

25. ~~CG III MAF 241350Z MAR68 (S)  
CUSHMAN to BEHRENS info ROSSON  
EMPLOYMENT ARG/SLF~~
26. ~~GEN CUSHMAN 241000Z MAR68 (S)  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND info ROSSON  
HOT PURSUIT -- LAOS~~
27. ~~CG III MAF 250038Z MAR68 (S)  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND info ABRAMS  
AIR CAV CAPABILITY -- Our Present Concept~~
28. ~~CG III MAF 260808Z MAR68 (U)  
CUSHMAN to KRULAK  
PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION DURING TET~~
29. ~~LTGEN CUSHMAN 260912Z MAR68 (C)  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
EVALUATION OF RVNAF OFFICERS~~
30. ~~LTGEN CUSHMAN 270633Z MAR68 (C)  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
VISIT REQUEST~~
31. ~~CG III MAF 271253Z MAR68 (S)  
CUSHMAN to KIM  
R&R FACILITIES~~

*Above to separate folder*

- 1 ~~32.~~ CG III MAF 290044Z MAR68 (S) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to TOMPKINS  
Availability of Bunker Materials
- 2 ~~33.~~ CG III MAF 291026Z MAR68 (C) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to KRULAK  
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
- 3 ~~34.~~ CG III MAF 291420Z MAR68 (C) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to MOMYER & MCBRIDE  
DUTCH MILL ORIENTATION VISIT REQUEST
- 4 ~~35.~~ CG III MAF 291014Z MAR68 (U)  
CUSHMAN to KRULAK  
SPLIT TOUR CONCEPT
- 5 ~~36.~~ CG III MAF 300230Z MAR68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to CHAPMAN & KRULAK  
QUOTES WESTY'S AND CUSHMAN'S TWO MSGS RE AIR CAV CAPABILITY

1. CG III MAF 110846Z MAR68 *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to ROSSON info WESTMORELAND  
Offensive plans for NICTZ
2. CG III MAF 130202Z MAR68 *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to KRULAK  
Passes CG III MAF 130158Z MAR68  
Subj: Additive Force Package
3. CG III MAF 140712Z MAR68 *gp-4*  
FROM CUSHMAN to ROSSON, info TOLSON AND MGen ANDERSON  
Air Cavalry Capability for Marine Divisions in SVN
4. CG III MAF 160630Z MAR68 *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to KRULAK  
Passes COMUSMACV 150105Z MAR68 (TS)  
(Additive Force Package)
5. CG III MAF 160712Z MAR68 *gp-3*  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
Coordination of Ground Reconnaissance
6. CG III MAF 251500Z MAR68 *gp-4*  
WIRENOTE from Col BECKINGTON to BGen DAVIDSON & Col MORRIS  
IN-COUNTRY SOG TEAMS
7. CG III MAF 261604Z MAR68 *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON  
ALTERNATE PLANS to PCV OPPLAN 1-68--SURPRISE ATTACK
8. CG III MAF 270934Z MAR68 *gp-3*  
CUSHMAN to ROSSON & TOMPKINS  
SPEEDUP OF D-DAY PEGASUS
9. CG III MAF 310305Z MAR68 TS EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to ROSSON info WESTMORELAND  
SECURITY DISCREPANCIES re PEGASUS
10. CG III MAF 311556Z MAR68 (MCEO) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to KRULAK info ANDERSON  
INPUT REQUESTED CONCERNING AIR CONTROL

25. CG III MAF 241350Z MAR68 (S) *group*  
CUSHMAN TO BEHRENS INFO ROSSON  
EMPLOYMENT ARG/SLF
26. GEN CUSHMAN 241000Z MAR68 (S) *group - not shown*  
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND INFO ROSSON  
HOT PURSUIT -- LAOS
27. CG III MAF 250038Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND INFO ABRAMS  
AIR CAV CAPABILITY -- Our Present Concept
- ~~28. CG III MAF 260808Z MAR68 (U)  
CUSHMAN TO KRULAK  
PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION DURING TEST~~
- ~~29. LTGEN CUSHMAN 260912Z MAR68 (C)  
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND  
EVALUATION OF RVNAF OFFICERS~~
- ~~30. LTGEN CUSHMAN 270633Z MAR68 (C)  
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND  
VISIT REQUEST~~
31. CG III MAF 271253Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO KIM  
R&R FACILITIES

13. CG III MAF 120328Z MAR68 (C) *group-4*  
 CUSHMAN to ABRAMS  
 Investigation of NAVIGATIONAL DIFFICULTIES on ABRAMS' trip to  
 Danang, 10Mar68

~~14. CG III MAF 130014Z MAR68 (C)  
 CUSHMAN to KENIAK  
 Colonel Slato~~

15. CG III MAF 160350Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO MOMYER info WESTMORELAND  
 LOCATION OF I DASC

16. CG III MAF/SA I CORPS 170156Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN to LAM  
 ADDITIONAL MSF SPT

~~17. CG III MAF 180124Z MAR68 (C) MSEO  
 Altopos in safe~~

18. CG III MAF 180724Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN to MOMYER info CUSHMAN  
 LOCATION OF I DASC  
 Passes WESTMORELAND's concurrence in location of DASC  
 at FMAW

19. CG III MAF 200138Z MAR68 (C) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND info ROSSON  
 RETENTION OF SMOKE GENERATOR PLT

~~all above needed to  
 separate folder~~

~~20. CG III MAF 220708Z MAR68 (C)  
 CUSHMAN to BRINGLE  
 Okay on visit 24, 26 March; Bringle select date~~

~~21. LTGEN CUSHMAN 230710Z MAR68 (C)  
 CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
 CONGRATS on new assignment~~

22. CG III MAF 230812Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN to ROSSON  
 ARG/SLF SCHEDULES

23. CG III MAF 230916Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN to LGEN LAM  
 PROJECT DELTA

24. LTGEN CUSHMAN 240632Z MAR68 (C) *group-4*  
 CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
 EVAL OF RVNAF OFFICERS

1. CG III MAF 060110Z MAR 68 (C) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to CHAPMAN & KRULAK  
Tour Dates -- Colonels
2. CG III MAF <sup>060326Z</sup>~~030224Z~~ MAR68 (C -- MCEO) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to TOMPKINS  
Quotes KRULAK's msg containing "Tuohy" news article  
Requests comments concerning 3rd MarDiv "Canards"
3. CG III MAF 061328Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to TOMPKINS  
C7A AIRSTRIP AT CA LU
4. CG III MAF 061330Z MAR68 (C) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
Info RADM VETH and MGen TOMPKINS  
AIR CUSHION VEHICLES (PACV) FOR CUA VIET RIVER
- ~~5. CG III MAF 070710Z MAR68 (C)  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
Concurs with press release, with changes~~
- ~~6. CG III MAF 071153Z MAR68 (C)  
Passes CG III MAF 070710Z MAR68 (CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND)  
to ABRAMS~~
7. CG III MAF 080650Z MAR68 (S) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
Info ABRAMS, MOMYER  
Pre-Emption of ARC LIGHTS at KHE SANH
8. CG III MAF 081605Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND & ABRAMS  
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS KHE SANH  
C7A Airstrip at Ca Lu (Taska 1st ACD)
9. CG III MAF 101316Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND  
Staff Augmentation - U. S. Army
- ~~10. CG III MAF 110958Z MAR68 (U)  
CUSHMAN to KRULAK  
Colonel Slate~~
11. CG III MAF 110914Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to CHAPMAN & KRULAK  
Answers to Allegations in TUOHY Article
12. CG III MAF 111412Z MAR68 (C) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN to Col LOWNDS info TOMPKINS  
"Well Done"

- EXCLUSIVE -

(OUTGOING)

- A-1. CG III MAF (BGEN ANDERSON) 010414Z MAR 68 (C) *gp-4*  
 FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 ALLEGED USMC LOOTING IN HUE
- A-2. CG III MAF 010432Z MAR 68 (C) *gp-4*  
 FOR RADM VETH FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 CONGRATULATIONS MESSAGE ON NELSONIAN VICTORY
- ~~3. CG III MAF 020024Z MAR 68 (C)  
 FOR MCEN KOSTER FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 CONGRATULATIONS ON PROMOTION TO MCEN~~
- A-4. CG III MAF 030816Z MAR 68 *gp-1*  
 MACV FOR J3  
 COVER AND DECEPTION EQUIPMENT
- ~~5. CG III MAF 030554Z MAR 68 (C)  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 (All copies retained in sealed envelope in S/S Safe)~~
- A-6. CG III MAF 050302Z MAR 68 (C) *gp-4*  
 FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 NEW COMMAND RELATIONS IN ICTZ AND LOOTING IN HUE

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG	2		3/12/68		JW	SERIAL 110846Z MAR COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	2		3/12/68		JW	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S	1.		3/14/68		C	REMARKS
DC/S			3/12/68		M	<h1>EXCLUSIVE</h1> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			11815		JW	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE  
 C-COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						OG III MAF SERIAL 010308Z MAR COPY # 7 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		3/1/68		@	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>#2 &amp; 3 burned 5 done</p>
DC/S			3/1/68		DRW	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			012005		DRW	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#50

OUTGOING

(EXCLUSIVE)

49. CG III MAF 010244Z MAR 68 (C) *9p-4*  
FOR MGEN ANDERSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)
50. CG III MAF 010308Z MAR 68 (C) *9p-4*  
FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG 111 WAF SERIAL MAR 68
DCG						COPY# 6 OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT OF MARINE AIR IN RVN (S)
C/S	1.					REMARKS COPY #2 to FMFPAC 2 APR COPY #3 to Air Control 1 Apr 68 Th
DC/S						<b>EXCLUSIVE</b>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			010700			MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
S/C						LEGEND A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I-INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #10

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/1/68		<i>[initials]</i>	CG III MAF
DCG	3		4/2/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SERIAL 311556Z MAR 68 COPY# 1 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR			4/1/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SUBJECT CONTROL OF MARINE AIR IN RVN (S)
C/S	1.		4/1/68		<i>[initials]</i>	REMARKS
DC/S			4/2/68		<i>[initials]</i>	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p> <p>TOP SECRET #10</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			010700	4/2	<i>[initials]</i>	
S/C						



**TOP SECRET**

PP RUHKM  
 DE RUMSAK 3718 091155G  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 311556Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MBEN  
 ANDERSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 CONTROL OF MARINE AIR IN RVN (S)

A. CMC MSG 281352Z MAR68 (TS)  
 B. CG FMFPAC MSG 300019Z MAR68 (TS)  
 1. REF B REQUESTED ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONTAINED  
 IN REF A.

2. ANSWERS FOLLOW:

A. ANS TO PARA 1 A (1) THROUGH (4)

(1) PCV CAME INTO BEING ON 10MAR68. ITS ONLY CURRENT  
 CMD/CONTROL RELATIONSHIP WITH FIRST ARVN DIV IS ONE OF  
 COOPERATION AND COORDINATION. THIS IS TRUE IN AIR SUPPORT  
 MATTERS AS WELL.

(2) COOPERATION AND COORDINATION HAVE BEEN AND ARE  
 THE ONLY RELATIONSHIP.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3718 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

(3) AMERICAL HAS BEEN UNDER OPCON OF III MAF SINCE  
 20APR67. PRIOR TO 21MAR68 AMERICAL SUBMITTED ITS REQUESTS  
 FOR AIR SUPPORT DIRECTLY TO TASE. SINCE 21MAR, AMERICAL  
 SUBMITS REQUESTS THROUGH III MAF.

(4) [COOPERATION AND] CONTROL HAS BEEN AND IS THE ONLY  
 RELATIONSHIP.

B. ANS TO PARA 1 B (3)

(3) AMERICAL DIV REQUESTED PREPLANNED STRIKES AS  
 FOLLOWS: AMERICAL TO TASE, TASE TO TACC, TACC FRAG TO  
 AMERICAL TOC AND COPY TO I DASC AND TFW

C. ANS TO PARA 1 D

(1) 1ST ARVN DIV FOLLOWS: DIV TO I CORPS TOC, TOC  
 TO TASE, TASE TO TACC, TACC FRAG TO I CORPS TOC/I DASC/TFW

(2) SAME AS 1ST ARVN DIC

(3) AMERICAL TO III MAF, MAF TO TASE, TASE TO TACC,  
 TACC FRAG TO AMERICAL TOC, I DASC AND TFW/1ST MAW

(4) 1ST AIR CAV TO PCV, PCV TO III MAF, III MAF TO  
 TASE, TASE TO TACC, TACC FRAG TO I DASC, V DASC, DIV TOC,  
 TFW/1ST MAW

(5) OMITTED

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3718 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
D. ANS TO PARA 1 E

(1) THRU (4): IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST PROCEDURE SAME FOR ALL: DIV TOC TO I DASC, I DASC THEN DIVERTS AIRBORNE A/C OR SCRAMBLES A/C ON HOT PAD. IF NO AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE WITHIN I DASC AREA, I DASC THEN GOES TO TACC FOR OTHER RESOURCES. EXCEPTION ARE DIVS UNDER PCV WHERE ANOTHER STEP IS ADDED (DIV TO V DASC, V DASC TO I DASC). ALTHOUGH COMUSMACV LETTER OF 7MAR68 RE SINGLE MANAGEMENT GIVES DASC VICTOR DIVERT AUTHORITY OVER PREPLANNED MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO PROVCORPS V, DUE TO COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES THIS AUTHORITY HAS BEEN RETAINED BY I DASC. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE LTR OF 7MAR DELEGATES DIVERT AUTHORITY TO I DASC AND DASC V, WHICH ARE 7TH AIR FORCE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES, AND III MAF HAS NOT EXERCISED ANY CONTROL IN THIS DECISION-MAKING AREA.

E. ANS TO PARA 2: THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NORMAL PROCESSING TIMES FOR PREPLANNED STRIKES. THESE TIMES ARE NOT DOCUMENTED BUT ARE BASED ON THE BEST ESTIMATES OF THE COMMAND OR AGENCY INVOLVED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THESE FIGURES ARE MAXIMUM PROCESSING TIMES ANDT THERE ARE NUMEROUS GAPS IN THE VARIOUS STEPS. FURTHER, THE PROCESSING TIME FROM BATTALION

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 3718 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
TO DIVISION IS THE SAME UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM AS PREVAILED UNDER THE MARINE SYSTEM. THE ONLY ADDED TIME PRIOR TO REACHING THE III MAF LEVEL IS IN THE CASE OF THE 3D MARDIV WHERE THEIR REQUESTS MUST PASS THROUGH THE PCV ECHELON. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONSRRAINT THAT IS IMPOSED UPON III MAF THAT IT MUST HAVE THE REQUESTS FOR COMBAT SKY SPOTS BY 1430 THE DAY PREVIOUS TO THE DAY SKY SPOTS ARE SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE AT 1900. OF COURSE, III MAF TRANSMITS THE PREPLANNED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TARGET REQUESTS TO TASE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE COMBAT SKY SPOTS. HOWEVER, THE PREPLANNED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT STRIKES DO NOT COMMENCE UNTIL 0700 THE SECOND DAY FOLLOWING SUBMISSION.

UNITS	TIME
BN TO REG	1.0
REG TO DIV	2.5
DIV TO PCV	2.5
PCV TO III MAF	3.5
MAF TO TASE	4.0
TASE TO TACC	5.5
TACC TO FIRST MAF	5.5

020700  
001430

~~43:30~~

3.30

47:00

12

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 3718 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
F. THE APPROXIMATE NORMAL TIME LISTED ABOVE REFLECTS TIME  
CONSUMED AT EACH LEVEL. PROCESSING OVERLAPS AND TIME USED  
DEPENDS ON THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS PROCESSED, PERSONNEL AND  
COMMUNICATIONS.

G. THE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST SYSTEM IMPOSES A SCHEDULE THAT  
REQUIRES III MAF TO HAVE DIVISION PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT  
REQUIREMENTS 28 TO 29 HOURS PRIOR TO EARLIEST POSSIBLE TARGET  
TIME. CONSEQUENTLY, BATTALIONS AND REGIMENTS MUST SUBMIT  
THEIR REQUEST SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ALLOW THE DIVISION  
TO CONSOLIDATE REQUESTS.

H. ORAL WARNING ORDERS ARE ISSUED BY TACC PRIOR TO HARD-  
COPY FRAGS. THE FIRST MAW RECEIVES THE ORAL WARNING ORDER  
FOR TPQ MISSIONS AT 1400 FOR STRIKES THAT COMMENCE AT 1900  
THE SAME DAY AND AT 1700 FOR CAS MISSIONS COMMENCING AT 0700  
THE FOLLOWING DAY. SINCE INAUGURATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT  
SYSTEM, FREQUENTLY THE FIRST FLIGHTS ARE FLOWN PRIOR TO  
RECEIPT OF THE HARD-COPY FRAGS.

GP-4  
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						OO III MAP
DCG	2		3/31/68		JW	SERIAL 310305Z MAR 68 SUBJECT PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF OP. INFO
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		3/31/68		Q	EYES ONLY  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>
DC/S			3/31		DK DK	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			3/31	3/31	DW.	LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						TOP SECRET #9

C 312355Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG PCV  
 INFO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR LTGEN ROSSON INFO GEN WESTMORELAND  
 REF A. GEN WESTMORELAND 301150Z MAR68

SUBJ: PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION TO NEWS  
 MEDIA

1. PLANS FOR OUR MOST SIGNIFICANT FORTHCOMING OPERATION INCLUDE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE INHERENT ELEMENTS OF NEWSWORTHINESS IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER. SUCH A JOINT OPERATION WHICH INCLUDES ABOUT AN EQUAL NUMBER OF U. S. ARMY AND MARINES ALONG WITH ELEMENTS OF VIETNAMESE FORCES WILL QUITE NATURALLY ATTRACT WORLD ATTENTION. THEREFORE, THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETE COVERAGE IS RECOGNIZED. THE FORCE ISO HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR PROPER HANDLING OF THE PRESS TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM COVERAGE BUT AT AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM RISK OF PREMATURE DISCLOSURE. THE PRESS WAS NOT TO BE INFORMED OF EVEN THE REQUIREMENT TO MOVE FROM DANANG PRESS CENTER TO OPERATIONAL UNITS UNTIL 31 MARCH, AND THEN ONLY TO BE INFORMED THAT IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST TO MAKE SUCH A MOVE WITH NO OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDED. THE FACT OF AN IMPENDING OPERATION WAS TO BE DISCLOSED TO NEWSMEN ONLY AFTER ARRIVAL AT UNITS WHERE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES PRECLUDED EVEN AN INADVERTENT RELEASE.

2. THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, FROM BOTH SAIGON AND DANANG, AS INDICATED BY REF A, THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INDISCREET PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO MEMBERS OF THE PRESS. I WAS BRIEFED BY MY ISO ON THIS ON 30 MARCH. ON 28 AND 29 MARCH SOME EIGHT NEWSMEN DEPARTED THE DANANG PRESS CENTER FOR THE 101ST AIRBORNE AND THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISIONS. ON 29 AND 30 MARCH A NUMBER OF THEM RETURNED TO DANANG PRESS CENTER WITH QUESTIONS INDICATING THAT THEY KNEW THE LOCATION, DATE AND GENERAL SIZE OF THE OPERATION. THEIR OBVIOUS KNOWLEDGE WAS TOO DETAILED AND PRECISE TO HAVE BEEN SPECULATION.

3. I REQUEST THAT YOU CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION ASAP SUBSEQUENT TO COMMENCEMENT OF OP PEGASUS AND SUBMIT A REPORT OF YOUR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME.  
 BEST REGARDS.

CP-4  
 555

TOP SECRET

UNNO

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG 111 MAF
DCG						SERIAL 300230Z MAR COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S	1.		3/30/68		A	REMARKS <b>EXCLUSIVE</b> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  HAS BEEN SENT  Copy Burned for Mque Robertson Casper SAJ  LEGEND A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION  " # 2 & 3 Burned 5 Nov 68 "
DC/S			3/30/68		DA	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			301800		DAW	
S/C						

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

RUMSAK RUEBHOA  
RUMSAK 3472 01  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 300230Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS  
1. THE FOLLOWING TWO MESSAGES ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.  
THE FIRST IS MY MSG TO GEN WESTMORELAND, AND THE SECOND HIS  
REPLY THERETO: QUOTE

P 250038Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GENERAL  
ABRAMS, FROM LT GENERAL CUSHMAN  
AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN (U)  
A. COMUSMACV 290417Z FEB68  
1. REF A INDICATED UTILITY OF AIR CAV SQDN IN VIETNAM ENVIRON-  
MENT, AND REQUESTED EXAMINATION OF FEASIBILITY OF ORGANIZING

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3472 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
SIMILAR MARINE CORPS FORCE.

2. MY REPS VISITED AIR CAV SQDN ON 17 MARCH AND WERE PROVIDED A MOST INFORMATIVE BRIEFING. FURTHER, MY STAFF HAS BEEN STUDYING THE SUBJECT. SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS REFLECT MY PRESENT VIEWS.
3. THE CONCEPT OF THE AIR CAV SQDN, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, ESSENTIALLY IS TO FIND, FIX AND EXPLOIT, IN A RAPID MANNER. THIS IS DONE BY EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER RECONNAISSANCE, GUNSHIP, AND LIGHT REACTION FORCES. WHEN THE SITUATION DEVELOPS BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE AIR CAV SQDN, EXPLOITATION IS PASSED FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT BY OTHER FORCES. THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS ARE ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF SUITABLE HELICOPTERS AND A PERMISSIVE HELICOPTER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT. IT HAS BEEN OUR EXPERIENCE IN ICTZ THAT THE MORE DISCIPLINED, PREPARED, AND HEAVILY ARMED THE ENEMY BECOMES, THE LESS PERMISSIVE BECOMES THAT ENVIRONMENT. AS COROLLARY THERETO, THE GREATER THEN BECOMES THE REQUIREMENT FOR HEAVIER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS TO BEAR UPON THE ENEMY IN ORDER TO FIX AND EXPLOIT HIM. IN THIS EXTENSIVE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, WE HAVE RUN THE COMPLETE GAMUT ON RELATIVE PERMISSIVENESS OF THE HELICOPTER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.
4. I ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUBSCRIBE TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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**SECRET**

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

**SECRET**

THREE RUMSAK 3472 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FINDING, FIXING, AND EXPLOITING IN AS RAPID AND EFFECTIVE MANNER AS IS FEASIBLE IN KEEPING WITH A GIVEN SITUATION. TO THIS END, OUR CONCEPT HAS BEEN TO EMPLOY OUR ASSIGNED RESOURCES IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

A. CONDUCT VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE BY HELICOPTER AND LIGHT FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, IN COORDINATION WITH A VERY ACTIVE HELICOPTER-INSERTED RECON TEAM PROGRAM. OUR RECON TEAM IS IN PLACE OVER A LENGTHY PERIOD, AND THE ENEMY GENERALLY IS UNAWARE OF ITS SPECIFIC LOCATION. MUCH CLOSER OBSERVATION IS PROVIDED, ALBEIT OVER A MORE LIMITED FIELD.

B. EFFECT QUICK REACTION BY FIRE ON SUITABLE TARGETS THROUGH ARTILLERY AND ATTACK AVIATION. WE CONTINUALLY MAINTAIN AT LEAST 10 FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT ON 15 MINUTE ALERT FOR QUICK-REACTION HEAVY FIREPOWER.

C. LIFT ALERT GROUND FORCES INTO AN AREA, TO EXPLOIT A SITUATION AS SUITABLE. WE HABITUALLY MAINTAIN THREE SPARROW HAWK/BALD EAGLE RAPID REACTION FORCES AT THE READY (PLATOON AND COMPANY SIZE, RESPECTIVELY). THEY ARE LIFTED BY TWO EARMARKED HUEY GUNS AND TWO CH-46 AT NIGHT, ON 15 MINUTE ALERT AT EACH OF THE THREE PRINCIPAL HELICOPTER AIRFIELDS IN ICTZ.

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 3472 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO RECYCLED AND DIVERT HELOS PARTICIPATE IN A FORCE BUILD-UP AS REQUIRED (ONE CH-46D LIFTS TWENTY COMBAT EQUIPPED MARINES). ADDITIONALLY, DURING DESIGNATED OPERATIONS SUCH AS FOSTER, CITRUS, BADGER TOOTH, ROCK, AND WORTH, ONE COMPANY HELICOPTER REACTION FORCES HAVE BEEN HELD AT THE READY FOR EXPLOITATION PURPOSES.

5. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW CURRENT MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER RESOURCES COULD BE USED TO AN ADVANTAGE GREATER THAN NOW IS ACHIEVED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR FIXED WING ATTACK AVIATION. NOT UNCOMMONLY, THE HEAVY ORDNANCE OF MY ORGANIC FIXED WING AIR CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE ENEMY TO FIX AND KILL EVEN MORE QUICKLY THAN THE MUCH MORE LIGHTLY ARMED HUEY.

6. THEREFORE, I FEEL THAT THE RESOURCES NOW AVAILABLE TO ME ARE STRUCTURED AND EMPLOYED SO AS TO GIVE A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY TO FIND, FIX, AND EXPLOIT. I PERCEIVE NO ADVANTAGE IN REORGANIZING PRESENTLY AVAILABLE HELICOPTER ASSETS, IN VIEW OF THE HARD FACT THAT IT SIMPLY WOULD BE ROBBING PETER TO PAY PAUL. HOWEVER, I DO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGE OF OBTAINING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION/GUNSHIP HELICOPTER ASSETS. IN THIS CONNECTION I ALREADY HAVE ASKED FOR

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 3472 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
72 MORE HUEYS. FULFILLMENT OF THIS REQUEST ALONE WOULD  
DOUBLE MY CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED FORCE LEVEL. OF COURSE, THE  
PROBLEM IS NOT SIMPLY TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL AIRFRAMES,  
TRAINED CREWS, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, ETC.,  
ALSO WOULD BE NEEDED.

7. PERHAPS I CAN SUMMARIZE THE FOREGOING IN THIS FASHION:  
ESSENTIALLY, WE ARE ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK YOU ADDRESS IN  
THE REFERENCE, IN KEEPING WITH THE ASSETS AVAILABLE AND MY  
OVERALL TACTICAL SITUATION. WE HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NEED FOR  
ADDITIONAL LIGHT HELICOPTER RESOURCES, WHICH HAS BEEN  
EXPRESSED. WITH THESE HELICOPTERS, WE COULD DO A MORE  
EFFECTIVE JOB OF VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE AND GUNSHIP ACTIVITY.  
I DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT THE AIR CAV SQDN NECESSARILY IS AN  
OPTIMAL ORGANIZATION PATTERN FOR THE MARINE CORPS, AS A  
FORMALIZED STRUCTURE. WE CAN DO THE JOB WELL WITHIN OUR OWN  
ORGANIZATIONAL PRECEPTS, SUBJECT TO ASSET AVAILABILITY. ON  
THE OTHER HAND, I DO CONCLUDE THAT WE CAN CONCEIVABLY  
MAKE FAVORABLE ADJUSTMENTS FROM TIME TO TIME IN OUR PRESENT  
PATTERN WITHIN III MAF. NATURALLY, I WOULD WELCOME ADDITIONAL  
LIGHT HELICOPTERS IN ICIZ. PENDING THEIR AVAILABILITY, I

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 3472 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
INTEND THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. PROPOSE TO GENERALS ROSSON AND TOLSON THAT WE MUTUALLY  
SELECT A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXPERIENCED HELICOPTER PILOTS  
AND RECON PERSONNEL FOR EXCHANGE DUTY BETWEEN THE AIR CAV  
SQDN, AND MARINE LIGHT HELICOPTER/RECON ELEMENTS. A 30-  
DAY CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF THIS SORT SHOULD PROVE BENEFICIAL  
TO BOTH ARMY AND MARINES.

B. CONTINUE TO REVIEW MY OWN RECON AND REACTION STRUCTURE,  
TO INSURE WE ARE ABLE TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FROM ANY  
ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER RESOURCES WHICH MAY COME OUR WAY.

C. APPLY THE BENEFIT OF UP DATED EXPERIENCE ON A TIMELY  
BASIS IN THIS VITAL AREA, IRRESPECTIVE OF ADDITIONAL ASSET  
AVAILABILITY.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

291600Z MAR 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF

SECRET 08894

BT

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**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUHFMA RUEBHOA  
 DE RUMSAK 3488 0900230  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 300230Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND  
 SUBJ: AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)  
 REF: A. MACV 05971 DTG 290417Z FEB68  
 B. CG III MAF 250038Z

1. (U) YOUR DETAILED REPLY TO THE REQUIREMENT OF REF A IS APPRECIATED.
2. (S) COMMENTS IN REF A MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MARINE CORPS UNITS IN SVN HAVE A CAPABILITY SIMILAR TO THAT OF ARMY AIR CAVARLY SQUADRONS. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF MARINE CAPABILITIES IN THIS AREA DEPENDS ON AN INCREASE IN YOUR HELICOPTER INVENTORY. I NOTE THAT NO SUCH INCREASE HAS BEEN APPROVED AND PROGRAMMED YET. SHOULD YOU DETERMINE THAT ADDITIONAL MARINE AIR UNITS OF THIS TYPE CAN BE MADE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3488 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO AVAILABLE TO YOU IN FY68 OR 69 FOR THIS PURPOSE, I WILL SUPPORT THROUGH JOINT CHANNELS YOUR REQUEST FOR THEM.

3. (S) YOUR PROPOSED ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS UNIT APPEAR SOUND. THE EXCHANGE DUTY PROGRAM FOR ARMY AIR CAV AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL OF LIGHT HELICOPTER/RECONNAISSANCE UNITS CAN BE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE AND SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL. I WILL BE VERY INTERESTED IN ANY NEW TACTICAL CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES WHICH MAY DERIVE FROM CLOSER PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THESE TWO HIGHLY QUALIFIED GROUPS OF COMBAT SPECIALISTS.

GP-4  
 UNQUOTE  
 WARM REGARDS.  
 GP-4  
 BT

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DCG	3		3/30/68		<i>JK</i>	SUBJECT SPLIT TOUR CONCEPT
DCG AIR						REMARKS  HAS BEEN SENT  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  <i>"# 243 Burned 5 Nov 68"</i>  LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
C/S	1.		3/30/68		<i>@</i>	
DC/S			3/30/68		<i>JK</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
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G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			300845	3/30	<i>DKW</i>	
S/C						

		FROM CG III MAF
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# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#4

RR RUHKM  
 DE RUMSAK 3413 0891014  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 R 291014Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**

UNCLAS E F T O SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 SPLIT TOUR CONCEPT

- A. HQ III MAF PROPOSED T/O OF 26 SEP 1967
- B. CG FMFPAC MSG 160117Z MAR 1968 (C) (EXCLUSIVE)
  - 1. A REVIEW OF REF A WAS CONDUCTED TO EVALUATE THE LTCOL AND BELOW OFFICER BILLETS IN EACH SECTION TO DETERMINE A GENERAL PROPORTION OF SPLIT AND FULL TOUR ASSIGNMENTS WHICH WILL GIVE THE OPTIMUM BLEND OF CONTINUITY AND OPERATIONAL CURRENCY.
  - 2. A TOTAL OF 48 BILLETS SUCH AS TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO SPLIT TOURS AND WERE IMMEDIATELY EXCLUDED. I CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING BILLET MOS'S AS AMENABLE TO SPLIT TOURS:

0202	0430	1802	0F7500
0302	0802	3502	9910
0402	1302	5715	9912

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3413 UNCLAS E F T O SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 3. WITHIN THE ABOVE MOS CATEGORIES THERE ARE 143 OF A TOTAL 191 LTCOL AND BELOW BILLETS. TO DESIGNATE ALL 143 AS SPLIT TOUR BILLETS WOULD RESULT IN 75 PERCENT SPLIT TOURS WITHIN THE STAFF. OPTIMUM CONTINUITY AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED AT THIS PROPORTION OF RAPID TURNOVER.  
 4. OF THE 143 BILLETS 69 ARE COMPANY GRADE OFF AND 74 LTCOL/MAJ. OF THE 69 COMPANY GRADE OFF 36 ARE IN OF 7500 AND MOS 9910/9912 BILLETS. I CONSIDER THIS AN EQUITABLE PROPORTION FOR SPLIT TOUR BILLETS FOR COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS.  
 5. FOR FIELD GRADE OFFICERS, I BELIEVE A SMALLER PROPORTION IS INDICATED. MOST OF THE FIELD GRADE OFFICERS OCCUPY ACTION OFFICER POSITIONS WHEREIN CONTINUITY OF EFFORT AND JOB SKILL IS MANDATORY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS 30 PERCENT OR 22 OF THE 74 LTCOL/MAJ BILLETS IS CONSIDERED AN OPTIMUM PROPORTION. THE 36 COMPANY GRADE AND 22 FIELD GRADE WILL AMOUNT TO 58 SPLIT TOUR BILLETS FOR THIS STAFF. UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WILL BE OTHERS FROM TIME TO TIME WHO SHOULD HAVE SPLIT TOURS. THESE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH INDIVIDUALLY.  
 6. NO DETAILED ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MADE OF THE COLONEL BILLETS I TRUST THAT WE CAN EXPECT SOME FIELD EXPERTISE FROM

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Pay. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sup.	Surg.									44

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3413 UNCLAS E F T O SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR THE MAJOR COMMANDS ON A SELECTIVE BASIS.

7. IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AN INPUT SCHEDULE WHICH WILL FILL THE DESIRED REQUIREMENTS IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE III MAF SPLIT TOUR BILLETS BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL FROM IN-COUNTRY WHO HAVE A MINIMUM OF SIX MONTHS REMAINING ON THEIR TOURS.

8. TO SCHEDULE REPLACEMENTS FOR BILLETS BEING VACATED DURING A GIVEN MONTH, YOUR HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE ADVISED THREE MONTHS IN ADVANCE AS TO THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS BY RANK AND MOS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED TO FILL THE SPLIT TOUR BILLETS. ANY SPECIAL BILLET REQUIREMENTS WILL BE STATED THEREIN. THEREAFTER, QUOTAS WOULD BE LEVIED ON DIVISIONS, WING AND FLC TO PROVIDE SPLIT TOUR PERSONNEL.

9. IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT REFLECTED HEREIN, I RECOMMEND THAT 1 JUNE 1968 BE ESTABLISHED AS A TARGET DATE. YOUR HEADQUARTERS WILL BE INFORMED NO LATER THAN 25 APRIL OF THE BILLETS THAT WILL BECOME VACANT DURING JUNE 1968.

10. I AWAIT YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE FOREGOING.

BT

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 DE RUMSAK 3449 0891420  
 ZNY CCOCC  
 P 291420Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAL/COMDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMSAL/COMDR TFA NAKHON PHANOM THAI  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN MONYER,  
 BGEN MCBRIDE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 SUBJ: DUTCH MILL ORIENTATION VISIT  
 I WOULD APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ORIENTATION VISIT DUTCH MILL  
 9 APRIL 1968. PLAN TO ARRIVE NKP 1000, DEPART 1400 LOCAL.  
 I WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG GEN E. E. ANDERSON, CHIEF  
 OF STAFF, III MAF, AND MAJ C. EDWARDS, AIDE. ALL CERTIFIED TS  
 CLEARED.  
 WARM REGARDS.  
 GP-4  
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DCG AIR	4			31	WJ	REMARKS  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>  <i>"#2 &amp; 3 Burned 5 Nov 68"</i>  LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
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S/C						

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FROM THE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGHT KRULAK FROM  
STORM COMMAND

A. CG PMPAC NSG 0900422 MARCH 1958

1. IN REFERENCE A YOU SPoke OF THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW  
OF OUR PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR HQ III MAF. I HEARTILY CONCUR  
THAT SUCH A REVIEW WOULD BE IN ORDER.

2. THE SIZE OF THE STAFF HAS, AS YOU HAVE WITNESSED, GROWN  
BY LEAPS AND BOUNDS AND WITH EACH INCREASE THERE HAS BEEN  
REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION BASED ON BEST JUDGMENT AT THE TIME.  
INCREASES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO MEET APPARENT AND IMMEDIATE  
WORK LOADS AND IMMEDIATELY FORESEEABLE ENLARGEMENT OF RE-  
SPONSIBILITIES, WIDENING OF THE SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES,  
OR MORE UNITS HAVING BEEN ADDED TO THE FORCE. IMPLICIT IN  
JUSTIFICATIONS IS THE THOUGHT THAT THE STAFF IS WORKING AN  
EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF HOURS AND THIS WILL ULTIMATELY RESULT  
IN DEGRADATION OF THE QUALITY OF STAFF EFFORT AND MORE

PAGE TWO RUMOK 3415 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR  
IMPORTANTLY, LESS THAN OPTIMAL DECISION MAKING.

3. HERETOFORE, NO REAL TEST OF REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN MADE.  
GUIDANCE FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS AND CMC HAS ALWAYS INCLUDED  
CONSIDERATION FOR COMPENSATORY REDUCTION ELSEWHERE. SIMILARLY,  
THE DISCIPLINE INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING IN-COUNTRY FORCE STRUCTURE  
(UNITS AND INDIVIDUAL SPACES) DEMANDS CONSIDERATION OF TRADE-  
OFF OF SPACES AND LEVEL PERSONNEL GOALINGS.

4. VALIDATION OF BELIEFS IS THE KEY TO A CONTINUING REVIEW  
OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS. THE BASIS FOR SUCH VALIDATION IS  
THE FORMALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS OF THE STAFF OF HQ III MAF.  
THIS BASIC STEP IS UNDER WAY AND SHOULD PRODUCE AN ORGANIZA-  
TION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE THE MISSIONS  
AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SEVERAL STAFF ELEMENTS. IN DEVELOPING  
THE FUNCTIONS IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR EACH SECTION TO IDENTIFY  
THE TASKS BEING PERFORMED BY SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AND INDIV-  
IDUALS THEREIN. THESE TASK LISTS WILL SERVE THE INITIAL  
PURPOSE OF INFORMING THE SECTION HEAD AND HIS IMMEDIATE  
SUBORDINATES WHAT IS BEING DONE BY HIS PEOPLE IN SUPPORT  
OF IDENTIFIABLE FUNCTIONS. A CLOSE REVIEW BY HIM WILL SURELY  
UNCOVER SOME GRACELESS OVERLAP OR DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 3415 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAL EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 WHICH HE CAN CORRECT. SECONDLY, THE TASK LISTING SHOULD  
 SUGGEST TO THE SECTION HEAD THE OPTIMUM ORGANIZATIONAL  
 STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT HIS ASSIGNED OR ASSUMED FUNCTIONS.  
 THIRDLY, THE RAW TASK LIST WHEN CLOSELY ANALYZED OBJECTIVELY  
 ALONG WITH OTHERS THROUGHOUT THE STAFF, SHOULD POINT TO  
 FUNCTIONAL DUPLICATION AND OVERLAP. FINALLY, THE TASK LIST  
 ONCE REFINED AND EDITED WILL SERVE AS A SECTION'S COMPLEMENT  
 TO THE HQ ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL. THE SECTION  
 TASK LISTING WHEREIN EACH TASK IS FORMALLY RELATED TO A  
 FUNCTION WILL SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A CONTINUITY OR TURN-  
 OVER FILE.

5. DURING THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING THE ORGANIZATION MANUAL,  
 EXISTING I/O AND BILLETS THEREIN WILL BE REVIEWED FOR ES-  
 SENTIALITY. HOPEFULLY, REFINEMENTS WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN  
 RANKS, MOS'S AND NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL. ONCE THE MANUAL IS  
 DEVELOPED IT SHOULD SERVE AS THE AUTHORITY DOCUMENT FOR  
 ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE STAFF.  
 BECAUSE OF EVER-CHANGING TASKS AND FUNCTIONS, CONTINUOUS  
 CHANGES WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR THE MANUAL. WITH EACH CHANGE,  
 HOWEVER, THERE WILL BE A REVIEW OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS.

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 3415 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAL EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 6. RATHER THAN A CRASH REVIEW OF A DETAILED MANPOWER STUDY,  
 IT IS CONSIDERED MORE IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH A DISCIPLINE  
 THAT WILL SERVE TO MONITOR PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS ON A  
 CONTINUING AND ORDERLY BASIS. THE TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION  
 OF THE ORGANIZATION MANUAL IS ARBITRARILY SET AT 1 JULY 1968.  
 BY ABOUT 20 MAY TASKS LISTS SHOULD BE ANALYZED AND SOME CON-  
 CLUSIONS REACHED AS TO NUMBERS AND TYPES OF PERSONNEL  
 REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE MISSION AND FUNCTIONS  
 OF EACH OF THE SEVERAL STAFF ELEMENTS. IT IS DURING THE  
 ANALYSIS OF THE MASS OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE TASKS LISTS  
 THAT I MAY REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM YOUR PERSONNEL AND  
 OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTIONS. I AM ALSO CONTEMPLATING  
 INVESTING IN A SMALL MANPOWER VALIDATION ELEMENT TO PROVIDE  
 THE CONTINUITY CONSIDERED NECESSARY.

GP-4  
 BT

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM CG III MAF
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DCG						SUBJECT AVAILABILITY OF BUNKER MATERIALS
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		3/30/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	<p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p><i>"#263 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			3/30/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			300725		<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

PP RUMHVP  
DE RUMSAK 3337 0890044  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 290044Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

**HAS BEEN SENT**

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
AVAILABILITY OF BUNKER MATERIALS

- A. CG THIRD MARDIV 240345Z FEB 68
- B. CG THIRD MARDIV 261435Z MAR 68
- C. CG III MAF 131204Z FEB 68
- D. CG III MAF 160906Z FEB 68
- E. CG III MAF 061538Z MAR 68

01. REFS A AND B ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM OF SUPPLY OF BUNKER MATERIALS TO THE THIRD MARDIV WITH PARTICULAR REF TO KHE SANH.  
02. PRIOR TO EARLY JAN 68 REQUESTS FOR BUNKERS GREATLY EXCEEDED SUPPLY. RECORDS OF THIS HQ SHOW THAT DURING 1967 A TOTAL OF 243 BUNKERS WERE DELIVERED TO ALL III MAF UNITS INCLUDING FLC, FMAW, FIRST MARDIV, ROKMC, CAP/CAG'S AND THIS HQ. 145 OF THESE, OR ROUGHLY 60 PERCENT WERE DELIVERED TO THIRD MARDIV FOR DISTRIBUTION THROUGHOUT AOR.

03. ON 30DEC67, THIRD MARDIV REQUESTED THIS HQ TO ARRANGE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3337 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DELIVERY OF BUNKERS TO KHE SANH. THIS REQUEST INCLUDED 78 BUNKERS PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED. SUBSEQUENT TO 30 DEC, AN ADDITIONAL 64 HAVE BEEN REQUESTED, MAKING A TOTAL OF 142 BUNKERS FOR KHE SANH. THESE REQUESTS CAME DURING THE RE-DEPLOYMENT OF THREE ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS TO KHE SANH WITH A REQUIREMENT FOR A 1600 S/I BUILDUP IN SUPPLY STOCKS IN ADDITION TO INCREASED DAILY RESUPPLY. LOS OF THE ASP ON 21 JAN REQUIRED STOCK REPLENISHMENT. FOUR INCIDENTS OF DAMAGE TO THE HIGHWAY, ENEMY INTERDICTION OF AIR LANDED OPERATIONS AND 28CH MARINES LIMITED CAPABILITY TO RECOVER AIR DROPS HAVE ALSO LIMITED RESUPPLY. BY REFS C, D, AND E, THIS HQ REQUESTED ACTION BY THIRD MARDIV TO INCREASE AIR DROP CAPABILITY. OUR ABILITY TO RESUPPLY KHE SANH WITH COMBAT ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES HAS BEEN MARGINAL. HOWEVER, THE EQUIVALENT OF 45 2'X6'X6' BUNKERS HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO KHE SANH SINCE 19 FEB AND DELIVERIES ARE BEING MADE AT THE RATE OF ONE TO TWO BUNKERS PER DAY NOW THAT STOCK LEVELS HAVE BEEN BUILT UP AND THE RESUPPLY SITUATION IS LESS CRITICAL.

4. I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE OF ENEMY INTERDICTION OF LOC'S IN NORTHERN LZTZ DURING FEB, INCLUDING THE CUA VIET AND PERFORM

**PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFG	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#1

**SECRET**

THREE RUMSAK 3337 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 RIVERS AND ROAD NETWORK. DESPITE A MAXIMUM EFFORT BY ALL  
 CONCERNED, INCLUDING UTILIZATION OF ADDITIONAL CTF 76 SHIPPING,  
 WE WERE NOT ABLE TO MEET DAILY MINIMUM COMBAT ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT  
 REQUIREMENTS AND STOCKS DREW DOWN TO DANGEROUSLY LOW LEVELS.  
 ALTHOUGH NOT FULLY RECOVERED FROM THIS DRAWDOWN, OUR STOCK  
 STATUS IS NOW SUCH THAT IT IS PLANNED TO COMMENCE SHIPPING  
 BUNKER MATERIALS TO NORTHERN 1 CORPS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.  
 IN ADDITION, U. S. ARMY SFT CMD IS SHIPPING HEAVY COMBAT  
 MATERIALS TO WUNDER BEACH BY DEEP DRAFT VESSELS. THIS MATERIAL  
 WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH PCV.

B. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM PCV, AUTHORIZATION WAS  
 OBTAINED FROM COMUSMACV FOR III MAF UTILIZATION OF SELECTED  
 DYE MARKER BUNKER MATERIALS TO MEET URGENT TACTICAL REQUIRE-  
 MENTS. EARLY ON 24 MAR A REQUEST FOR THIS SELECTED MATERIAL  
 WAS RECEIVED FROM PCV FOR AN URGENT TACTICAL REQUIREMENT IN  
 THE PREPARATION OF SUPPORT COMPLEX AT CA LU FOR FORTHCOMING  
 OPERATIONS. THIS REQUEST WAS APPROVED AND THE MATERIALS  
 WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO FIRST AIR CAV DIV THRU PLSO-2.  
 C. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS  
 FOR BUNKERS THROUGHOUT THIRD MARDIV AOR.. WE WILL CONTINUE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 3337 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR BUNKERS AT  
 THE SANH AND THROUGHOUT THIRD MARDIV, AS WE WILL DO FOR ALL  
 III MAF COMMANDS. HOWEVER, BY SEPARATE MESSAGE NOW BEING  
 PREPARED, I AM DIRECTING THAT YOU SUBMIT ALL FUTURE REQUESTS,  
 AND RESUBMIT MOST OF PENDING REQUESTS, THROUGH PCV FOR BETTER  
 COORDINATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION  
 OF AVAILABLE ASSETS. IF OUR CURRENT SHIPPING CAPABILITY CAN  
 BE MAINTAINED, I'M SURE WE WILL BE ABLE TO SATISFACTORILY  
 MEET REQUIREMENTS OF ALL NORTHERN 107Z COMMANDS FOR BUNKERS.  
 GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#1	

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		3/28/68		lo	CG III MAF
DCG	3		3/28/68		gn	SERIAL 270934Z MAR 68 COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4		3/29/68		h	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S	h		3/28/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S			3/29/68		h	HAS BEEN SENT
DC/S DM						EXCLUSIVE
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			280655		SH D/W	LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
S/C						TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FILE 50 CCN 279

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 270934Z MAR 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
SUBJECT		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
28 Mar	VH Thompson		
3/28	D. W. Keen		
3/28	[Signature]		
3/29/68	Mr. Gen Anderson Sean		
3/29/68	DCG + CFS leave sev.		
3/29/	[Signature]		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

# 8  
TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

OO RUMHMB  
 DE RUMSAK 3178 0370934  
 ZNY TTTT  
 O 270934Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE**

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN ROSSON AND NGEN  
 TOMPKINS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. A THROUGH ANALYSIS OF ALL FACTORS, INDICATES A LESSENING  
 OF ENEMY TROOP STRENGTH IN THE KHE SANH AREA, BUT CONTINUED  
 PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANT THREATS IN THE DONG HA AND HUE  
 AREA. IT IS MY INTENTION TO RECOMMEND A SPEED UP OF  
 3-DAY FOR PEGASUS AND TO MODIFY THE CONCEPT TO A SHORT  
 RAPID TWO WEEK OPERATION TO PERMIT THE GARRISON TO BE  
 PULLED OUT, THUS FREEING A MARINE REGIMENT TO REINFORCE  
 THE ONGOING OFFENSIVE NEAR DONG HA AND THE AIR CAV DIV TO  
 CARRY THE OFFENSIVE TO THE ENEMY IN THE RTE 547 AREA.  
 2. PREPARATORY TO THESE OPERATIONS, IT IS DIRECTED THAT  
 LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS BE  
 CONDUCTED BY THE FORCES AT KHE SANH IN ORDER TO DETERMINE  
 ENEMY POSTURE AND INTENTIONS IN THE AREA, TO FIX HIM IN POSITION

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3178 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 AND TO DESTROY THOSE GROUPS SELECTED AS OBJECTIVES.

3. IT IS FURTHER DIRECTED THAT MAXIMUM USE BE MADE OF TANKS  
 AND APC'S (3D TANK BN, 3/5 ARMORED CAVALRY AND 2/34 ARMOR) IN  
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DONG HA AREA. THEY HAVE BEEN USED  
 PREVIOUSLY IN THE DMZ AREA WITH GREAT EFFECTIVENESS.

GP-3  
 BT

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF SERIAL 271253Z MAR68 COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT R&R FACILITIES
DCG AIR						REMARKS  <i>Copy # 1 to Col Faw 31 May 68 In 5 June 68</i>  <i># 2 &amp; 3 burned 5 Nov 68</i>
C/S						
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						SERIAL <del>CG III HQ</del> COPY # OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		3/28/68		GM	SUBJECT <del>SECRET MARS</del> <del>FOR FACILITIES</del>
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		3/28/68		Q	
DC/S	3		3/28/68		P	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			3/27		JHW	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**

NY 3555  
R 271255Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG SECOND BDE ROKMC

TOD  
167K 27/13 302

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN YUN SANG KIM FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

R&R FACILITIES

1. LAST DECEMBER YOU REQUESTED THAT WE CONSTRUCT AN R&R CENTER FOR ABOUT 200 OF YOUR PERSONNEL. AS YOU WILL RECALL THIS WAS NOT APPROVED AND AS AN IMMEDIATE ALTERNATIVE YOUR BRIGADE WAS OFFERED A QUOTA FOR THE EXISTING FACILITIES AT CHINA BEACH.

2. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU DESIRE TO ROTATE PERIODICALLY COMPANY THROUGH AN R&R CENTER, FURTHER THAT THIS COMPANY WOULD USE THE R&R CENTER WILL COMPRISE A REACTION FORCE AND WILL TAKE WITH IT ALL ITS EQUIPMENT. ON THE SURFACE THIS SEEMS TO BE A REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL APPROACH INASMUCH AS YOUR TROOPS ARE DEPLOYED ONLY LIMITED OUT OF COUNTRY R&R.

3. ALTHOUGH YOUR ORIGINAL PLAN FOR A PERMANENTLY CONSTRUCTED CENTER WAS NOT ACCEPTED, WE HAD HOPED TO COMPROMISE BY FINDING

#510

YOUR PERSONNEL COULD ENJOY REST AND RECOVERY IN THE REGARD.  
 4. MY CHIEF OF STAFF AND SOME STAFF MEMBERS HAVE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS  
 ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE FOR A SUITABLE LOCATION. THE RECOMMENDA-  
 TION GIVEN BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE ONE I ACCEPT IS THAT  
 YOUR RAR FACILITY BE LOCATED IN APPROXIMATELY THE SAME LOCATION  
 AS YOU ARE NOW TEMPORARILY LOCATED. HAVING SEEN THIS SITE MYSELF  
 I ENVISION THAT IT WILL SATISFY YOUR REQUIREMENTS. THERE ARE,  
 HOWEVER, SEVERAL THOUGHTS I HAVE ON THE SUBJECT. I RECOGNIZE  
 THAT YOU WANT TO MAINTAIN YOUR REACTION COMPANY FULLY EQUIPPED  
 AND READILY RESPONSIVE. AS YOU MAY KNOW THE U.S. PERSONNEL AT  
 THE RAR CENTER ARE REQUIRED TO SECURE ALL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS  
 AND AN ARMORY. THIS I EXPECT WOULD ALSO BE YOUR DESIRE. FURTHER,  
 PERSONNEL AT THE RAR CENTER ARE NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE CHINA  
 BEACH AREA. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE BECAUSE THERE HAS NOT BEEN  
 LIBERTY IN THE DANANG AREA. THIS IS MORE SIGNIFICANT TODAY SINCE ALL  
 FORCES ARE ABIDING BY GENERAL LAN'S CURFEW RESTRICTIONS WHICH  
 PRECLUDE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE AREA AFTER 7 P.M. DAILY.  
 NATURALLY YOUR OFFICER IN CHARGE OR COMPANY COMMANDER WILL BE

PAGE THREE S E C R E T  
 CONCERNED IN THIS REGARD AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ABLE TO CONTROL  
 THIS MATTER. LASTLY, I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO  
 COORDINATE YOUR MILITARY POLICE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WITH  
 THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE CHINA BEACH RAR CENTER TO ENSURE  
 THAT YOUR TROOPS WOULD BE AWARE OF THE VARIOUS BEACH RULES AND D  
 REGULATIONS.  
 AS SUBJECT TO YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE DESCRIBED FACILITIES AND  
 IN LINE WITH THE FOREGOING MY STAFF WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE  
 YOUR REPRESENTATIVE WITH ALL NECESSARY DETAILS REGARDING SPECIFIC  
 AREAS, FACILITIES AVAILABLE, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, ETC. WARM  
 REGARDS.  
 SP-7  
 BT

YOUR PERSONNEL COULD ENJOY THE  
 ACTION IN THE REGARD.

4. XV CHIEF OF STAFF AND SOME STAFF MEMBERS HAVE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS  
 ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE FOR A SUITABLE LOCATION. THE RECOMMENDA-  
 TION GIVEN BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE ONE I ACCEPT IS THAT  
 YOUR BAR FACILITY BE LOCATED IN APPROXIMATELY THE SAME LOCATION  
 AS YOU ARE NOW TEMPORARILY LOCATED. HAVING SEEN THIS SITE MYSELF  
 I ENVISION THAT IT WILL SATISFY YOUR REQUIREMENTS. THERE ARE,  
 HOWEVER, SEVERAL THOUGHTS I HAVE ON THE SUBJECT. I RECOGNIZE  
 THAT YOU WANT TO MAINTAIN YOUR REACTION COMPANY FULLY EQUIPPED  
 AND READILY RESPONSIVE. AS YOU MAY KNOW THE U.S. PERSONNEL AT  
 THE BAR CENTER ARE REQUIRED TO SECURE ALL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS  
 AND IN ARMORY. THIS I EXPECT WOULD ALSO BE YOUR DESIRE. FURTHER,  
 PERSONNEL AT THE BAR CENTER ARE NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE CHINA  
 BEACH AREA. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE BECAUSE THERE HAS NOT BEEN  
 LIBERTY IN THE DANANG AREA. THIS IS MORE SIGNIFICANT TODAY SINCE ALL  
 FORCES ARE ABIDING BY GENERAL LAN'S CURFEW RESTRICTIONS WHICH  
 PRECLUDE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE AREA AFTER 7 P.M. DAILY.  
 NATURALLY YOUR OFFICER IN CHARGE OR COMPANY COMMANDER WILL BE

PAGE THREE S E C R E T  
 CONCERNED IN THIS REGARD AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ABLE TO CONTROL  
 THIS MATTER. LASTLY, I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO  
 COORDINATE YOUR MILITARY POLICE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WITH  
 THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE CHINA BEACH BAR CENTER TO ENSURE  
 THAT YOUR TROOPS WOULD BE AWARE OF THE VARIOUS BEACH RULES AND R  
 REGULATIONS.

DS/ SUBJECT TO YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE DESCRIBED FACILITIES AND  
 AIR LINE WITH THE FOREGOING MY STAFF WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE  
 YOUR REPRESENTATIVE WITH ALL NECESSARY DETAILS REGARDING SPECIFIC  
 AREAS, FACILITIES AVAILABLE, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, ETC. WARM  
 REGARDS.

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	CG III MAF
CG	2		3/27/68		lp	SERIAL	261604Z MAR 68 COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		3/27/68		9M	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE
DCG AIR						REMARKS	<p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p> <p>TOP SECRET #7</p>
C/S	1		3/27/68		Q		
DC/S			3/28/68		DM		
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S			276100		DM		
S/C							



**TOP SECRET**

OO RUMHMB  
 DE RUMSAK 3787 2861604  
 ZNY TTTT  
 O 261504Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS VN  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE  
 HAS BEEN SENT**

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION INDICATES A POSSIBILITY OF A THINNING OUT OF ENEMY INFANTRY IMMEDIATELY AROUND KHE SANH. SIGNIFICANT THREATS REMAIN TO DONG HA--QUANG TRI AND TO HUE, IN MY OPINION.

2. I WOULD THEREFORE ASK THAT YOU PREPARE ALTERNATE PLANS TO PROV CORPS V OP PLAN 1-68 WHICH WOULD ACCOMPLISH THE FOLLOWING--A HEAVY SURPRISE ATTACK AGAINST ENEMY FORCES ALONG THE HUE-547-A SHAU AXIS; AGAINST THE BASE AREA 121/QUANG TRI COMPLEX; AND AGAINST THE ENEMY IN NORTHEASTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

3. FURTHER REQ YOU CONSIDER AN ATTACK BY A MARINE REGT AND ONE ENGR BN ALONG THE AXIS OF ROUTE 9 TO KSCB IN CONJUNCTIONS WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS BY RLI-26.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

TOP SECRET

FILE 37 CCN 266

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 251500Z MAR COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT WIRENOTE FOR BGEN DAVIDSON J-2
C/S	A		3/26/68		Q	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">HAS BEEN SENT</p>
DC/S			3/26/68		DM	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		Copy				
G-3		Copy				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			260710	3/26	DM	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #6

TOP SECRET

FILE 37 CGN 266

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
		CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 251500Z MAR	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
3/26	DKWogn	SUBJECT WIRENOTE FOR BGEN DAVIDSON J-2	
3/26	C/S has seen Dkv	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/26	P. L. J. W.		
			<b>FOR</b>
S/S	COPY 2,3,4 OF 4 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#6  
**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET****FOR**

PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 2975 0851500  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 251500Z MAR 63  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 INFO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V  
 BT

**HAS BEEN SENT**

T O P S E C R E T

WIRENOTE FROM COL BECKINGTON G-2 FOR BGEN DAVIDSON J-2 INFO  
 COL MORRIS

A. CG III MAF MSF 190114Z MAR 63

1. REFERENCE CONTAINS COMMENTS BY COMUSMACV ON CONTROL OF SOG  
 ASSETS IN NORTHERN ICTZ. IN REPORTING THESE THIS HQ NOTED THAT  
 SUBJECT OF CONTROL OF IN COUNTRY USE OF SOG ELEMENTS SHOULD BE  
 SUBJECT OF EARLY DISCUSSION. THIS AFTERNOON CG PCV'S G-3  
 RAISED QUESTION AGAIN WITH III MAF G-3.

2. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING HERE THAT III MAF HAS NO OPCON OF  
 ANY ELEMENT OF SOG, DOES HAVE SOMETHING CALLED DIRECT TASKING  
 AUTHORITY FOR CURRENT IN COUNTRY SOG OPNS FOR A SHAU VALLEY ALONE.  
 IT IS MY OWN PRESENT JUDGEMENT THAT PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY  
 WE INFORM YOU OF DESIRED SOG ASSISTANCE WITH OUR PRIORITIES IS  
 A GENERALLY SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT, HOWEVER, THIS FALLS FAR

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2975 T O P S E C R E T

SHORT OF WHAT COMUSMACV STRICTURES ON THE SUBJECT WOULD SEEM  
 TO REQUIRE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE EARLY DISCUSSION OF  
 CURRENT RELATIONSHIP IS NECESSARY PARTICULARLY WITH GEN ROSSON  
 PRESSING HIS G-3 FOR SOME REACTION TO GEN WESTMORELAND'S COMMENTS.  
 IN THE MEANTIME C&C DET DANANG HAS STATED HE CAN PROVIDE NOW UP  
 TO THREE TEAMS FOR IN COUNTRY SUPPORT OF III MAF/CG PROV CORPS  
 AND THIS AVAILABILITY HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN TO PROV CORPS ALBEIT  
 VIA THE WIRENOTE ROUTE. REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 250302 MAR 68 COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN (U)
C/S						REMARKS
DC/S						<p>#3 burned 5 Nov 68</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>Copy #2 out to S/S 1st MAF for <sup>TM</sup> permanent retention 280830H Mar 68</p> <p><i>Duane M. Eber</i></p> <p>Copy #3 out to G-3 36700H Mar 68 In 290730H Apr 68 TM</p> <p>Photostat to Prov Corp U at 021755H Apr 68 TM</p> <p><i>Eugene Scott</i></p> <p>LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3		<i>Op. L. Ober</i>				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			251220		<i>813</i>	
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
						SERIAL 250038Z MAR 68 COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		3/25/68		<i>JH</i>	SUBJECT AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN (U)
DCG AIR	3		3/26/68		<i>A</i>	REMARKS
C/S	1		3/25/68		<i>@</i>	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			251220		<i>SBH</i> <i>D4W</i>	
S/C						

**EXCLUSIVE**  
**HAS BEEN SENT**

*Copy burned for Regue Robertson 6 April 68*

LEGEND  
A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE  
C - COMMENTS  
I - INFORMATION

*#27*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

FILE # CCN 262

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG 111 MAF	
		SERIAL 250038Z MAR 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
3/25	DH Wagon	SUBJECT AIR CAP CAPABILITY FOR MAR DIV IN SVN (U)	
3/25	C/S has seen DHW	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/25	<i>[Signature]</i>		
3/26/68	Major Gen Anderson <sup>has seen</sup>		
S/B	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT  
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#27

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 2875 0850038  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 250038Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GENERAL ABRAMS, FROM LT GENERAL CUSHMAN  
 AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN (U)  
 A. COMUSMACV 290417Z FEB68  
 1. REF A INDICATED UTILITY OF AIR CAV SQDN IN VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT, AND REQUESTED EXAMINATION OF FEASIBILITY OF ORGANIZING SIMILAR MARINE CORPS FORCE.  
 2. MY REPS VISITED AIR CAV SQDN ON 17 MARCH AND WERE PROVIDED A MOST INFORMATIVE BRIEFING. FURTHER, MY STAFF HAS BEEN STUDYING THE SUBJECT. SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS REFLECT MY PRESENT VIEWS.  
 3. THE CONCEPT OF THE AIR CAV SQDN, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, ESSENTIALLY IS TO FIND, FIX AND EXPLOIT, IN A RAPID MANNER. THIS IS DONE BY EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER RECONNAISSANCE, GUNSHIP, AND LIGHT REACTION FORCES. WHEN THE SITUATION DEVELOPS BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE AIR CAV SQDN, EXPLOITATION IS PASSED FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT BY OTHER FORCES. THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2875 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 ARE ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF SUITABLE HELICOPTERS AND A PERMISSIVE HELICOPTER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT. IT HAS BEEN OUR EXPERIENCE IN ICTZ THAT THE MORE DISCIPLINED, PREPARED, AND HEAVILY ARMED THE ENEMY BECOMES, THE LESS PERMISSIVE BECOMES THAT ENVIRONMENT. AS COROLLARY THERETO, THE GREATER THEN BECOMES THE REQUIREMENT FOR HEAVIER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS TO BEAR UPON THE ENEMY IN ORDER TO FIX AND EXPLOIT HIM. IN THIS EXTENSIVE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, WE HAVE RUN THE COMPLETE GAMUT ON RELATIVE PERMISSIVENESS OF THE HELICOPTER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.  
 4. I ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUBSCRIBE TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF FINDING, FIXING, AND EXPLOITING IN AS RAPID AND EFFECTIVE MANNER AS IS FEASIBLE IN KEEPING WITH A GIVEN SITUATION. TO THIS END, OUR CONCEPT HAS BEEN TO EMPLOY OUR ASSIGNED RESOURCES IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

A. CONDUCT VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE BY HELICOPTER AND LIGHT FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, IN COORDINATION WITH A VERY ACTIVE HELICOPTER-INSERTED RECON TEAM PROGRAM. OUR RECON TEAM IS IN PLACE OVER A LENGTHY PERIOD, AND THE ENEMY GENERALLY IS UNAWARE OF ITS SPECIFIC LOCATION. MUCH CLOSER OBSERVATION IS PROVIDED, ALBEIT OVER A MORE LIMITED FIELD.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.								#27	

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2875 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 B. EFFECT QUICK REACTION BY FIRE ON SUITABLE TARGETS THROUGH ARTILLERY AND ATTACK AVIATION. WE CONTINUALLY MAINTAIN AT LEAST 10 FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT ON 15 MINUTE ALERT FOR QUICK-REACTION HEAVY FIREPOWER.

C. LIFT ALERT GROUND FORCES INTO AN AREA, TO EXPLOIT A SITUATION AS SUITABLE. WE HABITUALLY MAINTAIN THREE SPARROW HAWK/BALD EAGLE RAPID REACTION FORCES AT THE READY (PLATOON AND COMPANY SIZE, RESPECTIVELY). THEY ARE LIFTED BY TWO EARMARKED HUEY GUNS AND TWO CH-46 AT NIGHT, ON 15 MINUTE ALERT AT EACH OF THE THREE PRINCIPAL HELICOPTER AIRFIELDS IN ICTZ. RECYCLED AND DIVERT HELOS PARTICIPATE IN A FORCE BUILD-UP AS REQUIRED (ONE CH-46D LIFTS TWENTY COMBAT EQUIPPED MARINES). ADDITIONALLY, DURING DESIGNATED OPERATIONS SUCH AS FOSTER, CITRUS, BADGER TOOTH, ROCK, AND WORTH, ONE COMPANY HELICOPTER REACTION FORCES HAVE BEEN HELD AT THE READY FOR EXPLOITATION PURPOSES.

5. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW CURRENT MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER RESOURCES COULD BE USED TO AN ADVANTAGE GREATER THAN NOW IS ACHIEVED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR FIXED WING ATTACK AVIATION. NOT UNCOMMONLY, THE HEAVY ORDNANCE OF MY ORGANIC FIXED WING

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2875 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 AIR CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE ENEMY TO FIX AND KILL EVEN MORE QUICKLY THAN THE MUCH MORE LIGHTLY ARMED HUEY.

6. THEREFORE, I FEEL THAT THE RESOURCES, NOW AVAILABLE TO ME ARE STRUCTURED AND EMPLOYED SO AS TO GIVE A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY TO FIND, FIX, AND EXPLOIT. I PERCEIVE NO ADVANTAGE IN REORGANIZING PRESENTLY AVAILABLE HELICOPTER ASSETS, IN VIEW OF THE HARD FACT THAT IT SIMPLY WOULD BE ROBBING PETER TO PAY PAUL. HOWEVER, I DO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGE OF OBTAINING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION/GUNSHIP HELICOPTER ASSETS. IN THIS CONNECTION I ALREADY HAVE ASKED FOR 72 MORE HUEYS. FULFILLMENT OF THIS REQUEST ALONE WOULD DOUBLE MY CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED FORCE LEVEL. OF COURSE, THE PROBLEM IS NOT SIMPLY TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL AIRFRAMES, TRAINED CREWS, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, ETC., ALSO WOULD BE NEEDED.

7. PERHAPS I CAN SUMMARIZE THE FOREGOING IN THIS FASHION: ESSENTIALLY, WE ARE ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK YOU ADDRESS IN THE REFERENCE, IN KEEPING WITH THE ASSETS AVAILABLE AND MY OVERALL TACTICAL SITUATION. WE HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NEED FOR ADDITIONAL LIGHT HELICOPTER RESOURCES, WHICH HAS BEEN

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 27	

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2875 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR EXPRESSED. WITH THESE HELICOPTERS, WE COULD DO A MORE EFFECTIVE JOB OF VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE AND GUNSHIP ACTIVITY. I DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT THE AIR CAV SQDN NECESSARILY IS AN OPTIMAL ORGANIZATION PATTERN FOR THE MARINE CORPS, AS A FORMALIZED STRUCTURE. WE CAN DO THE JOB WELL WITHIN OUR OWN ORGANIZATIONAL PRECEPTS, SUBJECT TO ASSET AVAILABILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, I DO CONCLUDE THAT WE CAN CONCEIVABLY MAKE FAVORABLE ADJUSTMENTS FROM TIME TO TIME IN OUR PRESENT PATTERN WITHIN III MAF. NATURALLY, I WOULD WELCOME ADDITIONAL LIGHT HELICOPTERS IN ICTZ. PENDING THEIR AVAILABILITY, I INTEND THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. PROPOSE TO GENERALS ROSSON AND TOLSON THAT WE MUTUALLY SELECT A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXPERIENCED HELICOPTER PILOTS AND RECON PERSONNEL FOR EXCHANGE DUTY BETWEEN THE AIR CAV SQDN, AND MARINE LIGHT HELICOPTER/RECON ELEMENTS. A 30-DAY CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF THIS SORT SHOULD PROVE BENEFICIAL TO BOTH ARMY AND MARINES.

B. CONTINUE TO REVIEW MY OWN RECON AND REACTION STRUCTURE, TO INSURE WE ARE ABLE TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FROM ANY ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER RESOURCES WHICH MAY COME OUR WAY.

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2875 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
C. APPLY THE BENEFIT OF UP DATED EXPERIENCE ON A TIMELY BASIS IN THIS VITAL AREA, IRRESPECTIVE OF ADDITIONAL ASSET AVAILABILITY.

GP-4  
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/7 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	Cs	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#27	

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	LAST ORIGINAL
CG						SERIAL	1, 2 AND 3 COPIES OF A
DCG	2		3/25/68		QML	25 FEBRUARY 68	COPY # OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3		3/26/68		A	SUBJECT <b>NOT FINISH</b>	
C/S	1		3/25/68		Q	REMARKS	
DC/S						<b>MEM ONLY</b>	
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S			250830		DHW		
S/C							

*# 2+4 burned  
5 Nov 68*

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**

O 241000Z ZYH  
FM CG ILLI MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO LGEN ROSSON, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

TODAY I APPROVED FOR PRESENTATION TO YOU THE PROV CORPS V PLAN FOR HOT PURSUIT INTO LAOS OF CERTAIN OF THEIR FORCES. IT IS READY FOR BRIEFING AT YOUR CONVENIENCE. WARM REGARDS.

110

HAS BEEN SENT

#26

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM CG III MAF
CG	2		5/25		lo	SERIAL 241350Z MAR COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		3/25		JK	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  HAS BEEN SENT  <i># 2 &amp; 3 burned 5 Nov 68</i>
C/S	1		3/25/68		Q	
DC/S			3/25/68		DK	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			250715	3/25	JKW	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
		CG III MAF	
		SERIAL	COPY# 7 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
		241350Z MAR	
		SUBJECT	
		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
3/15	DKW cogn		
3/15	C/S as seen DW		
3/25	lp		
3/25	th		
3/25	Dh Jan		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

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**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

**HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUMHMA  
DE RUMSAK 2867 0841350  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 241350Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX  
INFO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V  
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM BEHRENS INFO LGEN ROSSON  
FROM LGEN CUSHMAN.  
EMPLOYMENT ARG/SLF

A. CTF 76 MSG 221540Z MAR 68

1. KEENLY APPRECIATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN  
REFERENCE (A) AND CONCIR IN THE DESIRABILITY OF EMPLOYING  
BLTS IN THE AMPHIBIOUS ROLE. HOWEVER, YOU ARE AWARE THAT A KEY  
INGREDIENT IN THE TIMELY EXECUTION AND ULTIMATE SUCCESS  
OF OPERATION PEGASUS IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADEQUATE  
PREPOSITIONING OF SUPPLIES AT CA LU AND THE CAPABILITY  
OF ENSURING A CONTINJOUS FLOW OF MATERIAL DURING THE  
EXECUTION PHASE.

2. THE EMPLOYMENT OF BLT 2/4 IN THE VICINITY OF THE CUA  
VIET IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY  
FOR THIS VITAL LOC. SIMILIARLY, BLT 3/1 IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN

PAGE TWO RUMSAY 2867 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
SECURITY ON THE EXTENSION OF THIS LOC (RTE 9) FROM DONG HA  
TO THON SON L.M.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT FEASIBLE TO  
REDUCE THE NUMBER OF IN COUNTRY MANEUVER BATTALIONS AT THIS  
TIME.

4. PHASE I. OF MY PLANNED OFFENSIVE IS TO STRIKE THE ENEMY  
IN NORTHEASTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCES. DURING PHASE II, WHICH WILL  
BE A THRIST TO THE BEN HAI, YOUR FORCES WILL BE CALLED UPON  
TO PLAY A KEY ROLE.

5. WAR# REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#25

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM <b>LEGEND CUSHMAN</b>
CG						SERIAL <b>2406325 MAR68</b> COPIES <b>1, 2 and 4</b> OF <b>4</b> COPY # OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT <b>LIST OF RVNAF OFFICERS</b>
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		3/24/68		<i>Q</i>	<p><b>EYES ONLY</b></p> <p><i>"#2 + 4 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE                      C - COMMENTS                      I - INFORMATION</p> <p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b></p>
DC/S			3/24/68		<i>DK</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			24/605	3/24	<i>DKW</i>	
S/C						

# 24

O 240632Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN - EYES ONLY  
 (FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN - TO GEN WESTMORELAND)  
 EVALUATION OF RVNAF OFFICERS (CNF)

A. YOUR MAC 03915 DIG 220253Z MAR68

1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING INFO SUBMITTED
2. PART I (OUTSTANDING)

BGEN NGO QUANG TRUONG - CG 1ST ARVN DIV  
 COL PHAM VAN PHU - DEP COMDR, 1ST ARVN DIV  
 COL VU VAN GIAI - CO 2ND REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV  
 COL NGUYEN VAN TOAN - CO 2ND ARVN DIV  
 LCOL PHAM CAU DONG - C/S 2ND ARVN DIV  
 LCOL NGUYEN VAN THANH - CO 6TH REGT, 2ND ARVN DIV  
 LCOL TRUONG TAN THUC - CO 51ST REGT  
 LCOL PHAN HOA HIEP - CO 4TH ARMD CAV

3. PART II - NONE
4. PART III - NONE

GP-4

120

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

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NOFORN

#24

#24

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF SERIAL 230916Z MAR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		3/24/68		JW	SUBJECT PROJECT DELTA
DCG AIR	7		3/25/68		J	REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>  " #3 & 4 Burned 5 Nov 68"  LEGEND A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
C/S	1.		3/28/68		Q	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			3/23/68		JW	
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

FILE 52 UCN 251

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
		CG 111 MAF	
		SERIAL	COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
3/23	DHW	230916Z MAR 68	2 OF 6
		SUBJECT	
		PROJECT DELTA	
3/23	C/S R Co seen DHW.	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/24	JH		
3/25/68	1141 Gen Anderson (Has Seen)		
S/S	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
G-3	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

OO RUMKVN  
DE RUMSAK 2733 080016  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 230916Z MAR 68 ZPP-6  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMKVM/CG I CORPS  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**FOR**

**S E C R E T**  
FOR LIGEN LAM FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN  
PROJECT DELTA

- A. COMUSMACV 06047 DTG 291455Z FEB
- 1. AS YOU ARE AWARE PROJECT DELTA (SAMUAI IV) IS SCHEDULED TO TERMINATE 4 APR 1968 REF A.
- 2. IN VIEW OF THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION AND THE ENEMY CONCENTRATION BETWEEN HUE AND ANHAI I HAVE REQUESTED A 60 DAY EXTENSION AS FOLLOWS:
  - A. EXTEND SAMUAI IV TO 20 APR 68
  - B. NORMAL 15 DAY STAND DOWN UNTIL 30 MAY 68
  - C. COMMENCE SECOND OPERATING PERIOD ON 30 MAY TO TERMINATE

5 JUN 68.  
PROPOSED AO FOR SECOND OPERATING PERIOD WILL EITHER BE SAMUAI IV EXTENDED NORTH TO INCLUDE BASE AREA 114 AND SOUTH TO INCLUDE THE AREA BOUNDED ON THE WEST BY THE BAC HIE RIVER, ON THE EAST

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2733 **S E C R E T** FOR  
BY THE SONH HUU TRASH AND ON THE SOUTH BY THE LAOS BORDER (DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS THAT ARI OR HUONG - HUONG AREA YG 7098 EAST TO ZC 0598 SOUTH TO ZC 6072 WEST TO YG 7074 NORTH TO YC 7098, OR AN AREA DICTATED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION AT THE TIME.  
3. IF YOU CONCUR WITH THIS PROPOSAL, I SUGGEST THAT YOU MAY DESIRE TO SUBMIT A SIMILAR REQUEST FOR DELTA EXTENSION AND AO TO THE JCS. WARM REGARDS.

GF-4  
BT

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#23

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		3/24/68		<i>[initials]</i>	CG III MAF
DCG	3		3/24/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SERIAL 230842Z MAR 68 COPY # / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT ARG/SLF SCHEDULES
C/S	1.		3/23/68		<i>[initials]</i>	REMARKS  HAS BEEN SENT  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  <i>#2+3 burned 5 Nov 68</i>  LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
DC/S			3/24		<i>[initials]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			3/23/68		<i>DKW</i>	
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

FILE 32

250

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 2288422 MAR 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
3/23	<i>DAWagon</i>	SUBJECT ARG/SLF SCHEDULES	
3/23	<i>C/S Das Sam DAW</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
<i>3/24</i>	<i>D. h. Fan</i>		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

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01 0000Z  
DT VIKING 0700 000000  
ZNY 00000  
O 000000Z MAR 63  
FM 00 000 MAF  
TO 000000/00 000  
BT

**S E C R E T**  
SYNCRAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LEEB BOSSON FROM LIAISON CUSHMAN  
ARMY/SLP SCHEDULES  
A. CTF 76 201540Z MARCH 63 (SIFCAT 000000)  
1. REQUEST YOUR VIEW ON ADVISABILITY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
CONTAINED IN REF A ASAP.  
GP-6  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

**HAS BEEN SENT**

111 MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#22

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 200138Z MAR 68
DCG AIR						COPY # 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	t.		3/20/68		CE	REMARKS  <b>HAS BEEN SENT FOR</b>  <i>"#304 burned 5 Nov 68"</i>
DC/S			3/20/68		DM	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			201125		DKW	
S/C				3/20		

LEGEND

- A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
- C-COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

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DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG 111 MAF	
		SERIAL 200138Z MAR 68	COPY # 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
3/20	<i>DW Cogman</i>	SUBJECT RETENTION OF SMOKE GENERATOR PLT	
3/20	<i>els [unclear] [unclear]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/20	<i>DW [unclear]</i>		
S/S	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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OO RUMSAW RUMHMB  
 DE RUMSAK 2337 0600138  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 200138Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 INFO RUMHMB/CG PCV  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**FOR**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

FOR GEN WESTMORELAND INFO LGEN ROSSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 RETENTION OF SMOKE GENERATOR PLT

- A. COMUSMACV 0359 150921Z MAR 68 (BY OTHER MEANS)
- B. CG PROV CORPS V 0083 DTG 160657Z MAR 68

1. REF (A) REQUESTED COMMENTS WHETHER SMOKE GENERATOR PLATOON SHOULD BE RETAINED.
2. THREE EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE TACTICAL VALUE OF PLATOON. DURING OCTOBER 1967 UNIT PROVIDED SMOKE TO SCREEN CONSTRUCTION EFFORT AT A-3. IN EARLY FEB 68 UNIT PROJECTED SMOKE INTO TUNNEL AT KSCB TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS OCCUPIED BY ENEMY. IT WAS NOT. WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS UNIT SCREENED FRIENDLY A/C TOUCHING DOWN AT KSCB.
3. I SUPPORT THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN REF (B) THAT THE PLATOON SHOULD PROVE VALUABLE IN FUTURE OPS IN NORTHERN I CORPS AND

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2337 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
 SHOULD BE RETAINED THROUGH AUGUST 1968.  
 GP-4  
 BT

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#19	

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						03 III WAF SERIAL 1867247 WAF COPY # OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT LOCATION OF 1 DASC
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S						<p><b>(PERSONAL FOR)</b></p> <p><b>HAS BEEN SENT</b></p> <p>Copy #3 Air Control File 190745H Mar 68 DM</p> <p>Received copy #3. <i>St. John's</i> DM In 4 April 68</p> <p>#4 burned Should</p> <p>LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		copy				
G-3		copy				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		3/19/68		loj	CG III MAF SERIAL 180724Z MAR COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		3/19/68		W	SUBJECT LOCATION OF DASC
DCG AIR	4		3/22/68			REMARKS
C/S	L		3/19/68		Q	<b>PERSONAL FOR</b>  A <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>
DC/S			3/19/68		BAF	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		copy				
G-3		copy				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			202015		mar Dtu.	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

FILE 37 CON 207

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG 111 MAF	
		SERIAL 18V724Z MAR	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
SUBJECT		DATE	SIGNATURE
18 Mar	S.H. Stinson	LOCATION OF 1 DASC	
19 Mar	D.H. Wagner		
19 Mar	C/S as seen DFW.		
19 Mar	<i>[Signature]</i>		
19 Mar	D.H. Fenn		
20 Mar	P.H. Keeler		
22 Mar	the this		
9/8	COPY 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5		
	COPY 6		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT  
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#18

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**FOR**

**HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMSAL RUMSAU  
DE RUMSAX 2163 0750724  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 130724Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN  
INFO RUMSAU/COMUSMACV

BT

S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR GEN MONYER INFO GEN WESTMORELAND  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
LOCATION OF I DASC

1. DURING GEN WESTMORELAND'S VISIT TO I CORPS YESTERDAY, THE PHYSICAL LIMITATION OF THE DASC AT I CORPS HEADQUARTERS BECAME A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION. IN VIEW OF THE NEED FOR ADDED SPACE AND OPERATIVE COMMUNICATIONS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY AIR CONTROL HE AGREED WITH ME THAT CO-LOCATION WITH MY TADC PROVIDED AN ACCEPTABLE AND SPEEDY INTERIM SOLUTION.
2. I WOULD APPRECIATE THEREFORE, YOUR EARLY INPUT INTO REMODELING AND COMMUNICATION PLANS TO ACCOMMODATE THIS ADDED INTERIM FACILITY. CONTACT POINT LTJCOL CASSERMAN, DANANG 6125. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#18

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM CG III MAF/SA I CORPS
CG	2		3/18/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SERIAL 170156Z MAR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		3/18/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SUBJECT ADDITIONAL MSF SPT
DCG AIR						REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>  <i>"# 3 &amp; 4 burned 5 Nov 68"</i>  LEGEND A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
C/S	1.		3/17/68		<i>[initials]</i>	
DC/S			3/18/68		<i>[initials]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			171035		<i>[initials]</i>	
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF/SA I CORPS	
		SERIAL 170156Z MAR 68	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
3/17	DttWagner	SUBJECT ADDITIONAL MSF SPT	
3/17	CS Das seen DMU.	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/18	<i>lp</i>		
3/18	<i>JW</i>		
3/18	<i>DttWagner</i>		
S/S	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT

SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#16

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**FOR**

OO RUMHVN RUMSAW  
DE RUMSAK 2005 0770156  
ZNY 85555  
O 170156Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF/SA I CORPS  
TO RUMHVN/CG I CORPS  
INFO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
RUMHVN/DSA I CORPS

**HAS BEEN SENT**

BT

**SECRET**

FOR LGEN LAM FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

ADDITIONAL MSF SPT

A. CONFERENCE CG I CORPS/CG III MAF/CG PVC AT HQ III MAF,  
16MARG68

1. DURING REFERENCED CONFERENCE IT WAS AGREED THAT TWO MOBILE  
STRIKE FORCE COMPANIES ARE REQUIRED, IN ADDITION TO CURRENT  
ICIZ ASSETS, TO OPERATE IN NORTHERN ICIZ.

2. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE REQUESTED COMUSMACV TO ASK FOR TWO  
MSF COMPANIES FROM OUTSIDE ICIZ FOR THE PURPOSES DISCUSSED  
DURING THE COURSE OF REFERENCE A. THESE COMPANIES TO BE  
AVAILABLE PRIOR TO 1 APRIL.

3. IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE ACTION ON THIS MATTER, SUGGEST  
YOU SUBMIT A SIMILAR REQUEST THROUGH YOUR CHANNELS TO THE JGS. GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#16	

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF SERIAL 160630Z MAR 68 COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		3/16/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	<p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			3/17/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			16/65	3/16	<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

TOP SECRET #4



**TOP SECRET**

PP  
DE RUMSAK 1946 0750630  
ZNY TTTT  
P 160630Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMKN/CG FMFPAC  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
**EXCLUSIVE**

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE

P 150125Z MAR 68  
FM COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO CG III MAF DANANG  
BT

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

**T O P S E C R E T** 27026 FROM: MACJ542

SUBJ: ADDITIVE FORCE PACKAGE (U)  
REF: III MAF MSG DTG 100150Z MAR 68 (TS)

1. (TA) COMMENTS PROVIDED BY REFERENCE REGARDING THE TWO ALTERNATIVE 30,000 MAN FORCE PACKAGES SUBMITTED TO JCS BY MACV HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND ARE APPRECIATED.

2. (TS) IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT ALTERNATIVE TWO DOES NOT PROVIDE A MARINE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS NOR DOES IT CONSIDER FORCE LEVEL COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR MORE THAN ONE RLT

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1946 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR NORO  
ADDITIVE TO THE CURRENTLY APPROVED PROGRAM 5 III MAF STRUCTURE. THE  
JCS GUIDANCE WAS SPECIFIC IN THAT THE 3D BRIGADE, 3RD AIRBORNE DIVI-  
SION AND RLT 27 WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE 30,000  
MAN FORCE PACKAGE. ACCORDINGLY, THE MARINE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS WAS  
DELETED IN FAVOR OF ADDITIONAL COMBAT SPACES ELSEWHERE IN THE PACKAGE  
AND THE FORCE LEVEL COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SPACES WERE  
BASED ON ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR ONLY ONE ADDITIONAL RLT, PRESUMABLY  
SCHEDULED TO REPLACE RLT 27.

3. (S) IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT ALTERNATIVE TWO DOES NOT SATISFY  
THE STATED NEEDS OF III MAF TO CORRECT ALL EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE  
IMBALANCES. THESE IMBALANCES, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE OTHER  
COMPONENTS, WERE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. HOWEVER, IT WAS DECIDED TO  
OBTAIN THE GREATEST PRACTICABLE NUMBER OF COMBAT FORCES IN THIS  
ADDITIVE FORCE PACKAGE, WHILE MAINTAINING THE BEST POSSIBLE BALANCE  
WITHIN THE PACKAGE AND CORRECTING THE MOST PRESSING OVERALL FORCE  
IMBALANCES.

4. (S) ALTERNATIVE TWO PROVIDES 7 MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND  
FOUR ATTACK/FIGHTER SQUADRONS WHEREAS ALTERNATIVE ONE PROVIDED ONLY  
3 MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND THREE ATTACK/FIGHTER SQUADRONS. THE FACT  
THAT ALTERNATIVE TWO MAXIMIZES AVAILABLE COMBAT FORCES, AND PROVIDES

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1946 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR NORO  
A BALANCED ADDITIVE FORCE PACKAGE FOR MACV AROUND THE BOARD, AS  
OVERRIDING.

5. (U) COMMENTS PROVIDED IN REFERENCE WERE DEEMED USEFUL IN  
PLANNING FUTURE ACTION AS THEY APPLY TO ALL COMBAT AND SERVICE  
RESPONSE OF III MAF IN FURNISHING THE ABOVE COMMENTS IS  
APPRECIATED

BT

III MAF 0100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 160712Z MAR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT COORDINATION OF GROUND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
C/S	1.		3/16/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS  HAS BEEN SENT  <b>FOR</b>  Out-Copy #3 181620Hm Mar 68 In - 190740H Mar 68 J.V.
DC/S			3/17/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		X			<i>[Signature]</i>	
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			161652	3/17	<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C-COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #5

**TOP SECRET**

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 1607127 MAR 68	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
SUBJECT		DATE	SIGNATURE
3/16	<i>D. Wagner</i>		
3/16	<i>C/S Rao sun DW</i>		
3/17	<i>D. L. Jan</i>		
8/8	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT  
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#5  
**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 1914 0700712  
 ZNY TTTTT  
 P 160712Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**FOR**

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 COORDINATION OF GROUND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

A. COMUSMACV 140130Z MAR 68

I. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR COMMENTS PERTAINING TO COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS  
 AS THEY RELATE TO SOG AND DELTA FORCES, I HAVE REVIEWED THE  
 ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY NOW EXIST AND HAVE COME TO THE FOLLOWING  
 CONCLUSIONS:

A. WITH REGARD TO THE DELTA FORCE, I AM EXCEEDINGLY WELL PLEASED  
 WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS. THE DELTA FORCE  
 HAS BEEN MOST RESPONSIVE TO III MAF REQUIREMENTS AND HAS  
 PROVIDED A MOST WORTHWHILE GROUND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY.

B. I AM ALSO SATISFIED WITH MY RELATIONSHIP WITH SOG AND THE  
 C AND C DETACHMENT IN DANANG SINCE BEING GRANTED AUTHORITY TO  
 DIRECTLY TASK SOG ELEMENTS OPERATING WITHIN III MAF AREA OF INTEREST.  
 HOWEVER, I PROPOSE TO FORMALIZE MY RECONNAISSANCE REQUESTS FOR

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1914 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT FOR  
 SOG BY SUBMITTING THEM, ON A MONTHLY BASIS (BY THE 5TH OF THE  
 MONTH PRECEDING THE MONTH FOR WHICH THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE)  
 TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS, BASED ON THE SITUATION AS IT IS KNOWN  
 AT THE TIME OF SUBMISSION. I WOULD THEN SUBMIT DEVELOPING  
 REQUIREMENTS AS NECESSARY, DURING THE MONTH

GF-3

BT

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						OF III MAF SERIAL 160340Z MAR 68 COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR		X	<i>WTF</i>			REMARKS Copy #3 out 171050H Mar 68 by #2 bought S. Dooling HAS BEEN SENT
C/S						<b>EXCLUSIVE</b>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			181315		<i>SH</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE  
 C - COMMENTS  
 I - INFORMATION

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	<i>2</i>		<i>3/16/68</i>		<i>lp</i>	CG III MAF SERIAL 160350Z MAR 68 COPY # / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS  HAS BEEN SENT  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
C/S	<i>1</i>		<i>3/16/68</i>		<i>Q</i>	
DC/S			<i>3/16/68</i>		<i>JWF</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>161315</i>	<i>3/17</i>	<i>SHS Dkw</i>	
S/C						

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMSAL RUMSAL  
DE RUMSAL 1941 0750350  
ZNY 33553  
P 190550Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN  
INFO RUMSAL/COMUSMACV  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN MORNER INFO GEN WESTMORELAND  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

A. TAF TSN AB RVN 141215Z MARCH

1. I APPRECIATE THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE DEU AND AS I INDICATED  
IN MY 150520Z MARCH GOING IN RETENTION OF 1 BASC AT 2 CORPS HQERS  
UNTIL ADEQUATE FACILITIES CAN BE PREPARED ELSEWHERE. AS FOR THE  
EVENTUAL OPTIMUM LOCATION, IT IS APPARENT EARLY CORPS AREA PRESENTS  
SPECIAL PROBLEMS TO WHICH SUCH AGENCIES MUST ADJUST. IN THIS  
AREA THERE ARE 3000 BELSCONS THAT THE BASC BE PHYSICALLY LOCATED  
IN THE COMPOUND OF 8V REGT 100 FOR AIR. THIS LOCATION WILL:

A. AID IN DEPOPULATING MY HQERS WHICH IS SATURATED. FOR YOUR  
INFORMATION, THE PRESENT COC DID NOT CONTEMPLATE INCORPORATION  
OF BASC. IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPAND PRESENT CONSTRUCTION, AS COC IS  
BOUNDED ON THREE SIDES BY EXISTING BUILDINGS, AND ON THE FOURTH  
BY MAIN ROAD.

PAGE TWO RUMSAL 1941 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR

B. REDUCE THE CONCENTRATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL  
ASSETS, THEREBY REDUCING BOTH RISK AND DANGEROUS VALUE.

C. IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY TO IMPLEMENT WILL BUILD ON AN  
EXISTING CONTROL SYSTEM WHICH WILL EASE DOWN TRANSITION AND  
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS.

D. AVOID SEPARATING ANY MORE THAN NECESSARY THE HELICOPTER  
AND FIXED WING CONTROL AGENCIES.

E. PARALLEL THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMUSMACV WHEREBY THE  
SENIOR AIR CONTROL AGENCY IS LOANED WITH THE AIR COMPONENT.

2. ADEQUATE CROSS-TELL, CONTROL AND REPRESENTATION PERMIT  
CONSTANT COORDINATION OF AIR AND GROUND EFFORT IN III MAF

BT-4

BT

(II MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#15	

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		3/15/68		lp	CG III MAF
DCG	3		3/15/68		gm	SERIAL 14071ZZ MAR 68
DCG AIR	4					COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	1.		3/14/68		Q	SUBJECT AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN RVN
DC/S						REMARKS
DC/S DM						<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">HAS BEEN SENT</p>
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		Copy				
G-3		Copy				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			141705		DKW	LEGEND
S/C						A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
						C - COMMENTS
						I - INFORMATION

TOP SECRET # 3

TOP SECRET

ON 1/6

FILE 32

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
3/14	DH Wagner	140712Z MAR 68	
		SUBJECT AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN	
3/14	eps has seen DAW	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/15	lp		
3/15	JW		
8/8	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

TOP SECRET #3

**TOP SECRET**

PP UUMSEM  
 DE UUMSEA 1675 0740712  
 ZNY TTTTT  
 UUMSEM -I- CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 P 140712Z MAR 68 ZFF-6  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO UUMSEM/CG PCV PHU BAI  
 INFO UUMSEM/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV CAMP EVANS  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

**FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

BT  
 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT FOR LTGEN ROSSON INFO MGEN TOLSON  
 AND MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN  
 1. COMUSMACV HAS REQUESTED CG III MAF TO INVESTIGATE  
 FEASIBILITY OF ORGANIZING MARINE CORPS FORCE IN ICTZ WITH A  
 CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF ONE ARMY AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON.  
 2. MARINE RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS HAVE ACHIEVED CONSIDERABLE  
 SUCCESS IN THEIR STINGRAY OPERATIONS AND THE FIRST WING  
 CURRENTLY MAINTAINS SEVERAL ALERT PACKAGES AT STRATEGIC  
 LOCATIONS TO PROVIDE A REACTION CAPABILITY FOR EMERGENCIES  
 OR EXPLOITATION OF LUCRATIVE CONTACTS. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON CONCEPT HOWEVER WOULD INVOLVE A RE-  
 ORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN MARINE GROUND AND AIR UNITS AND THE  
 COMMITMENT OF FORCES SPECIFICALLY TO THIS MISSION.

PAGE TWO UUMSEA 1675 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT FOR  
 3. AIR CAVALRY OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN EMINENTLY SUCCESSFUL  
 IN LOCATING AND DESTROYING THE ENEMY AND HIS BASE AREAS IN  
 ICTZ. TO FURTHER EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF ORGANIZING A MARINE  
 CORPS FORCE IN ICTZ WITH A SIMILAR CAPABILITY I WOULD LIKE TO  
 SEND WING REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT AND DETAILS  
 WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE PCV AND 1ST AIR CAV DIV PERSONNEL. THE  
 FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REGARDING AIR CAV OPERATIONS WILL ILLUSTRATE  
 THE TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED:  
 A. HOW MANY AIRCRAFT OF EACH TYPE ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AN  
 AIR CAV SQUADRON, INCLUDING MAINTENANCE FLOATS?  
 B. WHAT IS ACCIDENT/LOSS RATE AND REPLACEMENT FACTOR FOR  
 AIR CAV SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN ICTZ?  
 C. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EXPERIENCE ON AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY  
 (MISSION READY) IN THIS TYPE OPERATION?  
 D. HOW MANY TROOPS ARE REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY MAN A  
 SQUADRON FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS? WHAT IS THE CASUALTY RATE?  
 E. OVER AN AVERAGE PERIOD WHAT DAILY UTILIZATION BY SORTIES  
 AND HOURS CAN BE EXPECTED EACH TYPE HELICOPTER ASSIGNED  
 TO AIR CAV SQUADRON?  
 F. OVERALL SUCCESS OF AIR CAV CONCEPT AS EMPLOYED IN ICTZ,

PAGE THREE UUMSEA 1675 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT FOR  
 1. E. CONTACTS DEVELOPED, KILL RATIO, EFFECT ON ENEMY.  
 4. CG 1ST MAW WILL CONTACT YOU TOMORROW TO MAKE FURTHER  
 ARRANGEMENTS  
 GP-4  
 BT

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		3/13/68		le	CG...111 MAF SERIAL 130202Z, MAR. COPY 2/ OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		3/14/68		gn	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DCG AIR	4					REMARKS  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  HAS BEEN SENT
C/S	1.		3/13/68		Q	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			131325H		DMW	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C-COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #2

TOP SECRET

FILE 37 GCN 159

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 130202Z MAR	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
3/13	DHW <i>[Signature]</i>	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MOEO	
3/13	C/S has seen DHW	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/13	<i>h</i>		
3/14	DCG has seen. DHW.		
8/8	COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

# 2  
TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

RUMSAK 1531 0730

ANY TTI

P 130202Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM  
LGEM CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE:

O 130138Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV

BT

TOP SECRET

ADDITIVE FORCE PACKAGE

1. III MAF HAS BEEN PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ADDITIVE  
FORCE PACKAGE MACV HAS REQUESTED FROM JCS AND HAS BEEN ASKED  
VERBALLY TO COMMENT ON ITS EFFECT ON III MAF'S FORCE STRUCTURE.2. ALTERNATIVE TWO, LISTED AS MACV'S PREFERRED PACKAGE, REQUIRES  
THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:A. DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL RLT DEMANDS A DIV HQ FOR  
ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL. THE GEOGRAPHY OF ICTZ, TOGETHERPAGE TWO RUMSAK 1531 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCOE  
WITH ITS EXTREMELY LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION, THE ENEMY'S  
CAPABILITY TO MASS HIS FORCES, AND THE NATURAL DISPERSION OF  
OUR FORCES IN THE RVN INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT, ALL TEND TO  
REQUIRE MORE COMMAND AND CONTROL RATHER THAN LESS. IF, HOWEVER,  
THIS ADDITIONAL RLT IS TO REPLACE RLT-27, THEN THE COMMAND  
AND CONTROL ELEMENT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED.B. ALTERNATIVE TWO DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT FORCE LEVEL  
COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SPACES FOR THE MAW (-)  
OR FOR THE RLT, IF IT IS ADDITIVE TO THE CURRENT III MAF FORCE  
STRUCTURE RATHER THAN REPLACING RLT 27. THE APPENDICES TO OUR  
RECENT SUBMISSION PROVIDE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS.C. ALTERNATIVE TWO DOES NOT ADDRESS THE CURRENT NEEDS OF III  
MAF FOR ITS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES. THIS LACK OF  
NEEDED FORCES NOW HAS CREATED AN IMBALANCE IN OUR CURRENT  
FORCE STRUCTURE AS EXPLAINED IN THE JUSTIFICATION PORTION OF  
OUR RECENT SUBMISSION.3. ALTERNATIVE ONE, OF COURSE, WOULD PROVIDE III MAF WITH A  
BETTER FORCE AND SERVICE BALANCE. IT DOES LACK SOME SPACES FOR  
CURRENTLY NEEDED PRIORITIES BUT GOES FORWARD IN SOLVING SOME OF  
THE DIFFICULTY.

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1531 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCOE

4. III MAF IS WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF SELECTING  
AVAILABLE FORCES IN ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE AN APPROPRIATELY  
BALANCED FORCE PACKAGE FOR MACV, BUT BELIEVES THAT THE ABOVE  
COMMENTS MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN PLANNING FOR FUTURE ACTIONS  
AS THEY APPLY TO III MAF.

GP-4

UNQUOTE:

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/4

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DCG AIR		<i>SMW</i>	<i>W/S</i>		<i>for Maen Anderson</i>	REMARKS Out 130940 H Mar 68 TM Copy #2
C/S						<p>#3 loaned 500068 HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p>
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DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
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DC/S			3/12/68		ML		
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DC/S AIR							
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G-4							
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LEGEND  
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HAS BEEN SENT

**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 1390 372032Z  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 RUMSAW -I- DEPCOMUSMACV FWD  
 P 120328Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/DEPCOMUSMACV FWD  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE PERSONAL FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. MY INVESTIGATION OF THE UNFORTUNATE NAVIGATIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN YOUR FLIGHT TO PHU BAI SUNDAY NOON DISCLOSES THAT PRINCIPAL NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS WERE OPERATIVE, THAT IS TACAN, GCA, AND APPROACH CONTROL. SURVEILLANCE RADAR WAS INOPERATIVE FROM 1130 TO 1300 AND THE CIVILIAN LOW FREQUENCY HOMER, WHICH HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY CARRIED AS UNRELIABLE FOR MILITARY USE, WAS INOPERATIVE FOR REPAIRS. A STANDBY LOW FREQUENCY HOMER WAS IN OPERATION AND ANNOUNCED TO ITINERANTS CHECKING IN WITH HUE APPROACH CONTROL.
2. IN ADDITION, TWO EXCELLENT AGENCIES FOR RADAR FOLLOWING AND POSITIONING ARE CONTINUOUSLY IN OPERATION IN I CORPS, VICE-SQUAD AND PANAMA, BOTH LOCATED TO PROVIDE COVERAGE OF PHU BAI AND HAND OFF TO PHU BAI APPROACH CONTROL.
3. IT IS MY OPINION THAT SERIOUS IN-FLIGHT DIFFICULTIES NEED

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1390 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NOT HAVE DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE DEFICIENCIES NOTED ABOVE HAD AVAILABLE ALTERNATE NAVIGATIONAL ASSISTANCE BEEN UTILIZED. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 190 INSTRUMENT FLIGHTS HANDLED SUNDAY BY PHU BAI APPROACH CONTROL AND 993 TAKE OFFS OR LANDINGS CONDUCTED.

4. BE ASSURED MY PEOPLE CONTINUE TO DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO PROVIDE SAFE AND EFFECTIVE HANDLING OF THE AIR TRAFFIC DENSITIES NOW EXPERIENCED IN I CORPS. ALTHOUGH CAREFUL FLIGHT PREPARATION BY AIR CREWS REMAINS THE BASIC MEANS FOR INSURING SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY OF AIR TRANSPORT, MEASURES ARE IN PROGRESS TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE THE GROUND EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO THIS OBJECTIVE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

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G-4							
CEO							
S/S			120910		dkw		
S/C							



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HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMWAA 1332 071141Z  
ZNY CCCCC  
THIRD MARDIV -T- TWO SIX MARINES  
P 111412Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMHVP/TWO SIX MARINES  
INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E F O R C O L L O S N D S F R O M  
L I G E N C U S H M A N . I N F O M G E N T O M P K I N S .

1. I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO KNOW THAT THE SUPPORT PROVIDED  
KHE SANH BY FMAW, 7TH AF, AND 7TH FLEET HAS BEEN GREATER THAN  
ANY OTHER AIR SUPPORT EFFORT IN HISTORY OF WARFARE. FROM  
22JAN TO 29FEB, AIRCRAFT COMMITTED TO OPERATION NIAGARA  
DELIVERED 53,386 TONS OF ORDNANCE. 2,500 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND  
NEARLY 1,000 SECONDARY FIRES WERE CAUSED. 1,000 STRUCTURES/  
BUNKERS WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED, AND IN EXCESS OF 100 TRUCKS  
WERE DESTROYED. THESE STATISTICS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO  
ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE 13,298 SORTIES FLOWN. ORDNANCE DROPPED  
BY REMAINING SORTIES WAS UNDER RADAR CONTROL DUE TO WEATHER,  
AND THE DAMAGE CAUSED WAS NOT DIRECTLY ASSESSED.
2. THIS UNPRECEDENTED SUPPORT FROM THE SKY, COMBINED WITH  
YOUR MASTERFUL EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND WEAPONS AND UNITS HAS

PAGE 2 RUMWAA 1332 C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E F O R  
CAUSED THE ENEMY TO SUFFER HEAVY LOSSES. YOU AND YOUR OFFICERS  
AND MEN ARE MAKING A GREAT CONTRIBUTION - KEEP UP THE  
OUTSTANDING WORK. WARM REGARDS TO ALL. LIGEN CUSHMAN SENDS.  
GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#12

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C/S						
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DCG AIR						REMARKS	<p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p> <p><b>SECRET</b></p>
C/S	1.		3/12/68		<i>Q</i>		
DC/S			3/12/68		<i>DM</i>		
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DC/S AIR							
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G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S			120710	3/12	<i>D/H</i>		
S/C							



**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMKM RUCINOA  
DE RUMSAK 1299 0710914  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 110914Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUCINOA/CMC  
RUMKM/CG FMFPAC  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 7  
1. IN ORDER TO ADEQUATELY COVER THE SCOPE OF THE TUOHY ARTICLE, ONE MUST ADDRESS THREE AREAS: FIRST, THE DOWNGRADING OF MARINE CORPS COMMAND OVER US FORCES IN ICTZ; SECOND, THE ALLEGED LACK OF ENTHUSIASM BY MACV HEADQUARTERS OVER MARINE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN ICTZ; AND THIRD, SPECIFIC REBUTAL OF THE CANARDS PUBLISHED TO SUPPORT THE TUOHY THEORY OF THE REASONS FOR THE FIRST. IN DISCUSSING THESE, THE TIME HAS COME TO BE COMPLETELY CANDID WITH OURSELVES, LEAVING THE NICETIES TO OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS.  
2. FIRST, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THERE APPEARS, TO ALL LOCAL OBSERVERS, TO BE AN OVERT AND DRAMATIC DOWNGRADING OF THE COMMAND EXERCISED BY THE CG III MAF OVER THE FORCES IN ICTZ. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A LEGITIMATE REASON FOR COMUSMACV TO

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1299 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO ESTABLISH A FORWARD COMMAND POST, THE HQTRS AT PHU BAI HAS NOT BEEN STAFFED AS A FORWARD CP, BUT RATHER STAFFED AS A SUPERIOR HQTRS TO III MAF, HEADED BY A FOR-STAR GENERAL, WITH A TRULY JOINT STAFF, AND WITH RANK STRUCTURES GENERALLY IN EXCESS OF THOSE AT DANANG. IT HAD NO OTHER APPARENT OPERATIONAL INTEREST THAN THE ICTZ. IT MOVED EN MASSE INTO PHU BAI DURING THE CRITICAL TET OFFENSIVE AND THE BATTLE FOR HUE AND DIVERTED MUCH OF OUR CRITICAL ENGINEERING, COMMUNICATIONS, AND LOGISTIC ASSETS FROM TACTICAL SUPPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING AND HARDENING ITS CP. IN SPITE OF LIP SERVICE TO THE ROLE OF THE CG III MAF, THE LARGE ENERGETIC STAFF AT PHU BAI HAS LARGELY DUPLICATED THE FUNCTIONS OF MY OWN HQTRS, AND HAS CAUSED A HEAVY BURDEN ON MY ALREADY OVERWORKED STAFF TO EDUCATE, GUIDE, AND REGULATE THEIR STAFF ACTION. PROPOSALS OF MACV FWD HAVE EITHER BEEN ACCEPTED BY THIS HQTRS, OR MY ACTION MUST BE DEFENDED IN DETAIL. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CHAIN OF COMMAND HAS RUN FROM THE ARMY DIVISIONS THROUGH III MAF TO COMUSMACV (MACV FWD), ARMY UNITS HAVE DEALT DIRECTLY WITH MACV FWD WITHOUT GOING THROUGH III MAF.

PAGE 1 OF 19 PAGES

**SECRET**

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#11

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1299 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 ON OCCASION, WHEN AN ARMY UNIT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH A  
 III MAF DIRECTIVE, IT HAS GONE TO GEN ABRAMS, AND A WAY HAS  
 BEEN FOUND NOT TO COMPLY. THIS IS KEENLY FELT BY MY STAFF,  
 AND IT CANNOT LONG GO UNOBSERVED BY THE INTELLIGENT  
 OBSERVER. WITH THIS PRECEDENT, I AM NATURALLY CONCERNED WITH  
 THE RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL DEVELOP BETWEEN FROV CORPS V  
 AND COMUSMACV. WILL THEY TRY TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH EACH  
 OTHER RATHER THAN THROUGH THIS HEADQUARTERS? I SHALL  
 INSIST ON THE LATTER.

3. SECOND, WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED LACK OF  
 ENTHUSIASM BY MACV HQRS OVER MARINE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN  
 ICIZ, I AM AFRAID MR. TUOHY HAS MISTAKEN COCKTAIL TALK FOR  
 FACTS. IT IS AN OPEN SECRET THAT VARIOUS OFFICERS AT MACV,  
 SOME OF WHOM HAVE ENOUGH RANK TO KNOW BETTER, HAVE  
 OCCASIONALLY BAD-MOUMTHED MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS DURING  
 THEIR TOURS OF THE COCKTAIL CIRCUIT IN SAIGON. A DEGREE  
 OF THIS IS TO BE EXPECTED BECAUSE OF OUR DIFFERENCES IN  
 DOCTRINE, AND BECAUSE OF HONEST CONVICTIONS THAT THEIR  
 METHODS ARE BETTER THAN OURS. HOWEVER, MR. TUOHY, IN CASTING  
 ABOUT FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE OBVIOUS SUPERIMPOSITION OF

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1299 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 A HIGHER COMMAND OVER III MAF, HAS SEIZED UPON THIS TALK  
 FOR HIS ANSWER. THIS IS BAD REPORTING, BECAUSE THERE IS AN  
 ANSWER, AND THIS IS NOT IT.

4. I AM PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT THE MOVES HERE ARE NOT  
 MOTIVATED BY ANY DISENCHANTMENT WITH MARINES OR BY ANY VALID  
 REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS. THEY ARE  
 DELIBERATE AND CALCULATED MOVES TO WEAKEN USMC POSITION IN  
 THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLITICS,---- WHICH INVOLVES SUCH  
 INTANGIBLES AS PUBLICITY, PRESTIGE, ETC. THESE ARE  
 WELL THOUGHT OUT STAFF ACTIONS, AND I AM NOT CERTAIN  
 HOW WITTINGLY THEY HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AT THE TOP. THIS HAS  
 BEEN A JOINT ARMY-AIR FORCE VENTURE FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT. AS  
 I SEE IT THE PLAN IS GENERALLY DESIGNED TO DIVIDE THE ICIZ  
 INTO TWO PARTS, ONE UNDER ARMY COMMAND, THE OTHER UNDER  
 MARINE. BY SO DOING, THEY ACCOMPLISH THESE ENDS:

A. THE FACT THAT THE PREDOMINANT FORCES IN ICIZ ARE STILL  
 MARINES IS CONCEALED FROM THE PUBLIC.

B. THE MARINE CORPS AIR-GROUND TEAM IS EFFECTIVELY  
 SPLIT UP, AND OUR POSITIONS PERTAINING TO COMMAND RELATION-  
 SHIPS WITHIN THE TEAM, SUCH AS OUR POSITION ON THE CONTROL

PAGE 2 OF 19 PAGES

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**SECRET**

PAGE 6 RUMSAL 1299 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO  
 OF MARINE OPS, ARE VIOLATED.

C. A MARINE DIVISION IS PLACED UNDER AN ARMY COMMAND AND AN ARMY DIVISION CONTINUES UNDER A MARINE COMMAND, WHICH ARRANGEMENT WILL SUPPORT BY HISTORICAL PRECEDENT ANY SUBSEQUENT MOVE TOWARD UNIFICATION.

D. THE 7TH AIR FORCE HAS BEEN GIVEN WHAT AMOUNTS TO OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. THE SPLITTING OF SUPPORTED MARINE CORPS UNITS INTO TWO WIDELY SEPARATED AREAS OF OPERATION, WITH ARMY UNITS IN BETWEEN, MITIGATES AGAINST OUR REGAINING THIS CONTROL.

E. THE MOVE WILL ULTIMATELY PLACE COMMAND OF THE ICTZ IN THE HANDS OF AN ARMY COMMANDER BY A PROCESS OF EVOLUTION RATHER THAN REVOLUTION. THIS IS THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

(1) GENERAL ABRAMS DEPARTED YESTERDAY AFTER THE STAFF AT PROV CORPS VIETNAM HAD BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED TO LOOK AFTER "ARMY" INTERESTS, AND AT THAT TIME CG III MAF, AS THE SENIOR COMMANDER IN ICTZ, REASSUMED OVERALL COMMAND OF ALL FORCES HERE. THE RELATIONSHIP IS SOLELY DEPENDENT UPON THE RANK OF THE INCUMBENTS, HOWEVER, AS I AM SENIOR TO LT GEN ROSSON.

PAGE 6 RUMSAL 1299 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO

(2) UPON MY DEPARTURE, AND I SHALL STAY UNTIL ASKED TO LEAVE, UNLESS RELIEVED BY A MARINE SENIOR TO LTGEN ROSSON, ROSSON WILL BECOME THE SENIOR COMMANDER IN ICTZ, AND WILL ASSUME OVERALL COMMAND.

F. DURING THE TIME CG III MAF IS THE SENIOR COMMANDER IN I CORPS HE WILL HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR STAFF EXPERTISE ON MANY ARMY MATTERS. OUR REQUEST TO COMUSMACV FOR STAFF AUGMENTATION BY ARMY PERSONNEL HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED, AND UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS GRANTED, THE III MAF STAFF WILL BE SHORT HANDED. BY CONTRAST, THE PROVCORPSV STAFF HAS BEEN LIBERALLY PROVIDED WITH MARINES FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO COMUSMACV HEAD-QUARTERS. THIS SERVES THE DUAL FUNCTION OF CONVERTING THE PROVCORPSV STAFF INTO A MORE TRULY JOINT STAFF THAN III MAF, AND SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCES MARINE CORPS PRESENCE AT HQTRS, COMUSMACV.

5. THIRD, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE FOREGOING, THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO REBUT EACH OF THE SPECIFIC CHARGES ENCLOSED IN SUBJECT ARTICLE.

A. ALLEGATION: MARINE COMMANDERS HAVE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PREPARED THEIR TROOPS FOR THE KIND OF WAR THAT HAS EVOLVED  
 BT

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# / /

**SECRET**

PP RUHKM RUCIHOA  
 DE RUMSAK 1352 0710914  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 110914Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
 RUHKM/CS FMFPAC  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 2 OF 7 ALONG THE DMZ. SPECIFICALLY, MARINES WERE ILL-PREPARED FOR THE ARTILLERY ATTACKS AT THE NORTHERNMOST OUTPOSTS, AND DESPITE A MONTH OF OPPORTUNITY, KHE SANH WAS NOT PREPARED TO WITHSTAND AN ENEMY ARTILLERY SIEGE UNTIL IT ACTUALLY BEGAN. FACTS: (ALONG DMZ) PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 495 BUNKERS HAD BEEN COMPLETED ALONG THE NORTHERN OUTPOSTS (DYE MARKER COMPLEX) MEETING MCAV APPROVED STANDARDS WITH MINIMUM OVER-HEAD THICKNESS OF MORE THAN 3-1/2 FEET. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE HUNDREDS OF BUNKERS AND COVERED FIGHTING HOLES WHICH DID NOT MEET PERMANENT STANDARDS, BUT WHICH WERE WHOLLY ADEQUATE FOR TEMPORARY BATTLEFIELD USE. IN ADDITION, WE FILLED OVER 1.5-MILLION SAND BAGS, SOWED MORE THAN 100-THOUSAND MINES, EMPLACED OVER 51-THOUSAND METERS OF BARBED WIRE. NEVERTHELESS, THE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1352 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO NATURE OF THE WAR IN THE AREA WAS NOT ONE THAT PERMITTED ONLY A STATIC DEFENSE AS ALLEGED. THE BULK OF THE COMBAT ACTIVITY FROM JUNE 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1967 WAS MOBILE. IT FOCUSED IN AN AREA OF ABOUT TWENTY (20) SQUARE MILES IN EXTENT, CENTERED GENERALLY AROUND HILL 158 (CON THIEN). THE HILL ITSELF WAS NEVER OCCUPIED BY MORE THAN A REINFORCED BATTALION. MOST OF THE ACTION OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF CONTACT BETWEEN MARINE UNITS MANEUVERING IN THE SURROUNDING AREA AND NVA FORCES SEEKING TO PREPARE A MAJOR ATTACK ON THE HILL. TWO MAIN ENEMY INVASION ATTEMPTS WERE MADE: JULY: TWO NVA REGIMENTS WERE DEFEATED NORTH OF CON THIEN BY MARINES IN OPERATION BUFFALO; SEPTEMBER: THE 812TH REGIMENT WAS LOCATED SOUTH OF CON THIEN IN MARINE OPERATION KINGFISHER AND DRIVEN FROM THE FIELD BY A SUCCESSION OF SHORT, INTENSE GROUND ENGAGEMENTS COORDINATED WITH HEAVY SUPPORTING ARMS. FROM MARCH 1967 TO PRESENT, OVER 9,000 ENEMY DEAD HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY MARINES IN THE DMZ AREA. (KHE SANH) WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE KHE SANH, AFTER OPERATION VIRGINIA IN APRIL 1966, KHE SANH WAS OCCUPIED BY A MARINE COMPANY FOR ALMOST A YEAR. THE FIRST MAJOR BATTLE IN THE KHE SANH AREA WAS

PAGE 4 OF 19 PAGES

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SY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 11

**SECRET**

24 APRIL - 13 MAY 1967, ( DURING WHICH 4 MARINE BNS WERE DEPLOYED, WITH 940 ENEMY CONFIRMED KIA AS COMPARED TO 155 USMC KIA. THE BASE WAS PERMANENTLY GARRISONED BY ONLY ONE MARINE BATTALION FROM MAY UNTIL DECEMBER 1967. BUNKERS WERE WHOLLY ADQUATE FOR THIS SIZE UNIT. FOR THIS REASON, OUR REQUESTS TO COMUSMACV FOR RELEASE OF DYE MARKER BUNKER MATERIALS FOR USE AT KHE SANH WERE DENIED. ON 18DEC67 KHE SANH WAS REINFORCED WITH A MARINE BATTALION WHICH DUG IN. BUNKER MATERIALS WERE NOT ABAILABLE IN QUANTITY, HOWEVER, AS THERE WERE HIGHER PRIORITY ITEMS COMPETING FOR AIR LIFT. ON 22 AND 24 JANUARY 1968 TWO ADDITIONAL MARINE BATTALIONS WERE SENT TO KHE SANH. ENEMY ARTILLERY WAS FIRST REPORTED AT KHE SANH ON 24JAN68, TWO DAYS AFTER ARRIVAL OF THE LAST MARINE BATTALION. DEFICIENCIES IN BUNKERS RESULTED NOT FROM ANY NEGLIGENCE, BUT RATHER FROM THE FACT THAT THE TROOPS HAD BEEN DOUBLED DURING THE WEEK BEFORE THE FIRST ARTILLERY ATTACK, AND THE ALL-AERIAL RESUPPLY COULD NOT PROVIDE ALL BUNKER MATERIAL DESIRED IN ADDITION TO COMBAT ESSENTIAL FOOD AND MUNITIONS. HOW WELL THE MARINES AT KHE SANH HAVE WITHSTOOD THE ARTILLERY SIEGE IS REFLECTED IN CASUALTY STATISTICS. SINCE THE SIEGE BEGAN ON

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1352 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MC&O  
 21 JANUARY 1968, AS OF 5 MARCH 1968 KHE SANH HAD RECEIVED 3,472 ROUNDS OF MORTAR 1,519 ARTILLERY ROUNDS, AND 967 ROCKETS, A TOTAL OF 5,958 ROUNDS. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE KHE SANH GARRISON HAS HAD 124 MARINES KILLED WHICH INCLUDES CASUALTIES FROM GROUND ATTACKS, PATROL ACTIVITY, AND ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE. EVEN IF ALL THE CASUALTIES HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF ENEMY ARTILLERY/MORTAR/ROCKET FIRE, IT WOULD AMOUNT TO ONE CASUALTY (KIA) FOR EVERY 50 ROUNDS--NOT A VERY IMPRESSIVE RESULT FOR AN "UNPREPARED" OBJECTIVE.

B. ALLEGATION: TOP MARINE LEADERSHIP IN VIETNAM HAS BEEN SINGULARLY UNIMPRESSIVE.

FACTS: IN ADDITION TO REFUTING THE DETAILS LISTED BY TUOHY IN SUPPORT OF THIS CONCLUSION, MARINE LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE EVALUATED UPON THE BASIS OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OR FAILURES OF ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS. I BELIEVE A PER CAPITA KILL RATIO SHOWING RESULTS OF MARINES VIS-A-VIS ARMY WOULD BE FRUITFUL, BUT I DO NOT HAVE THE ARMY FIGURES. ALSO, IT WOULD BE OF VALUE TO COMPARE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE ENEMY (VC AND NVA SEPARATELY) IN ICTZ WITH THE PERCENTAGE IN THE REMAINDER OF SVN. AND COMPARE THIS AGAINST THE PERCENTAGE OF

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U. S. TROOPS IN ICTZ VIS-A-VIS ALL OF VIETNAM. THESE FIGURES HAVE NOT BEEN RETAINED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS, BUT ARE BELIEVED TO BE AVAILABLE AT HQMC. ALSO OF INTEREST IS OUR EMPHASIS UPON PACIFICATION OF OCCUPIED AREAS, IN WHICH WE EXCELLED. THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS GIVE SOME INDICATION OF OUR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE KILL RATIO IN 1967 AND 1968 REFLECT NOT ONLY THE DYE MARKER LOSSES, BUT THOSE OCCASIONED BY THE BOOBY-TRAP WAR.

USMC		ENEMY		
	KIA	KIA		RATIO
MAR65-31DEC65	292	2,560		1/8.77
1966	1,326	10,724		1/8.08
1967	3,015	17,349		1/5.75
JAN68	310	2,211		1/7.13
FEB68	647	5,040		1/7.77
TOTAL	5,590	37,884		1/6.77

C. ALLEGATION: VAST TIME CONSUMING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS THAT DO NOT RESULT IN CONTACT.

FACTS: SINCE AUGUST 1965 THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE HAS

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1352 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO CONDUCTED 41 NAMED OPERATIONS. ALL BUT SIX HAVE RESULTED IN CONFIRMED ENEMY KILLS. IN 1967 OPERATIONS WHICH THE SLF CONDUCTED EITHER UNILATERALLY OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER FORCES, ACCOUNTED FOR OVER 3200 ENEMY KIA VS LOSSES OF UNDER 550. TWENTY OF THE OPERATIONS LASTED ONE WEEK OR LESS. ONLY THREE HAVE EXCEEDED TWO WEEKS, WITH THE LONGEST BEING FOR 22 DAYS.

D. ALLEGATION: FORAYS INTO THE DMZ BY UNDERSTRENGTH UNITS.

FACTS: NO BASIS OF FACT. MOST INFANTRY UNITS ARE BELOW T/O AND MANNING LEVEL WHEN IN COMBAT; HOWEVER THE EFFECTIVE STRENGTH HAS BEEN WHOLLY ADEQUATE FOR MISSION ASSIGNED.

RIFLE COMPANY AVERAGE EFFECTIVE STRENGTH

DATE:	1ST MAR DIV		3D MAR DIV	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
31MAR67	4.0	171.5	4.4	186.5
30JUN67	3.9	170.0	4.1	171.0
30SEP67	4.3	170.4	3.6	163.0
31DEC67	5.1	185.2	5.6	193.5
29SEP67	3.9	161.4	4.9	184.9

E. ALLEGATION: FAILURE TO ACCEPT INTELLIGENCE ON ENEMY UNITS  
BT

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PP RUMKM RUCIHOA  
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 FM CG III MAF  
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**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 3 OF 7 SUPPLIED BY MACV FROM ITS MANY SOURCES.

FACTS: ALL INTELLIGENCE PERTAINING TO THE ENEMY BUILD-UP IN ICTZ HAS BEEN MINUTELY FOLLOWED. MUCH OF THE INTELLIGENCE HELD BY MACV WAS, IN FACT, RECEIVED FROM AND THROUGH III MAF RESOURCES. THE LOCATION OF MAJOR VC AND NVA UNITS IN ICTZ HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN PLOTTED BY III MAF WITH GREATER ACCURACY THAN MACV. LOCAL WARNINGS PERTAINING TO THE DEGREE OF ROCKET THREAT HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY ACCURATE. THE NIGHT OF 20 DECEMBER III MAF SIMULATED AN ATTACK AGAINST DANANG, CAUSING THE ENEMY TO REACT PREMATURELY AND RESULTING IN THE CAPTURE OF THE FIRST COMPLETE 122MM ROCKET LAUNCHER AND THE SPOILING OF A PLANNED ROCKET ATTACK. THE TET TRUCE WAS DISCONTINUED IN ICTZ AT III MAF'S PROMPTING BASED UPON ENEMY INTELLIGENCE. PRIOR TO TET, III MAF

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1353 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO MOVED TWO BATTALIONS OF ARMY TROOPS INTO THE DANANG AREA BASED UPON THIS INTELLIGENCE, AND AS A RESULT SAVED THE CITY OF DANANG FROM ENTRY AND DAMAGE. AT THE TIME OF THE SO-CALLED "SURPRISE" ENEMY ATTACK AT TET, THE ENTIRE III MAF STAFF WAS MANNING THEIR POSITIONS IN THE COMMAND CENTER, AND ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS WERE ON 100PERCENT ALERT. THROUGHOUT ICTZ, WHERE THE ENEMY CONCENTRATED HIS GREATEST STRENGTH, HE WAS DEFEATED MORE RAPIDLY AND MORE THOROUGHLY THAN ANYWHERE ELSE IN VIETNAM. EXCEPT FOR HUE, WHICH INITIALLY WAS DEFENDED SOLELY BY ARVN FORCES, ALL ICTZ CITIES FARED BETTER THAN CITIES IN OTHER CORPS TACTICAL ZONES, INCLUDING THE CITY OF SAIGON, HEAD-QUARTERS FOR COMUSMACV.

F. ALLEGATION: RASH AND COSTLY ASSAULTS ON ENTRENCHED ENEMY POSITIONS OF LIMITED VALUE.

FACTS: MARINE CORPS TATICS ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE FORTIFIED POSITIONS WITH THE FEWEST CASUALTIES. OUR DOCTRINE REQUIRES MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING FIRES. IN THOSE FEW INSTANCES WHERE THERE MAY HAVE INITIALLY APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN AN ASSAULT UPON FORTIFIED POSITIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE COORDINATION, SUCH AS IN OPERATION BADGER TOOTH, IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT THE

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ATTACKING TROOPS WERE UNAWARE THAT THE AREA ASSAULTED WAS FORTIFIED. IN A WAR OF THE NATURE OF THIS CONFLICT, ENTRENCHED POSITIONS CANNOT BE BYPASSED AND ISOLATED AS IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, BUT THEY MUST BE REDUCED. REDUCTION OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS, EVEN WITH THE BEST OF TACTICS, MAY OCCASIONALLY PROVE COSTLY. THIS DOES NOT QUALIFY THE REDUCTION AS BEING RASH OR RECKLESS.

G. ALLEGATION: OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS LAUNCHED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FORCES AND SUPPORT.

FACTS: NO OPERATION LAUNCHED TO DATE HAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE FORCES OR SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ALWAYS TIMES WHEN MORE FORCES AND MORE SUPPORT COULD HAVE BEEN USED, NO MISSION HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BEYOND THE MEANS OF THE UNITS TASKED WITH THE OPERATION. NO WAR IN HISTORY HAS RECEIVED SUCH ADEQUATE SUPPORT. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF LOGISTICS--OF ORDNANCE AVAILABLE, FOOD AVAILABLE, EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE, AND CREATURE COMFORTS AVAILABLE, MARINE FORCES HAVE FARED WELL THROUGHOUT ALL OPERATIONS. FIRE SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY. THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM CONCEPT HAS PROVIDED THE BEST SYSTEM OF AIR SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO ANY MODERN ARMED FORCE.

H. ALLEGATION: FAILURE TO EMPLOY HELICOPTERS PROPERLY.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1353 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 FACTS: PRIOR TO EACH HELICOPTER ASSAULT AN AVIATION SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE IS HELD AT THE MARINE DIVISION (R REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST OF THE GROUND UNIT INVOLVED). REPRESENTING THE WING IS A WING PLANS/LIAISON OFFICER, THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROLLER (AIRBORNE), AND HELICOPTER COMMANDER (AIRBORNE) WHO WILL DIRECT THE AIR STRIKES AND COORDINATE THE ASSAULT, ARE ALSO PRESENT TO OBTAIN A COMPLETE AND THOROUGH BRIEFING FROM THE INFANTRY UNIT COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE AN OVERFLIGHT OF THE AREA BY THE TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER AND THE INFANTRY UNIT LEADERS IS CONDUCTED. THE ASSAULT IS PRECEDED BY EXTENSIVE FIXED WING AIR STRIKES IN THE LZ AREA AND ADJACENT THREAT AREAS. THE APPLICATION OF AIR ASSAULT WEAPONS IS LIBERAL IN SUPPORT OF THE HELICOPTERS AND INFANTRY UNITS. SUBSEQUENT TO THE LANDING, FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT AND HELICOPTER REINFORCEMENTS ARE AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE FROM THE MARINE TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION CENTER. A QUICK REACTION PACKAGE OF TWO UH-1E ARMED HELICOPTERS, TWO CH-46 ASSAULT TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS, AND A PLATOON OF MARINES IS MAINTAINED AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN PHU BAI. AND QUANG TRI. EACH ON FIFTEEN MINUTE

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**SECRET**

ALERT. FURTHER, THE DASC OR TADC CAN DIVERT FIXED WING OR HELICOPTER FLIGHTS IN THE AIR TO PROVIDE SUPPORT IMMEDIATELY IN ANY EMERGENCY.

I. ALLEGATION: SOME OF THE WEAKNESSES IN THE MARINES STRATEGY AND TACTICS ARE NOT OF THEIR OWN MAKING. THE MARINES STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED FOR HIT-AND-RUN ASSAULTS, THEIR HELICOPTERS FOR SHIP-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS, AND MUCH OF THEIR EQUIPMENT FOR THE SHORT-TIME PULL. IN VIETNAM THEY FIND THEMSELVES FIGHTING A LONG HAUL IN A RUGGED AREA WHERE THE HEAVIER ARMY DIVISIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.

FACTS: MR. TUOHY IS GROSSLY MISINFORMED AS TO THE NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF U. S. MILITARY UNITS. THE MISSION OF THE MARINE DIVISION IS TO EXECUTE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS AND SUCH OTHER OPERATIONS AS MAY BE DIRECTED. TO FULFILL THESE MISSIONS, MARINE CORPS FORCES HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED TO PROVIDE NOT ONLY THE WORLD'S MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ASSAULT LANDING FORCES, BUT ALSO---- WHEN LANDED----TO CONDUCT LAND OPERATIONS ALONG THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF LAND WARFARE. DURING AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IT DIFFERS FROM A CONVENTIONAL ARMY IN THAT IT CARRIES ITS

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1353 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO INITIAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT WITH IT RATHER THAN RELYING UPON OTHER FORCES, BUT ONCE SUSTAINED ASHORE, ITS LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS SIMILAR TO A CONVENTIONAL ARMY. FOR INITIAL AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS THE MARINE DIVISION IS TAILORED WITH LIGHT AND MOBILE, ALTHOUGH DURABLE, GEAR; BUT FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IT HAS IN ITS FORCE TROOPS ALL THOSE ITEMS OF HEAVY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT SUSTAINED LAND COMBAT. THE MARINE DIVISIONS IN VIETNAM ARE NOW SUPPORTED BY HEAVY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT IDENTICAL IN MOST RESPECT TO THOSE OF THE ARMY. IT HAS TANKS, LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY ARTILLERY, ETC., FOR CONVENTIONAL LAND WARFARE. ITS HELICOPTERS ARE NOT ONLY CARRIER-CAPABLE, BUT ARE PROCURED WITH AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS IN MIND. EACH MARINE DIVISION IN THE ICTZ HAS MORE FIREPOWER, MORE PERSONNEL IN THE FRONT LINES, MORE HELICOPTER LIFT AVAILABLE, AND MORE COMBAT CAPABILITY THAN HAS ANY ONE OF THE THREE ARMY DIVISIONS IN ICTZ. TO EPITOMIZE THE MARINES AS A SINGLE-MISSION FORCE IS TO DISPLY GREAT IGNORANCE OF THEIR CAPABILITY.

J. ALLEGATION: UNDERSTRENGTH BATTALIONS WERE THROWN HASTILY INTO BATTLE.

FACTS: AT THE TIME THE NVA STARTED THE TET OFFENSIVE IN  
BT

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PP RUHKM RUCIHOA  
 DE RUMSAK 1354 0710914  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 110914Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 4 OF 7 HUE THE NIGHT OF 30-31 JANUARY TASK FORCE XRAY FORCES WERE FULLY COMMITTED IN THE ASSIGNED AREA OF OPERATIONS AND NO RESERVE WAS AVAILABLE. THEREFORE, UNITS WERE COMMITTED TO OPERATION HUE CITY AS THEY COULD BE RELIEVED BY READJUSTMENT OF FORCES WITHIN THE AO AND THE ARRIVAL OF OTHER UNITS OPCON TASK FORCE XRAY. AS A RESULT ENTIRE BATTALIONS COULD NOT BE COMMITTED AT THE START OF THE OPERATION AS THEY WERE NOT AVAILABLE. INSTEAD THE BUILD-UP WAS COMPLETED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BUT WITH UNITS OF COMPANY SIZE. FORCES WERE COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:

31 JAN 1/1 COMMAND GROUP, A/1/1, G/2/5, AND 1 SECTION 81MM MORTARS ASSUMED OPCON OF 4 TANKS - 2 GUN AND 2 FLAME AT THE HUE RAMP ENROUTE TO 3D MARDIV.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1354 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 01 FEB F/2/5, 2 ONIOS, 1 SECTION 81MM MORTARS  
 02 FEB H/2/5, 2 ONIOS, 2 M42 40MM DUSTERS USA (OPCON TO TFX)  
 03 FEB 1ST MARINES COMMAND GROUP AND 2/5 COMMAND GROUP. COMPANIES F, G, AND H 2/5 CHOPPED TO 2/5.  
 04 FEB B/1/1  
 09 FEB 2 ONIOS  
 17 FEB 5 GUN TANKS, 2 FLAME TANKS (3RD MARDIV TANKS RELIEVED)

19 FEB 5 ONIOS  
 STRENGTHS OF THESE UNITS AS FOLLOWS:  
 SECOND BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES  
 AS OF 31 JAN

UNIT	ON ROLLS				EFFECTIVE			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&SCO	19	301	2	51	18	273	1	50
F	5	202			4	191		
G	6	194			5	164		
H	5	198			4	170		

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TOTAL 35 895 2 51 31 798 1 50  
 THE SECOND BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES SUFFERED 68 KIA, 365 WIA (EVAC), 3 DOW, AND 17 NBC FOR A TOTAL OF 453 CASUALTIES. 314 REPLACEMENTS, RETURNEES FROM R&R, LEAVE, HOSPITAL, ETC. WERE PROVIDED 2/5 DURING THE PERIOD 31 JAN-02 MAR 68.  
 FIRST BATTALION, FIRST MARINES

AS OF 31 JAN 68

UNITS	ON ROLLS				EFFECTIVE			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&SCO	18	306	3	47	17	285	3	47
A	5	200			3	165		
B	5	214			4	153		
TOTAL	28	720	3	47	24	603	3	47
SB CO HAD ONE PLATOON AS III MAF SECURITY AT DANANG								
AS OF 02 MAR 68								
H&SCO	14	325	3	61	12	299	3	56
A	6	230			4	169		
B	4	205			4	180		
TOTAL	24	760	3	61	20	648	3	56

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1354 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEG  
 THE FIRST BATTALION, FIRST MARINES SUFFERED 20 KIA, 150 WIA (EVAC), 1 DOW, AND 12 NBC FOR A TOTAL OF 183 CASUALTIES. 228 REPLACEMENTS, RETURNEES FROM R&R, LEAVE, HOSPITAL, ETC. WERE PROVIDED 1/1 DURING PERIOD 31 JAN-02 MAR 68.

THESE UNITS WERE ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF CLEARING THE CITY SOUTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER.

ON 10 FEBRUARY TFX WAS ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF CLEARING THE ENEMY FROM THE SOUTHEAST SECTION OF THE CITADEL IN HUE CITY NORTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER. THE 1/327, 1ST BRIGADE, 101 ABN DIV WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO TFX AND STARTED TO RELIEVE 1/5 IN THE PHU LOC AREA WHERE THEY HAD BEEN OPERATING SINCE 29 DECEMBER. FORCES WERE COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:

- 10 FEB A/1/5
- 11 FEB 1/5 COMMAND GROUP, B/1/5, C/1/5, AND 1 TANK PLATOON OF 5 TANKS
- 12 FEB MOVED INTO POSITION TO ATTACK
- 13 FEB ATTACK COMMENCED AT 0750
- 14 FEB D/1/5
- 19 FEB 2 ONTOS
- 21 FEB L/3/5

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22 FEB 21/5 WITHDRAWN FROM HUE  
 23 FEB 1/5 MOVED FROM CITADEL TO SOUTH SIDE OF PERFUME RIVER TO PARTICIPATE IN MOPPING UP OPERATIONS NORTH OF E-W GL YD20.

STRENGTHS OF THESE UNITS WERE AS FOLLOWS:  
 FIRST BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES

AS OF 12 FEB 68

UNIT	ON ROLLS				EFFECTIVE			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&SCO	19	313	3	58	15	259	3	49
A	4	219			2	164		
B	4	219			1	146		
C	5	207			5	188		
D	6	217			5	172		
TOTAL	38	1175	3	58	28	929	3	49

AS OF 02 MAR 68

UNIT	ON ROLLS				EFFECTIVE			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1354 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

H&SCO	19	311	3	58	15	237	3	47
A	4	221			2	180		
B	4	219			2	148		
C	5	208			4	189		
D	6	214			4	171		
TOTAL	38	1173	3	58	27	925	3	47

THE FIRST BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES SUFFERED 54 KIA, 166 WIA (EVAC), 4 DOW, AND 2 NBC FOR A TOTAL OF 226 CASUALTIES. 226 REPLACEMENTS, RETURNEES FROM R&R, LEAVE, HOSPITAL, ETC. WERE PROVIDED 1/5 DURING THE PERIOD 15 FEB-02 MAR 68.

L COMPANY, THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES

AS OF 21 FEB 68

UNIT	ON ROLLS				EFFECTIVE			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
L	6	196	0	6	6	144	0	6

AS OF 02 MAR 68

L	6	190	0	5	5	158	0	5
---	---	-----	---	---	---	-----	---	---

L COMPANY SUFFERED 8 KIA AND 35 WIA (EVAC) FOR A TOTAL OF 43 CASUALTIES. 57 REPLACEMENTS, RETURNEES FROM R&R, LEAVE,

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 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK  
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 5 OF 7  
 HOSPITAL, ETC. WERE PROVIDED L/E/5 DURING THE PERIOD 21FEB-  
 02MAR68.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE LISTED STATISTICS REVEALS THAT THE  
 1ST MARINE DIVISION MADE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE TIMELY  
 REPLACEMENTS TO THE FORCES COMMITTED TO OPERATION HUE CITY  
 AND THAT UNDERSTRENGTH BATTALIONS WERE NOT THROWN HASTILY INTO  
 BATTLE.

K. ALLEGATION: MARINE FORCES IN HUE WERE NOT PROPERLY SUPPLIED  
 WITH MEN AND AMMUNITION.

FACTS: SEE PARAGRAPH I ABOVE FOR PERSONNEL. THE FOLLOWING  
 QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION WERE SUPPLIED TO FORCES IN HUE CITY  
 DURING THE PERIOD 31 JAN-02MAR68:

NOMENCLATURE QUANTITY

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1355 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

90MM	4,284 RDS
106MM	6,026 RDS
40MM	17,983 RDS
81MM	30,583 RDS
60MM	19,457 RDS
4.2MM (WP & CS)	750 RDS
3.5 RKT	4,104 RDS
66MM LAAW	4,015 RDS
GRENADES, M26	4,359
GRENADES, CS	4,744
E-8 LAUNCHERS, CS	354
SMOKE GRENADES	8,599
DEMO KITS, CS	16,776 LBS.
NON-ELECTRIC BLASTING CAPS	46,450
FUZE, IGNITOR	26,301 FT.
5.56MM	1,054,920
7.62 LINKED	549,080
.50 CAL LINKED	87,060
.30 CAL LINKED	26,300
00 BUCK SHOT	720

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	DPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#11

**SECRET**

THE WEATHER DURING THE PERIOD 31 JAN-22 FEB, WHEN THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING OCCURRED, WAS CHARACTERIZED BY CONSISTENT CEILINGS OF 200' TO 500', AND ONLY ON FOUR DAYS DURING THIS PERIOD, 14, 15, 16, AND 22 FEB DID THE CEILINGS REACH OR EXCEED 1000' TO PERMIT THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIXED WING A/C. IN SPITE OF THIS SERIOUS HANDICAP THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE DAY DURING THE OPERATION THAT SUPPLIES WERE NOT DELIVERED BY AIR, LAND, OR WATER. LCU'S WERE BROUGHT FROM DANANG TO HUE BEGINNING 7 FEB AND THE ROAD FROM PHU BAI TO HUE WAS OPEN ALL THE TIME WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PERIOD 5-10 FEB WHILE A BLOWN BRIDGE WAS REPLACED. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE FORCES IN HUE WERE SUPPORTED BY 32 CAS SORTIES DELIVERING 134 250 LBS BOMBS, 12 500 LBS BOMBS, 228 2.75 FFAR, 248 5" ZUNI, 58 500LBS NAPALM, 1600 RDS 20MM, AND 14 500 LBS CS. ARTILLERY FIRED 16, 107 ROUNDS DELIVERING 1,331,576 POUNDS OF ORDNANCE. (7993 105MM, 5485 155 HOW, 216 155GUN, 2,088 8" HOW, AND 325 4.2 MORTAR) NAVAL SHIPS FIRED 5,191 ROUNDS TOTTALLING 402,300 POUNDS OF ORDNANCE. (3,816 5"/38, 753 5"/54, 142 6"/47, AND 480 8"/55)

L. ALLEGATION: NO SERIOUS EFFORT WAS MADE DURING THE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1355 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO CRITICAL PERIOD TO KEEP OPEN THE SEVEN-MILE ROAD LINK BETWEEN PHU BAI AND HUE, WHICH THE ENEMY INTERDICTED ALMOST AT WILL, TURNING BACK BIG CONVOYS.

FACTS: EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE TO KEEP THE ROAD OPEN BETWEEN PHU BAI AND HUE. THE ROAD WAS OPEN 31 JAN-4 FEB 68. DURING THE NIGHT OF 4 FEB THE ENEMY BLEW A 128 FOOT BRIDGE AT AN CUU YD 781209. ON 5 FEB A BRIDGE PLATOON WITH SECURITY PROCEEDED TO SITE AND MET HEAVY ENEMY RESISTANCE. THE CONVOY HAVING BEEN STOPPED 500 METERS SHORT OF THE BRIDGE TO DEPLOY TACTICALLY, THE TRUCKS TURNED AROUND AND PROCEEDED BACK TO PHU BAI. THE ENEMY WAS CLEARED FROM THE AREA ON 7-8-AND 9 FEB. THE BRIDGE PLATOON RETURNED ON 10 FEB TO INSTALL THE FLOATING BRIDGE, AND WORK WAS COMPLETED ON 11 FEB. DURING THE PERIOD 31 JAN-4 FEB AND 11 FEB-02 MAR A TOTAL OF 104 TRUCK CONVOYS PROCEEDED FROM PHU BAI TO HUE AND RETURNED. ON THE MORNING OF 18 FEB TWO CONVOYES, ONE BEHIND THE OTHER ON THE WAY TO HUE WERE HALTED BECAUSE OF AN ACTION FURTHER NORTH BETWEEN PF'S AND ENEMY. THE SECURITY FORCE FROM THE FIRST CONVOY REINFORCED THE PF'S AND PRESSED THE ATTACK. BY 1000 IT WAS LEARNED THAT A SMALL BRIDGE WAS DAMAGED IN THE AREA

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#11

**SECRET**

OF THE FIGHTING. BOTH CONVOYS WERE RETURNED TO PHU BAI AND A BRIDGE REPAIR UNIT WAS DISPATCHED. AT THE SAME TIME A RIFLE COMPANS WAS DIVERTED TO ROUTE 1 AND SUCCEEDED IN CLEARING THE ENEMY FROM THE AREA BY THE TIME THE BRIDGE REPAIR UNIT ARRIVED. TRAFFIC WAS RESTORED BY 1330 AND THE TWO DELAYED CONVOYS WERE ORDERED NORTH WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. OF THE 104 CONVOYS MENTIONED ABOVE RECORDS INDICATE THAT ONLY 9, IN ADDITION TO THE 3 PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, TOOK SPORADIC FIRE AND NOE WERE STOPPED. DURING THE BRIEF PERIOD THE AN CUU BRIDGE WAS OUT SUPPLIES WERE DELIVERED BY LCU TO THE HUE RAMP AND BY AIR.

M. ALLEGATION: THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM BATTALION TO DIVISION WAS CONFUCED.

FACTS: THE CHAIN OF COMMAND WAS WELL ESTABLISHED, CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY COMMANDERS, AND CONFORMED TO NORMAL PRACTICE. TASK FORCE XRAY WAS ACTIVATED ON 15 JAN 1968 AS AN OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS SUBORDINATE TO THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND SUPERIOR TO THE 1ST AND 5TH MARINE REGIMENTS WHICH WERE ASSIGNED TO THE TASK FORCE. THE THREE BATTALIONS SUBORDINATED TO THE 1ST MARINES FOR OPERATION HUE CITY, 1/1, 1/5, AND 2/5, HAD

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1355 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
NO MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, AS IT HAS BEEN NORMAL PRACTICE FOR BATTALIONS TO CHANGE OPERATIONAL CONTRL FOR OPERATIONS AND THIS IS WHAT OCCURRED. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME CONFUSION AMONG CORRESPONDENTS AS TO UNIT DESIGNATIONS SUCH AS THE 2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES BEING SUBORDINATED TO THE 1ST MARINE REGIMENT, BUT THERE WAS NO CONFUSION AMONG MARINES.

N. ALLEGATION: LITTLE COORDINATION BETWEEN MARINES AND THE VIETNAMESE FORCES WAS IN EVIDENCE.

FACTS: FROM THE START OF OPERATION HUE CITY THERE WAS CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST ARVN DIVISION IN HUE, HIS U. S. ADVISORS, AND THE COMMANDING GENERAL, TASK FORCE XRAY. THIS WAS PROVIDED THROUGH A TEAM OF TWO LIAISON OFFICERS OF TASK FORCE XRAY WHO REMAINED WITH THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION HEADQUARTERS THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE AND WERE IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATIONS WITH TASK FORCE XRAY HEADQUARTERS AND BY PERSONAL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMANDERS. TASK FORCE XRAY WAS KEPT INFORMED OF THE LOCATION OF ISOLATED ARVN UNITS WITHIN ITS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, RESUPPLIED THEM WITH FOOD, AMMUNITION, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, EVACUATED CASUALTIES, AND WHEN TACTICALLY FEASIBLE  
BT

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#11

**SECRET**

PP RUHKM RUCIHOA  
 DE RUMSAK 1356 0710914  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 110914Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 6 OF 7 RAISED THE SIEGE ON THESE ARVN POSITIONS. THROUGH CLOSE COORDINATION SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL AREAS WERE ASSIGNED MARINE UNITS IN HUE CITY. THE MARINES SUPPORTED ARVN UNITS IN HUE WITH TANKS, ONTOS, 106MM RECOILLESS RIFLES, ARTILLERY AND HELICOPTERS. MARINE UNITS FIRED 5,191 ROUDES OF ARTILLERY DELIVERING 402,300 POUNDS OF ORDNANCE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF ARVN UNITS IN HUE. TWO MARINE ARTILLERY FORWARD OBSERVERS TEAM WERE PROVIDED THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK AND TO INSURE ADEQUATE ARTILLERY SUPPORT WHEN NEEDED. TASK FORCE XRAY COORDINATED HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION TO DELIVER AMMUNITION AND OTHER SUPPLIES.

ALLEGATION: THERE WAS LITTLE FIRM INSTRUCTION TO TROOPS ON HOW TO COMPORT THEMSELVES IN DEVASTATED URBAN AREA. HENCE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1356 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO LOOTING WAS COMMON.

FACTS: AT THE START OF THE OPERATION THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER, 1ST MARINES THROUGH BATTALION COMMANDERS, OFFICERS AND NCO'S GAVE EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS THAT LOOTING AND PILLAGE WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. PERIODIC SHAKEDOWNS WERE HELD. ALL MOVES WERE ON FOOT WHICH DISCOURAGES LOOTING. SOME ITEMS WERE REMOVED FROM DAMAGED BUILDING FOR SAFE KEEPING AND SENT TO THE 1ST MARINES COMMAND POST. INCLUDED WERE SOME MICROSCOPES FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF HUE, TAPE RECORDERS, PIASTERS, JEWELRY, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS. MANY ITEMS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THE PROPER OWNERS AND OTHERS ARE BEING HELD PENDING DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP. MANY AREAS WERE PLACED OFF LIMITS BY THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER AND THESE WERE DEFINED BY ADDRESS, GRID COORDINATES, AND OVERLAY. BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS COMPLAINTS OF LOOTING, AT THE REQUEST OF CG, TASK FORCE XRAY THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION PROVIDED AN ATTORNEY FROM THE DIVISION LEGAL OFFICE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION. THIS INVESTIGATION BEGAN 23 FEB AND IS STILL UNDER WAY. TO DATE NO ACCUSATIONS HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. ALL REASONABLE MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT LOOTING AND NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION. EACH

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTDCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 11	

**SECRET**

ALLEGATION IS BEING INVESTIGATED AND, IF SUBSTANTIATED, EXPEDITIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN. ON 28 FEB THE PROVINCE CHIEF, THUA THIEN PROVINCE, WHO IS ALSO MAYOR OF HUE, STATED THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL COMPLAINT OF U. S. MARINES LOOTING IN HUE.

P. ALLEGATION: THE PERFORMANCE OF MARINE HELICOPTERS, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO PROVIDE RESUPPLY AND MEDICAL EVACUATION, WAS SPOTTY AND UNDEPENDABLE... MARINE INFANTRYMEN THEMSELVES OFTEN EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AND ANGER WITH THE FAILURE OF THEIR OWN HELICOPTERS TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY MEDICAL EVACUATION. SEVERAL MARINE INFANTRYMEN RESCUED WOUNDED BUDDIES UNDER FIRE ONLY TO HAVE THEM LIE WAITING FOR HOURS AT THE HELICOPTER PAD FOR MARINE HELICOPTERS TO ARRIVE.

FACTS: THE PERFORMANCE OF MARINE HELICOPTERS DURING OPERATION HUE CITY WAS OUTSTANDING IN EVERY RESPECT. DURING THE PERIOD 31 JAN-02 MAR 68 UNITS OF TASK FORCE XRAY HAD 142 KIA AND 859 WIA (MED EVAC) FOR A TOTAL OF 1001 CASUALTIES. DURING THIS PERIOD MARINE HELICOPTERS FLEW 823 TRANSPORT SORTIES LIFTING 1672 PASSENGERS AND 1,052,459 POUNDS OF SUPPLIES. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD OF TIME, THE HELICOPTERS FLEW 270 MED

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1356 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR CME0  
EVAC SORTIES LIFTING 977 WOUNDED AND DEAD. THIS IS A  
REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT WHEN THE MARGINAL WEATHER THROUGHOUT THE  
PERIOD IS CONSIDERED. SOME OF CASUALTIES IN THE AFORE-  
MENTIONED FIGURE OF 977 WERE ARVN, U. S. CIVILIAN, AND VN CIVILIAN.  
THE BALANCE OF MARINE CASUALTIES WERE EVACUATED BY SURFACE AND U.S.  
ARMY HELICOPTERS WHICH IS COMMON PRACTICE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE  
REGIMENTAL COMMANDER, 1ST MARINES STATES UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT  
THE MEDICAL EVACUATION PROCESSES WERE REMARKABLE AND COM-  
PLETELY EFFICIENT IN EVERY DEGREE. IN THE LIGHT OF THE  
ADVERSE WEATHER, HOT ZONES AND AN EVER CHANGING TACTICAL  
SITUATION THE PERFORMANCE OF THE HELICOPTER PILOTS LEFT NOTHING  
TO BE DESIRED. HE DOES NOT KNOW OF A SINGLE INSTANCE OF A  
REQUEST FOR EVACUATION UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WAS  
NOT ACCOMPLISHED. THE REGIMENTAL SURGEON, AS THE OVERALL COORDINATOR  
OF MEDICAL SERVICES, REQUIRED ALL CASUALTIES TO BE EVACUATED  
VIA THE REGIMENTAL AID STATION. HE WAS REQUIRED TO RENDER  
PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENTS IN SOME CASES THAT EVACUATION WOULD  
BE DETRIMENTAL AND IN CERTAIN CASES HE DIRECTED CRITICAL  
CASUALTIES TO BE RETAINED IN THE HOLDING WARD SET UP AT THE  
UNIVERSITY OF HUE IN ORDER TO PERFORM LIFE SAVING SURGERY TO

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PNO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 11

**SECRET**

SAVE THEIR LIVES. THE 1ST MARINES REGIMENTAL SURGEON STATES WITH POSITIVENESS THAT NOT A SINGLE CASUALTY WHO ARRIVED ALIVE AT THE REGIMENTAL AID STATION DIED AS A RESULT OF FAILURE TO BE EVACUATED; EVERY SINGLE INSTANCE WHERE HE REQUESTED AIR EVACUATION BECAUSE IN HIS JUDGMENT THE PATIENT WOULD HAVE DIED, WAS ACCOMMODATED WITHOUT EXCEPTION; AND THAT THE MEDICAL EVACUATION SUPPORT ACCORDED HIM WAS RULY OUTSTANDING AND THE MOST REMARKABLE HE HAS SEEN IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

Q. ALLEGATION: THE MARINE GENERAL IN COMMAND OF THE AIR WING ORDERED HELICOPTERS NOT TO FLY IN LESS THAN A 500 FOOT CEILING. LOW CEILINGS WERE COMMON DURING THE 25 DAY BATTLE FOR HUE.

FACTS: THE CG, 1ST MAW HAS DEFINED CERTAIN CEILING AND VISIBILITY LIMITATIONS FOR ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS, SUBJECT TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION. AMONG THESE IS A 500 FT CEILING LIMITATION ON HELICOPTER OPERATIONS. THIS WAS IMPOSED BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME VULNERABILITY TO ENEMY FIRE OF LOW FLYING HELICOPTERS, ESPECIALLY THE MARINE CORPS TROOP CARRYING VARIETY WHICH ARE USED IN EVACUATION OF MARINE CASUALTIES. WEATHER LIMITATIONS GROUNDED BOTH MARINE AND ARMY

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1356 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO HELICOPTERS AT MANY TIMES DURING THE HUE OPERATION. IN FACT, THE WEATHER WAS SO BAD THAT THE 1ST CAV HAD TO LAND THEIR CHOPPERS FAR SHORT OF THEIR INITIAL OBJECTIVE ON THE NW OUTSKIRTS OF HUE AND WALK INTO BATTLE. NOTWITHSTANDING THE 500 FT CEILING RESTRICTION, EXISTING REGULATIONS PERMIT FLYING IN ANY WEATHER CONDITIONS, PROVIDED IT IS TERMED A "MANDATORY" MISSION. THE FACT THAT NOT ONE MARINE DIED AS A RESULT OF A FAILURE TO FLY A CASUALTY EVAC MISSION (SEE PARAGRAPH 5, P.) AND THE STRENGTH OF THE FIGHTING UNITS WERE ALWAYS AT AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL (SEE PARAGRAPH 5, J., K.) ATTESTS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT NOT ONE VITAL MISSION WAS NOT FLOWN BECAUSE OF WEATHER RESTRICTIONS.

R. ALLEGATION: AS MARINES LAY WOUNDED, VAINLY WAITING FOR ONE OF THE DOZENS OF MARINE HELICOPTERS GROUNDED AT PHU BAI ONLY TEN MINUTES AWAY, U. S. ARMY "HUEY" HELICOPTERS ARRIVED AT HUE ON ROUTINE MISSIONS.

FACTS: THE WEATHER DURING THIS PERIOD WAS MARGINAL AT BEST. CEILINGS WERE OFTEN DOWN TO 200 FT AND 1/4 MILE VISIBILITY WITH VERY LITTLE IMPROVEMENT DURING THE DAY. AT VARIOUS TIMES THE WEATHER WAS DIFFERENT IN HUE THAN IN PHU BAI. BETTER IN HUE THAN IN PHU BAI AND VICE VERSE. THE MAJORITY OF U. S. ARMY HELICOPTERS ARE BT

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#11

**SECRET**

PP RUHKM RUCIHOA  
 DE RUMSAK 1357 0710914  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 110914Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF 7 BASED NORTH OF HUE. 51 USMC CASUALTIES WERE EVACUATED BY U. S. ARMY HELICOPTERS DURING THE PERIOD 31JAN-02MAR68. THIS IS NOT UNCOMMON IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS A HELICOPTER FROM EITHER USMC OR USA THAT IS DELIVERING PERSONNEL OR CARGO WILL PICK UP CASUALTIES IN A LANDING ZONE AND TRANSPORT THEM TO THE MEDICAL FACILITY REGARDLESS OF THE SERVICE THE CASUALTY BELONGS TO. NO U. S. ARMY HELICOPTERS WERE REQUESTED TO EVACUATE MARINE CASUALTIES AND THE ABOVE ALLEGATION IS NOT ONLY UNTRUE, BUT IS GROSSLY UNFAIR TO A GROUP OF DEDICATED PILOTS WHO DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS.  
 6. THE ITINERARY OF MR. TUOHY WHILE IN ICTZ FROM 4FEB TO 25FEB INDICATES NOTHING TO PRESAGE HIS ATTACK ON THIS COMMAND.  
 7. I REALIZE THE FOREGOING IS LENGTHY AND DETAILED; HOWEVER,

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1357 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO IT PROVIDES BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL INFORMATION FROM WHICH YOU CAN GLEAN THAT WHICH MAY BE USEFUL IN YOUR EVALUATION OF THE ARTICLE, AND IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS OF IT. WARM REGARDS.  
 GP-4  
 BT

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#11



TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMSAX  
 DE RUMSAX 1297 211054G  
 ZNY TTTT  
 RUMSAX -Y- CG PROV CORPS V  
 O 110546Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAX/CG PROV CORPS V  
 INFO RUMSAX/COMUSMACV  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN. ROSSON INFO  
 GEN WESTMORELAND

1. CONSISTENT WITH THE VERBAL GUIDANCE FURNISHED BY COMUSMACV  
 ON 10 MARCH, REQUEST YOU CONTINUE PREPARATIONS TO INITIATE  
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE ENEMY IN THE KHE SANH  
 AREA ON OR ABOUT 1 APRIL. SUCH PREPARATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE  
 CONSTRUCTION OF A C7A/C-123 STRIP AT CA LU, AND OPENING OF  
 RTE 9 TO CA LU. INTENSIFY AIR EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND  
 DESTROY ENEMY ARMY TO AND NORTH OF DMZ. SUBMIT REQUEST  
 FOR ANY FORCES OR SUPPORT NEEDED IN EXCESS OF YOUR OWN  
 RESOURCES.

2. CONTINUE OPERATIONS WITH A MINIMUM OF ONE BRIGADE TO  
 BLOCK ENEMY USE OF ROUTE 547. ESTABLISH FIRE SUPPORT ELM  
 AT CUMBERLAND FIRE BASE. CONDUCT AIRMOBILE OPNS TO DESTROY  
 LOCATED ENEMY. DEVELOP LUCRATIVE TARGETS IN ASHAW VALLEY

PAGE TWO RUMSAX 1297 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 FOR DESTRUCTION BY FIRE OR RAID. COORDINATE WITH SOG  
 AND DELTA FORCE IN AREA.

3. CONTINUE S&D OPNS THROUGHOUT YOUR AO WITH EMPHASIS ON  
 ENEMY FORCES NEAR HUE, AND IN COASTAL AREAS.

4. STUDY GROUP WILL CONVENE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS ON  
 12 MARCH TO DETERMINE WHAT OUR POSTURE SHOULD BE IN  
 NORTHERN I CORPS ON 1 SEPTEMBER. STUDY GROUP WILL BE  
 CHAIRED BY GEN G. W. HOFFMAN WHO WAS PRESENT DURING THE  
 DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT WITH COMUSMACV. REQUEST YOU  
 DESIGNATE PROV CORPS REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN  
 DISCUSSIONS. SUGGEST YOU INVITE 3D MARDIV PARTICIPATION.  
 STUDY GROUP SHOULD REPORT RESULTS TO YOU AND ME BY  
 27 MARCH.

GP-4  
 BT

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		3/11/68		<i>[initials]</i>	CG. III MAF
DCG	3		3/11/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SERIAL 101316Z MAR... COPY # / OF 2 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT STAFF AUGMENTATION, U.S. ARMY
C/S	1		3/11/68		<i>[initials]</i>	REMARKS  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  HAS BEEN SENT  <i>"# 2 + 3 burned 5 Nov 68"</i>
DC/S			3/11/68		<i>[initials]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			110765		<i>[initials]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE  
 C-COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

**HAS BEEN SENT  
EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMBAK  
DE RUMBAK 1105 070130G  
ZNY 00000  
P 101000Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMBAK/COMUSMACV  
BT

**SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTGORELAND FROM L GEN CUSHMAN  
STAFF AUGMENTATION, U. S. ARMY**

- A. MY 161620Z FEB68 (S)
- B. YR 061201Z MAR (S)

1. THE DIRECTIVE THAT ESTABLISHES THE ARMY HQ IN ICTZ ALSO PLACES THAT HQ AND OTHER U.S. ELEMENTS UNDER THE OPCON OF CG III MAF. THE PRELIMINARIES INCIDENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A HQ, THE INCREASE OF ARMY FORCES IN ICTZ, AND THE MOUNTING LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES WE ARE NOW FACING ALL CONFIRM TO ME THAT WE ARE IN NEED NOW OF THE ARMY EXPERIENCE ON MY STAFF AT THE ACTION OFFICER LEVEL, TO COPE WITH THE CURRENT AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE SITUATION. I DO NOT AGREE WITH YOUR J-1 THAT THE PRESENCE OF ARMY OFFICERS ON PW STAFF INVALIDATES MY ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AUGMENTATION CONTAINED IN REF A, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN APPROVED.

2. REF A, YOU MAY RECALL, WAS PRECIPITATED BY YOU

PAGE TWO RUMBAK 1105 **SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR** DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN CHAPMAN. CONCURRENT WITH MY REQUEST FOR ARMY STAFF AUGMENTATION I WAS GIVEN ASSURANCE BY GEN KHULAK AND GEN CHAPMAN THAT ADDITIONAL MARINE STAFF PERSONNEL WOULD BE PROVIDED EXPEDITIOUSLY IN RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER REVISION OF T/O. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THIS INCREASE IN PERSONNEL SHOULD ARRIVE LATE MARCH.

3. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH MACV-TASE/TAC PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS IT WILL REQUIRE AT THE OUTSET 3 ADDITIONAL SPACES IN MY HEADQUARTERS. THIS FUNCTION WAS FORMERLY PERFORMED BY DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MARINE DIVISIONS AND FIRST MAF AND BY ARMY DIV DIRECTLY WITH TASE SAIGON. IT WILL NOW BE NECESSARY TO CONSOLIDATE, ALLOCATE AND COORDINATE ALL PREPLANNED AIR REQUESTS FOR US AND FVNAF IN ICTZ AT CUSH HQ. I HAVE TAKEN IMMEDIATE STEPS TO LEVY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMANDS EXCLUSIVE OF THOSE IN PCV FOR THE REQUIRED PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THE ADDITIONAL ARMY SPACES SHOULD BE REFLECTED HEREIN AND ADDED TO MY ORIGINAL REQUEST. PCV UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE FACED WITH THE SAME REQUIREMENT OF ITS DIVISIONS.

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUSSAK 1188 S. E. C. R. E. T. EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 4. MY STAFF HAS CONTACTED THE G-1 OF PCV STAFF AND HAS  
 BEEN INFORMED THAT ONE LT COL U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS  
 STAFF OFFICER WILL BE THE OFFICIAL LIAISON OFFICER FROM PCV  
 TO HQ III MAF. ADDITIONALLY IT WAS STATED THAT STAFF  
 OFFICERS COULD BE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST ON A COMMITTEE BASIS.  
 THIS DEGREE OF COOPERATION IS APPRECIATED BUT IT DOES NOT  
 SOLVE THE DAY TO DAY STAFF ACTIONS REQUIRING FULL TIME  
 EFFORT OF THE INDIVIDUALS I HAVE REQUESTED. IN LIGHT OF  
 THE CURRENT SITUATION AND WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PCV  
 ON 10 MAR I HAVE, IN CONFORMANCE WITH REF B, REEVALUATED  
 REQUIREMENTS AND CONCLUDE THAT THE 16 ARMY OFFICERS  
 INITIALLY REQUESTED ARE STILL REQUIRED. ADDITIONALLY THE  
 FOLLOWING SHOULD BE ADDED TO MEET THE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST  
 TASKS:

- 1 CAPT: 2163
- 1 SFC: 11740
- 1 SGT: 11920

GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#9



DEPCOMUSMACV FWD

ZEM

S E C R E T

ATTN: DEPCOMUSMACV FWD - PASS TO CG PCV (DESIGNATE)  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, GEN ABRAMS AND LTGEN  
 ROSSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 KHE SANH OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

A. CG III MAF 040516Z MAR 68

1. I BELIEVE THE ENEMY THRUST HAS BEEN BLUNTED. NOW IS THE TIME FOR US TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE. ASSUMING A RELATIVELY STABLE ENEMY SITUATION IN AND AROUND HUE/QUANG TRI, AS A MATTER OF FIRST PRIORITY, I INTEND TO TASK CG PCV, WHEN ACTIVATED, TO EMPLOY 1ST AIR CAV DIV AND OTHER REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF PCV IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO OPEN RTE 9 TO KHE SANH AND CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS KHE SANH AREA O/A 20 MARCH.

2. FOR CG PCV (DESIGNATE)

A. AFTER ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF PCV DESIRE YOU SUBMIT DETAILED OPERATION/ADMIN PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS SET FORTH ABOVE.

B. CONSISTENT WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEP COMUSMACV, REF (A) TASKED CG 1ST ACD TO CONSTRUCT A C7A STRIP AT CA LU OAB 12MAR AND BE PREPARED TO INCREASE ITS CAPABILITY TO C-123. REQUEST YOU SCHEDULE AFTERNOON BRIEFING AT YOUR HQ AT AN EARLY DATE TO PERMIT 1ST ACD TO PRESENT DETAILED CONSTRUCTION/SECURITY PLAN TO YOU AND ME. IF YOU CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE, YOU MAY DESIRE TO INCLUDE CG 3D MARDIV AT THE SAME SESSION.

GP-4

IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY, DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

250

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG			<i>has seen</i>			CG III MAF
DCG	2		3/9/68		<i>JA</i>	SERIAL 180650Z MAR COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3			3/9	<i>WPC</i>	REMARKS <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  HAS BEEN SENT  FLASH  <i>"4# 2 &amp; 3 burned 5 Nov 68"</i>
C/S	1.		3/8/68		<i>A</i>	
DC/S			3/9/68		<i>M</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			08/64		<i>DHO</i>	LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 080650Z MAR	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
3/8/68	D. H. Weger	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
3/8	Anderson	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/8	CG has seen		
3/9	D/CG has seen DKW		
3/9/68	Major Anderson (Has Seen)		
3/9/68	D. H. Weger		
8/8	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT

SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

# 7

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

000000ZZ RUMSAL RUMSAL  
DE RUMSAK 0084 068065Z  
ZNY SSSSS  
RUMSAW -T- DEP COMUSMACV FWD  
Z 080650Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
INFO RUMSAW/DEP COMUSMACV FWD  
RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**FLASH**

S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND INFO GEN ABRAMS AND GEN MONYER FROM  
LTGEN CUSHMAN

AIR SUPPORT KHE SANH

- A. DEP COMUSMACV FWD 071000Z MARS 68 BY OTHER MEANS (NOTAL)
- B. COMUSMACV 252347Z FEB 68
- C. 7AF TACC 001650Z MARS 68 (NOTAL)
- D. 7AF 141230Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A WAS DEPCOMUSMACV'S RECOMMENDATION TO DIVERT ARC LIGHT STRIKES TO AREA WEST OF HUE AND USE TAGAIR AT KHE SANH. REF B STATES THAT KHE SANH WILL BE ACCORDED TOP PRIORITY FOR ARC LIGHT STRIKES. REF C IS SPECIAL FRAG ORDER TO MAXIMIZE AIR EFFORT IN FAVORABLE WEATHER (CODE WORD CRUSHER). REF D STATES THAT 7AF EXPECTS TO COMMIT 150 SORTIES DAILY TO AIR SUPPORT IN DEFENSE OF KHE SANH.

2. ALL ARC LIGHT FROM NOON UNTIL MIDNIGHT TODAY HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO HUE AREA PER REF A. THE WEATHER AT KHE SANH HAS BEEN EXCELLENT FOR THE PAST TWO DAYS AND IS SATISFACTORY FOR VISUAL AIR STRIKES TODAY. CRUSHER HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

3. DURING THE PAST FIVE DAYS THE 7AF HAS AVERAGED ONLY 115 NIAGARA SORTIES/DAY OR 77 PERCENT OF EXPECTED PERFORMANCE STATED REF D. THE LAST TWO DAYS OF GOOD WEATHER THEY FLEW 129 AND 110 SORTIES RESPECTIVELY.

4. THE UNREMITTING AND FULL EFFORT OF THE B-52'S HAVE DONE THE MOST IN MY OPINION TO IMPAIR THE ENEMY ATTACK POSTURE. LAST NIGHT I SUBMITTED FOUR TARGETS INSIDE 3000 METERS FOR AIR STRIKES TODAY ON A MOST URGENT BASIS. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN SCHEDULED. THEREFORE, I HAVE DIRECTED THE FIRST MAW TO DIVERT EVERY STRIKE SORTIE POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT KHE SANH TODAY.

5. SINCE "CRUSHER" HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED, APPARENTLY BECAUSE WEATHER IS NOT FAVORABLE ENOUGH, REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER THE ARC LIGHT PRIORITIES FOR TONIGHT AND THAT KHE SANH CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THE B-52 EFFORT YOU HAVE PROMISED.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#7

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	CG III MAF
CG	2		3/7/68		lp	SERIAL 061330Z MAR	COPY # / OF 2 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		3/8/68		DR	SUBJECT AIR CUSHION VEHICLES (PACV) FOR CUA VIET RIVER	
DCG AIR	4		3/9/68		Wp	REMARKS	
C/S	1.		3/9/68		Q	<p>✓</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>"#2 &amp; 3 burned 5 Nov 68"</p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p> <p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b></p>	
DC/S			3/9/68		DR		
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S			070630		DR		
S/C							



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**EXCLUSIVE  
HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUMSAW  
DE RUMSAK 0707 0651330  
ZNY CCCCC  
O 061330Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
INFO ZEN/COMNAVFORV  
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND  
INFO RADM VETH AND MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN  
AIR CUSHION VEHICLES (PACV) FOR CUA VIET RIVER.

1. LAST NOVEMBER COMNAVFORV INFORMED WE HE WAS CONSIDERING  
DEPLOYMENT OF THREE PACV'S TO I CORPS. THE TAN MY AREA WAS  
CONSIDERED MOST LUCRATIVE AREA FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND  
PLANS FOR FACILITIES TO SUPPORT A PACV BASE IN TAN MY HAVE  
BEEN COMPLETED. FOR LONG RANGE PLANS, TAN MY IS STILL  
CONSIDERED THE MOST SUITABLE AREA FOR THE PACV SUPPORT  
BASE; HOWEVER, ENEMY INTERDICTION OF THE VITAL CUA VIET  
WATERWAY SYSTEM DICTATES THAT ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES BE  
EMPLOYED IMMEDIATELY TO MAKE THAT VITAL LOC SECURE FOR  
PASSAGE OF LOGISTIC CRAFT.

2. THE SPEED AND MOBILITY OF THE PACV AND ITS INDEPENDENCE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0707 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
FROM CHANNEL NAVIGATION ORDINARILY REQUIRED IN THE CUA VIET  
WOULD PROVIDE AN INVALUABLE ASSET FOR PREVENTION OF MINING,  
BARRICADING, AND AMBUSHING OF BOAT CONVOYS. THE THIRD  
MARDIV HAS TWO INFANTRY BNS (WITH HELD QUICK REACTION FORCES)  
AND AN AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BN DEVOTED FULL TIME TO SECURITY  
OF THE CUA VIET. THESE FORCES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO COVER ALL  
POSSIBLE AMBUSH POSITIONS FROM MOUTH OF CUA VIET TO DONG NA  
RAMP.

3. TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY TO PURSUE AND PUNISH  
ENEMY WHEN CONTACT IS MADE ALONG RIVER BANKS, REQUEST  
ONE OR MORE PACV'S BE IMMEDIATELY DEPLOYED, ON AN INTERIM  
BASIS, TO NORTHERN I CORPS AND PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL  
CONTROL OF III MAF FOR USE ALONG THE CUA VIET.

4. IF YOU CONCUR, REQUEST PACV LNO PROCEED DONG NA ASAP  
TO FIRM UP LOGISTIC/FACILITY REQUIREMENTS WITH CG  
THIRD MARDIV.

GP-4  
BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#4

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		3/7/68		<i>lp</i>	CG III MAF
DCG	3		3/8/68		<i>lp</i>	SERIAL 061328Z MAR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4		3/9/68		<i>lp</i>	SUBJECT C7A AIRSTRIP AT CA LU
C/S	1.		3/7/68		<i>a</i>	REMARKS
DC/S			7/2/68		<i>pr</i>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;"><b>FOR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em;"><b>HAS BEEN SENT</b></p> <p style="text-align: center; font-style: italic;">#3 &amp; 4 burned 5 Nov 68"</p> <p>LEGEND                      A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C - COMMENTS                      I - INFORMATION</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		I COPY				
G-3		A COPY				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			070650		<i>DKW</i>	
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG 111 MAF	
		SERIAL 061928Z MAR 68	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
3/7	<i>DW Wagon</i>	SUBJECT C7A AIRSTRIP AT CA LU	
3/7	<i>C/S Das seen DW</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
3/7	<i>lp</i>		
3/8	<i>DCG Das seen DW</i>		
3/8/68	<i>R.P. Keller</i>		
3/9/68	<i>Maj Gen Anderson</i> <i>Has seen</i>		
3/9/68	<i>H.W.</i>		
8/8	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6		
	COPY 5 OF 6		
	COPY 6 OF 6		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT  
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

# 3  
**SECRET**

**SECRET**

A  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMSAK 0706 0661328  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 061328Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

**FOR**

**S E C R E T**  
 FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 C7A AIRSTRIP AT CA LU

**HAS BEEN SENT**

- A. CG III MAF 040516Z MAR68
  - B. CG THIRD MARDIV 041612Z MAR68
  - 1. REF A, INTERALIA, ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF C7A STRIP AT CA LU.
  - 2. REF B REQUESTED RECONSIDERATION OF ASSIGNMENT THIS REQUIREMENT TO THIRD MARDIV.
  - 3. CRITERIA THAT PROMPTED ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS IN REF A REMAIN VALID. REGRET UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO ALTER TASKS INDICATED REF A.
- GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.								#3	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 060326Z MAR COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S	1.		3/8/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	<p>REMARKS</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>"#263 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C - COMMENTS                      I - INFORMATION</p> <p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b></p>
DC/S			3/8/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			07630	3/9	<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						



**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMSAK 0623 0670326  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 060326Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS.

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM LTGEN KRULAK QUOTE  
 P 041959Z MAR 68

FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO CG III MAF  
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 HAS BEEN SENT  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF MY 040336Z/MAR TO  
 WESTMORELAND ON THE TUOHY NEWS ARTICLE:  
 QUOTE:

1. I HAVE JUST READ THE FOLLOWING LOS ANGELES  
 TIMES ARTICLE BY WILLIAM TUOHY, DATED SAIGON,

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0623 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 MARCH 2.

QUOTE:

CHANGES IN THE U.S. MILITARY STRUCTURE SEEM TO  
 PRESAGE A SIGNIFICANT DOWNGRADING OF THE TOP  
 MARINE LEADERSHIP IN VIETNAM. IN THE VIEW OF MANY  
 OBSERVERS, THE PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT OF AN ARMY  
 THREE STAR GENERAL TO THE I CORPS AREA REFLECTS  
 THE ARMY'S GROWING DOMINANCE IN A REGION ONCE  
 KNOWN AS MARINE LAND. THOUGH NO U.S. OFFICIAL  
 WILL ADMIT IT PUBLICLY, IT IS AN OPEN SECRET THAT  
 MANY TOP STAFFERS IN GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND'S  
 SAIGON HIGH COMMAND ARE LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC  
 WITH THE CONDUCT BY MARINE GENERALS OF THE WAR  
 IN THE FIVE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES WHICH COM-  
 PRISE THE CRITICAL I CORPS BATTLEFRONT.

ROSSON IN CHARGE

THE NEW CHANGE OF COMMAND ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY,  
 PLACES A THREE-STAR ARMY GENERAL, LT. GEN  
 WILLIAM B. ROSSON, IN I CORPS AS COMMANDER OF  
 "MAC-V FORWARD" MAC-V BEING THE DESIGNATION FOR

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

(II MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	OC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, THE OFFICIAL TITLE FOR WESTMORELAND'S HEADQUARTERS. HERETOFORE, A U.S. MARINE THREE-STAR GENERAL HELD FULL SWAY OVER ALL U.S. TROOPS IN THE I CORPS AREA, AND TECHNICALLY, THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS STILL HELD BY GEN. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, JR. THE SENIOR MARINE IN VIETNAM. BUT RECENTLY, GEN. CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS, A FOUR-STAR ARMY COMMANDER AND WESTMORELAND'S CHIEF DEPUTY, ESTABLISHED THE "MAC-V FORWARD" COMMAND AT PHU BAI, THE BIG MARINE BASE BETWEEN DANANG AND HUE. NOW ABRAMS HAS TURNED OVER PERSONNAL COMMAND TO GEN. ROSSON. THE 80,000 MAN MARINE FORCE IN I CORPS HAS RECENTLY BEEN BEEFED UP WITH SOME 30,000 ARMY TROOPS. BUT IT IS THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ARMY THREE-STAR GENERAL IN A SUPERVISORY CAPACITY TO I CORPS THAT FOCUSES ATTENTION ON THE QUALITY OF MARINE LEADERSHIP.

CRITICISMS CITED  
THE CHIEF CRITICISM LEVELED AGAINST THE TOP

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0623 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
MARINE COMMANDERS IS THAT THEY HAVE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PREPARED THEIR TROOPS FOR THE KIND OF WAR WHICH HAS EVOLVED ALONG THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, THAT IS, POSITIONAL WARFARE WITH STATIC DEFENSE BASES. IN THE VIEW OF ALMOST EVERY OBSERVER WHO HAS VISITED I CORPS, THE MARINES WERE ILL-PREPARED FOR THE ARTILLERY ATTACKS TO WHICH THEY WERE SUBJECTED AT THE NORTHERNMOST OUTPOSTS OF CON THIEN, GIO LINH, AND DONG HA. FURTHER, CRITICS SAY, DESPITE MONTH OF OPPORTUNITY, THE STRATEGIC MARINE BASE AT KHE SANH WAS NOT PREPARED TO WITHSTAND AN ENEMY ARTILLERY SEIGE UNTIL IT ACTUALLY BEGAN TWO MONTHS AGO. THE CRITICISM OF THE MARINES IS INVARIABLY DIRECTED AT THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP. THE BATTALION AND COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS ARE FIRST-RATE, AND THE VALIANT PERFORMANCE OF THE INFANTRYMAN, OR "GRUNT" IN MARINE SLANG, IS SECOND TO NONE IN VIETNAM. FOR A MILITARY BRANCH THAT HAS MADE ITS REPUTATION ON DASH, ENTERPRISE, STYLE AND

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IMAGINATION, THE TOP MARINE LEADERSHIP IN VIETNAM HAS BEEN SINGULARLY UNIMPRESSIVE, SAY THE CRITICS -- WHO ARE GROWING IN NUMBER. THE OTHER CRITICISMS OF THE MARINE LEADERSHIP AND TACTICS ARE MANY: VAST, TIME-CONSUMING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS THAT DO NOT RESULT IN CONTACT; FORAYS INTO THE DMZ BY UNDERSTRENGTH UNITS; FAILURE TO ACCPET INTELLIGENCE ON ENEMY UNITS SUPPLIED BY MAC-V FROM ITS MANY SOURCES; RASH AND COSTLY ASSUALTS ON ENTRENCHED ENEMY POSITIONS OF LIMITED VALUE; OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS LAUNCHED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FORCES AND SUPPORT, AND FAILURE TO EMPLOY HELICOPTERS PROPERLY. SOME OF THE WEAKNESSES IN THE MARINES' STRATEGY AND TACTICS ARE NOT OF THEIR OWN MAKING. THE MARINES' STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED FOR HIT-AND-RUN ASSUALTS, THEIR HELICOPTERS FOR SHIP-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS, AND MUCH OF THEIR EQUIPMENT FOR THE SHORT-TIME PULL. IN VIETNAM, THEY FIND THEMSELVES FIGHTING THE LONG HAUL IN A RUGGED AREA WHERE

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0623 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO THE HEAVIER ARMY DIVISIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.

THE RECENT BATTLE FOR HUE, IN THE VIEW OF MANY OBSERVERS, EXEMPLIFIED THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE MARINE TOP LEADERSHIP. UNDERSTRENGTHS BATTALIONS WERE THROWN HASTILY INTO THE BATTLE AND NOT PROPERLY RESUPPLIED WITH MEN AND AMMUNITION. NO SERIOUS EFFORT WAS MADE DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD TO KEEP OPEN THE SEVEN-MILE ROAD LINK BETWEEN PHU BAI AND HUE, WHICH THE ENEMY INTERDICTED ALMOST AT WILL, TURNING BACK BIG CONVOYS. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM BATTALION TO DIVISION WAS CONFUSED AND LITTLE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MARINES AND THE VIETNAMESE FORCES WAS IN EVIDENCE. THERE WAS LITTLE FIRM INSTRUCTION TO TROOPS ON HOW TO COMPORT THEMSELVES IN DEVASTATED URBAN AREA. HENCE LOOTING WAS COMMON. AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MARINE HELICOPTERS, WHICH WERE SUPPOSED TO PROVIDE RESUPPLY AND MEDICAL EVACUATION, WAS SPOTTY AND UNDEPENDABLE.  
BT

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.								#2	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMSAK 0643 0670326  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 060326Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

THE MARINE GENERAL IN COMMAND OF THE AIR WING  
 ORDERED HELICOPTERS NOT TO FLY LESS THAN A 500-  
 FOOT CEILING. LOW CEILINGS WERE COMMON DURING  
 THE 25 DAY BATTLE FOR HUE. MARINE INFANTRYMEN  
 THEMSELVES OFTEN EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AND  
 ANGER WITH THE FAILURE OF THEIR OWN HELICOPTERS  
 TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY MEDICAL EVACUATION. SEVERAL  
 MARINE INFANTRYMEN RESCUED WOUNDED BUDDIES

BT  
 P 041959Z MAR 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO CG III MAF  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0643 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 UNDER FIRE ONLY TO HAVE THEM LIE WAITING FOR  
 HOURS AT THE HELICOPTER PAD FOR MARINE HELI-  
 COPTERS TO ARRIVE.

AS MARINES LAY WOUNDED, VAINLY WAITING FOR ONE  
 OF THE DOZENS OF MARINE HELICOPTERS GROUNDED  
 PHU BAI ONLY TEN MINUTES AWAY, U.S. ARMY "HUEY"  
 HELICOPTERS ARRIVED AT HUE ON ROUTINE MISSIONS.

UNQUOTE

2. I AM SURE THAT YOU WOULD BE SADDENED AND OFFENDED TO READ  
 SUCH AN ARTICLE AT ANY TIME. COMING AT THIS MOMENT,  
 WHEN WE NEED THE MAXIMUM OF SOLIDARITY AND  
 MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, I REGARD THE ARTICLE NOT JUST  
 AN AFFRONT TO THE MARINES FIGHTING IN VIETNAM  
 BUT AS AN ALLEGATION OF INTERNAL EROSION IN OUR  
 MULTI-SERVICE FIGHTING FORCE THAT CAN ONLY  
 BENEFIT THE ENEMY.

3. AND, WHILE THE ARTICLE IS REplete WITH IN-  
 ACCURACIES, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND MOST  
 LAMENTABLE PASSAGE IS THE OPENING KEYNOTE, "  
 QUOTE IT IS AN OPEN SECRET THAT MANY TOP STAFFERS IN

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-60)

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	FACE	COMST.	AT	CLP.	CEO	
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
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GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND'S SAIGON HIGH COMMAND ARE LESS THE ENTHUSIASTIC WITH THE CONDUCT OF MARINE GENERALS OF THE WAR IN THE FIVE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES ---" UNQUOTE. THEREAFTER THE REPEATED REFERENCES TO "CRITICISMS" AND "CRITICS" ARE INELUDIBLY IDENTIFIED WITH THOSE SAME HIGH LEVEL PEOPLE, IN THE EYES OF THE READER.

4. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A NEWSMAN SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO INDICT MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF FOR MAKING EROSIIVE, CONFIDENCE - SHAKING COMMENTS REGARDING YOUR OPERATIONAL SUBORDINATES. PATENTLY, GRAVE CRITICISMS SUCH AS THOSE RECITED IN THE ARTICLE SHOULD NEVER BE PLACED IN THE ENEMY'S HANDS, AND FOR A REPORTER EVEN TO IMPLY THAT THEY HAVE COME TO HIM VIA HIGH LEVEL PERSONS IS A DISSERVICE TO ALL OFFICERS SERVING IN YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

5. CONSEQUENTLY, AND IN THE FACE OF ALL OF YOUR OTHER BURDENS, I URGE THAT YOU TAKE THE TIME TO

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0643 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SET MR. TUOHY STRAIGHT, BY GIVING HIM YOUR OWN VIEWS REGARDING THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR SUBORDINATES IN I CTZ, AND BY EXPLAINING THE TRUE POSTURE OF MACV (FORWARD) AND PROV CORPS VIETNAM IN THE SCHEME OF THINGS. WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE.

GP-4

UNQUOTE.

2. AM PREPARING DETAILED REBUTAL OF ARTICLE FOR SUBMISSION TO LTGEN KRULAK TOMORROW. DESIRE YOUR COMMENTS AND DETAILED FACTUAL BACK-UP REBUTTING THOSE CANARDS INVOLVING THIRD MARINE DIVISION.

REQ INFO NLT 071300H.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#2

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG			3/7/68		[Signature]	CG III MAF
DCG	2		3/8/68		[Signature]	SERIAL 060110Z MAR 68 COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3		3/9/68		[Signature]	SUBJECT TOUR DATES COLONELS
C/S	1.		3/7/68		[Signature]	REMARKS
DC/S			3/9/68		[Signature]	V
DC/S DM						<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>"#2 &amp; 3 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			080650		[Signature]	
S/C						

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RUHKM RUCIHOA  
DE RUMSAK 0614 0660110  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 060110Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND  
LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
TOUR DATES COLONELS

**HAS BEEN SENT**

- A. CG FMFPAC 250411Z FEB68
- B. CG FMFPAC 280748Z FEB 68
- C. CMC 221341Z JAN68
- D. CG FMFPAC 222125Z JAN68

1. A REVIEW OF REFERENCE A INDICATES THAT THE SEVERAL OFFICERS LISTED BELOW ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART RVN PRIOR TO NORMAL RTD. AT THE SAME TIME INCOMING RELIEFS ARE NOT ARRIVING IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUITY OF RELIEF.

NAME	ORG	RTD	SLATE	NEW DUTY STATION
STOCKMAN	3RD DIV	12 MAY	FEB	HQMC
CONWAY	9TH MAB	25 JUN	MAY	HQMC
CHAPMAN	3RD DIV	22 JUL	MAY	QUANT

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0614 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

DOERING	HQ III MAF	24 JUL	MAY	NAVAIRPAC
FOSSUM	HQ III MAF	25 JUL	MAY	AF SOUTH
ROBICHAUD	3RD DIV	26 JUN	MAY	MB. GLAKES
SCHICK	3RD DIV	19 JUN	MAY	TAIWAN
SMITH	HQ III MAF	21 JUL	MAY	JCS
WILSON	FMAW	25 JUL	MAY	JTF-2
LEFAIVRE	FMAW	30 AUG	JUN	ICAF STAFF
MICHAUX	3RD DIV	26 JUL	JUN	THAILAND
SHUFORD	1ST DIV	21 JUL	JUN	CNO
TOPE	FMAW	28 SEP	JUN	DJAKARTA
DUNBAR	HQ III MAF	13 AUG	JUL	PHIBPAC
HALL	1ST DIV	21 AUG	JUL	STAFF AFSC
PLATT	HQ III MAF	3 SEP	JUL	ARMY W.C.
REED	FMAW	24 SEP	JUL	MCAS QUANTICO
WOOD	FLC	23 AUG	JUL	HQMC
BROWNING	HQ III MAF	25 SEP	AUG	MEMPHIS
BUTCHER	9TH MAB	22 SEP	AUG	HQMC
CAMPORINI	FMAW	14 SEP	AUG	HQMC

2. IT CAN BE NOTED THAT SEVERAL OF THESE OFFICERS ARE BEING ROTATED THREE MONTHS EARLY AND A SIZEABLE NUMBER TO HQMC.

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0614 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 IT IS MY OPINION THAT WHEREVER HQMC CAN CONTROL INPUTS IN  
 CONUS THAT THE DEPARTING OFFICER THERE SHOULD BE OVERTOURED,  
 IF REQUIRED, AND THAT THE OFFICER IN III MAF SHOULD NOT BE  
 SHORT TOURED.

3. RELIEVING INDIVIDUALS EARLY HAS AN IMMEDIATE EFFECT  
 ON THE FLEXIBILITY OF SPLIT TOUR ASSIGNMENT, CONTINUITY,  
 AND A LONG-RANGE EFFECT ON SECOND OVERSEAS TOUR ASSIGNMENTS.  
 AS AN EXAMPLE, REF B REQ REASSIGNMENT COL BERGE THIS HQTRS  
 TO FMAW WITH A THREE-MONTH EXTENSION TO SEP. INTENT WAS  
 TO RELIEVE HIM BY COL LEFAIVRE, BUT THE LATTER IS BEING  
 SHORT TOURED THREE MONTHS TO JOIN ICAF STAFF, THEREBY MAKING  
 HIS ASSIGNMENT TO III MAF STAFF IMPRACTICAL.

4. THE ABOVE DOES NOT INDICATE RESULTS LTCOL SLATE,  
 INASMUCH AS IT HAS NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED. ONE EXAMPLE,  
 HOWEVER, LTCOL T. HILL RTD 8 JUN WAS DETACHED FROM  
 FORLOGCOMD 1 MAR IN COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS ASSIGNING HIM  
 TO HQMC. THIS OFFICER WAS SERVING IN A MOST CRITICAL  
 POSITION IN DEFENSE OF DANANG COMPLEX, CO 1ST MP BN. FIRST  
 NOTIFICATION OF HIS IMPENDING TRANSFER CONTAINED IN REF C.  
 THE RTD DISCREPANCY WAS QUERIED IN REF D. BY PA FORM DTD

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0614 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 29JAN68, LTCOL HILL REQUESTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT  
 HE BE PERMITTED TO COMPLETE HIS NORMAL TOUR OVERSEAS.  
 NO OFFICIAL ANSWER REC'D TO THIS REQUEST; HENCE, LTCOL  
 HILL DET ON 1 MAR IN ORDER FOR HIM TO COMPLY WITH CMC  
 ORDERS. UNDERSTAND THAT HE WAS TO FILL A NEW BILLET  
 IN ADC/S PROGRAMS SHOP.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.							#1		

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CONTROL SHEET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 050302Z MAR COPY # OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S						<b>REMARKS</b> <b>EXCLUSIVE</b> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT <i># 2 of 3 Burned</i> <i>4 Nov 68</i>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND  
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
C- COMMENTS  
I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 050372Z MAR COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S	1.		3/5	3/6	Q	REMARKS
DC/S						<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			051820		DNV	LEGEND
S/C						A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
						C- COMMENTS
						I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DE RUMSAK 0503 0660302  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 050302Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM  
LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FMFPAC'S 040336Z FEB 68 TO GEN WESTMORELAND CONTAINS CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING NEW COMMAND RELATIONS IN ICTZ AND LOOTING IN HUE. WITH RESPECT TO THE FORMER, I PERSONALLY ASKED DEPCOMUSMACV, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MACV FWD, TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH GEN WESTMORELAND, AND NOT WITNESSING ANY RESULTS, I SENT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL TO GEN WESTMORELAND: QUOTE

251020Z FEB 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. SOME RECENT ARTICLES IN THE PRESS HAVE CONTENTED OR

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0503 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
INFERRED THAT GENERAL ABRAMS HAS BEEN SENT TO ICTZ BECAUSE OF MARINE INCOMPETENCE. WHEN QUERIED I HAVE REPLIED THAT THE MOVE WAS TO PROVIDE GENERAL WESTMORELAND WITH A FORWARD COMMAND POST NEAR THE SCENE OF CRITICAL COMBAT, THAT IT INTERFERED WITH MY OPERATIONS NO MORE THAN GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S PRESENCE IN SAIGON INTERFERED WITH II FFV OPERATIONS, AND THAT IT WAS SOUND MILITARY PRACTICE.

2. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD MAKE SOME STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE STIGMA THEY PRESENTLY SEEK TO ATTACH TO THE STORY.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

HIS RESPONSE IS CONTAINED IN GEN WESTMORELAND 260936Z FEB 68 AND IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

260936Z FEB 68

FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV  
TO LTGEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAF  
CONFIDENTIAL MAC 02707 EYES ONLY.

1. FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER PRESS STORIES WHICH INFER

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES  
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#A-6

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0503 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
MARINE INCOMPETANCE AS RESULT OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MACV FORWARD,  
ALTHOUGH I PERSONALLY HAVE NOT YET SEEN ANY SUCH STORIES.

2. THERE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE BACKGROUNDING HERE WITH THE VARIOUS  
NEWS BUREAU CHIEFS TO POINT OUT THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MACV  
FORWARD CARRIED NO STIGMA WHATSOEVER WITH RESPECT TO THE MARINES,  
THAT IT WAS MERELY A NORMAL MILITARY PRACTICE OF ESTABLISHING  
A FORWARD HEADQUARTERS NEAR THE SCENE OF IMPENDING CRITICAL  
COMBAT, AND THAT IT WAS ONLY TEMPORARY.

3. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH GENERAL SIDLE AND WE AGREE  
THAT A STATEMENT BY ME TO THE PRESS AT THIS TIME WOULD APPEAR  
TO BE DEFENSIVE AND WOULD SERVE PRIMARILY TO HIGHLIGHT THE  
MATTER. MOREOVER, THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL ROSSON IN THE NEAR  
FUTURE AND THE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH RESULT SHOULD CLEARLY  
PUT THE MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE SIT  
TIGHT AND LET THE SITUATION CLARIFY ITSELF. BEST REGARDS.

UNQUOTE

2. WITH REGARD TO THE LOOTING, I'VE FORWARDED THE FOLLOWING MSG  
TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND: QUOTE

P 281216Z FEB 68  
FM CG III MAF

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0503 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND  
FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

SUBJ: ALLEGED USMC LOOTING IN HUE

1. MGEN ROBERTSON, BGEN LAHUE, AND I SHARE YOUR CONCERN  
OVER REPORTS OF USMC LOOTING IN HUE. INVESTIGATION HAS  
BEEN DIRECTED WITH RESPECT TO EVERY REPORTED INCIDENT. THIS,  
HOWEVER, IS SECONDARY TO OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT LOOTING BY  
TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE COMMAND CONTROL.

2. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE BULLINGTON MATTER, THE  
LETTER OF MR. BULLINGTON TO MR. KOREN CONTAINING INFORMATION  
CONTAINING SUBSTANTIALLY THAT REPORTED TO AMBASSADOR  
BUNKER, WAS FORWARDED TO BGEN LAHUE FOR APPROPRIATE  
ACTION. THE MATTER WAS FURTHER DISCUSSED WITH BGEN LAHUE  
BY TELEPHONE. ON 25 FEBRUARY AN OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A  
JUDGE ADVOCATE IN THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION LEGAL OFFICE  
WAS ASSIGNED AS INVESTIGATION OFFICER INTO EACH ALLEGATION  
CONTAINED IN THE LETTER. THE INVESTIGATION IS NOT YET  
COMPLETE.

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#A-6

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**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0503 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
3. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY WELL BE A NUMBER OF CONFIRMED  
INSTANCES OF LOOTING, I AM CONVINCED THAT MILITARY LOOTING  
WAS NOT RAMPANT AS OCCASIONALLY ALLEGED. THE COM-  
MANDEERING OF VEHICLES TO CARRY THE WOUNDED WAS CALLED  
LOOTING IN ONE INSTANCE. THE FOLLOWING REPORT FROM BBEN  
LAHUE MAY HAVE FURNISHED THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR BARRY  
ZORTHIAN'S REPORT OF HAVING SEEN AN AMERICAN WITH A  
PICTURE UNDER HIS ARM:

"ON 21 FEB 68 LTCOL ARCHIE VAN WINKLE, COMMANDED A  
ROUGH RIDER CONVOY FROM PHU BAI TO HUE AND RETURN. DURING  
UNLOADING AT THE HUE CITY STADIUM IN THE LATE AFTERNOON  
VAN WINKLE STOPPED A U.S. INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS CARRYING  
A PAINTING UNDER HIS ARM. THE PAINTING WAS AN OIL PAINTING  
APPROXIMATELY 2 1/2 FEET BY 4 FEET AND WAS OF A REDDISH TINT.  
THE EXACT SUBJECT WAS NOT VIEWED. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ASKED  
WHERE HE GOT THE PAINTING AND STATED THAT HE WAS A USA  
SOLDIER THAT HE AND FIVE OR SIX OTHERS WERE STATIONED IN  
HUE AND HAD BEEN LIVING IN A HOUSE IN THE CITY. THEY HAD  
BEEN TRAPPED WHEN THE NVA ATTACKED AND HAD ONLY ON 20  
FEB BEEN ABLE TO GET BACK TO THEIR HOUSE WHICH HAD BEEN

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0503 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
DESTROYED. THEY WERE BEING SENT BACK TO SAIGON AND WERE  
TAKING THEIR PERSONAL BELONGINGS WITH THEM. THE  
PAINTING HAD BEEN BOUGHT BY THE SOLDIER AND WAS PART OF  
HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY WHICH HE WAS TAKING TO SAIGON WITH  
HIM. THE OTHER THREE SOLDIERS WITH HIM ATTESTED TO HIS  
STORY. HE AND THE OTHER THREE PERSONNEL RETURNED TO PHU  
BAI WITH VAN WINKLE'S CONVOY WHERE THEY OBTAINED TRANS-  
PORTATION TO SAIGON. NAMES OF SOLDIERS ARE NOT KNOWN. HUE  
CITY STADIUM HAS BEEN USED BY 1ST MARINES AS LSA AND  
IS FREQUENTED BY MANY OF THE PRESS WHO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION  
FROM THIS AREA. ALTHOUGH IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED THAT THE  
PHOTO REFERRED TO BY ZORTHIAN IS THE SAME INCIDENT  
DESCRIBED BY VAN WINKLE IT IS POSSIBLE."

4. THIS MATER WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE COMMAND  
ATTENTION AT ALL LEVELS.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

IN ADDITION, GEN ABRAMS SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: QUOTE  
O 020330Z

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#A-6

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMSAK 0504 0660302  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 050302Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUCIHOA/CMC  
 RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTIONS  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LIGEN KRULAK FROM  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV  
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV  
 INFO LIG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 BG LA HUE CG TASK FORCE X-RAY

CONFIDENTIAL PHB 202 EYES ONLY

REF A. MACV 02693, DTG 260607Z FEB 68.  
 B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 281216Z FEB 68.

1. I HAVE HAD MY SJA LOOK INTO THE ALLEGED LOOTING IN HUE AND THE  
 MATTER OF THE ALLEGED AP PHOTO OF INDIVIDUAL WITH PAINTING UNDER ARM.  
 THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS FINDINGS IS IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

2. THROUGH MACOI A CHECK WAS MADE WITH AP BUREAU CHIEF, ROBERT  
 TUKMAN, AND AP PHOTO CHIEF, HORST FAAS, ON 27 FEB. NEITHER HAVE KNOWN

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0504 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 LEDGE OF PICTURE DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE A. THEY STATE ONLY KNOWN  
 SIMILAR PICTURE WAS TAKEN PRIOR TO TET, SOUTH OF DA NANG, OF A 1ST AIR  
 CAV SOLDIER CARRYING A RELIGIOUS PICTURE OF MOTHER MARY. ON 28 FEB A  
 CHECK WAS MADE WITH JOHN LENGEL, WHO WAS AP HEAD IN HUE UNTIL 26 FEB.  
 HE KNOWS OF NO PICTURE AS DESCRIBED. ON 27 AND 28 FEB, ROBERT D. OHMAN,  
 NEW AP HEAD IN HUE, MADE DISCREET INQUIRY AMONG PRESS CORPS IN HUE RE-  
 GARDING THE PICTURE. ALL WHO WERE CONTACTED DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH  
 A PICTURE.

3. THE MATTER OF THE US SOLDIER AT THE HUE STADIUM, RELATED BY LTC  
 VAN WINKLE AND SET OUT FULLY IN REFERENCE B, WAS INVESTIGATED AS A  
 POSSIBLE SOURCE OF THE ALLEGED PHOTOGRAPH. IDENTIFICATION ATTEMPTS  
 WERE FRUITLESS, AND NO INFORMATION WAS FOUND REGARDING A POSSIBLE  
 PHOTOGRAPH OF THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED.

4. ON 28 FEB COLONEL KHOA, THUA THIEN PROVINCE CHIEF, STATED THAT  
 THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL COMPLAINT OF LOOTING BY US PERSONNEL IN HUE.

5. FROM INTERVIEW WITH COMMANDERS, NEWSMEN, AND CORDS PERSONNEL,  
 IT APPEARS THAT PROBABLY SOME SMALL ARTICLES WERE LOOTED BY THE MARINES  
 DESPITE EFFORTS BY COMMANDERS; HOWEVER, THESE REPORTED INCIDENTS WERE  
 IN EXTREME CONTRAST TO EXTENSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC LOOTING BY ARVN TROOPS  
 AND CIVILIANS. AT THIS TIME, INVESTIGATION HAS FAILED TO PRODUCE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#A-6

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0504 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO BASE PROSECUTION FOR ANY INSTANCE OF LOOTING BY US PERSONNEL. ALLEGATIONS MADE BY CORDS REPRESENTATIVE OF MARINE LOOTING ARE CURRENTLY BEING INVESTIGATED BY CAPTAIN B. A. ALLEN, USMC, AN ATTORNEY FROM THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION LEGAL OFFICE, WHO WAS APPOINTED INVESTIGATING OFFICER AT THE REQUEST OF CG, TASK FORCE X-RAY. HIS INVESTIGATION BEGAN 25 FEBRUARY AND IS STILL IN PROGRESS. CAPTAIN ALLEN STATES THAT PHOTOS, AS YET UNDEVELOPED, WERE TAKEN OF ARVN LOOTING OF LARGE ITEMS, UTILIZING TRUCKS, CAPTAIN ALLEN IS CONDUCTING HIS INVESTIGATION IN COORDINATION WITH THE SJA, MACV FORWARD.

6. COL STANLEY HUGHES, CO, 1ST MARINES, TOOK POSITIVE MEASURES TO DETER LOOTING AS EARLY AS 4 FEB. THROUGH BATTALION COS, OFFICERS, AND NCOS, WORD WAS PASSED THAT LOOTING AND PILLAGE WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. PERIODIC SHAKEDOWNS WERE HELD. ALL MOVES WERE ON FOOT WHICH DISCOURAGES LOOTING. SOME ITEMS WERE REMOVED FROM DAMAGED BUILDINGS FOR SAFE KEEPING AND SENT TO THE 1ST MARINE CP. INCLUDED WERE SOME MICROSCOPES FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF HUE AND AN AKAI TAPE RECORDER FROM A CORDS BUILDING. THESE ITEMS WERE RETURNED TO THE PROPER OWNERS. IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT A SAND BAG FULL OF PIASERS AND SOME ITEMS OF JEWELRY WERE TURNED INTO THE REGIMENTAL CP BY CO, 2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES, AND ARE BEING HELD PENDING DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP.

HAS BEEN SENT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0504 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FOLLOWING COMPLAINTS BY COORDS, ALL CORDS AREAS WERE PLACED OFF LIMITS TO MARINES BY ORDER DATED 12 FEB 68. AREAS WERE DEFINED BY ADDRESS, GRID COORDINATES AND BY OVERLAY.

7. COMPLAINTS WERE MADE BY CORDS OF THE COMMANDEERING OF VEHICLES AND CANNIBALIZATION OF VEHICLES BY MARINES. CO, 1ST MARINES, AUTHORIZED COMMANDEERING OF VEHICLES AS IT BECAME NECESSARY TO TRANSPORT CASUALTIES. IN VIEW OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND LACK OF MARINE VEHICLES AT THE TIME, THIS ACTION APPEARS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF MILITARY NECESSITY. CAPTAIN ALLEN IS INVESTIGATING THESE COMPLAINTS FURTHER.

8. AN UNIDENTIFIED SWISS CORRESPONDENT MADE A COMPLAINT THAT MARINES WERE SHOOTING DOGS, CATS, AND PIGS. THIS IS TRUE. CO, 1ST MARINES ORDERED THIS BECAUSE THESE ANIMALS WERE EATING BODIES, BOTH US AND VN. THESE WERE BODIES WHICH COULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY RETRIEVED BECAUSE OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

9. ALL MARINE BATTALION AND COMPANY COMMANDERS WHO WERE INTERVIEWED REPORTED THAT ARVN AND CIVILIANS ENGAGED IN LOOTING FOLLOWED ON THE HEELS OF THEIR UNITS AS THE CITY WAS TAKEN. MANY INSTANCES WERE CITED WHERE RESIDENTS AND THEIR CONTENTS WERE INITIALLY FOUND FAIRLY INTACT BUT WERE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN RANSACKED AND LOOTED WHEN MARINE UNITS RETURNED TWO AND THREE DAYS LATER. CO, 2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES CITED THE FACULTY HOUSING AREA OF HUE UNIVERSITY AND A CORDS HOUSE AS EXAMPLES

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#A-6

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0504 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO OF THIS. MARINES DID USE BLANKETS AND BEDDING AND DID BREAK WINDOWS IN UNIVERSITY HOUSING TO AVOID FRAGMENTATION FROM INCOMING ROUNDS.

10. MARINE COMMANDERS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN REASONABLE MEASURES TO PREVENT LOOTING AND NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION. EACH ALLEGATION IS BEING INVESTIGATED AND, IF SUBSTANTIATED, EXPEDITIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTION HAS BEEN ASSURED.

UNQUOTE

3. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#A-6

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
						SERIAL 730816Z MAR COPY # / OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT COVER AND DECEPTION EQUIPMENT
DCG AIR						REMARKS THIS IS A KIRMISS MSG
C/S						<p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><b>NO FORM</b></p> <p>#243 Signed 406168</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 030816Z MAR COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT COVER AND DECEPTION EQUIPMENT
C/S	1.		3/4/68		J	REMARKS THIS IS A KIRMISS MSG  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>  <b>NO FORN</b>
DC/S			3/4/68		DM	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			032100	3/4	DMW	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**



**SECRET / NOFORN**

PP RUMSAW  
 DE RUMSAK 0294 0630816  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 RUMSAW ZXY-1  
 P 030816Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSAW/CG USARV  
 INFO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV  
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE KIRMISS NOFORN  
 ACCESS TO KIRMISS INFORMATION REQUIRED  
 MACV FOR J3

SUBJ: COVER AND DECEPTION EQUIPMENT:  
 A. CG USARV 120925Z FEB68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQ CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED C & D EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS  
 BE PROVIDED NLT 1 MAR 68. FOLLOWING TYPES AND QUANTITIES REQUIRED  
 BY III MAF BEING REQ THROUGH USMC CHANNELS:

- A. SIMULATOR, GUN FIRE, 30 CAL (FSN 1080-650-0199), 500 EACH.
- B. SIMULATOR, TANK GUNFIRE, M4A1 (FSN 1730-028-6005-1-366),  
75 EACH.
- C. SIMULATOR, PROJECTOR, AIRBURST (FSN 1730-028-6005-1-366),  
320 EACH.
- D. SIMULATOR, SMALL ARMS FIRE, FLASH, NOISE (FSN 6920-649-9282)

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0294 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE KIRMISS NOFORN  
 150 EACH.

E. SIMULATOR, DECOY PARATROOPER, REUSABLE (FSN 1080-650-0201),  
 50 EACH.

F. VISUAL SIMULATORS:

- (1) 105MM HOWITZER TOWED, 40 EACH.
- (2) 155MM HOWITZER TOWED, 10 EACH.
- (3) 155MM HOWITZER SELF-PROPELLED, 20 EACH.
- (4) 8 INCH SELF-PROPELLED, 10 EACH.
- (5) 2 1/2 TON TRUCK, 20 EACH.

G. EXPENDABLE DECOY LANDING LIGHTS, 10 EACH.

H. HELICOPTER LOAD CAMOUFLAGE, 20 EACH.

2. REF A FURTHER REQ OPTIMUM DIMENSIONS, BEST CONFIGURATION AND  
 MAX WEIGHT FOR THE HELICOPTER LOAD CAMOUFLAGE KIT (ITEM I. H ABOVE)  
 AND WHETHER LIGHT SET MARKER EMERGENCY; AIRFIELD RUNWAY, PORTABLE,  
 BATTERY OPERATED, FSN 6230-542-6680, UNIT COST \$230.00, WOULD  
 SATISFY IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT FOR EXPENDABLE DECOY LANDING LIGHT  
 (ITEM I. G ABOVE). LOAD CAMOUFLAGE SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT  
 RIGIDITY COUPLED WITH PROPER AERODYNAMIC SHAPE TO PREVENT  
 DISCLOSURE OF LOAD SHAPE. CONFIGURATION SHOULD BE ADJUSTABLE  
 DEPENDENT UPON LOAD SIZE AND SHAPE. WEIGHT DESIRED IS MINIMUM

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0294 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE KIRMISS NOFORN  
 POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY LESS THAN 200 POUNDS. LIGHT SET MARKER  
 EMERGENCY; AIRFIELD RUNWAY, WOULD PROVIDE SATISFACTORY INTERIM  
 SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPENDABLE DECOY LANDING LIGHTS.

3. REQUIREMENTS LISTED PARAGRAPH 1 ARE INITIAL EVALUATION  
 QUANTITIES PLANNED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN COORDINATION WITH USARV.

GP-1

BT

III MAF 2100-3 (9-66)

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CG	2		3/2/68		10	CG 111 MAF
DCG	3		3/2/68		MA	SERIAL 0104327 MAR COPY # 7 OF 8 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S	1.		3/1/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S			3/2/68		MA	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p># 263 Burned 4 Nov 68</p> <p>LEGEND                      A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE                      C - COMMENTS                      I - INFORMATION</p> <p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b></p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			012005		JFW	
S/C						

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		CG III MAF	
		SERIAL	COPY#
		010432Z MAR	1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
		SUBJECT	
		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
3/1/68	DHW		
3/1/68	C/S [unclear]		
3/2/68	[unclear]		
3/2	DCG [unclear]		
3/2/68	Dh [unclear]		
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P 010432Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF

TO COMNAVFORV

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM VETH  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR NELSONIAN VICTORY. THE ENEMY  
HAS MET HIS TRAFALGAR. AND ALL OF US ON TERRA FIRMA  
ARE GREATFUL TO YOU AND YOUR FORCES FOR PREVENTING A  
QUANTUM RESUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMO TO THE HOSTILE  
FORCES. THERE WILL BE THAT MANY FEWER CASUALTIES  
AMONG US BECAUSE OF THIS INITIATIVE AND UNRELENTING  
ATTACK. WELL DONE! WARM REGARDS. LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#A-2



P 010414Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO MACV(FWD)  
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(FROM BGEN ANDERSON TO MGEN PEARSON)

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED PER OUR PHONE CALL.

P 281216Z FEB 68

FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND  
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

SUBJ: ALLEGED USMC LOOTING IN HUE

1. MGEN ROBERTSON, BGEN LAHUE, AND I SHARE YOUR CONCERN  
OVER REPORTS OF USMC LOOTING IN HUE. INVESTIGATION HAS  
BEEN DIRECTED WITH RESPECT TO EVERY REPORTED INCIDENT. THIS,  
HOWEVER, IS SECONDARY TO OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT LOOTING BY  
TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE COMMAND CONTROL.

2. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE BULLINGTON MATTER, THE  
LETTER OF MR. BULLINGTON TO MR. KOREN CONTAINING INFORMATION  
CONTAINING SUBSTANTIALLY THAT REPORTED TO AMBASSADOR  
BUNKER., WAS FORWARDED TO BGEN LAHUE FOR APPROPRIATE  
ACTION. THE MATTER WAS FURTHER DISCUSSED WITH BGEN LAHUE  
BY TELEPHONE. ON 25 FEBRUARY AN OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A  
JUDGE ADVOCATE IN THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION LEGAL OFFICE  
WAS ASSIGNED AS INVESTIGATION OFFICER INTO EACH ALLEGATION  
CONTAINED IN THE LETTER. THE INVESTIGATION IS NOT YET  
COMPLETE.

3. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY WELL BE A NUMBER OF CONFIRMED  
INSTANCES OF LOOTING, I AM CONVINCED THAT MILITARY LOOTING  
WAS NOT RAMPANT AS OCCASIONALLY ALLEGED. THE COM-  
MANDEERING OF VEHICLES TO CARRY THE WOUNDED WAS CALLED  
LOOTING IN ONE INSTANCE. THE FOLLOWING REPORT FROM BGEN  
LAHUE MAY HAVE FURNISHED THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR BARRY  
ZORTHIAN'S REPORT OF HAVING SEEN AN AMERICAN WITH A  
PICTURE UNDER HIS ARM:

#A-1 (1)

"ON 21 FEB 68 LTCOL ARCHIE VAN WINKLE, COMMANDED A ROUGH RIDER CONVOY FROM PHU BAI TO HUE AND RETURN. DURING UNLOADING AT THE HUE CITY STADIUM IN THE LATE AFTERNOON VAN WINKLE STOPPED A U.S. INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS CARRYING A PAINTING UNDER HIS ARM. THE PAINTING WAS AN OIL PAINTING APPROXIMATELY 2 1-2 FEET BY 4 FEET AND WAS OF A REDDISH TINT. THE EXACT SUBJECT WAS NOT VIEWED. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ASKED WHERE HE GOT THE PAINTING AND STATED THAT HE WAS A USA SOLDIER THAT HE AND FIVE OR SIX OTHERS WERE STATIONED IN HUE AND HAD BEEN LIVING IN A HOUSE IN THE CITY. THEY HAD BEEN TRAPPED WHEN THE NVA ATTACKED AND HAD ONLY ON 20 FEB BEEN ABLE TO GET BACK TO THEIR HOUSE WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED. THEY WERE BEING SENT BACK TO SAIGON AND WERE TAKING THEIR PERSONAL BELONGINGS WITH THEM. THE PAINTING HAD BEEN BOUGHT BY THE SOLDIER AND WAS PART OF HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY WHICH HE WAS TAKING TO SAIGON WITH HIM. THE OTHER THREE SOLDIERS WITH HIM ATTESTED TO HIS STORY. HE AND THE OTHER THREE PERSONNEL RETURNED TO PHU BAI WITH VAN WINKLE'S CONVOY WHERE THEY OBTAINED TRANSPORTATION TO SAIGON. NAMES OF SOLDIERS ARE NOT KNOWN. HUE CITY STADIUM HAS BEEN USED BY 1ST MARINES AS LSA AND IS FREQUENTED BY MANY OF THE PRESS WHO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION FROM THIS AREA. ALTHOUGH IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED THAT THE PHOTO REFERRED TO BE ZORTHIAN IS THE SAME INCIDENT DESCRIBED BY VAN WINKLE IT IS POSSIBLE".

4. THIS MATTER WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE COMMAND ATTENTION AT ALL LEVELS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

66Z

**HAS BEEN SENT**

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#A-1 (2)

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		SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
3/1/68	D. H. Wagoner		
3/1/68	CIS has been OK		
3/1/68	D. H. Wagoner		
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

DE RUMMWA 0017 0610308  
ZNY CCCCC  
FMFPAC -T- CMC  
P 010308Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUCINOA/CMC  
RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND  
LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM GEN WESTMORELAND:  
QUOTE

P 290417Z FEB 68 ZFF-6  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO UUMSEA/CG III MAF DA NANG  
INFO UUMSEM/DEPCOMUSMACV FWD  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 05971 FROM MACJ322  
SUBJ: AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)  
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR LTG CUSHMAN, INFO GEN  
ABRAMS

1. (C) PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK IN OUR COUNTERINSUR-  
GENCY EFFORT IN SVN IS LOCATING THE ENEMY AND REACTING IMMEDIATELY

PAGE TWO RUMMWA 0017 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCEO  
ONCE WE HAVE FOUND HIM. I REALIZE FULLY THAT THE TWO MARINE RE-  
CONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS HAVE ACHIEVED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN THIS  
AREA, PARTICULARLY IN THEIR STINGRAY OPERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME  
I FEEL THAT THE PROVEN CAPABILITY OF THESE UNITS SHOULD BE MORE  
FULLY EXPLOITED THROUGH EMPLOYMENT IN THE TYPE RECONNAISSANCE AND  
REACTION OPERATIONS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY ARMY AIR CAVALRY SQUADRONS.

2. (U) THE ARMY AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON HAS THREE AIR CAVALRY  
TROOPS, EACH OF WHICH HAS ORGANIC AIRCRAFT AND IS CAPABLE OF ACCOM-  
PLISHING THE FOLLOWING TASKS:

- A. CONDUCT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OVER A WIDE AREA (10 LON  
AIRCRAFT).
- B. MOUNT AN IMMEDIATE AERIAL ATTACK ON DEVELOPED TARGETS  
(10 UH-1B/C GUNSHIPS).
- C. EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER BY LIFTING A RIFLE  
PLATOON INTO THE AREA TO FIX THE ENEMY OR TO CONDUCT POST-STRIKE  
GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AS APPROPRIATE.

3. (C) BECAUSE OF THE EXPANDED ENEMY THREAT AND THE DISSECTED  
NATURE OF TERRAIN IN YOUR AREA, I ASK THAT YOU INVESTIGATE ON A  
PRIORITY BASIS THE FEASIBILITY OF ORGANIZING A MARINE CORPS FORCE  
IN I CTZ WITH A CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF ONE ARMY AIR

PAGE \_\_\_ OF \_\_\_ PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#50

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PAGE THREE RUMWAA 0017 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
CAVALRY SQUADRON. AS YOU KNOW, UNITS OF THIS TYPE ARE DEPLOYED IN  
I. CTZ WITH THE 1ST CAV AND AMERICAL DIVISIONS. THESE UNITS CAN  
PROVIDE YOUR STAFF WITH INFORMATION NEEDED TO MAKE A DETAILED  
ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND EQUIPAGE OF THE UNIT.  
4. (7) FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMEN-  
DATIONS, I INTEND TO ADDRESS THE REQUIREMENT THROUGH APPROPRIATE  
CHANNELS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS:

GP-4

BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

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CG						CG III MAF SERIAL 0102447 MAR COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		3/1/68		<i>JK</i>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>JK</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>"3-4 turned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			3/1/68		<i>JK</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			012005		<i>JKW</i>	
S/C						

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		SERIAL M10244Z MAR	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
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		DATE	SIGNATURE
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3/1/68	G/S [unclear] [unclear]		
3/1/68	DHW		
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	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

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**UR**

DE RUMWAA 0015 0610244  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 010244Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DANANG  
 TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

**HAS BEEN SENT**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L** FOR MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR ACTION. THIS SHOULD BE  
 A COORDINATED III MAF/IST MAW EFFORT WITH III MAF MSG RESPONSE  
 TO COMUSMACV.

P 290417Z FEB 68 ZFF-6  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO UUMSEA/CG III MAF DA NANG  
 INFO UUMSEM/DEPCOMUSMACV FWD  
 BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L** 05971 FROM MACJ322  
 SUBJ: AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR LTG CUSHMAN, INFO GEN  
 ABRAMS

1. (C) PERKAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK IN OUR COUNTERINSUR-  
 GENCY EFFORT IN SVN IS LOCATING THE ENEMY AND REACTING IMMEDIATELY  
 ONCE WE HAVE FOUND HIM. I REALIZE FULLY THAT THE TWO MARINE RE-

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0015 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
 CONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS HAVE ACHIEVED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN THIS  
 AREA, PARTICULARLY IN THEIR STINGRAY OPERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME  
 I FEEL THAT THE PROVEN CAPABILITY OF THESE UNITS SHOULD BE MORE  
 FULLY EXPLOITED THROUGH EMPLOYMENT IN THE TYPE RECONNAISSANCE AND  
 REACTION OPERATIONS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY ARMY AIR CAVALRY SQUADRONS.

2. (U) THE ARMY AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON HAS THREE AIR CAVALRY  
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A. CONDUCT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OVER A WIDE AREA (10 LOH  
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B. MOUNT AN IMMEDIATE AERIAL ATTACK ON DEVELOPED TARGETS  
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C. EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER BY LIFTING A RIFLE  
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3. (C) BECAUSE OF THE EXPANDED ENEMY THREAT AND THE DISSECTED  
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#49	

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PAGE THREE RUMWAA 0015 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 I CTZ WITH THE 1ST CAV AND AMERICAL DIVISIONS. THESE UNITS CAN  
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 4. (7) FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMEN-  
 DATIONS, I INTEND TO ADDRESS THE REQUIREMENT THROUGH APPROPRIATE  
 CHANNELS.  
 GP-4  
 BT

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#49	