

~~167. CG FMAN 260711Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~168. CG FMAN 270725Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~169. CG FMAN 280755Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~170. CG FMAN 290745Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~171. CG FMAN 300320Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

172. COMUSMACV 300330Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Sets discussion of Single Management System at
COMUSMACV Hqtrs at 081000H MAY68 (S)

173. CG III MAF 281250Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Air Control Procedures Khe Sanh

174. COMUSMACV 291150Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: III MAF Target Nominations

~~113. CG FMAW 160601Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

114. COMUSMACV 160954Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Medium Lift Helicopters (U)

~~115. CG FMAW 171130Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: ROUTINE INPUT~~

117. 366 CMBTSPTGRP DNG 160920Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: I DASC Move to III MAF

118. CG THIRD MARDIV 170543Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Khe Sanh Air Support -- Requests package of air Support of 24 CSS Sorties

~~119. CG FMAW 180555Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input to CMC, FMFPAC~~

150. ADMINO FMFPAC 190104Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Nite Panther

~~151. CG FMAW 191200Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine input to CMC, FMFPAC~~

~~152. CG FMAW 200800Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine input to CMC, FMFPAC~~

153. 7AF TSN AB RVN 201001Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Recommends that evaluation of first thirty days of system operation be made on perod 0800H 1Apr to 0800H 1May--furnished MACV NLT 10May68 ✓

~~154. CG FMAW 211220Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine input to CMC, FMFPAC~~

132. CG PCV 100602Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Review of Procedures for Obtaining Pre-Strike Intelligence and Post Strike BDA

~~133. CG FMAW 110745Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~134. CG FMAW 120525Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

135. CG III MAF 111202Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Dye Marker Reporting -- Report to COMUSMACV NO. of SORTIES

136. 7AF TACC TSN RVN 121040Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: Sortie Rate for Fixed-Wing Fighter Aircraft

137. CG FMAW 130355Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Working Group for Rebuttal of Single Management to CINCPAC or higher

~~138. CG FMAW 130635Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~139. CG FMAW 140720Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

140. CG FMFPAC 142157Z APR68 (TS MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Replies to CG FMAW plans for Working Group -- Offers additional suggestions

141. 7AF TACC TSN RVN 140530Z APR68 (C) *group-4*

Subj: Request for Air Support --- Requests to MACV TASE

~~142. CG FMAW 150600Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: ROUTINE INPUT~~

120. 7AF TACC TSN RVN 050545Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 Subj: Combat Skyspot Back-up (U)
- ~~121. CG FMAW 070615Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input to CMC & CG FMEPAC~~
122. CG FMAW 080130Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-3*
 Subj: Status of Single Management as of 7 April 1968
123. 7AF TACC TSN AB RVN 060505Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: 7TH AIR FORCE INTERDICTION of Enemy LOGS in SVN
124. 7AF TACC TSN RVN 070400Z APR68 (C) *gp - not shown*
 Subj: Scramble of Marine Corps Aircraft off Hot Pad by I DASC
125. 7AF TSN AB RVN 080015Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Control and Coordination of Air and Artillery
- ~~126. CG FMAW 080980Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
- ~~127. CG FMAW 090645Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
128. CMC 091623Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 Subj: Requests of document that restricts Ground Commander requesting only certain of desired air targets ✓
129. CG FMAW 100010Z APR68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
 Subj: Further thoughts on Single Management ✓
- ~~130. CG FMAW 100012Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
131. CG III MAF 101336Z APR68 (C MCEO) *group-4*
 Passes "Preplanned Request for Close Air Support" msg to KRULAK & MCCUTCHEON

110. I DASC DNG 010245Z Apr68 (C) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Commdr 7AF request for complete Summary of Air Strike
111. CG III MAF 021608Z Apr68 (S) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Single Management of Strike and Recon Assets,
 Summary of situation as of 31Mar68
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR WESTMORELAND FROM CUSHMAN
112. CG FMAW 030300Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Revision of Reporting Format
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE ANDERSON to CHAPMAN, KRULAK, CUSHMAN,
 ROBERTSON, TOMPKINS
113. 7AF TSN AB RVN 030905Z APR68 (S) *gp - 4*
 Subj: A6A Support of Khe Sanh
114. NMCC 300039Z MAR68 (TS) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Requests input on Sorties
115. NMCC 302145 MAR68 (TS) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Requests additional input on Sorties
116. ADMINO CINCPAC 301942Z MAR68 (TS) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Passes NMCC's request for input
 (Note: Also under this tab is FMFPAC's PASEP OF SAME MSG.)
117. GEN WESTMORELAND 050339Z APR68 (S) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Answers Gen CUSHMAN's Disposition of Air Control
 Msg: CG III MAF 021608Z APR68 (S)
118. CG FMAW 050750Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp - 4*
 Subj: Input in reply to FMFPAC's requests
119. CG FMAW 060550Z APR68 (S MCEO) *group 4*
 Subj: Routine input for CG FMFPAC & CMC

155. CG FMAW 220245Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 Subj: Quotes Script for Presentation on Air Control
- ~~156. CG FMAW 220905Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
157. CG III MAF 221340Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Exclusive to Westmoreland, info CINCPAC, recording dissatisfaction with new system, after 30 days. ✓
158. CG 1ST AIR CAV 041310Z MAR68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Requests rescinding of request for use of AirCav helos for Delta Forces
- ~~159. CG 1ST MAW 230827Z APR68 (S)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
160. COMUSMACV 240045Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Khe Sanh Air Support
161. CG FMAW 240710Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF
 ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL
162. COMUSMACV 241216Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN info SHARP
 REPLIES TO OUR 30-day Disposition of Single Manager System message ✓
163. CG III MAF 250330Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 Subj: CUSHMAN to CHAPMAN & KRULAK passing COMUSMACV's response to our 30-day disposition msg
- ~~164. CG FMAW 250543Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
165. 7AF 251015Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Naval Air Support in ICTZ
166. 7AF 260030Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Air Interdiction Campaign

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUMUHFA4904 1201445-CCCC--RUMMWAA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 291150Z APR 68

FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 12158 ATTN: G2

SUBJ: III MAF TARGET NOMINATIONS. (U)

REF: A. MACV 11278/220116Z APR

B. III MAF 230516Z APR 68

1. (U) REF A REQUESTED INFORMATION REGARDING RECON TRAGETS ALLCOA-
TED TO III MAF. REF B REGEUESTED CLARIFICATION OF ORAL INSTRUCTIONS
REGARDING TRAGET NOMINATIONS.

2. (C) THE FLOOLWOING IS PROVIDED FOR CLARIFICATION:

A. THE TARGET NOMINATION SYSTEM DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE TO
THE MONTHLY IN-COUNTRY RECCE PLAN. ANH OUTSTANDING IN-COUNTRY RECON-
NAISSANCE TARGET MAY BE NOMINATED. TARGET MOMINATIONS MAY INCLUDE
THSOE FROM TTHR RECCE PLAN AS WELL AS TAGETS SUBMITTED TO THE TASE
ON AN INNEDIATE BASIS, REGARDLESS OF ANY PREVIOUSLY STATED PRIORTIY.B. NOMINATIONS FOR PHOTO TARGETS SHOULD BE CALLED IN TO THE TASE
AS EARLY AS POSSILBE EACH DAY, BUT NLT 1900 HRS. NOMINATIONS FOR R
TARGETS SHOULD BE CALLED IN EACH DAY NLT 1400 HRS.

PAGE 3 RUMUHFA 4904 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. (C) THE NUMBER OF TARGETS ALLOCATIED CAN BE EXPECTED TO CHAGNE
FROM TIME TO TIME DEPENDING ON SITUATION, TARGET INVENTROY AND
FORCE STRUCTIRE. THE CURRECTN ALLOCATION OFR III MAF REMAINS AT
FIVE PHOTO TRGETS PER DAY, AND ONE NIGHT IR TARGET PER NIGHT.

GP-4

BT

*air control***CONFIDENTIAL**

#174

SECRET

00 RUMHVH RUMSBJ
DE RUMWAA3544 1191250
ZNY SSSSS

O 281250Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF DNG
TO RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN
RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHB
INFO RUMHVH/CG I CORPS DNG
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF DNG
RUMHVP/TASK FORCE HOTEL
RUMHVH/I CORPS ADV GRP DNG
RUMHVH/I DASC
RUMHVP/DASC V
ZEN/CANDC DET DANANG
BT

HAS BEEN SENT
ORIG G-3
REL G-3

S E C R E T

ATTN: G-3 AIR

(AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES KHE SANH)
REF A: CG THIRD MARDIV 260240Z APR 68
B: CG III MAF 240610Z APR 68
C: CG PROV CORPS V 280550Z APR 68

1. REF A STATES THAT DUE TO EXTENSIVE GROUND RECON ACTY IN SCOTLAND
PAGE TWO RUMWAA3544 S E C R E T

II AO CLOSER COORDINATION OF AIR SUPPORT IS REQUIRED AND REQUESTS
MODIFICATION OF THE AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED THROUGH REF B.
REF C CONCURS WITH REF A AND REQUESTS ACTION BY THIS HQ.

2. IAW WITH REF A AND C THE CONTROL ZONES AND PROCEDURES RE REF B ARE
CANCELLED AND THE FOLLOWING CONTROL ZONES AND PROCEDURES ARE
ESTABLISHED:

A. ZONE "A" - FR XD6655 EAST TO XD8555 SOUTH TO XD8548, EAST TO XD
9048, SOUTH TO XD9047 EAST TO XD9147, SOUTH TO XD9143, SOUTH EAST
ALONG HIGH GRND WEST OF DA KRONG RIVER TO XD923400, EAST TO XD9840,
SOUTH ALONG DR KRONG RIVER TO XD005350, SOUTHWEST AND SOUTH ALONG
RIVER TO LAOS BORDER, ALONG LAOS BORDER TO XD9526, WEST TO XD7726,
NORTH ALONG LAOS BORDER, ALONG LAOS BORDER TO XD9526. WEST TO XD7726,
NORTH ALONG LAOS BORDER TO XD 6655. ZONE "A" REQUIRES FAC/TAC(A)
CONTROL AND DASC/FSCC/FDC CLEARANCE. CSS STRIKES REQUIRE DASC CONTROL
AND FSCC/FDC CLEARANCE. ASA RADAR SYS ATKS REQUIRE DASC CONTROL AND
FSCC/FDC CLEARANCE.

B. ZONE "B" - FR XD6655 NORTH TO THE DMZ, EAST ALONG DMZ TO XD8565,
SOUTH TO XD8555, WEST TO XD6655, ADDITIONAL SECTION FR XD9526 SOUTH
ALONG LAOS BORDER TO XD7726 EAST TO XD9526. ZONE "B" REQUIRES KHE
SANH DASC CLEARANCE TO DELIVER ORDN ON TARGETS AS DESIGNATED BY CG

PAGE THREE RUMWAA3544 S E C R E T

TASK FORCE HOTEL WITHIN ZONE "B"; NO FAC REQUIRED, FLIGHT LEADER
MUST BE DESIGNATED TAC(A).

3. EFFECTIVE DATE ABOVE PROCEDURE 300600H APR 68 UNTIL FURTHER
NOTICE.

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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#173

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

NNNNZCZCSAA986VV AWA377
 PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAW 1046U 1210340
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 300330Z APR 68 ZFF6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAL/CDR 7AF
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN MOMYER
 AND LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND 12217
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
 REF: A. CDR 7AF 201001Z APR 68
 B. CG III MAF 221340Z APR 68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) ASSESSMENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THIS HQ AT 081000H MAY 68.
2. (S) CDR 7AF AND CG III MAF WILL BE PREPARED TO PRESENT BRIEFING TO COMUSMACV ON THEIR RESPECTIVE ASSESSMENTS AT JOINT MEETING.
3. (S) ATTENDANCE WILL BE LIMITED TO THREE REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH COMMAND, INCLUDING COMMANDER OR HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#172

SECRET

CTISZYUW RUMSCMU0153 1170100-SSSS--RUMMWAA.
ZNY SSSSS ZFH-1 RUMSA

ADV ROUTED COPY MSG BEING SVC'D

ZVA 089 ARA240

OO RUMFAK

DE RUMSAR 1038 1170115

ZNY SSSSS

O 262030Z APR 68

ACT G-3

INFO G-2

COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

FM 7AF DO TAN SON NHUT AB RVN

TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF SA I CORPS DANANG AB RVN

RUMNVF/CG I FFV NHA TRANG AB RVN

RUMSFF/CG II FFV LONG BIEN RVN

RUMHVH/SA I CTZ DANANG RVN

RUMNVF/SA II CTZ NHA TRANG RVN

RUMSTN/SA III CTZ LONG BIEN RVN

RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ CAN THO RVN

INFO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV

RUMSARH/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI

RUMBB/CG 4TH INF DIV PLEIKU RVN

RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG AB RVN

RUMSAE/II DASC PLEIKU AB RVN

RUMSARF/III DASC BIEN HOA AB RVN

RUMSAUA/IV DASC CAN THO RVN

RUMSAB/DASC ALPHA NHA TRANG AB RVN

RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU BAI RVN

BT

SECRET/DO

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 1038 SECRET

SUBJECT: AIR INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN (U)

1. (S) ON 17 APR 68 COMUSMACV APPROVED THE IMMEDIATE COMMITMENT OF B-52 SORTIES AND ADDITIONAL OUT-COUNTRY STRIKE RESOURCES IN A MAJOR EXPANSION OF THE AIR INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN IN THE EXTENDED BATTLE AREA. AT THE SAME TIME HE GAVE APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE USE OF ADDITIONAL STRIKE SORTIES IN A COMPLEMENTARY INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ENEMY LOC AND BASE AREAS IN RVN IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY COMUSMACV. THE CODE NAME OPERATION TURNPIKE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN.

2. (S) THE CONCEPT FOR THE COMPLEMENTARY INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN IN RVN IS TO IDENTIFY AND STRIKE HIGH THREAT LOC'S, STORAGE AREAS AND ENEMY BASE CAMPS WHICH WILL ENHANCE PLANNED FRIENDLY GROUND OPERATIONS AND/OR SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE ENEMY SUPPLY AND RESUPPLY OF HIS IN-COUNTRY FORCES. THE INTENTION IS TO CONDUCT A CONCENTRATED EFFORT UPON EACH SELECTED TARGET. IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THIS EFFORT COMUSMACV HAS AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION BETWEEN 7TH AIR FORCE AND MAJOR FIELD COMMANDERS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF TARGETS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES AS SET FORTH IN MAVC DIR 95-4.

3. (S) IMPLEMENTATION OF A SYSTEMATIC IN-COUNTRY INTERDICTION

*Air Control***SECRET**

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAR 1038 S E C R E T
PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE THE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO MAKE
INTERDICTION EFFORT MOST EFFECTIVE TARGET

FOR THIS PROGRAM CAN BE CONCENTRATED ON THE MOST CRITICAL AREAS
FOR AS LONG AS NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE DESIRED RESULTS. THE
MASS OF THIS EFFORT THEN COULD BE SHIFTED TO OTHER HIGH PRIORITY
TARGET AREAS. RESULTS OF THESE EFFORTS WILL BE CONTINUALLY
REVIEWED. THE LEVEL OF FORCE APPLIED TO EACH AREA WOULD BE
ADJUSTED TO THAT REQUIRED TO KEEP THE AREA INTERDICTIONED FOR AS
LONG AS NECESSARY.

4. (C) IN ORDER TO ENSURE FLEXIBILITY FOR THE AIR INTERDICTION
CAMPAIGN, GROUND COMMANDERS WOULD ESTABLISH SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES
AND AUTHORIZED 7TH AIR FORCE TO DIRECT STRIKES INTO THOSE AREAS ON
SUSTAINED, AROUND-THE-CLOCK BASIS WITHOUT FURTHER POLITICAL
CLEARANCE OR TACTICAL APPROVAL. SHOULD THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRE
TO INSERT A RECONNAISSANCE TEAM IN A SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONE OR TO
INITIATE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, HE COULD TERMINATE THE AIR STRIKE
AUTHORITY AT ANY TIME-EITHER TEMPORARILY OR INDEFINITELY - BY
DIRECT COORDINATION WITH 7TH AIR FORCE.

5. (S) 7TH AIR FORCE HAS IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING TARGET AREAS
THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED INITIALLY FOR SUCH A CAMPAIGN. IT IS

PAGE 4 RUMSAR 1038 S E C R E T
RECOGNIZED THAT THE TARGET INPUTS FROM THE ADDRESSEES ARE
ESSENTIAL, PARTICULARLY IN CONSIDERATION OF PLANNED OPERATIONS
AND AREA KNOWLEDGE. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT EACH
ADDRESSEE IDENTIFY THOSE PERTINENT HIGH THREAT AREAS WITHIN THEIR
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY THAT SHOULD BE STRUCK IN THE CAMPAIGN.

7TH AF SUGGESTED TARGETS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. I CTZ: ROUTE 547A, SEGMENT 1, YD 450000 OUYZESZSIO
YC 427963; SEGMENT 2, YD 528032 WEST TO YD 478027, SEGMENT 3,
YD 450000 NORTHEAST TO HD 478027. ROUTE 548, SEGMENT 1, YC 554772
SOUTH TO YC 600715; SEGMENT 2, YC 496842 NORTH TO YC 482375; SEGMENT
3, YC 427963 SOUTH TO YC 439940; SEGMENT 4, YC 509800 NORTH TO
YC 503820; SEGMENT 5; YC 509000 WEST TO YC

JIVO SEGMENT 6,

YC 535789 SOUTHWEST TO YC 544777. ROUTE 922, SEGMENT 1, YD 254086
SOUTHWEST TO YD 238080; SEGMENT 2, YD 238030; SOUTH TO YD 23250440;
SEGMENT 3, YD 300000 WEST TO YD 254086. ROUTE 548 EXTENDED (YELLOW
BRICK), SEGMENT 1, YC 63007000 SOUTHEAST TO YC 66206640; SEGMENT 2;
YC 66206640 EAST TO YC 69806640.

B. II CTZ:

(1) ROUTE 110 FROM LAOS LEADING EAST INTO ROUTE 512. SEG-
MENT 1, YB 755219 EAST TO YB 804237.

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SECRET

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D(2) PLEI TRAP VALLEY LOC, TRUSCOTT WHITE, (CHARLIE ROAD SOUTH), SEGMENT 1, YB 726063 SOUTH TO YB 745040; SEGMENT 2, YA 743983, SEGMENT 3, YA 750919; SOUTH TO YA 752907; SEGMENT 4, YA 740897 SOUTH TO YA 731876; SEGMENT 5, YA 738857 SOUTHWEST TO YA 729853; (CHARLIE ROAD EAST) SEGMENT 1, YB 815040 NORTHEAST TO YB 850060; SEGMENT 2, YB 815040 SOUTHWEST TO YB 790045; SEGMENT 3, YB 777037 WEST TO YB 754045. (DELTA ROAD) SEGMENT 1, YA 690023 SOUTH TO YA 631799; SEGMENT 2, YA 6757800 SOUTH TO YA 670756.

(3) ROUTE 165 FROM LAOS LEADING INTO QL 14, SEGMENT 1, YB 893858 SOUTHEAST TO YB 931825.

C. III CTZ:

NEW LOC IN PHUOC LONG PROVINCE.

SEGMENT 1, YU 24053200 SOUTHEAST TO YU 26802900
 SEGMENT 2, YU 26802900 SOUTHEAST TO YU 27752400
 SEGMENT 3, YU 27752400 SOUTHEAST TO YU 29252030
 SEGMENT 4, YU 29252030 SOUTHEAST TO YU 31701790
 SEGMENT 5, YU 31701790 SOUTHEAST TO YU 32901490
 SEGMENT 5A, YU 31901700 SOUTHEAST TO YU 32501510
 SEGMENT 6, YU 32901490 SOUTHWEST TO YU 30901210.

D. IV CTZ SEVEN MOUNTAINS AREA.

PAGE 6 RUMSAR 1038 S E C R E T

6 (S) PRIORITY OF INTERDICTION EFFORT WILL BE DETERMINED BY COMUSMACV BASED ON CONSIDERATION OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE.

7. (C) ADDRESSEES ARE ENCOURAGED TO COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH 7AF TACC ON MATTERS CONCERNING SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM. COMUSMACV WILL BE INCLUDED AS AN INFO ADDRESSEE ON ANY ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS PERTAINING TO THIS SUBJECT. GP-4.

BT

SECRET
#166

SECRET

ZCZCSAA994VV ALF111
 OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAL 1790 1161044
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 O 251015Z APR 68
 FM 7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
 TO RUMFUE/CTF 77.0
 INFO RUKKA/CINCPAC
 RUHLKSF/CINCPACAF
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUYNBUL/COMM 7TH FLEET
 RUMFUAP/CTG 77.4
 RUMFUD/CTG 77.5
 RUYNBJO/CTG 77.8
 RUMSARH/PCV PHU BAI RVN
 RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG AB RVN
 RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG AB RVN
 RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU BAI RVN
 RUMSAV/MAR AIR CONT GP 18 (VICE SQUAD) DANANG AB RVN
 RUMSAGD/WATERBOY DET 1 620TH TAC CONT SQ DONG HA RVN
 RUMSAGS/PANAMA 620TH TAC CONT SQ MONKEY MOUNTAIN DANANG AB RVN
 RUMBDF/ABCCC UDORN RTAFB THAI
 RUMSAV/I MAW DANANG AB RVN

COG G-3
 INFO G-2

COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 1796D S E C R E T

BT

S E C R E T/DO/APR 68

SUBJECT: NAVAL AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ (U)

REF: A. CINCPAC MSG (S) 121922Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)

B. 7AF MSG (C) 211432Z APR 68 (NOTAL)

C. CTF 77.0 MSG (S) 220044Z APR 68 (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A PROVIDES CINCPAC POLICY ON RELATIVE USE OF CVA RESOURCES IN NVN AND I CTZ. REF B EXPLAINED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR NAVY SORTIES ANTICIPATED FOR CAS IN I CTZ. REF C ADVISED THAT WHILE FAVORABLE WEATHER PREVAILED IN ITS PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CTF 77.0 WOULD BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE SORTIES REQUESTED BY 7AF FOR I CTZ.

2. (S) 7TH AIR FORCE IS COGNIZANT OF THE IMPORTANCE AND THE PRIORITIES THAT MUST BE SET FOR NAVY SORTIES IN PACKAGES II AND III AS CITED IN REFERENCE A AND C AND RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF THIS CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF NAVY ASSETS.

3. (S) IN THE EVENT THAT NAVY SORTIES ARE DIVERTED FROM PACKAGES II AND III BECAUSE OF WEATHER AS CITED IN REFERENCE A, A NAVY SORTIE RATE OF THIRTY TO 100 SORTIES PER DAY COULD NORMALLY BE HANDLED IN I AND

Air Control

SECRET

#165

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAL 1796D S E C R E T

II CIZ. IN AN EMERGENCY MORE SORTIES COULD BE CONTROLLED. HOWEVER, THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE AIR EFFORT IN THIS AREA UNDER THE CONTROL OF FACS AND MSQ/TPQ SITES AVAILABLE NORMALLY PRECLUDES THE NO NOTICE SIMULTANEOUS ARRIVAL OF SORTIE RATES OF THESE MAGNITUDES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME BECAUSE OF THE PRE-PLANNED AND IMMEDIATE AIR EFFORT BEING EMPLOYED IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE MAJOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND EXISTING WEATHER CONDITIONS.

4. (S) TO ALLEVIATE SUCH AN OCCURRENCE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE MADE. ANYTIME YOU ARE AWARE OF SORTIES BEING AVAILABLE THE PRECEDING DAY PASS THE TOTS TO CTE 70.2.1.1 WHO CAN IN TURN ADVISE TACC WHO WILL PUBLISH THIS INFORMATION ON THE DAILY FRAG SO THAT THE APPROPRIATE CONTROLLING AGENCIES CAN TAKE ACTION TO HAVE FACS AND/OR MSQ/TPQ SITES AVAILABLE TO HANDLE STRIKES. IN ADDITION IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW THE TYPE OF ORDNANCE CARRIED.
5. (C) ON SHORTER NOTIFICATION OR DIVERSIONS AIRCRAFT

PAGE 4 RUMSAL 1796D S E C R E T

SHOULD REPORT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO WATERBOY AS A PRIMARY AND PANAMA/VICE SQUAD AS A SECONDARY WHO WILL CONTACT THE APPROPRIATE CONTROLLING AGENCY FOR A TARGET. IF A TARGET CANNOT BE FURNISHED THE CRC/CRP CONTACTID WILL HAND THE AIRCRAFT OFF TO ABCCC FOR A TARGET OUTSIDE OF SVN. ABCCC NO LONGER HANDLES IN-COUNTRY TARGETS.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

#165

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMKM
 DE RUMSAK 3066 116033Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 FMFPAC -T- CMC
 O 250530Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBMOA/CMC
 RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK FROM
 LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GEN WESTMORELAND AND IS
 QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE

P 241216Z APR 68 ZFFG

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF

INFO RUMKA/CINCPAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 11604

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGCUSHMAN, INFO ADMIRAL

SHARP, FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

A. CG, III MAF, 221340Z APR 68 (E)

B. CINCPAC 230409Z APR 68 (S) (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3066 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MDC

1. (E) YOUR COMMENTS ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAVE
 BEEN RECEIVED AND WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY. I HAVE DECIDED THAT
 WE WILL BASE OUR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM ON THE CALENDAR
 MONTH OF APRIL. THIS WILL PROVIDE A FULL MONTH OF UTILIZATION, AFTER
 THE INITIAL IMPERFECTIONS HAD BEEN IRONED OUT. YOU MAY WISH TO
 SEND ME AN ADDENDUM TO REFERENCE A ON 1 MAY, WITH ADDITIONAL
 COMMENTS.

2. (S) MEANWHILE, I WILL INITIATE A CAREFUL REVIEW OF EACH OF THE
 DEFICIENCIES WHICH YOU HAVE CITED TO DETERMINE IF IMMEDIATE
 ADJUSTMENTS ARE IN ORDER.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#163

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

ZCZCSAA 658ZVA 651VV AWA 957
 PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAW 0969U 1151248
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 P 241216Z APR 68 ZFF6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 11604
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGCUSHMAN, INFO ADMIRAL
 SHARP, FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
 A. CG, III MAF, 221340Z APR 68 (E)
 B. CINCPAC 230409Z APR 68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (E) YOUR COMMENTS ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY. I HAVE DECIDED THAT WE WILL BASE OUR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM ON THE CALENDAR MONTH OF APRIL. THIS WILL PROVIDE A FULL MONTH OF UTILIZATION, AFTER THE INITIAL IMPERFECTIONS HAD BEEN IRONED OUT. YOU MAY WISH TO SEND ME AN ADDENDUM TO REFERENCE A ON IMAY, WITH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

2. (S) MEANWHILE, I WILL INITIATE A CAREFUL REVIEW OF EACH OF THE DEFICIENCIES WHICH YOU HAVE CITED TO DETERMINE IF IMMEDIATE

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 0969U S E C R E T SPECAT
 ADJUSTMENTS ARE IN ORDER.
 GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#162

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 039W 1150710
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 240710Z APR 68
 FM CG FIRST MAF
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC F-012

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 221901H TO 231900H APR 68.
 B. (1) 164
 (2) 21
 (3) 77
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 173
 (2) 56
 (3) 56

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 039W S E C R E T SPECAT

- (4) 52
 (5) 86
 (6) 13
 (7) 78
 D. (1) 19
 (2) 17
 (3) 20
 (4) 22
 E. (1) 45
 (2) 33
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 42
 (2) 42
 (3) 42
 G. (1) 6
 (2) 30
 (3) 6
 (4) 0
 H. (1) 34

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#161

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 039W S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 8
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 142
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 113
 (3) 136
 (4) 6
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 8
 L. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 2
 (4) 0
 (5) 1
 (6) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 039W S E C R E T SPECAT

(7) 4
 M. (1) L5 -WX CANX USE OF ORD.
 L7 - 1 FLT (FAC) ASSIGNED ARVN TF-X AO UNABLE TO
 ESTABLISH ADEQUATE COMM WITH ARVN, DIVERTED.
 L7 - DIVERTED FUEL.
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
 A. (1) 182
 (2) 38
 (3) 20
 B. (1) 209
 (2) 31
 (3) 0
 C. (1) 189
 (2) 16
 (3) 0
 D. (1) 22
 (2) 16
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 E. (1) 26

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#161

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 039W S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 12

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

F. (1) 4

(2) 16

(3) 0

(4) 0

G. (1) 18

(2) 2

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

H. (1) 19

(2) 0

(3) 1

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 039W S E C R E T SPECAT

I. (1) 10

(2) 10

(3) 0

(4) 0

J. (1) NONE

K. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS; GROUND OR AIR COMMANDERS COMMENTS:

(1) NONE

GP-4

E.

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#161

SECRET

6

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMUHFA 39000 1150105
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JFCCO
 O 240045Z APR 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG
 INFO ZEN/CDR 7TH AF
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPS V PHU BAI
 RUMSAV/CG ISTIMAW DA NANG
 RUMSAK/CG 3D MAR DIV DONG HA
 RUMSA/CG TF GLICK KHE SANH
 BT

ACT G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

C E T 11503

SUBJ: KHE SANH AIR SUPPRT (U)

REF: CG III MAF MSG, DT 191406Z APR 68 (S)

1(S) REFERENCED MESSAGE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT INCREASED NUMBER OF INCOMING ARTILLERY, ROCKETGN AND MORTAR ROUNDS AT KHE SANH AND EVIDENCE OF RENEWED EFFORTS BY THE ENEMY TO REINFORCE HIS UNITS IN THE AREA. IT REQUESTED AN INCREASE OF 72 STRIKE SORTIES PER DAY (24 NIGHT, 48 DAY), TOGETHER WITH RELATED RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT, FOR USE IN AN EFFORT TO DESTROY OR NEUTRALIZE ENEMY STRONG POINTS AND INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS POSITIONS. THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO THE QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE INDICATED PARAGRAPHS OF REFERENCED MESSAGE.

FORM 21007 (3/68)

COPY COPIES

SECRET

#160

SECRET

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 3900D S E C R E T
 PARAGRAPHS 4, 5, AND 6 WERE PREPARED IN COORDINATION WITH 7TH AIR FORCE.

2. (S) PARA 7A: THE CONTINUING NEED FOR A SUBSTANTIAL AIR EFFORT IN THE KHE SANH AREA IS RECOGNIZED. HOWEVER, NO ADDITIONAL STRIKE SORTIES CAN BE ALLOCATED TO III MAF AT THIS TIME FOR PRE-PLANNED STRIKES. OF A TOTAL OF 406 SORTIES AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT PREPLANNED REQUESTS OF ALL MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS IN RVN DURING PERIOD 231900H TO 240900H APR, III MAF WAS ALLOCATED 248 (48 NIGHT, 200 DAY) OR 61 PER CENT OF TOTAL SORTIES AVAILABLE. ONLY 158 SORTIES (32 NIGHT, 126 DAY) WERE AVAILABLE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, AND THE FOUR ARVN CORPS. APPROVAL OF YOUR REQUEST FOR AN ADDITIONAL 72 SORTIES, OR ANY SIGNIFICANT PART THEREOF, WOULD REDUCE SUPPORT OF OTHER MAJOR COMMANDS BELOW MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LEVELS.

3. (S) ALLOCATIONS OF STRIKE SUPPORT ARE REVIEWED AND ADJUSTED DAILY IN LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION, STATED REQUIREMENTS OF ALL COMMANDS, ESTABLISHED PRIORITIES, AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE. IF RENEWED AND INTENSIFIED ENEMY PRESSURE SHOULD THREATEN THE INTEGRITY OF OUR POSITION IN THE KHE SANH AREA, ALLOCATIONS COULD BE CHANGED OVERNIGHT, MEANWHILE, TO FULFILL IMMEDIATE AIR REQUESTS FOR STRIKE

PAGE 3 RUMUHFA 3920D S E C R E T

SUPPORT IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH, DASC VICTOR CAN DIVERT ANY FLIGHT PREPLANNED TO SUPPORT FOCES UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE CG, PROV CORPS V, IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS COMMAND GUIDANCE. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, EITHER FROM DEVERTS OR SCRAMBLES, CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS FROM I DASC AND THE TACC IN SAIGON.

4. (C) PARA 7B: 7TH AIR FORCE HAS STATIONED THREE FACS AND TWO O-2 AIRCRAFT AT DONG HA TO SUPPORT 3D MAR DIV IN THE KHE SANH AREA. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THESE ASSETS BE USED TO CONDUCT VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE AND CONTROL STRIKES IN THE AREA OF INTEREST OUTLINED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

5 (C) PARA 7C: YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT PROCEDURES. A MAJOR PORTION OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT IS EXPENDED IN NORTHERN I CTZ, WEATHER PERMITTING, AND THIS SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE.

6. (C) PARA 7D: ABCC HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN ENTIRELY FROM IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS. BUT IN AN EMERGENCY IT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE, ALL STRIKES IN THE KHE SANH AREA WILL BE HANDLED THROUGH DASC VICTOR IN COORDINATION WITH THE MARINE DACS AT KHE SANH AND BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF A FAC OR A MSQ/TPA-10 SITE.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#160

SECRET

FLASH

ZNY SSSSS
Z 041310Z MAR 68
FM CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV CAMP EVANS RVN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF DANANG RVN
INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAF DANANG RVN
RUMHMB/DEPCOMUSMACV FWD PHU BAI RVN
RUMHMB/ PROJECT DELTA FIVE TWO DET PHU BAI RVN
BT

ACT: G-3
INFO: G-2 G-4 CEO
COPY TO: FEO ADJ S/S
G-5

S EAPRIV
REFERENCE:

- A. III MAF MSG, SECRET, 040318Z MAR 1968.
- B. III MAF MSG, SECRET, 280002Z FEB 1968.
- C. III MAF MSG, SECRET, 020916Z MAR 1968.

1. (S) REFERENCE A REQUIRES AIRCRAFT FROM 1 ACD TO PROVIDE 35 MAN SINGLE LIFT EMERGENCY REACTION FORCE CAPABILITY ON STANDBY BASIS AT YD 845152 AND TO BE AIRBORNE IN 15 MINUTES.
2. (S) REFERENCE B REQUIRES 281ST A H-CO TO BE IN DS OF PROJECT DELTA.
3. (S) REFERENCE C REQUIRES 1 ACD TO PROVIDE ONE BN RY BY INCREMENT.
4. (S) AIRCRAFT ARE ASSIGNED TO 1 ACD AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DIVISION'S OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY AND ARE FULLY UTILIZED DAILY IN TACTICAL MISSIONS. IN NORMAL OPERATIONS WITH THREE ORGANIC

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 8496 S E C R E T
BRIGADES, THERE IS NO EXCESS ORGANIC HELICOPTER LIFT. WITH FOUR BRIGADES TO SUPPORT, PARTS SHORTAGES, HIGHER THAN NORMAL COMBAT DAMAGE, AND MOVEMENT OF THE DIVISION'S AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BASE, THE DIVISION IS ALREADY CRITICALLY SHORT TACTICAL HELICOPTER LIFT.
5. (S) IN VIEW OF REF B AND IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, REQUEST THAT THE REQUIREMENT LEVIED IN REF A FOR ATANDDOWN OF RY LIFT AND GUNSHIPS AT PHU BAI BE RESCINDED. IF ESSENTIAL, THIS REQUIREMENT CAN BE MET WITHIN 30 MINUTES AT PHU BAI WITH A 5 SHIP RF FROM JEB STUART AO AND WITHOUT A STANDDOWN OF THE LIFT.

GP-4
BT

A-67

file Delta 68

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES

CG	AFG	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									

158

SECRET

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2801 1131340
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 221340Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM SHARP, FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
 A. CINCPAC LTR 3 OVER SER: 00488 OF 2MAR68
 B. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF 7MAR68
 1. (S) AS APPROVED BY REF A AND DIRECTED BY REF B III MAF
 FIXED WING COMBAT AIRCRAFT WERE PLACED UNDER CONTROL OF THE
 7TH AF ON 10MAR68 AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEM
 OCCURRED ON 22MAR68.
 2. (C) AFTER ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR A THIRTY-DAY PERIOD, I
 AM CONVINCED THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON
 ASSETS IS LESS EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFICIENT THAN OUR PREVIOUS
 SYSTEM WHEN THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAD
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR ASSETS. ACCORDINGLY, IN

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 KEEPING WITH THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED ME BY PARAGRAPH 8 OF
 REF B, I WISH TO RECORD MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE NEW
 SYSTEM FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS.

3. (C) THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE THIRTY-
 DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM:

A. (C) A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM IS BASED ON FOUR CHARACTERISTICS THAT THE MARINE CORPS
 DEMANDS OF ITS SYSTEM AND WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE ABSOLUTELY
 ESSENTIAL TO ANY SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR. THE
 SYSTEM MUST:

(1) BE RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS.
 IT MUST PROVIDE HIM FIRE SUPPORT THAT IS ACCURATE, APPROPRIATE
 AND TIMELY.

(2) INTEGRATE AIR SUPPORT WITH OTHER SUPPORTING
 FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER. ONE VERY ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF
 THIS INTEGRATION IS MINIMIZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACCIDENTS
 AND MISTAKES, WHICH CAN BECOME MORE PREVALENT IN FAST MOVING
 GROUND COMBAT SITUATIONS.

(3) POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND
 DELAYS. IT SHOULD INVOLVE THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INTERVENING

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#157

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAN 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
RELATIONS BETWEEN PRODUCER AND CONSUMER.

(4) BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE
STRUCTURE.

B. (C) EVALUATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM WAS MADE ON ITS
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE STATED FOUR MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS. EACH WILL BE INDIVIDUALLY DISCUSSED.

(1) RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS.

(A) (S) THE MAJORITY OF AIR IS NOW SCHEDULED
THROUGH AN ELABORATE SYSTEM WHICH REQUIRES THE BATTALION
COMMANDER TO SELECT TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE. THIS IS
OFTEN TACTICALLY IMPRACTICAL. THE EXCESSIVE LEAD TIME
REQUIREMENT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE SYSTEM
LACKS ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR ADD-ONS TO THE DAILY FRAG. FOR
EXAMPLE: IF A BN COMMANDER DECIDES ONE AFTERNOON THAT A
COMPANY HELILIFT IS REQUIRED THE NEXT DAY AT 1100, AND THAT
THE SELECTED LANDING ZONE NEEDS AIR PREPARATION, HIS ONLY
CHOICE IS TO CALL FOR AN "IMMEDIATE", WHICH NORMALLY MEANS
A DIVERT. IF HE GETS A DIVERT, IT MEANS THAT SOME OTHER
BN'S TACTICAL PLAN IS LIKELY COMPROMISED. WHEN AN "IMMEDIATE"
IS REQUESTED, THE REQUEST AND SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL MUST NOW

PAGE FOUR RUMSAN 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
GO THROUGH ADDITIONAL AGENCIES, WHICH USUALLY REDUCES
RESPONSIVENESS TO THE REQUESTOR'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THIS
SITUATION IS UNSATISFACTORY, AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES ARE
REQUIRED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN TIMELY AIR SUPPORT FOR THE GROUND
COMMANDER.

(B) (S) THE CURRENT SYSTEM'S LACK OF
RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS NOT ONLY FROM THE LONG LEAD TIME
FRAG, BUT ALSO FROM OVERALL TECHNIQUES OF MISSION ASSIGNMENT.
BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTED TO THE SUPPORTING UNIT RATHER THAN
THE SUPPORTED UNIT, THE SYSTEM PERMITS CONVENIENT AND
ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER.
BEFORE INAUGURATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, ABOUT EIGHTY
PERCENT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND
FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND AN IMMEDIATE SCHEME OF
MANEUVER. IN THOSE INSTANCES, AIRCRAFT REPORTED TO THE
AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED
TIME OVER TARGET (TOT), WITH THE REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND
THE PILOTS WERE BRIEFED ON THE GROUND SITUATION. THE RE-
MAINING TWENTY PERCENT OF THE PRE-PLANNED SORTIES WERE
FRAGGED SPECIFIC TARGETS THAT COULD BE REASONABLY SELECTED

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#157

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR IN ADVANCE. AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE A TACTICAL OPERATION PLANNED IN ADVANCE THAT REQUIRED SUPPORTING FIRES BY AIR AND ARTILLERY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ASSAULT. NOW, VIRTUALLY ALL THE SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED AS PRE-PLANNED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS, EVEN THOUGH IT IS UNREALISTIC TO FORECAST ALL TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE.

(C) (C) OVERALL WE HAVE FOUND SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES TO BE UNWIELDLY AND TIME CONSUMING. ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TIMES ARE THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE. EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED TO FIND WAYS TO MAKE THE SYSTEM FUNCTION IN A MANNER THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS, WITH VERY LITTLE SUCCESS. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS INHERENT DEFECTS THAT WILL NEVER PERMIT IT TO FUNCTION TO A MARINE GROUND COMMANDER'S SATISFACTION.

(2) MUST INTERGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVERS.

(A) (S) THE NEW SYSTEM LACKS A PRACTICAL AGENCY THROUGH WHICH THE GROUND COMMANDER CAN ORCHESTRATE HIS ENTIRE SUPPORTING AIR EFFORT IN A TIMELY MANNER WITH HIS GROUND

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. IN THIS REGARD, A MARINE DASC PERFORMS ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CONTROL, INCLUDING AIR SPACE COORDINATION, A USAF TACP ON THE OTHER HAND, PROVIDES ONLY MINIMUM COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION FOR STRIKE AIRCRAFT. FURTHERMORE, SINCE USAF TYPE DASC'S DO NOT MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH STRIKE AIRCRAFT, THEY ARE UNABLE TO ACT AS AN EFFECTIVE AIR SPACE COORDINATION AGENCY FOR AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORTING FIRES. THE RESULT IS THAT THE NEW SYSTEM HAS FAR LESS ABILITY TO COORDINATE FIRE WITH MANEUVER THAN THE SYSTEM IT REPLACED.

(3) MUST POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND DELAYS.

(A) (C) SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS INCREASED OUR ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN. IN THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHEN AIR WAS FRAGGED DIRECTLY TO THE UNITS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC WAS LIMITED TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED, TOT'S AND DESIRED ORDNANCE.

(B) (C) NOW THE SIZE OF THE NEW FRAG IS CONSISTENT WITH THE MORE COMPLEX CHAIN IT FOLLOWS AND IS
BT

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#157

SECRET

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2802 1131340
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 221340Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
 BT

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM SHARP, FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN

5-6 TIMES LONGER THAN THE ONE IT REPLACED. FURTHER,
 BEGINNING AT BATTALION LEVEL, LENGTHY FORMS ARE NECESSARY,
 ONE FOR EACH REQUESTED TARGET. PORTIONS OF THESE HAVE TO BE
 SHACKLED OR ENCRYPTED AT EACH LEVEL IN THE CHAIN, OR DELIVERED
 BY RUNNER TO THE NEXT HIGHER ECKELON. THE RESULT OF THIS
 INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IS INCREASED DELAY, AND THE
 POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN AND COMMUNICATION ERRORS BECOMES GREATER.

(4) MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE
 STRUCTURE.

(A) (S) WITH THE RELATIVELY SMALL AUTHORIZED
 NUMBER OF STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT, ALL WEAPONS IN THE AIR
 GROUND TEAM MUST BE CLOSELY INTEGRATED. IMPOSITION OF THE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2802 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM ON THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS
 HAS DISRUPTED THIS INTEGRATION AND DEPRIVED THE TEAM OF
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR FIRE POWER. FURTHER, THE
 NEW SYSTEM HAS NOT PRODUCED A MORE FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE
 DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT, WHICH WAS A DETERMINING FACTOR
 IN ITS INTRODUCTION. REGARDING FLEXIBILITY, ANALYSIS OF
 SORTIE STATISTICS REVEALS THAT THE MARINE CORPS RATE HAS
 SHOWN A FLEXIBLE SORTIE RESPONSE RISING AND FALLING ACCORDING
 TO GROUND REQUIREMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE RECENT
 PERIOD OF HEAVY CONTACT IN I CORPS, MARINE SORTIES HAVE
 RESPONDED ABOVE THE PLANNED RATE, WHILE SURGING TO SUPPORT
 BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES. AS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE
 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT, IT IS NOTED THAT THE ARMY FORCES IN
 I CORPS ARE NOW RECEIVING ONLY SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE AIR
 FORCE SORTIES PLANNED FOR THEM BY THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA
 PROGRAM. ALSO, AS STATED ABOVE, SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, THE MARINE AIR UNITS CONTINUED TO
 SURGE, THEREBY PROVIDING ALMOST DOUBLE THE SORTIES TO ARMY
 FORCES IN ICTZ THAN WERE SUPPLIED PRIOR TO THE NEW SYSTEM.
 WE SANCTION A FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE EFFORT FROM ALL AIR

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#157

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2802 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR UNITS; HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THE MARINE CORPS IS PROVIDING A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE AIR SUPPORT EFFORT UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

4. (S) MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: IT IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO OUR TACTICAL NEEDS; IT HAS INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR COORDINATION OF AIR WITH THE TOTAL EFFORT; IT INCREASES THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN; AND IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE. FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT FORESEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THESE SHORTCOMINGS UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

5. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I STRONGLY URGE THAT MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME, AND THAT THE VERY WORKABLE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

6. I AM PREPARED TO PROVIDE A DETAILED BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF THE ABOVE POSITION AT ANY TIME YOU DESIRE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#157

PRIORITY

SECRET

21APR68

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: COMUSMACV

INFO: CINCPAC
CG III MAF

SECRET

*Submitted by 1st MAW
Rewritten by 95 III MAF
and dispatched as 221340Z
Apr '68*

SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

- A. CINCPAC LTR 3 OVER SER: 00488 OF 21MAR68
- B. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF 71MAR68

1. (S) AS APPROVED BY REF A AND DIRECTED BY REF B III MAF

FIXED WING COMBAT AIRCRAFT WERE PLACED UNDER CONTROL OF THE 7TH AF ON 20MAR68 AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEM OCCURED ON 22MAR68.

2. (C) AFTER ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR A 30 DAY PERIOD, I AM CONVINCED THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS IS LESS EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT THAN OUR PREVIOUS SUCCESSFUL SYSTEM WHEN THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAD OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR FIRE POWER. ACCORDINGLY, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE NEW SYSTEM FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE COMPS AIR ASSETS.

3. (C) THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE 30 DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM:

A. (C) A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS BASED ON FOUR CHARACTERISTICS THAT WE DEMAND OF OUR OLD SYSTEM AND CONSIDER TO BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO ANY SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR. THESE ARE:

(1) IT MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS NEEDS. IT MUST GIVE HIM FIRE SUPPORT THAT IS ACCURATE,

APPROPRIATE AND TIMELY.

(2) IT MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVERS - AMONG THESE IS THE VERY ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF MINIMIZING THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES, THAT ALWAYS POSE A THREAT IN FAST MOVING SITUATIONS.

(3) IT MUST POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND DELAYS. IT SHOULD INVOLVE THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INTERVENING ECHELONS BETWEEN THE PRODUCER AND THE CONSUMER.

(4) IT MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

B. (C) EVALUATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM WAS MADE ON ITS ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE STATED FOUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND EACH ONE WILL BE INDIVIDUALLY DISCUSSED.

(1) RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS NEEDS.

(A) (S) THE MAJORITY OF AIR IS NOW SCHEDULED THROUGH AN ELABORATE SYSTEM WHICH REQUIRES THE BATTALION COMMANDER TO FORECAST THE TARGET HE WANTS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE. THIS IS AN UNREALISTIC SITUATION AND THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE PROGRESSIVE LEAD TIME REQUIREMENT ARE AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT NO ADEQUATE PROVISION IS MADE FOR ADD-ONS TO THE DAILY FRAG. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A BN COMMANDER DECIDES ONE AFTERNOON THAT HE SHOULD MAKE A COMPANY BELIEVE THE NEXT DAY AT 1100, AND HIS ~~FRAG~~ NEEDS A LANDING ZONE PREPARATION, HIS ONLY CHOICE IS TO CALL FOR AN "EMERGENCY" WHICH NORMALLY MEANS A DIVERT. IF HE GETS A DIVERT, IT IMPLIES THAT SOME OTHER

THIS TACTICAL PLAN IS LIKELY COMPROMISED. THE RESULT IS THAT THE COMMANDERS ARE NOW RELUCTANT TO CALL IN AN "IMMEDIATE"; THIS CAUSES A CONSIDERABLE INHIBITION OF HIS FLEXIBILITY. WHEN AN "IMMEDIATE" IS REQUESTED, THE REQUEST AND SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL MUST NOW GO THROUGH SEVERAL ADDITIONAL AGENCIES, WHICH IN MOST CASES REDUCES RESPONSIVENESS TO THE REQUESTORS IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THIS SITUATION HAS OFTEN FORCED CIRCUMVENTION OF THE SYSTEM IN ORDER TO OBTAIN TIMELY AIR SUPPORT. BETWEEN 1 AND 21 APRIL 1968, OVER HALF OF THE TOTAL IMMEDIATE SORTIES WERE PROVIDED BY CIRCUMVENTING THE CURRENT SYSTEM DUE TO URGENCY OF TACTICAL SITUATION.

(B) (S) ANOTHER FACTOR ON LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND TACTICAL SITUATION IS LARGELY A RESULT OF THE LONG LEAD TIME FRAG AND OVERALL TECHNIQUES OF MISSION ASSIGNMENT. THE CURRENT SYSTEM BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTATED TO THE SUPPLIER RATHER THAN TO THE CONSUMER, MAKES FOR CONVENIENT AND ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER. BEFORE SINGLE MANEUVERS ABOUT 80% OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND AN IMMEDIATE SCHEME OF MANEUVER. THAT IS THEY REPORTED TO THE AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED TOT, WITH THE REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND BRIMED ON THE GROUND SITUATION. THE REMAINING 20% OF THE PRE-PLANNED SORTIES WERE FRAGGED SPECIFIC TARGETS THAT COULD BE REASONABLY FORECAST 20 HOURS IN ADVANCE. AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE A LARGE OPERATION PLANNED IN ADVANCE THAT REQUIRED PREPARATION AND SUPPORTING FIRES BY AIR AND ARTILLERY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ASSAULT. NOW, VIRTUALLY ALL THE SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED AS

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THE TACTICAL PLAN IS HEAVILY CONTROLLED. THE RESULT IS THAT THE COMMANDERS ARE NOW RELUCTANT TO CALL IN AN "IMMEDIATE"; THIS CAUSES A CONSIDERABLE INHIBITION OF HIS FLEXIBILITY. WHEN AN "IMMEDIATE" IS REQUESTED, THE REQUEST AND SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL MUST NOW GO THROUGH SEVERAL ADDITIONAL AGENCIES, WHICH IN MOST CASES REDUCES RESPONSIVENESS TO THE REQUESTORS IN IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THIS SITUATION HAS OFTEN FORCED CIRCUMVENTION OF THE SYSTEM IN ORDER TO OBTAIN TIMELY AIR SUPPORT. BETWEEN 1 AND 21 APRIL 1968, OVER HALF OF THE TOTAL IMMEDIATE SORTIES WERE PROVIDED BY CIRCUMVENTING THE CURRENT SYSTEM DUE TO URGENCY OF TACTICAL SITUATION.

(B) (S) ANOTHER FACTOR ON LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND TACTICAL SITUATION IS LARGELY A RESULT OF THE LONG LEAD TIME FRAG AND OVERALL TECHNIQUES OF MISSION ASSIGNMENT. THE CURRENT SYSTEM BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTATED TO THE SUPPLIER RATHER THAN TO THE CONSUMER, MAKES FOR CONVENIENT AND ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER. BEFORE SINGLE MARCHES ABOUT 80% OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND AN IMMEDIATE SCHEME OF MANEUVER. THAT IS THEY REPORTED TO THE AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED TOP, WITH THE REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND BRIEFED ON THE GROUND SITUATION. THE REMAINING 20% OF THE PRE-PLANNED SORTIES WERE FRAGGED SPECIFIC TARGETS THAT COULD BE REASONABLY FORECAST 20 HOURS IN ADVANCE. AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE A LARGE OPERATION PLANNED IN ADVANCE THAT REQUIRED PREPARATION AND SUPPORTING FIRES BY AIR AND ARTILLERY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ASSAULT. NOW, VIRTUALLY ALL THE SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED AS

PRE-PLANNED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS, EVEN THOUGH IT IS UNREALISTIC TO FORECAST TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE.

(c) (c) OVERALL WE HAVE FOUND SINGLE MANAGEMENT OPERATION INFERIOR FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RESPONSIVENESS. SOME RESPONSE TIMES HAVE BEEN HELD AT AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL BY CIRCUUMVENTING THE SYSTEM, SO THE CUSTOMER GETS GENERALLY WHAT HE NEEDS WHEN HE ASKS FOR AN IMMEDIATE, BUT THE REMAINDER OF THE MISSIONS ARE DESIGNED IN A WAY THAT IS UNRELIABLE, TIME CONSUMING, AND NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS SCHEME OF MANEUVER IN A FAST MOVING TACTICAL SITUATION.

(2) MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVERS.

(A) (S) THE NEW SYSTEM LACKS A PRACTICAL AGENCY THROUGH WHICH THE GROUND COMMANDER CAN ORCHESTRATE HIS ENTIRE SUPPORTING AIR EFFORT IN A TIMELY MANNER WITH HIS MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUN FIRE. IN THIS REGARD, A MARINE DASC PERFORMS ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT INCLUDING AIR SPACE COORDINATION WHILE THE USAF TACP PROVIDES ONLY MINIMUM COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION FOR STRIKE AIRCRAFT. SINCE USAF TYPE DASCs DO NOT EFFECT RADIO CONTACT WITH AIRCRAFT THEY ARE UNABLE TO ACT AS AN EFFECTIVE AIR SPACE COORDINATION AGENCY FOR AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORTING FIRES. THE RESULT IS THAT THE NEW SYSTEM HAS FAR LESS ABILITY TO COORDINATE FIRE WITH MANEUVER THAN THE SYSTEM IT REPLACED.

(3) MUST POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND DELAYS.

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(A) (C) SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS INCREASED OUR ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN. IN THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHEN AIR WAS FRAGGED TO THE UNITS ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY WAS TO PASS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED, TOT'S AND DESIRED ORDNANCE.

(B) (C) NOW THE SIZE OF THE NEW FRAG IS CONSISTENT WITH THE MORE COMPLEX CHAIN IT FOLLOWS AND IS 5-6 TIMES AS LONG AS THE ONE IT REPLACED. FURTHER, BEGINNING AT BATTALION LEVEL, LIGHTY FORMS ARE NECESSARY, ONE FOR EACH REQUESTED TARGET. THESE HAVE TO BE SIGNED OR ENCRYPTED AT EACH LEVEL IN THE CHAIN, OR DELIVERED BY RUNNER TO THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON AND SO ON. THE RESULT OF THIS INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IS INCREASED DELAY AND IN ADDITION, IS THE GREATER POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN AND COMMUNICATION ERRORS.

(4) MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR COMMITMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

(A) (S) IN ORDER TO DO THE JOB WITH THE RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT MARINES ARE AUTHORIZED IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT ALL WEAPONS IN THE AIR GROUND TEAM BE CLOSELY INTEGRATED. IMPOSITION OF THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM ON THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAS DISRUPTED THIS INTEGRATION AND DEPRIVED THE TEAM OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR FIRE POWER. FURTHER, THE NEW SYSTEM HAS NOT PRODUCED A MORE FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT WHICH WAS A DETERMINING FACTOR IN ITS IMPOSITION. REGARDING FLEXIBILITY, ANALYSIS OF SORTIE STATISTICS REVEAL THAT THE MARINE CORPS RATE HAS SHOWN A FLEXIBLE SORTIE RESPONSE RISING AND FALLING ACCORDING TO GROUND REQUIREMENTS. DURING THE RECENT PERIOD OF HEAVY CONTACT IN I CORPS MARINE

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SORTIES HAVE RESPONDED ABOVE THE PLANNED RATE, WHILE SURGING TO SUPPORT BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS NOTED THAT BEFORE AND AFTER THE CHANGE TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE AIR FORCE HAS NOT RESPONDED WITH EFFORT COMMENSURATE WITH THE INCREASE IN GROUND COMBAT. THE AIR FORCE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PERIOD, HAS MAINTAINED AN ESSENTIALLY CONSTANT SORTIE PRODUCTION. AS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT, IT IS NOTED THAT THE ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS ARE NOW RECEIVING ONLY 70% OF THE AIR FORCE SORTIES PLANNED FOR THEM BY THE DOD APPROVED SEASLA PROGRAM. IT IS FURTHER NOTED THAT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, THE MARINE AIR UNITS CONTINUE TO ~~surge~~ SURGE WHILE THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED BY THE MARINE CORPS TO ARMY AND OTHER FORCES HAS APPROXIMATELY DOUBLED. WE SANCTION A FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE EFFORT FROM ALL AIR UNITS; HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THE MARINE CORPS IS PROVIDING A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF EFFORT UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY, MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS: THAT IT IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO OUR TACTICAL NEEDS; IT HAS SMALL PROVISION FOR COORDINATION OF AIR WITH THE TOTAL EFFORT; IT INCREASES THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN; AND IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE. FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT FORESEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THESE SHORTCOMINGS UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM.
5. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I STRONGLY URGE THAT MANAGEMENT OF

MARINE STRENGTH AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN III MAF BE
RETURNED TO US. I FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT THE MARINE AIR
CONTROL SYSTEM BE EMPLOYED TO SUPPORT ALL U.S. AND FREE
WORLD FORCES IN I CORPS BEING MORE EFFECTIVE, RESPONSIVE
AND ECONOMICAL THAN THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

GP 4

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DRAFTED BY _____

RELEASED BY _____

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUEBHQA
 DE RUMSAV 014W 1130245
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 220245Z APR 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHQA/CMC
 INFO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC (F0066)
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T / S P E C A T SECTION ONE OF TWO
 EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, LTGEN KRULAK AND
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN ANDERSON. FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 1. IN PREPARATION FOR THE THIRTY DAY REVIEW OF THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN CINCPAC'S APPROVAL OF THE
 COMUSMACV PROPOSAL OF THE SYSTEM AND COMUSMACV'S DIRECTIVE
 OF 7 MARCH 1968 ESTABLISHING THE SYSTEM, WE HAVE ASSEMBLED
 AS MANY STATISTICS AS COULD BE FORESEEN AND ANALYZED THE
 PROCEDURES THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION
 AND DATA HAS BEEN DEVELOPED INTO A PRESENTATION COVERING
 THE PERIOD 19 FEB 1968 TO 12 MAR 1968 AS THE PERIOD
 BEFORE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND THE PERIOD OF 1 APR
 1968 TO 20 APR 1968 AS THE AFTER IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD. THE
 INTERVENING PERIOD OF 13 MAR 1968 THROUGH 31 MAR 1968 WAS
 CONSIDERED TO BE THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THIS PRESENTATION

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 014W **S E C R E T** S P E C A T
 IS MOST REVEALING OF THE DEGRADATION OF OUR REQUEST AND
 CONTROL SYSTEM, OF RESPONSIVENESS AND SUPPORT FOR THE
 BATTALION COMMANDER.
 2. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTED FROM THE LATTER PART OF THE SCRIPT
 FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND USE.

"OUR AIR GROUND TEAM PACKAGE, STEMMING ORIGINALLY OUT OF
 OUR AMPHIBIOUS MISSION, CONTAINS AMONG THE SUPPORTING ARMS,
 HIGH PERFORMANCE, HIGHLY POTENT AIRCRAFT. THE CLOSE
 INTEGRATION OF ALL THESE WEAPONS INTO A SINGLE COMMAND
 PACKAGE PERMITS US TO DO OUR JOB WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL
 NUMBER OF THESE AIRCRAFT."

"OVER THE YEARS, IN PERIODS OF VARYING FISCAL AUSTERITY
 WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES IN
 OTHER EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS WE WANTED AND NEEDED.
 BUT THOSE SACRIFICES HAVE LET UP KEEP OUR TACTICAL AIR AS
 AN INTEGRATED PART OF THE TACTICAL COMMAND PACKAGE. AS I
 MENTIONED, THE NUMBER OF THESE AIRCRAFT IS NOT GREAT. THIS
 WILL BECOME MORE APPARENT LATER WHEN WE EXAMINE THE TOTAL
 U.S. AIR FIRE SUPPORT FOR FORCES IN ICTZ TODAY."

(SLIDE 14 ON)

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES**SECRET**

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 014W S E C R E T SPECAT
SLIDE 14 REFERRED TO IN THE SCRIPT DEPICTS:

ALL FIGURES ARE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH
THE MARINE CORPS FOXHOLE STRENGTH IN I CORPS - 20,736
THE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT AND OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT AUTH NO. - 336
THE FIXED WING STRENGTH OF ATTACK AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT - 159

"THE MARINES ARE AUTHORIZED BY DOD TO OPERATE 159
FIXED WING FIRE SUPPORT AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT
20,736 FOXHOLE MARINES, OR ONE AIRCRAFT FOR EVERY 130 MARINES.
IN ADDITION, WE ARE PRESENTLY OPERATING 60 OBSERVATION HELOS
WHICH HAVE BEEN ARMED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLOSE IN FIRE
SUPPORT AGAINST SOFT TARGETS DURING PERIODS OF EXTREMELY LOW
CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY. HOWEVER, FULL UTILIZATION OF THESE
AIRCRAFT AS GUNSHIPS CANNOT BE REALIZED DUE TO THE FACT THAT
THEY MUST ALSO PROVIDE THE TASKS FOR WHICH THE ARE AUTHORIZED,
E.G., AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION, GUNFIRE SPOTTING,
EMERGENCY AERIAL SUPPLY AND RESUPPLY, LIAISON AND COURIER
SERVICE, FRONT LINE CASUALTY EVACUATION, ETC, (IF WE COUNT
THESE 60 OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT THE MARINE CORPS HAD ONE AIRCRAFT
CAPABLE OF RENDERING SOME TYPE OF FIRE SUPPORT FOR EVERY
94 RIFLEMEN.)"

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 014W S E C R E T SPECAT
(SLIDE 14 OFF)

(SLIDE 14A ON - ARMY TAC.)

SLIDE 14A SHOWS ARMY AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS
THE ARMY FOXHOLE STRENGTH IN I CORPS - 17,116
ARMY TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS - 479
ARMY ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS - 184

"THE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE, LIKE THAT OF THE MARINE CORPS
RECOGNIZES THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT FOR ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT
UNDER THE DIRECT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE GROUND COMMANDER."

"THE ROTARY WING FIRE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT IN THE ARMY
STRUCTURE PROVIDE ORGANIC AIR FIRE SUPPORT AND THE ARMY IS
AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE 184 HELICOPTER FIRE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
FOR 17,116 FOXHOLE SOLDIERS IN I CORPS, OR ONE AIRCRAFT FOR
EVERY 93 MEN."

"BUT THERE IS ANOTHER VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR WHICH MUST
BE CONSIDERED. THE AIR FORCE IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE
132 FIXED WING FIRE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT IN VIETNAM FOR THE SAME
17,116 SOLDIERS, OR ONE AIRCRAFT FOR EACH 130 IN I CORPS.
THESE ARE ADDITIVE TO THE ARMY ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT. THE
132 AUTHORIZED AIRCRAFT ARE DETERMINED BY COMPUTING AIRCRAFT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAV OPLAN SECRET SPECAT
NEEDED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENT OF 150 COMBAT SORTIES/ARMY
MANEUVER BATTALION/MONTH AS STATED IN THE DOD APPROVED
SEASIA AIR PROGRAM. (NOTE 1)"

(SLIDE 14A OFF)

(SLIDE 15 ON - MARINE AND ARMY TACTICAL PACKAGES IN
ICYZ - 21 MARCH 1968).

SLIDE 15 COMPARES SIDE BY SIDE THE MARINE AND ARMY DATA
CONTAINED ON SLIDES 14 AND 14A PLUS THE COMPUTED AF FIXED
WING AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE AUTHORIZED AIR SUPPORT
OF 5 SORTIES PER DAY FOR 29 ARMY MANEUVER BNS IN ICYZ. THIS
EQUATES TO 132 FIXED WING AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT A FOXHOLE
STRENGTH OF 17,116.

IN ADDITION, THE RATIO OF AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE IN
SVN TO SUPPORT MARINES IS PORTRAYED AS ONE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT
PER 130 FOXHOLE MARINES. SIMILARLY THE AIR SUPPORT FOR THE
ARMY IS ONE FIVE SUPPORT HELICOPTER PER 95 ARMY FOXHOLE
SOLDIERS PLUS ONE FIXED WING AF STRIKE AIRCRAFT PER 130 FOX
HOLE SOLDIERS.

HERE, SIDE BY SIDE, ARE THE MARINE AND ARMY AIR FORCE
TACTICAL PACKAGES FOR ICYZ ON 20 MARCH 1968. CONSIDERING

PAGE SIX RUMSAV OPLAN SECRET SPECAT
THE STRUCTURE OF THESE FORCES AND THEIR TOTAL RESOURCES;
A STATED OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE OF THE TAKE OVER OF ALL
MARINE TACTICAL AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BY SINGLE
MANAGEMENT WAS TO ACHIEVE A MORE FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT."

(SLIDE 15 OFF)

(SLIDE 16 ON)

SLIDE 16 SHOWS - TWO PERIODS OF TIME - BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
12 FEB TO 12 MAR. AFTER SINGLE MANAGEMENT 1 APR TO PRESENT
AVAILABLE - THE OMITTED PERIOD BEING TRANSITION.

THE VERTICAL SCALE SHOWS 25 SORTIES INCREMENTS. THE PLOT
SHOWS SORTIES FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF MARINE PLUS A PLOT ABOVE
IT SHOWING TOTAL SORTIES. THE DIFFERENCE BEING MARINE SORTIES
PROVIDED TO OTHER. THERE IS A STRAIGHT LINE ACROSS THE CHART
AT THE 150 SORTIE LEVEL. (THE DAILY SORTIE TOTAL REQUIRED
FOR 24 MARINE BNS BY AUTHORIZED PLANNING FACTORS.) THE
SORTIES RISE AND FALL CONSISTENTLY ABOVE THE REQUIRED LINE
IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO THE GROUND SITUATION. AVERAGES SORTIES
ARE SHOWN IN THE PITCH FOR BEFORE AND AFTER PERIODS.

"REGARDING FLEXIBILITY, THIS CHART, ILLUSTRATES THE
BT.

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SECRET

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SECRET

OO RUEBKOA
 DE RUMSAV 015W 1150245
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 220245Z APR 68
 FM CG FIRST MAF
 TO RUEBKOA/CMC
 INFO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC (F006)
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, LTGEN KRULAK AND
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN ANDERSON. FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 EFFECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS HAD ON THE PROPORTION OF MARINE
 EFFORT FLOWN FOR MARINES AND FOR OTHER FORCES. THE SHADED
 AREA AT THE TOP SHOWS THE NON MARINE SUPPORT, CHIEFLY FOR
 THE ARMY AND IN SUPPORT OF THE AIR FORCE MANAGED ROLLING
 THUNDER PROGRAM. THE LOWER AREA SHOWS SORTIES FLOWN FOR
 MARINES. IN ORDER TO MEET THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA AIR
 PROGRAM, MARINES MUST FLY TO SUPPORT THE 24 BNS IN I CORPS,
 150 SORTIES PER DAY OR 200 SORTIES PER MARINE BN PER MONTH.
 DURING THE PERIOD SHOWN, MARINE GROUND FORCES WERE ENGAGED
 IN HEAVY COMBAT AND MARINE AIR SURGED, IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
 TO THE REQUIREMENTS, FLYING AN AVERAGE OF 198 SORTIES PER

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 015W S E C R E T SPECAT
 DAY FOR MARINES; AND IN ADDITION FLEW 19 SORTIES PER DAY
 IN SUPPORT OF OTHER TROOPS AND THE OUT OF COUNTRY INTERDICTION
 EFFORT. NOTE THAT AFTER SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS IMPOSED MARINE
 AIR STILL FLEW WELL OVER THE PROGRAMMED RATE BUT ALSO BEGAN
 TO SUPPLY A HIGHER NUMBER OF SORTIES PER DAY TO OTHER
 FORCES (PROVIDING AN AVERAGE OF 37 SORTIES PER DAY),
 CHIEFLY TO ARMY TROOPS.

(SLIDE 16 OFF)

(SLIDE 17 ON)

SLIDE 17 IS IN THE SAME FORMAT AND TIME PERIODS AS SLIDE 16.
 IT IS RELATED TO SORTIE RATES AND COMPARES MARINE SORTIE
 RATES TO AF SORTIE RATES FOR THE PERIOD. THE MARINE RATE
 AVERAGES WELL ABOVE THE DOD AUTHORIZED 1.1 PLANNING LEVEL
 RISING AND FALLING WITH THE NEEDS OF THE GROUND TROOPS.
 AGAIN IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, THE AIR FORCE RATE STAYS
 ESSENTIALLY LEVEL, SLIGHTLY BELOW THE 1.1 PLANNED RATE.
 IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE AIR FORCE HAS NOT EXERTED AN
 INCREASED EFFORT, COMMENSURATE WITH, OR IN RESPONSE TO
 GROUND NEEDS.

"IF THE NEED EXIST, MARINES ARE GLAD TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL

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PAGE THREE RUMSAY 015W S E C R E T SPECAT
 AIR SUPPORT TO ARMY FORCES BUT, IT IS OBSERVED, AS ILLUSTRATED ON THIS NEXT CHART, THAT THE AIR FORCE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A COMMENSURATE FLEXIBILITY TO MEET THE EMERGENCY THAT HAS EXISTED THROUGHOUT VIETNAM AND IN I CORPS. THIS CHART SHOWS THE AIR FORCE SORTIE RATE COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR THE SAME PERIOD. THE PLANNED DOD APPROVED SORTIE RATE FOR BOTH MARINE AND AIR FORCE UNITS IS 1.1, THE STRAIGHT LINE. NOTE THAT THE AIR FORCE HAS MAINTAINED A CLOSE ADHERENCE TO THIS PLANNING FACTOR. WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME THE MARINE CORPS RATE HAS EVIDENCED A MARKED AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WELL ABOVE THE PLANNED RATE TO SUPPORT BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS. IT IS ALSO NOTED THAT ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS DURING THIS LATTER PERIOD RECEIVED ONLY 70PCT OF THE AIR FORCE SORTIES PLANNED FOR THEM BY THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA PROGRAM." (NOTE 1 AND 2)

"MARINES SANCTION A FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE EFFORT FROM ALL AIR UNITS. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THE MARINE CORPS IS PROVIDING A DISPROPORTINATE SHARE OF BOTH FACTORS."

(SLIDE 17 OFF)

"THESE CONTRASTING FIGURES AND FORCE STRUCTURES CONCERN US."

PAGE FOUR RUMSAY 015W S E C R E T SPECAT

"THERE IS NO DOUBT, THAT BOTH THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE HAVE EXERTED EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE; YET, WE HAVE OBSERVED THAT DURING THREE YEARS OF OPERATIONS IN SVN THE ARMY HAS CONSISTENTLY ADDED TO ITS NUMBER OF ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS; WHILE BEING AFFORDED THE WEIGHT OF SINGLE MANAGED AIR."

"WE HAVE NOW TRIED THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM AND FIND EVERY INDICATION THAT THE ARMY'S NEED FOR ITS OWN ORGANIC AIR FIRE SUPPORT WAS COMPLETELY SOUND."

"NEVERTHELESS, IMPOSITION OF THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM ON THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAS DEPRIVED THE TEAM OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR FIRE/POWER."

(SLIDE 18 ON)

SLIDE 18 - THIS SLIDE IS THE WRAP UP SHOWING THAT MARINE AIR ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT IS NOW AF MANAGED THUS DEPRIVING THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM OF VITAL OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ITS AIR. WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE ARMY RETAINS 104 ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS AND HAS IN ADDITION THE AUTHORIZED SUPPORT OF 132 AF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT.

"FURTHERMORE, NO SUBSTITUTE HAS BEEN PROVIDED AND WE

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 015W S E C R E T SPECAT
 HAVE NO SANGUINE HOPES THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR CAN
 DO OVERNIGHT FOR THE MARINE CORPS WHAT IT HAS NOT DONE FOR
 THE ARMY IN THREE YEARS OF INTENSE EFFORT; THAT IS TO
 ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF AIR SUPPORT
 BY THE GROUND COMMANDER."

"WE CONTINUE TO WANT FOR RESPONSIVE AND TIMELY AIR
 SUPPORT INTEGRATED WITH OTHER SUPPORTING FIRES AND MANEUVER
 ELEMENTS. WE ARE WORKING THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM BUT AT CONTINUING COST TO EFFICIENCY AND ULTIMATELY
 TO THOSE WHOM WE SUPPORT, THE MARINE RIFLEMEN."

"THE ALTERNATIVES APPEAR TO BE THREE:

(1) CONTINUE AS WE ARE, ACCEPTING THE DEGRADATION AND ITS
 ATTENDANT RAMIFICATIONS TO THE MARINE LOCKED IN COMBAT;

(2) REQUEST AND EXPECT SUPPORT IN FORCE STRUCTURE
 CHANGES TO REFLECT THE LOSS OF ORGANIC FIRE POWER, WHICH
 IF APPROVED WILL COME TOO LATE FOR THIS CONFLICT AND IN
 ADDITION WILL BE EXTREMELY POOR IN COST EFFECTIVENESS;

(3) RETURN ORGANIC AIR FIRE POWER TO THE MARINE AIR
 GROUND TEAM."

"THEREFORE IT IS RECOMMENDED:

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 015W S E C R E T SPECAT

(1) THAT THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS FIXED
 WING AIR BE RETURNED TO THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM.

(2) THAT AIR UNITS FLYING IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY FORCES
 IN I CORPS BE INTEGRATED INTO MARINE CORPS AIR REQUEST AND
 CONTROL SYSTEM.

(3) THAT THE USAF AIRCRAFT DEDICATED TO ARMY USE PROVIDE
 SUPPORT THROUGH THE MARINE SYSTEM."

NOTES: 1. REFERENCE CINCPAC LTR 3010 SER: 00438 OF 2000166

2. REFERENCE JCS MSG OF AROUND OCT66 ESTABLISHING
 THE PRIORITY OF STRIKE ASSETS TO IN-COUNTRY
 REQUIREMENTS.

3. A MESSAGE TO COMUSMACV FROM CG III MAF REVIEWING THE
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION
 WITH THE SYSTEM IS BEING PREPARED. A COMPLETE PACKAGE
 OF THE SCRIPT AND CHARTS WILL BE FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE
 COVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE READY TO PRESENT OUR
 CASE AT ANY AND ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND AND INTEREST. WARM
 REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

#155

CONFIDENTIAL

ALF819
 PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAL 3144E 1111049
 ZNY CCCCC ZOK JPCCO
 P 201001Z APR 68 ZFF-6
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN
 TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG AB RVN
 BT

COG G-3
 INFO G-2 G-4
 COPY TO G-6 A DJ S/S ENGR

IC O N F I D E N T I A L / V C

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON-
 NAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

REF: COMUSMACV LTR (S), ABOVE SUBJECT, DTD 8 MAR 68.

1. (U) UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBJECT SYSTEM FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR OPERATIONS, THE REFERENCE DIRECTED THAT AN EVALUATION BE MADE OF THE SYSTEM AFTER APPROXIMATELY THIRTY DAYS OPERATION.
2. (C) THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS DIRECTED TO GO INTO EFFECT ON 10 MARCH 68. MINIMUM NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE AND PREPLANNED REQUESTS EXISTED. USMC PERSONNEL TO MAN ALLOCATED SLOTS IN DASC VICTOR, I DASC AND 7AF TACC WERE MANNED BEGINNING 21 MARCH AND WERE COMPLETELY MANNED ONLY ON 25 MARCH.

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 3144E C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. (C) DURING PERIOD 10-31 MARCH DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS IN REQUIRED REDUNDANCY WERE INSTALLED. DURING PERIOD 21 MARCH -31 MARCH TRAINING OF MARINE AND USAF PERSONNEL AT DASC VICTOR, I DASC AND TACC PROCEEDED. DURING THE SAME PERIOD THE MARINE DASC-FMAW SYSTEM WAS USED EXTENSIVELY FOR MARINE REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE AIR PENDING COMPLETION OF COMMUNICATION INSTALLATION BETWEEN DASC VICTOR AND MARINE DASCs. ADDITION OF UNFRAGGED SORTIES NOT KNOWN TO I DASC AND 7AF TACC OCCURRED THROUGH SAME INTERIM PROCEDURES. PROBLEMS IN MATING UP ARMY-AF PROCEDURES FOR ARTILLERY WARNING WITH THOSE OF THE MARINE DASC-FSCC ARTILLERY WARNING WERE ADDRESSED AND IMPROVED. METHODS OF ACCOUNTING FOR SORTIES FLOWN WERE GRADUALLY WORKED OUT.
4. (C) THE PERIOD 10 MARCH -31 MARCH 68 CAN PROVIDE MANY STATISTICS AND EXAMPLES TO SHOW THAT THERE WERE MANY NEEDED ADJUSTMENTS. HOWEVER, IN OUR VIEW MOST OF THE PROBLEMS DURING THAT PERIOD AROSE THROUGH THE NEWNESS OF THE SINGLE

air control

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PAGE 3 RUMSAL 3144E C O N F I D E N T I A L
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INTERIM PROCEDURES DUE TO PENDING
 COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS, AND NORMAL GROWING
 PAINS.

5. (C) WE CONSIDER THE PERIOD 10-31 MARCH AS A PROLOGUE
 AND THAT THE FULL SYSTEM WENT INTO OPERATION AT 0800H
 1 APRIL 1968. OUR VIEW THAT THE SYSTEM WAS FULLY
 OPERATIONAL AT THAT TIME WAS EXPRESSED TO SENIOR
 OFFICERS FMAW ON 31 MAR 68. THEY INDICATED THEY
 UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO GAIN GOOD STATISTICS ON THE
 OPERATION FROM 1 APRIL FORWARD.

6. (C) ACCORDINGLY, IN THE INTERESTS OF OBJECTIVE
 AND PRODUCTIVE EVALUATION, WE RECOMMEND THAT
 EVALUATION OF THE FIRST THIRTY DAYS OF FULL SYSTEM
 OPERATION BE MADE ON THE PERIOD 0800H 1 APRIL TO
 0800H 1 MAY 68 AND BE FURNISHED COMUSMACV NLT 10 MAY 68.

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SECRET

TT SZ YUW RUHMMA3471 1100104-SSSS--RIMMMAA.

SSSS

P 190104Z APR 68

FM ADMINO FMFPAC

TO RUHNBRA/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEBHOA/CMC

RUENAAA/CNO

RIMMMAA/C G III MAF

COG:G-2

INFO:G-3

COPY TO:G-5 ADJ S/S

BT

SECRET

NITE PANTHER (U)

A. SECDEF 192151Z/MAR68 (S)

B. CNO 192327Z/MAR68 (U) (NOTAL)

C. CINCPACFLT 22138Z/MAR68 (C) (NOTAL)

1. BY REFERENCE A, SECDEF STATED THE DESIRE THAT TESTING OF NITE PANTHER BE CONDUCTED IN THE KHE SANH AREA AFTER TWO DAYS OF INITIAL TESTING IN THE COASTAL PLAINS.

2. REFERENCE B REQUESTED THAT CINCPACFLT TAKE ACTION AS FEASIBLE ON SECDEF'S CONCEPT OF NITE PANTHER TESTING AND REFERENCE C REQUESTED CG FMFPAC TAKE ACTION AS APPROPRIATE.

3. AFTER DETAILED EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION AT KHE SANH, TESTING IN THAT AREA IS CONSIDERED NEITHER FEASIBLE NOR

PAGE 2 RUHMMA3471 SECRET

DESIRABLE. THE FOLLOWING FACTORS MILITATE AGAINST TESTING AS DIRECTED BY REFERENCE A:

A. LIMITED SUPPORT FACILITIES AT KHE SANH.

B. TIME LOST IN TRANSIT TO AND FROM KHE SANH, IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER AREAS.

C. THE NUMBER OF LIFTS REQUIRED TO RELOCATE GROUND CONTROL STATIONS, ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, AND PERSONNEL TO AN INTERMEDIATE SITE AND THEN TO KHE SANH.

D. THE LONG DISTANCE FROM THE GROUND CONTROL STATION AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT ABOARD THE USS BLUE.

E. POOR SURVEILLANCE CONDITIONS IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS DUE TO FOG.

F. THE RELATIVELY LEVEL TERRAIN IN THE COASTAL AREA AFFORDS AN EXCELLENT AREA TO EVALUATE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE LOW LIGHT LEVEL TV SYSTEM.

4. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING TEST CONCEPT BE APPROVED IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERATIONS POSED IN PARAGRAPH 3:

A. INITIAL TESTING -- TWO TO THREE DAYS WITH BOTH GROUND CONTROL STATIONS LOCATED AT DONG HA. THIS SITE AFFORDS EXCELLENT POTENTIAL COVERAGE OF DONG HA ROCKET

PAGE 3 RUHMMA3471 SECRET

BELT, COASTAL PLAIN INFILTRATION ROUTES, AND ENEMY ARTY POSITIONS IN THE EASTERN DMZ.

B. FOLLOW-ON TESTING -- AFTER INITIAL TESTING, DEPLOY ONE GROUND CONTROL STATION TO VIC CAM LO. THIS PROVIDES AN IDEAL AREA FOR SURVEILLANCE OF HELICOPTER VALLEY (YD 0464), MUTTERS RIDGES (XD 9662), THE DMZ EAST OF THE YD 00 NORTHING LINE, AND THE INFILTRATION ROUTES VIC CAM LO

SECRET

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ZNYVEP1P1AVVV PVAG1

DE RUMHVP 4689D 1380543
ZNY SSSSS
O 170543Z APR 68

COG G-3
INFO G-2
COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V
INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/CG TASK FORCE GLICK
BT

6

SECRET
KHE SANH AIR SUPT

1. RECENT RATE OF ENEMY ARTY STRIKING KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AND ENEMY ACTY INDICATES THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DEIREASE. THE AIR SUPT AVAIL TO KHE SANH HAS HOWEVER DECREASED. EXAMPLE ON THE NIGHT OF 16APR68 3D MARDIV HAS 79TGT'S TO BE STRUCK BY CSS AND WAS ALLOCATED FIFTEEN (15) TOTAL CSS SORTIES OF WHICH SIX (6) WERE PROVIDED TO KHE SANH WITH THE REMAINING FOUR (4) REGTS GETTING NINE (9).
2. CONSIDER THAT AIR SUPT AVAIL TO KHE SA H MUST CONTINUE AT A CONSTANT RATE AND OF SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY TO PREVENT INFILTRATION BACK INTO PREVIOUSLY HELD POSITIONS AND TO SUPPRESS ENEMY ARTY FIRES.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 4689D **SECRET**

3. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING REQUEST A PACKAGE OF AIR SUPT OF TWENTY FOUR (24) CSS SORTIES PER NIGHT AND FORTY-EIGHT (48) SORTIES OF FAC/CAS PER DAY BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO KHE SANH ON A DAILY BASIS.

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See file

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17 05 43

SECRET

#148

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMWAA
 DE RUMHPB 153 1071032
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 160920Z APR 68

COG G-6
 COPY TO G-2 ADJ S/S

FM 366 CMBTSPTGP DANANG AB RVN
 TO RUMUFKA/7AF/DEO/TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
 INFO RUMUFKA/377 CMBTSPTGP/BDE/TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
 RUMWAA/III MAF/CEO/DANANG RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BDEO

SUBJECT: I DASC MOVE TO III MAF. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS.

PART I. IT IS DESIRABLE FOR THE I DASC TO MOVE FROM THE I CORPS COMPOUND TO THE III MAF COMPOUND TO UTILIZE INCREASED FACILITIES WHICH CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. PLANNING IS BEING CONDUCTED BY 1972 COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON AND III MAF TO DETERMINE THE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS AT THE NEW LOCATION. THE FEASIBILITY OF USING THE EXISTING MARINE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER CIRCUITRY IS UNDER STUDY. IF THE EXISTING COMM CENTER CAN BE USED MUCH TIME AND FLOOR SPACE CAN BE SAVED, THUS IMPROVING THE I DASC FACILITY AND SPEEDING UP THE MOVE. IF THE MARINE COMM CENTER AUTODIN CIRCUIT CANNOT BE USED A REQUIREMENT WILL EXIST FOR ONE FULL DUPLEX CIRCUIT FROM THE I DASC TO TACC TAN SON NHUT. PART II. THE MARINE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER HAS AN IBM 1004 AUTODIN TERMINAL, A CIRCUIT TO PAFCO RELAY TAN SON

PAGE 2 RUMHPB 153 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 NHUT, AND TWO CIRCUITS TO DCS STRATCOM RELAY EAST DANANG. REQUEST YOU COORDINATE A TEST TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF USING THE DCS AUTODIN TO HANDLE THEIR DASC FRAG TRAFFIC. THE TEST WOULD CONSIST OF TWO DAYS OF ACTUAL TRAFFIC TO BE PASSED OVER THE AUTODIN SYSTEM FROM TAN SON NHUT TO III MAF COMM CENTER DANANG PASS ONLY THAT FRAG TRAFFIC WHICH IS NORMALLY TRANSMITTED TO III MAF OVER OTHER CIRCUITRY. DO NOT PASS I DASC TRAFFIC TO III MAF DURING THIS TEST, USE NORMAL ROUTING FOR I DASC TRAFFIC. TEST SHOULD BEGIN AT 2400 HOURS LOCAL ON 18 APRIL 68 AND END AT 2400 HOURS LOCAL ON 20 APRIL 68. IF POSSIBLE ALL MESSAGES SHOULD BE SENT TAPE TO TAPE SINCE III MAF COMM CENTER DOES NOT HAVE CARD PRINT OUT CAPABILITY. IT IS MANDATORY THAT FRAG TRAFFIC FROM TACC BE MADE A PART OF THIS TEST SINCE 60 PERCENT OF I DASC TRAFFIC ORIGINATES AT TACC. THIS TEST HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH OIC III MAF COMM CENTER. PART III. REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF THIS PROPOSAL TO PASS TACTICAL TRAFFIC OVER DCS AUTODIN.

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AC

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CONFIDENTIAL

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PR to S/S

NY TTTT
 O 011947Z APR 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 INFO WWND/CMC
 MMSB/CG FMFPAC (AM007)
 DDKE/CG III MAF
 DDKN/CG FIRST MAW (P002)
 P 011030Z APR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPAC
 INFO CINCPACAF
 CINCPACFLT
 CG FMFPAC
 CMDR SEVENTH AF
 P 010120Z APR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPAC
 INFO CINCPAC

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BT
 T O P S E C R E T SEC 1 OF 2
 PASS TO ADM SHARP FOR INFO AS ALFA 145
 O 311530 MAR 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO NMCC
 CINCPAC

BT
 T O P S E C R E T 09105 SEC I OF II.
 FOR LG SPIVY AT DJS DELIVER PRIOR 312 MAR
 AND LTG HUTCHINS DELIVER PRIOR 312200Z MAR AT
 HQ PACOM FROM BGEN BRYAN DCS MACV
 SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 REF: A. NMCC TELECON 085/68, DTG 300039Z MAR 68
 B. NMCC TELECON 086/68, DTG 302145Z MAR 68
 C. ADMIN CINCPAC DTG 301942Z MAR 68

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS IN REFERENCES. IT IS BASED ON BEST AVAILABLE DATA.
2. () BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO RESPOND TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS, AN EXPLANATION IS NECESSARY OF CERTAIN FACTORS WHICH MAKE IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE A VALID COMPARISON BETWEEN LEVELS OF FIXED WING ATTACK SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MARINE DIVISIONS BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF RVMU-BASED STRIKES ASSETS ON 29 MAR 68.

A. FORSO, UNDER MARINE AIR-GROUND SYSTEM, FIXED WING ATTACK SORTIES WERE ALLOCATED BY CG, III MAF ONLY IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS WHEN REQUIREMENTS OF DIVISIONS EXCEEDED CAPABILITIES OF 1ST MAW SUCH OCCASIONS HAVE BEEN RARE. NORMALLY DIVISIONS OBTAINED AIR SUPPORT BY DIRECT REQUEST OF 1ST MAW. SOME MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED IN RESPONSE TO PRE PLANNED REQUESTS SUBMITTED BY 1600 HOURS DAILY; HOWEVER, A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF TOTAL AIR CAPABILITY REMAINED AVAILABLE TO FULFIL IMMEDIATE REQUESTS AT ANY TIME. ADDITIONALLY, 1ST MAW LAUNCHED FLIGHTS ON A PREDETERMINED TIME SCHEDULE, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT AND DURING ADVERSE WEATHER. FLIGHTS WERE DIRECTED TO A DESIGNATED MARINE DASC (KHE SANH, DONG HA, PHU BAI, OR DA NANG) WHICH ASSIGNED FLIGHT TO A HIGH PRIORITY TARGET AND FAC OR TPQ-10 SITE TO CONTROL THE STRIKE. USING THIS SYSTEM, DURING THE PERIOD 1-20

Prague

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT
 DATE 4/2/68 III MAF S&C

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III MAF *[Signature]*
 (SIGNATURE)

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PAGE 3 YNA 0059 T O P S E C R E T
 MAR 68, 1ST MAW SORTIE RATE WAS 1.5. BASED ON DAILY AVERAGE OF
 152 POSSESSED ATTACK AIRCRAFT AND DAILY AVERAGE 229 ATTACK SORTIES
 FLOWN.

B. SECOND, BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM COULD BE IMPLEMENTED, IT WAS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHAT STRIKE ASSETS 1ST MAW WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO DEPCOMUSMACV/AIR FOR FRAGGING AND OPERATIONAL DIRECTION. 1ST MAW STATED THAT IT WAS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A 1.2 SORTIE RATE, (SORTIES PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT PER DAY) WHICH EQUATED TO APPROXIMATELY 190 SORTIES PER DAY DEPENDING ON NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WITH HEAVY BATTLE DAMAGE ZIN DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE. IT FURTHER STATED THAT NORMALLY 162 SORTIES SHOULD BE PRE-PLANNED AND THAT REMAINING 28 SORTIES WOULD BE RESULT OF EMERGENCY AND/OR ALLOCATED SCRAMBLES. IT INDICATED THAT 28 SCRAMBLED SORTIES PER DAY HAD BEEN STATISTICAL AVERAGE SINCE BEGINNING OF TET OFFENSIVE. OF THE 162 SORTIES AVAILABLE FOR PRE PLANNED USE, 16 WERE A-6A SORTIES FLOWN EACH NIGHT IN EXTENDED BATTLE AREA. APPROXIMATELY 91 ADDITIONAL SORTIES WERE COMMITTED DAILY FOR STRIKES AND HELICOPTER ESCORT MISSIONS IN OPERATION NIAGARA AREA AROUND KHE SANH. DEDUCTING THESE TWO GROUPS OF SORTIES LEFT A TOTAL OF 55 MARINE ATTACKS

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PAGE 4 YNA 0059 T O P S E C R E T

SORTIES AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT ALL MARINE FORCES IN III MAF, INCLUDING ROK MAR BDE, LESS THOSE AT KHE SANH. THOSE 55 SORTIES OBVIOUSLY WERE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE DESIRED LEVEL OF SUPPORT BUT MACV COULD NOT ALLOCATE A GREATER NUMBER OF MARINE SORTIES TO III MAF THAN HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT 1ST MAW IS FLYING A GREATER NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE SORTIES AT PRESENT. DURING PERIOD 21-27 MAR 1ST MAW STRIKE AIRCRAFT FLEW AN AVERAGE OF 204 SORTIES DAILY FOR SORTIE RATE OF 1.31 BASED ON AN AVERAGE OF 156 POSSESSED AIRCRAFT.

C. THIRD, THERE IS NOT ENOUGH AIR EFFORT AVAILABLE TO FULFILL STATED REQUIREMENTS OF ALL MAJOR COMMANDS. UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, MACV J3 AIR GIVES HQ III MAF TWO ALLOCATIONS DAILY. ONE IS FOR NUMBER OF TARGETS TO BE STRUCK AT NIGHT UNDER RADAR CONTROL (MSQ-77 OR TPQ-10). THE OTHER IS FOR NUMBER OF FLIGHTS OF AIRCRAFT (USUALLY TWO AIRCRAFT EACH) THAT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO EXECUTE STRIKES UNDER VISUAL OR RADAR CONTROL THE FOLLOWING DAY. III MAF SUBALLOCATES TO PROV CORPS; AMERICAN DIVISION, 1ST MARINE DIVISION, AND 2D ROK MARINE BDE BASED ON THEIR STATED REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY CG, AND MAF. PROV CORPS V FURTHER SUBALLOCATES TO 1ST CAVALRY DIV.

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III MAF 2100/4

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PAGE 5ME YNA 0059 T O P S E C R E T

101ST AIRBORNE DIV, AND 3D MARINE DIV, AGAIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR STATED REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY CG, PROV CORPS V. IN THIS INTEGRATED PROCEDURE, ENCOMPASSING ALLOCATIONS OF MARINE AND AF STRIKES TO MARINE AND ARMY UNITS, MARINE AIR IS FRAGGED TO MARINE UNITS INASFAR AS PRACTICABLE, HOWEVER, IT CANNOT BE AN OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IN ALL CASES.

3. (TS) FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO REQUEST A, REF A, SPECIFIC DATA ON NUMBER OF SORTIES "ALLOCATED" BY DAY DURING PERIOD 1-20MAR TO 1ST AND 3DD MARINE DIVS DASCs ARE NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, TABLE BELOW RELECTS ATTACK SORTIES FLOWN BY 1ST MAW DURING PERIOD IN SUPPORT OF 1ST MARINE DIV AND 3D MARINE DIV. TOTAL SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF 3D MARINE DIV INCLUDE MARINE SORTIES IN NIAGARA AREA. THESE FIGURES ARE REPORTED DAILY TO MACV J3 AIR BY III MAF AND ARE TAKEN FROM 1ST MAW SITREP. THEY MAY DIFFER SLIGHTLY FROM CORRESPONDING DATA IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.

DATE	1ST MAR DIV	3 MAR DIV	(INCLUDES NIAGARA SORTIES)
MAR 68			
1	39	106	
2	32	114	

PAGE 6 YNA 0059 T O P S E C R E T

3	44	130
4	31	186
5	33	191
6	41	183
7	36	176
8	44	182
9	37	147
10	35	88
11	34	161
12	22	97
13	43	121
14	41	170
15	47	152
16	39	149
17	63	136
18	62	143
19	79	136
20	71	109

4. (S) FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO REQUEST B, REF A.
A. FIRST ALLOCATIONS TO III MAF UNDER SINGLE MANAGE-
BT

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NAB 686A
 DDKE
 DE QYNA 0060 0921947
 ZNY TTTT
 O 011947Z APR 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 INFO WWD/CMC
 WWSB/CG FMFPAC (AM007)
 DDKE/CG III MAF
 DDKN/CG FIRST MAW (P002)
 P 011030Z APR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPAC
 INFO CINCPACAF
 CINCPACFLT
 CG FMFPAC
 CMDR SEVENTH AF
 P 010120Z APR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPAC
 INFO CINCPAC
 BT

№ 10894

TOP SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 2
 MENT SYSTEM WERE MADE 201830 MAR 68 FOR STRIKES DURING PERIOD
 211900 MAR AND 221900 MAR. III MAF SUBALLOCATED TO MAJOR SUB-
 ORDINATE UNITS AS EXPLAINED IN PARA 2C. FIRST PRE PLANNED
 REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED 21 MAR.
 B. IN TABLE BELOW "ALLOCATED" REFLECTS SORTIES FRAGGED
 IN RESPONSE TO APPROVED PRE PLANNED REQUESTS. "FLOWN" INDICATES
 TOTAL SORTIES, INCLUDING IMMEDIATES, THAT SUPPORTED EACH DIVISION.
 3D MARINE DIV "FLOWN" TOTALS INCLUDE 1ST MAW SORTIES IN NIAGARA

PAGE 2 YYN: 0060 TOP SECRET
 AREA. TOTALS IN "FLOWN" COLUMNS ARE FROM III MAF REPORT TO
 MACV J3 AIR.

DATE	1ST MAR DIV		3D MAR DIV	
	ALLOCATED	FLOWN	ALLOCATED	FLOWN
MAR 68				
21	-	35	-	135
22	14	41	33	136
23	7	36	38	108
24	14	31	41	33
25	10	22	24	77
26	7	26	26	123
27	11	29	15	152
28	15	30	33	149
29	8	24	62	133
30	9	20	63	117

5. (TS) FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO REQUEST C, REF A. THESE
 CIRCUMSTANCES IMPACTED IN VARYING DEGREE ON SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
 AND ALLOCATIONS DURING THE PERIOD 21-30 MAR.
 A. AIR SUPPORT OF FORCES AT KHE SANH (OP NIAGARA).
 THROUGHOUT BOTH PERIODS APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF THE TOTAL EFFORT OF
 THE 1ST MAW WAS EXPENDED IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH-BASED

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MARINES. THIS COMMITMENT REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY THE AMOUNT OF AIR SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO THE REMAINING MARINE FORCES; HOWEVER THERE WERE NO CRITICAL ACTIONS ELSEWHERE WHICH GENERATED REQUIREMENTS FOR A MASSIVE AIR EFFORT. DURING THE PERIOD 1-20 MAR THE 1ST MAW APPARENTLY WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE ALL AIR SUPPORT REQUESTED BUT, IN DOING SO, THE WING'S SORTIE RATE INCREASED FROM 1.45 TO 1.51 IN FEB 68.

B. ALLOCATIONS VS AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES. UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ON 21 MAR, MARINE AIR EFFORT THAT MACV COULD ALLOCATE TO III MAF WAS LIMITED AS DISCUSSED IN PARA 2B. WHILE THE ALLOCATION SYSTEM DOES PERMIT A COMMANDER TO SHIFT THE PRIORITY OF AIR SUPPORT WHERE HE WANTS IT, THE PRESENT SYSTEM FIXES A CEILING ON PRE PLANNED AIR SUPPORT WHICH MAY LIMIT SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO UNITS HAVING A LOW PRIORITY. THIS CEILING, HOWEVER, IS BASED ON APPROVED PROGRAMS FOR FLYING HOURS AND MUNITIONS. OF COURSE, TACTICAL AIR UNITS CGE FOR BRIEF PERIOD WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRES, BUT SUCH ACTIONS MUST BE COMPENSATED FOR LATER BY REDUCING SORTIE RATES OR BY INCREASING THE PROGRAMS FOR FLYING HOURS AND MUNITIONS.

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C. WEATHER HAD NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON REQUIREMENTS OR ALLOCATIONS; HOWEVER, THROUGHOUT BOTH PERIODS MANY STRIKES HAD TO BE EXECUTED UNDER RADAR CONTROL (TPQ-10 OR MSG-77).

6. (U) REQUEST D, REF A, APPEARS TO BE COVERED BY THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, PARTICULARLY IN PARA 5B.

7. (TS) REQUEST E, REF A, THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY INSTANCE IN WHICH MARINE FORCES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ALL AIR SUPPORT REQUESTED THROUGH IMMEDIATE CHANNELS. THE LIMITATIONS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF PRE PLANNED AIR SUPPORT ARE DISCUSSED IN PARA 5B.

8. (TS) FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO REQUEST IN REF B. THE TOTAL TIME LOSS IN TRANSMISSION OF SCRAMBLE REQUESTS IN I CTZ UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS INSIGNIFICANT. THIS AMOUNTS TO TRANSMISSION THROUGH ONE ADDITIONAL AGENCY AND TAKES ONLY A FEW SECONDS. THIS TIME OF TRANSMISSION DELAY IS OFFSET BY THE LARGE NUMBERS OF USAF PRE PLANNED SORTIES IN TO I CTZ DAILY (APPROXIMATELY 130). ALL OF THESE SORTIES ARE POTENTIALLY AVAILABEL FOR DIVERTS FOR USMC OR OTHER GROUND COMMANDERS USE. THEIR IRAF SORTIES ARE IN ADDITION TO THE USMC SORTIES ALSO AVAILABLE. REACTION TIME OF DIVERTS IN NORTHERN I CTZ

HAVE BEEN AVERAGING FIVE MINUTES WHICH IS CONSIDERABLE MORE REponsive THAN THE BEST SCRAMBLE TIMES. THE AVAILABILITY OF MORE AIR FOR IMMEDIATE REQUESTS THROUGHOUT I CTZ PROVIDES GREATER FLEXIBILITY OF AIR AND CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED BY THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

GP-4

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SECRET

DE RUMSAW 2620D 1071025

ZNY USSSS ZOK JPCCO

O 160954Z APR 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG

ZEN/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

BT

O S E C R E T 10771

SUBJ: MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTERS (U)

THIS MESSAGE IS IN TWO PARTS

IPART ONE FOR CG, III MAF

1. (S) A. IN FURTHERANCE OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT ON 14 APR 68, AN ASSESSMENT OF ALL IN-COUNTRY MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTERS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN AN EFFORT TO FURNISH III MAF WITH ADDITIONAL ASSETS. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS CANNOT BE PROVIDED AT THIS TIME.

B. CURRENTLY, FORTY-TWO PERCENT (42PCT) OF ALL MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTERS (CH-47 & CH 753) ARE OPCON TO CG, III MAF. THIS INCLUDES THOSE ASSETS IN THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION AND THE AMERICAL DIVISION IN ADDITION TO MARINE ASSETS. A CENTRALIZED UTILIZATION OF MEDIUM HELICOPTERS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE IN I CTZ SHOULD PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO MEET THE

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 2620D S E C R E T
REQUIREMENT DISCUSSED.

C. IF REQUIRED, IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE NECESSARY REDISTRIBUTION, A STANDDOWN OF OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF I CTZ IS AUTHORIZED. IN THIS CONNECTION, CG I FFORCEV IS BEING DIRECTED TO PREPARE A CONTINGENCY PLAN, ENCOMPASSING THE PERIOD 17 APR 18 TO 1 MAY 68, TO PROVIDE ON (1) CH-47 PLATOON OF AT LEAST SIX (6) FLYABLE AIRCRAFT FOR EMPLOYMENT IN QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TRINE PROVINCES IN THE EVENT EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT ONE (1) PLATOON OF AT LEAST SIX (6) FP AZYE AIRCRAFT TO THE SOUTHERN TWO (2) PROVINCES OF I CTZ.

B. PROVISION OF THESE ASSETS WILL BE ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS, REQUESTED BY CG III MAF, AND APPROVED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

GP-4

BT

ACT G-3

INFO G-2 G-4

COPY TO G-5 ADJ S/S ENGR

SECRET

#144

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MNNZCZCSAA894ZVA 302 ARA148

PP RUMSAK

DE RUMSAR 553 1050658

ZNY CCCCC

P 140530Z APR 68

FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN

TO RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG

INFO RUMSEEEA

INFO RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG

RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR PHU BAI

RUMSAW/COMUSMACV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L T A C P S .

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT (U)

REFERENCE A: III MAF MESSAGE 05/1432Z APR 68.

REFERENCE B: 7AF MESSAGE 06/0505Z APR 68.

1. (C) REFERENCE A REQUESTS ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTINUOUS INTERDICTION PROGRAM. REFERENCE B EXPLAINS NECESSITY FOR 7AF TO RESPOND ONLY TO REQUESTS PASSED THROUGH MACV TASE.
2. (C) 7AF STRIKE PLANS PASSED REFERENCE A TO MACV TASE TO DEVELOP REQUESTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH III MAF G-3 AIR. TARGETS ARE NOW BEING STRUCK BASED ON THOSE REQUESTS.
3. (U) UNDERSTAND THAT FUTURE III MAF REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT WILL BE DIRECTED TO MACV TASE.

GP-4

BT

ACT:G-3

INFO:G-2

COPY TO: ADJ G-6 S/S

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III MAF 2100/6 (3/68)

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#141

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMSAV RUMWAA
 DE RUHFMA 2773 1052157
 ZNY TTTT
 O 142137Z APR 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW (P026)
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN AND MAJ.
 GEN ANDERSON, FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 2

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE AIR (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 130359Z/APR68 (S)

B. CG FIRST MAW 100000Z/APR68 (S)

1. ANDY'S IDEA OF A WORKING GROUP TO BRING OUT THE REALITIES OF THE AIR SUPPORT PROBLEM IS FIRST CLASS. MY GUESS IS THAT WE ARE GOING TO NEED EXACTLY THE SORT OF IN-DEPTH EFFORT HE DESCRIBES IN REF A

2. HERE IS THE SITUATION, AS I KNOW IT TODAY.--THE COMMANDANT HAS MADE HIS PITCH TO THE JCS AND HAS CONSIDERED HIS POSITION IN WRITING. THE JCS HAVE CONSIDERED AND DEBATED THE MATTER AT LENGTH. IN THE INITIAL GO-ROUND ONLY CNO JOINED CMC IN HIS CONCLUSION

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 2773 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THAT CINCPAC HAS EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY AND SHOULD BE MADE TO REVERSE HIMSELF. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, PERCEIVING THE LONG RANGE IMPLICATION UPON HIS FORCES, REVERSED HIMSELF. IN THE FINAL VOTING HE ALIGNED WITH CMC AND CNO. THE PAPER WENT FORWARD TO SECDEF FOR DECISION--SPLIT, WITH THE CHAIRMAN AND THE AIR FORCE ON ONE SIDE, AND THE REMAINING THREE ON THE OTHER. PRESUMABLY THERE WILL BE A HEARING BY SECDEF, WHEN HE RECEIVES A LOOK AT BOTH SIDES OF THE PROBLEM AS PRESENTED BY THE RESPECTIVE PROTAGONISTS. THIS WAS SCHEDULED FOR DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY; SUBSEQUENTLY FOR YESTERDAY AND NOW, PROBABLY FOR THE FIRST OF NEXT WEEK. KNOWING HOW THOSE THINGS OPERATE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT GENERAL WHEELER WOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE MATTER TO GO FORWARD TO SECDEF WITHOUT FIRST LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE DECISION WHICH HE SEEKS. IF THIS SUSPICION IS CORRECT, THEN WE MAY EXPECT SOME FORM OF ADVERSE OR UNSATISFACTORY REACTION FROM SECDEF, AND THAT IS THE WAY I SEE IT NOW.

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHNFMA 2773 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

3. ACCORDINGLY, A FIRST RATE, IRREFUTABLE PRESENTATION ON OUR PART IS REQUIRED. THIS CAN ONLY BE BUILT ON A FABRIC OF HARD FACTS SUCH AS ANDY DESCRIBES IN HIS MESSAGE. AS I SEE IT, THE NEXT STEP, IF CMC'S EFFORTS ARE REBUFFED, IS FOR BOB TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE COMPLAINT CHANNEL TO CINCPAC. WHEN WE GO DOWN THIS TRACK, WE HAVE TO HAVE THE ACES TO A DEGREE THAT WILL MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE FOR CINCPAC TO IGNORE US OR BRUSH US OFF.

4. WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, HERE ARE MY COMMENTS ON THE OUTLINE AND PLAN WHICH ANDY DESCRIBED IN HIS MESSAGE:

A. I CONCUR IN THE THRUST OF THE PRESENTATION. IT IS PROPERLY TAILORED TO SPOTLIGHT THE DISADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF THE PRESENT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, AS IT IS NOW FUNCTIONING. IT WILL HELP ILLUMINATE THE UNWIELDINESS OF THE NEW SYSTEM IN TERMS OF LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS, WILL CHIP AWAY AT THE "ECONOMY OF FORCE" STATEMENT BEING USED AS AN AIR FORCE SELLING POINT, AND WILL CHALLENGE THE

PAGE 4 RUHNFMA 2773 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
VALIDITY OF THE SINGLE MANAGER AIR SUPPORT IMPROVEMENTS CLAIMED BY THE AIR FORCE IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE BENEFITS PROVIDED THE MARINE ON THE GROUND.

B. IN YOUR INTRODUCTORY REMARKS IT MAY BE FRUITFUL TO WARM THE ATMOSPHERE SOMEWHAT BY REVIEWING OUR LONG ESTABLISHED AGREEMENT WITH THE AIR FORCE ON CONTROL OF AIR BY SUCCINCTLY RESTATING THAT WE ALWAYS HAVE SUBSCRIBED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN THAT WITHIN A JOINT FORCE THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER NORMALLY SHOULD BE THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR ALL AIR OPERATIONS; THAT WE BELIEVE IN A SINGLE AUTHORITY FOR AIR DEFENSE AND HAVE LENT OUR FULL SUPPORT TO THE AIRFORCE IN THIS; THAT WE SUBSCRIBE WHOLLY TO THE EXTERIOR INTERDICTION SYSTEM FOR LAOS AND NVN, FOR THREE YEARS OF THE CURRENT WAR THIS SITUATION HAS PREVAILED IT HAS WORKED WELL; PROVING THE WISDOM OF COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, AND THE JCS IN DEFINING SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER'S

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHFMMA 2773 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SYSTEM, THE MARINE CORPS SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO SATISFY, AND DID SATISFY FOR THREE YEARS, THE RESPONSIVENESS REQUIRE BY THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDER WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, BEING RESPONSIVE TO THE OVERALL DIRECTION OF THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER.

BUT, THE MARINE COMMANDER, HIS AIR SUPPORT IS AS INSEPARABLE TO HIS COMBAT TEAM AS IS HIS ARTILLERY, HIS TANKS, OR EVEN HIS INFANTRYMAN'S M-16 RIFLE. HE DOESN'T FIGHT A GROUND WAR DISTINCT AND APART FROM THE AIR WAR. HE FIGHTS ONE WAR AND THE GROUND AND THE AIR OVER IT IS AN ENTITY WITHIN WHICH HE MUST HAVE INSTANT CONTROL OVER EVERY ONE OF HIS SUPPORTING ARMS, BE THEY ARTILLERY, HELICOPTERS, FIXED WING AIR, OR GROUND ELEMENTS. HE BLEND THESE TOGETHER TOWARD A SINGLE GOAL. ALL MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO HIM AND RESPONSIBLE TO HIM. HIS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS A CARDINAL ELEMENT IN HIS TACTICAL PLAN, AND, IF IT IS DIVERTED TO MEET A NEED ELSEWHERE, HIS OPERATION IS COMPROMISED. IN ANY CASE, IF THERE IS A DIVERSION UNDERTAKEN, THE DECISION ON WHAT HAS HIGHEST PRIORITY

PAGE 6 RUHFMMA 2773 T O P S E C R E T PSECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO MUST RESIDE IN THE GROUND CHAIN OF AUTHORITY. THE NEWLY IMPLEMENTED SYSTEM SIMPLE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THIS.

C. YOUR IDEA TO WEAVE IN THE THOUGHT THAT GROSS EXPENDITURES OF ORDNANCE ARE A MEASURE ONLY OF MAGNITUDE OF EFFORT, NOT THE SUCCESS OF IT, IS WELL TAKEN. RELATED TO THIS POINT I NOTED IN REF B THAT USAF (SAC B-52) MISSIONS WERE EQUATED WITH OTHER ATTACK AIRCRAFT STRIKES IN TERMS OF SORTIE COUNT. THIS OPENS THE DOOR IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSSION OF ORDNANCE TONNAGE FIGURES FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES. WE MUST GUARD AGAINST BECOMING ENMESHED IN A SORTIE OR TONNAGE STATISTICAL RACE TO THE EXTENT THAT WE MIGHT DEVELOP NUMBERS OF A SORT WHICH COULD BE TURNED AGAINST US.

5. SOME OF THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS MAY PROVE HELPFUL IN ZEROING ON THE TARGET; OTHERS COULD WORK TO OUR DISADVANTAGE. THEY STEM FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATISTICAL DATA PROVIDED BY YOUR DAILY REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD 3-12 APR 73.

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PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT. GEN CUSHMAN AND MAJ. GEN ANDERSON, FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF 2

A. ON THE NOT-SO-BAD SIDE, THE REPORTS SHOWED THAT 91 PERCENT OF THE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS WERE HONORED. OF THE SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED, 77 PERCENT ARRIVED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FROM THE TIME THE GROUND COMMANDER INITIATED HIS REQUEST. ALSO HIGHLIGHTED WAS THE FACT THAT THE ORDNANCE LOAD AVAILABLE WAS ALMOST ALWAYS ACCEPTABLE. THIS COMPARES FAVORABLY WITH OUR OWN PERFORMANCE ON IMMEDIATE REQUESTS.

B. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, YOUR STATISTICS REFLECT JUST HOW MUCH OUR MARINES ARE BEING SHORT CHANGED IN THE AREA OF PREPLANNED MISSIONS. ONLY 36 PERCENT OF THE TARGETS

PAGE 2 RUHNFMA2774 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN MCEO DESIRED BY THE GROUND COMMANDERS TO BE HIT WERE SCHEDULED BY THE TAGC. OF THOSE WHICH WERE FRAGGED, ONLY 51 PERCENT WERE ACTUALLY HIT.

C. REVEALED ALSO WAS THAT 41 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SORTIES PROVIDED WERE EXTRA AND UNREQUESTED BY THE ROUND COMMANDER, WHO COULD NEITHER PREPLAN FOR THIS SURGE EFFORT NOR INFLUENCE THE SELECTION OF THE ORDNANCE AVAILABLE. HIS ONLY RECOURSE WAS TO ACCEPT THE ORDNANCE, WHETHER RIGHT OR WRONG FOR THE TARGET, OR DECLINE TO ACCEPT THE SORTIES.

D. THE STATISTICS SHOWED, TOO, THAT 42 PERCENT OF THE PREPLANNED SORTIES WERE OVER 15 MINUTES LATE ARRIVING ON TARGET. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE AND COMPROMISES THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF INTERGRATING TOTALLY, ALL AVAILABLE FIRE POWER. THE COMMANDER CAN NO LONGER RELY ON THE PROMPT ARRIVAL OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT AS A SCHEDULED PART OF HIS DAILY SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

G. HOMER DAN WILL WILL HAND CARRY TO YOU SOME DOCUMENTS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL IN YOUR PRESENTATION.

PAGE 3 RUHNFMA2774 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO HE WILL HAVE ADVANCE COPIES OF A DRAFT OF OUR PRESENTATION ON THE SINGLE MANAGER CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES IN VIETNAM WHICH WILL APPEAR IN OUR MARCH UPDATE OF MARINE OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM, INCLUDING CHARTS ON PREPLANNED AND IMMEDIATE MISSIONS, PRINTED AND IN 35MM AND VUEOGRAPH FORM. THESE MAY PROVE USEFUL TO HISE'S WORKING GROUP. THEY ARE FREE TO USE ALL OR ANY OF IT, AS THEY WISH.

BEST REGARDS.
GP-4

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 130355Z APR 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN. WRLAK AND LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM M GEN ANDERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR FMFPAC F-913 OPERATION CONTROL OF MARINE AIR

1. I HAVE FORMED A SPECIAL, FULL-TIME WORKING GROUP, HEADED BY BEEN HISE TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. THE GROUP IS NOW PREPARING OUR CASE IN THE FORM OF A 45 MINUTE PRESENTATION SUITABLE FOR DELIVERY TO CINCPAC OR HIGHER LEVEL. TO ENSURE OUR EFFORTS MATCH ANY STEPS YOU MAY BE TAKING I HAVE AUTHORIZED THE WORKING GROUP TO CONTACT MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFFS ON THIS SUBJECT.
2. THE WORKING GROUP WILL COMPLETE A DETAILED OUTLINE OF THE PRESENTATION BY 14 APRIL, HAVE A COMPLETED DRAFT BY 17 APRIL FOR CONSIDERATION BY CG III MAF.
3. THE PRESENTATION WILL ADDRESS THE FIRST 30 DAYS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND WILL BE AIMED AT RESTORING OUR AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 032W SECRET SPECAT TO NORMAL. THE FOLLOWING IS A TENTATIVE TOPIC OUTLINE:

A. INTRODUCTION

- (1) 30 DAY PERIOD WAS ESTABLISHED BY CINCPAC IN WHICH TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF IMPOSITION OF SEPERATE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE AIR BY THE 7TH AIR FORCE. THIS BRIEFING IS A REPORT OF OUR ASSESSMENT.
- (2) WE SUSCRIBE TO THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM, SUCH AS AIR DEFENSE AND EXTERIOR INTERDICTION IN LAOS AND NVN, IN FACT, WE ARE ALREADY PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY IN BOTH THOSE EFFORTS.
- (3) HOWEVER, IN THE AREA OF MELDING TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT WITH THE FLUID TACTICAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND, SEPERATE MANAGEMENT OF AIR HAS SUCH EFFECTS OF THE CAPABILITY OF MARINE AIR TO INVITE CRITICAL INSPECTION.

B. MARINE AIR GROUND COMBAT AT CONTROL SYSTEM

- (1) AS ITS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MUST BE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE SYSTEM WHICH IT REPLACED.
- (2) MARINE AIR, LIKE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE AIR-GROUND TEAM, IS AIMED AT SUPPORT OF THE MARINE RIFLEMAN AND AT MAKING HIM MORE EFFECTIVE.
- (3) MARINE AIR IS TAILORED AND TASKED TO:

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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SECRET

PAGE THREE NUNSAV 052U S E C R E T S P E C I A L

(A) DEFEND THE AIR ABOVE THE REFUGEE

(B) DESTROY THE ENEMY ON THE GROUND SUBJECT AREA

(C) DELIVER THE MARINE RIFLEMAN INTO BATTLE AND RECOVER HIM AS REQUIRED

(D) RESUPPLY HIM

(4) THESE ARE INTERDEPENDENT AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS. MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THEM ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TOTAL SCHEME OF COMBAT CONTROL OF FIRE, MANPOWER AND RESUPPLY.

(5) THERE ARE CERTAIN MINIMUM CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE COMBAT CONTROL SYSTEM AS REGARDS TACTICAL AIR. THEY ARE:

(A) IT MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO THE TACTICAL NEEDS OF THE GROUND UNIT (TIMELY, ACCURATE, APPROPRIATE)

(B) IT MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH ALL OTHER FIRE AND MANPOWER ELEMENTS

(C) IT MUST INVOLVE A MINIMUM NUMBER OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES AND ECHELONS.

(D) IT MUST MINIMIZE THE RISK OF MISDIRECTED FIRE.

(E) IT MUST INVOLVE MINIMUM COMMUNICATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.

(F) IT MUST BE RELIABLE (SUPPORTED, UNITS MUST KNOW BY HEART)

PAGE FOUR NUNSAV 052U S E C R E T S P E C I A L

IS BEING HONORED AND MUST BE SURE PLANE'S WILL NOT BE DOWNED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL?

C. REMAINDER OF PRESENTATION WILL ADDRESS ABOVE SIX POINTS INDIVIDUALLY, ANALYZING EXTENT TO WHICH SINGLE MANAGEMENT ACCOMPLISHES THEM, USING STATISTICS INSTEAD OF POSSIBLE QUOTE UNQUOTE FROM COMBAT PERSONNEL, GIVING VIEWS, ETC. THIS WILL BE A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION. EVIDENCE COLLECTED THIS FAR ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM INDICATES THAT IT DOES NOT VINCIBLY SATISFY ANY OF THE ABOVE SIX MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. THIS PORTION OF THE PRESENTATION WILL CARRY THE REM. ORDER OF OUR CASE.

D. THE PRESENTATION WILL HAVE A WRAP-UP GIVING A BR-GAP OF SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING A PROPOSAL FOR RESTORING OUR SYSTEM. THE PROPOSAL WILL INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE NEW III MAF/PROV V/ARMY DIVISION ORGANIZATION.

E. OTHER USEFUL IDEAS THAT WILL BE MOVED INTO THE PRESENTATION AS THE WORK PROGRESSES ARE:

(1) SINGLE MANAGEMENT IS A SUPPLIER ORIENTED SYSTEM.

(2) A HIGH DEGREE OF INCENTIVE AND MOTIVATION BEING THE MAIN MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAMWORK.

(3) MARINE AIR PERSONNEL IN GROUND UNITS ARE MEMBERS OF THE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SRG.									

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAY 032W S E C R E T. SPECAT
UNITS, ANSWERABLE TO GROUND UNIT COMMANDER. SINGLE MANAGEMENT
AIR PERSONNEL ARE MEMBERS OF AN EXTERIOR SYSTEM, WITH A LIAISON
FUNCTION ONLY, AND STILL ANSWERABLE TO THEIR AIR COMMANDER, NOT
THE COMMANDER OF THE SUPPORTED GROUND UNIT.

(4) FIGURES LOOK VERY GOOD REGARDING PERCENT OF MARINE AIR EFFORT
AT NIGHT COMPARED TO MAGNITUDE OF USAF NIGHT EFFORT.

(5) GROSS EXPENDITURES OF ORDNANCE ARE A MEASURE OF THE
MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT, NOT THE SUCCESS OF IT. SUCCESS IS
MEASURE IN THE MARINE CONTEXT IN TERMS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
MISSION OF THE GROUND UNIT.

4. I WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE ON THIS APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM, AND ANY IDEAS TO REINFORCE OUR CASE.

5. WHILE OUR GOAL, OF COURSE, IS TO REGAIN CONTROL OF OUR AIR,
AND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, I BELIEVE OUR ALTERNATIVE POSITION
SHOULD BE TO KEEP THE MATTER OPEN AND NEGOTIABLE, AIMING AT
SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS. REGARDS.

G-4
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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

137

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P 121040Z APR 68
 FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN
 TO RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG
 INFO RUMSAV/COMUSMACV
 RUMSAV/ I MAW DANANG

ACT G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L T A C D .

SUBJECT: SORTIE RATE FOR FIXED-WING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (U)

REFERENCE A: III MAF 04/0300Z PAR 68.

REFERENCE B: I MAW 10/1343Z MAR 68.

1. (C) PARAGRAPH 8 OF REFERENCE A INDICATED COMUSMACV HAD BEEN TOLD THAT I MAW HAD THE CAPABILITY OF A 1.4 OR 1.45 SORTIE RATE. PART I OF REFERENCE B DECLARED TO COMMANDER 7AF THE CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN A 1.2 SORTIE RATE BASED ON POSSESSED AIRCRAFT.
2. (C) IN THE INTERSET OF BEST UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR RESOURCES REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF III MAF POSITION ON REFERENCED SORTIE RATES:
 - A. WHAT IS SUSTAINED SORTIE RATE CAPABILITY OF III MAF FIXED WING FIGHTER FLEET BASED ON POSSESSED AIRCRAFT, MANNING, EQUIPMENT, ORDNANCE AND RE-SUPPLY?

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 490 C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. WHAT IS SURGE RATE, OVER WHAT PERIOD OF TIME, PREDICATED ON SAME PARAMETERS?

3. (C) 7AF IS PREPARED TO ADJUST III MAF SUSTAINED SORTIE RATE TO ANY LEVEL WITHIN YOUR CAPABILITY AND APPROVED BY CINCPAC PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING DOCUMENTATION.

GP-4

BT

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NNNUVV MWB199CVVZCZCBMB235
 PP RUMWAA
 DE RUMMA 024 1010700
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 100502Z APR 68
 FM CG PCV PHU BAI RVN
 TO CG III MAF DNG RVN
 BT

ACT G-2
 INFO G-3
 COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

S E C R E T 00821 ROSSON SENDS
 REF: (S) REVIEW OF PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING PRE-STRIKE INTELLIGENCE AND POST-STRIKE BDA, INDICATES THAT AVAILABLE ASSETS ARE BEING JUCICIOUSLY EMPLOYED BUT THAT MAGNITUDE OF ARC LIGHT EFFORT IN THIS CORPS IN SUCH THAT SHORTFALL FROM DESIRED STANDARD SOF INTELLIGENCE IS THE INEVITABLE RESULT. RECENT REQUESTS FOR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS TO AAUGMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES HAVE NOT BEEN FAVORABLY CONSIDERED. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROGRESS OF OPERATION PEGASUS HAS UNDERSCORED AGAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARC LIGHT PROGRAM.

2. (S) EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE PCV RECONNAISSANCE AND BDA CAUABILITY. A MIBARS FACILITY FOR PCV IS NOW PROGRAMMED. DASC-V, THROUGH AIR FORCE CHANNELS, HAS RECOMMENDED AN EVALUATION OF THE RECCE REQUEST SYSTEM AND THE RECCE DELIVERY SYSTEM. I THESE EVALUATIONS PROVE FEASIBLE RESULTANT IMPROVEMENTS SHOULD ENHANCE THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT IN PCV. THOUGH THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE SOLUTION, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT ATTAINMENT OF DESIRED STANDARD WITHIN THIS CORPS CAN

PAGE 2 RUMMA 024 **S E C R E T**

BE MET BY THE PROVISION OF 10 ADDITIONAL HOURS PER DAY OF VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AND EXPEDITIONS FULFILLMENT OF AERIAL PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE REQUESTS FOR TARGET ACQUISITION AND BDA.

3. (U) AS A SEPARATE ACTION THIS HEADQUARTERS IS CONDUCTING A STUDY TO DETERMIN E THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ARMY AIRCRAFT ASSETS TO FULFILL THE PRIMARY ROLE OF ARTILLERY OBSERVATION.

GP-4

BT

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Control*

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FLC 2100/4 (1/68)

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						ADMINSERV CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 101336Z APR COPY# 3 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEG
C/S						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

AC

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OO RUHHFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1270 1011336
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 101336Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSOVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGEN
 MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS DELIVER FIRST WAKING HOUR.

SUBJ: CONTROL OF MARINE AIR IN RVN

1. THE FOLLOWING PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO CMC 091623Z APR 68:
 QUOTE

O 151905Z MAR 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO CG FIRST MAW DANANG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 07399 FROM MACCOC6 SEC I OF II.

SUBJ: PREPLANNED REQUESTS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)

REF: A. LTR, HQ MACV, MACJOD, 7 MAR 68, SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (S)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1270 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 B. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUN 66 (C)
 C. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11, 21 JUN 66 (C)

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE FOR REQUEST-
 ING PREPLANNED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE A. IT SUPPLEMENTS REFERENCES B AND C
 WHICH WILL BE REVISED.

2. (C) ALLOCATIONS.

A. ALLOCATIONS OF FLIGHTS OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED TO
 MAJOR COMMANDS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIONAL
 REQUIREMENTS AND ESTABLISHED PRIORITIES. TOTAL ALLOCATIONS ARE
 BASED ON THE EXPECTED AVAILABILITY OF FLIGHTS PLUS A SMALL NUMBER
 FOR FLEXIBILITY.

B. TWO PLANNING ALLOCATIONS ARE TELEPHONED ENCODED TO DEPUTY
 G3 AIR, III MAF, BY MACV TASE (J3 AIR) PRIOR TO 2000 HOURS DAILY.
 THESE ALLOCATIONS ARE FOR:

(1) RADAR-CONTROLLED (TPQ-10/MSQ-77) STRIKES FOR EXECUTION
 DURING PERIOD 1900 HOURS THE FOLLOWING NIGHT TO 0600 HOURS THE
 NEXT MORNING.

(2) STRIKES TO BE EXECUTED UNDER VISUAL OR RADAR CONTROL
 DURING THE PERIOD 0600 HOURS TO 1900 HOURS THE DAY AFTER REQUESTS ARE

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1270 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SUBMITTED.

C. THESE ALLOCATIONS ARE FOR SUBALLOCATION BY III MAF TO ALL US/FW GROUND TACTICAL UNITS REPORTING DIRECTLY TO CG, III MAF IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY CG III MAF.

D. SEPARATE ALLOCATIONS ARE MADE BY J3 AIR TO I CORPS.

E. THE DAILY PLANNING ALLOCATIONS TO III MAF REPRESENT THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS OF EACH TYPE THAT J3 AIR WILL ACCEPT BY TELEPHONE. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT ALLOCATIONS FREQUENTLY MAY BE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET ALL VALID REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT J3 AIR BE INFORMED DAILY OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT FOR WHICH TACTICAL UNITS UNDER III MAF WOULD SUBMIT REQUESTS IF UNLIMITED STRIKE SUPPORT WERE AVAILABLE.

3. (U) PREPLANNED REQUESTS.

A. ALL PREPLANNED REQUESTS ARE FORWARDED OVER GROUND FORCES COMMUNICATION CHANNELS. THEY MOVE PROGRESSIVELY UPWARD THROUGH EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND, UNTIL THEY REACH MACV J3 AIR. AT EACH INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ALL REQUESTS WILL BE EVALUATED, COORDINATED WITH OTHER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS, ASSIGNED A NUMERICAL PRIORITY, AND FORWARDED TO THE NEXT HIGHER LEVEL.

B. REQUESTS ARE FORWARDED BY TELEPHONE IN CLEAR TEXT EXCEPT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1270 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THAT TARGET COORDINATES AND DESIRED TIME ON TARGET (TOT) ARE ENCODED (SEE PARA 6 BELOW).

C. REQUESTS FOR RADAR-CONTROLLED STRIKES (SKYSPOTS) FOR EXECUTION BETWEEN 1900 HOURS ON DATE OF REQUESTS AND 0600 HOURS THE NEXT MORNING WILL BE SUBMITTED TO J3 AIR NOT LATER THAN 1100 HOURS DAILY.

D. REQUESTS FOR STRIKES TO BE EXECUTED BETWEEN 0600 HOURS AND 1900 HOURS THE FOLLOWING DAY, EITHER FAC/TACA OR RADAR-CONTROLLED, WILL BE SUBMITTED TO J3 AIR NOT LATER THAN 1300 HOURS DAILY.

E. REQUESTS RECEIVED TOO LATE TO FORWARD WITH OTHER PREPLANNED REQUESTS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY J3 AIR. IF CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL, THEY MUST BE FORWARDED THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

F. ALL REQUESTS MUST HAVE POLITICAL CLEARANCE AS WELL AS TACTICAL APPROVAL PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO J3 AIR.

G. PREPLANNED REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE AND IN THE SEQUENCE LISTED. CERTAIN ITEMS AS INDICATED ARE REQUIRED FOR ONLY ONE TYPE OF REQUEST--FAC OF SKYSPOT/SKYSPOT BACKUP MISSIONS.

(1) REQUEST NO.--BF-15-3. THE BF IDENTIFIES UNIT

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OO RUHFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1271 1011336
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 101336Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO
 MGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SECTION TWO OF TWO DELIVER FIRST WAKING HOUR.
 ON WHICH FAC OR OTHER CONTROL AGENCY CAN BE CONTACTED BY FLIGHT
 LEADER.

(9) RENDEZVOUS (REQUIRED FOR FAC REQUESTS ONLY)-- DESIGNATED
 HEADING AND DISTANCE IN NAUTICAL MILES FROM SPECIFIED TACAN STATION;
 E.G., 295/23/CHANNEL 69.

(10) HEADING (REQUIRED FOR SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP REQUESTS
 ONLY)-- DESIRED DIRECTION OF ATTACK IN DEGREES AND ACCEPTABL
 TOLERANCE, E.G., 280 PLUS OR MINUS 10. DO NOT REQUEST A HEADING
 THAT WOULD CAUSE AIRCRAFT TO OVERFLY FRIENDLY TROOPS OR POPULATED
 AREAS ON BOMB RUN.

(11) RECIPROCAL (REQUIRED FOR SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP RE-

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1271 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 O 150905Z MAR 68 ZFH-1
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FMAW DANANG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 07399 FROM MACCOCS FINAL SEC OF II.
 QUESTS ONLY)--IS RECIPROCAL OF RUN-IN HEADING AUTHORIZED? YES
 OR NO.

(12) FRIENDLIES (REQUIRED FOR SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP RE-
 QUESTS ONLY)-- DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FOR TARGET TO NEAREST
 FRIENDLY TROOPS OR POPULATED AREA, E.G. 2.5 KILOMETERS NW.

(13) BORDER-- BORDER INFORMATION NAO APPLICABLE TO II MAF;
 PERTAINS TO CAMBODIAN BORDER ONLY.

(14) RECOMMENDED ORDNANCE--INCLUDE FUSING IF APPROPRIATE.
 IF ANY SPECIFIC MUNITION IS UNACCEPTABLE, INDICATE HERE.

(15) IN SUPPORT--SPECIFY NAMED OPERATION, TAOR, OR AO
 SUPPORTED BY REQUESTED STRIKE.

(16) REMARKS--INCLUDE SUCH INFORMATION AS COORDINATION
 EFFEVED WITH OTHER COMMANDS IF STRIKE IS OUTSIDE TAOR OR AO OF
 REQUESTED UNIT. NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IF MULTIPLE STRIKES ARE DESIRED.

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AND ANY OTHER SPECIAL REQUESTS OR PERTINENT INFORMATION.

(17) DESIRED RESULTS--SPECIFY A (DESTROY), B (INTERDICT),
C (NEUTRALIZED), OR D (HARASS) AS DESIRED.

(H) AFTER RECEIPT OF PREPLANNED REQUESTS, THE FOLLOWING
ACTIONS ARE TAKEN BY J3 AIR:

(1) ENCODED PARTS OF REQUEST ARE DECODED.

(2) TARGET LOCATION IS PLOTTED ON AIR OPERATIONS MAP TO IN-
SURE THAT TARGET IS IN TAOR OR AO OF REQUESTING UNIT.

(3) DECODING OF TARGET COORDINATES FOR ALL SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT
BACKUP STRIKES IS CHECKED BY A SECOND PERSON.

(4) COORDINATES OF SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP TARGETS ARE RE-
ENCODED IN DIFFERENT CODE GROUPS WHICH ARE TELEPHONED TO MAJOR
COMMAND FOR VERIFICATION OF TARGET LOCATION BY COMMAND THAT SUB-
MITTED REQUEST. MACV J3 AIR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF VERIFICATION AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(5) ALL PREPLANNED REQUEST THAT CAN BE APPROVED ARE PASSED
TO 7TH AIR FORCE TACC STRIKE PLANS TO BE FRAGGED.

(6) MAJOR COMMANDS ARE NOTIFIED BY 1500 HOURS OF THOSE LOW
PRIORITY REQUESTS THAT ARE DISAPPROVED DUE TO THE LACK OF FLIGHTS
TO FULFILL THEM.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY **EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE FOUR RUMSAKI271 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

4. K(U) IMMEDIATE REQUESTS

A. IMMEDIATE REQUESTS ARE FORWARDED OVER AIR FORCE OR MARINE
AIR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES DIRECTLY FROM THE ORIGINATING COMMAND
TO THE APPROPRIATE DASC--DASC VICTOR FOR UNITS UNDER OPERATIONAL
CONTROL FO PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM AND I DASC FOR ALL OTHER
FORCES IN I CTZ.

B. REQUIRED REQUEST DATA ARE TRANSMITTED IN THE SAME SEQUENCE
AS SHOWN FOR PREPLANNED REQUESTS IN PARA 3G ABOVE. AS A MINIMUM,
THE FOLLOWING DATA ARE REQUIRED: REQUEST NUMBER; TARGET COORDI-
NATES; TARGET DESCRIPTION; FAC OR CNTRL AGENCY TO BE CONTACTED,
FREQUENCY, AND RENDEZVOUS.

C. ACTION TO FULFILL IMMEDIATE REQUESTS FROM UNITS IN I CTZ
ARE DESCRIBED IN INCLOSURE D TO REFERENCE A.

5. (U) TARGET DESCRIPTION/TYPE MISSION.

A. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MAY BE PREPLANNED TO ATTACK A WIDE
VARIETY OF GROUND TARGETS AND TO PERFORM OTHER TYPES OF MISSIONS
THAT WILL FACILITATE THE OPERATIONS OF GROUND FORCES OR PROVIDE
PROTECTION.

B. DESCRIPTION OF GROUND TARGETS MUST BE AS EXPLICIT AS
POSSIBLE AND INCLUDE COMMENTS ON THE TYPE AND DENSITY OF VEGETATION

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 IN THE TARGET AREA WHEN APPLICABLE. THE DESCRIPTION MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO FACILITATE DETERMINATION OF THE MOST APPROPRIATE ORDNANCE LOAD TO ACCOMPLISH DESIRED RESULTS.

C. OTHER TYPES OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS AS DEFINED BELOW MAY BE REQUESTED ON A PREPLANNED BASIS. MOST OF THESE ARE NONSTANDARD TERMS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO INSURE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THROUGHOUT THE JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM. THEY INCLUDE:

- (1) CONVOY COVER: COLUMN COVER AS DEFINED IN JCS PUB 1.
- (2) LANDING ZONE (LZ) COVER: COVER OF AN AIRMOBILE FORCE BY AIRCRAFT IN RADIO CONTACT THEREWITH, PROVIDING FOR ITS PROTECTION BY RECONNAISSANCE AND/OR ATTACK OF AIR OR GROUND TARGETS WHICH THREATEN FRIENDLY FORCES.
- (3) LANDING ZONE PREPARATION (LZ PREP): FIRE DELIVERED ON A SPECIFIC AREA TO NEUTRALIZE PREPOSITIONED ENEMY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS AND TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AN ATTACK BY AN AIRMOBILE FORCE.
- (4) LANDING ZONE (LZ) CONSTRUCTION: FIRE DELIVERED TO CLEAR TERRAIN OF OBSTACLES, THEREBY CONSTRUCTING SITES TO ACCOMMODATE THE LANDING OF HELIBORNE FORCES. (NOTE: PRESENT CAPABILITY TO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY **EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE SIX RUMSAKI271 CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
 CONSTRUCT HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE IS LIMITED; THEREFORE, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SELECT SITES WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE VEGETATION CONSISTENT WITH TACTICAL PLANS.)

- (5) PRESTRIKE: FIRE DELIVERED ON A SPECIFIC TARGET AREA TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF AIMED ENEMY FIRE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AN ASSAULT BY GROUND FORCES.
 - (6) DROP ZONE (DZ) COVER: SAME AS LZ COVER EXCEPT APPLICABLE TO OPERATIONS OF AN AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE.
 - (7) DROP ZONE PREPARATIONS (DZ PREP): SAME AS LZ PREPARATION EXCEPT APPLICABLE TO OPERATIONS OF AN AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE.
- D. LANDING ZONE COVER SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE HELICOPTER ESCORT.

6. (C) KAC-JN (JULIET NOVEMBER) WILL BE USED IN PROCESSING ENCODED PARTS OF AIR REQUESTS. GP-4
 UNQUOTE

2. PARA 2 APPEARS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY INFO REQUESTED BY GEN MCCUTCHEON. FYI, WE CONTINUE TO PASS TO MACV TASE OUR DESIRED TARGET REQUIREMENTS, REGARDLESS OF ARBITRARY ALLOCATIONS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
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PP RUMKM
DE RUMSAV 001W 1012010
ZNY SSSSS
P 100010Z APR 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN,
FROM MAJGEN ANDERSON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR FMFPAC F-001
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

A. CG III MAF 080752Z APR 68

1. THE REFERENCE QUOTED GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S EXCELLENT CONGRAT-
ULATORY MESSAGE ON THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION PEGASUS. SOME
THOUGHTS HAVE OCCURRED TO ME IN THAT CONTEXT, WHICH MIGHT BE
USEFUL TO YOU.

2. GENERAL WESTMORELAND MENTIONED "...THE DECISIVE AIR POWER..."
IN HIS REMARKS. I THINK WE ALL CAN AGREE THAT THE WEIGHT OF
ORDNANCE DROPPED ON THE ENEMY IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH HAD
SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT UPON HIS FORCES. WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS THE
DECISIVE FACTOR, IS MOOT, AND NOT PERTINENT TO THE BURDEN OF THIS
MESSAGE. HOWEVER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT KHE SANH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
HELD WITHOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF NAVY, MARINE AND AIR FORCE AIR. THUS

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 001W S E C R E T SPECAT

I FEEL INTIME TO COME, THIS ASPECT OF THE KHE SANH BATTLE MAY RECEIVE
INCREASING EMPHASIS. FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
OF AIR WAS INSTITUTED DURING THE KHE SANH EFFORT COULD - BY ASSOCIATION
IF NOT THROUGH MALICE AFORETHOUGHT - BE PURVEYED AS ONE REASON FOR THE
OVERALL SUCCESS OF THE EFFORT. ACCORDINGLY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE
WELL FOR ME TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE THOUGHTS AND FACTS CONTAINED IN
SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS.

3. LET US CONSIDER THAT AIR FORCE HISTORIANS WILL EQUATE OPERATION
NIAGARA WITH SUCCESSFUL AIR PARTICIPATION IN THE KHE SANH CAMPAIGN
NIAGARA COMMENCED ON 21 JAN AND TERMINATED 31 MAR 1968. OUR RECORDS
SHOW THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS APPLYING TO THIS TOTAL PERIOD:

A.	SORTIES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
USAF (TAC)	9691	39.3
USMC	7078	28.8
USN	5337	21.6
USAF (SAC)	2548	10.3

B. NEARLY 90 PERCENT OF ALL USMC SORTIES WENT INTO THE IMMEDIATE
KHE SANH AREA, VS 36 PERCENT OF USAF/USN SORTIES TO THE SAME AREA.

C. THE AREA ENCLOSED WITHIN A CIRCLE OF APPROX 9 MILES RADIUS FROM
THE KHE SANH PERIMETER RECEIVED 44 PERCENT OF TOTAL NIAGARA SORTIES.

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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PAGE THREE RUMSAV ØØIW S E C R E T SPECAT
 OF THESE, APPROX 57 PERCENT WERE FLOWN BY THE 1ST MAW. THE REMAINDER
 WAS SHARED BETWEEN USAF AND USN.
 D. SINGLE MANAGEMENT NOMINALLY COMMENCED 21 MARCH 1968, WHEN
 I DASC AND DASC VICTOR OSTENSIBLY WERE OPERATING, AND THE AIR SUPPORT
 REQUEST SYSTEM FIRST WAS EMPLOYED. THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS APPLY
 TO THIS LIMITED PERIOD:

	SORTIES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
USMC	1190	32
USAF (TAC)	1126	30.3
USAF (SAC)	458	25.3
USN	941	12.4

4. ALTHOUGH THE ABOVE FIGURES MAY BE SUBJECT TO SOME AUDIT, I FEEL
 THESE CONCLUSIONS LEGITIMATELY CAN BE DRAWN:
 A. 85 PERCENT OF THE SORTIE EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF NIAGARA OCCURRED
 BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT'S FIRST DAY -- AND, IN FACT, THE SO-CALLED
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ON A PRACTICAL BASIS DID NOT FULLY APPLY AT
 ANY ONE TIME DURING NIAGARA.
 B. DESPITE THE FACT THAT USAF (TAC) FLEW ABOUT A THIRD AGAIN AS
 MANY SORTIES DURING NIAGARA AS DID USMC, THE WEIGHT OF ORDNANCE
 DROPPED WAS APPROXIMATELY EQUAL BECAUSE OF OUR HIGHER TON/SORTIE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV ØØIW S E C R E T SPECAT
 RATIO. FURTHERMORE, THE MARINE CORPS PARTICULARLY WAS PREDOMINANT
 IN THE CRITICAL 9 MILE CIRCLE SURROUNDING THE KSCB.
 C. ACCORDINGLY, THE SUCCESS OF "...THE DECISIVE AIR POWER..."
 OVER WHICH GENERAL WESTMORELAND ENTHUSES WAS ACHIEVED WITHOUT ANY
 BENEFIT FROM "SINGLE MANAGEMENT". SINCE THE REQUIREMENTS AT KHE
 SANH FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN HIS CAMPAIGN TO ACHIEVE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 THE VERY SUCCESS OF THE EFFORT THERE WOULD TEND TO DEROGATE THE
 VALIDITY OF HIS ARGUMENT.
 5. I RECONGNIZE THE FOREGOING IS SMALL COMFORT TO US, IN VIEW
 OF THE FACT THAT HE DID WIN, HOWEVER, WE MIGHT FIND FUTURE UTILITY
 IN THE ABOVE. ALSO, I WOULD ADD THIS FURTHER OBSERVATION. THE
 TREND OF OUR ACCOUNTING SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS HAD PRINCIPALLY TO
 DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT RESPONSIVENESS MEASURED UP TO PREVIOUS
 STANDARDS. THIS IS NOT THE ONLY METHOD FOR MEASUREMENT. REALISTICALLY,
 THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND DECISION TO ESTABLISH SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS TO
 HAVE BEEN THAT THE NECESSARY JOB COULD BE DONE UNDER THE ALTERED
 SYSTEM, OR THAT EQUALLY AS GOOD A JOB COULD BE DONE AT LESS COST.
 OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE.
 THUS, I FEEL THERE MAY BE A TIME AND PLACE WHEN THE AIR FORCE SHOULD
 BE CHALLENGED TO PROVE THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT RESULTEDN SOME

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SIJG.									# 129

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 001W S E C R E T SPECAY
 DEMONSTRABLE IMPROVEMENT OR ECONOMY, AND NOT MERELY THAT IS WAS
 ABLE TO MEASURE UP TO THE STANDARDS PREVIOUSLY ACHIEVED (IF, IN
 FACT, THAT IN ITSELF EVER COULD BE PROVED). IN OTHER WORDS, THE
 BURDEN PROPERLY REST ON THEM TO PROVE THAT AIR SUPPORT RELATIVELY
 IS CONTRIBUTING MORE TO THE COMMON EFFORT THAN REASONABLY COULD
 HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE OLD MACV
 DIRECTIVE 95-4. WE SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT WE ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO
 MUST MAKE A CASE. LET'S HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE, TOO, WHEN IT
 IS SUITABLE SO TO DO.

G. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 129

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DE RUMSAR 290 0990033

ZNY 95555

0 04015Z APR 68

FM 7AF TSN AB RVN

TO RUMBDF/ABCCC UDORN RTAFB THAI

RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR

RUMSAGP/20TASS DANANG AB RVN

RUMBDF/23TASS NAKHON PHANOM AB THAI

INFO RUNSAW/COMUSMACV

RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG AB RVN

RUMBDFK/TASK FORCE ALPHA NAKHON PHANOM AB THAI

RUMSAGF/I DASC

RUMHMB/1ST AIR CAV

RUMSARH/PC VICTOR

RUMSARE/504TH BIEN HOA AB RVN

BT

S E C R E T NOFORN/TAC

SUBJECT: CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF AIR AND ARTILLERY (U).

REFERENCES: A. COMUSMACV CONF MSG 26487 MACCOC 12, DTG 091230Z AUG 67 (NOTAL).

B. DASC VICTOR SECRET MSG 00717, DTG 040150Z APR 68

(NOTAL).

1. REF A OUTLINES FORWARD BOMB LINE AND ESTABLISHED AREAS OF

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 290 **S E C R E T**

RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN 7AF ABCCC AND III MAF. REF B ESTABLISHED PEGASUS EXTENDED BATTLE AREA IN WHICH ABCCC EXERCISES CONTROL OF AIRSTRIKES AND COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY.

2. PENDING DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS IN THE SVN PEGASUS EXTENDED BATTLE AREA (EBA) DESCRIBED BELOW AND THE CAPABILITY OF DASC VICTOR TO CONTROL AND COORDINATE AIR AND ARTILLERY IN THAT AREA, ABCCC WILL RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROL OF AIR AND COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY IN THE EBA.

3. THE PEGASUS EBA IS DESCRIBED AS THE AREA WEST AND NORTH OF A LINE STARTING AT THE DMZ RUNNING SOUTH ALONG GRID LINE XD 95 RPT XD 95 TO XD 9553 RPT XD 9553; THEN WEST TO XD 7253 RPT XD 7253; THEN SOUTH ALONG GRID LINE XD 72 RPT XD 72 TO THE NATIONAL BOUNDARY OF RVN AND LAOS.

4. THESE INSTRUCTIONS SUPERSEDE AREAS OF CONTROL AND FAC ZONES ESTABLISHED DURING NIAGARA.

GP-4

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AC

CC	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CIB	COC	Des.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comd.	INSR	LEGAL	MTO	Posto	Protocol	PMO
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DE RUMSAR 252 0980516
ZNY CCCCC
P 070400Z APR 68

FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN
TO RUMSAGF/I DASC DANANG
RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR PHU BAI
RUMSAV/IMAW DANANG
INFO RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG
RUMSAV/MAG 11 DANANG
RUMHAW/MAG 12 CHU LAI
RUMHAW/MAG 13 CHU LAI

COG:G-3
INFO:G-2
COPY TO:ADJ G-6 S/S

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TACPS

SUBJECT: SCRAMBLE OF MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT OFF HOT PAD BY I DASC (U)
REFERENCE TACPS MESSAGE 14/1025Z MAR 68. SUBJECT: CHANGE TO GROUND
ALERT FRAG.

1. (C) REFERENCED MESSAGE ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY AND PROVIDED AUTHORITY FOR DIRECT CONTROL OF USMC HOT PAD AIRCRAFT FOR RESPONDS TO IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.
2. (C) I DASC SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY IS FURTHER DEFINED TO INCLUDE 28 SORTIES AS A PLANNING FACTOR. THIS FIGURE IS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF USMC AIRCRAFT ON ALERT ON A STANDARD FRAG DAY, AS CONFIRMED BY

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 252 C O N F I D E N T I A L
USMC LAISON OFFICERS. AS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SCRAMBLES PROWCHES
28 I DASC IS TO CONTACT 7AF TACC FOR AUTHORITY TO EXCEED THAT
FIGURE OR FOR AUTHORITY TO USE OTHER USAF RESOURCES.
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DE RUMSAR 231 0971015

ZNY SSSSS

P 060505Z APR 68

FM 7AF TACC TSN AB RVN
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG AB RVN

ACT:G-3
INFO:G-2 C/S
COPY TO:ADJ G-6 S/S

B
SECRET TACD/APR 68.

SUBJECT : 7TH AIR FORCE INTERDICTION OF ENEMY LOCS IN
SVN.

- REF: A. 7AF MSG (S) 230821Z MAR 68
- B. 7AF MSG (S) 270710Z MAR 68.
- C. III MAF MSG (S) 300228Z MAR 68.
- D. USMACV DIR 95-11 DTD 21 JUN 66

1. (S) REF A PROPOSED DESIGNATION OF FREE STRIKE ZONES ALONG CERTAIN ROAD IN I CTZ FOR FAC CONTROLLED INTERDICTION SORTIES BY 7AF/FMAW AIRCRAFT TO PERMIT TIMELY ATTACKS OF ENEMY TRAFFIC CONCENTRATED BY ROAD CUTS.
2. (S) REF B REQUESTED III MAF TAKE ACTION TO OBTAIN CLEARANCES AS OUTLINED IN REF A.
3. (S) REF C STATES THAT HARASSMENT AND INTERDICTION

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 231 SECRET
MUST BE CONSIDERED THE SAME AS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AT THE REQUEST OF GROUND COMMANDERS.

4. (S) MACV (TASE) INFORMS THIS DATE THAT AREA CLEARANCES ANDDD FREE STRIKE SONES ARE NOT PLANNED TO B PROVIDED 7AF FOR CONDUCT OF IN-COUNTRY INTERDICTION PROGRAM ALONG NOMINATED ROUTES.

5. (S) ACCORDNGLY 7AF WILL EXECUTE STRIKES ON ENEMY LOCS IN-COUNTRY UPON RECEIPT OF INDIVIDUAL STRIK REQUESTS FROM MACV (TASE). 7AF WILL PATRICIPATE IN CONFERENCE ON EXPANDED INTERDICTION AS DESIRED.

GP-4
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*Air Control
check refs*

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
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		SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON AIR ASSETS	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
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RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMSAV 003W 0990130
ZNY SSSSS
P 080130Z APR 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
RUMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK AND LGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN ANDERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR FMFPAC F-001 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS, STATUS AS OF 7 APR 1. THIS WEEK HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A CONTINUING SHAKEDOWN OF THE NEW SYSTEM WITH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF REALITY BEGINNING TO SURFACE AS THE FMAW GETS MORE REMOVED FROM DIRECTING OPERATIONS. THE IMPACT OF SOME OF THE COMPLEXITIES AND THE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS ARE STARTING TO BE FELT BY BOTH THE AF AND ARMY. I CORPS AIR CONTROL AND AIR REQUIREMENTS HAVE NEVER BEEN SIMPLE. NOW THEY ARE MORE COMPLICATED THAN EVER AND THIS IS STARTING TO BE APPRECIATED, MOST CERTAINLY AT THE WORKING LEVEL. INDICATIONS OF THE ABOVE ARE REFLECTED IN OPERATIONAL DISCREPANCY REPORTS, COMPLAINTS BY THE ABCCC'S, THE DIVISIONS AND THE COMMUNICATORS. AS EXAMPLES:
A. ON 27 MARCH, 2/A4'S WERE SCRAMBLED TO WORK WITH 26TH MAR.

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 003W SECRET SPECAT
WHEN THE TARGET WAS MARKED WITH ARTILLERY, TWO OTHER A/C BELIEVED TO BE USAF IMMEDIATELY AND WITHOUT WARNING STARTED TO ATTACK THE TARGET. NO ONE COULD CONTACT THEM AND THEY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE UNDER CONTROL OF ANYONE.
B. MAG-12 SUBMITTED FIVE REPORTS THIS WEEK CONCERNING LACK OF CONTROLLERS WHEN A/C REPORTED ON STATION. SOME A/C WERE REQUIRED TO HOLD UP TO 40 MINUTES, FOUR OF THE FLIGHTS EVENTUALLY RECEIVED ALTERNATE MISSIONS, BUT ONE WAS FORCED TO RETURN WITH ORDNANCE.
C. ABCCC HAS DIVERTED A/C TO TARGETS OTHER THAN AREA PRAGGED TO FOR SEVERAL REASONS: OVERFLOW AT A GIVEN TIME, TARGETS CONSIDERED MORE PRESSING, AND TO WORK AROUND SUDDEN INFLUX OF NAVY A/C. CYCLIC OPS OF CARRIERS WITH UNCERTAIN LAUNCH AND RECOVERY TIMES CONTINUE TO PROVIDE PROBLEMS FOR ABCCC. THE PRESENT SYSTEM DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THE FACILITY OF OURS TO SPREAD THESE LARGE NUMBERS OF A/C AROUND QUICKLY, ALTHOUGH QUITE FRANKLY THEY WERE ALSO A PROBLEM TO US. HOWEVER, 3D MARDIV PROFITS GREATLY BY THESE SORTIES, SINCE THEY GET THE MAJORITY OF THEM.
D. THERE IS A PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATIONS WITH NON-MARINE

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET GE FOUR RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T S P E C A T

FORCES PERFORMING TACTICAL MISSIONS WITH MARINE CONTROLLERS. TO PREVENT COMPROMISE OUR FREQS ALWAYS HAVE BEEN COLOR CODED. THE DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN GETTING THE 7TH AF TO APPRISE THEIR UNITS OF THESE CODES. THIS IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED SLOWLY.

2. OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACTORS:

A. THE RECENT CHANGE HAS RESULTED IN A DEFINITE INCREASE IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM 7TH AF. THE 7TH AF TACC FRAG NORMALLY IS TEN SECTIONS LONG. EACH SECTION OF THIS MESSAGE TAKES FIFTEEN MINUTES OF TRANSMISSION TIME OF A TELETYPE CIRCUIT. THIS RESULTS IN DELAY IN THE PREPARATION OF THE FMAW DAY FISED WING FRAG. BECAUSE OF THE REQUIRED HANDLING OF THE 7TH AF FRAG AND DUE TO INCREASING THE PRECEDENCE OF THE FMAW FRAGS, THE MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OUR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 2200H UNTIL 0800H IS FRAG ORDERS. THIS CAUSES A LONG DELAY OF OTHER OPERATIONAL TYPE TRAFFIC, SUCH AS OPREPS, SITREPS, SPRINX, ETC. ABOUT TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS OF CIRCUIT TIME IS LOST IN HANDLING THE 7TH AF FRAG. THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THIS HANDLING IS A TRAFFIC BACKLOG CAUSED BY THE "DISPLACEMENT" EFFECT OF INTRODUCING "IMMEDIATE" AND "FLASH" PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC INTO OUR SYSTEM AS A DIRECT RESULT OF RECEIPT OF THE AF FRAG.

PA

EXCLUSIVE

GE FOUR RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T S P E C A T

B. ANOTHER FACET OF THE AF FRAG SYSTEM IS THE SEPARATE DAY AND NIGHT FRAGS TO GET AS MUCH RESPONSIVENESS AS POSSIBLE IN THEIR SYSTEM. THIS PROCEDURE DOUBLES THE ADMINISTRATION WORK LOAD FOR GROUP AND OPERATIONS PERSONNEL. AND SINCE AS DESCRIBED IN A. ABOVE THESE ARE GENERALLY LATE ARRIVING THE PLANNING AND INSPECTION/QUALITY CONTROL TIME IS REDUCED, PARTICULARLY IN THE ORDNANCE FIELD IN THE PREPARING OF BOMBS AND FUSES.

C. A RECENT LIAISON VISIT TO HQS PCV UNCOVERED THE APPARENT REASON FOR THE FACT THAT PRE-PLANNED TACTICAL AIR STRIKES IN THE ASHAU VALLEY HAVE NOT BEEN REQUESTED BY PCV. SINCE THE ASHAU VALLEY WAS NOT WITHIN THE TAOR OF ANY SUBORDINATE UNIT, PCV WOULD BE THE REQUESTING LEVEL FOR STRIKES THEREIN. THE G-3 AIR AT PCV STATED THAT REQUEST FROM SUBORDINATE UNITS HABITUALLY EXCEEDED THE DAILY ALLOCATION OF TACTICAL AIR. ACCORDINGLY, PREPLANNED REQUEST FOR TACTICAL AIR IN THE ASHAU WERE NO SUBMITTED, IN ORDER TO AVOID INFRACTING FROM ALLOCATIONS MADE TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. THE G-3 AIR WAS ADVISED THAT, IN KEEPING WITH THE SYSTEM AND THE DISIRE OF CG III MAF, ALL LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR TACTICAL AIR SHOULD BE SUBMITTED, IRRESPECTIVE OF TACTICAL AIR AVAILABLE FOR ALLOCATION. THIS POINT WAS ALSO MADE TO THE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T S P E C I A L
 C/S PCV, AND DEPCDR (MGEN DAVIS). IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ARC
 LIGHT STRIKES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED AND FLOWN IN ASHAW, AND SOME
 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES DIVERTED ON A RANDOM BASIS INTO THE VALLEY
 AS WELL. HOWEVER, THIS MATTER ILLUSTRATES THE BUILT-IN INHIBITION
 WHICH CAN OCCUR RELATIVE TO REQUESTING TACTICAL AIR ON A GROSS
 REAL-EQUIPMENT BASIS, IN THE FACE OF KNOWLEDGE THAT ONLY A CER-
 TAIN LEVEL OF ALLOCATION CAN BE EXPECTED. THE TAILOR THEN TENDS
 TO CUT THE SUIT TO THE AVAILABLE CLOTH, RATHER THAN THE SIZE OF
 THE CUSTOMER.

3. ON THE 3D MGEN PEARSON, FORMER C/S PCV WHO IS RETURNING TO
 HIS JOB OF J-3 MACV CAME BY FOR A BRIEFING AT THE WING. HIS
 REACTION TO THE BRIEF WAS AS TO BE EXPECTED FROM ONE AS FAMILIAR
 AS HE WITH OUR CAPABILITY, PERFORMANCE AND BACKGROUND. I COULD
 SEE NO POINT TO THIS REQUEST FOR THIS BRIEF UNTIL WE GOT ON THE
 SUBJECT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. HE HAD SOME IDEAS WHICH IMPLIED
 THAT THE AIR REQUEST SYSTEM IS UNSATISFACTORY IN THE PCV AREA.
 HE SAID IT WAS SO LABORIOUS, THE CONSUMING AND TO SOME EXTENT
 UNNECESSARY, IN THAT ALLOCATIONS WERE BASICALLY MADE WITHOUT THE
 REQUEST ANYWAY. HE QUESTIONED THE STAFF ON WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF
 A PROCEDURE, WHICH REDUCED TO ITS BASICS, WOULD BE ONE OF

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T S P E C I A L
 REQUESTING BY EXCEPTION. THAT IS TO SAY EACH DIV/CORPS AREA
 WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RECEIVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FRAGGED SORTIES
 A DAY, THEN THE ONLY REQUEST TO BE FORWARDED WOULD BE WHEN THEY
 WANTED TO INCREASE OR DECREASE THIS REGULARLY FRAGGED NUMBER,
 WITH THE NECESSARY JUSTIFICATION. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD
 THOUGHT A GREAT DEAL ON THIS SUBJECT AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION
 THAT HE WAS GOING TO PURSUE IT AT THE MACV LEVEL. IT IS AN
 INTERESTING APPROACH BUT STILL DOES NOT ALTER THE SUPPLIER
 ORIENTATION OF THE ARMY AIR FORCE SYSTEM. IT MERELY TRIES TO
 LIVE WITH THE DEFECT AND MAKE IT MORE WORKABLE AND RESPONSIVE.
 4. IN VIEW OF DAILY REPORT BEING SUBMITTED, TRENDS AND OBSER-
 VATIONS WILL BE SUMMARIZED THEREIN AND THIS REPORT WILL BE
 DISCONTINUED AS OF THIS DATE.

GP-3
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ZCZCSAA/32VV ARA584

PP RUMSAK
DE RUMSAR 172 0960643
ZNY CCCCC ZEL RUMSAR
P 050545Z APR 68
FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN
TO RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG
INFO RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG
RUMSARR/CG FCV PRU BAI
BT

MSG CORRECTED BY ORIG:

COG: G-3
INFO: G-2
COPY TO G-6 S/S ADJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L /TACPS.

SUBJECT: COMBAT SKYSPOT BACK-UP (U)

REFERENCE I DASC MESSAGE 27/0430Z MARCH, SAME SUBJECT.

1. (C) REFERENCED MESSAGE RECOMMENDED EXTENSIVE USE OF COMBAT SKYSPOT BACK-UP ON TARGET REQUESTS IN I CORPS AREA. IT ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CSS/BU BE SCHEDULED TO CONTROL SIDE IN AN ORDERLY FLOW.
2. (C) BEFORE REQUESTING CSS/BU ON PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS, REQUESTING AGENCIES SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONSULT THEIR ASSIGNED FAC/ALO AND AVAILABLE WEATHER DATA. WHEN THE PROGNOSIS FOR VISUAL DELIVERY IS UNFAVORABLE AND DISPOSITION OF TROOPS IS SUITABLE, CSS/BU SHOULD BE INDICATED ON TARGET REQUEST PASSED TO MACV TASE.
3. (C) HOWEVER, I DASC IS NOT RECOMMEND THAT ALL REQUESTS FOR REPLANNED AIR SPECIFY A CSS/BU FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
 - A. CSS/BU SHOULD BE PREDICTED ON FORECAST AND LATEST OBSERVED

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 172 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WEATHER. WHEN WEATHER IS FAVORABLE, THE ORDNANCE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR THE TARGET SHOULD BE REQUESTED.

B. ORDNANCE REQUIRED FOR CSS/BU IS OFTEN NOT THE BEST ORDNANCE FOR THE TARGET.

C. MUNITIONS PLANS AND PROCUREMENT ARE BOTH PREDICATED ON USING A VARIETY OF ORDNANCE FOR VARIED TARGETS, NOT ON ALL HARD ORDNANCE FOR CSS.

D. WHEN WEATHER PREVENTS VISUAL STRIKES THE DENSITY OF TRAFFIC IN I CTZ AND BUNCHED TOT REQUESTS PRECLUDE A REGULAR AND ORDERLY FLOW TO THE AVAILABLE MSQ/TPQ SITES.

GP-4

BT

AC
45

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P 060550Z APR 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUMSAK/CG FMFPAC
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO

FOR FMFPAC (F-005)
FOR CMC CODE AA-I

- I. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS (DIV)
- A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 041901H TO 051900H APR 68
- B. NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO USMC GROUND UNITS BY SERVICES:
 - (1) USMC 113
 - (2) USAF 6
 - (3) USN 20
 - (4) OTHER (VNAF, RAAF) 0
- C. PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT
 - (1) NUMBER OF TARGETS THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRED HIT. 192

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 020W S E C R E T SPECAT

- (2) NUMBER OF TARGETS TO BE HIT WHICH WERE ALLOCATED TO GROUND COMMANDER BY HIGHER HQTRS (PCV, III MAF). 53
- (3) NUMBER OF TARGETS ALLOWED BY HIGHER HQTRS TO BE SUBMITTED. 53
- (4) NUMBER OF TARGETS FRAGGED BY 7AF TO BE HIT. 53
- (5) NUMBER OF SORTIES FRAGGED BY 7AF TO HIT THESE FRAGGED TARGETS. 80
- (6) NUMBER OF FRAGGED TARGETS WHICH WERE HIT. 25
- (7) NUMBER OF SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED. 72
- D. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
 - (1) WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 28
 - (2) WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 14
 - (3) WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 12
 - (4) MORE THAN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 18
- E. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:
 - (1) REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 32
 - (2) ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 37
 - (3) A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 3
 - (4) ON UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 0

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RUMSAV 020W S E C R E T SPECAT
 F. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES

- (1) REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDER. 23
- (2) APPROVED BY I DASC/DASC VICTOR. 21
- (3) RECEIVED. 19

G. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
 (1) WITHIN 15 MINUTES AFTER ORIGATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 9

(2) WITHIN 30 MINUTES AFTER ORIGATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 10

(3) WITHIN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 0

(4) MORE THAN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 0

H. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:

(1) REQUEST ORDNANCE. 17

(2) ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 2

(3) A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 0

(4) AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 0

I. EXTRA OR UNREQUESTED SORTIES RECEIVED.

(1) 48

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 020W S E C R E T SPECAT

J. NUMBER OF SORTIES CONTROLLED BY:

(1) MARINE TACP, FAC ON GROUND. 0

(2) MARINE TAC(A). 46

(3) MARINE TPQ. 91

(4) AF TACP, FAC(A) OR FAC. 0

(5) FLIGHT LEADER. 0

(6) OTHER. 0

K. NUMBER OF AIR SUPPORT SORTIES APPROVED BY HIGHER GROUND HQTRS WHICH WERE NOT PROVIDED BECAUSE OF:

(1) LACK OF AIRCRAFT ASSETS. 0

(2) COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES ABOVE DIVISION LEVEL. 0

(3) OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS). 1

(4) UNKNOWN (REASON NOT PROVIDED TO GROUND UNIT BN/RGT/DIV. 9

L. NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN AIR SUPPORT WAS FURNISHED BUT NOT USED BY GROUND COMMANDER BECAUSE OF:

(1) GROUND UNIT COMMUNICATION FAILURE OF DIFFICULTIES. 0

(2) CANCELLED BY GROUND COMMANDER. 0

(3) WEATHER. 0

(4) ASRT (TPQ) SYSTEM FAILURE. 0

(5) AIRCRAFT SYSTEM FAILURE (INCLUDES COM, EMERGENCIES,

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 020W S E C R E T SPECAT
ORDNANCE). 2

- (6) DIVERTED ON GROUND COMMANDER ORDER. 0
 - (7) OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS). 0
- M. REMARKS

(1) K-3: AIRCRAFT FRAGGED BY 7TH AF FOR WRONG DASC.

2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MARINE AIR WING:

A. SORTIES FLOWN

- (1) FRAGGED SORTIES FLWON. 176
- (2) SCRAMBLE SORTIES. 40
- (3) ADD-ONS. 25

B. ALL SORTIE EMPLOYMENT (AREA)

- (1) SORTIES FLOWN IN ICTZ. 192
- (2) SORTIES FLOWN OUT OF COUNTRY. 49
- (3) SORTIES FLOWN ELSEWHERE (II CTZ, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC). 0

C. SORTIES FRAGGED

(1) MARINE A/C FRAGGED IN ICTZUG

175

- (2) MARINE A/C FRAGGED OUT OF COUNTRY. 20
 - (3) OTHER (FRAGGED IN II CTZ, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC). 0
- D. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 020W S E C R E T SPECAT

- (1) NUMBER OF SORTIES SCRAMBLED BY I DASC/DASC V VIA TADC. 0
- (2) NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V. 40
- (3) NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V. 0
- (4) OTHER. 0

E. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)

- (1) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE RGTS/BN. 16
- (2) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY. 22
- (3) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN. 0
- (4) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC. 0
- (5) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER ICTZ FORCES (VNAF, SPECIAL FORCES). 2
- (6) SCRAMBLE SORTIES II CORPS. 0
- (7) SCRAMBLE SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY. 0

F. ADD-ON BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)

- (1) ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY I DASC/DASC V TO TADC. 0
- (2) ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC TO TADC. 25
- (3) ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) TO TADC. 0

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PP RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 022W 0970550
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 060550Z APR 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUMSAK/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 (4) OTHER. 0

G. ADD-ON BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)

- (1) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE RGTS/BN. 25
- (2) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY. 0
- (3) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN. 0
- (4) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC. 0
- (5) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER ICTZ FORCES (FWMAF, SSF). 0
- (6) ADD-ON SORTIES IN II CORPS. 0
- (7) ADD-ON SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY. 0

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 022W S E C R E T SPECAT

H. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (TYPE OF MISSION)

- (1) NUMBER OF FRAGGED SORTIES DIVERTED. 37
- (2) NUMBER OF SCRAMBLED SORTIES DIVERTED. 0
- (3) NUMBER OF AAD-ON SORTIES DIVERTED. 0

I. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (AGENCY INITIATING DIVERT)

- (1) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY I DASC/DASC V. 0
- (2) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY TADC/DASC/ASRT. 32
- (3) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY TACC. 0
- (4) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY OTHER AGENCY. 5

J. REMARKS

(1) I (2): WEATHER PRIMARY REASON FOR DIVERTS.
 0. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS; GROUND OR AIR COMMANDERS COMMENTS
 A. ANALYSIS OF PARAGRAPHS 2D AND 2E FOR LAST TWO DAYS TENDS TO INDICATE THAT THE MAJORITY OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT U. S. ARMY UNITS WERE SUBMITTED THROUGH MARINE DASC TO MARINE TADC VICE THROUGH I DASC OR DASC VICTOR TO MARINE TADC. THIS MAY INDICATE THE FAVORABLE RESPONSIVENESS OF MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AS OPPOSED TO USA/USAF SYSTEM. ANALYSIS WILL CONTINUE ON THIS SUBJECT.

GP-4
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DCG	3	4/8/68		[Signature]	SERIAL 050750Z APR 68 COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4	4/8/68		[Signature]	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
C/S	1	4/6/68		[Signature]	REMARKS
DC/S					<p>Q 3 - Provide explanation to red MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>For CG's info</p> <p>For CG - 2 keep</p> <p>I agree with all your comments, but there is nothing to be done except to pass our records and then Special Compliance with the end of our 30 day period</p> <p>SECRET</p>
DC/S DM					
DC/S AIR					
G-1					
G-2					
G-3					
G-4					
CEO					
S/S		060700		[Signature]	LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
S/C					

4/8/68 - has seen all remarks 4/6

4/8/68 Please see all correct

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DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG FIRST MAW	
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4/6	[Signature]	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/6	C/S [Signature]		
4/6	[Signature]		
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RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
FOR FMFPAC F-015

FOR CMC CODE AA-I

- 1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS (DIV)
 - A. PERIOD COVERED 031901H TO 041900H.
 - B. NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO USMC GROUND UNITS BY SERVICES:
 - (1) USMC 109
 - (2) USAF 6
 - (3) USN 96
 - (4) OTHER (VNAF, RAAF) 0

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 034W SECRET SPECAT

C. PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT

- (1) NUMBER OF TARGETS THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRED HIT. 118
 - (2) NUMBER OF TARGETS TO BE HIT WHICH WERE ALLOCATED TO GROUND COMMANDER BY HIGHER HQTRS (PCV, III MAF). 50
 - (3) NUMBER OF TARGETS ALLOWED BY HIGHER HQTRS TO BE SUBMITTED. 49
 - (4) NUMBER OF TARGETS FRAGGED BY 7AF TO BE HIT. 49
 - (5) NUMBER OF SORTIES FRAGGED BY 7AF TO HIT THESE FRAGGED TARGETS. 71
 - (6) NUMBER OF FRAGGED TARGETS WHICH WERE HIT. 23
 - (7) NUMBER OF SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED. 68
- D. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
- (1) WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 22
 - (2) WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 18
 - (3) WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 17
 - (4) MORE THAN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME. 11
- E. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:
- (1) REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 20
 - (2) ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 48
 - (3) A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 0

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

118

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 034W S E C R E T SPECAT

- (4) AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 0
- F. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES.
 - (1) REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDER. 24
 - (2) APPROVED BY I DASC/DASC VICTOR. 23
 - (3) RECEIVED. 23
- G. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
 - (1) WITHIN 15 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 8
 - (2) WITHIN 30 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 4
 - (3) WITHIN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 4
 - (4) MORE THAN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL. 7
- H. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:
 - (1) REQUEST ORDNANCE. 17
 - (2) ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 6
 - (3) A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE: 0
 - (4) AN INACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE. 0
- I. EXTRA OR UNREQUESTED SORTIES RECEIVED

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 034W S E C R E T SPECAT

- (1) 120
- J. NUMBER OF SORTIES CONTROLLED BY:
 - (1) MARINE TACP, FAC ON GROUND. 0
 - (2) MARINE TAC(A). 26
 - (3) MARINE TPQ. 185
 - (4) AF TACP, FAC(A) OR FAC. 0
 - (5) FLIGHT LEADER. 0
 - (6) OTHER. 0
- K. NUMBER OF AIR SUPPORT SORTIES APPROVED BY HIGHER GROUND HQTRS WHICH WERE NOT PROVIDED BECAUSE OF:
 - (1) LACK OF AIRCRAFT ASSETS. 0
 - (2) COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES ABOVE DIVISION LEVEL. 0
 - (3) OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS). 0
 - (4) UNKNOWN (REASON NOT PROVIDED TO GROUND UNIT BN/REGT/DIV. 3
- L. NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN AIR SUPPORT WAS FURNISHED BUT NOT USED BY GROUND COMMANDER BECAUSE OF:
 - (1) GROUND UNIT COMMUNICATION FAILURE OR DIFFICULTIES. 0
 - (2) CANCELLED BY GROUND COMMANDER. 0
 - (3) WEATHER. 0
 - (4) ASRT (TPQ) SYSTEM FAILURE. 0

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

118

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV **SECRET** SPECAT
 (5) AIRCRAFT SYSTEM FAILURE (INCLUDES COM, EMERGENCIES, ORDNANCE). 0

(6) DIVERTED ON GROUND COMMANDER ORDER. 0
 (7) OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS). 0

M. REMARKS

(1) NO 7AF FRAG TRANSMITTED TO 3RD MARDIV.
 (2) F-3: 8 EXTRA SORTIES SCRAMBLED BY TAC(A) ON VR MISSION, AND 9 OTHER SORTIES NOT APPROVED BY DASC VICTOR.

2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MARINE AIR WING:

A. SORTIES FLOWN

(1) FRAGGED SORTIES FLOWN. 185
 (2) SCRAMBLE SORTIES. 40
 (3) ADD-ONS. 3

B. ALL SORTIE EMPLOYMENT (AREA)

(1) SORTIES FLOWN IN I CORPS. 188
 (2) SORTIES FLOWN OUT OF COUNTRY. 40
 (3) SORTIES FLOWN ELSEWHERE (II CORPS, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC). 0

C. SORTIES FRAGGED

(1) MARINE A/C FRAGGED IN I CORPS. 185

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 034W **SECRET** SPECAT

(2) MARINE A/C FRAGGED OUT OF COUNTRY. 16
 (3) OTHER (FRAGGED IN II CORPS, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC). 0

D. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)

(1) NUMBER OF SORTIES SCRAMBLED BY I DASC/DASC V VIA TADC. 4
 (2) NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V. 36
 (3) NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V. 0
 (4) OTHER: 0

E. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)

(1) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE REGTS/BN. 16
 (2) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY. 10
 (3) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN. 0
 (4) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC. 0
 (5) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER IGTZ FORCES, (VNAF, SPEC FORCES. 14
 (6) SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN II CORPS. 0
 (7) SCRAMBLE SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY. 0

F. ADD ON BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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SECRET

FM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 035W 0960750
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 050750Z APR 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

- S E C R E T** SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF TWO
- (1) ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY I DASC/DASC V TO TADC. 0
 - (2) ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC TO TADC. 2
 - (3) ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) TO TADC. 0
 - (4) OTHER. 1
- G. ADD ON BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)
- (1) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE REGIS/BN. 2
 - (2) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY. 0
 - (3) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN. 0
 - (4) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC. 0
 - (5) ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER IC3Z FORCES (FWMAF, ...)

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 035W **S E C R E T** SPECAT (SSF). 1

- (6) ADD-ON SORTIES IN II CORPS. 0
 - (7) ADD-ON SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY. 0
- H. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (TYPE OF MISSION)
- (1) NUMBER OF FRAGGED SORTIES DIVERTED. 20
 - (2) NUMBER OF SCRAMBLEJ SORTIES DIVERTED. 2
 - (3) NUMBER OF ADD-ON SORTIES DIVERTED. 0
- I. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (AGENCY INITIATING DIVER)
- (1) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY I DASC/DASC V. 6
 - (2) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY TADC/DASC/ASRT. 9
 - (3) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY TACC. 0
 - (4) NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY OTHER AGENCY. 7
- J. REMARKS
- (1) NONE
8. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS, GROUND OR AIR COMMANDER COMMENTS
- A. NONE

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

118

JK

ll

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

It must, of course, be realistic and significant targets - not "soft" guess work targets.

From: Deputy G-3 (Air)
For: Chief of Staff
Subj: Daily Target/Sortie report to CMC
Ref: (a) CG First MAW 050750ZApr68 (MCEO)

1. The following provides comment to the Commanding General's queries to reference (a):

a. Preplanned Air Support

Paragraph 1.C.(1) shows the number of preplanned air support targets desired by the ground commanders as 118. This apparently does not reconcile with paragraph 1.C.(3) which shows targets allowed by higher headquarters as 49 and paragraph 1.C.(6) which shows only 23 of the fragged targets hit.

The 118 targets desired by the ground commander is an expression of that number of air suitable targets in this area of operation he would like hit and does not take into consideration air resources or control capability. Paragraph 1.C.(3) does consider the foregoing factors; consequently, a more realistic assignment of 49 targets was made by higher headquarters (TASE).

The number of targets hit shown by paragraph 1.C.(6) as 23 is misleading. Preplanned targets are scheduled some 28 to 29 hours in advance. The tactical situation can, and does, change very rapidly; particularly, around the DMZ, Khe Sanh and Phu Bai, wherein these targets were requested. Almost without exception, strikes are controlled by Tactical Air Controllers Airborne or Forward Air Controllers both airborne and on the ground. Seldom does a flight strike a target (coordinate) unless it is marked. Since strikes are under positive control and the controller is receiving directions from the Marine DASC, preplanned targets are often scrubbed in favor of fleeting or more lucrative ones. This procedure is commonplace, however, the preplanned target is not ignored. It will appear on the next days Iraq or may be hit at a later time of the day. The sorties were used; but, on different targets and should not be considered as diverts when they are used within the same area as previously scheduled. In other words 23 of the originally preplanned targets were still reasonably valid and 26 targets were perhaps more lucrative targets, hence, these sorties were not used as originally planned. This fact is confirmed by the 68 sorties provided as shown by paragraph 1.C.(7).

T that is mission and want.

As I explained to Gen. Duffek

*B-1
WHOM?
Some USAF
Capt in DASC
may be too late.*

EXACTLY! So what happens to that important target if it was preplanned as part of a coord fire plan!

b. Number of Immediate Air Support Sorties which Reported Within Certain Specified Time Intervals


(1) Paragraph 1.G.(3) shows that 4 immediate sorties arrived within 45 minutes of request originated. There are two flights of 2 aircraft involved here. The TADC log indicates a request for the first flight was requested at 1245 to strike NVA in the open. Normal priorities were used. Flight Lovebug 514 (2 aircraft) was scrambled at 1245 from MAG-13's Hot Pad (15 minutes) alert status. After a 15 minute flight from Chu Lai to Dong Ha (30 minutes total time) aircraft arrived on target.

The second flight of two aircraft was requested at 1245 to strike NVA in the open, normal priority. Helborn 515 (MAG-12) scrambled from Hot Pad alert and after a 22 minute flight from Chu Lai arrived over target at 1330.

(2) Paragraph 1.G.(4) shows that 7 immediate sorties arrived over target more than 45 minutes after request originated. Five of the original sorties listed here were add-on flights due to cancellation of Arc Light strikes. These add on strikes were requested at 2200 and subsequently received starting at 2400. The late receipt of the strikes was not detrimental to the accomplishment of unit mission. There were no troops in contact situations involved here; consequently, normal priorities were used.

The remaining two sorties involved a helo escort and LZ prep for Task Force XRAY. In-as-much as this was not a time sensitive requirement it was down graded by PCV to meet higher priorities causing a delay in the flight.

Very Respectfully,


DEAN WILKER
Col, USMC

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3J:ctw

From: Deputy G-3 (Air)

For: Chief of Staff

Subj: Daily Target/Sortie report to CMC

Ref: (a) CG First MAW 050750ZApr68 (MCEG)

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Very Respectfully,

DEAN WILKER
Col, USMC

0050339Z

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

SECRET MAC 04545 EYES ONLY

1. YOUR MESSAGE TO ME DISCUSSING CERTAIN AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS TIMELY AND CONSTRUCTIVE. SEVERAL OF YOUR POINTS HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION AS THE SYSTEM HAS PROGRESSED SINCE IT WAS IMPLEMENTED FULLY ON 21 MARCH 1968.

2. IMPLEMENTATION: IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT CERTAIN TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED IN THE RAPID INTEGRATION OF TWO DIFFERENT AIR-GROUND SYSTEMS. I BELIEVE MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN A SHORT TIME. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM IS WORKING MORE SMOOTHLY EACH DAY AND THAT ALL CONCERNED ARE MAKING GENUINE EFFORTS TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES AS THEY ARISE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WITH STRONG SUPPORT BY ALL CONCERNED THE SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THE TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES THAN WAS ACHIEVABLE PREVIOUSLY.

3. MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM: IN THE DESIGN OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT CERTAIN FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CONTROL SYSTEM MUST BE USED IN A COMPLEMENTARY ROLE TO ASSURE COMPLETE COVERAGE IN FIRE SUPPORT AND ARTILLERY WARNING COORDINATION. THE COMMUNICATIONS REDUNDANCY IT PROVIDES IS EQUALLY VALUABLE.

4. REQUEST SYSTEM: THERE IS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH TACTICAL AIR CAPABILITY IN THE RVN TO PROVIDE ALL COMMANDERS ALL THE AIR SUPPORT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. HENCE, THE RESOURCES MUST BE ALLOCATED BY COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR PRIORITIES. THE PLANNING ALLOCATIONS PROVIDED DAILY BY MACV TASE (J3 AIR) REFLECT THE BEST AVAILABLE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBERS OF FLIGHTS (TOTS) THAT ARE EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE TO FULFILL PREPLANNED REQUESTS. THEY REPRESENT THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS BY TYPE, NIGHT AND DAY, THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED FROM MAJOR COMMANDS BY MACV J3 AIR, WHICH RECEIVES OVER 250 REQUESTS DAILY. TO ACCEPT ANY ADDITIONAL REQUESTS WOULD UNNECESSARILY OVERBURDEN COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS AND DELAY THE PROCESSING OF REQUESTS THAT CAN BE APPROVED WITHIN AVAILABLE RESOURCES. HOWEVER, MACV J3 AIR ALWAYS RECORDS THE NUMBER OF VALID REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT THAT MAJOR COMMANDS STATE THEY WOULD SUBMIT IF ADDITIONAL AIR SUPPORT WERE AVAILABLE.

5. A. THE FAC REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS WAS IMPOSED BY CDR, 7AF BASED ON MANY "SHORT ROUND" EXPERIENCES WHEN THIS WAS NOT A REQUIREMENT. WITH THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF TACTICAL FIGHTER ACTIVITY, GUN SHIP II AND ARC LIGHT IN THE NIAGARA AREA, AND IMPROVING WEATHER CONDITIONS, IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THE UNIQUE

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SYSTEMS CAPABILITY OF THE ASA COULD BE EXPLOITED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT BY EMPLOYMENT IN RP-1 AND TALLY HO. THE DETECTION AND ATTACK OF MOVING TARGETS WITH THE ASA IN THOSE AREAS WOULD BEST SERVE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF RESTRICTING MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TROOPS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES INTO QUANG TRI PROVINCE FROM THE NORTH. THE VALUE OF ASA EQUIPMENT IN THE INTERDICTION ROLE IS WELL RECOGNIZED, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT SOUND JUDGMENT IS BEING APPLIED IN SUCH DECISIONS.

B. THE SCRAMBLE AND DIVERT AUTHORITY PROCEDURES ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE TOTAL REQUIREMENT, WHEN THE SITUATION SO DEMANDS. CONSEQUENTLY, SCRAMBLES AND DIVERTS MUST BE CONTROLLED WITHIN THE MECHANICS OF THE SYSTEM. THERE IS LOCAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE SYSTEM AT I DASC LEVEL TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO III MAF REQUIREMENTS, COMPLETELY BACKED UP BY THE TOTAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE THROUGH THE TACC. MOST CERTAINLY, THE GS AIR AT III MAF MUST MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE MECHANICS OF THE I DASC OPERATION IN ORDER TO ASSURE YOU THAT SUPPORT PROVIDED THROUGH THAT AGENCY IS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR NEEDS. IN YOUR PERIODIC ASSESSMENTS OF THE SYSTEM, I WOULD EXPECT TO HEAR FROM YOU ON THIS, IF THE I DASC OPERATION FALLS SHORT IN ANY RESPECT.

C. SORTIE RATE. ON 17 MARCH THE 1ST MAW INFORMED TAF THAT IT WAS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A 1.2 SORTIE RATE WHICH EQUATES TO APPROXIMATELY 198 SORTIES PER DAY. 1ST MAW FURTHER STATED THAT NORMALLY 160 SORTIES SHOULD BE PREPLANNED, THE REMAINING 38 SORTIES BEING SET ASIDE FOR SCRAMBLES. THIS HAS IMPOSED A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF MARINE SORTIES THAT CAN BE ALLOCATED TO YOU FOR SUPPORT OF YOUR FORCES. IF 1ST MAW IS PROVISIONED FOR AND CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A HIGHER SORTIE RATE THAN 1.2, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THE SORTIE RATE TO ANY LEVEL THE 1ST MAW IS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING. ALLOCATIONS FROM MACV TASE TO SUPPORT OF I CIZ WOULD BE INCREASED ACCORDINGLY.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

835

SECRET

117

TOP SECRET

VVVV YVNA775 NABYIW
 OO DDKE
 DE YVNA 0061 0921948
 ZNY TTTTT
 O 011948Z APR 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 INFO WVND/CMC
 NMSB/CG FMFPAC (AM008)
 DDKE/CG III MAF
 DDKN/CG FIRST MAW (P003)
 O R 301942Z MAR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPAC
 TO CINCPAC
 COMUSMACV
 INFO CMDR SEVENTH AF
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG III MAF
 CINCPACFLT
 NMCC
 CG FMFPAC
 CINCPACAF
 BT

S&C FILES
 HEADQUARTERS III MAF

NO 10892

TOP SECRET

PASS TO ADM SHARP FOR INFO AS ALFA 96
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THIRD MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 A. NMCC TELECON 085/68 300039Z MAR 68 (ALPHA 88) (PASEP)
 1. REF A REQUESTS INFORMATION REGARDING ALLOCATION OF
 SORTIES TO 1ST AND 3RD MAR DIV BASCS FOR PERIOD 1 THROUGH
 30 NMARCH.
 2. REQUEST INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE REPLY BE PROVIDED
 NLT 312200Z MAR 68. GP-4
 BT

AC

TOP SECRET

OO RUMKM
 DE RUMKA 4489 0901940
 ZNY TTTT ZOK JPCCO
 O R 301942Z MAR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPAC
 TO RUMKAX/CINCPAC
 RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO CMDR 7TMAF
 RUMSAV/CG 1ST MAW
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 RUMKB/CINCPACFLT
 RUEKDA/MCC
 RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUHLKSF/CINCPACAF
 BT

NO 10887

T O P S E C R E T
 PASS TO ADM SHARP FOR INFO AS ALFA 96
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THIRD MAF AVIATION ASSETS (ID)
 A. NMCC TELECON 085/68 30023SZ MAR 68 (ALPHA 88)
 1. REF A REQUESTS INFORMATION REGARDING ALLOCATION OF
 SORTIES TO 1ST AND 3RD MAR DIV DASCs FOR PERIOD 1 THROUGH
 30 MARCH.
 2. REQUEST INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE REPLY BE PROVIDED
 MLT 312200Z MAR 68. GP-4
 BT

TOP SECRET

NNNNZCZCSAA327ZVA 0
 PP RUMSAK
 ZNY TTTT ZFH-1 RUMSA
 PHN450NVV SVC580VV PHN437VV KAZ711
 PP RUMSAV RUMSAK
 TDE RUKKA 4596 0910034
 ZNY TTTT ZOK JPCCO
 P 310050Z MAR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPAC
 TO RUKKAK/CINCPAC
 INFO RUHLKSF/CINCPACAF
 RUKKB/CINCPACFLT
 RUKKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAL/CMR 7 AF
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T
 PASS TO ADM SHARP FOR INFO AS ALFA 118.

O 302145Z MAR 68

FM NMCC
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CINCPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T
 CINCPAC FOR LT. GEN HUTCHIN, HQ PACOM, DELIVER DURING NORMAL
 DUTY HOURS; MACV FOR MAJ. GEN KERWIN, DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS,

NO 10889

PAGE 2 RUKKA 4596 T O P S E C R E T

31MAR68 FROM LT. GEN SPIVY, DJS.

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THIRD MAF AVIATION ASSETS.

REF: A. NMCC TELECON 085/68, DTG 300039Z MAR68.

NECESSARY TO HAVE ONE ADDED PIECE OF INFORMATION NOT
 REQUESTED IN REFERENCE. WHAT IS THE NORMAL DIFFERENCE IN TIME RE-
 QUIRED FOR IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PRIOR TO 21 MARCH AND
 AFTER IN RESPONDING TO MARDIV DASC REQUEST. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

TOP SECRET

ZCZCSAA32EVA 033VV PHN443T

VV KAZ714
 RR RUMSAK
 DE RUMKA 4490 0901923
 ZNY TTTT ZOK JPCCO
 R 301943Z MAR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPCAC
 INFO RUHLKSF/CINCPCACAF
 RUMKB/CINCPCACFLT
 RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAL/CMDR 7AF
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 R 300419Z MAR 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPCAC
 TO CINCPCAC

No 10888

BT

TOP SECRET

PASS TO ADM SHARP FOR INFO AS ALFA 88.

O 300039Z

FM NMCC

TO COMUSMACV

INFO CINCPCAC

BT

TOP SECRET

FOR LTGEN HUTCHIN AT HQPACOM AND MGEN KERWIN AT MACV FROM LTGEN SPIVY, DJS.

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THIRD MAF AVIATION ASSETS.

REF: A. CINCPCAC 030735Z MAR 68

B. MACV 04266

1. CONFIRMING MY TELECON 1900 EST 29 MARCH, REQUEST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BE PROVIDED BY 0700 EST 1 APRIL.

A. FOR PERIOD 1 MARCH THROUGH 20 MARCH THE SORTIES ALLOCATED TO EACH OF THE 1ST AND 3RD MAR DIVS DASCs. BREAK DOWN BY DAYS.

B. FROM 21 MAR TO 30 MAR THE SORTIES ALLOCATED TO EACH OF THE 1ST AND 3RD MAR DIVS DASCs. BREAK DOWN BY DAYS.

C. FOR EACH TIME PERIOD IN A AND B ABOVE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND SITUATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ABNORMAL SORTIE REQUIREMENTS OR SORTIE ALLOCATIONS EG: WEATHER, ACTIONS IN OTHER AREAS.

D. HAS CURRENT SYSTEM CAUSED ANY REDUCTION IN SORTIES ALLOCATE TO MARINE DIV DASC? PROVIDE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING.

E. PROVIDE ANY INSTANCES SINCE 20 MAR 68 WHEN ALL AIR SUPPORT REQUESTED WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO MARINE FORCES.

WARM REGARDS. GP-4

BT

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TOP SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAL 199D 0940944
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 P 030905Z APR 68
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN
 TO RUMSAV/CG 1ST MAW DANANG AB RVN
 INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
 RUMKSF/CINCPACAF
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG AB RVN
 BT

COG G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

S E C R E T / D C .

SUBJECT: AGA SUPPORT OF KHE SANH (U).

REFERENCE: 1ST MAW MSG (S), DTG 26/0001Z MAR 68.

1. THE REALIZATION THAT THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE AGA WAS BEING INHIBITED BY THE EXISTING RULES MOTIVATED THE CHANGE TO EMPLOY THEM IN RP-1 AND TALLY HO. THERE THE AGA'S UNIQUE SYSTEMS COULD BE EXPLOITED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT AND FULL REALIZATION COULD BE MADE OF ITS CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND ATTACK MOVING TARGETS. CONSIDERING THE FORCES SUPPORTING KHE SANH, INCLUDING THE USE OF GUNSHIP II, AND THE GRADUALLY IMPROVING WEATHER IN THAT AREA, IT IS FELT THAT THE USE OF AGA'S IN THE ARMED RECCE AUTHORIZED AREAS OF TALLY HO AND RP-1 WOULD BETTER SERVE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 199D S E C R E T

RESTRICTING MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TROOPS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES INTO THE I CORPS AREA FROM THE NORTH.

2. FAC CONTROL IN LAOS AND SVN IS A VALID AND CONTINUING REQUIREMENT WHICH WAS GENERATED BY MANY "SHORT ROUND" INCIDENTS WHEN THIS REQUIREMENT WAS LIFTED. YOUR REQUEST HAS RECEIVED FULLEST CONSIDERATION AND ALTHOUGH IT HAS MANY GOOD POINTS RELIEF FROM THE REQUIREMENT FOR FAC CONTROL CANNOT AT THIS TIME BE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED.

GP-
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DATE

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CG FIRST MAW

SERIAL

030300Z APR 68 000003 of 3 000000 RECEIVED

SUBJECT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DATE

SIGNATURE

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT

SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#112

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FM RUMSAC
OZ RUMSAC 016W 0940300
ZNY SSSSS
P 030300Z APR 68
FM CG FIRST MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
FOR FMFPAC (F-004)
FOR CMC CODE AA-1

- A. CG FMAW 272350Z MAR 68
- B. CG III MAF 311550Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)
- C. CG FMFPAC 302125Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)

1. THE SUBSTANCE, DEFINITION AND FORMAT OF THE DETAILED INFORMATION REQUIRED BY REF A HAS BEEN REVISED IN THE INTERESTS OF CLARITY AND IN THE HOPE OF PROVIDING MORE MEANINGFUL AND ACCURATE DATA. IT WILL BE REVISED FURTHER AS REQUIREMENTS DICTATE.
2. NOTE THAT THE VARIOUS TOTALS WHICH CAN BE DERIVED FROM SECTION I WILL NOT MATCH THOSE IN SECTION II. THIS IS BECAUSE THE GROUND

PAGE TWO RUMSAC 016W S E C R E T SPECAT
COMMANDER RECEIVES HIS AIR SUPPORT FROM 1ST MAW, TF-77 AND 7TH AF, AND AT THE SAME TIME THE 1ST MAW SORTIE OUTPUT IS ALLOCATED IN PART TO OTHER THAN USMC GROUND UNITS.

3. AS YOU KNOW, THE CURRENT SYSTEM SPECIFIES THAT PREPLANNED REQUIREMENTS BE STATED IN TARGETS, WELL IN ADVANCE OF DATE/TIME NEEDED. THESE TARGETS ARE THEN FRAGGED IN TERMS OF SORTIES PER TARGET. THIS IS REFLECTED IN SECTION I C, WHICH LEADS FROM TARGET TO SORTIE, SO THAT SORTIE CAN BE USED AS A BASE ELSEWHERE IN THE DATA.

4. FOR FMFPAC - THE TIME IN ADVANCE REQUESTS HAVE TO BE IN THE HANDS OF 7AF IS CONTAINED IN REF B. THE OTHER OF YOUR SPECIFIC QUERIES IN REF C ARE INCORPORATED IN THE FOLLOWING NEW FORMAT OR ARE INDICATED IN THE REMARKS WHICH WILL BE ADDED THERETO.

5. THE FOLLOWING IS THE NEW FORMAT FOR THE SPECIAL REPORT:

SECTION I. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS (DIV)

- A. PERIOD COVERED - NORMALLY FROM 1901N TO 1900N.
- B. NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO USMC GROUND UNITS BY SERVICES:
 1. USMC
 2. USAF

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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PAGE THREE RUNSAV ØIGN S E C R E T SPECAT

- 3. USN
- 4. OTHER (VNAF, RAAF)
- C. PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT
 - 1. NUMBER OF TARGETS THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRED HIT.
 - 2. NUMBER OF TARGETS TO BE HIT WHICH WERE ALLOCATED TO GROUND COMMANDER BY HIGHER HQTRS (PCV, III MAF).
 - 3. NUMBER OF TARGETS ALLOWED BY HIGHER HQTRS TO BE SUBMITTED.
 - 4. NUMBER OF TARGETS FRAGGED BY 7AF TO BE HIT.
 - 5. NUMBER OF SORTIES FRAGGED BY 7AF TO HIT THESE FRAGGED TARGETS.
 - 6. NUMBER OF FRAGGED TARGETS WHICH WERE HIT.
 - 7. NUMBER OF SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED.
- D. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
 - 1. WITHIN 9 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
 - 2. WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
 - 3. WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
 - 4. MORE THAN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
- E. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:

PAGE FOUR RUNSAV ØIGN S E C R E T SPECAT

- 1. REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 2. ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 3. A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 4. AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- F. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES
 - 1. REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDER
 - 2. APPROVED BY I DASC/DASC VICTOR
 - 3. RECEIVED
- G. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
 - 1. WITHIN 15 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
 - 2. WITHIN 30 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
 - 3. WITHIN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
 - 4. MORE THAN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
- H. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:
 - 1. REQUEST ORDNANCE

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAV **SECRET** SPECAT

- 2. ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 3. A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 4. AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- I. EXTRA OR UNREQUESTED SORTIES RECEIVED
- J. NUMBER OF SORTIES CONTROLLED BY:
 - 1. MARINE TACP, FAC ON GROUND
 - 2. MARINE TAC(A)
 - 3. MARINE TPQ
 - 4. AF TACP, FAC(A) OR FAC
 - 5. FLIGHT LEADER
 - 6. OTHER
- K. NUMBER OF AIR SUPPORT SORTIES APPROVED BY HIGHER GROUND HQTRS WHICH WERE NOT PROVIDED BECAUSE OF:
 - 1. LACK OF AIRCRAFT ASSETS
 - 2. COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES ABOVE DIVISION LEVEL
 - 3. OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS)
 - 4. UNKNOWN (REASON NOT PROVIDED TO GROUND UNIT BN/RGT/DIV)
- L. NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN AIR SUPPORT WAS FURNISHED BUT

PAGE SIX RUMSAV **SECRET** SPECAT

- NOT USED BY GROUND COMMANDER BECAUSE OF:
- 1. GROUND UNIT COMMUNICATION FAILURE OR DIFFICULTIES
 - 2. CANCELLED BY GROUND COMMANDER
 - 3. WEATHER
 - 4. ASRT (TPQ) SYSTEM FAILURE
 - 5. AIRCRAFT SYSTEM FAILURE (INCLUDES COM, EMERGENCIES, ORDNANCE)
 - 6. DIVERTED ON GROUND COMMANDER ORDER
 - 7. OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS)
- M. REMARKS
- 1. OTHER REMARKS (KEYED TO SPECIFIC PARAGRAPH WHEN APPROPRIATE)

SECTION II DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING CONCERNS ONLY MARINE CORPS FLEXI WING STRIKE A/C

- A. SORTIE FLOWN
 - 1. FRAGGED SORTIE FLOWN
 - 2. SCRAMBLE SORTIES
 - 3. ADD-ONS
 - B. ALL SORTIE EMPLOYMENT (AREA)
 - 1. SORTIES FLOWN IN COUNTRY
- BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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PP RLESHON
 DE RUMSAV 017W 0940300
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 030300Z APR 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

- S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
2. SORTIES FLOWN OUT OF COUNTRY
 3. SORTIES FLOWN ELSEWHERE (II CORPS, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC)
 - C. FRAGGED SORTIES BREAKDOWN
 1. MARINE A/C FRAGGED IN COUNTRY
 2. MARINE A/C FRAGGED OUT OF COUNTRY
 3. OTHER (FRAGGED IN II CORPS, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC)
 - D. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)
 1. NUMBER OF SORTIES SCRAMBLED BY I DASC/DASC V VIA TADC
 2. NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V

- PAGE TWO RUMSAV 017W S E C R E T SPECAT
3. NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V
 4. OTHER
 - E. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)
 1. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE REGTS/BN
 2. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY
 3. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN
 4. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC
 5. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER ICTZ FORCES, (VNAF, SSF)
 6. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN II CORPS
 7. SCRAMBLE SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY
 - F. ADD-ON BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)
 1. ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY I DASC/DASC V TADC
 2. ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC TO TADC
 3. ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) TO TADC
 4. OTHER
 - G. ADD-ON BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)
 1. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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2. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY
 3. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN
 4. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC
 5. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER ICGA FORCES (FVNAP, SSF)
 6. ADD-ON SORTIES IN II CORPS
 7. ADD-ON SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY
 H. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (TYPE OF MISSION)
 1. NUMBER OF FRAGGED SORTIES DIVERTED
 2. NUMBER OF SCRAMBLED SORTIES DIVERTED
 3. NUMBER OF ADD-ON SORTIES DIVERTED
 I. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (AGENCY INITIATING DIVERT)
 1. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY 1 DASC/DASC V
 2. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY 2 DASC/DASC/ASRT
 3. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY CACC
 4. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY OTHER AGENCY
 J. REMARKS
 1. OTHER REMARKS (KEYED TO SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS, WHEN APPROPRIATE)

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0170 S E C R E T SPECAT.
 SECTION III: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS, SECOND OR AIR COMMANDERS COMMENTS (NARRATIVE).

EXAMPLES: (1) LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS
 (2) TARGETS FRAGGED SO FAR IN ADVANCE THAT SITUATION DICTATES DIFFERENT USE OF AIRCRAFT ON ARRIVAL
 (3) WHEN APPROPRIATE AND SUPPORTABLE - A STATEMENT FROM BN OR DIVISION COMMANDER THAT BECAUSE HIS PREPLANNED MISSIONS WERE DIVERTED OR BECAUSE AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FAILED TO MATERIALIZE PROPERLY, THAT CASUALTIES WERE SUFFERED.
 G. DAILY REPORTS THIS FORMAT WILL COMMENCE WITH REPORTING PERIOD ENDING 1900H 4 APRIL.

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF SERIAL 021628Z MAR 68 COPY # 3 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS, SUMMARY OF
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S						<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">EXCLUSIVE</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>LEGEND A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
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G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

LEGEND
A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
C - COMMENTS
I - INFORMATION

(III)

III

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3/ March rept summary
M7 to MCV printing
Act discrepancies
① Symbols/units - I ABC
② Series reduced from 212 to 177

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 0219 0931608
ZNY TTTT
O 021608Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS, SUMMARY OF SITUATION AS OF 31 MARCH 1968

1. YOUR DECISION CONCERNING THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MACV STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS HAS BEEN IN EFFECT NOW FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS. AS IN THE CASE OF ALL OF YOUR DECISIONS, I HAVE BEEN RESOLUTE IN CARRYING IT OUT TO THE FULLEST. MY STAFF AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN EXPLICITLY INSTRUCTED TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO OVERCOME ANY TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS AND TO MAKE THIS SYSTEM WORK. AS WITH MOST NEW SYSTEMS, PROBLEMS DO ARISE AT THE OUTSET. I REALIZE THAT SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS ARE EXPLAINABLE AS "GROWING PAINS" AND PERHAPS OTHERS ARE DUE TO EXISTING DEFECTS IN THE SYSTEM. HOPEFULLY, ALL OF THESE DIFFICULTIES CAN BE CORRECTED SOONEST, SO THAT YOUR DESIRE TO PROVIDE ALL GROUND COMMANDERS WITH THE MAXIMUM

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0219 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AIR SUPPORT AT YOUR COMMAND MAY BE REALIZED. IT IS IN KEEPING WITH THIS SPIRIT THAT I MAKE KNOWN TO YOU SOME OF MY EARLY OBSERVATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AT WORK, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO YOU. I REALIZE THAT YOU HAVE AFFORDED ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE KNOWN MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIR ASSETS TO YOU AS WELL AS CINCPAC; HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE MORE HELPFUL IF I PROVIDED MY VIEWS ONLY TO YOU AT THIS JUNCTURE.
2. IMPLEMENTATION: WE RECEIVED THE DIRECTIVE THE EVENING OF 9 MARCH AND ON 10 MARCH IT WAS IMPLEMENTED. ALTHOUGH BOTH I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ANNOUNCED THEY WERE OPERATIONAL SHORTLY THEREAFTER, IN FACT THEY WERE SOMEWHAT PREMATURE. THE FACILITIES WERE NOT READY, PERSONNEL HAD NOT YET BEEN ASSIGNED, AND THERE HAD BEEN NO OPPORTUNITY TO EITHER PROCURE OR TEST THE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO HAVE HAD AT LEAST ONE COMPLETE CPX OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM BEFORE THE EXECUTION DATE. AS A RESULT, THE CONTROL AGENCIES WERE UNABLE TO ASSUME THE REQUISITE FUNCTIONS UPON THE EFFECTIVE DATE. IN VIEW OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION AT THE TIME I COULDN'T CHANCE ANY BREAKDOWN IN MY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0219 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AIR SUPPORT; THEREFORE, I CONTINUED MY EXISTING SYSTEM. AS YOU KNOW, THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WASN'T COMPLETELY OPERATIVE UNTIL 21 MARCH.

3. MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS VITAL FOR THE CONTROL OF HELICOPTERS AND TO INSURE THEIR COORDINATION WITH FIRST MAW FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. IT CAN ALSO PROVIDE A VALUABLE REDUNDANCY OF COMMUNICATION TO THE AIR FORCE CONTROL SYSTEM. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 28 MARCH USAF C-130 AIRCRAFT ON KHE SANH RESUPPLY MISSIONS WERE DELAYED FOR SEVERAL HOURS DUE TO 1ST ACD ARTILLERY FIRE IN THE KHE SANH CORRIDOR. DUE TO CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES, DASC VICTOR WAS UNABLE TO COORDINATE THIS FIRE; THEREFORE, IT BECAME NECESSARY TO CANCEL ALL ARTILLERY FIRES IN THE CORRIDOR. SINCE THAT INCIDENT, PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT UTILIZING THE MARINE KHE SANH DASC TO INSURE COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT WITH OTHER EFFORTS. THE MARINE DASC'S ARE ALSO BEING UTILIZED TO PROVIDE A CENTRALIZED ARTILLERY FIRING ADVISORY SERVICE TO HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OPERATING WITHIN DIVISION AO'S. THESE SERVICES ARE THOSE REQUIRED OF AN ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0219 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR CENTER (AWCC) IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13. ON 1 APR 68, THE AWCC FUNCTION OF THE FIRST AIRCAV WAS BEING PROVIDED BY THE KHE SANH DASC. AT THIS TIME, THERE IS STILL NO OPERATIONAL AWCC ON UHF FOR THE 101ST AIRBORNE. THE FMAW IS ASSISTING IN THIS MATTER BY INITIATING EFFORTS TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION THROUGH THE MARINE DASC AT HUE/PHU BAI. FURTHERMORE, AT THE PRESENT TIME, WARNINGS OF NAVAL GUNFIRE IN SUPPORT OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE ARE DISSEMINATED TO FIXED WING AIRCRAFT BY THE MARINE DASC AT HUE/PHU BAI.

4. REQUEST SYSTEM: I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT AVAILABLE AIR SUPPORT ASSETS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET ALL REQUIREMENTS AND THAT AN ALLOCATION TO EACH CORPS AREA IS NECESSARY. HOWEVER, IT IS MY BELIEF, THAT A DIVISION'S TOTAL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE EXPRESSED AND RECORDED. CONSEQUENTLY, I INTEND TO CONSOLIDATE AND FORWARD TO YOUR TASE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL REQUIRED AIR SUPPORT IN I CORPS. I AM SURE THAT ONLY A PORTION WILL BE SATISFIED BY THE ALLOCATION OF SORTIES FROM THE TASE/TACC, BUT BELIEVE THAT YOU SHARE MY VIEWS THAT PROPOSED ALLOCATIONS SHOULD NOT INHIBIT THE GROUND COMMANDER'S REQUESTS.

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 0219 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
5. AREAS OF CONCERN:

A. INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 9 WEST OF KHE SANH AND INTO LAOS AT NIGHT AND IN BAD WEATHER CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE A6 WITH AMTI CAPABILITY, BUT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) ARE TOO RESTRICTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE NIGHT OF 25-26 MARCH MARINE A6 AIRCRAFT ON ROAD RECCE MISSIONS IN KHE SANH AREA WERE DIVERTED TO TALLY HO AREA BY THE TACC, APPARENTLY DUE TO ROE IN LAOS THAT REQUIRE FAC APPROVAL PRIOR TO ATTACKING A MOVING TARGET. CG FMAW MSG 260001Z MARCH BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE TACC AND REQUESTED THE ROE BE CHANGED. IN ADDITION, IT WAS REQUESTED THAT THE A6'S BE FRAGGED FOR ARMED RECCE MISSIONS IN-COUNTRY IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH WHILE A CHANGE TO THE ROE WAS PENDING. AS OF THIS DATE (31 MARCH) THIS HAS NOT BEEN DONE. ALL EIGHT A6 SYSTEM SORTIES FORMERLY SCHEDULED FOR KHE SANH ARE NOW BEING FRAGGED TO TALLY HO.

B. SCRAMBLES/DIVERTS: YOUR DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH TECHNICALLY GIVES SCRAMBLE AND DIVERT AUTHORITY TO I DASC, A 7TH AIR FORCE AIR CONTROL AGENCY. HOWEVER, IF I UNDERSTAND YOUR INTENT IN THIS REGARD, THE ACTUAL "DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY"

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 0219 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR FOR SCRAMBLE AND DIVERT PURPOSES MORE PROPERLY RESIDES IN III MAF, AND THAT III MAF DIRECTS I DASC AS NECESSARY. INASMUCH AS WE HAVE BEEN ABIDING BY YOUR DIRECTIVE, I AM UNAWARE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN IN THIS REGARD, SINCE III MAF HAS NOT FUNCTIONED IN THIS ARENA.

C. AVERAGE TOTAL DAILY SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT TO 1ST MARDIV AND 3RD MARDIV HAVE DIMINISHED FROM 212 IN THE PERIOD 1-20 MARCH TO 177 IN THE PERIOD 21-30 MARCH. THIS RESULTS PRINCIPALLY FROM APPLICATION OF SINGLE MANAGER CRITERIA FOR PREPLANNED SORTIE RATE (7TH AF CRITERIA HOLDS TO A MAXIMUM SORTIE OF 1.2 FOR BOTH PREPLANNED AND SCRAMBLE SORTIES) TO THE FRAGGING OF FMAW. THIS REDUCTION MAY ALSO BE RELATED TO THE FACT THAT FMAW SORTIES SUPPLIED TO OTHER III MAF UNITS JUMPED FROM 135 IN THE FIRST 20 DAYS TO 154 IN THE LAST TEN. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, DURING THE MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, AIRCRAFT OF THE FIRST MAF FLEW AT A 1.46 SORTIE RATE. IN KEEPING WITH YOUR DESIRE TO PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER WITH THE MAXIMUM AIR SUPPORT POSSIBLE WITHIN EXISTING RESOURCES, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU CONSIDER INCREASING THE PREPLANNED SORTIE RATE FOR ALL FORCES. GP-4
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. D.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 111	

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* C O N F I D E N T I A L * **FLASH**

PT000698
ZTTCZYUW RUMACMU4825 0920000-CCCC--RUMWAA.
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSAGP 6 0920323
ZNY CCCCC
Z 010245Z APR 68

COG: G-3
INFO: G-2
COPY TO G-6 S/S ADJ

FM I DASC DANANG AB RVN
TO RUMHMA/DASC VICTOR PHU BAI RVN
RUMSAV/CG 1 ST MAW DANANG AB RVN
RUMHVP/KME SANH DASC
RUMHVP/DONG HA DASC
RUMHLA/PHU BAI DASC
INFO RUMSAR/7TH AF TSN AB /TACC
RUMWAA/CG III MAF DANANG AB RVN

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L / I D A S C M A R 6 8 :
COMMANDER 7AF HAS DIRECTED THAT A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE SUMMARY OF AN AIR STRIKE IN I COPRS BE SUBMITTED ON A DAILY BASIS. TIME FRAM TO BE 0001 THRU 2400. 2. A SECTION WITHIN YOUR ORGANIZATION WILL BE DESIGNATED TO COORDINATE TRANSMISSION, FORMATS ETC. TO I DASC BY PHONE AS SOON AS SUFFICIENT DATA IS ACCUMULATED AFTER COMPLETION OF THE RESPECTIVE AIR STRIKE I DASC WILL COMPILE AND TRANSMIT TO 7 AF. 3. INFORMATION REQUIRED IS: A. CALL SIGN OF A/C, TYPE A/C AND SERVIC (USN USAF USMC) B. NUMBER OF A/C IN FLIGHT. C. CONTROL AGENCY, (FAC OR COMBAT SKY SPOT-TPQ 10, MISO 77) AN

PAGE 2 RUMSAGP 6 C O N F I D E N T I A L
STA. CALL SIGN, D. AGENCY REQUESTING STRIKE (1ST CAV, 101 ABRNE AMERICAL DIV, 26 USMC ETC) E. UNIT SUPPORTED (REGIMENT OR LOWER) F. MANEUVER BASE (KHE SANH ETC), G. DASC AREA (I DASC, DASC V, KHE SANH, DONG HA, PHU BAI), H. TIME OVER TARGET AND COORDINATES OF AIR STRIKE, I. ORNANCE EXPENDED TYPE AND AMOUNT) J. BDA ASSESSMENT FOR AIR STRIKE OF AVAILABLE. 4. WHEN STRIKE SORTIES ARE PASSED FROM ONE CONTROLLING AGENCY TO ANOTHER. IT WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GAINING AGENCY TO SEE THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS PASSED TO I DASC. GP-4.
BT

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III BAF
DCG						SERIAL 071014Z APR 60 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S						REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND

A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE

C - COMMENTS

I - INFORMATION

(109)

AC

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DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG 111 MAF	
		SERIAL 021014Z MAR 68	COPY: 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
		SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
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WING	COPIES 4,5,6 OF 6 COPIES		

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OO RUHFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 0188 0931014
 ZNY TTTT
 PAC -T-CMC
 O 021014Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT
EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN THARIN, INFO GEN
 CHAPMAN AND MGEN ANDERSON, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 A. ADMIN FMFPAC MSG 312044Z MAR 68 (TS)

1. INFO REQUESTED BY PARA 1.A. FOLLOWS; HOWEVER THERE ARE TWO
 ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION ASKED.

A. RESPONSE TO FIRST MARDIV DASC REQ FOR MARINE AIRCRAFT
 NOW TAKES ONE TO TWO MINUTES LONGER THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS IS
 DUE TO COMPATABILITY OF WORKING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN I DASC AND
 THE FIRST MAW TADC. THE AGREEMENT PERMITS FIRST MARDIV DASC
 TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE FROM TADC. THEN TADC NOTIFIES I DASC BY
 HOTLINE THAT IMMEDIATE IS REQUESTED. HOWEVER, THIS APPLIES
 ONLY TO FIRST MAW A/C. IF USAF A/C ARE REQUIRED DUE TO NON
 AVAILABILITY OF FIRST MAW A/C, I DASC CONTACTS CRC (PANAMA) OR
 TUOC OF 366TH FIGHTER WING, AS APPROPRIATE, WHO THEN SCRAMBLES OR

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0188 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 DIVERTS USAF A/C LOCATED IN ICTZ, OR GOES TO TACC FOR USAF A/C
 BASED IN OTHER CORPS AREAS. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT
 UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS DIVERTS OF PREPLANNED MISSIONS ARE
 EFFECTED BY THE I-DASC WITHOUT REFERRAL TO III MAF. TO CLOSE THIS
 LOOP WOULD TAKE ADDED TIME.

B. THE SECOND PART OF THE ANSWER INVOLVES UNITS IN NORTH-
 ERN ICTZ.

(1) THE 3D MARDIV DASC IN PCV AREA REQUESTS IMMEDIATE
 THROUGH DASC-V WHO THEN GOES TO I-DASC FOR SCRAMBLES OR MAY
 DIVERT PREPLANNED MISSION A/C ALLOCATED TO DIVS UNDER PCV.
 I-DASC THEN GOES TO TADC FIRST MAW AND IF /C ARE NOT AVAILABLE
 IN FIRST MAW, I-DASC GOES TO TACC AS INDICATED IN PARA 1.A.

(2) AT 0800H 1 APRIL 1968 DASC-V ENTERED THE TACTICAL
 AIR REQUEST NET. THREE IMMEDIATES WERE REQUESTED BY 3RD MAR
 DIV TODAY, TWO BY DONG HA DASC AND ONE BY 26TH MARINES THROUGH
 THE KHE SANH DASC. WHILE IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT COMMUNICATION
 FACILITIES MAY FAIL, A RECOUNT OF EVENTS CONCERNING THE KHE
 SANH IMMEDIATE REQUEST MAY BE OF INTEREST.

(3) AT 1645 THE KHE SANH (KS) DASC REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE
 STRIKE ON AN ACTIVE MORTAR POSITION. KS WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0188 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO RASH (1ST AIRCAV TACP) WHICH IS THE IMMEDIATE SENIOR AGENCY TO KS DASC FOR OPN PEGASUS. KS DASC THEN CONTACTED FIRST MAW TADC AT DANANG AND PASSED IMMEDIATE REQUEST. TADC THEN WENT TO I DASC WHO THEN WENT TO DASC-V AND RECEIVED CLEARANCE TO SCRAMBLE AN IMMEDIATE BY PASSING DASC-V CLEARANCE TO TADC. THE TOTAL PROCESSING TIME PRIOR TO THE REQUEST BEING PASSED BY TADC TO THE AIR GROUP THAT FLEW THE STRIKE WAS 18 MINUTES. WHILE THIS IS NOT INDICATIVE OF THE NORMAL, IT DOES HIGHLIGHT THE DISADVANTAGE OF COMPLEXITY. THE REMAINING TWO IMMEDIATES REQUESTED REQUIRED APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES LONGER THAN WAS NECESSARY PRIOR TO 21 MARCH 1968.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMHMB
DE RUMSAK 0125 0930300
ZNY CCCCC
O 020300Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V
RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV
RUMXVP/TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON, MGEN TOLSON, AND COL LOWNDS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE ABRUPT DROP IN AIR SUPPORT OF KHE SANH WHICH OCCURRED YESTERDAY. OPN NIAGARA WAS IN MANY RESPECTS A "PUSH" SYSTEM WHEREBY A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SORTIES WERE FED INTO THE AREA WITHOUT SPECIFIC TARGET REQUEST. OPN NIAGARA IS OVER, AND WE MUST NOW BE DILIGENT TO REQUEST THE AIR SUPPORT WE NEED TO PREVENT THE ENEMY GETTING A BREATHING SPELL. FURTHER, WITH RESPECT TO PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT, I WANT YOU TO SUBMIT COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS REGARDLESS OF ARBITRARY NUMBERS ALLOCATION FOR YOUR UNITS ESTABLISHED BY 7TH AF. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE THEM TO YOU BY GOING TO HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 108

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						SERIAL 020100Z APR COPY# 3 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DCG AIR						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
C/S						
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

AC
#107

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~~TOP SECRET~~

VV PAC323CMC1122
 AMPP RUHMFMA RUMWAA
 DE RUEBHOA 4706 0922251
 ZNY TTTT
 RUHMFMA -I-CG III MAF
 P 02010Z APR 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 GEN CHAPMAN

WESTY HAS JUST SENT A "EYES ONLY" TO WHEELER ON AIR CONTROL
 IN WHICH HE STATES "THERE ARE MULTIPLE REASONS WHY
 A CHANGE WAS REQUIRED AND WHY THE OLD SYSTEM WAS NOT
 ONE I COULD LIVE WITH AS THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER IN
 VIETNAM". HE THEN LAUNCHES INTO A NUMBER OF GENERALITIES
 HAVING TO DO WITH AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN I CORPS
 WHICH HE STATES, REQUIRED A CHANGE IN AIR CONTROL. HE
 MENTIONS INTERMINGLING OF ARMY AND MARINE DIVISIONS,
 SPECIAL OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE "GRAND SLAM" OPERATIONS,
 NIAGARA OPERATION WHICH REQUIRED INTERSPERSING OF AIR
 AND ARTILLERY AND FINALLY THE REQUIREMENT FOR A FIELD
 COMMANDER TO HAVE CONTROL OF THE ALLOCATION OF THE AIR
 POWER AVAILABLE TO HIM. THESE ARE ALL ARGUMENTS WHICH

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE TWO RUEBH044706 T O P S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 WESTY HAS USED BEFORE BUT WHICH REALLY DO NOT, WHEN
 CAREFULLY ANALYZED, SUPPORT HIS POSITION: IN FACT SOME
 ARE EXCELLENT ARGUMENTS FOR OUR POSITION.

WESTY CONCLUDES HIS MESSAGE BY THE FOLLOWING STATE-
 MENTS: "I RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT IF A RULING IS TO BE
 MADE AGAINST MY RECOMMENDATION WHICH WAS APPROVED BY
 ADMIRAL SHARP, I BE GIVEN THE COURTESY OF APPEARING
 PERSONALLY BEFORE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SO THAT I
 CAN EXPLAIN TO THEM THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FACED BY
 THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER ON THE GROUND WHOSE VIEWS
 HAVE HERETOFORE BEEN OVERRIDING.

"IN THE MEANWHILE, AS A MATTER OF TACTICAL NECESSITY
 AND SERVICE HARMONY, I ASK YOU TO APPROACH GEN CHAPMAN
 AND ASK HIM TO DIRECT HIS PEOPLE TO GIVE THEIR FULL
 COOPERATION TO THE SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF A TRIED AND
 BATTLE-TESTED SYSTEM WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR THE MOST
 EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE LIMITED AIR ASSETS AVAILABLE
 TO THIS COMMAND. FRANKLY, I AM DISAPPOINTED WITH WHAT
 APPEARS TO BE A DRAGGING OF THE HEELS."

IT IS MY INTENTION NOT TO BACK DOWN ON THIS ISSUE. I

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE THREE RUEBH044706 T O P S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 CONSIDER IT VITAL TO OUR AIR-GROUND TEAM CONCEPT AND A
 LIFE OR DEATH MATTER FOR OUR MARINES ON THE BATTLE FIELD,
 ESPECIALLY OUR LONG RANGE PATROLS WHOSE VERY SURVIVAL
 DEPENDS ON EMERGENCY CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.

I THINK WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE EXPEND EVERY EFFORT TO
 MAKE THE IMPOSED SYSTEM WORK. I FEEL WESTY'S ACCUSATION
 OF "FOOT DRAGGING" IS NOT JUSTIFIED BUT WE MUST BE WARY
 NOT TO GIVE HIM AMMUNITION TO BACK UP SUCH A CHARGE. I
 BELIEVE OUR STATISTICS GATHERING IS JUSTIFIED AND WE SHOULD
 CONTINUE IT. SINCE THE ORDER HAS BEEN PROMULGATED, I THINK
 IT BEST THAT YOU PLAY OUR DISAPPROVAL LOW-KEY ON YOUR
 END. GIVE ME ALL THE INFORMATION YOU CAN AND I WILL CARRY
 THE BALL HERE. WARM REGARDS. CHAPPIE

GP-4

BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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PP RUMHGK RUMHMB
 DE RUMWAA 0100 092144Z
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 011442Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHMA/PROV CORPS V
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV
 RUMHGK/CG SECOND ROK MAR BDE
 INFO RUMHMB/FIRST AIR CAV DIV
 RUMHVP/THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHMB/ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT
 ORIG G-3
 REL G-3

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PREPLANNED REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT

REF A. III MAF MSG DTG 180550Z MAR 68 SUBJECT AS ABOVE

1. PARA 5C IS CORRECTED TO READ: REQUESTS FOR COMBAT SKYSPOTS (CSS) (TPQ-10, OR MSQ 77) FOR EXECUTION BETWEEN 1900 HOURS ON DATE OF REQUEST AND 0600 HOURS THE NEXT MORNING WILL BE SUBMITTED IN TIME FOR ALL CSS REQUESTS TO ARRIVE AT III MAF TACTICAL AIR REQUEST CENTER (TARC) NOT LATER THAN 0900 HOURS DAILY.
2. PARA 5D OF REF A IS CORRECTED TO READ: REQUESTS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) STRIKES TO BE EXECUTED BETWEEN 0600 HOURS AND 1900 HOURS

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0100 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE FOLLOWING DAY, WILL BE SUBMITTED IN TIME FOR ALL CAS REQUESTS TO ARRIVE AT THE TARC NOT LATER THAN 1000 HOURS DAILY.

3. NLT 1430 A TELEPHONIC REQUEST WILL BE SUBMITTED TO III MAF TARC STATING THE NUMBER OF PREPLANNED CAS AND CSS ALLOCATIONS REQUESTED BY ALL MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS FOR THE NEXT PREPLANNED SUBMISSION PERIOD.

4. "HAD" REPORT: SUBMIT WITH THE FIRST CSS REQUEST SENT TO III MAF TARC EACH MORNING THE NUMBER OF VALID CSS TGT'S YOU WOULD HAVE SUBMITTED HAD YOU NOT BEEN LIMITED TO A SET ALLOCATION AND HAD SUFFICIENT AIR BEEN AVAILABLE. SUBMIT SIMILAR INFO ON VALID CAS TGT'S WITH FIRST CAS TGT PROCESSED WITH TARC. PCV HAD REPORT WILL BREAK OUT MARINE HAD AND ARMY HAD SEPARATELY.

GP-4

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG FIRST MAW SERIAL 272350Z MAR COPY # 3 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIXED WING AIR
DCG AIR						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE
C/S						MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

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DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
		CG FIRST MAW	
		SERIAL	COPIES 3 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
		272359Z MAR	
		SUBJECT	
		SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIXED WING AIR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
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PP RUEBHOA
DE RUMHAW 124W 0872350
ZNY CCCCC
P 272350Z MAR 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MAR DIV
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV
INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC (F-045)
RUMWAA/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS
MGEN ROBERTSON INFO GEN CHAPMAN LGEN KRULAK LGEN CUSHMAN MGEN
MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN ANDERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIXED WING AIR ASSETS

1. THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH THE PREPARATION AND
SUBMISSION OF A DAILY REPORT TO CMC AND CG, FMFPAC ON SELECTED
ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT COMUSMACV SYSTEM FOR THE SINGLE MANAGE-
MENT OF FIXED WING AIR ASSETS. INITIALLY THE REPORT WILL CONSIST
OF TWO PARTS, A DAILY STATISTICAL SUMMARY, AND A NARRATIVE
OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FOR THE PERIOD WHICH EXPLAINS OR ILLUS-
TRATES SHORTCOMINGS IN AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED. CERTAIN INPUTS

PAGE TWO RUMHAW 124W C O N F I D E N T I A L
MUST COME FROM THE FIRST AND THIRD MARINE DIVISIONS, AS OUTLINED
IN PARAGRAPH 2 BELOW.

2. PART I IS TO BE TABULAR IN FORM, FURNISHING NUMERICAL
ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. PERIOD COVERED, NORMALLY FROM 1900 TO 1900 HOTEL.
B. NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED BY SERVICE:

- 1. USMC
- 2. USAF
- 3. USN

C. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES:

- 1. DESIRED
- 2. REQUESTED
- 3. FURNISHED

D. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:

- 1. WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
- 2. WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
- 3. WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
- 4. MORE THAN 30 MINUTES AFTER SCHEDULED TIME

E. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:

- 1. REQUESTED ORDNANCE.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									# 105

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- 3. A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 4. AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- F. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
 - 1. WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL.
 - 2. WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL.
 - 3. WITHIN 45 MINUTES OF ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL.
 - 4. MORE THAN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL.
- G. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:
 - 1. REQUESTED ORDNANCE ABOARD
 - 2. AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
 - 3. A POOR SUBSTITUTE OR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
 - 4. AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- H. NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN NEEDED AIR SUPPORT WAS NOT FURNISHED BECAUSE OF:
 - 1. INABILITY TO CONTACT FAC
 - 2. FAC UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH DASC TO DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE SUITABLE STRIKE AIRCRAFT.
 - 3. OTHER REASONS. (SPECIFY IN PART II)

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PAGE FOUR RUMHAW 124 **CONFIDENTIAL**

- 1. NUMBER OF SORTIES CONTROLLED BY:
 - MARINE TACP, TACA
 - 2. AF FAC, AF TACP
 - 3. MARINE TPQ
 - 4. OTHER (SPECIFY IN PART II)
- J. NUMBER OF MISSIONS CANCELLED/DIVERED:
 - 1. BY GROUND COMMANDER REQUESTING
 - 2. BY HIGHER GROUND HQ
 - 3. BY DASC (NOT MARINE)
 - 4. BY OTHER (SPECIFY IN PART II)
- 3. PART II WILL BE NARRATIVE IN FORM. IT SHOULD COVER ANY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OR PROBLEM AREAS IN AIR SUPPORT RELATED TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR ASSETS, WHICH TEND TO DEGRADE OUR NORMAL STANDARDS OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN THE AIR-GROUND TEAM AT ANY GIVEN LEVEL.
- 4. TO INSURE TIMELY SUBMISSION OF THIS IMPORTANT REPORT TO CMC AND CG FMFPAC, I MUST HAVE YOUR INPUTS BY 2400 COVERING THE 24 HOUR PERIOD ENDING AT 1900. INFORMATION FOR PART I CAN BE TELEPHONED VIA THE DASC/TADC CIRCUITS TO BE CONSOLIDATED WITH RELATED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE MARINE AIR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									# 105

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5. IN VIEE OF THE USE TO WHICH THIS INFORMATION MAY BE PUT, THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE, FULL, SPECIFIC, AND FACTUAL DETAIL CANNOT BE OVERSTRESSED.

6. ANTICIPATE FIRST REPORT WILL COVER PERIOD 281900 TO 291859 HOTEL MAR68. REQUEST ACTION ADDEES FURNISH THIS HQTRS ANY SIMILAR AVAILABLE INFORMATION FOR PERIOD FROM 10 MAR 68 TO PRESENT.

GP-4
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									# 105

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CC III BDF SERIAL
DCG						000716Z APR COPY # 3 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPICAT EXCLUSIVE FOR USDO
C/S						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND
 A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
 C - COMMENTS
 I - INFORMATION

(104) AC

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 0046 0920746
 ZNY TTTT
 O 010746Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GENERAL KRULAK INFO
 CMC AND MAJ GENERAL ANDERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 DELIVER TO BGEN WIDDECKE IMMEDIATELY
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR IN RVN (S)

A. CG FMFPAC 302004Z MAR68

1. IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED:
 FIRST MAW AIRCRAFT SORTIES ALLOCATED AND FLOWN 1 THROUGH 30 MARCH 68
 FIRST MARINE DIVISION DASCS THIRD MARINE DIVISION DASCS

DAY	FIRST MARINE DIVISION DASCS			THIRD MARINE DIVISION DASCS		
	SCHEDULED	FLOWN	SCRAMBLE	SCHEDULED	FLOWN	SCRAMBLED
	(IMMEDIATE)			(IMMEDIATE)		
A. 1	41	39	0	148	137	0
2	37	32	0	143	137	0
3	41	42	1	143	157	14
4	37	31	0	173	209	36

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0046 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

5	37	33	0	173	219	46
6	43	41	0	173	215	42
7	31	36	5	161	199	38
8	33	44	11	153	189	36
9	31	37	6	153	170	17
10	39	35	0	155	113	0
11	29	34	5	155	167	12
12	29	22	0	154	122	0
13	29	43	14	175	160	0
14	41	41	0	157	197	40
15	29	47	18	154	190	36
16	33	39	6	148	179	31
17	33	63	30	148	158	10
18	31	62	31	148	170	22
19	47	79	32	136	159	23
20	29	71	42	135	123	0
TOTAL	700	871	201	3085	3370	403
B. 21	11	35	24	131	167	36
22	29	41	12	139	149	10
23	14	36	22	116	140	24

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TOP SECRET

THE THREE RUMSAK 0046 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

24	27	31	4	115	141	26
25	30	22	0	108	94	0
26	26	26	0	120	143	23
27	33	29	0	114	181	67
28	13	30	17	133	160	27
29	5	24	19	140	163	23
30	8	20	12	138	157	19
TOTALS	196	292	108	1254	1495	255

GRAND

TOTALS (896) (1163) (309) (4339) (4865) (658)

THE ABOVE SORTIES INCLUDE ONLY MARINE CORPS IN-COUNTRY MISSIONS.

SCRAMBLE SORTIES ARE INCLUDED IN (FLOWN) COLUMN.

C. SITUATIONS CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED SORTIE RATE DURING PERIOD COVERED:

14 MARCH - EXTRA (10) SCRAMBLE MISSIONS (IMMEDIATE) REQUIRED FOR SURGE EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF RECON MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THIRD MAR DIV.

18 MARCH - EXTRA (14) SCRAMBLE MISSIONS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION WORTH.

20 MARCH - EXTRA (21) SCRAMBLE MISSIONS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION WORTH.

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0046 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO D. THE AVERAGE DAILY SORTIES FOR THE ABOVE PERIODS ARE (1-20 MARCH, 212.0 SORTIES) (21-30 MARCH, 176.7 SORTIES). THE REDUCED NUMBER OF SORTIES REFLECTS THE 7TH AIR FORCE ALLOCATION SYSTEM WHICH IS BASED ON A 1.2 SORTIE RATE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE TOTAL PREPLANNED STRIKES REQUESTED. IN ADDITION, THE BELOW LISTED SORTIES FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF OTHER III MAF UNITS IN ICTZ INDICATE AN INCREASED TREND AFTER 21 MARCH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING SORTIES WERE FLOWN BY FIRST MAW AIRCRAFT IN MARCH IN SUPPORT OF OTHER III MAF UNITS IN ICTZ. READ IN THREE COLUMNS.

DAY	SORTIES	DAY	SORTIES	DAY	SORTIES
1	8	11	5	21	24
2	3	12	4	22	18
3	4	13	2	23	17
4	12	14	8	24	31
5	5	15	5	25	26
6	7	16	5	26	7
7	15	17	11	27	10
8	5	18	9	28	19
9	12	19	6	29	24
10	3	20	6	30	22

HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 00 P S E C E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO
TOTAL 135 154

GRAND TOTAL

(289)

E. KHE SANH DASC (CARSTAIRS II) DID NOT RECEIVE ALL SORTIES THAT HAD BEEN SCHEDULED ON 29 MARCH DUE TO FLIGHTS BEING REASSIGNED BY ABCCC PRIOR TO REPORTING TO CARSTAIRS II. OF 18 SCHEDULED SORTIES ONLY 4 WERE CLEARED THROUGH CARSTAIRS II - THE OTHER 14 SORTIES WERE UTILIZED BY ABCCC FOR OTHER TARGETS IN NIAGARA AREA. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 26TH MARINES WERE SATISFIED BY 14 IMMEDIATE STRIKES REQUESTED DURING A 5 HOUR PERIOD. AIR STRIKES WERE REQUIRED TO COUNTER HEAVY CLOSE-IN GROUND CONTACTS.

2. STATUS MSG CONCERNING SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES SINCE COMMENCEMENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN PROCESS OF PREPARATION. WILL BE ADDRESSED TO COMUSMACV INFO CINCPAC. A COPY WILL BE PROVIDED YOU SEPARATELY.

GP-4

BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

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