

26 35. CG 1ST AIR CAV 282320Z APR68 (U)  
TOLSON TO MOMYER, INFO ALL  
COURAGE OF C-130 CREWS IN ASHAU

27 36. COMUSMACV 300226Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to BARS NTI, GELLING, info CUSHMAN, ROSSON  
CONGRATULATORY MSG

- ~~13~~ 22. ~~CG FMAN 250573Z APR68 (S MCTO)~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 14 23. GEN WESTMORELAND 251046Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN  
 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
- ~~15~~ 24. ~~CG FMAN 260711Z APR68 (S) MCTO~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- ~~16~~ 25. ~~CG FMAN 270725Z APR68 (S) MCTO~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 17 26. COMUSMACV 121114Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*  
 WESTMORELAND to SHARP, GOULDING, WHEELER  
 CASUALTY REPORTING PROCEDURES
- ~~18~~ 27. ~~CG FMAN 280755Z APR68 (S) MCTO~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 19 28. LTG ROSSON 290645Z APR68 (U)  
 ROSSON to WESTMORELAND info CUSHMAN  
 CONTROL, TURN-IN AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS
- ~~20~~ 29. ~~CG FMAN 290745Z APR68 (S) MCTO~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 21 30. GEN WESTMORELAND 290937Z APR68 (S) *gp - not shown*  
 WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN, ROSSON, TOLSON, BARSANTI  
 PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DELAWARE/LAMSON 216
- 22 31. MGEN TOLSON 291415Z APR68 (S) *gp - not shown*  
 TOLSON to WESTMORELAND, CUSHMAN, ROSSON, BARSANTI  
 TOLSON'S ANSWER TO TAB 30. SITUATION IN HIS AREA OF ASHAU
- ~~23~~ 32. ~~CG FMAN 300320Z APR68 (S) MCTO~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 24 33. COMUSMACV 300330Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 WESTMORELAND to MOMYER & CUSHMAN  
 SETS DISCUSSION ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR 081000H MAY68
- 25 34. GEN WESTMORELAND 301340Z APR68 (S) *Group - not shown*  
 WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN, ROSSON, TOLSON, BARSANTI  
 PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR OPN DELAWARE/LAMSON 216

- 0 ~~8.~~ CG FMFPAC 230141Z APR68 *gp-4*  
SWITCH TWO, KRULAK to CUSHMAN  
*[of assignments]*
- ~~10.~~ ~~CG FMAN 230245Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW ANDERS ON to CHADMAN, KRULAK, & CUSHMAN~~  
~~SCRIPT FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT PRESENTATION~~
- ~~11.~~ ~~CG FMAN 230905Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAE~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 3 ~~12.~~ GEN WESTMORELAND 221133Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN, info ROSSON  
OPERATIONAL REPORTING -- DISCREPANCIES
- 4 ~~13.~~ COMUSMACV 221202Z APR68 (C) *gp-3*  
WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN, ECKHARDT, PEERS, MCMEARNS  
URBAN AREA DEFENSE
- 5 ~~14.~~ CG FMFPAC 222148Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
KRULAK to CUSHMAN  
MOVES "DAILY SPECIAL REPORT" UP TO 1230 DAILY.
- ~~15.~~ ~~CG FMAN 230827Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAE~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 7 ~~16.~~ COMUSMACV 231240Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to BARSANTI, TRUONG, info VIEN, LAM, CUSHMAN, ROSSON  
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 8 ~~17.~~ GEN WESTMORELAND 240114Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN, ROSSON, WEYAND, ETC.  
CONTROL, TURN-IN, AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS
- ~~18.~~ ~~CG FMAN 240710Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, III MAE~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 10 ~~19.~~ COMUSMACV 241216Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN, info SHARP  
WILL ANALYZE 30DAY DISPOSITION MSG, requests ADDENDUM FOR  
REMAINDER OF APRIL
- 11 ~~20.~~ DIR OF INFO 240051Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*  
to CUSHMAN, KRULAK  
GLENN HEWETT (CORRESPONDENT) LTR TO DEAN RUSK
- 12 ~~21.~~ DR PRIM MACV 250207Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
PRIM to VAN RYZIN  
EVALUATION OF DUMP TRUCK

46. ~~CG PROVCORPSV 181015Z APR68 (S)~~  
~~FOR CUSHMAN FROM ROSSON~~  
~~RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BASE DEF~~
- 26 47. ITC ROSSON 190724Z APR68 (S) *group - not shown*  
 ROSSON TO TOMPKINS, BARSANTI, TOLSON, INFO CUSHMAN  
 INDICATIONS OF A SECOND ENEMY OFFENSIVE
- 27 48. COMUSMACV 191155Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
 SWITCH  
~~ALL COPIES SEALED ENVELOPE~~
- 28 49. ~~CG FMAN 191200Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~  
~~MAN TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 29 50. CG MCRD SDIEGO (KRULAK) 192245Z APR68 (U)  
 SWITCH  
~~SEALED ENVELOPE~~
- 30 1. COMSEVENTHFLT 200336Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*  
 COL CODISPOTI TO BGEN ANDERSON  
 COURIER/MAIL SERVICE FOR HOSP SHIPS
- 31 2. COMUSMACV 200440Z APR68 (U)  
 WESTMORELAND to BARSANTI, CUSHMAN, ROSSON  
 CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 32 3. COMUSMACV 200439Z APR68 (U)  
 WESTMORELAND TO KOSTER, INFO CUSHMAN  
 CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 33 4. COMUSMACV 200420Z APR68 (U)  
 WESTMORELAND to PALMER, CUSHMAN, KOSTER  
 1ST ANNIVERSARY AMERICAL DIVISION
- 34 5. ~~CG FMAN 200800Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 35 6. ~~CG FMAN 211230Z APR68 (S MCEB)~~  
~~MAN to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 36 7. COMUSMACV 211232Z APR68 (U)  
 WESTMORELAND to TOLSON, INFO CUSHMAN, ROSSON  
 CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 37 8. GEN WESTMORELAND 211200Z APR68 (S) *group - not shown*  
 WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN, PEERS, MEARNs, ETC.  
 DEFECTION
- 38 9. CG THIRD MARDIV 201420Z APR68 (C) *group-4*  
 TOMPKINS TO CUSHMAN  
 LAVELLE BRIEF--DROPPING SENSORS IN EASTERN DMZ

- 13 34. CG 2D ROKMC BDE 141625Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
KIM to CUSHMAN  
TANKS AND LVT'S REQUEST FOR 2D ROKMC BDE
- 14 35. COMUSMACV 150105Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to TOMPKINS, info CUSHMAN & ROSSON  
CONGRATULATORY MSG -- 3D BN, 26TH MAR; HILL 881
- 15 36. CG TF GLICK 141425Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*  
GLICK to TOMPKINS  
PURPORTED FAILURE TO RECOVER BODIES
- ~~16~~ 37. ~~CG FMAN 150600Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- ~~17~~ 38. ~~CG FMAN 160601Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 18 39. CG FORLOGCOMD 170138Z APR68 (C) *group-4*  
OLSON to CUSHMAN  
SUPPORT OF FADAC AND ANCILLARY EQUIP
- 19 40. CG FMFPAC 170625Z APR68 (S MCEO) *group-4*  
KRULAK to CUSHMAN  
Quotes WHEELER msg to WESTMORELAND -- SECURITY LEAKS  
re FUTURE PLANS FOR OPNS IN KHE SANH
- ~~20~~ 41. ~~CG FMAN 171430Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 21 42. COMUSMACV 161030Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*  
KOMER to SHARP, info WHEELER, PEERS, WEYAND, CUSHMAN, ECKHARDT  
PACIFICATION IN SVN DURING FEB 68
- ~~22~~ 43. ~~CG FMAN 180555Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 23 44. GEN WESTMORELAND 180627Z APR68 (S) *group not shown*  
WESTMORELAND to PALMER, VETH, WORLEY, CUSHMAN, PEERS, ETC.  
SECURITY OF OPERATIONS
- 24 45. CMC 181438Z APR68 and CMC 181530Z APR68 (S MCEO) *group-4*  
"SWITCH" *Full file*  
~~ALL COPIES OF BOTH MESSAGES IN SAFE~~
- 25 46. CG PCV 181015Z APR68 (S) *group-4*  
ROSSON TO CUSHMAN  
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BASE DEVELOPMENT

- 1 22. ~~CG FMAW 120525Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~ANDERSON TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 2 23. COMUSMACV 120756Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to BARSANTI, info CUSHMAN & ROSSON  
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 3 24. CMC 122128Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-1*  
CMC TO FMFPAC & III MAF  
FAST REACTION PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING SEA OPERATIONS
- 4 25. CG FMFPAC 122325Z APR68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*  
KRULAK to CUSHMAN  
PCV Augmentation of Marine Officers
- 5 26. MGEN BOLES 121545Z APR68 (U, EYES ONLY)  
BOLES to STILLWELL  
SFC ROBINSON -- COOK
- 6 27. CINCPACFLT 122358Z APR68 (U)  
HYLAND to CUSHMAN, OSBORN, AND GILKESON  
CANCELS VISIT
- 7 28. CG FMAW 130355Z APR68 (S MCEO) *group-4*  
ANDERSON to KRULAK & CUSHMAN  
Establishment of Working Group for Rebuttal of Air Control  
to CINCPAC or Higher
- 8 29. ~~CG FMAW 130605Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 9 30. ~~GEN WESTMORELAND 140117Z APR68 (S EYES ONLY)~~  
~~WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN & ROSSON~~  
~~Cancels requirement for KHE SANH DAILY report~~  
~~Requests daily report ON OVERALL SITUATION N101Z~~
- 10 31. COMUSMACV 131034Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND TO TOMPKINS INFO CUSHMAN & ROSSON  
CONGRATULATORY MSG on 11TH ENGINEERS
- 11 32. CG FORLOGCOMD 140100Z APR68 (C) *group-4*  
OLSON TO CUSHMAN  
SUPPORT OF FADAC AND ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
- 12 33. ~~CG FMAW 140720Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~FMAW TO CMC, FMFPAC, III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

- 37 10. ~~CG FMAW 080000Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~ANDERSON TO CMC & FMBPAC~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 38 11. MGEN TOLSON 100250Z APR68 (C) *Group not shown*  
TOLSON to ROSSON, info ABRAMS, PALMER, CUSHMAN & WILLIAMS  
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
- 39 12. ~~CG FMAW 090645Z APR68 (S) MCEO~~  
~~ANDERSON TO CMC, FMBPAC, & CUSHMAN~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 39 13. *4039A* AMB Kover 091035 Z Apr 68 - *gp - not shown*  
GEN ABRAMS 091149Z APR68 (C) - *gp-4*  
ABRAMS to WEYAND, CUSHMAN PEERS, ETC.  
SHORTAGE OF T53 ENGINES -- WILLIAMS BRIEF
- 41 14. CMC 091623Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
CHAFFMAN to KRULAK & CUSHMAN  
REQUESTS DOCUMENT LIMITING GROUND COMMANDER'S SUBMITTING  
AIRSTRIKES
- 42 15. COMUSMACV 100306Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND TO EVERYONE  
Passes NEWS RELEASES from Washington
- 43 16. COMUSMACV 091221Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to TOMPKINS info CUSHMAN & ROSSON  
CONGRATULATORY MSG on 1/9
- 44 17. CG FMAW 100010Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
ANDERSON to KRULAK & CUSHMAN  
FURTHER COMMENTS ON AIR CONTROL & WESTY'S MSG on PEGASUS
- 45 18. ~~CG FMAW 100012Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~ANDERSON TO CMC & FMBPAC & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 46 19. COMUSMACV 100801Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to BARSANTI info CUSHMAN  
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 47 20. ~~CG FMAW 110745Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~ANDERSON TO CMC, FMBPAC, & III MAF~~  
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 48 21. GEN ABRAMS 110820Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*  
ABRAMS to CUSHMAN, ROSSON, PALMER, TOLSON  
AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

- 26 49. GEN ABRAMS 060834Z APR68 (S) *group - not shown*  
 ABRAMS TO ALL US COMMANDERS IN SVN  
 RACIAL BEHAVIOR
- ~~27 50. CG FMAN 060550Z APR68 (S MCEO)  
 ANDERSON TO GHO, CG FMFPAC, CG III MAF, ETC.  
 ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL.~~
- 28 51. CMC 061645Z APR68 (C) *group - 4*  
 CHAPMAN TO KRULAK AND CUSHMAN  
 STAFF AUGMENTATION FOR HQ, III MAF
- 29 2. GEN ABRAMS 061734Z APR68 (S) *gp - not shown*  
 ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN  
 ARMED FORCES RADIO BROADCASTS
- 30 3. CG FMFPAC 062147Z APR68 (C MCEO) *gp - 4*  
 KRULAK TO CHAPMAN & CUSHMAN  
 CONCURS IN RECOMMENDATION FOR COL LOWNDS
- 31 4. COMUSMACV, SAIGON 040652Z APR68 (S) *group - 4*  
 WESTMORELAND TO JOHNSON  
 M16 RIFLES FOR RVNAF (U)  
 (NOTE: THIS MSG PASSED TO III MAF HQTRS BY III MAF LSAISON  
 IN SAIGON FOR INFO.)
- 32 5. GEN ABRAMS 070447Z APR68 (C) *group - not shown*  
 ABRAMS TO PALMER, CUSHMAN, ETC.  
 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
- ~~33 6. CG FMAN 070615Z APR68 (S MCEO)  
 ANDERSON TO CHAPMAN, KRULAK, CUSHMAN, ETC.  
 ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL.~~
- 34 7. GEN ABRAMS 071211Z APR68 (U LEFTO)  
 ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN & ROSSON  
 AUGMENTATION OF PCV STAFF
- 35 8. COMUSMACV 071944Z APR68 (C) *group - not shown*  
 WESTMORELAND TO CUSHMAN, ABRAMS, ETC.  
 CONGRATULATIONS ON PEGASUS  
 (FROM WASHINGTON)
- 36 9. CG FIRST MAW 080130Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp - 3*  
 ANDERSON TO KRULAK AND CUSHMAN  
 STATUS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AS OF 7APR68

- 14 ~~14~~. CMC 011914Z APR68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*  
CHAPMAN TO CUSHMAN & KRULAK  
PRESS RELATIONS
- 15 ~~15~~. CG FIRST MAW 030300Z APR68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*  
ANDERSON TO CHAPMAN, KRULAK, CUSHMAN, ROBERTSON, TOMPKINS  
NEW FORMAT FOR AIR CONTROL REPORTING
- 16 ~~16~~. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 030701Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
ROBERTSON TO CHAPMAN, KRULAK, & CUSHMAN  
CAPT ROBB
- 17 ~~17~~. CG THIRD MARDIV 030400Z APR68 (C) *Group-4*  
TOMPKINS TO CUSHMAN  
RESTRICTIONS ON COFRAM
- 18 ~~18~~. CG PCV PHU BAI RVN 031339Z APR68 (S) *Group-4*  
ROSSON TO TOLSON INFO CUSHMAN  
ARVN FORCES LINKUP
- 19 ~~19~~. GEN ABRAMS 040931Z MAR68 (S) *gp-not shown*  
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN  
VISIT ON 5APR68
- 20 ~~20~~. GEN WESTMORELAND 041011Z APR68 (S) *Group-not shown*  
WESTMORELAND TO CUSHMAN  
STRESSES BACKING ARVN -- POLITICS OF BOMBING PAUSE  
MAXIMUM PRESSURE REQUIRED
- 21 ~~21~~. CG THIRD MARDIV 041435Z APR68 (C MCEO) *Group-4*  
TOMPKINS TO CUSHMAN  
COL LOWNDS FOR SPEAKER CIRCUIT
- 22 ~~22~~. CMC 041617Z APR68 (C MCEO) *Group-4*  
CHAPMAN TO ROBERTSON info KRULAK & CUSHMAN  
CAPTAIN ROBB -- CASUALTY REPORTING PROCEDURES FOR
- 23 ~~23~~. COMUSMACV 050200Z APR68 (U)  
WESTMORELAND to TOMPKINS info CUSHMAN, ROSSON  
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 24 ~~24~~. GEN WESTMORELAND 050339Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*  
WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN  
ANSWERS CUSHMAN'S DISPOSITION OF AIR CONTROL MSG
- ~~25~~ ~~25~~. ~~CG FMAW 050750Z APR68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~ANDERSON TO KRULAK, CMC, CUSHMAN, TOMPKINS, ROBERTSON~~  
~~INFO TO FMPAC AND CMC REQUESTS ON AIR CONTROL~~





FOR

VV ASA378  
 PP RUMMWA  
 DE RUMHFA 4951 1210232  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 P 500226Z APR 68 ZFFG  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMHMB/CG 101ST ABN DIV  
 RUMHIA/CO 1SGTR LIB  
 INFO RUMMWA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPSU  
 BT

UNCLAS 12204  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG BARSANTI, COL GELLING, INFO  
 LTG CUSHMAN, LTG ROSSON.  
 SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE  
 D/4/31ST INFANTRY, GUNSHIPS OF B/2/17TH CAV, AND SUPPORTING  
 ARMY DISPLAYED EXCELLENT TEAMWORK IN ENGAGEMENT OF ENEMY FORCE  
 13 KM SW OF QUANG TRI ON 27 APRIL. CONGRATULATIONS FOR HEAVY  
 TOLL OF BUNKERED ENEMY TROOPS.  
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#27





NWB991MZVA 359Y08

**FOR**

MM  
 OO RUMWAA  
 DE RUMHMB 5104R 1220215  
 ZNR UUUUU ZDK  
 IIFLRUMSMA RUMSBJ RUMSVA RUMWAA RUMHMA  
 DE RUMHMB 5324C 1202330  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 P 282320Z APR 68 ZFF-6  
 FM CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV CAMP EVANS RVN  
 TO RUMFKA/CG 7TH AIR FORCE TSN AB SAIGON RVN  
 RUMFKA/CG 834TH AIR DIV TSN AB SAIGON RVN  
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV LONG BINH RVN  
 RUMSVA/DCGUSARV LONG BINH RVN  
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG RVN  
 RUMHMA/CG PCV PHU BAI RVN

COMM NOTE:  
 MESSAGE RECEIVED FOR THE  
 FIRST TIME AT 01 MAY 2130H

BT  
 UNCLAS AVDAAG 8-FUO-11912 FOR GEN MOMYER FROM MG TOLSON  
 1. ON 26 AND 27 APRIL IN THE A SHAU VALLEY, I WITNESSED YOUR C-130  
 CREWS IN ONE OF THE MOST MAGNIFICENT DISPLAYS OF COURAGE AND AIRMEN-  
 SHIP THAT I HAVE EVER SEEN.  
 2. THE LOW CEILINGS, MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN, LACK OF TERMINAL NAVIGA-  
 TION FACILITIES AND ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRES ALL COMBINED TO CREATE  
 AN EXCEEDINGLY HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE PLANNED RESUPPLY AIR  
 DROPS.  
 3. TO THE CREWS WHO ACCOMPLISHED ALL OF THE SCHEDULED AIR DROPS ON  
 THOSE TWO DAYS GO THE SINCERE THANKS AND ADMIRATION OF ALL THE  
 SKYTROOPERS OF THE FIRST TEAM.

PAGE TWO RUMHMB 5324C UNCLAS

4. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT SUITABLE AWARDS FOR VALOR BE PRESENTED  
 TO EACH MEMBER OF THE CREWS INVOLVED. IT WAS JUST A FANTASTIC AND  
 INSPIRING DEMONSTRATION OF REAL COOPERATION IN GETTING THE JOB DONE.  
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#26



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN WESTMORELAND		DATE 30 APRIL 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 301340Z APR68		1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 216
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/1			REMARKS Carl Fauer has just been changed to work up this paper J. Henry
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
11	C/S		5/1	5-22		
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	610715			SMS	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
	ISO A					

TO LGEN CUSHMAN CG 111 MAJ  
 INFO LGEN ROSSON CG PROVCORPSV  
 MGEN TOLSON CG 1ST CAV DIV  
 MGEN BARSANTI CG 101ST ABN DIV  
 ZEM  
 S E C R E T MAC 5710 EYES ONLY  
 SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DELAWARE/  
 LAMSON 216

REFERENCE: A. MSG DTG 290137Z APR 68  
 B. MSG DTG 290937Z APR 68

1. PER REFERENCE B, I SUGGEST THAT YOU OR ROSSON HOLD OUR FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE ON OPERATION DELAWARE ON THURSDAY, 2 MAY, AND COVER THE OPERATION FOR THE PERIOD 21 APRIL TO MIDNIGHT 1 MAY OR, IF YOU PREFER, UNTIL MIDNIGHT 30 APRIL. THIS WILL BRING THE PRESS UP TO DATE AND PERMIT THEM TO RELEASE THE MATERIALS THEY HAVE PREPARED FOR THE PERIOD CONCERNED. YOU MAY INFORM THEM OF THIS PLAN NOW.

2. THE BRIEFING SHOULD STRESS SEVERAL POINTS.

A. THE EMBARGO WILL CONTINUE FOR OPERATIONS OCCURRING AFTER MIDNIGHT 30 APRIL (OR 1 MAY PER YOUR DECISION).

B. THE GROUND RULES WILL BE CAREFULLY OBSERVED FOR ALL MEDIA RELEASES. THESE RULES SHOULD BE REPEATED TO THOSE BRIEFED AND COPIES ISSUED. WE WILL MAKE THE SAME POINT HERE.

C. THE REASONS FOR CONTINUING THE EMBARGO AND THE STRESS ON THE GROUND RULES MUST BE EMPHASIZED. THESE ARE VALID REASONS AND THE PRESS SHOULD AGREE, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY.

3. THE BRIEFINGS SHOULD COVER THE OPERATION IN GENERAL TERMS ONLY. NO MENTION OF SPECIFIC UNITS OTHER THAN DIVISION OR SEPARATE MAJOR SMALLER UNIT SHOULD BE MADE. YOU MAY RELEASE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE 101ST PROVIDED YOU ARE SURE THAT THE ENEMY IS ALREADY AWARE OF THIS. THE LOCATIONS OF AIR STRIPS, LZ'S, UNITS, UNIT STRENGTHS, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PLAN, HELICOPTER LOSSES, AND SIMILAR ITEMS OF VALUE TO THE ENEMY WILL NOT BE MADE. OVERALL FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTIES MAY BE RELEASED, BUT LIMIT FRIENDLY WIA TO THOSE EVACUATED. NO MAPS, OR SKETCHES OTHER THAN VERY GENERALIZED WILL BE USED. FUTURE OBJECTIVES AND PLANS WILL NOT BE MENTIONED. IN ESSENCE, NOTHING WILL BE MENTIONED WHICH WILL BE OF GENUINE VALUE TO THE ENEMY.

4. PLEASE PROVIDE GENERAL SIDLE WITH YOUR TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SINCE WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE NEARLY CONCURRENT RELEASE HERE. SIDLE IS ALSO AVAILABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING DUTY HOURS  
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

450



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 30 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 300330Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/30			REMARKS  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR		5-1			
1.	C/S		4/30			
	D C/S		5/1			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	901440			DKW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #24



**SECRET****EXCLUSIVE**

NNNNZCZCSAABSVV AWA377  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAW 1146U 1210340  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 300330Z APR 68 ZFFG  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMSAW/CDR 7AF  
 RUMSAW/CG III MAF  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN NOMYER  
 AND LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTGORELAND 12217  
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)  
 REF: A. CDR 7AF 221001Z APR 68  
 B. CG III MAF 221040Z APR 68 (U) (NOTAL)  
 1. (S) ASSESSMENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WILL BE  
 DISCUSSED AT THIS HQ AT 201000H MAY 68.  
 2. (S) CDR 7AF AND CG III MAF WILL BE PREPARED TO PRESENT  
 BRIEFING TO COMUSMACV ON THEIR RESPECTIVE ASSESSMENTS AT  
 JOINT MEETING.  
 3. (S) ATTENDANCE WILL BE LIMITED TO THREE REPRESENTATIVES  
 FROM EACH COMMAND, INCLUDING COMMANDER OR HIS PERSONAL  
 REPRESENTATIVE.

GP-4  
 BT

**SECRET**  
#24

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5218 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM NGEN TOLSON		DATE 29 APRIL 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 291115Z APR 68		1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPIES OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PSY 346 KIRB ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  <i># 2 burned 5 Nov 68</i>  <i>Copy #4 to Press Delaware file 2 May 68 re</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

<b>OPERATION CODE</b> X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			<b>FROM</b> MGEN TOLSON		<b>DATE</b> 29 APRIL 68	
			<b>SERIAL/CONTROL DATE</b> 291415Z APR 68		1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPIES / OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/30			REMARKS
3	DCG		4/30			
	DCG AIR		2			
1	C/S		4/30			
	D C/S		4/30			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	30780			EMJ DMJ	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #22

197 ZYR ZFF-3  
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON RVN  
 LTG CHISHMAN CG III MAF DANANG RVN  
 LTG ROYSON CG PCV PHU BAI RVN  
 MG BARSANTI CG 1ST ABN DIV

ZEM

SEE C R E T FCV 346 EYES ONLY  
 REF: YOUR MSG DTG 290937 APR 68

IN REGARDS TO PARAGRAPH 1, REFERENCE MESSAGE. FROM MY  
 STANDPOINT DO NOT CONSIDER MY POSITION IN THE A SHAU VALLEY DANGEROUS.  
 WE HOLD COMMANDING GROUND. HAVE PLENTY OF ARTILLERY, DETERMINED  
 INFANTRYMEN, AND AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY LINE. WITH THE AIRFIELD AND  
 APPROACH FACILITIES OPERATIONAL THE WEATHER IS LESS OF A CONSIDERATION.  
 ACTUALLY, WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ENEMY COME AFTER US FOR A CHANGE,  
 PARTICULARLY THE FORCES FROM LAOS. AM SURE HE REALIZES THE HIGH COST  
 IT WOULD BE TO HIM. FROM HERE, I CONSIDER MY CRITICAL AREAS TO BE  
 THE HELICOPTER BASES AT CAMP EVANS AND LZ SHARRON.

FELT IT IMPORTANT TO GET TO YOU EXACTLY HOW THE SITUATION  
 COVERED IN PARAGRAPH 1 APPEARS TO ME.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER ONLY DURING DUTY HOURS  
 175

NNNN

SECRET

#22



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN WESTMORELAND		DATE 29 APRIL 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 290937Z APR 68		COPY# / OF 4 COPIES RECD 1, 2 & 3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/30		JK	SUBJECT MAC 05648 EYES ONLY  REMARKS S/S Please see ref of. From see this sub of 9,
3	DCG		4/30		JK	
	DCG AIR					
L	C/S		4/29		JK	
	D C/S		4/30		JK	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	291455			JK	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					
	CIB					COL FASER HAS BEEN 290820H NR

30  
SECRET

0290937Z ZYH ZFF-3  
TO GEN WETMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON  
INFO GEN CUSHMAN CG III MAR  
INFO GEN ROSSMAN CG PCV  
INFO TOLSON 1ST CAV DIV  
INFO BARSANTI 101ST ABN DIV

FROM C R E T MAC 055648 EYES ONLY  
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DELAWARE/  
LAMSON 216

REF: W 055 DTG 290137Z APR 68  
1. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE HIGH RISK INVOLVED IN OPERATION DELAWARE/LAMSON 216. THE WEATHER, TERRAIN, ENEMY AIR-CRAFT CAPABILITY, AND THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO REACT STRONGLY USING FORCES FROM LAOS, COMBINE TO MAKE THIS OPERATION POTENTIALLY VERY DANGEROUS FROM OUR STANDPOINT. WE MUST THEREFORE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DENY THE ENEMY ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE CANNOT OBTAIN FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.

2. AS YOU KNOW, I INTENDED TO EMBARGO THE OPERATION UNTIL IT WAS COMPLETED, OR NEARLY SO. HOWEVER, JOE ALEOP, IN A COLUMN PRINTED OURS APRIL BROKE THE STORY BY STATING THAT THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION WAS ON AN OPERATION IN THE A SHAN VALLEY. JOE IS A GOOD FRIEND OF THE MILITARY AND I AM SURE THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE EMBARGO SINCE HE LEFT VIETNAM BEFORE DELAWARE BEGAN. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER HE LEARNED ABOUT THE OPERATION WHILE HE WAS HERE OR AFTER HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

3. IN ANY CASE, JOE'S BREAK FORCED US, IN ALL FAIRNESS TO THE MEDIA, TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PRESS WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT, AND WHICH EMBARGOES THE RELEASE OF DETAILS OF THE OPERATION OCCURRING AFTER 21 APRIL.

4. THE MORNING WIRE SERVICE COPY CARRIED SOME QUOTES FROM GENERAL TOLSON CONCERNING THE INITIAL LANDINGS IN THE VALLEY. I UNDERSTAND THESE QUOTES WERE ACTUALLY MADE ON THE 21ST. HOWEVER, THIS RAISES THE VERY IMPORTANT POINT THAT ALL CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY THE SENIOR COMMANDERS INVOLVED, SHOULD BE MOST CAREFUL WHAT THEY SAY TO THE PRESS AND, IN FACT, SHOULD AVOID TALKING TO THE PRESS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WHILE THE OPERATION IS STILL EMBARGOED.

*I have my thoughts  
I haven't seen*

*I wonder if he cleared him out?  
#210*

5. TO INSURE MAXIMUM COORDINATION OF YOUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS, I SUGGEST THAT YOU DESIGNATE A CONTROL HEADQUARTERS FOR THIS PURPOSE. YOU MAY WISH TO DELEGATE THIS TO PROV. CORPS V, AND GENERAL ROSSON MAY, IN TURN, WISH TO DELEGATE IT FURTHER WHILE RETAINING POLICY CONTROL. IN ANY CASE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTROL SHOULD BE CENTRALIZED IN VIEW OF THE MANY HEADQUARTERS INVOLVED.

*I think it should remain at III MAF*

6. MY PLAN IS PERIODICALLY, ABOUT EVERY THREE DAYS, TO SEND YOU AUTHORITY TO BRIEF THE PRESS ON DELAWARE PROGRESS DURING A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME. THIS AUTHORITY WILL SPECIFY WHAT MAY AND MAY NOT BE COVERED IN THIS BRIEFING. FOR EXAMPLE, I EXPECT NORMALLY TO FORBID MENTION OF SUCH THINGS AS UNIT DESIGNATIONS, LOCATIONS, STRENGTHS, OPERATIONAL AIRFIELDS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANS, OVERALL HELICOPTER LOSSES AND SO FORTH. UNDOUBTEDLY, THE SPECIFICS INVOLVED WILL CHANGE WITH THE SITUATION.

7. I SUGGEST ALSO THAT DURING THESE BRIEFINGS AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO SEEK PRESS COOPERATION BY MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE REASON WE ARE ADOPTING THIS RATHER UNUSUAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE IS TO SAFEGUARD LIVES, POINTING OUT THE REAL DANGERS WHICH COULD ACCRUE FROM THE ENEMY LEARNING IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM PRESS REPORTS. WE ARE ALREADY DOING THIS HERE.

8. FINALLY, THE PRESS SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT WHEN THE OPERATION IS COMPLETED, WE ARE PREPARED ON A TOP PRIORITY BASIS TO GIVE A COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATION, INCLUDING DIAGRAMS, MAPS, AND ANYTHING ELSE NEEDED TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. THIS BRIEFING MAY BE PRESENTED SHORTLY BEFORE THE END OF THE OPERATION, SHOULD WE FEEL THAT SUCH ACTION WILL NOT BE HARMFUL TO OUR EFFORTS.

9. WITH RESPECT TO PERMITTING THE PRESS TO ENTER THE VALLEY, FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE.

10. INSURE THAT GEN LAM, GEN THRONG, AND THEIR SENIOR ADVISORS UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING.

INFO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
33

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

#21(a)

#21(a)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTG ROSSON CG PCV		DATE 29 APRIL 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 290645Z APR 68		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD 1, 2 & 3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PHB 575 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
✓	CG		4/30		[Signature]	
✓	DCG		4/30		[Signature]	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/29		[Signature]	
	DC/S		4/30		[Signature]	
	DC/S DM					
	S/S	291455	4/30		[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

" # 2 & 3 Burned  
5 Nov 68

38

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #19

UNCLAS E F T O PHB 575 EYES ONLY  
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV  
 INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O PHB 575 EYES ONLY  
 SUBJ: CONTROL, TURN-IN AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS  
 REF: A. MAC UNCLAS EFTO 05409, SUBJ SAME AS ABOVE, DIG  
 240114Z APR 68.

1. (U) THIS IS AN INTERIM REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 APR 68 ON THE SAME SUBJECT (REF A).
2. (U) POSITIVE CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT IS A SUBJECT OF CONTINUING EMPHASIS.
3. (U) SUPPLEMENTING EXISTING DIRECTIVES, SUBORDINATE DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO CONTROL CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT BY SERIAL NUMBER AND NOUN NOMENCLATURE AND TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CENTRAL COLLECTION POINTS FOR PROCESSING OF CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIAL AT DIVISION LEVEL. IN ADDITION, EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED UPON THE NECESSITY OF EVACUATING NEW MATERIAL INTRODUCED IN THE PCV AREA OF OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
4. (U) EXAMINATION OF PRESENT PROCEDURES CONTINUES WITH A VIEW TOWARD ASSESSING THEIR ADEQUACY IN PROVIDING DESIRED

CONTROL MECHANISMS. AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, I HAVE INSTITUTED A SPECIAL STUDY GROUP TO MONITOR THE FUNCTIONING OF PRESENT PROCEDURES DURING A ONE-WEEK PERIOD BEGINNING 1 MAY 68. COMPOSED OF G-4 REPRESENTATIVES OF IBIS HEADQUARTERS AND COUNTERPART REPRESENTATIVES IN EACH SUBORDINATE DIVISION, THIS GROUP WILL EXAMINE IN DETAIL EACH INCIDENT OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT DURING THAT PERIOD TO IDENTIFY PROCEDURAL WEAKNESSES AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THEIR CORRECTION. THE STUDY GROUP ALSO WILL REVIEW OTHER SELECTED, SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT DURING RECENT MONTHS.

5. (U) A FINAL REPLY, SUMMARIZING FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

GROUP AND RECOMMENDING CHANGES TO BE MADE IN PRESENT PROCEDURES, IF ANY ARE INDICATED, WILL BE SENT TO YOU BY 15 MAY.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

325

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 28 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 121114Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 1 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CASUALTY REPORTING PROCEDURES (U)
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/28			REMARKS
3	DCG		4/29			
4	DCG AIR		4/29			
1	C/S		4/28			
	D C/S		4/30			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	281105				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

11# 304 burned  
5 Nov 68

CONFIDENTIAL





**CONFIDENTIAL****FOR**

RTTCZYUW RUMHBRAS361 1141307-CCCC--RUMWAA.

ZNY CCCCC

R 231307Z APR 68

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO RUMHFMN/CG FMFPAC

RUMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUYNDUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMFKRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUEFAAA/CHINFO

RUWJHIA/COMFIRSTFLT

R 180210Z APR 68

FM CINCPAC

INFO RUMHRGA/CINCUSARPAC

RUMHDBA/CINCPACFLT

RUMKABA/CINCPACAF

RUMDTLA/COMUSMACVTHAI

O 121114Z APR 68 ZFF1

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMKA/CINCPAC

INFO RUEPJS/OSD PA

RUEPJS/CJCS

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 10370. FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR

ADM SHARP, INFO SEC'Y GOULDING, GEN WHEELER.

SUBJECT: CASUALTY REPORTING PROCEDURES (U)

1. (U) AT PRESENT, ALL CASUALTIES INCURRED BY US TROOPS IN VIETNAM, NO MATTER HOW SLIGHT THE INJURY, ARE REPORTED THROUGH CHANNELS AND TO THE PRESS.

2. (U) THIS PROCEDURE DIFFERS FROM THOSE USED IN WW II AND KOREA. DURING THOSE CONFLICTS THE WOUNDED IN ACTION STATISTICS INCLUDED ONLY THOSE PERSONS WOUNDED SERIOUSLY ENOUGH TO REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION.

3. (U) ALTHOUGH FOR SEVERAL MONTHS THE MIA FIGURES RELEASED TO THE PRESS HAVE CAREFULLY DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THOSE REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION AND THOSE WHO DO NOT, THE PRESS HAS TENDED TO LUMP THE TWO FIGURES TOGETHER, THEREBY GIVING A TOTALLY FALSE IMPRESSION WHEN COMPARED WITH WW II AND KOREAN CASUALTY FIGURES.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 1983D C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. (C) SHOULD THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF REPORTING CASUALTIES TO THE PRESS BE CHANGED TO CONFORM WITH THE KOREAN AND WW II PROCEDURES, A MUCH MORE VALID CASUALTY COMPARISON COULD BE MADE BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THOSE TWO CONFLICTS. FOR EXAMPLE, COUNTING ONLY THOSE WOUNDED REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION, THE STATISTICS WOULD READ:

A. WIA IN KOREA JUNE 1950-JULY 1953 (3 YEARS, 1 MONTH):  
103,284.

B. WIA IN VIETNAM 1 JAN 61-30 JAN '68 (7 YEARS 1 MONTH):  
56,992.

5. (C) IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A CHANGE IN VIETNAM CASUALTY REPORTING TO THE PRESS WOULD PROVIDE A MORE ACCURATE DATA BASE FOR THE COMPARISON OF REPORTED CASUALTIES WITH OTHER CONFLICTS. IN ADDITION, AN ACCURATE, MORE SIGNIFICANT PORTRAYAL OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS IN RVN WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

6. (C) IT IS EQUALLY OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A CHANGE, IF MADE AT THIS SOMEWHAT LATER DATE, WOULD CREATE CONSIDERABLE PRESS SPECULATION QUESTIONING THE MOTIVES FOR THE CHANGE AND POSSIBLY PROVIDING SOME GRIST FOR THE MILL OF CREDIBILITY GAP. HOWEVER, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE PRESS FURORE, IF ANY, WOULD BE SHORT LIVED AND THAT THE END RESULT WOULD BE A MUCH MORE REALISTIC PICTURE IN THE MINDS OF BOTH

PAGE 3 RUMSAW 1983D C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC AS TO THE CASUALTY SITUATION IN VIETNAM.

7. (C) TO EFFECT THE CHANGE AS PAINLESSLY AS POSSIBLE, DOD AND MACV SHOULD MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT SIMULTANEOUSLY, EXPLAINING THE REASONS FOR THE CHANGE AND PROVIDING REVISED CASUALTY STATISTICS BEGINNING 1 JANUARY 1961. SUBSEQUENTLY, ALL DOD CASUALTY RELEASES WOULD INCLUDE ONLY THOSE WIA REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION (MEDEVAC). IN SAIGON, PRESS QUESTIONS WOULD BE ANSWERED BY MACV AT THE APPROPRIATE EVENING BRIEFING. IN WASHINGTON, THE SAME TASK COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH EITHER A PRESS CONFERENCE OR A BACK-GRINDER. THE ACTUAL RELEASE AND FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SHOULD BE PREPARED BY ASD(PA).

8. (C) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

A. DOD PRESS CASUALTY REPORTS BE CHANGED TO LIMIT WIA TO THOSE REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION.

B. WIA PUBLIC STATISTICS SINCE 1 JAN, 1961 BE MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY.

C. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS CHANGE BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN WASHINGTON AND SAIGON.

D. THE ANNOUNCEMENT BE PREPARED BY ASD(PA).

E. NO CHANGE BE MADE IN OFFICIAL IN-HOUSE CASUALTY REPORTING. GP-4  
BY

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0051246Z ZYM ZTF-1  
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV  
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 05498 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE (D)

REF: A. DEPCOMUSMACV BACKCHANNEL MSG 24633, DTG 072447Z APR 63 (C)  
E. CG III MAF BACKCHANNEL MSG, DTG 232342Z APR 63 (C)

1. (C) REQUEST TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY FOR UTILIZATION OF STAND-DOWN AIRCRAFT TO DIVISION COMMANDERS IS APPROVED.
2. (C) RECOMMEND THAT ALL SUCH UTILIZATION BE REPORTED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ASAP IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES USED TO JUSTIFY SUCH EXCEPTIONS MEET YOUR PERSONAL CRITERIA.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. PREC FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
122

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						GEN WESTMORELAND
DCG						SERIAL 251046Z APR68
DCG AIR		I			A	1,2,4 OF 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	1.		4/25		Q	SUBJECT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
DC/S			4/26		R	REMARKS
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3	2	A				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			251940		SVB	
S/C						

"#2 3 Burned  
5 Nov 68"

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#14





0257227Z 240377-1

FM BR PRIM MACV  
TO MG VAN RYZIN DCG III MAF  
ZEM

T MAC 5462 EYES ONLY

1. (S) OUR EVALUATION OF THE DUMP TRUCK PERFORMANCE AROUND KHE SANH HAS BEEN VERY LIMITED BECAUSE OF THE INHERENT PROBLEMS IN DATA GATHERING IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT. WE ARE MOST INTERESTED IN OBTAINING, IN WHAT EVER DETAIL WE CAN, ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION WHICH WILL HELP IN PROVIDING THE BEST POSSIBLE ASSESSMENT OF WHAT DUMP TRUCK DID SO WE CAN, IN TURN, MAKE AN ASSESSMENT AS TO THE FUTURE POTENTIAL OF THIS SYSTEM.
  2. (S) WE WERE FORTUNATE IN BEING ABLE TO INTERVIEW A CAPTAIN BAIG WHO WAS ONE OF THE S2 TARGETTING OFFICERS IN THE 26TH MARINES DURING THE KHE SANH "SIEGE". HIS EXPERIENCE WITH THE DUMP TRUCK PROGRAM PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION WHICH IS OTHERWISE UNOBTAINABLE. IN SHORT, PERSONAL INTERVIEWS ARE OUR BEST AND ONLY SOURCE OF DETAILED INFORMATION AT THE MOMENT. WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD AN INTERVIEW OF THIS NATURE CAN ONLY BE TAKEN AS THE OPINION OF AN INDIVIDUAL. ANY USE OF THIS INFORMATION WILL BE IDENTIFIED AS PRELIMINARY IN NATURE.
  3. (S) THERE ARE THREE OTHER OFFICERS WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO INTERVIEW; A MAJOR HUDSON, WHO WAS THE 26TH MARINE S2; A LTCOL KNIGHT, WHO WAS ON THE 26TH MARINES STAFF; AND A CAPTAIN HOLMES OF THE 26TH MARINES, WHO HAD SOME EXPERIENCE WITH THE MICROTALES. THERE MAY BE OTHERS THAT YOUR STAFF MIGHT RECOMMEND AS HAVING VALUABLE INFORMATION.
  4. (C) WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET WITH THESE THREE OFFICERS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR EACH. I CAN COME TO DA NANG OR DONG HA AND IF FEASIBLE WOULD PREFER 29 OR 30 APRIL.
- GP-4

*6-3  
OK if  
we can  
locate  
officer*

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
310

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

#12





**CONFIDENTIAL****FOR**

VV PAC148  
 PP RUMWAA  
 DE RUMHMA 4642 1160248  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 250243Z APR 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR, ZINFO  
 R 240051Z APR 68  
 FM DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION  
 FOR RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC (LTGEN KRDLAK)  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. FOR RECD IN A LTR MARKED URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM  
 MR. GLENN HEWITT NOW IN VN, CORRESPONDENT FOR SOUTHERN  
 NEWSPAPERS, TO OMC.

QUOTE: CONSISTENT WITH MY POLICY AS IMPLIED IN A LETTER  
 TO SECRETARY OF STATE, DEAN RUSH, BEFORE LEAVING THE UNITED  
 STATES, MARCH 15TH TO DO A COLUMN ON THE WAR FOR WEEKLY  
 NEWSPAPERS IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF OUR COUNTRY; I FEEL  
 IT IS MY DUTY TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS TO YOU.

GENERAL YOUR HAVE ALL THE MAKING FOR THE GREATEST  
 MILITARY DISASTER IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN DAY ARMIES. IT IS  
 MY HUMBLE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT, THESE FIELD COMMANDERS,  
 LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
 SOUTH VIETNAM, CANNOT SUSTAIN THEIR FORCES MUCH LONGER WITHOUT  
 A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF THE VERY FABRIC OF THE UNITED STATES  
 MARINE CORPS.

PAGE TWO RUEBHOAS405 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- IF I MAY BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE TO YOU AT ANY TIME  
 IN THE FUTURE, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL UPON ME. UNQUOTE  
 2. HEWITT ALSO SENT COPIES TO SEVERAL U. S. SENATORS AND  
 TO THE CG FORLOGCMD  
 3. REQ YOU PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH ANY INFO AVAL WHICH MAY  
 BE USED TO RESPOND TO CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE.  
 4. PLS PASS TO ACMC AND CG III MAF.

GP-4  
 BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	COMUSMACV	24 APR 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL
2	CG		4/25		[Signature]
3	DCG		4/25		[Signature]
4	DCG AIR		4/25		[Signature]
AI	C/S		4/25		[Signature]
	D C/S		4/26		[Signature]
	D C/S DM				
	S/S		250655		SAT-DEW
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

REMARKS

**EXCLUSIVE**

Same as file [Signature]

SECRET



**SECRET****EXCLUSIVE**

ZCZCSAA658ZVA 651VV AWA 957  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAW 0969U 1151248  
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO  
 P 241216Z APR 68 ZFFS  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC  
 BT

*By Dranger decided  
 for him*

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 11604  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGCUSHMAN, INFO ADMIRAL  
 SHARP, FROM GEN WESTMORELAND  
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)  
 A. CG, III MAF, 221340Z APR 68 (E)  
 B. CINCPAC 230409Z APR 68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (E) YOUR COMMENTS ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY. I HAVE DECIDED THAT WE WILL BASE OUR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM ON THE CALENDAR MONTH OF APRIL. THIS WILL PROVIDE A FULL MONTH OF UTILIZATION, AFTER THE INITIAL IMPERFECTIONS HAD BEEN IRONED OUT. YOU MAY WISH TO SEND ME AN ADDENDUM TO REFERENCE A ON 1MAY, WITH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.
2. (S) MEANWHILE, I WILL INITIATE A CAREFUL REVIEW OF EACH OF THE DEFICIENCIES WHICH YOU HAVE CITED TO DETERMINE IF IMMEDIATE

*yes!*

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 0969U **S E C R E T** SPECAT  
 ADJUSTMENTS ARE IN ORDER.  
 GP--4  
 BT

**SECRET**

#10

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
CG						SERIAL 240111Z APR 68
DCG						1, 2, and 4 of 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT CONTROL OF CAPTURED WEAPONS
C/S						REMARKS  EYES ONLY  <i>#2 burned 5 dec 68</i>  <i>W. Makley</i> <i>Copy #4 to G-4 242015H Apr 68 74</i>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/25		lp	GEN WESTMORELAND
DCG	3		4/25		mn	SERIAL 240111Z APR 68
DCG AIR						2, 2, and 4 of 4 COPY# / OF COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	1.		4/24		Q	SUBJECT CONTROL OF CAPTURED WEAPONS
DC/S			4/25		mn	REMARKS S/S pass 2d copy to Q-2 for section
DC/S DM						EYES ONLY
DC/S AIR						C/S reassigned to G-4 due to G-2 note. DKW. S/S
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						Copy to G-4 24 2015M Apr 68
CEO						
S/S			241310		DKW.	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C-COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

#7

#8

0240114Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF

LTG ROSSON CG PCV

LTG WEYAND CG II FFV

MG PEERS ACG I FFV

MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ

INFO GEN MOMYER 7AF

LTG PALMER DCG USARV

RADM VETH COMNAVFORV

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 05409 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: CONTROL, TURN-IN AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS

REF: COMUSMACV MSG 05752, DTG 270047Z FEB 68 (104)

IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE PROGRESS BEING MADE ON THIS SUBJECT SINCE PROMULGATION OF REFERENCE MESSAGE, DATA TAKEN FROM INTSUMS SUBMITTED BY THE SENIOR U. S. HEADQUARTERS IN EACH CTZ, CONTACT WITH VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER AVAILABLE DATA WAS REVIEWED. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW INDICATE THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS REPORTED CAPTURED WERE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR NOR WERE PROCEDURES IN EFFECT TO ASSURE POSITIVE CONTROL AS DIRECTED. ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS POSITIVE CONTROL OVER CAPTURED WEAPONS AND RECORDS MAINTAINED AS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE. I WISH EACH ADDRESSEE TO EXAMINE PRESENT PROCEDURES AND SEND ME A REPLY INDICATING THAT HE HAS REVIEWED CURRENT PROCEDURES AND IS SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE ADEQUATE OR SUMMARIZE THE CHANGES HE INTENDS MAKING.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

235

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED  
"EFTO"

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM COMUSMACV
CG	2		4/24		<i>LS</i>	SERIAL 2312107 APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/25		<i>TH</i>	SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1		4/24		<i>@</i>	<p><b>FOR</b></p> <p><i>"# 3 - 4 Burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE                      C - COMMENTS                      I - INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			4/25		<i>DM</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			240705		<i>DKU</i>	
S/C						

*#7*



FOR

NNNNNZCZCSAA344ZVA 787 AWAB46

PP RUMSAK

DE RUMSAW 36410 1141245

ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO

P 231240Z APR 68 ZFFG

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMHMB/CG 101ST ABN DIV

RUMHVH/SA 1ST INF DIV ARVN

INFO ZEN/CHIEF JGS

RUMSAK/SA ICTZ III MAF

RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPSV

BT

UNCLAS 11465

FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND FOR MG BARSANTI, BG TRUONG, INFO  
GEN VIEN, LTG'S LAM, CUSHMAN, ROSSON.

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

RESULTS OF 22 APRIL ATTACK ON ENEMY FORCE 7 KM N OF HUE  
INDICATE AGGRESSIVE AND WELL-PLANNED ENGAGEMENT. CONGRATULATIONS  
TO A & B/2/301ST ABN FOR MAINTAINING PRESSURE THROUGHOUT DAY AND  
TO ARVN BLACK PANTHER CO AND PF PLATOON FOR REINFORCING ACTION.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#7

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

SI MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG EMEPAC		DATE 22 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 222148Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/24			<p>EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO</p> <p>REMARKS</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY - For Gen Hoffman's eyes Please comply with para 2.</p> <p>For S-3: 4/23 There is no problem in complying with this request. WILCO. FIR</p> <p>"# 2 &amp; 3 Burned [N/S]"</p>
3	DCG		4/24			
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/23			
	D C/S		4/24			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	236645				
	G-1					
	G-2					
4	G-3	A				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #5



**SECRET****EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

VV PAC062  
 RR RUMHAA  
 DE RUMKM 4124 1132148  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 R 222148Z APR 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM  
 LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE EXCELLENCE OF THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN I CTZ IS MOST APPRECIATED AT ALL LEVELS AND CONTINUES TO SERVE A MOST USEFUL PURPOSE FOR THE MARINE CORPS.
2. SIGNIFICANTLY, OUR SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR HAS BEEN KEYS NOT ONLY TO THE QUALITY OF REPORTING BUT TO TIMELINESS. WITH THE SEASONAL APPROACH OF DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME IN THE WASHINGTON AREA, WE ONCE AGAIN MUST ADJUST OUR TIMETABLE AT THIS END OF THE LINE. ACCORDINGLY, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COMPLETED TRANSMISSION OF THE REPORT TO US BY 1230 DAILY YOUR TIME.
3. I RECOGNIZE THE BURDEN THIS CREATES, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF YOUR EXPANDED RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT AGAIN

PAGE 2 RUMKM 4124 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
 ASSURE YOU THAT THE INVESTMENT IS SHOWING ABUNDANT  
 DIVIDENDS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

**SECRET**  
#5

MEMORANDUM

FROM: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

FOR: C/S

We will comply.

(See DTG's for past 10 days).

V Resp'y

curt.

Thanks  
9/1

45

To: Col Smith

REPORT OF DTG FOR FME-PAC SP RPT

ZULL

140309  
 150337  
 160527  
 170339  
 180325  
 190317  
 200615  
 210327  
 220311  
 230325

HOTEL

141109  
 151137  
 161327 (Passed by Quick Talk  
 at same time)  
 171139  
 181125  
 191117  
 201415 (Late due to late receipt  
 of input. Quick Talk out;  
 could not be passed  
 by voice.)  
 211127  
 221111  
 231125

*Samuel J. Hardy Jr*





**CONFIDENTIAL****EXCLUSIVE**

R 221202Z APR 68 ZFFS  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF SA I CTZ DANANG  
 ZEN/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ LONG BINH  
 ZEN/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ NHA TRANG  
 ZEN/SA IV CTZ CAN THO

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG CUSHMAN, MG  
 ECKHARDT, MG PEERS, MG MEARNS FROM GEN  
 WESTMORELAND. 11372

SUBJECT: URBAN AREA DEFENSE (U)

1. (C) THE FORM, EXECUTION, IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE  
 COMMUNIST TET ATTACK AGAINST URBAN CENTERS HAS PROMPTED A CON-  
 siderable accumulation of lessons learned. Accordingly, it is  
 desired that addressees, in concert with appropriate counterparts,  
 review critically present plans and concepts for the defense of  
 cities in light of past experience in their areas during the TET  
 offensive. This should be pursued as a matter of priority.  
 I need not emphasize the disastrous psychological and public  
 opinion impact that would result from successful enemy attacks

PAGE 2 RUMSAV 0943U C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT  
 AGAINST URBAN CENTERS.

2. (C) IN THESE COMBINED REVIEWS, IT IS DESIRED THAT A GREATER  
 emphasis in urban security planning be placed on the role of VN  
 police elements. Planning should provide specific delineation  
 of police responsibilities under all levels of enemy assault. It  
 is essential that police planning and methods be so contrived  
 and executed that developing enemy threats are detected early  
 and preempted. These plans must provide finite guidance for  
 determining the point at which outside military assistance is  
 required and for insuring that such assistance will be obtained.  
 Great emphasis should be placed on immediate reaction forces  
 that are earmarked for movement by helicopter, APC, or truck.  
 We should avoid pulling in troops to permanent positions around  
 the cities and thus depleting the countryside. Measures to  
 minimize destructive employment of air and artillery fires will  
 be included (CS would be much more preferable if sufficient for  
 the situation). Procedures developed must be rehearsed by those  
 who are to implement them. Command thinking must be  
 contingency oriented.

4. (U) ADDRESSEES WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS

PAGE 3 RUMSAV 0943U C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT  
IN THEIR RESPONSE TO THIS TASKING, THE RESULTS OF COMBINED  
 PLANNING WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE BRIEFINGS DURING MY VISITS.

GP-5

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#4

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

SIAMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	SERIALS / CONTROL DATE	22 APR 68

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					OPERATIONAL SUPPORTED REMARKS  EYES ONLY  <del>#203 Burned</del> #344 Burned Scroub Copy #2663 222225H Apr 68  <del>R.M. [Signature]</del> I n 23430H Apr 68 Th
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DA NANG  
 INFO LTG ROSSON CG PROVCORPSV PHU BAI  
 ZEM

SECRET MAC 05342 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL REPORTING

1. (S) DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, REPORTING ON OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN ICTZ HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY.
2. (S) IN A PERIOD OF NEARLY THIRTY-SIX HOURS COMMENCING ON THE AFTERNOON OF 20 APRIL, NO OPERATIONAL REPORTS WERE RECEIVED ON THE SITUATION IN A SHAU VALLEY PORTION OF OPERATION DELAWARE. THIS IS A CRITICAL OPERATION, THE PROGRESS OF WHICH HAS AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON MY DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO ASSIGNING PRIORITIES FOR ARC LIGHT, TACTICAL AIR, AIR LIFT, REPLACEMENT HELICOPTERS AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR WHICH THERE ARE COMPETITIVE DEMANDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS TO SATISFY OUR REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SITUATION REPORTS BE PROVIDED ON A TIMELY BASIS WHICH CLEARLY INDICATE WHAT IS GOING ON.

~~OPERATIONAL REPORTS WERE RECEIVED ON THE SITUATION IN A SHAU VALLEY PORTION OF OPERATION DELAWARE. THIS IS A CRITICAL OPERATION, THE PROGRESS OF WHICH HAS AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON MY DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO ASSIGNING PRIORITIES FOR ARC LIGHT, TACTICAL AIR, AIR LIFT, REPLACEMENT HELICOPTERS AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR WHICH THERE ARE COMPETITIVE DEMANDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS TO SATISFY OUR REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SITUATION REPORTS BE PROVIDED ON A TIMELY BASIS WHICH CLEARLY INDICATE WHAT IS GOING ON.~~  
~~OPERATIONAL REPORTS WERE RECEIVED ON THE SITUATION IN A SHAU VALLEY PORTION OF OPERATION DELAWARE. THIS IS A CRITICAL OPERATION, THE PROGRESS OF WHICH HAS AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON MY DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO ASSIGNING PRIORITIES FOR ARC LIGHT, TACTICAL AIR, AIR LIFT, REPLACEMENT HELICOPTERS AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR WHICH THERE ARE COMPETITIVE DEMANDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS TO SATISFY OUR REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SITUATION REPORTS BE PROVIDED ON A TIMELY BASIS WHICH CLEARLY INDICATE WHAT IS GOING ON.~~  
~~OPERATIONAL REPORTS WERE RECEIVED ON THE SITUATION IN A SHAU VALLEY PORTION OF OPERATION DELAWARE. THIS IS A CRITICAL OPERATION, THE PROGRESS OF WHICH HAS AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON MY DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO ASSIGNING PRIORITIES FOR ARC LIGHT, TACTICAL AIR, AIR LIFT, REPLACEMENT HELICOPTERS AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR WHICH THERE ARE COMPETITIVE DEMANDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS TO SATISFY OUR REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SITUATION REPORTS BE PROVIDED ON A TIMELY BASIS WHICH CLEARLY INDICATE WHAT IS GOING ON.~~  
 OF THE OPERATIONS IN A SHAU. I CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW THIS OPERATION COULD GO UNCORRECTED.

3. (S) ADDITIONALLY, THE DAILY REPORT ON THE DMZ/ NORTHERN ICTZ, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED BY MY DTG 140117Z, HAS BECOME EXTREMELY PERFUNCTORY. THIS REPORT IS RETRANSMITTED TO THE CJCS, WHO USES IT IN HIS PERSONAL BRIEFINGS OF HIGHER AUTHORITIES. I REQUEST THAT THE PREPARATION AND CONTENT OF THIS REPORT BE GIVEN YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIER IMMEDIATELY

270

**SECRET**

NNNN


HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROL SHEET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG EMEPAC		DATE 23 APR 68	
				SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 230141Z APR 68		COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
	CG					REMARKS <b>EXCLUSIVE</b> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  <i>#203 Burned</i> <i>Schubert</i>	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
	C/S						
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
	S/S						
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORPS						
	EMB/TRAIN						
	ENGR						
	MBE						
	II						
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	OF						
	PSY						
	SUPP						
	SB						



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINAL A- ACTION AUTHORIZATION C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 23 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 230141Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS <b>EXCLUSIVE</b> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		23 April		FMJ DKN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL****EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUMWAA  
 DE RUHFMA 4145 1140141  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 230141Z APR 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMWAA/ CG III MAF  
 INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN AND  
 MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LT GEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. I CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSAL RELATIVE TO BGEN  
 GLICK AND BGEN HOFFMANN. ORDERS WILL BE ISSUED  
 SHORTLY THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#0

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG THIRD MARDIV		22 Apr 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			201420Z APR 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/23		lo	REMARKS We should receive this proposal in the next day or so. V. happy 9. Sounds great! Hs.
3	DCG		4/23		W	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/23		2	
	D C/S		4/23		DM	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		4/23		JFW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

# 2 & 3 Burned  
6 Nov 68

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL****(PERSONAL FOR)**

MNNVV AWF403  
 PP RUMWAA  
 DE RUMHVP 5629D 1111420  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 20:420Z APR 68  
 FM CG 3D MARDIV  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

PERSONAL FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN TOMPKINS

1. MGEN LAVELLE USAF BRIEFED ME THIS AFTERNOON ON PLAN TO AIR-DROP SENSORS IN EASTERN DMZ. I SUPPORT HIS CONCEPT WITH THE UTMOST ENTHUSIASM AND CONSIDER IT A GREAT ADVANCE OVER PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR THIS AREA. NO MUSS, NO FUSS, NO TROUBLE TO INSTALL. PROVIDES TOTAL GROUND READOUT, I.ZMC REQUIRES NO OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR READOUT. AVAILABLE FOR INSTALLATION VERY SOON. EXPERIENCE WITH SENSORS AT KHE SANH, OF WHICH ARE WELL AWARE, LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL PAY EVEN GREATER DIVIDENDS IN THE DMZ SINCE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE AREA IS BETTER. WE KNOW ROUTES AND CROSSING SITES CHARLEY USED, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW THE "WHEN". WITH THE SENSORS WE WILL HAVE THE ANSWER TO "WHEN" AND WILL REAP DIVIDENDS ACCORDINGLY.
2. RECOMMEND YOUR APPROVAL OF MGEN LAVELLE'S PROJECT.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 5629D **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
#38

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN WASHINGTON AND
CG	2		4/22		lo	SERIAL 0211200Z APRIL 68
DCG	3				9M	1, 2, 3, AND 4 OF 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4				J	SUBJECT MAC 5298 EYES ONLY
C/S	1		4/21		A	REMARKS For CG - B-2 working on assessment for your personal.
DC/S			4/22		R	<i>copy of copy</i>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2	5		has seen	22/005		By hand. had close!
G-3	6		has seen			By hand.
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			21/161		ES	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C - COMMENTS  
 I - INFORMATION

"# 2 & 3 Burned 6 Nov 68"

**SECRET**

#37

0211200Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON  
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG  
 MG PEERS ACG IFFV  
 MG EARNES ACG II FFV  
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ  
 INFO LTG PALMER DEP CG USARV  
 MG WORLEY ACDR 7TH AIR FORCE  
 RADM VETH COMNAVFORV  
 ZEM

SECRET LIMDIS MAC 5298 EYES ONLY

ON 19 APRIL COLONEL TRAN VAN DAC RALLIED TO THE NATIONAL POLICE IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE. HE IS THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE LIBERATION FRONT SUB-REGION ONE WITH THE PERSONAL RANK OF DIVISION COMMANDER. THE US AND ARVN OFFICERS AND INTERROGATORS WHO HAVE QUESTIONED HIM ARE CONVINCED THAT HE IS GENUINE AND THAT HE HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ITEMS WHICH HE HAS REVEALED.

DAC STATES THAT THE ENEMY PLANS A THIRD GENERAL OFFENSIVE WHICH WILL START NOT LATER THAN 1 MAY. THIS OFFENSIVE WILL BE NATION-WIDE IN SCOPE. THESE OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS ARE TO BE COMPLETED NOT LATER THAN 22 APRIL WITH THE ATTACK SCHEDULED IN THE SAIGON AREA FOR 27 APRIL. HE HAS PROVIDED DETAILS ON THE PARTICIPATION BY SUB-REGION ONE IN THE PLANNED ATTACK ON SAIGON, BUT IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE DETAILS ON ENEMY PLANS IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. THE INFORMATION WHICH DAC HAS PROVIDED REGARDING ENEMY OPERATIONS AND PLANS IN AND AROUND SAIGON HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY ANOTHER HIGHLY PLACED AGENT AND BY OTHER INTELLIGENCE.

I BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY NOW INTENDS TO ATTACK SAIGON IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE WILL PROBABLY ATTACK A FEW TARGETS OR CITIES ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY ALSO. HIS OBJECTIVE IS TO MAKE HEADLINES IN THE WORLD PRESS AND AS DAC PUTS IT-- QUOTE "TO PROVIDE A POWER BASE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS"-- UNQUOTE.

WITH THIS FOREKNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY PLANS WE HAVE A CHANCE TO INFLICT A CRUSHING DEFEAT ON HIM. WE MUST INCREASE OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE THE ENEMY'S TARGETS, TIMING, AND TACTICAL METHODS. TO PERMIT ME TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE SITUATION I ASK THE ADDRESSEES TO GIVE ME THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF WHERE THE ENEMY MAY STRIKE IN THEIR AREAS OF OPERATION BASED ON HIS CURRENT DISPOSITION AND CAPACITY.

THE INFORMATION THAT THE GVN AND OURSELVES HAVE THIS RALLIER SHOULD BE HELD ON THE CLOSEST BASIS SINCE ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF HIS DEFECTION WILL ALMOST SURELY RESULT IN A CHANGE OF HIS PLANS AND THE LOSS OF A GREAT OPPORTUNITY BY US. IN PARTICULAR, ANY PUBLICATION OF DAC'S DEFECTION AT THIS TIME BY THE LOCAL, US, OR WORLD PRESS WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/22		lo	COMUSMACV
DCG	3		4/22		JK	SERIAL 211232Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
C/S	1.		4/22		Q	REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>
DC/S			4/22		JK	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3		Copy				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			220725		DMW	
S/C						

*x # 304 burned 6 Nov 68 "*

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C-COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

7

#36



FOR

NNNNZCZCSAA831ZVA 278VV AWA688

PP RUMSAK

DE RUMSAW 3486D 1121255

ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO

P 211232Z APR 68 ZFFG

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMHMB/CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV

INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF

RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPSV

BT

UNCLAS 11262

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG TOLSON, INFO LTG CUSHMAN, LTG  
ROSSON.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAG

CONGRATULATIONS TO B/2/17TH CAV FOR INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES  
ON ENEMY FORCE 14 KM NW OF HUE ON 20 APRIL. LIGHT FRIENDLY  
CASUALTIES PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#36





FOR

ZCZCSAA447 AWB303  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAW 3225D 1110500  
 ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO  
 P 200420Z APR 68 ZFF-6  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO ZEN/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI  
 RUMSVA/DCG USARV LONG BINH  
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS 11135

FOR KOSTER, INFO LTG PALMER AND LTG CUSHMAN  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

SUBJ: 1ST ANNIVERSARY AMERICAL DIVISION

1. ONE YEAR AGO TASK FORCE OREGON WAS ACTIVATED IN SOUTHERN ICTZ TO MEET A SERIOUS ENEMY CHALLENGE IN THAT AREA. THIS TASK FORCE, WHICH WAS LATER REDESIGNATED THE AMERICAL DIVISION, IMMEDIATELY LAUNCHED A SERIES OF SMASHING ATTACKS WHICH ROUTED THE ENEMY IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE AMERICAL DIVISION, AUGMENTED AT TIMES TO A FORCE OF FOUR BRIGADES, WAGED A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIV IN QUANG TIN AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES. DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN SAVING DA NANG.

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 3225D UNCLAS

2. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF YOUR DIVISION IN ITS FIRST YEAR OF REACTIVATION IS ONE OF THE REAL SUCCESS STORIES OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND IS A GREAT TRIBUTE TO THE PROFESSIONAL ABILITY AND DETERMINATION OF YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN. PLEASE CONVEY MY DEEP RESPECT TO ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMAND AND MY ANTICIPATION OF CONTINUED VICTORIES IN YOUR AREA.

CONGRATULATIONS.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#33

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/21		<i>lp</i>	COMUSMACV SERIAL 200439Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/22		<i>lp</i>	SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1		4/21		<i>lp</i>	FOR
DC/S			4/22		<i>lp</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			2/07/40		<i>SAH</i> <i>SAW</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

*"364 burned  
 6 Nov 68"*



FOR

CVVZCZQDLA008  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAK 32310 1110550  
 ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO  
 P 200439Z APR 68 ZFFG  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO ZEN/CG AMERICAL DIV  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 BT

UNCLAS 11140  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG KOSTER, INFO LTG CUSHMAN.  
 SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE  
 CONGRATULATIONS TO B/1/1 CAV, 198TH LTB, FOR HEAVY CASUALTIES  
 INFLICTED ON ENEMY UNIT SU OF TAM KY ON 19 APRIL. RESULTS INDI-  
 CATE AGGRESSIVE AND WELL PLANNED ACTION.  
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

# 32





FOR

VV SEAB00ZVAG57

PP ULMSEA  
DE UUMSA 3230D 1110545  
ZNR UUUUU  
P 200440Z APR 68 ZFF6  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO UUMKME/CG 101ST ABN DIV  
INFO ULMSEA/CG III MAF  
UUMSEM/CG PROVCORPSV  
BT  
UNCLAS 11141  
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG BARSANTI, LTC CUSHMAN, LTC  
ROSSON.  
SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE  
CONGRATULATIONS TO 1ST AND 2D BNS, 501ST ABN, FOR  
HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL ACTION 7 KM N OF KUE ON 18 APRIL. ABILITY TO  
REACT QUICKLY TO INITIAL CONTACT RESULTED IN SURROUNDING AND DECISIVE  
DEFEAT OF ENEMY FORCE. WELL DONE.  
BT

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMSEVENTHFLT		DATE 20 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 200336Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS <i>Q-3 - Please provide me info to have a reply</i> <i>9 4/20</i> <i>D-3 AIR: YOUR FAC</i> <b>FOR</b> <i>71R</i> <i>CG III MAF 1756 DTG 240634Z apr 68 Responds (Lt Col Codrington to Col Codrington) J. M. [unclear]</i>  <i>"# 364 Burned 6 Nov 1968"</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
<i>1</i>	C/S				<i>Q</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		<i>201410</i>		<i>84J DAW</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3		<i>1600</i> <i>20 APR 68</i>			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL****FOR**

PFTCZYUW RUAOVEC0355 1110458-CCCC--RUMWAA.  
 DE RUYNBUL 1518 1110336  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 200336Z APR 68 ZYO RUYN  
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR BGEN E. ANDERSON FROM COL CODISPOTI  
 COURIER/MAIL SERVICE FOR HOSP SHIPS (U)

A. CG III MAF 190236Z APR 68

1. THE REACTION HERE TO REF A IS THAT SOME HELD ASSIST COULD BE PROVIDED FOR MAIL DELIVERY TO HOSP SHIPS ON A NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OPS BASIS. FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GIVING THIS SERVICE. HOWEVER, NOT DOING SO COULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN EXAMPLE OF LACK OF SUPPORT TO THOSE SHIPS.
2. ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO ASSIST IN THIS MATTER WOULD CERTAINLY REFLECT WELL IN MARINE NAVY RELATIONSHIPS.
3. WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY REPLY. WARM REGARDS.

GP -4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**





(PERSONAL FOR)

PTTEZYUW RWJNSA0027 1PWWTAESEE--RUMWAA.  
ZNY EEEEE  
P 192245Z AFR 68  
FM CG MARCORCRUITDEP SDIEGO  
TO RUEBHQA/CMC  
INFO RUMWAA/CG THIRD MAF  
BT  
UNCLAS E F T O  
PERSONAL FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LT GEN CUSKMAN  
CONCUR IN CG III MAF 190214Z (S). CG FWFAC SENDS.  
BT

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

#29





SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

VV SAA251  
 OO RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAW 0912U 1101208  
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO  
 O 191155Z APR 68 ZFF6  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTG  
 CUSHMAN AND LTG KRULAK FROM GEN WESTMORELAND 11065  
 (S) PLEASSED AT THE GOOD NEWS ON BILL VAN RYZIN. TIMING ON HIS  
 DETACHMENT AND THE ARRIVAL OF MG DRAKE IS FINE WITH ME  
 GP-4  
 BT

SECRET  
#27

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/22		<i>[initials]</i>	LTG ROSSON CG PCV
DCG	3		4/20		<i>[initials]</i>	SERIAL 190724Z AP 68
DCG AIR	4			22	<i>[initials]</i>	1, 2 & 3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	1		4/19		<i>[initials]</i>	SUBJECT PHB 522 EYES ONLY
DC/S			4/22		<i>[initials]</i>	REMARKS
DC/S DM						<i>CYA</i>
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			192130		<i>[initials]</i>	<p>LEGEND</p> <p>A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE</p> <p>C-COMMENTS</p> <p>I- INFORMATION</p>
S/C						

*"# 2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 1968"*

*[Handwritten mark]*

**SECRET**

# 26

0 192724Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM LTG ROSSON CG PCV  
 TO MG TOMPKINS CG 3RD MARDIV  
 MG BARSANTI CG 101ST ABN DIV  
 MG TOLSON CG 1ST CAV DIV  
 INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 ZEM

S E C R E T PHB 522 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 SUBJECT: INDICATIONS OF A SECOND ENEMY OFFENSIVE

1. (S) DURING RECENT DAYS AN IMPRESSIVE NUMBER OF LOW LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS POINT UP THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN PCV AT SOMETIME BETWEEN NOW AND EARLY MAY. THE FOLLOWING EXTRACTS PERTAIN:

A. SR B/1/11/68/595 IR 688, FS 11,525 MI GP MSG 080115Z APR: ON 6 APR 9B REGT ATTENDING POLITICAL CLASSES. VC/NVA WILL STAGE LARGE ATKS VIC PHO TRACH (YD 525 347) TO INTERDICT LOC S BETWEEN HUE AND QUANG TRI CITY TO ISOLATE QUANG TRI CITY WHILE OTHER TROOPS ATK QUANG TRI CITY BEFORE THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS. SOURCE: R 001 WHO CONTACTED A CASUAL SOURCE/EN WHO OBTAINED FROM NVA SOLDIERS.

B. THIRD MAR DIV INTSUM 105, 14 APR, TAKEN FROM JIAD QUANG TRI REPORT 003 OR 696, DATED 10 APR: ON 9 APR, K-11, K-18 AND K-19 BNS MOVED TO LUONG MAI (YD 530 435). THE TROOPS ARE MOVING TO THUA THIEN TO ATTACK HUE CITY. VC/NVA TROOPS TO OCCUPY SOME PROVINCE IN PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE 350TH, 325C AND 304TH DIVS ARE TO MOVE TO THUA THIEN TO ATTACK HUE CITY. THESE DIVS, REINFORCED BY THE 6TH AND 9TH (9B) REGIMENTS, ARE TO BE USED TO ATTACK HUE CITY.

C. 1R/UA/D/68/147, 525 MI GP MSG 170123Z APRIL: ON 6 APR THE NINH LIEM DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE MET AT BUDDIST PAGODA, THUY KHE HAMLET (YD 243 785) TO ANNOUNCE AN ORDER FROM THE QUANG TRI PROVINCE PARTY COMMITTEE TO FURNISH 30 STRETCHERS FOR USE WHEN THE VC/NVA LAUNCH THEIR SECOND OFFENSIVE ON 1 MAY. SOURCE: 8866 FROM A PROSPECTIVE SOURCE WHO WAS PRESENT AT MEETING.

D. AIC, MSS/LNO, QUANG TRI CI TM, 525 MI GP MSG 151315Z APR: ON 11 APR THREE U/I BNS FROM THE 320 DIV WERE LOC FROM (YD 268 463) TO (YD 210 440). FORCE HAS 140MM ROCKETS AND OTHER WEAPONS. TWO BNS, LOC YD 256 467, AND TWO OTHER BNS, LOCATED (YD 188 387), ALL FROM 324(B) DIV. TWO BNS AT YD 188 387 HAVE MISSION TO ATTACK AND HARRASS ALLIED FORCE BASES AND LOCATIONS ON 1 MAY. SOURCE: MSS CODED AGENT C-58.

E. 1R/VA/D/68/145 RED BANK D-48, 525 MI GROUP MSG, DATED 160125Z APR: ON 13 APR AN U/I VC/NVA REGT MOVED TO (YD 295 391) AND (YD 351 395). THE SENIOR OFFICER (SOURCE SAID "GENERAL") WAS TO STUDY THE SITUATION IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES. TWO MORE REGTS TO MOVE INTO QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES AND LAUNCH A "DIEN BIEU PHU" FRONT THERE, THEN PEACE TALKS WOULD COME. US MI CODED SOURCE 3425, 1 149. - PROSPECTIVE SOURCE. #26(1)

F. SR E/1/11/SE/S17 IR 712 L-563, 525 MI GP MSG, DATED 150930Z APRIL: ON 14 APR AN U/I BN MOVED FROM (YD 245 739) AND (YD 245 725) TO (YD 250 765) AND (YD 255 774). CONCURRENTLY AN U/I REGT MOVED FROM (YD 236 827) TO VIC OF (YD 250 787) AND (YD 250 797). WEAPONS INCLUDED 140MM ROCKETS. THE REGT WAS FROM THE 360TH DIV. THE 360TH DIV IS TO INFILTRATE TRIEU PHONG AND HAI LANG DELTA AREAS TO COLLECT RICE FROM USE IN NEXT ATTACKS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. SOURCE: R 205 WHO OBTAINED FROM A CASUAL SOURCE, A VC ARTY OBSERVER.

G. SR/B/1/14/68/505/QR/1094, 525 MI GP MSG, DATED 151615Z APR: ON 10 APR, THE 9TH BN, 2D NVA REGT, (RECENTLY INFILTRATED) DEPLOYED VIC (YC 824 997) AND (YC 813 996). THE BN WAS PREPARING FOR AN ATTACK ON HUE CITY IN EARLY MAY. SOURCE: ARVN MI CODED SOURCE T002 WHO OBTAINED FROM T214 WHO OBSERVED UNIT.

H. 1R/B/1/14/68/103, 525 MI GROUP, DATE IN APRIL UNKNOWN: FROM 6 TO 10 APRIL, UNDER DIRECTION OF REGION II, LEADING MILITARY AND POLITICAL PERSONALITIES MET TO DISCUSS ATTACKS AGAINST HUE/PHU BAI. IT WAS DECIDED THAT ALL COMMUNICATION ALONG HIGHWAY 1 BETWEEN DANANG AND PHU BAI HAD TO BE DESTROYED BY THE END OF APRIL. SOURCE: ARVN MICODED SOURCE T002 WHO OBTAINED FROM T214 WHO ELICITED FRX U/I VC.

I. UA/1/0073/68/IN, 1ST BN (PROV), 525 MI GP, DATED 20 MARCH: THREE VC BNS, LOCATED VIC (YD 245 475) AND (YD 220 425), AND AN ARTILLERY BN, LOC VIC (YD 310 469), PLAN TO ATTACK US/ARVN INSTALLATIONS IN HAI LANG AND TRIEU PHANG DISTRICTS AND, IF AN OPPORTUNITY ARISES, TO ATTACK QUANG TRI CITY AND HAI LANG AND TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT HQS. SOURCE: MSS CODED SOURCE R18.

J. INTERROGATION REPORT: ITI 43-68, DATED 110155Z APRIL: PW NGUYEN VAN TIM, CAPTURED 7 APRIL AT (YD 939 246) STATES THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF A LOCAL FORCE COMPANY AND THAT HIS PLATOON LEADER HAD TOLD HIM THAT HIS UNIT WOULD ATTACK HUE. DATE OF ATTACK UNKNOWN TO PW.

K. PW LE THIEN, K-14 BN, CAPTURED 25 MARCH AT (YD 401 555), BY 1/8 CAV, STATES THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD HIS UNIT WOULD ATTACK QUANG TRI CITY.

K. PW PHAM BAN, K-14 BN, CAPTURED 25 MARCH AT YD 401 550 BY 1/8 CAV REPORTS THE MISSION OF "CONG TRUONG 7" IS TO ATTACK US FORCES IN HAI LANG DISTRICT, TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT, AND QUANG TRI CITY. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THE ATTACK WOULD BE BUT IT WILL BE AFTER THE UNIT RECEIVES REPLACEMENTS. SOURCE HEARD THAT K-14A WOULD RECEIVE REPLACEMENTS IN MAY.

L. 101ST DIV INTERROGATION REPORT D-101-178-68; PW NGUYEN VAN THANH, CAPTURED 11 APRIL AT (XD 475 486) STAQT HIS UNIT, 7TH BN, 812TH REGT,

S PRESENTLY RESTING AND REBUILDING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

930

# 26(2)

SECRET

# 26(2)

O 190704Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM LTG ROSSON CG PCV  
 TO MG TOMPKINS CG 3RD MARDIV  
 MG BARSANTI CG 101ST ABN DIV  
 MG TOLSON CG BQST CAV D V  
 INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 ZEM

S E C R E T PHB 522 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

M. TON THAT TAN AND NGUYEN DUC HAI, WHO RALLIED ON 5 APRIL AT (YD 848 086), STATE THAT THEIR UNIT, K-10 BN, IS TO PREPARE FOR A SECOND OFFENSIVE WHICH WILL RUN FROM 17 TO 24 APRIL. THE INITIAL TARGET IS TO BE PHU BAI, AND THEN THE OPERATION IS TO MOVE ON TO HUE.

N. FIELD STATION BQWN TWT MI GROUP MSG 172041Z: ON 6 APRIL THE 1ST VC REGT OF THE 2 DIVISION WAS DEPLOYED NEAR CHU LAI. REGT IS TO COLLECT 1,000 LABORERS PRIOR TO 1 MEY AND ANOTHER 1,000 BETWEEN 2 AND 19 MAY. MISSION OF THE REGIMENT IS TO ATTACK QUANG TIN CAPITAL PRIOR TO 19 MEY. SOURCE: S 206.

O. MACV INTSUM (DISSEMINATED BY OTHER MEANS 4 DATED 190032Z: AN AGENT REPORTS LEARNING THROUGH CONVERSATION WITH VC CADRE, PLANS FOR IMMINENT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO GAIN THE INITIATIVE IN COMING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. AS A PART OF A COUNTRY-WIDE CAMPAIGN, GROUND ATTACKS ARE TO SWEEP THROUGH EASTERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AGAINST GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS AND FZ MAF INSTALLATIONS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEY ARE TO BE HEAVY MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS WITH DANANG THE MAIN TARGET. THE ATTACKS ARE TO BE CARRIED OUT SOMETIME BETWEEN 20 APRIL AND THE END OF MAY.

P. JTAD REPORT 562 IR 655, DATED 27 MARCH: THE 95TH REGIMENT, LOCATED VIC (YD 384 256) ON 25 MARCH, WILL MOVE TO THUA THIEN TO REINFORCE UNITS DURING A SECOND ATTACK ON HUE.

1. JTAD REPORT 1R 658 OF 27 MARCH: ON 5 MARCH 2 V/I REGIMENTS OF THE 325C DIVISION WILL ATTACK TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT HQS AND THEN QUANG TRI CITY. NO DATES GIVEN.

R. JTAD IR 1087, DATED 120617Z APRIL: A V/I NVA BN, OBSERVED VIC (YD 568 248), WILL COORDINATE WITH OTHER UNITS IN ATTACKING AND SHELLING HUE DURING THE PERIOD 1-10 MAY. SOURCE: ARVN MI CODED SOURCE T 005 WHO OBTAINED FROM T-301.

S. ON 19 APRIL, BASED ON AN AGENT REPORT, CG, I CTZ STATED THAT THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF A MAJOR ATTACK AGAINST DANANG BETWEEN 20 APRIL AND 5 MAY.

2. (C) WITHOUT DOUBT, SEVERAL OF THESE REPO

TS ARE UNTRUE IN WHOLE OR IN PART. NEVERTHELESS, WHEN CONSIDERED COLLECTIVELY AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE THROUGH OTHER SOURCES, IT IS ONLY PRUDENT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE ENEMY IS PLANNING TO INITIATE A SECOND OFFENSIVE AT AN EARLY DATE. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE CAUGHT UNPREPARED.

3. (C) TO INSURE A HIGH STATE OF READINESS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORT BE MOUNTED WHICH WILL ASSURE THE ACQUISITION OF EARLY WARNING. IT IS LIKEWISE NECESSARY TO INSURE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED TO ALL WHO HAVE A NEED TO KNOW. FINALLY, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT A HIGH STATE OF READINESS TO REACT TO OPPORTUNITY TO DESTROY THE ENEMY BE MAINTAINED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

HEADQUARTERS  
II MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CONTROL SHEET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG PROV CORPS V		DATE 19 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 181015Z APR 68		COPY# <u>3</u> OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					<b>REMARKS</b>  <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</p> <p>Copy #3 to 6-11 2 Sep 68</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i> 1 May 69 R</p> <p>#4 burned &amp; 6 Nov 68</p> <p>Copy #3 to C-4 061320H May 69 R</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i> on 062030H May 69 R</p>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #25

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG PROV CORPS V		DATE 10 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 181015Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/20			<p>RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BASE DEV</p> <p>REMARKS</p> <p><b>FOR</b></p> <p>CG - This is a result of an apparent impasse between our FEO and PCV's engineers. I discussed this matter with C/S PCV yesterday and told him we would provide them an answer soonest - neg. is therefore a surprise.</p> <p>V. Ray J.</p>
3	DCG		4/20			
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		4/20			
	D C/S		4/24			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	200730			DRW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4	COPY				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #25



SECRET

FOR

P 181015Z APR 68  
 FM CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI  
 TO CG III MAF DANANG  
 BT

S E C R E T 00995 FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM LTG ROSSON  
 SUBJ: RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BASE DEVELOPMENT AND REAL ESTATE (U)  
 REF: A. COMUSMACV LOI- ROLE AND MISSION OF PVC DATED 3 MAR 68 (S)  
 B. ICCI 5402.3A DTD 16 MAR 68 (U)  
 C. III MAF LOI DTD 18 MAR 68 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE A, PAR 2 STATES THAT THE ROLE OF HQS, PVC IS "TO PROVIDE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF EXPANDED US GROUND FORCES". PAR 3, STATES THAT CG PVC "WILL CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS". PAR 4 STATES THE CG III MAF "WILL CONTINUE CURRENT MISSIONS IN ICTZ". PAR 6A STATES THAT COMMANDERS "WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES".
2. (U) REFERENCE B APPOINTS CG PCV AS ZONE COORDINATOR FOR NICTZ AND LISTS HIS DUTIES, PAR 6H, REFERENCE B ASSIGNS COORDINATION OF REAL ESTATE ACQUISITIONS AND ALLOCATIONS TO COMNAVFORV. PAR 6I, REFERENCE B, EXCLUDES BASE CONSTRUCTION AND PLANNING AND STATES "RESPONSIBILITY IN THESE AREAS IS CURRENTLY DEFINED IN THE JOINT AGREEMENT BETWEEN III MAF AND COMNAVFORV."
3. (U) REF C ALSO ASSIGNS CG, PCV THE ROLE OF ZONE COORDINATOR AND BY REFERENCE TO MACV DIRECTIVE 10-4 IMPLIES THAT CG, PCV IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BASE DEVELOPMENT AND REAL ESTATE. THUS REF C APPEARS TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH REF. B.
4. (S) BASED ON MY INTERPRETATION OF THE CITED REFERENCES, MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTENT OF REF A, THE INDETERMINATE LONGEVITY OF HQS, PCV AND ITS INHERENT TACTICAL NATURE, BASE DEVELOPMENT AND REAL ESTATE FUNCTIONS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE APPROPRIATE TASKS FOR HQS, PCV. YOUR CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED.

GP-4  
 BT

SECRET

#25







**SECRET**

//////SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOLLOWS//////

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

VV CMC200  
 PTT SZYUW RUEB40A2742 1091532-SSSS--RUMWAA RUMWMA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 181930Z APR 68 ZFF-G  
 FM CMC  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMWMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE**

S E C R E T - SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM  
 GENERAL CHAPMAN  
 A. NY 181455Z APR 68  
 LTGEN CUSHMAN. REQUEST YOU RECOMMEND REASSIGNMENTS  
 OF MAJOR GENERALS DESIRED WITHIN III MAF AS RESULT OF  
 ACTIONS TAKEN IN REFERENCE.  
 LTGEN KRULAK. REQUEST YOUR COMMENT OR CONCURRENCE IN THESE  
 RECOMMENDATIONS.  
 WARM REGARDS.  
 GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#24





**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

P 181438Z APR 68  
FM CMC  
TO COMUSMACV  
INFO CG FMFPAC  
CG III MAF  
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN.

1. DUE TO UNEXPECTED PHYSICAL RETIREMENT OF MY PROSPECTIVE C/S, I DESIRE TO ORDER MGEN VAN RYZIN TO HQMC WITH DATE OF DETACHMENT 1 JUNE TO SERVE AS C/S HQMC, IN THE GRADE OF LTGEN. I RECOGNIZE THE UNDESIRABILITY OF SHORT-TOURING, BUT FEEL THE NEED FOR BILL IN WASHINGTON IS OVERRIDING. OF COURSE, IT MEANS A PROMOTION FOR HIM, TOO. I WILL ORDER MGEN C B DRAKE TO REPORT TO III MAF ABOUT 20 MAY AS NUMERICAL RELIEF FOR VAN RYZIN.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#24

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/19		lo	GEN WESTMORELAND SERIAL 180627ZAPR68 COPY# 1, 3, and 4 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/19		JR	SUBJECT SECURITY OF OPERATIONS
DCG AIR	4			20	f	REMARKS
C/S			4/18		a	EYES ONLY
DC/S						<p>OG - you released the msg on opposite page the other day. Gen W's msg. is in considerable more detail (see para 2 a thru 6). Do you want it passed to DCV and subordinate Div &amp; Wing Comdr's. I think this is required by para 5.</p> <p>Yes ↑ Wesley G.</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			4/18		DFW	LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
S/C						<p>Passed to subordinates CG 44 19073008 see</p> <p><b>SECRET</b></p>

"# 3 & 4 burned 6 Nov 68"

# 23

O 180627Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 M GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV  
 TO LTG PALMER DCG USARV  
 RADM VEIH COMNAVFORV  
 MG WORLEY ACDR SEVENTH AF  
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 MG PEERS ACG I FFV  
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFV  
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ  
 INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
 ADM SHARP CINCPAC  
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 05136 EYES ONLY

1. I REMIND ALL COMMANDERS THAT WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO AVOID MAKING KNOWN TO THE PRESS FUTURE OPERATIONAL PLANS AND OTHER INFORMATION THAT WILL BE OF VALUE TO THE ENEMY. THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE COMMANDERS TALKING TO THE PRESS; HOWEVER, SENSITIVE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED WITH "NO COMMENT."

2. YOU ARE REMINDED THAT ALL NEWSMEN ACCREDITED TO MACV HAVE AGREED THAT THEY WILL ABIDE BY THE SO-CALLED "GROUND RULES" AND NOT WRITE ABOUT THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF INFORMATION UNTIL SUCH INFORMATION IS OFFICIALLY RELEASED BY MACV:

- A. FUTURE PLANS, OPERATIONS, OR STRIKES. ✓
- B. INFORMATION ON OR CONFIRMATION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
- C. AMOUNTS OF ORDNANCE AND FUEL MOVED BY SUPPORT UNITS OR ON HAND IN COMBAT UNITS (ORDNANCE INCLUDES WEAPONS OR WEAPONS SYSTEMS).
- D. DURING AN OPERATION OR PREPARATION THEREFOR: UNIT DESIGNATIONS AND TROOP MOVEMENTS, TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS, NAME OF OPERATION, AND SIZE OF FRIENDLY FORCES INVOLVED.
- E. INTELLIGENCE UNIT ACTIVITIES, METHODS OF OPERATION, OR SPECIFIC LOCATION.
- F. EXACT NUMBER AND TYPE OF CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY FRIENDLY UNITS.
- G. AERIAL PHOTOS OF FIXED INSTALLATIONS.

3. ALL CONCERNED SHOULD NOTE THAT THESE ITEMS MAY BE USED ONLY IF OFFICIALLY RELEASED BY MACV. SUCH RELEASE IS NORMALLY MADE BY MACOI; HOWEVER, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT, IF I OR ANY OTHER SENIOR COMMANDER MAKES SUCH RELEASE WHEN TALKING ON-THE-RECORD, THE PRESS CAN ASSUME THAT THE RELEASE IS OFFICIAL. CONSEQUENTLY, COMMANDERS SHOULD BE MOST CAREFUL WHEN DISCUSSING SUCH MATTERS WITH PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. THE NEWSMEN CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO CHECK WITH MACV CONCERNING THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A STATEMENT MADE TO THEM ON-THE-RECORD BY A SENIOR UNIT COMMANDER.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, IF INFORMATION COVERED BY THE GROUND RULES IS PROVIDED A NEWSMAN ON AN OFF-THE-RECORD OR NOT-FOR-PUBLICATION BASIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY A SITUATION AND IS THEN USED BY THAT NEWSMAN, HE IS SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS ACCREDITATION, AND I OR MY CHIEF OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AS SOON AS SUCH VIOLATION BECOMES KNOWN.

5. ADDRESSEES WILL PROVIDE SIMILAR GUIDANCE TO THEIR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION OF VALUE IS NOT MADE KNOWN TO THE ENEMY VIA THE NEWS MEDIA. //

SSO NOTE: FOR SSO CINCPAC: IF GEN WHEELER STILL AT YOUR LOCATION, PLEASE DELIVER COPY OF MESSAGE TO HIM. IF NOT, SSO DIA IS ADDITIONAL ADDEE AND WILL PROTECT.  
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

# 23(2)

600

# 23(2)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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CONTROL SHEET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 18 APR 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 161030Z APR 68		COPY # <u>4</u> OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  <b>NO FURN FOR</b>  <i># 3 burned 6 Nov 68</i>  Copy 4 to 6-3 for PR 19 Apr 68 thru <i>P. L. Oberla</i>  Copy # 5 to 6-3 for PR 19 Apr 68 thru <i>Herbert E. Sigmond</i>  Copy # 6 of 6 for PR 19 Apr 68 thru <i>David A. Smith</i> <b>CORDS</b>  CONFIDENTIAL
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 18 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 161030Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/21		[Signature]	REMARKS  <b>NO FORN FOR</b>
3	DCG		4/22		[Signature]	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/20		[Signature]	
	D C/S		4/22		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	190635			[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
TYPE TRANSMISSION	TO	INFO	
ELECTRICAL			
AIR MAIL			
COURIER	X	X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION TO: **Courier**

INFO: **Courier**

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

**DTG 161030 Z Apr 68**

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

C/S	X 8	SJS	HIT	X 1
J1	X 4	J2	X 8	C11P
J3	X 1	J4	X 3	
J5	X 1	J6	X 2	
ACTIV		NAG		
AFGP		NAVFORV		
AG	X 5	OICC		
AMEMB	X 4	PM		
CBPAC		SJA		
CH		SOG		
COC	X 2	SURG	X 3	
COMB STUDIES		TMA	X 3	
COMPT	X 2	TNG	X 1	
DOD SPEC REP		USAID	X 3	
FMAO		USARV	X 6	
HC		1FFV LNO	X 1	
IG	X 2	11 FFV LNO	X 3	
JRATA		111 MAFLNO	X 1	
JUSPAO	X 2	5TH SF LNO		
MACDC		7TH AF		
MACON		MACCORDS	30	
MACPD	X 2	MACJO1R	A 3	
DIR	1	OSA	1	
PHOENIX				

FROM: COMUSMACV

TO: CINCPC 2

INFO: CJCS 2

DOD 2

STATE/AID 2

CIA 2

CG, I FFORCEV/SA II CTZ 1

CG, II FFORCEV/SA III CTZ 3

CG, III MAF/SA I CTZ 8

SA, IV CTZ 2

**NO FORN FOR**

**CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 10781 FOR**

ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, MG PEERS, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER

SUBJ: PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING FEBRUARY 1968 (U)

1. (U) This is the second in the 1968 series of Monthly assessments of Pacification.

2. (C) Summary:

a. Starting on the night of 29-30 January, VC/NVA forces struck in unprecedented numbers at population centers

DR A F T E R

TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL

John Hayes MACV 3556  
Reports Officer  
CORDS/R&E Division

RELEASE ASSESSER

SIGNATURE *[Signature]*

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

R. W. KOMER  
DEP TO COMUSMACV for CORDS

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after skillful concentration involving infiltration, night movement, and the bypassing of territorial forces' outposts. Neither these outposts, RD Cadre Groups, nor RD areas were targeted by the VC to any significant degree. The timing of the Tet attacks, the number and quality of arms possessed by the enemy, and the number of enemy forces involved, combined to maximize shock and surprise. There was no massive popular demonstration of support for the enemy cause, and ~~no~~ was the VC/NVA expectation. On the other hand, Tet absences reduced the present-for-duty strength of GVN military units.

b. Initial VC attacks were beaten back or stopped by a hasty commitment of GVN and allied forces as local situations developed. National Police generally made an outstanding showing in this period. Some VC thrusts foundered through lack of coordination and numbers of enemy elements were destroyed during the days subsequent to the initial attacks. The blunting of these enemy attacks, and mounting concern for security of population centers, caused a countrywide gravitation of forces into and around the cities and towns.

c. Regional Force companies at the end of February were generally in or near cities and province and district towns. This deployment is normal for most such units. A few were redeployed to replace certain of the ARVN battalions redeployed from missions in direct support of RD. Relatively few Popular Force elements were redeployed. RF/PF performance frequently exceeded US expectations. Territorial force units were undermanned, but

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many stood and fought when attacked in strength. They were frequently outgunned by the enemy who were armed with the superior AK-47 and

d. About 320 of 557 RD Cadre Groups were in assigned hamlets, either Phase II 1967 or Phase I 1963, at the end of February, as were most of the Truong Son RD Teams. The remaining cadre were involved in relief and recovery tasks in the cities and towns.

e. In the wake of the Tet offensive, President Thieu, in response to US initiatives, announced that a high-level GVN/US task force had been created to direct and coordinate the activities of GVN and US agencies in speeding civil recovery. Vice-president Ky headed the group initially, with Deputy to COMUSMACV for GCRDS as the senior US representative. Each CTZ Commander and his US counterpart created similar task forces. The effort proved effective in getting "Project Recovery" under way. Ministries were brought together and forced to react quickly on basic recovery policies. Emergency actions were speeded.

to restore the situation to normalcy as rapidly as possible by:

- (1) Providing emergency care for the homeless;
- (2) Insuring adequate food for the populace of areas affected by VC attacks;
- (3) Rebuilding damaged cities and towns;
- (4) Arousing popular support for the government.

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<p>f. While VC incidents (less anti-aircraft incidents) declined from 2371 for January to 2090 in February, their intensity significantly increased. There were 7,424 war-related civilian fatalities and 15,434 wounded reported for the period; however, these casualties cannot be characterized in their entirety as results of VC terrorism since they stemmed in part from heavy fighting during post-Tet VC attacks.</p> <p>g. During February efforts to open LOCs permitted convoy traffic over most national highways. Security continued to improve from mid-month onward. At month's end, National Route 4 was open from Saigon to Can Tho, but the stretch between Can Tho and Camau remained subject to frequent minings and commercial traffic was often subject to interdiction.</p> <p>h. Momentum of Phoenix was disrupted by the VC/NVA attacks of early February. However, DIOCC's proved their worth as focal points for intelligence collection and operations. Contact with rural areas was maintained primarily through reporting sources passing intelligence to DIOCC's. Release of 1,000 prisoners from the Hue jail was a serious setback to the effort, since many were key members of the Quang Tri and Thua Thien VCI. Equally disturbing was the loss of intelligence assets killed or captured when VC/NVA elements passed into Hue and the surrounding area.</p> <p>i. Seven hundred sixty-three Hoi Chanh rallied, a drop of</p>	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
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about 400 from the January figure and slightly more than a quarter of the February 1967 rate.

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j. In the Refugee Program, continued VC harassing attacks on cities and towns kept attention focused on care and feeding of over 600,000 homeless persons in cities, as well as 800,000 pre-Tet refugees.

k. Major damage to radio transmitters or studios was sustained at Hue, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thuot, and Saigon. A 50-watt station was installed at Hue to provide limited daytime coverage; radio transmission by aircraft at night provided coverage throughout I CTZ. A major effort was launched to regain pre-Tet coverage nationwide. The Hue television station was silenced through loss of operating personnel; the Saigon TV station continued operations throughout the month.

3. IMPACT OF THE TOP-PRIORITY 1968 PACIFICATION SUB-PROGRAMS:

a. Improve and Expand Territorial Security:

(1) The following table depicts population status, measured by security and development HES criteria, as of 29 February

POPULATION CONTROL (Thousands)\*  
(Security and Development)

	31 Dec 1967	31 Jan 1968	28 Feb 1968
--	----------------	----------------	----------------

GVN CONTROLLED

I CTZ	1853.5	56.6%	1834.7	56.5%	1474.0	45.4%
II CTZ	2130.2	74.8%	2130.1	74.8%	1984.6	69.9%

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	<u>31 Dec 1967</u>		<u>31 Jan 1968</u>		<u>28 Feb 1968</u>	
III CTZ	4326.3	81.4%	4353.3	81.7%	3839.6	73.4%
IV CTZ	3204.8	55.6%	3263.3	56.2%	2959.7	50.8%
RVN	11514.8	66.9%	11581.5	67.2%	10257.9	59.8%
<u>CONTESTED</u>						
I CTZ	625.3	19.1%	627.4	19.3%	916.9	28.2%
II CTZ	491.4	17.2%	493.2	17.3%	619.3	21.8%
III CTZ	707.1	13.3%	694.7	13.0%	1098.1	21.0%
IV CTZ	1008.6	17.5%	1001.9	17.2%	1141.7	19.6%
RVN	2832.4	16.5%	2817.2	16.3%	3776.0	22.0%
<u>VC CONTROLLED</u>						
I CTZ	793.9	24.3%	786.1	24.2%	859.1	26.4%
II CTZ	228.2	8.0%	223.2	7.8%	237.1	8.3%
III CTZ	233.2	5.3%	281.3	5.3%	296.1	5.7%
IV CTZ	1555.8	27.0%	1543.7	26.5%	1724.8	29.6%
RVN	2861.1	16.6%	2834.2	16.4%	3117.1	18.2%

(2) Depicted below is the shift of hamlets between the various HES categories, to indicate trends in progression and regression. The categories are based upon security and development factors. The base line "Total Moved" shows the numbers of hamlets that exhibited a shift during the month of February. Reading up or down within a column, displacement into successive levels of progression or regression is shown in terms of hamlets and percentage of the "Total Moved" base line figure:

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MONTHLY HAMLET MOVEMENT \*

FROM: 31 JAN 68 TO: 29 FEB 68

UP TO	P R O G R E S S I O N	A	A	A	A	A	
		5(1.0%)					
			B	B	B	B	
			36(6.1%)				
				C	C	C	
			42(13.1%)		2(28.6%)		
				D	D		
				9(15.8%)	5(71.4%)		
					E		
TOTAL MOVED		A	B	C	D	E	VC
		85	493	589	320	57	7
DOWN TO	R E G R E S S I O N	B					
		64(75.3%)					
			C	C			
		6(7.1%)	372(75.5%)				
			D	D	D		
	15(17.6%)	93(18.9%)	446(75.7%)				
		E	E	E	E		
		2(0.3%)	21(3.6%)	168(52.5%)			
		VC	VC	VC	VC	VC	
		21(4.3%)	86(14.6%)	110(34.4%)	48(84.2%)		
NO CHANGE		A	B	C	D	E	VC
		152	1183	2598	1747	363	3762

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\* NOTE: The VC Tet offensive reduced mobility of many District Senior Advisors and limited their ability to make a comprehensive and complete evaluation of the situation in their areas. Therefore, March HES data probably will provide a more reliable index of Tet offensive impact. [REDACTED]

HES security indicators, specifically those for VC attacks, present a very sensitive situation. A single mortar round on a hamlet can depress the rating for that indicator from A or B to D or E. In addition, experience shows that without VC follow-on attacks, security indicators improve more rapidly than do development indicators.

February hamlet and population data for Thua Thien province were not received. Field reports indicate deterioration of security in Thua Thien during the past three months. Hence, all evaluated (non-VC) hamlets, and the population related to those hamlets, are carried in the February HES report as "Non-evaluated" and are summarized within the HES "Other" category.

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## RECAPITULATION:

Hamlets exhibiting a shift: 1551

Hamlets that progressed: 99 (6.4% of "Total Moved")

Hamlets that regressed: 1452 (93.6% of "Total Moved")

(3) The VC and NVA attacks of the closing days of January and the first week of February resulted initially in redeployment of friendly military forces from the countryside into and around population centers in all corps areas. This tactic, dictated by military necessity, blunted and then stopped the enemy attacks. By mid-February a new military situation existed nationwide, gradually assuming a unique regional character within each CTZ.

(4) Generally the VC/NVA forces bypassed outposts, watchtowers, and RD areas during the period of pre-assault concentration and approach to attack positions. RD hamlets were occupied only, in certain cases, to serve as staging areas or base camps. There were isolated attacks upon RD hamlets but these bore no apparent relationship to the larger objectives of the enemy effort. Some outposts engaged enemy forces; only a few were deliberately taken under attack by VC/NVA elements.

(5) In I CTZ territorial security declined in all provinces except Quang Tin during February. The enemy's seizure of the initiative at Tet and his continued harassment and attacks thwarted attempts to return to the previous security posture. Only in Quang Tin did most RD support units remain in their pre-Tet positions and continue to conduct operations as before.

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Elsewhere, friendly Vietnamese military units generally withdrew to province and district capitals and concentrated on defensive operations. ARVN failed to pursue aggressively the enemy as he was repulsed from his attacks on the cities. Instead, ARVN Commanders chose to wait and prepare for additional NVA/VC assaults, leaving the initiative with the enemy. Only during the latter part of the month did ARVN in Quang Ngai and Quang Tri begin to extend control back to the GVN's previous sphere of influence. Some RF/PF units returned to their former positions in the countryside by 29 February. A major ARVN military effort was devoted to expelling well-entrenched NVA forces from the city of Hue. At the end of the month, friendly territorial security remained considerably reduced from its pre-Tet level.

(6) II CTZ was the most lightly affected of any Corps during the Tet offensive. Several population centers were hard hit but enemy attacks were soon blunted. Initially, VC/NVA forces struck hardest at population centers in the western highlands, notably in Kontum and Darlac Provinces, where Kontum City and more particularly Ban Me Thuot were heavily attacked. Recurring ground attacks were made on Dalat in Tuyen Duc and on Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan until mid-month. By the end of the month, major cities were free from attack except by intermittent rocket and mortar fire. Pacification assets--RDC Groups, TSRD Teams, and Popular Force elements--in the countryside were left largely untouched except in Ninh Thuan and Binh Dinh. February ended with territorial security forces and other pacification

*ugh!*

*I don't agree with this at all.*

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assets back in near-completed 1967 and Phase I 1968 hamlets.

(7) The enemy offensive had a substantial impact in III CTZ. About 100,000 refugees were generated and around 11,000 structures, public and private, were destroyed. Interdiction of lines of communication throughout the province followed the initial attacks throughout the corps area. Although VC entered about half of the 1967 RD areas, they did little physical damage. Most territorial security forces and RD Cadre Groups were in assigned field deployments in III CTZ at the end of the month.

(8) On 31 January 1968, the VC initiated a general offensive in most provinces of the IV Corps Tactical Zone, taking advantage of the general laxity during the Tet holiday season. Attacks were initiated against most province and district capitals using a total of 24 VC battalions. A number of the provincial mobile battalions had split and had been reinforced with newly drafted and trained youths. Many of the attacking units moved undetected great distances during late January. VC units showed evidence of recent resupply and possessed newly issued weapons, including some not previously confirmed as being present in significant quantity in

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<p>the Delta (120 mm mortars, B-41 rockets, etc.) Available information indicates extensive movement by the VC of men and equipment over established routes from Cambodia into the Delta area throughout February. Initially the heaviest attacks were directed against Ben Tre, My Tho, Can Tho, Vinh Long and Chau Doc, the last-named city being partially occupied for approximately 30 hours. Extensive damage was done to provincial towns by friendly forces in their efforts to dislodge VC elements from populated areas. Performance of military units during the month was generally good with several exceptions. Reports were received of looting in Vinh Long by elements of the 9th ARVN Division and the Rangers. MACV installations were, in general, left alone except for standoff direct and indirect weapons attacks. After the first week of the Tet offensive, VC elements withdrew from heavy contact, regrouped, and were resupplied. In mid-month, another surge was noted in the VC effort, less intense than the initial onslaught of the first few days of the month. Throughout the month, the VC attacked the major airfields in IV Corps Tactical Zone in an unsuccessful attempt to immobilize U.S. and Vietnamese air assets. Significant ground and mortar attacks were launched on airfields at Vinh Long and Can Tho. Heavy mortar and recoilless rifle attacks were delivered on the Binh Thuy airfield with lesser harassing attacks against the Soc Trang airfield. After the initial attacks the VC elements methodically confined ARVN and territorial security units to defensive operations in and near major cities and towns, leaving</p>		
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the rural areas and main lines of communication under VC control for a period of several weeks, some throughout the reporting period. In general, RD areas were neither attacked nor destroyed, although some exceptions were noted. Many RF/PF units and RD Cadre Groups were shifted from RD areas in order to provide protection to district and province towns. Few RD Areas and hamlets were attacked by the VC in spite of reduced security. At the end of February, friendly forces in IV CTZ generally had not resumed offensive operations. National Route 4 was open, although with frequent temporary interdictions, from Saigon to Can Tho, but until the 23d of the month the Highway was closed from Can Tho to Camau. Several military convoys travelled between Can Tho and Camau the last week of the month. During the early part of February commercial traffic was almost nonexistent on Route 4 south of Saigon; by mid-month trade in hard goods reached about 60% of pre-Tet levels in Can Tho. South of that city commercial traffic was very sparse as March began.

## (9) Summary Assessment of Impact:

(a) Severe: 19 provinces -- 11 of them priority -- set back three to six months.

(b) Moderate: 17 provinces -- 12 of them priority -- set back one to two months.

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(c) Slight: eight provinces experienced little or no setback.

(10) Territorial Forces and ARVN Battalions in DSRD:

(a) Status of territorial security forces:

	<u>ARVN Bns</u>	<u>RF COS</u>	<u>PF PLT</u>
Deployed pre-Tet in DSRD, or for RF/PF in territorial Security role	51	909	4,365
Pre-Tet deployed strength:	22,950	100,000	144,000
Deployed post-Tet in DSRD, or for RF/PF in territorial security role	31	809	4,268
Post-Tet deployed strength:	12,400	79,300	123,772

(b) Corps-by-Corps territorial forces summary

(data based generally on CORDS field inputs):

1. Regional Forces:

	<u>AUTH COS</u>	<u>REPORTING COS</u>	<u>AVG PFD STR</u>	<u>REDEPLOYED</u>
I CTZ	139	126	81	25
II CTZ	260	232	87	18
III CTZ	234	233	78	3
IV CTZ	345	318	80	54
	<u>978</u>	<u>909</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>100</u>

2. Popular Forces:

	<u>AUTH PLTs</u>	<u>REPORTING PLTs</u>	<u>AVG PFD STR</u>	<u>REDEPLOYED</u>
I CTZ	712	710	31	79

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	<u>AUTH PLTs</u>	<u>REPORTING PLTs</u>	<u>AVG PFD STR</u>	<u>REDEPLOYED</u>
II CTZ	1110	1050	25	3
III CTZ	794	761	31	--
IV CTZ	<u>1847</u>	<u>1590</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>15</u>
	4463	4111	29	97

(c) During the Tet Offensive RF/PF unit performance was generally better than expected by most advisors. There were instances of outstanding action against the enemy as well as several cases of treachery on the part of individual RF/PF soldiers or small groups. Although in IV Corps many watchtowers and outposts were abandoned without significant contact with the enemy, in the majority of contacts throughout the country RF/PF units stood and fought. This was true in spite of being frequently outgunned by VC armed with AK-47 and K-50 weapons.

(d) At the beginning of the Offensive (29 January), RF units averaged 87.8 per cent, while PF units averaged 90.7 per cent, of assigned strength present for duty. During the course of the offensive RF units sustained 928 KIA, 1889 WIA, and 158 MIA, while inflicting a (countrywide) total of 5121 enemy KIA by body count. PF units sustained 1237 KIA, 2306 WIA and 1770 MIA, while inflicting 3016 enemy KIA by body count. Total RF and PF KIA was 2165 as opposed to a total of 8137 enemy KIA. Ratio of enemy KIA to friendly KIA was 3.75

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to one. RF units had a total of 743 deserters (including 8 officers), and PF units a total of 2309 (including 17 platoon leaders), as of 29 Feb. Considering the desertions as losses to RF/PF operations and combining them with KIA, the ratio of enemy KIA to friendly losses is 1.55 to 1. Combining the total RF/PF MIA of 1928 to desertions and KIA gives a ratio of enemy KIA to friendly losses of 1.11 to 1.

(e) RF/PF units lost a total of 5250 small arms and 177 crew-served weapons. Losses include weapons destroyed in action, destroyed by fire, taken by deserters and captured by the enemy. In Kontum, 398 small arms and 11 crew-served weapons were destroyed in a warehouse fire. At the Vi Thanh training center in Chuong Tien Province, 22 PF soldiers defected taking with them 44 small arms. In other reports, losses due to various causes cannot be separated from losses by enemy capture. Of these losses, 2258 small arms and 66 crew-served weapons were sustained in IV Corps. The total enemy weapons captured by RF/PF units were 2112 small arms and 283 crew-served weapons. Of these totals, 634 small arms and 29 crew-served weapons were captured in IV Corps. The RF/PF ratio of weapons captured to lost is .44 to 1. The ratio by Corps is:

I Corps	.80 to 1
II Corps	.53 to 1
III Corps	.51 to 1
IV Corps	.28 to 1

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There were 477 watchtowers and outposts seriously damaged or destroyed during the offensive. Many of these were a detriment to the pacification program and were scheduled for elimination in current plans. A total of 412 outposts are planned for rebuilding or construction in accordance with AB 143 and current outpost plans. The watchtowers and outposts damaged or destroyed and the number to be repaired and constructed are as follows:

<u>Corps</u>	<u>Damaged/Destroyed</u>		<u>Repair/Construct</u>	
	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>
I	12	17	9	17
II	2	6	28	30
III	15	48	24	62
IV	23	354	24	263
TOTAL	52	425	85	372

(f) Upgrading of RF and PF weapons is recommended by ~~almost all~~ advisors as an urgent requirement. Action is being taken by MACV and JGS to accomplish this at the earliest possible opportunity. As M16 rifles and M60 MG's are issued to ARVN, M2 carbines and BARs will be recovered and issued to RF and PF units. The M79 grenade launcher is programmed to be issued (one per PF platoon and nine to each RF company). Issue priorities for M16 rifles are being studied to determine feasibility and specific criteria for issue to selected RF/PF units concurrent with ARVN units.

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## (g) National Security Resume:

	January '68	February '68
VC Incidents (Less AA)	2,371	2,090
Incidents of Terrorism **	1,075	*
VC/NVA Combat Strength	225,346	204,126
Assassinations and abductions of civilians **	1,479	
VC Incidents against RDC	148	199
Status of Roads:		
Green (%)	42.5	37.6
Amber (%)	53.1	53.9
Red (%)	4.4	8.5
Status of waterways in III and IV CTZ:		
Green (%)	27.9	9.8
Amber (%)	65.3	83.1
Red	6.8	7.1

\* Specific instances could not be isolated from random acts carried out during the conduct of VC/NVA attacks.

\*\* As reported by CORDS Public Safety field advisors

b. Phoenix:

(1) Summary: While the Tet offensive created very little physical damage to the PHOENIX organization and facilities, it nevertheless had a detrimental effect on PHOENIX activities in all Corps areas during February. Most DIOCs were understaffed with Vietnamese personnel widely scattered because of the Tet holidays and because the subsequent tactical situation in many

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areas prevented the DIOCC staffs from returning immediately to their posts. However, I Corps reports that though the DIOCCs were essentially not functioning, some intelligence was forthcoming which did indicate the presence of increased enemy units in rural areas. Aggressive action against the VCI was in large part restricted to city operations, but PHOENIX action at district level played a key role in providing intelligence on enemy troop movements: as districts consolidated their strength, contact with the vacated rural areas was primarily maintained by reporting sources passing intelligence to DIOCCs. As a result, many DIOCCs emerged in the eyes of Vietnamese and US officials as the major intelligence mechanism at district and in many cases District 3-2s moved into the DIOCCs along with ranking police representatives. According to US units, the DIOCC-generated intelligence was particularly significant. The most serious blow to the I Corps attack on the VCI occurred with the release of over 1,000 prisoners from the Hue jail. Many of these individuals were "top ten" VCI previously captured in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. ~~Equally disturbing was the loss of~~ numerous assets that provided information and intelligence to PHOENIX ~~who~~ were either killed or captured when NVA and VC elements swept through Hue and areas surrounding the city. III Corps reported also that in most cases the DIOCC was the only GVN office that remained open during Tet and through the crisis. Nevertheless, as a result of the tactical situation,

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most anti-infrastructure operations became sideline activity with most resources being devoted to the military situation. Except in the cities, little concerted effort was made to root out the infrastructure and to destroy it. Even now, in many areas, PHOENIX Coordinators are having difficulty getting GVN officials to re-direct efforts against the VCI. However, US advisors believe that this is only temporary and as the level of security in the countryside improves there will be a rise in anti-VCI operations.

## (2) Sub-program elements:

## (a) Eliminate at least 12,000 VCI:

The following is a tabulation, by Corps based on the Province Monthly Report of Eliminations:

	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>RALLIED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I Corps*				
II Corps	43	240	33	316
III Corps	25	71	5	101
IV Corps	<u>23</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>123</u>
	91	398	51	540

\* No reports have been received from I Corps. In II Corps, 11 of 12 provinces reported; in III Corps, 10 of 11 reported; and in IV Corps, 14 of 16 reported. The goal of 600 identified VCI eliminations may have been attained when I Corps reports are received. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that more

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VCI were killed in the Tet offensive, but they were killed because they were carrying arms or were with armed groups and were not identifiable as VCI.

(b) Establish PHUNG HOANG Committees: The following is a breakdown by Corps of the number of Province and District PHUNG HOANG Committees established by the end of February:

	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>
I Corps	1	0
II Corps *	8	6
III Corps	8	8
IV Corps **	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTALS	23	21

\* II Corps - 9 of 12 provinces reported

\*\* IV Corps - 11 of 16 provinces reported

(c) Increase the number, pace and scope of anti-VCI Operations: The following is a breakdown by Corps of the number of Province and District level VCI operations conducted during January and February 1968:

	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>
I Corps *	5	5
II Corps **	43	19
III Corps	20	190
IV Corps ***	<u>76</u>	<u>      </u>
TOTALS	144	214

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\* I Corps advises that these figures are not entirely realistic inasmuch as operations against the VCI usually must be satellited on tactical operations rather than being mounted primarily as PHOENIX operations. Tactical commitment of forces severely limits their use in PHOENIX operations. These figures represent only PHOENIX planned operations.

\*\* II Corps - 9 of 12 provinces reported.

\*\*\* IV Corps reported only one district had conducted operations, however, the number was not reported. 11 of 16 provinces reported.

(d) Expand the number of DIOCCs:

	<u>ACTIVATED</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED (1968)</u>
I Corps	20	27
II Corps	21	52
III Corps	47	53
IV Corps	<u>19</u>	<u>68</u>
TOTAL	107	200

(e) Construct adequate detention facilities:

Blueprints have been approved in pre-final form for a 4,000 man masonry prison at Con Son island. Construction bids will be invited in late March. Completion of construction is estimated to be in December. Blueprints are nearing completion for a 300 man masonry addition to the Tan Hiep prison in II Corps. Completion of construction is estimated to be August. As a

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result of the Tet offensive an emergency camp for 5,000 detainees/prisoners is desired by the GVN on Con Son. Construction details are not yet firm. Completion of the detention camp for 3,300 at An Tuc in II Corps, by prison labor, is estimated for 1 April. Planning for other detention facilities is being held in abeyance pending GVN decisions anticipated in late March. The total population of detainees and prisoners is now estimated to be 39,000, of which approximately 23,000 are detainees. Included in these figures are over 7,000 picked up during the month.

c. Upgrade Refugee Care and Resettlement:

(1) Summary:

(a) The attention and energies of the Ministry of Social Welfare and Refugees staffs, both in Saigon and the field, have been devoted almost exclusively during the month to meeting the emergency requirements brought about by the recent Tet offensive. In excess of 600,000 persons suffered destruction of their homes or fled from them to seek safety elsewhere. Other agencies, groups and private citizens both military and civilian rallied to assist MSWR in the almost overwhelming task of providing the basic essentials of food, clothing and shelter to the thousands of displaced persons.

(b) Although confined generally to urban areas, MSWR staffs were also faced with the task of continuing assistance to <sup>nearly</sup> ~~over~~ 800,000 refugees who existed prior to the

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<p>offensive and who in many cases were in isolated regions of the country. Many waterways and highways remained interdicted by the enemy which impeded movement of supplies from corps and provinces and in turn from provinces to refugee sites. Aircraft were used to expedite the flow of supplies but in some cases they too were not available due to the more pressing needs of military operations.</p> <p>(c) Ample funds were provided to provinces and cities by the Central Recovery Committee in Saigon and by MSWR to start making resettlement payments and indemnity for loss of life, injury and destruction of property. The evacuees who suffered little or no damage to their homes were urged to return to them as soon as possible. Local Recovery Committees were established in many cities and plans were underway to re-build destroyed areas mainly by encouraging families to construct their own homes on a self-help basis wherever possible. The latter group is to receive 5000 VN\$ plus 10 bags of cement and 10 large sheets of roofing from CORDS supplies. Because of higher costs of materials, the Central Committee established an amount of 10,000 VN\$ for Saigon, Cholon, the municipal area of Gia Dinh, and the city of Hue. Recovery committees in Chau Doc and Bac Lieu Provinces are providing outstanding leadership in reconstruction efforts.</p>			
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(d) The recovery efforts, particularly in Saigon, are to a great extent due to the energy and leadership of Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que, Minister of Social Welfare and Refugees. Working through the Central Committee, Dr. Que has consistently urged that reconstruction in the country could be accomplished more readily through self-help projects. MSWR has, however, undertaken the construction of temporary housing in Saigon pending completion of government-built family units. One of these areas currently under construction will provide temporary shelter to approximately 10,000 persons.

(e) Statistical summary of temporary displaced persons as of 29 February 1968:

	<u>NUMBER EVACUEES</u>	<u>HOUSES DESTROYED</u>
I CTZ	121,818	7,637
II CTZ	101,454	13,030
III CTZ	94,766	8,169
IV CTZ	<u>109,441</u>	<u>22,263</u>
TOTAL	427,479	51,099

d. Press Economic Revival of the Countryside:

(1) Slow recovery from the Tet offensive still continues to inhibit economic revival programs. Insecurity and uncertainty about future NLF activities has caused partial

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<p>paralysis of the private sector of the economy. Hardest hit are commercial importers, who claim that the Vietnamese are unwilling to invest in machinery and hard goods at this time. This trend has slowed down plans for developing commercial outlets for agricultural machinery in areas of high agricultural production. Continuing insecurity in the countryside inhibited plans to expand rice production, and has hampered the two-way flow of goods between rural and urban areas.</p> <p>(2) A partial paralysis of the rice trade has generated a conservative attitude among farmers who are considering possible reduction of areas under cultivation because of the current inactivity of the national marketing system. GVN success in moving rice from the Delta could alter this attitude. Rural insecurity has inhibited free flow of goods from farm to market, and current insecurity and uncertainty about the future has caused the Chinese community to freeze credit for business expansion. The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) still plans to push ahead with extension of credit to farmers in new life hamlets with a 400-million-piaster allocation from MORD. The ministry has not released this proposed allocation, but CORDS is pressing for release during March. Current ADB assets of two million piasters should help the tight credit situation.</p>			DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
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(3) The CORDS-assisted USAID effort to make farm labor-saving devices more readily available will remain stalled until security improves, and with it, public confidence in the military strength of GVN.

4. IMPACT OF OTHER IMPORTANT 1968 SUB-PROGRAMS:

a. Improve Effectiveness of National Police:

(1) The VC Terror Campaign had an adverse effect on police recruitment goals during ~~the month of~~ February. The force level now stands at 72,829. A net gain of 254 recruits was realized as compared with the previous month's net gain of 2,284.

(2) The National Police constitute a segment of the local defense force. With the majority of all security forces committed to the defense of populated areas, the National Police are insufficient in number to move out into the rural areas. This defensive posture of the NP resulted in retardation of the program. Advisory efforts were directed toward raising the proportion of police serving in the countryside. Pacification goals in this endeavor will vary from province to province, depending upon the residual status of the enemy and the restoration of other security forces in rural areas.

(3) No progress was made in increasing the percentage of Marine Police in the Delta. The personnel strength of the force continued to grow and is estimated at

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<p>62% of planned force strength which is a 10% increase over the end-of-year figure. Approximately 30% of the present force strength is deployed in the Delta and 65% is based in the Saigon area. The number in the Saigon area will be decreased when six deadlined boats are repaired and put back in operation.</p> <p>(4) Most NPFV companies are acting within the scope of the SOP and successfully attacking VC infrastructure, with the exception of some companies that have been ordered to remain in a static, defensive posture, epitomized by eight NPFV companies in Region III. These eight companies, even though not employed strictly within concept, performed well in their assigned task.</p> <p>(5) Issuance of "tamper resistant" identification cards is dependent on receipt of supplies and equipment, and is planned to commence in July, 1968 with 46 registration teams. Additional teams will begin in successive months until approximately 100 teams are in operation by August, 1968. Each team is capable of issuing 150 cards per day, six days a week. Time phasing of the program indicates approximately 1,500,000 cards will be issued by end CY-68.</p> <p>(6) Progress continues in the reduction of fixed police control checkpoints adjacent to the population centers. Static checkpoints were reduced by 51 and an additional 24 mobile</p>			DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
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checkpoints were established throughout the country.

(7) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The responsibility for expanding detention facilities has recently been transferred from the Directorate of Correction to the Directorate of National Police. The Directorate of Correction retains responsibility for the prison expansion program.

(8) The GVN telecommunications system sustained a considerable amount of damage by the VC TET Offensive; however, radio contact with the provinces was restored early in February. The pacification program goals were adversely affected due to the loss of Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) personnel and equipment. Construction activities (except emergency repairs) were suspended during the entire month of February.

b. Induce at least 30-35,000 Hoi Chanh to Rally:

(1) The following table clearly depicts the effect of the VC Tet Offensive on the returnee rate. US verification now in process indicates that GVN returnee data for February run low as a result of communications difficulties during the Tet Offensive:

Region	February 1968	January 1968	February 1967
I CTZ	71	272	234
II CTZ	121	221	780

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<u>Region</u>	<u>February 1968</u>	<u>January 1968</u>	<u>February 1967</u>
III CTZ	150	151	1096
IV CTZ	421	535	807
TOTAL	763	686	2917

(2) It is perhaps most significant in view of the circumstances that rallying continued during the entire period. Actually the rate does not compare unfavorably with that of December 1967 (88%). However, the situation during the period at hand was such as to render invalid comparison with figures during similar months a year ago. Intensive combat activity is not conducive to the development of an atmosphere favorable to rallying. It is also clear from the continuing depressed rate that the point of crisis in the current episode has not been reached.

(3) An Ad Hoc Committee has been convened by the Minister of Chieu Hoi to revitalize and reorient inducement psyops which had been earlier oriented upon the Tet and Post Tet theme. Representatives from GVN ministries concerned as well as JUSPAQ <sup>AND MACV</sup> ~~MACV, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACV~~ are contributing to this expedited effort.

(4) In view of the tense security situation, construction has not progressed significantly over the figures contained in the January report. Damage to facilities was not heavy except in the cases of six provinces. In two of these (\*)

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damage was sufficiently serious to require major reconstruction and to reduce center capacities although at present the capacity is not required. Specific data on repair costs and reconstruction requirements are being submitted by the provinces concerned:

Quang Tri	- Major damage
Thua Thien *	- Believed totally destroyed
Kontum	- Major damage. One building totally destroyed; one building estimated 50% destroyed. Light damage all others
Pleiku *	- Extensive damage to entire center
V Vinh Long	- Major damage. Estimated 700,000 \$VN cost of repair
Kien Hoa	- Total destruction of Chieu Hoi office; minor damage to Center

(5) Provinces have submitted their recommended selections for District reception facilities in about 50% of the cases. Construction will begin as soon as the area Chieu Hoi budget is finalized and the individual District sites are approved by the Minister of Chieu Hoi.

(6) Reports from all regions contain testimony as to the effectiveness and outstanding performance of the APT's during the recent emergency. The number of Hoi Chanh enrolled as members of Armed Propaganda Teams increased over January

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figures:

<u>Region</u>	<u>January 1968</u>	<u>February 1968</u>
I	378	398
II	549	605
III	880	1014
IV	<u>857</u>	<u>912</u>
	2664	2919

(7) The number of Kit Carson Scouts enrolled increased as shown below:

<u>Region</u>	<u>January 1968</u>	<u>February 1968</u>
I	142	179
II	32	22
III	50	90
IV	<u>23</u>	<u>24</u>
	247	315

(8) The figures for both APT and Kit Carson Scouts are well below what would constitute a balanced rate toward the 1968 goal in each case. The low rate of growth is due to the VC Tet Offensive and the present decreased numbers of Hoi Chanh from whom recruits must be obtained.

c. Expand and Improve RD Cadre Groups and Associated

Programs:

(1) RD Cadres

(a) By the end of February 1968, the RD Cadre Groups were gradually returning to their hamlets.

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Compliance with the order for all RD Cadre Groups to return to their hamlets by 28 February was not as complete as it should have been, mainly because of inadequate security in or near RD areas. In some cases where the RD Groups did return, the groups are under strength and in ~~many~~<sup>Some</sup> areas the security situation precludes their staying in the hamlets overnight. Only when RVNAF carries out offensive operations and rural areas are controlled by the GVN will the RD Cadre Groups be able to concentrate on their normal duties.

(b) Number of RD Cadre Groups

	<u>Jan. 1968</u>	<u>Feb. 1968</u>
I Corps	112 *	114 **
II Corps	166	166
III Corps	83	83
IV Corps	<u>192</u>	<u>194</u>
TOTAL	553	557

\* This figure does not include RDC Groups in Thua Thien since the security situation precluded giving an accurate figure for January and February. December 1967 figures for Thua Thien were: 21 RDC Groups, a strength of 1,246 (includes 32 Control personnel), and 157 SCG Cadres.

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(2) Number of TSRD Groups

	<u>31 Jan. 1968</u>	<u>29 Feb. 1968</u>
I Corps	11	10
II Corps	85	85
III Corps	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTAL	109	108

(3) RD Cadre Losses

	<u>Jan. 1968</u>	<u>Feb. 1968</u>
Killed	56	136
Captured	8	34
Resigned	53	17
Discharged and Retired	92	117
Deserted	<u>212</u>	<u>359</u>
TOTAL	421	663

(4) TSRD Cadre Losses

	<u>Jan. 1968</u>	<u>Feb. 1968</u>
Killed	18	28
Captured	3	1
Resigned	27	20
Discharged and Retired	51	8
Deserted	<u>89</u>	<u>78</u>
TOTAL	188	135

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(5) VC Incidents Against RDC (Includes TruongSon RD Cadres)

	<u>Jan. 1968</u>	<u>Feb. 1968</u>
I Corps	50	51
II Corps	42	68
III Corps	32	30
IV Corps	<u>24</u>	<u>50</u>
TOTAL	148 *	199

\* Revised figure

(6) Static Census Grievance

(a) The Static Census Grievance (SCG) program as of 31 January 1968 had 5,414 \*\* cadres and as of 29 February there were 5414 cadres. The number of Hoi Chanh induced to rally by RD and TSRD and SCG are:

RD and TSRD	-	0
SCG	-	72

\*\* Again this figure does not include Thua Thien. As of 31 December there were 157 SCG cadres in Thua Thien.

(b) The figures given above are tentative and are subject to change once a fuller assessment of the damage caused by the VC Tet offensive is available.

d. Revitalize Pacification Psyops:

(1) The Vietnam Information Service (VIS) contribution to CVN/CORDS pacification sub-programs has not

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been adequate in most provinces. Delay in completion of the VIS budget has contributed to the problem. A directive to the field from the Directorate General of Information and Press (DGIP) is a basic requirement for improvement of the situation. CORDS is working with JUSPAO to press for publication of appropriate field guidance.

## (2) Radio Coverage:

(a) Major damage to radio transmitters, studios or both was sustained during the Tet offensive at Hue, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thuot, and Saigon. At Hue, a 50-watt station has been installed; it provides limited coverage during the day. At night, the Blue Eagle flight is providing radio transmission throughout the I CTZ area. Temporary facilities were made available to maintain the Saigon station on the air.

(b) At this juncture, the major effort is to regain the pre-Tet status of coverage. A 10-KW transmitter is ready for shipment to either Hue or Qui Nhon. This is contingent on a decision to turn over the 50-KW VOA station in Hue for GVN use. There is still discussion underway to determine if the Australian government will rebuild the Ban Me Thuot station to 50-KW output.

(c) A proposal is under study at JUSPAO which calls for a four-station national network. This would replace the Jacobs proposal for upgrading 11 stations throughout

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the country. The proposal would upgrade the Saigon 50-KW station to 100 KW and upgrade the stations at Danang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang to 50 KW each. CVN argues that this would permit consolidation of scarce technical personnel, permit better security for the stations, and simplify logistics. Switchover to this four-station system would cause delay in attaining coverage of 80% of the population but when completed would provide coverage of 95% of the population.

## (3) Television Coverage:

(a) Television sets have been placed in 106 Refugee centers and 136 pacified hamlets.

(b) The Hue TV station, one of two in operation before Tet, is off the air as a result of personnel losses. The Can Tho installation should be completed by the end of June. CVN has not been able to close a land-acquisition deal for the programmed Qui Nhon station.

(4) Newspaper Coverage: In isolated instances since Tet, provincial newspaper coverage has been expanded, notably in Bien Hoa, where the appearance of four new papers quadrupled total III CTZ circulation. For the most part, conditions have inhibited progress.

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e. Integrate Civic Action Fully with Pacification

Program: Civic action efforts by US/FWMAF and RVNAF during the month of February 1968 were diverted from those civic action projects usually undertaken in the fields of agriculture, education, social welfare, and public works to projects that assisted ~~Tet-offensive~~ recovery programs ~~[of the GVN]~~. Primary concentration was on providing food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and medical assistance to refugees. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The most effective programs during February were MEDCAP visits and ~~the~~ distribution of food to refugees. A significant increase in intelligence furnished by the people is attributable in large part to quick-response civic-action assistance given the needy during and after the Tet attacks.

f. Develop Systematic New Life Development Goals:

(1) Self-help: The Self-Help program, which got off to a good start in January, virtually stalled in February due to the Tet aggression. Field surveys indicate that the governmental structure to implement the program still is functional, and that the commodity stockpile is intact. The program stand ready for full implementation when security permits. Prognosis on the basis of available information indicates that the Self-Help program in I CTZ might suffer little reduction,

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and the program in II CTZ only spotty reduction in previously secure areas III CTZ may be expected to produce on a reduced scale, but IV CTZ will suffer a major loss of program accomplishments. Since the overall program was heavily concentrated in IV CTZ, a Self-Help program reduction of about 30-35 percent is considered probable due to the Tet aggression and continuing insecurity. (See below). The training function continues in preparation for resumption of activity.

	Programmed 1968	Completed As of Feb. 1968	1967
Number of Projects	16,500*	1,101	11,417

\* Revised goal

(2) Small Irrigation, Animal Husbandry, Agricultural Affairs, and Fisheries.

(a) The Tet offensive was directed toward the urban areas; the agricultural components of the pacification program were the least affected by the military action, and appear to be recovering the most rapidly.  However,



(b) The two northern provinces of I CTZ, Quang Tri and Thua Thien, are in a zone of almost continuous warfare and development there is almost at a standstill. In the three southern provinces, development has been slowed but at month's end was regaining momentum.

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(c) II CTZ reports that agricultural programs are being resumed in all except the Cambodian border provinces which are still under VC pressure.

(d) III CTZ reports near normal security for rural activities but they are experiencing some difficulty in getting GVN technicians back into the field.

(e) IV CTZ GVN and CORDS agricultural personnel were "holed up" in the province capitals. (An Giang Province is the only exception.) Planning is continuing but there is no indication when field work can be or will be resumed. Rice deliveries to Cholon during February were minimal due to the psychological climate which has paralyzed the rice trade.

(3) New Seabee Teams have been deployed to Ba Xuyen and Go Cong Provinces. Favorable reports have been received from the majority of the provinces on Seabee Team participation in the repair of damage caused by the Tet offensive.

5. SUMMARY RECAPITULATION OF PACIFICATION ASSETS:

	<u>RD</u> <u>BNS</u>	<u>RF</u> <u>COS</u>	<u>PF</u> <u>PLTS</u>	<u>RDC</u> <u>GROUPS</u>	<u>TSRD</u> <u>TEAMS</u>	<u>PFF</u> <u>COS</u>	<u>NATIONAL</u> <u>POLICE</u>
I CTZ	7	126	710	114	10	15	4,780
II CTZ	4	232	1,050	166	85	11	8,058
III CTZ	14	233	761	83	13	25	7,569

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	<u>RD</u> <u>BNS</u>	<u>PF</u> <u>COS</u>	<u>PF</u> <u>PLTS</u>	<u>RDC</u> <u>GROUPS</u>	<u>TSRD</u> <u>TEAMS</u>	<u>PF</u> <u>PLTS</u>	<u>NATIONAL</u> <u>POLICE</u>
IV CTZ	6	318	1,590	194	--	17	10,916
TOTAL	31	909	4,111	557	108	68	31,323*

\* Excludes Saigon metropolitan police, headquarters elements, PFF, and policemen in training or processing.

6. SUMMARY ACTIVITY REPORT OF FUNDS AND COMMODITIES  
IN SUPPORT OF RECOVERY:

a. Total funds made available for recovery (all sources):

(1)	I CTZ	108,900,000 \$VN
(2)	II CTZ	147,800,000
(3)	III CTZ	133,900,000
(4)	IV CTZ	205,000,000
(5)	MILCAP FUNDS*	7,105,000
(6)	TOTAL	603,205,000 \$VN

\* Imprest Civic Action funds in hands of US/FW forces.

b. Funds donated for relief by individuals and groups as of 29 February: 61,745,450 \$VN

c. Issues of Selected items:

(1) Issued by MSWR for relief in Saigon (78 temporary refugee shelters) and Gia Dinh (43 temporary refugee shelters):

(a) Rice: 11,997 bags

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(b) Condensed Milk: 132,723 cans

(c) Canned fish and meat: 269,936 cans

(2) USAID commodities issued:

(a) Bulgur wheat: 298,295 lbs.

(b) Flour: 21,288 lbs.

(c) Rice: 181,800 lbs.

d. Twelve nations contributed money, food, and goods for relief of war victims during February.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
**EXCLUSIVE**

BT  
S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM  
LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE GEN WHEELER TO  
WESTMORELAND INFO SHARP AND ME.

QUOTE:

1. A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN THE HONOLULU NEWSPAPER THIS MORN-  
ING PURPORTED TO SET FORTH THE FUTURE PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN  
AND CONTIGUOUS TO KHE SANH. THE ARTICLE WAS UNDER THE BYLINE  
OF GEORGE WILSON, A WASHINGTON POST REPORTER, AND WAS DATE-  
LINED KHE SANH. IN THE ARTICLE WILSON STATED THAT CUSHMAN  
PROPOSES TO "PEEL DOWN" THE KHE SANH GARRISON TO ABOUT 1,000  
WHILE UTILIZING ADDITIONAL FORCES IN THE KHE SANH AREA TO CON-  
DUCT MOBILE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY. THE STORY HAS THE  
RING OF TRUTH AND CONTAINS SEVERAL SHORT QUOTES ATTRIBUTED TO  
CUSHMAN AND, I BELIEVE, OTHER MILITARY SOURCES.  
2. PERHAPS I AM UNDULY SENSITIVE TO THINGS OF THIS KIND, BUT

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA3187 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
IF THE STORY IS FACTUAL (WHICH I AM LED TO BELIEVE IT AT LEAST  
APPROXIMATES) THE CONTENTS OF THE WILSON ARTICLE COMPRISES  
INFORMATION OF VALUE TO THE ENEMY COMMANDER. OF COURSE, IT MAY  
BE THAT WILSON, WHO IS AN ENTERPRISING NEWSMAN, HAS MERELY PIECED  
TOGETHER A LOT OF BITS OF INFORMATION AND COME UP WITH AN APPROXIMA-  
TION OF YOUR PLANNED COURSE OF ACTION. IN ANY EVENT, UNLESS THE STORY  
IS LARGELY UNTRUE, IT REPRESENTS ONE MORE INSTANCE OF THE HARM WE DO  
OURSELVES BY TALKING TOO MUCH TOO FREQUENTLY. I KNOW THAT INSTANCES  
OF THIS KIND HAVE CAUSED YOU GREAT TROUBLE IN THE PAST, AND I DON'T  
KNOW WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. PERHAPS YOU MAY FIND IT EXPEDIENT AND  
POSSIBLE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. WARMS REGARDS.  
UNQUOTE.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE REFERRED TO ABOVE.

QUOTE: BY GEORGE C. WILSON, WASHINGTON POST SERVICE.  
KHE SANH, SOUTH VIETNAM - THIS COMBAT BASE IS BEING  
TRANSFORMED FROM A FORTRESS TO A SPRINGBOARD UNDER A  
PLAN JUST APPROVED BY GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND.  
WESTMORELAND AND HIS TOP MARINE IN VIETNAM, LT.  
GEN. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, HAVE AGREED TO SHIFT FROM AN  
INSIDE TO AN OUTSIDE DEFENSE OF KHE SANH.

*Handwritten:* // 2/27  
20 and  
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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#19

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUHRFMA3187 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 CUSHMAN SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT HE WILL "PEEL  
 DOWN" THE 5,000 TO 6,000 MARINE FORCE INSIDE THE KHE  
 SAN WIRE TO ABOUT 1,000 MEN. THE REST WILL STAY OUT-  
 SIDE TO SWEEP THE SURROUNDING COUNTRYSIDE.

THIS MEANS KHE SANH COMBAT BASE PROPER WILL NOT  
 HAVE THE SAME VALUE - AS A PIECE OF MILITARY REAL ESTATE -  
 AS BEFORE.

WHILE THE AIR STRIP WILL REMAIN INTACT, THERE IS A  
 GOOD CHANCE MANY OF THE COMBAT BASE'S TRENCHES AND  
 BUILDINGS WILL BE DESTROYED TO CONFORM TO THE  
 CHANGED DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.

CUSHMAN SAID HOW MUCH THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT WILL  
 BE CHANGED DEPENDS ON WHAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO  
 IN THE AREA IN THE FUTURE. UNTIL SUNDAY, THE PLAN WAS  
 TO BLOW UP MUCH OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE.

THE MARINE BOSS LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THERE WILL BE A  
 NEW DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG THE TROOPS, WITH THOSE  
 ON THE OUTSIDE MAKING OFFENSIVE SWEEPS DAYS AT A TIME.

THE CHANGE REPRESENT A DECISION TO COMBINE MAN-  
 EUVERABILITY WITH FIREPOWER RATHER THAN RESUME THE

PAGE 4 RUHRFMA3187 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 ARTILLERY DUEL WHICH MARKED THE 77-DAY SIEGE OF KHE  
 SANH BY NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS.

CUSHMAN SAID HE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TROOPS DURING  
 THAT SIEGE TO CONDUCT AN OFFENSIVE OUTSIDE THE BASE  
 AGAINST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 304 AND 325C DIVISIONS.

THE U.S. FIRST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION RECENTLY WAS  
 CALLED IN TO CLEAR THE AREA AROUND KHE SANH IN A HIGHLY  
 MOBILE OPERATION CALLED PEGASUS. THE AIR CAV, WORKING  
 WITH MARINES AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (ARVN),  
 USED HUNDREDS OF HELICOPTERS TO POUNCE TROOPS DOWN  
 ON ENEMY POSITIONS.

PEGASUS STARTED APRIL 1 AND ENDED SUNDAY. CUSHMAN  
 BELIEVES THE MARINES STILL AT KHE SANH CAN NOW KEEP THE  
 COUNTRYSIDE AROUND THE COMBAT BASE CLEAR OF ENEMY  
 FORCES. UNQUOTE.

3. LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU CAN PICK  
 UP ABOUT THE WILSON ARTICLE. BEST REGARDS.

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#19

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FORLOGCOMD		DATE 17 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 170138Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SUPPORT OF FADAC AND ANCILLARY EQUIP
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/17		lf	REMARKS
7	DCG		4/18		lf	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/17		BK	
	D C/S		4/18		BK	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		4/17		DHW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

"#3 & 4 burned  
6 Nov 68"

29

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

EB TLZCNC R. P354  
 FM RUMWAA  
 DE RUMHFL 1890 1030138  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 170138Z APR 68  
 FM CG FORLOGCOMD  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 E

**FOR**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FR BGEN OLSON

SUPPORT OF FIELD ARTILLERY DIGITAL AUTOMATIC COMPUTER (FADAC)  
AND ANCILLARY EQUIP

R MY 140100Z APR 68 (C)

1. TEST OF PU-670 GEN AS STATED IN REF A, SATISFACTORILY  
COMPLETED.2. ACTION TO REPLACE ALL CURRENTLY DEADLINED PU-668 GENERATORS  
HAS COMMENCED.

P-4

E

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#18



## MEMORANDUM

17 APR

FROM: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

FOR: C/S

①. The 27 bodies of pers. KIA late Feb were recovered. Of this number 5 have been shipped CONUS. The remainder are at the mortuary for identification.

② Para 4 refers to 11 MIA from CO G 2/26 in actions 6 & 7 Apr. On 13 Apr. 10 body bags brought in. 5 have been identified & shipped to CONUS. The remainder of the remains are being processed for identification.

v. R.  
P.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**FOR**

P 151600Z APR 68  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO RUNMVA/CG III MAF  
P 141425Z APR 68  
FM CG TASK FORCE GLICK  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PURPORTED FAILURE TO RECOVER BODIES.

FOR NGEN TOMPKINS FROM BGEN GLICK AND COL MEYERS

1. LATE AFTERNOON 14 APRIL BGEN GLICK AND COL MEYERS INTERVIEWED BY MR GEORGE WILSON, WASH POST AND MR JOHN CANOLL BALTIMORE SUN.

2. THE INTERVIEW CONCERNED ALLEGED FAILURE TO RECOVER OF MARINE BODIES (KIA'S).

3. BOTH BGEN GLICK AND COL MEYERS REITERATED MARINE CORPS AND THIRD MARDIV POLICY OF HIGHEST PRIORITY GIVEN TO MARINE KIA RECOVERY. COL MEYERS STATED THAT NO CASUALTIES OF 26TH MAR FOR OPN SCOTLAND WERE IN MIA STATUS.

4. MR WILSON, WASH POST ALLEGED THAT AIRCAV STATED (TO HIM) THAT THEY HAD FOUND NUMEROUS MARINE BODIES OUTSIDE KSCB. POSSIBLY THIS REPORT REFERS TO 10 BODIES RECOVERED 13 APRIL (6 PREVIOUSLY CARRIED MIA. 4 KIA (BNR). FURTHER, WILSON ALLEGED PERSONNALLY SEEING PORTION OF "MARINE BODY" ON TRIP OUTSIDE PERIMETER KSCB. BODY ALLEGED TO CONSIST OF TORSO, USMC HELMET WITH AMERICAN REMAINS AND ONE ARM.

PGE TWO C O N F I D E N T I A L

NOTE: THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE OTHER THAN USMC.

5. IN FOLLOW THROUGH INVESTIGATION. MR WILSON DEPARTED KSCB APPROX 14:700H BEFORE HE COULD POINT OUT LOCATION TO INVESTIGATING/RECOVERY TEAM.

6 26TH MAR DISPATCHING SEARCH PARTY TO ATTEMPT TO LOCATE ABOVE PURPORTED BODY FOR RECOVERY/IDENTIFICATION. WILL ADVISE.

GP-4

BT

*They are a real help!*  
*G-1 check w/ 3rd Div to see if these bodies were the result of the ill-fated patrol that ventured too far from the wire several weeks ago.*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#15





FOR

ZCZCSAA059 XVV AWB736  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAW 2389D 1060125  
 ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO  
 P 150105Z APR 68 ZFF-6  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMSAK/CG 3D MARDIV  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV  
 BT

UNCLAS 10616  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG TOMPKINS, INFO LTG CUSHMAN,  
 LTG ROSSEN.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE  
 SECURING OF HILL 881 NORTH BY 3RD BN, 26TH MARINES ON 14 APRIL  
 ADDS ANOTHER EXCLAMATION MARK TO THIS BATTALION'S FINE PERFORMANCE  
 IN THE SANH AREA. CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL MEMBERS OF 3/26 USMC  
 AND TO UNITS AND CREWS RESPONSIBLE FOR OUTSTANDING ARTILLERY/AIR  
 PREPARATORY FIRES.  
 BT

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#14	



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

SIJAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG SECOND MAR BDE ROK		DATE 14 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 141625Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TANKS AND LVT'S REQUEST FOR
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/15		de	REMARKS <b>EXCLUSIVE</b> G-3. Prepare position paper on his request. #2 Copy delivered to CG Hoffman 152110H
3	DCG		4/15		de	
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		4/15		de	
	D C/S			4/15	de	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
f	G-3	A				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET #13



**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

OZFUOVV HGK040  
OO UUMSEA  
DE RUMHGX 185 1051625  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 141625Z APRIL 68  
FM CG SECOND MAR BDE ROK  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

**S E C R E T**

(EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CUSHMAN)  
SUBJ: TANKS AND LVT'S REQUEST FOR.  
A: CG 2D ROKMC BDE 241220Z FEB 68  
B: CG III MAF 290958Z FEB 68

1. REF A REQUESTED CERTAIN ADDITIONAL MECHANIZED COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS TO ASSIST THIS COMMAND IN CONDUCTING MORE EXTENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS WITHIN ITS TAOR IN SUPPORT OF MISSIONS ASSIGNED BY CG III MAF
2. REF B STATED THAT CONSIDERATION TO SUCH A REQUEST WOULD BE GIVEN AT A TIME WHEN THE THEN STRONG ENEMY THREAT TO DANANG CITY SUBSIDED.
3. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THIS COMMAND INDICATE THAT THE THREAT TO DANANG HAS DECREASED WHILE THAT FACED BY THIS BDE IN THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF ITS TAOR REMAIN HIGH. IF THIS THREAT WERE NEUTRALIZED OR CONTAINED, IT WOULD ADD TO THE SECURITY OF THE DANANG COMPLEX. THE ABOVE, COUPLED WITH THE RECENT ARRIVAL ADDITIONAL MECHANIZED FORCES IN THE AREA PROMPT THIS COMMAND TO REQUEST RECONSIDERATION OF THIS BDE'S NEED FOR ADDITIONAL MECHANIZED SUPPORT-PARTICULARLY TANK SUPPORT. THE PLATOON OF TANKS NOW AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE FOUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS PROVIDES ONLY MARGINAL SUPPORT FOR REACTION FORCES FOR THE CITY OF HOIAN.
4. IF ADDITIONAL FORCES ARE GRANTED, IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT THE PERIOD OF ATTACHMENT NOT BE LIMITED TO 30 DAYS BUT BY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, BGEN KIM SENDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									

#13

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FOR LOGCOMD		DATE 14 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 140100Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SUPPORT OF FADAC AND ANCILLARY EQUIP
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/14		DR	REMARKS
3	DCG		4/13		DR	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/14		DR	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	141145	4/15		SHD DR	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

"#30 4 burned  
6 Nov 68"

32

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

NR02020 FLP235  
 PP RUMHAA  
 DE RUMHFL 1390 1050100  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 140100Z APR 68  
 FM CG FORLOGCOMD  
 TO RUMHAA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**FOR**

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FM BGEN OLSON  
 SUPPORT OF FIELD ARTILLARY DIGITAL AUTOMATIC COMPUTER (FADAC)  
 AND ANCILLARY EQUIP

A. CG III MAF 120600Z APR68  
 B. SC-04459A

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUEST CONTAINED IN REF A, THE FOL  
 INFO IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH FADAC SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY  
 THE POWER SOURCE PU-668.

2. AS TO THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR THE REMOVAL FM D/L OF THE  
 GENERATOR PU-668, THE ACTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING  
 TAKEN AT THIS TIME TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PERSONAL CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE WITH DANANG SUB AREA COMD  
 BY THE FLC FADAC OFFICER AND THE FLC CENTRAL CONTROL POINT WITH  
 THE FOLLOWING RESULTS: EIGHT OF THE THIRTY ONE LINE ITEMS  
 REQUIRED TO REMOVE THE GENERATORS FM D/L WERE OBTAINED; THREE

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 1390 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 OF THE LINE ITEMS WERE ORDERED BY THE U.S. ARMY, DANANG SUB AREA  
 COMD ON RED BALL; THE REMAINING TWENTY LINE ITEMS WERE  
 ORDERED PRI TWO/NINE NINE NINE BY THE DANANG SUB AREA  
 COMD.

B. FLC IS IN THE PROCESS OF RESEARCHING OUR ASSETS  
 AND AT PRESENT, THRU PRIMARY AND SUBSTITUTE FSN'S HAS  
 LOCATED FIVE OF THE LINE ITEMS IN ADDITION TO THE ONES  
 THAT WERE OBTAINED AT DANANG SUB AREA COMD.

C. SUPPLY GROUP AND CLASS 6115 (POWER GENERATING EQUIP)  
 WAS RESEARCHED BY FLC FOR A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR  
 THE PU-668 GEN. THE PU-670 GEN MEETS THE SPECIFICATION  
 REQUIREMENTS AND WILL BE TESTED TO DETERMINE SUITABIL-  
 ITY AS A SUBSTITUTE. THERE ARE EIGHT PU-670 GEN IN  
 STOCK.

D. ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE FIVE PU-668 GEN IN STOCK AT  
 FLC WHICH WERE RECENTLY REC'D.

E. THE FIVE PU-668 GEN WILL BE ISSUED TO REPLACE THE  
 GEN WHICH REQUIRE ENGINE REPLACEMENT.

F. IF DETERMINED TO BE A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE, SEVEN  
 OF THE EIGHT PU-670 GEN WILL BE ISSUED TO REPLACE THE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

#11

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 1390 C O N F I D E N T I A L,  
OTHER D/L GEN AND WHEN THE D/L GEN ARE REPAIRED, THE  
SEVEN PU-670 GEN WILL BE PLACED BACK IN STOCK.

G. A TEAM OF TWO IS BEING SENT FM FLC TO QUI NHON  
WHERE THEY WILL BE ASSISTED BY THE DANANG SUB AREA  
COMD LIAISON, TO RESEARCH AND RETURN WITH ANY PARTS  
FOUND THAT WILL ASSIST IN REMOVING THE GEN FM D/L.  
H. ALL OF THE D/L GENERATORS ARE BEING SHIFTED INTO  
FLC MAINT FACILITIES.

3. AS TO THE FUTURE PLANS FOR SUPPORT, THE FOLLOWING  
ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN:

- A. A RECOMMENDED THIRTY DAY USAGE LIST OF PARTS FOR  
ALL FADAC HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO FLC BY THE III MAF  
FADAC ASSIST OFFICER.
- B. FLC WILL SUBMIT THE LIST TO DANANG SUB AREA COMD  
WHICH WILL REQUISITION ON PRI TWO, A ONE HUNDRED TWENTY  
DAY LEVEL OF PARTS.
- C. FLC WILL SUBMIT REQUISITIONS TO PHILA FOR A NINETY  
DAY LEVEL OF PARTS WHICH APPEARED IN THE LATEST PHILA  
CATALOG LISTING.
- D. FOR THE PARTS NOT APPEARING IN THE CATALOG LISTING,

PAGE FOUR RUMHFL 1390 C O N F I D E N T I A L

FLC WILL REQUEST INFO FM PHILA FOR REQUISITIONING.

E. UPON ARRIVAL OF PARTS FM BOTH ARMY AND MARINE CORPS  
SOURCES, THE PARTS WILL BE SEPARATED AND PROTECTED  
UNTIL FIRM USAGE DATA IS ESTABLISHED.

4. LONG RANGE SUPPORT WILL BE THE MARINE CORPS SUPPLY  
SYSTEM BEING CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE FADAC SYSTEMS.  
UNDER THE MARINE CORPS SUPPORT CONCEPT, REF D, THE ARMY  
IS TO PROVIDE PARTS SUPPORT ON AN IN-KIND REPLACEMENT  
BASIS UNTIL THE PARTS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE MARINE CORPS  
SUPPLY SYSTEM.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#11

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/14		<i>[Signature]</i>	COMUSMACV
DCG	2		4/15		<i>[Signature]</i>	SERIAL 131034Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
C/S	1		4/14		<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>  <i>"#3 &amp; 4 burned 6 Nov 68"</i>  LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
DC/S				4/15	<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			11/24/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						



NNNNZCZCSAA80AZVA 063VVVV AWB656

PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAW 2183D 1041115  
 ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO  
 P 131034Z APR 68 ZFF-6 ZFG  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMNVP/CG III MARDIV  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV

FOR

BT

MMXUNCLAS 10507

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG TOMPKINS, INFO LTG CUSHMAN,  
 LTG ROSSON.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE OUTSTANDING WORK OF 11TH ENGINEER  
 BN (USMC) IN OPENING ROUTE 9 FROM CA LU TO KHE SANH COMBAT  
 BASE. REPAIR OF OVER 14 MILES OF HIGHWAY, INCLUDING 13 BRIDGES,  
 IN 11 DAYS OF ROUND-THE-CLOCK ENGINEERING EFFORT WAS HERCULEAN  
 TASK. CONGRATULATIONS TO LTC PERRY, HIS OFFICERS AND MEN FOR  
 OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE

BT

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#10	

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 13 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 303552 APR 68		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  <i>#2 burned LeVouls</i>  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY   <i>Copy #3 to Air Control file 14 Apr 68</i>   <b>SECRET</b>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		13/900		SH	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 13 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 130355Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/14		KG	OPERATION CONTROL OF MARINE AIR REMARKS
3	DCG		4/14		KG	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/13/68		Q	
	D C/S		4/14/68		PL	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	131900	4/14		ETT DND	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET #7



**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

P 130355Z APR 68  
FM CG FIRST MAF  
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC  
RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN. KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN ANDERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR FMFPAC F-013 OPERATION CONTROL OF MARINE AIR

1. I HAVE FORMED A SPECIAL, FULL-TIME WORKING GROUP, HEADED BY BEN NISE TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. THE GROUP IS NOW PREPARING OUR CASE IN THE FORM OF A 45 MINUTE PRESENTATION SUITABLE FOR DELIVERY TO CINCPAC OR HIGHER LEVEL. TO ENSURE OUR EFFORTS MATCH ANY STEPS YOU MAY BE TAKING I HAVE AUTHORIZED THE WORKING GROUP TO CONTACT MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFFS ON THIS SUBJECT.
2. THE WORKING GROUP WILL COMPLETE A DETAILED OUTLINE OF THE PRESENTATION BY 14 APRIL, HAVE A COMPLETED DRAFT BY 17 APRIL FOR CONSIDERATION BY CG III MAF.
3. THE PRESENTATION WILL ADDRESS THE FIRST 30 DAYS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND WILL BE AIMED AT RESTORING OUR AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 032W SECRET SPECAT TO NORMAL. THE FOLLOWING IS A TENTATIVE TOPIC OUTLINE:

A. INTRODUCTION

(1) 30 DAY PERIOD WAS ESTABLISHED BY CINCPAC IN WHICH TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF IMPOSITION OF SEPERATE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE AIR BY THE 7TH AIR FORCE. THIS BRIEFING IS A REPORT OF OUR ASSESSMENT.

(2) WE SUSCRIBE TO THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM, SUCH AS AIR DEFENSE AND EXTERIOR INTERDICTION IN LAOS AND NVN, IN FACT, WE ARE ALREADY PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY IN BOTH THOSE EFFORTS.

(3) HOWEVER, IN THE AREA OF MELDING TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT WITH THE FLUID TACTICAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND, SEPERATE MANAGEMENT OF AIR HAS SUCH EFFECTS OF THE CAPABILITY OF MARINE AIR TO INVITE CRITICAL INSPECTION.

B. MARINE AIR GROUND COMBAT AT CONTROL SYSTEM

(1) ASSETS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MUST BE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE SYSTEM WHICH IT REPLACED.

(2) MARINE AIR, LIKE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE AIR-GROUND TEAM, IS AIMED AT SUPPORT OF THE MARINE RIFLEMAN AND AT MAKING HIM MORE EFFECTIVE.

(3) MARINE AIR IS TAILORED AND TASKED TO:

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#7	

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 032W S E C R E T S P E C I A L

- (A) DEPEND THE AIR ABOVE THE RIFLEMAN
- (B) DESTROY THE ENEMY ON THE GROUND BEFORE HIM
- (C) DELIVER THE MARINE RIFLEMAN INTO BATTLE AND MOVE HIM AS REQUIRED
- (D) RESUPPLY HIM
- (4) THESE ARE INTERDEPENDENT AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS. MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THEM ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TOTAL SCHEME OF COMBAT CONTROL OF FIRE, MANUEVER AND RESUPPLY.
- (5) THERE ARE CERTAIN MINIMUM CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE COMBAT CONTROL SYSTEM AS REGARDS TACTICAL AIR. THEY ARE:
  - (A) IT MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO THE TACTICAL NEEDS OF THE GROUND UNIT (TIMELY, ACCURATE, APPROPRIATE)
  - (B) IT MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH ALL OTHER FIRE AND MANUEVER ELEMENTS.
  - (C) IT MUST INVOLVE A MINIMUM NUMBER OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES AND ELEMENTS.
  - (D) IT MUST MINIMIZE THE RISK OF MISDIRECTED FIRE.
  - (E) IT MUST INVOLVE MINIMUM COMMUNICATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.
  - (F) IT MUST BE RELIABLE (SUPPORTED UNITS MUST KNOW IF REQUEST

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 032W S E C R E T S P E C I A L

IS BEING HONORED AND MUST BE SURE PLANES WILL NOT BE DIVERTED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL)

C. REMAINDER OF PRESENTATION WILL ADDRESS ABOVE SIX POINTS INDIVIDUALLY, ANALYZING EXTENT TO WHICH SINGLE MANAGEMENT ACCOMPLISHES THEM, USING STATISTICS INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE, PLUS QUOTES FROM COMBAT PERSONNEL, GIVING VIEWS. EACH TOPIC WILL HAVE A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION. EVIDENCE COLLECTED THUS FAR ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM INDICATES THAT IT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY SATISFY ANY OF THE ABOVE SIX MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. THIS PORTION OF THE PRESENTATION WILL CARRY THE REAL WEIGHT OF OUR CASE.

D. THE PRESENTATION WILL HAVE A WRAP-UP, GIVING A RE-CAP OF SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING A PROPOSAL FOR RESTORING OUR SYSTEM. THE PROPOSAL WILL INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE NEW III MAF/PROV V/ARMY DIVISION ORGANIZATION.

E. OTHER USEFUL IDEAS THAT WILL BE WOVEN INTO THE PRESENTATION AS THE WORK PROGRESSES ARE:

- (1) SINGLE MANAGEMENT IS A SUPPLIER ORIENTED SYSTEM.
- (2) A HIGH DEGREE OF INCENTIVE AND MOTIVATION STEMS FROM CLOSE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAMWORK.
- (3) MARINE AIR PERSONNEL IN GROUND UNITS ARE MEMBERS OF THE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#7

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 032W S E C R E T. SPECAT  
UNITS, ANSWERABLE TO GROUND UNIT COMMANDER. SINGLE MANAGEMENT  
AIR PERSONNEL ARE MEMBERS OF AN EXTERIOR SYSTEM, WITH A LIASION  
FUNCTION ONLY, AND STILL ANSWERABLE TO THEIR AIR COMMANDER, NOT  
THE COMMANDER OF THE SUPPORTED GROUND UNIT.

(4) FIGURES LOOK VERY GOOD REGARDING PERCENT OF MARINE AIR EFFORT  
AT NIGHT COMPARED TO MAGNITUDE OF USAF NIGHT EFFORT.

(5) GROSS EXPENDITURES OF ORDNANCE ARE A MEASURE OF THE  
MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT, NOT THE SUCCESS OF IT. SUCCESS IS  
MEASURE IN THE MARINE CONTEXT IN TERMS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE  
MISSION OF THE GROUND UNIT.

4. I WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE ON THIS APPROACH TO THE  
PROBLEM, AND ANY IDEAS TO REINFORCE OUR CASE.

5. WHILE OUR GOAL, OF COURSE, IS TO REGAIN CONTROL OF OUR AIR,  
AND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, I BELIEVE OUR ALTERNATIVE POSITION  
SHOULD BE TO KEEP THE MATTER OPEN AND NEGOTIABLE, AIMING AT  
SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS. REGARDS.

CP-4  
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SLRG.									# 7





PTTEZYUW RUMHBRA4411 1032358-EEEE--RUMWAA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 122358Z APR 68

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

UMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMWUA/COMNAVBASE SUBIC

T

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR LGEN CUSHMAN, RADM OSBORN AND RADM GILKESON FROM HYLAND

1. RELUCTANTLY I AM CANCELLING MY PROPOSED WESTPAC TRIP. HOPE TO SEE YOU ALL SOON. BEST REGARDS.

BT

FOR

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Pey.Ops.	Spl.Serv.	Sup.	Surg.								#6	



0 121545Z ZYN ZFF-1

FM HQ JOHN R BOLES CG 1ST AB FT HOOD TEXAS

TO: MG RICHARD G STILWELL HQ III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE VIETNAM  
ZAM

UNCLAS E F T O HOD OO EYES ONLY

1. REQUEST INFO ON WHETHER YOU HAVE PLANS, IN THE NEAR FUTURE, FOR SFC ROBINSON AS COOK?
2. IF NOT, I PLAN TO USE HIM HERE. IF YOU WANT HIM THERE, I WILL RELEASE HIM UPON YOUR REQUEST, BUT WILL USE HIM IN THE MEANTIME.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

100

UNCLAS E F T O HOD  
121545Z

01017 TYR374/00655

\*\*\*\*\*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/13/68		lo	CG FMFPAC
DCG	3		4/13/68		ll	SERIAL 122325Z APR 68 COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S	1.		4/12/68		Q	REMARKS CG - He certainly backs us to the hilt doesn't he? PS Should we thank him for his assistance?
DC/S						<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>yes - let's!</p> <p>lo.</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
S/C			"#263 been used 6/10/68"			<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>

#4



**CONFIDENTIAL**

VV PAC755

PP RUMHAA  
 DE RUMHMA 2404 1032325  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 122325Z APR 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMHAA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. CG III MAF 090202Z/APR68 (C)

1. I AGREE THAT SOME INCREASE IN MARINE  
 OFFICERS ON THE PCV STAFF MAKES GOOD SENSE FOR THE  
 PRESENT; HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY SHOULD  
 COME OUT OF THE HIDE OF YOUR HEADQUARTERS OR OUR  
 IN-COUNTRY COMMANDS. I INTEND THEREFORE TO PROVIDE  
 THE AUGMENTATION, EXCEPT FOR THE DEPUTY AND HIS AIDE,  
 FROM OKINAWA, HAWAII AND CONUS BASED COMMANDS.

2. FURTHER, I BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSED 180-DAY TAD  
 CYCLE NEEDS CLOSE EXAMINATION. TAD OF SUCH DURATION  
 PROLONGS AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEADACHE FOR THE  
 CONTRIBUTING COMMAND AND IS A GENUINE HARDSHIP  
 ON THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE ORDERED FROM ACCOMPANIED  
 TOUR STATUS. IT IS MY INTENTION, THEREFORE, TO ORDER

PAGE 2 RUMHMA2404 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO  
 THESE OFFICERS, TOTALING TENLN TO TEMPORARY DUTY FOR A  
 MAXIMUM OF NINETY DAYS, TO REPORT BY 1 MAY. ALLOWING  
 FOR SOME RANK SUBSTITUTION, THE BILLETS WILL BE FILLED  
 AS YOU HAVE RECOMMENDED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#4

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM OMC		DATE 12 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 122128Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FAST REACTION PROCEDURES FOR
			IN	OUT		
1	CG		4/13/68		JP	REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Good - I want to talk w/ G-6 9 NOTIFIED COL HUNT 130915H DISCUSSED
3	DCG		4/13/68		MA	
4	DCG AIR		4/13/68		MS	
1.1	C/S		4/13/68		DL	
	D C/S		4/13/68			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		4/13 0735		DM	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

#2, 3 burned  
6 Nov 68

SECRET #3



**CONFIDENTIAL**

VV PAC755

**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMMWA  
 DE RUHFMA 2404 1032325  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 122325Z APR 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMMWA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

Δ. CG III MAF 090202Z/APR68 (C)

1. I AGREE THAT SOME INCREASE IN MARINE OFFICERS ON THE PCV STAFF MAKES GOOD SENSE FOR THE PRESENT; HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY SHOULD COME OUT OF THE HIDE OF YOUR HEADQUARTERS OR OUR IN-COUNTRY COMMANDS. I INTEND THEREFORE TO PROVIDE THE AUGMENTATION, EXCEPT FOR THE DEPUTY AND HIS AIDE, FROM OKINAWA, HAWAII AND CONUS BASED COMMANDS.

2. FURTHER, I BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSED 180-DAY TAD CYCLE NEEDS CLOSE EXAMINATION. TAD OF SUCH DURATION PROLONGS AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEADACHE FOR THE CONTRIBUTING COMMAND AND IS A GENUINE HARDSHIP ON THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE ORDERED FROM ACCOMPANIED TOUR STATUS. IT IS MY INTENTION, THEREFORE, TO ORDER

PAGE 2 RUHFMA2404 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 THESE OFFICERS, TOTALING TENLN TO TEMPORARY DUTY FOR A MAXIMUM OF NINETY DAYS, TO REPORT BY 1 MAY. ALLOWING FOR SOME RANK SUBSTITUTION, THE BILLETS WILL BE FILLED AS YOU HAVE RECOMMENDED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#4

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/13/68		B	COMUSMACV SERIAL 120756Z APR COPY #2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/13/68		JK	SUBJECT FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>
C/S	1.		4/13/68		A	
DC/S			4/13/68		JK	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			130735 4/13		DMU	LEGEND A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						

*"#3 & 4 burned  
6 Nov 68"*

*23*

# 2



FOR

ZCZCBAA420ZVA 944VV AWAD17  
PP RUMSAK  
DE RUMSAW 1965D 1080823  
ZNR UUUUU ZOR JPCCO  
P 120756Z APR 68 ZFP-6  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO RUMSAF/CG 1018Y ABN DIV  
INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAP  
ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV

BT  
UNCLAS 10848  
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MS BARSANTI; INFO LTC CUSHMAN,  
LTC ROSSON.

SUBJ: CONSUATORY MESSAG  
CONGRATULATIONS TO ELEMENTS OF 2/501 ABN INF FOR HEAVY CASUAL-  
TIES INFLICTED ON ENEMY 14 KM ESE OF QUANG TRI CITY ON 10, 11  
APRIL. LIGHT FIENDLY LOSSES INDICATE WELL-PLANNED CORDON OPERATION.  
BT

202  
PP RUMSAK  
DE RUMSAK  
ZNR JJC  
12075  
4 COMUSMACV  
RUMSAK  
TO RUMSAF/CG  
1018Y

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Pey. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sup.	Surg.								#2	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN ABRAMS
CG	2		4/2/68		lo	SERIAL 110820Z 1,284 COPY # 8 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/13/68		9/11	SUBJECT AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY
DCG AIR	4			4-13	JA	REMARKS
C/S	1		4/4/68		Q	EYE'S ONLY
DC/S			4/14/68		RL	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			11925 H	4/14	EA	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"# 20 4 burned  
5 Nov 68"

#48

0110820Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV  
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 INFO LTG ROSSON CG PROV CORPS VN  
 LTG PALMER DCG USARV  
 MG TALSON CG 1ST CAV DIV  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 04821 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY (U)

REF: GEN TOLSON'S MSG FCV 277

1. (C) GEN TOLSON'S MESSAGE CONFIRMS IN DETAIL THE SITUATION AS ANALYZED BY USARV AND THE THREAT WE FACE IN LOSS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY UNLESS MAXIMUM ECONOMY IN EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT WITH INTENSIVE MAINTENANCE IS PRACTISED FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL CRITICAL MONTHS.
2. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS HAVE HAD THE SAME EFFECT ON ARMY AVIATION THROUGHOUT USARV AS DESCRIBED IN THE MESSAGE; COMBAT DAMAGE HAS TRIPLED, SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT UNITS HAVE BEEN DESPLACED LOSING EFFECTIVE TIME, AND MAINTENANCE WORK HAS BEEN HANDICAPPED BY ENEMY ACTION. BY INTENSIVE EFFORT ON THE PART OF ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND FROM OSD DOWN TO OPERATING UNITS THE IMPACT OF THE ENUMERATED DIFFICULTIES HAS BEEN MINIMIZED. NEW AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AS REPLACEMENTS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. PARTS AS AVAILABLE HAVE BEEN RUSHED FROM THE STATES. THE SHIPPING TIME OF REPAIR PARTS WITHIN RVN HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF ALL. THE NORS RATES FOR ALL UNITS TO INCLUDE THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION HAS REMAINED AT APPROXIMATELY THE D/A STANDARD.
3. (C) THE POINT IS THAT REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT AND PARTS WERE NOT PROGRAMMED ON THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT WE HAVE RECENTLY EXPERIENCED. D/A IS WELL AWARE OF THIS AND IS TAKING ACTION TO CORRECT THE SITUATION, BUT THIS TAKES TIME.
4. (C) I AM PLEASED TO KNOW THAT THE 1ST CAV HAS A STAND DOWN PROGRAM IN EFFECT. I URGE THAT ALL CONCERNED CONTINUE TO TAKE ANY ACTIONS PRACTICAL TO CONSERVE ASSETS SO THAT THEY WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN WE NEED THEM MOST. WE WILL CONTINUE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO PROVIDE NEEDED AIRCRAFT AND PARTS FROM ASSETS AVAILABLE.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
 DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

355

NNNN

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2.		4/11/68		lo	COMUSMACV SERIAL 100801Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3.		4/13/68		gh	SUBJECT FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>
C/S	1.					
DC/S			<del>6</del> 4/11/68		JH	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			118715 4/13		SIT	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

#

"# 364 burned 5 Nov 68"

# 46



VV ZCZCSAA963  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAW 1570D 1010320  
 ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO  
 P 100801Z APR 68 ZFF-6  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO ZEN/CG 101ST ABN DIV  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG PROV CORPS V

FOR

BT  
 UNCLAS 10095  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG BARSANTI; INFO LTG CUSHMAN,  
 LTG ROSSON.

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE  
 OPN CARENTAN II CONTINUES TO TAKE HEAVY TOLL OF ENEMY TROOPS.  
 MY CONGRATULATIONS TO THE SCREAMING EAGLES FOR SERIES OF AGGRESSIVE  
 AND SPIRITED ACTIONS SINCE OPERATION COMMENCED ON 1 APRIL.  
 BT

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Pay. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sup.	Surg.								#46	





**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMRM  
DE RUMSAV 001W 1010010  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 100010Z APR 68  
FM CG FIRST MAW  
TO RUMRM/CG FMFPAC  
RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN,  
FROM MAJGEN ANDERSON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR FMFPAC F-001  
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

A. CG III MAF 080752Z APR 68

1. THE REFERENCE QUOTED GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S EXCELLENT CONGRAT-  
ULATORY MESSAGE ON THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION PEGASUS. SOME  
THOUGHTS HAVE OCCURRED TO ME IN THAT CONTEXT, WHICH MIGHT BE  
USEFUL TO YOU.

2. GENERAL WESTMORELAND MENTIONED "...THE DECISIVE AIR POWER..."  
IN HIS REMARKS. I THINK WE ALL CAN AGREE THAT THE WEIGHT OF  
ORDNANCE DROPPED ON THE ENEMY IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH HAD  
SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT UPON HIS FORCES. WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS THE  
DECISIVE FACTOR, IS MOOT, AND NOT PERTINENT TO THE BURDEN OF THIS  
MESSAGE. HOWEVER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT KHE SANH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN  
HELD WITHOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF NAVY, MARINE AND AIR FORCE AIR. THUS

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 001W S E C R E T S P E C A T

I FEEL INTIME TO COME, THIS ASPECT OF THE KHE SANH BATTLE MAY RECEIVE  
INCREASING EMPHASIS. FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT  
OF AIR WAS INSTITUTED DURING THE KHE SANH EFFORT COULD - BY ASSOCIATION  
IF NOT THROUGH MALICE AFORETHOUGHT - BE PURVEYED AS ONE REASON FOR THE  
OVERALL SUCCESS OF THE EFFORT. ACCORDINGLY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE  
WELL FOR ME TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE THOUGHTS AND FACTS CONTAINED IN  
SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS.

3. LET US CONSIDER THAT AIR FORCE HISTORIANS WILL EQUATE OPERATION  
NIAGARA WITH SUCCESSFUL AIR PARTICIPATION IN THE KHE SANH CAMPAIGN  
NIAGARA COMMENCED ON 21 JAN AND TERMINATED 31 MAR 1968. OUR RECORDS  
SHOW THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS APPLYING TO THIS TOTAL PERIOD:

A.	SORTIES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
USAF (TAC)	9691	39.3
USMC	7076	28.8
USN	5337	21.6
USAF (SAC)	2548	10.3

B. NEARLY 90 PERCENT OF ALL USMC SORTIES WENT INTO THE IMMEDIATE  
KHE SANH AREA, VS 36 PERCENT OF USAF/USN SORTIES TO THE SAME AREA.

C. THE AREA ENCLOSED WITHIN A CIRCLE OF APPROX 9 MILES RADIUS FROM  
THE KHE SANH PERIMETER RECEIVED 44 PERCENT OF TOTAL NIAGARA SORTIES.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 44

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUNSAV 001W S E C R E T S P E C I A L  
 OF THESE, APPROX 97 PERCENT WERE FLOWN BY THE 1ST MAW. THE REMAINDER  
 WAS SHARED BETWEEN USAF AND USN.

D. SINGLE MANAGEMENT NOMINALLY COMMENCED 21 MARCH 1968, WHEN  
 1 DASC AND DASC VICTOR OSTENSIBLY WERE OPERATING, AND THE AIR SUPPORT  
 REQUEST SYSTEM FIRST WAS EMPLOYED. THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS APPLY  
 TO THIS LIMITED PERIOD:

	SORTIES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
USMC	1190	32
USAF (TAC)	1126	30.3
USAF (SAC)	455	25.3
USN	941	12.4

4. ALTHOUGH THE ABOVE FIGURES MAY BE SUBJECT TO SOME AUDIT, I FEEL  
 THESE CONCLUSIONS LEGITIMATELY CAN BE DRAWN:

A. 85 PERCENT OF THE SORTIE EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF NIAGARA OCCURRED  
 BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT'S FIRST DAY -- AND, IN FACT, THE SO-CALLED  
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ON A PRACTICAL BASIS DID NOT FULLY APPLY AT  
 ANY ONE TIME DURING NIAGARA.

B. DESPITE THE FACT THAT USAF (TAC) FLEW ABOUT A THIRD AGAIN AS  
 MANY SORTIES DURING NIAGARA AS DID USMC, THE WEIGHT OF ORDNANCE  
 DROPPED WAS APPROXIMATELY EQUAL BECAUSE OF OUR HIGHER TON/SORTIE

PAGE FOUR RUNSAV 001W S E C R E T S P E C I A L

RATIO. FURTHERMORE, THE MARINE CORPS PARTICULARLY WAS PREDOMINANT  
 IN THE CRITICAL 9 MILE CIRCLE SURROUNDING THE KSCB.

C. ACCORDINGLY, THE SUCCESS OF "...THE DECISIVE AIR POWER..."  
 OVER WHICH GENERAL WESTMORELAND ENTHUSES WAS ACHIEVED WITHOUT ANY  
 BENEFIT FROM "SINGLE MANAGEMENT". SINCE THE REQUIREMENTS AT THE  
 SANH FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN HIS CAMPAIGN TO ACHIEVE SINGLE MANAGEMENT  
 THE VERY SUCCESS OF THE EFFORT THERE WOULD TEND TO DEROGATE THE  
 VALIDITY OF HIS ARGUMENT.

5. I RECOGNIZE THE FOREGOING IS SMALL COMFORT TO US, IN VIEW  
 OF THE FACT THAT HE DID WIN, HOWEVER, WE MIGHT FIND FUTURE UTILITY  
 IN THE ABOVE. ALSO, I WOULD ADD THIS FURTHER OBSERVATION. THE  
 TREND OF OUR ACCOUNTING SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS HAD PRINCIPALLY TO  
 DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT RESPONSIVENESS MEASURED UP TO PREVIOUS  
 STANDARDS. THIS IS NOT THE ONLY METHOD FOR MEASUREMENT. REALISTICALLY,  
 THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND DECISION TO ESTABLISH SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS TO  
 HAVE BEEN THAT THE NECESSARY JOB COULD BE DONE UNDER THE ALTERED  
 SYSTEM, OR THAT EQUALLY AS GOOD A JOB COULD BE DONE AT LESS COST.  
 OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE.  
 THUS, I FEEL THERE MAY BE A TIME AND PLACE WHEN THE AIR FORCE SHOULD  
 BE CHALLENGED TO PROVE THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT RESULTED IN SOME

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

111 MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTG	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#44

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 001W S E C R E T SPECAT  
 DEMONSTRABLE IMPROVEMENT OR ECONOMY, AND NOT MERELY THAT IS WAS  
 ABLE TO MEASURE UP TO THE STANDARDS PREVIOUSLY ACHIEVED (IF, IN  
 FACT, THAT IN ITSELF EVER COULD BE PROVED). IN OTHER WORDS, THE  
 BURDEN PROPERLY REST ON THEM TO PROVE THAT AIR SUPPORT RELATIVELY  
 IS CONTRIBUTING MORE TO THE COMMON EFFORT THAN REASONABLY COULD  
 HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE OLD MACV  
 DIRECTIVE 95-4. WE SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT WE ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO  
 MUST MAKE A CASE. LET'S HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE, TOO, WHEN IT  
 IS SUITABLE SO TO DO.

S. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

111 MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#44

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/10/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	COMUSMACV SERIAL 091221Z APR 68 COPY #2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/10/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	SUBJECT CONGRATUATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR	4			4-11	<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>
C/S	11		4/10/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S			4/11/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			10/4/20	4/11	<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

"# 30 + burned 5/10/68"

# 43



ZCZCSAA788ZVA 272  
 PP RUMSAK  
 ZNR UUUUU ZFH-1  
 VV AWA 671

PP RUMHVP RUMSAK  
 E RUMSAW 1436D 1001255  
 ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO  
 P 091221Z APR 68 ZFF6  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV

FOR

BT

UNCLAS 09995  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG TOMPKINS; INFO LTG CUSHMAN,  
 LTG ROSSON.

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE  
 DEFENSE OF HILL 471 AGAINST ENEMY ATTACK ON 5 APRIL WAS OUT-  
 STANDING. USE OF IAS AND ARTY COMMENDABLE BUT PRIMARY CREDIT  
 GOES TO MEN OF 1/9 USMC FOR THROWING ENEMY BACK WITH HEAVY LOSSES.  
 CONGRATUALTIONS.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CIB	GOC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Pay. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sup.	Surg.								#43	

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	1		4/11/68		le	COMUSMACV SERIAL 100306Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		4/13/68		gh	SUBJECT STATEMENT TO THE PRESS
DCG AIR	3			4/12	gh	REMARKS For CG Passing this to all CG's V. [unclear] FOR
C/S	1.		4/10/68		has seen	
DC/S			4/12/68		me	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
CIB		Copy				
S/S			10/5/68	4/13	DEW	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

#3 & burned  
 5 Nov 68

#42



ZCZCSAAS33VV ATIS  
 OO RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAV 1518D 1010355  
 ZNY EEEEE ZOK JPCCO  
 O 100306Z APR 68 ZFF-6  
 FH COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMSVA/DCG USARV  
 ZEN/COM 7TH AF  
 ZEN/COMNAVFORV  
 ZEN/CG I FFV  
 ZEN/CG II FFV  
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/SA IV CTZ  
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS E F T O 10055. FOR PALMER, WORLEY, VEIN, PEERS, WEYAND, CUSHMAN, ECKHARDT, WESTMORELAND SENDS.

1. AS I LEFT WASHINGTON, I GAVE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE PRESS:  
 "A. YESTERDAY AND TODAY I CONFERRED WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT. I DISCUSSED THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE STATUS OF ENEMY FORCES, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY, THE MOBILIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, AND CURRENT AND FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PLANS.

PAGE 2 RUMSAV 1518D UNCLAS E F T O

"B. I TOLD THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF THAT DESPITE THE INITIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE, THE ENEMY FAILED TO ACHIEVE A PUBLIC UPRISING BY THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, TO BRING ABOUT THE DEFEAT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF VIETNAM AND TO ACHIEVE HIS MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS PROCEEDING RAPIDLY TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ITS ARMED FORCES BY 133,000 MEN. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS REVEALS THAT IN GENERAL THEY FOUGHT BRAVELY AND WELL. THE SPIRIT OF THE OFFENSIVE IS NOW PREVALENT THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM WITH ADVANTAGE BEING TAKEN OF THE ENEMY'S WEAKENED MILITARY POSITION. OUR TROOPS OF ALL SERVICES HAVE CONTINUED TO PERFORM IN A MAGNIFICENT FASHION AND THEIR CONDUCT SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR HAS BEEN ENHANCED AND MY ADMIRATION FOR THEM HAS LIKEWISE BEEN INCREASED. MILITARILY, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN IN A BETTER RELATIVE POSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

"C. THE ENEMY'S SEIGE OF KHE SANH HAS BEEN RELIEVED BY GROUND ACTION. FOLLOWING NEWS FROM MY COMMAND, I HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO GENERAL CUSHMAN CONGRATULATING HIM AND THE TROOPS UNDER HIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR THEIR SUCCESS IN RELIEVING KHE

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
GIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Pay. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sup.	Surg.									

PAGE 3 RUMSAW 1918D UNCLAS E F T O

SANH BASE AND WRESTING THE INITIATIVE FROM THE ENEMY. A COYP OF MY MESSAGE WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO YOU.

"D. LADIES AND GENTLE MEN IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY".

2. AS NOTED IN THIS STATEMENT, I SENT A MESSAGE TO GENERAL CUSHMAN CONCERNING THE BATTLE AT KHE SANH. THIS MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

"WHILE CONFERRING WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN WASHINGTON, I RECEIVED NEWS OF THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION PEGASUS THAT HAS RELIEVED KHE SANH. TO ALL TROOPS IN THE ASSAULT OR IN SUPPORT-- ARMY, MARINE, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY, I EXTEND MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS AND ASK THAT THESE BE PASSED ON TO THE ASSOICATED VIETNAMESE UNITS. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY PRIDE AND SATISFACTION TO ALL THOSE--VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN--WHO MANNED THE KHE SANH BASE DURING THE TWO AND ONE HALF MONTHS OF SIEGE, WHO KEPT THE BASE SUPPLIED, WHO BROUGHT THE DECISIVE AIR POWER TO BEAR ON THE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS OF THE ENEMY WITH DETERMINATION AND SKILL, AND WHO HAVE NOW RELIEVED THE BASE AND GAINED THE INITIATIVE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS OPERATION PINNED DOWN MORE THAN TWO DIVISIONS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TROOPS AT A CRUCIAL PHASE OF THEIR WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE. THESE ENEMY FORCES WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN

PAGE 4 RUMSAW 1918D UNCLAS E F T O

AVAILABLE TO JOIN THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND POPULATED AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEIR INTERVENTION COULD HAVE POSSIBLE ALTERED THE COURSE OF BATTLE. MY COMPLIMENTS TO THE COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS WHO PLANNED OPERATION PEGASUS AND TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN WHO HAVE CARRIED IT OUT WITH COURAGE AND PROFESSIONALISM. TO ALL HANDS: WELL DONE."

3. SINCE THESE STATEMENTS HAVE ONLY BEEN PARTIALLY REPORTED BY THE PRESS, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ALL IF THEY WERE SHOWN TO YOUR PRINCIPAL COUNTERPARTS. ALSO, I PARTICULARLY DESIRE THAT THEY BE PERSONALLY DISCUSSED WITH U.S. AND ARVN DIVISION COMMANDERS AND THEIR EQUIVALENTS.

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Pay. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sup.	Surg.									#42

WESTMORELAND SENDS:

*orig delivered  
to Gen Lam on 13 Apr.  
b.*

1. AS I LEFT WASHINGTON, I GAVE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE PRESS:

"A. YESTERDAY AND TODAY I CONFERRED WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT. I DISCUSSED THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE STATUS OF ENEMY FORCES, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY, THE MOBILIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, AND CURRENT AND FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PLANS.

"B. I TOLD THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF THAT DESPITE THE INITIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE, THE ENEMY FAILED TO ACHIEVE A PUBLIC UPRISING BY THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, TO BRING ABOUT THE DEFEAT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF VIETNAM AND TO ACHIEVE HIS MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS PROCEEDING RAPIDLY TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ITS ARMED FORCES BY 135,000 MEN. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS REVEALS THAT IN GENERAL THEY FOUGHT BRAVELY AND WELL. THE SPIRIT OF THE OFFENSIVE IS NOW PREVALENT THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM WITH ADVANTAGE BEING TAKEN OF THE ENEMY'S WEAKENED MILITARY POSITION. OUR TROOPS OF ALL SERVICES HAVE CONTINUED TO PERFORM IN A MAGNIFICENT FASHION AND THEIR CONDUCT SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR HAS BEEN ENHANCED AND MY ADMIRATION FOR THEM HAS LIKEWISE BEEN INCREASED. MILITARILY, WE HAVE NEVER

#42

BEEN IN A BETTER RELATIVE POSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

"C. THE ENEMY'S SIEGE OF KHE SANH HAS BEEN RELIEVED BY GROUND ACTION. FOLLOWING NEWS FROM MY COMMAND, I HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO GENERAL CUSHMAN CONGRATULATING HIM AND THE TROOPS UNDER HIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR THEIR SUCCESS IN RELIEVING KHE SANH BASE AND WRISTING THE INITIATIVE FROM THE ENEMY. A COPY OF MY MESSAGE WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO YOU.

"D. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY".

2. AS NOTED IN THIS STATEMENT, I SENT A MESSAGE TO GENERAL CUSHMAN CONCERNING THE BATTLE AT KHE SANH. THIS MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

"WHILE CONFERRING WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN WASHINGTON, I RECEIVED NEWS OF THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION PEGASUS THAT HAS RELIEVED KHE SANH. TO ALL TROOPS IN THE ASSAULT OR IN SUPPORT-- ARMY, MARINE, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY--I EXTEND MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS AND ASK THAT THESE BE PASSED ON TO THE ASSOCIATED VIETNAMESE UNITS. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY PRIDE AND SATISFACTION TO ALL THOSE--VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN--WHO MANNED THE KHE SANH BASE DURING THE TWO AND ONE HALF MONTHS OF SIEGE, WHO KEPT THE BASE SUPPLIED, WHO BROUGHT THE DECISIVE AIR POWER TO BEAR ON THE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS OF THE ENEMY WITH DETERMINATION AND SKILL, AND WHO HAVE NOW RELIEVED THE BASE AND GAINED THE INITIATIVE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS OPERATION PINNED DOWN MORE THAN TWO DIVISIONS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TROOPS AT A CRUCIAL

PHASE OF THEIR WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE. THESE ENEMY FORCES WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO JOIN THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND POPULATED AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEIR INTERVENTION COULD HAVE POSSIBLY ALTERED THE COURSE OF BATTLE. MY COMPLIMENTS TO THE COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS WHO PLANNED OPERATION PEGASUS AND TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN WHO HAVE CARRIED IT OUT WITH COURAGE AND PROFESSIONALISM. TO ALL HANDS: WELL DONE."

\* \* \*





SECRET

VV PAC 638

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

RF  
TRUHFMA  
DE RUEBHOA 8220 1001625  
ZNY SSSSS  
RUHFMA -I - CG III MAF  
III MAF -I - CG 1ST MAW  
R 091623Z APR 68  
FM CMC  
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMHAW/CG 1ST MAW

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BRULAK, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN, MGEN ANDERSON, BGEN ANDERSON FROM MGEN MC CUTCHEON  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONTROL OF MARINE AIR IN RVN (U)

A. CG III MAF 021600Z APR 68 TO COMUSMACV

B. COMUSMACV 050339Z APR 68 TO CG III MAF

1. REFS A AND B IMPLY THAT GROUND COMMANDER IS NOT PERMITTED TO SUBMIT ALL HIS TARGET REQUESTS TO MACV BASE. DAILY REPORTS FROM 1ST MAW COVERING PERIOD 3-6 APR INCLUSIVE, PROVIDE DATA WHICH INDICATE THAT GROUND COMMANDER IS PERMITTED TO SUBMIT A DAILY AVERAGE OF ONLY 32 PERCENT OF THE TARGETS HE DESIRES TO HAVE HIT.

2. IN ORDER TO BOLSTER OUR CASE THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA8220 SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO GROUND COMMANDERS REQUIREMENTS, REQUEST THAT A COPY OF DIRECTIVE BE TRANSMITTED AND/OR AIRMAILED ASAP WHICH RESTRICTS GROUND COMMANDER TO SUBMITTING ONLY CERTAIN NUMBER OF TARGET REQUESTS TO MACV BASE.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#41

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/10/68		LO	GEN ABRAMS SERIAL 091149Z APR68
DCG	3		4/10/68		JK	1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPY# / OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4			12	JK	SUBJECT MAC 4769 EYES ONLY
C/S	1		4/10		Q	REMARKS CG - brief arranged before at your convenience. J. Kepp OK - ASAP
DC/S			4/10		DC	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3	5	A	Copy of Rpt Slip + msg to G-3 101000H APR 68 TM			
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			5921401	4/14	DHW	
S/C				4/14		

LEGEND  
 A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE  
 C - COMMENTS  
 I - INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"# 2 + burned  
5 Nov 68"

#40

0091149Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV  
 TO LTG WEYAND CG II FFORCEV  
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 MG PEERS CG I FFORCEV  
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS  
 INFO LTG ROSSON CG PROV CORPS VN  
 LTG PALMER CDG USARV  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 4769 EYES ONLY

1. (C) I HAVE JUST BEEN BRIEFED BY MG WILLIAMS ON THE CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF T53 ENGINES WHICH IS DEVELOPING AND WHICH WILL REACH MORE ALARMING PROPORTIONS WITHIN THE NEXT 60 DAYS UNLESS WE TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO CONSERVE THESE ASSETS. A COPY OF THIS BRIEFING HAS BEEN FURNISHED EACH GROUP COMMANDER OF THE 1ST AVIATION BDE. I DESIRE THAT YOU, EACH DIVISION COMMANDER, EACH DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR AND SEPARATE BDE COMMANDER PERSONNALLY RECEIVE THE SAME BRIEFING FROM YOUR ARMY AVIATION STAFF ADVISOR.

2. (C) I ALSO INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO GEN PALMER'S 4 APRIL LETTER "CONSERVATION OF THE T53L-11 AND 13 ENGINES." (COPY BEING SENT EACH NONUSARV ADDRESSEE). IT IS HOPED THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS LETTER WILL REDUCE THE CONSUMPTION OF ENGINES TO REMAIN WITHIN AVAILABLE ASSETS THUS AVIODING THE NECESSITY FOR IMPOSING MORE RIGID CONTROL SUCH AS ALLOCATION OF FLYING HOURS.  
 GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS  
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

200

NNNN

#40

WSR  
KZ

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/11/68		le	AMB KOMER
DCG	3		4/12/68		gm	SERIAL 091035Z Apr COPY # 3 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECIAL PACIFICATION ASSESSMENT
C/S	✓		4/10/68		B	REMARKS
DC/S						<p>We took this as a crash project yesterday. All answers were phoned to KOMER's office and followed by a message report, by proxima, at 091245H. We beat his deadline by 2 hrs 15 min.</p> <p>V' Ropy R &amp; Warren BOL Please send me a copy of msg.</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p> <p>14 Apr phone conversation, Gen. Cushman and [unclear] sent this message and followed thru to COMOS. BOK</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			101230H KCD	4/13	DWA	
S/C						

*[Large handwritten scribble]*

# 39A

14 Apr phone conversation, Gen. Cushman and [unclear] sent this message and followed thru to COMOS. BOK

CONFIDENTIAL

#39A

YSHKOL/MR MATTHESON DEPCORDS II CTZ  
 YSHKOS/MR VANN DEPCORDS III CTZ  
 YSHKQW/MR COTTRELL DEPCORDS IV CTZ  
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 04707 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: SPECIAL PACIFICATION ASSESSMENT

I'M DOING RUSH SPECIAL PACIFICATION ASSESSMENT FOR  
 AND BUNKER TO TAKE TO PRESIDENT TUESDAY NIGHT. KNOW THAT  
 YOU HAVE BEEN BUSTING A GUT TO GET ALL SORTS OF DATA IN  
 COVERING MARCH. I'LL USE IT TO BEST ADVANTAGE. HOWEVER,  
 WOULD ALSO LIKE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE 47 PSA'S BEST ESTIMATES  
 OF OVERALL EFFECT OF TET OFFENSIVE ON PACIFICATION NOW  
 THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK HAS WORN OFF. HENCE WANT  
 YOU TO POLL BY UNCLASSIFIED RADIO MESSAGE (OR FASTEST  
 ALTERNATIVE MEANS) EACH PSA TO GET:

1. JUDGMENT OF NUMBER OF MONTHS PACIFICATION SETBACK  
 IN PROVINCE BY TET OFFENSIVE AND AFTERMATH. FOR EXAMPLE,  
 IF 1968 PLAN PUT INTO EFFECT ON 1 APRIL, SETBACK WOULD BE  
 TWO MONTHS. IF DAMAGE DONE REQUIRES ESTIMATED ONE MONTH  
 TO REPAIR, SETBACK WOULD BE TWO PLUS ONE OR THREE.

2. DEGREE TO WHICH PROVINCE -- CIVIL OFFICIALS,  
 MILITARY FORCES, COMMERCE, ETC. -- IS FUNCTIONING IN TERMS  
 OF PERCENT OF PRE-TET LEVEL. FOR EXAMPLE, IF EVERYTHING HAS  
 RETURNED TO NORMAL, PROVINCE IS 100 PERCENT FUNCTIONAL.

3. REMAINING SINGLE BIGGEST PROBLEM. FOR EXAMPLE, PROVINCE  
 OFFICIALS STILL DEFENSIVE MINDED, RECOVERY EFFORTS SAPPING STRENGTH  
 FROM NORMAL PROGRAMS, POOR PROVINCE CHIEF, RF/PF OUTGUNNED BY ENEMY  
 LOCAL/GUERRILLA FORCES, ETC.

MUST HAVE ANSWERS BY 1500, TUESDAY, 9 APRIL. CALL IN TO MY  
 OFFICE ON SAIGON LD AND TALK TO MONTAGUE OR SUPLIZIO.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

398

END

439A

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/10/68		le	MG TOLSON
DCG	3		4/10		Jh	SERIAL 100250Z APR 68 SUBJECT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
DCG AIR	4			4/11	A	REMARKS
C/S	1		4/9/68		Q	EYES ONLY
DC/S			4/11/68		m	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3			4/9/68		cut	
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			091445	4/11	<del>---</del> DKW	LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"#204 Burned  
5 Nov 68"

#38

0 100250Z ZYH ZFF-1  
FM MG TOLSON CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV LZ STUD RVN  
TO YSHKQL/LTG ROSSON CG PCV PHU BAI RVN  
INFO: YSHKOD/GEN ABRAMS DEP COMUSMACV TSN RVN  
YSHKOI/LTG PALMER DCG USARV LBN RVN  
YMRLKQ/LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DA NANG RVN  
YSHKOI/MG WILLIAMS CG 1ST AVN BDE LBN RVN  
ZEM  
C O N F I D E N T I A L FCV 277 EYES ONLY

1. THIS PERTAINS TO MAC 04663 ON THE SUBJECT OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
2. FOR THE PAST YEAR THE 1ST CAV HAS BEEN STANDING DOWN WWP PER CENT OR MORE OF MISSION READY AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMPLISH DEFERRED MAINTENANCE. THIS HAS PROVEN TO BE GOOD AIRCRAFT MANAGEMENT PRACTICE BUT IT ISN'T THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LOW AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY NOW FACING THIS DIVISION.
3. IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS 240 OF THE DIVISION'S AIRCRAFT HAVE SUFFERED BATTLE DAMAGE. THIS DAMAGE RESULTED IN A REQUIREMENT FOR MORE SPARE PARTS AND AN AVERAGE OF 144 MAN HOURS PER AIRCRAFT TO REPAIR. DURING A TYPICAL TWO MONTH PERIOD IN OPERATION PERSHING, 90 AIRCRAFT SUFFERED BATTLE DAMAGE. SINCE BATTLE DAMAGED AIRCRAFT ARE DOWN FOR REPAIR, STANDING DOWN FLYABLES WON'T PROVIDE THE SPARE PARTS AND THE ADDITIONAL MAINTENANCE TO COPE WITH BATTLE DAMAGE.
4. FOR THE PAST TWO MONTHS A DAILY AVERAGE OF 144 OF THE DIVISION'S AIRCRAFT HAD OUTSTANDING EDP REQUISITIONS. BY COMPARISON, A TYPICAL TWO MONTH DAILY AVERAGE DURING OPERATION PERSHING WAS 81 AIRCRAFT.
5. GENERALLY SPEAKING, IN BOTH JEB STUART AND PEGASUS WE HAVE BEEN CLOSE TO THE OBJECTIVE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM, SLIGHTLY BELOW IN JEB STUART AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE IN PEGASUS. THE SAD FACT IS THAT THE SPARE PARTS AVAILABLE APPARENTLY WON'T SUPPORT THAT FLYING HOUR PROGRAM UNDER THE CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED IN JEB STUART AND PEGASUS.
6. WHAT I'M REALLY SAYING IS THAT DOING WHAT I'M ALREADY DOING, I.E. STANDING DOWN FLYABLE AIRCRAFT FOR MAINTENANCE WON'T SOLVE MY SHORTAGE OF MISSION READY AIRCRAFT. THE REAL PROBLEM IS A SHORTAGE OF SPARE PARTS.

SSO NOTE: PRIORITY FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER  
DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS  
325

*A little longer  
in ICTZ*

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

#38

SECRET

CONTROL SHEET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG FIRST MAW SERIAL 080130Z APR COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON AIR ASSETS
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S						<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>#2 burned 5/10/68</p> <p>Copy #3 to Air Control 8 Apr 68 Ym</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

SECRET

#36

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/9		lo	CG FIRST MAW SERIAL 000130Z APR COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/9/68		JK	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON AIR ASSETS
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		4/8/68		Q	<p style="font-size: 2em; text-align: center;">EXCLUSIVE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p>
DC/S			4/10/68		Dr	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			081440		Drw	<p>LEGEND</p> <p>A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE</p> <p>C- COMMENTS</p> <p>I- INFORMATION</p>
S/C			4/13			

**SECRET**

#36



**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

DE RUMSAV 003W 0990130  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 080130Z APR 68  
FM CG FIRST MAF  
TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC  
RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK AND LGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN ANDERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR FMFPAC F-001 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS, STATUS AS OF 7 APR 1. THIS WEEK HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A CONTINUING SHAKEDOWN OF THE NEW SYSTEM WITH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF REALITY BEGINNING TO SURFACE AS THE FMAW GETS MORE REMOVED FROM DIRECTING OPERATIONS. THE IMPACT OF SOME OF THE COMPLEXITIES AND THE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS ARE STARTING TO BE FELT BY BOTH THE AF AND ARMY. I CORPS AIR CONTROL AND AIR REQUIREMENTS HAVE NEVER BEEN SIMPLE. NOW THEY ARE MORE COMPLICATED THAN EVER AND THIS IS STARTING TO BE APPRECIATED, MOST CERTAINLY AT THE WORKING LEVEL. INDICATIONS OF THE ABOVE ARE REFLECTED IN OPERATIONAL DISCREPANCY REPORTS, COMPLAINTS BY THE ABCCC'S, THE DIVISIONS AND THE COMMUNICATORS. AS EXAMPLES:  
A. ON 27 MARCH, 2/A4'S WERE SCRAMBLED TO WORK WITH 26TH MAR.

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 003W SECRET SPECAT WHEN THE TARGET WAS MARKED WITH ARTILLERY, TWO OTHER A/C BELIEVED TO BE USAF IMMEDIATELY AND WITHOUT WARNING STARTED TO ATTACK THE TARGET. NO ONE COULD CONTACT THEM AND THEY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE UNDER CONTROL OF ANYONE.  
B. MAG-12 SUBMITTED FIVE REPORTS THIS WEEK CONCERNING LACK OF CONTROLLERS WHEN A/C REPORTED ON STATION. SOME A/C WERE REQUIRED TO HOLD UP TO 40 MINUTES, FOUR OF THE FLIGHTS EVENTUALLY RECEIVED ALTERNATE MISSIONS, BUT ONE WAS FORCED TO RETURN WITH ORDNANCE.  
C. ABCCC HAS DIVERTED A/C TO TARGETS OTHER THAN AREA FRAGGED TO FOR SEVERAL REASONS: OVERFLOW AT A GIVEN TIME, TARGETS CONSIDERED MORE PRESSING, AND TO WORK AROUND SUDDEN INFLUX OF NAVY A/C. CYCLIC OPS OF CARRIERS WITH UNCERTAIN LAUNCH AND RECOVERY TIMES CONTINUE TO PROVIDE PROBLEMS FOR ABCCC. THE PRESENT SYSTEM DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THE FACILITY OF OURS TO SPREAD THESE LARGE NUMBERS OF A/C AROUND QUICKLY, ALTHOUGH QUITE FRANKLY THEY WERE ALSO A PROBLEM TO US. HOWEVER, 3D MARDIV PROFITS GREATLY BY THESE SORTIES, SINCE THEY GET THE MAJORITY OF THEM.  
D. THERE IS A PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATIONS WITH NON-MARINE

*need more facts  
must determine who is at fault*

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PHO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#36

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**SECRET**

GE FOUR RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T S P E C I A L

FORCES PERFORMING TACTICAL MISSIONS WITH MARINE CONTROLLERS. TO PREVENT COMPROMISE OUR FRAGS ALWAYS HAVE BEEN COLOR CODED. THE DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN GETTING THE 7TH AF TO APPRISE THEIR UNITS OF THESE CODES. THIS IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED SLOWLY.

2. OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACTORS:

A. THE RECENT CHANGE HAS RESULTED IN A DEFINITE INCREASE IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM 7TH AF. THE 7TH AF TACC FRAG NORMALLY IS TEN SECTIONS LONG. EACH SECTION OF THIS MESSAGE TAKES FIFTEEN MINUTES OF TRANSMISSION TIME OF A TELETYPE CIRCUIT. THIS RESULTS IN DELAY IN THE PREPARATION OF THE FMAW DAY FIRED WING FRAG. BECAUSE OF THE REQUIRED HANDLING OF THE 7TH AF FRAG AND DUE TO INCREASING THE PRECEDENCE OF THE FMAW FRAGS, THE MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OUR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 2200H UNTIL 0800H IS FRAG ORDERS. THIS CAUSES A LONG DELAY OF OTHER OPERATIONAL TYPE TRAFFIC, SUCH AS OPREPS, SITREPS, SPHINX, ETC. ABOUT TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS OF CIRCUIT TIME IS LOST IN HANDLING THE 7TH AF FRAG. THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THIS HANDLING IS A TRAFFIC BACKLOG CAUSED BY THE "DISPLACEMENT" EFFECT OF INTRODUCING "IMMEDIATE" AND "FLASH" PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC INTO OUR SYSTEM AS A DIRECT RESULT OF RECEIPT OF THE AF FRAG.

*maybe our G-3 can come up some suggestions*

PA

**EXCLUSIVE**

GE FOUR RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T S P E C I A L

B. ANOTHER FACET OF THE AF FRAG SYSTEM IS THE SEPARATE DAY AND NIGHT FRAGS TO GET AS MUCH RESPONSIVENESS AS POSSIBLE IN THEIR SYSTEM. THIS PROCEDURE DOUBLES THE ADMINISTRATION WORK LOAD FOR GROUP AND OPERATIONS PERSONNEL. AND SINCE AS DESCRIBED IN A. ABOVE THESE ARE GENERALLY LATE ARRIVING THE PLANNING AND INSPECTION/QUALITY CONTROL TIME IS REDUCED, PARTICULARLY IN THE ORDNANCE FIELD IN THE PREPARING OF BOMBS AND FUSES.

C. A RECENT LIAISON VISIT TO HQS PCV UNCOVERED THE APPARENT REASON FOR THE FACT THAT PRE-PLANNED TACTICAL AIR STRIKES IN THE ASHAU VALLEY HAVE NOT BEEN REQUESTED BY PCV. SINCE THE ASHAU VALLEY WAS NOT WITHIN THE TAOR OF ANY SUBORDINATE UNIT, PCV WOULD BE THE REQUESTING LEVEL FOR STRIKES THEREIN. THE G-3 AIR AT PCV STATED THAT REQUESTS FROM SUBORDINATE UNITS HABITUALLY EXCEEDED THE DAILY ALLOCATION OF TACTICAL AIR. ACCORDINGLY, PREPLANNED REQUEST FOR TACTICAL AIR IN THE ASHAU WERE NOT SUBMITTED, IN ORDER TO AVOID INFRACTING FROM ALLOCATIONS MADE TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. THE G-3 AIR WAS ADVISED THAT, IN KEEPING WITH THE SYSTEM AND THE DESIRE OF CG III MAF, ALL LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR TACTICAL AIR SHOULD BE SUBMITTED, IRRESPECTIVE OF TACTICAL AIR AVAILABLE FOR ALLOCATION. THIS POINT WAS ALSO MADE TO THE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#36

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

SECRETIVE RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T SPECIAL  
 C/S PCV, AND DEPCDR (MGEN DAVIS). IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AIR  
 LIGHT STRIKES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED AND FLOWN IN A SHAU, AND SOME  
 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES DIVERTED ON A RANDOM BASIS INTO THE VALLEY  
 AS WELL. HOWEVER, THIS MATTER ILLUSTRATES THE BUILT-IN INHIBITION  
 WHICH CAN OCCUR RELATIVE TO REQUESTING TACTICAL AIR ON A GROSS  
 REAL-EQUIPMENT BASIS, IN THE FACE OF KNOWLEDGE THAT ONLY A CER-  
 TAIN LEVEL OF ALLOCATION CAN BE EXPECTED. THE TAYLOR THEN TENDS  
 TO CUT THE SUIT TO THE AVAILABLE CLOTH, RATHER THAN THE SIZE OF  
 THE CUSTOMER.

3. ON THE 3D MGEN PEARSON, FORMER C/S PCV WHO IS RETURNING TO  
 HIS JOB OF J-3 MACV CAME BY FOR A BRIEFING AT THE WING. HIS  
 REACTION TO THE BRIEF WAS AS TO BE EXPECTED FROM ONE AS FAMILIAR  
 AS HE WITH OUR CAPABILITY, PERFORMANCE AND BACKGROUND. I COULD  
 SEE NO POINT TO THIS REQUEST FOR THIS BRIEF UNTIL WE GOT ON THE  
 SUBJECT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. HE HAD SOME IDEAS WHICH INFERRED  
 THAT THE AIR REQUEST SYSTEM IS UNSATISFACTORY IN THE PCV AREA.  
 HE SAID IT WAS SO LABORIOUS, THE CONSUMING AND TO SOME EXTENT  
 UNNECESSARY, IN THAT ALLOCATIONS WERE BASICALLY MADE WITHOUT THE  
 REQUEST ANYWAY. HE QUESTIONED THE STAFF ON WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF  
 A PROCEDURE, WHICH REDUCED TO ITS-BASICS, WOULD BE ONE OF

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 003W S E C R E T SPECIAL  
 REQUESTING BY EXCEPTION. THAT IS TO SAY EACH DIV/CORPS AREA  
 WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RECEIVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FRAGGED SORTIES  
 A DAY, THEN THE ONLY REQUEST TO BE FORWARDED WOULD BE WHEN THEY  
 WANTED TO INCREASE OR DECREASE THIS REGULARLY FRAGGED NUMBER,  
 WITH THE NECESSARY JUSTIFICATION. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD  
 THOUGHT A GREAT DEAL ON THIS SUBJECT AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION  
 THAT HE WAS GOING TO PURSUE IT AT THE MACV LEVEL. IT IS AN  
 INTERESTING APPROACH BUT STILL DOES NOT ALTER THE SUPPLIER  
 ORIENTATION OF THE ARMY AIR FORCE SYSTEM. IT MERELY TRIES TO  
 LIVE WITH THE DEFECT AND MAKE IT MORE WORKABLE AND RESPONSIVE.

4. IN VIEW OF DAILY REPORT BEING SUBMITTED, TRENDS AND OBSER-  
 VATIONS WILL BE SUMMARIZED THEREIN AND THIS REPORT WILL BE  
 DISCONTINUED AS OF THIS DATE.

GP-3  
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#36	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/8		6	COMUSMACV SERIAL 871944Z APR COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1		4/8		Q	<b>FOR</b>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			081610	4/8	DM D-W	
S/C						LEGEND A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"# 3 & 4 burned 5 Nov 68"

# 35



**CONFIDENTIAL****FOR**

VV SAA227  
 OFTCZYUW RUEOESF0831 0982127-CCCC--RUMSAK RUMSAW.  
 DERUEPWW 1229 0982000  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 071944Z APR 68 ZFF-3  
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND TDZ WASHINGTON DC  
 TO RUMSAK/LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG RVN  
 INFO RUMSAW/GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV SAIGON  
 RUHFBB/CG 3D AIR DIV GUAM  
 RUHGUL/CMDR SEVENTHFLT  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE CAP80739

WHILE CONFERRING WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN WASHINGTON, I RECEIVED NEWS OF THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION PEGASUS THAT HAS RELIEVED KHE SANH. TO ALL TROOPS IN THE ASSAULT OR IN SUPPORT-- ARMY, MARINE, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY, I EXTEND MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS AND ASK THAT THESE BE PASSED ON TO THE ASSOCIATED VIETNAMESE UNITS. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY PRIDE AND SATISFACTION TO ALL THOSE--VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN--WHO MANNED THE KHE SANH BASE DURING THE TWO AND ONE HALF MONTHS OF SIEGE, WHO KEPT THE BASE SUPPLIED, WHO BROUGHT THE DECISIVE AIR POWER TO BEAR ON THE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS OF THE ENEMY WITH DETERMINATION AND SKILL, AND WHO HAVE NOW RELIEVED THE BASE AND GAINED THE INITIATIVE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS OPERATION

PAGE 2RUEPWW 1229 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 PINNED DOWN MORE THAN TWO DIVISIONS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TROOPS AT A CRUCIAL PHASE OF THEIR WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE. THESE ENEMY FORCES WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO JOIN THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND POPULATED AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEIR INTERVENTION COULD HAVE POSSIBLY ALTERED THE COURSE OF BATTLE. MY COMPLIMENTS TO THE COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS WHO PLANNED OPERATION PEGASUS AND TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN WHO HAVE CARRIED IT OUT WITH COURAGE AND PROFESSIONALISM.  
 TO ALL HANDS: WELL DONE.

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#35



001211Z ZYR EFTO  
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV SAIGON  
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG  
 INFO LTG ROSSON CG PCV PHU BAI  
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 4658 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: AUGMENTATION OF PCV STAFF

1. IN VIEW OF THE JOINT NATURE OF OUR EFFORTS IN NORTHERN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE I BELIEVE IT HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO HAVE USMC REPRESENTATION ON THE PCV STAFF. WITH AN AUGMENTATION OF MARINE OFFICERS IN THE RANK AND MOS LISTED BELOW, PCV WILL ACHIEVE WHAT I CONSIDER A DESIRABLE INTEGRATION OF THE TWO SERVICES. THIS MARINE AUGMENTATION TO HQ PCV IS SIMILAR TO AND COMPLEMENTS THE ARMY AUGMENTATION OF 26 OFFICERS NOW ON YOUR STAFF.

GRADE	DUTY	MOS
08	DEP CG	9903
03	AIDE-DE-CAMP	9910
06	DEP COFS	9906
05	ASST G2	0202
04	ASST G2 AIR	0202
05	ASST G3	0302
04	ASST G3 AIR	9912
04	ASST G3 P&O	0302
04	ASST G3 P&O	0302
06	ASST G4 (NOTE)	0906
04	ASST G4 PLANS	0402
04	ASST SIG OP OFF	2502

(NOTE) TO BECOME G4 UPON DEPARTURE OF INCUMBENT

2. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE THESE OFFICERS SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE O/A 1 MAY 68 ON A TDY BASIS. IT IS SUGGESTED THEY BE ROTATED AFTER APPROXIMATELY 180 DAYS BY PROVIDING A QUALIFIED REPLACEMENT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

280

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED  
 "EFTO"

#34

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/7/68		le	GEN ABRAMS
DCG	3		4/8/68		gll	SERIAL 070117Z APR 68
DCG AIR	4		4-8		FD	COPIES OF COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	1.		4/7/68		G	SUBJECT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
DC/S			4/8/68		pr	REMARKS
DC/S DM						<p>G-3, Please get in this one as it is only work w/ PCV and Floor group of                       COPY SENT TO G-3 FOR ACTION (C/S rate) 071530H <sup>UP</sup> JAVE</p> <p># 32</p>
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			07/1/45		DRW	LEGEND
S/C				4/8		A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
						C - COMMENTS
						I - INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"# 204 burned  
6 Nov 68"

# 32

~~CONFIDENTIAL EYE 177-3~~

~~FM ADVANCE DEPARTMENT~~

TO PALMER DCG USARV

CUSHMAN CG III MAF

WEYAND CG II FFV

PEERS ACTING CG I FFV

ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS

INFO ROSSON CG PCV

WILLIAMS CG 1ST AVN BDE/USARV

TOLSON CG 1ST CAV DIV

ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 04633 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

1. COMBAT DAMAGE, PERSONNEL CASUALTIES AND ENEMY INTERRUPTION OF NIGHT MAINTENANCE DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS HAVE STRAINED THE CAPABILITY OF US ARMY AVIATION UNITS TO ACCOMPLISH ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE OF AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT. THE RESULT IS REFLECTED IN LOWERED AVAILABILITY AND IN INCREASING ACCIDENT RATES.

2. ~~EXCEPT WHERE INDICATED, EACH AIRCRAFT WILL BE STOOD DOWN WITH~~  
~~COMPLETE CARE OVER A 24-HOUR PERIOD EACH WEEK FOR MAINTENANCE~~  
~~TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE STAFF~~  
~~OF COMPANY SIZE UNITS. MAXIMUM COMMAND AND TECHNICAL~~  
~~SUPERVISION WILL BE PROVIDED DURING THE STAND-DOWN PERIODS.~~

3. ~~BY THE~~ I FFV, II FFV, SA IV CORPS FOR 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE UNITS UNDER THEIR OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND EACH UNIT HAVING ORGANIC AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED ~~WILL DETERMINE WHICH COMPANIES CAN BE~~  
~~STOOD DOWN BY COMPANY AND WHICH COMPANIES MUST ACCOMPLISH THE~~  
~~STAND-DOWN BY INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT. IN THE CASE OF STAND-DOWN BY~~  
~~COMPANY, THE HEADQUARTERS LISTED ABOVE WILL PUBLISH A STAND-DOWN~~  
~~SCHEDULE. IN THE CASE OF UNITS THAT MUST STAND-DOWN BY INDIVIDUAL~~  
~~AIRCRAFT TO CONTINUOUSLY ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSIONS, THE UNIT WILL~~  
~~PUBLISH ITS OWN STAND-DOWN SCHEDULE.~~

4. AIRCRAFT AND UNITS SCHEDULED FOR OR IN STAND-DOWN STATUS WILL NOT BE COMMITTED EXCEPT FOR TACTICAL EMERGENCIES APPROVED AT III MAF/FFV LEVEL.

5. THE IMPROVEMENT IN MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES ACHIEVABLE BY THE ABOVE PROGRAM SHOULD INCREASE OVER-ALL AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY AND PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMBAT CAPABILITIES.

6. ~~I FEEL THAT THE ABOVE EMERGENCY PROGRAM IS NECESSARY AS~~  
~~AN INTERIM MEASURE IF WE ARE TO RESTORE OUR US ARMY AVIATION~~  
~~CAPABILITY TO PRE-TET OPERATIONAL READINESS LEVELS AND PRESERVE THESE~~  
~~PRECIOUS, IRREPLACEABLE ASSETS. I ASK EACH ADDRESSEE TO GIVE~~  
~~THIS HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION.~~

SSD NOTE: DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS

33

# 32

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/7/68		<i>[initials]</i>	COMUSMACV, SAIGON
DCG	3		4/8/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SERIAL 040652Z APR68 COPY #1 OF 1 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT M16 RIFLES FOR RVNAF (U)
C/S	1.		4/7/68		<i>[initials]</i>	REMARKS (NOTE: THIS MSG PASSED TO III MAF HQTRS BY III MAF LIAISON IN SAIGON FOR INFO.)
DC/S						<p><i>S/S</i></p> <p><i>This should be passed to FHPFAE. It will have an impact on possible equip act on USMC program - particularly our support units</i></p> <p><i>Yan Huyen</i></p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>6 apr</i>		<i>[initials]</i>	
S/C						

**SECRET**

#31

**SECRET**

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNICATION CENTER				LOCAL DISTRIBUTION						
PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>				0537D 483 0950720 0730 ZFF-6 c				C/S	1-8	SJS	X	ST	X	
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE					J1	10-11	J2	X	C11B		
TYPE TRANSMISSION		TO	INFO					J3	(AV) 2-14	J4	15-17			
ELECTRICAL		X	X						3		X			
AIR MAIL								J5		J6				
COURIER								PRECEDENCE		ACTIV		NAG		
ACTION TO: PRIORITY		<b>DTG 040652Z APR 68</b>				AFGP		NAVFORV						
INFO: PRIORITY						AG		OICC						
FROM: COMUSMACV, SAIGON TO: CSA RUEFW D INFO: CJCS RUEPJS CINCPAC RUHKA CINCUSARPAC RUHKA SECRET 09450 FOR GEN JOHNSON INFO GEN WHEELER, ADM SHARP, AND GEN BEACH FROM GEN WESTMORELAND Sugj: M16 Rifles for RVNAF (U) 1. (S) On 7 January 1968, you were informed by other means of the proposed equal issue of M16 rifles to USARV and RVNAF each month. Your concurrence in such issue was given. 2. (S) Current evaluation indicates that RVNAF morale and aggressiveness are both above the pre-TET level. To capitalize on this and to lend impetus to RVNAF operations, every effort must be made to expedite the provision of improved weaponry. To implement this concept locally and to achieve a better utilization of these scarce assets, it is considered appropriate to divert a portion of the M16A1 rifles currently allocated to US combat support and combat service support units to RVNAF combat units. It is believed that the				AMEMB		PM								
				CBPAC		SJA								
				CH		SOG								
				COC		18-19		SURG						
				COMB STUDIES				TMA						
				COMPT				TNG						
				DOD SPEC REP				USAID						
				FWMAO				USARV 20-34		X				
				HC				1FFVLNO 35		X				
				IG				11 FFVLNO 36-38		X				
JRATA				111 MAFLNO		X 39								
JUSPAO				5TH SF LNO										
MACDC				7TH AF										
MACON				MACMA		X 40								
MACPD				CORDS		X 41-42								
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL JAMES W. CAMPBELL MAJ USA Opns Staff Officer, J311 2437			R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE <i>W. C. Westmoreland</i> TYPED NAME AND TITLE W. C. WESTMORELAND General, USA, COMUSMACV									
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>				PAGE NO. 1	NO OF PAGES 2		COPY NO. #31 59						

**SECRET**

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM  
CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

basis of issue should be modified to provide 75% of the available rifles to RVNAF and 25% to USARV. Under present allocations, issue of M16 rifles to ARVN combat units is not expected to be completed until well into the 1st Quarter of FY69. The proposed revised allocation should complete that issue by the end of FY68.

3. (S) No further allocation of M16 rifles has been received but it is considered absolutely essential to begin an early issue of these rifles to RF/PF combat units. These small units are particularly vulnerable to VC actions but contribute much to the overall security situation. The psychological impact of beginning early issue of M16 rifles to RF/PF will be great. The revised allocation will allow that issue to begin about 1 Jul 68.

4. (S) It is strongly recommended that approval be given for immediate implementation of the 25/75 issue of M16 rifles.

GP 4

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

OFFICE SYMBOL

MACJ311

PAGE  
NR.

2

NR. OF  
PAGES

2



~~TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG FMFPAC	
		SERIAL	
		062147Z APR 68	COPYZ 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
4/7	D. Waegm	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
4/7	C/S Has seen orig	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/7	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/9	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/9	D. h. Fur		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#80



**CONFIDENTIAL**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMMWAA  
 DE RUMMFMA 1251 0972147  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 06214Z APR 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUEBHQA/CMC  
 INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L . SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN  
 INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE  
 CORPS EYES ONLY

- A. CG III MAF 060634Z/APR 68 (C) (SPECAT)  
 1. I CONCUR IN THE RECOMMENDATION MADE IN REFERENCE  
 A. INCIDENTALLY, WE HAVE A NAVY CROSS IN THE WORKS  
 FOR HIM, AWAITING ONLY A COUPLE OF FACTS.  
 2. LOWDS' RTD IS 6AUG 68.

GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOGOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURC.								#30	

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN ABRAMS
CG	_____					SERIAL 061734Z
						COPY# 1 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	_____					SUBJECT ARMED FORCES RADIO BROADCASTS
DCG AIR	_____					REMARKS <i>7 copies</i>
C/S	<i>1</i>				<i>@</i>	<i>Opening on normal broadcast at midnight to - night, so we must have had some effect</i>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			070835		<i>DJW</i>	LEGEND A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
S/C						

**SECRET**

*"#2 to + burned 5 Nov 68"*

*#29*

0061734Z ZYH ZFF-1  
FM GEN ABRAMS, DEPCOMUSMACV  
TO LTG CUSHMAN, CG III MAF  
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 04619 EYES ONLY

I HAVE YOUR CONCERNED AND THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE CONCERNING  
THE CURRENT BROADCASTS OF THE ARMED FORCES RADIO.

I HAVE CONFERRED WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THIS SYSTEM TONIGHT AND I  
AM SATISFIED THEY ARE PRESENTING A BALANCED PICTURE OF WHAT IS NOW  
HAPPENING IN THE UNITED STATES - GOOD AND BAD WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITIES.  
WE SHOULD NEVER PROTECT OUR MEN FROM THE TRUTH BECAUSE THE VERY  
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT FOR WHICH THEY FIGHT AND SACRIFICE HAS ITS  
BASIC STRENGTH IN ITS CITIZENRY KNOWING THE FACTS. I BELIEVE THE ARMED  
FORCES RADIO IS PRESENTING A BALANCED SET OF FACTS. IT IS OUR JOB  
TO PERSERVE IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE FACTS. I WILL DIRECT NO CHANGE  
IN WHAT IS NOW PROGRAMMED FOR THE ARMED FORCES RADIO - THEY ARE DOING  
A GOOD JOB.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER FIRST WAKING HOUR  
150

NNNN

SECRET

#29

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/7/68		L	CMC SERIAL 061645Z APR 68
DCG	3		4/7/68		W	COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED SUBJECT
DCG AIR						STAFF AUGMENTATION FOR HQ III MAF (C) REMARKS
C/S	1.		4/7/68		Q	<p>(PERSONAL)</p> <p># 263 burned 5 Nov 68</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p> <p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b></p>
DC/S			4/9/68		M	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1	Let right		4/9		P	
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			070815		JW	
S/C						

#28



**CONFIDENTIAL**

070V CMC145  
RR RUNHFOA  
DE RUEBHOA7420 0971644  
ZNY CCCCC  
PAC- T - MAF  
R 061645Z APR63 ZFF-G  
FM CMC  
TO RUNHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
RUMVAA/CG III MAF  
BT

(PERSONAL)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WRULAW AND LIEUTENANT  
GENERAL CUSHMAN FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN

SUBJ: STAFF AUGMENTATION FOR HQ, III MAF (C).

1. THE 26 OFFICERS AND 61 ENLISTED PERSONNEL REQUESTED AS STAFF  
AUGMENTATION FOR HQ, III MAF, SHOULD HAVE REPORTED IN OR SHORTLY  
WILL REPORT AS THEY WERE DETACHED ON 4 MARCH WITH 15 DAYS DELAY.  
I AM PLEASED THAT THE AUGMENTATION COULD BE FURNISHED.

2. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE TWO OFFICER OPERATIONS ANALYSTS IS BEING  
STAFFED. WE WILL PROVIDED THESE OFFICERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  
YOU REALIZE THAT OUR SUPPLY OF TRAINED OPERATIONS ANALYSTS IS  
CRITICAL.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-56)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#28



O 060834Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV  
 TO LTG PALMER DCG USARV  
 LIG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 LIG WEYAND CG II FFV  
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ  
 MG PEERS CG I FFV  
 RADM VETH CNFV/CHNAG  
 MG WORLEY ACTG CDR 7TH AF  
 ZEM

*FM:*

S E C R E T MAC 04599 EYES ONLY

I REALIZE THAT RACIAL PROBLEMS AMONG OUR MEN IN  
 SOUTH VIETNAM ARE FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES INSIGNIFICANT.  
 NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS MUCH OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR WE DO NOT  
 ALWAYS CLEARLY PERCEIVE. WHILE I HAVE NO BASIS FOR FEELING  
 AS I DO, THERE IS IN MY OPINION A POSSIBILITY THAT THE RACIAL  
 UNREST NOW EXHIBITING ITSELF IN OUR COUNTRY COULD IN SOME  
 WAY INFECT OUR OWN MEN. I ASSUME THAT WE HAVE A FEW WHO  
 WOULD BE DISPOSED TO FAN IT AND FEED IT. I DESIRE THEN THAT  
 ALL COMMANDERS BE ALERT AND ESPECIALLY WATCHFUL FOR ANY  
 SIGNS OF RACIAL UNREST OR DISTURBANCE AND THAT PROMPT,  
 EFFECTIVE AND APPROPRIATE ACTION BE TAKEN.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
 1 0

*jk*



NNNN

SECRET

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
CG						SERIAL 050339Z APR 68 1, 2, AND 4 COPIES OF 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
DCG AIR						REMARKS Copy #2 to DC6 Air 081015H Mar 68 M  EYES ONLY  Copy to Air Control 5 Apr 68  LEGEND A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION
C/S						
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

**SECRET**

# 24



0050339Z L  
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV  
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
ZEM

SECRET MAC 04545 EYES ONLY

1. YOUR MESSAGE TO ME DISCUSSING CERTAIN AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS TIMELY AND CONSTRUCTIVE. SEVERAL OF YOUR POINTS HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION AS THE SYSTEM HAS PROGRESSED SINCE IT WAS IMPLEMENTED FULLY ON 21 MARCH 1968.

2. IMPLEMENTATION: IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT CERTAIN TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED IN THE RAPID INTEGRATION OF TWO DIFFERENT AIR-GROUND SYSTEMS. I BELIEVE MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN A SHORT TIME. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM IS WORKING MORE SMOOTHLY EACH DAY AND THAT ALL CONCERNED ARE MAKING GENUINE EFFORTS TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES AS THEY ARISE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WITH STRONG SUPPORT BY ALL CONCERNED THE SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THE TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES THAN WAS ACHIEVEABLE PREVIOUSLY.

3. MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM: IN THE DESIGN OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT CERTAIN FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CONTROL SYSTEM MUST BE USED IN A COMPLEMENTARY ROLE TO ASSURE COMPLETE COVERAGE IN FIRE SUPPORT AND ARTILLERY WARNING COORDINATION. THE COMMUNICATIONS REDUNDANCY IT PROVIDES IS EQUALLY VALUABLE.

4. REQUEST SYSTEM: THERE IS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH TACTICAL AIR CAPABILITY IN THE RVN TO PROVIDE ALL COMMANDERS ALL THE AIR SUPPORT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. HENCE, THE RESOURCES MUST BE ALLOCATED BY COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR PRIORITIES. THE PLANNING ALLOCATIONS PROVIDED DAILY BY MACV TASE (J3 AIR) REFLECT THE BEST AVAILABLE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBERS OF FLIGHTS (TOTS) THAT ARE EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE TO FULFILL PREPLANNED REQUESTS. THEY REPRESENT THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS BY TYPE, NIGHT AND DAY, THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED FROM MAJOR COMMANDS BY MACV J3 AIR, WHICH RECEIVES OVER 250 REQUESTS DAILY. TO ACCEPT ANY ADDITIONAL REQUESTS WOULD UNNECESSARILY OVERBURDEN COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS AND DELAY THE PROCESSING OF REQUESTS THAT CAN BE APPROVED WITHIN AVAILABLE RESOURCES. HOWEVER, MACV J3 AIR ALWAYS RECORDS THE NUMBER OF VALID REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT THAT MAJOR COMMANDS STATE THEY WOULD SUBMIT IF ADDITIONAL AIR SUPPORT WERE AVAILABLE.

*We should  
continue to  
require comds  
to fund their  
full requirements*

#24(1)

DECLASSIFIED

#24(1)

DECLASSIFIED

5. A. THE FAC REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS WAS IMPOSED BY CDR, 7AF BASED ON MANY "SHORT ROUND" EXPERIENCES WHEN THIS WAS NOT A REQUIREMENT. WITH THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF TACTICAL FIGHTER ACTIVITY, GUN SHIP II AND ARC LIGHT IN THE NIAGARA AREA, AND IMPROVING WEATHER CONDITIONS, IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THE UNIQUE SYSTEMS CAPABILITY OF THE ASA COULD BE EXPLOITED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT BY EMPLOYMENT IN RP-1 AND TALLY HO. THE DETECTION AND ATTACK OF MOVING TARGETS WITH THE ASA IN THOSE AREAS WOULD BEST SERVE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF RESTRICTING MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TROOPS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES INTO QUANG TRI PROVINCE FROM THE NORTH. THE VALUE OF ASA EQUIPMENT IN THE INTERDICTION ROLE IS WELL RECOGNIZED, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT SOUND JUDGMENT IS BEING APPLIED IN SUCH DECISIONS.

B. THE SCRAMBLE AND DIVERT AUTHORITY PROCEDURES ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE TOTAL REQUIREMENT, WHEN THE SITUATION SO DEMANDS. CONSEQUENTLY, SCRAMBLES AND DIVERTS MUST BE CONTROLLED WITHIN THE MECHANICS OF THE SYSTEM. THERE IS LOCAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE SYSTEM AT I DASC LEVEL TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO III MAF REQUIREMENTS, COMPLETELY BACKED UP BY THE TOTAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE THROUGH THE TACC. MOST CERTAINLY, THE GS AIR AT III MAF MUST MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE MECHANICS OF THE I DASC OPERATION IN ORDER TO ASSURE YOU THAT SUPPORT PROVIDED THROUGH THAT AGENCY IS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR NEEDS. IN YOUR PERIODIC ASSESSMENTS OF THE SYSTEM, I WOULD EXPECT TO HEAR FROM YOU ON THIS, IF THE I DASC OPERATION FALLS SHORT IN ANY RESPECT.

yes!

I can't  
buy this

← keep books!

#24(2)

DECLASSIFIED

C. SORTIE RATE. ON 10 MARCH THE 1ST MAW INFORMED 7AF THAT IT WAS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A 1.2 SORTIE RATE WHICH EQUATES TO APPROXIMATELY 190 SORTIES PER DAY. 1ST MAW FURTHER STATED THAT NORMALLY 162 SORTIES SHOULD BE PREPLANNED, THE REMAINING 28 SORTIES BEING SET ASIDE FOR SCRAMBLES. THIS HAS IMPOSED A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF MARINE SORTIES THAT CAN BE ALLOCATED TO YOU FOR SUPPORT OF YOUR FORCES. IF 1ST MAW IS PROVISIONED FOR AND CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A HIGHER SORTIE RATE THAN 1.2, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THE SORTIE RATE TO ANY LEVEL THE 1ST MAW IS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING. ALLOCATIONS FROM MACV TASE TO SUPPORT OF I CTZ WOULD BE INCREASED ACCORDINGLY. GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

835

NNNU

*What's good  
for the Goose  
is not good  
for the Gander*

*Recommend  
transmission to  
Jut Pac J  
Am C Vazpy G  
# 24(3)*

*yes* →

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

# 24(3)

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/6/68		le	COMUSMACV SERIAL 2502007 APR COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/6/68		YW	SUBJECT FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>
C/S	1		4/5/68		Q	
DC/S			4/6/68		DW	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			051240	4/6	SJH DWW	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE  
 C - COMMENTS  
 I - INFORMATION

"# 364 burned  
 5 Nov 68"

# 23



UNNNZCZCSAAS2VV Z

FOR

VV AUB782  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAV 0676D 0960226  
 ZNR UUUUU ZOK JPCCO  
 P 050200Z APR 68 ZFF-6  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMSAK/CG 3D MARDIV  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV  
 BT

UNCLAS 09534  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG TOMPKINS, INFO LEG CUSHMAN,  
 LTG ROSSON.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE  
 CONGRATULATIONS TO G/2/4 USMC FOR OUTSTANDING EFFORTS ESE OF  
 GIA LINH ON 2 MARCH. LARGE AMOUNT OF ENEMY AMMO SEIZED PAR-  
 TICULARLY NOTEWORTHY. WELL DONE!  
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	Compt.	Adj.	Chap.	CEO
CIB	COC	Dent.O.	Emb.	Engr.	Fd.Serv.	HQ Comdt.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	Postal	Protocol	PMO
Psy. Ops.	Spl. Serv.	Sup.	Surg.								#23	



**CONFIDENTIAL**

FILE 22 JUN 68

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CMC	
		SERIAL 041617Z APR 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
4/5	<i>D. Wagner</i>	SUBJECT CAPTAIN CHARLES ROBB	
4/5	<i>C/S has seen D/W</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
SS	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT

SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#22

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR RUMWAA RUMHLA RUHFMA  
DE RUEBHOA6131 0951623  
ZNY CCCCC  
FMFPAC-I- RUMWAA CT III MAF-I- RUMHLACG 1ST MARDIV  
R 041617Z APR 68  
FM CMC  
TO RUMHLA/CG 1ST MARDIV  
INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
BT

**EXCLUSIVE**  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**CONFIDENTIAL** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FOR MAJGEN ROBERTSON INFO LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM  
GEN CHAPMAN  
CAPTAIN CHARLES ROBB

A. CG 1ST MARDIV SPECAT MSG 030701Z APR 68

1. REF (A) RAISES LARGER QUESTION OF PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED SHOULD CAPT ROBB BECOME A CASUALTY. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WOULD POSE THE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM OF NOTIFICATION OF NEXT OF KIN TO THEIR RECEIPT OF SUCH INFORMATION VIA PRESS CHANNELS.

2. THEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WILL APPLY:

A. SUBMIT FLASH MESSAGE AND TELEPHONIC REPORT OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO THIS HEADQUARTERS (MARINE CORPS COMMAND CENTER.)

B. SUBMIT NORMAL CASREPS VIA NORMAL CHANNELS.

C. REQUEST NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES TO HOLD STORIES UNTIL NOK CAN BE NOTIFIED.

D. DENY ANY REQUEST OF CAPT ROBB THAT NOK NOT BE NOTIFIED.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#22

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	B		4/5/68		b	CG THIRD MARDIV
DCG	3		4/4/68		W	SERIAL 041435Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4				A	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
C/S	1		4/5/68		Q	REMARKS 4/5 I concur. b.
DC/S			4/8/68		R	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			050550	4/2	DUU	
S/C						

**FOR**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

"# 3 & 4 burned 5 Nov 68"

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

721

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FILE 52 CON 071

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
		CG THIRD MARDIV	
		SERIAL	COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
		SUBJECT	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
4/5	<i>DW Cooper</i>		
4/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/5	<i>C/S As seen DW</i>		
4/7	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/5/68	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/8/68	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/C	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 4 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#21

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

**FOR**

RR RUMHVA  
DE RUMHVP 1029D 0951435  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 041435Z APR 68  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

////C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT////MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN TOMPKINS.

1. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE FOLLOWING BE CONSIDERED FOR POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION TO CMC.

2. COL DAVID E. LOWNDS AND HIS TWENTY-SIXTH MARINES AT KHE SANH HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL POINT OF VIETNAM NEWS SINCE 21JAN68. DUE TO THE FIRST AIR CAV'S COMMENCEMENT OF RECENT OPERATIONS, HIS NEWS VALUE IS RAPIDLY DIMINISHING.

3. HIS NEWS VALUE TO THE MARINE CORPS IS STILL GOOD AND CAN BE GREATLY ENHANCED ON THE SPEAKERS CIRCUIT REPRESENTING THE AMERICANS AT KHE SANH AND AS THE MARINE COMMANDER WHO THWARTED GEN GIAP'S PLANS TO MAKE KHE SANH A SECOND DIEN BIEN PHU.

4. RECENT NEWS ARTICLES HAVE REFERRED TO THE MARINES AT KHE SANH AS "FRIGHTENED AND DEMORALIZED". COL LOWNDS' PERSONAL APPEARANCES AND TALKS WOULD SERVE TO DISPELL THESE FALSE IMPRESSIONS BY TELLING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THE TRUTH ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE'S COURAGE, HIGH MORALE AND STATE OF READINESS.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 1029D C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MCEO

5. COL LOWNDS HAS BEEN IN COUNTRY FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN MONTHS AND IS SLATED FOR DUTY IN WASHINGTON. SINCE HIS TOUR AS A REGIMENTAL COMMANDER IS NEARLY OVER IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT HE BE PLACED ON THE SPEAKERS CIRCUIT NOW WHILE KHE SANH IS STILL PROMINENT.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PWO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#21

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
						GEN WESTMORELAND
CG	2		4/4/68		<i>JP</i>	SERIAL 041011Z MAR68 1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/5/68		<i>JP</i>	SUBJECT MAC 04534 EYES ONLY
DCG AIR	4			4.5	<i>A</i>	REMARKS
C/S	1		4/4/68		<i>Q</i>	
DC/S			4/5/68		<i>R</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			041930	4/5	<i>JP</i>	
S/C						

*"# 2 + burned 5 Nov 68"*

**LEGEND**  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**

O 041011Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON  
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFV  
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS  
 MG PEERS ACG I FFV  
 MG WORLEY ACDR 7AF  
 RADM VETH CMDR NAVFOR VEITNAM  
 INFO ZEN/GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV  
 LTG PALMER DCG USARV  
 ZEN/BG BRYAN ACOFS MACV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 04534 EYES ONLY

1. AT THE UNIT COMMANDERS MEETING WITH OUR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS LAST SUNDAY, 31 MARCH, THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF AN IMMEDIATE AND SUSTAINED GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ENEMY IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS DISCUSSED. SINCE OUR MEETING, THERE HAVE BEEN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM WHICH WILL INEVITABLY RAISE QUESTIONS BY THE VIETNAMESE.

2. I DESIRE THAT YOU SIEZE THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE TO YOUR COUNTERPARTS THAT THE GUIDANCE GIVEN AT THE UNIT COMMANDERS MEETING STILL PERTAINS AND IS OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAINTAIN MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY IN THE SOUTH.

3. IF THE ENEMY DOES CHOOSE TO TALK, HE WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO GAIN AN EARLY PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE BY SOME SPECTACULAR ACTION OR SIGNIFICANT BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS. I EXPECT YOU TO PREEMPT ANY SUCH ENEMY INITIATIVE BY ALERT INTELLIGENCE AND TIMELY SPOILING OPERATIONS.

4. MAXIMUM PRESSURE AT THIS TIME COULD DEMORALIZE THE ENEMY IN THE SOUTH AND BRING ABOUT AN UNPRECEDENTED DEFECTION RATE. WE MUST DO ALL POSSIBLE TO ENCOURAGE THIS RESULT.

5. I EXPECT YOUR TROOPS AND THOSE OF YOUR COUNTERPARTS TO CONTINUE TO MARCH FORWARD WITH EVEN GREATER ZEAL AND AGGRESSIVENESS. WE MUST CAPITALIZE ON THE OPPORTUNITY. THE STAKES ARE HIGH.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS  
 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: GEN WESTMORELAND DESIRES THIS MESSAGE  
 BE DELIVERED TO ALL ADDRESSEES DURING WAKING HRS THIS DATE  
 310

SECRET

#20



0040931Z ZYH ZFF-1  
FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV  
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
ZEM

SECRET MAC 04527 EYES ONLY

I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT III MAF 5 APRIL 1968. ARRIVE  
DANANG 1000 HOURS, STAFF BRIEFING, GO TO PROV CORPS,  
STAFF BRIEFING AND LUNCH. VISIT 1ST CAV AND 3 MAR DIV IF  
PRACTICAL AND BACK TO DANANG FOR DEPARTURE AT 1600.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
100

*lo*

MMW

SECRET

#19

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/4/68		M	CG PCV PHU BAI RVN SERIAL 031339Z APR COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		4/5/68		M	SUBJECT FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
DCG AIR						REMARKS  <b>FLASH</b>  <b>FOR</b>  <i>"#3 - 4 burned 5 Nov 1968"</i>  LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
C/S	1		4/4/68		C	
DC/S			4/5/68		R	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			032230		M	
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

FILE 37 CCM 048

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG RCY PHU BAI RVN	
		SERIAL 031339Z APR	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
30 April	AH Stinson	SUBJECT FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN	
4/4	<i>lp</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/4	<i>C/S Acc seen DAN.</i>		
4/5	<i>JM</i>		
4/5	<i>JK</i>		
EDRX			
S/S	COPY 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6		
	COPY 6 OF 6		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT

SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#18

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

NNNNVZCZC420  
 \*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUMMWAA  
 DE RUMHMA 887 0941353  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 Z 031339Z APR 68  
 FM CG PCV PHU BAI RVN  
 TO ZEN/CG 1ST ACD TAC CP LZ STUD  
 INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF DANANG RVN  
 BT

**FOR FLASH**

**S E C R E T 00710**  
 FOR MG TOLSON FROM LT GEN ROSSON INFO LT GEN  
 CUSHMAN  
 BG TROUNG CONCURS WITH THE CONCEPT FOR USE OF ARVN FORCES  
 TO LINK UP WITH KHE SANH. ONE COMPANY OF THE ARVN AIRBORNE  
 TASK FORCE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THE QUANG TRI BIVOUAC  
 SITE ON THE MORNING OF 4 APRIL. CARRY ON.  
 GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#18	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/7/68	4/8/68	LP	CG THIRD MARDIV
DCG	3		4/8/68		JP	SERIAL 030400Z APR COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT COFRAM, USE OF
G/S	1.		4/7/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S			4/8/68		P	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p><i>"# 203 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p> <p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b></p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			040630	4/8	DPK	
S/C						

**EXCLUSIVE**

*"# 203 burned 5 Nov 68"*

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C- COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FILE 91 CCN 052

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG THIRD MARDIV	
		SERIAL 050400Z APR	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
4/4	DW Wagner	SUBJECT COFRAM, USE OF	
4/7	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/7	C/S Dan Sam DW.		
4/8	DW Wagner		
s/s	COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
#17

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**EXCLUSIVE**

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED  
PORTION OF TEXT AS RECEIVED  
WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST

O 030400Z APR 68  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM  
MAJ GEN TOMPKINS.  
COFRAM, USE OF.

- A. CG III MAF 261406Z JAN 68-
- B. CG III MAF 300354Z JAN 68-NOTAL

1. IN VIEW OF RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON EMPLOYMENT OF SUBJECT  
MUNITIONS BY REFS A AND B, IT IS FELT THAT LIMITATIONS ARE  
NOT OF A NATURE TO INHIBIT FULL EMPLOYMENT OF COFRAM MUNITIONS  
WHEN TARGETS OF A SUITABLE NATURE ARE PRESENTED.

2. THE NEWNESS OF THIS MUNITION IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A  
CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE RELATIVELY SMALL EXPENDITURE.  
NEVERTHELESS, THERE MAY BE INSTANCES WHEN PERSONNEL ARE RELUCTANT  
TO EMPLOY THESE MUNITIONS WHEN, IN THE EXPEYIENBE, CONVENTIONAL  
ORDNANCE IS COMPLETELY ADEQUATE. CONTINUING EDUCATION AND  
INDOCTRINATION AS WELL AS INCREASING FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE  
VARIOUS TYPES OF SUCH MUNITIONS WILL OVERCOME THIS NATURAL  
REACTION. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTED INSTANCES WHEN INSUFFICIENT  
COFRAM WAS PLACED ON A SUITABLE TARGET.

3. THE LACK OF TARGETS OF A SUITABLE NATURE CERTAINLY IS THE  
MOST PREDOMINATE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE RELATIVELY LOW  
EXPENDITURES OF COFRAM MUNITIONS BY THIS DIVISION.

GP-4  
BT

*Handwritten note:*  
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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMOT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#17

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/4/68		<i>JD</i>	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN SERIAL 030701Z APR 68 COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/5/68		<i>JD</i>	SUBJECT CAPT C.S. ROBB II 082102
DCG AIR	4			4-5	<i>A</i>	REMARKS
C/S	1		4/3/68		<i>JD</i>	<p><i>S/S See that Gen Kaulak's file has a copy of this msg.</i></p> <p><i>Delivered to Major Kurylow at 032130Z Apr 68 by Comms Unit</i></p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p><i>Done. DW.</i></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p><i>"# 2+3 burned 6/10/68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			4/8/68		<i>JD</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			032015H	4/5	<i>JD</i>	
S/C..						

SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN	
		SERIAL 030701Z APR 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
3 April	<i>[Signature]</i>	SUBJECT CAPT C.S. ROBB II 002102	
	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/5/68	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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**TOP SECRET**

SECRET

DE RUMHLA 0360 0940701  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 030701Z APR 68 ZFF-1  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
INFO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC  
RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FOR GEN CHAPMAN; INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN THARIN FROM MGEN ROBERTSON  
SUBJ: CAPT C. S. ROBB II 082102

1. CAPT ROBB REPORTED FOR DUTY WITH FIRST MARDIV AT 031320H APRIL 1968. CURRENTLY UNDERGOING BRIEFING AND ORIENTATION AT THE DIVISION COMMAND POST TOGETHER WITH OTHER NEWLY JOINED OFFICERS.

2. TOMORROW CAPT ROBB WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE 7TH MARINES FOR DUTY. HE WILL BE GIVEN ADDITIONAL BRIEFING AND ORIENTATION AT THE REGIMENT AND BATTALION COMMAND POSTS PRIOR TO EVENTUAL ASSIGNMENT AS THE COMMANDER OF COMPANY "I" 3RD BN, 7TH MARINES ON OR ABOUT 6 APRIL.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#16

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG FIRST NAV SERIAL 030300Z APR 68 COPY# 05 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DCG AIR						REMARKS  #2 burned 5/10/68  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  Copy #3 to Air Control 4 Apr 68 TM  LEGEND A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
C/S						
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/4/68		J	CG FIRST MAW
DCG	3		4/5/68		GM	SERIAL 030300Z APR 68 COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4			4-5	H	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
C/S	1.		4/3/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S			4/5/68		R	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			032015	4/5	<del>GM</del>	
S/C						

LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C-COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG FIRST MAW	
		SERIAL 030300Z APR 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
3 April	VH Anderson	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
4/3	D Wagner	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/4	lp		
4/4	C/S Has seen DAW		
4/5	M		
4/5	Maj Gen NJ Anderson <sup>Has Seen</sup>		
4/5	D. J. J...		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#15

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PP RUEBHOA  
 DE RUMSAV 01GW 0940300  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 030300Z APR 68  
 FM CG FIRST MAW  
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR FMFPAC (F-004)  
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1

- A. CG FMAW 272350Z MAR68
- B. CG III MAF 311556Z MAR68 (NOTAL)
- C. CG FMFPAC 302125Z MAR68 (NOTAL)

1. THE SUBSTANCE, DEFINITION AND FORMAT OF THE DETAILED INFORMATION REQUIRED BY REF A HAS BEEN REVISED IN THE INTERESTS OF CLARITY AND IN THE HOPE OF PROVIDING MORE MEANINGFUL AND ACCURATE DATA. IT WILL BE REVISED FURTHER AS REQUIREMENTS DICTATE.
2. NOTE THAT THE VARIOUS TOTALS WHICH CAN BE DERIVED FROM SECTION I WILL NOT MATCH THOSE IN SECTION II. THIS IS BECAUSE THE GROUND

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 01GW S E C R E T SPECAT  
 COMMANDER RECEIVES HIS AIR SUPPORT FROM 1ST MAW, TF-77 AND 7TH AF, AND AT THE SAME TIME THE 1ST MAW SORTIE OUTPUT IS ALLOCATED IN PART TO OTHER THAN USMC GROUND UNITS.

3. AS YOU KNOW, THE CURRENT SYSTEM SPECIFIES THAT PREPLANNED REQUIREMENTS BE STATED IN TARGETS, WELL IN ADVANCE OF DATE/TIME NEEDED. THESE TARGETS ARE THEN FRAGGED IN TERMS OF SORTIES PER TARGET. THIS IS REFLECTED IN SECTION I C, WHICH LEADS FROM TARGET TO SORTIE, SO THAT SORTIE CAN BE USED AS A BASE ELSEWHERE IN THE DATA.

4. FOR FMFPAC - THE TIME IN ADVANCE REQUESTS HAVE TO BE IN THE HANDS OF 7AF IS CONTAINED IN REF B. THE OTHER OF YOUR SPECIFIC QUERIES IN REF C ARE INCORPORATED IN THE FOLLOWING NEW FORMAT OR ARE INDICATED IN THE REMARKS WHICH WILL BE ADDED THERETO.

5. THE FOLLOWING IS THE NEW FORMAT FOR THE SPECIAL REPORT:

SECTION I. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS (DIV)

- A. PERIOD COVERED - NORMALLY FROM 1901N TO 1900H.
- B. NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO USMC GROUND UNITS BY SERVICES:
  1. USMC
  2. USAF

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

**SECRET**

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAV ØIGW S E C R E T SPECAT

- 3. USN
- 4. OTHER (VNAF, RAAF)
- C. PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT
  - 1. NUMBER OF TARGETS THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRED HIT.
  - 2. NUMBER OF TARGETS TO BE HIT WHICH WERE ALLOCATED TO GROUND COMMANDER BY HIGHER HQTRS (PCV, III MAF).
  - 3. NUMBER OF TARGETS ALLOWED BY HIGHER HQTRS TO BE SUBMITTED.
  - 4. NUMBER OF TARGETS FRAGGED BY 7AF TO BE HIT.
  - 5. NUMBER OF SORTIES FRAGGED BY 7AF TO HIT THESE FRAGGED TARGETS.
  - 6. NUMBER OF FRAGGED TARGETS WHICH WERE HIT.
  - 7. NUMBER OF SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED.
- D. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
  - 1. WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
  - 2. WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
  - 3. WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
  - 4. MORE THAN 30 MINUTES OF SCHEDULED TIME
- E. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV ØIGW S E C R E T SPECAT

- 1. REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 2. ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 3. A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 4. AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- F. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES
  - 1. REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDER
  - 2. APPROVED BY I DASC/DASC VICTOR
  - 3. RECEIVED
- G. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED:
  - 1. WITHIN 15 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
  - 2. WITHIN 30 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
  - 3. WITHIN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
  - 4. MORE THAN 45 MINUTES AFTER ORIGINATION OF REQUEST AT BN LEVEL
- II. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES WHICH REPORTED WITH:
  - 1. REQUEST ORDNANCE

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#15	

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV S E C R E T SPECAT

- 2. ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 3. A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- 4. AN UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR REQUESTED ORDNANCE
- I. EXTRA OR UNREQUESTED SORTIES RECEIVED
- J. NUMBER OF SORTIES CONTROLLED BY:
  - 1. MARINE TACP, FAC ON GROUND
  - 2. MARINE TAC(A)
  - 3. MARINE TPQ
  - 4. AF TACP, FAC(A) OR FAC
  - 5. FLIGHT LEADER
  - 6. OTHER
- K. NUMBER OF AIR SUPPORT SORTIES APPROVED BY HIGHER GROUND HQTRS WHICH WERE NOT PROVIDED BECAUSE OF:
  - 1. LACK OF AIRCRAFT ASSETS
  - 2. COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES ABOVE DIVISION LEVEL
  - 3. OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS)
  - 4. UNKNOWN (REASON NOT PROVIDED TO GROUND UNIT BN/RGT/DIV)
- L. NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN AIR SUPPORT WAS FURNISHED BUT

PAGE SIX RUMSAV Ø16W S E C R E T SPECAT

NOT USED BY GROUND COMMANDER BECAUSE OF:

- 1. GROUND UNIT COMMUNICATION FAILURE OR DIFFICULTIES
- 2. CANCELLED BY GROUND COMMANDER
- 3. WEATHER
- 4. ASRT (TPQ) SYSTEM FAILURE
- 5. AIRCRAFT SYSTEM FAILURE (INCLUDES COM, EMERGENCIES, ORDNANCE)
- 6. DIVERTED ON GROUND COMMANDER ORDER
- 7. OTHER (SPECIFY IN PARA M, REMARKS)

M. REMARKS

- 1. OTHER REMARKS (KEYED TO SPECIFIC PARAGRAPH WHEN APPROPRIATE)

SECTION II DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING CONCERNS ONLY MARINE CORPS FIXED WING STRIKE A/C

- A. SORTIE FLOWN
    - 1. FRAGGED SORTIE FLOWN
    - 2. SCRAMBLE SORTIES
    - 3. ADD-ONS
  - B. ALL SORTIE EMPLOYMENT (AREA)
    - 1. SORTIES FLOWN IN COUNTRY
- BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

**SECRET**

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SRG.									

# 15

**SECRET**

FM RUEBNOA  
 DE RUMSAV 017W 0940300  
 ZNY 33333  
 I 030300Z APR 68  
 FM CG FIRST MAF  
 TO RUEBNOA/CMC  
 RUHKN/CG FMFPAC  
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

- S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MAR CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
2. SORTIES FLOWN OUT OF COUNTRY
  3. SORTIES FLOWN ELSEWHERE (II CORPS, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC)
  - C. FRAGGED SORTIES BREAKDOWN
    1. MARINE A/C FRAGGED IN COUNTRY
    2. MARINE A/C FRAGGED OUT OF COUNTRY
    3. OTHER (FRAGGED IN II CORPS, SPECIAL SEA MISSION, ETC)
  - D. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)
    1. NUMBER OF SORTIES SCRAMBLED BY I DASC/DASC V VIA TADC
    2. NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V

- PAGE TWO RUMSAV 017W S E C R E T SPECAT
3. NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) VIA TADC AND COORDINATED WITH I DASC/DASC V
  4. OTHER
  - E. SCRAMBLE SORTIE BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)
    1. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE REGTS/BN
    2. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY
    3. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN
    4. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC
    5. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER ICEZ FORCES, (VNAF, SSF)
    6. SCRAMBLE SORTIES IN II CORPS
    7. SCRAMBLE SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY
  - F. ADD-ON BREAKDOWN (REQUESTING AGENCY)
    1. ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY I DASC/DASC V TADC
    2. ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY MARINE DASC TO TADC
    3. ADD-ON SORTIES REQUESTED BY FAC/TAC(A) TO TADC
    4. OTHER
  - G. ADD-ON BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)
    1. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MYO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#15	

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMSAV #17W S E C R E T SPECAT  
RECTS/BU

- 2. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF US ARMY
- 3. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN
- 4. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC
- 5. ADD-ON SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER ICIZ FORCES (FWMAF, SSF)
- 6. ADD-ON SORTIES IN II CORPS
- 7. ADD-ON SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY
- H. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (TYPE OF MISSION)
  - 1. NUMBER OF FRAGGED SORTIES DIVERTED
  - 2. NUMBER OF SCRAMBLED SORTIES DIVERTED
  - 3. NUMBER OF ADD-ON SORTIES DIVERTED
  - I. DIVERT BREAKDOWN (AGENCY INITIATING DIVERT)
    - 1. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY DASC/DASC V
    - 2. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY WADC/DASC/ASRI
    - 3. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY WACC
    - 4. NUMBER OF SORTIES DIVERTED BY OTHER AGENCY
- J. REMARKS
  - 1. OTHER REMARKS (KEYED TO SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS, WHEN APPROPRIATE)

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV #17W S E C R E T SPECAT  
SECTION III SIGNIFICANT EVENTS, GROUND OR AIR COMMANDERS COMMENTS (NARRATIVE).

EXAMPLES: (1) LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS  
 (2) TARGETS FRAGGED SO FAR IN ADVANCE THAT SITUATION DICTATES DIFFERENT USE OF AIRCRAFT ON ARRIVAL  
 (3) WHEN APPROPRIATE AND SUPPORTABLE - A STATEMENT FROM BN OR DIVISION COMMANDER THAT BECAUSE HIS PREPLANNED MISSIONS WERE DIVERTED OR BECAUSE AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FAILED TO MATERIALIZE PROPERLY, THAT CASUALTIES WERE SUFFERED.  
 6. DAILY REPORTS THIS FORMAT WILL COMMENCE WITH REPORTING PERIOD ENDING 1900H 4 APRIL.  
 GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**SECRET**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 15	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	CMC
CG	2		4/2/68		lp	SERIAL	011914Z MAR 68 COPY 3 / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/2/68		QW	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR	4			4-2	F	REMARKS	CG - that settles that! V. R. J.
C/S	1		4/2/68		Q		
DC/S							
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S			020605		DW		
S/C							

**EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

"# 2 & 3 burned  
5 Nov 68"

LEGEND  
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
C- COMMENTS  
I- INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#14



CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUEBHQA4437 0921918-CCCC--RUMMWAA RUHHFMA  
ZNY CCCCC

-I- CG III MAF  
P 011914Z APR 68  
FM CMC

TO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C I A L - E X C L U S I V E F O R  
LTGEN CUSHMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM GEN CHAPMAN - MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY

1. I AM DELIGHTED TO LEARN THAT YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE NEWS MEDIA ARE EXCELLENT. AS I MENTIONED IN MY EARLIER DISPATCH I COULD NOT VOUCH FOR THE TRUTH OF THE COMMENTS; MERELY RELAYED THEM FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
2. ASSOCIATED PRESS GENERAL MANAGER WES GALLAGHER WAS NOT THE WRITER OF THE LETTER I QUOTED. IT WAS A WORKING NEWSMAN.
3. I DON'T BELIEVE HIS COMMENTS WERE DIRECTED AT THE COMMANDER HIMSELF BUT RATHER MORE AT SOME OF THE COMMANDER'S SUBORDINATES IN THE FIELD.
4. KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK. I CONSIDER CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH NEWS MEDIA OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE INASMUCH AS THEY DAILY WRITE WHAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC READS ABOUT THIS WAR.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#14