

HAS BEEN SENT

- ~~12. CG III MAF 110330Z AUG67 (S)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
TOPICS OF GEN GREENE'S VISIT~~
13. CG III MAF 120102Z AUG67 (S) *Sp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGENS HOCKMUTH, ANDERSON, ROBERTSON, AND KNOWLES,  
AND BGEN HERBOLD. INFO LTGEN KRULAK  
GEN WESTMORELAND'S VISIT
14. CG III MAF 151046Z AUG67 (C) *Sp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
SIR INVOLVING TWO (2) AMERICAN SEAMAN
- ~~15. CG III MAF 160722Z AUG67 (S)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
III MAF FORCE POSTURE~~
- ~~16. CG III MAF 160938Z AUG67 (S)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY.  
EMPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO III MAF~~
17. CG III MAF 170600Z AUG67 (S) *Group-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY.  
LTR TO WESTY (RESUMPTION SLF ROTATION AND REDEPLOYMENT NINTH MAB  
ELEMENTS)
- ~~18. CG III MAF 190230Z AUG67 (S)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN HOCKMUTH INFO GEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN  
CUSHMAN  
III MAF FORCE POSTURE~~
19. CG III MAF 202322Z AUG67 (C) *Sp-4*  
FOR KOMER FROM CUSHMAN  
TALK WITH GEN LAM (19AUG67) RE: VISIT DR. QUE
20. CG III MAF 231614Z AUG67 (C) *Sp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ADDITIONAL MANEUVER ELEMENTS BY WRINGING OUT OUR T/O'S
21. CG III MAF 250600Z AUG67 (C) *Sp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
QUOTE TO WESTMORELAND RE: WRINGING OUT ADD'L MANEUVER ELEMENTS  
FROM T/O

4. CG III MAF 031144Z Aug67 (TS) *Gp-1*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ASHAU VALLEY RAID
5. CG III MAF 031242Z AUG67 (TS) *Gp-1*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE COPY, MARINE EYES ONLY, TO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ASHAU VALLEY RAID
- ~~6. CG III MAF 041408Z AUG67 (TS)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
(ACCESS WITH LTGEN CUSHMAN'S CONSENT ONLY) DESTROYED~~
7. CG III MAF 131338Z AUG67 (TS) *Gp-1*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
DMZ SITUATION

- 7 CG III MAF 011404Z AUG67 (S) *gp-4*  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 PRESS RELATIONS (CORSON)
- 8 CG III MAF 030610Z AUG67 (C) *group - not shown*  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN HOCHMUTH FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 PRESS COVERAGE OF 2/9 DURING PERIOD 28-30JUL67
- 9 CG III MAF 050816Z AUG67 (C) *group-4*  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS, PASS TO GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN  
 GREENE, INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 REPORT OF PROBABLE ATROCITY
- ~~10 CG III MAF 051518Z AUG67 (U)  
 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND  
 MONTHLY EVALUATION~~
- 11 CG III MAF 070557Z AUG67 (C) *gp - not shown*  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO GEN ROBERTSON AND GEN HUCHMUTH FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 SMALL ARMS FIRE (ACCURACY)

275

25

250600Z

AUG 67

*File  
JWB*

CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**

2 COPIES FILLER 2

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COPIES OF CG III MAF 250600Z AUG 67

RECEIVED BY

*Copy # 2 burned  
14 Dec 67  
S*

250600Z AUG 67

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMSDN 2089 2370600  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 230600Z AUG 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. TODAY I SENT GENERAL WESTMORELAND FOLLOWING, QUOTE:  
 JUST AFTER YOUR LAST BRIEFING HERE AT MAF YOU ASKED ME TO LOOK  
 INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF PRODUCING ADTL MANEUVER ELEMENTS BY  
 WRINGING OUT OUR T/O'S. YOU MENTIONED PARTICULARLY THE AT/ASLT  
 UNITS OF THE BNS AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF MANPOWER.  
 IT MAY BE OF INTEREST THAT WE HAVE TAKEN A THOROUGH LOOK AT  
 OUR T/O'S OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND RESULTS OF THESE  
 STUDIES HAVE GONE UP THE LINE THROUGH NORMAL MARINE CHANNELS.  
 THESE INVOLVED ANALYSES BY BOTH MARDIVS OF THE DIVISIONAL  
 T/O'S AS WELL AS THOSE OF FORCE-TYPE UNITS. THE PRINCIPAL  
 AIM OF THE STUDIES WAS TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO  
 PROVISIONAL CHANGES WHICH WOULD PRODUCE UNITS HERE MORE  
 ADAPTABLE TO THE VIETNAM WAR. THE BASIC INF BN T/O WAS  
 FOUND TO BE ADEQUATE, WITH ONLY MINOR ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED.

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 2089 C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE  
 THESE STUDIES WERE THEN THE SUBJ OF A FMFPAC T/O CONF IN EARLY  
 MAY, FROM WHICH REFINED RECOMMENDATIONS WENT TO THE COMMANDANT.  
 AMONG OTHER THINGS, ADJUSTMENTS TO THE AT BN ARE BEING MADE BY  
 WHICH THAT BN IS BEING REDUCED AND THE RESULTING MANPOWER  
 SAVINGS ARE BEING PUT INTO ADDITIONAL, BADLY NEEDED FORCE  
 RECON ELEMENTS.  
 ALSO OF NOTE, INFANTRY PERSONNEL THAT WERE LOCATED IN HEAD-  
 QUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND WITH FMAW FOR SECURITY  
 PURPOSES HAVE BEEN REDISTRIBUTED TO INFANTRY UNITS.  
 AS TO THE AT/ASLT ELEMENTS, I CANNOT REDUCE THEM BECAUSE THEY  
 PROVIDE THE BULK OF OUR BUNKER-BUSTING CAPABILITY AND HAVE  
 PROVEN THEIR NECESSITY AGAINST THE MANY SUCH ENPLACEMENTS WE  
 HAVE REDUCED. WE DO NOT HAVE THE SEMI RECOILESS RIFLE WHICH  
 I BELIEVE TASK FORCE OREGON USES FOR THIS PURPOSE. I WILL  
 CONTINUE TO MONITOR ALL AREAS WHERE POSSIBLE TRADE OFFS OR  
 SAVINGS CAN BE ACHIEVED TO OUR OVERALL ADVANTAGE IN  
 MEETING TROOP ROYNTS IN 1972.

GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

|           |            |          |       |       |           |            |       |       |        |        |          |     |
|-----------|------------|----------|-------|-------|-----------|------------|-------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-----|
| CG        | AFC        | CS       | DC/S  | G-1   | G-2       | G-3        | G-4   | G-5   | COMPT. | ADJ.   | CHAP.    | CEO |
| CIB       | COC        | DENT. O. | EMB.  | ENGR. | FD. SERV. | HQ. COMDT. | INSP. | LEGAL | MTO    | POSTAL | PROTOCOL | PMO |
| PSY. OPS. | SPL. SERV. | SUP.     | SURG. |       |           |            |       |       |        |        |          | #21 |

268

HAS BEEN SENT

19

231614Z

AUG 67

CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

FILLER

CG III MAF

1-2 2  
231614Z AUG 67

*J*  
*L*

*Copy # 2 burned  
14 Dec 67  
A*

*Now lets readdress one to*

*CG FMFPAC*

231614Z AUG 67

*Specat to*

*L Gen Kaulak*

*Copy # 2 to Gen Owens*  
*S*

*L*

#20

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMSMA  
DE RUMSDN 2004 2351614  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 231614Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
JUST AFTER YOUR LAST BRIEFING HERE AT MAF YOU ASKED ME TO LOOK  
INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF PRODUCING ADIL MANEUVER ELEMENTS BY  
WRINGING OUT OUR T/O'S. YOU MENTIONED PARTICULARLY THE AT/ASLT  
UNITS OF THE BNS AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF MANPOWER.  
IT MAY BE OF INTEREST THAT WE HAVE TAKEN A THOROUGH LOOK AT  
OUR T/O'S OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND RESULTS OF THESE  
STUDIES HAVE GONE UP THE LINE THROUGH NORMAL MARINE CHANNELS.  
THESE INVOLVED ANALYSES BY BOTH MARDIVS OF THE DIVISIONAL  
T/O'S AS WELL AS THOSE OF FORCE-TYPE UNITS. THE PRINCIPAL  
AIM OF THE STUDIES WAS TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO  
PROVISIONAL CHANGES WHICH WOULD PRODUCE UNITS HERE MORE  
ADAPTABLE TO THE VIETNAM WAR. THE BASIC INF BN T/O WAS  
FOUND TO BE ADEQUATE, WITH ONLY MINOR ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED.  
THESE STUDIES WERE THEN THE SUBJ OF A FMFPAC T/O CONF IN EARLY

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 2004 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
MAY, FROM WHICH REFINED RECOMMENDATIONS WENT TO THE COMMANDANT.  
AMONG OTHER THINGS, ADJUSTMENTS TO THE AT BN ARE BEING MADE BY  
WHICH THAT BN IS BEING REDUCED AND THE RESULTING MANPOWER  
SAVINGS ARE BEING PUT INTO ADDITIONAL, BADLY NEEDED FORCE  
RECON ELEMENTS.

ALSO OF NOTE, INFANTRY PERSONNEL THAT WERE LOCATED IN HEAD-  
QUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND WITH FMAW FOR SECURITY  
PURPOSES HAVE BEEN REDISTRIBUTED TO INFANTRY UNITS.  
AS TO THE AT/ASLT ELEMENTS, I CANNOT REDUCE THEM BECAUSE THEY  
PROVIDE THE BULK OF OUR BUNKER-BUSTING CAPABILITY AND HAVE  
PROVEN THEIR NECESSITY AGAINST THE MANY SUCH EMPLACEMENTS WE  
HAVE REDUCED. WE DO NOT HAVE THE SEMI RECOLESS RIFLE WHICH  
I BELIEVE TASK FORCE OREGON USES FOR THIS PURPOSE. I WILL  
CONTINUE TO MONITOR ALL AREAS WHERE POSSIBLE TRADE OFFS OR  
SAVINGS CAN BE ACHIEVED TO OUR OVERALL ADVANTAGE IN  
MEETING TROOP REQTS IN ICTZ.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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| CIB       | COC        | DENT. O. | EMB.  | ENGR. | FD. SERV. | HQ. COMDT. | INSP. | LEGAL | MTD    | POSTAL | PROTOCOL | PMO  |
| PSY. OPS. | SPL. SERV. | SUP.     | SURG. |       |           |            |       |       |        |        |          | # 20 |

256

3

202322Z

AUGUST 1967

CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

FOR

*Handwritten signature and scribble*

1

3

CG III MAF

202322Z AUG67

*Copy #3 burned  
14 Dec 69  
A*

202322Z AUGUST 1967

#19

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**FOR**

**HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMSMA  
DE RUMSDN 1557 232252Z  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 202322Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FOR KONER FROM CUSHMAN

A. COMUSMACV 180200Z AUG 67

1. I SPOKE MORNING 19 AUGUST TO GENERAL LAM RE VISIT DR. QUE. LAM INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ACTION. WE WILL FOLLOW UP.
2. I HAVE BEEN PUSHING LAM PRETTY HARD ON NUMBER OF FRONTS OF LATE, INCLUDING ELECTIONS, REFUGEES, PERSONALITIES, IN ADDITION TO NORMAL ITEMS. BELIEVE HE FEELS "OVER ADVISED" AT THE MOMENT SO I INTEND TO EASE UP LEST HE DO SOMETHING UNWANTED JUST TO SHOW INDEPENDENCE.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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|           |            |          |       |       |           |            |       |       |        |        |          |     |
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| CIB       | COC        | DENT. O. | EMB.  | ENGR. | FD. SERV. | HQ. COMDT. | INSP. | LEGAL | MTO    | POSTAL | PROTOCOL | PMO |
| PSY. OPS. | SPL. SERV. | SUP.     | SURG. |       |           |            |       |       |        |        |          | #19 |

216

170600Z

3

AUGUST 1967

CG 111 MAF HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE**  
**MARINE CORP'S EYES ONLY**

cl has son

FILLER

2

CG 111 MAF

1,2 2

170600Z AUG67

*Copy #2 burned  
14 Dec 69  
R*

170600Z AUG67

#17

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMSDN 1298 2290600  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 170600Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FM LGEN CUSHMAN  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- 1. I HAVE SENT THE FOLLOWING TO WESTY; QUOTE:  
RESUMPTION SLF ROTATION AND REDEPLOYMENT NINTH MAB ELEMENTS  
A. CINCPACFLT 122300Z AUG 67 (NOTAL)  
B. ADMINO NINTH MAB 149000Z JUL 67 (NOTAL)  
C. COMUSMACV 140151Z AUG 67

1. III MAF CONCURS IN PLANNED RESUMPTION INTRA-THEATER ROTATION PROGRAM AS CONTAINED REF A TO EXTENT OF ROTATING ONE BLY TO OKINAWA COMMENCING NLT INOV 67 FOLLOWING INSTALLATION OF DYEMARKER SPOS. MAGNITUDE OF EN CAPABILITY ICIZ DICTATES CONTINUED PRIORITY AVAILABILITY BOTH SLF'S TO III MAF ON REDUCED REACTION TIME BASIS. REF C REFERS.

2. CONCERNING REDEPLOYMENT NINTH MAB ELEMENTS TO OKINAWA PROPOSED REF B, CONSIDER RETENTION HQ RLT 26 FWD, HQ 1/13, 5TH 150MM GUN BTRY AND 1ST PLAT 5TH SIN HOW BTRY NECESSARY III MAF OPS.

PAGE 2 RUMSDN 1298 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

3. REF B REPORTED DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT "K" BTRY 4/12 TO RVN. REQUIREMENT FOR ADD ARTY CAPABILITY STILL EXISTS. DESIRE K BTRY BE DEPLOYED RVN WHEN COMBAT READY AND RETAINED IN COUNTRY.

- 4. OTHER 5TH MAB UNITS REQUIRED BUT NOT YET IN COUNTRY ARE:  
2 FIXED WING SQDNS & HMS & MABS SLICE. UNQUOTE.

GP-4  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

|                       |           |         |       |       |          |           |       |       |        |        |              |     |
|-----------------------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|----------|-----------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------------|-----|
| SEC                   | AFC       | CS      | DC/S  | G-1   | G-2      | G-3       | G-4   | G-5   | Compt. | Adj.   | Chap.        | CEO |
| ASST                  | COC       | Dent.O. | Emb.  | Engr. | Fd.Serv. | HQ Comdt. | INSP. | LEGAL | MTO    | Postal | Protocol #17 | PMO |
| Per.Org.              | Spl.Serv. | Sup.    | Surf. |       |          |           |       |       |        |        |              |     |
| III MAF 2100-2 (9-66) |           |         |       |       |          |           |       |       |        |        |              |     |

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

202

HAS BEEN SENT

19

151046Z

AUG 67

CG III MAF

*By C6r Mly*  
16 Aug '67

**EXCLUSIVE**

*J*  
*ll*

FILLER

CG III MAF

1-2 2

151046Z AUG 67

*Copy #2 burned  
14 Dec 67*

151046Z AUG 67

#14

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HAS BEEN SENT

P 15104Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUCNDA/CMC  
RUHKK/CG FMFPAC  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN THIS IS TO ALERT YOU TO A POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY GENERATE MUCH PRESS COVERAGE. ON THE LATE AFTERNOON OF 11 AUGUST A MERCHANT MARINE SEAMAN, B. A. TRIMM, DIED OF STAB WOUNDS AFTER AN ALLEGED AFFRAY IN VIETNAMESE BAR AT MY KHE BEACH, EAST DANANG, NEAR THE BEACH OCCUPIED BY NICKERSON. HIS ASSAILANT IS SAID TO BE ANOTHER AMERICAN SEAMAN, JAMES LATNEY. SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO BOTH FMFPAC AND HQMC. BOTH SEAMEN WERE CREWMEN ON A US FLAG CARGO SHIP (USS AMTANK) UNDER INDEFINITE TIME CHARTER TO MSTs. SINCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED ASHORE IN VIETNAM AND NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SHIP, I AM ADVISED THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE. IF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM--WHICH HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE INCIDENT--ELECTS TO PROSECUTE THIS CASE, THERE WILL

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 1166 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE BE NO INVOLVEMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS IN THIS MATTER OTHER THAN THE FACT THE ACCUSED WAS APPREHENDED BY MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL AND IS CURRENTLY CONFINED IN THE III MAF BRIG. THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIRECTIVES FROM COMUSMACV. HOWEVER, I AM ADVISED THAT, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN SAIGON DESIRE THAT THE U. S. REQUEST A WAIVER OF JURISDICTION BY VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES AND UNDERTAKE TO PROSECUTE THE CASE. COMUSMACV HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON--WHICH I HAVE PASSED TO YOU--WHICH ASKS FOR GUIDANCE FROM THAT LEVEL. IF THE UNITED STATES ASSUMES JURISDICTION, I AM ADVISED THAT THE ONLY COURTS WHICH COULD TRY LATNEY ARE COURTS-MARTIAL. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE VIETNAMESE YIELD JURISDICTION, UNLESS LATNEY IS COURT-MARTIALED, HE WILL GO UNTRIED AND, IF GUILTY, UNPUNISHED. AS THE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AREA IN WHICH THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED, I WILL BE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRIAL. THE SLO OF COMUSMACV HAS VISITED THIS HEADQUARTERS AND ADVISED COL. FAW, MY SLO, THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND EXPECTS LATNEY TO BE TRIED BY A LOCAL GCM CONVENING AUTHORITY. I HAVE NO DESIRE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER, AND IT IS MY INTENTION TO VOLUNTEER NOTHING, HOWEVER, IF REQUESTED TO ASSUME JURISDICTION, I PROPOSE TO REFER IT TO FLC FOR ROUTINE ACTION AS IN EVERY OTHER

PAGE THREE RUMSDN 1166 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DISCIPLINARY CASE. NEVERTHELESS WE CAN ANTICIPATE A GREAT HUE AND CRY ABOUT CIVILIANS BEING TRIED BY MILITARY COURTS.

GP-4  
III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)  
BT

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|           |            |          |       |       |           |            |       |       |        |        |          |     |
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| CIB       | COC        | DENT. O. | EMB.  | ENGR. | FD. SERV. | HQ. COMDT. | INSP. | LEGAL | MTO    | POSTAL | PROTOCOL | PMO |
| PSY. OPS. | SPL. SERV. | SUP.     | SURG. |       |           |            |       |       |        |        | #14      |     |

189

HAS BEEN SENT

19

131338Z

AUG 67

CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FILLER

CG III MAF

1-2 2

131338Z AUG 67

#2 burned  
2 doubs

131338Z AUG 67

#7

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMSDN 1905 225 1356  
ZNY TTTT  
P 131336Z AUG 68  
FM CG 1st MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T

SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

REF MAGNETZ AUG 30

1. AS A FURTHER REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO SOLVE THE DMZ SITUATION:  
A. IT IS EVIDENT AT THE MOMENT THAT THE ENEMY EXPECTS US TO ATTACK. THIS WE ARE DOING BY FIRE BUT NOT BY "SPOILING ATTACK" SINCE IT IS EXPECTED.

B. HE MAY THEN ATTACK US, ALTHOUGH I AM NOT SURE BECAUSE HE IS TAKING SUCH A POUNDING. IF HE DOES IT WILL BE A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY. BRUNG AND I HAVE WORKED TOGETHER TO PREPARE COUNTERATTACK PLANS WHICH WILL GIVE US A CHANCE OF WIPING UP THE ASSAULTING TROOPS. IN THE MEANTIME, SHOULD THEY ATTACK I BELIEVE THEY WILL LEAVE QUITE A FEW HANGING ON OUR WIRE.

C. TODAY WE HAD SIX ANG LIGHTS SCHEDULED IN AND ABOVE THE DMZ; CONTINUOUS OBSERVATION FLIGHTS WERE MADE; 92 USMC SORTIES (166 TONS) WERE FLOWN; ARTILLERY EXPENDITURES WERE UPPED BY 6000 ROUNDS; TWO MORE BATTERIES OF 175'S HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO MOVE INTO THE NORTHERN AREA (AND ONE TO FIRST MARDIV TO WORK ON THE ROCKET THREAT); I WILL NOT BORE YOU WITH THE STATISTICS OF DAY AND NIGHT AIR ATTACKS IN BOTH DMZ AND TALLY NO AND BOWEN PACKAGE 1 BY FMAW AND 7TH AIR FORCE BECAUSE I KNOW THAT YOU GET THEM, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT A QUANTUM INCREASE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.

2. WE HAVE ASKED FOR CBN AND MX 36 BUT AM SURE WE WILL NEVER GET ENOUGH. CONSEQUENTLY APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUED HELP IN PRESSING OUR REQUIREMENTS IN THIS MATTER.

3. I BELIEVE THE SITUATION IS IN HAND.

WARM REGARDS

GP-1

BT

180

19

120102Z

AUG 67

CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

CG has seen  
O

EXCLUSIVE

FILLER

1-2 8

CG III MAF

120102Z AUG 67

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120102Z AUG 67

*Copy #2 burned  
14 Dec 67*

#13

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMSDN 876 224018Z  
ZNY 93855  
O 120122Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG FIRST MAW  
CG FIRST MARDIV  
CG IF OREGON  
CG FLC  
INFO CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGENS HOCHMUTH, ANDERSON, ROBERTSON, AND KNOWLES, AND BGEN HERBOLD, INFO LGEN KRULAK.

1. I MET WITH GEN WESTNORELAND TODAY AND IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSING ELECTION PLANS HE EMPHASIZED THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF INCREASING AND THEN MAINTAINING INTENSE PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY THROUGH THE ELECTION PERIOD IN ORDER TO PREVENT ACTION THAT COULD RESULT IN MAJOR PROPAGANDA VICTORIES. HE DIRECTED THAT TWO SLAM OPERATIONS BE RUN IN THE DMZ AREA BETWEEN NOW AND ELECTION AND STATED HE WOULD FULLY SUPPORT CONTINUING ARC LIGHT STRIKES IN THE SAME AREA. HE AGREED THE ROCKET PROBLEM IS EQUALLY WORRISOME, ESPECIALLY IN THE

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 876 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DANANG AREA.

2. COMUSMACV HAS PROVIDED ADDED FIRE POWER IN FORM OF THREE BTRIES OF 175MM ARTY WHICH ARE NOW OFFLOADING AT DANANG. TWO BTRIES WILL MOVE NORTH TO REINFORCE THE DMZ AREA, AND ONE WILL REMAIN IN DANANG FOR PRIMARY USE IN INTERDICTING ROCKET INFILTRATION ROUTES AND SUPPORTING LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE ON THOSE ROUTES.

3. THE FIRST SLAM IS SKEED TO BEGIN 14 AUG AND I HAVE ALREADY SUBMITTED ARC LIGHT REQUESTS FOR 3 DMZ TARGETS ON AN URGENT BASIS. I WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THESE REQUIREMENTS BUT WILL DEPEND ON THIRD MARDIV AS WELL AS MY OWN STAFF TO FEED IN PRIORITY TARGET AREAS. FURTHER, I DESIRE THE 175MM BTRIES BE OPERATIONAL ASAP AND I DESIRE AN IMMEDIATE INCREASE OF IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 50 PERCENT IN ARTY FIRES IN THE DMZ AREA AS WELL AS ON ROCKET ROUTES. IN DMZ THESE FIRES ARE TO BE DIRECTED AT SUSPECTED TROOP CONCENTRATIONS, HQ AND SUPPORTING ARTY POSNS. I HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY THE ENEMY BATTALIONS THAT APPEAR TO BE CLUSTERING AROUND CON TRIEN. FURTHER, I DESIRE A CONCENTRATION OF AIR EFFORT IN THE DMZ BOTH IN DAYLIGHT SORTIES AND NIGHT PRECISION BOMBING. THE SAME GOES FOR THE ROCKET APPROACHES TO DANANG AND CHU LAI.

4. IN SHORT, PUT THE PRESSURE ON AND KEEP IT ON. GP-4

BT

|          |           |         |      |       |          |           |       |       |        |        |                 |      |
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SECRET

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AUGUST 1967

CG III MAF

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EXCLUSIVE

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CG III MAF 070557Z AUG67

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070557Z AUGUST 1967

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

*6/21*

PP RUMHVP  
DE RUMSDN 473 2190557  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 270557Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO GEN ROBERTSON AND  
GEN HOCHMUTH FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

1. DAILY BRIEFINGS INDICATE MANY EXCHANGES OF SMALL ARMS FIRE  
IN WHICH NO ENEMY ARE HIT, BUT MARINES ARE WOUNDED. I AM OF THE  
OPINION THAT MARKSMANSHIP AND FIRE DISTRIBUTION INSTRUCTION AND  
PRACTICE ARE IN ORDER. TARGETS SHOULD BE SET UP WHERE PRACTICABLE  
AND MEN EXERCISED IN THE USE OF THEIR WEAPON UNTIL THEY CAN HIT  
THE TARGET. TASK FORCE OREGON HAS PUT SUCH A PROGRAM INTO EFFECT  
AND HAS LARGELY CURED THEIR UNITS OF THIS SAME PROBLEM - NOT  
BEING ABLE TO KILL THE ENEMY BY SMALL ARMS FIRE.

2. I WANT TO SEE A BIG IMPROVEMENT - LIVES ARE AT STAKE.  
SECONDARILY, BUT VERY IMPORTANT, THE MARINE CORPS REPUTATION FOR  
BEING A REAL PROFESSIONAL, PARTICULARLY IN MARKSMANSHIP, IS  
BECOMING TARNISHED.

3. I KNOW OF YOUR CONCERN IN THIS MATTER; HOWEVER, WHEN ONE HEARS

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 473 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
BRIEFS OF EACH CONTACT FROM THE ENTIRE IOTZ, ONLY THEN DOES  
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM STRIKE HOME.

WARM REGARDS.

BT

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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| CIB       | COC        | DENT. O. | EMB.  | ENGR. | FD. SERV. | HQ. COMDT. | INSP. | LEGAL | MTO    | POSTAL | PROTOCOL | PMO |
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AUGUST 1967

CG III MAF

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*CIS* *Paul*

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Ø5Ø816Z AUGUST 1967

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

OO RUMSMA  
DE RUMSDN 362 2175316  
ZNY CCCCC  
O 050316Z AUG 67 ZFF-6  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
INFO ZEN/CG FMFPAC

**EXCLUSIVE**

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ADAMS. PASS TO  
GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN GREENE. INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN  
CUSHMAN.

SUBJ: REPORT OF PROBABLE ATROCITY.

1. REPORT OF INVESTIGATION RECEIVED 5AUG67 BY THIS HQ CONFIRMS  
PROBABILITY AN ATROCITY WAS COMMITTED UPON MARINE LIEUTENANT  
ROBERT A. KISCH 0100377 USMC COMPANY E 2/9. LT KISCH WAS  
FOUND WITH HANDS TIED AND UNUSUAL WOUNDS AFTER THE BATTLE OF BLT  
2/9 IN THE DNZ ON 29-30 JULY.

2. FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING MADE BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. SPOT  
REPORT MADE TO MACV. FINAL REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO COMUSMACV  
UPON COMPLETION.

GP-4

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| CIB       | COC        | DENT. O. | EMB.  | ENGR. | FD. SERV. | HQ. COMOT. | INSP. | LEGAL | MTD    | POSTAL | PROTOCOL | PMO |
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TOP SECRET

OO RUNSHA  
DE RUMSDN 0205 2191144  
ZNY TTTT  
O 051144Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUNSHA/COMUSMACV  
BT

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EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN ABRAMS FROM  
LTJEN CUSHMAN

1. I HAVE RELUCTANTLY CANCELLED THE A SHAU VALLEY RAID/  
RON IN FORCE, SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW 4 AUGUST, FOR THE  
FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. WEATHER FORECAST SHOWS BADLY DETERIORATING  
CONDITIONS IN THE VALLEY ON 6 AUGUST, EXTRACTION DAY, AND  
FOR SEVERAL DAYS THEREAFTER. FORECAST INDICATES PROBABILITY  
OF ONLY FEW HOURS UNHINDERED AIR OPNS; SIX HOURS MINIMUM  
ARE REQUIRED, AS OPN IS AT LIMIT OF HELO CAPABILITY AS TO  
RANGE, LIFT AND NUMBERS. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS AN ABSOLUTE  
REQUIREMENT FOR COVER OF EXTRACTION AND REQUIRES EVEN BETTER  
WEATHER THAN HELO OPNS.

B. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES PROBABLE ENEMY ATTACK IN  
CON THIEP AREA WITH THESE UNITS: 1ST, 2D, 3D BNS OF 203D

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 0205 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
REGT; 7TH AND 8TH BNS, 29TH REGT. THERE ARE ALSO SOME  
INDICATIONS OF OTHER UNITS IN THE GIO LICH-DONG NA AREA.  
POSSIBILITY OF HELO AND INFANTRY ASSETS BEING TIED UP AT  
A SHAU WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF EXTRACTION ON SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES  
AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK IN MY JUDGEMENT. ABILITY TO MOVE TROOPS  
TO AND WITHIN THE DNE--RTE 9 AREA MAY BECOME A CRITICAL  
FACTOR.

C. ANY REVERSE WOULD HAVE A MAGNIFIED PSYCHOLOGICAL  
EFFECT DURING THIS PRE-EXTRACTION PERIOD AND THE OPN IS OF  
CONSIDERABLE RISK.

D. THE ARTILLERY AND AIR INTERDICTION CAMPAIGNS ARE UNDERWAY  
IN THE VALLEY AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE PUSHED HARD.

E. I PROPOSE TO USE THE FORCE ASSEMBLED AND INTENDED FOR  
A SHAU, AND TO MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE  
IN THE BASE AREA 114, WHERE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES A HARD  
TARGET OF GEN HUN REGIMENT HQ AND OTHER ELEMENTS. THE RANGE  
IS SHORT AND THE TROOPS AND HELOS CAN BE RECOVERED AT WILL  
FOR USE IN THE DNE IF NEEDED.

OP-1

TOP SECRET

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AUG 67

CG III MAF

CG 6  
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EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MESSAGE FOLLOWS//45//

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DE RUMSDN 0206 215124Z  
 ZNY TTTT  
 O 031242Z AUG 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

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TOP SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE COPY, MARINE EYES ONLY, TO LTGEN KRULAK  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

I HAVE JUST SENT THE FOLLOWING TO GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN  
 ABRAMS:

1. I HAVE RELUCTANTLY CANCELLED THE A SHAU VALLEY RAID/  
 RCW IN FORCE, SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW 4 AUGUST, FOR THE  
 FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. WEATHER FORECAST SHOWS BADLY DETERIORATING  
 CONDITIONS IN THE VALLEY ON 6 AUGUST, EXTRACTION DAY, AND  
 FOR SEVERAL DAYS THEREAFTER. FORECAST INDICATES PROBABILITY  
 OF ONLY FEW HOURS UNHAMPERED AIR OPNS; SIX HOURS MINIMUM  
 ARE REQUIRED, AS OPN IS AT LIMIT OF HELO CAPABILITY AS TO  
 RANGE, LIFT AND NUMBERS. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS AN ABSOLUTE  
 REQUIREMENT FOR COVER OF EXTRACTION AND REQUIRES EVEN BETTER  
 WEATHER THAN HELO OPNS.

B. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES PROBABLE ENEMY ATTACK IN  
 CON THIEN AREA WITH THESE UNITS: 1ST, 2D, 3D BNS OF 803  
 REGT; 7TH AND 9TH BNS, 29TH REGT. THERE ARE ALSO SOME  
 INDICATIONS OF OTHER UNITS IN THE GIO LINH-DONG HA AREA.  
 POSSIBILITY OF HELO AND INFANTRY ASSETS BEING TIED UP AT  
 A SHAU WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF EXTRACTION ON SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES  
 AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK IN MY JUDGEMENT. ABILITY TO MOVE TROOPS  
 TO AND WITHIN THE DMZ--RTE 9 AREA MAY BECOME A CRITICAL  
 FACTOR.

C. ANY REVERSE WOULD HAVE A MAGNIFIED PSYCHOLOGICAL  
 EFFECT DURING THIS PRE-ELECTION PERIOD AND THE OPN IS OF  
 CONSIDERABLE RISK.

2. THE ARTILLERY AND AIR INTERDICTION CAMPAIGNS ARE UNDERWAY  
 IN THE VALLEY AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE PUSHED HARD.

3. I PROPOSE TO USE THE FORCE ASSEMBLED AND INTENDED FOR  
 A SHAU, AND TO MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE  
 INTO BASE AREA 114, WHERE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES A HARD  
 TARGET OF 6TH NVA REGIMENT HQ AND OTHER ELEMENTS. THE RANGE  
 IS SHORT AND THE TROOPS AND HELOS CAN BE RECOVERED AT WILL  
 FOR USE IN THE DMZ IF NEEDED.

GP-1

BT



TOP SECRET / T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MESSAGE FOLLOWS // // // //

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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T O P S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE COPY, MARINE EYES ONLY, TO LTGEN KRULAK  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

I HAVE JUST SENT THE FOLLOWING TO GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN  
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1. I HAVE RELUCTANTLY CANCELLED THE A SHAU VALLEY RAID/  
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 REQUIREMENT FOR COVER OF EXTRACTION AND REQUIRES EVEN BETTER  
 WEATHER THAN HELO OPNS.

B. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES PROBABLE ENEMY ATTACK IN  
 CON THIEN AREA WITH THESE UNITS: 1ST, 2D, 3D BNS OF 893  
 REGT; 7TH AND 9TH BNS, 29TH REGT. THERE ARE ALSO SOME  
 INDICATIONS OF OTHER UNITS IN THE GIO LINH-DONG HA AREA.  
 POSSIBILITY OF HELO AND INFANTRY ASSETS BEING TIED UP AT  
 A SHAU WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF EXTRACTION ON SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES  
 AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK IN MY JUDGEMENT. ABILITY TO MOVE TROOPS  
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 IN THE VALLEY AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE PUSHED HARD.

3. I PROPOSE TO USE THE FORCE ASSEMBLED AND INTENDED FOR  
 A SHAU, AND TO MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE  
 INTO BASE AREA 114, WHERE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES A HARD  
 TARGET OF GVN NVA REGIMENT HQ AND OTHER ELEMENTS. THE RANGE  
 IS SHORT AND THE TROOPS AND HELOS CAN BE RECOVERED AT WILL  
 FOR USE IN THE DMZ IF NEEDED.

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AUGUST 1967

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CG III MAF 030610 XX IMMEDIATE  
CG THIRD MARDIV

D C/S

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN HOCHMUTH FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE RECENT OPERATION OF THE 2DBN, 9TH MARINE DURING THE PERIOD 28-30 JULY 1967, IS CAUSING QUESTIONS TO BE RAISED CONCERNING THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS CONDUCTED AND THE EXACT TACTICS EMPLOYED.
2. AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, PLEASE PROVIDE ME WITH A DETAILED OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE OPERATION, INCLUDING THE CONCEPT, TASK ORGANIZATION, A CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF THE EVENTS, FORMATIONS EMPLOYED, AND SUPPORTING FIRES REQUESTED AND DELIVERED.
3. YOUR REPORT WILL ENABLE ME TO MAKE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES AND EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OO RUMHVP  
DE RUMSDN 174 215061Z  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 030612Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE FOR**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN HOCHMUTH FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

1. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE RECENT OPERATION OF THE 20BN 9TH MARINES DURING THE PERIOD 28-30 JULY 1967, IS CAUSING QUESTIONS TO BE RAISED CONCERNING THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS CONDUCTED AND THE EXACT TACTICS EMPLOYED.
  2. AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, PLEASE PROVIDE ME WITH A DETAILED OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE OPERATION, INCLUDING THE CONCEPT, TASK ORGANIZATION, A CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF THE EVENTS, FORMATIONS EMPLOYED, AND SUPPORTING FIRES REQUESTED AND DELIVERED.
  3. YOUR REPORT WILL ENABLE ME TO MAKE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES AND EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.
- BT

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**SECRET**

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVE  
HAS BEEN SENT**

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O 011404Z AUG 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CMC  
CG FMFPAC  
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**SECRET**

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. I TALKED TO CORSON TODAY AT LENGTH AND HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS:

A. THIS WAS A ONE TIME FLUFF. HE STATED TO ME THAT IN HIS OPINION HE HAD "BEEN LED DOWN THE GARDEN PATH" IN BEING QUOTED IN WHAT HE THOUGHT HAD BEEN A SORT OF "BACK GROUNDER"

B. HE IS NOT PRESENTLY DISPOSED TO CONTINUE THIS TACK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT POINT BLANK IF HE WAS CONSIDERING STARTING A CRUSADE, AND AFTER I HAD POINTED OUT THE EFFORTS I WAS MAKING IN THE PROBLEM AREAS AND WHICH HE HAD NOW JEOPARDIZED SEVERELY, HE SAID NO.

C. HE IS CONTRITE ABOUT THE SITUATION AND GENUINELY REGRETS IT.  
2. HE WAS DECORATED RECENTLY BY THE GVN FOR HIS WORK IN THIS FIELD AND IT HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING. FURTHERMORE THERE IS SOME TRUTH-IN-HIS-GENERALITIES AND I HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY SEEKING SOLUTIONS. HE DID ADMIT TO A SENSE OF PESSIMISM AND FRUSTRATION AND AGREED THAT IT WAS BECAUSE HE WAS TOO CLOSE TO THE PROBLEM AND EXPECTED TOO MUCH OF ORIENTALS IN SHORT SIX MONTHS TIME HE WAS INVOLVED.

NEW SUBJECT - PRESS RELATIONS.

1. TODAY I TOOK THE FOLLOWING STEPS TO IMPROVE SAME AND HAVE HAD SOME READOUT THAT IT WAS SUCCESSFUL.

A. DIRECTED BRUNO TO SHIFT AN ASSISTANT ISO AT DONG HA WHO WAS AN IRRITANT. HE DID.

B. HAD AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESENT "DEAN" OF CORRESPONDENTS PRESENTLY ON SITE - BOB CHMAN OF AP. IT WAS REALLY A PREVIEW OF MY PRESS CONFERENCE WITH ALL DANANG CORRESPONDENTS WHICH I ALSO HELD THIS AFTERNOON. SEE BELOW.

C. APPOINTED KARL FASER AS ISO, AND INTRODUCED HIM TO THE PRESS AFTER LONG BRIEFING IN MY OFFICE SO KARL WOULD KNOW THE PROBLEMS.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

|           |           |         |        |               |          |           |       |        |        |        |                |     |
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**SECRET**

D. HELD A ONE HOUR PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH I COVERED THE FOLLOWING:

1. PROBLEM I HAD TO SOLVE OF STAFF OFFICERS VIOLATING SECURITY AND MACV REGULATIONS. STEP I TOOK - TELLING THEM TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR STATEMENTS. REACTION WAS THAT TO PROTECT THEMSELVES THEY HID BEHIND "THEY TOLD ME NOT TO TALK" SO I ADMITTED MISTAKE IN MY APPROACH AND SAID WE WOULD START OVER AGAIN AND THAT ALL OFFICERS WERE ENCOURAGED TO TALK TO REPORTERS WITHIN THEIR RANGE OF KNOWLEDGE BUT STILL WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY. FURTHER THAT IT WAS A DUTY OF CO'S AND ISO'S TO TALK TO PRESS AND THEY COULD NOT REFUSE WITHIN SECURITY AND PROPRIETY LIMITS. IN ANY EVENT THERE WAS NO PROSCRIPTION OR RESTRICTION ON PRESS TALKING TO MARINES.
2. I THEN PRESENTED STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF OPERATIONS IN DMZ, INCLUDING ENEMY.
  - (A) THE ENEMY IS PUSHING ON US TO KEEP OUR FORCES IN DMZ AND FROM OTHER TASKS WHICH WOULD HURT THEM MORE; NAMELY THE GUERRILLA AND POLITICAL CADRE WAR IN THE LOWLANDS.
  - (B) I DESCRIBED BOTH STATIC AND ACTIVE DEFENSE. I SAID THAT IN MY JUDGEMENT THE STATIC DEFENSE WOULD RESULT IN MANY MORE CASUALTIES AND LESS SUCCESS IN PREVENTING ENEMY FROM OCCUPYING PIECES OF SVN. I DESCRIBED THEIR TACTICS IN DETAIL - CLEVER SCOUTING, PREP OF BATTLE-FIELD, SUICIDAL ATTACKS. I FINISHED BY SAYING THAT THE CONCEPT WAS: LOCATE THE ENEMY BY RECONNAISSANCE, BOTH BY PATROL AND IN FORCE, AND WHEN TARGET DEFINED HIT THEM WITH AIR AND ARTILLERY, NOT MARINES. HOWEVER, FIGHTS AND CASUALTIES INEVITABLE BUT I BELIEVE MY TACTICS WOULD SHOW LEAST CASUALTIES FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION, WHICH WAS TO ASSIST GVN IN PREVENTION OF INVASION OF SVN BY NVN IN THE DMZ AREA.
3. I THEN DISCUSS ENEMY HE ATTACKS AGAINST US IN DMZ (WHICH HAS BEEN VERY INACCURATELY REPORTED ALTHOUGH I HAVE FURNISHED INFO REPEATEDLY). I POINTED OUT SUDDEN OPENING OF MAJOR ARTILLERY OFFENSIVE ALONG DMZ ON 2 JULY WHEN INCOMING JUMPED FROM COUPLE HUNDRED TO OVER 1200 PER DAY IN ONE DAY. PREVIOUSLY GROUND REACTION BY ARTILLERY COUNTERBATTERY FIRE HAD BEEN SUFFICIENT. NOW IT WAS NOT. IMMEDIATELY,

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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| DB       | COC        | Dent.O. | Emb. | Engr.         | Fd.Serv. | HQ Comdt. | INSP. | LEGAL              | MTO    | Postal | Protocol #7 | PMO |
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SECRET

WORKING AROUND THE CLOCK, BY ANALYSIS CRATERS AND SHELLREPS AND FEEDING THIS INTO WING AND III MAF INTELLIGENCE WE TARGETED PHOTO MISSIONS AND THEN AFTER READOUT TARGETED PILOT, PLANE AND BOMB AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGET. IN THREE DAYS INCOMING DROPPED FROM OVER 1000 TO ABOUT 20 PER DAY. IT IS NOW ABOUT 75 PER DAY. I HAD BEEN WORKING ON III MAF AIR/GROUND INTELLIGENCE, AND THIS EMERGENCY GAVE THE NEEDED PUSH. WE NOW HAVE AN EMBRYO AIR/GROUND INTELLIGENCE.

4. I FINISHED UP BY BRIEFING THE RECENT OPERATION OF 2/9 WHICH WAS A SUCCESS - WE DEFEATED TWO ENEMY BATTALIONS. WE CANNOT PROVE IT BY PRESS STANDARDS OF BODY COUNT. I THEN ADDRESSED THE PROBLEMS OF CASUALTY COUNT AND ANNOUNCEMENT. POINTING OUT THAT I WORK FOR COMUSMACV AND FOLLOW HIS RULES. THOSE THEY DO NOT LIKE THEY MUST TAKE UP WITH HIM. FOR SOME REASON THIS HAS NOT BEEN SAID, AND IT NEEDED TO BE. TO CONCLUDE I THINK WE HAVE CLEARED THE AIR AND AT LEAST CREATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRESH START. NEEDLESS TO SAY I HAVE HAD SOME LONG TALKS WITH BRUNO ON THIS - BUT HE IS DOING AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN A REAL TOUGH SITUATION AND I SYMPATHIZE WITH HIS PROBLEM. THE PRESS IS FREQUENTLY UNBELIEVABLE IN THE DIFFICULTY IT PRESENTS - BUT OUR GOAL IS TO PROTECT THE CORPS. OTHER THAN THAT I CANNOT CARE LESS WHAT THEY THINK OF ME PERSONALLY AS LONG AS THEY RESPECT MY INTEGRITY.

GP-4  
BT

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