued search and destroy operations in Thua Thien Province with light contact. At 031415H an AO observed several VC fleeing from bunkers, called airstrike resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf). At 041700H a Reconnaissance patrol observed 5 VC in a stream. Artillery mission called resulting in 5 VC KIA (Conf). On 12 March 1967 Company G/2/9 found a cave 40x3x5 feet at YD 494328. A pit at the cave entrance contained an explosive device and 3 bamboo vipers. All were destroyed. At 151230H a platoon patrol from Company F/2/9 found and destroyed 7 15x15x3 foot bunkers at vicinity of YD 575266. At 250800H Company F/2/9 platoon ambush observed 7 VC. Called artillery mission resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf) and 2 VC KIA (Prob). At 300605H Company H/2/9 platoon ambush fired at 10 VC. 3 VC KIA (Conf) and 1 VC KIA (Prob). Results for this period were:

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USMC: 2 KIA, 44 WIA. Enemy: 44 KIA (Conf), 52 KIA (Prob), 17 Detainees, 1 Civil Defendant, 18 Innocent Civilians and 7 weapons captured. Cumulative results for this operation were: USMC: 11 KIA, 104 WIA. Enemy: 93 KIA (Conf), 197 KIA (Prob), 111 Detainees, 4 PW/VC, 12 PW/NVA, 1 Civil Defendant, 86 Innocent Civilians and 29 weapons captured.

C. DESOTO. During the period 1-31 March 1967, 7th Marines continued search and destroy operations in Quang Ngai Province with light contact. At 031230H Company L/3/7 search and destroy sweep force observed 3 VC in a trench. Fired 25 rounds small arms fire. 3 VC KIA (Conf). At 061400H Company I/3/7 squad combat patrol observed a VC squad. Fired 300 rounds of small arms fire killing 6 VC (Conf) and 1 VC (Prob). At 101730H Company M/3/7 encountered 5 VC emerging from a bunker. The subsequent firefight netted 5 VC KIA (Conf) and 1 weapon. At 161800H Company F/2/7 search and destroy sweep force received a heavy volume of small arms fire from an unknown size enemy unit, return small arms fire, air strike and artillery mission resulted in 11 VC KIA (Conf). At 171430H, the 3rd platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was attacked by 15 enemy. Received 125 rounds of small arms fire. Returned 50 rounds of small arms fire resulting in 5 VC KIA (Conf). At 271730H Company K/3/7 during a search and destroy sweep through the hamlet of Dong Thuan, screened villagers with village chief and national police. With the entire hamlet surrounded, numerous persons were observed slipping out of the village. After due warning all those trying to leave the area were taken under fire. 30 VC were observed hiding in a shallow swampy area utilizing various methods of camouflage. Results of this search and destroy were 26 VC KIA (Conf) and 2 VC KIA (Prob) and 46 Detainees. At 301700H Company G/2/7 received moderate fire from estimated 30 enemy. Returned small arms fire and grenades and assault of the enemy position resulted in 4 VC KIA (Conf) and 5 VC KIA (Prob). Results for this period were: USMC: 30 KIA, 201 WIA. Enemy: 142 KIA (Conf), 173 KIA (Prob), 112 Detainees, 5 PW/VC. Cumulative results of this operation were: USMC: 61 KIA, 500 WIA. Enemy: 355 KIA (Conf), 657 KIA (Prob), 155 Detainees, 5 PW/VC, 26 Civil Defendants and 7 Innocent Civilians.

D. DECKHOUSE VI. During the period 1-3 March 1967, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 continued search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Sa Huynh with light to moderate contacts with enemy forces. At 011100H Company B/1/4 received 10 rounds of small arms fire. Returned small fire resulted in 2 VC KIA (Conf) and 2 VC KIA (Prob). At 021000H Company D/1/4 search and destroy sweep received 75 rounds small arms fire.

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60 rounds of small arms fire returned resulting in 3 VC KIA (Conf) and 6 VC KIA (Prob). At 022205H a fire team from Company D/1/4 ambushed an unknown number of VC. Fired 200 rounds of small arms fire and 4 M-79 grenades. Search revealed 4 VC KIA (Conf) and 5 VC KIA (Prob). Two additional ambushes by units of Company D/1/4 during the period 030430H-030433H resulted in a total of 10 VC KIA (Conf) and 6 VC KIA (Prob). During this operation 145 tactical air sorties, 99 naval gunfire missions and 9 artillery missions were provided. Results for this period were: USMC: 1 KIA, 16 WIA. Enemy: 39 KIA (Conf), 45 KIA (Prob) and 1 Detainee. Cumulative results of Operation DECKHOUSE VI were: USMC: 6 KIA, 80 WIA. Enemy: 280 KIA(Conf), 210 KIA(Prob), 21 Detainees and 1 PW/VC.

E. LAFAYETTE. During the final period of Operation LAFAYETTE, 1-7 March 1967, 1st Marines continued search and destroy operations in Quang Nam Province. Contact during this period was light. At 011240H Company K/3/1 blocking force received one grenade from a spider hole. One M-26 grenade thrown into spider hole resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf). At 031700H Company L/3/1 sweep force received small arms fire. Unit returned 70 rounds of small arms fire, searched area and found 4 VC KIA (Conf). At 071800H Company L/3/1 blocking force observed 3 VC in a boat on river, fired small arms resulting in 3 VC KIA (Conf). During this operation 6 tactical air sorties and 76 artillery missions were provided. Results for this period were: USMC, 5 KIA, 37 WIA, 1 MIA. Enemy: 43 KIA (Conf), 28 KIA(Prob), 150 Detainees, 18 PW/VC and 3 weapons. Cumulative results were: USMC: 6 KIA, 41 WIA, 1 MIA. Enemy: 77 KIA (Conf), 29 KIA (Prob), 175 Detainees, 19 PW/VC, 1 Civil Defendant, 3 Innocent Civilians and 3 weapons captured.

F. GULF. During the period 4-7 March 1967, 9th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in the northern portion of the Danang TAOR with insignificant contact. The only significant event which occurred was the tank detonation of an enemy mine which resulted in the only USMC casualties of the operation. Cumulative results of the operation were: USMC: 5 WIA. Enemy: 1 weapon.

G. YUBA. During the period 10-12 March 1967, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines conducted a three day search and destroy operation southwest of Danang. This operation was conducted in the general area from which the first enemy initiated 140mm Rocket attack was launched against the Danang Air Base in the early morning hours of 27 February 1967. Contact with enemy forces

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for the three day period was light. There were several small contacts with enemy forces. Marine units encountered numerous booby traps and punji pits, which accounted for most of Marine casualties. Cumulative results of this operation were: USMC: 10 WIA. Enemy: 1 KIA (Conf), 1 KIA (Prob) and 8 Detainees.

H. TIPPECANOE. During the period 13-18 March 1967, 5th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. Contact during the operation was light. At 131345H Company C/1/5 received rifle fire from a native hut. A fire team moving to investigate observed 2 VC flee from hut. Team fired small arms resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf). At 151000H Company C/1/5 platoon patrol found and destroyed several bomb shelters. At 160900H Company D/1/5 search and destroy sweep in vicinity of BT 312110 found 50 punji stakes rigged as mines for helicopters. Included 20 lbs of unknown type of explosive, 5 155mm rounds, one 250 lb bomb and one 60mm round. All destroyed. There were 9 tactical air sorties flown in support of this operation. Cumulative results were: USMC: 1 KIA, 4 WIA. Enemy: 3 KIA (Conf), 2 KIA (Prob) and 7 Detainees.

I. PRAIRIE III. On 19 March 1967, 3rd Marine Division commenced Operation PRAIRIE III in the northern sector of Quang Tri Province. Contact during this period was moderate to significant. At 201945H the Provisional Artillery Group at Gio Linh received approximately 500 rounds of 82mm mortar and 120mm rocket fire. During this period enemy forces launched heavy mortar attacks on several units involved in PRAIRIE III. On 20, 23 and 25 March 1967, Gio Linh was attacked with an estimated total of 625 rounds of 82mm mortars and rockets. On 24 March, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines Command Group was attacked with 33 rounds of 82mm mortars and on 26 March Company I/3/3 sustained 2 attacks of 82mm mortar and 120mm rockets, a total of 220 rounds fell. At 241740H Company I/3/3 made contact with an estimated 50 NVA. Utilizing all organic weapons the company assaulted the enemy force resulting in 28 NVA KIA (Conf) and 15 NVA KIA (Prob). At 301800H Company I/3/9 was attacked by an estimated NVA company employing 82/60mm mortars. A second attack was followed by the NVA assaulting positions using heavy volume of small arms fire and grenades. A third attack was supported by automatic weapons and grenades. Utilizing artillery, mortars, small arms and UH-1E Gunships, Company I/3/9 accounted for 41 NVA KIA (Conf), 35 NVA KIA (Prob) and 23 weapons captured. Cumulative results for this period were: USMC: 51 KIA, 328 WIA. Enemy: 185 KIA (Conf), 201 KIA (Prob), 82 Detainees, 4 PW/NVA, 10 Civil Defendants, 61 Innocent Civilians and 79 weapons captured.

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J. BEACON HILL. On 20 March 1967, Commander Task Group 76.5 launched an amphibious operation in the northeast sector of Quang Tri Province near the DMZ for the purpose of conducting search and destroy operations. On 21 March 1967 Operation BEACON HILL became OPCON to 3rd Marine Division. During this operation contact was significant. During the period 221600H-222000H Company B/1/4 received 2000 rounds of small arms fire. Return small arms fire, grenades and LAAW resulted in 18 VC KIA (Conf) and 48 VC KIA (Prob). At 232145H Company D/1/4 received approximately 30 rounds of 82mm mortars, heavy machine gun and small arms fire. Return small arms, automatic weapons, M-79 and M-26 grenades, plus artillery fire resulted in 23 KIA (Conf) and 59 KIA (Prob). At 240715H Company C/1/4 was assaulted by an estimated NVA company. Company C called 60/81mm mortars, artillery and naval gunfire. Results were 38 NVA KIA (Conf) and 63 NVA KIA (Prob). During the period 251230H-251600H Company D/1/4 was in contact with an estimated enemy battalion in trenches. Utilizing all supporting arms and small arms fire, unit assaulted the enemy position. The enemy force broke contact leaving 15 KIA (Conf) and 132 KIA (Prob). At 280830H Company D/1/4 utilized 81mm mortars and artillery missions on enemy activity in front of their perimeter during the night. Search at first light revealed 8 NVA KIA (Conf). Cumulative results of this operation through its termination, 010200H April 1967, were: USMC: 26 KIA, 220 WIA. Enemy: 334 KIA (Conf), 523 KIA (Prob), 4 Detainees and 31 weapons captured.

K. NEW CASTLE. During the period 22-25 March 1967, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in the southwest portion of the Danang TAOR with significant contact. During the period 231600H-231730H Company E/2/5 squad patrol encountered an estimated enemy battalion at vicinity of AT 854496. Squad received heavy small arms fire and withdrew under covering fire of Company E/2/5. Company F/2/5 and two LVTH-6's moved to flank the enemy unit. LVTH's fired 60 rounds of 105mm HE. Enemy broke contact. Results were 61 VC KIA (Conf) and 37 VC KIA (Prob). At 241520H Company's E and F/2/5 made contact with an estimated 150 to 200 enemy troops. Company E was well into a U-shaped ambush when contact was made. Both Company's were taken under fire with mortars and small arms fire. Utilizing artillery, air strikes, a flame tank and supporting fire from LVTH-6's, both company's inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Enemy broke contact at 241840H. Results of this contact were: 1 USMC KIA and 35 WIA. Enemy losses were 42 KIA (Conf) and 52 KIA (Prob). During this operation 13 tactical air sorties and 146 artillery

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missions were provided. Cumulative results of this operation were: USMC: 5 KIA, 55 WIA. Enemy: 118 KIA (Conf), 140 KIA (Prob), 34 Detainees and 1 PW/VC.

L. EARLY. During the period 24-25 March 1967, First Battalion, 1st Marines and the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 4th Cavalry conducted a search and destroy operation south of Danang. Contact during the period was light. At 241050H Company A/1/1 platoon combat patrol observed 3 enemy. Tank fired two rounds of 90mm resulting in 3 VC KIA (Conf). At 241815H, scout snipers with Company A/1/1 observed two enemy trying to cross a river. Fired 2 rounds of small arms resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf). There were 4 naval gunfire missions and 5 artillery missions provided in support. Cumulative results were: USMC: 2 WIA. Enemy: 5 KIA (Conf), 4 KIA (Prob), 3 Detainees and 4 PW/VC.

M. PERRY. During the period 25-27 March 1967, Second Battalion, 7th Marines with one company of ROK Marines conducted a three day search and destroy operation south of Chu Lai. Contact during the operation was insignificant. A few incidents of small arms fire from enemy was experienced, but return fire resulted in no enemy casualties. A Marine LVT detonated a 155mm round rigged as a mine, resulting in 5 USMC WIA and heavy damage to the LVT. During the operation cumulative results were: USMC: 10 WIA. Enemy: 9 Detainees and 8 Innocent Civilians.

IV. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

A. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. For the month of March there were four primary areas of enemy activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The first was located in the northern Quang Tri Province and encompassed the Con Thien and Gio Linh sectors where Marine and ARVN units engaged the NVA in moderate to heavy ground action. In addition and of equal import was the heavy increase of mortar fire directed against U. S. and ARVN units and field facilities located in proximity to the eastern end of the DMZ. By the end of the reporting period such fire had subsided to a point of insignificance. Enemy ground action had also slacked off.

The second center of enemy activity in eastern Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces witnessed increasing attempts to disrupt local GVN RD efforts. A fairly constant volume of relatively small scale VC attacks were aimed at the RD Teams and RF/PF elements protecting them, this providing additional evidence of the enemy's growing concern with the initial success of the RD program.

The third area pertained to Quang Nam Province where the enemy rapidly centralized his operations between the south eastern end of the Danang TAOR and the Quang Tin Province border. Substantial contact occurred within this sector and, although this consisted primarily of small scale harassing and probing attacks against ARVN, RF and PF elements, several engagements did occur with major enemy formations. By the end of the month the intensity of activity in the area had dropped off to a considerable extent.

The fourth and final focus of enemy activity was centered in a larger region south of the Chu Lai TAOR and included the Binh Son, Son Tinh and Mo Duc Districts. The enemy strenuously maintained his attempts at controlling this critical high population and important food producing region and of contesting Allied operations in the area. He likewise stepped up his attacks against the local RD effort. In regard to the latter program, all indications point toward an even greater attempt to thwart this basic pacification plan, particularly in the coastal region of Quang Ngai Province.

B. QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND THE DMZ. During the period 1 through 24 March, the enemy initiated a series of ground actions including mortar, rocket and artillery fire against U. S. and ARVN units and facilities deployed in northern Quang Tri Province.

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Early in the month enemy activity was dominated by heavy, though inaccurate mortar fire against the Provisional Artillery Group site, the Gio Linh OP, the Con Thien OP and the Thuong District Headquarters. By 10 March, Operation PRAIRIE II had made three contacts in the area southwest of Con Thien with the NVA in estimated company strength and had participated in a sequence of lesser actions involving short engagements with enemy elements of up to platoon size. Substantial enemy casualties resulted. A portion of the ground activity noted appeared residual in nature with elements of the 812th NVA Regiment continuing their withdrawal toward the DMZ following heavy action with Marine units over the period 27 February through 3 March. In addition artillery positions at Camp Carroll, YD 082543, were subjected to three separate and heavy mortar and rocket attacks over 6-7 March. The estimated total of 420-485 mortar/rocket rounds received saturated the area with no discernible pattern or center of impact. Of this total 209 rounds were attributed to rocket fire. Damage was minor.

On 11 March the ARVN Airborne Task Force gained contact with an estimated two NVA battalions at YD 185716. Heavy action followed with substantial enemy casualties resulting. The next day two ARVN infantry battalions encountered an estimated battalion sized enemy force in the same general area. Enemy casualties were moderate.

During the period of 12 - 25 March, the enemy also concentrated his effort in the eastern portion of the province. On 17 March at YD 325584 RD Team 14 was attacked by an estimated VC Company. Both ARVN and Marine elements responded to the RD request for assistance. The ensuing action resulted in moderate enemy casualties. Within the same vicinity several RD Teams protected by RF and PF elements were attacked by small VC units. All attacks were successfully repulsed. The enemy approach in the area east of Quang Tri City remains directed against the RD program. The intensity of his actions in this coastal area was greater than the two previous reporting periods.

The week of 19 - 25 March saw a distinct increase in the intensity and tempo of enemy ground activity in northern Quang Tri Province. The enemy effort continued to be centered in the northern Con Thien/Gio Linh sector where 29 mortar attacks were reported. Although the majority of incoming was 82mm Mortar fire, some 105mm artillery fire was received plus other artillery fire of undetermined caliber. Ground action in the Con Thien sector consisted of Marine contacts with NVA company sized and

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smaller elements as part of Operations BEACON HILL and PRAIRIE III. The fighting was described as heavy, the enemy response tenacious and the NVA suffered severe casualties. Over 19 and 20 March, units of the 3rd Marines located 121 - 102mm spin stabilized rockets and three launchers in the vicinity of YD 0762. The positions were from seven to nine kilometers north of Camp Carroll.

There was an overall decrease in the tempo of enemy activity reported for the last week of the month. One significant contact occurred at YD 105656 with an estimated NVA company and the remainder of the ground action was scattered and involved enemy elements of squad to platoon size. Enemy casualties were heavy. There was also a very sharp drop in the intensity and number of mortar attacks directed against the northern Con Thien and Gio Linh areas. Following a three week period of intense ground activity and for what must have been for the enemy a high expenditure of critical supplies, the general easing off of action in northern Quang Tri Province would appear to represent an inability to maintain an intense level of action for any great length of time.

Aerial photographic coverage of the DMZ and the area north of it revealed no significant increase in enemy ground activity when compared to February photography. Marine ground reconnaissance reported contact and sightings with small groups of NVA and VC, further suggesting an enemy continuing his attempts at infiltrating small numbers of NVA in the ICTZ.

For the month of March, enemy actions in northern Quang Tri Province would appear to have been based on two limited objectives: One, the destruction of Camp Carroll and its artillery. Two, the destruction of ARVN and U. S. elements deployed in the northern Con Thien/Gio Linh areas.

C. THUA THIEN PROVINCE AND THE PHU BAI TAOR. Enemy activity was primarily centered in the northeastern portion of the province and close to Hue City. Significant action consisted of attacks against RF and PF elements providing security for various echelons of the GVN district administrative structure. The first three weeks of the month witnessed VC initiated action against the Quang Dien District Headquarters and the Phong Dien and Phu Thu Sub-Sector Headquarters. The latter action on 11 March best characterized the enemy's approach and resulted in the headquarters being overrun and destroyed by an estimated VC battalion. An RF company and ARVN elements were committed as

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a reaction force and the headquarters was reoccupied approximately three hours after the first attack. In the same vicinity the enemy increased his pressure against local RD elements. The pattern of his actions again pointed toward a growing concern over the GVN RD program.

Elsewhere in eastern Thua Thien, enemy action consisted of small scale harassing and probing actions against isolated, friendly security elements located primarily along the LOC.

Commencing 26 March, the sector east of the southern end of the Phu Bai TAOR saw a rise in terrorism reflected through an increase in VC use of mines. Seven major incidents took place in the vicinity of ZD 011031. Four minings, an assassination, an ambush, and one incident of sabotage were reported. With the exception of the sabotage, all others constituted terrorism directed against civilians travelling in commercial vehicles and represents a renewed effort to intimidate the populace in this location.

Operation CHINOOK II, underway in an area north and northwest of Hue City, reported negative to light contact with the enemy. Ground reconnaissance disposed along the western approaches to Hue City and the Phu Bai TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy for the entire period. Southeast Thua Thien remained relatively quiet and nothing of major significance was reported between Phu Bai and Danang.

D. QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND THE DANANG TAOR. In Quang Nam Province, the enemy effort was concentrated in the southeastern portion between Hoi An and the Quang Nam/Quang Tin border. The focus of enemy action became apparent for the week 5-12 March. The following two weeks, 13-25 March, saw a rapid increase in the tempo and intensity of enemy activity to a point where the relatively small sector experienced the heaviest enemy initiated ground action of any in the I Corps Tactical Zone. On 13 March an estimated VC company employing a full range of infantry weapons attacked the Hieu Nhon District Headquarters, BT 168573. The VC displayed unusual brutality while inflicting heavy casualties on the defenders. On the evening of 24 March in the vicinity of BT 113497 south of the Ba Ren Bridge, an ARVN convoy made up of approximately 96 vehicles was attacked by a sizeable VC force. An ARVN reaction unit was committed and artillery fire was brought to bear. Air strikes were likewise flown against the enemy. Results of the enemy attacks were 26 trucks destroyed, 45 with varying degrees of damage, and 25 undamaged. Marine convoy preceding the ARVN also was attacked; three vehicles were

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lost, one to mining which temporarily stopped the convoy and the remaining two by enemy fire.

The remainder of the enemy incidents reported out of this southeastern sector were of a lesser size and scope. They included assassinations, minings, mortar attacks, and small scale harassing and probing actions. Individually they would have been considered insignificant, however, when seen as a whole this representation becomes a highly centralized enemy effort. The intensity and tempo slacked off sharply during the last week of the month, but with one exception. On 29 March, an estimated enemy battalion attacked the 21st ARVN Ranger Battalion, BT 102511. Heavy action followed and the VC sustained heavy casualties.

Prisoners of war captured as a result of the engagement revealed that the attacking unit was the 1st Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment. These prisoners further stated that the 24 March attack against the USMC and ARVN convoys on Highway 1 in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin border area was conducted by the 2nd Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment reinforced by two companies of the R.20 Battalion, with the 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment in reserve.

Within the Danang TAOR Operation NEW CASTLE in the vicinity of AT 8549 gained significant contact with an estimated enemy battalion. Heavy action ensued and for the period 22-25 March enemy casualties were 70 KIA (Conf) and 88 KIA (Prob).

Ground reconnaissance along the northern and western portions of the TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. With the exception of the week 19-25 March when the number of enemy sighted was insignificant, the remainder of the period produced sightings totalling an average of approximately 270 VC per week in the area south of the Danang TAOR and north of the Quang Tin border.

When compared to the two previous reporting periods there has been a general decrease in the number of VC initiated incidents within the Danang TAOR. There has however, been a sharp rise in the number of incidents involving VC use of mines and booby traps.

Other significant activity in Quang Nam Province occurred in the vicinity of the Thoung Duc CIDG Camp where patrols gained several contacts with the enemy. VC strength was between 20 to 30 men per group. On 11 March the Thoung Duc District Headquarters

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at ZC 164535 was attacked by an unknown number of VC. This action was accompanied by mortar fire and the district headquarters was destroyed.

E. QUANG TIN PROVINCE AND THE CHU LAI TAOR. Quang Tin Province was the quietest of any in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The major portion of the VC initiated action which did occur came within a 10 kilometer radius of Tam Ky City. The incidence of destruction or damage sustained by friendly facilities such as bridges, culverts, OPs and lesser base installations was low. Elsewhere, enemy activity was primarily concerned with small scale harassing attacks against ARVN, RF and PF security elements located along Highway 1. The week of 19-25 March best characterized the VC effort in the region. Four major incidents were reported. The first two, on 19 and 20 March, concerned the partial destruction of a bridge and culvert at BT 236339 and BT 182410 by unknown numbers of VC. On 19 March at BT 270268 a platoon from the 929th RF company was attacked by an estimated company of VC. Following a short fire fight the enemy withdrew. Again at BT 213282 on 20 March two RF platoons manning an OP were hit by an estimated VC company. Supporting artillery was called for and the VC hastily broke contact and withdrew. Four minor harassing incidents were reported in the sector just west of Tam Ky City.

Ground reconnaissance west of the Chu Lai TAOR reported light sightings of the enemy. No significant movement was noted over the month.

The number of VC initiated incidents reported within the Chu Lai TAOR followed a normal pattern; activity was relatively light. On 5 March, Marine Aircraft Group 12 received 52 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in proximity to the Chu Lai airstrip. Friendly casualties were light and one aircraft was slightly damaged.

F. QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. The month of March, when compared to February, bore out a shift in the enemy's offensive approach within the eastern Quang Ngai region. The previous period had witnessed several major and set ground actions with Korean and ARVN units resulting in very heavy enemy casualties and the loss of considerable enemy equipment. VC activity during March was more diffuse, avoiding large scale offensive actions, in favor of the local effort which was centered primarily in the Binh Son, Son Tinh, and Mo Duc Districts. In addition, the enemy continued to deploy significant elements in the vicinity of the CIDG Camps. Patrols out of three of these facilities encountered the enemy throughout the month.

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West of Mo Duc City on 5 March the Ngia Hanh Sub-sector Headquarters, BS 599640, was attacked by an unknown number of VC. Two small OPs, in the same vicinity, manned by elements of the 715th RF Company were overrun. The RFs withdrew but subsequently reoccupied their positions and the VC broke contact. The week of 12-18 March involved scattered action north of Mo Duc directed against RF and PF security elements. Evidence pointed toward an increased enemy interest in the GVN RD program. On 12 March at BS 642750, north of Quang Ngai City, an estimated VC company attacked the Son Bay Provincial Training Center. Two RF Companies attending the RD training course sustained heavy casualties as a result of the attacks. Four additional harassing incidents were reported in the same sector.

An enemy resupply attempt was halted on 14 March in the vicinity of BS 7290 where a 100 foot steel trawler beached itself following a chase by Market Time vessels. The trawler was subsequently destroyed by its own crew; the explosion scattered its cargo. An examination of the contraband items revealed approximately 1200 Chinese Communist carbines, a small number of automatic and crew served weapons and various quantities of other military supplies.

South of the Chu Lai TAOR at two locations, BS 595643 and BS 595630, on 23 March the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion returning to their base at Ngia Hanh gained contact and promptly attacked an estimated VC battalion. Assisted by RF and PF elements, the attacked forced a rapid enemy withdrawal leaving 15 VC KIA (Conf). In the same area the An Son OP, BS 579641, manned by the 713th RF Company beat off an attack by a sizeable VC force. Other enemy action consisted of light harassing and demolition activity.

In the Phu Loc District, Operation DESOTO continued with light contact with the enemy. There was however, a modest increase in the tempo of VC action against friendly elements during the week of 19-25 March. In the vicinity of BS 814383 on 24 March the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP and 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines positions received an estimated 220 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar and 57mm RR fire. Counter mortar fire was returned. Within the LSA, the fuel dump was hit and burned. Two 105mm howitzers were slightly damaged <sup>but</sup> rapidly put back in action. To the south, the Sa Huynh OP, BS 920912, manned by an RF company, was overrun by an estimated VC company. The RFs fled the area. The nearby village of Sa Huynh was partially burned by the VC. Elements of the 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile)

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Division, USA occupied the OP until an ARVN reaction force arrived. Documents taken from enemy dead identified them as members of the 93rd Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division.

Throughout the month the VC maintained fairly constant pressure against the Minh Long, Gia Vuc, and Ha Thanh CIDG Camps. On 6 March a 150 man CIDG patrol north of the Minh Long Camp was ambushed by a sizeable VC force. A reaction element committed on the same day was likewise ambushed in the same vicinity. Information obtained from a PW taken during the Minh Long reaction operation, coupled with information obtained from another returnee, indicates the possibility that elements of the 1st VC Regiment took part in the Minh Long ambush. On 17 March a CIDG patrol in the vicinity of the Gia Vuc Camp was ambushed by an estimated VC battalion. The patrol broke contact and withdrew. A week later the VC probed the camp utilizing mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire. A ground attack against the camp did not occur. On 28 March a CIDG patrol gained contact with lead elements of an estimated enemy battalion west and north west of the Ha Thanh Camp. Supporting fires were called in with unknown results. On 31 March patrols again gained contact with elements in estimated company strength northwest of Ha Thanh and in one case an assisting air strike called in on a group of the enemy resulted in 80 VC KIA (Conf).

On 25 March an NVA major who had been assigned to the MR-5 Headquarters turned himself in to the ARVN. He revealed the locations in central Quang Ngai Province of subordinate units of the 2nd NVA Division and of several supporting base areas. Of further significance were his statements concerning the dry season objectives of the MR-5 Headquarters. A main and secondary objective were listed. The first listed involved military action in southern Quang Ngai and northern Binh Dinh Provinces. The second pertained to Quang Tin Province and the southern District of Que Son in Quang Nam Province. These missions were further assigned to subordinate units.

All available intelligence continues to indicate that the enemy, in all probability, will maintain a constant level of activity throughout Quang Ngai Province. He possesses the requisite force to accomplish this end. Emphasis, will however, probably remain on harassing and probing actions against more isolated outposts and security elements.

G. NEW ENEMY TACTICS, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT. On 17 March 1967, a USMC Squad, manning an OP near Nui Ya (I), nine kilometers south of Tam Ky City, found a booby trapped helicopter pad. Although not the first report of this nature, it is considered unique inasmuch as 50 helicopter stakes, 5 105mm howitzer rounds, 20 pounds of composition "C", 1250 pounds of bomb casings and one U/I artillery round, all booby trapped, were found on the pad.

On 19 March 1967 the VC employed a new type of explosive device. One 60mm mortar round and one M-26 grenade were attached to each other by a wire and placed approximately six feet apart. When the mortar round detonated, the force of the explosion released the attached wire leading to the grenade resulting in a secondary explosion four to six seconds later. This is the first report of the use of this device in our area, however, during WW II similar devices were employed. The devices were located in places of likely cover used by engineer personnel when destroying mines and booby traps. If the mines or booby traps were not checked closely for possible pull wires and/or primer cords attached to other devices, they would inflict casualties on personnel in a supposedly safe area.

On 16 March 1967, a PF, CAC H-3 volunteered the information that the VC remove their trousers and tie the trouser legs around their necks so that they can identify each other at night.

H. ENEMY ACTION STATISTICS. Facts pertaining to enemy activities in U. S. and Korean Marine operating areas, including combat bases, for February and March are as follows:

	<u>Enemy Initiated Activity</u>	
	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>
Attacks	1	12
Ambush	2	7
Assault by fire	25	28
Harassing fire	468	545
Mine/Booby Traps	163	206
Sabotage	36	37

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Terrorism	13	27
Anti-Aircraft Fire	<u>840</u>	<u>772</u>
TOTALS	1548	1634

Enemy Casualties

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>
KIA (Conf)	1721	2159
KIA (Prob)	2258	2144
Detainees	1200	1004
NVA PW	7	16
VC PW	202	58
NVA Returnees	1	0
VC Returnees	54	2
Civil Defendants	129	188
Innocent Civilians	1134	697
Individual Weapons Captured	152	266
Crew Served Weapons Captured	7	31

I. WEATHER. At the beginning of the month a cold front passed over I Corps producing an unfavorable weather picture. Drizzle and fog predominated with fairly long periods of reduced visibility. On 8 March a shifting of the cold front brought a general clearing throughout the I Corps area and on 9 March an increase in the speed of the flow aloft created unfavorable weather over a major portion of the ICTZ.

Toward the middle of the month a southeast flow of air at lower altitudes topped by a dry southwesterly wind dominated the weather pattern. This situation produced low stratus and fog during late evening and early morning, but by mid-day had dissipated with clear conditions prevailing.

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On 18 March a weak trough extending from a low pressure center over the Gulf of Tonkin created a poor weather picture. By 25 March a low level southeasterly flow topped by relatively dry southwesterly winds dominated the weather pattern. This produced considerable early morning surface fog which generally had dissipated by early afternoon though a moderate haze condition remained. A favorable weather condition existed during the last week of the month. Clear skies predominated with some early morning stratus and fog which dissipated by early afternoon. Weather data for the period is as follows:

	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature High	94	92	89	94
Low	58	59	66	66
Rainfall (total inches)	.91	1.03	.04	2.98
Visibility (Avg miles)	5.7	6	6.5	6
Winds (Avg knots)	6.2	5.2	5	6.5

J. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

Enemy Unit Recapitulation as of 31 March 1967.

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>
1 Military Region Hq	1 Regimental Hq
1 Military Sub-region Hq	
3 Division Hq	
6 Regimental Hq	
35 Infantry Battalions	1 Infantry Battalion
26 Separate Companies	4 Separate Companies

Comparison of Feb/Mar Estimated Enemy Strength in ICTZ.

	<u>As of 28 Feb</u>	<u>As of 31 Mar</u>
Confirmed VC/NVA Units	27,855	27,054
Probable VC/NVA Units	1,075	750
Guerrillas	<u>17,140</u>	<u>17,140</u>
TOTALS	46,070	44,944

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K. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSION. Propaganda activity for the month of March remained the same as the preceding reporting period. Propaganda again appeared in the form of "indoctrination courses" directed toward the civilian populace and propaganda leaflets directed against ARVN/U. S. military personnel. There also appeared this month numerous reports of VC intentions to influence the forthcoming GVN hamlet and village elections commencing on 2 April 1967.

TERRORISM. Terroristic acts against VN increased by over 100 percent over the the reporting period. This increase is attributed to the VC effort to destroy the GVN RD Program and instill fear in the local populace in order to capitalize on the GVN elections described above. Significant items of interest includes the destruction of 117 homes in a refugee camp located in Thua Thien Province and repeated assassinations and kidnappings of those VC employed by the RD program and/or VN suspected of betraying the VC cause.

ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE. Although there were 37 acts of sabotage reported during the month of March such activity remained basically the same as the preceding reporting period. Sabotage again continued to be directed against bridges, culverts and LOC. Incidents involving espionage continued to indicate low level agent activity directed against ARVN and U. S. units.

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V. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION.

A. STRENGTH. The average personnel strength for III MAF during March 1967 was:

1. III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters

	OFFICERS			ENLISTED		
	USMC	USN	USA	USMC	USN	USA
Hq III MAF	150	9		303	7	
H&SCo	10			248	4	
Sub Unit #1						
1stRadioBn	7			149		
29th CA Co USA			26			70
244th PSYOPS Co USA			15			47

2. III Marine Amphibious Force

USMC	OFFICERS			USAF	USMC	ENLISTED		
	USN	USA	USAF			USN	USA	USAF
4,390	364	244	14	69,239	2,485	2,504	25	

B. CASUALTIES. III MAF Casualties were:

1. Battle

<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
256	8	2,089	94	28	1	4	0

2. Non-Battle

<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
USMC	USN	USMC	USN
32	0	113	8

C. SPECIAL SERVICES

1. Recreation Area (Hill 327)

(a) Theater. The indoor theater (987 seating capacity) was officially opened on 19 March 1967. There are still some internal improvements to be made in the theater such as, air conditioning and installation of stage curtains.

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b. Library. The library building has been completed. Some shelving and furniture is available. Personnel with library experience have been screened and selected to attend a short course at MACV on library procedures and cataloguing. Estimated date of opening about 15 April 1967.

c. Bandstand. The first weekly concert was conducted by the III Marine Amphibious Force Drum and Bugle Corps on 25 March 1967.

d. Hobby Shops. The shells for the two buildings are about 92 percent completed. Equipment has been ordered.

e. Bowling Alley. The construction of the 20 lane bowling alley is about 30 percent completed.

f. Amphitheater. The overhead at the amphitheater has been extended about 10 feet. This will ensure that 90 percent of the stage is covered.

g. Security fencing. A perimeter barbed wire fence has been constructed at Hill 327. This fencing is not completely adequate, however, with reinforcing wire, concertinas and a lighting system it should be satisfactory.

h. Handball Courts. The handball courts are in use.

i. Tennis courts and basketball courts. Fencing for the tennis and basketball courts is being installed.

j. Gymnasium. The layout for the gymnasium has been completed. Considerable earth moving will be required before actual construction of the building.

k. Swimming Pool. The excavation for the swimming pool has been temporarily delayed. 30th Naval Construction Regiment will not start excavation until they are assured the water supply and the outflow systems are adequate.

2. China Beach. The design for an armory to handle over 3,000 rifles has been approved. Construction is due to start about 1 April 1967.

3. Entertainment. During the month of March the following USO shows visited I Corps:

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<u>TROUPE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Steve Curry & The Denims	4-7Mar	Musical variety show 7 males and 2 females
Australian Concert Tour	8-9Mar	Musical variety show 15 males and 3 females
Musicians Union	11-14Mar	Popular music. 3 males and 1 female
Roy Acuff and his "Grand Ole Opry"	19-22Mar	Country music. 8 males and 2 females
Black Caps	28Mar-1Apr	All service rock-n-roll show. 4 males and 1 female (WAC)
Norman and Sheryl Kaye	29-31Mar	Husband and wife singing team
Marshall Thompson	30Mar-3Apr	Handshake tour. Movie and TV star

Chuck Conners and Sue Lyons handshake visits scheduled for 14-17 March and 28-30 March, respectively, were cancelled

4. R&R Program (Out-of-Country). The following are the March statistics for III MAF and I Corps R&R usage for each out-of-country R&R site:

<u>SITE</u>	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>I CORPS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	976	515	1,491
Hong Kong	1,058	540	1,598
Singapore	272	96	378
Manila	257	175	432
Okinawa	329	61	390
Taipei	972	461	1,433
Kuala Lumpur	334	141	475
Hawaii	978	420	1,398
Tokyo	1,012	524	1,536
TOTALS	6,188	2,933	9,121

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D. CHAPLAIN

1. 1-2 March, Bishop Ralph Dean, Administrative Assistant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, visited the command for the purpose of an orientation briefing of I Corps and to visit Civic Action Projects. Bishop Dean was entertained at dinner 1 March by the Chief of Staff.

2. 3 March, MajGen J. A. MORGAN and MajGen H. CUNNINGHAM, Chaplains General of the Australian Army visited the command for the purpose of meeting with Australian military personnel serving in I Corps.

3. 15-16 March, Bishop Harry S. Kennedy, Episcopal Bishop of Hawaii visited the command for the purpose of meeting with the Episcopal Chaplains serving in III MAF and to visit Civic Action Projects. He administered the Rite of Confirmation to a serviceman at the 1st Medical Battalion. Bishop Kennedy was entertained at dinner 15 March by the Commanding General.

4. 18-19 March - Dr. Edwin H. Tuller, General Secretary, American Baptist Convention and First Vice President, National Council of Churches, Dr. J. Oscar Lee, Secretary for Program Service Division of Christian Life and Mission, National Council of Churches, and Dr. Fred S. Buschmeyer, Secretary, United Church of Christ, visited the command for the purpose of preaching at Palm Sunday Protestant Worship Services in I Corps and to visit Civic Action Projects. Dr. Tuller preached in the III MAF Chapel, Dr. Lee preached in the Danang Air Force Chapel, and Dr. Buschmeyer preached in the Camp Tien Sha Chapel. They were entertained at dinner 18 March by the Chief of Staff.

5. 24-25 March, Mr. Floyd Robertson, Secretary, National Association of Evangelicals, visited the Command for the purpose of visiting Civic Action Projects. Mr. Robertson was entertained at dinner 24 March in the III MAF Officer's Mess.

6. 26 March, the Force Chaplain preached the sermon at the Easter Sunrise Service at Red Beach and participated in the dedication of the Chapel at NCR-30.

7. 26 March, the Force Chaplain laid the cornerstone for the new Educational unit of the Central Danang Vietnamese Evangelical Church.

8. 27 March, the combined III MAF and Air Force Choirs presented a 1½ hour program of sacred music on Easter Sunday

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evening in the III MAF Chapel. The choir was under the direction of Major T. J. BRANTLEY, U. S. Army, of the 29th Civil Affairs Company.

9. 29 March, His Excellency Bishop CHI, administered the Rite of the Confirmation for Catholic personnel. 71 Marines were confirmed.

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VI. LOGISTICS.

A. The most significant factor concerning logistics in the past month was the further development and utilization of the three modes of transportation. The use of roads for the movement of supplies was increased considerably. Of particular note was the opening and use of Route #9 from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh. The establishment of LST facilities at the Cau Viet increased the capability to maintain a greater flow of cargo to Northern ICTZ and provides for an all weather capability to the Dong Ha area. From the standpoint of air, the field<sup>at</sup> An Hoa has been upgraded to a C-130 capability. Extensive rehabilitation of the Dong Ha airfield is being accomplished at the present time and will enhance the utilization of this field in the near future.

B. Dental

(1) Dental Civic Action was conducted in the RVN by III MAF Dental Companies during the period 1-31 March 1967.

Patients treated: 7,290  
Dental Procedures: 14,974

(2) Dental Officers attached to Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force units in I Corps met and established the I Corps Dental Society.

C. Embarkation

(1) During the month, 69 MSTs ships, 34 U. S. Navy ships embarked/debarked cargo and/or personnel at Danang and 41 LSTs and 2 deep draft ships moored at Chu Lai.

(2) A total of 141 LCU trips to Dong Ha and 81 LCU trips to Hue were conducted during the month in support of forces in Northern ICTZ.

(3) The LST ramp at the mouth of the Cau Viet River opened for operations on the 15th of the month; 11 LST trips moved 7186 S/T of cargo to this facility.

(4) The USS MERRICK (APA-97) shuttled 1479 S/T of cargo from Danang to the mouth of the Hue River. The cargo was trans-shipped to Hue by LCU.

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(5) Surface cargo throughput for the month was as follows:

	<u>S/T</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>M/T</u>	<u>DAILY AVERAGE</u>	
				<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
Danang	157,091		254,362	5,067	8,205
Chu Lai	31,040		48,335	1,001	1,559
Hue	9,346		17,128	301	552
Dong Ha	20,118		32,558	649	1,050

(6) Fixed wing airlift (in cargo pounds) during the month in support of USMC forces was as follows:

	<u>USAF</u>		<u>USMC</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
An Hoa	0	826,706	26	1,000	26	827,706
Chu Lai	73	1,188,506	7,227	1,536,200	7,300	2,724,706
Dong Ha	432	1,275,954	2,086	577,000	2,518	1,852,954
Khe Sanh	3	1,173,416	920	1,349,588	923	2,523,004
Danang	694	130,000	8,168	1,330,400	8,862	1,460,400
Phu Bai	1,172	1,736,029	4,652	1,117,400	5,824	2,853,429
Quang Ngai	0	0	0	44,200	0	44,200
C-117	0	0	4,879	721,400	4,879	721,400
Total	2,374	6,330,611	27,967	6,677,188	30,341	13,007,799

(7) Retrograde shipments for the month were as follows:

RVN to CONUS	307 S/T cargo
RVN to Okinawa	241 S/T cargo and vehicles
RVN to Japan	19 S/T cargo

(8) BLT 3/9 and VMA-223 arrived in-country and BLT 2/3 and VMA-311 were rotated out of country during the month. Battery G/29 Artillery (Searchlight), U. S. Army arrived in Danang on 25 March 1967.

(9) The USNS GORDON and USNS UPSHUR debarked a total of 1622 U. S. Marine Corps Personnel replacements at Danang. The USNS BARRETT debarked 249 ROKMC replacements at Danang and embarked 99 rotatees for Korea.

#### D. Engineer

(1) The emphasis in March 1967 with regards to engineer operations in ICTZ was on airfields. An Hoa was upgraded to C-130

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capability, Dong Ha was closed for rehabilitation, and plans to construct a new C-130 capability field in southern I Corps were started. The highlight of the month, however, was the opening of Route 9 from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh by the 11th Engineer Battalion.

(2) The following bridge construction was completed during the month:

(a) 45' Class 30 M4T6 fixed span, coordinates  
BT 045618.

(b) 53' Class 30 M4T6 fixed span was installed,  
coordinates YD 218709.

(c) 14' Class 60 timber bridge, coordinates AT 907753.

(d) 45' Class 25 M4T6 fixed span, coordinates  
AT 924602.

(e) 160' Class 60 multiple culvert causeway-bridge,  
coordinates XD 988559.

#### E. Fiscal

(1) The Force Comptroller prepared Force Bulletin 5120 of 7 March 1967, Subject: Savings Bonds/Savings Deposit Participation.

(2) Allocation of 25,283,000 piasters for procurement of rock and 350,000 piasters for rice were prepared for Commanding General, Force Logistic Command.

(3) The Comptroller forwarded III MAF major commands' Phase II Budget Estimates to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (Forward) by courier.

#### F. Food Service

(1) The Foremost Milk Plant in Danang went into production on 3 March 1967. Deliveries of milk were gradually increased during the month to include; Phu Bai, Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, An Hoa, and Chu Lai.

(2) On 19 March, the III MAF Subsistence Operational Analysis Report was submitted to CMC for the month of February. The issue of "A" and "B" rations totaled \$2,986,414.89 and the cost of MCI's was \$1,265,906.14. The number of messes in operation was 184.

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G. Motor Transport

(1) Improvement of the land LOC to the An Hoa Industrial Complex brought about increased truck utilization. The major achievement in this area was the completion of the movement of 925 S/T of M8A1 airfield matting required for the upgrading of the An Hoa airfield.

(2) The FMFPac Material Assistance Team arrived in the Republic of Vietnam on 31 March 1967.

H. Ordnance

(1) Technical Instruction (TI) 1015-15/2 of 13 January 1967 has established interim artillery tube life criteria which materially affects the force support posture. The new condemnation criteria based on EFC (equivalent full charge), has necessitated an analysis of the immediate and projected tube requirements within III MAF. Based on the interim criteria, it has been determined, and reported to FMFPac by CG III MAF message 201108Z March 1967, that thirty-six 105mm Howitzer tubes are unserviceable. Available stocks, 30 tubes, have been committed to immediate replacement of the condemned tubes and action has been initiated by FMFPac to replace the remaining unserviceable tubes and the in-country stocks. Additional analysis of the 155mm Howitzer (SP), 155mm Gun and 8" Howitzer (SP) tube requirements and assets indicates that the assets are adequate to meet the requirements.

(2) An Artillery Calibration Team from the U. S. Army's Second Logistic Command arrived in-country 6 March to inspect and calibrate the weapons of both the First and Third Marine Divisions, as requested. The team, composed of one officer and five enlisted, is expected to be in III MAF a total of six to eight weeks.

(3) This Headquarters' grave concern over the high incidence of unintentional firings of the ONTOS mounted 106mm Recoilless Rifle was stated in CG III MAF message 070610Z March 1967 to FMFPac. The message urged that action by the design agency to identify and correct the apparent design deficiencies be assigned the highest priority. Additionally, Force Order 8400.2 of 7 March 1967 was promulgated to provide guidance to the Divisions in the inspection and employment of the ONTOS, to assure that every reasonable effort is made to preclude the occurrence of additional unintentional firings.

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(4) The M700 Scout Sniper Rifles have been received and are being phased into service within the First and Third Marine Divisions. Force Logistic Command is administering the retrograde of the M70 and M1D Rifles which are being replaced by the M700.

(5) CG III MAF message 191418Z March 1967 established the following Available Supply Rates (ASR's):

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ASR</u>
C444 (and subs) G895	105mm HE Gren, Hand, Illum	32 MarDiv 14.2/InfBn Other .16/100 Individual
L312	Sig, Illum, WSP	MarDiv 7.4/InfBn Other .1/100 Individual
L314	Sig, Illum, GSC	MarDiv 2.0/InfBn Other .03/100 Individual

ASR's that had been previously imposed on the expenditures of 81mm Illumination, 155mm HE and Trip Flares were removed.

(6) 4.2" Mortars, M30, have been received in accordance with the CMC plan to replace the 107mm Howtar, M98. Eighteen mortars are being phased into each Division and the Howtars will be turned into Force Logistic Command for disposition as directed.

(7) Force Logistic Command requested that established Class V quantity distance storage requirements be waived indefinitely for the ASP's at Danang, Chu Lai and Dong Ha. A three month waiver was granted in recognition of the limited real estate available for Class V storage and the continuing requirement for storage of a forty day level. Force Logistic Command has been requested to submit a detailed report at the end of the three month waiver, setting forth the existent storage conditions and the status of those efforts being made to comply with the established storage criteria.

(8) The scheduled phase-in of the M16A1 Rifle commenced on 22 March when the first increment of weapons began arriving from Third Force Service Regiment; by 24 March there were sufficient weapons in-country to equip all III MAF maneuver elements. The M16A1 Rifles, repair parts and accessories have been delivered to the Infantry Battalions and are being issued to the individual Marines. Originally excluded in the Advance Logistics Data (MCO 8370.13), Headquarters Company of the Infantry Regiment has been

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included in the first increment. Sufficient rifles have been positioned to equip ~~ment~~ the 2nd Brigade ROKMC; COMUSMACV has directed that issue to ROK and RVN forces be initiated simultaneously, subsequent to the equippage of all U. S. maneuver elements. III MAF has not been tasked to provide those rifles scheduled for the RVNMC: CMC has stated that these weapons will be provided direct.

### I. Surgeon

(1) The total daily average patient load for the two Medical Battalions and the First Hospital Company was 299 with a total of 2,157 patients admitted, 565 patients evacuated out of country from these facilities and 1,559 pints of blood expended to use.

(2) Information relative to Collecting and Clearing Companies is as follows:

<u>MED BN</u>	<u>C&amp;C CO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>BEDS</u>	<u>AVERAGE CENSUS FOR MONTH</u>	<u>AVG PAT STAY DAYS</u>
1st	A and B(-)	Danang	90*	72*	5*
1st	C and D	Chu Lai	120	70	4
1st	B(-)	Duc Pho	30	12	2
3rd	A and B	Phu Bai	60	72	8
3rd	C	Danang	60*	*	*
3rd	D(-)	Dong Ha	30	18	4
3rd	D(-)	BLT 3/4	Embarked	--	-

\*Total 150 beds 1st Medical Battalion, Danang

(3) The 1st Hospital Company, Chu Lai, admitted only medical type patients due to non-completion of surgical operating suite. The average daily census was 55 for the month with length of patient stay per discharge of 4 days.

(4) The USS REPOSE supported operation Prairie II off Dong Ha for period 1-4 March. From 5-13 March she operated on her normal schedule. From 14-31 March she supported operation Beacon Hill and Prairie III off Dong Ha. The Naval Hospital in the REPOSE has an average daily patient load of 430 with length of patient stay per discharge of 20 days.

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(5) Statistics for Marine patients hospitalized in other than I Corps Medical Facilities was as follows:

	<u>Average Census</u>	<u>Average Length of Stay</u>
12th USAF Hospital Cam Ranh Bay	62	14
6th Convalescence Center Cam Ranh Bay	27	19

(6) The Force Surgeon as Chairman attended the I Corps Public Health meeting on 1, 15 and 29 March 1967.

(7) Aerial dispersal of insecticides for mosquito control was accomplished by fixed wing aircraft (C-123) as follows:

3 Days	Chu Lai	TAOR
1 Day	Danang	TAOR
2 Days	Phu Bai	TAOR
1 Day	Khe Sanh	Area

#### J. Supply

(1) The following Force Orders and Bulletins pertaining to supply administration were published during March.

(a) Force Order 4235.2 regarding tracer action in the WESTPAC area.

(b) Force Order 4230.2 regarding purchasing in Hong Kong and Singapore.

(c) Force Order 5512.3 concerning authorization to pick-up supplies at FLC issue points.

(d) Force Bulletin 10110 regarding disposable mess gear.

(2) Coordination activities included three conferences during the month:

(a) III MAF Supply Conference on 20 March.

(b) NSA monthly Logistic Conference on 27 March.

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(c) Conference to discuss shortage of lumber and proposed allocation controls on 27 March.

(3) Significant improvement was noted in the supply states of GP tents and these have been removed from allocation control.

(4) Supply support concepts have been developed in support of the expansion of the CAC program and action initiated to obtain required T/E equipment.

(5) Action has been initiated to obtain selected items of property declared excess by RMK-BRJ.

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VII. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. An increase in total message traffic through the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center was noted during March. Traffic totals are as follows:

	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
Incoming	42,652	50,260	
Outgoing	46,028	51,263	
Total	88,680	101,523	12,843

B. Message traffic through the COC Communication Center showed a decrease during March. Traffic totals are as follows:

Incoming	3,908	3,255	
Outgoing	4,237	3,895	
Total	8,145	7,150	995

C. Coordinated communication requirements for Special Landing Force for Beacon Hill 1.

D. Coordinated communication requirements for Plan OREGON.

E. III Marine Amphibious Force CEO representatives attended conferences in Saigon on Autodin, Interface of Integrated Wide Band Communications Systems, and TRC-66 System.

F. Communication-Electronics Officer attended senior communicators tactical planning conference in Saigon.

G. Monitored progress of the installation of FCC-19 teletype tone packages system by 5th Communication Battalion.

H. Authority to transmit Top Secret information on Talk Quick equipment was suspended pending correction of transmission security discrepancies. Correction of discrepancies is scheduled for 15 April 1967. Interim authority granted by CINCPAC until 15 April to transmit Secret information.

I. A high speed data transceiver and ancillary equipment have been installed at Red Beach. This equipment has a hundred word per minute capacity, with security to Top Secret. The data equipment will become operational upon installation of the air conditioning equipment. Compiled data to obtain log periodic antennas for use with KY-8 and AN/MRC-109/110.

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J. Conferred with Frequency Coordinator from MACV J-6 on ICTZ frequencies.

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VIII. CIVIL AFFAIRS

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civil Affairs program remain the same.

B. I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL. The Council met four times during March. The following is a listing of major topics dealt with during the March meetings.

(1) Movement of a sugarmill from Saigon to Quang Ngai.

(2) Repair of a sawmill located in Quang Tin Province. Training of operators for the mill was also discussed and agreed upon.

(3) The problem of trash disposal for the City of Danang was given much attention and arrangements were made to procure garbage trucks from Saigon, to train drivers for them, and to provide a location for a garbage dump.

(4) At the request of OCO, the Ministry of Public Works in Saigon agreed to provide a rock crusher for Region I. The Ministry made 2,000,000 piasters available for establishing this equipment.

(5) The price of fertilizer to farmers was also discussed but not yet resolved.

(6) Permission was received from the Army-Air Force Exchange system to introduce handicraft products from the Hue Vocational Training Center into the Post Exchange system.

(7) The council also received reports from, monitored, and directed progress of various committees and subcommittees. Committees which met during the month were:

(a) Road Committee.

(b) Public Health-CERO Committee.

(c) Education Committee.

(d) Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.

(e) Commodities Distribution Committee.

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(8) Minutes of the Council, Committees and Subcommittee meetings are enclosed herein as Annex B, C, D and E.

C. DISPLACED PERSONS. During March a total of 4,992 new refugees were reported in I Corps Tactical Zone. A revised chart of all refugee camps and populations will be completed in April. The Displaced Persons team of 29th Civil Affairs Company experienced some difficulty in securing refugee statistics during March due to lack of interpreters. Displaced Persons Periodic Report No. 3-67, 1-31Mar67, is enclosed herein as Annex F.

D. USMCR/CARE FUND. Major BARKER was relieved as Custodian of the USMCR/CARE fund and III MAF Civic Action Officer on 31 March 1967. He was replaced by Major J. B. HARRIS. Funds were transferred, and the Civic Action Program continued to render assistance to subordinate Civic Action Officers under the direction of Major HARRIS. A total of \$16,515.00 in USMCR/CARE funds was expended for III MAF Civic Action activities during March.

E. EMERGENCY RELIEF. Relief was administered to victims of disasters in several locations during March.

(1) A seven man team from MAG-11 provided immediate relief to the injured and homeless persons of Ap Moi Hamlet, BT 016728, after a fire had destroyed the hamlet. Commodities were distributed, medical attention was rendered, and temporary shelters were erected soon after the fire extinguished.

(2) The most notable achievement in the area of disaster relief was to the people of Long Vei, XD 794363, Huong Hoa District, Quang Tri Province. At approximately 1915 on 2 March 1967 the village was mistakenly bombed by two aircraft. The Special Forces Camp adjoining the village also sustained hits. Casualty estimates included 112 KIA, 213 WIA, 4 MIA and a minimum of 140 structures destroyed.

Initial assistance to the villagers (Montagnards) was given by Special Forces detachment A-101. A III MAF unit, Sub Unit #5, Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, was notified of the attack and immediately dispatched assistance. Twenty minutes after the bombing, four USMC helicopters were on the scene and commenced MEDEVAC operations. Bad weather and ground fog, however, halted helicopter operations after the initial lift. One KC-130 aircraft was able to land and evacuate 53 casualties before the weather closed in. A convoy of USMC

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trucks from the 12th Marines and Sub Unit #5, Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division subsequently arrived on the scene, evacuating more than 100 casualties to Khe Sanh. Further evacuation attempts on 2 March were prevented by two VC mortar attacks on the base at Khe Sanh. Finally, at 0900, 3 March, KC-130 aircraft were able to land, and by 1000 all casualties requiring evacuation were airlifted to Phu Bai or Danang.

On the morning of 3 March, the first of the relief supplies furnished by III MAF began to arrive in Long Vei via KC-130 aircraft. III MAF relief supplies included the following items:

Rice	250 bags
Salt	1000 pounds
Pots & Pans	250 sets
Chopsticks	1000 pair
Cooking Oil	60 cases
Bowls	1000 each
Tool Kits	25 each
Lumber	20,000 board feet, 2x4
	40,000 board feet, 1x6

In addition to these supplies, III MAF transportation equipment moved relief supplies furnished by OCO and the World Relief Commission.

Navy and Marine Corps heavy equipment moved to the scene on the morning of 3 March to aid in rescue and relief work. This equipment was provided by Sub Unit #5, HqBn, 3dMarDiv, FLSU, and MCB-40.

On 3 March the 1st MAW Contingency Relief Force (CRF) arrived on the scene. This force made a significant contribution to the relief operation by providing labor and security and assisting in burial and food distribution efforts.

The 29th Civil Affairs Company (USA) provided coordination assistance until 21 March.

By 21 March, although Navy and Marine trucks, equipment and operators continued to assist in the rebuilding of Long Vei, primary coordination of relief and rebuilding efforts had reverted to Advisor/GCN channels.

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F. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUMMARY.

(1) Civic Action of III MAF Units in March 1967 continued the rising trend begun in January, after a slight recession in February. Medical treatments were administered to a total of 112,854 persons this month. This compares favorably to the 84,787 treatments administered during February, the 102,322 treatments administered during January and the 1966 yearly average of 85,697 treatments per month. 9,899 dental treatments for the month surpassed the former all-time high record of 6,424 treatments achieved during January 1967. Accomplishments under other indicies which are frequently used to reflect trends in III MAF Civic Action activity are:

- (a) Distribution of 4,772 pounds of soap.
- (b) Distribution of 133,214 pounds of food.
- (c) Distribution of 2,172 pounds of clothing.

(2) With the continuation of good weather, construction projects have increased. These projects include schools built and repaired, wells dug, and minor road repairs. Construction of livestock pens continues, and emphasis is still being placed on agricultural projects.

(3) During March, approximately 4,992 refugees/displaced persons were generated by operations, and cared for by III MAF Civic Action program. This is considered an average to slightly below average monthly number. Mobile training teams are being introduced into ICTZ for the purpose of providing assistance and supervising assistance to all the refugees and refugee camps. During the month there appeared to be an increased interest and activities by GVN as evidenced in increased piaster spending to assist refugees.

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IX. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A. Chieu Hoi Program. 165 personnel rallied to the GVN during March. The Provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai continue to lead with 57 and 36 respectively. Ralliers are consistent in reporting that they have heard loudspeaker appeals and seen leaflets explaining the advantages offered by the Chieu Hoi Program. A good percentage of the ralliers during their interrogation state that many of their units are anxious to rally but are afraid the VC will kill them.

Ralliers continue to cite specific themes of messages they have heard from the loudspeaker broadcasts.

The following is a breakdown of returnees turning in to Marines and by Province:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>TO USMC</u>	<u>TO GVN</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>POLITICAL</u>
Quang Tri	0	1	5	0
Thua Thien	0	0	16	15
Quang Nam	4	2	37	30
Quang Tin	2	0	19	7
Quang Ngai	0	0	26	0

B. Ground Operations.

(1) The Psychological Operations Exploitation Team (POET) of the 244th PSYOP Company (USA) exploited 22 incidents during the reporting period. From these incidents a total of 20 leaflets, 3 posters, and one tape were produced and disseminated. Representative leaflets and posters developed are contained in Annex "G".

(2) The Armed Propaganda Platoon from Hue, assigned to the 4th Marines during the opening phases of Operation Chinook II, was very successful in discovering and working many times on mines, booby traps and punji pits. The Danang Armed Propaganda Platoon conducted an attitude survey for the Third Anti-Tank Battalion, First Marine Division.

(3) The Kit Carson Scout Program continued to be of great benefit. The First Marine Division has 20 scouts on the payroll as of 31 March. 8 KCS trainees are undergoing evaluation with the First Marine Division units.

A Scout with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, while on leave to be married continued to conduct extensive efforts on

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behalf of the Chieu Hoi Program. As a result, he was able to persuade two VC to rally. While debriefing the two VC it was discovered that the ralliers had knowledge of three caves and two other VC who wanted to rally. Acting on this information the battalion found three well camouflaged caves containing two U. S. Carbines, one Chicom carbine, numerous documents and miscellaneous equipment. A letter urging VC to rally was left at the scene by the KCS. As a result, one more VC rallied.

(4) KCS accomplishments during the month of March:

PW	9
Returnee	3
Weapons recovered	4
Grenades recovered	19
Booby traps	8
Caves discovered	8
PSYOP broadcasts	7
Tunnels discovered	1
Caches	3
Patrols guided	413
Classes held	9

(5) The first Kit Carson Scout Trainees, for Third Marine Division, were sent to the field for evaluation on 16 March.

(6) A total of 1,016,541 leaflets were hand distributed by units conducting patrols, MEDCAPS and checkpoints from U. S. Forces, RVNAF and FWMAF throughout the ICTZ

(7) Total leaflets/Posters produced by the 244th PSYOP Company, 12,067,300. Total Posters produced, 39,338.

(8) Total movies shown - 360.

(9) Total cultural Drama Team Performances - 156.

(10) Newspaper "THE BRIDGE" - 60,000

C. Air Operations

(1) Leaflet Dissemination.

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NO/HRS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
235	Leaflet/Air BDCST	92,950,000/171	9th ACS

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- (2) Total Campaign leaflets dropped:
- |                            |            |
|----------------------------|------------|
| (a) NVA Campaign           | 650,000    |
| (b) B-52                   | 3,150,000  |
| (c) Safe Conduct Pass      | 10,795,000 |
| (d) Operation "FOUR WINDS" | 1,325,000  |

D. Tactical PSYOP Support

- (1) Operation PRAIRIE II
- (a) 5,560,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) Four hours airborne loudspeaker time.
  - (c) Nineteen hours audio/visual presentations.
- (2) Operation LAM SON 25
- (a) 2,300,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) One POET mission
- (3) Operation CHINOOK II
- (a) 500,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) Three and one-half hours airborne loudspeaker time.
  - (c) Four hours audio/visual presentations
- (4) Operation LAFAYETTE
- (a) 150,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) Fifty-seven and one-half hours audio/visual Presentations.
- (5) Operation DESOTO
- (a) 3,640,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) Eight and one-half hours airborne loudspeaker time.
  - (c) One-half hour audio/visual presentations.

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## (6) Operation DECKHOUSE VI

- (a) 4,191,000 leaflets dropped.
- (b) Four and one-half hours airborne loudspeaker time.
- (c) Three and one-half hours audio/visual presentations.

E. III MAF Monthly PSYOP Orientation Course. The third Orientation Course was conducted 22-24 March with a total of 14 students completing the course. The syllabus for this course is contained in Annex "H".

F. III MAF PSYOP Newsletter. The III MAF Psychological Operations Newsletter 2-67, published 31 March, is contained in Annex "I".

G. A revised PSYOP SOP was published 20 March and is forwarded as Annex "J".

H. Lessons Learned. Experience has shown that the Kit Carson Scouts are very useful in the initial screening of Vietnamese and can conduct very effective interrogations of Detainees. It has also been learned that it is not always necessary to conduct face-to-face meetings to effectively disseminate PSYOP propaganda. Recently, scouts have spread messages over large areas by utilizing the "village grapevine". This "grass root" approach may prove to be of considerable value in the future. However, this technique is successful only after the scouts have gained the confidence of the local villagers.

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X. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

A. Background. During March 1967, 375 escorted visits were accomplished by the Combat Information Bureau. The escorts included civic action, combined action platoons, I Corps combat operations and several other subjects of interest to the news media. The Danang Press Center hosted 135 correspondents.

B. Motor Transport. Of the 8 vehicles assigned, 6 are operational. An M-37 3/4 ton truck is deadlined at FLSG for installation of a transfer case. A Marine Corps station wagon has been sent to Okinawa for class 4 maintenance. No replacements have been received.

C. Photography. During the period covered, 27,437 feet of motion picture frontage was forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3P). Of this, 37% was exposed on operations, 20.9% on civic action and 42.1% on miscellaneous. Operations covered were PRAIRIE III, CHINOOK II and DESOTO. Of special interest is the 600 feet exposed for the people's demonstration in Danang on behalf of the victims of the VC rocket attack on the village of Hoa Thuan.

D. Radio/TV. During the month, a total of 44 features and 259 Fleet Hometown interviews were submitted from III MAF units. In addition, the new live TV series, "I Corps Forum", continued with such guests as: Mrs Lucy Caldwell, Director, China Beach USO; Major General Herman NICKERSON, Jr., First Marine Division Commander; the Director of the Danang Office of Civil Operation, Ambassador KOREN; and LtCol R. S. STARK, Project Director of I Corps Forum.

E. Escorts. Major operations covered included PRAIRIE II and III, CHINOOK II, DECKHOUSE VI, DESOTO and BEACON HILL. Staff briefings by G-5, the CAC Director and the Commanding General, III MAF were conducted throughout the month. Notable news media representatives hosted/escorted during the month included: Tom Buckley, Raymond Apple, John Oakes, New York Times; Joe Alsop, Syndicated Columnist; Stephen A. Rowan, Bill Plante, Adam Raphael, CBS News; Bob Gassaway, Bob Ohman, Associated Press; Bob Hart, Reuters; Tom Corpora, Eugene Risher, John Schneider, UPI; Ted Koppel, Dave Snell, ABC; Charles Murphy, Bob Welch, NBC; Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard; Ward Just, Washington Post; Arnaud de Borchgrave, Newsweek; Colin Leinster, Dan Coggin, Time-Life; John Berthelsen, Newsweek.

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F. Press Releases. During March, 485 news releases were processed including 362 photographs. III MAF units completed 8,369 Fleet Hometown News releases. This is a monthly record.

G. Combat Art. Ten watercolors and ten sketches were sent to CMC. Five oil paintings, three watercolors, one French gouache and sketches were completed and all will be shipped to Headquarters Marine Corps during April.

H. Miscellaneous. Construction and remodeling of Press Center facilities have continued. A boat dock was completed during the month. Major J. J. CALDAS relieved Captain H. C. STACKPOLE as Press Relations and Escort Officer.

XI. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (RVNAF)

A. GENERAL. ARVN activities for the month of March were highlighted by Lam Son 25, a 1st Division controlled search and destroy operation northwest of Dong Ha; by two battalions and nine RF Companies completing RD training; by a successful PSYOPS campaign for the April village/hamlet elections; and by continued improvement in the logistics situation. Enemy activity showed a marked increase in that there were 55% more VC initiated incidents than in February.

B. OPERATIONS. I Corps conducted 31 large operations during March as compared to 30 last month. There were 5 combined operations and 3 heliborne operations included in the above figures. Contact was made with the VC/NVA in 16 of these operations. ARVN/RF/PF losses were 454 KIA and 1109 WIA as compared to 350 KIA and 901 WIA last month. Enemy losses were 1070 KIA and 53 PW/VC as compared to 1064 KIA and 126 PW/VC last month. ARVN/RF/PF captured 126 weapons compared to 263 captured last month. ARVN and RF/PF lost 140 and 263 weapons respectively as compared to 45 and 146 lost last month.

Five significant operations took place in the ICTZ in March. Lam Son 25, a combined 1st Division controlled search and destroy operation, was conducted northwest of Dong Ha from 10 March to 29 March. Friendly losses were 27 KIA and 131 WIA. Enemy losses were 211 VC KIA, 3 PW/VC and 27 weapons captured.

Lam Son 23, a 3rd Regiment controlled reaction operation was conducted northeast of An Lo from 7 March to 10 March. Friendly losses were 13 KIA and 71 WIA. Enemy losses were 49 VC KIA, 3 PW/VC, and 19 weapons captured.

Phi Phung 9 and 11, Quang Da Special Zone controlled operations in reaction to an I ALC convoy ambush on 24 March were conducted south of Hoi An from 25 March to 29 March. Forces committed were 3/51, 4/51, 2/4 APC, 706th RF Company, 21st Ranger Battalion, and one USMC company from 3/1. Friendly losses were 8 KIA, 2 USMC KIA, 25 WIA and 4 USMC WIA. Enemy losses were 302 VC KIA, 13 PW/VC, and 6 weapons captured.

Lam Son 142, Phase III, a 1st Regiment controlled search and destroy operation east of Quang Tri commenced on 15 January and continued into April. Friendly losses during March were 13 KIA and 48 WIA. Enemy losses during March were 58 VC KIA, 1 PW/VC, and 9 weapons captured. Accumulative friendly losses for the operation were 58 KIA and 240 WIA. Accumulative

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enemy losses at the end of the month were 389 VC KIA, 16 PW/VC, and 59 weapons captured.

C. ENEMY ACTIVITY. The number of VC initiated incidents reported in March was 400 compared to 258 in February, a 55% increase. Noteworthy were 14 VC attacks against subsector and district headquarters. Hieu Nhon, Thuong Duc and Phu Thu district headquarters were overrun and sustained heavy casualties.

Of significance in the 11th DfA were the continued mortar attacks against Gio Linh and Con Thien outposts. Only light casualties were reported as a result of these attacks. There was an increased number of mining incidents along Route 1 in Thua Thien Sector. Two noteworthy incidents occurred in Thua Thien Sector. On 21 March at 0100 hours, an estimated two VC platoons attacked a refugee camp 25 kilometers northwest of Hue and burned 150 houses, killed one civilian and kidnapped 3 others. Over 800 refugees were left homeless. On 11 March, an estimated VC battalion overran Phu Thu subsector headquarters. Friendly losses were 32 RF/PF KIA, 3 U. S. advisors KIA, 4 RF/PF WIA and police WIA. There were 30 individual and 2 crew-served weapons lost. Enemy casualties were unknown.

Two significant incidents occurred in Quang Da Special Zone. On Route 1 just east of Duy Xuyen at approximately 1915 hours 24 March, an ARVN I ALC 93-vehicle convoy and a 37-vehicle USMC convoy was attacked by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd NVA Regiment. The enemy force included women. The 1st Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment was in reserve. ARVN friendly forces reacted with artillery, flareships and a battalion-size reaction force - the 3rd Battalion, 51st Regiment. Air support reaction included 22 tactical air sorties. ARVN losses were: 12 KIA, 18 WIA, 5 MIA, 16 individual and 2 crew-served weapons lost, 3 radios lost, 22 vehicles destroyed, 9 vehicles heavily damaged, and 19 vehicles lightly damaged. Enemy losses were 96 VC KIA, 11 PW/VC, and 3 weapons captured.

On 13 March at approximately 0300 hours, an estimated NVA reinforced company overran Hieu Nhon subsector headquarters just east of Hoi An in Quang Da Special Zone. Friendly losses were 16 PF KIA, 1 U. S. Advisor KIA, 5 civilians killed, 13 PF WIA, 4 U. S. Advisors WIA and 15 civilians wounded. Enemy losses were unknown.

Aerial photographic missions conducted over the DMZ indicated new anti-aircraft positions and extensive trench systems.

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The enemy remains capable of launching multi-regimental attacks, conducting small unit harassing operations against isolated outposts, interdicting lines of communication, terrorizing the local population throughout much of ICTZ and continuing the campaign to disrupt the GVN RD program.

D. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD). During March two additional RD teams were deployed in the ICTZ to bring the total number of teams deployed to 112. There are 10 additional teams for future deployment in the ICTZ currently being trained in Vung Tau.

There was a marked increase in VC attacks against RD teams during the month. RD teams, RF, PF, and ARVN reaction forces generally performed well in repelling the attacks. RD team casualties were light.

ARVN RD direct support battalions continued to be trained by the RD MTT's. To date 12 ARVN battalions and one RF battalion have completed the two-week RD course. The direct support battalions conducted ambushes, patrols, and screening operations with only light contact reported.

In the National Priority Area 256 houses and 141 kitchens were constructed in the Hung Quang I RD campaign. Families started to move into the new houses during the month.

E. PSYOPS/CIVIC ACTION. During the first half of March the main effort of the 10th PSYWAR Battalion was directed toward commodity assistance for families involved in hamlet relocation in the National Priority Area. During the last half of the month the main effort of the battalion was directed toward preparing the people for the village/hamlet elections in April.

ARVN presses produced 2,021,638 leaflets and posters during the month compared to 466,800 last month. VNAF flew 3 leaflet sorties dropping a total of 300,000 leaflets compared to 16 sorties and 1,795,000 leaflets last month. Ground loud-speaker time totaled 416 hours compared to 319 last month. Of the 139 ralliers, 68% were local force guerrilla and 21% were political cadre.

F. REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE. The motivation indoctrination program for PF continued with an additional 21 platoons completing the course. To date 521 platoons totaling 19,798 soldiers have been trained. On 4 March, the 962nd RF Company

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from Quang Tri completed training at Hoa Cam Training Center. This Company was the last RF company to be trained before the center started conversion to a training center for PF only.

On 20 March, the 459th RF Company from Quang Tin and the 221st RF Company from Thua Thien started refresher training at Dong Da National Training Center, the center where all RF are now trained for I Corps. Nine RF companies completed RD training during the month. During March 30 tons of foodstuffs were distributed to PF personnel as compared to 102 tons last month. MEDCAP teams treated 2,840 patients.

G. PERSONNEL. The assigned versus authorized strength percentages in March for the 1st Division, 2nd Division, and 51st Regiment were 95, 94, and 103 respectively compared to 95, 95, and 104 in February. Present for duty versus authorized strength percentages in March for the same units were 85, 87, and 91 respectively compared to 80, 87, and 90 last month.

H. LOGISTICS. The overall logistics situation continued to improve during March despite only seven convoy movements to the DTA's and no rail movements. The shortage of fortification materials was partially relieved. In addition, 232 tons of signal batteries were received of which 160 tons were shipped directly from CONUS. There were 69 AN/PRC-25 radios received for issue to the 1st and 2nd Divisions. Class II and IV supply shipments from Saigon produced noteworthy improvement in quartermaster line items. Zero balances continued in I ALC depots in 53% of the engineer repair parts line items and 50% of the ordnance repair parts line items. Critical shortages continued in advisory vehicles, artillery panoramic sights, and AN/PRC-10 radios for RF/PF units.

I. ENGINEER. The number of enemy attacks against roads and bridges in the ICTZ increased from 22 in February to 27 in March. ARVN engineer reaction time continued to be excellent. National Highway 1 was open from the DMZ to Quang Ngai 69% of the month. There was one attack against the railroad in the ICTZ during March. The railroad was not open from Danang to Hue during the month.

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XI. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (RVNAF) for the month of February 1967.

A. GENERAL. ARVN activities for the month of February were highlighted by Lien Ket 81/Rio Grande/Giant Dragon, a 2nd Division controlled airmobile search and destroy operation west of Quang Ngai; by three battalions successfully completing RD training; 110 RD cadre teams starting RD work in assigned hamlets; by a highly successful Tet psyops campaign; and by an improved logistics situation. Enemy activity showed an increase for the third straight month.

B. OPERATIONS. I Corps conducted 30 large operations during February as compared to 34 last month. There were four combined and three heliborne operations included in the above figures. Contact was made with the VC/NVA in 20 of these operations. ARVN/RF/PF losses were 350 KIA and 901 WIA as compared to 313 KIA and 545 WIA last month. Enemy losses were 1,064 KIA and 126 PW (VC) as compared to 772 KIA and 109 PW (VC) last month. ARVN captured 263 weapons and lost 191 compared to 184 captured and 311 lost last month.

The most significant operation in I Corps recorded history took place in February. Lien Ket 81/Rio Grande/Giant Dragon, a 2nd Division controlled airmobile search and destroy operation, was conducted west of Quang Ngai from 17 February to 21 February. The 4th Bn, 4th Regt; 1st and 3rd Troops, 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron; 21st and 37th Ranger Bn's; 1st, 7th and 8th airborne Bn's; 1st Bn, 5th U.S. Marine Regt; and the 1st and 2nd Bn's, 2nd ROK Marine Brigade were committed. Of importance was the fact that this was the first tri-nation operation in the ICF to use a combined CP and of further importance, it had the highest recorded ARVN one-day kill. Approximately 750 VC from the 22nd and 33rd Bn's of the 21st NVA Regt were killed by the ARVN Airborne Task Force on 19 February. Noteworthy were the low friendly casualties for ARVN, only 44 KIA and 188 WIA including 1 US Advisor. Overall enemy losses inflicted by ARVN were 810 KIA, 84 PW (VC); 123 individual and 34 crew served weapons were captured.

C. ENEMY ACTIVITY. The number of VC initiated incidents reported in February was 258 compared to 228 in January and 171 in December. One significant series of mortar attacks occurred in the 11th DTA. Approximately 575 82mm mortar rounds were fired against the Gio Linh District Headquarters and outposts in Quang Tri Province on 7, 24, 26, and 28 February. Only light friendly casualties were reported.

One noteworthy incident occurred in Quang Da Special Zone during the month. At 0315 hours on 27 February the southeast portion of Danang Main Airbase was attacked by 51 140mm Russian-made rockets from firing positions eight kilometers southwest of the base. Friendly losses were 11 US KIA, 32 VN civilians killed, 27 US WIA, and 40 VN civilians injured.

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Of significance in the northeastern part of the DMZ were sightings of occupied anti-aircraft positions. The enemy unit situations remained essentially unchanged from January. The combat effectiveness of the 21st NVA Regiment is rated marginal as a result of heavy losses sustained from operation Lien Ket 81/Rio Grande/Giant Dragon.

The enemy remains capable of launching multi-regimental attacks, conducting small unit harrassing operations against isolated units and outposts, interdicting lines of communications, and terrorizing the local population throughout much of the ICTZ.

D. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. During February in the ICTZ, 110 RD cadre teams were deployed to assigned hamlets on schedule. Most teams were well motivated and showed satisfactory progress by improving the defensive posture of hamlets, repairing roads that were damaged during the rainy season, and assisting the local population build houses. Cadre teams were closely supervised during the month.

During the month ARVN battalions continued to receive training conducted by the RD MTT's, and RD training for RF companies started. To date, eight ARVN battalions and one RF battalion have completed the two-week Revolutionary Development course. In addition to their normal security operations, the RD direct support battalions conducted civic action projects during the month. No additional hamlets were secured during February.

E. PSYOPS/CIVIC ACTION. In February a Tet carnival was successfully conducted for the Danang area military dependent children, and ARVN and US forces conducted a very effective joint Tet, Chieu Hoi Campaign. The major effort of ARVN psywar and civil affairs units was directed toward support of RD during the month. The newly formed Armed Propaganda Platoon from Danang was employed in the National Priority Area.

ARVN presses produced 466,800 leaflets and posters during the month compared to 1,439,000 last month. VNAF flew 16 leaflet sorties dropping a total of 1,795,000 leaflets compared to 6 sorties and 709,000 last month. Ground loudspeaker time totaled 308 hours compared to 348 hours last month. The number of ralliers increased for the seventh straight month with a total of 319 compared to the last seven month average of 149. Of the 319 ralliers, 55% were local force guerrilla and 30% were political cadre. The large number of ralliers was attributed to increased combined RVNAF and US Forces psyops activity and air-ground operations.

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F. REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE. The ICTZ PF structure reorganization was completed during the month, and PF Platoons and PF Squads have now been integrated into 624 active PF Platoons out of 656 authorized. Excess strength created by the new PF structure authorization ceiling was reduced from 872 in January to 371 in February. During the month, TOE's for RF and PF rifle squads were reduced by one man. Disposition instructions for the excess manpower created by the TOE change have not been distributed by JGS.

The motivation indoctrination program for PF continued with an additional 28 platoons completing the course. To date, 500 platoons totaling 19,000 soldiers have been trained. Training for RF companies conducted by RD MTT's commenced on 27 February in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam Provinces, and 1 March in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. During February 102 tons of foodstuffs were distributed to PF personnel compared to 160 tons last month. MEDCAP teams treated 3,725 patients during the month.

G. PERSONNEL. The assigned versus authorized strength percentages in February for the 1st Division, 2nd Division, and 51st Regiment were 95, 95, and 104 respectively compared to 94, 93, and 95 in January. Present for duty versus authorized strength percentages in February for the same units were 80, 87, and 90 respectively compared to 89, 88, and 93 last month. The decrease in present for duty strengths was caused by a liberal Tet holiday season leave policy.

H. LOGISTICS. The overall logistics situation improved during February in spite of a continued backlog of supplies in Saigon. Zero balances continued in I ALC depots in almost 60% of the engineer line items, 50% of the ordnance repair parts lines, and 5 POL and 32 Class II and IV quartermaster lines. Critical shortages continued in barrier materials, medical litters, radios, and advisory vehicles. Resupply improved during February as 6,677 short tons were moved compared to 5,049 short tons last month.

I. ENGINEER. The number of enemy attacks against roads and bridges in the ICTZ decreased from 24 in January to 22 in February. ARVN engineer reaction time continued to be excellent. National Highway 1 was open from the DMZ to Quang Ngai 86% of the month.

There were four attacks against the railroad in the ICTZ during February. The railroad was open from Danang to Hue 7% of the month.

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XI. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (RVNAF) for the month of January 1967.

A. GENERAL. ARVN activities for the month of January were highlighted by Lam Son 142, a 1st Regiment Revolutionary Development (RD) operation east of Quang Tri; by POL WAR planning for future RD operations and Tet; and by five battalions completing RD training. Enemy activity showed a sizeable increase in total incidents compared to last month.

B. OPERATIONS. I Corps conducted 34 battalion size operations during January as compared to 42 last month. There were two combined operations included in the above figures. Contact was made with the VC/NVA in 16 of these operations. ARVN/RF/PF losses were 313 KIA and 545 WIA as compared to 227 KIA and 639 WIA last month. Enemy losses were 772 KIA and 109 PW (VC) as compared to 359 KIA and 121 PW (VC) last month. ARVN captured 184 weapons and lost 311 compared to 143 captured and 195 lost.

One significant operation took place in the ICTZ in January. Lam Son 142, a 1st Regiment controlled Revolutionary Development search and destroy operation east of Quang Tri commenced 15 January and continued into February. Friendly losses at the end of January were 18 KIA and 64 WIA. Enemy losses were 54 VC KIA and 3 PW (VC).

C. ENEMY ACTIVITY. The number of VC initiated incidents reported in January was 228 compared to 171 in December. One significant series of incidents occurred in the 11th DTA. In Quang Tri Province, on 21 January, the enemy simultaneously attacked the Truong Luong subsector headquarters, the 40th CAC, the Vo Xa police outpost, a village administrative office, and a hamlet. Friendly casualties reported were 10 KIA and 6 WIA.

Two noteworthy incidents occurred in the 12th DTA. On 14 January a PF platoon outpost northeast of Hau Duc, Quang Tin Province, was attacked and overrun by a multicompany size enemy force. Reaction forces committed on 14 January and on 15 January were ambushed while trying to reinforce the PF platoon. Friendly casualties were 13 KIA, 25 WIA, and 2 MIA. On 30 January an RD cadre team northwest of Mo Duc was attacked by a VC platoon. A PF element assisted the RD team in countering the attack. Friendly casualties were 4 KIA. There were seven weapons lost.

Enemy activity in the DMZ remained unchanged from December. The 808th Local Force and 814th Main Force battalions were operational in southern Quang Tri. Subordinate elements of the 6th Regiment were operational in northern Thua Thien and the 804th Main Force battalion was active in southern Thua Thien. The 21st NVA Regiment, 1st VC Regiment of the 2nd Division, 2nd VC Regiment of the 3rd NVA Division, and the 409th sapper battalion were reported operational in northern Quang Ngai.

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The enemy remains capable of launching multi-regimental attacks, conducting small unit harassing operations against isolated units and outposts, interdicting lines of communications, and terrorizing the local population throughout much of the ICTZ.

D. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. During January all provincial efforts were concentrated on organizing and training the 59 man RD cadre teams prior to deployment in selected hamlets. The teams were scheduled to be in their assigned hamlets by 1 February.

During the month, 5 ARVN battalions and 1 RF battalion completed the two week Revolutionary Development Training Course. These units, along with supporting units, conducted search and clear, and search and destroy operations in the selected RD areas prior to deployment of the RD cadre teams.

The effectiveness of the RD training was marked by noted improvement in all three tactical areas of ICTZ of the troop attitude toward the populace. This improved attitude has also resulted in increased intelligence sources from the populace. No Hamlets were secured during January.

E. PSYOPS/CIVIC ACTION. In January the I Corps POL WAR staff concentrated its efforts on planning and preparing for the RD and Tet Psywar Campaign. U S forces will support the Tet Psywar Campaign.

ARVN presses produced 1,439,000 leaflets and newspapers during the month compared to 1,115,000 last month. VNAF flew 6 leaflet sorties dropping a total of 709,000 leaflets compared to 9 sorties and 1,000,000 leaflets last month. Ground loudspeaker time totaled 348 hours compared to 272 hours last month. The number of ralliers increased for the sixth straight month with a total of 200 compared to the last six month average of 141.

F. REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE. The Motivation Indoctrination Program for PF continued with an additional 21 platoons completing the course. To date, 472 platoons totaling 17,208 soldiers have been trained. The 59th RF battalion from Quang Nam Province completed Revolutionary Development training at Hoa Cam Training Center during the month. During January, 160 tons of food-stuffs were distributed to PF personnel compared to 340 tons last month. MEDCAP teams treated 4,240 patients during the month.

G. PERSONNEL. The assigned versus authorized strength percentages in January for the 1st Division, 2nd Division, and 51st Regiment were 94, 93, and 95 respectively compared to 94, 93, and 91 in December.

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Present for duty versus authorized strength percentages in January for the same units were 89, 88, and 93 respectively compared to 87, 82, and 88 last month.

H. LOGISTICS. The overall logistics situation showed no improvement during January due to bad weather, enemy activity, and backlog of certain supplies in Saigon. Zero balances continued in I AIC depots in 61 percent of the engineer line items, 50 percent of the ordnance repair parts lines, and 45 active Quartermaster lines. Critical shortages continued in medical litters and radios. Resupply decreased during January as 5,049 short tons were moved compared to 7,305 short tons last month.

I. ENGINEER. The number of enemy attacks against roads and bridges in the ICTZ decreased from 28 in December to 24 in January. ARVN engineer reaction time continued to be excellent. National Highway 1 was open from the DMZ to Quang Ngai 90 percent of the month in spite of enemy interdiction and seasonal flooding.

There was one attack against the railroad in the ICTZ during January. The railroad was open from Danang to Hue 35 percent of the month.

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CHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS

<u>DATE:</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE/BILLET</u>
1-4Mar67	Paul R. TYLER	Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps
1-2Mar67	Bishop Ralph DEAN	Anglican Bishop of Cariboo (London)
3Mar67	B. J. ROEDER	Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy Commander, First Fleet
3Mar67	J. A. MORGAN	Major General, Chaplains General of the Australian Army
3Mar67	H. CUNNINGHAM	Major General, Chaplains General of the Australian Army
4Mar67	Ming Tang LAI	General, CINC, Combined Services Forces, Republic of China
6-7Mar67	H. ANDERSON	Major General, Adjutant General Australian Army
7-10Mar67	Victor H. KRULAK	Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
10Mar67	John D. RYAN	General, U. S. Air Force, Commander, Pacific Air Force
10Mar67	Howell M. ESTES, Jr.	General, U. S. Air Force, COMAC
10Mar67	Major General VOGT	Major General, U. S. Air Force, Staff, PACAF
10Mar67	Major General CHANDLER	Major General, U. S. Air Force, Staff, PACAF
10Mar67	MajGen CUNNINGHAM	Major General, U. S. Air Force, Commander, 22nd Air Force

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10Mar67	Brigadier General STEWART	Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force, Staff, PACAF
10Mar67	BGen TRIAUTEAFELLU	Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force, Staff, PACAF
10Mar67	Brigadier General FUNSCH	Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force, Command Surgeon
12-13Mar67	William T. FAIRBOURN	Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, Acting Director, J-5
13Mar67	George R. FORSYTHE	Major General, U. S. Army, G-3, USARPAC
13Mar67	Ralph W. COUSINS	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy PACOM J-5
14Mar67	R. R. BREEN	Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Deputy Secretary Joint Staff MACV
15Mar67	Guy PEPPIATT	GS-18, Chairman of Board of National Association of Manufacturers
15Mar67	William FLOWERS	GS-18, Deputy Chairman of Board of National Association of Manufacturers
15-16Mar67	Harry S. KENNEDY	Bishop, Military Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the Pacific
15-16Mar67	W. G. GRAVES	Colonel, U. S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, IFFORCEV
17Mar67	William C. WESTMORELAND	General, U. S. Army, COMUSMACV
17Mar67	Thomas DALY	Lieutenant General, CB, CBE, Chief of General Staff, Australian Army
17Mar67	D. VICENT	Major General, OBE, COMAFV

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17-18Mar67	Bruno A. HOCHMUTH	Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, Incoming Commanding General, Third Marine Division
17Mar67	Major General PHONG	Major General, Chief J-3/JCS and JOC
17Mar67	J. R. CHAISSON	Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Director, MACV Combat Operations Center
17Mar67	Brigadier General LOAN	Brigadier General, Director General, National Police
18-19Mar67	Rev. Dr. Edwin H. TULLER	General Secretary American Baptist Convention and 1st Vice President National Council of Churches
19-20Mar67	C. H. DUNN	Major General, U. S. Army, MAC J-4
20Mar67	Bruce PALMER, Jr.	Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, II FFORCEV Commander, Designee
20-21Mar67	Williard PEARSON	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 Designee
23Mar67	Sir Reginald POLLARD	Lieutenant General, KBE, CG, DSO (Honorary Colonel, Royal Australian Regiment)
24Mar67	C. H. BONESTEEL	General, U. S. Army, Commander, U. S. Forces, Korea
24Mar67	J. H. SKELDON	Major General, Chief K MAG
24Mar67	D. IRVINE	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, NAVFOR Korea
24-25Mar67	Floyd ROBERTSON	Secretary National Association of Evangelicals

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25Mar67	John TOLSON	Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding General, 1st Air Cavalry Division
26Mar67	Harry F. BYRD, Jr.	Senator (Dem. Va), Member Senate Armed Services Committee
26Mar67	A. M. SHINN	Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, COMNAVAIRPAC
26-29Mar67	Rear Admiral HEAMAN	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, CEC, USN, COMCBPAC
26-29Mar67	Rear Admiral SEUFER	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander, 3d Naval Construction Brigade
26-29Mar67	Brigadier General BOLES	Brigadier General, DCPG, Washington, D. C.
27-28Mar67	Basil L. WHITENER	Representative (Dem. N.C.), Mbr House Judiciary Committee
27-28Mar67	James C. CORMAN	Representative (Dem. Calif), Member, House Judiciary Committee
27-28Mar67	Charles E. WIGGINS	Representative (Rep. Calif), Member, House Judiciary Committee
27Mar67	Major General SMITH	Major General, Executive to Amb. PORTER, R&D
29-30Mar67	J. A. BYRNE	Representative (Dem. Pa.), Member, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	S. S. STRATTON	Representative (Dem. N.Y.), Member, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	G. E. HAGAN	Representative (Dem. Ga.), Member, House Armed Services Committee

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29-30Mar67	D. J. IRWIN	Representative (Dem. Conn.), Member, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	C. S. GUBSER	Representative (Rep. Calif.), Member, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	C. A. HALLECK	Representative (Rep. Ind.), Member, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	W. L. DICKINSON	Representative (Dem. Ala.), Member, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	Mr. W. H. COOK	General Counsel, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	L. H. WILSON	Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Advisor/ Observer, House Armed Services Committee
29-30Mar67	Charles C. NOBLE	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Chief of Construction, South- east Asia, Department of the Army
29Mar67	Chester L. JOHNSON	Major General, U. S. Army, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Depart- ment of the Army
30Mar67	William C. WESTMORELAND	General, U. S. Army COMUSMACV
30Mar67	J. R. CHAISSON	Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Director, MACV Combat Operations Center
30-31Mar67	H. W. BUSE	Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

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30-31Mar67 Richard J. MEYER

Major General, U. S. Army  
Commanding General, USA  
STRATCOM

30-31Mar67 R. D. TERRY

Brigadier General, U. S.  
Army, Commanding General,  
1st Signal Brigade

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## PART III

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 March - Operation PRAIRIE II - Continuing  
Operation CHINOOK II - Continuing  
Operation DESOTO - Continuing  
Operation DECKHOUSE VI - Continuing
- 3 March - Operation DECKHOUSE VI - Terminated
- 4 March - Operation GULF - Initiated
- 7 March - Operation LAFAYETTE - Terminated  
Operation GULF - Terminated
- 10 March - Operation YUBA - Initiated
- 12 March - Operation YUBA - Terminated
- 13 March - Operation TIPPECANOE - Initiated
- 18 March - Operation PRAIRIE II - Terminated  
Operation TIPPECANOE - Terminated
- 19 March - Operation PRAIRIE III - Initiated
- 20 March - Operation BEACON HILL - Initiated
- 22 March - Operation NEW CASTLE - Initiated
- 24 March - Operation EARLY - Initiated
- 25 March - Operation NEW CASTLE - Terminated  
Operation EARLY - Terminated  
Operation PERRY - Initiated
- 27 March - Operation PERRY - Terminated

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## PART FOUR

REFERENCES

- (A) First Marine Division Command Chronology, March 1967
- (B) Third Marine Division Command Chronology, March 1967
- (C) First Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, March 1967
- (D) Force Logistic Command Command Chronology, March 1967

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- (1) III Marine Amphibious Force, Command Directory, March 1967
- (2) March 1967 Editions, III Marine Amphibious Force Newspaper:  
"SEA TIGER" *[Removed & "done in". Record copy on file in AOSD Library]*
- (3) ANNEX "A" to PART II, Section IV.
- (4) ANNEX "B", "C", "D", "E", "F" to PART II, Section VIII.
- (5) ANNEX "G", "H", "I", "J" to PART II, Section IX.

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HEADQUARTERS  
 III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE  
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
 C/O FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96602

7B/OA-1BM  
 7 MAR 1967

COMMAND DIRECTORY

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBERS ARE PARCMENT UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED</u>	<u>RTD</u>
<u>COMMAND SECTION</u>				
CG III MAF	LTGEN	WALT, L W	6, DANANG 6100	6/67
SENIOR AIDE	CAPT	LEE, W F	6, DANANG 6449	6/67
ADMIN ASST	CAPT	SRAMEK, J S	6, DANANG 6449	4/67
JUNIOR AIDE	1STLT	SHOFF, J R	13, 213	6/67
VN AIDE	CAPT	QUY, VO DINH	6, DANANG 6449	
POLITICAL ADVISOR	MR.	COLEBAUGH, H	DANANG 6168/6169	
SERGEANT MAJOR	SGTMAJ	ELDREDGE, T G	109	6/67
<u>CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION</u>				
CHIEF OF STAFF	BGEN	ELWOOD, H M	5, DANANG 6383	5/67
DEP CHIEF OF STAFF	COL	NEVILLE, R B	305, DANANG 6405	8/67
STAFF SECRETARY	LTCOL	CANZONIERI, J V	38, DANANG 6383/6100	9/67
ADMIN ASST TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF	2DLT	SCHAUER, T W	5	3/67
<u>G-1 SECTION</u>				
ASST C/S G-1	COL	MAHON, J L	1, DANANG 6583	6/67
ASST G-1	LTCOL	HOLT, T J	1	9/67
MACV TMO	LTCOL	JOHNSTON, J C	MOTLEY 153	12/67
ASST G-1	MAJ	FOLSON, C A	101	7/67
<u>G-2 SECTION</u>				
ASST C/S G-2/SSO	COL	READ, B S	2, DANANG 6512	7/67
INT PLANS/EST O	LTCOL	CHAPLIN, D D	702	9/67
ASST INT PLANS O	LTCOL	FRAZIER, P N	202	8/67
INT OPS O	LTCOL	FRENCH, H D	202	8/67
INT COLL O	LTCOL	GREEN, F A	102, DANANG 6309	8/67
ASST G-2/SSO	LTCOL	WATTERSON, D E	2, DANANG 6512	7/67
COLL ANALYST O	MAJ	DANIELSON, D C	102	11/67
GND RECON O	MAJ	DOMAN, T A	102	7/67
OOB/ASSO	MAJ	GIUBILATO, J J	202	10/67
ASST OOB O	MAJ	HAVEN, T W	202	8/67
SPEC INT O/ASSO	MAJ	HUNTER, M	402	7/67
AIR INT RECON O	MAJ	KRAVET, R D	102	2/68
INT WATCH SUPVR	MAJ	MCCOART, J J	COC 102	4/67
STAFF CI O	MAJ	MONTGOMERY, B R	702, DANANG 6309	9/67
INT WATCH O	MAJ	MUNDY, C E	COC 102	12/67
ASST/INT/PLANS O	MAJ	SPARKS, J A	702	9/67
TIO	CAPT	FASSLER, C D	202	12/67

G-2 SECTION CONTINUED

INT WATCH O	CAPT	KIRKHAM, J H	COC	102	5/67
AERIAL REC/PHOTO O	2DLT	AILSTOCK, J W	102		12/67
AERIAL REC/PHOTO O	2DLT	DEFRANK, J W	102		8/67
ASST SPL INTO/ASSO	2DLT	HAYWARD, T E	402		8/67
ASST OOB O	2DLT	MCCALL, W D JR	202		1/68
AERIAL REC/PHOTO O	2DLT	MORRIS, C A	102		4/67
ASST STAFF CIO	2DLT	SCOTT, J	702,	DANANG 6309	11/67
ASST TID	2DLT	SHANDOR, J P	202		2/68
LNO ROKMC	WO	BOUCK, G A	COC	CHUNG YUNG	2/68
ELECMARFARE O	WO	MORSEAN, R	402		9/67
SIGNAL INT O	WO	TERRY, L W	402		11/67

5TH CI TEAM

5TH CI TEAM O	CAPT	MARDO, J F	380		9/67
OPERATIONS O	2DLT	MCHAKIN, J F JR	380		9/67
CI O	2DLT	VORONIN, D B	380		9/67
CI O	WO	CARSON, E M	380		9/67
CI O	WO	BUSKO, A H	380		9/67

G-3 SECTION

ASST C/S G-3	COL	BARRETT, D J JR	3,	DANANG 6232	7/67
OPERATIONS O	COL	SNODDY, L F	303,	DANANG 6489	8/67
LNO MACV	COL	WEST, R E		TIGER 3158	5/67
ASST G-3	COL	WILSON, R W	3,	DANANG 6232	7/67
R&D O	LTCOL	BAERISWYL, L JR	803		9/67
ASST PLANS O	LTCOL	COFFMAN, H L	603		3/67
CAC O	LTCOL	CORSON, W R	603		9/67
ABDC/RF/PF O	LTCOL	DONABEDIAN, H	603		8/67
HISTORICAL O	LTCOL	FAHEY, J E	43		8/67
LNO 2D BDE ROKMC	LTCOL	PARADIS, E J	COC	CHUNG YUNG	9/67
LNO 7TH AF	LTCOL	PRESTRIDGE, J C		SAIGON 31163	10/67
OPERATIONS O GND	LTCOL	SHRADER, P A	503		9/67
ASST OPERATIONS O	LTCOL	SUMERLIN, E B JR	303		11/67
PLANS/PROJ O	LTCOL	VOLKERT, H D	603		8/67
OIC COC	LTCOL	YOUNG, R E	COC	103	8/67
ASST OPERATIONS O	MAJ	BARSTOW, C A	503		10/67
ASST AIR O	MAJ	CARDWELL, R E	303,	DANANG 6489	5/67
ASST HISTORICAL O	MAJ	DAVIS, G A	43		9/67
OPERATIONS O AIR	MAJ	FRUCCI, A L	303,	DANANG 6489	3/68
ASST OPNS O AIR	MAJ	GOWDY, R J	303,	DANANG 6489	4/67
ASST TRNG O	MAJ	MCKEE, R D	803		7/67
ASST LNO 7TH AF	MAJ	POITEVENT, W O		SAIGON 31163	7/67
TRAINING O	MAJ	ROBINETT, H M	803		3/67
LNO 1ST FFV	MAJ	SAUL, J L	103		8/67
ASST LNO MACV	MAJ	START, R J		TIGER 3158	6/67
ASST OPNS O GND	MAJ	THOMPSON, W A	503		10/67
NAVAL GUNFIRE O	LDCR	LEASE, M D	403		6/67
SITREP/HISPEP O	CAPT	DYER, E G	COC	103	2/68
ASST RF/PF O	CAPT	LUCAS, A F	603		10/67
HIST TEAM LDR	CAPT	ROSS, R A	43		11/67
COC WATCH O	CAPT	TAYLOR, B C	COC	103	2/68
COC WATCH O	CAPT	WILDPRETT, W R	COC	103	2/68
DIR VIET LANG SCOL	1STLT	LENT, H G	109		6/67
COC WATCH O	CWO3	KENNEDY, J P	COC	103	8/67

G-3 SECTION CONTINUED

HIST TEAM LDR	CWO2	COMBS, R J	43	9/67
ROKMC LNO	LTCOL	LEE, MYONG BOK	24	
ARVN LNO	LTCOL	KHUY, LAI-VAN	224	
ARVN LNO	CAPT	CHUNG, HA-BA	224	
ARVN LNO	1STLT	LIEM, CHAU-KIM	224	
ARVN LNO	2DLT	TUYEN, NGUYEN-VAN	224	

G-4 SECTION

ASST C/S G-4	COL	QUILTY, J F	4	6/67
DEPUTY G-4	LTCOL	BAILEY, A S	4	8/67
LOG PLANS O	LTCOL	SNAPPER, J M	204	3/67
LOG OPNS O	LTCOL	JONES, C T	304	7/67
A/LOG PLANS O GND	MAJ	DUTTON, T A	204	7/67
ASST LOG OPNS O	MAJ	JONES, R D	304	7/67
LOG LNO	MAJ	NELSON, F N	304	10/67
A/LOG PLANS O AIR	MAJ	WHALLEY, A	204	1/68

G-5 SECTION

ASST C/S G-5	COL	HILL, J T	301, DANANG 6419	2/68
ASST G-5	COL	ROSS, G O	301, DANANG 6419	7/67
OPERATIONS O	LTCOL	OLEARY, R J	301	7/67
CIVIC ACTION O	MAJ	BARKER, W H	46, 301	8/67
MED MONITOR	LCDR	NOURIGAT, E R	46	10/67
REPORTS CONTROL O	CAPT	DOUGLAS, D H	46	3/67
ADMIN O	CAPT	GREMELS, N H	301, DANANG 6419	3/67
ASST REPORTS O	CAPT	SEAY, O A	46	3/67

ADJUTANT SECTION

FORCE ADJ	MAJ	REVILLE, J T	7, 207	8/67
ASST ADJ/OIC S&C	2DLT	ANDERSON, W L	107	2/68
ASST ADJ/PERS O	2DLT	MATTOX, L	207	10/67
ASST ADJ	WO	OAKES, M A	7, 207	5/67

CHAPLAIN SECTION

FORCE CHAPLAIN	CAPT	LYONS, E V	19	10/67
ASST CHAPLAIN	CDR	HERSHBERGER, J R	19	9/67

COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS SECTION

CEO	COL	HILL, J B	10	4/67
ASST CEO AVIONIC O	MAJ	ANDERSON, J L	110	2/68
ASST CEO	MAJ	COLLINS, G L	410	9/67
ASST CEO	MAJ	FRASER, J H	310	8/67
ASST CEO	MAJ	HULL, R R	210	3/67
ASST CEO	CAPT	BORDERS, J F	310	4/67

COMPTROLLER SECTION

ASST C/S COMPT	LTCOL	SNOW, M W	50	7/67
FISCAL O	2DLT	CROCKFORD, R K	50	9/67

DENTAL SECTION

FORCE DENTAL O	CAPT	MORGAN, K L	40	4/67
ADMIN ASST	LTJG	SNITTJER, W J	40	7/67

EMBARKATION - TRANSPORTATION SECTION

EMBARK O	LTCOL	SILVERTHORN, E A	39	7/67
ASST EMBARK O	MAJ	SAYE, D A	39	12/67
ASST EMBARK O	CAPT	REVES, S S	39	8/67
ASST EMBARK O	2DLT	RHODES, D L	39	4/67

ENGINEER SECTION

FORCE ENGINEER	COL	HORN, C H	15	9/67
ASST FORCE ENGR	LTCOL	TIMME, W G	15	2/68
CEC O	LCDR	MULDER, W H	15	7/67
ENGR OPNS O	CAPT	FLESSNER, M	15	8/67
ENGR UTILITIES O	CAPT	NELMS, R	15	9/67
PLANS O	1STLT	WILLIAMS, L R	115	4/67

FOOD SERVICES SECTION

FOOD SERVICES O			58	
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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

HEADQUARTERS CMDT	COL	RHOADES, J R	132, DANANG 6585	8/67
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INFORMATIONAL SERVICES SECTION - COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

FORCE ISO	COL	DERRYBERRY, D G	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	2/68
ASST ISO	LTCOL	STARK, R S	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	2/68
LNO MACV	LTCOL	WILLIAMS, J F	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	1/67
ASST ISO	MAJ	HAIGHT, W P	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	6/67
ASST ISO	CAPT	STACKPOLE, H C	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	9/67
ASST ISO	2DLT	ARNOLD, R E	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	10/67
COMBAT ARTIST	2DLT	DERMOTT, L H	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	12/67
PRESS CENTER O	2DLT	JARRELL, R JR	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	5/67
PHOTO O	WO	CORNUET, G S	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	7/67

INSPECTOR SECTION

FORCE INSPECTOR	COL	BOYD, C A	32	6/67
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LEGAL SECTION

FORCE LEGAL O	COL*	NEVILLE, R B	305	8/67
NAVMC JUD ACT O	LTCOL	WANDER, W W	117	5/67
ASST FORCE LEGAL O	CAPT	TOSI, G	17	12/67

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

FORCE MT O	LTCOL	TONNAKLIFF, C W	35	8/67
MT OPNS O	MAJ	SHAY, J H	35	1/68
MT MAINT O	1STLT	PEARCE, D B	35	4/67

MEDICAL SECTION

FORCE SURGEON	CAPT	BAKER, H A	16		5/67
MED ADMIN ASST	CDR	BROULIK, F	16		7/67
SURGEON	CDR	MILLS, W J		FLAMINGO 138	7/67

ORDNANCE SECTION

FORCE ORDNANCE O	LTCOL	THOMAS, J C	8, 108		8/67
END ORDNANCE O	CAPT	COULTER, R S	8, 108		7/67

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION

OPNS ANAL O	MAJ	ABERNATHY, T R	108		9/67
ASST OPNS ANAL O	CAPT	JOHNSON, R R	108		8/67

POSTAL SECTION

POSTAL O	MAJ	COURTNEY, J R	7, 207		7/67
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PROTOCOL SECTION

PROTOCOL O	MAJ	LIVINGSTONE, J A	62		10/67
ASST PROTOCOL O	CAPT	PIERZCHALA, R P	62		6/67

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

PROVOST MARSHAL	LTCOL	SULLIVAN, T H	27		9/67
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SECTION

PSY OPNS O	COL	READ, R R	401		7/67
ASST PSY OPNS O	MAJ	CAHILL, E D	401		1/68
ASST PSY OPNS O	CAPT	LUCKEY, S A	401		4/67

REPRODUCTION SECTION

REPRO O	CWO3	SPIKES, A W	307		3/67
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RED CROSS SECTION

RED CROSS REP	MR	JOYCE, R E	119, NIGHTS AND SUNDAYS		6/67
RED CROSS REP	MR	SMITH, R W	119, CALL AT MOMENT 119		7/67

SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

FORCE SPL SERV O	COL	SACHS, C A	37		7/67
ASST SPL SERV O	LTCOL	PLASKETT, W JR	37		9/67
ESCORT O	MAJ	BROOKS, H H	37		3/67
ASST SPL SERV O	MAJ	DREBUSHENKO, W	37		10/67
R&R O	CAPT	GUINN, W R	144, 241		8/67
CUSTODIAN	WO	BRECKENRIDGE, L L	37		1/68

SUPPLY SECTION

FORCE SUPPLY O	COL	HILL, A T	21	7/67
ASST SUPPLY O	LTCOL	ROURKE, R E	21	8/67
ASST SUPPLY O	MAJ	LYNCH, T K	121	10/67
ASST SUPPLY O	MAJ	WEILAND, J K	121	10/67

HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY

COMMANDING O	MAJ	SYLVESTER, V L	34	10/67
S-3/S-4	CAPT	BINCH, W B	34	6/67
MT O	CAPT	CASPER, W R	135	12/67
CLUBS O	CAPT	PAVLOVSKIS, V V	59	5/67
EXECUTIVE O	CAPT	SINCLAIR, D K JR	34	10/67
DISBURSING O	1STLT	DOWD, O H	18	6/67
SUPPLY O	1STLT	INGRAHAM, C H	221	6/67
SECURITY O	2DLT	EVANS, M J	127	7/67
ADMIN O	WO	DESHOTEL, B J	34	7/67

SUB-UNIT NO. 1 FIRST RADIO BATTALION

OIC	MAJ	CRUMBACK, W I	53, 453	9/67
OIC	CAPT	LOSIK, F A	53, 453	2/68


29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY

COMMANDING O	LTCOL	STEVENS, L A	80	6/67
EXECUTIVE O	MAJ	BURT, G	80	12/67
ADMIN O	CAPT	TENNANT, D D	180	6/67

244TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY

COMMANDING O	CAPT	MCCAIG, T H	85	9/67
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\*DENOTES ADDITIONAL, JOINT OR ATTACHED DUTY.  
 REPORT ERRORS, CHANGES AND/OR OMISSIONS IN WRITING TO THE FORCE ADJUTANT.

  
 J. A. REVILLE  
 FORCE ADJUTANT

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A (SECOND ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG AIR BASE) TO III MAF  
PERINTREP 11-67

1. Early in the morning of 15 March 1967, the DANANG Air Base underwent a second attack by fire of 140mm rockets. An estimated eight to 10 rounds impacted in an area centered on the runways (BT 011758).
2. At the time of the attacks, flashes from suspected firing positions were observed at (AT 9567). Counter battery fire commenced within two minutes with thirteen missions (213 rounds) fired into the area (AT 956673). Artillery batteries subsequently fired a total of 616 rounds into the same general vicinity. Two flareships, a C-47 and a C-130, were also on station and fired at suspected firing positions. A UH1E gunship was also utilized.
3. Ground reaction forces moved rapidly to seal off the area and these elements quickly located the launch site. Twenty four rocket firing points were found with two launchers still in position. Later in the day, an additional 31 launchers, together with eleven 140mm rockets and eight cannisters, were recovered in and along the banks of the SONG YEN River. Rockets were inserted in five of the launchers found.
4. The ground reaction force reported fresh craters within the rocket launch site. It appears probable that the initial counter battery fire interrupted the enemy fire mission, thereby accounting for his hasty departure from the area.

## APPENDIX:


1 - GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF ATTACK

ANNEX "A" to  
PART II, Section IV

A-1

CONFIDENTIAL

GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF ATTACK



- LEGEND**
- ① 33 ROCKET TUBES, SOME STILL CONTAINING ROCKETS RECOVERED HERE, MORE FOUND IN RIVER.
  - ② ARTILERY FIRED A TOTAL OF 616 ROUNDS, GUNSHIP ALSO FIRED INTO THIS AREA.
  - ③ FIRING POSITION, 27 FEB. 1967

DECLASSIFIED

MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING

7 MARCH, 1967

1. The Council convened at 0935 with the following members present:
  - a. MEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAW, (Chairman)
  - b. Mr. Nguyen Van DAI, Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps
  - c. BGEN. ELWOOD, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
  - d. RADM. LACY, USN, Commander NSA, Danang
  - e. Mr. GORDON, Deputy Regional Director, OCO
  - f. Mr. MORGAN, Assistant Regional Director for Revolutionary Development, OCO
  - g. Mr. HELMS, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OCO
  - h. Col. CACH, ARVN, I Corps DC of S for Rural Construction
  - i. Col. HILL, USMC, G-5, III MAF
  - j. Col. BEESON, USA, Deputy CO, I Corps Advisory Group
  - k. LtCol. BECKER, USA, G-5, I Corps Advisory Group
  - l. Lt. BUNN, USN, CAO, NSA, Danang
  - m. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)
  
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. Mr. FRANCIS, OCO
  - b. Dr. SPENCER, OCO
  - c. Capt. BAKER, USN
  - d. LtCol. ANDREWS, USAF
  - e. Capt. CAULKING, USAF
  - f. Lt. HART, USMC
  - g. Mr. Dong Si NGA, representing sugar refinery interests, Saigon
  
3. OLD BUSINESS
  - a. The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting, guests were introduced and welcomed, and members were asked to comment on items previously brought before the Council.
  
  - b. The CHAIRMAN read a farewell letter from LtCol. THANH, former Deputy Chief of Staff, POLMAR, I Corps Tactical Zone, and member of the JCC (letter is attached).
  
  - c. Capt. BAKER, USN, chairman of the Public Health Committee, presented a report on the Committee's meeting held on 1 March 1967 (minutes attached to the 28 February minutes of the Council). He stated that another letter will be drafted for the JCC to the Minister of Health, Saigon, discussing Region I public health needs and furnishing additional statistical data to reinforce the original request of 9 September 1966 for immediate public health needs.

The CHAIRMAN initiated a general discussion on the problem of the disposal of human waste in the rural areas. He concluded the discussion

ANNEX "B" to  
PART II Section VIII

DECLASSIFIED

by directing the Public Health Committee to take cognizance of the situation. Dr. SPENCER recommended research of the problem as it existed in Korea during and after the war, as a starting point in the search for a workable solution.

d. RADM. LACY stated he would initiate a letter to the Army-Air Force Exchange, Saigon, regarding the introduction of handicraft products from the Hue Vocational Trade Center into the Post Exchange system.

e. Lt. BUNN reported that the engine for the Quang Tri sawmill had been delivered to the site. Mr. GORDON stated that the sawmill was still inoperable due to missing parts and untrained operators.

f. Mr. DAI initiated a discussion on the movement of the sugar refinery from Saigon to Quang Ngai City via Chu Lai. The basic problems are those of logistics and engineering: moving, loading and unloading the equipment, and the ability of roads, bridges and ferrys to handle the size and weight. Sufficient information is not currently available upon which III MAF and Naval Supply Activity (NSA) planners can act. A meeting is scheduled for 9 March, to be held at I Corps Headquarters by the Vietnamese to refine their plans. A meeting will then be held on 11 March between I Corps, III MAF and NSA to discuss implementation of the plans.

g. Lt. BUNN reported that one bridge section for Quang Tri Province had arrived, the remaining sections will be sent by commercial ship. Office of Civil Operation has agreed to monitor this project.

h. Dr. SPENCER reported that he expected to hear from Saigon shortly on the enlargement of the Provincial Hospital at Tam Ky.

i. Mr. DAI opened discussion on the material support for the Youth Guidance Center. Mr. GORDON recommended a meeting between the Mayor of Danang, I Corps Advisory Group and NSA representatives to reaffirm requirements for the center.

j. Lt. BUNN announced that two trucks had arrived from Saigon to be used by the city of Danang for trash and garbage disposal. The location of a new trash dump will be announced shortly.

k. The JCC meeting of 14 March tentatively scheduled for Quang Ngai has been relocated to I Corps Headquarters. March 28 has been tentatively selected for the Quang Ngai visit.

l. Mr. GORDON announced that UCO had requested a rock crusher from Saigon. This crusher has a capacity of 50 tons per hour. He has also asked Public Works to investigate the procurement of a smaller portable rock crusher for use in Region I.

#### 4. NEW BUSINESS

a. Mr. GORDON announced that the survey team report on the An Hoa

Industrial Complex was positive and constructive. He further stated that the preliminary recommendation on the projected fertilizer operations will be available within a week.

b. Mr. GORDON stressed the desirability of complying with GVN standards when assisting communities in disaster or emergency situations. The generous assistance rendered Lang Vei, Quang Tri Province, after the bombing on 2 March prompted this comment. LtCol. BECKER pointed out that the decision to exceed the GVN standard was made because of the isolated location, proximity to Laos, and political value of maintaining harmonious relations with the village complex.

c. LtCol. BECKER requested that all civic action programs in Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, be coordinated through the District Chief to prevent duplication and wasted effort. Mr. FRANCIS pointed out that the District OCO Representative, Mr. Pat Irish, was available to assist in this coordination.

d. Mr. HELMS announced that the Psychological Warfare Committee will meet at 1030 on 11 March in the Vietnamese-American Association Library.

5. Agenda items for the next meeting are:

a. Report of the Education Committee (a copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed).


b. Report of the Psychological Warfare Committee.

c. Review of unfinished business items (separate distribution).

d. Review of highlights of the week's activities by all members.

6. The meeting adjourned at 1100. The next meeting is scheduled for 0930, 14 March, 1967, at I Corps Headquarters.

Respectfully submitted,

  
R. J. O'LEARY  
LtCol USMC  
Recorder

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Member  
Each Committee Chairman  
Each Guest  
LtCol. O'LEARY, Recorder (30)

DECLASSIFIED

6 March 1967

General ROBERTSMAW and members of the  
Joint Coordinating Council

With deep regret I bid farewell to you as I am transferred to Saigon to assume other duties. Although I am very pleased with my new opportunity for schooling I will miss my association with the Joint Coordinating Council and the challenges presented by my assignment in the I Corps area.

May I wish the Council continued success in all endeavors and express the hope that I may have the opportunity to serve with you again.

Sincerely,

DO DUONG TRIAM  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Deputy Chief of Staff, POLWAR  
I Corps Tactical Zone

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MEETING OF THE EDUCATION COMMITTEE OF THE I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL9 MARCH, 1967

1. The Education Committee met at 1330, 9 March at the USAID Office Building with the following members present:

Dr. Tolle, USAID Education (Chairman)  
1LT Spicer, 29th CA Co (Recorder, Secretary)  
LT Quinton, NSA

2. The following guest was present:

Mr. Von Goldberg, USAID Vocational Training

3. The Chairman opened the meeting and proposed that the committee follow the following agenda:

- a. Report on youth activities - LT Spicer
  - b. Report on school sanitation - CPT Plott, LT Quinton
  - c. Report on VNAF-USAF school building - COL Andrews
  - d. Report on vocational-refugee training - Mr. Von Goldberg
  - e. Other business: Meetings; time and date, items from group
4. OLD BUSINESS:
- a. Dr. Tolle explained that due to weather conditions in Hue, Mr. Tieu would not be able to attend today's meeting.
  - b. LT Spicer reported on his talk with Chaplain Davis, MAG 11, concerning transportation for two Vietnamese students to the US. It was suggested by the Chaplain that military transportation might be arranged through G5, III MAF. LT Spicer stated that he is presently investigating this possibility. LT Spicer also stated that a campfire for DaNang Boy Scouts has been arranged for 19 March at the DaNang Stadium.
  - c. In the absence of Dr. Plott, LT Quinton reported that GVN has accepted and is quite enthusiastic about the school sanitation program. He said that they are willing to supply laborers and funds for purchase of necessary sanitation aids. LT Quinton also reported that the grading of the DaNang PolyTech School grounds is progressing quite well, although the heavy turf will require quite a lot of work.
  - d. Due to the absence of COL Andrews no report was submitted concerning the VNAF-USAF school building project.
  - e. Mr. Von Goldberg said that GVN has released funds, and that they are on the way from Saigon, for 1st Cycle training and teachers salaries for January, February, and March at the DaNang PolyTech School.

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f. Dr. Tolle stated that USAID has a large quantity of building materials available for school building and repair projects.

5. NEW BUSINESS:

a. It was suggested by Mr. Von Goldberg that since he will be absent from the meeting next week that Dr. Tolle give the vocation-refugee training report. The change to the agenda was approved by the committee.

b. LT Spicer suggested that representatives from various agencies be invited to future meetings to give reports on projects completed for information purposes. He suggested VAA and JUSPAO as possibilities. Dr. Tolle added CARE as being another possibility.

c. The following agenda for the next meeting was proposed and approved by the committee:

- (1) Report on youth activities - LT Spicer
- (2) Report on school sanitation - CPT Plott, LT Quinton
- (3) Report on VNAF-USAF school building - COL Andrews
- (4) Report on vocational-refugee training - Dr. Tolle
- (5) Other business:

6. The meeting was adjourned at 1415. The next meeting is scheduled for 1330 hrs, 16 Mar 67, at the USAID Building.

Respectfully submitted,

*Willard F. Spicer*

WILLARD F. SPICER  
1LT, MEC  
Recorder, Secretary

DISTRIBUTION:

- 120-G5, III MAF
- 10-Dr. Tolle, USAID
- 3-CAO, NSA
- 1-Each Guest
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MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING14 MARCH, 1967

1. The Council convened at 1005 with the following members present:
  - a. MGEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAF, (Chairman)
  - b. Mr. Nguyen Van DAI, Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps
  - c. BGEN. ELWOOD, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
  - d. RADM. LACY, USN, Commander NSA, Danang
  - e. Mr. GORDON, Deputy Regional Director, OCO
  - f. Mr. WHELTON, Assistant Regional Director for New Life Development, OCO
  - g. Mr. COLEBAUGH, POLAD, III MAF
  - h. Mr. HORGAN, Assistant Regional Director for Revolutionary Development, OCO
  - i. Mr. HELMS, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OCO
  - j. Col. NGHI, ARVN, Chief of Staff, I Corps
  - k. Col. CACH, ARVN, I Corps DC of S for Rural Construction
  - l. Col. HILL, USMC, G-5 III MAF
  - m. Col. BEESON, USA, Deputy CO, I Corps Advisory Group
  - n. LtCol. TUAN, I Corps DC of S for Political Warfare
  - o. LtCol. BECKER, USA, G-5, I Corps Advisory Group
  - p. Lt. BUNN, USN, CAO, NSA, Danang
  - q. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. Ambassador KOREN
  - b. MGEN. LAM, ARVN
  - c. Col. HAMBLIN, USA
  - d. Dr. TOLLE
  - e. LtCol. ANDREWS, USAF
  - f. Maj. MORLEY, USMC
  - g. Capt. CAULKING, USAF

3. OLD BUSINESS

a. The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting. Col. NGHI welcomed, on behalf of MGEN. LAM, Commanding General I Corps, the JCC to the I Corps Headquarters. He then introduced LtCol. TUAN, I Corps DC of S for Political Warfare who has replaced LtCol. THANH. The CHAIRMAN welcomed LtCol. TUAN as a member of the JCC.

b. The CHAIRMAN asked members to comment on the minutes of the previous meeting. The CHAIRMAN then directed the RECORDER to make the following change to the minutes of the previous meeting: page 2, line one, strike out the word "directing" and replace it with "requesting", and to strike out the word "to" in the same line.

ANNEX "C" to  
PART II, Section VIII

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c. Dr. TOLLE, OCO, chairman of the Education Committee, presented a report on the committee's meeting held on 9 March 1967 (minutes attached to the minutes of the 7 March JCC meeting). Dr. TOLLE stated that the planned VNAF-USAF school building project had as its goal a combination Elementary-Secondary School, meeting modern standards for sanitation, classroom space, library and meeting rooms. Upon completion the school will become a part of the Danang Public School System.

d. RADM. LACY stated that a letter had been sent to the Army-Air Force Exchange, Saigon, regarding the introduction of handicraft products from the Hue Vocational Trade Center into the Post Exchange system.

e. RADM. LACY reported that a technician had been sent to Quang Tri Province to assist in the installation of the sawmill engine. He further volunteered Navy assistance in fabricating sawmill parts which are missing, and requested technical information from OCO. Mr. GORDON stated that a Philippine team, which would train operators, was in-country.

f. Col. NGHI reported on the meeting of 11 March which was held to discuss movement of the sugar mill from Saigon to Quang Ngai City via Chu Lai. The meeting was chaired by the Chief of Staff, I Corps and attended by representatives of III MAF, I Corps, NSA, OCO and the Sugar Mill Company. The following points were agreed upon:

(1) I Corps will assume responsibility for security for all land movement.

(2) Quang Ngai Sugar Mill Company has responsibility for correctness of inventory at all times.

(3) Quang Ngai Sugar Mill Company will hire civilian vehicles to do as much of the hauling as availability of vehicles will permit.

(4) I Corps will provide additional vehicles, as required, within their capabilities.

(5) NSA in conjunction with III MAF will unload LST's and deck loaded cargo.

(6) Quang Ngai Sugar Mill Company will hire civilian stevedores to unload hold loaded cargo from coastal freighters.

(7) In the event the GVN and sugar mill are successful in obtaining sea going barges (most desirable from our standpoint) NSA will unload them.

(8) III MAF will arrange for transportation of one 10 ton ARVN crane from Danang for use at Chu Lai.

(9) I Corps will provide another 10 ton crane and forklifts at Quang Ngai.

(10) III MAF will provide storage at Chu Lai for a maximum period of 5 days per incoming ship load.

(11) III MAF will make arrangements for admission of the necessary trucks and stevedores to Chu Lai Base.

(12) I Corps will provide guards for the storage area.

(13) The sugar mill people will provide a representative to I Corps, Mr. Dong Si NGA, who will keep them abreast of developments. They will coordinate with III MAF through their G-4.

(14) After gaining some experience through the handling of the lighter cargo, another meeting will be held to address the handling of the heaviest items.

In answer to a question, Col NGHI stated that the sugar mill will arrive in approximately 2,238 pieces and will be operational in about two years.

g. Lt. BUNN reported that a meeting, attended by LtCol. CUONG, (the Mayor of Danang), and his staff and Lt. TRIMPERT, NSA, was held on 10 March to discuss the Youth Guidance Center. The Mayor of Danang proposed that the Youth Guidance Center be combined with the existing "Boys Town", and a feasibility study is under way.

h. Lt. BUNN announced that the new trash dump will be located at the intersection of CUONG DE and DONG DA Street. The area will be sprayed and covered every two days. He also addressed the problem of inadequate wages for truck drivers and the inability to hire drivers for the Danang trash trucks. After a brief discussion the CHAIRMAN offered as a possible solution the inclusion of 5 ton trucks in the driver training course at Danang Polytechnic School and a requirement for an "On the Job Training" program before graduation, thereby furnishing drivers, on a short term basis, for the Danang trash trucks. Mr. GORDON stated he will have Mr. BURGESS give a report on the current wage situation in the Danang area at the next meeting.

i. Mr. HELMS recommended that due to the late hour, his report on the Psychological Warfare Committee meeting of 11 March be deferred until the next meeting. The CHAIRMAN concurred.

4. Ambassador KOREN and MGEN. LAM joined the meeting. MGEN. LAM welcomed the JCC and expressed his appreciation for the work done by the Committee in the past. His staff then briefed on Revolutionary Development in I Corps, Hung Quang I, the forthcoming village and hamlet elections and the refugee problem. MGEN. LAM requested that the JCC take cognizance of the refugee problem and assist him in finding a solution.

5. Agenda items for the next meeting are:

a. Report of the Public Health Committee Meeting (a copy of the

minutes is enclosed).

b. Report of the Commodities Distribution Committee Meeting (a copy of the minutes is enclosed).


c. Report of the Psychological Warfare Committee (a copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed).

d. Review of unfinished business items (separate distribution).

e. Review of highlights of the week's activities by all members.

6. The meeting adjourned at 1210. The next meeting is scheduled for 0930, 21 March, 1967, in Danang.

Respectfully submitted,



R. J. O'LEARY  
LtCol USMC  
Recorder

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Each Member

Each Committee Chairman

Each Guest

LtCol. O'LEARY, Recorder (30)

MINUTES OF THE I CORPS PUBLIC HEALTH  
COMMITTEE MEETING (JCC)  
15 MARCH 1967

1. The meeting was convened at 0945 hours with the following members present:

- a. Capt BAKER, MC, USN, III MAF Force Surgeon, Chairman
- b. Dr. SPENCER, Director, Public Health, OCO
- c. Dr. HO VAN PHU, Inspector General MOH/Region I
- d. Capt NHAN, MC, ARVN, I Corps Surgeon
- e. Capt PLOTT, MC, USAR, Medical Officer, 29th CA Co., III MAF
- f. Maj VAN STRATEN, MSC, USA, Senior Medical Advisor, I Corps, Recorder

2. OLD BUSINESS: Capt BAKER called the meeting to order at 0945 hours and the minutes of the 1 March 1967 meeting were reviewed. The following comments were made:

- a. Capt BAKER reported that LCDR NOURIGAT was still working on the letter to be sent to the Ministry of Health, Saigon which re-affirmed I Corps' public health needs.
- b. Capt SPENCER informed the committee that Quang Tin Province had held an organizational meeting for their new Province public health committee. He further stated that both Quang Ngai and Quang Tin had been informed to send copies of their minutes to his office.
- c. Capt PLOTT stated that his part of the sanitary survey of Da Nang had been completed. He is now summarizing his findings in a cover letter to be attached to his report. His report will then go to Mr. Adams, Region I USAID sanitation advisor. Mr. Adams will formulate his recommendations and present them at the next meeting. Capt PLOTT re-emphasized that his survey dealt primarily with trash and garbage disposal; it was not a comprehensive survey of Da Nang's public health needs.
- d. Dr. PHU elaborated on Capt PLOTT's report by highlighting problem areas in Da Nang's refugee camps. He stated that health education was needed more desperately than waste disposal facilities. He cited the fact that latrines which were put into Dong Giang refugee camp were used until they became filthy, and then the people resorted to previously employed procedures of defecating and urinating indiscriminately on the earth's surface. Apparently, no one is willing to exert effort to clean common property. Only if a latrine belongs to an individual family is it maintained clean. Dr. Phu further stated that no Ministry of Health funds were available to pay persons to clean the latrines. A tax system was considered by rejected as non-feasible because of the economic plight of the refugees. To further complicate matters, in many instances a good source of water to flush the toilets is not readily available. The committee decided to consult with Mr. Adams, USAID sanitarian, on this matter at the next meeting.

e. Capt PLOTT stated that problems had been encountered with the methane generator being built in Tuy Loan village, Hieu Duc district, Quang Nam province. The tank designed to hold water and feces, and eventually the methane gases, was found deficient on two trial attempts. It is being repaired by the Seabees at this time. Capt BAKER inquired about the location of the methane generator near Hue. Capt PLOTT promised to provide its exact location.

f. Dr. PHU reported that he had received 24,000 doses of plague vaccine during the past week.

### 3. NEW BUSINESS

a. Maj VAN STRATEN reported an outbreak of plague in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province. Thus far, there have been only eight cases, one of which died. Apparently, the Ministry of Health team in the area reacted well. The area was dusted, and inhabitants of two villages were placed on sulfa prophylactically.

b. Capt NHAN, I Corps Surgeon, asked that an investigation into the dumping area adjacent to the Prisoner of War Camp be initiated. He stated that, in his opinion, this dumping area was not being properly maintained and was a threat to the prisoners in the camp. Capt BAKER has requested PMU to investigate and recommend any needed corrective measures.

c. Capt PHU reported that the Ministry of Health is planning a large rodent eradication program. Initially, it will center on Hue and Danang. Warfarin, a highly effective rodenticide, will be employed. Dr. PHU stated that he has been planning the program and has obtained much valuable assistance from Mr. Adams, USAID sanitarian. It is their plan to dye corn which contains the deadly warfarin either red or green. This corn will then be placed inside a bamboo tube about 40 centimeters long. This warfarin containing tube will then be secured to the earth along likely rat runs. The purpose of the small tube, big enough for a rat to enter, is to preclude dogs, cats, or chickens from eating the poison. The tube itself may be painted and labeled "rat poison", in Vietnamese, of course. This program won the praise of the committee.

4. The meeting was adjourned at 1030 hours.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES G. VAN STRATEN  
MAJ, MCS, USA  
Recorder

#### DISTRIBUTION:

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Each JCC Member

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Chief, Preventive Medicine Section, MACV Surgeon's Office, APO 96222

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MEETING OF THE EDUCATION COMMITTEE OF THE I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL

16 MARCH, 1967

1. The Education Committee met at 1330, 16 March at the USAID Office bldg. with the following members present:

Dr. Tolle, USAID Education (Chairman)  
COL Hill, G5, III MAF  
1LT Spicer, 29th CA Co (Recorder, Secretary)  
1LT Quinton, NSA

2. The following guests were present:

LTC Andrews, G5, DaNang Air Base  
CPT Plott, 29th CA Co

3. The Chairman opened the meeting and proposed that the committee follow the following agenda:

- a. Report on youth activities - 1LT Spicer
- b. Report on school sanitation - CPT Plott, 1LT Quinton
- c. Report on VNAF-USAF school building - LTC Andrews
- d. Report on vocational-refugee training - Dr. Tolle
- e. Other business: Meetings; time and date, items from group

4. OLD BUSINESS:

a. Dr. Tolle stated that due to transportation problems once again, Mr. Tieu would not be in attendance.

b. 1LT Spicer reported that a training camp for scout leaders would take place in April lasting for approximately 8 days. He said that a team of instructors from Saigon would be present and that this camp would include the entire region. 1LT Spicer also reported on the 4-T meeting he attended. He explained that it is similar to the 4-H program in the States and since there is little organized youth activity in the rural areas, perhaps the education committee should attempt to assist the program. 1LT Spicer said that the Tet Games were very successful in that approximately 20,000 Vietnamese attended and improvements to the stadium were evident, although more remains to be done. He said that Mr. Huong, Youth Activity Director was personally complimented by General Lam.

c. Dr. Plott reported on the school sanitation program, specifically the model school. He said the project was initiated because of the health education problems in the schools. Hu-Tieu-Hoo School was chosen for the pilot project since it is used for teacher meetings, conferences, etc. and would provide the much-needed exposure to inspire other such projects. Dr. Plott stated

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that the project needs only the allocation of funds before it can be initiated.

COL Hill said he would review the program and present it to the Chief of Staff, III MAF, for his approval or disapproval.

d. LTC Andrews reported on the VNAF-USAF school building project. Col Andrews stated that the Air Base is faced with a problem of educating the children of the VNAF personnel assigned and working with the USAF at the Base; in that, there are no accredited schools in the immediate area. He said that there are approximately 232 families on Base with a projected increase to 450, each family with 5-6 children. He stated that many man-hours are lost when the VNAF personnel must transport their children back and forth to the DaNang schools. Col Andrews further stated that the problem was solved when the Base Commander agreed to donate the plot of ground on which the school will be built, to the city of DaNang. He said that plans call for a single story, 20 classroom building with the option of an additional 10 classrooms if necessary. It will include an assembly room, small cafeteria, sanitation facilities, conference rooms, etc. and will be mostly of block construction. The school will accommodate from 800 - 1300 students.

Dr. Tolle suggested that a list of requirements be given Mr. Soan, DaNang Primary Education Chief, for possible assistance.

e. LT Quinton reported on the vocational-refugee training since Dr. Tolle was unable to obtain a complete report from Mr. Von Goldberg. He said that funding responsibility for the refugees has gone back to the Ministry of Education. He also said that the teachers at the PolyTech School still have not been paid due to a tie-up between SCR and the Ministry of Education. He stated that the problem is beginning to show in the classroom attitudes of the teachers. LT Quinton reported that 1 April is the cut-off date for all classes in the refugee training program. Those with sufficient courses to graduate will be awarded diplomas, others will receive certificates of attendance.

5. NEW BUSINESS:

a. LT Spicer suggested that since the problem of transportation from Hue for the Region Inspector, Mr. Tieu, still exists that the committee attempt to go to Hue for the next meeting, 30 Mar 67.

b. The committee agreed and Dr. Tolle said that he would try to arrange an Air America helicopter for the trip. The committee agreed that if transportation was not available, the next meeting would be held at 1330, 30 Mar 67 at the USAID Building, Room 201.

6. The meeting was adjourned at 1515.

Respectfully submitted,

*Willard F. Spicer*

WILLARD F. SPICER

1LT, MFC

Recorder, Secretary

DISTRIBUTION:

120-G5, III MAF            1-Each Guest  
10-Dr. Tolle, USAID       2-File  
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MINUTES OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUBCOMMITTEE

11 MARCH 1967

1. The Subcommittee convened at 1030 with the following members present:

- a. Mr. Helms, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OCO (Chairman)
- b. Col READ, III MAF PsyOps Officer
- c. Maj PANZER, PsyWar/CA Advisor, I Corps
- d. Maj MCCAIG, Commander of 244th PsyOps Company
- e. Capt DELLARD, PolWar Bn Advisor
- f. Mr. Riddell, Deputy Asst for PsyOps OCO (Recorder)
- g. LtCol TUAN, Deputy C/S for PolWar I Corps
- h. Maj DIEN, G-V I Corps
- i. Capt HOI, 10th PolWar Bn
- j. Mr. Ro, Chief of Regional VIS
- k. Mr. Tho, Regional VIS Office
- l. Mr. Ba, VIS Danang
- m. Mr. Phat, Regional Chieu Hoi Office
- n. Mr. Thao, Regional Chieu Hoi Office
- o. Mr. Nghi, OCO/PsyOps (Interpreter)

2. The following guests were present:

- a. Mr. Dorsey, OCO/PsyOps Hoi An
- b. Mr. Warren, Asst. Prov. Rep./Danang City

3. OLD BUSINESS

a. Mr. Helms convened the meeting and welcomed the members. After introducing the guests present, he discussed briefly the activities of the VAA library, informing the members that the library contained 2500 books in four languages (English, Vietnamese, French and Chinese) which are borrowed at the average rate of 750 a month by the 450 members of the association.

b. Mr. Helms reported that he had informed the JCC of the subcommittee's recommendations concerning:

(1) the need of construction material to complete the Regional Chieu Hoi centers.

(2) the inadequacy of transportation for returnees going from the district to province.

(3) an appeal to youth in VC-infested areas to escape to GVN territory before they are impressed or killed by the VC.

c. He announced that the first two points are under consideration by the JCC and the latter point has been communicated to Saigon for assistance and guidance. Regarding the second point - returnee transportation - he said that a possibility existed of utilizing helicopters.

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4. NEW BUSINESS

a. Mr. Helms then turned the meeting over to Mr. Ro who briefed the members on the organization, activities and the 1967 program of VIS. (See annex)

b. Major PANZER asked if the hamlets to be included in the election had been selected yet. Mr. Ro replied that the election was very complex involving village elections in April and hamlet elections from May through June. He said he had not received word on candidates or hamlets as yet.

c. Major DIEN inquired when the new regional Cultural-Drama teams would be organized. He was interested in their use by ARVN G-5. Mr. Ro replied three more months.

d. Colonel READ asked how many teams were planned for. Mr. Ro answered one team of 12 to 15 members.

e. Mr. Helms asked how many C-D teams there were in the provinces. Mr. Ro said that most provinces had a team which was organized by other agencies.

f. Colonel READ and Major PANZER inquired about village-hamlet VIS cadre. Mr. Ro said that after the elections and the reorganization of the village-hamlet administrative machinery, the VIS cadre will be controlled and paid by the village and not by MICH as now. Colonel TUAN suggested that the village budget might be too small to assume that expense. If so, how would the cadre be paid. Mr. Ro agreed that may be true in some cases and that they were still seeking a way to solve this problem.

g. Major PANZER asked whether village-hamlet cadre can live on their salaries or were obliged to take on additional work. Mr. Ro said that the normal salary was 2,000 piasters a month and on that basis the cadre often had to find additional work to supplement their salary. Colonel TUAN suggested that Mr. Ro should bring up the problem of salaries next time he is in Saigon.

h. Mr. Helms asked where the VIS cadre are trained - in the provinces or at region in Da Nang. Mr. Ro said training should be done in Da Nang but the expense did not permit the cadre to visit Da Nang.

i. Major MCCAIG inquired about the mobile information teams in the provinces - who controlled them. Mr. Ro said they were supervised by the VIS province chief. Colonel READ asked if every province had a team. Mr. Ro replied there was one in each province in I Corps.

j. Mr. Phat warned of the VC desire to sabotage the elections and asked what counter-measures had been taken to prevent this. Mr. Ro said preparations had been made to counter VC attempts to distort the elections by having the VIS cadre available to answer the distortions as they occurred. He said VC-inspired demonstrations would not be permitted. Colonel

TUAN said ARVN units would be assigned to provide protection. Mr. Ro said he had not received any reports, so far, of VC sabotage. Mr. Ba suggested that some cadre should be kept inside the office to be able to intercept problems as they are reported to the office.

k. Mr. Ro announced that the salary of the village-hamlet VIS cadre would be increased after the election. Mr. Tho added that if the village-hamlet budget was insufficient to assume this salary increase that the difference would be met by MICH.

l. Major PANZER commented that the total numerical strength of the VIS in I Corps seemed adequate to cope effectively with their task. Mr. Ro explained that the total represented various sections - not all of which were devoted to carrying out propaganda. Major PANZER asked what was the size of a District VIS Staff. Mr. Ro said 3 to 5 cadre.

5. Agenda items for the next meeting: Mr. Helms suggested that the meeting be devoted to a general discussion of current problems and activities. The members agreed.

6. The meeting adjourned at 12:30. The next meeting will be held on Wednesday, April 5.

W. H. Riddell  
Recorder

Vietnamese Information Service, Region I

A briefing by Mr. Nguyen Ro, Chief of Regional VIS - PART I

I. Mission

- (1) Urge the provincial VIS services to implement the national program and inspect their efforts.
- (2) Direct policies and plans of local activities.
- (3) Carry out mobile propaganda activities and train village-hamlet cadre.
- (4) Censor publications, motion pictures and cultural-drama program.
- (5) Coordinate activities of VIS and radio stations in Region I as directed by the Commanding General of I Corps.

II. Organization

- (1) There are five branches in the regional office headed by a director and his deputy:
  - (a) Training Center
  - (b) Planning
  - (c) Administration
  - (d) Inspection
  - (e) Mobile Information Group

III. VIS Offices

- (1) Six provincial offices plus one for the DMZ - a total of seven.
- (2) 46 district offices
- (3) 251 village offices
- (4) 1185 hamlet offices

IV. Personnel

- (1) A total of 587 cadre presently assigned to provincial and district offices.
- (2) A total of 251 cadre presently assigned to the village offices.
- (3) A total of 1185 cadre presently assigned to the hamlet offices.

V. 1967 VIS Program

- (1) Constructive Activities

- (a) Train VIS cadre to be appointed, paid and controlled by village authorities after the elections.
- (b) Organize one Cultural-Drama team (12 - 15 members) for region.
- (c) Increase Mobile Information Group from 60 to 130 cadre and furnish with necessary audio-visual equipment, weapons and transportation.
- (d) Publicize activities and policies of the government.
- (e) Establish information hall in all villages (rural areas).
- (f) Increase support to the province newspapers and district bulletins - and begin publication of a regional magazine.
- (g) Organize inspection of provincial, district and village VIS activities.
- (h) Arrange regional VIS conferences every 3 months; provincial conference once each month and weekly conferences at district.

(2) Propaganda Activities

- (a) Peace: Disseminate our concept of peace by all media.
- (b) National Unity: Create understanding between parties and religions and help prevent public disturbances.
- (c) Public Opinion: Educate the public and VIS cadre through conferences and discussions of current events.
- (d) Democratic Development: Publicize the elections and urge people to welcome the constitution and participate in the elections.
- (e) RD Support: Coordinate closely with all government agencies to implement the RD program.
- (f) Press: Encourage a dialogue between the people and the government by promoting the MICH newspaper "Conversation" and the establishment of a privately-owned press.
- (g) Psychological Operations: Increase radio broadcasts to the North and to the VC areas in the South; increase Mobile Information Team activities; cooperate with Chieu Hoi in contacting VC cadre.

(3) PsyOps Campaigns for 1967

- (a) Tet Campaign (completed)
- (b) Democratic Development (March - June)

Promote village-hamlet elections and the reorganization of local administrative machinery. Promote the constitution.

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(c) New Life (July - October)

Urge people to participate in the RD program.

(d) Soldier Appreciation (November - December)

Promote public gratitude for the efforts of the ARVN and Free World soldiers.

Briefing - PART II

Office of VI Representative  
 Pac Zone I

PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES  
in support of the village/hamlet election campaign

I. Preparation of a general plan on the election campaign:

- Prepare a general plan, and a detailed plan to be carried out by the Provincial VIS agencies.
- Provide guidance to radio stations.
- Prepare slogans for dissemination.

II. Organization of discussions:

- Organization of internal discussion (20 Feb 67) for all the personnel of this Office, of the Mobile VI Group and of the training center.
- Organize a briefing team to give briefing to the agencies at Corps level.

III. Preparation of materials:

- One document for VIS cadres to give briefings at movie houses and public places.
- Two leaflets (1 dealing with the reorganization, the other with the election campaign).
- Prepare a special issue of a magazine on the elections.
- Print additional copies of the documents published by the Central Government.

IV. Organization of Propaganda Teams in support of village/hamlet elections:

All the cadre of the Mobile VI Group and a number of cadre of this Office will set up:

- 6 Election Propaganda Teams to be attached to the six Provinces/Cities.
- 1 Team of Female Volunteer Cadre to make propaganda in the Cities of Hue and Danang.

V. Inspection: Organize 3 Inspection Teams of two persons each (in coordination with the Office of Government Delegate).

VI. Painting: Draw 3 pictures to be sent to the Provincial VIS agencies on the following subjects:

- Meaning of the village/hamlet administrative reorganization.
- The people eagerly participate in the elections.
- Be vigilant against VC plots to sabotage the elections.

VII. Work development:

- Forward information regularly by the fastest means to Saigon Radio-station, and to local radio-stations.
- The propaganda teams will send information by message directly to the radio-stations, with info copy to this office.
- Have photographers work on the spot.
- Request the Central Government to send movie and TV teams to cover the village/hamlet elections.

VII. Liaison and coordination:

- Assign personnel to join the mission teams of the Office of Government Delegate.
- Request VIS Department to provide timely aid to the Provincial VIS agencies.
- Urge local newsmen to disseminate information on the elections.
- Get in touch with the Political Parties and Religious Groups in I Corps Tactical Zone and ask them to encourage their members to participate in the elections.

Office of VIS Representative  
I Corps Tactical Zone

Briefing - PART III

Plan of a Campaign to urge the people  
to participate in the Village Hamlet  
elections

I. Purpose: This Campaign will have two principal objectives:

1. Develop a thorough reorganization of the National administration infrastructure. The reorganization has the following objectives:

- Decentralization of power
- Democratisation
- Render the village/hamlet administration effective

2. Encourage the people to participate in the elections, to run as candidates, to be aware of election procedures.

II. Concept:

1. Coordinate closely with the following agencies:

- Administrative agencies
- Revolutionary Development agencies
- Military Psywar agencies

2. Work widely and deeply at the same time.

3. Make these activities a part of the 1967 VIS program.

III. Work to be done:

1. Organize debates and instruction for cadres (VIS and GVN cadres) and the people:

a. Subjects:

- Decrees No. 198/SL/DUHC and No. 199/BI/DUHC dated 24 Dec 66.
- Purpose and meaning of the reorganization of village, hamlet administration.
- How to vote, to run as candidate?
- Remain vigilant against VC sabotage.

Note: It is advisable to point out to the cadres and people the following characteristics of the reorganization:

- Local autonomy
- Decentralization of power
- Clearly defined responsibility between the deciding agency and the executive agency.
- Unification of command.

b. Organization:

- Organize briefing teams, train them carefully, and send them to the districts, villages and hamlets.
- Divide into two phases of instruction: (1) on the reorganization of village/hamlet administration; (2) on the village/hamlet elections.

Note: Use this program as a starting point for the debate and instruction movement in the 1967 VIS program.

2. Use and exploit to the maximum all forms of open information:

- Set up slogans on galvanized iron sheets and walls, posters and banners in support of the elections (link this work with the policy of developing the forms of open information in 1967).
- Urge the local papers to publish a special issue.
- Make cartoons and painting concerning the elections.

3. Increase radio-broadcast and loud-speaker broadcast:

- Mobile broadcast
- Fixed broadcast

Radio-stations will carry out the following works:

- Between now and the end of the elections, reserve some time every day to discuss, explain and disseminate information on the reorganization of village/hamlet administration, and rural elections.
- Make on-the-spot radio news reports on election subjects.
- Interview the notables and political parties on subjects related to administrative reorganization.
- In radio broadcasts, use spot announcements to inform and explain one of the subjects related to administrative reorganization.

4. Mobile propaganda: Organize mobile propaganda teams, coordinate with military Psywar teams, with administrative agencies and with RD agencies. Ceremonies must be organized to make a strong impression among the people.

5. Exhibitions: Organize mobile exhibitions at the provincial and district capitals to display pictures, charts, documents and newspapers on the reorganization of rural administration, and procedures for village/hamlet elections. (This exhibition may be incorporated with the RD exhibition).

6. Use all forms of Athletic, Sports and Cultural activities:

- Organize competition in writing and perform cultural shows in support of the elections.
- Carry out night broadcasting, and night propaganda.
- Organize athletic and sports competitions in support of the elections.

7. Organize public meeting separately for the youths, students and home guard to welcome the administrative reorganization.

IV. Length of time: From now until the end of June 1967, depending on each area.

V. Supporting agencies:

Ministry of Information and Chieu-Hoi:

- Provides funds to provincial agencies.
- Provides printed matter; documents, posters, banners.
- Provides teams of movie cameramen, and TV cameramen.

Local Administrative Agencies:

- Local funds for each provincial agency.
- Security for the action teams.

VI. Inspection and reporting:

1. Inspection:

- The Office of VIS Representative will assign personnel to the Inspection Teams of the Office of Government Delegate.
- The Office of VIS Representative will also assign inspectors to make direct inspections.
- The Provincial VIS Chiefs will directly supervise and inspect districts and villages.

2. Reporting:

- Submit weekly reports to VIS Department and to the Office of VIS Representative.
- Submit monthly reports on the progress of the elections before the 25th day each month.

COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE (CDC)  
 Minutes of meeting on 15 March, 1967 at  
 the OCO-Regional Office , Danang

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ATTENDING

I.B. Hayes, OCO-Logistics (Chairman)  
 Lt. Col. R. Andrews, Pol War Adv., AFAT-5  
 Major W. Barker , CAO, G-5, III MAF  
 Capt. F. Caulking, CAO, 366 Tact Ftr. Wing  
 F.E. Eubanks , OCO-Logistics  
 Capt. J. Ledee, CAO, Special Forces , C-Det.  
 Major D. Panzer, Asst. G-5, MACV  
 Lt. J. Parks, 1st M.P.Bn.  
 A. Reilly , CRS  
 Rev. P. Singleton , CRS  
 Lt. E. Trimpert , NSA-Danang City  
 P. Wiwcharuck , World Relief Commission

GUESTS

John Dunlap , Chief, Food for  
 Peace Office , USAID - Saigon  
 Fred Hagel , Assistant , Food  
 for Peace Office , USAID-Saigon  
 Major J.B. Harris, III MAF  
 Capt. J. Stephens, 29th C.A.Co.,  
 III MAF.

The Chairman introduced the guests , and then requested Mr. Dunlap , who with Mr. Hagel had come from Saigon to attend this meeting , to speak on Food For Work projects .

Mr. Dunlap first a brief description of the overall Food For Peace (FFP) program in Vietnam . Under Public Law-480 (PL-480) there are three categories covering uses of surplus foods :

Title I - The Commercial Import Program , for the importation of foodstuffs , paid for in U.S. Gov't . appropriated funds . These are sold by the GVN inside the country for piastres and these are used for GVN expenditures .

Title II - This is the regular Counter Insurgency effort , foodstuffs imported and distributed by USAID for relief and nation-building programs .

(Note: Since 1 October the Title III category has been void , and Voluntary Agencies also now receive surplus foods under Title II.)

Section 202 - commodities imported for animal feeding programs , as approved by the Agricultural Advisors in the provinces . The Food For Peace Office is interested in fostering animal feeding programs , esp. in relocation and resettlement areas .

Section 201 - commodities for feeding of humans . as a general rule , FFP's basic aim is to feed hungry people . As much as possible , work for food should be promoted , to preserve the self-respect of the recipients and to foster economic development projects such as roads , schools , etc. FFP has no fixed rules and can be very relaxed re projects . The US Gov't is keenly interested in food for work projects , and ICP-Saigon wants to be informed as to basic details , esp. the number of people involved . Anyone desiring some work to be done by the local populace can approach the OCO office in the province , or a Voluntary Agency Representative , present

the proposed project and its financial details upon the food staff. The staff does not want elaborate and formalized project proposals, as the aim is to get food for work projects going. The Secretary of Agriculture believes that, "If food is used properly, it can be as valuable as bullets".

There are 2 basic approaches in food for work :

- 1) - Getting people to volunteer their work and be paid with food .
- 2) - Pay for a portion of the work with food and a portion in cash . Another variant is to have workers work part of the week for food , and the other part outside for wages .

A note of caution - do not calculate food in terms of wages to be paid . Emphasis is to be on getting food to persons who need it , especially young children .

One example of a work project cited from of N.E. Brazil where there was a large population and little work available . Two crews of workers were formed for a road and dam building project , each team working one week for food and the other week for cash , then alternating . Thus the Gov't of Brazil got twice as much labor for its funds through PL-480 foodstuff usage . Another idea is the use of food to assist people who desire to study literacy or a craft .

Mr. Dunlap reported that in 1967-68 there will be a reduction in use of bulgur wheat for human consumption , and a sizeable reduction in whole kernel corn .

Emphasis will soon switch to newly developed high - protein foods , processed in chunks or powder form . Studies have shown that protein deficiency (prevalent in Vietnam) is especially harmful to body and brain development in the age group of 1 to 6 years . The new high-protein foods are :

- 1) - CSM - made of corn , soy beans , and milk .
- 2) - CEPH PRO - similar composition to CSM.

The Food For Peace program calls for stress on only 3 or 4 different high-protein foods so as to avoid distribution problems .

Mr. Wiccharzek asked about work projects on church property . Answer - No objection for any useful project excepting church construction .

Mr. Holden passed around copies of a booklet of PL-480 commodity menus , in Vietnamese . A sizeable supply is reportedly in the OCO warehouse , and members desiring booklets for distribution should contact him at OCO. These menus were prepared by Food For Peace , and printed by JUSPAO .

Re corn for animal feeding : this is handled by the Directorate for Farmers' Associations , esp. for the area near Saigon . The current program will end in several months , then the program will be changed from Title II to Title I and the corn will be sold .

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A new program concerns corn for animal growing projects among refugees and also other needy persons . 15,000 tons of corn will be imported under this program .

Food for Work projects in I Corps cited by CDC members include :

WRC - work, and study , 2500 people involved in the and Khe Sanh areas .

III MAF - 40 refugees working in the CINVA-RAM block-making factory at Hoa Khanh .

USN-NSA cleaning and painting of the Cham Museum , Danang . Refugees are working in this project .

Special Forces is preparing a number of large projects of village construction , esp. at Ha Thanh and Thuong Duc areas .

Mr. Wiwcharuck announced that WRO will assist projects with commodities and used clothing .

CRS reported that the noodle making machines are on their way , ETA unknown , but soon .

WRC announced that their portable sawmill is now in the Dalat area and has proven to be a great success .

Mr. Holdren announced that OCO has just received the portable sawmill donated by a company in the States . Investigation is now underway to find an isolated area (s) , esp. where there are Special Forces Camps , and with suitable timber accessible .

Lt. Trippert announced that the USAID sawmill in Quang Tri is now operable . However , although the US Navy mechanics have tested the sawmill (on the 11th) certain parts are needed before full-scale cutting is possible . OCO-Saigon has ordered the parts and it is hoped they will be arriving soon .

CRS announced that they are expecting in the near future to receive pumps and plows .

Mr. Holdren was asked by the Chairman to find out from OCO-Quang Nam how much of foodstuffs and other items have been shipped to Thuong Duc area .

Mr. Holdren announced that OCO is expecting over 700 cases of paper blankets and OCO desires to move these out soonest to relieve warehouse congestion . Members desiring paper blankets should contact him at OCO Regional Office .

Lt. Trippert requested the members to report to NSA any information they may have on assistance by anyone to the "Boystown" project in East Danzang.

Mr. Eubanks reported that OCO is working on a crash program to assist the military in reconstruction of Hieu Nhon District Hqtrs which was totally destroyed recently by the VC.

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Mr. Holdren reported that at this week's meeting of the Joint Coordinating Council, the I Corps Commander expressed concern over the plight of refugees in isolated areas who have received very little of assistance, whether foodstuffs, their cash relief payments, or rice.

Capt Leese stated that Special Forces have faced in certain areas with the populace in areas surrounding their camps being reluctant to come in from VC areas unless they can be assured of assistance. If there is food available they stay, otherwise they go back to the hills. With the air-logistical situation improving of late, hopefully large scale projects can be arranged to receive sizeable numbers of peoples, house and feed them, and later to get them settled into a new life.

The next meeting will be at 1430 on 12 April.

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MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING

21 MARCH, 1967

1. The Council convened at 0935 with the following members present:
  - a. MGEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAW, (Chairman)
  - b. BGEN. ELWOOD, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
  - c. RADM. LACY, USN, Commander NSA, Danang
  - d. Mr. GORDON, Deputy Regional Director, OCO
  - e. Mr. WHELTON, Assistant Regional Director for New Life Development, OCO
  - f. Mr. COLEBAUGH, POLAD, III MAF
  - g. Mr. HELMS, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OCO
  - h. Col. NGHI, ARVN, Chief of Staff, I Corps
  - i. Col. CACH, ARVN, I Corps DC of S for Rural Construction
  - j. Col. HILL, USMC, G-5, III MAF
  - k. LtCol. TUAN, I Corps DC of S for Political Warfare
  - l. LtCol. BECKER, USA, G-5, I Corps Advisory Group
  - m. Lt. BUNN, USN, CAO, NSA, Danang
  - n. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)
  
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. Capt. BAKER, USN
  - b. Mr. BURGESS, OCO
  - c. Mr. DECKARD, NSA
  - d. Mr. HAYS, OCO
  - e. Mr. HOFFMAN (Representing Ass't Director for RD, OCO, Region I)
  - f. LtCol. ANDREWS, USAF
  - g. Maj. HARRIS, USMC
  - h. Maj. MCRILEY, USMC
  - i. Maj. STEWART, USMC
  
3. OLD BUSINESS
  - a. The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting, guests were introduced and welcomed, and members were asked to comment on items previously brought before the Council.
  
  - b. Mr. HELMS, Chairman of the Psychological Warfare Committee, presented a report of that Committee's meeting held on 11 March, 1967 (minutes attached to the 14 March, minutes of the Council). He announced that the next meeting will be held 5 April.
  
  - c. Capt. BAKER, Chairman of the Public Health Committee, presented a report on that Committee's meeting held on 15 March, 1967 (minutes attached to the 14 March, minutes of the Council).

ANNEX "D" to  
PART II, Section VIII

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d. Mr. HAYS, Chairman of the Commodities Distribution Committee, presented a report on that Committee's meeting held on 15 March, 1967 (minutes attached to the 14 March, minutes of the Council). He announced that the next meeting will be held 12 April.

e. Mr. BURGESS briefly discussed the functions of the Manpower Coordinating Committee, established by the U. S. Embassy, Saigon. He introduced Mr. DECKARD who briefed the Council on the prevailing wage rates for drivers of trucks 5 tons and under in the Danang area. A copy of the facts covered by Mr. DECKARD is attached.

f. Col. HILL reported on the sugar mill meeting held in Saigon on 14 and 15 March. Maj. NELSON, G-4 Section, III MAF, representatives of OCO, Saigon, and representatives of the sugar mill were present. Inspection of the sugar mill revealed it presently occupies three large buildings, the remaining parts spilling over approximately ten acres. In its present configuration approximately 30 to 40 % of the equipment is in the "heavy lift" category with certain components 50 feet long. At the termination of the conference the following points were agreed upon.

(1) The sugar mill people will break the mill parts down to six tons and under.

(2) They will start the movement with a Vietnamese LST load of the lightest materials.

(3) The sugar mill company has contracted trucks for the movement from Chu Lai to Quang Ngai.

(4) The ARVN will provide a ten ton crane at Chu Lai and another at Quang Ngai to handle the cargo.

(5) All concerned will be advised at least 10 days in advance of the movement of the first load of cargo.

g. Mr. WHELTON reported that the saw mill at Quang Tri was operational, however, not in production. Missing parts, "dogs" for holding logs, have been ordered from the U. S.

h. Lt. BUNN reported that the problem of hiring drivers for the Danang trash trucks had been discussed at his weekly meeting with the Mayor of Danang. The mayor was very receptive to the proposal that a five week "On the Job Training" program for drivers of 5 ton trucks be included in the driver training course at the Danang Polytechnic School, which in turn would provide drivers for the Danang trash trucks. Further study is being made of this problem.

i. Mr. WHELTON reported that the Ministry of Public Works, Saigon, has agreed to provide a rock crusher for Region I, and in addition to provide 2 million piasters for the establishment of the equipment in the Region. The Ministry has requested I Corps to assist in the movement of the equipment into Region I.

j. The CHAIRMAN requested the membership to study the paper on the I Corps refugee problem, as prepared and distributed by III MAF, and to be prepared to discuss it at the next meeting.

k. Mr. GORDON further amplified the 14 March request of MGEN LAM, that the JCC take cognizance of the refugee problem. MGEN LAM desires the JCC to assist him in finding a long range solution, to include the schooling of children and the employment of the able-bodied.

#### 4. NEW BUSINESS

a. Mr. GORDON announced that the price of fertilizer had more than doubled. He gave as the reason for this price increase the desire of the Government of Viet Nam to have the farmer pay near the true cost of the product.


b. The CHAIRMAN announced that the next meeting will be held at Quang Ngai City, and requested all members planning to attend to assemble at USAF Base Operations, Danang Air Field, by 0745.

#### 5. Agenda item for the next meeting:

a. Discussion with GVN officials at Quang Ngai City.

6. The meeting adjourned at 1110. The next meeting is scheduled for 0900, 28 March, 1967, in Quang Ngai City.

Respectfully submitted,



R. J. O'LEARY  
LtCol, USMC  
Recorder

#### DISTRIBUTION:

Each member  
Each Committee Chairman  
Each Guest  
LtCol. O'LEARY, Recorder (30)

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The following information on wage rates for truck driver is provided by the Industrial Relations Department, NSA per request of the Chairman, I Corps Joint Coordinating Council.

I GVN

Truck driver (under 5 ton)

Monthly salary (44 hour week)	3900VN\$ (20.4 hour)
Family allowance (wife and 3 children)	2400VN\$
For rice supply	<u>400VN\$</u>
	6700VN\$ (35 hour)

- + 2 uniforms per year 1000VN\$ each - 2000VN\$
  - + housing occasionally.
  - + 15000VN\$ per year for repair to vehicle out of which the driver will realize approximately 3000.
  - + public land made available, free of charge to build a house, to rent or sell.
- Actual work time will average 3 to 4 hours per day, the remainder spent in waiting for another trip or work.
- After 8 years of employment, he becomes permanent and his salary will be increased by 20%.
- After completion of 20 to 30 years as a permanent employee, he will receive between 2000 - 3000VN\$ per month pension as long as he lives.
- After age 50 he is not required to drive but will continue on the pay roll as perhaps an inspector, dispatcher, etc.
- Retirement age 57. Exception may be granted.
- There is no overtime. If additional work is to be done, additional drivers are hired.

Note: No GVN employee may belong to a labor union.

II U. S. Forces and Contractors employing I.N.s.

Truck driver (5 ton and under)

Monthly salary (48 hour week)	4576VN\$ (22 hour)
Family allowance (wife and 3 children)	<u>495VN\$</u>
	5071VN\$ (24.3 hour)

TET bonus = 1/12 of the yearly salary after the 1st year of employment	<u>423</u>
	5494VN\$ (26.4 hour)

2 hours overtime 6 days per week (most employees)	<u>1716</u>
	7210VN\$ ( <del>35.2</del> 27.7 hour)

Time and half for overtime.  
 Double time for Sundays and holidays.  
 In case of death, burial expenses not to exceed 5000VN\$.  
 No pension or retirement.

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If English language is spoken, 2.3VN\$ per hour.  
 After the 1st year a .9VN\$ increase per hour is given for each succeeding year up to 5 years.

Note: Add 150VN\$ average daily per driver for gasoline stolen from tank of vehicle. This may be the incentive to work for the low wage rates indicated above.

III Private Industry

Firm A

Monthly salary (48 hour week)	4200VN\$ (20.2 hour)
Monthly driving allowance	500
Monthly for 2 meals daily	1300
Monthly family allowance (wife and 3 children)	<u>490</u>
	6490
 TET bonus 1/2 months salary for each year of performance	 <u>270</u> 6760VN\$ (32.5 hour)

Firm B

Monthly salary (48 hour week)	6000VN\$
Family allowance (wife and 3 children)	<u>490</u>
	6490VN\$ (31.2 hour)
 TET bonus 1/2 months salary for each year of performance	 <u>270</u> 6760VN\$ (32.5 hour)

Firm C

Monthly salary (48 hour week)	4550VN\$
Attendant allowance	176
Driving allowance	1000
Family allowance (wife and 3 children)	<u>490</u>
	6215
 TET bonus 1 months salary	 <u>500</u> 6716VN\$ (33.5 hour)

For good work, increase twice a year at discretion of the Manager.  
 No overtime.  
 No pension.

Firm D

Monthly salary (48 hour week)	5500VN\$
Cost of living allowance	1000
Family allowance	<u>490</u>
	6990
 TET bonus 1 month salary	 <u>500</u> 7490VN\$ (36 hour)

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IV. A new wage schedule is in the making at Saigon as a result of a recent wage survey conducted by the three armed services. The survey revealed that the U. S. Forces wage scale is generally too low. Also that the cost of living in the DaNang area is generally higher than Saigon. Previously the wage schedule was based upon a survey in Saigon area only.

Very respectfully,

/s/ W. L. DECKARD  
W. L. DECKARD  
Industrial Relations Officer  
U. S. Naval Support Activity

MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING  
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE MEETING

28 MARCH, 1967

1. The Council convened at 0900 with the following members present:

- a. MOEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAF, (Chairman)
- b. Mr. Nguyen Van DAI, Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps
- c. MOEN. ELWOOD, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
- d. RADN. LAGY, USN, Commander NSA, Danang
- e. Mr. COLEBAUGH, POLAD, III MAF
- f. Mr. HELMS, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OOO
- g. Col. CACH, ARVN, I Corps DC of S for Rural Construction
- h. Col. HILL, USMC, G-5, III MAF
- i. Col. BEESON, USA, Deputy CO, I Corps Advisory Group
- j. Lt. BURN, USN, GAO, NSA, Danang
- k. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)

2. The following guests were present:

- a. Maj. THIEP, ARVN, Special Commissariat for Refugees, IOTZ
- b. Maj. HOLMES, USA
- c. Maj. STEWART, USMC
- d. Lt(jg) TRIMPert, USN

3. The following principal members of the Province Team were present:

- a. Dr. HOANH, Quang Ngai Province Chief
- b. LtCol LYNCH, USA, Sector Advisor

4. The Province Chief, Dr. HOANH, opened the meeting and welcomed the Council and guests. He announced that the program for the meeting would include a general briefing in regards to Revolutionary Development (RD) in Quang Ngai Province for 1967.

a. Dr. HOANH reviewed the situation in each district as it pertained to the location of the RD Cadre Teams, 16 New Life, 22 Consolidated and 13 Constructed Hamlets. He warned that the Viet Cong had singled out the RD program in general and the RD Cadre specifically for their attention.

b. The Chief of Agriculture reviewed the province plan for the establishment of nurseries and gardens throughout the province to include a Victory Garden for each family in the New Life Hamlets.

c. The Chief of Fisheries outlined the plan for a fish pond for each New Life Hamlet and the planned distribution of nylon nets.

ANNEX "E" to  
PART II, Section VIII

d. The Chief of Education reviewed the classroom construction program, pointing out 57 new classrooms have been constructed. The immediate goal is a school in each hamlet where a RD Cadre Team is located.

e. The Chief of Irrigation discussed the requirement for additional dams to hold water and the use of water pumps for improved irrigation.

f. The Chief of RD Cadre discussed the location of his Teams and requested they be furnished 44 cameras, loudspeakers and one generator.

The CHAIRMAN recommended a reevaluation of assets at the provincial level to support the requirements of the Cadre, and if they were inadequate to utilize established channels to secure the requested material.

g. The Chief of National Police briefly reviewed the activities of his organization.

h. The Chief of Public Works presented the provincial plan for the improvement of roads and bridges. He also discussed the 1965 study by the Commission for Public Works, Saigon, on the development of harbor facilities for the Quang Ngai City area. This proposed harbor is located in the bay formed by the juncture of the Song Ve and Phu Tho rivers. This study called for the removal of 500,000 cubic feet of dirt to give the channel a 4.5 meter depth and 40 meter width. It included the construction of a dock at Phu Tho and the improvement of the road from Quang Ngai City to Phu Tho. The Quang Ngai City-Phu Tho road is approximately ten kilometers long. The 1967 budget contains 7 million \$VN to build up the road and a budget of 13 million \$VN to asphalt the surface is planned for 1968. No action has been taken, since the 1965 study, to further the harbor development. He further stated his department needed two trucks, one loader and one roller.

i. Maj. HUAN, Sector Commander, Quang Ngai Sector, briefed the Council on the GVN military units in direct and indirect support of RD.

j. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Province Chief and the members of his staff, on behalf of the Council, for the very informative briefings. He assured them the Council would review the problems presented, and would lend all assistance possible.

5. The meeting adjourned at 1100.

6. Agenda items for the next meeting are:

a. Report of the Education Committee Meeting (a copy of the minutes of this meeting were distributed with the minutes of the 14 March meeting).

b. Report of the Read Committee meeting (a copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed).

c. Report of the Public Health Committee meeting (a copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed).


d. Discussion of the Quang Ngai Province meeting.

e. Review of unfinished business items (separate distribution).

f. Review of the highlights of the week's activities by all members.

7. The next meeting is scheduled for 0930, 4 April, 1967, in Danang.

Respectfully submitted,



R. J. O'LEARY  
LtCol USMC  
Recorder

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Each member

Each Committee Chairman

Each Guest

LtCol. O'LEARY, Recorder (30)

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Minutes of ICJCC Road Committee Meeting  
21 March 1967

1. The Road Committee convened at 1500 hours with the following members present:
  - a. LTC J. L. Minear, USA, I Corps Adv Gp, Engr Adv (Chairman) (6325/Puma 113).
  - b. Col C. H. Horn, USMC, III MAF, Engr (Parchment 15/115).
  - c. CDR R. H. P. Dunn, USN, COMNAVFORV, Base Development (6539/Blood Alley 861).
  - d. LTC Vo Thanh Phu, ARVN, I Corps, Engr (Uy Dang 213).
  - e. Mr. Dong Sy Tung, GVN/PWD, Regional Engineer, I Corps (Danang PTT 117/Hue PTT 121).
  - f. Mr. Tom Worthey, COMNAVFORV, Base Development (6539/Blood Alley 861).
  - g. Mr. W. E. Ellis, OICC, Danang Design (Motley 123).
  - h. Mr. A. M. O'Connor, OICC, Danang Design (Motley 123).
  - i. Mr. V. B. Sun, OICC, Danang Design (Motley 123).
  - j. Mr. L. A. Chamberlain, USAID, Public Works (Motley 174).
  - k. Major G. E. Boyer, USA, I Corps Adv Gp, Asst Engr Adv (6325/Puma 113).
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. LTC E. M. Willis, Engr Adv Div, USARV G-4 (MA) (Saigon 60868).
  - b. CPT L. H. Son, OCE, Saigon (Saigon 60868).
  - c. CPT Not Kinh, OCE, Saigon (Saigon 60868).
3. The Chairman opened the meeting by calling attention to copies of the minutes of the February meeting that had been furnished to each member present.
4. Old Business:
  - a. In reference to bridge classification markings, Mr. Dong Sy Tung stated he had received orders from his headquarters in Saigon to put bridge classifications on bridges throughout I Corps. These classi-

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fication signs will contain the minimum width, military classification and metric tonnage of the bridge in both Vietnamese and English. This program is to get under way during the next week.

b. Mr. Chamberlain said a 50 ton per hour rock crusher would be located at a quarry site on Monkey Mountain. He indicated the rock produced will be for PWD.

5. New Business:

a. LTC Minear introduced LTC Willis, who in turn introduced CPT Son and CPT Kinh.

b. LTC Willis said in the past that the responsibility of ARVN engineers did not include maintenance or up-grading of roads and bridges to Class 35/50. OCE asked Corps engineers for the following information: How many bridges under Class 20? How many troops were available to be put on bridge construction and how much bridging could be completed if materials were available? It was indicated I Corps Engineers could construct 3500 meters of bridging per year. A Bill of Materials was submitted by Corps for semi-permanent bridges along Route #1 for support of tactical operations.

In II, III, and IV Corps areas under direction of General Ploger, ARVN decided which bridges to build and submitted the Bill of Materials to US advisors who in turn gave it to the field force. The field force then directs a U.S. unit to draw material from a U.S. depot and ARVN engineer units construct the bridges. 5000 meters of bridging are to be built in II, III, and IV Corps areas in the next 12 months.

It was suggested by LTC Willis that to expedite the program in I Corps that LTC Phu determine how much bridging can be built if materials are available and propose this to III MAF for action. A second proposal was made that LTC Phu go to ARVN OCE in Saigon for reserve materials held there for support of all Corps areas. Since the U.S. is supporting II, III, and IV Corps areas, the reserve materials are not needed by them. Colonel Horn indicated this program should be worked out between COMNAVFORV and MACV for funding arrangements.

c. Colonel Horn said up-grading is required, but the need is to repair Route #1 as it exists now before the next monsoon season. This is what confronts the engineers now.

d. Mr. O'Connor submitted drawings of six bridges in I Corps for approval and/or comments by 28 March 1967.

e. LTC Minear asked for further business. There was none.

f. Mr. Worthey moved to adjourn. CDR Dunn seconded. The meeting was adjourned at 1620 hours.

*Gerald E. Boyer*  
GERALD E. BOYER  
MAJ, CE, Recorder

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Member (1)  
LTC O'Leary, JCC Recorder (125)

*[Handwritten mark]*

MINUTES OF THE I CORPS PUBLIC HEALTH-CERO  
COMMITTEE MEETING (JCC)  
29 March 1967

1. The meeting was convened at 0930 hours with the following members present:

- a. Capt BAKER, MC, USN, III MAF Force Surgeon, Public Health Chairman
- b. Dr. SPENCER, Director, Public Health, OCO, CERO Chairman
- c. Dr. HO VAN PHU, Inspector General MOH/Region I
- d. LCDR NOURIGAT, MSC, USN, III MAF Medical Monitor
- e. LCDR BYRD, MC, USN, NSA, PMU
- f. Capt NHAN, MC, ARVN, I Corps Surgeon
- g. Capt PLOTT, MC, USAR, Medical Officer, 29th CA Co., III MAF
- h. Mr. ADAMS, Sanitarian, USAID Region I
- i. CWO RICE, NSA Preventive Medicine Unit
- j. Maj VAN STRATEN, MSC, USA, Senior Medical Advisor, I Corps, Recorder

2. OLD BUSINESS: Capt BAKER called the meeting to order at 0930 hours and the minutes of the 15 March 1967 meeting were reviewed. The following comments were made:

a. Capt BAKER informed the committee that the letter re-affirming I Corps' public health needs had been sent to the Vietnamese Ministry of Health, Saigon.

b. Dr. SPENCER stated that as of 29 March 1967 minutes from the Province Public Health Committee meetings had not reached his office.

c. Capt PLOTT informed the committee that the data obtained from the sanitation survey of Da Nang had been turned over to Mr. ADAMS, USAID sanitarian, for study and formulation of recommendations. He further stated that his commander, 29th CA Company, had asked that the survey be expanded to include the hamlets and villages surrounding Da Nang.

Mr. ADAMS elaborated on the current status of the survey. He stated that he will make definitive recommendations to Mr. Rose, USAID advisor to the Mayor of Da Nang, regarding Da Nang's sanitation needs. Mr. Rose will then work with the mayor in formulating a program of action. Mr. ADAMS further stated that Mr. Rose asked that the military not be involved at this point. He stated that if it was beyond the capacity of the city of Da Nang to handle the problem, the mayor himself should then, and only then, request assistance from the I Corps Commander.

Mr. ADAMS then went on to state that as a result of Capt PLOTT's maps, which located the garbage disposal points around the city, the mayor of Da Nang had his engineering department draw up plans for garbage depositories to be constructed at thirty strategic points around the city. Apparently no GVN funding is available for this project; furthermore, it is Mr. ADAMS' contention that the proposed receptacles are far more elaborate and, consequently, costly than is needed. Mr. ADAMS presented diagrams of a far simpler, less costly receptacle that he will present as a counter-proposal.

Mr. ADAMS will present his definitive recommendations at the next Public Health-CERO committee meeting. Capt BAKER stated that our committee will be available for help if help is requested from the mayor of Da Nang.

Capt PLOTT discussed the dumping area apparently approved for Da Nang's refuse and garbage by the mayor of Da Nang. A lake, in fairly close proximity to the U.S. Navy Officers' Club (Stone Elephant) is currently being used. Presently, this dumping area is not being maintained in a sanitary manner. Bulldozers are badly needed to pack the garbage and refuse and then to cover it with earth. The plan is to fill the salt water lake and expand Da Nang's usable terrain.

d. Mr. ADAMS presented the notion that perhaps deep pit latrines would better serve the needs of refugee villages in the Da Nang area. Presently, the Vietnamese seem to prefer the water-seal type latrine; however, the lack of an adequate source of water often precludes flushing. Without flushing after defecation, the latrine soon becomes completely inoperable and useless. Mr. ADAMS went on to state that, if properly built, deep pit latrines can be practically odorless and fly-less, thus, eliminating the two most objectionable characteristics of this type latrine.

Mr. Holden, Refugee Coordinator for Region I, will be invited to the next meeting during which a thorough discussion of the most efficacious type latrine for refugee camps will be presented. Capt PLOTT was asked to have his recommendations regarding latrines ready to present at the next meeting so as to provide a starting point for the discussion.

e. Mr. ADAMS informed the committee that the Ministry of Health is now ready to embark upon a program of health education. Posters will be displayed in refugee villages and mobile public address systems will be employed.

f. Capt PLOTT reported that he has been unable to pin-point the precise location of the methane generator currently being employed near Hue. He further reported that the generator in Tuy Loan hamlet is still non-functional.

g. Dr. PHU presented a brief résumé of the plague situation in Region I. On 25 March 1967 he received a TWX which reported an outbreak in Hai Lang district, Quang Tri province. This outbreak consisted of 3 confirmed cases and 7 suspected cases. One of the suspected cases died. Vaccine is available at the site of the outbreak and teams are dusting the affected villages.

He further reported that a TWX arrived at his office on 28 March 1967 which summarized the suspected incidence of plague in Quang Ngai province from 1 January 1967 thru 24 March 1967. According to the TWX, there have been 658 suspected cases of plague during this time frame; twelve resulted in death. The lack of a good laboratory in this province has precluded laboratory confirmation.

LCDR BYRD was queried as to why Health authorities were so concerned about outbreaks such as the one in Cam Ranh Bay. LCDR BYRD explained that Cam Ranh was a port area and world health authorities are extremely concerned about transporting infected rats to areas hitherto uninfected.

Dr. PHU also reported that from 13 thru 23 March 1967 there were 27 suspected plague cases admitted to the Da Nang Medical Hospital. Dr. PHU stated that vaccine has been steadily coming in from Saigon and that active immunization programs are underway in all outbreak areas.

Mr. ADAMS reported that there has been a significant down trend in the incidence of plague in Hoa Vang district since the NSA Preventive Medicine Unit finished its intensive program of immunization and dusting in this area.

h. LCDR BYRD stated that improvements in the dumping area near the PW compound are being made. The trash and garbage is now being burned and covered with earth. Plans are underway to move this disposal area to a location between the PW camp and Marble Mountain.

i. Dr. PHU reported that his office had not received the rodenticides from Saigon as of this date. He is ready to implement the program of rodent control as soon as the rodenticides arrive.

### 3. NEW BUSINESS:

a. Dr. PHU inquired about a medical library which had been discussed in the past. Maj VAN STRATEN stated that a fairly well stocked library now existed at Duy Tan General Hospital. Medical publications are constantly being added to this library. Capt BAKER directed that LCDR NOURIGAT draft a letter to the American Medical Association from our committee to see if that organization would be willing to supplement the books in this library. Permission to use this library by civilian doctors will be granted by card on request to I Corps Medical Officer.

b. Dr. PHU inquired about the availability of antibiotics for VD control. Capt BAKER reported that letters written to charitable organizations in the United States had not as yet produced favorable response. As of now, we have no drugs for the control of VD among the Vietnamese civil populace. Dr. SPENCER reported that he discussed this matter with General Humphreys, USAID Medical Representative, and was told that the ministry of Health would not allocate antibiotics for VD control centers. However, antibiotics are available for systemic diseases and availability of long acting antibiotics will be looked into.

c. Dr. SPENCER inquired about the incidence of cholera in Region I. Dr. PHU stated that there was little or no cholera last year and none reported thus far this year. However, an active immunization program against cholera is being carried out as a preventive measure.

d. Maj VAN STRATEN pointed out that (Corps Epidemiological Reference Office) meetings were not held because it was believed unnecessary. The Public Health Committee did, in fact, discuss the very subjects that the CERO was designed to discuss and act upon. He recommended that henceforth the minutes of this meeting be entitled Minutes of the I Corps Public Health-CERO Committee Meeting. The committee agreed on this recommendation. It was further pointed out that the idea of the CERO probably originated with the I Corps Public Health Committee, the first such joint civil-military medical committee on a Corps-wide scale in Vietnam.

e. Maj VAN STRATEN asked if Vietnamese doctors were now eligible for membership in the I Corps Medical Society. Capt BAKER assured him that Vietnamese doctors were most welcome, in fact encouraged, to attend the meetings.

f. Capt PLOTT reported that the Public Health Survey of I Corps which was jointly conducted by the 29th Civil Affairs Company and the MACV Advisory Group was presently being typed. It should be published within two or three weeks.

g. Capt PLOTT further reported that the model school project had been allocated \$1,000.00 from USMC Care Funds by the Chief of Staff of III MAF. Materials for the construction of latrines are being purchased at this time.

vb?  
h. Capt BAKER asked Dr. PHU how VC contact slips were handled by his office. Dr. PHU responded that the contact slip, which contains a description of the girl who transmitted a venereal disease and here name and residence if known, was turned over to the civilian police. Prostitution in Vietnam is illegal, hence, it becomes a police problem. The police orders the girl to report for medical treatment; if she refuses she is arrested.

4. The meeting was adjourned at 1105 hours.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES G. VAN STRATEN  
MAJ, MCC, USA  
Recorder

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Committee Member

Each JCC Member

CG, 1stMarDiv (5 copies)

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COMNAVSUPPACT, Da Nang (5 copies)

Chief, Preventive Medicine Section, MACV Surgeon's Office, APO 96222

I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCILFOR 4 APRIL 1967. MEETING

<u>UNFINISHED BUSINESS</u>	<u>INITIAL MENTION</u>	<u>RECENT MENTION</u>	<u>MONITOR</u>
1. Bridge sections for Quang Tri Province.	(8/23/66)	(3/7/67)	OOO
2. Enlargement of Province Hospital at Tam Ky.	(8/30/66)	(3/7/67)	OOO
3. JOC Letter to Minister of Public Health.	(9/6/66)	(3/7/67)	Pub. Health Committee
4. Hue Vocational Trade Center handicraft products.	(11/15/66)	(3/14/67)	NSA
5. Sugar refinery machinery for Quang Ngai Province.	(12/13/66)	(3/21/67)	OVN
6. NSA suspended supply of building materials for Youth Guidance Center.	(1/24/67)	(3/14/67)	NSA IG Adv. Op.
7. Sawmill for Quang Tri Province, parts and training.	(1/31/67)	(3/21/67)	OOO
8. Trash and garbage disposal.	(1/31/67)	(3/21/67)	NSA-OOO
9. F-8 aircraft crash claims.	(2/7/67)	(2/21/67)	IG Adv. Op.
10. Province Public Health Committees.	(2/7/67)	(2/21/67)	Pub. Health Committee
11. Rock Crusher.	(2/28/67)	(3/7/67)	OOO
12. Refugee Problem	(3/14/67)	(3/21/67)	

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY  
APO San Francisco, 96337

CA/29-DP

4 April 1967


SUBJECT: Displaced Persons Periodic Report, Number 3-67, 1-31 March 1967

TO: See Distribution

1. Subject report is forwarded for your information and action deemed appropriate.

2. Comment or suggestions regarding data contained in this report should be forwarded to: Commanding Officer, 29th Civil Affairs Company, APO San Francisco, 96337, ATTN: Displaced Persons Team; Telephone: Parchment 280.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
DARWIN D. TENNANT  
CPT, AGC  
Admin Officer

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1-G-5, Task Force X-Ray  
1-S-5, C Det, 5th SFG  
1-OCO (Da Nang)  
1-File

ANNEX "F" to  
PART II, Section VIII

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Periodic Civil Affairs Report 3-67  
Period Covered: 1-31 March 1967  
Reference: None

1. Summary of Activities:

a. Members of the Displaced Persons Team (VC) and attached VA Teams continue to provide assistance and advice in response to refugee problems in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The refugee questionnaire forms have been completed and a revision of statistical data is in progress. A total of 4,992 new refugees was reported in I Corps during the month of March 1967.

b. Interpreters are still needed by the Displaced Persons Team. One (1) interpreter, Mr. Duong Phien, VA Team # 10 (Tam Ky), resigned 31 March 1967, thus creating another vacancy. All teams are still searching for qualified applications for these positions.

c. The well forms project in Hoa Tein is progressing at a rapid pace; the prospect of continuing success appears very promising.

d. The sawmill in Quang Tri Province is still not operational due to the lack of chief components; however, log cutting continues.

2. Future Operations:

a. All teams have a requirement to secure and forward to D1 Team Chief, copies of Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) budget for their province for 1967. This information will assist each VA Team Chief in follow-up on planned projects for each camp.

b. Continuing emphasis is being placed on well forms and sawmill projects and refugee vocational training centers.

c. VA Teams have been instructed to observe Revolutionary Development (RD) Programs in their respective provinces. Paying special attention to security, effectiveness, locations, endeavors, and accomplishments of the RD Cadre.

3. Problem Areas: No significant problem areas to report at this time.

4. Recommendations: None at this time.

1 Incl  
1 - Detailed Discussion

*T. J. Brantley*  
T. J. BRANTLEY  
MAJ, FC  
Chief, CP Team

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DETAILED DISCUSSION

The following is a detailed discussion of significant developments occurring in major sub-divisions of the DI Team's area of responsibility for the period 1 thru 31 March 1967.

1. Refugee Statistics: The refugee questionnaire forms have been completed; however, some difficulty was experienced due to the lack of interpreters and the location of some camps in insecure areas. A revised chart of all refugee camps and population will be completed and published in the near future. The following new refugees were reported during the month of March:

Quang Tri Province:	Lai An (YD237721)	
	Ha Thanh (YD219697)	692
	Gai Linh District Hqs	1500
Quang Nam Province:	Dai Loo	200
Quang Tin Province:	Hau Duc District Hqs (BS024977)	100
Quang Ngai Province:	Binh Son (BS602921)	2000
	Duc Iho	500
	Total	<u>4,992</u>

2. Resettlement: No resettlement figures have been received during this reporting period.

3. Interpreters: DI Team is still having difficulty acquiring a sufficient number of interpreters to adequately accomplish its objective. At present there is only one (1) interpreter for use of DI Team (VC) and VA Teams. Mr. Duong Thien was assigned to VA Team 10 (Tam Ky) but resigned on 31 March 1967. He gave hazardous conditions under which he worked as the reason for his resignation. All teams are still searching for suitable interpreter applicants to fill these positions.

4. Operations:

a. Duc Iho (BS801379): Registration of refugees in Duc Iho has been completed by Province SCR representatives and steps are being taken to provide plaster payments. A total of 10,386 refugees are now in Duc Iho as a result of the military operation in the area. Plans concerning transportation of food commodities and other supplies into the area by helicopter have been discussed. To date, choppers have carried 1500 sheets of tin roofing into the area and 2,000 lbs of salad oil has been delivered by LST. The refugees have erected 42 houses to date and seven (7) others are nearing completion. The refugees are reported to be in good physical condition and have enough food to subsist on at the present time. VA Team 5, 29th CA Co, along with other military units and civilian agencies will continue to monitor this situation.

b. In Tam Ky, VA Team # 10 has assisted in providing emergency food commodity assistance for the one hundred (100) new generated refugees in Hau Duc District. Coordination was effected with OCO to procure and deliver food commodities to these refugees. The request originated with the Special Forces "A" Detachment in the area.

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Detailed Discussion ( )

5. MEDCAPS: The following number of MEDCAP treatments were performed by VA Teams in provinces during this reporting period as shown below:

Quang Tri Province (VA Team 3A)	1,294
Quang Tin Province (VA Team 10)	4,459
Quang Ngai Province (VA Team 5)	<u>1,490</u>
Total	7,243

6. Projects:

a. Progress on the well forms project in Hoa Tain (BT033752), Da Nang, has improved considerably. The project is now in full swing and six (6) well forms have been completed as of this date. The camp chief stated that initial sale of well forms will commence in a few days. An additional allowance of nine (9) bags of cement will be provided for this project. After this supply is exhausted, it is hoped that the project will be self-sustaining. DA Team continues to monitor.

b. The sawmill project in Quang Tri Province is still not operational. The motor, which had been previously sent to Naval Support Activity for repairs, has been returned to Quang Tri. Upon arrival of two chief component parts from CONUS, the sawmill will be put into operation. Logs are still being cut and transported to the sawmill site in Quang Tri.

c. A rural trade school has been built in Nam Hoa District, Thua Thien Province, by the World Relief Commission (WRC). The school was completed there by the use of refugee labor and has now opened. The school wishes to incorporate sewing classes into its program as well as other vocational training. Mr. Richard G. Milk, Trade School Director, has requested assistance from VA Team # 3B, in obtaining sewing machines. A check with Civilian Supply Team, 29th CA Co, revealed that sewing machines are not presently in stock. They have been ordered through CARE but the availability date cannot be forecasted. Attempts to obtain machines from other sources in ICTZ have met negative results. Upon receipt of machines on order, a proportionate share will be sent to the WRC for use in the project.

7. Staff Visits:

a. MAJ Brantley, Chief, Displaced Persons Teams, visited VA Team # 5, Quang Ngai Province, on 15 March 1967 to discuss the logistical problems at Duc Tho and to check on the refugee problem there. Discussions were also held with OCO Provincial Representative relative to the overall refugee picture in Quang Ngai Province. The importance of close coordination between OCO and the military refugee endeavors was stressed.

b. On 16 March 1967, MAJ Brantley visited Duc Tho District along with LTC Stevens, MAJ Whitehead, 29th CA Co, Commanding Officer and Operations Officer respectively, and other military and civilian agencies in the district. The group was briefed on the overall refugee problem by the District Chief.

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Detailed Discussion (cont'd)

8. Personnel: The following personnel changes have taken place during this reporting period:

- a. CPT Stephens was assigned to the Displaced Persons Team (VC) as Assistant Team Chief, on 6 March 1967.
- b. LT Smith, Chief, VA Team # 16, was granted a 30-day emergency leave commencing 15 March 1967.
- c. S15 Ramond Pierson, joined the DP Team on 21 March 1967 and has been further assigned to VA Team # 5, Quang Ngai Province, as a medic.
- d. SGT Long, DP Team (VC) was placed on TDY to VA Team # 16, Hoi An, Quang Nam Province Headquarters, to augment that team on 25 March 1967.
- e. CPL Sargent, DP Team (VC), was placed TDY to augment VA Team # 5, Quang Ngai Province on 21 March 1967.

**TITLE:** Viet Cong Murder Mrs Van-Thi-Doan  
**CAMPAIGN:** Anti-Viet Cong/ Support GVN  
**TARGET:** Civilian Population

(FRONT)

**Family of Mrs Van-Thi-Doan**

**CAPTION:** This is the Heart-rending grief caused by the cowardly Viet Cong when they murdered this family's mother.

(BACK)

You have seen the sad faces of the grief-stricken family of Mrs Van-Thi-Doan, who was killed by the cowardly Viet Cong during their unprovoked mortar attack on Hoi An City at 0245 on 22 February 1967. The Viet Cong care nothing for the lives of innocent civilians. Many times they have created incidents in Hoi An City and as a result of these incidents many civilians have been killed and wounded.

They didn't care about the safety and life of Mrs Van-Thi-Doan just as they don't care about your life and safety.

Support the GVN and the US Marines in your area by supplying them with any information you have concerning the Viet Cong. Help eliminate the cowardly, criminal VC who care nothing for your lives and safety.



**ĐÂY LÀ CẢNH TƯỢNG ĐAU LÒNG VÀ PHIÊN MUỘN, BỐI NHỨNG HÀNH ĐỘNG ĐỀ TIỆN CỦA VC. KHI CHÚNG ĐÃ AN SÁT BÀ MẸ HIẾN TRONG GIA ĐÌNH NÀY.**

Các bạn có thấy nét mặt đau khổ của những người trong gia đình bà VAN-THI-DOAN không? Những người thân yêu của bà đã bị tàn sát bởi tay của họ. Việt-Cộng hèn nhát giết chết trong cuộc pháo kích của chúng vào Thị xã Hội-An ngày 22 tháng 2 năm 1967 vào lúc 2 giờ 45 sáng. Họ Việt-Cộng không bao giờ thêm lòng ý chí mạng sống của đồng bào vô tội. Bởi thế đã nhiều lần bọn chúng gây ra cảnh tượng như trên và kết quả đem lại là một số thương dân bị chết hay bị thương tích.

Họ Việt-Cộng đã xen thương mạng sống người nhà của bà VAN-THI-DOAN cũng như chúng xen thương mạng sống của các bạn.

Vậy các bạn nên ủng hộ Chính-phủ VNCH và Lực-lượng TQLC Hoa-Kỳ bằng cách báo cáo mọi hoạt động của Việt-Cộng. Các bạn hãy giúp chúng tôi để loại bỏ Việt-Cộng hèn nhát và tàn bạo vì chúng chẳng cần đến nữa đến mạng sống của qui bạn.

244 - 302 - 67

ANNEX "G" to  
 PART II  
 Section IX

244-302-67

TITLE: Rallier Luong-Sanh  
 CAMPAIGN: Chieu-Hoi  
 TARGET: Viet Cong

(FRONT)  
 Photo of rallier

(BACK)

Dai Loc 10 March 1967

I am Luong-Sanh, born on 1 January 1953. I am a native of My Hao Hamlet, Loc Tan Village, Dai Loc District. I was a village guerrilla.

Dear Friends:

I have rallied to the Just National Cause and to the Allied Forces. Contrary to the deceitful propoganda of the VC I have been treated kindly by the GVN and Allies. The GVN has helped my family to lead a happy life.

I am writing this letter to you with the hope that you will hasten to return to the GVN. You will be warmly welcomed and treated kindly.

LUONG-SANH

 <p>DÂY LÀ HÌNH BẠN LƯƠNG-SANH          ĐƯỢC HƯỞNG HẠNH- PHÚC BÊN          CẠNH CHA, MẸ VÀ ANH.</p>	<p>Dai Loc ngày 10-3-1967          tôi tên là Lương Sanh.          Sinh ngày 1-1 năm 1953.          Chàng quân Mỹ hào hiệp          tâm đại lộ, du lịch và          các bạn thân mến,          tôi đã trở về với chính          phủ quốc gia và lễ          mừng đồng minh giúp đỡ          từ từ chủ không quên          lời lạc khoét của Việt cộng          và gia đình tôi cũng được          chính phủ giúp đỡ hàng          tháng vô cùng          Bây giờ tôi chỉ muốn          gọi cho các bạn nó          mong các bạn trở về          với chính phủ và lễ          mừng đồng minh sẽ đón          niềm tử tế và nồng hậu          vào cùng          chào các bạn tôi là          244          321-67 Sanh. <i>Luong</i></p>
---	---

244-321-67

TITLE: List of Wounded Civilians  
CAMPAIGN: Anti Viet Cong  
TARGET: Civilian Population

(FRONT)

Photos with captions

- CAPTION NO 1. TRAN BINH, CHAIRMAN OF HOA HIEP VILLAGE STRONGLY PROTESTS THE VIET CONG ATROCITY
- CAPTION NO 2. THIS IS NGUYEN TRUNG WHO WAS CRUELLY WOUNDED BY THE VIET CONG CRIMINALS.

(BACK)

On the night of 18 March 1967, the Viet Cong injured many people, the majority of whom were women and children.

These are the names of the wounded people:

Tran Thi Tien, age 10  
Bui Thong, age 39  
Nguyen Trung, age 13  
Pham Cu, age 2  
Bui Can, age 20  
Nguyen Thi Hoa, age 15  
Dang Thu, age 18

The bloodthirsty Viet Cong cruelly sneaked in and wounded the above named people of my village. The people must fight side by side to crush the inhuman Viet Cong.

TRAN BINH  
Chairman, Hoa Hiep Village  
19 March 1967

Trong đêm 18.3.1967 bọn Việt-Cộng đã bắn phá vào thôn xóm làm cho nhiều thường dân và trẻ em bị trọng thương như :

- 1- Trần-thị-Thiều 10 tuổi
- 2- Bùi-Thông 39 tuổi
- 3- Nguyễn-Trung 13 tuổi
- 4- Phạm-Co 2 tuổi
- 5- Bùi-Cậu 20 tuổi
- 6- Nguyễn-thị-Hoa 15 tuổi
- 7- Đặng-Thứ 18 tuổi

Bọn Việt-Cộng khát máu đã gây thương tích cho số đông bào trên. Đó là những thủ đoạn dã man và tàn ác của chúng.

Chúng tội nguyện một lòng cùng với toàn dân để tiêu diệt bọn Việt-Cộng ra khỏi nước Việt-Nam Tự-do.

244-334-67

*Trần Bình 19-3-67  
Chu Tích và gia đình  
Động Tân Nhân*



TRẦN BÌNH, CHU TỊCH XA HOA  
HIỆP ĐẢ MẠNH, ĐẠM KẾT AN HẠNH  
ĐỘNG TÂN NHÂN CỦA VC.



NGUYỄN TRUNG ĐÃ BỊ THƯƠNG BỞI  
BỌN VC KHÁT MÁU GÂY RA.

TITLE: Rallier Le Khac Bien  
CAMPAIGN: Chieu Hoi  
TARGET: Viet Cong

(FRONT)  
Photos of rallier

(BACK)

I, Le Khac Bien, 40 years old, resided in Thanh Dai Hamlet, Loch Binh Village, Thuong Duc District. This letter is for my friends Luong Chinh, Truong Cong Truc, Phan Hoa and Luong Toan.

Dear friends:

I have rallied to the GVN, where I have been treated kindly. I feel wanted and I have been helped materially. This as you know is contrary to what the VC tell you will happen if you rally. The VC tell you that if you rally you will be killed or tortured, put in jail by the GVN. Let me tell you the truth. The GVN always forgives those who recognize they had taken the wrong road. The GVN forgives those who repent.

I sincerely write to you this letter and hope that you think twice about staying in the VC ranks. Rally to the National Cause. You will have a chance to be reunited with your family and your fellow men. If you return your wives will not live abandoned any more, your children will not be orphans. They will have a father to love them.

I hope you will heed my sincere advice. I hope to see you as a free man.

LE KHAC BIEN.  
4 April 1967

Bài tâm thư  
 Tôi tên là Lê Khắc Biên ở thôn  
 ở ấp Thanh - thị xã Lộ - hị  
 thôn quê các bạn Lương Chính  
 Trương Công Trục, Phan Hoa,  
 Lương Toàn  
 các bạn thân mến  
 Tôi ngày nay được sống và sống trong  
 gia đình với vợ con được sống  
 phải đời tôi tôi tôi tôi, và hôm  
 phải ông nhà vật chất, không  
 phải nhà vật chất, không  
 trong tương lai. Tôi sống là ai  
 đi chiến đấu là cho tôi đánh  
 đời tôi tôi tôi. Sự thật là  
 chính phủ luôn luôn khoan hồng  
 những người em làm đường đời  
 và năm hồi tôi như tôi  
 Tôi tôi tôi tôi tôi tôi các bạn  
 lòng chân thành mong các bạn  
 suy nghĩ kỹ sớm trở về với  
 chính nghĩa quê gia đình tôi  
 bằng tôi gia đình dân tộc, và  
 là con các bạn tôi. Khi tôi là  
 chiến đấu chống tàn bạo người  
 cha chiến đấu.  
 Chúc tôi mong các bạn nhận  
 lời tôi tôi bạn các bạn tôi  
 giúp tôi tôi tôi tôi tôi tôi  
 244-389-  
 67  
 Tôi  
 Biên

244-389-67

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

TITLE: Thuong Duc Debate Program  
CAMPAIGN: Miscellaneous  
TARGET: Civilian Population

(FRONT)

PROGRAM OF THE THUONG DUC DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS

For the purposes of:

- Discussing the Just National Cause and debating the subjects of democracy and freedom concerning the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam.
- Exposing the deceitful Viet Cong propaganda.
- Condemning the criminal VC who kill innocent people.

(BACK)

The United States forces, in cooperation with Thuong Duc District Headquarters, will organize two meetings and a movie to be held as follows:

- 12 April 1967- Meeting to be held in the evening at the grounds of the Pacification Committee of Loc Binh Village.
- 13 April 1967- Meeting to be held at Loc Ninh Village New District Police office.

We respectfully invite all citizens to assist and participate in these two organized evenings at 8 PM at the indicated place.

NGUYEN DINH KHAM  
Thuong Duc District Chief  
Thuong Duc, April 1967

Do Quận Hành-chánh Thường-Đức và Phòng Chiến-tranh  
Chính-trị Hoa-kỳ tổ chức

Nhằm mục đích :

- Phát huy chính-nghĩa Quốc-gia và thảo luận đề tài dân chủ và Tự do của Chính-phủ Việt-nam Cộng-hòa .
- Đả phá luận điệu tuyên truyền xảo quyệt của Việt-cộng .
- Lên án Việt-cộng sát hại dân lành .

Phòng Chiến-tranh Chính-trị Hoa-kỳ sẽ phối hợp với Quận Hành Chánh Thường-Đức tổ chức hai đêm meeting và chiếu bóng theo thời gian và địa điểm sau đây :

\* Tối 12/4/1967 tại sân cơ quan Ủy ban Bình định xã Lộc-Bình cho nhân dân xã Lộc-bình .

\* Tối 13 tháng 4 tại xã Lộc-Ninh (Chi Cảnh-sát mới) cho nhân dân xã Lộc-Ninh .

Vậy trân trọng kính mời toàn thể đồng bào đúng vào lúc 08 giờ tối các ngày trên về tại địa điểm đã qui định để tham dự đông đủ .

Thường-đức ngày tháng 04 năm 1967

QUẬN TRƯỞNG QUẬN THƯỜNG-ĐỨC

Đại úy NGUYỄN - ĐÌNH - KHÂM



**TITLE:** Thuong Duc Debate Program (poster)  
**CAMPAIGN:** Miscellaneous  
**TARGET:** Civilian Population

**PROGRAM OF THE THUONG DUC DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS**

For the purposes of:

- Discussing the Just National Cause and debating the subjects of democracy and freedom concerning the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam.
- Exposing the deceitful Viet Cong propaganda.
- Condemning the criminal VC who kill innocent people.

The United States forces, in cooperation with Thuong Duc District Headquarters, will organize two meetings and a movie to be held as follows:

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We respectfully invite all citizens to assist and participate in these two organized evenings at 8 PM at the indicated place.

NGUYEN DINH KHAM  
Thuong Duc District Chief  
Thuong Duc, April 1967

244-391-67

**CHƯƠNG - TRÌNH****CÔNG-TÁC CHIẾN-TRANH CHÍNH-TRỊ**

Do Quận Hành - chánh Thường - Đức và Phòng Chiến - tranh  
Chính - trị Hoa - kỳ tổ chức

Nhằm mục đích :

- Phát huy chính - nghĩa Quốc - gia và thảo luận đề tài dân chủ và Tự do của Chính - phủ Việt - nam Cộng - hòa .
- Đả phá luận điệu tuyên truyền xảo quyệt của Việt - cộng .
- Lên án Việt - cộng sát hại dân lành .

Phòng Chiến - tranh Chính - trị Hoa - kỳ sẽ phối hợp với Quận Hành Chánh Thường - Đức tổ chức hai đêm meeting và chiếu bóng theo thời gian và địa điểm sau đây :

\* Tối 12/4/1967 tại sân cơ quan Ủy ban Bình định xã Lộc - Bình cho nhân dân xã Lộc - bình .

\* Tối 13 tháng 4 tại xã Lộc - Ninh ( Chi Cảnh - sát mới ) cho nhân dân xã Lộc - Ninh .

Vậy trân trọng kính mời toàn thể đồng bào đứng vào lúc 08 giờ tối các ngày trên về tại địa điểm đã qui định để tham dự đồng dự .

Thường - đức ngày tháng 04 năm 1967



TRƯỞNG QUẬN THƯỜNG - ĐỨC

Đại úy NGUYỄN - ĐÌNH - KHÂM

244-391-67

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MAF PSYOP ORIENTATION COURSE  
244TH PSYOP CO  
22 - 24 Mar 1967

22 Mar 1967 0800-0830 Greeting and scope by Company Commander and Force  
PSYOP Officer

0830-0939 III MAF PSC & Co. Operation Orientation

0930-1030 Intelligence Operations Orientation

1030-1100 Coffee break

1100-1200 Reproduction Operations Orientation

1200-1400 Open time

1400-1500 Use of Printed Matter in PSYOPS

1500-1600 Concept of Propaganda

1600-1700 Intelligence for Psychological Operations

23 Mar 1967 0800-1000 Development of a leaflet

1000-1200 Utilization of PSYOP Aircraft

1200-1400 Open time

1400-1600 Familiarization with Chieu Hoi Program

1600-1700 A-V Orientation

1700-1800 Chow

1800-2000 A-V Mission in Support of CAC

24 Mar 1967 0730-1100 Combat Loudspeaker at Hill 55

1100-1400 Open time

1400-1600 Preparation of PSYOP Plan and Annex

1600-1700 Closing remarks by Company Commander and Force  
PSYOP Officer

ANNEX "H" to  
PART II, Section IX #



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HEADQUARTERS  
 III Marine Amphibious Force  
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
 c/o PPO San Francisco, California 96602

50/1rd  
 3400  
 31 March 1967

## PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS NEWSLETTER 2-67

## ITEM: SURRENDER APPEALS, LEAFLETS AND TAPES

Interrogation reports point out that one of the best times to influence VC/NVA to rally is during heavy contact with VC/NVA units. The surrender appeal is the backbone of tactical PSYOP. PSYOP Officers should always have plans to support battalion size operations with either ground or aerial loudspeaker surrender appeals and special surrender leaflets for the particular operation. The surrender leaflets must always be mixed with the standard safe conduct pass. The best technique is using a rallier from the contacted unit to appeal to his squad or platoon to rally. Remember, keep your troops informed of your plans to call for ralliers or to have them surrender.

## ITEM: THE BRIDGE (NHIP CAU)

The first issue of the monthly news sheet NHIP CAU featuring ARVN/US/ F-MAF Revolutionary Development and Civic Action in I Corps will be distributed the first week of April 1967. Planned distribution is 10,000 copies per province. Distribution will be through major USMC and ARVN units. Units are requested to submit RD and Civic Action stories, with pictures, to the III MAF PSC for publication in THE BRIDGE.

## ITEM: MOVIE FESTIVALS

Movie Festivals have proven to be an effective means of establishing good relations with the people of hamlets/villages. A typical Festival opens with a speech by the hamlet/village chief concerning the purpose of the Festival; i.e., to express the appreciation of the local USMC unit for the cooperation the people have given or simply to provide entertainment for the people. The speech is usually followed by a cartoon, a feature film, and an educational film. During reel changes traditional Vietnamese music may be played or a short speech may be made by a local rallier. This program is expanding rapidly and as a result, there are not enough A/V teams available to support all requests. The program may be implemented using unit and/or borrowed equipment. Equipment requirements are (1) Films (procured through local OCO PSYOP Representative or the 244th PSYOP Company Liaison Officer), (2) Projector and screen (Local OCO PSYOP Representative, VIS, or organic equipment), (3) Sound system (OCO PSYOP Representative, VIS, or organic equipment). Movie Festivals are simple and effective. Contact local OCO PSYOP Representative, VIS, or 244th PSYOP Company for advice and assistance.

ANNEX "I" to  
 PART II, Section IX

## ITEM: PSYOP EXPLOITATION OF INTELLIGENCE

Successful tactical PSYOP depends upon timely reaction to intelligence. The necessary intelligence is usually available from Division, Regimental and Battalion G-2/S-2. PSYOP Officers, including Liaison Officers and team leaders from the 244th PSYOP Company, must examine this information daily and exploit all the vulnerabilities discovered. Standard leaflet and loudspeaker appeals are necessary to build the PSYOP base, add to this base the special leaflet and loudspeaker appeals produced as a result of daily examination of local intelligence. Exploit significant favorable incidents and local tactical victories with loudspeaker and leaflet appeals as rapidly as possible. Don't wait for a target to come into your area of operations or recon gone to hit him with PSYOP. Any known VC/NVA unit or organization within your area of interest is your responsibility. Make local coordination to hit these targets. If coordination is desired at Corps level refer to the III MAF PSC. Daily coordination is maintained with the I Corps PSYOP Coordination Center (PCC) by the PSC.

## ITEM: ANALYSIS OF POET INTERROGATION REPORTS

An analysis of POET Interrogation Reports containing information collected during the period of 1Jan - 15Mar 1967 reveals the following:

1. Number of POET missions: 47
  - a. Thirty-two (32) dealing primarily with ralliers.
  - b. Eleven (11) concerning incidents or situations in which some feedback was obtained.
2. Number of ralliers from whom comprehensive feedback information was obtained regarding the relative effectiveness of present PSYOP: 64,
  - a. Fifty-three (53): VC native to SVN.
  - b. Eleven (11) NVA.
3. Number having GVN/Allied leaflets in their possession when rallying: 17.
4. Number stating they were influenced in their decision to rally by GVN/Allied loudspeaker broadcast appeals: 41.
5. Number stating they were influenced in their decision to rally by GVN/Allied leaflets: 64.

6. Number stating that loudspeaker broadcasts were either indistinct or garbled beyond understanding: 8

7. Number stating that they had never heard loudspeaker broadcast appeals: 15

8. Number stating that leaflets had some degree of influence on other personnel in VC/NVA ranks: 27

9. Number stating that leaflets had no influence on other personnel in VC/NVA ranks: 4

10. Number stating they had no knowledge of influence of leaflets on other personnel in VC/NVA ranks: 33

11. Number of leaflets printed from material obtained from ralliers: 56

12. Number of taped loudspeaker broadcast appeals made from material obtained from ralliers: 10

13. Factors that cause rallying:

- a. The hard life in VC ranks,
- b. Lack of food, clothing, medicine,
- c. Ever present fear of death,
- d. Weapons.

(1) B-52 is the most feared weapon because of its great destructive capability and the fact that nothing is heard or seen of the weapon until the first explosion.

(2) Other types of air strikes are the second most feared weapon.

(3) Artillery is the third most feared weapon.

14. Recommendations by ralliers to increase number of ralliers:

- a. Drop more leaflets,
- b. Much more use of ground loudspeaker broadcasts, especially during "Sweep and destroy" operations.
- c. Better control of routes of communication for food and other supplies (food and supply denial operations),
- d. An explanation of the "Chieu Hoi Program" in greater detail stressing the many benefits and opportunities open to the rallier.
- e. Persuade members of the immediate family to appeal to their sons and husbands, explaining carefully and completely their right to rally under the Chieu Hoi Program.

## ITEM: III MAF PSYOP ORIENTATION COURSE

Sixteen personnel were graduated from the third monthly III MAF PSYOP Orientation Course conducted by the 244th PSYOP Company on 24 March. Personnel receiving diplomas were:

C. E. KNETTLES	MAJ	1ST MAW
J. L. TOBIN	1stLT.	Det. 1, 620 TCS
W. BASH	1stLT.	2/7, 1stMarDiv
J. T. TERRY	1stLT.	1st MP BN
J. D. BLEDSOE	1stLT.	3rd BN. 3RD Marines
H. D. MORTS	2ndLT.	4th Marines
D. E. DECKER	MSGT	4th Marines
T. SLETTEBO	MSGT	1st Bn (AW) (SP) 44th Arty
H. A. WILLIAMS	GYSGT	1st AmTrac Bn.
F. C. WHITE	GYSOT	9th Marines
A. R. CLARK	GYSOT	7th Eng Bn
H. G. RECKLINE	SSGT	1st FSR Maint Bn.
G. L. WATERS	SSGT	11th Engr Bn.
R. W. FAST	SSGT	2nd Bn. 4th Marines
L. E. HICKS JR.	SGT	4th Marines
R. F. GAC	LCPL	1st Force Recon

Colonel R. R. READ, III MAF PSYOP Officer, presented diplomas (hot off 244th's presses) to the graduates at ceremonies held after the final hour of instruction.

The three-day course, first presented in January, is designed to acquaint USMC personnel with the concepts, capabilities and value of psychological operations.

## ITEM: III MAF PSYOP SUPPORT CENTER (PSC)

To insure timely PSYOP support to all units and agencies within I Corps, both U.S. and ARVN, and to coordinate this commands psychological operations with ARVN I Corps, a Psychological Operations Support Center (PSC) was established on 1 November 1966. The PSC functions similar to a combat operations center and is manned and operational on a 24 hour a day basis. The PSC reviews, processes, and coordinates all requests for PSYOP support including leaflets, both standard and special, combat loudspeaker teams, audio-visual teams, POET teams, and Danang Armed Propaganda Teams. The PSC maintains daily liaison with I Corps PSYOP Coordination Center (PCC). Members of the PSC and PCC meet weekly for detailed planning and coordination of psychological operations. The PSC and PCC maintain a joint leaflet and aerial loudspeaker target list which integrates leaflet/loudspeaker coverage throughout I Corps Tactical Zone. The PSC schedules and targets all PSYOP aircraft support provided by the 9th Air Commando Squadron to I Corps and maintains current PSYOP journals, maps and charts. The director of the PSC is the Force Psychological Operations Officer; the OIC is the Commanding Officer of the 244th PSYOP Company.

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R. R. READ  
Colonel USMC

Force PSYOP Officer

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Case 4

Plus:

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20 Mar 1967

(3) Vulnerabilities based on enemy atrocities, friendly victories, personal hardships, and instances where enemy propaganda has lost its credibility.

(4) Status of enemy morale, with specific reference to events or circumstances/which have affected morale.

#### 10. Psychological Operations Units/Agencies

a. U.S. Army 244th Psychological Operations Company (Tactical) is under the operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force. The company has complete facilities for designing and printing leaflets, pamphlets and posters. Audio/Visual and Loudspeaker PSYOP teams are organized to provide field support with loudspeaker systems and movie equipment. "Jeepster" vehicles are available for audio/visual activities and are equipped with tape recorders, loudspeaker units, lighting systems, and movie projectors with portable two-way viewing screens. Portable gear for helicopter or tracked vehicle operations is also available for remote locations not accessible to regular vehicles.

b. Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) (Saigon): The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office has primary responsibility for psychological operations in the Republic of Vietnam. The I Corps Tactical Zone Regional Representative is the Assistant Regional Director, Office of Civil Operations, Psychological Operations Division (OCO/POD), I Corps located in Danang. OCO/POD Field Representatives are assigned to each province and are available to assist and coordinate PSYOP in their area of responsibility. JUSPAO provides large quantities of leaflets, posters, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers which are normally distributed through the III MAF PSC. Some of the material may also be obtained from the province OCO/POD Representative.

c. Cultural Drama Teams. Cultural Drama Teams composed of Vietnamese entertainers who play National music and entertain the people are generally available through the province OCO/POD Representatives. These teams are normally employed with audio/visual teams to establish a receptive atmosphere with the people.

The 10th ARVN Political Warfare Battalion has a cultural platoon and entertainers from the platoon can be obtained through the Psychological Operations Support Center or U.S. Advisors when available.

d. Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). Vietnamese Information Service is a Government of Vietnam agency that is active throughout the

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the populated area of I Corps, VIS units are equipped with a variety of audio/visual equipment ranging from hand carried bull horns to Lambretta 3-wheel vehicles with fixed speaker equipment. The OCO/POD Representatives advise VIS and should be contacted to aid unit psychological operations officers in obtaining VIS support. VIS personnel are trained in audio/visual operations and are well received by the people.

e. 10th Political Warfare Battalion (ARVN). The mission of the ARVN 10th Political Warfare Battalion is to provide support in the areas of psychological warfare, civic action, and political indoctrination for I Corps Tactical Zone. To accomplish its mission the 10th Political Warfare Battalion is organized into a battalion headquarters, four political warfare companies are integrated with personnel from the 11th Civil Affairs Company and are located in Hue, Hoi An, Quang Ngai and Danang. The battalion headquarters includes the Headquarters Company, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 sections; a leaflet printing section; and a cultural platoon. Each political warfare company consists of a headquarters and eight psychological warfare teams composed of six men each. The civil affairs company consists of a headquarters, a "B" team of specialists and three civil affairs platoons. The battalion headquarters is co-located with the 244th Psychological Operations Company in Danang. ARVN psychological operations efforts are coordinated with U.S. efforts through the I Corps Propaganda Coordination Center (PCC) and the III Marine Amphibious Force, Psychological Operations Support Center (PSC).

f. Flight A, 9th Air Commando Squadron. The 9th Air Commando Squadron has U-10/02 and C-47 aircraft with built-in 1000 watt loudspeaker broadcast systems compatible for live or taped library of JUSMAG tapes. The U-10/02 can carry approximately 100,000 average size leaflets and C-47 can carry approximately 1,000,000 (See paragraph 14, "Psychological Operations Support Requests").

#### 11. Utilization of Special/Non-standard Material

a. Any deviation from catalogued or previously approved psychological operations material which may conflict with current Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam policy requires prior approval by the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.

b. Expedient employment of psychological operations is often essential to the success of an operation. Therefore, in order to provide

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7. Themes. Themes are subjects, topics, or lines of persuasion used as a means of accomplishing a psychological objective, through the exploitation of existing vulnerabilities. Themes must be consistent with the Government of Vietnam's basic doctrines, with its political and military policies, and with the psychological activities of other agencies. They must be timely, exploiting the current situation and they must be credible and still be convincing to the target audience. The basic themes of this command's psychological operations at this time are the following:

- a. That the Government of Vietnam offers peace, security and freedom for the villagers to live their lives in the manner of their choice.
- b. That the strength of the Government of Vietnam, as assisted by other free nations throughout the world, is such that it will bring inevitable defeat to the Viet Cong even though they are being guided and assisted by Communist foreigners.
- c. That continued Viet Cong activity in an area deprives villagers of security, food and governmental ~~services~~ that would normally enable them to live wholesome lives apart from the fear and harassment forced on them by the Viet Cong.
- d. That Viet Cong soldiers and followers will be well-treated by the Government of Vietnam if they voluntarily surrender and they will be given occupational training and guidance under the Chieu Hoi program.

#### 8. Media

a. This command will utilize all available media in carrying out its psychological operations. Commanders at all levels are encouraged to use their initiative and imagination in suggesting variations and modifications for effecting results. Media to be utilized includes the following:

(1) Individual Marine. The use of the individual Marine as a medium for psychological operations cannot be overemphasized. The actions of each Marine, whether in battle, in camp, or on liberty must convey the message that the USMC is here only to help our friends, defeat their enemy, the Viet Cong. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, ranging from exemplary personal conduct to active participation in the distributing of propaganda material. Marines

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actively participating in Civic Action Programs demonstrate their earnest desire to assist the Vietnamese people and automatically **establish friendly rapport.**

(2) Face-to-face Persuasion. This includes speeches, appearances and visits by GVN officials, Chieu Hoi returnees, members of Armed Propaganda Platoons and Marines. It is one of the most effective means of communicating with the people and should be used to the maximum extent possible.

(3) Audio media. Loudspeaker utilizing taped and live broadcasts, both on the ground and airborne, can be used to reach large groups and are particularly effective in tactical or emergency situations. Radio is another audio media that can be effectively used. Regularly scheduled radio programs and special features are used to exploit incidents and appropriate situations as well as keeping the people informed on their government and its policies.

(4) Visual media. Leaflets, handbills and posters will be the most commonly used type of visual media. They can be used to disseminate news summaries, civic action directives, control regulations, announcements and meetings, and general propaganda. Newspapers, motion pictures, and television are advanced media to communicate visual propaganda and appeal to the masses.

## 9. Intelligence

a. PSYOP officers must coordinate with their unit Intelligence Officer to obtain pertinent data relating to target audiences and any information indicating results of past psychological operations. A current list of psychological operations essential elements of information (EEI) should be provided to the G/S-2 and interrogation teams. Information obtained will provide the basis for unit psychological operations. A Psychological Operator must be aware of the basic cultural background of this target audience. In addition to this basic information, the following specific points should be added to the knowledge of the psychological operator:

(1) Recent history, to include political control and economic state,

(2) Exposure to friendly and enemy propaganda.

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#### 4. Objectives

- a. To reduce the combat efficiency of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces.
- b. To further the efforts of the Government of Vietnam in establishing its effective control over the population by modifying or manipulating attitudes and behavior of special audiences.
- c. To facilitate the rural construction efforts of the Government of Vietnam by coordinating this command's psychological operations with the Revolutionary Development Program.
- d. To obtain the cooperation and assistance of villagers in the Government of Vietnam's efforts to quell the Viet Cong insurgency.

5. Policy. Psychological Operations will be exploited to the maximum extent possible in all operations conducted by units of this command. In addition to incorporating PSYOP in all phases of planning and operation, full consideration must be given to the psychological impact of each operation, act or deed of units and individuals on the U.S. and RVN National Psychological Objectives. Commanders are expected to direct personally the PSYOP effort in their commands and will assign the necessary personnel to assure an aggressive and effective PSYOP program.

#### 6. General

a. Psychological Operations is a continuous process that is waged before, during and after an engagement. The effects of PSYOP are seldom immediately apparent and success or failure is often learned months after the actual execution of efforts have ceased.

b. In order to conduct a successful psychological operation, the best information available about the target audience must be obtained. All exploitable weaknesses must be discovered and every opportunity must be taken to arrive at an effective approach. The cultural background of the people and their prior exposure to both friendly and enemy propaganda must be considered. The information below is designed to provide PSYOP officers in the III Marine Amphibious Force with sufficient background and guidance to enable them to conduct successful psychological operations.

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 3410.1A  
50:1rd  
20 Mar 1967

FORCE ORDER 3410.1A

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List.

Subj: Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for Psychological Operations

Ref: (a) MACV Directive 10-1  
(b) FMFPACO 5750.13B

Encl: (1) PSYOP Terminology and Definitions  
(2) PSYOP Support request procedures and forms  
(3) Elders/Mother Festival outline plan  
(4) PSYOP Support of County Fair Operations  
(5) PSYOP Annex to Operation Plan  
(6) Reporting Requirements and Procedures


Reports Required: I. Special PSYOP Report (Para. 25)  
II. Weekly PSYOP Report (Para. 25)  
III. Quarterly PSYOP Report (Para. 25)

1. Purpose. To standardize procedures for conducting and reporting psychological operations within the III Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Cancellation. Force Order 3410.1.

3. Mission

a. To establish an aggressive and imaginative psychological operations program within the III Marine Amphibious Force in support of the U.S. National Psychological Warfare Plan and Psychological Warfare Campaign Plans issued by Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

ANNEX "J" to  
PART II, Section IX  


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a unit with a capability for immediate response to a particular situation, approval is authorized for psychological warfare application in the following situations:

(1) Utilization of standard, catalogue leaflet, poster or recorded broadcast.

(2) Application of Chieu Hoi information through any available medium in keeping with any of the current themes published in Chieu Hoi Bulletins.

(3) Exploitation of acts involving VC terrorist tactics and incidents which follow current policies of ARVN/FMRF in the Republic of Vietnam. See paragraph 12 below.

12. Exploitation of VC Terror Incidents. Many Viet Cong caused incidents and acts of terror provide excellent propaganda material for psychological operations. To be most effective, incidents should be exploited as soon as possible using locally produced or standard propaganda material. Special leaflets and tapes can be produced rapidly by the 244th Psychological Operations Company for initial or follow up exploitation. Widespread publication of a Viet Cong terrorist incident could have an amplitory effect advertising the local VC terrorist capability. Therefore, the exploitation of these incidents should normally be limited to the local area of the incident in which the people are already aware of what happened. The maximum amount of information should be obtained on each incident including photos.

13. Psychological Terminology and Definitions. Enclosure (1) contains a list of terms and definitions commonly used in psychological operations.

14. Psychological Operations Support Requests. Enclosure (2) contains information on procedures for requesting various types of psychological operations support through the III Marine Amphibious Force Psychological Operations Support Center (FSC). Enclosure (2) also outlines precedence classification for assignment to psychological operations support requests.

15. Reporting. Enclosure (6) contains information on periodic and special reports required by this Headquarters.

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16. III MAF Psychological Operations Support Center (PSC). The PSC was established 1 November 1966 under the direction of the Force PSYOP officer. The Commanding Officer 244th PSYOP Company is the OinC of the center. The functions of the center are:

- a. Receive, process and assign priorities to requests received for PSYOP support from III MAF commands, U.S. Agencies, other U.S. Forces, F-MAF and ARVN.
- b. Coordinate scheduling, assign targets, and brief pilots of 9th ACS. Coordinate air/ground operations.
- c. Coordinate III MAF PSYOP with ARVN (PCC), U.S. Forces and agencies, and F-MAF.
- d. Maintain PSYOP statistics and records and prepare PSYOP reports.
- e. Coordinate distribution of leaflets received from external sources to all forces and agencies in I Corps.

17. Festivals. A psychological technique of utilizing hamlet size celebrations to establish rapport between Vietnamese nationals and U.S./Free World Military Allied Forces, has been introduced into the I Corps Tactical Zone by the Republic of Korea's Marine Corps. These "Festivals" have been successfully employed by ROK Marine units in areas where the number of Viet Cong is 30% or less of the total hamlet population. The objectives of the festivals are twofold; to gain support of the people for our forces and to appeal to the VC through his family to rally to the GVN. The festivals emphasize Oriental tradition by honoring elders and motherhood. By observing Vietnamese customs and tradition and mutually sharing in the festivities, a rapport can be established between the local Vietnamese and Marines that will be militarily advantageous to commanders. Enclosure (3) provides guidelines for conducting festivals.

18. Psychological Operations and Civic Action. Civic action is a form of psychological operations and comprises one of the largest efforts in the ICOTZ aimed at bringing the general population closer to their National Government. Many of the projects stimulate the desired effects only in the immediate area where the work is being done. Amplifying this effect by spreading news about new projects and announcing grand openings is a job of PSYOP. A well received C/A project such

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as a new school, is a concrete example of the GVN's sincere desire to improve public facilities for the people. These are credible additions to the PSYOP effort and will set the atmosphere to prepare a receptive audience for propagandizing.

a. Indoctrination. Participating troops must be informed of the necessity of working willingly and exhibiting friendly, sincere attitudes when in contact with the people. This single factor can be the most decisive feature affecting the success of a Civic Action project.

b. C/A Projects to Support. There is a tendency to direct too much effort at gay, happy events such as parades and displays. These are often good opportunities to employ PSYOP but should not be exploited at the expense of more worthy projects such as irrigation projects, education facilities, etc..

c. Impartiality; Customs and Religions. Care must be taken when conducting a PSYOP - C/A campaign. The rebuilding of a Catholic church, for example, while ignoring a Buddhist Temple which received equal damage on the adjoining lot, could lose more support among the population than is gained.

d. Security. Protection of the population from VC atrocities and influence is essential to achieve the desired objectives of any C/A program. Military necessity may remove troops from a partially completed project with a resulting adverse psychological effect on the population. PSYOP personnel must urge that static forces be committed until the project is completed.

e. Media. Motion pictures, recording the progress of military civic action projects are probably the most effective PSYOP medium for presenting C/A project news in other areas. Films can easily depict military and civilian cooperation which is highly desirable. Leaflets, pamphlets, posters, newspapers, radio and TV (where available) are other effective media available to amplify C/A projects. A combination of media such as films, hand distributed pamphlets, and air/ground loudspeaker broadcasts will insure that any target area is substantially covered.

19. Battalion Level TACR PSYOP Campaign Plan. To insure that psychological operations are conducted at the lowest profitable level, commanders should establish Battalion TACR Level PSYOP Campaign Plans in support of higher level plans. To be effective these plans must be coordinated with local Vietnamese officials and other U.S.

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Agencies conducting programs which affect psychological operations within the area. Coordination with adjacent units is also necessary. To determine what the initial objectives of the plan are to be, the TAOR should be surveyed to determine the current attitudes and opinions of the local population towards the GVN local officials, the GVN at national level, the V.C., the presence of the USMC, etc.. The survey should include information gathered through regular intelligence channels. Specific intelligence requests should be provided to the BN S-2. In addition, use should be made of local GVN officials, other U.S. Agencies, interpreters assigned the unit, Armed Propaganda Teams, and HE teams from the 244th PSYOP Company. Information concerning all programs of Revolutionary Development, Civic Action, and PSYOP should be gathered to determine what programs if any have been implemented, what has been accomplished and what is planned.

a. Based on the results of the attitude/opinion survey and the status of other programs within the TAOR, psychological objectives are determined within the guidelines provided by higher headquarters. (Example of objective: To strengthen the resentment of the population within the TAOR towards VC atrocities).

b. After the objectives have been selected the commander should determine what resources are available to accomplish the objectives. The plan should include all available media (face-to-face) loudspeakers, radio, visual, movies, posters, leaflets, etc.) There should be a balance of media employed since each has advantages and disadvantages and should make full use of organic equipment as well as support from the 244th, GVN, ARVN and U.S. Agencies

c. The plan should include the establishment of priority areas and a program to systematically contact each village and hamlet according to its priority.

d. In addition to contacting the population in general, key groups or opinion makers such as village leaders, farmers associations, students, etc., should be the target of concentrated psychological operations to gain their support for the GVN.

e. After the plan has been implemented it must be evaluated on a continuous basis to determine any attitude/opinion changes as a result of the program itself and as a result of other activities. It may be necessary to adjust the plan according to these changes.

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f. To have any success the commander must insure that a troop information program is implemented to explain in detail the objective of the program and the part that the individual Marine plays in its success by his daily contacts with the local population.

g. Complete records of all psychological operations in support of the plan must be maintained. Maps, overlays, charts, etc., indicating priority areas, areas covered by different media, areas that have been surveyed, areas where attitudes/opinions have undergone changes, must be maintained. These records provide means of control, evaluation, and continuity to the plan and should be passed on to relieving units when the battalion moves out.

## 20. Tactical Operations

a. ~~Aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops.~~ Leaflets, pamphlets and other printed propaganda air dropped during the confusion of battle, stand a better chance of being read by the enemy than at any other time. Viet Cong Cadre cannot monitor every action of their men and therefore cannot prevent them from hastily picking up a leaflet and either reading it or hiding it to read later. Psychological operations air support can be employed during a tactical operation to induce defection, to exploit vulnerabilities learned from intelligence information gained prior to and during the operation, and to harass the enemy. The following are examples and situations favoring psychological operations air support:

- (1) Immediate exploitation of substantial friendly victories by tape recorded messages. Utilize names of enemy casualties if obtainable.
- (2) Follow up speaker mission with leaflets containing pictures of enemy dead left on the battlefield.
- (3) Utilize air dropped leaflets with pictures of weapon caches, food and medicine caches, and other enemy objects captured to lower enemy morale.
- (4) Have ralliers record an appeal message as expeditiously as possible. Be sure to ensure credibility. Follow up with leaflet drop containing ralliers picture and personal appeal letter in his own handwriting.
- (5) Exploit any cooperative captives in the same manner. Emphasize good treatment, food, and medical care.

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b. Organic loudspeaker. A 500 watt portable loudspeaker system is available at regimental level and is highly effective when properly employed. The speaker set can be operated on any 24 volt power source and has been successfully utilized in jeeps, trucks, tanks, amtracs, helicopters and C-117 fixed wing aircraft without modification to the loudspeaker system. The system is mounted in a wooden box and weighs approximately 160 pounds. Although it can be hand carried for short distances, the set was designed to be vehicle mounted due to its weight and bulk. The loudspeaker unit provides an excellent quick reaction exploitation medium and has been successfully employed in the past to address surrender appeals to VC/NVA units in tactical situations where surrender would be a logical cause of action and to give directions to civilians endangered by combat operations. In static operations the set should be used similar to a local radio station, i.e. scheduled news information and music programs aimed both at the civilian population and VC/NVA soldiers. The effective range of the set is approximately 3000 meters depending upon winds and terrain. Accessories for the set include a microphone and a rechargeable cart-ridge-type tape recorder with electric charger.

c. Audio/Visual/Loudspeaker Teams. The 244th Psychological Operations Company has four audio/visual (HE) teams and four loudspeaker (HB) teams. The mission of these teams is to plan and conduct ground psychological operations; and to advise unit commanders on the employment of the teams.

(1) Team HE. Propaganda (Audio/Visual) has the capability of conducting sound and film operations. It is equipped with a public address system for addressing rallies and crowds and also can show motion pictures and film strips. It is ideal for presenting propaganda on a person-to-person basis in counter-insurgency operations. The team can also be used to distribute leaflets, posters, and other items. The team can conduct local surveys and report on local attitudes and opinions.

(a) Employment

1. County Fairs. The Audio/Visual (HE) Team is ideally suited to support County Fair type operations. Its public address system is used to give information and directions to the population. As the search continues and the villagers are processed for identification and interrogation, the A/V Team shows movies, plays music, and hands out leaflets, posters, newspapers and other propaganda items.

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Propaganda and information speeches by local GVN officials are broadcast by the A/V team. Rallies (Hoi Charhs) speak to villagers comparing the conditions under Viet Cong control to their present life under the GVN. All local GVN officials are introduced and invited to speak. The A/V team coordinates with and supports local VIS programs. Cultural/Drama teams present entertainment and propaganda. The A/V team leader provides advice and technical assistance to the unit psychological operations staff officer and unit commander. He also prepares the program of information, entertainment, and propaganda for the County Fair operation in conjunction with local VIS and ARVN psychological operations teams.

2. Medcaps. A/V team support of Medcaps is essentially the same as the support provided County Fairs operations. The public address set is used to give information and instructions to the local population. Movies and music are provided both as entertainment and propaganda. Health, sanitation and hygiene leaflets and posters are distributed along with any medical supplies available. Local GVN officials make speeches exploiting the theme that the GVN provides and cares for the people. The A/V team leader provides advice and technical assistance to the Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Staff Officer and unit commander. He prepares and supervises (in conjunction with ARVN psychological operations teams) the program of entertainment and propaganda for the unit commander.

3. Rallies and Festivals. The A/V team provides essentially the same support as provided County Fair operations and medcaps.

4. General Support of TAOR. The A/V team can conduct local surveys and opinion polls for the commander to determine the attitudes of the people. Based on these surveys and other intelligence provided to the team by the unit S-2 and higher headquarters, the team can assist in preparing a psychological operations plan for the TAOR. The team can conduct extensive tours of the TAOR presenting entertainment, information and propaganda. To conduct operations in general support of the TAOR, the team must initially be thoroughly briefed and thereafter kept informed on the tactical situation.

5. Refugee Control. Though not a primary mission of an A/V team, it can in emergencies and for short periods, perform the functions of a refugee control team. The team's sound and film equipment is used to direct and entertain the refugees until Civil Affairs

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teams assume control. The team can continue its entertainment and propaganda program with refugees after full control is established.

(a) Limitations

1. Mobility. Mobility is limited to areas with road net (in special operations some of the equipment may be airlifted).
2. Security. A/V team activities are best suited to secure or semi-secure areas in support of consolidation and pacification psychological operations.
3. Special equipment is sensitive to weather and rough treatment. Non-standard items of supply are not always readily available.
4. A/V teams must be augmented with local national personnel (interpreters, announcers, and entertainers).

(1) Team HB. Propaganda (loudspeaker) is the combat loudspeaker team for use in man-portable vehicle mounted loudspeaker operations in support of combat units. It can disseminate live or taped audio propaganda messages to enemy troops in contact and to selected target audiences. The team is normally equipped with remote control equipment so that the operator(s) can remain some distance away from the loudspeaker in a defilade position. This team is not to be confused with the HB team when requesting support.

21. Revolutionary Development. Psychological operations plays a key role in the Revolutionary Development effort to liberate people from VC control; restore public security; and initiate political, economic, and social development. In order to achieve this goal, GVN authority must be extended and the support of the people toward these ends must be won. The psychological operation support necessary to achieve the Revolutionary Development objectives must be included in all operations in their respective areas of responsibility. The following paragraphs outline the three phase operations guidance in each successive phase.

a. Phase I, Clearing. The objective of the clearing phase is to rid the designated Revolutionary Development area of VC/NVA main forces and permanently eliminate the threat of future VC interference. Marine psychological operations will employ all available media to direct propaganda at the VC/NVA and uncommitted civilian population in the area.

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The primary psychological operation mission for phase I will be to dissuade the population from supporting the VC. Propaganda will be used to sow dissent and demoralize and confuse the enemy while simultaneously emphasizing the hopelessness of the VC cause in conjunction with continuous Chieu Hoi appeals. Troop indoctrination is one of the most important concepts in achieving the psychological operation objective. All Marine personnel must be well informed on their major part in the Revolutionary Development program. Exemplary behavior and good discipline are paramount. Marines must exhibit a sincere interest and respect for the people; their natural rights and personal property. If this favorable attitude element can be achieved, a tremendous psychological impact will have been effected.

b. Phase II, Securing. Phase II aims at eliminating the remaining VC influence and concentrates on establishing a local government. Efforts are directed at gathering and reporting information on the VC infrastructure in order to eliminate it. Phase II psychological operations is directed at the entire population. Informative propaganda disseminates information on the new government. Personnel conducting psychological operations must coordinate with civic action personnel and sector advisors to obtain the aspirations and grievances of the people and monitor the process, whatever it takes, to see that they are satisfied. Originality and ingenuity are prime requisites for this type of task. The Chieu Hoi effort in phase II directs information on the program at families having relatives with the Viet Cong and at this point several examples adding credibility to the Chieu Hoi program are employed. Have rallies from the local area and Armed Propaganda Teams speak to the people over loudspeakers. Follow up rally appeals with leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts in order to reach everyone in the immediate and adjacent areas where the Viet Cong are operating. Effective security to guard against Viet Cong initiated incidents is essential for an effective psychological operations program.

c. Phase III, Development. Phase III amplifies the results obtained in Phase II and the Revolutionary Development concept spreads through the establishment of more developed hamlets (also termed "Real New Life Hamlets"). A permanent civil government is established at local levels and the National Police, assisted by the people's self defense forces, assume the security role. Psychological operations continues to keep the people informed on contemporary issues and the established government.

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The more refined civic action programs are exploited with leaflets, pamphlets, posters and air/ground loudspeaker broadcasts. More sophisticated psychological operations are introduced in the form of a local newspaper, (or news-sheet, depending on size of area and facilities), radio and television broadcasts. The Chieu Hoi effort is continued and the audience is conditioned to receive regular periodic material and learns to depend on the information.

22, Search and Destroy Operations. The search and destroy operation is probably the most common type of offensive tactical operation used in Vietnam and varies from platoon to multi-battalion in size. Search and destroy operations will employ psychological warfare directed at the VC/NVA rather than the civilian population. The tactical psychological operations resources discussed in paragraph 20 of this order should be considered by the Commander in the planning phase of the operation to include air/ground loudspeaker equipment and a good selection of rally and surrender tapes, and leaflets should be made available prior to the operation. The Chieu Hoi appeal will be the initial broadcast theme combined with vulnerability exploitation based on intelligence information. When contact is made, the themes will change accordingly. Surrounded VC can no longer rally; only surrender. The HB combat loudspeaker team from the 244th Psychological Operations Company will accompany the control element of the sweep force to immediately exploit incidents of psychological operations value. KCS, members of Armed Propaganda Platoons, returnees, etc, should accompany the HB team to conduct rally appeal and make general psychological operations broadcasts. The following situations are examples of exploitable incidents:

a, Significant tactical defeats suffered by Viet Cong. Names, if obtainable, can be broadcast of Viet Cong left on the battlefield. Emphasize the unmarked grave concept. Follow up with leaflets containing pictures of Viet Cong killed in the previous days fighting. Pictures and descriptive narrative should be forwarded to III Marine Amphibious Force Psychological Operations Support Center for immediate leaflet production.

b, Exploit significant discoveries such as weapon caches, food and medical storage areas, etc., in which the loss of these items would have a demoralizing affect on the enemy.

c, Exploit captives and ralliers. Have new rallier talk to his VC unit as soon as possible, appealing to them by name to return.

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Announce names of captives. Indicate good treatment and have captive talk over loudspeaker if he is cooperative. Follow up with leaflets in all instances possible. The time element in the exploitation of these incidents is critical and leaflet photos and narratives should be forwarded to the III Marine Amphibious Force, Psychological Operations Support Center by the most expeditious means available.

d. Exploit all VC atrocities against the civilian population such as using innocent people as shields and private homes and bomb shelters as hiding places and fortifications.

A valuable asset to any commander is the capability of being able to communicate with the civilians in an area. The KCS and Armed Propaganda Platoon members can be used to broadcast instructions for the people to move to a particular location, to stay in their homes, and not to run from Marines. This action will undoubtedly save lives of innocent people. Nearly all clearing operations result in some refugees. Guidance and instructions can be given by the HB team.

### 23. County Fair

a. Psychological operations are an integral part of the County Fair and one of the objectives is the influencing of the populace to the cause of the GVN, and away from the Viet Cong. The psychological impact of each act, deed and operation must be given full consideration in order to achieve the goal of "winning the people". Detailed plans must include full use of available psychological operation support and ensure adequate and timely civic action to meet the needs of the people. In the event adverse weather or other unforeseen events will undoubtedly deny the achievement of the tactical and/or psychological objectives then full consideration must be given to cancelling the operation. Enclosure (3) contains a sample concept of the County Fair. Tab A thereto contains a check list for the planning and execution phase.

24. Psychological Operations Annex to Operation Plan. Operation plans will include a psychological operations annex. Enclosure (5) contains guidance for typical psychological operations support to a tactical operation. Three copies of each psychological operations annex will be forwarded to this Headquarters (Attn: PSYOP).

25. Reports. Enclosure (6) contains reporting instructions and sample report forms. The following psychological operation reports are required by this command:

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- a. Special PSYOP Report
- b. Weekly PSYOP Report
- c. Quarterly PSYOP Report



H. M. ELWOOD  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:  
Case 1; A, I  
Case 2; A, B  
Case 3  
2ND ROYAL BN (20)  
1ST LF BN (5)  
INFO:  
NAVAL ADV GRI (2)  
5TH SIG FORG BATT (2)  
Case 2; Q  
9TH SIG (5)  
SLF (2)  
CCG (10)

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### DEFINITIONS

1. Propaganda. Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group, in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.
2. Agitation. Incitement, an appeal for action. It is based on the existence of a grievance, an impelling situation, or the occurrence often by design, of a dramatic or atrocious incident.
3. Psychological operations. Psychological activities and psychological warfare, encompassing those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral or friendly groups, the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the accomplishment of Government of Vietnam policies and objectives.
4. Psychological objective. A military, political, economic, or other objective; the attainment of which is to be achieved or facilitated by the employment of psychological operations. Examples of military objectives are:
  - (a) To reduce the combat efficiency of the Viet Cong forces.
  - (b) To further the war effort by modifying or manipulating attitude and behavior of special audiences.
  - (c) To facilitate the rural construction program of the Government of Vietnam in coordination with civic action programs.
  - (d) To obtain the cooperation of villagers in the war effort.
5. Psychological task. A particular project whose accomplishment will contribute to the achievement of a psychological objective.
6. Psychological theme. A subject or topic of propaganda used as a means of accomplishing a psychological task.
7. Psychological action. A specific political, economic, military, or ideological policy, course of action, rally, meeting, or demonstration used as a means of accomplishing a psychological task.
8. Psychological goal. A type of desired behavioral or mental effect which, if secured, will help achieve a psychological operation's objective.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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9. Psychological opportunity. Any social, political, economic, military, or ideological circumstance or condition within a society which may be favorably exploited for psychological purposes.

10. Appeal idea. A line of persuasion designed to accomplish a task of psychological operations.

(a) A persuasive appeal idea is designed to lead the members of a special audience to think, feel, or act in a manner which would facilitate the accomplishment of the psychological operations task.

(b) A boomerang appeal idea is designed to evoke negative or adverse effects (damaging to the accomplishment of the desired military purpose) in the special audience to which it is primarily directed even under optimum conditions.

11. Key symbol. The element, verbal or graphic, in an appeal which is especially significant in evoking the desired effect.

12. Special audience. An aggregate of persons who share certain predispositions which, when successfully manipulated, may lead to mental or behavioral reactions that will assist in the accomplishment of a psychological operation's task.

13. Audience effectiveness. The degree to which a group can influence the aims, objectives and capabilities of the nation of which it is a part.

14. Susceptibility. The degree to which a group can be influenced by psychological operation's appeals to respond in ways that will assist in the accomplishment of psychological operations tasks:

(a) Sensitivity, which involves the nature and strength of the feelings of the members of a special audience with regard to their own economic, political and social status in the society, and about their relationships with other groups.

(b) Responsiveness to source, which involves the nature and strength of the feelings of the members of a special audience about the basis for the psychological operations methods.

15. Potentials. The degree to which a group can assist in the accomplishment of a psychological operations goal. This is a function of the effectiveness and susceptibility of the group.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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16. Chieu Hoi Program. GVN Open Arms returnee program established 17 April 1965 by President Ngo Dinh Diem. Literal translation of Chieu Hoi is "invitation to return".
17. Hoi Quang. Any military or civilian member of the Viet Cong or NVN army who voluntarily turns himself in to the RVN or Free World Forces in response to the Chieu Hoi appeal.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Form 3410.1A  
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PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING PSYOP SUPPORT AND BRIEFING AIRCRAFT MISSIONS

1. Standard forms are available for requesting various types of PSYOP support and briefing aircraft for PSYOP missions. These forms are available from the III MAF PSC (PARCUMENT 85) and can be obtained through the PSYOP Liaison Teams assigned to the Marine divisions.

2. It is essential that all applicable information requested on the forms be provided by the requesting unit. The request forms will be forwarded to the III MAF PSC and filled according to precedence classification and availability of materials, personnel and aircraft. (see page 3 of this enclosure for assigning request priorities). All requests received without a designated priority will be processed as routine requests. The following is a list of the forms and instructions on each form.

a. PSYOP AUDIO/VISUAL REQUEST FORM: (see page 4 of this enclosure). This form is provided to request audio/visual support provided by the 244th PSYOP Company through the III MAF PSC. A special instructions section is available to list information on particular types of films, tapes, etc, audience information and any amplifying remarks on the operation to be supported. If the operational area is not accessible by jeep type vehicle, portable equipment must be utilized. The mode of transportation should be indicated if portable equipment is necessary. i.e.: helo, amtrac, on foot, etc..

b. PSYOP PRINTING REQUEST FORM: (see page 4 of this enclosure). All types of printed materials will be requested on this form. Forward all pictures, written messages and other information for special leaflets to the PSC along with the request form. A translator is available at the PSC but a translation should be forwarded with the request if available. Space is provided for complete delivery instructions in order to expedite leaflet handling. Standard leaflets and posters may also be ordered according to catalogue number as listed in the 244th PSYOP Company Leaflet Catalogue.

c. PSYOP AIRCRAFT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM: (see page 5 of this enclosure). The aircraft support request form is provided for requesting leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. The PSC liaison teams are available to assist in planning missions and to suggest leaflets and tapes to be used for a particular mission. The liaison teams will be able to process these requests in many instances and can procure the necessary tapes and leaflets and will brief the pilot for the mission. It is not necessary to indicate the number of leaflets desired to cover the target area as this information is computed at the PSC. Extra heavy coverage or other particulars can be included in the special instructions section.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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d. AIRCRAFT MISSION BRIEFING/REQUESTS FORMS: (see pages 6 and 7 of this enclosure). There are two separate briefing/request forms designed to acquaint the pilot of the G-47 and U-10 aircraft with essential information to provide aerial PSYOP support over a designated area. Each form, when completed, will provide enough information for a full day of support. It is essential that all control and appropriate unit frequencies be included in order to insure coordination with other aircraft and supporting arms. Planning data and recommendations are included at the bottom of each form to provide guidance for proper aircraft utilization. The pilot forwards the completed forms to the III MAF PSO at the end of each day and they become the primary source of aerial PSYOP support data. It is imperative that the report is signed and the supported unit is indicated in order to process the information.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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SUPPORT REQUESTS

1. Requests for printed materials, aircraft and audio/visual support will be processed and requests will be filled according to the precedence classification assigned by the requesting unit. All PSYOP requests will be assigned one of the following precedence classifications:

(a) IMMEDIATE: Support of combat operations which demand immediate reaction to exploit an important vulnerability or situation will be assigned this classification. This request will be processed upon receipt; has priority over all other classifications, and finished printing jobs will be delivered by the most expeditious means available. The requesting unit will designate desired method of delivery.

(b) PRIORITY: This classification will be assigned to requests supporting the exploitation of a situation which necessitates a timely reaction. It has priority over all routine requests and will be processed accordingly. Printed materials will be delivered by the most expeditious means available. The requesting unit will designate desired method of delivery.

(c) ROUTINE: This classification will apply to all PSYOP support requested in support of standard psychological operations programs in which the effectiveness of the requested materials is not necessarily dependent upon a quick reaction. These will be processed in the order received and delivered through normal channels as expeditiously as possible.

Immediate and priority requests may be submitted by telephone to the III MAF PSO (PARCHMENT 85), or the III MAF COO, if required. Immediate and priority requests can be relayed to the PSO through the III MAF Force PSYOP Officer (PARCHMENT 401 or DANANG 6293) in event of communications difficulties. The telecon requests should contain all of the information indicated on the appropriate request form.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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PSYOP AUDIO/VISUAL REQUEST FORM

III MAF Form No 3410.1

FROM:

DATE:

TO: OIC, III MAF PSYOP SUPPORT CENTER

PRECEDENCE:

REQUEST THE FOLLOWING AUDIO/VISUAL SUPPORT: REPORT (Date/Time) \_\_\_\_\_

TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Name) \_\_\_\_\_ PLACE (GP and Coordinates) \_\_\_\_\_

TYPE SUPPORT DESIRED: FILM \_\_\_\_\_ TAPE \_\_\_\_\_

HOI CHAN (RALLIER) \_\_\_\_\_ PSYOP MATERIAL DISTR \_\_\_\_\_ COMBAT LOUDSPEAKER \_\_\_\_\_

OPERATION AREA: ACCESSIBLE BY VEHICLE \_\_\_\_\_ 24 VOLT POWER SOURCE AVAIL \_\_\_\_\_

LENGTH OF OPERATION \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Cont'd on reverse): \_\_\_\_\_

REQUESTED BY \_\_\_\_\_ PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

REQUEST APPROVED BY \_\_\_\_\_

PSYOP PRINTING REQUEST FORM

III MAF Form No 3410.2

FROM:

DATE:

TO: OIC, III MAF PSYOP SUPPORT CENTER

PRECEDENCE:

REQUEST THE FOLLOWING PRINTING SUPPORT:

LEAFLET (No Theme) \_\_\_\_\_ POSTER \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

AMOUNT \_\_\_\_\_ SIZE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQUIRED \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: (Color of paper or ink, modifications, etc)  
(Cont'd on reverse)

SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS:  
(Cont'd on reverse)

REQUESTED BY \_\_\_\_\_ PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

REQUEST APPROVED BY \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE (2)

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PSYOP AIRCRAFT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM

III MAF Form 3410.3

FROM:

DATE:

TO: OIC, III MAF PSYOP SUPPORT CENTER

PRECEDENCE:

REQUEST THE FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT SUPPORT:

DATE REQUIRED \_\_\_\_\_ TOT (if applicable) \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_

LEAFLET THEME \_\_\_\_\_ AND/OR LEAFLET NO \_\_\_\_\_

TAPE THEME \_\_\_\_\_ AND/OR TAPE NO \_\_\_\_\_

TARGET AUDIENCE \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATES: (1) \_\_\_\_\_ (2) \_\_\_\_\_

(3) \_\_\_\_\_ (4) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Cont'd on reverse) \_\_\_\_\_

REQUESTED BY \_\_\_\_\_ PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

REQUEST APPROVED BY \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: SEE AIRCRAFT MISSION BRIEFING FORM FOR PLANNING INFORMATION.

ENCLOSURE (2)

C-47 MISSION BRIEFING/REQUEST FORM

EVENT NUMBERS

DATE

Sortie #	Leaflet No.	Leaflet Quantity	Serial No. (if applicable)	Tape No. & Broadcast Time (mins)	Target Audience	Target Coordinates	Unit Support	Control Frequency/Call Sign	Threats used and Remarks
1								MSC	For O 3410.1A 20 Mar 1967
2								MSC TACP	
3									

(1) Plan two (2) missions for each day of support.  
 (2) Mission duration 4.0 to 5.0 hours.  
 (3) C-47 is capable of carrying 1 million leaflets per mission and can cover a very large area with speaker work. Plan missions accordingly.

Briefing Officer  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Signature)

DATE

U-10 MISSION BRIEFING/REQUEST FORM

WEAPONS

Sorties	Leaflet Number	Leaflet Quantity	Serial No. (If applicable)	Type No. & Broadcast time (min.)	Target Audience	Target Coordinates	Unit Support	Control Frequency/Call Sign	Themes used and Remarks
1								DMSC TACP	
2								DMSC TACP	
3								DMSC TACP	
4								DMSC TACP	

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ENCLOSURE (2)

- (1) Plan four (4) missions for each day of support.
- (2) Mission duration 1.5 to 2.0 hours.
- (3) Maximum utilization of aircraft is essential.

Briefing Officer

(Signature)

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ELDERS/MOTHER FESTIVALS

1. Purpose. To incorporate the festival technique into the III Marine Amphibious Force PSYOP program.

2. Background. The psychological technique of utilizing Festivals to establish rapport between Vietnamese Nationals and Free World Military Allied Forces has overcome many barriers in areas where the Viet Cong are deployed in small numbers, 30% or less.

3. Action. When Festivals are used as a PSYOP technique in III Marine Amphibious Force Commands, the following elements should be used as a guideline.

a. The sponsoring unit should be battalion size or larger.

b. Festivals should be held on a monthly basis or more often if possible.

c. Establishment of liaison with the Hamlet Chief and Hamlet elders is required in order to communicate the idea of this program to the hamlet inhabitants.

d. Programs should be approximately two hour duration.

e. Distribution of a small amount of material are made by means of a prize drawing. Gifts may consist of the following:

(1) Kitchen items

(2) Articles of clothing

(3) Small bags of rice.

f. Advice on Vietnamese food and preparation is obtainable from the district RVN official.

4. Entertainment. Entertainment will normally be supplied from two sources, either Cultural Drama Teams or by organizational entertainment. The use of both types of entertainment enhances communication between the Hamlet inhabitants and U.S. Forces.

5. RVN Officials should be invited with the village and Hamlet Officials to increase the cooperation and enhance their prestige. When combat commitments permit the presence of high-ranking officers, field grade, and flag grade if possible, lends prestige and dignity to the festival.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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6. Follow Up Action. Upon completion of the Festival, an intelligence team will provide friendly, repetitious visits to those families having relatives in Viet Cong Units. When visits are made the following procedures will be utilized to attract Viet Cong as ralliers:

a. Tangible rewards are promised and then delivered when a rallier comes in with pyrotechnics or a weapon.

b. The rallier becomes part of the Chieu Hoi rehabilitation program of his area, with the opportunity to train at a vocational center.

7. Reports: Submit reports in accordance with enclosure (6).

ENCLOSURE (3)

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DEFINITIONS

1. Propaganda. Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group, in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.
2. Agitation. Incitement, an appeal for action. It is based on the existence of a grievance, an impelling situation, or the occurrence often by design, of a dramatic or atrocious incident.
3. Psychological operations. Psychological activities and psychological warfare, encompassing those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral or friendly groups, the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the accomplishment of Government of Vietnam policies and objectives.
4. Psychological objective. A military, political, economic, or other objective; the attainment of which is to be achieved or facilitated by the employment of psychological operations. Examples of military objectives are:
  - (a) To reduce the combat efficiency of the Viet Cong forces.
  - (b) To further the war effort by modifying or manipulating attitude and behavior of special audiences.
  - (c) To facilitate the rural construction program of the Government of Vietnam in coordination with civic action programs.
  - (d) To obtain the cooperation of villagers in the war effort.
5. Psychological task. A particular project whose accomplishment will contribute to the achievement of a psychological objective.
6. Psychological theme. A subject or topic of propaganda used as a means of accomplishing a psychological task.
7. Psychological action. A specific political, economic, military, or ideological policy, course of action, rally, meeting, or demonstration used as a means of accomplishing a psychological task.
8. Psychological goal. A type of desired behavioral or mental effect which, if secured, will help achieve a psychological operation's objective.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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9. Psychological opportunity. Any social, political, economic, military, or ideological circumstance or condition within a society which may be favorably exploited for psychological purposes.

10. Appeal idea. A line of persuasion designed to accomplish a task of psychological operations.

(a) A persuasive appeal idea is designed to lead the members of a special audience to think, feel, or act in a manner which would facilitate the accomplishment of the psychological operations task.

(b) A boomerang appeal idea is designed to evoke negative or adverse effects (damaging to the accomplishment of the desired military purpose) in the special audience to which it is primarily directed even under optimum conditions.

11. Key symbol. The element, verbal or graphic, in an appeal which is especially significant in evoking the desired effect.

12. Special audience. An aggregate of persons who share certain predispositions which, when successfully manipulated, may lead to mental or behavioral reactions that will assist in the accomplishment of a psychological operation's task.

13. Audience effectiveness. The degree to which a group can influence the aims, objectives and capabilities of the nation of which it is a part.

14. Susceptibility. The degree to which a group can be influenced by psychological operation's appeals to respond in ways that will assist in the accomplishment of psychological operations tasks:

(a) Sensitivity, which involves the nature and strength of the feelings of the members of a special audience with regard to their own economic, political and social status in the society, and about their relationships with other groups.

(b) Responsiveness to source, which involves the nature and strength of the feelings of the members of a special audience about the basis for the psychological operations methods.

15. Potentials. The degree to which a group can assist in the accomplishment of a psychological operations goal. This is a function of the effectiveness and susceptibility of the group.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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d. PHASE IV - Appeal to population to encourage relatives and friends with the Viet Cong to return to the GVN. A/V Team provides technical assistance for the Hoi Chanhs and Armed Propaganda Team to give speeches of the Chieu Hoi program and VC life vs life with GVN.

e. PHASE V - Termination of operation

(1) A/V Team provides technical assistance for local US and ARVN military commanders and officials to make short speeches expressing gratitude to the people for their patience and cooperation.

(2) On order, A/V Team informs population by loudspeaker that the operation is concluded and to return to their hamlet/village.

(3) Termination of abbreviated operation. A/V Team Leader 244th PSYOP Co. advises the local commander when it is apparent that uncontrollable factors (rain, strong VC resistance, etc.) will produce an adverse psychological effect on the population. The most prudent course of action is to recognize that the operation should be terminated while a favorable impression still exists.

(4) On order, A/V Team terminates the abbreviated operation (same as listed in para (1) and (2) above).

f. Coordinating instructions

(1) Request PSYOP support in accordance with ref (c).

(2) Unit commander coordinates with provincial agencies and officials.

(3) Final composition of combined PSYOP elements depends upon availability of teams from various agencies.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration: N/A

b. Logistics: Unit supported provides the following for the A/V team.

(1) One interpreter

(2) Messing

(3) POL

(4) One 24-volt system if sound equipment is to be portable.

ENCLOSURE (4)

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6. Command and Signal

a. Command: A/V Team 244th PSYOP Co, OFCON local tactical commander,

b. Signal: N/A

ENCLOSURE (4)

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FORMAT FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ANNEX  
(OR PLAN)

Annex \_\_\_\_\_ (Psychological Operations) to Operation Order \_\_\_\_\_

References: Maps or Charts

1. SITUATION. Such information of the general overall situation as may be essential for subordinates to understand the current situation.

a. Enemy Forces. Include here the military, sociological, political and economic background information required for psychological operations activity; basic ideological strengths and weaknesses; psychological factors favorable or unfavorable to the United States and the accomplishment of the mission; target groups and vulnerabilities. (this information is usually lengthy, and should be placed in an attached document, to which reference is made in this paragraph).

b. Friendly Forces. Psychological Operations mean other than those available within the command or on call from other military commands. This includes appropriate nonmilitary informational related agencies within the area of the issuing command responsibility. It also includes military psychological operations which may effect the operations of the issuing command.

c. Attachments and detachments. List here the psychological operations units attached or detached from the issuing unit together with the times they are effective.

2. MISSION. Write here a clear and concise statement of the mission to be accomplished by psychological operations in order to give maximum support to the accomplishment of the overall mission of the command.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. In this subparagraph give the concept of the psychological operation. This includes the development and phasing of the operation. Also include objectives and tasks.

b. In separate lettered subparagraphs, give the specific tasks of each subordinate unit charged with the accomplishment of a psychological warfare task.

c. In the last subparagraph of paragraph 3 give the details of coordination and control measures applicable to two or more units of the command which are necessary for coordination or general conduct of the operation and the particular policy guidance on the subject, i.e., whether national informational or military. Also included in this subparagraph would be themes to be avoided and themes to be stressed.

ENCLOSURE (5)  
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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Instructions concerning administrative matters, including logistical arrangements for the conduct of the operation. Normally reference is made to an annex or separate document concerning these instructions. Any requirements for special reports is included here.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal. Any special instructions relating to signal communications is included in this subparagraph.

b. Command. Command matters including command post locations. Acknowledgement instructions are also included.

ENCLOSURE (5)

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**PSYOP REPORTING PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS**

- UNCLASSIFIED
1. References (a) and (b) establish requirements for special weekly, monthly, and quarterly psychological operations reports.
  2. The PSYOP Support Center (PSC) maintains records of aerial leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts performed by the 9th ACS aircraft; leaflets printed and those received and distributed by the 244th PSYOP Co.. This information will be compiled by this headquarters for the subject reports.
  3. In order to meet other requirements of references (a) and (b), the following reports will be submitted by Regt., MAG, separate Bn., CAC, FLSG.
    - a. Special - The following items will be provided as indicated:
      - (1) Five copies of all new leaflets produced by the units. English translations will accompany each product. (Submit when produced).
      - (2) Five copies, if available, of each VC Propaganda leaflet found. (Submit when found).
      - (3) Two copies of Psychological Operations and Civic Action Annexes to operations orders for Battalion and larger sized units. (Submit as issued).
      - (4) Two copies of Psychological Operations After Action Reports of Battalion or larger sized units. (Submit as soon as possible following termination of operation).
      - (5) Extraordinary psychological operations such as operations resulting in large numbers of returnees; surrender of VC/NVA; exploitation of major victories, enemy losses, or PSYOP which produce significant response. i.e. reporting of VC mines, caches, etc.. (Submit as occurring).
    - b. Weekly
      - (1) Reporting period is from 0001 Thursday through 2400 Wednesday.
      - (2) Reports will arrive at this headquarters no later than 1000 Friday following the reporting period.

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- (3) Negative reports are required.
- (4) Where the weekly reporting period is intersected by the end of a month it will be necessary to submit two reports for that week; one from the first day of the weekly reporting period to the end of the month and a second from the first day of the month to the end of the weekly reporting period.
- (5) Reports will contain the following:
  - (a) Printing operations Total number of leaflets/posters printed/received by the reporting unit. (Do not include leaflets/posters received from 244th).
  - (b) Air operations (Do not include 5th AFS support).
    1. Leaflet/loudspeaker sorties by Tac/Recon area and province.
    2. Number and identification of leaflets dropped by province.
    3. Hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcast by province.
    4. Number of missions scheduled but not flown, type aircraft and reason for not flying (weather, maintenance, higher priority, etc.).
  - (c) Ground operations
    1. Hours ground/waterborne loudspeaker operations giving location and audience.
    2. Total leaflets/newspapers/pamphlets hand distributed by Tac/Recon area and province.
    3. Movies shown by number/hours/Tac/Recon area/province.
    4. Number of Chieu Hoi returnees who rallied to Marines and to SWA Agencies within Marine Tactical Areas during reporting period by province.
    5. Number of Cultural Drama Team performances.
    6. Meetings held with JCS provincial NVN sub committees (Agenda, discussion).

ENCLOSURE (6)

ForO 3410.1A  
20 Mar 1967(d) Narrative

1. Narrative summary of PSYOP activities at each Bn., regiment, separate battalion, MAG and CAC to include: PSYOP use in Tactical Operations, Civic Action, etc., Use of returnees/KOS/Armed Propaganda Teams. Effectiveness.
2. Problem areas
3. Recommendations

C. Quarterly

(1) Two copies of each leaflet hand delivered or dropped by other than 5th AC- aircraft will be forwarded to this headquarters. Identify the unit producing the leaflet if not produced by the 244th PSYOP Company.

(2) Report due: 5 Jan, 5 April, 5 July, 5 October

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SAMPLE

WEEKLY PSYOP REPORT (III MAP FORM 3410.4)

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

FROM:

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAP

VIA: (1)

PERIOD COVERED 9Mar67 TO 15Mar67

1. Leaflets/Posters printed or received (Exclude 244th)

Produced	<u>Leaflets</u> <u>5000</u>	<u>Posters</u> <u>-0-</u>	<u>Agency</u> <u>3rd MarDiv</u>
Received	<u>-0-</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>JUSPAO</u>

2. Air Operations (Less 9th ACS)

a. Sorties	<u>Leaflet</u> <u>No./Description</u>	<u>BDCST</u> <u>HRS</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>Tac/Recon</u> <u>Area</u>	<u>Province</u>
1	350,000/114-66	-0-	USMC	(Dong Ha)	(Q Tri)
2	500,000/264-67	1:30	RVNAF	(Phu Bai)	(T Thien)
				(Danang)	(Q Nam)
				(Chu Lai)	(Q Tih)
					(Q Ngai)

b. Missions Cancelled 1 Reason Weather Type A/C UH-34

3. Ground Operations

a. Broadcasts

<u>Unit</u> <u>Conducting</u>	<u>No.Hrs</u>	<u>Audience (No.)</u>	<u>Tac/Recon</u>	<u>Province</u>
244th	2:00	unk (Tactical)	(Phu Bai)	(Q Tri)
1st Mar	1:30	350	(Danang)	(T Thien)
			(Chu Lai)	(Q Nam)
			(Khe Sanh)	(Q Tin)
				(Q Ngai)

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b. Leaflet/Newspaper/Pamphlet hand distributed.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Ident</u>	<u>Tac/Recon Area</u>	<u>Province</u>
5000	TU DO	(Phu Bai)	(Q Tri)
300	Health Pamph	etc	etc

c. Movies

<u>Unit Conducting</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Hrs</u>	<u>Audience (No)</u>	<u>Tac/Recon</u>	<u>Province</u>
244th	4	1:40	600	(Phu Bai)	(Q Tri)
2/9	2	1:00	100	etc	etc

d. Cultural Drama Team Performances 3

e. Chieu Hoi Returnees ( Marine Tactical Areas ).

	<u>No</u>	<u>Tactical Area</u>	<u>Province</u>
Marines	6	(Phu Bai)	(Q Tri)
GVN	14	etc	etc

f. Meetings held with JOC Provincial PSYOP committees (Agenda - Discussion)

4. Narrative. (Description of PSYOP activities to include: Use in tactical Operations, Civic Action, etc.. Use of returnees/KCS/ Armed Propaganda Teams. (Effectiveness, problem areas, recommendations).

\* Weekly PSYOP Report form (III MAF Form 3410.4) is available at III MAF PSC.

ENCLOSURE (6)

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