

- 
16. CG III MAF 011024Z NOV67 (TS) *gp-4 ✓*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ALTERNATE TO BASE V-1 (U)
17. CG III MAF 130710Z NOV67 (TS) *gp-4 ✓*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS PLEASE PASS TO GEN WESTMORELAND FROM  
LTGEN CUSHMAN  
POSSIBLE CESSATION OF BOMBING NVN
-

HAS BEEN SENT

37. CG III MAF 200250Z NOV67 (S) *Group-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN
38. CG III MAF 200252Z NOV67 (S) *Group - not shown*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN
39. CG III MAF 240200Z NOV67 (S) *Sp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MGEN MURRAY  
2NDLT B. F. KOWALSKI
40. ADMNO III MAF 29002Z NOV67 (S) *Sp-4*  
MCEO  
COMBAT REPORTING
41. CG III MAF 290242Z NOV67 (C) *Sp-4*  
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM MGEN MURRAY  
POSSIBLE ATTACK ON COASTAL GROUP 13

HAS BEEN SENT

- ~~25. CG III MAF 010130Z NOV67 (S)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE, INFO LTGEN KRULAK, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
DYE MARKER CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE~~
- ~~26. CG III MAF 020010Z NOV67 (C)  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND INFO LTGEN MOMVER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
DEPOLIATION VICINITY OF CON THIN (DYE MARKER)~~
27. CG III MAF 022336Z NOV67 (C) *Group-4*  
FOR VADM HYLAND INFO RADM BURKE AND BGEN GLICK, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
CH-46 MOD PROGRAM SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS (U)
28. CG III MAF 031448Z NOV67 (C) *Gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
POST-VISIT SUMMARY OF SENATE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF  
VISIT TO III MAF
- ~~29. CG III MAF 040028Z NOV67 (S)  
FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND  
MONTHLY EVALUATION~~
30. CG III MAF 050826Z NOV67 (S) *Gp-4*  
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
RECOMMENDED MISSION FOR 108TH ARTY GROUP
31. CG III MAF 090536Z NOV67 (S) *Gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN LAHUE, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
ELIMINATION OF FIXED POSITIONS IN DANANG TAOR
32. CG III MAF 090626Z NOV67 (S) *Gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK, INFO MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MCEO  
COMUSMACV CONVENED CONFERENCE TO EXAMINE DMZ DEFENSIVE AND FIRE SUPPORT  
COORDINATION MEASURES
33. CG III MAF 130244Z NOV67 (S) *Group-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM COMBS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
NGFS
34. CG III MAF 150636Z NOV67 (C) *Gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
HOW 155MM SP M109
35. III MAF COC 180641Z NOV67 (S) *Gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN RASMUSSED J-4  
EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN
36. CG III MAF 192340Z NOV67 (U)  
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS  
ASSIGNMENT AS CG, 3RDMARDIV

CG  
45  
8

Readdressed  
to 3dMARDU

CCN 189

FILE# 3

STG 290242Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

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ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CATEGORY

FOR

FILE COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3-4 OF 6

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 290242Z NOV 67

RECEIVED BY DATE/TIME 291216Z Nov 67

G-2: COPY 5

G-3: COPY 6

DATE/TIME GROUP 290242Z NOV 67

#41

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMSAK 2768 3330242  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 290242Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

**FOR**

BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM MGEN MURRAY  
1. RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM RADM VETH.

HAS BEEN SENT

QUOTE  
C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FOR GENERAL CUSHMAN FROM RADM VETH  
POSSIBLE ATTACK ON COASTAL GROUP 13

1. COMNAVFORV INTSUMS 270-67, 271-67 AND 282-67 (ITEMS 1B, 1A AND 1A RESPECTIVELY) INDICATE SIZABLE VC UNIT MOVMENT FROM PHU LOC DISTRICT BASE AREAS TO VINH LOC OPERATION AREAS AND ADDITIONAL- LY PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH LENDS CREDENCE AND STRENGTH TO THE THREAT OF AN ATTACK ON VNN COASTAL GROUP 13 AT ANY TIME. COASTAL GROUP 13 IS LOCATED AT COORDINATES ZD 112 091.
2. THE VNN COASTAL GROUPS ARE, AT BEST, MINIMALLY EQUIPPED AND MANNED TO WITHSTAND A SIZABLE AND DETERMINED ATTACE BY THE ENEMY. AS YOU KNOW, IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR, VNN COASTAL GROUP 16 WAS

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2768 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
OVERRUN BY A BATTALION SIZED FORCE AND SUSTAINED A LOSS OF 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 15 VNN KIA AND 35 VNN VIA. ADDITIONALLY, 20 VN CIVILIANS WERE KIA/WIA.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, AND WITHIN OUR OWN RESOURCES, WE HAVE DEVELOPED A STRONG AND ALERT DEFENSIVE POSTURE AT COASTAL GROUP 13; HOWEVER, ANY ASSISTANCE YOU MAY BE ABLE TO RENDER IN KEEPING AN EYE ON THE SITUATION AND PROVIDING COMBAT FORCES WHEN REQUIRED WILL CERTAINLY MINIMIZE THE THREAT AND BE MOST WELCOME. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

*CG / 10*  
*DCO / W*  
*C/S / a*

CCN 185

FILE# 3

DTG 290002Z

MONTH

NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR ADMINO III MAF

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CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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DATE/TIME GROUP 290002Z NOV 67

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**SECRET**

DE RUMSAK 2750 3330002  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 290002Z NOV 67  
FM ADMINO III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**S E C R E T** MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
COMBAT REPORTING (U)

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

A. CG FMFPAC 241853Z NOV67

1. FOLLOWING SUBMITTED IAW REF A. SUB PARS CORRESPOND TO SUB PARS REF A

A. QUESTION: WAS AREA OF AIRSTRIKES SEARCHED? IF SO WHAT WERE RESULTS? WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN TO SUPPRESS SA FIRE AGAINST ATTACKING A/C? ANS: AREA WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SEARCHED BY F/2/7, NO SIGN OF EN CASUALTIES. F/2/7 CONTINUED TO DELIVER SA, AW AND FLAT TRAJECTORY CSW FIRE ON EN DURING AIRSTRIKE.

B. QUESTION: WHAT WERE RESULTS OF FINAL SEARCH? WHAT CONSTITUTED REACTION FORCE? WHEN WAS CONTACT BROKEN? ANS: FIGHTING HOLES, COOKED RICE AND ASSORTED CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT FOUND. NO EVIDENCE OF EN CASUALTIES. REACTION FORCE WAS PLATOON. A 15 MINUTE A/S WAS CONDUCTED DURING WHICH CONTACT WAS BROKEN.

C. AIRSTRIKES AS REPORTED IN III MAF HISTSUM 324 WERE VIC

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2750 **S E C R E T** MCEO

(AT 845514) AND (AT 840515), NOT AS STATED IN REF A (AT 875475). AIR STRIKES WERE CALLED BY AO AT LEAST THREE KM FROM USMC UNITS ATTACKING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION. QUESTION: WAS AREA SUBSEQUENTLY SWEEPED? WHAT WERE RESULTS? ANS: AREA WAS SWEEPED BUT NOT UNTIL LATER. UNITS WERE NOT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY AND WERE NOT DIVERTED FROM ATTACK. SUBSEQUENT SEARCH REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF EN CASUALTIES.

D. QUESTION: WHERE WAS THE CONTACT? DID REIN UNITS MAKE CONTACT? WHAT WAS RESULTS? ANS: III MAF HISTSUM 325 REPORTED LOCATION OF EN DURING CONTACTS AS FOLLOWS: 211215H, CO 1/3/7, (AT 855538) (AT 866533) (AT 867533); 211300H TO 211830H, CO 1/3/7, (AT 863539) (AT 863535); 211700H, CO 1/3/7 (AT 868542); 211745H, CO 1/3/7 (AT 867543) OTHER REIN UNITS DID NOT MAKE CONTACT. CO F/2/3 DID NOT COMPLETE HELO LIFT UNTIL 1815. SEARCH OF AREA NOT COMPLETED UNTIL DAYLIGHT. NO EVIDENCE OF EN CASUALTIES.

E. QUESTION: IS THIS THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED HVY CONTACT? IF SO HOW WERE REIN UNITS INVOLVED? ANS: YES. SEE ANS PAR D ABOVE.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#40

CCN 208

*CG* *ly*

*45* *@* FILLER 32

DIG 281502Z

MONTH DECEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

CATEGORY

**EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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RECEIVED BY S.H. Shuman DATE/TIME 290750H Dec

G-2

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G-3

*copy to de Jodelka  
18 Jan 68  
J*

DATE/TIME GROUP 281502Z DEC 67

# 22

**TOP SECRET**

PP RUKKM  
DE RUMSAK 2831 362150Z  
ZNY TTTTT  
P 281502Z DEC 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**LIMDIS NOFORN**

**T O P S E C R E T** LIMDIS NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION I OF II.

1. I HAVE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO MY PLANNING STAFF, COMUSMACV AND COMSEVENTHFLT CONCERNING DURANGO CITY: QUOTE INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DURANGO CITY (U)

A. COMUSMACV 160518Z DEC 67 (NOTAL) (TS)

1. PURPOSE

A. TO PROVIDE COMUSMACV AND COMSEVENTHFLT WITH THE PLANNING GUIDANCE ON WHICH MY CJLF PLANNING STAFF IS INITIATING ADVANCE PLANNING FOR OPERATION DURANGO CITY.

B. DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION TO OTHER THAN US FORCES IS PROHIBITED. FURTHER, DISSEMINATION OF THIS GUIDANCE WILL BE CLOSELY HELD AND LIMITED TO THOSE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO INITIATE PLANNING.

2. GENERAL

A. IN OPERATION DURANGO CITY CINCPAC WILL EXERCISE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OVER FORCES ASSIGNED AND OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERA-

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2831 **T O P S E C R E T** LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO TION THROUGH COMUSMACV AND THE PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS, AS APPROPRIATE.

B. COMUSMACV HAS BEEN ASSIGNED OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION AND HAS BEEN APPOINTED THE COORDINATING AUTHORITY AS DEFINED BY PAR 30281 OF JCS P B 2, UNAAF.

C. CINCPACFLT HAS DESIGNATED COMSEVENTHFLT AS COMMANDER, JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CJATF) AND DIRECTED CJATF REPORT TO COMUSMACV FOR PLANNING.

D. COMUSMACV HAS DESIGNATED CG III MAF AS COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCES (CJLF) FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT.

E. COMUSMACV HAS ADDITIONALLY DESIGNATED CG III MAF AS COMMANDER, JOINT LAND FORCES NORTH (CJLFN) FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE.

F. CG III MAF HAS DESIGNATED CG FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AS COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE AVIATION/COMMANDER LAND FORCE NORTHV AVIATION (CJLFAV/CLFNAV).

G. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL OFFICERS AND WILL FUNCTION AS NATIONAL UNITS INSOFAR AS PRACTICABLE. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN U.S. COMMANDERS AND RVNAF COMMANDERS WILL BE GOVERNED BY ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE MADE BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. V

**EXCLUSIVE**  
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T L I M D I S N O F O R N M C E O  
 3. MISSION. COMMENCING AT H-HOUR, D-DAY COMMANDER JOINT LANDING FORCE, WITH FORCES ASSIGNED, LANDS IN VICINITY OF XOM LAP, NORTH VIETNAM AND ATTACKS SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ IN ORDER TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INSTALLATIONS, SUPPLY CACHES AND OTHER LOGISTIC FACILITIES IN AND NEAR THE DMZ.

## 4. FORCES

## A. U.S. MARINE FORCES

- (1) 1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN)
- (2) 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

## B. U.S. ARMY FORCES

- (1) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) (-)
- (2) SUPPORTING FORCES AS REQUIRED

## C. MACV RESERVE

- (1) BDZ, 1ST CAV DIV (AM)
- (2) BDE, 101ST ABN DIV

## D. U.S. NAVY FORCES

- (1) TWO CVA
- (2) THREE-FOUR CRUISERS (TWO 8", ONE-TWO 6")
- (3) 16 DD
- (4) FOUR LSMR/IFSS
- (5) ONE AGMR
- (6) TWO AGC
- (7) TWO APD
- (8) FIVE LPH

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T L I M D I S N O F O R N M C E O

- (9) FIVE LPD
- (10) EIGHT AKA
- (11) EIGHT APA
- (12) 12-14 LSD
- (13) 24 LST
- (14) ONE APSS
- (15) MINECRAFT AS REQUIRED
- (16) SERVICE FORCES AS REQUIRED
- (17) TWO AH

## E. VIETNAMESE FORCES

- (1) ONE AIRBORNE TASK FORCE (THREE BNS PLUS A TASK FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS).
- (2) ONE MARINE TASK FORCE (TWO BNS PLUS A TASK FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS).

## 5. ASSUMPTIONS

A. THAT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM FORCES.

B. THAT CHICOM INVOLVEMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM FORCES.

C. THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE USED IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN.

D. THAT CJATF WILL DESIGNATE COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE AVIATION (CG FMAW) AS TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER FOR THIS JATF.

E. THAT UPON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, THE LAND

**LIMDIS**  
**NO FORN**

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO  
 PORTION OF THE FORMER AOA WILL BE ASSIGNED TO CJLFN/CG III MAF FOR  
 THE DURATION OF OPN DURANGO CITY AS AN EXTENSION OF THE CURRENT  
 III MAF AOR IN RVN.

**6. CONCEPT**

A. COMMANDER JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CJATF) WILL CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT IN THE VICINITY OF KOM LAP, NORTH VIETNAM AND ATTACK SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS VESTED IN COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE (CJLF) IN ACCORDANCE WITH NWP-22B (FM 31-11, AFM 2-53). UPON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONS AND CONTROL OF ALL U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES OPERATING WITHIN THE AOR IS PASSED TO COMMANDER JOINT LANDING FORCE NORTH. AFTER CONTROL IS PASSED TO CJLFN AND THE JATF IS DISESTABLISHED, NAVAL FORCES, AS REQUIRED, WILL REMAIN IN THE AREA IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION, AND U.S. AIR FORCE FORCES, AS REQUIRED, WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUESTED BY CLFN/CLFNAV.

B. THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER ASHORE PROVIDES FOR THE LANDING FORCE TO LAND APPROXIMATELY 25 KM NORTH OF THE DMZ (VIC KOM LAP) BY SURFACE, HELICOPTER AND AIRBORNE MEANS, WHEEL TO THE SOUTH AND ATTACK ON AS WIDE A FRONT AS PERMITTED BY THE TERRAIN, USING MULTIPLE AXIS

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO  
 OF ATTACK AND COMBINING SURFACE AND HELICOPTER MOBILITY.

A COVERING FORCE WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE LANDING FORCE FROM ENEMY MANEUVERS TO THE NORTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCE AS IT MOVES SOUTH. THIS COVERING FORCE WILL BE A MARINE RLT (-) AND WILL BE POSITIONED TO COVER THE MOST DANGEROUS AVENUE OF APPROACH FROM THE NORTH. A BLT FROM THIS REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM WILL BE ONE OF THE LF RESERVE UNITS AND BE HELD ABOARD AN LPH. THE OTHER LF RESERVE UNIT WILL BE ONE BATTALION FROM THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION HELD AT A DESIGNATED STAGING AREA SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

C. CONCURRENT WITH THE ATTACK TO THE SOUTH, LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS TO THE NORTH WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION TO FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN THE DMZ AREA AND TO INSTALL AND DEFEND BRIDGE CROSSINGS, WHEN DIRECTED.

D. COMUSMACV WILL TERMINATE OPERATION DURANGO CITY UPON THE CROSSING OF MAJOR UNITS THROUGH THE DMZ AND UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF CG III MAF AFTER IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS WITHIN ICTZ CAN RESUME/ASSUME CONTROL OF FRIENDLY FORCES ALONG THE DMZ.

E. THE GENERAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER IS INITIALLY DEPICTED AS FOLLOWS:  
 (1) 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND RVN MARINE TASK FORCE WILL LAND AT

BT

**LIMDIS**

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

**NO FORN**

**TOP SECRET**

PP RUHKM  
 DE RUMSAK 2834 362150Z  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 281502Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

# LIMDIS NOFORN

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF II SECTIONS. H-HOUR VIA HELO AND SURFACE MEANS AND ATTACK SOUTH TOWARD THE DMZ IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. BOUNDARIES WILL BE THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ON THE EAST AND RAILROAD BED ON THE WEST (INCLUSIVE).

(2) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM) (-) WILL LAND AT APPROXIMATELY H PLUS THREE HOURS IN ASSIGNED HLA'S AND ATTACK SOUTH TOWARD THE DMZ IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. THE RVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE WILL CONDUCT A PARACHUTE ASSAULT AT APPROXIMATELY H PLUS SIX HOURS AND OPERATE IN COORDINATION WITH THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. TIMING OF THIS SEQUENCE OF LANDING IS SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

BOUNDARIES WILL BE RAILROAD BED (NOT INCLUSIVE) ON THE EAST AND FOLLOW A GENERAL TRACE IN THE PIEDMONT AREA AS RECOMMENDED BY CG 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM).

(3) A COVERING FORCE WILL BE UTILIZED TO COVER THE REAR (NORTH) OF THE ATTACKING FORCES.

F. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC COORDINATING CONSIDERATIONS ARE:

(1) ONLY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT WILL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA.

(2) OPERATIONS WILL BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2834 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO

(3) THE SHORT DURATION OF THE OPERATION INHIBITS DEEP PENETRATION INTO THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE AOA.

(4) LINK-UP OPERATIONS WITH THE 3D MARINE DIVISION WILL REQUIRE A HIGH DEGREE OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION.

7. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV, CG 1ST MAW, AND CG 1ST CAVDIV (AM): SUBMIT RECOMMENDED TASK ORGANIZATION TO ARRIVE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 2 JAN 68. UNQUOTE.

GP-1  
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

*Dep CG / [Signature]*  
*c/s*  
*DC/S*      *1127*

CCN 147

FILLER 25

DTG 240200Z

MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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G-3

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DATE/TIME GROUP 240200Z NOV 67

#39

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**EXCLUSIVE**

DE RUMSAK 2306 3280200  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 240200Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM  
MGEN MURRAY.

LOU METZGER INFORMS ME THAT SECOND LIEUTENANT B.F.  
KOWALSKI 0102062, SON OF FORMER CONGRESSMAN REPORTED  
FOR DUTY TO 3/3 ON 20 NOVEMBER AND STATED THAT BECAUSE  
OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS DID NOT DESIRE TO BE PLATOON  
LEADER. BN COMMANDER INFORMED HIM OF RESPONSIBILITIES  
AND ASSIGNED HIM TO COMPANY. HIS PERFORMANCE WILL BE  
CLOSELY MONITERED. YOU WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF  
DEVELOPMENTS. THIS INITIAL INFO PASSED IN EVENT OF  
POSSIBLE PUBLICITY.

GP-4  
BT

66	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
68	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol #39	PRC
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DE RUMSAK 1938 3240252  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 200252Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. FOLLOWING MSG RECEIVED FROM GEN ABRAMS.  
 QUOTE:

O 180328Z  
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEP COMUSMACV  
 TO LTG CUSHMAN III MAF DANANG  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 11058 EYES ONLY  
 SUBJECT : EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN

1. FOLLOWING BACKCHANNEL MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM GEN WESTMORELAND:

"1. GENERAL WHEELER HAS JUST INFORMED ME THAT THE GAO HAS SUBMITTED A LENGTHY REPORT ALLEGING THAT THERE ARE HIGH QUANTITIES OF EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN IN THE MAGNITUDE OF 3 TO 9 TIMES REQUIREMENTS. THE CHAIRMAN AND THE SECRETARY ARE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1938 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ADVERSE PUBLICITY IN THIS REGARD AND URGENTLY NEED INFORMATION AS TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE GAO REPORT, THE REASON FOR THE EXCESS AND WHAT WE ARE DOING ABOUT IT.

2. PLEASE SEND TO ME BY 0800 WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW MORNING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WITH AN INFO COPY OF THE MESSAGE TO GEN WHEELER:

- A. WHAT KNOWLEDGE DO WE HAVE OF THE GAO REPORT?
- B. ARE THERE, IN FACT, EXCESSES OF THE MAGNITUDE ALLEGED AND WHAT ARE THE MAJOR COMMODITIES INVOLVED?
- C. WHY HAVE EXCESSES OF SUCH MAGNITUDE DEVELOPED?

D. WHAT STEPS ARE WE TAKING TO CORRECT THE SITUATION AND HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE TO BRING THIS ABOUT?"

2. REQUEST ANY INFORMATION YOU HAVE AVAILABLE REGARDING QUESTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 2 BE FORWARDED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN 1500 HOURS, 18 NOVEMBER.

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF 2100.1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#38

TOP SECRET

CG / C/S  
b  
Q

CCN 142

FILED 3

DTG 200702Z

MONTH DECEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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G-2:

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 200702Z DEC 67

TOP SECRET

#21

**TOP SECRET**

PP RUHKM  
 DE RUMSAK 1876 3540702  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 200702Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

# EXCLUSIVE

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO  
 MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

- A. CG FMFPAC 190046Z DEC67
- B. CG 1ST MAW LTR SERIAL 0003A34167 OF DEC67 (NOTAL)
- C. COMUSMACV 191053Z DEC 67 (NOTAL)
- D. ADMINO CINCPAC 191924Z DEC67 (NOTAL)
1. REF A REVIEWS MK36 SEEDING OPERATIONS OF INTEREST TO III MAF AND OFFERS CG FMFPAC SUPPORT IN OBTAINING DESTRUCTORS SHOULD NON-AVAILABILITY, OF THE MK36'S PRECLUDE THE REGENERATION OF ANY DESIRED SEEDING PROGRAM FOR BEN HAI.
2. CONSIDERING THE ADVANTAGE OF INTERDICTING THE ENEMY LOC THROUGH THE DMZ DURING THE MONSOON, I HAVE ONLY RECENTLY (DEC 12) RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV A FIRST MAW DEVELOPED PLAN (REF B) FOR SEEDING THE BEN HAI.
3. FIVE NEW SITES RECOMMENDED FOR INITIAL SEEDING BY 3D MARDIV AND

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1876 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO III MAF WERE INCLUDED WITH A PROPOSED AIR AND WEAPONS SCHEDULE FOR FIRST WING TO EMLACE THE DESTRUCTORS. FURTHER A RE-SEEDING PROGRAM WAS PROPOSED TO UPDATE THE SITES SEEDED PREVIOUSLY BY THE AIR FORCE. THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF THE MK-36 DESTRUCTOR IS FROM 3 TO 6 MONTHS, WITH 50 PERCENT OF THE BOMBS ASSUMED TO HAVE DETONATED AT THE END OF 3 MONTHS WHICH OCCURS DURING THE LAST WEEK IN DECEMBER.

4. IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT COMUSMACV APPROVE THE PLAN AND AUTHORIZE THE INITIAL SEEDING OF THE NEW SITES AND TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED 68 DESTRUCTORS. ADDITIONALLY IT WAS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORIZATION BE GRANTED TO EXECUTE THE RESEEDING PROGRAM AND THAT 536 MK-36 DESTRUCTORS BE ALLOCATED FOR THE OPERATION.
5. MY PROPOSED PLAN REFERRED TO ABOVE HAS BEEN APPROVED BY BOTH COMUSMACV AND CINCPAC. REFS C AND D APPLY. CINCPACAF HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY MK-36 WEAPONS TO CG FIRST MAW TO PERMIT SEEDING ASAP.
6. APPRECIATE YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE; HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF ABOVE I BELIEVE WE ARE WELL ON THE TRACK. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

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III MAF 2100/4

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**TOP SECRET**



**SECRET**

DE RUMSAK 1937 324002  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 200250Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC

**EXCLUSIVE**

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
A. DEPCOMUSMACV 180328Z

1. FOLLOWING MSG SENT IN REPLY TO REF A.

QUOTE:

180641Z

III MAF COC

MACV COC

**HAS BEEN SENT**

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN RASMUSSEN JA

SUBJ: EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN

A. COMUSMACV 171619Z (S) EXCLUSIVE FR GEN WESTMORELAND (NOTAL)

1. REF A PASSED BY TELECON BY DEP JA COMUSMACV 181100H.

2. IN RESPONSE TO REF A FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED. REPLIES KEYED TO QUESTIONS POSED PARA 2 OF REF A.

A. THIS COMMAND HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE GAO REPORT ON EXCESSES.

B. DURING VISIT BY MR. J. KENNETH FASICK, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1937 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

DIVISION, GEN ACCTG OFFICE 1300-1545 ON 230CT67 SUBJ OF EXCESSES WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS REPORTED TO MR. FASICK THAT THIS CMD HAD TAKEN ACTION TO IDENTIFY EXCESSES USING THE CRITERIA THAT ITEMS HAVING NO DEMAND FOR PAST 6 MONTHS OR ITEMS IN LONG SUPPLY OF 12 MONTHS (AUTH STOCK OBJECTIVE PLUS 12 MONTHS) ARE CLASSIFIED FOR EXCESS SCREENING. EXCESSES DETERMINED BY THE ABOVE CRITERIA ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR IMMEDIATE DISPOSITION SINCE THIS CATEGORY INCLUDES THOUSANDS OF LINE ITEMS OF INITIAL ISSUE PROVISIONING FOR THE SUPPORT OF NEW EQUIPMENTS FOR WHICH DEMANDS HAD NOT YET MATERIALIZED. CONSEQUENTLY, IDENTIFICATION AND ISOLATION OF VALID EXCESSED IS A CONTINUOUS FUNCTION. ITEMS DETERMINED TO BE TRUE EXCESSES HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO OTHER SERVICES IN-COUNTRY WITH SOME TAKERS, AND HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDED TO HIGHER MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS TO SCREENING ALL MARINE CORPS ACTIVITIES IN WEST PAC.

C. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF EXCESSES OF THE MAGNITUDE REPORTED IN REF A AND DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE ANY EXCESSES OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO BE UNMANAGEABLE. EXCESSES ARE NORMALLY GENERATED THROUGH SUCH EVENTS AS PHASE-OUT OF MAJOR EQUIPMENTS RESULTING IN TEMPORARY RETENTION OF PARTS PECULIAR AND SEASONAL ITEMS FOR WHICH DEMANDS FALL OFF OUT OF SEASON. AN ILLUSTRATION OF EQUIPMENT PHASE-OUT IS THE M214 RIFLE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES  
**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#37

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1937 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

BEING REPLACED IN ALL UNITS BY THE MISAI.

D. THE COMPUTERIZED SUPPLY SYSTEM EMPLOYED BY THIS COMMAND IS IMPROVING CONSTANTLY. MANY OF THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CONVERSION OF SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND NOW TIME AND TALENT IS BEING SPENT TO PURIFY OPERATING AND REVIEW PROCEDURES. THE MATTER OF IDENTIFICATION, ISOLATION AND DISPOSITION OF EXCESSES WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ACTIVE COMMAND ATTENTION.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#37

CCN 122

FILLER 16

DTG 192340Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

CS/O

FOR

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

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COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 192340Z NOV 67

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G-2:

*Copy # e*

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 192340Z NOV 67

#36

PP RUCINRA  
 DE RUMHMF 1916 323234Z  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 P 192340Z NOV 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCINRA/CG MCRDEP PISC

**FOP**

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR MGEN TOMPKINS

YOUR ASSIGNMENT AS COMMANDING GENERAL, 3D MARINE DIVISION PROVIDES MEMBERSHIP IN THE WORLD'S FINEST FIGHTING MILITARY FORCE. I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WELCOME YOU TO THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. THE COMING YEAR WILL OFFER THE CHALLENGES AND REWARDS OF FIGHTING AN ENEMY WHO IS DETERMINED TO INVADE THE FREE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. THE 3D MARINE DIVISION IS INDEED FORTUNATE TO HAVE YOU LEAD THEM IN BATTLE. WELCOME ABOARD. LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS.

BT

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CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 36



**SECRET**

O 180641Z NOV 67  
FM III MAF COC  
TO MACV COC  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN RASMUSSED J-4

SUBJ: EXCESS SUPPLIES IN SVN

A. COMUSMACV 171619Z (S) EXCLUSIVE FR GEN WESTMORELAND (NOTAL)

1. REF A PASSED BY TELECON BY DEP J4 COMUSMACV 181102H.
2. IN RESPONSE TO REF A FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED. REPLIES KEYED TO QUESTIONS POSED PARA 2 OF REF A.

A. THIS COMMAND HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE GAO REPORT ON EXCESSES.

B. DURING VISIT BY MR. J. KENNETH FASICK, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1937 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

DIVISION, GEN ACCTG OFFICE 1300-1545 ON 23OCT67 SUBJ OF EXCESSES WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS REPORTED TO MR. FASICK THAT THIS CMD HAD TAKEN ACTION TO IDENTIFY EXCESSES USING THE CRITERIA THAT ITEMS HAVING NO DEMAND FOR PAST 6 MONTHS OR ITEMS IN LONG SUPPLY OF 12 MONTHS (AUTH STOCK OBJECTIVE PLUS 12 MONTHS) ARE CLASSIFIED FOR EXCESS SCREENING. EXCESSES DETERMINED BY THE ABOVE CRITERIA ARE NOT ELICIBLE FOR IMMEDIATE DISPOSITION SINCE THIS CATEGORY INCLUDES THOUSANDS OF LINE ITEMS OF INITIAL ISSUE PROVISIONING FOR THE SUPPORT OF NEW EQUIPMENTS FOR WHICH DEMANDS HAD NOT YET MATERIALIZED. CONSEQUENTLY, IDENTIFICATION AND ISOLATION OF VALID EXCESSED IS A CONTINUOUS FUNCTION. ITEMS DETERMINED TO BE TRUE EXCESSES HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO OTHER SERVICES IN-COUNTRY WITH SOME TAKERS, AND HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDED TO HIGHER MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS TO SCREENING A.L MARINE CORPS ACTIVITIES IN WEST PAC.

C. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF EXCESSES OF THE MAGNITUDE REPORTED IN REF A AND DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE ANY EXCESSES OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO BE UNMANAGEABLE. EXCESSES ARE NORMALLY GENERATED THROUGH SUCH EVENTS AS PHASE-OUT OF MAJOR EQUIPMENTS RESULTING IN TEMPORARY RETENTION OF PARTS PECULIAR AND SEASONAL ITEMS FOR WHICH DEMANDS FALL OFF OUT OF SEASON. AN ILLUSTRATION OF EQUIPMENT PHASE-OUT IS THE M-14 RIFLE

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1937 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

BEING REPLACED IN ALL UNITS BY THE M16A1.

D. THE COMPUTERIZED SUPPLY SYSTEM EMPLOYED BY THIS COMMAND IS IMPROVING CONSTANTLY. MANY OF THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CONVERSION OF SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND NOW TIME AND TALENT IS BEING SPENT TO PURIFY OPERATING AND REVIEW PROCEDURES. THE MATTER OF IDENTIFICATION, ISOLATION AND DISPOSITION OF EXCESSES WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ACTIVE COMMAND ATTENTION.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO	
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.										#35

*CG*  
*C/S*

CCN 130

FILLER 32

DTG 181556Z

MONTH DECEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III VAF

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DATE/TIME GROUP 181556Z IEC 67

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PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 1724 352155G  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 181556Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAK/COMUSMACV  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND  
 FROM LT GENERAL CUSHMAN

A. COMUSMACV 171045Z DEC 67

1. DURING BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION ON 9 DEC CONCERNING OP YORK II  
 WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH MARINE FORCES AS COULD BE MADE  
 AVAILABLE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN YORK II.

2. I HAVE CONDUCTED PRELIMINARY LANNING AND HAVE BASED MY TENTATIVE  
 CONCEPT OF OPERATION ON THE INCLUSION OF A MARINE REGIMENT IN THE  
 YORK II TASK FORCE. I NOTE IN REF A, HOWEVER, THAT YORK TASK  
 FORCE DOES NOT INCLUDE MARINE FORCES.

3. I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE IN THIS MATTER TO CLARIFY YOUR  
 DESIRES AS REGARDS EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE FORCES IN YORK II.

GP-4

BT

**TOP SECRET**

CCN 109

FILLER 25

DTG 161426Z

MONTH DEC 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF **HAS BEEN SENT**

**EXCLUSIVE**

DCG AIR H

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G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 161426Z DEC 67

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

DE RUMSAK 1519 3501426  
 ZNY TITTT  
 P 161426Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN.

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS SENT TO COMUSMACV FOLLOWING VISIT OF  
 GENERAL WESTMORELAND ON 16 DEC 1967.

1. DURING THE COURSE OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S VISIT TO III MAF ON  
 16 DEC 1967, HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND MADE THE  
 FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

A. DIRECTED THAT A CONFERENCE BE HOSTED AT III MAF TOMORROW,  
 SUNDAY 17 DECEMBER AT 1400 TO PLAN THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION  
 TO RECEIVE AND SUPPORT EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY REINFORCEMENT OF  
 I CORPS BY THE 1ST AIR CAV. CONSTRUCTION TO BE COMPLETED NO  
 LATER THAN 15 JANUARY AND TO INCLUDE HELO MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY  
 AT DANANG AND INCREASED PORT CAPACITY AT CHU LAI.

B. DIRECTED THAT DYE MARKER PROVIDE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION  
 MATERIALS FOR OVERHEAD PROTECTION OF FIGHTING HOLES AT THE  
 STRONG POINTS.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1519 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 C. INDICATED DISSATISFACTION WITH LACK OF PROGRESS ON  
 REVEITEMENTS FOR HELOS AT PHU BAI AND DIRECTED ACCELERATION.  
 WARM REGARDS

GP-4  
 BT

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III MAF 2100/4

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**TOP SECRET**

CCN 108

FILLER 25

DTG 161424Z

MONTH DEC 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

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CATEGORY

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G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 161424Z DEC 67

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 1518 3501424  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 161424Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN.

I. DURING THE COURSE OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S VISIT TO III MAF  
 ON 16 DEC 1967, HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND MADE  
 THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

A. DIRECTED THAT A CONFERENCE BE HOSTED AT III MAF TOMORROW,  
 SUNDAY 17 DECEMBER AT 1400 TO PLAN THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION TO  
 RECEIVE AND SUPPORT EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY REINFORCEMENT OF I CORPS  
 BY THE 1ST AIR CAV. CONSTRUCTION TO BE COMPLETED NO LATER THAN  
 15 JANUARY AND TO INCLUDE HELO MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AT DANANG  
 AND INCREASED PORT CAPACITY AT CHU LAI.

B. DIRECTED THAT DYE MARKER PROVIDE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION  
 MATERIALS FOR OVERHEAD PROTECTION OF FIGHTING HOLES AT THE STRONG  
 POINTS.

C. INDICATED DISSATISFACTION WITH LACK OF PROGRESS ON  
 REVETMENTS FOR HELOS AT PHU BAI AND DIRECTED ACCELERATION.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1518 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 WARM REGARDS  
 GP-4  
 BT

**HAS BEEN SENT**

CG	PC
DCA	CS
DYS	CS

CCN 099

FILLER 3

DIG 150636Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

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DATE-TIME GROUP 150636Z NOV 67

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PP RUHKM  
 DE RUMSAK 1438 3190636  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 150636Z NOV 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO ZEN/CG FORLOGCOMD  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 HOW 155MM SP M109

1. THE SUPPORT PROBLEM FOR THE M109 HAS CONTINUED TO BE A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN DESPITE AGGRESSIVE EFFORT TAKEN BY EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND THROUGHOUT WESTPAC. EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO RESOLVE A SUPPORT PROBLEM IN WHICH THE RANGE AND DEPTH OF PARTS AVAILABILITY HAS BEEN INADEQUATE TO RESPOND TO OUR NEEDS. UNDER THE PRESENT EMPLOYMENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE DEADLINE RATE FOR THIS VEHICLE REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE AND UNMANAGEABLE DUE TO THE CRITICALITY OF REPAIR PARTS AND DETERIORATION ASSOCIATED WITH AGE AND ACCELERATED UTILIZATION.
2. IN OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE M109 AND INSURE AVAILABILITY OF A VITAL PIECE OF COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WE HAVE USED EVERY MEANS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SJRG.									# 34

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1438 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE AT OUR DISPOSAL. A REVIEW OF RECORDS SHOWS CONTINUING ACTION DATING BACK TO JULY 1966 TO ALLEVIATE OR IMPROVE THE SITUATION. EVERY FORM OF EXPEDITED SUPPLY ACTION HAS BEEN USED, FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS OF REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED, CRITIPAKS HAVE BEEN USED AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED. IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO CANNABALIZE CONUS DEPOT ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS EQUIPMENT. FURTHER, AN ISSA HAS BEEN EXECUTED WITH THE U.S. ARMY WITH MINIMAL SUCCESS DUE TO THE ARMY'S LATER MODEL 4TH YEAR CONFIGURATION WHICH LACKS COMPLETE COMMONALITY WITH OUR OWN GUNS. PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCE BEING IN THE VITAL AREA OF THE LOADER RAMMER, EQUILIBRATOR ELEVATING CYLINDER, AND ACCUMULATOR. SUSPENSION SYSTEM DIFFERENCES ARE OF MINOR CONCERN. WE HAVE METICULOUSLY MONITORED THE ACTUAL, THE ANTICIPATED, AND THE PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS WEAPON. REQUIREMENTS ARE SCRUTINIZED DAILY TO ENSURE THAT EFFECTIVE SUPPLY ACTION HAS BEEN INITIATED. PARTS FABRICATION IS UTILIZED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT. SELECTIVE INTERCHANGE IS EMPLOYED WHENEVER AND WHEREVER FEASIBLE. IN SPITE OF THIS EFFORT, WE HAVE CONTINUALLY FACED ONE CRISIS AFTER ANOTHER TO SUPPORT THE M109.

3. IT IS URGENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION BE INITIATED TO REPLACE THIS WEAPON WITH NEW WEAPONS OF A CONFIGURATION WHOLLY

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1438 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE COMPATIBLE WITH THE U.S. ARMY'S 4TH YEAR CONFIGURATION.

4. AS AN INTERIM MEASURE IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE END ITEM MAINTENANCE FLOAT ALLOWANCE FOR THE M109 BE INCREASED TO 12 VEHICLES AT THE FLC AND THAT THESE ADDITIONAL ASSETS BE SHIPPED BY THE FIRST AVAILABLE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION. WE CURRENTLY HAVE A 1/2 DEFICIENCY OF ONE M109. WE ARE AUTHORIZED ONE M109 FOR THE MAINTENANCE FLOAT AND HAVE NONE.

5. WARM REGARDS.  
GP-4  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#34

TOP SECRET

CG  
DCG  
c/s  
11/11/67

CCN 089

FILLER 3

DTG 130710Z

MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE**

**NO FORN**

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COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 130710Z NOV 67

RECEIVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE/TIME 131621H NOV

DATE-TIME GROUP 130710Z NOV 67

Copy 1 of 3

TOP SECRET

#17

**TOP SECRET****EXCLUSIVE  
NO FORN**

PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 1238 3170710  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 130710Z NOV 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 BT

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS PLEASE PASS TO  
 GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN NOFORN  
 POSSIBLE CESSATION OF BOMBING NVN

- A. COMUSMACV 060726Z NOV 67  
 B. III MAF COC 080137Z NOV 67

IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL PRESSURE FOR A STAND-DOWN  
 IN AIR ACTIVITY DURING THE FORTHCOMING HOLIDAY SEASON OR FOR EXTENDED  
 NEGOTIATIONS NOT INVOLVING A CEASE FIRE, I WOULD LIKE TO RELAY MY  
 THOUGHTS ON TWO MAIN POINTS I FEEL MUST RECEIVE THE HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.  
 FOREMOST I FEEL IS THE RIGHT TO RETURN FIRE WITH ANY WEAPONS SYSTEM,  
 TO INCLUDE AIR, AT WEAPONS FIRING ON OUR FORCES. THE SECOND, IS THE  
 IDEA OF A LINE SOUTH OF WHICH ENEMY MOVEMENT OR ACTIVITY WOULD BE  
 SUBJECT TO AERIAL ATTACK.

YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF WHAT OCCURRED DURING THE TET STAND-DOWN IN  
 FEBRUARY. I SEE NO REASON TO EXPECT A CHANGE IN THE ENEMY'S EXPLOITA-  
 TION OF SUCH A MORATORIUM EXCEPT TO INCREASE MANY FOLD HIS ARTILLERY/

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1238 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NOFORN  
 MORTAR AND LOGISTIC SUPPLY CAPABILITY. HE KNOWS WHAT EFFECT HIS  
 INTRODUCTION OF ROCKETS AND ARTILLERY AND INCREASE IN MORTAR FIRE  
 DURING THIS PERIOD HAD ON OUR FORCE DISPOSITIONS, CASUALTIES, AND  
 ABILITY TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE DYEMARKER. THIS LESSON WILL, OF  
 COURSE, MOTIVATE HIM TO REDOUBLE/QUADRUPLE HIS EFFORTS TO REPLENISH/  
 INTRODUCE FIRE SUPPORT MEANS AGAINST US.

THE RIGHT TO RETURN FIRE WITH ANY ARM MUST NOT BE DENIED.  
 MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS SOUTH OF DONG HOI SHOULD BE  
 CONSIDERED INDICATIVE OF BUILDUP AND EXPLOITATION OF A STAND-DOWN  
 AND SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AERIAL ATTACK.

IN REFERENCE A, YOU REQUESTED MY ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES WHICH  
 WOULD BE SUSTAINED MEASURED AGAINST VARYING INCREASES (FROM 10 TO 100  
 PERCENT) IN ENEMY CAPABILITIES TO DELIVER FIRE. BY REFERENCE B, I  
 PROVIDED THESE ESTIMATES. HOWEVER, THESE WERE PROJECTED ONLY TO A  
 100 PERCENT INCREASE IN FIRE SUPPORT CAPABILITY AND DO NOT PROVIDE FOR  
 HIS CAPABILITY TO INTRODUCE NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS NOR HIS CAPABILITY  
 TO FAR EXCEED A 100 PER CENT INCREASE IN ORDNANCE DELIVERED AGAINST  
 US. IN SPITE OF ALL OF OUR EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY HIS ARTILLERY  
 DURING THE PAST FOUR AND ONE HALF MONTHS, I CONSIDER THAT WE HAVE  
 ONLY DESTROYED 35 AND DAMAGED 33 WEAPONS. THE ENEMY CAN EASILY

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1238 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NO FORN  
NULLIFY THESE GAINS IN A FEW DAYS IF THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF  
AIR POWER IS DENIED OUR FORCES. MY ABILITY TO INSTALL DYEMARKER IN  
A TIMELY MANNER IS A DIRECT FUNCTION OF THE FORCES THE ENEMY DEPLOYS  
SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI AND THE QUANTITY OF ARTILLERY/ROCKET/MORTAR  
FIRE RECEIVED BY MY TROOPS. THE CESSATION OF BOMBING NORTH OF THE  
DMZ DURING ANY STAND DOWN WILL, IN MY OPINION, SERIOUSLY DELAY THE  
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR PLANNED SCHEDULE FOR DYEMARKER AND WILL CAUSE  
EXCESSIVE CASUALTIES TO BE INFLICTED ON MY TROOPS. FROM A MILITARY  
POINT OF VIEW, THE RISKS INVOLVED THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF SUCH A  
COURSE OF ACTION ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

I RECOMMEND THAT IN ANY DISCUSSIONS OF A STAND-DOWN OF AIR  
ACTIVITY THAT BOTH OF THE ABOVE POINTS BE CONSIDERED.

GP-4

BT

**EXCLUSIVE  
NO FORN****PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**

CG Has seen

CCN 087

FILLER 3 *CP*

DTG 130244Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967 *Dep CG*

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

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DATE-TIME GROUP 130244Z NOV 67

*Copy 1 of 3*

#33

**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

R 130244Z NOV 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM COMBS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN.  
 NGFS

A. CTG 70.8 060744Z NOV 67

1. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT THE PROBLEM AND PROCEDURES OUTLINED REF A ARE APPRECIATED AND UNDERSTOOD. I AM IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH CURRENT POLICIES.

2. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION OF THE EXTRA 5\*54 BEING PROVIDED SO OFTEN AND THE OUTSTANDING JOB ALL ASSIGNED SHIPS ARE DOING.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#33

CCN 052

FILLER 3

DTG 090626Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**EXCLUSIVE**

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

*CG*  
*DGG*  
*DG Dir*  
*C/S has seen*  
*D/S*

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**SECRET**

PP RUHKM  
DE RUMSAK 0815 3130626  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 090626Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**EXCLUSIVE**

*o*

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK, INFO MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. TWO ITEMS OF IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU SHOULD KNOW:
  - A. COMUSMACV CONVENED A CONFERENCE, HOSTED HERE, TO EXAMINE DMZ DEFENSIVE AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES. CHIEF OF STAFF MACV, MGEN KERWIN, STATED THAT, AS ONE OF HIS MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, THE PROBLEM OF THE FORWARD BOMB LINE WOULD HAVE TO BE REOPENED IN ORDER TO INSURE EFFECTIVE FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION NORTH OF DMZ. 7TH AIR FORCE DO, MGEN BLOOD, COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT THEN THE WHOLE QUESTION OF USMC AIR MUST BE REVIEWED WITH OBJECTIVE OF SETTING UP A SINGLE TACTICAL AIR ARRANGEMENT AS OBTAINED IN KOREAN WAR. I HAD PURPOSELY NOT REOPENED FBL QUESTION AT THE CONFERENCE LEVEL; HOWEVER, IT CAME OUT QUITE CLEAR THAT AIR FORCE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY ENTHUSED OVER OTHER WEAPON SYSTEMS OPERATING IN "THEIR" AREA. 7TH FLT REP RELATED LACK OF COORDINATION IN OPERATION AGAINST CAP LAY, WHICH

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0815 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
FIZZLED. MGEN KERWIN INDICATED THAT HE WAS GOING TO RECOMMEND TO WESTY A MEETING AT DECISION MAKING LEVEL TO REEXAMINE THE FBL. I AM AWAITING A READ-OUT FROM CHAISSON ON DEVELOPMENTS IN SAIGON.

B. COMNAVFORV 040712Z TO CINCPACFLT DISCLOSED TO ME FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT MACV HAD COMPLETED A STAFF STUDY WHICH CONCLUDED IT WAS FEASIBLE TO TRANSFER LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOUTHERN I CORPS (QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TIN) FROM NAVFORV TO USARV. MSG BEING PASEP. I HAVE ASKED FOR REFERENCED STUDY IN ORDER TO COMMENT. THIS IS BUT ONE OF SEVERAL RECENT MOVES AND REMARKS THAT WOULD INDICATE SOME PEOPLE ARE THINKING ALONG LINES RESTRUCTURING ICTZ. WESTY AT A RECENT BRIEFING REMARKED THAT QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TIN WERE ONCE PART OF II CORPS. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROSPECT WITH ADM'S LACY AND BARTLETT AS WELL AS WITH III MAF GENERAL OFFICERS AND WE ALL AGREE THAT OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO ESTABLISH OUR CLEAR RECORD OF FULL SUPPORT TO AMERICAL. MOVE OF ROKMC AND ASSOCIATED REDUCTION IN FLC REQUIREMENTS IN CHU LAI AREA COULD PRECIPITATE ACTION.

YOUR COMMENTS OR GUIDANCE WILL BE APPRECIATED.  
2. WARM REGARDS.

HAS BEEN SENT  
**SECRET**

GP-4

FORM 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#32

CCN 051

FILLER 16

DTG 090536Z MONTH NOVEMBER 1967

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG AIR	
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>
D/S	

**EXCLUSIVE**

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**EXCLUSIVE**

DE RUMSAK 0809 3130536  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 090536Z NOV 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN LAHUE, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 I KNOW THAT MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ELIMINATING FIXED POSITIONS  
 IN DANANG TAOR AND THAT YOU HAVE ONLY A FEW SEPARATE COMPANY OR  
 PLATOON POSITIONS REMAINING. VC MARAUDING IN THE DAI LOC AREA,  
 HOWEVER, LEADS ME TO STRESS THE POINT FURTHER. THE OBJECTIVE IS  
 TO KEEP THE SPIRIT AND ACTIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE AND, TO THIS END,  
 75 PERCENT OF YOUR INFANTRY FORCE SHOULD BE IN THE FIELD AT ALL TIMES.  
 MY PRINCIPAL AIM IS FOR MOST UNITS TO CONTINUE THEIR OFFENSIVE  
 OPERATIONS FOR TWO WEEKS OR SO AT A TIME, AND TO OPERATE MOST ACTIVELY  
 AT NIGHT. ONLY IN THIS WAY WILL WE BE ABLE TO REDUCE THE ENEMY'S  
 MAJOR ACTIVITY ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE DANANG TAOR.  
 GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 31

CCN 029

FILLER 25

DTG 050826Z MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG  
DCB *B*

DCG AIR

HAS BEEN SENT  
**FOR**

cls *a*

Dcls

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

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DATE-TIME GROUP 050826Z NOV 67

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HAS BEEN SENT

**FUR**

PP RUMSAW  
DE RUMSAK 0429 3090826  
ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO  
P 050826Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

S E C R E T FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN  
RECOMMENDED MISSION FOR 108TH ARTY GROUP

A. COMUSMACV 191125Z OCT67 (PASEP)

1. THE FOLLOWING TACTICAL MISSION IS PROPOSED:

A. WITH US ARMY UNITS DESIGNATED BY CG 3D MARDIV PROVIDE GENERAL SUPPORT TO THIRD MARDIV. NORMAL ROLE WOULD BE TO PROVIDE REINFORCING FIRES FOR TWELFTH MAR; ALSO TO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT WITH LIGHT ARTILLERY AS REQUIRED.

B. PROVIDE TARGET ACQUISITION IN THE FORM OF A TARGET ACQUISITION BATTERY. PROVIDE A CENTRAL COLLECTION AGENCY COLOCATED WITH THE TWELFTH MAR FDC INTEGRATED INTO THE TARGET INFORMATION CENTER TO COMPRISE A CENTRALIZED DATA PROCESSING/CONTROL CENTER OF ALL AFFILIATED ASSETS TO INCLUDE US MARINE AND US ARMY CMR DETS IN SUPPORT OF THE COUNTER BATTERY/COUNTER MORTAR PROGRAM.

C. PROVIDE DESIGNATED USA UNITS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0429 S E C R E T  
CONTROL AND SUPPORT. GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUCINOA  
DE RUMSAK 0272 3071448  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 031448Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUCINOA/CMC  
ZEN/CG FMFPAC  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

SUBJ: POST-VISIT SUMMARY OF SENATE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF VISIT TO III MAF

1. THE STAFF GROUP FROM THE SPIS HEADED BY MR. KENDALL AND INCLUDING SAM SHAW (BGEN USMC, RET.), S. R. NEAL AND E. HARPER, COMPLETED THEIR VISIT TO III MAF ON MORNING OF 3 NOVEMBER 1967 WHEN THEY DEPARTED FOR THE 366 TFW AT THE DANANG AIRFIELD.
2. THE GROUP WAS ACCOMPAINED AT ALL TIMES BY COL JOHN OSTBY, FORMERLY WITH THE LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT AT HQMC, AND A PERSONAL FRIEND OF MR. KENDALL.
3. ALL COMMITTEE MEMBERS EXPRESSED STRONG SATISFACTION WITH VISITS TO BOTH MARINE DIVISIONS. THE FLC PRESENTATION WAS CONSIDERED TO BE OUTSTANDING, HOWEVER, THE GROUP DID NOT SHOW AS MUCH INTEREST IN PURSUING QUESTIONS ON LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AS WAS EXPECTED.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0272 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

4. CONSISTENT INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN PERSONNEL SHORTAGES, AND ALL COMMANDS REPORTED FACTUALLY CONCERNING T/O'S, MANNING LEVELS, AND CURRENT STRENGTHS.
5. MAJOR AREA OF INTEREST SEEMED TO BE THE HELICOPTER SHORTAGE. WHEN THE FIRST WING PRESENTATION DID NOT PUT DOD ON REPORT, MR. KENDALL PURSUED A LINE OF QUESTIONING TO EMPHASIZE THE SHORTAGE. HE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT WE HAD NOT FORCEFULLY SUPPORTED HIS BELIEF THAT THERE WAS A CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF HELICOPTERS IN III MAF IN ADDITION TO THOSE LOST BY THE CH-46 GROUNDING. IN ADDITION TO THE HELICOPTER PROBLEM, HE SPOKE PRIVATELY OF THE DEADLINE RATE ON MOTOR TRANSPORT IN THE WING AND OF FIXED WING PARTS SHORTAGES.
6. MR. KENDALL ALSO INCICATED PRIVATELY A DISAPPOINTMENT THAT I HAD NOT GIVEN HIM INFORMATION ON DYEMARKER WITH WHICH TO CHALLENGE DOD.
7. UPON DEPARTURE, EACH OF THE MEMBERS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR COURTESIES WXTENDED THEM AND FOR A SUCCESSFUL VISIT.
8. AS A RELATED MATTER, MR. KENDALL WAS SUFFERING FROM A COLD THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT, AND WAS UNDER HEAVY MEDICATION.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#28

CCN Ø12

FILLER 25

DTG Ø22336Z

MONTH NOV 67

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT  
**FOR**

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG AIR	
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>
DC/S	

CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

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DATE-TIME GROUP Ø22336Z NOV 67

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#27

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PP RUABQL RUMFUV RUMGUL  
 DE RUMSAK 0182 3062336  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 022336Z NOV 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 INFO RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**FOR**

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR VADM HYLAND INFO RADM BURKE  
 AND BGEN GLICK, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.  
 CH-46 MOD PROGRAM SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS(U)  
 A. COMSEVENTHFLT 231436Z OCT67  
 B. CTF SEVEN NINE 011345Z NOV67  
 1. REF A PROVIDES LSD SCHEDULE FOR FOLLOW ON SEA LIFT SHIPPING  
 FOR CH-46 A/C RVN/OKI/RVN. REF B RECOMMENDS LPH LIFT AS WORKED  
 OUT AT SEVENTHFLT SKED CONF.  
 2. MY PRIMARY CONCERN IS THE DELIVERY OF MODIFIED CH-46'S ON  
 SCHEDULE IN FLYABLE CONDITION. CONCERNING BEST METHOD OF  
 TRANSPORTATION AND READINESS POSTURE OF ARG/SLF, I DEFER TO YOUR  
 JUDGEMENT.  
 GP-4  
 BT

NNNN

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#27



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DE RUMSAK 0048 3051024

ZNY TTTT

P 011024Z NOV 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN  
CUSHMAN SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

QUOTE

P 280858Z OCT 67

FM CG III MAF DANANG

TO COMUSMACV SAIGON

INFO CG FIRST MAF DANANG

COMNAVFORV SAIGON

COMNAVFORV REP DANANG

COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE TSN AB

COMTHIRD NCB DANANG

BT

T O P S E C R E T JPCCO

ALTERNATE TO BASE V-1 (U)

A. COMUSMACV TOP SECRET 34601 FROM MACDC-PO DTG 210055Z OCT 67 (TS)

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0048 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

1. CONFERENCE HELD AT HQ FMAW 26 OCT 67 TO DISCUSS ALTERNATE TO  
BASE VI IAW REF A. PRACTICALITY OF EXTENDED OPERATIONS ON SATS  
AIRFIELD DISCUSSED ON BASIS MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR TACTICAL AIRFIELD  
WITH ANTICIPATED LIFE SERVICE 6-12 MONTHS, AS CONTAINED TM 5-366  
DTD NOV 65.

2. DISCUSSION BASED ON CONSIDERATION FOLL POSSIBLE SITES:

PHU BAI-EXPANSION EXISTING AIRFIELD

V-1 - COORD YD 870250

QUANG TRI - EXPANSION EXISTING AIRFIELD

VINH XUA - COORD YD 960230

3. FROM OPERATIONAL ASPECT, RELOCATION OF THREE USMC ATTACK SQDNS TO  
NEW AIRFIELD VICINITY HUE - PHU BAI PROVIDES ADVANTAGE BY REDUCTION  
15 MINUTES FLIGHT TIME TO TARGETS IN NORTHERN ICTZ, DMZ, AND NORTH,  
OR CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN TOS OF 30 MINUTES, PLUS ADDITIONAL  
DISPERSAL OF TACTICAL A/C. CONCLUSION REACHED THAT ANY NEW SITE  
NORTH OF DANANG WILL PRESENT SEVERE DIFFICULTIES FROM VIEWPOINT  
CONSTRUCTION, LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AND PARTICULARLY REQUIRED SECURITY  
FORCES. SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON SITES CONSIDERED AS FOLLOWS:

A. PHU BAI

(1) ADVANTAGES: BASIC SECURITY ALREADY ESTABLISHED; LOCATED ON

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0048 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
EXISTING MSR.

(2) DISADVANTAGES: NEW COMPLETE RUNWAY REQD IN DIFFERENT ORIENTATION; SPACE AVAILABLE INADEQUATE; RELOCATION OF MANY EXISTING FACILITIES REQD INCLUDING HELO UNITS; EXTENSIVE EARTH MOVING EFFORT REQD. REQRS AUGM EXISTING SECURITY FORCE.

(3) CONCLUSION: NOT FEASIBLE DUE TO BOTH AIR GROUND SATURATION.

B. QUANG TRI

(1) ADVANTAGES: 3500 FT RUNWAY COMPLETED; SECURITY FORCES ALREADY IN AREA BUT REQUIRE AUGMENTATION; PROXIMITY TO TARGET AREAS.

(2) DISADVANTAGES: WITHIN MAXIMUM ENEMY ARTY RANGE, AND WITHIN EFFECTIVE RANGE OF SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES NORTH OF DMZ; PRESENTS LUCRATIVE TARGET NEAR DMZ; DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT LOGISTICALLY, AND SUPPORT CLASS IIIA HIGHLY DOUBTFUL

(3) CONCLUSION: NOT FEASIBLE DUE ENEMY THREAT AND SATURATION OF EXISTING LOGISTIC SUPPORT CAPABILITY.

C. V-1

(1) ADVANTAGES: DOES NOT REQUIRE EXTENSIVE EARTHWORK FOR AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0048 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

(2) DISADVANTAGES: SURROUNDED BY RICE PADDIES; INACCESSIBLE TO CONSTRUCTION FORCES AND MATERIALS; REQUIRES DREGING CHANNEL PIER OR CASUEWAY AND MAJOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION; AREA SATURATED WITH GRAVES; TWO BATTALIONS (MINIMUM) REQD FOR SECURITY; MAJOR CONSTRUCTION EFFORT REQD PRIOR TO INITIATION AIRFIELD CONST.

(3) CONCLUSION: OPERATIONS FEASIBLE BUT LOGISTIC SUPPORT DIFFICULT AND CONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY COST HIGH.

D. VINH XUAN - LOCATED ON ISLAND EAST OF V-1 SITE

(1) ADVANTAGES: TERRAIN REQUIRES MINIMAL EARTHWORK; NO GRAVES OR VILLAGES IN RUNWAY, TAXIWAY, PARKING APRON OR CANTONMENT AREAS; CONSTRUCTION EQUIP AND MATERIAL CAN BE LANDED ACROSS BEACH FROM LST EXCEPT DURING MONSON SEASON; SEA LOAN POL LINE CAN BE INSTALLED.

(2) DISADVANTAGES: MINIMUM TWO BATTALION SECURITY FORCE REQD; IMPROVEMENT OF 10 MILE ROAD NORTHWEST TO THUAN A WILL BE MAJOR EFFORT; ROAD ESSENTIAL DURING MONSOONS; NO ROAD CONNECTION TO HUE/PHU BAI AND ROUTE 1

(3) COMMENT: AVAILABILITY FRESH WATER NOT KNOWN; SURVERY WILL BE REQD TO DETERMINE.

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 0048 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
(4) CONCLUSION: OPERATIONS FEASIBLE BUT MAJOR CONSTRUCTION EFFORT REQD.

4. MINIMUM AUSTERE FACILITIES REQD TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS OVER EXTENDED PERIOD AS FOLL:
  - A. RUNWAY 8000 FT X 108 FT
  - B. TAXIWAY 8000 FT X 60 FT
  - C. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON FOR THREE VMA (70 A/C) - 1,000,000 SQ FT.
  - D. PARKING APRON CARGO A/C - 500,000 SQ FT
  - E. TOTAL AM2 MATTING - 11,500 BUNDLES.
  - F. M-21 ARREST GEAR - 3 SETS
  - G. MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT - 1
  - H. AIRCRAFT LIGHTING SYSTEMS - 3 SETS
  - I. OPTICAL LANDING SYSTEMS - 3 SETS
  - J. COMM SYSTEMS - 1 SET
  - K. READY SERVICE WPNS SHELTERS - 12
  - L. SATS VANS - 16
  - M. A/C HANGARS - 4
  - N. SUPPLY STORAGE BUTLER BLDG - 7
  - O. A/C MAINT BUTLER BLDG - 11

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 0048 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

- P. VEH AND EQUIP MAINT - 6,000 SQ FT
  - Q. FLIGHT CREW QTRS, AIR COND QUONSETS - 20
  - R. TROOP HOUSING, MESSING FACILITIES 3,750 EM, 90 OFF - 328,400 SQ FT
  - S. READY AMMO STORAGE - 80,000 SQ FT
  - T. ASP - 4000 S/T - 112,000 SQ FT
  - U. POL STORAGE - 12,000 BBL
  - V. A/C REVETMENTS - 5000 LINEAL FT
  - W. MUSE GENERATORS AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - 2250 KW
  - X. DISPENSARY - 4500 SQ FT
  - Y. LOX PLANT - 1
  - Z. ADMIN BLDGS, ROADS AND PARKING - AS REQD
- (1) OF ABOVE LISTED REQUIREMENTS, FMAW HAS ON HAND FOLL: F, I, J, K, L, AND Y.
5. LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS
    - A. DURING CONSTRUCTION OF AIRFIELD, FIRST 4 MOS: 400S/T SUPPLIES REQD DAILY; FIFTH AND SIXTH MONTH: 200 S/T REQD DAILY.
    - B. AFTER COMPLETION OF AIRFIELD, 300 S/T SUPPLIES REQUIRED DAILY, INCLUDING CLASS VA, BUT LESS CLASS IIIA.
    - C. AFTER COMPLETION OF AIRFIELD, 60,000 GALS AVATION FUEL REQD DAILY.
- BT

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**TOP SECRET**

DE RUMSAK 0060 3051024

ZNY TTTT

P 011024Z NOV 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN  
CUSHMAN FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

6. REAL ESTATE: NO MAJOR REAL ESTATE PROBLEMS ANTICIPATED AT V-1 OR VINH XUAN SITES. RELOCATION OF LARGE NUMBER OF GRAVES AT V-1 SITE COULD DELAY CONSTRUCTION UNLESS SUFFICIENT NOTICE PROVIDED TO PERMIT TIMELY REAL ESTATE PROCUREMENT ACTIONS TO BE INITIATED.

7. DELIVERY OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS IN QUANTITIES NEEDED WILL REQUIRE FULL OPERATION OF TAM MY LST RAMPS OR SUSTAINED LST BEACHING OPERATIONS AT VINH XUAN NEITHER OF WHICH IS FEASIBLE PRIOR TO 1 MAR 68. WITH FULL MATERIAL SUPPORT ESTIMATE THAT TWO NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS CAN CONSTRUCT AIRFIELD PROPER IN APPROXIMATELY THREE AND ONE HALF MONTHS. REMAINDER CONSTRUCTION INCLUDING ROAD TO EITHER V-1 OR VINH XUAN WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL THREE MONTHS CONSTRUCTION FOR 2NMCBS. NMCBS NOT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE. TO MAKE HORIZONTAL CONSTRUCTION CAPABILITY AVAILABLE WOULD HAVE DETERIMENTAL EFFECT ON ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM WHICH CONTEMPLATED NO CONSTRUCTION

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0060 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
WORK ON ROUTE NR. 1 SOUTH OF PHU BAI DURING NEXT CONSTRUCTION SEASON. THIS ADDED WORK EFFORT WOULD THEREFORE REQUIRE SACRIFICING 20 TO 25 MILES OF SCHEDULED VITAL ROAD CONSTRUCTION ON ROUTE NR. 1 BETWEEN PHU BAI AND DONG HA, HUE BY-PASS ROAD OR COL CO RAMP ROAD. PROVISION OR REQUIRED CAPABILITY WILL NECESSITATE MOVING TWO NMCBS FROM CHU LAI AND/OR DANANG TO AIRFIELD LOCATION. APPROXIMATELY 17 MONTHS BACKLOG CURRENTLY EXISTS FOR NMCBS IN CHU LAI AND DANANG. DIVERSION OF LIMITED ROCK PRODUCTION CAPABILITY TO USE ON UNIMPROVED ROADS TO AIRFIELD SITE COULD HAVE OVERALL DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IN ADDITION TO LOSS OF HORIZONTAL CONSTRUCTION CAPABILITY.

8. COMNAVFORV REP DANANG CONCURS IN THE FOREGOING.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

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