

SECRET

CON: 029

FILLER 19

DTG: 040113Z MONTH MAR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

FILE: COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES

W

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 040113Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY PRECEDENCE. AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS NOT REQUIRED.

*#2 burned
4 dec 68*

DTG MONTH 040113Z MAR 67

SECRET

#21

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 040113Z MAR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 CG NINTH MAB
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW, BGEN VAN STOCKUM
 AND BGEN METZGER FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

KC-130 UTILIZATION (U)

1. A RECENT QUERY FROM PACAF REGARDING THE UTILIZATION OF MARCORPS
 KC-130'S IN VIETNAM LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT RENEWED EFFORTS MAY
 BE DIRECTED TOWARD GAINING CONTROL OF OUR ASSETS. SPECIFIC
 QUESTIONS ASKED WERE:

- A. HOW MANY KC-130 AIRCRAFT ARE IN SVN?
- B. ARE THEY REFUELING STRIKE A/C IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND STEEL
TIGER?
- C. WHERE ELSE DO THEY REFUEL AIRCRAFT?
- D. WHAT TYPE AIRCRAFT ARE THEY REFUELING?

2. I BELIEVE THEY ARE EITHER LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL REFUELING
 RESOURCES, OR HOPING TO INCORPORATE OUR KC-130'S INTO THE
 OVERALL WESTPAC AIR LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEM. THE LATTER IS MORE
 LIKELY.

3. IN LARGE MEASURE WE HAVE JUSTIFIED AND DEFENDED RETENTION OF OUR
 KC-130 AIRCRAFT BASED UPON THEIR PURE OPERATIONAL FUNCTION; THE
 CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ASSAULT AIR TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL,
 EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES AND THE PROVISION OF AERIAL REFUELING
 SERVICE IN SUPPORT OF FLEET MARINE FORCES.

4. THE SPECIFIC TASKS THAT ASSOCIATE WITH THE AFORE MENTIONED MARINE
 MISSION, AND ON WHICH WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. PROVIDE ASSAULT AIR TRANSPORT OF AIR LANDED TROOPS AND COMBAT
CARGO BETWEEN AIR HEAD OF SUPPLY AND SMALL COMBAT FIELDS IN THE
OBJECTIVE AREA WHERE, FOR REASONS OF TIME OR AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY,
USE OF OUR OWN ASSETS IS OPERATIONALLY REQUIRED.
- B. PROVIDE AIR DELIVERY OF COMBAT CARGO AND EMERGENCY RESUPPLY TO
INCLUDE AIR DROP INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA DURING NIGHT AND
ALL-WEATHER CONDITIONS UNDER CONTROL OF OUR ASSAULT RADAR TEAMS;
- ALSO A UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCE.
- C. PROVIDE AERIAL REFUELING SERVICE TO FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS.
- D. PROVIDE CASUALTY EVACUATION FROM FIELDS WITHIN THE OBJECTIVE
AREA.

E. PROVIDE AIRCRAFT FOR AIRBORNE DASC/COMMAND POST FUNCTIONS
WHEN REQUIRED FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

F. PROVIDE A CAPABILITY OF LONG-RANGE DIRECT DELIVERY OF HIGH-
PRIORITY MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL TO ALLEVIATE AN EMERGENCY COMBAT
SITUATION, WHEREIN OTHER MEANS OF SUITABLE AIR TRANSPORT ARE NOT
READILY AVAILABLE.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#21

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

SECRET

5. IN CARRYING OUT THESE TASKS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS DUPLICATIVE OF SERVICES NORMALLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT FORCES. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT WE ASSOCIATE EACH AND EVERY FLIGHT WITH SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS WHICH GENERATE FROM ONE OR MORE OF THE ACCEPTABLE TASKS.

6. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DONE REASONABLY WELL IN AVOIDING REPETITIVE SCHEDULES AND IN RELATING MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT DIRECTLY WITH URGENT COMBAT REQUIREMENTS, WE MUST CONTINUE TO SCRUTINIZE CLOSELY ALL OF OUR AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE PERTINENT:

A. UTILIZE AERIAL REFUELING, AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE, FOR ALL TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ROTATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN/OKINAWA AND RVN.

B. MAINTAIN IN-FLIGHT REFUELING PROFICIENCY OF ALL FIXED WING TACTICAL PILOTS.

C. UTILIZE INFLIGHT REFUELING IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS WHEREVER IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS.

D. MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL AIRCRAFT TEMPORARILY RETAINED IN COUNTRY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC COMBAT REQUIREMENTS. KEEP THE NUMBER AT A MINIMUM IN CONSIDERATION OF BONIFIDE REQUIREMENTS, REQUESTING AUGMENTATION ONLY WHEN FACED WITH INCREASED DEMANDS RESULTING FROM TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

E. ENSURE THAT THE AIRCRAFT PRESENT IN-COUNTRY ARE VIEWED BY ALL CONCERNED AS ITINERANT; THAT THEY ARE IN RVN FOR EXECUTION OF SPECIFIC COMBAT MISSIONS AND THAT THEY RETURN TO OKINAWA UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR ASSIGNMENTS.

F. AVOID INFRINGEMENT ON INTRA-THEATER AIR TASKS. HERE WE MUST BE JUDICIOUS IN THE CHOICE OF WHAT AND HOW MUCH WE HANDLE WITH ORGANIC RESOURCES. WHATEVER WE HAUL MUST BE IDENTIFIED WITH AN AUTHORIZED TASK. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT CHWTO HAS CONSISTENTLY FULFILLED, AND IN SOME INSTANCES EXCEEDED, OUR STATED AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE BETWEEN OKINAWA AND DANANG. WE SHOULD REVIEW OUR POLICY FOR SOLICITING THEIR ASSISTANCE AND RAISE OUR REQUIREMENTS WHENEVER APPROPRIATE, THEREBY INCREASING UTILIZATION OF THEIR CAPABILITY IF AVAILABLE. MEANWHILE WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR ORGANIC KC-130 UTILIZATION BY INCREASING THEIR USAGE FOR OTHER TASKS UNIQUE TO THE MARINE CORPS MISSION.

7 BECAUSE THESE MATTERS, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, HAVE AN IMPACT ON EACH OF YOU, AND ARE THEREFORE OF MUTUAL CONCERN TO ALL OF US, I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THEM WITH YOU DURING MY FORTH COMING TRIP.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#21

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

SECRET

CCN: 025

FILLER 25

DTG 040218Z MONTH MAR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY **(PERSONAL FOR)**

TO file.
~~1 copy to 3.~~
CG has seen.

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

Reply sent

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES #2&3 OF 3
COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 040218Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

NOTE: THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY,
THERE IS A STATEMENT REQUESTING A REPLY.

1 copy w/ MACV - to CG 05/1140.

*#3 burned
4 doubles*

DTG /MONTH 040218Z MAR 67

CONFIDENTIAL

VV PAC 926
 PP DDKE
 DE YNA 570 0630218
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 040218Z MAR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK
 ARTILLERY FIRING PLATFORMS (U)

A. COMUSMACV 011117Z/MAR 67

1. WITH RESPECT TO 9TH INF DIV'S PROBLEM IN THE DELTA OUTLINE IN REF A, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT THERE MAY BE A CHANCE TO RECIPROCATE FOR THE SUPPORT MACV HAS GIVEN US WITH THE 175'S AND AT THE SAME TIME TUP OUR SPECIAL CAPABILITIES TO AN OPERATIONAL TEST AND GAIN SOME ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE. WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS THE OFFER TO MACV OF A PLATOON FROM 1ST ARMORED AMPHIBIAN COMPANY.

2. IF YOU AGREE, I SUGGEST YOU BRUACH THE SUBJECT DIRECT TO MACV BY MESSAGE, INFO ALL CONCERNED, AT WHICH TIME WE WILL CONCUR. MEANWHILE, I AM SURE I

// - OK
 MW

PAGE 2 YNA 570 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 CAN GET MORE LVTH-6'S OUT OF USMC DEPOT STOCK IF YOU WANT THEM, ALTHOUGH THE PEOPLE MIGHT COME HARDER. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

NNNN

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CCN : 030

FILLER 19

DTG : 040225Z MONTH MAR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE**

FILE : COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES

(Handwritten circled 'M' and 'SF')

MAF : RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 040225Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY : _____ DATE/TIME _____

THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY.
NO ANSWER IS REQUIRED TO THIS MESSAGE.

(Handwritten circled note: #2 burned 400068)

DTG MONTH 040225Z MAR 67

SECRET

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 040225Z MAR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO CMC
 CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE *ML*

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN WALT
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. HERE IS A MOST INTERESTING CAS REPORT. IF TRUE, IT CAN AFFECT OUR
 OPERATIONS IN ICTZ.

QUOTE. A. ROK DEFENSE MINISTER SAYS PRESIDENT PAK
 AGREES WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL CH'AE TO MAINTAIN QUOTE
 STATUS QUO UNQUOTE IN VIETNAM UNTIL AFTER ROK ELECTIONS: ON 27 FEB-
 RUARY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND) KIM SONG-UN SAID THAT
 ALTHOUGH HE PREVIOUSLY HAD WRITTEN TO LT. GENERAL CH'AE MYONG-
 SIN, THE COMMANDING GENERAL IN VIETNAM, THAT HE SHOULD NOT TAKE
 POSITIVE ACTION IN ANY MILITARY OPERATION, HE AGAIN PERSONALLY
 INSTRUCTED HIM WHEN HE RECENTLY VISITED VIETNAM CG GENERAL CH'AE
 WAS INSTRUCTED MERELY TO TAKE A QUOTE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE UNQUOTE IN
 CARRYING OUT MILITARY OPERATIONS, MAINTAINING THE QUOTE STATUS QUO
 UNQUOTE, IN ORDER TO AVOID HEAVY CASUALTIES OF ROK TROOPS. (FIELD
 COMMENT: FKS-7330 REPORTED THE MND'S ORIGINAL INSTRUCTION TO
 GENERAL CH'AE.) *Ca*

B. THE MND SAID THE MAJORITY OF THE ROK TROOPS PRESENTLY ARE
 STATIONED AT COASTAL AREAS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED SAFE FROM THE SECURITY
 STANDPOINT, SO THAT THE ROK CAN SEND MORE CIVILIAN WORKERS TO THESE
 AREAS WHERE THEY CAN WORK UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE ROK OCCUPATION
 FORCES. THE MND SAID THESE COASTAL AREAS ARE THE BEST IN VIETNAM FOR
 THE ROK TO EARN FOREIGN EXCHANGE SINCE MOST OF THE ROK WORKERS EARN
 MONEY FOR DOING STEVEDORING WORK. THE MND SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE
 WAS AFRAID IF GENERAL CH'AE WERE EXCESSIVELY PRAISED FOR HIS
 OUTSTANDING SERVICE, HE MIGHT MOVE THE ROK TROOPS INTO OTHER AREAS
 FOR FURTHER MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT WHEN REQUESTED BY THE AMERICANS.
 FOR THIS REASON HE SAID HE PERSONALLY TOLD GENERAL CH'AE NOT
 TO TAKE ANY MILITARY ACTION WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OBTAINED FROM THE
 MND IN ADVANCE.

C. THE MND SAID WHEN HE REPORTED THIS TO PRESIDENT PAK SEVERAL
 DAYS AGO, THE PRESIDENT FULLY AGREED WITH HIM. THE PRESIDENT SAID
 THAT IF THE ROK TROOPS MOVED OUT OF THE COASTAL AREAS TO OTHER AREAS,
 THE ROK MIGHT LOSE THE AREAS WHERE THEY HAVE FIRMLY BUILT UP GROUNDS
 FOR EARNING FOREIGN EXCHANGE. UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

#23

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

CCN: 037

FILLER 19

DTG 041057Z MONTH MAR 67

(Handwritten initials in a circle)

ORIGINATOR 7TH AF

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

E

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3
COPIES OF 7TH AF MESSAGE 041057Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

*#3 burned
4 doubles*

DTG /MONTH 041057Z MAR 67

#24

CONFIDENTIAL

NNND NVV AVV FMB0420KAE196VV TSC623VV BJB794

PP RUMHMF

DE RUMSAL 213D 2631133

ZNY CCCCC

P 241957Z MAR 67

FM 7AF TACC RVN

TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF DANANG

RUMHAW/CG I MAF DANANG

INFO RUNSMA/COMUSMACV

BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

C O N F I D E N T I A L C 30153 FEB 67. FOR LTGEN WALT,
MAJ GEN ROBERTSHAW. FROM LT GEN MOMYER. DELIVER DURING DUTY
HOURS. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT
PROVIDED 7TH AIR FORCE DURING THE PERIOD 22 - 26 FEB 67. OUR
CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT OPERATION JUCTION CITY WITH THE QUANTITY
OF TACTICAL AIR REQUESTED WAS GREATLY ENHANCED BY THE IMMEDIATE
RESPONSE AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING. THE
PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL
AIR DURING THIS PERIOD WAS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF HIGHLY
SUCCESSFUL TEAM WORK BY OUR SEVERAL FORCES. REQUEST THAT YOU
CONVEY TO YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN MY CONGRATULATIONS FOR THEIR
EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE DURING THIS PERIOD.

GP-4.

BT

361

(W)

#24

COPY *2* OF *3* COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

#2

CCN: 60

FILLER 19

DTG: 111640Z MONTH MAR 67

ORIGINATOR CNO

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____

FILE: COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES

(Handwritten mark)

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2

COPIES OF CNO MESSAGE 111640Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

*#2 burned
6/10/68*

DTG MONTH 111640Z MAR 67

(Handwritten mark)

#25

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

R 111640Z MAR 67
 FM CNO
 TO CINCPACFLT
 COMSEVENTHFLT
 CG THIRD MAF
 COMNAVFORV
 CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM JOHNSON, VADM HYLAND, LT GEN WALT, RADM WARD, RADM RICHARDSON FM VADM CONNOLLY.

1. SENATOR HARRY F. BYRD, JR, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, BEING SENT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA BY CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY COL ONEL WOODBURN J. MICKEL, USA, SENATE/CONGRESSIONAL LAISON.

THEIR PROPOSED ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS:

19 MAR	0930	DPT FRIENDSHIP VIA UAL 51.
19 MAR	1605	ARR HONOLULU CINCPAC BRIEFING VISIT PEARL HARBOR.
21 MAR	0215	DPT HONOLULU VIA PAA 841.
22 MAR	0610	ARR GUAM ACTUAL SAC MISSION BRIEFING AND WATCH B52'S TAKE OFF FOR RAID.
22 MAR	1300	DPT GUAM VIA MIL ACFT (T-39).
22 MAR	1630	ARR VIET NAM
		1. COMMAND, STATE, AND AID BRIEFINGS.
		2. LAND ABOARD CARRIER IN TONKIN BAY. BRIEFINGS AND RON.
		3. VISIT FIELD FORCES AS DETERMINED BY MACC.
		4. VISIT WITH CG THIRD MAF AND TROOPS.
		5. VISIT CAM RANH BAY.
		6. VISIT SEVENTH AIR FORCE.
27 MAR	1500	DPT SAIGON VIA MIL ACFT.
27 MAR	1630	ARR THAILAND
		1. VISIT AMBASSADOR
		2. BRIEFINGS AND VISIT WITH COMUSMACV.
		3. VISIT BANGKOK.
		4. VISIT UDORN.
29 MAR	1740	DPT THAILAND VIA TT 702.
29 MAR	2130	ARR HONG KONG.
30 MAR	1515	DPT HONG KONG VIA CX 572.
30 MAR	1630	ARR TAIWAN BRIEFINGS AND INSPECTIONS AS DETERMINED BY COMMAND VISIT CHANG KAI SHEK.

(Handwritten initials and scribbles)



PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#25

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

SECRET

SECRET

01 APR
01 APR
01 APR
01 APR

0800
1345
1930
0652

DPT TAIWAN VIA CT 32.
ARR TOKYO.
DPT TOKYO VIA N. W. NR 6.
ARR USARAL COMMAND BRIEFINGS
AND VISITS AS DETERMINED BY
COMMAND.
DPT USARAL VIA N. W. NR 6.
ARR DULLES.

02 APR
02 APR

0800
2208

2. SENATOR BYRD WAS A MEMBER OF MY WORLD WAR TWO SQUADRON AND WE HAVE REMAINED FRIENDS THROUGH THE YEARS. YESTERDAY, HE ASKED ME FOR ADVICE ON HIS PROPOSED ITINERARY. I SUGGESTED THAT HE GO FROM GUAM TO DANANG RATHER THAN TO SAIGON ON 22 MAR, WHERE I HOPED GENERAL WALT COULD MEET HIM, BRIEF HIM IF POSSIBLE, AND SEE HIM OFF BY CO FOR YANKEE STATION HOPFULLY TO ENTERPRISE. THEREAFTER HE COULD CARRY OUT THE PROPOSED SCHEDULE, PICKING UP A COMMAND BRIEFING FROM GEN WESTMORELANDS PEOPLE IN SAIGON ON THE 26TH OR 27TH. I BELIEVE HE WILL CHANGE HIS ITINERARY AS SUGGESTED. SENATOR BYRD IS A GREAT FRIEND OF THE NAVY AND OF THE MILITARY. HIS TWO SONS ARE MARINES WITH ONE ON ACTIVE DUTY NOW. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY WORTH WHILE IF HE CAN BE GIVEN THE FULL THREE DOLLAR TREATMENT BY RICHARDSON AND COMPANY ON YANKEE TEAM OPERATIONS AND BY LEW WALT ON EVEC OR PS OPERATIONS. THE REASON FOR HIS TRIP IS TO BECOME BETTER INFORMED ABOUT THE WAR AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS. HE HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY VISITED THE FAR EAST AND IS LOOKING FORWARD ENTHUSIASTICALLY AND WITH GREAT INTEREST TO HIS TRIP.

3. IN MY OPINION THERE IS NO ONE IN WHOM WE CAN REPOSE MORE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST WHEN IT COMES TO UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATING OUR SITUATIONS.

4. FOR ADM JOHNSON. IF YOU, OR BUSH WOULD DO THE COURTESIES WHEN HE GETS TO HONOLULU (UNLESS ADM SHARP WISHES TO HANDLE IT) IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED TO NO END.

5. FOR VADM HYLAND. IF ENTIRELY CONVENIENT FOR YOU TO MAKE CONTACT WITH SENATOR BYRD, I AM SURE HE WILL NOT ONLY APPRECIATE IT BUT GAIN A LOT FROM IT. IN SAIGON HE DOES NOT WANT EITHER STATE OR AID BRIEFINGS BUT IS VERY DESIROUS OF GETTING THE COMMAND BRIEFING BY GEN WESTMORELANDS PEOPLE. POSSIBLY COMNAVFORV CAN HELP TAKE CARE OF THINGS THERE. AS YOU WILL NOTE, I SUGGESTED THAT HE NOT GET THE COMMAND BRIEFING UNTIL HE HAS SEEN SOMETHING OF BASES AND OPERATIONS FIRST. I APOLOGIZE AGAIN FOR ADDING TO YOUR BURDENS BUT WE BENEFIT BY THE FRIENDSHIP AND ASSISTANCE OF PEOPLE LIKE SENATOR BYRD AND AT THE SAME TIME HELP HIM AND HIS WORK ON THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#25

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

069

25

DIG: 140143Z

MAR 67

ORIGINATOR: ADMINO FMFPAC

CATEGORY: (PERSONAL FOR)

W

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

E

Answered E

MAP: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2&3 OF 3

COPIES OF ADMINO FMFPAC MESSAGE 140143Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

NOTE: THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IS PRIORITY,
THERE IS NO STATEMENT REQUIRING AN ANSWER

*#3 burned
6/10/67*

DIG/MONTH 140143Z MAR 67

3

#26

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MAF DE PAC SUPVR
 P 140143Z MAR 67
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO CG FMFPAC
 INFO CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAW

(PERSONAL FOR)

BT

SECRET AM075 RPT AM 075

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HANDLING

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO LTGEN WALT AND MAJ GEN

ROBERTSHAW FROM MAJGEN THARIN

AIRCRAFT REVENEMENTS (U)

1. DURING ADM SHARP'S WESTPAC TRIP DEBRIEF CONDUCTED HERE
 13 MARCH, HE STATED THAT WE WERE LUCKY WE DIDN'T LOSE A
 NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO THE ROCKET ATTACK IN DANANG. HE
 MENTIONED THAT ONE ROUND LANDED INSIDE AN EMPTY CEMENT
 REVENEMENT AND COMPLETELY SPRAYED THE INSIDE WITH FRAG-
 MENTATION HE ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH THE AIR FORCE IS ALMOST
 COMPLETELY REVENETTED, THE MARINES STILL HAVE SOME AIRCRAFT
 NGY REVENETTED, AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE MARINES
 GET ON WITH IT.

2. FOR GEN KRULAK. A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE DEBRIEFING
 WILL BE MADE ON ARRIVAL. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS INCLUDE SAME SUBJECT
 MY 112233Z.

GP-3

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

#26

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

083

25

151639Z

MAR 67

CG I FFORCEV

(PERSONAL FOR)

W

COPY

1

3

31

RECEIVED (1) ENVI... 2&3... 3

COPIES OF CG I FFORCEV MESSAGE 151639Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____

*#2 burned
6 Nov 68*

DISPATCH 151639Z MAR 67

(S)

#27

SECRET

VV MFB474KCB867VV MAB359

PP RUMHMF

DE RUMSMA 2691C 0752015

ZNY SSSSS

P 161923Z MAR /7

FM COMUSMACV

INFO III MAF

O 151639Z MAR 67

FV CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN

TO COMUSMACV SGN RVN

INFO COMUSMACV COC SGN RVN

I FFORCEV LNO TO MACV SGN RVN

BT

SECRET AVFA-GC A0987 PERSONAL FOV GEN WEST-MORELAND FROM LTG LARSEN.

SUBJECT: VISIT OF COMUSMACV, 15 MAR 1967 (U)

1. (S) DURING HIS VISIT TO HQS 4TH INF DIV, GEN WESTMORELAND WAS BRIEFED BY GEN LARSEN AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE I FFORCEV STAFF ON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, CURRENT OPERATIONS, AND FUTURE PLANS. GEN PEERS BRIEFED COMUSMACV ON THE SITUATION IN THE SAM HOUSTON AO.

2. (S) DURING THESE BRIEFINGS, GEN WESTMORELAND ISSUED THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

A. I FFORCEV SHOULD EXERT PRESSURE TO HAVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW PW CAMP IN BINH DINH PROVINCE EXPEDITED. AS SOON AS THE

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2691C SECRET

BINH DINH PW CAMP IS COMPLETED, THE POPULATION OF THE CAMP AT PLEIKU SHOULD BE REDUCED BY TRANSFER TO THE NEW FACILITY. THE SECURITY OF THE CAMP AT PLEIKU IS OF CONCERN TO COMUSMACV. THE 4TH DIV SHOULD EXERCISE ITS REACTION FORCE BY MOVING IT TO VIC OF THE CAMP AND CONDUCTING NIGHT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES.

B. I FFORCEV SHOULD PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 1/101ST ABN BDE IN THE BOUN MI GA AREA BY 1 APR OR EARLIER IF POSSIBLE. CLEARANCE WILL BE OBTAINED FROM COMUSMACV BEFORE THE BDE IS DEPLOYED TO THE AREA. THE NAME MGCORMICK, USED UNTIL 1 MAR IN PLANS FOR THIS OPERATION, HAS BEEN CHANGED TO SUMMERALL.

C. GEN LARSEN SHOULD DISCUSS WITH GEN VINH LOC METHODS BY WHICH SUBTLE PRESSURES CAN BE PUT ON THE FRENCH PLANTATION OWNERS IN THE BAN ME THOUT AREA TO DISSUADE THEM FROM HARBORING AND PAYING TAXES TO THE VC. ALSO ARVN SHOULD PUT AGENTS INTO THE PLANTATIONS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON VC ACTIVITIES. GEN LARSEN WILL SEND A MESSAGE TO COMUSMACV OUTLINE PROPOSED ACTIONS AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN VINH LOC.

D. I FFORCEV SHOULD LOOK AT THE BASE AT THE PHAN THIET AIRFIELD TO SEE IF IT IS LARGER THAN REQUIRED. FURTHER, I FFORCEV SHOULD CONSIDER HAVING 2/7 CAV MOVE TO SONG MAO (BN2645) AND OPERATE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 2691C S E C R E T

IN THAT AREA FOR THREE OF FOUR WEEKS.

3. (S) GEN WESTMORELAND ASKED IF THE ROK FORCES HAVE BEEHIVE AMMUNITION. THE ANSWER, WHICH WAS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE BRIEFING, IS THAT 432 ROUNDS OF 105MM BEEHIVE AMMUNITION HAS BEEN ALLOCATED TO ROK FORCES.

4. (S) FOLLOWING THE BRIEFINGS AT HQS 4TH INF DIV, COMUSMACV AND CG I FFORCEV TRAVZLED TO THE 1ST CAV DIV CP. DURING DISCUSSIONS THERE, GEN WESTMORELAND ISSUED THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

A. CG I FFORCEV WILL MEET WITH CO, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP AND REVIEW TH PRIORITY OF CIDG CAMPS IN II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE WITH EMPHASIS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF PLACING CAMPS AT LZ PONY (BR7983) AND IN BOTH ENDS OF THE AN LAO VALLEY. COMUSMACV CONSIDERS THAT A MINIMUM OF 2 AND POSSIBLY ALL THREE OF THESE CAMPS ARE REQUIRED. FURTHER, THE POSSIBILITY OF USING ONE HALF OF A SPECIAL FORCES A TEVRH OR LLDB TO ESTABLISH A CIDG CAMP AT KANNAK (BR4265) SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH CO, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP.

B. I FFORCEV SHOULD PREPARE PLANS TO DEPLOY ONE BN TASK FORCE (APPROXIMATELY 1000 MEN) TO DUC PHO (BS7281) ON OR AFTER 10 APR TO RELIEVE THE MARINE FORCES WHICH ARE FURNISHING PROTECTION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A CIDG CAMP IN THE AREA.

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2691C S E C R E T

C. I FFORCEV SHOULD PREPARE PLANS TO INTRODUCE A FORCE UP TO BDE STRENGTH INTO SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI TO OPERATE IN THE AREA OF OW TO BS5732)-MO DUC (BS7254)-DUC PHO (BS7241) UNDER I FFORCEV CONTROL. COM COMUSMACV INDICATED THAT THIS CONTEGENCY MIGHT NOT BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE AUG OR SEP.

5. (S) DURING THE DISCUSSION, GEN LARSEN STATED THAT HE HOVED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REQUIREMENT TO DEPLOY THE 1ST CAV DIV OR THE 3/25TH INF BDE OUT OF BINH DINH PROVINCE UNTIL THE PROVINCE COULD STAND ON ITS OWN FEET WITH SECURITY PROVIDED BY LOCAL FORCES, ARVN ONE ONE U.S. BDE. GEN WESTMORELAND AGREED, BUT STATED THAT HE LOOKS TO THE TIME WHEN THE PRESENCE OF CIDG CAMPS, RF/PF, AND ARVN UNITS WILL MAKE IT UNNECESSAR TO RETAIN U.S. TROOPS IN BINH DINH.

6. (S) GEN LARSEN INDICATED THAT WHEN IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE 1ST CAV DIV TO MOVE INTO QUANG NGAI, 2X7 CAC SHOULD BE RETURNED FROM PHAN THIET TO OPCON OF THE DIVISION. GEN WESTMORELAND AGGEEED AND INDICATED THAT THE INCOMING BN WHICH WILL BE THE FOURTH BN OF THE 1/101 ABN BDE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A REPLACEMENT FOR 2/7 CAV.

7. (S) GEN LARSEN INFORMED COMUSMACV THAT HE WAS PREPARING A LETTER TO HIM WHICH DISCUSSES COMMAND, OPCON, AND RESPONSIVENESS OF U. S. AND VIETNAM SPECIAL FORCES AND OTHER SPECIALIZED UNITS WITH-

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 2691C S E C R E T

IN II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

8. (S) IN RESPONSE TO GEN WESTMORELAND'S QUESTION PERTAINING TO VC AND NV RETURNES FOR THE 22 ARVN DIV, FIGURES ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE. AN EXFORT WILL BE MADE TO OBTAIN THESE DATA. GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#27

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET
 PP RUMSDN
 DE RUMSMA 1144U 0771557
 ZNY TITIT

P 181552Z MAR 67

FM COMUSMACV

INFO CG III MAF

P 161730Z MAR 67

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 4433

INFO RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY 2562

RUEKDA/JCS

RUHKA//CINCPAC

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

STATE GRNC

BT

I O P S E C R E T STATE 156207

NODIS

SUBJECT: SVN STRONG POINT-OBSTACLE SYSTEM

REF: SAIGON 12303

1. BASED ON COMUSMACV PLAN WITH WHICH YOU MAY BE FAMILIAR, SECDEF HAS APPROVED INITIATION OF PREPARATORY MEASURES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AN ANTI-INFILTRATION STRONG POINT-OBSTACLE SYSTEM IN NORTHEASTERN PORTION QUANG TRI PROVINCE BETWEEN DMZ

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1144U T O P S E C R E T
 AND ROUTE 9. SYSTEM WILL CONSIST OF SERIES OF STRONG POINTS AND OBSTACLES INITIALLY EXTENDING INLAND ABOUT THIRTY KM FROM POINT NEAR COAST BETWEEN ROUTE 9 AND DMZ. ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENT OF PORT FACILITIES AT HUE AND EXTENSIVE WORK ON ROUTE 1 NORTH OF HUE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT AND RECENTLY DIRECTED BY SECDEF. PLANS FOR FURTHER EXTENSION OF ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEM TO WEST AND INTO LAOS USING MECHANICAL SENSORS AND AIR SEEDING TECHNIQUES BEING DEVELOPED BUT NOT YET COMPLETED.

2. AS NEXT STEP WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING YOU FOLLOWING JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE:

A. QUOTE SUBJECT: MACV PRACTICE NINE REQUIREMENTS PLAN, DID 26 JAN 67.

B. QUOTE REQUEST EMBASSY IN COORDINATION WITH COMUSMACV SECURE GVN SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENCED PLAN IN TERMS OF LAND ACQUISITION AND CIVILIAN RELOCATION. THE NATURE AND TIMING OF THE APPROACH BY THE EMBASSY TO GVN SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH COMSMACV. ALSO, BECAUSE THE TIMING OF INSTALLATION OF THE SYSTEM DESCRIBED IN THE REFERENCE WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE TACTICAL AND SUPPORT SITUATION, THE PROCUREMENT OF

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
 1100 California Street
 San Francisco, California 94109

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 1144U T O P S E C R E T
 RIGHTS OF WAY AND RELOCATION OF CIVILIANS SHOULD BE PHASED
 AS COMUSMACV DETERMINES TO BE NECESSARY.

C. QUOTE DISCUSSIONS ON PRACTICE NINE WITH THE GVN AT
 THIS TIME SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE STRONG POINT-OBSTACLE
 SYSTEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO POSSIBLE LAND ACQUISITION
 AND CIVILIAN RELOCATION. MENTION TO GVN OF THE OVERALL
 PLANNED INTERDICTION SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE AIR-LAID
 CAPABILITY AND THE EXTENSION INTO LAOS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
 IN THESE CONSULTATIONS. END QUOTE.

3. TO ASSIST US IN MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
 THIS PROJECT, WE WOULD LIKE YOUR LATEST VIEWS, WITHOUT
 APPROACHING GVN, ON SUCH MATTERS AS IMPACT ON INTERNAL
 POLITICAL SITUATION, POPULATION MOVES, POSSIBLE CHANGES
 IN THIEU'S AND KY'S RECEPTIVITY SINCE REPORT GIVEN IN
 REFTEL, ETC.

4. WE UNDERSTAND GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS PROPOSED THAT
 CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO PARTIAL MANNING OF STRONG POINT
 SYSTEM IN SVN BY FORCES FROM OTHER TROOPS CONTRIBUTING
 NATIONS TO GIVE IT INTERNATIONAL FLAVOR--SOMETHING LIKE
 THE KANZUS CONCEPT. WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT VIEWS ON THIS IDEA?
 GP-1. RUSK
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CCN: 094

FILLER 25

DTG: 161730Z MONTH MAR 67

ORIGINATOR SEC STATE

**HAS BEEN SENT
EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY _____

(NO DIST)

FILE: COPY FILLER OF _____ COPIES

File

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1&2 OF 2

COPIES OF SEC STATE MESSAGE 161730Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

*1 Copy to CMC on
10 Jan 68*

DTG MONTH 161730Z MAR 67

12

DE RUMSDN 1433 0780856
 ZNY TTTTT
 R 90856Z MAR 67
 FM CG III MAF
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
 P 181552Z MAR 67
 FM COMUSMACV
 INFO CG III MAF
 P 161730Z MAR 67
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 4433
 INFO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY 2562

JCS

CINCPAC

COMUSMACV

STATE GRNC

BT

T O P S E C R E T STATE 156207

MODIS

SUBJECT: SVN STRONG POINT-OBSTACLE SYSTEM

REF: SAIGON 2303

1. BASED ON COMUSMACV PLAN WITH WHICH YOU MAY BE FAMILIAR,

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 1433 T O P S E C R E T
 SECDEF HAS APPROVED INITIATION OF PREPARATORY MEASURES FOR
 CONSTRUCTION OF AN ANTI-INFILTRATION STRONG POINT-OBSTACLE
 SYSTEM IN NORTHEASTERN PORTION QUANG TRI PROVINCE BETWEEN DMZ
 AND ROUTE 9. SYSTEM WILL CONSIST OF SERIES OF STRONG
 POINTS AND OBSTACLES INITIALLY EXTENDING INLAND ABOUT THIRTY
 KM FROM POINT NEAR COAST BETWEEN ROUTE 9 AND DMZ. ADDITIONAL
 IMPROVEMENT OF PORT FACILITIES AT HUE AND EXTENSIVE WORK ON
 ROUTE 1 NORTH OF HUE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT AND RECENTLY DIRECTED
 BY SECDEF. PLANS FOR FURTHER EXTENSION OF ANTI-
 INFILTRATION SYSTEM TO WEST AND INTO LAOS USING MECHANICAL
 SENSORS AND AIR SEEDING TECHNIQUES BEING DEVELOPED BUT NOT
 YET COMPLETED.

2. AS NEXT STEP WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING YOU FOLLOWING
 JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE:

A. QUOTE SUBJECT: MACV PRACTICE NINE REQUIREMENTS PLAN,
 DTD 26 JAN 67.

B. QUOTE REQUEST EMBASSY IN COORDINATION WITH COMUSMACV
 SECURE GVN SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENCED PLAN IN TERMS OF LAND
 ACQUISITION AND CIVILIAN RELOCATION. THE NATURE AND TIMING
 OF THE APPROACH BY THE EMBASSY TO GVN SHOULD BE COORDINATED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

2 2

#12

PAGE THREE RUMSDN 1433 T O P S E C R E T
 WITH COMUSMACV. ALSO, BECAUSE THE TIMING OF INSTALLATION
 OF THE SYSTEM DESCRIBED IN THE REFERENCE WILL BE GOVERNED
 BY THE TACTICAL AND SUPPORT SITUATION, THE PROCUREMENT OF
 RIGHTS OF WAY AND RELOCATION OF CIVILIANS SHOULD BE PHASED
 AS COMUSMACV DETERMINES TO BE NECESSARY.

C. QUOTE DISCUSSIONS ON PRACTICE NINE WITH THE GVN AT
 THIS TIME SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE STRONG POINT-OBSTACLE
 SYSTEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO POSSIBLE LAND ACQUISITION
 AND CIVILIAN RELOCATION. MENTION TO GVN OF THE OVERALL
 PLANNED INTERDICTION SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE AIR-LAID
 CAPABILITY AND THE EXTENSION INTO LAOS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
 IN THESE CONSULTATIONS. END QUOTE.

3. TO ASSIST US IN MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
 THIS PROJECT, WE WOULD LIKE YOUR LATEST VIEWS, WITHOUT
 APPROACHING GVN, ON SUCH MATTERS AS IMPACT ON INTERNAL
 POLITICAL SITUATION, POPULATION MOVES, POSSIBLE CHANGES
 IN THIEU'S AND KY'S RECEPTIVITY SINCE REPORT GIVEN IN
 REFTEL, ETC.

4. WE UNDERSTAND GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS PROPOSED THAT
 CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO PARTIAL MANNING OF STRONG POINT

PAGE FOUR RUMSDN 1433 T O P S E C R E T
 SYSTEM IN SVN BY FORCES FROM OTHER TROOPS CONTRIBUTING
 NATIONS TO GIVE IT INTERNATIONAL FLAVOR--SOMETHING LIKE
 THE KANZUS CONCEPT. WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT VIEWS ON THIS IDEA?
 GP-1. RUSK
 BT

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

2 2

NO : 091

DATE : 25

DTG : 172308Z MONTH MAR 67

ORIGINATOR : CMC

CATEGORY : (PERSONAL FOR)

FILE : COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

MAF : RECEIVED (IN ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2, 3, 4)

COPIES OF CMC MESSAGE 172308Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY : _____ DATE/TIME _____

*#3 of burned
6 (Doc 6)*

DTG/MONTH : 172308Z MAR 67

#28

SECRET

(PERSONAL FOR)
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 172305Z MAR 67
FM CMC
TO CG FMFPAC
CG III MAF

SECRET PERSONAL MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY CG III MAF PASS
INFORMALLY TO GEN CHAISON

VISIT OF SENATOR HARRY F. BYRD JR. TO SOUTHEAST ASIA (S)
1. SENATOR HARRY F BYRD, JR. MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE IS PLANNING A TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE PERIOD
19 MAR-2 APR. CURRENTLY ANTICIPATING TO BE IN HONOLULU 19-21 MAR
AND VIETNAM 22-27 MAR.

eg

2. SENATOR BYRD'S POSITION AND HIS INTEREST IN THE
MARINE CORPS PROVIDE GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM TO GIVE FIRST HAND
INFORMATION TO COLLEAGUES UPON HIS RETURN AND I DESIRE THAT HE
BE GIVEN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW OUR OPERATIONS AND HEAR OUR
PLANS WHILE ON THIS TRIP. ONE SON CURRENTLY IN THIRD MILITARY
POLICE BATTALION DUE TO SAIL SOON FOR VIETNAM.

GP4
BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

SECRET

COPY 2 OF 4 #28 COPIES

TOP SECRET

CCN : 111

FILLER 19

DTG : 250115Z MONTH MAR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE**

FILE : COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES

MAF : RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2
COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 250115Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY : _____ DATE/TIME _____

*# 1 burned
2/20/68*

DTG MONTH 250115Z MAR 67

EE

TOP SECRET

13

TOP

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAV 857

PP DDKE
 DE YNA 4910 0840115
 ZOYAINOTT
 P 250115Z MAR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

SECTION 1 OF 2

T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN
 KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 FORCE REQUIREMENT (U)

A. COMUSMACV 180403Z/MAR67

B. CG III MAF LTR 3C/WSR 5000 SER 005996.7 OF 15MAR67

1. I HAVE ASKED JOHN CHAISSON TO GET YOU WPFOFY OF REF A.
 IT IS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT MESSAGE BUT, DUE TO FORMAT,
 PHRASEOLOGY, AND INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES, IS DIFFICULT
 TO ANALYZE. THESE ARE MY REACTIONS TO THE MESSAGE AFTER
 CAREFUL REFLECTION:

A. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ENEMY THREAT IS NOT FULLY
 RECITED, AND SEEMS TO BE RELATED TO THE CONTEXT OF THE
 DISCUSSION AT THE TIME. APPARENTLY IN JUSTIFICATION OF
 THE ADDED FORCE REQUIREMENTS, PARA 1B STATES THAT THE
 ENEMY HAS INCREASED HIS FORCE STRUCTURE APPRECIABLY.

PAGE 2 YNA 4910 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 LATER, HOWEVER, PARA 2 STATES THAT THE ENEMY COMBAT STRENGTH
 AND EFFECTIVENESS HAVE DECREASED SOMEWHAT DURING THE PAST FEW
 MONTHS. IN ANY CASE, A REQUEST OF THIS DIMENSION MUST HAVE A
 SOLID ENEMY SITUATION ESTIMATE AS ITS FOUNDATION. THIS ONE
 SEEMS DEFICIENT IN THAT REGARD.

B. IN DISCUSSING THE CONTEMPLATED OPTIMUM FORCE, IN PARA
 IC, MACV USES GENERALITIES SUCH AS THAT IT IS "ENTIRELY POSSIBLE
 THAT ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL MATERIALIZE", AND THAT PRESENT
 PLANNING "SUGGESTS" AN ADDITIONAL 2 1/3 DIVS AT A LATER TIME.
 THESE GENERALIZATIONS DO NOT TRACK WITH THE LATER DISCUSSION
 IN PARA 3B(3), WHICH STATES THAT THE OPTIMUM FORCE IS REQUIRED
 TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT SUCCESS.

C. MACV TAKES NOTE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY
 DEVELOPMENT, BUT IT IS APPARENT THAT HE PREFERENCES TO HAVE THE
 MILITARY STEER CLEAR OF IT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. IN HIS CONCEPT,
 PARA 3A(2), HE DEFINES THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AS PROVIDING
 A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE POPULATION SO THAT THE
 CIVIL ASPECTS OF RD CAN PROGRESS. APPARENTLY, IT IS UP TO THE
 CIVILIANS TO DO THE REST. THIS VIEW IS BORNE OUT IN HIS CONCEPT
 FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL FORCES IN II CTZ, PARA 3B(3)(B),

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

PAGE 3 YVNA 4910 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
WHERE HE DOES NOT MENTION RD.

D. THE DETAILED CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE 2 1/3 DIVS IN THE I CTZ IS MADE DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW BY THE PARTIAL DISCUSSION OF THE FORCE IN PARA 3B(3)(A), UNDER THE OPTIMUM FORCE HEADING, AND A LATER DISCUSSION OF THE SAME UNITS IN PARA 3B(4)(A), UNDER THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE HEADING. IN THE FIRST CASE, THE 1 1/3 DIVS PROPOSED FOR QUANG TRI ARE RATIONALIZED AS A CONTAINMENT FORCE. IN THE SECOND CASE, THERE IS NO MENTION OF CONTAINMENT. INSTEAD, THE ENTIRE 2 1/3 DIV FORCE IS TO EXPLOIT SUCCESS OF THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE TO RETAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE EXPANDING AREAS BEING CLEARED OF ENEMY INFLUENCE."

E. ALSO, THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WHICH MACV CONSIDERS NECESSARY FOR QUANG NGAI PROVINCE IS NOT CLEAR. PARA 3B(3)(A) STATES THAT 10 BNS ARE REQUIRED FOR THIS AREA, WHILE PARA 3B(4)(A) STATES A NEED FOR 9 BNS FOR THE SAME AREA. AND, WHILE THE DISCUSSION OF THE 1 1/3 DIV FOR QUANG TRI STATES THAT THE UNITS CURRENTLY ENGAGED THERE WILL BE RELIEVED FOR USE IN OTHER AREAS, SIMILAR MENTION IS NOT MADE CONCERNING THE UNITS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN QUANG NGAI. IT IS, THUS UNCERTAIN WHETHER

PAGE 4 YVNA 4910 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THE 9 (OR 10) BN FORCE IS INTENDED TO BE ADDITIVE TO THOSE CURRENTLY ENGAGED, OR REPRESENTS THE TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS AREA.

F. THE WORD "HELICOPTER" IS NOT USED IN REF A. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF 21 ADDITIONAL BNS WILL BE SIGNIFICANT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED, PARTICULARLY THE CONCEPT FOR BASE LOADING AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. IN THIS LATTER REGARD, MACV ADDRESSES THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF HIS PROPOSAL BY A BRIEF ALLUSION TO SELECTIVE AUGMENTATION OF NSA DANANG (PARA 3B(4)(A)). AS YOU KNOW, LOGISTIC FEASIBILITY HAS BEEN A KEY FACTOR IN THE EVALUATION OF OTHER PLANS WHICH CONTEMPLATED THE DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE FORCES INTO OR THROUGH NORTHERN I CTZ. THE RELATED PROBLEMS SHOULD ALSO BE EXPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECOMMENDED FORCE AUGMENTATION.

GB#U THE CONCEPT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE 4 TFS, STATED AS BEING REQUIRED AS A PART OF THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE, IS NOT EXPLAINED. IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF THE 2 1/3 DIVS TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE I CTZ, WHICH ARE A PART OF THE SAME STATED REQUIREMENT (PARA 3B(4)(A) AND 3B(4)(C)). IF THIS IS THE CASE, THEIR EMPLOYMENT FROM PHU

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

PAGE 5 YNA 4910 T O P S E C R E T S P E A T EXCLUSIVE
 CAT AND TUY HOA, APPROXIMATELY 240 AND 325 AIR MILES, RESPECTIVELY, FROM THE AREA OF THE DMZ, WOULD REPRESENT AN INEFFICIENT USE OF AVAILABLE TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES.

H. THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES IN III CTZ, PARA 3B(3)(C), IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY REFERENCE TO THE GAP WHICH WILL BE CREATED BY THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 9TH INF DIV TO IV CTZ. THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE 9TH DIV TO III CTZ WAS A TEMPORARY MEASURE TO BEGIN WITH, PENDING AVAILABILITY OF BASES AND NAVY SUPPORT IN IV CTZ.

I. THE STRENGTH FIGURE FOR THE TWO PACKAGES, THAT IS THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT (MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE) AND THE ADD-ON INCREMENT TO MAKE THE OPTIMUM FORCE, DO NOT APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT. THE FIRST FORCE (MINIMUM ESSENTIAL) IS THE LARGER OF THE TWO, ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF UNITS IN EACH. YET THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE REQUIRES ONLY 78,435 MEN (PARA 3B(4)(C)), WHILE THE ADD-ON INCREMENT REQUIRES APPROXIMATELY 123,000 MEN (TOTAL OPTIMUM FORCE IS 201,250, PARA 3B(3)).

J. A SIMILAR DISCREPANCY APPEARS IN PARA 7, PIASTER IMPACT. THE PARAGRAPH STATES THAT THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL

PAGE 6 YNA 4910 T O P S E C R E T S P E A T EXCLUSIVE
 FORCE OF 78,435 WILL COST OUT AT 41.7 BILLION PIASTERS. YET THE OPTIMUM FORCE, WHICH REPRESENTS AN ADDITIONAL 123,000 PERSONNEL, RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF ONLY 2.3 BILLION PIASTERS (FROM 41.7 TO 44). THERE IS SOME LACK OF CLARITY OF INTENT HERE, WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE CORRECTED IF THERE IS TO BE A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE PIASTER IMPACT OF THE TWO FORCE PACKAGES.

2. FROM THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL TROOP BREAKDOWN BY SERVICE (PARA 3B(4)(C)) IT MIGHT SEEM THAT MACV IS NOT AS MUCH INTERESTED IN "FORCE" REQUIREMENTS AS HE IS IN "ARMY" REQUIREMENTS. HE MAKES CLEAR THERE THAT HE WANTS ARMY, NOT MARINE, DIVISIONS. THIS VIEWPOINT IS STRENGTHENED BY HIS LUKE WARM INTEREST IN FREE WORLD FORCES, (PARA 1E), WHERE HE STATES THE PROVISION OF ANY AND ALL SUCH FORCES IS WELCOMED AS ADDITIVE REINFORCEMENTS.

3. FOR THE PAST YEAR OR SO, MACV HAS SUBMITTED A SUCCESSION OF PLANS WHICH REQUIRE ABOUT A 3 DIV FORCE, GIVE OR TAKE A LITTLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, DURING COL KIRBY VICK'S DEBRIEF HERE RECENTLY, HE ADVISED THAT A TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS HAS ALREADY BEEN CREATED TO COMMAND A FORCE COMPARABLE TO THAT STATED AS MACV'S IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT. WHEN I WAS IN SAIGON BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

NNN

2 2

#13

7858

PP DDKE

DE YVNA 4911 0840115

ZNY TTTTT

P 250115Z MAR 67

FM CG FMFPAC

TO DDKE/CG III MAF

BT

FINAL SECTION OF 2

~~T O P S E C R E T~~. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN
KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

I CONFIRMED THIS, IN CONVERSATION WITH ROSSON. THERE WAS ALSO A
CONFERENCE HELD AT USARV RECENTLY TO DETERMINE THE COMBAT SUPPORT AND
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AUGMENTATION FOR JUST SUCH A FORCE.

IT IS POSSIBLE, IN REF A, THAT MACV IS ACTUALLY LAYING THE
GROUNDWORK FOR "FULL CRY&. OR A SIMILAR PLAN FOR THE DEPLOYMENT
OF THE CORPS CONTINGENCY FORCE TO LAOS. THIS IS UNDERSCORED
BY HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH I CTZ, AND HIS ASSERTION THAT THE
WHOLE OF THE 2 1/3 DIVISION "MINIMUM" FORCE IS TO GO THERE,
AND THAT THE FORCE WILL BE COMPRISED OF ARMY UNITS. ANOTHER
POSSIBILITY IS THAT MACV HAS IN MIND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
SPECIAL ANTI-INFILTRATION ZONE IN QUNAG TRI PROVINCE, WHICH
WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE PRESENT I CTZ, AND WHOSE COMMANDER
WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE DIRECTLY TO MACV. NOW ALL OF THIS TIES

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

2 2

13

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 2 YVNA 4911 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

IN WITH THE CURRENT VIBRATIONS ON PRACTICE NINE -- THERE IS NO MENTION OF BARRIERS IN REF A -- IS NOT YET CLEAR, BUT IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE FORCE LEVELS DISCUSSED FOR I CTZ DO NOT ARISE WHOLLY FROM A DISPASSIONATE ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. IF MACV HAS MADE ONE, HE HAS NOT GIVEN IT TO CINCPAC IN THIS MESSAGE.

4. IN DETERMINING US/FW FORCE REQUIREMENTS IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO OVERLOOK THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE ARVN TO RD PARTICIPATION. ALTHOUGH NOT MENTIONED IN THE MACV MESSAGE, THIS IS A MAJOR DETERMINING FACTOR, FOR THE MORE EFFECTIVE THE ARVN BECOMES, THE LESS THE REQUIREMENT WILL BE FOR US/FW FORCES. AND ADDITIONALLY, OF COURSE, WE MUST AVOID ASSUMING A ROLE EXCESSIVELY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE GVN CONTRIBUTION.

5. TO CONCLUDE MY COMMENTS ON THE MACV MESSAGE, I BELIEVE MORE FORCES ARE NEEDED IN RVN, BUT I CANNOT SEE THIS DISPATCH, WITH ITS VACUA AND INCONSISTENCIES, AS A PROPER VEHICLE FOR GETTING THEM.

6. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT GUIDANCE YOU WERE GIVEN FOR THE PREPARATION OF REF B. I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN A COPY, OR IF TOO VOLUMINOUS, AT LEAST A SUMMARY, OF REF A OF REF B. IT WOULD

PAGE 3 YVNA 4911 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

APPEAR, BASED ON THE DATE OF THE GUIDANCE AND THE DATE OF YOUR RESPONSE, THAT REF B MAY HAVE BEEN PRODUCED ON A CRASH BASIS. IN ANY EVENT, NOW THAT YOU HAVE HAD TIME FOR A MORE DETAILED APPRAISAL OF THE PROBLEM, WHAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TELL ME IS THIS. IF, BY SOME MIRACLE, YOU COULD HAVE THEM, WHAT MARINE CORPS FORCES WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE, NOT BY JULY 1968, BUT RIGHT NOW? WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

NNNN

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

2 2

13

NOV 123

FILLER 19

DTG: 252323Z MONTH 'MAR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY

(Handwritten circled 'M')

(Handwritten symbol)

NO. OF COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES

NOT RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 252323Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: DATE/TIME

*#2 burned
2 dougs*

(Handwritten circled '14')

DTG MONTH 252323Z MAR 67

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE

VV PAC908
P 252323Z MAR 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT AND
MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORP EYES ONLY.
UTILIZATION OF A-6 AIRCRAFT (U)

A. CINCPAC 240315Z

1. BY NOW YOU WILL HAVE SEEN REF A IN WHICH CINCPAC
HAS DIRECTED UTILIZATION OF YOUR FULL SYSTEMS CAPABLE
A-6S IN ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS NORTH OF ROUTE
PACKAGE I IN YOUR PLANNING FOR THESE OPERATIONS, I
THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE A FEEL
FOR THE CINCPAC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH BROUGHT THIS
ABOUT. TO BEGIN WITH, SHARP RECOGNIZES THAT THIS AIR-
CRAFT REPRESENTS HIS ONLY CAPABILITY TO GET AT
SIGNIFICANT TARGETS UP NORTH IN BAD WEATHER. THE
FLEET HAS ONLY A FEW, AND IT IS CLEAR TO HIM THAT
THE MARINE ASSETS, IN ADDITION TO MORE THAN
DOUBLING WHAT HE NOW HAS FOR ROLLING THUNDER,
COULD BE USED AGAINST MORE PROFITABLE TARGETS
THAN IS THE CURRENT CASE, EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCY
NEEDS IN SUPPORT OF III MAF. HE HAS MADE IT
CLEAR, AND I FULLY AGREE, THAT SUCH SCARCE AND
VALUABLE ASSETS SHOULD NOT BE USED UNDER VFR
CONDITIONS FOR MISSIONS THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED
BY OTHER AIRCRAFT.

3. THIS USE OF THE A-6S OUTSIDE ROUTE PACKAGE I
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WITH A FULL SYSTEMS
CAPABILITY, IN BOTH CTF-77 AND 7 AF AREAS. THIS
HAS BEEN PERSONALLY CLEARED WITH WESTY, IN MOMYER'S
PRESENCE. (AS AN ASIDE, MOMYER TRIED TO INTERPOSE
AN OBJECTION TO THIS EXPANSION DOCTRINE IN MARINE CORPS
ACTIVITY ON THE GROUNDS THAT WE WERE ALREADY OPERATING IN
ROUTE PACKAGE I, BUT WAS SHOT DOWN BY SHARP).

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

1 2

#14

COMPENSATORY NAVY A-1/A-4 SORTIES WERE OFFERED BY SHARP WHEN REQUESTED BY MACV, BUT WESTY EVIDENCED NO GREAT CONCERN OVER THE SMALL SORTIE DRAWDOWN INVOLVED.

4. THE FEELING IS THAT YOU SHOULD START OFF BY WORKING YOUR WAY UP THE NVN COAST, BUILDING UP SOME EXPERIENCE BEFORE GETTING INTO THE HOTTEST AREAS IN ROUTE PACKAGE VI CTF-77 IS FAMILIAR WITH THIS AREA AND CAN GIVE YOU SOME HELP IN TARGET MATERIALS, AA ORDER OF BATTLE, TACTICS, ETC. IN THIS REGARD, YOU SHOULD PLACE STRONG EMPHASIS ON INSURING THAT YOUR ECM EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY THE ALQ-51, IS IN TOP NOTCH ORDER. ADDITIONAL ECM SUPPORT SHOULD BE USED AS AVAILABLE.

5. AFTER YOUR OPERATION IS SHAKEN DOWN YOU SHOULD ADVISE 7AF (IN WRITING IF NECESSARY) THAT YOU ARE IN A POSITION TO HELP OUT ON TARGETS IN HIS AREA APPROPRIATE FOR A-6 FULL SYSTEMS ATTACK WHEN WEATHER IS SLOWING THEM DOWN. CINCPAC IS UNDERSTANDABLY ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF A "NAVY ONLY" SHOW FOR THE USE OF A-6S AND WANTS THE RECORD TO SHOW THAT THIS SPECIAL SUPPORT HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT BOTH NAVY AND AIR FORCE OPERATIONS. IN FACT, AT ONE POINT IN THE CINCPAC DISCUSSIONS, FULL COMMITMENT OF YOUR FULL SYSTEMS CAPABLE A-6S TO 7AF WAS PROPOSED ON GROUNDS THAT THEY HAD NO EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY.

6. WHILE THERE IS A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF INTEREST IN A-6 PERFORMANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTHEAST AREAS, I AM SURE I NEED NOT CAUTION YOU THAT YOU SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO THAT ENVIRONMENT UNTIL YOUR CREWS AND AIRCRAFT ARE READY. MISSION REPORTING SHOULD BE AS COMPREHENSIVE AS POSSIBLE AND YOU WILL WANT TO WORK OUT WITH CTF-77 FAIRLY RESPONSIVE PLANS FOR GETTING PRE AND POST STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHY. IF THIS PROVES TO BE TROUBLESOME, I SEE NO PROBLEM IN GETTING AUTHORITY TO USE YOUR OWN RF-4S. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

1 2

#14

147

19

280735Z

MAR 67

CG FIRST MARDIV

(PERSONAL FOR)

CG has seen
O

1 3

2-3 3

CG FIRST MARDIV 280735Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY

THIS MESSAGE IS OF IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE

#2 burned
(copy)

280735Z MAR 67

13

#29

MAF DE NLA NR 0
 DE RUMHLA 3666E 0870735
 ZNY EEEEE
 O 280735Z MAR 67

(PERSONAL FOR)

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM MGEN NICKERSON
 BELIEVE IT BEST TO MAKE THIS A MATTER OF RECORD.
 FOLLOWING MSG FROM TF XRAY REGARDING LTCOL CORSON'S VISIT
 TO CAP L-5.

1. 262100H MARCH RECEIVED CALL FROM MAJ HENLEY DIV G-3
 SECT TO THE EFFECT THAT COL CORSON AND 2 OTHERS INCLUDING
 VIETNAMESE INTERPRETORS WOULD ARRIVE AT CHU LAI 270815H
 TO VISIT CAP L-5 1/7 IN CONNECTION ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN
 THAT CAP AND NVA FORCES 26 MARCH.
2. LT COL CORSON AND PARTY ARRIVED CHU LAI 270815H. IN
 PARTY WERE TWO NEWSMEN, GASSAWAY OF AP AND WEBB, UPI.
 TFXRAY ISO NOTIFIED BY CIB APPROX 15 MIN PRIOR ARRIVAL
 THAT TWO REPORTERS COMING TO COVER CAP STORY.
3. CORSON INDICATED HE WAS SENT BY GEN WALT AND THAT NEWS
 MEN HAD PERMISSION III MAF TO ACCOMPANY CORSON TO CAP.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3666E UNCLAS E F T O

CO 7TH MAR WAS DESIGNATED BY TFXRAY TO ACCOMPANY CORSON
 AND PARTY TO CAP.

4. AT CAP LOCATION, A TAPED INTERVIEW WITH SGT BUTLER,
 COMMANDER OF CAP L-5. WAS CONDUCTED BY CORSON. INTERVIEW
 WAS INQUIRY INTO CIRCUMSTANCES RELATED TO L-5'S ENCOUNTER
 WITH VC WHEN EIGHT MARINES ONE NAVY, AND FIVE PFS WERE
 KILLED. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE SEEMED TO BE TO DETERMINE
 LESSONS LEARNED FOR BENEFIT OF OTHER CACS. PRESENT AT
 INTERVIEW, IN ADDITION TO LTCOL CORSON AND SGT BUTLER,
 WERE THREE MARINE CAPTS, FROM III MAF THE TWO REPORTERS,
 AND CO 7TH MARINES. REPORTERS MADE DETAILED NOTES AND
 ASKED A FEW QUESTIONS (LIMITED BY TIME) AT THE CONCLUSION
 OF INTERVIEW WHICH LASTED ABOUT 45 MINUTES.

5. WHILE IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH MEMBERS OF PRESS ARE
 FAVORABLE TO MARINE CORPS, TECHNIQUE OF HAVING THEM SIT
 IN ON WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN INQUIRY APPEARS TO BE QUESTION-
 ABLE WAY OF HANDLING PRESS COVERAGE. AS AN EXAMPLE,
 SGT BUTLER, WHEN ASKED HIS CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OPERATION,
 STATED THAT HE HAD LEARNED THAT PFS WOULDN'T STAND AND
 FIGHT. HE LATER, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, STATED THAT THIS

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3666E UNCLAS E F T O

WAS AN ILL CONSIDERED CONCLUSION BECAUSE FIVE OF THE PFS
 DIED ALONGSIDE HIS MARINES. BUTLER HAS DONE AN OUT-
 STANDING JOB WITH HIS CAC, AND COULD HAVE PRESENTED
 A NEWS-WORTHY STORY WITH POSITIVE BENEFITS TO THE MARINE
 CORPS HAD THE MATTER BEEN HANDLED DIFFERENTLY.

BT

Copy 3 of 3 Copies

#29

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMSDN
DE RUHKM 5529 0380321
ZNY TTTT
P 290321Z MAR 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMSDN/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT. INFO MAJGEN
ROBERTSHAW FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
ARC LIGHT (U)

1. DISCUSSION WITH BGEN HUTCHINSON, J-3 CINCPAC
REVEALS THAT STRONGLY JUSTIFIED REQUEST FROM YOU TO MACV,
FOR ARC LIGHT STRIKES IN DMZ AREA, MIGHT
HELP TO MAKE B-52'S AVAILABLE IN NEAR FUTURE.

GP-3
BT

quote
va c/s-
Let's do it!
Walt "
unquote

2 2

TOP SECRET

CCN: 157

FILLER 19

DTG: 290355Z MONTH: MAR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FILE: COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIES

*CG Has seen
File
Jes*

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 290355Z MAR 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

*#2 banned
706068*

DTG MONTH 290355Z MAR 67

16

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

VV PAC050
 P 290355Z MAR 67 ZYM
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

EXCLUSIVE

BT
 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT INFO
 MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY.

A. CG FMFPAC 252323;
 B. CINCPAC 240315
 C. CG III MAF 290940

1. I SENT REF A TO PORTRAY THE BACKGROUND WHICH GENERATED CINCPAC'S DECISION REGARDING A-6A EMPLOYMENT, AS HE ANNOUNCED IT IN REF B. THE DECISION WAS MADE IN GUAM BY A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP. THERE WERE NUMEROUS ALTERNATIVES TO THAT DECISION. ONE, WHICH I FOUGHT OFF BEFORE THE GUAM MEETING, WAS TO TAKE AWAY ONE OF OUR A6 SQUADRONS AND PUT IT ON A CARRIER. ANOTHER WAS TO TURN OVER THE TOTAL - REPEAT TOTAL - EFFORT OF ONE OF OUR SQUADRONS TO 7TH AIR FORCE.

2. THE CINCPAC MESSAGE, AS WRITTEN, HAD FULL PROTECTION FOR YOU. IT ADDRESSED ONLY FULL SYSTEMS SORTIES. IT LEFT THE EMPLOYMENT OF NON-FULL SYSTEMS AIRCRAFT OUT OF THE DEAL, AND PLACED THE DECISION AS TO HOW MANY FULL SYSTEMS SORTIES COULD BE SPARED ENTIRELY IN YOUR HANDS. IT PRESCRIBED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN COMMAND AND CONTROL. AND, MOST IMPORTANT, IT SPELLED OUT THAT YOUR NEEDS WOULD COME FIRST. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU WERE IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT.

3. REF C IS NOT CONSISTEN WITH THE ABOVE KNOWLEDGE. UNTIL IT GETS TO PARA 03 IT IS NEGATIVE IN TENOR AND SUSCEPTIBLE OF BEING INTERPRETED AS A WARNING THAT RELATIVELY LITTLE IS GOING TO

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
3100 San Francisco, California 94111

MATERIALIZE FROM THIS PROGRAM. IN LIGHT OF THE BACKGROUND IN REF A, I CAN SEE NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY ANY PART OF REF C OTHER THAN PARA I AND PARA 5B. I HOPE IT GETS NO FARTHER BECAUSE IF MACV OR 7TH AIR FORCE PUTS THE MESSAGE, WITH ITS NEGATIVE TONE, IN CINCPAC'S HANDS, THERE IS GOING TO BE AN ABUNDANCE OF CAREFUL SCRUTINY TO ASCERTAIN JUST HOW YOU ARE CARRYING OUT THE DECISION. YOUR OPREP4 WILL BE STUDIED MICROSCOPICALLY AND WE MAY EXPECT QUESTIONS, VISITORS, AND ANALYSES GALORE, BECAUSE THE A-6A EMPLOYMENT IS VERY HIGH NOT ONLY IN SHARP'S MIND BUT IN MCNAMARA'S.

4. YOU CAN DEPEND ON ME TO DO MY BEST TO KEEP THE FLUTTER FACTOR DOWN SHOULD RE C--OR FALLOUT FROM IT--REACH HONOLULU. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. MEANWHILE, I AM SURE THAT THERE MUST BE SOMETHING IN THE AFFAIR WHICH DOES NOT SHOW ON THE SURFACE, SO PLEASE TELL ME THE FACTORS WHICH GENERATED REF C IN FACE OF THE KNOWLEDGE CONTAINED IN THE OTHER TWO REFERENCES. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES