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# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY



## APRIL 1967

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 April 1967 - 30 April 1967

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESTINATION

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III Marine Amphibious Force

COMMANDER

Lieutenant General  
Lewis W. WALT, U. S. Marine  
Corps  
4Jun65-30Apr67

DEPUTY COMMANDER

Major General  
Robert E. CUSHMAN, JR.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1-30 April 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

First Marine Division

Major General  
Herman NICKERSON, JR.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1Oct66-30Apr67

Third Marine Division

Major General  
Bruno A. HOCHMUTH  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1-30 April 1967

First Marine Aircraft Wing

Major General  
Louis B. ROBERTSHAW  
U. S. Marine Corps  
16May66-30Apr67

Force Logistic Command

Brigadier General  
James E. HERBOLD, JR.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
3Oct66-30Apr67

7th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel  
Frank W. HARRIS, III  
U. S. Marine Corps  
8Aug66-30Apr67

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9th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel  
George A. BABE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
7Feb67-30Apr67

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11th Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel  
Ross L. MULFORD,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
16Aug66-30Apr67

Sub-Unit #1, First Radio Battalion

Major Willard I. CRUMBACK,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1Mar67-30Apr67

Headquarters and Service Company  
III Marine Amphibious Force

Major Robert E. FINNEY  
U. S. Marine Corps  
27Mar67-30Apr67

ATTACHED UNITS

29th Civil Affairs Company,  
U. S. Army

Lieutenant Colonel  
Lawrence A. STEVENS  
U. S. Army

244th Psychological Operations  
Company, U. S. Army

Major T. H. MC CAIG,  
U. S. Army

2. LOCATION

1-30 April 1967, Danang, Quang Nam Province, Republic  
of Vietnam

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff

Brigadier General  
Robert G. OWENS, JR.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1-30Apr67

Deputy Chief of Staff

Colonel Robert B. NEVILLE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
5 Aug 1966 - 30 April 1967

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Colonel John L. MAHON,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
8Jun66-30Apr67

  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

  
Colonel Benjamin S. READ,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
14Feb67-30Apr67

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Colonel Drew J. BARRETT, JR.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
9Nov66-30Apr67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Colonel Joseph F. QUILTY, JR.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
21May66-30Apr67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Colonel John T. HILL  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1Feb67-26Apr67

Colonel George O. ROSS  
U. S. Marine Corps  
27-30Apr67

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6

Lieutenant Colonel  
Marvin D. VOLKERT,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
28Jul66-30Apr67

Psychological Operations Officer

Colonel Robert R. READ,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1Aug66-30Apr67

Supply Officer

Colonel Arthur T. HILL,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
6Oct66-30Apr67

Communications-Electronics Officer

Colonel Jake B. HILL  
U. S. Marine Corps  
23Mar66-7Apr67

Colonel Sanford B. HUNT, JR.  
U. S. Marine Corps  
8-30Apr67

Legal Officer

Colonel Robert B. NEVILLE,  
U. S. Marine Corps,  
30Jul66-30Apr67

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Engineer Officer

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Colonel Charles H. HORN,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
21Aug66-17Apr67

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Lieutenant Colonel  
William G. TIMME,  
U. S. Marine Corps,  
18-30Apr67

Adjutant

Major John T. REVILLE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
30Jul66-30Apr67

Comptroller

Lieutenant Colonel  
Melvin W. SNOW,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
19Jun66-30Apr67

Chaplain

Captain Earl V. LYONS,  
U. S. Navy  
11Oct66-30Apr67

Combat Information Bureau

Colonel Don G. DERRYBERRY,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
9Feb67-30Apr67

OinC, Combat Operations Center

Lieutenant Colonel  
Robert E. YOUNG,  
U. S. Marine Corps,  
22Dec66-30Apr67

Food Services Officer

Unassigned 1-30Apr67

Surgeon

Captain Howard A. BAKER,  
U. S. Navy  
17Jun66-30Apr67

Dental Officer

Captain Kenneth L. MORGAN,  
U. S. Navy  
31Aug66-30Apr67

Motor Transport Officer

Lieutenant Colonel  
Charles A. TONNACLIFF,  
9Jul66-30Apr67

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██████████  
Ordnance Officer

████████████████████  
Lieutenant Colonel  
John C. THOMAS,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
21Jul66-30Apr67

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Headquarters Commandant

Colonel Jack R. RHOADES,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
16Feb67-22Apr67

Major Robert E. FINNEY,  
U. S. Marine Corps,  
23-30Apr67

Protocol Officer

Major John A. LIVINGSTONE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
17Sep66-8Apr67

Major James T. HARRELL, III  
U. S. Marine Corps  
9-30Apr67

Special Services Officer

Colonel Carl A. SACHS,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
7Sep66-30Apr67

Embarkation Officer

Lieutenant Colonel  
Eugene A. SILVERTHORN,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
3Jul66-30Apr67

Inspector

Colonel Clay A. BOYD,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
12Jun66-30Apr67

Force Historian

Lieutenant Colonel  
John E. FAHEY,  
U. S. Marine Corps,  
28Jul66-30Apr67

USMC Liaison Officer, MACV

Colonel Jack R. RHOADES,  
U. S. Marine Corps,  
22-30Apr67

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS

	<u>OFFICER</u>			<u>ENLISTED</u>		
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>
Hq III MAF	155	12		329	7	
H&SCo	10			245	3	
SU #1 1stRadioBn	8			166		
29th CA Co			26			67
244th PsyOps Co			17			48

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

<u>OFFICER</u>				<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>
4,293	366	706	13	69,627	2,463	8,503	20

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a. GENERAL. During April 1967 III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located in East Danang, Republic of Vietnam. The average personnel strength was 85,991 an average of 5,681 over the previous month.

b. ACTIVITIES. III MAF continues to be guided by COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966, in pursuit of III MAF objectives for April.

2. OVERALL EVALUATION.

a. In April the number of small unit operations conducted by III MAF continued to reflect the continued effort placed upon counter guerrilla activities. April small unit operations totaled 30,806, an increase of only 627 from the previous month, but a continuation of great effort in that area. These operations resulted in 1,067 contacts with the enemy during which 635 KIA (Confirmed) resulted. This reflects the highest attained KIA (Confirmed) results in small unit operations since June 1966.

The April rate of VC/NVA captured, 258, was an increase of 184 over the previous month and is the highest attained rate over the last six months period. Enemy losses totaled 1,649 KIA (Confirmed) and 1,992 KIA (Probable). All losses reflect the increased pressure placed upon the enemy in I Corps Tactical Zone and are indications of the cost the enemy must pay to continue his efforts against III Marine Amphibious Force.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. DISCUSSION. During April, III MAF continued to pursue four major objectives: (1) Destruction of NVA/Main Force VC; (2) Destruction of Guerrilla Forces; (3) Revolutionary Development; (4) Base Defense.

(1) Destruction of NVA/Main Force VC. During April, III MAF conducted a total of fifteen large unit operations. These operations accounted for 811 enemy KIA (Confirmed) and 663 KIA

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(Probable). This is a decrease from the previous month's all time high of 1,549 KIA (Confirmed) and 1,542 KIA (Probable). There were 370 infantry battalion days of operation recorded by III MAF Forces in April. This total compares with 400 in March and 380 in February, a slight reduction.

(2) Destruction of Guerrilla Forces. As stated in the Overall Evaluation above, the continued high rate of counter guerrilla small unit operations totaled 30,806. The high rate of contact during these, 1,067, resulted in 635 KIA (Confirmed). This reflects a continuation of the trend of destruction of the enemy guerrilla forces. Two Special Operation categories, County Fairs and Sting Rays, also inflicted severe damage upon the guerrilla and his infrastructure. These Special Operations, for April, resulted in 203 KIA (Confirmed), 29 PW and 4 weapons captured.

(3) Revolutionary Development.

(a) The 30,806 small unit operations conducted during April, saturated areas of guerrilla activity in support of Revolutionary Development. Through these patrols, ambushes, and company sized search and destroy operations, the enemy was denied safe sanctuary from which he could disrupt or eliminate the conduct of Revolutionary Development. Of the fifteen major unit operations conducted in April, six were within or adjacent to TAOR's in areas of substantial Viet Cong activity. These operations served to restrict or eliminate the Viet Cong capability of interdiction of Revolutionary Development operations.

(b) There were four County Fair Operations in April in areas made safe by III MAF operations. These resulted in 13 KIA (Confirmed), 1 KIA (Probable), 29 PW/VC and 4 weapons captured. MEDCAP assistance was provided for 3,362 Vietnamese during these County Fair Operations.

(4) Base Defense. The First Military Police Battalion continued to provide security for the Danang Air Base Complex. At Chu Lai, the Chu Lai Defense Command continued to provide security for that installation. On 12 April 1967 the airstrip at Chu Lai received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. All rounds impacted at the south end of the airstrip and caused only light damage. Rapid reaction by the Chu Lai Defense Command prevented further attack.

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The small unit operations reported in paragraph 2.a above contributed greatly to the success of base defense in TAOR's by denial to the enemy of free movement near major base complexes.

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## PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

a. Operation PRAIRIE III. During the period 1-19 April 1967, this operation continued in Quang Tri Province. During this final period, contact was light. At 011100H Co L/3/3 sighted and killed 3 NVA. At 091200H CAP-P-1B made contact with an estimated 50 VC in vicinity YD 095593, exchange of small arms fire resulted in 10 VC KIA (Conf) and 5 VC KIA (Prob). At 101330H Recon Team 3C1 made contact with estimated two squads of NVA. Exchange of small arms fire and grenades resulted in 5 NVA KIA (Conf). At 182330H 1stBn 4thMar CP received 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortars. During this period, artillery units in the Gio Linh area were attacked by six separate mortar attacks with a total estimate of 200 rounds of 81/82mm mortars impacting. Patrols operating in the PRAIRIE area on 6 separate occasions found a total of 30 NVA bodies in graves, all killed by fragments and small arms. Five days after this operation terminated, at 241300H, Company A/1/4 in vicinity of YD 156712 uncovered 50 graves, 48 graves contained 2 bodies and 2 contained 4 bodies. All were NVA wearing khaki uniforms. Estimated to have been buried about 3 weeks. Add 104 NVA KIA (Conf) to this Operation. During this entire operation, 448 tactical air sorties and 17,237 artillery missions were provided in support. Results for this period were: USMC: 4 KIA, 201 WIA. Enemy: 171 KIA (Conf), 78 Detainees, 1 VC Returnee, 3 Civil Defendants, 74 Innocent Civilians and 49 weapons. Cumulative results for Operation PRAIRIE III were: USMC: 55 KIA, 529 WIA. Enemy: 356 KIA (Conf), 151 KIA (Prob), 160 Detainees, 4 PW/NVA, 1 VC Returnee, 13 Civil Defendants, 135 Innocent Civilians and 128 weapons captured.

b. Operation CHINOOK II. During the final four days of this operation, contact with enemy forces was light. At 031415H an AO called airstrikes on two enemy positions resulting in 11 VC KIA (Conf). During Operation CHINOOK II, 187 tactical air sorties, 6 NGF missions and 9,245 artillery missions were provided in support. Results for this period were: USMC: 1 KIA, 7 WIA. Enemy: 11 KIA (Conf), 2 Detainees, 5 PW/VC, 1 PW/NVA, 4 Innocent Civilians, and 1 Weapon. Cumulative results of Operation CHINOOK II were: USMC: 12 KIA, 111 WIA. Enemy: 104 KIA (Conf), 197 KIA (Prob), 113 Detainees, 17 PW/VC, 5 PW/NVA, 1 Civil Defendant, 90 Innocent Civilians and 30 weapons captured.

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c. Operation DESOTO. During the final period of Operation DESOTO, 1-7 April 1967, contact with enemy forces was light to moderate. At 010308H, Recon Team from Co D, 1st Recon Bn received 16 grenades and small arms fire from estimated 25 enemy. Returned small arms and called artillery mission. Results were 15 VC KIA (Conf) and 6 KIA (Prob). At 021115H Co K/3/7 search and destroy encountered 15 enemy with weapons. The resulting fire fight netted 5 VC KIA (Conf) and 6 VC KIA (Prob). The most serious occurrence during this final period occurred at 051925H at Co G/2/7 defensive position. A UH-1E MEDEVAC helicopter was in the final approach hovering several feet above the ground. An explosion, from what appeared to be a command detonated mine, resulted in 11 USMC KIA and 14 WIA. During Operation DESOTO, 850 tactical air sorties, 345 NGF and 454 artillery missions were provided. Results for this period were: USMC: 15 KIA, 73 WIA. Enemy: 28 KIA (Conf), 59 KIA (Prob), 23 Detainees, 4 PW/VC, 116 Civil Defendants, 7 Innocent Civilians and 8 weapons. Cumulative results were: USMC: 76 KIA, 573 WIA. Enemy: 383 KIA (Conf), 716 KIA (Prob), 178 Detainees, 9 PW/VC, 142 Civil Defendants, 14 Innocent Civilians and 28 weapons.

d. Operation PRAIRIE IV. During the period 20-30 April 1967, 3rd Marine Division commenced Operation PRAIRIE IV in northern Quang Tri Province. Contact with enemy forces was light to moderate, with the exception of 28 April 1967 when contact was significant. At 221430H Co A/1/9 received 150 rounds of small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Return small arms fire resulted in 2 enemy KIA (Conf) and 7 KIA (Prob). At 241400H Co C/1/4 found a cache of miscellaneous ordnance and uncovered 14 graves, each containing 1 NVA. 14 NVA KIA (Conf). At 271525H Co C/1/9 platoon sweep force found 6 graves with 6 bodies in green uniforms. 6 enemy KIA (Conf). At 280730H Co A/1/9, vicinity YD 256680, found 68 new fighting holes, 78 rocket launchers and 54 rounds of 140mm rockets. At 281755H Artillery units at YD 216731 received an estimated 200 rounds of 82mm and 250 rounds of artillery fire. The attack lasted 100 minutes. Received a total of 7 attacks until 282358H. During this period a total of 400 rounds of artillery and 800 rounds of 82mm mortar fire impacted in the area. Cumulative results for this period were: USMC 18 KIA, 269 WIA. Enemy: 45 KIA (Conf), 55 KIA (Prob), 26 Detainees and 32 weapons captured.

e. Operation BOONE. During the period 1-7 April 1967, 5th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in the south-east sector of the Chu Lai TAOR in coordination with units of the 2nd ARVN Division and the 2nd Brigade ROKMC. Contact during the operation was light to moderate. At 021615H Co D/1/7 received

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100 rounds of small arms fire from estimated 10 enemy. Air-strike was called and observed by AO. 4 VC KIA (Conf). At 031330H Co D/1/7 search and destroy found a cave containing an unknown number of enemy. A CS grenade was thrown into the cave. The enemy threw the CS grenade out. An M-26 grenade was thrown into the cave resulting in 5 VC KIA (Conf). At 040915H Co L/3/5 search and destroy received 50 rounds of small arms fire from unknown number of enemy. Returned small arms fire resulted in 6 VC KIA (Conf). During this operation 33 tactical air sorties and 378 artillery missions were provided. Cumulative results were: USMC: 2 KIA, 61 WIA. Enemy: 39 KIA (Conf), 17 KIA (Prob), 66 Detainees, 8 PW/VC, 6 Innocent Civilians and 9 weapons captured.

f. Operation Big Horn. During the period 5-21 April 1967, 4th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in Thua Thien Province. Contact with enemy forces was moderate during the first three days, but dropped off to light contacts during the remainder of the period. At 060050H in vicinity of YD 645277 a provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery of the 12th Marines received approximately 100 rounds of 82mm mortars followed by an attack of an estimated two VC companies. VC used small arms, grenades, hand held rocket launchers and satchel charges. The attack ceased at 060340H. Casualties were, 3 USMC KIA and 8 USMC WIA. Enemy, 12 VC KIA (Conf), 23 VC KIA (Prob) and 5 Detainees. Between 101315H-101500H a Recon patrol observed 84 VC in vicinity of YD 603265. Called artillery mission, fired 100 rounds small arms fire resulting in 18 VC KIA (Conf) and 5 VC KIA (Prob). At 101745H AO called airstrike on an enemy position, 6 VC KIA (Conf). At 121215H Co E/2/4 received sniper fire, returned small arms fire and searched the area and found 2 VC KIA (Conf). At 201120H Co F/2/4 observed 8 VC digging in an ambush position. Fired small arms and M-79 grenades resulting in 7 VC KIA (Conf). An unusual incident occurred at 081225H when a member of the 1stBn 9thMar stepped on an M-16 mine. The Marine recognized it to be a mine and remained on it while the mine was disarmed by an Engineer. There were 33 tactical air sorties and 4,394 artillery missions provided in support. Cumulative results were: USMC: 22 KIA, 127 WIA. Enemy: 70 KIA (Conf), 146 KIA (Prob), 22 Detainees, 1 Returnee/VC, 9 Civil Defendants, 11 Innocent Civilians and 12 weapons captured.

g. Operation CANYON. During the period 6-10 April 1967, 1st Marines conducted a Combined search and destroy operation with three battalions of ARVN troops just below the southeast sector of the Danang TAOR. The operation was conducted along the boundary of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces within 5

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kilometers of the sea. Contact, for the most part, was significant. Numerous small contacts with enemy forces were experienced, each with resultant kills of 1 to 3 VC. At 071400H Co K/3/1 observed 5 enemy. Called artillery mission of 15 rounds of 105mm. 4 VC KIA (Conf). At 071600H Co K/3/1 platoon sweep force with tanks received 75 rounds of small arms fire. Return small arms fire and 10 rounds of 90mm resulted in 6 VC KIA (Conf). At 071830H Co H/2/26 platoon sweep force received estimated 200 rounds small arms fire from approximately 20 VC. Returned 500 rounds small arms fire and 10 M-79 grenades resulting in 6 VC KIA (Conf) and 7 VC KIA (Prob). At 091000H Co C/1/1 platoon patrol observed 6-7 enemy running from sweep force, patrol fired 100 rounds small arms and 5 LAAW's resulting in 5 VC KIA (Conf). At 091545H Co A/1/1 sweep force observed 11 enemy moving South. Fired heavy volume of small arms, killing 9 VC (Conf). There were 55 NGF and 116 artillery missions provided in support of this operation. Cumulative results were: USMC: 3 KIA, 40 WIA. Enemy: 85 KIA (Conf), 10 KIA (Prob), 190 Detainees 89 PW/VC, 1 PW/NVA, 100 Innocent Civilians and 7 weapons.

h. Operation DIXIE. During the period 7-10 April 1967, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in Quang Nam Province, in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR. Contact during the operation was light. At 071230H, the first day of the operation, Co G/2/5 observed an enemy platoon in separated disposition moving East. Utilizing 30 rounds of 90mm fire from accompanying tanks, resulted in 8 VC KIA (Conf) and 5 VC KIA (Prob). This operation, though short in duration, had a high friendly casualty rate of WIA. This was due largely from encounters with a variety of booby traps and punji pits. The most serious occurrence was at 101510H when an LVTP-5, carrying troops from Co G/2/5, detonated a mine resulting in 30 WIA's of which 29 were MEDEVAC. Cumulative results were: USMC: 54 WIA. Enemy: 8 KIA (Conf), 42 KIA (Prob) and 1 PW/VC.

i. Operation HUMBOLDT. During the period 13-17 April 1967, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in Quang Nam Province near Tu Cau (3). Contact with enemy forces was light. At 140845H Co M/3/1 sweep force observed one enemy. Fired 3 rounds small arms resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf). At 141400H Co C 1stTkBn platoon observed 5 enemy. Fired 300 rounds of automatic weapons fire, 1 VC KIA (Conf). At 142015H Co L/3/1 observed 1 enemy swimming across a river. Fired 5 rounds of small arms and 1 M-79 grenade, 1 VC KIA (Conf). At 151420H Co M/3/1 sweep force found a cave under a building. Captured 5 VC and assorted equipment. There was one tactical air sortie and 6 artillery missions provided in support of this

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operation. Cumulative results were: USMC: 9 WIA. Enemy: 13 KIA (Conf), 1 KIA (Prob), 15 Detainees, 13 PW/VC and 6 weapons captured.

j. Operation LAWRENCE. During the period 17-19 April 1967, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, U. S. Army, conducted their first search and destroy operation since arrival in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The operation was conducted along the boundary of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces. There were no enemy sightings or contacts. Cumulative results were: USA: None. Enemy: None.

k. Operation YELL. During the period 18-20 April 1967, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR. Contact during the operation was light to moderate. Between 180630H and 180645H squad combat patrols from Co E/2/1 made 5 contacts with the enemy. Utilizing small arms fire in all contacts results were 7 VC KIA (Conf). At 192200H Co H/2/1 squad combat patrol heard movement to their front. Fired 20 rounds small arms fire and three M-79 grenades. Results were 3 VC KIA (Conf). There were 17 artillery missions fired in support of this operation. Cumulative results were: USMC: 6 KIA, 17 WIA. Enemy: 17 KIA (Conf), 11 KIA (Prob), 32 Detainees and 3 weapons captured.

l. Operation GRAND. During the period 21-26 April 1967, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines conducted an ARC Light Exploitation operation in Quang Nam Province in the southwestern portion of the Danang TAOR. Contact with enemy forces was insignificant. At 211908H Co L/3/7 search and destroy sweep force found pools of blood near a bomb crater. 2 VC KIA (Prob). During the operation 47 Detainees were apprehended. Cumulative results were: USMC: 1 WIA. Enemy: 2 KIA (Prob), 47 Detainees.

m. Operation UNION. During the period 21-30 April 1967, the First Marines commenced search and destroy operations in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces as a reaction to a major contact 15 kilometers west northwest of Tam Ky, in the Hiep Duc/Tien Phouc valley, where Co F/2/1 encountered an estimated VC battalion at 0655H on 21 April. As Co F/2/1 was taking heavy casualties from a well concealed and entrenched enemy, Company M and I/3/1 were committed as a reaction force and immediately engaged the enemy. The Commanding General, First Marine Division committed a total of three infantry battalions (-), 1/1(-), 3/1(-), and 3/5(-) from the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's. The first contact of the operation was the most significant, in terms of casualties to both friendly and enemy forces. By the time the

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initial contact subsided on the night of 21 April 1967, Marine losses stood at 41 KIA and 97 WIA with incomplete enemy casualties standing at 89 KIA (Conf) and 84 KIA (Prob). From this time through 25 April the most significant contacts were by reconnaissance elements who, while suffering no casualties, accounted for 46 enemy KIA (Conf) and 83 KIA (Prob). The operation continued through 30 April with 3 infantry battalions under OPCON of the 5th Marines. During this period 30 tactical air sorties and 605 artillery missions were provided. Cumulative results were: USMC: 50 KIA, 172 WIA. Enemy: 278 KIA (Conf), 288 KIA (Prob), 52 Detainees, 32 PW/VC and 14 weapons captured.

n. Operation SHAWNEE. During the period 22-30 April 1967, the Fourth Marines commenced search and destroy operations in Thua Thien Province west of Hue City. Contact with enemy forces was light during this period. At 221415H an Aerial Observer called an airstrike on 29 VC vicinity of YD 580249 resulting in 27 VC KIA (Conf). At 261130H Co F/2/9 found 2 bodies in graves, killed by fragments. 2 VC KIA (Conf). At 301055H a Recon Team made contact with 10 VC. Fired small arms resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf). At 301810H a Recon Team observed 3 VC. Fired small arms. Movement heard in the same area. Fired small arms again and searched the area, 6 VC KIA (Conf) and 6 VC KIA (Prob). During this period 53 tactical air sorties and 1884 artillery missions were provided. Cumulative results were. USMC: 2 KIA, 46 WIA. Enemy: 46 KIA (Conf), 15 KIA (Prob), 11 Detainees, 2 PW/VC, 1 Civil Defendant, 7 Innocent Civilians and 4 weapons captured.

o. Operation BEACON STAR. On 22 April 1967, BLT 2/3 commenced search and destroy operations in Thua Thien Province after launching an amphibious assault along the beach approximately 20 kilometers northwest of Hue City. OPCON was passed to III MAF and subsequently to 3rd Marine Division on 24 April 1967. Contact during the initial phase was light. Phase II of Operation BEACON STAR commenced at 261000H. At 261200H BLT 2/3 chopped OPCON to the Third Marines and entered the Khe Sanh operating area. During the remainder of the month the operation continued Phase II in General Support with negative contact. Cumulative results were: USMC: 1 KIA, 10 WIA. Enemy: 17 KIA (Prob) and 1 Detainee.

p. KHE SANH CONTACT. The Khe Sanh Unnamed operation began on 24 April 1967 at 241100H when an 81mm Forward Observer Team and Security unit on Hill 861 (XD 803444) was taken under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire and forced to withdraw back to their parent units location to the southwest. As a result of the initial contact, the 1st and 3rd platoons of Company B,

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1st Battalion, 9th Marines became heavily engaged while attempting to regain the hill. A Command Group from the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and Company K, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, were alerted to move to Khe Sanh from the PRAIRIE IV operation and another company was placed on four hour alert as additional reaction force. Bad weather prevented reinforcements on the 24th and TPQ-10 air strikes along with heavy artillery supporting fires were placed upon the enemy positions. Casualties for the initial contact stood at 12 KIA, 17 WIA and 4 MIA. At 250945H the alerted Command Group of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and Company K, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines moved to Khe Sanh by helicopter. During the morning, elements of Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines made contact with an enemy unit estimated at company strength. Friendly casualties from that contact were 9 KIA, 8 WIA and 5 MIA. The additional alert company, Company K, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Khe Sanh at 251720H and took up defensive positions for the night. Company K, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines took up defensive positions on their present locations to the northwest of Khe Sanh. At 260700H Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and Company K, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines moved out in the attack against Hill 861 and came under heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy company. Continued reinforcements were being sent into the operating area to counter the enemy buildup in the region. At 261200H Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines arrived at Khe Sanh and at 261430H the Command Group of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines and Companies G and H, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines arrived at Khe Sanh and began movement to the battle area. This increased the total ground units in the contact area to five infantry companies and two Command Groups. Second Battalion, 3rd Marines (-) with Companies E, G and H linked up with Company K, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines units in the vicinity of Hill 861 at 270830H. At 271130H the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines elements returned to Khe Sanh and 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines (-) remained in the battle area in the vicinity of Hill 861. There was no significant ground contact during the day of 27 April, however, ground and air observers made many visual observations of the enemy. At 271345H a reconnaissance team north of the Khe Sanh area was hit upon insertion and a CH-46 helicopter shot down. Helicopter burned, patrol and crew extracted, 3 patrol members WIA. At this time the 3rd Marine Division, due to the heavy automatic weapons, mortar and recoilless rifles being used by the enemy in their stubborn defense of Hill 861, reassessed the enemy strength to be of battalion size.

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Fixed wing aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was used extensively against enemy bunkers, trench lines and other positions. No significant contact was made during the day. At 281400H 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines moved out in the attack to regain Hill 861 followed in trace by 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. Two axis of advance were used from the South and the Southwest. At 281600H Company G, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines reached the western proximity of Hill 861 without contact. There that unit found 200 fighting holes, 4 mortar positions, 11 sleeping bunkers, several weapons and hand grenades. At 281630, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines secured Hill 861, recovering 6 friendly KIA's previously reported as missing in action. At 281710H Aerial Observer conducted airstrikes on enemy positions 10 kilometers northwest of Hill 861, destroying gun positions and observing many bodies. Aerial Observer debrief indicated 10 bunkers destroyed, 44 KIA (Confirmed), 20 KIA (Probable) during the strikes conducted on 28 April. At 290800H 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines moved in the attack against Hill 881 (South), one of two key promontories to the southwest and northwest from Hill 861. At 291200H Company M, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines received heavy automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Sporadic fighting continued throughout the day during the advance. At 301940 Company M, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines observed 30 NVA on Hill 881 (South) and to the East setting up mortars. Artillery missions were called with good coverage; 25 KIA (Probable). The remainder of the day and night remained relatively quiet. On 30 April one company of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Hill 861 with the remainder of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines moving in the attack against Hill 881 (North). 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines continued its attack against Hill 881 (South). Contact continued against enemy units up to platoon size as the advance to the objectives continued. At 1200 Company M, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines was on Hill 881 South encountering heavy resistance, mortar fires and small arms fire from enemy bunkers. 15 bunkers cleared. At 1500 both 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines and 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines were in contact and still receiving heavy enemy resistance. Supporting arms and air were working over both Hill 881 North and Hill 881 South. At 1605 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines was on Hill 881 North in heavy contact with one company in trace and moving forward. 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines was in light contact on Hill 881 South. Both Battalions were encountering positions honeycombed with enemy fortifications and bunkers.

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Cumulative casualties, as a result of this  
contact, for the period 24-30 April 1967 were:

USMC: 93 KIA, 257 WIA

Enemy: 253 KIA (Conf), 453 KIA (Prob)

2 PW/NVA

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2. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY.

	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>
KIA (Conf)	2159	1649
KIA (Prob)	2144	1992
Detainees	1004	1475
NVA PW	16	2
VC PW	58	256
NVA Returnees	0	1
VC Returnees	2	11
Civil Defendants	188	380
Innocent Civilians	697	737
Individual Weapons Captured	152	248
Crew Served Weapons Captured	7	11

3. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES SUSTAINED.

a. Battle.

<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
234	12	2,068	91	38	1	6	0

b. Non-Battle

<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
17	0	116	3

4. PERSONNEL.

a. Special Services

(1) Freedom Hill Recreation Center

(a) Library. The library building is complete. Metal shelving has been assembled; desks, chairs and tables are available. A Marine Lance Corporal who spent several weeks on the job training in Saigon has been assigned as Librarian. Additional civilian personnel will be hired.

(b) Hobby Shops. Except for the air conditioners which have not arrived in country, the hobby shop structures

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are completed. Equipment has been ordered.

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(c) Theater. The theater is open and going well. There are 4 shows Monday-Saturday and 3 on Sundays. Duct work for the air conditioning is progressing; the air conditioners are expected in country about 10 May 1967. Air conditioners have been installed in the projection booth.

(d) Bowling Alley. The bowling alley building is about 70 per cent complete. The alley equipment has been shipped to the West Coast for MSTC shipment to Danang.

(e) Gymnasium. The grading has been completed and work has commenced on a retaining wall.

(f) Tennis Courts and Basketball Courts. The tennis courts and basketball courts are completed. Lights have been installed at one basketball court.

(g) Signs. New signs for Freedom Hill facilities are being constructed.

(2) China Beach Recreation Center

(a) An additional 100 bunks, mattresses and pillows have been ordered. This will raise the billeting spaces available for in-country R&R to 500.

(b) An armory that can handle about 5,000 rifles has been designed and will be completed about 15 June.

(3) Entertainment. The following shows visited I Corps during April:

<u>TROUPE</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Black Caps	28Mar-3Apr	U.S. Military Musical Show
Marshal Thompson	31Mar-3Apr	Handshake Tour
Henry Fonda	9-11 Apr	Handshake Tour
Peter Palmer Show	12-16 Apr	Musical Variety
3 D's Musical Show	15-18 Apr	Musical Variety
Brian Kelly	20-23 Apr	Handshake Tour
Stateside USO Show	26-28 Apr	Variety Show
Richard Tucker	28-29 Apr	Opera Singer

(4) R&R Program (Out-of-Country). The following are the April statistics for III MAF and I Corps R&R usage for each out-of-country site:

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<u>Site</u>	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>I Corps</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	1308	512	1820
Hong Kong	1095	382	1477
Singapore	189	60	249
Manila	347	174	521
Okinawa	258	17	275
Taipei	686	300	986
Kula Lumpur	125	41	166
Hawaii	1324	453	1777
Tokyo	900	395	1295
Penang	<u>188</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>240</u>
TOTALS	6420	2386	8806

~~SECRET~~b. Chaplain.

(1) 6-7 April - Dr. Arthur Rutledge, Executive Secretary and Treasurer, Home Mission Board, Southern Baptist Convention, visited the Command for the purpose of meeting with the Southern Baptist Chaplains serving in III MAF and to visit Civic Action Projects. He was entertained at dinner 6 April by the Chief of Staff.

(2) 6 April - The Force Chaplain participated in presentation ceremony at ARVN hospital in which wheel chairs from World Vision, Inc., were presented to patients of the ARVN Hospital, Danang.

(3) 8-9 April - A Latter-Day Saints conference was held in the Chapel at the China Beach R&R Center under the leadership of Lt. N. H. Kearsley, III MAF Latter-Day Saints Chaplain and Captain C. N. Reading, USA, liaison officer 1st Marine Division.

(4) 9 April - The Force Chaplain participated in the dedication of new dormitory and classroom building of the Dieu Nhan Buddhist orphanage in Hoi An.

(5) 10 April - The Reverend William Flood, Minister to Service Personnel, American Baptist Convention, visited the Command for the purpose of meeting with American Baptist Chaplains serving in III MAF.

(6) 16 April - Force Chaplain participated in corner stone laying ceremony for the Evangelical Church of Cu Loo Re island 20 miles off coast of Chu Lai being built with the assistance of MAG-36.

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(7) 18 April - A memorial service for Colonel Charles Horn was held in the III MAF Chapel.

(8) 27 April - The Reverend Raymond C. Hohenstein, Executive Secretary for Field Services Division of Service to Military Personnel, Lutheran Council in the USA, visited the Command for the purpose of meeting with Lutheran Chaplains serving in III MAF.

(9) 24-25 April - The beginning of the Festival of Jewish Passover was observed with two Seders at the East Danang USO under the leadership of Lt. D. B. Saltzman, CHC, USNR, III MAF Jewish Chaplain.

(10) 28-30 April - Eastern Orthodox Holy Week and Easter Services were observed in the 1st Marine Air Wing Chapel under the leadership of Cdr. Boris Geeza, CHC, USN, III MAF Eastern Orthodox Chaplain.

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5. INTELLIGENCE.~~SECRET~~

a. General Enemy Situation. During the month of April the intensity of enemy activity increased in the northern portion of the I Corp Tactical Zone.

Early in the month the enemy centered his actions in eastern Quang Tri Province where mortar and ground attacks were made against several points in the general vicinity of Quang Tri City.

In the western portion of the province and throughout the first three weeks in April, a gradually increasing level of enemy ground movement was observed north of Thon Son Lam and west of the Khe Sanh combat base. In response to this intelligence and commencing 24 April, Marine units patrolling northwest of Khe Sanh gained contact with what was eventually estimated to be a multi-battalion size NVA force whose mission appeared to have been the destruction of the Khe Sanh facility. Heavy but intermittent action continued in this sector through the end of the reporting period.

In consort with his efforts in the Khe Sanh area, and well within the same time frame, the enemy directed heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery fire against friendly installations at Gio Linh and Dong Ha.

Northeastern Thua Thien Province represented an additional but lesser focus of enemy activity. As an adjunct to the early April attacks in the vicinity of Quang Tri City the enemy launched a battalion sized attack against PK-17 (YD 645277). Heavy action ensued with the VC being repulsed. Toward the middle of the month and north of Hue City, ARVN and RD elements defeated a large enemy force of estimated reinforced battalion size.

The remainder of eastern Thua Thien Province witnessed continued enemy attempts to interfere with GVN pacification programs.

The end of the month saw a substantial increase in Marine ground reconnaissance forward of the western approaches to the Phu Bai TAOR and Hue City. The last week of April produced sightings of approximately 250 of the enemy which was a considerable increase over the previous two reporting periods covering the same locale.

In southeastern Quang Nam Province the centralization of enemy activity previously experienced in the area south of Hoi An City remained at much the same level as that reported last

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month, although the intensity per incident dropped off sharply. Collectively the effort remained significant, singularly the incidents were limited to small scale harassing actions.

Reconnaissance activity, toward the middle of the month and south of the Danang TAOR produced a rise in observed movement of small groups of the enemy. This increase was followed on 21 April by a substantial contact south of Nui Loc San between units of the 1st Marines and enemy elements of battalion strength. Following moderate to heavy action the defeated enemy rapidly withdrew and dispersed.

Both Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces were relatively quiet for the month of April. This was certainly true when compared to enemy initiated activity in the northern portion of the I CTZ.

An analysis of current intelligence information, though unconfirmed, points toward possible redeployment of elements of the 2nd NVA Division north out of Quang Ngai into Quang Tin Province.

In eastern Quang Ngai Province the most significant enemy initiated ground action occurred in Son Tinh District where ARVN elements fought off and routed a VC ambush. To the south and in Mo Duc District U. S. Army infantry units captured large quantities of enemy rice.

Throughout the I CTZ and particularly along the populated coastal lowlands the enemy gave every indication of a concentration of local VC action against the RD effort.

b. Quang Tri Province and the DMZ. Early in the period ground reconnaissance north of Thon Son Lam, south of the western portion of Route 9 and west of the Khe Sanh combat base produced sightings of 150 NVA. Sixty-eight of the enemy were observed in the general vicinity of (XD 9060) and three contacts were made in the same sector with small groups of the enemy.

There was a significant increase in the tempo and intensity of enemy activities in eastern Quang Tri during the first week of April. A series of mortar and ground attacks were made against friendly installations on 6 April in Quang Tri City, at La Vang (YD 345505) and at Hai Lang and Trieu Phong District Headquarters in the same area. These actions included entry, by an unknown number of VC, into Quang Tri City Provincial jail where over 200 prisoners were set free. At La Vang, enemy action consisted of a short mortar attack

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followed by a ground assault. Friendly elements stood their ground, firing howitzers at point blank range and calling artillery down on their own positions. The 4th Bn., 2nd ARVN Regt., moving in as a reaction force, gained contact with an estimated enemy company. One of the three PW's taken in this action, the only one not seriously wounded, stated that he had recently infiltrated into eastern Quang Tri. An additional report indicated that the 814th Bn had participated in the action along with several local force units. The next day an additional contact between the 2nd Bn., 1st ARVN Regt. was made with an estimated enemy battalion at (YD 3260). The enemy unit appeared to have been withdrawing from the scene of the previous days action.

Over the period 9 through 15 April northeastern Quang Tri was relatively quiet. Enemy mortar fire directed at friendly units and facilities at Con Thien and Gio Linh was insignificant. On 13 April the Quang Tri City Citadel received approximately 36 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. A reaction force subsequently discovered the mortar positions one kilometer north of the city on the bank of the Song Thach Han River.

Ground reconnaissance deployed north of Cam Lo and north of the Khe Sanh combat base over 16-22 April reported sightings of the enemy which totalled approximately 160 NVA. On 20 April in the vicinity of (YD 1065) a reconnaissance element discovered a hut containing 200 assorted mortar rounds and a large quantity of grenades and flares. On 21 April at (XD 8752) northeast of Khe Sanh, contact was made with an estimated 50 man NVA element and at (XD 7346) west of Khe Sanh an additional reconnaissance element made contact with an enemy group of approximately 56 NVA.

Commencing 24 April there was a distinct increase in the tempo of enemy activity in western Quang Tri. In the vicinity of Hill 861 (XD 803444) approximately six kilometers northwest of the Khe Sanh combat base, elements of the 1st Bn., 9th Marines gained contact with what was subsequently estimated to be a reinforced enemy battalion. By 25 April the initial contact had developed into substantial action with an enemy force of at least two battalions. Rapid reinforcement with elements of the 2nd and 3rd Bn's, 3rd Marines supported by a full spectrum of available supporting fires provided the final impetus to a spoiling attack which disrupted an apparent enemy effort against the Khe Sanh combat base. The intensity of the air strikes

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brought against Hill 861 and enemy personnel and fortifications in the same vicinity permitted the reoccupation of the hill by assaulting Marine rifle elements. Enemy casualties in the Khe Sanh area for the period 24 through 30 April were 253 NVA KIA (Conf) and 453 NVA KIA (Prob).

Northeast of Con Thien and on 24 April, elements of 1st Bn., 4th Marines discovered two groups of graves. The first at (YD 156712) consisted of 50 graves and produced 104 NVA dead; the bodies were clothed in khaki uniforms. The second at (YD 144723) involved 14 graves containing the same number of dead.

On 27-28 April, Gio Linh received 850 rounds of mixed 105/122mm artillery fire plus 200 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At the same time the Gio Linh Sub-Sector Headquarters received an estimated 190 rounds of 82 mm mortar. Friendly artillery returned fire with unknown results. To the west and a short time following the attacks just mentioned, the Con Thien OP received eight rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle fire and finally, on 28 April, 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.

To the south and during the early hours of 28 April, the Dong Ha area received 82 rounds of mixed 140mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire. Fifty rounds were scattered in the Dong Ha combat base and 32 rounds in close proximity to the 2nd ARVN Regt Headquarters.

For the month of April enemy actions in Quang Tri Province would appear to have been based on the attempted destruction of friendly units and installations.

c. Thua Thien Province and the Phu Bai TAOR. For the first week of the month there was a definite increase in the tempo of enemy activity in eastern Thua Thien Province. On 4 April in the vicinity of (XD 615390) during Operation Big Horn, elements of 1st Bn, 9th Marines engaged an estimated enemy company. Enemy casualties were 6 VC KIA (Conf) and 40 VC KIA (Prob).

On 6 April an estimated enemy battalion hit PK-17 (YD 645277). The action, following a familiar pattern, involved a preliminary mortar attack preceding a ground assault which eventually penetrated the position. The VC were subsequently forced to withdraw. Documents found after the attack identified the 800th Main Force Bn of the 6th Regt. In addition the C.12 Sapper Co was listed as a supporting element.

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Hue City and the surrounding locale sustained a fairly large number of minor and small scale harassing and probing actions for the first week of the month.

Southeast of the Phu Bai TAOR between Phu Bai and Danang the enemy maintained his approach to terrorism through the use of mines along Highway 1.

During the second week of April the tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity in eastern Thua Thien dropped off slightly. Enemy efforts reported remained centered in the northeastern portion of the province and east of the southern end of the Phu Bai TAOR.

On 10 April at (YD 712286), RF and PF elements discovered a trench containing 47 VC bodies. The enemy had apparently been killed by either artillery or air strikes.

Approximately eight kilometers north of Hue City, elements of the 2nd Bn., 3rd ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated two companies of VC. Heavy action followed before the VC broke contact and fled. Six VC were killed and five weapons captured, one of which was crew served.

Ground reconnaissance deployed forward of the western approaches to the Phu Bai TAOR reported a significant rise in the number of enemy sighted over the period 9 through 15 April. A total of approximately 180 VC were observed. A greater portion of this number were sighted in proximity to the Co Bi Thanh Tan area.

The level of enemy activity in eastern Thua Thien dropped off slightly during the third week of the reporting period.

During the early morning hours of 17 April, the Thua Thien Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and RD Teams 5 and 8 sustained simultaneous ground attack approximately five kilometers northeast of Hue City. The reconnaissance unit was returning from a successful ambush launched against three enemy sampans, which had resulted in 17 VC KIA, and joined forces with RD Team 8 against the enemy. RD Team 5 withdrew from contact. ARVN forces reacted rapidly and by noon RD Team 8 had linked up with the 1st Bn., 3rd ARVN Regt in a counterattack. By late afternoon the enemy had increased in strength to an estimated reinforced battalion; however, effective USMC and ARVN supporting fires contained the enemy and by early evening, contact ceased with the enemy withdraw-

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ing. The determined and aggressive stand made by participating units contributed to the defeat of a large enemy force. Total enemy casualties were 71 VC KIA, 14 individual and one crew served weapon captured. Documents taken during the encounter indicated that elements of the 808th Bn had participated in the action.

The enemy continued to initiate harassing attacks against friendly elements located southeast of the Phu Bai TAOR and Danang for the third week in April. CAC elements in the general vicinity of (ZD 085006) made three contacts with enemy elements from squad to platoon size. Twenty VC were killed in these actions.

The last week of April was one of relative quiet in eastern Thua Thien Province.

Heavy ground reconnaissance deployed forward of the western approaches to Hue City and the Phu Bai TAOR reported a sharp increase in the number of enemy sighted. Approximately 250 of the enemy were observed within these areas over the week. Seven short contacts with small groups of VC were also reported by reconnaissance patrols.

During the early morning hours of 28 April the Phu Bai base complex received approximately 100 rounds of 82mm mortar rounds.

d. Quang Nam Province and the Danang TAOR. With reference to the province as a whole, the enemy effort was again concentrated in the southeastern portion between Hoi An and the Quang Nam/Quang Tin border. Though not of the intensity noted last month, this particular area remained a center of enemy activity.

The first and second week of April witnessed a sharp drop in the number of enemy sighted by Marine reconnaissance deployed to the south of the Danang TAOR. The remainder of the month saw a considerable increase in the number of enemy sighted in this area in south Quang Nam Province. Ground reconnaissance reported sightings which totaled approximately 340 of the enemy for the week 23 through 30 April.

In the vicinity of (BT 005583) on 9 April a reconnaissance patrol contact precipitated action between elements of 1st Bn., 26th Marines and an estimated 40 of the enemy. Subsequent fighting utilized both air and artillery support.

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Enemy casualties were 25 VC KIA (Conf), eight detainees and an assortment of equipment captured.

In Dai Loc District on 19 April, a CAC element in night defensive positions three kilometers north of Dai Loc City was attacked by an estimated VC company. The VC managed to penetrate the perimeter and destroyed several bunkers before being forced to withdraw. One VC was killed during the action.

On 16 April, the 706th RF Company manning the Cam Kim OP (BT 132561) one kilometer south of Hoi An City, was assaulted by an estimated VC company. Thirty VC were killed during the engagement. This contact was the heaviest reported from the sector south of Hoi An City.

On 21 April, elements of F Co., 2nd Bn., 1st Marines in the vicinity of Nui Loc San (BT 0530), gained contact with an estimated enemy company. Subsequent action grew in intensity with reaction forces being committed. Contact continued and by 22 April the enemy force was estimated to be at reinforced battalion strength.

Enemy casualties as of 30 April were 278 VC KIA (Conf), 288 VC KIA (Prob), 32 PW's and 14 weapons captured, one of which was crew served. Enemy movement noted by ground reconnaissance south of the Danang TAOR during the last week of the month and as mentioned above might possibly have been attributed to dispersal of the unit involved in action against Marines at Nui Loc San.

e. Quang Tin Province and the Chu Lai TAOR. Quang Tin Province remained relatively quiet for the second consecutive month. Enemy activity reported, occurred along Highway 1 and in the vicinity immediately north of Tam Ky City.

On 2 April and in the vicinity of Tam Ky City, two companies of the 3rd Bn., 5th ARVN Regt in night defensive positions were attacked by an estimated two VC companies. Following a heavy fire fight, the VC pulled back. Enemy casualties were 50 VC KIA (Conf). ARVN reported that documents taken during the action indicated the enemy unit as the 72nd VC Bn supported by local force elements. This particular sector is considered a normal operating area for the unit.

On 13 April at (BT 198372) four kilometers southeast of Thang Binh, a PF platoon along with RD Team Number 1 were

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attacked by an estimated two companies of VC. The RF and RD returned fire and the VC hastily withdrew.

On 12 April the Chu Lai airstrip received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire which impacted at the south end of the airstrip. Damage was light.

Recent enemy activity in the vicinity of Nui Loc San raises the possibility of future enemy action in the northern portions of Quang Tin Province. Intelligence information is available, though unconfirmed, which points toward possible redeployment of elements of the 2nd NVA Div out of Quang Ngai into Quang Tin as part of his forthcoming summer campaign plan.

f. Quang Ngai Province. When compared to the three previous months the current reporting period portrayed a lack of significant enemy ground activity. His approach consisted of relatively small scale ground actions in the southern portion of the Chu Lai TAOR and in the Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts. Though relatively dormant during the month, the enemy retains the capability of pressing a far more intense ground offensive approach in Quang Ngai Province.

Approximately five kilometers west of Son Tinh Village one company of the 1st Bn., 7th ARVN Regt was attacked by an estimated VC company. A heavy fire fight ensued and an airstrike was called in which resulted in 30 VC KIA (Conf).

On 7 April and at (BS 660603), the Hoa Vinh OP manned by an RF company was attacked and temporarily overrun by an estimated enemy battalion. The VC reportedly used tear gas and employed a flamethrower. Supporting artillery and air were called in resulting in 80 VC KIA (Conf). A document taken from a dead VC identified the participating unit as the 95th Bn., 2nd VC Regt., 3rd NVA Div. It now appears that elements of the 2nd Regt are operating in the northern Mo Duc and Nghia Hanh Districts.

Thirteen kilometers southeast of Quang Ngai City the 3rd Co., 3rd Bn., 4th ARVN Regt in night defensive positions was attacked by a multi-company VC force. Heavy action followed and the VC were driven off. Enemy casualties were 23 KIA (Conf) and five individual weapons captured.

The third week in April produced only isolated and small scale enemy harassing actions against more remote ARVN,

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RF and PF security elements.

During the latter part of the month and in Mo Duc District, the 1st Bn, 35th Infantry, USA, found a 25,000-lb rice cache at (BS 765408) and B Troop, 1st of the 9th Cavalry, USA, found 70,000-lbs of rice six kilometers southwest of Nui Dang Village at (BS 782336).

At (BS 775425) on 22-23 April, elements of the 1st Bn., 35th Infantry gained contact with the enemy in a series of engagements which accounted for 60 VC KIA (Conf) and eight individual and two crew served weapons captured.

On 27 April at (BS 8243), naval gunfire accounted for 65 VC KIA (Conf) and 20 KIA (Prob). In addition enemy structures, bunkers and trenches were destroyed and four large secondary explosions observed.

g. Enemy Action Statistics. Facts pertaining to enemy activities in allied operating areas, including combat bases, for March and April are as follows:

	<u>Enemy Initiated Activity</u>	
	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
Attacks	12	8
Ambush	7	7
Assault by fire	28	14
Harassing fire	545	494
Mine/Booby Traps	206	202
Sabotage	37	24
Terrorism	27	20
Anti-Aircraft Fire	<u>772</u>	<u>654</u>
TOTALS	1548	1423

h. Enemy Order of Battle.

Enemy Unit Recapitulation as of 30 April:

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>
1 Military Region Hq	1 Regimental Hq
1 Military Sub-region Hq	
3 Division Hq	
8 Regimental Hq	
41 Infantry Battalions	1 Infantry Battalion
26 Separate Companies	4 Separate Companies

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~~SECRET~~Comparison of Mar/April Estimated Enemy Strength in I CTZ

	<u>As of 31 March</u>	<u>As of 30 April</u>
Confirmed VC/NVA Units	27,054	32,167
Probable VC/NVA Units	750	750
Guerrillas	<u>17,140</u>	<u>17,100</u>
TOTALS	44,944	50,017

i. Counterintelligence.

(1) Propaganda and Subversion. VC propaganda activity for the month of April remained relatively the same as the preceding reporting period. Propaganda leaflets were again directed against U.S./ARVN forces and the rural pacification program. Also appearing this month were leaflets and propaganda lectures announcing the recent VC "victories" in Quang Tri Province.

(2) Terrorism. Viet Cong acts of terrorism remained relatively stable during the reporting period. Significant items of interest include the kidnapping of 12 villagers who were candidates for elections in Quang Nam Province, the mortaring of a village in Thua Thien Province, and the assassination and abduction of Vietnamese Nationals who have announced their candidacy in the forthcoming hamlet and village elections.

(3) Espionage and Sabotage. VC sabotage activity decreased sharply during the reporting period. Sabotage activity continued to be directed against bridges, culverts, and lines of communications. Reported espionage incidents continued to indicate low level agent activity directed against ARVN/U.S. military movements and/or information concerning our defenses and military facilities.

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6. LOGISTICS

a. A specific highlight for the month of April in the logistical area was the granting of authorization to commence major repair of Route 1 from Danang north to Dong Ha and Route 551 from Col Co west to Route 1. Additionally, authorization was received to construct an LST facility at Tan My which, when completed, will possess an estimated capability of 1,200 S/T per day. Further, the shift of supply maintenance and service assets from FLSG B in Chu Lai north to the FLSG A in Hue/Dong Ha will greatly enhance the logistic support available to those III MAF forces operating in the northern area. Finally, the arrival of a second hospital ship, USS SANCTUARY, in RVN provides a marked increase in the availability of medical facilities off the coastline. In summation, owing to the fact that tactical operations were focused in the northern area, logistical emphasis for the second consecutive month was given in the same area.

b. Dental

(1) Dental Civic Action was conducted in the RVN by III MAF Dental Companies during the period 1-30 April 67.

Patients Treated: 5,231  
Dental Procedures: 11,599

(2) During this period two separate meetings were conducted on 3 and 14 April 67 by the Administrative Assistant to the Fleet Dental Officer for the Administrative Officers of III MAF Dental Companies to discuss dental equipment.

(3) 4 April 67 - Captain Anderson, DC, USN, FDO, FMFPac departed RVN following official visit to Marine Dental Units in ICTZ.

(4) 8 April 67 - I Corps Dental Society held its initial Monthly Professional Meeting subsequent to establishment in March 67.

(5) 27 April 67 - Captain J. F. King, DC, USN reported as relief for Captain K. L. Morgan, DC, USN as III MAF Force Dental Officer.

c. Embarkation

(1) During April the following units arrived in country:

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VMA (AW)-553	HMM-363
BLT 1/4	Hq, RLT 26
3rd ForRecon Co (-)	Btry K, 4thBn., 13th Mar

The below listed units were rotated out of country during this same period:

VMA-214	BLT 3/4
HMM-164	Btry K, 4thBn, 12th Mar

(2) 8 April 67 - Dong Ha airfield opened to C-130 aircraft.

(3) The USS MERRICK (AKA-97) carried 958 S/T of cargo from Danang to the channel leading to the mouth of the Song Hue river in one load. This cargo was transhipped to Hue by LCU.

(4) The following movement figures for Operation Oregon by surface and air means are presented below. (They are included in the total figures for the month as listed in paragraphs (5) and (6)).

(a) Dong Ha 1,010 Passengers and 5,011 Short Tons by surface.

10 LST loads from Danang  
5 LST loads from Chu Lai  
2 LCU loads from Danang

(b) Dong Ha 504 Passengers and 117,058 pounds by air.

1 C-130 load from Chu Lai  
16 C-130 loads from Danang  
2 C-130 loads from Phu Bai

(c) Danang 2,379 Passengers and 8,821 Short Tons by surface.

24 LST loads from Chu Lai  
1 LSD load from Chu Lai

(d) Danang 3,057 Passengers and 389,339 pounds by air.

56 C-130 loads from Chu Lai

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(e) Hue 274 Passengers and 2,023 Short Tons  
by surface.

17 LCU loads from Danang  
1 LSD load from Chu Lai

(f) Phu Bai 2,543 Passengers and 1,186 pounds  
by air.

22 C-130 loads from Chu Lai  
53 C-130 loads from Danang

(5) Surface Operation Summary

111 MSTs ships debarked/embarked at Danang  
39 U. S. Navy ships debarked/embarked at Danang  
50 LSTs moored at Chu Lai  
27 LSTs unloaded at Cua Viet Ramp  
96 LCUs from Danang to Dong Ha  
153 LCUs from Danang to Hue

	S/T	Total	<u>Throughput Cargo</u>	
			M/T	Daily Average
			S/T	M/T
Danang	216,021	373,561	7200.7	12452.0
Chu Lai	62,366	148,415	2078.9	4947.2
Hue	13,576	22,027	452.5	734.2
Dong Ha	19,232	36,717	641.1	1223.9

(6) Air Operation Summary

Passenger & Cargo Airlifted During Period

	USAF		USMC		Total	
	PAX	Cargo	PAX	Cargo	PAX	Cargo
An Hoa	25	774,912	0	0	25	774,912
Chu Lai	201	1,118,604	5,160	1,525,600	5,361	2,644,204
Dong Ha	172	1,902,465	3,158	698,600	3,330	2,601,065
Danang	2,772	84,026	9,301	1,529,400	12,073	1,613,426
Khe Sanh	28	1,241,805	1,617	1,402,200	1,645	2,644,005
Phu Bai	816	1,308,979	8,482	1,909,200	9,298	3,218,179
Marble Mt	0	0	119	101,000	119	101,000
Tam Ky	2	3,620	0	0	2	3,620
Saigon	0	0	4	0	4	0

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Sub-total	4,016	6,434,411	27,841	7,166,000	31,857	13,600,411
C-117	0	0	4,795	439,400	4,795	439,400
Total	4,016	6,434,411	32,636	7,605,400	36,652	14,039,811

d. Engineer

(1) During the month, 7th Engineers placed priority on the construction of catwalks, rafts, lighting, and the installation of concertina to improve the physical security of major bridges in the Danang TAOR. The 9th Engineer Battalion continued to provide support for the ROKs, rendered assistance to TF Oregon, and made preparations to provide combat support and bridging capabilities to Marine elements in Operation Union. The 11th Engineer Battalion began clearing a 200 meter wide trace from Gio Linh to Con Thien, a distance of 10,600 meters.

(2) Bridging construction was completed and installed during the month as follows:

(a) 3 Apr - A 50', class 60, steel stringer bridge was constructed, coords XD 977435.

(b) 8 Apr - A 40', class 60, pile bent bridge was constructed, coords YD 218709.

(c) 11 Apr - A 90', class 60 superstructure, fixed span was installed, coords AT 943668.

(d) 13 Apr - NAMO Bridge, coords AT 928842 closed due to enemy attack.

(e) 14 Apr - A 403', class 55, M4/M4T6 float bridge was installed, coords AT 928845.

(f) 17 Apr - A 15', class 60, timber bridge was constructed, coords AT 943682.

(g) 21 Apr - A 44', class 60, steel stringer bridge was constructed coords BT 072702.

(h) 26 Apr - A 105', class 60, timber pile bent bridge was constructed coords AT 919958.

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e. Fiscal

- (1) Prepared ForO 7210.1A w/Ch 1 on currency control.
- (2) Prepared quarterly Savings Bond/Savings Deposit Participation Reports to CG, FMFPac and COMUSMACV.
- (3) Prepared quarterly summary of obligations incurred against Community Relations Funds for submission to CG, FMFPac.

f. Food Services

(1) The West Coast Food Services Contact Instruction Team consisting of one officer and three (3) enlisted arrived on 18 April 67 from Camp Pendleton TAD to III MAF for a period of about ninety (90) days. Subsequent to a general briefing of food services operations and future plans, the team was assigned to tour each of 1st and 3rd MarDivs, 1st MAW, and FLC/1st FSR in increments of about 21 days. The team will be available for instruction and assistance in all phases of the food service field.

(2) All ice produced and purchased in the Danang area is controlled by the Force Food Services Office. At present two ice plants are in operation with a daily output of approximately 28,500-lbs daily. In addition 22,000-lbs are purchased from a civilian ice making plant in Danang. A recent survey indicates that ice making capabilities have been increased to at least 2-lbs of ice per man per day. This enables those units in the field to receive milk and other beverages which have been iced-down.

(3) On 18 April the March III MAF Subsistence Operational Analysis Report was submitted to CMC:

Cost of issue of "A" and "B" rations	\$3,306,411.28
Cost of MCIs	\$1,241,195.64
Number of messes in operation - 177	

(4) As a matter of interest the Daily Ice Allocation, West Danang is included herein:

ORGANIZATION	POUNDS	ORGANIZATION	POUNDS
HqBn 1stMarDiv	2500	1stBn 26thMar	3600

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Hq 1stMarReg	1700	Hq 11thMarReg	1000
1stBn 1stMar	3600	11th MTBn	1000
2ndBn 1stMar	3600	"C" Btry 1-11	300
SupBn 1stFSR (ASP-1)	1500	"B" Btry 11th Mar	300
H&SBn 1stFSR (TRANSIENT)	1900	Hq 3rdBn 11th Mar	600
Bakery 1stFSR	1200	"H" Btry 3-11	600
Hq 1stTanks	600	"G" Btry 3-11	300
"B" Co 1stTanks	500	"K" Btry 4-11	600
1st MP Bn	900	"A" Btry 1-13	300
1st AmtracBn	1300	III MAF Brig	900
1st Anti-Tanks	500	An Hoa	2400
1st Shore Party	700	Dog Platoon	200
1st ReconBn	700	1stDiv CG	300
1st MedicalBn	1200	"F" Co CAC	350
1st MTBn	900	MAG-11	2400
1st EngBn	900	MWSG-17	1800
7th EngBn	1800	MWHG-1	1800
"A" Co 7th EngBn	500	1st LAAMBn	600
3rd 8" How Btry	700	37th Signal Bn	500
1stBn 7thMar	3600	MCB-1	900
2ndBn 7thMar	3600	MCB-4	None
3rdBn 7thMar	3600	MCB-58	None

Total 58,750

(5) Daily ice allocation, East Danang is as follows:

ORGANIZATION	POUNDS	ORGANIZATION	POUNDS
MAG-16	3000	Covered Storage	
III MAF	600	Warehouses	450
3rdBn 1stMar	3600	China Beach	
MCB-133	1500	Cafeteria	300
MCB-5	900	Philco	450
Camp Tien Sha Mess	1200	Ice Plant, West	
NSA Hospital	900	Danang	1,1000
5th CommBn	900	Tien Sha Elec	300
Tien Sha Sick Bay	150	Special Service	
YR-70	150	(Boats)	300
		Total	25,700

g. Motor Transport

(1) Rough rider convoys negotiated Route 9 in its entirety (44 miles) from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh for the first

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time since September 1964.

(2) Staff visit made to 2nd Brigade ROKMC and 11th Logistic Support Battalion ROK A to coordinate motor transport support for ROKV forces.

(3) Rough rider convoys of 121 task vehicles moved 865 tons of rice to the city of Quang Tri for DMZ refugees.

(4) 330 M35A2C 2½ ton trucks have been issued as continuing program to introduce multifuel vehicles in III MAF.

h. Ordnance

(1) CG III MAF 040548Z Apr 67, based on instructions from CG, FMFPac, requested III MAF participation in operational evaluation of tactical CS munitions scheduled by USARV in country. CG USARV 230544Z Apr 67 stated that a plan for the test was being prepared which included III MAF participation. Testing will include 105mm Howitzer, 107mm Mortar and 155mm Howitzer tactical CS munitions.

(2) CG III MAF Speedletter 8/JCT/qnm 4442 Ser: 085967 of 8 Apr 67 requested that Force Logistic Command take action to reduce the in country assets of certain Class V items. This request was based on the determination that substantial excesses of certain munitions were compounding the already critical ammunition storage problem, while being subjected unnecessarily to the deterioration that accompanies long storage in an outside environment.

(3) Phase-in of the first increment of 19, 116 M16A1 rifles was completed 13 April. Infantry and Reconnaissance Battalions, Regimental Headquarters Companies and Combined Action Companies were equipped. ROKMC and RVNMC units are being equipped in three monthly increments, the first of which was issued 24 April. The retrograde of M14 rifles is proceeding satisfactorily with 18,518 rifles received by Force Logistic Command thus far.

(4) Class V Control

(a) CG III MAF messages 130530Z Apr and 190950Z Apr established the following Available Supply Rates (ASR's):

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>ASR</u>
C444 (and subs)	105mm HE	32
D572	175mm HE	26

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G895	Gren, Hand, Illum	MarDiv 7.4 Inf Bn Other .15/100 Indiv
L312	Sig, Illum, WSP	MarDiv 7.4/Inf Bn Other .1/100 Indiv
L314	Sig, Illum, GSC	MarDiv 2.0/Inf Bn Other .03/100 Indiv

(b) Based on the above ASR's, allocations of 105mm HE and 175mm HE ammunition were made to ensure controlled expenditure and continuing availability of these rounds. Allocations were promulgated by CG III MAF messages 230044Z Apr and 240524Z Apr.

(5) CG III MAF 260150 Apr authorized M16A1 rifles and ammunition for the transitional training of those III MAF units to be equipped with the M16A1 rifle in the Second Increment. Issue of the Second Increment of rifles is scheduled for July 67.

(6) A five-man technical team composed of Department of the Army Civilians arrived in-country on 29 April to investigate the problem of accidental firings experienced with the ONTOS-mounted 106mm Recoilless Rifle; the team is to be joined by a sixth member who is already in-country in the Saigon area. These six men represent the Army Tank and Automotive Command, Watervliet Arsenal, Weapons Command and Munitions Command and have been assembled at the request of CMC in an effort to identify and eliminate the cause(s) of the accidental firings.

i. Surgeon

(1) The total daily average patient load for the two Medical Battalions and the 1st Hospital Company was 235 with a total of 1,764 patients admitted, 475 patients evacuated out of country and 1,911 pints of blood expended to use.

(2) As of the end of the month information relative to Collecting and Clearing Companies is as follows:

<u>MED BN</u>	<u>C&amp;C CO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>BEDS</u>	<u>AVERAGE CENSUS (For Month)</u>
1st	A, B(-), C, D	Danang	150	69
1st	B(-)	Chu Lai	120	*
3rd	A, B(-), C	Phu Bai	90	74
3rd**	D(-)	Dong Ha	30	17

\* Temporarily merged with 1st Hospital Co Chu Lai

\*\* Clearing Platoon D Co with BLT 3/4 (temporarily down-grading medical assets in country)

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(3) The 1st Hospital Company Chu Lai has been performing its assigned mission in that the surgical operating suites were completed on 8 April and 20 beds were set up in the Intensive Care Unit. The average daily census was 59 for the month with length of patient stay per discharge of 4 days.

(4) The USS REPOSE returned to Danang from Dong Ha on 20 Apr to continue normal operating schedule until 11 Apr. On 10 Apr 67 the REPOSE was in Danang Harbor upon arrival of the USS SANCTUARY (AH-17) and an interchange of staff liaison briefing visits were held for the benefit of the USS SANCTUARY. The USS REPOSE left RVN on 11 Apr for up-keep at Subic Bay, PI to return on 29 Apr and furnish logistic support remainder of April. The Naval Hospital in the USS REPOSE had an average daily patient load of 441 with length of patient stay per discharge of 20 days.

(5) The USS SANCTUARY arrived in Danang Harbor on 10 Apr. The Force Surgeon headed a briefing liaison group which went aboard for the purpose of assisting the SANCTUARY in administration and procedural matters while she is assigned to furnish logistic support of ICTZ. During the period 11-28 Apr she was assigned to support all TAOR's on a rotating weekly schedule. On 29 April Operational Control was shifted to CTG 76.4 to furnish Casualty Evacuation support in Operation Beaver Cage. As of midnight 30 Apr the hospital census was 586 patients.

(6) Statistics for III Marine Amphibious Force patients hospitalized in Vietnam in other than I Corps medical facilities was as follows:

	<u>Average Census</u>	<u>Average Length of Stay</u>
12th USAF Hospital Cam Ranh Bay	67	20 days
6th Convalescence CTR Cam Ranh Bay	42	24 days

(7) Lt. A. R. Dasler, MSC, USN and HMC R. O'Brien attached to NMRI Bethesda, Md., arrived III MAF on 11 Apr 67 in a TAD status for the purpose of obtaining information on the treatment of heat stress/strain and to evaluate treatment of heat casualties in the unit which is expected to arrive Danang on 6 May 67. Weather and temperature data has been collected at Danang, Phu Bai and Dong Ha TAOR's for use in this study.

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(8) Aerial dispersal of insecticide for mosquito control was accomplished by fixed wing (C-123) aircraft as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>
Chu Lai (Central TAOR)	16 Apr 67
Danang (Hill 327 to river including East Danang)	16 Apr 67

j. Supply

(1) All indications (e.g., fill rate, Red Ball, volume of Pri 02 requisitions) are that supply support is continuing to improve, especially since the end of the monsoon season. This improvement has occurred during Apr in spite of the downtime associated with conversion of stock records from the 1401 to the 360 computer. Preparations for the conversion to MUMMS on 1 May 67 have been completed.

(2) A III MAF Lumber Allocation Board was established to allocate critically short lumber and action has been taken to improve the supply posture for this item. Additional shipments are due in from CONUS and a \$90,000 special buy is being made by 3d FSR. In addition, arrangements are being made to transfer \$900,000 to FLC for purchase of lumber assets from NSA. Further, Advance Base Functional Components (ABFC) (e.g., lumber, bridges, etc.) will be made available as "prepackaged kits" from OPN funds through the 30th NCR. Both 30th NCR and NSA will draw upon excess contractor (i.e., RMK-BRJ) assets available in RVN.

(3) Two important conferences were held:

(a) A planning conference on the new Supported Activities Supply System (SASSYO being developed at HQMC. (Held on Okinawa, 17-19 April)

(b) The 8th Periodic FMFPac Logistics Conference. (Held on Okinawa, 20-22 April)

(4) The following Supply Bulletins and Orders were published during the month of April:

(a) Published Change 2 to ForO 4050.1B regarding shipment of Personal Effects and Baggage.

(b) Published Force Bulletin 4030 of 11 April

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regarding Packaging and Crating at 3rd FSR.

(c) Published Force Order 10120.1A regarding Individual Clothing Authorized Allowance.

(d) Published Force Order 4010.1A regarding Retrograde Shipment of Copper Based Ammunition Scrap.

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a. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civil Affairs program remains the same.

b. Command. Colonel John T. Hill (III MAF A/C of S G-5) was wounded near Tam Ky on 19 April 1967 and subsequently evacuated to CONUS on 26 April 1967. Colonel George O. Ross, 020278/9907 USMC, assumed duties as the III MAF Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, on 27 April 1967.

c. I Corps Joint Coordinating Council (JCC). The Council met four times during April. The following is a listing of major topics dealt with during April meetings.

(1) The problem of trash disposal for the City of Danang continued to receive the Council's attention. The program of sanitation and trash disposal made progress during the month.

(2) The problem of overloading bridges with excessive tonnage was addressed through the road committee of the JCC.

(3) During April the Council was informed that teachers at the refugee night courses at the Danang Polytechnic School had not been paid since December 1966 and had stopped teaching. The Office of Civil Operations (OCO) rectified the situation and reestablished financial support for future courses, commencing May 1967.

(4) Repair of the sawmill in Quang Tin Province continued to occupy the Council's attention.

(5) A refugee committee was formed within the JCC to deal with problems inherent in resettling refugees within I Corps. Its membership is drawn from the Government of Vietnam, III MAF and OCO.

(6) The Port Committee was dropped from the structure of the JCC. The military port facilities of the Port of Danang have been completed and coordination of port facilities is no longer a problem.

(7) A portable silo was obtained from Saigon for the storage of GVN commodities at Danang.

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(8) The council also received reports from, monitored, and directed programs of various committees and subcommittees. Committees which met during the month were:

- (a) Port of Danang Committee
- (b) Psychological Warfare Committee
- (c) Public Health Committee
- (d) Commodities Distribution Committee
- (e) Road Committee

(9) Minutes of the Council and subcommittees meetings are attached as ANNEX "A".

d. Displaced Persons

(1) During April new refugees were reported in I Corps Tactical Zone. A revised report of refugee camps and populations was completed this month and is attached as ANNEX "B".

(2) During April extensive plans were made to move approximately 20,000 refugees from the vicinity of the DMZ to areas further south. Temporary housing, wells, medical facilities, transportation, and security are among the many considerations in preparing for this move. The move is expected to get underway during May.

e. Civil Action Summary

(1) The III MAF experienced an average month in Civic Action. No significant fluctuation of distribution of commodities from preceeding months was noted. During this period medical treatments were average and dental treatments show a steady slow increase as they have over the past 5 months.

(2) During this period extensive plans were being formulated for movement and resettlement of approximately 20,000 refugees from within or near the DMZ. They are to be moved to areas further south of the DMZ to permit unrestricted military operations in the area.

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a. Chieu Hoi Program. 73 personnel rallied to the GVN during April. Almost all ralliers interrogated had been influenced by leaflets or loudspeaker appeals in the decision to rally to the GVN. A significant number of the ralliers stated that they had been pressed into the VC ranks rather than having volunteered.

The following is a breakdown of returnees turning in to Marines and by province:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>TO USMC</u>	<u>TO GVN</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>NON-MILITARY</u>
Quang Tri	4	2	5	1
Thua Thien	1	10	5	6
Quang Nam	4	18	9	13
Quang Tin	0	12	10	2
Quang Ngai	2	20	10	12

b. Training

Nineteen officers and enlisted men attended the III MAF PSYOP Orientation course held from 17-19 April. This is the fourth and largest class to date. Syllabus for this course is contained in ANNEX "C".

c. Ground Operations

(1) Utilization of POET Teams proved very effective in exploiting Chieu Hoi Ralliers, refugees, POW's and acts of terrorism. Several new leaflets were developed for Special Forces camps by the POET Teams and the intelligence section of the 244th PSYOP Company. During the month of April, 20 POET Teams were dispatched resulting in the production of 23 leaflets, 3 posters and 3 tapes.

Feedback from ralliers exploited by POET Teams remains basically the same; fear of the B-52 and other air weapons remains the primary cause for rallying. Leaflets and loudspeaker continue to play a large part in the decision to rally.

(2) A total of 839,311 leaflets were hand distributed by units conducting patrols, MEDCAPS and at checkpoints by U. S. Forces and RVNAF throughout ICTZ.

(a) Total number hrs. ground/waterborne loudspeaker broadcast for the month of April by U. S. Forces

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and RVNAF: 1,301:15.

- (b) Total posters produced: 34,040.
- (c) Total Movies shown: 669.
- (d) Total Cultural Team performances: 130.

(e) First Coastal Zone continues to emphasize the availability of U. S. ships and boats as Chieu Hoi rallying points. This particular campaign will be intensified.

d. Air Operations

(1) Leaflet Dissemination.

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NO/HRS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
384	Leaflet/air BDCST	102,303,000/192:40	9th ACS
16	Leaflet	1,460,000	ARVN
8	Leaflet	1,003,000	U.S. Army
1	Leaflet	120,000	USMC

(2) Total Campaign Leaflets Dropped:

- (a) NVA Campaign: 14,684,000
- (b) B-52: 15,020,000
- (c) Safe Conduct Passes: 21,130,000
- (d) Chieu Hoi Campaign: 256,000
- (e) Operation "Four Winds": 1,000,000

e. Tactical PSYOP support of brigade sized and larger operations:

(1) Operation Prairie II:

- (a) 1,800,000 leaflets dropped.
- (b) 13:10 airborne loudspeaker time.
- (c) 12:30 ground loudspeaker time.

(2) Operation Prairie III:

- (a) 9,799,000 leaflets dropped.
- (b) 7:40 airborne loudspeaker time.
- (c) 8:30 ground loudspeaker time.

(3) Operation Big Horn:

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- (a) 800,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) 5:05 airborne loudspeaker time.
  - (c) 8:00 ground loudspeaker time.
- (4) Operation Lejeune:
- (a) 330,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) 1:50 airborne loudspeaker time.
- (5) Operation Desoto:
- (a) 995,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) 6:50 airborne loudspeaker time.
  - (c) 44:00 ground loudspeaker time.
- (6) Operation Boone:
- (a) 332,000 leaflets dropped.
- (7) Operation Sea Dragon:
- (a) 30,000 leaflets dropped.
  - (b) 00:30 airborne loudspeaker time.
- (8) Operation Shawnee:
- (a) 1,200,000 leaflets dropped.

f. Tactical Operations.

(1) Working under the control of the 10th POLWAR Battalion and the 244th PSYOP Company, 30 members of the Danang APT initiated a field operation in QUANG TRI Province on 22 April. Objectives of this operation are to assist in the evacuation of personnel from GIO LINH/GIO MON area to the CAM LO area, conduct PSYOP missions and to collect information. This operation will continue through May. Reports received from the supported units indicates that this unit is making many valuable contributions to the operations in QUANG TRI.

(2) The Kit Carson scout program continues to be successful. Presently, there are 32 working with U.S. Marine units and an additional 31 in training. TCN Advisors are screening all returnees to determine suitability for this important program. Major accomplishments

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since the program was started in November 1966 include leading over 1000 patrols and identifying over 100 VC through facial recognition procedures. The scouts third casualty occurred during the month when DANG BA NAM was killed leading a patrol. This individual deserves special mention in that he was one of the original six scouts and was one of the first to suggest the program. During his service he identified over 30 VC, led numerous patrols, and obtained valuable information. On the day of his death he led a patrol at 4:00 p.m. and gained information about VC plans from some villagers. Based upon this information the Marines sent a patrol out at 6:00 p.m. Mr. NAM volunteered for this patrol and was killed in an ambush.

(3) The following is a list of major accomplishments by the Kit Carson Scouts for the month of April 1967:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>MONTHLY TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL FROM 1 Nov 1966</u>
Broadcasts	2	67
P.W.	5	90
Detainees	14	103
Grenades	-	39
Caves	4	37
Mines	1	16
Booby Traps	5	19
Tunnels	-	13
VC KIA	1	9
Weapons	1	12
Supply Caches	-	7
Patrol Guides	316	1051
Weapons Caches	-	1
Returnees	-	8
Classes	3	33

A KCS from 1/26 while leading a patrol, was taken under fire. He quickly and aggressively returned fire, assisted in calling in mortar fire, and during the withdrawal, he stayed with the rear fire team delivering covering fire.

A scout from 2/4 provided information concerning VC river fording routes and information concerning a high school girl in Dai Loc, the girl is reported to be a VC runner supplying VC with information of Dai Loc activities.

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Two KCS from 2/4 were responsible for obtaining information concerning routes used by the VC to lay mines on route 14., between hill 37 and 65.

The Third Battalion, First Marines is recommending NGO VAN BAY for the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, Silver Order for his great personal courage and skill in the line of duty.

g. III MAF PSYOP Newsletter.

(1) Annex "D" contains a copy of the III MAF PSYOP Newsletter.

h. The III MAF PSYOP conference was held on 26 April 1967 with a total attendance of 42. Annex "E" contains the conference agenda.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~9. COMMUNICATIONS

a. A vigorously pursued message reduction program by communicators and staff sections alike resulted in a substantial drop in message volume through the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center during April. Traffic totals were:

	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Incoming	50,260	37,533	
Outgoing	51,263	40,475	
Total	101,523	78,008	23,515

b. Message traffic through the Combat Operations Center Communication Center also showed a decrease during April. Traffic totals were:

	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Incoming	3,255	2,990	
Outgoing	3,895	4,068	
Total	7,150	7,058	92

c. Coordinated efforts of III Marine Amphibious Force units support of AN/TRC-66 site on Cu Lao Re Island. Site will be in support of Task Force Oregon and is interim system for Integrated Wideband Communication System.

d. Communication-Electronics Office representative attended an AUTODIN Working Group conference at Saigon.

e. Assisted in effecting the transfer of DC teletype lines to voice frequency teletype equipment. This change freed 66 pairs of cable for other requirements and greatly improved circuits.

f. Coordinated communication requirements for operations, Beacon Light and Beaver Cage.

g. Coordinated planned phase out of III Marine Amphibious Force Communication equipment and personnel with Task Force Oregon personnel.

h. Completed survey for UNIVAC AUTODIN terminal in III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center.

i. Participated in the cutover of selected teletype circuits from the Danang Interim Tape Relay to the Danang East Primary Relay Station. This action should result in improved circuit paths and faster teletype service.

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10. Combat Information Bureau.**SECRET**

(a) Background. During April 1967, 481 escorted visits were accomplished by the Combat Information Bureau. The escorts included civic action, combined action platoons, I Corps combat operations, an amphibious landing and air operations. The Danang Press Center hosted 232 correspondents.

(b) Motor Transportation. Of the 8 vehicles assigned 7 are operational. An M-151 "jeep" is presently deadlined at the 1st Log Cmd and should be operational within 10 days.

(c) Photography. During April 12,480 feet of motion picture footage was forwarded to CMC (Code A03P). Of this 24.5% was exposed on operations, 10.8% on civic action and 64.7% on miscellaneous projects. The operations covered were Prairie IV, Big Horn and Beacon Hill.

(d) Radio/TV. During April a total of 76 features and 686 Fleet Hometown interviews were submitted from III MAF units. In addition, the TV series "I Corps Forum" continued with such guests as: Lt General Lewis Walt, CG, III MAF; Rear Admiral Lacy, NSA, Danang; Miss Phillipa Schuyler, concert pianist and lecturer; 1stLt L. H. Dermott and PFC H. A. Deuel III, Combat artists.

(e) Escorts. Major operations covered included Prairie IV, Grand, Union, Shawnee, Beacon Star, Big Horn and Canyon. Staff briefings by G-2, G-3, G-5, the CAC director and the CG, III MAF were conducted throughout the month. Notable media representatives hosted/escorted during the month included: Raymond Apple, N.Y. Times; Raymond Pierrot-Minnot, Agence France Press; John Lengel, Bob Ohman, Steve Stibbens, AP; Hugh Lunn, Reuters; Tom Corpora, Paul Hoderne, Bryce Miller, Bob Kaylor and Eugene Risher, UPI; Ken Gale, Don North, Dave Snell, and Ted Koppel, ABC; Steve Rowan, Adam Raphael, Bill Plante, and Mike Wallace, CBS; George Page, Bill Wordham, and Chuck Murphy, NBC; Kermit Lansner, John Bertelsen, and Everett Martin, Newsweek; John Randolph, and Bill Tuohy, L.A. Times; Ron Ross, Minneapolis Tribune; Ray Belford, and Bob Kersey, Stars & Stripes; Ward Just, Washington Post; Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard; Bayard Hooper, Hedly Donovan, and Colin Leinster, Life.

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(f) Press. A total of 428 releases were processed by the press sections, 56 concerned civic action and 286 photographs accompanied the releases. A total of 6,819 Fleet Hometown news releases were forwarded to FHTN center for further processing and distribution. Included were 458 photographs. FHTNC forms processed this calendar year are at the same level as those processed by mid-September 1966. News releases distributed to media thus far in 1967 equal the total released thru mid-July 1966.

(g) Combat Art. There are 3 Marine combat artists working in the Combat Art Program in Vietnam. Eight charcoals, five water colors and seven oil paintings were sent to Headquarters, USMC during April.

(h) Miscellaneous. April was the busiest month since the establishment of the Combat Information Bureau.

~~SECRET~~11. I Corps Tactical Zone (RVNAF).~~SECRET~~

a. Overall Evaluation. ARVN activities for April were highlighted by Lien Ket 96/Boone/Sea Dragon, a 2nd Division/USMC/ROK combined search and destroy operation north of Quang Ngai; by four ARVN battalions and thirteen RF companies completing RD training and by 112,268 MEDCAP treatments being performed during the month.

(1) The major psychological operation of explaining the village/hamlet elections was successful. Over 318,000 people representing 80% of eligible voters participated in the April elections. Number of ralliers for the month was 86 as compared to 139 during March.

(2) A total of 6,790 short tons of military supplies was transported throughout I CTZ during April as compared to 9,593 short tons during the previous month. Additionally, 630 short tons of civilian rice was transported to distribution points throughout I CTZ.

(3) The desertion rate among ARVN forces decreased from 535 in March to 383 in April. Overall average of available for operations strength of ARVN forces in I Corps was 71% for April.

b. Ground Operations. I Corps conducted 27 large operations during April as compared to 31 last month. There were six combined operations and two heliborne operations included in the above figure. Contact was made with the VC/NVA in 14 of these operations.

(1) ARVN losses for April were 280 KIA, 589 WIA and 121 weapons lost as compared to 166 KIA, 707 WIA and 26 weapons lost last month. RF/PF losses for April were 168 KIA, 357 WIA and 104 weapons lost as compared to 215 KIA, 266 WIA and 185 weapons lost last month.

(2) Enemy losses credited to I Corps units during April were 450 KIA, 102 PW (VC) and 182 weapons captured as compared to 314 KIA, 90 PW (VC) and 122 weapons captured the previous month.

(3) Enemy losses credited to RF/PF units in I CTZ for April were 564 KIA, 25 PW (VC) and 138 weapons captured as compared to 209 KIA, 27 PW (VC) and 70 weapons captured the previous month.

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(4) Three significant operations took place in the I CTZ in April. Lien Ket 96, a 2nd Division controlled, combined search and destroy operation in conjunction with USMC Operation Boone and ROK Operation Sea Dragon was conducted north of Quang Ngai from 1 April to 6 April. The 37th Ranger Battalion; 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment; 2nd Battalion, 6th Regiment; 1st and 3rd Troops, 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron; 2nd Division Reconnaissance Company and the 424th and 489th RF Companies were committed. These units were supported by ARVN artillery. Ground units made only light contact and tactical air strikes were credited with 70 VC KIA. The enemy unit encountered was possibly the 48th VC Local Force Battalion. Friendly losses were 2 KIA and 41 WIA. Enemy losses were 101 VC KIA and three individual weapons captured.

(5) Lam Son 46, a 3rd Regiment controlled search and destroy operation was conducted east of Hue on 29 April. The 4th Battalion, 3rd Regiment; 2nd Airborne Battalion and the 2nd Troop, 7th Armored Cavalry Squadron encountered the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 804th VC Local Force Battalion. USMC and ARVN artillery supported the operation. Friendly losses were three KIA and 20 WIA. Enemy losses were 61 VC KIA, six PW (VC) and 13 weapons captured.

(6) Lam Son 142, Phase III, a 3rd Regiment controlled search and destroy operation east of Hue continued. Significant contact was developed on 17 April. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment; 2nd Troop, 7th Armored Cavalry Squadron; 1st Division Reconnaissance Company and the 742nd RF Company were committed against the 804th VC Local Force Battalion which had attacked an RD team and a Provincial Reconnaissance unit. ARVN and USMC artillery supported the operation. Total friendly casualties for the one day encounter were 29 KIA, 67 WIA and 7 MIA. Enemy casualties were 71 VC KIA. Friendly losses for April were 33 KIA and 158 WIA. Enemy losses for April were 107 KIA, 17 PW (VC) and 61 weapons captured. Accumulative friendly losses for the operation were 91 KIA and 398 WIA. Accumulative enemy losses at end of month were 496 VC KIA, 33 PW (VC) and 120 weapons captured.

c. Regional Force/Popular Force.

(1) During the period 24 to 29 April, the 258th, 744th, 928th and 929th RF Companies from Quang Tin sector participated in Operation Lien Ket 102 northwest of Tam Ky.

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The 424th and 489th RF Companies from Quang Ngai sector participated in Lien Ket 96 north of Quang Ngai from 1 April to 6 April.

(2) During April, 44 PF platoons completed MIP training. A total of 544 PF platoons are now MIP trained with a total of 21,910 individual soldiers having received such training to date.

(3) The 221st RF Company from Thua Thien and the 459th RF Company from Quang Tin completed refresher training at the Dong Da National Training Center during April. Thirteen RF Companies completed RD training and five RF Companies began RD training during the month.

(4) On 8 April, the JGS authorized the mobilization of 15 new RF Companies and 41 PF platoons within I CTZ. The I Corps Commander allocated these units by Provinces as follows: Quang Tri - 3 RF Companies and 7 PF platoons; Thua Thien - 1 RF Company and 7 PF platoons; Quang Da Special Zone - 3 RF Companies and 12 PF platoons; Quang Tin - 3 RF Companies and 5 PF platoons; Quang Ngai - 5 RF Companies and 10 PF platoons.

(5) During April, 163 tons of food stuffs were distributed to PF as compared to 30 tons last month.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~12. Chronology of VIP Visits.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE/BILLET</u>
1-2Apr67	Lucien MCDONALD	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander, MSTs, Far East
1-2Apr67	H. W. BUSE	Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters, Marine Corps
3-4Apr67	John J. HYLAND	Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, COMSEVENTHFLT
5Apr67	Lieutenant General WILSON	U. S. Army (Ret), Member, OASD Special Survey Team, Installations and Logistics
5Apr67	Major General MINTON	U. S. Air Force (Ret), Member, OASD Special Survey Team, Installations and Logistics
5Apr67	Commodore HUNTER	U. S. Navy (Ret), Member, OASD Special Survey Team, Installations and Logistics
5Apr67	Brigadier General MCBRIDE	U. S. Army (Ret), Member, OASD Special Survey Team, Installations and Logistics
5Apr67	James O. LINDBERG	Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Army and Air Force Exchange Systems
5Apr67	Ray SMITH	Wing Commander, RAAF, Member, Australian Parliament
6Apr67	John N. EWBANK	Major General, U. S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans (J-5) MACV

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6-7Apr67	Dr. Arthur RUTLEDGE	Executive Secretary and Treasurer, Home Mission Board, Southern Baptist Convention
6Apr67	Msr. LAMBROCHINI	French Consul General, Saigon
8Apr67	William C. WESTMORELAND	General, U. S. Army, COMUSMACV
8Apr67	J. R. CHAISSON	Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Director, COC
9-13Apr67	Edwin B. HOOPER	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, COMSERVPAC
9-12Apr67	John H. ROSCOE	Doctor (GS-17), OSD, ARPA
10-13Apr67	J. G. BOUKER	Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, CG, FMFPAC (FWD)
10Apr67	Reverend William FLOOD	
13-15Apr67	R. C. NEEDHAM	Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Naval Inspector General
13Apr67	W. B. ROSSON	Major General, U. S. Army, CG, Task Force Oregon
15-16Apr67	Mr. Norman PAUL	Under Secretary of the Air Force
15-16Apr67	Williard PEARSON	Major General, U. S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations MACV J-3
16Apr67	Richard NIXON	Former Vice President of The U. S.
18Apr67	Feth J. MCKEE	Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force, Commander, 5th Air Force, Japan

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18-19Apr67	Louis METZGER	Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, CTF-79
19-21Apr67	Roy L. JOHNSON	Admiral, U. S. Navy, CINCPACFLT
19-21Apr67	Finn J. LARSEN	Doctor (GS-18)(E), Principal Deputy Director DDR&E
19-21Apr67	John F. O'GARA	(GS-18) Assistant Director Special Intelligence
19-21Apr67	Charles A. FOWLER	(GS-18) Deputy Director, Tactical Warfare Programs
19-21Apr67	Lester R. SCHULZ	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Director NSA for National Cryptologic Staff
19Apr67	Frank W. VANNOY	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, CTF-76
21-23Apr67	Kenneth L. VETH	Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, COMNAVFORV Designee
25-26Apr67	Graves ERSKINE	General, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret), Vice President and Executive Director, Elect- ronics Division, North American, Northrop Corp
26Apr67	J. H. MOORE	Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force, VICE CINCPACAF
26Apr67	Stephen D. MCELORY	Brigadier General, Commander Group Electronics Engineer Installation
27Apr67	Raymond C. HOHENSTEIN	Reverend, Executive Sec- retary for Field Services Division of Service to Military Personnel, Lutheran Council in the U.S.A.
27-28Apr67	Hedley DONOVAN	Editor in Chief, Time-Life

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28Apr67	John A. HEINTGES	Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Deputy COMUSMACV
28Apr67	Williard PEARSON	Major General, U. S. Army, MACV Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations J-3
28Apr67	William A. KNOWLTON	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Director RD
28-29Apr67	Richard MITCHELL	(Labour) Member of British Parliament
28-29Apr67	John DUNWOODY	(Labour) Member of British Parliament
28-29Apr67	Peter EMERY	(Conservative) Member of British Parliament
29Apr67	W. B. ROSSON	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, CG, Task Force Oregon
29Apr67	Brigadier General KNOWLES	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, CG, 196th Brigade
30Apr67	Brigadier General FLANAGAN	Brigadier General, U. S. Army, MACV Training Directorate
30Apr67	T. L. HAYES	Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force, Deputy Commander for Management & System Military Traffic Management & Terminal Service
30Apr67	Williard PEARSON	Major General, U. S. Army, MACV Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations J-3

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~13. Chronology of Events.

- 1 April - Operation PRAIRIE III - Continuing
  - Operation CHINOOK II - Continuing
  - Operation DESOTO - Continuing
- 2 April - Operation BOONE - Initiated
- 4 April - Operation CHINOOK II - Terminated
- 5 April - Operation BIG HORN - Initiated
- 6 April - Operation CANYON - Initiated
- 7 April - Operation DIXIE - Initiated
  - Operation DESOTO - Terminated
  - Operation BOONE - Terminated
- 10 April - Operation CANYON - Terminated
  - Operation DIXIE - Terminated
- 13 April - Operation HUMBOLDT - Initiated
- 17 April - Operation HUMBOLDT - Terminated
  - Operation LAWRENCE - Initiated
- 18 April - Operation YELL - Initiated
- 19 April - Operation PRAIRIE III - Terminated
  - Operation LAWRENCE - Terminated
- 20 April - Operation PRAIRIE IV - Initiated
  - Operation YELL - Terminated
- 21 April - Operation GRAND - Initiated
  - Operation BIG HORN - Terminated
  - Operation UNION - Initiated
- 22 April - Operation BEACON STAR - Initiated \*
  - \*(OPCON to III MAF 24Apr67)
  - Operation SHAWNEE - Initiated
- 26 April - Operation GRAND - Terminated

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**SECRET**PART FOURREFERENCES

- (A) First Marine Division Command Chronology, April 1967
- (B) Third Marine Division Command Chronology, April 1967
- (C) First Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, April 1967
- (D) Force Logistic Command Command Chronology, April 1967

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Directory, April 1967
- (2) April 1967 Editions, III Marine Amphibious Force, Newspaper:  
"SEA TIGER" *Removed & destroyed. Record copy in HRS Library 1/17/67*
- (3) ANNEX "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E" to Part III.

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HEADQUARTERS  
 III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE  
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
 C/O FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96602

7B/OA-1BM  
 8 APR 1967

COMMAND DIRECTORY

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBERS ARE PARCHMENT UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED</u>	<u>RTD</u>
<u>COMMAND SECTION</u>				
CG III MAF	LTGEN	WALT, L W	6, DANANG 6100	6/67
SENIOR AIDE	CAPT	LEE, W F	13, DANANG 6449	6/67
ADMIN ASST	CAPT	SRAMEK, J S	13, DANANG 6449	4/67
JUNIOR AIDE	ZDLT	ANDERSON, P B	13, 213	6/67
DEP COMMANDER	MGEN	CUSHMAN, R E	606, DANANG 6516	4/68
SENIOR AIDE	CAPT	PACULA, N JR	616, DANANG 6516	11/67
VN AIDE	CAPT	QUY, VO DINH	6, DANANG 6449	
POLITICAL ADVISOR	MR.	COLEBAUGH, H	DANANG 6168/6169	
SERGEANT MAJOR	SGTMAJ	ELDREDGE, T G	109	6/67
<u>CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION</u>				
CHIEF OF STAFF	BGEN	OWENS, R G JR	5, DANANG 6385	1/68
DEP CHIEF OF STAFF	COL	NEVILLE, R B	305, DANANG 6405	8/67
STAFF SECRETARY	LTCOL	CANZONIERI, J V	38, DANANG 6383/6100	9/67
ADMIN ASST TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF	ZDLT	BOWYER, L E	5	4/68
<u>G-1 SECTION</u>				
ASST C/S G-1	COL	MAHON, J L	1, DANANG 6585	6/67
ASST G-1	LTCOL	HOLT, T J	1	9/67
MACV TMO	LTCOL	JOHNSTON, J C	MOTLEY 153	12/67
ASST G-1	MAJ	FOLSOM, C A	101	2/68
<u>G-2 SECTION</u>				
ASST C/S G-2/SSO	COL	READ, B S	2, DANANG 6512	7/67
INT PLANS/EST O	LTCOL	CHAPLIN, D D	702	9/67
ASST INT PLANS O	LTCOL	FRAZIER, P N	202	8/67
INT OPS O	LTCOL	FRENCH, H D	202	8/67
INT COLL O	LTCOL	GREEN, F A	102, DANANG 6309	8/67
ASST G-2/SSO	LTCOL	WATTERSON, D E	2, DANANG 6512	7/67
COLL ANALYST O	MAJ	DANIELSON, D C	102	11/67
GND RECON O	MAJ	DOMAN, T A	102	7/67
OOB/ SSO	MAJ	GIUBILATO, J J	202	10/67
ASST OOB O	MAJ	HAVEN, T W	202	8/67
SPEC INT O/SSO	MAJ	HUNTER, M	402	7/67
AIR INT RECON O	MAJ	KRAVET, R D	102	2/68
STAFF CI O	MAJ	MONTGOMERY, B R	702, DANANG 6309	9/67
INT WATCH O	MAJ	MUNDY, C E	COC 102	12/67
ASST/INT/PLANS O	MAJ	SPARKS, J A	702	9/67

G-2 SECTION CONTINUED

TIO	CAPT	FASSLER, C D	202		12/67
INT WATCH O	CAPT	KIRKHAM, J H	COC	102	5/67
AERIAL REC/PHOTO O	2DLT	AILSTOCK, J W	102		12/67
AERIAL REC/PHOTO O	2DLT	DEFRANK, J W	102		8/67
ASST SPL INTO/SSO	2DLT	HAYWARD, T E	402		8/67
ASST OOB O	2DLT	MCCALL, W D JR	202		1/68
AERIAL REC/PHOTO O	2DLT	MORRIS, C A	102		4/67
ASST STAFF CIO	2DLT	SCOTT, J	702,	DANANG 6309	11/67
ASST TIO	2DLT	SHANDOR, J P	202		2/68
LNO ROKMC	WO	BOUCK, G A	COC	CHUNG YUNG	2/68
ADMIN INT O	WO	BURGESS, F M	2,	DANANG 6512	4/68
ELECWARFARE O	WO	MORGAN, R	402		9/67
SIGNAL INT O	WO	TERRY, L W	402		11/67

5TH CI TEAM

5TH CI TEAM O	CAPT	NARDO, J F	480		9/67
OPERATIONS O	1STLT	MCMAKIN, J F JR	480		9/67
CI O	2DLT	VOROMIN, D B	480		9/67
CI O	WO	CARSON, E M	480		9/67
CI O	WO	BUSKO, A H	480		9/67

G-3 SECTION

ASST C/S G-3	COL	BARRETT, D J JR	3,	DANANG 6232	7/67
OPERATIONS O	COL	SNODDY, L F	303,	DANANG 6489	8/67
LNO MACV	COL	WEST, R E		TIGER 3158	5/67
ASST G-3	COL	WILSON, R W	3,	DANANG 6232	7/67
R&D O	LTCOL	BAERISWYL, L JR	803		9/67
CAC O	LTCOL	CORSON, W R	603		9/67
ABDC/RF/PF O	LTCOL	DONABEDIAN, H	603		8/67
HISTORICAL O	LTCOL	FAHEY, J E	43		8/67
LNO 2D BDE ROKMC	LTCOL	PARADIS, E J	COC	CHUNG YUNG	9/67
LNO 7TH AF	LTCOL	PRESTRIDGE, J C		SAIGON 31163	10/67
OPERATIONS O GND	LTCOL	SHRADER, P A	503		9/67
PLANS/PROJ O	LTCOL	VOLKERT, M D	603		8/67
OIC COC	LTCOL	YOUNG, R E	COC	103	8/67
ASST OPERATIONS O	MAJ	BARSTOW, C A	503		10/67
ASST AIR O	MAJ	CARDWELL, R E	303,	DANANG 6489	5/67
ASST OPNS O GND	MAJ	CLARK, D A	303,	DANANG 6489	4/68
ASST HISTORICAL O	MAJ	DAVIS, G A	43		9/67
OPERATIONS O AIR	MAJ	FRUCCI, A L	303,	DANANG 6489	3/68
ASST TRNG O	MAJ	MCKEE, R D	803		7/67
ASST LNO 7TH AF	MAJ	POITEVENT, W O		SAIGON 31163	7/67
LNO IST FFV	MAJ	SAUL, J L	103		8/67
ASST LNO MACV	MAJ	START, R J		TIGER 3158	6/67
ASST OPNS O GND	MAJ	THOMPSON, W A	503		10/67
NAVAL GUNFIRE O	LDCR	LEASE, M D	403		6/67
SITREP/HISSEP O	CAPT	DYER, E G	COC	103	2/68
ASST GND OPNS O	CAPT	GARDNER, B W	503		4/68
ASST CAC O	CAPT	LUCAS, A F	603		10/67
COC WATCH O	CAPT	MURPHY, R E	COC	103	9/67
ASST PLANS O	CAPT	MURPHY, W M	603		4/68
ASST CAC O	CAPT	MUSHALLO, J M	380		3/68
COCWATCH	CAPT	ROLLER, R F JR	COC	103	10/67
HIST TEAM LDR	CAPT	ROSS, R A	43		11/67

G-3 SECTION CONTINUED

COC WATCH O	CAPT	TAYLOR, B C	COC	103	2/68
DIR VIET LANG SCOL	1STLT	LENT, H G		119	6/67
ASST CAC O	2DLT	MOXLEY, W H		380	3/68
COC WATCH O	CWO3	KENNEDY, J P	COC	103	8/67
HIST TEAM LDR	CWO2	COMBS, R J		43	9/67
ARVN LNO	LTCOL	KHUY, LAI-VAN		224	
ROKMC LNO	MAJ	HWANG, KI UN		24	
ARVN LNO	CAPT	CHUNG, HA-BA		224	
ARVN LNO	1STLT	LIEM, CHAU-KIM		224	
ARVN LNO	2DLT	TUYEN, NGUYEN-VAN		224	

G-4 SECTION

ASST C/S G-4	COL	QUILTY, J F		4	6/67
DEPUTY G-4	LTCOL	BAILEY, A S		4	8/67
LOG OPNS O	LTCOL	JONES, C T		304	7/67
ASST LOG OPNS O	MAJ	BEURGEY, W L		304	4/68
A/LOG PLANS O GND	MAJ	DUTTON, T A		204	7/67
LOG LNO	MAJ	NELSON, F N		304	10/67
LOG PLANS O	MAJ	WHALLEY, A		204	1/68
ASST LOGOPNSO	CAPT	GRIGGS, W J		304	4/68

G-5 SECTION

ASST C/S G-5	COL	HILL, J T	301, DANANG	6419	2/68
ASST G-5	COL	ROSS, G O	301, DANANG	6419	7/67
OPERATIONS O	LTCOL	OLEARY, R J	301		7/67
CIVIC ACTION O	MAJ	HARRIS, J B	46, 301		2/68
REPORTS CONTROL O	MAJ	NELSON, H M	46		4/68
MED MONITOR	LCDR	NOURIGAT, E R	46		10/67
ASST REPORTS O	CAPT	SEAY, O A	46		3/67

ADJUTANT SECTION

FORCE ADJ	MAJ	REVILLE, J T	7, 207		8/67
ASST ADJ/PERS O	1STLT	MATTOX, L	207		10/67
ASST ADJ/OIC S&C	2DLT	ANDERSON, W L	107		2/68
ASST ADJ	WO	OAKES, M A	7, 207		5/67

CHAPLAIN SECTION

FORCE CHAPLAIN	CAPT	LYONS, E V	19		10/67
ASST CHAPLAIN	CDR	HERSHBERGER, J R	19		9/67

COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS SECTION

CEO	COL	HUNT, S B	10		4/68
ASST CEO AVIONIC O	MAJ	ANDERSON, J L	110		2/68
COMM C 5TH COMM	MAJ	CLARK, G	11		3/68
ASST CEO	MAJ	COLLINS, G L	410		9/67
ASST CEO	MAJ	FRASER, J H	310		8/67
ASST CEO	MAJ	WILLIAMS, D G	210		11/67
ASST CEO	CAPT	BORDERS, J F	310		4/67

COMPTROLLER SECTION

ASST C/S COMPT	LTCOL	SNOW, M W	50	7/67
FISCAL O	ZDLT	CROCKFORD, R K	50	9/67

DENTAL SECTION

FORCE DENTAL O	CAPT	MORGAN, K L	40	4/67
ADMIN ASST	LTJG	SNITTJER, W J	40	7/67

EMBARKATION - TRANSPORTATION SECTION

EMBARK O	LTCOL	SILVERTHORN, E A	39	7/67
ASST EMBARK O	MAJ	SAYE, D A	39	12/67
ASST EMBARK O	CAPT	REVES, S S	39	8/67

ENGINEER SECTION

FORCE ENGINEER	COL	HORN, C H	15	9/67
ASST FORCE ENGR	LTCOL	TIMME, W G	15	2/68
CEC O	LCDR	MULDER, W H	15	7/67
ENGR OPNS O	CAPT	FLESSNER, M	15	8/67
ENGR UTILITIES O	CAPT	NELMS, R	15	9/67

FOOD SERVICES SECTION

FOOD SERVICES O			58	
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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

HEADQUARTERS CMDT	COL	RHOADES, J R	132, DANANG 6585	8/67
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INFORMATIONAL SERVICES SECTION - COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

FORCE ISO	COL	DERRYBERRY, D G	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	2/68
ASST ISO	LTCOL	STARK, R S	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	2/68
LNO MACV	LTCOL	WILLIAMS, J F	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	1/67
ASST ISO	MAJ	HAIGHT, W P	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	6/67
ASST ISO	2DLT	ARNOLD, R E	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	10/67
ASST ISO	2DLT	COFFEY, A L	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	1/68
COMBAT ARTIST	2DLT	DERMOTT, L H	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	12/67
PRESS CENTER O	2DLT	JARRELL, R JR	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	5/67
PHOTO O	WO	CORNUET, G S	86, DNG 6259, MOTLEY 227	7/67

INSPECTOR SECTION

FORCE INSPECTOR	COL	BOYD, C A	32	6/67
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LEGAL SECTION

FORCE LEGAL O	COL*	NEVILLE, R B	305	8/67
NAVMC JUD ACT O	LTCOL	WANDER, W W	117	5/67
ASST FORCE LEGAL O	CAPT	TOSI, G	17	12/67

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

FORCE MT O	LTCOL	TONNAKLIFF, C W	35	8/67
MT OPNS O	MAJ	SHAY, J M	35	1/68
MT MAINT O	CAPT	PEARCE, D B	35	4/67

MEDICAL SECTION

FORCE SURGEON	CAPT	BAKER, H A	16		5/67
MED ADMIN ASST	CDR	BROULIK, F	16		7/67
SURGEON	CDR	MILLS, W J		FLAMINGO 138	7/67

ORDNANCE SECTION

FORCE ORDNANCE O	LTCOL	THOMAS, J C	8, 108		8/67
GND ORDNANCE O	CAPT	COULTER, R S	8, 108		7/67
AMMO	CAPT	LUZADDER, H R	8, 108		4/68

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION

OPNS ANAL O	MAJ	ABERNATHY, T R	108		9/67
ASST OPNS ANAL O	MAJ	JOHNSON, R R	108		8/67

POSTAL SECTION

POSTAL O	MAJ	COURTNEY, J R	7, 207		7/67
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PROTOCOL SECTION

PROTOCOL O	MAJ	HARRELL, J T	62		4/68
ASST PROTOCOL O	CAPT	PIERZCHALA, R P	62		5/67

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

PROVOST MARSHAL	LTCOL	SULLIVAN, T H	27		9/67
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SECTION

PSY OPNS O	COL	READ, R R	401, DANANG 6293		7/67
ASST PSY OPNS O	MAJ	CAHILL, E D	401, DANANG 6293		1/68

RED CROSS SECTION

RED CROSS REP	MR.	JOYCE, R E	119, NIGHTS AND SUNDAYS		6/67
RED CROSS REP	MR.	SMITH, R W	119, CALL AT MOMENT 119		7/67

SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

FORCE SPL SERV O	COL	SACHS, C A	37		7/67
ASST SPL SERV O	LTCOL	SUMERLIN, E B JR	37		10/67
ASST SPL SERV O	MAJ	DREBUSHENKO, W	37		10/67
R&R O	CAPT	JERSEY, D E	144, 241		4/68
CUSTODIAN	WO	BRECKENRIDGE, L L	37		1/68

SUPPLY SECTION

FORCE SUPPLY O	COL	HILL, A T	21		7/67
ASST SUPPLY O	LTCOL	ROURKE, R E	21		8/67
ASST SUPPLY O	MAJ	LYNCH, T K	121		10/67
ASST SUPPLY O	CAPT	HOOKE, G E	121		9/67

HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY

COMMANDING O	MAJ	FINNEY, R E	34	4/68
S-3/S-4	CAPT	BINCH, W B	34	6/67
MT O	CAPT	CASPER, W R	135	12/67
CLUBS O	CAPT	PAYLOVSKIS, V V	59	5/67
EXECUTIVE O	CAPT	SINCLAIR, D K JR	34	10/67
DISBURSING O	1STLT	DOWD, O H	18	6/67
SUPPLY O	1STLT	INGRAHAM, C H	221	6/67
SECURITY O	2DLT	EVANS, M J	127	7/67
ADMIN O	WO	DESHOTEL, B J	34	7/67

SUB-UNIT NO. 1 FIRST RADIO BATTALION

OIC	MAJ	CRUMBACK, W I	53, 453	9/67
OIC	CAPT	LOSIK, F A	53, 453	2/68

29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY

COMMANDING O	LTCOL	STEVENS, L A	80	6/67
CHIEF, DISPL PER	MAJ	BRANTLEY, T J	380	5/67
EXECUTIVE O	MAJ	BURT, G	80	12/67
OPERATIONS O	MAJ	WHITEHEAD, H S	280	11/67
CHIEF, ECON TEAM	CAPT	ANDERSON, D G	280	5/67
CLAIMS COMMISSION	CAPT	ANDERSON, V P		5/67
CHIEF, PUBLIC	CAPT	PLOTT, M F	380	5/67
HEALTH TEAM				
ADMIN O	CAPT	TENNANT, D D	180	6/67
CHIEF, FOOD&ARG TM	1STLT	DECKER, V G	380	12/67
CHIEF, CIV SUP TM	1STLT	GIBBS, C E	380	5/67
PLANS&INTELL O	1STLT	HENDERSON, R N	380	5/67
CHIEF, PUBLIC	1STLT	SPICER, W F	380	5/67
EDUCATION TEAM				

MOTLEY 241

244TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY

COMMANDING O	MAJ	MCCAIG, T H	85	9/67
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\*DENOTES ADDITIONAL, JOINT OR ATTACHED DUTY.  
 REPORT ERRORS, CHANGES AND/OR OMISSIONS IN WRITING TO THE FORCE ADJUTANT.

*J. T. Reville*  
 J. T. REVILLE  
 FORCE ADJUTANT

MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING4 APRIL, 1967

1. The Council convened at 0935 with the following members present:
  - a. MGEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAW, (Chairman)
  - b. Mr. Nguyen Van DAI, Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps
  - c. BGEN OWENS, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
  - d. RADM. LACY, USN, Commander NSA, Danang
  - e. Mr. GORDON, Deputy Regional Director, OCO
  - f. Mr. WHELTON, Assistant Regional Director for New Life Development, OCO
  - g. Mr. COLEBAUGH, POLAD, III MAF
  - h. Mr. HELMS, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OCO
  - i. Col. CACH, ARVN, I Corps DC of S for Rural Construction
  - j. Col. HILL, USMC, G-5, III MAF
  - k. Col. BEESON, USA, Deputy CO, I Corps Advisory Group
  - l. LtCol. BECKER, USA, G-5, I Corps Advisory Group
  - m. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)
  
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. Dr. TOLLE, OCO
  - b. Mr. FULLER, OCO (representing Ass't Director for RD, OCO, Region I)
  - c. Mr. STRICKLAND, OCO
  - d. Mr. VON GOLDBERG, OCO
  - e. Capt. BAKER, USN
  - f. LtCol. KIEU, ARVN
  - g. LtCol. PHU, ARVN
  - h. LtCol. MINEAR, USA
  - i. LtCol. WILLIS, USA
  - j. Maj. CHUC, ARVN
  - k. Maj. MORLEY, USMC
  - l. Maj. STEWART, USMC
  - m. Capt. NGHIEP, ARVN
  - n. Capt. SON, ARVN
  - o. Lt.(jg) QUINTON, USN
  - p. Lt.(jg) TRIMPert, USN (representing CAO, NAS, Danang)
  
3. OLD BUSINESS

a. The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting, guests were introduced and welcomed. The CHAIRMAN asked for comments on the minutes of the meetings of 21 and 28 March. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Wage Rate Study for truck drivers, an attachment to the minutes of 21 March, refuted a theory that the City of Danang wage scale was inferior to that paid by United States Forces and contractors. This theory had been advanced as a possible explanation for the inability of the City of Danang to hire drivers for trash trucks.

ANNEX "A" to PART III  
Paragraph 7.

RADM. LACY announced that drivers had been hired for the two new trash trucks.

b. LtCol. MINEAR, Chairman of the Road Committee, presented a report of that Committee's meeting held on 21 March 1967. He stated that bridge signs are being placed at bridges in I Corps by the GVN Public Works Department. These signs will be in English and Vietnamese and will show the width and capacity of each bridge. The CHAIRMAN asked where the status of each bridge might be found. LtCol. MINEAR stated that the information was updated monthly and promulgated to the field in the Road and Bridge Upgrading and Construction Report. The CHAIRMAN asked Col. BEESON to examine the report for adequacy of content and distribution. LtCol. MINEAR then introduced LtCol. WILLIS, Engineer Advisory Division, USARV (G-4). LtCol. WILLIS introduced LtCol. KIEU, Chief, Troops and Logistics Division, Office, Chief of Engineers, ARVN, his staff and LtCol. PHU, I Corps Engineer. Maj. CHUC then presented the engineer support program for the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan. The objectives of this program are:

(1) The support of the Revolutionary Development plan by repair of roads and bridges.

(2) The construction and repair of bridges and improvement of the national highway in coordination with the Free World Military Armed Forces.

At the completion of the presentation by Maj. CHUC the CHAIRMAN requested that LtCol. MINEAR, as the I Corps Engineer Advisor, originate a letter to CG, III MAF, discussing the engineer support program and recommending a meeting of representatives of III MAF, I Corps, I Corps Advisory Group, U. S. Naval Support Activity, OCO and GVN Public Works. This meeting would discuss and make recommendations regarding coordination and funding of engineer projects.

c. Dr. TOLLE, Chairman of the Education Committee reported that, because the 12 civilian school teachers who have been assisting the Seabees at the Danang Polytechnic School had not been paid since 31 December, the refugee training courses had been discontinued on 1 April. He explained that USAID had funded this program to 31 December. At this time the Commissariat for Refugees took cognizance of the program. On 15 March responsibility was transferred to the Commissioner for Education where it now rests. Mr. GORDON stated that OCO will take cognizance of this situation to include the back pay for teachers and reestablishment of financial support for teachers salaries for future courses.

d. Lt. TRIMPERT stated that the "dogs", which hold the logs, for the Quang Tri sawmill should be in-country in approximately 14 days. He further stated that members of the Philippine Civic Action Team will train operators for the sawmill.

e. Mr. WHELTON stated that on 3 April a funding document was to be signed in Saigon making available \$96,000.00 for procurement of commodities to be used in the additions or completion of four province hospitals.

f. Mr. WHELTON reported that the Rock Crusher will be installed at the quarry on Monkey Mountain. Date of delivery from Saigon is unknown at this time.

g. Capt. BAKER announced that the JCC letter to the Minister of Health, Saigon, discussing the Region I public health needs had been mailed.

h. RADM. LACY announced that he had received a favorable reply from the Army-Air Force Exchange System, Saigon, on the placement of Hue Vocational Trade Center handicraft products in the exchange system. The next step is the establishment of a concession to handle the products. He further stated NSA will continue to monitor this project.

#### 4. NEW BUSINESS

a. Mr. GORDON requested that the subject of security for the rice harvest and the storage of rice be placed on a future agenda.

b. Mr. HELMS announced that the high schools of Danang had sponsored an exhibition of crafts which was on display behind the Vietnamese-American Association building. He said the exhibition had been viewed by over 1,000 persons and urged members and guests to attend.


c. The CHAIRMAN recommended that committee reports for the 11 April meeting be delayed to 25 April unless they touch on the refugee situation in I Corps. He further recommended an April meeting at Quang Tri City. After discussion, it was agreed to visit Quang Tri City on 18 April, to include a visit to a New Life Hamlet.

#### 5. Agenda items for the next meeting:

- a. The refugee problem.
- b. Review of unfinished business items.
- c. Review of the highlights of the week's activities by all members.

6. The meeting adjourned at 1155. The next meeting is scheduled for 0930, 11 April, in Danang.

Respectfully submitted,

  
R. J. O'LEARY  
LtCol USMC  
Recorder

#### DISTRIBUTION:

Each member  
Each Committee Chairman  
Each Guest  
LtCol. O'LEARY, Recorder (30)

I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCILFOR 11 APRIL 1967, MEETING

<u>UNFINISHED BUSINESS</u>	<u>INITIAL MENTION</u>	<u>RECENT MENTION</u>	<u>MONITOR</u>
1. Bridge sections for Quang Tri Province.	(8/23/66)	(3/7/67)	OCO
2. Enlargement of Province Hospital at Tam Ky.	(8/30/66)	(4/4/67)	OCO
3. JCC Letter to Minister of Public Health.	(9/6/66)	(4/4/67)	Pub.Health Committee
4. Hue Vocational Trade Center handicraft products.	(11/15/66)	(4/4/67)	NSA
5. Sugar refinery machinery for Quang Ngai Province.	(12/13/66)	(3/21/67)	GVN
6. NSA suspended supply of building materials for Youth Guidance Center.	(1/24/67)	(3/14/67)	NSA IC Adv.Gp.
7. Sawmill for Quang Tri Province, parts and training.	(1/31/67)	(4/4/67)	OCO
8. Trash and garbage disposal.	(1/31/67)	(4/4/67)	NSA-OCO
9. F-8 aircraft crash claims.	(2/7/67)	(2/21/67)	IC Adv.Gp.
10. Province Public Health Committees.	(2/7/67)	(2/21/67)	Pub. Health Committee
11. Rock Crusher.	(2/28/67)	(4/4/67)	OCO
12. Refugee Problem.	(3/14/67)	(3/21/67)	
13. Rice	(4/4/67)		
14. Storage	(4/4/67)		
15. Teacher salaries for Danang Polytechnic.	(4/4/67)		OCO
16. Quang Tri Meeting, 18 April.	(4/4/67)		IC Adv.Gp.

MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING11 APRIL, 1967

1. The Council convened at 0935 with the following members present:
  - a. MGEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAW, (Chairman)
  - b. BGEN. OWENS, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
  - c. RADM. LACY, USN, Commander NSA, Danang
  - d. Mr. GORDON, Deputy Regional Director, OCO
  - e. Mr. COLEBAUGH, POLAD, III MAF
  - f. Mr. HELMS, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OCO
  - g. Col. CACH, ARVN, I Corps DC of S for Rural Construction
  - h. Col. HILL, USMC, G-5, III MAF
  - i. Col. BEESON, USA, Deputy CO, I Corps Advisory Group
  - j. LtCol. BECKER, USA, G-5, I Corps Advisory Group
  - k. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)
  
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. Mr. CAN, GVN
  - b. Mr. HOLDREN, OCO
  - c. Mr. FULLER, OCO (representing Ass't Director for RD, OCO, Region I)
  - d. LtCol. ANDREWS, USAF
  - e. Maj. THIEP, ARVN (representing Admin Ass't to the CG, I Corps)
  - f. Maj. BRANTLEY, USA
  - g. Maj. STEWART, USMC
  - h. Capt. KANE, USAF
  - i. Lt(jg) TRIMPert, USN (representing CAO, NSA, Danang)

3. OLD BUSINESS

a. The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting, guests were introduced and welcomed, and members were asked to comment on items previously brought before the Council. Col. BEESON reported that a meeting had been held by LtCol. MINEAR and his committee on engineer support of the 1967 Combined Campaign. A letter was being prepared for CG III MAF regarding coordination and funding of the engineer projects. Col. BEESON further reported that the Road and Bridge Upgrading and Construction Report was adequate both in content and distribution.

b. Col. HILL introduced Maj. BRANTLEY, Chief of The Displaced Persons Teams, 29th Civil Affairs Company. Major BRANTLEY presented a paper on the refugee problem. He stressed that there are presently an estimated 327,298 refugees in I Corps and the number is growing at an average rate of 10,000 per month. He pointed out that the major immediate problems are:

- (1) The registration of refugees so they can receive the aid to

which they are entitled.

(2) The recruitment, training and employment of Provincial staffs of the Special Commissariate for Refugees (SCR). Such Province-level staffs are responsible for Province refugee programs.

(3) The resettlement of refugees from the temporary camps to permanent homesites.

Plaster payment, employment and education all contribute to this complex problem. Agencies working with the SCR are OCO, the 29th Civil Affairs Company and the tactical units in whose areas refugee camps and resettlement hamlets are located.

Mr. GORDON commented that the first step might well be a program at the Province to train SCR employees in the functions of their office. This would be in line with the philosophy of assisting the present organization to function.

c. The CHAIRMAN appointed an ad hoc committee composed of Mr. HOLDREN, OCO, as Chairman, with membership from I Corps, III MAF, I Corps Advisory Group, and a representative of the Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps. This committee will make recommendations to the JCC regarding the establishment of a refugee committee within the structure of the JCC, and its membership, if so recommended.

d. LtCol. BECKER announced that all claims for the F-8 aircraft crash had been processed and paid except number 40 who cannot be located. Efforts are continuing to locate this person. LtCol. BECKER recommended that this item be removed from the "unfinished business" agenda. There being no objection by any member of the Council the CHAIRMAN ordered it so removed.

e. Mr. GORDON announced that the Rock Crusher was loaded aboard ship at Saigon on Saturday 8 April and is enroute to Danang.

f. Mr. GORDON reported that OCO is taking action on the pay of the teachers in the refugee night school program at the Danang Polytechnic School. This action includes the back pay problem and reestablishment of financial support to reopen the program.

#### 4. NEW BUSINESS

a. BGEN. OWENS announced that the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association has queried III MAF in regards to the establishment of a memorial to the late Col. James W. HURLBUT USMCR. III MAF has recommended the purchase of equipment for the operating room at the Quang Tri Provincial Hospital.


b. Mr. GORDON recommended a review of the structure of the JCC. The CHAIRMAN concurred in his recommendation and further directed the Recorder to review and report the number of times each committee has met. The CHAIRMAN requested the membership to review the structure of the JCC and to be prepared to discuss this topic at the 25 April meeting.

5. Agenda item for the next meeting:

Discussion with GVN officials at Quang Tri City.

6. The meeting adjourned at 1130. The next meeting is scheduled for 0900, 18 April, 1967, in Quang Tri City. Aircraft will depart the USAF Base Operations, Danang Air Base at 0745 18 April.

Respectfully submitted,



R. J. O'LEARY  
LtCol. USMC  
Recorder

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Member

Each Committee Chairman

Each Guest

LtCol. O'LEARY, Recorder (30)

MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETINGQUANG TRI PROVINCE MEETING18 April 1967

1. The Council convened at 0900 with the following members present:
  - a. MGEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAW, (Chairman)
  - b. Mr. Nguyen Van DAI, Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps
  - c. BGEN. OWENS, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
  - d. RADM. LACY, USN, Commander NSA, Danang
  - e. Mr. WHELTON, Assistant Regional Director for New Life Development, OCO
  - f. Col. NGHI, ARVN, Chief of Staff, I Corps
  - g. Col. CACH, ARVN, I Corps DC of S for Rural Construction
  - h. Col. HILL, USMC, G-5, III MAF
  - i. Col. BEESON, USA, Deputy CO, I Corps Advisory Group
  - j. LtCol. BECKER, USA, G-5, I Corps Advisory Group
  - k. Lt. BUNN, USN, CAO, NSA, Danang
  - l. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. Mr. FULLER, OCO (representing Ass't Director for RD, OCO, Region I)
  - b. Mr. HOLDREN, OCO
  - c. Mr. RIDDELL, OCO (representing Ass't Director for PsyOps, OCO, Region I)
  - d. Col. NHIEU, ARVN
  - e. Maj. THIEP, ARVN
  - f. Maj. STEWART, USMC
  - g. L. G. DELOSSANTOS YMC, USN
3. The following principal members of the Province Team were present:
  - a. LtCol. AM, Quang Tri Province Chief
  - b. Mr. VANDERBIE, Province Representative
  - c. LtCol SMITH, USA, Sector Advisor
4. The Province Chief, LtCol. AM, opened the meeting and welcomed the Council and guests. He announced that the program would include a briefing on the Revolutionary Development (RD) program in Quang Tri, and the problem of refugees from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). At the conclusion of the briefing there would be a tour of a New Life Hamlet.
  - a. LtCol. AM reviewed the 1967 RD program for Quang Tri Province 24 New Life, 17 Consolidated and 2 Constructed Hamlets. He then discussed the progress in each of the 14 hamlets containing RD Teams

b. LtCol. AM stressed that one of his major problems is transportation. Of his nine trucks one is located in a district, two are being used by OCO, four are deadlined for repair and only two are available for his use.

c. LtCol. AM reviewed the resettlement of refugees from the DMZ area. He was followed by Col. NGHI who amplified the plans of the Commanding General, I Corps, on this subject.

d. Mr. WHELTON stressed the importance of detailed, coordinated planning to insure that the refugees are properly cared for.

e. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Province Chief for the very informative and beneficial briefing and discussion.

5. At the conclusion of the meeting the Province Chief escorted the Council on a tour of Bich Khe, a New Life Hamlet in which is located RD Team number 10.

6. The Council departed Quang Tri at 1145.

7. Agenda items for the next meeting are:

a. Report of the Port Committee ( a copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed).

b. Report of the Psychological Warfare Committee ( a copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed).

c. Report of the Public Health Committee (a copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed).

d. Report of the Commodities Distribution Committee (a copy of the minutes of this meeting enclosed).

e. Discussion of Quang Tri meeting.


f. Review of structure of JCC.

g. Review of unfinished business items (separate distribution).

h. Review of the highlights of the week's activities by all members.

8. The next meeting is scheduled for 0930, 25 April, 1967 in Danang.

Respectfully submitted,

  
R. J. O'LEARY  
LtCol. USMC  
Recorder

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Each Member, Each Committee Chairman, Each Guest, LtCol. O'LEARY, Recorder (30)

MINUTES OF PORT COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING29 MARCH 1967

1. The Committee met at 1430 with the following members present:
  - a. CAPT RATH, USN, Chief of Staff, NSA (Chairman).
  - b. CAPT LINVILLE, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, NSA.
  - c. MAJOR GAM, ARVN, Port Director.
  - d. CAPT AN, Chief of Exploitation.
  - e. Mr. DANH, Port Works.
  - f. Mr. TINH, DaNang Port Security Officer.
  - g. Mr. THOA, Harbormaster, Commercial Port.
  - h. LT BUNN, USNR, Civic Action Officer, NSA.
  - i. LCDR ONG, USN, Plans Officer, NSA (Recorder).
  - j. LT TINH, ARVN.
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. CAPT MERDINGER, USN, NSA, Public Works Office.
  - b. Mr. CONSIGNED, OCO Port Department.
  - c. LCDR GALLOWAY, USN, Ass't Public Works Officer, NSA.
  - d. LCDR HALPERIN, USN, Head, Freight Terminal Section, NSA.
  - e. LTJG G. HUBBS, Public Works Division, NSA.
  - f. Mr. TEE, Translator, NSA.
3. The Chairman opened the meeting and the guests were introduced.
4. Old Business:
  - a. Commercial Port Repairs. LTJG HUBBS presented a report on the progress of repairs to the Commercial Port. The Port Officials have

arranged for the areas in the vicinity of warehouses 4 and 5 to be cleared. Surfacing will be accomplished as soon as the rock is available. The pile driver is repaired and will drive the pile for "2" Pier when it completes work at Bach Mang Landing.

b. Designated Harbor Anchoring Areas. Captain LINVILLE reported that CDR TONG VNN, Commander, First Coastal Zone had studied the designated anchorages from a harbor defense viewpoint and had agreed to them. Captain LINVILLE stated that anchorages are now being assigned by the Harbor Entrance Control Post in accordance with the agreed designated anchorage plan.

c. DaNang Rules of Navigation. Mr. THOA delivered a copy of the DaNang Rules of Navigation to Captain LINVILLE for use by Navy Harbor Pilots.

d. Harbor Dredging Summary. Captain AN requested a copy of the revised harbor soundings now that the harbor dredging is completed. Captain LINVILLE stated he would deliver him one as soon as they are available.

#### 5. New Business.

a. Lights. Mr. THOA requested that the floats that have been anchored near the DaNang River Bridge be lighted. Captain LINVILLE stated that this would be accomplished.

b. Dredging. Mr. THOA requested that the Navy have Swellmaster dredge a wider river channel and also along the commercial port extension. Captain RATH explained that the Navy did not have any funds remaining for DaNang dredging but would check to insure that the recent channel dredging was completed within the specifications which the Navy had requested. He suggested that the Port Directors contact OCO to arrange for additional dredging.

c. Skimmer Hulls. Mr. THOA stated the Harbor Police boat hull was worn out beyond repair and asked if the Navy had two outboard motorboat hulls or skimmer hulls that the Port Officials could use to replace their boats. Captain RATH stated that he regretted that the U. S. Navy, DaNang had no extra boat hulls. Mr. CONSIDINE stated he would see if OCO had any boat hulls.

d. Commercial Port Rice Cargo. Captain AN reported that during the period of 1 January - 29 March 1967 the Commercial Port had received 51,380 short tons of rice from the following vessels:

<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>\$1/Rice</u>
CABANAWK	13 January	9,551
CYRENIAN	15 February	7,940
ANASIA	9 February	8,251
FARALIS	4 March	15,326

<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>ST/Rice</u>
TAI NAN	20 March	5,000
NEW KAILING	21 March	5,250
REUBEN TIPTON	28 March	5,000

He further stated that the Commercial Port was now transshipping to Quinhon, Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay on ships returning to Saigon from DaNang.

e. Commercial Port Procedures. Major CAN passed out a memo showing the procedure to be followed in discharging and receiving cargo from the Commercial Port. He asked that this be promulgated to all U. S. Port Users. Captain RATH stated that the Navy would do so. A copy of these procedures is enclosed.


f. Port Workers Club. The Commercial Port Officials requested assistance in building a club for the port workers. LT BUNN stated that this was a civic action project. It was agreed that this should be accomplished through the Mayors Office.

g. Welding Material. Mr. DANH asked if the U. S. Navy could provide the port with two cylinders of oxygen, two cylinders of acetylene and 9 liters of acid a month for port works welding. Captain RATH stated that the Navy and OCO would investigate this request to determine its feasibility.

h. It was agreed that the next meeting would be held at 1430 on 26 April 1967. Agenda items were requested by 19 April 1967.


6. The meeting adjourned at 1530, 20 March 1967.

Respectfully Submitted,

  
R. E. ONG,  
LCDR, USN  
Recorder

PORT OF DA-NANG

Procedure for consignees to clear and remove cargo from the Da-nang Commercial Port to follow. Proceed to the:



VESSEL AGENT: Obtain signed Bill of Lading and complete fees requirements.

CUSTOMS OFFICE: Located at 20 Bach-DANG Street where you shall declare the cargo and complete formalities.

PORT POLICE: Obtain entrance authorization into the Commercial Port.

WAREHOUSE CLEARANCE: Proceed to Warehouse No. 3 in the Port and obtain cargo release and check of cargo against Bill of Lading.

PORT TAX OFFICE: Return to Port main Office have all papers checked by the taxation Office and pay costs as required.

PICK UP FREIGHT: Return to Port area to Warehouse where cargo is located and pick up your freight.

All claims or information please contact the administrative office in the service of Port Exploitation.

BIÊN BẢN BUỔI HỌP CỦA ỦY-BAN TƯỞNG-TRỢ HẢI-CẢNG VÀO  
NGÀY 29 THÁNG 3 NĂM 1967

1. Buổi họp bắt đầu vào lúc 14 giờ 30 với sự hiện diện của quý liệt vị sau đây:
  - a. Đại-Tá RATH, Tham-Mưu-Trưởng HQHK (Chủ-Tọa).
  - b. Đại-Tá LINVILLE, Phụ-Tá Tham-Mưu-Trưởng Phòng-Điều-Hành và Kế-Hoạch, HQHK.
  - c. Thiếu-Tá CẨM, QLVN, Giám-Đốc Nha Thương-Cảng.
  - d. Ông AN, Chánh-Sự-Vụ Ty Khai-Thác Thương-Cảng.
  - e. Ông DANH, Chánh-Sự-Vụ Ty Công-Tác Thương-Cảng.
  - f. Ông TINH, Sĩ-Quan An-Ninh Thương-Cảng Đà-Nẵng.
  - g. Ông THỎA, Cảng-Trưởng Ty Thương-Cảng.
  - h. Đại-Ủy BUNN, HQHK, Dân-Sự-Vụ.
  - i. Thiếu-Tá ONG, HQHK, Sĩ-Quan Kế-Hoạch ( Ghi chép).
  - j. Trung-Ủy TINH, QLVN.
  
2. Quý Quan-Khách hiện diện như sau:
  - a. Đại-Tá MERDINGER, HQHK, Ty Công-Chánh.
  - b. Ông CONSIDINE, Sở Thông-Vận Thương-Cảng.
  - c. Trung-Tá GALLOWAY, HQHK, Sĩ-Quan Phụ-Tá Công-Chánh.
  - d. Trung-Tá HALPERIN, HQHK, Trưởng-Ban Chuyên-Vận Hàng-Hóa.
  - e. Trung-Ủy HUBBS, Công-Chánh, HQHK.
  - f. Ông TEE, Phiên-dịch-viên, HQHK.
  
3. Vị Chủ-Tọa khai-mạc buổi họp và giới thiệu quý quan-khách.
  
4. Cửu-sự:
  - a. Sửa chữa Thương-Cảng. Trung-Ủy HUBBS (nói rằng) tường trình về sự diển-tiến của việc sửa chữa ty Thương-Cảng. Ty Thương cũng đã chỉnh đốn tươm tất các vùng lân cận Kho 4 và 5. Việc tráng nền sẽ được hoàn tất ngay khi đã làm xong. Các trụ chống đang được sửa chữa và sẽ đóng vào cầu chữ "T" ngay khi bến phà Bạch-Đặng hoàn tất.
  
  - b. Chỉ-Định địa điểm cho tàu neo. Đại-Tá LINVILLE nói rằng

Trung-Tá THÔNG, Chỉ-huy-Trưởng Vùng I Duyên-hải đã nghiên-cứu các địa điểm tàu neo và việc an-ninh phòng thủ hải-cảng và ông ta đã đồng ý. Đại-Tá LINVILLE nói rằng các địa điểm tàu neo đang được Ban Kiểm-Soát Hải-Cảng vạch định để phù hợp với dự án về các chỗ cho tàu neo.

c. Luật-lệ của Ty Hàng-hải. Ông THỎA trao cho Đại-Tá LINVILLE một bản sao về các luật-lệ của Ty Hàng-hải để cho các hoa-tiêu xử dụng.

d. Sơ lược về việc vét hải-cảng. Ông AN yêu cầu được một bản sao về các chiểu sáo của việc tu sửa hải-cảng khi việc vét sông hoàn tất. Đại-Tá LINVILLE nói rằng ông sẽ trao một bản ngay sau khi hoàn thành.

## 5. Tân-sự

a. Đèn. Ông THỎA yêu cầu trang bị đèn dọc theo các phao đặt gần cầu Đà-Nẵng. Đại-Tá LINVILLE nói rằng việc này sẽ được thực hiện.

b. Vét sông. Ông THỎA yêu cầu Hải-Quân đào vét lòng sông cho rộng cũng như việc khai thông dọc theo Thương-Cảng. Đại-Tá RATH giải thích rằng hiện nay Hải-Quân chưa có ngân-quản nào cho việc vét sông này nhưng sẽ thể bảo đảm là việc vét sông mới đây đã được hoàn tất vì nhu cầu cần thiết mà Hải-Quân yêu cầu. Ông ta đề nghị rằng Ban Giám-Đốc Thương-Cảng nên tiếp xúc với Sở Thông-Vận (OCO) để thảo luận về việc vét sông này.

c. Tàu nhỏ. Ông THỎA trình bày rằng hiện tàu của Cảnh-Sát Hải-Cảng đã quá cũ không sửa chữa lại được và nếu Hải-Quân có thì cung ứng cho 2 chiếc tàu có gắn động cơ hoặc loại tàu nhỏ để nhân viên Thương-Cảng có thể dùng để thay thế các tàu cũ. Đại-Tá RATH nói rằng hiện Hải-Quân Hoa-Kỳ ở Đà-Nẵng không có thêm loại tàu này. Ông CONSIDINE nói rằng để ông ta xem lại nếu OCO có loại tàu nhỏ này.

d. Vấn đề gạo ở Thương-Cảng. Ông AN cho biết suốt thời gian từ 1 tháng 1 cho đến 29 tháng 3 năm 1967, Thương-Cảng nhận được 51,330 tấn gạo của các tàu sau:

Tàu	Ngày	Tấn/gạo
CABANAWK	13-1	9,551
CYRENIAN	15-2	7,940
AMASIA	9-2	8,251
PARALIS	4-3	10,326
TAI NAN	20-3	5,000
NEW KAILING	21-3	5,250
REUBEN TIPTON	28-3	5,000

Ông nói thêm rằng hiện nay Thương-Cảng đang chuyển hàng đi Qui-Nhon, Nha-Trang và Vịnh Cam-Ranh và từ Đà-Nẵng đi Sài-gòn.

e. Các nguyên-tắc ở Thương-Cảng. Thiếu-Tá CÂM có đưa ra một bản họa đồ giải-thích các nguyên tắc để bốc hàng và nhận hàng ở Thương-Cảng. Ông ta nói rằng bản đồ chỉ dẫn này sẽ được phổ biến cho tất cả những người Hoa-Kỳ xử dụng hải-cảng. Đại-Tá RATH nói rằng Hải-Quân sẽ tuân theo các nguyên tắc đó. Một phó bản về nguyên tắc này đã được đính kèm theo.


f. Câu-lạc-bộ cho công nhân hải-cảng. Thương-Cảng xin được trợ giúp để xây một câu-lạc-bộ cho công nhân hải-cảng. Đại-Ủy BUNN nói rằng đây là việc thuộc chương-trình của Dân-Sự-Vụ. Việc này sẽ được thực hiện sau khi Tòa-Thị-Chính phê chuẩn.

g. Vật liệu để hàn xì. Ông DAMH yêu cầu Hải-Quân Hoa-Kỳ có thể thì cung cấp cho Thương-Cảng hai ống oxygen, hai ống acetylene, và 9 lít acid mỗi tháng để dùng vào việc hàn xì. Đại-Tá RATH nói rằng Hải-Quân và số 000 sẽ tham khảo lời yêu cầu này trước khi quyết định giúp đỡ.

h. Cuộc họp tối đã được đồng ý tổ chức vào lúc 1430 ngày 26 tháng 4 năm 1967. Chương trình này sẽ gửi đến trước ngày 19 tháng 4 năm 1967.

6. Cuộc họp bế mạc vào lúc 15 giờ (ngày) 30 ngày 29 tháng 3 năm 1967.

Kính gửi,

  
H. E. ONG  
THIẾU-TÁ HẢI-QUÂN HOA-KỲ  
Biên-tập

MINUTES OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE  
JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL - I CORPS

5 April 1967

1. The Subcommittee convened at 1030 with the following members present:

- a. Mr. HELMS, Assistant Regional Director for Psychological Operations, OCO (Chairman)
- b. Maj CAHILL, III MAR PsyOps
- c. Maj PANZER, PsyWar/CA Advisor, I Corps
- d. Capt DILLARD, PolWar Bn Advisor
- e. Mr. RIDDELL, Deputy Asst for PsyOps OCO (Recorder)
- f. LtCol TUAN, Deputy C/S for PolWar I Corps
- g. Maj DIEN, G-V I Corps
- h. Capt DAM, Commander of 10th PolWar Bn
- i. Mr. RO, Chief of Regional VIS
- j. Mr. BA, VIS Danang
- k. Mr. PHAT, Regional Chieu Hoi Office
- l. Mr. THAO, Regional Chieu Hoi Office
- m. Mr. NGHI, OCO/PsyOps (Interpreter)

2. OLD BUSINESS

None

3. NEW BUSINESS

a. Mr. HELMS opened the meeting and reminded the members that it would be devoted to a discussion of subjects of mutual interest. However, before beginning, he felt that some time might be devoted to the current elections. He asked Mr. RO about the support for the elections to date and whether there were problems in this respect he wished to bring before the committee.

b. Mr. RO gave the following summary of the 1st phase of the village council elections begun April 2. He explained that Quang Tin did not participate in the 1st phase.

(1) Villages Involved in 1st Phase:

Quang Tri - 7

Thua Thien - 10

Quang Nam - 7

Quang Ngai - 5

(2) Village Council Positions Involved in 1st Phase and Number of Candidates:

Quang Tri - 70 positions competed for by 82 candidates

Thua Thien - 90 positions competed for by 123 candidates

Quang Nam - 60 positions competed for by 93 candidates

Quang Ngai - 44 positions competed for by 69 candidates

(3) Number of Registered Voters Involved in 1st Phase and Number Participating:

	<u>Registered</u>	<u>Participated</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Quang Tri	24,142	19,395	81.3%
Thua Thien	21,384	17,263	80.7%
Quang Nam	10,568	9,546	89.6%
Quang Ngai	12,378	10,289	80.3%

c. Mr. RO added that in Quang Nam, 9 villages were originally scheduled to hold elections. The candidates of two villages withdrew due to internal political affairs. Major PANZER inquired if the candidates intended to run again in the future. Mr. RO replied that the elections were only postponed and would be held at a later date.

d. Mr. RO said that the majority of candidates were farmers and village craftsmen; the largest proportion being farmers.

e. Mr. RO added that, in general, the 1st phase of the elections could be viewed as successful. The one failing, in his opinion, was the lack of women candidates. He explained that they had hoped to motivate more women to participate as candidates in the elections because women are more available for village affairs, i.e. they work inside the village and are not eligible for military service. The results on women candidates were:

	<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Elected</u>
Quang Tri	2	2
Thua Thien	5	0
Quang Nam	0	0
Quang Ngai	3	1

f. Mr. RO said that the only report of VC harassment during the election was the mortaring of Hoi An around 1400 on April 2.

g. He said that another indication of the success of psyops in explaining the election to the people was the small number of faulty ballots.

h. Col TUAN commented that General LAM had also emphasized the importance of the elections at a recent meeting of I Corps military commanders. He asked if a list of the elected village council members had been published yet. Mr. RO answered that they were still involved in the mechanics of the election and no list had been provided yet.

i. Major CAHILL inquired about reports of VC activity during the elections. Mr. RO said that with the exception of Hoi An there were no other reports of harassment. He explained that only a few villages were involved all of which were in secure areas.

j. Major PANZER asked how the results here compared with other Corps areas. Major DIEN said that the results announced over the radio indicated the elections were equally successful elsewhere.

k. Captain DILLARD asked how the voter turnout compared with the election for the Constitutional Assembly. Mr. PHAT commented that the two elections are difficult to compare since the CA election was held in one day and the village-hamlet elections are being held over several days.

l. Capt DAM proposed that a short briefing on the election activities of the 10th PolWar Battalion might be of interest to the members. He said that the battalion is giving full support to the elections by:

(1) Organizing the unit into 32 teams of 3 to 4 men each to assist the district VIS chiefs in explaining the elections to the people.

(2) Distributing 60,000 copies of a news bulletin concerning the elections during the 1st phase.

(3) Employing 4 hours of air loudspeaker broadcasts throughout I Corps during the 1st phase.

(4) Dropping 385,000 election leaflets during the 1st phase.

(5) Printing 1,150,000 leaflets for use in the preceding phases.

(6) Preparation of 5 million posters for use in the preceding phases.

m. As there were no further comments on the elections, Mr. HELMS proposed that the members discuss other subjects of mutual interest.

n. Mr. PHAT raised three problems with regard to the Chieu Hoi program:

(1) Food - More food supplies or money to purchase them are required for the Chieu Hoi centers. Saigon has instructed Da Nang to contact other friendly agencies about this question.

(2) Vocational Training - There is a need for more training courses in order to prepare the returnees for jobs when they go back to their villages.

(3) Returnee Security Check - Some returnees are being released from the centers without proper verification of their background by the security agencies.

o. Col TUAN said the information forms compiled by the Chieu Hoi centers should be checked by the military intelligence agencies. Mr. PHAT proposed that the forms be signed by military intelligence before the returnees go home. Col TUAN said the Chieu Hoi center can sign the form but it should be verified by military intelligence.

p. Major CAHILL said that the Da Nang Chieu Hoi center did not have enough funds to pay for water and electricity. Saigon, in reply to queries, said that the funds for these expenses have not been released yet. Mr. PHAT said that a telegram has been sent to Saigon regarding this.

q. Mr. THAO requested a separate American military advisor - officer or NCO - for each of the Armed Propaganda Teams. (There is one company in each of the five provinces plus a platoon at region headquarters in Da Nang.) Major CAHILL said he would look into the question. Captain DAM suggested that the APT work more closely with the S-5. Major PANZER said it might be possible to assign an extra advisor to the S-5 staff to work with the APT. Major DIEN suggested writing a letter to the Province Chief and S-5 describing the functions of the APT and requesting advisory assistance. Captain DAM inquired who the APT was responsible to in the province. Mr. PHAT replied that the team came under the Province Chief but he frequently delegated the authority to the S-5.

4. Agenda items for the next meeting: Mr. HELMS announced that the next meeting the members could discuss the next two phases of the village council elections and any other subjects of mutual interest.

5. The meeting adjourned at 1200 hours. The next meeting will be held on Wednesday, April 19.

W. H. RIDDELL  
Recorder

Minutes of the I Corps Public Health  
Committee Meeting (JCC)  
12 April, 1967

1. The meeting convened at 0930 hours with the following members present:

- a. Capt BAKER, MC, USN, III MAF Surgeon and Chairman
- b. Dr. SPENCER, Director, Public Health, OCO
- c. LCDR BYRD, MC, USN, NSA, PMU
- d. Maj VAN STRATEN, MSC, USA, Senior Medical Advisor, I Corps
- e. Capt PLOTT, MC, USAR, Medical Officer, 29th CA Co., III MAF
- f. Capt ZINDEL, MC, SFUSA, Det. C-1, 5th SF
- g. LCDR NOURIGAT, MSC, USN, III MAF Medical Monitor

2. The following guest was present:

- a. Mr. WELTON, New Life Development, OCC.

3. OLD BUSINESS. Capt BAKER called the meeting to order and the minutes of 29 March meeting were reviewed.

a. Mr. ADAMS, Sanitarian, OCO, Region I was not present at the meeting. He is still working up the final recommendation of the sanitation survey. He will present these recommendations when finalized.

b. Mr. HOLDEN, Refugee Coordinator for Region I was not at the meeting, therefore his recommendations on latrines for Refugee Camps was not offered.

c. Dr. PHU, Inspector General, MOH/Region I was not in attendance and the latest plague statistics were not available.

4. NEW BUSINESS.

a. LCDR NOURIGAT reported that the letter to the ANA requesting assistance in obtaining books for Medical Library in DaNang has been mailed.

b. Mr. WELTON of OCC asked the Committee if it could make any recommendations for the training of the health technician with the 59 man team of the RD Cadre. It was stated that the following information would be needed before any recommendations could be made:

- (1) What is the amount of training these personnel have received?
- (2) What are the responsibilities of these medical technicians?
- (3) Will they duplicate the CAP effort in the same area?

Mr. WELTON said he would have this information for the next meeting.

5. The meeting was adjourned at 1030 hours.

Respectfully submitted,

  
E. R. NOURGAT  
LCDR, MSC, USN

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Committee Member

Each JCC Member

CG, 1st MarDiv (5 copies)

CG, 3rd MarDiv (5 copies)

CG, 1st MAW (5 copies)

CG, 2nd ROK Brig (5 copies)

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Chief, Preventive Medicine Section Surgeon's Office, APO 96222

COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE (CDC)  
Minutes of meeting on 12 April, 1967 at the  
OCO-Regional Office, Danang

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ATTENDING

I.B. Hayes, OCO-Logistics (Chairman)  
Lt. Col. R. Andrews, Pol War A. v., AFAT-5  
Capt. M. Darcy, MACV, RF/PF Ad.  
Capt. F. Dillard, Asst. G-5, MA V  
F.E. Eubanks, OCO-Logistics  
Major J. Fuchs, CAO, FLC, USMC  
Lt. C. Gibbs, 29th C.A.Co., III MAF  
Major J. Harris, CAO, G-5, III MAF  
Chaplain Hershberger, III MAF  
Capt. J. Kane, CAO, 366 Tact. F r. Wing  
Capt. A. Ramos, S-5, Special Forces, C-Det.  
A. Riley, Catholic Relief Service  
Lt. E. Trimpert, NSA-Danang City  
P. Wincharuck, World Relief Commission  
R. Holdren, OCO-Refugee Off. (Recorder)

GUESTS

Lt. W. Musick, 29th C.A.Co.  
J. Whelton, OCO, AD/NLD

The recorder read from a memo from Mr. John Dunlap, Chief, Food For Peace Div., noting an error in the minutes of the 15 March meeting. On page 2 was an example Mr. Dunlap had given of a food for work project in N.E. Brazil. The correct description is as follows:

"Two crews of workers were formed for a road and dam building project. Each crew worked one week and was off one week. When the crew worked it received cash and food. For the week it was off it received food only (no cash). This type of program feeds twice as many people but uses only the same amount of cash as one crew working full time."

Lt. Gibbs requested information on usage of cement, rebar, and roofing for religious institutions. There was discussion on whether these items could be furnished for construction of schools and orphanages, also for houses of worship damaged in combat. Mr. Whelton stated that he would obtain clarification on this subject within a week.

Mr. Hayes informed the committee that for military units to draw commodities from the OCO-Regional Warehouse they must first obtain a approval from the OCO Provincial Representative of the province concerned. He advised interested parties to contact the OCO provincial offices and make arrangements for desired amounts. In some cases commodities can be drawn from provincial warehouses, or the regional warehouse if the logistical situation warrants. The above procedure does not apply to CRS stocks for their programs, and contact should be made directly with the CRS Representative.

Mr. Whelton opened a discussion on the CRS program of supplying foodstuffs for Popular Force (PF) dependent's supplemental feeding. Of late there has been an effort at a general tightening of controls on distribution. OCO auditors are now making checks on end-usage of all PL-480 commodities and there is concern over whether commodities in Corps-wide distribution are in fact getting to the thousands of intended recipients.

Capt. D'Arcy explained the general problems of distribution, and that in such a far-flung operation effective checks can be made on very few distributions. Commodities are often sent by convoy from Danang to Hue, Hoi An, and Tam Ky, and amounts shipped and received should tally. Losses are possible at this stage, or afterwards down the line to separate platoons. A serious problem exists re transport availability, the program should be moving over 500 tons monthly whereas it runs about 200 tons.

Lt. Gibbs explained that for PF recipients connected with the CAC teams, III MAF is responsible for despatch of commodities from Danang, often by air.

Major Fuchs explained that in the FLC area in Hoa Vang District (around Danang) the commodities are handled through the District Chief, Village Chiefs, and then to the PF families.

Mr. Whelton stated that one problem cited by the auditors was the vagueness of receipts for issues, e.g.- "one bag of bulgur for 4 families". Also it should be noted that these commodities are not the property of the U.S. Gov't., and that the usage is under control of the Province Chief concerned.

Mr. Hayes announced that the OCO/Prov. Repres. Quang Ngai reports that refugee or CRS commodities should not be flown in to Quang Ngai without Mr. May's advance permission. The OCO staff is not able to handle the workload and irregularities connected with plane arrivals.

Mr. Holdren announced that parts for the sawmill in Quang Tri City are expected to arrive any day by air from the U.S. NSA personnel are ready to install these parts and put the mill in operation, and PHILCAG personnel are available on short notice to come from III Corps to supervise training local refugees in lumbering and operation of the mill.

Also, the "Mighty Mite" portable sawmill now in the OCO warehouse will be sent to the Tra Bong Special Forces Camp in Quang Ngai Province. Mr. W. Carlton, OCO-Agricultural Advisor in Quang Ngai, has made arrangements with provincial and district officials to form a cooperative amongst local refugees, and Special Forces will assist. Further, OCO-Saigon has announced the recent arrival of a forestry expert, and anyone desiring forestry advice should contact the OCO Regional Agricultural Officer in Danang.

Mr. Holdren reported that the Joint Coordinating Council (JCC) 11 April meeting discussed the refugee problem in response to General Lam's request for suggestion in finding a long-range solution to the refugee problem.

- 3 -

Major Brantley, D.P.Off., 29th C.A.Co., presented a comprehensive report on refugees in I Corps which has just been completed. An ad hoc committee was appointed to study the refugee problems and make recommendations to the 25 April meeting of the JCC. Mr. Hollen is chairman of this ad hoc committee.

Mr. Whelton commented on the magnitude and complexity of the refugee problem in I Corps with stress on the lack of secure land suitable for relocation, and lack of work opportunities. The suggestion that has been widely mentioned is food for work projects to employ large numbers of refugees. Examples would be construction of local roads of laterite, and irrigation projects.

Mr. Hayes explained the difficulties that have recently in road transport in view of VC threats on truckers. Bus fares to Hue have skyrocketed twentyfold recently.

Lt. Gibbs, who will be leaving for the States shortly was thanked by the Chairman for his services in the logistics and civic action fields.

Mr. Hayes announced that OCO-Logistics moved 6200 tons of commodities out of Danang in March, a new record.

Capt. Ramos commented about OCO Prov. Repres. considering that Special Forces Camps have lowest priority for OCO commodity assistance, and inquired who sets such priorities. Mr. Hayes stated that if such a situation exists it is the judgment of the individual Prov. Repres as he views the problems facing his team, with the limited manpower and logistics resources available, and then has to set priorities between lowland and upland areas.

A brief discussion ensued re the FWHAF Civic Action Fund, with several members discussing usage of funds and problems arising due to certain restrictions.

The next meeting will be at 1430 on 17 May at the OCO Regional Office.

MINUTES OF I CORPS JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL MEETING25 APRIL, 1967

1. The Council convened at 0935 with the following members present:
  - a. MGEN. ROBERTSHAW, USMC, CG 1st MAW, (Chairman)
  - b. Mr. Nguyen Van DAI, Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps
  - c. BGEN. OWENS, USMC, Chief of Staff, III MAF
  - d. Col. NGHI, ARVN, Chief of Staff, I Corps
  - e. Col. ROSS, USMC, G-5, III MAF
  - f. Lt. BUNN, USN, CAO, NSA, Danang
  - g. LtCol. O'LEARY, USMC, G-5, III MAF, (Recorder)
  
2. The following guests were present:
  - a. Mr. BURGESS, OCO (representing Asst Regional Director for New Life Development)
  - b. Mr. FULLER, OCO (representing Asst Director for RD, OCO, Region I)
  - c. Mr. HAYES, OCO
  - d. Mr. HOLDREN, OCO
  - e. MR RIDDELL, OCO (representing Asst Director for Psychological Operations)
  - f. Capt. RATH, USN (representing Commander NSA, Danang)
  - g. LtCol. THUAN, ARVN (representing I Corps DC/S for Rural Construction)
  - h. Maj. MORLEY, USMC
  - i. Maj. NELSON, USMC
  - j. LCdr. NOURIGAT, USN
  - k. Maj. PANZER, USA (representing G-5 I Corps Advisory Corps)
  - l. Lt(jg) TRIMPert, USN

3. OLD BUSINESS

- a. The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting and guest were introduced and welcomed. Col. ROSS, the new G-5, III MAF was introduced and welcomed as the replacement for Col. HILL who was wounded in action and scheduled for evacuation to the United States on 26 April. Members were asked to comment on items previously brought before the Council.
  
- b. LCdr. NOURIGAT, recorder of the Public Health Committee presented a report of that Committee's meeting on 12 April 1967 (minutes attached to the 25 April minutes of the Council).
  
- c. Capt. RATH, Chairman of the Port Coordinating Committee, presented the report of that Committee's meeting on 29 March 1967 (minutes attached to the 25 April minutes of the Council).
  
- d. Mr. RIDDELL of the Psychological Warfare Committee presented a report of that Committee's meeting held on 5 April 1967 (minutes attached to the 25 April minutes of the Council).

(1) It was noted that increased emphasis would be place on psychological operations during the remaining village elections and the hamlet elections of May and June in order to counter VC efforts to thwart election efforts.

e. Mr. HAYES, Chairman of the Commodities Distribution Committee, presented the report of that Committee's meeting on 12 April 1967 (minutes attached to the 25 April minutes of the Council).

(1) BGEN OWENS recommended that consideration be given to establishing a high risk insurance plan to compensate civilian truckers for vehicle damage incurred while transporting GVN commodities. Mr. BURGESS stated that OCO would study this recommendation, and the CHAIRMAN also requested Mr. DAI to investigate the matter.

f. Mr. HOLDREN, Chairman of the ad hoc committee for refugees, presented that Committee's recommendations to the Council. The committee recommended that a permanent Refugee Committee be established within the JCC. The committee membership will consist of Mr. HOLDREN, OCO; Major THLEP, GVN; and Major BRANTLEY, III MAF. A motion was made, seconded, and carried to establish the committee as recommended. The CHAIRMAN requested the Refugee Committee to submit weekly reports to the Council.

g. Lt. BUNN reported that the Mayor of Danang has approved the combining of the Youth Guidance Center with "Boys Town". The center will be able to accomodate fifty boys. A request for funds to construct a permanent facility as a Youth Guidance Center has been submitted to the Commisisoner for Social Welfare in Saigon.

h. Lt. BUNN reported that the financial problems besetting the refugee night school program at the Danang Polytechnical School have been resolved. Back pay for teachers has been paid and the Ministry of Education has approved funds for classes to reconvene on 2 May. The course will be conducted seven hours per day enabling each class to complete the program in three months.

i. The CHAIRMAN noted that, although the claims for the F-8 aircraft crash have not been paid as reported on 11 April, they have been processed and are at the GVN finance office.

j. Capt. RATH pointed out that coordination of port facilities at Danang is no longer a problem as the military port facilities have been completed. Matters requiring coordination are negotiated directly among the interested parties - Danang, OCO and NSA. Capt RATH moved that the Port Coordinating Committee be dropped from the JCC structure. The motion was seconded and passed.

k. Mr. DAI stated that a portable silo is being shipped from Saigon for storage of GVN commodities at Danang.

#### 4. NEW BUSINESS

a. BGEN OWENS recommended that the functions of the Roads Committee be expanded and its title changed to the Transportation Committee. This committee would have cognizance over land and sea transporation and any

future port developments in ICTZ. Thus, it would ensure that all transportation aspects continue to be coordinated and fill any void caused by disestablishment of the Port Committee. The CHAIRMAN requested the membership to take this matter under study until the next meeting.

5. The CHAIRMAN, on behalf of all members, expressed appreciation and bade farewell to Major MORLEY who, although not a JCC member, worked closely and frequently with the Council.
6. The meeting adjourned at 1140.
7. Agenda items for the next meeting are:
  - a. Report of the Refugee Committee.
  - b. Report of the Public Health Committee (a copy of the minutes of this meeting are enclosed).
  - c. Report of the Road Committee (a copy of the minutes of this meeting are enclosed).
  - d. Review of proposed agenda items for the Thua Thien meeting. (separate distribution).
  - e. Review of unfinished business (separate distribution).
  - f. Review of highlights of week's activities by all members.
8. The next meeting is scheduled for 0930, 2 May 1967 in Danang.

Respectfully submitted,



H. M. NELSON  
Major USMC  
Recorder (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Member  
Each Committee Chairman  
Each Guest  
Major Nelson, Recorder (30)

Minutes of the I Corps Public Health  
Committee Meeting (JCC)  
26 April 1967

1. The meeting convened at 0930 hours with the following members present:

- a. Capt BAKER, MC, USN, III MAF Surgeon, Chairman
- b. Dr. SPENCER, Director, Public Health, OCO
- c. Maj VAN STRATEN, MSC, USA, Senior Medical Advisor, I Corps
- d. Dr. HO VAN PHU, Inspector-General, MOH/Region I
- e. Capt NHAN, MC, ARVN, I Corps Surgeon
- f. LCDR NCURIGAT, MSC, USN, III MAF Medical Monitor, Recorder

2. The following guests were present:

- a. Capt FRAGEN, MC, USA, MILPHAP Team, Quang Ngai
- b. CMSW RICE, USN, PMU, NSA Hospital
- c. Mr. ADAMS, Sanitarian, Public Health, OCO

3. OLD BUSINESS: Capt BAKER called the meeting to order and the minutes of 12 April 1967 were reviewed.

a. Mr. ADAMS reported that a meeting was held at the Mayor's office last week regarding garbage collection in Danang. OCO has agreed to supply the cement and sheet metal and the Mayor's office is going to pay to have garbage receptacles made. These containers will be dispersed throughout the city. Another meeting is to be held 5 May 1967. It was estimated that the first container should be completed in about three weeks. The City of Danang has received two garbage trucks, with a capacity of six cubic yards, from Saigon. This will make a total of six trucks available for garbage pick-up.

b. Mr. ADAMS further reported that the rat poison has been ordered from Saigon and production of the bait containers will be starting in the near future.

c. Mr. HOLDEN was not present because of attendance at another meeting concerning movement of refugees from the DMZ.

d. Mr. WELTON was not present. He is in the Phillipines.

e. Dr. SPENCER reported that USAID does not have any long acting antibiotics. Dr. PHU stated that he has ordered some from the Ministry of Health in Saigon.

4. NEW BUSINESS

a. Dr. PHU gave a report on the statistics on Plague throughout I Corps. These figures are from 1 January 1967 to present and represent no increase over the same period for 1966.

<u>AREA</u>	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>SUSPECT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Danang	128	225	353
Quang Ngai		938	938
Quang Tri	5	47	52
Thua Thien	44	77	121
Quang Tin		38	38
Quang Nam		24	24
TOTALS	177	1,349	1,526

Dr. PHU stated that these figures would be greatly reduced once an effective program of garbage disposal and rat control was instituted.

b. Capt NHAN requested Dr. PHU to requisition enough inoculations of cholera and plague to immunize the 23,000 refugees that are to be moved from the DMZ. Dr. PHU stated that he would do so immediately.

c. CMSW reported that two rats with positive findings of plague were found at Nam Quan (BT055810). Four hundred and fifty pounds of 10% DDT powder was dusted throughout the Hamlet. This is part of a surveillance program that is conducted by PMU of the Station Hospital.

d. A movie on the diagnosis and treatment of cholera was shown.

5. The meeting was adjourned at 1110 hours.

Respectfully submitted,

  
E. F. NOURIAT  
LCDR, MSC, USN

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Each JCC Member

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CG, 2nd ROK Brig (5 copies)

COMNAVSUPACT, Danang (5 copies)

Chief, Preventive Medicine Section, Surgeon's Office, APO, 96222

Each MILFAP Team, I Corps

Minutes of ICJCC Road Committee Meeting  
25 April 1967

1. The Road Committee convened at 1505 hours with the following members present:

- a. LTC J. J. Minear, USA, I Corps Adv Gp, Engr Adv (Chairman) (6325/Puma 113)
- b. Maj D. A. Clark, USA, III MAF G-3 Opns (6489/Parchment 403).
- c. Maj Nguyen Van Bao, ARVN, 10th Engr Gp (UD213)
- d. Capt L. Flessner, USA, III MAF Engr Sec (Parchment 15/115).
- e. Mr. John Denoit, USAID/OCO, Regional Engr (Hotley 178).
- f. Mr. B. C. Trouer, USAID/OCO, PWD (Hotley 178).
- g. Lt(JG) D. D. Sargent, USA, Police Officer (Hotley 134).
- h. Mr. T. S. Worthley, COMNAVFORV Rep Da Nang. (6539/Blood Alley 861).
- i. Mr. E. L. Martin, COMNAVFORV Rep Da Nang. (6539/Blood Alley 861).
- j. Maj G. E. Boyer, USA, I Corps Adv Gp, Ass't Engr Adv (6325/Puma 113).

2. The Chairman opened the meeting by calling attention to copies of the minutes of the March meeting that had been furnished to each member present.

3. Old Business:

LTC Minear asked for discussions on old business. There was none.

4. New Business:

a. Mr. Worthley asked if there would be three ARVN engineer battalions to aid the Mobile Construction Battalions in the upgrading of Highway #1. Maj Bao indicated there would only be approximately a battalion plus Mr. Worthley said they are programming work on the upgrading of Highway #1 and trying to find out personnel available.


The first priority is to be Da Nang to Dong Ha. Mr. Benoit said the crusher site at Monkey Mountain for the rock had fallen through and now PWD was trying to set up the crusher site near the H&K quarry.

b. LTC Minear said that H&K is going to pave River Road in Da Nang and Route #1 north of Da Nang to Red Beach. A by pass is being constructed at the northend of the airfield.

c. LTC Minear asked for suggestions on methods to improve bridge defenses on critical bridges in I Corps. These defenses must be aimed at stopping VC frogmen. Cpt Flessner suggested the possible use of nets up to within few feet of water's surface. This net would have to be cleaned daily and opened daily to permit river traffic. He also suggested periodically exploding grenades around piers during hours of darkness. LTC Minear suggested wire cages around piers down to riverbed and also catwalks constructed under bridge and around piers for walking guards. This in conjunction with flood lighting to illuminate the water surface around piers and under bridge.

Maj Clark indicated that USMC units have been directed to assess the requirements for certain bridges as is the 10th Engineer Group (C) ARVN. In order not to duplicate effort, close coordination will be effected between III MAF engineers and 10th Engineer Group (C) personnel.

5. LTC Minear asked for further business. There was none. Mr. Benoit moved to adjourn. Lt(JG) Sargent seconded. The meeting adjourned at 1544 hours.

  
Gerald E. Boyer  
Maj, CE, Recorder

DISTRIBUTION:

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LTC O'Leary, JCC Recorder (125)

**29 TH  
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY  
APO 96337**



REFUGEE SURVEY  
OF THE  
I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE  
BY THE  
DISPLACED PERSONS TEAM  
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY  
III MAF  
DA NANG, VIET NAM  
31 MARCH 1967

*ANNEX "B" To  
PART III, PAR 7*

REFUGEE SURVEY  
OF THE  
I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE  
BY  
DISPLACED PERSONS TEAM  
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY  
III MAF  
DA NANG, VIET NAM  
31 MARCH 1967

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PREFACE

The following survey of the refugee situation in I Corps Tactical Zone is an attempt to point out some of the background, problems, and lessons learned of the refugee program since the arrival of the 29th Civil Affairs Company on 12 June 1966. If the study tends to progress non-sequentially or become ambiguous, it is because the refugee policies and guidelines have, at times, been promulgated with these same qualities.

The accumulation of the final population totals included in this report was made by the Displaced Persons Teams in each province with the assistance of the Office of Civil Operations. The "scattered" refugee population is taken directly from OCO reports. Even as this paper is finalized the refugee statistics are changing. With little control over the movement of these "Nomads of War" these statistics may fluctuate with the same extremes as the climate of the country.

The final result of this report is to assist those who follow in the refugee mission to benefit from experiences gained from our close association with refugees in each camp, from every organization which has provided its assistance, and to point the way in which they should press with vigor onward to the final resolution of the refugee problem.

  
T. J. BRANTLEY  
MAJ, FC  
Chief, DP Teams

## CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

The refugee problem in I Corps Tactical Zone is as old as the war itself. Abutting as it does on North Vietnam, ICTZ received refugees even as far back as 1954 when the DMZ was established and persons in North Vietnam who desired to leave were allowed to do so. This situation of course no longer exists, but ICTZ still contains an ever-growing refugee population. These refugees are created in several different ways. Many of them have been motivated by fear and hatred of communism, and have moved from their communist-held home areas to areas under GVN control. Other refugees have been generated by direct military action. These refugees have moved from their homes and land because of artillery fire or infantry action. Usually the combat destroys the majority of the refugee's possessions, his water buffalo and other stock. Thus, the refugee has no great economic incentive to return to his original homesite after the armed conflict in the area is terminated. A small minority of refugees are generated by Viet Cong terrorism specifically designed to create refugees in order to increase the burden upon the South Vietnam Government.

Though they are generated in different ways, all refugees share many common factors. Perhaps the most important of these is the inability to earn a living and support their families. The majority of refugees are farmers by vocation, and are incapable of farming once removed from their own land. The few skilled laborers and tradesmen among the refugee population are hardly more fortunate. Tradesmen have almost always lost their stocks of goods, and skilled workers such as carpen-

ters and masons live among their fellow-refugees who have no money to pay for skilled work. A small minority of refugees do find employment in the area to which they have been moved, but this small minority has little significance in refugee plans and programs.

The seriousness of this problem cannot be measured in a purely monetary way. Because of various refugee relief plans and food distributions few refugees actually starve. However, the debasing effect of living on doles and handouts has predictably made many refugees quite bitter. It is a perhaps somewhat illogical reaction; nevertheless, these persons do resent the failure of their government to provide gainful employment for them. This results in a certain disaffection between the refugee and his government which is inadmissible now, when we struggle with Communist ideology to win the support and allegiance of the Vietnamese people for the GVN. Another basic problem which refugees face is created by their very numbers. Though many agencies work diligently to provide a refugee program the sheer number of the refugees creates most difficult problems.

When the 29th Civil Affairs Company arrived in I Corps, there existed approximately 143 refugee camps in the five provinces, housing an estimated 133,000 refugees. These refugees were civilians who by reasons of real or imagined danger had left their homes to seek safety elsewhere within their own country. The current I Corps refugee problem began in the fall of 1964 when heavy rains and floods drove thousands of the rural people to "safe-havens" near the coast and larger districts. As the combat situation and operations increased in tempo, more and more people used this opportunity to escape from VC taxation,

domination, terrorism, and harrassing activities. The security afforded these people near US Military and ARVN camps prompted others, who had heard of their situation, to flow into these same areas. Temporary shelters were built for many, but others were required to seek refuge with friends, relatives, and in abandoned buildings in the area.

As of this writing refugees continued to move out of VC territory into areas secured by the military forces. The estimated number of arrivals each month based on a nine month sampling is 10,000. These people even though considered a liability by the misinformed, are a true asset to the government of Vietnam. They have "voted with their feet" to accept a more democratic way of life. They have deprived the VC of taxation, laborers, supplies, and food commodities. And finally, the refugees, by being placed in a position to observe for themselves a better way of life, act as the best anti-VC propaganda that can be provided.

Today the total population for refugees in the ICIZ is 327,298. The breakout of these figures is shown in Annex A. However, the refugee figure is extremely fluid. These people tend to move from one area to another, since they are unable to return to their ancestral territories. They continue steadfast in their hopes for this return and even after twenty (20) years of upheaval can visualize a time when they may return again to pursue a peaceful existance. One of our primary goals is to continue to provide a better existance to these "unfortunates of war" than was available to them under VC domination.

## CHAPTER II

SPECIAL COMMISSARIAT FOR REFUGEES

By virtue of Ordinance No. 22-SI-H-VP dated 22 February 1966, the Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) was officially established by Major General Nguyen Cao Ky, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee. Prior to the formal creation of the SCR, implementation of the refugee relief and resettlement program was divided into two phases. Phase I (Temporary Relief) was the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Welfare. Phase II (Resettlement) was the responsibility of the Ministry of Construction, with the Provincial Rural Construction Council active as the regional manager of the resettlement program.

The purpose of the establishment of the SCR was to unify the refugee relief program and in so doing provide a continuity in the refugee relief and refugee population control programs. Also, this new agency would permit an easy move from Phase I to Phase II a closer monitoring of the effectiveness of the entire program. A further aim of refugee relief offered by the SCR was to outsmart the Viet Cong in winning the rural population support.

The development and effectiveness of the Special Commissariat for Refugees has been exceedingly slow. Dr. Que, the Special Commissioner, has had to gather a competent staff, develop directives guidance, and obtain cadre for the provinces to carry out the programs of the SCR. Then too, the gap had to be fused between the two Ministries involved in the creation of the SCR.

On 23 November 1966, the Special Commissariat for Refugees published SCR Communique No. 4112-TNCS-KH-TK which formed a new project called

the "Refugee Relief Assistance and Resettlement Project". The following is an excerpt of the communique which all province and municipal administrators are required to observe in providing a correct implementation of the 1967 Project in accordance with the SCR Refugee Relief Assistance Policy.

I. Coordination of Refugee Relief Assistance and Resettlement (RRAR) Activity with Local Government Agencies:

Of particular concern to the GVN is the ever-growing afflux of persons seeking refuge from Communism which has created a medium for a hot political contest with the Viet Cong. A triumphant emergence of GVN from this struggle will have a strong influence on the project for pacification, economic development, and democratization of the countryside.

Aimed at such important targets, the program of activity will be burdensome and complicated. Therefore, a coordination effort between the Refugee Relief Service or Bureau (RRS or RRB) and the Provincial or Municipal Rural Construction Council (PRCC, MRCC) is required for planning and carrying out the project.

Following is the gradational progression of project programming:

1. First, the RRS or RRB should seek the advice of the Provincial or Municipal, the district administration and of the Technical Service to work out an estimate of the coming year's refugee population status and the province's ability to cope with this prospective situation.

2. The second step is to plan the various programs of the

project (see Project Programming Method) and bring them up for debate and discussion at a PRCC meeting.

3. After due indorsement of the tentative project by the PRCC or MRCC, it will be forwarded to the SCR through the Tactical Zone RCC and Regional RCC, for evaluation.

4. Upon the eventual approval of the project by SCR, the RRB or RRS will prepare the detailed budget needed to cover refugee activities for the first quarter, so that the SCR will be able to release an imprest fund to the province for implementation of the projects.

## II. 1967 Project Objectives and Guidelines:

To date, it has been noticed that the Provinces have not achieved an effective control of Refugee Relief operations. Consequently, refugee population reports (number of refugees returned to original villages, number of resettled refugees, number of resettlement centers, total number of refugees) and payment-of-temporary-relief-allowance reports submitted by the provinces are usually inaccurate. The primary cause of this erroneous reporting is that all refugees receiving relief assistance have not been concentrated into designated locations for easy control.

In 1967, the relief assistance and resettlement operation will be governed by the following fundamental principles:

1. Only refugees living in temporary camps will be paid temporary relief allowances. If there are no temporary camps in the province, the province will accomodate them in public housing facilities, temples and pagodas. Persons coming into GVN-controlled areas for refuge but choosing to settle down independently in scattered groups in various

hamlets, will be registered for reporting purposes, but will not be eligible for relief payments.

2. The relief assistance operation should be conducted efficiently and aimed at winning the hearts of the rural people. therefore, apart from provision of cash allowances and commodity support, it is necessary to encourage refugees to take part in the Refugee Hamlet Construction Program, Handicraft and Vocational Program, Education Program, and Development Program. (This portion of the project will be carried out by the Mobile Worker Teams.)

3. Resettlement allowances will only be paid refugees who, out of their own free will, desire to be resettled in Refugee Hamlets. Whether their place of settlement is secure or not, individually-resettled refugees will not be entitled to allocated relocation grants:

4. Refugee hamlets will be constructed only in secure areas and in locations which are favorable to installation of a defense network, to land and surface communication, and which offer potential resources- e. g., spacious land of farming and animal husbandry, and proximity to industrial enterprises with employment opportunities for refugees. These assets enable resettled refugees to attain self-sufficiency in a short time and lasting prosperity in the future.

5. Refugee Hamlets with a concentration of 150-200 families will be readied for conversion into NLHs. The implementation of a Refugee Hamlet construction project will consist of these phases:

Phase I: Preparatory Activities:

a. Census and classification of refugees for eradicating communist subversive agents and finding out the aspirations of refugees in order to send them to Refugee Hamlets, or Vocational Training courses, or back to their original villages.

b. Organization of collective activity to encourage refugees to take part in refugee camp construction and to train them in the institutions of a democratic society.

c. Implementation of procedures for compensation payment for government-requisitioned land, for crop losses incurred by such requisition, and for the rental of land for the establishment of Refugee Hamlets -- resettlement sites which have been chosen prior to project programming and endorsement by the TZRCC, Regional RCC and CRCC.

These preliminary steps will be taken while refugees are still living in Temporary Camps.

Phase II: Refugee Hamlet Construction:

a. Housing construction. (Housing will be built by the refugees, or by the local government and then allocated to individual families.)

b. Construction of refugee Hamlet HQS and auxillary facilities (Classrooms, health centers, wells, latrines, etc.)

c. Allotment of salt, rice, seeds, seedlings, livestock, farm implements, fishery equipment, etc.

Phase III: Refugee Hamlet Consolidation Development:

a. Promotion of a new spirit.

b. Organization of the popular struggle against the VC.

c. Administrative and popular organization.

d. Eradication of illiteracy.

e. Assault on disease.

f. Land reform.

g. Agricultural and cottage-industry development.

h. Internal communications network development.

i. Allocation of privileges for combatants.

Phase III activities are aimed at laying a democratic groundwork and promoting long range economic development. These activities, however, fall within the purview of the Rural Development Cadres.

Therefore, on completion of Phase I and Phase II within a maximum period of 12 months, during which time refugees are entitled to receive relief assistance, the Refugee Hamlet will become a New Life Hamlet and cease to be the object of SCB support.

#### III 1967 Budget Planning:

Within the area of field operations, the 1967 Project will be divided into three parts:

1. Temporary Relief assistance.
2. Resettlement.
3. Cottage industry and Vocational Training.

Each part will consist of a multiplicity of programs, and it is necessary for the province to base its estimation of the budget for each program on the local refugee situation and its own resettlement potential. The planning of the budget will be accomplished in conformance

with the following criteria:

Part I Temporary Relief Assistance:

1. Temporary Relief Assistance Program:

a. Cash Allowances: The province will estimate the total number of persons who may seek refuge in 1967. The fund needed for payment of temporary relief allowance to these persons will cover a mean period of two months on a basis of \$VN 10 per person per day.

b. Commodity Support: Usually, relief commodities are provided by OCO and domestic and foreign voluntary agencies. Based upon the value of commodities which have been distributed during 1966, the province will plan the budget needed for 1967.

c. Special Assistance: (Fire, natural catastrophies, VC terrorism): This is social welfare assistance which used to be provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare. However, if the above disasters affect refugees who are still entitled to receive refugee relief assistance, special assistance will be granted by the SCR in accordance with the criteria prescribed in the SCR Communique No. 1571-TNCS-CT-TC-2 dated 14 July 1966.

2. Temporary Camp Construction Program - CRITERIA:

a. 150 housing units per camp at a cost of \$VN 5,000 per unit.

b. The budget planned for construction of new temporary camps in 1967 will be based on the province's present accommodation potential in proportion to the estimated number of prospective refugee-seekers in 1967. Beginning with 1967, only refugees living in temporary camps will be granted temporary relief payments.

c. For justification of the planned budget, the tentative 1967 temporary camp construction project will be documented by a list of existing camps and new camps planned for 1967, to include a map of camp locations in the province (Appendix II).

3. Auxillary Facilities Construction Program:

a. Wells: 5 wells per camp at the rate of \$VN 2,500 - 3,500 per well.

b. Latrines: 30 latrines per camp at the rate of \$VN 1,000 - 1,500 per latrine.

c. Medicine Cabinet: 1 medicine cabinet per camp at the rate of \$VN 1,000 per cabinet. The refugee teacher will take care of the medicine cabinet and be paid a co-assumption of duty allowance of \$VN 500 a month.

d. Classrooms: (1 Classroom per camp)

(1) Construction & furnishings \$VN 25,000

(2) Monthly teacher salary \$VN 2,500

(3) Pupil supplies (\$VN 10 per student a month for 6 months).

Part II Resettlement:

1. Resettlement Allowances: The province will estimate the number of refugees that may be expected to resettle within the province, and the additional refugees to be resettled in special resettlement centers.

2. Criteria: \$VN 5,000 housing allowance per family.

a. 6 month rice allowance (at the rate of \$VN 10

per kilogram of rice and on the basis of 15 kilograms per adult and 10 kilograms per child under 2 years of age, per month).

b. Salt allowance for Montagnard refugees only:

(750\$VN x 20 kg) \$VN 150.

3. Refugee Hamlet Construction and Development:

a. Land survey, Clearance and Leveling - Criteria:

(1) To be set by the local committee in agreement with the landowner concerned.

(2) However, this still finances only the rental of private land to be used for refugee hamlet construction and refugee farming, and the indemnification for crop losses caused by the refugee hamlet construction.

(3) Compensation for expropriated private land will be made by the Ministry of Agriculture.

4. Refugee Hamlet Education Program:

a. Criteria: 3 classrooms will be allocated each refugee hamlet with a resettlement population of 150 families and above, at the rate of \$VN 70,000 per classroom.

b. A teacher training course is to be organized by each Region during the first quarter of 1967. The operating cost for a 3 month teacher training course with an attendance of 50 teacher-trainees is set at \$VN 153,000.

c. This is allocated as follows:

(1) Teacher salary \$VN 3,250 per month

Teacher kit	\$VN 500	per teacher
Pupil kit	" 30	" student
Training allowance	" 800	" trainee per month
Transportation	" 400	" trainee

The principal budget will make provisions only for the construction of classrooms and payment of teacher salaries.

The SCR will conduct the teacher training program. Arrangements will be made with the Ministry of Education for operating a training course in each region.

4. Health Program: The criteria for this program have been clearly defined in the SCR-Ministry of Public Health Agreement No. 19127-BYT and SCR Communique No. 3453-TNCS-CT-CTPH dated Oct 25, 1966, and the SCR Communique No. 2998-TNCS-CT-CTPH dated November 18, 1966, which has been sent to each province.

5. Promotion of Refugee Self-Sufficiency: After resettlement in a Refugee Hamlet, refugees will be given the support which will eventually enable them to sustain themselves, upon completion of the rice allowance payments. Therefore the Refugee Relief Service of Bureau is advised to work out some arrangement with the Province Agriculture Service, Animal Husbandry Service, and Farm Credit Cooperative to provide the resettlement with livestock, fingerlings, seeds, seedlings, fertilizer, farm implements, and fishery equipment. A provision may be made for this program in the budget on the basis of \$VN 3,000 per family.

6. Special Resettlement Hamlet Construction Program: With a view to resettling refugees from other provinces where no suitable resettlement sites are available, provinces with favorable conditions are encouraged

to establish resettlement centers accomodating 1,000 or more refugee families. An estimated \$VN 30 million budget is required for each center. The Special Resettlement Center Program will be planned by the province as a separate project, after proper endorsement by the Tactical Zone and Corps concerned, and submission to the SCR for analysis.

. Part III - Cottage Industry and Vocational Training:

1. Vocational Training Program: A fund will be appropriated for the financing of four cycles of vocational training courses to be held at the Da Nang Training Center. Provinces are advised to contact the training center for selection and admission of trainees to each cycle of courses in conformance with the SCR-Ministry of Education Joint Communique No. 660-GD-KTHV-TT and SCR Communique No. 3385-TNCS-CT-DC-2, dated Oct 20 1966.

2. Cottage Industry: An approximate \$VN 500,000 fund will be earmarked for each province for handicraft training courses for refugees. Depending on local handicraft activities, each province will make a detailed plan for handicraft training as follows:

- . Allowance for instructors.
- . Food allowances for trainees living far from the training center.
- . Training aids and materials.
- . Office Supplies.
- . Transportation fees for trainees.
- . Miscellaneous expenses,

## CHAPTER III

REFUGEE STATISTICS

The accumulation of refugee statistics in ICTZ has been a gradual and exceedingly slow process. Upon the arrival of the Displaced Persona Team in Vietnam, statistics available were in most cases less than current. In every instance, refugee camp, district, and province statistics were not in agreement. District tended to recognize certain categories of refugees, whereas, Province chose to make the final decision on these matters. The only figures available for a beginning were from the Office of Civil Operations, then USAID. These figures, too, were not kept current and no location of refugee camps by coordinates was available.

Realizing a need for an accurate, up-dating of refugee statistics, and as a means of further monitoring the amount of commodities and supplies being distributed to each camp, as comprehensive questionnaire form was developed in Jan 1967 by the DP Team (VC) and issued to each VA Team located in each province. This form when completed, will provide essential elements of information required in order to adequately monitor and assist the refugee population. These forms will be completed on 31 Mar 67. A sample of this questionnaire is added as In-closure #1 to this chapter. An attempt to continually up-date these figures will be made until more reliable statistics are available from the SCR, Province, or other agencies working in the area.

Even with the compilation of these figures, only about 65% of the total number of refugees residing in ICTZ will be included on the questionnaire forms. This is true because only this percentage of

refugees actually reside in official refugee camps. These are normally referred to as in-camp refugees. Others are scattered throughout the area, living in abandoned buildings, with friends, or relatives. These refugees comprise the other 35% of the total refugee population. In an effort to effect closer control over the refugees and to encourage out-of-camp refugees to register with the SCR and move into approved camps, GVN/SCR has adopted a policy of refusing to extend any aid, assistance, or recognition whatsoever to out-of-camp refugees. The SCR has requested that each Province submit an estimated number of refugee camps to be built as a part of their budgeting program for CY 1967. In this way, legitimate refugees who cannot move into currently existing refugee camps due to lack of space and over crowded conditions will not be completely deprived of assistance and commodities due them from the refugee relief program.

A recap of the total refugees compiled as of 31 March 1967 is listed below. A complete break-out of refugees by camp, district, and province is included as Annex A of this report.

RECAP: ICTZ REFUGEE STATISTICS

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>CAMPS</u>	<u>POPULATION IN CAMPS</u>	<u>POPULATION OUT OF CAMPS</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
QUANG TRI	30	26,049	1,926	27,975
THUA THIEN	21	14,076	2,500	16,576
QUANG NAM	60	101,683	66,340	168,023
QUANG TIN	13	27,145	3,162	30,307
QUANG NGAI	45	42,284	42,133	84,417
TOTAL IN ICTZ	169	211,237	116,061	327,298

REFUGEE QUESTIONNAIRE  
 29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY  
 PROVINCE

Date of Survey: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Name of Camp: \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinates: \_\_\_\_\_
2. District: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Population: Families: \_\_\_\_\_ Persons: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Date Camp Established: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Name of Chief: \_\_\_\_\_ Time in Office: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Name of Assistant Chief: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Medical Care:

- a. Medical Personnel: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (1) Vietnamese: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (a) Physician: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Qualifications: \_\_\_\_\_  
 % of Time in Camp: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (b) Nurse: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Qualifications: \_\_\_\_\_  
 % of Time in Camp: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (c) Other: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Qualifications: \_\_\_\_\_  
 % of Time in Camp: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (2) US - Third Country: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (a) Visited by Physician: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Country: \_\_\_\_\_ Organization: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Frequency of Visits: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (b) Visited by Corpsman or MEDCAP Team: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Organization: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Frequency of Visits: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (c) Others: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ Country: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Organization: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Frequency of Visits: \_\_\_\_\_

- b. Medical Facilities:
  - (1) Permanent Dispensary: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, indicate condition: Adequate: \_\_\_\_\_ Inadequate: \_\_\_\_\_ If inadequate, describe: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (2) Other Building Used for Dispensary: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, describe condition: Adequate: \_\_\_\_\_ Inadequate: \_\_\_\_\_ If Inadequate, Describe: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (3) If dispensary is operating in camp state status of medical supplies: Adequate: \_\_\_\_\_ Inadequate: \_\_\_\_\_ If inadequate, list deficiencies on MEDCAP supplies request form: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Public Health and Sanitation:

- a. Water Supply:
  - (1) Wells: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ How Many: \_\_\_\_\_ Condition: \_\_\_\_\_

INCLOSURE # 1, CHAPTER III, REFUGEE STATISTICS

- (2) Other Water Supply: \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Sewage Disposal:
- (1) Latrines: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, describe general condition and state of maintenance: \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Other: Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, describe system and indicate effectiveness: \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Indicate here any special problem affecting public health in the camp: \_\_\_\_\_
9. Camp Schools:
- a. Is a school now operating in the camp? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ If Yes, is it in permanent school building? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_ Where located: \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Physical Condition of School Building: Adequate \_\_\_\_\_ Inadequate \_\_\_\_\_ If inadequate, describe condition \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Is School Teacher Available? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, give qualifications: \_\_\_\_\_
- d. If Teacher is available, how is teacher paid? \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Status of School Supplies: Adequate \_\_\_\_\_ Inadequate \_\_\_\_\_ If Inadequate, list deficiencies \_\_\_\_\_
10. Commodities Assistance:
- a. Foodstuffs Received:
- | Type                           | Quantity | Date of Delivery |
|--------------------------------|----------|------------------|
| (1) Rice: Yes _____ No _____   | _____    | _____            |
| (2) Bulgar: Yes _____ No _____ | _____    | _____            |
| (3) Milk: Yes _____ No _____   | _____    | _____            |
| (4) Oil: Yes _____ No _____    | _____    | _____            |
| (5) Other: Yes _____ No _____  | _____    | _____            |
- b. Building Supplies:
- (1) Has camp received building supplies in previous four months Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, through what channels? \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Building supplies received:
- | Type                              | Quantity | Date of Delivery |
|-----------------------------------|----------|------------------|
| (a) Tin: Yes _____ No _____       | _____    | _____            |
| (b) Nails: Yes _____ No _____     | _____    | _____            |
| (c) Lumber: Yes _____ No _____    | _____    | _____            |
| (d) Building Kits:                |          |                  |
| 1. Carpenters: Yes _____ No _____ | _____    | _____            |
| 2. Mason's: Yes _____ No _____    | _____    | _____            |
| 3. Tool: Yes _____ No _____       | _____    | _____            |
| 4. Pioneer: Yes _____ No _____    | _____    | _____            |
| 5. Blacksmith: Yes _____ No _____ | _____    | _____            |

INCLOSURE #1, CHAPTER III, REFUGEE STATISTICS

c. Other Supplies: Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ (If yes, list them, quantity and frequency of delivery)

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) \_\_\_\_\_

11. Piaster Payments:

a. Refugee Relief Payments (10 piasters per person per day for up to 30 days):

(1) Have any families been paid this allowance? Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

If yes:

- (a) How many? \_\_\_\_\_
- (b) When? \_\_\_\_\_
- (c) By whom? \_\_\_\_\_

b. 5,000 \$VN Piaster Permanent Resettlement Allowance:

Have any families been paid this allowance? Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

If yes:

- (1) How many? \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) When? \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) By whom? \_\_\_\_\_

c. Other payments: Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ If yes, state title of payment: (Do not include solatium or other other individual-claim type payments.)

- Type? \_\_\_\_\_
- (a) How many? \_\_\_\_\_
  - (b) When? \_\_\_\_\_
  - (c) By whom? \_\_\_\_\_

12. Rate of Influx into or departure of persons from camp: \_\_\_\_\_

If rate is unusual give reason: \_\_\_\_\_

13. Request for Aid:

a. Has the camp submitted any requests for aid in the past four months? Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

(1) If yes, for what? \_\_\_\_\_

(2) To whom? \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Were the requests in writing? Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

(4) When submitted? \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Response to requests: \_\_\_\_\_

b. What requests does the camp wish to make now? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



## CHAPTER IV

PIASTER PAYMENTS FOR REFUGEES

GVN law provides piaster payments for bonafide refugees. These payments are diverse in nature, being designed to cover various situations. Payments are roughly divided into three broad categories, temporary relief payments, permanent resettlement payments, and payment for injury and damage to persons and property. All categories of payments are administered exclusively by the Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR).

All piaster payments require that the recipient meet certain criteria prior to payment. The refugees must be properly registered by SCR. This registration process involves the completion of a refugee relief card, a small green card kept in the possession of the head of the refugee family. This card is applicable throughout both refugee phases, temporary relief and permanent resettlement. As payments of any kind or type are made, this information is noted on the card. This is done to prevent the refugee from receiving the same payment again from a different official.

All refugee payments are made from the Refugee Relief Fund, an account held with the National Treasury General. The assets of the fund are derived from:

1. The remaining Ministry of Social Welfare Refugee Fund.
2. Funds voted by the national government.
3. Donations from other nations and from private organizations.

The Special Commissariat for Refugees has established an Imprest

Fund, which is a fund granted to each province chief and sub-area mayor. It is from this fund that the provincial SCR personnel make refugee payments, at the direction of the province chief. The province chiefs submit periodic statements to the Special Commissioner detailing and justifying disbursements from this fund.

The basic temporary relief payment for refugees is ten (10) piasters per person per day for up to thirty (30) days. Upon request this sum can be extended for a second thirty (30) day period. This payment may be made either fully in cash or in a combination of cash and rice, as long as the amount of rice given, plus the piasters paid, is equal to ten (10) piasters per person per day at current market rates.

The basic permanent resettlement payment is 5,000 \$VN per family. This payment is made for the purpose of purchasing building supplies for the refugee's new home. The allocation is; 2,000 piasters for foundation construction, 2,000 piasters for framework, and 1,000 piasters for roofing. Thus, if GVN, OCO or any other agency makes one or more of these items available to the refugee, the estimated cost will be deducted from his permanent resettlement payment. Each refugee family is also entitled to a rice allowance which is established at fifty (50) kilograms of rice per family per month, for six (6) months. This is based upon a hypothetical average-family, and provincial SCR personnel have authority to vary the rice allowance in cases of exceptionally large or small families, based upon an allotment of fifteen (15) kilograms per adult per month and ten (10) kilograms per child, per month.

The third category of piaster payments is one designed to cover a

broad range of catastrophies.

1. Fire damage from carelessness or Viet Cong action:

a. Temporary camps will have housing repair or reconstruction financed by SCR, and each family will be allotted five hundred (500) piasters worth of commodities, or in cash in lieu of commodities.

b. Resettlement center families will receive the following:

(1) For 30% housing damage; 500 piasters worth of commodities.

(2) For 30% - 60% housing damage; 500 piasters worth of commodities plus 1,000 \$VN.

(3) For 60% - 100% housing damage; 500 piasters worth of commodities plus 2,000 \$VN.

c. Fire victims of carelessness and VC actions:

(1) Deaths caused by fire:

(a) Adults (18 and over) Carelessness 3,000 \$VN,  
VC action 4,000 \$VN.

(b) Children (under 18) Carelessness 1,500 \$VN,  
VC action 2,000 \$VN.

(2) Injuries caused by fire:

(a) Adults (18 and over) Carelessness 1,000 \$VN,  
VC action 2,000 \$VN.

(b) Children (under 18) Carelessness 500 \$VN, VC  
action 1,000 \$VN.

2. Houses destroyed by natural disaster:

a. Temporary camps will be reconstructed by SCR.

b. Resettlement Center families will receive 1,000 piasters per family for reconstruction.

3. Victims of Viet Cong Sabotage:

a. Killed:

(1) Adult (18 and over), 4,000 piasters.

(2) Child (under 18), 2,000 piasters.

b. Seriously injured:

(1) Adult 2,000 piasters.

(2) Child 1,000 piasters.

The foregoing details the payments which in theory are made to refugees by SCR on behalf of GVN. One of the greatest problems in the refugee area, however, is the slowness with which these payments are made. Often they are never made. It is difficult to determine the reasons for this situation. It is vital to the refugee effort that this situation be radically improved.

## CHAPTER V

RESETTLEMENT

Permanent resettlement is the final relocation of refugees in new and permanent homes, as opposed to temporary relief, which is admittedly transitory in nature. Resettlement is a long range program designed to permanently pacify the rural areas of the country and deny support to all communist elements.

Many diverse factors must be considered in permanent resettlement planning, and such planning must be the combined effort of many different agencies. Basically, each resettlement program requires the following Vietnamese administrative procedures:

1. Resettlement allocations for refugee families.
2. Clearing and leveling of land for the homesites and local administrative buildings.
3. Resettlement hamlet construction.
4. Refugee education, to include both primary education and vocational training.
5. The promotion of new-life and self-help projects.
6. Public health.

At present these programs are coordinated by the SCR personnel within each province.

Prior to the beginning of such a resettlement program the province staff must determine a favorable area for the relocation. The following are the primary facts which must be evaluated in site consideration:

1. The available system of security and defense within the area,

balanced with potential security which can be developed within the area.

2. The proximity of the site to usable roads or waterways  
Isolated areas should be avoided.

3. The potential of the area for supporting a flourishing economy, i.e., land for livestock and crops, markets for light or cottage industry, etc. Finally, completed plans must be submitted to the Corps Command for final approval or disapproval.

4. The special needs of a unique ethnic group, such as the mountain acclimated Montagnards.

There are basically six different methods of resettlement:

1. Return to original village: This is the best method, when feasible, as it returns the refugee to his original home area with his own farm land and the graves of his ancestors, and perhaps to his house and livestock unless these have been destroyed by military action. However, this is often the very place which the refugee left to escape VC control. Unless a military change has taken place in the area since the refugee's departure, the return to the original village would again place the people under the VC, which must be avoided at all costs.

2. Resettlement in another province: GVN policy prescribes that movement of refugees from one province to another will be discouraged insofar as is possible, because this may permit refugee families to collect two or more permanent resettlement allowances.

However, the primary goal of refugee resettlement is to permit the refugees to create a new life, free from the terrorism and harrassment of communism, and when movement from one province to another will be in

the best interests of this goal, such movement will be permitted. The offer of work in another province in which the refugee could utilize a special skill, or the unavailability of a secure resettlement area, would be considered valid reasons for a request to resettle in another province. In such cases, resettlement policy requires the provincial administration to prepare letters of introduction stating the refugee's current resettlement status with regard to pay and allowances, and the refugee's reason for requesting a change of province.

3. Resettlement of out-of-province refugees within the new province: Refugees who arrive in a new province bearing the proper letters of introduction from their previous province will be resettled according to CVN directives governing pay and allowances and resettlement procedures.

When a refugee arrives in a new province without proper letters of introduction, the general rule is that he will be denied resettlement assistance. Once again, however, each province is directed to consider special cases and bear constantly in mind that many honest refugees may be not officially introduced due to war conditions. When such refugees give reasonable evidence of their honesty and good intentions, SCR directs that they will be afforded normal refugee status.

4. Temporary Camp Resettlement: At times there may be situations in which there will be no resettlement areas available within the province and also in which the refugees will have no valid reasons for removal to another province. When all other forms of resettlement are unusable, temporary camp resettlement is authorized. This form of resettlement is accomplished by giving the refugee title to his home in a temporary

camp. When this is accomplished the government is relieved of its obligation to provide the permanent resettlement payment, as this payment is intended for home construction.

However, the resettlement allowance should be used, when practicable, to obtain land adjacent to the camp for refugee agricultural pursuits and to help establish private enterprise.

5. Resettlement in existing New-Life Hamlets: When refugee resettlement in the original area is impractical, and when there are no reasons for out-of-province movement, refugees may be resettled in previously constructed New Life Hamlets. This should be discouraged unless other, more beneficial solutions have been exhausted.

6. Resettlement in a different location within the home province: Such resettlement will be carried out when military or other considerations render resettlement in the original area infeasible. In this situation the province administration will select a location for resettlement based upon the four (4) criteria outlined previously in this chapter.

Resettlement involves the payment of resettlement allowances. These allowances vary according to several criteria. SCR at province level has some latitude in the making of resettlement payments. The basic resettlement allowance is five thousand (5,000) piasters plus three hundred (300) kilograms of rice, the rice being distributed over a six month period. The rice allowance is based on a hypothetical family, and may varied in cases of unusually large or small families. SCR directives empower province authorities to distribute rice based on individual case needs. For Montagnard refugees an additional salt

allowance is authorized. Province may make rice and salt payments in kind or in cash, or in combination, as is considered best.

The 5,000 piaster allowance is also subject to the discretion of district. If district officials feel that a given family or group of families has already enjoyed disproportionate assistance, they can reduce or entirely eliminate the payment.

Further allowances will only be paid to persons who are resettled in newly constructed New Life Hamlets, or under one of the other official programs. Persons who elect to move away from the authorized refugee hamlets are considered to have completely rejected the government's aid.

Thus far, relatively little permanent resettlement has been accomplished in ICTE. One of the first permanent resettlements was carried out in Dai Loc District of Quang Nam Province. One resettlement housing approximately one hundred (100) families has been completed, and four (4) others are currently under construction in Dai Loc. Refugees residing in temporary camps in the Da Nang Municipality are currently being moved into permanent type brick homes in East Da Nang. This program is under the direction and guidance of the Office of the Mayor of Da Nang. The Naval Support Activity also is assisting in this project.

The resettlement program is also an ever-changing one. It has been difficult to determine the differences in permanent refugee camps and temporary camps. Requests for statistics and explanations of the differentiation of the two types of resettlement results in evasive and conflicting statements from each Province and other officials

queried. In an effort to eliminate this problem, the Special Commissariat for Refugees has most recently decreed that beginning with CY 1967, only refugees resettled in Refugee Hamlets, Refugee Sub-Hamlets, and Special Resettlement Centers will be eligible for resettlement payments.

## CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION

Refugee education in ICTZ is primarily the responsibility of the Special Commissariat for Refugees, which controls the allocation of funds for this program. The Ministry of Education is also concerned, however, with regard to educational guidance and method.

The goal of the refugee education program is the allocation of one classroom, one qualified teacher and adequate school supplies, per one hundred (100) primary pupils.

The SCR has instructed that classrooms will be concentrated in areas having large school-age populations and no existing facilities. 17,600 \$VN are allocated for the construction and furnishing of each classroom. Each classroom is allocated 1,500 \$VN for classroom supplies. This is based on 15 \$VN per child for the estimated one hundred (100) children who will use each classroom.

In the ICTZ camps, sixty-five (65) schools are currently constructed. Of these schools, all are in use for two (2) sessions per day. This figure represents a mere fraction of the number required to reach the goal of one (1) classroom for every one hundred (100) primary pupils. In March 66, SCR Saigon requested all province personnel to forward their requirements for classrooms, based upon the goal of one (1) for every one hundred (100) primary students. To date the response has been very poor. SCR Saigon has sent a second letter requesting this information, but response still lags.

The lack of classrooms is a most serious problem. Virtually all refugee classrooms are greatly overcrowded. Thus many refugees children either receive no education or attend permanent schools located in villages adjacent to their refugee camps. These schools are also usually overcrowded.

The current teacher situation is much the same as that of classroom construction. In theory one teacher is authorized for each classroom. Currently, ICTZ has one hundred and ten (110) teachers working in refugee camps. Teachers are required to have completed the First Cycle, which is the equivalent of junior high school in the United States, and to have completed one month of practice teaching. Actually, only a relatively small percentage of the teachers meet these requirements. Qualified teachers are authorized a salary of 2,500 \$VN per month. However, only about twenty-five (25) percent of the teachers regularly receive this salary. The other either receive less than this amount from GVN or receive no salary from GVN and are paid by a subscription raised by the parents of their students.

As there are currently too few teachers to meet the needs of all refugee camps, SCR has authorized the hiring of teachers from within the refugee camps when this is necessary. No formal qualifications are listed for refugee teachers. The best qualified person in each camp will be selected.

## CHAPTER VII

VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

Vocational training is now offered for refugees in ICTZ.

Training is conducted at the Da Nang Technical School. This school graduates approximately six hundred (600) refugees per year in the following fields:

1. Truck and heavy equipment operation.
2. Carpentry.
3. Automobile mechanics.
4. Sheetmetal working and welding.
5. Masonry.
6. Electrician.
7. Typing.
8. Sewing and tailoring.

When students can be found the school desires to begin classes in machine shop work and refrigeration mechanics.

Currently the school's primary problem is the extremely high attrition rate of the entering classes. It has been determined that this is almost solely attributable to a lack of basic mathematics on the part of entering students. Therefore, beginning approximately 1 May 67, all entering classes will be given an extensive course in basic mathematics prior to their studies in their chosen field. Students entering the school are paid 1,000 piasters per month while they are students. A portion of this sum is deducted for room and board, which the school furnishes. Upon completion of their studies

the students are assisted in finding work, if they return to their original home areas.

The requirements for entering studies at the vocational school are:

1. That the student be a bona fide, registered, male refugee,
2. That he be sixteen or over,
3. That he possesses an elementary school education or its equivalent.
4. That he be in good health, and
5. That he have a desire to learn.

At present the U.S. Navy is providing bus service for the refugees between the school and their temporary camp. This service is for students who live near the school and are not boarders.

Consideration is now being given to opening another technical school at Hue. As of this writing no definite decision concerning this has been made.

Refugee employment in ICTZ is minimal. The primary reason for this is that the great majority of refugees have only one skill, farming. When these persons are displaced from their home areas there is no land in the new areas for them to farm. Vietnamese industry cannot utilize more than the most infinitesimal percentage of the nation's unskilled labor. Some few refugees are hired as laborers by U.S. forces and agencies, and the few with such skills as barbering and maids' work are often employed, but again this is a small percentage of the refugee population.

Efforts are being made to improve this situation, most particularly by refugee vocational training. However, only a small fraction of the total number of refugees can be employed by Vietnamese industry in its present undeveloped state.

Another problem affecting refugee employment is that of security clearances. Regulations provide that all Vietnamese personnel employed by U.S. agencies, military, civilian or private contractor, must obtain security clearances. All clearances are processed by the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS). The MSS is far too small and understaffed to cope with the vast number of clearance applications. The average time for a security check is three months, and many clearances are never processed due to the loss of records in home areas and the insecurity of the applicants home area.

Because of the transitory nature of unskilled laboring work, it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of the number of refugees employed at any given time. Refugees are often employed in mass in the sense that they are required to perform useful work in exchange for the goods and commodities which they are issued. Such work is usually camp construction and camp improvement projects such as rudimentary sanitation systems employing deep wells and latrines, and camp drainage projects.

In Da Nang the Naval Support Activity employs approximately 250 refugees as laborers and stevedores. The Marine Corps employs approximately 200 refugees in Da Nang, also as laborers.

The 7th ENG Bn, USMC, has established a brick factory operated by

refugees at Hoa Khanh Village (AT052761) in Quang Nam Province. The number of refugees employed here varies as workers are periodically rotated to provide some work for many persons. The factory has produced more than 100,000 bricks as of this writing.

Some consideration should be given to the establishment of a WPA type project for the employment of refugees with unskilled talents. Such projects as road improvement and construction, public sanitation, etc., could be started. This organization, its funding and administration will require approval and the necessary impetus at the highest level in Saigon.

When students can be found the school desires to learn classes in machine shop work and technical drawing. Currently the school's primary problem is the extremely high attrition rate of the entering classes. It has been determined that this is almost solely attributable to a lack of basic mathematics on the part of entering students. Therefore, beginning approximately 1 May 67, all entering classes will be given an extensive course in basic mathematics prior to their chosen field. Students entering the school are paid 1,000 dollars per month which they are students. A portion of this sum is believed to come from board, which the school furnishes. Upon completion of their studies

## CHAPTER VIII

MISSION OF DISPLACED PERSONS TEAMS

MISSION: The mission of the Displaced Persons Teams is to provide assistance and advice in the control, care, and resettlement of all refugees in the I Corps Tactical Zone; to prevent these persons from interfering with military operations and to aid in the collection of intelligence from these refugees through close coordination with intelligence agencies. See Inclosure 1 for complete break out of functions of DP Team.

ORGANIZATION: The Displaced Persons Team (VC) is organized in accordance with TOE 41-500D and is further augmented by four (4) Displaced Persons Teams (VA) from the 41st Civil Affairs Company.

DP TEAM (VC)		
MAJ	8104	DP OFF
CPT	8104	DP OFF
LT	8104	DP OFF
E6	71L40	ADMIN NCO
E5	71L20	ADMIN SP
E4	71B30	CLK TYP
E4	71B20	RPT CLK
E3	70A10	GEN CLK

DP TEAM (VA)		
CPT	8104	CA SP
LT	3100	SUP CONST SP
LT	7110	CT SP
E7	04C20	INTP/CLK
E5	91B30	MED SP.

CAPABILITIES: The Displaced Persons Teams are available on call for the handling of tactical refugees as a result of military operations. They provide assistance during natural or man-made disasters, and arrange for and assist in the distribution of supplies to refugee camps on a periodic basis. The DP Teams further act as independent statistics-gathering sources for the 29th and III MAF on major refugee areas of concern, e. g., piaster payments, resettlement, self-help projects, and the precise location of each camp by coordinates. All teams are deployed in such a manner as to derive maximum flexibility in the accomplishment

of the refugee mission. Close coordination is maintained at all times with Sector/Sub-Sector Advisors, GVN Officials, OCO, and voluntary agencies in the area.

FUNCTIONS/ACTIVITIES: The Displaced Persons Teams are assigned in each Province as indicated in the organizational chart above and work to assist refugees throughout the province. The primary activities engaged in are as follows:

- a. Obtain complete census and registration of all refugee camps from camp leaders and verify with Province figures.
- b. Accumulate data on all piaster payments made to refugees so that a follow-up can be made on the propriety of payments.
- c. Provide the exact locations of all camps by coordinates.
- d. Maintain close liaison with OCO, other voluntary agencies, and GVN in the accomplishment of the mission and to prevent duplication of assistance in an attempt to insure a coordinated refugee program throughout ICTZ.
- e. Assist in the processing and acceptance of new refugees as a result of tactical operations or as occasioned by disaster - natural or man-made.
- f. Accumulate data on the resettlement of refugees, planned projects as outlined by camp chiefs or Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR), and projects in progress in an effort to insure equitable assistance to each camp.
- g. Assist in the transportation of food and clothing to refugee camps when requested by the GVN.

5. STATISTICS: The refugee population in I Corps is everchanging and figures are up-dated monthly as information is received from VA Teams. The most current statistics are available in ANNEX A.

6. PROBLEM AREAS: The primary problem encountered by the Displaced Persons Teams is the unreliability of most information and statistics received from district/province officials. Statistics on population, piaster payments, resettlement , and projects vary considerably from camp to district to province. These are the statistics which the DP Teams are attempting to reconcile.

Another problem area encountered in our dealings with the GVN officials is the district organization and administration. In most cases, district chiefs are the sole decision makers. When the chief is absent no positive decision can be made until he returns. Further, there is a complete lack of coordination between various officials within the district, i. e., district chief, public health workers, VIS and refugee coordinators. To talk to only one is useless if liaison with the others is necessary in the accomplishment of the mission. Lately, the Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) has developed an extremely effective program for CY 67. However, refugee camp leaders are poorly informed as to planned projects, available finances, and assistance programs. Thus, while assistance is supposedly available, little has been requested. The translated version of the "Refugee Relief Operational Handbook" has been distributed to each of our Refugee Teams so they in turn can point out to the camp leaders the support available from their own government.

MISSION OF DISPLACED PERSONS TEAMS

1. MISSION: The general mission of the Displaced Persons Team is to provide assistance and advice in the control, care, and resettlement of all refugees in the I Corps area; to prevent these persons from interfering with military operations and to aid in the collection of intelligence through close coordination with intelligence agencies.

2. FUNCTIONS:

a. General: The Displaced Persons Team will assist in establishing control over all refugees in the I Corps area and will:

1) Prevent hindrance to military operations which may be occasioned by the massing of, or uncontrolled movement of, refugees.

2) Prevent or control outbreaks of disease among refugees.

3) Relieve, as far as the military situation may permit, the conditions of destitution caused by war among affected civilians.

4) Determine bona fide refugees acceptable by Province, to prevent infiltration of guerillas, enemy agents, and escaping prisoners of war and to apprehend war criminals. This will be done in conjunction with intelligence agencies, military police, national police and ARVN forces.

5) Centralize refugees, provide work through the labor team or GVN officials, and encourage cottage industries.

6) Coordinate with other functional teams of the 29th CA Co having responsibility for assisting in the care for refugees

3. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS: Phase I (factual Refugees)

a. Pre-arrange initial camp site for refugees, if at all possible.

INCLOSURE # 1, CHAPTER VIII, MISSION OF DISPLACED PERSONS TEAMS

establish communication with local district/village chief in the area to complete plans for arrival of refugees.

b. Immediately segregate all VC-oriented families into an area with a minimum of security.

c. Coordinate with OCO representative and GVN officials to begin initial registration of all refugees.

d. Coordinate with Public Health Teams for medical assistance and technical aid and advice on sanitation, epidemic control, and vaccination of refugees.

e. Arrange with OCO Pro. Rep and province district chief for the shipment of food commodities into the area. If necessary, revert to disaster relief supplies.

f. Through district/village chiefs, ARVN CA Co, and DP Team deployed in the area, determine additional needs of people.

g. Coordinate with ARVN Psy War Co, VIS, and US Psy War Co for leaflet drops, loudspeaker operations, propaganda movies, to explain to refugees what has happened, why, and assistance being provided.

h. Distribute food supplies, blankets, etc., through GVN sources.

i. Arrange for GVN/ARVN forces to take over operation of camp with assistance of US Teams.

4. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS: Phase II (Resettlement)

a. Check with District and Province Chief on designation of resettlement area and support to be provided.

b. Coordinate with local US Commander operating in the area designated for resettlement concerning the security of the area.

INCLOSURE # 1, CHAPTER VIII, MISSION OF DISPLACED PERSONS TEAMS

c. Coordinate with representative of Special Commissariat for Refugees on assistance to be provided and commodities authorized; coordinate with S-5 or G-5 of US unit in the area.

d. Maintain close check on VC-oriented families and do not permit resettlement during this phase.

e. Assist district chief in the organization of a work force for the erection of houses, reconstruction of wells, latrines, schools, etc.

5. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS: Phase III (Follow up)

a. Arrange for periodic checks on resettlement area by members of DP Team, OCO and province officials.

b. Check on resettlement payments, submission of claims, if applicable, with GVN/province officials. Spot checks on individuals should be made to assure that payments have been made.

c. Arrange for MEDCAP/MILPHAP team to visit resettled area once each month, until permanent health facilities are in operation.

d. Check on security of area, who provides it, PF's in area, organization of hamlets, election of officials and overall administration of area.

VA TEAM DISPOSITION.

(ALPHA) ----- QUANG TRI (QUANG TRI)

TEAM # 3 -----

(BRAVO) ----- THUA THIEN (HUE)

TEAM # 5 ----- QUANG NGAI (QUANG NGAI)

TEAM # 10 ----- QUANG TIN (TAM KY)

TEAM # 16 ----- QUANG NAM (HOI AN)

Current as of 31 March 1967

## CHAPTER IX

OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED IN REFUGEE SUPPORT1. The Office of Civil Operations (OCO)

OCO has primary responsibility for coordinating refugee activities of US/FWMAF and civil agencies at region and province levels to support GVN refugee policies and goals. Technical assistance and operational support for refugee programs are provided by the OCO Office of Refugee Coordination (ORC) through its field representatives (Regional Refugee Officers and Assistant Provincial Representatives for Refugees). The ORC and its field representatives provide liaison with and support for the SCR and its field representatives.

OCO refugee work in I Corps is accomplished under the direction of Mr. Richard Holdren, (Regional Refugee Officer.) Each province of ICTZ has an OCO assistant Province Representative for Refugees. These persons are:

Quang Tri - Mr. Robert O'Melia  
Thua Thien - Mr. Richard Stevens  
Quang Nam - Mr. Donald Curry  
Quang Tin - Mr. Charles Fields  
Quang Ngai - Mr. David Entin

OCO has the capability of supplying GVN with surplus United States food commodities as authorized under United States Public Law 480. These commodities include bulgar wheat, rolled wheat, cornmeal, salad oil, and powdered milk. OCO also has the capability to perform liaison and coordination with all forces and agencies working with refugees to create coordinated and coherent refugee operations. OCO possesses the capability

of limited air transportation for persons and commodities throughout ICTZ.

2. The Committee for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

CARE has two primary missions in ICTZ. The first is the "General Program", which is the importing and distribution of "self-help" kits. CARE's second program is the administration of the United States Marine Corps Reserve fund for civic action, on behalf of the USMC. CARE monitors this fund and arranges purchases in other countries when needed. CARE has one representative in ICTZ, the Regional Director for CARE in I Corps. The present Director is Mr. John Frechette. The Regional Director works under the CARE Mission Chief in Saigon. CARE has the capability of providing various self-help tool kits for refugees. These include:

- (1) Tool kits - small carpenter kits for use by individual home owners.
- (2) Carpenter kits - for professional village carpenters.
- (3) Blacksmith kits - for professional blacksmiths.
- (4) Midwifery kits - for rural dispensaries.
- (5) Masonry kits - for professional masons.
- (6) Pioneer kits - for clearing large areas of land.

3. The Catholic Relief Service (CRS)

CRS acts as an appointed agent of the United States Department of Agriculture to monitor the distribution of United States Public Law 480 surplus food commodities to orphanages, institutions refugees, and Popular Forces soldiers and their families, and distributes privately made contributions given to CRS. CRS has one representative in ICTZ, the I Corps Regional Director for CRS. Mr. Frank Carlin is the present

Regional Director. He works directly for the CRS Mission Chief located in Saigon. CRS has the capability of monitoring the supplying of US Public Law 480 surplus food commodities to orphanages, institutions and refugees. These commodities include bulgar wheat, salad oil, rolled wheat, cornmeal, and powdered milk. CRS also distributes private contributions to this agency. These contributions are primarily soap and clothing and are distributed to institutions, orphanages, and charities.

4. The International Voluntary Service (IVS)

At present, the IVS has yet to define the exact mission which it wishes to pursue in ICTZ. Generally, IVS will orient a large portion of its effort to acting as advisors to SCR personnel and other Vietnamese officials, assisting them in obtaining supplies from other agencies, primarily OCO.

At present, IVS is headed by Mr. Donald Ronk, the IVS Team Leader for Region I. Two of the five provinces have personnel working with refugees. These are Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces.

IVS capabilities are not yet clearly defined. When the agency has developed and established a firm mission, it is anticipated that its capabilities will be constructed around this mission.

5. The American Red Cross (AMCROSS)

AMCROSS has signed a contract with OCO to perform the following mission in ICTZ. (This is general in nature and may be modified to meet changing conditions.)

Work with counterparts in the Vietnamese Red Cross, and train them by demonstration to:

- (1) Perform refugee camp registration and census;

- (2) distribute authorized piaster payments to refugees;
- (3) operate refugee camp dispensaries;
- (4) rapidly refer critical medical patients to nearby hospitals;
- (5) enlist refugee camp personnel in camp self-help projects such as sanitation improvement;
- (6) organize in-camp refugees for camp administration positions.

At present AMCROSS has a team of seven (7) persons working in ICTZ in Quang Ngai City. This number is expected to increase.

6. The Knights of Malta

The Knights of Malta is a private West German charitable organization working in ICTZ. The agency's primary mission is to provide medical treatment for Vietnamese civilians, and agricultural and social welfare advice.

The ICTZ team consists of 45 persons. A 150-bed hospital has been constructed in Hoi An, the capitol of Quang Nam Province. This team includes 2 physicians, one dentist, 10 nurses and 17 medics, plus agricultural and social welfare personnel. One project currently being developed by the ICTZ team is an ambulance service from outlying districts of Quang Nam to the Hoi An hospital.

7. Vietnam Christian Service (VCS)

The VCS Program is sponsored by Church World Services, Lutheran World Relief, and the Mennonite Central Committee, and administered by the latter. Thirty Vietnam Christian Service workers are now in Vietnam. Twenty more will arrive in July and August. Six Canadians give the program an international flavor which is expected to be emphasized with the arrival soon of volunteers from their countries.

Varied skills and background are gathered together in this group, doctors, nurses, medical assistants, nursing instructors, agriculturalists and mechanics, social workers, home economists, material aid specialists, and administrators. Plans call for the development of a health service and clinic in Da Nang.

8. National Association of Evangelical World Relief Commission

NAEWRC has established a leadership training center in Hue. Practical on-the-job training of youth in modern methods of agriculture and industry as well as the development and training of local leadership is emphasized. With the assistance of personnel from Vietnam Christian Service, the program is expanding to additional provinces to provide vocational training for refugees. A trade school is now getting underway in Hue, supervised by Mr. Wiwcharuck, the W.R.C. Director for Region I. High-protein type food or food supplements have been requested from this agency in cooperation with VCS and will possibly be available by CY 67.

## CHAPTER X

LESSONS LEARNED - SUMMARY

It is difficult to summarize all the "lessons learned" after almost a year of working so close to the problem of refugees. One of our fallacies has been not keeping a listing of all problems encountered and our solutions to these same problem areas. However, the immediate concern was the accomplishment of the mission at hand and at times documentation as to the "how" became inconsequential due to other more pressing needs. The following are a few of the more significant observations and "lessons learned" experienced during our tour:

1. Refugees must be treated as an asset of the GVN, rather than a liability. The absence of these people from VC territory deprives the VC of laborers, food, and taxes. In order to hold the loyalty of the refugees they must receive treatment and support that is better or at least as good as the type of existence while in VC territory.
2. A very close monitoring system must be observed to preclude the "raking off" of commodities by certain officials. A prime example of this was experienced in one of the districts in Quang Nam Province when tons of commodities were delivered to 18,000 new refugees generated from tactical operations. The District Chief had "padded the books", delayed official registration, and meanwhile stole many of the refugee commodities which were earmarked for the new refugees. He was relieved, but merely transferred to another district.
3. The GVN, specifically the Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR), must take prompt action to immediately register the new refugees.

This is the basis for all assistance to refugees from the SCR.

4. Security of temporary camps has presented another problem. On many occasions refugee camps have been invaded by a handful of VC who proceed to burn houses, kill pro-GVN leaders, and kidnap able-bodied males for their army. PF's and RF's who were supposed to be on duty and defend these people were not in camp to assist these people or fled when the going got rough. All temporary camps and permanent resettlements must have basic, effective security.

5. A lack of initiative and recognition of the refugee program by the GVN has been a serious handicap in accomplishing the mission of advising, caring for, and resettling refugees. Excellent guidance has been generated from Saigon, but actual support of these well worded "theories" has not materialized. Additional workers are needed, office facilities, a workable organization with a proper chain of command and some occasional "desk kicking" directed toward those who fail to respond to more subtle suggestions to get the job done.

6. Closer coordination must be effected between GVN, OCO, Civil Affairs Companies, Sector Advisors, G-5's and voluntary agencies. In most cases this is being accomplished at Corps and Region level, but the need for this is especially necessary at Province/District levels. Vietnamese Officials and civilian/military personnel in refugee work should be aware of the endeavors of each to prevent duplication of effort. Also, the possibility of assigning specific areas and camps to various teams and agencies should be pursued. This will allow more intimate and continuous contact with each camp and camp projects that

have been started. Each refugee camp should be visited by some refugee team at least three times weekly.

7. Learn the customs of the people. This can only be done by working at their level. Visit them frequently, especially the refugee camps. If offered tea or refreshments, accept it. Be a familiar sight at all camps and be known by the people. Winning the confidence and respect of these people assists in the accumulation of intelligence data and could save your life. In many instances, our teams have been warned of immediate danger in the area by friendly refugees.

8. In all activities, continually point out that the Government of Vietnam is responsible for assistance provided. If at all possible, take a member of the SCR, district, or the village chief with you during commodity distribution or unofficial visits of any kind. This will reflect the concern of the GVN.

9. In all cases, refugee camp leaders must reside in the refugee camps. We have observed this not to be the policy in many provinces. His presence will provide additional trust and faith in the person chosen to represent their community.

10. Refugee camp leaders are not fully aware of the benefits occurring to their constituents from their own government. The SCR published a manual which outlines in detail all assistance available to each refugee and refugee camp. Again, due to the short supply of GVN/SCR workers this information and method of receiving aid is not available at this lowest level. The 29th Displaced Persons Teams have been issued copies of the Refugee manual and assist in making the people aware of

assistance available for the asking. Mobile training teams and refugee camp workers must be armed with same manual and the information it contains.

11. Entirely too much red tape is required before refugees can receive assistance and payments available to them from their own government. Except in the cases of tactical refugees and only upon prompt action by US Military and OCO personnel is immediate assistance provided. GVN (SCR) arrives too late with too little - not enough cadre personnel to officially register the people and not enough concern to make prompt payments. There are instances where refugees have been awaiting official registration from the province and SCR for ten (10) months. Numerous requests have been made thru GVN and US Advisory channels - all to no avail. The lack of registration has resulted in little or no piaster payments authorized.

12. The necessity of having interpreters for each refugee team cannot be over-emphasized. All teams experienced considerable difficulty in communicating with officials at all levels due to the language barrier. When interpreters were available the task at hand was more easily accomplished.

13. Some thought should be given to the possibility of certain civil affairs teams wearing civilian clothing. In most cases, the DP/refugee teams would have been more acceptable in the refugee camps if civilian clothing had been worn. It was learned that most refugees feared reprisal by the V if military assistance was observed taking place in their camps. Unless the refugee camps were located in almost totally secure areas one did not feel that he was making any progress toward winning the complete refugee.

In conclusion, considerable progress and accomplishment have been evidenced in the refugee program in ICTZ. Great strides forward have been made in the payment of relief funds to the people. In Quang Tri especially, the piaster payments have recently increased. There appears to have been more general concern for the refugee during this past quarter than ever before. Mobile Training Teams are on the scene, more Vietnamese officials are taking an interest in these people, and the program is moving forward. All of these accomplishments cannot be attributed to any one organization or group of people, but rather are the results of the concentrated efforts of many to emphasize this most important facet of the pacification program. In the book Defeating Communist Insurgency, Sir Robert Thompson points out two prerequisites for the final victory in counter-insurgency; these being brains and feet. He stated "The side which has its feet on the ground at the right time and in the right place will win". We have over 300,000 of these feet already in the right place and this appears to be the right time to fully utilize these refugees and others who may leave VC domination and oppression to find peace and a better way of life with the Government of South Vietnam.

ANNEX "A"  
TOTAL REFUGEE CAMPS  
AND  
POPULATION IN ICTZ  
AS OF  
31 MARCH 1967

## DECLASSIFIED

## ANNEX "A", TO DP TEAM, REFUGEE SURVEY

## QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>CAMP (COORDINATES)</u>	<u>FAMILIES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Cam Lo	Hung Phu 2 (YD112581)	105	663
	De Nhi (YD237609)	53	209
	Doc Kinh (YD098522)	687	2,933
	Mo Xuan Khe (YD231613)	67	345
	Hung Phu 1 (YD115583)	200	800
	Tan Dinh (YD129594)	347	1,800
	My Hoa (YD223637)	50	199
	Total	1,509	6,949
Truong Luong	Gang Gian (YD233779)	93	467
	Vo Xa (YD200779)	51	240
	Total	144	707
Trieu Phong	A'i Tu (YD284575)	130	519
	Phuoc My (YD305564)	44	242
	Total	174	761
Hai Lang	My Chanh (YD462392)	30	162
	Trung Chanh (YD462402)	140	691
	Tan Dien (YD390498)	51	230
	Truong Phuoc (YD392467)	229	1,161
	Luong Dien (YD390448)	28	140
	Giap Trung (YD347231)	33	165
	Total	511	2,549
Mai Linh	La Vang Ta (YD344500)	215	831
	Xon Chuoi (YD324527)	198	633
	Thach Han (YD333510)	618	2,707
	Total	1,031	4,171
Huong Hoa	Tum Rong (YD846388)	134	630
	Lang Vie (YD794363)	442	2,060
	Ta Cong (YD841409)	80	382
	Trun Long (YD833395)	200	675
	Po Rieng (YD821840)	132	650
	Xom Mai (YD )	27	106
	Total	1,015	4,503
Gio Linh	Lai An (YD237721)	540	2,237
	Ha Thanh (YD335705)	105	482
	Cua Viet (YD219697)	400	3,690
	Gio My (Lai An) (YD237721)	8	36
	Total	1,053	6,409
Total in camps		5,437	26,049
Scattered in Province			1,926
Total in Province		5,437	27,975

## ANNEX "A", TO DP TEAM, REFUGEE SURVEY

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>CAMP (COORDINATES)</u>	<u>FAMILIES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Huong Tra	Kim Long (YD748210)	149	950
		<u>149</u>	<u>950</u>
Nam Hoa	Bong Lang (YD765130)	98	588
	Cu-Chanh I (YD753162)	94	434
	Cu-Chanh II (YD753162)	53	343
	Cu-Chanh III (YD753162)	45	500
	Cu-Chanh IV (YD753162)	40	110
	Total	330	1,975
Hue City	Tay Linh (YD230750)	45	247
	Total	45	247
Huong Thuy	Nam Giao (YD770195)	75	384
	Nam Giao (YD770220)	39	189
	Phu Bai (YD873155)	350	2,000
	Phuoc Qua (YD770180)	216	1,415
	Total	680	3,988
Phong Dien	Tan Nguyen I (YD531349)	126	650
	Tan Nguyen II (YD530350)	154	770
	Ba Phuong (YD596311)	174	816
	Pho Trach (YD527349)	116	662
	Phu Trach (YD526349)	85	253
	Phu Trach (B) (YD528349)	155	346
	Total	810	3,497
Phu Vang	Phu My (YD773250)	15	96
	Hoa Da Tay (YD819192)	133	700
	Total	148	790
Phu Loc	Loc Thuy (ZD142992)	331	1,989
	Ton That (YD940820)	101	640
	Total	432	2,629
	Total in camps	2,594	14,076
	Scattered in Province		2,500
	Total in Province	2,594	16,576

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ANNEX "A", TO DP TEAM, REFUGEE SURVEY

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>CAMP (COORDINATES)</u>	<u>FAMILIES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Duy Xuyen	Kieu Son (BT033509)	80	483
	Quang Ly II (BT065512)	278	1,361
	Tra Kieu (BT035509)	1,008	6,961
	Trung Dong (BT055509)	315	1,865
	Quang Ly I (BT064514)	386	2,498
	Thong Dong (BT054509)	90	614
	Total	2,157	13,782
Hieu Duc	Tung Son (AT899670)	207	789
	An Tan (AT917707)	162	672
	Total	369	1,461
Hieu Nhon	Cam Chau (BTL67577)	462	2,260
	Xuan My (BTL46577)	655	4,169
	Khong Mieu (BTL41571)	444	3,425
	Cao Pho (BTL34570)	31	217
	Thanh Dong (BTL29569)	521	3,263
	Thanh Truong (BTL28569)	344	1,964
	Thanh Tay (BTL24569)	487	3,054
	Ngoc Thanh (BTL32567)	712	3,760
	Con Chai (BTL63568)	40	280
	Cam Nam (BTL55562)	100	625
	Cau Phuoc Trach (BTL82589)	523	3,074
	Total	4,319	26,091
Hoa Vang	Phuoc Thanh (AT953792)	430	2,580
	Trung Phuoc (AT952792)	110	550
	Phuoc Quang (AT925795)	301	1,875
	Nam My II (AT902818)	71	277
	Chon Tam (AT958760)	425	2,930
	Con Dau (AT958693)	36	223
	Phuoc Nghai (AT959781)	371	1,936
	Hoa Khanh (AT952792)	634	3,778
	Hoa Lac I (AT902818)	118	536
	Cao Dai (BT016777)	134	678
	Hoa Tho (BT001715)	198	1,012
	Hoa Phat (AT984760)	209	1,120
	Hoa Choung (BT031743)	247	1,610
	Phuoc Tan (AT958790)	298	1,750
Total	3,582	20,855	

## ANNEX "A", TO DP TEAM, REFUGEE SURVEY

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (Con't)

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>CAMP (COORDINATES)</u>	<u>FAMILIES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Dien Ban	Ben Da (BT053583)	638	4,481
	Duy Hieu (BT057590)	147	807
	Cong Giao (BT058687)	97	555
	Tam Tang (BT065580)	96	551
	Lam Son (BT062582)	348	2,110
	Xom Chau (BT055585)	59	325
	Kim Thanh (BT063580)	52	283
	Phu Cu (BT072558)	250	1,508
	Total	1,687	10,620
Duc Duc	Nohn Son (AT830395)	727	3,176
	Thanh My (BT842457)	598	2,623
	Total	1,325	5,799
Dai Loc	Ai Nghia II (AT912582)	287	1,495
	Loc Chanh (AT920584)	299	2,032
	Ky Tan (AT927578)	149	745
	Loc Hung (AT927478)	400	2,300
	Loc An (AT877573)	205	1,315
	Loc My (AT912584)	18	140
	Total	1,358	8,027
Que Son	Dan Tri (BT045350)	120	528
	Cang Tay (BT042345)	85	510
	Total	205	1,038
Thuong Duc	Tam Hoa I (ZC149534)	68	440
	Tam Hoa II (ZC143585)	225	880
	No Name (ZC154535)	60	400
	Tuc Ha (ZC147537)	375	3,000
	Tam Hiep A (ZC145529)	50	300
	No Name (ZC145544)	11	58
	Total	789	5,078
Da Nang Municipality	Hoa Tien (BT )	80	457
	Phuoc Hai (BT )	324	1,925
	Dong Giang (BT )	916	6,550
	Total	1,320	8,932
	Total in Camps	17,111	101,683
	Scattered in Province		66,340
	Total in Province	17,111	168,023

## ANNEX "A", TO DP TEAM, REFUGEE SURVEY

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>CAMP (COORDINATES)</u>	<u>FAMILIES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Tam Ky	Tu Hiep (BT295225)	790	3,900
	Huong Son (BT326210)	260	1,263
	Vuon Lai (BT317209)	<u>931</u>	<u>4,326</u>
	Total	1,981	9,489
Ly Tin	Hoa Long (BT508121)	166	982
	Ly Tra (BT385173)	260	1,454
	Ky Hoa (BT )	<u>292</u>	<u>1,430</u>
	Total	718	3,866
Thang Binh	An Thanh (BT247298)	158	800
	Ha Lam (BT174418)	400	4,204
	Dong Thoi I (BT164417)	100	560
	Dong Thoi II (BT163407)	<u>2,000</u>	<u>4,500</u>
	Total	2,658	10,064
Tien Phuoc	Phuoc Ky (BT134123)	<u>817</u>	<u>1,982</u>
	Total	817	1,982
Hau Duc	Tien Chau ( )	81	632
	Tien Chanh ( )	<u>613</u>	<u>1,112</u>
	Total	694	1,744
Total in Camps		6,868	27,145
Scattered in Province			<u>3,162</u>
Total in Province		6,868	30,307

## ANNEX "A", TO DP TEAM, REFUGEE SURVEY

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>CAMP (COORDINATES)</u>	<u>FAMILIES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Duc Pho	An Thuong (BS808373)	214	1,100
	Tho Lac (a) (BS807378)	132	647
	Tho Lac (b) (BS809380)	<u>31</u>	<u>250</u>
	Total	377	1,997
Ba To	Ba To (BS )	<u>30</u>	<u>48</u>
	Total	30	48
Son Ha	Son Ha (BS )	153	420
	Ha Gia (BS )	<u>128</u>	<u>592</u>
	Total	367	1,281
Binh Son	Chau O (BS600962)	242	866
	Tu Van (BS603926)	172	663
	Vinh Xuan I (BS605910)	107	437
	Vinh Xuan II (BS607908)	158	680
	Vinh Xuan III (BS607910)	320	1,288
	An Chau (BS609931)	140	590
	Phu Le (BS580926)	<u>46</u>	<u>260</u>
	Total	1,185	4,784
Son Tinh	Nui Sua (BS64750)	175	825
	Son Phuong (BS624759)	87	573
	Son Chau (BS638757)	109	534
	Phu Hoa I (BS615760)	284	1,097
	Son Loc (BS627759)	231	1,274
	Si Ca (BS638750)	120	845
	Phu Nhan I (BS639755)	382	1,286
	Phu Nhan II (BS638756)	114	637
	Chua Phat (BS649750)		
	Son Dong (BS627750)	112	800
	Tan Loc I (BS616761)	168	836
	Tan Loc II (BS616760)	117	553
	Phu Hoa II (BS615760)	85	431
	Trung Tin (BS622759)	173	826
	Son An (BS672754)	30	135
	Son Tra (BS637754)	74	354
	Trai He (BS648752)	67	380
Tang Hoc (BS653749)	<u>63</u>	<u>363</u>	
Total	2,391	11,769	
Tu Nghai	Go Phu (BS646719)	14	106
	Rung Lang (BS615717)	1,258	5,856
	Cao Dai (a) (BS666569)	277	1,367
	Cao Dai (b) (BS666698)	445	2,486
	La Ha (BS675688)	498	2,577
	Phat Giao (BS632729)	104	400

## ANNEX "A", TO DP TEAM, REFUGEE SURVEY

## QUANG NGAI PROVINCE (Con't)

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>CAMP (COORDINATES)</u>	<u>FAMILIES</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
	Duc Doam (BS672687)	74	375
	Cong Giao (BS641728)	200	1,000
	Tin Larh (BS690692)	40	280
	Go Phu (BS648712)	<u>71</u>	<u>6,509</u>
	Total	2,981	20,956
Nghai Nahn	Phu Binh I (BS618655)	71	290
	Phu Binh II (BS619655)	81	307
	Phu Vinh (BS615646)	<u>11</u>	<u>52</u>
	Total	163	649
Tra Bong	Tra Bong (BS335880)	<u>200</u>	<u>800</u>
	Total	200	800
Total in Camps		7,694	42,284
Scattered in Province			<u>42,133</u>
Total in Province		<u>7,694</u>	<u>84,417</u>

RECAP: ICTZ REFUGEE STATUS

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>CAMPS</u>	<u>IN CAMPS</u>	<u>OUT OF CAMPS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri	30	26,049	1,926	27,975
Thua Thien	21	14,076	2,500	16,576
Quang Nam	60	101,683	66,340	168,023
Quang Tin	13	27,145	3,162	30,307
Quang Nam	<u>45</u>	<u>42,284</u>	<u>42,133</u>	<u>84,417</u>
Total	169	211,237	116,061	327,298

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III MAF PSYOP ORIENTATION COURSE  
 244th PSYOP Co.  
 17 - 19 April 1967

17 Apr 1967	0800-0830	Greeting and scope by Company Commander and Force PSYOP Officer
	0830-0930	III MAF PSC & Co. Operation Orientation
	0930-1030	Intelligence Operations Orientation
	1030-1100	Coffee break
	1100-1200	Reproduction Operations Orientation
	1200-1400	Open time
	1400-1500	Use of Printed Matter in PSYOPS
	1500-1600	Concept of Propaganda
	1600-1700	Intelligence for Psychological Operations
18 Apr 1967	0800-0900	Utilization of PSYOP aircraft
	0900-1100	Development of a leaflet
	1100-1200	Sources and Agencies
	1200-1400	Open time
	1400-1500	Familiarization with Chieu Hoi Program
	1600-1700	A-V Orientation
	1700-1800	Chow
	1800-2000	A-V Mission in Support of CAC
19 Apr 1967	0730-1200	Combat Loudspeaker Operation at Hill 55
	1200-1400	Open time
	1400-1600	Preparation of PSYOP Plan and Annex
	1600-1700	Closing remarks by Company Commander and Force PSYOP Officer

ANNEX "C" TO PART III  
 PARAGRAPH 8

HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

50/1rd  
3400  
30 April 1967

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS NEWSLETTER 3-67.

ITEM: PSYOP EXPLOITATION OF C/A

A continuing need exists for PSYOP exploitation of civic action using the general theme: The GVN and Allies are concerned about the health and general welfare of the people. PSYOP exploitation of civic action serves to amplify the overall favorable impact of civic action projects and insures that the people understand the purpose of the project. It should not be assumed by civic action officers that the people naturally understand all civic action projects. Reports have been received for instance indicating that the people failed to respond to MEDCARS because they thought they had to pay for the medical service. Large civic action projects may generate unfavorable rumors. These rumors can be killed by keeping the people informed. In addition enthusiasm for certain civic action projects may be generated by appealing to the people through the various PSYOP media. The PSC can provide publicity to all civic action projects. THE BRIDGE (NHIP CAU), a quarterly news sheet emphasizing GVN and Allied civic action is distributed throughout I Corps. PSYOP and Civic Action Officers should submit stories for publication. Leaflets and posters are other means of keeping the people informed of CA activities. Other agencies who may provide support are VIS and OCO PSYOP.

ITEM: EXPLOITATION OF VC CAUSED INCIDENTS

PSYOP Officers should be aware that the PSC screens all incident reports sent to the III MAF COC and I Corps TOC. Incidents which can be exploited by aerial loudspeaker are selected. Units are notified of the planned exploitation through channels. Special tapes are produced by the 244th PSYOP Company. These tapes are played on targets either by 9th ACS U-10 aircraft during day light hours the day the report is received or by C-47 aircraft the night the report is received. This system was started on 18 April. During the period 18 to 22 April, nine incidents have been exploited. Some were further exploited by special leaflets. This procedure should not be considered sufficient exploitation in all cases. PSYOP Officers must consider each incident for further exploitation with organic media or through POET operations.

ITEM: VC ROAD MINING INCIDENTS

An accelerated campaign to exploit these incidents was started in I Corps in October 1966 using the general theme that the VC indiscriminately placed mines on roads that killed innocent civilians, with little effect

ANNEX "D" TO PART III  
PARAGRAPH 8.

on friendly military operations. The purpose of this campaign is to cause friction between the population and the VC and to increase the reporting of VC mine locations by the population. In early 1967 (Feb-Mar) the VC, apparently to counter this campaign stepped up their propaganda warning civilians to stay off the main roads because they were mining them to hamper military operations of the allies. The VC continue to place mines indiscriminately on roads, trails, and similar locations causing injury and death to civilians. Even with warnings to the civilians the VC are in a difficult position to convince the population for the necessity of these minings. Friendly PSYOP should continue to exploit this situation with standard mining incident leaflets, mixed with reward leaflets. Particular incidents should be exploited in a timely manner with ground loudspeaker special leaflets using photographs of the damage and injured or killed. Civilian injured should be asked to make a tape following the general themes already mentioned in addition to the theme: The VC disrupt commerce by mining roads, bridges, trails and rice fields. The people must react to stop this in order to build a prosperous contry. The people need roads to transport their goods to market in order to live. Report this activity to the GVN and Allies. Local VIS should be encouraged to organize demonstrations in protests to these incidents.

ITEM: III MAF PSYOP ORIENTATION COURSE

Eighteen Marines and one Navy hospitalman were graduated from the III MAF PSYOP Orientation course conducted by the 244th PSYOP Company on 19 April 1967.

The three day course, presented on a monthly basis, provides student with instruction in the basic fundamentals of tactical psychological operations, field demonstrations of current PSYOP techniques used in III MAF area of operations, and in formation on the capabilities and limitations of PSYOP agencies available to support III MAF units.

Major McCaig, Commanding Officer of 244th PSYOP Company, presented diplomas to the graduates shortly after the final hour of instructions.

PERSONNEL ATTENDING:

Capt C. CATOE	III MAF
Capt D. DIRICH	3RD MARDIV
Capt G. D. LEE	1ST MARDIV
1ST Lt L. D. CLARK	1ST MARDIV
2ND Lt E. H. CATES	FLSG A
2ND LT J. A. GRIFFITH	11TH MARINES
2ND LT SNYDER	1/9
MSgt V. VALESANO	9TH MARINES
GySgt A. KALANI	CAC "P"
SSgt W. I. BACON	3/26
SSgt M. BRUCE	1/4
Sgt S. H. WILCOX	11TH ENG
Cpl D. E. BAKER	3/1
Cpl D. G. BARKER	3/1
Cpl R. G. REESE	2/1

PFC M. A. DENTON 3/1  
 PFC G. M. KRYSOSZEK 3/1  
 HM2 H. A. WILLIAMS JR. 3RD MT

ITEM: STATISTICS FOR MARCH

LEAFLET DROPS BY PROVINCE

QUANG TRI	THUA THIEN	QUANG NAM	QUANG TIN	QUANG NGAI
25,371,000	11,182,000	21,130,000	7,287,250	26,592,000

AIR/GROUND BROADCAST

116:55	19:35	386:25	36:00	63:15
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LEAFLETS HAND DELIVERED:

U.S. Forces: 271,541  
 RVNAF: 445,000  
 FWMAF: 300,000

RALLIERS:

QUANG TRI	THUA THIEN	QUANG NAM	QUANG TIN	QUANG NGAI
2	1	3	3	4
0	0	4	9	6
0	11	15	4	17
1	9	10	4	5
2	10	35	6	4
5	31	67	26	36

ITEM: MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY KGS DURING MARCH

	MONTHLY TOTAL	TOTAL FROM 1 NOV
VCC	9	85
CAVES	8	33
TUNNELS	1	13
WPNS	4	11
GRENADES	19	39
MINES/BOOBY TRAPS	-/8	15/14
CACHES	3	8
VC-KIA	0	8
PATROLS GUIDED	413	735
RETURNEES	3	8
BDCST (PSYOP)	7	65
CLASSES	9	30
	3	

## ITEM: CAMERAS FOR BATTALION

There is a requirement to record significant events such as: results of VC caused incidents, enemy KIA, acts of terrorism, civic action, etc., for PSYOP exploitation. Except for preplanned CA events, this requires that the tactical units recognize and have the capability of obtaining pictures immediately following the action. Recognition of PSYOP opportunities is a matter of education, initiative and imagination on the part of all hands. Cameras are authorized for each USMC battalion and can be ordered through normal supply channels. Supply data: TA # 13132; ID # 4368A; FSN 6720-903-0483, Camera Set, MOD 100; Class II, Type 2 (ENGR); Ref: TA Rev # 15.

## ITEM: FLIGHT "A", 9TH AIR COMMANDO SQUADRON

Airborne broadcasts and leaflet drops are essential elements in the prosecution of the Psychological Operations mission. In I Corps this support is provided by Flight "A" of the 9th Air Commando Squadron at Danang Air Base.

Utilizing specially equipped C-47 Skytrains and U-10 Helo Couriers, the 9th ACS had prime responsibility of aerial delivery of the PSYOP message to the enemy on the ground.

The C-47 has become the "Workhorse" for leaflet delivery. Since this aircraft is capable of carrying up to 3,000,000 leaflets per trip the C-47 is especially effective for covering large target areas. Smaller targets are normally hit by the U-10 which can carry up to 200,000 leaflets per sortie. Both aircraft are equipped with a powerful loudspeaker system for broadcasting messages to the ground. Either pre-recorded tape recordings or live messages can be broadcast by these planes.

Monthly mission reports reflect the capabilities of the 9th ACS in performing the PSYWAR mission. During the month of March 1967, the unit dropped 92,950,000 leaflets and broadcast 171 hours.

## ITEM: APRIL PSYOP CONFERENCE A SUCCESS

The monthly PSYOP Conference for April was held at III MAF Headquarters and was well received by the attendees. Forty-one officers and NCOs of various III MAF units, plus representatives of OCO participated in the conference which was chaired by Colonel R. R. READ, Force PSYOP Officer. High points of the morning session of the meeting were the discussion of The Revolutionary Development Teams by LtCol O'LEARY, the assistant G-5 of III MAF, and the explanation of 3/1's Operation Humbolt by SSgt ROBINSON, S-5 Chief of the 1st Marines. Operation Humbolt was a good example of good pre-planned PSYOP and proper exploitation of intelligence received through the PSYOP effort.

Mr. HELMS, OCO representative, briefed the conference on DOAN KEF, the new People's Unification program. You can expect details on this program soon. It will concern restoring former VC personnel at all levels of rank to citizenship in good standing with GVN.

Captain BARBOSA, U.S. Army, 244th PSYOP Company, discussed the proper making and testing of broadcast tapes.

After lunch units made their reports of their past month's activities and were followed by Major CAHILL, Assistant Force PSYOP Officer who discussed rumor control and its importance.

We were especially pleased to welcome the PSYOP Officer from Task Force Oregon, LtCol PLOTKIN and Major TORRES, U.S. Army.

ITEM: GROUND LOUDSPEAKERS PROVE EFFECTIVE

Acting Sergeant Walter T. CONWAY, a member of the 244th PSYOP Company, was making a loudspeaker broadcast in the DMZ area recently when he heard someone yelling out to his front asking to be picked up. A patrol was sent out and brought back an NVA Captain who turned out to be the political officer for his unit.

Late last month Sergeant Richard W. HILTZMAN, also of the 244th PSYOP Company, was broadcasting in the Chu Lai area. One Viet Cong came right up to the speakers and gave himself up. Sgt HILTZMAN used the former VC as a speaker to ask his friends to give up. You guessed it. The following day another Viet Cong came in stating he heard the broadcast and decided to rally.

During Sgt HILTZMAN's last operation he was grazed on the back by a sniper round while he was adjusting the speakers. The VC take every opportunity to knock out the speakers....another way of showing that PSYOP teams are doing their jobs in an effective manner.



R. R. READ  
Colonel USMC  
Force PSYOP Officer

DISTRIBUTION:  
Special

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONFERENCE

26 APRIL 1967

III MAF CONFERENCE ROOM

DANANG EAST, VIETNAM

TAB A - Conference Agenda

TAB B - Roster of Conferees

TAB C - Sample PSYOP Annex

ANNEX "E" TO PART III  
PARAGRAPH 8.

## MONTHLY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONFERENCE, APRIL 26, 1967

Col. R. R. READ, III MAF PSYOP Officer, opened the conference at 1000. He noted that the primary benefit to be gained from the monthly conference was the exchange of ideas and techniques developed in the field.

Maj. CAHILL, Assistant III MAF PSYOP Officer, invited all attendees to feel free to participate in the conference and solicited agenda items for future conferences. He also requested that reports of names of personnel filling PSYOP billets be forwarded to III MAF PSYOP office monthly.

He noted that the Kit Carson Scout payroll had not been received yet and promised to make every effort to have the payroll to the field by 30 Apr.

It was announced that equipment; amplifiers, tape recorders and microphones, were available for issue to those units rating them after the conference.

Maj. CAHILL noted that new JUSPAO Guidances 27, 28 and 31, and Field Memorandum 33, had been issued and that everyone should become familiar with them. He noted that Field Memorandum 33, contained the current policy on bombing villages; that Guidance 27 concerned the use of interpreters; and that Guidance 31 concerned the PSYOP aspects of defoliation.

LtCol O'LEARY, Assistant III MAF G-5 Officer, explained the Revolutionary Development (RD) program. He stated that for centuries the central government's influence had traditionally ended at the hamlet gates and that the RD program was a major attempt to bring GVN influence into the hamlet and that it was a civil and military coordinated operation. He noted that if a target were used to explain the redevelopment of a hamlet the bulls eye would be the hamlet with the RD cadre team working with the hamlet and with either PF or RF and sometimes OAC units providing local security. The next ring out on the target would be a security zone which would primarily be controlled by ARVN units and sometimes by Free World Forces. The last ring on the target would be the zone in which offensive operations would be executed against regular VC and NVA units utilizing primarily Free World Forces and some ARVN units. He discussed recruiting of RD team and noted that when possible they are from the district in which they will work. The members are usually very young or past military age. Their educational level prior to entering the program is usually low and any extra training or education received after their regular RD training would be useful. All new recruits undergo twelve (12) weeks of training. They are organized into 59 man teams and are assigned to a Province where they are further assigned under the OPCON of a district chief to work in one his hamlets. Their first job is security and self defense of the hamlet. Once security is established they start working with the people for a better way of life within the hamlet. They promote elections where necessary. LtCol O'LEARY noted that there were presently 114 RD teams in I Corps area. He stated that the success of each team was largely dependent upon the leadership of

the team. Some teams have defended themselves and their hamlets well. The VC attitude towards the RD program has been shown in the  $\mu$ 2 attacks against RD teams since 12 February 1967, resulting in 114 RD casualties. Maj. CAHILL asked how RD fitted into hamlets where elections were being held now and LtCol O'LEARY stated that their job was one of coordination.

SSgt ROBINSON, S-5 Chief, 1st Marines, explained that the 1st Marines kept daily contact with RD teams in their area to assist them and to coordinate programs. They keep track of them to help ensure their security; especially in VC areas. In turn the RD personnel have provided significant intelligence and are well thought of by Battalion and Company Commanders in 1st Marines.

Mr. HELMS, JUSPAO, explained that RD teams got their supplies primarily from JUSPAO but that an effort was being made to bring them under VIS. He further stated the teams had been extremely helpful in the propaganda effort. LtCol. BARKER agreed with Mr. HELMS and stated that by working closely with the RD team thru OCO the 3rd Marine Division had received good intelligence.

LtCol. BARKER, 3rd Marine Division PSYOP Officer, told of the success his units were having in their program of distributing newspapers and said the papers were in such demand that they were having troubles meeting the demand. Mr. HELMS asked that more information be furnished him concerning the newspaper handout.

LtCol. O'LEARY stressed that the RD program was a GVN project and had to remain that way to be successful.

Maj. CAHILL introduced SSgt ROBINSON, 1st Marines, to describe Operation Humbolt by 3/1 in March and its results since it was a good example of preplanned tactical PSYOP. SSgt ROBINSON related that the S-2 and S-5 had determined through evaluation of intelligence received that the local force VC resented the hard core VC and NVA troops. To exploit this situation they set up their FW compound as an R&R area complete with hot showers, T.V., tape recorder, hot food and guards who were lightly armed and spoke Vietnamese. On 7 March, three local VC were captured in the Tu Cau hamlet. The company, K/3/1, who captured the VC was read in on the "love thy neighbor" treatment, greeted these VC with kind treatment, and did not tie them up or mistreat them in any way. They were put in the special R&R center where the Kit Carson Scouts talked and ate with them and in general re-educated them. These prisoners cooperated completely and lead the Marines to all the VC houses and caves in the area that they knew of. Enough information was received to plan an operation. During the operation one Hoi Chanh received a total of 32,500\$VN in rewards for locating assorted weapons and mines. During the operation a variety of PSYOP teams were used; a cultural drama team, an audio/visual team, a FOET team and a loudspeaker team. The total results of the operation were: 13 VC captured, 3 VC suicides, 6 assorted small arms, 8 grenades, 1 mine, 2000 rounds of small arms ammunition, four 81mm mortar rounds and one 82mm Russian mortar with sight were captured.

GySgt CREAL, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, stated that he thought that our sense of values concerning rewards were off. He felt we should pay higher rewards for weapons, mines and information since the recovering of these items usually saved us thousands in equipment plus the lives saved.

Col. READ commented on the problems of the reward program and asked if anyone could provide documentation on the VC reward program.

Maj. CAHILL then stressed the importance of preplanning. He emphasized that our main effort must be one to get away from reaction situations. He also reminded the conference that since our PSYOP resources were in short supply we could only get optimum employment of those resources through preplanning. Col READ said he realized there would continue to be short notice operations and that III MAF would continue to try to support these operations within our means. He reminded the conference of the III MAF requirement that all operation orders and plans contain a PSYOP Annex and that a copy should be forwarded to III MAF Headquarters.

SSgt CREAL, 3/1, requested that leaflets and tapes be kept simple.

Lt. ST CLAIR, 1st Recon Bn, spoke of a system his battalion used whereby patrol leaders carried standard leaflets which could be distributed when they made any contact.

After a break, Mr. HELMS, OCO, explained a new program concerning national reconciliation. He stated that only limited information was currently available, but that the program was to be called "DOAN KET". The essentials of the program was that it welcomed VC of all ranks and positions back to the GVN side with full rights and citizenships.

Capt. BARBOSA, Intelligence Officer, 244th PSYOP Co., presented a short class on the preparation of broadcast tapes. He emphasized that only with the loudspeaker could we overcome the literacy rate. The broadcast should have a definite message using specific locations, units and names when at all possible. He stressed the importance of marrying propaganda and current intelligence of the situation to produce effective propaganda broadcasts. He stated that the best length for an aerial broadcast was 45 seconds and that anything over 45 seconds would probably be lost on the target. Finally he stressed the importance of pretesting the tape on native personnel. Mr. HELMS asked if we were going to be able to have VN personnel write our messages in the future and Capt. BARBOSA said it was his experience that it was better for us to write the message and have the VN translate it. A discussion arose as to rather or not it was advisable to use Hoi Chanh to make live broadcasts and Capt. BARBOSA recommended against it.

Col. READ showed loudspeaker and tape equipment that would be going down to battalion level. He also noted that only about 10 percent of the MACV standard tapes were being used in aerial broadcasts and said he felt it was due to a lack of catalogs. The catalogs have been requested.

After lunch unit reports were taken. Lt. CLARK, 1st Marine Division, stated the most significant success in that Division had been the 1st Marines Operation Humbolt. He said they were having some problems in coordination but that these some corrected themselves when the Division PSYOP SOP was issued shortly. He also indicated that the Division was getting a new PSYOP Officer.

LtCol BARKER, PSYOP Officer, 3rd Marine Division, said that based on information that Hoi Chanhs had rather turn into VN nationals because of the language problem the 4th Marines had built a Chieu Hoi bunker to try to encourage the ralliers to come in. To date none have rallied to the bunker. The division had 5 ralliers this month with 4 of those to 1/3/9. He felt that broadcasts and leaflet drops in the same areas were paying off. LtCol. BARKER proposed the idea of possibly paying rewards for whole units, such as squads, platoons, companies and etc., for rallying. He felt that even though we may not get many units that the program would place an extre worry upon VC/NVA Commanders.

Maj. CAHILL discussed rumor control. He cited the extensive history of the use of rumors and showed how fertile VN was for rumors. The best control of rumors is an informed populace.

Col READ mentioned several items in his closing remarks. He reminded everyone that the new speakers would have to be picked up on supply property accounts. He indicated that the 9th ACS was receiving new O-2 aircraft to replace the U-10s which would mean an increase in capability for aerial broadcasting and that everyone should start thinking about using this new capability. He mentioned that the early evening was the best time for aerial broadcasting and since the O-2 didn't presently have night navigation equipment that possibly we could investigate the possibility of using TPQ-10s. He reminded each battalion they were authorized to purchase a polaroid camera to use for exploitation purposes.

Col. READ stated that the MACV PSYOP Conference had felt that the best way to photograph VC/NVA KIA was in the natural position as they fell. III MAF is starting to receive school trained PSYOP officers with 15 recent graduates starting to arrive and approximately 32 more in school at Ft BRAGG. Cultural Drama teams are needed but are expensive. III MAF checking on the possibility of two teams just for our units to have better response.

Col. READ stated that he hoped that VIS would start to take a more active part in I Corps. He estimates that there are 1400 VIS employees in I Corps. He encouraged units to coordinate and cooperate with VIS personnel to help them become more active.

GySgt WHITE, 9th Marines, made a comment about the difficulty they were having indoctrinating new troops on the concept of the S-5s work.

He said that the S-5s brief the troops on the Chieu Hoi program and on face-to-face persuasion. The Gunny said he felt the key to how the men received the programs was dependent on the squad, platoon and company level leadership.

Lt O'TOOLE, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, presented the idea of using the Kit Carson Scouts as instructors when indoctrinating new troops. He said it was working very well.

Col. READ emphasized the fact that all hands had to be indoctrinated and that command influence was needed on all levels to ensure the future success of the Chieu Hoi Program.

There being no other business; Col. READ closed the conference.

## III MAF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONFERENCE, 26 APRIL 1967

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<u>TIME</u>	<u>SPEAKER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>
0930-1000		COFFEE PERIOD	
1000-1005	Col READ Major CAHILL	III MAF III MAF	Opening Remarks Administrative Notes
1005-1030	LtCol O'LEARY	III MAF G-5	RD Program
1030-1100	Major McCAIG Major CAHILL	244TH PSYOP CO. III MAF	Tactical PSYOP
1100-1130		1ST MARDIV 3RD MARDIV FLC 1ST MP BN 1ST MAW I CORPS TASK FORCE OREGON	PSYOP - Plans
1130-1200	Capt. BARBOSA	244TH PSYOP CO.	PSYOP Tapes
1200-1300		LUNCH	
1300-1315	Major CAHILL	III MAF	PSYOP Information Program
1315-1330		CRITIQUE/DISCUSSION	
1330	Col. READ	III MAF	Closing Remarks

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## LIST OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING PSYOP CONFERENCE, APRIL 26, 1967

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
McCAIG	Maj	244th PSYOP
O'LEARY	LtCol	G-5, III MAF
DILLARD	Capt	G-5, I CORPS
CAHILL	Maj	PSYOP, III MAF
READ	Col	PSYOP, III MAF
SMITH	Maj	9TH ACS
SCOTT	LT(JG)	NAG
HELMS	MR.	OCO
ENDUS	MR.	OCO
GRAHAM	2DLT	HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV
ROBERTS	1LT	244TH PSYOP
SIMMONS	Capt	3RD MARDIV
KUHN	Capt	1ST BN, 7TH MAR
CROGHAN	2DLT	1ST BN, 7TH MAR
BARBOSA	Capt	244th PSYOP
BATES	Capt	III MAF, PSYOP
PINKERTON	Lt	2/5
ST CLAIR	Lt	1ST RECON
WHITE	GySgt	HQ 9TH MARINES
HALLEY	1Lt	2ND BN, 1ST MAR
REECE	Cpl	2ND BN, 1ST MAR
HEIDTKE	2DLt	7TH MT BN
CALASSO	Capt	2ND BN, 1ST MAR

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BAYMGARONER	2DLt	3RD BN 3RD MAR
McLEAN	2DLt	11TH ENGR BN
McMANAMA	Sht	HQ 5TH MARINES
MAY	2DLt	1ST BN 5TH MARINES
PLOTKIN	LtCol	196TH
TORRES	Maj	196TH
O'TOOLE	2DLt	2ND BN, 9TH MARINES
BAILEY	LLt	3D BN, 26TH MARINES
CREAL	GySgt	3/1
CLARK	LLt	G-5, 1ST MARDIV
BERRYMAN	2DLt	11TH MARINES
DUNMAN	Lt	244TH PSYOP
MARTIN	Lt	244TH PSYOP
GELLESPIE	Lt	244TH PSYOP
GLEASON	Capt	1ST ENG BN
KENT	Lt	3RD TANKS
ROBINSON	SSgt	1ST MARINES
CLARK	GySgt	7TH ENG BN
BARKER	LtCol	3D MARDIV

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ANNEX \_\_\_\_\_ (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION) TO OPERATION ORDER \_\_\_\_\_

Ref: (a) Maps and Charts  
 (b) III MAF O. 3410.1A (SOP for PSYOP)

1. Situationa. Enemy Forces (If this para. is too long it should be a Tab)

- (1) Annex \_\_\_\_\_ (Intelligence)
- (2) Military. Local force VC up to platoon size conduct propoganda operations consisting of face-to-face persuasion, hand disseminated leaflets, agitation and rumors.
- (3) Civilian. VONG LIEN village, population 1250, approximatley 30% VC sympathizers. Hard core VC infrastructure well established down to hamlet level consisting of approximately 5% of population.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) The assigned TAOR had been subjected to PSYOP by USMC, ARVN and, OCO PSYOP, VIS and RD Teams. PSYOP conducted in the past has emphasized the following themes.

(a) Towards VC

1. The strength and inevitable victory of the GVN and its allies.
2. VC weaknesses.
3. Chieu Hoi Program.

(b) Towards Civilians

1. Ultimate GVN victory
2. The revolutionary nature of GVN.
3. The GVN's concern and plan for the people.
4. The presence of USMC in Vietnam.
5. The importance of reporting VC activity.

- (2) The following units have been assigned direct support missions to this battalion.

- (a) Det., 244th PSYOP Co., III MAF.
- (b) One U-10 aircraft from Flt "A", 9th ACS, III MAF

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(3) Additional PSYOP support will be provided or requested through the Psychological Operations Support Center (PSC) from the following agencies in accordance with reference (b).

- (a) 244th PSYOP Co., III MAF.
- (b) Flt "A", 9th ACS, III MAF.
- (c) JUSPAO
- (d) 10th ARVN PLOWAR Bn.
- (e) VIS
- (f) Local GVN District, Province and Regional agencies.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) One (1) HB loudspeaker Team, 244th PSYOP Co. attached effective (Date/time).

2. Mission. \_\_\_\_\_ Bn, \_\_\_\_\_ Marines conducts PSYOP within TAOR to assist in expanding the influence of local GVN to gain the winning support of the people, to lower the morale of the cause the defection of VC forces and infrastructure.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. PSYOP to include dissemination of leaflets from the air and on the ground, aerial and ground loudspeaker broadcasts and face-to-face communications will be conducted to accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Objectives:

- (a) Expand the influence of the GVN to gain the willing support of the people.
- (b) To lower the morale of and cause the defection of VC/NVA forces and infrastructure through the Chieu Hoi Program.

(2) Phases of Operation. The PSYOP objectives will be accomplished in the following phases:

(a) Phase I. Initial planning and coordination began on (Date/time). Analysis of the area and population is currently in progress and will continue throughout the operation. The following agencies have been coordinated with.

- 1). \_\_\_\_\_ Marines (PSYOP Off)
- 2). PSC (244th PSYOP Co.)
- 3). Local Province and District Officials (Names)
- 4). Local U.S. Army Advisors (Name)
- 5). Local OCO representative (Name)
- 6). Local Missionaries (Name)

SAMPLE

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- (b) Phase II. Tactical PSYOP will commence not later than (date/time) to include aerial loudspeaker missions and leaflet drops in the following areas listed in priority. (List specific villages, hamlets and suspected VC concentration areas). During this phase at least two aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops will be flown daily.

During the conduct of ground operations loudspeaker teams will be assigned to companies as required. Standard leaflets and tapes will be used throughout the operation and special leaflets and tapes will be utilized as specific opportunities present themselves. Additional PSYOP support will be requested in accordance with ref (b). Tapes and leaflet themes will stress:

- 1). The inevitable victory of the GVN and Allied forces.
- 2). Chieu Hoi appeals based on current intelligence.
- 3). VC treatment of the people and their own soldiers.
- 4). Recent VC defeats and losses.
- 5). Don't harbor VC.
- 6). Report mines and booby traps.
- 7). Don't run from Marines.
- 8). Explain USMC presence in RVN
- 9). Safe Conduct Passes.

- (c) Phase III. After tactical objectives have been secured PSYOP operations will continue using primarily hand distributed leaflets and newsletters, ground loudspeaker broadcasts, and face-to-face communications for the people. Aerial missions will continue as needed in any isolated VC areas. Primary themes to be stressed with the people in addition to those listed in Phase II will be:

- 1). GVN concern for security and welfare of people.
- 2). Self defense and self help programs by the people .

- b. HB Team, 244th PSYOP Co. In general support of battalion. Be prepared to make broadcasts as required stressing themes listed above.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) All requests for leaflet and loudspeaker operations will be coordinated by the S-3.
- (2) All commanders will ensure that troops are kept informed of PSYOP programs stressing the Chieu Hoi Program.
- (3) All commanders will be alert for events which can be immediately exploited to good PSYOP advantage. Examples would be VC defeats and atrocities and intelligence provided by ralliers, PWs and local populace. Priority of production of tapes and leaflets will be given to these specific events.

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4. Administration and Logistics. Omitted
5. Command and Communications.
  - a. Command. PSYOP Tms, 244th PSYOP Co., OPCON this Headquarters upon approval of PSC.
  - b. Communications. Annex \_\_\_\_\_ (Communications)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALFA

B. C. DELTA  
Major, U.S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

ACKNOWLEDGE:

TABS: As necessary

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