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UNCLASSIFIED

AIR CONTROL MESSAGES

VOLUME IV



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6. CG III MAF 280230Z Dec67 (TS) *gp-1*

Subj: Initial Planning Guidance for Operation DURANGO CITY (U)

CG III MAF has designated CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as Commander, Joint Landing Force Aviation/Commander, Land Force North Aviation (CJLFAV/CLFNAV)

7. 7TH AIR FORCE 281145Z Dec67 (TS) *gp-4*

Subj: Air Support for YORK II (U)

Recommends amending MACV Planning Directive to specify that tactical air support of forces involved will be provided from 7th/VNAF/FMAW resources as appropriate, such air support to be allocated, tasked, and coordinated through 7AF/VNAF TACS.

8. CG III MAF 281502Z Dec67 (TS) *gp-1*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes CG III MAF 280230Z Dec67 to LGen KRULAK

9. CG III MAF 300854Z Dec67 (TS) *gp-4*

CG III MAF's answer to 7AF 240245Z Dec67 (TS) re Conduct of Air Operations in SVN Portion of Muscle Shoals Area

10. CG III MAF 301616Z Dec67 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes CG III MAF 260542Z Dec67 to LGen KRULAK

11. CG III MAF 301618Z Dec67 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes 7AF 281145Z Dec67 to LGen KRULAK

2. COMUSMACV 160518Z DEC67 (TS) *gp-4*  
Subj: Initiating Directive, Operations North of the DMZ
3. COMUSMACV 171045Z DEC67 (TS) *gp-4*  
Subj: Operation York Planning Directive
4. 7AF TSN AB RVN 240245Z DEC67 (TS) *gp-3*  
Subj: Conduct of Air Operations in SVN Portion of  
Muscle Shoals area
5. CG III MAF 260542Z Dec67 (TS) *Group-4*  
Subj: Concept of Air Support for YORK II

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FP RUMKM  
DE RUMSAK 3065 3641618  
ZNY TTTT  
P 301618Z DEC 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN  
KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.  
OPERATION YORK II (U)

A. 7TH AF 281145Z DEC67

B. NY 260542Z DEC67 (PASEP)

1. REF A TO COMUSMACV CONCERNS REF B AND IS FORWARDED FOR INFO.

QUOTE:

P 281145Z DEC 67

FM 7AF TSN AB RVN

TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

INFO DUMSHG/CG I FFORCEV

RUMSAK/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T

SUBJ: AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II (U)

REFERENCE: A. CG III MAF MSG 260542Z DEC. 67.

NO FORN  
LIMDIS

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3065 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS MCEO

B. COMUSMACV MSG 171045Z DEC 67.

1. REFERENCE A INDICATED INTENTION OF CG III MAF, WHO HAS PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR YORK II AND III, TO TASK FIRST MAF FOR ALL YORK II AIR SUPPORT ON GROUNDS THAT SUCH ASSIGNMENT IS NECESSARY.

2. DO NOT CONSIDER THAT REASONS AS STATED IN REF ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE PROPOSED ACTION. OPPOSING CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST PRESENT AIR SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORCES ENGAGED IN THIS OPERATION, WITH COORDINATION AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY REMAINING WITH 7AF/VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. 7AF FORCES ASSISTED AS APPROPRIATE BY VNAF ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF OPERATING IN OBJECTIVE AREA. MOST IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT ARMY/ARVN FORCES INVOLVED HAVE WORKED CONSISTENTLY WITH 7AF FORCES WITH RESULT THAT ALL CONCERNED HAVE DEVELOPED MOST EFFECTIVE TEAMWORK BASED ON FAMILIARITY, RAPPORT AND FULL UNDERSTANDING OF MUTUAL CAPABILITIES. THESE FACTORS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN UNIQUE OPERATIONS OF AIRMOBILE FORCES. ASSIGNMENT OF 7AF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PERSONNEL IN ALO/FAC DUTIES IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN EFFECTIVENESS. COMPLEXITY AND DIFFICULTY OF PROPOSED OPERATIONS ARGUE STRONGLY FOR CONTINUING WITH EFFECTIVE AND PROVEN ARRANGEMENTS, AS DOES FACT THAT YORK II IS CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION OF YORK I,

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3065 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS MCEO  
IN WHICH SOME OF SAME FORCES WILL BE EMPLOYED. SUCCESS ACHIEVED WITH AMERICAN DIVISION CONFIRMS VALUE OF MAINTAINING ESTABLISHED AIR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS REGARDLESS OF OPERATING AREA.

3. III MAF FORCES WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED IN OPERATION CAN BE SUPPORTED AS DESIRED BY FMAW AIRCRAFT. THESE CAN BE READILY ASSIMILATED FOR AIR COORDINATION PURPOSES BY 7AF/VNAF TACS, WHICH HAS FULL CAPABILITY FOR COORDINATING ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN OBJECTIVE AREA AND IS SYSTEM THROUGH WHICH ARC LIGHT SUPPORT IS COORDINATED. IF FMAW HAS SORTIES AVAILABLE IN ADDITION TO THOSE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF III MAF REQUIREMENTS, THEY CAN BE REPORTED AND UTILIZED IAW MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 TO AUGMENT OR REPLACE 7AF/VNAF SORTIES IN OTHER AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE IN TALLY HO.

4. RECOMMEND AMENDING MACV PLANNING DIRECTIVE, REF B, TO SPECIFY THAT TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF FORCES INVOLVED WILL BE PROVIDED FROM 7AF/VNAF/FMAW RESOURCES AS APPROPRIATE, SUCH AIR SUPPORT TO BE ALLOCATED, TASKED AND COORDINATED THROUGH 7AF/VNAF TACS.

GP-4 UNQUOTE:

GP-4

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PP RUHKN  
DE RUMSAK 3064 3041616  
ZNY TTTTT  
P 301616Z DEC 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC  
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HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN  
KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.  
OPERATION YORK II (U)

A. MY 260542Z DEC67  
1. REF A CONSTITUTES MY CONCEPT OF AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II  
AND IS QUOTED BELOW.

QUOTE:  
P 260542Z DEC 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
INFO RUMSAL/CMR 7TH AF  
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV  
BT

NO FORN  
LIMDIS

T O P S E C R E T  
CONCEPT FOR AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II  
A. COMUSMACV MSG 070037Z DEC67 (NOTAL)

EXCLUSIVE  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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**TOP SECRET**

PAGE TWO RUMSAR 3064 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS MCEO  
 B. COMUSMACV MSG 171045Z DEC67 (NOTAL)

1. REFS A AND D TASK THIS HQ TO DEVELOP DETAILED PLANNING FOR YORK II. PRELIMINARY PLANNING FOR SUBJECT OPERATION ENVISIONS JOINT ARMY/MARINE CORPS/ARVN TASK FORCE DEPENDENCE OF TASK FORCE ON HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING RESOURCES FOR TACTICAL MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, HEAVY FIRE POWER, AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. REQUIRES CLOSEST INTEGRATION OF AIR INTO ORGANIZATION FOR ALL PHASES OF OPERATION, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION. INTEND TO TASK CG FIRST MAW WITH RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVIDING ALL CLOSE AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.

2. CONSIDER FMAW ASSIGNMENT AS SINGLE TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AGENCY NECESSARY FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. FIRST MAW HAS BEEN ASSIGNED PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERDICTION OF OBJECTIVE AREA PRIOR TO AND DURING WINTER MONSOON SEASON CAMPAIGN.

B. RECONNAISSANCE ACFT OF FMAW PROVIDE DAILY COVERAGE OF AREA AND ITS APPROACHES.

C. AIR CONTROL FACILITIES FOR BOTH HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING OPERATIONS ARE IN BEING AND CAN READILY ASSIMILATE YORK II OPERATIONS.

PAGE THREE RUMSAR 3064 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS MCEO

D. FMAW FIGHTER/ATTACK ACFT ARE LOCATED AT CHU LAI AND DANANG AND CAN PROVIDE CONTINUOUS ALL WEATHER DAY AND NIGHT AIR SUPPORT.

3. ABOVE AIR SUPPORT CONCEPT STRESSES UNITY OF COMMAND, ECONOMY OF FORCE, AND SIMPLICITY IN EXECUTION.

GP-4

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GP-4

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PP RUMSAL RUMSAW  
DE RUMSAK 3006 3649854  
ZNY TTTT  
P 300854Z DEC 67  
FM III MAF  
TO RUMSAL/7TH AF TSN AB RVN  
INFO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

LIMDIS

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T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN  
THIS IS A DYE MARKER MSG FOR LIMDIS

HAS BEEN SENT

- A. 7TH AF MSG 240245Z DEC 67 (TS)
  - B. MACV DIRECTIVE 10-11 DTD 2 MAR 1967 (S)
  - C. MACV PRACTICE NINE AIR SUPPORTED ANTI-INFILTRATION PLAN DTD 11 MAR 1967 (S)
  - D. MACV DIRECTIVE NUMBER 95-4 DTD 23 JUN 1966 (C)
  - E. MACV PLANNING DIRECTIVE 10-67 DTD 8 DEC 1967 (S)
  - F. RVNAF, JCS/USMCV COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN, 1968 (S)
- CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SVN PORTION OF MUSCLE SHOALS AREA
1. REF A OUTLINES 7TH AF RESPONSIBILITY IN DUMP TRUCK AREA OF ICTZ, PROPOSES SPECIAL CONTROL AND COORDINATION MEASURES TO ESTABLISH INTER-FACE WITH DYE MARKER OPERATION IN DEFILE SYSTEM (DFS), AND REQUESTS

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3006 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN

7TH AF BE CLEARED TO CONDUCT UNRESTRICTED AIR OPERATIONS NORTHWEST OF SPECIFIED LINE IN ICTZ AND UNDER CONTROL OF ABCCC.

2. CONCUR THAT ALL ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS IN DEFILE SYSTEM ARE OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN O III MAF. HOWEVER, DO NOT CONCUR WITH PROPOSALS FOR CONTROLLING AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN DUMP TRUCK AREA OF ICTZ.
3. REF B ESTABLISHES III MAF RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT AND COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. REF C TASKS 7TH AF TO CONDUCT ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS IN THE DUMP TRUCK AREA, WHICH INCLUDES, IN PART, AIR OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. REF D STATES III MAF RESPONSIBILITY TO ESTABLISH JOINT PLANNING-COORDINATION MEASURES REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH III MAF/USAF AIR OPERATIONS IN I CORPS AND ALSO ESTABLISHES BOTH III MAF AND 7TH AF RESPONSIBILITY TO PREPARE JOINT INSTRUCTIONS TO INSURE INTEGRATED AND COORDINATED JOINT EFFORT AND OPERATIONS. REF E DIRECTS 7TH AF AND III MAF COORDINATION BETWEEN DUMP TRUCK AND DYE MARKER TO ASSURE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS AND MINIMUM INTERFERENCE BETWEEN FORCES. REF E FURTHERMORE DEFINES DYE MARKER AS THAT GEOGRAPHIC AREA BOUNDED ON THE EAST BY THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON THE NORTH BY THE DMZ, ON THE WEST BY THE LAOTIAN BORDER, ON THE SOUTH BY HIGHWAY 9 RUNNING EAST FROM

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

DATE 31 DEC 67 III MAF S&C

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

*B. J. Daniel*  
(SIGNATURE)  
III MAF 2100/4

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3006 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN  
THE LAOTIAN BORDER TO COMBAT OPERATING BASE (COB) CA LU (YD 013457)  
THEN, A LINE DIRECT TO COB CAMP CARROLL (YD 061550) THEN N NORTH  
TO HIGHWAY 9; THEN, EAST ON HIGHWAY 9 TO DONG HA; THEN EAST, ALONG  
THE CUA VIET RIVER TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

4. REF F DIRECTS THAT III MAF WILL BE PRIMARILY COMMITTED TO THE  
ANTI-MAIN FORCE WAR TO CONTAIN THE ENEMY ALONG THE DMZ AND THE LAOTIAN  
BORDER. SUCH A MISSION DEMANDS THAT CONTROL OF ALL FORCES IN  
THIS CRITICAL AREA BE VESTED IN III MAF TO INSURE MAXIMUM RES-  
PONSIVENESS TO ANY SITUATION. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT WITH THE ADVENT  
OF THE STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF QUANG TRI  
PROVINCE, THE LIKELY AVENUES OF INFILTRATION IN THE DEFILE SYSTEM  
BECOME MORE CRITICAL THAN HERETOFORE. IT IS IN THIS SAME AREA THAT  
PROCEDURES PROPOSED IN REF A, IF ADOPTED, WOULD DEPRIVE THE COM-  
MANDER CHARGED WITH CONTAINING THE ENEMY ALONG THE DMZ AND THE  
LAOTIAN BORDER OF THE LATITUDE AND RESPOSIVENESS TO ADEQUATELY  
PERFORM HIS MISSION.

5. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND COORDINATION OF ALL OPERATIONS IN  
ICTZ MUST BE EXERCISED BY CG III MAF. ACCORDINGLY 7TH AF OPERATIONS  
ASSOCIATED WITH MUSCLE SHOALS IN ICTZ MUST BE CLEARED WITH AND COORD-  
INATED BY III MAF THROUGH FSOC DONG HA. THE MECHANISM TO EXERCISE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 3006 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN  
RESPONSIBILITY IS AND HAS BEEN IN BEING AND IS EXERCISED DAILY  
THROUGH THE FSOC AND ABCC. THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE  
GATHERING SYSTEM SHOULD NOT MODIFY ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES FOR  
CONTROL OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THERE IS PRESENTLY IN EXISTENCE A  
SECURE VOICE/TELETYPE CIRCUIT BETWEEN NAKHON PHANOM/PHU BAI. III  
MAF HAS INITIATED ACTION TO RELOCATE THE PHU BAI TERMINAL DO  
DONG HA FSOC.

6. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF REF  
D THAT 7TH AF AND III MAF ENTER INTO A JOINT AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO  
THE COORDINATION OF MUSCLE SHOALS OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. IN  
STRUCTURING SUCH AN AGREEMENT AND THE FOLLOWING RESPONSIBILITIES ARE  
PROPOSED:

- (A. 7TH AIR FORCE)
- (1) ESTABLISH COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ABCC AND FSOC/DASC, DONG HA
  - (2) ESTABLISH SECURE COMMUNICATIONS (TELETYPE AND VOICE) )  
BETWEEN ISC AND FSOC/DASC (DONG HA).
  - (3) UPON DEVELOPING TARGETS FROM SENSOR-GENERATED TARGET  
INFORMATION WITHIN III MAF AREA OF OPERATIONS, PROVIDE TARGET  
INFORMATION TO FSOC/DASC (DONG HA) FOR ATTACK AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.  
AIR STRIKES IN THE RVN PORTION OF DUMP TRUCK MUST BE CLEARED WITH

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FSCC (DONG HA).

(4) PROVIDE DIRECT LIAISON (TO INCLUDE EXCHANGE OF LIAISON PERSONNEL) BETWEEN FSCC AND ISC.

(5) COORDINATE WITH III MAF PROPOSED LOCATIONS PRIOR TO SEEDING EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND SENSORS IN ICTZ.

(6) PROVIDE LOCATION OF ALL ACTIVE SENSOR FIELDS TO AND COORDINATE ALL SPIKE TEAM OR OTHER GROUND OPERATIONS WITH FSCC/DASC DONG HA.

B. III MAF

(1) PROVIDE AIR SPACE/RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLANS FOR OPERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH MUSCLE SHOALS IN ICTZ. III MAF RETAINS RIGHT TO WITHDRAW AIR SPACE/RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN DURING EMERGENCIES. III MAF WILL EXPAND AIR SPACE/RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN UPON 7TH AF REQUEST TO ACCOMMODATE ANY AIRCRAFT EMERGENCIES.

(2) EXERCISE CONTROL OF ALL OPERATIONS IN MUSCLE SHOALS/DEFILE SYSTEM THROUGH FSCC/DASC DONG HA.

(3) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT WITHIN AND BEYOND DFS AS REQUESTED BY 7TH AF.

(4) PROVIDE DIRECT LIAISON (TO INCLUDE EXCHANGE OF LIAISON PERSONNEL) BETWEEN ISC AND FSCC DONG HA.

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 3006 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN

(5) PROVIDE LNO WITH BLOCK OF TARGET NUMBERS FOR USE BY ISC AS REQUIRED FOR DESIGNATING TARGETS.

(6) PROVIDE LOCATIONS, FREQUENCIES AND CODES OF ALL III MAF IMPLANTED SENSOR DEVICES TO ISC AND FSCC DONG HA.

7. III MAF REPRESENTATIVES ARE AVAILABLE TO FORMALIZE AN AGREEMENT WITH 7TH AF TO INSURE COORDINATION BETWEEN DUMP TRUCK AND DYEMARKER PRIOR TO DUMP TRUCK IOC DATE.

GP-4

BT

LIMDIS NOFORN

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PP RUHKM  
 DE RUMSAK 2831 362150Z  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 281502Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

LIMDIS NO FORN

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM  
 LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION I OF II.

1. I HAVE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO MY PLANNING STAFF,  
 COMUSMACV AND COMSEVENTHFLT CONCERNING DURANGO CITY; QUOTE  
 INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DURANGO CITY (U)

A. COMUSMACV 160518Z DEC 67 (NOTAL) (TS)

1. PURPOSE

A. TO PROVIDE COMUSMACV AND COMSEVENTHFLT WITH THE PLANNING  
 GUIDANCE ON WHICH MY CJLF PLANNING STAFF IS INITIATING ADVANCE  
 PLANNING FOR OPERATION DURANGO CITY.

B. DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION TO OTHER THAN US FORCES IS  
 PROHIBITED. FURTHER, DISSEMINATION OF THIS GUIDANCE WILL BE CLOSELY  
 HELD AND LIMITED TO THOSE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO INITIATE PLANNING.

2. GENERAL

A. IN OPERATION DURANGO CITY CINCPAC WILL EXERCISE OPERATIONAL  
 COMMAND OVER FORCES ASSIGNED AND OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERA-

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO  
 TION THROUGH COMUSMACV AND THE PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS, AS  
 APPROPRIATE.

B. COMUSMACV HAS BEEN ASSIGNED OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE  
 PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION AND HAS BEEN APPOINTED THE  
 COORDINATING AUTHORITY AS DEFINED BY PAR 30281 OF JCS P B 2, UNAAF.

C. CINCPACFLT HAS DESIGNATED COMSEVENTHFLT AS COMMANDER, JOINT  
 AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CJATF) AND DIRECTED CJATF REPORT TO COMUS-  
 MACV FOR PLANNING.

D. COMUSMACV HAS DESIGNATED CG III MAF AS COMMANDER, JOINT LAND-  
 ING FORCES (CJLF) FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT.

E. COMUSMACV HAS ADDITIONALLY DESIGNATED CG III MAF AS COMMANDER,  
 JOINT LAND FORCES NORTH (CJLFN) FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE.

F. CG III MAF HAS DESIGNATED CG FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AS  
 COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE AVIATION/COMMANDER LAND FORCE NORTH  
 AVIATION (CJLFAV/CLFNAV).

G. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) WILL BE UNDER THE  
 COMMAND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL OFFICERS AND WILL FUNCTION AS  
 NATIONAL UNITS INSOFAR AS PRACTICABLE. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN U.S.  
 COMMANDERS AND RVNAF COMMANDERS WILL BE GOVERNED BY ARRANGEMENTS AS  
 MAY BE MADE BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. V

EXCLUSIVE

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO  
 3. MISSION. COMMENCING AT H-HOUR, D-DAY COMMANDER JOINT LANDING FORCE, WITH FORCES ASSIGNED, LANDS IN VICINITY OF XOM LAP, NORTH VIETNAM AND ATTACKS SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ IN ORDER TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INSTALLATIONS, SUPPLY CACHES AND OTHER LOGISTIC FACILITIES IN AND NEAR THE DMZ.

## 4. FORCES

## A. U.S. MARINE FORCES

- (1) 1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN)
- (2) 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

## B. U.S. ARMY FORCES

- (1) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) (-)
- (2) SUPPORTING FORCES AS REQUIRED

## C. MACV RESERVE

- (1) BDZ, 1ST CAV DIV (AM)
- (2) BDE, 101ST ABN DIV

## D. U.S. NAVY FORCES

- (1) TWO CVA
- (2) THREE-FOUR CRUISERS (TWO 8", ONE-TWO 6")
- (3) 16 DD
- (4) FOUR LSMR/IFSS
- (5) ONE AGMR
- (6) TWO AGC
- (7) TWO APD
- (8) FIVE LPH

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- (9) FIVE LPD
- (10) EIGHT AKA
- (11) EIGHT APA
- (12) 12-14 LSD
- (13) 24 LST
- (14) ONE APSS
- (15) MINECRAFT AS REQUIRED
- (16) SERVICE FORCES AS REQUIRED
- (17) TWO AH

## E. VIETNAMESE FORCES

- (1) ONE AIRBORNE TASK FORCE (THREE BNS PLUS A TASK FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS).
- (2) ONE MARINE TASK FORCE (TWO BNS PLUS A TASK FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS).

## 5. ASSUMPTIONS

A. THAT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM FORCES.

B. THAT CHICOM INVOLVEMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM FORCES.

C. THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE USED IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN.

D. THAT CJATF WILL DESIGNATE COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE AVIATION (CG FMAV) AS TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER FOR THIS JAIF.

E. THAT UPON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, THE LAND

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO  
 PORTION OF THE FORMER AOA WILL BE ASSIGNED TO CJLFW/CG III MAF FOR  
 THE DURATION OF OPN DURANGO CITY AS AN EXTENSION OF THE CURRENT  
 III MAF AOR IN RVN.

## 6. CONCEPT

A. COMMANDER JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CJATF) WILL CONDUCT AN  
 AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT IN THE VICINITY OF XOM LAP,  
 NORTH VIETNAM AND ATTACK SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ. RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
 THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS  
 VESTED IN COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE (CJLF) IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
 NWP-22B (FM 31-11, AFM 2-53). UPON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS  
 OPERATION, RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONS AND CONTROL OF ALL U.S. AND  
 ALLIED FORCES OPERATING WITHIN THE AOR IS PASSED TO COMMANDER JOINT  
 LANDING FORCE NORTH. AFTER CONTROL IS PASSED TO CJLFW AND THE JATF  
 IS DISESTABLISHED, NAVAL FORCES, AS REQUIRED, WILL REMAIN IN THE AREA  
 IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION, AND U.S. AIR FORCE FORCES, AS REQUIRED,  
 WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUESTED BY CLFW/CLFNAV.

B. THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER ASHORE PROVIDES FOR THE LANDING FORCE  
 TO LAND APPROXIMATELY 25 KM NORTH OF THE DMZ (VIC XOM LAP) BY SUR-  
 FACE, HELICOPTER AND AIRBORNE MEANS, WHEEL TO THE SOUTH AND ATTACK ON  
 AS WIDE A FRONT AS PERMITTED BY THE TERRAIN, USING MULTIPLE AXIS

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2831 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO  
 OF ATTACK AND COMBINING SURFACE AND HELICOPTER MOBILITY.

A COVERING FORCE WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE LANDING FORCE  
 FROM ENEMY MANEUVERS TO THE NORTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCE AS IT MOVES  
 SOUTH. THIS COVERING FORCE WILL BE A MARINE RLT (-) AND WILL BE  
 POSITIONED TO COVER THE MOST DANGEROUS AVENUE OF APPROACH FROM THE  
 NORTH. A BLT FROM THIS REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM WILL BE ONE OF THE LF  
 RESERVE UNITS AND BE HELD ABOARD AN LPH. THE OTHER LF RESERVE UNIT  
 WILL BE ONE BATTALION FROM THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION HELD AT A DESIG-  
 NATED STAGING AREA SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

C. CONCURRENT WITH THE ATTACK TO THE SOUTH, LIMITED OBJECTIVE  
 ATTACKS TO THE NORTH WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION  
 TO FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN THE DMZ AREA AND TO INSTALL AND  
 DEFEND BRIDGE CROSSINGS, WHEN DIRECTED.

D. COMUSMACV WILL TERMINATE OPERATION DURANGO CITY UPON THE  
 CROSSING OF MAJOR UNITS THROUGH THE DMZ AND UPON THE RECOMMENDATION  
 OF CG III MAF AFTER IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE NORMAL COMMAND  
 AND CONTROL ELEMENTS WITHIN ICTZ CAN RESUME/ASSUME CONTROL OF  
 FRIENDLY FORCES ALONG THE DMZ.

E. THE GENERAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER IS INITIALLY DEPICTED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND RVN MARINE TASK FORCE WILL LAND AT

BT

LIMDIS  
 NO FORN

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TOP SECRET

PP RUHMM  
 DE RUMSAK 2834 3621502  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 281502Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

LIMDIS NO FORN

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF II SECTIONS, H-HOUR VIA HELO AND SURFACE MEANS AND ATTACK SOUTH TOWARD THE DMZ IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. BOUNDARIES WILL BE THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ON THE EAST AND RAILROAD BED ON THE WEST (INCLUSIVE).

(2) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM) (-) WILL LAND AT APPROXIMATELY H PLUS THREE HOURS IN ASSIGNED HLA'S AND ATTACK SOUTH TOWARD THE DMZ IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. THE RVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE WILL CONDUCT A PARACHUTE ASSAULT AT APPROXIMATELY H PLUS SIX HOURS AND OPERATE IN COORDINATION WITH THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. TIMING OF THIS SEQUENCE OF LANDING IS SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

BOUNDARIES WILL BE RAILROAD BED (NOT INCLUSIVE) ON THE EAST AND FOLLOW A GENERAL TRACE IN THE PIEDMONT AREA AS RECOMMENDED BY CG 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM).

(3) A COVERING FORCE WILL BE UTILIZED TO COVER THE REAR (NORTH) OF THE ATTACKING FORCES.

F. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC COORDINATING CONSIDERATIONS ARE:

(1) ONLY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT WILL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA.

(2) OPERATIONS WILL BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2834 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN MCEO

(3) THE SHORT DURATION OF THE OPERATION INHIBITS DEEP PENETRATION INTO THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE AOA.

(4) LINK-UP OPERATIONS WITH THE 3D MARINE DIVISION WILL REQUIRE A HIGH DEGREE OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION.

7. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV, CG 1ST MAW, AND CG 1ST CAVDIV (AM): SUBMIT RECOMMENDED TASK ORGANIZATION TO ARRIVE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 2 JAN 68. UNQUOTE.

GP-1  
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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAL 1988D 3621153  
 ZNY TTTT ZOK JPCCO  
 P 281145Z DEC 67

FM 7AF TSN AB RVN  
 TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 INFO UUMSHC/CG I FFORCEV  
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET

SUBJ: AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II (U)

REFERENCE: A. CG III MAF MSG 260542Z DEC 67.  
 B. COMUSMACV MSG 171045Z DEC 67.

1. REFERENCE A INDICATED INTENTION OF CG III MAF, WHO HAS PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR YORK II AND III, TO TASK FIRST MAF FOR ALL YORK II AIR SUPPORT ON GROUNDS THAT SUCH ASSIGNMENT IS NECESSARY.  
 2. DO NOT CONSIDER THAT REASONS AS STATED IN REF ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE PROPOSED ACTION. OPPOSING CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST PRESENT AIR SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORCES ENGAGED IN THIS OPERATION, WITH COORDINATION AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY REMAINING WITH 7AF/VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. 7AF FORCES ASSISTED AS APPROPRIATE BY VNAF ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF OPERATING IN OBJECTIVE AREA. MOST IMPORTANT FACT IS

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THAT ARMY/ARVN FORCES INVOLVED HAVE WORKED CONSISTENTLY WITH 7AF FORCES WITH RESULT THAT ALL CONCERNED HAVE DEVELOPED MOST EFFECTIVE TEAMWORK BASED ON FAMILIARITY, RAPPORT AND FULL UNDERSTANDING OF MUTUAL CAPABILITIES. THESE FACTORS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN UNIQUE OPERATIONS OF AIRMOBILE FORCES. ASSIGNMENT OF 7AF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PERSONNEL IN ALO/FAC DUTIES IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN EFFECTIVENESS. COMPLEXITY AND DIFFICULTY OF PROPOSED OPERATIONS ARGUE STRONGLY FOR CONTINUING WITH EFFECTIVE AND PROVEN ARRANGEMENTS, AS DOES FACT THAT YORK II IS CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION OF YORK I, IN WHICH SOME OF SAME FORCES WILL BE EMPLOYED. SUCCESS ACHIEVED WITH AMERICAN DIVISION CONFIRMS VALUE OF MAINTAINING ESTABLISHED AIR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS REGARDLESS OF OPERATING AREA.

3. III MAF FORCES WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED IN OPERATION CAN BE SUPPORTED AS DESIRED BY FMAW AIRCRAFT. THESE CAN BE READILY ASSIMILATED FOR AIR COORDINATION PURPOSES BY 7AF/VNAF TACS, WHICH HAS FULL CAPABILITY FOR COORDINATING ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN OBJECTIVE AREA AND IS SYSTEM THROUGH WHICH ARC LIGHT SUPPORT IS COORDINATED. IF FMAW HAS SORTIES AVAILABLE IN ADDITION TO THOSE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF III MAF REQUIREMENTS, THEY CAN BE REPORTED AND UTILIZED IAW MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 TO AUGMENT OR REPLACE 7AF/VNAF SORTIES IN OTHER AREAS, FOR

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EXAMPLE IN TALLY HO.

4. RECOMMEND AMENDING MACV PLANNING DIRECTIVE, REF B, TO SPECIFY THAT TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF FORCES INVOLVED WILL BE PROVIDED FROM 7AF/VNAF/FMAW RESOURCES AS APPROPRIATE, SUCH AIR SUPPORT TO BE ALLOCATED, TASKED AND COORDINATED THROUGH 7AF/VNAF TACS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/4

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PP RUMGUL RUMSAL RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 2737 362223Z  
 ZNY TTTT ZOK JPCCO  
 P 280230Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 INFO RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF  
 ZENM2G USARV  
 ZEN2G I FFORCEV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD  
 ZEN/CG FIRST CAV DIV (AM)

LIMDIS NO FORN

BT

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN SECTION I OF II SECTIONS  
 INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DURANGO CITY (U)

A. COMUSMACV 167518Z DEC 67 (NOTAL) (TS)

## 1. PURPOSE

A. TO PROVIDE COMUSMACV AND COMSEVENTHFLT WITH THE PLANNING GUIDANCE ON WHICH MY CJLF PLANNING STAFF IS INITIATING ADVANCE PLANNING FOR OPERATION DURANGO CITY.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2737 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN

B. DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION TO OTHER THAN US FORCES IS PROHIBITED. FURTHER, DISSEMINATION OF THIS GUIDANCE WILL BE CLOSELY HELD AND LIMITED TO THOSE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO INITIATE PLANNING.

## 2. GENERAL

A. IN OPERATION DURANGO CITY CINCPAC WILL EXERCISE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OVER FORCES ASSIGNED AND OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION THROUGH COMUSMACV AND THE PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS, AS APPROPRIATE.

B. COMUSMACV HAS BEEN ASSIGNED OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION AND HAS BEEN APPOINTED THE COORDINATING AUTHORITY AS DEFINED BY PAR 30281 OF JCS PUB 2, UNAAF.

C. CINCPACFLT HAS DESIGNATED COMSEVENTHFLT AS COMMANDER, JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CJATF) AND DIRECTED CJATF REPORT TO COMUSMACV FOR PLANNING.

D. COMUSMACV HAS DESIGNATED CG III MAF AS COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCES (CJLF) FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT.

E. COMUSMACV HAS ADDITIONALLY DESIGNATED CG III MAF AS COMMANDER, JOINT LAND FORCES NORTH (CJLFN) FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE.

F. CG III MAF HAS DESIGNATED CG FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AS COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE AVIATION/COMMANDER LAND FORCE NORTH

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DATE 12/29/67 III MAF S&amp;C

(SIGNATURE)

III MAF 2300/4

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AVIATION (CJLFAV/CLFNAV).

G. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL OFFICERS AND WILL FUNCTION AS NATIONAL UNITS INsofar AS PRACTICABLE. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN U.S. COMMANDERS AND RVNAF COMMANDERS WILL BE GOVERNED BY ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE MADE BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

3. MISSION. COMMENCING AT H-HOUR, D-DAY COMMANDER JOINT LANDING FORCE, WITH FORCES ASSIGNED, LANDS IN VICINITY OF XOM LAP, NORTH VIETNAM AND ATTACKS SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ IN ORDER TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INSTALLATIONS, SUPPLY CACHES AND OTHER LOGISTIC FACILITIES IN AND NEAR THE DMZ.

## 4. FORCES

## A. U.S. MARINE FORCES

- (1) 1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN)
- (2) 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

## B. U.S. ARMY FORCES

- (1) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) (-)
- (2) SUPPORTING FORCES AS REQUIRED

## C. MACV RESERVE

- (1) BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AM)

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2737 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN

- (2) BDE, 101ST ABN DIV

## D. U.S. NAVY FORCES

- |                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| (1) TWO CVA                | (2) THREE-FOUR CRUISERS (TWO 8", ONE-TWO 6") |
| (3) 16 DD                  | (4) FOUR LSMR/IFSS                           |
| (5) ONE AGMR               | (6) TWO AGC                                  |
| (7) TWO APD                | (8) FIVE LPH                                 |
| (9) FIVE LPD               | (10) EIGHT AKA                               |
| (11) EIGHT APA             | (12) 12-14 LSD                               |
| (13) 24 LST                | (14) ONE APSS                                |
| (15) MINECRAFT AS REQUIRED | (16) SERVICE FORCES AS REQUIRED              |
| (17) TWO AH                |  |

## E. VIETNAMESE FORCES

- (1) ONE AIRBORNE TASK FORCE (THREE BNS PLUS A TASK FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS).
- (2) ONE MARINE TASK FORCE (TWO BNS PLUS A TASK FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS).

## 5. ASSUMPTIONS

A. THAT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM FORCES.

B. THAT CHICOM INVOLVEMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO LOGISTIC AND

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2737 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN  
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM FORCES.

C. THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE USED IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN.

D. THAT CJATF WILL DESIGNATE COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE AVIATION (CG FMAV) AS TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER FOR THIS JATF.

E. THAT UPON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, THE LAND PORTION OF THE FORMER AOA WILL BE ASSIGNED TO CJLFN/CG III MAF FOR THE DURATION OF OPN DURANGO CITY AS AN EXTENSION OF THE CURRENT III MAF AOR IN RVN.

6. CONCEPT

A. COMMANDER JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CJATF) WILL CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT IN THE VICINITY OF XOM LAP, NORTH VIETNAM AND ATTACK SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS VESTED IN COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCE (CJLF) IN ACCORDANCE WITH NWP-22B (FM 31-11, AFM 2-53). UPON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONS AND CONTROL OF ALL U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES OPERATING WITHIN THE AOR IS PASSED TO COMMANDER JOINT LANDING FORCE NORTH. AFTER CONTROL IS PASSED TO CJLFN AND THE JATF IS DISESTABLISHED, NAVAL FORCES, AS REQUIRED, WILL REMAIN IN THE AREA

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2737 T O P S E C R E T LIMSID NOFORN  
IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION, AND U.S. AIR FORCE FORCES, AS REQUIRED, WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUESTED BY CLFN/CLFNAV.

B. THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER ASHORE PROVIDES FOR THE LANDING FORCE TO LAND APPROXIMATELY 25 KM NORTH OF THE DMZ (VIC XOM LAP) BY SURFACE, HELICOPTER AND AIRBORNE MEANS, WHEEL TO THE SOUTH AND ATTACK ON AS WIDE A FRONT AS PERMITTED BY THE TERRAIN, USING MULTIPLE AXIS OF ATTACK AND COMBINING SURFACE AND HELICOPTER MOBILITY.

A COVERING FORCE WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE LANDING FORCE FROM ENEMY MANEUVERS TO THE NORTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCE AS IT MOVES SOUTH. THIS COVERING FORCE WILL BE A MARINE RLT (-) AND WILL BE POSITIONED TO COVER THE MOST DANGEROUS AVENUE OF APPROACH FROM THE NORTH. A BLT FROM THIS REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM WILL BE ONE OF THE LF RESERVE UNITS AND BE HELD ABOARD AN LPH. THE OTHER LF RESERVE UNIT WILL BE ONE BATTALION FROM THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION HELD AT A DESIGNATED STAGING AREA SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

C. CONCURRENT WITH THE ATTACK TO THE SOUTH, LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS TO THE NORTH WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION TO FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN THE DMZ AREA AND TO INSTALL AND DEFEND BRIDGE CROSSINGS, WHEN DIRECTED.

D. COMUSMACV WILL TERMINATE OPERATION DURANGO CITY UPON THE  
BT

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TOP SECRET

PP RUMGUL RUMSAL RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 2738 362023 0  
 ZNY TTTTT ZOK JPCCO  
 P 280230Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 INFO RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF  
 ZENM/CG USARV  
 ZEN/CG I FFORCEV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD  
 ZEN/CG FIRST CAV DIV (AM)

BT

TOP SECRET LIMDIS NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF II SECTIONS  
 CROSSING OF MAJOR UNITS THROUGH THE DMZ AND UPON THE RECOMMENDATION  
 OF CG III MAF AFTER IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE NORMAL COMMAND  
 AND CONTROL ELEMENTS WITHIN ICTZ CAN RESUME/ASSUME CONTROL OF  
 FRIENDLY FORCES ALONG THE DMZ.

E. THE GENERAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER IS INITIALLY DEPICTED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND RVN MARINE TASK FORCE WILL LAND AT

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PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2738 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN  
H-HOUR VIA HELO AND SURFACE MEANS AND ATTACK SOUTH TOWARD THE DMZ IN  
THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. BOUNDARIES WILL  
BE THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ON THE EAST AND RAILROAD BED ON THE WEST  
(INCLUSIVE).

(2) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM) (-) WILL LAND AT APPROXIMATELY  
H PLUS THREE HOURS IN ASSIGNED HLA'S AND ATTACK SOUTH TOWARD THE DMZ  
IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. THE RVN AIR-  
BORNE TASK FORCE WILL CONDUCT A PARACHUTE ASSAULT AT APPROXIMATELY  
H PLUS SIX HOURS AND OPERATE IN COORDINATION WITH THE 1ST CAVALRY  
DIVISION FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. TIMING OF THIS SEQUENCE OF  
LANDING IS SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

BOUNDARIES WILL BE RAILROAD BED (NOT INCLUSIVE) ON THE EAST AND  
FOLLOW A GENERAL TRACE IN THE PIEDMONT AREA AS RECOMMENDED BY CG 1ST  
CAVALRY DIVISION (AM).

(3) A COVERING FORCE WILL BE UTILIZED TO COVER THE REAR (NORTH)  
OF THE ATTACKING FORCES.

F. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC COORDINATING CONSIDERATIONS ARE:

(1) ONLY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT WILL BE INTRODUCED  
INTO THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA.

(2) OPERATIONS WILL BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS.

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2738 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN

(3) THE SHORT DURATION OF THE OPERATION INHIBITS DEEP PENETRA-  
TION INTO THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE AOA.

(4) LINK-UP OPERATIONS WITH THE 3D MARINE DIVISION WILL REQ-  
UIRE A HIGH DEGREE OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION.

7. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV, CG 1ST MAW, AND CG 1ST CAVDIV (AM): SUBMIT  
RECOMMENDED TASK ORGANIZATION TO ARRIVE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT  
2 JAN 68.

GP-1

BT

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TOP SECRET

PP RUMSAL RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 2549 360054Z  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 262542Z DEC 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 INFO RUMSAL/CMDR 7TH AF  
 ZEN/CG I FFORCEV  
 BT

#1 0376

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

## CONCEPT FOR AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II

- A. COMUSMACV MSG 070037Z DEC67 (NOTAL)  
 B. COMUSMACV MSG 171045Z DEC67 (NOTAL)  
 1. REFS A AND B TASK THIS HQ TO DEVELOP DETAILED PLANNING FOR YORK II. PRELIMINARY PLANNING FOR SUBJECT OPERATION ENVISIONS JOINT ARMY/MARINE CORPS/ARVN TASK FORCE. DEPENDENCE OF TASK FORCE ON HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING RESOURCES FOR TACTICAL MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, FIRE POWER, AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, REQUIRES CLOSEST INTEGRATION OF AIR INTO ORGANIZATION FOR ALL PHASES OF OPERATION, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION. INTEND TO TASK CG FIRST MAW WITH RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVIDING ALL CLOSE AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.  
 2. CONSIDER FMAW ASSIGNMENT AS SINGLE TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2549 TOP SECRET

AGENCY NECESSARY FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

- A. FIRST MAW HAS BEEN ASSIGNED PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERDICTION OF OBJECTIVE AREA PRIOR TO AND DURING WINTER MONSOON SEASON CAMPAIGN.  
 B. RECONNAISSANCE ACFT OF FMAW PROVIDE DAILY COVERAGE OF AREA AND ITS APPROACHES.  
 C. AIR CONTROL FACILITIES FOR BOTH HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING OPERATIONS ARE IN BEING AND CAN READILY ASSIMILATE YORK II OPERATIONS.  
 D. FMAW FIGHTER/ATTACK ACFT ARE LOCATED AT CHU LAI AND DANANG AND CAN PROVIDE CONTINUOUS ALL WEATHER DAY AND NIGHT AIR SUPPORT.  
 3. ABOVE AIR SUPPORT CONCEPT STRESSES UNITY OF COMMAND, ECONOMY OF FORCE, AND SIMPLICITY IN EXECUTION.

GP-4

BT

TOP SECRET

VV ALF518  
PP RUMSAK  
DE RUMSAL 1675D 3580314  
ZNY TTTTT ZOK JPCCO  
P 240245Z DEC 67

NO FORN

# 10379

FM 7AF ISN AB RVN

TO RUMSAK/COMMANDER III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMBDFK/TASK FORCE ALVXA NAKHON PHANOM APRT THAI

RUMBDFFA/DET 1 6250 SPTSQ UDORN AFLD THAILAND

BT 3

T O P S E C R E T / N O F O R N / L I M D I S / D O

THIS IS A MUSCLE SHOALS MESSAGE FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

SUBJECT: CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SVN PORTION OF MUSCLE SHOALS AREA (S).

1. THE COMMANDER, SEVENTH AIR FORCE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING AN AIR SUPPORTED ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEM, MUSCLE SHOALS. THE ANTI-PERSONNEL PORTION (DUMP TRUCK) LIES WITHIN BOUNDARIES APPROVED TO MACV LEVEL AND ACCEPTED FOR PLANNING AND REPORTING PURPOSES BY THE JCS. IT INCLUDES PARTS OF NORTH VIETNAM, SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS BOUNDED BY THE FOLLOWING UTM COORDINATES: XE 300 090 SOUTH ALONG THE LAOS/NVN BORDER TO XD 660 800 TO XD 880 800 TO XD 880 400 TO XD 430 400 TO XD 430 700 TO XD 300 900 TO XE 300 090. APPROXIMATELY

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 1675D T O P S E C R E T N O F O R N L I M D I S

TEN PERCENT OF THIS AREA EXTENDS INTO THAT PART OF SOUTH VIETNAM OVER WHICH THE CG III MAF EXERCISES OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

2. IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE, IF NOT MANDATORY FOR MISSION SUCCESS AND SAFETY OF FRIENDLY FORCES, THAT THE SAME 7AF CONTROL PROCEDURES BE USED FOR ALL MUSCLE SHOALS OPERATIONS REGARDLESS OF AREA. TYPE MISSIONS TO BE CONTROLLED ARE AS FOLLOWS: HELICOPTER MISSIONS TO INSERT AND EXTRACT SOG TEAMS EMPLACING SENSORS BY HAND; CONVENTIONAL AND JET AIRCRAFT ON MISSIONS TO ACCURRATELY AIR EMPLACE SENSORS OR SOW ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES; FAC AIRCRAFT ON MISSIONS TO VERIFY SENSOR DETECTED TARGETS AND DIRECT STRIKES; STIKE AIRCRAFT ATTACKING TARGETS IN THE MUSCLE SHOALS AREA; SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT IN A DEFINED ORBIT TO RELAY SENSOR TRANSMISSIONS.  
3. MUSCLE SHOALS AIR OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THE OVERALL INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL BY THE AIRBORNE BATTLEFIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER (ABCCC) HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THESE ARE NORMAL AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH OTHER AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND THE TALLY HO AREA NORTH OF THE DMZ. RECOGNIZING THAT III MAF FORCES WILL DERIVE BENEFITS FROM PROMPT STRIKES AGAINST INFILTRATIONS IN ALL PARTS OF THE DUMP TRUCK AREA, PARTICULARILY THAT PART EXTENDING

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DATE 27 DEC 67 III MAF S&D PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

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 INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THESE SAME 7AF CONTROL  
 PROCEDURE SO CAN BE APPLIED IN THE AREA OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN A  
 MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF CG III MAF.

4. WITH THAT OBJECTIVE IN VIEW IT IS REQUESTED THAT 7AF BE CLEARED  
 TO CONDUCT UNRESTRICTED AIR OPERATIONS UNDER CONTROL OF THE ABCCC  
 IN THAT PART OF THE I CORPS AREA BOUNDED ON THE WEST BY THE LAOTIAN  
 BORDER, ON THE NORTH BY THE PMDL, AND ON THE EAST AND SOUTH BY A  
 LINE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: PROCEEDING FROM A POINT ALONG THE PMDL  
 AT XD8995 6845 TO THE 1371 METER PEAK AT XD8140 5170 TO A RIDGE  
 LINE POINT AT XD7075 4400 TO THE LAOTIAN BORDER XD6588 4645.  
 THIS INNER AREA COVERS THE GEOGRAPHY IN WHICH SENSORS WILL BE  
 EMPLACED, AND ENCLOSES THE EC-121 ORBIT NECESSARY TO READOUT  
 SENSOR TRANSMISSIONS. RELOCATION OF THIS ORBIT WITHIN DUMP  
 TRUCK BOUNDARIES MAY BE NECESSITATED FOR TECHNICAL REASONS OR  
 RELOCATION OF SENSORS. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESENT AREA  
 OF III MAF OPERATIONS DOWN TO THE KHE SANH TAOR IS OF IMMEDIATE  
 CONCERN TO THE CG III MAF FOR DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND OPERATIONS IN  
 THE KHE SANH COMPLEX, AND THEREFORE REQUIRES SPECIAL MEASURES  
 TO ESTABLISH THE FLEXIBLE OPERATIONAL AND COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS  
 NECESSARY TO CONTROL AIR AND GROUND FIRES. THEREFORE AUTHORITY

PAGE 4 RUMSAL 1675D T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS  
 TO MODIFY THIS INNER BOUNDARY OR TERMINATE OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE  
 WILL REMAIN WITH CG III MAF. NORMALLY 48 HOURS NOTICE TO 7AF HQ  
 WILL REESTABLISH BOUNDARIES AS REQUIRED BY THE CG III MAF, EXCEPT  
 THAT UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS A ONE HOUR NOTICE WOULD PERMIT  
 ORDERLY RELINQUISHMENT OF 7AF OPERATIONAL AIR CONTROL IN THE DUMP  
 TRUCK SENSOR AREA WITHIN SVN.

5. ACCORDINGLY IT IS PROPOSED THAT 7AF OPERATIONS BE CONDUCTED ON  
 A ROUTINE DAILY BASIS WITHIN DESIGNATED AREA AS FOLLOWS: A. THE  
 ABCCC WILL LIMIT ARTILLERY FIRES THROUGH THE FIRE SUPPORT  
 COORDINATION CENTER FOR MINIMUM TIME PERIODS WHEN ORBIT, STRIKE,  
 MISSION AIRCRAFT OR GROUND TEAMS WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY ARTILLERY.  
 B. WHEN ARTILLERY FIRES ARE BEING CONDUCTED AS COUNTER-BATTERY  
 OR IN SUPPORT OF MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED  
 AREA THE AIR CONTROL AND COORDINATION BOUNDARY WILL BE ADJUSTED  
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS STATED BY CG III MAF TO GIVE HIM  
 TACTICAL FREEDOM OF ACTION. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS, THE AREA OF  
 7AF CONTROL IN I CORPS AREA WILL BE CONTRACTED DURING THE PERIOD  
 NECESSARY TO CONFORM TO THE III MAF IMMEDIATE/PROGRAMMED  
 OPERATION NEEDS. C. WHEN INTERDICTION TARGETS/ROUTES ARE  
 NOMINATED BY THE INFILTRATION SURVEILLANCE CENTER (ISC) FOR

NO FORN

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LIMDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 5 RUMSAL 1675 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS  
 STRIKE, AND ARTILLERY IS CONSIDERED MOST ADVANTAGEOUS, THEN REQUEST  
 FOR QUICK RESPONSE ARTILLERY FIRES WILL BE MADE BY THE ABCCC TO  
 THE FSCC DONG HA IAW ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. D. IT WILL CONTINUE  
 TO BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ABCCC TO COORDIANTE GROUND FIRES  
 WITH THE AIRBORNE MONITORING EC-121 TO INCLUDE MOVING EC-121  
 ORBIT AS NECESSARY AND WITH OTHER MISSION AIRCRAFT AFFECTED. E.  
 ABCCC WILL REQUEST ARTILLERY TO SUPPORT EMERGENCY EXTRACTION OF  
 GROUND TEAMS AS REQUIRED. F. 7AF WILL KEEP III MAF INFORMED ON  
 A DAILY BASIS OF AIR OPERATIONS AND GROUND TEAM OPERATIONS  
 CONDUCTED IN THE I CORPS PORTION OF THE DUMP TRUCK AREA, TO INCLUDE  
 NO FIRE ZONES, NO BOMB LINES AND OTHER PERTINENT DATA. CG III  
 MAF WILL SUPPLY LOCATIONS WHICH ARE FRIENDLY OR WHICH SHOULD NOT  
 BE STRUCK INSIDE THE DUMP TRUCK AREA.  
 6. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A 1 JANUARY 1968 OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
 FOR DUMP TRUCK YOUR CONCURRENCE ON THE ABOVE AIRSPACE CONTROL  
 AND COORDINATION ARRAGEMENT FOR MUSCLE SHOALS OPERATIONS IS  
 REQUESTED. GP-3  
 BT

NO FORN  
 LIMDIS

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DATE 17 DEC 67 III MAF S&C

*Van D. Smith*

(SIGNATURE)

LIMITS NO FORN

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH

ZEN/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG

ZEN/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

ZEN/CO 5TH SFGO NHA TRANG

INFO ZEN/CDR 7TH AF TSN

BT

TOP SECRET LINDIS NOFORN 41883 FROM: MACCOC II

SUBJECT: OPERATION YORK PLANNING DIRECTIVE (U)

REF: COMUSMACV 40780 DIG 07003Z DEC. 67 (TS) (NOTAL)

THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS

PART ONE

1. (U) SUBSEQUENT TO BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION ON 9 DEC, COMUSMACV ANNOUNCED PLANNING GUIDANCE AS PROMULGATED HEREIN FOR OPERATION YORK. THIS MESSAGE SUPERCEDES REF.

2. (TS) OPERATION YORK.

A. PURPOSE: TO DIRECT PLANNING FOR A SERIES OF MAJOR OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD COMMENCING ABOUT MID FEB 68.

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 5724U TOP SECRET NOFORN LINDIS

B. OBJECTIVE: TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC/NVA BASES, FACILITIES AND MATERIAL, AND INTERDICT ENEMY LOC IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA OF QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI AND KONTRUM PROVINCES; AND WESTERN QUANG NAM, THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI PROVINCES.

C. CONCEPT:

(1) GENERAL: IN A FOUR-PHASE OPERATION (YORK) COMMENCING MID-FEB 68, A COMBINED TASK FORCE WILL ASSAULT SUCCESSIVELY INTO THE WESTERN DO XA AND WESTERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE (YORK I); THE A SHAU VALLEY (YORK II); WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE (YORK III); AND WHEN DETERMINED, THE ESTERN DO XA (YORK IV). YORK I WILL BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG, I FFORCEV; AND YORK II AND YORK III WILL BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG, III MAF. PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR YORK IV WILL BE ISSUED AT A LATER DATE. IN CONJUNCTION WITH AND IN SUPPORT OF YORK OPERATIONS, SPECIFIED AIRFIELDS WILL BE RESTORED AND CIDG CAMPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED. YORK WILL BE SUPPORTED BY ARC LIGHT AND TACAIR.

(2) YORK I: A TASK FORCE COMPRISED OF 1ST CAV (AM)

(-2 BDES) REINFORCED BY ONE ARVN ABN BDE WILL CONDUCT A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE INTO WESTERN DO XA (KONTRUM SEGMENT) AND WESTERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE DURING THE PERIOD MID-FEB TO END MAR 68. THE TASK FORCE

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PAGE 3 RUMSAW 5704U T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMC IS  
 WILL LOCATE AND INTERDICT ENEMY LOC, DESTROY BASE CAMPS AND FACILITIES, AND ESTABLISH CIDG CAMP AT TALON (YC 885325). A C7A TYPE II AIRFIELD WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT TALON COINCIDENT WITH CIDG CAMP CONSTRUCTION. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO KHAN DUC, DAK TO. AND DAK PEK AS SUPPORT BASES FOR YORK I. THE TASK FORCE WILL PROVIDE OWN SECURITY FOR SUPPORT BASE(S). INSERTION OF ARVN UNITS AT LIS. CREATION OF CG, I FFORCEV, BEARING IN MIND THE NECESSITY FOR DEVELOPING COORDINATED PROCEDURES WHICH WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS THE YORK SERIES PROGRESS.

(3) YORK II: AUGMENTED BY AN ADDITIONAL BDE 1ST CAV (AM). THE YORK TASK FORCE OF 3 BDES WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE A SHAU VALLEY DURING APR 68 TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, BASES AND FACILITIES; ESTABLISH CIDG CAMPS AT A SHAU AND TA BAT; AND ESTABLISH A MINIMUM OF ONE C-130 AND ONE C123 TYPE II AIRFIELD IN THE A SHAU VALLEY.

(4) YORK III: THE THREE BDE YORK TASK FORCE WILL CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES, BASES AND FACILITIES, AND INTERDICT LOC IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DURING MAY 68.

D. BASE SUPPORT: DESIGNATED CONTROL HEAD QUARTERS WILL

PAGE 4 RUMSAW 5704U T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMC IS  
 DETERMINE THEIR CONSTRUCTION/IMPROVEMENT REQUIREMENTS EARLIEST IN ORDER THAT ENGINEER WORK MAY COMMENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND TO ENSURE THAT YORK OPERATIONS ARE NOT DELAYED BY INCOMPLETE SUPPORT FACILITIES. (INFO THH HQ ON ALL BASE CONSTRUCTION/IMPROVEMENT PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS).

E. TASKS:

(1) CG, USARV: IN COORDINATION WITH CG, I FFORCEV; CG, III MAF; COMNAVFORV; AND CO, 5TH SFGA, DEVELOP LOGISTIC PLANS FOR OPERATION YORK. ASSIST COMMANDERS CONCERNED AS REQUIRED IN THE DETERMINATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS.

(2) CG, I FFORCEV: IN COORDINATION WITH CG, USARV; CG, III MAF; COMNAVFORV; AND CO, 5TH SFGA, DEVELOP DETAILED PLANNING FOR OPERATION YORK I.

(3) CG, III MAF: IN COORDINATION WITH COMUSARV; CG, I FFORCEV; COMNAVFORV; AND CO, 5TH SFGA, DEVELOP DETAILED PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS YORK II AND III.

(4) COMNAVFORV: IN COORDINATION WITH CG, USARV; CG, I FFORCEV; AND CG, III MAF, DETERMINE CONSTRUCTION/IMPROVEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLEMENT ACTION AS REQUIRED. DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANS AS REQUIRED.

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PAGE 3 RUMSAW 57240 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMITS

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(S) CO, 5TH SFGA: IN COORDINATION WITH CG, USARV; CG, I FFORCEV; AND CG, III MAF, DEVELOP PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS PLANS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL TASKS TO BE ASSIGNED, AND THE INSTALLATION OF CIDG CAMPS.

PART THREE

3. (S) ALL MATTERS HAVING TO DO WITH SUPPORT FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION/IMPROVEMENT AND CIDG CAMP ESTABLISHMENT WILL BE HANDLED AS SECRET (NEED TO KNOW) AND WILL BE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO PLANNED COMBAT OPERATIONS. COORDINATED PLANNING WITH RVNAF JGS PLANNING GROUP WILL BE INITIATED ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF EACH YORK PHASE AND AS DIRECTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. THEREAFTER, COMMANDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF YORK OPERATIONS ARE AUTHORIZED TO MODIFY THE NOFORN RESTRICTION AT THEIR DISCRETION AND AS REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE COORDINATION.

4. (C) DESIGNATED CONTROL HEADQUARTERS WILL BE PREPARED TO BRIEF COMUSMACV ON OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT DURING COMUSMACV VISITS AFTER 15 JAN 68.

5. (U) DIRLAUTH.

6. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY MSG OR TELEPHONE MACCOC 11, MACV 2927/2114 OF COC DROP 13. GP-4

BT

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P 160518Z DEC 67  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO COMSEVENTHFLT  
 CG III MAF  
 INFO CINCPAC  
 CINCPACFLT  
 CINCUSARPAC  
 CINCPACAF  
 CG FMFPAC  
 CDR 7TH AF SAIGON  
 CG USARV LONG BINH  
 COMNAVFORV SAIGON  
 BT

LIMDIS

NO FORN

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS 41761 FROM: MACPG SECT I OF II  
 SUBJ: INITIATING DIRECTIVE, OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE DMZ (S)  
 REF: A. CINCPAC LTR 5531, SER: 000590, 18 NOV 67 (NOTAL) (TS  
 LIMDIS NORFOR)  
 B. JCS PUB 2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF), 23  
 NOV 59  
 C. CINCPACFLT 292231Z NO 67 (NOTAL)

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 5676U T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS  
 D. DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (FM 31-11/NWP 22  
 (B)/ AFM 2-53/LFM 01), 1 AUGUST 1967  
 E. MAPS: 1:250,000 JOG(G) 1501, SHEETS NE 48-11, NE 48-  
 12, NE 48-15 AND NE 48-16

1. (TS) PURPOSE: HIS DIRECTIVE INITIATES PLANNING FOR OPER-  
 ATIONS NORTH OF THE DMZ AS AUTHORIZED BY CINCPAC OUTLINE PLAN PROMUL-  
 GATED BY REFERENCE A. IT IS TO BE EMPHASIZED THAT ALL PLANNING  
 UNDERTAKEN AS A RESULT OF THIS DIRECTIVE WILL BE SOLELY ON A CON-  
 TINGENCY BASIS.

2. (TS) BACKGROUND:

A. CINCPAC EXERCISES OPERATIONAL COMMAND OVER FORCES  
 ASSIGNED AND OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION THROUGH COMUSMACV  
 AND THE PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS, AS APPROPRIATE. COMUS-  
 MACV HAS BEEN DELEGATED OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING AND  
 CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION AND HAS BEEN APPOINTED THE COORDINATING  
 AUTHORITY AS DEFINED BY PARAGRAPH 30281 OF REFERENCE B.

B. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) WILL BE UNDER  
 THE COMMAND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL OFFICERS AND WILL FUNCTION  
 AS NATIONAL UNITS INSOFAR AS PRACTICABLE. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US  
 COMMANDERS AND RVNAF COMMANDERS WILL BE GOVERNED BY ARRANGEMENTS AS

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 DATE 17 Dec 67 III MAF S&C  
*[Signature]*  
 (SIGNATURE)

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PAGE 3 RUMSAW 56:GUT O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIND IS  
MAY BE MADE BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

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## 3. (TS) DESIGNATED COMMANDERS:

A. REFERENCE C DESIGNATED COMSEVENTHFLT AS COMMANDER, JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CJATF) AND DIRECTED THAT CJATF REPORT TO COMUSMACV FOR PLANNING.

B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A, CG, III MAF IS DESIGNATED COMMANDER, JOINT LANDING FORCES (CJLF) FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT.

C. ADDITIONALLY, CT III MAF IS DESIGNATED COMMANDER, JOINT LAND FORCES, NORTH (CJLFN) FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE.

4. (TS) MISSION: COMMANDER, JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE, WITH FORCES ASSIGNED, CONDUCTED AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF KOM LAP, NORTH VIETNAM AND ATTACKS SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ IN ORDER TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, THEIR SUPPLY CASCHE S AND OTHER LOGISTIC FACILITIES IN AND NEAR THE DMZ.

## 5. (TS) AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA):

A. LAND. FROM COORDINATES XE 7334 SOUTH ALONG THE COAST TO THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ (YD 2585), WEST ALONG THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ TO INTERSECTION OF ROUTE 123 (XD 7673), NORTH ON ROUTE 123 TO COORDINATES XD 7583, THEN ALONG WEST BANK OF THE XA RON

PAGE 4 RUMSAW 2576GUT O P S E C R E T NOFORN LIND IS  
SA RAK - SONG LONG DAI TO LANG MO (XE 5505), THEN ALONG THE WEST BANK OF THE SONG DAI GIANG TO COORDINATES (XE 4334).

B. SEA. THE AREA TO SEAWARD CONTAINED WITHIN A 27 NAUTICAL MILE ARC CENTERED FROM KOM LAP (YE 0901), EXCLUDING THAT PORTION SOUTH OF 1 DEG 05' LONGITUDE.

C. AIR. THAT AIR SPACE UP TO 25,000 FEET OVER THE DESIGNATED LAND AND SEA AREAS.

6. (TS) FORCES: INDICATED BELOW ARE THE FORCES COMMITTED TO AND IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDER, JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY REFERENCE A.

## A. US ARMY FORCES.

(1) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM) (-1 BDE, DESIGNATED MACV RESERVE).

(2) BRIGADE, - 101ST ABN DIV (DESIGNATED MACV RESERVE).

(3) SUPPORTING FORCES AS REQUIRED.

## B. US AIR FORCE FORCES.

(1) TACTICAL AIR LIFT AS REQUIRED.

(2) ARC LIGHT STRIKES AS REQUIRED.

(3) SUPPORTING AIR AS REQUIRED.

## C. US NAVY/MARINE FORCES.

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P 16350Z DEC 67  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC  
 RUHKB/CINCPACFLT  
 RUHKR/CINCPACFLT  
 RUHKQ/CINCPACAF  
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 ZEN/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON  
 ZEN/CG USARV LONG BINH  
 ZEN/COMNAVFORV SAIGON  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN L I N D I S 41761 FROM: MACPG FINAL SECT OF II  
 G. AFTER CONTROL IS PASSED ASHORE AND THE JAFT IS DIS-  
 ESTABLISHED, NAVAL FORCES, AS REQUIRED, WILL REMAIN IN THE AREA IN  
 SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION.  
 H. AFTER CONTROL IS PASSED ASHORE AND THE JAFT IS  
 DIS ESTABLISHED, US AIR FORCE FORCES, AS REQUIRED, WILL CONTINUE IN  
 SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION.

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 5670 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN L I N D I S

9. (TS) TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION: THE AMPHI-  
 BIOUS OPERATION WILL BE TERMINATED WHEN CJATF HAS REPORTED TO  
 COMUSMACV THAT THE LANDING FORCE IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND  
 THE CJLF IS READY TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK SOUTH.  
 THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION WILL BE TERMINATED AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE  
 AFTER LANDING THE LANDING FORCE.

8. (TS) TERMINATION OF THE OPERATION: THE CJLFW WILL REPORT  
 LINKUP OF FRIENDLY FORCES AND CROSSING OF MAJOR UNITS THROUGH DMZ  
 INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. UPON DETERMINATION BY CG III MAF THAT THE  
 NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS WITHIN I CTZ CAN RESUME CONTROL  
 OF FRIENDLY FORCES ALONG THE DMZ, COMUSMACV WILL TERMINATE THE  
 OPERATION.

13. (TS) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- A. DISCLOSURE OF THIS PLAN TO OTHER THAN US FORCES IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION OF COMUSMACV.
- B. UNCLASSIFIED NICKNAME DIRANGO CITY IS ASSIGNED TO THIS OPERATION.
- C. ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONCERNING THIS OPERATION WILL BE PROMULGATED SEPARATELY BY COMUSMACV.
- D. CJATF WILL SUBMIT HIS PLAN FOR APPROVAL TO COMUSMACV

PAGE 3 RUMSAW 51170 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN L I N D I S  
 BY 26 JANUARY 1968.

E. PLANNING WILL BE CONDUCTED TO PERMIT READINESS OF  
 PLANS AND FORCES BY 1 MAY 1968.

GP-4

BT

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