

CONFIDENTIAL

CCN: 016

FILLER 19

DTG: 032301Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR COMSERVPAC

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____ *o*

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DTG MONTH 032301Z PAR 67

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CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

R 032301Z APR 67
 FM COMSERVPAC
 TO COMNAVSUPACT DANANG
 INFO CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM LACY INFO
 LTGEN WALT FM RADM HOOPER

A. YOUR 190348Z MAR.

CONCUR TENTATIVE SFHEDULE PROPOSED BY REF A.

INTEND TO CONDUCT MODIFIED COMPREHENSIVE INSPECTION AS A WORKING
 INSPECTION WITH MINIMUM INTERFERENCE WITH OPERATIONS. TO EXTENT
 PRACTICABLE WOULD LIKE TO INCLUDE A BRIEF SESSION WITH COMDR
 THIRTIETH NCR, AND ANY OTHER SERVPAC UNITS-E. G. HELO TO
 HOSPITAL SHIP, DURING DEDICATION OF DEEP DRAFT PIERS,
 COMMANDER I CORPS, MGEN KOANG XUAN LAM, RREPEATIDLY
 INVITED ME TO A PERSONALLY ESCORTED TRIP TO HUE. IF GENERAL WALT
 FEELS THIS WOULD BE IN BEST INTERESTS OF U. S. AND INVITATION
 WOULD BE FORTHCOMING I WOULD BE RECEPTIVE, EVEN AT EXPENSE OF
 INSPECTION OBJECTIVES. I MAY GO TO YANKEE FROM DANANG ABOUT
 121100H TO VISIT OTHER UNITS WITH AIDE, REMAINDER OF PARTY TO
 HEAD SOUTH AS SCHEDULED. RETURN WOULD BE PLANNED TO QUI NHON
 IF PRACTICABLE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

yes m

Have notified Adm Secy of Gen W -
concurrance

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NOV 017

FILLER 19

DTG 050119Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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DTG 050119Z APR 67

(7)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

VV PAC270

PP DDKE
 DE YNA 679 0950119
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 050119Z APR 67
 FM CG FMPPAC
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAF 030852Z/APR 67

1. THANKS FOR REFERENCE A. I AM GLAD TO SEE YOU HAVE
 THE PROSPECT OF A LITTLE HELP, ALBEIT NOT IN THE
 AMOUNT, OR WHERE, OR WHEN YOU WOULD LIKE IT.

2. THE PROSPECTIVE PLAN RAISES SOME QUESTIONS WHICH WILL AFFECT
 OUR PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE, INSOFAR AS SUPPORT IS CONCERNED:

A. INFORMATION HERE IS THAT OREGON PROVIDES FOR TWO
 BRIGADES FROM I FFV (1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV, 3D BDE 25TH INF
 DIV) AND TWO FROM II FFV (173D ABN BDE AND 199TH LT INF BDE).
 HOWEVER REF A SEEMS TO TOTAL ONLY TWO BRIGADES UNDER
 BILL ROSSON. IS ROSSON TO HAVE TWO BRIGADES IN HIS PRO-
 VISIONAL DIVISION, OR FOUR?

B. SINCE OREGON IS TO BE IN EFFECT FOR ONLY FOUR MONTHS,

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE 2 YNA 679 C O N F I D E N T I A L

WOULD YOU PICTURE FLSG BRAVO REMAINING IN PLACE DURING THAT PERIOD?

C. YOUR NOTE THAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE FIRST BRIGADE INTRODUCED WILL COME FROM LARSON IN I FFV. DO YOU SEE THIS LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENT CONTINUING AFTER ROSSON TAKES OVER? OR WOULD IT CEASE AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT THEN COME THROUGH FLSG BRAVO TO THE PROVISIONAL DIVISION?

D. IF A MARINE REGIMENT IS ASSIGNED IN THE THANG BINH AREA IAW YOUR LOI 4-67, HOW WILL IT RECEIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT--FROM FLC OR FROM FLSG BRAVO? DO YOU SEE ANY ADDITIONAL HELP BEING REQUIRED FROM ME?

E. HOW WILL OUR CAC'S BE ADMINISTERED AND SUPPORTED IN THE AREA TUCTED OVER TO ROSSON BY TF X-RAY?

F. WHERE AND HOW DO YOU VISUALIZE THE ARMY HELICOPTERS BEING ACCOMMODATED? WILL WE HAVE TO SHIFT FROM KY HA? WOULD THE ARMY PROVIDE HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR 2D BDE ROKMC?

G. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT I WILL BE CALLED ON TO PROVIDE AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON SUPPORT TO THE PROVISIONAL

PAGE 3 YNA 679 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DIVISION?

H. ARE YOUR LOI'S 2-67 AND 4-67 RELATIVE TO OREGON STILL EFFECTIVE?

I. WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS CONCERNING AN AREA COORDINATOR AT CHU LAI, AFTER DEPARTURE OF TF X-RAY? WARM REGARDS
GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

NNNN

III MAF 2100-1 (9-66)

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OCN: 63

FILLER 19

DTG 102059Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR CMC

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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*File
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for action
JWC*

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
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ledover*

THIS MESSAGE IS EXCLUSIVE FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

102059Z APR 67



#32

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

P 102059Z APR 67

FM CMC

TO CG FMFPAC

CG FMFLANT

CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR CHIEF OF STAFF EACH COMMAND.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. THIS IS A TEST MESSAGE TO TEST THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY CRYPTONET. THE PURPOSES OF THE INTERCHANGE OF TEST MESSAGES ARE TO EXERCISE THE SYSTEM AND TO ISOLATE PROBLEM AREAS IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED HAS BEEN THE HANDLING AND TRANSMISSION TIMES OF MULTIPLE SECTION MESSAGES. THEREFORE, THE TEST MESSAGES ARE INTENTIONALLY DRAFTED TO REQUIRE TWO TRANSMISSION SECTIONS.

2. ACTION.

A. FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP LEJEUNE.

(1) FOR EACH CMC TEST MESSAGE, RECORD TIME OF RECEIPT OF THE ON-LINE VERSION, TIME OF DELIVERY OF EACH TRANSMISSION SECTION OF THE OFF-LINE ENCRYPTED VERSION, AND SUBMIT THIS INFORMATION TO CMC.

(2) FOR EACH TEST MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO CMC, RECORD TIME OF RECEIPT OF EACH SECTION OF THE OFF-LINE ENCRYPTED VERSION, AND THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF EACH SECTION OVER THE ON-LINE CIRCUIT TO HQMC. SUBMIT THIS INFORMATION TO CMC.

B. FOR ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES, WITHIN FIVE DAYS FROM TIME OF RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, PREPARE A RETURN TEST TO CMC AS FOLLOWS:

(1) MESSAGE TO BE ENCRYPTED IN THE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY CRYPTO SYSTEM, DESIGNATED SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DIRECTOR MARINE CORPS COMMAND CENTER MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

(2) MESSAGE TO BE OF ROUTINE PRECEDENCE, AND OF SUFFICIENT LENGTH TO REQUIRE SEPARATION INTO TWO TRANSMISSION SECTIONS.

(3) MESSAGE CONTENT WILL INCLUDE TIME OF RECEIPT IN THE COMMUNICATION CENTER AND THE TIME OF EACH SECTION OF EACH OF THE CMC TEST MESSAGES AND THE MESSAGE CONTENT MAY CONTAIN ANY DESIRED COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN REGARD TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF THIS CRYPTONET. FILLER TEXT MAY BE USED TO ATTAIN THE REQUIRED LENGTH, BUT CAUTION MUST BE TAKEN TO ASSURE FILLER IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH, AND THAT THE FILLER CONTAINS NO INFORMATION WHICH COULD BE MISUNDERSTOOD AS BEING THE CONTENTS OF ACTUAL MESSAGES.

(4) OVERSEAS ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO DEFER OR WAIVE THE PREPARATION AND TRANSMISSION OF THE RETURN TEST MESSAGES IF PARTICIPATION IN SUCH TEST WOULD INTERFERE WITH COMBAT OPERATIONS. IN THE EVENT OF SUCH WAIVER, NOTIFY CMC BY SPEEDLETTER.

3. AFTER THIS PARAGRAPH, THE REMAINDER OF THIS MESSAGE WILL BE COMPOSED OF FILLER TEXT NEEDED TO ATTAIN SUFFICIENT LENGTH TO REQUIRE SEPARATION INTO TWO TRANSMISSION SECTIONS. THE FILLER MATERIAL IS COMPOSED OF EXCERPTS FROM THE CMC LETTER ESTABLISHING

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

Sight 0715 - 13 Apr 67

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THE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY CRYPTONET, AND BEGINS WITH THE WORD QUOTE AND ENDS WITH THE WORDS END QUOTE.

4. QUOTE. THIS LETTER CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF A MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (MCEO) MESSAGE SYSTEM. THIS CAPABILITY SATISFIES A REQUIREMENT FOR SECURE, PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS MEANS WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS. MATTERS APPROPRIATE FOR TRANSMISSION IN THE MCEO MESSAGE SYSTEM ARE THOSE WHICH REQUIRE PROTECTION BEYOND THAT AFFORDED BY GENERAL, INTER-SERVICE COMMUNICATIONS. EACH ADDRESSEE ORIGINATED CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TRAFFIC IS AUTHORIZED TO DESIGNATE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN AS MCEO IF DISCLOSURE OF THAT INFORMATION TO PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE MARINE CORPS WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS DETERMINATION MAY BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OR OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE, PROPER MANAGEMENT, ETC. ONCE DESIGNATED MCEO, SUCH INFORMATION WILL NOT BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE MARINE CORPS WITHOUT PRIOR CONCURRENCE OF THE ORIGINATOR OR A SUPERIOR IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. WHILE MCEO IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGNATION REQUIRED TO INSURE PRIVACY, AND NOT A SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, ITS USE IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC WILL BE LIMITED TO MESSAGES CLASSIFIED AS CONFIDENTIAL OR HIGHER. SINCE MCEO MESSAGE TRAFFIC WILL REQUIRE TIME-CONSUMING OFF-LINE METHODS OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION, OTHER THAN THE NORMAL RAPID ON-LINE METHODS OF GENERAL CLASSIFIED TRAFFIC, THE DESIGNATION OF A MESSAGE AS MCEO SHOULD BE MADE ONLY WHEN CLEARLY APPLICABLE. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE USE OF MAIL WHEN APPROPRIATE. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT A MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC PROCESSED IN THE SYSTEM WILL BE "SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR" MESSAGES. THE MCEO MESSAGE SYSTEM WILL COMPRISE: AN OFF-LINE ADONIS (KAK2989, MCEO KEYLIST, USED WITH TSEC/KL-7 OR TSEC/KL-47 CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT) CRYPTONET OF 22 COMMANDING GENERALS NOW POSSESSING AN OFF-LINE CAPABILITY. AN EXISTING ON-LINE ROMULUS (TSEC/KW-26 CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT) POINT-TO-POINT CRYPTONET LINKING COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS AND COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP LEJEUNE, N. C. (HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS ALTERNATE HEADQUARTERS/EMERGENCY RELOCATION SITE). THE COMMANDING GENERAL MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP LEJEUNE, WILL PROVIDE MCEO OFF-LINE CRYPTO GUARD FOR HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS. THIS CRYPTO GUARD RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE LIMITED TO MESSAGES ENCRYPTED IN KAK-2989, THE MCEO KEY LIST. MESSAGES INTENDED FOR CMC, EITHER AS AN ACTION OR INFORMATION ADDRESSEE WILL BE ADDRESSED

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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TO CG, MARCORB CAMLEJ. APPROPRIATE PASSING INSTRUCTIONS IN THE ENCRYPTED TEXT WILL BE EMPLOYED. THE PHRASE "MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY" WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC, IMMEDIATELY AFTER SPECAT CATEGORY, OR IF NOT A SPECAT MESSAGE, AFTER CLASSIFICATION. UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGES WILL NOT BE DESIGNATED MCEO. ALL OTHER PROCEDURES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACP 121(D) AND OTHER CURRENT DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS. NEITHER THIS HEADQUARTERS NOR THAT OF THE MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE WILL BE INCLUDED AS AN ACTION OR INFORMATION ADDRESSEE PURELY BECAUSE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE COMMAND IN THE COMMAND IN THE SYSTEM. "NEED TO KNOW" PRINCIPLES WILL BE APPLIED METICULOUSLY WITHIN ANY COMMUNICATIONS CENTER OR HEADQUARTERS PROCESSING MCEO TRAFFIC. THE EXCHANGE OF NAMES AND CLEARANCES OF PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO PROCESS MCEO TRAFFIC TRANSMITTED ON-LINE BETWEEN THIS HEADQUARTERS AND CAMP LEJEUNE, AND PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED THERWITH, WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE. THIS LETTER CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF A MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (MCEO) MESSAGE SYSTEM. THIS CAPABILITY SATISFIES A REQUIREMENT FOR SECURE, PRIVATE COMMUNICATION MEANS WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS. MATTERS APPROPRIATE FOR TRANSMISSION IN THE MCEO MESSAGE SYSTEM ARE THOSE WHICH REQUIRE PROTECTION BEYOND THAT AFFORDED BY GENERAL, INTERSERVICE COMMUNICATIONS. EACH ADDRESSEE ORIGINATING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TRAFFIC IS AUTHORIZED TO DESIGNATE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN AS MCEO IF DISCLOSURE OF THAT INFORMATION TO PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE MARINE CORPS WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS DETERMINATION MAY BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OR OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE, PROPER MANAGEMENT, ETC. WHEN DESIGNATED MCEO SUCH INFORMATION WILL NOT BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE MARINE CORPS WITHOUT PRIOR CONCURRENCE OF THE ORIGINATOR OR SUPERIOR IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. WHILE MCEO IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGNATION REQUIRED TO INSURE PRIVACY, AND NOT A SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, ITS USE IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC WILL BE LIMITED TO MESSAGES CLASSIFIED AS CONFIDENTIAL OF HIGHER. SINCE MCEO TRAFFIC WILL REQUIRE TIME-CONSUMING OFF-LINE METHODS OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION, RATHER THAN THE NORMAL RAPID ON-LINE METHODS OF GENERAL CLASSIFIED TRAFFIC, THE DESIGNATION OF A MESSAGE AS MCEO SHOULD BE MADE ONLY WHEN CLEARLY APPLICABLE. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO USE OF MAIL WHEN APPROPRIATE. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT A MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC PROCESSED IN THE SYSTEM WILL BE "SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR" MESSAGES. THE MCEO MESSAGE SYSTEM COMPRISES AN OFF-LINE ADONIS (KAK 2989 MCEO KEYLIST, USED WITH TSEC/KL-7 OR TSEC/KL-47 CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT) CRYPTONET OF 22 COMMANDING GENERALS NOW POSSESSING AN OFF-LINE CAPABILITY. AN EXISTING ON LINE ROMULUS POINT-TO-POINT CRYPTO NET LINKING THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS AND THE COMMANDING GENERAL MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP LEJEUNE, N. C. (HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS ALTERNATE HEADQUARTERS/EMERGENCY RELOCATION SITE).
END QUOTE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

FORM 3/100 (Rev 7-61)

S&C SUBJ. FILE

CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SERIAL 102249Z Apr67	DATE	BUCK TAG NO. PERSONAL FOR
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FROM: CMC

SUBJECT: (Card MUST be Classified if Subject is Classified)

PERSONAL FROM GEN GREENE TO LTGEN KRULAK

MARINE A-6A EMPLOYMENT (U) Copy #3 of 3

DATE TO	SECTION	SIGNATURE	DATE RETURNED	INITIAL
15 Apr 67	1ST MAW	<i>[Signature]</i>		

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TOP SECRET

CCN : 71

FILLER : 19

DTG : 102249Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR : CMC

CATEGORY : (PERSONAL FOR)

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CG FMW

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NNNNVV DDKA56IDE YVNA SUP T O P S E C R E T MSG FOLLOWS////////

VV YVNA527VV NAB298
 PP DDKE
 DE YVNA 2439 1240529
 ZNY IIIII
 P 140529Z APR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 INFO DDKE/CG III MAF
 DDKM/CG FMAw
 R 102249Z APR 67
 FM CMC
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)*M*

T O P S E C R E T

PERSONAL FROM GEN GREENE TO LT GEN KRLLAK
 MARINE A-6A EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CG III MAF 310941Z MAR 67.

1. REF A PROVIDED CG III MAF POSITION REGARDING UTILIZATION
 MARINE ASA IN ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS.

THE FOLLOWING ARE MY VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.

2. THE PERFORMANCE OF MARINE A-6 SQUADRONS IN VIETNAM
 IS BEING CLOSELY MONITORED BY NAVY, OSD AND CONGRESS.

THE CAPABILITY OF THIS AIRCRAFT MUST BE FULLY EXPLOITED TO
 CONTINUE TO JUSTIFY ITS PRESENCE IN THE MARINE INVENTORY.

IN THIS RESPECT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT FULL SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES
 BE EMPLOYED AGAINST TARGETS OR ON MISSIONS THAT CLEARLY
 REQUIRE THIS UNIQUE CAPABILITY.

3. 80-3 PERCENT OF OUR A6A FORCE LEVEL OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN
 JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF DEEP SUPPORT INCLUDING INTERDICTION.

PAGE 2 YVNA 2439 T O P S E C R E T

AND ARMED RECCO. CINCPAC SANCTION TO GIVE OVERRIDING PRIORITY
 TO A6A SUPPORT OF III MAF MUST NOT PREVENT PARTICIPATION

IN NVN AIR OPERATIONS UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO

DEMONSTRATE ON A MISSION BY MISSION BASIS THAT III

MAF REQUIREMENTS WERE, IN FACT, OVERRIDING. THEREFORE I

SUPPORT UTILIZATION OF MARINE ASA IN ROLLING THUNDER
 OPERATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT III MAF REQUIREMENTS PERMIT.

4. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT PARTICIPATION IN ROLLING THUNDER
 WILL BE LIMITED UNTIL VMA (AW) FIVE THREE THREE COMPLETES

SHAKEDOWN AND FULL SYSTEMS AVAILABILITY IMPROVES. AT SUCH TIME
 AS CAPABILITIES ALLOW MARINE ASA TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS

FURTHER NORTH I RECOMMEND FMAw ALSO PROVIDE THE F-4 AND EA6A
 REQUIRED FOR SWEEP OR ESCORT IN SUPPORT OF THE ASA'S.

PROVIDING THE ALL WEATHER PACKAGE FOR WHICH WE ARE EQUIPPED
 SHOULD ENHANCE STRIKE PLANNING AND COORDINATION.

GP-3

BT

2 3

17

FORM: 050

FILLER 25

DTG 110055Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

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DTG 110055Z APR 67

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 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO CG FIRST MAJ
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EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT INFO MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

- A. COMNAVFORV 30114Z/MAR 67
- B. CG III MAF 28094Z/MAR 67.
- C. CINCPAC 03051Z (PASEP).
- D. CINCPAC 08214Z (PASEP).

1. AS A RESULT OF REFERENCE A, REFERENCE B FOUND ITS WAY TO CINCPACFLT
 AND FROM HIM TO CINCPAC. THE EFFECT WAS PREDICTABLY UNFAVORABLE. SHARP
 IS DEEPLY DEDICATED TO THE A6A PROJECT. HE INTENDS TO SEE IT GROW, AS
 EVIDENCED BY REFERENCES C AND D. HE HAS UNRESERVED HIGH LEVEL SUPPORT
 IN THIS, AND WILL BE VIGILANT FOR ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE MARINES ARE NOT
 COOPERATING.

2. WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND YOU WILL SEE THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF:

A. ENSURING THAT REPORTS RELATED TO A6A OPERATIONS ARE FULL AND
 TIMELY.

B. ENSURING THAT A6A FULL SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES WHICH ARE NOT
 UNQUESTIONABLY REQUIRED FOR APPROPRIATE MARINE SUPPORT ARE FRAGGED FOR
 THE NORTHERN ROUTE PACKAGE TASKS.

C. ENSURING, WHEN THE NUMBER SO FRAGGED IS SMALL, THAT YOU ARE FULLY
 ABLE TO RATIONALIZE THE EMPLOYMENT TO WHICH THE REMAINING AIRCRAFT ARE
 COMMITTED.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-3
 BT

2 2

#18

CCN: 060

FILLER: 19

DTG: 120210Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV

Def CG
b
(W)

CATEGORY: (PERSONAL FOR)

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DTG/MONTH 120210Z APR 67

(Large handwritten scribble)

SECRET

(PERSONAL FOR)

PP RUMHMF
DE RUMSMS 1823
ZNY SSSSS
P 120210Z APR 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF
BT

SECRET 12067 FROM MACJOO
PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND.
AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN HAS PROPOSED A MEETING AT DANANG
TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND CONCERN. WE HAVE
AGREED ON SATURDAY 15 APRIL AS AN ACCEPTABLE DATE. IF AGREEABLE
TO YOU, WE COULD HAVE A LIGHT LUNCH AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS AND
MEET IN YOUR BRIEFING ROOM FROM 1300 TO 1500. AMBASSADOR
SULLIVAN WOULD BRING 2 OR 3 OF HIS STAFF, AND I WOULD BRING 6 OR 7
FROM THE MACV STAFF. I REALIZE YOU MAY BE TIED UP WITH THE ROK
MARINES, BUT IF YOU CAN SEE YOUR WAY CLEAR, WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED
TO HAVE TO ATTEND. IN ANY CASE, YOU MIGHT WANT TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES FROM YOUR G-2 AND G-3 TO MONITOR THE MEETING FOR
YOUR INFORMATION. WARM REGARDS.

BT

G-4

I will attend -
Gen. Nicholson
~~*Gen. Nicholson*~~ *can*
go to ROK's

#33

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FILLER 19

DTG 120337Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

J
Have shown
to G-2

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Dep CG 6

22

120337Z APR 67

SECRET

#34

SECRET

DE RUHMF 2053 1020337
 P 120337Z APR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN WALT FROM LIGEN KRULAK.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. IN CASE YOU HAVE NOT SEEN THEM, I AM QUOTING
 BELOW AN INTERESTING EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN
 AMB SULLIVAN IN LAOS AND GEN WESTMORELAND.

2. QUOTE:

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN

1. I'M SURE THE LAST THING YOU NEED IS ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE
 ESTIMATE, ESPECIALLY FROM AN OUT-OF-COUNTRY ARMCHAIR AMATEUR.
 HOWEVER, I HAVE BEEN WATCHING WITH GREAT CONCERN THE SITUATION
 DEVELOPING IN THE WESTERN REACHES OF THE DMZ, THE AREA
 IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THIS IN SVN AND THE ADJACENT EASTERN
 FRONTIER REGIONS OF LAOS. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH
 PRECISELY THE PATTERN EMERGING, I HAVE SOME GUESSES AND A HUNCH
 WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO PASS ON TO YOU. I SOMETIMES FEEL THAT
 BECAUSE I LIVE A LITTLE CLOSER TO HANOI AND BECAUSE I SPEND
 MUCH TIME FIGHTING THEIR KIND OF WAR, I HAVE SOME IMPRESSION OF
 WHAT GOES ON IN THEIR LITTLE POINTED HEADS.

2. AS I SEE IT, THEY HAVE BEEN TAKING TWO SETS OF ACTIONS IN
 THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS. FIRST, THEY HAVE MOVED A CONSIDERABLE
 AMOUNT OF STORES AND EQUIPMENT DOWN TO HO CHI MINH TRAIL AND
 HAVE PUSHED THE BULK OF IT EASTWARD TO POSITIONS JUST SOUTH OF
 THE DMZ EITHER IN SVN OR IN BASE AREAS ON THE LAOS FRONTIER.
SECONDLY, THEY HAVE MOVED VAST NUMBERS OF TROOPS (PERHAPS IN
 DIVISIONAL STRENGTH) ACROSS THE WESTERN REACHES OF THE DMZ INTO
 SVN, PRESUMABLY TO MARRY UP WITH THIS EQUIPMENT. I WOULD ASSUME
 THAT THE WESTERN AREAS OF QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN ARE CURRENTLY
 CRAWLING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS WHO HAVE NOT YET DIS-
 CLOSED THEIR INTENTIONS.

3. WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST IS A HUNCH ABOUT THOSE
 INTENTIONS. I START FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS SOMETHING
 WHICH HAS A POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA, AS WELL AS A MILITARY
 CONTENT. I ASSUME IT IS THE CONSTANTLY RECURRING EFFORT TO
 EMULATE DIEN BIEN PHU.

4. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE LOGICAL PLACE FOR THEM TO BEGIN
 SUCH AN EFFORT IS AT KHE SANH. YOU HAVE AN ISOLATED BATTALION

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

COPY 2 OF 2

SECRET

OF MARINES AND SOME ARVN OUT THERE WHO CAN BE QUIETLY SURROUNDED BY TROOPS WHICH MAY BE ALREADY TUNNELLING IN AGAINST POTENTIAL AIR ATTACK. THEY CAN MAKE THEIR PREPARATIONS QUITE UNDISTURBED BECAUSE THEY CONTROL THE HILLS AND THE COUNTRYSIDE. THEY CAN WAIT UNTIL THE WEATHER DETERIORATES FURTHER (AS IT WILL DO IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS) AND THEN BE READY TO STRIKE YOUR MARINES AND ARVN AT A TIME WHEN AIR SUPPORT WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE.

5. THEY WILL ASSUME THAT THE MARINES AT DANANG WILL ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KHE SANH AND THAT THE MARINES WILL THEREFORE MOVE IN REINFORCEMENTS AS FAST AS THEY CAN. BUT THESE, WHETHER THEY ATTEMPT TO USE ROUTE 9 (WHICH YOU DO NOT CONTROL) OR MOVE BY AIR WILL BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO AMBUSH AND DESTRUCTION PIECEMEAL. IN SHORT, I WOULD ASSUME THAT THEY WILL USE THE BAIT OF A BE-SEIGED KHE SANH TO DRAW MORE AND MORE OF YOUR MARINES INTO THE TOTALLY INHOSPITABLE TERRITORY OF WESTERN QUANG TRI.

6. THEN, WHEN THEY GET ENOUGH OF THEM IN THERE AND GET YOU THOROUGHLY COMMITTED TO THAT SCRAP, THEY WILL SEND SOME OF THEIR OTHER UNITS TO HOOK AROUND SOUTH AND CARRY OUT MAJOR RAIDS EITHER ON HUE OR ON DANANG ITSELF. THE COMBINED PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL EFFECT OF TYING UP YOUR MARINES IN THE HILLS AND SHOOTING UP YOUR CITIES ON THE COAST WOULD, FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, BE A GREAT VICTORY.

7. YOU MAY TOTALLY DISAGREE WITH THIS OR ELSE FEEL THAT YOU HAVE THE CAPACITY, DESPITE THEIR BEST EFFORT, TO HANDLE ALL THIS. IF, HOWEVER, YOU SHARE MY CONCERN IN SOME MEASURE, I WONDER WHETHER YOU WOULD CONSIDER IT PRUDENT TO PULL YOUR MARINES AND ARVN TEMPORARILY OUT OF KHE SANH IN ORDER TO DEPRIVE THEM OF THE BAIT FOR THEIR TRAP.

8. IT SEEMS TO ME YOU COULD AFFORD TO LIFT THEM OUT AND ALSO CLEAR OUT FRIENDLY VILLAGERS IN ORDER TO OPEN UP THE HILLS FOR A FULL SCALE SHAMPOO. YOU COULD THEN FOLLOW UP BY A MASSIVE CAMPAIGN OF DEFOLIANT SPRAYING AS A FIRST STEP. (THEY BELIEVE THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA ABOUT TOXIC CHEMICALS SO THOROUGHLY THAT THIS WILL TERRORIZE THEM). SUBSEQUENTLY, BEFORE THEY GET FULLY DUG IN, SATURATE THE AREA ALL AROUND KHE SANH WITH ARC LIGHT RAIDS, AND KEEP IT UP FOR 8 OR 10 DAYS, LONG ENOUGH TO CRACK THEIR HEALTH AND THEIR SLEEP. THIS, COMBINED WITH SLAM IV OUGHT TO GET THEM OFF BALANCE ENOUGH TO RUIN AT LEAST THEIR TIMETABLE AND PERHAPS FORCE THEM TO SHOW THEIR INTENTIONS MORE CLEARLY.

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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9. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE CURRENT MARGINAL VALUE OF KHE SANH - IN THIS SEASON IS WORTH SACRIFICING FOR AWHILE RATHER THAN RISK THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENTRAPMENT. IF YOU DO AGREE AND DO INTEND TO PULL TEMPORARILY OUT OF KHE SANH, PLEASE LET ME KNOW SO THAT WE CAN MAKE CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR BAN HOI SANE. UNQUOTE.

3. QUOTE :

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. YOUR COMMENTS AND EVALUATION OF THE ENEMY THREAT IN WESTERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES ARE APPRECIATED.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER THE ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS FROM LAOS (PARTICULARLY IN AND EMANATING FROM BASE AREA 606) WHICH COULD LEAD TO A MORE SERIOUS INCURSION IN THE VICINITY OF HUE.

2. WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS I COMPLETED ONE OF MY PERIODIC PERSONAL INSPECTIONS OF THE KHE SANH AREA. I NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE CURRENT MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO DENY THE ENEMY THE ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE OVER OUR FORCES. SUCH MEASURES INCLUDE :

A. AN INTENSIVE RADIAL PATROL PATTERN FROM THE USMC PATROL BASE AT KHE SANH, SUPPLEMENTED BY CIDG PATROLS FROM LANG VBEI.

B. AUGMENTATION OF IN-COUNTRY FACs BY SELECTED USE OF TIGER HOUND FACs AS REQUIRED.

C. 175MM ARTILLERY POSITIONED AT CAMP CARROLL TO REINFORCE THE ARTILLERY POSITIONED AT KHE SANH, THUS PROVIDING EFFECTIVE COVERAGE OF THE AREA WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A SMALL PORTION OF THE EXTREME NORTHWEST OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

D. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF BASE AREA 606 AND THE ASHAU VALLEY.

E. ASSIGNMENT OF TOP PRIORITY TO THIS AREA FOR ARC LIGHT. WITHIN THE PAST THREE DAYS, 57 ARC LIGHT SORTIES HAVE STRUCK THE BASE AREA 606 - ASHAU VALLEY COMPLEX. ARC LIGHT PRIORITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE FOCUSED ON THIS AREA.

F. CONTINUED PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF SLAM IV. IT IS ANTICIPATED SLAM IV WILL BE TRIGGERED WHEN THE WEATHER FORECAST INDICATES CONTINUOUS OPERATIONAL WEATHER.

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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G. ROUTE 9 NOW OPEN FROM DONG HA TO KHE SANH FOR MILITARY CONVOYS.

H. EXTENSIVE TARGET PRE-SELECTION AND RADAR OFFSET TRAINING ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED AT KHE SANH AND OTHER CRITICAL AREAS TO MAXIMIZE THE INHERENT CAPABILITIES OF COMBAT SKY SPOT, TPQ-10 RADAR, AND THE RECENTLY ARRIVED AGA ALL WEATHER SQUADRON.

3. CONTINGENCY PLANS EXIST TO DEPLOY ON SHORT NOTICE MY STRATEGIC RESERVE TO PREDETERMINED LOCATIONS IN I CTZ. AT PRESENT, IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT WE WILL CONCENTRATE ADDITIONAL FORCES IN I CTZ TO PREEPT OR COUNTER A POSSIBLE MAJTR EOSEY OFFENSIVE.

4. FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IN THE KHE SANH AREA&?, OPERATIONAL WEATHER CAN BE EXPECTED TO PREVAIL ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THE DAYS AFTER THE EARLY MORNING HAZE BURNS OFFP. ASSUMING NORMAL WEATHER TRENDS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ENEMY HAS FAILED TO TAKE BEST ADVANTAGE OF THE WEATHER, IF IT IS HIS INTENTION TO ATTACK INSTRENGTH IN THE KHE SANH AREA. THE PERIOD OCTOBER THROUGH FEBRUARY WOULD HAVE BEEN HIS BEST MONTHS. REGARDLESS OF WEATHER PATTERNS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH FOR ENEMY MOVEMENT FROM THE NORTHWEST THROUGH THE DMZ AND LAOS.

5. THE CIDG BASE AT LANG VEI AND THE USMC BASE AT KHE SANH SERVE AS INTEGRAL PATROL BASES FOR OUR SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTHWEST. IN FACT, IT IS FROM KHE SANH THAT WE LAUNCH PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS INTO THE AREAS OF MORE IMMEDIATE INTEREST TO YOU. IT IS MY SINCERE CONVICTION THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, EVACUATION OF INSTALLATIONS IN THIS AREA, EVEN ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, WOULD BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY UNDESIREABLE.

6. EXPERIENCE HAS PROVED THAT THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED HIS GREATEST LOSSES WHEN HE HAS CHOSEN TO MASS FOR ATTACK AGAINST OUR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, OR WHEN WE HAVE MANAGED TO ENGAGE HIS FORCES IN OPEN COMBAT. SHOULD THE ENEMY ELECT TO ATTACK IN STRENGTH IN THE AREA CONCERNED, I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION BY OUR FLEXIBILITY TROOP DEPLOYMENT AND BY OUR ABILITY TO MASS FIRE POWER AND AIR SUPPORT AROUND-THE-CLOCK.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS AND PLEASE CONTINUE TO SEND ME YOUR VIEWS. UNQUOTE.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

CCN : 70

PAGE NO 19

DTG : 140807Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR : COMUSMACV

(PERSONAL FOR)

CATEGORY : _____

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(PERSONAL FOR)

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DE UUMSA 22400 1040815
ZNY SSSSS
R 140807Z APRH67
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MN
BT

S E C R E T 12391 PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM BGEN HUEY.

SUBJ: COMM SITE IN III MAF AREA (U)

FEF: CG III MAF DTG 120610Z APR 67 (S).

1. (S) THE USE OF BUDDHA MTN AS A COMMUNICATION SITE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH MAJ GEN ROSSEN AND IT WAS AGREED TO WITHDRAW THE REQUEST AND UTILIZE CU LAO RE ISLAND AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED.
2. (S) REPRESENTATIVES FROM MACV J6 AND 5TH ZCG ARE NOW IN DA NANG/CHU LAI AREA TO SURVEY AND SELECT A COMMUNICATION SITE ON CU LAO RE ISLAND.
3. (S) THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL TROPO/MICROWAVE SYSTEMS INTO CHU LAI AREA FROM DA NANG AND QUI NHMN IS TO PROVIDE IMPROVED AND ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE NORTH TO ALL USERS IN THE I CORPS AREA AS WELL AS SUPPORT FOR TF OREGON. THIS INTERIM REQUIREMENT DUE TO SLIPPAGE OF SCHEDULED IWCS SYSTEM QUI NHON TO DA NANG.
4. (S) NA WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE AND APPROVAL OF CU LAO RE SITE, FUN ORDER THAT COMMUNICATION MAY BE ESTABLISHED EXPE-

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 22400 YUE C R E T
DITIOUSLY. WARMEST REGARDS.

5. GP-4
BT

*Will have CEO prepare
msg approving CU LAO RE SITE
and offering assistance
within capability - O*

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APR 67

CG THIRD MARDIV

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CG THIRD MARDIV

170009Z APR 67

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P 170009Z APR 67

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

THIRD FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

A. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 291149Z MAR 67

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT

1. REF A REQUESTED THIRD FORCE RECON ASSETS EXPECTED IN COUNTRY IN APRIL BE ASSIGNED TO THIS DIVISION.

2. UNDERSTOOD YOU APPROVED THIS REQUEST, HOWEVER I HAVE RECEIVED NO REPLY. SO I CAN PROCEED WITH PLANNING PER YOUR DESIRES, APPERICATE EARLY AFFIRMATIVE TO REF A. MAJGEN HOCHMUTH SENDS.

GP-4

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VV PAC015
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 DE RUHFMMA 313, 1080459
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 180459Z APR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
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 BT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. YOUR 160900Z IS AN ELOQUENT REPETITION OF THE OLD DISAGREEMENT
 AS TO WHERE THE WAR IS. WE OWE YOU MUCH GRATITUDE FOR STICKING TO
 YOUR GUNS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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180900Z

APR 67

COMUSMACV

(PERSONAL FOR)

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V KDN004
 VV MAD846
 PP RUMSDN
 DE RUMSMA 1658U 1080915
 ZNY TTTT
 P 180900Z APR 67
 FM COMUSMACM
 TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUHKQ/CINCPACAF
 RUMSDN/CG III MAF
 RUHKB/CINCPACFLT
 RUMSAL/COM 7TH AF
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

(PERSONAL FOR)

BT

T O P S E C R E T/TACT-67-TS 12848 APR 67.
 FOR ADMIRAL SHARP FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND.
 SUBJ: UTILIZATION SVN BASED A6A ACFT (U), REFERENCE:
 CINCPAC/TS MSG DTG 240315Z MAR 67.

1. (S) REFERENCE INDICATED THAT THE SVN BASED A6A ACFT HAVING A FULL SYSTEMS CAPABILITY COULD BE BETTER UTILIZED AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS IN MID/NORTHERN NVN. IT REQUESTED THAT III MAF A6A ASSETS HAVING FULL SYSTEMS OPERATIONS BE MADE AVAILABLE AND EMPLOYED IN RT IN SUPPORT OF 7TH AF AND CTF 77 PROGRAMS.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1658U T O P S E C R E T

2. (S) I AGREE THAT A6A'S WITH FULLY OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS CAN BE UTILIZED TO GOOD ADVANTAGE AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS IN NVN, AND THAT THERE ARE FEWER PROBABLE TARGETS IN TALLY HO AND RP-1 AS COMPARED TO THE REST OF NVN. CONSEQUENTLY, I PROPOSE AN INTERIM PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE A6A'S IN A CRITICAL AREA OF INTEREST WHERE THEIR USE COULD BE OF MORE VALUE TO THE OVERALL EFFORT IN SEA.

3. (TS) THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO EXPEND CONSIDERABLE EFFORT IN RESUPPLY AND BUILDUP OF THE NVN FORCES IN SVN, THROUGH USE OF THE ROUTES IN STEEL TIGER AND TIGER HOUND AREAS OF LAOS. THESE EFFORTS WHICH RECOMMENCED IN NOVEMBER WITH THE ONSET OF THE NE MONSOON, HAVE INCREASED IN INTENSITY UP TO THE CURRENT TIME. AN EXTENSIVE ROAD REPAIR PROGRAM AND PERSISTENCY OF EFFORT ALLOW HIM TO CONTINUE TO MOVE MATERIEL OVER THE LAOS ROUTES AT NIGHT, IN SPITE OF OUR CURRENT ANTI-INFILTRATION EFFORTS. A LARGE NUMBER OF SIGHTINGS DO NOT RESULT IN VEHICLE DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE, DUE PRINCIPALLY TO STRIKE ACFT NOT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

3 3

PAGE 3 RUMSMA JFYTIU T O P S E C R E T
 BEING ABLE TO ACQUIRE THE VEHICLES ONCE OFFENSIVE
 REACTION HAS COMMENCED, BECAUSE THE VEHICLES MOVE
 OFF THE ROADS INTO THE SCREENING JUNGLE, OV-1B ACFT
 OPERATING IN THESE AREAS AT NIGHT UTILIZE AIRBORNE
 SLAR READOUT. THE TARGETS ARE MOVING UNDER COVER
 OF JUNGLE CANOPY OR UNDER COVER OF WEATHER WHERE
 THEY CANNOT BE VISUALLY ACQUIRED.

4. (S) WHILE CONSIDERABLE AIR EFFORT IS BEING EXPENDED
 AT NIGHT IN TERMS OF FLARE, OV-1 SLAR AND IR, AND STRIKE
 AND FAC ACFT, EMPLOYMENT OF ASA ACFT IN THE
 STEEL TIGER/TIGER MOUND AREAS OF LAOS WOULD ENHANCE
 THE VEHICLE INTERDICTION EFFORT AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME
 PRIOR TO THE START OF THE SW MONSOON RAINS IN LAOS.
 VISIBILITY AT NIGHT HAS HAMPERED OUR VISUAL ATTACK OF
 MANY MOVING TARGETS IN THESE AREAS.

5. (TS) IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE ASA'S WHICH ARE NOT
 COMMITTED TO BE EMPLOYED AGAINST TARGETS IN NVN, BE
 EMPLOYED AT NIGHT AGAINST MOVING TARGETS IN THE SL
 AREA OF LAOS UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1 JUN 67. THE RAINS
 AFTER THAT TIME SHOULD GENERALLY MAKE THE ROUTES

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 1658U T O P S E C R E T
 IMPASSABLE TO VEHICLES AND WILL REDUCE THE FLOW OF
 MATERIEL ACCORDINGLY. THE INCREASED PERIODS OF GOOD
 WEATHER IN TALLY HO AND RP-1 WILL ALLOW VISUAL ARMED
 RECCE OF LOC'S TO OFFSET LOSS OF ASA'S IN THOSE AREAS.
 REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

3 3

#19

CCN: 137

PILLER: 19

DTG: 210633Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR: CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN

(PERSONAL FOR)

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 FM CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF DNG RVN
 INFO RUMHMF/I FFORCEV LNO TO III MAF DNG RVN
 BT

SECRET AVFA-GC-PL A 1392 PERSONAL FOR LTG WALT
 FROM LTG LARSEN
 SUBJECT: OP OREGON (U)
 (S) IN VIEW OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF TF OREGON CONCOMITMENT
 EFFECTS UPON TACTICAL PLANNING IN THE I/II CORPS BORDER AREA,
 RECOMMEND THAT WE MEET AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOOSING TO
 DISCUSS MUTUALLY SUPPORTING OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI AND
 NORTHERN BINH DINH PROVINCES. GP -4
 BT

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SECRET

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REF: 141

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DTG: 220545Z

APR 67

ORIGINATOR: CG SECOND ROK BDE

(PERSONAL FOR)

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 O 220545Z APRIL 67
 FM CG SECOND ROK MAR BDE
 TO GY99/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

REF: A. YR 201120Z APRIL 67

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM BCEN KIM

1. I FULLY AND CERTAINLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF YOUR MESSAGE OF
 O 201120Z APR 67.

2. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY WARMEST APPRECIATION FOR YOUR DEEP AND
 CONTINUOUS CONCERN WITH MY BDE, AND I AM CERTAIN THE FRIENDSHIP
 AND COORDINATION BETWEEN III MAF AND 2ND ROK MAR BDE WILL
 BE CONTINUED.

3. I AM GOING TO INVITE MGEN ROSSON TO MY BDE IN THE NEAR FUTURE
 AND DISCUSS THE DETAILED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 196
 LT INFANTRY BDE AND MY BDE AND TACTICAL PROBLEMS.

WARMEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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CCN: 155

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DTG 230739Z MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

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DTG /MONTH 230739Z APR 67

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MV PAC248
 PP RUMHMF
 DE RUHFMA 4083 1130739
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 230739Z APR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

NOTE: CORRECTED COPY, MESSAGE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN MRULAK
 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS TACTICAL AND NON-TACTICAL (U)

- A. CG III MAF 212040Z/APR 67
- B. NAVFACENGCOM 111550Z/FEB 67
- C. CMC/CNO 072300Z/APR 67 (C)
- D. CG FMFPAC 131415Z/MAR 67 (C)
- E. CG FMFPAC 071643Z/APR 67 (U)

1. I HAVE YOUR REPORT, IN REF (A), ON THE
 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS FUNDING PROBLEM AND AM HAPPY
 THAT THE MATTER IS FINALLY ON TRACK. I AM AWARE
 OF THE CONFUSION, MISUNDERSTANDING, CONFLICTING
 INTERPRETATION AND DELAY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MATTER, PARTICULARLY
 IN REGARDS TO REF B WHICH TRIGGERED THE FUNDING POLICY CHANGE.

IN EACH CASE WHERE WE SAW EVIDENCE OF MATTERS NOT GOING
 PROPERLY PRESSURE WAS APPLIED AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. IN

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 4083 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

F CT REFERENCE (C) WAS DRAFTED BY MY STAFF IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE
 THAT PRECISE GUIDANCE WAS PUBLISHED. NOW, MY BIGGEST CONCERN
 IS THAT WE HAVE LOST SOME VALUABLE LEAD TIME. THIS IS REGRETTABLE,
 BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT NO STONE WAS LEFT UNTURNED IN TRYING
 TO PRESS FOR EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

2. YOU EXPRESSED CONCERN IN PAR 5 OF REF (A) RELATIVE
 TO UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF CANCELLATION OF LUMBER AND CONSTRUCTION
 MATERIAL REQUISITIONS, WHICH INFORMATION WAS NOT PASSED TO THE
 AFFECTED COMMANDS. THIS WAS ACTUALLY NOT THE CASE. WHAT HAPPENED
 WAS THAT REQUISITIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, PLUS SEVERAL
 MILLION DOLLARS IN OTHER REQUIREMENTS, REMAINED AT 3RD FSR IN
 AN UNFUNDED AND UNPROCESSED STATUS DUE TO LACK OF FUNDS. THE
 REQUISITIONS WERE NOT CANCELLED UNTIL 17 APR IAW REF (E) AT WHICH
 TIME EVERYONE WAS INFORMED AND THE REASONS FOR THESE ACTIONS.

3. WHILE I HAVE NO DESIRE TO BURDEN YOU WITH MY FINANCIAL
 PROBLEMS, I BELIEVE A BRIEF RESUME OF OUR FINANCIAL SITUATION
 AND ACTIONS TAKEN WILL HELP TO PROVIDE YOU A CLEARER PICTURE.

A. UNPROGRAMMED COSTS IN THE 3RD QTR, SUCH AS THE 30 DAY
 SPECIAL LEAVE, BODY ARMOR SHORTAGE, AND SUDDEN INCREASED ALLOCATION
 OF LIGHTWEIGHT UTILITIES AND TENTAGE DRAINED OFF 7 MILLION

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 4083 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 DOLLARS IN LESS THAN 60 DAYS. OUR FINANCIAL
 REQUIREMENTS WERE ADDRESSED TO THE COMMANDANT IN LATE JANUARY,
 AND AGAIN ON 2 MARCH, AT WHICH TIME WE WERE OVER 9 MILLION
 DOLLARS SHORT. ON 5 MARCH, I WAS GIVEN A LITTLE
 RELIEF BUT WAS DIRECTED TO DEVELOP A
 FINANCIAL PLAN TO LIVE WITH IN THE PRESCRIBED FUNDING LEVEL.
 I WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT THE MATTER OF FUNDING CONSTRUCTION
 MATERIALS WOULD BE RESOLVED AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL IN THE
 IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

B. DURING MY VISIT TO 3D FSR ON 15 MARCH, I FOUND THE
 FINANCIAL SITUATION TO BE EXTREMELY SEVERE. ON THE
 SPOT A FINANCIAL PLAN WAS DEVELOPED AND REPORTED
 IN DETAIL TO THE COMMANDANT. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR FUNDS AT
 THIS TIME PRECLUDED BUYING UP TO OUR REQUISITIONING OBJECTIVE,
 A DEFICIT OF 14 MILLION DOLLARS ALONE, PLUS BETWEEN 1-2
 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, AND OTHER LESSER
 ITEMS. THE DOLLARS PROVIDED ME PRACTICALLY CONFINED US TO
 SUPPORTING ONLY PRIORITY 2 REQUIREMENTS. BY REF (D), I ADDRESSED
 THE CRITICAL FUND SITUATION TO ALL COMMANDERS AND REQUESTED
 AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THEY, QUOTE, DEFER REQUISITION/

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 4083 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 PROCUREMENT OF ALL BUT URGENTLY NEEDED NON-T/A GARRISON
 PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL UNQUOTE. THEIR RESPONSE
 TO CANCELLING ITEMS NO LONGER REQUIRED HAS BEEN GRATIFYING.
 HOWEVER, ON 2 APRIL 3D FSR REPORTED TO ME THAT THEIR
 REQUISITIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS HAD INCREASED FROM
 ABOUT 2 MILLION DOLLARS TO OVER 6 MILLION DOLLARS. MY
 IMMEDIATE CONCERN, OF COURSE, WAS TO SHIFT THIS FINANCIAL BURDEN
 TO THE NAVY ASAP, IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY OF REF B.

C. DURING THIS PERIOD, THROUGH OTHER MESSAGE TRAFFIC AND
 TELEPHONE CALLS, WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THE CONSTRUCTION
 FUNDING PROBLEM. ON 1 APRIL CMC PRESENTED A PROPOSED CNO/CMC
 MESSAGE CLARIFYING THE CONSTRUCTION FUNDING. ON 4 APRIL
 I SUBMITTED A REVISED DRAFT WHICH WAS PUBLISHED BY REF (C).
 FURTHER IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS WERE THEN PROMULGATED BY REF
 (E). THUS, I HOPE THIS MATTER IS NOW RESOLVED TO THE MUTUAL
 UNDERSTANDING OF EVERYONE.

D. WE ARE STILL SHORT BETWEEN 8-10 MILLION
 DOLLARS OF OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 4TH QTR AND IT SEEMS THAT THE
 MARINES CORPS PORTION OF THE FY-67 SUPPLEMENTAL IS NOT ADEQUATE
 TO COVER US. HOWEVER, I WAS ADVISED YESTERDAY THAT FLC CARRIED

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PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 4083 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 11 MILLION DOLLARS OF CANCELLATIONS ON ABOUT 18 APRIL TO 3D FSR FOR PROCESSING. IF THIS ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN SIX WEEKS EARLIER WE WOULD NOT BE FACING OUR PRESENT CRISIS. AS IT STANDS NOW I HAVE DOUBT AS TO THE NUMBER OF DOLLARS WE CAN RECAPTURE, IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE COMPLETED SUPPLY ACTION ON THESE CANCELLATIONS. WHETHER WE ENTER FY-68 IN A DEFICIT STATUS OR NOT DEPENDS ON HOW WELL WE CAN PREDICT OUR REMAINING REQUIREMENTS, CLEAN OUT OUR EXCESSES, AND IDENTIFY WHAT WE HAVE IN FACT ON HAND.
 4. IN VOID OF 60-90 DAYS IN TACTICAL SUPPORT CAPACITY, AWAITING MATERIAL DELIVERY, AS YOU STATE IN PAR 3 TO REF (A), SHOULD BE COMPENSATED XOR, TO A LARGE EXTENT BY THE SIX MONTH LUMBER BUY EXECUTED BY FSR IN LATE NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER. IN ADDITION, I FEEL THAT PURCHASES FROM CONTRACTORS IN RVN, AS WELL AS LIMITED FLC PURCHASES FROM NSA, SHOULD CONTRIBUTE SOMEWHAT TO FILLING THE VOID. I CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSAL IN PAR 11 OF REF (A) TO FUND A PORTION OF THE NEW LUMBER BUY, STATED IN REF (E), THROUGH IN-COUNTRY SOURCES. IN FACT 3D FSR WAS DIRECTED YESTERDAY TO SEND THEIR PROPOSED BUY TO FLC FOR SCREENING PRIOR TO PROCUREMENT.

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 4083 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 5. WITH RESPECT TO PAR 7 OF REF (A), I SHARE YOUR CONCERN THAT BUNKERS AND OTHER FORWARD AREA CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE REGARDED AS LOW PRIORITY IN APPLICATION OF RESOURCES AND EFFORTS COMPARED TO THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY SYSTEM. UNFORTUNATELY COMUSMACV 150443Z/APR67 (REF F OF YOUR MESSAGE) HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED HERE OR BY CINCPAC, AND I CANNOT MAKE A PRECISE STATEMENT ABOUT IT. HOWEVER, I ASSUME THAT THE MACV MESSAGE IS POINTED AT PRACTICE NINE.

6. REGRET THE DELAY IN RESOLVING THE CONSTRUCTION FUNDING BUT APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS AND THOSE OF YOUR STAFF IN PUTTING THE PRESSURE ON AT THAT END AND RESOLVING THIS WITH CMDR ANDERSON. BEST REGARDS

GP-4

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DTG 230014Z

MONTH APR 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE**

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DTG/MONTH 230014Z APR 67

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 P 230014Z APR 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM
 LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

REF A CTG 79.5 201438Z,

1. I HAVE FOLLOWED YOUR MESSAGES CONCERNING
 COMMITMENT OF TG'S 76.4 AND 76.5, AS WELL AS
 YOUR OUTLINE PLANS FOR THE SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT OF
 THE TWO SLFS. AS A RESULT, I HAVE SEVERAL REACTIONS.
 HERE THEY ARE.---

2. I WILL GO OUT ON A LIMB TO THE EXTENT OF SAYING
 THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE YOU ARE GOING TO SEE AN NVN HOLDING
 ATTACK IN THE DMZ AREA, MAJOR ATTACKS IN THUA THIEN
 AND QUANG TRI, A HEAVY WEAPONS ATTACK ON DANANG, AND AN
 ATTACK ON KHE SANH. ALL SUPPLEMENTED BY STRONG
 GUERILLA ACTION AGAINST LOCS AND SMALL POPULATION
 CENTERS.

3. IN THE FACE OF ALL THIS, IT IS PLAIN THAT YOU
 NEED HELP. THE WHOLE OF YOUR OWN RESOURCES, THE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

2 2

#20

PAGE 2 RUHKM 4013 T O P S E C R E T

MODEST ARMY ADDITIONS, THE LESS-THAN-ACTIVE ROKMC AND THE ARVN ALL PUT TOGETHER, ARE NOT GOING TO PUT YOU IN A GOOD POSITION TO MEET WHAT, AT LEAST I THINK, IS COMING.

4. WESTY CAN HELP YOU MORE THAN HE IS CONSTRAINED TO DO. HE ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME THAT HE COULD--AT WHAT HE CALLED GREAT COST TO THE RESERVES REPEAT RESERVES IN I FFV AND II FFV.-- GIVE YOU TWO MORE BRIGADES. I WOULD GUESS YOU WILL GET ONE - THE 18TH REGT OF THE 101ST DIV. MEANWHILE HE SEEMS TO SEE NO INCONSISTENCY IN HAVING A BRIGADE SITTING IN WAR ZONE C, JUST WAITING FOR THE COSVN HQ TO COME BACK.

5. ALSO, THERE IS MORE ARVN AVAILABLE THAN IS BEING EFFECTIVELY USED; WITNESS WESTY'S CURRENT IDEA OF PUTTING A WHOLE ARVN DIVISION OVER IN LAJS, OPPOSITE III CORPS, AT A TIME WHEN SUCH A FORCE IS CRITICALLY NEEDED IN ICTZ TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE.

6 AS TO OUR OWN FORCES, I KNOW THE TWO SLFS WILL HELP YOU QUITE A BIT, BUT I WOULD CAUTION YOU IN ONE CRITICAL REGARD: IF YOU ELECT TO USE THEM IN A WAY THAT SEVERS THEIR CONNECTION COMPLETELY WITH THE ARGS (SEE PARA

PAGE 3 RUHKM 4013 T O P S E C R E T

4.C(1) OF REF A), YOU WILL LOSE THE SHIPS, ALONG WITH THE SUPPLIES, THE MAINTENANCE, THE COMMUNICATIONS, THE MOBILITY, AND ALL THE OTHER VIRTUES THAT GO WITH THEM.

IF THEY ARE BROKEN AWAY FROM THE SLFS, THE SHIPS WILL GO TO SUBIC, AND THE NEXT TIME WE SEE THEM THEY WILL BE DOWN OFF IV CORPS WITH ARMY TROOPS ABOARD.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU MAINTAIN THE IDENTITY OF THE ARG/SLF COMBINATION AND THE CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF THE COMPONENTS, I BELIEVE WE CAN KEEP THE NAVY THERE ALMOST CONTINUALLY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

2 2

#20

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE

O 270732Z APR 67
FM CG NINTH MAB
TO CG III MAF
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WALT FROM BGEN METZGER
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SLF SUPPORT

- A. CG III MAF 261350Z APR 67
- B. ADMNO COMSEVENTHFLT 200700Z APR 67
- C. NWP 22A

1. REF A REQUESTED CTF SEVEN SIX EFFECT BACKLOADING OF ELEMENTS OF BLT 2/3 AND MOVEMENT OF ARG (TG 76.5) TO GENERAL VICINITY OF CUA VIET AREA.
2. IT HAS BEEN A CONSTANT STRUGGLE TO KEEP CTF 76 FROM GETTING BETWEEN ARG/SLF AND SEVENTHFLT. ADM HYLAND DIRECTED THE PREVIOUS CTF, ADM WULZEN, AND HIS SUCCESSOR, ADM BURKE, NOT TO IMPOSE THEMSELVES IN AMPHIB OPNS INVOLVING A SINGLE ARG/SLF. ON THE MARINE SIDE, I HAVE RECEIVED CORRESPONDING GUIDANCE FROM GEN KRULAK. UNTIL RECENTLY, CATF/CLF RPTS WENT DIRECTLY TO COMSEVENTHFLT WITH INFO COPIES TO CTF 76/79 WHICH IS AS IT SHOULD BE. NOW THAT ADM VANNOY IS CTF 76, AND EVEN THOUGH REF B SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNS CTG 76.5/79.5 AS CATF/CLF RESPECTIVELY, REPORTS ARE SENT TO CTG 76. THIS MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE COMSEVENTHFLT SCHED CONF.
3. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN MAINTAINING CMD RELATIONSHIPS IAW REF C AND GUIDANCE PARA 2 ABOVE IF FUTURE MSGS SIMILAR TO REF A BE ADDRESSED TO THE DESIGNATED CATF THUS KEEPING CTF 76 OUT OF THE PICTURE.

GP-4
BT

*6-3 Think we were
"mouse-trapped" on this
one -*

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FO. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#41

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APR 67

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DE RUMSMA 4344D 1170411
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 270257Z APR 67
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

C O N F I D E N T I A L 13863 MACJ212
 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WALT FROM GENERAL EWBANK
 SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE SPOT REPORTING (U)
 REF: CG III MAF MSG DTG 120544Z APR 67 (S) SUBJ: SPOT REPORT
 OF SITUATION IN HUE

1. (U) SPOT REPORT B/1/14/67/001 FROM TEAM 14, JTAD, HUE, RVN WAS INITIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV DIRECTIVE 335-12, SUBJECT: "REPORTS/SPOT REPORTS," DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1966 (MACOC3) AS IMPLEMENTED BY SUBORDINATE UNIT DIRECTIVES.
2. (U) J2 MACV PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO THE PROCESSING AND DISSEMINATION OF THIS PARTICULAR SPOT REPORT WERE EXAMINED AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN FORWARDED OUT OF COUNTRY FROM THIS COMMAND. HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS AND SPECULATION CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE SPOT REPORT WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC DIRECTIVE AND EXCEEDED THE MISSION AND COMPETENCE OF THE ORIGINATOR.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4344D C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. (C) IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE FUTURE OCCURRENCES OF THIS NATURE, FIELD INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL OF THE 525TH MI GROUP HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO LIMIT THEIR REPORTING TO THEIR ASSIGNED COLLECTION MISSIONS AND TO ENSURE THAT ALL OF THEIR REPORTS WILL BE GIVEN TIMELY LOCAL DISSEMINATION.
 4. (U) YOUR COMMENTS AND INTEREST IN THIS MATTER ARE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS. GP-4.
- BT

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