

13. CG III MAF 021014Z APR68 (MCEO) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO THARIN, INFO CHAPMAN & ANDERSON
INFO REQUESTED BY PARA 1.A. of ADMIN FMFPAC 312044Z MAR68
14. LTGEN CUSHMAN 171100Z APR68 *Gr-4*
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND
Requests extention of DELAWARE D-day to 10Apr in light of
Enemy AA positions, etc.
15. CG III MAF 260834Z APR68 *Gr-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON info WESTMORELAND
OPERATIONS (U)

- 12 ~~23~~. CG III MAF 190754Z APR68 (S) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN to ALL U.S. GENERAL OFFICERS I CORPS
QUOTES "SECURITY ON OPERATIONS" MSG FROM WESTMORELAND
- 13 ~~24~~. CG III MAF 220304Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to TOMPKINS & GLICK
GUIDANCE ON EVALUATION OF TACTICS
- 14 ~~25~~. CG III MAF 221340Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND, info SHARP
THIRTY-DAY GRIPE MSG TO COMUSMACV on AIR CONTROL
- 15 ~~26~~. CG III MAF 230150Z APR68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN to CHAPMAN & KRULAK
PASSES OUR MSG ON THIRTY-DAY DISPOSITION of AIR CONTROL
- 16 ~~27~~. CG III MAF 230520Z APR68 (S) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND info ROSSON
REPLIES to WESTY'S OPERATIONAL REPORTING DISCREPANCY MSG
- 17 ~~28~~. CG III MAF 230840Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
- 18 ~~29~~. CG III MAF 240634Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
EGEN ANDERSON to COL CODISPOTI
COURIER/MAIL SERVICE FOR HOSP SHIPS
- 19 ~~30~~. CG III MAF 250330Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to CHAPMAN & KRULAK
PASSES WESTY'S REPLY TO OUR 30-DAY DISPOSITION OF SINGLE
MANAGER SYSTEM MSG
- 20 ~~31~~. CG III MAF 251438Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON info ~~E~~ WESTMORELAND
CURRENT THREAT -- QUANG TRI, HUE, DMZ, OR KHE SANH
- 21 ~~32~~. CG III MAF 260046Z APR68 (U)
~~WXX~~ CUSHMAN to TOMPKINS, ROBERTSON, & ANDERSON & OLSON
AWARD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFICERS
- 22 ~~33~~. CG III MAF 260220Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BASE DEVELOPMENT AND REAL ESTATE (U)
- 23 ~~34~~. CG III MAF 270532Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to KRULAK
RECONSIDERING THE SLF'S
- 24 ~~35~~. CG III MAF 271148Z APR68 (U)
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND
CONTROL, TURN-IN, AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS

- ~~11. CG III MAF 110022Z APR68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
CONGRATS ON ASSIGNMENT AS COMISMACV~~
- ~~12. CG III MAF 120324Z APR68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO ADM MCCAIN
CONGRATS ON ASSIGNMENT AS CINCPAC~~
- 2 13. CG III MAF 120600Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO OLSON
Support of Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC)
- 3 14. CG III MAF 130136Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON info ANDERSON & ROBERTSON
Reduce Khe Sanh Manning to one Mar Bn
Marine units relieved assume responsibility Quang Tri
- 4 15. CG III MAF 130708Z APR68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
to FMFPAC
QUOTES PCV OPLAN Subsequent to Khe Sanh for Ashau, etc.
- 25 16. CG III MAF 130914Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON
Insurance against loss of value equipment upon WITHDRAWAL
FROM KHE SANH -- 7TH AF
- 6 17. GEN CUSHMAN 130935Z APR68 S EYES ONLY *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND
ENEMY ROAD CONSTRUCTION EFFORT DANANG TAOR -- TACAIR UTILIZATION
- 7 18. CG III MAF 131140Z APR68 (C MCEO) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO KRULAK
THANKS FOR PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION FOR PCV.
- 8 19. CG III MAF 160946Z APR68 (C) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON, info TOMPKINS, ANDERSON, & GLICK
VISIT TO KHE SANH -- INCREASED INCOMING -- LANDING HELOS
- 9 20. CG III MAF 170342Z APR68 (C) *group-4*
CUSHMAN to ABRAMS
ALLEGED LOOTING BY U. S. MARINES IN HUE
- 10 21. CG III MAF 190214Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
"SWITCH"
~~ALL COPIES IN SAFE~~
- 11 22. CG III MAF 190602Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON info TOMPKINS AND GLICK
ANALYSIS OF ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS AND EVALUATION OF WPNS
SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS - KHE SANH

- ~~18 49.~~ ~~CG III MAF 040200Z APR68 (C)~~
~~MGEN ANDERSON TO MGEN BOWKER~~
~~CONFIRMING BRUTES TRAVEL INFO~~
- 19 50. CG III MAF 060634Z APR68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN, info KRULAK
 QUOTES TOMPKINS ON SPEAKER CIRCUIT FOR COL LOWNDS
- 20 51. CG III MAF 061336Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN to ABRAMS
 RECOMMENDS SOFTENING OF ARMED FORCES RADIO
- 21 52. CG III MAF 070206Z APR 68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK & CHAPMAN
 PASSES WESTMORELAND'S REPLY TO OUR SINGLE MANAGEMENT DISPOSITION
 MESSAGE
- 22 53. CG III MAF 071000Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK info TOMPKINS
 FURTHER INPUT FOR NAVY CROSS -- COL LOWNDS
- 23 54. CG III MAF 080200Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK
 PASSES COMUSMACV MSG ON M16 RIFLES FOR RVNAF
- 24 55. CG III MAF 080752Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN to MOMYER, LAM, ROSSON, ANDERSON info TOMPKINS,
 TOLSON, OLSON, OSBORN, MCBRIDE
 passes GEN WESTMORELAND'S CONGRATULATORY MSG ON PEGASUS
- 25 56. CG III MAF 090202Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK
 MARINE AUGMENTATION PCV STAFF
- 26 57. CG III MAF 090336Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ALL US I CORPS COMMANDERS
 RESPONSE TO ALERT CONDITION.
- 27 58. CG III MAF 101002Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ROSSON
 TERMINATION OF PEGASUS
- 28 59. CG III MAF 101336Z APR68 (C MCEO). *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK info MCCUTCHEON
 PASSES COMUSMACV 151905Z MAR68; Subj: Preplanned Requests for
 Close Air Support (U)
- 29 60. CG III MAF 110112Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO LOWNDS INFO ROSSON & TOMPKINS
 CONGRATS ON KHE SANH -- HEROISM
- ~~30 61. CG III MAF 110922Z APR68 (C)~~
~~CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS~~
~~CONGRATS ON ASSIGNMENT AS COMUSMACV~~

- ~~6~~ 27. CG III MAF 200236Z MAR68 (C)
~~VAN RYZIN to RADM BEHRNS~~
~~ACCEPTS LUNCH INVITE FOR LAPP~~
- 7 28. CG III MAF 211150Z MAR68 (C)
~~CUSHMAN TO KRULAK INFO TOMPKINS~~
~~Consent in Navy Cross for LOWNDS~~
- 8 39. CG III MAF 010002Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK info TOMPKINS & LAHUE
 "DEDICATION OF CAMP HOCHMUTH"
- 9 40. CG III MAF 010018Z APR68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & KRULAK
 "RESPECTED NEWSMAN"
- 10 41. CG III MAF 010600Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN to TOMPKINS
 REVIEWING COFRAM EXPEDNTIRUES
- 11 42. CG III MAF 010658Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN to ROSSON & ANDERSON
 AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN
 "Provide Implementing Directive"
- 12 43. CG III MAF 010700Z APR68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN to ROSSON & ANDERSON
 Passes COMUSMACV 291600 Mar68 re AIR CAV CAPABILITY
- 13 44. CG III MAF 020300Z APR68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN to ROSSON, TOLSON, & COL LOWNDS
 ABRUPT DROP IN AIR SUPPORT
- ~~14 45. CG III MAF 021608Z APR68 (S)
~~CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND~~
~~SINGLE MANAGEMENT, SUMMARY OF SITUATION AS OF 21MAR68~~~~
- 15 46. CG III MAF 030138Z APR68 (S) *group-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ROSSON & TOLSON
 EMPLOYMENT OF ARVN AT KS LINKUP
- 16 47. CG III MAF 030200Z APR68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ROBERTSON
 TYPEWRITER LOOTING IN HUE
- 17 48. CG III MAF 030232Z APR68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN AND KRULAK
 PASSES CG III MAF 021608Z APR68 RE STATUS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT

-
11. CG III MAF 010746Z APR68 MCEO) *Gp-4*
CUSHMAN to KRULAK info CMC & ANDERSON
SINGLE MANAGEMENT -- ADDITIONAL INPUT TO CG FMFPAC

 12. CG III MAF 020200Z APR68 (MCEO) *Gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ALL SUBORDINATE CG'S
PASSES CMC 011919Z APR68 re President's Decision "Bombing Pause"
Support

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/28		lo	CG III MAF
DCG	3		4/29		Ma	SERIAL 271148Z APR 68 COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR			4/27		DCIS	SUBJECT CONTROL TURN-IN AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS
C/S	1		4/27			REMARKS
DC/S						<p>PERSONAL FOR</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>UNCLAS EFTO</p> <p># 364 burned 6 Nov 68</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			272045		SH	
S/C						

34

FILE 37 CGN 272

		FROM CG 111 MAF	DATE 27 APR 68
		SERIAL# 271148Z APR 68	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT CONTROL TURN-IN DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
4/27	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/28	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/29	<i>[Signature]</i>		
4/29	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPY 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD #24

(PERSONAL FOR)

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 3417 118114Z
 ZNY EEERE
 P 271148Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF DRR
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGA
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

UNCLAS EFTO

UNCLAS EFTO

PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM ARVN CUSHMAN
 CONTROL, TURN-IN AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS

A. COMUSMACV MAC 05400 DTG 246114Z APR 68

1. I HAVE EXAMINED CURRENT III MAF PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL OF
 CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS AS REQ REF A. ALTHOUGH I AM SATISFIED
 THAT THESE PROCEDURES HAVE PREVENTED THE RECAPTURE OF WEAPONS,
 THEY DO NOT INCLUDE ADEQUATE REPORTING PROCEDURES TO ACCOUNT
 FOR THE WEAPONS FROM TIME OF CAPTURE TO FINAL DISPOSITION.
 III MAF DIRECTIVES ARE BEING REVISED TO INCLUDE SUCH A REPORTING
 SYSTEM WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR CONTINUOUS AND POSITIVE ACCOUNT-
 ABILITY AND CONTROL.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#24

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TEMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
TO ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		22 APR 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			270532Z APR 68			
NO	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/27		lo	EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE <i>Label "Marine Corps Eyes Only"</i> <i>"# 2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68"</i>
3	DCG		4/28		DL	
4	DCG AIR		4/28		DL	
11	C/S		4/27		a	
	D C/S		4/28		DL	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		27/25		DLW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUMKM
 DE RUMSAK 3366 118053Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 270532Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

A. CG III MAF 081412Z APR 68

B. COMUSMACV 230418Z APR 68

1. THE REFERENCED MESSAGES ARE MOST PERTINENT WITH RESPECT TO THE DISTURBING MATTER WE DISCUSSED OVER THE PHONE TODAY. IN REFERENCE A I WENT FIRMLY ON THE RECORD THAT I WANTED TO RECONSTITUTE THE SLF'S COMMENCING WITH BACKLOADING OF 3/1 ON 28 APRIL AND 2/4 ON 7 MAY. THIS I DID IN SPITE OF THE PRESSURE I WAS RECEIVING FROM GEN WESTMORELAND TO ENSURE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF ALL FORCES AVAILABLE TO ME FOR CONCENTRATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN NICTZ. I NEED NOT TELL YOU OF HIS THOUGHTS CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT OF SLF'S AND I WASN'T AT ALL SURPRISED THAT REF B REJECTED MY PROPOSAL FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE SLF'S.
2. NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISAPPROVAL OF MY SLF EMPLOYMENT PLANS, MY JUST COMPLETED III MAF SUMMER CAMPAIGN PLAN CALLS FOR

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3366 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR EXTENSIVE USE OF THE SLF'S FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD. JUST AS SOON AS OPN DELAWARE IS TERMINATED. (APPROXIMATELY 15 MAY) I INTEND TO AGAIN REQUEST BACKLOADING OF THE SLF'S FOR COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE COASTAL PLAINS REGION.

3. IN SUM, IN SPITE OF THE KNOWN OPPOSITION OF COMUSMACV, I REQUESTED RECONSTITUTION OF THE SLF'S; AS EXPECTED, COMUSMACV DISAPPROVED THE REQUEST. I WILL RENEW MY REQUEST WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS BUT AT THE SAME TIME, I FIND IT A LITTLE INCONGRUOUS THAT 7TH FLT WOULD BELIEVE THAT WE DIDN'T DESIRE TO RECONSTITUTE THE SLF'S AND THAT THE ARMY COULD ACCEPT THE OFFER AND PROVIDE TWO ARMY BATTALIONS IN FACE OF THEIR TURN DOWN OF MY REQUEST. THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO, WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE ECONOMY OF FORCE MEASURES GEN WESTMORELAND HAS TAKEN IN THE OTHER THREE CORPS AREAS.

WARM REGARDS.

CP-4

BT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CASE		FROM	DATE
X - DRAFTED A - ACTION / CONTROL C - COMMENTS / RELEASE / ACTION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE		CG III MAF	26 APR 68
		SERIALS / CONTROL DATE	COPIES / OF / COPIES RECD
		260834Z APR 68	1 / OF 4
ROUTE	SECTION	INITIAL	SUBJECT
			PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS (U)
7	05	4/27	REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE NO FORN
3	06	4/27	
3	05 AIR	4/26	
4	07		
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	09		
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TOP SECRET #15

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
NO FORN

OO RUMHNB
DE RUMSAR 3249 1179834
ZNY TTTT
O 200804Z APR 68
FM CG III MAP DANANG
TO RUMHNB/CG PROVCORPS V CP HOCHMUTH PHU BAI
INFO RUMSAV/COMUSMACV
RUMSAV/CG MACSOG SAIGON
ZEN/CG C AND C DET DMS
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BOSSON INFO GEN WESTMORELAND, CM MACSOG
AND LEGOL WARREN FROM LGEN CUSHMAN.
PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS (U)
A. MACV MSG 11787 DTG 251007Z APR68 (NOTAL)
1. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE IS PARTICULARLY
SENSITIVE. TAKE EXTRAORDINARY PRECAUTIONS IN ITS HANDLING.
2. REQ YOU TAKE REF A FOR ACTION.
3. TASKING AUTHORITY FOR OPERATIONS OF FOB-1 FORCES IN CONJUNCTION
WITH OPN DELAWARE HEREBY ASSIGNED TO CG, PCV.
4. IN PREPARING YOUR PLAN TO IMPLEMENT REF A SUGGEST
YOU CONSIDER EXTENDING DELAWARE OPERATIONS AS FAR SOUTH
AS VICINITY OF ASHAW AFLD (YC 5083), AMONG OTHER

PAGE 2 RUMASK 3249 T O P S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THINGS SUCH OPERATIONS WOULD PROVIDE:

A. STAGING AREAS FOR PRAIRIE FIRE FORCES TO PERMIT
CONVENIENT AIR AND/OR GROUND INSERTION INTO BASE AREA
607.

B. FIRE SUPPORT BASE FOR PRAIRIE FIRE FORCES IN DA 607.
5. PROVIDE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OLI 22APR68.

GP-4
BT

SECRET**FOR**

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMHMA
 DE RUMMWAAS242 1174220
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 264224Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI RVN
 BT

S E C R E T

FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BASE DEVELOPMENT AND REAL ESTATE (U)

A. YOUR 181415Z APR 68

1. CONCUR YOUR POSITION EXPRESSED REF A. BASE DEVELOPMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR PCV ZONE BEING REVISED ACCORDINGLY.

2. III MAF BASE DEVELOPMENT BOARD WILL BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE CG PROV CORPS V REPRESENTATION. CONSTRUCTION PRIORITY LISTS AND REAL ESTATE ALLOCATION ACTION DEVELOPED BY YOUR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS WILL BE REVIEWED BY THIS BOARD FOR APPROVAL.

CP-4

BT

SECRET

#22

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 260046Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT FOR
C/S	A		4/26		Q	REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR <i>"#3 to 4 burned 6 Nov 68"</i>
DC/S			4/26		DC	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			261145		DM	LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						#21

RR RUMHAW RUMHLA RUMHFL RUMHVP
 DE RUMSAK 3184 1170048
 ZNR UUUUU
 R 260048Z APR 68 ZNY -6
 FM CG 111 MAF DNG RVN
 TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV QTR RVN
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCOND DNG RVN
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT
FOR

UNCLAS
 FOR NGEN TOMPKINS, NGEN ROBERTSON, NGEN ANDERSON
 NGEN OLSON.

1. GEN KRULAK DURING HIS LAST VISIT COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF AWARD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFICERS. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO ME INDICATES THAT, WITHIN THE TWO DIVISIONS, THE PERCENTAGE OF HEROIC AWARDS HAS BEEN RUNNING ABOUT 20/80, OFFICER/ENLISTED. FOR MERITORIOUS AWARDS THERE IS MORE VARIANCE, PERHAPS CAUSED BY A SURGE IN THE USE OF THE NAVY ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL. I DO NOT INTEND TO ANALYZE THE VARIOUS STATISTICS, ONLY THE SIGNIFICANCE AND ORDER OF MAGNITUDE.

2. WHEN WE LOOK AT THE STATISTICS WE MAY BE MISLED BY WHAT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3184 UNCLAS
 APPEARS TO BE A REASONABLE PROPORTION. WHEN WE CONSIDER OUR OFFICER/ENLISTED STRENGTH RATIO WE GET A MORE REALISTIC READ-OUT. IT IS THEN THAT WE CAN SEE THE DISPROPORTION. I DO NOT INTEND TO PRESCRIBE OR SUGGEST ANY RATIO FOR AWARDS.
 3. RECOGNITION OF HEROIC DEEDS IS RELATIVELY SIMPLE. WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO CITE DEEDS OF VALOR AMONG ALL RANKS. WE MAY, HOWEVER, BE OVERLOOKING SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCES OF DUTY BEING PERFORMED BY THE ENLISTED. WHILE WE SHOULD NOT ARBITRARILY REDUCE OUR STANDARDS, THEREBY DEGRADING THE VARIOUS AWARDS, I AM OF THE OPINION THAT WE SHOULD BE MORE LIBERAL WITH THE LESSER AWARDS. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD SEEK OUT GREATER NUMBERS OF YOUNG MARINES AND SAILORS, BOTH OFFICER AND ENLISTED, WHO CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATE OUTSTANDING SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT. IN THIS REGARD, I INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE RELATIVELY NEW AWARD, THE NAVY ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL, WHICH IS DESIGNED FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF DUTY, DEMONSTRATED EXCELLENCE IN LEADERSHIP OR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT. IT APPEARS TO ME

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#21

PAGE 3 RUNSAK 3184 UNCLAS
THAT THIS AWARD IS IDEAL FOR THE YOUNG MARINE OR
SAILOR WHO SEEMS TO GET LOST IN THE SHUFFLE, ALTHOUGH
FROM DAY TO DAY HE PERFORMS HIS DUTY ADMIRABLY.
4. I URGE ALL COMMANDERS AND TROOP LEADERS TO BE
ALERT TO APPROPRIATE RECOGNITION OF DEEDS OF VALOR
AND MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENTS. THE NEW
FORM FOR AWARD RECOMMENDATIONS WAS INTENDED TO EXPE-
DITE SUBMISSION AT THE LOWEST LEVEL WITHOUT BENEFIT
OF ELABORATE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.
BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 0216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GG 111 MAF		DATE 25 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 251438Z APR 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S				<i>Q</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	160700H			<i>JMU</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S GO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 3170 1161438
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 251438Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPSV PHU BAI RVN
 INFO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 RUMHIA/CG 196TH LIGHT INF BRIG CHU LAI RVN
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA RVN
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV PHU BAI RVN
 RUMHMB/CG 101 ABN DIV GAI LE RVN
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI RVN
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW DANANG RVN

BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ROSSON INFO GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
 GEN CUSHMAN

SUBJ: CURRENT THREAT

1. BY TELECON, COMUSMACV FOCUSED ATTENTION ON CURRENT INDICATIONS
 OF IMPENDING ENEMY ACTIVITY, WHICH SUGGEST NEED TO RETAIN 196TH
 LIGHT INF BRIG IN INSTANT READINESS TO MOVE TO EITHER QUANG TRI,
 HUE, DMZ OR KHE SANH.

2. REQ YOU INSURE BRIGADES READINESS TO MOVE TO THREATENED AREA
 ON SHORT NOTICE. REC BRIGADE CONDUCT ON SITE VISITS OF AREAS OF
 POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT ASAP.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 250330Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEG
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY "2 burned 6 Nov 68"
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		4/25		P	
	D C/S		4/25		M	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	251220H			DTW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SGC					

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUMKM
 DE RUMSAK 3066 1160330
 ZNY SSSSS
 FMFPAC -T- CMC
 O 250330Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBROA/CMC
 RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK FROM
 LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GEN WESTMORELAND AND IS
 QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE

P 241216Z APR 68 ZFFS

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF

INFO RUMKA/CINCPAC

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 11604

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGCUSHMAN, INFO ADMIRAL
 SHARP, FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

A. CG, III MAF, 221340Z APR 68 (E)

B. CINCPAC 230409Z APR 68 (S) (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3066 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC

1. (E) YOUR COMMENTS ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAVE
 BEEN RECEIVED AND WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY. I HAVE DECIDED THAT
 WE WILL BASE OUR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM ON THE CALENDAR
 MONTH OF APRIL. THIS WILL PROVIDE A FULL MONTH OF UTILIZATION, AFTER
 THE INITIAL IMPERFECTIONS HAD BEEN IRONED OUT. YOU MAY WISH TO
 SEND ME AN ADDENDUM TO REFERENCE A ON IMAY WITH ADDITIONAL
 COMMENTS.

2. (S) MEANWHILE, I WILL INITIATE A CAREFUL REVIEW OF EACH OF THE
 DEFICIENCIES WHICH YOU HAVE CITED TO DETERMINE IF IMMEDIATE
 ADJUSTMENTS ARE IN ORDER.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#19

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 2406747 APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS FOI HAS BEEN SENT "4304 burned 6 Nov 68"
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		4/24		GD	
	D C/S		4/24		DM	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		4/24		JHW	
	G-1	COPY				
	G-2					
	G-3	COPY				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMFUL
 DE RUMWAA 2977 1150634
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 240634Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMFUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR COL CODISPOTI FROM BOEN E. ANDERSON

COURIER/MAIL SERVICE FOR HOSP SHIPS (U)

A: COMSEVENTHFLT 230356Z APR 68

1. THE LIMITED HELO ASSETS AVAILABLE TO MEET EXPANDING TACTICAL SITUATION IN ICTZ AND FREQUENT CHANGE IN HOSP SHIPS LOCATION MITIGATE AGAINST A DAILY SCHEDULED COURIER SOLELY FOR SUPPORT OF HOSP SHIPS. HOWEVER, EVERY EFFORT WILL BE EXTENDED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED ON A MISSION BASIS W/ICE COURIER.

2. IN THIS REGARD THE FORCE POSTAL OFFICER ENSURES THAT HOSP SHIP MAIL IS DELIVERED BY AIR (FIXED/ROTOR, MINS) FROM DANANG TO PHU BAY/DONG HA TO HOSP SHIPS LOCATED IN NORTHERN SECTOR AND FROM DANANG TO CHU LAI TO HOSP SHIPS WHEN LOCATED IN SOUTHERN SECTOR. SCHEDULED COURIER SERVICE AND OTHER AVAILABLE AIR, AS APPROPRIATE, IS UTILIZED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IN ABSENCE OF OTHER EXISTING AIR TRANSPORTATION, MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED AS REQUIRED.

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 2977 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. HOPE THIS INFO WILL BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE.

GP-4

BT

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CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE****HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2876 1140340
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 230840Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
 FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

ACFT MAINTENANCE (U)

A. DEPCOMUSMACV 04633, DTG 070447Z APR 68

1. REF A DIRECTED STAND-DOWN ONCE A WEEK FOR EACH ARMY ACFT AND SPECIFIED THAT UTILIZATION OF STAND-DOWN ACFT FOR TACTICAL EMERGENCIES MUST BE APPROVED BY MY HQ.

2. IN VIEW OF CURRENT TACTICAL OPERATIONS, I REQUEST THAT APPROVAL AUTHORITY BE FURTHER DELEGATED TO DIVISION LEVEL TO INSURE PROMPT RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#17

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 230520Z APR 68		COPY# 7 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE ... BEEN SENT # 2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68
2	DCG		4/23		JW	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/23		G	
	D C/S		4/23		JW	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		23 April		JW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #16

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2857 1140520
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 230520Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 RUMHMB/CG PROV COPRS V
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND INFO LGEN
 ROSSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

A. COMUSMACV 05342 DTG 221133Z APR68 (BY OTHER MEANS)
 1. FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION DELAWARE ON 190905H
 APR68 UNTIL 222200H APR68, THERE HAVE BEEN A TOTAL OF TWENTY
 (20) SPOT REPORTS AND THIRTEEN (13) SITREPS PASSED TO THE
 MACV COC. ADDITIONALLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MACV COC WAS
 GIVEN A COMPLETE SET OF OVERLAYS AND UNIT LOCATIONS DURING
 LIAISON VISIT 20APR68. FURTHER DURING THE 36-HOUR PERIOD
 COMMENCING 201500H APR THERE WERE SIX (6) SPOT REPORTS AND
 SEVEN (7) SITREPS TRANSMITTED TO MACV COC. THE ASHAU VALLEY
 SECTOR OF THE OPERATION HAS NOT AS YET HAD ANY SIGNIFICANT
 GROUND CONTACTS DUE TO WEATHER, TO THE NECESSITY FOR BUILDING
 UP TROOP STRENGTH AND FOR ESTABLISHING FIRE BASES ON THE
 SHOULDERS OF THE VALLEY PRIOR TO COMMITMENT OF FORCES IN
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON THE VALLEY FLOOR. AS AN EXAMPLE,
 THE PRINCIPAL EFFORT ON 21 APRIL WAS DIRECTED TOWARD
 RESUPPLY. ON 22 APRIL, ADDITIONAL TROOP AND RESUPPLY LIFTS
 WERE FLOWN DURING THE MORNING; AIR OPERATIONS CEASED IN THE
 PM DUE TO WEATHER. A FURTHER INDICATION ON THE TEMPO OF
 OPERATIONS IS SHOWN BY THE CUMULATIVE CAS FOR THE ENTIRE
 ASHAU PORTION OF OPERATION DELAWARE AS OF 221200H: FRIENDLY
 12 KIA, 55 WIA, 12 MIA, AND 37 EN KIA.

WE EXPERIENCED AN INITIAL REPORTING PROBLEM DURING THE
 FIRST DAY OF THE OPERATION IN THAT THE 1ST ACD AND 101ST
 ABN DIV SIX-HOUR SITREPS WERE NOT BEING RECEIVED ON TIME.
 III MAF BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF PCV AND PCV TOOK
 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION BY CONSOLIDATING THE DIVISION
 REPORTS FOR OPN DELAWARE. RAPID AND TIMELY REPORTING TO
 BOTH THIS HQTRS AND MACV HAS PREVAILED SINCE THAT TIME. AS
 A DOUBLE CHECK TO INSURE NOTHING HAS BEEN MISSED, III MAF
 COC CALLS MACV COC A MINIMUM OF TWICE DAILY IN THE MORNING
 AND EVENING AND THE ENTIRE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG FOR THIS
 COMMAND IS PASSED TO COC I CORPS DESK OFFICER.
 2. THE DAILY REPORT SUBMITTED ON THE DMZ/NICIZ IS SUBMITTED
 BY PCV DIRECT TO YOUR HQTRS, INFO MY COMMAND. GENERAL ROSSON
 ASSURES ME THAT EVERY EFFORT IS BEING EXPENDED TO INSURE THAT
 THIS REPORT IS FACTUAL, COMPLETE, AND INFORMATIVE.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 APR 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 230150Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT " #2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68 "
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/23		[Signature]	
	D C/S		4/23		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		23 April		[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#15

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUHNFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 2834 1140150
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 230150Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. I HAVE SENT THE FOLLOWING MSG TO GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM
 SHAPR: QUOTE
 P 221340Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM SHARP, FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
 A. CINCPAC LTR 3 OVER SER: 00488 OF 2MAR68

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2834 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 B. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOD OF 7MARG8

1. (S) AS APPROVED BY REF A AND DIRECTED BY REF B III MAF
 FIXED WING COMBAT AIRCRAFT WERE PLACED UNDER CONTROL OF THE
 7TH AF ON 10MARG8 AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEM
 OCCURRED ON 22MARG8.

2. (C) AFTER ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR A THIRTY-DAY PERIOD, I
 AM CONVINCED THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON
 ASSETS IS LESS EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFICIENT THAN OUR PREVIOUS
 SYSTEM WHEN THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAD
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR ASSETS. ACCORDINGLY, IN
 KEEPING WITH THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED ME BY PARAGRAPH 8 OF
 REF B, I WISH TO RECORD MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE NEW
 SYSTEM FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS.

3. (C) THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE THIRTY-
 DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM:

A. (C) A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM IS BASED ON FOUR CHARACTERISTICS THAT THE MARINE CORPS
 DEMANDS OF ITS SYSTEM AND WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE ABSOLUTELY
 ESSENTIAL TO ANY SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR. THE
 SYSTEM MUST:

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HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

(1) BE RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS. IT MUST PROVIDE HIM FIRE SUPPORT THAT IS ACCURATE, APPROPRIATE AND TIMELY.

(2) INTEGRATE AIR SUPPORT WITH OTHER SUPPORTING FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER. ONE VERY ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THIS INTEGRATION IS MINIMIZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES, WHICH CAN BECOME MORE PREVALENT IN FAST MOVING GROUND COMBAT SITUATIONS.

(3) POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND DELAYS. IT SHOULD INVOLVE THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INTERVENING ECHELONS BETWEEN PRODUCER AND CONSUMER.

(4) BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

B. (C) EVALUATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM WAS MADE ON ITS ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE STATED FOUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. EACH WILL BE INDIVIDUALLY DISCUSSED.

(1) RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS.

(A) (S) THE MAJORITY OF AIR IS NOW SCHEDULED THROUGH AN ELABORATE SYSTEM WHICH REQUIRES THE BATTALION COMMANDER TO SELECT TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE. THIS IS

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2834 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO OFTEN TACTICALLY IMPRACTICAL. THE EXCESSIVE LEAD TIME REQUIREMENT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE SYSTEM LACKS ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR ADD-ONS TO THE DAILY FRAG. FOR EXAMPLE: IF A BN COMMANDER DECIDES ONE AFTERNOON THAT A COMPANY HELILIFT IS REQUIRED THE NEXT DAY AT 1100, AND THAT THE SELECTED LANDING ZONE NEEDS AIR PREPARATION, HIS ONLY CHOICE IS TO CALL FOR AN "IMMEDIATE", WHICH NORMALLY MEANS A DIVERT. IF HE GETS A DIVERT, IT MEANS THAT SOME OTHER BN'S TACTICAL PLAN IS LIKELY COMPROMISED. WHEN AN "IMMEDIATE" IS REQUESTED, THE REQUEST AND SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL MUST NOW GO THROUGH ADDITIONAL AGENCIES, WHICH USUALLY REDUCES RESPONSIVENESS TO THE REQUESTOR'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THIS SITUATION IS UNSATISFACTORY, AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES ARE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN TIMELY AIR SUPPORT FOR THE GROUND COMMANDER.

(B) (S) THE CURRENT SYSTEM'S LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS NOT ONLY FROM THE LONG LEAD TIME FRAG, BUT ALSO FROM OVERALL TECHNIQUES OF MISSION ASSIGNMENT. BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTED TO THE SUPPORTING UNIT RATHER THAN THE SUPPORTED UNIT, THE SYSTEM PERMITS CONVENIENT AND

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EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER. BEFORE INAUGURATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, ABOUT EIGHTY PERCENT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND AN IMMEDIATE SCHEME OF MANEUVER. IN THOSE INSTANCES, AIRCRAFT REPORTED TO THE AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED TIME OVER TARGET (TOT), WITH THE REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND THE PILOTS WERE BRIEFED ON THE GROUND SITUATION. THE REMAINING TWENTY PERCENT OF THE PRE-PLANNED SORTIES WERE FRAGGED SPECIFIC TARGETS THAT COULD BE REASONABLY SELECTED IN ADVANCE. AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE A TACTICAL OPERATION PLANNED IN ADVANCE THAT REQUIRED SUPPORTING FIRES BY AIR AND ARTILLERY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ASSAULT. NOW, VIRTUALLY ALL THE SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED AS PRE-PLANNED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS, EVEN THOUGH IT IS UNREALISTIC TO FORECAST ALL TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE.

(C) (C) OVERALL WE HAVE FOUND SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES TO BE UNWIELDLY AND TIME CONSUMING. ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TIMES ARE THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE. EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED TO FIND WAYS TO MAKE

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2834 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO THE SYSTEM FUNCTION IN A MANNER THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS, WITH VERY LITTLE SUCCESS. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS INHERENT DEFECTS THAT WILL NEVER PERMIT IT TO FUNCTION TO A MARINE GROUND COMMANDER'S SATISFACTION.

(2) MUST INTERGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVERS.

(A) (S) THE NEW SYSTEM LACKS A PRACTICAL AGENCY THROUGH WHICH THE GROUND COMMANDER CAN ORCHESTRATE HIS ENTIRE SUPPORTING AIR EFFORT IN A TIMELY MANNER WITH HIS GROUND MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. IN THIS REGARD, A MARINE DASC PERFORMS ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CONTROL, INCLUDING AIR SPACE COORDINATION, A USAF TACP ON THE OTHER HAND, PROVIDES ONLY MINIMUM COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION FOR STRIKE AIRCRAFT. FURTHERMORE, SINCE USAF TYPE DASC'S DO NOT MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH STRIKE AIRCRAFT, THEY ARE UNABLE TO ACT AS AN EFFECTIVE AIR SPACE COORDINATION AGENCY FOR AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORTING FIRES. THE RESULT IS THAT THE NEW SYSTEM HAS FAR LESS ABILITY TO COORDINATE FIRE WITH MANEUVER THAN THE SYSTEM
 BT

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HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUHHFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 2835 1140150
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 230150Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 IT REPLACED.

(3) MUST POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND
 DELAYS.

(A) (C) SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS INCREASED OUR
 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN. IN THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHEN AIR WAS
 FRAGGED DIRECTLY TO THE UNITS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC WAS
 LIMITED TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED, JOT'S AND DESIRED
 ORDNANCE.

(B) (C) NOW THE SIZE OF THE NEW FRAG IS
 CONSISTENT WITH THE MORE COMPLEX CHAIN IT FOLLOWS AND IS

BT
 P 221340Z APR 68

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2835 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM SHARP, FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN
 5-6 TIMES LONGER THAN THE ONE IT REPLACED. FURTHER,
 BEGINNING AT BATTALION LEVEL, LENGTHY FORMS ARE NECESSARY,
 ONE FOR EACH REQUESTED TARGET. PORTIONS OF THESE HAVE TO BE
 SHACKLED OR ENCRYPTED AT EACH LEVEL IN THE CHAIN, OR DELIVERED
 BY RUNNER TO THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON. THE RESULT OF THIS
 INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IS INCREASED DELAY, AND THE
 POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN AND COMMUNICATION ERRORS BECOMES GREATER.

(4) MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE
 STRUCTURE.

(A) (S) WITH THE RELATIVELY SMALL AUTHORIZED
 NUMBER OF STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT, ALL WEAPONS IN THE AIR
 GROUND TEAM MUST BE CLOSELY INTEGRATED. IMPOSITION OF THE
 SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM ON THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS

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EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS DISRUPTED THIS INTEGRATION AND DEPRIVED THE TEAM OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR FIRE POWER. FURTHER, THE NEW SYSTEM HAS NOT PRODUCED A MORE FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT, WHICH WAS A DETERMINING FACTOR IN ITS INTRODUCTION. REGARDING FLEXIBILITY, ANALYSIS OF SORTIE STATISTICS REVEALS THAT THE MARINE CORPS RATE HAS SHOWN A FLEXIBLE SORTIE RESPONSE RISING AND FALLING ACCORDING TO GROUND REQUIREMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE RECENT PERIOD OF HEAVY CONTACT IN I CORPS, MARINE SORTIES HAVE RESPONDED ABOVE THE PLANNED RATE, WHILE SURGING TO SUPPORT BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES. AS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT, IT IS NOTED THAT THE ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS ARE NOW RECEIVING ONLY SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE AIR FORCE SORTIES PLANNED FOR THEM BY THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA PROGRAM. ALSO, AS STATED ABOVE, SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, THE MARINE AIR UNITS CONTINUED TO SURGE, THEREBY PROVIDING ALMOST DOUBLE THE SORTIES TO ARMY FORCES IN ICTZ THAN WERE SUPPLIED PRIOR TO THE NEW SYSTEM. WE SANCTION A FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE EFFORT FROM ALL AIR UNITS; HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THE MARINE CORPS IS PROVIDING

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2835 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE AIR SUPPORT EFFORT UNDER
SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

4. (S) MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: IT IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO OUR TACTICAL NEEDS; IT HAS INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR COORDINATION OF AIR WITH THE TOTAL EFFORT; IT INCREASES THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN; AND IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE. FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT FORESEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THESE SHORTCOMINGS UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

5. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I STRONGLY URGE THAT MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME, AND THAT THE VERY WORKABLE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

6. I AM PREPARED TO PROVIDE A DETAILED BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF THE ABOVE POSITION AT ANY TIME YOU DESIRE.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS. GP-4

BT

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SECRET

#15

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 22 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 221340Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE
2	DCG					
3	DCG AIR					
1	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	230645				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET -14

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2801 1131340
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 221340Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM SHARP, FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
 A. CINCPAC LTR 3 OVER SER: 00488 OF 2MAR68
 B. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF 7MAR68
 1. (S) AS APPROVED BY REF A AND DIRECTED BY REF B III MAF
 FIXED WING COMBAT AIRCRAFT WERE PLACED UNDER CONTROL OF THE
 7TH AF ON 10MAR68 AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEM
 OCCURRED ON 22MAR68.
 2. (C) AFTER ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR A THIRTY-DAY PERIOD, I
 AM CONVINCED THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON
 ASSETS IS LESS EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFICIENT THAN OUR PREVIOUS
 SYSTEM WHEN THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAD
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR ASSETS. ACCORDINGLY, IN

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 KEEPING WITH THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED ME BY PARAGRAPH 8 OF
 REF B, I WISH TO RECORD MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE NEW
 SYSTEM FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS.

3. (C) THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE THIRTY-
 DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM:

A. (C) A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM IS BASED ON FOUR CHARACTERISTICS THAT THE MARINE CORPS
 DEMANDS OF ITS SYSTEM AND WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE ABSOLUTELY
 ESSENTIAL TO ANY SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR. THE
 SYSTEM MUST:

(1) BE RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS.
 IT MUST PROVIDE HIM FIRE SUPPORT THAT IS ACCURATE, APPROPRIATE
 AND TIMELY.

(2) INTEGRATE AIR SUPPORT WITH OTHER SUPPORTING
 FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER. ONE VERY ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF
 THIS INTEGRATION IS MINIMIZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACCIDENTS
 AND MISTAKES, WHICH CAN BECOME MORE PREVALENT IN FAST MOVING
 GROUND COMBAT SITUATIONS.

(3) POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND
 DELAYS. IT SHOULD INVOLVE THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INTERVENING

PAGE 7 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#14

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
ECONOMERS BETWEEN PRODUCER AND CONSUMER.

(4) BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE
STRUCTURE.

B. (C) EVALUATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM WAS MADE ON ITS
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE STATED FOUR MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS. EACH WILL BE INDIVIDUALLY DISCUSSED.

(1) RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS.

(A) (S) THE MAJORITY OF AIR IS NOW SCHEDULED
THROUGH AN ELABORATE SYSTEM WHICH REQUIRES THE BATTALION
COMMANDER TO SELECT TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE. THIS IS
OFTEN TACTICALLY IMPRACTICAL. THE EXCESSIVE LEAD TIME
REQUIREMENT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE SYSTEM
LACKS ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR ADD-ONS TO THE DAILY FRAG. FOR
EXAMPLE: IF A BN COMMANDER DECIDES ONE AFTERNOON THAT A
COMPANY HELILIFT IS REQUIRED THE NEXT DAY AT 1100, AND THAT
THE SELECTED LANDING ZONE NEEDS AIR PREPARATION, HIS ONLY
CHOICE IS TO CALL FOR AN "IMMEDIATE", WHICH NORMALLY MEANS
A DIVERT. IF HE GETS A DIVERT, IT MEANS THAT SOME OTHER
BN'S TACTICAL PLAN IS LIKELY COMPROMISED. WHEN AN "IMMEDIATE"
IS REQUESTED, THE REQUEST AND SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL MUST NOW

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
GO THROUGH ADDITIONAL AGENCIES, WHICH USUALLY REDUCES
RESPONSIVENESS TO THE REQUESTOR'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THIS
SITUATION IS UNSATISFACTORY, AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES ARE
REQUIRED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN TIMELY AIR SUPPORT FOR THE GROUND
COMMANDER.

(B) (S) THE CURRENT SYSTEM'S LACK OF
RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS NOT ONLY FROM THE LONG LEAD TIME
FRAG, BUT ALSO FROM OVERALL TECHNIQUES OF MISSION ASSIGNMENT.
BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTED TO THE SUPPORTING UNIT RATHER THAN
THE SUPPORTED UNIT, THE SYSTEM PERMITS CONVENIENT AND
ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER.
BEFORE INAUGURATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, ABOUT EIGHTY
PERCENT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND
FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND AN IMMEDIATE SCHEME OF
MANEUVER. IN THOSE INSTANCES, AIRCRAFT REPORTED TO THE
AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED
TIME OVER TARGET (TOT), WITH THE REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND
THE PILOTS WERE BRIEFED ON THE GROUND SITUATION. THE RE-
MAINING TWENTY PERCENT OF THE PRE-PLANNED SORTIES WERE
FRAGGED SPECIFIC TARGETS THAT COULD BE REASONABLY SELECTED

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#14

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2301 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MEMBERS BETWEEN PRODUCER AND CONSUMER.

(4) BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

B. (C) EVALUATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM WAS MADE ON ITS ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE STATED FOUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. EACH WILL BE INDIVIDUALLY DISCUSSED.

(1) RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS.

(A) (S) THE MAJORITY OF AIR IS NOW SCHEDULED THROUGH AN ELABORATE SYSTEM WHICH REQUIRES THE BATTALION COMMANDER TO SELECT TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE. THIS IS OFTEN TACTICALLY IMPRACTICAL. THE EXCESSIVE LEAD TIME REQUIREMENT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE SYSTEM LACKS ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR ADD-ONS TO THE DAILY FRAG. FOR EXAMPLE: IF A BN COMMANDER DECIDES ONE AFTERNOON THAT A COMPANY HELICOPTER IS REQUIRED THE NEXT DAY AT 1800, AND THAT THE SELECTED LANDING ZONE NEEDS AIR PREPARATION, HIS ONLY CHOICE IS TO CALL FOR AN "IMMEDIATE", WHICH NORMALLY MEANS A DIVERT. IF HE GETS A DIVERT, IT MEANS THAT SOME OTHER BN'S TACTICAL PLAN IS LIKELY COMPROMISED. WHEN AN "IMMEDIATE" IS REQUESTED, THE REQUEST AND SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL MUST NOW

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2301 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GO THROUGH ADDITIONAL AGENCIES, WHICH USUALLY REDUCES RESPONSIVENESS TO THE REQUESTOR'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THIS SITUATION IS UNSATISFACTORY, AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES ARE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN TIMELY AIR SUPPORT FOR THE GROUND COMMANDER.

(B) (S) THE CURRENT SYSTEM'S LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS NOT ONLY FROM THE LONG LEAD TIME FRAG, BUT ALSO FROM OVERALL TECHNIQUES OF MISSION ASSIGNMENT. BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTED TO THE SUPPORTING UNIT RATHER THAN THE SUPPORTED UNIT, THE SYSTEM PERMITS CONVENIENT AND ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER. BEFORE INAUGURATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, ABOUT EIGHTY PERCENT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND AN IMMEDIATE SCHEME OF MANEUVER. IN THOSE INSTANCES, AIRCRAFT REPORTED TO THE AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED TIME OVER TARGET (COT), WITH THE REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND THE PILOTS WERE BRIEFED ON THE GROUND SITUATION. THE REMAINING TWENTY PERCENT OF THE PRE-PLANNED SCENES WERE FRAGGED SPECIFIC TARGETS THAT COULD BE REASONABLY SELECTED

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#14

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T, SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
IN ADVANCE. AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE A TACTICAL OPERATION PLANNED
IN ADVANCE THAT REQUIRED SUPPORTING FIRES BY AIR AND
ARTILLERY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ASSAULT. NOW, VIRTUALLY
ALL THE SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED AS PRE-PLANNED ON SPECIFIC
TARGETS, EVEN THOUGH IT IS UNREALISTIC TO FORECAST ALL
TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE.

(C) (C) OVERALL WE HAVE FOUND SINGLE
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES TO BE UNWIELDY AND TIME CONSUMING.
ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TIMES ARE THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE
RULE. EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED TO FIND WAYS TO MAKE
THE SYSTEM FUNCTION IN A MANNER THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THE
GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS, WITH VERY LITTLE SUCCESS. IT IS
MY OPINION THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS INHERENT
DEFECTS THAT WILL NEVER PERMIT IT TO FUNCTION TO A MARINE
GROUND COMMANDER'S SATISFACTION.

(2) MUST INTERGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND
MANEUVERS.

(A) (S) THE NEW SYSTEM LACKS A PRACTICAL AGENCY
THROUGH WHICH THE GROUND COMMANDER CAN ORCHESTRATE HIS ENTIRE
SUPPORTING AIR EFFORT IN A TIMELY MANNER WITH HIS GROUND

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 2801 S E C R E T, SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. IN
THIS REGARD, A MARINE DASC PERFORMS ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CONTROL, INCLUDING AIR SPACE COORDINA-
TION. A USAF TACP ON THE OTHER HAND, PROVIDES ONLY MINIMUM
COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION FOR STRIKE AIRCRAFT.
FURTHERMORE, SINCE USAF TYPE DASC'S DO NOT MAINTAIN RADIO
CONTACT WITH STRIKE AIRCRAFT, THEY ARE UNABLE TO ACT AS AN
EFFECTIVE AIR SPACE COORDINATION AGENCY FOR AIRCRAFT AND
SUPPORTING FIRES. THE RESULT IS THAT THE NEW SYSTEM HAS FAR
LESS ABILITY TO COORDINATE FIRE WITH MANEUVER THAN THE SYSTEM
IT REPLACED.

(3) MUST POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND
DELAYS.

(A) (C) SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS INCREASED OUR
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN. IN THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHEN AIR WAS
FRAGGED DIRECTLY TO THE UNITS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC WAS
LIMITED TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED, TOT'S AND DESIRED
ORDNANCE.

(B) (C) NOW THE SIZE OF THE NEW FRAG IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE MORE COMPLEX CHAIN IT FOLLOWS AND IS

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#14

SECRET

BT
 DE RUMSAK 2802 1131849
 ZNY 33089
 P 281000Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAK/COMUSMACV
 INFO RER/COMUSMACV
 BT

S E C R E T
 SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM EMATE, FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN

5-6 TIMES LONGER THAN THE ONE IT REPLACES. FURTHER,
 BEGINNING AT BATTALION LEVEL, LENGTHY FORMS ARE NECESSARY,
 ONE FOR EACH REQUESTED TARGET. PORTIONS OF THESE HAVE TO BE
 SIGNED OR ENCRYPTED AT EACH LEVEL IN THE CHAIN, OR DELIVERED
 BY RUNNER TO THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON. THE RESULT OF THIS
 INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IS INCREASED DELAY, AND THE
 POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN AND COMMUNICATION ERRORS BECOMES GREATER.

(A) MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE
 STRUCTURE.

(A) (C) WITH THE RELATIVELY SMALL AUTHORIZED
 NUMBER OF STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT, ALL WEAPONS IN THE AIR
 GROUND TEAM MUST BE CLOSELY INTEGRATED. INFORMATION OF THE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2802 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR
 SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM ON THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS
 HAS DISRUPTED THIS INTEGRATION AND DEPRIVED THE TEAM OF
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ORGANIC AIR FIRE POWER. FURTHER, THE
 NEW SYSTEM HAS NOT PRODUCED A MORE FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE
 DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT, WHICH WAS A DETERMINING FACTOR
 IN ITS INTRODUCTION. REGARDING FLEXIBILITY, ANALYSIS OF
 SORTIE STATISTICS REVEALS THAT THE MARINE CORPS RATE HAS
 SHOWN A FLEXIBLE SORTIE RESPONSE RISING AND FALLING ACCORDING
 TO GROUND REQUIREMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE RECENT
 PERIOD OF HEAVY CONTACT IN I CORPS, MARINE SORTIES HAVE
 RESPONDED ABOVE THE PLANNED RATE, WHILE SURGING TO SUPPORT
 BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES. AS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE
 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT, IT IS NOTED THAT THE ARMY FORCES IN
 I CORPS ARE NOW RECEIVING ONLY SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE AIR
 FORCE SORTIES PLANNED FOR THEM BY THE JOB APPROVED SEADIA
 PROGRAM. ALSO, AS STATED ABOVE, SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, THE MARINE AIR UNITS CONTINUED TO
 CHANGE, THEREBY PROVIDING ALMOST DOUBLE THE SORTIES TO ARMY
 FORCES IN 1972 THAN WERE SUPPLIED PRIOR TO THE NEW SYSTEM.
 WE DESIRE A FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE EFFORT FROM ALL ATE

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2802 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR UNITS; HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THE MARINE CORPS IS PROVIDING A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE AIR SUPPORT EFFORT UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

4. (S) MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: IT IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO OUR TACTICAL NEEDS; IT HAS INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR COORDINATION OF AIR WITH THE TOTAL EFFORT; IT INCREASES THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN; AND IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE. FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT FORESEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THESE SHORT-COMINGS UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

5. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I STRONGLY URGE THAT MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME, AND THAT THE VERY WORKABLE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

6. I AM PREPARED TO PROVIDE A DETAILED BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF THE ABOVE POSITION AT ANY TIME YOU DESIRE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		22 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			220304Z APR 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE " #2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68 "
<i>2</i>	DCG		4/23		<i>gmv</i>	
	DCG AIR					
<i>1</i>	C/S		4/22		<i>gmv</i>	
	D C/S		4/22		<i>DWC</i>	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		<i>21 April</i>		<i>821 DW</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #13

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

FM RUMHVP
DE RUMSAK 2738 1130304
ZNY 36985
P 220304Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
RUMHVP/ADC THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MOEN TOMPKINS AND BOEN GLICK FROM
LIGEN CUSHMAN

1. I KNOW YOU ARE CONSTANTLY EVALUATING YOUR TACTICS AND I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY GUIDANCE.
2. WE MUST AT ALL COSTS AVOID THE UNIMAGINATIVE, THE STEREOTYPED, THE SLOW AND THE PREDICTABLE. THEY CAUSE NEEDLESS CASUALTIES AND PASS THE INITIATIVE TO THE ENEMY. TO MY MIND THIS GENERALLY RULES OUT THE LINEAR FRONTAL ATTACK WITH ZONES OF ACTION. IT DEMANDS RAPID MOVEMENT BY HELICOPTER, FLUID ATTACK SITUATIONS WITHIN AREAS OF OPERATIONS, MUTUAL SUPPORT BY HELO REINFORCEMENT AND AVAILABLE ARTILLERY AND AIR AND, ABOVE ALL, FLEXIBILITY OF MIND.
3. WE ARE GETTING MANY MORTAR CASUALTIES. HERE IS A

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2738 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
COUNTER MORTAR PLAN THAT WORKS. EACH BN SHOULD DEVELOP
ONE. IMMEDIATE REPLY BY THE COMPARATIVE FRIENDLY MORTAR
TO THE INCOMING CALIBER HAS BEEN FOUND EFFECTIVE. APPROPRIATE
MORTARS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO EACH QUADRANT. THE INSTANT
INCOMING MORTAR ARRIVES ESTIMATE RANGE AND AZIMUTH AND
START COUNTER FIRE IMMEDIATELY FROM THE EFFECTIVE QUADRANT
WITH A SMALL ADJUSTMENT BETWEEN ROUNDS SO THAT THE AREA IS
SEARCHED AND TRAVERSED. THE ENEMY MORTAR IS OFTEN QUICKLY
SILENCED EVEN THOUGH NOT DIRECTLY HIT.

4. WHENEVER TROOPS STOP, THEY DIG IN. NO PATTERN SHOULD
BE SET OF STOPPING EACH AFTERNOON AND ATTACKING EACH MORNING.
VARY THE PLAN. MOVE AFTER DARK TO PREVIOUSLY RECONNOITERED
POSITIONS FOR EXAMPLE.
5. TO PROTECT ROADS AND PIPE LINES, CLEVERLY LAID NIGHT
AMBUSHES PLUS DAYTIME SWEEPS PLUS FIREFLY OPERATIONS ARE
REQUIRED--ALL IN THE VICINITY OF THE ROAD AT FIRST, THEN
PUSHED FURTHER OUT.
6. USE MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING FIRES OF ALL KINDS, INCLUDING
FIRECRACKER, TO SAVE MEN. BRAINS INSTEAD OF BLOOD IS ALWAYS
A GOOD MOTTO FOR YOUNG TACTICAL LEADERS. NOT ENOUGH OF THEM

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2738 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO ENOUGH THINKING.

7. FINALLY, THE ENEMY IS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN THE INITIATIVE
IN THE KHE SANH AREA. WE MUST PREVENT THIS BY FLEXIBLE, HARD
HITTING, MOBILE OFFENSIVE ACTION.

WARW REGARDS

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES.**SECRET**

#13

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

111 MAF
 DE RUMSAK 2738 1130304
 ZNY 30335
 P 220304Z APR 68
 FM CG 111 MAF DANANG
 TO RUMRUP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUMRUP/ADC THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 BY

HAS BEEN SENT**SECRET**

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR WOEN TOMPKINS AND BERN GLICK FROM
 LIGEN GUSHMAN

1. I KNOW YOU ARE CONSTANTLY EVALUATING YOUR TACTICS AND I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SUGGESTIONS.
2. WE MUST AT ALL COSTS AVOID THE UNIMAGINATIVE, THE STEREOTYPED, THE SLOW AND THE PREDICTABLE. THEY CAUSE NEEDLESS CASUALTIES AND PASS THE INITIATIVE TO THE ENEMY. TO MY MIND THIS GENERALLY RULES OUT THE LINEAR FRONTAL ATTACK WITH BOMBS OF ACTION. IT DEMANDS RAPID MOVEMENT BY HELICOPTER, FLUID ATTACK POSITIONS WITHIN AREAS OF OPERATIONS, MUTUAL SUPPORT BY HELICOPTER REINFORCEMENT AND AVAILABLE ARTILLERY AND AIR AND, ABOVE ALL, FLEXIBILITY OF MIND.
3. WE ARE GETTING MANY MORTAR CASUALTIES. THERE IS A

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2738 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 COUNTER MORTAR PLAN THAT WORKS. EACH BN SHOULD DEVELOP
 ONE. IMMEDIATE REPLY BY THE COMPARATIVE FRIENDLY MORTAR
 TO THE INCOMING CALIBER HAS BEEN FOUND EFFECTIVE. APPROPRIATE
 MORTARS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO EACH QUADRANT. THE INSTANT
 INCOMING MORTAR ARRIVES ESTIMATE RANGE AND AZIMUTH AND
 START COUNTER FIRE IMMEDIATELY FROM THE EFFECTIVE QUADRANT
 WITH A SMALL ADJUSTMENT BETWEEN ROUNDS SO THAT THE AREA IS
 SEARCHED AND TRAVERSED. THE ENEMY MORTAR IS OFTEN QUICKLY
 SILENCED EVEN THOUGH NOT DIRECTLY HIT.
 4. WHENEVER TROOPS STOP, THEY DIG IN. NO PATTERN SHOULD
 BE SET OF STOPPING EACH AFTERNOON AND ATTACKING EACH MORNING.
 VARY THE PLAN, MOVE AFTER DARK TO PREVIOUSLY RECONNOITERED
 POSITIONS FOR EXAMPLE.
 5. TO PROTECT ROADS AND PIPE LINES, CLEVERLY LAID NIGHT
 AMBUSHES PLUS DAYTIME SWEEPS PLUS FIREFLY OPERATIONS ARE
 REQUIRED--ALL IN THE VICINITY OF THE ROAD AT FIRST, THEN
 PUSHED FURTHER OUT.
 6. USE MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING FIRES OF ALL KINDS, INCLUDING
 FIRECRACKER, TO SAVE MEN. BRAINS INSTEAD OF BLOOD IS ALWAYS
 A GOOD MOTTO FOR YOUNG TACTICAL LEADERS. NOT ENOUGH OF THEM

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2738 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 DO ENOUGH THINKING.

7. FINALLY, THE ENEMY IS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN THE INITIATIVE
 IN THE KHE SANH AREA. WE MUST PREVENT THIS BY FLEXIBLE, HARD
 HITTING, MOBILE OFFENSIVE ACTION.

WANN PREARDS

BT

BT

SECRET

#13

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMHMB
 DE RUMSAK 2414 1100754
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 190754Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROVCORPSV PHU BAI
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV PHU BAI
 ZEN CG FIRST MAW DANANG
 RUMHMB/CG 101ST AIRBORNE DIV GAI LE
 RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV DANANG
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI
 RUMHVA/CG TASK FORCE X-RAY
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCOMD DANANG
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT**S E C R E T**

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON, MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN TOLSON,
 MGEN ANDERSON, MGEN BARSANTI, MGEN ROBERTSON, MGEN KOSTER,
 BGEN MCLAUGHLIN, AND BGEN OLSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG FROM GEN WESTMORELAND IS PASSED FOR YOUR
 INFORMATION: QUOTE

O 180627Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2414 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 TO LTG PALMER DCG USARV
 RADM VETH COMNAVFORV
 MG WORLEY ACDR SEVENTH AF
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 MG PEERS ACG I FFV
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFV
 MG ECHKARDT SA IV CTZ
 INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS
 ADM SHARP CINCPAC
 TEM

S E C R E T MAC 05136 EYES ONLY

1. I REMIND ALL COMMANDERS THAT WE MUST BE CAREFUL
 TO AVOID MAKING KNOWN TO THE PRESS FUTURE OPERATIONAL
 PLANS AND OTHER INFORMATION THAT WILL BE OF VALUE
 TO THE ENEMY. THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE COMMANDERS
 TALKING TO THE PRESS; HOWEVER, SENSITIVE QUESTIONS
 SHOULD BE ANSWERED WITH "NO COMMENT."

2. YOU ARE REMINDED THAT ALL NEWSMEN ACCREDITED TO
 MACV HAVE AGREED THAT THEY WILL ABIDE BY THE SO-CALLED
 "GPOUND RULES" AND NOT WRITE ABOUT THE FOLLOWING TYPES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#12

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 2414 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR
OF INFORMATION UNTIL SUCH INFORMATION IS OFFICIALLY
RELEASED BY MACV:

- A. FUTURE PLANS, OPERATIONS, OR STRIKES.
 - B. INFORMATION ON OR CONFIRMATION OF RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT.
 - C. AMOUNTS OF ORDNANCE AND FUEL MOVED BY SUPPORT
UNITS OR ON HAND IN COMBAT UNITS (ORDNANCE INCLUDES
WEAPONS OR WEAPONS SYSTEMS).
 - D. DURING AN OPERATION OR PREPARATION THEREFOR:
UNIT DESIGNATIONS AND TROOP MOVEMENTS, TACTICAL
DEPLOYMENTS, NAME OF OPERATION, AND SIZE OF FRIENDLY
FORCES INVOLVED.
 - E. INTELLIGENCE UNIT ACTIVITIES, METHODS OF
OPERATION, OR SPECIFIC LOCATION.
 - F. EXACT NUMBER AND TYPE OF CASUALTIES SUFFERED
BY FRIENDLY UNITS.
 - G. AERIAL PHOTOS OF FIXED INSTALLATIONS.
3. ALL CONCERNED SHOULD NOTE THAT THESE ITEMS MAY BE
USED ONLY IF OFFICIALLY RELEASED BY MACV. SUCH RELEASE
IS NORMALLY MADE BY MACOI; HOWEVER, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT,

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2414 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR
IF I OR ANY OTHER SENIOR COMMANDER MAKES SUCH RELEASE WHEN
TALKING ON-THE-RECORD, THE PRESS CAN ASSURE THAT THE RELEASE
IS OFFICIAL. CONSEQUENTLY, COMMANDERS SHOULD BE MOST CAREFUL
WHEN DISCUSSING SUCH MATTERS WITH PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. THE
NEWSMEN CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO CHECK WITH MACV CONCERNING THE
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A STATEMENT MADE TO THEM ON-THE-RECORD
BY A MAJOR UNIT COMMANDER.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, IF INFORMATION COVERED BY THE GROUND
RULES IS PROVIDED A NEWSMAN ON AN OFF-THE-RECORD OR NOT-FOR-
PUBLICATION BASIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY A SITUATION AND
IS THEN USED BY THAT NEWSMAN, HE IS SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL OF HIS ACCREDITATION, AND I OR MY CHIEF OF INFORMATION
SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AS SOON AS SUCH VIOLATION BECOMES KNOWN.

5. ADDRESSEES WILL PROVIDE SIMILAR GUIDANCE TO THEIR
SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION
OF VALUE IS NOT MADE KNOWN TO THE ENEMY VIA THE NEWS MEDIA.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	19 APR 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
	190602Z APR 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT ANALYSIS OF ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS AND EVAL. OF WPNS SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/20			REMARKS KHE SANH
3	DCG		4/20			
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/19			
	D C/S		4/20			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	191955				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

#243 burned
6 Nov 68

SECRET #11

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMMBB
DE RUMSAK 2388 110200Z
ZNY 55355
P 190602Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUMMBB/CG PROVOCORPS V PHU BAI
INFO RUMMVP/CG THIRD MARDIV BONG HA
RUMMVP/CG TF GELICK KSOB
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LOAN ROSSON INFO NGEN TOMPKINS
AND DGEN GLICK FROM LOAN CUSHMAN
ANALYSIS OF ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS AND EVALUATION OF WPNS
SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS - KHE SANK
A. COMUSMACV 09982 DTG 091010Z APR68 NOTAL
B. CG III MAF 121014Z APR68 NOTAL
C. CG III MAF 190304Z APR 68
1. REF A AND B DIRECTED SUBJECT COLLECTION EFFORT.
2. I DESIRE TO EMPHASIZE THE HIGH-LEVEL INTEREST IN IMPROVING
OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ENEMY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES, THE KHE
SANK BATTLEFIELD OFFERS US A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO DO JUST
THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE BATTLE OF KHE SANK WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY BE OF HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE AS ONE OF
THE PIVOTAL ACTIONS OF THIS WAR.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2388 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
3. THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION EFFORTS DIRECTED BY REFS A AND B MUST
GET UNDERWAY ASAP, I DESIRE TO BE ADVISED OF YOUR
ORGANIZATION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IMPORTANT TASK, AND OF PROGRESS
ACHIEVED, DURING SUBSEQUENT VISITS.
4. AS A RELATED MATTER, REF C ALSO DESERVES ATTENTION SINCE
IT RELATES TO A DCPG DESIRE TO ACQUIRE INFO ON SENSORS LOCATED
IN THE KHE SANK AREA.
GP-4
BT

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PWD
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 11	

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 190214Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT <i>"# 2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68"</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S				<i>Q</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	1110	4/19		<i>DRY</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMKM
 DE RUMSAK 2365 1100214
 ZNY SSSSS
 FMFPAC -T- CMC
 P 190214Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUEBFOA/CMC
 INFO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN KRULAK FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. VR 191530Z APR 68

1. FOR GEN CHAPMAN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, RECOMMEND
 FOLLOWING REASSIGNMENTS OAD 1 JUNE: MGEN R. M. TOMPKINS TO
 DC/6 III MAF; MGEN R. G. DAVIS TO CG 3D MARDIV; MGEN G. B.
 DRAKE TO DC/6 PCV.

2. FOR LTGEN KRULAK, REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE IN ABOVE
 RECOMMENDATIONS.

WARM REGARDS.

3P-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#10

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/18		b	LTGEN CUSHMAN SERIAL 171100ZAPR68
DCG	3		4/18		gm	COPY # OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMOREL NI
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1		4/18		@	
DC/S			4/18		YH	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			182030	4/18	DA JKC	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #14

O 171102Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO CG PROVCORPSV
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN
CUSHMAN, INFO LTGEN ROSSON--OPERATION DELAWARE

1. RECONNAISSANCE HAS REVEALED MANY ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS
AND ACTIVE AA IN ASHAU VALLEY.
2. GEN ROSSON HAS RECOMMENDED AND I HAVE CONCURRED
THAT D DAY BE SET BACK TO 19 APRIL IN ORDER THAT
OUR FIRE POWER MAY BE USED DURING THIS PERIOD TO SUPPRESS
THE ENEMY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

#14

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2113 1080342
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 170342Z APR 68 ZEL
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMSAW/DEP COMUSMACV SAIGON
 INFO RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV DANANG
 BT

EXCLUSIVE**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO MGEN ROBERTSON FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN

ALLEGED LOOTING BY U. S. MARINES IN HUE

A. MEMORANDUM FOR GEN ABRAMS BY AMBASSADOR KOMER DTD 9APR68
 CONCERNING ALLEGED LOOTING BY U. S. MARINES IN HUE

B. COMUSMACV FWD MSG 020330Z MAR68 (C) TO COMUSMACV

1. REF A REPORTS EXAMPLES OF ALLEGED LOOTING IN HUE BY
 U. S. MARINES AS RELATED BY MR. BOB KELLY. SIMILAR ALLEGA-
 TIONS LED TO AN INVESTIGATION ORDERED BY BGEN LANUE OF TASK
 FORCE X-RAY. THEY WERE ALSO THE SUBJECT OF AN INVESTIGATION
 BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE OF MACV FWD
 WITH THE RESULTS REPORTED IN REF B.

2. THE TASK FORCE X-RAY INVESTIGATION WAS LARGELY DIRECTED
 TOWARD SPECIFIC INSTANCES OTHER THAN THOSE RELATED IN REF A.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2113 C O N F I D E N T I A L

BUT COVERED THE BROAD SUBJECT OF LOOTING. IT CONTAINED
 INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE HOME OF MR. BERNARD, HOWEVER,
 WHICH INDICATES SOME ABUSE OF THE HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS OF
 MR. BERNARD, BUT CONTAINED NO EVIDENCE OF LOOTING OR
 MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION BY U. S. TROOPS. THERE WAS THE CLEAR
 IMPLICATION THAT ANY LOOTING WAS DONE BY VIETNAMESE MILITARY
 AND CIVILIANS WHO FOLLOVED MARINES INTO LIBERATED AREAS.

3. U. S. MARINES DID COMMANDEER LOCAL U. S. VEHICLES UNDER
 THE AUTHORITY OF THEIR COMMANDING OFFICER FOR RESUPPLY AND
 MEDEVAC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF LAND WARFARE AND
 UNDER THE EMERGENCY CONDITIONS THEN EXISTING. ALL SUCH
 VEHICLES WERE RETURNED UPON ARRIVAL OF ORGANIC VEHICLES.

4. MR. KELLY HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS MADE IRRESPONSIBLE
 STATEMENTS CONCERNING ALLEGED LOOTING BY MARINES. HE HAS
 RELATED AS TRUE MANY INSTANCES THAT WERE REPORTED TO HIM AS
 HEARSAY. AT THE TIME OF THE INVESTIGATION BY TASK FORCE
 X-RAY, MR. KELLY REFUSED TO MAKE A SWORN OR WRITTEN STATEMENT
 PERTAINING TO HIS ALLEGATIONS IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE
 INVESTIGATION PERTAINED TO INCIDENTS RELATED IN STATEMENTS
 MADE BY HIM. HE CLAIMED HE COULD NOT REMEMBER WHEN OR WHERE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMSAK C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 THE INSTANCES OCCURRED WHICH HE REPORTEDLY HAD OBSERVED.
 MR. KELLY SAID THAT HE WAS SO BUSY WITH HIS OWN JOB THAT MANY
 OF THE DETAILS CONCERNING LOOTING HAD BEEN FORGOTTEN. HAD
 MR. KELLY COOPERATED WITH THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER BY RELATING
 SPECIFIC INSTANCES UNDER OATH, HE COULD HAVE ASSISTED IN GETTING
 AT THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF HIS OWN ALLEGATIONS.
 5. I AM THEREFORE RELUCTANT TO INITIATE ANOTHER INVESTIGATION
 INTO ALLEGATIONS BY MR. KELLY IN THE ABSENCE OF SWORN STATE-
 MENTS BY HIM AS TO THOSE MATTERS OF WHICH HE IS PERSONALLY A
 WITNESS. HOWEVER, I HAVE RECEIVED CORRESPONDENCE DIRECTLY
 AND INDIRECTLY FROM MR. BERNARD, DR. NGUYEN THE ANH AND HIS
 WIFE, CONSTANCE SMITH NGUYEN, ALLEGING ACTS WHICH ARE NOT
 CLEARLY DISPOSED OF BY THE INVESTIGATION OF TF X-RAY. THESE
 WILL BE INVESTIGATED IN DETAIL BY AN INVESTIGATING OFFICER
 OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, A COLONEL SELECTEE, UNDER
 APPOINTING ORDERS OF MGEN ROBERTSON. THIS INVESTIGATION
 WILL BE MONITORED ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS BY MY STAFF LEGAL
 OFFICER. AS OTHER INCIDENTS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORT ARE RE-
 PORTED, THESE WILL BE ADDED TO THE INVESTIGATION.
 6. WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE INVESTIGATION, IT IS MY PRESENT

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 2113 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 IMPRESSION FROM EXISTING REPORTS THAT IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE
 SOME MARINES MAY HAVE BEEN LESS THAN CAREFUL WITH RESPECT TO THE REAL
 ESTATE WHICH THEY OCCUPIED AND FROM WHICH THEY FOUGHT.
 UNDOUBTEDLY, SOME TOOK "SOUVENIRS" OF SMALLER ITEMS. HOWEVER, MANY
 ITEMS WERE REMOVED FROM THE PREMISES BY MARINES IN AN EFFORT TO
 PRESERVE THEM FOR THE BONA FIDE OWNERS FROM THE MORDS OF
 VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS WHO FOLLOWED THE MARINES AND
 REPORTEDLY LOOTED EVERYTHING OF VALUE. LOOTING BY VIETNAMESE MAY
 WELL BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MARINES BY OWNERS WHO DO NOT KNOW WHO
 LOOTED THEIR PREMISES, BUT WHOSE ONLY HOPE OF REIMBURSEMENT
 IS TO ESTABLISH U. S. RESPONSIBILITY.

7. I AM SATISFIED WITH THE MEASURES NOW BEING TAKEN BY
 MGEN ROBERTSON TO INVESTIGATE SPECIFIC RESPONSIBLE ALLEGA-
 TIONS. THE RESULTS OF THIS ACTION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO
 THOSE HANDLING CLAIMS AGAINST THE U. S. FOR DAMAGES. FURTHER-
 MORE, I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED PERIODICALLY OF THE GENERAL
 TENOR OF THE EVIDENCE, ALTHOUGH FINAL JUDGEMENT MUST AWAIT
 THE COMPLETION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 APR 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 160946Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT			
	CG						
1	DCG		4/17		HW	REMARKS	
1	DCG AIR		4/16		HW	A-17 April	
	C/S						
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
	S/S	4/16			DHW		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

"#2+3 burned
6 Nov 68"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUMHMB
 DE RUMSAX 2006 1070946
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 160946Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMKMB/CG PROVCORPS V PHU BAI
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THRID MARIDV DONG HA
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW DANANG
 RUMHVP/ADC THRID MARIDV DONG HA
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON, INFO MGEN TOMPKINS
 MGEN ANDERSON AND BGEN GLICK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. MY TRIP TO KHE SANH TODAY CAUSES ME TO MAKE THE
 FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A. THE INCOMING IS AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN THAT
 DURING MOST OF THE DAYS OF THE SEIGE. I FEEL MORE
 VIGOROUS MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO SUPPRESS THIS
 FIRE.

B. AS AN EXAMPLE, I WAS TOLD THAT 40 TPO SORTIES
 ON ABOUT 20 TARGETS HAD BEEN REQUESTED FOR THE PREVIOUS
 NIGHT AND ONLY 5 HAD BEEN APPROVED.

C. WE NOW HOLD CONSIDERABLE REAL ESTATE BESIDES

PAGE TWO RUMSAX 2006 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 THAT ENCOMPASSED BY THE PERIMETER WIRE, YET ALL
 HELICOPTER LANDINGS ARE SYILL BEING MADE ON THE
 AIRFIELD WHICH IS ZEROED IN BY ENEMY FIRE. I SUGGEST
 IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF LZ'S NEAR-BY BUT OUTSIDE
 THE IMPACT AREA; PERHAPS ALONG THE ACCESS ROAD RUNNING
 ALONG HIGHWAY 9. IN PARTICULAR, THIS APPLIES TO TROOP
 MOVEMENT. THERE IS NO REASON FOR TROOPS SIMPLY TO COME
 IN OR LOAD OUT FROM THE AIRFIELD BY HELICOPTER AND I
 DO NOT THINK C-130 AIRCRAFT WILL BE MAKING ANY LANDINGS
 WITH THE INCOMING AT PRESENT LEVELS.

2. I WANT TO STRESS AGAIN THE UNDERSTANDING WE ALL HAVE
 THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE KHE SANH AREA BY
 OFFENSIVE FIRE AND MOVEMENT AND WE ARE NOT DESTROYING
 THE BASE OR WALKING AWAY FROM IT.

3. ALL HANDS SEEMED IN GOOD SPIRITS AND ARE EXECUTING
 YOUR PLAN TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT
 HAMPERED BY WEATHER AND INCOMING. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-60)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE
X-ORIGINATOR			CG III MAF		13 APR 68
ACTION/COGNIZANCE			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES REC
C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION			131440Z APR 68		
I-INFORMATION			SUBJECT		
S-SIGNATURE			SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
	CG				
2	DCG		4/14		OK
3	DCG AIR		4/16		OK
1.	C/S		4/14		OK
	D C/S		4/14		OK
	D C/S DM				
	S/S		4/14	4/14	DKW
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

REMARKS
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

"# 2 & 3 Burned
6 Nov 68"

#8

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUHFMA
 DE RUMSAR 1677 1041440
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 131440Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK
 FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG FMFPAC 122325Z APR 68

MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR AGAIN COMING TO OUR AID WITH
 PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION FOR PVC. YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
 IN THIS MATTER AS IN ALL SIMILAR SITUATIONS IS DEEPLY
 APPRECIATED. VARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

O 130935Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE PRESENT ENEMY ROAD CONSTRUCTION EFFORT (YC 6170 TO YC 8362), BASE AREA 607 TOWARD HAPPY VALLEY AND DANANG CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS A MAJOR UNDERTAKING. VR SIGHTINGS HAVE DISCERNED OVER 3,000 WORKERS/TROOPS IN THE AREA DURING A SEVEN DAY PERIOD (30MAR-6APR) AND THIRTY AA/AW WPN PSNS BOTH 50CAL AND ESTIMATED 37MM DURING PAST TEN DAYS HAVE BEEN BOTH SIGHTED AND IDENTIFIED IN IMAGERY. A VR SIGHTING OF SLASH AND CLEAR EFFORTS FROM YC 9161 TO YC 9865, ON 12 APR LEAVES LITTLE DOUBT AS TO THE INTENDED COURSE OF THE ROAD. AN NVA HOI CHANH, PVT DAO TRONG TU (RPT NO 249-AMERICAL-68) TELLS US WORKERS ON THE ROAD CLAIM ITS DESTINATION IS DANANG SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION THE END OF MAY. TU CLAIMS TO HAVE OBSERVED A THOUSAND WORKERS IN EXCESS OF THREE HUNDRED RUSSIAN BUILT VEHICLES IN EARLY MARCH. THE VEHICLES INCLUDE VARIOUS TRUCKS, SU-85 ASSAULT GUNS AND ROCKET LAUNCHER VEHICLES. TU CLAIMED OBSERVING 122MM FIELD GUNS BEING TOWED. BEST ESTIMATE AS TO THE NUMBER OF ARTY PIECES WOULD BE TWENTY. THESE IDENTIFICATIONS WERE MADE BY TU WITH THE AID OF A SOVIET EQUIPMENT MANUAL AFTER HE DESCRIBED HIS OBSERVATIONS. INFO AVAILABLE TO US WOULD INDICATE HIS STORY IS PROBABLY TRUE.

2. IT IS MY INTENT TO GREATLY INCREASE OUR TACAIR EFFORT IN THIS AREA AND REQUEST ADDITIONAL ARC LIGHT STRIKES.

3. THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF AN ENEMY LOC LEADING TOWARD DANANG. THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF TUBE ARTILLERY AND THE CONTINUED LACK OF INFO ON THE 325C NVA DIV CAUSES GRAVE CONCERN. I WOULD APPRECIATE A PRIORITY OF ARC LIGHT EFFORT IN THIS AREA IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR TACAIR STRIKES. REGARDS.

GP-4
375

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

26

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TIMEFORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13 APR 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 130914Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
1	CG		4/14			REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE " #2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68 "
3	DCG		4/14			
4	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		4/14/68			
	D C/S			4/14	m	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	131900	4/16		gtd	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #5

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMHMB
DE RUMSAK 1650 1040914
ZNY SSSSS
O 130914Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMB/CG PROVCORPSV
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
1. MY HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN IN RECEIPT OF SEVERAL INQUIRIES
RE POSSIBLE PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM KSCB
WITH CONSEQUENT LOSS OF CRITICAL MATERIAL. FOR EXAMPLE,
SEVERAL ITEMS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR GEAR BELONGING TO
SUCH COMMANDS AS 7TH AF, TF-ALPHA, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE AND
DCA ARE NOW INSTALLED AT KSCB. I'M SURE THAT YOU ARE TAKING
THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE AGAINST LOSS OF THIS VALUABLE
EQUIPMENT.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SLP.	SURG.									#5

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 130708Z APR 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG		4/14			REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY "2" 3 burned 6 Nov 68"
7	DCG		4/14			
7	DCG AIR		4/14/68			
1	C/S		4/14			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	131900				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #4

SECRET

OO RUHKM
 DE RUMSAK 1640 1040708
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 130708Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR INFO. QUOTE:
 Z O 120815Z APR 68
 FM CG PROV CORPS V PHB
 TO CG 1ST ACD LZ STUD
 CG 101ST ABN DIV CP EAGLE
 CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
 CTF CLEARWATER CUA VIET
 INFO COMUSMACV SGN
 CG III MAF DNG
 DSA I CTZ DNG
 CG USASPTCMD DNG
 SA 1ST ARVN DIV HUE
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T 00875 FROM AVII-GCO

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1640 **S E C R E T** MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SUBJ: OPLAN 2-68 (U)

REF: PCV MSG DTG 101426Z APR 68 (S)
 (S) ADDRESSEES WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION AS OUTLINED BELOW IN
 PREPARATION FOR EXECUTION OF PCV OPLAN 2-68. THIS SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT
 TO CHANGE.

DATE	PLANNED ACTIVITY
D-6, 11 APR	- ONE BDE TF (2 BN) OF 1 ACD EXTRACTED FROM PEGASUS AO, ONE BN TO LZ BETTY/SHARON, ONE BN TO CP EVANS. LOGISTICAL BACKHAUL FROM LZ STUD BEGINS.
D-5, 12 APR	- ONE BDE, 1 ACD STARTS EXTRACTION FROM PEGASUS AO TO BASE CAMPS. RTE 9 OPENED AND LOGISTICAL BACKHAUL BEGINS FROM KSCB. 3D MAR DIV CONTINUES OPERATIONS IN PEGASUS AO.
D-4, 13 APR	- BDE OF 1 ACD COMPLETES EXTRACTION TO BASE CAMP. 3D REGT, 1ST ARVN INF DIV BEGINS AIRMOBILE TRAINING PER MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF CG, 1 ACD AND CG, 1ST ARVN DIV. ONE BN, 101ST ABN DIV RELIEVED BY IACD AT CP EVANS, AND RELOCATES AS DIRECTED BY CG, 101ST ABN DIV.
D-3, 14 APR	- ARVN ABN TF EXTRACTED FROM PEGASUS AO AND MOVED TO PK 17, 3D MAR DIV ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEG-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	NTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#4

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1640 S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ASUS AO. IACD CP OPENS AT CP EVANS. ONE BN, 101ST ABN DIV RELOCATES FROM LZ JANE TO AREA DESIGNATED BY CG, 101ST ABN DIV.

D-2, 15 APR - BEGIN REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE FORCES FROM KSCB.
 D-DAY, 17 APR - ONE BDE, IACD, AIR ASSAULTS INTO A SHAU VALLEY VIC A LUOI. ENGR EQUIP AIR LANDS AT A LUOI FOR REPAIR AND UPGRADING OF AIR STRIP TO C-7A CAPABILITY. 101ST ABN DIV COMMENCES ASSAULT IN VIC JUNCTION RTE 547/A 547.

D&1, 18 APR - ARVN INF REGT AIR LANDS IN A SHAU VALLEY. ADDITIONAL BDE IACD AIR ASSAULTS INTO A SHAU VALLEY ON ORDER CG IACD

D&2, 19 APR - 3D MAR DIV COMMENCES CLOSING OUT OF LZ STUD. RETAINS CA LU. LIGHT MOBILE BN SIZE FORCE AND POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF FOB-3 REMAIN AT KHE SANH. FOLLOWING EXTRACTION OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL NOT REQUIRED IN THE KHE SANH AREA THE 3D MAR DIV WITHDRAWS ALL COMBAT BRIDGING MATERIAL FROM RTE 9 WEST OF CA LU. 3D MAR DIV ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR WUNDER BEACH AREA AND AO VICINITY QUANG TRI. ONE BN 101ST ABN

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 1640 S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DIV RELEASED FROM WUNDER BEACH AND MOVES TO AREA DESIGNATED BY CG, 101ST ABN DIV. A LUOI AIR STRIP REPAIRS COMPLETED FOR C7A AIR CRAFT CAPABILITY.

ARVN ABN TF ASSAULTS INTO BA 114.

D&3, 20 APR - 3D MAR DIV INITIATES ACTION IN BA 101. PROJECT DELTA COMMENCES OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED AO. C7A AIRSTRIP OPENS AT A LUOI.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#4	

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13 APR 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 130136Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR <i>#3 & 4 burned 6 Nov 68</i>
2	DCG		4/13/68		<i>JA</i>	
3	DCG AIR				<i>JA</i>	
K	C/S		4/13/68		<i>JA</i>	
	D C/S		4/14/68		<i>JA</i>	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		3/14	4/14	<i>DWW</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2	<i>COPY</i>				
	G-3	<i>COPY</i>				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #3

SECRET

OO RUMHMB
 DE RUMSAK 1577 1040136
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 130136Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 BT

**FOR
 HAS BEEN SENT**

S E C R E T
 FOR LGEN ROSSON INFO MGEN ANDERSON AND MGEN ROBERTSON
 FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER COMPLETION OF RETROGRADE MVMPT OF HEAVY EQUIP FROM KSCB, DESIRE TO REDUCE MANNING IN KHE SANH AREA TO MAXIMUM OF ONE MAR BN (REINF). THIS BN TO BE ONE ORGANIC TO THIRD MARDIV. HELOS MUST BE READILY AVAILABLE TO PERMIT THIS FORCE TO MOVE QUICKLY AND FREQUENTLY.
2. FURTHER WISH FIRST AVAILABLE MARINE UNITS SO RELIEVED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY QUANG TRI - WUNDER BEACH AREA. ONE REINFORCED BN 1ST MAR DIV (EITHER 1/1 OR 2/1) WILL REMAIN OF CON PCV UNTIL COMPLETION IMPENDING OPNS ASHAU - ROUTE 547 - BASE AREA 114. FOREGOING WILL RELEASE 101 ABN FORCES FOR OPNS W OF HUE. REMAINDER OF 1ST MARDIV ASSETS (INCLUDING REGT HQ AND ONE BN) NOW UNDER PCV

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1577 **S E C R E T**
 OPN CCN TO RETURN TO 1ST MARDIV UPON COMPLETION OF RETROGRADE OF SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT FROM KSCB, BUT NLT 27 APRIL.

4. IT IS MY DESIRE TO RESTORE ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY TO BOTH MARDIVS. CONSEQUENTLY, 2D BN, 3D MAR, SHOULD REVERT TO 3D MARDIV AND 2N BN, 1ST MAR, SHOULD RETURN TO 1ST MARDIV CONTROL AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

5. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV. EARMARK 1 BN IN HUE/PHU BAI AREA AS III MAF RESERVE FOR QUICK HELO AVAILABILITY TO MOVE AS REQUIRED. CONTINUE PLANS TO EXECUTE MAJOR OPNS W OF DANANG.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#3	

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/13/68		lp	CG III MAF SERIAL 120600Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/13/68		YM	SUBJECTSUPPORT OF FIELD ARTILLERY DIGITAL AUTOMATIC COMPUTER (FADAC)
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1		4/12/68		Q	<p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>FOR</p> <p>" #364 burned 6 Nov 68"</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p>
DC/S			4/13/68		DM	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			12.1700		DM	
S/C						

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMHFL
 DE RUMSAK 1481 1030600
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 120600Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR BGEN OLSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

SUPPORT OF FIELD ARTILLERY DIGITAL AUTOMATIC COMPUTER (FADAC)
 AND ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT

1. FADAC HAS BEEN OPERATIONAL SINCE JULY 67 IN RVN. REPORTS FROM FIELD COMMANDERS INDICATE MAJOR SUPT PROBLEM DEVELOPING, PARTICULARLY FOR GENERATOR PU 668.
2. BASED ON PRESENT POSTURE AND EXPERIENCE FACTORS, CURRENT ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT 50 PERCENT OF M-13 WILL BE NONOPERATIONAL WITHIN 4 MONTHS DUE TO LACK OF POWER SUPPLY.
3. FADAC IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN COMBAT READINESS OF THIS COMMAND. CURRENT MISSION DEMANDS MAXIMUM SUPPORT FROM ARTILLERY UNITS AVAILABLE. DEPENDENCE ON FADAC HAS INCREASED SINCE INTRODUCTION OF COFRAM.
4. I REALIZE THAT THIS PROGRAM HAS NOT BEEN UNDER YOUR IMMEDIATE COGNIZANCE AND THAT YOU WILL NOT ASSUME PRIMARY SUPPORT

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1481 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR
 RESPONSIBILITY UNTIL 15 APR 68. HOWEVER, REMEDIAL ACTION IS
 REQUIRED IN ADDITION TO LONG RANGE SUPPORT CONCEPT YOU ARE
 DEVELOPING.

5. REQUEST YOU UTILIZE EXPERTISE WITHIN YOUR COMMAND TO ARRIVE AT AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION TO THIS PRESSING PROBLEM. PLEASE ADVISE.

GP-4

BT

#2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG	2		4/13/68		gh	SERIAL 110112Z APR 68 COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3			4/17	gh	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S	1.		4/14/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S			4/13/68		ma	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			11045	4/13	Deu	
S/C						

EXCLUSIVE
HAS BEEN SENT

"# 2 & 3 burned 5 Nov 68"

LEGEND
A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
C - COMMENTS
I - INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RR RUMHVP
 DE RUMSAK 1314 102011Z
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 110112Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHVP/CO TWENTY-SIXTH MAR
 INFO RUMHMB/CG PROVCORPSV
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
 HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR COL D.E. LOWNDS
 INFO LTGEN ROSSON AND MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 YOUR RESOLUTION TO WIN, THE COURAGEOUS EXAMPLE OF
 YOUR HEROISM, AND THE PROFESSIONAL PRIDE OF YOU MEN HAVE
 CAUSED THE ENEMY TO WITHDRAW IN BITTER DEFEAT. THEY HAD
 NO CHOICE. KHE SANK WILL LONG ENDURE IN THE MINDS OF
 THE MARINES, SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN, AND ARVN WHO
 SERVED THERE AS AN EXAMPLE OF DETERMINATION IN THE CAUSE
 OF FREEDOM. THE VICTORY IS OURS BECAUSE OF DEVOTION TO
 CORPS AND COUNTRY. MANY TIMES IN THE FACE OF GRAVE
 DANGER, YOU RISKED YOUR PERSONAL SAFETY TO BOLSTER THE
 CONFIDENCE OF YOUR MEN, ASSIST WITH THE WOUNDED, AND
 SUPERVISE ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE COMBAT BASE, ALL
 THIS AND MORE, UNDER CONTINUAL ENEMY FIRE. YOU AND YOUR

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1314 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 TROOPS HAVE DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB. BECAUSE OF THIS
 KHE SANK WILL BE ADDED TO THE LIST OF UNFORGETTABLE NAMES
 IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY. WELL DONE!
 GP-4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#29

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/11/68		<i>L</i>	FROM: RBMVBKX CG III MAF SERIAL 181336Z APR COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/13/68		<i>Y</i>	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DCG AIR	4			4-17	<i>J</i>	REMARKS
C/S	1		4/13/68		<i>C</i>	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>I want to discuss this message w/ Col Walker</i></p> <p><i>Col. Walker has discussed. #4W</i></p> <p><i>"#2 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p>
DC/S		<i>B</i>	4/11/68		<i>SH</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			110715	4/13	<i>RTJ</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
- C - COMMENTS
- I - INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUHHFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1270 1011336
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 101336Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRILAK INFO MGEN
 MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS DELIVER FIRST WAKING HOUR.

SUBJ: CONTROL OF MARINE AIR IN RVN

1. THE FOLLOWING PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO CMC 091623Z APR 68:

QUOTE

O 151905Z MAR 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO CG FIRST MAW DANANG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 07399 FROM MACCOG6 SEC I OF II.

SUBJ: PREPLANNED REQUESTS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)

REF: A. LTR, HQ MACV, MACJOD, 7 MAR 68, SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (S)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1270 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

B. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUN 66 (C)

C. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11, 21 JUN 66 (C)

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE FOR REQUEST-
 ING PREPLANNED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE A. IT SUPPLEMENTS REFERENCES B AND C
 WHICH WILL BE REVISED.

2. (C) ALLOCATIONS.

A. ALLOCATIONS OF FLIGHTS OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED TO
 MAJOR COMMANDS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIONAL
 REQUIREMENTS AND ESTABLISHED PRIORITIES. TOTAL ALLOCATIONS ARE
 BASED ON THE EXPECTED AVAILABILITY OF FLIGHTS PLUS A SMALL NUMBER
 FOR FLEXIBILITY.

B. TWO PLANNING ALLOCATIONS ARE TELEPHONED ENCODED TO DEPUTY
 G3 AIR, III MAF, BY MACV TASE (J3 AIR) PRIOR TO 2000 HOURS DAILY.
 THESE ALLOCATIONS ARE FOR:

(1) RADAR-CONTROLLED (TPQ-10/MSQ-77) STRIKES FOR EXECUTION
 DURING PERIOD 1900 HOURS THE FOLLOWING NIGHT TO 0600 HOURS THE
 NEXT MORNING.

(2) STRIKES TO BE EXECUTED UNDER VISUAL OR RADAR CONTROL
 DURING THE PERIOD 0600 HOURS TO 1900 HOURS THE DAY AFTER REQUESTS ARE

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1270 CO N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SUBMITTED.

- C. THESE ALLOCATIONS ARE FOR SUBALLOCATION BY III MAF TO ALL US/FW GROUND TACTICAL UNITS REPORTING DIRECTLY TO CG, III MAF IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY CG III MAF.
- D. SEPARATE ALLOCATIONS ARE MADE BY J3 AIR TO I CORPS.
- E. THE DAILY PLANNING ALLOCATIONS TO III MAF REPRESENT THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS OF EACH TYPE THAT J3 AIR WILL ACCEPT BY TELEPHONE. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT ALLOCATIONS FREQUENTLY MAY BE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET ALL VALID REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT J3 AIR BE INFORMED DAILY OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT FOR WHICH TACTICAL UNITS UNDER III MAF WOULD SUBMIT REQUESTS IF UNLIMITED STRIKE SUPPORT WERE AVAILABLE.
3. (U) PREPLANNED REQUESTS.
- A. ALL PREPLANNED REQUESTS ARE FORWARDED OVER GROUND FORCES COMMUNICATION CHANNELS. THEY MOVE PROGRESSIVELY UPWARD THROUGH EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND, UNTIL THEY REACH MACV J3 AIR. AT EACH INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ALL REQUESTS WILL BE EVALUATED, COORDINATED WITH OTHER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS, ASSIGNED A NUMERICAL PRIORITY, AND FORWARDED TO THE NEXT HIGHER LEVEL.
- B. REQUESTS ARE FORWARDED BY TELEPHONE IN CLEAR TEXT EXCEPT:

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1270 CO N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THAT TARGET COORDINATES AND DESIRED TIME ON TARGET (TOT) ARE ENCODED (SEE PARA 6 BELOW).

- C. REQUESTS FOR RADAR-CONTROLLED STRIKES (SKYSPOTS) FOR EXECUTION BETWEEN 1900 HOURS ON DATE OF REQUESTS AND 0600 HOURS THE NEXT MORNING WILL BE SUBMITTED TO J3 AIR NOT LATER THAN 1100 HOURS DAILY.
- D. REQUESTS FOR STRIKES TO BE EXECUTED BETWEEN 0600 HOURS AND 1900 HOURS THE FOLLOWING DAY, EITHER FAC/TACA OR RADAR-CONTROLLED, WILL BE SUBMITTED TO J3 AIR NOT LATER THAN 1300 HOURS DAILY.
- E. REQUESTS RECEIVED TOO LATE TO FORWARD WITH OTHER PRE-PLANNED REQUESTS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY J3 AIR. IF CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL, THEY MUST BE FORWARDED THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS AT APPROPRIATE TIME.
- F. ALL REQUESTS MUST HAVE POLITICAL CLEARANCE AS WELL AS TACTICAL APPROVAL PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO J3 AIR.
- G. PREPLANNED REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE AND IN THE SEQUENCE LISTED. CERTAIN ITEMS AS INDICATED ARE REQUIRED FOR ONLY ONE TYPE OF REQUEST--FAC OF SKYSPOT/SKYSPOT BACKUP MISSIONS.
- (1) REQUEST NO.-- BF-15-3. THE BF IDENTIFIES UNIT

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

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PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1270 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
WHICH ORIGINATED REQUEST; 15 REPRESENTS DATE REQUEST SUBMITTED;
3 INDICATES THIRD REQUEST OF ORIGINATING COMMAND FOR THE DATE.

(A) ON ANY REQUESTED STRIKE WHICH FALLS IN OR NORTH OF DMZ
OR WEST OF RVN-LAOS BORDER, ADD TH TO REQUEST NUMBER TO DESIGNATE
OUT-OF-COUNTRY STRIKE.

(B) THE THREE US ARMY DIVISIONS PRESENTLY IN I CTZ HAVE
SERVED RECENTLY UNDER THREE DIFFERENT MAJOR COMMANDS AND US
DIFFERENT SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY ORIGINATOR OF AN AIR REQUEST.
AMERICAN DIV REQUEST NUMBERS START WITH O (OSCAR) FOLLOWED BY
LETTER INDICATING BRIGADE ONLY. 1ST CAV DIV REQUEST NUMBERS START
WITH B (BRAVO) FOLLOWED BY LETTER TO IDENTIFY THE BRIGADE OF BATTALION
ORIGINATING REQUEST. 101ST ABN DIV REQUEST NUMBERS START
WITH 101 FOLLOWED BY TWO LETTERS WHICH IDENTIFY BRIGADE AND BATTALION.

(C) RECOMMEND III MAF ESTABLISH A UNIFORM SYSTEM FOR ALL
US/FW GROUND TACTICAL UNITS IN I CTZ TO INCLUDE MANEUVER BATTALION
LEVEL. LETTERS M THROUGH T ARE ASSIGNED FOR THIS PURPOSE; HOWEVER,
1ST AIR CAV DIV MAY CONTINUE TO USE B (BRAVO) IF DESIRED. REQUEST
THAT A COPY OF III MAF UNIT DESIGNATION SYSTEM BE FORWARDED
TO HQ MACV, ATTN: COC-TASE, APO 96222.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1270 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

(2) PRIORITY--III MAF WILL ASSIGN A III MAF PRIORITY (1
THROUGH TOTAL NUMBER OF REQUESTS OF EACH TYPE) TO ALL AKYSPOT AND
FAC REQUESTS PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO J3 AIR.

(3) TARGET COORDINATES--TARGET LOCATION WILL BE ENCODED BY
ORIGINATING COMMAND PRIOR TO SUBMISSION OF REQUEST. FOUR DIGITS
ARE ADEQUATE FOR STRIKES TO BE EXECUTED UNDER VISUAL CONTROL;
EIGHT DIGITS ARE REQUIRED FOR ANY TARGET TO BE STRUCK UNDER RADAR
CONTROL, I.E., SKYSPOT (NIGHT) OR SKYSPOT BACKUP (DAY).

(4) TARGET DESCRIPTION--SEE PARA 5 BELOW.

(5) DESIRED TOT (TIME ON TARGET)--THIS MUST BE ENCODED.

(6) LATEST ACCEPTABLE TOT-- MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY CONSISTENT
WITH TACTICAL PLAN SHOULD BE PERMITTED. HARD TOTS SHOULD BE REQUESTED
ONLY FOR HIGHEST PRIORITY MISSIONS WHICH MUST BE COORDINATED WITH
FIRE AND MANEUVER OF GROUND FORCES. ACCEPTABLE TIME FRAME IS
TRANSMITTED AS PLUS (OR MINUS) SPECIFIED NUMBER OF MINUTES OR
HOURS FROM DESIRED TOT.

(7) FAC (REQUIRED FOR FAC REQUESTS ONLY)-- CALL SIGN OF FAC
WHO WILL CONTROL STRIKE OF CONTROL AGENCY, SUCH AS MARINE DASC,
WHICH WILL DESIGNATE FAC OR TACA WHO WILL DIRECT STRIKE.

(8) FREQUENT (REQUIRED FOR FAC REQUESTS ONLY)-- FREQUENCY

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

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CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUHHFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1271 1011336
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 101336Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN KRULAK INFO
 MGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SECTION TWO OF TWO DELIVER FIRST WAKING HOUR.
 ON WHICH FAC OR OTHER CONTROL AGENCY CAN BE CONTACTED BY FLIGHT
 LEADER.

(9) RENDEZVOUS (REQUIRED FOR FAC REQUESTS ONLY)-- DESIGNATED
 HEADING AND DISTANCE IN NAUTICAL MILES FROM SPECIFIED TACAN STATION;
 E.G., 295/23/CHANNEL 69.

(10) HEADING (REQUIRED FOR SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP REQUESTS
 ONLY)-- DESIRED DIRECTION OF ATTACK IN DEGREES AND ACCEPTABL
 TOLERANCE, E.G., 280 PLUS OR MINUS 10. DO NOT REQUEST A HEADING
 THAT WOULD CAUSE AIRCRAFT TO OVERFLY FRIENDLY TROOPS OR POPULATED
 AREAS ON BOMB RUN.

(11) RECIPROCAL (REQUIRED FOR SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP RE-

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1271 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 O 150905Z MAR 68 ZFH-1
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FMAW DANANG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 07399 FROM MACCOG6 FINAL SEC OF II.
 QUESTS ONLY)--IS RECIPROCAL OF RUN-IN HEADING AUTHORIZED? YES
 OR NO.

(12) FRIENDLIES (REQUIRED FOR SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP RE-
 QUESTS ONLY)-- DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FOR TARGET TO NEAREST
 FRIENDLY TROOPS OR POPULATED AREA, E.G. 2.5 KILOMETERS NW.

(13) BORDER-- BORDER INFORMATION NAO APPLICABLE TO II MAF;
 PERTAINS TO CAMBODIAN BORDER ONLY.

(14) RECOMMENDED ORDNANCE--INCLUDE FUSING IF APPROPRIATE.
 IF ANY SPECIFIC MUNITION IS UNACCEPTABLE, INDICATE HERE.

(15) IN SUPPORT--SPECIFY NAMED OPERATION, TAOR, OR AO
 SUPPORTED BY REQUESTED STRIKE.

(16) REMARKS--INCLUDE SUCH INFORMATION AS COORDINATION
 EFPEVED WITH OTHER COMMANDS IF STRIKE IS OUTSIDE TAOR OR AO OF
 REQUESTED UNIT, NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IF MULTIPLE STRIKES ARE DESIRED.

PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
AND ANY OTHER SPECIAL REQUESTS OR PERTINENT INFORMATION.

(17) DESIRED RESULTS--SPECIFY A (DESTROY), B (INTERDICT),
C (NEUTRALIZED), OR D (HARASS) AS DESIRED.

(H) AFTER RECEIPT OF PREPLANNED REQUESTS, THE FOLLOWING
ACTIONS ARE TAKEN BY J3 AIR:

(1) ENCODED PARTS OF REQUEST ARE DECODED.

(2) TARGET LOCATION IS PLOTTED ON AIR OPERATIONS MAP TO IN-
SURE THAT TARGET IS IN TAOR OR AO OF REQUESTING UNIT.

(3) DECODING OF TARGET COORDINATES FOR ALL SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT
BACKUP STRIKES IS CHECKED BY A SECOND PERSON.

(4) COORDINATES OF SKYSPOT AND SKYSPOT BACKUP TARGETS ARE RE-
ENCODED IN DIFFERENT CODE GROUPS WHICH ARE TELEPHONED TO MAJOR
COMMAND FOR VERIFICATION OF TARGET LOCATION BY COMMAND THAT SUB-
MITTED REQUEST. MACV J3 AIR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF VERIFICATION AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(5) ALL PREPLANNED REQUEST THAT CAN BE APPROVED ARE PASSED
TO 7TH AIR FORCE TACC STRIKE PLANS TO BE FRAGGED.

(6) MAJOR COMMANDS ARE NOTIFIED BY 1500 HOURS OF THOSE LOW
PRIORITY REQUESTS THAT ARE DISAPPROVED DUE TO THE LACK OF FLIGHTS
TO FULFILL THEM.

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK1271 CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

4. K(U) IMMEDIATE REQUESTS

A. IMMEDIATE REQUESTS ARE FORWARDED OVER AIR FORCE OR MARINE
AIR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES DIRECTLY FROM THE ORIGINATING COMMAND
TO THE APPROPRIATE DASC--DASC VICTOR FOR UNITS UNDER OPERATIONAL
CONTROL FO PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM AND I DASC FOR ALL OTHER
FORCES IN I CTZ.

B. REQUIRED REQUEST DATA ARE TRANSMITTED IN THE SAME SEQUENCE
AS SHOWN FOR PREPLANNED REQUESTS IN PARA 3G ABOVE. AS A MINIMUM,
THE FOLLOWING DATA ARE REQUIRED: REQUEST NUMBER; TARGET COORDI-
NATES; TARGET DESCRIPTION; FAC OR CNTROL AGENCY TO BE CONTACTED,
FREQUENCY, AND RENDEZVOUS.

C. ACTION TO FULFILL IMMEDIATE REQUESTS FROM UNITS IN I CTZ
ARE DESCRIBED IN INCLOSURE D TO REFERENCE A.

5. (U) TARGET DESCRIPT IN/TYPE MISSION.

A. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MAY BE PREPLANNED TO ATTACK A WIDE
VARIETY OF GROUND TARGETS AND TO PERFORM OTHER TYPES OF MISSIONS
THAT WILL FACILITATE THE OPERATIONS OF GROUND FORCES OR PROVIDE
PROTECTION.

B. DESCRIPTION OF GROUND TARGETS MUST BE AS EXPLICIT AS
POSSIBLE AND INCLUDE COMONENTS ON THE TYPE AND DENSITY OF VEGETATION

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 608 (V) MAR 12 2110 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 IN THE TARGET AREA WHEN APPLICABLE. THE DESCRIPTION MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO FACILITATE DETERMINATION OF THE MOST APPROPRIATE ORDNANCE LOAD TO ACCOMPLISH DESIRED RESULTS.

C. OTHER TYPES OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS AS DEFINED BELOW MAY BE REQUESTED ON A PREPLANNED BASIS. MOST OF THESE ARE NONSTANDARD TERMS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO INSURE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THROUGHOUT THE JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM. THEY INCLUDE:

- (1) CONVOY COVER: COLUMN COVER AS DEFINED IN JCS PUB 1.
- (2) LANDING ZONE (LZ) COVER: COVER OF AN AIRMOBILE FORCE BY AIRCRAFT IN RADIO CONTACT THEREWITH, PROVIDING FOR ITS PROTECTION BY RECONNAISSANCE AND/OR ATTACK OF AIR OR GROUND TARGETS WHICH THREATEN FRIENDLY FORCES.
- (3) LANDING ZONE PREPARATION (LZ PREP): FIRE DELIVERED ON A SPECIFIC AREA TO NEUTRALIZE PREPOSITIONED ENEMY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS AND TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AN ATTACK BY AN AIRMOBILE FORCE.
- (4) LANDING ZONE (LZ) CONSTRUCTION: FIRE DELIVERED TO CLEAR TERRAIN OF OBSTACLES, THEREBY CONSTRUCTING SITES TO ACCOMMODATE THE LANDING OF HELIBORNE FORCES. (NOTE: PRESENT CAPABILITY TO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE SIX RUMSAKI271 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 CONSTRUCT HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE IS LIMITED; THEREFORE, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SELECT SITES WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE VEGETATION CONSISTENT WITH TACTICAL PLANS.)

(5) PRESTRIKE: FIRE DELIVERED ON A SPECIFIC TARGET AREA TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF AIMED ENEMY FIRE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AN ASSAULT BY GROUND FORCES.

(6) DROP ZONE (DZ) COVER: SAME AS LZ COVER EXCEPT APPLICABLE TO OPERATIONS OF AN AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE.

(7) DROP ZONE PREPARATIONS (DZ PREP): SAME AS LZ PREPARATION EXCEPT APPLICABLE TO OPERATIONS OF AN AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE.

D. LANDING ZONE COVER SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE HELICOPTER ESCORT.

6. (C) KAC-JN (JUL IET NOVEMBER) WILL BE USED IN PROCESSING ENCODED PARTS OF AIR REQUESTS. GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. PARA 2 APPEARS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY INFO REQUESTED BY GEN MCCUTCHEON. FYI, WE CONTINUE TO PASS TO MACV TASE OUR DESIRED TARGET REQUIREMENTS, REGARDLESS OF ARBITRARY ALLOCATIONS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 101002Z APR 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR # 304 burned 5 Nov 68
2	DCG					
3	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		4/10/68			
	D C/S		4/11			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		101940	4/11	DKW.	
	G-1					
	G-2	COPY				
	G-3	COPY				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

FOR

00 RUMHMB
DE RUMSAK 1250 101100Z
ZNY SSSSS
O 101002Z APR 68 ZFF-1
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T

FOR LGEN ROSSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
TERMINATION OF OPN PEGASUS

1. CURRENT PROGRESS SUGGESTS PROBABILITY THAT CURRENT LEVEL OF FORCE COMMITMENT TO OPN PEGASUS CAN BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. UNTIL THEN, I THINK WE SHOULD USE AVAILABLE FORCES TO VIGOROUSLY PURSUE THE ENEMY AND FERRET OUT HIS SUPPLY CACHES IN THE KHE SANH AREA. EFFORTS IN THIS CONNECTION HAVE ALREADY PROVEN FRUITFUL BUT VAST AREAS REMAIN UNEXPLORED. WE MUST BE CERTAIN THAT THE ENEMY DOES NOT RETAIN HIDDEN ABILITY TO RESURGE READILY. THEN WE MUST PRESS THE CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE IN OTHER AREAS WITH ALL THE SPEED AND VIGOR THAT PRUDENCE WILL ALLOW.
2. CONSISTENT WITH THE FOREGOING, YOUR PLANS FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT SHOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1250 **S E C R E T** FOR:

- A. PHASED WITHDRAWAL/REDUCTION IN FORCE KHE SANH AREA
 - B. WITHDRAWAL OF HVY EQUIP AND SALVAGABLE MATERIAL FROM KSCB.
 - C. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY IN THE HUE - A SHAU AREA.
 - D. TIME/FORCE PHASING OF THE ABOVE.
3. DESIRE EARLY BRIEFING ON THE ABOVE AT YOUR CONVENIENCE.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.								#27	

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/10/68		le	CG III MAF
DCG	3		4/10/68		JK	SERIAL 090336Z APR 68 COPY # 1 OF 10 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT RESPONSE TO ALERT CONDITION
C/S	1		4/9/68		Q	REMARKS MAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE <i>"# 24 3 burned 5 Nov 68"</i>
DC/S			4/10/68		PK	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			091345	4/11	JKW	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C- COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

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RR RUMHFL RUMHVA
 DE RUMSAK 1094 1000336
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 090336Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG DANANG SUPPORT COMMAND
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD
 ZEN/COMMANDER NSA
 ZEN/COMMANDER NCB 7D
 ZEN/CO 366TH TFW
 BT

EXCLUSIVE**HAS BEEN SENT**

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ANDERSON, MGEN ROBERTSON, BGEN MCBRIDE,
 BGEN OLSON, RADM OSBORN, RADM BARTLETT AND COL WATSON FROM LGEN
 CUSHMAN

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO ALERT CONDITION

- A. CG III MAF 062100Z APRIL 68
- B. ICCI 5500.1A OF 23 MARCH 1968
- C. FORCE ORDER 5500.2 OF 22 MARCH 68
1. BY REFERENCE A THIS HEADQUARTERS SET ALERT CONDITION GRAY
 AS DEFINED BY REFERENCE B. REFERENCE A WAS PASSED BY FLASH

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1094 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 PRECEDENCE TO ALL US UNITS IN THE DANANG AREA.

2. DURING THE COURSE OF SUNDAY, 7 APRIL, TRAFFIC WAS APPRECIABLY
 LIGHTER, HOWEVER THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS ATTEST TO THE FACT THAT
 THE ALERT CONDITION WAS NOT FULLY COMPLIED WITH:

- A. SEVERAL GATE SENTRIES WERE UNAWARE OF ALERT CONDITION.
 NO SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN ON VEHICLES OR PERSONNEL EN-
 TERING OR LEAVING.
- B. ONE COMMAND CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE A COPY OF REFERENCE B.
- C. NUMEROUS TRUCK LOADS OF PERSONNEL IN BATHING CLOTHES
 APPROACHED CHINA BEACH.
- D. EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES AT CHINA BEACH, FREEDOM HILL AND
 DANANG AIR FORCE BASE WERE OPEN.
- E. VEHICLES AND PERSONNEL MADE RUNS TO CHINA BEACH AND
 FREEDOM HILL EXCHANGES.

3. I AM CONCERNED THAT THE ALERT CONDITIONS ANNOUNCED BY THIS
 HEADQUARTERS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY PROMULGATED AND ENFORCED. I
 EXPECT EACH OF YOU TO MAKE ADEQUATE PLANS WITHIN YOUR COMMAND
 TO INSURE THAT EVERYONE WHO NEEDS TO KNOW OF ALERT CONDITONS
 IS INFORMED ON A TIMELY BASIS, AND THAT ALL LOCAL ACTION NECES-
 SARY TO EFFECT THE CONDITION IS TAKEN RAPIDLY. REFERENCE B IS

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1094 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 DELIBERATELY BROAD, AND REQUIRES LOCAL PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

4. AS A RELATED MATTER, SIMILAR ACTION IS REQUIRED WITH RESPECT TO
 THE CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE C FOR UNITS UNDER III MAF.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#26

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUHKM
 DE RUMSAK 1078 1000202
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 090202Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

FOR**HAS BEEN SENT**

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 MARINE AUGMENTATION PCV STAFF

1. GENERAL ABRAMS HAS ASKED THAT THE PCV STAFF BE AUGMENTED BY 12 MARINE OFFICERS IN VIEW OF THE JOINT NATURE OF EFFORTS IN NORTHERN ICTZ. HE FURTHER REQUESTS THAT THEY BE MADE AVAILABLE ABOUT 1 MAY AND SUGGESTS TDY WITH OFFICERS ROTATING EACH 180 DAYS. I AGREE THAT A SPRINKLING OF MARINE OFFICERS ON THE STAFF MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE OPERATIONAL MOMENTUM DESIRED THERE. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT III MAF STAFF CAN ABSORB ALL BILLETS HE DESIRES EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE A SIZABLE NUMBER OF ARMY OFFICER AUGMENTATION PLUS THE RECENT MARINE OFFICER AUGMENTATION. OUR REQUIREMENT FOR AUGMENTATION IS GENERALLY WITHIN THE OVERALL INCREASE DESIRED IN THE REVISED T/O WHICH WAS TO SUPPORT FEWER FORCES THAN WE CURRENTLY HAVE UNDER CONTROL.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1078 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** FOR

2. I CANNOT COMMIT THE MAJOR COMMANDS EVEN ON A TDY BASIS TO PROVIDE ANY OF THE DESIRED BILLETS BUT DO FEEL THAT A PART MUST COME FROM OTHER THAN THIS HQ. ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING COMMITMENTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

LINE	GRADE	DUTY	MOS	REC SOURCE
1	08	DEP CG	9903	III MAF
2	03	AIDE	9910	3D DIV
3	06	DEP C/S	9906	III MAF
4	05	ASST G-2	0202	3D DIV
5	04	ASST G-2AIR	0202	9TH MAB
6	05	ASST G-3	0302	III MAF
7	04	ASST G-3, AIR	9912	FMAW
8	04	ASST G-3, P&O	0302	III MAF
9	04	ASST G-3, P&O	0302	III MAF
10	06	ASST G-4	9906	3D DIV
11	04	ASST G-4	0402	9TH MAB
12	04	ASST C-E	2502	III MAF

NOTES:

LINES 1 AND 2 ARE ALREADY FILLED. LINES 6,8,9, COULD, IN MY OPINION, BE FILLED BY ANY GROUND MOS, ERGO MOS 9911. SOME

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1078 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** FOR
 DEVIATION IN RANKS SHOULD BE ALLOWED.

GP-4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG	2		4/8/68		JK	SERIAL 080752Z APR68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3			4-9	A	REMARKS FOR HAS BEEN SENT <i>"#3 + 4 burned 5 Nov 68"</i> LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
C/S	1		4/8/68		Q	
DC/S			4/9/68		R	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			081700	4/9	SJK	
S/C						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OO RUMHAW RUMHMA RUMHMB RUMHFL RUMHNA RUMHVA RUMHVP RUMHVT RUMSAL
 DE RUMSAK 1008 0990752
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 080752Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE
 RUMHVA/CG I CORPS
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCOMD
 RUMHNA/CDR NSA
 RUMHVT/CG DANANG SUPPORT CMD

FOR**HAS BEEN SENT**

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR GEN MOMYER, LTGEN LAM, LTGEN ROSSON, MGEN ANDERSON,
 INFO MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN TOLSON, BGEN OLSON, RADM OSBORN,
 BGEN MCBRIDE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. IT IS WITH PRIDE THAT I PASS ON THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
 FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND THAT OUTLINES THE OUTSTANDING
 ACHIEVEMENTS OF OPERATION PEGASUS: QUOTE

WHILE CONFERRING WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN WASHINGTON

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 1008 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR
 I RECEIVED NEWS OF THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION PEGASUS THAT HAS
 RELIEVED KHE SANH. TO ALL TROOPS IN THE ASSAULT OR IN SUP-
 PORT--ARMY, MARINE, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY, I EXTEND MY HEARTIEST
 CONGRATULATIONS AND ASK THAT THESE BE PASSED ON TO THE
 ASSOCIATED VIETNAMESE UNITS. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY PRIDE AND
 SATISFACTION TO ALL THOSE--VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN--WHO MANNED
 THE KHE SANH BASE DURING THE TWO AND ONE HALF MONTHS OF SIEGE,
 WHO KEPT THE BASE SUPPLIED, WHO BROUGHT THE DECISIVE AIR
 POWER TO BEAR ON THE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS OF THE ENEMY
 WITH DETERMINATION AND SKILL, AND WHO HAVE NOW RELIEVED THE
 BASE AND GAINED THE INITIATIVE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS
 OPERATION PINNED DOWN MORE THAN TWO DIVISIONS OF NORTH
 VIETNAMESE ARMY TROOPS AT A CRUCIAL PHASE OF THEIR WINTER-
 SPRING OFFENSIVE. THESE ENEMY FORCES WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE
 BEEN AVAILABLE TO JOIN THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND POPULATED
 AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEIR INTERVENTION COULD HAVE
 POSSIBLY ALTERED THE COURSE OF BATTLE. MY COMPLIMENTS TO THE
 COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS WHO PLANNED OPERATION PEGASUS
 AND TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN WHO HAVE CARRIED IT OUT WITH
 COURAGE AND PROFESSIONALISM.

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 1008 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR
 TO ALL HANDS: WELL DONE.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#24

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/9		L	CG 111 MAP
DCG						SERIAL 08200Z APR COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S	1.		4/8/68		Q	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
DC/S			4/9/68		BR	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			081440	4/9	DUW	
S/C						

"# 2 & 3 burned 5 Nov 68"

LEGEND
A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE
C- COMMENTS
I- INFORMATION

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUHFMA
DE RUMSAK 0957 0990200
ZNY SSSSS
P 080200Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

040652Z APR 68
FM COMUSMACV, SAIGON
TO CSA
INFO CJCS

CINCPAC
CINCUSARPAC

FOR GEN JOHNSON INFO GEN WHEELER, ADM SHARP, AND GEN BEACH FROM
GEN WESTMORELAND

SUBJ: M16 RIFLES FOR RVNAF (U)

1. (S) ON 7 JANUARY 1968, YOU WERE INFORMED BY OTHER MEANS OF THE PROPOSED EQUAL ISSUE OF M16 RIFLES TO USARV AND RVNAF EACH MONTH. YOUR CONCURRENCE IN SUCH ISSUE WAS GIVEN.
2. (S) CURRENT EVALUATION INDICATES THAT RVNAF MORALE AND AGGRESSIVENESS ARE BOTH ABOVE THE PRE-TET LEVEL. TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS AND TO LEND IMPETUS TO RVNAF OPERATIONS, EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO EXPEDITE THE PROVISION OF IMPROVED WEAPONRY. TO IMPLEMENT THIS CONCEPT LOCALLY AND TO ACHIEVE A BETTER UTILIZATION OF THESE SCARCE ASSETS, IT IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO DIVERT A PORTION OF THE M16A1 RIFLES CURRENTLY ALLOCATED TO US COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS TO RVNAF COMBAT UNITS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE BASIS OF ISSUE SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE 75 PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE RIFLES TO RVNAF AND 25 PERCENT TO USARV. UNDER PRESENT ALLOCATIONS, ISSUE OF M16 RIFLES TO ARVN COMBAT UNITS IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED UNTIL WELL INTO THE 1ST QUARTER OF FY69. THE PROPOSED REVISED ALLOCATION SHOULD COMPLETE THAT ISSUE BY THE END OF FY68.
3. (S) NO FURTHER ALLOCATION OF M16 RIFLES HAS BEEN RECEIVED BUT IT IS CONSIDERED ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO BEGIN AN EARLY ISSUE OF THESE RIFLES TO RF/PF COMBAT UNITS. THESE SMALL UNITS ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO VC ACTIONS BUT CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF BEGINNING EARLY ISSUE OF M16 RIFLES TO RF/PF WILL BE GREAT. THE REVISED ALLOCATION WILL ALLOW THAT ISSUE TO BEGIN ABOUT 1 JUL 68.
4. (S) IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT APPROVAL BE GIVEN FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 25/75 ISSUE OF M16 RIFLES.

GP-4
UNQUOTE
GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SRG.									#23

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUHKM
 DE RUMSAK 0894 0981000
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 071000Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO MGEN TOMPKINS

A. CG 3D MARDIV MSG 301508Z MAR 1968

1. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO IMPROVE UPON LUCID ACCOUNTS CONTAINED
 REF A. AS TOMMY SAYS, THE SITUATION WAS AT THE CENTER OF A
 SCENE WATCHED BY THE WORLD AND EVERY PERSON HAS A FEEL FOR WHAT
 WENT ON DURING THE MOST CRUCIAL DAYS AT KSCB. I HAVE, HOWEVER,
 MADE SOME INDEPENDENT INQUIRIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE A FEW
 SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF COL LOWNDS HEROIC ACTIONS.

2. A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF HIS PERSONAL COURAGE AND DEDICATION
 TO DUTY OCCURRED DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 21 JANUARY
 WHEN THE KSCB WAS SUBJECTED TO AN INTENSE ENEMY ROCKET AND
 MORTAR BARRAGE. AS THE RESULT OF THE FIRING THE PRIMARY
 AMMUNITION DUMP WAS HIT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY STARTING TO BURN
 AND EXPLODE CULMINATING IN A TREMENDOUS EXPLOSION IN MID-

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0894 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 MORNING WHICH SCATTERED A LARGE NUMBER OF MORTAR ROUNDS,
 ARTILLERY ROUNDS AND DEADLY EXPLOSIVE DEVICES THROUGHOUT THE
 EASTERN END OF THE BASE. AFTER THE INITIAL EXPLOSIONS COLONEL
 LOWNDS AMID CONTINUAL ENEMY MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE TOURED THE
 ENTIRE AREA OF THE STILL BURNING AND EXPLODING AMMUNITION DUMP
 IN ORDER TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT OF THE DAMAGE TO HIS
 POSITIONS AND TO CALM HIS TROOPS IN THEIR POSITIONS. HE FEAR-
 LESSLY AND COURAGEOUSLY WALKED OVER TERRAIN HEAVILY LITTERED
 WITH VARIOUS EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE ITEMS, MANY OF WHICH WERE STILL
 EXPLODING FROM HEAT GENERATED BY THE BURNING DUMP. HIS DEDI-
 CATION TO DUTY IN THE FACE OF GRAVE DANGER TO HIMSELF WAS OF
 THE HIGHEST ORDER. NEVER FALTERING FROM THIS DUTY HE WAS ABLE
 TO GIVE ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS OF DAMAGES TAKING REMEDIAL ACTION
 WHERE REQUIRED.

3. AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HIS COOL COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP AND IMM-
 EDIATE RESPONSE I AM REMINDED OF THE AIR FORCE C-130 AIRCRAFT
 WHICH ON 12 FEBRUARY CRASHED ON THE STRIP AND WAS IMMEDIATELY EN-
 GULFED IN FLAMES. COLONEL LOWNDS RACED TO THE SCENE OF THE
 ACCIDENT AND IMMEDIATELY TOOK CHARGE OF RESCUE OPERATIONS.
 TO DO SO HE PLACED HIMSELF IN IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY TO THE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

#22

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PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0894 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BURNING PLANE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING WHILE EXPOSED TO FLAME, BURNING DEBRIS AND NUMEROUS EXPLOSIONS CAUSED BY THE FIRE. HE PERSONALLY AND DILIGENTLY SEARCHED THE WRECKAGE FOR SURVIVORS. LOCATING ONE CREW MEMBER HE PULLED HIM FROM THE WRECKAGE IN A VAIN ATTEMPT TO SAVE HIS LIFE. THROUGHOUT THE RESCUE EFFORTS HE CONTINUALLY EXPOSED HIMSELF TO THE BILLOWING FLAMES DIRECTING OPERATIONS AND PERSONALLY TRYING TO EXTRICATE OTHER CREW MEMBERS FROM THE WRECKAGE.

4. STILL ANOTHER SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF HIS COURAGE AND INDOMITABLE SPIRIT OCCURRED ON 23 FEBRUARY WHEN KSCB WAS SUBJECTED TO THE HEAVIEST MORTAR, ROCKET AND ARTILLERY BARRAGE ENCOUNTERED. MORE THAN 1300 ROUNDS WERE FIRED IN AN EFFORT BY THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE COMBAT BASE UNTENABLE. THROUGHOUT THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, COLONEL LOWNDS PROVIDED FIRM, DECISIVE AND HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AT ALL TIMES DEMONSTRATING SUPREME COOLNESS AND CALM DESPITE CONSTANT LANDING OF LARGE CALIBER ENEMY ROCKET AND ARTILLERY ROUNDS ON AND IN PROXIMITY TO HIS CP BUNKER. THROUGHOUT THIS TREMENDOUS BARRAGE COLONEL LOWNDS COORDINATED ACCURATE AND TIMELY COUNTER FIRE USING THE COMPLETE SPECTRUM OF FIRE SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO HIM. HIS ACTIONS THROUGHOUT

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0894 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR UNDOUBTEDLY SAVED MANY LIVES AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES SUFFERED DURING THE BARRAGE.

5. COLONEL LOWNDS' CALIBER OF LEADERSHIP WHICH HE HAS DEMONSTRATED THROUGHOUT HAS BEEN A CONSTANT SOURCE OF INSPIRATION TO ALL WHO WERE THERE WITH HIM. EACH MAN AND OFFICER THERE COULD LOOK TO HIM AS THE BULWARK OF THE KSCB AREA OF OPERATIONS, CONTINUALLY PROVIDING DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP, EXHIBITING KEEN JUDGEMENT AND FORESIGHT IN REACHING THE MANY DECISIONS HE HAD TO MAKE DURING EACH 24-HOUR PERIOD.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAP SERIAL 070206Z APR COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		4/7/68		<i>AK</i>	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>"# 2, 3 Burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			4/7/68		<i>AK</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			071425		<i>AKW</i>	
S/C				4/7		

SECRET

SECRET

SO RUMSAK RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 0813 0980206
ZNY SSSSS
O 070206Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG RECEIVED FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND:
QUOTE

O 050339Z
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
S E C R E T MAC 04545 EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

1. YOUR MESSAGE TO ME DISCUSSING CERTAIN AREAS OF
CONCERN IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS TIMELY AND
CONSTRUCTIVE. SEVERAL OF YOUR POINTS HAD BEEN BROUGHT
TO MY ATTENTION AS THE SYSTEM HAS PROGRESSED SINCE IT WAS
IMPLEMENTED FULLY ON 21 MARCH 1968.

2. IMPLEMENTATION: IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT CERTAIN
TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE ENCOUN-

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0813 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
TERED IN THE RAPID INTEGRATION OF TWO DIFFERENT AIR-GROUND
SYSTEMS. I BELIEVE MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN A SHORT
TIME. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM IS WORKING
MORE SMOOTHLY EACH DAY AND THAT ALL CONCERNED ARE MAKING
GENUINE EFFORTS TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES AS THEY ARISE. I
AM CONFIDENT THAT WITH STRONG SUPPORT BY ALL CONCERNED
THE SYSTEM WILL PORVIDE GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND MORE
EFFEICIENT UTILIZATION OF THE TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES THAN WAS
ACHIEVEABLE PREVIOUSLY.

3. MARINE ARI CONTROL SYSTEM: IN THE DESIGN OF THE
SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT CERTAIN
FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CONTROL SYSTEM MUST
BE USED IN A COMPLEMENTARY ROLE TO ASSURE COMPLETE
COVERAGE IN FIRE SUPPORT AND ARTILLERY WARNING COORDINATION.
THE COMMUNICATIONS REDUNDANCY IT PROVIDES IS EQUALLY VALUABLE.

4. REQUEST SYSTEM: THERE IS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH
TACTICAL AIR CAPABILITY IN THE RVN TO PROVIDE ALL COMMANDERS
ALL THE AIR SUPPORT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. HENCE, THE
RESOURCES MUST BE ALLOCATED BY COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELONS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR PRIORITIES. THE PLANNING ALLOCA-

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

RUMSAK 0810 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 TIONS PROVIDED DAILY BY MACV TASE (J3 AIR) REFLECT THE BEST
 AVAILABLE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS (TOTS) THAT
 ARE EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE TO FULFILL PREPLANNED
 REQUESTS. THEY REPRESENT THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS BY TYPE,
 NIGHT AND DAY, THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED FROM MAJOR COMMANDS
 BY MAVC J3 AIR, WHICH RECEIVES OVER 250 REQUESTS DAILY. TO
 ACCEPT ANY ADDITIONAL REQUESTS WOULD UNNECESSARILY
 OVERBURDEN COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS AND DELAY THE PROCESSING
 OF REQUESTS THAT CAN BE APPROVED WITHIN AVAILABLE RESOURCES.
 HOWEVER, MACV J3 AIR ALWAYS RECORDS THE NUMBER OF VALID
 REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT THAT MAJOR COMMANDS STATE
 THEY WOULD SUBMIT IF ADDITIONAL AIR SUPPORT WERE AVAILABLE.

5. A. THE FAC REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS
 WAS IMPOSED BY CRD, 7AF BASED ON MANY "SHORT ROUND"
 EXPERIENCES WHEN THIS WAS NOT A REQUIREMENT. WITH
 THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF TACTICAL FIGHTER ACTIVITY,
 GUN SHIP II AND ARC LIGHT IN THE NIAGARA AREA, AND IMPROVING
 WEATHER CONDITIONS, IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THE UNIQUE
 SYSTEMS CAPABILITY OF THE A6A COULD BE EXPLOITED TO THE
 MAXIMUM EXTENT BY EMPLOYMENT IN RP-1 AND TALLI HO. THE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0818 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 DETECTION AND ATTACK OF MOVING TARGETS WITH THE A6A IN
 THOSE AREAS WOULD BEST SERVE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF
 RESTRICTING MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TROOPS, EQUIPMENT AND
 SUPPLIES INTO QUANG TRI PROVINCE FROM THE NORTH. THE
 VALUE OF A6A EQUIPMENT IN THE INDERDICTION ROLE IS WELL
 RECOGNIZED, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT SOUND JUDGMENT IS
 BEING APPLIED IN SUCH DECISIONS.

B. THE SCRAMBLE AND DIVERT AUTHORITY PROCEDURES
 ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
 THE SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE TOTAL
 REQUIREMENT, WHEN THE SITUATION SO DEMANDS. CONSEQUENTLY,
 SCRAMBLES AND DIVERTS MUST BE CONTROLLED WITHIN THE
 MECHANICS OF THE SYSTEM. THERE IS LOCAL FLEXIBILITY IN
 THE SYSTEM AT I DASC LEVEL TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO
 III MAF REQUIREMENTS, COMPLETELY BACKED UP BY THE TOTAL
 RESOURCES AVAILABLE THROUGH THE TACC. MOST CERTAINLY,
 THE G3 AIR AT III MAF MUST MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN
 THE MECHANICS OF THE I DASC OPERATION IN ORDER TO ASSURE
 YOU THAT SUPPORT PROVIDED THROUGH THAT AGENCY IF
 RESPONSIVE TO YOUR NEEDS. IN YOUR PERIODIC ASSESSMENTS

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET

RUMSAK 0818 S E C R E T S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
OF THE SYSTEM, I WOULD EXPECT TO HEAR FROM YOU ON THIS,
IF THE I DASC OPERATION FALLS SHORT IN ANY RESPECT.

C. SORTIE RATE. ON 10 MARCH THE 1ST MAW INFORMED
7AF THAT IT WAS CAPABLE OF USSTAINING A 1.2 SORTIE RATE WHICH
EQUATES TO APPROXIMATELY 190 SORTIES PER DAY. 1ST MAW
FURTHER STATED THAT NORMALLY 162 SORTIES SHOULD BE
PREPLANNED. THE REMAINING 28 SORTIES BEING SET ASIDE FOR
SCRAMBLES. THIS HAS IMPOSED A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF
MARINE SORTIES THAT CAN BE ALLOCATED TO YOU FOR SUPPORT
OF YOUR FORCES. IF 1ST MAW IS PROVISIONED FOR AND CAPABLE
OF SUSTAINING A HIGHER RATE THAN 1.2, YOU ARE
AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THE SORTIE RATE TO ANY LEVEL THE
1ST MAW IS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING. ALLOCATIONS FROM MACV
TASE TO SUPPORT OF I CTZ WOULD BE INCREASED ACCORDINGLY.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. OBVIOUSLY, PARA 3 REVEALS THAT THE AVAILABLE AIR SUPPORT
IS INADEQUATE TO MEET THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS; THEREFORE,
HIS REQUEST MUST BE CONSTRAINED BY THE 7TH AF DAILY ALLOCA-
TIONS. SIGNIFICANTLY, PARA 5B INDICATES THAT SCRAMBLE AND

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 0818 S E C R E T S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
DIVERT AUTHORITY ARE CONTROLLED BY I DASC. THIS IS COMPLETELY
UNACCEPTABLE, AS THE GROUND COMMANDER HAS ABSOLUTELY NO
AUTHORITY IN DETERMINING WHETHER A PRE-PLANNED STRIKE SHOULD
BE DIVERTED OR NOT. ADDITIONALLY, PARA 5C STATES THAT THE
MARINE CORPS CAN INCREASE ITS SORTIE RATE TO ANY HIGHER LEVEL
IT DESIRES, BUT SAYS NOTHING ABOUT THE 7TH AIR FORCE INCREASING
THEIR SORTIE RATE, WHICH I REQUESTED IN MY MSG TO WESTMORELAND.
IMMEDIATE FOR TRANSMISSION - DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

GP-4

BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

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DCG AIR						REMARKS
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DC/S			4/7/68		<i>R</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			062230		<i>900</i>	
S/C					<i>Y/6</i>	

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		SERIAL	COPY# / OF# COPIES RECEIVED
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 ZNY SSSSS
 O 061336Z APR 68 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 1. IT IS URGENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE LENGTHY AND VIVID
 BROADCASTS OF ARMED FORCES RADIO DESCRIBING STATESIDE RIOTS,
 LOOTINGS, AND BURNINGS BE CURTAILED SUBSTANTIALLY TO SPOT FACTUAL
 REPORTS. THESE OVERLY LENGTHY AND DESCRIPTIVE BROADCASTS ARE IN
 SOME RESPECTS INFLAMMATORY AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY ARE
 ADVERSELY AFFECTING REAR AREA TROOPS IN THIS AREA. IN MY OPINION,
 NOW IS THE TIME TO RETURN TO BROADCASTING NORMALCY IN ORDER TO
 TAKE PEOPLES' MINDS OFF THIS TRAGIC EVENT AND ITS POSSIBLE
 CONSEQUENCES. IN THIS REGARD, I'VE ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL
 U.S. UNITS IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE TO HOLD FITTING COM-
 MEMORATIVE CHAPEL SERVICES TOMORROW. I HAVE ALSO COUNSELED
 ALL COMMANDING OFFICERS TO EXERT THEIR FULL INFLUENCE TO
 ENSURE THAT THIS TRAGIC EVENT DOES NOT DETRACT US FROM OUR
 MUTUAL GOAL OF DEFEATING COMMUNISM IN VIETNAM.
 DELIVER IMMEDIATELY. GP-4
 BT

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DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		4/6/68		Q	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p><i>"#2-3 burned 5/1/68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			4/7/68		JK	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			6/16/68		JK	
S/C			4/7			

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUHFMA RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 0606 0970634
ZNY CCCCC
P 060634Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO GEN CHAPMAN, INFO LGEN
VRULAK, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM MGEN
TOMPKINS:

QUOTE:

1. COL DAVID E. LOWNDS AND HIS TWENTY-SIXTH MARINES AT KHE SANH HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL POINT OF VIETNAM NEWS SINCE 21 JAN 68. DUE TO THE FIRST AIR CAV'S COMMENCEMENT OF RECENT OPERATIONS, HIS NEWS VALUE IS RAPIDLY DIMINISHING.
2. HIS NEWS VALUE TO THE MARINE CORPS IS STILL GOOD AND CAN BE GREATLY ENHANCED ON THE SPEAKERS CIRCUIT REPRESENTING THE AMERICANS AT KHE SANH AND AS THE MARINE COMMANDER WHO THWARTED GEN GIAP'S PLANS TO MAKE KHE SANH A SECOND DIEN BIEN PHU.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0606 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

3. RECENT NEWS ARTICLES HAVE REFERRED TO THE MARINES AT KHE SANH AS "FRIGHTENED AND DEMORALIZED". COL LOWNDS' PERSONAL APPEARANCES AND TALKS WOULD SERVE TO DISPEL THESE FALSE IMPRESSIONS BY TELLING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THE TRUTH ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE'S COURAGE, HIGH MORALE AND STATE OF READINESS.

4. COL LOWNDS HAS BEEN IN COUNTRY APPROXIMATELY TEN MONTHS AND IS SLATED FOR DUTY IN WASHINGTON. SINCE HIS TOUR AS A REGIMENTAL COMMANDER IS NEARLY OVER IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT HE BE PLACED ON THE SPEAKERS CIRCUIT NOW WHILE KHE SANH IS STILL PROMINENT.

UNQUOTE.

2. I CONCUR IN THIS RECOMMENDATION.

GP-4

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DCG AIR	3		4/4		JF	REMARKS
C/S	1.		4/3/68		Q	EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			031715		DUTW	
S/C						

*"# 2 & 3 Burned
5 Nov 68"*

LEGEND
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
C- COMMENTS
I- INFORMATION

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		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEQ	
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O 030232Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE
O 021608Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN
CUSHMAN. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS, SUMMARY OF
SITUATION AS OF 31 MARCH 1968

1. YOUR DECISION CONCERNING THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MACV
STRIKE AND RECON ASSETS HAS BEEN IN EFFECT NOW FOR APPROXIMATELY
THREE WEEKS. AS IN THE CASE OF ALL OF YOUR DECISIONS, I HAVE

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0253 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
BEEN RESOLUTE IN CARRYING IT OUT TO THE FULLEST. MY STAFF
AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN EXPLICITLY INSTRUCTED TO
DO THEIR UTMOST TO OVERCOME ANY TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS AND TO MAKE THIS SYSTEM WORK. AS WITH MOST NEW
SYSTEMS, PROBLEMS DO ARISE AT THE OUTSET. I REALIZE THAT SOME
OF THESE PROBLEMS ARE EXPLAINABLE AS "GROWING PAINS" AND PERHAPS
OTHERS ARE DUE TO EXISTING DEFECTS IN THE SYSTEM. HOPEFULLY,
ALL OF THESE DIFFICULTIES CAN BE CORRECTED SOONEST, SO THAT
YOUR DESIRE TO PROVIDE ALL GROUND COMMANDERS WITH THE MAXIMUM
AIR SUPPORT AT YOUR COMMAND MAY BE REALIZED. IT IS IN
KEEPING WITH THIS SPIRIT THAT I MAKE KNOWN TO YOU SOME OF
MY EARLY OBSERVATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AT WORK, IN THE HOPE
THAT THEY MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO YOU. I REALIZE THAT YOU HAVE
AFFORDED ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE KNOWN MY DISSATISFACTION
WITH THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIR ASSETS TO YOU AS WELL AS
CINCPAC; HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE MORE HELPFUL
IF I PROVIDED MY VIEWS ONLY TO YOU AT THIS JUNCTURE.
2. IMPLEMENTATION: WE RECEIVED THE DIRECTIVE THE EVENING
OF 9 MARCH AND ON 10 MARCH IT WAS IMPLEMENTED, ALTHOUGH
BOTH I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ANNOUNCED. THEY WERE OPERATIONAL

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
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RUMSAK 0253 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SHORTLY THEREAFTER, IN FACT THEY WERE SOMEWHAT PREMATURE.
 THE FACILITIES WERE NOT READY, PERSONNEL HAD NOT YET BEEN
 ASSIGNED, AND THERE HAD BEEN NO OPPORTUNITY TO EITHER PROCURE
 OR TEST THE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
 HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO HAVE HAD AT LEAST ONE COMPLETE CPX OF
 THE ENTIRE SYSTEM BEFORE THE EXECUTION DATE. AS A RESULT,
 THE CONTROL AGENCIES WERE UNABLE TO ASSUME THE REQUISITE
 FUNCTIONS UPON THE EFFECTIVE DATE. IN VIEW OF THE TACTICAL
 SITUATION AT THE TIME I COULDN'T CHANCE ANY BREAKDOWN IN MY
 AIR SUPPORT; THEREFORE, I CONTINUED MY EXISTING SYSTEM. AS
 YOU KNOW, THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WASN'T COMPLETELY
 OPERATIVE UNTIL 21 MARCH.

3. MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR THE MARINE
 AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS VITAL FOR THE CONTROL OF HELICOPTERS
 AND TO INSURE THEIR COORDINATION WITH FIRST MAW FIXED WING
 AIRCRAFT. IT CAN ALSO PROVIDE A VALUABLE REDUNDANCY OF
 COMMUNICATION TO THE AIR FORCE CONTROL SYSTEM. FOR EXAMPLE,
 ON 28 MARCH USAF C-130 AIRCRAFT ON KHE SANH RESUPPLY MISSIONS
 WERE DELAYED FOR SEVERAL HOURS DUE TO 1ST ACD ARTILLERY FIRE
 IN THE KHE SANH CORRIDOR. DUE TO CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES, DASC

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0253 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 VICTOR WAS UNABLE TO COORDINATE THIS FIRE; THEREFORE, IT
 BECAME NECESSARY TO CANCEL ALL ARTILLERY FIRES IN THE
 CORRIDOR. SINCE THAT INCIDENT, PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN
 WORKED OUT UTILIZING THE MARINE KHE SANH DASC TO INSURE
 COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT WITH OTHER EFFORTS. THE MARINE
 DASC'S ARE ALSO BEING UTILIZED TO PROVIDE A CENTRALIZED
 ARTILLERY FIRING ADVISORY SERVICE TO HELICOPTERS AND FIXED
 WING AIRCRAFT OPERATING WITHIN DIVISION AO'S. THESE
 SERVICES ARE THOSE REQUIRED OF AN ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL
 CENTER (AWCC) IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13. ON 1 APR 68,
 THE AWCC FUNCTION OF THE FIRST AIRCAV WAS BEING PROVIDED BY
 THE KHE SANH DASC. AT THIS TIME, THERE IS STILL NO
 OPERATIONAL AWCC ON UHF FOR THE 101ST AIRBORNE. THE FMAW
 IS ASSISTING IN THIS MATTER BY INITIATING EFFORTS TO PROVIDE
 THIS FUNCTION THROUGH THE MARINE DASC AT HUE/PHU BAI.
 FURTHERMORE, AT THE PRESENT TIME, WARNINGS OF NAVAL GUNFIRE
 IN SUPPORT OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE ARE DISSEMINATED TO FIXED
 WING AIRCRAFT BY THE MARINE DASC AT HUE/PHU BAI.

4. REQUEST SYSTEM: I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT AVAILABLE AIR
 SUPPORT ASSETS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET ALL REQUIREMENTS AND

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES
SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	HTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 17

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK 0253 **SECRET** SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THAT AN ALLOCATION TO EACH CORPS AREA IS NECESSARY. HOWEVER,
 IT IS MY BELIEF, THAT A DIVISION'S TOTAL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD
 BE EXPRESSED AND RECORDED. CONSEQUENTLY, I INTEND TO
 CONSOLIDATE AND FORWARD TO YOUR TASE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL
 REQUIRED AIR SUPPORT IN I CORPS. I AM SURE THAT ONLY A
 PORTION WILL BE SATISFIED BY THE ALLOCATION OF SORTIES FROM
 THE TASE/TACC, BUT BELIEVE THAT YOU SHARE MY VIEWS THAT
 PROPOSED ALLOCATIONS SHOULD NOT INHIBIT THE GROUND
 COMMANDER'S REQUESTS.

5. AREAS OF CONCERN:

A. INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 9 WEST OF KHE SANH AND INTO
 LAOS AT NIGHT AND IN BAD WEATHER CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
 THE A6 WITH AMTI CAPABILITY, BUT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
 ARE TOO RESTRICTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE NIGHT OF 25-26 MARCH
 MARINE A6 AIRCRAFT ON ROAD RECCE MISSIONS IN KHE SANH AREA
 WERE DIVERTED TO TALLY HO AREA BY THE TACC, APPARENTLY DUE
 TO ROE IN LAOS THAT REQUIRE FAC APPROVAL PRIOR TO ATTACKING
 A MOVING TARGET. CG FMAW MSG 260001Z MAR68 BROUGHT THIS TO
 THE ATTENTION OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE TACC AND REQUESTED THE ROE
 BE CHANGED. IN ADDITION, IT WAS REQUESTED THAT THE A6'S
 BE FRAGGED FOR ARMED RECCE MISSIONS IN-COUNTRY IN THE

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE SIX RUMSAK 0253 **SECRET** SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 VICINITY OF KHE SANH WHILE A CHANGE TO THE ROE WAS
 PENDING. AS OF THIS DATE (31 MARCH) THIS HAS NOT BEEN
 DONE. ALL EIGHT A6 SYSTEM SORTIES FORMERLY SCHEDULED FOR
 KHE SANH ARE NOW BEING FRAGGED TO TALLY HO.

B. SCRAMBLES/DIVERTS: YOUR DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH
 TECHNICALLY GIVES SCRAMBLE AND DIVERT AUTHORITY TO I DASC, A
 7TH AIR FORCE AIR CONTROL AGENCY. HOWEVER, IF I UNDERSTAND
 YOUR INTENT IN THIS REGARD, THE ACTUAL "DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY"
 FOR SCRAMBLE AND DIVERT PURPOSES MORE PROPERLY RESIDES IN
 III MAF, AND THAT III MAF DIRECTS I DASC AS NECESSARY.
 INASMUCH AS WE HAVE BEEN ABIDING BY YOUR DIRECTIVE, I AM
 UNAWARE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN IN THIS
 REGARD, SINCE III MAF HAS NOT FUNCTIONED IN THIS ARENA.

C. AVERAGE TOTAL DAILY SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT TO
 1ST MARDIV AND 3RD MARDIV HAVE DIMINISHED FROM 212 IN THE
 PERIOD 1-20 MARCH TO 177 IN THE PERIOD 21-30 MARCH. THIS
 RESULTS PRINCIPALLY FROM APPLICATION OF SINGLE MANAGER
 CRITERIA FOR PREPLANNED SORTIE RATE (7TH AF CRITERIA HOLDS
 TO A MAXIMUM SORTIE OF 1.2 FOR BOTH PREPLANNED AND SCRAMBLE
 SORTIES) TO THE FRAGGING OF FMAW. THIS REDUCTION MAY ALSO
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#17

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OO RUHFMA RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 0259 0940232
ZNY SSSSS
O 030232Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN LRULAK
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS
BE RELATED TO THE FACT THAT FMAW SORTIES SUPPLIED TO OTHER
III MAF UNITS JUMPED FROM 135 IN THE FIRST 20 DAYS TO 154
IN THE LAST TEN. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, DURING THE MONTHS OF
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, AIRCRAFT OF THE FIRST MAF FLEW AT A
1.46 SORTIE RATE. IN KEEPING WITH YOUR DESIRE TO PROVIDE
THE GROUND COMMANDER WITH THE MAXIMUM AIR SUPPORT POSSIBLE
WITHIN EXISTING RESOURCES, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU CONSIDER
INCREASING THE PREPLANNED SORTIE RATE FOR ALL FORCES. GP-4
UNQUOTE
WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#17

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 030200Z APR COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S	1.		4/3/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT <i>"# 2 to 3 burned 5 Nov 68"</i>
DC/S			4/3/68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			031715		<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

DE RUMSAK 0245 0940200
ZNY CCCCC
P 030200Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ROBERTSON FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. GEN KRULAK REPORTED TO ME THAT HE WAS IN RECEIPT OF A
LETTER FROM A MARINE, WHO HAD BEEN PARTICIPANT IN THE
TASK FORCE X-RAY OPERATION IN HUE CITY, STATING THAT HIS
BATTALION EQUIPPED ITSELF WITH TYPEWRITERS TAKEN FROM HUE
UNIVERSITY. AS YOU KNOW, THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS
FROM MANY SOURCES CONCERNING ALLEGED LOOTING BY MARINES IN
THE HUE ACTIONS. THIS MOST RECENT ALLEGATION SHOULD BE
QUITE EASILY CONFIRMED OF DENIED. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO
INVESTIGATE THIS ALLEGATION ASAP AND REPORT YOUR RESULTS
OFFICIALLY TO ME.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	HTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.								#16	

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF SERIAL 0301307 APR COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		4/4/68		9M	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR	3			4-4		REMARKS
C/S	1.		4/3/68		A	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>"# 2 & 3 Burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			031715		20501	
S/C						

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMHMB
DE RUMSAK 0236 0940138
ZNY SSSSS
O 030138Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMB/CG PROVCORPS V
RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON AND MGEN TOLSON
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

REF A. GEN WESTMORELAND'S 301150Z MARG8 TO LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO
LTGEN ROSSON

1. SO THAT YOU CAN TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION, I WISH TO RELAY
TO YOU THAT AT THE CDRS CONFERENCE THE OTHER DAY, GEN ABRAMS
INSTRUCTED ME THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE ARVN
AIRBORNE TASK FORCE PLAY A PROMINENT PART IN THE ATTACK OF
THE ENEMY IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND IN THE LINK-UP WITH THE
ARVN RANGER BATTALION THERE. ALSO, IN REFERENCE A, GEN
WESTMORELAND EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE OF COMMITTING THIS TASK FORCE
AT THE TIME HEAVY CONTACT BEGINS OR WHEN A LINK-UP IS MADE
SO THAT IT IS OBVIOUS TO ALL THAT ARVN FORCES HAVE PLAYED AN
IMPORTANT PART IN THIS BATTLE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#15

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CONTROL SHEET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 020300Z APR COPY # 05 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE HAS BEEN SENT <i>Copy #3 to Air Control File 2 Apr 68 TM</i> <i>#2 burned</i> <i>5/20/68</i>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND

- A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C - COMMENTS
- I - INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF SERIAL 020300Z APR COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		4/2/68		AK	SUBJECT SPEGAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR	3		4-4		J	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE HAS BEEN SENT
C/S	1		4/2/68		Q	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			021670		AK	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

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DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 020300Z APR	COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
4/2	JH Wagner	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
4/2	C/S Das sen DW	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/2	JH		
4/4	Mej Gen NJ Anderson ^{Has Been}		
9/8	COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES		

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EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMHMB
DE RUMSAK 0125 0930300
ZNY CCCCC
O 020300Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V
RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV
RUMHVP/TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON, MGEN TOLSON, AND COL LOWNDS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE ABRUPT DROP IN AIR SUPPORT OF KHE SANH WHICH OCCURRED YESTERDAY. OPN NIAGARA WAS IN MANY RESPECTS A "PUSH" SYSTEM WHEREBY A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SORTIES WERE FED INTO THE AREA WITHOUT SPECIFIC TARGET REQUEST. OPN NIAGARA IS OVER, AND WE MUST NOW BE DILIGENT TO REQUEST THE AIR SUPPORT WE NEED TO PREVENT THE ENEMY GETTING A BREATHING SPELL. FURTHER, WITH RESPECT TO PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT, I WANT YOU TO SUBMIT COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS REGARDLESS OF ARBITRARY NUMBERS ALLOCATION FOR YOUR UNITS ESTABLISHED BY 7TH AF. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE THEM TO YOU BY GOING TO HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#13	

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG	2		4/2/68		JK	SERIAL 820200Z APR COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3				A	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S	1		4/2/68		Q	REMARKS
DC/S						<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			021730		JK	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C-COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #12

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DE RUMSAK 0121 0930200
 ZNY TTTT
 O 020200Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMHLA/CG TASK FORCE X-RAY
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN ANDERSON,
 MGEN ROBERTSON, BGEN LAHUE, AND BRIG GEN OLSON FROM LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GEN CHAPMAN AND IS PASSED FOR
 YOUR INFORMATION. WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH YOU PERSONALLY
 LATTER PART OF THIS WEEK. QUOTE:

O 011919Z APR 68
 FM CMC
 TO CG FMFPAC
 INFO CG III MAF
 BT

T O P S E C R E T

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0121 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGENS KRULAK AND CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, GENERAL WHEELER HAS PASSED A MESSAGE
 TO THE PACIFIC COMMANDERS AND MACV RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S
 STOPPING AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM NORTH OF 20
 DEGREES NOTRH LATITUDE. PORTIONS OF THE MESSAGE ARE QUOTED
 AS FOLLOWS:

"3. THE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE PERTINENT TO HIS (THE
 PRESIDENT'S) DECISION:

A. SINCE THE TET OFFENSIVE SUPPORT OF THE
 AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS FOR THE WAR IN SEA HAS
 DECREASED AT AN ACCELERATING RATE. MANY OF THE STRONGEST
 PROPONENTS OF FORCEFUL ACTION IN VIETNAM HAVE REVERSED THEIR
 POSITION, HAVE MOVED TO NEUTRAL GROUND, OR ARE WAVERING. IF
 THIS TREND CONTINUES UNCHECKED, PUBLIC SUPPORT OF OUR
 OBJECTIVES IN SEA WILL BE TOO FRAIL TO SUSTAIN THE EFFORT.

B. WEATHER OVER THE NORTHERN PORTION OF NORTH
 VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE UNSUITABLE FOR AIR OPERATIONS DURING THE
 NEXT 30 DAYS; THEREFORE, IF A CESSATION OF AIR OPERATIONS IS
 TO BE UNDERTAKEN, NOW IS THE BEST TIME FROM THE MILITARY VIEW-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0121 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO POINT.

C. IT IS HOPED THAT THIS UNILATERAL INITIATIVE TO SEEK PEACE WILL REVERSE THE GROWING DISSENT AND OPPOSITION WITHIN OUR SOCIETY TO THE WAR.

D. THE INITIATIVE WILL AID IN COUNTERING FOREIGN CRITICISM.

E. PRESIDENT THIEU HAS BEEN CONSULTED AND AGREES TO THE CESSATION

4. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE BEEN APPRAISED OF THE UNILATERAL INITIATIVE TO BE TAKEN. UNDERSTAND THE REASONS THEREFOR, AND THEY ENJOIN ALL COMMANDERS TO SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, ADDRESSEES, WITHOUT CITING THE SOURCE OR MENTIONING THE PRESIDENT, SHOULD DRAW ON THIS MESSAGE IN TALKING TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO SOLICIT THEIR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT. IN PARTICULAR, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO DISCOURAGE MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM EXPRESSING CRITICISM TO NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES. I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A DELICATE MATTER AND ONE WHICH CANNOT BE APPROACHED ON THE BASIS OF ISSUING FACTS; RATHER, THE ATTITUDES OF COMMANDERS WILL PROBABLY BE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0121 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO GUIDING THE REACTION OF THEIR SUBORDINATES."

2. I AM IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH GENERAL WHEELER'S VIEWS IN THIS MATTER AND FEEL THAT IT IS DOUBLY IMPORTANT THAT OUR MARINE COMMANDERS FULLY SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT IN HIS DECISION THROUGH OUR ATTITUDE AND IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SUBORDINATES AND THE PRESS. WE ARE ON THE DMZ AND ARE THE ONES FIRST TO BE AFFECTED BY A BOMBING PAUSE; THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE REAL PRESSURE TO CRITICIZE. THIS WILL BE A SEVERE TEST OF OUR LOYALTY BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT, THROUGH YOUR GOOD OFFICES AND THOSE OF YOUR SUBORDINATES, WE CAN STAND THE TEST. WARMEST REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE
BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAP
DCG						SERIAL 021014Z APR 68 COPY #4 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
C/S						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Copy #1 to G-3 080850H Apr 68 m In #1 at 091420H Apr 68 m Copy #2 to Air Control 24 Apr 68 m Copy #3 to CG FMFPAC 2 APR Received Copy #3 28 Bealy
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

Copy #1 to G-3 080850H Apr 68 m
In #1 at 091420H Apr 68 m

Copy #2 to Air Control 24 Apr 68 m

Copy #3 to CG FMFPAC 2 APR

Received Copy #3 28 Bealy

LEGEND
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
C-COMMENTS
I- INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #13

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/4/68		<i>[initials]</i>	CG III MAF SERIAL 021014Z APR 68 COPY# / OF 5 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		4/4/68		<i>[initials]</i>	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		4/3/68		<i>[initials]</i>	<p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p><i>[handwritten signature]</i> on 091420H 04/21/68 <i>[initials]</i></p>
DC/S			4/4/68		<i>[initials]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3					<i>[initials]</i>	
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			4/2	4/4	<i>[initials]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C - COMMENTS
- I - INFORMATION

TOP SECRET #13

TOP SECRET

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 021014Z APR 68	COPY# 1 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
		SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
4/2	DHWegw		
4/3	C/S has seen		
4/4	lp		
4/4	W		
4/4	DW		
4/8	W		
4/8	W		
S/S	COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 6 COPIES		
WING	COPIES 4, 5, 6 OF 6 COPIES		

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OO RUHHMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 0188 0931010
 ZNY TTTT
 PAC -T-CMC
 O 021014Z APR 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHHMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN THAM, INFO GEN
 CHAPMAN AND GEN ANDERSON, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 A. ADMIN FMFPAC MSG 312044Z MAR 68 (TS).

1. INFO REQUESTED BY PARA 1.A. FOLLOWS; HOWEVER THERE ARE TWO
 ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION ASKED.

A. RESPONSE TO FIRST MARDIV DASC REQ FOR MARINE AIRCRAFT
 NOW TAKES ONE TO TWO MINUTES LONGER THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS IS
 DUE TO COMPATABILITY OF WORKING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN I DASC AND
 THE FIRST MAW TADC. THE AGREEMENT PERMITS FIRST MARDIV DASC
 TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE FROM TADC. THEN TADC NOTIFIES I DASC BY
 HOTLINE THAT IMMEDIATE IS REQUESTED. HOWEVER, THIS APPLIES
 ONLY TO FIRST MAW A/C. IF USAF A/C ARE REQUIRED DUE TO NON
 AVAILABILITY OF FIRST MAW A/C, I DASC CONTACTS CGC (PANAMA) OR
 TUOC OF 366TH FIGHTER WING, AS APPROPRIATE, WHO THEN SCRAMBLES OR

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0188 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO
 DIVERTS USAF A/C LOCATED IN ICTZ, OR GOES TO TACC FOR USAF A/C
 BASED IN OTHER CORPS AREAS. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT
 UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS DIVERTS OF PREPLANNED MISSIONS ARE
 EFFECTED BY THE I-DASC WITHOUT REFERRAL TO III MAF. TO CLOSE THIS
 LOOP WOULD TAKE ADDED TIME.

B. THE SECOND PART OF THE ANSWER INVOLVES UNITS IN NORTH-
 ERN ICTZ.

(1) THE 3D MARDIV DASC IN PCV AREA REQUESTS IMMEDIATE
 THROUGH DASC-V WHO THEN GOES TO I-DASC FOR SCRAMBLES OR MAY
 DIVERT PREPLANNED MISSION A/C ALLOCATED TO DIVS UNDER PCV.
 I-DASC THEN GOES TO TADC FIRST MAW AND IF A/C ARE NOT AVAILABLE
 IN FIRST MAW, I-DASC GOES TO TACC AS INDICATED IN PARA 1.A.

(2) AT 0800H 1 APRIL 1968 DASC-V ENTERED THE TACTICAL
 AIR REQUEST NET. THREE IMMEDIATES WERE REQUESTED BY 3RD MAR
 DIV TODAY, TWO BY DONS HA DASC AND ONE BY 26TH MARINES THROUGH
 THE KHE SANH DASC. WHILE IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT COMMUNICATION
 FACILITIES MAY FAIL, A RECORD OF EVENTS CONCERNING THE KHE
 SANH IMMEDIATE REQUEST MAY BE OF INTEREST.

(3) AT 1645 THE KHE SANH (KS) DASC REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE
 STRIKE ON AN ACTIVE MORTAR POSITION. KS WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0188 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO RASH (1ST AIRCAV TACP) WHICH IS THE IMMEDIATE SENIOR AGENCY TO KS DASC FOR OPN PEGASUS. KS DASC THEN CONTACTED FIRST MAW TADC AT DANANG AND PASSED IMMEDIATE REQUEST. TADC THEN WENT TO 1 DASC WHO THEN WENT TO DASC-V AND RECEIVED CLEARANCE TO SCRAMBLE AN IMMEDIATE BY PASSING DASC-V CLEARANCE TO TADC. THE TOTAL PROCESSING TIME PRIOR TO THE REQUEST BEING PASSED BY TADC TO THE AIR GROUP THAT FLEW THE STRIKE WAS 18 MINUTES. WHILE THIS IS NOT INDICATIVE OF THE NORMAL, IT DOES HIGHLIGHT THE DISADVANTAGE OF COMPLEXITY. THE REMAINING TWO IMMEDIATES REQUESTED REQUIRED APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES LONGER THAN WAS NECESSARY PRIOR TO 21 MARCH 1968.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG	2		4/2/68		JM	SERIAL 010700Z APR 68 COPY #2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3			4.2	A	REMARKS FOR HAS BEEN SENT " #3 & 4 Burned 5 Nov 68 "
C/S	1.		4/2/68		W	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			020720		JM(U)	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

SECRET

TOP SECRET

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
		CG III MAF	
		SERIAL	COPY#
		010700Z APR 68	2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
2 Apr	<i>DW Wood</i>	SUBJECT AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)	
4/2	<i>C/S has seen DW</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/2	<i>DCG has seen DW</i>		
4/2/68	<i>Major W. Anderson</i>		
S/S	COPIES 2,3,4, OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#12

TOP SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMHMB
DE RUMMWAA 0039 0920700
ZNY SSSSS
P 010700Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
BT

**FOR
HAS BEEN SENT**

S E C R E T
FOR LGEN ROSSON AND MGEN ANDERSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)
FOLLOWING MSG PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:
P 291600Z MAR 68
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF
BT

S E C R E T 08894
FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
SUBJ: AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS IN SVN (U)
REF: A. MACV 05971 DTG 290417Z FEB 68
B. CG III MAF 250038Z

1. (U) YOUR DETAILED REPLY TO THE REQUIREMENT OF REF A IS APPRECIATED.

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 0039 **S E C R E T**

2. (S) COMMENTS IN REF B MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MARINE CORPS UNITS IN SVN HAVE A CAPABILITY SIMILAR TO THAT OF ARMY AIR CAVALRY SQUADRONS. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF MARINE CAPABILITIES IN THIS AREA DEPENDS ON AN INCREASE IN YOUR HELICOPTER INVENTORY. I NOTE THAT NO SUCH INCREASE HAS BEEN APPROVED AND PROGRAMMED YET. SHOULD YOU DETERMINE THAT ADDITIONAL MARINE AIR UNITS OF THIS TYPE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU IN FY68 OR 69 FOR THIS PURPOSE, I WILL SUPPORT THROUGH JOINT CHANNELS YOUR REQUEST FOR THEM.

3. (S) YOUR PROPOSED ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE AERIAL RECONNIASSANCE STRIKE CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS UNIT APPEAR SOUND. THE EXCHANGE DUTY PROGRAM FOR ARMY AIR CAV AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL OF LIGHT HELICOPTER/RECONNIASSANCE UNITS CAN BE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE AND SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL. I WILL BE VERY INTERESTED IN ANY NEW TACTICAL CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES WHICH MAY DERIVE FROM CLOSER PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THESE TWO HIGHLY QUALIFIED GROUPS OF COMBAT SPECIALISTS.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#12

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG	2		4/2/68		JK	SERIAL 010658Z APR 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	3			4-2	A	SUBJECT AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN (U) REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR <i># 3 & 4 burned</i> <i># 5 Nov 68</i> Copy burned for inqur Rikutions Capul SH
C/S	1.		4/2/68		Q	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			020720		DKU	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM	
		CG III	MAF
		SERIAL 010658Z MAR 68	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
2 Apr.	DH Wagner	SUBJECT AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN (U)	
4/2	J/S DHO	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/2	DCG Das sen		
4/2/68	Major Gen N. Anderson		
S/S	COPIES 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#11

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUMHMB
DE RUMWAA 0038 0920658
ZNY SSSSS
P 010658Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
BT

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T

FOR LGEN ROSSON AND MGEN ANDERSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISION IN SVN (U)
A. COMUSMACV MSG 05971 DTG 290417Z FEB68 (NOTAL)
B. CG III MAF MSG 250038Z MAR68 (NOTAL)
C. COMUSMACV MSG 08894 DTG 291600Z MAR68 (NOTAL)
1. REF A ASKED THAT I INVESTIGATE ON A PRIORITY BASIS THE
FEASIBILITY OF ORGANIZING A MARINE CORPS FORCE IN ICTZ WITH A
CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF AN ARMY AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON.
2. REF B WAS MY RESPONSE TO REF A IN WHICH I STATED THAT I WOULD
WELCOME ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS IN ICTZ AND THAT MARINE UNITS WERE
ACCOMPLISHING THE RECONNAISSANCE TASKS IN KEEPING WITH ASSETS
AVAILABLE AND OVERALL TACTICAL SITUATION. ADDITIONALLY I PROPOSED
THAT WE MUTUALLY SELECT A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXPERIENCED HELICOPTER
PILOTS AND RECON PERSONNEL FOR EXCHANGE DUTY BETWEEN AIR CAV.

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0038 **S E C R E T**
SQDN AND MARINE LIGHT HELO/RECON ELEMENTS TO EFFECT 30 DAY CROSS-
FERTILIZATION PERIODS.

3. REF C WHICH I HAVE PASSED TO YOU IS GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S
REPLY TO MY DETAILED RESPONSE (REF B.)

4. THE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED FROM AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM COULD BE
SUBSTANTIAL. THEREFORE, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO IMPLEMENT AN EXCHANGE
PROGRAM THAT IS PRACTICAL AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE.
DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED.

5. PROVIDE ME WITH AN IMPLEMENTATING DIRECTIVE BY 1 MAY 1968 AND
MONTHLY PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS THEREAFTER.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

1 /

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	<i>g</i>		<i>4/1/68</i>		<i>lp</i>	CG III MAF SERIAL 018600Z APR COPY # <i>1</i> OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	<i>1</i>		<i>4/1/68</i>		<i>Q</i>	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>"# 203 Burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p>
DC/S			<i>4/1/68</i>		<i>M</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>011450</i>	<i>4/2</i>	<i>SM DKW</i>	

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMHVP
DE RUMSAK 0036 0920600
ZNY CCCCC
O 010600Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN TOMPKINS
FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN
USE OF COFRAM

1. IN REVIEWING COFRAM EXPENDITURES SINCE INITIAL USE BY YOUR COMMAND, WHICH BY THE WAY IS ANOTHER FIRST FOR THIRD MARINE DIVISION, I AM CONCERNED THAT WE MAY NOT BE MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS MUNITION.
2. IN VIEW OF YOUR LIMITED EXPENDITURES, PLEASE EVALUATE THE SITUATION AND ADVISE. MY PARTICULAR AREAS OF CONCERN ARE AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. ARE WE, AS COMMANDERS, LIMITING USE OF THIS MUNITION TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR SUBORDINATES ARE RELUCTANT TO USE IT EXCEPT WHEN DIRECTED, OR NATURE OF TARGET IS OBVIOUS TO ALL?
 - B. IS THE NEWNESS OF THIS MUNITION INHIBITING FIRE DIRECTION OFFICERS FROM ALLOCATING SUFFICIENT FIRE POWER TO ASSURE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS?
3. IT MAY BE THAT OUR LIMITED USE OF THIS MUNITION STEMS FROM LACK

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0036 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
OF TARGETS, IN ANY CASE YOUR VIEWS WILL BE APPRECIATED.
WARM REGARDS
GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	CDC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#10	

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG 111 MAF
DCG	2					SERIAL 010018Z APR
DCG AIR	3					COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	4		4/1/68			SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DC/S						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			011240			
S/C						

HAS BEEN SENT

"#2 & 3 burned
5 Nov 68"

LEGEND
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
C- COMMENTS
I- INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 0002 0920018
ZNY CCCCC
P 010018Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND
LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
REF: A. CMC 301940Z MAR 68

1. I WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT A RESPECTED NEWSMAN HAD FAILED TO SEE ME ON HIS VISIT TO I CORPS. I HAVE NEVER REFUSED A PRIVATE INTERVIEW SINCE ASSUMING COMMAND OF III MAF, AND MY ISO UNDERSTANDS THAT I ENCOURAGE THIS TYPE OF MEETING WITH THE PRESS.
2. THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE OCCASION WHEN I WASN'T ABLE TO SEE A NEWSMAN AT THE TIME THE REQUEST WAS MADE, BECAUSE OUR TIME SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT IT. MR. WES GALLAGHER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS CAME INTO I CORPS ON 21 FEBRUARY AND REMAINED HERE FOR APPROXIMATELY FIVE HOURS. MY ISO INFORMS ME THAT THERE WAS ADVANCE NOTICE OF HIS ARRIVAL, FROM OUR LIAISON OFFICER IN SAIGON, ONLY TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WOULD BE IN

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	CC/S	C-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	ENGR.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	P&D
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	TRAIN.								#9	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 00022 CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MCEO
I CORPS ON OR ABOUT A GIVEN DAY. UPON HIS ARRIVAL AT THE
CIB THE ISO CALLED AND CAUGHT ME JUST PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE
FOR PHU BAI AND A CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND.
I WANTED HIM TO COME TO DINNER IN THE EVENING, BUT HE STATED
THAT HE WAS LEAVING FOR SAIGON IN THE AFTERNOON. THE STATED
PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT WAS TO SEE HIS MEN IN THE FIELD. MY ISO
FURTHER INFORMS ME THAT HE APPEARED TO BE MIFFED THAT I DID
NOT CHANGE MY SCHEDULED VISIT WITH GEN WESTMORELAND TO MEET
WITH HIM.

3. THERE HAVE BEEN NO OTHER INCIDENTS WHERE A NEWSMAN FAILED
TO SEE ME IF HE REQUESTED IT. THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONS,
HOWEVER, WHEN A NEWSMAN DID NOT GET TO SEE ME AT THE TIME HE
FIRST REQUESTED IT. SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR I HAVE BEEN
INVOLVED WITH MEDIA AND MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AS FOLLOWS:
FOUR LIVE TV INTERVIEWS; TEN PRIVATE INTERVIEWS; ONE LUNCHEON
MEETING IN MY QUARTERS AND DINNER AT THE CIB; THREE PRESS
CONFERENCES AT THE CIB AND FIVE LOCAL TV APPEARANCES. AT THE
PRESENT TIME MY SCHEDULE CALLS ME TO APPEAR AT THE CIB TWICE A MONTH
FOR PRESS CONFERENCES AND MORE OFTEN IF THE SITUATION DICTATES.
BY III MAF DIRECTIVE, MY G-2/G-3 ARE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0002 CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MCEO
BACKGROUND BRIEF AT CIB ONCE A WEEK, OR MORE OFTEN IF THE ISO
REQUESTS IT.

4. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT EVERY EFFORT IS MADE TO
MAINTAIN CORDIAL AND EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS.

WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES.

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#9	

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2					CG III MAF SERIAL 010002Z APR COPY # 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	2		4/1/68		has scw	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DCG AIR	3			4/2	H	REMARKS
C/S	1		4/1/68		Q	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>2 of 3 Turned 5 copies</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			01/24/68	4/1	SB JHW	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE
- C- COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 010002Z APR	COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
4/1	DITW <i>Wagner</i>	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
4/1	C/S has seen DITW	DATE	SIGNATURE
4/1	DG has seen DITW		
7/2/68	Major Gen N. Anderson		
s/s	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

8

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMHLA RUMHVP
DE RUMSAK 0001 092000Z
ZNY SSSSS
P 010002Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUKHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMHLA/CG TASK FORCE X-RAY
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGEN TOMPKINS AND BGEN LAHUE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
1. FOR SOME TIME I HAVE WANTED TO DEDICATE THE PHU BAI COMPLEX AS "CAMP HOCHMUTH". I HAVE GOTTEN THE CUSTOMARY PERMISSION FROM MARY AND I BELIEVE ALL THE PRELIMINARIES ARE IN ORDER.
2. I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH FOR YOU TO OFFICIALLY DEDICATE THE CAMP DURING YOUR TRIP. WE HAVE SET THE DATE AS 4 APRIL AND THE TIME 0915 WHICH WAS THE TIME PROPOSED IN MY 260922Z MARCH FOR YOU TO VISIT TF X-RAY. FROSTY LAHUE WILL BE THE HOST FOR THE DEDICATION AND IS COORDINATING THE DETAILS IN HIS AREA.
3. I AM GOING TO INVITE GENERALS LAM AND TRUONG AND ASK GENERAL LAM TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS.
4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IS PLANNED:

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0001 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
A. HOST COMMANDER ESCORTS DEDICATING OFFICER TO REVIEWING STAND.
B. III MAF DRUM AND BUGLE CORPS SOUND ATTENTION FOLLOWED BY HONORS.
C. NARRATOR ADVANCES THE COLORS TO POSITION IN FRONT OF DEDICATING OFFICER.
D. D&B CORPS PLAYS U.S. AND VN NATIONAL ANTHEMS.
E. COLORS POSTED.
F. 3DMARDIV CHAPLAIN GIVES INVOCATION.
G. NARRATOR READS GENERAL HOCHMUTH'S BIOGRAPHY.
H. LTGEN CUSHMAN INTRODUCES LTGEN LAM WHO MAKES FEW REMARKS.
I. LTGEN CUSHMAN INTRODUCES LTGEN KRULAK.
J. LTGEN KRULAK GIVES SHORT TALK ON SIGNIFICANCE OF DEDICATION FORMER HQ 3DMARDIV IN MEMORY MGEN HOCHMUTH. LAST WORDS QUOTE I NOW FORMALLY DEDICATE THIS CAMP AS "CAMP HOCHMUTH" UNQUOTE. UNVEILS PLAQUE.
K. D&B PLAYS MARINES' HYMN.
L. CEREMONY TERMINATED.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#8

TOP SECRET

CONTROL SHEET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAF
DCG						SERIAL 0107467 APR COPY# OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
C/S						REMARKS EXCLUSIVE
DC/S						MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DC/S DM						HAS BEEN SENT
DC/S AIR						Copy #3 to Air Control File 2 Apr 68
G-1						Copy #2 to CCFMFPAC 2 Apr 68 TM
G-2						Received Copy #2 V Busby
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			01/80		SW	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C - COMMENTS
 I - INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		4/2/68		<i>l</i>	CG III MAF SERIAL 0107A67 APR COPY #2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		4/2/68		<i>gll</i>	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DCG AIR	4			4-2	<i>gll</i>	REMARKS
C/S	1		4/2/68		<i>Q</i>	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p> <p>TOP SECRET #11</p>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			01825		<i>sb</i> <i>DKW</i>	
S/C						

TOP SECRET

CO RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 0046 0320746
ZNY TTTT
O 010746Z APR 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
BT

HAS BEEN SENT
EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GENERAL KRULAK INFO
CMC AND MAJ GENERAL ANDERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DELIVER TO BGEN WIDECKE IMMEDIATELY
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR IN RVN (S)

A. CG FMFPAC 302004Z MAR 68

1. IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED:
FIRST MAW AIRCRAFT SORTIES ALLOCATED AND FLOWN 1 THROUGH 30 MARCH 68
FIRST MARINE DIVISION DASCS THIRD MARINE DIVISION DASCS

DAY	FIRST MARINE DIVISION DASCS			THIRD MARINE DIVISION DASCS		
	SCHEDULED	FLOWN	SCRAMBLE (IMMEDIATE)	SCHEDULED	FLOWN	SCRAMBLED (IMMEDIATE)
A. 1	41	39	0	148	137	0
2	37	32	0	143	137	0
3	41	42	1	143	157	14
4	37	31	0	173	209	36

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0046 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

5	37	33	0	173	219	46
6	43	41	0	173	215	42
7	31	36	5	161	199	38
8	33	44	11	153	189	36
9	31	37	6	153	170	17
10	39	35	0	155	113	0
11	29	34	5	155	167	12
12	29	22	0	154	122	0
13	29	43	14	175	160	0
14	41	41	0	157	197	40
15	29	47	18	154	190	36
16	33	39	6	148	179	31
17	33	63	30	148	158	10
18	31	62	31	148	170	22
19	47	79	32	136	159	23
20	29	71	42	135	123	0
TOTAL	700	871	201	3085	3370	403
B. 21	11	35	24	131	167	36
22	29	41	12	139	149	10
23	14	36	22	116	140	24

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

RE THREE RUMSAK 004		TOP SECRET		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCD		
24	27	31	4	115	141	26
25	30	22	0	108	94	0
26	26	26	0	120	143	23
27	33	29	0	114	181	67
28	13	30	17	133	160	27
29	5	24	19	140	163	23
30	8	20	12	138	157	19
TOTALS	196	292	108	1254	1495	255

GRAND TOTALS (896) (1163) (309) (4339) (4865) (658)

THE ABOVE SORTIES INCLUDE ONLY MARINE CORPS IN-COUNTRY MISSIONS. SCRAMBLE SORTIES ARE INCLUDED IN (FLOWN) COLUMN.

C. SITUATIONS CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED SORTIE RATE DURING PERIOD COVERED:

14 MARCH - EXTRA (10) SCRAMBLE MISSIONS (IMMEDIATE) REQUIRED FOR SURGE EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF RECON MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THIRD MAR DIV.

18 MARCH - EXTRA (14) SCRAMBLE MISSIONS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION WORTH.

20 MARCH - EXTRA (21) SCRAMBLE MISSIONS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION WORTH.

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0046 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCD. D. THE AVERAGE DAILY SORTIES FOR THE ABOVE PERIODS ARE (1-20 MARCH, 212.0 SORTIES) (21-30 MARCH, 176.7 SORTIES). THE REDUCED NUMBER OF SORTIES REFLECTS THE 7TH AIR FORCE ALLOCATION SYSTEM WHICH IS BASED ON A 1.2 SORTIE RATE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE TOTAL PREPLANNED STRIKES REQUESTED. IN ADDITION, THE BELOW LISTED SORTIES FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF OTHER III MAF UNITS IN ICTZ INDICATE AN INCREASED TREND AFTER 21 MARCH 1968.

THE FOLLOWING SORTIES WERE FLOWN BY FIRST MAF AIRCRAFT IN MARCH IN SUPPORT OF OTHER III MAF UNITS IN ICTZ. READ IN THREE COLUMNS.

DAY	SORTIES	DAY	SORTIES	DAY	SORTIES
1	8	11	5	21	24
2	3	12	4	22	18
3	4	13	2	23	17
4	12	14	8	24	31
5	5	15	5	25	26
6	7	16	5	26	7
7	15	17	11	27	10
8	5	18	9	28	19
9	12	19	6	29	24
10	3	20	6	30	22

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRETPAGE FIVE RUNSAK 00 T O P S E C E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR WOOD
TOTAL 135 154

GRAND TOTAL (289)

E. KHE SANH DASC (CARSTAIRS II) DID NOT RECEIVE ALL SORTIES THAT HAD BEEN SCHEDULED ON 29 MARCH DUE TO FLIGHTS BEING REASSIGNED BY ABCCC PRIOR TO REPORTING TO CARSTAIRS II. OF 18 SCHEDULED SORTIES ONLY 4 WERE CLEARED THROUGH CARSTAIRS II - THE OTHER 14 SORTIES WERE UTILIZED BY ABCCC FOR OTHER TARGETS IN NIAGARA AREA. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 26TH MARINES WERE SATISFIED BY 14 IMMEDIATE STRIKES REQUESTED DURING A 5 HOUR PERIOD. AIR STRIKES WERE REQUIRED TO COUNTER HEAVY CLOSE-IN GROUND CONTACTS.

2. STATUS MSG CONCERNING SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES SINCE COMMENCEMENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN PROCESS OF PREPARATION. WILL BE ADDRESSED TO COMUSMACV INFO CINCPAC. A COPY WILL BE PROVIDED YOU SEPARATELY.

GP-4

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