

CCN 029

FILLER 25

DTG: 020720Z

MONTH: SEP 67

ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV

*E*

CATEGORY: FOR

*o*

FILE COPY: 1 OF 3 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2&3 OF 3  
COPIES OF COMUSMACV MESSAGE 020720Z SEP 67

RECEIVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE / TIME \_\_\_\_\_

*Copy #3 furnished  
14 Dec 67*

DATE MONTH 020720Z SEP 67

*#1*

SECRET

VV MFA037WKA397MMZVA 728VV MAA356

OO RUMHMF  
DE RUMSMA 0183 2450740

ZNY SSSSS  
O 020720Z SEP 67

FM COMUSMACV  
TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV  
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV  
RUMSMT/ACTING SA IV CTZ  
BT

FOR

SECRET 29160 FROM MACCOC  
GENERAL WESTMORELAND SENDS TO GENERALS CUSHMAN, ROSSON,  
WEYAND AND MR. COTTRELL

1. (S) THE EFFECTIVENESS AND DETERMINATION DEMONSTRATED  
THUS FAR IN SECURING THE RVN ELECTIONS IS MOST SATISFACTORY. FROM  
NOW THROUGH ELECTION DAY AND THE DAY FOLLOWING WILL BE A MOST CRITICAL  
PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF THIS COUNTRY. ANY MEASURES STILL REMAINING  
AVAILABLE TO YOU OR YOUR RVN COUNTERPARTS TO HEIGHTEN THE DEGREE  
OF SECURITY SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW TO ASSURE UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS.

2. (S) ALTHOUGH THE ELECTION WILL TERMINATE ON THE EVENING OF  
3 SEPTEMBER, THERE SHOULD BE NO TAPERING OFF IN SECURITY ACTIVITIES  
FOR AT LEAST AN ADDITIONAL 24 HOURS TO INSURE THE ORDERLY ACCOMPLISH-  
MENT OF THE NECESSARY POST ELECTION FUNCTIONS. GP-4

BT

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CS	COC	Den.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Div. Sup.	III MAF	2100-2	19	681	Sup.	Surg.						

SECRET

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CCN 33

FILLER 19

DTG: Ø22134Z

MONTH: SEPT 67

ORIGINATOR: ADMINO FMFPAC

*CG* lp

*c/s* O

CATEGORY: EXCLUSIVE

*DCIS* JHC

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PAC: RECEIVED COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES AMØ33

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DATE/TIME \_\_\_\_\_

DATE MONTH \_\_\_\_\_

Ø22134Z SEPT 67

#2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

VV PAC0994  
PP RUMMF RUCIHOA  
DE RUMHMA 0295 2452134  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 022134Z SEP 67  
FM ADMNO FMFPAC  
TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
RUMHMF/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUMMF/CG III MAF  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L AM033 RPT AM033  
EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL GREENE AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL KRULAK FROM  
MAJOR GENERAL THARIN INFO LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUSHMAN  
LATNEY CASE (U)

- A. ADMNO FMFPAC 292244Z AUG67 (C)
- B. CG III MAF 291226Z AUG67 (C)
- C. COMUSMACV 010918Z SEP67 (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATE ON INFORMATION SUMMARIZED IN REF A.
2. REF B REQUESTED ATTITUDE OF COMUSMACV AND AMEMBASSY SAIGON WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE REQUESTS WHICH INVOLVE REMOVAL OF LATNEY FROM VN PRIOR TO TRIAL. REF C ADVISED THAT ACTIONS AS TO DEFENSE REQUESTS ARE WITHIN SOUND DISCRETION OF CONVENING AUTHORITY PRIOR TO TRIAL AND OF COURT DURING TRIAL. NO ADVERSE REACTION ANTICIPATED FROM GVN AS TO ANY ACTIONS TAKEN PURSUANT TO UCMJ AND MCM. AMEMBASSY CONCURS IN LATER ASSESSMENT.
3. WILL CONTINUE TO ADVISE YOU OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS.

GI-4  
BT

NNNN

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#2

*CG* \_\_\_\_\_

CCN 74

*C/S* \_\_\_\_\_  
FILER 19 *9*

DTG: 050316Z

MONTH: SEP 67

ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV

CATEGORY: FOR

FILE COPY: 1 OF 3 COPIES

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COPIES OF COMUSMACV MESSAGE 050316Z SEP 67

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14 Oct 67  
S*

DATE MONTH 050316Z SEP 67

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SECRET

FORM

MFB 3 73 FFCA59200ZVA 533

VV MAD 800

VV WAG511  
 PP RUMHMF  
 DE RUMSMA 0503J 2480325  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 050316Z SEP 67  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMHMF/G III MAF  
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV  
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV  
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ  
 BT

SECRET 29377 FROM MACCORDS.  
 GENERAL WESTMORELAND SENDS TO GENERAL CUSHMAN, ROSSON, WEYAND AND  
 MR. COTTRELL

REF: MACV MSG 29160, DTG 020720Z SEP 67

(S) IN THIS POST ELECTION PERIOD IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL  
 VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, SUPPORT THE  
 FREELY ELECTED GOVERNMENT. THERE SHOULD BE NO WAVERING OF LOYALTY.  
 ADVISORS SHOULD IMPRESS THIS FACT UPON THEIR COUNTERPARTS AND  
 SHOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE TO SEE THAT COUNTERPARTS GET FULLY BEHIND  
 THE EFFORTS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT SO THAT THERE MAY BE NO LOSS OF  
 MOMENTUM IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS HERE GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CFO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PRD
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#3

CG *[Handwritten signature]*

CCN 075

*C/S* FILLER 3

DTG: 050825Z

MONTH: SEPTEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV

CATEGORY: FOR

FILE COPY: 1 OF 3 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3  
COPIES OF COMUSMACV MESSAGE 050825Z SEPT67

RECEIVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE/TIME \_\_\_\_\_

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14 Dec 67  
E*

DATE MONTH 050825Z SEP67

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*lp*

OO UUMSEA  
 DE UUMSA 0537J 2480930  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 O P 050825Z SEP 67 ZEX ZYT  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO AIG 7046  
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS 29402 FROM: MACOI FOR: CG'S AND FLAG OFFICERS SECTION I OF IV.  
 SUBJ: PRESS TRENDS NUMBER 248-67 FOR 5 SEPTEMBER 1967:

THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT ITEMS WERE RELEASED TO NEWS  
 CORRESPONDENTS IN SAIGON AT 1630H THIS DATE:

CONTACT FLARED ANEW YESTERDAY AS ALLIED FORCES REPORTED SIG-  
 NIFICANT ACTIONS IN I CORPS, III CORPS, AND IV COPRS. THERE ARE  
 35 BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER OPERATIONS UNDERWAY IN THE REPUBLIC  
 17 OF THEM ARE ANNOUNCED.

IN QUANG NAM PROINCE, ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH MARINES CONTINUE TO  
 PRESS THE ENEMY IN THE CONTACT REPORTED YESTERDAY. THE U.S. MARINES  
 ARE REPORTED TO BE IN LIGHT CONTACT. THUS FAR THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED  
 FOR 160 ENEMY KILLED. THE ACTION BEGAN AT 0500 ON THE 4TH AND IS  
 CENTERED IN AN AREA 24 KM (15 MILES) NORTHWEST OF TAM KY.

U.S. MARINES IN OPERATION KINGFISHER KEILLED 37 ENEMY IN A  
 CONTACT 2 KM (1.2 MILES) SOUTHWEST OF CON THEIN YESTERDAY, TWO  
 MARINES WERE KILLED IN THE ACTION.

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(ON BACKGROUND) A LIGHT FIRE TEAM FOR THE U.S. ARMY'S 1ST  
 AVAITION BRIGADE KILLED 16 ENEMY SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF CAN THE YESTER-  
 DAY WHEN THEY CAME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF AN ARVN OUTPOST. THE OUT-  
 POST WAS ATTACKED BY AN ESTIMED COMPANY AND THE GUNSHIPS  
 SPOTTED THE ENEMY IN CAMPANS MOVING DOWN A CANAL. (END BACKGROUND)

IN OPERATION KOLE KOLE ELEMENTS OF THE 2D BRIGADE, 25TH  
 INFANTRY DIVISION MADE TWO CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY WEST OF SAIGON  
 YESTERDAY ACCOUNTING FOR 16 ENEMY KILLED. TWO U.S. SOLDIERS WERE  
 KILLED IN THE FIRST CONTACT AND THERE WERE NO U.S. INJURIES IN THE  
 SECOND.

IN OPERATION DIAMOND HEAD HEAVY CONTACT WAS REPORTED NORTHEAST  
 OF TAY NINH WHEN UNITS OF THE 3D BRIGADE, 25 TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
 MADE CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY NEAR THE BASE OF NUI BA DEN MOUNTAIN  
 THREE U.S. SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN THIS ACTION. ENEMY CASUALTIES  
 ARE UNKNOWN.

AIR FORCE PILOTS FLEW 83 MISSIONS, MARINE CORPS PILOTS 34, AND  
 NAVY PILOTS 10 FOR A TOTAL OF 127 AIR STRIKES AND ARM RECONNAISSANCE  
 MISSIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM YESTERDAY. TARGETS INCLUDED HIGHWAY  
 BRIDGES, RAILROAD FACILITIES, WEAPONS POSITONS AND LINES OF COM-  
 MUNICATION. AIR FORCE F-4 PHANTOM WAS DOWNED TO GROUND FIRE IN

III MAF 2100/3 (REV. 11-66)

COPY # 2

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO.	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 4

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THE PANHANDLE, THE PILOT IS MISSING.

U.S. PILOTS CONTINUED THEIR SUPPORT OF ALLIED GROUND FORCES THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC YESTERDAY. THEY FLEW MORE THAN 500 FIXED WING AND 12,000 HELICOPTER SORTIES PROVIDING THE NECESSARY COMBAT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO KEEP THE ENEMY OFF BALANCE.

THE SEVENTH FLEET ROCKET-FIRING SHIP USS ST FRANCIS RIVER WRECKED 439 ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS AND KILLED AT LEAST 10 ENEMY IN QUANG TRI AND BINH DINH PROVINCES DURING THE PAST THREE DAYS.

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

OPERATION KINGFISHER (QUANG TRI PROVINCES) - THIRTY SEVEN ENEMY AND TWO U.S. MARINES WERE KILLED YESTERDAY AS A RESULT OF A CONTACT BETWEEN A MULTI-COMPANY FORCE FROM THE 4TH MARINES AND AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE 2 KM (1.2 MILES) SWEST OF CON THIEN.

AT 1115 YESTERDAY A COMPANY FROM THE 4TH MARINES MADE FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY. AS CONTACT DEVELOPED A SECOND MARINE COMPANY REINFORCED. A MARINE OBSERVER CALLED ON STATION ADJUSTED ARTILLERY FIRE AND DIRECTED GROUND FORCES AGAINST THE ENEMY. LATE IN THE AFTERNOON THE ENEMY EMPLOYED ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST THE FRIENDLY UNITS AND THEN BROKE CONTACT AFTER DARK.

CT AFTER DARK.

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 0537J UNCLAS

ONE CREW SERVED AND TWO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS WERE CAPTURED. FORTY-SEVEN MARINES WERE WOUNDED (16 MEDEVAC).

AT 1220 YESTERDAY ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH MARINES COMPANY ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE 4 KM (2.4 MILES) SOUTHEAST OF CON THIEN. SMALL ARMS AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE WAS EXCHANGED AND MORTAR FIRE SUPPORTED THE MARINE UNIT. ONE MARINE WAS KILLED AND SIX WERE WOUNDED. ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN.

ONE ROUND OF THE MORTAR FIRE SUPPORTING THE MARINES FELL SHORT, WOUNDING NINE MARINES, AN INVESTIGATION IS UNDERWAY.

BETWEEN 0845 AND 1100 YESTERDAY THE U.S. 4TH MARINES COMMAND POST AT CON THIEN WAS HIT BY AN ESTIMATED 35 ROUNDS OF ENEMY 82MM ARTILLERY FIRE. COUNTER BATTERY FIRE WAS INITIATED FROM ARTILLERY UNITS AND TANKS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THREE U.S. MARINES WERE WOUNDED.

(DELAYED REPORT) BETWEEN 1700 AND 1920 ON 3 SEPTEMBER THE 4TH MARINES COMMAND POST AT CON THIEN RECEIVED 70 ROUNDS OF ENEMY 82MM MORTAR FIRE. COUNTER MORTAR FIRE WAS RETURNED FROM TANKS AND ONTOS AND AIR STRIKES WERE DIRECTED AGAINST SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITIONS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. TWO MARINES WERE WOUNDED.

AT 0055 YESTERDAY MORNING THE SAME MARINE COMMAND POST RE-

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#4	

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CEIVED 52 ROUNDS OF ENEMY ARTILLERY AND RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE. COUNTER BATTERY FIRE WAS RETURNED WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THERE WERE NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES.

QIANG NAM/QUANG TIN PROVINCES - UPDATE - THE ENEMY HAS 160 DEAD THUS FAR AS ACTION CONTINUES BETWEEN UNITS OF THE 5TH MARINES AND ELEMENTS OF AN ESTIMATED TWO ENEMY BATTALIONS 24 KM (15 MILES) NORTHWEST OF TAM KY.

THE MARINES ARE RECEIVING U.S. AIR FORCE AC-47 DRAGONSHIP TANK AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO SEAL OFF THE ENEMY ESCAPE ROUTES IN THE QUE SON VALLEY WHERE THE ACTION IS TAKING PLACE.

ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH MARINES WERE ON A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION 6 KM (4 MILES) EAST OF THE HAMLET OF QUE SON YESTERDAY WHEN THEY MADE CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY IN DUG IN POSITIONS. THE TERRAIN IS RELATIVELY OPEN TREE LINED PATTY LAND. OTHER MARINE UNITS WERE HELD INTO THE AREA. THE ACTION THROUGHOUT THE DAY WAS DESCRIBED AS SPORADIC TO HEAVY. THE ACTION TAPERED OFF DURING THE NIGHT.

AT MID-NIGHT COUNTER MORTAR FIRE AND DRAGONSHIPS SILENCED ENEMY MORTAR FIRE AS LIGHT CONTACT CONTINUED.

IN ADDITION TO THE ENEMY CASUALTIES THERE HAVE BEEN 24

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DETAINEES. NINETEEN AND TWO CREW SERVED WEAPONS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. THE LIGHT ACTION IS CONTINUING.

TASK FORCE OREGON - FIFTEEN ENEMY WERE KILLED YESTERDAY THROUGHOUT THE TASK FORCE OREGON AREA OF THE OPERATION WHEN U.S. ARMY ELEMENTS PRESSED THEIR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF I CORPS.

EIGHT OF THE ENEMY WERE KILLED BY UNITS OF THE 3D BRIGADE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, IN SCATTERED ACTIONS NEAR DUC PHI IN QUANG NGIA PROVINCES. U.S. PARATROOPERS FROM THE 1ST BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNS DIVISION, KILLED SEVEN ENEMY AND DESTROY MISSION NEAR CHI LAI IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE.

I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

OPERATION PERSHING BINH DINH PROVINCE THE ENEMY DEATH TOLL IN OPERATION PERSHING NOW STANDS AT 3,145. CALVARYMEN FROM THE U.S. ARMY 1ST CALVARY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) CONTRIBUTED TO THE TOTAL WHEN THEY KILLED SEVEN ENEMY IN SCATTERED CONTACTS IN BINH DINH PROVINCE YESTERDAY. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FOR THE OPERATION ARE 447 KILLED AND 2,021 WOUNDED.

II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

OPERATION KOLO KOLO (TAY NINH PROVINCE) EIGHT ENEMY WERE

BT

(11) MAF 2100/3 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
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 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO AIG 7046  
 BT

OUNCLAS 29402 FROM: MACOI FOR: CG'S AND FLAG OFFICERS SECTION II OF IV. KILLED AND ONE SUSPECT WAS DETAINED IN SOUTHERN TAY NINH PROVINCE LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON BY U.S. INFANTRYMEN.

A COMPANY FROM THE U.S. ARMY'S 2D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE 64 KM (40 MILES) NORTHWEST OF SAIGON AT 1745. THE ACTION TOOK PLACE IN A RICE PADDY AREA 5 KM (3 MILES) NORTHWEST OF THE VAM CO DONG RIVER. AC-47 DRAGONSHIPS, HELICOPTER LIGHT FIRE TEAMS AND ARTILLERY FIRES SUPPORTED THE INFANTRYMEN. TWO OTHER COMPANIES FROM THE DIVISION WERE CALLED IN AS REINFORCEMENTS.

THE ENEMY BROKE CONTACT AT 2045. TWO U.S. SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND 13 WOUNDED IN THE ACTION. THE U.S. SOLDIERS RECOVERED TWO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS LEFT BEHIND BY THE ENEMY.

MEANWHILE, AT 1930 ANOTHER 2D BRIGADE COMPANY ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ENEMY IN SAMPANS 20 KM (13 MILES) DOWN THE RIVER, JUST INSIDE THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF HAU NGHIA PROVINCE.

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A SHORT FIRE FIGHT ENSUED WHICH RESULTED IN EIGHT ENEMY KILLED AND THREE ENEMY SAMPANS DESTROYED. THERE WERE NO U.S. CASUALTIES IN THIS ACTION.

OPERATION DIAMOND HEAD (TAY NINH PROVINCE) - HEAVY CONTACT WAS MADE YESTERDAY BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. ARMY'S 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, AND AN ESTIMATED REINFORCED ENEMY COMPANY 86 KM (54 MILES) NORTHWEST OF SAIGON.

THE U.S. TROOPS MADE CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY AT 1311 NEAR THE BASE OF THE TOWERING NUI BA DEN MOUNTAIN NORTHEAST OF TAY NINH CITY. A COMPANY FROM THE 22D INFANTRY MADE THE INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE WELL FORTIFIED ENEMY. AS THE ACTION DEVELOPED A SECOND COMPANY FROM THE 22D REINFORCED ITS SISTER UNIT.

THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE THE ENEMY EMPLOYED SMALL ARMS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND RPG-2 ROCKETS WHILE THE U.S. ELEMENTS RETALIATED WITH ARTILLERY, A HELICOPTER LIGHT FIRE TEAM AND U.S. AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR STRIKES. FIVE OF THE TACTICAL AIR STRIKES Poured ORDNANCE DIRECTLY ON THE ENEMY TARGETS. THE ACTION BECAME LIGHT TO SPORADIC AS EVENING APPROACHED AND AT 1910 THE ENEMY BROKE OFF THE ENGAGEMENT. THERE WERE THREE U.S. SOLDIERS KILLED AND 33 WOUNDED IN THE ACTION. ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN.

III MAF 2100/3 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#4	

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 0538J UNCLAS

IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

OPERATION CORONADO IV. (LONG AN PROVINCE) - AN ENEMY AMMUNITION CACHE, 22 KM (14 MILES) SOUTH-SOUTHEAST OF SAIGON, WAS UNCOVERED LATE YESTERDAY MORNING BY A PATROL OF THE US ARMY'S 2D BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION. THE CACHE CONTAINED 4,000 ROUNDS OF 81MM AMMUNITION, 2,050 ROUNDS OF 7.92 AMMUNITIONS, 680 ROUNDS OF .30 CALIBER AMMUNITIONS AND TWENTY 60MM MORTAR ROUNDS. EIGHT POUNDS OF TNT WERE ALSO FOUND.

(PHONG DINH PROVINCE) - IV CORPS- (ON BACKGROUND) - SIXTEEN ENEMY WERE KILLED YESTERDAY WHEN A LIGHT FIRE TEAM FROM THE U.S. ARMY'S 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE CAME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF AN ARVN OUTPOST SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF CAN THO.

THE ARMY GUNSHIPS WERE CALLED IN WHEN THE OUTPOST, LOCATED 137 KM (86 MILES) SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON, WAS ATTACKED BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY. THE GUNNERS SPOTTED THE ENEMY ESCAPING IN SAMPANS DOWN A CANAL AND FIRED ON THEM. NINE SAMPANS WERE ALSO SUNK IN THE ACTION. (END BACKGROUND).

AIR NORTH-AIR SOUTH

AIR NORTH-AIR FORCE PILOTS FLEW 83 MISSIONS, MARINE PILOTS 34 AND NAVY PILOTS 10 FOR A TOTAL OF 127 STRIKE AND ARMED RECON-

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 0538J UNCLAS

NAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM YESTERDAY. TARGETS INCLUDED HIGHWAY BRIDGES, RAILROAD FACILITIES, WEAPONS POSITIONS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

IN A UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES, U.S. AIR FORCE FIGHTER PILOTS FROM THE 366TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING LAUNCHED A SAM MISSILE.

IN AN F-4 PHANTOM ATTACK ON A MOBILE MISSILE SITE, THE RESULTANT FIRE AND EXPLOSION OF THE SITE, LOCATED SOME 25 MILES SOUTH-SOUTHEAST OF DONG HOI IN THE PANHANDLE CAUSED THE SAM MISSILE TO RACE SKYWARD WITHOUT DIRECTION OR CONTROL TO 2,000 FEET BEFORE ARCHING OVER AND IMPACTING 4 KM (2 1/2 MILES) NORTH OF THE TARGET. OTHER F-4'S SET OFF FOUR MORE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND DESTROYED THE TRANSPORTER.

PHANTOM AND THUNDERCHIEF PILOTS FROM THE 355TH TFW ATTACKED THE KEP HA (REPEAT) KEP HA ARMY BARRACKS AGAIN YESTERDAY, DESTROYING SIX BUILDINGS 64 KM (40 MILES) NORTH OF HAIPHONG. PILOTS OBSERVED A NUMBER OF OTHER MILITARY STRUCTURES THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DESTROYED.

EIGHT PIECES OF ROLLING STOCK WERE DESTROYED AND EIGHT OTHERS DAMAGED IN THE PHU CHO RAILROAD SIDING 21 KM (13 MILES)

III MAF 2100/3 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 4

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EAST-NORTHEAST OF HANOI BY 385TH TFW PILOTS AND 150 FEET OF TRACK WAS TORN UP AT THE HOANG MAI RAILROAD SIDING 37 KM (23 MILES) NORTH-NORTHEAST OF HANOI BY PHANTOMS FROM THE 8TH TFW.

OTHER 8TH TFW PILOTS TOUCHED OFF A LARGE SECONDARY EXPLOSION WHICH SENT FLAMES TO 800 FEET AND SMOKE TO OVER 2,000 FEET ALONG A TRUCK CONVOY 40 KM (25 MILES) SOUTH OF VINH. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF TRUCKS WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. SMOKE AND DARKNESS PREVENTED COMPLETE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

AN AIR FORCE F-4 PHANTOM WAS DOWNED BY ENEMY GROUND FIRE IN THE PANHANDLE. THE PILOT IS MISSING IN ACTION.

TWO SPANS OF A KEY HIGHWAY BRIDGE, 5.4 KM (3.1 MILES) SOUTH OF THE CENTER OF HAIPHONG WERE DESTROYED BY U.S. NAVY CARRIER-BASED PILOTS YESTERDAY. A-4 SKYHAWK AND F-8 CRUSADER PILOTS FROM THE USS ORISKANY SCORED DIRECT HITS WITH THEIR 500 POUND BOMBS ON THE BRIDGE, DROPPING TWO SPANS INTO THE WATER. TWO FLAK SITES AND A SAM SITE IN THE SAME AREA WERE ALSO ATTACKED BY THE NAVY JETS. THE FLAK SITES WERE SILENCED. SMOKE AND DUST AT THE SAM SITE PREVENTED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

THE ARMY SUPPLY DEPOT AT AN LUAN, 11.1 KM (7 MILES) SOUTHWEST OF HAIPHONG WAS ALSO HEAVILY DAMAGED YESTERDAY BY ORISKANY

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 0538J UNCLAS

JETS. A SERIES OF FIRES, THROUGHOUT THE COMPLEX SENT COLUMNS OF SMOKE BILLOWING TO 10,000 FEET.

USS CORAL SEA SKYHAWKS DAMAGED TWO OTHER BRIDGES, 33 AND 48 KM (20 AND 30 MILES) SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF HAIPHONG AND REPORTED ORDNANCE ON TARGET AT A THIRD BRIDGE, 51 KM (32 MILES) SOUTH OF THANH HOA.

A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM) ON A TRAILER TRANSPORTER WAS DESTROYED AND FIVE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS WERE SET OFF AS A RESULT OF MARINE CORPS A-4 SKYHAWK RAID 40 KM (25 MILES) SOUTH OF DONG HOI YESTERDAY. OTHER CHU LAI BASED MARINE JETS JOINED WITH DA NANG BASED PILOTS IN HITTING ARTILLERY POSITIONS JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ. THEY DESTROYED FIVE FORTIFICATIONS, SET OFF TWO SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND STARTED THREE FIRES. DARKNESS PREVENTED FURTHER BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

TWO LARGE ORANGE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS WERE TRIGGERED AND ONE FIRE IGNITED AT A FERRY COMPLEX 25 KM (16 MILES) SOUTH OF DONG HOI BY DA NANG BASED A-6 INTRUDERS.

AIR SOUTH-U.S. AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS TACTICAL FIGHTER PILOTS HAMMERED ENEMY ENCAMPMENTS AND POSITIONS WHILE FLYING OVER 500 SORTIES IN THE REPUBLIC YESTERDAY, ALMOST HALF OF WHICH BT

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
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BT  
 UNCLAS 29402 FROM: MACOI FOR: CG'S AND FLAG OFFICERS SECTION III OF IV.  
 WERE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF ALLIED GROUND OPERATIONS.

WORKING CLOSELY WITH GROUND FORCES, SEVENTH AIR FORCE PILOTS REPORTED 21 ENEMY SAMPANS SUNK, EIGHT OF WHICH RESULTED IN SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 148 ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS NEUTRALIZED AND TEN FIRES STARTED WITHIN ENEMY POSITIONS. THEY FLEW 148 OF THEIR 303 SORTIES IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF ALLIED GROUND OPERATIONS UNDERWAY IN THE REPUBLIC.

PILOTS FROM THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING CONTINUED TO PROVIDE HEAVY SUPPORT TO GROUND FORCES IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. ANNOUNCED GROUND OPERATIONS WERE SUPPORTED BY 102 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES OF THE 263 SORTIES FLOWN BY MARINE AVIATORS. THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE ENEMY LOCATIONS ACCOUNTED FOR 12 ENEMY KILLED, 27 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND 22 FIRES. THEY ALSO DESTROYED OR DAMAGED 183 ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS AND TWO WEAPONS POSITIONS.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0539J UNCLAS

U.S. AIR FORCE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND B-52 CREWS STRUCK MORTAR AND ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE LAST NIGHT, 5 KM (3 MILES) NORTH-NORTHEAST OO CON THIEN.

TWENTY-FOUR ENEMY WERE KILLED YESTERDAY, 15 ENEMY SAMPANS WERE DESTROYED AND 16 FIELD POSITIONS WERE NEUTRALIZED BY U.S. ARMY GUNSHIP CREWS. ARMY AIRCRAFT, IN A CONTINUING EFFORT TO PRESS THE ENEMY AND PROVIDE COMBAT AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO ALLIED GROUND FORCES, FLEW ALMOST 11,000 SORTIES IN THE REPUBLIC YESTERDAY. THEY CARRIED MORE THAN 15,000 TROOPS AND OVER 1,500 TONS OF CARGO.

WORKING SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH ARVN FORCES IN THE IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE ARMY HELICOPTERS ASSISTED IN KEEPING THE ENEMY OFF BALANCE BY FLYING NEARLY 600 SORTIES.

ADDING SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE OVERALL MISSION U.S. MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER CREWS FLEW OVER A THOUSAND SORTIES IN THE III MAF AREA, 150 OF WHICH WERE ARMED HELO SORTIES. THEY TRANSPORTED OVER 1,800 TROOPS AND 356 TONS OF CARGO.

US NAVY SEVENTH FLEET  
 NGF - RVN - THE ROCKET-FIRING SHIP USS ST. FRANCIS RIVER

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
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AGE 3 RUMSMA 0539J UNCLAS

WRECKED 439 ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS AND KILLED AT LEAST 10 ENEMY IN QUANG NGAI AND BINH DINH PROVINCES DURING THE PAST THREE DAYS.

YESTERDAY THE SHIP POUNDED AN ENEMY STORAGE AREA 10 KM (6 MILES) NORTHEAST OF QUANG NGAI CITY, DESTROYING OR DAMAGING 100 EMPLACEMENTS AND 18 SAMPANS. HER FIREPOWER ALSO DAMAGED FOUR BARGES AND TRIGGERED THREE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

ON 3 SEPTEMBER, HER ROCKETS AND FIVE-INCH GUNS HIT AN ENEMY ASSEMBLY AREA 30 KM (19 MILES) NORTH OF BONG SON, DESTROYING OR DAMAGING THREE EMPLACEMENTS.

THE ENEMY FELT SOME OF THE STRENGTH OF THE ST. FRANCIS RIVER ON 2 SEPTEMBER WHEN SHE KILLED 10 ENEMY AND DESTROYED OR DAMAGED 336 EMPLACEMENTS 10 KM (6 MILES) NORTHEAST OF QUANG NGAI CITY. THE SHIP'S ROCKETS ALSO WRECKED 28 BUNKERS AND COLLAPSED 420 FEET OF TRENCH BESIDE SPARKING A SECONDARY EXPLOSION AND THREE FIRES.

IN OTHER NAVAL ACTION ALONG THE COAST OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THE DESTROYER USS KNOX SHELLED AN ENEMY EMPLACEMENT 10 KM (6 MILES) SOUTH-SOUTHEAST OF BONG SON IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION PERSHING YESTERDAY. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WAS UNAVAILABLE. SEVEN ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS, THREE SAMPANS AND TWO BUNKERS WERE

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 0539J UNCLAS

DESTROYED OR DAMAGED YESTERDAY WHEN A SEVENTH FLEET DESTROYER FIRED ON TARGETS IN THE IV CORPS. THIS ACTION TOOK PLACE IN AN AREA 132 KM (83 MILES) SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON IN VINH BINH PROVINCE.

THE SAME AREA WASH HIT ON 3 SEPTEMBER WITH SIX ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS AND ONE BUNKER DESTROYED OR DAMAGED.

NGF-DMZ (DELAYED REPORT)-ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN BOTH HALVES OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE WERE TARGETS FOR THE DESTROYER USS WALDRON ON 3 SEPTEMBER. ONE POSITION WAS SILENCED BY THE SHIP'S FIVE-INCH GUNS IN THE NORTHERN HALF AND GOOD COVERAGE WAS REPORTED ON A POSITION IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION.

THE HEAVY CRUISER USS BOSTON ALSO TURNED HER GUNS ON ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE 17TH PARALLEL THAT DAY, BUT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WAS UNAVAILABLE.

U.S. NAVAL FORCES, VIETNAM

NAVFORV - U.S. UUY AND COAST GUARD MARKET TIME PATROLS DETAINED 55 PERSONS AND 16 JUNKS YESTERDAY, WHILE SURVEYING OR SEARCHING A TOTAL OF 2,120 VESSELS ALONG THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S COASTLINE.

FORTY-THREE OF THE SUSPECTS WERE DETAINED-FOLLOWING A

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-65)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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E 5 RUMSMA 0539J UNCLAS

LARGE ROUN-UP OF RIVER CRAFT 7 KM (5 MILES) NORTH OF DONG PHU OFF THE COAST OF QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. IN THIS ACTION, 14 OF THE TOTAL JUNKS WERE HELD. THREE OF THE SUSPECTS DETAINED WERE LATER CONFIRMED TO BE VIET CONG.

SEVEN U.S. NAVY RIVER PATROL BOATS (PBR) AND FOUR NAVY ARMED SEAWOLF HELICOPTERS BATTLED ENEMY FORCES FOR THREE HOURS YESTERDAY ALONG THE CO CHIEN RIVER, 80 KM (50 MILES) SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON, RESULTING IN NINE ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS DESTROYED AND 27 OTHERS DAMAGED.

AT 1500 YESTERDAY, VINH LONG-BASED PBRs ON ROUTINE PATROL CAME UNDER ENEMY ATTACK WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM SIX TO EIGHT SHORE POSITIONS. OTHER PBRs AND A HEAVY HELICOPTER FIRE TEAM WERE CALLED IN TO HIT THE ENEMY POSITIONS WITH .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUN AND M-79 GRENADE FIRE. THE ENEMY ATTACK CAME FROM BUNKERED FORTIFICATIONS AND FOXHOLES ALONG A 2 KM (1 1/2 MILE) STRETCH OF THE SHORELINE. THERE WERE NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN.

OTHER PBRs OPERATING IN THE MEKONG DELTA AND RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE DURING GAME WARDEN PATROLS REPORTED SURVEYING OR SEARCHING

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 0539J UNCLAS

1,382 VESSELS YESTERDAY DETAINING EIGHT SUSPECTS.

NOTE: CASUALTY FIGURES ARE INTERIM AND ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING U.S. WOUNDED FIGURES THAT 85 PCT ARE RETURNED TO DUTY WITHOUT HOSPITALIZATION AND OVER 2/3 OF THOSE HOSPITALIZED ARE LATER RETURNED TO DUTY.

ADDENDUM:

THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT WON A SINGLE MEANINGFUL VICTORY IN THE II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.

THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE IN A REPORT PREPARED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM B. ROSSON, COMMANDER OF THE U.S. ARMY'S I FIELD FORCE.

THE REPORT STATES THAT MORE THAN 36,000 NORTHVIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE BY U.S., RVN AND ROK FORCES DURING THE 18-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY.

THE ALLIED FORCES HAVE REPEATEDLY REVERSED MAJOR ENEMY OFFENSIVES DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A BIG VICTORY THAT WOULD RESTORE BADLY NEEDED MORALE AND PRESTIGE TO THE COMMUNISTS.

THE ALLIES STYMIED THEIR GREATEST EFFORT WHEN THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED FOUR AMBITIOUS CAMPAIGNS IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS  
BT

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-65)

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UNCLAS 29402 FROM MACCI FOR : CG'S AND FLAG OFFICERS FINAL SECT OF IV.  
 BETWEEN OCTOBER 1965 AND NOVEMBER 1966

THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT A MAJOR ENEMY OFFENSIVE WAS PLANNED  
 THIS PAST JUNE, BUT WAS ABORTED WHEN THE U.S. ARMY'S 4TH INFANTRY  
 DIVISION KILLED 470 COMMUNISTS IN BATTALION SIZE ELEMENTS  
 OF THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY REGIMENTS.  
 THE REPORT CONTINUES TO STATE THAT THE ENEMY HAS BEEN FORCED  
 INTO AVOIDING DECISIVE CONTACT WITH ALLIED FORCES. ALLIED ACTIONS  
 HAVE REPEATEDLY CUT HIS FLOW OF MATERIEL, FORCING THE ENEMY TO  
 MOVE TO SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS WHERE THERE IS SCANTY FOOD  
 SUPPLIES.  
 BT

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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*CG*                     

CCN 076

*c/s* FILLER 3 *O*

DTG: 051205Z

MONTHS SEPTEMBER 1967

*G-4 Has seen*

ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV

*DCG 10 My 6 Sept 67*

CATEGORY: **EXCLUSIVE** *For Eng*                     

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TO CG III MAF  
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**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR 29434  
FROM MACDC-EBD EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND  
REF: A. CG, III MAF MSG DTG 050106Z SEP 67 (C)

1. (C) RECEIVED YOUR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN FUNDING REPAIR OF THE SONG CAU DO BRIDGE.
2. (C) THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN:
  - A. COMNAVFORV HAS REQUESTED OICC TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY WITH NECESSARY PLANNING AND DESIGN.
  - B. COMNAVFORV HAS REQUESTED FROM COMSERVPAC 0.81 FUNDS FOR THIS EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.
3. (U) BE ASSURED THAT MY STAFF WILL MONITOR THESE ACTIONS TO INSURE THAT PLANNING, DESIGN, AND FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE ON A TIMELY BASIS FOR REPAIR OF THIS VITAL BRIDGE.
4. BEST REGARDS.

GP4  
BT

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Lt Smith Hansen*

ORIGINATOR: CG FMFPAC

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## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMSDN/CG III MAF  
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM  
 LTGEN KRULAK - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 OBSTACLE/STRONGPOINT SYSTEM (S)

- A. CG III MAF 080812Z/SEP67 (S)
1. APPRECIATE THE INFORMATIVE REPORT ON GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S VISIT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 7 SEP 67. HERE ARE A FEW HASTY THOUGHTS WHICH MAY HELP YOU IN DEVELOPING THE REQUIRED ALTERNATE PLANS.
  2. FIRST, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, ANY ALTERNATE PLAN WE PROPOSE SHOULD AIM TO RELIEVE MARINE FORCES OF STATIC RESPONSIBILITY, IN ORDER TO FREE THEM TO CONDUCT MORE PRODUCTIVE OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ICTZ.
  3. AS YOU WELL KNOW, THE PRESENT DYE MARKER PLAN ENVISIONS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LINEAR TRACE WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY EXTEND FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ON THE EAST TO DONG HA MOUNTAIN IN THE

PAGE 2 RUMKM1337 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCOE  
 WEST. THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR THE SURVEILLANCE OF THIS SYSTEM EQUATES TO APPROXIMATELY 2 INFANTRY REGIMENTS PLUS THE CONCURRENT UTILIZATION OF HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED MUNITIONS AND SENSORY DEVICES THROUGHOUT THE LINEAR TRACE. A CONSIDERABLE EXPENDITURE IN MATERIALS AND MANPOWER HAS ALREADY BEEN COMMITTED TO THAT PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE. THIS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NEW PLAN.

4. ON THE ABOVE BASIS, AND IF THE DECISION TO ABANDON THE PRESENT DYE MARKER PLAN IS FORTHCOMING, HERE IS WHAT I WOULD PROPOSE TO WESTY:

A. RETAIN ALL OF THE PLANNED STRONGPOINTS, EXCEPT A-6, ALONG PRESENT TRACE OF THE SYSTEM.

B. CEASE CLEARING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE OBSTACLE/STRONGPOINT SYSTEM ALONG THE PRESENT 600 METER WIDE TRACE. BECAUSE THAT IS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF HEAVY CASUALTIES. BATTALION BASE AREAS C-1 AND C-2 SHOULD BE FULLY DEVELOPED.

C. USE ARVN TROOPS TO MAN THE EXISTING STRONGPOINTS TO PREVENT INFILTRATION, TO CONDUCT ACTIVE COMBAT PATROLLING AND TO MAINTAIN A READY REACTION FORCE.

D. EMPLACE ADSIDS, HELOSIDS, ACOUNBUOYS, AND AIR

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUNKM1337 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
MONITORED SENSORY DEVICES ALONG ALL KNOWN OR SUSPECTED INFILTRATION  
ROUTES BETWEEN THE SONG BEN HAI AND THE PRESENT TRACE OF THE  
OBSTACLE/STRONG POINT SYSTEM.

E. USE EXTENSIVE STING RAY OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE DMZ,  
PARTICULARLY FROM STRONG POINT A-4 TO THE WEST, AND  
INCLUDE AN OP AT DONG HA MOUNTAIN.

F. SELECTIVELY AIR EMPLACE GRAVEL, DRAGON TOOTH AND TRIP  
WIRE MINES (WAAPM) IN THE DMZ NORTH OF THE SONG BEN HAI.

G. DEVELOP, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, STRONG POINTS A-2, A-4,  
A-3, A-1 AND A-5, AND THEIR SUPPORTING ROADS/HELI PADS IN THAT  
ORDER, USING ALL AVAILABLE DYE MARKER BOM INCLUDING BURIED AND  
LINE-OF-SIGHT SENSORY DEVICES, ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES, BUNKERS AND  
FORTIFICATION MATERIAL TO PROVIDE HARDENED, DEFENSIBLE AND  
HABITABLE POSITIONS. USE MARINE ENGINEER AND SEABEE UNITS FOR  
THIS PURPOSE, IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER CONSTRUCTION FORCES.  
FOLLOW-ON THE FOREGOING CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENT WITH DEVELOPMENT  
OF BASE CAMPS C-1 AND C-2 IN THAT ORDER, WITH REMAINING DYE MARKER  
BOM, TO PROVIDE BASE FACILITIES FOR REACTION FORCES SUPPORTING  
THE STRONG POINTS.

H. EXPLOIT TACTICAL AIR TO THE FULLEST IN SUPPORT OF THIS

PAGE 4 RUNKM1337 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
CONCEPT. ASK WESTY TO REQUIRE MONYER TO ACCEPT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES  
OR REMOVE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL IMPEDIMENT GEOGRAPHICALLY  
FIXED AT THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ, MOVING THAT LINE OF  
DEMARCATATION NORTH SO AS TO ENCOMPASS THOSE ENEMY ARTILLERY/ROCKET  
POSITIONS WHICH DIRECTLY OPPOSE YOU.

3. IN SUMMARY, THE FOREGOING ALTERNATIVE PLAN TO THE CURRENT  
DYE MARKER PROGRAM ENVISAGES INTENSIFICATION OF FIRE SUPPORT,  
CEASES WORK ON THE ACTUAL GROUND TRACE OF THE OBSTACLE  
SYSTEM WHILE RETAINING STRONG POINTS MANNED BY ARVN TROOPS.  
SENSORY DEVICES WOULD BE EMPLOYED ALONG INFILTRATION ROUTES  
AND ALONG THE PRESENT TRACE OF THE OBSTACLE/STRONG POINT  
SYSTEM, AND ASSORTED ANTI PERSONNEL DEVICES NORTH OF THE BEN  
HAI. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REMOVE U. S. MARINE  
FORCES FROM STATIC COMMITMENT IN ORDER TO PERMIT A MORE  
OFFENSIVE COMBAT POSTURE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CON 93

CG  
C/S  
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SEP 67

DTG: 090714Z

MONTH: SEP 67

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

**EXCLUSIVE**

TECHNICAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WITHIN FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 100204Z AUG67

B. CG FMFPAC 050345Z SEPS67

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK - INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM BGEN HERBOLD  
1. DURING YOUR RECENT VISIT TO FLC YOU EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER PEOPLE AVAILABILITY AND THE SKILL LEVELS OF OUR PERSONNEL WORKING IN A NUMBER OF HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED JOB ASSIGNMENTS AND IN THE ON-THE-JOB TRAINING WE ARE DOING AFTER THESE MEN ARRIVE IN-COUNTRY. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN AND ADMITTEDLY HAVE BEEN TOO PRONE TO ACCEPT WHAT THE CORPS HAS PROVIDED US.

2. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, OUR GREATEST NEED IS FOR THOROUGHLY TRAINED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS EXPERTS, DATA PROCESSING PROGRAMMERS, 3SG OPERATORS, AUTODIN MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS, INVENTORY MANAGEMENT EXPERTS, SKILLED WAREHOUSEMEN, IPP&P PEOPLE, AND SHIPPING AND

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 601 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RECEIVING PERSONNEL. BY REFERENCES A AND B, YOU HAVE PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE TO THIS COMMAND FOR WAREHOUSING AND SHIPPING AND RECEIVING FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD. WE DO NEED HELP, HOWEVER, IN THESE FIELDS ON A PERMANENT BASIS. FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE 59 STAFF NCO'S 3051 WAREHOUSEMEN AUTHORIZED WE HAVE 51. IN OCCUPATIONAL FIELD 31 WE HAVE 7 OF THE 10 WE RATE. IN OTHER SPECIALTIES WE HAVE SIMILAR SITUATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE REMAINING STAFF 400 SUPPLY OF 30 BILLETS WE HAVE ONLY 74 OF THE 100 WE RATE. IN DATA PROCESSING OF 40 WE HAVE 21 OF 36.

3. MORE IMPORTANT THAN OVERALL OF SHORTAGES ARE THE SKILLS REQUIRED OF CERTAIN JOBS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ESTIMATE OUR NEED TO BE FOR 10 SUPPLY DATA PROCESSING PROGRAMMERS. AT PRESENT WE HAVE 3, ALL OF WHOM HAVE BEEN TRAINED HERE IN THE 3SG ON-THE-JOB. WE DO HAVE 5 EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL AND FISCAL PROGRAMMERS NOW WORKING IN SUPPLY WHO HAVE LEARNED SUPPLY HERE ON-THE-JOB BUT WHO SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THEIR OWN FIELDS. I BELIEVE ALL PERSONNEL SENT TO WESTPAC AS SUPPLY PROGRAMMERS SHOULD HAVE COMPLETED A REGULAR PROGRAMMING COURSE IN THE 3SG OR HAVE 2 YEARS EXPERIENCE AND ALL MUST KNOW COBAL AND BE COMPETENT IN 1401 PROGRAMMING. AS FOR MACHINE OPERATORS (4021), WE SHOULD HAVE 16 ON BOARD. AT PRESENT

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PAGE THREE RUMHFL 601 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 WE HAVE 10, ALL TRAINED ON-THE-JOB. ALL SHOULD HAVE HAD AT LEAST ONE YEAR EXPERIENCE OR EQUIVALENT SCHOOL ON 360 OPERATION BEFORE ARRIVAL.

4. IN INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AT ANY ONE TIME AT LEAST 15 OF OUR STAFF NCO'S (3091 AND 3042) AND 20 JUNIOR ENLISTED MEN (3042) SHOULD HAVE SPECIALIZED TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE IN INVENTORY MANAGEMENT BY EXCEPTION AS GAINED AT A MECHANIZED INVENTORY CONTROL POINT BEFORE COMING IN-COUNTRY. THE JUNIOR MEN COULD HAVE RECEIVED SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION IN SUCH TECHNIQUES IN COURSES AT SUPPLY SCHOOLS.

5. ANOTHER SKILL REQUIRED IS FOR 6 MEN IN OF 28 TO BE TRAINED IN IBM MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES SO AS TO ASSURE THAT CAPABILITY AT OUR 3 AUTODIN TERMINALS. THIS REQUIREMENT IS OUTLINED IN ADMINS FMEPAG DIS 051853Z FEB 67 TO CMC. SO FAR WE DO NOT KNOW OF CMC'S ACTION BUT WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED THE PEOPLE REQUESTED. IN LIKE MANNER THE MOS 2542'S WHO WILL BE AUTODIN OPERATORS SHOULD RECEIVE AT C&E SCHOOLS BATTALION, INSTRUCTION IN TRANSCRIBER OPERATIONS AND ON CURRENT DIRECTIVES RE AUTODIN PROCEDURES.

6. WITH REGARD TO SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, WE HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED A CAPTAIN USMC JUST OUT OF COMPUTER ENGINEERING POST GRAD ED AT MONTEREY. HE IS THE FIRST OF 6 PEOPLE WE NEED TO GIVE US A CAPABI-

PAGE FOUR RUMHFL 601 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 LITY IN THIS VITAL AREA. WE'D LIKE THE REST - ANOTHER OFFICER OR TWO AND 3 OR 4 ENLISED. WE COULD FILL SOME OF THESE FROM EXISTING ASSETS IF WE HAD FULL ALLOWANCE, BUT ALL OUR EXISTING QUALIFIED PEOPLE ARE NOW IN OPERATING JOBS. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN GETTING ADDITIONAL TRAINED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS MEN WERE WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL. I WANT THEM TO DO THE SAME KINDS OF THINGS THAT LTCOL ELDER AND MAJOR STEIN DID ON THEIR RECENT VISIT.

7. I BELIEVE THAT THE OVERALL WELL BEING OF THE COMMAND CAN BEST BE SERVED BY THE ARRIVAL ON BOARD OF OUR FULL ALLOWANCE OF OFFICER PERSONNEL. TODAY WE ARE SHORT 71 OFFICERS. THE FUTURE LOOKS BRIGHTER AND BY KNOWN GAINS AND LOSSES WE WILL BE 47 SHORT ON 1 OCT AND 36 SHORT BY 1 NOV. THAT STILL IS ABOUT 10% SHORT OF MEETING OUR MANNING LEVEL REQUIREMENT.

8. IN SUMMARY, FLC COULD WELL USE THE FOLLOWING: 35 MORE OFFICERS, OF WHICH 2 ARE TRAINED SYSTEMS ANALYSTS OR 360 PROGRAMMERS, A SCHEDULED INPUT OF 10 SUPPLY PROGRAMMERS (4051) AND 16 CONSOLE OPERATORS (4021), 6 SPECIALLY IBM TRAINED CRYPTO REPAIRMEN (2817), 8-10 STAFF NCO WAREHOUSEMEN, 5 PP&P STAFF NCO'S, 3S&R STAFF NCO'S AND 4 STAFF NCO'S OF ANY MOS WITH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OR SUPPLY MANAGEMENT TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE FOR OUR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS/SUPPLY

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE RUMFL 601 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 MANAGEMENT TEAM. WHILE WE ARE PRESENTLY OVER STRENGTH IN 3042'S,  
 I ALSO CONSIDER IT HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO PROGRAM INTO OUR REPLACE-  
 MENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS AT LEAST 15 STAFF NCO'S 3091 AND  
 3042 AND 20 SGT'S AND CPL'S 3042 WITH SPECIFIC EXPERIENCE AS  
 OUTLINED IN PARA 4 ABOVE. I BELIEVE THAT THESE SPECIFIC ACTIONS  
 COMPILED WITH A RAPID BUILDUP TO OUR APPROVED ENLISTED MANNING  
 LEVEL WILL SOLVE OUR RECOGNIZABLE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS.  
 9. GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR MANY CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS IN OUR  
 BEHALF AND YOUR DEEP INTEREST IN HELPING US IMPROVE OUR OPERATIONS.  
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

GP-4

BT

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MONTH: SEP 67

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ZNY SSSSS

P 131205Z SEP 67 ZFD

FM COMNAVFORV

TO RUMMF/CG III MAF

INFO RUMNVH/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE FT ONE

BT

SECRET

PERSONAL TO GEN CUSHMAN FROM RADM VETH

A. CG III MAF 091156Z SEP 67

B. COMCOSURVFOR OP-ORD 201-64 ANNEX D RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST IN REF A FOR MY VIEWS ON MARKET TIME (M/T) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE). REPLY DELAYED TO OBTAIN INPUT OF PARTICIPANTS.

2. THE APPLICABLE PORTION OF REF B IS QUOTED. "VIOLATORS OF CURFEW AND PROHIBITED ZONES (WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUBJECTED TO GUNFIRE BY VNN FORCES) WILL NOT BE FIRED UPON BY TF ONE ONE FIVE UNITS UNLESS THE VIOLATOR QUALIFIES AS A HOSTILE VESSEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 2 K OF THIS ANNEX OR ATTEMPTS TO EVADE AND IGNORES WARNINGS TO STOP".

3. THE OPERATION DESCRIBED IN REF A INCLUDED PSYOPS PROGRAM-

PAGE TWO RUMSBB 1763 SECRET

TIONS AND PRESUMABLY DECLARED THE IMMEDIATE WATERS A PROHIBITED ZONE. COMPLETE CONTROL OF JUNKS IN THIS PROHIBITED ZONE BY NAVAL UNITS WAS UNDERSTANDABLY DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY WHEN OPS INTENSIFIED ASHORE. THE MOVEMENTS OF THE JUNKS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EVASIVE AS IT APPEARS THEY HEADED TOWARD THE NAVAL UNITS RATHER THAN AWAY.

4. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT CTG ONE ONE FIVE FT ONE EXPLAINED PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION DRAGON FIRE THAT M/T ROE WOULD APPLY AND THAT THE RULES WOULD RESTRICT M/T UNITS FROM FIRING AT NON-HOSTILES OR NON-EVADERS. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR NILO, CHU LAI WITH INTERPRETER AND M. L. TEAMS FROM TASK FORCE OREGON TO EMBARKED IN M/T UNITS TO PROVIDE AN INTERROGATION CAPABILITY DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF THE OPERATION WHEN FACILITIES WERE NOT AVAILABLE ASHORE. DURING THE FIRST THREE DAYS OF THE OPERATION OVER 80 PERCENT OF THE 250 JUNKS DETECTED WERE INSPECTED AND THE OCCUPANTS INTERROGATED. OCCUPANTS OF THE JUNKS WERE 60 PERCENT CHILDREN, 25 PERCENT WOMEN, AND THE REMAINDER MALES OF WHICH A VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE WERE OF MILITARY AGE. NINE JUNKS AND 124 DETAINEES WERE TAKEN TO AN HAI VILLAGE VIC BS 77588 AT THE REQUEST OF THE 2ND BRIG RUMV. ALL OTHERS DURING THE FIRST

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE THREE RUMSBB 1763 S E C R E T  
 THREE DAYS WERE RELEASED AFTER INTERROGATION.  
 5. THE CURRENT ROE ARE PRESCRIBED BY THE JCS, MODIFIED TO SOME  
 EXTENT TO FIT M/T OPERATIONS. ADMITTEDLY THEY ARE NOT VERY FLEX-  
 IBLE AND DO ON OCCASION WORK TO OUR DISADVANTAGE, AS THEY MAY  
 HAVE IN THIS INCIDENT. HOWEVER, HAD THERE BEEN AUTHORITY FOR  
 M/T UNITS TO TAKE UNDER FIRE THOSE JUNKS THAT PUT TO SEA, I AM  
 SURE WE WOULD HAVE INFLICTED NUMEROUS CASUALTIES ON INNOCENT  
 CIVILIANS. I UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN OVER THE LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE  
 INHABITANTS OF BATANGAN, BUT IT APPEARS THE ALTERNATIVE EVEN IF  
 WE HAD NOT BEEN RESTRICTED BY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN  
 THE SHOOTING UP OF A NUMBER OF VERY FRIGHTENED CONFUSED NON-COMBATANTS  
 WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO DO EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE  
 BEEN VC FAMILIES. IN THE MARKET TIME/ GAME WARDEN BUSINESS OF POPULATION

AND RESOURCES CONTROL WE HAVE LEARNED TO LIVE WITH THE CONSTRAINTS  
 IMPOSED BY ROE AND CONSIDER THAT WE HAVE ENOUGH LEEWAY TO ATTACK OR  
 CAPTURE LEGITIMATE VC. SHOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS FURTHER HOWEVER IF  
 YOU CONSIDER DESIRABLE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4  
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PRIORITY 132208Z SEP67  
FM COMNAVFORV  
TO CG III MAF  
INFO COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO RADM LACY FROM RADM VETH.

CUA VIET CHANNEL DREDGING

A. CG III MAF SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 121206Z SEP67

B. COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG 080736Z SEP67.

1. REF ALFA REQUESTED THAT I BE FULLY AWARE OF URGENCY OF DREDGING PROBLEM CUA VIET CHANNEL DURING MONSOON SEASON AND THAT MATTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH GEN WESTMORELAND DURING III MAF CONFERENCE.

2. OICC RVN WILL HAVE ARMY SURVEY VESSEL TUDOR MAKE HYDROGRAPHIC SWEEP OF CUA VIET CHANNEL IN RESPONSE TO REF BRAVO COMMENCING NEXT MONDAY TO DETERMINE SILTING ACTION SINCE DREDGING LAST APRIL. OICC RVN PREPARED TO DEPLOY ARMY DREDGE DAVIDSON TO SWEEP CHANNEL SHOULD SURVEY INDICATE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DREDGING. NAVSUPPACT DANANG WILL BE REQUIRED TO FUND MAINTENANCE DREDGING FROM O&M FUNDS OR REQUEST ADDITIONAL FUNDS FROM COMSERVPAC.

3. I RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE CUA VIET CHANNEL OPEN AND THE OICC CHANNEL STUDY WILL INDICATE DREDGING REQUIREMENTS, IF ANY, DURING NEXT MONSOON SEASON. I WILL FULLY SUPPORT ANY REQUEST FOR FUNDS OR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING DREDGES FOR THIS WORK BY RADM LACY OR ANY OTHER ACTION REQUIRED TO GET THE JOB DONE.

BEST REGARDS

GP-4

BT

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ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

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MAF -T- CG FORLOGCMD

FP RUMHFL RUMHMF

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ZNY CCCCC

P 141956Z SEP 67

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD (B009)

BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO BGEN HERBOLD FROM LTGEN KRULAK

- A. CG III MAF 130836Z/SEP67
- B. CG FMFPAC 101921Z/SEP67 (PASEP)
- C. CMC 111917Z/SEP67 (PASEP)
- D. CG FMFPAC 070708Z/JUL67

1. I AM AWARE OF THE GRAVITY OF THE M-109 PROBLEM ADDRESSED IN REF A AND CERTAINLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN. MY MOST RECENT ACTION TAKEN FOLLOWING MY LAST TRIP, IS REFLECTED IN REF B, IN WHICH I ASKED THAT THE TOTAL M-109 SUPPORTABILITY PICTURE BE REVIEWED. THE COMMANDANT DIRECTED ACTION BY MCSA PHILA IN THIS MATTER BY REF C.
2. AS TO THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE OBTURATOR SPINDLE ASSEMBLY, I HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THIS FOR SOME TIME. IN FACT, I BROUGHT

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 2052 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR A COMPLETE ASSEMBLY BACK WITH ME IN JUNE TO ENSURE THAT MY ORDNANCE PEOPLE KNEW PRECISELY WHAT THE PROBLEM AMOUNTED TO. SINCE THE KIND OF FIX RECOMMENDED BY FIRST MARDIV HAS TO BE APPROVED BY CMC, WE TOLD HIM THE STORY IN REF D, AND ASKED HIM TO INITIATE ACTION TO PROVIDE BOTH A LONG RANGE SOLUTION, AND INTERIM SOLUTION OF THE FORM RECOMMENDED BY FIRST MARDIV. THIS IS BEING PURSUED AT USARMC NOW. HOWEVER, WE MAY POSSIBLY SPEED THINGS UP IF YOU WILL FORWARD EXACT SPECIFICATIONS AND DETAILS OF THEIR PROPOSED MOD. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, WITH THESE, WE MAY OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR THE IN-COUNTRY FIX.

3. I AM DESIGNATING ALL OUTSTANDING REQUISITIONS FOR M-109 PARTS "RED BALL". I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS WAS NOT DONE SOME TIME AGO IN-COUNTRY.
4. AS A FINAL NOTE, THE SUPPLY PEOPLE IN CONUS ARE CANNIBALIZING OTHER WEAPONS TO PROVIDE TEN OBTURATOR SPINDLE ASSEMBLIES. THEY WILL BE ON THE WAY TO YOU BY AIR SHORTLY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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ORIG: G-4  
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INFO RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
**RECOGNITION OF SUPERIOR ACHIEVEMENT**

1. "WHAT WAS EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE PAST, IS NORMAL PERFORMANCE TODAY", APPEARS TO BE THE BY-WORD OF NAVSUPACT. ONCE AGAIN IT HAS BEEN CALLED TO MY ATTENTION THAT YOUR ACTIVITY HAS SURPASSED PREVIOUS PERFORMANCES IN SUPPORT OF THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AND III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. SPECIFICALLY, I REFER TO THE 13 NEW CARGO TONNAGE RECORDS ESTABLISHED DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST:

	OLD RECORD	NEW RECORD
A. DANANG DAILY OFFLOAD IN M/T:	16,137 (15 JUN)	16,858
B. DANANG MONTHLY BACKLOAD IN M/T:	134,204 (JUN)	135,032
C. DANANG MONTHLY THROUGHPUT IN M/T:	374,204 (JUN)	389,005
D. DANANG MONTHLY THROUGHPUT IN S/T:	228,212 (JUN)	232,679
E. HUE MONTHLY OFFLOAD IN S/T:	17,672 (MAY)	18,336

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 347 C O N F I D E N T I A L

F. HUE MONTHLY BACKLOAD IN S/T:	1,583 (MAY)	1,699
G. HUE MONTHLY BACKLOAD IN M/T:	4,602 (JUN)	7,720
H. HUE MONTHLY THROUGHPUT IN S/T:	18,663 (JUN)	20,035
I. HUE MONTHLY THROUGHPUT IN M/T:	32,868 (JUN)	36,262
J. I CORPS MONTHLY OFFLOAD IN S/T:	34,370 (JUN)	241,787
K. I CORPS MONTHLY THROUGHPUT IN S/T:	326,701 (JUN)	331,409

2. THE ABOVE CARGO TONNAGE RECORDS ARE ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR WHICH THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF YOUR COMMAND HAVE EARNED A MOST DESERVED "WELL DONE". THE "CAN DO" SPIRIT EXHIBITED BY NAVSUPACT ASSURES ME THAT III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE CAN CONTINUE TO EXPECT THIS EXCELLENT SUPPORT UNDER THE ADVERSE CONDITIONS EXPECTED IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. I EXTEND MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO ALL CONCERNED, FOR THE OUTSTANDING SUPPORT PROVIDED BY NAVSUPACT DANANG. LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS.

GP-4  
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*lp*

ZNY CCCC  
R 150334Z SEP 67  
FM COMSERVPAC  
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM RADM HOOPER  
IN VIEW OF MY RESPONSIBILITIES IN CHAIN OF COMMAND OF  
MAVSUPACT DANANG, FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF U.S. AND FWMAP  
IN ICTZ, ETC., I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFO ADDED ON MESSAGES  
SUCH AS YOUR 050832Z, OR ADVERSE ONES AS YOU SEE FIT.  
WARM REGARDS.  
GP-4  
BT

*oops!*  
*[Signature]*

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SEP 67

CG FMFPAC

C/S O

EXCLUSIVE G-1

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FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMSDN/CG III MAF  
RUMSDN/CG THIRD MARDIV (R014)  
RUMSDN/CG FIRST MAF (P022)  
ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
RUMSDN/CG FIRST MARDIV (W015)  
RUMSDN/CG FORLOGCMD (B025)  
ZEN/CG NINTH MAB  
BT

*I concur -  
in fact I  
generated it. lb*

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, MGEN HOCHMUTH, MGEN ANDERSON, MGEN BOUKER, MGEN ROBERTSON, MGEN HERBOLD, MGEN GLICK FROM LTGEN KRULAK.  
1. IN THE COURSE OF MY VISITS TO MARINE COMMANDS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA I HAVE BECOME CONCERNED WITH THE RELATIVELY HIGH INCIDENCE OF OFFICERS TEMPORARILY OCCUPYING KEY BILLETTS AWAITING A REPLACEMENT, SCHEDULED BUT NOT YET

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 2453 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ARRIVED. THIS USUALLY OCCURS WHEN THE INCUMBENT DEPARTS IN THE FIRST WEEK OF HIS ROTATION MONTH AND HIS SUCCESSOR DOES NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OR LATTER PART OF THE MONTH. I KNOW THAT DEPUTIES, EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF ASSISTANTS ARE CAPABLE, THAT THEY ARE SO ASSIGNED WITH THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO TAKE OVER THE TASK OF THEIR SUPERIOR. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT EXPECTED TO DO THIS AS A ROUTINE THING. WE CANNOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF ALLOWING KEY OFFICERS TO CARRY AWAY THEIR CURRENT AND VITAL KNOWLEDGE AND THEIR HARD-WON EXPERIENCE WITHOUT SHARING IT WITH THE MAN WHO MUST SUBSEQUENTLY PICK UP THE LOAD. I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST STRIVE FOR A CONTACT TURNOVER IN KEY POSITIONS ONLY WHENEVER POSSIBLE, TO PREVENT "LESSONS LEARNED" FROM BECOMING "LESSONS RE-LEARNED."  
2. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE FOR SENIOR COMMANDERS TO WANT TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE BY PERMITTING COMMANDERS AND KEY STAFF OFFICERS TO ROTATE AS EARLY AS IT IS TECHNICALLY ALLOWABLE. I AGREE,

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PAGE RUHHFMA 2453 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR WITH THIS, AND ENCOURAGE THAT EVERY CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO DOING JUST THIS. HOWEVER, UNLESS IT INVOLVES UNDUE HARDSHIP TO THE INDIVIDUAL OR UNLESS THERE ARE OTHER UNUSUAL CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS MY POLICY IN THE CASE OF YOUR TRULY KEY PEOPLE (AND I LEAVE THE DETERMINATION OF WHO THEY ARE TO YOU) THAT WE SHALL HAVE CONTACT RELIEFS WITH A MODEST OVERLAP (PERHAPS 5 DAYS) TO PERMIT THE FULL PASSING OF CURRENT AND ESSENTIAL INFORMATION. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
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MONTH SEPTEMBER 67

ORIGINATOR CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

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COPIES OF CG FIRST MARDIV REIN MESSAGE 180853Z SEP 67

RECEIVED BY *B. Shuta*

DATE/TIME *181815H*

*OK by me, since  
as area can be controlled  
by patrols etc from  
Que San.*

*S/S Route copy to Dep CG  
for comment - @*

*3*

DATE-TIME GROUP 180853Z SEP 67

*Copy 2 of 2  
BCG 19 Sep 67  
Khan seen #13*

**SECRET**

DE PUMHLA 2195 2610853  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 180853Z SEPR 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO CG III MAF  
 RT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN ROBERTSON

NUI LAC SON COMBAT BASE

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 010105Z AUG (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CUSHMAN)

1. IN REF A I QUESTIONED ADVISABILITY OF RETAINING NUI LAC SON AS COMBAT BASE. I HAVE SINCE CONDUCTED A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF THE REQUIREMENT. THIS INVESTIGATION CONFIRMS MY EARLIER DOUBTS AS TO DESIRABILITY OF RETAINING NUI LAC SON AS A FIXED BASE.
2. PRIOR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AT QUE SON, NUI LAC SON AFFORDED SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN PROJECTING FORCES INTO SOUTHERN REACHES OF QUE SON VALLEY. THIS REQUIREMENT NOW CAN BE MET MORE ECONOMICALLY BY FORCES OPERATING OUT OF QUE SON. NUI LAC SON AFFORDS ONLY MARGINAL ADVANTAGE IN THIS REGARD. MOREOVER IT REPRESENTS SIGNIFICANT DRAW-

PAGE TWO PUMHLA 2195 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DOWN ON MANEUVER CAPABILITY AS MAJOR ELEMENTS OF ONE RIFLE COMPANY REQUIRED FOR ITS DEFENSE UNLESS I HAVE OTHER FORCES OPERATING IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA. THREE OTHER TERRAIN FEATURES IN VICINITY ARE MORE SUITABLE AS OBSERVATION POINTS.

3. ADDITIONALLY, EXTENSIVE CRITICAL ENGINEER EFFORT WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE MINIMUM DEFENSE AND LIVING FACILITIES BY ONSET ON MONSOON WEATHER. ALL EXISTING BUNKERS MUST BE REPLACED AND REBUILT; 30'X60' WOODEN MELO PAD REQUIRES RELOCATION, MAJOR REPAIRS, AND NON-SKID RAMPS; MESS REQUIRES COMPLETE RENOVATION TO INCLUDE NEW TIN COOF, SCREFFING AND REPLACEMENT OF DEFRIORTED WOOD; FIVE NEW HEADS REQUIRED; FOUR 500 GAL WATER TANKS REQUIRE WOODEN TOWERS; WOODEN TOWER SUPPORTING 105MM RIFLE MUST BE REPLACED; ALL FIGHTING POSITIONS MUST BE REDUG; CONNECTING TRENCHES BETWEEN FIGHTING POSITIONS AND BUNKERS MUST BE REDUG AND REVETTED WITH TIN OR LUMBER TO PREVENT LANDSLIDE AND EROSION; AND A COMPLETE DRAINAGE SYSTEM DESIGNED AND INSTALLED. ESTIMATE AFOREMENTIONED REHABILITATION WOULD CEQUIRE ONE ENGR CO MINUS FOR APPROX 60 DAYS. ALL MATERIALS MUST BE FLOWN TO POSITION AND MOST WORK WILL BE HAND LABOR BECAUSE OF RESTRICTED AREA FOR OPERATION OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT. SOIL COMPOSITION, SLIDES, EROSION, AND DRAINAGE FURTHER COMPLICATE ENGR PROBLEMS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 **SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#13

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2195 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
4. BASED ON FOREGOING, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT NO REQUIREMENT EXISTS  
FOR RETENTION OF THIS BASE BY FREE WORLD FORCES.  
5. CONSEQUENTLY, REQUEST THAT BASE AT NUI LAC SON BE DISESTABLISHED  
IMMEDIATELY.

GP-4  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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CG

l

S/S

o

CCN 151

FILLER 16

DTG 190315Z

MONTH SEPTEMBER 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

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*REF MSG INSIDE*

*OK  
Contains it,*

4 *l*

DATE-TIME GROUP 190315Z SEP 67

#14

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR RUMHMF  
 DE RUHFMMA 2798 2620315  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 190315Z SEP 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK  
 PLANNED OPERATIONS (U)

A. CG III MAF 100244Z/SEP67 (S)

1. REF A EXPLAINED REASONS FOR DISCONTINUANCE OF THE MONTHLY PLANNED OPERATIONS REPORT.
2. THIS HEADQUARTERS APPRECIATES THE TIME ELEMENT INVOLVED IN PREPARING THIS REPORT AND ATTEMPTED TO EXTRACT SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FROM YOUR EXCELLENT MESSAGE 090628Z/SEP67; HOWEVER THIS DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT.
3. YOUR REPORT ON PLANNED OPERATIONS IS EXTREMELY USEFUL BOTH HERE AND AT HQMC; IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF IT WERE CONTINUED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#14



PP RUMHMF RUCIHOA  
2888 2601957

**SECRET**

P 191957Z SEP 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUCIHOA/CMC  
RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN  
FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

P 191908Z SEP 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM  
LTGEN KRULAK.

1. I REGRETTED, DURING MY LAST VISIT TO SAIGON, THAT CIRCUMSTANCES PREVENTED OUR HAVING A LONGER TALK. HAD THERE BEEN MORE TIME, IN ADDITION TO EXPRESSING MY CONCERN REGARDING THE LOGISTIC SITUATION IN THE DMZ REGION, I WOULD HAVE DISCUSSED MY APPREHENSIONS OVER WHAT LOOKS TO BE A DEARTH OF POWER IN ICTZ, AND THE CASUALTIES WHICH WE ARE SUFFERING AS A CONSEQUENCE.
2. SINCE RETURNING HERE I HAVE WATCHED THE CASUALTIES MOUNT IN ICTZ, AS OPERATIONS HAVE PROGRESSED IN THE NUI LOC SON, CO BI THANH TAN AND DMZ REGIONS. DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS, IN ICTZ, TOTAL KILLED ON OUR SIDE, INCLUDING ARVN, HAVE NUMBERED 550 AND OF THESE, 326 WERE MARINES. THE ENEMY, MEANWHILE, LOST 2,491 KILLED, 75 CAPTURED AND 374 WEAPONS. THIS

PAGE 2 RUMHMFMA 2888 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
REPRESENTS OVER TWO THIRDS OF ALL THE U. S. AND ENEMY  
CASUALTIES IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, FOR THE PERIOD.

3. IT IS HARD EVER TO CONCLUDE THAT CASUALTIES ARE JUSTIFIED OR ACCEPTABLE. IN THIS CASE, I WOULD ONLY OFFER YOU THE OPINION THAT THE INTENSE COMBAT IN ICTZ IS PROVIDING A SHIELD BEHIND WHICH MUCH EFFECTIVE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS BEING PROSECUTED FARTHER SOUTH. UP TO NOW WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REPLACE THE SUBSTANTIAL MARINE LOSSES. OUR UNITS, GROUND AND AIR, ARE VERY NEAR THEIR MANNING LEVELS NOW, AND I BELIEVE WE CAN MANAGE TO MEET THE CURRENT LEVEL OF ATTRITION. BUT THE POINT THAT STRUCK ME, DURING MY MOVEMENT ABOUT ICTZ, WAS THAT THIS CASUALTY RATE NEED NOT BE SO HIGH; THAT, IN PART, IT MAY BE A PRODUCT OF HAVING TO BUTTER THE BREAD TOO THIN.
4. HERE IS WHAT I MEAN.

A. THE NUI LOC SON BATTLE AREA IS OF CONTINUING  
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE. 1ST MARDIV, ARVN AND TF OREGON  
FORCES, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A  
CONTINUING PROJECT OF MACERATING AN NVA DIVISION,  
DESTROYING ITS BASE AREAS, AND GENERALLY

PAGE 1 OF 3 SECRETS

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 15

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUKHFMA 2888 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
BREAKING THE TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST HOLD ON A RICH  
REGION. THE FORCES INVOLVED HAVE BEEN MINIMAL, IN  
TERMS OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ENEMY STRENGTH.

B. THE FORCES COMMITTED TO THE OUTPOSTS ABUTTED  
AGAINST THE DMZ ARE DOING THE BEST THEY CAN, BUT THE  
NATURE OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT PUTS THEM AT DISADVANTAGE.  
GIO LINH AND CON THIEN ARE THE BASE POINTS FOR EVERY  
ARTILLERY PIECE IN NVN THAT CAN REACH AND, FAIR WEATHER  
OR FOUL, THE MARINES IN THOSE OUTPOSTS ARE GOING TO  
SUFFER. UP TO NOW THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN ROUTE  
PACKAGE I HAS NOT STILLED THE ENEMY HIGH EXPLOSIVE  
EFFORT, AND IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IDLE TO ASSUME THAT  
IT WILL WHOLLY DO SO. THE MARINES CLOSE TO THE DMZ  
ARE UNABLE TO MANEUVER AGAINST THE NVN UNITS FACING THEM. THE  
LATTER UNDERSTAND THE VIRTUES OF THE NVN SANCTUARY, TO WHICH  
THEY WITHDRAW WHENEVER THE HEAT GETS INTOLERABLE,  
ONLY TO SORTIE OUT AGAIN WHEN THEY HAVE REGAINED THEIR  
BREATH. YOUR FORCES CANNOT GET BEHIND THEM TO CUT THEM UP.

C. THE REAL CRUNCH, HOWEVER, IS IN WHAT IS GOING  
ON IN THE TWELVE HUNDRED SQUARE MILES OF SIGNIFICANT

PAGE 4 RUKHFMA 2888 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
REAL ESTATE BETWEEN THE LINE GIO LINH-CON THIEN-KHE  
SANH AND CAMP EVANS. AS I SEE IT, THE REDS, BECAUSE OF THE  
THINNESS OF OUR FORCE NEXT TO THE DMZ, HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IN-  
FILTRATE SUBSTANTIAL POWER INTO THIS REGION - PERHAPS  
TWELVE BATTALIONS. THESE UNITS ARE OPERATING AGAINST  
OUR BASE AREAS AND COMMUNICATION LINES; - - WITH  
DIFFICULTY, AND AT CONSIDERABLE COST, BUT OPERATING  
THERE NEVERTHELESS. THESE ARE THE UNITS THAT ARE  
CAUSING TROUBLE ALONG ROUTE 9, NEAR CAM LO, NORTH OF CUA  
VIET AND EAST OF KHE SANH. THESE ARE THE UNITS WHICH  
CAUSE US CASUALTIES BY MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON  
LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER NECESSARILY FIXED  
LOCALITIES. AND IT IS THE CASUALTIES DERIVING FROM THE  
OPERATIONS OF THESE NVA UNITS THAT I BELIEVE WE COULD  
DIMINISH, IF THE POWER WERE AVAILABLE TO DO SO. UNLIKE  
THEIR COMPANIONS FARTHER NORTH ALONG THE DMZ, THESE  
NVA UNITS DO NOT HAVE A SANCTUARY. THEY ARE VULNERABLE;  
SUSCEPTIBLE TO ISOLATION AND DECIMATION BY FORCES  
WHICH ARE FREE TO MANEUVER AROUND AND AMONG THEM.  
BUT IS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME THAT CUSHMAN AND LAM

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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**SECRET**

PAGE 5 RUHFMMA 2888 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
 TOGETHER HAVE THE POWER AVAILABLE IN ICTZ TO DO ALL  
 ELSE THAT IS NEEDED, AND STILL PROVIDE MANEUVER FORCES  
 TO CHOP UP AND DESTROY THE ENEMY IN THIS LARGE AREA.  
 5. THIS IS WHAT I WOULD HAVE SAID, DURING OUR DISCUSS-  
 ION IN SAIGON, HAD THE WASHINGTON DELEGATION NOT  
 REQUIRED YOUR PRESENCE. I WOULD HAVE  
 RECOMMENDED THAT YOU EXAMINE THE PROBLEM FROM THE ABOVE  
 VIEWPOINT, WITH THE PROSPECT OF SEEKING TO CUT CASUALTIES BY  
 PUTTING SOME MORE POWER INTO THE ICTZ. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT


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CG 

CCN 159

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DTG 202218Z

MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

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CATEGORY

**EXCLUSIVE**

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
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
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CS, G-3*

*We need to discuss this.*



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4 Dec 67*



DATE-TIME GROUP 202218Z SEP 67

**SECRET**

DE RUHHFMA 3121 2632218  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 202218Z SEP 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
BT

*DOG*

*Mj*  
21 Sept. 67

**S E C R E T**

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. THE RECENT INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST OUR CAP'S APPEARS TO BE AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF TWO THINGS; - FIRST, HIS INCREASING CONCERN WITH THE SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM AND ITS POTENTIAL; AND SECOND THAT THE CAPS MAY BE BECOMING A RELATIVELY FIXED TARGET FOR ENEMY ACTION.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE CONCEPT OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT, LET ME GIVE YOU MY PERSONAL VIEWS CONCERNING A TREND WHICH I SEE DEVELOPING. INITIALLY, THE MISSION OF THE CAP WAS TO PROTECT A HAMLET OR PERHAPS TWO HAMLETS, BY ACTIVELY DENYING THE VC ACCESS TO THE LOCAL POPULATION. THEIR FUNCTION. WAS PIVOTED ON EXTENSIVE NIGHT PATROLLING AND AMBUSHING AS THE

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 3121 **S E C R E T**

PRINCIPAL MEANS OF HAMLET SECURITY, WITH THE CAP COMPOUND RIGHT IN THE HAMLET, AND SERVING AS A RESTING, TRAINING AND RESUPPLY P INT TO WHICH THE CAP COULD RETIRE DURING DAYLIGHT WHEN THE VC THREAT WAS MINIMAL.

3. IT HAS BEEN MY OBSERVATION, OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, THAT INCREASING EFFORT IS BEING EXPENDED ON IMPROVING CAP COMPOUND DEFENSES AND, AS THEY SAY, "HARDENING" THE PHYSICAL FACILITIES, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE CAP INSTALLATIONS TEND TO BECOME ARMED FORTRESSES, ON THE FRENCH PATTERN, WITH ALL OF THE WEAKNESSES CHARACTERISTIC OF THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE. ADDITIONALLY, IN SOME INSTANCES, THE CAP LIVING AREAS ARE LOCATED SO REMOTE FROM THE COMMUNITY WITH WHICH THEY ARE ASSOCIATED, THAT THEY ARE, IN FACT, AN ISOLATED TARGET. THE OBVIOUS DANGER THIS TREND REVEALS IS THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT EMPHASIS IS SHIFTING FROM THE HAMLET ASPECTS OF THE DEFENSE TO THE SINGLE TASK OF MANNING A FIXED INSTALLATION...SUCH A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS TIES DOWN OUR FORCES, INCREASES THE COST OF THE INSTALLATION,

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#16

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUHFMA 0121 S E C R E T  
 AND ILLUMINATES THE CAP AS A LUCRATIVE, READILY IDENTIFI-  
 FIABLE FIXED TARGET, ALL AT THE EXPENSE OF PROVIDING  
 SECURITY TO THE PEOPLE.

4. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE WE MUST DELIBERATELY AVOID  
 SLIPPING INTO A FORTRESS CONCEPT; THAT THE CAPS SHOULD  
 BE INSTALLED IN THE POPULATED LOCALITIES, WHERE THEY  
 ARE VISIBLE TO THE PEOPLE IN THE HAMLET DURING THE DAY,  
 WHILE DENYING VC ACCESS AT NIGHT THROUGH A PROGRAM  
 OF AGGRESSIVE PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY. WARM  
 REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

11 MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG  
C/S

CCN 156

FILLER

DTG 200724Z

MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

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DATE-TIME GROUP 200724Z SEP 67

TOP SECRET

PP RUMSAK RUMSAV  
 DE RUHKM 3071 2630724  
 ZNY TTTTT  
 P 200724Z SEP 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 AND NGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK  
 DEPLOYMENT TO RVN OF TWO MARINE SQDNS FROM IWAKUNI (S)  
 A. CG FMFPAC 162233Z/SEP67 PASEP

1. REFERENCE A, BEING PASSED TO YOU SEPARATELY,  
 REPRESENTS MY VIEWS. I THOUGHT I HAD SENT IT TO YOU, AND REGRET  
 THE OVERSIGHT IN NOT RETRANSMITTING IT SOONER.

2. THE MATTER OF DEPLOYING THE TWO MAG-15 SQUADRONS  
 HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED BY CINCPAC, BUT I AM FORTIFIED  
 FURTHER IN MY VIEWS BY THE FOLLOWING FROM A  
 CINCPACAF RETRANSMITTAL TO CINCPAC FROM 7TH AF:  
 QUOTE: 1. (TS) 7AF SUPPORTS COMMITMENT OF FORCES  
 INDICATED IN REF C; HOWEVER, REQUEST IMMEDIATE DEPLOY-  
 MENT BE HELD IN ABEYANCE. THE RAINY SEASON HAS BEGUN  
 AND RESULTANT DEGENERATING WEATHER AS WELL AS TIME

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 2 RUHKN 3071 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
REQUIRED TO INDOCTRINATE AIRCREWS INTO THIS THEATER  
MAKES IT INAPPROPRIATE TO DEPLOY THESE FORCES AT THIS  
TIME.

2. (S) BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE LITTLE WOULD BE GAINED  
BY DEPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES FOR THIS SHORT PERIOD.  
CURRENT INVENTORY OF ECM PODS AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL  
TANKER REQUIREMENTS PRECLUDE ADDITIONAL DANANG AND  
CAM RANH BAY SORTIES INTO HIGH THREAT AREAS. THERE-  
FORE, UNLESS THESE REQUIREMENTS COULD BE SATISFIED  
WE WOULD GAIN FEW ADDITIONAL SORTIES OTHER THAN IN-  
COUNTRY AND LOAS. THESE MISSION REQUIREMENTS CAN BE  
FULFILLED BY EXISTING RESOURCES.

3. (S) RECOMMEND THAT THE COMPOSITE F-100/B-57  
SQUADRON BE HELD IN READY STATUS AT THEIR PRESENT  
LOCATION TO BE DEPLOYED WHEN AND IF THE SITUATION  
SO DICTATES AS DETERMINED BY COMMANDER 7AF. BELIEVE  
THE SAME ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH REGARDS TO USMC  
SQUADRONS.

4. (TS) IN REGARD TO REF A: IF DEPLOYMENT IS DIRECT-  
ED, THE F-100 AND B-57 AIRCRAFT, CREWS AND SUPPORT

PAGE 3 RUHKN 3071 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
PERSONNEL COULD BE ACCOMMODATED IMMEDIATELY. ADDI-  
TIONAL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE UNREVIEWED AND WITH CURRENT  
VULNERABILITY OF ALL BASES IN RVN TO MORTAR AND ROCKET  
ATTACKS CALCULATED RISK MUST BE ACCEPTED. RECOMMEND  
B-57S BE INTEGRATED INTO CURRENT TDY UNITS AT PHAN  
RANG AND THE F-100 UNIT ATTACHED TO 31 TAC FTR WG  
FOR PERIOD OF TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENT.

5. (S) SINCE USMC SQUADRONS ARE TO REPLACE OUT OF  
COUNTRY SORTIE LOSS, THEY SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER  
OPERATION CONTROL OF 7AF AND HANDLED AS NORMAL PART  
OF ROLLING THUNDER/BARREL ROLL STRIKE FORCE. UNQUOTE.  
3. ADDED TO ALL THE ABOVE ARE THE UNDERIABLE ADVANTAGES  
WE GAIN FROM HAVING A REST AND ROTATION  
BASE, PLUS SHOEHORN AND OTHER REHAB CAPABILITIES.  
4. WOULD WELCOME ANY THOUGHTS YOU MAY WISH TO ADD.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



TOP SECRET

DE RUMHAW 084W 2651047

ZNY TTTTT

P 221047Z SEP 67

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN  
FROM MAJGEN ANDERSON/F-31

DEPLOYMENT TO RVN OF TWO MARINE SQDNS FROM IWAKUNI (S)

A. CG FMFPAC 200724Z SEP 67

B. CG FMFPAC 162233Z SEP 67

1. CONCUR IN ALL RESPECTS WITH CG FMFPAC POSITION EXPRESSED  
IN REFERENCES.

2. RELATED THOUGHTS FOLLOW:

A. ACCIDENT/INCIDENT RECORD OF VMA-121 SINCE ARRIVAL IN  
COUNTRY HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING TO SAY THE LEAST. CONSIDER  
SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO BE RELATIVELY LIMITED A-4  
EXPERIENCE OF SOME PILOTS. EXACERBATED BY NEWNESS TO RVN  
COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AS WELL AS DIFFICULT  
WEATHER CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH MONSOON TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.  
THIS CAUSES ME TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES  
OF ROTATING INDIVIDUALS INCREMENTALLY FROM MAG-15 SQUADRONS

PAGE TWO RUMHAW 084W T O P S E C R E T S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR  
TO IN-COUNTRY SQUADRONS, RATHER THAN COMPLETE UNITS. I WILL  
MAKE TIMELY PROPOSAL IN THE REGARD, IN DUE COURSE.

B. IMPLIED DANGER TO III MAF/1ST MAW COMMAND INTEGRITY.  
OF 7TH AIR FORCE VIEW THAT ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS SHOULD BE  
ASSIGNED THEIR OPCON, FOR ROLLING THUNDER/BARREL ROLL STRIKE  
FORCE, IS RECOGNIZED CLEARLY. IRRESPECTIVE OF FINAL STATED  
RATIONALE SUPPORTING RECENT JCS APPROVAL OF DEPLOYING THESE  
SQUADRONS INTO RVN, FACT REMAINS PROPOSAL WAS INITIATED LATE  
LAST MAY BASED ON MARINE CORPS BALANCED FORCE NEEDS IN RVN.  
THIS AGAIN UNDERSCORES NECESSITY FOR VIGILANCE IN RESPECT TO  
PROTECTING WHAT IS RIGHT, MEET, AND PROPER.

C. IT IS OF COURSE FULLY CONCEIVABLE THAT THE TEMPO OF POST-  
MONSOON OPERATIONS MAY CAUSE US TO ASK FOR THESE SQDNS NEXT YEAR.  
ACCORDINGLY, CONSIDER IT PRUDENT THAT ALL MEMBERS OF OUR  
STAFFS PHRASE ANY OBSERVATIONS ON CURRENT SITUATIONS SO AS NO TO  
JEOPARDIZE INADVERTENTLY OUR CHANCES OF FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION  
THEN.

3. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT



VV PAC  
**SECRET** 4935

DE RUHFMA 3732 2661903

ZNY SSSSS

O 231903Z SEP 67

FM CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

O 230937Z SEP 67

FM CG FMFPAC

TO CINCPACFLT

BT

# EXCLUSIVE

*DCG*  
*Thi*  
*in series*

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**S E C R E T** EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN OR IN HIS ABSENCE MAJGEN NICKERSON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 3.

A. CG FMFPAC LTR SER 000508-67 DTD 29MAY67

1. THE CASUALTY LEVEL CURRENTLY BEING EXPERIENCED BY THE MARINES IN THE DMZ REGION IS TOO HIGH, CONSIDERING THE OPERATIONAL BENEFITS RECEIVED. IN THE PAST MONTH 958 MARINES HAVE BEEN KILLED OR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN THE DMZ AREA ALONE, AND IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MARINES KILLED OR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN THAT AREA HAS BEEN 4,961. WHILE THE ENEMY IS PAYING A HEAVY PRICE FOR HIS PAINS--SOME 7,900 KILLED IN THE DMZ AREA IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS--THE COST TO US IS STILL TOO HIGH. MORE IMPORTANT, UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE ABOUT IT, OUR CASUALTIES IN THE DMZ ARE LIKELY TO MOUNT.

2. THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT OUR FORCES BUTTED UP AGAINST THE DMZ ARE AT A SERIOUS TACTICAL DISADVANTAGE.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 3705 **S E C R E T**

THE ENEMY, ENJOYING THE BENEFITS OF THE NVN SANCTUARY, HAS A REAR AREA THAT IS SECURE AGAINST OUR MANEUVER. WE CANNOT GET BEHIND HIM TO CUT HIM OFF FROM HIS SUPPLIES OR TO OVERRUN HIS ARTILLERY. ALONG THE DMZ WE MUST FACE HIM ON FRONTAL TERMS, FOREGOING THE BENEFITS OF MANEUVER, AT LEAST SO LONG AS WE ELECT TO MAINTAIN OUR KEY OUTPOST POSITIONS AND OUR FORWARD LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS.

3. AMONG THE ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY THE ENEMY IN HIS SANCTUARY THE KEY ONE IS IN THE AREA OF ARTILLERY AND HEAVY ROCKET SUPPORT. DURING THE PAST MONTH, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT 4,000 ROUNDS HAVE FALLEN ON CON THIEN ALONE, AND ON 20 SEPTEMBER THAT OUTPOST TOOK 441 ROUNDS. WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE FROM 100 TO 110 ARTILLERY PIECES, WITH RANGES UP TO 27,400 METERS, IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ, POSITIONED WHERE THEY CAN FIRE ON OUR FORWARD POSITIONS. THESE ARTILLERY PIECES ARE LOCATED NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER, IN AN AREA EXTENDING GENERALLY FROM A POINT NORTHWEST OF CON THIEN, EAST TO VIN LINH AND THENCE TO THE COAST. THERE ARE MANY

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### SECRET

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**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUHFMMA 3705 S E C R E T  
 POSITION AREAS, SOME OCCUPIED AND SOME UNOCCUPIED;  
 AND THE ENEMY MOVES HIS WEAPONS FROM ONE TO ANOTHER  
 TO FACILITATE DECEPTION. RECENTLY HE HAS PUT INTO EFFECT  
 A COMMON U. S. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUE, IN THE FORM OF  
 TIME-ON-TARGET FIRE, WHERE LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNI-  
 TION ARE FIRED ON A SINGLE TARGET OVER A SHORT PERIOD OF  
 TIME, AND FROM MANY WEAPONS. LIKEWISE HE HAS BEGUN  
 TO MIX AIR-BURST OR INFLUENCE FUZING AMONG HIS ROUNDS  
 TO ENHANCE THE CASUALTY EFFECT AGAINST TROOPS IN THE  
 OPEN. THESE ARE SOUND TECHNIQUES, AND MAY BE EXPECTED  
 TO CONTINUE.

4. THIS ARTILLERY THREAT IS ONE WHICH, UNDER EXISTING  
 CONSTRAINTS, CAN BE OVERCOME ONLY THROUGH FIRE  
 SUPPORT MEANS, SINCE WE ARE NOT AT LIBERTY TO MANEUVER  
 AGAINST IT. NEVERTHELESS, AND WHILE A MAJOR  
 AIR/ARTILLERY/NGF EFFORT HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME  
 TIME TO DIMINISH THE INTENSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE  
 ENEMY'S FIRE, THE RESULTS THUS FAR HAVE NOT BEEN  
 DECISIVE. THE INTENSITY AND SCOPE OF OUR EFFORT HAS  
 JUST NOT BEEN GREAT ENOUGH.

PAGE 4 RUHFMMA 3705 S E C R E T

5. THE PROBLEM OF HEAVY CASUALTIES IS NOT CONFINED  
 TO THE DMZ. WE ARE ALSO FEELING THE PINCH IN THE  
 TWELVE HUNDRED SQUARE MILE AREA EXTENDING SOUTH OF  
 THE LINE GIO LINH-CON THIEN-KHE SANH TO CAMP EVANS.  
 THE REDS, BECAUSE OF THE THINNESS OF OUR FORCE NEXT  
 TO THE DMZ, HAVE BEEN ABLE TO INFILTRATE RESPECTABLE  
 POWER INTO THIS REGION--PERHAPS TWELVE BATTALIONS.  
 THESE UNITS ARE OPERATING AGAINST OUR BASE AREAS AND  
 COMMUNICATION LINES;--WITH DIFFICULTY, AND AT  
 CONSIDERABLE COST, BUT OPERATING THERE NEVERTHELESS.  
 THESE ARE THE ENEMY UNITS THAT ARE CAUSING TROUBLE  
 ALONG ROUTE 9, NEAR CAM LO, NORTH OF CUA VIET AND  
 EAST OF KHE SANH. THESE ARE THE UNITS WHICH CAUSE US  
 CASUALTIES BY MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON LOGISTIC  
 INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER NECESSARILY FIXED LOCALITIES.  
 HOWEVER, UNLIKE THEIR COMPANIONS FARTHER NORTH ALONG  
 THE DMZ, THESE NVA UNITS DO NOT HAVE A SANCTUARY.  
 THEY ARE VULNERABLE; SUSCEPTIBLE TO ISOLATION AND DECI-  
 MATION BY FORCES WHICH ARE FREE TO MANEUVER AROUND  
 AND AMONG THEM. BUT CG III MAF AND CG I CORPS DO NOT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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**SECRET**

PAGE 5 RUHFMMA 3705 S E C R E T  
TOGETHER HAVE THE FORCES NECESSARY TO CHOP UP AND DESTROY THE ENEMY IN THIS LARGE AREA, WHILE STILL FULFILLING ALL OF THEIR OTHER OBLIGATIONS. AS A RESULT, THE ENEMY ENJOYS A DEGREE OF FREEDOM WHICH HE SHOULD BE DENIED.

G. ON BALANCE, THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR OUR FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE DMZ AREA CAN BE MEASURED ONLY IN TERMS OF A CONTINUED HIGH LEVEL OF UNREQUITED CASUALTIES, UNLESS DECISIVE ACTION IS TAKEN TO REDRESS THE SITUATION. AMONG THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS, THE FOLLOWING ARE CONSIDERED TO MERIT CONSIDERATION:

A. WITHDRAW OUR INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE DMZ, MOVING THEM SOUTHWARD, OUT OF NVA ARTILLERY RANGE. THEN, IF THE ENEMY DESIRES TO USE HIS ARTILLERY AGAINST US, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DISPLACE IT SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI, WHERE WE CAN GET AT IT. HE WOULD THUS BE DENIED SOME MEASURE OF HIS SANCTUARY ADVANTAGE.

B. CONDUCT A JOINT AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE OPERATION LANDING ON THE NVN COAST, NORTH OF THE DMZ, SWEEPING SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ TO DESTROY THE NVA TROOPS,

PAGE 6 RUHFMMA 3705 S E C R E T  
SUPPLIES AND INSTALLATIONS WHICH ARE AFFECTING OUR FORCES DEPLOYED NEAR THE DMZ. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE PROVISION OF SUFFICIENT FORCES, FROM OUTSIDE OF RVN OR FROM SOURCES WITHIN RVN, TO CONSTITUTE AN ADEQUATE LANDING FORCE. THIS PROSPECT HAS BEEN EXPLORED PREVIOUSLY IN REF A AND, AS YOU KNOW, THE WHOLE MATTER OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK IS NOW BEING ACTIVELY EXAMINED UNDER CINCPAC AEGIS.

C. COMUSMACV PROVIDE AT LEAST A DIVISION SIZE FORCE FROM OTHER CORPS AREAS TO REINFORCE III MAF IN THE DMZ AREA. LAUNCH AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT FROM SOUTH OF THE DMZ AREA INTO AND NORTH OF THE DMZ TO DESTROY NVA FORCES, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES, AND INSTALLATIONS; SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDRAWING.

D. MOUNT MASSIVE DELIBERATE ATTACKS BY AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE AGAINST THE ENEMY TROOPS, ARMAMENT, INSTALLATIONS AND SUPPLIES ARRAYED AGAINST US IN SOUTHERN ROUTE PACKAGE I. EXPLOIT FULLY THE CAPABILITY OF 7TH AIR FORCE, TF 77, 1STMAW AND THE HEAVY GUNS OF THE 7TH FLEET. UTILIZE EVERY VISUAL AND ELECTRONIC MEANS OF TARGET  
BT

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**SECRET**

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FM CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

O 230937Z SEP 67

FM CG FMFPAC

TO CINCPACFLT

BT

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN OR IN HIS ABSENCE MAJGEN NICKERSON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 2 OF 3 IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION.--ALL OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THE ENEMY WEAPONS AND IMPEDING, CANALIZING AND BLOCKING ENEMY MOVEMENT THROUGH SOUTHERN ROUTE PACKAGE I.

E. REINFORCE OUR ELEMENTS NOW COMMITTED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. WITH THIS INCREASED DENSITY OF MANEUVER FORCES, CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON THE ENEMY BATTALIONS WHICH HAVE INFILTRATED INTO THE REGION. ISOLATE, CUT UP AND DESTROY THEM, AND RELIEVE THE CURRENT ROCKET/MORTAR PRESSURE ON OUR FIXED INSTALLATIONS IN THE ROUTE 9--DONG HA AREA.

5. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE OPTIONS FOLLOWS:

A. TO WITHDRAW SOUTHWARD FROM THE DMZ AREA IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE MANEUVER ROOM IS A SOUND TACTICAL MOVE, BUT IT CARRIES A LARGE PRICE. IT

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 3710 SECRET

WOULD GIVE THE ENEMY PERSUASIVE PROPAGANDA MATERIAL IN TERMS OF THE UNDENIABLE FACT THAT WE HAD INDEED SURRENDERED GROUND. AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GIVE UP A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF GROUND TO ENSURE THAT ENEMY ARTILLERY WHICH MOVED SOUTHWARD WOULD, IN FACT, BE EXPOSED TO ENVELOPMENT BY OUR FORCES. THE EFFECT ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND ON OUR OWN PEOPLE AT HOME OF SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE GREAT. FINALLY, IT WOULD ENTAIL ABANDONMENT OF THE STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM. WHATEVER CRITICISM MAY HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT THAT CONCEPT BEFORE, IT IS NOW AN OFFICIAL U.S./GVN ENDEAVOR, AND TO BACK AWAY FROM IT NOW COULD NOT CONCEIVABLE BE IDENTIFIED WITH PROGRESS IN THE WAR.

B. TO INVADRE NORTH VIETNAM IN THE ROUTE PACKAGE I AREA--EITHER BY GROUND OR AMPHIBIOUS MEANS OFFERS GOOD PROSPECT OF RELIEVING OUR FORCES WHO ARE SUFFERING FROM ENEMY POWER BASED IN THE SANCTUARY. THE FAVORABLE EFFECT WOULD PERSIST, OF

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PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 3710 S E C R E T  
 COURSE, ONLY AS LONG AS WE REMAINED IN NVN. FURTHER, IT WOULD BE IDLE TO IGNORE THE SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH WILL BEAR UPON SUCH A DECISION, OR TO EVADE THE REALISTIC TIME AND SPACE MATHEMATICS ASSOCIATED WITH MOUNTING AND DELIVERING A MAJOR ATTACK; NOT TO SPEAK OF THE FACT THAT THE MONSOON IS HERE--THE VERY WORST PERIOD FOR SUCH OPERATIONS. THE NEED IS NOW, AND AN INVASION OF NVN, BY SEA OR LAND, WITH ALL OF ITS TACTICAL MERITS, IS NOT A NOW COURSE OF ACTION.

C. INTENSIFICATION OF THE FIRE SUPPORT EFFORT CAN BE UNDERTAKEN QUICKLY. AS TO ARTILLERY, WE KNOW THAT OUR COUNTERBATTERY ARTILLERY ALONE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO SILENCE THE ENEMY ARTILLERY, ANY MORE THAN HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO SILENCE OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGE OURS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAS MORE ARTILLERY IN THE AREA THAN WE DO. AIR IS THUS THE DECISIVE ARM, SINCE WE CANNOT OVERRUN THE ENEMY POSITIONS WITH GROUND FORCES. THE REASON THAT AIR, UP TO NOW, HAS NOT ABATED

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 3710 S E C R E T  
 THE THREAT IS THAT THE MEANS ADDRESSED TO THE JOB HAVE THUS FAR BEEN FAR TOO SMALL.

D. TO REINFORCE OUR ELEMENTS IN QUANG TRI MAKES GOOD SENSE. IT IS URGENT THAT OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION BE PROTECTED. MORE IMPORTANT IS THE NEED TO CUT UP AND DESTROY THOSE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WHICH INFILTRATE SOUTHWARD AND GET THEMSELVES OUT OF SUPPORT OR REFUGE DISTANCE FROM THE DMZ. THESE FORCES ARE VULNERABLE TO OUR HELI-BORNE MANEUVER UNITS. TWO ADDITIONAL REGIMENTS IN THE AREA ALONG AND AROUND ROUTE 9 WOULD MAKE A MAJOR DIFFERENCE. THIS IS AN AMELIORATIVE ACTION, WHICH CAN HAVE IMMEDIATE FAVORABLE EFFECT IN TERMS OF U.S. CASUALTIES SAVED AND ENEMY KILLED.

6. TO CONCLUDE. IF THIS BATTLE IS NOT SOON TURNED AGAINST THE ENEMY, THE POUNDING NOW FELT AT CON THIEN, GIO LINH, DONG HA AND ELSEWHERE IS GOING TO RESOUND ALL THE WAY BACK TO DUBUQUE. THE CASUALTIES WE ARE LOSING TO THE ENEMY SHELLING MAY WELL

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**SECRET**

PAGE 5 RUHFMMA 3710 S E C R E T  
 BECOME A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE  
 USA TOWARD THE ENTIRE WAR.

THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT RESOLUTION OF THIS  
 SITUATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY OTHER  
 SINGLE PRISIS IN THE WAR TODAY. AND THE  
 THINGS WE CAN DO QUICKEST TO REDRESS THE SITUATION ARE  
 FIRST TO REINFORCE THE QUANG TRI AREA WITH AT  
 LEAST TWO REGIMENTS; AND SECOND, TO DEVASTATE AN  
 AREA BOUNDED BY THE BEN HAI RIVER ON THE SOUTH  
 AND BY AN ARC OF ABOUT 27 KILOMETERS RADIUS, CEN-  
 TERED UPON CON THIEN, AND EXTENDING FROM THE 330  
 DEGREE RADIAL TO THE SEA. THIS REGION HAS TO CON-  
 TAIN THE BULK OF THE OFFENDING ENEMY ARTILLERY  
 POSITIONS, AS WELL AS THE ENEMY'S PRINCIPAL FORWARD  
 BASES. IT MEASURES ABOUT 180 SQUARE MILES, BUT  
 THE AREA CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY NARROWED DOWN BY CAREFUL  
 TERRAIN ANALYSIS.

TO DESTROY THE ENEMY MATERIAL AND SUPPLIES,  
 CAUSE HIM GRAVE PHYSICAL LOSS AND IMPEDE HIS  
 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA WILL REQUIRE

PAGE 6 RUHFMMA 3710 S E C R E T  
 AIR OPERATIONS OF A MAGNITUDE VASTLY GREATER  
 THAN EVER CONTEMPLATED BEFORE FOR THIS REGION.

HERE IS WHAT I HAVE IN MIND:

- A. 1,500 B-52 SORTIES PER MONTH, IN THIS ONE SPECIFIED AREA.
- B. 10,000 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES PER MONTH IN THE  
 SAME LIMITED AREA, EMPLOYING THE COMPLETE ARRAY OF CONVENTION-  
 AL WEAPONS, INCLUDING USE OF THE HEAVIEST AVAILABLE AERIAL  
 ORDNANCE UPON ANY SPECIFIC TARGET LOCATED OR SUSPECTED.  
 SUPPORT THE TARGETING WITH AN ALL-OUT EFFORT BY AIR AND  
 GROUND OBSERVATION, AS WELL AS ALL ELECTRONIC AND  
 INFRA RED MEANS.
- C. QUANTUM USE OF THE MK-36 DESTRUCTOR ON ALL  
 AVENUES OF APPROACH AND COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES WITHIN  
 THE AREA. THE BEN HAI RIVER, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD BE  
 SEEDED WITH AT LEAST 500 DESTRUCTORS, AND THEN RE-  
 SEEDED WITH AN EQUAL NUMBER WEEKLY.
- D. THE EMPLOYMENT OF WALLEYE ON ANY FIRMLY  
 LOCATED AND CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE ARTILLERY WEAPONS.
- E. PIN POINT DESTRUCTION BY NAVAL GUNFIRE OF EVERY LOCATED  
 TARGET IN THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHIN RANGE, USING ALL NAVAL  
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 2 PAGES

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 INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 O 230937Z SEP 67  
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 TO CINCPACFLT  
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SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN OR IN HIS ABSENCE MAJGEN NICKERSON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. NFINAL SECTION OF 3 GUNFIRE AVAILABLE IN HE ENTIRE AREA.

F. THE BROADCAST AERIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES, IN TERMS OF THOUSANDS, ALONG EVERY AVENUE OF APPROACH WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA; AND THE REPETITIVE SEEDING OF MORE THOUSANDS OF MINES.

7. AT THIS POINT IT MAY BE OBSERVED THAT, TO DO ALL OF THIS, WOULD PROBABLY TAKE ALL OF THE OFFENSIVE AERIAL RESOURCES WE HAVE, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NOTHING LEFT FOR ANYTHING ELSE. WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS SO, IN AN ABSOLUTE SENSE, I DO NOT KNOW. IF IT IS, I BELIEVE THE DIVERSION OF MEANS IS NOT ONLY JUSTIFIED BUT ESSENTIAL. IT COULD BE THAT WE EITHER DELIVER OUR MEN FROM THE DESTRUCTION THEY ARE SUFFERING FROM AN ENEMY THEY CANNOT THEMSELVES ELIMINATE, OR THE U. S. PEOPLE MAY MAKE THE WHOLE

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 3711 SECRET  
 MATTER ACADEMIC.  
 GP-3  
 BT

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//////////////////SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOLLOWS////////////////////////////////

OO RUMSAK  
DE RUMSAW 4313U 2661155  
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FM COMUSMACV  
TO CG III MAF  
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EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT 31448 FROM MAGCOC  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND  
REF: CG, III MAF DTG 211730Z SEP 67 (S)

1. (S) I HAVE EXAMINED THE RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSED IN THE REFERENCE AND AM IN RECORD WITH YOUR PLAN TO MOVE THE 5TH MARINES WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO THE NORTH AND TO CONCENTRATE THE SLF'S IN THAT SAME AREA.
2. (S) AFTER MY VISIT TO THE 3D MARINE DIVISION YESTERDAY, MY OPINION IS CONFIRMED THAT MANY PROFITABLE TARGETS EXIST IN THUA THIEN-QUANG TRI AREA WHICH SHOULD BE HIT BEFORE THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON SETS IN. I AM CONCERNED OVER THE INDICATIONS OF AN ENEMY BUILDUP IN BASE AREA 101 - HAI LANG FOREST. THIS POSES A DANGEROUS THREAT TO THE LOC TO QUANG TRI AND TO THE NEW AIRFIELD LOGISITC BASE IN THAT AREA.
3. (S) IT IS MY INTENTION TO RETAIN THE 1ST OF THE 101ST IN III MAF UNTIL AT LEAST 1 NOVEMBER, AT WHICH TIME I WILL MAKE A

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 4313U SECRET  
DECISION ON ITS SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT BASED ON WEATHER, ENEMY THREAT, AND A CONSIDERATION OF THE OVERALL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN I CTZ. IN THE INTERIM, YOU SHOULD MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF ALL AVAILABLE FORCES IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. YOUR PLAN TO ADJUST THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND THE AMERICAL DIVISION WOULD FACILITATE THESE MOVES.

4. (S) I HAVE ALERTED GENERAL ROUSON TO BE PREPARED TO EXPAND THE PERSHING AO INTO SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI, IF REQUIRED.
5. (S) YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING A ROK ARMY BATTALION IS BEING STUDIED BY MY STAFF.
6. (S) IN SUMMARY, I HAVE NO PLANS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN I CTZ. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE 19TH BRIGADE, A DECISION WILL BE MADE AS TO THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST BRIGADE OF THE 101ST. I HEARTILY ENDORSE YOUR PLAN TO MOVE THREE OF FOUR BATTALIONS NORTH, AND SUGGEST EARLY IMPLEMENTATION. BEST REGARDS.  
GP-4.

BT

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O 242221Z SEP 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
BT

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

- A. ADMINO III MAF 240336Z
- B. CG FMFPAC 191908Z/SEP (PASEP)
- C. CG FMFPAC 230937Z/SEP (PASEP)

1. REF A ADDS UP TO JUST ABOUT ZERO. WESTY, IN THE FACE OF THE CLEAR NEED FOR MORE TROOPS IN ICTZ, HOLDS OUT THE HOPE THAT HE MAY NOT LEAVE YOU WITH FEWER TROOPS ON 1 NOV.

2. I BELIEVE IT IS GOING TO TAKE A LOT OF PRESSURE TO MAKE HIM FACE THE FACTS. REF B IS ONE EXAMPLE. REF C IS ANOTHER. THE LATTER MESSAGE IS NOW IN CINCPAC'S HANDS OFFICIALLY, AND HE IS USING THE INCLUDED FORMULA TO WORK ON WESTY. THAT MAY HELP, BUT I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO ADVISE HIM - ALWAYS IN WRITING - OF YOUR PRESSING NEED FOR FORCES; USING

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#19

**SECRET**

PAGE 2 YNA 3899 S E C R E T

FACTS AND STATISTICS TO BUTTRESS YOUR CASE.

3. NEW SUBJECT. IT MIGHT BE WELL FOR YOU TO REVIEW YOUR NEEDS FOR TARGET ACQUISITION MEANS OF EVERY SORT, AND MAKE THE REQUIREMENT KNOWN.

4. ANOTHER NEW SUBJECT. THE QUESTION OF JUST HOW THE MARINES GOT TO PLACES LIKE CON THIEN, KHE SANK AND GIO LIN IN THE FIRST PLACE IS COMING TO THE FORE. I KNOW, AND YOU KNOW, THAT WE ARE THERE BECAUSE WESTY FORCED LEW TO MAKE THE DEPLOYMENTS, AND AGAINST HIS WILL AND RECOMMENDATIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU NOW TO DIG OUT AS MUCH DOCUMENTATION AS YOU CAN. WE ARE GOING TO NEED IT.

5. AND FINALLY; METZGER'S REPORTED COMMENTS TO THE PRESS HAVE REALLY BLOWN SKY HIGH. IF HE, IN FACT, SAID WHAT HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING, MY REACTIONS ARE THESE:

A. HE IS PRETTY MUCH CORRECT.

B. TO SAY MUCH THINGS PUBLICLY WAS UNNECESSARY, UNTIMELY, IMPRUDENT AND A SOURCE OF DIRECT COMFORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE ENEMY. I WOULD HOPE THAT HE IS GROSSLY MISQUOTED. LET

PAGE 3 YNA 3899 S E C R E T

ME KNOW WHAT THE SCORE IS AS SOON AS YOU CAN, AND I WILL ABSORB AS MUCH OF THE FLAK AS POSSIBLE.

6. C'EST LA GUERRE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#19



SECRET

VS  
OO RUMHMF  
DE RUHMFMA 4174 2692135  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 262135Z SEP 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
BT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. MACV 260106Z

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM WESTMORELAND.

QUOTE:

1. (U) I APPRECIATE YOUR EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN I CTZ.
2. (S) AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE MADE MAJOR MOVES OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS TO INCREASE THE COMBAT POWER IN THAT AREA. SINCE APRIL, APPROXIMATELY 17,000 U.S. ARMY GROUND FORCES HAVE BEEN SHIFTED TO III MAF. ALSO, NEARLY 5,000 ADDITIONAL MARINES WERE PROVIDED FROM 9TH MAB. THIS REPRESENTED AN INCREASE OF NEARLY FIFTY PERCENT IN GROUND COMBAT STRENGTH. IN U.S. MANEUVER BATTALIONS IT REPRESENTED AN INCREASE FROM EIGHTEEN TO THIRTY-TWO. THESE RE INFORCEMENTS, IN MY OPINION, SAVED THE SITUATION IN I CTZ.
3. (S) AT PRESENT, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF REDUCING THE COMBAT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#20

**SECRET**

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA4174 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO STRENGTH OF III MAF. AFTER THE 198TH BDE ARRIVES IN COUNTRY IN MID-OCTOBER, I WILL RE-EVALUATE THE SITUATION AND MAKE A DECISION ON THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST BDE OF THE 101ST. AT THE SAME TIME, I WILL RE-EVALUATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE CONTINUED USE OF THE 9TH MAB ASSETS IN-COUNTRY. MY PRESENT OPINION IS THAT WE WILL NEED TO RETAIN THE WHOLE FORCE INDEFINITELY. ON THIS, I WOULD ANTICIPATE YOUR SUPPORT.

4. (S) AFTER VISITING DONG HA, CAMP CARROLL AND KHE SANH LAST FRIDAY, AND TALKING WITH THE COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND: I WAS CONVINCED THAT WE NEED THREE OR FOUR MORE BATTALIONS NORTH OF AI VAN. I HAVE APPROVED A PROPOSAL OF GENERAL CUSHMAN TO MOVE THE 5TH MARINES AND AN SLF NORTH, WHILE EXTENDING THE AMERICAN DIV AO TO THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF QUANG NAM. GENERAL ROYSON HAS BEEN ALERTED TO THE CONTINGENCY OF MOVING A BRIGADE OF THE 1ST CAV INTO SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI.

5. (U) PLANS FOR STRENGTHENING THE COMBAT OPERATING BASES AND STRONG POINTS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI ARE PROGRESSING. TWO ADDITIONAL ARVN AIRBORNE BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN SENT NORTH DURING THE PAST WEEK. THERE ARE NOW FIVE OF EIGHT VN GENERAL RESERVE AIRBORNE BATTALIONS INHI CTZ. BY 1 NOVEMBER, THE 2D ARVN

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA4174 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO REGIMENT OF FOUR BATTALIONS SHOULD BE READY TO OCCUPY THREE BATTALION STRONG POINTS AND ONE OB.

6. (S) THROUGH THE WINTER MONTHS, WHILE CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN II AND III CORPS, I WILL RETAIN THE ABILITY TO REINFORCE III MAF WITH A BRIGADE IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES IT. BY NEXT MARCH/APRIL, I PLAN ON SENDING THE 1ST CAV INTO I CTZ FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF FAVORABLE WEATHER DURING 1968.

UNQUOTE  
GP-4  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SJRG.									#20



SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMHM  
DE RUHFMA 4189 2692345  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 262345Z SEP 67  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMHM/CG III MAF  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

- A. CG III MAF 251142Z/SEP67
- B. CG FMFPAC 230937Z/SEP67

1. THE LAST TIME I WAS IN RVN I SAW A CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF MANPOWER IN THE REPLACEMENT/ROTATION/R&R SYSTEM, REFLECTING ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN THE FLC AND IN THE SEVERAL MAJOR UNITS, WHICH ADDED UP TO THOUSANDS OF MAN-DAYS PER MONTH. AT THAT TIME I SAID THAT I COULD NOT, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, SUPPORT OR GENERATE PLEAS FOR MORE MARINES UNTIL WE CLEANED UP THE DISARRAY. I AM SURE THAT MUCH HAS SINCE BEEN DONE, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE FACTS BEFORE I TAKE MY POSITION ON REF A WITH CINCPAC. INCIDENTALLY, I WOULD HAVE WELCOMED SOME ADVANCE WARNING ON THE CONTENT OF THAT MESSAGE.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA4189 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

2. THE DMZ SITUATION IS STILL BOILING. THE ARMY IS ENRAGED AT REF B. PRIVATELY WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THEIR DISSATISFACTION IS THAT IT PROPOSES WHAT WESTY SHOULD HAVE DONE ON HIS OWN, LONG SINCE.
3. THE ARMY HAS TAKEN A POSITION ON THE DMZ, WHICH IS BEING REPEATED BLUNTLY, BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON. IT IS AS FOLLOWS:
- A. THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF FORCES IN NORTHERN ICTZ. THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF TACTICS.
  - B. THE MARINES HAVE A BEACH-HEAD ATTITUDE, AND ARE SITTING IN THEIR HOLES AT CON THIEN. IF THEY MOVED ABOUT AND MANEUVERED TO CUT UP THE ENEMY, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM.
  - C. MOST OF THE FIRE ON THE MARINE POSITIONS IS MORTAR FIRE, WHICH THEY COULD ABATE IF THEY WOULD MANEUVER OFFENSIVELY.
4. I HAVE COUNTERED THE ABOVE BY PRESENTING FACTS ON WHERE OUR FORCES ARE, AND WHAT THEY ARE DOING IN TERMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER, POINTING OUT THAT ONLY A SMALL FRACTION ARE MANNING GIO LIN AND CON THIEN; THAT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#21

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA4189 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 THESE ARE POINTS A-2 AND A-4 ON WESTY'S STRONG  
 POINT SYSTEM; THAT HE HAS DIRECTED THAT THEY BE  
 OCCUPIED, AND THAT CINCPAC HAS CONCURRED; THAT  
 THE MARINES HAVE NO EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT AT ALL TO THESE  
 EMINENCES; THAT WE ARE ONLY IN THE DMZ AREA BECAUSE IT  
 IS MACV POLICY TO SECURE ROUTE 9, WHICH ACT  
 CANNOT BE CONSUMMATED WITHOUT PUTTING LARGE  
 FORCES NORTH OF THE ROAD; THAT WE DO NOT HAVE  
 ENOUGH FORCES THERE NOW; THAT IF WESTY WANTS TO  
 GIVE UP ROUTE 9 III MAF CAN WITHDRAW TO ANY POSITION HE  
 DESIRES. AND I HAVE BROADCAST TO ALL WHO WILL LISTEN, THAT 70  
 PERCENT OF THE FIRE IN THE DMZ AREA IS ARTILLERY, 8 PERCENT  
 ROCKET AND ONLY 22 PERCENT MORTAR.

5. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BUTTRESS OUR  
 CASE IN EVERY WAY WE CAN. IN THIS REGARD, WILL YOU  
 PLEASE SEND ME A MESSAGE WHICH DETAILS THE NATURE  
 OF OUR ACTIVE DEFENSE IN THE CON THIEN - GIO LIN  
 AREA, PORTRAYING SPECIFICALLY HOW IT IS BEING  
 PURSUED. ONE POINT, BROUGHT UP BY THE ARMY HERE  
 YESTERDAY, WAS THAT OUR ARTILLERY SITS IN ITS HOLES,

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA4189 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 SERVING AS PIN-POINT COUNTERBATTERY TARGETS, WHILE  
 THE ENEMY MOVES HIS ARTILLERY ABOUT. MY RESPONSE WAS TO  
 DISAGREE, AND TELL HOW I HAD SEEN OUR ARTILLERY MOVE OFF AND  
 AROUND GIO LIN WHEN OUT THERE TWO TRIPS AGO.

COULD YOU GIVE ME MORE ON THIS?

6. I HAVE JUST SENT YOU WESTY'S ANSWER TO MY  
 191908Z. WOULD WELCOME SUGGESTION AS TO ANY-  
 THING I MIGHT DO FURTHER TO HELP. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#21

TOP SECRET

CCN 212 CRYPTO

FILLER 3

DTG 270359Z

MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

*CG*  
*o/s*  
*Dep Cdn*  
*27 Sept 67*

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 270359Z SEP 67

RECEIVED BY \_\_\_\_\_

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2 Nov 68*

DATE-TIME GROUP 270359Z SEP 67

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

W PAC945  
 OO DDKE  
 DE YNA 4291 2700359  
 ZNY TTTT  
 O 270359Z SEP 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
 BT

# EXCLUSIVE

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM  
 LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A BACK-CHANNEL FROM  
 SHARP TO WESTMORELAND:

QUOTE:

- A. CG FMFPAC 230937Z SEP 67 (PASEP)
- B. CINCPACFLT 242242Z SEP 67 (PASEP)
- C. CINCPACFLT 242241Z SEP 67 (PASEP)
1. I HAVE GIVEN DEEP AND SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE SITUATION  
 IN THE DMZ REGION, AS I KNOW YOU HAVE.
2. REF A CONTAINS THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF CG FMFPAC  
 TO CINCPACFLT. CINCPACFLT HAS EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS  
 TO ME, AND I HAVE PASSED HIS MESSAGE TO YOU. HE HAS  
 ALREADY TAKEN ACTION TO MAKE MAXIMUM NAVAL GUNFIRE  
 AVAILABLE ALONG THE DMZ. (REF C).
3. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I HAVE THE BENEFIT OF YOUR VIEWS IN

PAGE 2 YNA 4291 T O P S E C R E T

THE PREPARATION OF A COORDINATED RECOMMENDATION FOR THE  
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT A  
 DIRECTED COURSE OF ACTION IS IN PREPARATION AT THAT LEVEL.

4. FROM A CONSENSUS OF YOUR EARLIER VIEWS, THE SERIES OF RECENT  
 FMFPAC/FLEET MESSAGES, AND MY OWN CONSIDERED OPINION, I THINK  
 WE ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE CASUALTY LEVEL CURRENTLY BEING  
 EXPERIENCED BY OUR FORCES IN THE DMZ REGION IS BECOMING INCREAS-  
 INGLY GRAVE. UNLESS THIS CASUALTY RATE CAN BE REDUCED QUICKLY AND  
 IN VERY SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE, THE OPERATIONAL BENEFITS NOW BEING

ACHIEVED IN THE AREA IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ ARE NOT CON-  
 SISTENT WITH THE LOSSES INCURRED.

5. OUR FORCES ARE SO CLOSE TO THE DMZ THAT THEY ARE NOW AT SERIOUS  
 TACTICAL DISADVANTAGE BECAUSE THE ENEMY HAS A REAR AREA THAT IS  
 SECURE AGAINST OUR GROUND MANEUVER. IN HIS REAR AREA HE HAS A  
 HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF ARTILLERY WHICH IS FIRING INTO FRIENDLY POSI-  
 TIONS THAT ARE FIXED AND EXPOSED TO ENEMY OBSERVATION. THIS ARTILLERY  
 THREAT UNDER EXISTING RESTRAINTS CAN BE COUNTERED ONLY BY AIR,  
 ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. WHILE IT IS REALIZED THAT YOU  
 HAVE CONCENTRATED B52 STRIKES IN THIS AREA AND HAVE MADE A MAJOR  
 TACTICAL AIR AND ARTILLERY EFFORT, THE RESULTS THUS FAR HAVE NOT BEEN

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 YNA 4291 T O P S E C R E T

EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING THE LEVEL OF ENEMY FIRE.

6. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE IMMEDIATE AND SERIOUS NATURE OF THIS SITUATION REQUIRES THAT OVERRIDING PRIORITY FOR THE USE OF ALL FIRE SUPPORT RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOU BE ASSIGNED TO THIS TASK. EXCEPT FOR MOST URGENT AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER AREAS, IN-COUNTRY TACTICAL AIR AND ARC LIGHT RESOURCES SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO THE LIMITS OF TACTICAL FEASIBILITY AGAINST THIS THREAT. ALL AVAILABLE NGF RESOURCES SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED AGAINST THOSE PORTIONS OF THIS AREA WITHIN THEIR RANGE. CINCPACFLT HAS MADE SEA DRAGON FORCES AVAILABLE FOR USE IN THIS AREA. RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES, INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES AND AIR CONTROL FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES ARE TO BE RE-ORIENTED AS NECESSARY TO RESPOND AS EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE.

7. IN ORDER TO DESTROY ENEMY MATERIAL AND SUPPLIES, INFLICT PERSONNEL LOSSES AND IMPEDE HIS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA TO A DEGREE NOT PREVIOUSLY ATTEMPTED, AIR OPERATIONS ON A SCALE GREATER THAN EVER CONTEMPLATED BEFORE FOR THIS REGION WILL BE REQUIRED. I WILL PROVIDE SUCH AUGMENTATION TO THIS EFFORT AS CAN BE USEFULLY EMPLOYED. THERE WILL BE A PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING FIRES OF THE VARIOUS FORCES IN THIS RELATIVELY SMALL AREA

PAGE 4 YNA 4291 T O P S E C R E T

WHICH WILL NEED CLOSE ATTENTION.

8. SHOULD THE FOREGOING ACTIONS FAIL TO RELIEVE PROMPTLY AND SATISFACTORILY THE SITUATION IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA SOUTH OF THE DMZ, A CHANGE IN THE CURRENT POSTURE OF FIXED POINT DEFENSE IN THE AREA WHICH WOULD RESTORE TO OUR OWN FORCES THOSE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES INHERENT IN OUR SUPERIOR MOBILITY AND FIRE POWER MAY BE NECESSARY. WHILE A PROBABLE REDUCTION IN CONTROL OVER SOME TERRAIN IN THE AREA IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ COULD BE EXPECTED, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT AN OVER-ALL INCREASE IN THE THREAT TO FRIENDLY FORCES WOULD NECESSARILY ACCRUE.

9. THE PROBLEM OF HEAVY CASUALTIES IN I CORPS DOES NOT APPEAR CONFINED TO THE DMZ. NVA FORCES CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE INTO I CORPS IN SIZEABLE NUMBERS. THEY CONTINUE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY AND IN FORCE AGAINST FRIENDLY BASE AREAS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS AGAINST INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AREA ARE TAKING A HEAVY TOLL IN SUPPLIES DESTROYED AND ARE INFLICTING NUMEROUS CASUALTIES. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SIMILAR ENEMY ACTIVITY IN VARYING DEGREE IN OTHER CORPS AREAS, NEITHER THE LEVEL OF INTENSITY NOR THE NUMBER OF ENEMY FORCES INVOLVED APPEAR TO BE ON A SCALE COMPARABLE TO THAT IN I CORPS. CONSISTENT WITH

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 YVNA 4291 T O P S E C R E T

THIS HIGHER LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR INFLICTING RELATIVELY LARGE LOSSES ON THE ENEMY IF ADDITIONAL FORCES WERE TO BE MOVED INTO THIS CTZ.

10. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR INCREASING THE LEVEL OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN I CORPS WOULD SERVE TO REDUCE HEAVY ENEMY PRESSURES NOW BEARING ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS IN THE CON THIEN/GIO LINH/DONG HA AREA. I RECOMMEND THIS SITUATION BE REVIEWED TO INCLUDE AN APPRAISAL, BY CORPS AREA, OF THE ESTIMATED THREAT, THE CURRENT LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY, THE FORCES PRESENTLY COMMITTED AND DEVELOPMENTS TO BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF THE NECESSITY TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE I CTZ IS REQUESTED.

11. I HAVE JUST BEEN HANDED JOHNNY JOHNSON'S 252144Z WHICH CONFIRMS MY PREDICTION IN PARAGRAPH 3. WARM REGARDS. GP-3 UNQUOTE.

12GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

CG *[Signature]*  
CG *[Signature]*

CCN 238

FILLER *[Signature]*

DTG 290129Z

MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

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DATE/TIME 291310 H

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20 Nov 68*

DATE-TIME GROUP 290129Z SEP 67

TOP SECRET

# 34

TOP SECRET

OO RUMSAK  
 DE RUHMM 4635 2722129  
 ZNY TTTT  
 O 297129Z SEP 67  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN  
 KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING IS MY 272105Z SEP TO CINCPACFLT ON THE  
 DMZ/ROUTE PACKAGE I SITUATION:

QUOTE:

A. CG FMFPAC 230937Z/SEP67

B. CINCPACFLT 242247Z/SEP67

C. CG FMFPAC 162233Z/SEP67

D. MACV PRACTICE NINE REQUIREMENTS PLAN (U) DTD  
26JAN67 (TS)

E. COMUSMACV MSG 192217Z/APR67 (TS)

F. CINCPAC MONTHLY ASIA AIR OPERATIONS DIGEST

1. REFERENCE A DISCUSSED A REQUIREMENT FOR MASSIVE  
 ATTACKS BY AIR, NAVAL VUNFIRE AND ARTILLERY TO DESTROY  
 ENEMY WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES IN THE DMZ AREA. AND TO IMPEDE HIS  
 MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN ROUTE PACKAGE I.

2. REFERENCE B EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE EFFORT PRO-  
 POSED BY REFERENCE A WOULD PROVIDE ONLY TEMPORARY  
 RELIEF; THAT IT COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED AND THAT THERE  
 WOULD BE A RETURN TO THE SITUATION NOW PREVAILING  
 UPON REDUCTION OF THE FIRE SUPPORT EFFORT. REFERENCE  
 B REQUESTED COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ON THOSE  
 COURSES OF ACTION WHICH SHOULD BE ADOPTED. SUBSE-  
 QUENT TO THE IMMEDIATE FIRE SUPPORT ACTIONS RECOM-  
 MENDED - WELL AS COMMENTS CONCERNING REFERENCE  
 C, WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT THE TWO MARINE SQUADRONS  
 AT IWAKUNI NOT BE DEPLOYED TO RVN AT THIS TIME. THIS MESSAGE  
 RESPONDS TO THE THREE TOPICS ADDRESSED IN REFERENCE B.

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

III MAF 2300/4

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#8081  
TOP SECRET

#34

TOP SECRET

## 3. BACKGROUND

OUR FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI FOR FOUR PRINCIPAL REASONS. FIRST, COMUSMACV PERCEIVED AND SPOILED A MAJOR ENEMY INVASION THREAT IN THE DMZ BY DEPLOYING FORCES FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS HASTINGS AND PRAIRIE IN 1966. THESE FORCES, IN VARYING DENSITIES, HAVE REMAINED THERE TO FORESTALL SUBSEQUENT ENEMY EFFORTS. SECOND, AND PERSISTING SINCE EARLY IN THE WAR, HAS BEEN THE POLICY THAT ROUTE 9 SHALL BE SECURED AND KEPT OPEN. TO DO THIS EFFECTIVELY REQUIRES THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL FORCES NORTH OF THE ROAD. THIRD, THE MAJOR REORIENTATION OF ARVN FORCES TO THE RD EFFORT IN JAN 67, RESULTED IN ABSORPTION BY III MAF OF ARVN SECURITY TASKS IN NORTHERN I CTZ. AND FINALLY, THE STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM HAS DRAWN U.S. FORCES INTO THE DMZ REGION. REF D IS MACV'S PRACTICE 9 REQUIREMENTS PLAN. BY REF E MACV INFORMED CINCPAC AND JCS OF HIS INTENTION OF IMPLEMENTING THE DYE MARKER PLAN, GIVING III MAF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND MANNING OF THE SYSTEM, WHICH, OF COURSE, INVOLVED PROTECTION OF THE INSTALLING FORCES AS WELL. MARINE FORCES IN THE DMZ AREA ARE NOW MANNING GIO LINH AND CON THIEN (STRONG POINTS A-2 AND A-4 IN THE OBSTACLE SYSTEM) AS A RESULT OF THESE DECISIONS, AND OTHER MARINE FORCES ARE MANEUVERING IN THE AREA TO PROTECT THE STRONG POINTS AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM.

4. PARAGRAPH 1 OF REFERENCE B, EXPRESSES THE VIEW THAT THE HEAVY FIRE SUPPORT EFFORT DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE A COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED ON A PERPETUAL BASIS. IN THE ABSOLUTE SENSE OF THE TERM PERPETUAL, THIS VIEW IS CONCURRED IN, BUT, THE CURRENT SITUATION IS REGARDED LESS AS A PERPETUAL EFFORT THAN AS AN ESSENTIAL DEFENSIVE STEP AND AS A PROFITABLE TACTICAL OPPORTUNITY WHICH SHOULD BE EXPLOITED FOR WHATEVER TIME IT IS BENEFICIAL TO DO SO; SPECIFICALLY:

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

(1) THE NE MONSOON HAS PRODUCED HEAVY RAINS AND FLOODING IN THE BEN HAI BASIN. INTELLIGENCE FROM HIGH LEVEL SOURCES, AGENTS, DEFECTORS, AND PW'S DISCLOSES THAT THE ENEMY IS SUFFERING FROM THE WEATHER. HE IS HAMPERED BY INUNDATED TRENCHES, BUNKERS, AND DUG-IN ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND HAS LOST FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES FROM WATER DAMAGE. FLOODING OF THE BEN HAI AND OTHER RIVERS IS RESTRICTING THE MOVEMENT OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT, TO THE POINT WHERE SOME OF HIS UNITS ARE ISOLATED. BUT PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT, THESE SAME CONDITIONS HAVE FORCED ENEMY TROOPS FROM THEIR COVER, DRIVEN THEM ABOVE GROUND MAKING THEM MORE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY OUR SUPPORTING ARMS. THIS WOULD THUS APPEAR TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE MASSIVE AND CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OF AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE, WITH THE PROSPECT OF HIGHLY PROFITABLE RESULTS.

(2) BEYOND THIS, THERE IS THE RELATIVELY CONCENTRATED NATURE OF THE ENEMY DISPOSITIONS. ONE OF OUR PRIME MILITARY PURPOSES--REPEATED OFTEN DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS--IS DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S MILITARY SUBSTANCE WHEN IT IS IN CONCENTRATED AND VULNERABLE FORM; IN THE PORT OF HAIPHONG FOR EXAMPLE. THIS CONDITION NOW OBTAINS, IN A MODEST DEGREE, IN THE DMZ AREA WHERE THE ENEMY IS OBLIGATED TO RECONCENTRATE HIS PEOPLE, HIS WEAPONS, AND HIS LOGISTIC MEANS IF HE IS TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF DRIVING US AWAY OR DESTROYING US. THIS IN TURN HAS RECREATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO STRIKE HIM AS HE MASSES HIS WEAPONS SUPPLIES AND PEOPLE. IN A LIMITED DEGREE, THAT IS WHAT IS GOING ON NOW AND, IN THIS SENSE, THE EXECUTION OF INTENSIVE FIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A STOP-GAP MEASURE BUT AS A TACTICAL OPPORTUNITY.

5. PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCE B REQUESTS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING COURSES OF ACTION WHICH SHOULD BE ADOPTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE MAJOR FIRE SUPPORT EFFORT OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A. THERE APPEAR TO BE JUST TWO MAJOR LONG-TERM UNDERTAKINGS THAT MERIT DISCUSSION: INVADE NORTH VIETNAM AND WITHDRAW FROM THE GENERAL DMZ AREA

A. RESPECTING THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AND, IGNORING POLITICAL FACTORS, THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE PERTINENT:

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

(1) IF WE MADE A LIMITED OBJECTIVE LANDING, SAY SOUTH OF VINH, FOR THE PURPOSE OF QUICKLY CLEANING OUT THE FORCES AND WEAPONS FACING US NOW AND THEN RETURNING SOUTH OF THE DMZ, LITTLE DURABLE WILL HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE ENEMY WOULD PROBABLY BE BACK WHERE HE IS NOW, SHORTLY AFTER WE WITHDRAW. WE WOULD HAVE HURT HIM, BUT WOULD THEN BE FACED WITH THE PROSPECT OF HAVING TO RE-EXECUTE THE LANDING UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ENEMY HAD GAINED VALUABLE DEFENSIVE EXPERIENCE.

(2) IF WE INVADE NORTH VIETNAM WITH THE PURPOSE OF REMAINING THERE INDEFINITELY, THEN THE ENEMY IS FREE TO FACE US WITH THE SAME FORM OF DESTRUCTIVE FIRE POWER WE ARE ENDURING NOW NEAR THE DMZ. AS WE EXPAND OUR LODGEMENT TO DESTROY HIS WEAPONS, HE CAN WITHDRAW NORTHWARD, DEFENDING ON SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS, UNTIL WE ARE LOOKING DIRECTLY INTO YUNNAN PROVINCE OF CHINA. THE STRENGTH-SAPPING PROSPECTS OF THIS ARE FORBIDDING.

(3) IN SHORT, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE TACTICAL VIRTUE IN A LANDING IN NORTH VIETNAM, UNLESS IT IS ESTIMATED, BY OUR INVADING THEIR HOMELAND, THAT THE TRAUMA WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO BRING THE HANOI GOVERNMENT TO THE PEACE TABLE.

B. WITH RESPECT TO DIMINISHING OUR STRENGTH IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI, THE PROBLEM REDUCES ITSELF TO AN APPRAISAL OF THE FOUR FACTORS WHICH BROUGHT US THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE, (PARA 3A ABOVE) PARTICULARLY THE MATTERS OF ROUTE 9 AND DYE MARKER.

(1) MACV AND GVN STRATEGY IS THAT ROUTE 9 IS A CRITICAL FEATURE, TO BE PRESERVED TO US AND DENIED TO THE ENEMY. THAT IS ONE OF THE PRIME REASONS WHY COMUSMACV DEPLOYED FORCES NORTH OF ROUTE 9 IN THE FIRST PLACE. ROUTE 9 CAN BE INTERDICTED BY US FROM POSITIONS TO THE SOUTHWARD; HOWEVER, IT CAN ONLY BE SECURED BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF SIZEABLE FRIENDLY FORCES TO THE NORTH OF THE ROAD;-- FORCES IN AT LEAST AS MUCH STRENGTH AS ARE THERE NOW.

(2) TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF THE FIELD COMMANDER, BUT I AM SURE THAT NEITHER COMUSMACV OR CG III MAF HAVE ANY DESIRE TO MEMORIZLIZE CON THIEN OR GIO LINH BY MAINTAINING FORCES ON THOSE EMINENCES FOR OTHER THAN SOUND TACTICAL PURPOSES. THE DYE MARKER REQUIREMENT FOR OCCUPATION OF THESE LOCALITIES FINDS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN A COMPANY AND A BATTALION ON CON THIEN AND

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TOP SECRET

A COMPANY ON GIO LINH. SHOULD THE PRESENT DYE-MARKER PLANS CONTINUE, THEN WE SHOULD EXPECT TO SEE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF THESE KEY POINTS BY FRIENDLY FORCES, AND CONTINUED PRESENCE OF FRIENDLY FORCES NEAR THE DMZ. IF THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE DYE MARKER PLAN, TO MOVE THE STRONG-POINT TRACE FARTHER SOUTH, THEN THESE POINTS LOSE THEIR SIGNIFICANCE, AND SOME REDUCTION IN TROOP DENSITY WOULD RESULT.

C. IT WILL BE SEEN, THEN, THAT NEITHER OF THE ABOVE LONG TERM OPITONS APPEARS TO OFFER PROSEPECT OF DECISIVE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION UNLESS, IN THE CASE OF DYE MARKER, THERE WERE SOME MAJOR CHANGE IN THE TRACE LOCATION.

6. FINALLY REFERENCE A ASKS FOR A REVIEW AND CONFIRMATION OF THE RECOMMENDATION IN REEFERENCE C RESPECTING HOLDING THE TWO MARINE OUT-OF-COUNTRY TACTICAL SQUADRONS IN THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS AT IWAKUNI. NOTWITHSTANDING THE ADVANTAGES LISTED IN REFERENCE C WHICH ACCRUE IF THE SQUADRONS DO NOT DEPLOY, IF A STUDY OF REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES DISCLOSES THAT THEY ARE ESSENTIAL IN CARRYING OUT THE PROGRAM OUTLINED IN REFERENCE B, THEN THE TWO SQUADRONS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED AT ONCE, AND THEY ARE NOW READIED FOR THIS PURPOSE. HOWEVER, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT THE SORTIES THESE AIRCRAFT COULD ADD ARE ACTUALLY NEEDED. FACTORS WHICH SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION ARE THE FOLLOWING:

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