

DECLASSIFIED

7. CG III MAF 032356Z JAN68 (S) *gp-4*
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MCEO
OPCON SLF/ARG
8. ADMIN III MAF 050732Z JAN68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR MGEN KOSTER
SAFETY OF CIVILIANS, MUSCATINE AREA
9. ADMINO III MAF 051412Z JAN68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR LTGEN KRULAK
SUMMARY OF EVENTS 021315H to 030510H JAN 68
- ~~10. CG III MAF 060744Z JAN 68 (U)
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
RETURN OF CG III MAF~~
11. CG III MAF 071336Z JAN68 (S) *Group-4*
FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
OPERATION BADGER TOOTH
12. CG III MAF 080730Z JAN68 (C) *gp-4*
FOR VADM BRINGLE, INFO BGEN GLICK, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
PUC RECOGNITION FOR SLF SUPPORT UNITS (REF A)
13. CG III MAF 102336Z JAN 68 (C) *gp-4*
FOR AMB KOMER
WHETHER OR NOT CIVILIANS REMAIN IN AREA ONCE IT BECOMES ACTIVE BATTLEGROUND

DECLASSIFIED

- EXCLUSIVE -

(OUT-GOING)

14. CG III MAF 120350Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
CY-67 ASSESSMENT
15. CG III MAF 131320Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
EMPLOYMENT ARG/SLF ALPHA
16. CG III MAF 131446Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
INCREASED CBU-24 ASSETS
17. CG III MAF 141402Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
SUBJECTS OF POSSIBLE CMC DISCUSSION ON RETURN TRIP TO FMFPAC
18. CG III MAF 150304Z JAN 68 (S) *Group-4*
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS
REINF KHE SANH
19. CG III MAF 160010Z JAN 68 (C) *gp-4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
DISTINCTIVE INSIGNIA FOR CIVILIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES IN VIETNAM
20. CG III MAF 161200Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS AND COL LOWNDES FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
OBSERVATIONS AFTER INSPECTION OF THE KHE SANH DEFENSES (S)
21. CG III MAF 171402Z JAN 68 *gp-4*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE EYES ONLY
PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MARINE AIR WING UNDER MACV DEPUTY FOR AIR
22. CG III MAF 171700Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
PLANNED OPS QUANG TRI PROV
23. CG III MAF 180332Z JAN 68 (C) *gp-4*
FOR BGEN KIM FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
COMMENDABILITY FOR SPEED AND EFFICIENCY OF DIFFICULT TACTICAL MOVE
24. LTGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF 180212Z JAN 68 (S) *Group-3*
EYES ONLY
PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MARINE AIR WING UNDER MACV OPER CONTROL
25. CG III MAF 181352Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
DISCUSSION OF GEN CUSHMAN AND GEN MOMYER AS DIRECTED BY MACV 171206Z JAN 68
26. CG III MAF 182210Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
DISCUSSION HELD BY LGEN CUSHMAN AND GEN MOMYER AS DIRECTED BY MACV 171206Z JAN 68

- SECRET -
(OUTGOING)

27. LTGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF 190250Z JAN 68 *gp-4*
MACV EYES ONLY
STOCKING KHE SANH
28. CG III MAF 190332Z JAN 68 *gp-4*
FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
DISCUSSION HELD BY GEN MOMYER AND GEN CUSHMAN AS DIRECTED IN MACV 171206Z JAN 68
29. CG III MAF 200416Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE
30. LGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF 200943Z JAN 68 (S) *Group - not shown*
TO GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV EYES ONLY
MEETING OF GEN ABRAMS AT KHE SANH
31. CG III MAF 201132Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MGEN TOMPLINS
DISAPPROVAL BY GEN WESTMORELAND OF LEATHERNECK SQUARE OPERATION
- ~~32. CG III MAF 201240Z JAN 68 (C)
FOR RADM BEHRENS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
CHANGE OF LUNCHEON DATE ON BOARD TWO JIMA, DUE TO OPERATIONAL MATTERS~~
33. CG III MAF 201524Z JAN 68 (S) *Group - 4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
34. CG III MAF 220126Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
IMMEDIATE OPNS MUST BE UNDERTAKEN TO REMOVE ENEMY INTERDICTION
35. CG III MAF 221002Z JAN 68 (S) *Group - not shown*
LTGEN SENDS FOR GEN ABRAMS
REGISTRATION OF 175MM GUNS IN CAMP CARROLL AND ROCK PILE
36. CG III MAF 221308Z JAN 68 (S) *Group - 4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
37. CG III MAF 240758Z JAN 68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY
38. CG III MAF 240920Z JAN 68 *Group - 4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
WAR ROOM AT DONG HA
39. CG III MAF 251050Z JAN 68 *gp-4*
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
BILLET FOR BGEN MATHESON, USA

DECLASSIFIED

- EXCLUSIVE -

(OUTGOING)

40. LTGEN CUSHMAN 281028Z JAN 68 (S) *gp not shown*
TO LGEN TOMPKINS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
QUOTED MSG FROM GEN ABRAMS DESIRING TO VISIT 3D MARDIV AT DONG HA ON 29 JAN 68

41. CG III MAF 300736Z JAN 68 (C) *gp-4*
SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DEBRIEFING OF RETURNING PERSONNEL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 300735Z JAN COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	X		31 Jan		Wk	SUBJECT DEBRIEFING OF RETURNING PERSONNEL
C/S						REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT MARINE CORPS EYES OR # 143 burned Schubert
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

#41

CONFIDENTIAL

FMFPAC T CMC

PP RUCIHOA
 DE RUMSAK 3380 0300736
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 300736Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUCIHOA/CMC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 DEBRIEFING OF RETURNING PERSONNEL

- A. ADMINO FMFPAC 060224Z JUL66
1. REF A APPLIES. THIS HQ NOTIFIED THE OIC, NISO, DANANG, OF THE RETURN OF NELSON, ROHA, AND AGOSTO-SANTOS TO USMC CUSTODY. IN THE CASE OF NELSON AND ROHA, NOTIFICATION OCCURRED WITHIN THREE HOURS AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL AT THIS HEADQUARTERS. IN THE CASE OF AGOSTO-SANTOS, NOTIFICATION WAS GIVEN WHILE HE WAS STILL ENROUTE TO DANANG.
 2. FURTHER, PARTICIPATION OF NISO, DANANG REPS IN, OR PROVISION OF EEI TO THE DEBRIEF OF THE RECAPS WAS ALSO SOLICITED BY THIS HQ.
 3. THE OIC, NISO, DANANG PARTICIPATED IN THE DEBRIEFING OF AGOSTO-SANTOS FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY THREE (3) HOURS ON 28 JAN 68, IN RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS.
- GP-4
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	CCG	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#41	

281028Z

JANUARY 1968

LTGEN CUSHMAN

DCG-AIR

XHayz

*#2d4 burned
5 Nov 68*

3

4

1, 2, AND 4

4

LTGEN CUSHMAN

281028Z JANUARY 1968

281028Z JANUARY 1968

#40

0 251025Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO CG THIRD MARDIV
ZNY

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN EYES ONLY

FM: LTGEN CUSHMAN
TO: MGEN TOMPKINS

1. RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GENERAL ABRAMS. QUOTE
I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT 3D MAR DIV AT DONG HA 29 JANUARY. I
WOULD FLY UP BY U-21 ARRIVING DONG HA ABOUT 11:45. I WOULD
LIKE TO HAVE LUNCH WITH 3D MAR DIV. MY PURPOSE ON THIS TRIP
WOULD BE TO HEAR THE 3D MAR DIV APPRECIATION OF THE ENEMY
AND FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS. I WOULD LIKE ALSO A
RATHER COMPREHENSIVE RUNDOWN AT THE FSCC CONCERNING FIRE
SUPPORT OF ALL KINDS, NAVAL, AIR, AND GROUND. ALSO THE
TARGETING SYSTEM, RESULTS AND PLANS. UNQUOTE.
2. I'LL ARRIVE PRIOR TO GENERAL ABRAMS. WILL FURNISH MY
ETA THIS AFTERNOON.

125

NNNN

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

#40

CCN _____

*#4 banned
5/20/68*

FILLER _____

DTG 251050Z

MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

*I made some slight
modifications General*
EYES ONLY

CG	<i>g</i>
DCG	<i>w</i>
C/S	<i>a</i>

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2, AND 4 OF 4

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 251050Z

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME GROUP 251050Z JANUARY 1968

SECRET

054Z ZYH
 III MAF
 USMACV

SECRET

MESSAGE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

SUBJ: BILLET FOR BRIG GEN MATHESON, USA

1. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ORDERS DETAILING GEN MATHESON TO MY HEADQUARTERS DESIGNATE THE BILLET AS "DEPUTY FOR ARMY MATTERS". THE IDEA HAS BEEN ADVANCED THAT THE BILLET MIGHT BE CALLED "DEPUTY COMMANDER, ARMY"; HOWEVER, I CANNOT CONCUR FOR THESE REASONS:

A. THE TWO ARMY DIVISIONS UNDER OPCOM OF III MAF ARE COMMANDED BY MAJOR GENERALS.

B. MAJGEN MURRAY, AS THE DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, IS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR ALL FORCES UNDER OPCOM OF III MAF.

2. MY CONCEPT OF BILLET OPERATION IS AS DISCUSSED WITH YOU: NAMELY, THAT GEN MATHESON WOULD BE A POINT OF CONTACT FOR MAJOR ARMY COMMANDERS AND COULD MAKE SURE THAT THEIR REQUIREMENTS ARE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MYSELF OR DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL AND MY CHIEF OF STAFF. WE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO MAKE PROPER INPUT TO THE STAFF SECTIONS. THESE STAFF SECTIONS ARE NOW BEING AUGMENTED BY ARMY OFFICERS AND OUR STAFF RESPONSE TO THESE ARMY REQUIREMENTS WILL BE IMPROVED ACCORDINGLY. IN ADDITION, BRIG GEN MATHESON WILL ADVISE ME ON ARMY CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN BOTH THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC FIELDS. I WILL THUS BE ABLE TO GIVE COMPLETE AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDANCE TO MY STAFF IN THEIR PLANNING.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

360

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

CCN 341 FILLER 32

DTG 240920Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

*#1 of 3 burned
5 Nov 68*

DCG-AIR WV
H

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY FILLER _____ COPIES

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MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 240920Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 240920Z JAN 68

38

SECRET

OO RUMSMA
DE RUMSAK 2671 0240920
ZNY SSSSS
O 240920Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM L GEN CUSHMAN
A. VISIT GEN WESTMORELAND 23 JAN 68
1. DURING REF A WE DISCUSSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
III MAF WAR ROOM (FWD) AT DONG HA, TO MAINTAIN CURRENT
OPERATIONAL/INTELLIGENCE/LOGISTIC/AIR INFORMATION. THIS
DATE I HAVE ESTABLISHED THIS WAR ROOM AND TASKED ADC
THIRD MAR DIV, BGEN HOFFMAN, AS MY DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE.
2. WAR ROOM WILL CONSIST OF III G-2, G-3, G-4 AND AIR REPS
AND LIAISON OFFICERS FROM 1ST ACD, 1ST ARVN DIV AND DET
NSA CUA VIET. THE PURPOSE OF THE WAR ROOM WILL BE TO OBTAIN,
DISPLAY AND CORRELATE ALL INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONAL,
LOGISTIC AND AIR DATA FROM KHE SANH, DONG HA, CUA VIET,
QUANG TRI, GIA LE AND CAMP EVANS, WHEN CP 1ST ACD
DISPLACES THERETO. WARM REGARDS. GP-4
BT

EXCLUSIVE

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#38

CGC 355 FALLER 32

DTG 240758Z NOV 77 JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCG	<i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>[Signature]</i>

*344 burned
5 Nov 68*

HAS BEEN SENT
FOR

CATEGORY

FILE COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

NOTE RECEIVED (C) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6

APPROX ON CG III MAF MESSAGE 240758Z JAN 68

COPY 5 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

COPY 6 OF 6 _____ DATE/TIME _____

240758Z JAN 68

#37

SECRET

O 240728Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

SECRET FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.
COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

- A. MCPR M00027/7145/4414
- B. MCPR M00027/7151/4415
- C. MCO 4400.102

1. THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY OF III MAF IS LIMITED TO THE GENERIC AREAS LISTED BELOW. WITH THE ARRIVAL OF 1ST AIR CAV DIV AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW DASC AT KHE SANH ALL OPERATIONAL ASSETS IN THESE AREAS ARE FULLY COMMITTED.

- A. HIGH CAPACITY TELETYPEWRITER
- B. RADIO RELAY
- C. FM RADIO
- D. UHF RADIO
- E. 400 CYCLE POWER

FOR

2. FOLLOWING ARE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- A. INCREASED CIRCUIT REQUIREMENTS CAUSED BY RECENT

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2655 **SECRET** FOR ADDITION OF NEW ELEMENTS TO ICTZ. ALL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL FIXED PLANT TTY, RADIO RELAY AND 400 CYCLE POWER EQUIPMENTS.

B. POOR RESPONSE FROM INTERIM FACTORY REPAIR PROGRAM, LACK OF TEST EQUIPMENT AND MODULE FLOAT CAUSING HIGH DEADLINE OF RADIO RELAY SYSTEMS (AN/TRC-97).

C. INABILITY TO RESPOND RAPIDLY TO EQUIPMENT FAILURES. ALTHOUGH SUPPLY REPAIR PARTS WAS ON UPSWING, COMMITMENT OF BACK UP ASSETS TO MEET INCREASED REQUIREMENTS HAS MORE THAN NEUTRALIZED ANY GAIN.

D. THE TACTICAL SITUATION HAS DEMANDED THE COMMITMENT OF ALL AVAILABLE FORCE LEVEL UHF ASSETS.

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING:

- A. EXPEDITE FIXED PLANT TTY SHIPMENT CITED REFS A AND B.
- B. INCREASE IN-COUNTRY RADIO RELAY ASSETS OF AN/TRC-97.

REQUIRE 24 CHANNEL SYSTEMS IF AVAILABLE.

C. APPLY PRESSURE ON INTERIM FACTORY SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR AN/TRC-97 CITED REF C.

D. FORCE FEED TO STOCK AT 1ST AND 3RD FSR'S SUFFICIENT RADIO SETS AN/PRC-25 TO ALLOW RAPID RESPONSE TO T/E SHORTAGES BEING CAUSED BY COMBAT LOSSES, CODE H, AND T/E CHANGES.

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2655 **SECRET** FOR

- E. EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF 400 CYCLE GENERATORS (PU-670).

GP-4
BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#37	

HAS BEEN SENT

CGO 282 FILLER 119

DTG 221308Z JAN 68 MONTH

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG	<i>lo</i>
DCG	<i>th</i>
C/S	<i>Q</i>

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY

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Scrub*

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COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 221308Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY DATE/TIME

3-2

6-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 221308Z JAN 68

#36

SECRET

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EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMSMA
 DE RUMSAK 2407 0221308
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 221308Z JAN 68 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV

BT
 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM L GEN CUSHMAN

DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

A. PHONE CONS OF 20 AND 21 JAN 68: GENERAL WESTMORELAND/L GEN CUSHMAN

B. VISIT OF GEN ABRAMS, 21 JAN 68

C. CG III MAF 170924Z JAN 68

1. AS RESULT OF REFS A AND B, I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING SUBJECT TO YOUR APPROVAL:

A. CONTINUE PRESENT COMMITMENT 1ST AIR CAVDIV (-) (ONE BRIGADE) TO BASE AREA 101.

B. RECEIVE ONE BN, 2D/101ST 23 JAN 68, PASS OPCON TO CG 1ST AIR CAVDIV (-).

C. BEGIN MOVEMENT 3D/1ST ACD TO QUANG TRI AREA, 24 JAN 68 FOR EMPLOYMENT IN BASE AREA 101. UPON ARRIVAL, REPORT TO CG, 1ST ACD FOR OPCON.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2407 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

D. O/A 25 JAN 68, CONTINUE MOVEMENT 2D/101ST TO PHU BAI. UPON ARRIVAL, REPORT TO CG, 1ST ACD FOR OPCON.

E. EXTEND AO OF 1ST ACD AS SET FORTH REF C TO SOUTHEAST TO SONG BO, WEST ALONG ROA LA TO VIC YD 421093, THENCE GENERALLY NW TO JOIN PRESENT AO VICINITY YD 200243; AO EXTENDED INCLUDES BASE AREAS 101 AND 114.

F. MARINE MANEUVER BN DEPLOYS FROM CAMP EVANS (VIC PHONG DIEN) TO KHE SANG 22 JAN 68. BN (-) (3 RIFLE COS) SLF ALPHA LANDS CAMP EVANS 22 JAN 68. SLF ALPHA RECONSTITUTES AS CORPS RESERVE ASAP UPON ASSUMPTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAMP EVANS BY 1ST AIR CAV DIV, ESTIMATED O/A 25 JAN 68.

G. ARG/SLF BRAVO BE PREPARED CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN CUA VIET AREA O/A 23 JAN TO CLEAR RIVER IN ORDER TO PERMIT UNIMPEDED LOGISTIC TRAFFIC TO DONG HA. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, 3D MARDIV CONDUCTS PREEMPTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATION IN AT LEAST TWO BN STRENGTH (INCLUDING ELMS SLF BRAVO), WESTWARD OF RTE 561, NORTH OF RTE 9, WITH MISSION OF DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES IN ZONE AND CONTRIBUTING TO SECURITY OF CAMP CARROLL - THON SON LAM - ROCKPILE AREA.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#36

221002 Z Jan 68
CG, III MAF

#24 buried
501068

DCG-AIR

O 221002 ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
KEN

SECRET EYES ONLY

LTCEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN ABRAMS
REF YOUR 220717Z. 175MM GUNS IN CAMP CARROLL AND ROCK
ARE REGISTERED IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND HAVE BEEN
USED IN SUPPORT OF THAT OPERATION FOR THE LAST COUPLE
OF DAYS. WARM REGARDS.

NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING
DUTY HOURS.

090

SECRET

#35

BOX 270

FILLER 25

NO 220126Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG	lp
196	lyp
c/s	o

EXCLUSIVE HAS BEEN SENT

#2 & 3 burned
5 Nov 68

FILL COPY FILLER OF COPIES

MAF RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 220126Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY DATE/TIME 221213 H Jan 68

8-2

8-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 220126Z JAN 68

#34

SECRET

DE RUMSAK 2327 0220126
ZNY SSSSS
O 220126Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NGEN TOMPKINS FR L GEN CUSHMAN.
INTERRUPTION TO CUA VIET LOC UNACCEPTABLE. IMMEDIATE OPNS MUST
BE UNDERTAKEN TO REMOVE ENEMY INTERDICTION. COMMAND DETONATED
MINES AND GROUND FIRES AGAINST CRAFT ARE CONDUCTED FROM RIVER
BANKS. THEY MUST REPEAT MUST BE CLEARED AT ONCE. COORD WITH
1ST ARVN DIV. CONSIDER USE SLF BRAVO THERE FOR FEW DAYS PRIOR
OPN N OF CAMP CARROLL. WILL DISCUSS THIS PM WITH YOU AT DONG HA.
GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#34

243

16

201524Z

JANUARY 1968

HAS BEEN SENT

CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

GG	lo
c/s	@

CATEGORY

FILE COPY FILLER OF COPIES

RE: RECALLED 123 ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2-3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 201524Z JAN 68

#2dB burned & 5 dec 68

RECEIVED BY DATE/TIME

0-2

0-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 201524Z JAN 68

#33

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 2213 0201524
ZNY SSSSS
O 201524Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
FROM LGEN CUSHMAN.

EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

A. FONCON GEN WESTMORELAND/LGEN CUSHMAN 20 JAN 68

B. CG III MAF 200618Z JAN 68

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS OF REF A, BY SEPARATE MESSAGE TO MGEN TOMPKINS, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE "LEATHER-NECK SQUARE" SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION REQUIRED BY REF B WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONDUCTED.

2. SINCE THE OPERATION IN "LEATHERNECK SQUARE" WAS SO CRITICAL TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LINEAR OBSTACLE, I INTEND TO DEFER ITS CONSTRUCTION FROM A-2 WESTWARD PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE ENEMY SITUATION IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

3. I WILL DISCUSS WITH GEN ABRAMS TOMORROW MY CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE FORCES MADE AVAILABLE BY THE ACTIONS CITED IN PARAS 1 AND 2.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#33

CCN 81

FILLER _____

DTG 201132Z

MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR LTGEN CUSHMAN

CG	<i>[Signature]</i>
CIS	<i>[Signature]</i>

EYES ONLY

*2 of 4 burned
5/20/68*

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2, AND 4 OF 4

COPIES OF LTGEN CUSHMAN MESSAGE 201132Z JANUARY 1968

RECEIVED BY VH [Signature] DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME GROUP 201132Z JANUARY 1968

DELIVERED TO CG THIRD MARI DIV AT 20/2024H

#31

FROM LTG CUSHMAN FOR MG TOMPKINS

A. CG III MAF 200618Z JAN 68

1. LEATHERNECK SQUARE OPERATION SET FORTH IN PARA 4A, REF A HAS BEEN DISAPPROVED BY WESTY. I EXPLAINED THAT THIS AREA MUST BE CLEARED BEFORE THE TRACE COULD BE CONSTRUCTED. HE STATED THAT WE COULD STOP THE TRACE FOR THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD. THEREFORE UNODIR, CONSTRUCTION OF THE LINEAR OBSTACLE, CALLED FOR BY PARA 4B, REF A WILL BE DEFENDED PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

2. I MUST DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONS WITH GENERAL ABRAMS, TOMORROW, FOR THE FORCES MADE AVAILABLE AS RESULT OF THESE CHANGES. I AM THINKING IN TERMS OF AN OPERATION IN THE CA LU/THON SON LAM/ CAMP CARROLL AREA. WILL APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS RE THAT OR OTHER PROFITABLE AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT WHEN I MEET YOU TOMORROW.

3. WEATHER PERMITTING, I ANTICIPATE GENERAL ABRAMS WILL PERSONALLY INSPECT KHE SANH DEFENSES. HAVE YOUR PEOPLE THERE PREPARED TO BRIEF HIM ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION, FIRE SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE LOGISTICAL STATUS TO INCLUDE MEDICAL SUPPORT. I EXPECT A SHARP PERFORMANCE FROM ALL HANDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

250

HAS BEEN SE

NNNN

SECRET

CCN 61 *#2 of 4 burned* FILLER

50 Nov 68

DTG 200943Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR LTGEN CUSHMAN

CG
c/s

EYES ONLY

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2, AND 4 OF 4

COPIES OF LTGEN CUSHMAN MESSAGE 200943Z JAN 1968

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

DATE/TIME GROUP 200943Z JAN 68

SECRET EYES ONLY
REF YOUR 200435Z. DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU. SINCE I'LL ALREADY
BE AT KHE SANH THAT MORNING, I'LL MEET YOU THERE. WARM
REGARDS.
SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS. PRECEDENCE FOR
TRANSMISSION ONLY.
100

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

SECRET

430

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUNSAW
DE RUNSAK 2125 020041G
ZNY SSSSS
P 200416Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUNSAW/CONUSMACV
BT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE

- A. CG III MAF 021526Z OCT 67
- B. CG III MAF 260610Z OCT 67
- C. CG III MAF 161440Z JAN 68

1. WHEN THE AMERICAL DIVISION CAME NORTH TO IOTZ WE FELT THE FIRST SQUEEZE ON OUR FM FREQUENCY ALLOCATION. AT THAT TIME I TOOK STEPS TO EXTEND THE USE OF UHF AND HF IN THE AREA AS AN ATTEMPT TO EASE THE PRESSURE ON FM FREQUENCIES (AN/PRC-25 AND AN/VRC-12 SERIES RADIOS). THE ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST AIR CAV PROVIDED THE FIRST REAL AND STILL EXISTING INTERFERENCE PROBLEM NOT PREVIOUSLY ENCOUNTERED. THIS WAS CAUSED BY THE HELICOPTERS AT ALTITUDE INTERFERING WITH GROUND UNITS AS FAR NORTH AS DANANG. THE APPROX 500 FREQS ASSIGNED TO IOTZ ARE USED 3 TO 5 TIMES OVER THROUGHOUT THE

PAGE TWO RUNSAK 2125 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AREA. THE EQUIPMENT IS CAPABLE OF 920 FREQUENCIES BUT THESE MUST BE SHARED WITH THE ARVN AND OTHER TACTICAL UNITS.
2. WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) (-) TO OPCON CG III MAF, THE FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT SITUATION IS SUCH THAT EVEN GREATER FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE WILL RESULT.
3. RFPs A, B, AND C HAVE PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS. WITHOUT SUCH ASSIGNMENTS FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED TO AFFECT TACTICAL OPERATIONS.
4. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED IN PRESENTING OUR CASE TO THE JCS FOR A MINIMUM OF 250 ADDITIONAL FM FREQUENCIES AT LEAST THROUGH MONTH OF APRIL, AT WHICH TIME A REEVALUATION OF REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MADE.

BT-4
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#29

CCN 214 FILLER 32

DTG 190332Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

CG / de
c/s / e

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY FILLER OF _____ COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 190332Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

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Schubert

G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 190332Z JAN 68

#28

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUCINOA
DE RUMSAK 2017 019033Z
ZNY SSSSS
PAC -T- CMC
P 190352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUCINOA/CMC
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED BY
COMM GEN. MSG. HAS BEEN SERVICED
TO ADDRESSEE.

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM L GEN CUSHMAN
FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO GEN WESTMORELAND AND IS
PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:
O 181352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
L GEN CUSHMAN.

REF (A) YOUR 171206Z JAN 68
REF (B) MACV DIRECTIVE 99-4

GENERAL MONYER AND I HELD DISCUSSIONS AS DIRECTED IN REF (A) AND
MY CONVICTIONS AS REQUESTED IN THE REFERENCE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. MY ONLY CONCERN IS IN WINNING THE WAR AND SPECIFICALLY
MY ENERGIES AND ASSETS ARE FOCUSED UPON WINNING THE BATTLE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2017 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
IN I CORPS AREA.

2. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS THIS MORNING WE EXPLORED IN
DEPTH THE CONCEPT WHICH GENERAL MONYER HAD IN MIND. I HAVE
CAREFULLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE POINTS ANALYZED AND CANNOT FIND
WHERE ANY IMPROVEMENT IN AIR SUPPORT PERFORMANCE WOULD
EVENTUATE. ON THE CONTRARY THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS WHICH
WILL DEGRADE THE PRESENT EXCELLENT EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION.
THE OVERALL CONCEPT ADVANCED BY GENERAL MONYER WAS THAT THE
PRESENT SITUATION REQUIRED AN ABILITY TO SHIFT FIXED WING AIR
STRIKES ANYWHERE WITHIN THE THEATER AND THAT INCREASINGLY
COMPLEX COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS HAD ARISEN WHICH MADE A
NEW OPERATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
ACCOMPLISH SUCH SHIFTS. ON THE CONTRARY I AM CONVINCED THAT
THE ABILITY EXISTS NOW AND THAT IT CAN BE DONE SMOOTHLY. FURTHER,
WE HAVE HAD NO PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO ROKMC,
TO THE ARVN, AND TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION WHEN THE 7TH AIR
FORCE WAS ALSO PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE SAME UNITS AND WHEN
THEY WERE INTERMINGLED. THE SAME WILL PROVE TRUE WITH THE
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR MOBILE). IT IS THEREFORE MY CONVICTION
THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS SMOOTH, EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#28	

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUNSAK 2017 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 BOTH TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS AS THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND TO
 MINE AS THE COMMANDER OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND THE
 OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF III MAF FORCES. FURTHERMORE, PRESENT
 COORDINATION AND AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH
 JCS 2308/299-2 WHICH DIRECTS THE APPLICABLE AND SOUND DOCTRINE
 IN THIS MATTER.

3. GEN MONYER APPEARED TO BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH HAVING
 THE FLEXIBILITY OF SHIFTING FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT TO THE AREAS
 MOST IN NEED, TO INCLUDE DIVERTING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS BOTH IN
 AND OUT OF COUNTRY TO MEET THE CHANGING THREAT. HE ALREADY
 POSSESSES SUCH FLEXIBILITY WITH HIS OWN FORCES AND REF (B)
 PROVIDES FOR THIS FLEXIBILITY OVER 1ST MAW ASSETS IN A MAJOR
 EMERGENCY. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAW RESOURCES IS EVIDENT
 IN THE PRESENT PROVISION OF 30 SORTIES DAILY TO TALLY HO AND
 STEEL TIGER MISSIONS. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 7TH AF RESOURCES
 WAS EVIDENT IN THE PROVISION FOR A 50 DAY PERIOD OF 28.6
 SORTIES DAILY IN SUPPORT OF III MAF IN OPERATION NEUTRALIZE,
 WHILE 30.4 SORTIES OF THE 1ST MAW WERE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED IN
 THE SAME OPERATION.

4. THERE IS AT PRESENT UNITY OF COMMAND IN IOTZ WHERE THE

PAGE FOUR RUNSAK 2017 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 MAJOR THREAT ADMITTEDLY EXISTS. TO DESTROY THIS UNITY BY
 SUPERIMPOSING ANOTHER LAYER OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION WILL
 NOT, IN MY OPINION, INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OR EFFICIENCY. TO
 THE CONTRARY, TO SUBSTITUTE A DIFFERENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTROL
 FOR ONE THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD, RESPONSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE, WOULD
 SERVE ONLY TO DECREASE THE RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OUR
 AIR SUPPORT IN IOTZ. PROOF OF THE PUDDING CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED
 BY THE SATISFACTION OF THE TROOPS BEING SUPPORTED. THIS PROOF
 IS PRESENTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS' EXPRESSIONS THAT THE
 PREDOMINANT FACTOR IN LAST YEAR'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF
 KHE SANH, INTERDICTION IN AHSAU VALLEY AND THE CONTINUING BATTLE
 OF DMZ/DYE MARKER, WAS THE OUTSTANDING AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT
 PROVIDED BY THE 1ST MAW. TO BE DEPRIVED OF THIS PROVEN MEANS
 OF CONTROL WEAKENS THE FIRE POWER AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MY MARINE
 FORCES TO AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE.

5. AS I UNDERSTOOD GEN MONYER, HE PREDICTED LITTLE CHANGE IN
 THE UTILIZATION OF MARINE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS
 PATENTLY CLEAR THAT PLACING ONE OF MY DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT
 POWER UNDER A REMOTE DEPUTY COMMANDER IN SAIGON, IS NOT REQUIRED
 BY ANY VITALLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COMBAT SITUATION IN I

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	NTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURC.								#28	

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2017 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 CORPS. THIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REPLACING MY AVIATION COMMANDER AND CONTROL OVER HIS ASSETS WITH ONE WHO IS NOT DIRECTLY UNDER MY COMMAND; YET MY OVERALL OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN IGTZ REMAIN THE SAME.

6. IN SUMMARY, THEREFORE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT JCS 2308/299-2 REQUIRES THAT THE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER MUST ACCOMMODATE BLOCK AIRSPACE AND/OR SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY NEEDED FOR OPERATION AND CONTROL OF AERIAL VEHICLES ORGANIC TO EACH SERVICE, THAT CINCPAC 242345Z APR 65 HAS STOOD UP VERY WELL AND THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS IN THE FUTURE, FOR NOT ONLY ACCOMPLISHING THE OBJECTIVE OF AIR POWER FLEXIBILITY WHICH YOU REQUIRE, BUT FOR ALSO RECOGNIZING THE UNITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM AS A COMBAT ENTITY, WHICH TOGETHER IS MORE POWERFUL THAN JUST THE SUM OF ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTS. I MUST THEREFORE STATE THAT I AM UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY CHANGE IN CINCPAC'S DIRECTIVE, AND TO ANY FRACTIONALIZATION OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

GP-4
 UNQUOTE:
 GP-4
 BT

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#28	

CCN HAS BEEN SENT

*#2 of 4 burned
5000068*

FILLER _____

DTG 190250Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR LTGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF

EYES ONLY

*CG [signature]
C/S [signature]*

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1, 2 & 4 OF 4

COPIES OF LTGEN CUSHMAN MESSAGE 190250Z JAN 68

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DATE/TIME GROUP 190250Z JAN 68

#27

SECRET

19 0190201

O 190257Z

FM LTJ CUSHMAN CG III MAF
TO GEN ADRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV

ZEN

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

YOUR CONCERN AND THOUGHTS ON STOCKING THE BANK ARE APPRECIATED.
 AT PRESENT WE FEEL WE ARE IN GOOD SHAPE. CLASSES ONE AND THREE BEAR
 THIRTY DAYS. MINIMUM OF 30 DGA FOR ALL ARTY, MORTAR AND SMALL ARMS
 FOR THREE EMS ON POSITION AND IN ASP. HOWEVER, I PLAN TO INCREASE
 CLASS V STOCKS BY ABOUT 5 DGA WHEN AIRCRAFT BECOME AVAILABLE AFTER
 PRESENT HEAVY MOVE SCHEDULES. WE ARE ACUTELY AND CONTINUALLY AWARE
 OF THIS SITUATION AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO CALL FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE
 IF THE NEED ARISES.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY.

GP-4

130

KIMM

#27

HAS BEEN

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMSAK 1991 0182210
ZNY SSSSS
O 182210Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED BY
COMM GEN. MSG. HAS BEEN SERVICED
TO ADDRESSEE.

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT**

QUOTE:
O 181352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN.

REF (A) YOUR 171206Z JAN68
REF (B) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

GENERAL MOMYER AND I HELD DISCUSSIONS AS DIRECTED IN REF (A) AND
MY CONVICTIONS AS REQUESTED IN THE REFERENCE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. MY ONLY CONCERN IS IN WINNING THE WAR AND SPECIFICALLY
MY ENERGIES AND ASSETS ARE FOCUSED UPON WINNING THE BATTLE
IN I CORPS AREA.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1991 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

2. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS THIS MORNING WE EXPLORED IN
DEPTH THE CONCEPT WHICH GENERAL MOMYER HAD IN MIND. I HAVE
CAREFULLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE POINTS ANALYZED AND CANNOT FIND
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1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR MOBILE). IT IS THEREFORE MY CONVICTION
THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS SMOOTH, EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE
BOTH TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS AS THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND TO

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 26

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1991 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCEO
 NINE AS THE COMMANDER OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND THE
 OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF III MAF FORCES. FURTHERMORE, PRESENT
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3. GEN MOMYER APPEARED TO BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH HAVING
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PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1991 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCEO
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 BY ANY VITALLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COMBAT SITUATION IN I
 CORPS. THIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REPLACE-

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#26

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSAR 1991 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 ING MY AVIATION COMMANDER AND CONTROL OVER HIS ASSETS WITH ONE WHO
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6. IN SUMMARY, THEREFORE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT JCS 2308/
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 AM UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY CHANGE IN CINCPAC'S DIRECTIVE,
 AND TO ANY FRACTIONALIZATION OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

GP-4
 UNQUOTE
 GP-4
 BT

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#26	

CCN 203 FILLER 16

DTG 181352Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF HAS BEEN SENT

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scouts*

*CC-10
DCG
CSA*

EXCLUSIVE

CATEGORY _____

FILE COPY FILLER OF _____ COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE, SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1 THRU 5 OF 5

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 181352Z JAN 68

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

G-2

G-3

DATE/TIME GROUP 181352Z JAN 68

#25

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT
EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 1967 0181352
ZNY SSSSS
O 181352Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN.

REF (A) YOUR 171206Z JAN68

REF (B) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

GENERAL MOMYER AND I HELD DISCUSSIONS AS DIRECTED IN REF (A) AND
MY CONVICTIONS AS REQUESTED IN THE REFERENCE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. MY ONLY CONCERN IS IN WINNING THE WAR AND SPECIFICALLY
MY ENERGIES AND ASSETS ARE FOCUSED UPON WINNING THE BATTLE
IN I CORPS AREA.

2. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS THIS MORNING WE EXPLORED IN
DEPTH THE CONCEPT WHICH GENERAL MOMYER HAD IN MIND. I HAVE
CAREFULLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE POINTS ANALYZED AND CANNOT FIND
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THE OVERALL CONCEPT ADVANCED BY GENERAL MOMYER WAS THAT THE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1967 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
PRESENT SITUATION REQUIRED AN ABILITY TO SHIFT FIXED WING AIR
STRIKES ANYWHERE WITHIN THE THEATER AND THAT INCREASINGLY
COMPLEX COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS HAD ARISEN WHICH MADE A
NEW OPERATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
ACCOMPLISH SUCH SHIFTS. ON THE CONTRARY I AM CONVINCED THAT
THE ABILITY EXISTS NOW AND THAT IT CAN BE DONE SMOOTHLY. FURTHER,
WE HAVE HAD NO PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO ROKMC,
TO THE ARVN, AND TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION WHEN THE 7TH AIR
FORCE WAS ALSO PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE SAME UNITS AND WHEN
THEY WERE INTERMINGLED. THE SAME WILL PROVE TRUE WITH THE
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR MOBILE). IT IS THEREFORE MY CONVICTION
THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS SMOOTH, EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE
BOTH TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS AND THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND TO
MINE AS THE COMMANDER OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND THE
OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF III MAF FORCES. FURTHERMORE, PRESENT
COORDINATION AND AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH
JCS 2308/299-2 WHICH DIRECTS THE APPLICABLE AND SOUND DOCTRINE
IN THIS MATTER.

3. GEN MOMYER APPEARED TO BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH HAVING
THE FLEXIBILITY OF SHIFTING FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT TO THE AREAS

MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PAGE 1 OF 3 **SECRET**

AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1967 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MOST IN NEED, TO INCLUDE DIVERTING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS BOTH IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY TO MEET THE CHANGING THREAT. HE ALREADY POSSESSES SUCH FLEXIBILITY WITH HIS OWN FORCES AND REF (B) PROVIDES FOR THIS FLEXIBILITY OVER 1ST MAW ASSETS IN A MAJOR EMERGENCY. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAW RESOURCES IS EVIDENT IN THE PRESENT PROVISION OF 30 SORTIES DAILY TO TALLY HO AND STEEL TIGER MISSIONS. FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF 7TH AF RESOURCES WAS EVIDENT IN THE PROVISION FOR A 50 DAY PERIOD OF 28.6 SORTIES DAILY IN SUPPORT OF III MAF IN OPERATION NEUTRALIZE, WHILE 30.4 SORTIES OF THE 1ST MAW WERE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED IN THE SAME OPERATION.

4. THERE IS AT PRESENT UNITY OF COMMAND IN ICTZ WHERE THE MAJOR THREAT ADMITTEDLY EXISTS. TO DESTROY THIS UNITY BY SUPERIMPOSING ANOTHER LAYER OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION WILL NOT, IN MY OPINION, INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OR EFFICIENCY. TO THE CONTRARY, TO SUBSTITUTE A DIFFERENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTROL FOR ONE THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD, RESPONSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE, WOULD SERVE ONLY TO DECREASE THE RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OUR AIR SUPPORT IN ICTZ. PROOF OF THE PUDDING CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED BY THE SATISFACTION OF THE TROOPS BEING SUPPORTED. THIS PROOF

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1967 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR IS PRESENTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS' EXPRESSIONS THAT THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR IN LAST YEAR'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF KHE SANH, INTERDICTION IN ANSAU VALLEY AND THE CONTINUING BATTLE OF DMZ/DYE MARKER, WAS THE OUTSTANDING AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE 1ST MAW. TO BE DEPRIVED OF THIS PROVEN MEANS OF CONTROL WEAKENS THE FIRE POWER AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MY MARINE FORCES TO AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE.

5. AS I UNDERSTOOD GEN MOMYER, HE PREDICTED LITTLE CHANGE IN THE UTILIZATION OF MARINE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS PATENTLY CLEAR THAT PLACING ONE OF MY DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER UNDER A REMOTE DEPUTY COMMANDER IN SAIGON, IS NOT REQUIRED BY ANY VITALLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COMBAT SITUATION IN I CORPS. THIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REPLACING MY AVIATION COMMANDER AND CONTROL OVER HIS ASSETS WITH ONE WHO IS NOT DIRECTLY UNDER MY COMMAND; YET MY OVERALL OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ REMAIN THE SAME.

6. IN SUMMARY, THEREFORE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT JCS 2308/299-2 REQUIRES THAT THE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER MUST ACCOMMODATE BLOCK AIRSPACE AND/OR SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY NEEDED FOR OPERATION AND CONTROL OF AERIAL

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 1967 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VEHICLES ORGANIC TO EACH SERVICE, THAT CINCPAC 242345Z APR 65 HAS STOOD UP VERY WELL AND THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS IN THE FUTURE, FOR NOT ONLY ACCOMPLISHING THE OBJECTIVE OF AIR POWER FLEXIBILITY WHICH YOU REQUIRE, BUT FOR ALSO RECOGNIZING THE UNITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM AS A COMBAT ENTITY, WHICH TOGETHER IS MORE POWERFUL THAN JUST THE SUM OF ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTS. I MUST THEREFORE STATE THAT I AM UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY CHANGE IN CINCPAC'S DIRECTIVE, AND TO ANY FRACTIONALIZATION OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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DTG 180212Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR LTGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF

CG	
C/S	R

EYES ONLY

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DATE/TIME GROUP 180212Z JAN68

TOR CMC: 181300 Z-JA8

#24

SECRET

0 160212Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM LTGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 TO GEN CHAPMAN CMC
 ZIM

SECRET EYES ONLY

I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND THIS MORNING.
 QUOTE: 1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES INTO
 I CORPS, IMPENDING BATTLES AND THE NEED FOR HAVING MORE OPERATIONAL
 FLEXIBILITY OF THE AIR EFFORT AVAILABLE TO ME, I AM CONTEMPLATING
 PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MAF AIR LING UNDER MY DEPUTY
 FOR AIR. HELICOPTERS WOULD REMAIN UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. I
 HAVE ASKED MONYER TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AND ANDERSON TOMORROW. IN
 VIEW OF THE ENEMY BUILD-UP, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT I BE IN THE BEST
 FEASIBLE POSTURE TO MEET THE THREAT. I BELIEVE CENTRALIZING CONTROL
 OF THE AIR RESOURCES WILL PROMOTE THIS REQUIREMENT. I AM PROPOSING
 THIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL ARRANGEMENT AS TEMPORARY MEASURE TO MEET
 THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOUR VIEWS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED. UNQUOTE.
 CP-3

SEC NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER AT COMMENCEMENT
 OF WORKING HOURS.

BSC

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CCN 198 FILLER 32

DTG 180332Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

for file id.

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CG | *[Signature]*
CIS | *[Signature]*

FOR

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RR RUMHVH
DE RUMSAK 1906 0170332
ZNY CCCCC
RUMHVH -I- HOI AN
HOI AN -I- 2D ROK BDE
R 180332Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHVH/2D ROK BDE
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR BGEN KIM FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE SPEED AND EFFICIENCY AT WHICH YOU ACCOMPLISHED A MOST DIFFICULT TACTICAL MOVE IS MOST COMMENDABLE. THE 2D ROK BDE HAS DISPLAYED THE HIGHEST QUALITIES OF PROFESSIONALISM AND MILITARY PROFICIENCY IN EXECUTING A MOVEMENT ORDER WITH A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF DIFFICULTY. YOUR SUPERBLY DEvised PLAN UTILIZING MAXIMUM TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS TOWARDS DISPLACEMENT, AND RAPID ASSUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSIONS LEFT NOTHING TO BE DESIRED. WELL DONE AND BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS IN YOUR NEW TAOR.

LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#23

CCN 191 FILLER 16

DTG 171700Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

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ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG	<i>lp</i>
DCG	<i>W</i>
C/S	<i>@</i>

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EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMSAK 1883 0171700
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 171700Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM L GEN CUSHMAN
 PLANNED OPS QUANG TRI PROV
 A. CG III MAF 170926Z JAN 68.

1. REF A DESCRIBES GENERALLY MY CONCEPT FOR PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS IN YOUR AO.
2. I HAVE DISCUSSED THESE PROPOSED OPERATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH CG I CORPS. HE HAS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO EMPLOY 2 ARVN ABN BNS RECENTLY MADE AVAILABLE BY JGS.
3. I DESIRE THAT YOU COORDINATE WITH CG FIRST ARVN DIV TO DEVELOPE AND EXECUTE COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREAS INDICATED IN REF A. IF POSSIBLE, CONVINCCE CG ARVN DIV THAT ARVN FORCES IN ADDITION TO THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE ARE REQUIRED.
4. TO PRODUCE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS THESE ATTACKS MUST BE PREEMPTIVE, THEREFORE TIMELINESS IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE.
5. I INTEND TO ASSIGN ELEMENTS SLF BRAVO (BLT 3/1) YOUR OPCON ON REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF THESE OPERATIONS.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1883 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 SLF ALPHA WILL REMAIN AFLOAT AS CORPS RESERVE.

6. REQUEST YOU ADVISE ME OF YOUR CONCEPTS, PLANNING PROGRESS AND PLANNED DATES OF EXECUTION.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

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SECRET

DE RUMSAK 1867 0171402
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 171402Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND.

QUOTE:

1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES INTO I CORPS, IMPENDING BATTLES AND THE NEED FOR HAVING MORE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE AIR EFFORT AVAILABLE TO ME, I AM CONTEMPLATING PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MARINE AIR WING UNDER MY DEPUTY FOR AIR. HELICOPTERS WOULD REMAIN UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. I HAVE ASKED MOMYER TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AND ANDERSON TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY BUILD UP, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT I BE IN THE BEST FEASIBLE POSTURE TO MEET THE THREAT. I BELIEVE CENTRALIZING CONTROL OF THE AIR RESOURCES WILL PROMOTE THIS REQUIREMENT. AM PROPOSING THIS OPERATIONAL CONTRL ARRANGEMENT AS TEMPORARY MEASURE TO MEET THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOUR VIEWS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED. UNQUOTE.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1867 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO MOMYER DUE TO ARRIVE 181000H FOR DISCUSSIONS. APPRECIATE ANY INPUT YOU CAN PROVIDE PRIOR TO MTG, AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AT YOUR LEVEL.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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GCN 178

FILLER 25

DTG 161200Z

MONTH JAN 68

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG	b
DCG	w
C/S	a

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DE RUMSAK 1749 0161200
 ZNY SSSSS
 THIRD MARDIV -T- TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 O 161200Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV
 CO TWENTY-SIXTH MAR REGT
 BT

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EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS AND COL LOWNDES FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN.

1. I HAVE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS AFTER INSPECTION OF THE KHE SANH DEFENSES:
 - A. MORE SEISMIC INTRUSION DETECTORS ARE NEEDED.
 - B. LARGE QUANTITIES OF AIRCRAFT FLARES FOR EMPLACEMENT ON TOP OF THE FIGHTING HOLES AND OTHER BUNKERS ARE REQUIRED. IN CASE OF ATTACK THEY WOULD BE TRIGGERED TO PROVIDE ILLUMINATION AND BLIND THE ENEMY.
 - C. CHICKEN WIRE OR OTHER WIRE OF MESH TYPE IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT BUNKER AND FIGHTING HOLE APERATURES FROM GUN AND RPG ROUNDS.
 - D. MORE CS GRENADES NEEDED.
 - E. DURING THIS PERIOD OF EMERGENCY, COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR WOULD BE USEFUL. PLEASE INVESTIGATE THE USE OF PPS-5 OR 6 RADAR

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1749 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR IN THE KHE SANH AREA. YOUR COUNTER-BATTERY PLAN IS OUTSTANDING. I HOPE THAT YOUR PLAN WILL BE INTRODUCED THROUGHOUT THE DIVISION, AND I SHALL PASS THE WORD TO THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION AS WELL.

F. I WANT GROUND FORWARD OBSERVERS TO CONTROL ARTILLERY STRIKES. I WANT GROUND FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS TO PRACTICE CALLING AIR STRIKES. THEY HAVE NOT DONE SO IN THE PAST AND RELIANCE HAS BEEN PLACED ON AIRBORNE OBSERVERS COMPLETELY.

G. THE EASTERN ASP NEEDS TIDYING UP. THERE IS TOO MUCH AMMUNITION OUTSIDE OF THE REVETMENTS.

H. AS VIEWED FROM THE AIR IT SEEMS TO ME THAT I VISITED THE MOST ADVANCED PART OF THE DEFENSES, AND THAT THE WESTERN AND NORTHERN DEFENSES ARE BEHIND AND NEED CONCENTRATED EFFORT. I AM ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE EASTERN END OF THE RUNWAY. THE DEFENSE LEAVES THE LAST 100 FEET OF THE AIR STRIP OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER AND I DID NOT SEE ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR A MOVEABLE BARRICADE TO BE PLACED ACROSS THE RUNWAYS AND COVERED BY FIRE.

I. PLEASE INVESTIGATE THE MEDICAL FACILITIES TO MAKE SURE THERE IS ENOUGH EMERGENCY SURGICAL CAPABILITY TO HANDLE CASUALTIES UNTIL THEY CAN BE MEDEVACED. I KNOW A SURGICAL TEAM IS SCHEDULED TO BE FLOWN IN BUT THIS MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-65)

AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.							# 20	

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1749 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

1. AS WE DISCUSSED, THERE MUST BE A QUANTUM JUMP IN PATROLS AND OUTPOST PROTECTION TO PROVIDE WARNING OF IMPENDING ATTACK. THE PATTERNS MUST BE CHANGED AS THE INFANTRY PATROL SCHEDULE IS MUCH TOO RIGID. SCOUTS MUST BE LEFT OUT OVERNIGHT, WELL HIDDEN, SO THAT WARNING CAN BE GIVEN OF LARGE TROOP MOVEMENTS. MORE RECON PATROLS MUST BE UTILIZED, ON FOOT IF NECESSARY, AND IN INTELLIGENCE ROLE RATHER THAN A STING-RAY ROLE.

2. ON THE WHOLE, THE DEFENSES ARE EXCELLENT AND I KNOW YOU CAN STAND OFF ANY ATTACK AND PUNISH THE ENEMY DECISIVELY. HOWEVER, WE NEED PERFECTION, AND THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE WILL CARRY US TOWARD THESE OBJECTIVES. SPEED IS OF THE ESSENCE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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111 MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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FILLER 32

DTG 1600107 MONTH JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG
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PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 1666 0160010
ZNY CCCCC
P 160010Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM L GEN CUSHMAN
SUBJ: DISTINCTIVE INSIGNIA FOR CIVILIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES
IN VIETNAM

- A. INFORMAL RECOMMENDATION MADE BY III MAF ISO IN DEC 1967
1. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTED INSTANCES IN III MAF COMMANDS IN WHICH A MARINE HAS TALKED WITH ANOTHER UNIFORMED PERSON FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE OTHER PERSON WAS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER, ONLY TO LEARN THAT IT WAS A NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE. THE INHERENT DANGER IN THIS IS OBVIOUS. AN INDIVIDUAL MARINE, OR SOLDIER, MIGHT MAKE ANY NUMBER OF COMMENTS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION ONLY TO FIND HIS WORDS IN PRINT. OF GREATER CONCERN IS THE EFFECT SUCH QUOTES COULD HAVE ON THE OVERALL EFFORT TO ASSURE FACTUAL, OBJECTIVE STORIES.
 2. MOST NEWSMEN IN I CORPS, AND PRESUMABLY IN OTHER FIELD

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1666 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SITUATIONS, WEAR MILITARY UTILITY UNIFORMS. BECAUSE THEIR DRESS LENDS ITSELF TO THE SORT OF OCCURRENCES COMMENTED ON IN 1, ABOVE, IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT ALL NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES IN VIETNAM BE ISSUED AND REQUIRED TO WEAR AN EASILY IDENTIFIABLE DISTINGUISHING DEVICE OR INSIGNIA, SUCH AS AN ARMBAND OF DISTINCTIVE COLOR WHICH WOULD NOT BE HIDDEN BY BODY ARMOR, CAMERA BAGS, PACK STRAPS AND SIMILAR GARMENTS OR EQUIPMENT.

WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
BT

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#19	

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ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG/6
ds/6

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FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMSAK 1557 0150304
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 150304Z JAN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T
 FOR MGEN TOMPKINS
 RE INF KHE SANH

1. AS YOU KNOW, ARG/SLF BRAVO IS STANDING BY AND ARG/SLF ALFA WILL BE HULL DOWN OFF CUA VIET ON 17 JAN.
2. I BELIEVE WE MUST TAKE ALL PRUDENT STEPS TO STRENGTHEN KHE SANH ASAP, SINCE WEATHER MAY WELL PRECLUDE OUR DOING SO LATER. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SUGGEST FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:

A. MOVE AN ADDITIONAL BN TO KHE SANH FROM YOUR PRESENT RESOURCES.

B. ARG/SLF BRAVO CONDUCT AMPHIB OPN SOMEWHERE SOUTH OF CUA VIET, EITHER HELIBORNE AND/OR SURFACE LANDING. ARG/SLF ALFA REMAINS CORPS RESERVE.

C. APPROPRIATE ELMS OF SLF PASS TO YOUR OPCON TO REPLACE FORCE MOVED TO KHE SANH PER PARA 2A ABOVE.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1557 **S E C R E T**

3. REQ YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE ABOVE BY IMMEDIATE RETURN MSG TO INCLUDE IDENTITY OF ADDITIONAL BN TO KHE SANH, LOCATION OF AOA, AND TIMING OF ACTIONS INDICATED IN PARAS 2A, B AND C.
4. BY SEP MSG ARG/SLF PLANNERS ARE BEING REQ TO RPT TO YOUR CP IMMEDIATELY.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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ZNY SSSSS
P 141402Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE SUBJECTS OF POSSIBLE CMC DISCUSSION ON RETURN TRIP TO FMFPAC.

A. IMPROVED ARMAMENT FOR CH-46 HELO'S TO INCLUDE POSSIBLE INSTALLATION OF 50 CAL M.G.'S.

B. IMPROVED ARMAMENT PACKAGE FOR HUEY GUNSHIPS. POSSIBLE MINIGUN INSTALLATION.

C. IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASED HUEY RESOURCES TO SUPPORT EXISTING IN-COUNTRY MARINE FORCES.

D. HELICOPTER PILOT SHORTAGES.

E. EXAMINATION OF ADVISABILITY OF MARINE CORPS MANAGEMENT OF CERTAIN IN-COUNTRY AIRFIELDS, E.G., CHU LAI. SAVINGS OF PERSONNEL RESOURCES COULD BE REALIZED IF USAF MANAGED.

F. NIAGARA I COLLECTION EFFORTS.

G. FORCE INCREASES REQUIRED TO MEET EXISTING I CORPS

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1525 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE THREAT.

H. POSSIBLE COMMENCEMENT OF IN-COUNTRY SCHOOL DEVOTED TO BASIC COMBAT FUNDAMENTALS.

I. DESIRABILITY OF RETENTION OF A MINIMUM OF 1 MARINE BAWK BN IN-COUNTRY--PREFERABLY AT THE MKY. MT. SITE.

J. EXAMINATION OF PRESENT POLICIES OF REPORTING DEADLINED COMBAT EQUIPMENT IN COUNTRY.

K. PURSUIT OF REAL HARD CORE PROGRAM S REQUIREMENTS.

WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
BT

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LT GEN
 CUSHMAN.

SUBJ: INCREASED CBU-24 ASSETS

A. CINCPAC REVISED PACOM MUNITIONS ALLOCATIONS CY68 W/CHG ONE
 1. REF A MAKES MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS TO FIRST MAW OF CBU-24 MUNITIONS
 AS FOLLOWS:

JAN 68	400
FEB 68	400
MAR 68	400
APR 68	700

2. PWAN RECEIVED ZERO CBU-24'S IN DEC. CURRENT ON HAND ASSETS
 ARE 10. HOWEVER 300 ENROUTE TO PWAN AT PRESENT TIME.

3. AS DEVELOPED BY CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND
 OPERATIONAL OBSERVATIONS AN IMMEDIATE ENEMY THREAT TO III MAF

PAGE TWO RUMSAL 1455 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 FORCES IS POISED WEST OF NHE SANH. ADDITIONAL HEAVY ENEMY CON-
 CENTRATIONS ARE INDICATED IN THE A SHAU VALLEY AS WELL AS IN
 AND NORTH OF THE DMZ.

4. CURRENT OPERATING WEATHER RESTRICTIONS IN THE ABOVE AREAS ARE
 GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE TO VFR DELIVERED. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AT THIS
 TIME. PRIMARY MEANS OF AERIAL WEAPONS DELIVERY IS BY TPQ-10. SUCH
 RADAR DELIVERY IS MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZING CBU MUNITIONS AGAINST
 DISSEMINATED ENEMY.

5. PWAN CONSIDERS THAT MINIMAL DAILY USAGE OF CBU MUNITIONS TO
 MEET THREATS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 TO BE 32 WEAPONS. A BREAK-
 DOWN OF THIS ESTIMATE IS AS FOLLOWS:

NHE SANH	16
A SHAU VALLEY	8
DMZ	8

DEPENDENCE AT THIS RATE WILL EXHAUST PWAN RESOURCES IN TEN DAYS.

6. ACUTE PACOM WIDE SHORTAGES OF CBU-24'S IS RECOGNIZED. HOW-
 EVER, THESE MUNITIONS REPRESENT THE MOST EFFECTIVE ANTI-PERSONNEL
 WEAPON AVAILABLE TO III MAF.

7. CONSIDER IF MANDATORY ALLOCATION BE INCREASED TO MONTHLY TOTAL
 OF 900 CBUs UNTIL CURRENT THREAT DEFEATED. FURTHER REQUEST

PAGE THREE RUMSAL 1455 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 URGENT ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING INITIAL INCREMENT OF SAME.
 WASH RECORDS

CP-4
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SIG 131320Z MONTH JANUARY 1968

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TO CONSEVENTHFLT
INFO COMUSMACV
CINCPACFLT
CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
CG FORLOGCMD
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1440 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

BT
S E C R E T
EMPLOYMENT ARG/SLF ALPHA
1. IAW VERBAL INSTRUCTION COMUSMACV, REQ ARG/SLF ALPHA RETURN
ICTZ WATERS ASAP NLT 17JAN68. FURTHER REQ ARG/SLF ALPHA PLANNERS
ARRIVE III MAF CP VIA FIRST AVAIL TRANSPORTATION.
2. ANTICIPATE EMPLOYMENT SELECTED ELEMENTS SLF ALPHA ASHORE TO
REINFORCE THIRD MARDIV.
GP-4
UNQUOTE.
GP-4
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**SECRET FOR GEN WESTMORELAND SECTION ONE OF FOUR SECTIONS
 CY67 ASSESSMENT**

- A. COMUSMACV 020225Z AUG67
- B. COMUSMACV 201122Z OCT67
- C. COMUSMACV 170150Z DEC67

1. FOLLOWING IS CY 1967 ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN IGTZ:
 A. OBJECTIVES: CY67 OBJECTIVES WERE: PREVENT INVASION NVN BY MAJOR NVA FORCES THROUGH DMZ AND LAOTIAN BORDER ALONG NV QUANG TRI PROVINCE; INTERDICT INFILTRATION HTS INTO IGTZ; DESTROY NVA/VC MAIN AND GUERRILLA FORCES LOCATED WITHIN IGTZ; NEUTRALIZE BASES AND SUPPLY POINTS WITHIN AREAS DESIGNATED FOR PRIORITY MILITARY OPERATIONS; PROTECT VITAL AREAS FROM ATK BY FIRE AND/OR GROUND ATTACK; OPEN AND SECURE LOC'S; IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF NVDAF; WIN SPY OF POPULACE FOR GVN AND DENY EN ACCESS TO INTELL, TAXES, AND RESUPPLY SOURCES.
 B. ENEMY SITUATION: EN ATTEMPTED TO GAIN GREATER CONTROL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1255 **SECRET**

OVER CIVIL POPULACE AND TO ENLARGE AREA OVER WHICH HE CLAIMS CONTROL. EN INITIATED ACTIVITY INCREASED IN NUMBERS AND INTENSITY TO MORE THAN TWICE PRECEDING YR. NUMEROUS HEAVY ATKS BY FIRE INITIATED AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS ALONG DMZ AND THROUGHOUT QUANG TRI PROVINCE, WHILE ENEMY CONDUCTED GROUND ATKS OF REGTL SIZE AND SMALLER AGAINST FIXED POSITIONS THROUGHOUT IGTZ. PRIMARY AREAS EN INTEREST WERE LOCATIONS ASTRIDE SUPPLY, COMMUNICATION AND INFILTRATION ROUTES; CENTERS OF HIGH POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION, AND AREAS IN WHICH GVN SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING RD PROGRAMS.

GENERALLY, EN HOPED HIS 1967 CAMPAIGNS WOULD GAIN SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL VICTORIES WITH MINIMUM LOSSES, WHILE IMPOSING HEAVY LOSSES ON ARVN AND ALLIED FORCES. INTENTION WAS TO UTILIZE VICTORIES AS PSYCHOLOGICAL TOOL IN UNDERMINING MORALE AND PRESTIGE OF FRIENDLY FORCES. ATTENDANT LONG-RANGE POLITICAL AIM WAS TO CREATE POLIT SITUATION IN US PARALLED TO THAT IN FRANCE IN 1953, THUS INFLUENCING WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND CONFRONTING PUBLIC WITH ENDLESS WAR OF ATTRITION.

AS MEANS OF ACHIEVING AIM, EN EVOLVED PLAN WHICH ENCOMPASSED FOLLOWING:

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1255 S E C R E T
 DESTRUCTION OF RD PROGRAMS THROUGH SELECTIVE TERROR AND PROPAGANDA;
 INFLECTING CASUALTIES ON FRIENDLY FORCES THROUGH USE OF HEAVY
 WPNS ATKS AND LIMITED GRND ATKS, WHILE EFFECTIVELY SCREENING
 OWN MOVEMENT; ISOLATION OF CITIES BY INTERDICTING HIGHWAYS; AND
 INFLECTING CASUALTIES AT TIMES AND PLACES OF HIS CHOOSING IN
 BATTLE WHICH WOULD BE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE. EN UNABLE
 TO ACHIEVE HIS AMBITIOUS PROGRAM IN 1967, AND SUFFERED SEVERE
 SETBACKS IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY AREAS. EN HOWEVER, WAS
 MOST EFFECTIVE IN INSTANCES WHEN HE UTILIZED RKT'S AND/OR SAPPERS.
 HIS MOST PSYCHOLOGICALLY EXPLOITABLE SUCCESSES WERE HIS RKT ATKS
 ON HANG AIR BASE ON 27 FEB AND 15 JUL. OTHER ACTIONS OF
 PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE INCLUDE HIS OVERRUNNING OF THREE
 PROVINCIAL JALS, FOUR DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, AND SUCCESSFUL
 PENETRATION OF ALL PROVINCIAL CAPITOLS.

EN HAS FAILED TO REALIZE CONTINUING PATTERN OF SUCCESS, AND
 HAS IN FACT SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL DEFEATS. DICHOTOMY WHICH EXISTS
 IS EVIDENCE BY CONVENTIONAL TYPE WAR IN NORTH AND COUNTER-
 INSURGENCY STRUGGLE IN REMAINDER OF ICIZ. AS EN CONDUCTED INCURS-
 IONS INTO QUANG TRI PROV EARLY IN YEAR, MARINE UNITS REPULSED
 HIS ADVANCE CAUSING EN TO WITHDRAW NORTH OF BEN HAI RIVER.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1255 S E C R E T
 FOLLOWING TET STANDOWN, EN COMBINED CONVENTIONAL ATKS FROM DMZ
 WITH INCREASED EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS. PRINCIPAL ENEMY
 TARGETS DURING THIS PERIOD WERE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE (HILLS 881
 AND 861) CON THIEN-GIO LINH COMPLEX AND QUANG TRI CITY. EN WAS
 UNSUCCESSFUL IN MOST OF HIS ENDEAVORS THESE AREAS.

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THUA THIEN PROV WAS DIRECTED TOWARD SEVERING
 TRI THIEN AREA FROM REMAINDER OF SVN. IN COASTAL REGIONS, EN
 CONCENTRATED EFFORTS AGAINST GVN INSTALLATIONS, RD CENTERS AND
 ISOLATED OUTPOSTS. ALTHOUGH EN INITIATED SERIES OF COORDINATED
 ATTACKS IN AREA, MARINE AND ARVN OPERATIONS FORCED HIM TO WITH-
 DRAW INTO PIEDMONT.

QUANG NAM PROV WAS CENTER OF EN ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT YEAR.
 ENEMY COMBINED UNCONVENTIONAL WAREFARE PATTERN WITH LIMITED GRND
 ATKS BY NVA FORCES. 2D NVA DIVISION HAS REMAINED IN ALMOST
 CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH FRIENDLY FORCES DURING OPERATIONS UNION
 AND UNION II, LIEN KET 106, SWIFT, FOSTER AND WHEELER-WALLOWA.
 EN HAS INFILTRATED MEN IN LVARGE NUMBERS TO REPLACE HIS CONTINUING
 SEVERE LOSSES.

QUANG NGAI PROV WAS SCENE OF ENEMY'S FIRST MAJOR ATK DURING
 POST-TET PERIOD, WHEN 1ST VC REGT INITIATED THREE PHASE ATK AGAINST

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 1255 S E C R E T
 KMC PORTION OF CHU LAI TAOR, QUANG NEAI CITY, AND USMC OPERATIONS
 IN THE HO DUC-DUC PHO AREA. THIS EFFORT TURNED INTO DISASTROUS
 DEFEAT, AND HE WITHDREW INTO PIEDMONT.

G. FRIENDLY OPERATIONS: IN ACCOMPLISHING I CORPS OBJECTIVES
 DURING CY 1967, III MAF FORCES CONDUCTED 100 MAJOR OPNS, ROKMS
 BDE CONDUCTED 15 MAJOR OPNS, AND TOGETHER THEY TOTALLED 428,051
 SMALL UNIT OPNS. III MAF FORCES ACCOUNTED FOR 25,452 ENEMY KIA
 CONFIRMED AND 23,275 KIA PROBABLE WHILE 2D BDE ROKMC HAD 1,927
 CONFIRMED ENEMY KIA AND 800 KIA PROBABLE. 22 SLF OPNS NETTED
 3,287 KIA. U. S. SPECIAL FORCES IN FORZ ACCOUNTED FOR 1199 KIA
 CONFIRMED AND 993 KIA PROBABLES. US/RVNAF CAPTURED 6,794 WEAPONS
 DURING THE YEAR. RVNAF CONDUCTED 447 BN OR LARGER OPERATIONS AND
 167,312 SMALL UNIT OPNS IN 1967 WHICH RESULTED IN 10,771 ENEMY
 KIA CONFIRMED, 8,933 KIA PROBABLE AND 3,079 ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED.
 RVNAF OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT IGTZ, WITH THE
 MAJORITY IN QUANG TRI AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES.

DEEP RECONNAISSANCE WAS CARRIED OUT DURING 1967 THROUGHOUT
 IGTZ, AS WAS CONTINUAL, EXTENSIVE PATROLLING WITHIN DANANG/CHU
 LAI ROCKET BELTS AND THEIR APPROACHES. AN AVERAGE OF 33 III MAF
 LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS IN FIELD PER 24 HR PRD WERE

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1255 S E C R E T
 EMPLOYED TO MONITOR ENEMY ACTIVITY AND DIRECT FIRE ON ENEMY
 OBSERVED. THESE LONG RANGE RECON PATROLS WERE IN ADDITION TO RECON
 IN SUPT OF NAMED OPNS. A NETWORK OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS AND BASES
 WAS ESTABLISHED FROM SO CHINA SEA TO KHE SANH. THIS LINE OF POSIT-
 IONS, MANNED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY UNITS AND SUPPORTED BY
 AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE, EFFECTIVELY BLOCKED AND SOUNDLY DEFEATED
 THE ENEMY'S ATTEMPTS TO INVAD THROUGH DMZ. MILITARY OPNS
 INTO DMZ IN EARLY 1967 TOOK HEAVY TOLL OF EN FORCES AND DIS-
 COURAGED HIM FROM FURTHER MASSING OF OVERT INVASION FORCES.
 LARGE SCALE INFILTRATION THROUGH DMZ WAS LIKEWISE IMPEDED AND
 EN RESORTED TO LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS AND USE OF Hvy ARTY, MTRS,
 RKTs, AND RR'S AGAINST OUR FORWARD POSITIONS, WHICH AFFORD OBSERVA-
 TION INTO DMZ. AIR, ARTY AND NGFS NORTH OF BEN HAI RIVER HAVE IN-
 HIBITED FREE USE OF DMZ AS ENEMY'S SAFE HEVEN FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH
 ATTACKS.

FIRST MARINE ACFT WING AVIATION COMPONENT OF III MAF, INCLUD-
 INF BOTH HELO AND FIXED WING STRIKE ACFT, MADE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION
 TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OBJECTIVES. SEVEN MEDIUM AND ONE HEAVY TRANSP
 HELO SQDNS, AND THREEB OBSERV SQDNS SPT BOTH WARDIVS. TWO ADDITIONAL
 SQDNS PROVIDE HELO SPT TO TWO BLT'S OPERATING WITH 7TH FLEET AMPHIB
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S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF FOUR SECTIONS
 FORCES IN SPT OF OPNS IN RVN. DEPLOYMENT OF OBSRV SQDN, TRANSI-
 TION TO NEWER HELO'S AND INTRODUCTION OF THE CH-53 HAS INCREASED
 HELO SPT CAPABILITY AND IMPROVED MOBILITY OF COMBAT BATTALIONS.
 DURING 1967, 1ST MAW HELICOPTERS FLEW 443,572 SORTIES, AND LIFTED
 578,719 TROOPS AND 67,236 TONS CARGO.

DURING CY 67, 1ST MAW FIXED-WING TACTICAL ACFT FLEW OVER 82,000
 SORTIES AND DELIVERED OVER 144,000 TONS AVN ORDNANCE. 85 PER CENT
 OF SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN SPT III MAF GRND FORCES. CLOSE SPT PROVIDED
 TO MARINE GROUND UNITS PLAYED SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN SUCCESS MAJOR
 OPNS. FROM SEP THROUGH DEC 1ST MAW CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE INTERDICTION
 CAMPAIGN IN A SHAU VALLEY WITH OBJ STOPPING VEHICULAR TRAFFIC.
 TWO BARRIERS WERE CREATED BY CRATERING VALLEY FLOOR WITH BOMBS AT
 POINTS WHERE TERRAIN MADE BYPASS CONSTRUCTION DIFFICULT. RECON
 AND STRIKE ACFT CONTINUALLY CONDUCT OPNS IN VALLEY TO MAINTAIN
 BARRIERS, DETECT INFILTRATION AND STRIKE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1256 **S E C R E T**

STRIKE ACFT WERE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE IN DMZ AREA IN SPT DYE-
 MARKER. OVER 3500 SORTIES AND 9000 TONS OF ORD WERE EXPENDED
 ON ENEMY ARTY AND MTR POSITIONS, TRP POSITIONS, RKT SITES AND
 SUPPLY CACHES THIS AREA.

IN NVN INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN MARINE A-6A'S CONTRIBUTED 2780
 SORTIES AND DELIVERED OVER 15,000 TONS ORD ON HIGH PRIORITY
 TARGETS. APPROX 12,000 SORTIES WERE FLOWN AND 34,000 TONS OF ORD
 DELIVERED IN SPT 7TH AF OPNS OUT-OF-COUNTRY.

III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY DUR CY 1967 INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY
 WITH ADDITION AMERICAL DIVISION AND ITS ATTACHED HELO UNITS.
 225 UH-1 AIRCRAFT PROVIDE TROOP LIFT AND GUNSHIP SUPPORT NEC FOR
 AMERICAL'S MOBILE ASSAULT CAPABILITY. STATISTICS FOR PERIOD 1MAY
 - 31DEC67 ARE 391,461 HELO SORTIES CARRYING 598,846 PASSENGERS
 AND 81,569 TONS OF CARGO.

INCLUDED IN AIR SUPPORT PICTURE IN ICTZ ARE ADDITIONAL ARMY
 AVN CO'S WHICH SPT THE ADVGRP AND III MAF. IN ADDITION TO ONE
 ASSAULT HELO CO AND ONE O-I RECON CO, III MAF RECENTLY AUG-
 MENTED BY 18 PLANE CV-1 MOHAWK CO WHICH PROVIDES IR/SLAR AND
 PHOTO COVERAGE OF EN INFILTRATION RTES AND BASE AREAS.
 DURING CY 67 588 ARC LIGHT STRIKES WERE EXECUTED IN SUPT GRD

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1256 S E C R E T

FOR IN ICTZ. IN DMZ AREA 377 STRIKES FLOWN WITH 83,075 TONS OF ORD DELIVERED ON SEL TGTS. ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO AIR SPT EFFORT IN ICTZ AND HAVE PROVEN VALUABLE IN DESER OF EN FORT POS AND ATK OF SUPPLY AND TRP ASSEMBLY AREAS. CREDIT FOR PREVENTION ORD ATK BY EN ON CRIT INSTALL IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE BELONGS IN GREAT PART 3RD AIR DIV AND THEIR BS2'S.

WITH EXCEPTION OF BASE AREAS 100 AND 119, EA EXISTING BASE AREA WITHIN I CORPS WAS PENETRATED BY MAJOR UNIT OPNS AND WAS CLASSIFIED NEUTRALIZED AT LEAST ONCE DURING YEAR. BASE AREA 119, ALTHOUGH NOT PENETRATED BY FRIENDLY FORCES WAS BOMBED WITH 68.5 TONS OF ORD DELIVERED BY 35 SORTIES. AS OF 31DEC67 BASE AREAS 100, 101, 114, 116, 117, 119, 121, 123, AND 124 EXISTED, WITH 121, 123, AND 124 CONSIDERED NEUTRALIZED AT CLOSE OF PERIOD.

FRIENDLY FORCES CAPTURED 2187 TONS OF RICE FROM EN THROUGHOUT YEAR AND EFFECTIVELY DENIED HIM ACCESS TO RESUPPLY OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF RICE, FISH, AND SALT FROM COASTAL AREAS. AS RESULT OF DENIAL OPNS AND DECREASING POPULATION UNDER HIS CONTROL, EN DEMANDS ON REDUCED POPULATION BASE INCREASED AND HE INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST CIVIL POPULACE. CONSEQUENTLY, SHARP RISE IN

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1256 S E C R E T

REFUGEES WAS EXPERIENCED DURING LAST QTR.

DURING CY67 COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM CONTINUED WITH EXTENSIVE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS IN ALL FIVE PROVINCES OF I CTZ. PROGRAM EXPERIENCED DYNAMIC REORIENTATION AND EXPANSION BY ESTABLISHING 22 NEW CAPS, 8 COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES (CACOS) AND 4 CAP RELOCATIONS. THREE COMBINED ACTION GROUPS (CAGS) WERE ACTIVATED TO ADMINISTER FIELD UNITS; 1ST CAG AT CHU LAI, 2ND CAG AT DANANG, AND 3RD CAG AT PHU BAI. A COMPARISON OF 66-67 ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES IS SHOWN BELOW:

CY 1966	CY 1967
CAPS: 57	CAPS: 79
CACOS: 6	CACOS: 14
	CAGS: 3

OVERALL MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM IN 67 CAMPAIGN IS EXPRESSED BELOW, BY RATES AND RESULTS OF OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES:

CY 1966	CY 1967
PATROLS 14,693	PATROLS 41,247
AMBUSHES 8,500	AMBUSHES 16,626
VC KIA 154	VC KIA 451
VC CAPTURED 193	VC CAPTURED 261
WPNS CAPTURED UNKNOWN	WPNS CAPTURED 282

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B, ARVN) ASSIGNED STRENGTH PERCENTAGE AS COMPARED TO AUTH STRENGTH DECREASED ALMOST STEADILY FROM 99.5 PERCENT IN JAN TO 94.7 PERCENT IN SEPT. IN OCT, TREND REVERSED AND STRENGTH INCREASED AS LGE NOS OF REPLACEMENTS WERE RECEIVED, ESPECIALLY IN 1ST AND 2ND DIVS. DEC PERCENTAGE WAS APPROXIMATELY 101.7 PERCENT. RF INCREASED 2 PERCENT TO 98 PERCENT AND PF STRENGTH DECLINED 7 PERCENT TO 95 PERCENT OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. AVERAGE PRESENT FOR OPERATIONS STRENGTH FOR ARVN COMBAT UNITS FOR 1967 WAS APPROXIMATELY 71 PERCENT OF AUTH STRENGTH.

NO ARVN REPLACEMENTS IN 67 INCREASED 64 PERCENT FROM 66 TOTAL DESPITE FACT ONLY 59 PERCENT AND 90 PERCENT OF RECRUITING AND INDUCTION GOALS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE ACHIEVED.

TOTAL 67 ARVN CASUALTIES INCREASED 53 PERCENT FROM PREVIOUS YEARS TOTAL. RF CASUALTIES INCREASED 12 PERCENT AND PF CASUALTIES INCREASED 5 PERCENT UNDER SAME COMPARISON.

ARVN DESERTERS TOTALED 6,350 FOR YEAR, APPROXIMATELY 1,500 MORE THAN TOTAL ARVN WIA FIGURE. LARGEST NUMBER OCCURED AROUND TET SEASON AND OCT - NOV WHEN LARGE NUMBERS OF REPLACEMENTS WERE RECEIVED. TOTAL DESERTERS FOR THESE TWO MONTHS WAS APPROXIMATELY 24 PERCENT OF YEARS TOTAL. WHEN COMPARED TO 1966, PICTURE BRIGHTENED AS ARVN PERCENTAGE OF DESERTIONS COMPARED TO TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH DECREASED

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4 PERCENT. RF DESERTIONS DROPPED 7 PERCENT AND PF 12 PERCENT.

TROOP MORALE WITHIN IOTZ GENERALLY IMPROVED OVER PAST YEAR. BETTER EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, MORE PAY, AND SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RISE, WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY IS RELATED TO DECREASED DESERTION RATE.

DURING 1967 TRAINING OF I CORPS UNITS SHOWED GRADUAL, YET CONSISTENT IMPROVEMENT. SEVEN INFANTRY AND RANGER BNS RECEIVED SIX-WEEKS REFRESHER COURSE THIS YEAR AS COMPARED TO FIVE IN 1966. ADDITIONALLY, POI WAS REVISED AND IMPROVED RESULTING IN MORE PRACTICAL TRNG AND FEWER LECTURES. TWO-WEEK RD PROGRAM WAS STARTED EARLY 67 TO MOTIVATE AND TACTICALLY PREPARE ARVN BNS DEPLOYED IN RD SUPT. THREE MOBILE TRNG TMS CONSISTING OF 12 OFFICERS EACH WERE FORMED AND THEY TRAINED ALL COMBAT BNS OF CORPS.

2ND REGT, 1ST DIV RECEIVED SPECIAL TRNG AT DONG DA TRNG CTR 2 OCT - 18 NOV PREPARATORY TO UNIT ASSUMING OPRL DYE MARKER MISSION. DURING PERIOD 337 ARVN PERSONNEL WERE TRAINED IN OPN & MAINT ELECTRONIC BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE EQUIP. ADDITIONALLY, REGT WAS EQUIPPED WITH M16A1 RIFLES, AND OVER 85 PERCENT OF PERS QUAL WITH WPN.

DURING LATER PART 67 BOTH DIVS INSTITUTED "IN-PLACE" TRNG PROGRAM.
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S E C R E T SECTION THREE OF FOUR SECTIONS
 PRESCRIBED TRNG MISSION ORIENTED, CONDUCTED AT LOWEST PRACTICABLE
 LEVEL, FLEXIBLE IN APPLICATION, WITH LEADERSHIP AT LOWER LEVELS AND
 SMALL UNIT TACTICS STRESSED. RESULTS THUS FAR REVEAL GENERAL
 COMPLIANCE WITH TRNG DIRECTIVES AND REVEAL FAVORABLE ATTITUDE
 DEVELOPING TOWARD TRNG, EXCEPTION BEING 91ST REGT WHICH DOES NOT
 HAVE TRNG PROGRAM.

DURING 4TH QTR 67 PLANNING BEGAN FOR EXCHANGE OF KET'S BETWEEN
 ARVN AND U.S. UNITS. AT END OF YEAR I CORPS HAD PREPARED AND
 TRANSLATED TRNG MATERIAL FOR THEIR SUBJECTS. INSTRUCTIONS WERE
 REHEARSED, AND TEAMS WERE BEING FORMED. IN ADDITION, 2ND DIV
 CONDUCTED TRNG IN VC NEMES AND BOOBY TRAP TECHNIQUES FOR OVER
 5,000 MEMBERS OF 198TH AND 11TH BDES UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY.
 E. CORDS. RD PLAN FOR 67 OBTAINED RELATIVE SUCCESS DESPITE SLOW
 START, PREOCCUPATION WITH LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AND
 CONCENTRATED VC ATTEMPTS TO DISRUPT PROGRAM, THOUGH REMAINING BEHIND

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1203 **S E C R E T**
 SCHEDULE ENTIRE YEAR FOLLOWING DELAYED BEGINNING, 78PERCENT OF ORIGINAL
 PLAN AND 99PERCENT OF PLAN AS MODIFIED DURING YEAR WERE ACCOMPLISHED,
 COMPARED TO 47PERCENT OF REVISED PROGRAM IN 66. TOTAL OF 316,998
 PEOPLE IN 203 HAMLETS WERE BROUGHT UNDER GUN CONTROL THROUGH 67 PROGRAM.
 OVER 75PERCENT OF CORDS RD BUDGET OF NEARLY 400 MILLION PIASTERS SPENT
 AS OF 30 NOV, INCLUDING VIRTUALLY ALL FUNDS FOR AGRICULTURE AND
 EDUCATION, PUBLIC WORKS, HEALTH, SELF HELP, AND WAREHOUSE PROJECTS
 LAGGED BEHIND. PERFORMANCE OF MOST TECHNICAL SERVICES IN SUPPORT
 OF PACIFICATION WAS NOT CONSIDERED SAT.

MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF RD CADRE IMPROVED NOTICEABLY
 THROUGHOUT YEAR. NUMBER OF TEAMS IN I CORPS ROSE FROM 119 TO 150,
 WHILE APPROXIMATELY 75PERCENT OF 7,500 CADRE ATTENDED NATL TRNG
 CENTER. ARVN SOURCES REPORTED 216 CADRE KIA DURING 67, BUT CADRE
 ACCOUNTED FOR 584 VC KIA AND 98 CAPTURED. CADRE DESERTION RATE
 REMAINED HIGHER THAN ACCEPTABLE BUT DROPPED STEADILY DURING YEAR.
 MAJOR PROBLEM WAS EMPHASIS ON MEASURABLE PROJECTS AT EXPENSE OF
 MORE DIFFICULT TO ASSESS ACTIONS SUCH AS DESTRUCTION OF VC INFRA-
 STRUCTURE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE LIAISON NETWORK. PRIMARY
 REGT UNFULFILLED WAS ASSURANCE OF SECURITY FORCE IN HAMLET AFTER
 TEAM'S REMOVAL.

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LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS DOMINATED CORPS POLITICALLY AND REPRESENTED ONE OF MOST SUBSTANTIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF 67. VOTER TURN-OUT RANGED FROM 77.9 PERCENT TO 85.0 PERCENT IN FOUR ELECTIONS, WHICH GAVE PEOPLE OPPORTUNITY TO CHOOSE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AT LOWEST LEVEL, IN 154 VILLAGES AND 545 HAMLETS, AND HIGHEST LEVEL.

NUMBER OF HOI CHANK FOR 67 TOTALED 2,539 INCLUDING A RECORD 375 FOR DEC. YEARLY TOTAL COMPARED TO 1,653 IN 66 AND 1,143 IN 65, AND ORIG 67 GOAL OF 4,000.

GENERATION OF 200,000 NEW REFUGEES DURING 67 PRESENTED SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO CORPS RESOURCES AND OFFICIALS AND WAS INTERPRETED AS SIGNIFICANT DEFEAT FOR VC, AS EVIDENCED BY INCREASING VC ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST REFUGEES LATE IN 67. MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS DURING 67 INCLUDED FOLLOWING: CONSTRUCTION OF OVER 60,000 FAMILY UNITS IN OVER 200 TEMPORARY REFUGEE CAMPS; EXPENDITURE OF 60 PERCENT OF 144,431,000 PIASTERS REFUGEE RELIEF BUDGET; DISTRIBUTION OF OVER 500 TONS OF AMERICAN COMMODITIES PER MONTH; RESETTLEMENT OF 120,000 REFUGEES, PRIMARILY IN CAMPS REDESIGNATED "RESETTLEMENT CENTERS." EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL TRAINING, PUBLIC HEALTH, RESETTLEMENT AND JOB PLACEMENT WERE LESS SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS THAT WILL RECEIVE INCREASED

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ATTENTION IN 68. THOUGH APATHY ON PART OF GVN OFFICIALS REMAINED MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLE TO REFUGEE PROGRAM, IT WAS IN THIS AREA THAT MOST SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN 67. THIS PROGRESS WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY ACTION-ORIENTED SEPTEMBER REFUGEE CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY CORPS COMMANDER AND SCR COMMISSIONER, AND FORMATION IN LATE DECEMBER OF VIABLE GVN/US REFUGEE TASK FORCE FOR I CORPS, F. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. SIGNIFICANT PSYOPS ACHIEVEMENT IN 1967 WAS CLOSELY INTEGRATED COMBINED PSYOPS CONDUCTED BY III MAF AND I CORPS. JOINT REGIONAL MEETINGS WERE HELD REGULARLY TO ENSURE CENTRAL DIRECTION.

DURING YEAR ONE AND A HALF BILLION LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED, 6,610 HOURS OF GROUND/WATERBORNE BROADCASTS, 3,556 HOURS OF AERIAL BROADCASTS, 4,367 MOVIES SHOWN AND 1,198 CULTURAL DRAMA TEAM PERFORMANCES. THIS EFFORT SUPPORTED SEVERAL PSYOPS CAMPAIGNS: CHIEU HOI, SUPPORT GVN, ANTI-VC, ANTI-NVA, AND REREWARDS.

85.7 PERCENT OF REGISTERED VOTERS WENT TO POLLS IN SEP, AND 77.5 IN OCT. RESPONSE CONSIDERED HIGH IN VIEW OF HIGH LEVEL TERRORIST ATKS AIMED AT DISRUPTING ELECTIONS.

THERE WERE 236 REWARD INCIDENTS RESULTING IN PAYMENT OF 431,125 SVN THROUGH JUN AND 570 INCIDENTS RESULTING IN PAYMENT OF 351,300 SVN

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JAN THROUGH NOV. DEC FIGURES ARE NOT AVAIL. THERE WERE TWO INCIDENTS OF HOY CHANKS REPORTING LARGE ARMS CACHES. ONE INCIDENT RESULTED IN REWARD OF 400,000SVN, OTHER AMOUNTED TO 500,000SVN. NOTABLE SUCCESS WAS ACHIEVED IN TECHNIQUE OF DESIGNATING AND ADVERTISING SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS FOR CIVILIANS TO REPORT ARMS/MUNITIONS FOR REWARD.

NUMBER OF OPML ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS IN ICTZ INCREASED FROM TWO IN JAN, TO THREE FULLY OPML AND THREE IN FINAL STAGES OF TRNG IN DEC. THESE TEAMS USED WITH SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS BY U.S. UNITS THROUGHOUT YEAR.

THERE WERE 219 OFFICERS AND MEN GRADUATED FROM III MAF PSYOPS ORIENTATION COURSE DURING YEAR.

DURING YEAR, KIT CARSON SCOUTS INCREASED FROM 16 TO 132. FORMAL TRAINING SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY EACH MARINE DIVISION. THERE WERE 7 KCS KIA AND 12 WIA. SIGNIFICANT SCOUT ACTIVITY DURING YEAR: 50 VC KIA, 61 VC CAPTURED, PARTICIPATED IN 6,432 PATROLS IN DISCOVERED 25 SUPPLY CACHES, 207 EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, 7 WEAPONS, AND 65 CAVES TUNNELS AND MADE 61 PSYOPS BROADCASTS.

G. LOGISTICS: GENERAL SUPPLY STATUS WAS ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT MISSION THROUGHOUT CY67. COMPUTERIZATION, IMPLEMENTATION OF MARINE CORPS

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1283 S E C R E T

UNIFIED MATERIAL SYSTEM, AND CONVERSION TO MILSTRIP REQUISITIONING ALL CONTRIBUTED TOWARD CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN SUPPLY SUPPORT EFFECTIVENESS.

DURING CY67 TOTAL OF 40,797 M16 RIFLES ISSUED III MAF PERSONNEL. M109 155MM SP HOWITZERS EXPERIENCED HIGH DEADLINE RATE DUE LACK OF REPAIR PARTS. ASSISTANCE BY HQMC AND US ARMY DROPPED DEADLINE RATE FROM 93.4PERCENT IN ONV TO 9.7PERCENT LATE DEC.

COMM/ELEC CAPABILITIES III MAF EXPANDED DURING 67 BY INTRODUCTION OF FOLLOWING: HIGH SPEED TRANSCIVER AND ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, LARGE CAPACITY SWDDS, UNIVAC 1004 IN DCS AUTODIN SYSTEM, DIAL CENTRAL OFFICES, AN/PPS-6 BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE RADAR, AND TROPO-SCATTER EQUIPMENT.

DURING CY 1967, 3,085,934 S/T OF CARGO WAS MOVED BY SEA IN ICTZ. RAMP CAPACITIES INCREASED FROM 271,500 S/T IN JAN TO 351,000 S/T IN DEC. AIRLIFTED CARGO INCREASED FROM AVERAGE OF 6,204 S/T IN 1ST QTR TO 14,373 S/T IN 4TH QTR DUE IN PART TO INTRODUCTION OF CH-53 HELO. UPGRADING OF C-130 TACTICAL APLDS CONTINUED. III MAF MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES CARRIED 4,264,275 S/T OF CARGO AND 6,832,157 PASSENGERS TRAVELING OVER 19 MILLION MILES. 1,041 MULTIFUEL VEHICLES, 48PERCENT RATED IN FLEET, WERE RECEIVED DURING YEAR.

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF FOUR SECTIONS

SINCE JUL OVER 19,000 S/T OF MATERIAL HAVE BEEN USED IN DYE MARKER AS STEADY PROGRESS CONTINUES ON ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEM. IN ADDITION TO CONTINUING MAINTENANCE OF CRITICAL HIGHWAYS AND BRIDGES, CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS HAVE BEEN EXPENDED TO BUILD AND EXPAND AFLDS AND HELO PADS, DEVELOP MAJOR CAMPMENTS AND ASP'S, EXPAND PORT AND CARGO HANDLING FACILITIES, AND CONSTRUCT NUMEROUS FORTIFICATIONS AND BUNKERS.

N. HIGHWAYS AND BRIDGES: ENEMY INTERDICTION AND HARASSMENT THROUGHOUT YEAR WAS SIGNIFICANTLY COUNTERBALANCED BY CONCENTRATED AND EXTENSIVE ENGR EFFORT TO MAINTAIN, REPAIR, AND UPGRADE ESSENTIAL ICTZ HIGHWAYS. EN SUCCESSFULLY SABOTAGED, BY DAMAGING OR DESTROYING, 104 BRIDGES AND 191 CULVERTS DURING YEAR, ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THIS SABOTAGE CONCENTRATED ALONG NATIONAL RTE 1, MAJOR BRIDGES DESTROYED WERE 1148 FT NAMO HIGHWAY/RAILWAY BRIDGE N OF DANANG, AND 666 FOOT SONG CAU DO AND 756 FOOT SONG CAU LAU BRIDGES S OF DANANG. ADDITIONALLY,

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SEVERE TROPICAL STORM IN EARLY OCT, CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO 23 BRIDGES, SEVERAL CULVERTS, AND NUMEROUS SMALL SECTIONS OF ROADS, WASHED AWAY 600 FEET OF NEWLY COMPLETED 2,040 FOOT LIBERTY BRIDGE ON RTE 5 (DANANG TO AN HOA).

RECUPERATIVE EFFORTS THROUGH YEAR GAINED 11,500 FEET BRIDGING REPAIRED AND 10,500 FEET NEW BRIDGING INSTALLED, 13,600 FEET TACTICAL BRIDGING, BOTH FLOAT AND FIXED, WERE INSTALLED TO MAINTAIN TRAFFIC-ABILITY ESSENTIAL HIGHWAYS WHILE MORE PERMANENT BRIDGES WERE BEING REPAIRED AND/OR CONSTRUCTED.

SEVERAL ESSENTIAL HIGHWAYS WERE OPENED DURING YEAR AFTER LONG PERIODS OF LIMITED USE OR NON-USE. UPGRADING AND REPAIR OF RTE 1 FROM NO DUC TO SOUTHERN I CORPS BOUNDARY OPENED THIS HIGHWAY IN JUL TO MILIT AND CIVIL TRAFFIC ALONG ENTIRE 387 KM LENGTH FROM DMZ TO I/II CORPS BOUNDARY. THIS WAS FIRST TIME HIGHWAY OPENED FOR THIS DISTANCE SINCE NOV 65. CONCURRENTLY NOTABLE WAS FIRST OPENING SINCE OCT 64 OF RTE 9 FROM DONG HA TO KHE SANH IN NORTHERNMOST I CORPS PROVINCE, AND REOPENING OF RTE 5 FROM DANANG TO AN HOA INDUS-TRIAL COMPLEX.

THESE TANGIBLE AND DEFINITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE, LATE IN YEAR, FURTHER SUPPLEMENTED BY ESTABLISHMENT OF III MAF/I CORPS COMBINED

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1284 S E C R E T

HIGHWAY COORDINATING COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS SET FORTH DYNAMIC YET REASONABLE AND ATTAINABLE PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ESSENTIAL HIGHWAYS THROUGHOUT ICFZ DURING CY68.

I. DYE MARKER: DURING 1967, DYE MARKER PROGRESSED FROM CONCEPT TO SERIES OF FOUR STRONG POINT/PATROL BASES (A-SITES) AND THREE FORWARD OPERATING BASES (C-SITES) IN-BEING ON THE GROUND, EITHER COMPLETE OR NEARING COMPLETION. TOTAL OF 161 BUNKERS FULLY COMPLETED AND 234 OTHERS COMPLETE EXCEPT FOR COVER LAYERS. ADDITIONALLY 67,229 METERS OF TACTICAL WIRE CONSTRUCTED AND 12,058 METERS OF MINEFIELD EMPLACED. SITES A-1 (ARVN) AND C-2 (U.S.) ARE COMPLETE AND MANNED IN BN STRENGTH. WITH EXCEPTION OF SITE A-5, REMAINING "C" SITES AND "A" SITES AVERAGE OVER 80PERCENT COMPLETE WITH ALL BUNKERS COMPLETE EXCEPT FOR TOP COVER LAYERS. SITE A-5 IS PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION IN 68. ARVN FORCES ARE IN PROCESS OF ASSUMING MANNING OF A-2 AND ARE SCHEDULED TO ASSUME FROM U.S. FORCES MANNING OF A-3 AND A-4 DURING CY 1968.

CLEARING OF 600 METER WIDE TRACE FROM CON THIEN TO GIO LINH COMPLETED JUL 67. CONSTRUCTION OF LINEAR OBSTACLE ON THIS TRACE EXPECTED TO BEGIN JAN 68 UPON ARRIVAL OF REMAINING ITEMS OF REQUIRED MATERIAL.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1284 S E C R E T

J. CIVIC ACTION: DURING 67 CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM CONTINUED TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES, MEDICAL AND DENTAL TREATMENTS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS.

FOOD DISTRIBUTION INCREASED DURING YEAR, REACHING 3,508,081 POUNDS, MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 291,962 POUNDS VERSUS 66 MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 226,365 POUNDS. DISTRIBUTION OF OTHER SIGNIFICANT COMMODITIES INCLUDE 1,927,310 POUNDS OF CEMENT, MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 160,509 POUNDS VERSUS 66 AVERAGE OF 25,300 POUNDS; 1,183,667 BOARD FEET OF LUMBER, FOR MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 98,639 BOARD FEET VERSUS 66 MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 27,168.

1,468,370 MEDICAL TREATMENTS WERE CONDUCTED FOR A MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 122,145 VERSUS 66 AVERAGE OF 78,555. 118,572 DENTAL TREATMENTS WERE CONDUCTED FOR MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 9,881 VERSUS 66 AVERAGE OF 2,038. AVERAGE OF 194 MEDICAL AIDS/NURSES WERE TRAINED VERSUS 66 MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 54.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORPHANAGES, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, SCHOOLS, AND INDIVIDUALS AVERAGED 84,824 SVN AS COMPARED TO 66 MONTHLY AVERAGE OF 20,429 SVN.

IN SUMMARY, I CORPS OBJECTIVES IN 1967 WERE EITHER ACCOMPLISHED OR SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARD THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT.

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CONSIDERED NOTEWORTHY ARE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ARVN 1ST AND 2ND DIVISIONS. WITH DISPLACEMENT OF UNITS NORTH AND MOMENTUM GAINED 1967, ACCELERATED PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS WILL CONTINUE IN 1968.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
EYES ONLY
FOR AMB KOMER

FOR

A. MACV 091002Z JAN 68
1. RESPONSE TO PARA 1A REF A MUST BE BASED ON CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER OR NOT CIVILIANS REMAIN IN AREA ONCE IT BECOMES ACTIVE BATTLEGROUND. IF THEY DO REMAIN, VAST MAJORITY WOULD NOW BE DEAD AS RESULT OF INTENSIVE ARTILLERY, AIR AND NGF BOMBARDMENTS AS WELL AS REPEATED FIRE AND MANEUVER OF BOTH ENEMY AND FRIENDLY FORCES. THAT CIVILIANS WOULD REMAIN UNDER SUCH BATTLE CONDITIONS IS UNTHINKABLE. THE RATE AT WHICH THEY MIGHT DEPART OR DIE IN THEIR VILLAGES IS AN UNKNOWN. OPERATION BEAU CHARGE/BELT TIGHT/HICKORY IN JUN 67 PRODUCED AN ESTIMATED 17,749 REFUGEES WHO WERE RELOCATED AT CAM LO, HA THANH AND DONG HA. THE NUMBER AND/OR PERCENTAGE WHO WOULD SURVIVE IN THE DMZ IS AT BEST A GUESS. HOWEVER, IN AN

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 1109 C O N F I D E N T I A L
EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUEST THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED:

A. IF ALL CIVILIANS HAD REMAINED IN EXCESS OF 90 PERCENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CASUALTIES.

B. BY REMOVAL OPERATIONS, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

2. RESPONSE TO PARA 1B REF A SIMILARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY. CERTAINLY IF OUR SIDE DISREGARDED CIVILIAN PRESENCE AND CONSIDERED EVERY MAN, WOMAN AND CHILD IN THE AREA AN ENEMY, OUR CASUALTIES WOULD NOT RISE AS THEY WOULD IF WE CARRIED FORWARD OUR TRADITIONAL AMERICAN CONCERN FOR THE NON-COMBATANT. IN THIS LATTER CASE, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT WE WOULD HAVE EXPERIENCED A SHARP INCREASE IN OUR CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF ACTIVELY ATTEMPTING TO AVOID CIVILIAN CASUALTIES EITHER THROUGH BEING MORE DISCRIMINATE IN OUR USE OF FIRE POWER AND/OR OUR USE OF TERRAIN THROUGH WHICH WE WOULD MANEUVER OUR FORCES. THEREFORE, AGAIN COMMENTING THAT THE FOLLOWING IS AT BEST A GUESS, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED:

IF WE HAD CONSIDERED CIVILIANS AS NON-COMBATANTS AND BEEN FORCED TO WITHHOLD FIRES AND CURTAIL MANUEVERS, OUR CASUALTIES MIGHT

PAGE THREE RUMWAA 1109 C O N F I D E N T I A L
HAVE BEEN INCREASED 40-50 PERCENT.

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FOR VADM BRINGLE, INFO BGEN GLICK, FROM LTCEN CUSHMAN

- A. COMSEVENFLT MSG 051144Z JAN 68 (C)
- B. CG NINTH MAB MSG 230154Z DEC 1967 (C)(NOTAL)
- C. CG III MAF MSG 051248Z JAN 1968 (NOTAL)

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR MSG RE PUC RECOGNITION FOR SLF SUPPORT UNITS (REF A) PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING: THE COMMANDING GENERAL, NINTH MAB RECENTLY ADVISED THIS HQ (REF B) THAT ALL NINTH MAB GROUND UNITS WERE INCLUDED IN THE REVISED LIST OF SUPPORTING UNITS RECOMMENDED FOR THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION PUC WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HEADQUARTERS SEVEN NINE POINT FOUR (SLF ALFA) AND SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE (SLF BRAVO). THIS HQ SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED CG 9TH MAB THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED UNITS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN A MODIFICATION CURRENTLY BEING PREPARED (REF C).

PAGE 2 RUMMWAA0807 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. WITH REGARD TO THE SUPPORTING HMM'S: A RECOMMENDATION IS CURRENTLY PENDING FOR THE PUC FOR THE ENTIRE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING. THE HMM'S AUTOMATICALLY WILL BE INCLUDED THEREIN. IN ORDER TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF AWARDS, THE HMM'S WERE DELETED FROM THE THIRD MARDIV RECOMMENDATION SINCE THEY WERE INCLUDED IN THE WING'S RECOMMENDATION. THEIR SUPPORTING DETACHMENTS WILL LIKEWISE BE RECOGNIZED.

3. A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE PUC FOR THE FIRST MARDIV HAS ALSO BEEN FORWARDED FOR CONSIDERATION.

4. I STRONGLY CONCUR IN YOUR OPINION THAT ALL PARTICIPATING MARINES SHOULD RECEIVE EQUAL RECOGNITION AND AM CONVINCED THAT SUCH WILL BE THE CASE, ALTHOUGH IN ALL INSTANCES, NOT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS WAS THE THIRD MARDIV. YOUR INTEREST IS SINCERELY APPRECIATED.

GP-4

BT

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*A 142 hand
500068*

DIG 0713367

JANUARY 1968

ORIGINATOR CG III MAF

CG	<i>le</i>
DCG	<i>W</i>
C/S	<i>Q</i>

CATEGORY **EXCLUSIVE** MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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DE RUMSAK 0741 0071336
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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS. REF A CG FMFPAC 040236Z JAN 68

OPERATION BADGER TOOTH (U)
 1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF A, I HAD THE CG 1ST MARDIV LOOK INTO THE TRAINING READINESS BACKGROUND OF BLT 341 FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 1ST MARD
 IV REVEALED THE FOLLOWING:

A. PERSONNEL

(1) KEY BILLET. DURING THE SIX MONTHS PERIOD FROM 1 JUNE THROUGH 30 NOVEMBER, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN EXCESSIVE TURNOVER OF PERSONNEL IN KEY BILLET WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FOUR; BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OPERATIONS OFFICER, SUPPLY OFFICER AND H&S COMPANY COMMANDER.

(A) THE CURRENT BN XO HAS HELD THIS BILLET SINCE 28 AUGUST, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE THREE PREDECESSORS IN THE THREE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0741 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCOE PRECEDING MONTHS.

(B) THE S-3 BILLET HAS CHANGED HANDS FIVE TIMES IN SIX MONTHS. THE CURRENT S-3 HAS HELD HIS BILLET SINCE 9 NOVEMBER. HE IS KNOWN TO BE AN EXPERIENCED CAPABLE OFFICER, WITH PRIOR EXPERIENCE AS A BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND S-3 AND AS A COMPANY COMMANDER SINCE JOINING THE BATTALION.

(C) THE SUPPLY OFFICER BILLET HAS CHANGED HANDS SIX TIMES WITH THE PRESENT INCUMBENT ASSUMING HIS DUTIES ON 4 NOVEMBER.

(D) THE CO H&S COMPANY BILLET HAS CHANGED HANDS FIVE TIMES WITH THE PRESENT INCUMBENT ASSUMING HIS DUTIES ON 28 OCTOBER.

(2) STRENGTH. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH OF THE BATTALION REACHED A HIGH IN AUGUST (45 OFFICERS AND 1156 ENLISTED MEN) AND HAS GRADUALLY DECLINED TO AN AVERAGE IN NOVEMBER OF 40 OFFICERS AND 998 ENLISTED. NOTABLE ALSO IS THAT DURING NOVEMBER 6 OFFICERS AND 247 ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS WERE RECEIVED; ALMOST A QUARTER OF THE BATTALION. STRENGTH ON CHOP TO 5TH MAB OF THE BATTALION LESS ATTACHMENTS WAS 36 OFFICERS AND 1020 ENLISTED

AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

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PAGE THREE RUMSAX 8741 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MORS
 OPERATIONS (USMC & USN)
 1846 1847 1858 1891 1844 988 1828

FIGURE 1
 TRANSFERS (USMC)
 OFFICERS
 STAFF MOBILE
 CASUALTIES

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
OFFICERS	3	4	5	5	9	8
STAFF MOBILE	2	3	5	4	7	6
CASUALTIES	119	54	71	99	176	215

FIGURE 2
 REPLACEMENTS (USMC)
 OFFICERS
 STAFF MOBILE
 CASUALTIES

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
OFFICERS	2	11	6	4	1	0
STAFF MOBILE	4	2	7	9	9	2
CASUALTIES	111	55	197	33	139	249

FIGURE 3
 CASUALTIES
 KIA
 MIA
 POW
 MIA
 NON SABLE

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
KIA	2	0	11	2	0	5
MIA	2	4	2	0	0	0
POW	67	74	77	43	34	41
MIA	1	3	2	3	1	3

PAGE FOUR RUMSAX 8741 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MORS
 B. OPERATIONS

(1) GENERAL. THE BATTALION WAS ASSIGNED TO THE TAOR JUST SOUTH OF MARBLE MOUNTAIN, AND THUS HAD THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE ROCKET BELT AND BISECTING ITS TAOR. ADDITIONALLY IT OPERATED DURING THE MAJORITY OF THE LAST SIX MONTHS AS A THREE RIFLE COMPANY BATTALION DUE TO THE NECESSITY OF PLACING ONE COMPANY UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE VEA MARINES. THE BATTALION HAS HAD EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS, PATROLS AND AMBUSHES, BUT ONLY OCCASIONAL BATTALION SIZE OPERATIONS AND THEM OF ONLY LIMITED DURATION. ENEMY CONTACTS DURING THE SIX MONTHS PERIOD STEADILY INCREASED AS DID HEAVY DISCOVERIES AND DETONATIONS. RESULTS IN TERMS OF ENEMY LOSSES HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A DECREASE IN POW'S DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
COMPANY SIZE OPS IN TAOR (DAYS)	2	3	6	2	0	0
ENEMY CONTACTS	39	54	72	66	63	59
HEAVY INCIDENTS	UNK	UNK	UNK	26	62	89
MIA CONFIRMED/PRESUMED	18/9	22/8	19/3	16/7	28/6	14/2
POW/DETAINEE'S	16/74	15/113	26/114	5/113	2/56	3/75

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 0741 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 OPNS CAPTURED 11 7 3 3 7

FIGURE 5

(2) OPERATIONS OUTSIDE TAOR. ON ONE OCCASION ONLY IN THE SIX MONTHS PERIOD DID THE BATTALION COMMAND GROUP OPERATE OUTSIDE ITS TAOR. AT THIS TIME, DURING OPERATION SHELDWILLE ONE ORGANIC COMPANY OF THE BATTALION OPERATED UNDER THE PARENT BATTALION. A COMPANY OF THE BATTALION OPERATED UNDER CONTROL OF ANOTHER BATTALION ON OPERATIONS PIKE, COCKISE AND SWIFT, AND ON SEVERAL OCCASSIONS A COMPANY WAS CHOPPED TO ANOTHER BATTALION FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS WITHIN A TAOR. A COMPANY WAS NOT EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE TAOR EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION FOR A TWO DAY PERIOD.

C. TRAINING

(1) HOURS DEVOTED TO COMBAT TRAINING TOOK A QUANTUM JUMP IN AUGUST AND REMAINED HIGH THEREAFTER. THE NUMBER OF BATTALION SCHOOLS IS CONSIDERED NORMAL FOR A BATTALION IN A TAOR ENVIRONMENT. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BATTALION TRAINING PROGRAM IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS AT THIS POINT IN OTHER THAN TERMS OF HOURS AND NUMBER OF PERSONNEL. PRE-AMPHIBIOUS DEPLOYMENT AND AMPHIBIOUS INDOCTRINATION CLASSES WERE CONDUCTED. AN

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 0741 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 EXTENSIVE PERIOD OF TRAINING INCLUDING TWO LANDING EXERCISES, WAS SCHEDULED AT SUBEG BAY AFTER DEPLOYMENT AS A BLT.

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
NO OF REPLACEMENTS						
COMPLETING 4-DAY ORIENTATION	118	78	219	80	135	234
IN SCHOOLS/GRADUATES	2/26	2/16	4/190	4/93	3/24	3/94
HRS OF COMBAT TRNG	159	130	429	347	320	304

FIGURE 6

D. SUMMARY

(1) THE BATTALION, AS A WHOLE, WAS CONSIDERED CAPABLE IN PERFORMANCE, BUT BECAUSE OF LOCATION, MISSION AND NECESSITY WAS EXPERIENCED PRIMARILY IN SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS IN WHICH IT DID WELL. NO SIGNIFICANT FLAWS WERE EVIDENT IN LEADERSHIP, MOTIVATION, TRAINING, OR EXECUTION. FACTORS WHICH IN RETROSPECT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT ARE:

(A) 24PERCENT TURNOVER OF PERSONNEL IN NOVEMBER.

(B) LIMITED EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE OF TAOR.

(C) LIMITED EXPERIENCE OF BATTALION STAFF IN BATTALION LEVEL OPERATIONS.

(2) THE INCUMBENT HAS COMMANDED THE BATTALION SINCE 30 AUGUST

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY, FINAL SECTION OF TWO (2) DURING THIS TIME WAS ADMINISTERED HIS BATTALION WELL. HIS PERFORMANCE IN THIS REGARD WAS TO BE RATED ABOVE AVERAGE. THE PREPARATION OF THE COMMAND FOR REBANKATION AS PART OF THE GULF THROUGH DESERVED EXPRESSION OF PRAISE FROM SENIOR COMMANDERS. ON THE ONE OCCASION IN THE RECENT PAST WHEN THE COMMAND AND STAFF CONDUCTED BATTALION SIZED OPERATIONS (SHELTERING), PERFORMANCE WAS SATISFACTORY. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ENEMY RESISTANCE IN THE OPERATION CONCERNED WAS RELATIVELY MODEST.

WARM REGARDS,
 GP-4
 BT

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JANUARY 68

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THE FOLLOWING REPORT CONTAINS
THE RESULTS OF A SEARCH
OF THE RECORDS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AND THE AIR FORCE
AND THE RESULTS OF A SEARCH
OF THE RECORDS OF THE
NAVY DEPARTMENT

HAS BEEN SENT

FOR

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
FOR AFHQ RELAY.
BRIDGE BATTERY OF TOWERS OBSERVED TO OBSERVE JAMES
TO THE POLICE AS A BURNING BATTERY. BRIDGE OF TOWERS
OBSERVED TO BE A BURNING BATTERY. BRIDGE OF TOWERS
AND BRIDGE AND TOWERS OBSERVED TO BE A BURNING BATTERY.
A. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 A AND C TO ADVANCE BRIDGE AND THE POWER.
021000 BRIDGE TO BRIDGE. BRIDGE TOWERS OBSERVED TO BE A BURNING BATTERY.
B. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.
C. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.
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X. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.
Y. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.
Z. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.

PAGE TWO BUNSAK 0402 S E C R E T
E. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.
F. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.
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Z. BRIDGE VIG AT 020000 CAP D-3 APPROPRIATELY 3 BRIDGE.

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PAGE THREE NUMBER 3452 S E C R E T
 1. 030500 VIC AT 030500 CP 073 RECD MORTAR BOMBING, EN CAS UNK
 CAS UNK.
 2. 030540 VIC BY 031910 ON NEW BRIDGE RECD 7 MRS GUNN MORTAR
 AND CAS. 3 GUNN MORTAR RES 0305 AT 030500. RES CAS, ARMY ARTY
 RECD AT 0305 03 1.03.
 3. 030500 VIC BY 030500 CAP 1-4 ATK BY UNK SMOKE RE FORCE.
 RECD SA AND MORTAR FIRE. RECD SAF, ARMY AND GUNSHIP CALLED.
 RECD FR 2 OF KIA. EN 1 VIC KIA (C).
 4. 030600 VIC AT 030600 RECD DUE DIST HQ DEFENDED BY 466TH
 TF (C) AND 1ST REG MORTAR FIRE FOLLOWED BY GROUND ATK. BY
 HQ 466TH REG. 300000 PERIMETER; 10000 CONTACT PERIMETER.
 5000 CONTACT PERIMETER OF STATION AT 030600. GUNSHIP OF
 STATION AT 030600. RECD 1000 1/2 MINS; 1000 030600.
 CONTACT TERMINATED AT 030640. RECD SA, 5 RECD VIA (10000),
 1 VIC KIA, 1 VIC UNK, 1000 1000 030600 CONTACT PERIMETER
 030600 MORTAR FIRE. EN 4 KIA (C).
 6. 030600 VIC AT 030600 RECD HQ AT 1000 030600 HQ UNK (1000)
 ATTACK. RECD FR 1 PF UNK. EN 1 VIC UNK (C), 2 EN AND 3 UNK
 UNK (C).
 7. 030600 VIC AT 030600 CP 1/7 AND VIC 030600 RECD MORTAR FIRE.

PAGE FOUR NUMBER 3452 S E C R E T
 COUNTER MORTAR FIRED, RES: 3 USING VIA (2 EVAC), EN CAS UNK.
 8. 030600 VIC BY 030600 COASTAL GROUP 14. NOX AW, RECD SAF FROM
 ACROSS RIVER.
 9. 030600 VIC AT 030600 CAP 2-3, VIC AT 030600 CAP 2-4; VIC
 AT 030600 CAP 2-5 RECD MORTAR FIRE. RES: 4 USING VIA, 1 PF VIA
 10. 030600 VIC BY 030600 LZ ROSS, DEFENDED BY A, B & C 2/12 CAV,
 B/1/1 CAV TRP, B/1/77 ARMY, A/1/30 ARMY, B/3/10 ARMY, AND
 VIC AT 030600 LZ LESLIE, DEFENDED BY B/2/12 CAV AND B/1/22
 ARMY RECD MORTAR ATK. BY 030600 BOTH LZ WERE ALSO RECEIVING
 GROUND ATK. EN REACHED PERIMETER WERE AT LZ LESLIE, COUNTER
 MORTAR FIRE; GUNSHIP, PLANEWIPES, AAA, AND SPOCKY ON STATION
 TO SET. AT 030600 VIC BY 030600 LZ BALDY RECD MORTAR FIRE AND
 AT 030600 VIC BY 030600 CP 077 AT LZ COLT RECD MORTAR FIRE.
 BY 030600 LZ ROSS WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE EN AND ARMY
 FIRING DIRECT FIRE. CONTACT CONTINUED AT LZ ROSS UNTIL 030600.
 LZ LESLIE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE MORTAR FIRE UNTIL APPROX
 030700. RES: LZ LESLIE FR 12 KIA, 95 VIA, 1 KIA, EN 71 MVA KIA (C).
 LZ ROSS FR 4 KIA, 64 VIA, EN 143 MVA KIA (C). 90 WPWS WERE CAPTURED
 AT THE TWO LOCATIONS. RES CAS RES FROM MORTAR FIRE AT LZ'S
 BALDY AND COLT.

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RE RUMSAK 0498 063101R
RUY 88888
P 051412Z JAN 68
FM ADMIRAL III MAF
TO CG 212706
BT

S E C R E T. FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS
VILLAGE ROAD SA AND MORTAR FIRE. NEG GAS REFD.
22. 050815 VIC AT 102910 SA BRD BRIDGE AND BRIDGE SECURITY ROAD
MORTAR FIRE. NEG GAS REFD. SPOOKY AND SINGHINS COMMITTED TO SUPPORT.
23. 050820 VIC AT 050810 BUS BUS W/ 6 BRD MORTAR FIRE. NEG GAS REFD.
24. 050830 VIC AT 050810 AND 050820 BRD AND 1000 FT COS DEFLECTING
THE COS AND NEW COS LAU BRIDGES ROAD APPROX 20 NOS OF MORTAR FIRE.
NEG GAS REFD.
25. 050840 VIC AT 101810 HLEM OF SOUTH RP CG AT RUC BAI CP RECD
MORTAR AND D-40 MHT FIRE FOLLOWED BY PROBE. NEG GAS REFD.
26. 050850 VIC AT 050820 CP 2/3 RECD 4 NOS MORTAR FIRE AND SA
PROBE. NEG GAS.
27. 050900 VIC AT 050814 SECURITY FORCE AT RUY HUYN DIST HQ RECD
MORTAR FIRE. RECD 4 PF VIA. CRYPTICALLY FIRED BY ARVN ARMY AT
AT 050850.
28. 050900 ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS SIGHTINGS OF MISS Firing BY 1/7 CP

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0498 S E C R E T
CP HILL 10, TANK AND ARM AMPHS CP ON HILL 47, 2/11 CP, 7TH MAR
CP AT HILL 25, AND AT 3/11 CP, 3/11 OBTAINED A 3 WAY INTERSECTION
IN 30 SECONDS, AND 3 MINUTES AFTER 1ST READING. HIS ARTY NOS ON
THE WAY, REPORTING TIMES OF INITIAL SIGHTINGS VARIED SLIGHTLY AND
ENSCOFFER AT 1ST MARDIV OBTAINED TIME CHECKS FROM ALL REPORTING
UNITS. WITH 1ST MARDIV CLOCK AS STANDARD ALL REPORTING TIMES WERE
ADJUSTED TO REALIZE THAT SIGHTINGS WERE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS, FROM
0406-0407, 3 UNITS COMMENCED FIRE ON HKT POSITION. ARMORED ANTRACHS,
105'S AND TANKS FIRED DIRECT FIRE AND 6/3/11 FIRED INDIRECT FIRE
AT GRID COORDINATES 926663. THEREAFTER FIRE WAS DIRECTED AT ROUTES
OF ESCAPE TO THE S & SW. BY 0411, 12 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS HAD BEEN
OBSERVED, AS DIRECTED BY 1ST MARDIV BASS AND FSCG, SPOOKY WAS ON
STATION AND FIRING 50 CAL BY 0410. THERE WERE 4 SQUAD AMBUSHES
WITHIN 2000 METERS OF HKT FIRING POS., ONE WITHIN 500 METERS, 2 FLT
REACTION FORCE WAS DISPATCHED WHICH LINKED UP WITH CLOSEST SQUAD
AND LATER ENGAGED ENEMY FORCE WITHDRAWING FROM POSITION, PURSUED
AND LOST THEM IN HEAVY BRUSH.
29. 050400 VIC AT 923725 CAP 2-1 RECD 1 MORTAR RD. NEG GAS.
30. 050400 VIC AT 050910 HONG BONG CP MANNED BY 325TH RF CG AND
TWO ARVN 150MM HOWITZERS RECD MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK. ARTY PSN

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 9

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0408 S E C R E T
 WAS OVERFLO. ARVN ARMY FIRED AT WITH COMPOUND. BOMB WITH OF LOSS
 FROM 030146 UNTIL 030450. MUNSLEPS ON STATION AT 030720. CONTACT
 GRABED AT 030730. RECS FR 10 KIA, 03 UVA, TWO 100MM ROCKETERS
 DAMAGED CRIBS. ED 03 VC KIA, 17 IVG, 1 M420 CAPTURED.
 HQ, 030803 VIC AT 030874 HQ BTRY 2/11 REGD 2 UNK CAL, MONTAR RDS.
 RDS LANDED 30 METERS OUTSIDE PERIMETER WIRE, NEG CAS.
 HQ, 030852 VIC BS 717923 CAP 2-9 AND PLATOON FROM A1/402 INF
 SURROUNDED A VILLAGE AND RECD FIRE FROM EST 03 VC. ENGAGED IN,
 CONTACT ENR 030920. RECS NEG FR CAS, 30 VC KIA (0).
 CO, 030910 VIC AT 030967 1/7 BAR CALLED ARVN HQ RE EN OPEN. NEG
 UNK. REGRUCE FORCE DISPATCHED BY TTH ENR WITH NEG RECS.
 PPL 030920 7TH BAR DISPATCHED UNITS TO SEARCH AREA OF ENR FIRING
 SITE VIC AT 037070. THREE SPES CONTAINING A TOTAL OF 20 PERIOD
 POSITIONS WERE FOUND AT AT 037030. EIGHT 120MM WARHEADS AND TWENTY
 MOONS FOR 120MM ROCKETS, & ONE 100MM ART IDN FOUND TO DATE. THREE
 NO BODIES WERE FOUND (0 KIA (0)).
 CO. CASUALTIES AS DIRECT RESULT OF ENR ATTACK BARANG AB WAS 1 UVA.
 A LIST OF THE DAMAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:
 1- USMC-F4B DESTROYED
 3- UNAF-U17 DESTROYED

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0408 S E C R E T
 1- USAF-C-47 MAJOR DAMAGE
 1- USMC-F4B MAJOR DAMAGE
 3- UNAF-O1E MAJOR DAMAGE
 1- USAF-C130K MINOR DAMAGE
 1- USAF-C47P MINOR DAMAGE
 3- USAF-F4C MINOR DAMAGE
 3- USAF-UC-120 MINOR DAMAGE
 1- USAF-MH-43E MINOR DAMAGE
 2- USAF-O2A MINOR DAMAGE
 1- USAF-RFAC MINOR DAMAGE
 2- UNAF-(NOT IDENTIFIED) MINOR DAMAGE
 3- USMC-F4B MINOR DAMAGE
 AIRFIELD DAMAGE BOTH RUNWAYS (REPAIRED AND OPERATIONAL BY 051930H)
 RAMPS AND TAXIWAYS (REPAIRED BY 041000H)
 1 VEHICLE RECEIVED MAJOR DAMAGE
 3 VEHICLES RECEIVED MINOR DAMAGE
 RR. TOTAL FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTIES FOR QUANG NAM AND QUANG
 TIN PROVINCES.
 FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FRIENDLY WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT LOST
 3 USMC KIA 16 M-16

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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KEY 030000
P 030732Z JAN 68
FM ADMIN III MAF
TO RUMSIG/CS AMERICAL DIV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT
FOR

SECRET FOR NGEN HOSTED
SAFETY OF CIVILIANS, MUSKATINE AREA

A. CG 167Z COMF W/CG III MAF 30DEC67

1. DURING THE COURSE OF VICE PRESIDENT KY'S VISIT TO SOUTHERN I CORPS ON 20DEC67 A DELEGATION OF CIVILIANS APPROACHED HIM AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE DEPARTURE OF THE 2D BOMB BDE WOULD EXPOSE CIVILIANS RESIDING IN AREA TO VC DEPRADATIONS/ INFLUENCE. ALSO, THE CG I CORPS DURING THE COURSE OF REFERENCE A EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE SAFETY OF CIVILIANS IN THAT AREA. I REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT DESPITE AMERICAL NOT OCCUPYING ALL COMPANY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS BEING VACATED BY BOMB BDE, THE MOBILE OPERATIONS OF AMERICAL FORCES IN MUSKATINE AREA WOULD BE EXPECTED TO BE EFFECTIVE IN DENYING VC ACCESS TO THE PEOPLE.

2. IN CONJUNCTION WITH YOUR MOBILE OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA, AN INCREASED PSY OPS CAMPAIGN TO REASSURE THE VILLAGERS

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0432 **SECRET** FOR APPEARS IN ORDER. THESE ACTIONS PLUS CONTINUED COORDINATION WITH 2D ARVN DIV WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF IMPROVING THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF VIETNAMESE FORCES IN HAMLET/VILLAGE SECURITY, SHOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD PROVIDING THE NECESSARY SECURITY TO THE CIVIL POPLACE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#8	

015

25

038 0923567 FILLER JAN 68

038 MONTH

CG III MAF

ORIGINATOR

CG	lo
C/S	@
B-3	JR
G-2	JK

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B-2

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DE RUMSAK 2278 0032356
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P 032356Z JAN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN KRULAK FROM
L GEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

HAS BEEN SENT

SUBJ: OPCON SLF/ARG

1. GEN WESTMORELAND INFORMED ME LAST NIGHT THAT AS RESULT OF
BADGER TOOTH FIASCO HE WAS OPENING SUBJECT OF OPCON SLF/ARG
AND WOULD WISH SUCH OPCON BE TO III MAF/FFV CORPS; I.E., THERE
WOULD BE NO CHOP AS AT PRESENT AFTER ESTABLISHMENT A SHORE OF
SLF BUT RATHER ENTIRE SLF AND ARG WOULD CHOP PRIOR TO OPER-
ATION. I POINTED OUT PRESENT DOCTRINE TO NO AVAIL. PARENTHETI-
CALLY, I TOLD HIM YOU HAD ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION SINCE
HE WAS PERTURBED THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO DO SO.

2. WARM REGARDS.

CP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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