

III MAF: Air Control Study (Jan-Jul 1968)

Point Paper. Single Management of Marine fixed wing attack and reconnaissance aircraft. N/D. (S)

MACV paper, MACJ00, "Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets",  
7 Mar 1968. (S) Gp-3 COPY

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Section I thru IV

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## POINT PAPER

1. SUBJECT: Single management of Marine fixed wing attack and reconnaissance aircraft.

2. BACKGROUND: On 7 March 1968 COMUSMACV directed his Deputy for Air, Commander, 7th Air Force, to assume mission direction of III MAF fixed wing strike and reconnaissance assets, and the single management system was implemented fully in late March 1968. Since innovation of the single management system, major technical modifications, based on recommendations of the Commanding General, III MAF and the Commander, 7th Air Force, have been made. These changes have resulted in continued improvement in the responsiveness of air support operating under the single management system. CG, III MAF, however, maintains that the most efficient, flexible and responsive method of employing Marine air in I CTZ is for CG, III MAF to frag Marine aircraft in support of ground units of all services operating in I CTZ.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. The objectives of single management as set forth in the COMUSMACV directive of 7 March 1968 are:

(1) To maintain the capability to concentrate the air effort as dictated by the enemy threat.

(2) To insure that the air effort is applied in the most effective manner.

(3) To insure that air support is apportioned equitably in accordance with the situation and on a timely basis to all units in I CTZ.

b. Although the stated objectives of single management are being met to a large degree, the delegation of mission direction of Marine fixed wing assets to Commander, 7th Air Force has not been directly responsible for meeting these objectives. The concentration of air effort has been attained by COMUSMACV's increased utilization of 7th Air Force air resources in I CTZ. Marine in-country attack sorties continue to be provided in support of ground units in I CTZ under the single management system in approximately the same number that were provided prior to single management.

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c. The increased attention placed on air support in SVN in all Corps areas since the implementation of single management has resulted in a general improvement in air support provided to U. S. Army and Free World Forces, other than Marine forces. COMUSMACV has reported that the II, III and IV Corps U. S. Army Commanders have indicated satisfaction with the existing system. This improved air support of Free World Military Armed Forces, other than Marine, has resulted from modifications to single management air control procedures and is not directly related to mission direction of III MAF air assets by the MACV Deputy Commander for Air. The employment of Marine fixed wing support of forces in I CTZ at the present time is essentially the same as that provided prior to single management; the only significant difference being the additional steps of CG, III MAF submitting requirements to MACV TASE and the publication of the 7th Air Force TACC frag.

d. CG, III MAF, the senior commander of U. S. Forces in I CTZ, has continued to express dissatisfaction with COMUSMACV's single management concept for the employment of Marine fixed wing aircraft in I Corps, citing as his reasons the excessive administrative burden imposed by the preplanned frag and the lack of responsiveness of the present system to the tactical needs of the III MAF ground commanders. Forwarding of III MAF requirements for Marine preplanned sorties to MACV TASE, and the inclusion of Marine sorties on the weekly 7th Air Force frag, which is executed by CG, III MAF, are unnecessary and burdensome administrative tasks. Further, necessary changes to the weekly frag generate additional administrative tasks. Finally, the system is unresponsive tactically, since publication of the weekly frag requires III MAF ground commanders to plan their air support at least five days in advance of scheduled operations. CG, III MAF has recommended that the out-of-country Marine air effort continue to be fragged by the 7th Air Force TACC, with the remaining Marine strike sorties in I CTZ being fragged by CG, III MAF in order to attain the desired responsiveness. This would reduce the lead time required presently for obtaining preplanned sorties from five days to one day.

e. Under the existing preplanned air support system (70% of available sorties allocated weekly and 30% daily), CG, III MAF and other Corps commanders allocate the sorties assigned in such manner as will support their tactical plans most effectively. In essence then, CG, III MAF is managing the air effort in I CTZ for COMUSMACV by making his requirements known to TASE and suballocating to III MAF units the sorties assigned to him by the 7th Air Force TACC frag.

f. I CTZ is unique in that CG, III MAF possesses extensive fixed wing air support resources and also has integral air control facilities which have been functioning within the framework of the single management system.

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In an effort to provide the optimum air control system in I CTZ which will serve best the needs of all III MAF ground commanders, consideration should be given to returning those Marine fixed wing air support assets to be employed in I CTZ to the fragging authority of CG, III MAF. This would permit CG, III MAF to employ his air assets most effectively, reduce materially the administrative burden required by the single management system and capitalize on inherent Marine capabilities.

g. To this end, existing single management arrangements could continue with the following minor revisions designed to simplify procedures, increase flexibility and eliminate inefficient sortie utilization in SVN:

(1) Each week, COMUSMACV would continue to determine allocation of his air effort as the tactical situation demands.

(2) Based on this allocation, Commander, 7th Air Force would continue to publish a weekly frag for Air Force sorties to all four Corps areas. The number of Air Force sorties fragged into I CTZ would be dependent on CG, III MAF's requirement over and above Marine capability and could be standardized at a minimum figure with increases as necessary.

(3) Commander, 7th Air Force would continue to publish a daily frag for Air Force support and Marine Corps support, if required, to be provided to II, III and IV Corps.

(4) On a daily basis within I CTZ, Marine air, except as otherwise allocated by COMUSMACV outside I CTZ, would be fragged daily, directly by CG, III MAF (through his Deputy for Air) to support all III MAF forces, both Army and Marine. The daily III MAF frag would be published concurrently with publication of the 7th Air Force daily frag in order that the TACC would be apprised, on a timely basis, of air plans for I CTZ.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That, based on the above, COMUSMACV return to CG, III MAF, on a trial basis, mission direction of all Marine fixed wing attack and reconnaissance aircraft sorties to be utilized in support of I CTZ ground forces.

b. That, after a period of thirty days, the revised system be evaluated by COMUSMACV to determine the effectiveness of air support in I CTZ under direction of CG, III MAF versus that provided to I CTZ during a similar period under the single management concept.

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c. That the Commander, 7th Air Force continue to augment Marine air support in I CTZ, as required.

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HEADQUARTERS  
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
 OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACJOO

7 March 1968

SUBJECT: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets (U)

TO: Commanding General  
 III Marine Amphibious Force  
 FPO 96602

1. (S) Because of the increased deployment of Army forces to I Corps area, the concentration of air effort in support of all ground forces being deployed, and the overriding requirement to maintain the flexibility to concentrate this effort as dictated by the enemy threat, I have concluded that it is of paramount importance to achieve a single manager for control of tactical air resources. Consequently, I have decided to charge my Deputy Commander for Air Operations with the responsibility for coordinating and directing the air effort throughout Vietnam, to include I CTZ and the extended battle area. He is responsible for seeing to it that the air effort is applied in the most effective manner in furtherance of the MACV mission and that it is apportioned equitably in accordance with the situation and on a timely basis to all units in I CTZ.

2. (S) You will make available to my Deputy Commander for Air Operations the following air assets for mission direction:

- a. Strike aircraft.
- b. Reconnaissance aircraft.
- c. Tactical air control system as required.

3. (S) My Deputy Commander for Air Operations will be responsible for fragging and operational direction of these air assets with all

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MACJOO

SUBJECT: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets (U)

other available assets now under his control to meet the daily operational requirements of forces in I CTZ. Consistent with the tactical situation, Marine aircraft will be fraggged through the appropriate DASC to support Marine ground units. In the joining together of the two tactical air control systems to insure continuity of control of air operations, the integrity of the Marine tactical control system shall be preserved. Marine helicopters and airlift assets will not be affected by this directive.

4. (S) I expect you to provide Marine Corps personnel to augment:

a. The J2 Air and J3 Air groups of MACV TASE to establish priority of effort between major commands.

b. TACC (Saigon), I DASC (Da Nang), and DASC VICTOR (Hue Phu Bai). Total positions will not exceed ten.

5. (S) In addition you will provide my Deputy Commander for Air Operations:

a. Daily status report of availability of aircraft for fraggging in accordance with your established criteria.

b. Reports as set forth in Inclosure F hereto.

c. Such officers as you see necessary for planning special allied or combined air operations.

6. (S) The inclosures reflect the organization of forces in I CTZ and describe air control and coordination arrangements. Additionally, a description of the reporting procedures is included.

7. (U) Any provisions of MACV Directive 95-4, 28 June 1966, and MACV Directives 95-11, 21 June 1966, or any other directives, that conflict with the instructions contained herein are hereby superseded. The indicated directives will be revised appropriately.

8. (S) In recognition of the fact that Marine Corps air assets will be employed under these arrangements in a manner different from that previously intended by the CG III MAF, I desire to be informed directly

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MACJOO

SUBJECT: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets (U)

by CG III MAF on proposed improvements in the system or in event of his dissatisfaction with the employment of Marine Corps air assets. CINCPAC will be made an information addressee on any communication to COMUSMACV in either case.

4. These instructions will be reviewed within thirty days to determine those technical and organizational changes which may prove necessary as a result of experience in this single management system.

6 Incl  
as



W. C. WESTMORELAND  
General, United States Army  
Commanding

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## INCLOSURE A

## ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONS

1. A new tactical headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam (PROV CORPS V), is being established to provide operational direction of the expanded US ground force structure in northern I CTZ. The role and missions of PROV CORPS V are stated in MACV letter, 3 March 1968, Subject: Letter of Instructions -- Role and Missions of Provisional Corps Vietnam (PROV CORPS V).

2. CG, III MAF, is over-all US Commander in I CTZ. He will exercise operational control of PROV CORPS V and US ground tactical units deployed in southern I CTZ. As stated in the MACV letter cited in paragraph 1 above, he will continue current missions in I CTZ and retain responsibility for CORDS functions throughout I CTZ.

3. The existing relationship between CG, III MAF, and CG, I CTZ remains unchanged. CG, III MAF's relationship with the ROK Marine brigade also remains unchanged.

4. I DASC at Da Nang, appropriately expanded and with Marine personnel included, will serve as over-all coordinating agency for all tactical air support in I CTZ. A combined DASC (designated DASC Victor) will be formed to coordinate tactical air support of Provisional Corps Vietnam (PROV CORPS V) and will function under the over-all

coordinating authority of I DASC while having certain authorizations for control and coordination as subsequently described. The 1st and 3d Marine Divisions will retain their DASCs. Those Marine DASCs established for special situations (such as Khe Sanh and Hue Phu Bai) will be retained as long as required. All Marine DASCs will be subordinate to I DASC or DASC VICTOR, depending on location.

5. In integrating Marine aviation into the over-all control organization, the capabilities of the Marine Tactical Air Control System will be fully exploited. Coordination of effort will be achieved by the assignment of Marine personnel to the MACV TASE, 7th Air Force TACC, I DASC and DASC VICTOR for assistance in tasking and coordinating air activities.

6. Operational direction of tactical air support (strike/recce) in I CTZ will be accomplished through the TACC. This agency will:

- a. Control all strike and reconnaissance operations in I CTZ.
- b. Issue daily frag orders for preplanned missions based on requirements provided by MACV TASE.
- c. Control air defense operations through the 7AF TACC and TACC (North Sector).
- d. Control search and rescue operations through the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC) and Regional Control Center at Da Nang.


e. Control all scrambles except for scrambles, which may be ordered by I DASC for air units located in I CTZ.

7. I DASC will be manned by AF, VNAF and Marine Corps personnel and is designated as the primary direct air support center (DASC) for support of CG, III MAF and CG, I CTZ. I DASC will exercise divert authority over all preplanned missions assigned to I CTZ and will coordinate in each case with TACC (Saigon) those scramble sorties allocated for troops in contact. A jointly manned DASC VICTOR will be established and designated as a subordinate DASC to provide support for the CG, PROV CORPS V operating in northern I CTZ. DASC VICTOR will exercise divert authority over preplanned missions assigned to PROV CORPS V. At levels below I DASC and DASC VICTOR, the appropriate USAF/ Marine control and coordination agencies will function in the normal manner.

8. The charts on pages 4 and 5 show I CTZ organization and air control relationships.

ORGANIZATION

I CORPS




----- COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

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CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS



\* Senior DASC


## INCLOSURE B

## PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS

1. Pre-planned requests originate at the lower levels of command. Requests are sent up the chain of command with each level consolidating the requests and establishing priorities on the requested targets. Specifically, the requests would be dispatched as depicted upon the attached chart. (See Chart pg 7)
2. In the case of Provisional Corps V the requests would be consolidated within the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) and sent forward to the CC III MAF/I ARVN Corps CTOC for overall consolidation and the establishment of priorities for the entire I CTZ. The requests are then submitted to the MACV Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) for the allocation of strikes. Within the TASE would be Marine representatives (G-2 and G-3 Air), who would participate in overall planning and specifically monitor the requests that originated from Marine units.
3. Once the targets are approved and allocated the TASE would submit them to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), who would assign the targets to appropriate units, establish ordnance loads, and time over targets (TOTs). Marine officers would be assigned and participate in the establishment of the Daily Frag Order. Within the TACC every effort would be made to have Marine aircraft support Marine units. The distribution of the Daily Frag Order is covered in Inclosure C.

PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS

STRIKE / RECCE



## INCLOSURE C

## DAILY FRAG ORDER

1. The daily frag order will be prepared by the TACC. The frag order will contain information on control agencies, timing, targets, call signs and ordnance and any pertinent instructions pertaining to mission accomplishment. Marine officers will be assigned to the TACC to participate in frag preparation.
2. As a normal practice, every effort will be made to frag Marine aircraft against Marine requests. Under emergency situations or as the situation dictates Marine/USAF/VNAF aircraft can be diverted to any unit within I CTZ under the immediate request system.
3. Upon completion the daily frag order will be dispatched first in the form of a warning order to all pertinent agencies by voice and then by message.
4. Pertinent portions of the daily frag orders would be distributed to all agencies responsible for Strike/Rece aircraft control, to include wings, groups, separate USAF squadrons, CRC/CRP/TAOC sites, ABCCC, Tactical Air Support Squadrons (TASS) and MSQ/TPQ sites. The frag order for all Marine units would be forwarded to the 1st MAW TADC. I DASC would receive the entire frag for I CTZ and DASC V the frag for Prov Corps V area. Each DASC would in turn transmit to their subordinate control agencies those portions of the frag that affect operations within their areas of responsibility.


## INCLOSURE D

## IMMEDIATE REQUESTS

1. Requests for immediate air support may be relayed from the lowest unit aware of the need.
2. A divert of a preplanned mission normally provides fastest response. Division TACP/MARDASC continue to have authority to divert air support missions fraggged to them.
3. If there are no aircraft available for divert within the division area, division TACP/MARDASC will relay/confirm request for immediate air to I DASC/DASC VICTOR.
4. I DASC, in coordination with the adjacent FSCC, has divert authority for all aircraft fraggged into the I CTZ. DASC VICTOR, in coordination with adjacent FSCC, has divert authority for aircraft fraggged to Provisional Corps VICTOR. If none available DASC V will request I DASC for divert from other areas. I DASC will divert or scramble alert aircraft as feasible. If I DASC has none available, it will go directly to TACC Saigon for divert or scramble. In most cases there will be sufficient aircraft airborne on missions of lower priority to provide ample resources for divers. These will normally provide more rapid response than scramble aircraft. When requirements cannot be met by divers from other areas, alert aircraft will be scrambled.
5. MACV-TASE representative will coordinate on TACC scrambles and inter-corps divers. (See Chart pg 10)

IMMEDIATE AIR REQUESTS

STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT



- NOTES: 1. ~~440~~ is Divert Authority for internal air.  
 2. Requests go direct to DASC where communication permits; intermediate levels monitor; silence means consent.

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ENCLOSURE E

## CONTROL AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES

1. CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. The following arrangement will permit maximum use of available agencies and equipment in controlling the increased air activities in I CTZ:

a. Panama CRC (USAF) is designated as the senior airspace controlling agency for airborne aircraft in I CTZ.

b. Waterboy CRP (USAF) will control airborne aircraft in the northern portion of I CTZ (area to be specified) under the overall direction of Panama.

c. Vice Squad TAOC/CRP (USMC) will control airborne aircraft in the southern portion of I CTZ (area to be specified) under the overall direction of Panama.

d. ABCCC will be employed as a controlling agency for special operations when required. When so employed it will serve in effect as an airborne DASC with functions and responsibilities to be as prescribed by TACC Saigon.

2. MSQ/TPQ-10. MSQ and TPQ-10 procedures will remain essentially the same. Sites will be fraged each day for pre-planned strikes by TACC, based upon pre-planned requests and anticipated weather conditions. Airborne aircraft will continue to be passed to the MSQ/TPQ controllers through the appropriate CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. Immediate strikes

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will be handled in a similar manner as pre-planned with aircraft receiving target information and controlling agency after becoming airborne.

MSQ/TPQ will receive target location and flight mission information from either the requesting DASC or TACC.

3. Coordination of Naval Gunfire and Ground Artillery. A comparable and compatible system exists between the US Army/USAF and the Marines. Naval gunfire and ground artillery would be controlled and coordinated between the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) and the DASC at Division level and above, and between the FSCC or FSC (Fire Support Coordinator) and the TACP/ALO at subordinate levels. At each level the information will be passed up and down the chain of command, with the DASC/TACP informing appropriate CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC and FAC aircraft operating in the area with the intent that all aircraft will be informed as to location, direction and altitude of fire. In the placement of strikes coordination will be effected between the FSCC/DASC and FSC/TACP dependent upon the operating level. With respect to pre-planned ground or naval gunfire, such information will be contained within daily frag orders issued to all appropriate agencies.

4. Control Communications. Seventh AF in cooperation with III MAF will identify additional communications requirements for responsive operational coordination of air operations.

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5. Airlift. Marine helicopter and airlift assets will not be affected by this arrangement. Requests for airlift will be handled in accordance with current procedures.
6. Strike/Recce Control Procedures. No significant changes are indicated in the launch and airborne control procedures from the viewpoint of aircrews. Unit operations centers (TUOC/TADC) will be informed directly by the TACC, appropriate DASC or the Daily Frag Order as to the time of launch, controlling agencies and, when possible, target type and location. After launch aircraft will contact the local controlling agency (CRC/CRP/TAOC) for flight following and monitoring into the target area; initial and subsequent agencies have the capability to pass divert information when required. CRC/CRP/TAOC will pass aircraft to the designated strike control agency, which can be either a FAC for visual strikes or a MSQ/TPQ site for radar drop.

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INCLOSURE F

## REPORT PROCEDURES

1. Timely intelligence, operations data, and mission results are essential to ensure effective direction and control of strike and reconnaissance forces and to facilitate sound decisions with respect to target base adjustments and strike/re-strike timing.
2. Accordingly,
  - a. DASCs will report to 7AF TACC by the most expeditious means in as near to real time as practical Bomb Damage Assessment provided by FACs.
  - b. DASCs and strike/reconnaissance units will provide: "Hot" Reports of incidents/events not associated with aerial operations when such activities occur in assigned areas of responsibility; Aerial Observation Reports and Intelligence Summaries (DISUM) daily, or more frequently as required; and Ground Fire Incidents as set forth in COMUSMACV Directive 381-34.
  - c. Strike and Reconnaissance units will provide Operational Reports (OPREPS) 1 through 5 as specified in Enclosure 7 (Operational Reports) to CINCPACINST 005440.1E, or PACAF Manual 55-3 (Commanders Operational Reports) as applicable.
  - d. Staff intelligence agencies, or reconnaissance units as may be appropriate, will provide IPIRS, CPIRS, SUPIRS and other applicable sensor, or imagery, interpretation reports for all reconnaissance performed.

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3. Reports enumerated in subpara b-d above, will be transmitted electrically by IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence as appropriate, and will include DEPCOMUSMACV/AIR (7AF - TACC) as an action addressee.

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BACKGROUND INFO

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A I R C O N T R O L

SECTION ONE -- A brief summary of the meetings held  
at Headquarters III MAF on 18Jan68 and 20Feb68.

SECTION TWO -- Reference Materials including documents  
provided for III MAF Reps at above meetings.  
(All message traffic dealing with Air Control is  
contained in a separate "Air Control Message File.")

SECTION THREE -- COMUSMACV and CINCPAC correspondence.  
Subj: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance  
Assets

SECTION FOUR -- C/S MEMO FOR RECORD 16-68  
Subj: Delivery of "Single Management of Strike and  
Reconnaissance Assets" document to III MAF

CG FMAW MEMO FOR RECORD of 2 May 1968

Subj: Meeting at PCV on 2 May 1968

SECTION ONE

18 JANUARY 1968

On 18 January 1968, discussions were held at III MAF Headquarters with respect to Air Control for Operation DURANGO CITY. Attendees were as follows:

Representing III MAF

Lieutenant General R. E. CUSHMAN, Jr., CG III MAF  
 Major General N. J. ANDERSON, CG 1st MAW  
 Brigadier General E. E. ANDERSON, C/S III MAF

Representing 7th Air Force

General W. W. MOMYER, CDR 7th Air Force  
 Major General G. F. BLOOD, DC/S Opns 7th Air Force

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Reference materials provided for the use of the III MAF representatives during these discussions were as follows:

DOCUMENTS (Section II)

- Pertinent Extracts from JCS PUB-1 (Tab I-A)
- Pertinent Extracts from JCS PUB-2 (Tab I-B)
- Pertinent Extracts from Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Tab I-C)
- Pertinent Extracts from JCS Paper 2308/299-1 (Tab I-D)
- Marine Corps Position on Air Control (Tab I-E)
- Proposed Definitions for Inclusion in "Air Space Management" Panel (Tab I-E)
- Area Airspace Control Authority (Tab I-E)
- Extract Questions from CG FMFPAC msg 172259Z Jan68 (Tab III)

MESSAGES (Air Control Message File)

- CG 3d MarDiv 141526Z Jan68 (TS) (Tab 22)
- CG III MAF 131516Z Jan68 (S) (Tab 21)
- COMUSMACV 121110Z Jan68 (TS) (Tab 18)
- CG FMFPAC 060245Z Jan68 (Tab 16)
- 7th AF 051405Z Jan68 (TS) (Tab 15)
- COMUSMACV 021205Z Jan68 (Tab 13)
- CG III MAF 021000Z Jan68 (Tab 12)
- CG III MAF 300854Z Dec67 (TS) (Tab 9)
- 7th AF 281145Z Dec67 (Tab 7)
- CG III MAF 260542Z Dec67 (Tab 5)
- 7th AF 240245Z Dec67 (TS) (Tab 4)

20 FEBRUARY 1968

On 20 February 1968, discussions were held at III MAF Headquarters with respect to Air Control in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone. Attendees were as follows:

Representing III MAF

Lieutenant General R. E. CUSHMAN, Jr., CG III MAF  
Major General N. J. ANDERSON, CG 1st MAW  
Brigadier General E. E. ANDERSON, C/S III MAF

Representing 7th Air Force

General W. W. MOMYER, CDR 7th Air Force

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Reference materials provided for the use of the III MAF representatives during these discussions were as follows:

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- Pertinent Extracts from JCS PUB-2 (Tab I-B)
- Pertinent Extracts from Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (I-C)
- Pertinent Extracts from JCS Paper 2308/299-2 (Tab I-D)
- Marine Corps Position on Air Control (I-E)
- Extracted questions from CG FMFPAC msg 172259Z Jan68 (Tab III)
- Proposed Air Control Wiring Diagram (Tab VII)

MESSAGES (Air Control Message File)

- Gen WESTMORELAND 191239Z Feb68 (Tab 41)
- Gen WESTMORELAND 191147Z Feb68 (Tab 40)
- CG FMFPAC 190455Z Jan68 (TS) (Tab 29)
- CG III MAF 181352Z Jan68 (S) (Tab 26)
- CG FMFPAC 172259Z Jan68 (S) (Tab 25)
- CINCPAC 242345Z Apr65 (S) (Tab 1)

SECTION TWO

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- I. Pertinent Extracts from JCS Publications 1 and 2  
Doctrine for Amphibious Operations  
Extracts from JCS Paper 2308/299-1  
Marine Corps Position on Air Control
- II. Control of Aircraft in I Corps as Prepared by  
Commander, 7th Air Force
- III. Extracted questions from CG FMFPAC contained in  
CG FMFPAC msg 172259Z Jan68
- IV. 7th Air Force letter to COMUSMACV  
Subj: DURANGO CITY
- V. MACV Disposition Form -- Recommends the meeting  
between Major Generals ANDERSON and BLOOD  
Subj: Development of a joint integrated air control  
plan to support Operation DURANGO CITY
- VI. Major General ANDERSON's memorandum for the record  
dtd 19 January 1968  
Subj: Consolidation of air support resources in ICTZ
- VII. Proposed Air Control Wiring Diagram



I

PART I

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Pertinent Extracts from JCS Paper 2308/299-2	D
Marine Corps Position on Air Control	E

PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM JCS PUB 1

OPERATIONAL COMMAND--(JCS) Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 U.S.C. 124).)

See also ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL; CONTROL

PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM JCS PUB-2

## 20303. Collateral Functions of the Navy and the Marine Corps

To train forces:

- a. To interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operations at sea.
- b. To conduct close air and naval support for land operations.
- c. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.
- d. To be prepared to participate in the over-all effort, as directed.
- e. To establish military government, as directed, pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

## 30201. Definitions

b. Operational Command. Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational Command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (The term is synonymous with OPERATIONAL CONTROL and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 U.S.C. 124). (See paragraphs 30202 and 30203 for specific guidance.)

**30256. Operational Control Within a Joint Task Force**

The commander of a joint task force will exercise operational control in accordance with the provision of 30201c (above), and will in addition exercise logistic control to the extent indicated in paragraph 30257.

**30281. Definition and Scope of Authority**

A Coordinating Authority is a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, or two or more forces of the same Service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority.

**30282. When a Coordinating Authority is Applicable**

A Coordinating Authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. It is useful when it is desired to coordinate two or more agencies for a special common task without disturbing normal organizational relationships in other matters.

**30283. Joint Force Not Implied**

Designation of a Coordinating Authority does not establish a joint force.

PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS280. AIRSPACE CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS

c. To ensure unity of effort in overall air operations, the amphibious task force commander will coordinate air operations within the defined airspace as necessary, with the commander responsible for airspace control in the surrounding area. At the termination of the amphibious assault operation, the amphibious task force will be dissolved, the assigned airspace will be disestablished, and the airspace control will normally be exercised in accordance with doctrine for control of airspace over the combat zone by the airspace for that area.

290. TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF FUNCTIONS

As conditions warrant and as coordination agencies are established ashore, the amphibious task force commander passes control of gunfire and missile support to the landing force commander. At the discretion of the amphibious task force commander, control of air operations in the amphibious objective area is passed to the landing force commander ashore who has the capability to control such operations (See Article 737).

731. BASIC ELEMENTS OF AIR SUPPORT PLANNING

(6) Transfer of Airspace Control. Plans must provide for the orderly transfer of airspace control throughout the amphibious operation. The following are the transfer operations which, if required, must be the subject of detailed planning (See Articles 290, 737, and 738):

(a) From the area airspace control authority of the Joint Force commander exercising control over the combat zone in which the amphibious objective area is located (see Doctrine for Airspace Control Over the Land Combat Zone) to the advance force commander of the amphibious task force.

(b) From the advance force commander to the amphibious task force commander.

(c) From the amphibious task force commander to the landing force commander or other commander ashore.

(d) From the amphibious task force to the area airspace control authority of the appropriate joint force commander on termination of the amphibious operation.

732. AIR PLAN

(4) Air Control and Warning. Comprehensive plans for aircraft control and air warning for the amphibious task force are prepared, including provisions for the echeloning of landing force air control organizations ashore.

(5) Air Delivery of Supplies. The basic requirements for air delivery of supplies are established by the landing force commander. Air support plans contain provisions for their delivery.

(6) Troop Carrier Operations. If the tactical plan involves the movement of troops into the combat area by air transport, the landing force commander translates the tactical plan into a general statement of aircraft requirements by type for inclusion in his comprehensive request for air support.

737. CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS

(4) Shift of Control Responsibility. Air control facilities are established ashore that parallel those of the amphibious task force commander and of attack group commanders when such groups are formed. The elements of the tactical air control system ashore are initially in a standby status monitoring all air control circuits. When ashore control facilities are complete, the amphibious task force commander, while retaining overall responsibility for the amphibious assault, will at his discretion pass control of air operations in the amphibious objective area to the landing force commander or to an appropriate commander ashore who has the capability to control such operations. To facilitate an orderly passage of control, specific control functions may be progressively passed as control facilities ashore become operational. After passage of control ashore, the afloat control centers continue to monitor air circuits in a standby status, ready to assume control in the event of an emergency ashore.

738 SHIFT OF AIRSPACE CONTROL ON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

a. Air support planning must provide for an orderly transition of airspace control from the amphibious task force on termination of the amphibious operation. At the termination of the amphibious assault, the amphibious task force will be dissolved, the assigned airspace will be disestablished, and the responsibility for "airspace-control," defined as coordination, intergration, and regulation of airspace, normally will be exercised by the Air Force component commander through a joint air operations arrangement for the joint force commander. The initiating directive will indicate whether airspace control is to be reassumed by the unified commander, assigned to a joint force commander exercising airspace control in an adjacent area, or established by a joint force commander engaged in follow-up operations. In any event planning must include consideration of those steps required to provide for assumption of airspace control in accordance with the doctrine for airspace control over the land combat zone.

PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM JCS PAPER 2308/299-1

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered and resolved certain air control matters in JCS 2308/299-2.

- a. Airspace control is defined in paragraph (c) of Definitions below.
- b. Normally the responsibility for airspace control will be exercised over the land combat zone by the Air Force Component Commander through a joint air operations arrangement for the joint force commander.
- c. The airspace control system established must accommodate block airspace and/or sectors of responsibility needed for operation and control of aerial vehicles organic to each Service. Control of aircraft should make maximum use of Service control elements and capabilities.

## DEFINITION

- a. Operational Control. (Command) This involves the span of control that an organizational commander exercises over his organic and attached units.
- b. Control of Air Operations. This involves the authority to approve, disapprove, deny or delay air support activities. Such authority in joint operations is vested in the Joint Force Commander. In its simplest terms it is "mission control."
- c. Airspace Control. A "service" which coordinates, integrates, and regulates the use of airspace over a defined area. This control does not include the authority to approve, disapprove, deny or delay air operations.
- d. A term loosely used, and without any definition is "air control." It combines elements of all of the above to describe various situations, and thus leads to confusion and misunderstanding.

MARINE CORPS POSITION ON AIR CONTROL

Proposed definitions for inclusion in "Air Space Management" panel

Block Airspace

A geographic area of airspace organization, normally with defined boundaries and a vertical limit established by a COORDINATING ALTITUDE, within which a commander has responsibility for airspace control and control of air operations. It is established on as permanent a basis as possible by the commander of a joint/unified command to facilitate maximum freedom of employment of organic aircraft. It is coordinated with and integrated in the joint/unified command area airspace control system to effect unity of airspace control throughout the combat zone.

Sector of Responsibility

A geographic area of airspace organization, normally defined by lateral boundaries, within which a commander has responsibility for airspace control and control of air operations. It is established on as permanent a basis as possible by the commander of a joint/unified command to facilitate freedom of employment of organic aircraft. It is coordinated with and integrated into the joint/unified command area airspace control system to effect unity of airspace control throughout the combat zone.

AREA AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY

a. Within a unified command the unified commander establishes the boundaries within which airspace control is to be exercised; provides the general priorities and restraints to be applied, with due regard for the requirements of all users of the airspace; and resolves differences that cannot otherwise be agreed upon by the Service component commanders concerned.

b. For joint operations in an overseas combat zone the unified commander ordering the conduct of combat operations will normally assign to the commander of the joint force an area of defined proportions. Unless otherwise limited by his terms of reference the joint force commander will exercise airspace control within this area.

c. Normally, airspace control will be exercised for the joint force commander by the Air Force component commander at the appropriate level through joint air operations arrangements. The commander designated to establish and operate the airspace control system will hereafter be described as the Airspace Control Authority of the appropriate level. Representation from other Service components involved will be provided, as appropriate to the airspace control authority.

d. The mission of the airspace control authority, subject to the approval of the joint force commander, is to coordinate, integrate and regulate the use of airspace and the flow of air traffic, and to formulate policies and procedures for the employment of all available means of air traffic regulations. The airspace control authority will operate the airspace control system to accommodate:

- (1) Air defense.
- (2) Block airspace and/or sectors of responsibility needed for operation and control of aerial vehicles organic to each Service.
- (3) Control of aircraft engaged in all types of missions, making maximum use of Service control elements and capabilities.
- (4) Integrating the airspace requirements of all pre-planned aerial operations.
- (5) Assignment of airspace under other than pre-planned operations to accommodate the requirements of all forces.
- (6) Regulation of air traffic so as to preclude interference between various aerial missions.

e. The joint force commander will coordinate air operations within the defined airspace, as necessary, with the commander responsible for airspace control in contiguous areas.

MARINE CORPS POSITION ON AIR CONTROL

## 3. Marine Corps Policies in this matter are:

- a. It is the policy of the CMC that control of Marine Corps Aircraft is exercised through the Marine Corps Air Command and Control System after the passage of control ashore in an amphibious operation and in other tactical environments not involving amphibious operations.
- b. In amphibious operations, control of air operations is a responsibility of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force, who exercises this control prior to the passage of control ashore through his Tactical Air Officer in accordance with the doctrine established in Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (LEM 01).
- c. When a Marine Corps air-ground team is employed ashore following the termination of an amphibious operation, the air element forms an integral portion of the combined arms team, and is under the command of the Marine Corps air-ground team commander. This Marine Air Command and Control System is controlled by the Marine Corps air-ground commander through his Tactical Air Commander in accordance with current doctrine for operations.
- d. Integration of Service tactical air control systems is best effected through the assignment of block airspace and/or sectors of responsibility within which authority for control of aerial vehicles organic to each service and/or belonging to other Services can be delegated. The airspace control system established by the unified/joint force commander will coordinate and integrate the capabilities of the Service airspace control system to effect unity of airspace control effort throughout the unified/joint force combat zone. This is in accordance with the decision indicated in 2c above.
- e. Plans for the employment of a Marine Corps air-ground organization will provide for a sector of responsibility to be assigned to the Marine Corps force within which the Marine Corps Commander will exercise control of all air operations.



II

CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS

as prepared by

COMMANDER

SEVENTH AIR FORCE

PART II

INDEX TO BLUE TABS

- A. General MOMYER's memo to CG III MAF dtd 22Feb68
- B. General WESTMORELAND's memo to CG III MAF  
Subj: Air Control Coordination
- C. Part I: Organization and Command Relations
- D. Part II: Pre-Planned Requests
- E. Part III: Daily Frag Order
- F. Part IV: Immediate Request
- G. Part V: Control and Coordination Procedures
- H. Part VI: Report Procedures
- I. General MOMYER's memo to General WESTMORELAND  
dtd 22Feb68

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



22 Feb 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAF

SUBJECT: Control of Aircraft in I Corps

1. I have asked Col Brett and Col Braswell from my staff to personally carry my plan to your headquarters so they can review with you or your staff the adjustments made as a result of our discussions on 20 Feb 1968. That is the implementing plan I am submitting to Gen Westmoreland as directed. I indicated that I would give you a copy for your comments. Also, a copy of my report of our visit and briefing on 20 Feb 1968 is attached for your reference.
2. When attachments are withdrawn or not attached, the classification of this correspondence is changed to UNCLASSIFIED.

Handwritten signature of William W. Momyer in cursive.

WILLIAM W. MOMYER, General, USAF  
Commander

2 Atch

1. Plan (S) (1 cy)
2. Memo to Gen Westmoreland,  
22 Feb 1968 (S) (1 cy)

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TAB-A-1  
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COMUSMACV

SUBJECT: Air Control Coordination (U)

TO: CG III MAF

1. (S) Because of the increased deployment of Army forces to I Corps area, the concentration of air effort in support of all ground forces being deployed, and the overriding requirement to maintain the flexibility to concentrate this effort as directed by the enemy threat, I have concluded that it is of paramount importance to achieve a single manager for control of tactical air resources. Consequently, I have decided to charge my Deputy Commander for Air with the responsibility for coordinating and directing the air effort throughout Vietnam to include I Corps and the extended battle area. He is responsible for seeing to it that the air effort is applied in the most effective manner in furtherance of the MACV mission.

2. (S) You will make available to my Deputy Commander for Air the following air assets for mission direction:

- a. Strike aircraft.
- b. Reconnaissance aircraft. ✓
- c. Tactical air control system as required.

He will be responsible for fragging and operational direction of these air assets with all other available assets now under his control to meet the daily operational requirements of all forces in I CTZ. Consistent with the tactical situation, Marine aircraft will be fragged by him through the appropriate DASC to support Marine ground units. In the joining together

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GROUP 1  
DOWNGRADED AND DECLASSIFIED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 25 YEARS.

TAB-B.1

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of the two tactical air control systems to insure continuity of control of air operations, the integrity of the Marine tactical control system shall be preserved. Marine helicopters and airlift assets will remain responsive to the direction of the I MAW.

3. (S) I expect you to provide my Deputy Commander for Air with the following:

- a. G-2 and G-3 air representation in the MACV TASE to establish priority of effort between corps. Also, personnel to augment the TACC and appropriate DASCs.
- b. Daily status report of availability of aircraft for fragging.
- c. Mission reports.
- d. Such officers as you see necessary for planning special allied or combined air operations.

4. (S) The attachment reflects the organization of forces in I CTZ and describes air control and coordination arrangements. Additionally, a description of the reporting procedures is included.

Encl  
Air Cont Coord  
Arrangements

WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND  
General, USA  
COMUSMACV

SECRET

Tab B-2

SECRET

## PART I

## ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONS

1. US/ARVN forces in northern I Corps are organized in a provisional Corps (designated Provisional Corps Bravo for present purposes) under command/control of a US Corps Commander (US Army). Included are the following divisions: 101st Airborne, 1st Air Cavalry, 3d Marine, 1st ARVN. The Corps Commander is responsible to CG III MAF, who is overall US Commander in I Corps. Relationship between CG III MAF and CG I Corps (ARVN) remains unchanged.
2. CG III MAF/CG 1st Corps (ARVN) exercise direct command/control over remaining US/ARVN/FWMAF in I Corps, functioning in effect as Corps Commander for these units (1st Marine Division, Americal Division, 2d ARVN Division, 2d ROK Marine Brigade).
3. The DaNang DASC (I DASC), appropriately expanded and with Marine personnel included, will serve as overall coordinating agency for all air support in I CTZ. A combined DASC (designated DASC Bravo) will be formed to coordinate air support of Provisional Corps B and will function under the overall coordinating authority of I DASC while having certain authorizations for control and coordination as subsequently described. Each Marine division will retain its DASC, which will be subordinate to I DASC (1st Mar Div) or DASC B (3d Mar Div).
4. In integrating Marine aviation into the overall control organization, the capabilities of the Marine Tactical Air Control System will be

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Tab C-1

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fully exploited. Coordination of effort will be achieved by the assignment of Marine personnel to the MACV TASE, 7th Air Force TACC, I DASC and DASC Bravo for assistance in tasking and coordinating air activities. ✓

5. Operational direction of tactical air support (strike/recce) in I CTZ will be accomplished through TACC (Saigon). This agency will:

- a. Control all strike and reconnaissance operations in I CTZ. ✓ *King*
- b. Issue daily frag orders for pre-planned missions based on requirements provided by MACV TASE. *Don*
- c. Control air defense operations through the 7AF TACC and TACC (NS).
- d. Control search and rescue operations through the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC) and Regional Control Center at DaNang.
- e. Control all scrambles. ✓ *King*

6. I DASC will be jointly manned by AF, VNAF and 1st MAW personnel and is designated as the primary direct air support center (DASC) for support of CG III MAF. He will exercise divert authority over all pre-planned missions assigned to I Corps. A jointly manned DASC Bravo will be established and designated as a subordinate DASC to provide support for the CG, Provisional Corps Bravo operating in the northern sector of I Corps. DASC Bravo will exercise divert authority over pre-planned

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
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missions assigned to Provisional Corps Bravo. At levels below I DASC and DASC Bravo, the appropriate USAF/Marine control and coordination agencies will function in the normal manner.

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ORGANIZATION


I CORPS



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CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS



\*Senior DASC for Coordination Purposes

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## PART II


## PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS

1. Pre-planned requests originate at the lower levels of command, commencing at Battalion level for US organizations and at Province level for ARVN forces. Requests are sent up the chain of command with each level consolidating the requests and establishing priorities on the requested targets. Specifically, the requests would be dispatched as depicted upon the attached chart.
2. In the case of Provisional Corps B the requests would be consolidated within the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) and sent forward to the CG III MAF/I ARVN Corps CTOC for overall consolidation and the establishment of priorities for the entire I CTZ. The request are then submitted to the MACV Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) for the allocation of strikes. Within the TASE would be Marine representatives (G-2 and G-3 Air), who would participate in overall planning and specifically monitor the requests that originated from Marine units.
3. Once the targets are approved and allocated the TASE would submit them to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), who would assign the targets to appropriate units, establish ordnance loads, and time over targets (TOTs). Marine officers would be assigned and participate in the establishment of the Daily Frag Order. Within the TACC every effort would be made to have Marine aircraft support Marine units. The distribution of the Daily Frag Order is covered in Part III.

**SECRET***Tab D-1*

PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS

STRIKE/RECCE



Tab D-2

**SECRET**

## PART III

## DAILY FRAG ORDER

1. The daily frag order will be prepared by the TACC. The frag order will contain information on control agencies, timing, targets, call signs and ordnance and any pertinent instructions pertaining to mission accomplishment. Marine officers will be assigned to the TACC to participate in frag preparation.
2. As a normal practice, every effort will be made to frag Marine aircraft against Marine requests. Under emergency situations or as the situation dictates Marine/USAF/ARVN aircraft can be diverted to any unit within C/G III MAF/I ARVN Corps area of responsibility under the immediate request system.
3. Upon completion the daily frag order will be dispatched first in the form of a warning order to all pertinent agencies by voice and then by message. The attached chart depicts the distribution of the daily frag order.
4. Pertinent portions of the daily frag orders would be distributed to all agencies responsible for Strike/Recce aircraft control, to include wings, groups, separate USAF squadrons, CRC/CRP/TAOC sites, ABCCC, Tactical Air Support Squadrons (TASS) and MSQ/TPQ sites. The frag order for all Marine units would be forwarded to the 1st MAW TADC. I DASC would receive the entire frag for I CTZ and

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DASC B the frag for Corps B area. Each DASC would in turn transmit to their subordinate control agencies those portions of the frag that affect operations within their areas of responsibility.

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## PART IV


## IMMEDIATE REQUESTS

1. Requests for immediate air support may be relayed from the lowest unit aware of the need.
2. A divert of a preplanned mission normally provides fastest response. Division TACP/MARDASC continue to have authority to divert air support missions fraggd to them.
3. If there are no aircraft available for divert within the division area, division TACP/MARDASC will relay/confirm request for immediate air to I DASC/DASC BRAVO.
4. I DASC, in coordination with the adjacent FSCC, has divert authority for all aircraft fraggd into the I CTZ. DASC B, in coordination with adjacent FSCC, has divert authority for aircraft fraggd to Provisional Corps B. If none available DASC B will request I DASC for divert from other areas. If I DASC has none available, DASC B will go directly to TACC Saigon for divert or scramble. In most cases there will be sufficient aircraft airborne on missions of lower priority to provide ample resources for divers. These will normally provide more rapid response than scramble aircraft. When requirements can not be met by divers from other areas, alert aircraft will be scrambled.
5. MACV-TASE representative will coordinate on TACC scrambles and inter-corps divers.

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IMMEDIATE AIR REQUESTS

STRIKE/RECCE



- NOTES: 1. *1200* is Divert Authority for internal air.  
2. Requests go to DASC Direct where commo permits, intermediate levels monitor, silence means consent.

Tab E-2

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## PART V

## CONTROL AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES

1. CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. The following arrangement will permit maximum use of available agencies and equipment in controlling the increased air activities in I CTZ:

a. Panama CRC (USAF) is designated as the senior airspace controlling agency for airborne aircraft in I CTZ.

b. Waterboy CRP (USAF) will control airborne aircraft in the northern portion of I CTZ (area to be specified) under the overall direction of Panama.

c. Vice Squad TAOC/CRP (USMC) will control airborne aircraft in the southern portion of I CTZ (area to be specified) under the overall direction of Panama.

d. ABCCC will be employed as a controlling agency for special operations when required. When so employed it will serve in effect as an airborne DASC with functions and responsibilities to be as prescribed by TACC Saigon.

2. MSQ/TPQ-10. MSQ and TPQ-10 procedures will remain essentially the same. Sites will be fraggd each day for pre-planned strikes by TACC, based upon pre-planned requests and anticipated weather conditions. Airborne aircraft will continue to be passed to the MSQ/TPQ controllers through the appropriate CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. Immediate strikes will be handled in a similar manner as pre-planned with aircraft receiving target information and controlling agency after becoming airborne. MSQ/TPQ will receive target location and flight mission information from either the requesting DASC

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or TACC.

3. Coordination of Naval Gunfire and Ground Artillery. A comparable and compatible system exists between the US Army/USAF and the Marines.

Naval gunfire and ground artillery would be controlled and coordinated between the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) and the DASC at Division level and above, and between the FSCC or FSC (Fire Support Coordinator) and the TACP/ALO at subordinate levels. At each level the information will be passed up and down the chain of command, with the DASC/TACP informing appropriate CRC/CRP/TAO/ABCCC and FAC aircraft operating in the area with the intent that all aircraft will be informed as to location, direction and altitude of fire.

To suppress fire for the placement of strikes coordination will be effected between the FSCC/DASC and FSC/TACP dependent upon the operating level. With respect to pre-planned ground or naval gunfire, such information will be contained within daily frag orders issued to all appropriate agencies.

4. Control Communications. Seventh AF in cooperation with III MAF will identify additional communications requirements for responsive operational coordination of air operations.

5. Airlift. Not affected by this arrangement. Requests for airlift will be handled in accordance with current procedures.

6. Strike/Recce Control Procedures. No significant changes are indicated in the launch and airborne control procedures from the viewpoint of aircrews. Unit operations centers (TUOC/TADC) will be informed directly by the TACC, appropriate DASC or the Daily Frag Order the time of launch, controlling

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agencies and when possible target type and location. After launch aircraft will contact the local controlling agency (CRC/CRP/TAOC) for flight following and monitoring into the target area; initial and subsequent agencies have the capability to pass divert information when required. CRC/CRP/TAOC will pass aircraft to the designated strike control agency, which can be either a FAC for visual strikes or a MSQ/TPQ site for radar drop.

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## PART VI

## REPORT PROCEDURES

1. Timely intelligence, operations data, and mission results are essential to ensure effective direction and control of strike and reconnaissance forces and to facilitate sound decisions with respect to target base adjustments and strike/re-striking timing.
2. Accordingly,
  - a. DASCs will report to 7AF TACC by the most expeditious means in as near to real time as practical Bomb Damage Assessment provided by FACs.
  - b. DASCs, strike, and reconnaissance units will provide: "Hot" Reports of incidents/events not associated with aerial operations when such activities occur in assigned areas of responsibility; Aerial Observation Reports and Intelligence Summaries (DISUM) daily, or more frequently as required; and Ground Fire Incidents as set forth in COMUSMACV Directive 381-34.
  - c. Strike and Reconnaissance units will provide Operational Reports (OPREPS) 1 thru 5 as specified in Enclosure 7 (Operational Reports) to CINCPACINST 005440.1E, or Pacific Air Forces Manual 55-3 (Commanders Operational Reports) as applicable.
  - d. Staff intelligence agencies, or reconnaissance units as may be appropriate, will provide IPIRS, CPIRS, SUPIRS and other applicable sensor, or imagery, interpretation reports for all reconnaissance performed.
3. Reports enumerated in sub paras b-d above, will be transmitted electrically by IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence as appropriate, and will include DEP-COMUSMACV/AIR (7AF - TACC) as an action addressee.

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22 Feb 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND

SUBJECT: Control of Aircraft in I Corps (U)

1. (S) In response to your 191147Z Feb 1968 directive to me, I met with Lt Gen Cushman and selected members of his staff at Da Nang on 20 Feb 1968. Lt Gen Cushman and I agreed that your directive required me to develop the best possible arrangement that made me responsible for all air operations in South Vietnam including I Corps. As Commander, Seventh Air Force, I was the single airman you could turn to for the success or failure of air operations. The question was not whether there should be one man responsible for all air operations but how best to accomplish this arrangement while preserving the principal of Marine air units supporting Marine ground units whenever the tactical situation permitted.
2. (S) Gen Cushman first provided a briefing of the current arrangements in III MAF for the control of air around Khe Sanh. Procedures for the use of the tactical control system of the Marines were covered, and the control zones were reflected where positive control of air strikes was required. Outside of two zones of control was a third zone which 7AF strikes could use as a free zone without consulting anybody.
3. (S) I then opened the Seventh Air Force briefing by pointing out the new structure of an Army Provisional Corps which was being finalized. I also stated that our briefing would show how the air effort could be employed to enhance the mission of Gen Cushman without degrading any of his other firepower. The 7AF briefing was then presented which first reflected how we were currently organized to support the Army in each of the other corps areas. The corresponding organizations of the Marine system were pointed out during this presentation.
4. (S) The major interest of the audience was in the charts reflecting the organization of I Corps North and I Corps South. The structure above corps level was not reflected as I did not believe it would make any difference. The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) was joint in both I Corps North and I Corps South. I Corps North DASC was to be a new one with the elements already in being in MACV Advance. The

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 Year Intervals:  
Declassified 12 Years**SECRET**

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Provisional Corps in the northern two provinces was reflected as being operational about 1 Mar 1968. The DASC of I Corps South would be an expansion of the existing I DASC by augmentation from the Seventh Air Force and the Marines. Gen Cushman clarified his position to be that of an equivalent Field Army Commander with operational control of the Provisional Corps plus two and 1/2 separate divisions reporting direct to him with no intervening corps headquarters.

5. (S) I indicated that this organization in I Corps placed him on the level with I Corps (ARVN) as far as operational control over a geographical area was concerned and that the DASC could be established at that level with Marine air, US Air Force, and VNAF representation. This would not affect our air support system. Within the Provisional Corps it would be necessary to consolidate the requests for air support from the individual divisions and establish overall Corps priority for air support. These requests would then be sent to I DASC which would perform the function of consolidating for Gen Cushman the requirements of the provisional corps as well as the 2-1/2 divisions. After Gen Cushman made the decision as to how the total corps area effort would be allocated it would go to the MACV, TASE in Headquarters Seventh Air Force. It was explained that the TASE is an element of your office to decide on the relative priority among all the ground units throughout SVN for air support. It was your day to day policy to reflect where the major effort would go. The Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) would then pass these priorities over to the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) where the sorties would be fraggged to the flying units.

6. (S) Maj Gen Anderson, CG I MAF, then asked what his headquarters would do. I said Seventh Air Force could frag the flying units direct, or for the Marine units the daily fragmentary operations order could go to him for appropriate distribution. Gen Anderson was advised that the Seventh Air Force Headquarters would require the status of his units on a daily basis and that the Marine representation would be available to frag sorties and loads on a preplanned or immediate basis as allocated.

7. (S) Lt Gen Cushman said he did not want his resources going to Seventh Air Force to be thrown in with Army requirements. I covered again that Gen Cushman with his overall III MAF hat on submitted his requirements for US Army and US Marine units to MACV TASE where

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Gen Westmoreland made the overall review concerning the allocation of air resources, and that Seventh Air Force only carried out the policy by controlling the air in executing the support requirement. Maj Gen Anderson was concerned that this procedure would take his helicopter support away. I pointed out this was not the case. If he had a number of missions requiring this support, it would be an expressed requirement on a preplanned priority basis when it was submitted to TASE. Seventh Air Force would then frag him for the mission with available Marine air. If Marine air were not available due to other Marine priorities, then an Air Force fighter unit would be fragged for the mission.

8. (S) We then briefed from the charts how the immediate or alert sorties would be controlled. It was pointed out that Seventh Air Force TACC normally diverted sorties to an immediate target. In an emergency the I DASC could divert sorties. If we were using the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), the divert action could be handled by it. The discussion then reviewed the case that air divers were quicker but may not have the precise ordnance load required. On balance it was also brought out that the ground alert aircraft at nearby air bases possibly with a better ordnance load could be used, if the time was available. This then provided the flexibility of the force to meet a changing situation.

9. (S) Lt Gen Cushman said he wouldn't accept any arrangement that limited his artillery or organic weapons. On the contrary, the proposal I was making recognized the full authority of the ground commander to call for whatever weapon he wanted on the target. I would hope that his air advisor would convince him that when a suitable target for air was available, air would be requested over other weapons. In the final analysis, however, this was his decision. We then reviewed the location and relationship of the Army and Marines Fire Support Coordination Center and the Fire Support Coordinates.

10. (S) Lt Gen Cushman contended that centralized direction and control of strike and reconnaissance resources would dilute the number of sorties available for the support of each Marine battalion and that he would find himself fighting to get his own aircraft back if they were centrally controlled. I indicated that, to the contrary, in his new position only through the single theater agency responsible for coordinating and directing all air forces could the mass effect of Tactical Air, Navy, Marine, and B-52s be brought to bear on one or more objective areas in direct support

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Tab-3





III

EXTRACTED QUESTIONS FROM CG FMFPAC  
MESSAGE 172259Z JAN68

- A. Just what benefits to the war effort do you foresee coming out of breaking up the tested Marine Air/Ground team?
- B. What exactly are the authorities which you contemplate 7thAF would exercise over 1st MAW?
- C. Outline how the tactical air control mechanism would work under your concept. Would you plan to augment the 7thAF I Corps DASC? How, and for what purpose? In what respect would centralizing control in Saigon be superior to the system now employed in III MAF? Just how would the impending DMZ battle be influenced to our advantage under your scheme?
- D. Specifically, assuming we maintain our air control system as it is now operating....but under your operational control.... where would approval be granted for each air request?
- E. This is not the first big battle we have had. Last May, we had a battle at Khe Sanh where in 1004 sorties we dropped 1502 tons of ordnance in close air support. The ground part of our team said that the close air support of 1st MAW was the decisive factor. How do you propose to improve on this?
- F. What advantages do you see to a III MAF requirement to place its requests for air support to 7th AF? What 7thAF resources are you planning to commit to support ICTZ?
- G. Who, in your scheme, would make the decisions concerning the allocation and employment of air in support of the Marine ground forces in combat? Would you expect the support to be more timely as a result? In this regard, study by the JCS in 1966 showed Marine average response times to be approximately 33 minutes, as opposed to 38 minutes for USAF Air....if you are given operational control of Marine Air do you believe it will improve our responsiveness?
- H. Have there been any observed deficiencies in the amount of air support or control associated with your support of the Americal Division that could have been corrected by your having operational control of the 1st MAW?
- I. Marine air assets in RVN are predicated on precise requirements to support in-country infantry battalions....daily sorties in excess of these requirements are allotted to 7th AF now. Under your scheme, do you envision a greater diversion of Marine Air to tasks other than support of Marine operations than at present? If you do, how can air support in the critical DMZ battle in prospect possibly be improved by a shift in operational control?

J. Marine DASCS presently are co/located with FSCC's at Division level, or in special operations, at lower levels.... USAF DASC co/located with Army counterparts only at Corps level ....do you envision a change in our existing air control structure if you are given operational control of USMC air? If so, how would you propose to accomplish fire support coordination? How would it be better?

K. If you take over operational control of the Marine Air, it seems inevitable that an additional layer must be added to approval channels for air requests. How can this fail to degrade in responsiveness?



**TOP SECRET NOFORN**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (MACAF)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307REPLY TO  
ATTN: OPI

SUBJECT: Durango City (U)

8 JAN 1968

TO: COMUSMACV

1. (TS) I have reviewed the MACV Durango City Initiating Directive and the basic plan draft. I am convinced that if this operation is to be a success, additional guidance must be given the planning group at Okinawa. I cannot concur with this effort when I foresee that there might possibly be insufficient forces and a definite lack of proper control.

2. (TS) The objective established for this operation is certainly larger than the initial planning group realized. It constitutes a major incursion into enemy territory where he is better equipped and has far more fire power than in SVN. He will certainly have much greater motivation to fight.

a. MACV Intelligence estimates that there are approximately 30,000 enemy troops now in the proposed objective area. Additional sizeable reinforcements could reach the area by the time of the landing if the enemy has any idea that the D-4 preparatory fires are a signal of our intentions. This contrasts with the proposed total of 30,000 friendly combatant troops.

b. We must recognize that this is not just an amphibious operation. It is just as much an airborne/airmobile assault; all with the goal of linking with forces already on land. In this regard I am deeply concerned over the airborne/airmobile assault landing in the middle of the enemy force area. This will be a more difficult ground and air task than the amphibious operation. These units will have to fight a longer distance, over more difficult terrain, and be exposed on the flank and rear all the way.

c. The preponderance of the ground forces in the objective area will therefore be Army and ARVN. This will require a tremendous airlift effort with more Air Force and Army units involved and in reserve than originally envisioned. Since the preponderance of ground effort will be by the U. S. Army, the Joint Land Force should be commanded by an Army general.

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Page 1 of 5 Pages

MACV TS 000 00167

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DOD DIR 5200.10

93-TS-104-68

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**TOP SECRET NOFORN**

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3. (TS) The risk associated with this operation demands that we adhere to the established and proven joint doctrine for Amphibious Operations and for Airborne Operations. When the amphibious landing is complete and the Joint Land Force Commander is established ashore and assumes responsibility for subsequent operations in accordance with paragraph 113 of the Joint Doctrine For Amphibious Operations, the amphibious operation is over. The amphibious force will then have to join the airborne/airmobile forces and enter into classic land battle. The fact is that the objective area is at that point no longer an amphibious assault area, but a land battle area no different than those previously defined for MACV campaigns.

a. For this particular operation I do not question the right of the Joint Amphibious Task Force Commander to control the air over the fleet and over the beach. However, when the Joint Landing Force Commander is no longer afloat he should become the Eastern Land Force Commander under the airborne/airmobile Army commander. The joint doctrine clearly applies for the subordination of the air effort over the Eastern Land Force to the continuing larger air effort which must be controlled and coordinated with the air approaches and necessary adjacent aerial interdiction. Paragraph 280 of the doctrine states:

"a. For the amphibious assault operation, the joint force commander who orders the operation will assign to the amphibious task force commander for airspace control an airspace of defined proportions which will include the amphibious objective area.

b. All air operations in the amphibious objective area will be under the control of the amphibious task force commander until the amphibious operation is terminated.

c. To ensure unity of effort in overall air operations, the amphibious task force commander will coordinate air operations within the defined airspace as necessary, with the commander responsible for airspace control in the surrounding area. At the termination of the amphibious assault operation, the amphibious task force will be dissolved, the assigned airspace will be disestablished, and the airspace control will normally be exercised in accordance with doctrine for control of airspace over the combat zone by the airspace control authority designated for that area."

d. The next force to be assigned to the objective area will therefore be... with more...

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**TOP SECRET NOFORN**

It is prima facie that I am designated as the Air Commander for the area and TACC Saigon has and will continue to have the capability for the air-space control.

b. This established doctrine has grown from the joint experience at Normandy and Inchon. These were truly joint efforts with the Air Force controlling the air. In contrast, Operation Hickory had serious coordination problems. The system had no flexibility for employing available air resources in interdiction areas adjacent to the very limited land area. The Marines required considerable Air Force assistance during this operation. Many Air Force strike aircraft returned to base with ordnance, and FAC and strike flights were continually concerned with the possibility of mid-air-collisions and short rounds. The lesson learned again was that there must be a central control authority for not only the objective area, but the air approaches and exposed flank areas as well.

4. (TS) Joint campaign planning attempts to foresee such problems as these and provides for the necessary controls to avoid them. This is exactly why the Air Force Component Commander has been constituted; to control and direct the air operations over the land battle area. MACV Directive 95-4 in paragraph 4a states:

"a. Commander, 7th Air Force, in his capacity as MACV Air Force Component Commander, acts as coordinating authority for all US/FWMAF air operations and Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) activities in the MACV area of responsibility."

5. (TS) As your Deputy for Air Operations I am, of course, primarily concerned with the success of the air effort. I feel we must utilize our total air capability to the maximum. For the same reason that Marine air should provide close air support for the landing and their forces in combat in this particular case, 7th Air Force should be designated for command and control of tactical air resources supporting the Army/ARVN troops. As I stated in the planning for Operation York, the most important fact is that the Army/ARVN forces involved have worked consistently with 7th Air Force with the result that all concerned have developed most effective teamwork based on familiarity, rapport, and full understanding of mutual capabilities. Success achieved with the Americal Division confirms the value of maintaining established air support relationships regardless of operating area.

**TOP SECRET NOFORN**

**TOP SECRET - NOFORN**

The Joint Army/Air Force Doctrine for Airborne Operations states in Chapter 2:

"2-1a. The conduct of joint airborne operations requires that the efforts of participating forces be properly coordinated and integrated to achieve a common objective. These requisites are accomplished through joint forces command arrangements which are prescribed by law and DOD and JCS directives.

2-2b. Joint Airborne Task Forces (JTF). Tactical air forces or elements may be assigned as a part of an Air Force component command of a joint task force. When assigned to a joint task force, all Air Force forces or elements are placed under the command of the Air Force component commander."

6. (TS) 7th Air Force will provide all of its forces necessary for successful execution of this operation. This will consist of the necessary strike aircraft, a unique major airlift effort, the majority of forward air controllers, elint and tactical electronic warfare aircraft, psychological operations, continued and increased reconnaissance, adjacent interdiction strikes, and continued air defenses over Vietnam to include the assault area. Aro Light sorties will be an essential Air Force tactical air ingredient.

7. (TS) With regard to the matter of overall authority for air control for the objective area after the landing has been made, the Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations states in paragraph 226b:

"When the preponderance of tactical aviation is provided by the Air Force for the assault phase of an amphibious operation, an Air Force officer will be designated by the Air Force commander of the participating Air Force forces to direct the total air effort in the amphibious objective area. He will exercise such direction under the joint amphibious task force commander or when control of air operations is passed ashore, under the landing force commander or an appropriate commander ashore who has the capability to control such operations."

**TOP SECRET - NOFORN**

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN~~

a. The objective area, as I stated above, is more than an amphibious area. The doctrinal point is that I am already the appropriate commander and TACC Saigon has and exercises control capability. The obvious need to continue a unified airspace control effort is the only way to insure that the enemy air threat to this operation could not reach its goal. The speed and sophistication needed will not allow air defense fragmentation. I cannot relinquish the air defense responsibility you assigned to 7AF in MACV Directive 95-8.

b. Not only will the Air Force provide the predominance of forces needed, it will have to do so to assure success. The task involved requires forces which exceed the Marine and Navy capability for this specific operation if they are to continue their existent responsibilities. The air actions over North Vietnam directed by JCS and the requirements to support FWMAF/RVNAF forces in South Vietnam must be continued during this exercise by the Air Force, Marines, and Navy.

8. (TS) In summary, although I agree that we should not be a slave to doctrine, the scope and complexity of Durango City demands the use of proven procedures and capabilities if confusion and resultant higher losses are to be avoided. I strongly believe that the joint doctrine derived from our successful experience of the past must be followed. As your Deputy for Air Operations I recommend that the MACV Initiating Directive be amended to direct that planning be accomplished in accordance with the established concepts.


*William W. Momyer*  
WILLIAM W. MOMYER, General, USAF  
Commander

Revised air report to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN~~

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DOD-DIR 9300.10



B-371R

## MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF


FOR: CG

Best copy of D/S that  
 accompanied msg of COMUS  
 MACV telling 7th Air Force  
 & MAF to get together  
 (Gen's Jackson & Blood  
 meeting).

It appears to me that  
 the 7th Air Force has not  
 convinced MACV that the  
 Air Force view is 100%  
 correct. Negotiation appears  
 to be possible. We should  
 attempt to work out an  
 arrangement that is best for  
 the support of the ground forces  
 involved, regardless of our  
 -over-

prejudices or present modes  
of practice.

J. Leary  
Edison



IN: 07.20 10 JAN 68  
CH: 1200 11 JAN 68

## DISPOSITION FORM TOP SECRET LIMDIS NOFORN

(AR 340-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT
MACPG	Operation DURANGO CITY (U)

TO Chief of Staff FROM ACoS, J3 DATE 8 JAN 1968 CMT 1  
COL WATERS/ree/2962

1. (U) PURPOSE:

a. To transmit a message to CDR 7th AF and CG III MAF requesting the development of a joint integrated air control plan to support Operation DURANGO CITY.

b. To transmit a message to CINCPAC requesting a 15 day extension for the submission of the COMUSMACV Operation Plan DURANGO CITY.

2. (TS) DISCUSSION:

a. The COMUSMACV Initiating Directive of 16 Dec, established the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) (Tab C).

b. Tactical air operations in the AOA are to be controlled by the Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force (CJATF) through his Tactical Air Commander (Tab D). The CJATF has designated the CG 1st MAW as his TAC for the amphibious operation (Tab E).

c. CG III MAF in issuing planning guidance to the SJLF planning group envisioned the CG 1st MAW retaining control of the air space over the Objective Area after control was passed ashore (Tab F).

d. The concept of the CG 1st MAW retaining control of the air space was acceptable to the MACV Planning Group and in consonance with the concept of operations.

e. CDR 7th AF has proposed a re-examination of Operation DURANGO CITY to include ground and air operations (Tab G).

f. The MACV Planning Group was directed to conduct a detailed review of the CDR 7th AF ltr and the concept of operations for DURANGO CITY. The findings indicate that the command relationships as currently established for the ground combat forces are valid and vital in ensuring a successful ground offensive in enemy territory. The control of air space subsequent to the termination of the amphibious operation requires a closer detailed examination by the major commands directly concerned.

g. To ensure optimum support of the ground forces by all tactical air elements the development of a joint integrated air operations plan is considered necessary.

WORKING PAPER  
NOT UNDER CONTROL  
DATE 11 JAN 68  
EFFECTIVE FOR 60 DAYS

Approved/Disapproved  
By COMUSMACV

Date 11 JAN 1968

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

TOP SECRET LIMDIS NOFORN

DA FORM 2496  
1 FEB 62REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE  
ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.

FPC-Japan

TOP SECRET LINDIS NOFORN

9 JAN 1968

MACPG

SUBJECT: Operation DURANGO CITY (U)

h. The possible shift of responsibility for development of the air operations plan necessitates the request for a 15 day extension of the current 1 Feb suspense date established by CINCPAC for submission of the MACV plan.

3. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That the message at Tab A be approved, signed and dispatched.
- b. That the message at Tab B be approved, signed and dispatched.

Incls  
as

*W. Pearson*  
WILLARD PEARSON  
MG, USA  
ACofS, J3

Msg released by CHIEF OF STAFF  
at 1210 hrs, on 11 JAN 1968

SJS Policy Branch  
*4/11*

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET LINDIS NOFORN



19 Jan. 1966

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Consolidation of air support resources in I Corps

1. Upon completion of his up-dating with the III MAF staff this afternoon, General Westmoreland met with LtGen Cushman, MGen Murray, MGen Anderson and BGen Anderson to discuss the question of consolidating air support in I Corps under 7th AF. More specifically, the subject was the placing of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing under OPCON of 7th AF.

2. a. General Westmoreland stated that existing procedures for air support in I Corps are presently cumbersome and less responsive than they should be. He stated that he suspected we pay a 10% overhead as the price for having two air systems in I Corps. He suggested that we should consolidate the Army/Air Force DASC at I Corps Headquarters with the TADC of the FMAW in order that there be a single agency through which air support for I Corps units can be requested and a single system through which air support can be controlled. He expressed concern over the question of adequate air support for the First CavDiv (Air Mobile), an Army conclave within a Marine Controlled area for air support.

b. To these thoughts the Marines present responded to the effect that the present request system whereby Marines go through one chain and Army units through another has been working very well for many months and will project no new problems in the future. 7th AF is charged with providing air support for Army units and does so. Similarly, FMAW is charged with providing air support for Marine Controlled units and does so. It is extremely doubtful whether any melding of these request and control systems would enhance the responsiveness of either source of air sorties.

c. General Westmoreland then went on to the problem of utilizing air force assets in support of Marine controlled units, suggesting that under present arrangements there was a rigidity which made it impossible or very difficult for Air Force aircraft to support ground Marines. He invoked the example of a Marine ground unit in the Khe Sanh area that could more quickly get air support from Air Force aircraft present in Laos than from Marine aircraft some distance away in I Corps.

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d. The response to this point was by example, utilizing the case of operation Neutralize wherein some 30 sorties a day were applied by 7th AF to 3d MarDiv requirements along the DMZ. It was stated that existing liaison arrangements between the Dong Ha DASC and 7th AF ABCCC can instantly divert aircraft either in pursuit of 7th AF responsibilities or conversely in pursuit of FMAW responsibilities. It was further pointed out that during the standard day, 8 or 10 Navy sorties and 10 to 15 Air Force sorties were controlled against 3d MarDiv targets by our air support radar teams along the DMZ. The existing system, by these examples, is demonstrated to be flexible, in the application and responsiveness of air power.

3. General Westmoreland carefully made it clear that he had no intention of taking any air support away from the Marines, that his only objective was to insure that the Marines get all the support in his power to give. It was pointed out in response, that the present system provided the capability of meeting this requirement. Upon determination that III MAF air resources were inadequate at a particular moment, COMUSMACV can then direct 7th AF to furnish the required augmentation to the designated Marine control agency at the proper time. It was also pointed out that the reverse is possible wherein the FMAW directs aircraft to report to Air Force control agencies for Tally Ho and Steel Tiger missions is equally possible.

4. It was the feeling of the Marine Officers present that General Westmoreland is perplexed by the air situation in I Corps and that he has been led to doubt the effectiveness of it. He finds difficulty visualizing a more effective arrangement than one in which the commander can hold a single individual responsible for all air operations. In other words he thinks in terms of ground and air operations rather than combined operations.


5. Finally General Westmoreland asked all to take an objective, dispassionate view of this problem, even going so far as to suggest that the Marine Corps take over the air requests and air control functions for all units operating in I Corps, Army, Vietnamese, Korean and U. S. Marine Corps. This proposal was rejected by the Marines present for the reason that should we consent to this concept the logical rejoinder would be, "If you like it for I Corps you should like it for all of South Vietnam, so we will give centralized control to my Air Deputy, Commander, 7th AF".




VII

I CORPS ORGANIZATION

I CORPS NORTH



I CORPS SOUTH



\* Senior Advisor to ARVN I Corps Commander

SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF SERVICE AND PERSON ASSETS

*Handwritten notes:*  
JCS  
300  
File

*Handwritten:* Ref

INDY CINCPAC 2100-26 (4-67)  
MESSAGE UNDER CINCPAC SSO CONTROL

O 040044Z ZFF1 *A565*  
FM GENERAL WHEELER CJCS  
TO ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC

**SECRET**

**SECRET EYES ONLY**

JCS 02517 MAR 68.

**EYES ONLY**

REF: YOUR 030735Z MARCH,

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACAIR ASSETS IN SVN

I APPRECIATE AND SUPPORT THE TIMELY AND DECISIVE ACTION YOU TOOK ON WESTY'S PROPOSAL. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE NEW CONTROL/COORDINATION SYSTEM WILL ASSIST IN ASSURING MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF AIR RESOURCES IN-COUNTRY, AND CERTAINLY I FULLY SHARE WITH YOU AND WESTY THIS OBJECTIVE. I SHALL BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING HOW WELL THIS NEW SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AFTER A REASONABLE SHAKEDOWN PERIOD. WARM REGARDS.

MAR 68 1:38 Z

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

CINCPAC SSO COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY—INCOMING

*Handwritten signature:* [Signature]

EXEC J01	F/LT J02	C/S J01	DEP C/S J02	DEP C/S J03	PA	JT SEC J04	PERS J1	INT J2	OPS J3	LOG J4	PLN J5	C&E J6	PEG J71	COMP J72	LEGL J73	PIO J74	PROT J75	MED J76	J2P	EAO	B/S	JRC	OPR	MDC	J02C	DDR & E ADV	SSO J25	
X	Y		X	X	Y				Y	A		X	X															

CY. NR.

*Handwritten:* 4

DTG

*Handwritten:* 040044Z



COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC  
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96610

SECRET

3

Ser: GU495

2 MAR 1968

SECRET

From: Commander in Chief Pacific  
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
Subj: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets (U)  
Ref: (a) MACJOO ltr, dated 26 Feb 1968

1. The enclosure to subject letter has been reviewed and I am in general agreement with the proposed management arrangements of subject assets in I Corps. My major concern is that I DASC have alert aircraft assigned for emergency use to include authority to scramble these aircraft immediately keeping the TACC appropriately informed. This is along with certain other changes desired which are as follows:

a. Add to paragraph 1 of enclosure (1):

".... the MACV mission, and that it is apportioned equitably in accordance with the situation and on a timely basis to all units in I Corps."

b. Add to paragraph 2 of enclosure (1):

"In recognition of the fact that Marine Corps air assets will be employed under these arrangements in a manner different from that previously intended by the CG III MAF, I desire to be informed directly by CG III MAF on proposed improvements in the system or in event of his dissatisfaction with the employment of Marine Corps air assets. CINCPAC will be made an information addressee on any communication to COMUSMACV in either case."

c. Change subparagraph 5e of Part I to enclosure (1) to read:

"e. Control all scrambles except for emergency scrambles which may be ordered by I DASC and DASC B for air units located in I CTZ."

Reason: To affirm the scramble authority of I DASC.

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d. Change the second sentence of paragraph 6 to Part I of enclosure (1) to read:

"I DASC He will exercise divert authority over all pre-planned missions assigned to I Corps and will coordinate in each case with TACC (Saigon) those scramble sorties allocated for troops in contact."

Reason: To ensure that TACC (Saigon) is kept informed.

e. Change second sentence of paragraph 2 of Part III to enclosure (1) to read:

"Under emergency situations.. Marine/USAF/VNAF aircraft... within CG III MAF....."

Reason: Accuracy.

f. Part IV, paragraph 4, change as follows:

"...If none available DASC B will request I DASC for divert from other areas. I DASC will divert or scramble alert aircraft as feasible. If I DASC has none available, DASC B it will go directly to TACC Saigon for divert or scramble."

g. Change chart labelled IMMEDIATE AIR REQUESTS STRIKE/ RECCE Part IV, page 10, enclosure (1) as follows:

"(1) Add a dotted line between box labelled I DASC and line connecting TUOC, MARTADC and CRC. Title dotted line, "SCRAMBLE (AS ALLOCATED)."

(2) Delete line from DASC BRAVO to TACC, adding it between DASC B and I DASC."

Reason: To reflect I DASC scramble authority and communication channels.

2. Subject to incorporation of the changes in paragraph 2 above, I concur in the reorganization proposed.

U. S. G. SHARP

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26 FEB 1968


MACJOO

SUBJECT: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets (U)

TO: Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp  
 Commander in Chief, Pacific  
 FPO 96553

1. (U) Reference: Secret Message MAC 02365, 191239Z Feb 68.
2. (S) In accordance with my instructions, General Momyer visited III MAF on 20 February 1968 and briefed Lieutenant General Cushman on his plan for control and coordination of the air assets in the First Corps Tactical Zone, less helicopters and transport aircraft. A follow-up briefing was conducted by members of General Momyer's staff on 22 February 1968 to brief in greater detail the arrangements for control and coordination of air assets, as they pertain to the establishment of Provisional Corps, Vietnam, under the tactical control of LTG Cushman. In this capacity, LTG Cushman would be serving at the field army level.
3. (U) LTG Cushman's subsequent comments have been considered in the preparation of the directive I would send him. This directive is inclosed, together with an attachment describing the air control and coordination arrangements to be implemented.
4. (S) Your agreement is requested as soon as possible, as I desire to reorganize on an urgent basis in order to be fully operational when the battle of I Corps North reaches its maximum intensity and upon the activation of Provisional Corps, Vietnam.
5. (U) I am sending immediately to your headquarters Major General Elcod as MACV and Seventh Air Force representative to discuss this organization and control arrangements with you and your staff.

1 Incl  
 as



Signed  
 W. C. WESTMORELAND  
 General, United States Army  
 Commanding

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DDY DRS 30610

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

MACJOO

SUBJECT: Single Management of Fighter Bomber and Reconnaissance Assets (U)

TO: Commanding General  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO 96602

*as - 7* *↑* *Handwritten*

1. (S) Because of the increased deployment of Army forces to I Corps area, the concentration of air effort in support of all ground forces being deployed, and the overriding requirement to maintain the flexibility to concentrate this effort as directed by the enemy threat, I have concluded that it is of paramount importance to achieve a single manager for control of tactical air resources. Consequently, I have decided to charge my Deputy Commander for Air Operations with the responsibility for coordinating and directing the air effort throughout Vietnam, to include I Corps and the extended battle area. He is responsible for seeing to it that the air effort is applied in the most effective manner in furtherance of the MACV mission.

2. (S) You will make available to my Deputy Commander for Air Operations the following air assets for mission direction:

- a. Strike aircraft.
- b. Reconnaissance aircraft.
- c. Tactical air control system as required.

3. (S) My Deputy Commander for Air Operations will be responsible for fragging and operational direction of these air assets with all other available assets now under his control to meet the daily operational requirements of forces in I CTZ. Consistent with the tactical situation, Marine aircraft will be fragged through the appropriate DASC to support Marine ground units. In the joining together of the two tactical air control

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ENCLOSURE

SECRET

MACJOO

SUBJECT: Single Management of Fighter Bomber and Reconnaissance Assets (U)

systems to insure continuity of control of air operations, the integrity of the Marine tactical control system shall be preserved. Marine helicopters and airlift assets will not be affected by this directive.

3. (S) I expect you to provide my Deputy Commander for Air Operations with the following:

a. G2 and G3 air representation in the MACV TASE to establish priority of effort between major commands. Also, personnel to augment the TACC and appropriate DASCs (total personnel involved should not exceed ten).

b. Daily status report of availability of aircraft for fraggings in accordance with your established priorities.

c. Mission reports.

d. Such officers as you see necessary for planning special allied or combined air operations.

4. (S) The inclosure reflects the organization of forces in I CTZ and describes air control and coordination arrangements. Additionally, a description of the reporting procedures is included.

1 incl  
AS

W. C. WESTMORELAND  
General, United States Army  
Commanding

## PART I

## ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONS

1. US/ARVN forces in northern I Corps are organized in a provisional Corps (designated Provisional Corps Bravo for present purpose) under command/control of a US Corps Commander (US Army). Included are the following divisions: 101st Airborne, 1st Air Cavalry, 3d Marine, 1st ARVN. The Corps Commander is responsible to CG III MAF, who is overall US Commander in I Corps. Relationship between CG III MAF and CG I Corps (ARVN) remains unchanged. (See Chart pg 4)
2. CG III MAF/CG 1st Corps (ARVN) exercise direct command/control over remaining US/ARVN/FWMAF in I Corps, functioning in effect as Corps Commander for these units (1st Marine Division, Americal Division, 2d ARVN Division, 3d ROK Marine Brigade).
3. The Da Nang DASC (I DASC), appropriately expanded and with Marine personnel included, will serve as overall coordinating agency for all air support in I CTZ. A combined DASC (designated DASC Bravo) will be formed to coordinate air support of Provisional Corps B and will function under the overall coordinating authority of I DASC while having certain authorizations for control and coordination as subsequently described. Each Marine division will retain its DASC, which will be subordinate to I DASC (1st Mar Div) or DASC B (3d Mar Div).
4. In integrating Marine aviation into the overall control organization, the capabilities of the Marine Tactical Air Control System will be

fully exploited. Coordination of effort will be achieved by the assignment of Marine personnel to the MACV TASE, 7th Air Force TACC,

I DASC and DASC Bravo for assistance in tasking and coordinating air activities.

5. Operational direction of tactical air support (strike/recce) in I CTZ will be accomplished through TACC (Saigon). This agency will:

- a. Control all strike and reconnaissance operations in I CTZ.
- b. Issue daily frag orders for pre-planned missions based on requirements provided by MACV TASE.
- c. Control air defense operations through the 7AF TACC and TACC (NS).
- d. Control search and rescue operations through the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC) and Regional Control Center at Da Nang.
- e. Control all scrambles except for emergency scrambles, which may be ordered by I DASC and DASC B for air units located in I CTZ.

6. I DASC will be jointly manned by AF, VNAF and 1st MAF personnel and is designated as the primary direct air support center (DASC) for support of CG III MAF. He will exercise divert authority over all pre-planned missions assigned to I Corps. A jointly manned DASC Bravo will be established and designated as a subordinate DASC to provide support for the CG, Provisional Corps Bravo operating in the northern sector of I Corps. DASC Bravo will exercise divert authority over pre-planned missions assigned to Provisional Corps Bravo. At levels


below I DASC and DASC Bravo, the appropriate USAF/Marine control

and coordination agencies will function in the normal manner.


6. The chart on page 5a shows the current organization of I Corps and is furnished for comparison purposes.

ORGANIZATION

I CORPS



CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS



\*Senior DASC for Coordination Purposes




## PART II

## PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS

1. Pre-planned requests originate at the lower levels of command, commencing at Battalion level for US organizations and at Province level for ARVN forces. Requests are sent up the chain of command with each level consolidating the requests and establishing priorities on the requested targets. Specifically, the requests would be dispatched as depicted upon the attached chart. (See Chart pg 5)
2. In the case of Provisional Corps B the requests would be consolidated within the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) and sent forward to the CG III MAF/ I ARVN Corps CTOC for overall consolidation and the establishment of priorities for the entire I CTZ. The requests are then submitted to the MACV Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) for the allocation of strikes. Within the TASE would be Marine representatives (G-2 and G-3 Air), who would participate in overall planning and specifically monitor the requests that originated from Marine units.
3. Once the targets are approved and allocated the TASE would submit them to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), who would assign the targets to appropriate units, establish ordnance loads, and time over targets (TOTs). Marine officers would be assigned and participate in the establishment of the Daily Frag Order. Within the TACC every effort would be made to have Marine aircraft support Marine units. The distribution of the Daily Frag Order is covered in Part III.

PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS

STRIKE/RECCE



## PART III

## DAILY FRAG ORDER

1. The daily frag order will be prepared by the TACC. The frag order will contain information on control agencies, timing, targets, call signs and ordnance and any pertinent instructions pertaining to mission accomplishment. Marine officers will be assigned to the TACC to participate in frag preparation.
2. As a normal practice, every effort will be made to frag Marine aircraft against Marine requests. Under emergency situations or as the situation dictates Marine/USAF/ARVN aircraft can be diverted to any unit within CT III MAF/I ARVN Corps area of responsibility under the immediate request system.
3. Upon completion the daily frag order will be dispatched first in the form of a warning order to all pertinent agencies by voice and then by message.
4. Pertinent portions of the daily frag orders would be distributed to all agencies responsible for Strike/Recce aircraft control, to include wings, groups, separate USAF squadrons, CRC/CRP/TAOC sites, ABCCC, Tactical Air Support Squadrons (TASS) and MSQ/TPQ sites. The frag order for all Marine units would be forwarded to the 1st MAW TADC. I DASC would receive the entire frag for I CTZ and DASC B the frag for Corps B area. Each DASC would in turn transmit to their subordinate control agencies those portions of the frag that affect operations within their areas of responsibility. (See Chart pg 7)


## PART IV

## IMMEDIATE REQUESTS

1. Requests for immediate air support may be relayed from the lowest unit aware of the need.
2. A divert of a preplanned mission normally provides fastest response. Division TACP/MARDASC continue to have authority to divert air support missions fraggd to them.
3. If there are no aircraft available for divert within the division area, division TACP/MARDASC will relay/confirm request for immediate air to I DASC/DASC BRAVO.
4. I DASC, in coordination with the adjacent FSCC, has divert authority for all aircraft fraggd into the ICTZ. DASC B, in coordination with adjacent FSCC, has divert authority for aircraft fraggd to Provisional Corps B. If none available DASC B will request I DASC for divert from other areas. If I DASC has none available, DASC B will go directly to TACC Saigon for divert or scramble. In most cases there will be sufficient aircraft airborne on missions of lower priority to provide ample resources for divers. These will normally provide more rapid response than scramble aircraft. When requirements can not be met by divers from other areas, alert aircraft will be scrambled.
5. MACV-TASE representative will coordinate on TACC scrambles and inter-corps divers. (See Chart pg 10)

IMMEDIATE AIR REQUESTS

STRIKE/RECCE



- NOTES: 1. ~~I DASC~~ is Divert Authority for internal air.  
 2. Requests go to DASC Direct where comms permits, intermediate levels monitor, silence means consent.

## PART V

## CONTROL AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES

1. CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. The following arrangement will permit maximum use of available agencies and equipment in controlling the increased air activities in I CTZ:
  - a. Panama CRC (USAF) is designated as the senior airspace controlling agency for airborne aircraft in I CTZ.
  - b. Waterboy CRP (USAF) will control airborne aircraft in the northern portion of I CTZ (area to be specified) under the overall direction of Panama
  - c. Vice Squad TAOC/CRP (USMC) will control airborne aircraft in the southern portion of I CTZ (area to be specified) under the overall direction of Panama.
  - d. ABCCC will be employed as a controlling agency for special operations when required. When so employed it will serve in effect as an airborne DASC with functions and responsibilities to be as prescribed by TACC Saigon.
2. MSQ/TPQ-10. MSQ and TPQ-10 procedures will remain essentially the same. Sites will be fragged each day for pre-planned strikes by TACC, based upon pre-planned requests and anticipated weather conditions. Airborne aircraft will continue to be passed to the MSQ/TPQ controllers through the appropriate CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. Immediate strikes

will be handled in a similar manner as pre-planned with aircraft receiving target information and controlling agency after becoming airborne. MSQ/TPQ will receive target location and flight mission information from either the requesting DASC or TACC.

3. Coordination of Naval Gunfire and Ground Artillery. A comparable and compatible system exists between the US Army/USAF and the Marines. Naval gunfire and ground artillery would be controlled and coordinated between the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) and the DASC at Division level and above, and between the FSCC or FSC (Fire Support Coordinator) and the TACP/ALO at subordinate levels. At each level the information will be passed up and down the chain of command, with the DASC/TACP informing appropriate CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC and FAC aircraft operating in the area with the intent that all aircraft will be informed as to location, direction and altitude of fire. To suppress fire for the placement of strikes coordination will be effected between the FSCC/DASC and FSC/TACP dependent upon the operating level. With respect to pre-planned ground or naval gunfire, such information will be contained within daily frag orders issued to all appropriate agencies.

4. Control Communications. Seventh AF in cooperation with III MAF will identify additional communications requirements for responsive operational coordination of air operations.

5. Airlift. Not affected by this arrangement. Requests for airlift will be handled in accordance with current procedures.

6. Strike/Recce Control Procedures. No significant changes are indicated in the launch and airborne control procedures from the viewpoint of aircrews. Unit operations centers (TUOC/TADC) will be informed directly by the TACC, appropriate DASC or the Daily Frag Order as to the time of launch, controlling agencies and, when possible, target type and location. After launch aircraft will contact the local controlling agency (CRC/CRP/TAOC) for flight following and monitoring into the target area; initial and subsequent agencies have the capability to pass divert information when required. CRC/CRP/TAOC will pass aircraft to the designated strike control agency, which can be either a FAC for visual strikes or a MSQ/TRQ site for radar drop.

## PART VI

## REPORT PROCEDURES

1. Timely intelligence, operations data, and mission results are essential to ensure effective direction and control of strike and reconnaissance forces and to facilitate sound decisions with respect to target base adjustments and strike/re-strike timing.

2. Accordingly,

a. DASCs will report to 7AF TACC by the most expeditious means in as near to real time as practical Bomb Damage Assessment provided by FACs.

b. DASCs and strike/reconnaissance units will provide: "Hot"

Reports of incidents/events not associated with aerial operations when such activities occur in assigned areas of responsibility; Aerial Observation Reports and Intelligence Summaries (DISUM) daily, or more frequently as required; and Ground Fire Incidents as set forth in COMUSMACV Directive 381-34.

c. Strike and Reconnaissance units will provide Operational Reports (OPREPS) 1 thru 5 as specified in Enclosure 7 (Operational Reports) to CINCPACINST 005440.1E, or PACAF Manual 55-3 (Commanders Operational Reports) as applicable.

d. Staff intelligence agencies, or reconnaissance units as may be appropriate, will provide IPIRS, OPIRS, SUPIRS and other applicable sensor, or imagery, interpretation reports for all reconnaissance performed.

3. Reports enumerated in sub para b-d above, will be transmitted electrically by IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence as appropriate, and will include DEPCOMUSMACV/AIR (7AF, - TACC) as an action addressee.

SECTION FOUR

5/twm  
9 March 1968

SECRET

C/S MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 16-68

1. On 8 March 1968, General CUSHMAN made mention to General ABRAMS, DEPCOMUSMACV FWD, that as yet, the paper with respect to the Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets, that was to be issued by COMUSMACV, had not yet been received. He also stated that it was his understanding that the procedures outlined in the proposed directive were to take effect on 10 March. General ABRAMS told General CUSHMAN that he would get on the phone right away with General WESTMORELAND to expedite this paper. Today, 9 March, at 1700, by special courier, the document entitled "Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets" was received at this Headquarters. It is interesting to note that the document itself, as signed by General WESTMORELAND, has a date on it of 7 March 1968.

2. With the tremendous requirements for new procedures required to be instituted on 10 March, it is obviously impossible to be able to effect a smooth transition with respect to the Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Management in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

Very respectfully,

E. E. ANDERSON  
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

6/NJA/jrf  
 2 May 1968

FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLYMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets

1. At approximately 1000, 2 May 1968 General Momyer, Commander 7th Air Force; Lieutenant General Rossen, Commander Prov Corps V; Major General Ray Davis, Deputy Commander, PCV; Brigadier General Bolt, Deputy Commander for Operations, 7th Air Force; Colonel Phelps, USA, Director TASE, Saigon; Colonel Henderson, USAF, OIC DASC-V, and I conferred at Headquarters, PCV on the basic subject. Initially the meeting had been scheduled between General Momyer and General Rossen, but because of its implications for the Marine Corps, CG, III MAF directed my presence with the approval of General Westmoreland.
2. General Momyer presided and commenced the discussion by remarking that a review of the Single Management System after 30 days of implementation had been directed for the purpose of determining what flaws existed in the Single Management System and how to correct them. (It should be noted here that his interpretation of this proviso differs from mine in that I would have thought the intent was to review the 30 days to determine whether or not we should continue with Single Management.) At any rate, COMUSMACV has directed an evaluation report be presented to him next Wednesday, 8 May 1968. In this connection, General Momyer indicated that although Single Management went into effect on the 10th of March, the evaluation will cover performances from 1 thru 30 April because full implementation was a gradual matter. As with all new systems, he said, a shakedown period is necessary.
3. General Momyer remarked that Lieutenant General Walt had been asked by General Westmoreland to examine and report to him all air management problems while in the III MAF area. This General Walt did. Further he was asked when he returned to Saigon to see General Momyer on these problems. In response to General Walt's remarks, General Momyer was asked by General Westmoreland to confer with General Rossen to determine what constructive changes might be made. According to General Momyer, General Walt's criticisms were these:
  - a. There is too long a delay in approving pre-planned sorties. This has an adverse effect since things moved much more rapidly before Single Management.
  - b. Munitions delivered are not optimum since there is a high reliance on diverts of aircraft with pre-loaded ordnance.

f/NJA/jrf  
2 May 1968

c. 3d Marine Division is not getting the desired level of effort. It's fewer sorties now are inadequate.

d. Air attacks are not being delivered as close to ground forces as previously because under Single Management, ground FAC's have been replaced with airborne FAC's who are less familiar with the ground situation.

In this respect, it appears to me, General Walt makes reference to the classic Marine Corps System rather than as practiced in Vietnam.

4. General Momyer indicated he had tried to explain to General Walt that the reason for 3d Marine Division shortages was priorities established at PCV. General Rossen replied that this was very true, saying that he weights the main effort within PCV and has given at times 50% of available air to the Cavalry Division, 25% to the 101st Airborne and 25% to the 3d Marine Division. Quite aside from this, however, General Rossen feels that the Marines, having always had more air support, tend today to ask for more than Army units. General Momyer's response was to the effect that he understood there were fewer gunships and less artillery in the Marines so naturally they relied on fixed wing instead.

5. General Rossen cited the Marines' Khe Sanh resupply operation as an example of the importance of fixed wing support. General Momyer appeared sensitive to this coordinated employment of helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. He suggested that we determine the amount of air support needed for direct utilization by the Marines in connection with helicopter operations in order to offset the lack of gunship helicopters. It seemed to me General Rossen also understood this point, stating that PCV as a whole can't complain about the volume of air support, but the Marines do need and do rely on more fixed wing habitually. General Momyer asserted that his proposed modification will alleviate this problem. He would show in 7th Air Force frag a set number of sorties daily reserved for use as escort for helicopters.

6. The subject of diverts was next addressed. It seemed agreed by all, including General Momyer, that pre-planning merely results in placing a certain amount of air effort airborne and available for any use a specific ground commander may wish. It appeared that General Momyer and General Bolt have some intentions of reducing the time delays in the pre-planning process, a weakness which General Rossen emphasized heavily, saying the system is too ponderous but we are trying to make it work. General Momyer agreed that everyone has done a good job so far in trying to make it work.

7. Addressing the subject of suitable ordnance, General Momyer suggested that perhaps a frag modification received about 6 hours prior to TOT might specify the ordnance load to be carried. I indicated that it's my experience that down-loading of ordnance and substituting another is much too wasteful of manpower. A superior solution, I stated, was to have strip alert aircraft pre-loaded with various desired types of ordnance.

6/NJA/jrf  
2 May 1968

8. The discussion continued after General Momyer inquired from all participants if they had any further subjects to offer. Except for a reference made by Colonel Phelps to the desire of the 3d Marine Division for more night TPQ's, there was no constructive thought added.

9. The tenor of this discussion leads me to believe that the Air Force knows it is in some trouble on Single Management and is willing to modify the System, in major respects if necessary, to keep the System in force. There was a stated willingness on the part of General Momyer to adjust in order to correct the disadvantage of long lead time, the disadvantage of improper ordnance, and even the disadvantage of not providing sufficient flexibility for the Marines to plan their support of helicopter operations with practical certainty. I feel 7th Air Force will go to any length to maintain the air control and scheduling authority Single Management gives them. In such an atmosphere of accommodation we will be hard pressed to obtain a reversal of the decision to implement Single Management. Since our objective is to regain the close association of Marine ground and air units and resources which we formerly enjoyed, we should examine with great care the points we make on the 8th of May to insure that we retain the greatest possible impact for later consideration by higher authority.

*Norman J. Anderson*

NORMAN J. ANDERSON  
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

(MCEO)

III MAF Fact Sheet

30 JUL 1968

Subject: Single Management Air AssetsI. GENERAL

A. Operations of the Tet offensive; the entry of two additional Army Divisions into I Corps; inadequate air support by the USAF of Army Units; COMUSMACV concern; 7th AF ambitions to control all air in South Vietnam; and CINCPAC's acquiescence after discussion with the Chairman of JCS; produced the MACV Order of 7 March 1968.

B. COMUSMACV by MACVJOO of 7 March 1968 directed CG III MAF to make available to his deputy commander for air operations for "Mission Direction" all Marine strike and reconnaissance assets and the Marine Tactical Control System as required. A period from 1 to 30 April was selected to test the system. Following the test, III MAF presented the Marine Corps case to COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. The COMUSMACV brief to General WESTMORELAND and CINCPAC was given by the 7th AF. During these briefings it was evident that the Army/Air Force system was cumbersome and slow when compared to the Marine system. Further, it was evident that while Marines were exceeding planned levels of air support, the Air Force was flying far below the JCS planned and supported levels for Army units in South Vietnam.

C. Air Force and Army reactions to the briefings were to propose modifications to correct the obvious deficiencies. CINCPAC directed that III MAF be given opportunity to comment on the modifications. The Air Force changes, scheduled for presentation to Admiral SHARP during his visit to Saigon during May, were rejected by COMUSMACV. The Army proposal, originated in TASE, was approved by General WESTMORELAND over verbal objection by the Air Force. The TASE proposals were put in effect on 1 June 1968. III MAF was not given an opportunity to comment on these changes. The refusal of Deputy SECDEF to support the Marine Corps appeal to reverse Single Management decision was noted by Army action officers at TASE. This was taken by them to mean the end of Marine Corps objections and may have played some part in not soliciting Marine input for the 21 May revisions.

D. The 21 May revisions decreased Air Force control of air support and greatly increased that of the Corps Commanders. The Air Force doctrine, requiring the ground commander to specify targets two days in advance and the air commanders to decide the number of sorties and types of ordnance needed to neutralize targets, was largely overthrown. The Marine system of providing the corps and division commander a stream

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of aircraft for use as he sees fit was adopted. The Air Force was allowed to retain 30% of their previous 100% control over preplanned sorties. The sortie capabilities divided 70% into a weekly standard frag to Corps Commanders as directed by TASE at COMUSMACV, and 30% into a daily pre-planned frag based on the old system of target selection and Air Force allocation of sorties and ordnance.

## II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. The 21 May system is now functioning throughout South Vietnam. It is a great improvement over the original Single Management System and most significantly it is providing Army units more and better air support than at any time in the past. Marine units have not suffered under the system due chiefly to scramble authority at III MAF.

The present system has the following effects:

1. Has greatly improved the quality and quantity of air support to Army units throughout South Vietnam.
2. Has significantly increased Army control over 7th AF and correspondingly reduced control of Tac Air by the Air Force.
3. Has evolved USAF air support towards Marine Corps procedures.
4. Has enabled Marine ground units to receive normal Marine air support through use of scramble and addition authority.

B. At the conclusion of a 30 day evaluation period during the month of June, the following recommendations were submitted to COMUSMACV by CG III MAF for further improvement of the Single Management System:

1. Present air control system be further improved by providing for full coordination of surface supporting arms with tactical air.
2. Marine out-of-country sorties be fragged by TACC consistent with overall interdiction plans.
3. All other Marine strike sorties be fragged by III MAF.
4. Emergency requirements arising outside I Corps be met by COMUSMACV preemption of sorties scheduled in I Corps.
5. III MAF inform COMUSMACV of all Marine sorties scheduled in I Corps. Real Time Reports made to Air Force CRC as sorties are flown.

**SECRET**

6. Air Force sorties supporting forces in I Corps continue as currently directed by COMUSMACV and scheduled by TACC.

7. Initial Point (IP) be eliminated from weekly frag since it is contingent upon suballocation of sorties by III MAF.

8. Consideration be given to replacement of consolidated mission report by information contained in COACT, Marine SPHINX Report and I DASC Divert Reports.

9. MACVJOO of 7 March 1968 be revised to incorporate above refinements to the temporary Single Manager Tactical Air Concept.

C. To date, no action has been taken on the III MAF evaluation of the modified system.

### III. RECOMMENDATION:

A. That Marine efforts to regain "Mission Direction" of Marine aircraft be channeled through evolution of the present Single Management System.

B. That III MAF work within the framework of the existing Single Management System cooperating fully with General ABRAMS and endeavoring to solve problems at the local level.

C. That III MAF adhere to its evaluation of the Modified Single Management System (III MAF 300636Z JUN 68) and continuing efforts be directed toward obtaining approval of the recommendations contained therein.

D. That the system be continually monitored to insure optimum use of Marine tactical air.

Prepared by: Col E. H. FINLAYSON Supplemental data sheet attached

A. Addendum to Fact Sheet: Single Management Air Assets (limited distribution)

SECRET  
(FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY)

III MAF Supplemental Data Sheet

Subj: Single Management Air Assets

ADDENDUM TO FACT SHEET

I. PURPOSE: To provide information on the attitude of 7th Air Force staff members gained through personal staff contacts.

II. EXPLANATION/DATA:

A. 7th Air Force now realizes the severe doctrinal setbacks which they have suffered under Single Management and recognizes that recoupment of lost ground must come through treatment of I Corps as a special case. Certain members of the 7th Air Force Staff have suggested that Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be invited to 7th AF Headquarters for informal discussions. It appears that the next proposal for change to the Single Management System will be originated by the 7th Air Force.

B. Continued inter-staff liaison between 7th Air Force and III MAF/1st MAW Staff Officers may result in a proposal by the 7th Air Force that the III MAF recommendations (III MAF 300636Z JUN 68) to improve the Modified Single Manager System be adopted.

DISTRIBUTION: CMC, CG FMFPAC, C/S, III MAF, CG FMAW

Prepared by: Brigadier General H. W. HISE

HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS  
ROUTING SHEET (5511)  
NAVMC HQ 335a (REV. 7-83)

DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	T8079	SUBJECT	IIIMAF FORC REFUC PL 4 APR-12 JUN 69 BK 1&2	FILE NUMBER	MAF3	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO	01	DATE	0000
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ROUTING Use numbers to show order of routing

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- G - INFORMATION
- H - RETURN TO
- I - INITIAL
- J - DISPOSITION
- K - DECISION
- L - RETENTION
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HQSR-3

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\_\_\_\_\_ UNTIL OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AS DETERMINED ON ANNUAL REVIEW

REQUEST ACTION OFFICER ADVISE RETENTION ABOVE

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER ESTABLISHING DISPOSITION: *R. J. [Signature]* L. Cpl

SECTION: HQSR-3

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ALL PERSONS WHO HANDLE THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT, SIGN AND DATE IN NUMERICAL ORDER BELOW.

RTG	OPR CODE	ADDRESSEES	DATE		INIT
			IN	OUT	
		COMMANDANT CMC			
		MILITARY SECY TO CMC			
		ASSISTANT COMMANDANT APMC			
		MILITARY ASST TO CMC			
		CHIEF OF STAFF CS			
		SECY GEN STAFF			
		DIR SPL PROJ SPJ			
		DC/S AVN A			
		DC/S I&L L			
		DC/S MPR M			
		DIR PERS MGT DIV MM			
		DIR MPR P&P DIV MP			
		DIR PERS PROC DIV MR			
		DC/S PP&O P			
		DIR PLANS DIV PL			
		DIR OPNS DIV PO			
		MCCC POC			
		GRD CBT REQBR POG			
		DC/S RD&S RD			
		DC/S RESAFF RES			
		DC/S R&P RP			
		DC/S TRNG T			
		FD&C FD			
		IGMC IG			
		MED OFF MED			
		DIR C4 SYS DIV CC			
		C4 SYS P&P BRANCH CCP			
		DIR OF INTEL INT			
		DIR JAD JA			
		DIR PA PA			
		LEGIS ASST OLA			
		COUNSEL FOR CMC CL			
		DIR MCH&M HD			
		DIR HQSPT HQS			
		DENT OFF DEN			
		CHAPLAIN REL			
		JOINT CONTROL JC			
		CLASSIFIED FILES HQSR-3			
		ANMCC AJCC			
		AHERS AHERS			

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
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REMARKS (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate "Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments)

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*[Signature]*

Signature Date 1/14/92

#8079

14 FEB 1988

RETURN TO HQSR-3 UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTING

DO NOT DETACH - THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED

ORIGINAL ATTACHED IS