

DECLASSIFIED

- TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE -

(OUTGOING)

1. CG III MAF 241256Z FEB 68 (Ts) *Group-4*  
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND INFO GEN MOMYER, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ
2. CG III MAF 241258Z FEB 68 (TS) *Group-4*  
FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ
3. CG III MAF 270232Z FEB 68 (TS) *Gp-3*  
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
REQUIREMENT PACKAGE
4. CG III MAF 280041Z FEB 68 (TS) *Gp-4*  
TO GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GEN MOMYER FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
RECOMMENDED LOCATIONS AND PHASE IN
5. CG III MAF 281328Z FEB 68 (TS) *Gp-4*  
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
ADDITIONAL MACV REQUIREMENTS (U)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

45. ✓ CG III MAF 030858Z FEB 68 (TS) *gp-4*  
~~FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY~~  
STAFF PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION

~~46. ✓ CG III MAF 060701Z FEB 68  
SPEECH EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC  
Copies #1, #2, & #3 filed in S/C Safe /s/ Major Stevenson~~

47. ✓ CG III MAF 170834Z FEB 68 (TS) *gp-4*  
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
POST TET CONDITION OF THE ARVN

48. ✓ CG III MAF 201301Z FEB 68 (TS) *gp-4*  
EYES ONLY

TWO AIRBORNE DIVISION OFFENSIVE

49. ✓ CG III MAF 210258Z FEB 68 (TS) *gp-4*  
FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN - MARINE EYES ONLY  
ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS

50. ✓ CG III MAF 240904Z FEB 68 (TS) *gp-4*  
FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
DISCUSSION WITH GEN WHEELER OVER CONTROL OF AIR PROBLEM

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG-111 MAF
DCG						SERIAL 281328Z FEB. COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT ADDITIONAL MACV REQUIREMENTS (U)
C/S	1.		2/29/68		Q	REMARKS  HAS BEEN SENT  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  <i>"#243 burned 7 Nov 68"</i>  LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
DC/S			2/28/68		DF	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			270814		JHW	
S/C						

TOP SECRET #5

TOP SECRET

FILE

CCN

300

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 281328Z FEB	COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
2/29	<i>D. H. Wagner</i>	SUBJECT ADDITIONAL MACV REQUIREMENTS (U)	
	<i>Anderson</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
2/29	<i>J. H. ...</i>		
S/S	COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#5

#5  
TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

RR RUHKN  
 DE RUMSAK 3022 0591328  
 ZNY TTTT  
 R 281328Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**HAS BEEN SENT**

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM  
 LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 2  
 SUBJ: ADDITIONAL MACV REQUIREMENTS (U)  
 A. COMUSMACV 081527Z FEB 68 (TS) (BACK CHANNEL FROM VESTY  
 TO WHEELER)

1. I HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED A COPY OF REF A FROM III MAF  
 LN OFF TO MACV. IT IS QUOTED FOR INFO:

QUOTE - SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL MACV REQUIREMENTS (U)  
 REF: COMUSMACV 02753 DTG 250649Z JAN 68 (S). (NOTAL)

1. (TS) RECENT EVENTS POINT UP THE NEED FOR US TO TAKE  
 A NEW LOOK AT THE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED IN THE  
 COMING YEAR IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR NATIONAL PURPOSE IN  
 SOUTH VIETNAM. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE BASIC INFORMATION  
 NECESSARY IN THE EVENT THAT A SUPPLEMENTARY DOD BUDGET  
 REQUEST SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, MY STAFF  
 HAS EMBARKED ON A REQUIREMENTS STUDY IN DEPTH EMPHASIZING

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3022 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCO  
 PROBLEM AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN OUR CURRENT  
 525,000 FORCE STRUCTURE. RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED AT  
 EARLY DATE. IT IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT 525,000  
 FORCE STRUCTURE CEILING WILL BE LIFTED.

2. (TS) THE FOLLOWING ARE GENERAL AREAS THAT WILL BE  
 ADDRESSED:

A. ACCELERATING THE MODERNIZATION OF RVNAF: THIS HAS  
 NUMBER ONE PRIORITY. RVNAF ASSUMPTION OF A GREATER SHARE  
 OF THE BURDEN OF DEFEATING THE ENEMY MUST BE ACCELERATED  
 BY RAPIDLY UPGRADING THEIR WEAPONRY AND FORCE STRUCTURE.  
 ALTHOUGH CRITICAL EQUIPMENT SUCH AS M16 RIFLES, M79  
 GRENADE LAUNCHERS, TELEPHONES, RADIOS, ARMORED CARS (V-100)  
 AND MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT ARE PROGRAMMED AND BEING  
 RECEIVED, THERE ARE OTHER ITEMS AS YET UNPROGRAMMED. EXAMPLES  
 ARE ADDITIONAL M60 MACHINE GUNS, M29 81MM MORTARS AND THE  
 XENON SEARCHLIGHT. ANY EFFORT TO ACCELERATE THE MODER-  
 NIZATION OF THE RVNAF WOULD REQUIRE MORE RAPID AVAILABILITY  
 OF EQUIPMENT. SOME OF THE MOST CRITICAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT  
 THAT ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY ARE: M-34 HELICOPTERS, M16 RIFLES,  
 M79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS, M29 81MM MORTARS, M60 MACHINE GUNS,

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAX 3022 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEU  
 N113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, ARMORED CARS (V-100), 1/4  
 TON TRUCKS, 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS, AND ARTILLERY TUBES.

B. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ROK LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION  
 (OR ITS US EQUIVALENT) AT AN EARLY DATE: THIS IS NEXT IN  
 IMPORTANCE AFTER THE RVNAF MODERNIZATION ACCELERATION.  
 IT WOULD PROVIDE A VIABLE COMBAT FORCE IN NORTHERN II CTZ,  
 AND WITH ADEQUATE ARTILLERY, ENGINEER AND COMBAT SERVICE  
 SUPPORT, COULD REPLACE US FORCES IN BINH DINH AND QUANG NGAI  
 PROVINCES. A US DIVISION COULD THEN BE MOVED NORTH TO  
 REINFORCE OUR FORCES NORTH OF DA NANG.

C. EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF PROGRAM 5 FORCES: FORCES WHICH  
 WERE DEFERRED IN PREVIOUS SUBMISSIONS SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED.  
 THREE TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS (ONE USAF AND TWO USMC) WERE  
 DEFERRED FROM DEPLOYMENT TO REMAIN IN READY STATUS AT CURRENT  
 LOCATIONS. THESE SHOULD BE RELEASED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH  
 VIETNAM. IT IS PREFERABLE TO INCREASE FACILITY SPACE PRIOR  
 TO DEPLOYMENT OF THESE SQUADRONS BUT THE SITUATION HERE  
 DICTATES EARLY DEPLOYMENT. THE FLOATING AIRCRAFT MAINTEN-  
 ANCE FACILITY (FAMF) IS STILL REQUIRED TO ROUND OUT THE  
 IN-COUNTRY ARMY AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY. THIS

PAGE FOUR RUMSAX 3022 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 FACILITY WAS APPROVED IN PROGRAM 5 BUT SUBSEQUENTLY DELETED  
 BY DOD DISAPPROVAL OF THE ASSOCIATED PROGRAM CHANGE REQUEST.

D. AN ADDITIONAL AIRFIELD: THE ABOVE INCREASE IN  
 AVIATION UNITS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CREATE A NEED FOR AN  
 ADDITIONAL AIRFIELD. THE MACV STAFF RECENTLY CONDUCTED A  
 STUDY IN DEPTH, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVES, ON BUILDING AN  
 ADDITIONAL JET CAPABLE AIRFIELD IN THE HUE-PHU BAI AREA.  
 HOWEVER, COST (\$55.8 MILLION) AND TIME (20 MONTHS  
 AFTER APPROVAL) MILITATED AGAINST ITS CONSTRUCTION. IN  
 VIEW OF THE CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE BEING INFLICTED ON AIRCRAFT  
 AT OVER-CROWDED AIRFIELDS, THIS WILL BE CONSIDERED.

E. RESTORATION OF ITEMS ELIMINATED BY THE \$25,000 FORCE  
 STRUCTURE CEILING.

(1) THERE REMAINS A REQUIREMENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL US  
 INFANTRY DIVISION, PARTICULARLY IF OPERATIONS IN LAOS ARE  
 AUTHORIZED. THIS DIVISION SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO SOUTH  
 VIETNAM NLT 1 OCT 68 IN ORDER TO PERMIT IN-COUNTRY  
 TRAINING TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF SUCH  
 OPERATIONS IN THE GOOD WEATHER PERIOD. THE DIVISION SHOULD  
 HAVE COMPLETE TO&E AND ADDITIONAL MEDIUM AND GENERAL SUPPORT  
 ARTILLERY, ADDITIONAL ENGINEER AND AVIATION SUPPORT AND

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 3022 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
NECESSARY COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES.

(2) THE CIVILIANIZATION CONCEPT, ALTHOUGH SOUND FROM STANDPOINT OF THE SAVINGS IN MILITARY MANPOWER SPACES, HAS PROVEN UNSATISFACTORY DURING THE PAST TEN MONTHS. IMPORTANT LOGISTICS TASKS ARE NOT BEING PERFORMED BECAUSE THE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE IS NOT AVAILABLE. WE WILL RE-EXAMINE THIS PROGRAM. ABOUT 12,000 SPACES ARE INVOLVED.

(3) AT LEAST AN ADDITIONAL ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION GROUP OF FOUR BATTALIONS WILL BE REQUIRED TO SATISFY EXISTING AND ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS. ENEMY INTERDICTION OF LOC'S AND THE INCREASED TEMPO OF US/FW OPERATIONS REQUIRES INCREASED STOCKS OF TACTICAL BRIDGING.

ADDITIONAL PANEL AND FLOATING BRIDGING WILL BE REQUIRED. SHIPPING FOR THIS BRIDGING SHOULD BE EXPEDITED TO INSURE PROMPT ARRIVAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ENGINEER ASSETS ARE URGENTLY REQUIRED TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING CAUSED BY RECENT ENEMY ATTACKS IN SAIGON AND OTHER POPULATION CENTERS. HOUSING MUST BE PROVIDED FOR THE REFUGEES AND LOC'S REPAIRED TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT IN SECURE AREAS.

F. MORE HELICOPTER UNITS: THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 3022 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
WEEKS REAFFIRM THE VITAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HELICOPTER UNITS TO OUR SUCCESS IN COMBAT. I FEEL THAT WE MUST LOOK NOW AT THE ACTION REQUIRED TO INSURE UH-1 AND CH-47 PRODUCTION IN FY 69. THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR BOTH US AND VNAF AVIATORS DURING THIS SAME PERIOD MUST BE RE-EXAMINED AND THE TRAINING BASE POSSIBLY EXPANDED. ALSO I AM ANXIOUS TO ACQUIRE THE ADDITIONAL TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY THAT ANOTHER AIRMOBILE DIVISION COULD PROVIDE US. THE HELICOPTER AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE CONVERSION OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION WITHOUT A REDUCTION, NO MATTER HOW MODEST, IN THE HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR OTHER US, FVNAF AND ARVN FORCES IS OF SINGULAR IMPORTANCE. I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO SEE ONE AIR CAV SQDN PER ARMY DIVISION WITH THE EXCEPTION TO THE AIR CAV DIVISION. ANY ADDITIONAL US/FVNAF MANEUVER FORCES THAT MIGHT BE INTRODUCED WILL ALSO REQUIRE HELICOPTER LIFT SUPPORT FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS.

G. TACTICAL AIRLIFT: ADDITIVE FORCES WILL GENERATE ADDITIONAL AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS. EVENTS OF PAST TWO WEEKS DICTATE THAT TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM RESPONSIVENESS AN  
BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

RR RUNKM  
 DE RUMSAK 3034 0591328  
 ZNY TTTT  
 R 281328Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUNKM/CG FMEPAC  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF 2 AIRLIFT WING AND FIVE C-130 SQUADRONS SHOULD BE BASED AT CAM RANH BAY. THIS WING WOULD HAVE FULL MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AND INVOLVE APPROXIMATELY 4500 TO 5000 PERSONNEL. CONTINUATION OF PRESENT PERIPHERAL METHOD OF AIRLIFT SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SEA WOULD ALSO CONTINUE.

H. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT: USING PROVEN FACTOR OF FIVE SORTIES PER MANEUVER BATTALION PER DAY, ADDITIVE US AND ROK DIVISION WILL REQUIRE SUPPORT OF FIVE MORE F-4 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS.

I. EXPANDING THE MRF: THE ADDITIONAL SHIPS AND CRAFT REQUESTED IN REFERENCE MESSAGE ON ADDED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE ARE URGENTLY REQUIRED. SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN THE STRENGTH AND FREQUENCY OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN IV CORPS HAVE ADDED TO THE URGENCY OF

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3034 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO INCREASING THE TEMPO OF RIVERINE OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA.

J. R AND D: THERE ARE CERTAIN R&D ITEMS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY TESTED BUT WHICH SHOW SUFFICIENT PROMISE AND ARE INEXPENSIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT AN INITIAL LIMITED PRODUCTION PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF TESTING. OF PARTICULAR VALUE TO THIS COMMAND WOULD BE THE EARLY AVAILABILITY OF DEVICES TO LOCATE THE ENEMY SUCH AS AIRBORNE PERSONNEL DETECTORS, LOW LIGHT LEVEL TELEVISION, A VARIETY OF PERSONNEL INTRUSION DETECTION DEVICES AND TUNNEL DETECTION/DESTRUCTION DEVICES. IN ADDITION, I ANTICIPATE TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE POTENTIAL UTILIZATION OF A COFRAM TYPE WARHEAD IN THE NIKE-MERCULES, HONEST JOHN OR A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE TO PROVIDE A RAPID ALL-WEATHER RESPONSE AGAINST TARGETS DEVELOPED BY MUSCEL SHOALS SENSORS.

3. (U) A DETAILED TREATMENT OF MY SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENT WILL BE FORWARDED BY FRONT CHANNEL AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. UNQUOTE.

3. I INTEND TO FORM A SPECIAL PLANNING GROUP TO CONSIDER ALL FACETS OF THIS SUBJ. A FORMAL CONCEPT HAS NOT YET BEEN ISSUED BY COMUSMACV BUT IS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY.

4. AT AN ADVANCE MEETING ATTENDED BY III MAF LN OFFICER

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3034 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCEO  
FOLLOWING POINTS WERE EMPHASIZED:

A. REQUIREMENTS MUST BE HARD CORE AND HAVE FOOLPROOF  
JUSTIFICATION, NOT A SHOPPING LIST OF NICE TO HAVE  
SPACES AND/OR EQUIPMENT.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL/EQUIP  
WILL BE BASED ON THE GUIDELINES TO BE SPELLED OUT IN  
CONCEPT WHEN ISSUED.

C. TIME PHASING IS NECESSARY, BY QUARTERS, BASED ON LEAD  
TIME FOR CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER FACTORS FOR FORCES/EQUIP  
TO BE INTRODUCED.

GP-4

BT

**PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES**

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	<i>V</i>		<i>2/29/68</i>		<i>le</i>	CG III MAF SERIAL 280041Z FEB68 1,284 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	<i>ly</i>		<i>2/29/68</i>		<i>JAL</i>	SUBJECT MARINE AIR WING CONTINGENCY
DCG AIR	<i>4</i>		<i>1 Mar 68</i>		<i>WJL</i>	REMARKS
C/S	<i>I</i>		<i>2/28/68</i>		<i>Q</i>	<i>#284 burned 7 Nov 68</i>
DC/S						EYES ONLY
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2	<i>PLANS - copy</i>				<i>J. A. [Signature]</i>	
G-3						EYES ONLY
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>2/28</i>		<i>Jkw</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C - COMMENTS  
 I - INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #4

O 280041Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CDR 7AF  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EYES ONLY

FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN TO GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GEN MOMYER

A. COMUSMACV MAC 02062 DTG 131359Z FEB68

1. REF A REQUESTED RECOMMENDED LOCATIONS AND PHASE IN FOR APPROXIMATELY  
 1/3 MARINE AIR WING AND 2/3 MARINE AIR WING AS A CONTINGENCY.

2. FOR ONE-THIRD WING.

A. ADDITIONAL UNITS REQUIRED AS FOLLOWS:

1 MARINE WING HEADQUARTERS GROUP (-) QUANG TRI  
 HEADQUARTERS, MAW (-)  
 HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS SQ (-)  
 MARINE WING FACILITIES SQ (-)  
 MARINE WING COMMUNICATIONS SQ (-)  
 MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQ

TOTAL PERSONNEL MWHG 699 MARINE AND 30 NAVY

1 MARINE WING SUPPORT GROUP (-) QUANG TRI  
 HEADQUARTERS AND MAINTENANCE SQ (-)  
 WING EQUIPMENT REPAIR SQ (-)

TOTAL PERSONNEL MWSG 657 MARINE AND 21 NAVY

1 MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP (FIGHTER/ATTACK) CHU LAI  
 HEADQUARTERS AND MAINTENANCE SQ  
 MARINE AIR BASE SQ

3 MARINE ATTACK/FIGHTER ATTACK SQS

TOTAL PERSONNEL MAG (VF/VA) 1805 MARINE AND 39 NAVY

1 MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP (HELICOPTER) (-) QUANG TRI  
 HEADQUARTERS AND MAINTENANCE SQ (-)  
 MARINE AIR BASE SQ (-)

2 MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQS

4 MARINE OBSERVATION QS

TOTAL PERSONNEL MAG (H) 1931 MARINE AND 25 NAVY

3 ADDITIONAL SQS REQUIRED AT PRESENT TIME. 1 ADDITIONAL FOR 1/3 WING.

B. ADDITIONAL FACILITIES REQUIRED

(1) CHU LAI EAST: CONSTRUCTION OF COVERED AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE  
 FACILITIES AND CANTONMENT AREA.

(2) QUANG TRI: ADDITIONAL 40,000 SQ YDS MATTING, COVERED  
 MAINTENANCE AREAS, WING HEADQUARTERS BUILDING COMPLEX AND  
 ENLARGED CANTONMENT AREA.

C. TIME PHASING

(1) THE HEADQUARTERS GROUP AND SUPPORT GROUP FACILITIES COULD BE  
 PROVIDED WITHIN 3 MONTHS OF GO-AHEAD ASSUMING CONSTRUCTION PRIORITY.  
 THE CRITICAL FACTOR DETERMINING READY DATE FOR THE HELICOPTER GROUP  
 IS MATTED RAMP AREA AND AN ADDITIONAL HANGAR. THE RAMP AREA COULD  
 BE FINISHED IN 45 DAYS FROM GO-AHEAD PROVIDING OPERATING SPACE AND  
 PERMITTING OCCUPANCY BY THE GROUP AS EARLY AS 45 DAYS AFTER CONSTRUCT-  
 ION STARTS.

(2) THE FIXED-WITN GROUP AT CHU LAI COULD BE DEPLOYED AS SOON AS  
 MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AND REVETMENTS COULD BE PROVIDED. ESTIMATED  
 TIME FROM GO-AHEAD IS 2 MONTHS.

# 4

(3) WHILE NOT ESSENTIAL, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT NEITHER THE HELICOPTER NOR FIXED-WING GROUP BE COMMITTED UNTIL THE COMMAND, CONTROL AND SUPPORT FACILITIES PROVIDED BY THE HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT GROUPS ARE OPERATIONAL. EITHER OR BOTH MAGS COULD BE ASSIGNED TO FIRST MAW. BEFORE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

3. FOR TWO-THIRD WING.

A. IN ADDITION TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 1/3 WING:

1 MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP (FIGHTER/ATTACK) - SATS NORTHERN ICTZ HEADQUARTERS AND MAINTENANCE SQ  
MARINE AIR BASE SQ

3 MARINE ATTACK/FIGHTER ATTACK SQS

TOTAL PERSONNEL MAG (VF/VA) 1805 MARINE AND 39 NAVY  
FOR MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP (H)

ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AND MAINTENANCE SQ PERSONNEL

ADDITIONAL AIR BASE SQ PERSONNEL

1 MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQ

1 LIGHT HELICOPTER SQ

TOTAL ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO REINFORCE MAG (H) 689 MARINE AND 8 NAVY

B. ADDITIONAL FACILITIES REQUIRED

(1) THUA THIEN PROVINCE: COMPLETE SATS SITE

(2) QUANG TRI A/F: EXPANDED CANTONMENT AREA

(3) PHU BAI A/F: 45,000 SQ YDS OF ADDITIONAL MATTING AND ADDITIONAL CANTONMENT AREA FOR LIGHT AND MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADREONS

C. TIME PHASING

(1) PROVIDING SUFFICIENT PRIORITY WERE ESTABLISHED THE ESSENTIAL SATS COMPONENTS COULD BE OPERATIONAL WITHIN 90 DAYS. DEPLOYMENT OF THE GROUP COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THIS TIME.

(2) THE ADDITIONAL RAMP SPACE, COVERED MAINTENANCE AREA AND CANTONMENT FACILITIES TO SUPPORT THE TWO HELICOPTER SQUADRONS COULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 180 DAYS FROM GO-AHEAD.

4. PRIORITIES FOR MOVEMENT OR DEPLOYMENT OF ELEMENTS OF THE NEW WING TO RVN ARE:

A. MARINE WING HEADQUARTERS GROUP - QUANG TRI

B. MARINE WING SUPPORT GROUP - QUANG TRI

C. MARINE HELICOPTER GROUP - QUANG TRI/PHU BAI

D. MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP VF/FA - CHU LAI EAST

E. MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP VF/VA - SATS

GP-4

850

NNNN

TOP SECRET

#4

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM CG III MAF
CG	2		2/27		le	SERIAL 210232Z FEB COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		2/27		JK	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DCG AIR	4		2/28/68		MM	REMARKS <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  HAS BEEN SENT
C/S	1		2/27/68		Q	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			211315		JKW	
S/C						

Copy 3 of 3 for HCol.

Added UP to  
Tx 201605H Mar 68 JM

"# 2 & 3 burned  
1 Nov 68"

LEGEND  
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
C- COMMENTS  
I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #3

TOP SECRET

FILE

CCN

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 270252Z FEB	COPIES 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
27 Feb	<i>S.H. Wagner</i>	SUBJECT SPEC AT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO	
27 Feb	<i>J.H. Wagner</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
2/27	<i>C/S Has seen. DHW</i>		
2/27	<i>J</i>		
2/27	<i>DCI Has seen DHW</i>		
2/29/68	<i>Maj Gen Anderson (Has seen)</i>		
S/S	COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES		

3

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

43  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DE RUMNAAA 2837 0560232  
 ZNY TTTTT  
 P 270232Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE  
 HAS BEEN SENT**

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN  
 CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 REQUIREMENT PACKAGE

1. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE FOL REQUIREMENTS PACKAGE WAS  
 FORWARDED BY GEN WESTMORELAND TO CINCPAC BY COURIER THIS DATE  
 AS RESULT OF UPPER ROAD VISIT.
2. INCREMENT ONE

	USMC	USN
A. CIVILIZATION (DEFERMENT)	300	
B. 5TH MARDIV (-) (INCLUDES RLT 27)	15301	1027
C. FORTRPS (-) (INCLUDES FSR)	8200	223
D. AVIATION FORCES -WING (-)	4762	116
E. MAJCU	23	
F. RAD BN DET	163	
G. CMRT	125	
H. ASRT	23	

PAGE TWO RUMNAAA 2837 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

I. III MAF HQ AUG	157	
J. OBSERVATION SQDNS (3 HML)	732	9
K. III MAF TASK ORG INCREASES	7344	
L. OBSERVATION SQDNS		5
M. TOTALS	37,132	1,380
2. FOLLOW ON INCREMENT COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM	2004	138
3. INCREMENT ONE REQUIRED IMAY68 OR ASAP.		
4. FOLLOW ON INCREMENT REQUIRED 31DEC68.		
5. WARM REGARDS		
GP-3		
BT		

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM CG III MAF
CG						SERIAL 241258Z FEB COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1		2/25/18		<i>Wk</i>	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			250630		<i>DKW.</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C - COMMENTS
- I - INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #2



TOP SECRET

PP RUHHFMA RUCIHOA  
 DE RUMHAAA 2583 0551258  
 ZNY TTTT  
 CG FMFPAC -T- CMC  
 P 241258Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**  
**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**  
**HAS BEEN SENT**

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE  
 O 241256Z FEB 68

FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAL/CONUSMACV  
 INFO RUMSAL/CRD SEVENTH AIR FORCE  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND,  
 INFO GEN MOMYER, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS ONLY.  
 CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ

REF A. CG III MAF 201416Z FEB 68  
 1. I HAVE TALKED WITH GENERAL MOMYER AND HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY HIS  
 STAFF CONCERNING THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF

PAGE TWO RUMHAAA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 FIRST MAW STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES TO THE SEVENTH AIR  
 FORCE. GENERAL MOMYER HAS PROVIDED ME WITH A COPY OF HIS PLAN AND  
 THE MACV DIRECTIVE WHICH HE IS RECOMMENDING FOR YOUR SIGNATURE. MY  
 POSITION IN THIS MATTER HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TO YOU BOTH  
 PERSONALLY AND BY MESSAGE (SEE REF A.). MY OPINION HAS NOT CHANGED.  
 AS THE COMMANDING GENERAL III MAF, SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS, AND YOUR  
 IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF  
 THE FUMAF CAMPAIGN IN ICTZ, I CANNOT CONCUR.

2. I AM CONCERNED THAT PERHAPS THE MOST CRITICAL POINT IN THE  
 VIETNAM CONFLICT IT IS PROPOSED THAT III MAF ORGANIZATIONAL AIR  
 STRIKE RESOURCES BE WITHDRAWN FROM MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL.  
 THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM IS ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED TO  
 FIGHT AS AN ENTITY. TO REMOVE THIS ESSENTIAL SUPPORTING ARM FROM  
 THE TEAM AND PLACE IT UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANOTHER COMMANDER CAN  
 ONLY DEGRADE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM.  
 I THINK THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE TEAM'S PERFORMANCE IN ICTZ  
 TO DATE LEAVES NO DOUBT AS TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS. I CANNOT CONCUR  
 IN ITS FRAGMENTATION.

3. I DO NOT BELIEVE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF ALL TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES  
 IS REQUIRED. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE THREE RUMWAA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SUPPORT PROVIDED UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM WOULD IMPROVE THE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.

4. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS A TASK ORGANIZED AVIATION COMMAND, SPECIFICALLY STRUCTURED TO SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN ICTZ AS WELL AS THE TWO MARINE DIVISIONS IN THE FORCE. THE MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS ORIENTED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO MEET THE THREAT IN THE NORTH AND TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF ANY FUMAF'S OPERATING IN ICTZ.

5. MARINE DASC'S ARE TACTICAL FUNCTIONING AIR CONTROL AGENCIES WITH A REAL TIME READ-OUT OF BOTH THE AIR AND GROUND COMBAT SITUATION. THEY COORDINATE AND INTEGRATE FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT WITH TACTICAL HELICOPTER LIFT AND THE FIRE OF GUNSHIPS. THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE OF OTHER GROUND COMMANDER AND CAN DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE AS NECESSARY TO MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS. ALL DASC'S ARE TIED TOGETHER AT THE WING TADC WHERE MY TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER CONSTANTLY MONITORS, ADJUSTS, AND DIRECTS HIS TOTAL RESOURCES TO BEST SATISFY THE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE MARINE ELEMENT OF THE FORCE.

6. GEN MOMYER'S PLAN DOES NOT INTEGRATE THIS COMPLETE CONTROL PACKAGE

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE FOUR RUMWAA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO INTO HIS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. INSTEAD HE TAKES ONLY THE FIXED WING STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES, AND THE FACILITIES FOR THEIR CONTROL. THE RESULT WOULD BE AN AWKWARD AND CUMBERSOME SYSTEM WITH MARINE DASC'S RESPONSIBLE TO GEN MOMYER IN SAIGON FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESPONDING TO GEN ANDERSON IN DANANG FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORT/UTILITY AIRCRAFT.

7. FURTHER, HIS PLAN PLACES THE AIR STRIKE FUNCTION OF EACH MARINE DASC UNDER TWO ECHELONS OF 7AF/VNAF "SUPER" DASC'S AND THE ENTIRE CONGLOMERATION UNDER A MASTER TACC IN SAIGON AND IN TIMES OF URGENCY, A C-130 COMMAND CENTER CIRCLING OVERHEAD. AS I POINTED OUT IN REF A, THIS SUPERIMPOSING OF ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF CONTROLLING AGENCIES, AS WELL AS THE ADDED LEVELS OF APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS, CAN ONLY RESULT IN LESS RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE ELEMENTS OF MY GROUND FORCES.

8. ANOTHER POINT OF REAL CONCERN IS THE COST OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT TO ME IN THE FORM OF AVIATION PERSONNEL. I MUST CONTINUE TO MAN MY AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND IN ADDITION PROVIDE AVIATORS AND OTHER STAFF PERSONNEL TO MACV TASE, 7TH AF TACC, I DASC, DASC BRAVO, ETC., FOR FRAGGING, LIAISON AND COORDINATION DUTIES. AS

**HAS BEEN SENT**PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE FIVE RUNMWAA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
CRITICAL AS MARINE CORPS PILOTS AND AVIATION SPECIALISTS ARE, I'M  
SURE I CANNOT AFFORD THIS ADDITIONAL DRAIN ON MY RESOURCES.

9. AS I'VE PREVIOUSLY STATED, GENERAL MONYER'S PROPOSAL DILUTES  
THE COMBAT POWER OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM. IT REMOVES FROM  
III MAF DIRECT CONTROL MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE  
RESOURCES. THESE UNITS ARE INTEGRAL TO THE MARINE AIR/GROUND  
TEAM AND PROVIDE THE SAME TYPES OF FIRE SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND  
TROOPS THAT ARE FURNISHED TO ARMY GROUND TROOPS BY THE HUEY, HUEY  
COBRA, CHEYENNE AND MOHAWK. I'M CERTAIN THAT MARINE CLOSE AIR  
SUPPORT SHOULD REMAIN UNDER THE PRESENT COMMAND AND CONTROL  
ORGANIZATION, JUST AS THE ARMY HELO AND RECON SUPPORT REMAINS  
UNDER ITS VERY SATISFACTORY COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE.

10. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCES AN ADDED DELAY IN  
RESPONSIVENESS, A CHANGE IN ORGANIZATION, AND A LOSS OF COMBAT POWER  
WITHIN THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER AT A  
CRITICAL TIME. THE CURRENT AIR CONTROL ARRANGEMENT IS EFFECTIVE,  
FLEXIBLE, AND HAS DEMONSTRATED RESPONSIVENESS. MAVC DIRECTIVE 95-4  
PROVIDES THE EMERGENCY OPTIONS THAT YOU MUST HAVE WHILE PRESERVING  
THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF THE VARIOUS FORCE PACKAGES THAT COMPRISE  
THE FUMAF IN RVN. I'M SURE A REVIEW OF PAST SORTIE RATES OF THE

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE SIX RUNMWAA 2583 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
FIRST MAW, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PER BATTALION DAY, WILL  
MORE THAN JUSTIFY THE MERITS OF OUR SYSTEM. FURTHERMORE, WHILE  
OPERATING UNDER YOUR DIRECTIVE, III MAF HAS CONSISTENTLY IDENTIFIED  
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SORTIES TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE AS OUR SHARE  
TOWARD THE COMMON GOAL OF ALL MACV FORCES. YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE  
OF CONTINUANCE OF THIS SAME DEGREE OF SUPPORT.

11. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MARINE  
AIR/GROUND TEAM WITHIN III MAF. ITS TOTAL RESOURCES, FIGHTER, ATTACK  
AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, AND CONTROL AGENCIES, ARE PART AND  
PARCEL OF THIS TEAM. THE WING AND III MAF IN ITS ENTIRETY WILL  
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE YOU A MOST EFFECTIVE AND SPIRITED FIGHTING FORCE  
AND WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO RESPOND TO YOUR GUIDANCE, EXPERIENCE,  
AND LEADERSHIP.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

**HAS BEEN SENT****PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		2/25/68		lp	CG III MAF
DCG	3		2/26/68		PR	SERIAL 241256Z FEB COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4		2/27/68		W	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
C/S	1		2/25/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S						<h1>EXCLUSIVE</h1> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>#2 burned 7 Nov 68"</p> <p>LEGEND                      A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C - COMMENTS                      I - INFORMATION</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			250670		SHJ DHW.	
S/C						

TOP SECRET #1



TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMSAL RUMSAU  
 DE RUMSAK 2582 0551256  
 ZNY TTTTT  
 O 241236Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAU/COMUSMACV  
 INFO RUMSAL/CRD SEVENTH AIR FORCE  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND,  
 INFO GEN MONYER, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS ONLY.  
 CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ

REF A. CG III MAF 201416Z FEB 68

1. I HAVE TALKED WITH GENERAL MONYER AND HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY HIS STAFF CONCERNING THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FIRST MAF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES TO THE SEVENTH AIR FORCE. GENERAL MONYER HAS PROVIDED ME WITH A COPY OF HIS PLAN AND THE MACV DIRECTIVE WHICH HE IS RECOMMENDING FOR YOUR SIGNATURE. MY POSITION IN THIS MATTER HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TO YOU BOTH PERSONALLY AND BY MESSAGE (SEE REF A.). MY OPINION HAS NOT CHANGED. AS THE COMMANDING GENERAL III MAF, SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS, AND YOUR IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE FUMAF CAMPAIGN IN ICTZ, I CANNOT CONCUR.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

2. I AM CONCERNED THAT PERHAPS THE MOST CRITICAL POINT IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT IT IS PROPOSED THAT III MAF ORGANIZATIONAL AIR STRIKE RESOURCES BE WITHDRAWN FROM MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL. THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM IS ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED TO FIGHT AS AN ENTITY. TO REMOVE THIS ESSENTIAL SUPPORTING ARM FROM THE TEAM AND PLACE IT UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANOTHER COMMANDER CAN ONLY DEGRADE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM. I THINK THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE TEAM'S PERFORMANCE IN ICTZ TO DATE LEAVES NO DOUBT AS TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS. I CANNOT CONCUR IN ITS FRAGMENTATION.

3. I DO NOT BELIEVE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF ALL TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES IS REQUIRED. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM WOULD IMPROVE THE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.

4. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS A TASK ORGANIZED AVIATION COMMAND, SPECIFICALLY STRUCTURED TO SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN ICTZ AS WELL AS THE TWO MARINE DIVISIONS IN THE FORCE. THE MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS ORIENTED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO MEET THE THREAT IN THE NORTH AND TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
ANY FUMAF'S OPERATING IN IGTZ.

5. MARINE DASC'S ARE TACTICAL FUNCTIONING AIR CONTROL AGENCIES WITH A REAL TIME READ-OUT OF BOTH THE AIR AND GROUND COMBAT SITUATION. THEY COORDINATE AND INTEGRATE FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT WITH TACTICAL HELICOPTER LIFT AND THE FIRE OF GUNSHIPS. THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE AND OTHER GROUND COMMANDER AND CAN DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE AS NECESSARY TO MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS. ALL DASC'S ARE TIED TOGETHER AT THE WING TADC WHERE MY TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER CONSTANTLY MONITORS, ADJUSTS, AND DIRECTS HIS TOTAL RESOURCES TO BEST SATISFY THE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE MARINE ELEMENT OF THE FORCE.

6. GEN MONYER'S PLAN DOES NOT INTEGRATE THIS COMPLETE CONTROL PACKAGE INTO HIS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. INSTEAD HE TAKES ONLY THE FIXED WING STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES, AND THE FACILITIES FOR THEIR CONTROL. THE RESULT WOULD BE AN UNKWARD AND CUMBERSOME SYSTEM WITH MARINE DASC'S RESPONSIBLE TO GEN MONYER IN SAIGON FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESPONDING TO GEN ANDERSON IN DANANG FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS AND TRANSPORT/UTILITY AIRCRAFT.

7. FURTHER, HIS PLAN PLACES THE AIR STRIKE FUNCTION OF EACH MARINE

**HAS BEEN SENT**

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
DASC UNDER TWO ECHELONS OF 7AF/VNAF "SUPER" DASC'S AND THE ENTIRE CONGLOMERATION UNDER A MASTER TADC IN SAIGON AND IN TIMES OF URGENCY, A C-130 COMMAND CENTER CIRCLING OVERHEAD. AS I POINTED OUT IN REF A, THIS SUPERIMPOSING OF ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF CONTROLLING AGENCIES, AS WELL AS THE ADDED LEVELS OF APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS, CAN ONLY RESULT IN LESS RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE ELEMENTS OF MY GROUND FORCES.

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9. AS I'VE PREVIOUSLY STATED, GENERAL MONYER'S PROPOSAL DILUTES THE COMBAT POWER OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM. IT REMOVES FROM III MAF DIRECT CONTROL MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES. THESE UNITS ARE INTEGRAL TO THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM AND PROVIDE THE SAME TYPES OF FIRE SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND TROOPS THAT ARE FURNISHED TO ARMY GROUND TROOPS BY THE HUEY, HUEY

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR COBRA, CHEYENNE AND MOHAWK. I'M CERTAIN THAT MARINE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SHOULD REMAIN UNDER THE PRESENT COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION, JUST AS THE ARMY HELO AND RECON SUPPORT REMAINS UNDER ITS VERY SATISFACTORY COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE.

10. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCES AN ADDED DELAY IN RESPONSIVENESS, A CHANGE IN ORGANIZATION, AND A LOSS OF COMBAT POWER WITHIN THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER AT A CRITICAL TIME. THE CURRENT AIR CONTROL ARRANGEMENT IS EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE, AND HAS DEMONSTRATED RESPONSIVENESS. MAVC DIRECTIVE 95-4 PROVIDES THE EMERGENCY OPTIONS THAT YOU MUST HAVE WHILE PRESERVING THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF THE VARIOUS FORCE PACKAGES THAT COMPRISE THE FVMAF IN RVN. I'M SURE A REVIEW OF PAST SORTIE RATES OF THE FIRST MAW, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PER BATTALION DAY, WILL MORE THAN JUSTIFY THE MERITS OF OUR SYSTEM. FURTHERMORE, WHILE OPERATING UNDER YOUR DIRECTIVE, III MAF HAS CONSISTENTLY IDENTIFIED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SORTIES TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE AS OUR SHARE TOWARD THE COMMON GOAL OF ALL MACV FORCES. YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE OF CONTINUANCE OF THIS SAME DEGREE OF SUPPORT.

11. THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM WITHIN III MAF. ITS TOTAL RESOURCES, FIGHTER, ATTACK

**HAS BEEN SENT**

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2582 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, AND CONTROL AGENCIES, ARE PART AND PARCEL OF THIS TEAM. THE WING AND III MAF IN ITS ENTIRETY WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE YOU A MOST EFFECTIVE AND SPIRITED FIGHTING FORCE AND WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO RESPOND TO YOUR GUIDANCE, EXPERIENCE, AND LEADERSHIP.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		2/25/68		lp	CG III MAF
DCG	3		2/25/68		has seen	SERIAL 2409047 FFR COPY # 1 OR COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4		2/26/68		WMA	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S	1		2/25/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S						<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>" #3 burned 7 Nov 68 "</p> <p>#2 burned 7 May 1970 / MAR-40</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			250630		set DW.	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C-COMMENTS  
 I-INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

#50

TOP SECRET

FILE

PCW

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 47 FEB	COPIES 7 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
2/25/68	DW Wagon	SUBJECT: SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO	
2/25/68	DCG + CFS have seen.	DATE	SIGNATURE
	<i>Jp</i>		
2/26/68	Major Gen Anderson (Has Seen)		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT

SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#50  
**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

OO RUKM  
 DE RUMSAK 2559 0550904  
 ZNY TTTT  
 CG FMFPAC -T- CMC  
 O 240904Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
 RUKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSVIE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND  
 LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.  
 I. IN DISCUSSION TODAY GEN WHEELER SAID TO ME PRIVATELY,  
 WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTROL OF AIR PROBLEM:

A. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT SPECIFICALLY UNTIL HE HAD SEEN  
 PLAN, BUT HE URGED ME TO VIEW THE SITUATION WITH THESE  
 TWO POINTS IN MIND:

FIRST, THAT I PLACE MYSELF ABOVE THE STRUGGLE AS A FIELD  
 ARMY COMMANDER AND CONSIDER ONLY THE GOOD OF THE TROOPS  
 (CAN APPEAL TO VANITY); SECOND, THAT IN ANY FIGHT OVER  
 DOCTRINE IN WAR TIME, PRESS AND PUBLIC WOULD NOT  
 UNDERSTAND AND SERVICES COULD NOT TELL WHERE THAT WOULD  
 LEAD. (PERHAPS A THREAT TO LEAK TO PRESS?).

B. I REPLIED THAT OF COURSE I TOOK THE BROAD VIEW AND  
 THAT THE GOOD OF THE TROOPS DEMANDED THE SYSTEM NOW IN

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2559 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 USE WITH NO ADDITIONAL LAYERING, NO NEW DASC ORGANIZATIONS.  
 I STRESSED POINT THAT PRESENT CINCPAC AND MACV DIRECTIVES  
 ENTIRELY ADEQUATE AND THAT ARMY CONTROLLED THEIR HELO CLOSE  
 SUPPORT AND MARINES MUST CONTROL MARINE FIXED WING CLOSE  
 AIR SUPPORT. I POINTED UP OUR 1.43 SORTIE RATE. FINALLY  
 IN ANSWER TO HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DIDN'T YET HAVE THE  
 DETAILS WHICH REQUIRED THIS STEP BY WESTY, I REPLIED THAT  
 WESTY WANTED ONE MAN RESPONSIBLE FOR AIR BUT I DID NOT  
 FEEL IT NECESSARY AS HE HAD THREE US. COMMANDERS  
 RESPONSIBLE FOR GROUND WAR AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO USE TWO  
 FOR AIR OPERATIONS. ON THAT NOTE HE TOOK LEAVE WITHOUT  
 FURTHER COMMENT.

GP-4  
 BT

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		2/21/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	CG III MAF
DCG	3		2/22/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	SERIAL 210258Z FEB COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4		2/22/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	SUBJECT ADDITIONAL FOR DE REQUIREMENTS
C/S	1		2/21/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS
DC/S			2/22/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p># 2 of 3 burned 2 Dec 68</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			211345		<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
- C - COMMENTS
- I - INFORMATION

TOP SECRET # 49

TOP SECRET

FILE 37

206

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG 111 MAF	
		SERIAL 210258Z FEB	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
21 Feb 68	S.H. Stumason	SUBJECT ADDITIONAL FOR CE REQUIREMENTS	
2/21/68	D.H. Wagner	DATE	SIGNATURE
2/21/68	Anderson		
2/21/68	[Signature]		
2/22/68	Maj Gen Anderson (Has Seen)		
2/22/69	[Signature]		
S/S	COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#49

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMKM  
 DE RUMSAK 2193 0520258  
 ZNY TITTT  
 O 210258Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK  
 FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS

- A. MACV WORKING PAPER (TS) UNNUMBERED & UNSIGNED  
 B. TELECON 190200H FEB68 TO MAJ RUANE FROM LTCOL MILLER  
 1. REF A PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL FORCE  
 REQUIREMENTS TO BE PRESENTED TO CHAIRMAN, JCS. REF B PROVIDED  
 FMFPAC INPUT DETAILS REQUIRED BY COMUSMACV BY 220600H FEB AND  
 REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING TROOP LIST AS APPROPRIATE.  
 2. REF A IS QUOTED FOR INFO:  
 QUOTE "FORCE REQUIREMENTS BRIEFING"  
 1. (TS) PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE PREPARATION  
 OF INPUT FOR THE 25 FEB 1968 FORCE REQUIREMENTS BRIEFING FOR  
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  
 2. (TS) GENERAL:  
 A. CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND PARTY WILL BE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2193 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 IN-COUNTRY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE HAS ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT  
 OF THE VARIOUS TASKS WHICH MUST BE PERFORMED AND THE PROJECTED  
 CAPABILITY OF MACV COMBINED FORCES TO ACCOMPLISH THOSE TASKS.

B. J3, BASED ON GUIDANCE FROM COMUSMACV HAS PROPOSED  
 ADDITIONAL COMBAT FORCES WITH POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT AREAS AS  
 INDICATED BELOW:

- (1) 82D ABN DIV (I CTZ)  
 (2) 5TH MARINE DIV (I CTZ)  
 (3) 1 ARMY DIV (III CTZ)  
 (4) 6TH ARMED CAV REGT (II CTZ)  
 (5) 1 ARMORED GP (SMALL HQ AND 2 TANK BNS) (TDY  
 TO I CTZ)  
 (6) APPROPRIATE SLICE OF ARTILLERY, AVIATION,  
 ENGINEER, AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES.  
 (7) 5 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS  
 (8) 5 C-130 SQUADRONS AND AIRLIFT WING HQS  
 (9) ROK LIGHT DIV (II CTZ)

C. BRIEF OUTLINE OF PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR EMPLOYING THESE  
 UNITS FOLLOWS:

- (1) THE 82 DIV AND 5 MAR DIV WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2193 T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
I CTZ, RELEASING 1 CAV DIV (AIRMBL) AND 101 ABN DIV FOR MOBILE  
RESERVE EXPLOITATION FORCE. 1 CAV DIV (AIRMBL) WOULD BE BASED  
EITHER IN I OR II CTZ, POSSIBLY AT AN KHE; 101 ABN DIV WOULD BE  
BASED AT BEAR CAT.

(2) THE LT ROK DIV WOULD BE BASED AT BINH DINH,  
RELEASING 3 BDE, 4 INF DIV TO REJOIN ITS PARENT DIVISION IN  
THE HIGHLANDS.

(3) THE ADDITIONAL ARMY DIV WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN  
III CTZ TO REPLACE THE 9 INF DIV AS IT REDEPLOYS TO THE DELTA.

(4) THE ARMORED BDE WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN I CTZ DURING  
THE DRY SEASON (MAY-SEP 1968) ON A TEMPORARY IN-COUNTRY BASIS  
TO COUNTER THE ENEMY ARMOR THREAT.

(5) THE ARMED CAV REGT WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN II CTZ,  
PRIMARILY TO SECURE LOC'S 14 AND 19.

(6) THE RTAVD (6 BN'S) WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR THE BEAR CAT AREA.

(7) AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND FORCES WILL COMPLETE BUILD  
UP TO APPROXIMATELY 8,500 STRENGTH AND CONTINUE CURRENT MISSION.

3. (S) PREPARATION OF INPUT:

A. FORCE REQUIREMENTS TO ADJUST THE MACV FORCE STRUCTURE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2193 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ADDITIONAL FORCES AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT  
IN PARAGRAPH 2, ABOVE, ARE REQUESTED IN TROOP LIST FORMAT.

B. TROOP LIST INPUT IS REQUESTED IN TWO SECTIONS.

C. THE FIRST SECTION SHOULD INCLUDE ALL REQUIREMENTS  
CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR SUPPORT OF CURRENT PROGRAM 5, AS APPROVED,  
THE INCREASED STRENGTH OF THE AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND FORCES, THE  
RTAVD, AND THE TWO UNITS RECENTLY ORDERED TO RVN (3 BDE, 82 ABN  
DIV AND 27 RTI, USMC). THE FIRST SECTION WILL INCLUDE ALSO THOSE  
REQUIREMENTS NEEDED TO REPLACE SUPPORT ELEMENTS RELOCATED TO I CTZ  
AS PART OF THE REALIGNMENT OF FORCES TO MEET THE CURRENT THREAT.

D. THE SECOND SECTION SHOULD INCLUDE THE ESSENTIAL  
FORCE ELEMENTS TO BUILD THE MACV FORCE STRUCTURE FROM THE LEVEL  
IN THE FIRST SECTION (PARAGRAPH 3C, ABOVE) TO THE LEVEL OUTLINED  
IN PARAGRAPH 2, ABOVE.

E. THE USARV AND III MAF INPUTS SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO  
COMBAT - COMBAT SUPPORT - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT LISTING WITHIN  
EACH SECTION. THE 7F AND NAVFORV INPUTS SHOULD BE DIVIDED WITHIN  
EACH SECTION TO SHOW COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL FORCE LISTING VERSUS  
SUPPORT (SERVICE) FORCE LISTING.

4. (U) DATE OF SUBMISSION: REQUEST INPUT BE FURNISHED TO

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2193 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCE  
MACVJ312 BY 220830H FEB 1968." UNQUOTE.

3. ALTHOUGH THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE THIS INFO IS APPARENTLY  
BASED ON GUIDANCE FROM VESTY, I AM COGNIZANT OF OUR OWN PIPELINE  
PROBLEMS AND REALIZE THAT SUCH A DEPLOYMENT MAY NOT BE PRACTICABLE.  
ACCORDINGLY YOUR GUIDANCE IN THIS AREA WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

GP-4  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 201301Z FEB 68 1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPY # OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT WIRENOTE FROM COL HOUGHTON
C/S	1.		2/21/68		<i>G</i>	REMARKS TWO AIRBORNE DIVISIONS
DC/S						<p>EYES ONLY</p> <p># 2 of 4 burned 2 du 68</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			2/0730		<i>DMW</i>	LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						# 48 TOP SECRET

O 201301Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO MACV  
 SSO MACV (FWD)  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

MACV (BGEN DAVIDSON 2)

MACV (FWD) (COL MORRIS 2)

WIRENOTE FROM COL HOUGHTON III MAF G-2

A. MACV FWD SSO MSG 171435Z FEB 68

B. MACV FWD SSO MSG 180930Z FEB 68

1. REF A AND B REFER.

2. I SEE THREE POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES FOR GEN ABRAMS' FUTURE TWO AIRBORNE DIVISION OFFENSIVE: FIRST, THE 324TH AND 304TH DIVISIONS IN THE KHE SANH AREA; SECOND, THE 320TH DIVISION NEAR THE CAMP CARROLL/C2/C3 COMPLEX; AND LAST, THE REGIMENTS OPERATING EAST OF THE LINE, GIO LINH, DONG HA, QUANG TRI CITY, NAMELY THE 270TH, 803RD, 812TH, 9TH AND 5TH VC REGIMENTS.

3. THE FIRST TARGET AREA PRESENTS A LUCRATIVE CONCENTRATION OF ENEMY FORCES BUT THAT IS WHERE THE ADVANTAGE ENDS. THE ENEMY IS PREPARED TO MEET US THERE AT THE END OF A LONG AND TENUOUS LOC WITH THE LAOS BORDER TO HIS BACK PROVIDING SANCTUARY WHEN NEEDED. THE CAMP CARROLL AREA, LIKE KHE SANH, IS WITHIN RANGE OF SUPPORT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE ACROSS A SANCTIFIED BORDER. BOTH ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS ARE POSITIONED TO EXPLOIT THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCED GOAL OF THE VC/NVA. NGUYEN VAN MAI - "THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WILL ENTICE THE AMERICANS CLOSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BORDER, AND WILL BLEED THEM WITHOUT MERCY. IN SOUTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN WILL BE DESTROYED.-

4. THE ENEMY UNITS POSITIONED EAST OF NAT'L ROUTE NR 1 PRESENTS US WITH AN EXCELLENT TARGET (HIS RECENTLY REPORTED CONCRETE BUNKERS AND ELABORATE UNDERGROUND POSITIONS WOULD INDICATED HIS INTENT TO REMAIN). HERE ALL THE ADVANTAGES ARE OURS. FIRST, WE WOULD BE CLEARING A CRITICAL AREA, WHILE PRESSING A LARGE ENEMY FORCE AGAINST THE SEA (OUR ALLY). NEXT, NGF, AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, VERTICAL ASSAULT, VIRTUALLY EVERY ONE OF OUR ACES CAN BE UTILIZED IN AN AREA PROMISING GOOD WEATHER DURING THE TIME FRAME ANNOUNCED. REGARDS.

GP-4

480

EO

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

#48

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		2/18/68		<i>lp</i>	CG III MAF
DCG	2		2/18/68		<i>gm</i>	SERIAL 170834Z FEB COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S	1		2/17/68		<i>g</i>	REMARKS
DC/S			2/19/68		<i>DS</i>	HAS BEEN SENT
DC/S DM						<b>EXCLUSIVE</b>
DC/S AIR						MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
G-1						<i>To CG -</i>
G-2						<i>Msg. released</i>
G-3						<i>before you returned</i>
G-4						<i>Change # 99 out</i>
CEO						<i>force disposition. Do</i>
						<i>notify once the air</i>
						<i>is cleared.</i>
						<b>OK</b>
						<i>J. Johnson</i>
						LEGEND
						A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
						C - COMMENTS
						I - INFORMATION
S/S			172105 2/19/68	2/19/68	<i>DS</i> <i>DHW</i>	
S/C						

TOP SECRET #47



TOP SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**EXCLUSIVE**

DE RUMSAK 1777 0480834

ZNY TTTT

P 170834Z FEB 68

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN  
CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG FMFPAC 122012Z FEB 68

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE (A).
2. YOU ASKED ABOUT THE POST TET CONDITION OF THE ARVN. BEST ESTIMATES INDICATE LOSSES SINCE 15 JAN 68 TO PRESENT BASED ON OPERATIONS STRENGTH AS FOLLOWS: 1ST DIV, 20 TO 25 PER CENT; 2ND DIV, INSIGNIFICANT; 31 REG, 5 TO 10 PER CENT; AND RRGR & CAV, INSIGNIFICANT. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF INCREASED DESERTION AND THE PRESENT TIGHT CONTROL WITHIN ARVN AND THE MAJOR CITIES IN THE ICTZ WOULD TEND TO REDUCE DESERTIONS. LOGISTICALLY, ARVN HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY IN REACTION TIME AND VALIDITY OF REQUESTS. LOGISTICS ARE ADEQUATE. STAFF CONSENSUS IS THAT ARVN WAS ADVERSELY ~~NOT~~ GRAVELY AFFECTED. TIMELY REPLACEMENTS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PLUS EFFECTIVE SUPPORT FROM OTHER ALLIED FORCES

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1777 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
AND ADVISORS WILL COUNTERACT THIS EFFECT, SIGNIFICANTLY.

WE FEEL THAT THE TET OFFENSIVE WILL IMPROVE ARVN IN THE ICTZ.

WE DO NOT FEEL THAT WE HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE SITUATION.

3. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT THE NVN A/C EVEN ACTUALLY ATTEMPTED TO LAND IN ASHAU. I AM ALMOST CERTAIN THAT WE WOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT SUCH AN INTRUSION AS ALL CONCERNED WERE WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY.

4. AT THE TIME YOUR MESSAGE ARRIVED, I WAS MEETING WITH ABRAMS AND WE HAVE BEEN WORKING OUT A COURSE OF ACTION OVER THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS. I AGREE WITH YOUR VIEWS ENTIRELY. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS IN AGREEMENT THAT A MOVE MUST BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE WHICH CONTINUES TO BUILD ON KHE SANH.

A. ESSENTIALLY I PLAN TO SECURE HUE CITADEL BY 20 FEBRUARY AND COMMENCE OPENING ROUTE ONE BETWEEN HUE AND EVANS AT THAT TIME.

B. ON 21 FEB, TWO USMC BNS WILL MOVE FROM HUE TO PHU LOC AND HAI VAN PASS TO RELIEVE TWO BNS OF THE 101ST.

C. ON 23 FEB, THE TWO BNS OF 101ST WILL MOVE TO VICINITY OF CAMP EVANS AND BE OPCON OF 1ST AIR CAV. BY THIS TIME,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1777 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 I EXPECT ROUTE ONE TO BE OPEN FROM II CORPS TO DONG HA.  
 D. BY 24 FEB, WE HOPE TO HAVE TAN MY CHANNEL OPEN AND  
 THREE TEMPORARY LST RAMPS OPERATIONAL.  
 E. BETWEEN 25 - 27 FEB REMAINDER 101ST HQ WILL HAVE CLOSED  
 THROUGH QUANG TRI AIRFIELD TO VIC SOUTH OF AIRFIELD.  
 F. OAB 10 MAR, 1ST AIR CAV (-) (2BDES) WILL COMMENCE OPERATIONS TO  
 OPEN RTE NINE FROM CA LU TO KHE SANH, WITH 11TH ENGR AND SEABEE  
 SUPPORT, THEN WE WILL EXECUTE PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS FROM KHE  
 SANH COMBAT BASE.  
 G. BY 1 MAR, I EXPECT TO HAVE A USABLE LOC TO HAI LANG  
 BEACH.  
 H. IN THE PD 1-3 MAR, WE WILL CLOSE A BDE OF 82D ABN TO  
 101ST TO VIC 2KMS NW OF QUANG TRI AIRFIELD.  
 I. DURING PRD 1-5 MAR, WE WILL LOSE 3D/4TH FROM AMERICAL AND  
 JOIN A BDE OF 1ST AIR CAV WHICH WILL REVERT TO PARENT UNIT  
 CONTROL.  
 5. AT A MEETING WITH ABRAMS YESTERDAY THAT THE AUGMENTATION  
 CONSISTING ESSENTIALLY OF A DIV HQ OF 101ST, A BRIGADE HQ  
 FROM THE 101ST AND A BRIGADE FROM THE 82D AIRBORNE WERE  
 PROVIDED. THIS IS, OF COURSE, IN ADDITION TO 27TH MARINES.

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1777 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 6. LOOKING AT THE OVERALL CONCERTED EFFORT TO OPEN ROUTE ONE  
 TO DONG HA AND ROUTE NINE OUT TO KHE SANH, I SEE THE ENEMY IN  
 QUANG TRI BEING SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED TO REDEPLOY HIS FORCE  
 TO COUNTER THESE MOVES. I FEEL THERE IS SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE  
 TO INDICATE THAT DENIAL OF THESE LOC MUST BE ONE OF HIS  
 OBJECTIVES, AND REASONABLY SO. IN ANY CASE THEIR OPENING WILL  
 FAVOR OUR POSITION MEASURABLY. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE OPENING  
 OF ROUTE NINE WILL PUT ANOTHER FACTOR IN THE EQUATION WHICH  
 THE ENEMY MUST SOLVE AND WILL DRAAW HIM OUT SO THAT WE WILL  
 BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT OUR SUPERIOR WEAPONS SYSTEM AGAINST  
 LUCRATIVE TARGETS.

7. NEW SUBJECT: FOLLOWING COMMENTS PERTAIN TO KHE SANH  
 PER PARA 4 YOUR 150141Z FEB. ONLY PROBLEM CONCERNING  
 PATROLLING IS ACCRUED DUE TO REQUIREMENT FOR IMMEDIATE  
 RESPONSE BY BOTH TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC AIR TO TARGETS  
 UNCOVERED IN VICINITY OF KHE SANH. THIS OF COURSE HAS  
 PRECLUDED CONDUCT OF OUR NORMAL EXTENSIVE LONG RANGE  
 PATROLLING IN ORDER TO FACILITATE STRIKE CLEARANCE PROCEDURES.  
 HOWEVER, MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF VR, IR, SLAR, AERIAL PHOTO-  
 GRAPHY, AND SENSORS IS CONSIDERED TO COMPENSATE TO A MARKED

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 1777 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 DEGREE FOR THIS LIMITATION. CURRENT STOCKS OF BARBED WIRE  
 AND CONCERTINA AT KHE SANH ARE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE AND  
 WILL BE KEPT SO TO ALLOW FOR THAT BEING CONTINUALLY USED  
 IN POSITION IMPROVEMENT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

RR RUKKM  
 DE RUMSAK 0271 0340853  
 ZNY TTTT  
 R 030858Z FEB 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

STAFF PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION

1. AS YOU KNOW THE SITUATION IN ICTZ HAS UNDERGONE MANY CHANGES DURING RECENT MONTHS WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND ARMY DIVISION IN ICTZ. TWO MORE ARE PROJECTED FOR THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE ARE ALSO THOUGHTS TO INCREASE ROKMC FORCES.
2. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FOR THE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF ALL U. S. AND FREE WORLD FORCES DEPLOYED IN ICTZ, THIS HEAD-QUARTERS HAS BEEN TASKED WITH PROVIDING PERSONNEL FOR SPECIAL STAFFS FOR PLANNING AND FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS YORK II AND DURANGO CITY. AS NOTED IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE ON PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION FOR YORK II, I INDICATED THAT WE DESIRED TO DRAW ON U. S. ARMY ASSETS TO AUGMENT IN-HOUSE ASSETS.
3. AT A SUBSEQUENT DATE YORK III, ALSO UNDER OPCON CG III MAF, WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL PLANNING EFFORTS. YORK IV PLANNING GUIDANCE HAS

HAS BEEN SENT

- PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0271 T O P S E C R E T MCEO  
 NOT YET BEEN PROMULGATED. ALL YORK OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ALONG THE WESTERN CORRIDORS OF VIETNAM FROM DO XA THROUGH THE A SHAU VALLEY INTO WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.
4. THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT BASES FOR ALL OPERATIONS WILL BE LARGELY IN ICTZ. CONSEQUENTLY THE BULK OF THE PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS A III MAF RESPONSIBILITY.
  5. THE ADDITIONAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL STAFF REQUIREMENTS CONCURRENT WITH THE LARGE INCREASE IN FORCES IN ICTZ IS PLACING AN UNPRECEDENTED DEMAND ON THIS STAFF. MARINES ARE AND WILL BE MORE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN PLANNING FOR ARMY, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS. THE MARINE CORPS CANNOT BE SATISFIED WITH LESS THE THE BEST IN PROFESSIONALISM AND EXPERTISE IN ITS SUPPORT OF ITS MISSION. ANY FALTERING WILL BE THE EXCUSE NEEDED TO REDUCE EVEN FURTHER THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CG, III MAF.
  6. I HAVE REVIEWED CURRENT PERSONNEL ASSETS NOW ASSIGNED TO THE HEADQUARTERS; CONSIDERED STATED REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE SEPTEMBER REVISION TO T/O; AND UPDATED REQUIREMENTS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT AND PROJECTED COMMITMENTS. IN ORDER TO RESPOND PROPERLY AND WITH PROFESSIONALISM TO OUR NUMEROUS COMMITMENTS, WE NEED ADDITIONAL STAFF AUGMENTATION.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0271 T O P S E C R E T M C E O

7. SPECIFICALLY, IN ADDITION TO OUR PRESENT ON BOARD STRENGTH I SEE THE NEED FOR 42 OFFICERS AND 61 ADDITIONAL ENLISTED PERSONNEL TO PROPERLY SUPPORT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINT AND COMBINED STAFF PLANNING AND OPERATIONS. WITH THE EVER INCREASING U S ARMY POPULATION IN ICTZ IT SEEMS PRUDENT TO ASSUME A SEMI-JOINT STAFF POSTURE; CONSEQUENTLY, 16 OF THE OFFICERS COULD BE ARMY. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE HAVE TEN U S ARMY OFFICERS RECENTLY ASSIGNED FROM USARV VIA AN OFFER BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND TO GEN CHAPMAN. AFTER I HAD REQUESTED THEM. THEY ARE A WELCOME ADDITION TO THE STAFF. THESE AND ANY OTHERS ASSIGNED WOULD NO DOUBT INEVITABLY REQUIRE TRADE-OFF ACTION RESULTING IN EQUIVALENT DEDUCTIONS FROM IN-COUNTRY MARINE CEILING.

8. I PERCEIVE THIS IS A CRUCIAL PERIOD IN WHICH THE ARMY WILL MAKE ITS BID TO EXPAND ITS AREA OF CONTROL AT THE EXPENSE OF MARINE CORPS FORCES. YOUR THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE MATTER ARE SOLICITED. SUBJECT TO YOUR COMMENTS AND WHEN REQUIRED WE WILL PROVIDE THE DETAILS OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AS TO RANK AND MOS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES