
Declassify
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Tagged
Document

~~TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE~~

(OUTGOING)

38. LTGEN CUSHMAN 160215Z JAN 68 (TS) *gp-1*
 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL LAM (2 AIRBORNE BNS) (S)
39. CG III MAF 170924Z JAN 68 (TS) *gp-4*
 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR FORCES IN NORTHERN I CTZ (S)
40. CG III MAF 201632Z JAN 68 (TS) *gp-4*
 FOR VADM BRINGLE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL OF AIR IN DURANGO CITY
- ~~41. CG III MAF 270156Z JAN 68 (TS)
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 (Copies 1, 2, and 3 are filed in C/S Safe in envelope, only to be opened
 by CG or C/S or upon their direction.) /s/ Major Stevenson~~
42. CG III MAF 290225Z JAN 68 (TS) *gp-2*
 EYES ONLY
 PHOTO COVERAGE OF THE KHE SANH AREA BEING PROVIDED BY 7TH AF
43. CG III MAF 290644Z JAN 68 (TS) *gp-3*
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 DURANGO CITY (U)
44. CG III MAF 291452Z JAN 68 (TS) *gp-3*
 FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 DURANGO CITY CJLF OPLAN 44-68 OF 20 JAN 68

EXCLUSIVE - HBS (T. S.)

27. CG III MAF 301622Z DEC67 (TS) *Op-4*
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MCEO
THIS IS A DYE MARKER MSG (CONDUCT OF AIR OP'S IN SVN PORTION OF MUSCLE SHOALS AREA)
28. CG III MAF 031202Z JAN68 (TS) *Op-1*
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MCEO
AIR SUPPORT OPERATION YORK II (U)
29. CG III MAF 040145Z JAN 68 (TS) *Op-1*
FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
COMMAND AND CONTROL, DURANGO CITY OPNS
30. CG III MAF 081402Z JAN68 (TS) *Op-3*
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN ANDERSON, AND MGEN ROBERTSON FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - LAOS (U)
31. CG III MAF 090936Z JAN 68 (TS) *Op-3*
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN KOSTER FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - LAOS (U)
32. CG III MAF 091020Z JAN 68 (TS) *Op-3*
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN ANDERSON, AND MGEN ROBERTSON FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - DMZ (U)
33. CG III MAF 120054Z JAN 68 (TS) *Op-4*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN CORPS EYES ONLY
AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II (U)
34. CG III MAF 121616Z JAN 68 (TS) *Op-1*
FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE EYES ONLY
DURANGO CITY (U)
35. CG III MAF 130650Z JAN 68 (TS) *Op-3*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MC EYES ONLY
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AIR RESOURCES DURANGO CITY (C)
36. CG III MAF 130652Z JAN 68 (TS) *Op-3*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
DURANGO CITY (U)
- ~~37. CG III MAF 131446Z JAN 67 (TS)
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
INCREASED CBU-24 ASSETS~~
37. CG III MAF 131322Z JAN 67 (TS) *Op-4*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
KHE SANH (QUOTED MSG)

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
						CG III MAF
CG						SERIAL 291452Z JAN
						COPY # 3 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT
						TURANCO CITY CULE OPLAN 44-68 OF
DCG AIR		I				REMARKS 20 JAN 68
C/S						<p><i>15/30/68</i></p> <p># 1 of 2 burned 7 docs</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		I				
G-3		I				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						1/30/68 D4W
						COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES
S/C						

TOP SECRET #44

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 290644Z JAN COPY 3 / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	X		30 Jan	1/29/68		SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
C/S	1					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE NO FORN LIMDIS HAS BEEN SENT #3 barued 7 doug
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			1/29/68		DHW	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #43

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAK 3264 0290644
 ZNY TTTT
 P 290644Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY

1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR INFO.

P 270507Z JAN 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

CG III MAF DANANG

CDR 7TH AF SAIGON

INFO CINCPAC

BT

TOP SECRET NOFORN LINDIS 02975 FROM MACJS

SUBJ: DURANGO CITY (U)

WESTMORELAND SENDS

REF: A. COMUSMACV OPERATION PLAN 44-68 DRAFT (TS)

B. COMUSMACV 01118 DTG 110429Z JAN 68 (TS) (NOTAL)

C. CDR 7TH AF LTR 19 JAN 68 SUBJ: DURANGO CITY (U) (TS) (NOTAL)

NO FORN
LINDIS

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3264 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCE0

D. CG III MAF DTG 201630Z JAN 68 (TS) (NOTAL)

E. COMUSMACV INITIATING DIRECTIVE 160518Z DEC 67 (TS)

F. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 OF 28 JUN 66

1. (TS) THIS MSG MODIFIES INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE PROVIDED
 VIA REF A TO CTF 112 AND CTF 113 CONCERNING CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS
 IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS
 OPERATION. REFS B, C, D PERTAIN.

2. (TS) IN REVIEW, REF E ESTABLISHED THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE
 AREA AND ASSIGNED THE COMMANDER JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE THE
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENTIRE FORCE, FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/
 AIRBORNE OPERATION AND VESTED HIM WITH THE COMMENSURATE COMMAND
 AUTHORITY TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. IN FULFILLING PART
 OF HIS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY THE CJATF HAS DESIGNATED THE CG
 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AS THE TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER TO CONTROL AIR
 OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AOA DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRMOBILE/
 AIRBORNE OPERATION.

3. (TS) MY DECISION IS THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE TERMINATION OF
 THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, CDR 7TH AF, IN HIS CAPACITY OF MACV AIR FORCE
 COMPONENT COMMANDER (REF F, PARA. 4.A) WILL CONTROL AIR OPERATIONS
 WITHIN THE DESIGNATED OBJECTIVE AREA AND COORDINATE, AS NECESSARY,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3264 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
WITH COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE SURROUNDING
AREAS TO ASSURE INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING ARMS TO
ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT IN OVERALL AIR OPERATIONS.

GP-3

BT

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		1/29/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	CG III MAP
DCG	3		1/29/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	SERIAL 290225Z JAN 68 COPY # 1 OF 1 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4		31 Jan		<i>[Signature]</i>	SUBJECT N/A
C/S	1.		1/29/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR			30 Jan 68		<i>[Signature]</i>	EYES ONLY
G-1						<i>#2 & 4 burned 2 double</i>
G-2		Info Copy				
G-3		Info Copy				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			1/29/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #42

TOP SECRET

O 290225Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 CG 7TH AF
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T
 FROM LTG CUSHMAN
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND
 GEN ~~WOMEVER~~

29 JAN 1963

A. COMUSMACV 271158Z

1. PHOTO COVERAGE OF THE KHE SANH AREA IS BEING PROVIDED IN THE MAIN BY 7TH AIR FORCE. TARGET READOUTS IN THIS REGARD ARE PROVIDED US BY IPIR'S, SUPIR'S, AND HOPIR'S WHICH ARE READDRESSSED TO THE 26TH MAR. THESE TARGETS THEN ARE ADDED TO THE TARGET PRIORITY LIST OF THE 26TH MARINES.

2. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE SPECIFIC TARGETS MENTIONED IN REFERENCE A, 7TH AIR FORCE WAS QUERIED AS TO WHAT CLOSE-IN TARGETS REMAINED IN THE KHE SANH AREA. THEIR RESPONSE INDICATED EIGHTEEN UNOCCUPIED ENEMY POSITIONS. A PORTION OF THESE EIGHTEEN UNOCCUPIED ENEMY POSITIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN STRUCK AND THE REMAINDER WILL BE STRUCK.

3. THE IPIR'S, SUPIR'S, AND HOPIR'S MENTIONED ABOVE RELATE TO BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPHY. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THESE IMAGERY REPORTS HAVE PROVIDED THE 26TH MARINES A CONTINUING AND COMPREHENSIVE FLOW OF TARGET INFORMATION.

4. DURING GENERAL ABRAMS' VISIT HERE ON 25 JANUARY, IT WAS MENTIONED THAT 7TH AIR FORCE HAD FLOWN CD COVERAGE IN THE NIAGARA AREA ON 24 JANUARY. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MAJOR CLEMENT, J211 ON 25 JANUARY DISCLOSED J211 HAD NO INFORMATION ON SUBJECT MISSION, BUT WOULD "LOOK INTO THE MATTER." 7TH AIR FORCE, TASE CALLED IN RESPONSE TO THE CALL TO J211 CONCERNING CD, ALSO ON 26 JANUARY, AND INDICATED THAT TWO MISSIONS, NUMBERED 4232 AND 4215 HAD BEEN FLOWN AND OFFERED NO FURTHER EXPLANATION. WE RECEIVED MISSION 4232 ON 27 JANUARY WHICH PROVED TO BE BLACK AND WHITE, NOT CD IMAGERY. ON 27 JANUARY, HOWEVER, WE DID RECEIVE CD IMAGERY OF MISSION 4215. THIS PARTICULAR MISSION DID NOT PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT READOUT. NEITHER THE IPIR OR SUPIR OF MISSION 4232 HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

GP-4
 350

TOP SECRET

NNNN

#42

CCN 254

FILLER 32

DTG 201632Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SEEN

OG
CS

CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE

FILE COPY FILLER OF COPIES

#3 burned 7/2/06/68

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 201632Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

G-2

TOP SECRET

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 201632Z JAN 68

#40

TOP SECRET

NO FORN
LINDIS

P 201632Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMSEVENTHFLT
BT

TOP SECRET NOFORN LINDIS
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM BRINGLE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
SUBJ: COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL OF AIR IN DURANGO CITY
A. 7TH FLT 170710Z JAN 68
B. CG III MAF 201630Z JAN 68
1. DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT HELD MONDAY, 15 JAN WITH NO ADJUSTMENT OF POSITIONS REACHED BETWEEN III MAF AND 7TH AF REPRESENTATIVES. III MAF RATIONALE, SUPPORTING DURANGO CITY PLANNING STAFF PROPOSAL, PREPARED BUT WITHHELD PENDING OUTCOME OF SUBSEQUENT COMUSMACV PROPOSAL TO PLACE 1ST MAW FIXED WING ASSETS UNDER OPCON 7TH AF FOR DURATION OF PROBABLE MAJOR ENGAGEMENT FORESEEN IN NORTHERN I CORPS. TODAY MACV ASKED FOR OUR POSITION AND I RESPONDED BY REF B.
2. I UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN. WILL ADVISE.
GP-4
BT

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

CCN 184 FILLER 25

DTG 170924Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG/l
45
OC/G m

**TOP SECRET
EXCLUSIVE** HAS BEEN SENT

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7 dec 68*

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COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 170924Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

G-2

Top SECRET

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 170924Z JAN 68

TOP SECRET

OO RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 1851 0170924
 ZNY TTTT
 O 170924Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN NORTHERN I CTZ (S)

1. FIRST AIR CAV DIV (-) WITH ONE BDE COMMENCED MOVEMENT TO PHU BAI AREA 170830H JAN. ANTICIPATE CLOSING O/A 24 JAN. DIV CP AND DISCOM WILL BE LOCATED VIC GIA LE (YD 807161). DIV WILL BE TARGETED INITIALLY AGAINST BASE AREA 101. FOLLOWING AO ASSIGNED NORTHERN BOUNDARY EXTENDS FROM RJ (YD 314498) WESTWARD ALONG SECONDARY RD NORTH OF BA LONG VALLEY TO RJ (YD 121459) THENCE SOUTH GENERALLY ALONG N-S GL YD 12 TO YD 120323 THEN SOUTHEAST TO YD 203241 THEN NORTHWEST TO YD 228286 THEN EAST ALONG SONG THAC MA TO YD 460400 THEN GENERALLY NORTHWEST TO POINT OF ORIGIN. BDE BASE VIC HAI LANG TO BE SELECTED.
2. CONCURRENT WITH ABOVE OPERATION AGAINST BASE AREA 101, I INTEND TO CONDUCT TWO COMBINED OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH FIRST ARVN DIV. ONE AGAINST ENEMY LOCATED WEST OF QUANG TRI,

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1851 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NORTH OF AO DESCRIBED IN PARA ONE ABOVE AND SOUTH OF CAM LO RIVER. SECOND OPERATION AGAINST ENEMY IN AREA BOUNDED BY ROUTE 1, TRACE AND CAM LO RIVER, EXTENDING WESTWARD BEYOND ROUTE 561.

3. I BELIEVE THAT SUCH PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS INITIATED EARLY WILL DISRUPT ENEMY TIME TABLE AND INFLECT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN EASTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. I AM ADVISING ALL COMDRS AFFECTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

CCN _____

FILER _____

DTC 160215Z

MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR LTGEN CUSHMAN

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
CIS	<i>[Signature]</i>

HAS BEEN SENT
EXCLUSIVE

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FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

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COPIES OF LTGEN CUSHMAN MESSAGE 160215Z JANUARY 1967

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

G-2:

G-3

TOP SECRET

DATE/TIME GROUP 160215Z JANUARY 1967

38

TOP SECRET

P 160215Z
FM LT GEN CUSHMAN
TO GEN WESTMORELAND
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
AT CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL LAM TODAY HE AGREED TO ASSIGN 2 AIRBORNE
BNS TO 11TH (NORTHERN) DTA, AND ALSO INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO
PARTICIPATE IN COMBINED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, CONCEPT OF WHICH
IS NOW BEING PREPARED FOR YOUR APPROVAL.

WARM REGARDS

GP-1

Ø7Ø

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

TOP SECRET

38

CCW 148 FILLER 32

DTG 131922Z 68 MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

CG	X
DCS	X
C/S	<i>e</i>

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*# 243 burned
70068*

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 131922Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME 14047H

G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 131922Z JAN 68

37

TOP SECRET

PP RUMKM
DE RUMSAK 1441 0131322
ZNY TTTTT
P 131322Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN.

1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE.

Z 130252Z JAN 68

FM CG III MAF

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FMAV

BT

TOP SECRET

KHE SANH

1. REQ YOU TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES FOR DEFENSE OF KHE SANH:

A. SWIFT ALL 175 MM GUNS TO PROVIDE BEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT OF KHE SANH DEFENSES.

B. OUTPOST HILLS SOUTH OF KHE SANH.

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1441 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

C. INSURE FIGHTING HOLES HAVE OVERHEAD COVER CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING DIRECT HIT 82 MM MORTAR (EITHER DOUBLE LAYER OF SAND BAGS OR EQUIVALENT PROTECTION).

D. INSURE ARMY IS PREPARED TO RECEIVE AND EMPLOY COFRAM MUNITIONS ON ORDER.

2. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, FOLLOWING ACTIONS TAKEN/PLANNED/UNDERWAY.
A. ON OR ABOUT 16 JAN, MAXIMUM AVAILABLE ARC-LIGHT STRIKES WILL BE TARGETTED IN SUPPORT KHE SANH.

B. I AM REQUESTING CG AMERICAL DIV TO PLACE 3RD BDE, 1ST AIR CAUDIV (AM) ON 24-HOUR ALERT FOR DEPLOYMENT TO HUE-PHU BAI AREA.

C. COMUSMACV HAS DIRECTED CG II FFORCEV TO BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY 1ST BDE, 101ST ABNE DIV TO I CTZ ON 24 HOUR NOTICE.

3. INDICATIONS ARE ENEMY TARGET DATE FOR ATTACK OF KHE SANH IS 18 JAN 68.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

CCN 138 FILLER 16

DTG 130652Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

**TOP SECRET
EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
CS	<i>[Signature]</i>

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20068*

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 130652Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME 141051H Jan 68

G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 130652Z JAN 68

36

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RUMSAK 1388 0130652
 ZNY TTTT
 P 130652Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN
 CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DURANGO CITY (U)
 1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE:

P 110428Z JAN 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CINCPAC
 INFO CONSEVENTHFLT
 CG III MAF
 CDR 7TH AF
 CTF 76
 CTF 79
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS 01117 FROM MACPG
 SUBJ: DURANGO CITY (U)

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1388 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 REF: A. CINCPAC LTR 5531 SER: 000590 DTD 18 NOV 67 (NOTAL)
 1. (TS) REFERENCE A DIRECTED THAT COMUSMACV INITIATE PLANNING
 FOR OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE DMZ. THE REFERENCE FURTHER DIRECTED THAT
 THIS PLAN BE SUBMITTED TO CINCPAC FOR REVIEW BY 1 FEBRUARY 1968.
 2. (TS) CONCURRENT PLANNING BY THE STAFFS OF COMUSMACV,
 CJATF AND CJLF IS WELL UNDERWAY IN SAIGON AND ON OKINAWA.
 3. (TS) PROBLEMS HAVE SURFACED REGARDING AIR CONTROL SUBSEQUENT
 TO THE TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. SOLUTIONS TO THESE
 PROBLEMS REQUIRE COMPLETE INTEGRATION OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT
 OF JOINT LAND FORCES NORTH WITH THOSE AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
 OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RVN AND NORTH VIETNAM.
 4. (TS) DUE TO THE COMPLEX PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED, I HAVE
 DIRECTED CDR 7TH AF AND CG, III MAF TO PRESENT A SUITABLE PLAN FOR
 AIR CONTROL IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA FOR MY APPROVAL BY 18 JAN 68.
 5. (TS) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME TO INCORPORATE ANY
 REQUIRED CHANGES IN THE COMUSMACV OPERATION PLAN, IT IS REQUESTED
 THAT THE SUBMISSION DATE FOR THE COMUSMACV PLAN BE EXTENDED TO 15
 FEBRUARY 1968. GP-3

BT

UNQUOTE.

GP-3

BT

CCN 137 FILLER 16

DTG 130650Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY FILLER OF _____ COPIES

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7/1/68*

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 130650Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME 141052H Jan 68

G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 130650Z JAN 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RUMSAK 1389 0130650
 ZNY TTTT
 P 130650Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN KRULAK FROM L GEN
 CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AIR RESOURCES DURANGO CITY (C)
 1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE:
 P 110429Z JAN 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CDR 7TH AF SAIGON
 CG III MAF
 INFO COMSEVENTHFLT
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS 01118 FROM MACJ3
 SUBJ: COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROL AND USE OF AIR
 RESOURCES IN DURANGO CITY (C)
 REF: A. COMUSMACV MSG, 160518Z DEC 67
 B. CG, III MAF MSG, 280230Z DEC 67

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1389 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 C. CDR 7TH AF LETTER, 5 JAN 68
 D. MACV DIR 95-4
 E. DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, 1 AUG 67
 WESTMORELAND SENDS:

1. (TS) I CONSIDER THAT THE ISSUE RAISED IN REFERENCE C CONCERNING THE COMMAND ARRANGEMENT FOR EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE AIR RESOURCES FOR DURANGO CITY REQUIRES PROMPT RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLEAR GUIDANCE TO THE PLANNING GROUP NOW MEETING IN OKINAWA.
2. (C) DURING RECENT MONTHS, SITUATIONS HAVE ARISEN PERTAINING TO AIR SUPPORT WHICH HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR CAREFUL, INTERGRATED, COORDINATED JOINT PLANNING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FORCES IN AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO 7TH AF AND III MAF. SPECIFICALLY, THESE INVOLVED OPERATION HICKORY, THE DNZ, OPERATION YORK II AND MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER. BECAUSE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL PECULIARITIES OF THE MACV AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS WELL AS THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE MACV COMMAND STRUCTURE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT COMMANDERS RECOGNIZE THE INTENT OF APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS IN ANNEXES A AND B OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, AND TAKE PROPER ACTIONS TO:
 - A. RECOGNIZE THE JOINT IMPLICATIONS INHERENT IN A SIT-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1389 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
UATION, CAMPAIGN OR CONTINGENCY PLAN.

B. TAKE NECESSARY JOINT PLANNING ACTIONS TO ASSURE AN
INTERGRATED, COORDINATED COMMAND AND CONTROL PLAN WHICH RECOGNIZES
AND RESPECTS THE INHERENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
COMMANDS INVOLVED.

C. PRESENT TO COMUSAMCV FOR APPROVAL A PLAN OF ACTION
WHICH FUNCTIONAL, REALISTIC, AND SATISFACTORY TO FIELD
COMMANDERS CONCERNED.

3. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, I REQUEST THE COMMANDER, 7TH AF AND
THE CG, III MAF OR A GENERAL OFFICER FROM THEIR COMMANDS MEET AND
JOINTLY DEVELOP A COMMAND ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE MOST
EFFECTIVE USE AND CONTROL AND AIR RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR DURANGO
CITY WITHIN THE OVERALL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS AND TASKS CURRENTLY
IN EFFECT FOR THE AIR RESOURCES OF 7TH AF, III MAF AND THE SEVENTH
FLEET.

4. (C) I AM HAVING A COPY OF REFERENCE C DELIVERED TO CG, III MAF.

5. (U) REPORT YOUR RECOMMENDED JOINT PLAN TO ME NLT 18 JAN

68. GP-3

BT

UNQUOTE:

GP-3

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Draw Sub

CCN 127 FILLER 25

DTG 121616Z MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG	<i>le</i>
DCG	<i>m</i>
<i>efs</i>	<i>Q</i>

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CATEGORY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT

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TO A SECRET

121616Z JAN 68

DATE/TIME GROUP _____

#34

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAK 1351 0121616
 ZNY TTTT
 P 121616Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
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EXCLUSIVE

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T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION I OF II SECTIONS THE FOLLOWING LETTER IS FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE:
 SUBJECT: DURANGO CITY(U)
 TO: COMUSMACV

1. (TS) I HAVE REVIEWED THE MACV DURANGO CITY INITIATING DIRECTIVE AND THE BASIC PLAN DRAFT. I AM CONVINCED THAT IF THIS OPERATION IS TO BE A SUCCESS, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE MUST BE GIVEN THE PLANNING GROUP AT OKINAWA. I CANNOT CONCUR WITH THIS EFFORT WHEN I FORESEE THAT THERE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE INSUFFICIENT FORCES AND A DEFINITE LACK OF PROPER CONTROL.
2. (TS) THE OBJECTIVE ESTABLISHED FOR THIS OPERATION IS CERTAINLY LARGER THAN THE INITIAL PLANNING GROUP REALIZED. IT CONSTITUTES A MAJOR INCURSION INTO ENEMY TERRITORY WHERE HE IS BETTER EQUIPPED AND HAS FAR MORE FIRE POWER THAN IN SVN. HE WILL CERTAINLY HAVE MUCH GREATER MOTIVATION TO FIGHT.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

A. MACV INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 30,000 ENEMY TROOPS NOW IN THE PROPOSED OBJECTIVE AREA. ADDITIONAL SIZEABLE REINFORCEMENTS COULD REACH THE AREA BY THE TIME OF THE LANDING IF THE ENEMY HAS ANY IDEA THAT THE D-4 PREPARATORY FIRES ARE A SIGNAL OF OUR INTENTIONS. THIS CONTRASTS WITH THE PROPOSED TOTAL OF 30,000 FRIENDLY COMBATANT TROOPS.

B. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS NOT JUST AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. IT IS JUST AS MUCH AN AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE ASSAULT; ALL WITH THE GOAL OF LINKING WITH FORCES ALREADY ON LAND. IN THIS REGARD I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE ASSAULT LANDING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ENEMY FORCE AREA. THIS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT GROUND AND AIR TASK THAN THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. THESE UNITS WILL HAVE TO FIGHT A LONGER DISTANCE, OVER MORE DIFFICULT TERRAIN, AND BE EXPOSED ON THE FLANK AND REAR ALL THE WAY.

C. THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE GROUND FORCES IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA WILL THEREFORE BE ARMY AND ARVN. THIS WILL REQUIRE A TREMENDOUS AIRLIFT EFFORT WITH MORE AIR FORCE AND ARMY UNITS INVOLVED AND IN RESERVE THAN ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED. SINCE THE PREPONDERANCE OF GROUND EFFORT WILL BE BY THE U.S. ARMY,

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 THE JOINT LAND FORCE SHOULD BE COMMANDED BY AN ARMY GENERAL.
 3. (TS) THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THIS OPERATION DEMANDS THAT WE ADHERE TO THE ESTABLISHED AND PROVEN JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS. (WHEN THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING IS COMPLETE AND THE JOINT LAND FORCE COMMANDER IS ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 113 OF THE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS OVER. THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WILL THEN HAVE TO JOIN THE AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE FORCES AND ENTER INTO CLASSIC LAND BATTLE. THE FACT IS THAT THE OBJECTIVE AREA IS AT THAT POINT NO LONGER AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AREA, BUT A LAND BATTLE AREA NO DIFFERENT THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY DEFINED FOR MACV CAMPAIGNS.

A. FOR THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION I DO NOT QUESTION THE RIGHT OF THE JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER TO CONTROL THE AIR OVER THE FLEET AND OVER THE BEACH. HOWEVER, WHEN THE JOINT LANDING FORCE COMMANDER IS NO LONGER AFLOAT HE SHOULD BECOME THE EASTERN LAND FORCE COMMANDER UNDER THE AIRBORNE/AIRMOBILE ARMY COMMANDER. THE JOINT DOCTRINE CLEARLY APPLIES FOR THE SUBORDINATION OF THE AIR EFFORT OVER THE EASTERN LAND FORCE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 TO THE CONTINUING LARGER AIR EFFORT WHICH MUST BE CONTROLLED AND COORDINATED WITH THE AIR APPROACHES AND NECESSARY ADJACENT AERIAL INTERDICTION, PARAGRAPH 280 OF THE DOCTRINE STATES:

"A. FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATION, THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER WHO ORDERS THE OPERATION WILL ASSIGN TO THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL AN AIRSPACE OF DEFINED PROPORTIONS WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA.

B. ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA WILL BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER UNTIL THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS TERMINATED.

C. TO ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT IN OVERALL AIR OPERATIONS, THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER WILL COORDINATE AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DEFINED AIRSPACE AS NECESSARY, WITH THE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE SURROUNDING AREA. AT THE TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATION, THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE WILL BE DISSOLVED, (THE ASSIGNED AIRSPACE WILL BE DISESTABLISHED AND THE AIRSPACE CONTROL WILL NORMALLY BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOCTRINE FOR CONTROL OF AIRSPACE OVER THE COMBAT ZONE BY THE AIRSPACE CONTROL)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E M C E O
 AUTHORITY DESIGNATED FOR THAT AREA."

IT IS PRIMA FACIE THAT I AM DESIGNATED AS THE AIR COMMANDER
 FOR THE AREA AND TACC SAIGON HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE
 CAPABILITY FOR THE AIRSPACE CONTROL. //?

3. THIS ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE HAS GROWN FROM THE JOINT EXPER-
 IENCE AT NORMANDY AND INCHON. THESE WERE TRULY JOINT EFFORTS
 WITH THE AIR FORCE CONTROLLING THE AIR. IN CONTRAST, OPERATION
 HICKORY HAD SERIOUS COORDINATION PROBLEMS. THE SYSTEM HAD
 NO FLEXIBILITY FOR EMPLOYING AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES IN
 INTERDICTION AREAS ADJACENT TO THE VERY LIMITED LAND AREA.
 THE MARINES REQUIRED CONSIDERABLE AIR FORCE ASSISTANCE DURING
 THIS OPERATION. MANY AIR FORCE STRIKE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO
 BASE WITH ORDNANCE, AND FAC AND STRIKE FLIGHTS WERE CONTINUALLY
 CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MID-AIR-COLLISIONS AND SHORT
 ROUNDS. THE LESSON LEARNED AGAIN WAS THAT THERE MUST BE A
 CENTRAL CONTROL AUTHORITY FOR NOT ONLY THE OBJECTIVE AREA BUT
 THE AIR APPROACHES AND EXPOSED FLANK AREAS AS WELL.

4. (TS) JOINT CAMPAIGN PLANNING ATTEMPTS TO FORESEE SUCH PRO-
 BLEMS AS THESE AND PROVIDES FOR THE NECESSARY CONTROLS TO
 AVOID THEM. THIS IS EXACTLY WHY THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 1351 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E M C E O
 COMMANDER HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED; TO CONTROL AND DIRECT THE AIR
 OPERATIONS OVER THE LAND BATTLE AREA. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 IN
 PARAGRAPH 4A STATES:

"A. COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MACV
 AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER, ACTS AS COORDINATING AUTH-
 ORITY FOR ALL US/PWMAF AIR OPERATIONS AND VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
 (VNAF) ACTIVITIES IN THE MACV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY."

5. (TS) AS YOUR DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS I AM, OF COURSE,
 PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE SUCCESS OF THE AIR EFFORT. I FEEL
 WE MUST UTILIZE OUR TOTAL AIR CAPABILITY TO THE MAXIMUM. FOR
 THE SAME REASON THAT MARINE AIR SHOULD PROVIDE CLOSE AIR
 SUPPORT FOR THE LANDING AND THEIR FORCES IN COMBAT IN THIS
 PARTICULAR CASE, 7TH AIR FORCE SHOULD BE DESIGNATED FOR COMMAND
 AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES SUPPORTING THE ARMY/ARVN
 TROOPS. AS I STATED IN THE PLANNING FOR OPERATION YORK, THE
 MOST IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT THE ARMY/ARVN FORCES INVOLVED HAVE
 WORKED CONSISTENTLY WITH 7TH AIR FORCE WITH THE RESULT THAT
 ALL CONCERNED HAVE DEVELOPED MOST EFFECTIVE TEAMWORK BASED ON
 FAMILIARITY, RAPPORT, AND FULL UNDERSTANDING OF MUTUAL CAPA-
 BILITIES. SUCCESS ACHIEVED WITH THE AMERICAL DIVISION CONFIRMS
 BT

"word
 not in
 directive"

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAK 1352 0121616
ZNY TTTT
P 121616Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRILAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF II SECTIONS THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING ESTABLISHED AIR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS REGARDLESS OF OPERATING AREA.

(THE JOINT ARMY/AIR FORCE DOCTRINE FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS STATES IN CHAPTER 2)

"2-1A. THE CONDUCT OF JOINT AIRBORNE OPERATIONS REQUIRES THAT THE EFFORTS OF PARTICIPATING FORCES BE PROPERLY COORDINATED AND INTEGRATED TO ACHIEVE A COMMON OBJECTIVE. THESE REQUISITES ARE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH JOINT FORCES COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND DOD AND JCS DIRECTIVES.

airborne operations over after drop.

2-2B. JOINT AIRBORNE TASK FORCES (JTF). TACTICAL AIR FORCES OR ELEMENTS MAY BE ASSIGNED AS A PART OF AN AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMAND OF A JOINT TASK FORCE. WHEN ASSIGNED TO A JOINT TASK FORCE, ALL AIR FORCE FORCES OR ELEMENTS ARE PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1352 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCEO 6. (TS) (VIN AIR FORCE WILL PROVIDE ALL OF ITS FORCES NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THIS OPERATION. THIS WILL CONSIST OF THE NECESSARY STRIKE AIRCRAFT, A UNIQUE MAJOR AIRLIFT EFFORT, THE MAJORITY OF FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS, ELINT AND TACTICAL ELECTRONIC WARFARE AIRCRAFT, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, CONTINUED AND INCREASED RECONNAISSANCE, ADJACENT INTERDICTION STRIKES, AND CONTINUED AIR DEFENSES OVER VIETNAM TO INCLUDE THE ASSAULT AREA. ARC LIGHT SORTIES WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR INGREDIENT.

7. (TS) WITH REGARD TO THE MATTER OF OVERALL AUTHORITY FOR AIR CONTROL FOR THE OBJECTIVE AREA AFTER THE LANDING HAS BEEN MADE, THE JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS STATES IN PARAGRAPH 226B:

(WHEN THE PREPONDERANCE OF TACTICAL AVIATION IS PROVIDED BY THE AIR FORCE FOR THE ASSAULT PHASE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, AN AIR FORCE OFFICER WILL BE DESIGNATED BY THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER OF THE PARTICIPATING AIR FORCE FORCES TO DIRECT THE TOTAL AIR EFFORT IN THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA. HE WILL EXERCISE SUCH DIRECTION UNDER THE JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMMANDER OR WHEN CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS IS

This is why he wants CG III MAF as CG Eastern Land Force and Secret

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1352 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO PASSED ASHORE, UNDER THE LANDING FORCE COMMANDER OR AN APPROPRIATE COMMANDER ASHORE WHO HAS THE CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SUCH OPERATIONS."

A. THE OBJECTIVE AREA, AS I STATED ABOVE, IS MORE THAN AN AMPHIBIOUS AREA. THE DOCTRINAL POINT IS THAT I AM ALREADY THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDER AND TACC SAIGON HAS AND EXERCISES CONTROL CAPABILITY. THE OBVIOUS NEED TO CONTINUE A UNIFIED AIRSPACE CONTROL EFFORT IS THE ONLY WAY TO INSURE THAT THE ENEMY AIR THREAT TO THIS OPERATION COULD NOT REACH ITS GOAL. THE SPEED AND SOPHISTICATION NEEDED WILL NOT ALLOW AIR DEFENSE FRAGMENTATION. I CANNOT RELINQUISH THE AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY YOU ASSIGNED TO 7AF IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-8.

B. NOT ONLY WILL THE AIR FORCE PROVIDE THE PREDOMINANCE OF FORCES NEEDED, IT WILL HAVE TO DO SO TO ASSURE SUCCESS. THE TASKS INVOLVED REQUIRES FORCES WHICH EXCEED THE MARINE AND NAVY CAPABILITY FOR THIS SPECIFIC OPERATION IF THEY ARE TO CONTINUE THEIR EXISTENT RESPONSIBILITIES. THE AIR ACTIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM DIRECTED BY JCS AND THE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT FVMAF/RVNAF FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE CONTINUED DURING THIS

Want to USAF to be required to support the ground troops?

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1352 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO EXERCISE BY THE AIR FORCE, MARINES, AND NAVY.

8. (TS) IN SUMMARY, ALTHOUGH I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE A SLAVE TO DOCTRINE, THE SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF DURANGO CITY DEMANDS THE USE OF PROVEN PROCEDURES AND CAPABILITIES IF CONFUSION AND RESULTANT HIGHER LOSSES ARE TO BE AVOIDED. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE JOINT DOCTRINE DERIVED FROM OUR SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST MUST BE FOLLOWED. AS YOUR DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS, I RECOMMEND THAT THE MACV INITIATING DIRECTIVE BE AMENDED TO DIRECT THAT PLANNING BE ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED CONCEPTS.

WILLIAM W. MOMYER, GENERAL, USAF
COMMANDER
GP-1
BT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RUMSAK 1241 0120054
 ZNY TTTT
 P 120054Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN KRULAK FROM L GEN
 CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FOR YOUR INFO

QUOTE
 O 021000Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CMDR 7AF
 CG I FFORCEV
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T
 AIR SUPPORT FOR YORK II (U)
 A. CG III MAF 260542Z DEC 67
 B. 7AF 281145Z DEC 67
 C. COMUSMACV 171045Z DEC 67
 1. REF A EXPLAINED III MAF CONCEPT FOR AIR SUPPORT IN OPERATION

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1241 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCEO.
 YORK II AND STATED INTENT TO TASK CG FIRST MAW WITH RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR PROVIDING ALL CLOSE AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.
 REF B CONTAINS 7AF POSITION AND RECOMMENDS AMENDING MACV PLANNING
 DIRECTIVE, REF C, TO SPECIFY THAT TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF
 FORCES INVOLVED WILL BE PROVIDED BY 7AF/VNAF/FMAW RESOURCES AS
 APPROPRIATE, SUCH AIR SUPPORT TO BE ALLOCATED, TASKED, AND
 COORDINATED THROUGH 7AF/VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.
 2. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT MUST BE INTEGRATED COMPLETELY INTO THE
 OVERALL HELICOPTER ASSAULT PLAN TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF INITIAL
 LANDINGS AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS IN ASNAU. HELICOPTER ESCORT,
 LANDING ZONE PREPARATION, AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SORTIES FLOWN BY
 JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT ARE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THIS PLAN.
 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE CRITICAL INITIAL PHASE REQUIRES A
 KEEN UNDERSTANDING OF HELICOPTER CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS AND
 EXPERIENCE IN THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT OF ROTARY AND FIXED WING
 AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST MAW IS EMINENTLY QUALIFIED IN THIS RESPECT.
 3. IN THE SAME VEIN THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM MUST BE CAPABLE OF
 COORDINATING THIS INTEGRATED HELICOPTER AND JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT
 AIR SUPPORT PLAN. INCLUDED WITH THE MARINE DASC IS A HELICOPTER
 DIRECTION CENTER (HDC) SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED, AND EQUIPPED,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

100/4

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#32

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1241 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. A MARINE DASC CURRENTLY LOCATED AT HUE-PHU BAI ADJACENT TO THE MARINE DIVISION FSCC IS INTENDED TO BE THE PRIMARY AIR CONTROL AGENCY FOR THE OPERATION. THE DASC INCLUDES AN AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM (ASRT) FOR ALL-WEATHER, TPQ-10, RADAR BOMBING, AND WDC, AND HAS COMPLETE ARTILLERY SAVE-A-PLANE INFORMATION. A SECOND TPQ-10 WILL BE POSITIONED TO PROVIDE SKIN PAINT OVER THE VALLEY. ADDITIONALLY AN AIRBORNE DASC AND HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE MINI-DASC ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE FIRST MAW FOR COMMITMENT SPECIFICALLY TO YORK II FORCES IN ASHAU VALLEY AS DESIRED.

5. THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM WITHIN THE FIRST MAW IS PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED FOR OVERALL CONTROL OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF YORK II. THE PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN CONTROL OF III MAF AIR OPERATIONS AND THE AIRCREW FLYING THE FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT ARE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH ASHAU VALLEY, ITS GEOGRAPHY, WEATHER, AND ENEMY SITUATION.

6. THE CONCEPT PRESENTED HEREIN DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF 7AF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PERSONNEL IN ALO/FAC DUTIES AND, IN FACT, THE ADVANTAGES INHERENT IN THE CONTINUED USE OF THESE SAME PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT THE YORK OPERATION INSURES CONTINUITY OF

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1241 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO EFFORT IN THIS VITAL AREA. SIMILARLY, 7AF ALO/FAC STRUCTURE IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT FOR OUT OF COUNTRY OPERATIONS.

7. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE AIR SUPPORT CONCEPT EXPRESSED IN REFERENCE A AND CLARIFIED HEREIN BE APPROVED.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

DE RUMSAK 0938 0091020

ZNY TTTT

P 091020Z JAN 68

FM CG III MAF

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST MAH

CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN ANDERSON, AND MGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. FOLLOWING IS QUOTED FOR INFORMATION: QUOTE.

P 071030Z JAN 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH

RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON

RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG

ZEN/CG I FFORCEV LONG BINH

ZEN/CG II FFORCEV NHA TRANG

RUMSAN/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

ZEN/CG 5TH SFGA NHA TRANG

BT

T O P S E C R E T 00694 FROM: MACCOC12

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0938 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SUBJ: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT-DMZ (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 31909 DTG 280141Z SEP 67 (TS)

B. STATE 210270 DTG 121808Z JUN 67 (S) (NOTAL)

C. JOINT STATE/DEF 91707 DTG 26 NOV 66 (S) (NOTAL)

D. JCS 9029 DTG 282338Z NOV 66 (S) (NOTAL)

E. MACV DIRECTIVE 335-12, 29 NOV 67 (U)

F. CINCPACINST 005440.1E (S) (NOTAL)

1. (U) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR BORDER AREAS AND THE DMZ WILL BE MODIFIED AND UPDATED AS NECESSARY AND REPUBLISHED QUARTERLY. THIS IS THE SIXTH REPLICATION OF THE RULES APPLICABLE TO THE DMZ.
2. (U) REF A IS RESCINDED.
3. (TS) THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED HEREIN APPLY TO US/PWMA FORCES ONLY. HOWEVER, PERSONNEL IN POSITIONS TO INFLUENCE RVNAF OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN OR NEAR THE DMZ WILL MAKE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO ASSURE THAT SUCH OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED UNDER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED HEREIN, AS APPLICABLE.
4. (TS) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOLLOW:
 - A. OPERATIONS BY GROUND FORCES MAY BE CONDUCTED IN THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE (PMDL). GROUND FORCES MAY RETURN FIRE ACROSS THE PMDL BUT WILL NOT ADVANCE

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TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUNSAK 0938 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
NORTH OF THE PNDL.

B. TACTICAL AIR STRIKES MAY BE CONDUCTED IN THE DMZ BOTH
NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE PNDL.

C. ARTILLERY FIRE (LAND AND NAVAL) MAY BE DIRECTED AGAINST
VALID MILITARY TARGETS IN THE DMZ BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE PNDL.
ARTILLERY FIRE (LAND ONLY) MAY BE DIRECTED AGAINST VALID TARGETS
IN NORTH VIETNAM NORTH OF THE DMZ.

D. DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS MAY BE CONDUCTED ALONG IDENTIFIED
INFILTRATION ROUTES IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ AS SPECIFIED
IN REF B AND IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ AS SPECIFIED IN REF C
AND D.

E. NOTHING HEREIN WILL BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT US/PVMA
FORCE COMMANDERS FROM DEFENDING THEIR UNITS AGAINST ATTACK. COMMAND-
ERS OF US/PVMA FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY COUNTER-
ACTION AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-
DEFENSE AND TO DEFEND THEIR UNITS AGAINST ARMED ATTACK WITH ALL MEANS
AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

5. (IS) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/INFORMATION FOLLOWS:

A. COMSEVENTHFLT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO EMPLOY NAVAL
GUNFIRE AGAINST SUITABLE TARGETS ASHORE, IN NVN BETWEEN LATITUDE

PAGE FOUR RUNSAK 0938 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
17 DEGREES NORTH AND LATITUDE 20 DEGREES NORTH.

B. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION WHICH
SHALL BE SAFEGUARDED BY APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES. THESE
INSTRUCTIONS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR EXISTENCE SHALL BE HELD
CLOSELY WITH ACCESS LIMITED TO PERSONS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY
ADDRESSEES ON A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

C. NO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ANY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS
MESSAGE OR OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER AUTHORITY CONTAINED HEREIN
SHALL BE MADE EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. IF
PRESS QUERIES ARE MADE, RESPONSE WILL TAKE THE FORM OF REFERRAL TO
THIS HEADQUARTERS.

D. THE AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES CONTAINED HEREIN ARE
ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF RVN AND THE DEFENSE OF US/
RVN/PVMA FORCES. THESE AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES WILL NOT BE
APPLIED TOWARD WIDENING THE CONFLICT IN SEASIA.

E. REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS ACTIONS TAKEN
UNDER THIS AUTHORITY AS FOLLOWS:

(1) CG, III MAF: REPORTS OF ALL INSTANCES INVOLVING
MANEUVER INTO THE DMZ WILL BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS
OF REF E.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 0938 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 (2) (OR, 7 TH AF: REPORTS OF ALL AIRDTRIKES WILL BE
 SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT CINCPAC JOPREP/OPREP PROCEDURES
 CONTAINED IN APPENDIX III OF REF F.

6. (TS) THE POLICY REGARDING US ADVISORS ACCOMPANYING ARVN
 UNITS INTO THE DMZ IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE JGS (RVNAF) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE DMZ ARE
 SIMILAR TO THE MACV RULE CONTAINED HEREIN. THEY WERE DEVELOPED
 IN COORDINATION WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS AND ARE SUPPORTED BY THIS
 HEADQUARTERS. A COPY OF THE JGS RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IS AVAILABLE
 AT HEADQUARTERS, I CORPS.

B. US ADVISORS WILL ACCOMPANY ARVN UNITS MANEUVERING INTO
 THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE PMKL.

C. US ADVISORS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ACCOMPANY ARVN UNITS
 NORTH OF THE PMDL.

D. US ADVISOR WILL BE DETACHED FROM ARVN UNITS THAT TAKE
 ANY ACTION WHICH IS CLEARLY BEYOND THE AUTHORITY WHICH HAS BEEN
 PROVIDED TO US/FUMA FORCES BY PARA 4 ABOVE.

E. THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL BE NOTIFIED BY THE MOST
 EXPEDITIOUS MEANS OF ALL INSTANCES OF DETACHMENT OF US ADVISORS
 FROM ARVN UNITS AND REASONS THERE FORE; GP-3
 UNQUOTE. GP-3
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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DTG 090926Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

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7 Nov 68*

~~CC~~
~~DCS~~
c/s | *e*

EXCLUSIVE

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G-2

G-3

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PP RUMHIC
 DE RUMSKA 0933 0090936
 ZNY TTTT
 P 090936Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN KOSTER FROM L GEN CUSHMAN.

1. COMUSMACV 052325Z JAN 68, QUOTED BELOW, MAY BE USED AS REQUIRED AS THE BASIS FOR INSTRUCTING YOUR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PAR 5.A. QUOTE.

P 052325Z JAN 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSVA/DCG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
 ZEN/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 ZEN/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
 RUMSAN/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 ZEN/CG 5TH SFGA NHA TRANG
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

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 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT 00534 FROM: MACCOC12

SUBJ: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - LAOS (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 31919 DTG 280400Z SEP 67 (TS-SPECAT)

B. MACV DIR 335-12, 29 NOV 67 (U)

C. CINCPACINST 005440.1E (S)(NOTAL)

1. (U) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR BORDER AREAS WILL BE MODIFIED AND UPDATED AS NECESSARY AND REPUBLISHED QUARTERLY. THIS IS THE SIXTH SUCH REPUBLICATION OF RULES APPLICABLE TO THE LAOTIAN/RVN BORDER.

2. (U) REFERENCE A IS RESCINDED.

3. (TS) THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED HEREIN APPLY TO US/FWMA FORCES ONLY. HOWEVER, PERSONNEL IN POSITIONS TO INFLUENCE RVNAF OPERATIONS CONDUCTED NEAR THE LAOTIAN/RVN BORDER WILL MAKE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO ASSURE THAT SUCH OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED UNDER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED HEREIN, AS APPLICABLE.

4. (TS) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOLLOW:

A. AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO EMPLOY ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST VALID MILITARY TARGETS IN LAOS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN PARA 4D BELOW.

B. WHEN PLANNING OPERATIONS NEAR THE LAOTIAN/RVN BORDER, EXCLUSIVE OF OPERATIONS CONDUCTED UNDER AUTHORITY GRANTED IN PARA

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 4A ABOVE, COMUSMACV WILL BE KEPT INFORMED SO THAT APPROPRIATE COORDINATION CAN BE EFFECTED. THIS IS MANDATORY IN EACH INSTANCE WHEN NECESSARY ACTIONS OR COUNTERACTIONS AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES MAY INVOLVE RETURNING FIRE OR MANEUVERING INTO LAOS IN ATTAINING OBJECTIVES IN RVN OR IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

C. IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AND IN ADDITION TO AUTHORITY GRANTED IN PARAGRAPH 4A ABOVE, US/PVMA FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTERACTIONS IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ATTACKS DIRECTED AT US/PVMA FORCES FROM LOCATIONS INSIDE LAOS WITH COMUSMACV BEING ADVISED. AN EMERGENCY SITUATION IS CONSIDERED TO EXIST WHEN, IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE US/PVMA FORCE COMMANDER, THE URGENCY FOR TAKING TIMELY COUNTERACTIONS IN SELF-DEFENSE OF US/RVN/PVMA FORCES PRECLUDES OBTAINING PRIOR APPROVAL. AS NECESSARY, SUCH COUNTERACTIONS MAY INCLUDE:

- (1) AIR STRIKES AGAINST ENEMY FIRING FROM THE LAOTIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AGAINST US/RVN/PVMA FORCES.
- (2) MANEUVER BY US/PVMA FORCES, WHILE ACTUALLY ENGAGED AND IN CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES, INTO LAOS AS NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE.

D. IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ABOVE, LAOTIAN VILLAGES WILL

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 NOT BE ATTACKED EXCEPT:

- (1) WHEN FIRE IS BEING RECEIVED THEREFROM, AND
- (2) WHEN, IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE US/PVMA FORCE COMMANDER, THE ATTACK ON A POPULATED AREA IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF HIS FORCE.

E. MINIMIZE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

F. NOTHING HEREIN WILL BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT COMMANDERS FROM DEFENDING THEIR UNITS AGAINST ARMED ATTACK. COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY COUNTERACTIONS AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND TO DEFEND THEIR UNITS AGAINST ARMED ATTACK WITH ALL MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

5. (IS) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW:

A. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION WHICH SHALL BE SAFEGUARDED BY APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES. THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR EXISTENCE SHALL BE HELD CLOSELY WITH ACCESS LIMITED TO PERSONS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY ADDRESSEES ON A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. COMMUNICATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FOR APPROPRIATELY CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION. ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM SENIOR COMMANDERS UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION WHO NEED TO KNOW ON AN

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EYES ONLY BASIS OF THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE.

B. NO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ANY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS MESSAGE OR OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER AUTHORITY CONTAINED HEREIN WILL BE MADE EXCEPT BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. IF PRESS QUERIES ARE MADE, RESPONSE WILL TAKE THE FORM OF REFERRAL TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

C. THE AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES CONTAINED HEREIN ARE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF RVN AND US/RVN/FUMA FORCES. THESE AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES WILL NOT BE APPLIED TOWARD WIDENING THE CONFLICT IN SEASIA.

D. TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING, THE FOLLOWING CAUTION APPLIES: THE ACT OF INFORMING THIS HEADQUARTERS OF PLANS TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN AOS CONTIGUOUS TO THE RVN/LAOTIAN BORDER DOES NOT REPEAT DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT TO "KEEP COMUSMACV INFORMED" WHEN PLANNING OPERATIONS AS ENVISIONED IN PARA 4B ABOVE. EACH OPERATION PLANNED TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER CONDITIONS DESCRIBED IN PARA 4B ABOVE MUST BE DELINEATED IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL AND FAR ENOUGH IN ADVANCE TO PERMIT EVALUATION AND APPROPRIATE ACTION BY THIS AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. AS A MINIMUM, INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE FOLLOWING MUST BE PROVIDED:

(1) ENEMY STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND CURRENT ACTIVITY.

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(2) TASK ORGANIZATION.

(3) D-DAY AND ESTIMATED DURATION OF OPERATION.

(4) CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(5) MISSION OF FORCE.

(6) SCHEME OF MANEUVER/PLANNED DISPOSITION OF FRIENDLY FORCE IN RELATION TO THE BORDER.

E. REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS ACTION TAKEN UNDER THIS AUTHORITY AS FOLLOWS:

(1) CG, III MAF AND CG, I FFORCEV: REPORTS OF ALL INSTANCES INVOLVING ARTILLERY, AIRCRAFT UNDER OPCON, AND MANEUVER OF GROUND UNITS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF REF B.

(2) CDR, 7TH AF: REPORTS OF ALL AIR STRIKES WILL BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT CINCPAC JOPREP/OPREP PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX III. OF REF C.

GP-3

UNQUOTE.

GP-3

BT

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