

CCN _____

FILLER _____

DTG 003

MONTH _____ 25

ORIGINATOR 010148Z _____ NOV 67

CG FMFPAC **MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**
EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____

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010148Z NOV 67

#54

SECRET

VV PAC019
PP RUMHMF
DE RUHFMA 0019 3050148
ZNY SSSSS
P 010148Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
LTGEN KRLUAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE STRENGTH IN VIETNAM - PROGRAM FIVE (U)

A. CG III MAF 172352Z/OCT67 SPECAT (S)

1. YOUR ANALYSIS, IN REFERENCE A, WAS GREATLY AP-
PRECIATED. EXAMINATION OF THE INFORMATION AVAIL-
ABLE HERE REVEALS SLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN THE JCS
APPROVED FORCES FOR FY-68, WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN
THIRD QUARTER MANNING LEVELS, BUT NOT AVAILABLE TO YOU
AT THE TIME REFERENCE A WAS PREPARED. MY ANALYSIS
COMPELS ME TO DISAGREE WITH YOUR CONCLUSIONS RE-
GARDING THE DESIRABILITY OF INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL
UNITS IN-COUNTRY WITHOUT COINCIDENT INCREASED
AUTHORIZATIONS.

2. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FOLLOWING IS THE LATEST
INFORMATION AVAILABLE HERE ON THE ITEMS SET FORTH

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 0019 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
IN YOUR RATIONALE.

A. PROGRAM 5 AUTHORIZED ADD-ON MARINE SPACES OF
969 TO THE 81,270 SPACES AUTHORIZED BY PROGRAM 4, FOR
A GROSS AUTHORIZATION OF 82,239. INCLUDED IN THE
PROGRAM 5 ADD-ONS WERE 800 SPACES FOR CAPS, 164
SPACES FOR AN ADDITIONAL FIXED WING RECON SQUADRON,
4 SPACES FOR JUSPAO JTD BILLETS AND 1 SPACE FOR A
MACV JTD BILLET. PROGRAM 5 ALSO DIRECTED CIVILIANI-
ZATION OF 300 SPACES AND ESTABLISHED A NET AUTHORI-
ZATION OF 81,939 MARINE MILITARY SPACES.

B. THE NET MARINE MILITARY SPACES AUTHORIZED
BY PROGRAM 5 INCLUDED 398 SPACES FOR MARINE BILLETS
IN VIETNAM THAT ARE NEITHER IN III MAF NOR NINTH MAB
ELEMENTS IN VIETNAM. THIS INCLUDES MACV JTD BILLETS,
COMNAVFORV BILLETS, THE EMBASSY GUARD AND OTHERS.
DEDUCTING THESE REQUIREMENTS, ALONG WITH THE 6,720
SPACES AUTHORIZED FOR NINTH MAB ELEMENTS, FROM THE
NET SPACES AUTHORIZED RESULTS IN A FIGURE OF 74,821
MARINE MILITARY SPACES FOR III MAF, INCLUDING PER-

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PAGE 3 RUHFMA 0019 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SONNEL IN-COUNTRY IN A TAD STATUS. FOR PLANNING, OSD HAS AUTHORIZED 500 IN-COUNTRY SPACES FOR MARINES IN A TAD STATUS.

C. THE THIRD QUARTER FY-68 MANNING LEVEL FOR III MAF IS 75,931, INCLUDING 1,685 SPACES FOR THIRD BATTALION FOURTH MARINES. THIS WILL PROVIDE A NET MANNING LEVEL OF 74,246. COMPARING THE NET III MAF MANNING LEVEL OF 74,246 WITH THE NET SPACES AUTHORIZED III MAF BY PROGRAM 5 (74,821, FROM SUBPARAGRAPH B ABOVE), IDENTIFIES 575 ADDITIONAL AND UNPROGRAMMED SPACES AVAILABLE. COMPARING THE MANNING LEVEL TO ON-ROLLS III MAF STRENGTH OF 71,754 ON 12OCT67 IDENTIFIES 3,067 UNFILLED SPACES.

3. UNFILLED AUTHORIZED IN-COUNTRY SPACES THAT BECOME APPARENT WHEN COMPARING AUTHORIZED SPACES WITH EITHER MANNING LEVEL STRENGTH OR CHARGEABLE ON-ROLLS STRENGTH, CANNOT BE USED TO DEPLOY OR SUPPORT ADDITIONAL UNITS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CURRENT APPROVED PROGRAM. THESE SPACES HAVE IN FACT ALREADY BEEN COMMITTED TO FULFILL MANNING LEVEL NEEDS AND THEIR UTILIZATION

PAGE 4 RUHFMA 0019 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL UNITS OR TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS NOT APPROVED IN THE CURRENT PROGRAM COULD RESULT IN OUR BREACHING THE ESTABLISHED IN-COUNTRY MARINE STRENGTH CEILING IF ALL UNITS ARE BROUGHT TO MANNING LEVEL. ADDITIONAL UNITS CANNOT BE DEPLOYED IN-COUNTRY WITHOUT PLACING OUR ENTIRE PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION IN JEOPARDY, UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY APPROVED AS EITHER A CHANGE OR AN ADD-ON TO THE CURRENT PROGRAM.

4. THE PROBLEM OF SATISFYING ADDITIONAL III MAF REQUIREMENTS IS A COMPLICATED ONE WHICH INVOLVES BOTH APPROVED IN-COUNTRY SPACES AND UNITS, AND MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH. WHILE WE CANNOT DEPLOY ADDITIONAL UNITS TO VIETNAM WITHOUT FIRST HAVING AUTHORIZED SPACES IN THE CURRENT PROGRAM, IT IS EQUALLY TRUE THAT APPROVED SPACES WITHOUT MARINES TO FILL THEM DOES NOT PRODUCE THE REQUIRED ADDITIONAL FIGHT. THIS DICTATES THAT ADDITIONAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED PRIOR TO IDENTIFICATION AND THAT, UPON APPROVAL FOR PLANNING,

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE 4 RUHFMA 0019 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THEY BE THOROUGHLY SUPPORTED BY DETAILED PLAN-
 NING AND PROGRAMMING TO PROVIDE BOTH THE IN-COUNTRY
 SPACES AND THE MARINES TO FILL THE SPACES.

5. IN SUMMARY, MARINE STRENGTH IN VIETNAM, AS RE-
 FLECTED IN THE LIGHT OF PROGRAM 5 AUTHORIZATIONS
 AND THE TAUT PERSONNEL SITUATION IS NOT A ROSY ONE.
 IMMEDIATE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF A HIGH PRIORITY
 NATURE WILL, OF NECESSITY, HAVE TO BE MET BY A
 DIVERSION OF AUTHORIZED SPACES AND ON-HAND RESOURCES
 OR BE DELAYED TO ALLOW FOR THE REQUISITE PLANNING
 AND PROGRAMMING ACTIONS TO BEAR FRUIT. YOU CAN BE
 ASSURED THAT I WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE YOU THE
 MAXIMUM SUPPORT POSSIBLE IN CONNECTION WITH OBTAIN-
 ING THE MEANS REQUISITE FOR THE TASK YOU FACE. IT
 IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO COORDINATE OUR
 EFFORTS CLOSELY TO SATISFY OUR ADDITIONAL REQUIRE-
 MENTS BY PARALLEL ACTION THROUGH DIFFERENT CHANNELS.
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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CCN 013

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DTG 022005Z

MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CMC

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SECRET

VV MAF060
OO RUMHMF
DE RUHMFMA 0312 3062325
ZNY SSSSS
O 022325Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

(SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
LTGEN KRULAK)

O 022005Z NOV 67
FM CMC
TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN BUSE
CHAIRMAN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
GENERAL WALLACE M GREENE, JR.
COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

DEAR WALLY:

A HIGH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY HAS ASKED THAT I SECURE YOUR COMMENTS
AND THOSE OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND ON THE ATTACHED ARTICLE
AND FORWARD THEM, TOGETHER WITH MY COMMENTS, TO HIM.
A COPY OF THE ARTICLE HAS GONE TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND
VIA THE BACK CHANNEL AND WHEN I HAVE RECEIVED HIS COMMENTS,
I WILL MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO YOU.

EARLE G. WHEELER
CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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PAGE 2 RUCIHOAA177 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 FOREIGN REPORT
 PUBLISHED BY THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LIMITED
 25 ST. JAMES'S STREET, LONDON SW1
 1027 26 OCTOBER 1967

CONTENTS

VIETNAM: IS THE DMZ WORTH FIGHTING FOR?
 CYPRUS PEACE MOVES BY MAKARIOUS
 THE CHINESE AID GAME: (1) FOCUS ON AFRICA
 " " " (2) SIHANOUK QUILS
 HOW A UN VOTE ON VIETNAM MIGHT GO
 VIETNAM: IS THE DMZ WORTH FIGHTING FOR?
 ARE THE AMERICANS INEXTRICABLY BOGGED DOWN IN THE BLODDY FIGHTING AROUND
 THE DMZ - VIETNAM'S DEMILITARIZED ZONE? ACCORDING TO INFORMED
 SOURCES, GENERAL WESTMORELAND, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE UNITED
 STATES FORCES IN VIETNAM, IS VIRTUALLY STAKING HIS REPUTATION ON HOLDING
 CON THIEN, THE MARINES' MUDDY, SHELL-FLATTENED OUTPOST WHICH HAS
 RECENTLY BEEN UNDER HEAVY ENEMY BOMBARDMENT.

AMONG SENIOR AMERICAN MILITARY MEN OPINION IS DIVIDED ABOUT THE
 IMPORTANCE OF CON THIEN, AND, INDEED, OF THE WHOLE DEMILITARISED ZONE.
 BUT GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS BACKING THE MARINES WHO ARGUE THAT CON
 THIEN MUST BE HELD, AND APPEARS TO HAVE REJECTED THE ADVICE OFFERED BY
 ARMY OFFICERS WHO ARGUE THAT THE AREA DOES NOT GREATLY MATTER.

THE TROUBLE IS THAT THE MARINES' POSITION AT CON THIEN IS BECOMING

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PAGE 3 RUCIHOA 4177 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE. THEY HAD ROOM TO MANOEUVER ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO, BEFORE THE HEAVY ENEMY SHELLING BEGAN; BUT NOT NOW. ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS NOW COVER A 320-DEGREE ARC AROUND THE MARINES' POSITION AND ONLY ONE SUPPLY CONVOY HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET THROUGH BY ROAD DURING THE PAST 3 1/2 WEEKS. ALL OTHER SUPPLIES HAVE HAD TO COME IN BY AIR.

ENEMY TARGET-SPOTTING IS SO HIGHLY DEVELOPED THAT AMERICAN HELICOPTERS CAN NO LONGER 'LIFT OFF' STRAIGHT INTO THE AIR - THEY ARE TOO VULNERABLE IN THE FIRST FEW SECONDS OF FLIGHT. INSTEAD, THEY HAVE TO 'CRAB' SIDWAYS AT HIGH SPEED, ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKE-OFF, IN ORDER TO OUTWIT THE ENEMY. THIS MANOEUVER IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS, AS THE HELICOPTER CAN EASILY CATCH ITS ROTOR ON THE GROUND AS IT TILTS SIDWAYS.

DURING THE DRY SEASON, THE MARINES CHOSE NOT TO DIG-IN PROPERLY (SHALLOW, SANDBAGGED DUG-OUTS WERE THE ORDER OF THE DAY) BECAUSE 'THAT' NOT THE MARINES' WAY OF FIGHTING'. BUT NOW, WHEN THEY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE, THE MUD AND RAIN MAKE IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DIG-IN THOROUGHLY. MEANWHILE, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEGUN TO USE LETHAL, AIR-BURST SHELLS AIMED AT THE MEN STILL VISIBLE ON THE GROUND. IN SOME SECTORS THE ENEMY IS ALREADY SO CLOSE TO THE MARINES' POSITIONS THAT COUNTER-ATTACKS (WHETHER BY SHELLING OR BOMBING) HAVE KILLED MORE MARINES THAN ENEMY TROOPS. THE LOCAL MARINES THEMSELVES MAKE NO BONES ABOUT WANTING TO GET OUT OF THIS SITUATION.

PAGE 4 RUCIHOA 4177 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NEVERTHELESS, ALL THE MARINE COMMANDERS, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND HIMSELF, SEEM CONVINCED THAT BOTH THE REPUTATION OF THE MARINES, AND THE FATE OF THE WHOLE AMERICAN EFFORT IN VIETNAM, MAY BE AT STAKE. (THE MARINES PROBABLY REGARD THE FORMER AS THE MORE IMPORTANT.) THEY ARGUE THAT EVACUATION OF CON THIEN WOULD RENDER UNTENABLE GIO LINH (THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY POST TO THE EAST), AND ALSO THREATEN THE MARINE SUPPLY BASE AT DONG HA. IF THESE WERE TO FALL, THEY SAY, THE IMPORTANT TOWN OF HUE WOULD BE THREATENED.

IN SUBSTANTIATION OF THEIR CASE, THEY CITE ENEMY DOCUMENTS CAPTURED MORE THAN A YEAR AGO, WHICH CLAIMED THAT DEFEAT OF THE MARINES AROUND THE DMZ WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE CAPTURE OF THE FIVE NORTHERN PROVINCES, WHICH MAKE UP THE I CORPS ZONE.

BUT OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS ARGUE DIFFERENTLY. THEY SAY THE MARINES HAVE FALLEN INTO A TRAP OF THEIR OWN MAKING. THEY ALSO SAY THE WHOLE OF THE DMZ SHOULD BE A 'FREE FIRE ZONE'.

BY THIS THEY MEAN THAT NO ALLIED TROOPS SHOULD BE THERE, EXCEPT POSSIBLE LARGE MOBILE UNITS ON SEARCH-AND DESTROY OPERATIONS. AT ALL OTHER TIMES THE AREA SHOULD BE OPEN TO CONTINUOUS SHELLING AND BOMBING, AT THE SLIGHTEST SIGN OF THE ENEMY. THIS, THEY ARGUE, WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE. FURTHER, THE PROBLEM OF DEALING WITH THE REFUGEES IN THIS AREA IS A MAJOR HEADACHE; WHOLE VILLAGES WHICH HAVE HAD VIETCONG ASSOCIATIONS HAVE HAD TO BE EVICATED.

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PAGE 5 RUCIHOA4177 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR THE SITUATION MAY GET WORSE RATHER THAN BETTER. IF IT FOLLOWS ITS USUAL TACTICS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN ITS ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT OF CON THIEN WHILE SENDING OUT PROBING SEMI-RECONNAISSANCE FORCES (OF BETWEEN 500 AND 1,000 MEN) TO WITHIN SMALL-ARMS FIRING DISTANCE OF THE MARINES' POSITIONS; IN THIS WAY THEY GO OVER EVERY INCH OF THE GROUND BEFORE MOUNTING A MAJOR ASSAULT.

THIS MAJOR ASSAULT WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND HALF OF NOVEMBER, OR EARLY DECEMBER, DEPENDING ON HOW MUCH CLOUD COVER THE CURRENT MONSOON PROVIDES FOR THE BRINGING UP OF SUPPLIES. IF THE AMERICANS WANT TO MAKE ANY MAJOR COUNTER-ATTACK IT WILL ONLY MEAN POURING MORE MEN INTO THE AREA; AND THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS SEEM TO MAKE THIS UNFEASIBLE. FOR THE AMERICANS IT IS A TRICKY PROBLEM. SOME ARMY MEN ARE NOW BETTING PRIVATELY THAT CON THIEN WILL FALL BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

BUT IF THIS DID HAPPEN, WOULD IT BE ANOTHER DIEN BIEN PHY AS SOME PUNDITS SUGGEST? IT IS UNLIKELY. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A CONSIDERABLE BLOW TO AMERICAN PRESTIGE (AND TO THE REPUTATION OF THE MARINES); AND A TREMENDOUS MORALE-BOOSTER TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

BUT, PUT IN PERSPECTIVE, THE LOSS OF A SMALL BASE NEAR THE DMZ WOULD NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE COURSE OF THE REST OF THE CONFLICT,

PAGE 6 RUCIHOA4177 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR OR FOR THAT MATTER THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DMZ IS NOT A POPULAR AREA (LIKE THE DELTA) OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE VIETCONG IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS.

DESPITE THE CONTINUING PRESSURE ON THE MARINES - AND THE WIDESPREAD CRITICISIM OF THEIR INFLEXIBLE METHODS - IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE NOW CONDUCTING AN ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE OPERATION IN THE THREE MOST NORTHERLY PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT HANOI'S RULERS NOW GENUINELY FEAR THEIR COUNTRY MAY BE INVADED.

THIS POSSIBILITY HAS BEEN DISAVOWED BY THE AMERICANS BUT SOME OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S GENERALS ARE NOW ALL IN FAVOUR OF AN INVASION OF THE NORTH. THEY ARGUE THAT AS THE HANOI REGIME AS FREQUENTLY FLOUTED THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954, BY INFILTRATING THOUSANDS OF TROOPS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, THE AMERICANS HAVE VERY RIGHT TO SEND THEIR TROOPS INTO NORTH VIETNAM.

IT IS A REASONABLE INFERENCE, THEREFORE, THAT THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR IN THE I CORPS AREA REFLECTS HANOI'S DETERMINATION TO NIP IN THE BUD ANY POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTACK ACROSS THE 17TH PARALLEL.

WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE ANY SUCH PREPARATIONS (BEYOND CONTINGENCY PLANS) IS DOUBTFUL IN THE EXTREME; FORTUNATELY FOR THE WORLD, THIS IS A MATTER WHICH WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE WHITE HOUSE, NOT BY THE BELLICOSE TOP BRASS IN AND AROUND THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT.

GP-4
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FILLER 25

DTG 030314Z

MONTH NOV 67

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DATE-TIME GROUP 030314Z NOV 67

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 P 030314Z NOV 67
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
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T O P S E C R E T
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. CG III MAF 011024Z/NOV67 (TS)

1. I FOLLOW EVERYTHING IN REFERENCE A. IT CONVEYS
 TWO BASIC POINTS TO ME:

A. IT DISCOURAGES MOVEMENT OF MARINE AIR FROM
 CHU LAI.

B. IT TELLS WESTY THAT IF HE DOES CHOOSE TO MOVE
 OUR AIR, THAT HE MUST PREPARE TO COMMIT RESOURCES FOR
 HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION IN ABOUT THE
 SAME QUANTITY AS THE AIR FORCE WOULD ASK FOR.

2. WHILE PARAGRAPH 4 SPEAKS TO AN "EXTENDED PERIOD",
 PARAGRAPH 1 DESCRIBES ANTICIPATED LIFE OF THE FIELD AS
 6-12 MONTHS.

3. I BELIEVE THAT A MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH DOES

PAGE 2 RUMHFMA 0385 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 NOT COME FORWARD WITH A RECITAL OF THE MARINE SATS
 CAPABILITY GIVES THE AIR FORCE AND ARMY A STICK TO BEAT
 US WITH. WHILE I WOULD NOT WANT TO SWAP CHU LAI FOR
 A SATS INSTALLATION - OR TWO OF THEM FOR THAT MATTER -
 I STILL AM CONVINCED WE WILL COME OUT OF THIS WAR
 WITH AN UNDESIRABLE DEGREE OF "ME TOO" WHERE THE AIR
 FORCE IS CONCERNED, UNLESS WE GET OURSELVES ON THE
 RECORD CLEARLY, RESPECTING OUR SATS CAPABILITY. SOME-
 HOW, DURING THE CURRENT DIALOG, PLEASE MAKE THE
 CAPABILITY OF OUR SATS SYSTEM PLAIN, ALONG WITH A
 STATEMENT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SET IT IN MOTION, IF
 REQUIRED, AND IF THE NECESSARY RESOURCES ARE MADE
 AVAILABLE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CCN 020

FILLER 25

DTG 032225Z

MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG AMERICAL DIV

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D/C	<i>has seen</i>

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FOR

PP RUMHMF RUMNVF
 DE RUMHIC 6258 3080330
 ZNY CCCCC
 P R 032225Z NOV 67
 FM CG AMERICAL DIVISION CHU LAI RVN
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF DANANG RVN
 INFO RUMNVF/CO 17TH AVN GP NHA TRANG RVN
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AVDF-GC 5939 FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM
 MGEN KOSTER.

- SUBJECT: SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF AVIATION CO (U)
1. (C) THE FLYING ELEMENTS OF THE 190TH CBT AVN CO HAVE DIS-
 PLACED TO DUC PHO FROM DANANG WITHOUT INCIDENT.
 2. (C) USE OF THESE AVIATION ASSETS IS CONTINGENT ON MOVEMENT
 OF THE COMPANY MAINTENANCE ELEMENTS FROM DANANG TO CHU LAI.
 3. (C) COMPANY MAINTENANCE ASSETS ARE WAITING FOR TRANSPORT AT
 DANANG.
 4. (U) REQUEST MAINTENANCE ELEMENTS OF 190TH CBT AVN CO BE
 GIVEN SUFFICIENT TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY TO MOVE TO DUC PHO AS
 SOON AS POSSIBLE

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CCN 019

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DTG 040030Z

MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG AMERICAL DIV

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<u>DCG-ARR</u>	<u>has seen</u>
<u>CLS</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<u>D/CS</u>	<u>has seen</u>
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DATE-TIME GROUP 040030Z NOV 67

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OO RUMHMF
 DE RUMHIC 6255 3080150
 ZNY CCCCC
 O P 040030Z NOV 67
 FM CG AMERICAL DIVISION CHU LAI RVN
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF DANANG RVN
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH RVN
 RUMNVFA/CG 1ST CAV DIV AML LZ TWO BITS
 ZEN/CO 3D BDE 1ST CAV DIV AML
 BT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L AVDF-GC 5941 FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM MG KOSTER
 SUBJECT: FOURTH BATTALION FOR 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AML) (U)

1. (C) DURING A RECENT VISIT TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION, COMUSMACV COMMENTED THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING PROVIDING A FOURTH BATTALION FOR USE WITH THE 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AML).
2. (C) OPERATIONS PLANNED TO START 6 NOV COULD PROFITABLY UTILIZE AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION WITH THE 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AML) FROM RESOURCES OTHER THAN THOSE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION. SUCH AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION COULD BE SUPPORTED WITH CURRENT AMERICAL DIVISION LOGISTICAL ASSETS.
3. (C) OPERATIONS STARTING 6 NOV ARE DESIGNED TO SEEK AND DESTROY REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THE 2D NVA DIVISION. SIX BATTALIONS OF

THE 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AML) AND THE 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV WILL LAUNCH ASSAULTS FROM TIEN PHOUC TO AN AREA WEST OF HIEP DUC: AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION COULD BE USED AND SUPPORTED.

4. (C) IN ADDITION, THE 1ST BN, 35TH INF, TOGETHER WITH THE 1ST SQDN 1ST CAV WILL SUPPORT THE 5TH AND 6TH ARVN REGIMENTS IN OPERATIONS ON THE COAST, ALONG ROUTE 1, IN THE PINEAPPLE JUNGLE, AND IN THE EASTERN END OF THE QUESOF VALLEY. ADDITIONALLY, THE 2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES IS SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT OPERATION ESSEX TO THE NORTHWEST OF HIEP DUC, COMPLEMENTING THE AMERICAL OPERATION.

5. (C) REQUEST ONE ADDITIONAL BATTALION OF THE 1ST CAV DIV (AML) BE ATTACHED TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, FOR FURTHER ATTACHMENT TO THE 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AML) STARTING 5 NOVEMBER ALL OTHER RESOURCES WILL BE FULLY EMPLOYED

GP-4
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CCN 18

FILLER 25

DTG 040132Z

MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG AMERUCAL DIV

CG

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DCG AIR

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FOR

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NNNNVV MFA340ZVA 064VVV IHA 173

*****ZZ RUMHMF

DE RUMHIC 6257 3080145

ZNY SSSSS

Z 040132Z NOV 67

FM CG AMERICAL DIVISION CHU LAI RVN

TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF DANANG RVN

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV ISN RVN

RUMHVH/I CORPS G2 ADVISOR DNG RVN

RUMHVH/CG COMPANY C 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP DNG RVN

BT

SECRET AVDF-GC 611 FOR LIG CUSHMAN FROM MG KOSTER

SUBJECT: QUICK RUN ARC LIGHTS REQUEST (U)

1. (S) COORDINATES.

- A. TARGET 1: AT 895257 RPT AT 895257
 AT 887263 RPT AT 887263
 AT 912281 RPT AT 912281
 AT 904287 RPT AT 904287
- B. TARGET 2: AT 918279 RPT AT 918279
 AT 918289 RPT AT 918289
 AT 948289 RPT AT 948289
 AT 948279 RP AT 928279
- C. TARGET 3: AT 906290 RPT AT 906290
 AT 914284 RPT AT 914284
 AT 933308 RPT AT 933308
 AT 924314 RPT AT 924314

FOR

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE TWO RUMHIC 6257 S E C R E T

2. (U) MAP REF: SHEET 6640 III, SERIES L 7014, 1:50,000.

3. (S) INTELLIGENCE JUSTIFICATION:

A. TARGET 1

- (1) ELEMENTS OF 2D NVA DIV HQ AND ONE REGT LOC INTARGET AREA.
- (2) AIR CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE INDICATES EXTENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS AND PRESENCE OF LARGE ENEMY MANEUVER FORCE.
- (3) CONTINUED DAILY REPORTS OF INTENSE GROUND FIRE IN AREA (SA AND 50 CAL/12.7MM).
- (4) ON 10 OCT 67 TWO TONS OF RICE LOCATED IN THE AREA.
- (5) ON 20 OCT 67 A LOW-LEVEL AGENT REPORT LOCATED AN NVA COMPANY IN THE AREA.

- (6) AN NVA HOI CHANH REPORTED ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST MF REGIMENT WERE OPERATING IN THE AREA.
- (7) FIVE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS RECEIVED DURING LATE OCT 67 INDICATE A DIVISION SIZE UNIT IN THE AREA.
- (8) FIVE INTELLIGENCE REPCS RECEIVED ON 2 NOVEMBER 67 INDICATE A DIVISION SIZE UNIT IN THE AREA.

B. TARGET 2:

- (1) ELEMENTS OF 2D NVA DIV HQ AND ONE REGT LOC IN TARGET AREA.
- (2) AIR CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE INDICATES EXTENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS

PAGE THREE RUMHIC 6257 S E C R E T

AND PRESENCE OF LARGE ENEMY MANEUVER FORCE.

- (3) CONTINUED DAILY REPORTS OF INTENSE GROUND FIRE IN AREA (SA AND 50 CAL/12.7MM).
- (4) GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AND PHOTOGRAPHY TAKEN IN LATE SEPT INDICATED EXTENSIVE FORTIFICATION ACTIVITY IN THE AREA.
- (5) FOUR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS DURING LATE OCT INDICATED A REGIMENTAL SIZE UNIT IN THE AREA.
- (6) REPORTS INDICATE A CONCENTRATION OF ENEMY INSTALLATIONS: RICE STORAGE CACHES, WEAPONS CACHES, AND MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS IN THE AREA.
- (7) VR REPORTS INDICATE EXTENSIVE TROOP AND LOGISTICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE AREA.

C. TARGET 3:

- (1) GROUND AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE CONDUCTED IN LATE OCT REVEALED INDICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS AND LARGE TROOP UNITS.
- (2) AIR CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE INDICATES EXTENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS AND THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE MANEUVER FORCE.
- (3) ON 20 OCT 67 A LOW-LEVEL AGENT REPORTED AN NVA COMPANY IN THE AREA.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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0401322 NOV 67
CG AMERICAL DIV

PAGE FOUR RUMHIC 6257 S E C R E T

(4) ON 19 OCT 67, AND LRPP REPORTED 150 NVA MOVING ON A TRAIL IN THE TARGET AREA.

(5) CONTINUED DAILY REPORTS OF INTENSE GROUND TO AIR FIRE DIRECTED AT RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ARMED HELICOPTERS.

(6) LARGE SECONDARY EXPLOSION REPORTED FOLLOWING ENGAGEMENT OF TARGET WITHIN RECOMMENDED TARGET AREA, ON 22 OCT.

(7) A HOI CHANH REPORTED THE 1ST MF REGIMENT OPERATING IN THE AREA IN LATE OCT.

(8) FOUR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS DURING LATE OCT INDICATED A REGIMENTAL SIZE UNIT OPERATING IN THE AREA.

4. (U) THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY TROOPS WITHIN A MINIMUM OF THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF THE TARGETS AREAS. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NO KNOWN NON-COMBATANTS, HUTS, RELIGIOUS SHRINES OR NATIONAL MONUMENTS IN OR WITHIN ONE KILOMETER OF THE TARGET AREAS.

5. (S) EXPLOITATION: AT LEAST ONE INFANTRY BATTALION IS PLANNED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN EACH OF THE TARGET AREAS, AND WILL FURNISH GROUND B D A: A TOTAL OF SEVEN MANEUVER BATTALIONS, SIX FROM THE AMERICAL DIV AND THE 2D BN 5TH MARINES WILL BE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN, OR ADJACENT TO THE TARGET AREAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE STRIKES HERE REQUESTED.

6. (S) RECOMMENDED DATE AND TOT (COORDINATED WITH GROUND ATTACK PLANS):

PAGE FIVE RUMHIC 6257 S E C R E T

TARGET 1 - 060500H NOV 67

TARGET 2 - 060600H NOV 67

TARGET 3 - 060630H NOV 67

7. (C) DATE TARGETS WILL NO LONGER BE VALID: 060730H NOV 67

8. (U) REQUEST G2 I CORPS AND 5TH SFG FURNISH CLEARANCE STATEMENTS TO III MAF COC, ATTN: G3 AIR, ASAP

GP-4

BT

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CCN 023

FILLER 3

DTG 040330Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CTF 76

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CCN 026

FILLER 16

DTG 042025Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FM CG FMFPAC
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG NINTH MAB
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C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND BGEN GLICK FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. CMC 291441Z/OC167

B. BLT TWO SLANT THREE 030612Z NOV 67

1. FOR BOTH. THE REFERENCE SOUGHT TO PURSUE THE CIRCUMSTANCES RELATED TO A LETTER WRITTEN BY A LIEUTENANT. THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE SINCE BECOME PRETTY WELL KNOWN TO CMC, AND WILL BE ELABORATED AS A RESULT OF GENERAL CUSHMAN'S INITIAL EXPLORATION UNDERTAKEN AS A RESULT OF REF A.

2. FOR BGEN GLICK. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY PLAIN THAT THE PROBLEM MAY BE LESS ONE OF WHAT A LIEUTENANT DID THAN ONE OF UNIT INADEQUACIES, IN SUPPLY, TRAINING, LEADERSHIP, ETC. THIS IS PROPERLY YOUR BUSINESS, AND GENERAL CUSHMAN SHOULD NOT BE

PAGE 2 YNA 0683 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TAXED WITH IT. ACCORDINGLY, I AM DIRECTING YOU TO INVESTIGATE THE WHOLE SUBJECT IN DETAIL AND TO MAKE A MESSAGE REPORT ASAP, FOLLOWED BY A WRITTEN ONE. GIVE GENERAL CUSHMAN COPIES. I NOTE, INCIDENTALLY, FROM REF B, THAT YOU ARE FOLLOWING THIS COURSE ALREADY.
3. FOR GENERAL CUSHMAN. SUBMIT INFORMATION ON WHAT YOU HAVE LEARNED REGARDING LIEUTENANT CHERVENAK'S LETTER, IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A, AND IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE INVESTIGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE, SUPPLY, TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP MATTERS WILL BE PURSUED IN DETAIL BY GLICK.

4. BEST REGARDS TO BOTH.

GP-4

BT

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Masterful!

CCN 033

FILLER 16

DTG 060312Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG AIR	<i>Has Seen</i>
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DE RUHMFMA 0850 31003 12
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P 060312Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUCIHOA/CMC
INFO RUMMF/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE FROM LTGEN KRULAK
INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

SECTION 1 OF 3

A. CMC 022005Z/NOV67 (S)

1. AT THE OUTSET LET ME SAY THAT IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE
ECONOMIST CORRESPONDENT HAD HIS EAR GENEROUSLY
BENT BY U. S. ARMY OFFICERS. THE CUE TO THIS IS IN THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH WHICH AVERS THAT WESTMORELAND HAS "REJECTED THE ADVICE
OFFERED BY ARMY OFFICERS".

I AM SURE THAT THIS IS CORRECT. MY ARMY
COUNTERPART HERE, CG USARPAC, PINGS ON ME CONTINUALLY
WITH THE THEME THAT WE DO NOT BELONG WHERE
WE ARE IN THE DMZ AREA, BUT HE NEVER PRODUCES ANYTHING
DEFINITIVE AS AN ALTERNATIVE. I JUST REMIND HIM THAT WESTY IS IN
CHARGE.

PAGE 2 RUHMFMA 0850 SECRET SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O

2. BEFORE ADDRESSING THE SPECIFICS OF THE ECONOMIST
ARTICLE, LET ME TAKE THE GENERAL QUESTIONS AND
CRITICISMS WE HEAR CONCERNING OUR POSTURE IN THE DMZ
REGION, AND FACE UP TO THEM, ONE AT A TIME:

A. IT IS SOMETIMES CLAIMED THAT THE MARINES ARE IN
A DILEMMA OF THEIR OWN CONTRIVING, THAT THERE WAS NO
REASON TO GO TO THE DMZ IN THE FIRST PLACE; AND NOW THAT THEY
MUST EITHER SIT IMMOBILE AT GIO LINH AND CON THIEN AND
ABSORB HEAVY PUNISHMENT, OR THEY MUST PULL BACK AND
TAKE A SIGNIFICANT DEFEAT.

ACTUALLY, PRIOR TO THE OPERATION HASTINGS PERIOD,
IN JULY 1966, THERE WAS NO PRESSING MILITARY REQUIREMENT
FOR LARGE U. S. FORCES IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.
THE AREA WAS RELATIVELY QUIET, THE PROVINCE CAPITAL WAS
NOT ENDANGERED AND THE AVAILABLE ARVN FORCES WERE
ADEQUATE TO OUTPOST THE FRONTIER. HOWEVER, IN MAY OF
1966, MACV PERCEIVED AN NVN INVASION THREAT, AS RUMORS
OF THE APPEARANCE OF REGULAR NVA UNITS GREW. ULTIMATELY,
THE DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR MARINE AND ARVN FORCES INTO
NORTHERN QUANG TRI WAS TRIGGERED BY CONFIRMED

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHFMA 0850 SECRET SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O INTELLIGENCE THAT SOME 5,000 REGULAR TROOPS OF THE 324TH "B" NVA DIVISION HAD CROSSED THE DMZ INTO RVN. THE INTENSITY OF THE ENSUING OPERATIONS, HASTINGS AND PRAIRIE, WHERE THE ENEMY SUFFERED SOME 2,200 CONFIRMED AND 2,600 PROBABLE KILLED, DISPELLED ALL DOUBT OF THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS. IF LEFT UNOPPOSED, HE WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTROL OVER NORTHERN QUANG TRI, AND ITS CAPITAL CITY WOULD HAVE FALLEN INTO HIS HANDS. MACV'S PROMPT REACTION STEMMED THIS INVASION EFFORT BEFORE IT COULD BE CONSUMMATED, BUT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE ENEMY DID NOT INTEND TO RESPECT ANY RESTRICTION IMPOSED OR IMPLIED BY THE DMZ.

ALTHOUGH THE LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DECLINED DURING THE SUBSEQUENT RAINY SEASON, THE ENEMY RESUMED HIS PRESSURE UPON THE ADVENT OF THE 1967 DRY SEASON. HIS INITIAL THRUST WAS REPULSED, AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH, IN THE EAST CENTRAL DMZ AREA, NORTHWEST OF CAM LO. SUBSEQUENTLY, FRIENDLY SWEEPS ACROSS THE APPROACHES TO GIO LINH AND CON THIEN DURING EARLY APRIL ENCOUNTERED STIFF

PAGE 4 RUHFMA 0850 SECRET SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O RESISTANCE FROM POCKETS OF ENTRENCHED ENEMY. DURING THE LATTER PART OF APRIL, ATTENTION SHIFTED TO THE WEST, WHEN THE 325TH "C" DIVISION ADVANCED AGAINST KHE SANH FROM THE DIRECTION OF HILLS 861 AND 881. HIS LARGE EFFORT WAS DEFEATED BY A POWERFUL AIR-GROUND TEAM COUNTERATTACK.

IN EARLY MAY THE MAJOR ACTION SWITCHED TO THE EAST ONCE AGAIN, WHEN THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO OVERRUN THE OUTPOST AT CON THIEN, WAS REPULSED, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO ESTABLISH FORTIFIED POCKETS IN THE VICINITY IN AN EFFORT TO ISOLATE THE OUTPOST. OPERATION HICKORY, IN MID-MAY, OPENED ROUTE 561 NORTH FROM CAM LO AND TEMPORARILY CLEARED THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE EASTERN DMZ. WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM HICKORY, THE ENEMY MOVED BACK INTO THE DMZ, SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI, ESTABLISHED HEAVILY FORTIFIED AMBUSH POSITIONS AND PROCEEDED TO INVITE ATTACK. A SERIES OF SHARP GROUND ENCOUNTERS INVOLVING BATTALION-SIZE FORCES HAVE SINCE OCCURRED AROUND CON THIEN, THE MOST NOTABLE BEING DURING EARLY JULY AND THE FIRST

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PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 0850 S E C R E T
THREE WEEKS OF SEPTEMBER. THESE ENGAGEMENTS IN THE DMZ
AREA SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 1967 DRY SEASON HAVE
COST THE ENEMY SOME 4,100 CONFIRMED AND 4,300 PROBABLE
KIA PLUS OVER 2,000 KIA CLAIMED BY THE ARVN.

IN SUMMARY, IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR FORCES WERE INITIALLY
ORDERED INTO THE AREA BY COMUSMACV TO STEM A MAJOR
INVASION. FURTHERMORE, AND DESPITE HIS LOSSES OF THE
PAST TWO SUMMERS, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT
THE ENEMY INTENDS TO PERSIST IN MAINTAINING THIS THREAT
OF INVASION WITH REGULAR NVA UNITS.

B. WHY ARE THE MARINES STAYING IN THE DMZ AREA?--
WE REMAIN THERE BECAUSE WE ARE CARRYING OUT OUR ORDERS.
FIRST, AS NOTED ABOVE, WE ARE THERE TO GUARD AGAINST THE
ENEMY OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY EMBODIED IN HIS REGULAR ARMY
FORCES POISED NORTH OF THE BEN HAI.

SECOND, WE ARE THERE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF
A MAJOR ANTI-INFILTRATION PLAN. THE DANGER OF UNDETEC-
TED AND UNIMPEDED INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH HAS
BEEN RECOGNIZED FOR SOME TIME. THE JASON PLAN WAS
CONCEIVED TO COUNTER THIS CAPABILITY. MACV'S RESPON-

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 0850 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O
SIVE DYE MARKER PLAN IS DESIGNED TO COVER THE MOST
ACCESSIBLE AVENUES OF APPROACH FROM THE NORTH. IN
DEVELOPING THIS PLAN, MACV STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR A
ONE-AND-ONE-THIRD DIVISION MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE TO
EXECUTE THE PLAN, ABOVE AND BEYOND THE EXISTING ASSETS
OF III MAF. THIS FORCE WAS NOT PROVIDED FROM OUT-OF-
COUNTRY RESOURCES, OR FROM ELSEWHERE IN RVN, AND THE
MARINES HAVE BEEN TASKED BY COMUSMACV TO EXECUTE
DYE MARKER.

MACV'S DYE MARKER PLAN IS EXPLICIT IN LAYING OUT THE
PRECISE LOCATIONS AND NATURE OF THE STRONG POINTS, THE
OBSTACLE SYSTEM AND THE SUPPORTING COMBAT BASES WHICH
FORM THE MATRIX OF THE CONCEPT. THE MACV PLAN IS TIED
TO SPECIFIC TERRAIN LOCALITIES, SUCH AS CON THIEN, AND
SPECIFIES FORCES TO BE EMPLOYED. THE SELECTED POSITIONS
ARE LOCATED PROXIMATE TO THE DMZ, AND THE FORCES
INVOLVED ARE MARINES.

C. WHY SPECIFICALLY CON THIEN?--FIRST, BECAUSE
THE HILL HAPPENS TO BE THE BEST OBSERVATION PLATFORM IN
THE AREA. WE HAVE UNITS ON IT BECAUSE OF
BT

PAGE 3 OF 9 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE FROM LTGEN KRULAK
INFO LTGEN CUSHMANMARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 2 OF 3
THE UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW IT AFFORDS US INTO NORTH VIETNAM,
WHENCE WE CAN DETECT AND OBSERVE ENEMY MOVEMENT
AND COORDINATE THE OPERATIONS OF OUR SUPPORTING ARMS.
IN ENEMY HANDS IT WOULD PROVIDE THEM OBSERVATION
ALMOST TO THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL.

SECOND, BECAUSE CON THIEN IS THE LOCATION OF A
MAJOR STRONG POINT IN THE MACV DYE MARKER SYSTEM. IN
SELECTING THIS POINT, MACV AND III MAF PERCEIVED THAT THE
SYSTEM WILL BE ONLY SO GOOD AS THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS,
ARTILLERY POSITIONS, AND AIR SUPPORT THAT COVER IT. CON THIEN
PROVIDES A GOOD LOCATION FOR THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL
OF THOSE MEANS UPON WHICH ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
OBSTACLE SYSTEM IN THIS VITAL AREA DEPENDS.

PAGE 2 RUHFMMA 0852 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
IN EITHER CASE, THERE IS NO EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT
TO CON THIEN. IT HAS MILITARY VALUE IN OUR HANDS,
WHICH COULD BE TURNED AGAINST US IN THE HANDS OF THE
ENEMY. BUT IF A TACTICAL LOCALITY SUPERIOR TO IT
EXISTED IN THE AREA, WE WOULD BE THERE, AND NOT AT CON
THIEN.

D. BUT WHY NOT BACK OFF TO POSITIONS FARTHER SOUTH,
OUT OF ARTILLERY RANGE FROM THE DMZ, AND CUT UP ANY
ENEMY WHO VENTURES INTO THE REGION BY MOBILE OPERATIONS?--THE
ANSWER IS PLAIN. ROUTE 9 IS REGARDED BY COMUSMACV AS AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF HIS STRATEGY IN NORTHERN RVN.
THAT ROAD CANNOT BE SECURED WITHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT
OF SUBSTANTIAL FORCES NORTH OF IT. IF THE ROUTE 9
CONCEPT WAS ABANDONED, OR IF A NEW ROUTE 9 TRACE WERE
BUILT FARTHER SOUTH, THEN WE COULD AFFORD TO MOVE
SOUTHWARD; BUT ONLY IF IT WERE DETERMINED ALSO TO
MOVE THE DYE MARKER TRACE SOUTHWARD TOO. AS TO MOBILE
OPERATIONS, WE ARE PROSECUTING THESE NOW, TO THE
EXTENT THAT THE TERRAIN WILL PERMIT.

3. SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON REFERENCE A ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PAGE 4 OF 9 SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 0852 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

A. THE AUTHOR ASKS "IS THE DMZ WORTH FIGHTING FOR?" THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND THINKS IT IS. SECDEF, THROUGH THE JCS, DIRECTED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DYE MARKER. COMUSMACV ON 26 JAN 1967 ISSUED THE MACV PRACTICE NINE REQUIREMENTS PLAN WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONG POINT AND OBSTACLE SYSTEM IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WEST TO THE VICINITY OF DONG HA MOUNTAIN, BY 1 NOV 1967, TO IMPEDE INFILTRATION AND TO DETECT INVASION. IN THE EXECUTION OF THE MACV MISSION AS STATED ABOVE, III MAF WAS TASKED, IN COORDINATION WITH CG I CORPS, TO BE PREPARED WITH US/FREE WORLD AUGMENTATION FORCES, TO CONSTRUCT AND MAN A STRONG POINT AND OBSTACLE SYSTEM; AND TO CONDUCT ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ. THE CONCEPT SPECIFIED THAT A SERIES OF STRONG POINTS AND FORTIFIED BASE AREAS WOULD BE CONSTRUCTED IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE NEAR THE DMZ BY TACTICAL TROOPS. SIX STRONG POINTS WERE TO BE CONSTRUCTED (OF WHICH CON THIEN WAS INCLUDED AS A-4) AND FOUR OF

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 0852 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

THESE (INCLUDING CON THIEN) WOULD BE MANNED BY ADDITIVE U. S. FORCES. IN ADDITION A SERIES OF BARBED WIRE AND MINEFIELD OBSTACLES WOULD BE CONSTRUCTED FORWARD OF THE STRONG POINTS.

B. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS VIRTUALLY STAKING HIS REPUTATION ON HOLDING CON THIEN ...". THE FACTS ARE THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS ONLY TAKING PRUDENT STEPS TO FORESTALL INVASION, WHILE CARRYING OUT HIS ORDERS TO CONSTRUCT AND MAN THE DYE MARKER SYSTEM, OF WHICH CON THIEN IS A PART. HIS REPUTATION IS NO MORE AT STAKE THAN THAT OF HIS SUPERIORS.

C. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...OPINION IS DIVIDED...". DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AMONG MILITARY MEN ARE NOT UNUSUAL. BUT THE POINT HERE IS THAT ORDERS REGARDING THE MARINE PRESENCE IN THE DMZ HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY THOSE IN AUTHORITY, BASED ON EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE DMZ AREA, AND THE MARINES ARE THERE AND ARE CARRYING THEM OUT.

D. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...THE MARINES POSITION AT CON THIEN IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE...". THE

PAGE 5 OF 9 PAGES

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SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 0852 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 REVERSE IS ACTUALLY TRUE. THE LONGER WE ARE THERE, THE
 STRONGER THE POSITION GETS IT IS BEING IMPROVED AND
 STRENGTHENED CONSTANTLY.

E. THE AUTHOR SAYS "THEY HAD ROOM TO MANEUVER
 ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO BEFORE THE HEAVY SHELLING BEGAN,
 BUT NOT NOW." NEITHER HAS CON THIEN
 MOVED NOR HAS THE LINE OF THE PMDL DRAWN ALONG
 THE BEN HAI. THE SAME AMOUNT OF TERRAIN IS THERE
 NOW AS WAS THERE TWO MONTHS AGO, AND THERE ARE
 FEWER ENEMY IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY, AS A RESULT OF OUR
 MANEUVER AND FIRE SUPPORT.

F. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...ONLY ONE SUPPLY CONVOY HAS
 BEEN ABLE TO GET THROUGH BY ROAD DURING THE PAST
 THREE-AND-ONE-HALF WEEKS." THE FACTS ARE THAT THE
 FOLLOWING RESUPPLY CONVOYS TRAVELLED BY ROAD TO AND
 FROM CON THIEN ON THE DATES INDICATED, JUST PRIOR TO
 PUBLICATION OF THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION:

14 OCT 67	25 TRUCKS
17 OCT 67	24 TRUCKS
20 OCT 67	20 TRUCKS

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 0852 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

21 OCT 67	4 LOWBOYS, 6 TRUCKS, 2 LVT'S
22 OCT 67	9 TRUCKS, 1 LOWBOY
23 OCT 67	4 TRUCKS
25 OCT 67	18 TRUCKS

PRESENTLY THE ROAD TO CON THIEN IS OPEN, 30 PERCENT OF
 IT IS BLACK TOP, THE REMAINDER IS CRUSHED ROCK. IT IS
 IN DAILY USE, DESPITE SERIOUS PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE
 WEATHER.

G. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...HELICOPTERS CAN NO LONGER
 LIFT OFF STRAIGHT INTO THE AIR..." HELICOPTERS NORMALLY
 DO NOT LIFT OFF STRAIGHT INTO THE AIR, SINCE THAT
 MANEUVER REQUIRES MAXIMUM POWER AND IS NOT AS SAFE AS
 GAINING HORIZONTAL SPEED WHILE IN GROUND EFFECT.
 THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN SAFETY RELATED TO FORWARD OR LATERAL
 MOVEMENT--THE AIRCRAFT IS DIPPED IN EITHER CASE IN THE DIRECTION
 OF FLIGHT. MOREOVER, "CRABBING SIDWAYS" IS NOT PECULIAR
 TO CON THIEN; IT IS PRACTICED IN ANY SITUATION WHERE
 THIS METHOD AVOIDS TERRAIN MASKS OR TAKES ADVANTAGE OF
 DEFILADE.

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PAGE 6 OF 2 PAGES

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#61

SECRET

PP RUMHMF RUCIHOA
 DE RUMHFMA 0853 3100312
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 060312Z NOV 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE FROM LTGEN KRULAK
 INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 FINAL SECTION OF 3

H. THE AUTHOR SAYS "DURING THE DRY SEASON THE MARINES CHOSE NOT TO DIG IN PROPERLY...". THE MARINE FIRST MOVED ONTO CON THIEN IN STRENGTH AT THE OUTSET OF OPERATION HICKORY, UNDER FIRE. GIVEN THIS SITUATION, DIGGING IN IS LESS THAN A SLOW DELIBERATE PROCESS AND "SHALLOW SAND BAGGED DUGOUTS" WERE ALL THAT WERE ATTAINABLE. SINCE THEN THE POSITION HAS BEEN CONSTANTLY IMPROVED, BUT NOT ON AN AROUND-THE-CLOCK, ALL HANDS BASIS. THE MARINES ON CON THIEN DO NOT SIT ON THE HILL AND DIG, TO THE EXCLUSION OF EVERYTHING ELSE. THEY ARE CONSTANTLY PATROLLING, SETTING AMBUSHES, CONDUCTING SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY

PAGE 2 RUMHFMA 0853 SECRET SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O
 SWEEPS BOTH AROUND CON THIEN AND AT CONSIDERABLE DISTANCES FROM IT.

I. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEGUN TO USE LETHAL AIR BURST SHELLS AIMED AT THE MEN STILL VISIBLE ON THE GROUND." A FEW ISOLATED INSTANCES OF EITHER PROXIMITY FUZED OR TIME FUZED ENEMY ARTILLERY ROUNDS HAVE BEEN REPORTED. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEATHS REPORTED DUE TO THIS FIRE. SO FAR, THE OVERHEAD COVER ON THE POSITIONS AT CON THIEN HAS PROVIDED PROTECTION AGAINST SUCH ATTACKS.

J. THE AUTHOR SAYS "COUNTERATTACKS (WHETHER BY SHELING OR BOMBING) HAVE KILLED MORE MARINES THAN ENEMY TROOPS." THE FACTS ARE THAT ON 13 OCTOBER ELEMENTS OF 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES ON CON THIEN WERE HIT ACCIDENTALLY BY TWO 500 POUND BOMBS FROM OUR OWN AIRCRAFT ON A RADAR BOMBING MISSION. TWO MARINES WERE KILLED, 21 WERE WOUNDED. THE ONLY COUNTERATTACK CONDUCTED AT CON THIEN WAS ON 8 MAY 1967 WHEN AN ENEMY REGIMENT ATTACKED CON THIEN, PENETRATING THE PERIMETER. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES DURING THE

PAGE 2 OF 9 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUHKFMA 0853 S E C R E T SPECT EXCL FOR M C E O
 COUNTERATTACK WERE 36 MARINES KIA AND 5 NAVY WIA; FIVE USA
 WERE WIA AND 14 CIDG WERE KIA. 179 NVA SOLDIERS WERE KILLED,
 CONFIRMED, 100 WEAPONS WERE CAPTURED, AND TEN NVA SOLDIERS
 WERE TAKEN PRISONER.

K. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...ALL THE MARINE COMMANDERS,
 AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND HIMSELF, SEEM CONVINCED
 THAT BOTH THE REPUTATION OF THE MARINES AND THE FATE
 OF THE WHOLE AMERICAN EFFORT IN VIETNAM MAY BE AT
 STAKE...THEY ARGUE THAT THE EVACUATION OF CON THIEN
 WOULD THREATEN THE MARINE SUPPLY BASE AT DONG HA.
 IF THESE WERE TO FALL...HUE WOULD BE THREATENED."

ACTUALLY, THE FATE OF THE WHOLE AMERICAN EFFORT IN
 VIETNAM NO MORE HINGES ON CON THIEN AND GIO LINH
 THAN IT DOES ON A SCORE OF OTHER CRITICAL REGIONS. ON
 THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO ARGUMENT THAT THE LOSS OF
 CON THIEN AND GIO LINH WOULD PLACE DONG HA IN
 JEOPARDY.

L. THE AUTHOR SAYS THAT CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS
 CLAIMED "...THE DEFEAT OF THE MARINES AROUND THE DMZ
 WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE CAPTURE OF THE FIVE NORTHERN

PAGE 4 RUHKFMA 0853 S E C R E T SPECT EXCL FOR M C E O
 PROVINCES...". THIS ENEMY VIEW IS WELL SUBSTANTIATED,
 AND THAT IS PRECISELY WHY WE ARE IN THE DMZ AREA TODAY.
 AND THE SAME UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION WOULD OBTAIN
 IF WE WERE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA VOLUNTARILY.

M. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...THE MARINES HAVE FALLEN
 INTO A TRAP OF THEIR OWN MAKING. THIS IS NOT TRUE.
 OUR SITUATION IS NOT AN ENTRAPMENT, NOR IS IT OF OUR
 OWN MAKING. PARAGRAPH 2.A. ABOVE DISCUSSES THIS POINT.

N. THE AUTHOR SAYS "THEY ALSO SAY THE WHOLE OF THE
 DMZ SHOULD BE A FREE FIRE ZONE." THE WHOLE OF THE DMZ
 IS A FREE FIRE ZONE NOW. IT WAS CLEARED OF ALL CIVILIANS
 FROM SOUTH OF THE PMDL TO ABOUT 1,500 METERS SOUTH
 OF THE PRESENT DYE MARKER TRACE DURING OPERATIONS
 NICKORY, BEAU CHARGER, BELT TIGHT, AND LAM SON 54,
 WHICH HAD THIS TASK AS A MAINT OBJECTIVE.

O. THE AUTHOR SAYS "THE SITUATION MAY GET WORSE...
 THE NVA IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN ITS ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT
 OF CON THIEN WHILE SENDING OUT...FORCES OF 500 TO 1,000
 MEN TO WITHIN SMALL ARMS DISTANCE OF THE MARINE
 POSITIONS." SHOULD SUCH A SITUATION COME TO PASS IT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUHNFMA 0853 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O WOULD BE WORSE FOR THE ENEMY. THE MARINES WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO DESTROY HIS MASSES FORCES. WE HAVE MANEUVER ELEMENTS AVAILABLE IN THE AREA TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE CAPABILITIES.

P. THE AUTHOR STATES "THIS MAJOR ASSAULT WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND HALF OF NOVEMBER...". THIS MAY TURN OUT TO BE CORRECT. HOWEVER, IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE MONSOON IS A GREATER HINDRANCE TO THE ENEMY THAN TO US. THE HEAVY SEPTEMBER RAINS DROVE HIM FROM HIS FLOODED POSITIONS, STOPPED HIS RESUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT EFFORTS ACROSS THE BEN HAI, AND SET THE STAGE FOR A GENERAL ENEMY STAND DOWN WHICH HAS PERSISTED FOR A MONTH, AND MAY EXTEND TO THE BEGINNING OF THE DRY SEASON.

Q. THE AUTHOR SPEAKS OF THE "WIDESPREAD CRITICISM" OF THE MARINES "INFLEXIBLE METHODS".--HE DOES NOT OPENLY IDENTIFY THE CRITICS, NOR DOES HE DETAIL THE CRITICISM; HOWEVER, IT HAS NO JUSTIFICATION. THE MARINES HAVE UTILIZED THE FULL ARRAY OF COMBATANT

PAGE 6 RUHNFMA 0853 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O TECHNIQUES IN THE DMZ BATTLE;-LARGE AND SMALL UNIT EFFORTS, NIGHT OPERATIONS, HELIBORNE OPERATIONS, AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, RADAR CONTROLLED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CLOSE TACTICAL COORDINATION THROUGHOUT WITH THE ARVN.

R. THE AUTHOR STATES "THE DMZ IS NOT A POPULAR AREA...". THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT APPEAR TO HOLD THIS VIEW. THEIR DESIRE TO SECURE ALL OR PART OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES IS WELL DOCUMENTED; AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THEIR GAINING SUCH AN OBJECTIVE IS PATENT.

S. THE AUTHOR SAYS "...THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT HANOI'S RULERS NOW GENUINELY FEAR...INVASION". THEY DO, AND THE PROXIMITY OF OUR FORCES TO THE DMZ FERTILIZES THIS FEAR, TO OUR BENEFIT AND TO THE ENEMY'S DISCOMFITURE.

4BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 9 OF 9 PAGES

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CCN 034

FILLER 16

DTG 060744Z MONTH NOVEMBER 67

ORIGINATOR CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

CG

DCC

DCC AIR

C/S

D C/S

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FOR

CATEGORY _____

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#62

SECRET

PP RUMHMF
DE RUMFUAD 025A 3100744
ZNY SSSSS
P 060744Z NOV 67
FM CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

FOR LIGEN CUSHMAN FROM RADM COMBS
NGFS (U)

FOR

- A. CTG 70.8 030755Z OCT 67 (PASEP)
- B. CTU 70.8.9 051344Z OCT 67

1. FROM TIME TO TIME I NOTE IN DISPATCHES REFERENCE TO A RANGE LIMITATION OF 18,000 YDS IMPOSED ON NGFS SHIPS IN THE I CORPS. IT IS IMPLIED THAT THESE LIMITATIONS ARE DUE TO ENEMY REACTION FROM CD SITES ON CAP LAY, AND THAT AS A RESULT THERE HAS BEEN A DIMINUTION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.
2. AM CONCERNED FOR SUCH IS NOT THE CASE. THE POLICY REMAINS THAT SHIPS WILL NOT STEAM CLOSER THAN 12,000 YDS FROM CAP LAY EXCEPT WHEN RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY MISSION. UNDER SUCH EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANTIONS NO RANGE RESTRICTIONS ARE SET.
3. BELIEVE THAT POSSIBLY REF A AND REF B MAY NOT HAVE BEEN UNDERSTOOD BY SOME. THE ACTION PRESCRIBED THEREIN WAS DESIGNED

PAGE 2 RUMFUAD 025A SECRET

TO PERMIT CONTINUED CLOSE SUPPORT IN SPITE OF THE INCREASED ACTIVITY OF CAP LAY BATTERIES. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE 18,000 YD RESTRICTION APPLIES ONLY WHEN NOT REPEAT NOT FIRING A NGFS MISSION. IT IS DIRECTED THAT SUPPRESSION FIRE BE USED ON THE CD BATTERIES WHEN THE SHIP IS CLOSER THAN 18,000 YDS IN DAYLIGHT OR 12,000 YDS AT NIGHT. THERE ARE NO RESTRICTION ON CLOSING TO 12,000 FOR NGFS OR TO LESS THAN 12,000 YDS FOR EMERGENCY MISSIONS.

4. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS POLICY OF UTILIZING SUPPRESSION FIRE IS INDICATED BY THE FACT THAT NO NGFS SHIP HAS BEEN FIRED UPON BY CAP LAY CD BATTERIES SINCE ITS IMPLLEMENTATION.

5. AS ALWAYS WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE MARINES TO THE UTMOST.

6. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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Dept 9 air CG 16*

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DTG 072023Z MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR ADMNO FMFPAC *o*

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EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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 O 072023Z NOV 67
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 TO RUMSDN/CG III MAF
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~~TOP SECRET. EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 NGEN THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.~~

~~1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO CINCPACFLT
 APPROVED BY GEN KRULAK ON HUE-PHU BAI (V-1) AIRFIELDS:
 QUOTE:~~

~~A. COMUSMACV 221304Z/OCT67 (TS)~~

~~B. STAFF STUDY ON ALTERNATIVE TO BUILDING A JET
 CAPABLE AIRFIELD AT HUE-PHU BAI DTD 24OCT 1967,
 (MACV 0013398-67)~~

~~1. IN REF A COMUSMACV PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A
 JET CAPABLE FIELD IN THE HUE PHU BAI AREA TO RELIEVE
 SPACE AT CHU LAI WHERE AIR FORCE UNITS COULD BE DE-
 PLOYED. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT A
 DETERMINATION WAS BEING MADE AS TO THE FEASIBILITY
 OF INSTALLING A MARINE SATS AS A POSSIBLE QUICK-FIX,
 SOLUTION.~~

~~2. CINCPAC HAS PROVIDED THIS HEADQUARTERS A COPY~~

~~PAGE 2 RUHKM 1095 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 OF REF B WHICH LISTS ALTERNATIVES TO BUILDING A JET
 CAPABLE AIRFIELD AT HUE-PHU BAI (V-1). THE STUDY
 CONCLUDES THAT WITH THE EXPANSION OF PHU CAT. PHAN
 RANG, TUY HOA AND CAM RANH BAY, FIVE ADDITIONAL
 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS AND AIRLIFT CAN BE BED-
 DED DOWN ON EXISTING USAF BASES IN SVN. HOWEVER, IT
 FURTHER CONCLUDES THAT AIRCRAFT DISPERSAL, REACTION
 TIME, TIME ON TARGET, OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY, SUP-
 PORT OF ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEM, PROVISIONS FOR
 FUTURE INCREASES IN AIR OPERATIONS, REDUCTION OF
 TRAFFIC DENSITY AND SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS
 WOULD ALL BENEFIT FROM AN ADDITIONAL JET CAPABLE
 AIRFIELD IN THE HUE-PHU BAI AREA, AND AGAIN RECOM-
 MENDS CONSTRUCTION OF THAT AIRFIELD.~~

~~3. AT THE OUTSET IT IS AFFIRMED THAT FMFPAC IS FULLY
 CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING A SATS IN THE HUE-PHU BAI
 AREA, IF REQUIRED. IF THE NECESSARY RESOURCES ARE
 MADE AVAILABLE, A TRUE SATS CAN BE CONSTRUCTED
 QUICKLY. NO MAJOR REAL ESTATE PROBLEMS ARE FOR-
 SEEN AT V-1 OR VINK XUAN SITES. THIS WILL CONSIST OF~~

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 8100/4

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TOP SECRET

#38

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMKM 1095 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR
AN EXPEDITORY RUNWAY, CATAPULT, PARKING FOR
THREE A-4 SQUADRONS, AND MINIMUM EXPEDITORY
FACILITIES.

4. THE SATS IS DESIGNED FOR A TEMPORARY OPERATIONAL
AIRFIELD UNDER AUSTERE CONDITIONS. IF THE NEW SITE
IS INTENDED TO BE OPERATIONAL FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD,
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO REPLACING THE EXPED-
ITORY FACILITIES. THE FOLLOWING WOULD BE REQUIRED:

- A. CANTONMENTS
- B. ADDITIONAL MATTING FOR EXTENDING THE RUNWAYS,
TAXIWAYS, AND PARKING AREAS.
- C. POWER AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
- D. REVETMENTS
- E. MAINTENANCE AND STORAGE FACILITIES
- F. ROADS AND PARKING

5. AN INITIAL SATS GRADUALLY EXPANDED TO A SEMI-
PERMANENT AIRFIELD COULD RESULT ULTIMATELY IN
GREATER COST THAN BUILDING A PERMANENT AIRFIELD
FROM THE START. IT RETAINS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING
A QUICK FIX BUT, IN THE LONG TERM LOSES ITS BARGAIN

PAGE 4 RUMKM 1095 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
BASEMENT APPEAL.

6. THE MOVE OF 3 MARINE A-4 SQUADRONS NORTH REDUCES
FLIGHT TIME TO TARGETS IN NORTHERN ICTZ AND DISPERSAL OF
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING DIS-
ADVANTAGES ALSO ACCRUE:

A. CATAPULT AND ARRESTING OPERATIONS INCREASE
LAUNCHING AND LANDING INTERVALS, THUS OFFSETTING
IN PART THE REDUCTION IN FLIGHT TIME TO THE TARGET.

B. A NEW BASE WILL REQUIRE COMMITMENT OF ABOUT
TWO BATTALIONS FOR SECURITY.

C. MINIMUM CONSTRUCTION AND ROAD BUILDING WILL
REQUIRE DIVERSION OF ALREADY SHORT ENGINEER ASSETS.

7. IN SUMMARY, UNLESS THERE IS AN OVERRIDING OPER-
ATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELOCATION OF
THREE MARINE SQUADRONS, THE COST THE ADDITIONAL
PERSONNEL REQUIRED, AND THE DEGRADATION OF CURRENT
AND SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEER PROJECTS
ALL COMBINE TO MAKE THE UNDERTAKING UNPROFITABLE
AT THE PRESENT TIME. HOWEVER, SHOULD A GENUINE
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT EXIST, A MARINE SATS CAN

PAGE 5 RUMKM 1095 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
BE CONSTRUCTED QUICKLY.

UNQUOTE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CCN 053

FILLER 25

DTG 090257Z MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
Dep CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>
Dep C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>
Dep CG Air	<i>[Signature]</i>

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#63

SECRET/NOFORN

MFB061KCA911TTZVA 608

VV MAB787

PP RUMHMF

DE RUMSAW 1378L 3130325

ZNY SSSSS

P 090257Z NOV 67

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMHMF/CG IIIMAF DANANG

RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH

RUMSMT/SA USAAG IV CTZ CAN TWO

RUMSVA/DCG USARV LONG BINH

ZEN/COMNAVFORV

ZEN/CDR 7AF SAIGON

RUMNGR/CO 5TH SFG NAX TRANG

BT

SECRET NOFORN LINDIS 36743 FOR PALMER
MOMYER, CUSHMAN, ROSSON, WEYAND, VETH, DESORBRY, AND LADD FROM
WESTMORELAND.

SUBJ: IMPROVING THE IMAGE OF ARVN AMONG THE US PUBLICJ(U)
1. (S) AT A RECENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON, THE MAJOR SUBJECT
OF DISCUSSION CONCERNED THE DETERIORATING PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE
US FOR THE VIETNAMESE WAR. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS CONSIDERED WAS THE
FACT THAT MANY AMERICANS BELIEVE THE ARVN IS NOT CARRYING ITS
FAIR SHARE OF THE COMBAT EFFORT. ADDITIONALLY, MANY BELIEVE THAT

NO FORN
LINDIS
FOR

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 1378L S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS
 THE BULK OF VIETNAMESE COMBAT CASUALTIES ARE BORNE BY THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES RATHER THAN THE ARVN. THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT A SERIOUS PROBLEM EXISTS WITH AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION; NAMELY, HOW TO ACHIEVE A SITUATION WHEREIN THE ARVN IS VISIBLY CARRYING A GREATER SHARE OF COMBAT OPERATIONS.

2. (C) MUCH OF THIS PROBLEM ARISES FROM PRESS REPORTS AND COMMENTS OF VISITORS TO VIETNAM WHICH DEROGATE THE WILLINGNESS AND CAPABILITY OF THE ARVN TO FIGHT. SOME PRESS REPORTS CITE COMMENTS TO THAT EFFECT BY UNNAMED AMERICAN MILITARY MEN.

3. (C) I AM UNDERTAKING SEVERAL ACTIONS WHICH I HOPE WILL ASSIST IN CORRECTING THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT ARVN WILL NOT FIGHT. AMONG THESE ARE: (A) DISCUSS WITH GEN VIENTH THE NECESSITY OF EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAMS TO PRESENT ARVN'S SIDE OF THE STORY IN A FACTUAL AND FAVORABLE LIGHT. INCLUDED IN THIS APPROACH IS THE REQUIREMENT THAT ARVN COMMANDERS MEET WITH THE PRESS AND FACILITATE VISITS BY NEWSMEN TO THEIR AREAS. (B) HAVE THE INFORMATION ADVISORY EFFORT EXPLORE ALL METHODS OF ACTIVELY ASSISTING THE RVNAF INFORMATION EFFORTS. IN THIS REGARD I PROPOSE TO PUT INFORMATION ADVISORS WITH ALL ARVN DIVISION ADVISORY GROUPS. (C) TOGETHER WITH JUSPAO, DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF

PAGE 3 RUMSAW 1378L S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS
 CONDUCTING JOINT US/VIETNAMESE DAILY PRESS BRIEFINGS FOR CORRESPONDENTS. (D) OBTAIN MORE BALANCED NEWS COVERAGE ON AFRTV AND IN STARS AND STRIPES WHICH WILL HIGHLIGHT VIETNAMESE COMBAT ACTIONS. (E) NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS BY MYSELF, GEN ABRAMS, AND OTHER KEY MEMBERS OF THE MACV STAFF WITH NEWSMAN AND INFLUENTIAL VISITORS TO THE COMMAND IN WHICH WE EMPHASIZE ARVN ACHIEVEMENTS AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE BRING OUT (1) THE DISPARITY BETWEEN US AND ARVN UNITS IN STRENGTH, ARMAMENT, MOBILITY AND FIRE SUPPORT AND (2) THE IMPRESSIVE RECORD OF ARVN COMBAT SUCCESSES SINCE JANUARY, HIGHLIGHTING THOSE OF THE RECENT PAST.

4. (C) AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE ABOVE ACTIONS, I DESIRE THAT ALL US COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS REVIEW AND ADHERE TO MACV DIRECTIVE 550-3, 23 JANUARY 1967, WHICH DEALS WITH PUBLIC AWARENESS OF RVNAF OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

5. (C) I EXPECT EVERY ECHELON OF COMMAND TO BE ALERT TO SITUATIONS THAT WILL IMPROVE THE RVNAF IMAGE. I CERTAINLY DO NOT WISH TO DECIEVE, BUT DO WANT TO INSURE THAT THE PUBLICITY GIVEN RVNAF TREATS THEM FAIRLY AND PUTS THEM IN THE FAVORABLE LIGHT THEY DESERVE. WE MUST, HOWEVER, TAKE CARE NOT TO OVERDO IT. THE PRESS ALREADY IS SKEPTICAL OF CLAIMS MADE BY ADVISORY

PAGE 4 RUMSAW 1378L S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS
 PERSONNEL, BECAUSE OF OUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF RVNAF. WE MUST BE ABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE ANY STATEMENTS MADE.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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Handwritten notes:
C/S
DCG
DCG FILLER 16
DCG AIR Has Seen

CCN 058

DTG 100553Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

EXCLUSIVE

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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMHLA 1128 3140553
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 100553Z NOV 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDV REIN
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN, FROM BGEN LAHUE.
 IN RESPONSE TO YOUR 090536Z, 1ST MARDIV IS IN THE PROCESS OF
 REEVALUATION OF ALL FIXED POSITIONS. I HAVE DIRECTED THE REMOVAL
 OF THE PLATOON POSITION IN THE WESTERN PART OF 3/7 TAOR WHICH
 WAS ATTACKED ON THE MORNING OF 2 NOVEMBER. THE FEW REMAINING
 COMPANY POSITIONS ARE BEING CAREFULLY EVALUATED IN TERMS OF
 DEFINITIVE REQUIREMENTS. CONTINUOUS FIELD OPERATIONS BY A
 MINIMUM OF 75 PERCENT OF OUR INEANTRY ELEMENTS ARE AND WILL BE
 ACHIEVED WITH EMPHASIS UPON OFFENSIVE AND NIGHT OPERATIONS. WHILE
 WE ARE TIED BY OUR MISSION AND RELATED TASKS TO THE SECURITY OF FIXED
 INSTALLATIONS, OUR AIM IS TO PROVIDE THAT SECURITY INSOFAR AS
 POSSIBLE BY MOBILE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS RATHER THAN FROM STATIC
 DEFENSIVE BASES.

GP-4
 BT

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#64

CB
ops *Q*

Dep CG
D ELLER *W*
BTZ *16*

CCN 059

DTG 100854Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE

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DE YNA 1683 3140854
ZNY SSSSS
O 100854Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
DD KN/CG FIRST MAW

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE

BT
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO
MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2

- A. CG III MAF 090626Z/NOV67 (S)
- B. 7AF TSN AB RVN 061225Z/JUL67 (S)
- 1. HERE ARE MY THOUGHTS ON PARA 1. OF REF A.
 - A. I AGREE WITH KERWIN, AND AM NOT SURPRISED AT BLOODS' RESPONSE. HE GOES BEYOND STRETCHING A POINT, TO ASSOCIATE THE LOCATION OF A LINE ON THE GROUND WITH SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR. AS I SEE IT, YOUR NEED IS SIMPLE; FREEDOM TO REACT IN A MINIMUM OF TIME WITH ALL THREE SUPPORTING ARMS.
 - B. FROM DISCUSSIONS WHICH OUR RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATIVES HAD WITH REPS FROM THE 7TH FLEET AND

PAGE 2 YNA 1683 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
7AF AT YOKOSUKA LAST WEEK RELATING TO CAP LAY, IT
IS APPARENT THAT THE AIR FORCE IS FEARFUL OF ESTAB-
LISHING A PRECEDENT IN RELINQUISHING CONTROL OF
EVEN A SMALL PART OF THEIR AREA FOR A LIMITED TIME.
IT WAS EQUALLY APPARENT THAT THE AIR FORCE ABCC
DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COORDINATE EFFECT-
IVELY THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR/NGF/ARTY ON ANY EX-
CEPT A PRE-PLANNED BASIS.

C. BY ESTABLISHING A FBL AT THE MAXIMUM RANGE
OF THE 130MM GUN FROM CON THIEN, I SEE YOU ASKING
ONLY FOR THE ABILITY TO REPLY WITH FIRE, ON YOUR
OWN INITIATIVE WHEN TARGETS APPEAR.
AIR FORCE OBJECTIONS TO THIS PROPOSAL
PROBABLY CENTER ON TWO POINTS;
I.E., THE USE OF THE WORD "CONTROL" AND THE SAFETY
OF THEIR OWN AIRCRAFT. THE USE OF THE TERM "CONTROL"
IN DESCRIBING THE EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS IN
THE AREA SMACKS OF COMMAND, IS THEREFORE OBJECT-
IONABLE TO THEM. WHAT YOU REALLY WANT IS RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR COORDINATION, AS DEFINED IN ACCEPTED

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PAGE 3 YNA 1683 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE. YOU WANT THE ABILITY,
THROUGH THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION FACILITIES
AND COMMUNICATIONS ESTABLISHED AT DONG HA, TO
COORDINATE FIRES TO ENSURE OPTIMUM EFFECTIVENESS,
AND TO PROVIDE SAFETY TO AIRCRAFT FROM THE FIRES
OF ARTILLERY OR NGF. THE AIR FORCE WOULD CONTINUE
TO "CONTROL" AIR STRIKES, WHICH WOULD BE COORDINATED
THROUGH YOU.

D. IN PURSUING THESE LEGITIMATE NEEDS, THE POINT
SHOULD BE MADE THAT THE NAVY/MARINE TEAM HAS
LONG ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES AND FACILITIES FOR
COORDINATION OF ALL THREE SUPPORTING ARMS; THAT
PAST EFFORTS BY THE 7AF HAVE NOT SILENCED THE
BATTERIES AT CAP LAY AND THAT, AS POINTED OUT IN
REF B, IT IS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT TO BOTH III MAF AND
THE DMZ.

E. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM MINDFUL OF YOUR OWN
EARLIER APPREHENSION THAT A HEAVY MESSAGE OF TYX
BOMB LINE MATTER BY US COULD, IN THE END, PRODUCE
A DECISION BY COMUSMACV THAT WE WOULD NOT LIKE AT

PAGE 4 YNA 1683 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NOR MCEO
ALL. THEREFORE, MY COUNSEL IS TO PLAY IT SOFTLY,
REALIZING THAT WHAT WE HAVE NOW IS BETTER THAN
ANY WARTIME ARRANGEMENT WE HAVE EVER ENJOYED IN THE
PAST.

2. IN THE CASE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCE A, I FIND
MACV'S STAFF STUDY ON TRANSFER OF LOGISTIC RESPON-
SIBILITY IN SOUTHERN I CTZ, AN INCOMPLETE DISCUSSION
OF THE PROGRAM AND ITS ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS. FUR-
THER, IT IS MANIFEST THAT THIS DISCUSSION OF LOGISTIC
SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES IS A PRECURSOR TO AN
SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL. THE
DISCUSSION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES IN
SOUTHERN I CTZ CANNOT BE LIMITED TO THAT REQUIRED
FOR THE AMERICAL DIVISION, BUT MUST INCLUDE CON-
SIDERATION OF THAT SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE U. S.
MARINES, 2D ROKMC BD AND NMCB'S OPERATING IN SOUTH-
ERN ICTZ. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS APPLY:

(1) THE STUDY GLOSSES OVER THE MOST LOGICAL
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION; THAT OF PROVIDING THE ADDITION-
AL SUPPORT PERSONNEL REQUIRED BY COMNAVFORV FROM

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PAGE 5 YNA 1683 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ARMY SOURCES (IF, IN FACT NAVFORV DOES REQUIRE THEM).
LOGISTIC SUPPORT UN OS OF ANY SERVICE SHOULD EMBODY
THE FLEXIBILITY TO PERMIT THEIR ATTACHMENT TO ANY
ACTIVITY CHARGED WITH PRIMARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT
RESPONSIBILITIES IN A GIVEN TACTICAL AREA.

(2) MACV'S REFERENCE TO THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED
IN TRANSFERRING COMPONENT CEILINGS AMONG SERVICES
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PROBLEM. THERE IS NO
REASON TO ASSUME THAT ANY SHIFT OF LOGISTIC FORCES BETWEEN
ESTABLISHED CTZ'S IS ONE OF A PERMANENT NATURE; THE
CHANGING TACTICAL SITUATION IN RVN CAN AT ANY TIME
NECESSITATE CHANGES IN THE MIX OF LOGISTIC FORCES IN A PAR-
TICULAR CTZ. THIS MOST RECENT SHIFT IS NOT CON-
SIDERED JUSTIFICATION FOR AN ETERNAL TRANSFER OF ESTABLISHED
LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES.

(3) THE TOTAL DEPLOYED FORCES HAVE NOT INCREASED
THEREFORE, THE SAME TOTAL LOGISTIC EFFORT IS RE-
QUIRED, AND THE AMERICAN DIVISION ET AL CAN BE SUP-
PORTED UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM, WITH APPROPRIATE
AUGMENTATION OF PERSONNEL PREVIOUSLY USED IN SUP-

HERE YA ARE PAG 6

PAGE 6 YNA 1683 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
PORT OF THAT UNIT.

(4) IN SUMMARY, THE PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO DEVELOP INCREMENTALLY IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD
PERMIT MACV TO BACK INTO A MAJOR CHANGE IN COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN I CTZ. WE SHOULD REGARD THE
TROOP SHIFTS IN I CTZ AS A TRANSITORY MATTER, SUBJECT
TO REPEATED CHANGE, AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE
REQUIREMENT FOR A VIABLE NAVY LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION
IN I CTZ, BASED UPON ITS OBLIGATIONS TO PROVIDE
LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO B. AND FWMAF THROUGH-
OUT THE FIVE PROVINCES OF I CTZ.

3. THE DISCUSSION ABOVE LEADS TO COMMENT ON SEVERAL
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD ACCRUE THROUGH
RESTRUCTURING OF I CTZ BOUNDARIES. SHOULD THE
BOUNDARY BE PLACED AT THE QUANG TRI - QUANG NAM, WE MIGHT
REALIZE NUMEROUS ADVANTAGES, AND THE WHOLE ISSUE NEEDS
CAREFUL STUDY BEFORE WE TAKE A FIRM POSITION. HOWEVER,
THESE PROBLEMS ARE IMMEDIATELY VISIBLE.

A. THE AIRFIELD AND FACILITIES AT CHU LAI WILL
BECOME AN OASIS IN UNFRIENDLY HANDS, AND BECOME YET
BT

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DE YNA 1684 3140854
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 O 100854Z NOV 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF
 DDKN/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO
 MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2
 ANOTHER ARGUMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JET
 AIRFIELD IN NORTHERN I CTZ.

B. FROM A TACTICAL VIEWPOINT, THE PROVINCE
 BOUNDARY EFFECTIVELY BISECTS THE IMPORTANT HIEP-
 DUC, QUE SON, THANG BINH VALLEY. ASIDE FROM ITS
 ECONOMIC VALUE TO BOTH THE VC AND THE SOUTH VIET-
 NAMESE, IT SERVES AS A MAJOR ROUTE FOR INFILTRATION
 OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT AND PROVIDES A COVERED
 ROUTE OF APPROACH TO THE DANANG TAOR. TO SPLIT
 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS VALLEY CAN POSE
 SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN COORDINATION.

C. THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF RELATIONSHIPS BE-
 TWEEN CG III MAF AND CG I CORPS, INCLUDING ADVISORY,

PAGE 2 YNA 1684 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED. I CAN SEE IT AS A
 HEAVY BURDEN ON LAM TO HAVE TO COORDINATE WITH TWO
 CORPS COMMANDERS IF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES ARE NOT
 CHANGED TO COINCIDE WITH THE PROVINCE
 REALIGNMENT.

D. IN ANY CASE, THE MATTER SHOULD BE ANALYZED CAREFULLY.
 I AM HAVING THE STAFF HERE PREPARE SUCH AN ANALYSIS,
 AND WILL PASS IT ON, WHEN COMPLETED. HAPPY
 BIRTHDAY.

GP-4
 BT

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CG	<i>Hansen</i>
DG	<i>W</i>
C/S	<i>O</i>
DOGAIR	<i>Hasler</i>

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DTG 120101Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

FOR

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PTTSZYUW RUMSCMV2907 3160000-SSSS--RUMMWAA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 DE RUMSMA 1898L 3160114
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 12010IZ NOV 67
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO ZEN/7AF
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/COMNAVFORV
 BT

FOR

SECRET MAC 37084 MACDC
 FOR ADMIRAL SHARP FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND
 SUBJECT: SATS AIRFIELD, I CTZ (C)
 (S) CONFIRMING OUR DISCUSSION 10 NOV 67 ON SUBJECT, I HAVE
 CONCLUDED THAT CONSTRUCTION OF A SATS AIRFIELD IN I CTZ IS NOT NOW
 FEASIBLE. ACCORDINGLY, NO FURTHER ACTION WILL BE TAKEN. GP4
 BT

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CG	<i>[initials]</i>
C/S	<i>[initials]</i>
DCS	has copy <i>copy 3</i>
DC/S	has copy <i>copy 4</i>

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DTG 132147Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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*I am assigning the Inspector the task of
investigating where the reporting system broke down -
o*

#107

SECRET

77777 S E C R E T M C E O F O L L O W S / / / / /

RR RUMMWAA
DE RUHFMA 1983 3172147
ZNY SSSSS
R 132147Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T M C E O
REPORTING PROCEDURES (U)

- A. SSO MACV 100322Z NOV 67 (BY OTHER MEANS)
- B. CG III MAF 100333Z NOV 67
- C. CG III MAF 101444Z NOV 67
- D. CG III MAF 080145Z NOV 67
- E. CG III MAF 100111Z NOV 67
- F. CG III MAF 080403Z NOV 67

1. CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON THIS HEAD-
QUARTERS NECESSITATE TIMELY AND DETAILED REPORTING
ON IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE FIELD, PARTICULARLY THOSE

WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.
UNDERSTANDING FULLY THAT III MAF MUST ALWAYS REPORT ON
OPERATIONS FIRST THROUGH THE MACV CHAIN, THE CONVEYANCE OF
INFORMATION TO THIS HQ HAS, IN THE RECENT PAST, NOT
BEEN WHOLLY ADEQUATE OR TIMELY. EXAMPLES FOLLOW:

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 1983 S E C R E T M C E O

A. THE DAI LOC ACTIONS OF 2 NOV WERE FIRST REPORTED
TO THIS HEADQUARTERS BY THE MCCC. A SUBSEQUENT
TELECON TO III MAF PROVIDED THE FIRST COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN THIS HEADQUARTERS AND III MAF ON THE SUBJECT.

B. REF A, REFERRING TO THE SUBSEQUENT ACTION AT
DAI LOC ON 8 NOV, REPORTED THAT REFUGEES IN THE DAI
LOC AREA WERE AFRAID TO REMAIN IN THE CAMPS AND WERE
RETURNING TO THEIR FORMER VILLAGES. REFERENCES B, C,
AND D DO NOT ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT.

C. REF D IS A III MAF SPOT REPORT ON THE ACTION AT
DAI LOC WHICH COMMENCED AT 080125H, 8 HOURS AND
40 MINUTES PRIOR TO THE MESSAGE BEING TRANSMITTED.

D. SUBSEQUENTLY, TELEPHONE QUERIES FROM THIS HEAD-
QUARTERS RESULTED IN A TELEPHONED RESPONSE WITH SUFF-
ICIENT DETAILED INFORMATION, TOGETHER WITH REF F, TO
CONSTRUCT A FAIRLY ACCURATE PICTURE OF WHAT TRANS-
PIRED. THIS TELEPHONED REPORT WAS RECEIVED AT THIS
HEADQUARTERS 35 HOURS AND 29 MINUTES AFTER THE ACTION.

E. THE FIRST III MAF MESSAGE WITH A DETAILED
INFORMATION OF THE 8 NOV ACTION AT DAI LOC WAS THE

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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#67

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHFM1983 S E C R E T MCEO
 III MAF HISTORICAL SUMMARY 313, AND WAS NOT TRANSMITTED
 TO THIS HEADQUARTERS UNTIL 100033Z OR OVER 55 HOURS
 SUBSEQUENT TO THE ATTACK.

F. IN GENERAL, THE HISTORICAL REPORTING ON OPERA-
 TION ESSEX HAS NOT SUPPLIED SPECIFICS AND DETAILS.
 THE COMPANY H AND M CONTACT STARTING ABOUT 081800H
 AND TERMINATING ABOUT 092000H, IS A CASE IN POINT. THE
 FIRST KNOWLEDGE THIS HEADQUARTERS HAD OF THIS 26 HOUR
 CONTACT APPEARED AS A LATE ENTRY IN REFS B AND E. ASIDE
 FROM REPORTING THE INITIAL CONTACT, AND SUBSEQUENT
 ACTION DURING THE NIGHT OF 8 NOV, THE ENTRIES CONTAIN
 LITTLE DETAIL CONCERNING THE ACTION ON 9 NOV. FROM
 A REVIEW OF THE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES SUFFERED, IT WOULD
 APPEAR, IN ITS TOTAL ASPECT, THAT THE CONTACT WAS A
 SIGNIFICANT ONE AND THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD
 PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL HISTORICAL INSIGHT INTO WHAT
 ACTUALLY HAPPENED. IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE, ANSWERS TO
 THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO THIS PARTICULAR
 CONTACT ARE REQUESTED:

(1). WHAT FRIENDLY ACTIONS FOLLOWED THE ARRIVAL OF

PAGE 4 RUHFM1983 S E C R E T MCEO
 H/2/5 IN SUPPORT OF M/3/5 ON 8 NOV 67?

(2). WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE ACTION ON 9 NOV 67?

(3). WERE THE CASUALTIES THE RESULT OF A SINGLE SHARP
 ACTION?

(4). WHEN DID D/1/5 AND G/2/5 JOIN THE ACTION?

(5). WAS MORE THAN ONE HEAVILY FORTIFIED POSITION
 INVOLVED IN THE CONTINUING ACTION?

(6). BY WHAT ENEMY MEANS WERE THE MAJORITY OF THE
 FRIENDLY CASUALTIES INFLICTED?

(7). WERE THERE ANY SIGNIFICANT ITEMS SUCH AS DOCU-
 MENTS OR SUPPLIES CAPTURED?

GP-4
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#67

P 150014Z NOV 67
 FM CTF SEVEN SIX
 TO CG III MAF
 CG III MARDIV
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

UNCLAS E F T O

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND BGEN METZGER FROM RADM BURKE

1. I WAS DEEPLY DISTRESSED TO HEAR OF THE DEATH OF MGEN HOCHMUTH. THE MARINE CORPS HAS LOST A FINE AND CAPABLE OFFICER AND ALL OF US HAVE LOST A GOOD FRIEND. I AM SURE THAT WE ARE ALL BETTER MEN FOR HAVING HAD THE PRIVILEGE TO SERVE WITH HIM. THE MEMORY OF HIS STRENGTH, COURAGE AND SACRIFICE SHOULD BE AN ASSET TO US ALL IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

2. I SHARE IN YOUR SYMPATHY. WARM REGARDS.-

BT

112 MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#68

CG
Dy CG
C/S

CCN 100

has been
Dep CGAR FILLER 3

DTG 150645Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG 7TH AIR FORCE

FOR

CATEGORY _____

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#69

OO RUMMF
 DE RUMSAL 2576E 3190653
 ZNR UUUUU
 O 150645Z NOV 67
 FM 7AF ISN AB RVN
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS C
 PERSONAL FOR GEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN MOMYER.
 DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR. ALL THE OFFICERS AND MEN
 OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE ARE SADDENED BY THE LOSS OF A
 GREAT FIGHTER. GEN HOCHMUTH LIVED IN THE FINEST
 TRADITION OF THE MARINE CORPS HIS INSPIRING
 LEADERSHIP WILL BE AN EXAMPLE FOR THOSE WHO FOLLOW
 HIM. I WISH TO ADD MY OWN PERSONAL EXPRESSION OF
 SYMPATHY FOR THE LOSS OF A GALLANT COMRADE.
 BT

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G-3 has for action P

CCN 103

FILLER 25

DTG 161400Z MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DC/C	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>
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(1) K with me!



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DE RUMSMA 2730L 3201430

ZNY CCCCC

P 161400Z NOV 67

FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF

BT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L 37605 FROM; MACSA SGD MCMILLAN

FOR GENERAL CUSHMAN

1. (C) AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH LACK OF OPPORTUNITY AT RECENT III MAF CONFERENCE TO CONVEY TO YOUR AND YOUR STAFF THE GREAT POTENTIAL OF TPS-25 RADAR IN DETECTING MOVEMENT OF ENEMY VEHICLES, WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL IN AND ABOVE DMZ. SUCH EMPLOYMENT OF THIS AVAILABLE RADAR WILL BE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED IN ARMOROCCO STUDY. WE FEAR THAT EXISTING TPS-25 LITERATURE DESIGNED FOR EUROPEAN THEATER MAY GIVE EXAGGERATED VIEW OF LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT PROBLEMS FOR THE FIXED SITE DEPLOYMENT USED IN VIETNAM AND THUS MIGHT BIAS III MAF DECISION AGAINST THIS HIGHLY CAPABLE RADAR. I WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HAVING MR. CLYDE HARDIN OF MY STAFF INFORMALLY BRIEF YOU AND YOUR COMMAND GROUP AND MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR STAFF CONCERNING HIS EXPERIENCE WITH THIS EQUIPMENT HERE IN VIETNAM. SUGGEST WED 22 NOVEMBER FOR HARDIN VISIT TO III MAF HQS, BUT WILL ARRANGE TO SUIT YOUR CONVENIENCE.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2730L C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. (C) WE MOST ANXIOUS TO GET THE SEVERAL TPS-25 RADARS THAT HAVE BEEN EARMARKED IN CONUS FOR POSSIBLE DMZ USE ON THEIR WAY TO THE THEATER, SO AS TO MINIMIZE DELAY IF AND WHEN THE NVN ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT RESUMES IN EARNEST.

3. (U) WE EXTEND OUR PROFOUND SYMPATHIES ON THE LOSS OF GENERAL HOCHMUTH.

GP-4

BT

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 ZNY CCCCC
 P 150515Z NOV 67
 FMCOMUSMACV
 TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEPJS/CJS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ

COMNOTE: ~~MESSAGE INCOMPLETE.~~
~~SECTIONS NINE AND TEN MISSING.~~
 UNDERLINED PORTIONS AS PECT.
~~MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELETED.~~
 Will service upon request.

FOR

BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM: MACJ01R SEC I OF X
 FOR ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, BG DESOBRY FROM AMB KOMER
 SUBJ: PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING SEPTEMBER 1967 (U)
 1. (U) THIS REPORT IS THE EIGHTH IN A SERIES OF MONTHLY
 ASSESSMENTS OF PACIFICATION. IT IS BASED UPON FIELD REPORTING AND
 ANALYSIS DONE IN SAIGON.
 2. (C) SUMMARY. THE TEMPO OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS INCREASED

PAGE TWO RUMSMA 239 IL C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 SLIGHTLY DURING SEPTEMBER AFTER THE LULL INCIDENT TO THE ELECTIONS.
 ONLY MOSEST IMPROVEMENT WAS NOTED IN HAMLET AND POPULATION SECURITY
 (SEE HES FIGURES), BUT MUCH OF THE ACTIVITY DURING THE MONTH WAS
 DIRECTED TOWARD LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE GAINS.
 A. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN ICEX -- HE ATTACK ON
 THE INFRASTRUCTURE, AS WE ARE STILL SEEING GVN ENDORSEMENT AT
 THE SAIGON LEVEL SO THE PAYOFF STAGE CAN BE REACHED.
 B. IT WAS ALSO TRUE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
 PROGRAM, AS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE CADRES
 WERE ENGAGED IN MOVING TO THEIR SECOND HAMLET FOR THE YEAR. MOST
 OF THE MONTH WAS GIVEN TO MOVEMENT, CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES IN
 NEW HAMLETS, AND REDEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY FORCES TO PROTECT THE
 CADRES IN THEIR NEW LOCATIONS. AT THE END OF SEPTMBER, FUL-
 FILLMENT OF RD PLANS WAS ON SCHEDULE IN 10 PROVINCES AND BEHIND
 SCHEDULE IN 34, NO CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH. BECAUSE OF
 THIS LAG, ALL CONCERNED ON BOTH THE US AND GVN SIDE HAVE BEEN
 STRONGLY URGED TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO COMPLETE THE 1967
 PROGRAM BY 31 JANUARY. EXPERIENCE GAINED BY THE CADRE SHOULD
 PERMIT A FASTER PACE OF WORK IN THE SECOND PHASE.
 C. THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM DISMALLY RECORDED THE THIRD

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PAGE THREE RUMSMA 239IL C O N F I D E N T I A L NO FORN
 SUCCESSIVE MONTHLY DECLINE AND A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR, ALTHOUGH
 RETURNEES ARE STILL APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE NUMBER FOR THE SAME
 PERIOD OF 1966.

D. IN SEPTEMBER THE GENERATION OF REFUGEES EXCEEDED RE-
 SETTLEMENT, ADDING TO THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES REQUIRING TEMPORARY
 CARE. HOWEVER, STRONG COMMAND EFFORTS ON BOTH THE US AND GVN
 SIDES AIMED AT SPEEDING UP DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES AND
 PAYMENT OF ALLOWANCES WROUGHT A MARKED IMPORVEMNT IN THE REFUGEE
 SITUATION AND ABATED THE CRISIS OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS.

E. POLICE PROGRAM ATTENTION CENTERED ON PRESENTATION TO
 THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAY PROPOSALS TO EQUALIZE PAY OF POLICE
 OFFICIALS WITH EQUIVALENT GRADES IN ARVN, AND MEASURES TO IMPROVE
 CAREER INCENTIVES AND INCREASE RISK ALLOWANCES. THIS PACKAGE IS
 NEEDED TO RALLY THE LAGGING RATE OF POLICE RECRUITMENT.

F. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES CONTINUED TO SHOW
 PROGRESS, AS EXPENDITURE OF THE MORD BUDGET INCREASED TO 51
 PERCENT FROM 42 PERCENT THE PREVIOUS MONTH. X

G. HE ECONOMICS OF PACIFICATION RECEIVED AMAJOR FILLIP
 FROM THE OPENING OF ROUTE 20 IN LONG KHANH AND ROUTE 5 ETWEEN
 SAIGON AND GO CONG. ALREADY A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF COMMERCIAL

PAGE FOUR RUMSMA 239IL C O N F I D E N T I A L NO FORN
 TRAFFIC IS FLOWING OVER THESE ROUTES. RESTORATION OF TRADE BE-
 TWEEN FARM AND CITY WILL YIELD HIGHER REAL INCOME FOR BOTH TRADING
 PARTNERS AS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE AGAIN
 COMES INTO PLAY. THUS AN ECONOMIC PULL IS BEING EXERTED WHICH
 COMPLEMENTS OUR DIRECT EFFORTS TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY. A DARK
 SPOT, HOWEVER, WAS THE DEERIOATION OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY 4 IN THE
 DELTA DUE TO HEAVY ASE, VC MININGS, AND SHORTAGE OF ROCK FOR REPAIR.
 THIS MATTER IS RECEIVING COMMAND ATTENTION.

H. FINALLY, WHILE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE MONUMENTAL
 EFFORT TO MAKE THE ELECTIONS A SUCCESS INEVITABLY DAMPENED THE

PACE OF PACIFICATION, THERE IS NO GAINSAYING THE IMMEASURABLE
 SIGNIFCANCE OF THE ADVENT OF A GOVERNMENT CLOAKED IN THE MANTLE
 OF LEGITIMACY.

3. (C) IMPACT OF THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE PACIFICATION
 EFFORT:

A. ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE: (1) INFRASTRUCTURE
 INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND EXPLOITATION (ICEX) ACTIVITIES
 CONTINUE CONCENTRATED ON ORGANIZATION. HE US ICEX STRUCTURE IS
 NOW ESTABLISHED IN THE FOUR REGIONS AND MOST PROVINCES. ORGANIZA-
 TION WILL REMAIN A PRIME TASK UNTL ICEX IS ESTABLISHE IN ALL

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PROVINCES, DISTRICT OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS (DOICC'S) ARE OPERATING SMOOTHLY, AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED. THE NUMBER OF DOICC'S OPERATIONAL INCREASED FROM 10 IN JULY TO 2 IN AUGUST AND 48 IN SEPTEMBER. COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF DOICC'S ACTIVATED AND PROGRAMMED FOR 1967 AS OF 30 SEP SHOWS:

	ACTIVATED	PROGRAMMED
I CORPS	14	20
II CORPS	7	20
III CORPS	23	53
IV CORPS	4	22
TOTAL	48	115

NO FORN

IN ADDITION TO MOVING AHEAD WITH DOICC'S ALL REGIONS ARE STRIVING TO UPGRADE CAPABILITIES AND UTILIZATION OF PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTERS (PIC) AND TO REVIVE THE MORIBUND PROVINCIAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION CENTERS (PICC). STATUS OF PIC'S ON 30 SEP WAS AS FOLLOWS:

	NUMBER OF PIC'S	CAPACITY PERSONS
I	6	156

PAGE SIX RUMSMA 239 IL C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

II	9	200
III	10	260
IV	13	298
TOTAL	38	914

TOTAL PROGRAMMED 41

NO. OF BETAINEES IN PIC'S: 550-600

(A) ICEX HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ENTHUSIASTICALLY BY THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND COOPERATION IS EXCELLENT. ON THE GVN SIDE, HOWEVER, LACK OF NATIONAL LEVEL ENDORSEMENT OF ICEX HAD A DAMPENING EFFECT ON THE FIELD OWING TO RELUCTANCE OF LOCAL GVN OFFICIALS TO EMBRACE THE ICEX PROGRAM WITHOUT DIRECTION FROM ABOVE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAS BEEN INCREASING US/GVN COOPERATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL THROUGHOUT EACH CORPS. SINCE THE GVN IN SAIGON WAS BRIEFED ON THE ICEX PROGRAM IN AUGUST, DISCUSSION WITH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE GVN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE OCCURRED FREQUENTLY, AND EARLIER MISGIVINGS ARE BEING OVERCOME. THE MOST SERIOUS OBSTACLE HAS BEEN RELUCTANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE TO ACCEPT THE DOICC CONCEPT. WE ARE ASSURING GENERAL LOAN THAT THE DOICC'S DO NOT THREATEN THE ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY OF THE POLICE, THAT POLICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND OPERATIONS NEED NOT BE REVEALED, AND THAT POLICE

BT

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 ZNY CCCCC
 P 150515Z NOV 67
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSM/SA IV CZ

NO FORN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM: MACJ0IR SEC II OF X PARTICIPATION IN THE DOICCWILL BE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.

(3) O E A N W H I L E , I N F R A S T R U C T U R E I N T E L L I G E N C E I S B E I N G D E V E L O P E D A T R E G I O N A N D P R I V I N C E , A N D E X P L O I T A T I O N O P E R A T I O N S H A V E B E E N M O U N T E D A G A I N S T I N F R A S T R U C T U R E T A R G E T S . A L T H O U G H T H E P R U A P P E A R T O B E T H E M O S T E F F E C T I V E R I F L E S H O T A C T I O N A R M , T H E S P E C T R U M O F E X P L O I T A T I O N F O R C E S R A N G E S F R O M A R M E D P O L I C E S P E C I A L B R A N C H J K P S B) S Q U A D S T O A I R A N D A R T I L L E R Y S T R I K E S A N D P S Y O P S L E A F L E T D R O P S . H O I C H A N H A R E

PAGE TWO RUMSMA 2392L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN BEING WIDELY EMPLOYED OR EXPLOITED IN INCREASING NUMBERS AND WAYS. CONSOLIDATED REPORTING SYSTEM TO PROVIDE AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF PROGRESS WILL BE INSTALLED IN N V E M B E R , B U T C U R R E N T O S A A N D I C E X R E P O R T I N G A L R E A D Y S H O W E N C O U R A G E I N G T R E N D S .

(4) I C E X S T A F F H A S D E S I G N E D A P R O V I F E L E V E L F O R M A T F O R R E P O R T I N G O N I D E N T I F I E D V C I N F R A S T R U C T U R E W H O H A V E B E E N A P P R E H E N D E D , K I L L E D , 9 4 4 -)) 8 3 \$. I T W I L L A L S O I N D I C A T E T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F T H E E L I M I N A T E D I N F R A S T R U C T U R E M E M B E R S A N D I D E N T I F Y T H E U S A N D G V N A G E N C I E S W H I C H A C C O M P L I S H E D T H E A C I O N . I T I S P R I M A R I L Y A M A N A G E R I A L T O O L A N D R E P O R T O F P R O G R E S S . I T S D A T A W I L L B E I N J E C T E D I N T O M A C V P R O J E C T C O R R A L (A U T O M A T E D I N F R A S T R U C T U R E D A T A F I L E) .

(5) T H E L E G A L C O N S U L T A N T O F I C E X / S I D E (S C R E E N I N G I N T E R R O G A T I O N , A N D D E T E N T I O N O F T H E E N E M Y) H A S D E T E R M I N E D , A F T E R C O N S U L T A T I O N W I T H T H E M I N I S T E R O F J U S T I C E A N D T H E D I R E C T O R O F M I L I T A R Y J U S T I C E , T H A T T H E B E S T M E T H O D O F P R O C E S S I N G C I V I L D E F E N D A N T S W A S T H R O U G H E X P A N S I O N O F E X I S T I N G J U R I S D I C A T O N O F M I L I T A R Y F I E L D C O U R T S O V E R C I V I L I A N S E C U R I T Y O F F E N S E S . W E D R A F T E D A P R O P O S E D E X E C U T I V E D E C R E E C R E A T I N G F O U R N E W M I L I T A R Y F I E L D C O U R T S , D O U B L E T H E P R E S E N T N U M B E R A N D P L A C I N G T W O I N E A C H C O R P S . I T W A S S I G N E D B Y T H E C H I E F O F S T A T E .

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PAGE THREE RUMSMA 2392L C O N F I D E N T I A L NO FORN
 B. EXPAND AND IMPROVE TERRITORIAL SECURITY.
 (1) HAMLETS AND POPULATION ON 30 SEPTEMBER IN
 CATEGORIES ESTABLISHED BY THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES)
 TOGETHER WITH CHANGES DURING THE MONTH ARE SHOWN IN THE NEXT
 TABLE. HES RESULTS ARE PRESENTED FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
 COMBINED AND FOR SECURITY ONLY.

HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

	SECURE			CONTESTED			OTHER	TOTAL
	A	B	C	D	E	VC		
I	28	254	462	455	77	996	180	2452
	5	8	-5	12	-1	1	-15	5
II	50	33	992	539	150	572	257	3093
	0	-4	33	-35	-13	-31	44	-6
III	1	329	659	403	65	444	210	2111
	1	0	8	4	15	-23	-6	-1
IV	134	786	1024	809	191	1975	66	4985
	6	3	9	-19	3	2	-2	2
RVN	213	1902	3137	2206	483	3987	713	12641
	12	7	45	-38	4	-51	21	0

POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2392L C O N F I D E N T I A L NO FORN

	A	B	C	D	E
I	75.3	504.5	589.1	426.4	69.2
	5.6	-9.3	-3.4	13.9	-1.1
II	218.4	723.3	837.7	296.1	76.9
	23.4	10.1	-2.3	-18.2	-22.7
III	7.6	804.5	1248.6	531.3	38.2
	7.6	-1JMQ	33.1	-12.3	3.3
IV	345.4	1457/3	1332/9	833.6	153.0
	10.0	.6	25.7	-12.6	-2.6
RVN	646.7	3489.6	4044.3	2087.4	337.3
	46.6	.3	53.1	-29.2	-23.1
	VC	OTHER	NON-HAMELT	TOTAL	
I	77.6	24.6	593.0	3059.6	
	-18.8	-9.6	.8	-21.9	
II	225.3	29.9	419.0	2862.6	
	2.4	7.2	.0	-.1	
	VC	OTHER	NON-HAMELT	TOTAL	
III	256.0	28.6	2357.8	5272.6	
	5.1	-24.9	-12.6	-1.8	
IV	1550.5	8.6	152.2	833.5	
XX					

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RVN -0.6 -9.7 4.3 15.1
 2809.4 91.7 3522.0 17028.4
 -11.9 -37.0 -7.5 -8.7

NO FORN

HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)

	SECUR E			CONTESTED				TOTAL
	A	B	C	D	E	VC	OTHER	
I	115	245	478	370	68	996	180	2452
	8	6	6	7	-8	1	-15	5
II	209	715	827	423	90	527	257	3093
	JAR	79	-3	-34	-7	-31	44	-6
III	133	378	563	347	36	44	210	2111
	-6	2	13	17	2	-23	-6	-1
IV	288	748	1020	721	167	1975	66	4985
	17	-22	18	-17	6	2	-2	2
RVN	745	2086	2888	1861	361K	3987	713	12641
	-35	65	34	-27	-7	-51	21	0

POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)
(THOUSANDS)

	A	B	C	D	E
I	266.3	449.2	524.5	362.6	62.4

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	7.6	-10.9	3.3	14.9	-9.2	
II	472.7	724.8	692.9	246.0	51.6	
	6.5	11.2	16.4	-33.4	-10.5	
III	301.7	1029.7	941.1	331.8	26.1	
	-6.2	.9	18.9	16.4	.5	
IV	JYPRMI	1226.6	1294.4	847.0	149.4	
	30.1	-43.0	37.4	-3.4	.1	
RVN	1645.5	3430.3	3452.9	1787.4	289.5	
	38.0	-41.8	76.1	-5.5	-19.2	
	VC	OTHER		NON-HAMLET	TOTAL	
I	77.6	24.6		593.0	3060.2	
	-18.8	-7.6		.8	-21.9	
II	225.3	-9.9		419.0	2862.2	
	2.3	7.1		.0	-74	
III	256.0	28.6		2357.8	5272.8	
	5.1	-24.9		-12.6	-1.9	
IV	150.5	8.6		152.2	5833.5	
	-0.6	-9.8		4.3	15.1	
RVN	280					
MR	91.7		3522.0		17028.7	
	-12.0	-37.0			-7.5	-9.1
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 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM; MACJØIR SEC III OF X
 STATUS OF NON-HAMLET POPULATION, 30 SEP
 (CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS MONTH)

	SECURE	CONTESTED	VC
I	380.8	85.1	27.1
	.8	0	0
II	353.8	50.3	9.9
	0	3.3	-3.3

PAGE TWO RUMSMA 2393L **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

III	2235.5	84.5	37.9
	.1	.0	-12.7
IV	60.2	32.0	59.2
	4.3	0	0
RVN	3135.2	252.7	134.1
	5.3	3.3	-16.0

(2) COMPARISON OF SECURE AND VC-CONTROLLED POPULATION FOR RVN AS A WHOLE IS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE. DATA REFLECTS HES RATINGS FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT COMBINED. ANDSIS OF SECURITY ALONE, WHICH IS THE MOST CRITICAL FACTOR IN PACIFICATION, 69 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WERE IN THE SECURE CATEGORY ON 30 SEP. THIS INCLUDES BOTH HAMLET (A,B,C) AND NON-HAMLET SECURE POPULATION.

SECURE AND VC-CONTROLLED POPULATION
 TOTAL RVN, 30 SEP
 IN THOUSANDS
 POPULATION

SECURITY ONLY
 SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

SECURE	VC
11663.9	2809.4
11315.8	2809.4

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NO FORN

SECURITY ONLY
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

PERCENT OF
TOTAL 30 SEP
SECURE VC
69 17
67 17

SECURITY ONLY
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

PERCENT OF
TOTAL 31 AUG
SECURE VC
68 17

(3) ON THE BASIS OF HES SECURITY RATINGS, TERRITORIAL SECURITY IMPROVED IN RVN AS A WHOLE DURING SEPTEMBER, AS THE NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN A, B, C, CATEGROY INCREASED BY 64 ANS POPULATION IN THESE HAMLETS INCREASED BY 72,300. THE PERCENTAGE OF HAMLET AND NON-HAMLET POPULATION IN THE SECURE CATEGORY INCREASED FROM 68 TO 69 PERCENT WHILE VC CONTROL REMAINED THE SAME. TREND DATA WILL BE PRESENTED IN FUTURE REPORTS.

(4) I CORPS SECURITY RESUME.

	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	1,658	1,455

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VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	37,410	36,895
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIV	1,013	417
VC INCENDENTS AGAINST		

	RRDC	42	71
STATUS OF RAODS - GREEN (PER)		58.2	56.6
(SEE FOOTNOTE) AMBER (PCT)		40.7	43.4
	RED (PCT)	1.1	0

HES NO. OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (A,B,C) CATEGORY	838	818
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	56.3	55.8

RF STRENGTH	18,068	19,670
PF STRENGTH	23,200	23,345

HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE A MARKED INCREASE IN VC TERRORISM AGAINST CIVILIANS INCIDENT TO THE ELECTION. THERE WAS A DECIDED DECLINE IN SECURITY IN QUANG NGAI AND QUANG NAM. QUANG NGAI'S PACIFICATION EFFORT SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK WHEN THE VC OCCUPIED EASTERN TU NGHIA, THE MOST IMPORTANT RD CAXPAIGN AREA, FOR TEN DAYS FOLLOWING THE 29-30 AUG ATTACK ON THE PROVINCE CAPITAL. RF/PF AND RD CADRE WERE DRIVEN FROM THE HAXLETS. ARVN REACTION WAS DELAYED AFD CAUTIOUS BUT SUCCESSFUL IN CLEARING THE AREA. RF/

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 PF AND CADRE HAVE NOW RETURNED TO THE HAMLETS. QUANG NAM EXPERIENCED A SIMILAR REVERSAL IN HIHON DISTRICT AROUND HOI AN, THE PROVINCE CAPITAL. AT ONE POINT FIVE RD TEAMS WERE WITHDRAWN TEMPORARILY FROM THEIR HAMLETS DUE TO DETERIORATING SECURITY. VC INCIDENTS INCLUDED 6 ATTACKS AND 13 HARASSMENTS OF PROVINCE AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS IN I CORPS IN SEPTEMBER.

(5) II CORPS SECURITY RESUME.

	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	463	415
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	31,695	30,025
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIV	187	217
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	37	49
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	67.3	64.7
AMBER (PCT)	22.5	24.7
RED (PCT)	10.2	10.6
HES NO. OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (A,B,C) CATEGORY	1,751	1,621
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	78.6	77.6
RF STRENGTH	34,670	34,687

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 PF STRENGTH

35,040 35,107
 SECURITY SHOWED LITTLE CHANGE IN MOST PROVINCES. HOWEVER, A SHARP SETBACK TO PACIFICATION OCCURRED IN PHU YEN WHEN THE 95TH NVA REGIMENT ATTACKED THE MAIN RD AREA IN TUY HOA VALLEY, FORCING WITHDRAWAL OF RD TEAMS. INTENSE COMBAT FOLLOWING QUICK REACTION BY ROK AND ARVN FORCES RESULTED IN DESTRUCTION OF SEVERAL HAMLETS AND DAMAGE TO OTHERS. PROVINCE REACTED WITH EMERGENCY RESUPPLIES AND PROMPT COMMENCEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION. IN BINH DINH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE 3D NVA DIVISION IS CONTINUING ITS EFFORT TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE POPULATION, SEIZE SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF THE RICE HARVEST AND NEUTRALIZE THE RD PROGRAM. HOWEVER, ARVN, RF AND PF FORCES HAVE THUS FAR BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MAINTAINING TERRITORIAL SECURITY.

(6) III CORPS SECURITY RESUME.

	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	751	640
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	29,512	32,472
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIV	72	135
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	14	21
STATUS OF RADS - GREEN (PCT)	68	54

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	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	946	679
VC BOMBAT STRENGTH	19,535	19,135
ASSASSINATION, ABDUKTION OF CIVILIANS	139	145
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	16	12
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	23	23
AMBER (PCT)	77	-7
RED (PCT)	0	0
STATUS OF WATERWAYS GREEN (PCT)	30	45
AMBER (PCT)	51	57
RED (PCT)	10	8
HES NO. OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (A, B, C) CATEGORY	2,056	2,043
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	54.8	54.3
RF STRENGTH	52,899	51,296
PF STRENGTH	57,936	58,031

IV CORPS REMAINS AN ARE OF UNCERTAIN TERRITORIAL SECURITY. LITTLE CHANGE WAS NOTED IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER. VC INCIDENTS ROSE SHARPLY DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS AND THEN TAPERED

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2394L C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M

OFF. THE MORTARING OF MY THO ON TWO OCCASIONS DURING THE MONTH LED TO THE LAUNCHING OF A NEW PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN NORTH OF THE TOWN. IN CHUONG THIEN THE VC HARASS THE CADRE IN THE RD CAMPAIGN AREA ALMOST DAILY. BA XUYEN REPORTED ONE ATTACK AND SEVERAL MINOR HARRASSMENTS AGAINST RD CADRE IN BOTH COMPLETED AND NEWLY OCCUPIED HAMLETS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE VC HAVE LAUNCHED A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN AGAINST HIGHWAY 4 THROUGHOUT THE DELTA. SEVERAL PROVINCES REPORTED MININGS AND ROADBLOCKS ON THE ROUTE. THE CHALLENGE TO TERRITORIAL SECURITY HAS INCREASED WITH REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES TO SECURE THE HAMLETS NEWLY OCCUPIED BY RD CADRE TEAMS. SECURITY FORCES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MORE HAMLETS AND LARGER AREAS. ALLOCATION OF 18 RD COMPANIES AND 50 PF PLATOONS TO IV CORP IN SEPTEMBER WILL EVENTUALLY ALLEVAITE THIS SITUATION.

C. EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD GROUPS EFFORTS AND ASSICATED PROGRAMS; (1) THE RD CADRE (RDC) GROUPS AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO MAKE GOOD PROG RESS. THE NUMBER OF RD GROUPS WHICH MOVED TO THEIR SECOND HAMLET FOR THE YEAR INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY DURING SEPTEMBER. DEPLOYMENT OF RD GROUPS AND STATUS OF MOVES TO SECOND-PHASE HAMLETS ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

RD RD NO. OF GROUPS NO. OF GROUPS

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	GROUPS 30 SEP	GROUPS 31 AUG	COMPLETING MOVES 31 AUG	COMPLETING MOVES 30SEP
I	128	122	26	43
II	148	143	52	92
III	69	69	11	31
IV	160	157	9	99
TOTAL	505	491	98	265

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THE 38 RD GROUPS IN AN GIANG WILL NOT MOVE BUT WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ONE GROUP TO A VILLAGE. HENCE THERE WERE 453 RD GROUPS SUBJECT TO MOVEMENT ON 31 AUGUST. OF THESE 265 OR 58 PERCENT HAD COMPLETED THEIR MOVES BY 30 SEIEMBER.

(2) EXPANSION OF RD CADRE STRENGTH CONTINUED DURING SEPTEMBER. FROM A LOW FOR THE YEAR OF 2,332 (411 GROUPS) IN APRIL RDC STRENGTH INCREASED TO 24,509 ON 30 SEP, A GAIN OF 20 PERCENT. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS GAIN IS AS FOLLOWS;

	RDC STRENGTH 30 SEP	RDC STRENGTH 30 SEP	PERCENT INCREASE
I	7331	7001	4.7
II	7222	6188	16.7
III	3267	2881	1.3

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IV ~~6689~~ 5370 24.6

EXPANSION IN III CORPS WAS NOT AS GREAT AS DESIRED DUE TO RECRUITING DIFFICULTY. IN ADDITION TO RD CADRE THERE WERE 126 TRUONG SON CADRE (TSC) (MONTAGNARD) GROUPS AND 6266 TS CADRE AS OF 30 SEP. ALSO IN OUR ARSENAL ARE 35 CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, 32 OF THEM IN II CORPS. CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS ARE COMPOSED OF TECHNICAL SERVICE CADRE AND RF OR PF PLATOONS.

(3) RD CADRE DESERTIONS INCREASED IN SEPTEMBER FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE MAY. THE DESERTION RATE INCREASED FROM 9.7 PER THOUSAND IN AUGUST TO 12.5 IN SEPTEMBER. TOTAL CADRE LOSSES ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

	RD CADRE LOSSES	
	SEP	AUG
KILLED	54	66
CAPTURED	11	10
DISCHARGED	224	142
DESERTED	308	298
TOTAL	597	516

IN ORDER TO IMPROVE DISCIPLINE AND CURB DESERTION THE RD MINISTRY PUBLISHED A REGULATION ON 1 SEP PROVIDING FOR SUSPENSION OF PAY OF BT

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 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
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 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ

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C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM: MACJ0IR SEC V OF X
 RD CADRES ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE. THIS IS A USEFUL MOVE BUT DOES NOT
 DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH CADRE WHO DESERT OR RESIGN. WE ARE DIS-
 CUSSING WITH THE MINISTRY APPLICATION OF HARSHER SANCTIONS, SUCH
 AS IMMEDIATE DRAFTING INTO RVNAF IN APPROPRIATE CASES. DISCHARGES
 (RESIGNE, RETIRED, CASHIERED) ARE A SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT OF
 CADRE ATTRITION. THE INCREASING DISCHARGE RATE IS ATTRIBUTED TO
 IMPORVED DISCIPLINE AND POOR RECRUITMENT AND SCREENING PRACTICES

LAGE TWO RUMSMA 2395L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 IN THE PAST. TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF RECRUITS ELEVEN PROVINCES
 HAVE INSTITUTED TRAINING PROGRAMS TO PERMIT SCREENING OUT THE UN-
 FIT AND UNDESIRABLE PRIOR TO SENDING RECRUITS TO THE NATIONAL
 TRAINING CENTER. THE MOST PROMISING OF THESE PROGRAMS SEEM TO BE
 THOSE INVOLVING A SHORT APPRENTICESHIP WITH EXISTING RDC GROUPS IN
 THE FIELD. OUR GOAL IS TO HAVE PRE-VUNG TAU TRAINING PROGRAMS IN
 ALL PROVINCES BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

(4) DURING SEP 2060 NEW RD CADRES COMMENCED THE BASIC COURSE AT
 THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER AT VUNG TAU. TH WAS 140 SHORT OF
 OUR GOAL OF 2200 FOR SEP. IN ADDITION 828 CADRES WERE PLACED INTO
 LEADERSHIP TRAINING AN 505 INTO MEDICAL TRAINING FOR A TOTAL INPUT
 OF 3393 IN SEP. AS A RESULT VUNG TAU IS NOW BULGING WITH 8000
 STUDENTS. IN-PROVINCE TRAINING OF RD CADRES AFTER THEY RETURN
 FROM VUNG TAU HAS BEEN INSTITUTED IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. THE
 OBJECT IS TO IMPROVE CADRE EFFECTIVENESS, AT THE SAME TIME IN-
 VOLVING THE OLD LINE GVN MINISTRIES AND THEIR TECHNICAL CADRES IN
 RD BOTH WHILE THE RD CADRES ARE RESIDENT IN A HAMLET AND AFTER
 THEY MOVE ON. IN II CORPS A RETRAINING PROGRAM, BY USING MOBILE
 TRAINING TEAMS AND SENDING SELECTED CADRE TO VUNG TAU FOR LEADER-
 SHIP TRAINING, HAS IMPROVED THE QUALITY O THE GROUP.

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(5) BECAUSE OF THE PREVAILING CLIMATE OF SECURITY IN AN GIANG PROVINCE THE DECISION WAS MADE IN JULY TO REORIENT THE RD PROGRAM ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REORGANIZE THE R VARE GROUP INTO 38 20-MAN TEAMS, ONE FOR EACH VILLAGE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE END OF JULY THE NEW TEAMS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED VERY LITTLE. THIS IS DUE TO LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND SINCERE INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE VILLAGE AND

HAMLET GOVERNMENT, BAD FEELING CREATED BY INTEGRATING THE PROVINCE TECHNICAL SERVICE CADRES INTO THE RD GROUPS AND SENDING THEM TO WORK IN THE VILLAGES, AND CONFUSION AMONG THE CADRES WHO ARE NOT COMPLETELY AWARE OF WHAT THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH. STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO GET THIS PROGRAM BACK ON TRACK.

(6) A RATHER CUMBERSOME INTER-MINISTERIAL DIRECTIVE PROVIDING FOR THE ARMING OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PEOPLE'S GROUPS (RDPG) WAS ISSUED ON 27 SEP AFTER MONTHS OF URGING ON OUR PART. THE RDPG ARE MILITIA-TYPE POPULAR ASSOCIATIONS ORGANIZED BY THE RD CADRES IN THE HAMLETS. NUMEROUS PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN ARMING AND TRAINING THESE ELEMENTS IN THE PAST. WE ARE NOW WORKING ON INTER-MINISTERIAL DIRECTIVE TO FACILITATE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION TO THE RDPG.

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(7) THE CENSUS GRIEVANCE CADRE PROGRAM IS ONE OF THE MOST TROUBLE-FREE PROGRAMS WE HAVE. DEALING WITH A RESPECTED, MATURE, AND OLDER INDIVIDUAL IN EACH HAMLET MAKES FOR A GOOD PROGRAM. NOT ALL CG CADRES WORK PROPERLY, NOR ARE ALL RESPECTED, MATURE, AND OLDER, BUT THE PROBLEMS ARE OF SUCH A NATURE THAT THEY CAN BE HANDLED EXPEDITIOUSLY. ON 30 SEP THE NUMBER OF STATIC CENSU GRIEVANCE CADRE STOOD AT 5340. OUR GOAL IS 6399 BY THE END OF 1967. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH INDUCED TO RALLY BY RD AND CG ARE :

	SEP	YEAR TO DATE
RD CADRE	49	812
CENSUS GRIEVANCE	106	1465

D. ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI EFFORT; (1) THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH FELL TO 1781 IN SEP, REACHING A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR AFTER THREE CONSECUTIVE MONTHS OF DECLINE. THE TREND DURING 1967 IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING FIGURES.

	1ST QTR	2ND QTR	3RD QTR	PERCENT DECLINE 1-3 QTR
I	755	612	544	28PCT
II	3140	2377	817	74PCT
III	3302	2201	1700	49PCT

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IV	3551	2288	2382	33 PCT
TOTAL	10,748	7398	5443	49 PCT

TO STEM THE DECLINE IN III CORPS, A MONTH-LONG CHIEU HOI OFFENSIVE WAS LAUNCHED IN HAU NGHIA AND BINH DUONG ON 25 SEP. THE OPERATION IS ENVISIONED IN THREE PHASES, A TWO-WEEK MILITARY OFFENSIVE, A ONE-WEEK BONUS PERIOD DURING WHICH ALL RETURNEES WILL BE GIVEN ON-THE-SPOT EXTRA REWARDS FOR RALLYING, AND A ONE-WEEK EXPLOITATION PERIOD DURING WHICH RALLIERS WILL BE PUBLICIZED TO THEIR FORMER COMRADES IN AN EFFORT TO INDUCE ADDITIONAL VC TO RALLY. A TOTAL OF 150 MILLION LEAFLETS HAVE BEEN PRE-PLANNED FOR THE OPERATION, AND TWO MILLION PIASTERS WERE MADE AVAILABLE FROM THE CHIEU HOI CONTINGENCY FUND TO SUPPORT REWARD BONUSES AND SPECIAL INDUCEMENTS TO DEFECTION OF AN ENTIRE UNIT. ANOTHER INDUCEMENT OPERATION SUPPORTED BY 1.5 MILLION PIASTERS FROM THE CONTINGENCY FUND IS UNDERWAY IN II CORPS. RESULT OF THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE ASSESSED IN SUBSEQUENT REPORTS. CHIEU HOI ACTIVITY WILL CULMINATE THIS YEAR IN A NATIONWIDE ALL CHIEU HOI CAMPAIGN TO BE LAUNCHED NEXT MONTH.

(2) DESPITE THE DOWNWARD TREND CHIEU HOI RESULTS IN 1967 CONTINUED TO EXCEED 1966 PERFORMANCE. THE FOLLOWING TABLE COMPARES

follow previous

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THE NUMBER OF RETURNEES FOR 1967 TO DATE WITH THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR.

	1 JAN- 30 SEP 1966	1 JAN- 30 SEP 1967	PERCENT INCREASE
I	1153	1911	66
II	5287	6334	20
III	3134	7203	130
IV	3932	8140	107
TOTAL	13,159	23,588	81

THE LOW RATE OF INCREASE IN II CORPS IS ATTRIBUTED PRIMARILY TO THE FACT THAT MILITARY ACTION INVOLVING PENETRATION AND CLEARING OF ENEMY SANCTUARIES HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY LOWER IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR THAN IN 1966.

(3) CAPACITY OF CHIEU HOI RECEPTION CENTERS CONTINUES TO INCREASE WITH III CORPS SHOWING THE LARGEST EXPANSION. DISTRIBUTION OF CAPACITY AND COMPLETION OF PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION IS SHOWN BELOW.

CAPACITY	PERCENT INCREASE SINCE	PERCENT COMPLETION OF PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION

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 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNLF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM: MACJ0IC. SEC VI OF X.
 W 30 SEP 1 JAN 30 SEP
 I 590 87PCT 58PCT
 II 1575 21PCT 48PCT
 III 1335 95PCT 23.6PCT
 IV 1640 62PCT 69.2PCT
 A TOTAL OF 53 CENTERS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 1967, AND CONSTRUCTION IS ACUTALLY UNDERWAY OR COMPLETED IN 31 CENTER.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2396L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

(4) USE OF HOI CHANHIN ARMED PROPAGANBA TEAMS (APT'S) CONTINUES TO EXPAND, AS REVEALED IN THE STRENGTH DATA OF THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

	APT STRENGTH	
	30 SEP	20 AUG
I	580	373 + 207
II	455	459 - 4
III	864	874 - 10
IV	1028	928 + 100
TOTAL	2927	2634

AS OF 30 SEP, 839 APT WERE ARMED. THE LACK OF WEAPONS FOR SELN-DEFENSE WHILE PERFORMING PROPAGANDA MISSIONS AND GUARD DUTIES AT CHIEU HOI INSTALLATIONS HAS BEEN A SERIOUS PROBLEM. ORTUNATELY, AS A RESULT OF OUR INSISTENT URGING THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS FINALLY ISSUED A DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING THE NEEDED WEAPONS. ALL ELEMENTS OF MACV HAE BEEN ALERTED AND ARE STANDING BY TO ENSURE THE MOST RAPID POSSBLE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TOAPT'S.

(5) MORE THAN 1100 HOI CHANH HAVE ENTERED VUNG TAU FOR TRAINING AS RD CADRES. THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF APPROXIMATELY 300 IS ALREADY

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 BACK ON DUTY IN THE FIELD AND FROM ALL REPORTS THEY ARE PERFORMING AS ELITE UNITS. REPORTS FROM VUNG TAU INDICATE THE HOI CHANG GROUP FROM BA XUYEN WAS THE BEST THE PROVINCE HAD SENT TO VUNG TAU. (6) IN JULY NO HOI CHANG WERE USED AS KIT CARSON SCOUTS ON A REGULAR BASIS. IN AUGUST, APPROXIMATELY 40 WERE BEING USED BY MARINES IN I CORPUS. RECRUITMENT OF HOI CHANH FOR KIT CARSON SCOUTS CONTINUES. AT THE END OF SEP THERE WERE 92 SCOUTS ON ACTIVE DUTY AND 65 IN TRAINING FOR A TOTAL OF 157. MANY MORE HOI CHANH ARE BEING USED BY US MILITARY UNITS ON A ONE-TIME BASIS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION IS NOT RECORDED. OUR PRESENT TARGET IS 1800 KIT CARSON SCOUTS BY THE END OF FY 1968. WE ARE NOW LAUNCHING A SPECIAL EFFORT TO ASSESS THE KIT CARSON PROGRAM THROUGHOUT ALL MILITARY UNITS, WITH A VIEW TO EITHER GREATLY EXPANDING THE USE OF THESE SCOUTS OR READJUSTING THE TARGET TO MORE REALISTIC LEVEL. (7) CONSISTENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR

HOI CHANH, WITH EMPHASIS ON PRACTICAL SKILLS THAT REQUIRE A COMPARATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TRAINING AND UTILIZE READILY AVAILABLE MATERIAL AND FEW, IF ANY, COMPLICATED TOOLS. SUCH PROGRAMS INCLUDE CARPENTRY, MASONRY, TAILORING, AND AGRICULTURE-RELATED ACTIVITIES. PROVINCIAL CHIEU HOI SERVICES HAVE BEEN SLOW

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2396L C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N
 TO APPLY TO THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CHIEU HOI (MICH) FOR ALLOCATIONS FROM THE 1967 FUND OF 34 MILLION PIASTERS FOR VOCATIONAL TRAINING. WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION. EXCEPT FOR PROVINCIAL ACTIVITIES NOTED ABOVE, ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENT IN VOCATIONAL TRAINING WILL DEPEND LARGELY UPON PROGRAMS SIMILAR TO THAT BEING CONDUCTED BY EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANTS LTD UNDER CONTRACT WITH USAID. EDCON NOW HAS ELEVEN OPERATING SITES. EIGHT OF THESE ARE IN IV CORPUS AND CONSIST OF ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AT CHIEU HOI CENTERS AND HAMLETS WHERE HOI CHANH ARE DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION OF NEW BUILDINGS AND MAKING IMPROVEMENTS ON EXISTING ACTIVITIES. THE EDCON PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY LIMITED BY LACK OF TRAINING MATERIALS TO TEACH CERTAIN TRADES, SUCH AS MOTOR MAINTENANCE AND WELDING. THIS AREA IS UNDER REVIEW.

(8) NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH HAS YET OCCURRED IN GETTING JOBS FOR HOI CHANH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, ALTHOUGH MANY RETURNEES ARE GETTING JOBS, PARTICULARLY WHEN TRAINED BY SEABEES, EDCON OR OTHERS. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE OFFICIAL GVN SUPPORT OF EMPLOYMENT OF HOI CHANH BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR CONTINUE. THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF SECURITY CLEARANCES TO PERMIT EMPLOYMENT OF RETURNEES

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 IN NON-SENSITIVE OCCUPATIONS HAS YET TO BE RESOLVED.
 (9) RVNAF IS NOW EXPERIMENTING WITH USE OF HOI CHANH TROOPS
 EITHER AS INDIVIDUAL UNITS OR AS FILLERS FOR REGULAR UNITS. IN
 VINH BINH A POPULAR FORCE COMPANY COMPOSED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF HOI
 CHANH HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS AN OUTSTANDING UNIT. PERFORMANCE
 OF HOI CHANH IN APT'S, KIT CARSON SCOUTS, AND PF HAS DEMSTRATED
 THEIR SUPERIOR POTENTIAL AS MILITARY UNITS. HOWEVER, ISSUE IS
 WHETHER ARVN WILL PERMIT SUCH UNITS TO BE ORGANIZED. PRESIDENT-
 ELECT THIEU IS KNOWN TO PERSONALLY FAVOR HOI CHANH UNITS IN ARVN
 P TO COMPANY SIZE. QUESTION WILL BE RAISED AGAIN AFTER NEW GVN
 SETTLES DOWN.

E. IMPROVE THE REFUGE EFFORT. (1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
 REFUGEE INCREASED DURING THE MONTH BY 54,862. AT THE SAME TIME
 35,789 REFUGEES WERE RE-ESTABLISHED, LEAVING THE DIFFERENCE OF
 19,073 AS THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES RE-
 QUIRING CARE. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHANGE IN TOTAL REFUGEES
 AND THE CHANGE IN REFUGEES RE-ESTABLISHED DURING THE MONTH IS A
 MEASURE OF OUR PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING THE GENERATIO OF REFUGEES
 AND IN RESETTLEMENT. THIS MONTH REFUGE GNERATION WAS GREATER
 THAN REFUGEE RE-ESTABLISHMENT. AN ACCURATE STATISTICAL SERIES

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 FOR TEMPORARY REFUGEES (DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOTAL REFUGEES AND THE
 NUMBER RE-ESTABLISHED) IS AVAILABLE FROM JUNE 1967. THE CHANGE
 FROM THE PRECEDING MONTH IN THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES IS
 SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

CHANGE IN TEMPORARY REFUGEES FROM PREVIOUS MONTH
 JULY AUG SEP
 PLUS 12,885 PLUS 31,496 PLUS 19,073

AS REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRESSES AND MEASURES TO LIMIT REFUGEE
 GNERATION TAKE EFFECT, THE CHANGE SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A
 NEGATIVE QUANTITY.

(2) MODEST PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING THE MONTH IN REFUGE RE-
 ESTABLISHMENT. THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES RE-ESTABLISHED SINCE 1
 JAN 1964 AND THE CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH IS SHOWN BELOW.

REFUGEES RE-ESTABLISHED
 1 JAN 64 - 30 SEP 67
 (WITH CHANGE FROM 31 AUG)
 TOTAL RE-ESTABLISHED 159,744
 VILLAGE AND INDIVIDUALLY RESETTLED 69,167
 GVN RETURNED TO SUPPORTED RESETTLEMENT 90,577

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 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMI/SA IV CTZ

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C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROT; MACJDIR SEC VII OF X

	2,569	0	2,569
II	477,368	365,797	111,571
	13,868	9,293	4,575
III	234,343	70,414	163,929
	2,045	0	2,045
IV	404,973	132,622	272,351
	17,307	15,938	1,369

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TOTAL	1,276,248	638,000	638,428
	35,789	25,231	10,558

THE SPECIAL COMMISSARIAT FOR REFUGEES CONTINUES PLANNING FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON I CORPS. SCR HAS DIRECTED I CORPS TO EXPEDITE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS. SCR, MACV AND WORVZE ARE WORKING OUT FINAL DETAILS OF A

ARE LORKING OUT FINAL DETAILS OF A CONTRACT WITH WVI FOR A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION FROM THAT ORGAVIZATION IN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS.

(3) REEUGEES NOT RE-ESTABLISHED ARE CLASSIFIED AS TEMPORARY REFUGEES. THESE ARE THE OBJECT OF GUN PROGRAMS OF TEMPORARY CARE AND EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT. THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES INCREASED IN I AND III CORPS AND DECREASED IN II AND IV CORPS DURING SEP, AS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

TEMPORARY REFUGEES
 1 JAN 64 - 30 SEP 67
 (WITH CHANGE FROM 31 AUG)

	IN CAMP	OUT OR CAMP	TOTAL	NO. OF TEMPORARY REFUGEE CAMPS
I	189,428	216,580	406,062	140

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	297	36,222	36,519	12
II	72,201	111,633	183,834	132
	-7,329	-3,580	-10,909	-1
III	32,396	58,908	91,304	50
	-4,280	6,526	2,246	0
IV	17,677	87,655	105,332	73
	7,904	-16,687	-8,783	8
TOTAL	311,756	474,776	786,532	395
	-3,408	22,481	19,073	19

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(4) THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN I CORPS IS STILL SERIOUS, BUT NO LONGER CRITICAL. THE CRISIS OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS ABATED IN SEP DUE TO RELAXATION OF STRINGENT GVN CONTROLS IN REFUGEE ALLOWANCES, BETTER PERFORMANCE BY PROVINCE SCR OFFICIALS, AND INCREASED COMMODITY SHIPMENTS. CAALYST OF THIS MRKED IMPROVEMENT WAS THE 9 SEP I CORPS COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES CHAIRED BY GENERAL LAM AND ATTENDED BY DR. QUE (HEAD OF SCR), ALL PROVINCE CHIEFS, AND PROVINCE REFUGEE OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS THE AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS. THIS ACTION-ORIENTED MEETING RESULTED IN CUTTING CONSIDERABLE RED TAPE AND FIRM ORDERS BY THE CORPS COMMANDER AND REFUGEE COMMISSIONER TO IMPROVE PRESENT PERFORMANCE.

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INCOMPETENT REFUGEE SERVICE CHIEFS WEREREMOVED IN QUANG TRI AND QUANG NAM. CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, SUCH AS ROOFING, ARE STILL NOT IN ADEQUATE SUPPLY BUT STOCKS ARE IMPROVING. STEPS ARE IN TRAIN TO IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. WE ARE CONTINUING TO GIVE THIS SITUATION CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION, AND HOPE FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT.

(5) SCR NOW HAS 18 REFUGEE MOBILE TEAMS IN THE FIELD AND 3 IN TRAINING, A TOTAL OF 214 REFUGEE WORKERS. EIGHT TEAMS ARE IN I CORPS AND SEVEN IN II CORPS. PLANS CALL FOR THE CREATION OF 15 MORE MOBILE TEAMS DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS AND 51 MORE TES DURING THE NEXT 15 MONTHS. ALTHOUGH SCR HAS OBTAINED AUTHORITY TO ARM THE TEAMS, LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS RESPECT.

(6) VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR REFUGEES IS MOVING AT A GOOD PACE. TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE BEING EXPANDED AND PRIMARY CLASSROOMS BY THE END OF SEP REACHED A TOTAL OF 243 WITH A STAFF OF 314 TEACHERS. SCR HAS REQUESTED THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS ORGANIZING COURSES FOR REFUGEES FROM 16 TO 25. PLANNING WITH PHILCO FORD FOR TEACHER TRAINING AIDS AND DORMITORY CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

(7) DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, SEVERAL VOLUNTARY AGENCIES HAVE

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 EITHER BEGUN PROGRAMS OR PLANNED EXPANSION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS.
 THE WORLD VISION, IND 500,000 PROGRAM WILL BE LAUNCHED IN 90 DAYS
 THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE PLANS TO ESTABLISH IN TWO MORE
 LOCATIONS ITS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WHICH HAS BEEN
 SUCCESSFUL WITH IRON TRIANGLE REFUGEES. INCREASED INTEREST WAS
 SHOWN BY THE THAILAND, KOREAN AND NEW ZEALAND RED CROSS SOCIETIES.
 THE INTERNATIONAL YMCA IS CONSTRUCTING A COMMUNITY CENTER IN LAI
 THIEU AND PLANS TO BEGIN OTHERS ELSEWHERE.
 F. EXPAND POLICE EFFORT. (1) THE PRESENT NATIONAL POLICE
 FORCE LEVEL IS 67,000. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE FORCE LEVEL WILL
 REACH 70,000 BY THE END OF 1967, 4000 SHORT OF THE ESTABLISHED GOAL.
 LOW SALARIES AND POOR CAREER INCENTIVES UNDER HAZARDOUS JOB CONDI-
 TIONS CONTINUE TO BE SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO POLICE RECRUITMENT. ONLY
 10,000 POLICEMEN OF THE PRESENT FORCE HAVE CAREER STATUS. PAY OF
 POLICE OFFICERS IS BELOW THE PAY OF EQUIVALENT MILITARY GRADES. A
 PROPOSED SALARY INCREASE FOR THE TOP GRADES AND AN INCREASE IN
 CAREER PERSONNEL OF 20,000 HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE AMBASSADOR TO
 THE PRIME MINISTER. THE DGNP HAS ALSO REQUESTED AN ADDITIONAL RISK
 ALLOWANCE FOR NPFF AND SPECIAL BRANCH POLICE.
 (2) THE NUMBER OF NATIONAL POLICE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF PROVINCE

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 CAPITALS IS AN INDICATOR OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH POLICE ARE UTILIZED
 TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE RURAL POPULATION. CURRENT DATA IS NOT
 AVAILABLE, BUT RESULTS OF AN EARLIER STUDY SHOW THE FOLLOWING
 DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL POLICE (EXCLUDING NPFF) AS OF 1 JUL 1967:

	NO. OF POLICE, IN PROVINCE AT DISTRICT LEVEL	PERCENTAGE OF POLICE IN PROVINCES AT DISTRICT LEVEL
I	1297	23.2
II	1842	23.9
III	3934	41.6
IV	3248	26.8

RECENTLY SOME IMPROVEMENT WAS NOTED IN IV CORPS WHERE GO CONG,
 DINH TUONG, AND SADEC PROVINCES REPORTED THAT ADDITIONAL POLICEMEN
 WERE DEPLOYED TO DISTRICTS DURING SEP. IN KIEN HOA 165 ADDITIONAL
 POLICEMEN WERE STATIONED IN THE DISTRICTS DURING THE ELECTION
 PERIOD BUT SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO THE PROVINCE CAPITAL. ANOTHER
 CASE OF POOR PERFORMANCE IS CHAU DOC, WHERE 801 OF 1085 NP ARE IN
 THE PROVINCE CAPITAL OR ON VARIOUS SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS.
 (3) AFTER CONSIDERABLE URGING ON OUR PART, THE DGNP PROMULGATED IN
 AUGUST A NEW SOP FOR THE NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES (NPFF) MAKING
 THIS FORCE THE ACTION ARM OF THE PLICE SPECIAL BRANCH IN ELIMINAT-

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 ING THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. A REORGANIZATION OF THE NP SPECIAL POLICE
 IS DELAYING FULL IMPEMENTATION OF THE NEW CONCEPT. SOM PROVINCES
 ARE CONTINUING TO USE NPFFTO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR VILLGES AND RD
 TEAMS. HOWEVER, A STRONG ADVISORY EFFORT IS BEING MADE TOCORRECT
 THIS SITUATIONGM THE NPFF FORCE LEVEL HAS REHED 11,000 MEN. WITH
 59 OMPANIES DELPOYED AND 4 IN TRAINING. SOME DELOYED COMPANIES
 ARE NOT YET AT FULL STRENGTH. AS OF 30 SE29 COMPANIES WERE DE-

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 PLOYED ACCORDING TO THE NEW CONCEPT.
 KRL PRISON REHAILITATON TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE DETENTION CENTERS
 FOR CONVICTED INFRASTRUCTURE MEMBERS WAS STALLED DURING SEP. A RE-
 QUEST FOR 100 MILLION PIASTERS TO INITATE CONSTRUCTION OF
 DETENTION CENTERS WAS SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 SEP. CURRENT
 PLANS CALL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF EIGHT 500-MAN CAMP AND ONE 5,000-
 10,000 MAN FACILITY BY JUNE 1968. THE LATER FACILITY WOULD BE FOR
 CONVICTED CIVIL DEFENDANTS WHILE DEINTION CAMPS WOULD BE FOR THOSE
 AWAITING PROCESSING AND SENTENCING. PRELIMINARY SURVYS HAVE BEEN
 CO DUCTED TO DETRMIN POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION SITES, ATERIAL AND
 CONSTRUCTIO COST. NUMEROUS SITES HAVE BEEN EXAMINED BUT ONLY ONE
 IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR THE LARGE FACILITY-CON SON ISLAND.
 DESPITE OUR EFFORTS, NO NEW PRSONNEL WERE ADDED TO THE ROLLS OF
 THE DIRECTORATE OF CORRECTIONS. LOS SALARIES ARE PERAPS THEMAIN
 DETERRENT TO RECRUITING AAD RETENTION OF PRSONNEL WITHIN GHE
 DIRECTORATE. RECENT BUDGET HEARINGS BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
 BUDGET AND FOREIGN AID (DGBFA) INDICATE THAT NO. PROVISION WILL BE
 MADE FOR AN INCREASE IN SALARIES OR FORCE LEVELS. ACTION IS NOW
 REQUIRED AT THE PRIME MINISTER LEVEL.
 (5) THE FIRST MEETING OF THE NEWLY FOMED NATIONAL RESOURCES

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 CONTROL COUNCIL WAS HELD ON 6 SEP. ONLY PROCEDURAL MATTERS WERE
 COVERED. THE NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 6 OCT WILL COVER RESOURCES
 CONTROL OPERATIONS IN THE IIICORPS AEA. IT IS HOPED THAT A NEW
 APPROACH TO RESOURCES CONTROL CAN BE FASHIONED, PARTICULARLY IN
 REMOVING USLESS BOTTLENECKS TO THE FREE FLOW OF COMMERCE AND
 TRAFFI.

G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC WORKS, VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT,
 AGRICULTURE, ELF-HELP, ETC. (1) PROGRESS IN VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IS
 REFLECTED IN BUDGETARY PERFORMANCE AS DEPICTED IN THE FOLLOWING
 TABLE.

	BUDGETED VN	PCT BUDGET EXPENDED 30 SEP	PCT BUDGET EXPENDED 31 AUG
VILLAGE/HAMLETS ADMIN PRSONNEL	31,933,000	39	
SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT	242,988,000	66	56
RURAL EDUCATION	477,591,000	70	59
RURAL HEALTH	172,186,000	57	53
ROADS AND BRIDGES	464,543,000	42	32
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION	82,031,000	19	4
AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION	51,601,000	61	45

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ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	101,795,000	50	43
AGRICULTURE AFFAIRS AND EXTENSION	106000,000	55	44
FISHERIES	44,922,000	58	43

(2) VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMINISTRATION. THIS PROGRAM IS RELATED TO THE
 TRAINING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS. TRAINING COURSES FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS
 ARE PROGRAMMED IN EACH PROVINCE. THE TRAINING WAS INITIATED
 IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE HAMLET/VILLAGE ELECTIONS. THE GOAL FOR CY
 1967 IS TO GIVE A TRAINING COURSE OR SEMINAR FOR OVER 22,900 OR
 ABOUT 41PCT OF ALL VILLAGE-HAMLET OFFICIALS. QUALITY OF TRAINING IS
 GENERALLY GOOD BECAUSE INSTRUCTOR TRAINING HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
 AND TRAINING BOOKLETS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AND ISSUED. QUALITY OF
 TRAINING WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AS EXPERIENCE IS GAINED AND AS
 COURSES ARE DEVELOPMENT AND REFINED TO MEET LOCAL NEEDS.

(3) SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT. COMPLETION OF UNFUNDED AND UN-
 FUNDED SELF-HELP PROJECTS IS SHOWN BELOW.

SELF-HELP PROJECTS COMPLETED 1967

FUNDED	JAN-SEP 66	JAN-SEP 67	JAN-AUG 67	PROGRAM
	3478	2487	2071	4804

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 UNFUNDED 1281 6592 5000 5000PLUS
 (4) RURAL EDUCATION.

CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION
 PROGRAMMED 1967 CONSTRUCTED SEP CONSTRUCTED AUG
 NO. OF CLASSROOMS 2266 1148 843
TEACHER TRAINING
 TRAINING COMPLETED
 PROGRAMMED 1967 SEP AUG
 NO. OF TRAINEE 2959 2937 2706
 (5) RURAL HEALTH.

MATERNITY/DISPENSARY CONSTRUCTION
 SEP AUG
 NO. PROGRAMMED 327 327
 NO. COMPLETED 42 18
 O. UNDER CONSTRUCTION 154 123
 THIS PROGRAM GOT OFF O A SLOW STARTE DUE TO INITIAL DESIGN
 PROBLEMS AND SELECTION OF SITES, AND CONSTRUCTION WAS NOT
 INITIATED UNTIL JUN 1967.

(6) ROADS AND BRIDGES. HIS PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO DEVELOP LINES
 OF COMMUNICATIN IN VILLGES AND HALETYS AND FROM THEM TO THE

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 2398L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORM
 SECONDARY ROADS. THE EFFORT IS CONCENTRATED IN AND NEAR NEW LIFE
 HAMLET. THIS PROJECT IS CARRIED ON USING THE SELF-HELP PRINCIPLE,
 WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM PROVINCIAL PUBLIC WORKS CHIEFS.
PROVINCIAL ROADS/BRIDGES

		SEP	AUG
(BRIDGES PROGRAMMED FOR	ABOVE 1 MILLION VM	33	33
CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION)	UNDER MILLION	31	31
(UNDER CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION	ABOVE 1 MILLION	7	3
COMPLETED)	UNDER 1 MILLION	56	42
(ROAD PROGRAMMED FOR	REPAIR	566	566
CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATON(KM)NEW	CONSTRUCTION	216	216
COMPLETED (KM)	REPAIRED	263	230
	NEW CONSTRUCTION	115.6	97

(7) RURAL ELECTRIFICATION. THIS PROGRAM CONSISTS OF CONSTRUCTION
 FACILITIES TO PROVIDE POWER TO VILLAGES AND
 HAMLETS. THE PLANTS WILLBE OPERATED BY RURAL COOPERATIVES. AS OF

31 AUGUST 18 SITES WERE COMPLETED AND 26 WERE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

(8) AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE FARMLAND
 IRRIGATION, DRAINANGE AND FACILITIES FOR WATER SUPPLY CONTROL IN NEW
 LIFE HAMLETS. THESE PROJECTS ARE LOCALLY SELECTED AND INCLUDE BOTH
 BT

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ZNY CCCCC
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FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ

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RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM: MACJDIR SEC IX OF X
NEW CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR OF OLD SYSTEMS.

SMALL IRRIGATION CONSTRUCTION

1967 PROGRAM	COMPLETED	
	SEP	AUG
NO. OF DAMS 19	ABOVE 1 MILLION VN 7	4
	UNDER 1 MILLION VN 25	16
NO. OF CANALS 107.7		74

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2399L **C O N F I D E N T I A L** NOFORN
(9) ANIMAL HUSBANDRY. THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES GRANT DISTRIBUTION OF PIGS, POULTRY, ANIMAL FEEDS, ETC., AND PROVIDES TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND TRAINING FOR FARMERS IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS.

PROGRAMMED	COMPLETED	
	SEP	AUG
PIGS DISTRIBUTED	8,145	7,809
CHICKEN AND DUCKS.	16,180	12,770
FARMERS TRAINED	19,797	13,468

(10) AGRICULTURE AFFAIRS UNDER RD BUDGET. RURAL HAMLETS ARE ASSTED BY NAGRICULTURAL CADREE AND TECHNICIANS TRAINED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. THESE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL ASSIST RD CADREIN TRAINING LOCAL FARMERS IN IMPROVED CROP PRODUCTION METHODS AD TECHNOLOGY. THE PAY OF THE AGRICULTURAL CADRE AND TECHNICIANS AS WELL AS COST OF FERTILIZER, INSECTICIDES, SPRAYERS, PUMPS AND THE TRAINING AND DEMONSTRATION COSTS ARE FUNDED FROM THE RD BUDG ET AND USAID. THIS PROGRAM IS SUPERIMPOSED UPON THE REGULAR MOA PROGRAM.

PROGRAM	COMPLETED	
	SEP	AUG
FARMER TRAINING SESSIONS	982	651

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 2399L C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N
 NO. OF FARMERS 32,447 30,643
 DEMONSTRATIONS 928 834 682

VN
 PLANTING MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED 24,750,000 18,735,000 17,826,000

(11) FISHERIES. THE COUNTRY-WIDE GOAL IS TO INCREASE THE TOTAL FISH CATCH IN 1967 BY 50,000 MT OVER THE 1966 CATCH. IN NEWLY SECURED AREAS WHERE FISHING IS THE MAIN OCCUPATION, TRAINING OF FISHERMEN, DISTRIBUTION OF FISHING GEAR, BOAT MOTORS AND CONSTRUCTION OF FISH MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES ARE SUPPORTED WITH TECHNICAL SERVICES AND COMMODITIES FUNDED BY MORD AND USAID.

	1967	COMPLETED	COMPLETED
	PROGRAM	SEP	AUG
	17	6	4

MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES (NO.)			
FISHING EQUIP AND FINGERLINGS	VN 10,943,000	4,432,000	3,827,000

BOAT MOTORS (NO.)	383	168	101
NO. OF FISHERMEN TRAINED		5,985	5,658

(12) THE MAJOR IR-8 RICE EXPERIMENT IN BINH TUY IS PROCEEDING FAVORABLY. IR-8 IS A RICE WITH POTENTIALLY MUCH GREATER YIELDS.

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2399L C O F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N

THREE ADDITIONAL PROVINCES HAVE STARTED DEMONSTRATION PLOTS, ALTHOUGH GVN IS RELUCTANT TO INTRODUCE IR-8 ON A MASS SCALE UNTIL A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL CULTIVATION DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN SORTED OUT.

(13) HIGHLIGHTS FROM PROVINCE REPORTS INDICATE CONTINUATION OF WEAK PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN I CROPS, AGTHOUGH SOME IMPROVEMENT WAS

NOTED WITH APPOINTMENT OF A NEW REFUGEE CHIEF IN QUANG TRI AND NEW RD CHIEFS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN. IN QUANG NAM A PILOT PROGRAX USING RICE THRESHING MACHINES IS SUCCESSFUL SO FAR. FARMERS REPORT THRESHING CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASED FROM 200 TO 500 KILOS PER

DAY. IN II CORPS ON 9 SEP A SPILL WAY WAS OPENED AT THE DAN NHIM HYDROELECTRIC PLANT (NINH THUAN), PERMITTING IRRIGATION OF 10,000 HECTARES DURING THE DRY SEASON. SEVERAL NEW AGRICULTURAL AND EDUCATION ADVISORS ARE AT WORK IN THE HIGHLANDS: FIVE ELEMENTARY TEACHER WORKSHOPS HAVE BEEN ATTENDED BY NEARLY 800 TEACHERS. A COORDINATED IMMUNIZATION/SANITATION/HEALTH EDUCATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN INITIATED IN THE LOWLAND PROVINCES. IN III CORPS COMPETITION OF FUNDED SELF-HELP PROJECTS ROSE 10 PERCENT DURING THE MONTH. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT (NLD) PROGRESS IN NON-RD AREAS IS BASICALLY SUB-MARGINAL, RANGING FROM POOR TO SATISFACTORY. IN IV CORPS THE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY VITAL FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE HIGHWAY

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 2399L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 LIFELINE, WAS PLAGUED BY LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND THE HIGH PRICE OF
 ROCK. THE ONLY SOURCE OF ROCK IN THE DELTA IS THE NUI SAP QUARRY
 IN THE SEVEN MOUNTAINS AREA OF AN GIANG PROVINCE. A START TOWARD
 SOLVING THIS PROBLEM WAS MADE WITH AWARD OF A CONTRACT TO RMK FOR
 THE NUI SAP ROCK QUARRY PROJECT. IN GENERAL, THE MAJOR ROADS IN IV
 CORPS DETERIORATED FURTHER UNDER HEAVY USE AND CONTINUED MININGS BY
 THE VC.
 H. BUDGET PERFORMANCE.

GUN BUDGET PROGRAM	1967 BUDGET (VN)	PERCENT	PERCENT
		EXPENDED SEP	EXPENDED AUG
CHIEU HOI	972,000,000	81%	73%
VIS	40,000,000	45	41
REFUGEES			
TEMP. RELIEF	532,900,000	19	16
RESETTLEMENT	760,000,000	16	13
SPECIAL FUND	50,000,000	58	51
TOTAL	1,342,900,000	19	16
MORD			
<u>RD BUDGET PERFORMANCE</u>			
I CORPS	337,142,000	60	46

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 2399L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

II CORPS	484,792,000	48	40
III CORPS	539,784,000	54	45
IV CORPS	810,614,000	47	39
TOTAL	2,172,332,000	51	42

OBIGATIONS. EXPENDITURE DATA UNRELIABLE.

4. (C) STATUS OF PACIFICATION RESOURCES

UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
(1) ARVN BNS	53	53
(2) RF COS	213	219
(3) PF PLATS	775	745
(4) GROUPS		
(A) RD CADRE	491	505
	(INCLUDING 38 20-MAN TEAMS IN AN GIANG)	
(B) TRUONG SON	107	106
(C) CIV/MILITARY	32	32
(D) QTR ZONE TEAM CADRE	2	2
(5) STATIC CENSUS GRIVINCE	5234	5340
(6) NATIONAL POLICE	66,135	67,240
	(AS OF 30 JUL)	(AS OF 30

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 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM: MACJDIR FINAL SEC OF X. (AUG)

5. (C) INDICATOR TRENDS

- A. CHIEU HOI
- B. REFUGEES

GAINS
 NOT RESETTLED
 RESETTLED

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
	179:	1781
	62,700	54,862
	767,459	786,532
	1,240,639	1,276,428

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2400L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

C. VC INCIDENTS

TOTAL
 TERRORISM (INCLUDING RCD)
 CIVIL CASUALTIES (ASSINA-
 TIONS AND ABDUCTIONS) AS A
 RESULT OF TERRORISM

3,191	3,181
610	567
914	1411

D. STATUS OF RD PLANS:

	ON SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	LAST MONTH	BEHIND SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	LAST MONTH
I CORPS	1	(0)	W4	(5)
II CORPS	4	(5)	8	(-)
III CORPS	2	(1)	9	(10)
IV CORPS	3	(4)	13	(12)
	10	(10)	34	(34)

E. LOC STATUS

1. ROADS (MILITARILY
 ESSENTIAL

GREEN	AMBER	RED
61PCT (1711 KM)	32PCT (698 KM)	7PCT (196 KM)

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 2400L C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N

2. RAILROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)

42PCT
(521 KM)

2PCT
(25 KM)

56PCT
(694 KM)

3. ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS IN NPA OF III & IV CORPS

45PCT
(261 KM)

47PCT
(272 KM)

8PCT
(46 KM)

6. (C) ENEMY REACTION TO PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE:

A. ENEMY REACTION TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN I CORPS

REMAINS AT THE SAME LEVEL. TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND ENEMY INCIDENTS WERE HIGH EARLY IN SEPTEMBER AS A RESULT OF THE VC ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT THE ELECTION. THE ENEMY CONTINUED HIS ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT PACIFICATION PROGRAMS BY ATTACKING RCD GROUPS, DISTRICT HEAD-QUARTERS AND PROVINCE CAPITALS. THE VC/NVA RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST ANY RD AREA. THE ENEMY HAS ALSO CONTINUED TO INTERDICT HIGHWAY NR 1.

B. THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER WAS MARKED BY A CONTINUED LACK OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS; A CONSOLIDATION OF THE 3D NVA DIVISION'S FORCES NEAR THE POPULATION CENTERS OF BINH DINH PROVINCE; INTENSIFICATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS ON PHU

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2400L C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N

YEN PROVINCE; AND SMALL SCALE ATTACKS ON THE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY, HIGHWAY INTERDICTION, BRIDGE DESTRUCTION AND MINING INCIDENTS IN THE REMAINDER OF THE CORPS AREA. THE APPARENT LACK OF ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HIGHLAND SUGGESTS THAT THE ENEMY'S SUMMER MONSOON CAMPAIGN HAS FAILED. THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO DISRUPT THE GVN ELECTIONS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND HAS SINCE INCREASED HIS EFFORTS TO KEEP FRIENDLY FORCES TIED DOWN ALONG THE COAST. HIS APPARENT OBJECTIVES ARE TO SECURE THE MAJOR RICE HARVEST SCHEDULED FOR EARLY OCTOBER AND TO MOUNT MEDIUM TO LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS AND THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS.

C. IN SEPTEMBER THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN VC TERRORISM

ATTACKS DIRECTED AT INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE RD PROGRAM, (THIS OCCURRED DESPITE THE OVERALL LOW LEVEL OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS) AND A CONTINUATION OF SMALL SCALE ATTACKS AND HARRASSMENT OF RD HAMLET AND MILITARY OUTPOSTS. VC ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES RESULTED IN THE KILLING OF THE POLICE CHIEF OF PHUOC LONG AND WOUNDING THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF HSANG BANG. THE DEPUTY FOR SECURITY IN HUB NGHIA WAS KILLED BY A LAND MINE. THESE OFFICIALS WERE CONSIDERED AMONG THE TOP OF THEIR CONTEMPORARIES AND THEIR LOSS IS SIGNIFICANT WHEN CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE SHORTAGE OF

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 2400L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 QUALIFIED LEADERS. PRIOR TO AND DURING THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS PERIOD THE VC CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA OPERATION OF THREATS IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE POLLS, BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO CARRY OUT THE THREATS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT MANNER. THIS FAILURE IS BELIEVED TO BE DUE TO THE SECURITY PROVIDED TO THE POLLING PLACES AND A GREATLY REDUCED CAPABILITY OF THE ENEMY.

D. ALMOST HALF OF THE VC INITIATED INCIDENTS IN IV CORPS BURING SEPTEMBER TOOK PLACE DURING THE PERIOD 2-4 SEPTEMBER MY THO WAS MORTARED FOR THE FIRST TIME DURING THE WAR ON SEPTEMBER 3, AND AGAIN ON SEPTEMBER 16TH. SEVERAL DISTRICT CAPITALS ALSO WERE MORTARED ON ELECTION DAY. FIVE PROVINCES REPORTED ATTACKS ON RD TEAMS DURING THE MONTH. ROADS WERE INTERDICTED IN BAC LIEU, CHUONG THIEN, AND VINH LONG.

(C) A GAS REQUIRING SPECIAL ATTENTION, THE PROTECTION OF HAMLETS ALREADY CONSTRUCTED AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR REGRESS ARE PROBLEMS WE ARE KEEPING AN EYE ON. THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PEOPLES GROUP (RDPG) HAVE NOT YET BECOME A VIABLE VSRO OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM; ALL TO OFTEN THEY ARE NOT TRAINED AND WHEN TRAINED, NOT ARMED. ATTEMPTS BY THE VC TO REINFILTRATE FIRST SEMESTER HAMLETS

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 2400L C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 WERE NOTED IN VINH BINH AND CHUONG THIEN PROVINCES IN IV CORPS. ONE PROVINCE TEAM IN PHONG DINH HAS EXPRESSED ITS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE LACK OF A VIABLE VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN GRAI XUAN VILLAGE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE GAINS MADE BEFORE THE RD GROUPS MOVE BEING LOST. THESE PROBLEMS ARE GETTING OUR CLOSE ATTENTION. THE IV CTZ COMMANDER HAS AGREED TO SEND AN INSPECTION TEAM TO AREAS WITH QUESTIONABLE SECURITY TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF THE PACIFIED HAMLET AND ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIRED.

FOOTNOTE: ROADS DEFINED AS MILITARILY ESSENTIAL INCLUDE 451 KM IN I CORPS, 1413 KM IN II CORPS, 590 KM IN III CORPS, AND 351 KM IN IV CORPS. ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS INCLUDE 225 KM IN III CORPS AND 354 KM IN IV CORPS.

GP-4.
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ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

FOR

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 ZNY EEEEE
 P 170201Z NOV 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. AS YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION FOR 3DMAR DIV WAS APPROVED BEFORE A COMPLETE LIST OF ALL QUALIFYING AND RECOMMENDED REINFORCING UNITS COULD BE APPROVED BY SECNAV. THIS HAS CREATED A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE SUBSEQUENT RECEIPT OF THE RECOMMENDATION FOR THE AWARD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION FOR THE 1STMARDIV AND THE 1STMAR. GEN ABRAMS, IN HIS REVIEW, HAS POINTED OUT THAT SOME UNITS APPEAR IN MORE THAN ONE RECOMMENDATION FOR THE SAME TIME FRAME. IN ADDITION, SOME UNITS, I.E. THE 5THMAR AND UNITS OF MAGS 16 AND 36 WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR UNIT AWARDS ARE AGAIN SHOWN IN THE DIVISION AND WING RECOMMENDATION. I HAVE RETURNED THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1STMARDIV AND 1STMAR TO YOU TO

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 2605 UNCLAS E F T O

PURGE THEM FOR DUPLICATION AND RESUBMISSION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE 3DMARDIV HAS BEEN AWARDED THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION, THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IS TO REVIEW THE UNITS INVOLVED IN THIS RECOMMENDATION AND SUBMIT THE REVISED LIST.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, NUMEROUS MARINES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED WEARING THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION WHILE TRANSITING OKINAWA. PENDING PROMULGATION OF UNITS APPROVED FOR CITATION, PERSONNEL SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM PURCHASING AND WEARING THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION FOR SERVICE WITH 3DMARDIV. BEST REGARDS.

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c/s	<i>o</i>

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ZNY CCCCC
R 172303Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

BT
CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND
MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK
1. IN YOUR INVESTIGATION OF THE UNIE LOSS INVOLVING
GENERAL HOCHMUTH, I AM SURE YOU WILL EXPLORE CARE-
FULLY THE MATTER OF POSSIBLE SABOTAGE. OF CONCERN TO
ME, IN THIS REGARD, IS THE OLD ISSUE OF SECURITY AT
HUE-PHU BAI BECAUSE OF THE CIVILIAN PRESENCE. I HAVE
NEVER FELT THAT OUR AIRCRAFT ARE SAFE THERE, UNDER THE
EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. PERHAPS IT IS TIME TO REOPEN,
ONCE MORE, THE ISSUE OF REAL ESTATE AND RESPONSIBILITY WITH
MACV. BEST REGARDS.

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SECRET

FLEET MARINE FORCE STRUCTURE (U)
AGMC SPDLTR SER: 003625867 OF 24OCT67
1. REFERENCE A APPROVED REALIGNMENT OF 1ST AND 3RD ANTI-TANK, DIRECTED USE OF ASSETS GAINED BY REDUCTION OF ANTI-TANK BATTALIONS PZ ACTIVATE TWO NEW RECON COMPANIES AND TWENTY-FOUR ADDITIONAL RECON SQUADS AND PROVIDED IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.
2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF REFERENCE A IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU SUBMIT A DEPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT REQUEST (DAR) ON AN ASAP BASIS, TO COMUSMACV, TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY FOR TRADE-OFF OF ANTI-TANK BATTALION SPACES FOR THE TWO NEW RECON COMPANIES AND THE ADDITIONAL RECON SQUADS.

WNEM I S
HAVE PERSONALLY DISCUSSED THE EXCHANGE WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND; HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSARY THAT

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 2661 SECRET
CONFIRMATION OF THIS EXCHANGE BE OBTAINED TO SUPPORT THE

ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED.
4. FURTHER REQUEST THAT COPIES OF REFERENCE A BE FURNISHED CGS OF THE 1ST AND 3RD MARDIV

GP-4
BT

15 NOV 67
Gen Krulak called this date - No action required on this msg
No further action
RMPlett

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#74

O 180325Z ZYH ZFF 1
FM GEN ABRAMS DEP COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN III MAF NANG
ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 1105 EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN

CONFIDENTIAL

1. FOLLOWING BACKCHANNEL MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM GEN WESTMORELAND:

"1. GENERAL WHEELER HAS JUST INFORMED ME THAT THE GAO HAS SUBMITTED A LENGTHY REPORT ALLEGING THAT THERE ARE HIGH QUANTITIES OF EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN IN THE MAGNITUDE OF 3 TO 9 TIMES REQUIREMENTS. THE CHAIRMAN AND THE SECRETARY ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ADVERSE PUBLICITY IN THIS REGARD AND URGENTLY NEED INFORMATION AS TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE GAO REPORT; THE REASON FOR THE EXCESS AND WHAT WE ARE DOING ABOUT IT.

2. PLEASE SEND TO ME BY 0800 WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW MORNING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WITH AN INFO COPY OF THE MESSAGE TO GEN WHEELER:

- A. WHAT KNOWLEDGE DO WE HAVE OF THE GAO REPORT?
- B. ARE THERE, IN FACT, EXCESSES OF THE MAGNITUDE ALLEGED AND WHAT ARE THE MAJOR COMMODITIES INVOLVED?
- C. WHY HAVE EXCESSES OF SUCH MAGNITUDE DEVELOPED?

D. WHAT STEPS ARE WE TAKING TO CORRECT THE SITUATION AND HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE TO BRING THIS ABOUT?"

2. REQUEST ANY INFORMATION YOU HAVE AVAILABLE REGARDING QUESTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 2 BE FORWARDED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN 1800 HOURS, 13 NOVEMBER.

NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

250

File with, and as, personal/exclusives
[Signature]



NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

75

SECRET/NOFORN

INZYCSUGVV VPF681
 DE RUMHVP 5013D 3250641
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 210641Z NOV 67
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

NOFORN
 EXCLUSIVE

SECRET NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM BGEN METZGER
 OPERATION A-3 AREA

1. CG 3D MARDIV MSG 210611Z NOV 67
1. PRESENTED TENTATIVE PLAN TO CLEAR A-3 POSITION ACCESS ROAD TO SECURE GENERAL A-3 AREA DURING CONSTRUCTION PERIOD TO GEN TRUONG 201600H NOV 67. RECOMMENDED PLAN IS BASED ON INITIAL PARTICIPATION THREE USMC BNS AND THREE ARVN BNS WITH POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT DELETION SOME FORCES IF ENEMY SITUATION AND REACTION PERMIT. WHILE THIS IS OPTIMUM, FORCES BELIEVED NECESSARY I INDICATED THAT WE COULD CONDUCT THIS OPN WITH TWO BNS EACH VICE THREE.
2. GEN TRUONG AGREED TO GENERAL CONCEPT BUT ONLY AGREED TO PROVIDE TWO BATTALIONS INITIALLY TO CLEAR AREA AND THEN ONE BATTALION AFTER POSITION CLEARED TO PROVIDE TACTICAL SECURITY FOR USMC ENGINEER FORCE AND ITS OWN LOCAL SECURITY

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 5013 SECRET NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 USMC RIFLE COMPANY UNTIL 10DEC67. HE STATED HE COULD NOT PROVIDE THIS BATTALION ANY LONGER THAN 10DEC67 DUE TO SHORTAGE OF ARVN BATTALIONS HIS DIVISION.

3. ASIDE FROM DOUBT WHETHER ABOVE ARVN PARTICIPATION PERIOD 29NOV67 - 10DEC67 SUFFICIENT FROM TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW I HAVE SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT ARVN NON-PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS FROM 10DEC67 TO 1FEB71 WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO SECURE AREA WHILE WE BUILD THEIR POSITION. IT HAS BEEN OUR CONCEPT ALL ALONG THAT THE ARVN SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN SECURING THIS POSITION WHICH THEY WILL MAN AND THAT MY SO DOING THEY WILL BECOME FAMILIAR EARLY WITH THE AREA AS WILL AS BE IN A POSITION TO COMMENCE MANNING IT AS CONSTRUCTION PERMITS. OUR OWN HEAVY COMMITMENTS AND LIMITED FORCES AVAILABLE TO MEET THOSE COMMITMENTS FOR A-3 OPERATION ARE SET FORTH IN REF A. WE ARE SIMPLY NOT IN A POSITION TO ALSO ASSUME WHAT RIGHTLY SHOULD BE ARVN COMMITMENTS. THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF OUR SHOULDERING THE ARVN LOAD FOR THIS PORTION OF DYE MARKER RESPONSIBILITY NEED NO COMMENT.
4. I BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE CALLED TO GENERAL LAM'S ATTENTION IN AN EFFORT TO HELP GENERAL TRUONG OBTAIN THE ASSETS HE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

#76

SECRET/NOFORN

PAGETHREE RUMHVP 5013 SE C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
REQUIRES TO CARRY HIS PART OF THE LOAD.

5. NEW BUT RELATED SUBJECT. GENERAL TROUNG ALSO INDICATED
DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING ARTILLERY FOR C-1 FROM I CORPS.
UNTIL THIS IS DONE AND THE C-1 POSITION IS CONSTRUCTED AND
MANNED, WE HAVE NO HOPE OF REMOVING OUR OWN ARTILLERY FROM
GIO LINH WHICH PRESENTLY IS SECURED BY ONE USMC RIFLE COMPANY.
THIS COMPANY IS BADLY NEEDED ELSEWHERE. IT WILL NOT BE
REQUIRED AT C-1 ONCE WE MOVE CERTAIN ARTILLERY UNITS THERE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

COPY

1 OF 3

#76
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CG | *10*
C/S | *9*
DC/SMA | *has been*
FILLER

CCN 141

16

DTG 221130Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FIRST MAW

FOR

CATEGORY _____

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MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3-4 OF 6

COPIES OF CG FIRST MAW MESSAGE 221130Z NOV 67

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G-2:

G-3

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24 Dec 67
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DATE/TIME GROUP 221130Z NOV 67

#77

SECRET

FOR

PP RUMWAA
 DE RUMHAW 291W 326113Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 221130Z NOV 67
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUMFUN/CTG SEVEN SEVEN
 INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET

FOR FMFPAC (F-234)
 FOR RADM COUSINS FROM MGEN ANDERSON
 ASA BDA EVALUATION

- A. CINCPACFLT 222018Z NOV 67
- B. CG FMFPAC 122224Z NOV 67
- C. ADMIN COMSEVENTHFLT 132630Z NOV 67
- D. CG FMAW 130253Z NOV 67

- 1. REF A, B AND C REQUEST FMAW ASA BDA EVALUATION BE COORDINATED WITH CTF-77. REF D WAS MY INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR COORDINATION OF SUBJ PROGRAM.
- 2. I HAVE FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST THE OEG PROGRESS REPORTS

PAGE TWO RUMHAW 291W SECRET

ON NAVY ASA SYSTEMS DELIVERY ACCURACY AND WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE MARINE ASA BDA SUBJECTED TO THE SAME DETAILED ANALYSIS.

3. IT APPEARS NOW THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR OUR STAFFS TO MEET PERSONALLY AND DISCUSS THIS PROGRAM AND WORK OUT DETAILS. IN THIS REGARD I WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY YOU AND MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF TO MY HQ IN DANANG AT A TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. SUBJ TO YOUR CONCURRENCE I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE AGENDA:

- A. CONCEPT
 - B. TIME FRAME
 - C. TARGET CRITERIA AND MATERIALS
 - D. PHOTO COVERAGE
 - E. USE OF RSP
 - F. CREW DATA INPUTS.
5. PLS ADVISE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
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TOP SECRET

VV PAC 589
 PP RUMWAA
 DE RUMHMA 3732 3262337
 ZNY TTTT
 P 222337Z NOV 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN MURRAY
 FROM LTGEN RULAK, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE BLACK BOOK BEGINS TO GIVE CLUES THAT THE
 ENEMY IS PROBABLY MOVING FORCES AND MATERIAL TOWARD
 THE DMZ REGION, IMPROVING ARTILLERY COORDINATION
 MEANS, INTENSIFYING RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHERWISE
 PREPARING THE BATTLEFIELD. A FAIR JUDGEMENT WOULD
 SEEM TO BE THAT HE HAS IN MIND AN UNDERTAKING SIMILAR
 TO LATE SEPTEMBER.

2. I HAVE CALLED THIS TO CINCPAC'S ATTENTION,
 SUGGESTING THAT HE PRESS COMUSMACV TO INTENSIFY
 ARC LIGHT AND OTHER NEUTRALIZATION EFFORTS IN THE
 AREA, TO HELP YOU IN YOUR EFFORTS TO SPOIL THE
 ENEMY'S PREPARATIONS. HAPPY THANKSGIVING.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 97
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AT EXCLUSIVE FOR FOLLOWS FROM SUPVR SENDS/////

PP RUMWAA
DE RUHFMA 3783 3270434
ZNY CCCCC
P 230434Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN MURRAY
FROM LTGEN KRULAK
155MM HOW SP M109

1. YOUR CONCERN OVER SUPPORT OF THE M109 IS SHARED HERE.

AS YOU RECALL, DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, IN A SERIES OF MESSAGES, THIS HEADQUARTERS REQUESTED STATUS UPDATES ON END ITEM DEFICIENCIES AND REPAIR PARTS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE M109, ALONG WITH THE OTHER MAJOR ORDNANCE EQUIPMENTS. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO THE M109:

A. MCSA PHILA HAS BEEN PROVIDED WITH REQUIREMENTS TO FILL T/E AND MAINTENANCE FLOAT DEFICIENCIES. SHIPMENTS WILL BE EXPEDITED.

B. MAINTENANCE FLOAT ALLOWANCES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND AN INCREASE OF FOUR M109'S, FOR A NEW TOTAL OF FIVE, IS BEING REQUESTED.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 3783 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. SUPPLY ACTION HAS BEEN EXPEDITED ON SIXTY FIVE REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONS DESIGNATED RED BALL. TO DATE FORTY REQUISITIONS HAVE BEEN FILLED AND SHIPPED BY MCSA PHILA. THE REMAINING 25, SOME OF WHICH REQUIRED NEW PROCUREMENT, ARE EXPECTED TO BE FILLED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

D. FORECASTS OF REPAIR PARTS REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO MCSA PHILA AND PHILA HAS INITIATED PROCUREMENT TO SUPPORT THESE REQUIREMENTS. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON OBTURATOR SPINDLES AND PADS.

2. IT IS REALIZED THAT THE EXTENSIVE UTILIZATION OF THIS WEAPON, PARTICULARLY THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF FIRING AT MAXIMUM CHARGE, HAS CAUSED ABNORMAL WEAR. IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET THESE PROBLEMS, THE U.S. ARMY WEAPONS COMMAND IS CURRENTLY PREPARING AN M109 PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT MODIFICATION KIT SIMILAR TO THAT PROVIDED FOR THE M110 HOWITZER. TENTATIVE AVAILABILITY DATE OF THIS KIT IS LATE JAN 68. RESULTS OF THE USA WEAPONS COMMAND'S EVALUATION OF THE FIRST MARD IV PROPOSAL FOR AN OBTURATOR SPINDLE SLEEVE ARE INDEED SLOW IN COMING, BUT WE ARE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HQMC ON THESE ITEMS AND WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE.

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#78

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PAGE 3 RUHMFMA 3783 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. REPLACEMENT OF THE CURRENT WEAPONS WITH NEW WEAPONS OF FOURTH YEAR CONFIGURATION IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. WHILE SOME SMALL TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE MAY ACCRUE, SUCH A CHANGE OVER WOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE REPAIR PARTS AVAILABILITY PROBLEM SINCE MAJOR COMPONENTS SUCH AS THE CANNON ASSEMBLY, RECOIL MECHANISM, TRAVERSING MECHANISM, HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS, FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM, ENGINE AND TRANSMISSION ARE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL ON BOTH MODELS. HOWEVER, HQMC HAS INFORMED US THAT THEY ARE WORKING ON AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR THE WEAPONS, BUT IT IS A YEAR OFF AT BEST.

4. CONSIDER A MAINTENANCE FLOAT OF TEN WEAPONS EXCESSIVE. A FLOAT OF THAT SIZE FOR A T/E OF FORTY TWO WEAPONS WOULD COMPROMISE THE PURPOSE OF A FLOAT. IF PROPERLY EMPLOYED, A MAINTENANCE FLOAT OF FIVE WEAPONS SHOULD BE ADEQUATE.

5. THE M109 HAS BEEN PLAGUED BY SHORTAGES OF REPAIR PARTS SINCE ITS INTRODUCTION INTO RVN, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO GO WITH IT FOR SOME TIME. EVERY EFFORT WILL CONTINUE TO BE MADE HERE TO PROVIDE FOR PRESENT NEEDS AND TO PLAN FOR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. TO COMPLEMENT THIS EFFORT IS WILL BE NECESSARY TO PURSUE VIGOROUS MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, PARTICULARLY AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL, COUPLED WITH

PAGE 4 RUHMFMA 3783 C O N F I D E N T I A L

TIMELY SUPPLY ACTION AND AGGRESSIVELY FOLLOWED UP.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

11 MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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DTC 230538Z MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE**

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79

CONFIDENTIAL

VV PAC598

//////CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO FOLLOWS RUHFMMA SUPVR SENDS//////

PP RUMWAA
DE RUHFMMA 3804 3270538
ZNY CCCCC
P 230538Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN MURRAY FROM LIGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

- A. CG III MAF 100308Z/SEP67 (C)
- 1. REF A ADVISED OF THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF MARIJUANA IN III MAF, AS SUPPORTED BY DISCIPLINARY STATISTICS, AND ADDITIONALLY THE SUSPECTED USE REFLECTED BY INVESTIGATIVE STATISTICS.
- 2. THE USE OF MARIJUANA IN VIETNAM CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE NATIONAL PRESS. AN AP STORY QUOTED GENERAL MOORE, ARMY PROVOST MARSHALL IN VIETNAM, AS STATING THAT MORE U.S. SERVICE-MEN ARE ARRESTED FOR SMOKING MARIJUANA THAN FOR ANY OTHER SINGLE OFFENSE. ALTHOUGH THIS STATEMENT MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE TO III MAF, THE EXISTENCE OF THE PROBLEM, AS RELATED IN-

PAGE 2 RUHFMMA 3804 C O N F I D E N T I A L REFERENCE A, IS APPARENT.

3. WE ARE CONSTANTLY BEING PINGED ON, BY HIGHER AUTHORITY AND THE PRESS FOR FACTS ON THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTS. I WANT TO RESPOND TO QUERIES ROUTINELY WITHOUT PASSING THEM ON TO YOU. ACCORDINGLY, AND IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A FULL PICTURE OF THE PROBLEM, I AM SENDING LTCOL W. C. JAECK FROM THIS HQ ON 24 NOVEMBER TO CONFEG WITH YOU, YOUR STAFF, AND ANYONE ELSE WHO CAN HELP. PUT THE MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE. HE WILL REPORT TO YOU UPON ARRIVAL. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
P 230538Z FM CG III MAF TO CG FMFPAC BT												
PSY. OPS.	APL. SERV.											
											# 79	

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUCIHOA RUHFMA
DE RUMHLA 2633 3271000
ZNY CCCCC

P 231000Z NOV 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUCIHOA/CMC
INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC (W014)
ZEN/CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE,
INFO LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM BGEN LAHUE.

CONGRINT LTCOL A. VAN WINKLE 055793 USMC AND MAJ L. H.

JOY, 059841 USMC

A. YR 221552Z NOV 67

1. IN RESPONSE TO REFA, SNO'S HAVE BEEN REPLACED AS CO
AND EXO OF SECOND BN, FIRST MAR, FIRST MARDIV. NEITHER OFFICER
WAS RELIEVED AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE.

2. AFTER OBSERVING AND RECEIVING REPORTS IN THE PERFORMANCE
OF THESE OFFICERS FOR OVER THREE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS, IT WAS
THE OPINION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST MARDIV, THAT
SUCH PERFORMANCE WAS NOT UP TO THE HIGH STANDARDS REQUIRED
OF A MARINE INFANTRY BATTALION COMMANDER OR BATTALION
EXECUTIVE OFFICER; THEREFORE, BOTH OFFICER'S WERE REPLACED.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2633 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

3. LTCOL VAN WINKLE HAS BEEN REASSIGNED TO THE OPERATIONS
SECTION, G-3 AND MAJOR JOY WAS REASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS
BATTALION FOR DUTY.

4. MAJ JOY IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION. HE
HAS ALSO BEEN NAMED AS A PARTY TO THE INVESTIGATION OF AN
INCIDENT WHICH HAS OCCURED SINCE HIS ASSIGNMENT TO HEAD-
QUARTERS BATTALION. THE RESULTS WILL BE REPORTED WHEN COMPLETE.

GP-4

BT

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#80

W
~~CG~~
~~C/S~~
~~DCS~~
~~DCS-AIR~~ *As Seen*
 25
 MONTH NOV 67

CCN 148

DTG 240720Z MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG FMAW

CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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DATE/TIME GROUP 240720Z NOV 67

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OO RUHKM
DE RUMHAW 047W 3280720
ZNY CCCCC
O 240720Z NOV 67
FM CG FMAW
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR FMFPAC F-916

HELLO SUPPORT INVESTIGATION FOR CMC (U)

A. PHONECON FMFPAC TO FMAW 24 NOV 67

B. CG FMAW 230545Z NOV 67

1. AS REQUIRED BY REF A FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO TO REF B IS PROVIDED:

A. TWENTY FOUR (24) ACFT ASSIGNED VMO-3 10 NOV, TWENTY ONE (21) ON HAND. TWO (2) AT PAR, ONE (1) IN REPAIR.

B. TWELVE (12) ACFT OPERATIONAL AVAILABLE 10 NOV.

C. ONE (1) ACFT UNDERGOING ROUTINE MAINT 10 NOV.

D. NO ACFT BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR 10 NOV.

E. FIVE (5) ACFT AWAITING PARTS (WORSG) 10 NOV. (3) WASH PLATE ASSMBY, (1) ROTOR HEAD AND (1) OIL COOLER.

F. SIX (6) TACAN STATIONS I CORPS.

PAGE TWO RUMHAW 047W C O N F I D E N T I A L

G. FIVE (5) TACAN STATIONS UP.

H. UANG TRI TACAN HAD NOT BEEN FLIGHT CHECKED 10 NOV.

I. FIVE (5) ACFT IN NEED OF TACAN. NO ACFT WORSG ON 10 NOV FOR TACAN. (4) OF THESE DOWN FOR OTHER EQUIP, (1) FLEW W/NO TACAN.

J. NO WORSG DEMANDS FOR TACANS PASSED INTO SUPPLY SYSTEM PAST FOUR MONTHS.

K. PAST SIX MO OPERATIONAL STATISTICS OF VMO-3
READ IN SEVEN COLUMNS

MONTH	AVG ACFT ON HAND DAILY	AVG ACFT AVAIL DAILY	AVG PERCENT AVAIL DAILY
MAY	12.3	8.1	64.5
JUNE	14.6	9.2	65.8
JULY	22.1	16.2	75.0
AUG	23.3	18.0	77.2
SEP	22.0	15.1	68.6
OCT	23.0	12.2	53.0

REFLECTS PARTIAL SQDN IN RVN UNTIL MID JUNE 67. DETACH "A" ARRIVED FROM CONUS DURING JUNE.

TOTAL FLT HRS PERCENT UTILIZATION AVG FLT HRS/ACFT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#81

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMHAW 047W C O N F I D E N T I A L

MAY	1687.7	196.0	132
JUNE	1359.4	133.0	93
JULY	1621.8	103.4	74
AUG	2112.9	126.7	91
SEPT	1728.5	111.6	78
OCT	1529.7	93.6	66

L. REFER PARA 5 REF B. PARA 1310 OPNAV 3710.7D AND FMAW WING ORDER P3310.14.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#81

CG	70
CIS	0
DLS	JK

DCG AIR *has seen* FILLER

CCN 149

16

DTG 241853Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

copy to 6-3 for action

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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24 Dec 67
A*

DATE/TIME GROUP 241853Z NOV 67

82

SECRET

RR RUMWAA
DE RUHHEMA 3914 3281853
ZNY SSSSS
R 241853Z NOV 67
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT
SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMBAT REPORTING (U)

- A. III MAF 200333Z/NOV67 (S)
- B. III MAF 210333Z/NOV67 (S)
- C. III MAF 220333Z/NOV67 (S)

1. ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, RELATING TO REPORTS CONTAINED IN REFERENCES A, B, AND C ON OPERATION FOSTER, ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE A COMPLETE RECORD OF THE EVENTS OCCURRING DURING THE OPERATION.

A. REFERENCE A REPORTED, THAT AT 180300H, COMPANY F, SECOND BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES (AT 876550) REQUESTED AIR STRIKES ON A TRAIL IN THE VICINITY OF (AT 871551) WITH TRENCHES, BUNKERS, FIGHTING HOLES AND A SUSPECTED CAVE COMPLEX. DAMAGE ASSESSED: 24 STRUCTURES AND 2 BUNKERS DESTROYED. AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FIRE ON EACH RUN

PAGE 2 RUHHEMA 3914 SECRET NCEO
FROM (AT 868556). QUESTIONS: WAS THE AREA OF THE AIR-STRIKE SEARCHED ON THE GROUND? IF SO, WHAT WERE THE RESULTS? WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN TO SUPPRESS THE SMALL ARMS FIRE AGAINST THE ATTACKING AIRCRAFT?

B. REFERENCE B REPORTED THAT AT 191615H, COMPANY I, THIRD BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES AT (AT 873520) ENGAGED THE ENEMY AT (AT 870523) AND CAME UNDER HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE. A REACTION FORCE WAS DISPATCHED AND RECEIVED FIRE FROM AN ESTIMATED FORTY ENEMY AT (AT 868517). AN INITIAL SEARCH REVEALED NO ENEMY CASUALTIES. SIX USMC KIA, 12 WIA. WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF THE FINAL SEARCH? WHAT CONSTITUTED THE REACTION FORCE? WHEN WAS CONTACT BROKEN?

C. IN REFERENCE B, THE DIVISION A0 CALLED A SERIES OF AIR STRIKES IN THE VICINITY OF (AT 875475), CLOSE TO THE VICINITY OF COMPANY I, THIRD BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES. WAS THE AREA SUBSEQUENTLY SWEEPED? WHAT WERE THE RESULTS?

D. REFERENCE C REPORTED, THAT COMPANY I, THIRD

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEB
CIS	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HO Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 3914 S E C R E T M C E O
 BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES HAD HEAVY CONTACT COMMENCING IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE 21ST. COMPANY F, SECOND BATTALION, THIRD MARINES; COMPANY F, SECOND BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES; AND COMPANY L, THIRD BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES WERE COMMITTED IN SUPPORT. WHERE WAS THE CONTACT? DID THE REINFORCING UNITS MAKE CONTACT? WHAT WERE THE RESULTS?

E. IN A SUBSEQUENT ENTRY IN REFERENCE C, IT WAS REPORTED THAT FROM 211300H TO 211830H, COMPANY I, THIRD BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES (AT 867534) AND (AT 866537) RECEIVED FIRE FROM (AT 863539) AND (AT 863535) RESULTING IN TWO USMC KIA AND FOUR USMC WIA. IS THIS THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED HEAVY CONTACT? IF SO, HOW WERE THE REINFORCING UNITS INVOLVED?

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CS	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
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III M	F 2100-2 (9-65)											

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DTG 260115Z

MONTH

NOV 67

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D/S
DC/SAIR *W* *DM*
FILED *13*
13

ORIGINATOR CG FMAW

CATEGORY

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PP RUMKM
DE RUMHAW 010W 330015
Z Y CCCCC
P 260115Z NOV 67
FM CG FMAW
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

FOR

BT
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR FMFPAC F-003

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRILLAK, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN ANDERSON
CHU LAI AIRFIELD

1. CHU LAI WAS DESIGNATED A MARINE CORPS AIR STATION BY ORDERG FMAW.
ON 5 MAY 67. DECISION BASED ON CONDITIONS WHICH, IF NOT OFFSET,

WE CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DETRIMENTAL TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
MARINE CORPS MISSION AT CHU LAI. DESIGNATION WAS INITIATED WITHOUT
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IN POSSIBLE CONFLICT
WITH POLICIES OF HIGHER AUTHORITY.

2. THE INTENT OF THE DESIGNATION TO PROVIDE FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND
COORDINATION OF AIRFIELD FACILITIES, IS STILL VALID. TO SATISFY
THIS REQUIREMENT AND TO REMEDY POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH POLICY OF
HIGHER AUTHORITY, THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS BEING TAKEN:

A. CANCELLATION OF THE WING ORDER ESTABLISHING MCAS CHU LAI.

PAGE TWO RUMHAW 010W CONFIDENTIAL

B. PUBLICATION OF A WING ORDER ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR THE OPERATION, MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION OF ALL AIRFIELDS
OPERATED BY THIS COMMAND.

C. DESIGNATION OF AN OFFICER-IN-CHARGE AND A MINIMUM STAFF FOR
EACH AIRFIELD TO INCLUDE CHU LAI.

3. REQ ANY COMMENTS OR GUIDANCE.

GP-4

BT

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PP DDKE
DE RUAUBAC 2806 3300343
ZNY SSSSS
P 260237Z NOV 67
FM CTF 77
TO DDKE/CG FIRST MAW
INFO FFNUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
YINA/FMFPAC
YINB;CINCPACFLT
RUMHMF/CG III MAF
BT

FOR

S E C R E T
FOR MGEN ANDERSON FROM COUSINS
AGA BDA EVALUATION (U)
A. YOUR 221130Z NOV 67
B. YOUR 140525Z NOV 67
C. MY 120728Z NOV 67
D. YOUR 010025Z NOV 67

1. IN REPLY TO REF A, WE ARE MOST INTERESTED IN CONTINUING THE AGA EVALUATION AND I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY FOR OUR STAFFS TO WORK TOGETHER. THE LATEST PHASE OF THIS EVALUATION WAS COMPLETED WHEN THE AGA SQDN ON BOARD THE USS CONSTELLATION LEFT YANKEE STATION.

PAGE TWO RUAUBAC 2806 S E C R E T

IT WILL BE CONTINUED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF AG SQDNS ON BOARD THE USS RANGER AND KITTY HAW IN DEC.

2. MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH COL W.P. BROWN (REFB) ON 15 NOV WHEN HE VISITED THE CONSTELLATION TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON ANTI TECHNIQUES (REF C). AT THAT MEETING THE AG EVALUATION PROGRAM WAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND AGREEMENTS REACHED:

A. CONCEPT. CONCUR WITH PLANNING CONCEPT OUTLINED PARA 2 REF D. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY IS IN FINDING SUFFICIENT TGT'S THAT MEET THE CRITERIA YOU HAVE SPECIFIED.

B. TIME FRAME. WE FORSEE NO CONFLICT IN RUNNING CONCURRENT EVALUATIONS PROVIDED INFORMATION ON TGT'S SELECTED IS EXCHANGED IN TIMELY MANNER. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED ON OUR EFFORTS AND HOPEFULLY WE CAN ELIMINATE DUPLICATION OF EFFORT.

C. TARGET CRITERIA AND MATERIALS. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE EVAL NOT BE COMPROMISED BY POOR TGT SELECTION, MARGINAL RADAR SIGNIFICANT POINTS (RSP) OR INADEQUATE MAPS. SELECTION OF GOOD TGT'S HAS PROVED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN THE EVAL.

D. PHOTO COVERAGE. THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE PHOTO COVERAGE PRIOR TO FURTHER STRIKES WAS ANOTHER DIFFICULT REQUIREMENT AND WILL CONTINUE

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

84

SECRET

FOR

PAGE THREE RUAUBAC 2805 S E C R E T
TO BE A PROBLEM UNTIL GOOD WEATHER RETURNS. WE SHALL BE INTERESTED
IN THE RESULTS OF YOUR REARWARD LOOKING CAMERAS AND FLASHER PODS
FOR BDA.

E. USE OF RSP. USE OF ADEQUATE RSP'S IN CONSIDERED MANDANTORY AS
MENTIONED IN PARA 3C.

F. CREW DATA INPUTS. A MEETING OF AIRCREWS AFTER SOME INITIAL
FLIGHTS WILL PROBABLY BE MOST VALUABLE FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION.

G. ANALYSIS. THS SERVICES OF OUR OEG REPRESENTATIVE WERE OFFERED
(BY DR MUIR DURING A VISIT TO FMAW ON 11-12 NOV AND AGAIN TO COL
BROWN ON 15 NOV) TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND ANALYSIS INFORMATION. WE
UNDERSTOOD THAT COPIES OF OEG REPORTS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. THESE
WERE FORWARDED TO YOUR COMMANDON 19 NOV. IT WAS AGREED THAT FUTURE
REPORTS WOULD BE EXCHANGED.

3. A VISIT BETWEEN MEMBERS OF OUR STAFFS AFTER OUR RETURN TO YANKEE
STATION IN MID DECEMBER WOULD UNCOUBTEDLY BE PROFITABLE. I LOOK
FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU THEN. BEST REGARDS9

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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DTG 280712 Z

MONTH Nov

ORIGINATOR AMB KOMER

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#85

P 230719Z ZFF-1

FM 1ST MAJ MAC JO 10 NOV 68 SA 1074

TO LTC CUSMAN CG III AF

ZFM

SECRET MAC 11440 EYES ONLY

1. AM GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT CONTINUED HEAVY INFUX REFUGEES IN I CORPS. KOREN'S LATEST FIGURES SHOW 29,016 COMING IN DURING 1-23 NOVEMBER AND 12,500 GENERATED DUE TO MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WEEK OF 17-23 NOVEMBER ALONE. OF THESE 10,548 WERE IN QUANG NAM.

2. REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS MOST PAINFUL OF THOSE RAISED WITH ME IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. SENATOR TED KENNEDY IS HOT ON TRAIL, AND ASKING WHETHER US OPERATIONS ARE NOT CREATING MUCH POPULAR ANTI-PATHY FOR THIS REASON IN COUNTRYSIDE. HE IS COMING OUT IN JANUARY TO INVESTIGATE PERSONALLY. OTHER CONGRESSMEN AS WELL AS PRESS ARE BUILDING UP HEAD OF STEAM ON REFUGEE ISSUE TOO.

3. SINCE GREAT BULK OF CURRENT REFUGEE PROBLEM IS CONCENTRATED IN I CORPS, CRITICAL FOCUS WILL NATURALLY BE ON YOUR AREA. RECOGNIZE THAT CORDS PEOPLE, VOLAGS AND

MARINES ARE ALL DOING THEIR BEST, AND THAT CRITICAL BOTTLENECK IS GETTING GVN TO MOVE OUT MORE EFFECTIVELY. BUT I ALSO CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT WE CAREFULLY ANALYZE CAUSES OF REFUGEE GENERATION, WHICH MAY SUGGEST MEANS OF REDUCING INFLOW. FORE-WARNED IS FOREARMED, AS I AM, SURE YOU WILL AGREE.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS, AND LOOK FORWARD TO COMING UP AND DISCUSSING THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WITH YOU IN NEXT FEW WEEKS. MEANWHILE, HOPE YOU WILL KEEP URGENCY OF THIS PROBLEM BEFORE GEN LAM.

NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

258

CG
DYG | *W*
CS | *O*

CCN 184

25

DTC 281009Z

DCG AIR Has been
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MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR COMNAVFORV

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* C O N F I D E N T I A L *

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DE RUMSBB 4767 3321009
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P 281009Z NOV 67
FM COMNAVFORV
TO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF DANANG

FOR

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR GENERAL CUSHMAN FROM RADM VETH
POSSIBLE ATTACK ON COASTAL GROUP 13
1. COMNAVFORV INTSUMS 270-67, 271-67 AND 282-67 (ITEMS 1B, 1A AND 1A RESPECTIVELY) INDICATE SIZABLE VC UNIT MOVMENT FROM PHU LOC DISTRICT BASE AREAS TO VINH LOC OPERATION AREAS AND ADDITIONAL- LY PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH LENDS CREDENCE AND STRENGTH TO THE THREAT OF AN ATTACK ON VNN COASTAL GROUP 13 AT ANY TIME. COASTAL GROUP 13 IS LOCATED AT COORDINATES ZD 112 091.
2. THE VNN COASTAL GROUPS ARE, AT BEST, MINIMALLY EQUIPPED AND MANNED TO WITHSTAND A SIZABLE AND DETERMINED ATTACE BY THE ENEMY. AS YOU KNOW, IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR, VNN COASTAL GROUP 16 WAS OVERRUN BY A BATTALION SIZED FORCE AND SUSTAINED A LOSS OF 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 15 VNN KIA AND 35 VNN VIA. ADDITIONALLY, 20 VN CIVILIANS WERE KIA/WIA.
3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, AND WITHIN OUR OWN RESOURCES, WE

PAGE TWO RUMSBB 4767 C O N F I D E N T I A L
HAVE DEVELOPED A STRONG AND ALERT DEFENSIVE POSTURE AT COASTAL GROUP 13; HOWEVER, ANY ASSISTANCE YOU MAY BE ABLE TO RENDER IN KEEPING AN EYE ON THE SITUATION AND PROVIDING COMBAT FORCES WHEN REQUIRED WILL CERTAINLY MINIMIZE THE THREAT AND BE MOST WELCOME. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

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CG	<i>log</i>
DCG	<i>W</i>
4/5	<i>Q</i>

DCG AIR *Has seen* FILLER

CCN 187

3

DTC 282218Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

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 P 282218Z NOV 67
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 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN GLICK INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY ARG/SLF OPERATIONAL SECURITY (U)

1. RECENTLY, A HIGH LEVEL TEAM INITIATED AN ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF ARG/SLF OPERATIONS. INITIAL EXAMINATION OF THE TEAM'S FINDINGS HAS REVEALED SEVERAL HIGHLY IMPORTANT AREAS OF CONCERN.

2. THE FOLLOWING AREAS, RELATED SPECIFICALLY TO THE LANDING FORCE, SHOULD BE EXAMINED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL SECURITY:

A. STEREOTYPED COMMUNICATION PATTERNS EXIST WHICH ARE EXPLOITABLE BY TRAFFIC/INTERCEPT/ANALYSIS.

B. THERE IS AN ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF LPH ORGANIC AND AUGMENTATION HELO TRAFFIC PRIOR TO D-DAY.

PAGE 2 RUHFMMA 4641 S E C R E T

C. AUGMENTING HELOS CAN BE IDENTIFIED BY CALL SIGNS.

D. THE VOLUME OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC INCREASES PRIOR TO D-DAY.

E. IN-COUNTRY COORDINATION PATTERN IS ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO AN IMPENDING OPERATION.

F. EXTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE IS CONDUCTED 48-72 HOURS PRIOR TO L/H HOUR.

G. STEREOTYPED L/H HOURS ARE USED.

3. THE TEAM'S FINDINGS HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE CINCPACFLEET STAFF, AND IT IS LIKELY THAT YOU MAY BE HEARING OF IT VIA COMSEVENTHFLEET. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT WITH SEVENTH FLEET. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

3

CCN

DTC 290737Z

MONTH NOV 67

COPY TO CORDS?

ORIGINATOR GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV

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to Amb at 291710H New
S.M.*

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 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPOCOMUSMACV
 TO LIEUTENANT COL III MAJ
 INFO MG KOSTER CG AND IV
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 7105 EYES ONLY

I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE AMERICAN DIVISION, AND THE PROVINCE SEN OR ADVISORS OF QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TIN BEGINNING ABOUT 0900 NOVEMBER 30. I WOULD PLAN TO SPEND THE DAY. IF PRACTICAL IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO VISIT THE 20 ARVN DIVISION.

IN ADDITION TO A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY OPERATIONS, I WOULD LIKE SPECIFICALLY TO REVIEW THE REFUGEE SITUATION, HOW MANY THERE ARE, THE RATE AT WHICH THEY ARE GENERATED AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE GENERATION OF REFUGEES. HOW ADEQUATELY ARE REFUGEES BEING PROVIDED FOR. ADDITIONALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR A SUMMARY OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND HOW THEY ARE PROVIDED CARE.

NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

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CG
Dep CG
c/s
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FILLER 32
As Seen

DTG 301115Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

EXCLUSIVE

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FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO
LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN ROBERTSON
CONGRINT LTCOL A. VAN WINKLE 055793 USMC AND MAJ. L. H. JOY
059841 USMC

A. MY 231000Z NOV 67

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR 301415H TELECON, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO AUGMENT REF A.
2. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBJECT OFFICERS AS CO AND EXO OF THE SECOND BN, FIRST MARINES WAS OBSERVED DURING OPERATIONS IN THE DANANG TAOR, DURING THE RELIEF OF THE BATTALION BY THE THIRD BN, FIFTH MARINES IN THE DANANG AREA, AND DURING OPERATIONS IN THE QUANG TRI AREA. IN THE LATTER CASE, THEY WERE UNDER THE COMMAND, LESS OPCON, OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION.
3. THE FIRST UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE ON THE PART OF BOTH

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3481 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR OFFICERS WAS NOTED AT THE TIME THE BATTALION MOVED FROM THE DANANG TAOR TO THE QUANG TRI AREA. BOTH OFFICERS WERE GIVEN NON-PUNITIVE LETTERS OF CENSURE ON 14NOV67 FOR FAILING TO SUPERVISE AND ENSURE THE PROPER STATE OF POLICE, PROTECTION OF MILITARY PROPERTY AND STORAGE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL WITHIN THE AREA OF THEIR BATTALION COMBAT BASE.

4. EXAMPLES OF DISCREPANCIES INVOLVED ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. ON 4OCT67, ONE (1) STARLIGHT SCOPE WITH CASE AND TWO (2) PAIRS OF BINOCULARS WERE FOUND IN THE BILLETING AREA VACATED BY THE BATTALION WHEN IT DISPLACED NORTH ON 3OCT67.
- B. ON 5OCT67, WITHIN THE COMBAT BASE, ASSORTED ITEMS OF ORDNANCE, INCLUDING CLAYMORE MINES, ASSORTED SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, FRAGMENTATION GRENADES, DEMOLITION CORD, BLASTING CAPS, AND FUSE IGNITERS WERE LEFT OUTSIDE AUTHORIZED STORAGE AREAS IN VIOLATION OF DIVISION ORDERS. MOST OF THE ITEMS WERE IN THE VICINITY OF AMMUNITION BUNKERS; HOWEVER, THE REMAINDER WERE LOCATED IN AND IN THE VICINITY OF BILLETING AREAS.
- C. ON 5OCT67, THE COMBAT BASE FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY THE SECOND BN, FIRST MARINES WAS IN THE FOLLOWING STATE OF UNSATISFACTORY POLICE. THERE WERE LOOSE PILES OF MIXED TRASH AND MILITARY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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EXCLUSIVE

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3481 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR EQUIPMENT INCLUDING ASSORTED ORDNANCE, MESS TRAYS, HELMETS WITH LINERS, CANTEENS AND CUPS, JUNGLE UTILITIES, MEAT CANS WITH COVERS, KNIVES, FORKS AND SPOONS, BAYONETS, SCABBARDS AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS. IN AND WITHIN THE VICINITY OF THE THEATER, BEER AND SOFT DRINK CANS WERE STREWN ON THE DECK. MIXED AND SCATTERED PERSONAL BELONGINGS AND ASSORTED MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS LOCATED WITHIN BUILDINGS AND BILLETING SPACES THROUGHOUT THE AREA. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, HUTS AND TENTAGE APPEARED TO HAVE RECEIVED DELIBERATE DAMAGE.

5. ALSO IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PREPARATION FOR THE MOVE, SEVEN PERSONNEL OF THE SECOND BN, FIRST MARINES VIOLATED U.S. POSTAL REGULATIONS BY ENTERING NONMAILABLE ITEMS SUCH AS FLARES INTO THE MAIL; AND FORTY PERSONNEL OF THE BATTALION WRONGFULLY ENTERED INTO THE U.S. POSTAL SYSTEM SUCH CONTRABAND AND MISAPPROPRIATED ITEMS AS SLEEPING BAGS, AIR MATTRESSES, CARTRIDGE BELTS, BAYONETS AND BLANKETS. THESE FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS REFLECTED A SERIOUS ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE SUPERVISION ON THE PART OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER.
6. AFTER THE SECOND BN, FIRST MARINES MOVED TO THE QUANG TRI AREA, ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS, ANSWERS TO CONGRINTS AND OTHER

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3481 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SIMILAR MATTERS WERE OFTEN OVERDUE AND REQUIRED ADTAKES.

7. WHILE IN THE QUANG TRI AREA, MARINES OF THE SECOND BN, FIRST MARINES WERE OBSERVED WEARING VARIOUS ODD AND ASSORTED TYPES OF HEADGEAR. MILITARY COURTESY OF THE BATTALION PERSONNEL WAS NOTICEABLY DEFICIENT. ACCORDING TO THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER, LTCOL VAN WINKLE WAS FORMULATING POLICIES FOR GUIDANCE OF THE BATTALION WHICH WERE NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THOSE OF THE REGIMENT; FOR EXAMPLE, SALUTING WAS DISCONTINUED.

8. IN CONSIDERATION OF ALL OF THE ABOVE, AS STATED IN REF A, IT WAS DECIDED THAT SUCH PERFORMANCE WAS NOT UP TO THE HIGH STANDARDS REQUIRED OF A MARINE INFANTRY BATTALION COMMANDER OR EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AND BOTH WERE REPLACED.

9. AS STATED IN REF A, MAJOR JOY HAS BEEN NAMED AS A PARTY TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE THEFT OF FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS FROM ANOTHER OFFICER. A PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION WILL BE CONDUCTED VERY SHORTLY.

10. I HOPE YOU WILL FIND THE ABOVE INFORMATION ADEQUATE.

GP-4
BT

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