

CCN: 180

FILLER 25

DTG 090025Z

MONTH MAY 67

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ORIGINATOR NMCC

CATEGORY (PERSONAL FOR)

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DTG /MONTH 090025Z MAY 67

21

VV KDN 785

VV MAD 207
RR RUMSDN
DE RUMSMA 1959U 130055Z
ZNY TTTT
R 100540Z MAY 67
FM COMUSMACV
INFO CG III MAF
R 092126Z MAY 67
FM CINCPAC
INFO RUHKR/CINCUSARPAC
RUHKB/CINCPACFLT
RUHKQ/CINCPACAF
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBAN/COMUSMACTHAI
P 090025Z
FM NMCC
TO CINCPAC
BT

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
10000th Street
San Francisco, California 94302

(PERSONAL FOR)

T O P S E C R E T FOR MAJOR GENERAL HUTCHIN FROM BRIGADIER GENERAL CASSIBRY, DDO, NMCC

1. THE FOLLOWING QUOTED MEMO WITH ENCLOSURE, DATED 8 MAY 67, IS AN ADVANCE COPY NOT YET SEEN BY THE JCS. LT GENERAL STARBIRD FELT THE MEMO WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO YOU IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT PRACTICE NINE PLANNING: QUOTE:

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1959U T O P S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: PRACTICE NINE FORCES (C)

I HAVE REVIEWED JCSM 204-67 AND THE FORCES I AM APPROVING FOR PLANNING PURPOSES FOR PRACTICE NINE ARE SHOWN ON THE ENCLOSURE.

I AM NOT APPROVING THE OPENING OF NAM PHONG AIR BASE. PLEASE PROCEED WITH ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS TO BASE THE EC-121 AIRCRAFT AT KURAT AND THE SP-2S AT NAKHON PHANOM OR SOME OTHER SUITABLE BASE. BY SEPARATE MEMO, I AM DIRECTING THE ASD/I&L TO INITIATE THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION.

PROGRAM 4 WILL BE REVISED TO INCLUDE THE APPROVED FORCES FOR PRACTICE NINE. THIS SUPERSEDES THE FINAL SENTENCE OF MY MEMORANDUM OF APRIL 22, 1967.

/S/ ROBERT S MCNAMARA

	ENCLOSURE		
	APPROVED FORCES FOR UNIT	PRACTICE NINE LOCATION	PERSONNEL
NAVY	SP-2 SQUADRON	THAILAND	551 (AA)
AIR FORCE	EC-121 WING	THAILAND	1392
	BUS FOR EC-121 WING	THAILAND	252

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#21

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 1959U T O P S E C R E T

	MSQ -77	THAILAND	34
	SURV. CENTER	THAILAND	412
	NAXHON PHANOM BOS	THAILAND	112
	CH-3C SQUADRON	SVN	142
	F-4 SQUADRON	THAILAND	627
ARMY (CC)	SOG AUGMENTATION	THAILAND	39
	SOG AUGMENTATION	SVN	166
	AERIAL WEAPONS CO.	SVN	172
	TOTAL		3326 (BB)

(AA) TEMPORARY FORCES, 1 NOVEMBER 67 - 31 MARCH 68.

(BB) EXCLUDING SP-2 PERSONNEL

(CC) ARMY SUPPORT UNITS FOR THAILAND ARE NOT APPROVED. SUPPORT SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY EXPANSION OF THE THAI CONTRACT EFFORT. IF THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE, USE OF ARMY TROOPS WILL BE RECONSIDERED.

END QUOTE.

BT

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

2 3

#21

TOP SECRET

OCN: _____

FILLER _____

DTG 199 MONTH 44

152021Z

MAY 67

ORIGINATOR _____

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CATEGORY _____

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*for CB -
would like to discuss
this with you -
v.p.
J*

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MARINE CORP'S EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

DTG/MONTH: 152021Z MAY 67

22

W
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE

P 102021Z MAY 67
 FM CMC
 TO CG FMFPAC
 INFO CG III MAF
 BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION
 RECEIVED GARBLED.

T O P S E C R E T

EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN KRULAK AND LTGEN WALT FROM GEN GREENE
 (MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY)

MIDWAY DURING THE RECENT ACTION IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (WHSR) REQUESTED THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND CENTER (MCCC) TO FURNISH A NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, IT WAS REQUESTED THAT MCCC FURNISH A DAILY SUMMARY. SINCE THEN WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAS BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH NMCC REPORTING ON SOUTH VIETNAM. AS A RESULT, UNBERKNOWNST TO THE NMCC AND THE JOINT STAFF, THE WHSR STAFF HAS FOR SOMETIME BEEN WRITING THEIR OWN DAILY SUMMARY FOR THE PRESIDENT RATHER THAN USING THAT FURNISHED BY THE NMCC. PLEASED WITH THE REPORTS THEY RECEIVED FROM THE MCCC, WHICH REPORTS WERE USED IN THEIR SUMMARIES FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PHPRESSING A GREAT INTEREST IN ICTZ AS THE SCENE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS, THE WHSR HAVE REQUESTED DAILY SUMMARIES ON ICTZ ON A CONTINUING BASIS FROM THE MCCC. I HESITATE TO BURDEN YOU WITH ADDITONAL REPORTING BUT I AM SURE YOU RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A SPLENDID OPPORTUNITY. THERE ARE PROBLEMS BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT THEY CAN BE OVERCOME.

I SUGGEST THAT THE III MAF COC MAKE A TELECON RPT TO THE FMFPAC COMD CENTER DAILY WHICH WILL IN TURN PASS TO THE MCCC, PROVIDING, OF COURSE, THERE IS INFORMATION OF SIGNIFICANCE TO RPT. NZGSV WHAT WE CAN GET AROUND THE PROBLEM OF BYPASSING COMUSMACV AND NMCC CHANNELS BY INSURING THAT THE BASIC STATISTICAL DATA HAS BEEN PASSED TO MACV. I REALIZE THAT SUCH TELECONS WILL AUTOMATICALLY PRECEDE BY SOME 24 HRS THE SITREPS AND HISSUMS UPON WHICH WE DEPEND FOR DETAILED INFORMATION. I UNDERSTAND THIS SITUATION AND WILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER SITREPS AS THE PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR REPORTING.

PART OF THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN THE RAPID, DETAILED AND THOROUGH (AND OFTEN INACCURATE) REPORTING OF ACTIONS NEAR THE DMZ BY THE PRESS. I HAVE NO INTENTION OF COMPETING WITH THE PRESS SINCE I WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE WHITE HOUSE TO UNDERSTAND WHY THEY CANNOT RECEIVE JUST AS TIMELY AND DETAILED INFORMATION VIA OFFICIAL CHANNELS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

SINCE TIMELINESS IS A FACTOR, AND THE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED HERE EACH MORNING AT 0430 WASHINGTON TIME, I SUGGEST THAT III MAF MAKE THEIR TELECON DAILY AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 DANANG TIME WHICH IS 2200 HAWAII TIME IN ORDER TO MEET OUR DEADLINE.

PART OF THE DISSATISFACTION OF THE WHITE HOUSE WITH THE NMCC DAILY SUMMARY HAS BEEN THAT IT IS PRINCIPALLY A DULL STEREOTYPED COMPILATION OF STATISTICS WHICH GIVE THE NON-MILITARY READER LITTLE IF ANY FEEL FOR THE SITUATION. THEY DESIRE A NARRATIVE TYPE REPORT OF APPROX A PARAGRAPH IN LENGTH WITH ONLY ENOUGH STATISTICS TO BOLSTER THE RPT.

EXAMPLES OF ITEMS OF INTEREST ARE THE DEGREE AND NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION, OUR OBJECTIVES, WEATHER AND TERRAIN, IF THIS IS A FACTOR, NEW INTELLIGENCE, ANY UNUSUAL ISOLATED INCIDENTS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE TWO RUN DOWNS LEW WALT GAVE ME ON THE KHE SANH AND CON THIEN ACTIONS WHEN I PHONED HIM ARE EXACTLY WHAT IS DESIRED.

ON THE BASIS OF THESE TWO TELECONS, WE WERE ABLE TO PASS EARLY REPORTS ON OUR RECON EFFORTS, THE RUGGED TERRAIN, THE EXTENT OF ENEMY ENTRENCHMENTS, THE HIGH NUMBER OF FMAW SORTIES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS,

THE TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ENEMY UNITS, THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE ENEMY, THE SQUAD AMBUSH WHICH ABOUT-FACED AND KILLED 32 OF THE ENEMY, THE MASSING OF ARTILLERY FIRE, LEW'S NARROW ESCAPE, ETC.

THE WHSR WAS MOST PLEASED TO GET THESE FIRST HAND REPORTS. I

REALIZE THAT EVERY DAY WILL NOT BE AS NECTIC AS THESE LAST FEW HAVE BEEN. BUT ON QUIETER DAYS WE CAN OCCASIONALLY DESCRIBE A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL STING, RAY PATROL OR GOLDEN FLEECE OPERATION OR ONE OF THE MANY OTHER FACETS OF OUR OPERATION IN I CORPS.

IN ANY CASE THIS SUMMARY MUST BE BRIEF AND TIMELY AND NOT HISTORICAL.

I BELIEVE THE SOFT SELL APPROACH WILL STAND US IN GOOD STEAD OVER THE LONG RUN BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST BE ALERT TO HIT HARD WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES. WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

CCN: 207

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DTG 111959Z MONTH MAY 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

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EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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DE RUHKN 2111 131195
ZNY SSSSS
O 111959Z MAY 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

INTEGRATION OF US CIVIL/MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR RD SUPPORT (U)

1. SEC STATE MSG 190901 PASSED BY NMCC TO CINCPAC FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 190901

LIMDIS

1. PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM (NO. 362, MAY 9, 1967) FOR US ROLE IN PACIFICATION (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT), TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS:
2. QUOTE US CIVIL/MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT) IN VIETNAM WILL BE INTEGRATED UNDER A SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT TO PROVIDE ADDED THRUST FORWARD IN THIS CRITICAL FIELD.
3. QUOTE BECAUSE THE BULK OF THE PEOPLE AND RESOURCE

PAGE 2 RUHKN 2111 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO INVOLVED ARE MILITARY, COMUSMACV WILL BE CHARGED WITH THIS RESPONSIBILITY IN VIET-NAM, UNDER THE OVERALL AUTHORITY OF THE AMBASSADOR.

4. QUOTE TO CARRY OUT THESE RESPONSIBILITIES, UNDER COMUSMACV, MR. ROBERT W. KOMER WILL BE APPOINTED DEPUTY FOR PACIFICATION (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT) WITH PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR.
5. QUOTE TO THIS END THE PRESENT FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF CIVIL OPERATIONS OF THE US MISSION WILL BECOME A PART OF MACV. FOR THE TIME BEING ITS CIVILIAN COMPONENTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUPPORTED WITH FUNDS, PERSONNEL, AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS BY THE CIVIL AGENCIES INVOLVED, SUCH AS STATE, AID, USIA, CIA, AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. COMUSMACV IS EXPECTED TO CALL ON THESE AGENCIES, AS WELL AS THE REEVANT MILITARY AGENCIES, FOR ALL RESOURCES NEEDED FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS MISSION. I HEREBY CHARGE ALL US DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WITH MEETING THESE REQUIREMENTS PROMPTLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

6. QUOTE ONE PURPOSE OF UNIFYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#43

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHNM 2111 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE PACIFICATION GRPD UNDER COMUSMACV IS TO PERMIT LOGISTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMIES THROUGH CONSOLIDATION AND CROSS-SERVICING. I EXPECT SENSIBLE STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN THIS DIRECTION. ANY INTER-AGENCY JURISDICTIONAL OR OTHER ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE IN COUNTRY WILL BE REFERRED TO THE US AMBASSADOR.

7. QUOTE AMBASSADOR WILLIAM LEONHART WILL ASSUME FROM MR KOMER THE WASHINGTON SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES ALREADY ASSIGNED IN NSAM 343, AND WILL BE APPOINTED SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

8. QUOTE THIS NEW ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENT REPRESENTS AN UNPRECEDENTED MELDING OF CIVIL AND MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES TO MEET THE OVER-RIDING REQUIREMENTS OF VIET-NAM, THEREFORE, I COUNT ON ALL CONCERNED -- IN NATIONAL INTEREST TO MAKE THIS ARRANGEMENT WORK.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON. UNQUOTE
RUSK
UNQUOTE.

2. THIS UNPRECEDENTED MELDING OF CIVIL AND MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES UNDOUBTEDLY WILL NOT BE GREETED WITH EQUAL

PAGE 4 RUHNM 2111 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE ENTHUSIASM AMONG THE US CIVIL AGENCIES, BUT IT SHOULD RESULT IN AN IMPROVED AND BETTER COORDINATED RD SUPPORT EFFORT COUNTRY-WIDE. OF IMMEDIATE

INTEREST WILL RELATIONSHIPS THAT EVOLVE AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVE. THE MACV SECTOR ADVISORS MAY WELL ASSUME A MUCH MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ASIDE FROM THESE POINTS, IT WILL BE OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO NOTE THE IMPACT THAT THIS MOVE, WHICH COMES AT A TIME WHEN THE GVN IN MOVING TO TRANSFER AUTHORITY TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, HAS ON THE GVN, PARTICULARLY THE MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND THE CIVIL AGENCIES SUPPORTING RD.

3. I ANTICIPATE CONSIDERABLE INTEREST FROM WASHINGTON IN THE COMING WEEKS AS THE DETAILS OF INTERGRATING THE EFFORT ARE RESOLVED. PLEASE KEEP ME ADVISED.

GP-4
BT

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MAY 67

CG FIRST MARDIV

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CG FIRST MARDIV 170103Z MAY 67

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FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

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SECRET

REASSIGNMENT OF SEVENTH MT BN

A. CG III MAF MSG 140450Z MAY 67

B. CG III MAF ORDER P4007.5A

C. CG III MAF MSG 101310Z APR 67

PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM MAJ GEN NICKERSON

1. MY VIEWS RELATING TO THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MOTOR TRANSPORT ASSETS WERE SET FORTH SOME MONTHS AGO WHEN THE ELEVENTH MT BN WAS CLOSING DANANG. THEY REMAIN UNCHANGED. I AM OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE CONCEPT SET FORTH IN REF A.

2. DURING A 7 MAY CONFERENCE AT YOUR HQ, COPIES OF A DRAFT STAFF STUDY WERE DISTRIBUTED, DISCUSSED, BUT NOT CONCURRED WITH BY MY REPRESENTATIVES. COPIES DRAFT STUDY COLLECTED AT CLOSE OF CONFERENCE AT WHICH TIME YOUR MTO WAS ADVISED THAT THIS DIVISION WOULD PROVIDE ITS POSITION IN WRITING AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

3. PARA 505.1. A REF B DIRECTS SUPPLY POINT DISTRIBUTION UNLESS

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2044E **SECRET**

OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY YOUR HQ OR UNLESS UNIT DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS ARE MUTUALLY AGREED TO BY THE FORLOGCMD AND THE UNIT BEING SUPPORTED. TO DATE NO CHANGE IN SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN DIRECTED, NOR HAS MY HQ MUTUALLY AGREED TO A CHANGE TO UNIT DISTRIBUTION.

4. THE SHORTAGE OF T/E CARGO VEHICLES WITHIN THE FORLOGCMD/FIRST FSR STRUCTURE IS RECOGNIZED. HOWEVER, THE REDISTRIBUTION DIRECTED BY PARA 8 B REF C OF GASOLINE VEHICLES TURNED IN BY DIVISION UNITS UPON RECEIPT OF MULTIFUEL VEHICLES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A TEMPORARY SOLUTION PENDING RECEIPT NEW VEHICLES BY FORLOGCMD/FIRST FSR.

5. UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN WHICH RESULTED IN THE OREGON THE MAJORITY OF MY UNITS IN CHU LAI DISPLACED TO DANANG. THE EVENTS 20-21 APRIL WHICH LED TO OPERATION UNION RESULTED IN DELAYING THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE SEVENTH MT BN (-) TO DANANG. IT IS MY INTENTION TO USE THE SEVENTH MT BN TO MOVE/ACCOMPANY THE REAR ECHELON AND SUPPORTING UNITS OF THE FIFTH MARINES TO DANANG UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIFTH MARINES IN THE THANG BINH - QUE SON AREA FOR PURSUIT OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES.

6. MANY OF THE ROADS TRAVELED BY VEHICLES IN THE DANANG TACR ARE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2344E S E C R E T
 NOT SECURE. ONLY A TACTICAL ORGANIZATION HAS THE CAPABILITY OF ORGANIZING INTRA AND INTER TAOR CONVOY MOVEMENTS WITH THE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING THE SECURITY ELEMENTS, COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS. COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT, AND REACTION FORCES. THE UTILIZATION OF TACTICAL VEHICLES OVER ROADS OPENED BY THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN WILL REQUIRE ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION BY THIS DIVISION.

7. I PLAN TO USE THE SEVENTH MT BN TO DIRECTLY SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY THE FIFTH MARINES REIN OVER ROUTE 1 AND THE ROAD FROM ROUTE 1 TO QUE SON. I HAVE NO OTHER MT ASSETS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE THIS SUPPORT. SINCE THE ADVENT OF THE DRY SEASON MY CARGO VEHICLES IN THE DANANG AREA HAVE BEEN COMMITTED APPROXIMATELY 132 PCT DAILY. OCCASIONALLY ROUGH RIDERS AND TACTICAL TROOP MOVEMENTS HAVE CURTAILED ESSENTIAL RESUPPLY AND HOUSEKEEPING OPERATIONS. FURTHER, I DESIRE TO MAXIMIZE THE USE OF MOTOR VEHICLES TO PRESERVE LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS FOR THE MANEUVER OF TROOPS AND RESUPPLY TO INACCESSIBLE AREAS.
 8. DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS THE ONLY COMMITMENTS TO UNITS NOT ORGANIC TO THIS DIVISION PROVIDED BY THE SEVENTH MT BN WERE TO RL SG-BRAVO. THESE COMMITMENTS AVERAGED EIGHT VEHICLES PER DAY

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2344E S E C R E T
 FOR THE RESUPPLY OF THE TAM KY LSA, AND 2 VEHICLES FOR HOUSEKEEPING. THEY ALSO PROVIDED TWICE WEEKLY A CONVOY CMDR, 2 SECURITY VEHICLES FOR CLASS III CONVOYS TO QUANG NGAI AND TAM KY. UPON THE RELOCATION OF THE LSA TO THANG BINH I PLAN TO POSITION VEHICLES AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR.

9. CONTINUATION OF PRESENT TEMPO OF MT OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OF SUMMER CAMPAIGN REQUIRES RETENTION OF SEVENTH MT BN AND MOVEMENT TO DANANG OUTLINED PARA 5. REQ CANCELLATION REF 4.

GP-4
 BT

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 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
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T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN WALT
 OPN HICKORY

A. YOUR 160939Z MAY67

1. CURRENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT OPN HICKORY AND ITS ASSOCIATED OPNS
 (OPN LAM SON 54, OPN BEAU CHARGER) WILL BE INITIATED ON 18MAY AS
 PLANNED. NORTHERN BDRY OF OPS IS PMDL. 3D MARDIV EAST BDRY FM YD 163773
 SOUTH TO YD 168620. SLF INLAND BDRY FROM YD 229792 SOUTH ALONG RIVER
 TO YD 258730 THENCE EAST TO SEA, ARVN IN BETWEEN.

2. GENERAL SEQUENCE OF MAJOR EVENTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARVN ELEMENTS WILL MOVE FORWARD ALONG HWY 1 FROM GIO LINH COMMEN-
 CING AROUND MIDNIGHT SEEKING TO REACH THE BEN HAI RIVER AS RAPIDLY AS
 POSSIBLE SO THAT BY FIRST LIGHT ON 18MAY THEY WILL BE READY TO TURN ONE
 COLUMN TO THE EAST AND ONE TO THE WEST AND THEN START SOUTH AGAIN,
 SEARCHING AND DESTROYING ALL FORTIFICATIONS AND REMOVING ALL NON-
 COMBATANTS FROM THE AREA. HOPEFULLY THE INITIAL ARVN MOVES WILL ATTRACT
 ENEMY ATTENTION AND CAUSE HIM TO REACT, THIS SHOULD PROVIDE OUR US

PAGE 2 RUMSDN 1192 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS

FORCES SOME TARGETS AND PERHAPS WILL CAUSE SOME SHIFT OF ENEMY FORCES
 TO MEET THE ARVN MOVE.

B. AT 180300H, SLF ALFA (CTG 79.4) WILL LAND VIA HELICOPTER IN VIC
 YD 2277 AND OVER THE BEACH IN THE EASTERN END OF THE DMZ BELOW THE PMDL.
 THE SLF, IN COORD WITH ARVN, WILL TURN NORTHEAST ALONG THE RIVER AND
 THEN SOUTH IN S&D OPNS AND CLEAR OUT THE NON-COMBATANTS.

C. AT A TIME TO BE SELECTED BASED ON ARVN AND SLF ACTIONS AND NVA
 REACTIONS, 3D MARDIV (9TH MAR REGT HQ WITH 3BNS AND TWO COMPANIES OF
 TANKS) WILL MOVE FORWARD WITH 2 BNS AND TANKS FROM CON THIEN, MOVE AS
 RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE BEN HAI RIVER AND LINK UP WITH THE OTHER BN
 WHICH WILL LAND BY HELO NEAR THE BEN HAI RIVER. THESE UNITS WILL THEN
 HEAD SOUTH IN S&D OPNS DESTROY THE ENEMY AND HIS FORTIFICATIONS AND
 REMOVE NON-COMBATANTS. ELEMENTS OF THE 3D MAR REGT WILL PROVIDE BLOCKING
 FORCE TO THE WEST AND SCREEN THAT FLANK OF THE 9TH MAR REGT.

3. NON-COMBATANTS WILL BE MOVED TO A REFUGEE CENTER IN CAM LO. CIVILIANS
 IN THE SLF AREA WILL BE MOVED BY ARVN AND NATIONAL POLICE TO THE BEACH
 AND MOVED VIA LCU TO DONG HA AND THENCE TO CAM LO. MARINE FORCES WILL
 ASSIST ARVN AND POLICE IN THIS EFFORT. ROUTE 1 WILL BE THE PRIMARY ROUTE
 FOR REFUGEE TRAFFIC FROM THE ARVN AREA. APPROX 400 FFP HAVE BEEN PROVI-
 DED TO ASSIST IN HANDLING THE REMOVAL AND TO CONTROL THE REFUGEES FROM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

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PAGE 3 NUMBER 1192 TOP SECRET LINDIS
THE COMBAT AREAS TO CAM LO.

4. SEVENTH AF COMMENCES GRAND SLAM OPERATIONS TODAY IN THE AREAS NORTH OF THE DMZ AND FINAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING EFFECTED TODAY FOR COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY AND AIR IN COMPLIANCE WITH REF A. SEVENTH AF HAS ARRANGED FOR ADDITIONAL AIR SUPPORT TO INCLUDE NAVY AIR. THE AIR EFFORT ALONE SHOULD DO MUCH TO CONFUSE THE NVA AS TO OUR INTENTIONS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

5. RESPONSES FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS TO OUR MESSAGES AND THE PROMPT ACTION TAKEN ALL ALONG THE LINE HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH APPRECIATED.

WARM REGARDS, LEW.

GP-3

BT

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CCN : 16

FILLER : 19

DTG : 180134Z

MONTH : MAY 67

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to Col Snoddy.
JR*

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(PERSONAL FOR)

DE YNA 3260 1380134
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P 180134Z MAY 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN. WALT FROM LTGEN. KRULAK

1. FOR TWO DAYS NOW, THE PRESS HAS BEEN FILING STORIES REGARDING CON THIEN THAT ARE ABSOLUTELY AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD BE FULLY AWARE OF IT.

2. EXAMPLES:

A. FROM ALVIN WEBB, JR., UPI: QUOTE

U. S. MARINES WEDNESDAY GAVE UP A FOUR DAY ATTEMPT TO TAKE A ROAD LEADING TO THE SPECIAL FORCES BORDER OUTPOST AT CON THIEN WHICH WAS SURROUNDED BY 3,600 NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS... AND... ELSEWHERE, THE DISCOVERY OF COMMUNIST MISSILE SITES IN THE DMZ, THE SIX-MILE BUFFER BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, WAS SEEN AS NEW EVIDENCE OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE PLAN TO GRAB AND OCCUPY A NORTHERN PORTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

PAGE 2 YNA 3260 C O N F I D E N T I A L

AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAID THE PLAN HAD NO CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING.

ALTHOUGH IT WAS SURROUNDED AND UNDER INTENSE MORTAR FIRE, CON THIEN WAS NOT LIKELY TO FALL, A SPOKESMAN SAID. UNQUOTE

B. ALSO FROM ALVIN WEBB, JR., UPI QUOTE

STALLED FOR FOUR DAYS IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO OPEN THE ROAD TO CON THIEN--A ROAD THE COMMUNISTS HAVE CONTROLLED FOR 74 DAYS--MARINE TROOPS AND TANKS ABANDONED THE PUSH AND MOVED THROUGH THE COUNTRYSIDE TRYING TO KNOCK OUT THE MORTARS WHICH POUNDED THE SPECIAL FORCES BASE CAMP WITH DEADLY ACCURACY... UNQUOTE

C. FROM UPI (NO BY LINE): QUOTE

THOUSANDS OF COMMUNIST TROOPS YESTERDAY SURROUND-ED THE KEY U. S. MARINE BASTION AT CON THIEN ON THE NORTH-SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AND BEAT BACK LEATHERNECK ARMORED FORCES TRYING TO REACH THE HNGED AMERICANS, INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SAID... UNQUOTE

3. HOW DO YOU ESTIMATE THEY CAN GET SO WIDE OF THE MARK? CAN ANYTHING BE DONE? WARM REGARDS.

CP - 4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-56)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FO. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
APSYAORS AVIAVIV	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#45

351

25

190418Z

MAY 67

CG III MAF

CG has seen

(PERSONAL FOR)

Hold CLOSE

FIL COPY 1

3

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283 of 3

CG III MAF

190418Z MAY 67

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#3 burned
7/10/68

190418Z MAY 67

2

TOP SECRET

PP RUMSMA
 DE RUMSDN 1340 1390418
 ZNY TTTT
 P 190418Z MAY 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)
 HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LIGEN WALT
 CHINESE VOICES ON RADIO CIRCUITS AT GIO LINH

1. INVESTIGATION OF YOUR INQUIRY CONCERNING SUBJECT REVEALS FOLLOWING:
 A. THE COMPOSITE ARTILLERY BATTALION COMMANDER AT GIO LINH REPORTED THAT
 HIS RADIO OPERATORS HEARD UNUSUAL OR STRANGE VOICES ON THEIR NETS ON
 16 MAY. THE VIETNAMESE LIAISON OFFICER WITH THAT BATTALION VERIFIED THAT
 THESE VOICES WERE NOT VIETNAMESE, WITH EITHER NORTHERN OR SOUTHERN
 DIALECT.

B. THE BATTALION COMMANDER, ALTHOUGH NOT A LINGUIST, HAS SOME KNOWLEDGE
 OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE. HE STATED HE BELIEVED THESE WERE CHINESE
 VOICES.

2. WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP THIS MATTER UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND REPORT
 ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

GP-4
 BT

NNNN

SECRET

378

19

200832Z

MAY 67

CTF 79

(PERSONAL FOR)

1

3

2-3

3

CTE 79

200832Z MAY 67

THE PRECEDENCE OF THIS MSG IS IMMEDIATE AND ACTION

*#2 burned
6000 68*

200832Z MAY 67

SECRET

49

#46

SECRET

VV DDKA514VV FUV934A

OO DDKE

DE DDKUV 678 1400832

ZNY SSSSS

O P 200832Z MAY 67

FM CTF SEVEN NINE

TO DDKE/CG III MAF

RUMUAM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

INFO ZEN/CHF SEVEN SIX

DDKE/CG THIRD MARDIV

MMSB/CG ADMIN NINTH MAB

BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

S E C R E T

1. FOR CG III MAF

A. REGRET UNABLE TO CALL UPON CG III MAF THIS TRIP.

B. REQUEST C-10 TRANS FR DONG HA TO OKI FOR CTF 79 PLUS FOUR OFFICERS AND THREE ENL. ETD DONG HA 211000H OR SOON THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE. REQUEST ADVISE.

2. FOR CTG 79.4 REQ HELO TRANS ARRIVE USS ELDORADO AT 210930H FOR LIFT OF PARTY TO DONG HA. CONFIRM.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

TOP SECRET

CCN: 450

FILLER 19

DTG 250124Z MONTH MAY 67

ORIGINATOR SECSTATE

G-3 Volkert has seen

CATEGORY

EXCLUSIVE

Dep CG

NODIS

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF SECSTATE MESSAGE 250124Z MAY 67

RECEIVED BY: _____ DATE/TIME _____

DTG /MONTH 250124Z MAY 67

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MW-23

VV KDN976V9 MAH 210
 RR- RUMSDN
 DE RUMSMA 2185U 145 15 11
 ZNY TTTT
 R 25025Z
 FM COMUSMACV
 INFO CG III MAF
 R 250124Z MAY 67
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8202
 INFO RUEPJS/JCS
 RIHKA/CINCPAC
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIEN TIAN
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMBAN/COMUSMACV HAI
 RUEPJS/DCPG
 STATE GRNC
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NO DIS

T O P S E C R E T STATE 201574
 NODIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
 SUBJ: PRACTICE NINE

1. REQUEST YOU PROCEED TO SECURE NECESSARY CLEARANCE FOR IMMEDIATE INITIATION OF BASE IMPROVEMENT AT UBON, NAKHON PHANOM, KORAT, SATTAHIP, AND UDORN FOR PRACTICE NINE. EDE SIRE TO INITIATE BASE IMPROVEMENT WITH GREATEST URGENCY. REQUEST ALSO CLEARANCE FOR DEPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2185U T O P S E C R E T
 AND PERSONNEL CONCERNED TO ARRIVE IN MONTHS SHOWN. DETAILS FOLLOW BELOW:

2. UBON:

A. AIRCRAFT:

18 F-4 (MARCH 68)

B. UNIT S/ PERSONNEL/ ENTRY MONTH:

1 TAC. FIR. SQUADRON (18 F-4'S US) 687 USAF PERSONNEL

ENTER MARCH 68

C. CONSTRUCTION:

START:

EARLIEST COMPLETE: MAR YL

(\$000)

FACILITY

SCOPE

COST

AGENT

APRON, OPERATIONAL

30,000 SY

600

C (CONTRACTOR)

BKPCO H

(SQUARE YDS)

SQDN OPNS

8,400 SF

127

IS C

(SQUARE FT)

POL STORAGE JP-4

25,000 BBL

300

C

(BARRELS)

AMMO STORAGE (14 PADS)

35,000 SF

525

C

SPECIAL STORAGE FAC. LS (LUMP SUM)

10,000 SF

100

C

WHFV SUP & EQUIP

10,000 SF

80

C

DORM, AIRMAN

540 MN (MEN)

335

C

G-3

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 2185 UT O P S E C R E T
 OR (AIR CONDITION FOR 67 MN 90 C
 FLT CREW)
 DINING HALL 200 SE (SEATS) 250 C
 SHOP ENG (I&R) (ADD ITION) 5000 SF 65 C
 REVETMENTS 18 EA (EACH 36 C
 UTILITIES (POWER, LS 930 C
 WATER)

3. NAKHON PHANOM:

A. AIRCRAFT

19 A1-3 (OCT 67) (TDY TO APRIL 68)

12 CH-3C (TEMPORARILY PRESENT PRIMARILY DURING NORTHEAST MONSOON)

B. UNITS/PERSONNEL/ENTRY MONTH:

(1) INFILTRATION SURVEILLANCE CENTER. 412 USAF PERSONNEL ENTER OCT 67.

(2) BASE OPERATING SUPPORT AUGMENTATION. 112 USAF PERSONNEL ENTER OCT. 67.

(3) MSQ-77. 34 USAF PERSONNEL. ENTER OCT 67.

(4) AERIAL WEAPONS CO. (12 UH-1F). 170 USA PERSONNEL. (TEMPORARILY PRESENT PRIMARILY DURING NORTHEAST MONSOON).

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2185 UT O P S E C R E T

(5) HELICOPTER SQUADRON (12"1-3C). 200 USAF PERSONNEL.

(TEMPORARILY PRESENT PRIMARILY DURING NORTHEAST MONSOON).

(6) A1-E SQUADRON. (19A1-E) 435 USAF PERSONNEL. ENTER OCT. 67 ON TDY UNTIL APRIL 68.

(7) SOG FOB AND LIAISON SECTION. 39 USA PERSONNEL. ENTER NOV. 67.

(8) SP-2E UNIT 331 USN PERSONNEL ENTER OCT. 67 ON TDY UNTIL APRIL 68.

C. CONSTRUCTION START EARLIEST COMPLETE OCT. 67

FACILITY	SCOPE	COST (\$000)	AGENT
APRON OPERATIONAL (M&A)	65,000 SF	650	T
MSQ-77 (REVEITED)	LS (LUMP SUM)	20	T
SQDN OPNS	5,6000 SF	LZ	T
HANGAR MAINT	8,000 SF	80	T
SPECIAL COMM CENTER	LS	3,400	C
SPECIAL STORAGE FAC.	10,000 SF	80	T

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 21850 T O P S E C R E T

PQL STORAGE (AVGAS)	20,000 BBL (BARRELS)	185	T
WHS, SUP & EQUIP	0,000 SF	40	T
AMMO STORAGE (9 PADS)	22,500 SF	112	T
UTILITIES	LS	500	T
REVELEMENTS	LS	42	T
DORM	480 MN	120	T
OQ	120 MN	60	T
DINING HALL	100 SE (SEAT)	60	T
ASTERIK SOG	LS	375	C

ASTERIK (INCLUDES HELICOPTER PADS AND MAINT. FACILITIES;
ADMIN SUPPORT AND COMM FACILITIES; BILLETING & MESSING)

4. KORAT

A. AIRCRAFT:

21 EC-121 (OCT 67)

B. UNITS/PERSONNEL/ENTRY MONTH:

(1) BASE SUPPORT 252 USAF PERSONNEL ENTER OCT 67

(2) EC-121 WING. 1392 USAF PERSONNEL ENTER OCT 67

C. CONSTRUCTION START: EARLIEST COMPLETE: OCT-NOV. 67

FACILITY	SCOPE	COST (\$000)	AGENT
APRON OPERATIONAL	100,000 SY	4,000	C
TAXIWAY	5,000 SY	200	C
HANGAR, MAINT.	36,000 SF	1,000	C
W/SHOPS			
SQDN OPS	0,400 SF	260	C
WAREHOUSE	20,000 SF	500	C
DORMITORIES	1,406 MN	238	C

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 21850 T O P S E C R E T

OQ	238 MN	238	C
DINING HALL	450 SE	RTP	C
SHOP A & E	12,650 SF	380	C
SHOP AGE (ACFT. GD. EQUIP)	3,000 SF	75	C
REVELEMENTS	LS	40	C
UTILITIES	LS	1,875	C
RELOCATE FACILITIES	LS	66	C
STORAGE OPEN	7,000 SY	42	C
STORAGE SHED	2,000 SF	20	C
BASE COMM ADD	1,000 SF	15	C

5. UDORN

A. ARMY LOGISTIC SUPPORT FACILITY

B. NO ADDITIVE PERSONNEL

C. CONSTRUCTION START: EARLIEST COMPLETE: AUG 67

FACILITY	SCOPE	COST (\$000)	AGENT
MOYOR PARK	6,000 SY	35	C

6. SATTAHIP:

A. ARMY LOGISTIC SUPPORT FACILITY

B. NO ADDITIVE PERSONNEL

C. CONSTRUCTION START: EARLIEST COMPLETE: AUG 67

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 7 RUMSMA 2182 BT O P S E C R E T

FACILITY	SCOPE	COST (\$000)	AGENT
COLD STORAGE	43,100 CF	168	C
COVERED STORAGE	10,750 SF	65	C
MOTOR PARK	6,000 SY	55	C
		268	

7. FYI ONLY. THERE IS NO AGREEMENT HERE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS CAN OR WILL BE SUPPORTED BY STAGING ONLY THROUGH NAKHON PHANOM OR WHETHER TEAMS WILL BE BASED AT NAKHON PHANOM FOR AT LEAST PARTS OF THE YEAR. FURTHER THERE IS NO AGREEMENT HERE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT RIG SHOULD BE ASKED TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL FOR TEAMS. ACCORDINGLY YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT NOW ASK RIG FOR USE OF THEIR PERSONNEL FOR TEAMS. SEVERAL OF HIGHEST OFFICIALS ONLY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT GROUND SURVEILLANCE WILL BE NECESSARY PART OF PRACTICE NINE, THAT BEST METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS NOT YET DETERMINED BUT THAT AT LEAST SOME STAGING THROUGH NAKHON PHANOM WILL BE REQUIRED.

END FYI.
GP-1. RUSK
BT

NNNN

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES