

CCN 246

FILLER _____

DTG 020417Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUS MACV

CG	la
C/S	Q
DCG	M

EYES ONLY

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

#244 burned
2 doul

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2 AND 4 OF 4

COPIES OF GEN ABRAMS MESSAGE 02 0417Z JAN68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME GROUP 020417Z JAN68

TOP SECRET

296

TOP SECRET

NOFORN

0008

JAN 1968

O 020417Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUS MACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN MAC 00037 EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: LTG CUSHMAN CONVERSATION WITH LTG LAM FUTURE
OPERATIONS (U)

1. (TS) OUR INTENTION IS TO RELAX THE NOFORN RESTRICTIONS
ON A PHASED BASIS AT ABOUT D-30 FOR EACH OF THE YORK OPERATIONS.
THIS WILL BE INITIATED AT THE MACV/JGS LEVEL VIA PERSONAL CONTACT
BETWEEN GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN VIEN. [WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT
TO INSURE THAT RVNAF KNOWLEDGE OF YORK OPERATIONS IS KEPT
HIGHLY RESTRICTED.]

2. (TS) YOU SHOULD INFORM LTG LAM THAT YOU INTEND TO
CONSULT WITH COMUSMACV ON THE ASHAU/DOXA PROPOSALS UPON
COMUSMACV'S RETURN AND WILL RECOMMEND DISCUSSION OF THE
MATTER WITH GEN VIEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

GP-4
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION
ONLY
150

NNNN

TOP SECRET NOFORN

#43

CCN 017 FILLER 25

DTG 040236Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

*Parad this info *
this morning following conversation
with Gen Guafyfan. I have additional info
about to give false and possible
signature of Sgt.*

*CG / lo
DCG M
C/S @*

CATEGORY

EXCLUSIVE

*M. Malberry
C. Anderson*
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FILE COPY FILLER OF _____ COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 040236Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

G-2

G-3

*#2 & 3 banned
2/20/68*

38

DATE/TIME GROUP 040236Z JAN 68

#28

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUMWAA
DE RUHHFMA 0386 0040236
ZNY SSSSS
P 040236Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

BT
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN
KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

OPERATION BADGER TOOTH (U)

1. SINCE THE PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED
BY BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/1 DURING OPERATION BADGER
TOOTH OCCURRED 36 HOURS SUBSEQUENT TO WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE
BEEN A SATISFACTORY AMPHIBIOUS LANDING, SUGGEST YOU LOOK
INTO THE TRAINING READINESS BACKGROUND OF THIS
BATTALION DURING THE PRECEEDING SIX MONTHS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#28

CCN 047

FILLER _____

DTG 051003Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR GEN WESTMORELAND

CG	le
DCG	m
CLS	@

EYES ONLY

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20/0/68

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2, AND 4 OF 4

COPIES OF GEN WESTMORELAND MESSAGE 051003Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY VH Summit DATE/TIME 060730H Jan

DATE/TIME GROUP 051003Z JAN 68

39

#29

O 051003Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND C OSMACV SAIGON
 TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC H AII
 INFO GEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 ZEM

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00196 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROL OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION (A)

1. (S) UPON DELVING INTO OPERATION BADGER TOOTH CONDUCTED BY AGR/ LF BRAVO IN QUANG TRI AND THAU THIEN PROVINCES DURING 26 DEC 67 - 2 JAN 68, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE REPORTING, COORDINATION, RESULTS, AND POLICIES INVOLVED.

2. (S) SPECIFICALLY, I QUESTION THE APPLICABILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE UNITS IN SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS IN SVN WHEN SIZEABLE FRIENDLY FORCES, AND OTHER RESOURCES ARE ALREADY ASHORE AND AVAILABLE. THIS IS UNLIKE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION DURING WORLD WAR II, WHEN FORCES LANDED ON HOSTILE SHORE. ALSO, IT DOES NOT SEEM REALISTIC THAT SUCH AN OPERATION CAN TAKE PLACE IN THE AREA OF MY COMMAND WITH NEITHER GEN CUSHMAN NOR I HAVING ANY DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RESULTS. THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE, PLANNING, TACTICS, AND EXECUTION THAT WOULD PERMIT THE CASUALTIES WHICH OCCURED IN THIS OPERATION IS SUBJECT TO QUESTION. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS SITUATION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD IT BEEN PLANNED AND EXECUTED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG, III MAF.

3. (S) I STRONGLY URGE THAT MARINE LANDING FORCES IN OPERATIONS OF THIS NATURE IN SVN BE PLANNED AND EXECUTED

UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG, III MAF, OR OTHER FIELD COMMANDER DESIGNATED BY ME.

4. (U) BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOQRS
 300

DECLASSIFIED
 DAMH-HSR-D#8
 DATE: 81 JAN 1992

NNNN

copy #1

~~SECRET~~

#29

CCN 027 FILLER 25

DTG 050310Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG	lp
D/CG	W
C/S	Q

CATEGORY FOR

FILE COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

*#3+4 burned
7 Dec 68*

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6

COPIES OF COMUSMACV MESSAGE 050310Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME 051350H Jan 68

G-2 COPY 5 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

G-3 COPY 6 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME GROUP 050310Z JAN 68

~~2~~ 30

SECRET

NNNR SVV MFA626 ASA014
 RR RUMMWAA
 DE RUMSMA 0630A 0050315
 ZNY SSSSS
 P R 050310Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 BT

FOR

~~SECRET~~ 00413 FROM MACCO C7.
 FOR ADM SHARP FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
 SUBJ: USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF
 THE DMZ (S)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 35668 DTG 300818Z OCT 67 (S)

B. CINCPAC DTG 262010Z DEC 67 (S) NOTAL

C. CSAF DTG 202252Z JAN 67 (S) NOTAL

D. COMUSMACV 32379 DTG 140832Z SEP 67 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE A REQUEST'S APPROVAL TO EMPLOY RIOT CONTROL
 AGENT CS NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER WITHING THE NORTHERN PORTION OF
 THE DMZ AS A MEANS OF ATTACKING ENEMY DUG-IN POSITIONS. REFERENCE B
 STATED THAT ACTION WOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO SEEK APPROVAL OF HIGHER
 AUTHORITY IN THIS MATTER.

2. (S) BASED ON PRIOR SUCCESSFUL USE IN THE ICIZ, CG, III MAF
 HAS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY BE OBTAINED TO EMPLOY RIOT CONTROL

DECLASSIFIED
 DAMH-HSR-DH
 DATE: 01 JAN 1992

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#30

SECRET

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0630A ~~SECRET~~
AGENT CS IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ. IN MY JUDGEMENT, ALL FEASIBLE METHODS MUST BE EXPLORED WHICH WOULD RELIEVE ENEMY PRESSURE ON FORCES ALONG THE DMZ AND MINIMIZE CASUALTIES IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE DYE MARKER AND MUSCLE SHOALS PROJECTS.

3. (S) RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS CAN BE DELIVERED EFFECTIVELY ON ENEMY DUG-IN POSITIONS. CURRENTLY, III MAF IS EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 4.2" CS FILLED ROUNDS UNDER CONDITIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE ANTICIPATED IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN DEMONSTRATED AT EGLIN AFB THAT SOLID CS-1 DELIVERED BY THE BLU-52 IS EFFECTIVE ON THE GROUND FOR UP TO SIX DAYS (REFERENCE C PERTAINS). THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS REQUESTED AN ALLOCATION OF 2,500 OF THESE MUNITIONS (REFERENCE D PERTAINS). OG, III MAF HAS EMPLOYED CS SUCCESSFULLY IN DISENGAGEMENT ACTIONS AND IN FLUSHING THE ENEMY OUT INTO KILLING ZONES. CS HAS BEEN EMPLOYED SUCCESSFULLY IN OTHER AREAS OF SVN IN THE ATTACK OF DUG-IN FORTIFIED POSITIONS. DESPITE EXTENSIVE USE OF THIS AGENT, NVA/VC FORCES HAVE NOT EMPLOYED EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES NOR HAVE THEY RETALIATED IN KIND IN ANY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT FASHION. III MAF UNITS ARE EQUIPPED WITH PROTECTIVE MASKS AND ARE ALERT TO POSSIBLE ENEMY USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.
4. (C) I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 0630A ~~SECRET~~
PROPAGANDA VALUE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH AN UNDERTAKING. HOWEVER, RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS HAS BEEN EMPLOYED EXTENSIVELY IN SVN. NO UNUSUAL PROPAGANDA RESULTING FROM ITS USE HAS BEEN DETECTED HERE.
5. (S) I STRONGLY URGE THAT YOU SEEK APPROVAL OF HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR EMPLOYMENT OF RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER WITHIN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ. GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-DW 8
DATE 8 1 JAN 1992

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#30

CCN 040 FILLER 32

DTG 051144Z MONTH JANUARY 68

ORIGINATOR COMSEVENTHFLT

CG	le
DCG	M
C/S	Q
D/S	M

FOR

DC/S - Please look into this and give me a reading of how

CATEGORY _____

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COPIES OF COMSEVENTHFLT MESSAGE 051144Z JAN 68

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2 doubts*

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Info G-2 COPY 5 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

Info G-3 COPY 6 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

ACTION COPY TO G-4

(Signature) 43

DATE/TIME GROUP 051144Z JAN 68

#31

CONFIDENTIAL

RTTCZYUW RUHMOC0734 0050000-CCCC-RUMWAA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 DE RUXUL 0300 0051144
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 051144Z JAN 68 ZYO RUMGCS
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUABGL/CG NINTH MAB
 BT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR LGEN CUSHMAN INFO DGEN GLICK FROM BRINGLE.
 1. THE THIRD MARDIV AND PARTICIPATING BATTALIONS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN AWARDED THE PUC. INCLUDED WITHIN THE QUALIFYING AWARD PERIODS ARE SPECIFIC DATES WHEN FOUR BATTALIONS WERE IDENTIFIED AS BEING ATTACHED TO THE SLF. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE FINE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS WHO WERE INTEGRAL UNITS OF THE SAME SLF'S AND WITHOUT WHOSE SUPPORT THE BATTALIONS COULD NOT HAVE DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES WILL BE SIMILARLY REWARDED. I REFER TO THE BTL SUPPORT UNITS SUCH AS PLATOONS FROM THE TANK BATTALIONS, AMTRACS, ARTILLERY, TRUCK, ENGINEER, RECON, C AND C, OTHER SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS, AND OF COURSE THE HMM'S AND THEIR SUPPORTING DETACHMENTS.
 2. REQUEST INFORMATION REGARDING PUC AWARDS OR NOMINATIONS FOR AWARDS FOR THE SUPPORT UNITS MENTIONED ABOVE AND FOR THE OTHER

PAGE TWO RUMGUL **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
 EQUALLY FINE SLF GROUPINGS CENTERED AROUND BATTALIONS FROM THE FIRST MARDIV AND 26TH MARINES. THIS IS REQUESTED TO AVOID A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THAT THERE IS STRONG FEELING THAT ALL PARTICIPATING MARINES SHOULD HAVE EQUAL RECOGNITION. THE DEGREE TO WHICH ANY ONE SLF HAS DISTINGUISHED ITSELF ABOVE ANOTHER IS TOO SLIGHT TO PRECLUDE EQUAL BILLING. WARM REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#31

TOP SECRET

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUHKM 0770 0063245
 ZNY TTTT
 P 060245Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- A. 7TH AF 240245Z/DEC67 (TS)
 - B. CG III MAF 300854Z/DEC67 (TS)
 - C. CG III MAF 260542Z/DEC67 (TS)
 - D. 7TH AF 281145Z/DEC67 (TS)
 - E. COMUSMACV 021205Z/JAN68 (TS)
 - F. CINCPAC 242345Z/APR65 (S) (PASEP)
1. HAVING FOLLOWED THE DIALOGUE OUTLINED IN THE SIX REFERENCES, HERE ARE A FEW THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE OVERALL IMPLICATIONS, AS I SEE THEM.
 2. FIRST, WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCHANGE REGARDING DYE MARKER IN REFERENCES A AND B, I BELIEVE THAT YOU AND 7TH AIR FORCE HAVE A GOOD DEAL OF COMMON GROUND, THAT YOUR OWN POSITION IS SOUND AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT YOU WILL PROBABLY COME OUT WITH AN ACCEPTABLE

PAGE 2 RUHKM 0770 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU FOR MCEO
 SOLUTION. REALISTICALLY, YOU EACH HAVE PROBLEMS, AND
 THE OVERLAP CAN BE RESOLVED BY GOOD COMMUNICATIONS.
 THE DYE MARKER AIR PROBLEM DOES NOT GRAVELY TROUBLE ME.
 3. REFERENCES C AND D, THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
 RESPECTING YORK II, AND THE MACV RESOLUTION OF THE
 DEBATE IN REFERENCE E, GIVE ME MORE TROUBLE. IN THIS
 CONNECTION, I BELIEVE IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR ALL HANDS TO
 REREAD REFERENCE F. THIS DOCUMENT, WHICH NEVER
 WOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED HAD SHARP NOT BEEN CINCPAC
 AND HAD NOT HOMER HUTCHINSON SEIZED THE PENCIL AT A
 CRITICAL MOMENT, HAS DONE A LOT TO MAINTAIN THE
 COMBAT INTEGRITY OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM. THE FIRST
 SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF REFERENCE D IS CLEARLY
 A DERIVATIVE OF THIS CINCPAC DICTUM. MOMYER
 WOULD NOT MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT BASED ON HIS OWN
 CONVICTIONS; OF THAT I AM CERTAIN.
 4. HOWEVER, THE CINCPAC DIRECTIVE WAS WRITTEN PRIMARILY
 TO PRESERVE THE AIR/GROUND TEAM. IT WAS NOT DESIGNED
 TO MEET IN DETAIL, THE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE MARINES AND
 SOLDIERS AND ARVN ARE OPERATING TOGETHER ON THE GROUND

#8081

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

III MAF 2100/4

TOP SECRET

VPAGE 3 RUKM 000 770 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU FOR MCEO AND MARINE AIR, AIR FORCE AIR AND VNAF AIR ARE ALL INVOLVED IN CARRYING THE AIR SUPPORT LOAD. MAINLY THE CINCPAC MESSAGE WAS INTENDED TO INSURE THAT THE FUNCTION OF MARINE AIR (INCLUDING OPERATION OF THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM) IN SUPPORT OF MARINES SHOULD NOT BE FRUSTRATED BY INTERMEDIATE ECHELONS IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE. AND IT HAS DONE THAT REASONABLY WELL.

5. I AM SURE, WHEN CG 7TH AIR FORCE FLEAD HIS CASE WITH MACV, THAT HE POINTED OUT THAT THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM CONCEPT DOES NOT COVER THE ARMY TOO, WHEN MARINES AND ARMY ARE INVOLVED IN AN OPERATION TOGETHER. I SUSPECT ALSO, THAT 7TH AIR FORCE CANNOT HAVE OVERLOOKED THE PERSUASIVE PLOY OF ASKING WHAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE IF MARINES WERE OPERATING, IN A SUBORDINATE ROLE, WITH THE ARMY IN III CORPS. FINALLY, I AM SURPRISED THAT 7TH AIR FORCE DID NOT COMPLICATE THE ISSUE BY SAYING THAT EVEN IF WE WERE GIVEN THE WHOLE JOB OF AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II, WE WOULD HAVE TROUBLE PROVIDING ALL THE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND AIR

PAGE 4 RUKM 0770 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU FOR MCEO CONTROL PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE ARMY UNITS.

6. IN SUN, I AM NOT SURPRISED WITH THE CONTENT OF REFERENCE E. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE HOMOGENEOUS NATURE OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM, BUT WITHOUT SUGGESTING THAT THE MARINE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP OUGHT TO EXTEND TO ARMY UNITS WHEN THEY ARE IN THE AREA CONTROLLED BY CG III MAF.

7. IT WOULD APPEAR IN THIS CASE THAT WHAT YOU REALLY WANT IS SUFFICIENT 7TH AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL, PLACED WITHIN THE HEAD-QUARTERS WHICH CONTROLS YORK II, TO INSURE THAT THE ARMY REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT OR, FOR THAT MATTER, YOUR REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY--ARE PROMPTLY LAID ON 7TH AIR FORCE TO PROVIDE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CCN 047 FILLER 25

DTG 060403Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

TOP SECRET

CG	<i>lb</i>
DCG	<i>W</i>
C/S	<i>Q</i>
<i>G3</i>	

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE** MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FILE COPY FILLER OF COPIES

*# 1 of 2 burned
700068*

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 060403Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY S.H. Shuttles DATE/TIME 061335H Jan.

G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 060403Z JAN 68

45

TOP SECRET

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUHKK 0320 0060403
 ZNY TTTT
 P 060403Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 COMMAND AND CONTROL, DURANGO CITY OPNS
 A. CG III MAF 040145Z/JAN (TS)

1. I THINK YOUR CHOSEN SOLUTION IS THE BEST -
 ESSENTIALLY THE ONLY FEASIBLE - ONE. IT PARALLELS
 EXACTLY THE FORMULA ADOPTED BY CG JOINT LANDING
 FORCE IN ICEBERG (OKINAWA). KEEPING IN MIND THE FACT
 THAT, WHETHER ASHORE OR AFLOAT, THE EXTENT OF YOUR COMMAND OF
 THE LANDING FORCE IS EXACTLY THE SAME, AND THAT
 COMMUNICATION RELAY IS THE COMMON ORDER THESE DAYS,
 YOU ARE REALLY NOT STRETCHING NWP 22B OUT OF SHAPE.
 BEST REGARDS.

GP-1
 BT

CCN 060 FILLER 16

DTG 070601Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CINCPAC

C6	<i>lo</i>
DC6	<i>m</i>
C/S	<i>Q</i>

FOR

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FILE COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

*# 2d3 burned
700068*

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COPIES OF CINCPAC MESSAGE 070601Z JAN 68

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G-2

TOP SECRET

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 070601Z JAN 68

#46

TOP SECRET

RR RUMSAK
 DF RUMSAW 0102U 0070825
 ZNY TTTT ZOK JPCCG
 R 070809Z JAN 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 INFO CG III MAF
 P R 070601Z
 FM CINCPAC
 TO RUEKDA/CJCS
 INFO RUHKB/CINCPACFLT
 RUCSAAA/CINCSAC
 RUHQ/CINCPACAF
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 BT

LIMDIS

FOR

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS
 FOR GEN WHEELER FROM ADMIRAL SHARP
 SUBJ: COASTAL DEFENSE MISSILE SITES IN NORTH VIETNAM (S)
 A. CJCS 060453Z JAN 68
 B. DIA 061617Z JAN 68
 C. CTU 77.0 021201Z JAN 68
 D. CTG 77.0 060853Z JAN 68
 E. CTF 77 061532Z JAN 68 (PASEP)

1. REFERENCE A ADVISED THAT TWO NVN COASTAL SITES WERE REPORTED AS APPEARING TO BE COASTAL DEFENSE MISSILE SITES. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED ON AN EXAMINATION OF 19 DEC PHOTOGRAPHS. REFERENCE B PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT SITES. NGF ON 2 JAN AND AIR STRIKES ON 5 JAN AGAINST THE SUSPECT SITES

PAGE 2 RUHKA 0772 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS
 WERE REPORTED BY REFS C & D.

2. PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE, AIR STRIKES AND NAVAL GUNFIRE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED AGAINST THE TWO MISSILE SITES IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING NGF AND AIR STRIKES ON 6 JAN IS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE E, WHICH WAS INFO TO NMCC.

3. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF PHOTOGRAPHY BY CTF 77 SHOWS LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EXISTENCE OF STYX MISSILE SITES. PHOTOGRAPHY OF SITES 1 AND 2 OBTAINED ON 3 CONSECUTIVE DAYS WILL BE ANALYZED BY CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT AND FICPACFAC AND YOU WILL BE INFORMED OF ANY SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS.

4. DESPITE PRESENT LACK OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AT EITHER SUSPECTED SSM SITE LOCATION, DAILY SURVEILLANCE BY PHOTO AND/R VISUAL RECCE MEANS WILL BE CONTINUED AND STRIKE ACTION WILL BE CONDUCTED IF DEEMED NECESSARY.

5. ANY SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS WILL BE FORWARDED ASAP.

GP-4
 BT

CCN 1108

*#4 burned
20/0068*

FILLER

DTG 091002Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR AMBASSADOR KOMER

EYES ONLY

CG	<i>lo</i>
DLG	W
CIS	Q

CATEGORY _____

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MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2,AND 4 OF 4

COPIES OF AMBASSADOR KOMER MESSAGE 091002Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

*copy to CORDS } For info on which to base a reply
G-3 } NLT than 1600 10 Jan 68*

DATE/TIME GROUP 091002Z JAN 68

(Signature) 45

#32

O 091002Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM AMBASSADOR KOMER JOIR, MACV, SAIGON
TO CG III MAF
CG I FFV
CG II FFV
ZEM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MAC 00365 EYES ONLY
1. IN CONNECTION OUR EFFORTS EXPLAIN OUR
POLICIES ON REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, O

IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL HAVE YOUR ESTIMATES
OF EXTENT TO WHICH RELOCATION OF CIVILIANS IN
SUCH CASES AS BEN SUC, EDAP ENANG, AND CAM LO
REDUCED LIKELY (A) CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING
1967; (B) US CASUALTIES FROM REPEATED OPERA-
TIONS IN AREAS FROM WHICH REFUGEES REMOVED.

2. REALIZE DIFFICULTY OF EX POST FACTO
JUDGEMENTS ON THIS MATTER, BUT COM@SMACVHAND
I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR BEST GUESSES (OR THOSE
OF APPROPRIATE DIVISION COMMANDERS). NEED
REPLY BEFORE 11 JANUARY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
110

** Being serviced*

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-008
DATE: 31 JAN 1992

NNNN

copy #1

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

#32

CCN 096 FILLER 16

DTG 100133Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CG	<i>ly</i>
DCG	<i>m</i>
C/S	<i>g</i>

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 100133Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME 101300H JAN 68

G-2

G-3

*#3 burned
2 doug*

DATE/TIME GROUP 100133Z JAN 68

45

#33

SECRET

PP DDKE
DE YNA 1386 0100133
ZNY SSSSS
P 100133Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXTRANEIOUS COMMITMENT OF USMC HELO RESOURCES (U)

- A. ADMINO FMAW 050010Z/JAN68 (S) (PASEP)
- B. ADMINO III MAF 060334Z/JAN68 (S)

1. DURING CMC'S VISIT HERE I REITERATED YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS, AS WELL AS FOR AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF PILOTS TO MAN THE AIRCRAFT YOU HAVE NOW. FROM WHAT WE KNOW, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MARINE CORPS' CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT OUR PRESENT WESTPAC DEPLOYMENTS HAS ALREADY BEEN STRETCHED. HOWEVER, MY STAFF IS EXAMINING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES TO MAINTAIN OR IMPROVE YOUR PRESENT HELO LIFT CAPABILITY. WE WILL PRESENT THESE ALTERNATIVES TO CMC ON HIS RETURN, AND WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE RESULTS.
2. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO IMPROVING MARINE HELO

PAGE 2 YNA 1386 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SUPPORT CAPABILITY WOULD BE TO REQUEST HELP FROM THE ARMY IN RVN. TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH A REQUEST WERE RLEATED DIRECTLY TO MEETING USMC NEEDS, IT COULD LEAD TO THE ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION, IN POST-WAR REVIEW, THAT THE MARINE CORPS COULD NOT TAKE CARE OF ITSELF IN COMBAT. HOWEVER, IF THE REQUEST WERE AIMED NOT AT COVERING BASIC MARINE NEEDS, BUT AT FULFILLING THE EXTENSIVE EXTRANEIOUS COMMITMENT OF YOUR ORGANIC HELICOPTER RESOURCES, WE MIGHT ESCAPE THE LATER INDICTMENT THAT THE MARINES WERE NOT ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES IN COMBAT.

3. REALISTICALLY, YOUR HELO FORCE STRUCTURE HAS BEEN DESIGNED SOLELY TO MEET MARINE CORPS NEEDS IN ICTZ. HOWEVER, REF B DOCUMENTS ONCE AGAIN THAT A SUBSTANTIAL FRACTION OF YOUR ACROSS-THE-BOARD HELO CAPABILITY WENT TO SUPPORT THE ROKMC, VNAF AND USA DURING DECEMBER. OF THE TOTAL HOURS FLOWN, 1,238 WERE DEDICATED TO OTHER NATIONS OR SERVICES IN ICTZ. TO CONTINUE TO ADDRESS TEN PERCENT OF YOUR OVERALL CAPABILITY TO THESE EXTRANEIOUS COMMITMENTS, AND TO THE ROKMC IN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#33

#33

CCN 104 FILLER 32

DTG 102338Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

CATEGORY ~~EXCLUSIVE~~ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 102338Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY *[Signature]* DATE/TIME 1109554 Jan

G-2
G-3

** * The contents of the visit
are depicted on the attached
map of [unclear]*

DATE/TIME GROUP 102338Z JAN 68

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PP RUMWAA
 DE RUMHFMA 1617 0102338
 ZNY TTTTT
 P 102338Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM
 WESTMORELAND TO SHARP ON OPERATION NIAGARA.

QUOTE

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO KEEP YOU ABREAST
 OF CURRENT PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE AND REINFORCEMENT
 OF THE KHE SANH AREA. A PORTION OF THESE PREPARATIONS
 WHICH I HAVE CALLED OPERATION NIAGARA ENCOMPASSES
 THE FOLLOWING:

- A. NIAGARA I. A COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE
 COLLECTION EFFORT TO LOCATE THE ENEMY IN NW QUANG
 TRI AND ADJACENT AREAS OF LAOS AND NVN, AND
- B. NIAGARA II. PLANS FOR HEAVY, COORDINATED B-52
 AND TACTICAL AIR STRIKES ON A SUSTAINED BASIS AGAINST ANY
 ENEMY BUILDUP.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 2 RUMHFMA 1617 T O P S E C R E T

2. A. THE GENERAL AREA OF INTEREST FOR OPERATION
 NIAGARA IS DEFINED BY THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES:

XD9717 XD3846 D8688
 XD6220 XD6673

B. WITHIN THIS AREA, RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVES
 HAVE BEEN SELECTED. A COLLECTION PLAN IS BEING
 DEVELOPED TO UTILIZE ALL APPROPRIATE GROUND AND AERIAL
 RESOURCES FOR IN-COUNTRY AND CROSS BORDER
 RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. ~~FOR~~
~~FOR~~ ~~FROM~~ ~~IN~~ ~~HEADQUARTERS~~ ~~IS~~ ~~VISITING~~ ~~III~~ ~~MAF~~ ~~TO~~
 INSURE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORTS ARE
 THOROUGHLY COORDINATED.

C. THE TARGET COMPLEX IS BEING DIVIDED INTO GRID
 RECTANGLES APPROPRIATE FOR ATTACK BY ARC LIGHT FORCES.
 AN OVERLAY WILL BE PROVIDED TO VIENTIANE ALONG WITH
 LATEST PHOTOGRAPHY FOR COORDINATION AND CONCURRENCE
 PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO YOU FOR APPROVAL. AN INCREASE
 IN ARC LIGHT SORTIES NEXT MONTH WILL GIVE US AN EVEN
 GREATER CAPABILITY TO PUT HEAVY STRIKES ON LUCRATIVE
 TARGETS FOR A SUSTAINED PERIOD OF A WEEK OR MORE.

PAGE 3 RUMHFMA 1617 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLU FOR NCEO

UNQUOTE
 GP-4
 BT

CCN 105 FILLER 32

DTG 110001Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

CG	<i>l</i>
DCG	<i>w</i>
C/S	<i>e</i>

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____

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*#2 & 3 turned
700068*

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 110001Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY *VH Johnson* DATE/TIME 110955 H Jan

Memo for CG -

G-2

G-3

The C-1 and I discussed this matter before I made the decision to inform FMFPAC. therefore I believe all credit should go to C-1

(48)

VH Johnson

110001Z JAN 68

DATE/TIME GROUP

#34

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMWAA
DE RUHFMA 1624 2110001
ZNY CCCCC
P 110001Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK
1. CONCERNING THE CH-53 TRAGEDY, AND IN THE FACE OF
ALL THE SADNESS, THERE IS ONE SMALL BRIGHT SPOT. IT IS
THE WORK OF THE FAST THINKING MAN WHO PERCEIVED THAT
TWO OF THE CRASH VICTIMS WERE SCHEDULED TO BE ON THE
HONOLULU R&R FLIGHT THIS MORNING. HIS ALERTNESS MADE
IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO TALK TO ONE FAMILY
ON ARRIVAL AND TO THE OTHER BEFORE THEY WENT
TO MEET THE R&R FLIGHT AND TO BREAK
THE SAD NEWS TO THEM, IN TERMS WHICH SPARED THEM
A LITTLE ANGUISH. I WISH YOU WOULD FIND THE PERSON OR
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE AND PASS ON MY SINCERE GRATITUDE
FOR THEIR ALERTNESS. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

EXCLUSIVE

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 34

P 110649Z ZFF -B
 FM AMB KOMER JOIR MACV SAIGON
 TO LIG CASHMAN CG III MAF
 LTC ROSSON CG I FFV
 LIG WEYAND CG II FFV
 ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00462 EYES ONLY

1. MY MEG DTG 120720Z DEC, SUBJECT ESTIMATED REFUGEE INFLOW DURING 1967, ASKED FOR YOUR ESTIMATES. MY PRIMARY AIM WAS TO GET COMMANDER'S VIEWS, SINCE YOUR REFUGEE PEOPLE NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ON PROSPECTIVE 1968 MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH WILL GREATLY INFLUENCE REFUGEE GENERATION. REPLIES INDICATED I CTZ - 85,000, II CTZ - 65,000, III CTZ 7 55,000, AND IVHCTZ - 140,000

2. WHEN I CITED THESE FIGURES TO SEN. KENNEDY TODAY, HIS STAFF HAD IMPRESSION THAT THESE ESTIMATES WERE IN FACT THOSE OF DEPCORDS REFUGEE ADV SORS RATHER THAN COMMANDERS. I TOLD THE SENATOR I THOUGHT THIS IMPRESSION WRONG, BUT WOULD CHECK.

3. REQUEST CONFIRMATION THAT THESE ARE IN FACT YOUR ESTIMATES, SINCE THEY ARE ABOUT TO ENTER PUBLIC DOMAIN.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 170

DECLASSIFIED
 DAMH-HSR-DW8
 DATE 81 JAN 1982

EYES ONLY

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

#35

P 120515Z
FM CG III MAF
TO AMBASSADOR KOMER JOIR MACV SAIGON
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A. YOUR 110649Z JAN68
B. MY 230638Z DEC67

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, MY STAFF PARTICIPATED IN THE PREPARATION OF ESTIMATE CONTAINED IN REF B WITH WHICH I CONCUR. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
080

WJ

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-DH 8
DATE: 31 JAN 1992

HAS BEEN SENT

QJ

Copy #1

#35

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAC 296
 00 RUMSAK
 DE RUMKM 1971 0121957
 ZNY TTTT
 O 121957Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION HAS BEEN
 VERIFIED WITH ORIGINATOR. WILL
 SVC ON REQUEST.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING IS A QUOTE OF A BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE
 FROM WHEELER TO WESTMORELAND. AS SOON AS YOU HAVE
 READ AND DIGESTED IT, CALL ME ON THE KY-3 WITH YOUR
 VIEWS SINCE I AM ON THE HOOK FOR COMMENTS TO SHARP
 ASAP.

QUOTE:

1. THERE IS DISCUSSION AROUND TOWN IN HIGH NON-MILITARY QUARTERS
 OF WHAT THE ENEMY OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS MAY BE IN THE KHE SANH
 AREA. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOUR RECENT CABLE ON ENEMY OB AND
 STRATEGY HAS BEEN MOST USEFUL AND CLARIFYING. HOWEVER, TWO
 DIFFERENG VIEWS OF KHE SANH ARE BEING GIVEN PROMINENT ATTENTION
 -- SUMMARIZED BELOW.

2. VIEW NO. 1 - THE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE
 KHE SANH TO OUR ADVANTAGE, THAT IS, DIEN BIEN PHU IN REVERSE, THIS
 VIEW ARGUES THE POSSIBILITY OF CAPITALIZING ON AN ATTACK AGAINST
 KHE SANH BY STRIKING THE ENEMY FROM THE REAR IN LAOS AND PROCEEDING
 TO ATTACK ENEMY BASES IN THE AREA, PERHAPS AS FAR WEST AS TCHEPONE,
 IN A RELATIVELY SHORT CAMPAIGN.
 SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE CONSIDERABLE
 POLITICAL OVERTONES AND WOULD REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE PRE-
 SIDENT AND SOUVANNA.

3. VIEW NO. 2 - WITHDRAWAL FROM KHE SANH BECAUSE THE ENEMY
 IS BUILDING TOWARD A DIEN BIEN PHU. THIS ARGUMENT IS BASED
 UPON THE FOLLOWING PREMISES:

- A. THE ROAD TO KHE SANH HAS BEEN CUT.
- B. WE DO NOT CONTROL THE COMMANDING HILLS.
- C. THE ENEMY IS BRINGING UP ARTILLERY WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO
 CONTROL THE AIRFIELD.
- D. A WITHDRAWAL NOW COULD BE DONE WITHOUT MUCH PUBLIC NOTICE.
- E. THERE IS AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMUSMACV AND
 THE MARINE COMMANDER WHICH MAKES THE MARINES RELUCTANT TO
 WITHDRAW AND COMUSMACV RELUCTANT TO DIRECT THEM TO DO SO.

4. I WANT TO STRESS TO YOU THAT I DO NOT PERSONALLY SUBSCRIBE
 TO EITHER OF THE FOREGOING VIEWS, BOTH OF WHICH IN THE SIMPLE
 FORMS EXPRESSED OVER LOOK IMPORTANT FACTORS, IN MY
 JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, THEY ARE RECEIVING SOME ATTENTION AT HIGH
 NON-MILITARY LEVELS IN WASHINGTON AND, ACCORDINGLY, I SEEK YOUR
 VIEWS ON THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH ONE. THEREFORE, I REQUEST YOUR
 ANALYSIS OF THE TWO PROPOSITIONS,
 TOGETHER WITH ANY OTHER COMMENTS OR PROPOSALS YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE
 ASAP.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

CCN 152 FILLER 16

DTG 132035Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG FMFPAC

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

CG	<i>lg</i>
DCG	<i>m</i>
C/S	<i>Q</i>

CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FILE COPY FILLER OF COPIES

*# 2 of 3 bound
700068*

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC MESSAGE 132035Z JAN 68

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G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 132035Z JAN 68

#49

TOP SECRET
VV PACSSZ

///// T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R F O L L O W S /////

PP RUMSAK
DE RUHMM 2197 2132035
ZNY TTTTT
P 132035Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R G E N E R A L C H A P M A N , I N F O
L I G E N C U S H M A N F R O M L I G E N K R U L A K . M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y . C G
F M F P A C (F W D) N O T A D E E P A S S A C T I O N C M C . S E C T I O N 1 O F 2 .

1. QUOTED HEREWITH IS A MESSAGE FROM WHEELER TO
WESTMORELAND, INFO SHARP. QUOTE:

1. THERE IS DISCUSSION AROUND TOWN IN HIGH NON-MILITARY QUARTERS
OF WHAT THE ENEMY OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS MAY BE IN THE KHE SANH
AREA. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOUR RECENT CAPLE ON ENEMY OB AND
STRATEGY HAS BEEN MOST USEFUL AND CLARIFYING. HOWEVER, TWO
DIFFERREING VIEWS OF KHE SANH ARE BEING GIVEN PROMINENT ATTENTION
-- SUMMARIZED BELOW.

2. VIEW NO. 1 - THE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE
KHE SANH TO OUR ADVANTAGE, THAT IS, DIEN BIEN PHU IN REVERSE.
THIS VIEW ARGUES THE POSSIBILITY OF CAPITALIZING ON AN ATTACK
AGAINST KHE SANH BY STRIKING THE ENEMY FROM THE REAR IN LAOS AND

PAGE 2 RUHMM 2197 S T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R
P R O C E E D I N G T O A T T A C K
E N E M Y B A S E S I N T H E A R E A , P E R H A P S A S F A R W E S T A S T C H E P O N E , I N A
R E L A T I V E L Y S H O R T C A M P A I G N .
S U C H A N A T T A C K W O U L D , O F C O U R S E , H A V E C O N S I D E R A B L E
P O L I T I C A L O V E R T O N E S A N D W O U L D R E Q U I R E T H E A P P R O V A L O F T H E P R E S I D E N T
A N D S O U V A N N A .

3. VIEW NO. 2 - WITHDRAWAL FROM KHE SANH BECAUSE THE ENEMY
IS BUILDING TOWARD A DIEN BIEN PHU. THIS ARGUMENT IS BASED UPON
THE FOLLOWING PREMISES:

A. THE ROAD TO KHE SANH HAS BEEN CUT.

B. WE DO NOT CONTROL THE COMMANDING HILLS.

C. THE ENEMY IS BRINGING UP ARTILLERY WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO
CONTROL THE AIRFIELD.

D. A WITHDRAWAL NOW COULD BE DONE WITHOUT MUCH PUBLIC NOTICE.

E. THERE IS AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMUSMACV AND
THE MARINE COMMANDER WHICH MAKES THE MARINES RELUCTANT TO
WITHDRAW AND COMUSMACV RELUCTANT TO DIRECT THEM TO DO SO.

4. I WANT TO STRESS TO YOU THAT I DO NOT PERSONALLY SUBSCRIBE TO
EITHER OF THE FOREGOING VIEWS, BOTH OF WHICH IN THE SIMPLE FORMS
EXPRESSED OVER LOOK IMPORTANT FACTORS, IN MY JUDGMENT. HOWEVER ?

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHKM 2197 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
THEY ARE RECEIVING SOME ATTENTION AT HIGH NON-MILITARY LEVELS IN
WASHINGTON AND, ACCORDINGLY, I SEEK YOUR VIEW ON THE PROS AND
CONS OF EACH ONE. THEREFORE, I REQUEST YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE TWO
PROPOSITIONS, TOGETHER WITH ANY OTHER COMMENTS OR PROPOSALS YOU
MAY WISH TO MAKE ASAP.

2. SHARP OFFICIALLY REQUESTED MY REACTION ALONG WITH
THAT OF USARPAC. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF MY MESSAGE
TO SHARP:

QUOTE:

1. BEFORE OFFERING SPECIFIC VIEWS ON THE TWO SCENARIOS
IN REF A, AND AS A BACKDROP UPON WHICH TO PROJECT THOSE
VIEWS, THE FOLLOWING IS MY ESTIMATE OF WHAT IS IN STORE
FOR US IN THE KHE SANH AREA.--

A. I BELIEVE THE ENEMY IS PREPARING A MAJOR ATTACK,
TO BE LAUNCHED BY ABOUT THREE REGIMENTS, SUPPORTED
AND FOLLOWED BY TWO MORE. IT WILL PROBABLY COME FROM
THE NORTHWEST, WEST AND SOUTHWEST, SIMULTANEOUSLY.

B. THE ATTACK WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY ANCILLARY OP-
ERATIONS AGAINST OUR LOGISTIC AND AIR BASES;--DONG HA,
QUANG TRI, PHU BAI AND DANANG, AS WELL AS A SECONDARY

PAGE 4 RUHKM 2197 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FR
ATTACK IN THE CON THIEN-GIO LINH REGION.

C. THE ENEMY TACTICAL PLAN WILL UNDERTAKE TO CURE
THE MAJOR DEFECT OF THE DKHE SANH ATTACK OF LAST MAY,
WHEN THE 95C AND 29TH REGIMENTS OF THE
325C DIVISION WERE DEFEATED. AT THAT TIME THE
ENEMY WAS HEAVILY OUT-GUNNED, AND SUFFERED DECISIVELY
FROM INADEQUATE FIRE SUPPORT. THIS TIME HE WILL PROBAB-
LY BRING 122 MM AND 140 MM ROCKETS INTO RVN, AS WELL AS
ARTILLERY INTO LAOS, NEAR THE RVN BORDER, TO GIVE HIS
ATTACK BOTH SHOCK AND MOMENTUM.

D. AS TO TIMING, IT DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY THAT THE ENEMY CAN BE
WHOLLY READY BEFORE TET. THIS CONVICTION, COUPLED
WITH THE FACT THAT THE STAND-DOWN OFFERS A FRUIT-
FUL BUILD-UP OPPORTUNITY, SUGGESTS THAT THE ATTACK
SHOULD COME SHORTLY AFTER TET.

2. WITH THE FOREGOING AS A FORECAST OF WHAT THE ENEMY
WANTS AND PLANS TO DO, MY COMMENTS ON THE TWO ALTER-
NATIVE IDEAS IN REF A. FOLLOW:

A. VIEW NO 1. IF, SOMEHOW, WE COULD FIX THE ENEMY
MASSED IN BASE AREAS IN LAOS, AND COULD STRIKE HIM THERE

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHKM 2197 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR IN OVERWHELMING STRENGTH NOW, THE IMPACT COULD BE DECISIVE. BUT THE ENEMY IS NOT SO MASSED; NOR CAN WE, IN THE BRIEF TIME REMAINING, MARSHAL A FORCE LARGE ENOUGH AND POWERFUL ENOUGH TO TAKE ON ONE OR TWO NVN DIVISIONS IN REMOTE AND INHOSPITABLE LAOS, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE WEATHER IS UNDEPENDABLE AND WHEN OUR TOTAL LOGISTIC EFFORT WOULD HAVE TO BE BY AIR. FURTHERMORE, THE IMPACT UPON OTHER PRODUCTIVE COMUSMACV PROGRAMS RESULTING FROM A DIVERSION OF FORCES OF THE MAGNITUDE REQUIRED, COULD BE UNFAVORABLE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE BECAUSE THERE IS NO CERTAINTY, DESPITE THE SUGGESTION BY THE HIGH NON-MILITARY QUARTERS, THAT IT WOULD BE "A RELATIVELY SHORT CAMPAIGN."

B. VIEW NO 2. GOING DIRECTLY TO THE HEART OF THIS FORMULA I COME OUT WITH THE OBVIOUS CONCLUSION THAT TO WITHDRAW WOULD SAVE LIVES THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE LOST IN A BATTLE FOR KHE SANH, BUT THAT NOBODY EVER WON ANYTHING BY BACKING AWAY. AS TO THE SPECIFIC POINTS MADE:

(1) THE ROAD TO KHE SANH HAS INDEED BEEN INTERRUPT-;

PAGE 6 RUHKM 2197 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ED-- IN SIX PLACES-- BUT BY THE WEATHER, NOT THE ENEMY. OUR FORCES HAVE ELECTED TO PUT THEIR ENGINEER POWER INTO DYE MARKER AT THIS TIME, RATHER THAN INTO THE FRUSTRATING TASK OF TRYING TO KEEP ROUTE 9 REPAIRED DURING THE RAINS. THE ROAD CAN BE OPENED IF A DECISION IS MADE TO DO SO.

(2) IT IS TRUE THAT WE DO NOT CONTROL ALL THE COMMANDING HILLS IN THE KHE SANH-CA LU ARG, IN THE SENSE THAT WE DO NOT OCCUPY THEM ALL PHYSICALLY. BUT THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT WE EXERCISE MORE CONTROL OVER THE CRITICAL TERRAIN THAN THE ENEMY DOES. WE HAVE MORE TROOPS, MORE MOBILITY, MORE FIRE POWER AND A STRONGER LOGISTIC FOUNDATION.

(3) I CONCUR THAT THE ENEMY IS PROBABLY BRINGING UP ARTILLERY, AND BELIEVE IT WILL BE HIS PURPOSE SO TO INTERDICT THE KHE SANH AIRFIELD AS TO PRECLUDE ITS USE BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. THIS IS HIS HOPE. TO MAKE HIS HOPE EFFECTIVE HE MUST, SOMEHOW, NEUTRALIZE OUR OWN COUNTER-BATTERY CAPABILITY, WHICH IS TO SAY, AT LEAST 36 ARTILLERY TUBES PLUS THE ALL-WEATHER AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF AT
BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNNVV PAC333

/////TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR FOLLOWS/////

PP RUMSAK
 DL RUMKM 2198 0132035
 ZNY TTTT
 P 132035Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN, INFO
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. CG
 FMFPAC (FWD) NOT ADD PASS ACTION CMC. FINAL SECTION OF 2
 LEAST 150 ATTACK AIRCRAFT. HIS HOPE IS TO ISOLATE THE
 FORCES AT KHE SANH FROM LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE EXTENT
 THAT THEIR COMBATANT CAPABILITY WILL BE DECISIVELY IM-
 PAIRED. BUT WITH III MAF'S ONE-TRIP HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY OF
 OVER 350 TONS, AND EVEN ASSUMING TOTAL NEUTRALIZATION
 OF THE KHE SANH AIRSTRIP, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT
 OUR LOGISTIC POSTURE THERE CAN BE SERIOUSLY ATTENUATED, NOR CAN
 OUR RAPID REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. IF THIS
 CONCLUSION IS VALID, THE QUESTION THEN FOLLOWS AS TO
 WHY THE ENEMY WOULD ATTEMPT A FRUITLESS EFFORT AT KHE
 SANH IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE ANSWER IS THAT HE NEEDS A
 DRAMATIC VICTORY, AND, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF HIS OWN

PAGE 2 RUMKM 2198 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LOGISTICS, KHE SANH IS PROBABLY THE BEST PLACE TO TRY.

(4) CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESSED VIEW, WITHDRAWAL
 CERTAINLY COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT MUCH
 PUBLIC NOTICE. THERE ARE NEWSMEN AT KHE SANH EVERY DAY.
 THEIR COMPETITIVE CHARACTERISTICS ARE WELL KNOWN. IN
 NOTHING FLAT A WITHDRAWAL FROM KHE SANH WOULD BE
 BALLOONED ALL OVER THE WORLD. WHILE IT IS DANGEROUS TO
 TRY AND THINK LIKE AN ASIAN, I BELIEVE THAT THE NVN WOULD
 HAVE TO CHARACTERIZE SUCH AN ACT AS AN EXHIBITION OF
 WEAKNESS ON OUR PART.

(5) THE COMMENTS CONCERNING EXISTENCE OF AN
 AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMUSMACV AND CG, III
 MAF HAVE NO SUBSTANCE. THE RELATIONSHIP IS GOLD TURKEY.
 COMUSMACV TELLS CG, III MAF WHAT TO DO, AND HE DOES IT.
 THE MARINES WENT TO KHE SANH BECAUSE COMUSMACV WANTED
 THEM THERE. THEY ARE THERE NOW, FOR THE SAME REASON.
 IF CG, III MAF BELIEVED THAT SOME CHANGE IN DISPOSITION
 SHOULD BE MADE, HE WOULD NOT ONLY BE WITHIN HIS RIGHTS,
 BUT WOULD BE OBLIGED, AS A SUBORDINATE, SO TO RECOMMEND. I AM
 CERTAIN THAT THERE IS NO RELUCTANCE, ON THE PART OF EITHER

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUHM 2198 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SUPERIOR OR SUBORDINATE, TO DO HIS DUTY.
3. REFERENCE A ASKS FOR ANY PROPOSALS WHICH MAY BE PERTINENT. I BELIEVE THAT CONUSMACV IS DOING THE RIGHT THINGS, AND WOULD ONLY OBSERVE THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO INTERPOSE A MAXIMUM OF IMPEDIMENT TO THE ENEMY PREPARATIONS. ALL POSSIBLE RECONNAISSANCE--AIR, GROUND AND ELECTRONIC--NEEDS TO BE COMPLEMENTED BY MASSIVE INTERDICTION OF LOCATED ENEMY, OF ALL FIRM DF FIXES AND OF ALL POSITIVE PHOTO AND GROUND RECONNAISSANCE REFLECTIONS.
UNQUOTE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

CCN 212 FILLER 32

DTG 170710Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR COMSEVENTHFLT

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
D/G	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	has seen

CATEGORY *D/G can EOP*

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1/2000 being done RMP

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Action to
G-3 COPY 6 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

TOP SECRET

DATE/TIME GROUP 170710Z JAN 68

#8081
#50

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RUMFCMU1721 0183000-TTTT--RUMWAA.

ZNY TTTT

DE RUMFUL 1381 0170710

ZNY TTTT

P 170710Z JAN 68 ZSHERUMF

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET

FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM BRINGLE

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AND USE OF AIR RESOURCES IN DURANGO CITY (U)

A. COMUSMACV 110429Z JAN 68

1. I NOTE IN PARA 3 OF REF ATTAT COMMANDER 7AF AND CG III MAF OR GENERAL OFFICERS FROM THE TWO COMMANDS WILL MEET JOINTLY TO DEVELOP A COMMAND ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF AIR RESOURCES AVAIL FOR DURANGO CITY WITHIN THE OVERALL COMMANDD ARRANGEMENTS AND TASKS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT FOR THE AIR RESOURCES OF 7AF, III MAF, AND THE SEVENTH FLEET.

2. AS I AM NOT BEING REPRESENTED IN THIS DUSCUSTION, WOULD APPRECIATE BEING NOTIFIED PRIOR TO ANY AGREEMENT BEING REACHED WHICH COULD AFFECT SEVENTH FLEET.

3. BEST REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

FOR

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

TOP SECRET

#50

CCN _____

FILLER _____

DTG 170443Z

MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR MG KERWIN C/E MAGV

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

EYES ONLY

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6 Nov 68*

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DATE/TIME GROUP 170443Z JANUARY 1968

442

O 170443Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM MG KERWIN C/E MACV
TO ZEN/AMB KOMER
GEN MOMYER CG 7TH AF
LTG PALMER DCG USARV
LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
LTG WEYAND CG II FFV
LTG ROSSON CG I FFV
MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
RADM VETH COMNAVFORV
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ I A L MAC 00759 EYES ONLY

1. ON 27 JAN 68 GEN. WESTMORELAND COMPLETES FOUR YEARS
IN VIETNAM. GEN. ABRAME PLANE A SMALL SURPRISE (F POSSIBLE)
DINNER PARTY AT GEN. ABRAME HOUSE COMMENCING 2000 SUNDAY JAN
28. DRESS INFORMAL (PORT SH RTS). ADDRESSEES AREHCORDIALLY
INVITED. RSVP TO ME. REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVERDURING DUTY HOURS PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSM SSION
ONLY

120

OK
le

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-DH 8
DATE 01 JAN 1992

NNNN

1001

[Handwritten signature]

42

CCN 799

FILLER _____

DTG 120409Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII

*Want notification to
EYES ONLY*

<i>CG</i>	<i>lp</i>
<i>CS</i>	<i>R</i>
<i>D/C M</i>	
<i>Protocol</i>	<i>8</i>

CATEGORY _____

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DATE/TIME GROUP 120409Z JAN 68

50

P 120409Z ZFF4
 FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND, COMMACV, SAIGON
 INFO LGEN CUSHMAN, CG, III MAF, DANANG
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY

1. BY SEPARATE MESSAGE I HAVE PROMULGATED MY ITINERARY FOR THE PERIOD 21-28 JANUARY. PRIMARY PURPOSE OF TRIP IS TO VISIT PHILIPPINES, BUT YOU WILL NOTE THAT I PLAN TO ARRIVE DANANG AT 231130 LOCAL, ENROUTE TO YANKEE STATION. I WILL REQUIRE NO IN-COUNTRY ASSISTANCE BUT WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO SEE BOB CUSHMAN IF HE IS OTHERWISE AVAILABLE WITHOUT INTERRUPTING HIS OWN SCHEDULE. IF NOT, ANY MARINE CORPS GENERAL OFFICER CAN HOST AN INFORMAL UPDATE BRIEFING AND VISITS TO NEARBY INSTALLATIONS. I WILL DEPART THAT SAME AFTERNOON AT 1500. SINCE I WILL BE IN DANANG OVER THE NOON HOUR I WOULD ENJOY HAVING LUNCHEON WITH HOST, BUT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE KEPT SMALL AND INFORMAL.
2. PLEASE EMPHASIZE THAT I DO NOT WANT TO DIVERT EITHER YOU OR CUSHMAN FROM OTHER DUTIES OR VISITORS WHO WILL PROBABLY BE IN WIDE PRESENCE AT THAT TIME. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

240

NNNN

z

Copy #1

CONFIDENTIAL

36

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMHFL RUMWAA
 DE RUHFMA 1989 0122131
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 122131Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD (B017)
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC (PND)
 ZEN/THIRD FORSERVREGT
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN OLSON
 INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN, MGEN BOUKER AND COL SHELLEY
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 CANCELLATION/OBLIGATION OF BACKORDERS (U)
 A. CG FORLOGCMD 241638Z/DEC67 (U) (NOTAL)
 B. CG FMFPAC 080324Z/DEC67 (C) (NOTAL)
 I. THE CANCELLATION OF BACKORDERS OVER 90 DAYS OLD
 AND BACKORDERING ALL REQUISITIONS AT THE FLC ARE
 DRAMATIC ACTIONS AND CHANGES FROM OUR ESTABLISHED
 POLICY. HOWEVER, AS I POINTED OUT TO YOU IN REF B, I
 BELIEVE THESE ARE STEPS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN IF WE ARE TO
 IMPROVE OUR SUPPLY SUPPORT SITUATION NOW AND ESTABLISH
 A FIRM BASE FOR SUSTAINED SUPPLY AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 1989 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 IN WESTPAC.

2. THOUGH I APPROVE THE ACTIONS BEING TAKEN, I AM
 CONCERNED ABOUT SEVERAL AREAS OF YOUR OPERATIONS
 WHICH MUST BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND CLOSE SCRUTINY FROM
 EXTERNAL AGENCIES. SOME OF THESE AREAS ARE:

A. CONTROL OF THE HIGH PRIORITY REQUISITIONS WHICH
 WILL BE OBLIGATED AT THE FLC. THIS PROCEDURE REQUIRES
 CONSTANT ATTENTION TO INSURE THAT VALID REQUISITIONS
 ARE IN FACT IN THE SYSTEM AND ARE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUED.
 THIS REQUIRES TIMELY FOLLOW-UP AND RECONCILIATION BY
 THE FLC WITH THE HOLDER OF THE REQUISITION.

B. USING PRIORITY 02 STOCK REPLENISHMENT REQUISITIONS.
 THIS MAY RESULT IN A LARGE NUMBER OF CHALLENGES FOR
 AIR SHIPMENT OF MATERIAL AND AIR SHIPMENT MAY BE
 DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY. YOU SHOULD SET UP PROCEDURES
 NOW TO RESPOND TO THESE CHALLENGES QUICKLY, AND TO
 INSURE THAT AIR SHIPMENT IS USED ONLY FOR THAT PRECISE QUANTITY
 OF MATERIAL WHICH CAN BE COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED.

C. THE ABILITY OF WESTPAC UNITS TO RESPOND TO
 REQUESTS FROM THIS AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.									#37

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 1989 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DETAILED REQUISITION DATA FOR EXPEDITING PURPOSES. THE FLC WILL BE REQUIRED PROMPTLY TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION INFORMATION WHICH WILL ENABLE THE SUPPLY SYSTEM TO RESPOND RAPIDLY TO USING UNIT REPORTS OF DEADLINED EQUIPMENT, CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS, AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. THIS IS ANOTHER AREA WHERE PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED NOW TO ACHIEVE A POSITIVE AND A PROMPT RESPONSE.

D. CLOSE CONTROL OF RECEIPTS PROCESSING. UNDER THE REVISED PROCEDURES ONLY REQUISITIONS FOR CONTROLLED ITEMS WILL BE PASSED BY THE FLC WITH THE REQUISITIONERS OWN DOCUMENT NUMBER. ALL OTHERS WILL BE OBLIGATED. WHEN THE MATERIAL IS RECEIVED THE RECEIPTS PROCESSING TIME MUST BE CUT TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND HIGH PRIORITY OBLIGATIONS MUST BE RELEASED WITHOUT DELAY. IN THIS REGARD I HAVE NOTED YOUR BACKLOG OF RECEIPTS TO BE PROCESSED, AS YOU KNOW, EACH OF THOSE RECEIPTS REPRESENTS A POTENTIAL FILL OF AN IMMEDIATE NEED BY SOME USING UNIT.

E. THE CANCELLATION OF ALL OBLIGATIONS AND THE

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 1989 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SUBSEQUENT REVIEW AND REINSTATEMENT OF THOSE ACTUALLY REQUIRED. WE MUST INSURE THAT UPDATED AND VALID REQUIREMENTS ARE KNOWN BY THE THIRD FSR PRIOR TO PROCESSING THE PURA EXCESS LIST BY THE THIRD FSR. IF OUR TOTAL WESTPAC REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE THIRD FSR AT THE TIME THE AVAILABLE EXCESS LIST IS PROCESSED, WE MAY NOT GET MANY NEEDED ITEMS ON A NC-COST BASIS.

3. WARM THANKS FOR KEEPING ME ADVISED ABOUT YOUR OPERATIONS, YOUR PROBLEMS, AND WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO OVER COME THEM.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2102/1 (REV. 11-65)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#37	

XREFCN 142 FILLER 32

DTG 130041Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG	<i>lo</i>
DCG	<i>m</i>
C/S	<i>a</i>

*relief G-3 and
CORUS
DSA provide
ALSO input*

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le 10 68*

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RECEIVED BY R M Platt DATE/TIME 141053H Jan 68

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ACTION copy to
G-3 COPY 6 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME GROUP 130041Z JAN 68

#38

CONFIDENTIAL

.50 ASA097
 PP RUMWAA RUMNVF
 DE RUMSMA 2032A 0130118
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 130041Z JAN 68 ZFF6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEP/CGCS WASH DC
 RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/DCG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DANANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSBB/ COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 BT

FOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 01317 FROM MACCCC-3 FOR ADM SHARP
 INFO GEN WHEELER, GEN MONYER, LTC PALMER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTC ROSSON
 LTG WEYLAND, RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND
 SUBJ: MONTHLY ASSESSMENT(U)

- REF: A. MAC 7172 DTG 020225A AUG 67 (C) (NOTAL)
 B. MAC 28936 DTG 310100Z AUG 67 (C) (NOTAL)
 C. MAC 34527 DTG 201122Z OCT 67 (U) (NOTAL)
 D. MAC 34528 DTG 201123Z OCT 67 (U) (NOTAL)

PAGE W RUMSMA 2032A C O N F I D E N T I A L
 PART I FOR ALL

(C) THE NEW QUARTERVAL COMBINED WITH THE MONTHLY CORES AIRGRAM, AND SUPPLEMENTED WITH DAILY/WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND THE OPREP-5 TELECON SERIES WILL PROVIDE THE INFORMATION FORMERLY CONTAINED IN THE COMUSMACV MONTHLY EVALUATION.

PART II FOR ; CMDR 7TH AIRFORCE, COMNAVFORV, CG III MAF, CG IFFORCEV, CG II FFORCEV, SA IV CORPS.

(C) EFFECTIVE AFTER THE ANNUAL COMUSMACV ASSESSMENT FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1967, REFS A-D ARE RESCINDED AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE COMMANDERS MONTHLY ASSESSMENT IS NEGATED.

GP-4
 BT

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 DAMH-HSR-DW 8
 DATE: 31 JAN 1992

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#38

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EXCLUSIVE

PP RUPMMWAA RUMHAW
DE RUHFMA 2070 0130202
ZNY CCCCC
P 130202Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
INFO RUMWAA/CG II MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ANDERSON
INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK
AVIATION SAFETY (U)

1. I AM CONCERNED, AS I KNOW YOU ARE, BY THE FACT THAT DURING THE SIX MONTHS FROM 1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1967, VMA-311 HAS HAD SIX AIRCRAFT MISHAPS, FIVE OCCURRING DURING THE LANDING OR APPROACH PHASE. THESE HAVE RESULTED IN ONE AIRCRAFT STRIKE, FOUR AIRCRAFT SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED, ONE AIRCRAFT WITH MINOR DAMAGE AND ONE MAJOR INJURY.

2. THE VMA-311 ACCIDENT RATE OF 8.33 FAR EXCEEDS THAT OF COMPARABLE UNITS, E. G. 1.76 FOR 223 AND 4.6 FOR 211.

3. ANALYSIS REVEALS THAT MATERIAL FAILURE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN TWO INCIDENTS, IMPROPER MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES SUSPECTED IN ONE INCIDENT, AND C LINE 18-AA ANALYSIS REVEALS

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 2070 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR PILOT ERROR WAS THE FACTOR IN THE OTHERS.

4. ACCIDENTS THAT ARE THE RESULT OF IMPROPER MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES OR PILOT ERROR ARE THE MORE LAMENTABLE BECAUSE THEY ARE PREVENTABLE. APART FROM THE INJURIES TO VALUABLE MEN, WE CAN ILL AFFORD THE LOSS OF AIRCRAFT IN THE OPERATING INVENTORY.

5. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSE FACTORS AND RELATED MEASURES TO BRING THE VMA-311 SAFETY RATE INTO ACCEPTABLE LIMITS.

GP-4
BT

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#39

CCN 630

FILLER _____

DTG 151109Z

MONTH JANUARY

CG	<i>[initials]</i>
DCG	<i>[initials]</i>
CS	<i>[initials]</i>

ORIGINATOR GENERAL ABRAMS

*#2 of 4 burned -
600068*

EYES ONLY

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O 151109Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM ABRAMS
TO CUSHMAN
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00683 EYES ONLY

IN YOUR VISIT TO KHE SAN PLEASE CHECK THE REVEIMENT
AND DISPERSION OF BULK AMMUNITION STOCKS FOR ADEQUACY.
WE HAVE HAD A FEW BAD LOSSES IN OTHER PLACES BECAUSE
BASIC NEEDS OF DISPERSION AND REVEIMENT HAD NOT BEEN MET

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

070

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
DATE: 21 JAN 1992

10r1

~~SECRET~~

#40

CCN 169

FILLER 16

DTG 151229Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3	copy 17/1/20H

FOR

CATEGORY _____

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DATE/TIME GROUP 151229Z JAN 68



#41

~~SECRET~~ MFA435VV SA408
PP RUMMWAA
DE RUMSMA 2562A 0151315
ZNY SSSSS
P 151229Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF DA NANG
BT

FOR LIMDIS

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS 01626 FROM: MACJ33
THIS IS A DYE MARKER MESSAGE FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR LIG CUSHMAN.
SUBJECT: REPORT OF TRIP TO III MAF, 1-2 JAN 68 (U)
(S) SURVEY OF THE DYE MARKER POSITIONS ON 1-2 JAN 68 BY
THE COMBINED US/ARVN TEAM LED BY MAJOR GENERAL MURRAY, DEP
CG, III MAF, AND BG CARUTHERS OF MY STAFF DEVELOPED WHAT I FEEL
TO BE A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT AREAS. I SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE ARVN BROUGHT OUT BY THE SURVEY AND WILL EXPECT YOU TO
ASSURE TIMELY SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS BROUGHT OUT BY THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS:

A. COL NGHI STATED THAT THE ARVN UNITS WOULD ACCEPT
THE CONCEPT OF NOT USING THE 14-MAN LIVING BUNKERS FOR PRIMARY
DEFENSE, BUT WOULD FIGHT FROM SMALL 3-MAN FIGHTING BUNKERS ON THE
PERIMETER THAT WOULD BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AND CONNECTED TO EACH
TO THE LIVING BUNKERS BY COMMUNICATION TRENCHES, THIS POINTS UP

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2562A SECRET LIMDIS
THE REQUIREMENT FOR PROVISION OF SMALL PREFAB CONCRETE FIGHTING
BUNKERS ASAP. MEANWHILE, OVERHEAD PROTECTION MUST BE AFFORDED
AGAINST AIR BURSTS BY TEMPORARY MEASURES SUCH AS PSP WITH TWO
LAYERS OF POUNDED SANDBAGS.

B. IT WAS INDICATED THAT THE ARVN CONCEPT OF MANNING
STRONG POINTS WITH ONE BATTALION MEANS ONE COMPANY IN THE STRONG
POINT AND TWO COMPANIES OUT PATROLLING; THEREFORE, THEY PLANNED TO
HAVE ONLY ENOUGH FIGHTING BUNKERS IN EACH STRONG POINT FOR THE
DEFENDING COMPANY. THIS NEEDS TO BE CHANGED TO PROVIDE FIGHTING
BUNKERS FOR AN ARVN BATTALION MINUS A COMPANY IN EACH OF A-1,
A-2, AND A-3 STRONG POINTS; A-4 SHOULD BE DESIGNED FOR A THREE-
COMPANY ARVN BATTALION.

C. COL NGHI, CHIEF OF STAFF, I CORPS, HAS REQUESTED
THAT A COMBINED TEAM BE FORMED WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM MACV,
JGS, I CORPS, III MAF, 3D MAR DIV, AND 1ST ARVN DIV TO REDESIGN
A-1 AND TO SITE FIGHTING BUNKERS FOR A-2 AND A-3. THE BIG LIVING
BUNKERS AT A-1 SHOULD ONLY BE TAKEN DOWN WHEN REPLACEMENT
SECOND GENERATION CONCRETE OR STEEL BUNKERS HAVE BEEN EMPLACED.

D. ALL ARVN UNITS NEED MORE HEAVY WEAPONS IF THEY ARE
TO DEFEND STRONG POINTS AS REQUIRED. AT A-1 THE BATTALION HAD ONLY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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~~SECRET~~

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO	
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 41

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 31 JAN 1992

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 2562A S E C R E T L I M D I S
 SIX MACHINE GUNS WHICH WENT OUT WITH PATROLS, SO THERE WERE NONE
 ON SITE. A-1 HAD TWO 81MM MORTARS; ARVN DID NOT WISH TO FIRE
 THESE AT MAXIMUM CHARGE AS THEY BELIEVED THEM TOO OLD. A-2 AND
 A-3 WERE ALSO SHORT OF SUFFICIENT HEAVY WEAPONS FOR THEIR TASK.
 3. ARVN ENGINEERS NEED HELP. ARVN PRISONERS SHOULD
 BE CONSIDERED AS A SOURCE OF LABOR TO FILL SAND BAGS, ETC.
 F. COMMUNICATION TRENCHES HAVE BEEN STARTED, AND IN
 SOME POSITIONS THEY CONNECT MOST OF THE FIGHTING HOLES. HOWEVER,
 MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE IN THIS AREA AND ON COMMUNICATION TRENCHES
 CONNECTION LIVING BUNKERS AND FIGHTING BUNKERS.
 G. IN NEARLY ALL POSITIONS, COMMUNICATION WIRE NEEDS TO
 BE BURIED. GP-3
 BT

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

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CCN 183 FILLER 32

DTG 170540Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG NINTH MAB

CC	<i>b</i>
DCG	<i>W</i>
CIS	<i>Q</i>
DOS	<i>JP</i>

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DATE/TIME GROUP 170540Z JAN 68

#43

CONFIDENTIAL

PFTCZ YUW RUHHROG0194 0170804-CCCC--RUMWAA.
 DE RUABQL 1039B 0170540
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 170540Z JAN 68
 FM CG NINTH MAB
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 A. CG FMFPAC 152127Z JAN 68
 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN TOMPKINS FROM BGEN GLICK
 I. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, I PLAN TO DEPART OKINAWA 180600I,
 ETA DANANG 181030H. VERY RESPECTFULLY.
 GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#43

CCN 1223

FILLER _____

DTG 171206Z

MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND

*ONE COPY
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OFFICE
2670668*

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COPIES OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND MESSAGE 171206Z JANUARY 1968

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DATE/TIME GROUP 171206Z JANUARY 1968

*Very immediate reply is contained
in*

686-2175

#44

O 171206Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND C OSMACV SAIGON
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 INFO GEN MOMYER CG 7TH AF
 ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00791 EYES ONLY

1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES INTO I CORPS, IMPENDING BATTLES AND THE NEED FOR HAVING MORE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE AIR EFFORT AVAILABLE TO ME, I AM CONTEMPLATING PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MARINE AIR WING UNDER MY DEPUTY FORHAIR. HELICOPTERS WOULD REMAIN UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. I HAVE ASKED MOMYER TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AND ANDERSON TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY BUILD-UP, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT I BE IN THE BEST FEASIBLE POSTURE TO MEET THE THREAT. I BELIEVE CENTRALIZING CONTROL OF THE AIR RESOURCES WILL PROMOTE THIS REQUIREMENT. AM PROPOSING THIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL ARRANGEMENT AS TEMPORARY MEASURE TO MEET THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOUR VIEWS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 170

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DECLASSIFIED
 DAMH-HSR-D88
 DATE 31 JAN 1992

~~SECRET~~

1 OF 1

#44

CCN 193 FILLER 16

DTG 171229Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

FOR

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCC	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>
<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>

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COPIES OF COMUSMACV MESSAGE 171229Z JAN 68

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G-3: COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES _____ DATE/TIME _____

D _____ /TIME GROUP 171229Z JAN 68

#45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR

PTTCZYUW RUMSCMV0356 0170000-CCCC--RUMWAA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 DE RUMSMA 2899A 0171300
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 171229Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC WASHDC
 INFO RUHHHQ/CINCPAC
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG RVN
 BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ I A L 01854 FROM; MACJ322
 FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND
 SUBJ; HAWK MISSILE DEFENSE SVN (U)
 REF; COMUSMACV DTG 090146Z JAN 68 (PASEP)
 (C) REFERENCE OUR DISCUSSION REGARDING THE MARINE LAAM
 BATTALION, I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION STATED IN REFERENCE MESSAGE.
 THE MATTER IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF CINCPAC AND THE DETAILS OF ANY
 RECLAMA WHICH THE MARINES MIGHT DESIRE TO MAKE SHOULD BE FOR-
 WARD TO CINCPAC. GP-4
 BT

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-65)

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PP RUHKM
DE RUMSAV 001W 0130020
ZNY CCCCC
P 180020Z JAN 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MGEN ANDERSON INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN

FOR FMFPAC F-004
AVIATION SAFETY (U)
A. CG FMFPAC 130202Z JAN 68

1. CAUSE FACTORS OF VMA-311 ACCIDENTS STATED IN REF A ARE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT AND WERE OF GREAT CONCERN TO ME THE FOUR MAJOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FAULTY MAINTENANCE PRACTICES AND POOR PILOT TECHNIQUE OCCURRED PRIOR TO 1 OCTOBER AND RESULTED IN MAINTENANCE AND TRNG PROCEDURES BEING RE-EXAMINED AND MORE EMPHASIS PLACED ON INCREASED SUPERVISION AT ALL LEVELS. SPECIFICALLY MAG-12 WAS GIVEN A LOWER FRAG REQUIREMENT IN OCT AND THE GROUP COMMANDER INSTITUTED A POSITIVE FORMAL INDOCTRINATION AND TRNG PROGRAM FOR PILOTS AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 001W C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. SINCE THAT TIME VMA-311 HAS SHOWN STEADY IMPROVEMENT AND COMPARES FAVORABLY WITH THE OTHER A4 SQUADRONS IN TERMS OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE ACCIDENT SUFFERED BY THE SQUADRON IN NOV WAS CAUSED BY FAILURE OF THE M-21 ARRESTING CABLE AND IN NO WAY REFLECTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE OF VMA-311.

3. MY EVALUATION INDICATES THAT SQUADRON WILL PERFORM WITH CREDIT IN MONTHS AHEAD.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2109/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SJRG.									#46

CCN 196 FILLER 32

DTG 180118Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

**CG*
c/s

CATEGORY ** We are working on a map for 2d Air Div of Hawaii*

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DATE/TIME GROUP 180118Z JAN 68

47
49

CONFIDENTIAL

VV MF3418 ASA575
RR RUMVAA
DE RUMSMA 2961A 0180132
ZNY CCCCC
R 180118Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUCIHOA/CMC
RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
RUMVAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
BT

RUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 01907
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR ADMIRAL SHARP
SUBJ: ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDERS (U)

VACJ312

1. (C) RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH COMMANDANT, USMC, CONCERNED THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING TWO ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDERS (ADC'S) IN EACH OF THE USMC DIVISIONS IN RVN. THE NATURE OF CIMBAT IN THIS ENVIRONMENT DICTATES WIDE DISPERSION OF DIVISIONAL MANEUVER ELEMENTS AND EXPERIENCE IN COUNTRY HAS PROVED THAT THE ARMY'S TWO ADC PER DIVISION ARE REQUIRED FOR MOST EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL. SINCE THE USMC DIVISIONS HAVE THE SAME TYPE MISSIONS IN THE SAME OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE USMC DIVISIONS IN COUNTRY WILL BE ENHANCED BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF A SECOND ADC TO EACH DIVISION.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 2961A CONFIDENTIAL

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TASK IN I CTZ MAKES IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT OF A SECOND ADC PER USMC DIVISION HIGHLY DESIRABLE. CMC AGREES.

2. (U) REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORTING THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SECOND BRIG GENERAL (ADC) IN EACH OF THE TWO USMC DIVISIONS IN

RVN.
GP-4
BT

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DAMM-HSR-DW 8
DATE: 31 JAN 1982

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#47

CCN _____

FILLER _____

DTG 180332Z

MONTH JANUARY

ORIGINATOR GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV

<u>EG</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<u>DCG</u>	<u>M</u>
<u>C/S</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>

EYES ONLY

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G-3
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DATE/TIME GROUP 180332Z JANUARY 1968

#48

~~SECRET~~

03502

O 130332Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMOSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ I MAC 00805 EYES ONLY

THE MOVES WHICH WE DISCUSSED ON 15 JAN ARE NOW ON THE WAY. THE THOUGHT OCCURS TO ME THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO BUILD UP YOUR STOCKS IN THE KHE SANH AS SOON AS AIRLIFT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. THE PRESENT HEAVY MOVE SCHEDULE WILL EASE UP A LITTLE STARTING 24 JANUARY. AT THAT TIME WE COULD START TO MOVE ADDITIONAL STOCKS ON A ROUTINE BASIS. OF COURSE WE WILL MEET COMBAT ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS AT ANY TIME.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANEM SSION ONLY

110

NNNN

10P1

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-DH 8
DATE: 31 JAN 1992

~~SECRET~~

#48

CCN 210 FILLER 16

DTG 181154Z MONTH JANUARY 1958

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG
c/s
DCS
@
m

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DAMH-HSR-D#
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G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 181154Z JAN 68

#50

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

RR RUMSAK
DE RUMSAW 0275U 0181205
ZNY SSSSS
R 181154Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG
INFO ZEN/CDR 7AF SAIGON
BT

~~SECRET~~ S P E C I A T 02005 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN
CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
SUBJ: INCREASED CBU-24 ASSETS (U)
REF: YOUR MSG 131446Z JAN 68 (S)

1. (S) THE THREAT OUTLINED IN YOUR MESSAGE APPEARS WELL WORTH THE ADDITIONAL MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES WHICH YOU PROPOSE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH GEN MOMYER, AND HE HAS AGREED TO ASSIST AS POSSIBLE. GEN BLOOD, DCS OPRS., HQ, 7AF, CONTACTED GEN ANDERSON 15 JAN. GEN BLOOD RETURNED TO HIS HQ AND IS EVALUATING THE EXTENT OF THE LOAN THAT CAN BE MADE FROM 7AF ON HAND STOCKS.

2. (S) PLEASE KEEP ME ADVISED ON DEVELOPMENTS AND OF ADDED ASSISTANCE YOU MAY REQUIRE.
GP-4
BT

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DAMH-HSR-DWF
DATE: 01 JAN 1982

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#50

CCN 242

FILLER 16

DTG 200130Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG NINTH MAB

*# 344 burned
led out
FOP*

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<i>45</i>	<i>2</i>

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copy 64 COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES _____ DATE/TIME _____

INFO G-3 COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES _____ DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME GROUP 200130Z JAN 68

#51

SECRET

FOR

RFTSZYUW RUMHROJ2541 0201418-SSSS--RUMMWAA.
 DE RUABQL 1209B 0200130
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 200130Z JAN 68
 FM CG NINTH MAB
 TO RUMHFM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 RUAUDE/MAG ONE FIVE (REIN)
 RUABPO/VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
 BT

S E C R E T
 FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN BOUKER
 REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FOR AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION (U)

- A. CG III MAF 181430Z JAN68
- B. CG 9TH MAB 270217Z DEC67
- C. CG 9TH MAB 040619Z JAN68
- D. CG 9TH MAB 180540Z JAN68

1. IN VIEW OF THE ADDITIONAL KC-130F AUGMENTATION REQ REF A, THE FOLLOWING INFO IS SUBMITTED: ALL T-56-7A ENGINES ARE INSTALLED OR ASSIGNED TO A/C. FOUR SPARE ENGINES NOT INSTALLED ARE NOT RFI FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

(A) ONE HAS METAL IN SUMPS AND LOSS OF POWER BEYOND LIMITS

PAGE TWO RUABQL 1209B **S E C R E T**
 CAUSED BY COMPRESSOR EROSION.

(B) THREE ENGINE COMPRESSOR SECTIONS TURNED IN TO CUSTOMER SERVICE NARF ALAMEDA FOR REWORK ON 7265, 7364 AND 8008 JULIAN DATES. TURN AROUND TIME THESE COMPRESSORS EST TO BE 45-60 DAYS.

2. SINCE NO SPARE ENGINES AVAILABLE, LOSS OF AN ENGINE WOULD REQUIRE CANNIBALIZATION TO RECOVER THE A/C.

3. IN VIEW OF PARA 1 AND 2 ABOVE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT TWO QEC WITH ACCESSORIES, TORQUEMETER AND GEAR BOX INSTALLED BE DELIVERED TO VMGR-152 ASAP.

4. KC-130F BUNO 150687 NORS-G FOR GTC85A VMGR-152 REQD R094438009G744 PASSED TO PAZ. FIVE SPARE GTC85A CURRENTLY ON ORDER NORS-A. REQUEST TWO GTC85A BE DELIVERED VMGR-152 ASAP.

5. REF B, C AND D REPORTED CRITICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IN OF 3100, 6314 AND 6761. DEGRADATION OF MISSION COULD RESULT IF THESE SHORTAGES CONTINUE WITH INCREASED TONNAGE REQUIREMENTS LISTED REF A.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#51

CCN _____

FILLER _____

DTG 200435Z JAN 68

MONTH JAN 68

CG
CIS

ORIGINATOR GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV

EYES ONLY

I passed this info to Gen Tompkins. He will be at the bank to meet w/ Gen Abrams. I advised that you would probably accompany that. I will definitely inform you after I talked with you. [Signature]

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COPIES OF GEN ABRAMS

MESSAGE 200435Z JAN 68

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DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME ~~GROUP~~ 200435Z JAN 68

22 0200436

O 200435Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GENERAL ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV
TO LT GENERAL CUSHMAN CG III MAF

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00929 EYES ONLY

I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT KHE SANH 21 JANUARY 1968. I WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ BRADFORD, BRIG GEN RASMUSSEN, COL CAMM AND COL TAYLOR.

I WOULD LIKE A BRIEFING THERE ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION, FIRE SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS AND THE LOGISTICAL STATUS TO INCLUDE MEDICAL SUPPORT.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE A LOOK AROUND THE INSTALLATION ITSELF. I HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS:

ARRIVE DANANG AT 1145 BY T-39, BOARD A C-130 AT DANANG, AND ARRIVE AT KHE SANH AT APPROXIMATELY 1230 HOURS. I PLAN TO STAY ABOUT 2 HOURS.

PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS IS AN ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

150

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DATE: 01 JAN 1992

1 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

#52

CCN _____

lp/

FILLER _____

DTG 210145Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR GEN ABRAMS

af

EYES ONLY

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6C10068*

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0210146

O 0210145Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ I MAC 02957HEYES ONLY

I HAVE DECIDED TO CHANGE PLANS. I WILL
ARRIVE AT DA NANG BY T-39 ABOUT 1200. I WOULD
LIKE TO VISIT 1 T CAV AND 3D MAR DIV AT DONG HA.
I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ABLE TO CONFER WITH YOU.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
065

NNNN

GET HERE OK MAE

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DAMH-HSR-D48
DATE
31 JAN 1992

10F4

#63

CCN 272

FILLER 25

DTG 190717Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG / lo
h
CB / e

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6/10/68

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DATE/TIME GROUP 190717Z JAN 68

#58

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VV ASA 742
 PP RUMWAA
 DE RUMSMA 3251A 0190814
 ZNY CCCC
 P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
 BT

FOR

NO FORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ I A L NOFORN 02086 FROM MACJOIR FOR
 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER SEC I OF X SECTIONS
 SUBJ: PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING NOVEMBER 1967 (U)
 1. (U) THIS REPORT IS THE TENTH IN A SERIES OF MONTHLY ASSESS-
 MENTS OF PACIFICATION BASED UPON FIELD REPORTING AND ANALYSIS.
 2. (C) SUMMARY: THE INCREASED TEMPO OF THE PACIFICATION PRO-
 GRAM WAS MAINTAINED DURING NOVEMBER. ALTHOUGH THE RD PLANS IN MOST

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3251A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 PROVINCE REMAINED BEHIND SCHEDULE IN RELATION TO THEIR YEAR END GOALS,
 THE NUMBER OF PROVINCES ON SCHEDULE INCREASED FROM 9 TO 15. THERE
 WAS A SLIGHT DECLINE (2,005 FROM 2,135) IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VIC
 INCIDENTS, BUT A SHARP INCREASE IN THE USE OF TERROR (586 INCIDENTS
 COMPARED TO 367 IN OCTOBER) ARE THE NUMBER OF ASSASSINATIONS AND
 ABDUCTIONS (976 COMPARED TO 479 LAST MONTH). IN SPITE OF THESE
 FIGURES, YOXUR BEST ESTIMATE OF THE POPULATION UNDER GVN CONTROL
 (BASED UPON THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM) REMAINS AT 68.2PCT (SECURITY
 FACTORS ONLY.)

A. ICE CONTINUED TO MAKE HEADWAY IN NOVEMBER, THOUGH TOP-
 LEVEL GVN ENDORSEMENT WAS NOT FORTHCOMING. A NOTABLE SUCCESS WAS
 SCORED IN QUANG NAM IN I CORPS, AND III CORPS 148 VC INFRASTRUC-
 TURE (VIC) WERE ELIMINATED BY DOICC OPERATIONS.

B. OPENING OF HIGHWAY 1 IN BINH THUAN FROM PHAN THIET TO
 TUY PHONG AND COMMENCEMENT OF MUCH NEEDED REPAIR OF ROUTE 20 IN LAM
 DONG WERE DEVELOPMENTS OF ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE. APPROXIMATELY
 100,00 MORE PEOPLE IN PHAN THIET-TUY PHONG AREA NOW HAVE GREATER
 ACCESS TO MARKETS. FLOW OF DALTA PRODUCE TO SAIGON VEGETABLE
 MARKET SHOULD BE STIMULATED WHEN REPAIR OF ROUTE 20 IS COMPLETE.

C. EXPANSION OF THE RD CADRE CONTINUED DURING NOVEMBER TO

PAGE 1 OF 30 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

DAVIN-HSR-D
 DATE 31 JAN 1992

#54

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3251A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 A NEW HIGH OF 26,908 (527 TEAMS). IN ADDITION, THERE WERE 6,180
 TRUONG SMN (MONTAGNARD) CADRE (110 TEAMS) AND 35 MILITARY-CIVIL
 TEAMS. RD CADRE DESERTIONS, HOWEVER, INCREASED AGAIN IN NOVEMBER.
 FOR THE THIRD STRAIGHT MONTH, REACHING A RATE OF 16.8 PER THOUSAND.
 IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE DESERTION RATE WILL DECLINE IN 1968 WHEN
 NEW LEGISLATION DEALING WITH THE CADRE DISCIPLINE BEGINS TO TAKE EFFECT
 ALONG WITH THE NEW MANDATORY PRE VUNG TAU TRAINING FOR ENLISTEES IN
 ALL PROVINCES.

D. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH FELL TO 960 IN NOVEMBER, MARK-
 ING A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR. CHIEU HOI RESULTS, HOWEVER, STILL
 EXCEED 1966 WITH AN OVERALL INCREASE OF 48PCT. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
 HOI CHAN OF THE MONTH WAS THE MORTAR CREWMAN FROM THE 66TH NVA RGT.
 WHO RALLIED THE DAY BEFORE THE BATTLE OF DAK TO BEGAN, DIVULGING
 IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON THE NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF ENEMY UNITS.
 E. UNLIKE SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES
 RESETTLED OR RETURNED TO VILLAGES WAS GREATER THAN THE NUMBER
 GENERATED (11,448 GENERATED; 16,468 REESTABLISHED). MOREOVER, CORDS
 EFFORTS TO SPUR RESETTLEMENT HAVE RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED
 PROCESSING RATE. MINISTER QUE HAS PROVEN SO FAR TO BE AN
 AGGRESSIVE TASKMASTER DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES HE FACES IN MELDING

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3251A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

TWO FORMER MINISTRIES INTO ONE (SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEES).
 F. NATIONAL POLICE RECRUITMENT TOOK A TURN FOR THE BETTER
 DURING NOVEMBER. THE INCREASE PROBABLY IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE
 GVN GENERAL MOBILIZATION DECREE, AND A SUBSEQUENT RUSH TO AVOID THE
 DRAFT. PRISON OVER-CROWDING WAS SOMEWHAT REDUCED THROUGH THE
 PRESIDENT'S AMNESTY PROGRAM; PRISON POPULATION IS DOWN FROM SLIGHTLY
 OVER 32,700 TO 30,218.

G. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES PROGRESSED AS
 EXPENDITURE OF THE MORD BUDGET INCREASED FROM 57PCT (REVISED FIGURE)
 IN OCTOBER TO 64PCT BY THE END OF NOVEMBER.

3. (C) IMPACT OF THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT

A. ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE

(1) I CORPS SCORED NOTABLE SUCCESS THROUGH EMPLOYMENT
 OF ICE CONCEPT. IN QUANG TRI CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS OF
 SELECTED HAMLETS USING ICE TARGET FOLDERS NETTED 22 VCI. IN QUANG
 TIN THE "RIFLE SHOT" APPROACH USING MOST WANTED LISTS RESULTED IN
 CAPTURE OF THE VC PROVINCE ECONOMY AND FINANCE COMMITTEE CHIEF. IN
 QUANG NAM 64 VCI IN HOI AN WERE ARRESTED, INCLUDING AN EMPLOYEE OF
 THE PROVINCE LAND TENURE SERVICE WHO WAS A CHAIRMAN OF THE HOI AN NLF.
 ALSO CAPTURED WERE FOUR PENETRATION AGENTS IN GVN MILITARY UNITS.

PAGE 2 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 3251A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 (2) ICE ACTIVITIES STILL CENTER ON RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN EXPANDING AND REFINING THE ORGANIZATION. A MAJOR EFFORT GOES INTO ESTABLISHING A THOROUGH AND PURIFIED DATA BASE, PRIORITY TARGET LISTS, AND EFFECTIVE LOCAL COLLATING SYSTEMS. COORDINATED, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST VCI ARE STILL ON THE RISE. WHILE THE LACK OF A NATIONAL PROGRAM EXERTS A DRAG, THE EFFORT CONTINUES TO ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM INCREASINGLY INFULSNTIAL QUARTERS. GVN SUPPORT IN I AND II CORPS IS STRONG AND IN IV CTZ SUBSTANTIAL. IN III CORPS, WHERE GVN COMMITMENT IS LESS EVIDENT, NOVEMBER WAS MARKED BY A VISIT OF GENERAL LOAN TO THREE DOICCS. HIS CURRENT OVERT INTEREST IN ICEX IS HEARTENING.
 (3) THE PROGRAM IS STAYING AHEAD OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. FIELD STAFF STRENGTH STANDS AT 106 OF 126 AUTHORIZED. PERSONNEL FILL HAS BEEN ADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN THE THRUST OF ICE. BASED ON PRESENT ASSESSMENTS OF NEED, ICE HAS REQUESTED 10E ADDITIONAL SPACES.
 (4) THE NUMBER OF DISTRICT OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS (DOICCS) THROUGH WHICH ICEX OPERATES AT DISTRICT GREW FROM 57 AS OF 31 OCTOBER TO 75 AS OF 30 NOVEMBSR. TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF THE 11 DOICCS PROGRAMMED

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3251A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 IS 31 DECEMBER 1967.

TABLE ONE

	ACTIVATED	PROGRAMMED
I CORPS	20	20
II CORPS	14	20
III CORPS	37	53
IV CORPS	4	22
TOTAL	75	115

THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTERS (PCCS) FROM LAST MONTH.

TABLE TWO

	NUMBER OF PICSN	N CAPACITY (PERSONS)
I CORPS	6	156
II CORPS	9	200
III CORPS	10	260
IV CORPS	13	298
TOTAL	38	914

(5) ICEX MEMORANDA AND OPERATIONAL AIDS AND THE THIRD NEWS LETTER ISSUE, WERE PUBLISHED IN NOVEMBER. THESE PUBLICA-
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 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOO
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
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CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 02086 FROM MACJOIR FOR
 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER SEC II OF X SECTIONS
 TIONS HAVE PROVED AN ADEQUATE MEDIUM FOR MEETING FIELD INFORMATION
 REQUIREMENTS GENERATED BY PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT.

(G) NEW DETENTION FACILITIES, MEANT TO RECEIVE MAINLY
 CIVIL DETAINEES GENERATED BY MILITARY AND CIVIL ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
 OPERATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE ICEX CONCEPT. AS THINGS NOW STAND,

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3252A CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 NEW CONSTRUCTION IS MOVING AT A BARELY ACCEPTABLE RATE. THE MAJOR
 WEAKNESS IN THE DETENTIONCENTER PROGRAM IS A LACK OF CORRESPONDING
 SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE PART OF THE GVN.

B. EXPAND AND IMPROVE TERRITORIAL SECURITY:

(1) BASED ON THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES),
 RESULTS AS OF 30 NOVEMBER 1967, THE FOLLOWING TABLES SHOW CHANGES
 IN HAMLET AND POPULATION STATUS FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH BY & OR -
 NUMBERS IN EACH CATEGORY: NOTE: THIS & STANDS FOR THE PLUS SIGN

TABLE THREE

HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

	SECURE					CONTESTED			TOTAL
	A	B	C	D	E	OTHER	VC		
I CORPS	28 &0	269 &13	533 &53	436 -17	72 -3	195 &8	939 -43	2468 &11	
II CORPS	50 &1	524 &8	1002 -6	548 -4	140 -5	298 &51	541 -38	3103 &7	
III CORPS	8 &1	313 -9	644 -12	443 &35	66 -&2	199 &1	468 -10	2141 -28	
IV CORPS	133 &1	743 -21	1090 &38	806 -2	168 -20	77 &7	1985 -15	5002 &18	

PAGE 4 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3252A C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N
 RVN 219 1845 3269 2233 446 769 3933 12714
 &3 -9 &73 &12 -26 &67 -56 &64

TABLE FOUR
 POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)
 (THOUSANDS)

	A	B	C	D	E
I CORPS	74.7	567.2	654.0	414.4	67.6
	-0.6	&28.2	&45.5	-11.6	-3.3
II CORPS	213.2	420.2	914.3	301.0	76.0
	&0.3	&1.5	&34.9	-5.2	&1.4
III CORPS	32.6	780.7	1249.1	587.4	41.7
	&1.0	-4.2	&4.9	&49.7	&4.2
IV CORPS	345.3	1398.3	1421.2	842.8	131.8
	&5.3	-22.5	&35.9	&9.1	-16.4
RVN	665.8	3466.4	4238.6	2145.6	317.1
	&6.0	&30.	&121.2	&42.0	-14.1

NON

	VC	OTHER	HAMLET	TOTAL
I CORPS	762.4	30.0	660.0	3230.3
	-11.0	&6.2	&67.9	&121.3

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3252A C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N

II CORPS	217.7	35.6	430.4	2908.4
	-8.5	&8.9	&11.8	&45.1
III CORPS	257.3	16.6	2356.7	5322.1
	-6.6	-2.2	-1.1	&45.7
IV CORPS	1536.6	16.3	76.7	5769.0
	-4.1	&4.0	-81.0	-69.7
RVN	2774.0	98.5	3523.8	17229.8
	-30.2	&16.9	-2.4	&142.4

TABLE FIVE
 HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)

	SECURE					CONTESTED		VC	TOTAL
	A	B	C	D	E	OTHER			
I CORPS	114	266	518	377	59	195	939	2468	
	-1	&19	&24	&8	-4	&8	-43	&11	
II CORPS	190	670	856	458	90	298	541	3103	
	&4	-46	&36	-4	&4	&51	-38	&7	
III CORPS	118	371	551	392	42	199	468	2141	
	-13	-7	-2	&36	&3	-1	&10	&28	
IV CORPS	275	708	1042	89370	145	77	1957	5302	
	&2	-26	&6	&37	-23	&7	&49	&18	

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 RVN 697 2015 2967 1997 336 769 3933 12714
 -8 -60 864 877 -20 867 -56 864

TABLE SIX
 POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)
 (THOUSANDS)

	A	B	C	D	E
I CORPS	303.9	473.7	576.7	366.9	56.8
	81.1	816.3	840.4	83.6	-3.1
II CORPS	462.1	653.6	780.6	272.2	55.9
	812.0	-78.0	897.6	-7.2	88.5
III CORPS	298.8	1925.0	960.1	374.8	32.8
	-10.7	-9.6	834.4	839.2	82.3
IV CORPS	578.2	1169.2	1340.4	922.9	128.7
	813.1	-44.9	815.1	849.5	-20.9
RVN	1643.0	3321.5	3657.8	1936.8	274.2
	815.5	-116.2	8187.5	885.0	-13.2

	VC	OTHER	NON HAMLET	TOTAL
I CORPS	762.4	30.0	770.0	3230.4
	-44.0	86.2	867.9	8121.4

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3252A C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N
 II CORPS 217.7 35.6 430.4 2908.1

	-8.5	88.9	811.8	845.0
III CORPS	257.3	16.6	2356.7	5322.1
	-6.6	-2.2	-1.1	845.7
IV CORPS	1536.6	16.3	76.7	5769.0
	-4.1	84.0	-81.0	-69.2
RVN	2774.0	98.5	3523.8	17229.6
	-30.2	816.9	-2.4	8142.9

(2) A COMPARISON OF SECURE AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION FOR RVN AS A WHOLE IS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE. ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY ALONE - THE MOST IMPORTANT CRITICAL FACTOR IN MEASURING THE PROGRESS OF PACIFICATION - 68.2 PCT OF THE POPULATION WAS IN THE SECURE CATEGORY ON 30 NOVEMBER 1967.

TABLE SEVEN
 SECURE, CONTESTED AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION
 TOTAL RVN, 30 NOVEMBER 1967
 POPULATION (THOUSANDS)

	SECURE	VC	CONTESTED
SECURITY ONLY	11,747.3	2886.7	2595.1
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	11,496.3	2886.7	2846.8

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 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMMAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZN
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
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 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION III OF X.

N PERCENT OF TOTAL, 30 NOVEMBER 1967

	SECURE	VC	CONTESTED
SECURITY ONLY	68.2	16.7	15.1
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	66.7	16.8	16.5

(3) ON BALANCE, SECURITY IMPROVED IN I CORPS DURING

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3253A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 NOVEMBER. IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE CORPS, SECURITY CONTINUED
 TO IMPROVE AS A RESULT OF OPERATIONS BY THE MARINES AND THE
 AMERICAL DIVISION. ENEMY INTERFERENCE WITH PACIFICATION WAS MINI-
 MAL EXCEPT IN QUANG NAM, WHERE THERE WAS A GENERAL DETERIORATION
 OF SECURITY AND QUANG TIN, WHERE THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN TERRORISM.
 QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TRI NOTED AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR OVERALL
 SECURITY SITUATION; THUA THIEN EXPERIENCED NO NOTICEABLE CHANGE.
 THERE WAS CONTINUED INTIMIDATION OF LOCAL RESIDENTS THROUGHOUT THE
 CORPS, PARTICULARLY IN THE QUANG NAM RESETTLEMENT CAMPS. ASSASS-
 INATIONS INCREASED FROM 36 LAST MONTH TO 84 IN NOVEMBER, INCLUDING
 FOUR HAMLET CHIEFS, AND ABDUCTIONS ROSE DRAMATICALLY FROM 87 TO 232.
 VC ATTACKS AGAINST REFUGEE CAMPS IN QUANG TIN, QUANG NAM AND QUANG
 TRI RESULTED IN 34 REFUGEES KILLED, 70 WOUNDED AND 90 ABDUCTED. 885
 STRUCTURES WERE DESTROYED AND 431 DAMAGED. THE NUMBER OF MININGS
 ALONG NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1 INCREASED THROUGHOUT THE CORPS. THE ENEMY
 DESTROYED SEVERAL MAJOR BRIDGES IN QUANG NAM. THE RESULT OF THIS
 INTERDICTION WAS THE CONTINUAL BLOCKING OF THE FLOW OF CIVILIAN GOODS
 FROM DANANG TO THE PROVINCES AT A TIME WHEN THE MONSOON SEASON
 PRECLUDED NORMAL COASTAL JUNK TRAFFIC.

TABLE EIGHT

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3253A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
I CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	NOV	OCT
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	574	766
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	36,850	37,410
ASSASSINATIONS, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	410	255
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	37	54
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	41.2	54.5
(SEE FOOTNOTE 1) AMBER (PCT)	51.5	45.5
RED (PCT)	7.3	0
NES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY	898	856
NES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECUCE CATEGORY	67.5	57.12
RF STRENGTH	18,973	18,608
PF STRENGTH	23,620	23,359

(4) IN II CORPS, ENEMY ACTION WAS MARKED BY A MAJOR ATTACK IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS, SOME INCREASE IN ACTIVITY IN BINH DINH AND INTENSIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES IN PHU YEN, KHANH HOA, BINH THUAN AND LAM DONG PROVINCES. INCIDENTS OF HIGHWAY INTERDICTION AND SMALL SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND SELECTED INSTALLATIONS OCCURRED THROUGHOUT II CORPS. IN BINH DINH PROVINCE VC ACTIVITY INCREASED SOMEWHAT AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO REGAIN CONTROL

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3253A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
OF THE POPULATION AND RESOURCES. MORE EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON SAPPER ATTACKS AND RESUPPLY ACTIVITY. PHU YEN PROVINCE'S SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATED SOMEWHAT DUE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES TO MEET THE DONTUM THREAT AND THE VC SOUGHT TO GAIN CONTROL OF GVN SECURED AREAS BY ATTACKING DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AT HIEU XUONG AND SUB-SECTOR HEADQUARTERS AT TUY AN. IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE, ENEMY ACTIVITY WAS INTENSIFIED AROUND THE POPULATION CENTERS OF NINH HOA AND NHA TRANG. FOOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM BUT APPARENTLY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY AND PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, ALLEVIATING SERIOUS SHORTAGES IN THOSE AREAS. A BATTALION SIZE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED AGAINST NINH HOA EARLY IN THE MONTH WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY ENEMY CASUALTIES. SAPPER ACTIVITY AND A SMALL SCALE ENEMY ASSAULT TOOK PLACE IN THE NHA TRANG AREA. INCREASED ACTIVITY WAS DIRECTED AGAINST ACVN/RF/PF UNITS IN MAJOR EFFORTS TO REGAIN CONTROL OF ROUTE 20 IN VAM DONG AND TO DISRUPT THE RD EFFORT IN BINH THUAN. THE MUONG MAN-THIEN-GIAO-PHAN THIET TRIANGLE WAS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IN HIS ATTEMPT TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE POPULATION. HARASSING FIRES, TERRORISM, AND SABOTAGE WERE DIRECTED AGAINST THIS DENSELY POPULATED AREA. BATTALION SIZE ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED IN BOTH BINH THUAN AND LAM DONG TO OBTAIN A FIRMER CONTROL

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 253A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 OF LOC'S IN THESE AREAS. SPORADIC INTERDICTION OF ROUTES 1 AND 20
 CONTINUED DURING NOVEMBER AND BRIDGES WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED ON
 BOTHE HIGHWAYS.

TABLE NINE
 III CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	NOV	OCT
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	284	289
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	29,990	30,545
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	145	99
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	33	24
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	58.0	67.4
AMBER (PCT)	30.3	22.3
RED (PCT)	11.7	10.2
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY	1,716	1,722
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	78.33	77.73
RF STRENGTH	36,270	36,131
PF STRENGTH	35,434 N	35,706

(5) THE VC TERRORIST RATE IN III CORPS REACHED THE
 HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE YEAR. A TOTAL OF 373 ACTIONS AGAINST THE
 CIVILIAN POPULATION (49 OF THESE WERE SELECTIVE) WERE REPORTED

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3253A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 DURING NOVEMBER, MORE THAN A 30PCT INCREASE OVER THE FIGURES
 REPORTED FOR OCTOBER. THERE WERE FEWER PROPAGANDA AND TAX
 COLLECTION INCIDENTS (DOWN FROM 122 TO 111),
 FEWER KIDNAPPINGS (DOWN FROM 55 TO 26), BUT ASSASSINATIONS (50 NON-
 SELECTIVE AND 23 SELECTIVE) AND WOUNDINGS (213 NON-SELECTIVE AND 14
 SELECTIVE) WERE UP SHARPLY. A PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF THE UP-SWING
 IS THE INCREASE IN VC MILITARY ACTIONS IN BINH LONG AND PHUOC LONG
 PROVINCES. MORTAR AND/OR ROCKET ATTACKS ON THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS
 AND THE DISTRICT TOWNS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THESE PROVINCES HAVE
 BECOME RATHER COMMON PLACE, RESULTING IN A RISE IN
 CIVILIAN WOUNDINGS. IN PHUOC TUY, AN INCREASE WAS ALSO NOTED.
 IN ALL AREAS, THE PRIMARY TARGET OF VC TERRORIST ACTION APPEARS TO
 BE THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN GENERAL, AND THE RD CADRES AND THE
 NATIONAL POLICE. EXAMPLES HAVE RECENTLY OCCURRED IN BINH DUONG
 AND PHUOC LONG WHERE RD HAMLETS WITH GOOD RD GROUPS HAVE SUFFERED
 GRIEVOUS CASUALTIES. THESE INCIDENTS INCLUDE HOA MY IN BINH DUONG
 WHEREIN THE VC HIT THE RD GROUP GUARDING A LITERACY CLASS KILLING
 EIGHT AND WOUNDING FOUR CADRE. DURING NOVEMBER THERE WERE A TOTAL
 OF 20 ATTACKS AGAINST RD TEAMS, RESULTING IN 11 CADRE KIA AND 34
 WIA. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT TO DATE THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS OF
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 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMFFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSNT/SA IV CTZ
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 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION IV OF X.
 A GENERAL DETERIORATION OF MORALE AS A RESULT OF THESE ATTACKS,
 AND THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE EFFECT ON THE RECRUITMENT OF
 NEW CADRE.

TABLE TEN
 III CORPS SECURITY RESUME

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3254A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

	NOV	OCT
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	519	602
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	29,002	29,062
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIAN	166	86
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	35	26
STATUS OF ROADS- GREEN (PCT)	73.2	73.3
AMBSR (PCT)	15.8	15.8
RED (PCT)	11.0	11.0
STATUS OF WATERWAYS- GREEN (PCT)	61.3	55
(SSE FOOTNOTE 1) AMBER (PCT)	34.2	41
RED (PCT)	4.5	4
NES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY	1,040	1,062
NES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	83.3	85.4
RF STRENGTH	38,278	37,689
PF STRENGTH	26,374	25,678

(6) IN NO DELTA PROVINCE DID SECURITY IMPROVE DURING
 NOVEMBER. IN MOST, IT TOOK A DECIDED DOWNTURN. THERE WAS A STRONG
 RISE IN VC INCIDENTS DURING THE MONTH, CONTINUING UN UPTURN THAT
 BEGAN ON OGBODR. EVERY PROVINCE EXCEPT THREE REPORTED SIGNIFICANT
 VC REACTION TO PURIFICATION, AND MOST REPORTED STRONG EFFORTS AT

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3254A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 LONG-RUN INTERDICTION OF LOC'S. AS IN OCTOBER, VC ATTEMPTS TO INTERDICT NATIONAL HIGHWAY FOUR RESULTED IN NUMEROUS TRAFFIC STOPPAGES ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC FLOW WAS MAINTAINED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT DELAY. GVN/US COORDINATION IN REPAIRING THE ROAD IS INCREASING AND COMMAND ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN TO ELIMINATING THE MX THUAN FERRY BOTTLENECK. A NUMBER OF LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE TO RELIEVE VC PRESSURE ON ROUTE 4. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE VC HOPE, BY STRIKING AT OUTPOSTS, TOWNS, RD AREAS AND LOC, TO DESTROY THE MOMENTUM OF PACIFICATION, NEGATE THE RESULTS OF THE LOCAL ELECTIONS, AND ISOLATE THE LOWER REACHES OF THE DELTA. BRIGHT SPOTS IN THE TERRITORIAL SECURITY PICTURE ARE THE CONTINUED ASCENDANCY OF ARVN OVER THE VC MAIN FORCES, PERFORMANCE OF RDC GROUPS IN BEATING OFF HARASSING ATTACKS, AND INTRODUCTION OF US MOBILE ADVISORY (MAT) TEAMS WHICH SHOULD RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT UP-GRADING OF COMBAT CAPABILITY OF RF/PF. CORDS COMMANDER IS TAKING INCREASING INTEREST IN TERRITORIAL SECURITY AND HAS INSTITUTED CORPS INSPECTION OF RF/PF OUTPOSTS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS.

TABLE ELEVEN
 IV CORPS SECURITY RESUME

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3254A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

	NOV	OCT
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	628	478
VC COMBAT STRENGTH	18,735	19,535
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	255	69
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	39	30
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	23.1	23.1
AMBER (PCT)	51.4	51
RED (PCT)	0.0	0.0
STATUS OF WATERWAYS - GREEN (PCT)	38.7	39
AMBER (PCT)	51.4	51
RED (PCT)	9.9	10
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY	2,025	2,043
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	55.8	54.2
RF STRENGTH	53,675	52,810
PF STRENGTH	60,690	59,379

IC. EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD TEAMS EFFORTS AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS:
 (1) EXPANSION OF THE RD CADRS CONTINUED DURING NOVEMBER. FROM A LOW OF 21,440 DURING APRIL (411 TEAMS), RDC STRENGTH INCREASED TO 26,908 (527 TEAMS) ON 30 NOVEMBER. THE DISTRIBUTION

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 3154A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
OF THE GAIN IS AS FOLLOWS:

TABLE TWELVE

	RDC STRENGTH 30 APRIL	RDC STRENGTH 31 OCTOBER	RDC STRENGTH 30 NOVEMBER	PERCENT INCREASE APR-NOV 67
I CORPS	7,001	7,354	7,328	4.7
II CORPS	6,188	7,907	8,073	30.5
III CORP	2,881	3,618	3,901	35.4
IV CORPS	5,370	7,199	7,606	41.6

IN ADDITION TO RD CADRE, THERE WERE 110 TRUONG SON RD (TSRD) MONTAG-NARD TEAMS AND 6,180 TS CADRE AS OF 30 NOVEMBER. THERE ARE ALSO 35 CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, 32 OF THEM IN II CORPS.

(2) RD CADRE DESERTIONS INCREASED AGAIN IN NOVEMBER FOR THE THIRD STRAIGHT MONTH. DESERTION RATES HAVE INCREASED FROM 12.5 PER THOUSAND IN SEPTEMBER TO 14.1 PER THOUSAND IN OCTOBER AND 16.8 PER THOUSAND IN NOVEMBER. ON 1 JANUARY 1968, PRE-VUNG TAUN TRAINING FOR RD CADRE ENLISTEES WILL BE MANDATORY IN ALL PROVINCES. IT IS HOPED THAT THIS, AND OTHER RECENTLY PASSED LEGISLATION DEALING WITH CADRE DISCIPLINE AS WELL AS MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE RD CADRE MORALE WILL BE FELT IN 1968. TOTAL CADRE LOSSES ARE SHOWN

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3254A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE THIRTEEN
RD CADRE LOSSES

	NOV	OCT
KILLED	113	70
CAPTURED	10	18
RESIGNED	91	100
DISCHARGED AND RETIRED	157	153
DESERTED	441	370
TOTAL	812	711

(3) BY THE END OF NOVEMBER, THERE WERE 8,052 STUDENTS IN TRAINING AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER IN VUNG TAU, INCLUDING RECRUIT CLASSES AND SPECIALISTS UNDERGOING LEADERSHIP, INTELLIGENCE,

AND MEDICAL TRAINING. ON 6 NOVEMBER, 2,322 RD CADRE GRADUATED FROM VUNG TAU. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PROBLEM OF RECRUITMENT, WHICH HAS PLAGUED RD CADRE FOR SOME TIME, HAS RESOLVED ITSELF, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF A WIDE SPREAD MOVE TO AVOID SERVICE IN THE RVNAF UNDER THE NEW MOBILIZATION DECREE.

(4) THE STATIC CENSUS GRIEVANCE CADRE PROGRAM CONTINUES AS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL OF THE RD PROGRAMS. AT THE END OF
BT

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 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III FTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 02286 KROM MACJOIR FOR
 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTC ROSSON, LTC WEYAND, LTC CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER, SECTION V OF X.
 THE MONTH, THERE WERE 5,469 (5,365 IN OCTOBER) CENSUS GRIEVANCE
 CADRES. THE CEILING SET FOR 1 JANUARY 1968 IS 7,917. THE NUMBER
 OF HOI CHANH INDUCED TO RALLY BY RD AND CG ARE:

RD & T SRD	OCT 43	NOV 51	YEAR TO DATE 906
------------	-----------	-----------	---------------------

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3255A CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 CENSUS GRIEVANCE 86 63 1,615

D. ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI EFFORT
 (1) THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH FELL TO 960 IN NOVEMBER,
 MARKING A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR. THE TREND IS ILLUSTRATED IN THE
 FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE FOURTEEN

	NOV	MONTHLY AVERAGE 1ST QTR	MONTHLY AVERAGE 2ND QTR	MONTHLY AVERAGE 3RD QTR
I CORPS	172	251	204	181
II CORPS	257	1,047	792	272
III CORPS	206	1,101	733	567
IV CORPS	325	1,183	736	794
TOTAL	960	3,916	2,466	1,814

A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DECLINE IN NOVEMBER IS RECENT VC
 PROPAGANDA TO THE EFFECT THAT FIGHTING WOULD CEASE IN III AND IV
 CTZ AFTER TET, AND A COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMED. THE ENEMY ALSO
 IS APPARENTLY EXERCISING CLOSER PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER LOWER RANKING
 VC.

(2) CHIEU HOI RESULTS STILL EXCEED THOSE ATTAINED IN

PAGE 13 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3255A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 1966.

TABLE FIFTEEN

	1 JAN-30 NOV 1966	1 JAN-30 NOV 1967	PERCENT CHANGE
I CORPS	1,476	2,253	PLUS 53
II CORPS	7,692	6,913	MINUS 10
III CORPS	3,443	7,891	PLUS 129
IV CORPS	5,113	9,232	PLUS 81
TOTAL	17,724	26,289	PLUS 48

THERE WERE 9,068 RETURNEES IN II CORPS IN 1966, A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE TOTAL. OF THESE, 7,122 CAME FROM THE TWO PROVINCES OF BINH DINH AND PHU YEN. IT APPEARS IN RETROSPECT THAT THOSE PROVINCES MAY HAVE BEEN LARGELY DEPLETED OF RETURNEES IN LATE 1966 AND EARLY 1967, THEREBY ACCOUNTING FOR THE SHARP DECLINE IN MIDDLE AND LATE 1967.

(3) THE CAPACITY OF CHIEU HOI CENTERS AGAIN INCREASED IN NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN III CORPS. DISTRIBUTION OF CAPACITY AND COMPLETION OF PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION IS SHOWN BELOW:

TABLE SIXTEEN

PERCENTAGE OF

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3255A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

	CAPACITY 30 NOV	PERCENT INCREASE SINCE 1 JANUARY	PROGRAM COMPLETED 30 NOVEMBER
I CORPS	735	137	137
II CORPS	1998	100	55
III CORPS	1430	94	78
IV CORPS	1745	73	81

A TOTAL OF 53 CENTER S ARE PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION IN 1967. CONSTRUCTION IS UNDERWAY OR COMPLETED IN 38 WILL START IN AN ADDITIONAL 12 SHORTLY.

(4) THE NUMBERS OF HOI CHANH IN ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS INCREASED SLIGHTLY AS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE SEVENTEEN

	31 OCT	30 NOV	WEAPONS
I CORPS	331	338	216
II CORPS	536	611	316
III CORPS	898	836	299
IV CORPS	850	851	530
TOTAL	2615	2636	1361

PROCEDURES AND DIRECTIVES TO IMPLEMENT ISSUANCE OF WEAPONS TO ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS FROM MAP SOURCES HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND DISSEMINA-

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 3255A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
TED BY MACV AND JGS. IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR ONE MONTH
WITH MARKED PROGRESS NOTED IN MOST PROVINCES. THE NUMBER OF ARMED
APT PERSONNEL ROSE FROM 1054 IN OCTOBER TO 1361 IN NOVEMBER.
(5) OUR KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY PLANS FOR DAK TO WAS SIGNI-
FICANTLY INCREASED BY A MORTAR CREWMAN FROM THE 66TH NVA RCT, WHO
RALLIED ON NOVEMBER 2. HIS INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER AND DISPOSITION
OF NVA UNITS WAS PARTICULARLY VALUABLE AS IT WAS THE FIRST REAL
CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPENDING ATTACK ON DAK TO. THE BATTLE BEGAN
THE NEXT DAY, NOVEMBER 3.

(6) IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 3,000 HOI CHANH WILL HAVE
RECEIVED A COURSE OF VOCATIONAL INSTRUCTION OR WILL BE IN SUCH A
COURSE BY YEAR'S END. HERETOFORE, A TOOL SHORTAGE HAS ADVERSELY
AFFECTED THE PROGRAM. AN INITIAL PROCUREMENT OF AMERICAN TOOLS TO
SUPPORT THE PROGRAM ARRIVED IN NOVEMBER, AND IS SCHEDULED FOR COM-
PLETION IN JANUARY 1968.

(7) IN III MAF, 104 HOI CHANH ARE EMPLOYED AS KIT
CARSON SCOUTS, A SLIGHT INCREASE FROM LAST MONTH, AND 35 PROSPECTIVE
RECRUITS ARE BEING SCREENED. FORTY-THREE ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY IN II
CORPS, 49 IN III CORPS AND 18 IN IV CORPS. THE PROBLEM OF INTERIM
FUNDING IS WELL ON THE WAY TO SOLUTION, A PROPOSAL TO USE AIK FUNDS

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3255A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 68 HAVING RECEIVED THE CONCURRENCE OF
APPROPRIATE MACV STAFF AGENCIES. UPON FINAL APPROVAL, PLANS WILL
BE DEVELOPED TO ATTAIN THE GOAL OF 1,800 KIT CARSON SCOUTS BY THE END
OF CALENDAR YEAR 1968.

(8) GVN CHIEU HOI STAFFING REMAINS WEAK, BUT SOME
EFFORT IS BEING MADE BY THE MINISTRY TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION. FOUR-
TEEN RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS WERE RECRUITED INTO THE SERVICE. THREE
RECEIVED PROVINCIAL ASSIGNMENTS. RECRUITING HAS BEEN SUSPENDED WHILE
THE MINISTER CONDUCTS A "PERSONNEL EVALUATION".
E. IMPROVE THE REFUGEE EFFORT:

(1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES GENERATED DURING THE
MONTH WAS 11,448. 16,468 REFUGEES WERE REESTABLISHED; HENCE A DE-
CREASE OF 5,020 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT STATUS. UNLIKE
THE PATTERNS OF SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES GENER-
ATED WAS SMALLER THAN THE NUMBER RESETTLED. THE FOLLOWING ARE COM-
PARATIVE FIGURES:

CHANGE IN TEMPORARY REFUGEES FROM PREVIOUS MONTH
AUG SEP OCT NOV
PLUS 31,496 PLUS 19,073 PLUS ENTYI MINUS 5,020
CORDS EFFORTS TO SPUR RESETTLEMENT HAVE RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANTLY
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 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSNT/SA IV CTZ

BT
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 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION VI OF X.
 IMPROVED PROCESSING RATE, AS THE FOREGOING TABULATION INDICATES.
 (2) THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES REESTABLISHED SINCE 1
 JANUARY 1964 AND THE CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH, ARE SHOWN BE-
 LOW:

TABLE EIGHTEEN

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3256A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 REFUGEES REESTABLISHED
 1 JANUARY 64 - 31 OCTOBER 1967

	TOTAL REESTABLISHED	RETURNED TO VILLAGE AND INDIVIDUALLY RE- SETTLED	GVN SUPPORTED RESETTLEMENT
I CORPS	16,829 PLUS 2,534	71,985 PLUS 2,287	95,835 PLUS 247
II CORPS	482,648 PLUS 1,312	366,388 PLUS 108	116,260 PLUS 1,024
III CORPS	246,491 PLUS 10,662	69,689 MINUS 725	176,802 PLUS 11,387
IV CORPS	414,051 PLUS 1,960	133,395 MINUS 1,052	280,656 PLUS 907
TOTAL	1,311,010 PLUS 16,468	641,457 PLUS 2,723	669,553 PLUS 13,745

(3) REFUGEES NOT REESTABLISHED ARE CLASSIFIED AS TEM-
 PORARY REFUGEES. THESE PEOPLE ARE THE OBJECT OF GVN PROGRAMS OF
 TEMPORARY CARE AND EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT. THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY
 REFUGEES INCREASED IN I AND IV CTZ, BUT DECREASED IN THE OTHER TWO
 CORPS.

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3256A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

TABLE NINETEEN
 TEMPORARY REFUGEES
 1 JANUARY 1964-30 NOVEMBER 1967
 (WITH CHANGES FROM 31 OCT)

	IN CAMP	OUT OF CAMP	TOTAL
I CORPS	198,743	203,679	402,422
	PLUS 13,667	MINUS 12,901	PLUS 776
II CORPS	73,565	117,332	190,897
	PLUS 125	MINUS 366	MINUS 241
III CORPS	28,442	55,109	83,551
	MINUS 3,643	MINUS 3,695	MINUS 7,338
IV CORPS	9,675	99,137	108,210
	PLUS 101	PLUS 1692	PLUS 1793
TOTAL	329,823	475,257	785,080
	PLUS 10,250	PLUS 15,270	MINUS 5,020

(3) REFUGEE REORGANIZATION AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL: THE MSWR (MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEES) PUBLISHED A DECREE ON 18 NOVEMBER DEALING WITH REORGANIZATION AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL AND PROVIDING GUIDANCE ADEQUATE TO PERMIT RESTRUCTURING UNDER A SINGLE CHIEF. BY THIS MEANS SERIOUS PROGRAM IMPAIRMENT WAS AVERTED.

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3256A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

I CTZ INTERSERVICE RIVALRIES LED TO A TEMPORARY INTERREGNUM, AS SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEE CHIEFS SQUABBLED OVER PRECEDENCE. SUCH TRANSITORY DERANGEMENTS SEEM INEVITABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY DO NOT DIMINISH THE LIKELIHOOD OF A STRONGER REFUGEE PROGRAM UNDER THE REORGANIZED MINISTRY. CROSS-UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEE HUMAN RESOURCES TO ENRICH THE PROGRAM LEADERSHIP, PLANNED BY DR. QUE, FOUNDERED IN THE FACE OF GVN CIVIL SERVICE RULES OF SENIORITY.

(4) EMERGENCY REFUGEE SUPPLIES: A THIRTY-DAY, 1,000-PERSON EMERGENCY LOAD OF REFUGEE SUPPLIES HAS BEEN STOCKPILED AT TAN SON NHUT AND WERE DRAWN UPON IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DAK SON INCIDENT. FULL GVN PARTICIPATION IN THIS MEASURE IS UNDER US-GVN DISCUSSION.

(5) JOINT RESETTLEMENT PLANNING: CORDS AND GVN REFUGEE STAFFS HAVE ACCELERATED RESETTLEMENT PLANNING WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LAM DONG PROVINCE IN II CTZ AND TAY NINH, BINH TUY AND PHUOC TUY PROVINCES OF III CTZ. SECURITY FOR RESETTLEMENT AREAS IS THE MOST PERSISTENT PROBLEM. IF APPROVED, THESE PLANS WOULD PERMIT ALLEVIATION OF I CTZ OVERCROWDING. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, A PLAN FOR ADVANCE PREPARATION OF PERMANENT REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT SITES IN

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 3256A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 KEY PROVINCES IS UNDER STUDY. INTENT OF THE PLAN IS TO OBTAIN THE
 NEED FOR A TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT PHASE IN REFUGEE PROCESSING.

F. EXPAND POLICE EFFORT:

(1) NATIONAL POLICE RECRUITMENT, LONG A MATTER OF CONCERN,
 TOOK A TURN FOR THE BETTER DURING NOVEMBER. FROM AN AVERAGE
 OF 25 NP APPLICATIONS PER DAY IN THE PAST, APPLICATIONS AVERAGED
 250 PER DAY DURING NOVEMBER. THIS INCREASE IN APPLICATIONS FOR
 MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL POLICE COINCIDES WITH THE PROMULGATION
 OF THE NEW GVN GENERAL MOBILIZATION DECREE AND IS BELIEVED DIRECTLY
 ATTRIBUTED TO THAT DECREE. WHILE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SHORT-
 AGE OF A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NATIONAL POLICEMEN TO CARRY OUT THE
 NP MISSION DURING A SCREENING AND TRAINING PERIOD, SOME RELIEF SEEMS
 TO BE IN SIGHT.

(2) NPFF SHOULD BENEFIT BY THE IMPROVED RECRUITMENT
 POTENTIAL AND ALSO FROM ANOTHER RECENTLY EFFECTED NP DIRECTIVE.
 THIS DIRECTIVE SETS OUT A PERSONNEL ROTATION POLICY WHEREBY ALL
 NATIONAL POLICEMEN UNDER AGE 30 MUST ROTATE INTO NPFF FOR A PERIOD
 OF TWO YEARS. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NPFF IS ALREADY UP SLIGHTLY IN
 NOVEMBER; 11,988. WITH THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION DECREE AND THE
 ROTATION DIRECTIVE, IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE NPFF PER-

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3256A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

SONNEL LEVEL WILL RISE APPRECIABLY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. TEN COMP-
 ANIES OF THE 67 ACTIVE NPFF COMPANIES ARE STILL EMPLOYED UNSATIS-
 FACTORILY, BUT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE GRADUALLY IN REDUCING THIS
 MIS-USE THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW NPFF SOP.

(3) PRISON OVER-CROWDING WAS SOMEWHAT REDUCED THROUGH
 THE PRESIDENT'S AMNESTY PROGRAM DURING NOVEMBER, AND THE PRISON
 POPULATION IS DOWN FROM SLIGHTLY OVER 32,700 TO 30,218. REHABILITA-
 TION THROUGH TRAINING IS MAKING ACCEPTABLE PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF
 VOCATIONAL TRAINING, AND THE PRISONS INDUSTRIES CLOTHING PRODUCTION
 PROGRAM IS ON SCHEDULE. ACADEMIC TRAINING, HOWEVER, IS STATIC AND
 STILL INADEQUATE BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING SUITABLE IN-
 STRUCTORS. A DECREE SIGNED 22 NOVEMBER 1967 ESTABLISHES A DIRECTOR-
 ATE OF CORRECTIONS WITH A DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL, RESPONSIBLE
 DIRECTLY TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. OTHER CHANGES AMOUNTING TO
 A RE-ORGANIZATION WERE EFFECTED. THESE CHANGES PROVIDE ENHANCED
 STATUS FOR THE PRISONS DIRECTORATE, AS WELL AS A MORE MANAGEABLE
 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION.

TABLE TWENTY
 VC INCIDENTS (TERRORISM)

TOTAL CIVILIAN

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 REPJA/CIA
 RUMVF/CG I FFORCEV YZ II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
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 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHART FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION VII OF X.

	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS
I CORPS	122	410
II CORPS	184	145
III CORPS	142	166

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3257A CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 IV CORPS 133 255
 NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO NP IN ALL CATEGORIES: 68,131
 G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC WORKS, VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT,
 AGRICULTURE, SELF-HELP, ETC.:
 (1) PROGRESS IN VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IS REFLECTED IN
 BUDGETARY PERFORMANCE AS DEPICTED IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:
 TABLE TWENTY-ONE

	BUDGETED \$VN	PCT BUDGET EXPENDED 31 OCT	PCT BUDGET EXPENDED 30 NOV
VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMIN.			
PERSONNEL	31,933,000	39	49
SELF HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT	244,289,000	72	76
RURAL EDUCATION	478,046,000	79	86
RURAL HEALTH	173,530,000	67	72
PUBLIC WORKS	457,833,000	48	56
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	101,795,000	57	66
AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS	105,641,000	61	69

(2) VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMINISTRATION: TRAINING COURSES

PAGE 19 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3257A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS WERE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VILLAGE/
HAMLET ELECTIONS IN JUNE 1967. THE GOAL FOR CY 1967 WAS TO GIVE A
TRAINING COURSE OR SEMINAR FOR 22,900 PEOPLE OR ABOUT 41PCT OF ALL
ELECTED OFFICIALS. THE PROGRAM IS CONSIDERABLY BEHIND SCHEDULE.
AN ESTIMATED 15,500 WILL HAVE COMPLETED TRAINING BY 31 DECEMBER,
WITH 1,500 MORE IN TRAINING, 5 IT NOT YET GRADUATED.

(3) SELF-HELP: SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT: THIS
PROGRAM CONSISTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE AT HAMLET LEVEL
AND THE GOVERNMENT ON SMALL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. THE PEOPLE DE-
CIDE ON THE PROJECTS, RANGING FROM WELLS TO CLASSROOMS, MARKETS
AND RICE-DRYING COURTS. CORDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICERS AND
GVN PROVIDE TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL (AND IN THE CASE OF FUNDED PRO-
JECTS, MONETARY) ASSISTANCE. THE PEOPLE CONTRIBUTE LABOR AND OFTEN
MONEY OR CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. IDEALLY THIS PROVIDES A HEALTHY
MIX OF POPULAR INVOLVEMENT, GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE. THE PROGRAM HAS
BEEN EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL. COMPLETION OF FUNDED AND UNFUNDED PRO-
JECTS IS SHOWN BELOW:

TABLE TWENTY-TWO
SELF-HELP PROJECTS COMPLETED

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3257A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN	JAN-OCT 67	JAN NOV 67	1967 PGM
FUNDED	2931	3548	4704
UNFUNDED	4815	5679	5000 PLUS

(4) RURAL EDUCATION:

TABLE TWENTY - THREE
CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION

	PROGRAMMED 1967	CONSTRUCTED OCTOBER	CONSTRUCTED NOVEMBER
NO. OF CLASSROOMS	2266	1266	1403

TEACHER TRAINING

	1967 PROGRAMMED	TRAINING OCT	COMPLETED NOV
NO. OF TRAINEES	2959	2962	2968

(5) RURAL HEALTH:

TABLE TWENTY-FOUR

MATERNITY/DISPENSARY
CONSTRUCTION

		OCT	NOV
NO. PROGRAMMED		325	325
NO. COMPLETED		73	96

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PAGE 20 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 3257A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 NO. UNDER CONSTRUCTION 229

INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

(6) ROADS AND BRIDGES:

TABLE TWENTY-FIVE
 PROVINCIAL ROADS AND BRIDGES

	OCT	NOV
BRIDGES PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/ RENOVATION:		
ABOVE 1 MILLION VNS	33	33
UNDER 1 MILLION VNS	31	31
UNDER CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION COMPLETED:		
ABOVE 1 MILLION VNS	7	11
UNDER 1 MILLION VNS	62	73
ROADS PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/ RENOVATION (KM):		
REPAIR	566	566
NEW CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED (KM):	216	216
REPAIRED	299	327
NEW CONSTRUCTION	124	131

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3257A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

(7) AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION: THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROGRAM IS TO PROVIDE FARMLAND IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE, AND FACILITIES FOR WATER SUPPLY CONTROL IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS. THE PROJECTS ARE LOCALLY SELECTED.

TABLE TWENTY-SIX
 SMALL IRRIGATION CONSTRUCTION

	1967 PROGRAMMED	COMPLETED NOVEMBER
NO. OF DAMS:		
ABOVE 1 MILLION VNS	19	4
UNDER 1 MILLION VNS	(COMBINED FIGURE)	11
KM OF CANALS	107.7	98

(8) ANIMAL HUSBANDRY: THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES GRANT DISTRIBUTION OF PIGS, POULTRY, ANIMAL FEED, ETC, AND PROVIDES TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND TRAINING FOR FARMERS IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS.

TABLE TWENTY-SEVEN

	PROGRAMMED 1967	COMPLETED OCTOBER	COMPLETED NOVEMBER
PIGS DISTRIBUTED	15,534	9,088	9,725
BT			

PAGE 21 OF 30 PAGES

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 ZNY CCCCC
 P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMWVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMI/SA IV CTZ
 BI

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJOIR FOR
 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LIG ROSSON, LIG WEYAND, LIG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION VIII OF X.
 CHICKENS & DUCKS 33,586 20,882 22,204
 FARMERS TRAINED 21,226 25,492
 (C) AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS UNDER RD BUDGET: RURAL HAMLETS
 ARE ASSISTED BY AGRICULTURAL CADRE AND TECHNICIANS TRAINED AND
 ADMINISTERED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. THESE TECHNICAL PER-

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3258A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 SONNEL ASSIST RD CADRE IN TRAINING LOCAL FARMERS IN IMPROVED CROP
 PRODUCTION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGY. THE PAY OF THE AGRICULTURAL
 CADRE AND TECHNICIANS, AS WELL AS THE COST OF FERTILIZER, INSECTI-
 CIDES, SPRAYERS, PUMPS, AND THE TRAINING AND DEMONSTRATION COSTS
 ARE FUNDED FROM THE RD BUDGET AND USAID. THIS PROGRAM IS SUPER-
 IMPOSED UPON THE REGULAR MOA PROGRAMS.

TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT

PROGRAM	1967	COMPLETED OCTOBER	COMPLETED NOVEMBER
FARMER TRAINING			
SESSIONS	982	785	868
NO. OF FARMERS		35,864	40,254
DEMONSTRATIONS	928	863	941
PLANTING MATERIAL			
DISTRIBUTED	\$VN 24,750,000	\$VN 20,352,000	\$VN 22,516,693

(10) FISHERIES: THE COUNTRY-WIDE GOAL IS TO INCREASE
 THE TOTAL FISH CATCH IN 1967 BY 50,200 MT OVER 1966. IN NEWLY SE-
 CURED AREAS WHERE FISHING IS THE MAIN OCCUPATION, THE TRAINING OF
 FISHERMEN, DISTRIBUTION OF FISHING GEAR AND BOAT MOTORS, AND THE
 CONSTRUCTION OF FISH MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES ARE SUPPORTED WITH

PAGE 22 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3258A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 TECHNICAL SERVICES AND COMMODITIES FUNDED BY MORD AND USAID.
 TABLE TWENTY-NINE

1967 PROGRAM	COMPLETED OCTOBER	COMPLETED NOVEMBER
MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES	17	6
FISHING EQUIPMENT AND FINGERLINGS (\$VN)	10,943,000	8,655,001
NO. OF FISHERMEN TRAINED	6,338	9,625

(11) IR8 RICE: IN THE OCTOBER MESSAGE IT WAS REPORT-
 ED THAT IR8 RICE, A NEW HIGH YIELD STRAIN, HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO
 SVN ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF YIELDS AS
 SHOWN BELOW ARE ENCOURAGING, ALTHOUGH INFORMATION IS LACKING ON
 CULTURAL PRACTICES AND AMOUNTS OF PESTICIDE UTILIZED. YIELDS DE-
 PICTED THEREFORE, CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION OF PRO-
 DUCION POTENTIAL.

LOCATION	YIELD (KG PER HA)	AVERAGE YIELD OF LOCAL VARIETY	YIELD MULTIPLE
----------	-------------------	--------------------------------	----------------

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3258A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

TAY NINH	7,000	1,500	5.3
BINH DINH	5,985	1,800	3.3
LONG XUYEN, AN GIANG	7,500	2,300	3.3
MY THO, DINH TUONG	5,000	2,200	2.3
PHONG DINH	6,000	2,400	2.5

M. BUDGET PERFORMANCE:

1967 GVN BUDGET PROGRAM	BUDGET (\$VN)	PERCENT EXPENDED OCT.	PERCENT EXPENDED NOV.
CHIEU HOI	772,000,000	53%	96%
VIS	41,077,384	68	81
REFUGEES:			
TEMPORARY RELIEF	532,900,000	31	36
RESETTLEMENT	760,000,000	24	27
SPECIAL FUND	160,000,000	74	66%
TOTAL	1,452,900,000	32	35
MORD			
I CORPS	341,465,000	65	70
II CORPS	489,229,000	56	63
III CORPS	540,369,000	60	67

PAGE 23 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 3258A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 IV CORPS 817,292,000 53 61
 TOTAL 2,188,355,000 57 64

& OBLIGATIONS- EXPENDITURE DATA UNRELIABLE
 && PERCENTAGE EXPENDED DECLINED DUE TO INCREASE IN BUDGET

I. IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF UNITS IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION:

- (1) NINETY PERCENT OF ARVN BATTALIONS AND 84 PERCENT OF RF COMPANIES HAVE RECEIVED RD TRAINING. SIXTY PERCENT OF PF PLATOONS HAVE UNDERGONE "NEW" MIP TRAINING. RD TRAINING FOR RVNAF UNITS HAS PROVED FRUITFUL. IT HAS IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF PACIFICATION OBJECTIVES, ENGENDERED WARMER CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, AND SHARPENED PACIFICATION SUPPORT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES. THERE HAS BEEN NO SHIFT IN TRAINING PROBLEM AREAS, ALL OF WHICH RELATE TO INADEQUATE ARVN COMMAND INTEREST.
- (2) TROOP CARE IS IMPROVING BUT REMAINS A WEAK AREA. BY THE END OF NOVEMBER, 60 PERCENT OF THE YEAR-END GOAL OF 2,267 UNIT MESSES WERE ESTABLISHED AND FREE OPERATIONAL RATIONS WERE BEING ISSUED.
- (3) EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF PACIFICATION-SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS IS MAKING EXCELLENT PROGRESS. EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3258A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 TABLES HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR MAP FUNDING AND PROCUREMENT REQUESTS ARE BEING PREPARED. PLANS INCLUDE USAID-FUNDED TECHNICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL. MACCORDS TELETYPE SERVICE AND EXPANDED TELEPHONE SERVICE IN III AND IV CTZ SHOULD BE COMPLETED DURING DECEMBER. THE AN/PRC-74 RADIC IS UNDERGOING TEST PRELIMINARY TO ISSUE FOR PROVINCIAL NETS.

J. IMPROVE PACIFICATION PLANNING:

(1) AB 143, THE 1968 COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN, WAS SIGNED ON 13 NOVEMBER. RECONCILIATION OF THE AID CAP AGAINST PACIFICATION PLANS SHOULD PROVIDE, WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE APPROVED AID BUDGET, A BALANCED MIX OF EARMARKED RESOURCES TO SUPPORT PACIFICATION AS A TOTAL SYSTEM. AS MATTERS NOW STAND, PROVINCE RD PLANS AND PACIFICATION PLANS AT EVERY LEVEL ARE SUBJECT TO BOTH US AND GVN APPROVAL. APART FROM THE FORMALITIES OF REVIEW AND APPROVAL, PROVINCE RD PLANS FOR 1968 WERE GENERALLY THE PRODUCT OF UNPRECEDENTED US-GVN COORDINATION AND ARE CHARACTERIZED BY REALISTIC BUT SUITABLE AMBITIOUS GOALS. THE 1968 PLANNING APPROACH HAS LED TO THE CURRENT DAY-BY-DAY DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLETELY INTEGRATED PACIFICATION PLANS. ELECTED GVN OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN UNSOPHISTICATED EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND CONSOLIDATED AUTHORITY IN

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 PP RUMWAA
 DE RUMSMA 3259A @190814
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 AFM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DOD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJOIR FOR
 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER, SECTION IX OF X.
 THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, WHILE THE MILITARY AND THE OLD-LINE PUBLIC
 SERVANTS DISPCSE OF IMPORTANT ISSUES WITH REASONABLE DISPATCH.
 THUS, WHILE IT IS A BAD PERIOD FOR BROAD COMMITMENTS, NEITHER PLANN-
 ING FOR 1968 NOR PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES FOR 1967 HAVE SUFFERED ANY
 SERIOUS IMPAIRMENT.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3259A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 (2) CORPS COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLANS ARE UNDER PREPARA-
 TION. THE UNIFIED APPROACH EMBODIED IN AB 143 WAS RECEIVED WITH
 ENTHUSIASM AND, AS IT FINDS EXPRESSION IN CORPS PLANS, IS ELICITING
 OPTIMISM IN THE FIELD. THREE OF THE CORPS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE
 15 DECEMBER DEADLINE FOR CORPS CAMPAIGN PLANS WOULD BE MET AND
 INDICATED EXCELLENT PROGRESS IN THE PREPARATION OF PROVINCE
 PACIFICATION PLANS.

(3) THE EXACT PICTURE ON CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS FOR
 1968 WILL EMERGE WITH PUBLICATION OF THE CORPS COMBINED CAMPAIGN
 PLANS. ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISCRS' AIK FUND
 CONTINUES UNABATED. UNQUESTIONABLY, THE FUND WAS VITAL IN
 COUNTERING REGRESSION IN MANY PREVIOUSLY PACIFIED HAMLETS, AND
 HELPED CATALYZE THE FLURRY OF ACTIVITY TO MAXIMIZE THE RD EFFORT
 DURING PHASE II, 1967.

(4) 1968 PACIFICATION PLANNING HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED
 THUS FAR BY AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF JOINT US-GVN INVOLVEMENT
 AND COOPERATION. IT CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED THAT COMMITMENT
 TO PACIFICATION IN 1968 WILL INCREASE IN THE SAME MEASURE. THE
 CUSTOMARY INADEQUATE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION BY PROVINCIAL
 OFFICIALS IN PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES HAS TURNED UPWARD ONLY SLIGHT-

PAGE 25 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3259A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 LY AS THE YEAR'S END APPROACHES. THIS CONDITION REMAINS A REFLECTION
 OF INDIFFERENCE TO RURAL PROBLEMS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. HOW-
 EVER, DEVELOPMENTS IN 1968, AS THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S KEY ORGANS RE-
 SOLVE THE PRACTICAL QUESTION OF HOW TO AMASS AND WIELD THEIR APPRO-
 PRIATE SHARE OF AUTHORITY, CAN ONLY LEAD TO BETTER INTERMINISTERIAL
 COORDINATION AND A GREATER IMPULSE TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE
 ELECTORATE.

4. (C) STATUS OF PACIFICATION RESOURCES:

TABLE THIRTY-TWO

UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT	NOV	OCT
ARVN BATTALIONS	51	54
RF COMPANIES	218	218
PF PLATOONS	738	719
GROUPS:		
RD CADRE (INCLUDING 38 20-MAN TEAMS IN AN GIANG)	527	516
TRUONG SON	110	110
CIVIL/MILITARY		35
QUARTER ZONE TEAM CADRE		2
STATIC CENSUS GRIEVANCE	5,469	5,366

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3259A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

NATIONAL POLICE 68,131 67,527

5. (C) INDICATOR TRENDS:

TABLE THIRTY-THREE

CHIEU HOI REFUGEES:	960	1,741
GAINS	11,448	21,682
NOT RESETTLED (CUMULATIVE)	785,030	790,100
RESETTLED (CUMULATIVE)	1,311,010	1,294,542
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	2,005	2,135
TERRORISM (INCLUDING RDC)	586	367
CIVIL CASUALTIES (ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS) AS A RESULT OF TERRORISM	976	479
STATUS OF RD PLANS:		

	ON SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	(LAST MONTH)	BEHIND SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	(LAST MONTH)
I CORPS	2	1	3	4
II CORPS	6	5	6	7
III CORPS	1	1	10	10
IV CORPS	6	2	10	14
TOTAL	15	9	29	35

PAGE 26 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 3259A C O N F I D E N T I A L NCFORN
LOC STATUS:

	GREEN	AMBER	RED
ROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	54 PCT (1518 KM)	37 PCT (1023 KM)	9 PCT (263 KM)
RAILROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	48 PCT (590 KM)	5 PCT (62 KM)	47 PCT (588 KM)
ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS IN NPA OF III CORPS AND IV CORPS	47 PCT (275 KM)	45 PCT (259 KM)	8 PCT (45 KM)

6. (C) ENEMY REACTION TO PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE:
 A. DURING NOVEMBER, 1967, ENEMY GUERRILLA ACTIVITY WAS AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. MOST OF THE ACTIVITY WAS IN THE FORM OF SMALL SCALE ATTACKS ON ISOLATED HAMLETS AND HARASSMENTS OF RD PERSONNEL. HOWEVER N CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT MORE OF THE MISSION OF NULLIFYING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN GIVEN TO GUERRILLA UNITS AND LOCAL FORCES. THESE DOCUMENTS STATE THAT RD PERSONNEL MUST BE ELIMINATED, THE PEOPLE RETURNED TO "LIBERATED" AREAS, AND PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES NEUTRALIZED.
 B. THE EFFECTS OF PACIFICATION, AIDED BY MILITARY OPERATIONS CAN BE SUMMARIZED BY THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CONTAINED IN A

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 3259A C O N F I D E N T I A L NCFORN
 CAPTURED DOCUMENT REGARDING THE PRESENTATION GIVEN TO THE MR5 SUB REGION PARTY COMMITTEE'S 11TH CONFERENCE HELD IN JUNE 1967: "IN MANY AREAS, THE PEOPLE WERE ROUNDED UP AND EVACUATED TO OTHER PLACES; AS A RESULT, THERE EMERGED A SHORTAGE OF MEN, LABOR AND MATERIAL RESOURCES."

C. THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO DIRECT ITS PROPAGANDA AT CIVILIANS, ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE THEM INTO TURNING AWAY FROM THE GVN REFUGEE CENTERS AND RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES. THE PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IS TYPIFIED BY RADIO HANOI BROADCAST OF 15 NOVEMBER COMMENTING ON "THE BASIC FAILURE OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN THE SUMMER-AUTUMN PERIOD." HE COMMENTARY CLAIMED THAT 7000 PACIFICATION CADRE HAD BEEN ANNIHILATED AND THAT 170,000 PEOPLE HAD "ESCAPED THE ENEMY'S BONDS IN STRATEGIC HAMLETS ALL OVER THE SOUTH." HANOI CLAIMED THAT ONLY 70 STRATEGIC HAMLETS HAVE BEEN SET UP OUT OF THE 1100 ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

D. CONTRARY TO THE CLAIMS IN THE HANOI BROADCAST, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE LOSS OF POPULATION CONTROL IS CAUSING THE VC INCREASING CONCERN. IN II CORPS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEAL ENEMY PLANS FORMULATED TO REGAIN BT

PAGE 27 OF 30 PAGES

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 DE RUMSMA 3260A 2190814
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 190719Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
 RUEPJS/DCD
 RUEHC/STATE AID
 RUEPIA. 0:8-
 47.001/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02036 KROM MACJOIR FOR
 ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
 MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOWE. FINAL SECTION OF X.
 CONTROL OF THE POPULATION. BINH DINH AND KHANH HOA PROVINCES WERE
 TO COORDINATE THEIR MILITARY ACTIONS WITH OTHER UNITS IN SVN IN
 ORDER TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE POPULATION IN SOUTHERN BINH DINH
 PROVINCE. PLANS FOR THE 1967-68 WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN IN DAR LAC
 PROVINCE ALSO CALLED FOR A LARGE SCALE MILITARY OPERATION TO

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3260A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 IMPROVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL POPULACE. IN TUYEN
 DUC PROVINCE (II CTZ), PLANS FOR SECURING CONTROL OF THE POPULATION
 INCLUDED NON-MILITARY MEANS, I.E. PROSELYTING, TERROR, AND
 ASSASSINATION OF GVN VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERS.
 E. MOREOVER, A CAPTURED ENEMY COMMUNIQUE, DATED 30 AUGUST,
 STATED THAT DURING JULY AND AUGUST ALLIED OPERATIONS IN III AND IV
 CTZS HAVE GAINED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN THEIR PACIFICATION
 PROGRAM. THE DOCUMENT GOES ON TO SAY THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO FOIL
 THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, THE VCTHAVE LAUNCHED CONTINUOUS RAIDS ON
 ROUTES 4, 13 AND 20 AND HAVE INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES AND
 SHELLINGS TO FORCE THE ALLIES INTO CONCENTRATING THEIR FORCES TO
 PROTECT REAR BASES. THE VC PLAN FOR IV CORPS CALLS FOR DISRUPTION
 OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM BY PENETRATING DEEPLY INTO GOVERNMENT
 AREAS, STAYING CLOSE TO THE POPULATION AND INDUCING THE POPULACE TO
 REVOLT.

F. REFUGEE MOVEMENT AND ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS APPEAR
 TO HAVE ADDED TO THE VC'S DIFFICULTY IN COLLECTING TAXES.
 (1) AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON VC TAXATION INDICATES
 THAT U.S. AND ARVN OPERATIONS HAVE DENIED THE PEOPLE IN CH CHI
 DISTRICT TO THE VC BY GIVING THE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE OUT

PAGE 28 OF 30 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3260A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
OF CONTESTED AREAS AND SEEK THE SAFETY OF SECURE HAMLETS. THE
REMAINING PEOPLE ARE VERY POOR AND THE VC ARE UNABLE TO EXTRACT
MUCH IN THE WAY OF TAXES FROM THEM. THE LOCAL POPULATION RARELY
SHOWS ANY OPEN OPPOSITION TO VC TAXES, BUT WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY
ARISES, THEY FLEE TO GVN SECURE ARDAS.

(2) RESISTANCE TO VC TAXATION IN TAY NINH PROVINCE IS
COMMONLY SHOWN BY SEVERAL FORMS OF TAX EVASION. ONE SUCH METHOD
IS FOR THE FARMER TO TELL THE VC TAX COLLECTOR TEAM THAT HIS CROPS
WERE DESTROYED BY DEFOLIATION AND HERBICIDE OPERATIONS. SOME
EVADERS HAVE ESCAPED TAXATION WITH SUCH A STORY.

(3) DURING 1967, THE VC RAISED TAXES 50PCT IN KIEN HOA
PROVINCE. THIS CAUSES SOME OF THE WEALTHIER FARMERS TO LEAVE THE
AREA TO SEEK SAFETY IN GVN CONTROLLED AREAS. IN VINH BINH PROVINCE
FARMERS HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO ABANDON THEIR PROPERTIES TO MOVE TO GVN
CONTROLLED AREAS FOR REFUGE FROM VC TAXES. THE PEOPLE WHO STAY IN
VC AREAS ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT TO LOSE THEIR LAND OR THOSE
WITHOUT RELATIVES IN GVN AREAS TO HELP THEM ESCAPE.

G. RECRUITMENT ACTIVITY: THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE
VC ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING VOLUNTARY RECRUITS IN THOSE
AREAS WHERE THE GVN EXERCISES SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL. RECENT

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 3260A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE VC ARE RESORTING TO FORCED CONSCRIPTION
AND ABDUCTION TO OBTAIN REPLACEMENTS. CONVERSELY, IN THOSE AREAS
WHERE THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE MAINTAIN CONTROL, THEIR RECRUITMENT
PROBLEMS AGSOMEWHAT ABATED. PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION, PARTICU-
LARLY BY FEMALES, ARE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS USED TO RECRUIT NEW
MEMBERS. COERCION AND FORCE ARE USED TO A MUCH LESSER DEGREE IN
THESE AREAS. THE ELEVATION OF GUERRILLAS TO MAIN FORCES HAS LED
TO THE INCREASED USE OF ADOLESCENTS, THE OLD, AND WOMEN TO REPLACE
THE GUERRILLA LOSS AND IN SOME CASES, TO AUGMENT LOCAL FORCES.

H. FUTURE ENEMY PLANS TO COUNTERACT PACIFICATION: THE
ENEMY NO DOUBT WILL INCREASE HARASSMENT OF THE REFUGEE-PACIFICATION
PROGRAMS AS THEY CONTINUE TO REDUCE THE POPULATION BASE AVAILABLE
TO THE VC, THUS DEPRIVING HIM OF REVENUE, FOOD, LABOR, AND SECUR-
ITY. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING AS SOME OF THE PLANNED MEASURES TO COUNTER PACIFICATION:

- (1) PENETRATE REFUGEE, NEW LIFE HAMLETS AND CHIEU HOI
CENTERS THROUGH USE OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS, SOME DISGUIISING THEM-
SELVES AS RD CADRE.
- (2) STEP UP HARASSMENT AND ATTACKS AGAINST LOCS AND
ASSASSINATE RD CADRE.

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PAGE 5 RUMSM: 3260A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
(3) INCITE THE POPULACE TO REVOLT THROUGH THE FORMA-
TION OF "REVOLT COMMITTEES."

(4) ESTABLISH COMBAT PERIMETERS TO PREVENT MASS
MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES.

(5) ORGANIZE A CAMPAIGN TO ENTICE ARVN SOLDIERS TO
DEFECT THROUGH THE USE OF LETTERS WRITTEN BY FAMILY MEMBERS.

FOOTNOTE 18: ROADS DEFINED AS MILITARILY ESSENTIAL INCLUDE 451 KM
IN I CORPS, 1415 IN II CORPS, 590 IN III CORPS AND 351 IN IV CORPS.
ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS INCLUDE 225 KM IN III CORPS AND 354 IN IV CORPS.

GP-4.

BT

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DATE: 31 JAN 1992

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CCN 257

FILLER _____

DTG 022015Z Z

MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG THIRD MARDIV

CG
lo
** c/s*

EYES ONLY

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w/dub*

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DATE/TIME GROUP 22015Z JANUARY 1968

#55

REF
SECRET

1 0220156

1 0220134 ZFFI
3D US MAR DIV
3D US MAR

ZFM

SECRET

FROM MAJ GEN TOMPKINS FOR LTJEN CUSHMAN

1. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY AND PROPER TO REINFORCE KHE SANH NOW WITH ADDITIONAL INFANTRY BN.
2. UNODIR I WILL COMMIT DIVISION RESERVE 1ST BN 1ST MAR TO FLY IN TODAY. THEY ARE CURRENTLY STATIONED VICINITY QUANG TRI.
3. REQUEST THAT SLF A 2ND BN 4TH MAR RATHER THAN SLF B 3RD BN 1ST MAR BE CHOPPED TO 3RD MARDIV. 2ND BN 4TH MAR KNOWS QUANG TRI AREA

150

NNNN

1 OPI

SECRET

#53

Action Completed

23 January 1968

Sandy - see me

please

CCN 273

FILLER

25

DTG 220216Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

For sighting of CEO and appropriate action within the grounds

CG

OCF

cls

CATEGORY

EXCLUSIVE CEO

FILE COPIER OF COPIES

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Turner
Wed 20/68

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G-2

Copy #3 to G-6 18 Jun 68 by Robert P. Audubert 994 In 21 Jun 68

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 220216Z JAN 68

#56

Copy #3 to G-6 Anderson 18 Jun 68

SECRET

PP RUMSAK
DE RUMSAW 0338U 0220224
ZNY SSSSS
P 220216Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF DNG RVN
BT

EXCLUSIVE

~~SECRET~~ T SPECAT 02364 EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND.

SUBJ: FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE (U)
REF: CG III MAF SPECAT DTG 200416Z JAN 68 (S)

1. (C) THIRTY TWO ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES WERE ASSIGNED YOUR COMMAND 21 JANUARY 68.
2. (S) AS YOU KNOW, THE RVNAF CONTROLS AND ALLOCATES THE MILITARY TACTICAL FREQUENCY BANDS AND THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDING FREQUENCIES TO SATISFY U.S. AND RVNAF REQUIREMENTS IS ACUTE. YOU PRESENTLY HAVE ALL JGS ALLOCATED RESOURCES AT MY DISPOSAL. OF THE 920 FREQUENCIES AVAILABLE, THE JGS HAS ALLOCATED 800 FOR TACTICAL VOICE USE. OF THE 800, YOU HAVE 442, THE RVNAF HAS 358. THE 32 FREQUENCIES WERE TAKEN FROM MACV RADIO RELAY RESOURCES. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME WITH THE JGS FOR SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS AND A DECISION IS EXPECTED SHORTLY.
3. (C) TO SATISFY THE REMAINDER OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS, I AM

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 0338U ~~SECRET~~ SPECAT
PROPOSING A CO-SHARING ARRANGEMENT WITH THE RVNAF. TO BE EFFECTIVE, CLOSE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN YOUR CE OFFICER AND HIS I CTZ COUNTERPART IS REQUIRED. AN EXPRESSION OF COMMAND INTEREST ON YOUR PART TO THE CG I CTZ WOULD BE BENEFICIAL.

4. (C) THE MEASURES I HAVE OUTLINED SHOULD AFFORD SUBSTANTIAL RELIEF. I ALSO STRESS THE NEED FOR CONTINUED EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE VERY LIMITED FREQUENCY SPECTRUM. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MAXIMUM USE OF AIRBORNE UHF IN LIEU OF VHF FM. PRIMARY RELIANCE ON UHF WHEREVER POSSIBLE IS NECESSARY TO REDUCE MUTUAL INTERFERENCE IN THE VHF FM BAND. MULTIPLE USE OF THE SAME FREQUENCY BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TERRAIN SHIELDING AND DISTANCE SEPARATION IS INDICATED, AS IS STRICT NET DISCIPLINE.

GP-4
BT

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~~SECRET~~

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#56	

CCN _____

FILLER _____

DTG 220717Z

MONTH JAN 68

*#4 bur need
e doo*

ORIGINATOR GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV

CG

EYES ONLY CIS

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES *action completed*

reply in the affirmative

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DATE/TIME GROUP 220717Z JAN 68

#57

67

0815

29 020713
O 222717Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS DEPUTY COMMANDER HQ MACV SAIGON
TO GENERAL CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01027 EYES ONLY

DURING OQR VISIT TO 3RD MARINE DIVISION ONE OF MY STAFF WAS ADVISED THE 175 E GUNS IN CAMP CARROLL AND AT THE ROCK PILE WERE NOT REGISTERED IN THE KHE SANH AREA. I FEEL TH S IS NOT THE CASE, HOWEVER IN VIEW OF THE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT THESE GUNS MAY RENDER TO THE KHE SANH DEFENSE, PARTICULARLY DURING BAD WEATHER AND DARKNESS, I WOULD LIKE TO BE ASSURED THEY HAVE BEEN REGISTERED TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM EFFECT SUPPORT FOR THE COM NG BATTLE.

WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
135

NNNN

10F1

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-DM5
DATE 81 JAN 1992

*57

CCN 287 FILLER 25

DTG 220448Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

OCG	<i>[initials]</i>
DCG	<i>[initials]</i>
O/S	<i>[initials]</i>

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DATE/TIME GROUP 220448Z JAN 68

**58*

SECRET

OO RUMWAA
DE RUMSMA 3706A 0220453
ZNY SSSSS
O 220448Z JAN 68 ZFFG ZFG
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMSBJ/CDR 7AF SAIGON
RUMWAA/CG III MAF DANANG
INFO RUEPJS/GJCS
RUHHKQA/CINCPAC
RUCIHOA/CMC
RUEFHQA/CSAF
RUHHA BA/PACAF
RUHHFMA/FMEPAC

FOR

~~SECRET~~ 02378

FOR GENMOMYER, LTG CUSHMAN, GEN WHEELER, ADM SHARP,
GEN MCCONNELL, GEN CHAPAMAN, GEN RYAN, LTG KRULAK FROM:
GEN WESTMORELAND

1. I CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THE MAXIMUM AIR FIRE-POWER AVAILABLE TO MEET THE ENEMY THREAT IN I CORPS. THIS WAS THE ISSUE WHICH PROMPTED BY MESSAGE 171206Z JAN 68. (NOTAL)
2. IN ORDER TO EFFECT DETAILED APPLICATION OF AIR RESOURCES IN I CORPS, THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVE WILL APPLY:

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3706A S E C R E T

A. 7TH AIR FORCE WILL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIR SUPPORT OF THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY AND AMERICAL DIVISIONS NOW DEPLOYED INTO I CORPS. POLICY OF HAVING 7TH AIR FORCE SUPPORT ARMY AND ARVN UNITS IN I CORPS WILL CONSTITUTE GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS.

B. TO MEET THE THREAT IN THE QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN AREA, I HAVE DIRECTED BY DEPUTY COMDR MACV AIR, GEN MOMYER, TO DEVEOP A PLAN TO CONCENTRATE ALL AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES (SLAM-TYPE OPERATION). THE DIRECT SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS BY THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING IS NOT EFFECTED BY THIS PLAN. THE INITIAL AREA OF CONCENTRATION WILL BE AROUND THE KHE SANH (NIAGARA II). DEPENDING UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION THE AREA WILL BE SHIFTED. DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR OPERATIONS WILL COORDINATE THE DETAILS OF THIS AIR PLAN WITH THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING AND III MAF AS APPROPRIATE. I HAVE CHARGED HIM WITH THE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. HE WILL COORDINATE AND DIRECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIR, MARINE AIR, DIVERTED AIR STRIKES FROM OUT OF COUNTRY AIR OPERATIONS AND SUCH NAVAL AIR THAT MAY BE REQUESTED. B-52 STRIKES WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH HIM.

C. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, IT IS DIRECTED THAT III MAF MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE ALL TACTICAL BOMBER SORTIES NOT RE-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 3706A S E C R E T
REQUIRED FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS. THESE SORTIES WILL BE INITIALLY COMMITTED TO THE NIAGARA OPERATION.

3. (S) I WISH TO STRESS THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR COORDINATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COMMAND TO BRING OUR FIREPOWER AGAINST THE ENEMY IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER. THE SERIOUS THREAT WE FACE IN I CORPS AND KHE SANH IN PARTICULAR, DEMANDS THIS. I HAVE DIRECTED MY AIR DEPUTY TO INSURE IN MY NAME THAT THESE AIR RESOURCES ARE APPLIED TO THIS END. GP-4

BT

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221140Z Jan 68

O 221140Z ZYH

FM: CG, 1/101ST AIRBORNE DIV
TO: CG, 3RD MARINE DAMPHI FORCE
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L IAPV406-CO 8022/212.
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM BG MATHESON
DELIGHTED TO HEAR TODAY THAT I AM TO REPORT TO
YOU FOR DUTY FOR THE REMAINDER OF MY TOUR. REGRET THAT
THE BRIGADE IS NOT ACCOMPANYING ME. HOPEFULLY WILL
REPORT LATE 24 JAN.

GP #
075

Dep CG
c/s
Tell Beeson
23 Jan 68
c/s called
Col. Beeson
Rw date.
D.H. [Signature]

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

#59

CCN 301 FILLER 25

DTG 230411Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

FOR

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DATE/TIME GROUP 230411Z JAN 68

#60

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VV MFB334ASA263
 PP CUMWAA
 DE RUMSMA 3878A 0230:13
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 230411Z JAN 68 ZFF6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEPJS/JCS
 RUEPOD/DA
 RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG

FOR

BT
~~SECRET~~ 02486 FROM: MACJ312

FOR ADM SHARP FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
 SUBJ: INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND INFANTRY COMPANY PACKETS (U)
 (S) I CTZ IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REINFORCED TO MEET THE
 INCREASED ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THAT AREA AT THE EXPENSE OF II
 AND III CTZ'S. CURRENTLY, ARMY COMBAT UNITS ARE UNDER STRENGTH
 ACROSS THE BOARD WITH NO IMMEDIATE RELIEF IN SIGHT THROUGH THE
 REPLACEMENT STREAM. TO OFFSET THIS UNFAVORABLE POSTURE, REQUEST
 YOUR ASSISTANCE IN DEPLOYMENT OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS TO RVN AS
 EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE:

FRN	UNIT DESCRIPTION	PARENT UNIT
	PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3878A S E C R E T	
01B041	6/31 INF BN	196 INF BDE
01B042	CO PKTN WXQ INF BN	196 INF BDE
01B043	CO PKT, 3/21 INF BN	196 INF BDE
01B044	CO PKT, 4/31 INF BN	196 INF BDE
PQB045,	5/12 INF BN	199 INF BDE
01B046	CO PKT, 2/3 INF BN	199 INF BDE
01B047	CO PKT, 3/7 INF BN	199 INF BDE
01B048	CO PKT, 4/12 INF BN	199 INF BDE
011004A	CO PKT, 1/6 INF BN	198 INF BDE
011005A	CO PKT, 1/46 INF BN	198 INF BDE
011006A	CO PKT, 1/52 INF BN	198 INF BDE
011032	5/46 INF BN	198 INF BDE
04B012	4/21 INF BN	11 INF BDE
04E026	INF CO PKTS, (4)	1 BDE, 101 ABN DIV

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.									#60

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FILLER _____

DTG ⁷ 250105Z _____

MONTH JAN 68 *wcb/m*

ORIGINATOR GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

*R-4 is working on this
and will have a programed section
this PM*
EYES ONLY

CG	<i>h</i>
DCG	<i>W</i>
C/L	<i>Q</i>
ACIS	<i>DK</i>

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DATE/TIME GROUP ⁷ 250105Z JAN 68

SECRET

TOS

0-52106
 O 250705Z ZY ZFF-3

FM GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV
 TO LTGEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
 INFO LTGEN PALMER, DCC, USARV
 ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC @1700 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT

1. K I AM ENDEAVORING TO BE SURE THAT WE OVERLOOK NO OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE GREATEST CAPABILITY PRACTICABLE IN THE OPERATIONS CENTERING AROUND THE SANM, CAMP CARROLL, AND OTHER VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN I CTZJM TWO SUGGESTIONS FOL

OWING ARE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

2. YOU HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF M79 LAUNCHERS ALREADY AVAILABLE. I WILL ASK GEN PLAMER TO MAKE UP TO 100 ADDITIONAL LAUNCHERS AVAILABLE TO YOU AT YOUR REQUEST EVEN TH

UGH THIS MEANS DIVERTING THEM FROM USARV UNITS WHO ARE ALSO IN NEED OF LAUNCHERS.

3. WE HAVE FOUND TANKS WITH BULLDOZERS TO BE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE FOR US IN CONNECTION WITH AMMUNITION FIRES. SUGGEST CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO POSITIONING THIS EQUIPMENT NEAR KEY ASP'S. YOU ALREADY HAVE WITHIN III MAF A NUMBER OF THESE TANK-DOZERS. HOWEVER, IF YOU HAVE NEED FOR 1 OR 2 MORE, WE WILL TRY TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE. THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE THROUGH WITHDRAWAL FROM ARMY UNITS WHICH ARE ALREADY BEL

AUTHORIZED LEVELS. TRANSPORTATION, OF COURSE, BECOMES A PROBLEM.

4. IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL BEEHIVE AMMUNITION, TRIP MINES, CLAY-MORE MINES OR OTHER MUNITIONS, I AM SURE ASSISTANCE CAN BE PROVIDED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

25E

DECLASSIFIED
 DAMH-HSR-DH8
 DATE: 31 JAN 1992

NNNNK

CCN 364 FILLER 25

DTG 250451Z MONTH JAN 68

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DLG	<i>[Signature]</i>
G/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

ORIGINATOR CINCPAC

FOR

	S/O
	SC

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DATE/TIME GROUP 250451Z JAN 68

#62

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PT003046
 PTTSZYUW RUMMWGA0473 0250451-SSSS-RUMMWAA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 250451Z JAN 68
 FM CINCPAC
 TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUHHHQA/ADMINO CINCPAC
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

FOR

BT
 S E C R E T
 TANGO NINETEEN FOR ADMINO CINCPAC
 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM ADM SHARP
 1. SINCE DISCUSSION WITH CUSHMAN AT DANANG CONCERNING DRAWDOWN
 OF 9TH MAB F4/A4 ASSETS TO OFFSET SHORTAGES IN THE FIRST
 MAW, SITUATION IN KOREA HAS WROSENED:
 2. FORTUNATELY, EIGHT F4B, SIX TA4F, SIX A6A AND FIVE
 EA6A ARE NOW ENROUTE TO CUBI POINT, THE FIRST MARINE
 AIR WING WILL RECEIVE A NUMBER OF A4S AND A6S IN THIS
 DEPLOYMENT AND AT LEAST HALF THE F4S. THESE ADDITIONS
 WILL BE IN VIETNAM SOON.

PAGE TWO RUMMWGA0473 S E C R E T
 3. ON THIS BASIS, PREFER NOT REPEAT NOT TO AUGMENT THE
 FIRST MAW WITH AIRCRAFT FROM THE 9TH MAB AT THIS TIME,
 UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE PUEBLO SITUATION IS RESOLVED IT
 IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TWO MARINE CORPS SQUADRONS BE
 MAINTAINED IN A FULLY OPERATIONAL STATUS IN JAPAN.
 GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 62

CCN 386 FILLER 32

DTG 252045Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG FIVEPAC

Show to CEO a
Five support
Q.

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
EOG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

CATEGORY _____

FOR

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#203 Barnes
to Nov 68
Thank you
SBH

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VV PAC751

PP RUMWAA
DE RUHFMA 4506 0252045
ZNY SSSSS
P 252045Z JAN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

FOR

SECRET FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK
COMMUNICATION SUPPORT (U)

A. CG III MAF 240758Z/JAN68

B. CG FMFPAC LTR 00727-66 DTD 24JUN66

1. APPRECIATE YOUR HIGHLIGHTING COMMUNICATIONS
REQUIREMENTS AND PROBLEM AREAS. I AM TAKING THE
FOLLOWING ACTION REGARDING YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS
IN PARA 3 REF A:

A. RESTATING YOUR REQUIREMENT FOR FIXED PLANT
TELETYPE TO CMC AND REQUESTING SHIPMENT OF EQUIP-
MENT BE EXPEDITED.

B. REQUESTING THAT ONE FIXED PLANT TELETYPE VAN
(AN/MGC-36), WHICH IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING
EVALUATION AT QUANTICO BE SHIPPED TO III MAF FOR TESTING; IT
WILL PROVIDE TERMINALS FOR SIX FULL DUPLEX SECURE CIRCUITS.

C. RECOMMENDING IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND SHIP-

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 4506 SECRET
MENT OF FOUR AN/TRC-97 HELD BY MCSC BARSTOW FOR
COMBAT REPLACEMENT.

D. REQUESTING CMC TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO
IMPROVE AN/TRC-97 TURN AROUND TIME UNDER THE
FACTORY SUPPORT PROGRAM, AND GRANT AUTH
TO REQN REPLACEMENT OF THE TRC-97 COMPONENTS/MODULES
SHIPPED TO RCA PRIOR TO 15AUG67 WHICH HAVE NOT
BEEN RETURNED.

E. DIRECTIVE THAT CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
PROVIDE A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF RT-503/PRC-25
MAINT FLOAT ESTABLISHED IAW REF B, TO INCLUDE AN
ESTIMATE OF THE QTY REQUIRED TO MEET THE NEEDS
OF III MAF.

F. REQUESTING CMC EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF GENE-
RATOR SET PU-670 ASSETS WHICH ARE AVAIL IN SUPPLY
SYSTEM AND NOW ARE IN PROCESS OF BEING DELIVERED.

2. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

463

CONFIDENTIAL

CCN 392 FILER 119

DTG 260737Z JAN 68 MONTH

ORIGINATOR COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

DCG-AIR [Signature]

CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

*#4 burned
600068*

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DE RUMHNA 110 0260737
ZNY CCCCC
P 062737Z JAN 68
FM COMNAVSUPACT DANANG
TO CG III MAF
BT

CONFIDENTIAL MC AND NAVY EYES ONLY LINDIS
DOCUMENTATION OF 1ST AIR CAV DIV MOVE INTO ICTZ (C)

- 1. YOUR 210205Z JAN 68 INITIAL REPORT COVERING PERIOD PRIOR TO 21 JAN
- 2. APPROX 300 MAN HOURS ASSOCIATED WITH MEETINGS HELD AT III MAF HQ.
- 3. INCREASED NORTHERN ICTZ THROUGHPUT REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED TAD ASSIGNMENT OF FIVE ADDITIONAL ARMY LCU'S. INCREASED POL REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED ADDITIONAL LCM & BLADDER BOAT AND TWO AM41 FUEL TANKERS FOR USE AT DONG HA/QUA VIET AND HUE/TAN MY.
- 4. NORTHERN ICTZ THROUGHPUT AVE FOR MONTH HAS BEEN 1,937 ST PER DAY AS COMPARED TO ANTICIPATED 2,500 ST PER DAY REQUIREMENT.
- 5. REAL ESTATE ACQUIRED: 550,000 SQ METERS DMG, 120,000 SQ METERS PHU PAI. NO COST FOR REAL ESTATE.

BP-A
BT

DRAFTER: LT CASWELL

00 01 N6 N3(N) 01 32

NNNN

WU/1260

260737Z JAN 68

HAND CARRIED AT 1625N/26 JAN 68

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CG	1				<i>[Signature]</i>	COMUSMACV SERIAL 260755Z JAN
DCG	3				<i>[Signature]</i>	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED SUBJECT FOR
DCG AIR	4		27 Feb		DC/B AIR	REMARKS #344 burned 60 Nov 68
C/S	2				<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR			31 Jan		<i>[Signature]</i>	
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G-3		COG COPY				
G-4						
CEO						
A/A			281500		<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/S	1		1/28/68		DHW	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
- C-COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

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DE RUMSMA 4461A 0260900
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 260755Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUEPJS/CRSC WASHDC
 RUMSBJ/COMDR 7TH AIR FORCE
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NAG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN TO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 BT

FOR

SECRET NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 SECT 1 OF XII FOR ADM SHARP
 INFOR GEN WHEELER, GEN MDMYER, LTG PALMER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG ROSSON,
 LTG WEYAND, MG ECKHARDT AND RADM VETH FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND
 SUBJ: ANNUAL ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (U) THIS IS MY ASSESSMENT FOR CY 1967, AND THE LAST IN THIS
 PARTICULAR SERIES OF REPORTS.

AM THIS PAST YEAR WAS MARKED BY STEADY FREE WORLD PROGRESS,
 A NOTICEABLE DETERIORATION OF THE ENEMY'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, AND

PAGE TWO RUMSMA 4461A SECRET NOFORN

HIS LOSS OF CONTROL OVER LARGE AREAS AND THE POPULATION. AT YEAR'S
 END HE FACED SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THIS IN-COUNTRY RECRUITMENT, AS
 EVIDENCED BY THE INCREASING NUMBER OF NVA REPLACEMENTS IN VC UNITS.
 IN SPITE OF THIS, THE LAST QUARTER OF 1967 WAS MARKED BY A RESURGENCE
 OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.D

B. DURING THE YEAR OUR PROGRAM FIVE DEPLOYMENTS PROVIDED
 US WITH AN INCREASED FORCE STRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS BASE FOR OFFENSIVE
 OPERATIONS. RVNAF REGULAR AND IRREGULAR FORCES, WITH A SLOW BUT
 STEADY INCREASE IN THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, ACHIEVED CREDITABLE VICTOR-
 IES AND PARTICIPATED INCREASINGLY IN COORDINATED OPERATIONS.

C. NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD WITH A BETTER
 THAN 80 PER CENT VOTER PARTICIPATION, FORMING THE BEGINNING OF A STABLE
 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

(I CIZ)

2. (S) THE 1967 OBJECTIVES IN THE I CTZ WERE TO PREVENT THE
 INVASION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM THROUGH THE DMZ AND THE LAOTIAN
 BORDER IN NORTH-WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE; TO INTERDICT ENEMY IN-
 FILTRATION ROUTES INTO THE I CIZ; NEUTRALIZE HIS BASES AND SUPPLY
 POINTS; PROTECT VITAL AREAS FROM ATTACK BY FIRE OR GROUND ATTACK;
 OPEN AND SCRUE LINES OF COMMUNICATION; IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

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DATE: 31 JAN 1992

PAGE 1 OF 36 PAGES #65

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4461A S E C R E T N O F O R N

RVNAF AND EXTEND GVN CONTROL.

3. (S) A. IN ACCOMPLISHING I CORPS OBJECTIVES DURING CY 1967, III MAF FORCES CONDUCTED 102 MAJOR OPERATIONS AND THE ROK MARINE BRIGADE CONDUCTED 15 MAJOR OPERATIONS. TOGETHER THEY TOTALED 428,051 SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS. III MAF FORCES ACCOUNTED FOR 25,452 ENEMY KILLED WHILE THE 2D BRIGADE, ROK MARINE CORPS KILLED 1,927 ENEMY. 22 SLF OPERATIONS NETTED 3,287 ENEMY KILLED. U.S. SPECIAL FORCES IN I CTZ ACCOUNTED FOR 1,199 ENEMY KILLED. US/PWMAF FORCES CAPTURED 6,794 WEAPONS DURING THE YEAR. RVNAF CONDUCTED 447 BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER OPERATIONS AND 167,812 SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS IN 1967. THESE RESULTED IN 10,771 ENEMY KILLED AND 3,079 ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED. RVNAF OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT I CTZ, WITH THE MAJORITY IN QUANG TRI AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES.

F. A NET WORK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS AND BASES WAS ESTABLISHED FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA TO KHE SANH. INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY UNITS, MANNING THESE POSITIONS, AND SUPPORTED BY AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE, EFFECTIVELY BLOCKED AND SOUNDLY DEFEATED THE ENEMY'S ATTEMPTS TO INVAD THROUGH THE DMZ. MILITARY OPERATIONS INTO THE DMZ IN EARLY 1967 TOOK A HEAVY TOLL OF ENEMY FORCES AND DISCOURAGED HIM FROM FURTHER MASSING OVERT INVASION FORCES. WHEN LARGE SCALE INFIL-

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4461A S E C R E T N O F O R N

TRATION THROUGH THE DMZ WAS IMPEDED, THE ENEMY RESORTED TO LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS AND THE USE OF HEAVY ARTILLERY, MORTARS, ROCKETS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES AGAINST THOSE FORWARD POSITIONS AFFORDING OBSERVATION INTO THE DMZ. AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE STRIKING NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER HAVE INHIBITED THE ENEMY'S USE OF THE DMZ AS A SAFE HAVEN FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS.

C. DURING 1967 THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING FLEW OVER 82,000 SORTIES AND DELIVERED OVER 144,000 TONS OF AVIATION ORDNANCE. 85PERCENT OF THESE SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF III MAF GROUND FORCES. THE CLOSE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MARINE GROUND UNITS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE SUCCESS OF MAJOR OPERATIONS. FROM SEPTEMBER THROUGH DECEMBER, THE MARINE AIR WING CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN IN THE ASHAW VALLEY WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF STOPPING VEHICULAR TRAFFIC. TWO BARRIERS WERE CREATED BY CRATERING THE AVULLEY FLOOR WITH BOMBS AT POINTS WHERE TERRAIN MADE BYPASS CONSTRUCTION DIFFICULT. RECONNAISSANCE AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY TO MAINTAIN BARRIERS, DETECT INFILTRATION, AND STRIKE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY. STRIKE AIRCRAFT WERE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE IN THE DMZ AREA IN SUPPORT OF DYE MARKER. OVER 3,500 SORTIES AND 9,000 TONS OF ORDNANCE WERE EXPENDED ON ENEMY ARTILLERY AND MORTAR

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PAGE 2 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4461A S E C R E T NOFORN
POSITIONS, TROOP POSITIONS, ROCKET SITES, AND SUPPLY CACHES IN THIS AREA.

D. III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING THE YEAR WITH THE ADDITION OF THE AMERIC

L DIVISION AND ITS ATTACHED HELICOPTER UNITS. TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE UH-1 AIRCRAFT PROVIDED THE TROOP LIFT AND FUNSHIP SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR THE AMERIC'S MOBILE ASSAULT CAPABILITY. FROM 1 MAY TO 31 DECEMBER, 391,461 HELICOPTER SORTIES, CARRYING 598,946 PASSENGERS AND 81,569 TONS OF CARGO, WERE FLOWN.

E. IN THE DMZ AREA, 377 ARC LIGHT STRIKES WERE FLOWN WITH 83,075 TONS OF ORDNANCE DELIVERED ON SELECTED TARGETS. ARC LIGHT STRIKES MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE AIR SUPPORT EFFORT IN I CTZ AND HAVE PROVEN VALUABLE IN THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORTIFIED POSITIONS, SUPPLY, AND TROOP ASSEMBLY AREAS. CREDIT FOR PREVENTION OF GROUND ATTACKS BY ENEMY ON CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE BELONGS IN GREAT PART TO THE 3D AIR DIVISION AND THEIR B-52'S.

F. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BASE AREAS 100 AND 119, EACH EXISTING BASE AREA WITHIN I CORPS WAS PENETRATED BY A MAJOR UNIT OPERATION AND WAS CLASSIFIED NEUTRALIZED AT LEAST ONCE DURING THE YEAR.

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4461A S E C R E T NOFORN
BASE AREA 119, ALTHOUGH NOT PENETRATED BY FRIENDLY FORCES, WAS BOMBED WITH 68.5 TONS OF ORDNANCE.

G. FRIENDLY FORCES CAPTURED 2,187 TONS OF RICE LAST YEAR AND EFFECTIVELY DENIED THE ENEMY ACCESS TO SIGNIFICANT RESUPPLY QUANTITIES FOR RICE, FISH, AND SALT FROM THE COASTAL AREAS. AS A RESULT OF DENIAL OPERATIONS AND A DECREASING POPULATION UNDER HIS CONTROL, THE ENEMY DEMANDS ON THE REMAINING POPULATION INCREASED AS DID HIS TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST THE CIVIL POPULACE; BOTH CAUSED A SHARP RISE IN REFUGEES DURING THE LAST QUARTER.

H. DEEP RECONNAISSANCE WAS CARRIED OUT DURING 1967 THROUGHOUT I CTZ, AS WAS CONTINUAL, EXTENSIVE PATROLLING WITHIN DANANG/CHU LAI ROCKET BELTS AND THEIR APPROACHES. AN AVERAGE OF 33 III MAF LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS PER 24 HOUR PERIOD WERE EMPLOYED TO MONITOR ENEMY ACTIVITY AND DIRECT FIRE ON ENEMY ELEMENTS. THESE LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS WERE IN ADDITION TO RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF NAMED OPERATIONS.

4.(S) A. DURING 1967, TRAINING OF I CORPS UNITS SHOWED GRADUAL, YET CONSISTENT IMPROVEMENT. SEVEN ARVN INFANTRY AND RANGER BATTALIONS RECEIVED A SIX-WEEKS REFRESHER COURSE THIS YEAR AS COMPARED TO FIVE IN 1966. ADDITIONALLY, THE PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
BT

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PAGE 3 OF 36 PAGES

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 P 260755Z JAN 68 ZFF-6

PP RUEPJS RUMHHQA RUMSBB RUMSBJ RUMSFF RUMSMT
 DE RUMSMA 4462A 0260900
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 260755Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUEPJS/CJSC WASH DC
 RUMSBJ/CDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 BT

S E C R E T NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 SEC II OF XII FOR ADM SHARP
 WAS REVISED AND IMPROVED, RESULTING IN MORE PRACTICAL TRAINING AND
 FEWER LECTURES. A TWO-WEEK RD PROGRAM WAS STARTED EARLY IN 1967 TO
 MOTIVATE AND TACTICALLY PREPARE ARVN BATTALIONS DEPLOYED IN RD
 SUPPORT. THREE MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS, CONSISTING OF 12 OFFICERS
 EACH, WERE FORMED. THEY TRAINED ALL COMBAT BATTALIONS IN I CORPS.
 THE 2D REGIMENT, 1ST DIVISION RECEIVED SPECIAL TRAINING AT DONG HA
 TRAINING CENTER IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER PREPARATORY TO ASSUMING
 THEIR MISSION OF MANNING PART OF THE STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4462A S E C R E T NOFORN
 DURING THIS PERIOD 337 ARVN PERSONNEL WERE TRAINED IN THE OPERATION
 AND MAINTENANCE OF ELECTRONIC BATTLE FIELD SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT.

B. TOTAL ARVN CASUALTIES LAST YEAR INCREASED 53 PERCENT
 FROM THE PREVIOUS YEARS TOTAL. RF CASUALTIES INCREASED 12 PERCENT
 AND PF CASUALTIES INCREASED 6 PERCENT UNDER THE SAME COMPARISON.
 ARVN DESERTERS TOTALED 6,350 FOR THE YEAR, APPROXIMATELY 1,500 MORE
 THAN THE TIAL ARVN WOUNDED FIGURE. MOST DESERTIONS OCCURRED AROUND
 THE TET SEASON AND OCTOBER - NOVEMBER WHEN LARGE NUMBERS OF REPLACE-
 MENTS WERE RECEIVED. TOTAL DESERTIONS FOR THESE TWO MONTHS WAS 24
 PERCENT OF THE YEARS TOTAL. WHEN COMPARED TO 1966, THE PICTURE
 BRIGHTENED AS THE ARVN PERCENTAGE OF DESERTIONS COMPARED TO TOTAL
 ASSIGNED STRENGTH DECREASED 4 PERCENT. RF DESERTIONS DROPPED 7 PER-
 CENT AND PF 12 PERCENT.

C. TROOP MORALE WITHIN I CTZ GENERALLY IMPROVED OVER THE
 PAST YEAR. BETTER EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, MORE PAY, AND SEVERAL
 SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISE, WHICH UNDOUBT-
 EDLY IS RELATED TO THE DECREASED DESERTION RATE.

D. I CORPS OBJECTIVES IN 1967 WERE EITHER ACCOMPLISHED OR
 SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARD THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT. CONSID-
 ERED NOTE-WORTHY ARE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ARVN 1ST AND 2D DIVISIONS.

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4462A S E C R E T F O F O R N

WITH THE DISPOACEMENT OF THEIR UNITS NORTH AND MOMENTUM GAINED IN 1967, ACCELERATED PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS WILL CONTINUE IN 1968.

5. (S) A. ENEMY INTERDICTION AND HARRASSMENT OF OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. IN ALL, 104 BRIDGES AND 151 CULVERTS WERE EITHER DAMAGED OR DESTROYED. APPROXIMATELY 75PCT OF THIS SABOTAGE WAS CONCENTRATED ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE NB 1. THE ENEMY'S EFFORTS WERE MORE THAN OFFSET BY AN EXTENSIVE ENGINEER EFFORT. DURING THE YEAR, 11,500 FEET OF BRIDGING WERE REPAIRED OR REPLACED, AND 10,500 FEET OF NEW BRIDGING INSTALLED. IN ADDITION, 13,600 FEET OF TACTICAL BRIDGING, BOTH FLOATING AND FIXED, WERE INSTALLED TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL HIGHWAYS IN A USEABLE STATUS, WHILE MORE PERMANENT BRIDGES WERE BEING REPAIRED OR CONSTRUCTED.

B. SEVERAL ESSENTIAL HIGHWAYS WERE OPENED DURING THE YEAR. IN JULY, NATIONAL ROUTE NBR 1 WAS OPENED TO MILITARY AND CIVIL TRAFFICE ALONG THE ENTIRE WENGTH, FROM THE DMZ TO THE I CORPS-II CORPS BOUNDARY. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE HIGHWAY HAS BEEN OPEN FOR THIS DISTANCE SINCE NOVEMBER 1965. ALSO NOTABLE, ROUTE NBR 537 FROM DANANG TO THE AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WAS OPENED.

C. IN DYE MARKER, FOUR STRONG POINT/PATROL BASES (A-SITES) AND THREE FORWARD OPERATING BASES (C-SITES) WERE NEAR COMPLETION AT

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4462A S E C R E T N O F O R N

THE END OF THE YEAR. A TOTAL OF 167 BUNKERS WERE COMPLETED, WITH 234 OTHERS COMPLETED EXCEPT FOR COVER LAYERS. 67,229 METERS OF TACTICAL WIRE WERE CONSTRUCTED AND 12,058 METERS OF MINEFIELD EMPLACED. ONE A-SITE (A-1) AND ONE C-SITE (VC-2) ARE COMPLETE AND MANNED IN BATTALION STRENGTH. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE A-SITE (A-5) THE REMAINING A AND C SITES AVERAGE 80PCT COMPLETION. SITE A-5 IS PROGRAMMED FOR COMPLETION IN CALENDAR YEAR 1968. ARVN FORCES ARE IN THE PROCESS OF MANNING SITE A-2, AND ARE SCHEDULED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SITES A-3, AND A-4 IN CALENDAR YEAR 1968. CLEARING OF A 600 METER WIDE TRACE FROM CON THIEN TO GIO LINH WAS COMPLETED IN JULY 1967. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE ON THIS TRACE IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN FEBRUARY 1968, UPON THE ARRIVAL OF REMAINING ITEMS OF REQUIRED MATERIAL.

6. (S) A. IN SPITE OF CONCENTRATED ENEMY EFFORTS TO DISRUPT THE PROGRAM, THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN I CORPS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. THOUGH THE PROVINCIAL RD PLANS REMAINED BEHIND SCHEDULE ALL YEAR, 78PCT OF THE ORIGINAL PLANS AND 99PCT OF THE PLANS AS MODIFIED DURING THE YEAR WERE ACCOMPLISHED, COMPRED TO 47PCT OF THE REVISED PROGRAM IN 1966. A TOTAL OF 316,998 PEOPLE IN 203 HAMLETS WERE BROUGHT UNDER GVN CONTROL. BY THE END OF THE YEAR, WULL OVER 75PCT

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PAGE 5 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4462A S E C R E T NOFORN
 OF THE RD BUDGET OF NEARLY 400 MILLION PIASTERS HAD BEEN SPENT, INCLUDING VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE FUNDS FOR AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION. THE MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RD CADRE IMPROVED NOTICEABLY THROUGHOUT THE YEAR; THE NUMBER OF TEAMS ROSE FROM 119 TO 150. APPROXIMATELY 75PCT OF THE 7,500 CADRE ATTENDED THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER. ON THE DEBIT SIDE, PUBLIC WORKS, HEALTH, SELF-HELP, AND WAREHOUSE PROJECTS LAGGED BEHIND. THE PERFORMANCE OF MOST TECHNICAL SERVICES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION IS UNSATISFACTORY.

B. THE GENERATION OF 200,000 NEW REFUGEES DURING 1967 PRESENTED A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO MACCORDS RESOURCES AND WAS INTERPRETED AS A SIGNIFICANT DEFEAT FOR THE VC, AS EVIDENCED BY INCREASED VC ATTACKS AGAINST REFUGEES LATE IN THE YEAR. THE MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS DURING THE YEAR INCLUDED: CONSTRUCTION OF OVER 60,000 FAMILY UNITS IN OVER 200 TEMPORARY REFUGEE CAMPS; THE EXPENDITURE OF 60PCT OF THE MORE THAN 140 MILLION PIASTER REFUGEE RELIEF BUDGET; THE DISTRIBUTION OF OVER 500 TONS OF US COMMODITIES PER MONTH; AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF 120,000 REFUGEES, PRIMARILY IN CAMPS REDESIGNATED "RESETTLEMENT CENTERS". EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL TRAINING, PUBLIC HEALTH, RESETTLEMENT, AND JOB PLACEMENT, HOWEVER, WERE LESS SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS. THEY WILL RECEIVE INCREASED ATTENTION IN 1968. THOUGH

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4462A S E C R E T NOFORN
 APATHY ON THE PART OF GVN OFFICIALS REMAINED THE MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLE IN THE PROGRAM, SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN JACKING THEM UP. THIS PROGRESS WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY AN ACTION-ORIENTED REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN SEPTEMBER, CONDUCTED BY THE CRPS COMMANDER AND THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES (SCR), AND BY THE FORMATION IN LATE DECEMBER, OF A VIABLE GVN/US REFUGEE TASK ORCE FOR I CORPS.

7. (S) A. THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO GAIN GREATER CONTROL OVER THE CIVIL POPULACE AND TO ENLARGE THE ARA OVER WHICH HE CLAIMS CONTROL. ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY INCREASED IN NUMBER AND INTENSITY TO MORE THAN TWICE THE PRECEDING YEAR. NUMEROUS HEAVY ATTACKS BY FIRE WERE INITIATED AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS ALONG THE DMZ AND THROUGHOUT QUANG TRI PROVINCE. VC/NVA UNITS CONDUCTED GROUND ATTACKS UP TO REGIMENTAL SIZE AGAINST FIXED POSITIONS THROUGHOUT I CTZ. PRIMARY AREAS OF ENEMY INTEREST WERE LOCATIONS ASTRIDE SUPPLY, COMMUNICATION AND INFILTRATION ROUTES, CENTERS OF HIGH POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION, AND AREAS IN WHICH GVN SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING RD PROGRAMS.

B. THE ENEMY HOPED HIS 1967 CAMPAIGNS WOULD GAIN SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL VICTORIES WITH MINIMUM LOSSES, WHILE IMPOSING HEAVY LOSSES ON ARVN AND ALLIED FORCES. HIS INTENTION WAS TO UTILIZE
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PAGE 6 OF 36 PAGES

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 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
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SECRET NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 SEC III OF XII
 VICTORIES AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL TOOL IN UNDERMINING THE MORALE AND
 PRESTIGE OF FRIENDLY FORCES. HIS ATTENDANT LONG-RANGE POLITICAL
 AIM WAS TO CREATE A POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES PARALLEL
 TO FRANCE IN 1953, THUS INFLUENCING WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND CON-
 FRONTING THE PUBLIC WITH AN ENDLESS WAR OF ATTRITION.

C. AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING HIS OBJECTIVES, THE ENEMY
 EVOLVED A PLAN WHICH ENCOMPASSED THE DESTRUCTION OF RD PROGRAMS
 THROUGH SELECTIVE TERROR AND PROPAGANDA, THE USE OF HEAVY WEAPONS

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4463A SECRET NOFORN
 ATTACKS AND LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS, ISOLATION OF CITIES BY INTER-
 DICTION HIGHWAYS, AND INFLECTION CASUALTIES AT TIMES AND PLACES OF
 HIS CHOOSING IN BATTLES WHICH WOULD BE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE.
 HE WAS UNABLE TO ACHIEVE HIS AMBITIOUS PROGRAM IN 1967, AND SUFFERED
 SEVERE SETBACKS IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY AREAS. HE WAS MOST
 EFFECTIVE IN INSTANCES WHEN HE UTILIZED ROCKETS AND/OR SAPPERS. HIS
 MOST EXPLOITABLE SECCESSES WERE HIS ROCKET ATTACKS ON DANANG AIR
 BASE OF 27 FEBRUARY AND JULY, THE EVERRUNNING OF THREE PROVINCIAL
 JAILS, FOUR DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, AND THE SECCESSFUL PENETRATION
 OF ALL PROVINCEAL CAPITALS.

(II CTZ)

8. (C) A. OBJECTIVES IN THE II CTZ DURING 1967 WERE POINTED
 TOWARD THE ULTIMATE GOALS OF DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S MAIN FORCES AND
 EXTENDING GVN CONTROL OVER THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE.
 B. ALTHOUGH ASSIGNED AN ECONOMY OF FORCE ROLE IN THE
 LARGER CONTEXT OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR, US, FVMAF, AND RVNAF FORCES
 IN II CTZ PURSUED THIS AGGRESSIVE TWO PART STRATEGY AIMED AT DES-
 TROYING THE VC/NVA MAIN FORCES AND EXTENDING GVN CONTROL THROUGHOUT
 THE CORPS ZONE. THE MILITARY SIDE WAS A CONTINUATION OF THAT
 PURSUED WITHIN THE ZONE THE PRECEDING YEAR. THE OTHER SIDE WAS A

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PAGE 7 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4463A S E C R E T NOFORN.
 NEW AND EXPANDED APPROACH TO PACIFICATION. THE MILITARY STRATEGY WITHIN THE ZONE CALLED FOR FRIENDLY MANEUVER ELEMENTS SUPPORTED BY AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY'S ORGANIZED FORMATIONS AND DEVELOPED BASE AREAS, TO INTERDICT HIS LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND TO DENY HIM ACCESS TO THE FOOD PRODUCTION AND POPULATION CENTERS UPON WHICH HIS CONTINUED EXISTENCE DEPENDS. MEANWHILE, SECURITY FORCES IN ACTIVE DEFENSE OF FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS, LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND GVN CONTROLLED AREAS WERE TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INNER SHIELD BEHIND WHICH PACIFICATION COULD GO FORWARD.

9. (C) A. IN JANUARY 1967, OVER 311,500 FIGHTING MEM OF THE FREE WORLD WERE ARRAYED AGAINST THE VC/NVA WITHIN II CTZ. THESE FORCES INCLUDED: 139,900 US, 134,200 GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND 37,400 REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK).

B. OUR OPERATIONS IN 1967 WERE CHARACTERIZED BY VIGOROUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO LOCATE THE ENEMY, TO DEFEAT HIM IN PITCHED BATTLES WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND TO PRE-EMPT HIS INITIATIVES BY FREQUENT SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT. WHERE HE DID NOT ELECT TO STAND AND FIGHT, OUR SMALL, HIGHLY MOBILE RECONNAISSANCE AND REACTION UNITS PURSUED HIM RELENTLESSLY. DESPITE THE FACT THAT II CTZ

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4463A S E C R E T NOFORN

WAS ESSENTIALLY AN ECONOMY OF FORCE AREA FOR UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM (MACV), EMPHATIC PROGRESS IN DEFEATING MAJOR FORCES IS CLAIMED FOR 1967.

C. DURING THE ASSESSMENT PERIOD, 11 NAVED OPERATIONS WERE COMPLETED AND SIX MORE WERE IN PROGRESS AT YEAR'S END. THE YEAR BEGAN WITH OPERATION THAYER II IN BINH DINH, OPERATION ADAMS IN PHU YEN, OPERATIONS PICKETT AND SAV HOUSTON IN KONUM AND PLEIKU AND OPERATION BYRD IN BINH THUAN, ALL WITH INITIAL OBJECTIVES OF ELIMINATING OR BREAKING UP LARGE VC/NVA FORCES OPERATING IN THE POPULATED AREAS. CONTINUED STEADY PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY FORCED HIM AWAY FROM THE PEOPLE WHILE OTHER US FORCES PURSUED HIM INTO HIS BORDER OR MOUNTAIN SANCTUARIES. MEANWHILE, FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS SUCH AS PERSHING IN BINH DINH PROTECTED HIGH DENSITY POPULATION AREAS FROM MAJOR ENEMY INCURSIONS. TASK FORCE 2/7 CAVALRY IN THE BYRD AO CONTINUED TO KEEP THE OLD VIET-MINH STRONGHOLD IN BINH THUAN OUT OF ENEMY HANDS. THE 951 CAVALRY DIVISION, WITH THE ARVN 40TH AND 41ST REGIMENTS, FOUGHT MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS IN THE CRESCENT AREA, THE CAY GIAP MOUNTAINS, AND AN LAO VALLEY AND THE BONG SON PLAIN, ALL WITHIN BINH DINH. IN THE LATTER (BATTLE OF TAMQUAN) MORE THAN 500 ENEMY DEAD WERE ACCOUNTED FOR. THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND

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PAGE 8 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4463A S E C R E T NOFORN
 THE 173D ABN BDE, ASSISTED BY 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ELEMENTS AND FIVE ARVN BATTALIONS, ENGAGED FOUR NVA REGIMENTS NEAR DAK TO IN NOVEMBER ON ONE OF THE PIVOTAL BATTLES OF THE WAR. FRIENDLY FORCES KILLED 1,644 ENEMY SOLDIERS WHILE LOSING 368 OF OUR OWN. AT YEAR'S END, ALL FRONTS WERE QUIET BY COMPARISON AND ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE TO KEEP WATCH OVER THE ENEMY AS HE REGROUPED AND RECOVERED WITHIN HIS SANCTUARIES OR PUSHED MORE INFILTRATORS INTO THE CORPS ZONE. THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, US FORCES CONTINUED TO FRUSTRATE THE ENEMY'S STATED ABJECTIVE OF DESTROYING ONE OR MORE BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER US UNITS OR EVERRUNNING ONE OR OUR CIDG CAMPS. WE EXPECT TO FRUSTRATE HIM FURTHER THROUGHOUT 1968.

US RESULTS IN 1967:	US RESULTS IN 1966:
FRIENDLY - 1,695 KIA, 7,412 WIA	FRIENDLY - 1,379 KIA, 7,287 WIA
ENEMY - 11,171 KIA, 3,247 DET	ENEMY - 11,520 KIA, 1,983 DET

D. DURING THE YEAR, FIVE MAJOR OPERATION FEATURED COMBINED US/ARVN ACTIVITIES ON A CONTINUING BASIS: PERSHING, BYRD, GREELEY, BOLLING AND MACARTHUR. ONE MAJOR ARVN OPERATION, AN DAN 707 IN PHU YEN PROVINCE INCLUDED ROK PARTICIPATION. EXPANSION OF COMBINED OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE GREATER PARTICIPATION BY RF UNITS,

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4463A S E C R E T NOFORN
 WILL BE MATTER OF CONTINUING EMPHASIS DURING 1968.
 E. IT LONG HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED WITHIN II CTZ THAT THE ENEMY OFTEN USES POLITICAL AND TACTICAL BOUNDARIES AS INFILTRATION ROUTES AND SAFE HAVENS BECAUSE OF THE COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES POSED FOR FRIENDLY FORCES IN PURSUING HIM. ACCORDINGLY, OPERATIONAL AO'S SUCH AS PERSHING AND BYRD HAVE FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME BEEN DESIGNED TO PERMIT OPERATIONS ACROSS BOUNDARIES. FURTHER, MANY OF THE CIDG CAMPS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED AO'S WHICH INCLUDE DISTRICT OR PROVINCE BOUNDARIES, AND OPERATIONAL AO'S OF MOBILE STRIKE COMPANIES ARE SOMILARY DRAWN.
 F. THE ICEX PROGRAM PROVED TO BE ANOTHER PROMISING AREA RELATING TO FUTURE ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE ON ENEMY ACTIVITIES. INTDXNDVR AS AN APPARATUS FOR COLLECTION AND RAPID EXPLOITATION OF INFORMATION ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE, THE PROGRAM SHOULD PROVE OF VALUE AS WELL FOR DEVELOPMENT OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS (PRU) HAVE BEEN FULLY INTEGRATED INTO THE ORGANIZATION.
 G. THE FORCES OF THE FREE WORLD CAN BE JUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF THEIR PROGRESS IN II CTZ DURING 1967. NOT ONLY DID THEY DEFEAT THE ENEMY IN EVERY MAJOR ENGAGEMENT AND SIGNIFICANTLY EXTEND THE
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PAGE 9 OF 36 PAGES #65

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 AREA UNDER RVN CONTROL, BUT THE RESULT OF THEIR EFFORTS ARE CLEARLY
 DEMONSTRABLE. OUR SUCCESSSES IN HIS ZONE WERE NOT UNBROKEN IN 1967.
 LATE IN THE YEAR, THE ENEMY ACHIEVED SOME LOCAL MILITARY SUCCESS IN
 THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES TO INCLUDE PARTIAL INTERDICTION OF HIGHWAY 20
 SOUTH FROM DALAT. THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM WENT FORWARD, BUT DID NOT
 PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS AS FAR AS HAD BEEN HOPED. THE INFRASTRUCTURE
 IS YET SUBSTANTIALLY INTACT. THE MAIN FORCE IS STILL IN BEING,
 BATTERED BUT STILL HOPING FOR A VICTORY FROM WHICH THEY CAN

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4464A SECRET/NOFORN
 POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. YET, THE BASIC PACIFICATION PLANNING IS COM-
 PLETE AND THE PROGRAMS ARE MOVING; THE STRENGTH OF FREE WORLD FORCES
 IS SUCH THAT THE CHANCES OF A MAJOR ENEMY VICTORY GROW MORE REMOTE
 EACH DAY.

10. (C) A. US, RVNAF AND FVMAF'S IN JANUARY 1967 WERE DEPLOYED
 IN A CONFIGURATION ROUGHLY ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF THE ENEMY. REGIONAL
 AND POPULAR FORCE (RF, PF) ASSETS WERE DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY UNIFORMLY
 THROUGHOUT THE CORPS ZONES, PROVIDING LOCAL SECURITY FOR POPULATED
 AREAS, LOCS, BRIDGES, AND KEY INSTALLATIONS. TWENTY-SIX CIQG
 CAMPS WERE IN EVIDENCE, 77 OF WHICH WERE LOCATED IN THE WESTERN
 BORDER REGION, WHERE THEY SERVED AS A SCREEN AGAINST ENEMY
 INFILTRATION AND PROVIDED EARLY WARNING OF MAJOR INCURSIONS.
 THE REMAINDER WERE LOCATED GENERALLY IN REMOTE INTERIOR AREAS TO
 MAINTAIN A RVN PRESENCE IN AREAS NOT YET UNDER COMPLETE
 CONTROL. THE 71 AVAILABLE MANEUVER BATTALIONS OF THE
 REGULAR FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES WERE DEPLOYED TO DEAL WITH THE
 MAJOR ENEMY THREATS THROUGHOUT THE ZONE.

B. FORCES OF THE 9TH ROK (WHITE HORSE) AND 885-1 ROK
 (PIERCE TIGER) DIVISIONS DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES BY THEIR AGGRESS-
 IVE, PROFESSIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY. THEIR

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PAGE 10 OF 36 PAGES #65

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4464A S E C R E T NOFORN

MISSIONS WERE TO CLEAR AND HOLD THEIR AOR'S AND TO PROTECT ALLIED INSTALLATIONS, LOC'S AND THE PACIFICATION EFFORT THEREIN. THERE WERE A LEAST TWO HIGH POINTS DURING THE YEAR. OPERATION ON JAC KYO-I RESULTED IN THE LINK-UP OF THE TWO DIVISIONS NEAR TUY HOA IN APRIL, GIVING THEM AN EXTENSIVE, CONTINUOUS TAOR FROM ABOVE QUI NHON TO THE VICINITY OF PHAN RANG. OPERATION HONH KIL DONG NORTHWEST OF TUY HOA IN JULY FOUND SEVEN BATTALIONS PITTED AGAINST THE 95TH NVA REGIMENT. BY THE END OF AUGUST ROK FORCES HAD KILLED 638 ENEMY, WHILE LOSING 23 OF THEIR OWN.

C. ONE OTHER ENGAGEMENT IS MENTIONED, NOT FOR THE SENSATIONAL RESULTS ATTAINED, BUT RATHER FOR THE REMARKABLE RESTRAINT DISPLAYED BY ROK FORCES. IN OCTOBER, THE 9TH ROK DIVISION DISCOVERED THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY HAD INFILTRATED INTO TWO VILLAGES (NINH BA AND CHAPLE) NEAR NINH HOA AND HAD SEIZED MOST OF THE POPULATION AS SHIELDS FROM FRIENDLY ARTILLERY FIRE. ALTHOUGH EVENTUALLY EJECTING THE ENEMY FROM THE TOWN, SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES IN LIMITING CASUALTIES AMONG INNOCENT CIVILIANS. THEY SUFFERED 47 KIA, AND 93 WIA WHILE KILLING 69 OF THE ENEMY.

TOTAL RESULTS FOR 1967:

FRIENDLY - 500 KIA 1,424 WIA

TOTAL RESULTS FOR 1966

FRIENDLY-310 KIA, 964 WIA

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4464A S E C R E T NOFORN

ENEMY - 3,422 KIA, 1930 DET ENEMY - 3,972 KIA, 929 DET

D. THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF ARKCN FORCES REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME IN 1967, DESPITE THE SPLENDID SHOWING IN THE DAK SEA AREA IN AUGUST, THE DAK TO AREA IN NOVEMBER AND IN NORTHWESTERN BINH DINH THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. RESULTS WERE CHARACTERIZED, HOWEVER, BY A DROP IN THE FAVORABLE KILL RATIO FROM 7.3 TO 1 TO 2.9 TO 1. THIS IS EXPLAINED ONLY PARTIALLY BY THE DIVERSION OF APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD OF THE COMBAT BATTALIONS TO PACIFICATION SUPPORT.

E. IN THE 22D DIVISION TACTICAL AREA (DIA), THE 40TH, 41ST, AND 47TH ARVN REGIMENT AND THE TWO BATTALIONS OF THE ARVN MARINE TASK FORCE CONDUCTED OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHEASTERN PORTION OF II CTZ WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF ELIMINATING VC/NVA UNITS, DESTROYING ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE, ESTABLISHING CONTROL OF THE POPULATION IN THE LOWLANDS, AND SUPPORTING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN THE HAMLETS. THE 40TH AND 41ST REGIMENTS, IN PARTICULAR, PERFORMED WITH IMPRESSIVE EFFECTIVENESS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR IN BINH DINH.

F. DURING THE FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF THE YEAR, THE 23D ARVN DIVISION IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF II CTZ, ASSISTED BY SEVERAL ARVN RANGER BATTALIONS AND US HELICOPTER SUPPORT, CONCENTRATED ON PROTECTING HIGHWAY 20, AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS AND OPER-

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PAGE 11 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4464A S E C R E T NOFORN
 ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION. ONLY LIGHT CONTACT WAS REPORTED
 IN GENERAL. THE FOURTH QUARTER SAW A MAJOR INCREASE IN ACTIVITY AS
 THE VC SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED OUTPOST MAMA ON HIGHWAY 1 IN BINH THUAN,
 AMBUSHED SECURITY PF AND ARVN UNITS IN NAM DONG IN NOVEMBER AND
 OVERAN A PR CUTPOST.
 G. ARVN FORCES IN THE NORTHWESTERN PORTION OF II CTZ,
 SUPPORTED BY THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, WERE BUSY IN THE FIRST TWO
 QUARTERS OF 1967 RESETTLING 8,200 MONTAGNARD TRIBESMEN FROM THE
 WESTERN BORDER AREA TO DAP ENANG SOUTHWEST OF PLEIKU CITY. IN
 AURUS, THE 8TH AIRBORNE BATTALION MADE CONTACT WITH ELEMENTS OF THE
 74TH NVA REGIMENT NEAR DAK SEANG KILLING 203 WHILE LOSING ONLY 12
 FRIENDLY KIA. LIGHT SKIRMISHING WAS INTERRUPTED IN LATE OCTOBER BY
 A 122MM ROCKET ATTACK ON PLEIKU. DURING THE BATTLE NEAR DAK TO IN
 NOVEMBER, THE 42D ARVN REGIMENT, AN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE AND RANGER
 ELEMENTS FOUGHT WELL IN COORDINATION WITH THEIR US COMRADES.
 ARVN RESULTS IN 1967 ARVN RESULTS IN 1966:
 FRIENDLY - 993 KIA, 2,237 WIA FRIENDLY - 628 KIA, 1,431 WIA
 ENEMY - 2,559 KIA, 966 DET ENEMY - 4,589 KIA, 1,434 DET
 H. TWENTY OPERATIONS INVOLVING USSF AND CIDR ELEMENTS
 WITHIN II CTZ WERE CONDUCTED IN 1967. THESE WERE IN ADDITION TO

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4464A S E C R E T NOFORN
 CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS WITHIN CAMP TAOR'S ASSOCIATED
 WITH THE 25 CIDG CAMPS WITHIN II CTZ: ONE ADDITIONAL CAMP (TIEU
 AARG) IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN KARLAC PROVINCE WITH A TENTATIVE
 COMPLETION DATE OF 28 JANUARY 1968. TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR RECONNAIS-
 SANCE AND INTERDICTION MISSIONS, 14,920 PERSONNEL ARE DEPLOYED
 THROUGHOUT II CTZ IN 108 CAM STRIKE FORCE (CSF) COMPANIES AND NINE
 MOBILE STRIKE FORCE (MSF) COMPANIES.
 CIDG AND SPECIAL FORCE CIDG AND SPECIAL FORCE
 RESULTS IN 1967: RESULTS IN 1966:
 FRIENDLY: CIDG-396 KIA, 1,047 WIA FRIENDLY: CIDG-378 KIA 920 WIA
 CNSF- 4 KIA, 71 WIA CNSF- KIA, 26 WIA
 USSF- 3 KIA, 69 WIA USSF-22 KIA, 96 WIA
 ENEMY: 1,629 KIA, 338 DET ENEMY: 1,736 KIA, 681 DET
 I. (C) A. AT PRESENT, OF THE 1,942KM OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
 ROADS IN THE CTZ, 35 PCT ARE GREEN, 60PCT ARE AMBER, AND 5PCT ARE RED.
 ROUTE 1 IS GREEN FROM TAM QUAN SOUTH TO PHAN RANG. ONE REGRESSION
 OCCURRED DURING THE YEAR: ROUTE 20 FROM DALAT TO THE II-II CORPS
 BOUNDARY REACHED GREEN DURING THE 3D QUARTER BUT FELL BACK TO AMBER
 IN THE 4TH AS A RESULT OF INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA.
 B. AT YEAR'S END, 402 OF 560KM, OR 71.8PCT OF THE RAILROAD
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PAGE 12 OF 36 PAGES #65

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RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON

RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH

RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG

RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA

RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

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IN THE CORPS ZONE WAS OPERATIONAL. THIS COMPARES WITH 253 KM OR 45.3 PCT OPERATIONAL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.

C. IN JANUARY 1967, THERE WERE 103 FIXED AND 17 MOBILE POLICE CHECK POINTS IN THE CORPS ZONE. AT YEAR'S END, THERE WERE 114 FIXED, 30 MOBILE AND 15 MARINE CHECK POINTS. OVERALL, THE INCREASE WAS 33 PCT. PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT WAS THE 96 PCT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MOBILE CHECK POINTS, FOUND TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE OF ALL TYPES IN RESOURCES CONTROL.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4465A SECRET/NOFORN

12. (C) A. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN II CTZ WAS SUCCESSFUL IN 1967. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME ASPECTS OF RVNAF SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION WERE DISAPPOINTING. SOME RD CAMPAIGNS ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE EXCEPT TO TIE UP SORELY NEEDED RESOURCES ALONG WITH DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS AND CADRES. THE RF/PF CONTINUED TO BEAR THE BRUNT OF VIET CONG PRESSURE AND ATTACKS AGAINST THE POPULATED AREAS. IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION, 60 RF COMPANIES INCREASED TO 72 AND 190 PF PLATOONS TO 231. IN ADDITION, ONE MORE ARVN BATTALION WAS DEPLOYED IN A SUPPORTING ROLE, RAISING THE NUMBER FROM 7 TO 8.

B. THE MAJOR THRUST OF THE RD PROGRAM WAS PROVIDED BY THE RD TEAMS. PROGRESS IN HAMLET CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE CORPS ZONE. WELL CONSTRUCTED SCHOOLS, DISPENSARIES, WELLS, ROADS AND MARKETS WERE HALLMARKS OF RD PROGRESS IN ALMOST EVERY RD HAMLET. MOST OF THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED UNDER RD CADRE LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE.

C. ALTHOUGH A PRINCIPAL TARGET OF THE VC, THE RD CADRES GAVE AN EXCELLENT ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES IN MOST ENCOUNTERS. HOWEVER, THE PUBLIC ACTION TEAM COMPONENT OF THE RD TEAM TENDED NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN HAMLET ACTIVITIES, ITS PERSONNEL FREQUENTLY BECOMING

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PAGE 13 OF 36 PAGES #65

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4465A S E C R E T N O F O R N
 "WATCHERS" INSTEAD OF "DOERS".

D. TROUNG SON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (TSRD) CADRES MADE A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION IN HIGHLAND PROVINCES. THE GVN, HOWEVER, IS CONFRONTED WITH A NEED TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS UPON THE EXECUTION OF MONTAGNARD PROGRAMS TO INCLUDE MODIFICATION OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR ISRD TEAMS. THE MONTAGNARD PROGRAM CAN BE AN IMPORTANT ADJUNCT TO PACIFICATION, BUT ADDITIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC EFFORT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE GVN.

E. THE GVN PLAN TO LEAVE BEHIND CERTAIN CADRES IN COMPLETED HAMLETS (AP NUOI DUONG) IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE PACIFICATION LEVEL REACHED, CONTINUOUS GVN PRESENCE IS ESSENTIAL IN THE HAMLETS.

F. THE 1967 PACIFICATION PROGRAM GOT OFF TO A SLOW START BUT FINISHED STRONGLY. WE HAVE REASON TO BE OPTIMISTIC REGARDING THE 1968 PROGRAM. THE PRESSING NEED IS TO CONTINUE THE FORWARD MOMENTUM GAINED IN 1967, BUT THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN MOVING TOO FAST MUST BE RECOGNIZED. "MORE, BETTER AND FASTER" CAN BE CONSIDERED THE KEYNOTE OF 1968, BUT EMPHASIS MUST LIE HEAVILY ON REALISTIC RESULTS CONSISTENT WITH MODERATELY EXPANDING GVN CAPABILITIES AT THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVELS.

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4465A S E C R E T N O F O R N

13. (C) A. AS 1967 BEGAN, I I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE FACED AN ENEMY ESTIMATED AT 26,200 NVA MAIN FORCE, 10,300 VC MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL FORCE, 3,400 ADMINISTRATIVE TROOPS AND 16,900 GUERRILLAS SUPPORTED BY AN INFRASTRUCTURE, THEN BELIEVED TO NUMBER 11,900, BUT NOW KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY LARGER. THIS FORCE HAD A SPEARHEAD OF 53 MANEUVER BATTALIONS, MOST OF WHICH WERE ORGANIC TO FOUR NVA DIVISIONS, THE 1ST, 3D, 5TH AND 10TH. THESE DIVISIONS, IN TURN, WERE CONTROLLED BY THREE MAJOR HEADQUARTERS: THE B3 FRONT STATIONED ACROSS THE LAOTIAN-CAMBODIAN BORDER; HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY REGION 5, CONTROLLED THE IN-COUNTRY FORCES IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE CTZ; AND HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY REGION 6, WHICH CONTROLLED OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES. IN ADDITION TO THE DIVISIONAL UNITS UNDER THE B3 FRONT, MR-5, AND MR-6, EACH OF THESE THREE HEADQUARTERS HAD SEVERAL SEPARATE BATTALIONS UNDER ITS CONTROL.

B. MILITARILY, HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WAS TO RETAIN AND EXTEND HIS CONTROL OVER THE RICH POPULATION AND AGRICULTURAL AREAS ON THE COASTAL PLAIN, WITH PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON BINH DINH, PHU YEN AND KMANH HOA PROVINCES, AND SECONDARY EMPHASIS ON THE AGRICULTURAL AREAS AROUND PHAN TRIET IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE. ONLY BY SO DOING COULD HE ACCOMPLISH HIS LONG TERM STRATEGIC GOAL OF REDUCING GVN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 4 OF 36 PAGES #65

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4465A S E C R E T NOFORN
 CONTROL OF URBAN ENCLAVES, THEREBY PAVING THE WAY FOR ULTIMATE VICTORY. TO ACCOMPLISH HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE, HE ATTEMPTED TO DISPERSE AND TIE DOWN THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF US FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS WHERE TERRAIN AND SHORT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FAVOR HIS OPERATIONS. HE HOPED THEREBY TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE ON HIS COASTAL FORMATIONS AND TO INFLICT SUCH HEAVY CASUALTIES ON FRIENDLY FORCES AS TO DISCOURAGE CONTINUED US PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR.

C. THE ENEMY RETAINED A SIZEABLE IN-COUNTRY BASE, SINCE 20 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WAS UNDER HIS EFFECTIVE CONTROL AND AN ADDITIONAL 20 PERCENT LIVED IN CONTESTED TERRITORY. HIS INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGHOUT THE ZONE BASICALLY WAS INTACT AND HE WAS OPERATING AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF TAX COLLECTION POINTS ALONG KEY ROADS, THUS ENABLING HIM TO OBTAIN THE MONEY HE NEEDED TO BUY ON THE OPEN MARKET THOSE COMMODITIES NECESSARY FOR HIS OPERATIONS, BUT NOT OBTAINABLE THROUGH HIS OWN SUPPLY SYSTEM. HE WAS INFILTRATING REPLACEMENTS FROM NORTH VIETNAM INTO THE ZONE AT A RATE OF APPROXIMATELY 1,250 PER MONTH AND WAS RECRUITING AT THE RATE OF 500 PER MONTH WITHIN THE COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH HE HAD SUSTAINED LOSSES IN 1966 OF 25,869 KNOWN KIA AND 8,511 CAPTURED, PLUS LOSSES THROUGH THE

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4465A S E C R E T NOFORN
 CHIEF HOI PROGRAM OF 9,068. HE APPARENTLY WAS FINDING REPLACEMENTS IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT IN QUALITY, TO MAINTAIN HIS OVERALL STRENGTH.

D. AVAILABLE FIGURES CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO REFLECT THE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY REVERSES THE ENEMY SUSTAINED AT DAK TO IN NOVEMBER, AND IN THE TAM QUAN - PHU CAT ACTION IN DECEMBER. WITH NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS IN KONIUM DURING JUNE AND NOVEMBER AND IN BINH DINH IN DECEMBER, THE ENEMY GENERALLY TENDED TO AVOID BATTLE DURING THE YEAR. OVERALL, HE SUSTAINED FEWER CASUALTIES THAN IN 1966: 22,666 KIA VERSUS 25,869; 6,474 CAPTURED VERSUS 8,511; 7,324 HOI CHANH VERSUS 96,068. MOREOVER, BECAUSE RVNAF NOW IS CONCENTRATING ON SECURITY MISSIONS AND RD SUPPORT, US AND ROK FORCES HAVE INFLICTED A GREATER PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL CASUALTIES: 73.2 PERCENT OF KIA IN 1967 VERSUS 59.8 PERCENT IN 1966. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT A GREATER PERCENTAGE OF ENEMY CASUALTIES OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF FRIENDLY INITIATIVES THAN IN 1966. PRISONER INTERROGATIONS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS UNIFORMLY INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY IS PLAGUED BY FOOD AND PERSONNEL SHORTAGES, DISEASE AND FALLING MORALE.

III CTZ

14. (S) OBJECTIVES IN III CTZ IN 1967 WERE TO NEUTRALIZE KEY

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#65
PAGE 15 OF 36 PAGES~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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 ZNY SSSSS
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 INFO RUEPJS/CJSC WASH DC
 RUMSBJ/COMDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMNVA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMI/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
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S E C R E T NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 SEC VI OF XII.
 VC/NVA BASE AREAS, UPGRADE THE SECURITY STATUS OF VITAL ROAD, RAIL
 AND WATER LOC'S, INCREASE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION IN SECURE
 AREAS WHILE SECURING A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF HAMLETS, AND TO INFLICT
 LOSSES ON THE VC/NVA FORCES AT A RATE WHICH EXCEEDED THEIR
 REPLACEMENT CAPABILITY.

15. (S) A. IN JANUARY 1967, THE ENEMY ENJOYED RELATIVE
 SECURITY IN VAST SANCTUARIES IN III CTZ. THE USE OF LOC'S BY
 FRIENDLY FORCES WAS GENERALLY RESTRICTED TO SAIGON AND ITS IMMEDIATE

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4466A **S E C R E T** NOFORN
 AREA. THROUGHOUT 1966, FRIENDLY FORCES WERE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS
 TO SECURE AND EXPAND THEIR BASE AREAS. ALTHOUGH FRIENDLY STRENGTH
 AND COMBAT POWER HAD ASSUMED SIZABLE PROPORTIONS, LARGE-SCALE
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS HAD NOT BEEN CONDUCTED AGAINST THE ENEMY IN
 MOST OF III CTZ. ARVN FORCES WERE COMMITTED LARGELY TO A STATIC
 SECURITY ROLE AND, ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUAL UNITS FOUGHT BRAVELY IN
 COMBAT, THEY WERE GENERALLY LACKING IN LEADERSHIP AND COMBAT
 EFFECTIVENESS. THE PICTURE WAS BRIGHTER THAN AT THE BEGINNING OF
 1966, BUT ALLIED FORCES HAD NOT DECISIVELY TURNED THE BATTLE IN THEIR
 FAVOR.

B. THE 1966-67 DRY-SEASON CAMPAIGN BEGAN WITH ALLIED
 FORCES ASSUMING THE OFFENSIVE, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY SUPPORTING
 PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THE PROVINCES SURROUNDING SAIGON.
 PRIORITY OF EFFORT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS TO THE
 NORTHWEST OF SAIGON AND IN WAR ZONE C. THE ENEMY WAS DEFEATED IN
 EVERY MAJOR BATTLE OF THE CAMPAIGN AND HIS THREE MAIN FORCE DIVISIONS
 WERE FORCED TO RELOCATE FAR TO THE NORTH AND AWAY FROM THE NATIONAL
 PRIORITY AREA. MAJOR FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OUR SUCCESS WERE
 OVERWHELMING FIREPOWER AND SUPERIOR TACTICAL MOBILITY. AS THE END
 OF THE DRY-SEASON APPROACHED, OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED TO MAINTAIN

UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 26 OF 36 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4466A S E C R E T NOFORN
 PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AND TO UPGRADE THE SECURITY STATUS OF ROADS. THE ENEMY WAS UNABLE TO REESTABLISH HIS POSITION IN HIS FORMER SANCTUARIES, AND IT BECAME MORE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH CONTACT. HE CONDUCTED NUMEROUS MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON BASE CAMPS AND INSTALLATIONS, BUT GENERALLY FAILED TO FOLLOW UP WITH GROUND ATTACKS. A NOTABLE EXCEPTION WAS THE ATTACK ON TONG LE CHON ON 7 AUGUST BY THE 165TH NVA REGIMENT, WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY VC LOSSES. BEGINNING IN OCTOBER AND CONTINUING SPORADICALLY THROUGH THE END OF 1967, THE ENEMY AGAIN DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN SUSTAINED COMBAT. HIS ATTEMPTS TO GAIN A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY AT LOC NINH, SONG BE, AND BU DOP/BO DUC WERE DECISIVELY DEFEATED. NOVEMBER MARKED THE BEGINNING OF THE 1967-68 DRY-SEASON CAMPAIGN. FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ARE NOW BEING CONDUCTED IN THE MAY TAO AREA, WAR ZONE C, WAR ZONE D, AND MR 10.

C. DURING 1967, SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONS TO THE COMBAT POWER IN III CTZ INCLUDED TWO MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND SIX ARTILLERY BATTALIONS. THE ROYAL THAI ARMY VOLUNTEER REGIMENT (RTAVR) AND THE 3 BATTALION, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT JOINED US DURING THE YEAR. IMPORTANT ARMY AVIATION GAINS INCLUDED EIGHT ASSULT HELICOPTER COMPANIES, ONE AVIATION COMPANY (CORPS), THREE ASSAULT SUPPORT

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4466A S E C R E T NOFORN
 HELICOPTER COMPANIES, ONE RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANE COMPANY, AND ONE AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON. THE ADDITION OF ONE PLATOON OF CH-54 SKYCRANES GREATLY IMPROVED OUR HEAVY LIFT CAPABILITY. THE 3/17TH AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON BECAME OPERATIONAL IN DECEMBER AND IS THE FIRST UNIT IN III CTZ TO BE EQUIPPED WITH THE NEW TURBINE POWERED OH-6A LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTER. THIS UNIT HAS GREATLY INCREASED THE COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY OF II FFORCEV.

D. PLANNING FOR THE MOVEMENT, STATIONING, AND IN-COUNTRY TRAINING OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (-) WAS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT. THE DIVISION CLOSED INTO VIETNAM ON 19 DECEMBER AND WILL BE COMBAT READY ON OR ABOUT 20 JANUARY 1968.

E. SEVEN CIDG CAMPS ARE BEING REPOSITIONED ASTRIDE KNOWN VC INFILTRATION ROUTES ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. ASSETS WILL BE TRANSFERRED FROM CAMPS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED A DECLINE IN SIGNIFICANT ENEMY CONTACTS OR ARE IN AN AREA OF OPERATIONS THAT WILL BE SECURED BY OTHER FORCES. THREE NEW CAMPS HAVE BEEN OPENED AND TWO OLD CAMPS CLOSED.

F. THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE (MRF) WAS ORGANIZED USING US NAVY ASSETS (CTF 117) AND THE 2D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION. A BASE WAS ESTABLISHED AT DONG TAN IN IV CTZ WITH THE MRF ON BOARD.

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#65
 PAGE 17 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4466A S E C R E T NOFORN
 NAVY BARRACKS SHIPS, WHICH ARE MOVED TO THE VICINITY OF THE OBJECTIVE AREAS, ARE USED AS FLOATING BASES. LARGE SCALE MOBILE RIVERINE WARFARE BEGAN IN JUNE WITH THE INITIATION OF OPERATION CORONADO. THE MAJOR IMPACT OF THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE HAS BEEN THE EXTENSION OF THE BATTLE FIELD INTO PREVIOUSLY INACCESSIBLE AREAS IN THE DELTA. ENEMY FORCES NO LONGER ENJOY VIRTUALLY FREE AND UNLIMITED MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA. PROGRESS BY THE MRF HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS US STRIKE FORCE IN THE PROVINCES OF DINH TUONG, KIEN HOA, BIEN HOA, LONG AN, GO CONG AND KIEN PHONG, AND THE RSSZ, EXTENSIVE AREAS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY HAVENS, HAVE BEEN RENDERED UNSAFE FOR THE NEMY. FROM JUNE THROUGH DECEMBER LAST YEAR, THE MRF KILLED 1,273 ENEMY.

G. A MAJOR FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO OUR CAPABILITY TO DELIVER ACCURATE ARTILLERY FIRE OVER WIDE AREAS HAS BEEN THE EXTENSION OF ARTILLERY SURVEY THROUGHOUT III CTZ. DURING 1967 SURVEY CONTROL WAS EXTENDED TO ALL SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS, US BASE CAMPS, AND ARVN ARTILLERY PLATOON POSITIONS. SURVEY WAS PROVIDED FOR 27 RD HAMLETS. 235 MONUMENTED FOURTH ORDER SURVEY STATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED IN III CTZ.

H. 1967 MAY BE REGARDED AS THE YEAR WHEN THE TIDE OF THE

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4466A S E C R E T NOFORN

MILITARY ASPECT OF THE WAR DECISIVELY SHIFTED IN III CTZ. ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS ARE NOW IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, AND HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES. FRIENDLY US/FWMAF/RVNAF FORCES, ON THE OTHER HAND, NOW CONTROL THE KEY POPULATED AREAS, POSSESS THE CAPABILITY TO DELIVER OVERWHELMING FORCES AND FIRE ANYWHERE IN THE CTZ, AND ARE INCREASING IN OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS WITH EACH MONTH. THE OPTIMISM AND CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE HAS INCREASED IN PROPORTION TO THEIR INCREASED SECURITY AND FREEDOM FROM INTIMIDATION AND THEIR RISING STANDARD OF LIVING. AS THE II FFORCEV COMBAT CAPABILITY INCREASES AND RECENTLY ARRIVED UNITS COMPLETE IN-COUNTRY TRAINING, THE ENEMY WILL BE ENGAGED IN AREAS WHERE HE HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN FORCED TO FIGHT. HE WILL BE FORCED TO MOVE FREQUENTLY AND WILL BE KEPT OFF BALANCE. HIS VULNERABILITY TO AIR, ARTILLERY AND ENGAGEMENT BY MANEUVER FORCES WILL INCREASE. HE WILL LOSE CONTROL OF POPULATION AREAS WHERE, UNTIL NOW, HE HAS RETAINED A DEGREE OF CONTROL. HIS LOGISTICAL SYSTEM WILL BE SEVERLY TAXED TO SUPPORT HIS UNITS.

16. (C) A. THE PAST YEAR HAS WITNESSED A SLOW BUT STEADY INCREASE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF. ARVN UNITS WON SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES OVER ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS. THE QUALITY OF
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#65

PAGE 18 OF 36 PAGES

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FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC HAW
 INFO RUEPJS/CJSC WASH DC
 RUMSBJ/COMDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMNVA/CG III MAF DANANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORIEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

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S E C R E T NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 SEC VII OF XII.
 LEADERSHIP HAS IMPROVED AND A PROMOTION SYSTEM BASED UPON MERIT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF INEFFECTIVE LEADERS WERE REMOVED FROM COMMAND POSITIONS.

B. ARVN UNITS HAVE ENGAGED IN MORE OPERATIONS, WITH SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS INCREASING 40 PERCENT IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR. THE PERCENTAGE OF CONTACT REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT EXCEPT FOR BATTALION SIZE OPERATIONS, WHERE ENEMY CONTACTS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY. ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4467A S E C R E T NOFORN
 HELICOPTER ASSETS HAS RESULTED IN A MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 101 AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH QUARTER, CONTRASTED WITH 32 AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN THE ENTIRE SIX MONTH PERIOD PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER. THE FAVORABLE ARVN KILL RATION INCREASED FROM 1.46 TO 2.02 IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1967. IN LINE WITH THIS IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS, THE 5TH RANGER GROUP ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE 199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (US) FOR OPERATIONS IN GIA DINH PROVINCE.

C. THERE ARE NOW 43 ARVN REGULAR INFANTRY AND RANGER BATTALIONS IN III CTZ. IN UJULY, A REFRESHER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ARVN INFANTRY, RANGER, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, AND ENGINEER UNITS WAS INITIATED. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROGRAM WAS TO IMPROVE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEADERSHIP AT ALL LEVELS. EACH US/FWMAF BR HADDE SIZE UNIT WAS ASSIGNED A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ARVN INFANTRY/RANGER BATTALIONS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES. TWENTY-FOUR BATTALIONS HAVE COMPLETED THIS TRAINING AND, ALONG WITH THIS, THE NUMBER OF COMBINED OPERATIONS WAS INCREASED.

D. IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE RVNAF LOGISTICAL SYSTEM. THE 5TH RANGER GROUP RECENTLY RECEIVED OVER 2,000 M-16 RIFLES TO RE-EQUIP ITS BATTALIONS AS PART OF THE RVNAF EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. A RECENTLY APPROVED MONTHLY ALLOCATION FOR

UNCLASSIFIED #65 PAGE 19 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUNSMA 4

67A S E C R E T NOFORN

BARRIER MATERIALS WILL PERMIT MORE RESPONSIVE DISTRIBUTION TO USING UNITS. INCREASED ARVN EMPHASIS ON LOGISTICAL MATTERS MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE ADVISORY TEAM MEMBERS AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS.

EM ARVN ENGINEERS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN SEEKING TO UPGRADE LOC'S PROVIDING ENGINEER SUPPORT FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS, AND PROVIDING DEPENDENT HOUSING FACILITIES. THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR TECHNICAL COMPETENCE WHILE UPGRADING 151 KM'S OF ROAD, CONSTRUCTING 46 KM'S OF ROAD, 249 METERS OF TACTICAL BRIDGING, AND COMPLETING PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS FOR 12 BRIDGES.

F. THE RF/PF HAVE MADE MAJOR PROGRESS IN INCREASING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. MANY PROGRAMS INITIATED DURING 1967 HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS PROGRESS. SEVENTEEN RD/PF TRAINING TEAMS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTING RF COMPANIES IN A TWO WEEK RD ORIENTED PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTIONS. EACH OF THE MAJOR OPCON UNITS HAS CONDUCTED A PROGRAM OF TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE TO UPGRADE THE RF/PF UNITS IN ITS TAOI. MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS (MATS) HAVE WORKED WITH RF/PF, RD CADRE TEAMS, AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO ASSURE CONTINUED PROGRESS OF THE RD PROGRAM. THESE TEAMS ARE SMALL ADVISORY ELEMENTS OF US AND ARVN PERSONNEL, WHICH PARTICIPATE IN OPERATIONS AND CONDUCT UNIT LEVEL TRAINING WHILE

PAGE 4 RUNSMA 4467A S E C R E T NOFORN

LIVING ON-SITE. TWENTY-FIVE (25) SUCH TEAMS ARE NOW DEPLOYED AND ADDITIONAL TEAMS ARE PROGRAMMED. THE IMPACT OF MATS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE.

G. ARVN COMMANDERS HAVE DEVELOPED AN INCREASED REALIZATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF TELLING THE ARVN STORY TO BOTH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND TO THE WORLD. THIS NEW EMPHASIS ON TROOP INFORMATION, PRESS INTERVIEWS AND NEWS RELEASES CREATES A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ARVN AND SHOULD IMPACT FAVORABLY ON THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN 1968.

H. PROGRAMS TO INCREASE THE MORALE AND HEALTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED. IMPROVED MEDICAL FACILITIES AND PX/COMMISSARY OUTLETS ARE NOW AVAILABLE. RETAIL OUTLETS INCREASED THIS YEAR TO INCLUDE EACH ARVN REGIMENT AND SOME BATTALIONS. THE ADDITION OF FOURTEEN NEW FOOD COMMODITIES HAS GREATLY IMPROVED THE SOLDIERS DIET, AND A NEW RATION CARD ENABLES THE WIFE TO MAKE PURCHASES WHILE HER HUSBAND IS ABSENT ON OPERATIONS. THESE AND SIMILAR MEASURES, SUCH AS IMPROVED DEPENDENT HOUSING, DEFINITELY AFFECT THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER AND HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN A LOWER DESERATION RATE. (1,705 IN JANUARY TO 1,261 IN NOVEMBER 1967).

17. (S) A. UPGRADING THE SECURITY STATUS OF ROAD, RAIL AND WATER LOC'S WAS A MAJOR 1967 OBJECTIVE. THIS OBJECTIVE AS

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PAGE 20 OF 36 PAGES #65

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4467 S E C R E T NOFORN

ACCOMPLISHED BY EFFECTIVE GROUND AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED AGAINST ENEMY UNITS SEEKING TO INTERDICT THESE LOC'S AND DENY THEIR USE FOR BOTH MILITARY AND VCIVILIAN PURPOSES. ROAD RUNNER OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN INCREASING NUMBERS, INCLUDING FREQUENT NIGHT CONVOY MOVEMENTS OVER KEY HIGHWAYS. THE DESIRED LEVEL OF SECURITY WAS ATTAINED ON 509 KMS OF ROAD, EXCEEDED ON 147 KMS OF ROAD AND NOT REACHED ON 42 KMS OF ROAD (HIGHWAY 1A FROM PHU CUONG TO PHUOC VINH; AN ALTERNATE ROUTE IS IN USE). THE RAIL LOC FROM SAIGON TO XUAN LOC WAS UPGRADED TO GREEN. THE GOAL OF UPGRADING WATER LOC'S IN THE NATIONAL PRIORITY AREA OF III CTZ TO A GREEN SECURITY STATUS WAS ONLY 50 PERCENT ATTAINED. MOST OF THE REMAINING WATERWAYS IN THE NPA ARE OPEN AND HAVE AMBER SECURITY STATUS. AS OF 31 DECEMBER, CONVOYS COULD MOVE OVER ALL NATIONAL HIGHWAYS IN III CTZ WITH THE EXCEPTION OF INTERPROVINCIAL HIGHWAY 1A TO DONG OAI AND HIGHWAY 14 FROM DUONG XOAI TO THE NORTHEAST.

B. JUNGLE CLEARING OPERATIONS WERE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY ON THE ROAD LOC'S IN III CTZ. THIS CLEARING TYPICALLY VARIES FROM 100-300 METERS ON EACH SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY AND IS NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED IN COORDINATION WITH MAJOR SECURITY FORCES.

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4467A S E C R E T NOFORN

C. THE MAINTENANCE OF LOC'S WAS A MAJOR US ENGINEER OBJECTIVE IN 1967. DURING THE YEAR 2,944 KMS OF ROAD WERE IMPROVED OR MAINTAINED AND OVER 5,500 FEET OF FLOAT AND PANEL BORDERS WERE INSTALLED.

D. ENGINEER ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF II FFORCEV HAS ACCELERATED IN TEMPO THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. ENGINEER UNITS SUPPORTED 27 MAJOR OPERATIONS IN 1967. DURING THE YEAR 88,800 ACRES OF JUNGLE WERE CLEARED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS, TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF LOC'S, INSTALLATIONS, AND VILLAGES, AND TO DENY THE ENEMY FREE USE OF HIS BASE AREAS. BASE AREAS NEUTRALIZED INCLUDED THE IRON TRIANGLE, HOBO WOODS, ONG DONG JUNGLE, AND PORTIONS OF THE FILHOL PLANTATION, BOI LOI WOODS, NHON TRACH JUNGLE, AN LOI WOODS, HAI DICH, AND MAY TAO AREA. NUMEROUS CACHES OF ARMS, SUPPLIES AND DOCUMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE WERE LOCATED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THESE LAND CLEARING OPERATIONS. FIRE SUPPORT BASES FOR HEAVY ARTILLERY WERE BUILT AND MAINTAINED AT TAN AN, BEN LUC, HAM TAN, AND SONG BE. FSB'S ARE CURRENTLY BEING CONSTRUCTED AT LOC NINH, TAN TRU, AND FRENCH FORT. SPECIAL FORCES/CIDG CAMPS WERE CONSTRUCTED, OR ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT PREK KLOK, TONG LE CHON, BUNARDWN LUONG HOA, MINH THANH, LONG HAI AND KATUM.

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PAGE 21 OF 36 PAGES #65

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 TO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUEPJS/CJSC WASH DC
 RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
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S E C R E T NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 SEC VIII OF XII.
 18. (C) A. THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM MADE SLOW BUT STEADY
 PROGRESS THROUGHOUT 1967, ALTHOUGH ONLY 54 PERCENT OF THE PROVINCIAL
 RD PLANS WERE COMPLETED BY 31 DECEMBER. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS,
 HOWEVER, PROVINCE CHIEFS HAVE INDICATED THEIR 1967 PROGRAMS WILL BE
 COMPLETED BY THE END OF JANUARY 1968.
 B. DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATION
 CENTERS (DIOCC'S) HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ALL III CTZ DISTRICTS,
 EXCEPT THE TWO RSSZ DISTRICTS. THEY NOW TOTAL 51, 38 OF WHICH ARE

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4468A S E C R E T NOFORN
 OPERATIONAL WITH AN ASSIGNED PRU ACTION ELEMENT. THE DIOCC HAS
 PROVED ITS WORTH AND PROMISES TO BE THE PRINCIPAL TOOL IN IDENTIFYING
 AND ELIMINATING THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THE CENTERS MUST BE
 IN OPERATION FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME BEFORE A REALLY VALID
 ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE. IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 280 VC WERE
 ELIMINATED IN III CTZ; MANY OF THEM WERE THE RESULT OF DIOCC ACTION.
 BY 30 NOVEMBER 1,314 HAMLET LEVEL, 2,342 VILLAGE LEVEL, 800 DISTRICT
 LEVEL AND 521 PROVINCE LEVEL OR HIGHER VC (A GRAND TOTAL OF 4,977)
 HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED IN III CTZ; THE OPERATION OF THE DIOCC
 CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THIS.
 C. THE CENSUS GRIEVANCE PROGRAM CONTINUED TO BE AN
 EFFECTIVE PROGRAM. CG TEAMS ARE CREDITED WITH INDUCING 469 VC TO
 RALLY IN 1967; THEY PRODUCED 6,766 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.
 D. TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST POPULATION CENTER, RD CADRE
 TEAMS, CG CADRE AND CENTERS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE.
 MILITARY AND POLICE PROTECTION HAS NOT YET PROVED ADEQUATE TO PROTECT
 THE CIVIL POPULATION FROM HARRASSMENT, ABDUCTION OR ASSASSINATION.
 THE RISE IN TERRORIST ACTS IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AS INCREASED
 PRESSURE AGAINST THE ENEMY IS APPLIED AND HE BECOMES UNABLE TO
 ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY SUCCESS.

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PAGE 52 OF 36 PAGES #65

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4468A S E C R E T NOFORN

E. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM IN 1967 WAS TO DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS OVER 1966. THIS GOAL WAS ALMOST ACHIEVED AS THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS INCREASED 94 PERCENT THIS YEAR (3,721 IN 1966 TO 7,210 IN 1967).

F. THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT PROGRAM FOR 1967 IMPROVED OVER 1966 BUT STILL HAS A LONG WAY TO GO. THIS IMPROVEMENT CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE NEW AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK AND A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE BY GVN OFFICIALS. AID LOANED 50 MILLION VN DOLLARS IN GIA DINH PROVINCE ALONE. THIS WAS TWICE THE AMOUNT LOANED IN GIA DINH IN 1966. OTHER PROVINCES MADE SUBSTANTIAL, ALTHOUGH LESS SPECTACULAR PROGRESS.

G. THE HAMLET EDUCATION PROGRAM MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS. OVER 95 PERCENT OF THE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM WAS COMPLETED. 100 PERCENT OF THE TEACHERS WERE TRAINED, AND TEXT BOOK DELIVERIES WERE UP 30 PERCENT OVER 1966. TWO VOCATIONAL AGRICULTURE HIGH SCHOOLS WERE OPENED IN SEPTEMBER WITH 400 STUDENTS, AND FIVE JUNIOR TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOLS ARE OPERATING WITH 608 STUDENTS.

H. THE HAMLET AND VILLAGE ELECTIONS AND THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS CONDUCTED THIS YEAR WERE ALL CONSIDERED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. THE TRAINING OF VILLAGE/HAMLET OFFICIALS HAS MADE PROGRESS; ABOUT

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4468A S E C R E T NOFORN

4,000 OFFICIALS (55 PERCENT) HAVE COMPLETED THE INITIAL TRAINING PROGRAM, AND 100 PERCENT COMPLETION IS ANTICIPATED BY MARCH 1968.

I. MEDCAP CONTINUED TO BE A MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR REACHING THE LOCAL POPULATION. MORE THAN 940,000 PATIENTS WERE TREATED DURING 1967. THE NUMBER OF PATIENTS PER MONTH HAS RISEN FROM 41,000 IN THE FIRST QUARTER TO 113,000 IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 1967.

J. IN THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM, ABOUT 100 PERCENT MORE MEDICINES, 200 PERCENT MORE SALT, AND 50 PERCENT MORE RICE WERE CONFISCATED IN CY 1967 THAN IN CY 1966. THESE FIGURES ARE OPEN TO CONSIDERABLE INTERPRETATION, AS THE PROGRAM IS STILL CONSIDERED TO BE ONLY marginally effective. GVN OFFICIAL APATHY IS THE PRIMARY REASON. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESOURCES CONTROL VARIES FROM PROVINCE TO PROVINCE, DEPENDING PRIMARILY UPON THE WHIMS OF THE PROVINCE CHIEFS. THE RESOURCES CONTROL BLOC WAS ELIMINATED DURING THE LAST HALF OF CY67, THEREBY DISCONTINUING RESOURCES CONTROL AS A SPECIALIZED AREA AND EXPANDING IT AS A RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL POLICEMENT. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT AN IMPROVEMENT WILL BE GRADUALLY NOTED AS THIS CONCEPT TAKES HOLD.

K. THE ENEMY CONTROLLED ONLY EIGHT PERCENT OF THE III CTZ

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#65

PAGE 23 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4468A S E C R E T NOFORN
 POPULATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR, WHEREAS 71 PERCENT OF THE
 POPULATION WAS CONSIDERED TO BE UNDER GVN CONTROL AND THE REMAINING
 21 PERCENT WAS IN CONTESTED AREAS.

19. (S) A. MAJOR VC/NVA OBJECTIVE IN 1967 WAS TO MOBILIZE
 SUFFICIENT MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES TO DEFEAT PACIFICATION
 EFFORTS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE, IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR HIM TO
 MAINTAIN A HIGH TROOP STRENGTH LEVEL THROUGH RECRUITMENT AND
 INFILTRATION, KEEP LOC'S OPEN WHILE INTERDICTING VITAL GVN LOC'S,
 INCREASE RICE PROCUREMENT, AND EFFECTIVELY COUNTER GVN PACIFICATION
 EFFORTS. THE ENEMY HAS FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH ANY OF THESE
 PREREQUISITES. ALTHOUGH NEW UNITS HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED AND
 INFILTRATED INTO THE AREA, RECRUITMENT AND INFILTRATION HAVE NOT BEEN
 ABLE TO KEEP PACE WITH BATTLE LOSSES; VC LOC'S ARE BEING SEVERELY
 INTERDICTED, WHILE VITAL GVN LOC'S ARE OPEN; RICE PROCUREMENT IS DOWN;
 AND THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IS MAKING STEADY PROGRESS.

B. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE HAD A NET INCREASE OF TWO
 REGIMENTS DURING CY 1967. NEW UNITS APPEARING IN THE III CTZ WERE
 THE 88TH NVA REGIMENT AND THE DONG NAI MAIN FORCE REGIMENT. THE
 FORMER WAS A UNIT WHICH HAD OPERATED IN THE II CTZ. THE DONG NAI
 REGIMENT WAS FORMED BY COMBINING AN INFILTRATED BATTALION-SIZED

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4468A S E C R E T NOFORN
 ELEMENT FROM NORTH VIETNAM WITH AVAILABLE LOCAL FORCES.

C. ENEMY FAILURE TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVE OF MOBILIZING
 SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO DEFEAT PACIFICATION EFFORTS HAS CAUSED A
 REDISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES. AT THE END OF 1967, OF THE 10 MAIN
 FORCE INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN THE III CTZ, SIX HAD BEEN RELOCATED TO
 THE PERIPHERY OF THE CORPS AREA WHERE THE PROXIMITY OF CAMBODIAN
 SANCTUARIES AFFORDED A MEASURE OF SECURITY. THE FOUR REMAINING
 INFANTRY REGIMENTS WERE STILL LOCATED IN AREAS OVER WHICH THE ENEMY
 MUST MAINTAIN CONTROL, IF OUR PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE
 SUCCESSFULLY COUNTERED.

IV CTZ

20. (C) THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES IN THE IV CTZ DURING 1967 WERE
 DIRECTED TOWARD MAINTAINING UNREMITTING GVN PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY.
 PARTICULARLY AGAINST MAIN FORCE UNITS AND BASE AREAS, PROVIDING
 GREATER SECURITY FOR RD TEAMS, MAINTAINING AND UPGRADING THE SECURITY
 OF MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MAJOR
 UNIT AND BILATERAL US/GVN OPERATIONS.

2. (C) A. STEADY PROGRESS WAS EVIDENT IN ALL FUNCTIONAL
 AREAS DURING THE YEAR. FORCES IN THE CTZ WERE ABLE TO DENY THE
 ENEMY A JOAJOR VICTORY WHILE INCREASING THEIR OWN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
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PAGE 24 OF 36 PAGES

#65

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 INFO RUEPJS/CJSC WASH DC
 RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 RUMWVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSGG/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMS99/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
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SECRET NOFORN 028- FROM: MACCOC-3 SEC IX OF XII,
 AND FIGHTING SPIRIT.

B. DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1967 RVNAF MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED LESS FREQUENTLY THAN IN 1966. THIS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO FIFTEEN INFANTRY BATTALIONS THAT WERE DESIGNATED IN EARLY 1967 TO SUPPORT PACIFICATION. DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1967, MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL AS IN 1966. IN SPITE OF VC ATTEMPTS TO AVOID CONTACT, THE PERCENTAGE OF CONTACTS ACHIEVED ON MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4469A SECRET NOFORN
 1967. THIS REFLECTED IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE AND BETTER GVN RESPONSIVENESS.

D. DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF THE YEAR, INCREASED EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON IMPROVING THE DEFENSES OF MAJOR AIRFIELDS IN THE IV CTZ. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF PROBABLE FIRING POSITIONS FOR ENEMY INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1967. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND FIREFLY MISSIONS WERE FLOWN NIGHTLY OVER THE FOUR MAJOR AIRFIELDS AT CAN THO, BINH THUY, SOC TRANG AND VINH LONG. THE CONSTRUCTION OF WATCHTOWERS, USE OF SEARCHLIGHTS, NIGHT PATROLS, AND AMBUSHES WERE CONDUCTED TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION AND DETER ENEMY GROUND ATTACKS.

22. (C) EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED AGAINST ALL MAIN VC VASE AREAS IN THE IV CTZ, EXCEPT THE INNER PARTS OF THE U-MINH AND NAM CAN-DAM DOI BASES. RESULTS OF THESE OPERATIONS TOTALED OVER 2,000 VC KIA, 300 VC DETAINEES AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL CAPTURED. THE TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR THE YEAR WERE THE INITIATION OF AND CONTINUING SUCCESSES OF COMBINED US/GVN OPERATIONS AND THE INCREASING NUMBER OF SUSTAINED OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE THREE ARVN DIVISIONS. INTRODUCTION OF US FORCES INTO IV CTZ EARLY IN 1967 WENT SMOOTHLY AS

UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 25 OF 36 PAGES

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DID THE INITIAL CONDUCT OF BILATERAL US/GVN OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS INCREASED IN NUMBER AND EFFECTIVENESS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. THE FREQUENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY ARVN ALSO INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY, PARTICULARLY DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR. ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL SUSTAINED OPERATIONS OF THE YEAR, DAN CHI 315, CONDUCTED FROM 8 THROUGH 24 DECEMBER 1967, RESULTED IN 594 VC KIA, 235 WEAPONS CAPTURED AND OVER SEVEN TONS OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS, THE MAJORITY OF WHICH WERE CONDUCTED BY RF/PF UNITS, INCREASED FROM ABOUT 35,000 PER MONTH IN 1966 TO OVER 50,000 PER MONTH IN 1967. THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES INCREASED IN BOTH QUANTITY AND QUALITY OVER THE YEAR. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE RF AND PF ARE STANDING UP BETTER TO VC ATTACKS AND ARE WILLING TO PATROL AND AMBUSH MORE OFTEN. THERE WAS A 50 PERCENT DROP IN RF/PF DESERTIONS IN 1967 AS COMPARED WITH 1966.

23. (C) A. PROGRESS WAS MADE IN IMPROVING THE SECURITY STATUS OF MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS DESPITE INCREASED VC ATTEMPTS AT INTERDICTION. THE CO CHIEN AND HAM LUONG BRANCHES OF THE MEKONG RIVER WERE UPGRADED FROM RED TO AMBER, AND THE MY THO BRANCH OF THE MEKONG RIVER WAS UPGRADED FROM AMBER TO GREEN. THE SECURITY STATUS

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4469A ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

OF THE BASSAC RIVER FROM ITS MOUTH TO THE AN GIANG PROVINCE BOUNDARY IMPROVED FROM AMBER TO GREEN. ROAD SECURITY STATUS IMPROVED FROM AMBER TO GREEN IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: HIGHWAY 4, VICINITY OF BAC LIEUWP HIGHWAY 5 FROM IV CIZ BOUNDARY TO GO CONG; HIGHWAY 24, MY THO TO CHO GAO; HIGHWAY 25, DONG TAN TO MY THO; AND HIGHWAY 27, CAN THO TO PHONG PHU. HIGHWAY 29 FROM CAI LAY TO MOC HOA IMPROVED FROM RED TO AMBER. VC INTERDICTION OF NATIONAL ROUTE 4, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT OTHER MINOR ROADS, WAS GENERALLY HEAVY THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, DIMINISHING SIGNIFICANTLY DURING OCTOBER AND THE LAST 15 DAYS OF DECEMBER. BY STATIONING ARVN ENGINEER UNITS ALONG ROUTE 4, ASSIGNING SECTORS OF ROAD RESPONSIBILITY, AND PROVIDING MATERIALS FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES, ROAD AND BRIDGE REPAIRS WERE MADE WITH SUFFICIENT RAPIDITY SO THAT ROUTE 4 REMAINED OPEN TO AT LEAST ONE WAY TRAFFIC WITH ONLY BREF INTERRUPTIONS.

B. MEASURES TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF ROUTE 4 INCLUDED INCREASED DAY AND NIGHT AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND SIDE LOOKING AERIAL RADAR (SLAR) MISSIONS, ARMED HELICOPTER NIGHT PATROLS (FIREFLY), ESTABLISHMENT OF NIGHT REACTION FORCES, AND CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS BY NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES (NPF) IN THE AREA SURROUNDING ROUTE 4. ARVN, US AND MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS (MPW)

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#65

PAGE 26 OF 36 PAGES

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4469A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

PLANS FOR 1968 HAVE BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE GOAL OF RESTORING ROUTE 4 TO PRE-WAR CONDITIONS, REBUILDING BRIDGES AND ROAD BASES, AND RESURFACING, WHERE REQUIRED.

24. (C) A. THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM MOVED SLOWLY DURING THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR. REAL MOMENTUM WAS NOT ACHIEVED UNTIL AFTER THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME GVN OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS BEGAN TO PLACE MAJOR EMPHASIS ON ACHIEVING 1967 GOALS. AT YEAR'S END, MOST COMPONENT PROGRAMS WERE APPROXIMATELY 90 PCT COMPLETED. COMPLETION TIME WAS EXTENDED BY THE MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT UNTIL 31 JANUARY 1968 AND ESSENTIAL PARTS OF ALL PROGRAMS ARE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED AT THAT TIME. DURING THE YEAR, THE RD CADRE STRENGTH INCREASED BY OVER 50 PCT, RESULTING IN WIDER COVERAGE OF HAMLET DEVELOPMENT. SIGNIFICANT VIET CONG ATTACKS ON PHASE I HAMLETS, EXPECTED UPON DEPARTURE OF TEAMS TO PHASE II HAMLET SITES, FAILED TO MATERIALIZE AS VILLAGERS IN PHASE I HAMLETS EMPLOYED EFFECTIVE PASSIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES. RD TEAMS TOOK SOME CASUALTIES BECAUSE OF HOSTILE ACTION, BUT FORWARD MOMENTUM WAS NOT SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED.

B. THAT PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION IS BEING MADE IS APPARENT FROM THE DIRECT ECONOMIC GAINS WHICH RESULT FROM THE PACIFICATION

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4469A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

PROGRAM. MORE GOODS APPEARED IN MARKET PLACES AND INCREASED PURCHASING POWER CREATED AN IMPROVED DAILY TURNOVER. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT A 10 PCT INCREASE IN RICE PRODUCTION WILL BE REALIZED FROM THE 67-68 CROPS. THIS GAIN WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE RESTORATION OF LAND TO THE FARMERS, BETTER UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE MATERIALS DURING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS, IMPROVED SECURITY, AND IMPROVED METHODS OF IRRIGATION.

25. (C) A. THE POSTURE OF THE VC IN IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE DETERIORATED THROUGHOUT CALENDAR YEAR 1967, DESPITE VC EFFORTS DURING NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER TO REVERSE THIS TREND. THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO LOSE CONTROL OF THE POPULATION AS ARVN OPERATIONS AND AN EXPANDING PACIFICATION PROGRAM DENIED INCREASING AREAS TO THE VC. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ENEMY SUFFERED A LOSS OF TAX BASES, SOURCES OF RECRUITS, FOOD SUPPLIES, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, AND SAFE HAVENS TO WHICH HE COULD WITHDRAW. ALTHOUGH THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VC ONLY DECREASED BY APPROXIMATELY TWO THOUSAND DURING THIS YEAR, THE COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF ENEMY UNITS DECREASED GRADUALLY DUE TO RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES, THE IMPRESSMENT OF YOUTHS INTO COMBAT UNITS, INADEQUATE TRAINING, AND HEAVY LOSSES INFLICTED BY US AND ARVN FORCES. LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE VIET CONG DURING THE YEAR TOTALED 13,936 KIA,

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PAGE 27 OF 36 PAGES #65

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 KFM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMHQA/CINCPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUEPJS/CRSC WASH DC
 RUMSB/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRA
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
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SECRET/NOFORN 02891 FROM MACCOC-3 SEC X OF XII.
 4,763 CAPTURED, AND 9,750 CHIEU HOI'S. THESE FIGURES COMPARED
 FAVORABLY TO 1966 TOTALS OF 12,074 KIA, 2,495 CAPTURED AND 5,383
 CHIEU HOI'S.

B. IN AN EFFORT TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE POPULATION, THE
 VC MOVED THEIR MOST TRUSTED AND CAPABLE CADRE FROM REGION AND PRO-
 VINCE LEVELS TO DISTRICT AND HAMLET LEVELS. MANY OF THE YOUNGER VC
 CADRE WERE CRITICIZED FOR A LACK OF ZEAL, FOR NOT BEING CLOSE TO
 THE PEOPLE AND FOR NOT EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING NLF PROGRAMS.

PAGE 2 RUMSMA GRUPA SECRET/NOFORN
 REFLECTING DECLINING CADRE EFFECTIVENESS. THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS
 REMAINED THE PRIMARY TARGET OF VC ACTIVITIES THRU 975 9 3 63-4.
 IN ADDITION TO OVERT ATTEMPTS TO DISRUPT THESE PROGRAMS THROUGH
 ATTACKS, SHELLINGS, HARASSMENTS AND TERRORISM, REPORTS WERE
 RECEIVED OF VC INTENTIONS TO INFILTRATE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THESE
 PROGRAMS.
 C. THE GENERAL AREA OF VC UNIT DEPLOYMENT IN THE IV CTZ
 REMAINED ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. THIS AREA CONSISTS OF A BELT THRU
 5 3 83, 54-0 094589, 91 5 3 835-, EXTENDING FROM DINH TUONG AND
 NORTHWESTERN KIEN HOA PROVINCES TO THE SOUTHWEST THROUGH CHUBNG
 THIEN PROVINCE. WITHIN THIS AREA, SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT REDEPLOYMENTS
 OF VC UNITS OCCURRED. IN EARLY JANUARY 1967, THE 316TH MAIN FORCE
 BATTALION WAS MOVED FROM CHUBNG THIEN PROVINCE TO VINH LONG PROVINCE
 IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT REOPENING THE MANG-THIT RIVER-NICOLAI CANAL
 COMPLEX TO COMMERCIAL USE. IN THE CAN THO AREA, THE 303D AND THE
 309TH MAIN FORCE BATTALIONS OPERATED JOINTLY WITH THE TAY DO BAT-
 TALION, COMMENCING IN JULY, IN AN EFFORT TO DISRUPT THE GVN PACIF-
 ICATION PROGRAMS. ALSO IN JULY, BOTH THE 261ST AND 267TH MAIN FORCE
 BATTALIONS REDEPLOYED TO NORTHWESTERN DINH TUONG PROVINCE IN AN
 EFFORT TO CLOSE HIGHWAY 4, COUNTER GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS IN

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PAGE 28 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSYA 4470A S E C R E T NOFORN
 THIS PROVINCE AND POSSIBLY TO ATTACK THE US BASE AT DONG TAM.
 D. DURING THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF THE YEAR, VC INITIATED INCIDENTS GENERALLY FOLLOWED A PATTERN SIMILAR TO THE PRECEDING YEAR, BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS PATTERN NOTED, WAS THE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE VC TO ACHIEVE THEIR NORMALLY HIGH INCIDENT RATE DURING MAY. INCREASED ARVN OFFENSIVE EFFORT, UTILIZING TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, PRECLUDED VC ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR INCREASED ACTIVITY DURING THAT MONTH. VC-INITIATED INCIDENTS SHOWED A MARKED INCREASE IN SEPTEMBER, ATTRIBUTABLE TO VC EFFORTS TO DISRUPT THE GVN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. VC ACTIVITIES RETURNED TO NORMAL DURING OCTOBER, AND LITTLE EFFORT WAS EXPENDED IN ATTEMPTING TO DISRUPT THE ELECTIONS FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. COMMENCING IN LATE OCTOBER, HOWEVER, VC-INITIATED INCIDENTS TOOK A SHARP UPSWING IN BOTH NUMBERS AND INTENSITY. THIS SIGNALLED THE INITIATION OF THE ANNUAL VC WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, AND THE PATTERN OF ACTIVITY REFLECTED A DEGREE OF COORDINATION AND CONCENTRATION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVIDENCED IN THE DELTA. THIS HIGHER LEVEL OF INTENSITY AND ACTIVITY CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE FINAL TWO MONTHS OF THE YEAR, INDICATING THAT THE ENEMY RETAINED THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SUCH ACTIVITIES, THOUGH THE EFFORT PLACED AN INCREASED

PAGE 4 RUMSYA GRUPA S E C R E T NOFORN
 ING STRAIN ON HIS MILITARY MACHINE. THE MAJORITY OF VIET CONG INCIDENTS WERE NOT CHARACTERISTICALLY MILITARY IN NATURE AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, BUT HARASSMENTS AND TERRORIST TACTICS. D (NAVFORV)

26. (C) A. THE OBJECTIVES OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN VIETNAM DURING 1967 WERE TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY, INTERDICT THE ENEMY'S WATERBORNE LOGISTIC EFFORTS, CONDUCT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, AND CONDUCT AN ADVISORY EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE NAVY.
 B. DURING 1967, MARKET TIME UNITS DETECTED 913,121 WOODEN HULL VESSELS AND BOARDED OR INSPECTED 538,054, FOR AN AVERAGE OF APPROXIMATELY 2,500 DETECTIONS AND 1,490 BOARDINGS OR INSPECTIONS PER DAY. STABLE DOOR UNITS PROVIDED HARBOR DEFENSE, DETECTED 535,288 CRAFT AND BOARDED OR INSPECTED 151,380 FOR AN AVERAGE OF 1,480 DETECTIONS AND 475 BOARDINGS OR INSPECTIONS PER DAY. A TOTAL OF THREE STEEL HULLED TRAWLERS WERE DESTROYED OR CAPTURED BY MARKET TIME FORCES. THE FIRST OCCURRED ON 1 JANUARY OFF THE CA MAU PENINSULA, 165 MILES SOUTHWEST OF VUNG TAU; THE SECOND, ON 14 MARCH, WAS GROUNDING ONE MILE SOUTH OF PHUOC THIEN VILLAGE AND DISINTEGRATED BY

UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 29 OF 36 PAGES

#65

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA GRRUPA S E C R E T NOFORN
 A SINGLE INTERNAL EXPLOSION. THE FORCE OF THE EXPLOSION WAS SUCH THAT THE LARGEST PORTION OF THE SHIP RECOVERED WAS PART OF THE STERN MEASURING SEVEN BY FIFTEEN FEET. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION WERE SCATTERED OVER A LARGE AREA. THE THIRD TRAWLER WAS DETECTED ON 19 JULY BY PATROL AIRCRAFT 85 MILES SOUTHEAST OF DANANG. THE TRAWLER DEFEATED ITS INFILTRATION ATTEMPT UNTIL THE NIGHT OF 15 JULY. LOUDSPEAKER REQUEST FOR SURRENDER WERE IGNORED, AND WITH THE TRAWLER THREE MILES FROM SHORE THE MARKET TIE UNITS OPENED FIRE, FORCING THE TRAWLER TO GROUND NEAR THE MOUTH OF THE SA KY RIVER. THE TRAWLER WAS EQUIPPED WITH 3,122 POUNDS OF TNT IN SELF-DESTRUCTION CHARGES WHICH WERE DISARMED BY EOD. THE CARGO INCLUDED OVER 700,000 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION, 3,500 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND GRENADES, 1,200 VARIOUS WEAPONS AND ALMOST 10,000 POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES. THE TWO OTHER TRAWLERS PROBABLY CARRIED A SIMILAR CARGO.
 C. GAME WARDEN FORCES MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS DURING 1967 TOWARD FREEING THE MAJOR RIVERS OF THE MEKONG DELTA AND RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE OF ENEMY CONTROL. INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL NOW TRAVEL THE MAJOR WATERWAYS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS RELATIVELY FREE OF ENEMY HARASSMENT. INCREASED PRESSURE WAS PLACED ON KNOWN ENEMY RIVER CROSSING POINTS. IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT ON THE MAJOR RIVERS,

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4470A S E C R E T NOFORN
 AMMUNITION, MEDICINE AND OTHER CONTRABAND ITEMS WERE NOT FOUND IN QUANTITY. NUMEROUS RIVER PATROL BOAT (PBR) INCURSIONS WERE MADE INTO SMALLER WATERWAYS. TWO ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPFOON THE LONG TAU RIVERS WERE THWARTED BY COMBINED US, ARVN EFFORTS AND RESULTED IN 28 ENEMY KILLED. GAME WARDEN PBR'S MADE 800,508 DETECTIONS, CONDUCTED OVER 600,000 BOARDINGS OR INSPECTIONS AND TOOK 8,721 DETAINEES; WHILE HELOS CONDUCTED A TOTAL OF 4,214 STRIKES. THE FOLLOWING TABLE IS INDICATIVE OF THE RESULTS OF GAME WARDEN PATROLS:

	PBR	SEAL	HELO	TOTAL
VC KIA	305	183	434	922
VC PW	28	14	1	43
HOI CHANH	22	0	0	22
SAMPANS DESTROYED	327	176	435	938
SAMPANS CAPTURED	68	18	0	86
JUNKS DESTROYED	23	2	13	38
WEAPONS CAPTURED	44	62	0	106
RICE CAPTURED/ DESTROYED	26.5T	17T	7Z	50.5T

D. DURING 1967, THE NUMBER OF SEALS IN-COUNTRY DOUBLED. USE OF IMAGINATION, REFINED TACTICS, AND IMPROVED EQUIPMENT HAS MADE BT

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PAGE 30 OF 36 PAGES

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S/UKS WASH DC

RUMSBJ/CMR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMMWA/CG III MAF DA NACG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMS&/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

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S E C R E T NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 SEC XI OF XII.
 POSSIBLE AN INCREASE IN EFFECTIVENESS. IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL MISSIONS OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTERDICTION AGAINST THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, SEALS TRAINED PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS (PRU).
 E. SEABEES OF THE THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE BUILT A 3,500 FOOT RUNWAY NORTH OF QUANG TRI. WORK ON DYE-MARKER FACILITIES COMMENCED ON 1 NOVEMBER AND IS PROGRESSING AT A FASTER RATE THAN ANTICIPATED. PROGRESSIVE TECHNIQUES, SUCH AS PREFABRICATION AT A CENTRAL LOCATION, ARE BEING UTILIZED. DURING THE YEAR 20

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4471A **S E C R E T** NOFORN
 SEABEES WERE KILLED AND 181 WERE WOUNDED.

F. THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE NAVY HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING 1967. FOR EXAMPLE, IN I CORPS CARGO TONNAGE THROUGH NAVY PORTS INCREASED FROM 3.25 MILLION MT IN 1966 TO 5.6 MILLION IN 1967; SALES VOLUME IS AT 20 MILLION DOLLARS PER MONTH AND RISING; AND HOSPITAL PATIENT LOAD INCREASED FROM 6,990 IN 1966 TO 12,900 IN 1967.

G. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. NAVY AND VNN RECEIVED RENEWED EMPHASIS. MARKET TIE AND GAME WARDEN BOATS CONTACT APPROXIMATELY 200,000 WATER CRAFT PEOPLE MONTHLY, AND ON A ROUTINE BASIS, PASS OUT PRINTED PROPAGANDA. ON THESE OCCASIONS, AS A FRIENDLY GESTURE, THEY GIVE SMALL GRATUITIES SUCH AS SOAP, CIGARETTES, CANDY AND APPLY FIRST AID WHEN APPROPRIATE.

H. THE VIETNAMESE NAVY MADE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS DURING THE YEAR IN BOTH OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS. MANY OF THESE IMPROVEMENTS, SUCH AS THE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON TRAINING, ARE ONLY BEGINNING TO SHOW RESULTS. OTHERS, INCLUDING REORGANIZATION HAVE ALREADY SHOWN RESULTS. AVAILABILITY OF LOGISTIC LIFT INCREASED FROM 44 PERCENT TO 63 PERCENT; UTILIZATION OF LOGISTIC LIFT INCREASED FROM 18 PERCENT TO 66 PERCENT; CARGO BACKLOGS DECREAS-

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PAGE 37 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4471A S E C R E T NOFORN
 ED FROM 48,000 ST IN APRIL TO 6,000 ST IN NOVEMBER. IN NOVEMBER,
 THE VNN ASSUMED FSLL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE MARKET TIME AREA IN
 EACH OF THE FOUR COASTAL ZONES. THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY
 TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE PATROLS IN THESE AREAS. TWO VNN SHIPS (CON-
 VERTED LSM) ARE ASSIGNED A PRIMARY MISSION OF CONDUCTING PSYCHOLOG-
 ICAL OPERATIONS IN REMOTE AREAS ACCESSIBLE BY WATER. CULTURAL DRAMA
 TEAMS ON EACH SHIP PROVIDE PROPAGANDA IN THE FORM OF MOVIES, PLAYS,
 AND SPEECHES. THE SHIPS ARE ALWAYS CROWDED WITH PEOPLE DURING THESE
 PERFORMANCES, AND THE AUDIENCE IS ATTENTIVE. IN MANY CASES THESE
 PERFORMANCES ARE THE ONLY DIRECT CONTACT THE PEOPLE HAVE WITH
 REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. DURING THE PERFORMANCES,
 MEDICAL AND DENTAL SERVICES ARE PROVIDED BY THE MEDICAL TEAM WITH
 INSTALLED EQUIPMENT. D

I. THE ENEMY HAS DEMONSTRATED TENACITY AND RESOURCEFULNESS
 IN KEEPING OPEN HIS LINES OF COMMUNICATION DESPITE ROUTE IDENTIFI-
 CATION. HE HAS MAINTAINED CONTROL OVER THE INTERCONNECTING WATER-
 WAYS BETWEEN MAJOR RIVERS AND HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAKE COVERT CROSSINGS
 OF MAJOR RIVERS. HIS ABILITY TO MOVE AND TO RESUPPLY USING INLAND
 AND COASTAL WATERWAYS WAS, HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IN 1967.
 (7TH AIR FORCE)

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4471A S E C R E T NOFORN

27. (S) 7-. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
 IN 1967 WERE TO SUPPORT THE EXPANDED FJEE WORLD OFFENSIVE MILITARY
 OPERATIONS, SEEK OUT AND DESTROY COMMUNIST FORCES AND THE INFRASTRUC-
 TURE, DEFEAT VC/NVA MAIN FORCE UNITS, AND DESTROY ENEMY BASE AREAS
 AND RESOURCES. A HARD-HITTING PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN WAS WAGED TO
 OFFSET THE ENEMY'S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. COUNTER-INFILTRATION PRO-
 GRAMS WERE AIMED AT DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S MILITARY AND LOGISTICAL
 BASE, INTERDICTION HIS LOC'S, FORCING HIM INTO SUSTAINED COMBAT
 OPERATIONS, AND FINALLY, INHIBITING HIS USE OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA AS
 SANCTUARIES.

B. STRIKE PILOTS FLEW A TOTAL OF 116,681 STRIKE SORTIES.
 OF THESE, 85,363 WERE IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS. A
 TOTAL OF 350,295 TONS OF MUNITIONS WERE EXPENDED AGAINST ENEMY
 TARGETS, RESULTING IN 3,162 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 45,521 MILITARY
 STRUCTURES DESTROYED, AND 4,504 WATERCRAFT (SAMPANS) DESTROYED. D
 AC 47 DRAGON SHIPS PROVIDED ILLUMINATION FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS AND
 SUPPORTED GROUND FORCES WITH THEIR MINI-GUNS.

C. DURING 1967, 7TH AF RECONNAISSANCE EFFORTS TOTALED
 137,631 SORTIES. OF THIS TOTAL, TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
 FLEW 6,501 PHOTO, 4,801 INFRARED (IR), AND 267 SLAR SORTIES. FAC'S

PAGE 32 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4471A S E C R E T NOFORN
 CARRIED OUT DAILY FLIGHTS DETECTING ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS AND ACTIVITIES, MARKING TARGETS, CLEARING STRIKE REQUESTS, DIRECTING ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES AND ASSESSING BOMB DAMAGE. A TOTAL OF 43,541 FAC SORTIES AND 73,058 VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES WERE FLOWN. THERE WERE 9,462 RDF/ELECTRONIC SORTIES FLOWN. DURING THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE PERIOD, RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES WERE INTENSIFIED TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF ENEMY INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES. A TOTAL OF 31 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES WERE FLOWN DURING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD.

D. RESUPPLY, AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION, AND DEFOLIATION ACTIVITIES DURING 1967 CONSTITUTED THE LARGEST SUSTAINED TACTICAL AIRLIFT EFFORT EVER MOUNTED. THE FIRST AIRBORNE ASSAULT BY US PARATROOPS SINCE KOREA TOOK PLACE ON 22 FEBRUARY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION JUNCTION CITY, WHEN 700 PARATROOPERS OF THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE AND THEIR HEAVY EQUIPMENT WERE AIRLIFTED FROM BIEN HOA TO WAR ZONE "C". BY THE END OF THE OPERATION, 336 TONS OF SUPPLIES HAD BEEN DROPPED INTO THAT ZONE. IN CARRYING OUT SPECIAL OPERATIONS, SUCH AS RESUPPLYING SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS, AIRLIFTING HIGH PRIORITY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT AND ROTATING ARMY PERSONNEL, 407,437 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SORTIES WERE FLOWN. OVER 3,384,000 PASSENGERS WERE MOVED

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4471A S E C R E T NOFORN
 BY AIR AND 751,306 TONS OF CARGO WERE DELIVERED DURING THE YEAR.

E. AERIAL DEFOLIATION MISSIONS WERE CONDUCTED TO ENHANCE VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE, IMPROVE FIELDS OF FIRE, REDUCE ENEMY AMBUSH CAPABILITIES, DENY HIM FOOD, AND REDUCE HIS COVER AND CONCEALMENT. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION, 5,321 SORTIES WERE 2092, 2 81 5308; 3438 4, 733, 100 GALLONS OF CHEMICALS. THE SECONDARY MISSION OF SPRAYING INSECTICIDE FOR THE CONTROL OF MALARIA CARRYING MOSQUITOS HAS PROVED TO BE OF GREAT VALUE IN POPULATED AREAS.

F. THE AIR FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE MACV PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM CONSISTED OF LEAFLET DROPS AND LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS. TO SUPPORT THE PROGRAM, 20,867 SORTIES WERE FLOWN, LOGGING 11,936 SPEAKER HOURS AND DROPPING OVER 4.5 BILLION LEAFLETS.

G. THE USAF ADVISORY GROUP CONTINUED IN ITS ROLE OF ASSISTING, TRAINING, AND ADVISING THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE. DURING THE YEAR, VNAF RECEIVED A SQUADRON OF F-5 AIRCRAFT, FOR WHICH 7TH AF PROVIDED MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AIRMEN ON A TEMPORARY DUTY BASIS. AS VNAF CAPABILITIES ROSE, 5 3 7TH AF SUPPORT WAS DECREASED. DURING THE YEAR, VNAF FLEW 35,227 STRIKE SORTIES RESULTING IN 15,421 MILITARY STRUCTURES DESTROYED, 1451 SAMPANS DESTROYED, AND 446 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. IN SUPPORTING OPERATIONS, VNAF FLEW 15,357
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PAGE 33 OF 36 PAGES

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 DE RUMSMA 4472A 0260900
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 260755Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUEPJS/CJSC WASH DC
 RUMSBJ/CDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMWAA/CS III MAF DA NANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSGG/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
 RUMSMT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 BT

SECRET NOFORN 02891 FROM: MACCOC-3 FINAL SEC OF XII.
 MISSIONS LIFTING 145,000 PASSENGERS, AND 2,632 TONS OF CARGO.
 (SUMMARY)

28. (S) A. OUR RECORDABLE PROGRESS IN 1967 RANGED FROM FAIR TO EXCELLENT IN THE SEVERAL AREAS OF INVOLVEMENT. SOME OF OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS WILL NOT BECOME MANIFEST FOR MONTHS TO COME. A REFLECTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS ILLUSTRATES THE PROFUSE ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTIVE TO ASSESSMENT OF OUR PROGRESS IN RVN. A COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE WE STAND IN VIETNAM TODAY

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 4472A SECRET NOFORN
 REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF THE FULL RANGE OF HUMAN AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS; AS WELL AS THE INSEPARABLE AND NOT SO CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ASPECTS INVOLVED. OUR PROGRESS VARIES BY AREA; GEOGRAPHICALLY, MILITARILY, AND IN THE PRIMARILY CIVIL AFFAIRS FIELDS. HENCE, THE GENERALIZATIONS THAT FREQUENTLY FORM THE BASIS OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING ARE PRONE TO MISREPRESENTATION.

B. WE HAD DURING THE YEAR A STABLE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN RVN; SOLIDIFIED BY SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS IN WHICH MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE PARTICIPATED. LOCAL ELECTION (HAMLET AND VILLAGE) WERE EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL. RESULTANT FROM THESE DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES IS A PROMISING START IN A CAMPAIGN TO ROOT OUT THE CORRUPTION WHICH HAS BEEN AN OBSTACLE.

C. DURING 1967, THE ENEMY LOST CONTROL OF LARGE SECTORS OF THE POPULATION. HE FACES SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN THE AREAS OF INDIGENOUS RECRUITING, MORALE, HEALTH AND RESOURCES CONTROL. VOIDS IN VC RANKS ARE BEING FILLED BY REGULAR NVA. SEA INFILTRATION THROUGH THE MARKET TIME AREA HAS DIMINISHED TO NEAR-INSIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. INTERDICTION OF THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICS TRAIN IN LAOS AND NVN BY OUR INDESPENSABLE AIR EFFORTS HAS IMPOSED SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES ON HIM. IN MANY AREAS THE ENEMY HAS BEEN DRIVEN AWAY

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PAGE 34 OF 36 PAGES

#65

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PAGE 3 RUMSMA 4472A S E C R E T NOFORN
 FROM THE POPULATION CENTERS; IN OTHERS HE HAS BEEN COMPELLED TO DISPERSE AND EVADE CONTACT, THUS NULLIFYING MUCH OF HIS POTENTIAL. THE YEAR ENDED WITH THE ENEMY INCREASINGLY RESORTING TO DESPERATION TACTICS IN ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE MILITARY/PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY; AND HE HAS EXPERIENCED ONLY FAILURE IN THESE ATTEMPTS. ENEMY BASES, WITH SPARSE EXCEPTION, ARE NO LONGER SAFE HAVENS AND HE HAS NECESSARILY BECOME INCREASINGLY RELIANT ON CAMBODIAN AND LAOTIAN SANCTUARIES.

D. THE FRIENDLY PICTURE GIVES RISE TO OPTIMISM FOR INCREASED SUCCESSSES IN 1968. IN 1967, OUR LOGISTICS BASE AND FORCE STRUCTURE PERMITTED US TO ASSUME A FULLY OFFENSIVE POSTURE. WITH GROUND FORCES, TAC AIR, ARC LIGHT AND NGFS WE WERE ABLE TO APPLY CONTINUOUS PRESSURE AGAINST THE ENEMY. A GREATLY IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM FREQUENTLY ENABLED US TO CONCENTRATE OUR SUPERIOR MILITARY ASSETS IN PREEMPTING ENEMY MILITARY INITIATIVES LEADING US TO DECISIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL ENGAGEMENTS. MATERIEL AND TACTICAL INNOVATIONS HAVE BEEN FURTHER DEVELOPED AND EMPLOYED: LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS, AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE SENSORS, NEW O-2A OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT, ROME FLOWS, C-47 (SPOOKY) GUNSHIPS, AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS AND THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE (MRF) TO NAME A FEW. THE

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 4472A S E C R E T NOFORN

MRF HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY SUCCESSFUL IN DEPRIVING THE ENEMY OF FREEDOM AND INITIATIVE IN THE POPULATION AND RESOURCES RICH DELTA AREAS. THE HELICOPTER HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS PERMAPS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT TOOL IN OUR ARSENAL - AND WE WILL WELCOME MORE. TO AIR SUPPORT IN BOTH RVN AND NVN (ARMY, NAVY MARINE AND AIR FORCE) GOES MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

E. A MUCH MALIGNED RVNAF IS STEADILY IMPROVING AND ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES. MANY UNITS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE AND AGGRESSIVE IN COMBAT. PRESS ACCOUNTS NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT A WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT EXISTS IN THE VIETNAMESE RANKS. WE ARE DIRECTING INTENSIVE EMPHASIS TO RVNAF TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS.

F. FURTHER ACCELERATED PROGRESS IS FORSEEN IN 1968. THE PACE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT WILL BE DEPENDENT IN LARGE MEASURE ON OUR SUCCESS IN FINDING, FIXING AND DESTROYING AN ELUSIVE ENEMY.

G. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION DURING THE YEAR ALTHOUGH MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. A RANDOM SURVEY OF ACCOMPLISHMENT REVEALS: POPULATION IN SECURE AREAS INCREASED FROM 62 PCT TO 67 PCT (APPROXIMATELY 1.3 MILLION PEOPLE); SECURE HAMLETS INCREASED BY 638 FROM 4,702 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR TO 5,340 AT

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PAGE 35 OF 36 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSMA 4472A S E C R E T NOFORN

THE END; 55 ARVN BATTALIONS WERE ASSIGNED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION; POSITIVE ACTION HAS BEGUN AGAINST CORRUPTION LEADING TO THE RELIEF OF AT LEAST SIX PROVINCE CHIEFS AND 13 POLICE CHIEFS OR DEPUTIES; SUCCESSFUL VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN MORE THAN 5,000 HAMLETS AND 1,000 VILLAGES; AND AN INTEGRATED US ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT REACHING FROM SAIGON TO THE DISTRICTS WAS ESTABLISHED.

M. ACROSS THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS - AGRICULTURE, CHIEU HOI, PUBLIC SAFETY, RD CADRE, ETC., PROGRESS WAS VISIBLE AND IT WAS MEANINGFUL. IN 1967 MORE REFUGEES WERE RESETTLED THAN GENERATED. THE QUALITY OF THE RD TEAMS IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY, AND INCREASED FROM 420 TEAMS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR TO 555 AT THE END. BY DECEMBER, THERE WERE 29,190 RD CADRE IN THE FIELD AND OVER 7,884 IN TRAINING VUNG TAU. THERE WERE 27,178 HOI CHANH IN 1967 COMPARED TO 20,242 IN 1966. THESE FIGURES SPEAK WELL FOR THE PROGRAM. THERE IS STILL HOWEVER, MUCH TO BE DONE; THE GVN IS NOT YET A READY AND EFFECTIVE PARTNER WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE; 793,944 REFUGEES STILL WERE NOT RESETTLED AT THE END OF THE YEAR IN SPITE OF THE GREAT EFFORTS MADE; THE INFRASTRUCTURE REMAINS BASICALLY INTACT; AND CORRUPTION IS BOTH CORROSIVE AND EXTENSIVE. THERE IS

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 4472A S E C R E T NOFORN

MUCH TO BE PROUD OF IN 1967, BUT CLEARLY OUR WORK IS CUT OUT FOR US IN 1968. GP-4
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PAGE 36 OF 36 PAGE #65

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FILLER _____

DTG 271149Z

MONTH JANUARY

ORIGINATOR GEN WESTMORELAND

EYES ONLY

CG	<i>le</i>
100	<i>W</i>
C/S	<i>Q</i>

CATEGORY _____

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le dallas*

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DATE/TIME GROUP 271149Z JANUARY 1968

#66

P 271149Z ZFF-3

FM GN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF A NANG
 INFO BG MATHESON DEPUTY FOR ARMY MATTERS III MAF
 ZEM

~~SECRET~~ T MAC 01300 EYES ONLY

1. REFERENCE YOUR MSG ON THE BILLET FOR BG MATHESON. I AM IN AGREEMENT REGARDING THE DESIGNATION OF MATHESON'S BILLET SINCE MY CONCEPT OF HIS ROLE AND OPERATIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH YOURS. OUR GENERAL ORDERS ASSIGNING HIM TO THIS SLOT WILL BE AMENDED TO REFLECT HIS FORMAL TITLE AS QUOTE DEPUTY FOR ARMY MATTERS UNQUOTE.

2. MEANWHILE, AS GENERAL KERWIN HAS APPRISED YOU, WE WANT TO PUT MATHESON TEMPORARILY INTO THE MACV FORWARD HQ WE ARE NOW ORGANIZING, WHERE HE WILL BE THE J3. GENERAL KERWIN INFORMS ME THAT YOU AGREE TO THIS AND I APPRECIATE IT. AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, MATHESON WILL BE RELEASED TO RETURN TO HIS ASSIGNMENT AS III MAF DEPUTY FOR ARMY MATTERS OR TO COMPLY WITH HIS ORDERS FOR REASSIGNMENT TO THE STATES, WHICHEVER COMES SOONEST. I ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, REPLACING HIM WITH AN ARMY GENERAL OFFICER OF EQUALLY HIGH QUALIFICATION WHEN THE TIME COMES. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING DUTY HOURS
 200

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#66

CCN _____

FILLER _____

DTG 280633Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR GEN ABRAMS

CG	<i>[Signature]</i> SEE HAVE SEEN JHW S/S
DC6	
C/S	

EYES ONLY

CATEGORY _____


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0658

SVV ODA685

20 0230634
0230633Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01319 EYES ONLY

I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT 3D MAR DIV AT DONG HA 29 JANUARY. I WOULD FLY UP BY U-21 ARRIVING DONG HA ABOUT 11:45. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE LUNCH WITH 3D MAR DIV. MY PURPOSE ON THIS TRIP WOULD BE TO HEAR THE 3D MAR DIV APPRECIATION OF THE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS. I WOULD LIKE ALSO A RATHER COMPREHENSIVE RUN-DOWN AT THE FSCC CONCERNING FIRE SUPPORT OF ALL KINDS, NAVAL, AIR, AND GROUND. ALSO THE TARGETTING SYSTEM, RESULTS AND PLANS.
SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

100

NNNN

10FI

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
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DCG	3		2/1/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	SUBJECT AIR SUPPORT IN I CORPS
DCG AIR	4		2/1/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS Seen. D4W.
C/S	1		1/31/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	<p>#248 burned to 11/68</p> <p>EYES ONLY</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR			1 Feb 68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
AIA			3-10-700		<i>[Signature]</i>	<p>LEGEND</p> <p>A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE</p> <p>C - COMMENTS</p> <p>I - INFORMATION</p>
S/S			1/31/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

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#68

SECRET

PP RUMWAA
 DE RUHHFMA 5380 0292028
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 292028Z JAN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR, INFO
 O 28080IZ ZFF3
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND
 TO LTG KRULAK CG FMFPAC
 INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS
 GEN MCCONNELL CSAF
 GEN CHAPMAN CMC
 ADM SHARP CINCPAC
 BT

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01326 EYES ONLY
 REF: A. MAC 00797 180009Z JAN 68
 B. FMFPAC 192309Z JAN 68
 C. COMUSMACV DTG 220448Z JAN 68

SUBJ: AIR SUPPORT IN I CORPS

1. (U) I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO MY REF A MESSAGE. THE COURSE OF ACTION I HAVE TAKEN AND THE REASONS THEREFORE ARE CONTAINED IN MY REF C MESSAGE.

2. (S) I ASSURE YOU THAT EACH OF THE AREAS OF YOUR COMMENTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIRECTED COURSE OF ACTION. AS INDICATED IN MY DIRECTIVE, IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT THIS CENTRALIZATION OF CONTROL, AND CONCENTRATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES, BE CON-

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#68

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PAGE 2 RUHFMA 5380 S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 STRUED AS ABROGATION OF THE TRADITIONAL SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS.
 DIRECT SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS BY THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING WILL CONTINUE
 WITHIN THIS OVERALL PLAN.

3. (S) IN MY FOUR YEARS OF SERVICE HERE I CAN STATE THAT THE
 FACTORS MENTIONED IN YOUR MESSAGE HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY CONSIDERED.
 OVER THESE YEARS AS FORCES HAVE CONTINUED TO BUILD, THE LEVEL AND
 SCOPE OF CONFLICT HAS INTENSIFIED. THERE HAVE BEEN IMPROVISATIONS
 ALONG THE WAY TO ASSURE COORDINATION OF EFFORT AND MUTUAL SUPPORT.
 MAJOR ENEMY OPERATIONS HAVE CONTINUALLY EXPLOITED THE TACTICAL
 ADVANTAGES OF OPERATING FROM ACROSS THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN BOR-
 DERS OF I CORPS. THUS THERE IS A NECESSITY FOR CAREFUL PLANNING
 AND CONTROL OF OUR AIR RESOURCES TO ASSURE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE USE OF
 THIS VALUABLE AND LIMITED RESOURCE IN COUNTERING MAJOR ENEMY
 INITIATIVES.

4. (S) AS REFLECTED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN
 RECOGNIZED THAT THE EXIGENCIES OF A CRITICAL SITUATION MAY IN MY
 JUDGEMENT REQUIRE VESTING OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR OPERATIONS
 IN A PLAN OF THIS NATURE AND MAGNITUDE, IN MY DEPCOMUSMACV/AIR. THE
 EXISTING SITUATION AS IT IS DEVELOPING IN NORTHERN I CORPS COULD
 WELL BE THE DECISIVE PHASE OF THIS CONFLICT. THEREFORE I CONSIDER

PAGE 3 RUHFMA 5380 S E C R E T EYES ONLY
 IT ESSENTIAL THAT CENTRALIZED DIRECTION OF THE UTILIZATION OF ALL
 AIR RESOURCES COMMITTED TO THIS MAJOR ACTION BE PLANNED, COORDINATED
 AND EXECUTED BY DEPCOMUSMACV/AIR, WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF PROVID-
 ING III MAF MAXIMUM AIR SUPPORT WITHIN THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THIS
 ENTIRE COMMAND. BE ASSURED THAT MARINE AIR WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT
 THE MARINE GROUND UNITS IN ACTION.

WARM REGARDS. CP-4

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 68

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM COMUSMACV
CG	2		1/29/68			SERIAL 290100Z JAN COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		1/29/68			SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE
DCG AIR						REMARKS #2 & 3 burned & destroyed
C/S	1.		1/29/68		a	EXCLUSIVE
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						Copy #2 to Gen Anderson 18 Jun 68 In 18 Jun 68 PM
G-2						
G-3						Copy #2 to G-6 18 Jun 68 Th Robert A. Rindheart 9Sgt In 21 Jun 68 PM
G-4						
CEO						
A/A			291145H	301215H	SH SH	LEGEND
S/S			1/29/68		PHW	A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
S/C						C - COMMENTS
						I - INFORMATION

SECRET

#69

SECRET

ZC LA 909

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR FOLW

PP RUMSAK
DE RUMSAW 0466U 0290108
ZNY SSSSS
P 290100Z JAN 68 ZFF6
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF DNG
BT

EXCLUSIVE

~~SECRET~~ SPECAT. EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND 03163

SUBJ: FM FREQUENCIES (U)

- REF: A. CG III MAF DTG 200416Z JAN 68 (S)
- B. COMUSMAPV 02364 DTG 220216Z JAN 68 (S)
- C. CG III MAF DTG 240120Z JAN 68 (C)

1. (S) AN ADDITIONAL ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEEN FM FREQUENCIES WERE ASSIGNED ON 26 JAN BY CG I CTZ FOR USE BY III MAF AND OPCON UNITS FOR A PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968.
2. (C) THIS ALLOCATION IS A RESULT OF PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH JGS AND A FINAL CONFERENCE HELD AT I CTZ SIGNAL OFFICE ON 25 JAN 68. AT THIS CONFERENCE, REPRESENTATIVES OF MACV J6, III MAF AND OPCON UNITS PRESENTED THEIR CASE TO REPRESENTATIVES OF I CTZ, ARVN SIGNAL AGENCY AND J6 JGS. REQUIREMENTS OF US AND RVNAF FORCES WERE EXAMINED IN DETAIL. AS A RESULT OF THIS MEETING, JGS AUTHORIZED I CTZ TO ASSIGN FOR YOUR TEMPORARY USE AN ADDITIONAL 117 FM

you have change of copy

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 0466U S E C R E T SPECAT

FREQUENCIES. THESE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO YOU BY I CTZ.

3. (C) ARRANGEMENTS WERE ALSO CONSUMMATED WHEREBY YOUR COMM ELECT OFFICER MAY REQUEST LOCALLY OF THE I CTZ SIGNAL OFFICER THE TEMPORARY USE OR THE CO-SHARING OF FM FREQUENCIES ON A SPOT BASIS. A RAPPORT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PRINCIPALS THAT SHOULD MAKE THIS A SUCCESSFUL MODE OF OPERATION. AGAIN, AN EXPRESSION OF COMMAND INTEREST TO THE CG I CTZ WOULD BE BENEFICIAL.
4. (C) I CONSIDER THAT THE JGS HAS RESPONDED IN A POSITIVE, RAPID MANNER TO THE REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL FM FREQUENCIES. THE ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES REPRESENTS A MOST SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION ON THEIR PART, SINCE THEY HAVE DENIED THE USE OF THESE FREQUENCIES TO THEIR OWN FORCES WHO HAVE NEEDS SIMILAR TO YOURS.
5. (S) CAREFUL MANAGEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR MESSAGE "UTILIZATION OF FREQUENCIES" (REF C.) OF YOUR PRESENT COMPLEMENT OF 559 FM FREQUENCIES AS AUGMENTED BY THE LOCAL AGREEMENT SHOULD REDUCE MATERIALLY THE RADIO INTERFERENCE PROBLEMS BEING ENCOUNTERED. COMPLETE INTERFERENCE FREE OPERATION IS RARELY POSSIBLE.

GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HS-RD-8
DATE: 01 JAN 1992

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#69

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM COMUSMACV
CG						SERIAL 291110Z JAN COPY #2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1		1/31/68		DKW	95 has seen. FOR
DC/S						<p># 304 burned le Douc</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		COPY A				
G-3		COPY I				
G-4						
CEO						
A/A			311415		85	LEGEND
S/S			1/31/68		DKW	A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
S/C						- COMMENTS
						1 - INFORMATION

SECRET

#70

SECRET

DE RUMSMA 5172A 0291130
NY SSSSS
R 291110Z JAN 68 ZFF6
FM COMUSMACV
TO ZEN/CDR 7AF SAIGON
ZEN/DCG USARV LONG BINH
RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
ZEN/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
BT

FOR

~~SECRET~~ 03214 ABRAMS SENDS
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR MUNITIONS (U)
FBR GENERALS MOMYER, PALMER, CUSHMAN, ROSSON, WEYAND AND
ADMERAL VETH.

- (S) URGENT REQUIREMENT EXISTS WITHIN THIS COMMAND FOR THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF CAPTURED MATERIAL:
WEAPONS
AK TYPE ASSAULT RIFLES
RPG-7 ROCKET LAUNCHERS
AMMUNITION
INTERMEDIATE 7.62MM FOR AK TYPE ASSUALT RIFLE

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 5172A S E C R E T
122MM ROCKET AMJUNITION
RPG-7 AMMUNITION WITH PROPELLANT CHARGES
82MM ORJAR AMMUNITION

- (U) REQUEST NECESSARY ACTION BE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT ABOVE ITEMS ARE NOT DESZROYED OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF
- (U) FURTHER REQUESZ A SURVEY BE MADE TO DETERMIN ITEMS PRESENTLY ON HAND. REPORT RESULTS AND THE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF YOUR CONTACT OFFICER TO MACJ287 NOT LATER THAN 15 FEB 68.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-DY8
DATE: 81 JAN 1992

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#70

HEADQUARTERS, 3rd MAF

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONTROL NO.

109

ACTION DATE

ORIGINATOR:

CG THIRD MARDIV

DATE:

31 JANUARY 1968

SER NO.

310318Z JAN 68

DISTRIBUTION:

*#3 bar net
cedated*

SUBJECT:

MOVEMENT OF 2/4

COPY NO.

OF 3 COPIES

OPERATION CODE

X - OFFICE AFFIXING
ROUTE SHEET

A - FOR APPROPRIATE
ACTION

I - INFORMATION

D - COGNIZANCE

C - COMMENT

INSTRUCTIONS

THE ACTION SECTION WILL
RETURN THIS DOCUMENT WITH
APPROPRIATE ACTION COM-
PLETED BY "ACTION DATE"
IF ONE IS ASSIGNED.

ROUTE SEQ	SECTION	OPN CODE	DATE		SIGNATURE
			IN	OUT	
2	CG D/COMDR				<i>[Signature]</i>
1	CS D/CS S/S G-1 G-2 G-3 G-4 G-5 PSYOPS CEO ADJ S/C FOR ENG EMBARK SUPPLY COMPT K/COMOT				<i>[Signatures]</i>
			1/31	71R	

REMARKS:

SPECAT

*CG -
Gen Tompkins
called at 1400
and stated he was
going to execute
the op
[Signature]*

OK

SECRET

Fde

#71

SECRET

109



0 3103 18Z ZYH



FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO CG III MAF
ZEM

SECRET SPECAT
MOVEMENT OF 2/4.

1. FROM MAJ GEN TOMPKINS TO LTGEN CUSHMAN
MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT ENEMY WILL AIM A MAJOR EFFORT TO OVERRUN
CAMP CARROLL THON SON LAM CA LU. 320 DIV ADMIRABLY POSITIONED FOR
SUCH OPERATION WHICH OFFERS ENEMY GREATEST RETURN MORE PROFITABLE
FOR HIM THAN SIMILAR MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST HARDENED POSITIONS AT A-4,
C-2, C-2 BRIDGE AND C-3.

UNODIR WILL MOVE 2/4 LESS THE ONE COMPANY AT C-2 FROM PRESENT LOCATION
EAST OF RTE 561 TO OCCUPY POSITION VICINITY YD 025 558 THROUGH 014563.
THIS POSITION DOMINATES VITAL KHE GIA BRIDGE AT 026561, IS ADJACENT
TO CAMP CARROLL ACCESS ROAD JUNCTION AT 032560 AND PERMITS COUNTER
ATTACK TOWARD ROCKPILE, THON SON LAM, AND CAMP CARROLL.
AM ORDERING E-2-9 TO MOVE TO CA LU ASAP.

180

~~Handwritten signature~~

~~Handwritten signature~~

NNNN

109

SECRET

#71

HEADQUARTERS, III MAF

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONTROL NO.

ACTION DATE

ORIGINATOR:

GEN ABRAMS

DATE:

31 JAN 1968

SER NO.

310721Z JAN 68

DISTRIBUTION:

#244 based
601068

SUBJECT:

MAC 01446 EYES ONLY

COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES

OPERATION CODE

X - OFFICE AFFIXING
ROUTE SHEET

A - FOR APPROPRIATE
ACTION

I - INFORMATION

D - COGNIZANCE

C - COMMENT

INSTRUCTIONS

THE ACTION SECTION WILL
RETURN THIS DOCUMENT WITH
APPROPRIATE ACTION COM-
PLETED BY "ACTION DATE"
IF ONE IS ASSIGNED.

ROUTE SEQ	SECTION	OPN CODE	DATE		SIGNATURE	REMARKS:
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				<i>[Signature]</i>	
4	D/COMOR				<i>[Signature]</i>	
2	CS				<i>[Signature]</i>	
	D/CS					
1	S/S		1/31/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	PSYOPS					
	GEO					
	ADJ					
	S/C					
	FOR ENG					
	EMBARK					
	SUPPLY					
	COMPT					
	D/COMOT					

RETURN TO
III MAF S&C

72

NNNN

0749

VV ODA303

7 0310722

O 310721Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS SAIGON
TO LTG CUSHMAN DA NANG
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01446 EYES ONLY

IT IS MY INTENTION TO ARRIVE AT HUE-PHU BAI ON OR ABOUT THE FIFTH OF FEBRUARY TO JOIN HEADQUARTERS MACV FORWARD NOW BEING ESTABLISHED AT THAT LOCATION. ALTHOUGH HEADQUARTERS MACV FORWARD WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL ABOUT 12 FEBRUARY, I WANT TO FAMILIARIZE MYSELF WITH THE DETAILED SITUATION IN I CORPS. I INTEND TO STOP AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS ENROUTE FOR AN UPDATE. THE ASSISTANCE YOU AND YOUR STAFF HAVE RENDERED IS MOST APPRECIATED.
BEST REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
110

DECLASSIFIED
DAMH-HSR-D#8
DATE: 31 JAN 1982

1071

NNNN

72

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG THIRD MARDIV
DCG						SERIAL 307307 JAN COPY # 4 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	I		27 Feb 68			SUBJECT MOVEMENT OF 2/4
C/S						<p>REMARKS</p> <p>FOR</p> <p>D of S AIR <u>Mr</u> 2 Feb 68</p> <p>#243 burned</p> <p>6 Nov 68</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR			27 Feb 68		Hoye	
G-1						
G-2		copy I				
G-3		copy A				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						LEGEND
S/C						A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
						C- COMMENTS
						I- INFORMATION

SECRET

#73

SECRET

FOR

ZNY SSSSS
O 310730Z JAN 68
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO CG III MAF
BT

S E C R E T
MOVEMNT OF 2/4

1. FROM MAJGEN TOMPKINS TO LTGEN CUSHMAN
MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT ENEMY WILL AIM A MAJOR EFFORT TO OVERRUN
CAMP CARROLL, THON SON LAM, CA LU. 320 DIV ADMIRABLE POSITIONED FOR SUCH
OPERATION WHICH OFFERS ENEMY GREATEST RETURN MORE PROFITABLE FOR HIM
THAN SIMILAR MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST HARDENED POSITIONS AT A-4, C-2, C-2
BRIDGE AND C-3.

UNODIR WILL MOVE 2/4 LESS THE ONE COMPANY AT C-2 FROM PRESENT LOCATION
EAST OF RIE561 TO OCCUPY POSITION VICINITY YD 025558 THROUGH 014563,
THIS POSITION DOMINATES VITAL KHE GIA BRIDGE AT 026561, IS ADJACNT TO
CAMP CARROLL ACCESS ROAD JUNCTION AT 032560 AND PERMITS COUNTER ATTACK
TOWARD ROCKPILE, THON SON LAM, AND CAMP CARROLL.
AM MRDERING E-2-9 TO MOVE TO CA LU ASAP.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

COPY 4 OF 6 COPIES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FO. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									

73

SECRET

		ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN
CG	2			2/2/68	1/68	<i>lo</i>	SERIAL 01 FEB 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	4			2/3/68		<i>m</i>	SUBJECT FOR
DCG AIR	2	I		2/2/68		<i>o</i>	REMARKS
C/S	1			4 Feb 68		<i>llw</i>	<p>all was not clear out, as one copy per 9.</p> <p>#3 of 4 burned 6/20/68</p> <p>FOR</p>
DC/S							
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2		Action copy					
G-3		Info copy					
G-4							
CEO							
S/S				2/2/68	2/3/68	<i>Dtw</i>	LEGEND
S/C							A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
							C - COMMENTS
							I - INFORMATION

SECRET

#74

WITHDRAWN MATERIALS
"OUT CARD"

DESCRIPTION of WITHDRAWN MATERIALS:

Collection Title: III MAF Incoming Msgs Dec 67-1 Feb 68

PC Number: _____

Location: Folder, Drawer LS

Box Number: _____

Folder Title: _____

Photo Number: _____

Description of Item: Referral 1 DTG O P 01 Feb 68

THESE MATERIALS HAVE BEEN SIGNED OUT TO:

Name/Rank: _____

Unit: _____

Address: _____

Phone Number: _____

Date: _____

Purpose: _____