

HAS BEEN SENT

- ~~24. CG III MAF 050342Z SEP67 (S)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM~~
25. CG III MAF 110410Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
TEAM OF MACV STAFF OFFICERS
26. CG III MAF 121206Z SEP67 (C) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM VETH INFO ADM LACY FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
CUA VIET CHANNEL (DYE MARKER)
27. CG III MAF 122342Z SEP67 (C) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN HOCMUTH AND ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ANALYSIS OF PATROL ACTIONS BY REGULAR RIFLE UNITS
28. CG III MAF 100308Z SEP67 (C) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
MARIJUANA
- ~~29. CG III MAF 080812Z SEP67 (S)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
COMUSMACV VISIT TO III MAF~~
30. CG III MAF 130836Z SEP67 (C) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO BGEN HERBOLD FROM LTGEN  
CUSHMAN  
AVAILABILITY OF THE M-109 SELF PROPELLED HOWITZER
31. CG III MAF 131636Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
SUMMARY OF GEN ABRAMS VISIT TO III MAF, 10SEP67
32. CG III MAF 141438Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
FOLLOWING MSG SENT TO COMUSMACV FOLLOWING GEN WESTMORELAND'S VISIT  
SUBJ: RPT OF GEN WESTMORELAND'S VISIT 13S EP67
33. CG III MAF 180804Z SEP67 (C) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK  
VISIT BY MR. JOSEPH ALSOP 16-17SEP67
34. CG III MAF 211700Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ENEMY THREAT IN I CTZ AND PARTICULARLY THE DMZ
35. CG III MAF 211702Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
RESTRICTION OF COUNTERBATTERY FIRE IN DMZ AREA

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36. CG III MAF 212334Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON AND BGEN KOSTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
DIRECT LIAISON WITH 1/101ST AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL BRIGADE
37. MCG III MAF 220054Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGENS HOCHMUTH AND ANDERSON  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
MESSAGE TO WESTY CONCERNING COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE IN DMZ AREA
38. CG III MAF 240336Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
MOVEMENT OF THE 5TH MARINES WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO THE NORTH AND  
ALSO THE CONCENTRATION OF THE SLF'S IN THE SAME AREA
39. ADMINO III MAF 240340Z SEP67 (S) *gp-3*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN NICKERSON  
CASUALTY RATE AT THE DMZ AS STATED BY LTGEN KRULAK IN  
CG FMFPAC MSG 231903Z
40. CG III MAF 250752Z SEP67 (C) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
WASHINGTON POST NEWS ARTICLE OF 24 SEP67 (TOM CHEATHAM)
41. CG III MAF 270410Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN KOSTER ~~XX~~ FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN (NOFORN)  
CANDID EVALUATION OF EACH VNAF CMDR
42. CG III MAF 270412Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
CANDID EVALUATION OF EACH VNAF CMDR
43. CG III MAF 270414Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN METZGER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN,  
CANDID EVALUATION OF EACH VNAF CMDR
44. CG III MAF 220110Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ENEMY THREAT IN I CTZ AND PARTICULARLY THE DMZ
45. CG III MAF 231424Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN NICKERSON  
RECOMMENDATIONS TO MOVE THE 5TH MARINES WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO THE  
NORTH
46. CG III MAF 271650Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ACTIVE DEFENSE IN THE DMZ AREA
- 
47. CG III MAF 291406Z SEP67 (U)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN METZGER FROM BGEN OWENS  
COMMENTS ON THE FOLLOWING NEWSPAPER ARTICLE "RAIN AND HOSTILITY"
48. CG III MAF 291446Z SEP67 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR GEN WESTMORELAND UPON HIS  
RETURN NOFORN  
REDEPLOYMENT OF 2D ROKMC
- 
8. CG III MAF 291630Z SEP67 (TS) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
DEPLOYMENT OF FIRST AIRCAVDIV(MINUS) TO I CORPS

FILLER

MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967

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P 291630Z SEP 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN  
CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. DECISION HAS BEEN REACHED TO DEPLOY FIRST AIRCAVDIV (MINUS) TO I CORPS. FORCE WILL BE SEVEN BATTALIONS PLUS AIRCAV SQUADRON ORGANIZED IN THREE BRIGADES. THIS WILL FREE TWO MARINE BNS AT ONCE TO MOVE NORTH AND ATTACK ENEMY IN QUANG TRI AREA, PLUS SLF NOW IN AFLOAT RESERVE. THESE ARE ALL THAT CAN BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AIRCAV WILL ATTACK SECOND NVA DIV AND V.25 BN. 193TH BDE WILL ALSO ARRIVE DURING THIS TIME FRAME BUT 1/101 WILL MOVE SOUTH. AT THAT POINT FURTHER DEPLOYMENT AND ATTACK POSSIBILITIES OPEN UP AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES SHOULD HAVE IMPROVED UP NORTH WITH COMPLETION OF QUANG TRI A/F.
2. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS TO LIMIT PRESENT AND FUTURE ADVANTAGE OVER ENEMY.
3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**TOP SECRET**

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HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN-  
 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND UPON HIS RETURN NOFORN  
 REDEPLOYMENT OF 2D ROKMC

1. PURSUANT TO OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY, I RECOMMEND THAT THE ROKMC BDE BE REDEPLOYED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE TO THE DANANG TAOR. THIS WOULD SIMPLIFY OUR LOGISTIC AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT OF THE BDE AND WOULD ENABLE US TO ASSIGN CONTIGUOUS AREAS TO THE AMERICAL AND AIR CAV THUS SIMPLIFYING LOGISTIC AND OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THAT SCORE ALSO.
2. I WOULD ENVISION THE ROK BDE MOVING INTO A TAOR IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY 1ST MAR AND SOON BY THE 5TH MAR. OTHERWISE, IT APPEARS THAT WHEN THE 198TH BDE ARRIVES I WILL HAVE TO DEPLOY AN AMERICAL BDE INTO THAT AREA IN ORDER TO SHIFT ADDITIONAL MARINE FORCES NORTH AS YOU INDICATED.
3. IN THE EVENT IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO REDEPLOY ROKMC BDE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF A DEFINITE COMMITMENT COULD BE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2327 **S E C R E T** EXCLUSIVE  
 OBTAINED TO EFFECT REDEPLOYMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. THIS WILL FACILITATE PLANNING FOR DEPLOYMENTS OF OTHER UNITS.

4. I HAVE NOT TALKED WITH GEN KIM ABOUT THIS PROPOSED MOVE AND WILL NOT UNTIL I HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU.

GP-4  
 BT

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 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**  
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UNCLAS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN METZGER FROM  
 BGEN OWENS

1. REQUEST YOUR REACTION AND COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING NEWSPAPER  
 ARTICLE QUOTE

"RAIN AND HOSTILITY"

GIO LINH GETS A JOB IT WASN'T BUILT FOR BY ORR KELLY STAR STAFF WRITER  
 GIO LINH-THIS FURTHEST OUTPOST OF AMERICAN MILITARY INFLUENCE  
 IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS A BATTERED ISLAND OF STICKY RED MUD SURROUNDED  
 BY A SEA OF BOILING HOSTILITY.

ITS POORLY CONSTRUCTED BUNKERS ARE COLLAPSING UNDER THE IMPACT  
 OF TORRENTIAL RAINS AND HEAVY GUNFIRE FROM THE NORTH.

THE RAINS HAVE CUT THE ONE ROAD LEADING TO THE SOUTH. BUT EVEN WHEN  
 THE ROAD WAS OPEN, CONVOYS WERE MINED AND AMBUSHED REGULARLY ON THE  
 SEVEN KILOMETER DASH TO THE AIRBASE AT DONG HA.

WHEN THE ROAD WAS OPEN, THE MARINES, ARMY ARTILLERYMEN AND NAVY GUN

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2813 UNCLAS EXCLUSIVE

SPOTTERS STATIONED HERE USUALLY GOT TWO HOT MEALS A DAY. NOW THEY  
 ARE ON C RATIONS. THERE IS A WELL THAT PROVIDES A GOOD SUPPLY OF  
 DRINKABLE WATER. BUT THE PUMP WAS DROWNED OUT BY THE RAINS. NOW, THERE  
 IS LITTLE WATER TO DRINK AND NONE TO SUPPLY THE BEST SHOWERS IN  
 SOUTH VIETNAM. GIO LINH IS LOCATED ON HILL 46 (46 METERS ABOVE SEA  
 LEVEL), ABOUT 2,000 METERS FROM THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. IT IS THE NEXT  
 HILL EAST OF CON THIEN, THE OUTPOST FIVE MILES AWAY THAT HAS BECOME  
 THE FAVORITE TARGET OF COMMUNIST ARTILLERY EMPLACED IN THE DMZ.  
 UNTIL A LITTLE OVER A YEAR AGO, THE DMZ WAS ONE OF THE MOST PEACEFUL  
 SECTORS OF THE WAR. VISITORS COULD DRIVE SAFELY UP TO FREEDOM  
 BRIDGE OVER THE BEN HAI RIVER AND PEER INTO NORTH VIETNAM.  
 BUT NOW, MUCH OF THE ENEMY MILITARY EFFORT IS CENTERED HERE. WITH TWO  
 DIVISIONS AND ELEMENTS OF A THIRD OPERATING IN THE VICINITY. IN  
 RECENT MONTHS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE MOVED HEAVY ARTILLERY, AN  
 ESTIMATED 100 TUBES, INTO THEIR HALF OF THE DMZ AND HIDDEN THEM SO  
 SKILLFULLY THAT A STEADY POUNDING BY PLANES, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUN-  
 FIRE HAS FAILED TO SILENCE THEM. GIO LINH, CON THIEN, CAMP CARROLL  
 AND THE OTHER MARINE OUTPOSTS HERE ALONG THE DMZ WERE NEVER DESIGNED  
 TO TAKE THE KIND OF PUNISHMENT THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING SINCE THE  
 NORTH VIETNAMESE MOVED IN THEIR HEAVY GUNS. THE BUNKERS PUT TOGETHER BY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2813 UNCLAS EXCLUSIVE

THE TROOPS STATIONED HERE SINCE THE SHELLING BEGAN ARE MADE OF SAND-BAGS FILLED WITH THE HEAVY RED CLAY THAT COVERS THE HILL. A FEW TIMBERS HAVE BEEN USED TO SHORE UP A COUPLE OF THE BUNKERS, BUT MOST ARE MADE OF NOTHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN DIRT-BAGS AND THE LUMBER FROM AMMUNITION CRATES. THE MARINES SAY THE REAL MONSOON WEATHER HAS NOT YET ARRIVED. BUT A TROPICAL STORM PELTED GIO LINH FOR FIVE STRAIGHT DAYS SHORTLY BEFORE OUR VISIT, FILLING MANY OF THE BUNKERS AND ALL OF THE FOXHOLES WITH WATER. MANY BUNKERS COLLAPSED UNDER THE WEIGHT OF THE SODDED BAGS OF DIRT THAT WERE SUPPOSED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION. MARINES HERE SAID THAT IF GIO LINH IS TO BE HELD, PRE-FABRICATED CONCRETE BUNKERS SHOULD BE DROPPED INTO POSITION BY HELICOPTER AND SEABEES SHOULD BE SENT IN TO DO A PROPER ENGINEERING JOB OF STRENGTHENING THE POSITION. IF THE ARMY, WHICH THE MARINES FELT HAS MORE MONEY AND THINKS BIGGER, WERE RUNNING THE SHOW HERE, THIS ALREADY WOULD HAVE BEEN DON, SAID THE MARINES. BUT ONLY TWO DAYS BEFORE, LT. GEN. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN JR., COMMANDER OF THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, SAID DURING AN INTERVIEW IN DANANG, "I THINK I'VE DONE ABOUT ALL I CAN THINK OF TO CUT DOWN CASUALTIES UP THERE." HE SAID.

SHIPS OFFSHORE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2813 UNCLAS EXCLUSIVE

LOOKING OFF TO THE EAST, THE LAND SLOPES DOWN FROM GIO LINH TO A RIVER RUNNING NORTH AND SOUTH, THEN TO SUBMERGED RICE PADDIES, TO A WIDE STRIP OF SAND DUNES AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. OFFSHORE LAY ELEMENTS OF A FLEET OF SHIPS THAT HAD PUT A MARINE LANDING PARTY OF ABOUT 1,000 MEN ASHORE TO SWEEP THE AREA BETWEEN GIO LINH AND THE SEA. "THAT'S THE BARRIER," SAID CAPT. MICHAEL E. RICH, 27, OF MONTEREY PARK, CALIF. COMMANDER OF FOX CO., 9TH BATTALION, 2ND MARINES, WHOSE JOB IT IS TO PROTECT GIO LINH FROM ENEMY ASSAULT. HE POINTED TO A WIDE CLEARED STRIP STRETCHING OUT ON BOTH SIDES OF GIO LINH, 600 METERS WIDE AND 10,000 METERS LONG. THE BARRIER IS SUPPOSED TO BE EXTENDED AND FITTED OUT WITH EVERYTHING FROM BARBED WIRE TO HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED DEVICES TO PREVENT INFILTRATION ACROSS THE BORDER. ATIP A WOODEN TOWER, SLIGHTLY ASKEW BECAUSE OF A NEAR MISS BY AN ARTILLERY SHELL, A FIRE CONTROL TEAM WAS DIRECTING THE FIRING OF DESTROYERS OFFSHORE. EACH DAY, CUSHMAN HAD SAID, THE SHIPS POUR IN ABOUT 100 ROUNDS, ARMY AND MARINE ARTILLERY FIRES 6,000 ROUNDS, FIGHTER-BOMBERS DROP 300 TONS OF BOMBS AND THERE IS AN AVERAGE OF AT LEAST ONE MASS BOMBING BY B-52S FLYING OUT OF THAILAND OR GUAM. RICH'S MEN DIVIDE THEIR TIME BETWEEN REBUILDING BUNKERS,

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-65)

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2813 UNCLAS EXCLUSIVE  
 PROVIDING PERIMETER SECURITY FOR GIO LINH AND NIGHTTIME AMBUSHES AND  
 PATROLS. THE PATROLS ARE AGGRESSIVE, BUT CAUTIOUS. RICH DOESN'T  
 WANT ANYONE TO GET INTO TROUBLE THAT WOULD REQUIRE STRONG RE-  
 INFORCEMENTS, THUS CUTTING DOWN ON THE FORCE LEFT BEHIND TO PROTECT  
 GIO LINH. FIRST LT. DENNIS ZOERB OF NEDLICK, ME., LEADER OF ONE OF  
 RICH'S THREE PLATOONS, TOLD HOW HE HAS GOTTEN INTO THAT KIND  
 OF TROUBLE SHORTLY AFTER THE COMPANY ARRIVED HERE IN AUGUST. RICH  
 SENT THEM OUT ACROSS A RAILROAD TRACK JUST TO THE NORTHWEST OF THE  
 HILL AND THEY WERE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY PINNED DOWN BY A SIZEABLE NVA  
 FORCE. "WE HELD THEM DOWN WITH MORTARS UNTIL WE COULD PULL BACK INTO  
 A DEFENSE POSITION. THEN THE SECOND PLATOON CAME OUT WITH TANKS AND  
 DUSTERS (TRUCK-MOUNTED RECOILLESS RIFLES) AND WE PULLED BACK THROUGH  
 THEM" HE SAID. RICH AND ZOERB SPOKE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WITH  
 BOTH RESPECT AND CONTEMPT. "THE ONES WE'VE RUN INTO HAVE UNIFORMS,  
 HELMETS, FLAK JACKETS, GOOD AUTOMATIC WEAPONS...EVEN HAIRCUTS. THEY'RE  
 NO SKINNY GOOKS RUNNING AROUND IN BLACK PAJAMAS," RICH SAID.  
 BUT THEY ALSO DO SOME STUPID THINGS. "THEY GO OUT ON PATROL CARRYING  
 FLASHLIGHTS." RICH SAID. "IF I EVER CATCH ANY OF MY PATROLS  
 CARRYING FLASHLIGHTS I'LL KILL 'EM."  
 THE ARVN (ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM) LIAISON MAN SAID HE THOUGHT

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2813 UNCLAS EXCLUSIVE  
 THEY WERE AFRAID OF SNAKES." BOTHE THE MEN INTERVIEWED ON HILL 46 AND  
 THE GENERALS WHO DISCUSSED THE WAR IN DA NANG AND SAIGON FEEL THAT  
 GIO LINH, CON THIEN AND THE OTHER MARINE POSTS ALONG THE DMZ ARE IMP-  
 ORTANT MILITARY POSITIONS THAT CAN AND SHOULD BE HELD.  
 BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO THINK OF THEM AS SOME KIND OF FRONT LINE.  
 INSTEAD, THEY ARE MORE LIKE THE POINTS WHERE THE WIRES INTERSECT IN  
 A SIEVE. FROM THESE STRONG POINTS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO HURT THE  
 NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY WHENEVER IT TRIES TO MASS TROOPS ACROSS THE  
 DMZ AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO HARASS AND IMPEDE THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES AND  
 MEN INTO THE SOUTH. BUT ALL DAY, THE MARINES SAID, THEY CAN  
 SEE MEN STREAMING DOWN ALONG THE RIVER, JUST TO THE EAST. PRESUMABLY,  
 THIS GOES ON AT NIGHT, TOO, AT AN ACCELERATED PACE. THEY CAN CALL  
 IN ARTILLERY, BUT, WITH THE BEST OF LUCK, THEY ARE ONLY LIKELY TO  
 HIT ONE OR TWO MEN. ONE MARINE POINTED DOWN TOWARD THE RIVER AND OFF  
 TO THE SEA.  
 "IT'S A SUPER HIGHWAY DOWN THERE," HE SAID.

BT

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III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

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 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. YOUR 262345Z SEP67

1. THINGS ARE FAIRLY TENSE IN SAIGON AND I SUGGEST THAT WE BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY INDICATION THAT I AM FEEDING ANYTHING INTO YOUR HEADQUARTERS OTHER THAN THAT WHICH I WOULD NORMALLY DO IN THE WAY OF REPORTING AND DISCUSSING THE COMMON PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING MARINE FORCES IN III MAF.

2. WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF REF (A), I WOULD OFFER TWO COMMENTS WHICH MAY BE OF USE IN BUTTRESSING OUR CASE:

A. WITHIN THE LIMIT OF FORCES THAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE, WE HAVE CONDUCTED AN ACTIVE DEFENSE IN THE DMZ AREA. HICKORY- LAM SON 54-BEAU CHARGER ARE REMARKABLE EXAMPLES OF IMAGINATIVE OFFENSIVE OPS AND DONE WITH SIZEABLE FORCES. WE HAVE, FOR REASONS WELL KNOWN TO ALL, NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN THAT HIGH A CONCENTRATION OF FORCES ON AN ACTIVE BASIS IN THE GENERAL AREA. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE,

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2655 **S E C R E T** EXCLUSIVE MCEO

IN A WHOLE SERIES OF ACTIONS DOWN TO THIS VERY DAY, BEEN MANEUVERING OUR MOBILE FORCES. ALL UNITS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF CON THIEN HAVE MAINTAINED VIGROUS PLATOON AND COMPANY SIZE PARTOLS WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF OPERATIONS. THESE HAVE CONTINUED ON A DAILY BASIS, INTERSPERSED WITH BATTALION OR LARGER OPERATIONS, WHICH I WILL SUMMARIZE BELOW. AS A GENERAL RULE, THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER WE HAVE MAINTAINED ONLY ONE COMPANY IN CON THIEN PROPER, WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE CON THIEN BATTALION OPERATING OUTSIDE THE POSITION. ONLY IN RECENT DAYS, BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED THREAT IN THAT AREA, HAVE WE PULLED THE BULK OF A BATTALION TO THE FORTIFIED AREA OF CON THIEN.

THE OPERATIONS OF LARGER SIZE THAT HAVE CHARACTERIZED OUR TACTICS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 14-16 JULY - HICKORY II - 5 BATTALION S&D OPERATION SOUTH OF THE GIO LINH - CON THIEN LINE; 20-21 JULY - 1 BATTALION S&D OPERATION NORTH AND WEST OF CON THIEN TO THE DMZ; 28-30 JULY - 1 BATTALION S&D OPERATION IN THE DMZ TO THE BIEN HAI RIVER WITH 1 BATTALION ASSISTING SOUTH OF DMZ AND NORTHWEST OF CON THIEN; 3-6 AUGUST - 1 BATTALION S&D OPERATION NORTH AND WEST OF CON THIEN TO DMZ; 14-19 AUGUST - 1 BATTALION SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION EAST OF HIGHWAY 561 AND NORTHEAST OF CAM LO;

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAF.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#46	

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2655 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 20-25 AUGUST - 1 BATTALION S&D OPERATION EAST OF CON THIEN AND  
 SOUTH OF TRACE; 10-14 SEPTEMBER - 1 BATTALION S&D OPERATION WEST  
 OF HIGHWAY 561; 15 SEPTEMBER - 1 BATTALION S&D OPERATION EAST OF  
 HIGHWAY 561 WITH 1 BATTALION SWEEPING SOUTH ALONG WEST SIDE 561  
 FROM CON THIEN TO C-2; 21 SEPTEMBER - ALL BATTALIONS IN THE VICINITY  
 OF THE GENERAL CON THIEN AREA CONDUCTING SWEEPS WITHIN RESPECTIVE  
 AREAS OF OPERATION; 27 SEPTEMBER - A MULTI-BATTALION S&D OPERATION  
 WITH ONE BATTALION MOVING EAST OF HIGHWAY 561 IN THE GENERAL  
 DIRECTION OF CON THIEN. THIS LATTER OPERATION CONTINUES TODAY.  
 B. THE SECOND COMMENT RELATES TO THE QUESTIONS THE ARMY IS RAISING  
 ABOUT ARTILLERY. OUR ARTILLERY IN THE DMZ AREA IS SO POSITIONED  
 THAT IT HAS OVERLAPPING FANS WHICH ENABLE OUR UNITS TO MOVE WITH  
 CONTINUOUS ARTILLERY SUPPORT. IN ADDITION WHEN WE HAVE SITUATIONS  
 IN WHICH THE FANS FROM THE MORE PERMANENT POSITIONS DO NOT COVER  
 AN OPERATION, WE MOVE THE ARTILLERY. THIS IS DONE FREQUENTLY,  
 ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA CAM LO - CA LU - KHE SANH. IT GOES WITHOUT  
 SAYING, OF COURSE, THAT IN THE DRY SEASON IT IS MUCH SIMPLER TO  
 MOVE ARTILLERY THAN IT IS DURING THE MONSOON. NEVERTHELESS, WE  
 CAN AND DO MOVE IT BOTH BY HELICOPTER AND BY SURFACE MEANS.  
 FOR A LONG PERIOD THE ENEMY WAS DOING ALL OF HIS FIRING AT NIGHT.

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2655 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 THIS APPARENTLY BECAME TOO COSTLY FOR HIM BECAUSE WE COULD LOCATE AND  
 BRING HIS ARTILLERY UNDER FIRE FROM THE VISIBLE FLASH. HE HAS SINCE  
 CHANGED HIS TACTICS AND WITHIN THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS MOST OF  
 HIS ROUNDS HAVE BEEN FIRED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. HOWEVER, DURING THE  
 PERIOD HE WAS FIRING MAINLY AT NIGHT, WE MOVED WEAPONS OUT OF THE  
 GIO LINH POSITION AFTER SUNDOWN AND PUT THEM IN ALTERNATE POSITIONS,  
 MOVING THEM BACK INTO PRIMARY POSITIONS ON A RANDOM TIME BASIS  
 AS WE SAW FIT. THESE WERE PRIMARILY THE HEAVIER TUBES. WE LATER FELT  
 THERE WAS SOME INCREASED DANGER TO THE 175'S IN THE GIO LINH POSITION,  
 SO WE MOVED THEM ABOUT HALFWAY BACK TOWARD DONG HA; BUT BECAUSE  
 THIS REQUIRED ADDITIONAL INFANTRY ASSETS TO PROTECT THE WEAPONS,  
 WE FINALLY MADE THE DECISION TO PULL THEM BACK INTO DONG HA PROPER.  
 I SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE SUFFERED SERIOUS DAMAGE TO  
 ONLY 5 OR 6 ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE DMZ AREA SINCE THE BEGINNING  
 OF MAY.

ONE FURTHER THOUGHT - THE ARMY'S STATEMENT ABOUT THE ENEMY MOVING  
 HIS ARTILLERY AROUND WHILE OURS SITS IN ITS HOLES IS A FAULTY ONE.  
 THE ENEMY HAS NO U.S. OR ARVN GROUND FORCES TO CONTEST HIS ARTY  
 MOVEMENT NORTH OF THE BIEN HAI RIVER. ON THE OTHER HAND, ANY MOVEMENT  
 WE MAKE WITH ARTILLERY MUST OF NECESSITY CARRY A SIZEABLE INFANTRY

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#46

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2655 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 SECURITY UNIT WITH IT. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE FRAGMENT OUR INFANTRY ASSETS TO PROTECT ARTILLERY. TO THAT EXTENT WE REDUCE OUR MANEUVER FLEXIBILITY. ( I FEEL, BY THE WAY, THAT THE ENEMY IS PROBABLY NOT MOVING HIS ARTILLERY AS MUCH AS HE WAS, SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE VERY HEAVY RAINS THAT HAVE OCCURRED THROUGHOUT THIS AREA.)  
 3. I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO TAKE A LOOK AT CASUALTIES FOR THE FIRST AND THIRD MARINE DIVISIONS OVER THE PAST 9 MONTHS. MY TOTALS UP THROUGH 23 SEPTEMBER INDICATE FOR JUNE, JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER 484 KILLED AND 3,788 WOUNDED (EVAC) IN THE 1ST MARDIV; 564 KILLED AND 5,183 WOUNDED (EVAC) IN THE 3RD MARDIV. FOR THE PERIODS JANUARY THROUGH MAY THE TOTAL FIGURES ARE SOMEWHAT CLOSER, WITH THE 1ST DIVISION LOSSING 499 KILLED AND 4,473 WOUNDED (EVAC) AND THE 3RD DIVISION LOSING 662 KILLED AND 4800 WOUNDED (EVAC).  
 4. LEST ANYONE FORGET THAT THE ENEMY IS SUFFERING, I THINK IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT OUR EXTENSIVE USE OF FIRE SUPPORT HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE EFFECT SINCE 1 AUGUST. IN ADDITION TO THE REPORTED ENEMY KIA, WHICH YOU HAVE, HEAVY CASUALTIES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INFLICTED ON THE 90TH REGIMENT, WHICH IS CURRENTLY REPORTED TO BE 700 PERSONNEL UNDERSTRENGTH. CASUALTIES DUE TO ARC LIGHTS, TACTICAL AIR AND ARTILLERY HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF EACH ENEMY REGIMENT

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2655 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO,  
 ALTHOUGH KIA AND WIA TOTALS CANNOT BE ACCURATELY DETERMINED. IN ADDITION, OUR STRIKES HAVE CAUSED MORALE PROBLEMS THAT APPEAR TO BE EQUALLY SERIOUS. ARTILLERY AND TACTICAL AIR HAVE BEEN DESTRUCTIVE; HOWEVER, THEIR EFFECT ON MORALE HAS NOT BEEN AS EVIDENT AS HAS THAT OF THE B-52 STRIKES.

TACTICAL PRESSURE HAS CAUSED THE 29TH REGIMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE DMZ AREA DUE TO CASUALTIES, SICKNESS, LOW MORALE, AND A GENERAL SHORTAGE OF SUPPLIES. THE 812TH REGIMENT, AFTER SUSTAINING HEAVY CASUALTIES IN THE 3-26 CONTACT, HAS REMAINED INACTIVE AND MAY HAVE WITHDRAWN AS WELL. I THINK ALL OF THIS, PLUS OUR OWN ACTIVE DEFENSE OF THE AREA, HAS KEPT THE ENEMY OFF BALANCE AND HAS DISRUPTED HIS LOGISTICS AND DELAYED HIS PLANS TO THE EXTENT THAT HE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MOUNT ANY MAJOR GROUND ATTACK, IF THE LATTER IS HIS INTENTION. WE CAN HURT HIM A GREAT DEAL MORE IF GIVEN PROPER FORCES.

5. I HOPE THIS IS OF SOME USE TO YOU. I WILL REPORT ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH WESTY AFTER OUR CONFERENCE TOMORROW. WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1H MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

# 46

CCN 183FILLER 25DTG 231424Z

MONTH

SEP 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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CATEGORY

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DATE-TIME GROUP 231424Z SEP 67

**SECRET**

HAS BEEN SENT

DCG *10/1/67*  
4 Sept 67**EXCLUSIVE**P 231424Z SEP 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
BTSECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN NICKERSON  
CG FMFPAC FWD NOT ADDEE PASS TO LTGEN CUSHMAN  
COMUSMACV MSG 231139Z SEP EXCLUSIVE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND IS  
QUOTED.

QUOTE:

REF: CG, III MAF DTG 211700Z SEP (S)

1. (S) I HAVE EXAMINED THE RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSED IN THE REFERENCE AND AM IN ACCORD WITH YOUR PLAN TO MOVE THE 5TH MARINES WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO THE NORTH AND TO CONCENTRATE THE SLF'S IN THAT SAME AREA.
2. (S) AFTER MY VISIT TO THE 3D MARINE DIVISION YESTERDAY, MY OPINION IS CONFIRMED THAT MANY PROFITABLE TARGETS EXIST IN THUA THIEN-QUANG TRI AREA WHICH SHOULD BE HIT BEFORE THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON SETS IN. I AM CONCERNED OVER THE INDICATIONS OF AN ENEMY BUILDUP IN BASE AREA 101-HAI LANG FOREST. THIS POSES A DANGEROUS THREAT TO THE LOC TO QUANT TRI AND TO THE NEW AIRFIELD-LOGISTIC BASE IN THAT AREA.
3. (S) IT IS MY INTENTION TO RETAIN THE 1ST OF THE 101ST IN III MAF UNTIL AT LEAST 1 NOVEMBER, AT WHICH TIME I WILL MAKE A DECISION ON ITS SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT BASED ON WEATHER, ENEMY THREAT, AND A CONSIDERATION OF THE OVERALL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN ICTZ. IN THE INTERIM, YOU SHOULD MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF ALL AVAILABLE FORCES IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. YOUR PLAN TO ADJUST THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND THE AMERICAL DIVISION WOULD FACILITATE THESE MOVES.
4. (S) I HAVE ALERTED GENERAL ROSSON TO BE PREPARED TO EXPAND THE PERSHING AO INTO SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI, IF REQUIRED.
5. (S) YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING A ROK ARMY BATTALION IS BEING STUDIED BY MY STAFF.
6. (S) IN SUMMARY, I HAVE NO PLANS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN ICTZ. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE 198TH BRIGADE, A DECISION WILL BE MADE AS TO THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST BRIGADE OF THE 101ST. I HEARTILY ENDORSE YOUR PLAN TO MOVE THREE OF FOUR BATTALIONS NORTH, AND SUGGEST EARLY IMPLEMENTATION. BEST REGARDS. UNQUOTE.

1. SUGGEST WE PASS TO SAME ADDEES AS REF.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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#45



CCN 173FILLER 16DTG 220110Z

MONTH

SEPTEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR

CG III MAFHAS BEEN SENT

CATEGORY

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DATE-TIME GROUP 220110Z SEP 67

**SECRET**

PP RUCIJUB RUHMM  
DE RUMSAK 2044 2650110  
ZNY SSSSS

P 220110Z SEP 67

FM CG III MAF  
TO RUCIJUB/CMC  
RUHMM/CG FMFPAC  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LT GEN KRULAK  
FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

I SENT THE FOLLOWING TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND

211700Z SEP 67

FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
BT

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN.  
1. AS YOU KNOW, THE ENEMY THREAT IN ICTZ, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE DMZ, CONTINUES UNABATED. DURING THE PAST WEEK TWO THINGS HAVE OCCURRED WHICH ARE OF REAL CONCERN AND WHICH HAVE CASUED ME TO REASSESS THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES. FIRST, THE ENEMY HAS CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT HE CAN MASS HIS SUPPORTING FIRES. ON OCCASION HE FIRED OVER 200 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY IN A VERY FEW MINUTES, CORRDOINATED WITH HEAVY MORTAR FIRE NOT ONLY AGAINST OUR STRONG POINTS BUT AGAINST MOBILE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2044 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FORCES AS WELL. SECONDLY, THE EARLY AND TORRENTIAL RAINS HAVE DECREASED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT AND COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE AS WELL AS MAKING RE-SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT DISTURBINGLY SLOW AND DIFFICULT. EFFECTS OF THESE FACTORS ON INSURING AN ADEQUATE AND ACTIVE DEFENSE ARE EVIDENT.

2. I HAD HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE ENEMY WITH SOMEWHAT REDUCED FORCES DURING THE NE MONSOON. HOWEVER, I ALWAYS HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS AND AFTER LISTENING TO THE BRIEFING BY YOUR STRATEGIC STUDY TEAM AM MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER OF THE HIGH RISKS INVOLVED IN REDUCING FORCES IN ICTZ AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. WITH MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE ACTIVE COMBAT IN SVN GOING ON IN THIS AREA AND WITH INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT INORDINATELY HIGH CASUALTIES TO ACHIEVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES, HE COULD BE EMBARKED ON A STRATEGY TO GAIN A BARGAINING POSITION AT ALL COSTS.

3. AS YOU ARE AWARE, I HAVE A VERY LIMITED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE IN THE DMZ AREA WITHOUT UNCOVERING IN VARYING DEGREES OTHER VITAL AREAS. AND WHILE I AM CERTAIN WE WILL EXTRACT A SUBSTANTIAL TOLL IF THE ENEMY CHOOSES A MORE AGRESSIVE COURSE OF ACTION, I FEEL WE RUN TOO HIGH A RISK IF PLANS TO SHIFT US ELEMENTS FROM ICTZ TO TACTICAL

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#44

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2044 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 AREAS FURTHER SOUTH ARE EXECUTED. IN FACT, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT  
 WE AT LEAST CONTINUE THE PRESENT FORCE LEVEL THROUGH THE MONTHS  
 IMMEDIATELY AHEAD.

4. SPECIFICALLY, I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING GENERAL DISPOSITION OF FORCES:

A. THE AMERICAL DIVISION, WITH 3 BRIGADES (198TH, 196TH, 3/4TH),  
 RESPONSIBLE FOR QUANG NGAI, QUANG TIN AND THAT PORTION OF QUANG NAM  
 THAT INCLUDES THE QUI SON-HIEP DUC VALLEY. THIS WOULD GIVE MINIMUM  
 BUT ADEQUATE COVERAGE OF THE AREA WHERE THE 2D NVA DIV HAS CONCENTRA-  
 TED AND WOULD AT THE SAME TIME FREE TWO BATTALIONS AND A COMMAND GROUP  
 OF THE 5TH MARINES TO MOVE NORTH.

B. THE ROK MARINE BDE WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE BUT EXTEND ITS  
 AREA OF OPNS TO THE TRA KHUC RIVER. AND I WOULD URGE YOUR THOUGHTFUL  
 CONSIDERATION OF THE ADDITION OF A ROK ARMY BN TO THE MARINE BDE TO  
 EXPAND ITS CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE QUANG NGAI AREA.

C. THE 1ST MAR DIV, WITH 2 AND 1/3 REGTS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE  
 RESPONSIBLE FOR QUANG NAM, LESS THAT SMALL PORTION ASSUMED BY THE  
 AMERICAL DIV.

D. THE 3D MARDIV WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD RESPONSIBILITY FOR THUA THIEN  
 AND QUANG TRI; BUT TO THEIR PRESENT FORCE OF 10 BNS (INCLUDING THE  
 OKI ROTATIONAL BN) WOULD BE ADDED THE COMMAND GROUP AND 2 BNS OF THE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2044 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 5TH MARINES. THESE ADDITIONS, PLUS THE CONTINUING AVAILABILITY OF THE  
 2 SLF'S WOULD PROVIDE THE MINIMUM FORCE TO COUNTER A SERIOUS ENEMY  
 ATTACK IN THE DMZ AREA AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES TO  
 DESTROY ENEMY BATTALIONS PIECEMEAL SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI AS THEY OPEN  
 THEMSELVES TO ATTACK.

5. IN ADDITION, I RECOMMEND THAT THE 101ST AIRBORNE BDE REMAIN HERE  
 AS LONG AS THE WEATHER PERMITS THE KINDS OF OPERATIONS AT WHICH THEY  
 ARE SO ADEPT. THEY CAN MAKE INVALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE AREA  
 WHERE THEY NOW ARE OPERATING AS WELL AS IN THE KEY BASE AREAS BOTH  
 IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SECTORS OF ICTZ.

6. I REALIZE YOUR PROBLEMS IN DISTRIBUTING LIMITED ASSETS THROUGHOUT  
 SVN BUT I SUBMIT THAT THE COMMITMENT OF FORCES LISTED ABOVE TO I  
 CORPS IS THE ONLY PRUDENT COURSE, GIVEN THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION  
 HERE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#44

CCN 217FILLER 25

DTG 270414Z

MONTH SEP 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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**CATEGORY**

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DATE-TIME GROUP 270414Z SEP 67

**SECRET**

HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMSAK 2577 27027414  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 270414Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

**SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN METZGER FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH A CANDID EVALUATION OF EACH OF THE VNAF COMMANDERS LISTED BELOW. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SUCH EVALUATIONS BE ACCOMPLISHED AND TRANSMITTED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT ITS EXISTENCE IS NOT SUSPECTED BY ANY VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL, AND IS NOT KNOWN TO US PERSONNEL OTHER THAN THOSE ESSENTIAL TO COMPILE AND TRANSMIT IT.
2. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SUCH MATTERS AS PROFESSIONAL MILITARY COMPETENCE, INFLUENCE IN THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY, REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND FAIR DEALING, GENERAL EFFECTIVENESS, ETC.
3. EACH COMMANDER SHOULD BE EVALUATED AS: EXCELLENT (E), OR SATISFACTORY (S), OR SHOULD BE RELIEVED (R). IN THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH RELIEF IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, PLEASE GIVE THE REASONS WHICH PROMPTED THIS CONCLUSION.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2577 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 4. EVALUATIONS ARE DESIRED BY 4 OCTOBER ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:  
 1. CG 1ST ARVN DIVISION  
 2. CO EACH ARVN REGIMENT IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES  
 3. CO EACH ARVN BATTALION INCLUDING SEPARATE BNS E.G. RANGER, AIRBORNE, ETC., OPERATING IN SUCH AREA.

GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#43

CCN 216FILLER 25 *C/S* *O*DTG 270412Z

MONTH

SEP 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**FILE COPY FILLER OF      COPIESMAF: RECEIVED ONE ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1&2 OF 2COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 270412Z SEP 67RECEIVED BY                     

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**EXCLUSIVE  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

DE RUMSAK 2576 270341Z

ZNY SSSSS

P 270412Z SEP 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ROBERTSON FROM  
LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH A CANDID EVALUATION OF EACH OF THE VNAF COMMANDERS LISTED BELOW. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SUCH EVALUATIONS BE ACCOMPLISHED AND TRANSMITTED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT ITS EXISTENCE IS NOT SUSPECTED BY ANY VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL, AND IS NOT KNOWN TO US PERSONNEL OTHER THAN THOSE ESSENTIAL TO COMPILE AND TRANSMIT IT.

2. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SUCH MATTERS AS PROFESSIONAL MILITARY COMPETENCE, INFLUENCE IN THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY, REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND FAIR DEALING, GENERAL EFFECTIVENESS, ETC.

3. EACH COMMANDER SHOULD BE EVALUATED AS: EXCELLENT (E), OR SATISFACTORY (S), OR SHOULD BE RELIEVED (R). IN THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH RELIEF IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, PLEASE GIVE THE REASONS WHICH PROMPTED THIS CONCLUSION.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2576 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

4. EVALUATIONS ARE DESIRED BY 4 OCTOBER ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:

1. CG 2ND ARVN DIV

2. CO EACH ARVN REGIMENT INCLUDING 51ST ARVN REGT IN QUANG NAM AND NORTHERN QUANG TIN PROVINCES

3. CMDR, QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

4. CO EACH ARVN AND RF BATTALION, INCLUDING SEPARATE BNS. E.G. RANGER, AIRBORNE, ETC., OPERATING IN SUCH AREAS

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#42

CCN 215FILLER 25 *C/S*DTG 270410ZMONTH SEP 67ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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EXCLUSIVE

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HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMSAK 2575 2700410  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 270410Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG AMERICAL DIV  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN KOSTER FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN. NOFORN

1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH A CANDID EVALUATION OF EACH OF THE VNAF COMMANDERS LISTED BELOW. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SUCH EVALUATIONS BE ACCOMPLISHED AND TRANSMITTED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT ITS EXISTENCE IS NOT SUSPECTED BY ANY VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL, AND IS NOT KNOWN TO US PERSONNEL OTHER THAN THOSE ESSENTIAL TO COMPILE AND TRANSMIT IT.
2. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SUCH MATTERS AS PROFESSIONAL MILITARY COMPETENCE, INFLUENCE IN THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY, REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND FAIR DEALING, GENERAL EFFECTIVENESS, ETC.
3. EACH COMMANDER SHOULD BE EVALUATED AS: EXCELLENT (E), OR SATISFACTORY (S), OR SHOULD BE RELIEVED (R). IN THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH RELIEF IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, PLEASE GIVE THE REASONS WHICH PROMPTED THIS CONCLUSION.

- PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2575 **S E C R E T** NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
4. EVALUATIONS ARE DESIRED BY 4 OCTOBER ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:
    1. CG 2ND ARVN DIV
    2. CO EACH ARVN REGIMENT IN QUANG NGAI AND SOUTHER QUANG TIN PROVINCES
    3. CO EACH ARVN BATTALION INCLUDING SEPARATE BNS E.G. RANGER, AIRBORNE, ETC., OPERATING IN SUCH AREA.

GP-4  
 BT

#41

**SECRET/NOFORN**

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CCN 205FILLER 3DTG 250752ZMONTH SEPTEMBER 1967ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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Memorandum

DATE:

9/26/67

FROM :

S/S

FOR :

C/S

SUBJECT:

**BGEN METZGER desires  
copy of III MAF EXEL  
MSG 250752Z to  
CMC.**

DUP 250752Z SEP67

**VR**  
**/s/**

#40

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMSAK 2404 263075

ZNY CCCCC

P 250752Z SEP 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CMC

INFO CG FMFPAC

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL GREEKE INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUSHMAN.

SUBJ: WASHINGTON POST NEWS ARTICLE OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1967

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV AND III MAF DIRECTIVES, INTERVIEWS ARE ENCOURAGED TO BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS UPON REQUEST AND THUS SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GRANT INTERVIEWS. THE SUBJECT INTERVIEW WAS GIVEN TO TOM CHEATHAM, UPI, BY GEN METZGER OR THE SENIOR MARINE IN THE AREA AT DONG HA AT APPROXIMATELY 1030, 23 SEPTEMBER 1967, AT CHEATHAM'S REQUEST. THE INTERVIEW WAS RECORDED AND A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE 3D MARINE DIVISION PIO WAS PRESENT. IT WAS ALSO STRESSED BY GENERAL METZGER THAT ALL HE WOULD DISCUSS WAS THE SPECIFIC AREA IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ, THAT HE WAS THE ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER WITH NO COMMAND FUNCTIONS, THAT HE DESIRED NO PERSONAL PUBLICITY, AND MANY STATEMENTS WERE OFF THE RECORD.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2404 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

2. THE INTERVIEW CENTERED ON THE QUESTIONS OF INCOMING ENEMY MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE, THE STRENGTH OF ENEMY UNITS SOUTH OF THE DMZ, AND WHETHER CONTHIEN COULD BE ATTACKED. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE, WHEN COMPARED TO THE RECORDED INTERVIEW, REVEALS THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

A. THE HEADLINE IS A GROSS MISREPRESENTATION OF THE ACTUAL QUOTE, AS OUTLINED IN THE BODY OF THE TEXT, WHICH STATES WE CANNOT DESTROY QUOTE EVERYTHING UNQUOTE (REPEAT EVERYTHING) IN THE AREA. IT IS NOTED THAT THIS ALMOST EXACTLY PARALLELS A QUOTE OF GENERAL WALT IN HIS TALK GIVEN IN LANSING, MICHIGAN WHICH IS QUOTED IN THE AP AS FOLLOWS: "WE ARE SHELLED CONSTANTLY BY ARTILLERY FIRE FROM NORTH VIETNAM, WALT SAID. WE CAN KNOCK SOME OF IT OUT WITH OUR ARTILLERY AND PLANES, BUT A LOT OF IT WE CAN'T. SOME OF THEIR GUNS ARE IN CAVES OR UNDERGROUND. THE ONLY WAY WE COULD KNOCK THEM ALL OUT IS TO OCCUPY THE AREA." FROM THE TAPE THE SUBJECT QUOTE WAS CLEARLY STATED AS BEING OFF THE RECORD "WE ARE DELUDING OURSELVES IF WE THINK THAT BECAUSE WE ARE FIRING 5,000 ROUNDS OR PUTTING MASSIVE AIRSTRIKES IN THAT WE ARE DESTROYING EVERYTHING."

B. IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SUBJECT ARTICLE THERE IS A QUOTE FROM U.S. COMMAND IN SAIGON WHICH DISCUSSES CURRENT U.S. ARTILLERY

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2404 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
AND AIR STRIKES NORTH OF THE DMZ. THIS OBVIOUSLY SLANTS THE ARTICLE  
TO MAKE IT APPEAR THIS EFFORT IS BEING DEPRECIATED.

C. DURING THE INTERVIEW, CHEATHAM REQUESTED INFORMATION AS TO  
ENEMY TROOPS AROUND CON THIEN. IT WAS CAREFULLY EXPLAINED TO HIM  
THAT ALTHOUGH WHERE THE COST WAS GREAT TO THE ENEMY, THEY WERE  
APPARENTLY WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE AND THAT THEY WERE INFILTRATING  
ACROSS THE BIEN HAI RIVER IN GROUPS OF FIVE OR TEN. COMMENT: THERE  
IS NO OTHER REASONABLE WAY TO EXPLAIN THE ENEMY FORCES WHICH ARE FACING  
US SOUTH OF THE RIVER AND WHICH CHEATHAM KNEW OF HAVING BEEN BACK-  
GROUND BRIEFED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, AND FROM HIS OWN EXPERIENCE.  
IT IS NOTED AN ALMOST IDENTICAL STATEMENT IS IN THE STARS AND STRIPES  
OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1967.

D. THE ARTICLE MISSTATED THAT GENERAL METZGER HINTED THE NVA  
COULD BE EXPECTED TO ATTACK CON THIEN. THE ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO THE  
QUESTION WAS THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE IF THEY WERE WILLING TO PAY THE  
PRICE. COMMENT: THE FOREGOING HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY STATED AT EVERY  
LEVEL OF COMMAND AND ARE COMMON KNOWLEDGE. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO  
EXPLAIN THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE  
ARTICLE QUOTED METZGER IN SAYING THAT THEY WOULD PAY "A HIGH PRICE  
IF THEY ATTACKED". IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FOOLISH TO COMPLETELY WRITE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2404 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK AND WOULD CAUSE A CREDITABILITY OF  
U.S. MILITARY TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE QUESTION.

E. THE MOST MISLEADING PORTION OF THE ARTICLE ARE THE HEADLINES,  
LEAD PARAGRAPH AND CAPTION UNDER THE PICTURE AND THE REARRANGING AND  
COMBINING OF QUOTES FROM SAIGON AND DONG HA. A LOGICAL  
DEDUCTION IS THAT THIS WAS DONE BY THE UPI BUREAU. ALL THE FOREGOING  
INACCURACIES ARE DESIGNED TO CONFUSE THE READER SO THAT HE READS THE  
SELECTED QUOTES IN A BIASED CONTEXT.

4. IN SUMMARY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES, A PRESS  
INTERVIEW WAS HELD. THREE MAIN QUESTIONS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE  
REPORTER AND THE ANSWERS GIVEN IN BRIEF WERE: WE CANNOT DESTROY  
EVERYTHING IN THE AREA NORTH OF THE DMZ BY ARTILLERY AND AIR. COMMENT  
- THIS HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY SAID BY MILITARY COMMANDERS AS SHOWN BY  
THE CITED QUOTE OF GENERAL WALT. SECONDLY, THAT WE CANNOT COMPLETELY  
STOP MINOR (5 TO 10 MEN) INFILTRATION IF THEY ACCEPT HIGH  
CASUALTIES ACROSS THE BIEN HAI RIVER BY ARTILLERY AND AIR. COMMENT-  
THIS IS SELF-EVIDENT BY THE ENEMY STRENGTH SOUTH OF THE DMZ. AND  
THIRDLY, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CON THIEN COULD BE ATTACKED.  
HERE THE ANSWER GIVEN WAS A DISCUSSION OF THE MUCH QUOTED ENEMY  
OBJECTIVES IN THE DMZ AREA. THE QUOTED COMMENT WAS OUT OF CONTEXT

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2404 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
AND ONLY A PART OF THE ANSWER. AT NO TIME DURING THE INTERVIEW WAS  
A NOTE OF PESSIMISM STRUCK OR ANY INDICATION THAT WE ARE NOT DOING  
EXTREMELY WELL. THE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY OF U.S. FORCES,  
THE MASSIVE FIRE SUPERIORITY, COMPLETE AIR SUPERIORITY AND THE COURAGE,  
DETERMINATION AND CALIBER OF THE YOUNG MARINES WAS STRESSED BUT  
OMITTED IN THE ARTICLE. THIS CAN ONLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANOTHER  
EXAMPLE OF THE PRESS'S SELECTED USE OF QUOTES TO SUPPORT AN  
EDITORIAL LINE. WE MUST FACE THE FACT THAT ENEMY ARTILLERY IS  
FIRING ALONG THE DMZ, THERE ARE ENEMY FORCES SOUTH OF THE DMZ, AND  
IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY TO ATTACK CON THIEU OR ANY OTHER  
OF OUR POSITIONS. THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT EVERY LEVEL OF  
COMMAND.

5. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE QUOTES OF  
GENERAL METZGER WHEN TAKEN BY THEMSELVES, WERE IN CONTEXT WITH  
PREVIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES. FURTHER, UPI HAD  
USED A QUOTE WHICH THE RECORDED INTERVIEW CLEARLY SHOWS WAS  
PUT OFF THE RECORD. I HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE RECORDED INTERVIEW  
AND IT REFLECTS COMPLETE SUPPORT OF OUR OPERATIONS AND NATIONAL  
OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM. ALL OF THE QUOTES WERE BASED ON  
STATEMENTS PREVIOUSLY MADE BY OTHERS IN HIGH POSITION. I HAVE

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2404 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
GIVEN ORDERS THAT GENERAL OFFICERS AND COMMANDERS HAVE A DUTY TO  
TALK TO THE PRESS. THERE IS ALWAYS THE RISK OF A SLANTED ARTICLE,  
BUT IT IS A RISK WE HAVE TO TAKE! AFTER LISTENING TO THE TAPE,  
I CONSIDER THAT THE ENTIRE INTERVIEW WAS FACTUAL, NOT  
DEROGATORY OF OUR EFFORT AND WELL STATED. THE FAULT LIES WITH  
THE PRESS AND NOT GENERAL METZGER.

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A. CG FMFPAC LTR SER 000508-67 ZTD 29MAY67

1. THE CASUALTY LEVEL CURRENTLY BEING EXPERIENCED BY  
THE MARINES IN THE DMZ REGION IS TOO HIGH, CONSIDER-  
ING THE OPERATIONAL BENEFITS RECEIVED. IN THE PAST  
MONTH 958 MARINES HAVE BEEN KILLED OR SERIOUSLY  
WOUNDED IN THE DMZ AREA ALONE, AND IN THE PAST SIX  
MONTHS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MARINES KILLED OR SERIOUSLY  
WOUNDED IN THAT AREA HAS BEEN 4,961. WHILE THE ENEMY IS  
PAYING A HEAVY PRICE FOR HIS PAINS--SOME 7,900 KILLED IN  
THE DMZ AREA IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS--THE COST TO US IS  
STILL TOO HIGH. MORE IMPORTANT, UNLESS SOMETHING IS  
DONE ABOUT IT, OUR CASUALTIES IN THE DMZ ARE LIKELY TO  
MOUNT.

2. THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT OUR FORCES BUTTED UP  
AGAINST THE DMZ ARE AT A SERIOUS TACTICAL DISADVANTAGE.

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THE ENEMY, ENJOYING THE BENEFITS OF THE NVN SANCTUARY, HAS A REAR AREA THAT IS SECURE AGAINST OUR MANEUVER. WE CANNOT GET BEHIND HIM TO CUT HIM OFF FROM HIS SUPPLIES OR TO OVERRUN HIS ARTILLERY. ALONG THE DMZ WE MUST FACE HIM ON FRONTAL TERMS, FOREGOING THE BENEFITS OF MANEUVER, AT LEAST SO LONG AS WE ELECT TO MAINTAIN OUR KEY OUTPOST POSITIONS AND OUR FORWARD LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS.

3. AMONG THE ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY THE ENEMY IN HIS SANCUTARY THE KEY ONE IS IN THE AREA OF ARTILLERY AND HEAVY ROCKET SUPPORT. DURING THE PAST MONTH, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT 4,000 ROUNDS HAVE FALLEN ON CON THIEN ALONE, AND ON 20 SEPTEMBER THAT OUTPOST TOOK 441 ROUNDS. WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE FROM 100 TO 110 ARTILLERY PIECES, WITH RANGES UP TO 27,400 METERS, IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ, POSITIONED WHERE THEY CAN FIRE ON OUR FORWARD POSITIONS. THESE ARTILLERY PIECES ARE LOCATED NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER, IN AN AREA EXTENDING GENERALLY FROM A POINT NORTHWEST OF CON THIEN, EAST TO VIN LINH AND THENCE TO THE COAST. THERE ARE MANY

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 3705 S E C R E T  
POSITION AREAS, SOME OCCUPIED AND SOME UNOCCUPIED; AND THE ENEMY MOVES HIS WEAPONS FROM ONE TO ANOTHER TO FACILITATE DECEPTION. RECENTLY HE HAS PUT INTO EFFECT A COMMON U. S. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUE, IN THE FORM OF TIME-ON-TARGET FIRE, WHERE LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION ARE FIRED ON A SINGLE TARGET OVER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, AND FROM MANY WEAPONS. LIKEWISE HE HAS BEGUN TO MIX AIR-BURST OR INFLUENCE FUZING AMONG HIS ROUNDS TO ENHANCE THE CASUALTY EFFECT AGAINST TROOPS IN THE OPEN. THESE ARE SOUND TECHNIQUES, AND MAY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

4. THIS ARTILLERY THREAT IS ONE WHICH, UNDER EXISTING CONSTRAINTS, CAN BE OVERCOME ONLY THROUGH FIRE SUPPORT MEANS, SINCE WE ARE NOT AT LIBERTY TO MANEUVER AGAINST IT. NEVERTHELESS, AND WHILE A MAJOR AIR/ARTILLERY/NGF EFFORT HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME TO DIMINISH THE INTENSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENEMY'S FIRE, THE RESULTS THUS FAR HAVE NOT BEEN DECISIVE. THE INTENSITY AND SCOPE OF OUR EFFORT HAS JUST NOT BEEN GREAT ENOUGH.

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PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 3705 S E C R E T

5. THE PROBLEM OF HEAVY CASUALTIES IS NOT CONFINED TO THE DMZ. WE ARE ALSO FEELING THE PINCH IN THE TWELVE HUNDRED SQUARE MILE AREA EXTENDING SOUTH OF THE LINE GIO LINH-CON THIEN-KHE SANH TO CAMP EVANS. THE LEDS, BECAUSE OF THE THINNESS OF OUR FORCE NEXT TO THE DMZ, HAVE BEEN ABLE TO INFILTRATE RESPECTABLE POWER INTO THIS REGION--PERHAPS TWELVE BATTALIONS. THESE UNITS ARE OPERATING AGAINST OUR BASE AREAS AND COMMUNICATION LINES;--WITH DIFFICULTY, AND AT CONSIDERABLE COST, BUT OPERATING THERE NEVERTHELESS. THESE ARE THE ENEMY UNITS THAT ARE CAUSING TROUBLE ALONG ROUTE 9, NEAR CAM L, NORTH OF CUA VIET AND EAST OF KHE SANH. THESE ARE THE UNITS WHICH CAUSE US CASUALTIES BY MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER NECESSARILY FIXED LOCALITIES. HOWEVER, UNLIKE THEIR COMPANIONS FARTHER NORTH ALONG THE DMZ, THESE NVA UNITS DO NOT HAVE A SANCTUARY. THEY ARE VULNERABLE; SUSCEPTIBLE TO ISOLATION AND ZECI-MATION BY FORCES WHICH ARE FREE TO MANEUVER AROUND AND AMONG THEM. BUT CG III MAF AND CG I CORPS DO NOT

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 3705 S E C R E T

TOGETHER HAVE THE FORCES NECESSARY TO CHOP UP AND DESTROY THE ENEMY IN THIS LARGE AREA, WHILE STILL FULFILLING ALL OF THEIR OTHER OBLIGATIONS. AS A RESULT, THE ENEMY ENJOYS A DEGREE OF FREEDOM WHICH HE SHOULD BE DENIED.

6. ON BALANCE, THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR OUR FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE DMZ AREA CAN BE MEASURED ONLY IN TERMS OF A CONTINUED HIGH LEVEL OF UNREQUITED CASUALTIES, UNLESS DECISIVE ACTION IS TAKEN TO REDRESS THE SITUATION. AMONG THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS, THE FOLLOWING ARE CONSIDERED TO MERIT CONSIDERATION:

A. WITHDRAW OUR INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE DMZ, MOVING THEM SOUTHWARD, OUT OF NVA ARTILLERY RANGE. THEN, IF THE ENEMY DESIRES TO USE HIS ARTILLERY AGAINST US, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DISPLACE IT SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI, WHERE WE CAN GET AT IT. HE WOULD THUS BE DENIED SOME MEASURE OF HIS SANCTUARY ADVANTAGE.

B. CONDUCT A JOINT AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE OPERATION LANDING ON THE NVN COAST, NORTH OF THE DMZ, SWEEPING SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ TO DESTROY THE NVA TROOPS,

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PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 3705 S E C R E T  
 SUPPLIES AND INSTALLATIONS WHICH ARE AFFECTING OUR FORCES DEPLOYED NEAR THE DMZ. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE PROVISION OF SUFFICIENT FORCES, FROM OUTSIDE OF RVN OR FROM SOURCES WITHIN RVN, TO CONSTITUTE AN ADEQUATE LANDING FORCE. THIS PROSPECT HAS BEEN EXPLORED PREVIOUSLY IN REF A AND, AS YOU KNOW, THE WHOLE MATTER OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK IS NOW BEING ACTIVELY EXAMINED UNDER CINCPAC AEGIS.

C. COMUSMACV PROVIDE AT LEAST A DIVISION SIZE FORCE FROM OTHER CORPS AREAS TO REINFORCE III MAF IN THE DMZ AREA. LAUNCH AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT FROM SOUTH OF THE DMZ AREA INTO AND NORTH OF THE DMZ TO DESTROY NVA FORCES, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES, AND INSTALLATIONS; SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDRAWING.

D. MOUNT MASSIVE DELIBERATE ATTACKS BY AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE AGAINST THE ENEMY TROOPS, ARMAMENT, INSTALLATIONS AND SUPPLIES ARRAYED AGAINST US IN SOUTHERN ROUTE PACKAGE I. EXPLOIT FULLY THE CAPABILITY OF 7TH AIR FORCE, TF 77, 1STMAW AND THE HEAVY GUNS OF THE 7TH FLEET. UTILIZE EVERY VISUAL AND ELECTRONIC MEANS OF TARGET

IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION.--ALL OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THE ENEMY WEAPONS AND IMPEDING, CANALIZING AND BLOCKING ENEMY MOVEMENT THROUGH SOUTHERN ROUTE PACKAGE I.

E. REINFORCE OUR ELEMENTS NOW COMMITTED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. WITH THIS INCREASED DENSITY OF MANEUVER FORCES, CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON THE ENEMY BATTALIONS WHICH HAVE INFILTRATED INTO THE REGION. ISOLATE, CUT UP AND DESTROY THEM, AND RELIEVE THE CURRENT ROCKET/MORTAR PRESSURE ON OUR FIXED INSTALLATIONS IN THE ROUTE 9--DONG HA AREA.

5. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE OPTIONS FOLLOWS:

A. TO WITHDRAW SOUTHWARD FROM THE DMZ AREA IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE MANEUVER ROOM IS A SOUND TACTICAL MOVE, BUT IT CARRIES A LARGE PRICE. IT

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PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 3710 S E C R E T  
 WOULD GIVE THE ENEMY PERSUASIVE PROPAGANDA MATERIAL IN TERMS OF THE UNDENIABLE FACT THAT WE HAD INDEED SURRENDERED GROUND. AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GIVE UP A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF GROUND TO ENSURE THAT ENEMY ARTILLERY WHICH MOVED SOUTHWARD WOULD, IN FACT, BE EXPOSED TO ENVELOPMENT BY OUR FORCES. THE EFFECT ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND ON OUR OWN PEOPLE AT HOME OF SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE GREAT. FINALLY, IT WOULD ENTAIL ABANDONMENT OF THE STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM. WHATEVER CRITICISM MAY HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT THAT CONCEPT BEFORE, IT IS NOW AN OFFICIAL U.S./GVN ENDEAVOR, AND TO BACK AWAY FROM IT NOW COULD NOT CONCEIVABLE BE IDENTIFIED WITH PROGRESS IN THE WAR.

B. TO INVADE NORTH VIETNAM IN THE LOUE PACKAGE 1 AREA--EITHER BY GROUND OR AMPHIBIOUS MEANS OFFERS GOOD PROSPECT OF RELIEVING OUR FORCES WHO ARE SUFFERING FROM ENEMY POWER BASED IN THE SANCTUARY. THE FAVORABLE EFFECT WOULD PERSIST, OF

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 3710 S E C R E T  
 COURSE, ONLY AS LONG AS WE REMAINED IN NVN. FURTHER, IT WOULD BE IDLE TO IGNORE THE SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH WILL BEAR UPON SUCH A DECISION, OR TO EVADE THE REALISTIC TIME AND SPACE MATHEMATICS ASSOCIATED WITH MOUNTING AND DELIVERING A MAJOR ATTACK; NOT TO SPEAK OF THE FACT THAT THE MONSOON IS HERE--THE VERY WORST PERIOD FOR SUCH OPERATIONS. THE NEED IS NOW, AND AN INVASION OF NVN, BY SEA OR LAND, WITH ALL OF ITS TACTICAL MERITS, IS NOT A NOW COURSE OF ACTION.

C. INTENSIFICATION OF THE SIRE SUPPORT EFFORT CAN BE UNDERTAKEN QUICKLY. AS TO ARTILLERY, WE KNOW THAT OUR COUNTERBATTERY ARTILLERY ALONE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO SILENCE THE ENEMY ARTILLERY, ANY MORE THAN HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO SILENCE OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGE OURS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAS MORE ARTILLERY IN THE AREA THAN WE DO. AIR IS THUS THE DECISIVE ARM, SINCE WE CANNOT OVERRUN THE ENEMY POSITIONS WITH GROUND FORCES. THE REASON THAT AIR, UP TO NOW, HAS NOT ABATED

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PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 3710 S E C R E T  
THE THREAT IS THAT THE MEANS ADDRESSED TO THE  
JOB HAVE THUS FAR BEEN FAR TOO SMALL.

D. TO REINFORCE OUR ELEMENTS IN QUANG TRI  
MAKES GOOD SENSE. IT IS URGENT THAT OUR LINES OF  
COMMUNICATION BE PROTECTED. MORE IMPORTANT  
IS THE NEED TO CUT UP AND DESTROY THOSE NORTH  
VIETNAMESE FORCES WHICH INFILTRATE SOUTHWARD  
AND GET THEMSELVES OUT OF SUPPORT OR REFUGE  
DISTANCE FROM THE DMZ. THESE FORCES ARE  
VULNERABLE TO OUR HELI-BORNE MANEUVER UNITS.  
TWO ADDITIONAL REGIMENTS IN THE AREA ALONG AND  
AROUND ROUTE 9 WOULD MAKE A MAJOR DIFFERENCE.  
THIS IS AN AMELIORATIVE ACTION, WHICH CAN HAVE  
IMMEDIATE FAVORABLE EFFECT IN TERMS OF U.S. CAS-  
UALTIES SAVED AND ENEMY KILLED.

6. TO CONCLUDE. IF THIS BATTLE IS NOT SOON TURN-  
ED AGAINST THE ENEMY, THE POUNDING NOW FELT AT CON  
THIEN, GIO LINH, DONG HA AND ELSEWHERE IS GOING  
TO RESOUND ALL THE WAY BACK TO DUBUQUE. THE  
CASUALTIES WE ARE LOSING TO THE ENEMY SHELLING MAY WELL

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 3710 S E C R E T  
BECOME A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE  
USA TOWARD THE ENTIRE WAR.

THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT RESOLUTION OF THIS  
SITUATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY OTHER  
SINGLE CRISIS IN THE WAR TODAY. AND THE  
THINGS WE CAN DO QUICKEST TO REDRESS THE SITUATION ARE  
FIRST TO REINFORCE THE QUANG TRI AREA WITH AT  
LEAST TWO REGIMENTS; AND SECOND, TO DEVASTATE AN  
AREA BOUNDED BY THE BEN HAI RIVER ON THE SOUTH  
AND BY AN ARP OF ABOUT 27 KILOMETERS RADIUS, EN-  
TERED UPON CON THIEN, AND EXTENDING FROM THE 330  
DEGREE RADIAL TO THE SEA. THIS REGION HAS TO CON-  
TAIN THE BULK OF THE OFFENDING ENEMY ARTILLERY  
POSITIONS, AS WELL AS THE ENEMY'S PRINCIPAL FORWARD  
BASES. IT MEASURES ABOUT 180 SQUARE MILES, BUT  
THE AREA CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY NARROWED DOWN BY CAREFUL  
TERRAIN ANALYSIS.

TO DESTROY THE ENEMY MATERIAL AND SUPPLIES,  
CAUSE HIM GRAVE PHYSICAL LOSS AND IMPEDE HIS  
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA WILL REQUIRE

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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#39

**SECRET**

PAGE 6 RUHFMMA 3710 S E C R E T  
AIR OPERATIONS OF A MAGNITUDE VASTLY GREATER  
THAN EVER CONTEMPLATED BEFORE FOR THIS REGION.

HERE IS WHAT I HAVE IN MIND:

A. 1,500 B-52 SORTIES PER MONTH, IN THIS ONE SPECIFIED AREA.  
B. 10,000 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES PER MONTH IN THE  
SAME LIMITED AREA, EMPLOYING THE COMPLETE ARRAY OF CONVENTION-  
AL WEAPONS. INCLUDING USE OF THE HEAVIEST AVAILABLE AERIAL  
ORDNANCE UPON ANY SPECIFIC TARGET LOCATED OR SUSPECTED.  
SUPPORT THE TARGETING WITH AN ALL-OUT EFFORT BY AIR AND  
GROUND OBSERVATION, AS WELL AS ALL ELECTRONIC AND  
INFRA RED MEANS.

C. QUANTUM USE OF THE MK-36 DESTRUCTOR ON ALL  
AVENUES OF APPROACH AND COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES WITHIN  
THE AREA. THE BEN HAI RIVER, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD BE  
SEEDED WITH AT LEAST 500 DESTRUCTORS, AND THEN RE-  
SEEDED WITH AN EQUAL NUMBER WEEKLY.

D. THE EMPLOYMENT OF WALLEYE ON ANY FIRMLY  
LOCATED AND CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE ARTILLERY WEAPONS.

E. PIN POINT DESTRUCTION BY NAVAL GUNFIRE OF EVERY LOCATED  
TARGET IN THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHIN RANGE, USING ALL NAVAL

GUNFIRE AVAILABLE IN THE ENTIRE AREA.

F. THE BROADCAST AERIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ANTI-  
PERSONNEL MINES, IN TERMS OF THOUSANDS, ALONG EVERY  
AVENUE OF APPROACH WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, AND THE  
REPETITIVE SEEDING OF MORE THOUSANDS OF MINES.

7. AT THIS POINT IT MAY BE OBSERVED THAT, TO DO ALL  
OF THIS, WOULD PROBABLY TAKE ALL OF THE OFFENSIVE  
AERIAL RESOURCES WE HAVE, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE  
NOTHING LEFT FOR ANYTHING ELSE. WHETHER OR NOT  
THIS IS SO, IN AN ABSOLUTE SENSE, I DO NOT KNOW. IF  
IT IS, I BELIEVE THE DIVERSION OF MEANS IS NOT ONLY  
JUSTIFIED BUT ESSENTIAL. IT COULD BE THAT WE EITHER  
DELIVER OUR MEN FROM THE DESTRUCTION THEY ARE  
SUFFERING FROM AN ENEMY THEY CANNOT THEMSELVES  
ELIMINATE, OR THE U. S. PEOPLE MAY MAKE THE WHOLE

PAGE 2 RUHFMMA 3711 S E C R E T  
MATTER ACADEMIP.  
GP-3  
BT

PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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#39

CCN 190FILLER DCG 27 Sept 67DTG 240336Z MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967ORIGINATOR CG III MAF C/SCATEGORY EXCLUSIVE HAS BEEN SENTFILE COPY FILLER OF      COPIESMAF: RECEIVED ONE ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1 & 2 OF 2COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 240336Z SEP 67RECEIVED BY                      DATE/TIME                     

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DATE-TIME GROUP 240336Z SEP 67

**SECRET**

PP RUCIJUB RUHKM  
DE RUMSAK 2288 2670336  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 240336Z SEP 67  
FM ADMINO III MAF  
TO RUCIJUB/CMC  
RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
BT

*le*  
HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM  
LTGEN CUSHMAN  
COMUSMACV MSG 231139Z SEP EXCLUSIVE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND IS QUOTED:  
QUOTE:

REF: CG, III MAF DTG 211700Z SEP (S)

1. (S) I HAVE EXAMINED THE RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSED IN THE REFERENCE AND AM IN ACCORD WITH YOUR PLAN TO MOVE THE 5TH MARINES WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO THE NORTH AND TO CONCENTRATE THE SLF'S IN THAT SAME AREA.  
2. (S) AFTER MY VISIT TO THE 3D MARINE DIVISION YESTERDAY, MY OPINION IS CONFIRMED THAT MANY PROFITABLE TARGETS EXIST IN THUA THIEN- QUANG TRI AREA WHICH SHOULD BE HIT BEFORE THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON SETS IN. I AM CONCERNED OVER THE INDICATIONS OF AN ENEMY BUILDUP IN BASE AREA 101-HAI LANG FOREST. THIS POSES A DANGEROUS THREAT TO THE LOC TO QUANG TRI AND TO THE NEW AIRFIELD-LOGISTIC BASE IN THAT AREA.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2288 SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR

3. (S) IT IS MY INTENTION TO RETAIN THE 1ST OF THE 101ST IN III MAF UNTIL AT LEAST 1 NOVEMBER, AT WHICH TIME I WILL MAKE A DECISION ON ITS SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT BASED ON WEATHER, ENEMY THREAT, AND A CONSIDERATION OF THE OVERALL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN ICTZ. IN THE INTERIM, YOU SHOULD MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF ALL AVAILABLE FORCES IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. YOUR PLAN TO ADJUST THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND THE AMERICAL DIVISION WOULD FACILITATE THESE MOVES.

4. (S) I HAVE ALERTED GENERAL ROSSON TO BE PREPARED TO EXPAND THE PERSHING AO INTO SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI, IF REQUIRED.

5. (S) YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING A ROK ARMY BATTALION IS BEING STUDIED BY MY STAFF.

6. (S) IN SUMMARY, I HAVE NO PLANS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN ICTZ. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE 198TH BRIGADE, A DECISION WILL BE MADE AS TO THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST BRIGADE OF THE 101ST. I HEARTILY ENDORSE YOUR PLAN TO MOVE THREE OR FOUR BATTALIONS NORTH, AND SUGGEST EARLY IMPLEMENTATION. BEST REGARDS. UNQUOTE.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#38

CCN 172FILLER 2DTG 220054ZMONTH SEPTEMBER 1967ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

*Dep Cdr 7Mj*  
*Acting Ch 22 Sep 67*

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE**FILE COPY FILLER OF 4 COPIESMAF: RECEIVED ONE ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 4COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 220054Z SEP67

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CG FMAW - COPIES 3-4 CG III MAF 220054Z SEP67

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*14 Dec 67*

DATE-TIME GROUP 220054Z SEP67



**SECRET**

DE RUMSAK 2048 2650054  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 220054Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FMAW  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGENS HOCHMUTH AND  
 ANDERSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

I SENT THE FOLLOWING TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND

211702Z SEP67

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: COMUSMACV

A. 7TH AF 101430 SEP67

1. DURING THE LAST THREE DAYS, 19-21 SEP, OUR FORCES IN THE VICINITY  
 OF THE DMZ HAVE RECEIVED ALMOST 1000 ROUNDS OF INCOMING ARTILLERY FIRE.  
 THE BULK OF THIS COMES FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ. IN THIS SAME PERIOD III  
 MAF ARTILLERY WAS DENIED PERMISSION FOR COUNTER-BATTERY AND OTHER  
 FIRES AT A TIME WHEN EFFORTS NORTH OF THE DMZ APPEAR NOT TO HAVE  
 SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE ENEMIES FIRE ON MY TROOPS. FOR EXAMPLE DURING  
 THE PERIOD 200700H TO 210700H, MY 37 ARTILLERY TUBES CAPABLE OF FIRING

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2048 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

ABOVE THE DMZ WERE HELD IN CHECK-FIRE FOR 21 HOURS AND 17 MINUTES.  
 DURING THIS TIME OUR TROOPS WERE KILLED AND WOUNDED BY ENEMY ARTY  
 WHICH I COULD HAVE ENGAGED WITH COUNTER BATTERY. I CONSIDER THIS  
 SITUATION INTOLERABLE.

2. REF A DESIGNATED ABCCC HILLSBORO AS THE CONTROLLING AGENCY FOR THE  
 OPERATION. THE ABCCC IS APPARENTLY CHECKING FIRE NORTH OF THE DMZ  
 WHENEVER OPN NEUTRALIZE ACFT ARE IN THE GENERAL VICINITY. THIS  
 BLANKET RESTRICTION IS WHOLLY UNNECESSARY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF  
 EFFECTIVE FIRE COORDINATION.

3. RECOMMEND YOU REEVALUATE PRESENT CONCEPT. AS A MINIMUM  
 RECOMMEND 7 AF PERSONNEL WITH NECESSARY AUTHORITY AND  
 ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT BE COLOCATED WITH MY FACILITIES AT  
 DONG HA. KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHT PATH AND TARGET ASSIGNMENT OF A/C  
 SHOULD NECESSITATE CHECK FIRES ONLY IN AFFECTED AREAS.

4. REQUEST SENIOR 7TH AF REP ESTABLISH LIAISON ASAP.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
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# 37

CCN 171FILLER 3DTG 212334Z MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENTCATEGORY EXCLUSIVEFILE COPY FILLER OF 2 COPIESMAF: RECEIVED ONE ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 212334Z SEP67

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/s*

DATE-TIME GROUP 212334Z SEP67

**SECRET**

PP RUMHIA  
 DE RUMSAK 2040 2642334  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 212334Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO ZEN/CG IFFORCEV  
 INFO CG TF OREGON  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON AND BGEN KOSTER  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

1. DIRECT LIAISON WITH 1/101ST IS WELCOMED AND ENCOURAGED. IN ALL  
 FAIRNESS, HOWEVER, I MUST ADVISE YOU THAT I HAVE ASKED WESTY FOR AN  
 ADDITIONAL BRIGADE DURING THE MONSOON AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE  
 101ST BE LEFT HERE AS LONG AS WEATHER CONDITIONS PERMIT THE TYPE OPS  
 AT WHICH THEY ARE SO ADEPT. DO NOT YET HAVE HIS REACTION.

2. WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND THE BEST OF LUCK TO YOU AND YOUR  
 FINE OUTFIT IN THE GOOD HUNTING MONTHS AHEAD.

GP-4

BT

**HAS BEEN SENT**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#36

*CG-1*CCN 165FILLER *45*DTG 211702ZMONTH SEP 67ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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CATEGORY EXCLUSIVEFILE COPY FILLER OF      COPIESMAF: RECEIVED ONE ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1&2 OF 2COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 211702Z SEP 67RECEIVED BY     DATE/TIME 020600H*Copy #1, burning  
14 Dec 67  
S**Dup CG 10M  
22 Sept 67*DATE-TIME GROUP 211702Z SEP 67

**SECRET**

00 RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 2035 2641702  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 211702Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE***Mr. [unclear]*

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

A. 7TH AF 101430Z SEP67

1. DURING THE LAST THREE DAYS, 19-21 SEP, OUR FORCES IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ HAVE RECEIVED ALMOST 1000 ROUNDS OF INCOMING ARTILLERY FIRE. THE BULK OF THIS COMES FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ. IN THIS SAME PERIOD III MAF ARTILLERY WAS DENIED PERMISSION FOR COUNTER-BATTERY AND OTHER FIRES AT A TIME WHEN EFFORTS NORTH OF THE DMZ APPEAR NOT TO HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE ENEMIES FIRE ON MY TROOPS. FOR EXAMPLE DURING THE PERIOD 200700H TO 210700H, MY 37 ARTILLERY TUBES CAPABLE OF FIRING ABOVE THE DMZ WERE HELD IN CHECK-FIRE FOR 21 HOURS AND 17 MINUTES. DURING THIS TIME OUR TROOPS WERE KILLED AND WOUNDED BY ENEMY ARTY WHICH I COULD HAVE ENGAGED WITH COUNTER-BATTERY. I CONSIDER THIS SITUATION INTOLERABLE.

. REF A DESIGNATED ABCCC HILLSBORO AS THE CONTROLLING AGENCY

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2035 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR FOR THE OPERATION. THE ABCCC IS APPARENTLY CHECKING FIRE NORTH OF THE DMZ WHENEVER OPN NEUTRALIZE ACFT ARE IN THE GENERAL VICINITY. THIS BLANKET RESTRICTION IS WHOLLY UNNECESSARY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EFFECTIVE FIRE COORDINATION.

3. RECOMMEND YOU REEVALUATE PRESENT CONCEPT. AS A MINIMUM RECOMMEND 7TH AF PERSONNEL WITH NECESSARY AUTHORITY AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT BE COLOCATED WITH MY CONTROL FACILITIES AT DONG HA. KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHT PATH AND TARGET ASSIGNMENT OF A/C SHOULD NECESSITATE CHECK FIRES ONLY IN AFFECTED AREAS.

4. REQUEST SENIOR 7TH AF REP ESTABLISH LIAISON ASAP.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CCN 166FILLER 25DTG 211700Z

MONTH

SEP 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CATEGORY

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also Sam

DATE-TIME GROUP 211700Z SEP 67

**SECRET**

PP RUMSAW  
DE RUMSAK 2034 2641700  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 211700Z SEP 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**

*My  
25 Sept 67*

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

1. AS YOU KNOW, THE ENEMY THREAT IN ICTZ, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE DMZ, CONTINUES UNABATED. DURING THE PAST WEEK TWO THINGS HAVE OCCURRED WHICH ARE OF REAL CONCERN AND WHICH HAVE CAUSED ME TO REASSESS THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES. FIRST, THE ENEMY HAS CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT HE CAN MASS HIS SUPPORTING FIRES. ON OCCASION HE FIRED OVER 200 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY IN A VERY FEW MINUTES, COORDINATED WITH HEAVY MORTAR FIRE NOT ONLY AGAINST OUR STRONG POINTS BUT AGAINST MOBILE FORCES AS WELL. SECONDLY THE EARLY AND TORRENTIAL RAINS HAVE DECREASED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT AND COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE AS WELL AS MAKING RE-SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT DISTURBINGLY SLOW AND DIFFICULT. THE EFFECTS OF THESE FACTORS ON INSURING AN ADEQUATE AND ACTIVE DEFENSE ARE EVIDENT.

2. I HAD HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE ENEMY WITH

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2034 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SOMEWHAT REDUCED FORCES DURING THE NE. MONSOON. HOWEVER, I ALWAYS HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS AND AFTER LISTENING TO THE BRIEFING BY YOUR STRATEGIC STUDY TEAM AM MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER OF THE HIGH RISKS INVOLVED IN REDUCING FORCES IN ICTZ AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. WITH MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE ACTIVE COMBAT IN SVN GOING ON IN THIS AREA AND WITH INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT INORDINATELY HIGH CASUALTIES TO ACHIEVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES, HE COULD BE EMBARKED ON A STRATEGY TO GAIN A BARGAINING POSITION AT ALL COSTS.

3. AS YOU ARE AWARE, I HAVE A VERY LIMITED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE IN THE DMZ AREA WITHOUT UNCOVERING IN VARYING DEGREES OTHER VITAL AREAS. AND WHILE I AM CERTAIN WE WILL EXTRACT A SUBSTANTIAL TOLL IF THE ENEMY CHOOSES A MORE AGGRESSIVE COURSE OF ACTION, I FEEL WE RUN TOO HIGH A RISK IF PLANS TO SHIFT US ELEMENTS FROM ICTZ TO TACTICAL AREAS FURTHER SOUTH ARE EXECUTED. IN FACT, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE AT LEAST CONTINUE THE PRESENT FORCE LEVEL THROUGH THE MONTHS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD.

4. SPECIFICALLY, I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING GENERAL DISPOSITION OF FORCES:

A. THE AMERICAL DIVISION, WITH 3 BRIGADES (196TH, 196TH, 3/4TH),

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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#34

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2034 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE FOR QUANG NGAI, QUANG TIN AND THAT PORTION OF QUANG NAM THAT INCLUDES THE QUE SON-HIEP DUC VALLEY. THIS WOULD GIVE MINIMUM BUT ADEQUATE COVERAGE OF THE AREA WHERE THE 2D NVA DIV HAS CONCENTRATED AND WOULD AT THE SAME TIME FREE TWO BATTALIONS AND A COMMAND GROUP OF THE 5TH MARINES TO MOVE NORTH.

B. THE ROK MARINE BDE WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE BUT EXTEND ITS AREA OF OPNS TO THE TRA KHUC RIVER. AND I WOULD URGE YOUR THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE ADDITION OF A ROK ARMY BN TO THE MARINE BDE TO EXPAND ITS CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE QUANG NGAI AREA.

C. THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION, WITH 2 AND 1/3 REGTS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR QUANG NAM, LESS THAT SMALL PORTION ASSUMED BY THE AMERICAL DIV.

D. THE 3D MARDIV WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD RESPONSIBILITY FOR THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI; BUT TO THEIR PRESENT FORCE OF 10 BNS (INCLUDING THE OKI ROTATIONAL BN) WOULD BE ADDED THE COMMAND GROUP AND 2 BNS OF THE 5TH MARINES. THESE ADDITIONS, PLUS THE CONTINUING AVAILABILITY OF THE 2 SLF'S WOULD PROVIDE THE MINIMUM FORCE TO COUNTER A SERIOUS ENEMY ATTACK IN THE DMZ AREA AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES TO DESTROY ENEMY BATTALIONS PIECEMEAL SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI AS THEY OPEN THEMSELVES TO ATTACK.

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2034 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

5. IN ADDITION, I RECOMMEND THAT THE 101ST AIRBORNE BDE REMAIN HERE AS LONG AS THE WEATHER PERMITS THE KINDS OF OPERATIONS AT WHICH THEY ARE SO ADEPT. THEY CAN MAKE INVALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE AREA WHERE THEY NOW ARE OPERATING AS WELL AS IN THE KEY BASE AREAS BOTH IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SECTORS OF ICTZ.

6. I REALIZE YOUR PROBLEMS IN DISTRIBUTING LIMITED ASSETS THROUGHOUT SVN BUT I SUBMIT THAT THE COMMITMENT OF FORCES LISTED ABOVE TO I CORPS IS THE ONLY PRUDENT COURSE, GIVEN THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION HERE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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#34



*CE*  
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CCN 143FILLER 16DTG 180804ZMONTH SEPTEMBER 67

ORIGINATOR

CG III MAF**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

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DATE-TIME GROUP 180804Z SEP 67

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMSAK 1644 2610804  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 180804Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CMC  
 CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**HAS BEEN SENT**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK.

SUBJ: VISIT BY MR JOSEPH ALSOP

1. DURING THE PERIOD 16-17 SEPTEMBER THE SUBJECT NAMED COLUMNIST VISITED THIS COMMAND. DURING HIS VISIT HE EXPRESSED CERTAIN VIEWS, WHICH ARE BELIEVED OF INTEREST TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, AND WHICH HE PREDICATES ON THE NVA DOCUMENTS CAPTURED IN 1966 IN OPERATION "CEDAR FALLS". HE BELIEVES THE NVA OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHIEVE A DIEM BIEN PHU TYPE VICTORY UPON WHICH TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. HE FURTHER BELIEVES THAT PUBLIC REACTION WOULD BE SUCH THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY ACCEPT PEACE UNDER UNFAVORABLE TERMS AFTER SUCH A DEFEAT. ADDITIONALLY, HE STATES THAT THE NVA'S OBJECTIVE IS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE PROGRESSING

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1644 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE IN ORDER TO WIN AN ULTIMATE VICTORY.

2. MR ALSOP CITES THE DISPOSITION OF THREE NVA REGIMENTS AROUND CON THIEN AS SUBSTANTIATING HIS THESIS. HE POINTS TO THE RELATIVELY LITTLE INCOMING ARTILLERY FROM THE ENEMY AS AN INDICATION THAT THEY ARE BUILDING UP AN AMMUNITION STOCK. HE FURTHER BELIEVES THAT AROUND OCTOBER THEY WILL FIRE THIS HOARD. AMMUNITION WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BUILD UP, SOME FIFTEEN TO SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SHELLS IN HIS JUDGMENT, WILL SUPPORT A MASS ATTACK ON CON THIEN; THAT THEY WILL TAKE HEAVY LOSSES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A LIMITED VICTORY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. HE CONTENTS THAT IF THIS ATTACK WERE DEFEATED IT WOULD BE A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE U.S., BUT IF IT SUCCEEDED IT WOULD BE A DEVASTATING POLITICAL DEFEAT.

3. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THE HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, DEEP AIR SUPPORT, AND B-52 ATTACKS ARE HAMPERING THE ENEMY BUT THAT THEY COULD HAVE EFFECTED A BUILDUP OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT SUCH AS HE ENVISIONS. HOWEVER, I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD HURT THE ENEMY BY PERSONNEL CASUALTIES AND THAT I THOUGHT OUR COUNTER-

**PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#33

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1644 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 ATTACK PLANS COULD WIN US VICTORY. IT IS HIS FIRM  
 CONVICTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM IS NOW  
 IN THE PROCESS OF "PREPARING THE BATTLEFIELD" AND HAS  
 BEEN IN THIS PROCESS SINCE LATE JUNE. TO THIS I CONCURRED.  
 AS A SIDE LIGHT TO THIS HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT  
 THE MARINE CORPS CONCEPT WAS WRONG, THAT THE WAY TO WIN  
 THE WAR OUT HERE WAS NOT TO HAVE A PACIFICATION AND  
 MILITARY ACTION GO HAND IN HAND, BUT THAT IT WAS TO  
 DEFEAT THE ENEMY ON THE BATTLEFIELD. I COUNTERED THAT  
 IN MY VIEW BOTH WARS HAD TO BE PURSUED VIGOROUSLY. HE  
 DID STATE THAT HE WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY THE SPIRIT  
 AND CALIBER OF THE MARINES HE HAD MET.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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*C/S* *[Signature]* 25

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SEP 67

CG III MAF

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**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS SENT TO COMUSMACV FOLLOWING VISIT OF  
 GENERAL WESTMORELAND 13 SEPT 67:

SUBJ: THE FOLLOWING IS A REPORT OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S VISIT TO  
 III MAF ON 13 SEP 1967.

1. BRIEFED BY G-2 CONCERNING NUMBER AND IDENTITY OF ENEMY UNITS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THREAT IS OF MAGNITUDE OF 7 TO 9 BATTALIONS IN IMMEDIATE DMZ AREA. ALSO BRIEFED ON ARTILLERY OOB. ENEMY THREAT IS ESTIMATED 100 TO 108 TUBES.
2. BRIEFED BY G-2 CONCERNING WEATHER. LATE SEP, ALL OCT AND EARLY NOV RECEIVE HEAVIEST RAINFALL IN QUANG TRI. RAINS ALREADY STARTED. WILL AFFECT CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS.
3. BRIEFED BY G-3 REP CONCERNING OP PLAN 12-67 WHICH IS THE ALTERNATE PLAN DIRECTED TO BE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION. PLAN CALLS FOR PRESENT A1, A2, A3, AND A4 TO BE COMPLETED AND OCCUPIED BY ARVN BN EACH. C1 TO BE COMPLETED AND OCCUPIED BY ARVN REGT CP,

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1294 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 ARTY, AND RECON CO. C2, C3 AND C4 TO BE COMPLETED AND OCCUPIED BY  
 USMC UNITS. IN ADDITION, USMC BASE CAMPS TO BE SPREAD GENERALLY  
 ALONG ROUTE 9 TO LAOS BORDER. USE OF BARRIER MATERIALS AND SENSOR  
 DEVICES IN SELECTED LOCATIONS FOR OPTIMUM EMPLOYMENT. PLAN TO USE  
 USMC UNITS AS REACTION FORCES AND FOR ACTIVE PATROLLING.

4. BRIEFED BY G-3 ON CASUALTY ESTIMATED FOR SHERMAN AND FOR ALTERNATE PLAN. ESTIMATE FURTHER REDUCTION OF CASUALTIES IN ALTERNATE PLAN BY USE OF FORTIFICATIONS AS BUILT, SMOKE AND MORE INTENSIVE USE OF SUPPORTING ARTILLERY, NGF, AND PARTICULARLY AIR.
5. BRIEFED ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR PLAN. CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH CURRENT BOM BY EMPLOYING THE RESERVE MATERIALS. BRIEFED ON ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING UNITS NEEDED. THERE IS IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT FOR ONE MEDIUM TRUCK CO (CARGO) AND ONE TRANSP. MED. TRUCK SQUAD (PETROLEUM) DURING 18SEPT-25OCT. OTHER REQUIREMENTS WITH JUSTIFICATION WILL BE FORWARDED TO MACV SOONEST. ALSO, WILL REQUIRE EXPANSION OF DONG HA PORT CAPACITY, AND SUBSTANTIAL DREDGING OPERATION TO KEEP CUA VIET CHANNEL CLEAR DURING MONSOON. ADVISED THAT QUANG TRI AIRPORT SITE DETERMINED, AND CONSTRUCTION CREWS MOVE IN TOMORROW.

6. GENERAL WESTMORELAND SAID:

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1294 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

A. PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLAN TO MARSHALL CARIBOU AIRCRAFT TO AIRLIFT A USMC BN INTO KHE SANH WHILE RUNWAY UNDER REPAIR IF NEEDED.

B. WILL REQUEST AIRLIFT OF SMOKE GENERATING PLATOON FROM CONUS ASAP, WITH REMAINDER OF COMPANY TO FOLLOW. USARV TO FIND COMPENSATORY SPACES.

C. APPROVED THE ALTERNATE PLAN IN CONCEPT AND DIRECTED CG III MAF TO PROCEED, BUT DESIRES MACV STAFF TO REVIEW DETAILS BEFORE FINAL APPROVAL OF PLAN.

(1) WITH RESPECT TO REQUEST OF GEN LAM TO ALTER PLAN BY MANNING A-4 WITH MARINES VICE ARVN, AUTHORIZED CG III MAF TO MAN A-4 ON INTERIM BASIS, BUT WILL NOT AUTHORIZE CHANGE OF PLAN PERMANENTLY.

(2) WILL HAVE TO STUDY ADDITIVE SUPPORT UNITS REQUESTED BEFORE APPROVING THEM. FOR EXAMPLE, INQUIRED IF 12 TON TRUCKS COULD BE USED VICE 2-1/2 AND 5 TON TRUCKS REQUESTED. WAS ADVISED ROADS AND BRIDGES WOULD BEAR THE TRAFFIC.

D. STATED SLFS NOW AVAILABLE TO CG III MAF FOR OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED. (RELEASED FROM HOLD FOR SHERMAN.)

E. DIRECTED EXPLOITATION OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY FOR TACTICAL DECEPTION DURING CONSTRUCTION AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1294 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LARLY AS REGARDS CLEARED TRACE.

F. DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT OF FOLLOW-ON PLAN AS EXPERIENCE INDICATED, INCLUDING SPECIFICS OF HOW WE MIGHT USE ROKS.

G. EXPRESSED INTEREST IN POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPING AN OBSERVATION PLATFORM THAT IS NOT FIXED, SUCH AS HINGED TOWER OR TELESCOPIC TOWER, VICE A PERMANENT TOWER.

H. WILL TASK THE AIR FORCE TO USE COMMANDO LAVA IN AHAU VALLEY AT TWO INTERDICTION AREAS.

I. DESIRES TO KEEP PRESSURE ON ENEMY BY ALL MEANS. CONTINUE PRIORITY OF B-52 STRIKES TO III MAF, AND SLAM OPERATIONS NORTH OF DMZ.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

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SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN KRULAK FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN  
 THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF GENERAL ABRAMS VISIT TO III MAF,  
 10 SEPTEMBER 1967. THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO PREPARE  
 HIMSELF ON DETAILS OF THE DYE MARKER DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER  
 TO BE READY TO DISCUSS THEM WITH WESTY UPON HIS RETURN FROM  
 P.I. VISIT.

G-2 GAVE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE DMZ  
 INCLUDING ESTIMATE OF ARTILLERY OOB OF 100-110 TUBES OF  
 VARIOUS CALIBERS. FOLLOWED BY A WEATHER BRIEFING SHOWING  
 THAT NORTHEAST MONSOON PRECIPITATION HEAVIEST DURING  
 SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER PERIOD.

BRIEFING BY G-3 ON ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES WHICH MIGHT  
 RESULT FROM OPERATION SHERMAN, ASSUMING SOME NINE USMC  
 BATTALIONS, INCLUDING ONE CONSTRUCTION BN, PLUS THREE  
 ARVN BATTALIONS. BASED ON 29 DAYS OF CONTINUOUS OPERA-  
 TIONS FOR INSTALLATION OF THE SPOS. METHODOLOGY BEGINS

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1202 SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 WITH ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL CASUALTIES FROM OPNS HICKORY AND  
 BEAU CHARGER TO ESTABLISH BASE OF LOSSES PER BN DAY.  
 IN 90 BN DAYS LOST 142 KIA 896 WIA TO ESTABLISH BASE OF 1.85  
 KIA AND 9.95 WIA PER BN DAY. MULTIPLIES BASE BY PROJECTED  
 BN DAYS IN OPN SHERMAN. 260 US BN DAYS PROJECT 411 KIA  
 AND 2587 WIA. 87 ARVN BN DAYS PROJECTED AT 1/2 RATE TO  
 COMPENSATE FOR SMALLER SIZE YIELDS 69 KIA AND 433 WIA. AN  
 ADJUSTMENT TO BE MADE FOR ENEMY INCREASED CAPABILITY TO  
 INFLECT CASUALTIES BY ARTILLERY/ROCKETS/MORTARS. INCOMINE  
 ROUND IN HICKORY AND BEAU CHARGER AVERAGED 195 PER DAY.  
 ESTIMATED CURRENT CAPABILITY TO AVERAGE 550 ROUNDS PER  
 DAY DURING OPN SHERMAN. BY MULTIPLYING THE CASUALTIES  
 INFLECTED BY ARTILLERY/MORTARS/ROCKETS PER BN DAY DURING  
 HICKORY AND BEAU CHARGER BY A FACTOR OF 2.8, AN ADJUST-  
 MENT WAS MADE FOR THE INCREASED CAPABILITY TOTALING US  
 261 KIA AND 1201 WIA; ARVN 43 KIA AND 209 WIA. TOTAL  
 PROJECTED CASUALTIES: US 672 KIA, 3788 WIA; ARVN 112  
 KIA, 642 WIA. THIS DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION FACT  
 THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL WILL WORK IN RELATIVELY  
 CONCENTRATED FORMATIONS IN THE OPEN NOR FACT THAT ENEMY

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1202 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR  
NOW HAS A DEMONSTRATED AIR BURST CAPABILITY.

BRIEF OF THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF ALTERNATE PLAN WHICH  
CALLED FOR EARLY CONSTRUCTION OR IMPROVEMENT OF A-1, A-2,  
A-3, A-4, C-1, C-2, AND C-3 ESSENTIALLY AS PREVIOUSLY  
PLANNED, PLUS ANOTHER BASE AREA NORTH OF CUA VIET (C-4).  
MACV/JGS ENVISIONED ARVN MANNING A-1, A-2, A-3, AND A-4  
WITH A BATTALION EACH. JGS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BATTAL-  
IONS TO I CORPS. C-1 TO CONTAIN REGIMENTAL CP, ONE  
BATTALION OF ARTILLERY (THREE BATTALIES: 105, ONE BATTERY  
155), AND POSSIBLY A RECON COMPANY. III MAF TO PROVIDE  
MOBILE FORCE THROUGH-OUT AREA.

GENERAL LAM'S DESIRE TO INCLUDE ROK'S IN DYE MARKER  
AT A LATER DATE FOR INTERNATIONAL FLAVOR WAS DISCUSSED.

LOGISTICS PROBLEMS CENTERED AROUND DONG HA RAMP  
CAPABILITY, AND REQUIREMENT TO BUILD C-130 AIRFIELD  
AT QUANG TRI. THESE WERE DISCUSSED IN GROSS TERMS.  
ESSENTIALITY OF ADDITIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND  
CONSTRUCTION FORCES WAS EXPRESSED.

FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT OF THE MISSION OF ALTERNATE  
PLAN AS BRIEFED:

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1202 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR

ON ORDER, CG III MAF, WITH FORCES ASSIGNED, AND IN  
COORDINATION WITH CG, I CORPS, ARVN, CONDUCTS ANTI-  
INFILTRATION OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE  
MAKING MAXIMUM USE OF A SENSOR AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM  
IN SUPPORT OF BATTALION STRONG POINTS, AND BATTALION  
COMBAT OPERATING BASES LOCATED ALONG ROUTE 9 WESTWARD  
TO THE LAOS BORDER, IN ORDER TO IMPEDE ENEMY INFIL-  
TRATION, DEFEND FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS, PROTECT LINES  
OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND DESTROY THE ENEMY IN ZONE.  
INSTALLS THE ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEM IN SUCH MANNER  
AS TO PROVIDE THE OPTION OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE OBSTACLE SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE ADDITIONAL EMPLOY-  
MENT OF FUTURE DETECTION DEVICES IN THE R&D PROGRAM.

HAVE ALTERNATE PLAN COMPLETED AND PREPARED TO BRIEF  
WESTY ON 13 SEPTEMBER. MACV STAFF REPRESENTATIVES HERE  
TO ASSIST AND BECOME FAMILIAR WITH PLAN.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO BEEN  
 HERBOLD FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 101645Z SEP67

B. CG FLC 23143Z AUG67 TO 3RD FSR

1. I HAVE GROWN INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE AVAILABILITY OF  
 THE M109 SELF PROPELLED HOWITZER. WE HAVE BEEN AVERAGING 10-11  
 GUNS DEADLINED EACH DAY AT 3RD AND 4TH ECHELON FOR SOME TIME AND  
 WE ARE ONLY HOLDING OUR OWN WITH THAT FIGURE. IN ADDITION, THERE  
 ARE SEVERAL OTHER WEAPONS DOWN DAILY AT 2ND ECHELON. THERE ARE A  
 VARIETY OF PARTS CAUSING THE DEADLINES AND CG FLC IS IDENTIFYING  
 AND EXPEDITING THESE ON A DAILY BASIS. BY SEPARATE MSG HE WILL  
 REPORT APPROPRIATE DOC NUMBERS, ETC. HE IS ALSO WORKING ON U. S.  
 ARMY SOURCES IN COUNTRY TO PROCURE CRITICAL ITEMS ON AN ISSA BASIS.

2. AT PRESENT THERE IS ONE REALISTIC ACTION I BELIEVE WE CAN TAKE  
 TO HELP THE SITUATION. BY REF A CG 1ST MARDIV HAS IDENTIFIED A  
 MODIFICATION WHICH MAY SOLVE OUR PROBLEM WITH THE OBTURATOR SPINDLE.  
 THIS IS A SECOND ECHELON PART FOR WHICH 1ST AND 3RD MARDIV'S AND  
 FLC HAVE REQUISITIONS IN THE SYSTEM. AT PRESENT THERE ARE 5 WEAPONS  
 DOWN JUST FOR THIS ASSEMBLY. BACK IN JULY YOU TURNED DOWN A SIMILAR  
 REQUEST FROM 1ST MARDIV TO MAKE THIS MODIFICATION BUT MY EXPERTS TELL  
 ME THAT IT IS PRACTICAL AND CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED HERE IN FLC'S SHOPS  
 PROVIDED A BASIC THREADING TAP IS MANUFACTURED AND MADE AVAILABLE FROM  
 OKINAWA. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT ALTER THE GUN  
 TO THE EXTENT THAT WE WILL BE UNABLE TO USE THE NEW SPINDLE ASSEMBLIES  
 WHEN THEY DO ARRIVE. I AM SURE YOUR EXPERTS HAD GOOD REASON FOR THE  
 TURN DOWN BUT WE FEEL APPROVAL TO MODIFY 6 OBTURATORS ON AN EXPERIMENTAL  
 BASIS WOULD BE A WISE MOVE AT THIS TIME.

3. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR HELP IN EXPEDITING SPINDLES ON REQUISITION  
 ON REF B. MANY OTHER SPINDLES ARE ON REQUISITION BY BOTH DIVISIONS AND  
 FLC. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

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#30

*CG Hissan*

*CIS<sub>3</sub> Q*

097

DISC 100308Z

MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967

*le*

ORIGINATOR CG

MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR: CG -

**EX**

CATEGORY:

*for your approval -*

*v.p.  
Q*

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

1. AM SURE YOU HAVE NOTICED THAT THE USE OF MARIJUANA IS MENTIONED IN FAR TOO MANY ADMINISTRATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY REPORTS ORIGINATING IN MARINE UNITS IN VIETNAM. THIS HAS BEEN OF CONCERN TO ME. AND WANT YOU TO BE APPRISED OF THE MEASURES THIS COMMAND HAS ALREADY TAKEN TO COUNTER IT.

2. THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN MARIJUANA TRAFFIC IN I CORPS THIS YEAR. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT GROWN LOCALLY, IT IS SOLD LOCALLY BOTH IN BULK AND IN MACHINE-ROLLED CIGARETTES. MAJOR CID EFFORT HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO LOCATING THE SOURCE. IT IS CLEARLY A VIETNAMESE OPERATION, AND THE MOST PROBABLE MEANS OF ENTRY IS BY SVN COMMERCIAL OR MILITARY AIR. DUE TO PAST LACK OF COOPERATION FROM LOCAL VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO TRACE SOURCE BEYOND LOCAL DISTRIBUTORS. WHETHER IT IS COMMUNIST SPONSORED IS STILL A MATTER OF CONJECTURE.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 819 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

3. STREET VENDORS ARE USUALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. APPETITES ARE TEASED BY TOSSING CIGARETTES ON PASSING TRUCKS CARRYING TROOPS. VENDORS ARE FOUND AT ALMOST EVERY PLACE WHERE AMERICAN SERVICEMEN CAN BE CONTACTED. PRICES HAVE INCREASED FROM 10 TO 50 PIASTRES PER CIGARETTE OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS.

4. DUE TO INCREASED CID ACTIVITY, THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF CASES INVOLVING MARIJUANA WERE INVESTIGATED:

1966: NOV.-1; DEC.-7; 1967: JAN.-10; FEB.-14; MAR.-30; APR.-18; MAY.-16; JUN.-17; JUL.-35; AUG.-10 SINCE 1 JANUARY 17 MEN HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF MARIJUANA OFFENSES BY GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL: 6 BY SPCM; 2 BY SCM; 3 GMC PENDING, 1 MEDVAC; 4 CID INVESTIGATIONS IN PROGRESS. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS PROCESSED FOR DISCHARGE BY ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS IS UNKNOWN, BUT AT LEAST 4 ARE PENDING.

5. THE SUBJECT WAS A JCC AGENDA ITEM IN JULY AND SEPTEMBER. THE MAYOR OF DANANG ATTENDED THE JULY MEETING. FURTHER ON 6 SEPTEMBER III MAF REPRESENTATIVES MET WITH THE MAYOR AND VARIOUS VIETNAMESE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND THEY AGREED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH MILITARY EFFORTS TO STAMP OUT MARIJUANA TRAFFIC. APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF VIETNAMESE PUSHERS AND DISTRIBUTORS WAS FORCEFULLY DIRECTED BY MAYOR CUONG. MARINE CID/MP PERSONNEL WERE AUTHORIZED TO APPREHEND

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 819 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
VIETNAMESE NATIONALS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF SELLING MARIJUANA.

6. COMMAND INTEREST IN THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS. MCO  
6710.1 WAS DISTRIBUTED. PMO REPORTS AND SUMMARIES REFLECTED THE  
PROBLEM TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS. IT WAS A MAJOR ITEM AT A RECENT  
COMMANDERS CONFERENCE.

7. IN SPITE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM, THERE IS NO EPIDEMIC  
OF MARIJUANA USE IN III MAF. SUCH USE, AS IT ENJOYS IS CAUSED BY ITS  
READY AVAILABILITY. WITH THE PROMISED SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE  
MAYOR AND VIETNAMESE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, THE PROBLEM SHOULD  
BE GREATLY REDUCED BY IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE OF SUPPLY.

GP-4

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN HOCMUTH AND  
 ROBERTSON FM LTGEN CUSHMAN

ANALYSIS OF PATROL ACTIONS BY REGULAR RIFLE UNITS - FIRE  
 TEAM AND SQUAD HAS CONVINCED ME THAT REFRESHER INSTRUCTION IS  
 REQUIRED IN THIS ART. TOO MANY PATROLS HAVE BECOME PERFUNCTORY  
 HIKE, WITH EXCESSIVE CASUALTIES FROM INATTENTION AND LACK OF  
 SKILL, AND RESULTANT FAILURE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION AND/OR INFLICT  
 CASUALTIES, DEPENDING UPON MISSION. WE ARE PARTICULARLY POOR IN  
 GAINING AND MAINTAINING CONTACT, IN LOCATING AND DETERMINING SIZE  
 AND POSITIONS OF ENEMY. STEALTH, PATIENCE AND OBSERVATION HAVE  
 BEEN MISSING FROM OUR PATROL WORK.

I WOULD LIKE APPROPRIATE SCHOOL AND TRAINING TO BE HELD ON  
 CHAP 3, PATROLLING, OF FMFM 6-5, THE MARINE RIFLE SQUAD. I  
 PARTICULARLY COMMEND TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL CONCERNED PARA 3102,  
 PARA A(2)(A) AND (B). IF WE DO NOTHING ELSE BUT ENGRAVE THAT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1103 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 IN FLAMING LETTERS ON THE BRAIN OF EVERY RIFLEMAN, FIRE TEAM AND  
 SQUAD LEADER, AND PLATOON LEADER - WE WILL HAVE TAKEN A GIGANTIC  
 STEP.

I QUOTE: (A) MOVE BY BOUNDS, HALT, LISTEN, OBSERVE, THEN MOVE  
 AGAIN. (B) LOOK FOR THE NEXT SPOT BEFORE LEAVING THE CONCEALMENT  
 OF ONE POSITION. AND SO ON. THE ENTIRE CHAPTER IS A MUST FOR  
 PLATOON LEADERS AND THEIR MEN.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
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MONTHS SEP 67

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CATEGORY:

**EXCLUSIVE**

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NAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1&2 OF 2  
COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 121206Z SEP 67

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#26

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RUMSBB  
 DE RUMSAK 1063 2551206  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 121206Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 INFO ZEN/COMNAVSUPACT DNG  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADN VETH  
 INFO ADM LACY FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

A. OICC RVN 261132Z AUG 67

B. COMNAVSUPACT DNG 080736Z SEPT 67

1. THE CUA VIET CHANNEL ON THE MOUTH OF THE SONG THACH RIVER  
 PLAYS A VITAL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF DYE MARKER OPERATIONS AND  
 THE PLANNED QUANG TRI ALTERNATE AIRFIELD SINCE THE MAJORITY  
 OF MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF THESE OPERATIONS MUST PASS  
 THROUGH THIS CHANNEL FOR OFF-LOADING AT DONG HA. CONSIDERA-  
 BLE DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED DURING PREVIOUS MONSOON  
 DREDGING OPERATIONS IN THAT THE CHANNEL SILTED UP AS FAST AS  
 DREDGED OUT. SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES ARE ANTICIPATED THIS  
 MONSOON SEASON.

2. BY REF A, OICC RVN VOLUNTEERED TO DEVELOP PROGRAM FOR  
 ADVANCE PLANNING OF DREDGING REQUIREMENTS. BY REF B,

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1063 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE  
 PROFESSIONAL ADVICE WAS REQUESTED OF OICC RVN AS TO TOTAL  
 REQUIREMENTS FOR DREDGING, EXPECTED TIME DREDGE WILL BE  
 NEEDED TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS, DURATION OF DREDGING AND  
 ESTIMATED COST.

3. CONTINUOUS OPERATION OF DONG HA PORT FACILITIES AT  
 MAXIMUM CAPACITY OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE IN ACCOMPLISHMENT  
 OF DYE MARKER AND QUANG TRI PROJECTS. ANY DEGRADATION OF THIS  
 ALREADY MINIMAL CAPABILITY WILL SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE THE  
 SUCCESS OF THESE HIGHLY IMPORTANT PROJECTS. I DESIRE  
 THAT YOU BE FULLY AWARE OF THE URGENCY OF THIS PROBLEM  
 SINCE IT IS CRITICAL TO MY FUTURE OPERATIONS AND WILL  
 BE ON THE AGENDA TO BE DISCUSSED WITH GEN WESTMORELAND  
 DURING TOMMORROW'S CONFERENCE AT III MAF HEADQUARTERS.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#26

*CS*  
*C/S* *1/0*

COAL 102

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OEG 110410Z

MONTH SEPTEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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DATE MONTH 110410Z SEP67

# 25

P 101135Z ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS DEP COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III

ZEM

SECRET

SECRET MAC 8586 EYES ONLY

I WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH THE ENERGY AND THOUGHT THAT YOU AND YOUR STAFF ARE GIVING TO THE ALTERNATE PLAN DURING MY VISIT. I WAS ALSO IMPRESSED WITH THE MAGNITUDE OF THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH FACE ALL OF US.

IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE IF WE WERE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM OF MACV STAFF OFFICERS (PROBABLY J-3, J-4, AND CONSTRUCTION) TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE TO ENABLE EACH OF US TO STAY AHEAD OF THE POWER CURVE. THIS TEAM COULD ASSIST YOUR STAFF BY PROVIDING INFORMATION AS TO WHAT THE CAPABILITIES ARE FROM THIS END. IN ADDITION, THEY COULD BE WELL READ INTO YOUR THINKING IN ORDER TO ASSIST GENERAL WESTMORELAND IN ARRIVING AT A TIMELY DECISION ONCE YOUR PLAN ARRIVES HERE.

IF YOU CONCUR, I SUGGEST YOU LET ME KNOW WHEN YOU THINK YOUR PLANS WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY FAR ADVANCED FOR THE GROUP TO BE OF ASSISTANCE AND I WILL DISPATCH THEM IMMEDIATELY.

WARM REGARDS.

NOTE: DELIVER OPENING DUTY HOURS

NNN

Ch *le*  
Jaguer

G-2 *[Signature]*  
2

SECRET

Dep CG *[Signature]*

425

**SECRET***le*

PP RUMSMA  
 DE RUMSAK 910 2540410  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 110410Z SEP67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

A. YOUR 101135Z SEP67.

A SMALL TEAM OF MACV STAFF OFFICERS TO ADVISE MY PLANNING STAFF ON  
 MACV CAPABILITIES AND TO CONVEY OUR THINKING TO GEN WESTMORELAND AS  
 HE REVIEWS OUR PLAN SHOULD PROVE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.

RECOMMEND 12 SEPTEMBER AS ARRIVAL DATE. PLEASE ADVISE NAMES, GRADES  
 AND ARRIVAL TIME OF TEAM. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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#25-

*Dep CG 704*  
*544567*

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050106Z

SEP 67

MONTHS

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY:

*CG has seen*

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PP RUMSMA  
DE RUMSAK 0307 2480106  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 050106Z SEP 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

A. COMNAVFORV REP DANANG 020834Z SEP 67

B. COMUSMACV 010115Z SEP 67

1. THE SONG CAU DO BRIDGE ON RVN NATIONAL RTE 1A APPROX THREE KM SOUTH OF DANANG AB WAS DAMAGED BY ENEMY ACTION AND IS UNUSABLE. BRIDGE PIER DESTROYED AND END OF TWO SPANS DROPPED INTO RIVER SIMILAR TO DAMAGE INCURRED AT NAM O. THIS BRIDGE IS A VITAL ARTERIAL LINK BEING USED AS THE NORTH SOUTH MSR THROUGH DANANG TO MAINTAIN TACTICAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF III MAF, RD EFFORT AND ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF RVN. A FLOATING BRIDGE HAS BEEN INSTALLED BUT CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO REMAIN DURING THE MONSOON SEASON.

2. THE REPAIR OF THIS BRIDGE IS BEYOND THE AVAILABLE CAPABILITY OF MY FORCE ENGINEERS AND SUPPORTING CB UNITS, HOWEVER, THE OICC CONTRACTOR HAS DETERMINED HE HAS THE CAPABILITY TO REPAIR

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0307 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE BRIDGE AND ESTIMATES IT WILL TAKE APPROX FOUR MONTHS INCLUDING ONE MONTH DESIGN AFTER DECISION AND AUTH OICC TO INITIATE DESIGN AND PLANNING. ESTIMATED COST BY CONTRACTOR, AS REPORTED REF A, 350 THOU.

3. IN KEEPING WITH YOUR ANNOUNCED POLICY CONTAINED REF B THAT ALL BRIDGES DAMAGED OR DESTROYED ALONG PRINCIPAL LOC'S AND ALTERNATE ROUTES BE REPAIRED OR REPLACED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, YOUR ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED IN OBTAINING NECESSARY FUNDS EARLIEST. I AM PRESENTLY STRAPPED ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION EFFORT AND CONSIDER THE REPAIRS MUST BE A CONTRACTOR PROJECT. CONTRACTOR HAS STATED THAT HE CAN START ON 1 OCT.

4. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS OBTAINING FUNDING EARLIEST IS REQUESTED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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