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JULY 1967

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T S P E C A T
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN
KRULA. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF WESTY'S OPENING SPEECH FOR
SECDEF. QUOTE:

THE COMMUNIST LEADERS IN HANOI CONTINUE TO PURSUE A
STRATEGIC GROUND OFFENSIVE AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM. RE-
STRICTIONS, IMPOSED BY THE PECULIARITIES OF THE WAR, HAVE
FORCED US TO A DEFENSIVE STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH. ON THE OTHER
HAND, AND FORTUNATELY, WE ARE PURSUING A STRATEGIC AIR AND
NAVAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S BASE IN NORTH VIETNAM
WHICH IN TURN HAS FORCED THE ENEMY TO A STRATEGIC DEFENSE.

I HAVE INTERPRETED OUR OVERALL STRATEGY AS ONE OF
APPLYING PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING
HIS WILL TO CONTINUE HIS AGGRESSION. SINCE, FOR POLITICAL
REASONS, WE DO NOT HAVE FREEDOM OF MANEUVER, WE

PAGE 2 YVNA 0648 T O P S E C R E T S P E C A T
WOULD SEEM TO HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE -- AT LEAST FOR
THE MOMENT.

WE MUST CONVINCe THE ENEMY THAT HE CANNOT WIN AND THAT TIME
IS NOT ON HIS SIDE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS STRATEGY WILL WIN PROVIDED
WE STEP UP THE PRESSURE BY REINFORCING OUR MOUNTING SUCCESSES.

THE GROWING SUCCESS OF OUR AIR AND NAVAL OFFENSIVE IS BEING
MATCHED BY THE LESS DRAMATIC SUCCESS OF OUR GROUND CAMPAIGN.
ALTHOUGH OUR STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH IS NECESSARILY DEFENSIVE, OUR
TACTICS ARE DECIDEDLY OFFENSIVE.

DURING THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE:
PREEMPTED OR BLUNTED SEVERAL ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY ACROSS
THE DMZ.

OPENED HIGHWAY 9 TO THE LAO BORDER.
INCREASED SECURITY IN THE COASTAL AREAS OF I AND II CORPS
AND DEALT A MAJOR BLOW TO GUERRILLA FORCES AND POLITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THOSE REGIONS.

OPENED HIGHWAY 1 FROM PHAM RANG TO THE DMZ.
KEPT OPEN HIGHWAY 19 TO THE HIGHLANDS AND USED HIGHWAYS
21 AND 14 AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.
CONTAINED THE ENEMY ALONG THE CAMBODIA-FLEIKU-KONTUM

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PAGE 3 YVNA 0648 T O P S E C R E T S E C A T
 BORDER.
 DESTROYED LONG-ESTABLISHED BASE AREAS NORTH, WEST AND
 EAST OF SAIGON -- THEREBY PUSHING THE ENEMY DEEPER INTO THE JUNGLES.
 OPENED ALL MAJOR ROADS AND WATERWAYS IN THE VICINITY OF SAIGON.
 REDUCED TO A NEGLIGIBLE LEVEL INFILTRATION BY SEA.
 INTERDICTIONED THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICATION AND LIAISON ROUTES TO
 WAR ZONE C BY OUR GAME WARDEN OPERATIONS AND OCCUPATION OF DONG TAM
 BASE ON THE MEKONG.
 IMPROVED OUR INTELLIGENCE.
 DEVELOPED A FLEXIBLE LOGISTICAL BASE AND SUPPORT ORGANIZATION.
 MEANWHILE THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES HAVE:
 INITIATED A PROMISING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
 IMPROVED THE FIGHTING STRENGTH OF ITS BATTALIONS.
 INCREASED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS OPERATIONS.
 REDUCED IN MAJOR DEGREE ITS WEAPONS LOSSES.
 INCREASED ITS KILL RATIO.
 IMPROVED ITS LEADERSHIP.
 GAINED THE INITIATIVE IN IV CORPS AND REDUCED THE ENEMY'S
 RECRUITING POTENTIAL.
 TOGETHER, THE VIETNAMESE, US AND FREE WORLD FORCES HAVE ERODED

PAGE 4 YVNA 0648 T O P S E C R E T S E C A T
 THE ENEMY'S GUERRILLA FORCE BY KILLING, CAPTURING OR ATTRACTING
 DEFECTORS. AS AN EXAMPLE, IN THE ARVN/US 25TH DIVISION AREA BETWEEN
 15 MAY AND 30 JUNE, 820 LOCAL VC WERE PUT OUT OF ACTION... 480
 OF THESE WERE KILLED, 145 CAPTURED, AND 295 RALLIED -- 43 PERCENT
 OF THESE ENEMY LOSSES ARE CREDITED TO THE VIETNAMESE.
 OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN REFUSED STRATEGIC
 OR SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL SUCCESS.
 IT HAS BEEN MY PURPOSE TO FRUSTRATE THE ENEMY'S PLANS AND
 CAUSE HIM TO REASSESS HIS OBJECTIVES. THEREFORE, I HAVE GIVEN OVER-
 RIDING ATTENTION TO MANEUVERING TROOPS TO DENY THE ENEMY BATTLEFIELD
 SUCCESSES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES.
 DURING THE PAST YEAR, THE ENEMY:
 HAS BEEN FORCED BY OUR MARKET TIME OPERATIONS TO ABANDON
 PLANS TO BRING IN LARGE TONNAGES BY SEA.
 HAS HAD TO RESORT TO USE OF THE LONG AND RUGGED LAND SUPPLY
 ROUTE THROUGH LAOS.
 HAS BEEN DENIED RECRUITS IN THE NUMBERS REQUIRED FROM THE
 POPULATED AREAS ALONG THE COAST, THEREBY FORCING HIM TO SUPPLY LARGE
 QUANTITIES OF MANPOWER FROM NORTH VIETNAM.
 HAS BEEN DENIED RICE FROM THE COASTAL PROVINCES OF I AND II

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 MARINE CORP'S EYES ONLY

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 YVNA 0648 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L
CORPS IN THE QUANTITIES REQUIRED, THEREBY FORCING HIM TO BUY
RICE FROM CAMBODIA.

THE LEADERS IN HANOI HAD PLANNED TO WAGE A CHEAP WAR OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION IN THE DOCTRINAL PATTERN OF MAO TSE TUNG. THEY HAVE NOW
FOUND IT NECESSARY TO:

MOBILIZE.

SEND THEIR YOUTH AND BEST LEADERSHIP TO THE SOUTH...MANY
NEVER TO RETURN.

DIVERT LARGE QUANTITIES OF MANPOWER AND RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN
LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND TO MAN AN EXTENSIVE -- BUT INCREASINGLY
INEFFECTIVE -- AIR SYSTEM.

FURTHERMORE, THEY ARE WITNESSING THE STEADY DESTRUCTION OF
THEIR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE DETERIORATION OF THEIR ECONOMY
REQUIRING THEM TO BECOME INCREASINGLY MORE OBLIGATED TO RED CHINA
WHOM THEY TRADITIONALLY DISTRUST.

IN CONTRAST, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE:

GROWING IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRENGTH.

INHERITING A HUGE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AS A BY-PRODUCT
OF THE WAR.

ATTRACTING DEFECTORS IN INCREASING NUMBERS FROM THE COMMUNIST
RANKS.

IN SUMMARY, NORTH VIETNAM IS PAYING A TREMENDOUS PRICE WITH

PAGE 6 YVNA 0648 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L

NOTHING TO SHOW IN RETURN. BUT THEIR BROTHERS IN THE SOUTH, DESPITE
CONTINUOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE VIET CONG, ARE MAKING PROGRESS ON
SEVERAL FRONTS. THE TREND OF HISTORY WOULD SEEM TO WEIGH IN BALANCE
IN FAVOR OF THE SOUTH.

WE ARE NOT BOGGED DOWN OR IN A STALEMATE. WE ARE WINNING SLOWLY
BUT STEADILY -- AND THIS PACE CAN ACCELERATE IF WE REINFORCE OUR
SUCCESSSES. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD STEP UP OUR OPERATIONS IN
THE SOUTH, INCREASE THE PRESSURE IN THE NORTH, AND EXERCISE NEW
INITIATIVES IN LAOS.

MR. SECRETARY, WE HAVE PREPARED A SERIES OF COMPREHENSIVE
BRIEFINGS ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS. THE FIRST OF THESE WILL BE
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

UNQUOTE.

GP-4

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MAHNE CURY'S EYES ONLY

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Nha Trang

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR ADM JOHNSON, VADMS HYLAND AND SHINN, RADMS WHITE AND FRANK JOHNSON, INFO GENERAL GREENE, ADM HOLMES AND RADM KOSSLER FROM CONNOLLY

1. THE NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND HAS SELECTED NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION TO PROVIDE THREE LEASED, CONTRACTOR-SUPPORTED T-39 A/C FOR USE IN WESTPAC (BUY OPTION FOR FY 69). THE FIRST A/C SHOULD ARRIVE BY 11 JULY.
2. IT HAS BEEN ONE YEAR SINCE VADM HYLAND CITED THE SHORTAGE

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PAGE TWO RUWJMUA 1739 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 OF RESPONSIVE AIRLIFT AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE. ANALYSIS AT COMNAVTRPAC WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF COMFAIRWESTPAC SUPPORTED REQUIREMENT FOR EIGHT AIRCRAFT. WE LACKED "TRADING BEADS" FOR EIGHT AND WENT FOR FOUR WHICH WOULD HAVE PROVIDED AN EFFECTIVENESS INCREASE WHILE PAYING FOR ITSELF WITH THE TRADE-OFF OF FIVE C-54S, WITHOUT AN ANALYSIS OF ANY KIND OTHER THAN LOWER COST, OSD HAS APPROVED THE LESS EFFECTIVE THREE FOR FIVE "TRADE-OFF." EVEN THIS MET CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE FROM OSD PERSONNEL WHO ARGUED THAT IT WAS A THREE FOR TWO TRADE. BECAUSE ONE MARINE C-54 AND TWO NAVY C-54S WILL BE DROPPED OUT OF THE FYDP AFTER FY 69. YOU CAN APPRECIATE THE "PUN" WE HAVE WITH OTHER PROJECTS WHEN THIS MUCH WORK WAS REQUIRED TO "SELL" A MINOR SCHEME THAT SAVES MONEY.

3. EVEN SO, WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD A CHANCE WITH THIS PROGRAM IF YOU HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO TRADE YOUR LOCALLY CONTROLLED AIRCRAFT FOR AIRCRAFT TO BE OPERATED BY A VR SQUADRON WITH POOLED ASSETS AND CENTRALIZED SCHEDULING. FUTURE PROSPECTS OF GETTING MODERN EXECUTIVE TRANSPORTATION FOR THE NAVY & MARINE CORPS DEPEND ON EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THESE AIRCRAFT.

4. MON. CHARLES F. BAIRD, UNDERSECNAV-TO-BE, HAS REQUESTED AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL COSTS AND DERIVED BENEFITS OF THIS

PAGE THREE RUWJMUA1739 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 PROJECT ONE YEAR AFTER INITIATION. DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED NOW THAT WILL SHOW (1) AIRLIFTS ACCOMPLISHED AND (2) AIRLIFT NOT PERFORMED FOR LACK OF AIRLIFT. "DERIVED BENEFITS" AND ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE DOCUMENTED.

5. THIS PROJECT BORE SOME FRUIT PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT ORIGINATED IN THE FLEET AND WAS PROSECUTED FOR FLEET PERSONNEL. THE MANY MAN-HOURS OF EFFORT TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE DATA JUSTIFYING THIS PROJECT ARE APPRECIATED. (ASSISTANCE OF LCDR KOMP, COMFAIRWESTPAC STAFF, WAS ESPECIALLY BENEFICIAL.)

6. ALSO THE PROJECT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE MARINES. THEY GAVE UP ONE A/V AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL WITHOUT GAINING ASSETS. HOPEFULLY, THE T-39S WILL PROVIDE MORE SUPPORT FOR MARINE AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS IN WESTPAC.

7. WARM REGARDS.

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN
THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. THE FOLLOWING WAS RECEIVED BY OTHER MEANS AND IS QUOTED FOR
YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE.

P 15 1405Z
FM GENERAL WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC
TO GENERAL ABRAMS, SAIGON
INFO ADMIRAL SHARP, CINCPAC
GENERAL WESTMORELAND, HONOLULU TDY
CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY - JCS 5451 JULY 67
SUBJ: PRESS REPORT 13 JULY ON PACIFICATION PROGRAM
1. ON HUNTLEY-BRINKLEY PROGRAM 13 JULY, REPORTER
HOWARD TUCKNER NARRATED A SHORT FILM CLIP ON PACIFICATION
PROGRAM IN I CORPS. TUCKNER CLAIMED THE PROGRAM WAS
FAILING BECAUSE ALL INHABITANTS RELOCATED FROM CAM NE

PAGE 2 YNA 3124 CONFIDENTIAL
(I CORPS) WERE DISSATISFIED WITH CONDITIONS IN THE
PEACE HAMLET AND GVN SUPPORT AND THAT 4,600 HAD FLED
TO THE HILLS PROBABLY TO JOIN THE VIET CONG.
2. AN UNIDENTIFIED VOLUNTEER SOCIAL WORKER (IVS)
INTERVIEWED IN THE TUCKNER FILM CLIP STATED THAT THE
PEACE HAMLET WAS A CONCENTRATION CAMP.
3. THE TUCKNER PROGRAM PROVED EMBARRASSING HERE. ITS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE A BALANCED PICTURE AND TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN VC SYMPATHIZERS AND LOYAL VILLAGERS WILL MISLEAD
MANY REGARDING THE RD PROGRAM IN I CORPS.
4. SUGGEST SA I CORPS CAUTION ADVISORS, AND SPECIFICALLY
THE IVS WORKER, TO AVOID AIDING AND ABETTING PROGRAMS WHICH
PROVIDE A DISTORTED PICTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
IN VIETNAM.

UNQUOTE
2. THE ABOVE HAS ALSO BEEN PASSED TO LTGEN KRULAK.
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TO DDKE/CG III MAF
MMSB/CG FMFPAC (FUD)
DDKE/CG FIRST MAW
MMSB/CG NINTH MAB
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EXCLUSIVE FOR

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, MAJGENS BOUKER AND ANDERSON, BGEN GLICK, FROM LTGEN KRULAK, NINTH MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE.

1. THERE HAS BEEN A LIVELY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE NINTH MAB SINCE THE VISIT OF THE SECDEF TO RVN; QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT ITS FUTURE SHALL BE AFTER SEPT; WHETHER ITS MEMBERS SHALL BE COUNTED IN THE OVERALL PERSONNEL CEILING CHARGED TO MACV; WHETHER IT SHALL REMAIN AS A CINCPAC FORCE, CHARGED TO CINCPAC, WHETHER IT SHALL BE PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED IN RVN OR WHETHER IT SHALL BE AFLOAT AND EMPLOYED ASHORE ON AN INTERMITTENT BASIS.
2. WHILE IN WASHINGTON I TALKED TO VARIOUS PEOPLE IN OSD ON THE SUBJECT (INCLUDING MCNAMARA) AS WELL AS OFFICERS ON THE JOINT STAFF AND AT HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, AND TODAY I TALKED TO

PAGE TWO YVNA 4534 SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR JOHN CHAISSON, PASSING THROUGH HONOLULU ON LEAVE. THE FOLLOWING IS ABOUT WHAT I DISTILL FROM THE VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS.

3. WHEN SPEAKING OF THE NINTH MAB, MOST OF THOSE WITH WHOM I TALKED WERE REALLY ADDRESSING RL2 TWO SIX; SOMETIMES THE HELICOPTER SQUADRONS AS WELL; SOMETIMES THE FIXED WING SQUADRONS TOO; AND, OCCASIONALLY, ARTILLERY AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. GEN WESTMORELAND IS INTERESTED MOSTLY IN THE BLYS AND THE HELICOPTER SQUADRONS. THE SAME GOES FOR SECDEF. SHARP IS INTERESTED IN THE FIXED WING SQUADRONS ALSO.

4. AT SAIGON, IN THE MACV PRESENTATION GIVEN TO SECDEF, THE NINTH MAB WAS MENTIONED PROMINENTLY AS AN RVN ASSET, BUT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GROSS STRENGTH FIGURES PROPOSED FOR IN-COUNTRY FORCES. SUBSEQUENTLY, SECDEF DIRECTED THAT THE NINTH MAB BE INCLUDED AS A CHARGE AGAINST MACV'S NUMERICAL CEILING. THIS HAS SINCE GIVEN RISE TO A SHARP DIALOGUE. OBVIOUSLY MACV WOULD RATHER HAVE THE SERVICES OF NINTH MAB FORCES WITHOUT THEIR BEING CHARGED AGAINST HIM. EQUALLY OBVIOUSLY, SECDEF WANTS TO CHARGE THEM AGAINST MACV BECAUSE THAT MAKES A CONTRIBUTION TOWARD HIS FULFILLMENT OF MACV'S STATED NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS. IN OTHER WORDS, NINTH MAB IS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF A NUMBERS NUT CRACKER WHICH, SO FAR AS I CAN SEE, HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH WINNING THE WAR.

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PAGE THREE YNA 4534 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR
 5. AFTER THE SECDEF PARTY GOT BACK TO WASHINGTON, GEN ABRAMS, ACTING COMUSMACV, SENT IN A MESSAGE SAYING IN PART QUOTE I ENVISION EMPLOYMENT OF GENERALLY TWO BLTS OF NINTH MAB ASHORE AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THUS, WE MAY BE PENALIZED BY BEING CHARGED WITH THE ENTIRE NINTH MAB AND HAVING ONLY TWO THIRDS OF IT AVAILABLE AT ANY ONE TIME...IN MY VIEW IT IS OPERATIONALLY PREFERABLE TO USE THIS FORCE FROM AN AFLOAT BASE, WHICH CAN BE SHIFTED EASILY FROM POINT TO POINT WHERE IT IS NEEDED MOST, AND ITS LOGISTICS SUPPORT AFLOAT WHIFTS WHEREVER IT GOES. UNQUOTE
 6. THE JCS SEEMS TO HAVE FELT PRETTY MUCH LIKE ABRAMS. THEY TOLD SECDEF SO IN A MEMO ON 20 JULY, WHICH STATED THAT THE CHIEFS DID NOT CONCUR IN THE ENCLUSION OF ELEMENTS OF THE NINTH MAB IN THE RVN CEILING. THEY WENT TO SOME LENGTH TO DESCRIBE THE POSITION OF THE NINTH MAB AS THE PACOM AMPHIBIOUS RESERVE, SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT IN OTHER AREAS, AS CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS DICTATE. THEY TOLD SECDEF THAT, WHEN ASHORE IN RVN, THE NINTH MAB SHOULD BE CARRIED AS A TEMPORARY AUGMENTATION.
 7. SO FAR AS I CAN LEARN, THERE HAS BEEN NO DECISION YET FROM SECDEF ON THE NUMBERS BUSINESS. ALTHOUGH SUPERFICIALLY INSIGNIFICANT, THIS DECISION WILL ACTUALLY BE IMPORTANT TO US

PAGE FOUR XNA 4534 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR
 BECAUSE, IF THE MAB IS SHOWN AS A PART OF THE MACV CEILING, WE MAY EXPECT MACV TO REQUEST THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF AT LEAST RLT TWO SIX PLUS THE HELOS ASHORE, AND PERMAPS MORE. THEN, WHEN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE FORCES AND THE ARG'S IS TERMINATED, I AM SURE WE CAN LOOK TO SEE THE SHIPS EITHER WITHDRAWN FROM THE COMBAT AREA, OR ELSE WE MAY SEE SOLDIERS ABOARD THE LPHS.
 8. I AM UNABLE GREATLY TO INFLUENCE THE BIDDING, HAVING NO REAL LEVERAGE ON EITHER SECDEF OR COMUSMACV. HOWEVER, HERE IS MY BASIC FEELING AS TO WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN. FIRST I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD PUT WHATEVER IS NECESSARY INTO VIETNAM. IF EVERYTHING THE U. S. HAS IS REQUIRED TO DO THE JOB PROPERLY, THEN WE SHOULD COMMIT IT. I PRESENT THIS VIEWPOINT CONSISTENTLY IN THE LOCAL COUNCILS. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THIS IS WHAT I WOULD PERSONALLY LIKE TO SEE TAKE PLACE WITH RESPECT TO NINTH MAB, IF THE COMBAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL PERMIT IT:
 A. ONE BLT OF NINTH MAB SHOULD BE OUT OF COUNTRY CONTINUOUSLY, TO SERVE AS A REHABILITATION BASE FOR III MAF. (I HAVE WRITTEN CONCURRENCE FROM WESTY ON THIS, TO BEGIN IN SEPTEMBER)
 B. ONE OF THE NINTH MAB HELICOPTER SQUADRONS SHOULD BE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE YUNA 4534 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR
 WITHDRAWN PERIODICALLY, TO PROVIDE THE SAME REHABILITATION
 CAPABILITY FOR FIRST MAW HMM.

C. 2 SLF'S SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN COASTAL AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
 IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, AS DESIRED BY CG, III MAF.

D. THE A4 SQUADRON OF MAG 15 SHOULD MOVE INTO COUNTRY, FOR AS
 LONG AS THERE IS A DEMONSTRATED NEED FOR ITS SORTIES. WHEN THE
 MONSOON DIMINISHES THE SORTIE REQUIREMENTS, THE SQUADRON SHOULD
 COME OUT AND SERVE AS A RENAB BASE FOR THE FIRST WING'S COMMITTED
 A4'S.

E. THE F4 SQUADRON OF MAG 15 SHOULD SEND A DETACHMENT INTO
 COUNTRY NOW, TO REMAIN AS LONG AS ITS SORTIES ARE REQUIRED. THE
 SQUADRON, LESS THE DETACHMENT, SHOULD REMAIN AT IWAKUNI TO HANDLE
 THE SHOENORN PROGRAM.

F. THE ARTILLERY OF NINTH MAB SHOULD ROTATE INTO COUNTRY
 TO RELIEVE GENERALLY SIMILAR UNITS, FOR REHABILITATION PURPOSES.

G. ALL OF THIS, AS I SAY, IS MY OPTION IF COMBAT CIRCUMSTANCES
 WILL PERMIT. IF ANY OF YOU HAVE FURTHER OR VARIANT IDEAS ON THE
 SUBJECT, OR SUGGESTIONS AS TO A COURSE WHICH I SHOULD PURSUE
 WITH CINCPAC OR CMC, PLEASE LET ME KNOW. WARM REGARDS TO ALL.

GP-4

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COPIES OF CG-NINTH MAB MESSAGE 280752Z JUL67

RECEIVED BY : _____ DATE/TIME _____

THERE IS NOT A STATEMENT IN THE MESSAGE REQUIRING AN IMMEDIATE REPLY.

*Copy # 2 burned
14 Dec 67
A*

DATE MONTH 280752Z JULY 1967

#65

SECRET

6

P 280752Z JULY 67
FM CG NINTH MAB
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CG III MAF
CG FMFPAC (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW

EXCLUSIVE FOR

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM BGEN GLICK.
INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN, MAJGEN BOUKER, AND MAJGEN ANDERSON.
NINTH MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE.

A. CG FMFPAC 262157Z JUL 67.

1. I AM IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH PARA 8 OF REF A.
2. KEEPING THE ARG/SLF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FUNCTIONING EVEN IF THEIR TOTAL EFFORT CONTINUES TO BE IN SUPPORT OF III IN I CTZ IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE. IN ADDITION TO THE ADVANTAGE NOTED IN PARA 7 OF REF A THE TRAINING REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN OUR AMPHIBIOUS PROFICIENCY IS AT LEAST MET BY THE ARG/SLF OPERATIONS WHICH GAVE US CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF VIETNAM.
3. A PERTINENT FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED RELATIVE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF RLT 26 AND OTHER NINTH MAB ASSETS IS MY CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT BLT'S ROTATING FROM IN-COUNTRY. MY PRESENT ASSETS ON OKINAWA PLUS HQ 1/13 IS REQUIRED TO PROPERLY ACCOMPLISH THE TRAINING AND REHAB OF ROTATING BLTS.

GP-4

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEP
CIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP	LEGAL	MTO.	Postal	Protocol	PMG
Per. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sub.	Surp.									
III MAF 2100-2 (9-66)												

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES #65

CCW : 322

FILLER : 19

DTG : 291055Z

MONTH : JULY 67

ORIGINATOR : CG I FFRCEV

Handwritten initials

CATEGORY : FOR

FILE COPY : 1 OF 3 COPIES

Handwritten 'File' with a large flourish

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COPIES OF CG I FFRCEV MESSAGE 291055Z JUL 67

RECEIVED BY : _____ DATE/TIME _____

*Copy # 3
Annexed
14 Dec 67
S*

DATE MONTH 291055Z JUL 67

#66

SECRET

FOR

le

V FV 126
 O RUMHMF
 DE RUMNVF 2020 210112Z
 ZNY 55538
 C 291055Z JUL 67 ZFF-1
 FM CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN
 TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV 30N RVN
 INFO RUMSMA/I FFORCEV LHO TO MACV 30N RVN
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV 30C 30N RVN
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF DNG RVN
 BT

SECRET AVFA-CC-PL A-2156 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
 FROM GEN ROSSON

SUBJECT & IAISON VISIT TO III MAF BY GEN ROSSON (U)

1. (U) REFERENCES:

A. VISIT COMUSMACV TO I FFORCEV 28 JUL 67 (U)

B. PARA 2 D, MSG I FFORCEV AVFA-CC-PL, CITE A-2148

DTG 281330Z JUL 67 (U)

2. (S) GEN TOLSON AND I MET WITH GEN CUSHMAN TODAY TO COOR-
 DINATE DETAILS AND MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT
 OF A BDE IF OF THE 1ST CAV TO QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, TO CONDUCT
 SEARCH & DESTROY OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA AFTER RELIEF OF 1/101 ABN
 BDE.

3. (S) BASED ON OUR MEETING THE FOLLOWING CONCEPT WAS AGREED

PAGE 2 RUMNVF 2020 SECRET

UPON:

A. 3D BDE 1ST CAV WOULD BEGIN DEPLOYMENT 1 AUGUST WITH
 1 BN TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE REMAINDER OF THE BDE WITHIN THE NEXT
 SEVERAL DAYS.

B. 3D BDE 1ST CAV WILL REMAIN UNDER OPCOM 1ST CAV DIV.

C. AO FOR 3D BDE 1ST CAV WILL BE VURRENT AO 1/101 ABN
 BDE MODIFIED BY EXTENSION OF THE WEST LIMIT TO THE 30 N-S GRID
 LINE SO AS TO INCLUDE THE SONG RE VALLEY.

4. (U) SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, I PROPOSE TO INITIATE THE CON-
 CEPT OUTLINED IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

GP-4.

BT

NNN

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEG	
CIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMS	
Per. Ops.	Sp. Serv.	Sub.	Surp.										
III MAF 2100-2 (9-66)										COPY 2	OF 3	#66	COPIES

SECRET

CGN : 324

FILLER : 3

dp

DIG : 291726Z

MONTH : JULY 1967

ORIGINATOR : CMC

*G-3 HAS SEEN
WR*

CATEGORY : **(PERSONAL FOR)**

J

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COPIES OF CMC MESSAGE 291726Z JUL 67

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- 4 Dec 67
A*

DATE MONTH 291726Z JULY 1967

#67

PP RUMHMF
 DE RUCIHOA 1128 2101740
 ZNR UUUUU
 P 29172Z JUL 67
 FM CMC
 TO RUMHMFMA/CG FMXPAC
 INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS SPECAT PERSONAL FOG LTGEN KRULAK
 OPREP 5 (GROUND) REPORTING SYSTEM

1. DURING RECENT OPREP REPORTING CONFERENCE HELD HERE IN WASHINGTON IT WAS DISCLOSED THAT COMUSMACV HAS BEEN EXPERIMENTING WITH A NEW OPREP-5 (GROUND) REPORTING FORMAT THAT INCLUDES ONLY 5M CATEGORIES OF OPERATIONS AS FOLLO;

- A. SEARCH AND DESTROY (REGIONAL)
- B. SEARCH AND DESTROY (PROVINCIAL)
- C. SEARCH AND DESTROY (LOCAL)
- D. SECURITY OPERATIONS
- E. RESERVE (INCLUDES TRAINING/REFITTING)

2. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL OF THESE CATEGORIES WILL BE LARGE UNIT ONLY, AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS MUST BE POOLED INTO BATTALPON EQUIVALENTS. FURTHER, THE ONLY OPERATIONS THAT WILL BE COUNTED AS BEING IN SUPPORT OF RD WILL BE THOSE INCLUDED IN

PAGE TWO RUCIHOA 1128 UNCLAS SPECAT PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK
 CATEGORIES B AND C.

3. THE PROBABLE IMPACTS OF THIS REVISED FORMAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE;

A. THE ONLY REPORTED GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS WOULD BE LARGE UNIT SEARCH AND DESTROY. THIS WOULD REQUIRE III MAF TO LUMP ITS SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS INTO BN EQUIVALENTS UNDER THE APPROPRIATE CATEGORIES. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF THE REPORT INDICATES THAT THIS WAS DONE AND HOW MANY SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS WERE INCLUDED.

B. MANY OF III MAF OPERATIONS SUCH AS COUNTY FAIR AND GOLDEN FLEECE WOULD HAVE TO BE STATED AS SEARCH AND DESTROY (PROVINCIAL OR LOCAL) IF THEY ARE TO BE CREDITED AS SUPPORT OF RD.M

C. A COMBAT READY RESERVE UNIT, SUCH AS POSSIBLY AN SLF, WOULD BE LUMPED WITH UNITS NOT READY FOR COMBAT SUCH AS ARMY UNITS RECENTLY ARRIVED IN SVN.

D. ALL OTHER OPERATIONS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN A GENERAL CATEGORY OF SECURITY.

4. THE JOINT STAFF (NMCS) IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A GROUND OPREP FORMAT THAT WILL BE STAFFED WITH THE SERVICES

(PERSONAL FOR)

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#67

PAGE THREE RUCIHOA 1128 UNCLAS SPECAT PERSONAL LTGEN KRULAK
BEFORE SENDING TO THE FIELD AS A REPORTING SYSTEM DIRECTIVE.
IT APPEARS THAT THEY WILL USE THE REVISED MACV FORMAT AS A BASIS
FOR THEIR FORMAT.

5. IT IS THE VIEW OF HQMC THAT A BETTER FORMAT WOULD BE:

A. OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF RD

(1) DIRECT SUPPORT

(2) INDIRECT SUPPORT

B. OPERATIONS NOT IN SUPPORT OF RD.

(1) OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

(A) LARGE UNITS S&D

(B) RESOURCES CONTROL AND RESTORATION OF LOGS

(C) OTHER - INCLUDES COUNTY FAIR, STINGRAY AND SMALL
UNIT OPS NOT INCLUDED IN (B) ABOVE.

(2) STATIC SECURITY

(A) MILITARY AREAS AND INSTALLATIONS

(B) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CENTERS

(C) HAMLETS AND VILLAGES

(3) RESERVE/REACTION

(4) TRAINING/REFITTING

PAGE FOUR RUCIHOA 1128 UNCLAS SPECAT PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK
6. YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE MCV FORMAT AND THE
HQMC FORMAT ARE REQUESTED BY 2 AUGUST 1967.

BO

(PERSONAL FOR)

NNNN

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#67

CCN : 345

FILLER : 3

DTG : 302249Z

MONTH : JULY 1967

ORIGINATOR : CG FMFPAC

CG has seen

CATEGORY : **EXCLUSIVE FOR**

9

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*Dep CG A
31 July '67
G-4 D*

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 302249Z JUL 67

RECEIVED BY : _____ DATE / TIME _____

DATE MONTH 302249Z JULY 1967

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUMHMF
 DE RUMHM 5225 2112255
 ZNY TTTT
 P 302255Z JUL 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 P 302249Z JUL 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO WWD/CMC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 FOR GEN GREENE FROM LTJEN KRULAK.

1. I AM CONCERNED OVER CONTINUING III MAF INVOLVEMENT IN THE DYE MARKER PROJECT AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WESTY'S BROADENING USE OF III MAF MARINE ASSETS IN THIS TASK, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR ADD-ON FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE. I HAVE THE FEELING THAT UNLESS WE DO SOMETHING POSITIVE NOW TO SPOT-LIGHT THE SITUATION AND TO MAKE BOB'S PLIGHT KNOWN, WESTY WILL CONTINUE TO NIBBLE AT III MAF ASSETS IN ORDER TO PERMIT HIS USE OF THE ADD-ON FORCES ELSEWHERE.

2. IN THE PARAGRAPHS THAT FOLLOW I WILL SUMMARIZE HOW WE ARE INVOLVED TO DATE, WHAT I HAVE ADVISED BOB TO DO AND CONCLUDE WITH A RECOMMENDATION THAT MAY HELP CLEAR THE AIR.

3. SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN DYE MARKER ARE:

A. THE CLEARING OF THE STRONG POINT/OBSTACLE SYSTEM FROM

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 5222 T O P S E C R E T
 CON THIEU TO GIO LINH AND THE FORCES ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION HAVE TO DATE, COME WHOLLY OUT OF III MAF'S ASSETS.

B. THE INSTALLATION OF WIRE AND OTHER OBSTACLES HAS NOT EVEN BEGUN. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRICE OF III MAF'S EFFORTS DEVOTED TO THE DYE MARKER PROJECT TO DATE HAS ALREADY BEEN HIGH. HERE ARE SOME EXAMPLES:

(1) DIRECT LABOR: 5795 MANDAYS; III MAF ESTIMATES THAT 50 PER CENT OF AVAILABLE ITH ENGR BN EFFORT IS BEING APPLIED TO DYE MARKER.

(2) EQUIPMENT HOURS: 15440 HOURS

(3) EQUIPMENT LOSSES: (CODE X) (INCOMPLETE REPORT)

TRACTORS 15.

DUMP TRUCK 2.

(4) PERSONNEL LOSSES: (INCOMPLETE REPORT)

WIA 77.

KIA 4.

(5) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

LENGTH OF CLEARING 12.7 KM.

WIDTH OF CLEARING 620 METERS.

PIONEERED RTE 961, FROM LO TO CON THIEU, 10.5 KM.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHNFMA 3222 T O P S E C R E T

C. IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY FOR BOB TO REQUEST STAFF AUGMENTATION TO THE TUNE OF 3 OFFICERS AND 4 ENLISTED TO PERMIT THE THIRD DIVISION STAFF TO HANDLE THE DYE MARKER JOB. I HAVE RELUCTANTLY TAKEN ACTION TO PROVIDE THIS INTERIM AUGMENTATION ON A TAD BASIS, NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS, FROM OUT-OF COUNTRY FREPPAC RESOURCES.

4. ALTHOUGH SECDEF HAS TENTATIVELY APPROVED ONE BRIGADE FOR DYE MARKER, WE HAVE INFORMAL INFORMATION THAT WESTY INTENDS TO USE THE FIRST AVAILABLE BRIGADE, PROBABLY THE 196TH, AS A REPLACEMENT FOR ONE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO TASK FORCE OREGON. WHAT HIS INTENTIONS ARE FOR THE BRIGADE THIS RELIEVED IS UNKNOWN, BUT MY LAST CONVERSATION WITH HIM INDICATED THAT IT WOULD GO TO IFFV.

5. AS A RESULT OF MY CONCERN, I HAVE ADVISED BOB THAT HE SHOULD DO TWO THINGS:

A. FIRST, MAINTAIN CLEARLY SEPARATE ACCOUNTING AND IDENTITY OF THE PEOPLE, THINGS AND DOLLARS THAT ARE APPLIED TO DYE MARKER.

B. SECOND, MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON COMUSMACV TO SECURE THE REQUIRED RESOURCES THROUGH UNIFIED COMMAND CHANNELS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

PAGE 4 RUHNFMA 3222 T O P S E C R E T

6. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MACV RESUBMISSIONS OF FY-69 FORCE REQUIREMENTS, WHICH INCLUDED ORIGINAL DYE MARKER REQUIREMENTS, WAS DUE AT CINCPAC 17 JULY; HOWEVER, CINCPAC APPROVED A MACV REQUEST FOR DELAY IN SUBMISSION UNTIL 15 AUGUST.

IN ORDER TO GET THE MATTER OUT IN THE OPEN, SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER HAVING JOE QUERY CINCPAC ON LATEST PLANS FOR FORCE ALLOCATIONS TO DYE MARKER IN INCLUDE TIME PHASING AND SOURCE OF FORCES. SHARP HAS BEEN ALERTED TO THIS PROPOSAL. HE IS IN FULL SYMPATHY WITH US, AND WILL PUT THE MONEY ON WESTY'S BACK IN SPECIFIC TERMS WHEN HE GETS THE JOE QUERY. WARM REGARDS.

CF-3
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES