

35. COMUSMACV 270507Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-3*

Subj: DURANGO CITY (U)

Gen WESTMORELAND's decision that subsequent to the termination of the amphibious operation, CDR 7th AF, in his capacity of MACV Air Force component commander will control air operations within the designated objective area and coordinate, as necessary, with commander responsible for airspace control in the surrounding areas to assure integration and coordination of supporting assets to ensure unity of effort in overall air operations.

36. CG III MAF 290644Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-3*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes COMUSMACV msg 270507Z Jan68

29. CG FMFPAC 190455Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN from LGen KRULAK

Passes Adm SHARP msg to WESTMORELAND, WHEELER, MCCONNELL, CHAPMAN, AND KRULAK

30. CG FMFPAC 200335Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-3*

Passes CG FMFPAC 192309Z Jan68 to LGen CUSHMAN for info.
Provides LGen KRULAK's comments to General WESTMORELAND concerning operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

31. CG III MAF 201630Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-3*

Subj: Command Arrangements for Control and Use of Air Resources in DURANGO CITY (C)

Report of meeting between MGen ANDERSON and MGen BLOOD on 15Jan concerning Command, Control, and Utilization of Air Resources in DURANGO CITY. The meeting was directed by Gen WESTMORELAND to be held.

32. CG III MAF 201632Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for VAdm BRINGLE from LGen CUSHMAN

Subj: Command arrangements for control of DURANGO CITY

Reports results of 15Jan meeting between MGen ANDERSON and MGen BLOOD as requested by previous 7th Flt msg.

33. CG FMFPAC 212215Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN from LGen KRULAK

Passes Gen WESTMORELAND msg to Adm. SHARP. General WESTMORELAND reports of his actions to prepare for a major engagement in Northern ICTZ, specifically Khe Sanh. He also requests authority to delegate authority to his Deputy Commander for Air that control that he deems appropriate over the air assets in his command.

34. COMUSMACV 220448Z Jan68 (S) *gp-4*

Gen WESTMORELAND's directive to effect detailed application of air resources in I Corps to meet the enemy threat.

21. CG III MAF 131516Z Jan68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Conduct of Air Operations in SVN Portion of Muscle Shoals Area (S)
 Requests comments from CG 3rd MarDiv
22. CG 3RD MARDIV 141526Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*
 Subj: Conduct of Air Operations in SVN Portion of Muscle Shoals Area
 Comments in answer to CG III MAF 131516Z Jan68
23. COMSEVENTHFLT 170710Z Jan68 (TS) *gp 3*
 Subj: Command Arrangements for Control and Use of Air Resources in DURANGO CITY (U)
 Requested to be notified prior to any agreement on Control of Air Resources between 7th Air Force and III MAF which could affect 7th Flt.
24. CG III MAF 171402Z Jan68 (S) *gp-4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN
 Passes Gen WESTMORELAND's msg 171206Z Jan68. Requests any input prior to meeting that might be helpful and other assistance at your level.
25. CG FMFPAC 172259Z Jan68 (S) *gp-4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LtGen CUSHMAN from LtGen KRULAK
 Proposed questions for Gen MOMYER.
26. CG III MAF 181352Z Jan68 (S) *gp-4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for Gen WESTMORELAND from LGen CUSHMAN
 Gen CUSHMAN's report on meeting with Gen MOMYER
27. CG III MAF 182210Z Jan68 (S) *gp-4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN
 Passes CG III MAF 181352Z Jan68
28. CG III MAF 190332Z Jan68 (S) *gp-4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for Gen CHAPMAN from LGen CUSHMAN
 Passes CG III MAF 181352Z Jan68

12. CG III MAF 021000Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

Subj: Air Support for YORK II (U)

Sets forth the procedures for Air Support during operation and recommends the approval of this concept.

13. COMUSMACV 021205Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

Subj: Air Support for Operation YORK II (U)

Requests that CDR 7AF and CG III MAF prepare and integrate and coordinate air support plan in accordance with appropriate provision of MACV Dir 95-4, MACV Operation YORK Planning Document, and guidance contained herein.

14. CG III MAF 031202Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-1*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes COMUSMACV 021205Z Jan68 to LGen KRULAK

15. 7AF 051405Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-3*

Subj: Alternate EC121 Orbit for Muscle Shoals (S)

16. CG FMFPAC 060245Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN from LGen KRULAK, MCEO

LGen KRULAK's comments on control of air support in Operation YORK II.

17. CG III MAF 120054Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes CG III MAF 021000Z Jan68 to LGen KRULAK

18. COMUSMACV 121110Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-4*

Subj: Conduct of Air Operations in SVN Portion of Muscle Shoals Area (S)

COMUSMACV's direction concerning subject

19. CG III MAF 121616Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-1*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes 7th Air Force ltr to COMUSMACV dtd 5Jan68

20. CG III MAF 130650Z Jan68 (TS) *gp-3*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes COMUSMACV 110429Z Jan68 to LGen KRULAK

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RUMSAK 3264 0290644

ZNY TTTT

P 290644Z JAN 68

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR INFO.

P 270507Z JAN 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

CG III MAF DANANG

CDR 7TH AF SAIGON

INFO CINCPAC

BT

TOP SECRET NOFORN LINDIS 02975 FROM MACJ3

SUBJ: DURANGO CITY (U)

WESTMORELAND SENDS

REF: A. COMUSMACV OPERATION PLAN 44-68 DRAFT (TS)

B. COMUSMACV 01118 DTG 112429Z JAN 68 (TS) (NOTAL)

C. CDR 7TH AF LTR 19 JAN 68 SUBJ: DURANGO CITY (U) (TS) (NOTAL)

~~EXCLUSIVE~~

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

~~NO FORN~~

HAS BEEN SENT

~~LINDIS~~

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3264 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE WCEO

D. CG III MAF DTG 201630Z JAN 68 (TS) (NOTAL)

E. COMUSMACV INITIATING DIRECTIVE 160518Z DEC 67 (TS)

F. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 OF 28 JUN 66

1. (TS) THIS MSG MODIFIES INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE PROVIDED VIA REF A TO CTF 112 AND CTF 113 CONCERNING CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. REFS B, C, D PERTAIN.

2. (TS) IN REVIEW, REF E ESTABLISHED THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA AND ASSIGNED THE COMMANDER JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENTIRE FORCE, FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE OPERATION AND VESTED HIM WITH THE COMMENSURATE COMMAND AUTHORITY TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. IN FULFILLING PART OF HIS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY THE CJATF HAS DESIGNATED THE CG 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AS THE TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER TO CONTROL AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AOA DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE OPERATION.

3. (TS) MY DECISION IS THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, CDR 7TH AF, IN HIS CAPACITY OF MACV AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER (REF F, PARA. 4.A) WILL CONTROL AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED OBJECTIVE AREA AND COORDINATE, AS NECESSARY,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3264 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
WITH COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE SURROUNDING
AREAS TO ASSURE INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING ARMS TO
ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT IN OVERALL AIR OPEATIONS.

GP-3

BT

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

ZCZCSAA527VV ZVC080VV AWB985

PP RUMSAK

DE RUMSAV 0441U 0270535

ZNY TTTTT

P 270507Z JAN 68 ZFF6

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMFUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG

ZEN/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON

INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC

BT

TOP SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS 02975 FROM MACJ3

SUBJ: DURANGO CITY (U)

WESTMORELAND SENDS

REF: A. COMUSMACV OPERATION PLAN 44-68 DRAFT (TS)

B. COMUSMACV 01118 DTG 110429Z JAN 68 (TS) (NOTAL)

C. CDR 7TH AF LTR 19 JAN 68 SUBJ: DURANGO CITY (U) (TS) (NOTAL)

D. CG III MAF DTG 201630Z JAN 68 (TS) (NOTAL)

E. COMUSMACV INITIATING DIRECTIVE 160518Z DEC 67 (TS)

F. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 OF 28 JUN 66

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PAGE 2 RUMSAV 0441U TOP SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS

2. (TS) IN REVIEW, REF E ESTABLISHED THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA AND ASSIGNED THE COMMANDER JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENTIRE FORCE, FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE OPERATION AND VESTED HIM WITH THE COMMENSURATE COMMAND AUTHORITY TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. IN FULFILLING PART OF HIS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY THE CJATF HAS DESIGNATED THE CG 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AS THE TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER TO CONTROL AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AOA DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/AIRBORNE OPERATION.

3. (TS) MY DECISION IS THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, CDR 7TH AF, IN HIS CAPACITY OF MACV AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER (REF F, PARA. 4.A) WILL CONTROL AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED OBJECTIVE AREA AND COORDINATE, AS NECESSARY, WITH COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE SURROUNDING AREAS TO ASSURE INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING ARMS TO ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT IN OVERALL AIR OPERATIONS.

GP-3

BT

No 10608

LIMDIS

SECRET

OO RUMWAA
DE RUMSMA 3706A 0220453
ZNY SSSSS
O 220448Z JAN 68 ZFF6 ZFG
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMSBJ/CDR 7AF SAIGON
RUMWAA/CG III MAF DANANG
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUHHQA/CINCPAC
RUCIKOA/CMC
RUEFHQA/CSAF
RUHABA/PACAF
RUHFMMA/FMPAC

FOR

SECRET 02378

FOR GENMOMYER, LTG CUSHMAN, GEN WHEELER, ADM SHARP,
GEN MCCONNELL, GEN CHAPAMAN, GEN RYAN, LTG KRULAK FROM:
GEN WESTMORELAND

1. I CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THE MAXIMUM AIR FIRE-POWER AVAILABLE TO MEET THE ENEMY THREAT IN I CORPS. THIS WAS THE ISSUE WHICH PROMPTED BY MESSAGE 171206Z JAN 68. (NOTAL)
2. IN ORDER TO EFFECT DETAILED APPLICATION OF AIR RESOURCES IN I CORPS, THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVE WILL APPLY:

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3706A **SECRET**

A. 7TH AIR FORCE WILL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIR SUPPORT OF THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY AND AMERICAL DIVISIONS NOW DEPLOYED INTO I CORPS. POLICY OF HAVING 7TH AIR FORCE SUPPORT ARMY AND ARVN UNITS IN I CORPS WILL CONSTITUTE GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS.

B. TO MEET THE THREAT IN THE QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN AREA, I HAVE DIRECTED BY DEPUTY COMDR MACV AIR, GEN MOMYER, TO DEVEOP A PLAN TO CONCENTRATE ALL AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES (SLAM-TYPE OPERATION). THE DIRECT SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS BY THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING IS NOT EFFECTED BY THIS PLAN. THE INITIAL AREA OF CONCENTRATION WILL BE AROUND THE KHE SANH (NIAGARA II). DEPENDING UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION THE AREA WILL BE SHIFTED. DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR OPERATIONS WILL COORDINATE THE DETAILS OF THIS AIR PLAN WITH THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING AND III MAF AS APPROPRIATE. I HAVE CHARGED HIM WITH THE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. HE WILL COORDINATE AND DIRECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIR, MARINE AIR, DIVERTED AIR STRIKES FROM OUT OF COUNTRY AIR OPERATIONS AND SUCH NAVAL AIR THAT MAY BE REQUESTED. B-52 STIKES WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH HIM.

C. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, IT IS DIRECTED THAT III MAF MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE ALL TACTICAL BOMBER SORTIES NOT RE-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

* 34

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3706A S E C R E T
REQUIRED FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS. THESE SORTIES WILL BE INITIALLY COMMITTED TO THE NIAGARA OPERATION.

3. (S) I WISH TO STRESS THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR COORDINATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COMMAND TO BRING OUR FIREPOWER AGAINST THE ENEMY IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER. THE SERIOUS THREAT WE FACE IN I CORPS AND KHE SANH IN PARTICULAR, DEMANDS THIS. I HAVE DIRECTED MY AIR DEPUTY TO INSURE IN MY NAME THAT THESE AIR RESOURCES ARE APPLIED TO THIS END. GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET

III NAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTCDL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

34

TOP SECRET

00 RUMWAA
 DE RUHFMA 3802 0212215
 ZNY TTTT
 O 212215Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM WESTMORE-
 LAND TO SHARP INFO WHEELER. SHARP OFFICIALLY PASSED TO ME. QUOTE.

T O P S E C R E T MAC 00992 EYES ONLY

REF: A. COMUSMACV MAC 00797 DTG 180009Z JAN

B. CINCPAC DTG 16 2231Z JAN

1. THE ANTICIPATED ENEMY ATTACK ON KHE SANH WAS INITIATED
 LAST EVENING. KHE SANH MILITARY INSTALLATION HAS BEEN UNDER
 CONSTANT ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE SINCE EARLY MORNING, AND HILL
 861 HAS BEEN UNDER GROUND ATTACK. AMMUNITION AND POL DUMPS
 HAVE BEEN HIT, WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS REPORTED BY AIR FORCE
 FAC. 7AF IS MAINTAINING AN AIRBORNE COMMAND POST AND FAC'S
 IN THE AREA. THERE IS A BUILD-UP NORTH OF THE DMZ AND IN BASE
 AREAS 101 WEST OF QUANG TRI AND 114 WEST OF HUE. THE NEXT SEVERAL
 WEEKS ARE DESTINED TO BE ACTIVE.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA3802 TO P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

2. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN:

A. ON 6 JAN A COORDINATED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
 EFFORT WAS INITIATED ON THE KHE SANH AREA (NIAGARA I) USING
 MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

B. ON 6 JAN, I DIRECTED GEN MONYER TO PREPARE A PLAN
 TO CONCENTRATE ALL AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES INTO THE KHE SANH
 AREA (NIAGARA II).

C. ON 17 JAN THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION MINUS ONE
 BRIGADE BEGAN TO DEPLOY TO HUE/PHU BAI, AND WILL CLOSE TOMMOROW.

D. ON 18 JAN TWO ADDITIONAL VIETNAMESE AIRBORNE BATTALIONS
 DEPLOYED TO HUE, MAKING A TOTAL OF FOUR IN THE AREA.

E. ON THE 19TH, I DIVERTED ALL B-52 STRIKES TO THE AREA.

F. BASED ON MY VISIT TO III MAF ON 19 JANUARY, I SENT MY
 G2 TO KHE SANH ON 20 JANUARY TO INSURE COORDINATION OF RE-
 CONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND KHE SANH.

G. ON THE 19TH, I DIRECTED GEN CUSHMAN TO DEPLOY THE
 30 BRIGADE OF THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION AS SOON AS PRACTICAL
 FROM THE WHEELER-WALLOWA AREA TO HUE/PHU BAI TO JOIN ITS
 PARENT DIVISION.

H. ON 20 JANUARY, I INSTRUCTED LTG MEYAND TO DEPLOY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA3822 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU MCEO
THE 2D BRIGADE OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION TO HUE/PHU BAI
FOR ATTACHMENT TO 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION AS SOON AS AIR LIFT
BECOMES AVAILABLE, PROBABLY ABOUT 23 JANUARY.

I. BASED ON PLANS INITIATED LAST WEEK, I DIRECTED GEN
MOMYER ON 20 JANUARY TO DIVERT ANY USEFUL "DUMP TRUCK" ASSETS
FROM THE MUSCLE SHOALS PROJECT TO THE QUANG TRI AREA.

J. ON 20 JANUARY, I INSTRUCTED LTG CUSHMAN TO DEFER ANY
FURTHER WORK ON THE TRACE INVOLVED IN THE DYE MARKER PROJECT SO
AS TO KEEP MAXIMUM TROOPS AVAILABLE TO REACT TO ENEMY INITIATIVES.

K. TODAY, I AM SENDING GEN ABRAMS TO III MAF TO ASSESS
THE SITUATION. ALSO I HAVE DIRECTED GEN MOMYER TO STATION AN AIR
LIAISON OFFICER AT KHE SANH.

4. IT HAS NEVER BEEN MY INTENTION
TO IN ANY WAY INTERFERE WITH THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SO ESSENTIAL
TO THE MARINES ON THE GROUND OR TO UPSET THE SYSTEM AT THIS
CRITICAL TIME. ON THE OTHER HAND, I INTEND TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO
TO BRING TO BEAR IN THE MOST EFFICIENT AND COORDINATED WAY ALL
WEAPONS THAT CAN SUPPORT OUR FIGHT DURING THE IMPORTANT PERIOD AT
HAND. I URGENTLY NEED AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE TO MY DEPUTY COMMANDER
FOR AIR, THE CONTROL THAT I DEEM APPROPRIATE OVER THE AIR ASSETS

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA3802 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU MCEO
IN MY COMMAND. THE FOLLOWING ARE MY INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM AND
CG III MAF WHICH I PLAN TO ISSUE AS A MATTER OF OPERATIONAL URGE-
NCY AND WHICH I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND FULLY SATISFACTORY. QUOTE.

1. I CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THE MAXIMUM
AIR FIREPOWER AVAILABLE TO MEET THE ENEMY THREAT IN
I CORPS. THIS WAS THE ISSUE WHICH PROMPTED MY MESSAGE
(COPY BEING RELAYED TO YOU) MAC 00791 171206Z JAN 68.

2. IN ORDER TO EFFECT DETAILED APPLICATION OF MY
AIR RESOURCES IN I CORPS, THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVE WILL
APPLY:

A. 7TH AIR FORCE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIR
SUPPORT OF THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY AND AMERICAL DIVISIONS
NOW DEPLOYED INTO I CORPS. POLICY OF HAVING 7TH AIR
FORCE SUPPORT ARMY AND ARVN UNITS IN I CORPS WILL
CONSTITUTE GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS.

B. TO MEET THE THREAT IN THE QUANG TRI-THUA
THIEN AREA, I HAVE DIRECTED MY DEPUTY COMDR MACV
AIR, GEN MOMYER, TO DEVELOP A PLAN TO CONCENTRATE
ALL AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES IN THE BATTLE AREA.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 RUNHFMA3802 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU MCEO
 THE INITIAL AREA OF CONCENTRATION WILL BE AROUND KHE
 SANH (NIAGARA II). THE DIRECT SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS
 BY THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING IS NOT EFFECTED BY THIS PLAN,
 DEPENDING UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION THE AREA
 WILL BE SHIFTED. DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR
 OPERATIONS WILL COORDINATE THE DETAILS OF THIS AIR
 PLAN WITH THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING AND III MAF AS
 APPROPRIATE. I HAVE CHARGED HIM WITH THE OVERALL
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE EXECUTION
 OF THIS PLAN. HE WILL COORDINATE AND DIRECT THE
 EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIR, MARINE AIR, DIVERTED AIR
 STRIKES FROM OUT OF COUNTRY AIR OPERATIONS AND SUCH
 NAVAL AIR THAT MAY BE REQUESTED. B-52 STRIKES WILL BE
 COORDINATED THROUGH HIM.

C. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, IT IS DIRECTED THAT III MAF
 MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE ALL TACTICAL
 BOMBER SORTIES NOT REQUIRED FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT
 OF MARINE UNITS. THESE SORTIES WILL BE INITIALLY COM-
 MITTED TO THE NIAGARA II OPERATION.

3. (S) I WISH TO STRESS THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR

PAGE 6 RUNHFMA3802 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU MCEO
 COORDINATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COMMAND TO
 BRING OUR FIREPOWER AGAINST THE ENEMY IN THE MOST
 EFFECTIVE MANNER. THE SERIOUS THREAT WE FACE IN I
 CORPS AND KHE SANH IN PARTICULAR, DEMANDS THIS. I
 HAVE DIRECTED MY AIR DEPUTY TO INSURE IN MY NAME THAT
 THESE AIR RESOURCES ARE APPLIED TO THIS END. UNQUOTE.

9. A SIMILAR DIRECTIVE NOW UNDER STUDY WITH RESPECT TO THE
 EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF AIRLIFT MAY BE NECESSARY DUE TO THE
 CRITICAL NATURE OF THIS RESOURCE. UNQUOTE.

2. IT LOOKS AS IF WESTY HAS BACKED OFF,
 AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. I NOTE, HOWEVER,
 THAT HE DID NOT REPUDIATE DIRECTLY HIS
 EARLIER WORDS RELATED TO OPCOM OF 1ST
 MAW, ALTHOUGH I RECKON THIS CAN
 BE INFERRED. WARM REGARDS. GOOD LUCK.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

NO FORN
LIMDISP 201630Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMSEVENTHFLT
BT

TOP SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM BRINGLE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
SUBJ: COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL OF AIR IN DURANGO CITY

A. 7TH FLT 170710Z JAN 68

B. CG III MAF 201630Z JAN 68

1. DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT HELD MONDAY, 15 JAN WITH NO ADJUSTMENT OF POSITIONS REACHED BETWEEN III MAF AND 7TH AF REPRESENTATIVES. III MAF RATIONALE, SUPPORTING DURANGO CITY PLANNING STAFF PROPOSAL, PREPARED BUT WITHHELD PENDING OUTCOME OF SUBSEQUENT COMUSMACV PROPOSAL TO PLACE 1ST MAW FIXED WING ASSETS UNDER OPCON 7TH AF FOR DURATION OF PROBABLE MAJOR ENGAGEMENT FORESEEN IN NORTHERN I CORPS. TODAY MACV ASKED FOR OUR POSITION AND I RESPONDED BY REF B.

2. I UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN. WILL ADVISE.

GP-4

BT

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

PP RUMSAW RUMSAL RUHGUL
DE RUMSAK 2218 0201630

ZNY TTTT

P 201630Z JAN 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV

INFO RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN

RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

TOP SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AND USE OF AIR RESOURCES IN
DURANGO CITY (C)

A. COMUSMACV 110429Z JAN68

B. CG III MAF 280230Z DEC67

C. NWP 22 (B)

D. CDR 7AF LETTER, 5 JAN68

CUSHMAN SENDS:

1. ON 15 JAN68 AT THIS HEADQUARTERS MGEN ANDERSON AND MEMBERS OF MY
STAFF MET WITH MGEN BLOOD AND OFFICERS FROM THE 7AF STAFF TO DISCUSS
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND UTILIZATION OF AIR RESOURCES IN DURANGO CITY.
REF A REQUESTED A REPORT TO COMUSMACV NLT 18 JAN68.

2. THE 7AF REPRESENTATIVES WERE GIVEN A THOROUGH BRIEFING ON THE
CONCEPT FOR THE ENTIRE OPERATION, AS OUTLINED IN REF B, WITH

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2218 TOP SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS
EMPHASIS ON THE PLAN FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF ALL SUPPORTING
ARMS. THE CJATF/CJLF AIRPLAN COVERING PRE D-DAY PREPARATION,
AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE ASSAULT, AND POST ASSAULT OPERATIONS
WAS BRIEFED AS REQUESTED. SPECIFIC 7AF QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED
RELATING TO STRENGTHS OF PARTICIPATING SERVICE COMPONENTS, ENEMY
ORDER OF BATTLE, NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OF AIRMOBILE OPNS, ENEMY
REACTION FORCE CAPABILITY, AIR DEFENSE IN OBJECTIVE AREA AND FIRST
NAW SORTIE CAPABILITY.

3. 7AF REPRESENTATIVES STATED THEY APPRECIATED THE BRIEFING AND
ALL QUESTIONS HAD BEEN ANSWERED. THEY WERE CONCERNED HOWEVER
ABOUT ALL PHASES OF THE OPERATION AND CONSIDERED THE CONTROL OF
TACTICAL AIR IN THE NORMAL MANNER (THROUGH THE ABCCC) THE ONLY
ARRANGEMENT SATISFACTORY TO THE 7AF. THE SENIOR AF REPRESENTATIVE
WAS NOT EMPOWERED TO MAKE DECISIONS, AND STATED THAT THE 7AF
POSITION WOULD BE STATED BY CDR 7AF IN A LETTER TO COMUSMACV.

4. I HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE INITIATING DIRECTIVES FOR OPERATION
DURANGO CITY, STUDIED THE OBJECTIVE AREA IN DETAIL, AND EXAMINED
THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE FORCES ASSIGNED. IT IS IMPERATIVE
THAT ALL SUPPORTING ARMS, AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL GUN FIRE BE
COORDINATED BY AGENCIES DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE OVERALL

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

DATE 11/21/68 III MAF S&C

SIGNATURE)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

NO FORN

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2218 T O P S E C R E T N O F O R N L I M D I S
 COMMANDER. THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF AIR RESOURCES INCLUDING
 HELICOPTER, TRANSPORT AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT MUST BE INTEGRATED AND
 RESPONSIVE. THE TRANSITION OF CONTROL FROM ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS,
 THROUGH THE ASSAULT, TO OPERATIONS ASHORE MUST BE ORDERLY, COOR-
 DINATED, AND APPROPRIATE TO THE TACTICAL SITUATION. FRAGMENTATION
 OF CONTROL WITHIN THE OBJECTIVE AREA IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH JOINT
 AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE. THE PRINCIPLES FOR AIR SUPPORT PLANNING EMBODIED
 IN PARA 731 REF C HAVE BEEN CLOSELY OBSERVED IN THE AIR SUPPORT
 PLAN FOR DURANGO CITY. I CONSIDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGE-
 MENTS SOUND AND ESSENTIAL TO THE OPTIMUM/EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE/
 ARMY/NAVY AND USAF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION.

5. REF D, THE CDR 7AF LETTER ON THIS SUBJ, HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED
 AT THIS HQ. HOWEVER I CONSIDER THE 7AF ROLE TO BE THE ATTACK OF
 TARGETS IN AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE AOA/AO, INTERDICTION OF LOGS
 LEADING TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA, PROVISION OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
 TO ENGAGED ARMY AND ARVN UNITS, AND AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS. THE
 SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THESE TASKS ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE
 OPERATION.

GP-3

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET**FOR**

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMKM 3454 0200335
 ZNY TTTT
 O 200333Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR INFO
 O 192309Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO ZEN/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CJCS WASH
 ZEN/CINCPAC
 ZEN/CSAF WASH
 RUCINOA/CMC
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
 INFO GEN WHEELER, ADMIRAL SHARP, GEN MCCONNELL AND GEN
 CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. EYES ONLY.

- A. COMUSMACV 180009Z/JANBVIKS) (EYES ONLY)
- B. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 (C) 6 FEB 66
- C. CINCPAC 242345Z/APR65 (S)

1. AS A SUPPORTING COMMANDER, PROVIDING PEOPLE AND THINGS, MY MAIN PURPOSE IS TO HELP YOU WIN THE BATTLE. HOW THE MARINE TOOLS ARE USED, ONCE THEY GET TO VIETNAM, IS NOT MY PROVINCE; THAT FUNCTION RESIDING IN THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN, HOWEVER, IN REFERENCE A, YOU GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON A PROPOSITION

PAGE 2 RUMKM 3362 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 WHICH GOES TO THE HEART OF THE MARINES' COMBATANT CAPABILITY AND WHICH HAS A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OVERALL U. S. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN VIETNAM. IN LIGHT OF ITS IMPORTANCE, I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE MATTER, AND HOPE THAT MY OBSERVATIONS WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU.

2. REFERENCE A PROPOSSV TO BREAK UP THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM, BY REMOVING THE 1ST MAW FROM THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG III MAF, AND RELATES THE PROPOSITION TO SIX CONSIDERATIONS:

A. THE FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN ARMY STRENGTH IN ICTZ.

B. THE IMPENDING MAJOR BATTLE IN THE KHE SANH AREA.

C. THE BELIEF THAT THERE IS A DEMAND FOR GREATER ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF AIR RESOURCES.

D. THE FACT THAT THERE IS A PREMIUM ON THE NEED FOR RAPID DECISION MAKING.

E. THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS NOT FEASIBLE OR PRUDENT TO RESTRICT EMPLOYMENT OF TOTAL TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES TO GIVEN AREAS.

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

TOP SECRET

FOR

PAGE 3 RUMKM 3362 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY

F. THE BELIEF THAT YOU HAVE NEED FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE POSTURE WITH RESPECT TO THE SHIFT OF AIR RESOURCES TO MEET THE CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS OF COMBAT.

I WILL ADDRESS EACH ONE.

3. THE GROWTH OF ARMY STRENGTH IN ICTZ.

AS THE FOCUS OF THE CONFLICT HAS SHIFTED TO AND FROM THE ICTZ, THERE HAS BEEN A CONSEQUENT EBB AND FLOW OF ARMY STRENGTH THERE, WITH A GENERAL UPWARD TENDENCY. THE ARMY STRENGTH CHANGES HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A CORRESPONDING RISE AND FALL IN THE LEVEL OF USAF AIR SUPPORT DELIVERED IN THAT REGION. BUT WHATEVER ITS VOLUME, THIS AIR SUPPORT HAS PROCEEDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. SINCE 11 NOVEMBER, WHEN OPERATION WHEELER-WALLOWA WAS CONSOLIDATED UNDER THE AMERICAL DIVISION, 7TH AIR FORCE HAS EXECUTED 1,202 SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE DIVISION, AND IN NO CONFLICT WHATEVER WITH THE 7,866 SORTIES CONDUCTED IN MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD, IN CONSONANCE WITH YOUR DIRECTIVE NO. 95-4, SOME 3,562 MARINE AIR SORTIES WERE TURNED OVER TO THE 7TH

PAGE 4 RUMKM 3362 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY

AIR FORCE. THE BULK OF THESE WERE FLOWN OUT-OF-COUNTRY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR WISHES, BUT 96 OF THEM WERE UTILIZED TO SUPPORT THE AMERICAL DIVISION, AND 14 OF THEM TO SUPPORT II FFV OPERATIONS AT DAK TO, AND IT ALL MOVED SMOOTHLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

THE PRESENCE--OR THE PROSPECT--OF ADDITIONAL ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ CAN IN NO WAY VITATE THE VALIDITY OF THE ABOVE EXPERIENCE, WHICH TESTIFIES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT AIR SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS.

4. THE IMPENDING MAJOR BATTLE.

THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE FACE A LARGE ENEMY EFFORT IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI. THE MACV J-2 APPRAISAL PUTS THE SITUATION IN GOOD PERSPECTIVE. HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TIME THAT THE ENEMY HAS GIVEN US AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A MAJOR BATTLE AND, SO FAR AS AIR SUPPORT

ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONCERNED, PAST EXPERIENCE EXHIBITS THAT YOU ARE WELL PREPARED.

NOTHING COULD HAVE BEEN MORE COMPLICATED, FROM AN AIR SUPPORT POINT OF VIEW, THAN THE BATTLE FOR CON THIEN, THERE, IN THE SPACE OF FOUR WEEKS DURING

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

TOP SECRET

FOU

PAGE 5 RUMKM 3362 F O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 SEPTEMBER 1967, 3,918 AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN A MOST
 RESTRICTED AREA; AN AREA IN WHICH CONCURRENTLY SOME
 127,600 ROUNDS OF OUR ARTILLERY AND 6,100 ROUNDS OF
 NAVAL GUNFIRE WERE DELIVERED, DEMANDING THE BEST IN
 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION.

UTILIZING YOUR EXISTING PROCEDURES AND AUTHORITY
 SOME 712 SAC B-52 SORTIES, 699 7TH AIR FORCE SORTIES,
 2,436 USMC SORTIES, AND 71 USN SORTIES WERE ALL
 EXECUTED IN THE BATTLE AREA, WITH GOOD EFFECT ON THE
 ENEMY AND WITH MINIMAL COORDINATION DIFFICULTY ON OUR PART.

THERE SEEMS GREAT LIKELIHOOD THAT YOU WILL SOON FIND
 YOURSELF DELIVERING THE SAME SORT OF COMPLEX AND
 COORDINATED FIRE POWER ON A RENEWED ENEMY ATTACK.
 YOUR PROCEDURES FOR DOING THIS MET A STERN TEST IN THE
 CON THIEU BATTLE THE CUSTOMER--THE TROOPS RECEIVING
 THE SUPPORT-- WERE ABUNDANTLY CONTENT THEN, AND IT WOULD
 APPEAR IMPRUDENT NOW TO ALTER A DEMONSTRABLY EFFECTIVE
 SYSTEM.

5. DEMAND FOR GREATER ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF
 AIR RESOURCES. IN YOUR POSITION, YOU MUST HAVE A

PAGE 6 RUMKM 3362 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 RESPONSIVE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES
 CENTRALIZED DIRECTION, COORDINATION, INTEGRATION,
 AND MAXIMUM DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY TO ENSURE
 FLEXIBILITY OF ACTIONS. THESE ESSENTIALS ARE SOUND
 MILITARY PRINCIPLES. WITH YOUR PRESENT ARRANGEMENT,
 YOU NOW HAVE A SYSTEM WHICH ACHIEVES THESE GOALS AND
 WHICH, AT THE SAME TIME, RESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLES
 LAID DOWN IN JCS 2308-299-2. FRAGMENTING THE MARINE
 AIR/GROUND ORGANIZATION IN ICTZ OFFERS NO PROMISE OF
 IMPROVING ON THIS SYSTEM.

6. THE PREMIUM ON RAPID DECISION MAKING.

YOUR CONCLUSION THAT THE SITUATION PLACES A PREMIUM ON
 RAPID DECISION MAKING IS CERTAINLY CORRECT. HOWEVER, THAT
 PROBLEM SEEMS ALREADY TO BE WELL IN HAND. I HAVE NO DOUBT BUT
 THAT 7TH AF SUPPORT FOR ARMY UNITS IS IMMEDIATE AND
 RESPONSIVE. ALL THAT IS REQUIRED IS THAT THE ARMY UNITS
 GO DIRECTLY TO THE APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING 7TH AF DASC'S
 AND STATE THEIR NEEDS IN WHATEVER FORM THE SUPPORT IS
 REQUIRED--PREPLANNED, STRIP ALERT OR ON-STATION. THESE
 REQUESTS ARE FUNNELLED INTO THE 7TH AF TACC IN SAIGON,
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET00 RUMSAK
DE RUMSAK 3455 020055Z

ZNY TTTT

O 200339Z JAN 68

FM CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF LFOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR INFO

FOR

V 192309Z JAN 68

FM CG FMFPAC

TO ZEN/COMUSMACV

INFO ZEN/CJCS WASH

RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH

ZEN/CINCPAC

ZEN/CMC

BT

NT O P S E C R E T. FINAL SECTION OF 2 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND INFO
GEN WHEELER, ADMIRAL SHARP, GEN MCCONNELL AND GEN CHAPMAN
FROM LTGEN KRULAK. EYES ONLY.

WHERE THEY ARE SORTED OUT, AND THEN PASSED DOWN FOR
ACCESSION. THE MARINES GO TO THEIR DASC'S, ASK FOR
WHAT THEY NEED, AND THE FNAW PROVIDES. NOW YOU ARE
CONTEMPLATING INTERPOSING AN ADDITIONAL ECHELON AND AN ADDITIONAL
PROCEDURAL STEP IN THE MARINE REQUEST-RESPONSE CHAIN,
BY REQUIRING APPROVAL OF MARINE REQUESTS AT A SECOND
AND HIGHER ECHELON. THIS MUST DEGRADE RATHER THAN IMPROVE
THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS AS IT AFFECTS THE CRITICAL
ICTZ.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3455 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY.

WITH RESPECT TO YOUR OWN POSITION IN RAPID DECISION
MAKING, I SEE IT AS OPTIMAL NOW. IF AN IMPENDING CRISIS
CREATES A NEED FOR CONCENTRATED AIR EFFORT A SIMPLE DECISION
ON YOUR PART PUTS THE EFFORT IN MOTION. OPERATION NIAGARA, IN
THE KHE SANH AREA, IS A CURRENT EXAMPLE OF AIR ACTION
FOLLOWING A RAPID TACTICAL DECISION ON YOUR PART.

FURTHER, IF A REAL AND EXISTING EMERGENCY CREATES A NEED FOR
MASS MISSION DIVERSION, CINCPAC 242345Z/APR65, HIS BASIC DOCUMENT
ON AIR CONTROL, AND YOUR DIRECTIVE 95-4 PROVIDE A WHOLLY ADEQUATE
PROCEDURE. A RAPID DECISION ON YOUR PART ACHIEVES THE EMERGENCY
RESULT. OPERATION NEUTRALIZE, DURING THE CON THIEN
BATTLE, IS AN EXAMPLE OF MAJOR AND SUCCESSFUL DIVERSION
OF AIR MEANS TO FULFILL THE CRISIS NEED.

IN SHORT, TO RELIEVE CG III MAF OF OPCODEN OF HIS
FORCES WILL ONLY RETARD HIS LOWER LEVEL DECISION
MAKING PROCESS AND WILL ADD NOTHING TO THE
DECISION MAKING PROCEDURE ALREADY IN EFFECT AT THE TOP.

7. THE IMPRUDENCE OF GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS.

I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE UNSOUND TO RESTRICT THE EMPLOYMENT
OF TOTAL TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES TO A GIVEN AREA.

PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

TOP SECRET

FOR

PAGE 3 RUMKM 3363 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 FORTUNATELY, THIS IS NOT THE CASE IN VIETNAM. TAKE I CORPS FOR
 EXAMPLE. TO EXHIBIT THAT MARINE AIR DOES NOT
 OPERATE UNDER GEOGRAPHIC RESTRAINTS, HERE ARE A FEW
 SPECIFICS. DURING 1966, THE 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
 FLEW 57,950 FIXED WING SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF AND
 OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES. APRIL 1966 IS A GOOD EXAMPLE, OF
 THE 5,107 MARINE FIXED WING SORTIES FLOWN,
 DURING THE MONTH, 1,400 WERE DIRECTED AGAINST TARGETS IN NORTH
 VIETNAM AND LAOS, WHILE AN ADDITIONAL 1,400 WERE FLOWN
 IN SUPPORT OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN I AND II CORPS.

IN 1967 FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OF THE 1ST MAW EXECUTED
 79,332 COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES. OF THIS
 NUMBER, 18,360 WERE FLOWN FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN
 SUPPORT OF THE MARINES, LARGELY OUTSIDE OF ICTZ, AND
 MAINLY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF 7TH AIR FORCE IN
 OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS. OF
 COURSE, HAD YOU OR CG 7TH AIR FORCE SO ELECTED,
 THIS CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SORTIES COULD ALL HAVE
 BEEN DIRECTED IN CLOSE TROOP SUPPORT OPERATIONS,
 ANYWHERE IN RVN. THAT THEY WERE NOT IS SIMPLY A

PAGE 4 RUMKM 3363 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 REFLECTION OF THE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY WITH WHICH
 MACV HEADQUARTERS IS ENDOED BY YOUR CURRENT
 PROCEDURES.

THE FOREGOING STATISTICAL RECORD, IN ADDITION TO
 EXHIBITING THAT THE MARINE AIR EFFORT IS NOT AREA-LIMITED,
 ADDRESSES A MATTER WHICH, ALTHOUGH NOT MENTIONED
 BY YOU IN REFERENCE A, IS ONE WHICH I BELIEVE SHOULD
 BE UNDERScoreD. IT IS THAT THE MARINES HAVE PLAYED
 THE GAME, AND HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT IMPROPERLY
 YOUR DIRECTIVE 95-4 BY RETAINING AN INORDINATE
 PROPORTION OF THE EFFORT FOR MARINE CLOSE SUPPORT.
 ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF THEIR TOTAL CAPABILITY HAS BEEN
 APPLIED TO THE COMMON TASK, FOR USE WHEREVER YOU
 OR CG 7TH AIR FORCE REGARD THE NEED TO BE GREATEST.
 B. THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY.

AS I MZED IN PARAGRAPH 6
 ABOVE, YOUR DIRECTIVE NO. 95-4 AND CINCPAC'S INSTRUCTION
 FOR THE CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
 OPERATIONS CONTAINED IN CINCPAC 242345Z/APR 65 PROVIDE OPTIMUM
 AUTHORITY FOR YOU TO APPORTION YOUR AIR ASSETS TO MEET REQUIREMENTS.

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

TOP SECRET

FOR

PAGE 5 RUMKM 3363 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 IT IS A REAL TIME SYSTEM, LIMITED ONLY BY COMMUNICATIONS
 VAGARIES AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH STAFFS CAN OPERATE.
 AND BEYOND THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY WHICH EXISTS
 FOR MASSING OR SHIFTING YOUR IN-COUNTRY AIR EFFORT,
 THERE ARE BROADER PROCEDURES SET DOWN WHICH AFFORD
 COMUSMACV GREAT LATITUDE IN DIRECTING AND FOCUSING
 THE EFFORTS OF SAC B-52 RESOURCES. AND FINALLY, THERE ARE,
 AS YOU KNOW, PROCEDURES WHICH PROVIDE FOR CONCEN-
 TRATION OF 7AF FLEET AIR RESOURCES ON RVN TARGETS, IF
 NEEDED. THE SEVERAL SLAM OPERATIONS ARE EXAMPLES OF THIS.

I INVISION NO POSSIBLE INCREASE IN FLEXIBILITY
 ARISING FROM REMOVING CONTROL OF THE 1ST MAW FROM
 ITS PARENT COMMAND.

9. IN SUMMARY, THE CHANGES WHICH YOU ARE CONSIDERING
 WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DEGRADING EACH OF THE
 CRITICAL AREAS OF AIR/GROUND POWER APPLICATION;--
 DECISION MAKING AT THE POINT AND TIME OF CRISIS,
 TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND OPERATIONAL COORDINATION.
 ADDITIONALLY, IT WOULD FRAGMENT THE MARINE AIR/
 GROUND COMBAT TEAM, DIMINISHING ITS EFFECTIVE-

PAGE 6 RUMKM 3363 T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY.
 NESS AT A CRITICAL HOUR. AND IT WOULD DO THESE
 THINGS, WITHOUT ANY PROMISE OR PROSPECT OF BENEFIT
 TO THE OVERALL WAR EFFORT.

IN THE MARINE AIR/GROUND COMBAT TEAM YOU HAVE A
 WEAPONS SYSTEM WHEREIN THE WHOLE IS OF GREATER VALUE
 THAN THE SUM OF ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTS. ADDITIONALLY,
 YOU PRESENTLY HAVE A CONTROL SYSTEM, DERIVED FROM
 CINCPAC'S BASIC DIRECTIVE AND FROM YOUR OWN RESPONSIVE ONE,
 WHICH EMBODIES THE OPTIMUM IN FLEXIBILITY, WHICH HAS
 MET CRISES BEFORE, AND WHICH CAN MEET ADEQUATELY LIE
 CRISIS SITUATION WHICH FACES YOU NOW. IT
 PROVIDES FOR EFFECTIVE CONTROL, SWIFT DECISION MAKING

AND THE MEANS RAPIDLY TO CONCENTRATE YOUR AIR
 RESOURCES AT THE POINT OF CLIMAX. IT HAS A RECORD OF
 SUCCESS. IT HAS NOT YET LET US DOWN. NOW IS NO TIME
 TO TAMPER WITH IT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3
 BT

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

TOP SECRET

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUHKM 3257 0190455
 ZNY TTTT
 O 190455Z JAN 67
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T M C E O
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SHARP TO
 WESTMORELAND INFO WHEELER, MCCONNEL, CHAPMAN
 AND MYSELF.

QUOTE

CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)

A. COMUSMACV MAC 00797/180009Z JAN 68

B. CINCPAC 242345Z APR 65 (GENSER)

1. REF A ADVISES THAT YOU ARE CONSIDERING ASSIGNMENT OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING TO YOUR DEPUTY FOR AIR.
2. CURRENT POLICY FOR THE CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN SVN IS PRESCRIBED IN REF B. UNDERSTAND THESE GROUND RULES HAVE WORKED WELL FOR OVER NEARLY THREE YEARS OF

PAGE 2 RUHKM 3257 T O P S E C R E T M C E O SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR COMBAT. THEY CONFORM TO DOCTRINE AND TO THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND. IF CHANGES ARE NECESSARY THEY MUST BE VIEWED IN THE BROADEST CONTEXT IF WE ARE NOT TO CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN WE SEEK TO REMEDY.

3. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE AWARE THAT WE CAN FIND AS MANY DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS ON TACTICAL AIR CONTROL AS WE HAVE PEOPLE TO SERVE AS THEIR SPONSORS. MY GOAL HAS BEEN TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES WHICH SATISFY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, WHILE MINIMIZING THE INTER-SERVICE DEBATE WHICH HAS MUCH NEWSPAPER APPEAL BUT LITTLE IN THE WAY OF CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION.

4. ANY PLAN WHICH MIGHT DIVEST CG, III MAF OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HIS OWN ASSETS WILL REQUIRE FULL CONSIDERATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. I WILL MAKE ANY DECISION NECESSARY AFTER YOU HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF MOMYER AND CUSHMAN, AND SUBMIT A PROPOSAL TO ME. WARM REGARDS. GP-4

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUCIHOA
DE RUMSAK 2017 019033Z
ZNY SSSSS
PAC -I- CMC
P 190352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUCIHOA/CMC
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED BY
COMM GEN. WSC HAS BEEN SERVICED
TO ADDRESSEE.

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM L GEN CUSHMAN
FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO GEN WESTMORELAND AND IS
PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:
O 181352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN.

REF (A) YOUR 171206Z JAN 68
REF (B) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

GENERAL MOMYER AND I HELD DISCUSSIONS AS DIRECTED IN REF (A) AND
MY CONVICTIONS AS REQUESTED IN THE REFERENCE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. MY ONLY CONCERN IS IN WINNING THE WAR AND SPECIFICALLY
MY ENERGIES AND ASSETS ARE FOCUSED UPON WINNING THE BATTLE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2017 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
IN I CORPS AREA.

2. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS THIS MORNING WE EXPLORED IN
DEPTH THE CONCEPT WHICH GENERAL MOMYER HAD IN MIND. I HAVE
CAREFULLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE POINTS ANALYZED AND CANNOT FIND
WHERE ANY IMPROVEMENT IN AIR SUPPORT PERFORMANCE WOULD
EVENTUATE. ON THE CONTRARY THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS WHICH
WILL DEGRADE THE PRESENT EXCELLENT EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION.
THE OVERALL CONCEPT ADVANCED BY GENERAL MOMYER WAS THAT THE
PRESENT SITUATION REQUIRED AN ABILITY TO SHIFT FIXED WING AIR
STRIKES ANYWHERE WITHIN THE THEATER AND THAT INCREASINGLY
COMPLEX COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS HAD ARISEN WHICH MADE A
NEW OPERATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
ACCOMPLISH SUCH SHIFTS. ON THE CONTRARY I AM CONVINCED THAT
THE ABILITY EXISTS NOW AND THAT IT CAN BE DONE SMOOTHLY. FURTHER,
WE HAVE HAD NO PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO ROKMC,
TO THE ARVN, AND TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION WHEN THE 7TH AIR
FORCE WAS ALSO PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE SAME UNITS AND WHEN
THEY WERE INTERMINGLED. THE SAME WILL PROVE TRUE WITH THE
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR MOBILE). IT IS THEREFORE MY CONVICTION
THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS SMOOTH, EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE.

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 28

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2017 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 BOTH TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS AS THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND TO
 MINE AS THE COMMANDER OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND THE
 OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF III MAF FORCES. FURTHERMORE, PRESENT
 COORDINATION AND AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH
 JCS 2308/299-2 WHICH DIRECTS THE APPLICABLE AND SOUND DOCTRINE
 IN THIS MATTER.

3. GEN MOMYER APPEARED TO BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH HAVING
 THE FLEXIBILITY OF SHIFTING FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT TO THE AREAS
 MOST IN NEED, TO INCLUDE DIVERTING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS BOTH IN
 AND OUT OF COUNTRY TO MEET THE CHANGING THREAT. HE ALREADY
 POSSESSES SUCH FLEXIBILITY WITH HIS OWN FORCES AND REF (B)
 PROVIDES FOR THIS FLEXIBILITY OVER 1ST MAW ASSETS IN A MAJOR
 EMERGENCY. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAW RESOURCES IS EVIDENT
 IN THE PRESENT PROVISION OF 30 SORTIES DAILY TO TALLY HO AND
 STEEL TIGER MISSIONS. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 7TH AF RESOURCES
 WAS EVIDENT IN THE PROVISION FOR A 50 DAY PERIOD OF 28.6
 SORTIES DAILY IN SUPPORT OF III MAF IN OPERATION NEUTRALIZE,
 WHILE 30.4 SORTIES OF THE 1ST MAW WERE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED IN
 THE SAME OPERATION.

4. THERE IS AT PRESENT UNITY OF COMMAND IN ICTZ WHERE THE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2017 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 MAJOR THREAT ADMITTEDLY EXISTS. TO DESTROY THIS UNITY BY
 SUPERIMPOSING ANOTHER LAYER OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION WILL
 NOT, IN MY OPINION, INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OR EFFICIENCY. TO
 THE CONTRARY, TO SUBSTITUTE A DIFFERENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTROL
 FOR ONE THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD, RESPONSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE, WOULD
 SERVE ONLY TO DECREASE THE RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OUR
 AIR SUPPORT IN ICTZ. PROOF OF THE PUDDING CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED
 BY THE SATISFACTION OF THE TROOPS BEING SUPPORTED. THIS PROOF
 IS PRESENTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS' EXPRESSIONS THAT THE
 PREDOMINANT FACTOR IN LAST YEAR'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF
 KHE SANH, INTERDICTION IN AHSAU VALLEY AND THE CONTINUING BATTLE
 OF DMZ/DYE MARKER, WAS THE OUTSTANDING AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT
 PROVIDED BY THE 1ST MAW. TO BE DEPRIVED OF THIS PROVEN MEANS
 OF CONTROL WEAKENS THE FIRE POWER AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MY MARINE
 FORCES TO AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE.

5. AS I UNDERSTOOD GEN MOMYER, HE PREDICTED LITTLE CHANGE IN
 THE UTILIZATION OF MARINE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS
 PATENTLY CLEAR THAT PLACING ONE OF MY DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT
 POWER UNDER A REMOTE DEPUTY COMMANDER IN SAIGON, IS NOT REQUIRED
 BY ANY VITALLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COMBAT SITUATION IN I

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

28

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2017 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CORPS. THIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REPLAC-
ING MY AVIATION COMMANDER AND CONTROL OVER HIS ASSETS WITH ONE WHO
IS NOT DIRECTLY UNDER MY COMMAND; YET MY OVERALL OPERATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ REMAIN THE SAME.

6. IN SUMMARY, THEREFORE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT JCS 2308/
299-2 REQUIRES THAT THE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE JOINT
FORCE COMMANDER MUST ACCOMMODATE BLOCK AIRSPACE AND/OR SECTORS
OF RESPONSIBILITY NEEDED FOR OPERATION AND CONTROL OF AERIAL
VEHICLES ORGANIC TO EACH SERVICE, THAT CINCPAC 242345Z APR
65 HAS STOOD UP VERY WELL AND THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE
A SOUND BASIS IN THE FUTURE, FOR NOT ONLY ACCOMPLISHING THE
OBJECTIVE OF AIR POWER FLEXIBILITY WHICH YOU REQUIRE, BUT
FOR ALSO RECOGNIZING THE UNITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM
AS A COMBAT ENTITY, WHICH TOGETHER IS MORE POWERFUL THAN JUST
THE SUM OF ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTS. I MUST THEREFORE STATE THAT I
AM UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY CHANGE IN CINCPAC'S DIRECTIVE,
AND TO ANY FRACTIONALIZATION OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

GP-4

UNQUOTE:

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMSAK 1991 0182210
ZNY SSSSS
O 182210Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED BY
COMM GEN. MSG HAS BEEN SERVICED
TO ADDRESSEE.

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

QUOTE:

O 181352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN.

REF (A) YOUR 171206Z JAN68

REF (B) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

GENERAL MOMYER AND I HELD DISCUSSIONS AS DIRECTED IN REF (A) AND
MY CONVICTIONS AS REQUESTED IN THE REFERENCE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. MY ONLY CONCERN IS IN WINNING THE WAR AND SPECIFICALLY
MY ENERGIES AND ASSETS ARE FOCUSED UPON WINNING THE BATTLE
IN I CORPS AREA.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1991 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

2. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS THIS MORNING WE EXPLORED IN
DEPTH THE CONCEPT WHICH GENERAL MOMYER HAD IN MIND. I HAVE
CAREFULLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE POINTS ANALYZED AND CANNOT FIND
WHERE ANY IMPROVEMENT IN AIR SUPPORT PERFORMANCE WOULD
EVENTUATE. ON THE CONTRARY THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS WHICH
WILL DEGRADE THE PRESENT EXCELLENT EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION.
THE OVERALL CONCEPT ADVANCED BY GENERAL MOMYER WAS THAT THE
PRESENT SITUATION REQUIRED AN ABILITY TO SHIFT FIXED WING AIR
STRIKES ANYWHERE WITHIN THE THEATER AND THAT INCREASINGLY
COMPLEX COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS HAD ARISEN WHICH MADE A
NEW OPERATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
ACCOMPLISH SUCH SHIFTS. ON THE CONTRARY I AM CONVINCED THAT
THE ABILITY EXISTS NOW AND THAT IT CAN BE DONE SMOOTHLY. FURTHER,
WE HAVE HAD NO PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO ROKMC,
TO THE ARVN, AND TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION WHEN THE 7TH AIR
FORCE WAS ALSO PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE SAME UNITS AND WHEN
THEY WERE INTERMINGLED. THE SAME WILL PROVE TRUE WITH THE
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR MOBILE). IT IS THEREFORE MY CONVICTION
THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS SMOOTH, EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE
BOTH TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS AS THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND TO

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									# 27

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1991 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
MINE AS THE COMMANDER OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND THE
OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF III MAF FORCES. FURTHERMORE, PRESENT
COORDINATION AND AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH
JCS 2308/299-2 WHICH DIRECTS THE APPLICABLE AND SOUND DOCTRINE
IN THIS MATTER.

3. GEN MOMYER APPEARED TO BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH HAVING
THE FLEXIBILITY OF SHIFTING FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT TO THE AREAS
MOST IN NEED, TO INCLUDE DIVERTING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS BOTH IN
AND OUT OF COUNTRY TO MEET THE CHANGING THREAT. HE ALREADY
POSSESSES SUCH FLEXIBILITY WITH HIS OWN FORCES AND REF (B)
PROVIDES FOR THIS FLEXIBILITY OVER 1ST MAW ASSETS IN A MAJOR
EMERGENCY. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAW RESOURCES IS EVIDENT
IN THE PRESENT PROVISION OF 30 SORTIES DAILY TO TALLY HO AND
STEEL TIGER MISSIONS. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 7TH AF RESOURCES
WAS EVIDENT IN THE PROVISION FOR A 50 DAY PERIOD OF 28.6
SORTIES DAILY IN SUPPORT OF III MAF IN OPERATION NEUTRALIZE,
WHILE 30.4 SORTIES OF THE 1ST MAW WERE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED IN
THE SAME OPERATION.

4. THERE IS AT PRESENT UNITY OF COMMAND IN ICTZ WHERE THE
MAJOR THREAT ADMITTEDLY EXISTS, TO DESTROY THIS UNITY BY

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1991 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
SUPERIMPOSING ANOTHER LAYER OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION WILL
NOT, IN MY OPINION, INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OR EFFICIENCY. TO
THE CONTRARY, TO SUBSTITUTE A DIFFERENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTROL
FOR ONE THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD, RESPONSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE, WOULD
SERVE ONLY TO DECREASE THE RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OUR
AIR SUPPORT IN ICTZ. PROOF OF THE PUDDING CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED
BY THE SATISFACTION OF THE TROOPS BEING SUPPORTED. THIS PROOF
IS PRESENTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS' EXPRESSIONS THAT THE
PREDOMINANT FACTOR IN LAST YEAR'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF
KHE SANH, INTERDICTION IN AHSAU VALLEY AND THE CONTINUING BATTLE
OF DMZ/DYE MARKER, WAS THE OUTSTANDING AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT
PROVIDED BY THE 1ST MAW. TO BE DEPRIVED OF THIS PROVEN MEANS
OF CONTROL WEAKENS THE FIRE POWER AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MY MARINE
FORCES TO AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE.

5. AS I UNDERSTOOD GEN MOMYER, HE PREDICTED LITTLE CHANGE IN
THE UTILIZATION OF MARINE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS
PATENTLY CLEAR THAT PLACING ONE OF MY DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT
POWER UNDER A REMOTE DEPUTY COMMANDER IN SAIGON, IS NOT REQUIRED
BY ANY VITALLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COMBAT SITUATION IN I
CORPS. THIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REPLACE-

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 1991 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 ING MY AVIATION COMMANDER AND CONTROL OVER HIS ASSETS WITH ONE WHO
 IS NOT DIRECTLY UNDER MY COMMAND; YET MY OVERALL OPERATIONAL
 RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ REMAIN THE SAME.

6. IN SUMMARY, THEREFORE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT JCS 2308/
 299-2 REQUIRES THAT THE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE JOINT
 FORCE COMMANDER MUST ACCOMMODATE BLOCK AIRSPACE AND/OR SECTORS
 OF RESPONSIBILITY NEEDED FOR OPERATION AND CONTROL OF AERIAL
 VEHICLES ORGANIC TO EACH SERVICE, THAT CINCPAC 242345Z APR
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 FOR ALSO RECOGNIZING THE UNITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAMN
 AS A COMBAT ENTITY, WHICH TOGETHER IS MORE POWERFUL THAN JUST
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 AND TO ANY FRACTIONALIZATION OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

GP-4
 UNQUOTE
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SECRET

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CG - I believe "has been sent copies corrected by deleting" and substituting "as". The communicators may the error in transmission.

EXCLUSIVE

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED BY COMM GEN. MSG HAS BEEN SERVICED TO ADDRESSEE.

OO RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 1967 018135Z
ZNY SSSSS
O 181352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN.

REF (A) YOUR 171206Z JAN68
REF (B) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

HAS BEEN SENT

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2. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS THIS MORNING WE EXPLORED IN DEPTH THE CONCEPT WHICH GENERAL MOMYER HAD IN MIND. I HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE POINTS ANALYZED AND CANNOT FIND WHERE ANY IMPROVEMENT IN AIR SUPPORT PERFORMANCE WOULD EVENTUATE. ON THE CONTRARY THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS WHICH WILL DEGRADE THE PRESENT EXCELLENT EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION. THE OVERALL CONCEPT ADVANCED BY GENERAL MOMYER WAS THAT THE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1967 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR PRESENT SITUATION REQUIRED AN ABILITY TO SHIFT FIXED WING AIR STRIKES ANYWHERE WITHIN THE THEATER AND THAT INCREASINGLY COMPLEX COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS HAD ARISEN WHICH MADE A NEW OPERATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH SUCH SHIFTS. ON THE CONTRARY I AM CONVINCED THAT THE ABILITY EXISTS NOW AND THAT IT CAN BE DONE SMOOTHLY. FURTHER, WE HAVE HAD NO PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO ROKMC, TO THE ARVN, AND TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION WHEN THE 7TH AIR FORCE WAS ALSO PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE SAME UNITS AND WHEN THEY WERE INTERMINGLED. THE SAME WILL PROVE TRUE WITH THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR MOBILE). IT IS THEREFORE MY CONVICTION THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS SMOOTH, EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE BOTH TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS AS THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND TO MINE AS THE COMMANDER OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF III MAF FORCES. FURTHERMORE, PRESENT COORDINATION AND AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH JCS 2308/299-2 WHICH DIRECTS THE APPLICABLE AND SOUND DOCTRINE IN THIS MATTER.

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SECRET

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JAN 68

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1967 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MOST IN NEED, TO INCLUDE DIVERTING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS BOTH IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY TO MEET THE CHANGING THREAT. HE ALREADY POSSESSES SUCH FLEXIBILITY WITH HIS OWN FORCES AND REF (B) PROVIDES FOR THIS FLEXIBILITY OVER 1ST MAW ASSETS IN A MAJOR EMERGENCY. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAW RESOURCES IS EVIDENT IN THE PRESENT PROVISION OF 30 SORTIES DAILY TO TALLY HO AND STEEL TIGER MISSIONS. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 7TH AF RESOURCES WAS EVIDENT IN THE PROVISION FOR A 50 DAY PERIOD OF 28.6 SORTIES DAILY IN SUPPORT OF III MAF IN OPERATION NEUTRALIZE, WHILE 30.4 SORTIES OF THE 1ST MAW WERE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED IN THE SAME OPERATION.

4. THERE IS AT PRESENT UNITY OF COMMAND IN ICTZ WHERE THE MAJOR THREAT ADMITTEDLY EXISTS. TO DESTROY THIS UNITY BY SUPERIMPOSING ANOTHER LAYER OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION WILL NOT, IN MY OPINION, INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OR EFFICIENCY. TO THE CONTRARY, TO SUBSTITUTE A DIFFERENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTROL FOR ONE THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD, RESPONSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE, WOULD SERVE ONLY TO DECREASE THE RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OUR AIR SUPPORT IN ICTZ. PROOF OF THE PUDDING CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED BY THE SATISFACTION OF THE TROOPS BEING SUPPORTED. THIS PROOF

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1967 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR IS PRESENTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS' EXPRESSIONS THAT THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR IN LAST YEAR'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF KHE SANH, INTERDICTION IN ANSAU VALLEY AND THE CONTINUING BATTLE OF DMZ/DYE MARKER, WAS THE OUTSTANDING AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE 1ST MAW. TO BE DEPRIVED OF THIS PROVEN MEANS OF CONTROL WEAKENS THE FIRE POWER AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MY MARINE FORCES TO AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE.

5. AS I UNDERSTOOD GEN MOMYER, HE PREDICTED LITTLE CHANGE IN THE UTILIZATION OF MARINE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS PATENTLY CLEAR THAT PLACING ONE OF MY DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER UNDER A REMOTE DEPUTY COMMANDER IN SAIGON, IS NOT REQUIRED BY ANY VITALLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COMBAT SITUATION IN I CORPS. THIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REPLACING MY AVIATION COMMANDER AND CONTROL OVER HIS ASSETS WITH ONE WHO IS NOT DIRECTLY UNDER MY COMMAND; YET MY OVERALL OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ REMAIN THE SAME.

6. IN SUMMARY, THEREFORE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT JCS 2308/299-2 REQUIRES THAT THE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER MUST ACCOMMODATE BLOCK AIRSPACE AND/OR SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY NEEDED FOR OPERATION AND CONTROL OF AERIAL

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 1967 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VEHICLES ORGANIC TO EACH SERVICE, THAT CINCPAC 242345Z APR 65 HAS STOOD UP VERY WELL AND THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS IN THE FUTURE, FOR NOT ONLY ACCOMPLISHING THE OBJECTIVE OF AIR POWER FLEXIBILITY WHICH YOU REQUIRE, BUT FOR ALSO RECOGNIZING THE UNITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM AS A COMBAT ENTITY, WHICH TOGETHER IS MORE POWERFUL THAN JUST THE SUM OF ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTS. I MUST THEREFORE STATE THAT I AM UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY CHANGE IN CINCPAC'S DIRECTIVE, AND TO ANY FRACTIONALIZATION OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

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CCN 193 FILLER 32

DTG 172259Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CB
CS
Have seen

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE** MARINE CORPS EYES ONL

FILE COPY FILLER OF COPIES

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 172259Z JAN 68

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G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 172259Z JAN 68

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DE YNA 2925 0172259
ZNY SSSS
O 172259Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE. DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. CG, III MAF MSG 171402Z JAN68

1. REF A REFERS. HERE IS MY INPUT, IN A NUTSHELL.--BE TOUGH. BE TOUGH NOT IN TERMS OF MARINE DOCTRINE OR POLICY, BUT IN TERMS OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE USA. LEAVE NO DOUBT IN MOMYER'S MIND THAT YOU ARE NOT GIVING AN INCH ON THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM, AND THEN PUT YOUR STRONG DISSENT IN WRITING TO WESTY, SO THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION AS TO WHERE YOU STAND.

2. AS TO TACTICS, I SUGGEST THAT YOU PROCEED IN TWO PHASES; FIRST A RECORDED REPEAT RECORDED MEETING TODAY WITH MOMYER, WHERE YOU ASK HIM HARD QUESTIONS AIMED AT EXPOSING WEAKNESSES IN HIS SCHEME AND THE ULTIMATE COSTS TO OUR COMBATANT EFFORT; THEN A STRONG MESSAGE TO WESTY, RECITING SELECTED POINTS

PAGE 2 YNA 2925 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY MADE BY MOMYER, ALONG WITH YOUR REFUTATION OF EACH, AND FOLLOWED BY A SUCCINCT AND UNEQUIVOCAL RECOMMENDATION TO LEAVE THE SYSTEM ALONE.

3. AS TO QUESTIONS FOR MOMYER, I AM SURE YOU CAN ROLL PLENTY OF SPITBALLS FOR YOURSELF, BUT HERE ARE A FEW THAT MAY HELP:

A. JUST WHAT BENEFITS TO THE WAR EFFORT DO YOU FORESEE COMING OUT OF BREAKING UP THE TESTED MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM?

B. WHAT EXACTLY ARE THE AUTHORITIES WHICH YOU CONTEMP-
PLATE 7THAF WOULD EXERCISE OVER 1ST MAW?

C. OUTLINE HOW THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL MECHANISM WOULD WORK UNDER YOUR CONCEPT. WOULD YOU PLAN TO AUGMENT THE 7THAF I CORPS DASC? HOW, AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE? IN WHAT RESPECT WOULD CENTRALIZING CONTROL IN SAIGON BE SUPERIOR TO THE SYSTEM NOW EMPLOYED IN III MAF? JUST HOW WOULD THE IMPENDING DMZ BATTLE BE INFLUENCED TO OUR ADVANTAGE UNDER YOUR SCHEME?

D. SPECIFICALLY, ASSUMING WE MAINTAIN OUR AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AS IT IS NOW OPERATING....BUT UNDER YOUR OPERATION-
AL CONTROL....WHERE WOULD APPROVAL BE GRANTED FOR

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET

~~PAGE 3 YYN A 2925 S E C R E T S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY~~
EACH AIR REQUEST?

E. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST BIG BATTLE WE HAVE HAD. LAST MAY, WE HAD A BATTLE AT KHE SANH WHERE IN 1004 SORTIES WE DROPPED 1522 TONS OF ORDNANCE IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. THE GROUND PART OF OUR TEAM SAID THAT THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OF 1ST MAW WAS THE DECISIVE FACTOR. HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO IMPROVE ON THIS?

F. WHAT ADVANTAGES DO YOU SEE TO A III MAF REQUIREMENT TO PLACE ITS REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT TO 7TH AF? WHAT 7TH AF RESOURCES ARE YOU PLANNING TO COMMIT TO SUPPORT ICTZ?

G. WHO, IN YOUR SCHEME, WOULD MAKE THE DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ALLOCATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF AIR IN SUPPORT OF THE MARINE GROUND FORCES IN COMBAT? WOULD YOU EXPECT THE SUPPORT TO BE MORE TIMELY AS A RESULT? IN THIS REGARD, STUDY BY THE JCS IN 1966 SHOWED MARINE AVERAGE RESPONSE TIMES TO BE APPROXIMATELY 33 MINUTES, AS OPPOSED TO 38 MINUTES FOR USAF AIR....IF YOU ARE GIVEN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE AIR DO YOU BELIEVE IT WILL IMPROVE OUR RESPONSIVENESS?

H. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY OBSERVED DEFICIENCIES IN

~~PAGE R4 YYN A 2925 S E C R E T S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY~~
THE AMOUNT OF AIR SUPPORT OR CONTROL ASSOCIATED WITH YOUR SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN DIVISION THAT COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED BY YOUR HAVING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 1ST MAW?

I. MARINE AIR ASSETS IN RVN ARE PREDICATED ON PRECISE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT IN-COUNTRY INFANTRY BATTALIONSDAILY SORTIES IN EXCESS OF THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE ALLOTTED TO 7TH AF NOW. UNDER YOUR SCHEME, DO YOU ENVISION A GREATER DIVERSION OF MARINE AIR TO TASKS OTHER THAN SUPPORT OF MARINE OPERATIONS THAN AT PRESENT? IF YOU DO, HOW CAN AIR SUPPORT IN THE CRITICAL DMZ BATTLE IN PROSPECT POSSIBLY BE IMPROVED BY A SHIFT IN OPERATIONAL CONTROL?

J. MARINE DA SCS PRESENTLY ARE CO/LOCATED WITH FSCC'S AT DIVISION LEVEL OR, IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS, AT LOWER LEVELS...USAF DA SC CO/LOCATE WITH ARMY COUNTERPARTS ONLY AT CORPS LEVEL...DO YOU ENVISION A CHANGE IN OUR EXISTING AIR CONTROL STRUCTURE IF YOU ARE GIVEN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF USMC AIR? IF SO, HOW WOULD YOU PROPOSE TO ACCOMPLISH FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION? HOW WOULD IT BE BETTER?

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE 5 YVNA 2925 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

K. IF YOU TAKE OVER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE MARINE AIR, IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT AN ADDITIONAL LAYER MUST BE ADDED TO APPROVAL CHANNELS FOR AIR REQUESTS. HOW CAN THIS FAIL TO DEGRADE IN RESPONSIVENESS?

4. THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, AND OTHERS LIKE THEM, ALL COINED IN TERMS THAT EXHIBIT YOUR CONVICTION THAT MOMYER IS SIMPLY FOLLOWING THE AIR FORCE LINE, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE WAR EFFORT, SHOULD GIVE YOU THE RAW MATERIAL FOR A VERY STRONG MESSAGE TO WESTY. I SUGGEST THAT ITS THEME BE SOMETHING LIKE THIS:

A. I AM INTERESTED IN WINNING THE WAR AND, SPECIFICALLY, IN WINNING THE ICTZ BATTLE.

B. DURING MOMYER'S VISIT WE EXPLORED IN DEPTH EXACTLY WHAT HE HAS IN MIND, WITH RESPECT TO THE III MAF AIR ELEMENT. I FOUND NOTHING WHATEVER IN THE DISCUSSION TO EVEN SUGGEST, ANY ENHANCEMENT IN AIR SUPPORT PERFORMANCE. THE REVERSE WOULD ACTUALLY EVENTUATE.

C. THEN, A DETAILING OF THE PRIME TOPICS COVERED, MOMYER'S VIEWS AND YOUR REACTIONS IN EACH CASE.

PAGE 6 YVNA 2925 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

D. THEN, A SUMMARY THAT SAYS THAT CINCPAC 242345Z APR65 HAS STOOD UP WELL; THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE UNITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM; THAT YOU ARE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY CHANGE IN CINCPAC'S DIRECTIVE OR TO ANY FRAGMENTATION OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

5. I HAVE ALREADY BEEN TO SEE SHARP AND HAVE TOLD HIM WHAT IS UP. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS GOING TO COUNSEL YOU THAT THIS IS THE TIME TO BE RESOLUTE AND AS A RESULT, ESTIMATED THAT HE WILL BE HEARING FROM WESTY ON THE SUBJECT. I WENT CAREFULLY OVER HIS 242345Z DIRECTIVE, AND URGED HIM TO STAND FIRM ON IT. HE UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUE AND I AM CERTAIN HE IS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO OUR CASE. I WILL STAY WITH HIM AND HUTCHINSON WILL DO THE SAME. KEEP ME ADVISED. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET

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ZNY SSSSS
O 171402Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND.
QUOTE:

1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES INTO I CORPS, IMPENDING BATTLES AND THE NEED FOR HAVING MORE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE AIR EFFORT AVAILABLE TO ME, I AM CONTEMPLATING PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MARINE AIR WING UNDER MY DEPUTY FOR AIR. HELICOPTERS WOULD REMAIN UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. I HAVE ASKED MOMYER TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AND ANDERSON TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY BUILD UP, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT I BE IN THE BEST FEASIBLE POSTURE TO MEET THE THREAT. I BELIEVE CENTRALIZING CONTROL OF THE AIR RESOURCES WILL PROMOTE THIS REQUIREMENT. AM PROPOSING THIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL ARRANGEMENT AS TEMPORARY MEASURE TO MEET THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOUR VIEWS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED. UNQUOTE.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1867 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO MOMYER DUE TO ARRIVE 181000H FOR DISCUSSIONS. APPRECIATE ANY INPUT YOU CAN PROVIDE PRIOR TO MTG, AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AT YOUR LEVEL.
WARM REGARDS
GP-4
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

24

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUN RUMFCMUI721 018000-TTTT--RUMWAA.

ZNY TTTT

DE RUMFUL 1381 0170710

ZNY TTTT

P 170710Z JAN 68 ZSHERUMF

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET

FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM BRINGLE

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AND USE OF AIR RESOURCES IN DURANGO CITY (U)

A. COMUSMACV 110429Z JAN 68

1. I NOTE IN PARA 3 OF REF ATTAT COMMANDER 7AF AND CG III MAF OR GENERAL OFFICERS FROM THE TWO COMMANDS WILL MEET JOINTLY TO DEVELOP A COMMAND ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF AIR RESOURCES AVAIL FOR DURANGO CITY WITHIN THE OVERALL COMMANDD ARRANGEMENTS AND TASKS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT FOR THE AIR RESOURCES OF 7AF, III MAF, AND THE SEVENTH FLEET.

2. AS I AM NOT BEING REPRESENTED IN THIS DISCUSSION, WOULD APPRECIATE BEING NOTIFIED PRIOR TO ANY AGREEMENT BEING REACHED WHICH COULD AFFECT SEVENTH FLEET.

3. BEST REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

FOR

TOP SECRET

ZNY TTTTT
 O 141526Z JAN 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 INFO CG FIRST MAF
 BT

S&C FILES
 HEADQUARTERS III MAF
 № 10505

T O P S E C R E T

CONDUCT OF AIR OPNS IN SVN PORTION MUSCLE SHOALS

A. CG III MAF 131516Z JAN 68

B. COMUSMACV 121110Z JAN 68 (PASEP)

C. CG III MAF 300854Z DEC 67

1. REF A REQUESTS COMMENTS ON REF B ON PRIORITY BASIS. REF B GIVES 7TH AF CONTROL OF SMALL PORTION OF III MAF AOR FOR PURPOSE OF CONTROLLING AND MANAGING DUMP TRUCK ACTIVITIES. REMAINDER OF THAT PORTION OF DUMP TRUCK IN III MAF AOR. REQUIRES 7TH AF TO CLEAR WITH III MAF. THIS IS DIRECTIVE IN NATURE AND RECLAMA IS NOT PROVIDED FOR.

2. ALTHOUGH PARA 2 OF REF B IS AT VARIANCE WITH III MAF POSN SET FORTH IN REF C, IT APPEARS OBVIOUS THAT COMUSMACV EITHER CANNOT OR WILL NOT DO OTHER THAN COMPROMISE AS REGARDS BASIC PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSIGNED OPERATIONS AREA, AND CONTROL OF AIR SPACE THERIN IN CONNECTION WITH DUMP TRUCK.

3. THIS DIVISION BELIEVES PRINCIPLE ADVOCATED BY REF C TO BE DOCTRINALLY CORRECT, IF EXPEDIENCY INDICATES DESIRABILITY OF ACCEPTING 7TH AF CONTROL OVER SMALL CORNER OF SCOTLAND AOR IN EXCHANGE FOR III MAF CONTROL OF REMAINDER AOR AS REGARDS DUMP TRUCK, THIS DIVISION WOULD NOT OBJECT. BOUNDARY SET FORTH IN PARA 2 OF REF B IS DISTANT ENOUGH FROM KHE SANH TO GIVE GROUND COMMANDER CONTROL OF GROUND AND AIR SPACE TO RANGE GREATER THAN ENEMY 85MM GUN.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

DE RUMVAA 1456 013 15 16
ZNY SSSSS
P 13 15 16Z JAN 68

ORIG: G-3
REL: G-3

FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO CG THYRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW

SECRET
6

BT

SECRET

CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS SVN PORTION OF MUSCLE SHOALS

AREA (S)

A. COMUSMACV 12110Z JAN 68 (PASSEP)

1. COMMENTS REFERENCE DESIRED ON PRIORITY BASIS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DEPT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

21

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RUMSAK 1389 0130650
 ZNY TTTT
 P 130630Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN KRULAK FROM L GEN
 CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AIR RESOURCES DURANGO CITY (C)
 1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE:

P 110429Z JAN 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CDR 7TH AF SAIGON
 CG III MAF
 INFO COMSEVENTHFLT
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS 01118 FROM MACJ3
 SUBJ: COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AND USE OF AIR
 RESOURCES IN DURANGO CITY (C)
 REF: A. COMUSMACV MSG, 160518Z DEC 67
 B. CG, III MAF MSG, 280230Z DEC 67

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1389 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 C. CDR 7TH AF LETTER, 5 JAN 68
 D. MACV DIR 95-4
 E. DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, 1 AUG 67
 WESTMORELAND SENDS:

1. (TS) I CONSIDER THAT THE ISSUE RAISED IN REFERENCE C CONCERNING THE COMMAND ARRANGEMENT FOR EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE AIR RESOURCES FOR DURANGO CITY REQUIRES PROMPT RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLEAR GUIDANCE TO THE PLANNING GROUP NOW MEETING IN OKINAWA.
2. (C) DURING RECENT MONTHS, SITUATIONS HAVE ARISEN PERTAINING TO AIR SUPPORT WHICH HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR CAREFUL, INTEGRATED, COORDINATED JOINT PLANNING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FORCES IN AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO 7TH AF AND III MAF. SPECIFICALLY, THESE INVOLVED OPERATION HICKORY, THE DMZ, OPERATION YORK II AND MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER. BECAUSE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL PECULIARITIES OF THE MACV AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS WELL AS THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE MACV COMMAND STRUCTURE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT COMMANDERS RECOGNIZE THE INTENT OF APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS IN ANNEXES A AND B OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, AND TAKE PROPER ACTIONS TO:
 - A. RECOGNIZE THE JOINT IMPLICATIONS INHERENT IN A SIT-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1389 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 UATION, CAMPAIGN OR CONTINGENCY PLAN.

B. TAKE NECESSARY JOINT PLANNING ACTIONS TO ASSURE AN
 INTERGRATED, COORDINATED COMMAND AND CONTROL PLAN WHICH RECOGNIZES
 AND RESPECTS THE INHERENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
 COMMANDS INVOLVED.

C. PRESENT TO COMUSAMCV FOR APPROVAL A PLAN OF ACTION
 WHICH FUNCTIONAL, REALISTIC, AND SATISFACTORY TO FIELD
 COMMANDERS CONCERNED.

3. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, I REQUEST THE COMMANDER, 7TH AF AND
 THE CG, III MAF OR A GENERAL OFFICER FROM THEIR COMMANDS MEET AND
 JOINTLY DEVELOP A COMMAND ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE MOST
 EFFECTIVE USE AND CONTROL AND AIR RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR DURANGO
 CITY WITHIN THE OVERALL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS AND TASKS CURRENTLY
 IN EFFECT FOR THE AIR RESOURCES OF 7TH AF, III MAF AND THE SEVENTH
 FLEET.

4. (C) I AM HAVING A COPY OF REFERENCE C DELIVERED TO CG, III MAF.

5. (U) REPORT YOUR RECOMMENDED JOINT PLAN TO ME NLT 18 JAN

GG. GP-3

BT

UNQUOTE:

GP-3

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMSAK 1351 0121616
ZNY TTTT
P 121616Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION I OF II SECTIONS
THE FOLLOWING LETTER IS FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE:
SUBJECT: DURANGO CITY(U)

DATE - 5 JAN 1968

TO: COMUSMACV

1. (TS) I HAVE REVIEWED THE MACV DURANGO CITY INITIATING DIRECTIVE AND THE BASIC PLAN DRAFT. I AM CONVINCED THAT IF THIS OPERATION IS TO BE A SUCCESS, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE MUST BE GIVEN THE PLANNING GROUP AT OKINAWA. I CANNOT CONCUR WITH THIS EFFORT WHEN I FORESEE THAT THERE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE INSUFFICIENT FORCES AND A DEFINITE LACK OF PROPER CONTROL.
2. (TS) THE OBJECTIVE ESTABLISHED FOR THIS OPERATION IS CERTAINLY LARGER THAN THE INITIAL PLANNING GROUP REALIZED. IT CONSTITUTES A MAJOR INCURSION INTO ENEMY TERRITORY WHERE HE IS BETTER EQUIPPED AND HAS FAR MORE FIRE POWER THAN IN SVN. HE WILL CERTAINLY HAVE MUCH GREATER MOTIVATION TO FIGHT.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1351 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

A. MACV INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 30,000 ENEMY TROOPS NOW IN THE PROPOSED OBJECTIVE AREA. ADDITIONAL SIZEABLE REINFORCEMENTS COULD REACH THE AREA BY THE TIME OF THE LANDING IF THE ENEMY HAS ANY IDEA THAT THE D-4 PREPARATORY FIRES ARE A SIGNAL OF OUR INTENTIONS. THIS CONTRASTS WITH THE PROPOSED TOTAL OF 30,000 FRIENDLY COMBATANT TROOPS.

B. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS NOT JUST AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. IT IS JUST AS MUCH AN AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE ASSAULT; ALL WITH THE GOAL OF LINKING WITH FORCES ALREADY ON LAND. IN THIS REGARD I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE ASSAULT LANDING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ENEMY FORCE AREA. THIS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT GROUND AND AIR TASK THAN THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. THESE UNITS WILL HAVE TO FIGHT A LONGER DISTANCE, OVER MORE DIFFICULT TERRAIN, AND BE EXPOSED ON THE FLANK AND REAR ALL THE WAY.

C. THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE GROUND FORCES IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA WILL THEREFORE BE ARMY AND ARVN. THIS WILL REQUIRE A TREMENDOUS AIRLIFT EFFORT WITH MORE AIR FORCE AND ARMY UNITS INVOLVED AND IN RESERVE THAN ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED. SINCE THE PREPONDERANCE OF GROUND EFFORT WILL BE BY THE U.S. ARMY,

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 THE JOINT LAND FORCE SHOULD BE COMMANDED BY AN ARMY GENERAL.
 3. (TS) THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THIS OPERATION DEMANDS THAT WE ADHERE TO THE ESTABLISHED AND PROVEN JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS. WHEN THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING IS COMPLETE AND THE JOINT LAND FORCE COMMANDER IS ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 113 OF THE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS OVER. THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WILL THEN HAVE TO JOIN THE AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE FORCES AND ENTER INTO CLASSIC LAND BATTLE. THE FACT IS THAT THE OBJECTIVE AREA IS AT THAT POINT NO LONGER AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AREA, BUT A LAND BATTLE AREA NO DIFFERENT THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY DEFINED FOR MACV CAMPAIGNS.

A. FOR THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION I DO NOT QUESTION THE RIGHT OF THE JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER TO CONTROL THE AIR OVER THE FLEET AND OVER THE BEACH. HOWEVER, WHEN THE JOINT LANDING FORCE COMMANDER IS NO LONGER AFLOAT HE SHOULD BECOME THE EASTERN LAND FORCE COMMANDER UNDER THE AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE ARMY COMMANDER. THE JOINT DOCTRINE CLEARLY APPLIES FOR THE SUBORDINATION OF THE AIR EFFORT OVER THE EASTERN LAND FORCE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 TO THE CONTINUING LARGER AIR EFFORT WHICH MUST BE CONTROLLED AND COORDINATED WITH THE AIR APPROACHES AND NECESSARY ADJACENT AERIAL INTERDICTION. PARAGRAPH 280 OF THE DOCTRINE STATES:

"A. FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATION, THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER WHO ORDERS THE OPERATION WILL ASSIGN TO THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL AN AIRSPACE OF DEFINED PROPORTIONS WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA.

B. ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA WILL BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER UNTIL THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS TERMINATED.

C. TO ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT IN OVERALL AIR OPERATIONS, THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER WILL COORDINATE AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DEFINED AIRSPACE AS NECESSARY, WITH THE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE SURROUNDING AREA. AT THE TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATION, THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE WILL BE DISSOLVED, THE ASSIGNED AIRSPACE WILL BE DISESTABLISHED AND THE AIRSPACE CONTROL WILL NORMALLY BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOCTRINE FOR CONTROL OF AIRSPACE OVER THE COMBAT ZONE BY THE AIRSPACE CONTROL

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
AUTHORITY DESIGNATED FOR THAT AREA."

IT IS PRIMA FACIE THAT I AM DESIGNATED AS THE AIR COMMANDER
FOR THE AREA AND TACC SAIGON HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE
CAPABILITY FOR THE AIRSPACE CONTROL.

B. THIS ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE HAS GROWN FROM THE JOINT EXPER-
IENCE AT NORMANDY AND INCHON. THESE WERE TRULY JOINT EFFORTS
WITH THE AIR FORCE CONTROLLING THE AIR. IN CONTRAST, OPERATION
HICKORY HAD SERIOUS COORDINATION PROBLEMS. THE SYSTEM HAD
NO FLEXIBILITY FOR EMPLOYING AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES IN
INTERDICTION AREAS ADJACENT TO THE VERY LIMITED LAND AREA.
THE MARINES REQUIRED CONSIDERABLE AIR FORCE ASSISTANCE DURING
THIS OPERATION. MANY AIR FORCE STRIKE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO
BASE WITH ORDNANCE, AND FAC AND STRIKE FLIGHTS WERE CONTINUALLY
CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MID-AIR-COLLISIONS AND SHORT
ROUNDS. THE LESSON LEARNED AGAIN WAS THAT THERE MUST BE A
CENTRAL CONTROL AUTHORITY FOR NOT ONLY THE OBJECTIVE AREA BUT
THE AIR APPROACHES AND EXPOSED FLANK AREAS AS WELL.

A. (TS) JOINT CAMPAIGN PLANNING ATTEMPTS TO FORESEE SUCH PRO-
BLEMS AS THESE AND PROVIDES FOR THE NECESSARY CONTROLS TO
AVOID THEM. THIS IS EXACTLY WHY THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
COMMANDER HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED; TO CONTROL AND DIRECT THE AIR
OPERATIONS OVER THE LAND BATTLE AREA. MACV DIRECTIVE 99-4 IN
PARAGRAPH 4A STATES:

"A. COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MACV
AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER, ACTS AS COORDINATING AUTH-
ORITY FOR ALL US/PUMAF AIR OPERATIONS AND VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
(VNAF) ACTIVITIES IN THE MACV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY."

5. (TS) AS YOUR DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS I AM, OF COURSE,
PRIMARYLY CONCERNED WITH THE SUCCESS OF THE AIR EFFORT. I FEEL
WE MUST UTILIZE OUR TOTAL AIR CAPABILITY TO THE MAXIMUM. FOR
THE SAME REASON THAT MARINE AIR SHOULD PROVIDE CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT FOR THE LANDING AND THEIR FORCES IN COMBAT IN THIS
PARTICULAR CASE, 7TH AIR FORCE SHOULD BE DESIGNATED FOR COMMAND
AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES SUPPORTING THE ARMY/ARVN
TROOPS. AS I STATED IN THE PLANNING FOR OPERATION YORK, THE
MOST IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT THE ARMY/ARVN FORCES INVOLVED HAVE
WORKED CONSISTENTLY WITH 7TH AIR FORCE WITH THE RESULT THAT
ALL CONCERNED HAVE DEVELOPED MOST EFFECTIVE TEAMWORK BASED ON
FAMILIARITY, RAPPORT, AND FULL UNDERSTANDING OF MUTUAL CAPA-
BILITIES. SUCCESS ACHIEVED WITH THE AMERICAL DIVISION CONFIRMS
BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES.

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAK 1352 0121616
 ZNY TTTT
 P 121616Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF II SECTIONS THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING ESTABLISHED AIR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS REGARDLESS OF OPERATING AREA.

THE JOINT ARMY/AIR FORCE DOCTRINE FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS STATES IN CHAPTER 2

"2-1A. THE CONDUCT OF JOINT AIRBORNE OPERATIONS REQUIRES THAT THE EFFORTS OF PARTICIPATING FORCES BE PROPERLY COORDINATED AND INTEGRATED TO ACHIEVE A COMMON OBJECTIVE. THESE REQUISITES ARE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH JOINT FORCES COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND DOD AND JCS DIRECTIVES.

2-2B. JOINT AIRBORNE TASK FORCES (JTF). TACTICAL AIR FORCES OR ELEMENTS MAY BE ASSIGNED AS A PART OF AN AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMAND OF A JOINT TASK FORCE. WHEN ASSIGNED TO A JOINT TASK FORCE, ALL AIR FORCE FORCES OR ELEMENTS ARE PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER."

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1352 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO 6. (TS) 7TH AIR FORCE WILL PROVIDE ALL OF ITS FORCES NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THIS OPERATION. THIS WILL CONSIST OF THE NECESSARY STRIKE AIRCRAFT, A UNIQUE MAJOR AIRLIFT EFFORT, THE MAJORITY OF FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS, ELINT AND TACTICAL ELECTRONIC WARFARE AIRCRAFT, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, CONTINUED AND INCREASED RECONNAISSANCE, ADJACENT INTERDICTION STRIKES, AND CONTINUED AIR DEFENSES OVER VIETNAM TO INCLUDE THE ASSAULT AREA. ARC LIGHT SORTIES WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR INGREDIENT.

7. (TS) WITH REGARD TO THE MATTER OF OVERALL AUTHORITY FOR AIR CONTROL FOR THE OBJECTIVE AREA AFTER THE LANDING HAS BEEN MADE, THE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS STATES IN PARAGRAPH 226B:

"WHEN THE PREPONDERANCE OF TACTICAL AVIATION IS PROVIDED BY THE AIR FORCE FOR THE ASSAULT PHASE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, AN AIR FORCE OFFICER WILL BE DESIGNATED BY THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER OF THE PARTICIPATING AIR FORCE FORCES TO DIRECT THE TOTAL AIR EFFORT IN THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA. HE WILL EXERCISE SUCH DIRECTION UNDER THE JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER OR WHEN CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS IS

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1352 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO PASSED ASHORE, UNDER THE LANDING FORCE COMMANDER OR AN APPROPRIATE COMMANDER ASHORE WHO HAS THE CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SUCH OPERATIONS."

A. THE OBJECTIVE AREA, AS I STATED ABOVE, IS MORE THAN AN AMPHIBIOUS AREA. THE DOCTRINAL POINT IS THAT I AM ALREADY THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDER AND TACC SAIGON HAS AND EXERCISES CONTROL CAPABILITY. THE OBVIOUS NEED TO CONTINUE A UNIFIED AIRSPACE CONTROL EFFORT IS THE ONLY WAY TO INSURE THAT THE ENEMY AIR THREAT TO THIS OPERATION COULD NOT REACH ITS GOAL. THE SPEED AND SOPHISTICATION NEEDED WILL NOT ALLOW AIR DEFENSE FRAGMENTATION. I CANNOT RELINQUISH THE AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY YOU ASSIGNED TO 7AF IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-2.

B. NOT ONLY WILL THE AIR FORCE PROVIDE THE PREDOMINANCE OF FORCES NEEDED, IT WILL HAVE TO DO SO TO ASSURE SUCCESS. THE TASKS INVOLVED REQUIRES FORCES WHICH EXCEED THE MARINE AND NAVY CAPABILITY FOR THIS SPECIFIC OPERATION IF THEY ARE TO CONTINUE THEIR EXISTENT RESPONSIBILITIES. THE AIR ACTIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM DIRECTED BY JCS AND THE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT PMAF/RVNAF FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE CONTINUED DURING THIS

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1352 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO EXERCISE BY THE AIR FORCE, MARINES, AND NAVY.

8. (TS) IN SUMMARY, ALTHOUGH I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE A SLAVE TO DOCTRINE, THE SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF DURANGO CITY DEMANDS THE USE OF PROVEN PROCEDURES AND CAPABILITIES IF CONFUSION AND RESULTANT HIGHER LOSSES ARE TO BE AVOIDED. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE JOINT DOCTRINE DERIVED FROM OUR SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST MUST BE FOLLOWED. AS YOUR DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS I RECOMMEND THAT THE MACV INITIATING DIRECTIVE BE AMENDED TO DIRECT THAT PLANNING BE ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED CONCEPTS.

WILLIAM W. MOMYER, GENERAL, USAF
COMMANDER

GP-1

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

AA979 ZVA 753VV AWB9974
 PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAW 0181U 0121120
 ZNY TITTE
 P 121110Z JAN 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAL/CDR 7AF SAIGON
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG
 INFO RUMEDQ/TF ALPHA NKP THAI
 BT

T O P S E C R E T 01277 FROM MACCOC2
 SUBJ: CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SVN PORTION OF MUSCLE
 SHOALS AREA (S).

REF: A. CDR 7AF DTG 240245Z DEC 67 (TS)
 B. CG III MAF DTG 300854Z DEC 67 (TS)
 C. CDR 7AF DTG 100920Z JAN 68 (TS)

NO 10491

1. (TS) REFERENCE A AND B REFLECT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN REGARD TO THE CONTROL OF AIR IN A SMALL AREA IN THE NW CORNER OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE, REF C REQUEST FURTHER GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER.
2. (TS) IN THAT THE TIME ELEMENT IS BECOMING CRITICAL IN RESOLUTION OF 7AF/III MAF DIFFERENCES AS TO CONTROL PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO THAT AREA IN SVN WHERE IN DUMP TRUCK AND DYE MARKER OVERLAP, THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WILL APPLY. THE AREA IN SVN BOUNDED BY THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES: XD. 6668 SOUTH ALONG THE

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 0181U T O P S E C R E T
 BORDER TO XD 6637 THENCE NE XD 6958 THENCE EAST TO XD 7258 THENCE NE XD 8068 WEST ALONG PNDL TO 6668, WILL BE UNDER PRIMARY CONTROL OF 7AF FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTROLLING AND MANAGING DUMP TRUCK ACTIVITIES. PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THE REMAINDER OF AREA IN CONTENTION WILL REMAIN WITH III MAF; HOWEVER, 7AF WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR AIR DELIVERY AND AIR READOUT OF SENSORS IN TOTAL DUMP TRUCK AREA, AS THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION DEMANDS. THESE OPERATIONS IN THE III MAF AREA WILL BE CLEARED FOR NON-INTERFERENCE WITH III MAF. IN ORDER TO GAIN EARLY WARNING OF ENEMY APPROACH, III MAF MAY ALSO REQUEST 7AF TO DELIVER AND READ OUT SENSORS ON APPROACHES TO KHE SANH.

3. (TS) CHANGES IN GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF THESE AREAS WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS, SUBSEQUENT ONLY TO MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF COMMANDS CONCERNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 AND MACV PLANNING DIRECTIVE 10-67. COMMANDS CONCERNED ARE REMINDED THAT IT IS THE INTENTION OF MACV DIRECTIVES TO REQUIRE AND PERMIT COMMANDERS CONCERNED IN SUCH MATTERS TO PROVIDE COMUSMACV WITH A COORDINATED, JOINT POSITION, FOR FINALIZATION AND APPROVAL.
4. (TS) REQUEST COMMANDS ACCOMPLISH NECESSARY DETAILED JOINT

PAGE 3 RUMSAW 0181U T O P S E C R E T
 PLANNING IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE CONTAINED HEREIN. GP-4.
 BT

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAK 1241 0120054

ZNY TTTT
 P 120054Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN KRULAK FROM L GEN
 CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FOR YOUR INFO
 QUOTE

O 021000Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CDR 7AF
 CG I FFORCEV
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T
 AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II (U)
 A. CG III MAF 260542Z DEC 67
 B. 7AF 281145Z DEC 67
 C. COMUSMACV 171045Z DEC 67
 1. REF A EXPLAINED III MAF CONCEPT FOR AIR SUPPORT IN OPERATION

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1241 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 YORK II AND STATED INTENT TO TASK CG FIRST MAW WITH RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR PROVIDING ALL CLOSE AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.
 REF B CONTAINS 7AF POSITION AND RECOMMENDS AMENDING MACV PLANNING
 DIRECTIVE, REF C, TO SPECIFY THAT TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF
 FORCES INVOLVED WILL BE PROVIDED BY 7AF/VNAF/FMAV RESOURCES AS
 APPROPRIATE, SUCH AIR SUPPORT TO BE ALLOCATED, TASKED, AND
 COORDINATED THROUGH 7AF/VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.
 2. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT MUST BE INTEGRATED COMPLETELY INTO THE
 OVERALL HELICOPTER ASSAULT PLAN TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF INITIAL
 LANDINGS AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS IN ASHAU. HELICOPTER ESCORT,
 LANDING ZONE PREPARATION, AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SORTIES FLOWN BY
 JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT ARE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THIS PLAN.
 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE CRITICAL INITIAL PHASE REQUIRES A
 KEEN UNDERSTANDING OF HELICOPTER CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS AND
 EXPERIENCE IN THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT OF ROTARY AND FIXED WING
 AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST MAW IS EMINENTLY QUALIFIED IN THIS RESPECT.
 3. IN THE SAME VEIN THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM MUST BE CAPABLE OF
 COORDINATING THIS INTEGRATED HELICOPTER AND JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT
 AIR SUPPORT PLAN. INCLUDED WITH THE MARINE DASC IS A HELICOPTER
 DIRECTION CENTER (MDC) SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED, AND EQUIPPED,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1241 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. A MARINE DASC CURRENTLY LOCATED AT HUE-PHU BAY ADJACENT TO THE MARINE DIVISION FSCC IS INTENDED TO BE THE PRIMARY AIR CONTROL AGENCY FOR THE OPERATION. THE DASC INCLUDES AN AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM (ASRT) FOR ALL-WEATHER, TPQ-10, RADAR BOMBING, AND HDC, AND HAS COMPLETE ARTILLERY SAVE-A-PLANE INFORMATION. A SECOND TPQ-10 WILL BE POSITIONED TO PROVIDE SKIN PAINT OVER THE VALLEY. ADDITIONALLY AN AIRBORNE DASC AND HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE MINI-DASC ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE FIRST MAW FOR COMMITMENT SPECIFICALLY TO YORK II FORCES IN ASHAU VALLEY AS DESIRED.

5. THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM WITHIN THE FIRST MAW IS PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED FOR OVERALL CONTROL OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF YORK II. THE PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN CONTROL OF III MAF AIR OPERATIONS AND THE AIRCREW FLYING THE FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT ARE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH ASHAU VALLEY, ITS GEOGRAPHY, WEATHER, AND ENEMY SITUATION.

6. THE CONCEPT PRESENTED HEREIN DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF 7AF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PERSONNEL IN ALO/FAC DUTIES AND, IN FACT, THE ADVANTAGES INHERENT IN THE CONTINUED USE OF THESE SAME PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT THE YORK OPERATION INSURES CONTINUITY OF

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1241 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO EFFORT IN THIS VITAL AREA. SIMILARLY, 7AF ALO/FAC STRUCTURE IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT FOR OUT OF COUNTRY OPERATIONS. 7. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE AIR SUPPORT CONCEPT EXPRESSED IN REFERENCE A AND CLARIFIED HEREIN BE APPROVED.

GP-4

BT

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CON 045

FILLER 25

CG
DCG
C/S

DTG 060245Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FILE COPY FILLER OF COPIES

MAP: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 060245Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY DATE/TIME 061315

G-2

G-3

#16

PP RUMSAK
DE RUMKM 0770 0060043
ZNY ITTTT
P 060245Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- A. 7TH AF 240245Z/DEC67 (TS)
- B. CG III MAF 300354Z/DEC67 (TS)
- C. CG III MAF 260542Z/DEC67 (TS)
- D. 7TH AF 281145Z/DEC67 (TS)
- E. COMUSMACV 021205Z/JAN68 (TS)
- F. CINCPAC 242345Z/APR65 (S) (PASEP)

1. HAVING FOLLOWED THE DIALOGUE OUTLINED IN THE SIX REFERENCES, HERE ARE A FEW THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE OVERALL IMPLICATIONS, AS I SEE THEM.
2. FIRST, WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCHANGE REGARDING DYE MARKER IN REFERENCES A AND B, I BELIEVE THAT YOU AND 7TH AIR FORCE HAVE A GOOD DEAL OF COMMON GROUND, THAT YOUR OWN POSITION IS SOUND AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT YOU WILL PROBABLY COME OUT WITH AN ACCEPTABLE

PAGE 2 RUMKM 0770 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU FOR MCEO
SOLUTION. REALISTICALLY, YOU EACH HAVE PROBLEMS, AND THE OVERLAP CAN BE RESOLVED BY GOOD COMMUNICATIONS. THE DYE MARKER AIR PROBLEM DOES NOT GRAVELY TROUBLE ME.
3. REFERENCES C AND D, THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS RESPECTING YORK II, AND THE MACV RESOLUTION OF THE DEBATE IN REFERENCE E, GIVE ME MORE TROUBLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR ALL HANDS TO REREAD REFERENCE F. THIS DOCUMENT, WHICH NEVER WOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED HAD SHARP NOT BEEN CINCPAC AND HAD NOT HOMER NOTCHINSON SEIZED THE PENCIL AT A CRITICAL MOMENT, HAS DONE A LOT TO MAINTAIN THE COMPLETE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM. THE FIRST SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF REFERENCE D IS CLEARLY A DERIVATIVE OF THIS CINCPAC DICTUM. NOMYER WOULD NOT MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT BASED ON HIS OWN CONVICTIONS; OR THAT I AM CERTAIN.
4. HOWEVER, THE CINCPAC DIRECTIVE WAS WRITTEN PRIMARILY TO PRESERVE THE AIR/GROUND TEAM. IT WAS NOT DESIGNED TO MEET IN DETAIL, THE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE MARINES AND SOLDIERS AND ARVN ARE OPERATING TOGETHER ON THE GROUND

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

VPAGE 3 RUMKM 0770 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU FOR MCEO
AND MARINE AIR, ARMY FORCE AIR, AND USAF AIR AND ALL
INVOLVED IN CARRYING THE AIR SUPPORT LOAD. MAINLY THE
CINCPAC MESSAGE WAS INTENDED TO INSURE THAT THE
FUNCTION OF MARINE AIR (INCLUDING OPERATION OF THE
MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM) IN SUPPORT OF MARINES
SHOULD NOT BE FRUSTRATED BY INTERMEDIATE ECHELONS IN THE
COMMAND STRUCTURE, AND IT HAS DONE THAT REASONABLY
WELL.

5. I AM SURE, WHEN CG 7TH AIR FORCE FLEAD HIS CASE WITH
MACV, THAT HE POINTED OUT THAT THE MARINE AIR/GROUND
TEAM CONCEPT DOES NOT COVER THE ARMY TOO, WHEN
MARINES AND ARMY ARE INVOLVED IN AN OPERATION TOGETHER.
I SUSPECT ALSO, THAT 7TH AIR FORCE CANNOT HAVE OVER-
LOOKED THE PERSUASIVE PLOY OF ASKING WHAT THE SITUATION
WOULD BE IF MARINES WERE OPERATING IN A SUBORDINATE
ROLE, WITH THE ARMY IN III CORPS. FINALLY, I AM
SURPRISED THAT 7TH AIR FORCE DID NOT COMPLICATE THE
ISSUE BY SAYING THAT EVEN IF WE WERE GIVEN THE WHOLE
JOB OF AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK XI, WE WOULD HAVE TROUBLE
PROVIDING ALL THE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND AIR

PAGE 4 RUMKM 0770 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU FOR MCEO
CONTROL PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE ARMY UNITS.

6. TO SURE, I AM NOT SURPRISED WITH THE CONTENT OF
REFERENCE 5. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD SUGGEST
THAT WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE
HOMOGENEOUS NATURE OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM, BUT
WITHOUT SUGGESTING THAT THE MARINE AIR/GROUND
RELATIONSHIP OUGHT TO EXTEND TO ARMY UNITS WHEN THEY
ARE IN THE AREA CONTROLLED BY CG III MAF.

7. IT WOULD APPEAR IN THIS CASE THAT WHAT YOU REALLY
WANT IS SUFFICIENT 7TH AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION
FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL, PLACED WITHIN THE HEAD-
QUARTERS WHICH CONTROLS YORK XI, TO INSURE THAT THE
ARMY REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT OR, FOR THAT MATTER,
YOUR REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY--ARE PROMPTLY
LAID ON 7TH AIR FORCE TO PROVIDE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

#16

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAL 0073U 0060140

ZNY TTTT ZOK JPCGO

P 060125Z JAN 68

FM COMUSMACV

INFO CG III MAF

P 051405Z JAN 68

FM 7AF TSN AB RVN

TO RUMEDFK/TASK FORCE ALPHA NAKHON PHANOM APRT THAI

INFO RUMEDF/7/13AF UDORN RTAFB THAI

RUEPWT/DCPG WASH D C

RUMEDFJ/553RD RECON WG KORAT RTAFB THAI

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

BT

TOP SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS/TACH

THIS IS A MUSCLE SHOALS MESSAGE FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

SUBJECT: ALTERNATE EC121 ORBIT (U)

#10450

1. THERE IS AN INCREASING ENEMY THREAT IN THE KHE SANH AREA WHICH MAY REQUIRE SUSTAINED INTENSE HIGH-ORDINATE ARTILLERY FIRES BY III MAF FORCES IN AND THROUGH THAT PART OF DUMP TRUCK WHICH LIES IN SVN. ACCORDINGLY WE CONSIDER AN ALTERNATE EC-121 ORBIT LOCATION IS NECESSARY.
2. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE ALTERNATE ORBIT ARE 10NM STRIGHT LEGS WITH 10NM SEPARATION BETWEEN LEGS. COORDINATES ARE XD4540 4740 TO XD4540 6600 THEN TURN TO XD6400 6600 TO XD6400 4740 THEN TURN TO XD4540 4740.

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 367D TOP SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS

3. TO EXPEDITE COMPUTED DETERMINATION OF TERRAIN MASKING, REQUEST ABOVE INFO BE PROVIDED MR CONNOR OF DCPG TECH SUPPORT GROUP.

GP-3

BT

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAK 0244 0200
 ZNY TAIT
 P 031202Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN
 CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 AIR SUPPORT OPERATION YORK II (U)
 1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE:

R 021205Z JAN 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG
 RUMSAL/CDR 7AF SAIGON
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T 00133 FROM MACCOV2
 SUBJ: AIR SUPPORT OPERATION YORK II (U)
 REF: A. CG III MAF DTG 260341Z DEC 67 (TS)
 B. CDR 7AF DTG 281145Z DEC 67 (TS)
 C. MACV DIR 95-4 DTD 28 JUN 66 (C)

1. (TS) REF A CONSIDERS FMAW ASSIGNMENT AS A SINGLE TACTICAL

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0244 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 AIR SUPPORT AGENCY FOR THE SUBJECT OPERATION. REF B OBJECTED TO REF A
 AND RECOMMENDS THAT AIR SUPPORT BE ALLOCATED, TASKED AND COORDINATED
 THROUGH 7AF/VNAF TACS.

2. (TS) OVERALL MACV GUIDANCE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR
 STRIKE SUPPORT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS IS CONTAINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE
 95-4, PARA 4A, PAGE 2 IN ANNEX A, AND IN PARA 3D(1), ANNEX B. CONTROL
 RESPONSIBILITIES FOR STRIKE AIRCRAFT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE
 7AF/VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FORCES
 WILL BE PROVIDED FROM 7AF/VNAF/FMAW AS APPROPRIATE AS PER PRESENT
 SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT III MAF FORCES INVOLVED
 WILL BE SUPPORTED BY FMAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B, MACV DIRECTIVE
 95-4, PARA 3A, AND IN COORDINATION WITH TACS AUTHORITY.

3. (TS) REQUEST THAT COMMANDER 7AF AND CG III MAF PREPARE AND
 INTEGRATE AND COORDINATE AIR SUPPORT PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH
 APPROPRIATE PROVISION OF MACV DIR 95-4, MACV OPERATION YORK PLANNING
 DIRECTIVE, AND GUIDANCE CONTAINED HEREIN.

UNQUOTE

GP-1

BT

TOP SECRET

ZCZCSAA253V AWA529
 RR RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0019U 0021209
 ZNY TTTT
 R 021205Z JAN 68

№ 10422

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG
 RUMSAL/CDR 7AF SAIGON
 BT

TOP SECRET 00133 FROM MACCOV2

SUBJ: AIR SUPPORT OPERATION YORK II (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF DTG 260341Z DEC 67 (TS)
 B. CDR 7AF DTG 281145Z DEC 67 (TS)
 C. MACV DIR 95-4 DTD 28 JUN 66 (C)

1. (TS) REF A CONSIDERS FMAW ASSIGNMENT AS A SINGLE TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AGENCY FOR THE SUBJECT OPERATION. REF B OBJECTED TO REF A AND RECOMMENDS THAT AIR SUPPORT BE ALLOCATED, TASKED AND COORDINATED THROUGH 7AF/VNAF TACS.

2. (TS) OVERALL MACV GUIDANCE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR STRIKE SUPPORT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS IS CONTAINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, PARA 4A, PAGE 2 IN ANNEX A, AND IN PARA 3D(1), ANNEX B. CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR STRIKE AIRCRAFT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE 7AF/VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FORCES WILL BE PROVIDED FROM 7AF/VNAF/FMAW AS APPROPRIATE AS PER PRESENT

PAGE 2 RUMSAV 0019U TOP SECRET

SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT III MAF FORCES INVOLVED WILL BE SUPPORTED BY FMAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B, MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, PARA 3A, AND IN COORDINATION WITH TACS AUTHORITY.

3. (TS) REQUEST THAT COMMANDER 7AF AND CG III MAF PREPARE AND INTEGRATE AND COORDINATE AIR SUPPORT PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATE PROVISION OF MACV DIR 95-4, MACV OPERATION YORK PLANNING DIRECTIVE, AND GUIDANCE CONTAINED HEREIN. GP-4

BT

TOP SECRET

OO RUMSAW RUMSAL
 DE RUMSAK 0156 0021000
 ZNY TTTT
 O 021000Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUMSAL/CMR 7AF
 ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

NO 10421

T O P S E C R E T
 AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II (U)
 A. CG III MAF 260542Z DEC67
 B. 7AF 281145Z DEC 67
 C. COMUSMACV 171045Z DEC67

1. REF A EXPLAINED III MAF CONCEPT FOR AIR SUPPORT IN OPERATION YORK II AND STATED INTENT TO TASK CG FIRST MAF WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING ALL CLOSE AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION. REF B CONTAINS 7AF POSITION AND RECOMMENDS AMENDING MACV PLANNING DIRECTIVE, REF C, TO SPECIFY THAT TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF FORCES INVOLVED WILL BE PROVIDED BY 7AF/VNAF/FMAW RESOURCES AS APPROPRIATE, SUCH AIR SUPPORT TO BE ALLOCATED, TASKED, AND COORDINATED THROUGH 7AF/VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.
2. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT MUST BE INTEGRATED COMPLETELY INTO THE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0156 T O P S E C R E T
 OVERALL HELICOPTER ASSAULT PLAN TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF INITIAL LANDINGS AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS IN ASHAU. HELICOPTER ESCORT, LANDING ZONE PREPARATION, AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SORTIES FLOWN BY JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT ARE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THIS PLAN. PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE CRITICAL INITIAL PHASE REQUIRES A KEEN UNDERSTANDING OF HELICOPTER CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS AND EXPERIENCE IN THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT OF ROTARY AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST MAF IS EMINENTLY QUALIFIED IN THIS RESPECT.

3. IN THE SAME VEIN THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM MUST BE CAPABLE OF COORDINATING THIS INTEGRATED HELICOPTER AND JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT AIR SUPPORT PLAN. INCLUDED WITH THE MARINE DASC IS A HELICOPTER DIRECTION CENTER (HDC) SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED, AND EQUIPPED, FOR THIS PURPOSE.
4. A MARINE DASC CURRENTLY LOCATED AT HUE-PHU BAI ADJACENT TO THE MARINE DIVISION FSCC IS INTENDED TO BE THE PRIMARY AIR CONTROL AGENCY FOR THE OPERATION. THE DASC INCLUDES AN AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM (ASRT) FOR ALL-WEATHER, TPQ-10, RADAR BOMBING, AN HDC, AND HAS COMPLETE ARTILLERY SAVE-A-PLANE INFORMATION. A SECOND TPQ-10 WILL BE POSITIONED TO PROVIDE SKIN PAINT OVER THE VALLEY. ADDITIONALLY AN AIRBORNE DASC AND HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE MINI-

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT
 DATE 2 JAN 68 III MAF S&C

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B. J. Davis
 (SIGNATURE)

III MAF 2100/4

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE THREE RUNSAK 0156 T O P S E C R E T
DASC ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE FIRST MAW FOR COMMITMENT SPECIFICALLY TO YORK II FORCES IN ASHAU VALLEY AS DESIRED.
5. THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM WITHIN THE FIRST MAW IS PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED FOR OVERALL CONTROL OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF YORK II. THE PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN CONTROL OF III MAF AIR OPERATIONS AND THE AIRCREW FLYING THE FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT ARE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH ASHAU VALLEY, ITS GEOGRAPHY, WEATHER, AND ENEMY SITUATION.
6. THE CONCEPT PRESENTED HEREIN DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF 7AF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PERSONNEL IN ALO/FAC DUTIES AND, IN FACT, THE ADVANTAGES INHERENT IN THE CONTINUED USE OF THESE SAME PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT THE YORK OPERATION INSURES CONTINUITY OF EFFORT IN THIS VITAL AREA. SIMILARLY, 7AF ALO/FAC STRUCTURE IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT FOR OUT OF COUNTRY OPERATIONS.
7. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE AIR SUPPORT CONCEPT EXPRESSED IN REFERENCE A AND CLARIFIED HEREIN BE APPROVED.

GP-4
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