

49. CG FMFPAC 230355Z Feb68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN from LGen KRULAK

Passes text of msg for LGen KRULAK from Gen CHAPMAN

Subj: Single management of fighter/bomber reconnaissance assets (TS) (Memo for Chairman, JCS)

50. CG III MAF 240904Z Feb68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for Gen CHAPMAN and LGen KRULAK

Report of conversation between Gen WHEELER and LGen CUSHMAN with respect to the control of air problem.

51. CG III MAF 241256Z Feb68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for Gen WESTMORELAND, info Gen MOMYER from LtGen CUSHMAN

Subj: Control of Aircraft in ICTZ

LGen CUSHMAN's non-concurrence to Gen MOMYER's proposed plan for control of aircraft in ICTZ

52. CG III MAF 241258Z Feb68 (TS) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for Gen CHAPMAN and LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Passes CG III MAF 241256Z Feb68

53. CG FMFPAC 282109Z Feb68 (TS) *gp-1*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN and MGen ANDERSON from LtGen KRULAK

LtGen KRULAK's report on 7th AF presentation to Gen WHEELER, CINCPAC, and staff.

42. CG III MAF 201416Z Feb68 (S) *Group - 4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for Gen WESTMORELAND, info Gen MOMYER, from LtGen CUSHMAN
 Reports the meeting held at III MAF between Gen MOMYER and LGen CUSHMAN on Gen MOMYER's proposed I Corps organization for air request and control.
43. CG III MAF 201418Z Feb68 (S) *gp - 4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN
 Passes III MAF 201416Z Feb68
44. CG FMFPAC 202058Z Feb68 (TS) *gp - 3*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN from LGen KRULAK
 LGen KRULAK's thoughts on Gen WESTMORELAND's LOI to Gen ABRAMS (CV(P)) and air control.
45. CG FMFPAC 210436Z Feb68 (S) *gp - 4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN from LGen KRULAK
 LGen KRULAK remarks concerning CG III MAF 201418Z Feb68 (LGen CUSHMAN's report to Gen WESTMORELAND on the meeting between Gen MOMYER and LGen CUSHMAN.)
46. COMUSMACV 220427Z Feb68 (S) *gp - 4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen CUSHMAN from Gen WESTMORELAND
 Gen WESTMORELAND's comments on LGen CUSHMAN's comments on the meeting with Gen MOMYER. Gen WESTMORELAND speaks of the relationship between III MAF and CV(P).
47. CG III MAF 221254Z Feb68 (S) *gp - 4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN
 Passes 7th AF proposed plan for control of aircraft in I Corps.
48. CG III MAF 221414Z Feb68 (S) *Group - 4*
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN
 Passes COMUSMACV 220427Z Feb68

37. GEN WESTMORELAND 171206Z Feb68 (S) (Back Channel) *gp - not shown*

Proposes placing Operational Control of First Marine Aircraft Wing under his Deputy for Air. Helicopters would remain under III MAF control. Has asked Gen MOMYER to confer with LGen CUSHMAN and MGen ANDERSON on this matter tomorrow(18Feb).

38. CG III MAF 180120Z Feb68 (S) *gp-4*

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LGen KRULAK from LGen CUSHMAN

Informs FMFPAC that on or about 1 March, Gen WESTMORELAND intends to form a Provisional Corps.

39. LGen CUSHMAN 180212Z Feb68 (Back Channel) *gp-3*

Passes Gen WESTMORELAND's msg 171206Z Feb68 to LGen KRULAK

40. GEN WESTMORELAND 191147Z Feb68 (S) Back Channel to LGen CUSHMAN *gp - not shown*

Gen WESTMORELAND informs LGen CUSHMAN that he has directed Gen MOMYER to work out an arrangement for my consideration to adjust our management structure to meet the requirements of the situation we face (control of air in I Corps North).

41. GEN WESTMORELAND 191239Z Feb68 (S) Back Channel to Adm SHARP *gp - not shown*

Subj: Single Management of Fighter Bombers and Reconnaissance Assets

Proposes subject to Adm SHARP

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG FMFPAC
DCG						SERIAL 282109Z FEB COPY # 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT
C/S						SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DC/S						REMARKS
DC/S DM						<p>EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p>
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						LEGEND
S/C						A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
						C - COMMENTS
						I - INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #53

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OO RUMMWAA
 DE RUHFMA 4634 0592109
 ZNY TTTT
 MAF I CG FIRST MAW
 O 282109Z FEB 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 AND MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE
 CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. THE AIR CONTROL BRANNIGAN BEGAN WITH A PRESENTA-
 TION BY MGEN BLOOD OF 7TH AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
 HE ILLUSTRATED WITH CHARTS, AND IN THE MOST DRAMATIC
 WAY THAT HE COULD, THE PROBLEMS THAT ARE GENERATED
 BY THE CREATION OF THE PROVISIONAL CORPS, VIETNAM WITH
 RESPECT TO AIR SUPPORT. HE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR
 A CONCLUSION THAT ARMY AND MARINE UNITS ARE SO
 INTERMINGLED THAT THE AIR FORCE AND MARINE AIR
 SUPPORT SYSTEMS JUST HAVE TO BE SORTED OUT AT THE TOP.
 HE LEANED HEAVILY ON THE PHILOSOPHY THAT THE
 RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER MUST ALWAYS HAVE THE READY
 MEANS TO GOVERN THE ASSIGNMENT OF ALL OF HIS

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 4634 T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 RESOURCES.

2. FOLLOWING BLOOD'S FORMAL PRESENTATION, THE
 CINCPAC STAFF--PRIMARILY HOMER HUTCHINSON--ASKED
 HIM A PROCESSION OF QUESTIONS REGARDING THE OPERA-
 TION OF THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM UNDER THE PROPOSED
 DIRECTIVE. HUTCHINSON'S MAIN THRUST WAS TO EXPOSE
 THAT THERE IS NO GOOD REASON FOR REQUESTS TO BE
 MASSAGED AT THE MACV LEVEL IF THE RESULTANT IS SIMPLY
 TO RETURN THOSE REQUESTS IN THE FORM OF MISSIONS TO
 III MAF ELEMENTS.

3. AFTER A HALF-HOUR OF QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
 AIR CONTROL SYSTEM I MADE MY CONTRIBUTION, WHICH
 EMBODIED THE KEY POINTS IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE I SENT
 TO YOU VIA BANNING THIS AFTERNOON. SPECIFICALLY I
 EMPHASIZED:

A. THAT THIS IS NOT REALLY A MATTER OF TWO
 COMPETITIVE AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS. WE ALL USE THE
 SAME AIR CONTROL SYSTEM; IT IS STANDARD. THE REAL
 ISSUE IS OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 1ST MARINE AIR-
 CRAFT WING. THE 7TH AIR FORCE WANTS IT, AND WE

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

#53

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFNA 4634 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
CANNOT GIVE IT UP. IT IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG TO
REMOVE FROM A COMMANDER'S HANDS HIS ESSENTIAL
ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT MEANS; BUT THAT IS WHAT THE
WESTMORELAND PLAN PROPOSES TO DO. I NOTED THAT NO
SIMILAR ATTEMPT WAS MADE WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMY
ORGANIC AIR SUPPORT MEANS.

B. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM REQUIRES THAT CG, 1ST MAW
RENDER OPERATIONAL FEALTY TO TWO COMMANDERS; ONE
FOR TACTICAL AIR AND ONE FOR HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORTS.
THIS CAN CAUSE TROUBLE.

C. GENERAL WESTMORELAND AS PRIME TACTICAL
COMMANDER MUST CERTAINLY HAVE THE FREEDOM TO PUT
HIS RESOURCES WHERE HE BELIEVES THEY ARE NEEDED TO
MEET AN OPERATIONAL DEMAND. THIS INCLUDES AIR. HE
HAS THIS AUTHORITY NOW, IN THE EXISTING CINCPAC
DIRECTIVE, AND SHOULD FEEL FREE TO USE IT. CUSHMAN
COULD HAVE NO COMPLAINT IF, IN HIS BEST JUDGEMENT,
WESTMORELAND CONCLUDED THAT FIFTY 1ST MAW SORTIES
MUST BE TURNED OVER TO 7TH AIR FORCE ON SHORT NOTICE
FOR WHAT HE REGARDS AS OVERRIDING PRIORITY USE

PAGE 4 RUHHFNA 4634 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ELSEWHERE TO MEET A CRISIS. HE HAS THIS OPTION NOW,
BUT THAT IS QUITE A DIFFERENT THING FROM TAKING AWAY A
COMMANDER'S ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT, ONLY LATER TO
ISSUE ALL OR PART OF IT TO HIM FOR THE CONDUCT OF HIS
ROUTINE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS.

3. AT THIS POINT SHARP INTERRUPTED AND SAID TO WHEELER
"I HAVE TO AGREE WITH BRUTE. WESTMORELAND HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO DO WHAT HE NEEDS TO DO RIGHT NOW". AT
THIS POINT I FELT SOMEWHAT BETTER ABOUT THE PROGRESS
OF EVENTS, HAVING CONCLUDED EARLIER THAT SHARP WOULD
PROBABLY FOLD UP.

4. THEN I ASKED GENERAL BLOOD SEVERAL QUESTIONS,
AMONG THEM WERE THE FOLLOWING:

A. RIGHT NOW ALL 1ST MAW SORTIES WHICH ARE IN
EXCESS ARE IDENTIFIED TO 7TH AIR FORCE. UNDER YOUR
PROPOSED SYSTEM DO YOU RECKON THAT THE MARINES WILL
END UP WITH MORE, FEWER, OR ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER
OF SORTIES? HIS ANSWER WAS, "ABOUT THE SAME". TO
THIS I OBSERVED THAT MOMYER HAD SAID THE SAME THING
TO CUSHMAN; THAT CUSHMAN WOULD SEE NO DIFFERENCE

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

GE 5 RUHFMMA 4364 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AT ALL, AT LEAST NO OFTENER THAN ONCE A MONTH. I
 THEN COMMENTED THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE THERE
 SEEMS NO REASON TO CHANGE A GOOD SYSTEM JUST TO
 MEET A ONE OUT OF THIRTY DAY PROBLEM. IT IS POINTLESS
 TO TAKE CUSHMAN'S AIR AWAY FROM HIM, ONLY TO GIVE IT
 BACK DAILY.

B. "DO YOU RECKON THAT THE PROPOSED PLAN WILL
 RESULT IN GREATER RESPONSIVENESS, LESS RESPONSIVENESS
 OR RESPONSIVENESS AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL FOR THE
 MARINE AT THE DMZ?" BLOOD'S ANSWER WAS, "ABOUT THE
 SAME FOR THOSE MISSIONS FRAGGED AT THE MACV LEVEL;
 SOMEWHAT LESS RESPONSIVENESS FOR THOSE FRAGGED AT
 THE DASC LEVEL." TO THIS I COMMENTED THAT, ASSUMING
 THE MARINE IS THE CUSTOMER TO BE SATISFIED, THERE
 APPEARS TO BE NO OPERATIONAL BENEFIT IN THE PROPOSED
 SCHEME.

C. "HOW IS IT THAT YOUR PLAN ENCOMPASSES MARINE
 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BUT DOES NOT CONSIDER ARMY
 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT?" HIS REPLY WAS THAT HE DID
 NOT KNOW. TO THIS I OBSERVED THAT THIS IS A SIZEABLE

PAGE 6 RUHFMMA 4634 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 INCONSISTENCY, AND IS AN EXTENSION OF THE INCONSIS-
 TENCY REFLECTED IN THEIR NOT CONSIDERING THE ORGANIC
 AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITIES OF THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION,
 IN THE FORM OF ITS ARMED HELICOPTERS AND HUEY COBRAS;
 THESE BEING COMPARABLE TO OUR ORGANIC AIR. I SAID I
 BELIEVED THE ORGANIC ARMY AIR OUGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE -
 JUST AS IN THE CASE OF ORGANIC MARINE AIR.

5. AT THIS POINT WHEELER MADE A SPEECH ABOUT WESTY'S
 GRAVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND HIS NEED FOR AUTHORITY TO
 PUT HIS RESOURCES WHERE THEY WOULD DO THE MOST
 GOOD. AFTER HE HAD SAID THIS IN TWO OR THREE DIFFERENT
 WAYS SHARP TOOK OVER THE DISCUSSION AND SUMMARIZED.
 HE SAID THAT HE CONCURRED FULLY IN THE NEED FOR WESTY
 TO HAVE AUTHORITY FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS COMBAT
 POWER, AND WAS EMPHATIC IN HIS STATEMENT THAT WESTY
 NOW HAS THAT AUTHORITY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE
 IS NOT ABLE TO FOLLOW THE NEED FOR SUBMITTING MATTERS
 FOR DECISION TO THE SAIGON LEVEL WHICH, IN THE
 PROSECUTION OF THE GROUND BATTLE IN I CORPS, SHOULD
 BE RESOLVED BY THE COMMANDER ON THE GROUND. HE
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

OO RUMWAA
 DE RUHFMA 4660 3592139
 ZNY TTTT
 MAF I CG FIRST MAW
 O 232179Z FEB 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

TOP SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 2 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

ENDED BY SAYING THAT, IN ADDITION TO WESTY'S
 RESPONSIBILITY, HE, AS THE THEATER COMMANDER, ALSO
 HAS A RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA, AND THAT HE INTENDS
 TO FACE UP TO IT; THAT HE HAS ALREADY MADE A DECISION
 ON THIS MATTER FOUR TIMES AND, THOUGH HE MAY BE
 OVERRIDDEN IN WASHINGTON, HE INTENDS TO MAKE A
 DECISION ON THE MATTER THIS TIME, AFTER STUDYING IT
 FURTHER.

6. WHEELER THEN DIRECTED GENERAL BLOOD TO REMAIN TO
 TALK FURTHER TO THE CINCPAC STAFF, AS DESIRED BY
 ADMIRAL SHARP, AND THE MEETING WAS ENDED.

7. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IS SOME USEFUL DELAY.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 4660 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 I EXPECTED TO BE TELEPHONING FROM THE JAIL TONIGHT,
 BUT WE ARE STILL AT LARGE. MY GUESS IS THAT SHARP
 IS GOING TO SEARCH FOR SOME FORM OF COMPROMISE.
 HOWEVER, I SENSE THAT THE AIR FORCE IS IN CONCRETE,
 AND I DOUBT IF MOMYER WILL GIVE AT ALL. BEST REGARDS.
 GP-1
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUHFMMA RUCIHOA
 DE RUMMVA 2583 0551258
 ZNY TTTT
 CG FMFPAC -I- CMC
 P 241258Z FEB 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC
 RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE

O 241256Z FEB 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMSAU/COMUSMACV

INFO RUMSAL/CRD SEVENTH AIR FORCE

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND,

INFO GEN MONYER, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS ONLY.

CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ

REF A. CG III MAF 201416Z FEB 68

1. I HAVE TALKED WITH GENERAL MONYER AND HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY HIS
 STAFF CONCERNING THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF

PAGE TWO RUMMVA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO
 FIRST MAW STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES TO THE SEVENTH AIR
 FORCE. GENERAL MONYER HAS PROVIDED ME WITH A COPY OF HIS PLAN AND
 THE MACV DIRECTIVE WHICH HE IS RECOMMENDING FOR YOUR SIGNATURE. MY
 POSITION IN THIS MATTER HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TO YOU BOTH
 PERSONALLY AND BY MESSAGE (SEE REF A.). MY OPINION HAS NOT CHANGED.
 AS THE COMMANDING GENERAL III MAF, SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS, AND YOUR
 IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF
 THE FUMAF CAMPAIGN IN ICTZ, I CANNOT CONCUR.

2. I AM CONCERNED THAT PERHAPS THE MOST CRITICAL POINT IN THE
 VIETNAM CONFLICT IT IS PROPOSED THAT III MAF ORGANIZATIONAL AIR
 STRIKE RESOURCES BE WITHDRAWN FROM MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
 THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM IS ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED TO
 FIGHT AS AN ENTITY. TO REMOVE THIS ESSENTIAL SUPPORTING ARM FROM
 THE TEAM AND PLACE IT UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANOTHER COMMANDER CAN
 ONLY DEGRADE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM.
 I THINK THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE TEAM'S PERFORMANCE IN ICTZ
 TO DATE LEAVES NO DOUBT AS TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS. I CANNOT CONCUR
 IN ITS FRAGMENTATION.

3. I DO NOT BELIEVE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF ALL TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES
 IS REQUIRED. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES.

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE THREE RUMHAA 2383 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SUPPORT PROVIDED UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM WOULD IMPROVE THE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.

4. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS A TASK ORGANIZED AVIATION COMMAND, SPECIFICALLY STRUCTURED TO SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN ICTZ AS WELL AS THE TWO MARINE DIVISIONS IN THE FORCE. THE MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS ORIENTED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO MEET THE THREAT IN THE NORTH AND TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF ANY FVNAF'S OPERATING IN ICTZ.

5. MARINE DASC'S ARE TACTICAL FUNCTIONING AIR CONTROL AGENCIES WITH A REAL TIME READ-OUT OF BOTH THE AIR AND GROUND COMBAT SITUATION. THEY COORDINATE AND INTEGRATE FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT WITH TACTICAL HELICOPTER LIFT AND THE FIRE OF GUNSHIPS. THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE OF OTHER GROUND COMMANDER AND CAN DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE AS NECESSARY TO MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS. ALL DASC'S ARE TIED TOGETHER AT THE WING TADC WHERE MY TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER CONSTANTLY MONITORS, ADJUSTS, AND DIRECTS HIS TOTAL RESOURCES TO BEST SATISFY THE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE MARINE ELEMENT OF THE FORCE.

6. GEN MONYER'S PLAN DOES NOT INTEGRATE THIS COMPLETE CONTROL PACKAGE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE FOUR RUMHAA 2383 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO INTO HIS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. INSTEAD HE TAKES ONLY THE FIXED WING STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES, AND THE FACILITIES FOR THEIR CONTROL. THE RESULT WOULD BE AN AWKWARD AND CUMBERSOME SYSTEM WITH MARINE DASC'S RESPONSIBLE TO GEN MONYER IN SAIGON FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESPONDING TO GEN ANDERSON IN DANANG FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORT/UTILITY AIRCRAFT.

7. FURTHER, HIS PLAN PLACES THE AIR STRIKE FUNCTION OF EACH MARINE DASC UNDER TWO ECHELONS OF 7AF/VNAF "SUPER" DASC'S AND THE ENTIRE CONGLOMERATION UNDER A MASTER TACC IN SAIGON AND IN TIMES OF URGENCY, A C-130 COMMAND CENTER CIRCLING OVERHEAD. AS I POINTED OUT IN REF A, THIS SUPERIMPOSING OF ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF CONTROLLING AGENCIES, AS WELL AS THE ADDED LEVELS OF APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS, CAN ONLY RESULT IN LESS RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE ELEMENTS OF MY GROUND FORCES.

8. ANOTHER POINT OF REAL CONCERN IS THE COST OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT TO ME IN THE FORM OF AVIATION PERSONNEL. I MUST CONTINUE TO MAN MY AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND IN ADDITION PROVIDE AVIATORS AND OTHER STAFF PERSONNEL TO MACV TASE, 7TH AF TACC, I DASC, DASC BRAVO, ETC., FOR FRAGGING, LIAISON AND COORDINATION DUTIES. AS

HAS BEEN SENT**PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FIVE RUMMVA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
CRITICAL AS MARINE CORPS PILOTS AND AVIATION SPECIALISTS ARE, I'M
SURE I CANNOT AFFORD THIS ADDITIONAL DRAIN ON MY RESOURCES.

9. AS I'VE PREVIOUSLY STATED, GENERAL MOMYER'S PROPOSAL DILUTES
THE COMBAT POWER OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM. IT REMOVES FROM
III MAF DIRECT CONTROL MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE
RESOURCES. THESE UNITS ARE INTEGRAL TO THE MARINE AIR/GROUND
TEAM AND PROVIDE THE SAME TYPES OF FIRE SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND
TROOPS THAT ARE FURNISHED TO ARMY GROUND TROOPS BY THE HUEY, HUEY
COBRA, CHEYENNE AND MOHAWK. I'M CERTAIN THAT MARINE CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT SHOULD REMAIN UNDER THE PRESENT COMMAND AND CONTROL
ORGANIZATION, JUST AS THE ARMY HELO AND RECON SUPPORT REMAINS
UNDER ITS VERY SATISFACTORY COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE.

10. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCES AN ADDED DELAY IN
RESPONSIVENESS, A CHANGE IN ORGANIZATION, AND A LOSS OF COMBAT POWER
WITHIN THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER AT A
CRITICAL TIME. THE CURRENT AIR CONTROL ARRANGEMENT IS EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE, AND HAS DEMONSTRATED RESPONSIVENESS. MAVC DIRECTIVE 95-4
PROVIDES THE EMERGENCY OPTIONS THAT YOU MUST HAVE WHILE PRESERVING
THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF THE VARIOUS FORCE PACKAGES THAT COMPRISE
THE FUMAF IN RVN. I'M SURE A REVIEW OF PAST SORTIE RATES OF THE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE SIX RUMMVA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
FIRST MAW, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PER BATTALION DAY, WILL
MORE THAN JUSTIFY THE MERITS OF OUR SYSTEM. FURTHERMORE, WHILE
OPERATING UNDER YOUR DIRECTIVE, III MAF HAS CONSISTENTLY IDENTIFIED
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SORTIES TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE AS OUR SHARE
TOWARD THE COMMON GOAL OF ALL MACV FORCES. YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE
OF CONTINUANCE OF THIS SAME DEGREE OF SUPPORT.

11. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MARINE
AIR/GROUND TEAM WITHIN III MAF. ITS TOTAL RESOURCES, FIGHTER, ATTACK
AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, AND CONTROL AGENCIES, ARE PART AND
PARCEL OF THIS TEAM. THE WING AND III MAF IN ITS ENTIRETY WILL
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE YOU A MOST EFFECTIVE AND SPIRITED FIGHTING FORCE
AND WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO RESPOND TO YOUR GUIDANCE, EXPERIENCE,
AND LEADERSHIP.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

HAS BEEN SENT**PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMSAL RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2582 0531296
 ZNY TTTTT
 O 241256Z FEB 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUMSAL/CRD SEVENTH AIR FORCE
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND,
 INFO GEN MONYER, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS ONLY.
 CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ

REF A. CG III MAF 201416Z FEB 68

1. I HAVE TALKED WITH GENERAL MONYER AND HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY HIS STAFF CONCERNING THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FIRST MAF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES TO THE SEVENTH AIR FORCE. GENERAL MONYER HAS PROVIDED ME WITH A COPY OF HIS PLAN AND THE MACV DIRECTIVE WHICH HE IS RECOMMENDING FOR YOUR SIGNATURE. MY POSITION IN THIS MATTER HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TO YOU BOTH PERSONALLY AND BY MESSAGE (SEE REF A.). MY OPINION HAS NOT CHANGED. AS THE COMMANDING GENERAL III MAF, SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS, AND YOUR IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE FUMAF CAMPAIGN IN ICTZ, I CANNOT CONCUR.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

2. I AM CONCERNED THAT PERHAPS THE MOST CRITICAL POINT IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT IT IS PROPOSED THAT III MAF ORGANIZATIONAL AIR STRIKE RESOURCES BE WITHDRAWN FROM MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL. THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM IS ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED TO FIGHT AS AN ENTITY. TO REMOVE THIS ESSENTIAL SUPPORTING ARM FROM THE TEAM AND PLACE IT UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANOTHER COMMANDER CAN ONLY DEGRADE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM. I THINK THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE TEAM'S PERFORMANCE IN ICTZ TO DATE LEAVES NO DOUBT AS TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS. I CANNOT CONCUR IN ITS FRAGMENTATION.

3. I DO NOT BELIEVE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF ALL TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES IS REQUIRED. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM WOULD IMPROVE THE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.

4. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS A TASK ORGANIZED AVIATION COMMAND, SPECIFICALLY STRUCTURED TO SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN ICTZ AS WELL AS THE TWO MARINE DIVISIONS IN THE FORCE. THE MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS ORIENTED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO MEET THE THREAT IN THE NORTH AND TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FOUR RUNS AK 2582 T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 ANY PWNAF'S OPERATING IN ICYZ.

5. MARINE DASC'S ARE TACTICAL FUNCTIONING AIR CONTROL AGENCIES WITH A REAL TIME READ-OUT OF BOTH THE AIR AND GROUND COMBAT SITUATION. THEY COORDINATE AND INTEGRATE FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT WITH TACTICAL HELICOPTER LIFT AND THE FIRE OF GUNSHELLS. THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE OR OTHER GROUND COMMANDER AND CAN DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE AS NECESSARY TO MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS. ALL DASC'S ARE TIED TOGETHER AT THE WING TADC WHERE MY TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER CONSTANTLY MONITORS, ADJUSTS, AND DIRECTS HIS TOTAL RESOURCES TO BEST SATISFY THE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE MARINE ELEMENT OF THE FORCE.

6. GEN MOMYER'S PLAN DOES NOT INTEGRATE THIS COMPLETE CONTROL PACKAGE INTO HIS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. INSTEAD HE TAKES ONLY THE FIXED WING STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES, AND THE FACILITIES FOR THEIR CONTROL. THE RESULT WOULD BE AN AWKWARD AND CUMBERSOME SYSTEM WITH MARINE DASC'S RESPONSIBLE TO GEN MOMYER IN SAIGON FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESPONDING TO GEN ANDERSON IN DANANG FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORT/UTILITY AIRCRAFT.

7. FURTHER, HIS PLAN PLACES THE AIR STRIKE FUNCTION OF EACH MARINE

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FOUR RUNS AK 2582 T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DASC UNDER TWO ECHELONS OF 7AF/VNAF "SUPER" DASC'S AND THE ENTIRE CONGLOMERATION UNDER A MASTER TACC IN SAIGON AND IN TIMES OF URGENCY, A C-130 COMMAND CENTER CIRCLING OVERHEAD. AS I POINTED OUT IN REF A, THIS SUPERIMPOSING OF ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF CONTROLLING AGENCIES, AS WELL AS THE ADDED LEVELS OF APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS, CAN ONLY RESULT IN LESS RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE ELEMENTS OF MY GROUND FORCES.

8. ANOTHER POINT OF REAL CONCERN IS THE COST OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT TO ME IN THE FORM OF AVIATION PERSONNEL. I MUST CONTINUE TO MAN MY AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND IN ADDITION PROVIDE AVIATORS AND OTHER STAFF PERSONNEL TO MACV TASE, 7TH AF IACC, 1 DASC, DASC BRAVO, ETC., FOR FRAGGING, LIAISON AND COORDINATION DUTIES. AS CRITICAL AS MARINE CORPS PILOTS AND AVIATION SPECIALISTS ARE, I'M SURE I CANNOT AFFORD THIS ADDITIONAL BRAIN ON MY RESOURCES.

9. AS I'VE PREVIOUSLY STATED, GENERAL MOMYER'S PROPOSAL DILUTES THE COMBAT POWER OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM. IT REMOVES FROM III MAF DIRECT CONTROL MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES. THESE UNITS ARE INTEGRAL TO THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM AND PROVIDE THE SAME TYPES OF FIRE SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND TROOPS THAT ARE FURNISHED TO ARMY GROUND TROOPS BY THE HUEY, HUEY

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR COBRA, CHEYENNE AND MOHAWK. I'M CERTAIN THAT MARINE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SHOULD REMAIN UNDER THE PRESENT COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION, JUST AS THE ARMY HELO AND RECON SUPPORT REMAINS UNDER ITS VERY SATISFACTORY COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE.

10. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCES AN ADDED DELAY IN RESPONSIVENESS, A CHANGE IN ORGANIZATION, AND A LOSS OF COMBAT POWER WITHIN THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER AT A CRITICAL TIME. THE CURRENT AIR CONTROL ARRANGEMENT IS EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE, AND HAS DEMONSTRATED RESPONSIVENESS. MAVC DIRECTIVE 95-4 PROVIDES THE EMERGENCY OPTIONS THAT YOU MUST HAVE WHILE PRESERVING THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF THE VARIOUS FORCE PACKAGES THAT COMPRISE THE FVMAF IN RVN. I'M SURE A REVIEW OF PAST SORTIE RATES OF THE FIRST MAW, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PER BATTALION DAY, WILL MORE THAN JUSTIFY THE MERITS OF OUR SYSTEM. FURTHERMORE, WHILE OPERATING UNDER YOUR DIRECTIVE, III MAF HAS CONSISTENTLY IDENTIFIED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SORTIES TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE AS OUR SHARE TOWARD THE COMMON GOAL OF ALL MACV FORCES. YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE OF CONTINUANCE OF THIS SAME DEGREE OF SUPPORT.

11. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM WITHIN III MAF. ITS TOTAL RESOURCES, FIGHTER, ATTACK

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, AND CONTROL AGENCIES, ARE PART AND PARCEL OF THIS TEAM. THE WING AND III MAF IN ITS ENTIRETY WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE YOU A MOST EFFECTIVE AND SPIRITED FIGHTING FORCE AND WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO RESPOND TO YOUR GUIDANCE, EXPERIENCE, AND LEADERSHIP.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

OO RUHKM
 DE RUMSAK 2559 0550904
 ZNY TTTT
 CG FMFPAC -T- CMC
 O 240904Z FEB 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUCINOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSVIE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND
 LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 1. IN DISCUSSION TODAY GEN WHEELER SAID TO ME PRIVATELY,
 WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTROL OF AIR PROBLEM:

A. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT SPECIFICALLY UNTIL HE HAD SEEN
 PLAN, BUT HE URGED ME TO VIEW THE SITUATION WITH THESE
 TWO POINTS IN MIND:

FIRST, THAT I PLACE MYSELF ABOVE THE STRUGGLE AS A FIELD
 ARMY COMMANDER AND CONSIDER ONLY THE GOOD OF THE TROOPS
 (AN APPEAL TO VANITY); SECOND, THAT IN ANY FIGHT OVER
 DOCTRINE IN WAR TIME, PRESS AND PUBLIC WOULD NOT
 UNDERSTAND AND SERVICES COULD NOT TELL WHERE THAT WOULD
 LEAD. (PERHAPS A THREAT TO LEAK TO PRESS?):

B. I REPLIED THAT OF COURSE I TOOK THE BROAD VIEW AND
 THAT THE GOOD OF THE TROOPS DEMANDED THE SYSTEM NOW IN

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2559 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 USE WITH NO ADDITIONAL LAYERING, NO NEW DASC ORGANIZATIONS.
 I STRESSED POINT THAT PRESENT CINCPAC AND MACV DIRECTIVES
 ENTIRELY ADEQUATE AND THAT ARMY CONTROLLED THE IR HELO CLOSE
 SUPPORT AND MARINES MUST CONTROL MARINE FIXED WING CLOSE
 AIR SUPPORT. I POINTED UP OUR 1.43 SORTIE RATE. FINALLY
 IN ANSWER TO HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DIDN'T YET HAVE THE
 DETAILS WHICH REQUIRED THIS STEP BY WESTY, I REPLIED THAT
 WESTY WANTED ONE MAN RESPONSIBLE FOR AIR BUT I DID NOT
 FEEL IT NECESSARY AS HE HAD THREE US. COMMANDERS
 RESPONSIBLE FOR GROUND WAR AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO USE TWO
 FOR AIR OPERATIONS. ON THAT NOTE HE TOOK LEAVE WITHOUT
 FURTHER COMMENT.

GP-4
 BT

TOP SECRET

VV PAC891
 00 MAF
 DE PAC 3614 0540355
 ZNY TTTT
 O 230355Z FEB 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE I JUST RECEIVED FROM
 GEN. CHAPMAN, AND WHICH MAY BE OF USE TO YOU IF GEN
 WHEELER OPENS TO SUBJECT.

QUOTE:

1. THE FOLLOWING MEMO WAS DELIVERED TO GENERAL WHEELER ON 21
 FEBRUARY 1968.

2. MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIGHTER/BOMBER RECONNAISSANCE
 ASSETS (IS)

REFERENCE IS MADE TO:

(A) COMUSMACV 191239Z FEB 1968 WHICH OUTLINES, IN GENERAL
 TERMS, A CONCEPT FOR ESTABLISHING "SINGLE MANAGEMENT" OF
 FIGHTER/BOMBER AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT ASSETS UNDER CONTROL
 OF THE COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE.

PAGE 2 PAC 3614 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O

(B) JCS 2343/767 OF 10FEB66 WHICH ESTABLISHED III MAF AS A
 SEPARATE UNI-SERVICE COMMAND DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO COMUSMACV.

(C) CINCPAC 182231Z JAN68 WHICH ADVISES COMUSMACV THAT
 CINCPAC WILL MAKE ANY NECESSARY DECISION REGARDING A PROPOSAL
 WHICH MIGHT DIVEST CG III MAF OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HIS AIR
 ASSETS.

1. I HAVE NOTED WITH INCREASING CONCERN THE SEVERAL RECENT
 PROPOSALS BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND FOR ASSIGNING CONTROL OF
 FIGHTER/ATTACK/RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OF THE FIRST MARINE
 AIRCRAFT WING TO HIS DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR. REFERENCE (A)
 OUTLINES THE MOST RECENT OF THESE PROPOSALS.

2. THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH "SINGLE MANAGEMENT" OF FIGHTER/
 BOMBER AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS UNDER CONTROL OF THE COMMANDER,
 7TH AIR FORCE (DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR) APPEARS DESIGNED TO
 ASSIGNED OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FIGHTER/BOMBER AND
 RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING TO
 THE COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE. THIS WOULD BE A FLAGRANT VIOLATION
 OF UNAAF AND OF THE JCS DECISION PROMULGATED IN REFERENCE (B).
 THE COMMENTS OF CINCPAC IN THE PREMISE, CONTAINED IN REFERENCE
 (C), ARE AS VALID TODAY AS THEY WERE WHEN PREPARED ONE MONTH AGO.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 3 PAC 3614 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O
 THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM, NOR IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM WOULD ENHANCE THE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY. IN SHORT I CANNOT ACCEPT ANY STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD, IN ANY WAY, DEGRADE THE TOTAL OPERATIONAL CONTROL EXERCISED BY GENERAL CUSHMAN OVER THE AIR ELEMENT OF HIS AIRGROUND TEAM.

3. AT ISSUE IS THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF FORCES ASSIGNED TO COMUSMACV. I KNOW THAT COMUSMACV CANNOT REALIZE THE DESIRED GOAL OF MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS FROM EACH ELEMENT OF HIS COMMAND IF HE FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY FOR PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF THOSE FORCES IN CONSONANCE WITH WHICH INDIVIDUAL AND DELIBERATELY DESIGNED OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS. WHERE MARINES ARE CONCERNED, WE KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE, THAT THE AIR/GROUND TEAM FIGHTS MOST EFFECTIVELY WHEN IT IS A COMMAND ENTITY.

4. IN SUMMARY, I REQUEST THAT YOU RECOMMEND TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND THAT CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT WITH THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF EXERCISING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AS DIRECTED BY CINCPAC.

PAGE 4 PAC 3614 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR M C E O
 UNQUOTE.

2. MEANWHILE WE ARE WORKING ON AN ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, WHICH WILL BE ON THE WAY TO YOU IN ABOUT FIVE HOURS. IN ADDITION TO TAKING IT CAREFULLY TO PIECES, IT WILL OFFER THOUGHTS ON HOW TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE. BASICALLY, HOWEVER, IT WILL COUNSEL YOU TO NON-CONCUR, OFFICIALLY AND IN WRITING BECAUSE:

A. THE SCHEME DEGRADES OUR FIGHTING ABILITY AT A CRISIS HOUR, WITH NO COMPENSATORY BENEFITS. ✓

B. THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING OF DEFECTS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM. ✓

C. THE SCHEME IS FOREIGN TO OUR WAY OF OPERATING, AND VIOLATES UNAAF AND A JCS DIRECTIVE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT
EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DE RUMWAA 2378 0531414
ZNY SSSSS
O 221414Z FEB 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GEN WESTMORELAND AND IS QUOTED
FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE

O 220427Z FEB 68 ZFF6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
INFO RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN,
INFO GENERAL MOMYER,
FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND 05337

1. (S) I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON THE PLAN WHICH
GENERAL MOMYER PRESENTED TO YOU IN RESPONSE TO MY INSTRUCTIONS.
I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THAT I AM SEEKING A SOLUTION

PAGE 2 RUMWAA 2378 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
THAT WILL SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE THE PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING AIR
SUPPORT TO THE TROOPS UNDER YOUR CONTROL.

2. (S) IT IS MY INTENTION THAT YOU SERVE AT THE FIELD ARMY
COMMANDER LEVEL WITH TACTICAL CONTROL OF BOTH THE PROVISIONAL
CORPS AND III MAF. IN THIS CAPACITY YOU WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO
ALLOCATE, AT YOUR DISCRETION, THE TACTICAL AIR ASSETS AVAILABLE TO
SUPPORT YOUR FORCES, SUBJECT TO MODIFICATIONS THAT I MIGHT INVOKE
AS THE SITUATION DICTATES. YOU WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES IN YOUR AREA, IN KEEPING
WITH CURRENTLY APPROVED DOCTRINE.

3. (S) I AM KEENLY AWARE OF THE DEPENDENCE WHICH THE MARINE
CORPS PLACES ON ITS INTEGRAL FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT IN LIEU OF
GUNSHIPS. IN KEEPING WITH THIS, I WOULD DESIRE THAT UNDER THE
PROPOSED PLAN, MARINE AIRCRAFT SUPPORT MARINE TROOPS TO THE
EXTENT REQUIRED, AS THE NORMAL RULE. THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE
SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENTS DICTATED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

4. (S) IF AT ANY TIME YOU FIND THAT THE AIR SUPPORT YOU WERE
RECEIVING WAS NOT SATISFACTORY, YOU COULD ADVISE ME IMMEDIATELY.
ON THE OTHER HAND, I WOULD EXPECT THAT MY DEPUTY FOR AIR WOULD
HAVE GENERAL DIRECTION OF ALL ROUTINE MATTERS RELATING TO THE

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PAGE 3 RUMWAA 2378 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING, FRAGGING AND CONTROLLING AIR SUPPORT.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
UNQUOTE
2. WARM REGARDS
GP-4
BT

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMWAA 2377 0531254
ZNY SSSSS
O 221254Z FEB 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG RVN
TO ZEN/CG FMFPAC
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN KRULAK FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER AT WAKING HOURS, BUT NLT 0800 HOURS.
1. I'M PASSING TO YOU THE PROPOSED PLAN OF MOMYER'S THAT WAS
DELIVERED TO MY STAFF THIS AFTERNOON. THE CHARTS WILL BE PASSED BY
PHONE. ANY THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE WILL BE APPRECIATED AND WILL ENSURE
A UNITED FRONT. I WILL PASS MY COMMENTS TO YOU AS SOON AS THEY ARE
SUBMITTED TO WESTY.

CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS

AS PREPARED BY

COMMANDER
SEVENTH AIR FORCE

MEMORANDUM FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAF

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS

1. I HAVE ASKED COL BRETT AND COL BRASWELL FROM MY STAFF TO PERSON-
ALLY CARRY MY PLAN TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS SO THEY CAN REVIEW WITH YOU
OR YOUR STAFF THE ADJUSTMENTS MADE AS A RESULT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ON
20 FEB 1968. THAT IS THE IMPLEMENTING PLAN I AM SUBMITTING TO GEN
WESTMORELAND AS DIRECTED. I INDICATED THAT I WOULD GIVE YOU A COPY
FOR YOUR COMMENTS. ALSO, A COPY OF MY REPORT OF OUR VISIT AND BRIEF-
ING ON 20 FEB 1968 IS ATTACHED FOR YOUR REFERENCE.
2. WHEN ATTACHMENTS ARE WITHDRAWN OR NOT ATTACHED, THE CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE IS CHANGED TO UNCLASSIFIED.

SIGNED: WILLIAM W. MOMYER, GENERAL, USAF

PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGES

COMMANDER

SECRET

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EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMUSMACV

SUBJECT: AIR CONTROL COORDINATION (U)
TO: CG III MAF

1. (S) BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES TO I CORPS AREA, THE CONCENTRATION OF AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF ALL GROUND FORCES BEING DEPLOYED, AND THE OVERRIDING REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO CONCENTRATE THIS EFFORT AS DIRECTED BY THE ENEMY THREAT, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVE A SINGLE MANAGER FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES. CONSEQUENTLY, I HAVE DECIDED TO CHARGE MY DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING AND DIRECTING THE AIR EFFORT THROUGHOUT VIETNAM TO INCLUDE I CORPS AND THE EXTENDED BATTLE AREA. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEEING TO IT THAT THE AIR EFFORT IS APPLIED IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER IN FURTHERANCE OF THE MACV MISSION.
2. (S) YOU WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO MY DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR THE FOLLOWING AIR ASSETS FOR MISSION DIRECTION:
 - A. STRIKE AIRCRAFT.
 - B. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.
 - C. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AS REQUIRED.

HAS BEEN SENT

HE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FRAGGING AND OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THESE AIR ASSETS WITH ALL OTHER AVAILABLE ASSETS NOW UNDER HIS CONTROL TO MEET THE DAILY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF ALL FORCES IN I CTZ. CONSISTENT WITH THE TACTICAL SITUATION, MARINE AIRCRAFT WILL BE FRAGGED BY HIM THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE DASC TO SUPPORT MARINE GROUND UNITS. IN THE JOINING TOGETHER OF THE TWO TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS TO INSURE CONTINUITY OF CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS, THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE TACTICAL CONTROL SYSTEM SHALL BE PRESERVED. MARINE HELICOPTERS AND AIRLIFT ASSETS WILL REMAIN RESPONSIVE TO THE DIRECTION OF THE I MAW.

3. (S) I EXPECT YOU TO PROVIDE MY DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR WITH THE FOLLOWING:
 - A. G-2 AND G-3 AIR REPRESENTATION IN THE MACV TASE TO ESTABLISH PRIORITY OF EFFORT BETWEEN CORPS. ALSO, PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT THE TACC AND APPROPRIATE DASCs.
 - B. DAILY STATUS REPORT OF AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT FOR FRAGGING.
 - C. MISSION REPORTS.
 - D. SUCH OFFICERS AS YOU SEE NECESSARY FOR PLANNING SPECIAL ALLIED OR COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS.
4. (S) THE ATTACHMENT REFLECTS THE ORGANIZATION OF FORCES IN I CTZ AND DESCRIBES AIR CONTROL AND COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, A DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTING PROCEDURES IS INCLUDED.

WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND
GENERAL, USA
COMUSMACV

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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SECRET

PART I

EXCLUSIVE

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONS

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. US/ARVN FORCES IN NORTHERN I CORPS ARE ORGANIZED IN A PROVISIONAL CORPS (DESIGNATED PROVISIONAL CORPS BRAVO FOR PRESENT PURPOSES) UNDER COMMAND/CONTROL OF A US CORPS COMMANDER (US ARMY). INCLUDED ARE THE FOLLOWING DIVISIONS: 101ST AIRBORNE, 1ST AIR CAVALRY, 3D MARINE, 1ST ARVN. THE CORPS COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE TO CG III MAF, WHO IS OVERALL US COMMANDER IN I CORPS. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CG III MAF AND CG I CORPS (ARVN) REMAINS UNCHANGED.
2. CG III MAF/CG 1ST CORPS (ARVN) EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND/CONTROL OVER REMAINING US/ARVN/FWMAF IN I CORPS, FUNCTIONING IN EFFECT AS CORPS COMMANDER FOR THESE UNITS (1ST MARINE DIVISION, AMERICAL DIVISION, 2D ARVN DIVISION, 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE).
3. THE DANANG DASC (I DASC), APPROPRIATELY EXPANDED AND WITH MARINE PERSONNEL INCLUDED, WILL SERVE AS OVERALL COORDINATING AGENCY FOR ALL AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ. A COMBINED DASC (DESIGNATED DASC BRAVO) WILL BE FORMED TO COORDINATE AIR SUPPORT OF PROVISIONAL CORPS B AND WILL FUNCTION UNDER THE OVERALL COORDINATING AUTHORITY OF I DASC WHILE HAVING CERTAIN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION AS SUBSEQUENTLY DESCRIBED. EACH MARINE DIVISION WILL RETAIN ITS DASC, WHICH WILL BE SUBORDINATE TO I DASC (1ST MAR DIV) OR DASC B (3D MAR DIV).
4. IN INTEGRATING MARINE AVIATION INTO THE OVERALL CONTROL ORGANIZATION, THE CAPABILITIES OF THE MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM WILL BE FULLY EXPLOITED. COORDINATION OF EFFORT WILL BE ACHIEVED BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE PERSONNEL TO THE MACV TASE, 7TH AIR FORCE TACC, I DASC AND DASC BRAVO FOR ASSISTANCE IN TASKING AND COORDINATING AIR ACTIVITIES.
5. OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT (STRIKE/RECCE) IN I CTZ WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH TACC (SAIGON). THE AGENCY WILL:
 - A. CONTROL ALL STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN I CTZ.
 - B. ISSUE DAILY FRAG ORDERS FOR PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS BASED ON REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED BY MACV TASE.
 - C. CONTROL AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS THROUGH THE 7AF TACC AND TACC (NS).
 - D. CONTROL SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS THROUGH THE JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER (JSARC) AND REGIONAL CONTROL CENTER AT DANANG.
 - E. CONTROL ALL SCRAMBLES.
6. I DASC WILL BE JOINTLY MANNED BY AF, VNAF AND 1ST MAW PERSONNEL AND IS DESIGNATED AS THE PRIMARY DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER (DASC) FOR SUPPORT OF CG III MAF. HE WILL EXERCISE DIVERT AUTHORITY OVER ALL PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO I CORPS. A JOINTLY MANNED DASC BRAVO WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND DESIGNATED AS A SUBORDINATE DASC TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE CG, PROVISIONAL CORPS BRAVO OPERATING IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF I CORPS. DASC BRAVO WILL EXERCISE DIVERT AUTHORITY OVER PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO PROVISIONAL CORPS BRAVO. AT LEVELS BELOW I DASC AND DASC BRAVO, THE APPROPRIATE USAF/MARINE CONTROL AND COORDINATION AGENCIES WILL FUNCTION IN THE NORMAL MANNER. (DIAGRAM NUMBER ONE (1) AND TWO (2) TO FOLLOW BY TELEPHONE.)

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EXCLUSIVE

PART II MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS HAS BEEN SENT

1. PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS ORIGINATE AT THE LOWER LEVELS OF COMMAND, COMMENCING AT BATTALION LEVEL FOR US ORGANIZATIONS AND AT PROVINCE LEVEL FOR ARVN FORCES. REQUESTS ARE SENT UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND WITH EACH LEVEL CONSOLIDATING THE REQUESTS AND ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES ON THE REQUESTED TARGETS. SPECIFICALLY, THE REQUESTS WOULD BE DISPATCHED AS DEPICTED UPON THE ATTACHED CHART.
2. IN THE CASE OF PROVISIONAL CORPS B THE REQUESTS WOULD BE CONSOLIDATED WITHIN THE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (CTOC) AND SENT FORWARD TO THE CG III MAF/I ARVN CORPS CTOC FOR OVERALL CONSOLIDATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES FOR THE ENTIRE I CTZ. THE REQUESTS ARE THEN SUBMITTED TO THE MACV TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT ELEMENT (TASE) FOR THE ALLOCATION OF STRIKES. WITHIN THE TASE WOULD BE MARINE REPRESENTATIVES (G-2 AND G-3 AIR), WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IN OVERALL PLANNING AND SPECIFICALLY MONITOR THE REQUESTS THAT ORIGINATED FROM MARINE UNITS.
3. ONCE THE TARGETS ARE APPROVED AND ALLOCATED THE TASE WOULD SUBMIT THEM TO THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER (TACC), WHO WOULD ASSIGN THE TARGETS TO APPROPRIATE UNITS, ESTABLISH ORDNANCE LOADS, AND TIME OVER TARGETS (TOIS). MARINE OFFICERS WOULD BE ASSIGNED AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DAILY FRAG ORDER. WITHIN THE TACC EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO HAVE MARINE AIRCRAFT SUPPORT MARINE UNITS. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DAILY FRAG ORDER IS COVERED IN PART III.
(DIAGRAM NUMBER THREE (3) TO FOLLOW BY TELEPHONE.)

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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PART III MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DAILY FRAG ORDER HAS BEEN SENT

1. THE DAILY FRAG ORDER WILL BE PREPARED BY THE TACC. THE FRAG ORDER WILL CONTAIN INFORMATION ON CONTROL AGENCIES, TIMING, TARGETS, CALL SIGNS AND ORDNANCE AND ANY PERTINENT INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. MARINE OFFICERS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE TACC TO PARTICIPATE IN FRAG PREPARATION.
2. AS A NORMAL PRACTICE, EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO FRAG MARINE AIRCRAFT AGAINST MARINE REQUESTS. UNDER EMERGENCY SITUATIONS OR AS THE SITUATION DICTATES MARINE/USAF/ARVN AIRCRAFT CAN BE DIVERTED TO ANY UNIT WITHIN CG III MAF/I ARVN CORPS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE IMMEDIATE REQUEST SYSTEM.
3. UPON COMPLETION THE DAILY FRAG ORDER WILL BE DISPATCHED FIRST IN THE FORM OF A WARNING ORDER TO ALL PERTINENT AGENCIES BY VOICE AND THEN BY MESSAGE. THE ATTACHED CHART DEPICTS THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DAILY FRAG ORDER.
4. PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THE DAILY FRAG ORDERS WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR STRIKE/RECCE AIRCRAFT CONTROL, TO INCLUDE WINGS, GROUPS, SEPARATE USAF SQUADRONS, CRC/CRP/TAOC SITES, ABCCC, TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SQUADRONS (TASS) AND MSQ/TPQ SITES. THE FRAG ORDER FOR ALL MARINE UNITS WOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE 1ST MAW TADC. I DASC WOULD RECEIVE THE ENTIRE FRAG FOR I CTZ AND DASC B THE FRAG FOR CORPS B AREA. EACH DASC WOULD IN TURN TRANSMIT TO THEIR SUBORDINATE CONTRL AGENCIES THOSE PORTIONS OF THE FRAG THAT AFFECT OPERATIONS WITHIN THIER AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PART IV MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

IMMEDIATE REQUESTS HAS BEEN SENT

1. REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT MAY BE RELAYED FROM THE LOWEST UNIT AWARE OF THE NEED.
2. A DIVERT OF A PREPLANNED MISSION NORMALLY PROVIDES FASTEST RESPONSE. DIVISION TACP/MARDASC CONTINUE TO HAVE AUTHORITY TO DIVERT AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FRAGGED TO THEM.
3. IF THERE ARE NO AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR DIVERT WITHIN THE DIVISION AREA, DIVISION TACP/MARDASC WILL RELAY/CONFIRM REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE AIR TO I DASC/DASC BRAVO.
4. I DASC, IN COORDINATION WITH THE ADJACENT FSCC, HAS DIVERT AUTHORITY FOR ALL AIRCRAFT FRAGGED INTO THE I CTZ. DASC B, IN COORDINATION WITH ADJACENT FSCC, HAS DIVERT AUTHORITY FOR AIRCRAFT FRAGGED TO PROVISIONAL CORPS B. IF NONE AVAILABLE DASC B WILL REQUEST I DASC FOR DIVERT FROM OTHER AREAS. IF I DASC HAS NONE AVAILABLE, DASC B WILL GO DIRECTLY TO TACC SAIGON FOR DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE. IN MOST CASES THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE ON MISSIONS OF LOWER PRIORITY TO PROVIDE AMPLE RESOURCES FOR DIVERTS. THESE WILL NORMALLY PROVIDE MORE RAPID RESPONSE THAN SCRAMBLE AIRCRAFT. WHEN REQUIREMENTS CAN NOT BE MET BY DIVERTS FROM OTHER AREAS, ALERT AIRCRAFT WILL BE SCRAMBLED.
5. MACV-TASE REPRESENTATIVE WILL COORDINATE ON TACC SCRAMBLES AND INTER-CORPS DIVERTS.
(DIAGRAM NUMBER FOUR (4) TO FOLLOW BY TELEPHONE.)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SJRG.									

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PART V MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONTROL AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES HAS BEEN SENT

1. CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENT WILL PERMIT MAXIMUM USE OF AVAILABLE AGENCIES AND EQUIPMENT IN CONTROLLING THE INCREASED AIR ACTIVITIES IN I CTZ:

A. PANAMA CRC (USAF) IS DESIGNATED AS THE SENIOR AIRSPACE CONTROLLING AGENCY FOR AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT IN I CTZ.

B. WATERBOY CRP (USAF) WILL CONTROL AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF I CTZ (AREA TO BE SPECIFIED) UNDER THE OVERALL DIRECTION OF PANAMA.

C. VICE SQUAD TAOC/CRP (USMC) WILL CONTROL AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF I CTZ (AREA TO BE SPECIFIED) UNDER THE OVERALL DIRECTION OF PANAMA.

D. ABCCC WILL BE EMPLOYED AS A CONTROLLING AGENCY FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS WHEN REQUIRED. WHEN SO EMPLOYED IT WILL SERVE IN EFFECT AS AN AIRBORNE DASC WITH FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE AS PRESCRIBED BY TACC SAIGON.

2. MSQ/TPQ-10. MSQ AND TPQ-10 PROCEDURES WILL REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. SITES WILL BE FRAGGED EACH DAY FOR PRE-PLANNED STRIKES BY TACC, BASED UPON PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS AND ANTICIPATED WEATHER CONDITIONS. AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT WILL CONTINUE TO BE PASSED TO THE MSQ/TPQ CONTROLLERS THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CRC/CRP/TAOC/ABCCC. IMMEDIATE STRIKES WILL BE HANDLED IN A SIMILAR MANNER AS PRE-PLANNED WITH AIRCRAFT RECEIVING TARGET INFORMATION AND CONTROLLING AGENCY AFTER BECOMING AIRBORNE. MSQ/TPQ WILL RECEIVE TARGET LOCATION AND FLIGHT MISSION INFORMATION FROM EITHER THE REQUESTING DASC OR TACC.

3. COORDINATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE AND GROUND ARTILLERY. A COMPARABLE AND COMPATIBLE SYSTEM EXISTS BETWEEN THE US ARMY/USAF AND THE MARINES. NAVAL GUNFIRE AND GROUND ARTILLERY WOULD BE CONTROLLED AND COORDINATED BETWEEN THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER (FSCC) AND THE DASC AT DIVISION LEVEL AND ABOVE, AND BETWEEN THE FSCC OR FSC (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR) AND THE TACP/ALO AT SUBORDINATE LEVELS.

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
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MAKING CORPS EYES ONLY

AT EACH LEVEL THE INFORMATION WILL BE PASSED UP AND DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WITH THE DASC/TACP INFORMING APPROPRIATE CRC/CRP/TAO/ABCCC AND FAC AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN THE AREA WITH THE INTENT THAT ALL AIRCRAFT WILL BE INFORMED AS TO LOCATION, DIRECTION AND ALTITUDE OF FIRE. TO SUPPRESS FIRE FOR THE PLACEMENT OF STRIKES COORDINATION WILL BE EFFECTED BETWEEN THE FSCC/DASC AND FSC/TACP DEPENDENT UPON THE OPERATING LEVEL. WITH RESPECT TO PRE-PLANNED GROUND OR NAVAL GUNFIRE, SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE CONTAINED WITHIN DAILY FRAG ORDER ISSUED TO ALL APPROPRIATE AGENCIES.

4. CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS. SEVENTH AF IN COOPERATION WITH III MAF WILL IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR RESPONSIVE OPERATIONAL COORDINATION OF AIR OPERATIONS.

5. AIRLIFT. NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ARRANGEMENT. REQUESTS FOR AIRLIFT WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT PROCEDURES.

6. STRIKE/RECCE CONTROL PROCEDURES. NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ARE INDICATED IN THE LAUNCH AND AIRBORNE CONTROL PROCEDURES FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF AIRCREWS. UNIT OPERATIONS CENTERS (TUOC/TADC) WILL BE INFORMED DIRECTLY BY THE TACC, APPROPRIATE DASC OR THE DAILY FRAG ORDER THE TIME OF LAUNCH, CONTROLLING AGENCIES AND WHEN POSSIBLE TARGET TYPE AND LOCATION. AFTER LAUNCH AIRCRAFT WILL CONTACT THE LOCAL CONTROLLING AGENCY (CRC/CRP/TAOC) FOR FLIGHT FOLLOWING AND MONITORING INTO THE TARGET AREA; INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT AGENCIES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO PASS DIVERT INFORMATION WHEN REQUIRED. CRC/CRP/TAOC WILL PASS AIRCRAFT TO THE DESIGNATED STRIKE CONTROL AGENCY, WHICH CAN BE EITHER A FAC FOR VISUAL STRIKES OR A MSQ/TPQ SITE FOR RADAR DROP.

HAS BEEN SENT

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SRG.									

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PART VI MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
REPORT PROCEDURES HAS BEEN SENT

1. TIMELY INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS DATA, AND MISSION RESULTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE FORCES AND TO FACILITATE SOUND DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO TARGET BASE ADJUSTMENTS AND STRIKE/RE-STRIKING TIMING.

2. ACCORDINGLY,

A. DASCS WILL REPORT TO 7AF TACC BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS IN AS NEAR TO REAL TIME AS PRACTICAL BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PROVIDED BY FACS.

B. DASCS, STRIKE, AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS WILL PROVIDE: "HOT" REPORTS OF INCIDENTS/EVENTS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH AERIAL OPERATIONS WHEN SUCH ACTIVITIES OCCUR IN ASSIGNED AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY; AERIAL OBSERVATION REPORTS AND INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES (DISUM) DAILY, OR MORE FREQUENTLY AS REQUIRED; AND GROUND FIRE INCIDENTS AS SET FORTH IN CMUSMACV DIRECTIVE 381-34.

C. STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS WILL PROVIDE OPERATIONAL REPORTS (OPREPS) 1 THRU 5 AS SPECIFIED IN ENCLOSURE 7 (OPERATIONAL REPORTS) TO CINCPACINST 005440.1E, OR PACIFIC AIR FORCES MANUAL 55-3 (COMMANDERS OPERATIONAL REPORTS) AS APPLICABLE.

D. STAFF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, OR RECONNAISSANCE UNITS AS MAY BE APPROPRIATE, WILL PROVIDE IPIRS, CPIRS, SUPIRS AND OTHER APPLICABLE SENSOR, OR IMAGERY, INTERPRETATION REPORTS FOR ALL RECONNAISSANCE PERFORMED.

3. REPORTS ENUMERATED IN SUB PARAS B-D ABOVE, WILL BE TRANSMITTED ELECTRICALLY BY IMMEDIATE OR FLASH PRECEDENCE AS APPROPRIATE, AND WILL INCLUDE DEPCOMUSMACV/AIR (7AF - TACC) AS AN ACTION ADDRESSEES.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 47

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

VV AWA 508
OO RUMSAK
DE RUMSAN 0232U 0530448
ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
O 220427Z FEB 68 ZFFG
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
INFO RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN,
INFO GENERAL MONYER,
FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND 05337

1. (S) I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON THE PLAN WHICH GENERAL MONYER PRESENTED TO YOU IN RESPONSE TO MY INSTRUCTIONS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THAT I AM SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT WILL SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE THE PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING AIR SUPPORT TO THE TROOPS UNDER YOUR CONTROL.
2. (S) IT IS MY INTENTION THAT YOU SERVE AT THE FIELD ARMY COMMANDER LEVEL WITH TACTICAL CONTROL OF BOTH THE PROVISIONAL CORPS AND III MAF. IN THIS CAPACITY YOU WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO ALLOCATE, AT YOUR DISCRETION, THE TACTICAL AIR ASSETS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT YOUR FORCES, SUBJECT TO MODIFICATIONS THAT I MIGHT INVOKE AS THE SITUATION DICTATES. YOU WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES IN YOUR AREA, IN KEEPING

PAGE 2 RUMSAN 0232U S E C R E T SPECAT
WITH CURRENTLY APPROVED DOCTRINE.

3. (S) I AM KEENLY AWARE OF THE DEPENDENCE WHICH THE MARINE CORPS PLACES ON ITS INTEGRAL FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT IN LIEU OF GUNSHIPS. IN KEEPING WITH THIS, I WOULD DESIRE THAT UNDER THE PROPOSED PLAN, MARINE AIRCRAFT SUPPORT MARINE TROOPS TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, AS THE NORMAL RULE. THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENTS DICTATED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION.
4. (S) IF AT ANY TIME YOU FIND THAT THE AIR SUPPORT YOU WERE RECEIVING WAS NOT SATISFACTORY, YOU COULD ADVISE ME IMMEDIATELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, I WOULD EXPECT THAT MY DEPUTY FOR AIR WOULD HAVE GENERAL DIRECTION OF ALL ROUTINE MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING, FRAGGING AND CONTROLLING AIR SUPPORT.

WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-65)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 46

SECRET

DE RUMHMA 3295 0029435
ZNY SSSSS
O 212435Z FEB 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FRIM
LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
A. CG III MAF 231413Z/FEB68(S) (MCEO)

1. I HAVE LOOKED OVER YOUR MESSAGE TO WESTY AS QUOTED IN REFERENCE A. A D BELIEVE YOU HAVE MADE SOME TELLING POINTS. MOST IMPRESSIVE TO ME IS PARAGRAPH IB, WHEREIN IT SPEAKS OF THE INEVITABLE ADDITIONAL APPROVING AUTHORITIES AND DEGRADED RESPONSIVENESS UNDER A JCH AF DOMINATED SYSTEM. OUR EXPERIENCE IN KOREA, UNDER AN IDENTICAL SITUATION, WAS GHASTLY. WE HAD TO HAVE OUR REQUESTS IN FOR PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS BY NOON THE PRECEDING DAY, AND THEN DID NOT FIND OUT WHETHER OUR REQUESTS WERE TO BE HONORED UNTIL ABOUT 0400 ON THE MORNING WE INTENDED TO EMPLOY THEM.
2. EQUALLY IMPRESSIVE WAS YOUR POINT IN SUBPARAGRAPH IB CONCERNING MOMYER'S ASSERTION THAT

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 3295 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
YOUR REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT WOULD BE TAMPERED WITH AS RARELY AS ONCE A MONTH, WITH THE POINT THAT THE CHANGE THUS APPEARS DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE.

3. THE THIRD EFFECTIVE POINT IS THE ONE IN SUBPARAGRAPH ID THAT RELATES TO MISSION CONTROL BY THE AIR FORCE OF OUR LIFE BLOOD AIR SUPPORT, WHERE A SIMILAR SITUATION DOES NOT OBTAIN FOR THE ARMY WITH ITS HUEY FIREPOWER UNDER THE COMMANDER'S CONTROL.

4. THESE THREE POINTS, COUPLED WITH YOUR APPLAUSE OF DIRECTIVE 95-4 IN PARAGRAPH 2, MAKE A STRONG CASE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT FEEL THAT THE LATTER PART OF PARAGRAPH 2 WHEREIN YOU STATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE OVER AIR CONTROL FOR ALL OF ICTZ IS EQUALLY BENEFICIAL. OUR STRENGTH LIES IN FIGHTING FOR THE PROCEDURES WHICH PROTECT THE AIR/GROUND TEAM AND ITS AIR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS. ANY TIME WE ATTEMPT TO TRY OUR CASE IN TERMS OF EXERCISING CONTROL ON GEOGRAPHIC OR REGIONAL GROUNDS, WE GET IN TROUBLE. ADDITIONALLY, WESTY WILL PAY LITTLE ATTENTION TO REFERENCES TO

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	WTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHFM 3295 S E C R E T SPECIALLY EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
"DOCTRINE" OR "STATUTE". I SUGGEST SOFT PEDALING
THESE APPROACHES.

5. WHEN YOU WRESTLE FURTHER WITH MOMYER ON THIS
PROBLEM AND HAVE THE DRAFT DOCUMENT IN HAND, SEND IT
TO ME AT ONCE SO THAT I CAN GO TO WORK ON MY
APPROACH TO SHARP. IN SENDING IT TO ME, PLEASE
INCLUDE ANY USEFUL BACKGROUND WHICH MIGHT HELP ME
IN MY CAMPAIGN. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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TOP SECRET

0 DD
 DE YVNA 3176 0512053
 ZNY TTTT
 O 202058Z FEB 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LIGEN KRDLAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAF 180120Z
 B. CG III MAF 160704Z
 C. COMUSMACV 191239Z
 D. CG FMFPAC 192309Z/JAN

1. HERE ARE A FEW THOUGHTS ON REFERENCE A, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH WESTY'S LOI TO ABRAMS (REFERENCE B)

AND MOMYER'S LATEST TRIP TO THE WELL (REFERENCE C).
 2. FIRST A WORD ON THE LOI, JUST IN CASE YOU FIND THAT YOUR HAVE TO LIVE WITH IT LONGER THAN NOW APPEARS LIKELY:

A. PARAGRAPH 1. WESTY GIVES ABRAMS, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, FULL TACTICAL AUTHORITY OVER CG III MAF. SIGNIFICANTLY, HE DOES NOT SAY THAT ABRAMS IS PERFORMING THESE DUTIES AS A MACV STAFF OFFICER, ACTING IN WESTY'S NAME. IF HE

PAGE 2 YVNA 3176 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEC
 IS, THERE IS NO REAL BASIS FOR COMPLAINT. IF HE IS NOT, THEN WE HAVE A NEW ECHELON OF COMMAND, WITH ALL THE ATTENDANT INEFFICIENCY AND LAYERING.

B. PARAGRAPH 2. THIS IS AN UNSOLDIERLY AND ORGANIZATIONALLY INOPERABLE SCHEME. MACV FORWARD IS, BY DEFINITION, WESTY'S OWN STAFF. HE SAYS THAT IT WILL SERVE ABRAMS WHO, WE ASSUME, IS STILL HIS DEPUTY. HOWEVER, IF ABRAMS IS NOT PRESENT AT THE FORWARD HEADQUARTERS, THEN WESTY SAYS THAT HIS STAFF BECOMES YOUR STAFF--BUT FOR DIRECTION OF ONLY A PART OF III MAF'S OPERATION--THE NORTHERN ICTZ. THUS, MACV FORWARD--ESTABLISHED BY WESTY AS A SUPERIOR OF III MAF-- AT TIMES BECOMES A PARALLEL OR, IF YOU WANT, A SUBORDINATE TO III MAF, WHENEVER ABRAMS IS "NOT IN RESIDENCE" WHATEVER THE HELL THAT MEANS. SO, WHILE IN PARAGRAPH 1, ABRAMS (PRESUMABLY SUPPORTED BY THE STAFF) GIVES YOU ORDERS ON ALL OF III MAF TACTICAL MATTERS, THE STAFF IS

APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO WORK ON ONLY PART OF III MAF'S PROBLEM WHEN YOU ARE THE BOSS.

3. NOW, HOWEVER, FROM REFERENCE A, IT LOOKS LIKE THE

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TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 YVNA 3176 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 POORLY THOUGHT-OUT PROVISIONAL FIELD ARMY AND THE
 SUBSEQUENT RETREAT INTO THE MACV FORWARD IDEA ARE
 GOING TO EVOLVE FURTHER INTO A SPLIT OF ICTZ INTO TWO
 GEOGRAPHIC/TACTICAL ENTITIES. APPARENTLY WESTY'S
 FEELING THAT HE MUST HAVE A CP OF HIS OWN, NEAR
 THE BATTLE, HAS GONE BY THE BOARD. AND I WOULD THINK
 THAT LAM WOULD SOON BE PRETTY CONFUSED AS TO WHO
 HIS U. S. COUNTERPART REALLY IS.

4. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE NEXT CYCLE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT
 WESTY WILL SEVER THE COMMAND LINE NOW CONTEMPLATED
 TO SUBORDINATE THE PROVISIONAL CORPS TO CG III MAF,
 LEAVING III MAF, WITH 2 DIVISIONS (PLUS), THE 1ST MAW AND
 FLC. THIS WOULD NOT ONLY BREAK UP THE MARINES, BUT WOULD PUT WESTY IN
 A GOOD POSTURE, IF THE CURRENT ENEMY OPERATIONS CAN BE
 BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL, TO PROSECUTE HIS LONG-
 TREASURED YORK OPERATIONS OR HIS CORPS CONTINGENCY
 FORCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, OF
 COURSE, A FAR BETTER DEAL WOULD BE TO CONCENTRATE
 BOTH MARINE DIVISIONS IN QUANG TRI, WITH THE ARMY

PAGE 4 YVNA 3176 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 FORCES PACKAGED FARTHER SOUTH. BUT HOWEVER THE MARINES
 ARE DISTRIBUTED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT WESTY
 WILL LONG REMAIN SATISFIED TO PERMIT AN ARMY CORPS
 HEADQUARTERS, WHICH IS TO BE THREE TIMES THE SIZE OF
 HEADQUARTERS, III MAF, TO BE DIRECTED BY THE LATTER,
 AND I CONSIDER IT PRUDENT TO PRESUME THAT HIS NEXT STEP
 WILL BE TO REOPEN HIS PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT
 FIELD ARMY HEADQUARTERS FOR THE CONTROL OF III MAF
 AND THE PROVISIONAL CORPS, VIETNAM.

5. THE PROVISIONAL CORPS, VIETNAM STEP HAS ANOTHER EFFECT:--
 OBVIOUS TO YOU, I AM SURE. IT FRAYS THE AIR/GROUND
 TEAM BINDING BETWEEN 3D MAR DIV AND 1ST MAW, BY
 INSINUATING AN INTERVENING GROUND HEADQUARTERS
 BETWEEN 3D MAR DIV, III MAF AND 1ST MAW. IN ALL OF OUR
 DISCUSSIONS OF THE SUBJECT WESTY HAS NEVER BEEN ABLE
 TO SEE WHAT THE AIR/GROUND TEAM REALLY IS;--MARINE AIR
 AND GROUND FORCES SERVING TOGETHER UNDER MARINE
 OPERATIONAL COMMAND. HE FEELS (INSPIRED, I AM SURE,
 BY MOMYER) THAT THE AIR/GROUND TEAM FORMULA CAN BE
 SATISFIED IF USMC AIRCRAFT, OPERATING UNDER 7TH AIR

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 YVNA 3176 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 FORCE OPCON, ARE FRAGGED TO SUPPORT USMC GROUND
 FORCES, IN NUMBERS DETERMINED BY 7TH AF, AND IN TERMS
 WHERE YOU HAVE NO AUTHORITY OVER THE MARINE AIR UNITS,
 AND NO CAPABILITY TO DIRECT OR APPORTION THE MARINE
 AIR EFFORT.

UNDER THE CONTEMPLATED PROVISIONAL CORPS, VIETNAM
 DEAL, 3D MARDIV WILL STILL BE UNDER III MAF OPCON
 (ALBEIT ONCE REMOVED) AND YOU CAN STILL DIRECT THE
 LEVEL AND THRUST OF THE TACTICAL AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT
 OF THE MARINE GROUND ACTION. PROBLEMS OF FIRE SUPPORT
 COORDINATION, FIRE SUPPORT ALLOCATION AND AIR SPACE
 CONTROL WILL MAKE IT MOST DIFFICULT, BUT YOU CAN DO
 IT. OR, AT LEAST, YOU CAN DO IT, IF REFERENCE C
 DOES NOT PRODUCE A MACV DIRECTIVE WHICH DIRECTLY
 PRECLUDES YOUR DOING SO.

6. WITH RESPECT TO REFERENCE C, IT EMBODIES NOTHING
 NEW AT ALL. IT IS A SHINED UP RESTATEMENT OF THE SAME
 PITCH, ISSUED JUST A MONTH EARLIER, MEANING HARDER THAN
 EVER ON GENERALIZATIONS RELATED TO THE CRISIS AND ON
 GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING MAINTAINING "TO THE

PAGE 6 YVNA 3176 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT THE PRESENT MODUS OPERANDI;
 ALL DESIGNED TO LEVER SHARP INTO COLLAPSING. IN
 ATTACKING WESTY'S RESTATEMENT OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE CASE,
 I FEEL THAT EVERYTHING CONTAINED IN REFERENCE D, STILL
 APPLIES. WHEN SHARP RETURNS TO HIS HEADQUARTERS TOMORROW,
 I WILL TAKE THAT POSITION WITH HIM, EMPHASIZING:

A. THAT WESTY ALREADY HAS A SINGLE MANAGER--HIMSELF;
 AND HE HAS A JOINT STAFF ADEQUATE TO SERVE HIM IN THIS
 REGARD.

B. THAT NOMYER DOES NOT TODAY COORDINATE THE AIR
 EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; THAT HIS ONLY FUNCTION
 IS TO BUMP WHAT HE STATES ARE HIS SORTIE CAPABILITIES
 AGAINST ARMY DIVISION REQUIREMENTS, AND THEN LET THE
 ARMY FIGURE OUT THE ALLOCATION INTERNALLY; THAT THIS
 DOES NOT PRESENT ANY BENEFIT FROM TURNING MARINE AIR
 OVER TO NOMYER.

C. THAT DESPITE THE CURRENT HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF
 AIR EFFORT NEAR THE DMZ, THERE HAS BEEN NO PROBLEM OF
 CONTROL OF COORDINATION, AND CONSEQUENTLY NO NEED
 BY

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

OO DDKE
 DE YVNA 3177 05 12358
 ZNY TTTT
 O 202358Z FEB 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2.
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR MAJOR CHANGE.

D. THAT GIVING NOMYER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
 YOUR TACTICAL AIR WILL RESULT IN NOT ONE BIT MORE
 COORDINATION, BUT IT WILL CERTAINLY RESULT IN DEGRADED
 RESPONSE FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, DIRECT AIR SUPPORT AND
 HELICOPTER ESCORT--AT THE MOST CRITICAL HOUR OF THE
 BATTLE. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE OUTCOME.

7. SUMMARIZING:

A. WESTY'S LOT WILL NOT WORK, UNLESS THAT DIRECTIVE
 IS SOON CHANGED OR RESCINDED. YOU MAY WISH TO GO TO HIM
 AND POINT OUT ITS DEFECTS; REQUESTING THAT ABRAMS'
 POSITION AS A STAFF OFFICER, AND NOT A COMMANDER, BE
 MADE CLEAR; AND REQUESTING THAT THE INCONSISTENCY OF
 CAUSING THE MACV STAFF TO SERVE CG III MAF, PART TIME, BE

PAGE 2 YVNA 3177 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 ELIMINATED.

B. IT IS QUITE WITHIN WESTY'S AUTHORITY TO CREATE THE
 PROVISIONAL CORPS, VIETNAM, AND TO INCLUDE MARINES AND
 SOLDIERS IN IT. THIS ACTION WILL COMPLICATE BUT WILL
 NOT TOTALLY COMPROMISE YOUR AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIPS,

SO LONG - BUT ONLY SO LONG - AS THE PROVISIONAL CORPS
 IS UNDER CG III MAF.

C. THE LATEST AIR FORCE EFFORT (REFERENCE C) RESPONDS
 TO THE TREATMENT IN REFERENCE D. THERE ARE NO NEW
 FACTORS, JUST ADDED REASON FOR NOT CHANGING AN
 EFFECTIVE SYSTEM AND FOR NOT PROTRACTING REACTION
 TIMES AT THE HOUR OF CRISIS.

S. AS TO THE PROVISIONAL CORPS, VIETNAM IDEA, HERE ARE
 MY THOUGHTS:

A. FIRST AND FOREMOST, DEPLOYMENTS AND OPERATIONAL
 ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE SOUGHT WHICH DO THE MOST
 TO WIN THE BATTLE.

R. THESE ARE TACTICAL DECISIONS, AND SUBSTANTIALLY
 WITHIN WESTY'S PROVINCE. HOWEVER, WHERE MARINES ARE
 CONCERNED, WE KNOW, FROM EXPERIENCE, THAT THE AIR/

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 YVNA 3177 T O P S E C R E T S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE MCEO
GROUND TEAM FIGHTS MOST EFFECTIVELY WHEN IT IS A
COMMAND UNITY.

C. ON THIS BASIS, AND APPRECIATING THE NEED FOR A
CORPS TYPE ORGANIZATION IN NORTHERN ICTZ, IT WILL BE
MOST PRODUCTIVE, IN ACHIEVING IT, TO BRING THE ELEMENTS
OF III MAF TOGETHER. AND, SINCE IT IS PATENTLY INFEASIBLE
NOW TO REDEPLOY 3D MAR DIV, I BELIEVE THAT CONSIDERATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE NORTHWARD MOVEMENT OF 1ST MAR
DIV, TO A POSTURE ADJACENT TO 3D MAR DIV. THIS WOULD
UNITE THE MARINE GROUND ELEMENTS IN AN AREA WITH
WHICH THEY ARE FAMILIAR, WHERE THEY ALREADY HAVE AN
ON-GOING LOGISTIC SYSTEM, AND WHERE THEY CAN OPERATE
OVER THE BEACH FOR THE NEXT SEVEN MONTHS, IF NEEDED.
ADDITIONALLY, IT REDUCES THE PROSPECTIVE TACTICAL AIR
PROBLEM.

9. NEW SUBJECT. I PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THE ENEMY IS
LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE HAZARDS INVOLVED IN
ASSAULTING KHE SANH, CON THIEN ETC, THEN HE IS ABOUT
THE AFTERMATH. HE DOUBTLESS SENSES THAT NO GREAT
TRIUMPH IS INVOLVED IN OVERRUNNING A POSITION, ONLY

PAGE 4 YVNA 3177 T O P S E C R E T S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE MCEO
TO BE EJECTED BY COUNTERATTACK. CONSEQUENTLY IT
WOULD APPEAR PROFITABLE TO LET HIM KNOW - BY THE
VARIOUS OBVIOUS MEANS - THAT OUR DEFENSE OF THE KEY
LOCALITIES IS INTENDED TO BE AN ACTIVE ONE; THAT OUR
COUNTERATTACK PLANS ARE COMPREHENSIVE, OUR COUNTER-
ATTACK FORCES VERY STRONG. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3
BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMMWAA 2156 0511418
ZNY SSSSS
O 201418Z FEB 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT TO GEN WESTMORELAND TODAY.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

QUOTE.
O 201416Z FEB 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
INFO RUMSAL/CG SEVENTH AIR FORCE
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GEN
MOMYER, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
REF (A) YOUR 191147Z FEB 68
1. IN RESPONSE TO REF (A), GENERAL MOMYER AND I MET THIS DATE AT
III MAF HQTRS. GENERAL MOMYER PRESENTED HIS PROPOSED I CORPS
ORGANIZATION FOR AIR REQUEST AND CONTROL. AS A RESULT OF THIS

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 2156 **S E C R E T** MCEO SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
BRIEFING, SEVERAL POINTS HAVE BEEN RAISED IN MY MIND:
A. FIRST, THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT IN THE I CORPS
TACTICAL ZONE. IN THE PRESENTATION OF GENERAL MOMYER'S, THERE WAS
A PROVISIONAL CORPS B NORTH AND AN I CORPS SOUTH, WITH PARALLEL
AIR REQUEST AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS. THERE WAS NO INDICATION AS
TO WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A COMMON SUPERIOR TO PROVISIONAL CORPS B
NORTH, AND I CORPS SOUTH, OR WHETHER, AS YOU HAVE STATED TO ME,
I WOULD FUNCTION AT THE FIELD ARMY COMMANDER LEVEL AND THE
PROVISIONAL CORPS WOULD BE UNDER MY OPCON. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE
THE PROPER AIR REQUEST AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, IT IS NECESSARY
THAT THE EXACT ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT BE ESTABLISHED.
B. UNDER THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, THE TACC AT SAIGON WOULD
FRAG ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN VIETNAM. UNDER EXISTING MARINE
CORPS DOCTRINE, THE SENIOR MARINE CORPS COMMANDER POSSESSES THE
AUTHORITY TO FRAG ALL AIRCRAFT THAT ARE INTEGRAL TO THE MARINE CORPS
COMBAT ELEMENTS. IT IS MY DESIRE THAT ANY SYSTEM ENSURE CONTINUANCE
OF THIS HIGHLY DESIRABLE PRACTICE OF FRAGGING MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT.
UNDER THE PROPOSED SYSTEM, AT LEAST TWO LEVELS OF APPROVING AUTHORITY
WOULD BE SUPERIMPOSED OVER MY PRESENT SYSTEM. NATURALLY, RESPONSIVE-
NESS TO FRAGGING PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS WOULD SUFFER. DURING OUR

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

43

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE THREE RUMMWAA 2156 S E C R E T MCEO SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
DISCUSSION, IT WAS CONTENTED THAT THE MARINE CORPS REQUESTS FOR AIR
SUPPORT WOULD RARELY BE CHANGED BY THE 7TH AF; IT WAS POSTULATED THAT
THIS WOULD OCCUR ON THE ORDER OF ONCE A MONTH. ACCORDINGLY, TO INSIST
UPON A MORE COMPLICATED REQUEST SYSTEM FOR THE EXCEPTION, RATHER THAN
THE RULE, APPEARS TO BE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE.

C. UNDER ANY ARRANGEMENTS, IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE GROUND
COMMANDER BE THE DETERMINING INDIVIDUAL AS TO WHICH SUPPORTING ARM-
ARTILLERY, AIR, OR NAVAL GUNFIRE, WILL BE DELIVERED IN HIS AREA.

I, AS THE GROUND COMMANDER, MUST POSSESS THE FINAL CHOICE IN
DERMINING WHETHER I WANT TO SHUT OFF ARTILLERY, AIR, OR NAVAL
GUNFIRE AT ANY PARTICULAR MOMENT DURING THE BATTLE.

D. THE MARINE CORPS, BY STATUTE, PROVIDES FLEET MARINE FORCES
OF COMBINED ARMS, TOGETHER WITH SUPPORTING AIR COMPONENTS. OUR
DIVISIONS AND AIR WINGS ARE ORGANIZED FOR COMBAT INTO AIR/GROUND
TEAMS, AND THE FIXED-WING SQUADRONS ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A CERTAIN
NUMBER OF SORTIES FOR EACH MARINE BATTALION. TO FOLLOW THE SYSTEM
PROPOSED BY GENERAL MOMYER WOULD, IN EFFECT, DILUTE THE NUMBER OF
SORTIES REQUIRED FOR THE SUPPORT OF EACH MARINE BATTALION. ON THE
OTHER HAND, THE INTEGRAL AIR SUPPORT OF THE U. S. ARMY IS UNTOUCHED.
UNDER THE PROPOSAL, HELICOPTERS ARE NOT AFFECTED. AS YOU KNOW, THE

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMMWAA 2156 S E C R E T MCEO SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
ARMY ORGANIZATION INCLUDES HUEY GUNSHIPS, HUEYS ARMED WITH A.R.A.,
HUEY COBRAS, AND IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE ADVANCED AERIAL FIRE SUPPORT
SYSTEM. ACCORDINGLY, THE ARMY COMMANDER RETAINS THE CONSIDERABLE
FIRE POWER OVER WHICH HE HAS DIRECT CONTROL, AND WITH WHICH HE CAN
INFLUENCE THE TIDE OF BATTLE. UNDER THE PROPOSED SYSTEM, THESE
ASSETS WOULD BE UNTOUCHED, WHEREAS THE FIXED-WING OF THE MARINE AIR/
GROUND TEAM THAT PERFORMS SIMILAR MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF MARINE
GROUND FORCES WOULD BE PLACED UNDER THE MISSION CONTROL OF ANOTHER
SERVICE.

2. IN MY OPINION, THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN YOUR DIRECTIVE 95-4
PROVIDE YOU THE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO MARSHAL ALL AVAILABLE AIR
ASSETS IN MACV, IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER. IN
QUESTIONING GENERAL MOMYER, I WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THERE HAD
BEEN DISSATISFACTION ON THE PART OF THE GROUND UNIT COMMANDERS WITH
RESPECT TO THE AIR SUPPORT BEING PROVIDED IN I CORPS. CONSEQUENTLY,
IT IS MY OPINION THAT THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON FOR CHANGING A
SYSTEM THAT IS PRESENTLY WORKING WELL. ALTHOUGH NOT ACTIVELY
ADVOCATING THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL, I BELIEVE IT COULD VERY WELL
SATISFY YOUR DESIRE FOR HAVING A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL YOU COULD HOLD
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AIR EFFORT IN I CORPS. AS YOUR

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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43

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMWAA 2156 S E C R E T M C E O S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E
 PRINCIPAL GROUND COMMANDER, I ALSO POSSESS CONSIDERABLE AIR ASSETS,
 AND IN MY OPINION, THE FINEST AIR CONTROL SYSTEM EXISTING IN THE
 WORLD TODAY. IF YOU WISH, I COULD ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
 CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF THE ENTIRE AIR EFFORT IN THE I CORPS
 TACTICAL ZONE AND BE THE SINGLE INDIVIDUAL THAT YOU COULD HOLD
 RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENTIRE U. S. MILITARY EFFORT IN THE I CORPS
 TACTICAL ZONE. IN THIS REGARD, THE MANY NAVY CARRIER SORTIES COULD
 EASILY BE ASSIMILATED AND CONTROLLED BY MY AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, AS
 BOTH OUR SERVICES USE THE SAME SYSTEM THAT HAS BEEN PROVEN SO
 SUCCESSFUL IN PAST AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT OPERATIONS.

3. ALTHOUGH THE BRIEFING CONDUCTED BY GENERAL MOMYER WAS WELL DONE,
 SEVERAL POINTS OTHER THAN THOSE OUTLINED ABOVE WERE RAISED BY ME
 OR MY STAFF. AS A RESULT, I HAVE ASKED GENERAL MOMYER TO PROVIDE
 ME THE DRAFT PLAN THAT YOU INTEND SUBMITTING TO CINCPAC FOR APPROVAL,
 WHICH HE PROMISED TO DO. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT UPON RECEIPT, IT WILL
 RECEIVE MY IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE.

GP-4

BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

43

SECRET

OO RUMSAW RUMSAW
DE RUMSAW 2155 0511416
ZNY SSSSS
O 201416Z FEB 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
INFO RUMSAL/CG SEVENTH AIR FORCE
BT

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GEN MOMYER, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
REF (A) YOUR 191147Z FEB 68

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF (A), GENERAL MOMYER AND I MET THIS DATE AT III MAF HQTRS. GENERAL MOMYER PRESENTED HIS PROPOSED I CORPS ORGANIZATION FOR AIR REQUEST AND CONTROL. AS A RESULT OF THIS BRIEFING, SEVERAL POINTS HAVE BEEN RAISED IN MY MIND:
A. FIRST, THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. IN THE PRESENTATION OF GENERAL MOMYER'S, THERE WAS A PROVISIONAL CORPS B NORTH AND AN I CORPS SOUTH, WITH PARALLEL AIR REQUEST AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS. THERE WAS NO INDICATION AS TO WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A COMMON SUPERIOR TO PROVISIONAL CORPS B NORTH, AND I CORPS SOUTH, OR WHETHER, AS YOU HAVE STATED TO ME, I WOULD FUNCTION AT THE FIELD ARMY COMMANDER LEVEL AND THE PROVISIONAL CORPS WOULD BE UNDER MY OPCON. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE

PAGE TWO RUMSAW 2155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

THE PROPER AIR REQUEST AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE EXACT ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT BE ESTABLISHED.

B. UNDER THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, THE TACC AT SAIGON WOULD FRAG ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN VIETNAM. UNDER EXISTING MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE, THE SENIOR MARINE CORPS COMMANDER POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO FRAG ALL AIRCRAFT THAT ARE INTEGRAL TO THE MARINE CORPS COMBAT ELEMENTS. IT IS MY DESIRE THAT ANY SYSTEM ENSURE CONTINUANCE OF THIS HIGHLY DESIRABLE PRACTICE OF FRAGGING MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT. UNDER THE PROPOSED SYSTEM, AT LEAST TWO LEVELS OF APPROVING AUTHORITY WOULD BE SUPERIMPOSED OVER MY PRESENT SYSTEM. NATURALLY, RESPONSIVENESS TO FRAGGING PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS WOULD SUFFER. DURING OUR DISCUSSION, IT WAS CONTENTED THAT THE MARINE CORPS REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT WOULD RARELY BE CHANGED BY THE 7TH AF; IT WAS POSTULATED THAT THIS WOULD OCCUR ON THE ORDER OF ONCE A MONTH. ACCORDINGLY, TO INSIST UPON A MORE COMPLICATED REQUEST SYSTEM FOR THE EXCEPTION, RATHER THAN THE RULE, APPEARS TO BE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE.

C. UNDER ANY ARRANGEMENTS, IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE GROUND COMMANDER BE THE DETERMINING INDIVIDUAL AS TO WHICH SUPPORTING ARM-ARTILLERY, AIR, OR NAVAL GUNFIRE, WILL BE DELIVERED IN HIS AREA. I, AS THE GROUND COMMANDER, MUST POSSESS THE FINAL CHOICE IN

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SECRET

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2155 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 DETERMINING WHETHER I WANT TO SHUT OFF ARTILLERY, AIR, OR NAVAL GUNFIRE AT ANY PARTICULAR MOMENT DURING THE BATTLE.
 D. THE MARINE CORPS, BY STATUTE, PROVIDES FLEET MARINE FORCES OF COMBINED ARMS, TOGETHER WITH SUPPORTING AIR COMPONENTS. OUR DIVISIONS AND AIR WINGS ARE ORGANIZED FOR COMBAT INTO AIR/GROUND TEAMS, AND THE FIXED-WING SQUADRONS ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SORTIES FOR EACH MARINE BATTALION. TO FOLLOW THE SYSTEM PROPOSED BY GENERAL MOMYER WOULD, IN EFFECT, DILUTE THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUIRED FOR THE SUPPORT OF EACH MARINE BATTALION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INTEGRAL AIR SUPPORT OF THE U. S. ARMY IS UNTOUCHED. UNDER THE PROPOSAL, HELICOPTERS ARE NOT AFFECTED. AS YOU KNOW, THE ARMY ORGANIZATION INCLUDES HUEY GUNSHIPS, HUEYS ARMED WITH A.R.A., HUEY COBRAS, AND IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE ADVANCED AERIAL FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM. ACCORDINGLY, THE ARMY COMMANDER RETAINS THE CONSIDERABLE FIRE POWER OVER WHICH HE HAS DIRECT CONTROL, AND WITH WHICH HE CAN INFLUENCE THE TIDE OF BATTLE. UNDER THE PROPOSED SYSTEM, THESE ASSETS WOULD BE UNTOUCHED, WHEREAS THE FIXED-WING OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM THAT PERFORMS SIMILAR MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF MARINE GROUND FORCES WOULD BE PLACED UNDER THE MISSION CONTROL OF ANOTHER SERVICE.

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2155 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 2. IN MY OPINION, THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN YOUR DIRECTIVE 95-4 PROVIDE YOU THE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO MARSHAL ALL AVAILABLE AIR ASSETS IN MACV, IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER. IN QUESTIONING GENERAL MOMYER, I WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISSATISFACTION ON THE PART OF THE GROUND UNIT COMMANDERS WITH RESPECT TO THE AIR SUPPORT BEING PROVIDED IN I CORPS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS MY OPINION THAT THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON FOR CHANGING A SYSTEM THAT IS PRESENTLY WORKING WELL. ALTHOUGH NOT ACTIVELY ADVOCATING THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL, I BELIEVE IT COULD VERY WELL SATISFY YOUR DESIRE FOR HAVING A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL YOU COULD HOLD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AIR EFFORT IN I CORPS. AS YOUR PRINCIPAL GROUND COMMANDER, I ALSO POSSESS CONSIDERABLE AIR ASSETS, AND IN MY OPINION, THE FINEST AIR CONTROL SYSTEM EXISTING IN THE WORLD TODAY. IF YOU WISH, I COULD ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF THE ENTIRE AIR EFFORT IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AND BE THE SINGLE INDIVIDUAL THAT YOU COULD HOLD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENTIRE U. S. MILITARY EFFORT IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. IN THIS REGARD, THE MANY NAVY CARRIER SORTIES COULD EASILY BE ASSIMILATED AND CONTROLLED BY MY AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, AS BOTH OUR SERVICES USE THE SAME SYSTEM THAT HAS BEEN PROVEN SO

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2155 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SUCCESSFUL IN PAST AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT OPERATIONS.

3. ALTHOUGH THE BRIEFING CONDUCTED BY GENERAL MOMYER WAS WELL DONE, SEVERAL POINTS OTHER THAN THOSE OUTLINED ABOVE WERE RAISED BY ME OR MY STAFF. AS A RESULT, I HAVE ASKED GENERAL MOMYER TO PROVIDE ME THE DRAFT PLAN THAT YOU INTEND SUBMITTING TO CINCPAC FOR APPROVAL, WHICH HE PROMISED TO DO. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT UPON RECEIPT, IT WILL RECEIVE MY IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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DC/S						
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CEO						
S/S			200730		<i>plw</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

SECRET

41

O 191239Z H ZFF-3

FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
 TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
 INFO GEN WHEELER CJC WASH
 GEN MOMYER CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT
 LIG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV MACV (FWD)
 ZEM

SECRET

SECRET MAC 02365 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIGHTER BOMBER AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR, CONTEMPLATED NEW COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN I CORPS NORTH, THE DEPLOYMENT OF TWO ARMY DIVISIONS TO THAT AREA, AND THE NECESSITY OF BRINGING TO BEAR THE MAXIMUM FIRE POWER ON THE ENEMY IN SUPPORT OF BOTH ARMY AND MARINE TROOPS NECESSITATES A NEW AND OBJECTIVE LOOK AT THE CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR. THE PROBLEM IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE INCREASE IN B-52 STRIKES IN I CORPS NORTH IN ADDITION TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE AND NAVY STRIKES, AND THE COMPLICATED TRAFFIC CONTROL RESULTING FROM THE HEAVY TRANSPORT ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I HAVE GIVEN LONG AND DETAILED THOUGHT TO THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SITUATION DICTATES THE CREATION OF A SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT. IN ESSENCE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I LOOK TO ONE MAN TO COORDINATE THIS AIR EFFORT AND BRING THIS FIRE POWER TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY IN LINE WITH MY DAY-TO-DAY GUIDANCE.

I HAVE A FOUR-STAR AIR FORCE GENERAL, MOMYER, AS DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR WHO ALSO COMMANDS THE 7TH AIR FORCE. OBVIOUSLY, HE IS THE MAN FOR ME TO HOLD RESPONSIBLE FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THIS EFFORT. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT GEN MOMYER DEVELOP A PLAN THAT WILL GIVE HIM CONTROL OF THE AIR ASSETS, LESS HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE FOR MARINE AIRCRAFT TO CONTINUE DIRECT SUPPORT TO THEIR DEPLOYED GROUND FORCES. I HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM TO GET TOGETHER URGENTLY WITH III MAF AND DEVELOP SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR WAR EFFORT AND TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM SUPPORT POSSIBLE TO MARINE GROUND ELEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, I HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM TO DEVELOP AN ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL PRESERVE THE MARINE CONTROL SYSTEM AND MAINTAIN TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT THE PRESENT MODUS OPERANDI.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE SOONEST SO THAT THEY WILL BE FULLY OPERATIONAL WHEN THE BATTLE IN I CORPS NORTH REACHES ITS MAXIMUM INTENSITY. UNDER THE FORGOING GUIDANCE, GENERAL MOMYER WILL PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DEVELOP A DIRECTIVE FOR MY CONSIDERATION. THIS I WILL SUBMIT SOONEST WITH THE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

500

SECRET

41

0191239Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
 TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC VAIL
 INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH
 GEN MOMYER CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV MACV (FWD)
 ZEM

SECRET

SECRET MAC 02365 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIGHTER BOMBER AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR, CONTEMPLATED NEW COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN I CORPS NORTH, THE DEPLOYMENT OF TWO ARMY DIVISIONS TO THAT AREA, AND THE NECESSITY OF BRINGING TO BEAR THE MAXIMUM FIRE POWER ON THE ENEMY IN SUPPORT OF BOTH ARMY AND MARINE TROOPS NECESSITATES A NEW AND OBJECTIVE LOOK AT THE CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR. THE PROBLEM IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE INCREASE IN B-52 STRIKES IN I CORPS NORTH IN ADDITION TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE AND NAVY STRIKES, AND THE COMPLICATED TRAFFIC CONTROL RESULTING FROM THE HEAVY TRANSPORT ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I HAVE GIVEN LONG AND DETAILED THOUGHT TO THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SITUATION DICTATES THE CREATION OF A SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT. IN ESSENCE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I LOOK TO ONE MAN TO COORDINATE THIS AIR EFFORT AND BRING THIS FIRE POWER TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY IN LINE WITH MY DAY-TO-DAY GUIDANCE.

I HAVE A FOUR-STAR AIR FORCE GENERAL, MOMYER, AS DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR WHO ALSO COMMANDS THE 7TH AIR FORCE. OBVIOUSLY, HE IS THE MAN FOR ME TO HOLD RESPONSIBLE FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THIS EFFORT. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT GEN MOMYER DEVELOP A PLAN THAT WILL GIVE HIM CONTROL OF THE AIR ASSETS, LESS HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE FOR MARINE AIRCRAFT TO CONTINUE DIRECT SUPPORT TO THEIR DEPLOYED GROUND FORCES. I HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM TO GET TOGETHER URGENTLY WITH III MAF AND DEVELOP SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR WAR EFFORT AND TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM SUPPORT POSSIBLE TO MARINE GROUND ELEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, I HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM TO DEVELOP AN ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL PRESERVE THE MARINE CONTROL SYSTEM AND MAINTAIN TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT THE PRESENT MODUS OPERANDI.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE SOONEST SO THAT THEY WILL BE FULLY OPERATIONAL WHEN THE BATTLE IN I CORPS NORTH REACHES ITS MAXIMUM INTENSITY. UNDER THE FORGOING GUIDANCE, GENERAL MOMYER WILL PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DEVELOP A DIRECTIVE FOR MY CONSIDERATION. THIS I WILL SUBMIT SOONEST WITH THE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

500

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

O 180212Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM LTGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF
TO GEN CHAPMAN CMC
ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY

I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND THIS MORNING.
QUOTE: 1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES INTO
I CORPS, IMPENDING BATTLES AND THE NEED FOR HAVING MORE OPERATIONAL
FLEXIBILITY OF THE AIR EFFORT AVAILABLE TO ME, I AM CONTEMPLATING
PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MARINE AIR WING UNDER MY DEPUTY
FOR AIR. HELICOPTERS WOULD REMAIN UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. I
HAVE ASKED MOMYER TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AND ANDERSON TOMORROW. IN
VIEW OF THE ENEMY BUILD-UP, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT I BE IN THE BEST
FEASIBLE POSTURE TO MEET THE THREAT. I BELIEVE CENTRALIZING CONTROL
OF THE AIR RESOURCES WILL PROMOTE THIS REQUIREMENT. I AM PROPOSING
THIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL ARRANGEMENT AS TEMPORARY MEASURE TO MEET
THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOUR VIEWS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED. UNQUOTE.

GP-3

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER AT COMMENCEMENT
OF WORKING HOURS.

250

NNNN

#39

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMSAK 1851 0490120
ZNY SSSSS
P 180120Z FEB 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRBLAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. WESTY HAS CURRENTLY STATED THAT ON OR ABOUT 1 MARCH HE INTENDS TO FORM A PROVISIONAL CORPS OF 1ST AIRCAV, 101ST AIRBORNE AND 3D MARINE DIVISIONS. ROSSON WOULD COMMAND THE CORPS AND REPORT TO ME. I, AS III MAF, WOULD COMMAND PROVISIONAL CORPS, 1ST MARDIV, AMERICAL DIV, 1ST MAW AND FLC. WESTY MAY ASK CHAPPY FOR MAJGEN USMC AS ROSSON DEPUTY.

2. I CONCURRED WITH PROVISO 3D MARDIV COULD STILL RECEIVE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FROM 1ST MAW. WESTY AGREED; HOWEVER, THERE IS MUCH AND CONTINUING TROUBLE OVER THE WHOLE QUESTION OF AIR CONTROL. MOMYER ATTACKS US AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY.

3. WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS ON MY TAKING CARL HOFFMAN AS G-3 UNDR NEW SET UP.

WARM REGARDS. GP-4

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PWO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

38

O 171206Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
INFO GEN MOMYER CG 7TH AF
ZEM

SECRET MAC 00791 EYES ONLY

1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES INTO
CORPS, IMPENDING BATTLES AND THE NEED FOR HAVING MORE OPEN
PERSONAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE AIR EFFORT AVAILABLE TO ME, I AM
CONTEMPLATING PLACING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I MARINE
AIR WING UNDER MY DEPUTY FORNAIR. HELICOPTERS WOULD REMAIN
UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. I HAVE ASKED MOMYER TO DISCUSS
THIS WITH YOU AND ANDERSON TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY
BUILD-UP, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT I BE IN THE BEST FEASIBLE POSTURE
TO MEET THE THREAT. I BELIEVE CENTRALIZING CONTROL OF THE AIR
RESOURCES WILL PROMOTE THIS REQUIREMENT. AM PROPOSING THIS
OPERATIONAL CONTROL ARRANGEMENT AS TEMPORARY MEASURE TO
MEET THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOUR VIEWS WILL BE MOST AP-
PRECIATED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
170

NNNN

SECRET

37