

239. CG III MAF 260728Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: 70-75% OPCON comments by III MAF

240. CG III MAF 271244Z MAY68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: EGen to MACV for Air Ops - Terms of Reference

241. ADMNO III MAF 271340Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Modified Preplanned Air Support System

~~242. CG FMAW 280046Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

243. ADMNO III MAF 280704Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: I DASC RELOCATION

~~244. CG FMAW 280931Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~245. CG FMAW 290715Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

246. CG FMFPAC 291917Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Passes CMC's proposed Point Paper for SecDef Requests comments

247. CG PCV 281404Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Modified Preplanned Air Support System

248. CG FMFPAC 300511Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: KRULAK'S COMMENTS ON CMC POINT PAPER

~~249. ADMNO FMAW 300650Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

250. CG III MAF 301458Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Comments on CMC Point Paper

251. CG FMFPAC 302121Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *Group 4*

Subj: Requests additional data from wing Request change in format of Daily Special Report

~~252. CG FMAW 310820Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~100-10/4/70~~
 #230. JCS 202253Z MAY68 (S) ^{gp-3} -7 Added (from "Wing Daily" file/HOR-40/2 May 70)

Subj: SecDef's opinion on Air Control

231. 7AF TACC 231105Z MAY68 (C) ^{gp-4}

Subj: Simplified Frag Procedures

232. CG III MAF 240226Z MAY68 (C) ^{gp-4}

Subj: Location of I DASC

~~233. CG FMAW 241536Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

234. CG FMAW 240119Z MAY68 (S) ^{gp-4}

Subj: Khe Sanh ART

235. COMUSMACV 260207Z MAY68 (C) ^{gp-4}

Subj: I DASC Location

~~236. CG FMAW 260216Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~237. CG FMAW 260859Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

238. CG FMFPAC 262248Z MAY68 (S MCEO) ^{gp-4}

Subj: Further comments on 70-75% OPCON formula

~~217. CG FMAW 180527Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

218. CG FMFPAC 182001Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group-4*

Subj: DepSecDef's Memo to Chairman JCS
Krulak reiterates necessity for hard facts

~~219. CG FMAW 190810Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

220. CG III MAF 200530Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Recommendation for EGEN to COMUSMACV

~~221. CG FMAW 200630Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

222. CG III MAF 200630Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Answers to KRULAK's request on Air Support provided
Kham Duc

223. CG FMAW 210047Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: First Maw HELICOPTER ESCORT SORTIES (U)

224. CG III MAF 210602Z MAY68 (S) *group-4*

Subj: Standard Frag

~~225. CG FMAW 210647Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

226. COMUSMACV 211145Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Modified preplanned air support system ✓

~~227. CG FMAW 220854Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

228. CG FMFPAC 221855Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Requests 30-day extension of FMAW Special Report

~~229. CG FMAW 231406Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~206. CG FMAW 120650Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE Input on Air Control~~

207. ADM SHARP 112316Z MAY68 (S) *gp - not shown*

Subj: Requests detailed changes from COMUSMACV and CG III MAF'S comments thereon

~~208. CG FMAW 132310Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~209. CG FMAW 141259Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

210. ADMINO FMFPAC 141901Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp - 3*

Subj: Quotes Adm Hyland's comments on air control presentation at CINCPAC

~~211. CG FMAW 150705Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

212. GEN WESTMORELAND 151235Z MAY68 (S) *gp - 4*

Subj: DETAILS OF NEW SYSTEM & III MAF COMMENT PACKAGE SHOULD BE READY 25May68

213. CG FMFPAC 160134Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp - 4*

Subj: REQUEST FOR SINGLE MGR INFO ON KHAM DUC

~~214. CG FMAW 160534Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

215. CG FMFPAC 160911Z MAY68 (S) *gp - 4*

Subj: KRULAK's comments to SHARP & CUSHMAN on CINCPAC Brief

~~216. CG FMAW 170530Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: ROUTINE Input~~

193. CG III MAF 080250Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 Subj: Passes III MAF Presentation at MACV to KRULAK
194. 7AF TSN AB 080300Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
 Subj: Diversion of recon aircraft (U)
- ~~195. CG FMAW 080933Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
196. CG III MAF 081344Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 Subj: Recap of meeting at MACV
- ~~197. CG FMAW 091553Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
198. COMUSMACV 071217Z MAY68 (C) (*Sec I of II*) *gp - not shown*
 Subj: In-Country Air Support Data
199. CINCPAC 082229Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4* ✓
 Subj: Single Management Review
200. COMUSMACV 090003Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
 Subj: Single Management Presentation Lists attendees
201. CG III MAF 100008Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 Subj: Notes taken at COMUSMACV talks
- ~~202. ADMNO FMAW 100912Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~
203. MGEN KERWIN 110154Z MAY68 (C) *gp - not shown*
 Subj: Kerwin's recap of CINCPAC meeting
204. ADMNO FMFPAC 110334Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-3*
 Subj: THARIN's recap of meeting at CINCPAC
- ~~205. ADMNO FMAW 111438Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~Subj: Routine Input~~

180. 7AF 020450Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: In-country/Out-country efforts for targets west of Khe Sanh

181. 7AF TACC 020945Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: Divert Missions within I Corps (U)

~~182. CG FMAW 030700Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

183. COMUSMACV 040550Z MAY68 *cc*

Subj: In-Country Air Support Data

184. CG III MAF 040810Z MAY68 (C) MCEO *gp-4*

Subj: MGen Anderson's MEMO FOR RECORD, 2May68

~~185. CG FMAW 040835Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

186. CG III MAF 040902Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Addendum to 30-day disposition msg to COMUSMACV ✓

187. CG III MAF 040906Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Passes CG III MAF 040902Z MAY68 to CMC & FMFFAC

~~188. CG FMAW 051547Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~189. CG FMAW 061603Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

190. COMUSMACV 070100Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Single Management Review -- Info on presentations at MACV AND CINCPAC

~~191. CG FMAW 070617Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

192. CG III MAF 071424Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: Mix of preplanned tactical air spt allocation

175. 7AF TACC 010145Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: RADIO Freq Designators and Color Codes

~~176. CG FMAN 010840Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~177. CG FMAN 020530Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

178. CINCPAC 030139Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Team to arrive RVN 4 May 68 for discussions and evaluation of Single Manager System

179. CINCPAC 030528Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Details data to be provided evaluation team

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMUGRA RUMHAW
 DE RUHHFMA 5380 QT QWQWQ
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 302121Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO ZEN/CMC

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT
 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN AND
 MGEN ANDERSON INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LT GEN
 KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS (U)
 A. COMUSMACV 211145Z/MAY 68 KS)
 B. COMUSMACV 150905Z/MAR 68 KC) NOTAL
 C. CG FIRST MAW 230300Z/APR 68 KS)
 1. REFERENCE A MODIFIED THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B,
 EFFECTIVE 300600H/MAY 68

TO PROVIDE QUOTE: GREATER FLEXIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS
 AND CONTINUITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PREPLANNED AIR
 SUPPORT TO MEET THE DAY-BY-DAY REQUIREMENTS OF
 GROUND COMMANDERS. UNQUOTE. COMUSMACV STATED THAT

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA5380 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN
 AN EVALUATION WILL BE CONDUCTED FOLLOWING THE
 OPERATION OF THE MODIFIED SYSTEM FOR A THIRTY DAY
 PERIOD ENDING 30 JUNE.

2. TO ASSIST IN DOCUMENTING THE MARINE CORPS POSITION
 RELATIVE TO THIS MODIFICATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED.

3. FOR CG III MAF: TO PROVIDE DETAILED DOCUMENTATION
 OF THE MODIFIED SYSTEM FOR THE PROPOSED THIRTY DAY
 TEST PERIOD IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOUR OPERATIONS
 ANALYSIS SECTION ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO PROVIDE A
 DAY BY DAY DESCRIPTION OF THE EFFECTS OF THIS NEW
 APPROACH ON III MAF OPERATIONS. I HAVE ORDERED LTCOL
 BUCKON AND MR. JOHN SESSLER, OPERATIONS ANALYSTS FROM
 HQ FMFPAC, TAD TO III MAF TO ASSIST, AS YOU DIRECT, IN ESTABLISH-
 ING WHATEVER DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES ARE NECESSARY.
 ONGOING PROJECTS HERE REQUIRE THEIR RETURN NLT 6 JUNE.
 MAJOR ROBERTSON, AN OPERATIONS ANALYST NOW ENROUTE TO
 III MAF ON PCS ORDERS, IS BEING BRIEFED HERE ON THE
 BACKGROUND, INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND WILL ARRIVE III MAF ON 15 ABOUT

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

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5 JUNE.

4. FOR CG FIRST MAW: REFERENCE C ESTABLISHED THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT, WHICH HAS BEEN INVALUABLE IN THE ACCUMULATION OF DATA FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS OF AIR CONTROL. TO PROVIDE A BROADER DATA BASE FOR DOCUMENTING THE MODIFIED SYSTEM THE FOLLOWING REVISIONS TO THE FIRST MAW DAILY SPECIAL REPORT ARE RECOMMENDED:

A. SECTION ONE, PARAGRAPH CHARLIE:

C. PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT.

(1) NUMBER OF TARGETS THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRED HIT.

(2) NUMBER OF TARGETS FRAGGED TO BE HIT.

(3) NUMBER OF WEEKLY PREPLANNED SORTIES FRAGGED TO HIT THESE FRAGGED TARGETS.

(4) NUMBER OF DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES FRAGGED TO HIT THE REMAINDER OF THOSE FRAGGED TARGETS.

(5) NUMBER OF FRAGGED TARGETS WHICH WERE HIT.

PAGE 4 RUMHFMAS380 SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCE

(6) NUMBER OF WEEKLY PREPLANNED SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED.

(7) NUMBER OF DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED.

B. SECTION ONE, PARAGRAPH FOXTROT:

F. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES.

(1) REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDER.

(2) APPROVED BY IDASC/DASC VICTOR.

(3) RECEIVED FROM DIVERTED SORTIES.

(4) RECEIVED FROM SCRAMBLED SORTIES.

C. SECTION ONE, PARAGRAPH INDIA:

I. EXTRA OR UNREQUESTED SORTIES RECEIVED FROM SERVICES.

(1) USMC

(2) USAF

(3) USN

(4) OTHER (VNAF, RAAF)

D. SECTION TWO, PARAGRAPH ALFA:

A. SORTIES FLOWN

(1) PREPLANNED

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(2) SCRAMBLED

(3) ADDED-ON

E. SECTION TWO, NEW PARAGRAPH JULIET:

J. PREPLANNED SORTIE BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)

(1) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF
MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE REGTS/BN:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(2) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF U.S.
ARMY:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(3) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(4) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(5) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER
ICIZ FORCES, KVNAF, SSF)

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA5380 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(6) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN II CORPS

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(7) PREPLANNED SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

F. SECTION TWO, NEW PARAGRAPH KILO:

K. REMARKS

(1) OTHER REMARKS (KEYED TO SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS, WHEN APPROPRIATE)

(2) WEEKLY BASIS ONLY: THE NUMBER OF USAF AND USMC SORTIES FRAGGED TO CG III MAF, THE NUMBER ACTUALLY PROVIDED AND AN EVALUATION OF THESE SORTIES IN TERMS OF TGT AND ORDNANCE EXPENDED. WARM RECARDS.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

CG RUMM RUMBKA
 DE RUMSAK 3922 15 1143E
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 301458Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBKOA/CMC WASHINGTON D C
 INFO RUMK/CG FMPPAC HAWAII
 ZK

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAMBER, INFO LTGEN KRULAK
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 AIR CONTROL. (U)

- A. CG FMPPAC 29 19 17Z MAY 68 (NOVAL)
- B. CG FMPPAC 262240Z MAY 68
- C. CG III MAF 260728Z MAY 68

1. REFERENCE (A) QUOTED A CMC POINT PAPER ON CHANGE TO THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT OF III MAF AIR ASSETS AND REQUESTED COMMENTS THEREON
 BE FORWARDED TO CMC. ACCORDINGLY, PERTINENT COMMENTS, IN ADDITION
 TO THOSE CONTAINED IN REFERENCES B AND C ARE AS FOLLOWS:
 COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO QUOTED PARAGRAPHS OF REF A.

A. PARAGRAPH 2

COMMENT: THE MODIFIED SYSTEM ASSIGNS 10 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED AIR
 AVAILABLE WEEKLY AND PRESCRIBES TYPE ORDNANCE AND ASSIGNS
 TOTS. FRAG PROVIDES GROUND UNITS A FIXED AIR SUPPORT PACKAGE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3922 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCRD
 AND AIR UNITS A PARTIAL TIME TABLE THAT FACILITATES AIRCRAFT
 UTILIZATION AND SCHEDULING. HOWEVER, THE CMC'S PROPOSAL,
 WHICH ASSIGNS OPCOM OF AIR ASSETS TO III MAF,
 CONSISTING 10 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIES AVAILABLE, IS
 MUCH PREFERRED.

B. PARAGRAPH 5B

COMMENT: AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED
 FRAG IS MORE RESPONSIVE THAN THE WORDS "WEEKLY FRAG" IMPLIES.
 AGREE ACTUAL GROUND REQUIREMENTS CANNOT BE PREDICTED ONE WEEK
 IN ADVANCE; HOWEVER THE SYSTEM IS NOT COMPLETELY INFLEXIBLE, AND
 REQUIREMENTS CAN BE ADJUSTED. PROBLEM HERE IS FIXED ORDNANCE
 LOADS AND TOTS. THESE CAN BE ADJUSTED UPON REQUEST TO TAGC OR
 TAGC VIA III MAF OR I DASC. TOTS NLT 7 HOURS BEFORE TARGET
 TIME AND ORDNANCE LOADS NLT 2 TO 4 HOURS PRIOR TO TOTS. FOR
 DAILY FRAG; UNITS REQUESTING AIR SUPPORT BEYOND WEEKLY ALL-
 OCATIONS SUBMIT REQUESTS TO III MAF NLT 1400 DAILY TO BE
 EFFECTED THE FOLLOWING DAY. PROCESSING OF THE 30 PERCENT PRE-
 PLANNED SORTIES AVAILABLE DAILY IS ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO
 ORIGINAL PROCEDURE EFFECTED 21 MARCH 1968 EXCEPT REQUESTS REQUIRE
 LESS DETAILED INFORMATION.

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C. PARA 5

COMMENT: (1) III MAF SHOULD HAVE OPCON OF ALL MARINE AIRCRAFT UNITS AND MAKE AVAILABLE TO MACV 30 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIES AT THE 1.1 RATE. THE USE OF THE TERM OPCON IN CONNECTION WITH SORTIES SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

(2) THIRTY PERCENT OF MARINE CORPS SORTIES MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR EMERGENCY AIR SUPPORT TO OTHER UNITS BUT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE IN EXCESS OF DAILY ROUTINE REQUIREMENTS, PROVIDED AIR FORCE PROVIDES ITS SHARE OF SORTIES. THIRTY PERCENT IS ALSO CONSIDERED AN EXCESSIVE TAX ON DAILY MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS SINCE AN AVERAGE OF 9.4 SORTIES HAVE BEEN PROVIDED EACH MARINE BN PER DAY THE PAST YEAR.

D. PARA 6

COMMENT: FRAGGING OF MARINE SORTIES UNDER MY OPCON TO SUPPORT MARINES MAY BECOME A PROBLEM DUE TO MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER IF THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ARMY DIVISIONS WITH SUFFICIENT AIR SUPPORT. ADDITIONALLY, UNLESS AIR FORCE REVISES ITS METHOD OF FRAGGING SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY, MARINES UNITS WILL BE RECEIVING AIR SUPPORT WHICH IS MUCH MORE RESPONSIVE THAN THAT PROVIDED TO THE ARMY.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 3922 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
FURTHER, IT IS NOT BELIEVED REASONABLE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO INSIST THAT ONLY 70 AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT SUPPORT ARMY UNITS THE 30 PERCENT SORTIE SLICE AVAILABLE TO MACV SHOULD NORMALLY COME BACK TO I CORPS AND BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT I CORPS GROUND FORCES, BOTH MARINE AND ARMY, AS REQUIRED.

E. PARAGRAPH 7A (2)

COMMENT: A PREPLANNING CYCLE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED FOR III MAF BY COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE 95-4. THIS DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHED THE SYSTEM USED BY ARMY DIVISIONS AND WAS SIMILAR TO PRESENT SYSTEM. MARINE CORPS SYSTEM WAS IN-HOUSE PROCEDURE.

F. PARAGRAPH 7A (3)

COMMENT: SYSTEM DOES NOT OBLIATE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE MARINE PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT THE ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM SINCE TWO SYSTEMS WOULD BE EXERCISED. NECESSITY TO PROCESS ARMY AND MARINE REQUESTS THROUGH ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM STILL EXISTS. SOME REDUCTION IN MARINE PERSONNEL MAY BE REALIZED.

G. PARAGRAPH 7A (4)

COMMENT: CLEAN LINES OF NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS WILL NOT BE COMPLETELY RESTORED UNDER PROPOSED SYSTEM, UNTIL MARINE AIR ASSETS ARE RETURNED TO FULL OPCON OF CG III MAF,

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 3922 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WILL REMAIN MORE COMPLEX.

H. PARAGRAPH 7B (2)

COMMENT: THE 70 PERCENT ALLOCATION DOES NOT ESTABLISH A CEILING BUT REPRESENTS A MINIMUM LEVEL SINCE THE REMAINING 30 PERCENT SHOULD LARGELY BE REALLOCATED TO I CORPS.

GP-4

BF

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUMUGRA RUMNAW
DE RUMKM 5342 QTQPTQQ
ZNY SSSSS
O P 30051Z MAY 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW
BT

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SECTION 1 OF 2
S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, INFO
LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY
AIR CONTROL (U)

A. CMC 290144Z/MAY68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. YOUR SUMMARY CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A IS SOLID, AND
ELIMINATES A CASE THAT HAS BEEN LOGICAL FROM THE START. BY NOW,
I BELIEVE THAT ALL THE LITIGANTS KNOW WE ARE RIGHT.
THE PROBLEM IS TO GET THEM TO ADMIT IT. I FEEL THAT WE GAIN
THE MOST SYMPATHETIC HEARING TO THE EXTENT THAT WE SHOW THAT
OUR PROPOSITION IS BEST FOR THE TOTAL WAR EFFORT WHILE OFFERING
THE FACE SAVING REQUIRED BY THE STRONG PERSONALITIES INVOLVED.
IN THIS

PAGE 2 RUMKM 5342 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
LATTER CONTEXT I BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL MIGHT BE STRENGTHENED
BY FLAVORING IT TO MAKE THE MARINE CORPS DEDICATION TO
THE COMMON GOAL STAND OUT MORE CLEARLY. FOR INSTANCE, RESTORING
THE COMBAT INTEGRITY OF MARINE FORCES ENABLES MARINES TO
FIGHT AS THEY WERE DESIGNED, TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO FIGHT,
THUS ENHANCING NOT JUST THE MARINE CAPABILITY, BUT THE TOTAL
COMBAT CAPABILITY OF MACV. ADDITIONALLY, IN TERMS OF THE JOINT
FORCE, THE DEDICATION OF 30 PERCENT OF MARINE AIR TO THE
OVERALL EFFORT IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
COMUSMACV SEEKS WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, CG III MAF,
WITH OPCON OF HIS ORGANIC AIR, WOULD HAVE GREATER
FLEXIBILITY TO FOCUS HIS MARINE AIR WHEREVER REQUIRED, TO MEET
THE NEEDS OF HIS FORCES.

2. WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 5, I SUGGEST A MODIFICATION IN
THE ACTUAL WORDING OF YOUR PROPOSAL. SPECIFICALLY I SUGGEST IT
PROPOSE THAT OPCON OF MARINE FIXED WING ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE
AIRCRAFT AND THE RELATED CONTROL MEANS BE RETURNED TO CG III MAF
WITH THE STIPULATION THAT CG III MAF WILL ASSIGN TO 7TH AIR FORCE,
FOR MISSION DIRECTION, 30 PERCENT OF HIS SORTIE GENERATION

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	WTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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PAGE 3 RUHKM 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 CAPABILITY, BASED ON THE ACCEPTED AIR FORCE 1.1 SORTIE RATE.
 THIS WOULD BE THE PRACTICAL MECHANICS OF RETURNING 70 PERCENT
 OF OUR AIR, WHILE LEAVING 30 PERCENT WITH 7TH AIR FORCE.
 3. TURNING TO OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION MONDAY MORNING
 WHEN YOU OBSERVED THAT THE SO-CALLED "INTERMINGLING" OF FORCES
 IN I CTZ MAY BE USED AS RATIONALE FOR THE STATUS QUO, I HAVE
 FOUR SPECIFIC POINTS IN MIND WHICH MAY BE OF ASSISTANCE TO
 YOU IN HOUR DISCUSSIONS:

- A. INTERMINGLING OF ARMY AND MARINE FORCES IN I CTZ DOES NOT EXIST FROM EITHER A COMMAND OR A PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT.
 - B. DESPITE SINGLE MANAGEMENT THERE ARE IN FACT TWO AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS NOW FUNCTIONING IN I CTZ.
 - C. REGARDLESS OF INCREASED TROOP DENSITY IN I CTZ THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME AS IT WAS BEFORE THE BUILD-UP.
 - D. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A SINGLE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST PROCEDURE FOR, IN FACT, MULTIPLE REQUEST PROCEDURES CAN BE EMPLOYED FOR AIR AS IS THE CASE FOR OTHER SUPPORT MEANS.
- I WILL TAKE UP EACH OF THESE THOUGHTS IN TURN.

PAGE 4 RUHKM 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

4. REALISTICALLY, FIVE U.S. DIVISIONS SPREAD OVER A TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY MILE AXIS, SEPARATED BY CLEARLY DEFINED TERRAIN FEATURES, AND OPERATING IN WIDELY SEPARATED ZONES CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS INTERMINGLED. THOSE WHO USE "INTERMINGLING" AS AN EXCUSE FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT IGNORE THE FUNCTION OF BOUNDARIES, NO FIRE LINES, AND SIMILAR CONTROL DEVICES WHICH DEFINE, COORDINATE, AND COMPARTMENT THE OPERATIONS OF ADJACENT FORCES. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE MAN ON THE GROUND THERE IS MORE ISOLATION THAN THERE IS MIX. TACTICALLY THE FORCES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT. PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF TROOP UNITS IS GENERALLY GREAT AND, IN THE CASE OF DIVISIONS, IS MEASURED IN MILES.

5. THE INTERMINGLING ARGUMENT IS A SUPERFICIAL ONE WHEN VIEWED IN THE FACE OF WHAT IS ACTUALLY TAKING PLACE IN I CTZ. TWO AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS ARE NOW JUSIAPOSED AND OPERATING IN

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PAGE 5 RUMKM 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MUCO
 PRECISELY THE SAME MANNER AS THEY DID, PRIOR TO SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT, WITH ONE EXCEPTION: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF OUR
 ORGANIZATION NOW RESTS WITH THE 7TH AIR FORCE AND
 THE AUTHORITY OF OUR TADC HAS BEEN PASSED OVER TO
 SAIGON. VIEWED IN TERMS OF INTERMINGLED FORCES, THE
 ONLY LOGICAL OBJECTIVE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WOULD BE TO
 REGULATE, INTEGRATE, AND COORDINATE, WITHIN CONTIGUOUS
 AIR-SPACE, TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN AIR SUPPORT
 MISSIONS IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE MUTUAL INTERFERENCE. HOWEVER,
 I BASC, THE AGENCY OF THE SINGLE MANAGER IN I CZ, DOES NOT
 HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS, AND IT DOES
 NOT PERFORM THEM. IT SERVES ONLY AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING
 AGENCY FOR IMMEDIATE AIR REQUESTS, EXCEPT FOR THE FREQUENCY OF
 DIVERSIONS, ONCE AN AIR SUPPORT MISSION IS LAUNCHED, SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT HAS NO EFFECT AND CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT FOLLOWS
 THE PROCEDURES EXTANT UNDER 95-4.
 6. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE INTERMINGLING OF FORCES IN I CZ
 REQUIRED SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF SPECIFIED AIR ASSETS AND,

PAGE 6 RUMKM 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MUCO
 CONSEQUENTLY, A SINGLE SET OF PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING FIXED
 WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, IS NOT VALID WHEN VIEWED IN LIGHT OF
 THE MANY VARIANT REQUEST PROCEDURES CURRENTLY USED TO PROCURE
 OTHER MOBILE FORMS OF COMBAT SUPPORT. TANKS ARE NOT SINGLE
 MANAGED; THE REQUEST PROCEDURES FOR TANK SUPPORT IN THE FIRST AIR
 CAV DIVISION AND THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION ARE NOT AT ALL
 THE SAME. REQUEST PROCEDURES FOR HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS VARY GREATLY,
 EVEN BETWEEN THE THREE ARMY DIVISIONS IN I CZ. SIMILARLY,
 VARIANT PROCEDURES TO PROCURE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER SUPPORT
 EXIST. THE UNITS USING THESE FIRE SUPPORT MEANS ARE THE SAME
 SO-CALLED INTERMINGLED UNITS AS USE FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT.
 YET WESTY HAS NOT SEEN FIT TO DECREE THAT A SINGLE REQUEST
 PROCEDURE MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO PROCURE TANK AND HELICOPTER
 SUPPORT. THE FACT IS THAT A SINGLE REQUEST PROCEDURE
 FOR FIXED WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS NO MORE REQUIRED THAN IT
 IS FOR THESE OTHER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS.
 7. IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT THE INFUSION OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT INTO
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OO RUEBHOA RUMUGRA RUMHAW
 DE RUHKM 5343 GT QPT QQ
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 30021Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMPPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCELO FINAL SECTION OF 2
 THE SKIES OVER I CTZ, NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE ARMY
 UNITS WHICH MIGRATED NORTHWARD, REQUIRED THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION OF AIR ASSETS AND TACTICAL
 AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS TO ENSURE COMPATIBILITY WITH THE
 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM AND TO ENSURE SAFE
 CONTROL OF AIRBORNE TRAFFIC. THE FACT IS, THERE HAS BEEN
 NO CHANGE IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES UNDER SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT. THE COMBAT REPORTING CENTER (PANAMA) AND THE COMBAT
 REPORTING POINT (WATERBOY) WERE ESTABLISHED, WERE FUNCTIONING AND
 WERE BEING USED BY MARINE AND AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IN
 EXACTLY THE SAME MANNER AS NOW, LONG BEFORE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT WAS PLACED IN EFFECT. THE AIR TRAFFIC
 CONTROL PROCEDURES HAVE NOT BEEN CHANGED; THE

PAGE 2 RUHKM 5343 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCELO
 PROCEDURES COULD ACCOMMODATE THE INCREASED DENSITY
 OF AIR TRAFFIC IN I CTZ UNDER EITHER THE NEW OR THE
 MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS
 NOT NECESSARY TO CONTROL THE INCREASED AIR TRAFFIC, AS IS
 EVIDENCED BY THE HUNDREDS OF HELICOPTERS AND
 FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN ATTACK AND RECONNAI-
 SSANCE TYPES, WHICH OPERATE DAILY AND ARE NOT SINGLE
 MANAGED.

8. IN RETROSPECT, IT SEEMS THAT THE AIR FORCE USED THE
 RAPID BUILD-UP IN I CTZ AS A VEHICLE TO CREATE THE
 ILLUSION IN WESTMORELAND'S MIND THAT WITHOUT
 MOMYER'S FIRM HAND ON THE THROTTLE INCLUDING OPCON OF OUR AIR CHAOS
 WOULD RESULT IN I COPRS. WESTMORELAND, LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM FROM
 ABOVE, COULD NOT PERCEIVE THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT WOULD ENTAIL
 NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN EITHER AIR CONTROL OR TACTICAL AIR
 DIRECTION PROCEDURES AT THE EXECUTION LEVEL. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

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EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OO RUMUGRA
DE RUMHMA 5204 QTPQOQU
ZNY SSSSS
O 291917Z MAY 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DELIVER AT THE BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF GEN CHAPMAN'S 290144Z/MAY
SETTING FORTH THE SUMMARY OF A PROPOSAL BEING
PRESENTED TO SECNAV FOR HIS POSSIBLE PRESENTATION TO
DEPSECDEF.

QUOTE:

SUBJ.

CHANGE TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF III MAF AIR ASSETS (U)

1. COMUSMACV MESSAGE 211145Z MAY 68 ANNOUNCES MODIFICATIONS OF
THE PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM TO BE EFFECTIVE COMMENCING 200600 MAY 68.

2. THE CHANGE ESSENTIALLY PROVIDES FOR MAJOR DECENTRALIZATION
IN THAT IT ASSIGNS BLOCKS OF AIR SUPPORT ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE WITH
PREDETERMINED TOTS AND ORDNANCE LOADS. 70PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE

PAGE 2 RUMHMA5204 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SORTIES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS,
AND THE REMAINING 30PERCENT ON A DAILY FRAG IN RESPONSE TO AIR
REQUESTS RECEIVED BY 1600 THE DAY BEFORE THEY ARE TO BE FLOWN.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS WERE BROUGHT ABOUT
BY THE UNWIELDINESS AND UNRESPONSIVENESS OF THE ORIGINAL PLAN.
ALSO EVIDENT IS THAT THE CENTRALIZATION, ENVISIONED AS A PARA-
MOUNT REQUIREMENT BY THE ORIGINAL PLAN, HAS BEEN ABANDONED.

3. THIS MODIFIED SYSTEM, BY PUSHING AIR TO THE USER, IS
INTENDED TO PROVIDE GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF
PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT TO MEET THE DAY-BY-DAY REQUIREMENTS
OF GROUND COMMANDERS. RESPONSIVENESS, HOWEVER, WILL STILL BE
DEFICIENT COMPARED TO THE MARINE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. THE WEEKLY FRAG WILL BE PUBLISHED 36 HOURS AHEAD OF ITS
EFFECTIVE TIME OF IMPLEMENTATION. ACTUAL GROUND REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT CANNOT BE PREDICTED ONE WEEK PLUS 36
HOUR AHEAD OF TIME.

B. THE WEEKLY FRAG WILL BE PUBLISHED SHOWING THE TIMES SORTIES
WILL BE FLOWN AND ORDNANCE TO BE CARRIED. THUS GROUND
OPERATIONS REQUIRING AIR SUPPORT MUST BE PLANNED TO ACCOMMODATE

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA5204 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THE SUPPORTING AIR ARM WITH NO BEARING ON THE FLUID ENEMY
 SITUATION. THIS MEANS THAT GROUND OPERATIONS MUST NECESSARILY
 BECOME RESPONSIVE TO, AND DEPENDENT UPON, AN AIR SCHEDULE PLANNED
 A WEEK IN ADVANCE. INTELLIGENT ALLOCATION OF THE 30PERCENT
 OF AVAILABLE SORTIES HELD BACK FOR THE DAILY FRAG WILL HELP,
 BUT CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO OVERCOME THIS BASIC DEFICIENCY.
 C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AIR ASSETS REMAINS WITH THE
 CG, 7TH AIR FORCE. ONLY BY POSSESSING OPCON OF ITS OWN AIRCRAFT
 CAN III MAF ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY
 OF AIRCRAFT WHICH CAN THEN BE EMPLOYED THROUGH A SYSTEM DELIBERATLY
 DESIGNED TO PROMOTE ITS MOST EFFECTIVE USE BY
 KEYING ITS EMPLOYMENT TO THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND IN
 COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS.
 4. IN CONSLUSION, IT APPEARS THAT THERE ARE TWO OVERRIDING
 CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMNT PLAN:
 A. THE REQUIREMENT FOR 30PERCENT OF THE AIR ASSETS TO BE
 HELD BY COMUSMACV AS A HEDGE AGAINST THE OVERALL TACTICAL
 SITUATION.
 B. THE RECOGNITION THAT AT LEAST 70 PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA5204 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AIR ASSETS ARE REQUIRED ON A DAILY BASIS BY THE GROUND
 COMMANDERS.
 IT LOGICALLY FOLLOWS THAT CG III MAF WHO HAS ORGANIC
 AIR ASSETS, SHOULD APPLY THOSE ASSETS AGAINST HIS OWN RE-
 QUIREMENTS. THIS WOULD ENABLE RESPONSIVENESS KEYED TO
 THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER RATHER THAN HAVING THE GROUND COMMANDER
 RESPONDING TO TOTS, ORDNANCE LOADS AND AVAILABILITY OF AIR-
 CRAFT AS DETERMINED BY THE AIR COMMANDER.
 5. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS PROPOSED THAT CG, III MAF BE ASSIGNED
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HIS AIR ASSETS THAT CONSTITUTE 70 PERCENT
 OF THE SORTIES AVAILABLE FOR AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES IN I
 CORPS, WHILE RETAINING 30PERCENT AT THE ACCEPTED 1:1 RATE FOR
 ALLOCATION BY COMUSMACV ON A DAILY BASIS.
 6. AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR US ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS WOULD BE
 SUBMITTED TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF,
 FOR COORDINATION AND ALLOCATION OF SORTIES FROM THE 7TH
 AIR FORCE WEEKLY OR DAILY FRAG, AS APPROPRIATE.
 7. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE 70/30 PROPOSAL ARE:
 A. ADVANTAGES.
 (1) IT RETURNS TO THE MARINE COMMANDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A

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PAGE 5 RUHHFMA5224 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF HIS ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT MEANS,
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SATISFYING COMUSMACV'S NEEDS.

- (2) IT REESTABLISHES THE PREPLANNING CYCLE THAT WAS IN EXISTENCE UNDER 95-4.
- (3) IT OBTVIATES THE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE MARINE PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION TO THE AIR FORCE CONTROL SYSTEM.
- (4) IT RESTORES THE CLEAN LINES OF NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS AND ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR IMPROVISATIONS.
- (5) IT REDUCES RELIANCE ON THE USE OF DIVERTS TO FILL IMMEDIATE MISSION REQUIREMENTS, AND RESTORES DIVERT AUTHORITY TO THE GROUND COMMANDER VIS-A-VIS, THE AIR COMMANDER.

B. DISADVANTAGES.

- (1) IT IS ONLY A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY NECESSARY FOR MARINE FORCES TO FUNCTION MOST EFFECTIVELY.
- (2) IT FIXES A CEILING ON MARINE SORTIES AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT MARINE GROUND FORCES.
- (3) INSTEAD OF ASSURING THAT MARINE AIR RESOURCES

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA5224 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ARE AVAILABLE TO MACV ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS (MACV 95-4).
III MAF WOULD BE PROVIDING THIS AMOUNT AS A MATTER OF COURSE,
REGARDLESS OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION."
UNQUOTE.

2. PLEASE GIVE GEN CHAPMAN YOUR COMMENTS ON THE POINT
PAPER ASAP. WE ARE ALSO PREPARING COMMENTS AND WILL
FORWARD THEM SEPARATELY.

GP-4
BT

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PP RUMUHFA
 DE RUMUGRA3648 1490704
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 280704Z MAY 68 ZFF-1
 FM ADMINO III MAF DNG
 TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
 BT

ORIG: C-6
 COM: G-3 FEO
 REL: C/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 I DASC RELOCATION

A. COMUSMACV 260207Z MAY 68 CITE 15079
 B. COMUSMACV 13391/111032Z MAY 68

1. IAW REF A FOL REQUIRED TO RELOCATE I DASC TO CAMP HORN.
 BOD TO RECEIVE COMM EQUIP 15 JUL 68. IOC TARGET DATE WITH
 EQUIP INSTLD, CHECKED OUT AND OPERATIONAL, IS CONTINGENT
 UPON AVAILABILITY AND INSTALLATION OF COMM/ELEC
 REQUIREMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PROVISION OF MINIMUM OF 100 CIRCUITS FROM AIR FORCE
 MDF (DNG WEST) TO III MAF MDF (DNG EAST). THESE CIRCUITS CAN
 BE MICROWAVE CHANNELS OR CABLE. CIRCUITS NOT AVAILABLE FROM
 PRESENT ASSETS. PROVISION OF THESE CIRCUITS BEYOND III MAF
 CAPABILITY AND MUST BE TASKED TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AS APPROPRIATE.
 (1) ADDITIONAL 100 FRC-109 CHANNELS (REF B REFERS) AND
 CABLING TO III MAF MDF PREFERRED METHOD.

S/S

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FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

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PAGE TWO RUMUGRA3648 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION FOR 200 VICE 100 CHANNELS TO ALLOW FOR EXPANSION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS. CONSIDER THIS TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE CABLE SITUATION BTWN DNG EAST AND DNG WEST. B. SEVENTH AIR FORCE ASSISTANCE AND ASSIGNMENT OF APPROPRIATE PRIORITIES AND URGENCY OF NEED DESIGNATORS TO ENABLE THE 1972 COMM SQD TO PROCURE (WHERE REQUIRED), INSTALL, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN THE FOLLOWING (DETAILS AVAILABLE 1972 COMM SQD):

- (1) ONE COMPLETE (A) KEY SYSTEM.
- (2) TWO SECURE FULL DUPLEY TELETYPEWRITER CIRCUITS WITH ONE BACK-UP POSITION.
- (3) RECEIVE ONLY TELETYPEWRITER POSITION FOR WEATHER.
- (4) ONE SECURE VOICE POINT-TO-POINT CIRCUIT FROM I DASC (CAMP HORN) TO I CORPS HDQS. CIRCUIT REQD TO COORDINATE CLASSIFIED TACTICAL OPERATIONS BTWN I DASC AND ARVN I CORPS CMDR IN EVENT ARVN CONTINGENT DOES NOT RELOCATE TO CAMP HORN.
- (5) ONE SECURE GROUND-TO-AIR UHF RADIO FACILITY.
- (6) TACTICAL VHF AND UHF RADIO FACILITIES.
- (7) FM VHF RADIO FACILITY
- (8) THREE HF SSB RADIO BASE STATIONS CAPABLE OF REMOTE OPERATION. REMOTE OPERATIONS REQD DUE NON-AVAILABILITY OF

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA3648 C O N F I D E N T I A L

ADEQUATE ANTENNA SITES AT PROPOSED I DASC LOCATION.

(9) TERMINATION OF DIRECT LINE VOICE CIRCUITS AND COMMON USER TELEPHONE LINES.

C. AS I DASC UTILIZES A MAJORITY OF DCA CIRCUITS, DCA SAM MUST PROVIDE COORDINATION AS REQD FOR THOSE CIRCUITS.

GP-4

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0000ZZ RUMHGK RUMHMB RUMHVH RUMHVP RUMUFKA RUMUHFA
 DE RUMUGRA3527 1481340
 ZNY SSSSS

Z 271340Z MAY 68
 FM ADMINS III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHB RVN
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN
 RUMHGK/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE HAN RVN
 INFO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN RVN
 RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN SGN
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH RVN
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST ACD PHB RVN
 RUMHMB/ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV GIA LE RVN
 RUMHAW/FIRST MAW DNG RVN
 RUMHVH/I DASC DNG RVN
 RUMHMB/DASC VICTOR

ORIG:G-3
 REL:G-3

BT

S E C R E T

MODIFIED PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (U)

A. COMUSMACV 211145Z MAY 68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A IMPLEMENTS A MODIFIED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM EFFECTIVE 30MAY68.
 UNDER MODIFIED SYSTEM, STRIKE SORTIES AVAILABLE FOR USE BY III MAF

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA3527 S E C R E T

ON A PREPLANNED BASIS WILL BE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS. 70PCT OF
 THE SORTIES WILL BE ALLOCATED ON A WEEKLY BASIS THROUGH THE "WEEKLY
 FRAG". REMAINDER WILL BE ALLOCATED IN "DAILY FRAG".

2. CONCEPT.

A. STRIKE SORTIES ALLOCATED III MAF WILL BE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS:
 WEEKLY FRAG AND DAILY FRAG.

(1) WEEKLY FRAG IS SCHEDULE WHICH IS REPEATED THURS 0600 THRU
 THURS 0600. SORTIES AVAILABLE WILL BE SUBALLOCATED TO PCV, AMERICAL,
 2ND ROK BDE, AND FIRST MARDIV. SUBALLOCATION WILL BE CONSTANT UNLESS
 CHANGES ARE REQUESTED OR DIRECTED.

(2) DAILY FRAG IS BASED ON EVALUATION OF ALL REQUESTS AND PRIORI-
 TIES IN RVN. SORTIES ALLOCATED IN THIS FRAG WILL BE SUBALLOCATED BY
 III MAF ON A DAILY BASIS.

B. IT IS ENVISIONED THAT WEEKLY FRAG WILL PROVIDE TACTICAL AIR
 SORTIES TO SATISFY ROUTINE REQUIREMENTS.

C. THE DAILY FRAG PROVIDES AIR SUPPORT TO SATISFY ADDITIONAL RE-
 QUIREMENTS SUCH AS LZ CONSTRUCTION PREP, AIR CAPS, CONVOY ESCORT,
 INTERDICTION, SUPPORT OF MAJOR OPERATIONS, OR UNITS BEING INSERTED IN
 AREAS OF KNOWN HEAVY ENEMY ACTIVITY. REQUESTS SUBMITTED FOR DAILY
 FRAG MAY BE FOR CAS OR CSS SORTIES.

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3. WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG.

A. PRIOR TO 0800 EACH WEDNESDAY, III MAF WILL PROVIDE PCV, AMERICAL, FIRST MARDIV, AND 2ND ROK BDE WITH WEEKLY FRAG. THE BREAKOUT WILL INCLUDE MISSION NUMBER, AIRCRAFT CALL SIGN, TOIP (TIME OVER INITIAL POINT IS TIME AIRCRAFT REPORTS OVER INITIAL REPORTING POINT IN ICTZ), TACAN BEARING OF IP (INITIAL POINT-KNOWING IP AND TOIP, THE TOT OF AIRCRAFT CAN BE COMPUTED TO WITHIN A FEW MINUTES), AND ORDNANCE LOAD CODED K, S, M, MRK, AMCH-HARD ORDNANCE CONSISTING OF LOW DRAG BOMBS; S-SOFT ORDNANCE CONSISTING OF HIGH DRAG BOMBS AND NAPALM; M-MIXED ORDNANCE CONSISTING OF LOW DRAG BOMBS AND NAPALM OR ROCKETS; MRK-MIXED ORDNANCE CONSISTING OF LOW DRAG BOMBS AND ROCKETS, AM-LOW DRAG BOMBS WITH NAPALM). PRIOR TO 0900 EACH WEDNESDAY III MAF WILL NOTIFY I DASC OF SUBALLOCATION OF EACH MISSION.

B. PROCESSING OF CSS MISSIONS.

(1) AMERICAL AND 2ND ROK BDE WILL PHONE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION NLT 1700 DAILY TO III MAF G-3 AIR FOR ALL CSS SORTIES SUBALLOCATED: UNIT REQUEST DESIGNATOR (FIRST TWO LETTERS OF PRESENT REQUEST NUMBER AND OPERATION OR AO SUPPORTED), TARGET DESCRIPTION, MISSION NUMBER, TARGET COORDINATES, PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE RUN IN HEADING, DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM TARGET TO FRIENDLY TROOPS. III MAF WILL RELAY THIS

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA3527 S E C R E T

INFO TO I DASC NLT 1730.

(2) PCV WILL PASS CSS INFO REQUIRED TO DASC VICTOR FOR ALL CSS SORTIES SUBALLOCATED TO PCV.

(3) FIRST MARDIV WILL PHONE III MAF G-3 AIR THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION NLT 1800 DAILY FOR ALL CSS SORTIES SUBALLOCATED: MISSION NUMBER AND ASRT CONTROL STATION. III MAF WILL RELAY INFO NLT 1800 TO I DASC.

C. PROCESSING OF CAS MISSIONS.

(1) AMERICAL, FIRST MARDIV, AND 2D ROK BDE WILL SUBMIT TO III MAF DAILY NLT 2300 THE FOLLOWING INFO FOR EACH CAS MISSION SUBALLOCATED ON WEEKLY FRAG: MISSION NUMBER, FAC CALL SIGN AND FREQUENCY, RE-NEZVOUS POINT, TARGET DESCRIPTION, UNIT REQUEST DESIGNATOR WITH OPERATION OR AO SUPPORTED. III MAF WILL RELAY INFO TO I DASC NLT 2300 NIGHTLY.

(2) PCV WILL PASS ALL INFO REQUIRED TO DASC VICTOR FOR ALL CAS MISSIONS SUBALLOCATED TO PCV.

D. PROCESSING CHANGES TO WEEKLY FRAG

(1) UNITS DESIRING CHANGES IN NUMBER OF SORTIES SUBALLOCATED ON WEEKLY FRAG WILL SUBMIT REQUESTS TO III MAF G-3 AIR.

(2) UNITS DESIRING CHANGES IN ORDNANCE OR SPECIFIC ORDNANCE

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FUZING ON SORTIES SUBALLOCATED BY WEEKLY FRAG WILL SUBMIT REQUESTS TO III MAF G-3 AIR NLT 7 HOURS PRIOR TO TOIP OF SORTIE.
 (3) UNITS DESIRING CHANGES IN TOIP OF SORTIES SUBALLOCATED TO THEM IN WEEKLY FRAG WILL SUBMIT REQUESTS NLT 7 HOURS PRIOR TO FRAGGED TOIP IF REQUESTING A LATER TOIP, OR 7 HOURS PRIOR TO DESIRED TOIP IF REQUESTING EARLIER THAN FRAGGED TOIP.

(4) III MAF WILL RELAY ALL REQUESTS FOR CHANGES TO I DASC FOR ACTION.

4. DAILY FRAG.

A. ALL UNITS REQUIRING AIR SUPPORT BEYOND THEIR ROUTINE REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATED IN WEEKLY FRAG WILL SUBMIT AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS TO III MAF G-3 AIR NLT 1400 DAILY. REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL AIR SUPPORT WILL CONTAIN THE SAME INFORMATION PRESENTLY REQUIRED, LESS TARGET COORDINATES.

B. III MAF WILL PROVIDE FOLLOWING INFO TO AGENCIES INDICATED NLT 1900 ON REQUESTS APPROVED FOR THE DAILY FRAG:

(1) I DASC: MISSION NUMBER, FAC CALL SIGN AND FREQUENCY, REQUEST NUMBER, RENDEZVOUS POINT, TARGET DESCRIPTION, AND OPERATION OR AO SUPPORTED.

(2) PCV, AMERICAL, 2ND ROK BDE, OR FIRST MARDIV AS APPROPRIATE: MISSION

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NUMBER, FIGHTER CALL SIGN, TYPE AND NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT, TOIP, IP, ORDNANCE, REQUEST NUMBER.

(3) PCV WILL RELAY TO DASC VICTOR INFO REQUIRED BY DASC VICTOR FOR SORTIES PROVIDED BY DAILY FRAG.

5. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO SUPPORT MARINES UNITS WITH MARINE AIRCRAFT AND ARMY UNITS WITH USAF AIRCRAFT.

6. THE MODIFIED SYSTEM HAS NO EFFECT ON IMMEDIATE REQUEST SYSTEM.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#241

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PP RUMKM
 DE RUMSAK 3545 1481244
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 271244Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK, INFO
 MAJGEN ANDERSON, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A MARINE GENERAL OFFICER,
 ASSISTANT TO THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS (C)
 A. MACJOO DTD 7 MARCH 1968

1. IN ELABORATION OF OUR RECENT PHONE CALL CONCERNING UTILIZATION
 OF A 1ST MAW AWC ON TAD TO MACV HEADQUARTERS AS ASST TO COMUSMACV'S
 DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED TERMS OF
 REFERENCE ARE SUBMITTED FOR YOUR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION:

A. BACKGROUND:

(1) REFERENCE (A) CHARGED THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER
 FOR AIR OPERATIONS WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING AND
 DIRECTING THE AIR EFFORT THROUGHOUT VIETNAM TO INCLUDE ICTZ AND
 THE EXTENDED BATTLE AREA.

(2) CG III MAF WAS DIRECTED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3545 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS THE FOLLOWING ASSETS
 FOR MISSION DIRECTION: STRIKE AIRCRAFT, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
 AND THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AS REQUIRED.

B. REQUIREMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF MARINE STRIKE AND
 RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO ARMY, AS WELL AS MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS
 IN VIETNAM, IS RECOGNIZED BY THE SENSE OF THE REFERENCE. THIS
 IMPORTANCE, AND THE DYNAMIC CHARACTER OF OPERATIONS, MAKE IT
 NECESSARY THAT MARINE AIR BE APPROPRIATELY REPRESENTED AT
 COMUSMACV.

C. ACTION: A MARINE GENERAL OFFICER WILL BE ASSIGNED AS THE
 ASSISTANT FOR MARINE AIR MATTERS TO THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER
 FOR AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS SPECIFIED
 BY THE REFERENCE AND CHANGES THERETO.

D. THE TASKS OF THE ASSISTANT FOR MARINE AIR MATTERS TO THE
 COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER AIR OPERATIONS FOLLOW. HE WILL:

(1) PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING, COORDINATING AND
 DIRECTING MARINE AIR EFFORTS.

(2) PROVIDE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO APPLYING MARINE AIR IN
 THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER; IN FURTHERANCE OF ASSIGNED MISSIONS AND
 IN EQUITABLE AND TIMELY APPORTIONMENT.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 3545 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

(3) CONSISTENT WITH THE TACTICAL SITUATION, ENSURE THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIR TO SUPPORT MARINE GROUND UNITS.

(4) ASSIST IN THE CONCERTED USE OF ALL TACTICAL AIR CONTROL ASSETS WHILE PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(5) CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND DELAYS ARISING FROM REQUESTING, ALLOCATING, REPORTING AND EXECUTING AIR OPERATIONS.

(6) MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE AND ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFERENCE.

E. THE ASSISTANT FOR MARINE AIR MATTERS TO THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS SHALL ADVISE AND BE CONSULTED ON THE ABOVE LISTED ITEMS AND ALL OTHERS OF SPECIFIED DIRECT CONCERN TO MARINE AIR OPERATIONS. HE SHALL HAVE ACCESS TO ORGANIZATIONS, RECORDS AND REPORTS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT ASSIGNED TASKS.

2. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A BILLET BY CINCPAC, RATHER THAN AS A SUGGESTION FROM MY HEADQUARTERS, WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. IF YOU CONCUR, YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THE MATTER WITH ADM SHARP WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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CONFIDENTIAL

#240

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM
 DE RUMSAK 3418 1470728
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 260728Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH D.C.
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 BT

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 HAS BEEN SENT**

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN
 HRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE
 AIRCRAFT ASSETS (U)

REF A. COMUSMACV 211145Z MAY68

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT A PROPOSAL TO DEP SEC DEF TO RETURN
 70-75 PERCENT OF MARINE FIXED WING ASSETS TO MARINE OPCON
 IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

2. MY COMMENTS ARE:

A. IT IS HIGHLY DESIREABLE TO RETURN ALL MARINE STRIKE
 AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO MARINE OPCON AS SOON AS
 POSSIBLE AND THE PROPOSAL TO IMMEDIATELY RETURN 70-75
 PERCENT OF THEM HAS MUCH MERIT.

B. THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS PROPOSAL SEEM TO BE:

(1) IT WOULD REGAIN OPCON OF A VITAL PORTION OF OUR

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3418 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AVIATION ASSETS.

(2) IT WOULD EFFECT A WORKABLE COMPROMISE AND FOR THE
 TIME RESOLVE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ISSUE.

(3) IT WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO COMUSMACV AND THE 7AF A
 DEFINITE PORTION OF MARINE EFFORT TO BE EMPLOYED AS NECESSARY
 FOR EMERGENCIES AND MASSES AIR EFFORTS.

C. THE DISADVANTAGES ARE:

(1) IT WOULD ROUTINELY PROVIDE A DAILY ALLOCATION OF 20-25
 PERCENT OF MARINE STRIKE ASSETS TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE FOR USE
 AS COMUSMACV SAW FIT. THUS, APPROXIMATELY ONE-FOURTH OF ALL
 MARINE SORTIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR USE IN SUPPORT OF ARMY
 UNITS IN I CORPS OR OTHER CORPS AREAS. CONSEQUENTLY, INSTEAD
 OF ASSURING THAT MARINE AIR RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO MACV
 ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS, WE ARE PROVIDING THIS AMOUNT AS A
 MATTER OF COURSE, REGARDLESS OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

(2) IT COULD BE USED TO DIVERT MARINE AIR ASSETS NEEDED IN
 I CORPS INTO OTHER CORPS AREAS IN OTHER THAN EMERGENCY SITUA-
 TIONS.

(3) IT WOULD ENTAIL DUPLICATIVE AIR REQUEST, CONTROL, AND
 DIRECTION SYSTEMS IN I CORPS, AND THUS TEND TO RESULT IN

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 3413 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
CONSIDERABLE COMPLICATIONS.

(4) IT COULD EXPOSE US TO THE CONTENTION THAT THE MARINE
AIR-GROUND TEAM, EVEN WITH ONLY ONE REINFORCED WING DEPLOYED
WITH TWO DIVISIONS, HAS A THIRTY-PERCENT EXCESS STRIKE CAPABILITY.

D. ASSETS PROVIDED UNDER SUCH A SYSTEM SHOULD BE IN THE FORM
OF SORTIES AND NOT BY SQUADRON. THE DEDICATION OF SQUADRONS
TO SUCH A PURPOSE IS INFLEXIBLE IN OPERATION AND WOULD PRESENT
AN EASY TARGET IN POST-WAR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. A NEW BUT RELATED SUBJECT FOLLOWS. REFERENCE A IS A MACV
DIRECTIVE MODIFYING SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES FOR A THIRTY-
DAY TRIAL PERIOD. IT APPEARS TO OFFER US A CONSIDERABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO REGAIN CONTROL OF OUR ASSETS. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED
THAT I SHOULD NOT FORWARD COMMENTS ON IT TO CINCPAC UNTIL AFTER
ANOTHER THIRTY-DAY PERIOD; HOWEVER, I DO INTEND TO COMMENT TO
COMUSMACV. I WILL FORWARD THESE DRAFT COMMENTS TO YOU TOMORROW
TO OBTAIN ANY SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS AND TO PRECLUDE ANY ACTION
THAT WOULD CROSS PENDING PROPOSALS TO DEP SEC DEF OR JCS.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

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SECRET

00 RUEBHOA RUMUGRA
 DE RUHHFMA 4722 QRUWRI
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 262248Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN,
 INFO LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY

AIR CONTROL (U)

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE NEW PROPOSITION WE DISCUSSED
 FRIDAY TO RETURN OPCON OF SOME 70 PERCENT OF THE FIRST
 MAW ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY TO CG III MAF
 LEAVING THE BALANCE TO BE IDENTIFIED TO CG 7TH AIR FORCE
 FOR MISSION DIRECTION. I AM IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH
 BOB'S 260728Z/MAY ON THIS SAME SUBJECT. ADDITIONALLY,
 HEREIN, I WILL GO OVER THE GROUND FROM MY OWN VIEW-
 POINT.

2. BASICALLY, THOUGH FALLING SHORT OF WHAT WE SEEK, IT
 IS A MAJOR STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT WILL SAVE
 MARINES LIVES, IT HELPS COMUSMACV, AND IT SERVES THE

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT A UNISERVICE FORCE ASSIGNED
 TO A UNIFIED COMMANDER SHOULD REMAIN INVIOLEATE.
 HAVING SAID THAT, JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING ELSE IN THIS
 MESSAGE IS SAWING SAWDUST. HOWEVER, AIMING TO ASSIST
 YOU IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. NITZE, THE PROBLEM
 WILL BE REVIEWED BELOW, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE
 BASIC CONCEPT, ESSENTIAL IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES, THE
 PROS AND CONS AS THEY RELATE TO THE WAR EFFORT, AND THE
 ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS OF A NEW IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE.
 I WILL ADDRESS EACH IN THAT SEQUENCE.

3. AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR CONCEPT OF AIR OPERA-
 TIONS IN RVN IS TO ENSURE THAT THE AIR CONTROL ARRANGE-
 MENTS GUARANTEE TO COMUSMACV THE EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT,
 AND FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES
 WITHOUT, AT THE SAME TIME, REQUIRING ONE OF HIS
 COMMANDERS TO EXERCISE INORDINATE AUTHORITY OVER THE
 ORGANIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF ANOTHER OF HIS COMMANDERS.
 AS I SEE IT, THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT IS GENERALLY
 CONSISTENT WITH THIS ORIENTATION AND WITH THE MARINE
 CORPS DEDICATION TO APPLYING ITS RESOURCES IN THE WAY

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SECRET
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PAGE 3 RUHNFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO THAT MAKES THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO WINNING THE WAR. FOR OUR AVIATION, THIS MEANS FIRST TO APPLY THE SORTIES REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE COST AND INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE MARINE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND, AFTER THAT, TO CONTRIBUTE APPROPRIATELY TO THE OVERALL AIR EFFORT. WE DID IT UNDER MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 AND ARE DOING IT NOW. WE WOULD DO IT EVEN IN THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF ANY FORMAL ORDER TO DO SO. THEREFORE, RETURN OF ALL OR A PORTION OF OUR MARINE AIR CAPABILITY TO III MAF OPERATIONAL CONTROL SIMPLY MOVES TOWARD THE WAY WE WERE OPERATING UNDER 95-4. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS THAT, UNDER THAT DIRECTIVE, WE WERE CAREFUL TO USE LANGUAGE TO QUOTE IDENTIFY UNQUOTE RATHER THAN QUOTE ASSIGN UNQUOTE SORTIES TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE. UNDER THE OLD SYSTEM, THE 20-30 PERCENT IDENTIFIED TO 7TH AIR FORCE FOR FRAGGING THEORETICALLY CAME OFF THE BOTTOM OF OUR CAPABILITY. AS I SEE IT FROM HERE, UNDER THE PROPOSED PLAN IT WOULD HAVE TO COME OFF THE TOP AND, IN EFFECT, BE GUARANTEED. IN ACTUAL PRACTICE, I DOUBT THAT THE DIFFERENCE WOULD OFTEN BE SIGNIFICANT. FROM A PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT,

PAGE 4 RUHNFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO THEREFORE, I SEE NOTHING THAT RUNS COUNTER TO EITHER OUR TACTICAL DOCTRINE OR OUR INTENTIONS.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES TO BE PROVIDED THE AIR FORCE, WE MUST BE SPECIFIC. SOME CRITERIA MUST BE ESTABLISHED UPON WHICH TO BASE THE NUMBER OF SORTIES FURNISHED. THE IDEA OF ASSIGNING SPECIFIC SQUADRONS OPCON TO 7TH AIR FORCE SHOULD BE REJECTED, I BELIEVE, DUE SIMPLY TO THE FACT THAT THE APPROACH LACKS FLEXIBILITY AND FAILS TO EXPLOIT OUR VERSATILE CAPABILITIES. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IS TO GUARANTEE THE AIR FORCE 30 PERCENT OF OUR EFFORT BASED ON THE ACCEPTED 1:1 SORTIE RATE. THE DETAILS CAN BE COORDINATED THROUGH EXISTING LIAISON BETWEEN FIRST MAW TADC AND 7TH AIR FORCE TACC. THESE AGENCIES WOULD DETERMINE, WITHIN THE SORTIE LIMITS PRESCRIBED, THE MIX OF FIRST MAW ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY THAT WOULD MAKE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL EFFORT. THIS OFFERS THE REQUIRED FLEXIBILITY FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS TO BOTH 7TH AIR FORCE AND FIRST MAW. COMUSMACV'S IMPLICIT EMERGENCY AUTHORITY WOULD COVER ALL OTHER SITUATIONS.

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

THE DETAILED MECHANICS OF SORTIE ALLOCATION WERE ALREADY ESTABLISHED UNDER '95-4. UNDER THAT SYSTEM, THE TAGC SAIGON ASSIGNED TARGETS AND TOT'S TO THE FIRST MAW, WHICH IN TURN, PUBLISHED A SINGLE FRAG ORDER TO WING UNITS. THE SYSTEM IS SIMPLE AND DIRECT, AND REQUIRES NO CHANGE.

AS FOR THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, SINGLE MANAGEMENT LEFT THE MARINE APPARATUS INTACT. THEREFORE, THE REVERSION OF ORGANIC AIR UNITS TO MAKINE OPCON BRINGS NO CONTROL PROBLEMS OR CHANGES. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE IS NOT ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT UNDER EITHER SYSTEM. I HAVE IN MIND, CONSIDERING THE PRESENT LEVEL OF UNITED USAF/USMC AIR EFFORT IN I CORPS, CUSHMAN'S NEED FOR A JOINTLY MANNED I CTZ AIR DIRECTION AGENCY, COLLOCATED WITH HIS COC. BUT THIS IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION.

3. ANY PROPOSAL ON OUR PART FOR SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT IS ONLY GOING TO GET A SYMPATHETIC HEARING IF IT IS BASED ON WHAT IS BEST FOR THE WAR EFFORT. IN THAT REGARD, THE EXISTING SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM HAS PROVEN TO BE UN-

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

HELDY AND HAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED THE DESIRED RESULTS. THAT THIS IS RECOGNIZED IN SAIGON IS IMPLICIT IN THE IMPROVISATIONS NOW PROPOSED BY THE 7TH AF IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THE NEW SYSTEM FUNCTION SATISFACTORILY. LIKEWISE, THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM, DEFINED IN '95-4, WHILE EFFECTIVE FOR MARINE PURPOSES, WAS ALSO DEFICIENT IN THE OVERALL THEATER SENSE WHERE FLEXIBILITY OF TACTICAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION WAS CONCERNED. WHAT WE NEED IS A MODERATED FORMULA WHICH ENSURES TO MACV HIS OBJECTIVE OF CERTAIN SINGLE MANAGEMENT WHILE STILL GIVING THE MARINES THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THE ORGANIC RESOURCES THAT WE REQUIRE TO DO OUR JOB.

EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSAL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE OVERALL GOOD, AND AGAINST THE KNOWN PREDISPOSITION OF THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES:

A. ADVANTAGES

- (1) THE SCHEME YOU PROPOSE SATISFIES THE NEED FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH BUILT-IN FACE SAVING FEATURES.
- (2) IT MORE ACCURATELY REFLECTS AN ARRANGEMENT

BT

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SECRET

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SECRET

OO RUEBHOAT RUMUGRA
 DE RUHHFMA 4723 QRUWRI
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 262248Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN,
 INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY

NOW BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN III MAF AND 7TH AIR FORCE,
 WHEREBY ALL MARINE ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY
 IS PRESENTED TO 7TH AIR FORCE, WHO IN TURN HANDS ABOUT
 70 PERCENT BACK TO III MAF.

(3) IT RETURNS TO THE MARINE COMMANDER OPERATION-
 AL CONTROL OF A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF HIS ORGANIC FIRE
 SUPPORT MEANS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SATISFYING
 COMUSMACV'S NEEDS.

(4) IT REESTABLISHES THE PREPLANNING CYCLE THAT
 WAS IN EXISTENCE UNDER 95-4.

(5) IT OBTVIATES THE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE MARINE
 PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION TO THE AIR FORCE CONTROL

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 4723 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SYSTEM.

(6) IT RESTORES THE CLEAN LINES OF NORMAL COMMAND
 AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS AND ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR
 IMPROVISATIONS.

(7) IT REDUCES RELIANCE ON THE USE OF DIVERTS TO FILL
 IMMEDIATE MISSION REQUIREMENTS, AND RESTORES DIVERT
 AUTHORITY TO THE GROUND COMMANDER VIS-A-VIS, THE AIR
 COMMANDER.

KIL IT REDUCES THE NUMBER OF BATTALIONS SUPPORTED
 BY I DASC FROM 93 TO 65.

B. DISADVANTAGES

(1) THE 70 PERCENT SCHEME IS ONLY A PARTIAL SOLUTION
 TO THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY
 NECESSARY FOR MARINE FORCES TO FUNCTION MOST EFFECTIVE-
 LY.

(2) IT REQUIRES CG, III MAF TO COORDINATE AIR SUPPORT
 THROUGH TWO SEPARATE AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS IN I CTZ.

(3) IT FIXES A CEILING ON MARINE SORTIES AVAILABLE TO
 SUPPORT MARINE GROUND FORCES.

6. YOUR PROPOSAL, IF ADOPTED, SHOULD BE FORMALIZED IN

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SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 4723 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AN IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE WHICH SHOULD BE ISSUED BY
 SHARP, AND WHICH SHOULD EMBODY THE FOLLOWING
 ESSENTIAL FEATURES.

A. IT SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT AS TO COMUSMACV'S
 ULTIMATE AUTHORITY TO FOCUS, WEIGHT, PREEMPT OR
 OTHERWISE DIRECT THE AIR EFFORT IN THE OVERALL TACTICAL
 INTEREST.

B. AT THE SAME TIME, IT SHOULD CLEARLY SPECIFY THE
 BASIC PROPORTION OF MARINE AIR SORTIES TO BE ALLOCATED
 FOR NORMAL 7TH AIR FORCE MISSION DIRECTION, WITH
 PROVISION FOR DEVIATION AS JUDGED NECESSARY BY
 COMUSMACV OR CG III MAF.

C. IT MUST REQUIRE REAL TIME EXCHANGE OF ESSENTIAL
 INFORMATION THROUGH SECURE, DEDICATED CIRCUITRY
 BETWEEN III MAF TADC AND THE TACC IN SAIGON.

7. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE
 SUPPORTED, AND THAT THE THRUST OF OUR ARGUMENT
 SHOULD BE THAT THE PROPOSAL CLEANS UP MANY OF THE
 IMPEDIMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT
 SYSTEM, THAT IT PRESERVES COMUSMACV'S FLEXIBILITY AND

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 4723 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 WILL REDUCE USMC CASUALTIES BY REDRESSING THE BALANCE
 OF OUR TEAM. WE MAY BE ACCUSED OF NEEDING BUT 70
 PERCENT OF OUR CAPABILITY NOW IN-COUNTRY. HOWEVER,
 THERE IS REALLY NO PROBLEM HERE, SINCE WE ARE DELIBERATE-
 LY STRUCTURED TO EXECUTE BOTH THE CLOSE SUPPORT AND
 THE AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS IN AN AMPHIBIOUS ENVIRONMENT.
 THE LATTER FUNCTION IS FULFILLED BY THE SO-CALLED 30
 PERCENT EXCESS, WHICH IS WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR
 STATUTORY MISSION. FROM OUR OWN VIEWPOINT, MY
 REACTION IS BEST DISTILLED IN THE THOUGHT THAT IT GETS
 THE CAMEL'S NOSE BACK INTO THE TENT. A MOST ADVANTA-
 GEOUS, SINCE THE TENT HAPPENS TO BE OUR OWN.

8. I HAVE NOT BROACHED THIS PROPOSITION TO SHARP,
 FEELING THAT THE IMPETUS JUST HAS TO COME FROM THE
 TOP DOWN. SO FAR, HE HAS FELT ABSOLUTELY NO PRESSURE
 FROM ABOVE. ALL OF HIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN LATERALLY FROM
 ME, OR VERTICALLY, FROM BELOW. IF YOU WISH, I WILL
 TAKE HIM ON IMMEDIATELY, AND TRY AND SELL THE IDEA, BUT
 MY RECOMMENDATION IS TO GIVE HIM A FEW THOUSAND
 VOLTS FROM ABOVE FIRST. BEST REGARDS. GP-4
 BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES**SECRET**

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CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNZ CZ CSAA39&VZ CZ CKXC5961305
 PP RUMSAK
 Z NY CCCCC
 PTT CZ YUM RUMHFA4612 147022G-CCCC--RUMSAK.
 Z NY CCCCC
 P 260207Z MAY 68 ZFF-G
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 15079 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTJ CUSHMAN
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

REF: CG III MAF DTG 240226Z (C)

(C) AGENCIES AND SERVICES IDENTIFIED IN REFERENCE MESSAGE
 ARE READY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT TO EXPEDITE
 RELOCATION OF I DASC. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PLANNING, REQUEST
 YOU FORWARD A FIRM DATE AND IDENTIFY SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE AND
 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.

GP-4

BT

EXCLUSIVE**CONFIDENTIAL**

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~~SECRET~~

ZNY SSSSS
DE RUMHAW 004W 1450250
ZNY SSSSS
R 240119Z MAY 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAW
RUMHVP/CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
ZEN/YMACG ONE EIGHT

COG G-4
INFO SUPO
COPY TO G-2 G-6 ADJ
S/S ENGR

BT
SECRET
~~KHE SANH ASRT~~

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 220143Z MAY 68

1. KHE SANH ASRT FULLY OPERATIONAL AT PRESENT AS IS CAMP CARROLL ASRT. CIRCUMSTANCES RELATED IN REF A ARE RESULT OF STATISTICAL PROBABILITY AND REOCURRENCE NOT ANTICIPATED. IT IS OPINION OF THIS HDGTFB THAT CONTINUOUS SUPT OF KHE SANH WOULD NOT BE ENHANCED BY REPLACEMENT OF SUBJECT ASRT.

GP-4
BT

AC
19
~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

**FOR
CONFIDENTIAL
HAS BEEN SENT**

EXCLUSIVE

T
PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 3106 1450226
ZNY CCCCC
P 240226Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN RVN
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
GEN CUSHMAN

RELOCATION OF IDASC

A. COMUSMACV 190154Z MAR 68

1. MY STAFF AND COGNIZANT OFFICERS OF THE IDASC AND
1972 COMM SQD ARE CONDUCTING LIAISON, DETERMINING
REQUIREMENTS AND FORMULATION PLANS TO RELOCATE IDASC
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF REF A.

2. PLANNING TO DATE INDICATES THAT ADEQUATE BUILDING
AND FLOOR SPACE WILL BE PROVIDED BY ALTERATION OF A
PRESENT STRUCTURE AT III MAF HQTRS.

3. REVIEW OF COMMUNICATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS
INDICATES THAT COMMAND ASSISTANCE WILL BE REQUIRED TO
TASK CERTAIN AGENCIES AND SERVICES TO PROVIDE THE
NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR IDASC OPERATION.
REQUEST THAT COMM SEVENTH AF, CG USARV, CG FIRST SIGNAL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3106 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR
EDG, AND DCA SAM BE APPRISED OF THE DESIRED RELOCATION
OF IDASC AND TASKED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE/EQUIPMENT
WITH PRIORITY IN CONSONANCE REF A AS REQUIRED. APPRISAL AND
TASKING IS REQUESTED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME
TO PROVIDE TIMELY SUPPORT FOR IDASC RELOCATION.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNZCZCSAA836ZVA 705VV AQA695EEZEEZZ0000000VV ARP 63/6

OO RUMSAK

DE RUMSAR 931 1441134

ZNY CCCCC

O 231100Z MAY 68

FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN

TO RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG

RUMSAE/II DASC PLEIKU

RUMSARF/III DASC BIEN HOA

RUMSAUA/IV JSC CAN THO

RUMSAB/DASC ALPHA NHA TRAVU

RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR PHU BAI

RUMSARB/3 TFW BIEN HOA

RUMSAH/12 TFW CAM JNH BAY

RUMSARE/31 TFW TUY HOA

RUMSAP/35 TFW PHAN RANG

RUMSARA/37 TFW PHU CAT

RUMSAGP/366 TFW DANANG

RUMSA/S ACS PLEIKU

RUMSAUA/DET 3 619 TCS CAN THO

RUMSAEB/DET 9 619 TCS BAN ME THUOT

RUMSABA/DET 11 619 TCS HON TRD

RUMSAE/DET 2 620 TCS PLEIKU

RUMSAGS/620 TCS SON TRA

ACT: G-3

INFO: G-2

COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 931 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMSA/III MAF DANANG

INFO RUMSAV/CG I MAW DANANG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L T A C K

SUBJECT: (U) SIMPLIFIED FRAG PROCEDURES

1. (C) AT 1300 ON SATURDAY 25 MAY REPRESENTATIVES OF DASC'S WINGS AND CRC'S WILL MEET IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM AT HQ 7AF, TSN, FOR A FINAL BRIEFING BY THE DIRECTOR OF CURRENT PLANS ON IMPLEMENTING SIMPLIFIED FRAG PROCEDURES.

2. (C) ALL USAF ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO SEND ONE REPRESENTATIVE FOR 1 DAY TDY TO ATTEND THIS BRIEFING. CG III MAF IS INVITED TO SEND MAW AND DASC REPRESENTATIVE. REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE WORKING WITH IY FRAG ON A REGULAR BASIS.

3. (C) A DUMMY FRAG WILL BE PRESENTED, DISCUSSED AND DISPATCHED TO THE FIELD ON THIS DATE. THE PRESENT PLAN CALLS FOR THE FIRST WEEKLY FRAG TO BE DISPATCHED 28 MAY AND THE FIRST DAILY SUPPLEMENT ON 29 MAY TO BE EFFECTIVE 0600 30 MAY.

GP-4

111 MAF 2100/6 (3/68)

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SECRET

VV SEA488
 OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAW 4248 1450342
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 O 240305Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF FOR GEN CUSHMAN
 RUMSAL/CDR 7AF FOR GEN MOMYER
 P 202253Z MAY 68 ZFFI
 RM JCS
 TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
 RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV
 BT

**LIMDIS
 EXCLUSIVE
 FOR**

S E C R E T LIMDIS EXCLUSIVE IVY TREE 9497 CJCS SENDS.
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIGHTER BOMBER/RECON-
 NAISSANCE ASSETS IN SVN
 PART I OF II:

1. DEPUTY SECRETARY'S DECISION MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT, DATED 15 MAY 1968, HAS BEEN RECEIVED. TEXT IS CONTAINED IN PART II.
2. IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECRETARY NIIZE'S MEMO, COMUSMACV IN CONJUNCTION WITH CG 3 MAF AND COMMANDER 7TH AIR FORCE WILL CONTINUE TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT IN I CORPS AND WILL INFORM CINCPAC AND THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, EACH MONTH OF THE RESULTS OF HIS EVALUATION AND OF ANY MODIFICATIONS HE HAS MADE TO THE SYSTEM.

PAGE 2 RUEOJFA 6055 **S E C R E T** LIMDIS EXCLUSIVE IVY TREE
 PART II

(QUOTE) MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 REFERENCES: A. JCSM 237-68, SUBJECT AS ABOVE, DTD 19 APR 68
 B. CM-3312-68, SUBJ: "SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE
 AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS," DTD 15 MAY 68

I HAVE REVIEWED THE VARIOUS POSITIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE ISSUE CONCERNED WITH ASSIGNING THE III MAF FIGHTER-BOMBER AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR, AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCE (A). I AM IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, IN APPENDIX D OF REFERENCE (A) THAT THE UNIFIED COMBAT COMMANDER ON THE SCENE SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO BE THE BEST JUDGE OF HOW THE COMBAT FORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM ARE TO BE ORGANIZED, COMMANDED AND DEPLOYED TO MEET THE TREAT FACING HIM (JUST AS THE UNIFIED COMMANDER IS PRESUMED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE NEED OF HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND RESPONSIVE TO GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER ECHELONS). FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE AIR UNITS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#230

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUEOJFA 6255 S E C R E T LIND IS EXCLUSIVE IVY TREE CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS UNDER OTHER COMBAT CONDITIONS, OR NEED POSE A THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM.

I NOTE IN APPENDIX D TO REFERENCE (A) ASSURANCE MADE BY COMUSMACV TO THE ACHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT OVER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THAT NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH IT WAS DEvised. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV SHOULD REVERT TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS.

THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT, CITING UNUSUAL DELAYS IN PLANNING CYCLES AND IN PROVIDING AIRCRAFT FOR IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES. THE REPORT CONTAINED IN REFERENCE (B) INDICATES THAT COMUSMACV HAS ALREADY INITIATED ACTIONS WHICH SHOULD GO FAR TO ALLAY THESE CONCERNS. I AM ALSO CONFIDENT THAT CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE POINTS RAISED BY THE COM-

MANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF DIVERTED AIRCRAFT TO SATISFY IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE PROBLEMS CITED BY THE COMMANDANT REGARDING ORDNANCE LOAD MIXEX AND PRE-BRIEFING OF PILOTS ON IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES IN

PAGE 4 RUEOJFA 6255 S E C R E T LIND IS EXCLUSIVE IVY TREE SUPPORT OF MARINE OPERATIONS IN I CORPS.

I DESIRE THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW PERSONALLY THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT IN I CORPS TO DETERMINE, IN COORDINATION WITH CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV, SUCH CHANGES AS HE CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO MINIMIZE DELAYS BETWEEN REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT AND THEIR EXECUTION AND TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. SIGNED PAUL H. NITZE. (UNQUOTE)

GP-3
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

RR RUEBHOA RUMHAW RUMUGRA RUMHVP RUMHLA
 DE RUHFMA 3907 GREGITT
 ZNY SSSS

R 221655Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ANDERSON, INFO
 GEN CHAPMAN, LTGEN CUSHMAN, MGEN TOMPKINS, AND
 MGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY

SPECIAL REPORT (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 150705Z/MAY 68 (S)

B. CG FIRST MAW 050300Z/APR 68 (S)

1. REFERENCE A STATED INTENT TO TERMINATE THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B.
2. DATA SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE B HAVE BEEN OF INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE IN DOCUMENTING THE MARINE CORPS POSITION RELATIVE TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT

PAGE 2 RUHFMA3907 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SYSTEM OF AIR CONTROL. IT IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM ANY OTHER SINGLE SOURCE, AND THE ACCUMULATED DATA WILL PROVIDE USEFUL MEASUREMENT FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS.

3. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST THAT THE FIRST MAW SPECIAL REPORT CONTINUE FOR AN ADDITIONAL THIRTY DAYS AND BE REEVALUATED AT THAT TIME.

GP-A

BT

SECRET

228

~~SECRET~~Air Control
File 226

OTTISZYUW RUMUHFA3731 142123Z-SSSS--RUMUGRA.

ZNY SSSSS

O P 211145Z MAY 68

XM COMUSMACV

TO ZEN/CJR 7AF SAIGON

RUMUGRA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ DANANG

RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ NHA TRANG

RUMSEF/CG II FFORCE SA III CTZ LONG BINH

ZEN/SA IV CTZ CAN THO

INFO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC

ZEN/CG PROV CORPU V PHU BAI

RUMHAW/CG 1ST MAW DANANG

RUMHVH/DSA I CTZ DANANG

RUMNVB/DSA II CTZ PLEIKU

RUMSBH/DSA III CTZ BIAN HOA

5

SECRET 14578 SEC I OF II.

(SUBJ: MODIFIED PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (L))

REF: A. COMUSMACV 07399 DTG 150925Z MAR 68 (C) (NOTAL)

B. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUN 66 (C)

C. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11, 21 JUN 66 (C)

1. (C) THE PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES OF THE SINGLE

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 3731 SECRET

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE MODIFIED AS INDICATED BELOW. ACTION ADDRESSEES WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THIS MESSAGE IN PLANNING FOR AIR STRIKES TO BE EXECUTED COMMENCING 302600H MAY 68.

2. (C) STRIKE SORTIES AVAILABLE FOR USE ON A PREPLANNED BASIS

WILL BE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS. 70 PER CENT OF THE SORTIES WILL BE ALLOCATED ON A WEEKLY BASIS THROUGH THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG. THE REMAINDER WILL BE ALLOCATED DAILY IN THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG. THESE TWO FRAG ORDERS WILL BE ALIKE IN FORMAT, GREATLY SIMPLIFIED, AND MORE CONVENIENT FOR USERS.

3. (S) WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG.

A. A SPECIFIC AND RELATIVELY CONSTANT NUMBER OF STRIKE SORTIES WILL BE ALLOCATED WEEKLY TO THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS, NAMELY, III MAF, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, AND THE FOUR ARVN CORPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH WEEKLY PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY COMUSMACV. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE PUBLICATION BY THE 7TH AIR FORCE TACC OF A WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG PRIOR TO 1800 HOURS EACH TUESDAY. LISTING ALL FLIGHTS OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT TO BE AVAILABLE DAILY TO FULFILL THE PREPLANNED STRIKE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MAJOR COMMANDS

DURING THE WEEK FROM 0600 HOURS THURSDAY TO 2600 HOURS THE FOLLOWING THURSDAY. THE WEEKLY FRAG WILL LIST FLIGHTS BY TACTICAL AIR UNIT

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMUHFA 3731 S E C R E T

AND CALL SIGN, THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, ORDNANCE LOADS (H-HARD, S-SOFT, OR M-MIXED), AND SCHEDULED TIME WILL BE SHOWN FOR EACH FLIGHT. NIGHT TOTS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE WEEKLY FRAG.

• EACH MAJOR GROUND COMMANDER MAY USE THESE SORTIES IN ANY MANNER HE CONSIDERS WILL SUPPORT HIS TACTICAL PLANS MOST EFFECTIVELY, SO LONG AS HIS INTENSIFICATION IS CONSISTENT WITH AIRCRAFT AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES. HE MAY SUBALLOCATE ALL OR PART OF THE AVAILABLE SORTIES AS INDIVIDUAL FLIGHTS OR BLOCKS OF FLIGHTS TO HIS MAJOR SUBORDINATE UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS TACTICAL PLANS AND PRIORITIES. SORTIES THAT HE DOES NOT SUBALLOCATE CAN BE USED AT THE TIMES

UNLESS REQUIRED TO MEET ANY REQUIREMENTS THAT MAY ARISE DURING THE COURSE OF EACH DAY'S OPERATIONS.

4. (C) DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG. THE DAILY FRAG WILL BE EFFECTIVE FROM 0600 TO 2600 THE FOLLOWING DAY. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO ALL AGENCIES BY 2200 HOURS OF THE DAY PRECEDING OPERATIONS. IT WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SORTIES ALLOCATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DAILY PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY COMUSMACV IN RESPONSE TO JUSTIFIED REQUESTS FOR ADDED SUPPORT OR TO MEET INCREASED ENEMY THREATS AS THEY OCCUR.

5. (S) SUPPORT OF PROV CORPS V, ALL SORTIES ALLOCATED FOR

PAGE 4 RUMUHFA 3731 S E C R E T

SUPPORT OF III MAR FORCYLIDBL BE FRAGGED TO 1 DASC-NONE DIRECTLY TO DASC VICTOR. THEREFORE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR CG III MAF, TO SUBALLOCATE AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE AND MARINE SORTIES FOR SUPPORT OF PROV CORPS V, AS STATED IN PARA 3B ABOVE.

6. (C) PREPLANNED REQUEST PROCEDURES.

A. EACH MAJOR GROUND COMMANDER WILL ESTABLISH SUCH POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PREPLANNED REQUESTS WITHIN HIS COMMAND AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, SUCH REGULATIONS OR DIRECTIVES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN CONSONANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE.

(1) TACTICAL UNIT COMMANDER'S SUBMISSION OF PREPLANNED REQUESTS TO THE G3 AIR AT MAJOR GROUND FORCE LEVEL SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED ANY EARLIER THAN NECESSARY, CONSISTENT WITH THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS THAT MUST BE PROCESSED.

(2) DETAIL IN REQUESTS SHOULD BE MINIMIZED; HOWEVER, FOR PROPAR PLANNING, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EACH REQUEST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING DATA:

(A) ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST NUMBER.

(B) TARGET DESCRIPTION OR TYPE MISSION.

(C) DESIRED

EAUCBZND TIME FRAME WITHIN WHICH

SECRET

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PAGE 5 RUMUHFA 3731 S E C R E T
STRIKE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

(D) NUMBER OF SORTIES (OR FLIGHTS) REQUESTED;
INTERVAL BETWEEN FLIGHTS, IF APPLICABLE.

(E) DESIRED ORDNANCE AND FUSING, IF APPROPRIATE.

(F) NAMED OPERATION, TAOR, OR AO SUPPORTED.

(3) PROVISIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF ESSENTIAL CHANGES DESIRED BY THE ORIGINATOR OF AN APPROVED REQUEST, E. G., A MINOR CHANGE IN TOT, OR A CHANGE IN ORDNANCE.

(4) COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD SEEK TO ACHIEVE THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES. ALL SHOULD BE CONSTANTLY ON THE ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO ACHIEVE DECISIVE RESULTS THROUGH THE USE OF MASSES AIR FIREPOWER.

(5) THE NEED FOR TIMELY DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FIREPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND AIR FIRE PLANS FOR ALL OPERATIONS SHOULD BE STRESSED.

(6) ALL PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AIR STRIKES MUST SEARCH CONTINUALLY TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHORT ROUND INCIDENT.

B. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AT THE MAJOR GROUND COMMAND/DASC LEVEL TO FULFILL AS MANY AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AS POSSIBLE FROM

PAGE 6 RUMUHFA 3731 S E C R E T

RESOURCES MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG. THE G3 AIR WILL PASS VALIDATED REQUESTS TO THE DASC FOR ACTION. IF ANY CHANGES IN ORDNANCE LOADS OR TOTs ARE CONSIDERED NECESSARY, THE DASC, UPON REQUEST FROM THE G3 AIR, WILL INITIATE ACTION WITH THE TACCC OR THE MARINE TADC, AS APPROPRIATE, TO ACCOMPLISH THE REQUIRED ADJUSTMENTS. THE G3 AIR AND THE DASC DIRECTOR MUST WORK IN CLOSE COORDINATION TO ACHIEVE THE MOST EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE USE OF THE AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES AND, ABOVE ALL, TO INSURE THAT AIR SUPPORT IS RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDERS.

7. (C) REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL SORTIES.

A. IT IS INTENDED THAT THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG WILL PROVIDE EACH MAJOR GROUND COMMAND SUFFICIENT SORTIES ON A CONTINUING BASIS TO FULFILL NORMAL REQUIREMENTS. A VARIABLE BUT SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL SORTIES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR DAILY ALLOCATION TO MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY COMUSMACV. THESE SORTIES WILL PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO MASS A SIZEABLE AIR EFFORT AGAINST LUCRATIVE TARGETS WITH THESE SORTIES COMMITTED. INCLUDE INCREASED AIR SUPPORT OF
BT

SECRET

#256

~~SECRET~~

 O P 211145Z MAY 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO ZEN/CDR 7AF SAIGON
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ DANANG
 BINVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ NHA TRANG
 BINSF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ LONG BINH
 ZEN/SA IV CTZ CAN THO
 INFO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC
 ZEN/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 BINHAB/CG 1ST MAW DANANG
 BINHVA/DSA I CTZ DANANG
 BINHVB/DSA II CTZ PLEIKU
 BINHVB/DSA III CTZ BIEN HOA
 BT

ACT: G-3
 INFO: G-2
 COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

SECRET 14578 FINAL SEC IF II,
 ON-GOING MAJOR OPERATIONS AND THE INTERDICTION
 OF ENEMY LOC AND BASE AREAS. FURTHER, THESE SORTIES MAY BE USED TO
 FILL SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH WEIGHT OF EFFORT, FICTION,
 OR TIMING IS CRITICAL.
 B. VALID REQUIREMENTS OF MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS FOR AIR

PAGE 2 RUMHFA 3732 SECRET

SUPPORT BEYOND RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG
 WILL BE SUBMITTED TO MACV TASE (J3 AIR) PRIOR TO 1600 HOURS THE DAY
 BEFORE THE STRIKES ARE DESIRED. FOR ANY SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS THE
 MINIMUM REQUIRED DATA WILL BE AS SET FORTH IN PARA 6A(2). REQUESTS
 FOR ESSENTIAL BLOCK SORTIE PACKAGES MAY BE SUBMITTED IN THE
 FOLLOWING SIMPLIFIED FORMAT:

- (1) NUMBER OF SORTIES DESIRED;
- (2) TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH FLIGHTS WOULD BE
 ACCEPTABLE;
- (3) ORDNANCE DESIRED AND FUSING, IF APPROPRIATE.
- (4) JUSTIFICATION, INCLUDING INTENDED USE (TYPE
 MISSION).

C. ALL SUCH REQUESTS WILL BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER EACH DAY.
 ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL SORTIES WILL BE BASED UPON THE RELATIVE
 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REQUESTS, RESOURCES AVAILABLE, AND GUIDANCE
 FROM COMUSMACV.

D. ADDITIONAL SORTIES ALLOCATED IN RESPONSE TO SUCH
 REQUEST WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE DAILY FRAG. THE G3 AIR AT MAJOR
 GROUND COMMAND LEVEL WILL MANAGE THE UTILIZATION OF THESE ADDITIONAL
 SORTIES IN THE SAME MANNER AS THOSE ALLOCATED TO THE WEEKLY FRAG.

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

* S E C R E T *

PAGE 3 RUMHFA 3732 S L C R E T

8. (U) THIS MESSAGE SUPERSEDES REFERENCE A AND ANY PROVISIONS OF REFERENCES B AND C THAT CONFLICT WITH THE FOREGOING.
9. (C) THIS MODIFIED SYSTEM IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE GREATER FLEXIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS AND CONTINUITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT TO MEET THE DAY-BY-DAY REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND COMMANDERS. CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENT IS ENCOURAGED. FOLLOWING THE OPERATION OF THIS MODIFIED SYSTEM FOR A THIRTY DAY PERIOD ENDING 30 JUNE AN EVALUATION WILL BE CONDUCTED. GP
BT

~~**SECRET**~~
226

SECRET

PP RUMUFKA RUMUHFA
 DE RUMUGRA2739 142060Z
 ZNY SSSSS

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG: G-3
 CON: G-3
 REL: C/S

P 210602Z MAY 68 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF DANANG RVN
 TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SAIGON RVN
 INFO RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN SAIGON
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DANANG RVN
 RUMUFKA/SEVENTH AF TACC TSN AB RVN SAIGON
 BT

S E C R E T

(STANDARD FRAG (U))

REF A: 7TH AF TACC MSG 151100Z MAY 68 (S)

1. REF A REQUESTED CALL SIGNS AND TOTS FOR FMAW AIRCRAFT BE PROVIDED TO INITIATE STANDARD FRAG.
2. AT COMUSMACV COMMANDERS CONF AT CAM RANH BAY 19 MAY 68 DEPCOMUSMACV FOR AIR OPERATIONS AND DEP CG AIR III MAF DISCUSSED CHANGES CONCERNING OVERALL SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AS REQUESTED BY CINCPAC.
3. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD AT THAT TIME THAT CHANGES WOULD BE PROVIDED ALL CONCERNED FOR COMMENT IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
4. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, SINCE REF A ADDRESSES AN INTEGRAL PART OF SYSTEM, INFORMATION REQUESTED WILL BE INCLUDED IN OVERALL COMMENTS

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA2739 S E C R E T
 TO THE TOTAL PROPOSED CHANGE/IMPROVEMENTS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

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SECRET

NNNNZCZCSAA273VZCZCKXC73500ZVA 7750VV CKB405VV WAB036

PP RUMSAK

DE RUMSAV 008W 1420047

ZNY SSSSS

P 210047Z MAY 68

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUMUFKA/CMDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF

BT

GOG: G-3

INFO: G-2

COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

SECRET

FIRST MAW HELICOPTER ESCORT SORTIES (U)

A. 7TH AF IACC 150930Z MAY68

1. REF A REQUESTED CONFIRMATION PROPOSED DEDICATED COMMITMENT OF ACFT FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT.

2. CMDR 7TH AF AND CG FIRST MAW DISCUSSED CHANGES/IMPROVEMENTS TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AT COMUSMACV COXIANDERS CONFERENCE 19 MAY. AT THAT TIME IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE 7TH AF PROPOSED CHANGES, AS REQUESTED BY CINCPAC, WOULD BE PROVIDED ALL CONCERNED FOR COMMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND SINCE REF A IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF FIRST MAW OPERATIONS, ANSWER TO REF A WILL BE INCLUDED IN FIRST MAW OVERALL COMMENTS TO THE TOTAL PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE/IMPROVEMENTS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

GP-4

BT

Our Control
SECRET

SECRET

DE RUMSAK 2591 1410630
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 200630Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMSAK/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
FOR HAS BEEN SENT
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGEN ANDERSON
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REF A: CG FMFPAC 160134Z MAY 68. (SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE)
 THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RESPONDS TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED IN
 REFERENCE A.

QUESTION A:
 ANS: "C" CO, FIFTH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP DANANG THROUGH SOG SAIGON
 TO TACC 7TH AF INITIALLY. ON 101050H O-PCON PASSED TO CG AMERICAL
 DIV (2ND BN, 1ST INF), WHO THEN HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR REQUESTING
 AIR SUPPORT.

QUESTION B:
 ANS: NO PRE-PLANNED AIR WAS REQUESTED BY CG AMERICAL DIV.
 HAD THERE BEEN, REQUESTS WOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH NORMAL
 CHANNELS, 2ND BN TO AMCL TO III MAF TO TASE. IMMEDIATE AIR WAS
 REQUESTED BY ALO WITH BN AT KHAM DUC THROUGH AMCL TOC TO I DASC.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2591 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

QUESTION C:
 ANS: INITIAL REQUEST RECEIVED BY I DASC AT 120510H. TACTICAL AIR
 DIVERTED IMMEDIATELY AND ARRIVED ON STATION AT 120530H. GRAND
 SLAM DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV AT 120830H. DIVERTS AND SCRAMBLES
 CONTINUED UNTIL EVACUATION COMPLETED AT 121630H.

QUESTION D:
 ANS AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED; 12 MAY 1968:

COMPONENT	TYPE A/C	SORTIES
7TH AF	C-130	8
	C-123	4
	F4/F105	120
	O-2	10
FMAW	CH-46	110
	UH-1E	10
	A4/F4	18
AMCL DIV	CH-47	44
	UH-1E	41
	UH-1C	8

QUESTION E:

ANS:

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2591 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 1. 7TH AF ABCCC WAS PUT ON STATION TO COORDINATE AIR SUPPORT
 AND ACT AS AN EXTENSION OF THE 7TH AF TACC. THE ABCCC
 HANDED AIRCRAFT OFF TO FAC'S AND MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH 7TH AF
 TACC.

2. CONCENTRATION OF TACTICAL AIR WITHIN CONFINED AREA WAS
 POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS BUT SUCCEEDED BY MAGNIFICANT EFFORT
 OF USMC/USAF AIRBORNE FAC'S WHO CONTROLLED AIR STRIKES.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUHKN
 DE RUMSAK 2587 1410530
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 200530Z MAY 68
 RM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. TODAY I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE GIVING THE BAD NEWS FROM MR. NITZE, GEN MOMYER ALSO GAVE THE NEWS AT COMUSMACV CMDRS CONFERENCE TODAY. MOMYER FURTHER DIVULGED THAT ADM SHARP HAD APPROVED THE PROPOSED MACV IMPROVEMENTS, PRESENTED TO HIM DURING HIS SAIGON VISIT, FOR A 30 DAY TRIAL PERIOD.

2. IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS I THINK IT IS WISE TO CONSIDER THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND HOW TO MAKE THE BEST OF THIS SITUATION. COMUSMACV AND THE AIR FORCE CANNOT DENY THAT MARINE AIR IS FLYING MORE THAN ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL EFFORT IN SVN. NEITHER CAN THEY IGNORE THAT WE HAVE AVERAGED 9.4 SORTIES PER MARINE BN PER DAY FOR THE PAST YEAR. HOWEVER WE NEED TO KEEP THESE AND SIMILAR FACTS CONSTANTLY BEFORE THEM AND TO INFLUENCE THE DAILY AND HOURLY DECISIONS IMPINGING ON OUR MARINE PERFORMANCE. THE QUESTION IS HOW? HERE IS WHERE WE NEED HELP AND AUTHORITY FROM CINCPAC.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2587 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

3. IF WE CAN PLACE A MARINE BGEN AS AN ASSISTANT DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS (MARINE) TO MOMYER IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS, I BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE A VALUABLE ENTREE INTO ALL AIR OPERATIONS BOTH IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY. FURTHER SUCH ASSIGNMENT TO COMUSMACV WOULD AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF SUBSERVIENCE TO THE 7TH AF THAT COULD RETURN TO HAUNT US IN THE POST WAR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. OF COURSE, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT ANY SENIOR OFFICER PLACED AT COMUSMACV IN SUCH A CAPACITY WILL BE IGNORED OR WILL BE CONSIDERED AS SEALING OUR DEFEAT. I DO NOT AGREE WITH EITHER SUPPOSITION. IF WE CAN OBTAIN AUTHORITY FROM CINCPAC TO INSTALL AND CHARTER HIM TO SPEAK ON MARINE AIR OPERATIONS AT COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF, HE COULD BE INVALUABLE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE. WE COULD AVOID CONNOTATIONS OF PERMANANCY BY ASSIGNING HIM, FOR THE DURATION OF THE PRESENT OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENT, INDICATING THAT WHEN A MORE NORMAL SITUATION PREVAILS HE WILL BE REMOVED.

5. BGEN HISE, AS YOU RECALL, WAS DETAILED AS A 2ND ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER AT THE TIME OF THE BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN I CORPS. HE WAS TASKED TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF OUR SIX AIR BASES IN

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SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUSMAK 2587 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 I CORPS AND HAS DEVELOPED A WORKING STAFF AND PROCEDURES FOR
 THIS PURPOSE. HE HAS ALSO RECENTLY MANAGED THE PREPARATION OF
 THE BRIEFING AND BACK-UP INFORMATION I USED AT COMUSMACV AND AT
 CINCPAC ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT. HE IS THEREFORE WELL READ INTO
 THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ISSUE.

6. CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE AND RELATIVE URGENCY OF THE TASKS
 OF AIRBASE MANAGEMENT AND THE TASKS OF INFLUENCING OPERATIONAL
 USE OF MARINE AIR AT COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF, I RECOMMEND THAT
 BGEN HISE BE ASSIGNED TO COMUSMACV. I THINK THE TIME IS RIPE
 TO OBTAIN SENIOR AIR REPRESENTATION AT COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF
 BEFORE WE ARE FACED WITH AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT AND UNNEGOTIABLE
 SITUATION.

7. SHOULD YOU CONCUR IN THIS PROPOSAL WE COULD MAKE SUCH A
 RECOMMENDATION IN OUR COMMENTS TO CINCPAC ON THE PROPOSED MACV
 IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

OO RUEAARR RUMHAW
 DE RUMHAW 3225 1392001
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 132001Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

**SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND
 NGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK, MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY**

1. HERE IS THE BAD NEWS, IN THE FORM OF A MEMO FROM
 DEPUTY SEC DEF, TO THE CHAIRMAN JCS.

QUOTE:

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE VARIOUS POSITIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE ISSUE CONCERNED WITH ASSIGNING THE III MAF FIGHTER-BOMBER AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR, AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCE (A).
2. I AM IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, IN APPENDIX D OF REFERENCE (A) THAT THE UNIFIED COMBAT COMMANDER ON THE SCENE SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO BE THE BEST JUDGE OF HOW THE COMBAT FORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM ARE TO BE ORGANIZED, COMMANDED AND DEPLOYED TO MEET THE THREAT FACING HIM (JUST AS THE

PAGE 2 RUMHAW 3225 **SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO**
 UNIFIED COMMANDER IS PRESUMED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE NEEDS OF HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND RESPONSIVE TO GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER ECHELONS). FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE AIR UNITS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS UNDER OTHER COMBAT CONDITIONS, OR NEED POSE A THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM.

3. I NOTE IN APPENDIX D TO REFERENCE (A) THE ASSURANCES MADE BY COMUSMACV TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT OVER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THAT NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH IT WAS DEvised. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV SHOULD REVERT TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS.
4. THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT, CITING UNUSUAL DELAYS IN PLANNING CYCLES AND IN PROVIDING AIRCRAFT FOR IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES. THE REPORT CONTAINED IN REFERENCE (B) INDICATES THAT COMUSMACV HAS ALREADY INITIATED ACTIONS WHICH SHOULD ALLAY THESE CONCERNS. I AM ALSO CONFIDENT

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SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHFMA3225 S E C R E T SPECAT. EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THAT CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE POINTS RAISED BY THE
 COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF DIVERTED
 AIRCRAFT TO SATISFY IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING
 THE PROBLEMS CITED BY THE COMMANDANT REGARDING ORDNANCE LOAD
 MIXES AND PRE-BRIEFING OF PILOTS ON IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES IN
 SUPPORT OF MARINE OPERATIONS IN I CORPS.

5. I DESIRE THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW
 PERSONALLY THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT IN I CORPS TO DETER-
 MINE, IN COORDINATION WITH CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV, SUCH CHANGES AS
 HE CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO MINIMIZE DELAYS BETWEEN REQUESTS FOR
 AIR SUPPORT AND THEIR EXECUTION AND TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF SIGNIF-
 ICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

/S/ PAUL H NITZE
 UNQUOTE.

2. THIS DECISION JUST REFLECTS THE CIRCUMSTANCE
 WHICH I OUTLINED TO NORM THE OTHER EVENING. MR.
 NITZE, WHILE AWARE OF AND SYMPATHETIC TO OUR POSITION,
 STILL WAS FACED, AS A CIVILIAN, WITH MAKING A PURE
 MILITARY DECISION WHICH OVERRIDES THE FIELD COMMANDER,
 THE THEATER COMMANDER AND THE JCS CHAIRMAN. THAT IS

PAGE 4 RUHFMA3225 S E C R E T SPECAT. EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 WHY I WANTED BADLY TO FLOAT A FACE-SAVER, SUCH AS IN
 MY 160911Z/MAY. AND THAT FORMULA WILL STILL GIVE US
 SOME HELP.

3. A LONG DISCUSSION WITH CMC BROUGHT OUT THE
 FOLLOWING:

A. OBVIOUSLY, WE HAVE TO KEEP TRYING. WE CANNOT GIVE UP, OR
 WAVER. NITZE'S MEMO, IN PARAGRAPH THREE, GIVES US A TINY LOOPHOLE
 WHERE IT SAYS THAT WE SHOULD GET BACK TO THE NORMAL COMMAND POSTURE
 AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. USING THIS AS A SPRINGBOARD
 CMC HAS TABLED A PAPER AT JCS PROPOSING THE
 FORMULA IN MY 160911Z/MAY AS A LOGICAL INTERVENING
 STEP IN THE MOVE BACK TO THE PROPER COMMAND RELATIONSHIP. I
 AM GOING TO DO THE SAME WITH SHARP. IF WE ARE
 SUCCESSFUL IN THAT EFFORT, WE WILL HAVE THE OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE
 REDRESSED - THE MATTER OF OPCON. AND I CANNOT OVER-
 STRESS MY OWN CONVICTION THAT GETTING OPCON BACK
 IN MARINE HANDS IS, BY A MILE, THE MOST IMPORTANT
 THING OF ALL.

B. WE HAVE TO UNDERSCORE, BY HARD FACTS AND BY
 VALIDATED GROUND COMMANDER TESTIMONY, ANY AND

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SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHMFWA3225 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO.
EVERY OCCASION WHERE THAT GROUND COMMANDER CAN
LEGITIMATELY RELATE CASUALTIES OR LACK OF SUCCESS TO
ANY PART OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM, CMC WILL
TAKE ANY SUCH INSTANCES TO SEC DEF - OR THE WHITE
HOUSE - AND I WILL DO THE SAME WITH SHARP. BEST REGARDS
TO ALL.
GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 3 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

518

SECRET

DDKA 782
 VV YNA712V NAB796
 OO DDKE
 DE YNA 2790 1370911
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 160911Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR**

S E C R E T SPECAT. EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, PLEASE DELIVER TO ADMIRAL SHARP, FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. THIS MORNING, WHEN I RETURNED FROM CONUS, MY STAFF BRIEFED ME ON THE PRESENTATION MADE TO YOU LAST FRIDAY BY WESTY'S TEAM ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR ASSETS.

2. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONING, I COME OUT WITH THE FOLLOWING DISTILLATION:

A. THE CURRENT PROCEDURE IS UNWIELDY; NOT YET PRODUCING THE RESULTS IT WAS INTENDED TO ACHIEVE.

D. THE PROPOSED FIXES WILL IMPROVE THE SITUATION, BUT WILL STILL EMBODY AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY WHICH IS BASICALLY INFERIOR TO THE REPLACED MARINE SYSTEM.

C. THE ORIGINAL MARINE ARRANGEMENT, WHILE EFFECTIVE FOR MARINE PURPOSES IS DEFICIENT, IN THE

PAGE 2 YNA 2790 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR OVERALL THEATER SENSE, WHERE FLEXIBILITY OF TACTICAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION IS CONCERNED. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THAT OPTIONAL SINGLE AIR MANAGEMENT WHICH COMUSMACV SEEKS.

D. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A MODERATED FORMULA WHICH ENSURES TO COMUSMACV HIS OBJECTIVE OF CERTAIN SINGLE MANAGEMENT, WHILE STILL GIVING THE MARINES THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THEIR ORGANIC TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES.

E. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THIS CAN BE DONE; THAT WHAT HAS BECOME A GRAVE PROBLEM, ABSORBING THE ATTENTIONS OF MANY AT ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND, CAN BE SOLVED REASONABLY, SATISFYING BOTH OF THE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED ABOVE.

3. AS BACKGROUND FOR MY PROPOSAL LET ME ILLUMINATE THESE POINTS FROM OUR EARLIER EXPERIENCE:

A. UNDER 95-4 COMUSMACV EXERCISED UNRESTRAINED SINGLE MANAGERSHIP OVER 7TH AF FIXED WING TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES; WHICH IS TO SAY ABOUT 65 PERCENT OF ALL THE TACTICAL AIR IN-COUNTRY.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 YVNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 B. AT THE SAME TIME, III MAF WAS DELIVERING ABOUT
 20 PERCENT OF ITS DAILY SORTIE GENERATION TO 7TH AF,
 AND THESE SORTIES WERE EXECUTED WHEREVER COMUSMACV
 CHOSE.

C. OR, PUT ANOTHER WAY, COMUSMACV SINGLE MAN-
 AGED ABOUT 70-75 PERCENT OF ALL OF THE TACTICAL
 SORTIES IN RVN BEFORE THE CURRENT CHANGE TOOK
 PLACE.

D. BUT, FROM COMUSMACV'S VIEWPOINT, SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT OF 75 PERCENT REALLY WAS NOT ENOUGH.
 HE WAS NEVER SURE OF WHAT NUMBER OF SORTIES THE
 MARINES WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE, NOR WAS THE EMERGEN-
 CY AUTHORITY WHICH YOU GAVE HIM UNDER ~~95-4~~ **PERMIT**
 ENOUGH TO ~~LEGITIMIZE~~ A DAY-IN DAY-OUT DIVERSION OF
 ADDITIONAL MARINE SORTIES TO OTHER WEIGHT-OF-EFFORT **BY FMFPAC SERVICE**
 TASKS WHICH COMUSMACV, IN HIS OVERALL TACTICAL
 JUDGEMENT, REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE. **S 0832**

E. SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE BUT, IT SEEMS
 TO ME, THE SURGERY WAS SO SEVERE THAT IT HAS LEFT
 THE PATIENT EXTREMELY WEAK, WITH HIS MARINE LEG

PAGE 4 YVNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 PARTIALLY PARALYZED.

4. HERE, IN ITS ESSENCE, IS MY PROPOSAL TO OVERCOME
 THOSE GENUINE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE DESCRIBED
 ABOVE:

A. RETURN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE FIXED
 WING ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND THE
 RELATED CONTROL MEANS TO CG III MAF. REUNITE THE
 MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM.

B. ISSUE A CINCPAC DIRECTIVE WHICH AUTHORIZES
 COMUSMACV TO DIRECT CG III MAF TO MAKE AVAILABLE
 TO CG 7TH AF SUCH SORTIES AS COMUSMACV REGARDS AS
 NECESSARY TO ENSURE A PROPER WEIGHT OF TACTICAL
 AIR EFFORT. THIS AUTHORITY, MOREOVER, SHOULD EX-
 TEND NOT ONLY TO PRE-PLANNED ACTIVITY, BUT SHOULD
 ENVISION THE AUTHORITY OF MACV TASE TO PRE-EMPT
 ADDITIONAL MARINE AIR RESOURCES WHEN, IN MACV'S
 JUDGEMENT, THE OVERALL TACTICAL EFFORT SO
 REQUIRES. I VISUALIZE, IN THIS REGARD, THAT III MAF
 TADC WOULD PROVIDE MACV TASE WITH REAL TIME IN-
 FORMATION ON MARINE AIR AVAILABILITY AND STATUS AT

TACC
BY FMFPAC SERVICE
S 0832

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 YVNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ALL TIMES. I VISUALIZE, ALSO, THAT CG III MAF, UTILIZING THE REGULAR CHAIN OF COMMAND, WOULD ENSURE THAT CG PROV CORPS V WOULD MAKE HIS AIR REQUIREMENTS KNOWN ON A CERTAIN AND TIMELY BASIS.

5. AS YOU CAN SEE, SUCH A CINCPAC ORDER WOULD LEGITIMIZE SINGLE MANAGERSHIP WITHOUT QUESTION, AND WOULD STILL LEAVE THE ESSENTIAL OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF III MAF ORGANIC AIR RESOURCES IN CG III MAF HANDS.

6. IT MIGHT BE CONTENDED THAT THE SOLUTION I HAVE PROPOSED COULD RESULT IN ALL OR MOST OF THE MARINE AIR BEING DIVERTED AT ANY TIME TO OTHER TASKS, WITH CG III MAF LEFT TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER ESSENTIALLY NO AIRPLANES; - A HOLLOW TRIUMPH IN PRINCIPLE. I CANNOT BUY SUCH REASONING, SINCE IT IS TANTAMOUNT TO CONCLUDING THAT THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER IS NOT GOING TO USE HIS TOOLS TO THE OVERALL BENEFIT OF THE MISSION. TO THE CONTRARY AND, ASSUMING UNIVERSAL DEDICATION TO THE TASK AT HAND, I BELIEVE THIS IS A SOUND ANSWER

PAGE 6 YVNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR TO THE PROBLEM, AND ONE WHICH COULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT ONCE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

GP -4
BT

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SECRET

#215

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMUGRA RUMHAW
 DE RUHFMA JPPP GEUPGER
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 160134Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMGVAR/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO
 MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KAULAK. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY,

1. THIS CONCERNS THE EVACUATION AND SUPPORT OF
 KHAM DUC ON 12-13 MAY. CAN YOU GIVE ME THE FACTS
 RELATING TO TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF THIS ACTION IN THE
 FOLLOWING TERMS:

- A. WHAT WAS PLANNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR SUPPORT
 PRIOR TO ENEMY ATTACK?
- D. HOW WAS TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT REQUESTED? TO WHOM?
 BY WHOM?
- C. WHO DIRECTED RESPONSE? HOW LONG DID IT TAKE?
- D. WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT, IN NUMBER OF SORTIES?
- E. WHAT UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF AIR SUPPORT WERE
 ENCOUNTERED, IF ANY?

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

213

O 151235Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV
TO ADMIRAL SHARP, CINCPAC
INFO: GENERAL MOMYER, CDR 7TH AF
LT GENERAL CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 6343 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

REF: CINCPAC 112316Z MAY 68 (S)

1. (C) I FULLY AGREE THAT OUR COMMON CONCERN MUST BE TO GET THE MOST OUT OF OUR AVAILABLE TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES AND THAT WE MUST IMPLEMENT QUICKLY THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

2. (S) STAFF MEMBERS OF 7TH AIR FORCE AND MACV TASE PRESENTLY ARE WORKING OUT MODIFICATIONS FOR PREPLANNED REQUESTS WHICH WERE OUTLINED TO YOU ON 10 MAY.

3. (C) I WILL FORWARD DETAILS OF THE NEW SYSTEM TO YOU AS SOON AS THEY ARE COMPLETED. WE EXPECT TO HAVE THE PACKAGE, TOGETHER WITH III MAF COMMENTS, BY 25 MAY. HOWEVER, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL DURING YOUR VISIT LATER THIS WEEK. LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT.

BEST REGARDS

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

360

NNNN

#212

SECRET

VV PAC687

OO RUMUGRA
 DE RUHFMA 2457 1351901
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 141901Z MAY 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 MGEN THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ADM HYLAND'S SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 112321Z/MAY TO ADM SHARP INFO LTGEN KRULAK. IT MAY BE
 OF SOME VALUE TO YOU IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ADM
 SHARP.

QUOTE:

SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR ASSETS (U)

1. I THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENTATIONS ON FRIDAY 10 MAY BY REPS OF
 CG III MAF, SEVENTH AF AND COMUSMACV CLEARLY BROUGHT OUT THE FACT
 THAT HIGHLY CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS IN
 COUNTRY IS CLEARLY INFERIOR TO THE SYSTEM WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY IN
 EFFECT UNDER MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4.

2. THE MARINE PRESENTATION WAS FACTUAL AND SHOWED THAT THE NEW
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS BROUGHT NO ADVANTAGES WHILE IT HAS
 BROUGHT THE SEVERAL IMPORTANT DISADVANTAGES TO THE MARINES WHICH

PAGE 2 RUHFMA2457 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 WERE SO CLEARLY PRESENTED.

3. IN MY OPINION THE SEVENTH AF PITCH CONFINED ITSELF TO CLAIMS
 THAT THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE NEW SYSTEM WERE DOING A GOOD JOB
 TRYING TO MAKE IT WORK. INCIDENTALLY FULL MARINE COOPERATION WAS
 SHOWN TO HAVE EXISTED DURING THE TRIAL PERIOD. ALL THE PROPOSED
 FIXES TO THE ADMITTEDLY MORE COMPLEX AND CUMBERSOME SYSTEM WERE IN
 THE DIRECTION OF MOVING AWAY FROM HIGHLY CENTRALIZED CONTROL TOWARD
 A MORE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM, BUT IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE UNTILMATE
 IN THESE CORRECTIVE MEASURES WOULD AMOUNT TO A RETURN TO THE OLD
 SYSTEM.

4. I DO NOT SEE ANY REASON WHY UNDER THE OLD SYSTEM A MAJOR PORTION
 OF ALL OF THE MARINE ASSETS COULD NOT BE UTILIZED IN SUPPORT OF ARMY
 UNITS IF THAT WAS NECESSARY AT ANY TIME. AS WAS BROUGHT OUT
 GEN CUSHMAN WORKING UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM CAUSED MORE SUPPORT TO GO
 TO THE ARMY THAN TO THE MARINES BECAUSE THE TACTICAL SITUATION
 REQUIRED THIS DURING SOME OF THE HEAVY FIGHTING IN APRIL. THE
 SEVENTH AF PITCH SEEMED TO TAKE CREDIT FOR THIS AND FOR THE FACT
 THAT OPERATIONS IN THE EYE CORPS WERE CONSISTENTLY MORE HEAVILY
 SUPPORTED FROM THE AIR THAN OPERATIONS IN THE OTHER CORPS AREAS.
 OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD HAVE OCCURRED REGARDLESS OF THE SYSTEM IN USE

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SECRET

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SECRET

RUHKFMA2457 S E C R E T S P EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SINCE THE HEAVY FIGHTING HAS OCCURRED IN THE EYE CORPS, ALSO THERE WERE SEVERAL AREAS OF DOUBTFUL VALIDITY IN THE AIR FORCE PRESENTATION WHICH GLOSSED OVER OR WHICH DID NOT IN MY JUDGEMENT PRESENT THE FACTS OBJECTIVELY. THE BROAD ADVANTAGES TO THE AREA COMMANDER WERE PARTICULARLY VAGUE TO ME, ALTHOUGH I KNOW BOTH WESTY AND SPIKE SEEM TO PREFER THE NEW SYSTEM AND ARE DETERMINED TO MAKE IT WORK.
 5. I AM CONVINCED THAT DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT IS FAR SUPERIOR TO CENTRALIZED CONTROL. OUR CVA OPERATIONS ARE A GOOD EXAMPLE. WE GET THE UTMOST RESPONSIVENESS BY DECENTRALIZED TACTICAL MANAGEMENT IN DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS AND THIS AS YOU KNOW IS BROADLY GUIDED AND TEMPERED BY HIGHER ECHELON MONITORING AND SUGGESTION OR DIRECTION AS DESIRED BY THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES. I BELIEVE THAT IF NAVY ASSETS SHOULD EVER BE INCLUDED IN A CENTRALIZED SYSTEM VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE UNIQUE ADVANTAGES WE NOW ENJOY WOULD DISAPPEAR.
 6. I CONSIDER A FURTHER TEST PERIOD FOR THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DURING WHICH THE MOST SINCERE EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO MAKE IT WORK BETTER WILL REALLY AMOUNT TO SHOVELLING AGAINST THE TIDE. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ADMIT THAT THE QUOTE EMERGENCY UNQUOTE IS OVER AND RETURN MARINE AIR ASSETS TO THE MARINE AIR/

PAGE 4 RUHKFMA2457 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 GROUND TEAM.

UNQUOTE.

GP-3

BT

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SECRET

#210

R 112316Z

FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV, SAIGON
 INFO GEN MOMYER, CDR 7AF, VIETNAM
 LGEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAF, VIETNAM
 ZEM

S E C R A T EYES ONLY

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

1. YOUR TEAM HEADED BY MGEN KERWIN HAS BRIEFED ME ON THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF AIC IN I CORPS, THE DEFICIENCIES AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED TO DATE AND IN GENERAL TERMS THE ACTIONS PROPOSED TO CORRECT THOSE PROBLEMS. WHILE THE PRESENTATIONS WERE INFORMATIVE, THEY DID NOT IDENTIFY IN DETAIL THE CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS WHICH YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE TO THE SYSTEM -- NOR WERE THE CHANGES DEFINED IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO PERMIT AN EVALUATION HERE AS TO WHETHER THEY WILL CORRECT THE PROBLEM AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED.

2. OUR COMMON CONCERN MUST BE TO GET THE MOST OUT OF OUR AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND FOR THIS REASON IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE PROCEED QUICKLY TO DEFINE AND IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM. AS SOON AS YOU CAN DEVELOP WITH ALL CONCERNED THE DETAILED CHANGES YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE, PLEASE FORWARD THEM TO ME. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CG III MAF'S COMMENTS ON THESE CHANGES FOR MY FINAL APPRAISAL.

3. PLEASE GIVE ME AN ESTIMATE OF WHEN YOU EXPECT TO HAVE THESE CHANGES COMPLETED.

WARM REGARDS.

270

NNNN

SECRET

#207

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
DE RUHKM 1966 1320334

ZNY SSSSS
P 110334Z MAY 68
FM ADMINO FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CG FMFPAC
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

S E C R E T (AMC005 RPT AMC005)
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN
CUSHMAN FROM MGEN THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 2

1. BEFORE SUMMARIZING THE AIR CONTROL BRIEFING TO SHARP, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET THAT NORM ANDERSON MET FULL FACE THE CURRENT AIR FORCE TACTICS OF ACCOMMODATION AND ADJUSTMENT BOTH IN HIS EXCELLENT PRESENTATION AND IN DISCUSSIONS WHICH FOLLOWED.

2. IN ADDITION TO SHARP, THE AUDIENCE INCLUDED RYAN, HYLAND, MYSELF AND THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE CINCPAC STAFF. THE BRIEFERS WERE MGEN'S KERWIN, ANDERSON, AND BLOOD FOLLOWED BY A LTCOL STONER OF THE MACV OPERATIONS EVALUATION GROUP.

PAGE 2 RUHKM 1966 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
3. FIRST, HERE IS WHERE WE STAND. SHARP DIRECTED THAT THE PROPOSED MACV MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM BE PROVIDED TO HIM IN WRITING WITH III MAF'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE CHANGES. HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT CG, III MAF WAS FREE TO PRESENT ANY MATERIAL HE MIGHT DESIRE ON THE SUBJECT.

4. MGEN KERWIN INTRODUCED NORM ANDERSON, BLOOD FOLLOWED NORM, THEN STONER. PRESENTATION WAS CONCLUDED BY MACV REMARKS BY KERWIN.

5. NORM'S BRIEFING WENT SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION EXCEPT FOR SHARP'S KEEN INTEREST IN TWO CHARTS. FIRST WAS THE ARMY-MARINE I CTZ TACTICAL PACKAGE COMPARISON (SLIDE 7). SECOND, WAS THE CHART COMPARING PREPLANNED SORTIES TO SCHEME OF MANEUVER VERSUS SPECIFIC TARGETS (SLIDE 13). NORM ADHERED TO HIS ORIGINAL SCRIPT EXCEPT FOR MINOR WORD CHANGES AND AN ADDED CONCLUSION THAT: QUOTE: THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CAN BE FURTHER ADJUSTED AND

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES**SECRET**

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHKM 1966 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO ACCOMMODATED TO SHOW ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENT OVER THE CONDITIONS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED IN APRIL AND ARE DISCUSSED IN THIS PRESENTATION. BUT NO AMOUNT OF ACCOMMODATION WILL SOLVE THAT ASPECT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WHICH DEPRIVES THE MARINE-AIR-GROUND COMMANDER OF MISSION CONTROL OF HIS ORGANIC AIR FIRE SUPPORT. UNQUOTE.

6. BLOOD'S BRIEFING WAS LESS POLISHED, AND HEAVY ON STATISTICS, THE MOST REMARKABLE OF WHICH WAS THE ASSERTION THAT ONLY 4 PERCENT OF APRIL PREPLANNED SORTIES WERE DIVERTED. HE WAS INTERRUPTED FREQUENTLY BY SHARP. HE OPENED WITH CHARTS SHOWING COMPARATIVE USAF-USMC SORTIE CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARMY AND MARINE FORCES IN I CTZ. STRESSING THE POINT THAT III MAF CHOSE TO WEIGHT THE AIR EFFORT TO ARMY FORCES, HE EXPLAINED THAT ARMY BATTALIONS (28 OUT OF 31) WERE MORE HEAVILY ENGAGED THAN MARINE BATTALIONS (19 OUT OF 24). SHARP INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO ASK IF THIS MEANT THAT PEOPLE ON SECURITY TASKS DID NOT REQUIRE AIR SUPPORT. BLOOD REPLIED NOT AS MUCH AND THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF

PAGE 4 RUHKM S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO WEIGHTING. LATER BLOOD AGAIN REFERRED TO III MAF AIR ALLOCATION DECISIONS ON A CHART WHICH SHOWED THAT III MAF HAD FORWARDED TO TASE ONLY 24 PERCENT OF THE 1ST MARDIV AND 35PERCENT OF THE 3D MARDIV PREPLANNED REQUESTS WHEREAS HE NOMINATED ABOUT 67PERCENT OF BOTH THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION AND 101ST AIRBORNE REQUEST. HIS IMPLICATION WAS CLEAR. THE MARINES ASKED FOR TOO MUCH AIR AND THUS III MAF WAS CONFRONTED WITH SOME HARD DECISIONS. HE EVEN LIKENED THE MARINE PHILOSOPHY FOR PRELANNED SORTIES TO STATIONING COMBAT AIR PATROL OVER THE BATTLEFIELD. IN CONTRAST, HE INDICATED THAT THE ARMY LEANS TO SELECTION OF FINITE TARGETS.

7. A KEY EXCHANGE DEVELOPED BETWEEN SHARP AND BLOOD ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF IN-COUNTRY AIR FORCE ASSETS TO MEET IN-COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS. SHARP ASKED WHAT HAS BEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF USAF SORTIES IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY AND SPECIFICALLY HOW IS SPIKE USING THE F-4'S AT DANANG. WHEN BLOOD TOLD HIM THAT ABOUT 24 OF THE 65 WERE BEING EMPLOYED OUT-OF-COUNTRY, SHARP SAID THIS WAS MAL-USE OF ASSETS AND WENT ON TO SAY HE DID

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PAGE 5 RUHKM 1966 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 NOT SEE WHY ANY AIR BASED IN I CTZ SHOULD BE GOING
 ANYWHERE BUT I CTZ OR II CTZ. BLOOD COOLED HIM ON
 THIS POINT SAYING THAT WITH THE BOMBING PAUSE ALL OF
 THE DANANG WING WAS BEING DIVERETED IN-COUNTRY AND
 A PORTION OF UBON ASSETS AS WELL. BLOOD WAS QUICK TO
 NOTE THIS WOULD HELP ALLEVIATE PRESSURE ON MARINE AIR.
 8. BLOOD TALKED AT LENGTH ON IMPROVEMENTS AND
 REFINEMENTS, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH FOLLOWS:

A. TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS, 7TH AF WILL PROMUL-
 GATE A WEEKLY FRAG THAT PREALLOCATES SORTIES FOR EACH
 DAY TO EACH CORPS DASC FOR SUBALLOCATION IN ACCORD-
 ANCE WITH THE CORPS COMMANDER'S PRIORITIES.

B. DISTRIBUTION, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DAILY
 FRAG WILL BE SIMPLIFIED BY USING AUTOMATED TRANSMISSION
 PROCESSES ADDRESSING TO EACH CUSTOMER ONLY THOSE
 PORTIONS OF THE FRAG WHICH CONCERNS HIM. THIS IS
 FORECAST TO REDUCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN BY 60 PERCENT.

C. TO REDUCE REPORTING, 7TH AF WILL ACCEPT THE
 MARINE SPHYNX REPORT IN LIEU OF THE CONSOLIDATED
 MISSION REPORT.

PAGE 6 RUHKM 1966 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUVIDE FOR MCEO

D. IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNICATIONS IS UNDER WAY.
 HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC HERE BUT DID ALLUDE TO HOT LINES
 FROM I DASC TO THE MARINE FIXED WING MAG'S STATING
 THAT III MAF WAS OPPOSED TO THIS BUT FURTHER NEGOTIA-
 TIONS WERE IN PROGRESS.

9. BLOOD CONCLUDED THAT:

A. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 HAVE BEEN ATTAINED. THE AIR EFFORT HAS BEEN CONCEN-
 TRATED AND HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE TO THE NEED. COMUSMACV
 HAS A SINGLE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIR EFFORT.

B. CG III MAF HAS APPLIED THE FLEXIBILITY THAT IS
 PROVIDED BY THE SYSTEM.

C. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE.

10. THE MACV OPEVAL PRESENTATION IS PERHAPS BEST
 SUMMARIZED BY SHARP'S REMARK THAT THE CHARTS REALLY
 DIDN'T SHOW ANYTHING AND HE CONSIDERED THE STUDY TO
 BE DEFICIENT. IN A NUTSHELL, THE STUDY EQUATED ALL
 ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE TO 105 HOWITZER EQUIVALENTS
 AND USED THIS TO RELATE THE WEIGHT OF METAL TO THE
 NUMBER OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN EACH CORPS AREA. IT

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PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
 DE RUHKM 1968 1320334
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 110334Z MAY 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T (AMC0&4 RPT AMC005)
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN KRULAK AND LIGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM MGEN THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF 2
 THEN MADE A SIMILAR COMPARISON OF AIR EFFORT BY CORPS
 AREAS. THESE CHARTS DEMONSTRATED THAT I CTZ RECEIVED
 MORE THAN A STRAIGHT LINE PROPORTION OF FIRE SUPPORT,
 TO WHICH SHARP COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS TO BE EX-
 PECTED SINCE I CORPS WAS WHERE THE FIGHTING WAS. IT
 WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH WHETHER THE MARINES
 OR THE ARMY WERE BEING FAVORED, BECAUSE THE ARMY
 GUNSHIPS WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN THE EVALUATION. THE
 STUDY DID SKIRT A SIGNIFICANT FINDING WHEN THEY SHOWED
 THAT THE AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION WAS 96PERCENT AND
 THAT THE MARINES HAD A 122PERCENT RATE OF PROGRAMMED

PAGE 2 RUHKM 1968 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 UTILIZATION, WHICH EQUATE TO SORTIE RATES OF 1.06 AND
 1.34 RESPECTIVELY. THEY THEN SHOWED THAT THE AIR FORCE
 AVERAGE SORTIE LENGTH WAS 1.72 HOURS AS OPPOSED TO
 THE MARINE 1.19 HOURS. SHARP COMMENTED ON THEIR
 FAILURE TO APPLY THESE TWO FACTORS AGAINST EACH OTHER
 TO PRODUCE A USEFUL COMPARISON. WE HOLD A COPY OF
 THIS ANALYSIS.

11. MY IMPRESSIONS FOLLOW:

A. THE AIR FORCE IS ALMOST STAMPEDING TO ACCOMMO-
 DATE CHANGES TO MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK. THEY KNOW
 THEY'RE IN TROUBLE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF SHARP'S
 ATTITUDE TODAY.

B. WE SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND WAIT QUIETLY UNTIL WE
 HAVE THEIR PROPOSALS IN WRITING, AT WHICH TIME WE CAN
 EXPLOIT THE SEVERAL HOLES WHICH ARE IDENTIFIABLE IN
 THEIR ORAL PROPOSALS.

C. SHARP APPEARED NOT TO UNDERSTAND COMPLETELY
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN I DASC AND CG III MAF. HE
 SEEMED TO THINK THAT I DASC WAS UNDER CONTROL OF
 III MAF. ENSUING DISCUSSION STILL LEFT SOME DOUBT IN

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PAGE 3 RUHKM 1968 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
HIS MIND REGARDING THE TRUE RELATIONSHIP. WE CAN
EXPAND ON THIS TO DEMONSTRATE THE BASIC DEFICIENCY
OF THE AIR FORCE PHILOSOPHY WITH RESPECT TO SERVING
THE GROUND COMMANDER.

12. I HAVE ASKED HUTCH TO PUT SHARP'S INSTRUCTIONS
IN WRITING, SPECIFYING AN APPROPRIATE DEADLINE. WE WILL
MANEUVER TO HAVE BOB'S COMMENTS ON MACV'S WRITTEN
PROPOSALS SUBMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO SHARP AND WESTY
IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE EXPOSING OUR HAND PREMATURELY.

13. HAVE JUST BEEN MADE AWARE OF SOME REMARKS BY
SHARP TO MGEN KERWIN LATER THIS AFTERNOON. THE TENOR
OF HIS REMARKS FOLLOWS:

A. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT ANY OF THE BRIEFINGS GIVEN
DURING THE MORNING WERE AS PRODUCTIVE AS THEY SHOULD
HAVE BEEN. HE FELT THAT THE MARINES HAD VERY ABLY
STATED WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE; THAT THE AIR FORCE
HAD DONE LIKEWISE TO INCLUDE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES WHICH HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE
MARINES, AND THEIR GENERAL INTENTIONS TO ADJUST
PROCEDURES TO CORRECT THEM; AND THAT COMUSMACV HAD

PAGE 4 RUHKM 1968 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
FAILED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION IN THAT THEY HAD SUB-
MITTED NO DEFINITE SOLUTIONS OTHER THAN TO CONTINUE
WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ADJUSTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH AIR FORCE PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS.
HE THEN CONCLUDED THAT THE REAL NUB OF THE
PROBLEM WAS YET TO BE RESOLVED, I.E., IN SPECIFICS,
WHAT IS THE BEST SYSTEM TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE
SUPPORT POSSIBLE FOR ALL FORCES INVOLVED. HE WOUND
UP BY COMMENTING THAT THIS PROBLEM HE CONSIDERED TO
BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO BE SOLVED
WHILE HE WAS STILL CINCPAC, AND THAT HIS INTENTION
WAS TO DETERMINE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM FOR THE
ENTIRE COUNTRY AT LARGE WITHOUT MAJOR INFLUENCE AS
TO WHAT THE MARINES, THE AIR FORCE, OR THE ARMY WOULD
THEMSELVES ALONE PREFER.

14. NORM ANDERSON HAS SEEN. THIS CONSTITUTES HIS
INTERIM REPORT TO GEN CUSHMAN.

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM MGEN KERWIN, TDY HAWAII		DATE 11 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 110154Z MAY 68		COPY# 3 OF 11 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

P 111547 0004
 FM GEN. KERNIN, 7TH MAJAF
 TO GEN. WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
 VET ABRAMS DEPUTY COMUSMACV SAIGON
 GEN. MONYER CMDR 7AF I MAJAF, RVN
 LGEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAJAF, DANANG
 770

COM F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY.
 SKBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND
 RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

THE CONFERENCE WAS HELD WITH CINCPAC FROM 1715 TO
 1230 HOURS. ADMIRAL SHARP, COMPONENT COMMANDERS OR
 THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT. THREE QUESTIONS
 WERE ASKED AND DISCUSSED AS FOLLOWS:

1. "WHY NOT ALLOCATE AIR DIRECTLY TO THE CORPS COM-
 MANDER? IS THE I MAJAF UNDER THE CONTROL OF CG III MAJAF OR
 7TH AIR FORCE?" THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WERE PRO-
 VIDED BY THE TEAM REPRESENTATIVES AND RESOLVED.
2. "WHY ARE THE IN-COUNTRY ASSETS GOING TO THE OUT-OF-
 COUNTRY EFFORT?" WERE ADMIRAL SHARP SPECIFICALLY REFERRED
 TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE DANANG-BASED AIRCRAFT BEING UTILIZED IN
 ROUTE PACKAGE I. HE MADE THE STATEMENT THAT HE FELT UNDER
 THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF REDUCTION OF ROLLING THUNDER THAT
 THIS WAS A MAL-UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES. 7TH AIR FORCE
 REPRESENTATIVE REVIEWED THE CURRENT TREND AS DISCUSSED BY
 GENERAL MONYER AT THE COMUSMACV PRESENTATION ON 5 MAY.
 THIS EMPHASIZED THAT 7TH AIR FORCE IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF
 REDUCING THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY APPLICATION OF IN-COUNTRY RESOURCES,
 AND, IN FACT, REFLECTED THAT THAI FORCES WERE BEING REDUCED TO
 IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT OF I CORPS. THE RESPONSE RESOLVED THE
 QUESTION TEMPORARILY. HOWEVER, I FEEL THIS WILL BE THE SUBJECT
 OF CONTINUING REVIEW.
3. "WHAT DOES III MAJAF THINK OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE PROPOSALS?"
 TO THIS QUESTION III MAJAF REPLIED THAT SO FAR 7TH AIR FORCE PROPOSALS
 HAD ONLY BEEN GENERAL. THEY HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC UPON WHICH TO
 COMMENT. CINCPAC INDICATED THAT HE DESIRES THE 7TH AIR FORCE
 PROPOSALS IN WRITING. FOLLOWING THIS HE EXPECTS III MAJAF TO COM-
 MENT UPON THESE PROPOSALS IN WRITING AND TO MAKE SUCH COMMENTS
 AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS NECESSARY. CINCPAC ALSO INDICATED THAT HE
 EXPECTED THESE TO BE SUBMITTED SOONEST. HE ALSO INDICATED
 THAT HE REALIZED THE NEW SYSTEM MAY NOT BE FULLY OPERATIONAL
 FOR AT LEAST FIVE TO SEVEN DAYS AND THAT IT MAY BE SOME TIME
 BEFORE THE RESULTS OF THE PROPOSALS CAN BE TESTED. BUT HE DOES
 NOT DESIRE TO DELAY THE SUBMISSION OF THE WRITTEN PROPOSALS
 AND III MAJAF COMMENTS. MATR REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVERED DURING WORKING HOURS.

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HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OO RUHKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1198 131000Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 100000Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH D.C.
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FMAW DNG
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK INFO MGEN
 ANDERSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING NOTES WERE TAKEN IN THE CLOSED SESSION AFTER
 THE FORMAL BRIEF AT MACV ON 8 MAY 1968. THEY PROVIDE INSIGHTS
 THAT MIGHT BE VALUABLE BEFORE AND AFTER THE MACV/AIR FORCE/III
 MAF PRESENTATION AT CINCPAC.

2. GEN WESTMORELAND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. "THIS IS A SERVICE CONFLICT" - INVOLVING:

(1) PROCEDURES

(2) TACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS

(3) PHILOSOPHY AND DESIRE OF COMMANDERS TO ALLOCATE

TOTAL RESOURCES IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

B. THE BRIEF WAS HELPFUL IN REFINING POINTS OF CONFLICT
 IN THE SYSTEM THAT WE HAVE BEEN EXPERIMENTING WITH.

C. THE PROBLEM IS CREATED BY THE CONFLICT IN ICTZ
 RESULTING FROM THE ENEMY STRATEGY TO SEIZE AND CONTROL QUANG
 TRI, THUA THIEN. THIS HAS RESULTED IN DEPLOYING REINFORCEMENTS
 OF THREE (3) ARMY DIVISIONS TO I CORPS. THIS DEPLOYMENT
 CREATED A REQUEST FOR A TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS NORTH OF HAI VAN
 PASS TO HELP GENERAL CUSHMAN.

D. THE FIRST JOB WAS TO REACT TO THE TET OFFENSIVE AND
 THE SECOND JOB WAS TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE WHEN THE WEATHER BROKE.
 A PROBLEM WAS CREATED BY THE SATURATION OF AIR, BOTH TACTICAL
 AND LOGISTICAL -- PARTICULARLY DURING CRACHIN WEATHER.

E. WE HAD TO ADDRESS THE IN-COUNTRY AND EXTENDED BATTLE
 AREA AIR REQUESTS.

F. THE TRIAL PERIOD HAS DEMONSTRATED - THAT THE STRONG
 FEATURES OF THE MARINE SYSTEM ARE EVIDENT. THE PRACTICAL
 ADVANTAGE OF COMMAND WIDE AREA OF THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM IS
 ALSO EVIDENT.

G. IT IS HOPED WE CAN DEVISE A SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE THE
 PRIMARY OBJECTIVES AND INCORPORATE THE BEST FEATURES OF THE

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
TWO USEABLE SYSTEMS.

H. MARINE SYSTEM IS RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE. THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM PROVIDES FOR SHIFTING OF AIR ASSETS BY FIELD COMMANDERS.

I. MARINE SYSTEM DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF BOMBS AND AIRCRAFT, DUE TO ITS AMPHIBIOUS ROLE. IT IS NOW EMPLOYED IN SUSTAINED LAND WARFARE AND NEEDS TO ADJUST.

J. AIR FORCE SYSTEM IS FAR TOO CUMBERSOME AND NEEDS TO BE POLICED UP. THE TASE MUST ALSO BE IMPROVED AND MODIFIED TO TAKE PRACTICAL ADVANTAGE OF OUR EXPERIENCE.

K. IT IS EVIDENT THAT WE HAVE BEEN EMPLOYING STEREOTYPED METHODS AND PROCEDURES. THE INTENT IS TO USE OUR RESOURCES TO MEET THE PROBLEM WE FACE NOT ON THEORY AND NOT BY INEFFECTIVE PRACTICES.

L. EQUITY IN USE OF TOTAL RESOURCES IS HARD TO ACHIEVE BUT HE WILL NOT BE A PARTY OF SHORT CHANGING THE MAN ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

M. MANY PECULIAR THINGS HAVE HAD TO BE DONE IN THIS WAR WITH UNITS OF ONE SERVICE UNDER THE OPCON OF OTHER SERVICES, FOR

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
EXAMPLE - MONAWK AIRCRAFT ARE IN TALLY HQ UNDER THE OPCON OF 7TH AIR FORCE. THIS ABILITY TO MIX OPERATIONS SPEAKS WELL FOR THE PROFESSIONALISM OF ALL SERVICES IN THIS WAR.

N. HE DOUBTED - OR DOES NOT KNOW, IF GENERAL MOMYER WILL MEET NEEDS OF III MAF, BUT THE PROPOSED IMPROVMENTS TO THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD APPEAR TO HELP. HE ASKED GENERAL MOMYER WHY HE HAD NOT MADE THE IMPROVMENTS A YEAR AGO. MOMYER REPLIED THERE WAS NOT THE REQUIREMENT, BUT THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO GO IN A WEEK WITH THE IMPROVMENTS.

3. GEN ABRAMS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO HASTY IN IMPLEMENTING NEW PROCEDURES. THERE ARE TWO PROBLEMS. THOSE OF GEN WESTMORELAND'S ARE MACV WIDE AND GENERAL CUSHMAN'S PROBLEMS ARE ASSOCIATED ONLY WITH I CORPS. GEN CUSHMAN CANNOT HELP MUCH WITH GEN WESTMORELAND'S BUT GEN WESTMORELAND CAN BE SYMPATHETIC WITH GEN CUSHMAN.

B. SOMEONE HAS TO PAY - THAT IS WHY WE HAVE THE HQTRS HERE - TO MAKE EXCRUCIATING DECISIONS. THE IDEAS PRESENTED TODAY HIGHLIGHTS THE KIND OF DATA NEEDED AT MACV; NEEDED TO PROPERLY INFLUENCE WITH GREATER PRECISION THE DISTRIBUTION OF

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EFFORT.

C. WE HAVE MADE UP FOR A LACK OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CORPS BY WEIGHT OF FIRE SUPPORT EMPLOYED THERE. I WOULD LIKE TO TRY OUT SOME SUGGESTIONS - BASED ON THE MAC/EVAL BRIEF. FROM WHAT LOCATIONS DO YOU USE AIRPLANES MOST EFFICIENTLY? WHERE SHOULD THE NAVY APPLY AIR ASSETS OUT OF COUNTRY? WHERE SHOULD THE AIR FORCE USE AIR ASSETS OUT OF COUNTRY? WHAT CAN YOU DO WITH AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT AT DANANG TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF THE AIR FORCE FORCES IN THE SOUTH PORTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM? IF NAVY IS PUTTING ALL ITS AIR INTO NORTH VIETNAM, DOESN'T THIS UP EFFICIENCY?

D. THAILAND BASED AIRCRAFT SHOULD LIKEWISE BE USED IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE BEST PLACE TO USE DANANG BASED AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IS IN I CORPS. THIS MIGHT GET AIR FORCE UP TO PROVIDING AS MUCH AS 84 PERCENT OF THE REQUIRED FACTORS INSTEAD OF ONLY 76 PERCENT OF THE GOAL.

E. THIS SERIES OF PRESENTATIONS HAS OPENED UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE THOUGHT ON PROCEDURES AND DETAILS -- WE DO NOT HAVE IN OUR HANDS AN OPTIMUM REFINED SYSTEM TO RUN ALL THIS.

4. GENERAL MOWYER THEN ADDRESSED THE USE OF F4'S AT DANANG.

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
HE STATED THAT TWO WEEKS AGO HE BEGAN TO SHIFT MORE OF 366TH SORTIES, MOVING THEM TO IN COUNTRY OPERATIONS AND MOVING MORE AIR FROM THAILAND INTO LAOS. THIS SHOULD PRODUCE AN UPTURN IN THE AVAILABILITY OF MORE AIR IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS A DEFICIT OF RESOURCES - THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH FORCES FOR ALL. WE ARE FILLING GAPS, FOR EXAMPLE - IF 50,000 GROUND TROOPS WERE MOVING DOWN THROUGH LAOS I AM SURE THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND WOULD ORDER THE DIVERSION OF AIR ASSETS OUT OF COUNTRY TO STRIKE THEM. AS LONG AS WE ARE BOMBING BELOW THE 19TH PARALLEL, I WILL SHIFT AIR DOWN INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. BUT WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH AIR TO DO THE WHOLE JOB. MALDISTRIBUTION OF AIR HAS CREATED A PROBLEM - THE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH AIR AVAILABLE TO FURNISH ARMY REQUESTS WITHOUT USING MARINE AIR.

5. GENERAL WESTMORELAND THEN ASKED IF THE MARINE SYSTEM WAS INTACT. GENERAL ANDERSON REPLIED THAT IT WAS, EXCEPT THAT GENERAL CUSHMAN NO LONGER HAS CONTROL OF THE ALLOCATION OF HIS AIR ASSETS.

6. GENERAL CUSHMAN ADDED THAT HE AGREED THAT ASSETS MUST BE DISTRIBUTED TO MEET THE ENEMY THRUST AND SUPPORT U.S. MAIN EFFORT.
BT

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SECRET

OO RUHKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1199 131000Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -I- CMC
 O 100008Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH D.C.
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FMAW DNG
 BT

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2
 HE SAID HE COULD CONTROL MARINE AIR AND USE THAT PROVIDED BY THE
 AIR FORCE.

7. GEN MOMYER REMARKED THAT 25 TO 30 F-105 SORTIES ARE NOW
 USED IN SOUTH VIETNAM FROM THAILAND BASED AIRCRAFT.
8. GENERAL ABRAMS ASKED IF WE GO BACK TO THE OLD SYSTEM, HOW
 DO WE VISUALIZE THE SYSTEM OPERATING?--THERE IS THE PROBLEM
 OF JOINT COMMAND.
9. GENERAL CUSHMAN REPLIED THAT WE COULD KEEP THE PRESENT
 JOINT SYSTEM OF DASC'S--REQUESTS WOULD COME UP THE CHAIN OF
 COMMAND. THE WING WOULD PRODUCE ALL IT COULD AND THE AIR
 FORCE WOULD PRODUCE THAT WHICH IS MISSING.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

10. GEN ABRAMS REPLIED THAT UNDER OLD SYSTEM III MAF WOULD USE OPCON
 OF FMAW TO SATISFY ALL MARINE AIR REQUESTS AND REPORT EXCESS TO
 7TH AIR FORCE AND THE 7TH AIR FORCE FRAG THE EXCESS AS IT SEES
 FIT. IF WE RETURN TO THAT, THE 1ST CAV AND 101ST WOULD GO TO
 7TH AIR FORCE DIRECTLY. THE REQUEST WOULD BE FILLED BY 7TH AIR
 FORCE FROM AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES. HE SAID ALSO, UNDER OLD
 SYSTEM, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION TO
 GO TO PROV CORPS; IT WOULD GO DIRECT TO FMAW. HE DID NOT SEE
 HOW SUCH A PROCEDURE COULD WORK, SINCE IT LEFT PROV CORPS OUT
 OF PICTURE.

11. GENERAL CUSHMAN ANSWERED, THAT REQUESTS SHOULD GO THROUGH
 THE CHAIN OF COMMAND INCLUDING PROV CORPS SO COMMAND COULD
 WEIGHT AIR EFFORT. THE FMAW WOULD TAKE CARE OF MARINE REQUIREMENTS
 AND SOME ARMY NEEDS. REST WOULD BE REQ FROM 7AF.

12. GEN ABRAMS THEN STATED THAT THE BRIEF IS FOCUSED ON
 AIR - BUT, THE FACT THAT TORE UP RELATIONSHIP IN ICTZ IS
 ARMY DIVISIONS ARE EMPLOYED THERE. THERE IS THE EXAMPLE OF
 THE ARMY AND THE NAVY RUNNING A MEDICAL SYSTEM AT HUE.--THEY
 SEE THAT EACH MAN GOT THE BEST OF ATTENTION HE COULD GET,
 WITHOUT REGARD TO SERVICE, AND FOR EXAMPLE - LOGISTICS ALL

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
USE COMMON POOL. THIS WAR IS AN IRREGULAR SITUATION, AN
UNPREDICTABLE CONDITION.

13. GEN ANDERSON, SPEAKING FOR MARINES, ADDED THAT WE SHOULD
NOT REGARD MARINE AIR IN THE SAME CONTEXT AS AIR FORCE AIR.
MARINE AIR IS AN ORGANIC COMPONENT OF THE MARINE TEAM. HE
LISTED THE HYPOTHETICAL EFFECT OF TAKING ARMED HELOS AWAY FROM
THE AIR CAV. HE STATED THAT, IT IS INCUMBENT ON MARINES TO
PROTECT MARINE STRUCTURE.

14. GEN WESTMORELAND STATED THAT THE MARINE STRUCTURE AND
DOCTRINE ARE NOT COMPLETELY APPROPRIATE IN PROLONGED LAND
WAR. HE SAID THAT THE MARINE AIR GROUND SYSTEM IS TO REMAIN
INTACT, BUT HE MUST MAKE THE BEST ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.
HE ACCEPTED MARINE PHILOSOPHY AND INTERNAL REQUIREMENTS, BUT
THE ARMY AND MARINE DIVISION ARE VERY SIMILAR--SOME CONSIDERATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR FRAGGING FOR THE MARINE'S LACK OF GUN SHIPS.

15. GEN WESTMORELAND THEN ADDRESSED THE MATTER OF THE BRIEFING
FOR CINCPAC. HE STATED THAT CHANGES IN THE BRIEF SHOULD BE
MADE: THE 7TH AIR FORCE BRIEF HAD INCLUDED HIS PHILOSOPHY
AND REASONING. THE 7TH AIR FORCE SHOULD STICK TO 7TH AIR
FORCE CONSIDERATIONS.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

16. CHIEF OF STAFF COMUSMACV, GEN KERWIN, WAS DESIGNATED
COMUSMACV REP AT CINCPAC. HE WILL GIVE THE OPENING RATIONALE,
AND THE ORDER OF PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. III MAF
- B. 7TH AF
- C. MACEVAL

D. CHIEF OF STAFF FIELD ANY QUESTIONS.

17. THE ABRAMS MADE THE POINT THAT THE WORD "DISSATISFACTIONS" AS
LISTED, SET A BAD TONE IN THE 7TH AIR FORCE PRESENTATION.
THE MACV BRIEF CAN RECOGNIZE ANY DISSATISFACTIONS IN A
GENERAL STATEMENT.

18. GEN MOMYER ADDED THAT HE COULD ISOLATE THE PROBLEMS,
SUCH AS THE PREPLANNED FRAGGING SYSTEM, AND PROVIDE FOR
MARINE HELICOPTER ESCORT A CUT OUT OF THE SORTIES BASED ON
THE HISTORICAL PERCENTAGE OF HELO ESCORT MISSIONS.

19. GEN ABRAMS THOUGHT THAT FIFTY SORTIES PER BATTALION PER
MONTH DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARINE AND ARMY BATTALIONS MIGHT BE
USED FOR THE HELO SUPPORT CUT.

20. GEN MOMYER RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IN A SHORT WHILE, WE
WILL HAVE TAKEN UP AND FIXED MOST OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS.

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

21. GEN WESTMORELAND ENDED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT IT
WAS FICTION THAT THIS THING WAS GENERATED BY THE AIR FORCE
ROLES AND MISSION. IT WAS HIS IDEA -- HIS DECISION AND NOT A
MANUEVER BY THE AIR FORCE. HE WANTED THIS POINT INCLUDED IN
THE BRIEFING.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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 VV ANB 121
 PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAW 1263 1300020
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 P 090003Z MAY 68

(FM COMUSMACV)
 TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUMSAL/CDR 7AF SAIGON
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
 BT

COG G-3
 COPY TO ADJ S/SG-6
 G-2

MVVS E C R E T 13096 FOR LTG HUTCHIN FR MG KERWIN
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT PRESENTATION (U)

REF: A: CINCPAC 042216Z MAY 68 (S)
 B: COMUSMACV 12781 DTG 051440Z MAY 68 (C)
 C: COMUSMACV 12890 DTG 070100Z MAY 68 (S)

1. (U) CONCERNING PART II OF REF C, THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL
 WILL ARRIVE HONOLULU 9 MAY FOR MACV PRESENTATION TO CINCPAC AT
 101000W:

MAJ GEN W. T. KERWIN 0-21963 USA (MACV)
 MAJ GEN N. J. ANDERSON 05256/9903 USMC (III MAF)
 MAJ GEN GORDON BLOOD FR4706 USAF (7AF)
 COL D. BRETT FR17000 USAF (7AF)
 COL R. E. PHELPS 0-24165 USA (MACV)
 LT/COL C. C. CHAMBERLAIN 051689/7501 USMC (III MAF)

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 1263 S E C R E T
 LT/COL J. K. STONER 0-64590 USA (MACV)
 MAJOR B. C. HOSMER FR55499 USAF (7AF)

2. (S) THE AGENDA FOR PRESENTATION WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:
 INTRODUCTION - MAJ GEN KERWIN
 III MAF PRESENTATION
 7AF PRESENTATION
 MACEVAL BRIEFING (ANALYSIS OF FIRE SUPPORT DISTRIBUTION)-
 ASSESSMENT - MAJ GEN KERWIN

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ZNY CCCCC

R 082229Z MAY 68

CCG G-3

COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-2 G-6

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RUHMBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC

RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMUFKA/7TH AF

RUMUGRA/III MAF

~~RUMURFA/COMUSMACV~~

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SINGLE MANAGEMENT REVIEW (U)

~~As COMUSMACV 12990/070100Z MAY 68~~

1. THE REGULAR FRIDAY STAFF MEETING ON 10 MAY WILL START AT 0930 AND WILL BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS BY THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR OPERATIONS PRESENTATION BY THE TEAM FROM MACV.

PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND CG FMFPAC PLUS

ONE ARE INVITED TO ATTEND. THE SPECIAL PRESENTATION IS EXPECTED TO LAST 90 MINUTES WHICH TOGETHER WITH DISCUSSIONS WILL TAKE UP THE MORNING.

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*However
msg is
done*
*rest part of
this msg
Air Control file
please*

~~OP 71217Z MAY 68~~

~~FM COMUSMACV~~ MSG PREV ADV ROUTE GARB, DESTROY ALL PREV COPIES:
TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO ZEN/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON
RUMURGA/CG III MAF DANANG
RUMHAW/CG I ST MAW DAVANG
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INFO G-2
COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L 12958 SEC I OF II
SUBJ: ~~IN-COUNTRY AIR SUPPORT DATA CD~~

- REF: A. CINCPAC 032139Z MAY 68 (S) (NOTAL)
 - B. CINCPAC 232528Z MAY 68 (S) (NOTAL)
 - C. COMUSMACV 240550Z MAY 68 (U) (NOTAL)
 - DD. MACV FACT SHEET, SUBJECT AS ABOVE, 6 MAY 68 (NOTAL)
1. (C) REF A ADVISED OF VISIT OF CINCPAC EVALUATION TEAM TO RVN TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS. REF B REQUESTED THAT CINCPAC EVALUATION TEAM BE PROVIDED CERTAIN SPECIFIC STA CONCERNING AIR SUPPORT OF ALL FOUR CTZ'S DURING MONTHS OF FEB, MAR, AND APR 68. REF C REQUESTED THAT CG III MAF PROVIDE REQUIRED INFORMATION PERTAINING TO 1ST MAW STRIKE SUPPORT OF HROUND FORCES IN I CTZ DURING PERIOD

PAGE 2 RUMHFA 1084 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 FEB-21 MAR 68. DIRECTLY TO CINCPAC EVALUATION TEAM DURING ITS VISIT TO DANANG OR PROVIDE TO MACV MLT C OB 6 MAY 68. REF S, PROVIDED TO BGEN HUTCHINSON PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF CINCPAC EVALUATION TEAM FROM SAIGON ON 6 MAY, CONTAINED INFORMATION THEN AVAILABLE AND STATED THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE III MAF INPUT, WOULD BE FORWARDED ELECTRICALLY TO CINCPAC ON 7 MAY 68.

2. (U) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES DATA WHICH SUPPLEMENT THOSE CONTAINED IN REFERENCE D. HOWEVER, IT DOSE NOT INCLUDE ANY DATA PERTAINING TO STRIKE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO GROUND TACTICAL UNITS IN I CTZ BY 1ST MAW DURING PERIOD 1 FEB-21 MAR 68. III MAF ADVISED THIS HEAD-QUARTERS THAT REQUIRED DATA WERE BEING PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO BGEN HUTCHINSON AT CLARK AB THE MORNING OF 7 MAY.

3. (C) FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS RESPONSE TO PARAS 1B AND 1C, REFERENCE B, PROVIDED AT TABB, REFERENCE D. IN THE TABLES BELOW FOR FEB, MAR, AND APR 68, COLUMN HEADINGS HAVE THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFI-
CANCE:

A. "DESIRED" REFLECTS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT FOR WHICH TACTICAL UNITS UNDER THE COMMANDS INDICATED STATED THEY WOULD SUBMIT REQUESTS IF UNLIMITED STRIKE SUPPORT WERE AVAILABLE.

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PAGE 3 RUMUFA 1084 C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. "PLANNING ALLOCATIONS" INDICATES THE AMOUNT OF AIR SUPPORT ALLOCATED TO EACH COMMAND BASED UPON ALL RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS AND THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS BY TYPE, NIGHT AND DAY, ACCEPTED BY MACV TASE FROM EACH COMMAND. TOTAL PLANNING ALLOCATIONS NORMALLY EXCEED ANTICIPATED RESOURCES BY APPROXIMATELY 5 PER CENT.

C. "FRAGGED" REFLECTS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES APPROVED AND FRAGGED IN RESPONSE TO PREPLANNED REQUESTS PROCESSED THROUGH MACV TASE.

D. IN ALL C O L U M N S THE NUMBERS UNDER "NIGHT" REFLECT TARGETS (ASSUME ONE SORTIE PER TARGET) WHILE THE NUMBERS UNDER "DAY" INDICATE SORTIES REQUIRED TO FULFILL PRE

PLANNED REQUESTS.

E. PREPLANNED REQUESTS-FEB 68:

COMMAND	DESIRED NIGHT/DAY	PLANNING	FRAGGED
		ALLOCATIONS NIGHT/DAY	NIGHT/DAY
III MAF (MARINES) PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO CINCPAC BY III MAF			
I CTZ (ARMY)	199/1382	116/922	36/810
I FFV	204/1426	117/1350	162/1218
II FFV	277/2058	185/1632	160/1540
I CORPS	113/768	78/244	65/202

PAGE 4 RUMUFA 1084 C O N F I D E N T I A L

II CORPS	235/2658	31/228	64/198
III CORPS	127/1464	82/182	61/156
IV CORPS	265/1172	149/368	114/342
RSSZ	15/290	9/58	6/54

F. PREPLANNED REQUESTS-MAR 68:

COMMAND	DESIRED NIGHT/DAY	PLANNING	FRAGGED
		ALLOCATIONS NIGHT/DAY	NIGHT/DAY
I-21 MAR			
III MAF (MARINES) PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO CINCPAC BY III MAF			
I-21 MAR			
I CTZ (ARMY)	279/1338	159/743	140/698
22-31 MAR			
III MAF (ARMY)	1200/1474	391/988	356/960 (171/600)

COMMAND	DESIRED NIGHT/DAY	PLANNING ALLOCATIONS NIGHT/DAY	FRAGGED NIGHT/DAY
(MARINES)			(185/360)
1-31 MAR			

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PAGE 5 RUMUWFA 1084 C O N F I D E N T I A L

I FFV	232/1520	213/1394	178/1264
II FFV	350/2344	214/1658	187/1538
I CORPS	34/806	90/196	69/160
II CORPS	287/2904	91/202	70/152
III CORPS	134/1580	62/138	42/110
IV CORPS	301/1460	120/204	98/342
RSSZ	2/310	0/54	0/54

G. PREPLANNED REQUESTS- APR 68:

COMMAND	DESIRED NIGHT/DAY	PLANNING ALLOCATIONS NIGHT/DAY	FRAGGED NIGHT/DAY
III MAF (ARMY) (MARINES)	5060/3566	1636/5918	1636/5830 (679/2958) (957/2372)
IFFV	302/1878	302/1856	282/1744
II FFV	418/2552	257/1944	240/1808
I CORPS	183/1222	103/163	83/94
II CORPS	263/2158	128/145	111/100
III CPRS	163/1446	106/6	88/0
IV CORPS	382/1548	207/500	192/358

PAGE 6 RUMUWFA 1084 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RSSZ 7/232 1/8 1/8

INCLUDES SORTIES FRAGGED TO SUPPORT 1ST AND 26TH MARINE REGIMENTS WHILE THOSE UNITS WERE UNDER OPCON OF 1ST CAV DIV (AMP) DURING OPERATION PEGASUS.

4. (C) TABLES 2 AND 3 AT TAB C, REFERENCE D, PROVIDE DATA FOR STRIKE SUPPORT OF GROUND TACTICAL UNITS IN I CTZ FOR MONTHS OF FEB AND MAR 68. THE RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL OF AIR EFFORT IN I CTZ SHOWN IN THOSE TABLES REFLECTS THE IMPACT OF THE HEAVY TACTICAL AIR COMMITMENT IN OPERATION NIAGARA. THEREFORE, TO PRESENT A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE TOATL AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN I CTZ, THE FOLLOWING NIAGARA STRIKE SORTIES SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE TOATL SORTIES FLOWN SHOWN IN THE TWO TABLES:

COMMAND	FEB 68	MAR 68
7TH AF	3943	3720
1ST MAW	1849	4157
CIF 77	1985	2386
TOTAL	7777	10263

5. (C) FOLLOWING STRIKE DATA PERTAINING TO 57TH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN II, III, AND IV CTZ ARE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO PARAS 1D THROUGH 1G, REFERENCE B. THEY SUPPLEMENT THE INFORMATION PERT

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 TODAY WE PRESENTED OUR VIEWS TO COMUSMACV WITH RESPECT
 TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS.
 OUR PRESENTATION WAS FOLLOWED BY THE 7TH AF AND MACEVAL BRIEFS.
 IT WAS A VERY LENGTHY SESSION BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY OF US
 CONVINCED THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MERITS OF THEIR POSITION.
 FORTUNATELY, THE BRIEFS WERE CONDUCTED IN A VERY AMICABLE
 ATMOSPHERE. ALSO, GEN WESTMORELAND WAS CONVINCED THAT THE
 PRESENT AIR FORCE SYSTEM WAS QUITE PONDEROUS. HOWEVER, IN
 SPIE OF HIS FEELINGS IN THIS AREA, HE DID NOT FALL OFF HIS
 POSITION THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF ALL STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE
 ASSETS IN RVN WAS A NECESSITY. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT EXISTING
 PROCEDURES WERE UNWIELDY AND TIME CONSUMING AND DIRECTED
 IMMEDIATE CORRECTION. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS POSITION, HE
 STILL ADHERED TO HIS FORMER DECISION TO SINGLE MANAGE ALL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1004 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 ASSETS IN THE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AREA. IF YOU DESIRE
 ADDITIONAL ELABORATION PRIOR TO YOUR TRIP EAST, DON'T HESITATE
 TO CALL AT ANY TIME.
 WARM REGARDS.
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FM 7AF TSN AB RVN

TO RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG AB RVN

RUMSAGP/II DASC DANANG AB RVN

RUMSAE/II DASC PLEIKU AB RVN

RUMSARF/III DASC BIEN HOA AB RVN

RUMSAHA/IV DASC CAN THO AB RVN

RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU BAI AB RVN

RUMNAB/DASC ALPHA NHA TRANG AB RVN

ZEN/460 TRW TSN AB RVN

RUMBDF/7ACCS UDORN RTAFB THAI

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L/DOCR

SUBJ: DIVERSION OF RECON AIRCRAFT (U)

1. VNAF-7

F JOINT OPORD 456-67 DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY AGENCIES HAVING AUTHORITY TO DIVERT IN-COUNTRY RECON AIRCRAFT. THIS MESSAGE SUPPLEMENTS THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN ANNEX H TO THE SUBJECT OPORD AND IS DIRECTIVE IN NATURE PENDING OPORD REVISION.

2. THE 7AF IN-COUNTRY RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS BRANCH (DOCRI) EXERCISES CENTRALIZED OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALL USAF AND USMC IN-

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 496D C O N F I D E N T I A L

COUNTRY TACTICAL RECON FORCES AND RETAINS THE AUTHORITY FOR MISSION DIVERTS, MISSION DIVERT, OR AIRCRAFT DIVERSION AUTHORITY, AS USED IN THIS MESSAGE IS DEFINED AS THE AUTHORITY TO REDIRECT AIRBORNE RECON MISSIONS OR AIRCRAFT TO PERFORM RECON OF TARGETS OTHER THAN THOSE ASSIGNED AND BRIEFED PRIOR TO TAKEOFF.

3. ALL IMMEDIATE REQUESTS FOR RECON SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO MACV-TASE (J-2 AIR) FOR APPROVAL. DOCRI, COLLOCATED WITH THE TASE, WILL THEN DETERMINE IF DIVERSION OF AN AIRCRAFT IS WARRANTED. DASCs WILL NOT DIVERT AIRCRAFT UNLESS SO DIRECTED BY DOCRI. THE 460 TRW AND THIRD MAF MAY DIVERT ASSIGNED FORCES TO EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISH TARGETS APPROVED BY TASE AND ASSIGNED BY DOCRI. DIVERSION ACTION WILL BE IMMEDIATELY REPORTED TO DOCRI. THE DASC OF PRIMARY INTEREST WILL BE INFORMED OF THIS ACTION OR, IF NECESSARY, WILL BE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO EFFECT THE DIVERSION.

4. THE ABCCC WILL NOT DIVERT IN-COUNTRY RECON MISSIONS WITHOUT DOCRI APPROVAL. EXCEPTED ARE MISSIONS SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED TO ABCCC CONTROL. DIVERSION ACTION CAN BE EXPEDITED TO SATISFY IMMEDIATE REQUESTS IF THE ABCCC OR DASC PROMPTLY SUBMITS TARGET COORDINATES AND JUSTIFICATION OR VALIDATION OF THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT. THE REMAINING TARGET REQUEST INFORMATION REQUIRED BY MACV DIR 95-11 SHOULD BE

PAGE 3 RUMSAL 496D C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBMITTED ASAP. FOR YOUR GUIDANCE, PINPOINT TARGETS, SHORT STRIPS, OR AREA COVERAGE TARGETS REQUIRING A MAXIMUM OF TWO FLIGHT LINES ARE MORE SUITABLE FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT BY DIVERSION ACTION AND ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE APPROVED AND SATISFACTORILY ACCOMPLISHED.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE III MAF SINGLE MANAGEMENT PRESENTATION
 GIVEN AT COMUSMACV HQTRS THIS DATE: QUOTE

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APPROXIMATELY 1 1/2 MONTHS AGO III MAF'S MARINE FIXED WING COMBAT
 AIRCRAFT WERE PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL, OR SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT, OF 7TH AIR FORCE. AT THE SAME TIME, A 30 DAY PERIOD
 WAS ESTABLISHED IN WHICH TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS. THE MONTH OF APRIL
 WAS SELECTED. MGEN ANDERSON'S PRESENTATION SUMMARIZES MY CON-
 CLUSIONS IN MY CAPACITY AS A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND IN MY
 CAPACITY AS COMMANDER OF A MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM.

GEN. WESTMORELAND, GEN. ABRAMS, GEN. MOMYER, GENTLEMAN:
 OF COURSE, OPERATIONAL CONTROL BY THE AIR FORCE OF SOME
 FUNCTIONS OF MARINE AIR IS NOT NEW. OUR AIR DEFENSE ASSETS IN T

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0917 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 CORPS HAVE LONG BEEN CONTROLLED BY 7TH AIR FORCE. WE HAVE ALSO
 LENT OUR FULL SUPPORT TO THE AIR FORCE MANAGED INTERDICTION
 EFFORTS IN LAOS AND NVN. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1967,
 MARINE AIR OPERATING UNDER MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 FLEW 20 PERCENT OF
 ITS EFFORT (18,000) SORTIES FOR OTHER THAN SUPPORT OF MARINES;
 THESE WERE MANILY IN LAOS AND NVN. HAD COMUSMACV OR THE 7TH AF SO
 ELECTED, MOST OF THIS CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SORTIES COULD HAVE
 BEEN DEVOTED TO CLOSE TROOP SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITHIN RVN. FOR
 THE PAST THREE YEARS OF THE CURRENT WAR, THIS ARRANGEMENT HAS
 PREVAILED AND IT HAS WORKED WELL, PROVING THE WISDOM OF
 COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, AND JCS IN DEFINING SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.
 WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, THE MARINE CORPS SYSTEM FUNCTIONED UNDER
 THE NORMAL PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 OF 28 JUNE 1966. IT
 DID SATISFY THE RESPONSIVENESS REQUIRED BY THE MARINE GROUND
 COMMANDER, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING RESPONSIVE TO THE OVERALL
 DIRECTION OF COMUSMACV.

THE PROVISIONS OF 95-4 RECOGNIZED THAT MARINE AVIATION RESOURCES
 ARE ORGANIC TO THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM AND ARE COMMANDED IN
 SUPPORT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY CG, III MAF. 95-4
 MADE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR BOTH ROUTINE AND EMERGENCY AIR

PAGE 1 OF 13 PAGES

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OPERATIONS. FOR ROUTINE OPERATIONS THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF WAS DIRECTED TO AUGMENT DAILY THE U. S. AIR FORCE RESOURCES WITH THOSE OF HIS NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS OF PRIME CONCERN TO III MAF. COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF IDENTIFIED TO THE COMMANDER 7TH AF, FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL THROUGH THE TACS, THE SORTIES IN EXCESS OF THAT DAY'S REQUIREMENT. THESE SORTIES WERE THEN ALLOCATED IN SUPPORT OF OTHER MISSIONS BY COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF. THE DIRECTIVE WAS EMINENTLY WORKABLE AND PERMITTED FIELD COMMANDERS TO OBTAIN THE FULL PRODUCTIVITY OF U. S. AIR CAPABILITIES. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INHIBITING RESPONSIVENESS OR THE UNTIMELY DIVERSION OF ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT RESOURCES. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS WERE COVERED IN 95-4 BY THE PROVISION THAT: "IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER COMUSMACV MAY DIRECT THE COMMANDER, 7TH AF TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER CERTAIN DESIGNATED U. S. AIR RESOURCES." IT WAS FURTHER STATED, "UPON TERMINATION OF THE EMERGENCY CONDITION, OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER U. S. AIR RESOURCES WILL REVERT TO NORMAL AS SPECIFIED IN THIS DIRECTIVE." IT APPEARS THAT THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT IS A DE FACTO EXECUTION OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISION OF 95-4 IN THAT THE OPERATIONAL

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0917 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO CONTROL OF MARINE AIR WAS PASSED TO THE 7TH AF COINCIDENTAL WITH THE RISING TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN I CORPS THAT CULMINATED IN THE SEIGE OF KHE SANH. HOWEVER, WITH THE RESUMPTION OF MORE ROUTINE OPERATIONS IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE FIXED WING ASSETS BE RETURNED, FOR THE MARINE TEAM IS UNIQUELY DEPENDENT ON THE INTEGRATED EMPLOYMENT OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES. IN THIS REGARD MARINE AIR IS TASKED AND TAILORED TO DO FOUR THINGS FOR THE MARINE RIFLEMAN.

(SLIDE 2 ON - FUNCTIONS OF MARINE AIR)

THE FIRST OF THESE; AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, FUNCTIONS UNDER AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT. THE OTHER 3; HOWEVER, DEPEND ON EACH OTHER AND ARE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING. THEY ARE CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE SAME SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM WHICH DIRECTS ALL TACTICAL MARINE UNITS.

(SLIDE 2 - OFF)

IN MAKING A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, WE SHOULD LOOK AT THE FOUR CHARACTERISTICS THAT WE DEMAND OF OUR OWN SYSTEM AND CONSIDER ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO ANY SYSTEM FOR MANAGEMENT OF MARINE AIR.

(SLIDE 3 ON - MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS)

PAGE 2 OF 13 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0917 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

(1) IT MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

(2) IT MUST INTERGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER-AMONG THESE IS THE IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF MINIMIZING THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES, THAT ALWAYS POSE A THREAT IN FAST MOVING SITUATIONS.

(3) IT MUST POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BUDENS AND DELAYS. IT SHOULD INVOLVE THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INTERVENING ECHELONS BETWEEN THE PRODUCER AND THE CONSUMER.

(4) AND FINALLY, IT MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS. IT MUST GIVE HIM FIRE SUPPORT THAT IS ACCURATE, APPROPRIATE AND TIMELY.

(SLIDE 3 - OFF)

(SLIDE 4 ON - MUST BE COMPATIBLE)

THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

OUR AIR GROUND TEAM PACKAGE, STEMMING ORIGINALLY OUT OF OUR AMPHIBIOUS MISSION, CONTAINS AMONG THE SUPPORTING ARMS, HIGH PERFORMANCE, HIGHLY POTENT AIRCRAFT. WE HEAVILY DEPEND ON THESE AIRCRAFT AND OUR CONTROL SYSTEM TO PROVIDE THE FOUR FUNCTIONS

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0917 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

MENTIONED EARLIER, THE CLOSE INTERGRATION OF ALL THESE WEAPONS INTO A SINGLE COMMAND PACKAGE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH MANY YEARS OF EFFORT AND IT NOW PERMITS US TO DO OUR JOB WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF THESE AIRCRAFT. TO EMPHASIZE THIS LET US EXAMINE THE FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE MARINE CORPS IN I CORPS FOR JUST A MOMENT.

(SLIDE 4 - OFF)

(SLIDE 5 ON - TACTICAL MARINE PACKAGE IN I CORPS 20 MARCH)

IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OUR AUTHORIZED 20,736 RIFLEMEN, WE WERE AUTHORIZED 276 TRANSPORT AND 60 ARMED OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS ALONG WITH 159 FIXED WING FIRE SUPPORT AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT. THE 60 OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS, IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED, HAVE BEEN ARMED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLOSE IN FIRE SUPPORT AGAINST SOFT TARGETS DURING PERIODS OF EXTREMELY LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY IN THE LANDING ZONE. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE, THEY CANNOT BE FULLY UTILIZED AS GUNSHIPS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY MUST ALSO PERFORM THE TASKS FOR WHICH THEY ARE AUTHORIZED, E. G. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION, GUNFIRE SPOTTING, EMERGENCY AERIAL SUPPLY AND RESUPPLY, LIAISON AND COURIER SERVICE, AND, OF COURSE, EMERGENCY MEDEVAC.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 SECTIONS

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ACCORDING TO THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA AIR PROGRAM PLANNING FACTORS,
 THE APPROVED AIRCRAFT WHICH YOU SEE HERE ARE PROGRAMMED TO
 PROVIDE EACH MARINE BATTALION 200 FIXED WING SORTIES PER MONTH.
 INCIDENTALLY, WE HAVE CONSISTENLY FLOWN IN EXCESS OF THIS
 PLANNING FACTOR FOR THE PAST YEAR. THIS SUPPORT IS 1/3 GREATER
 FOR THE MARINES THAN THE SUPPORT PROGRAMMED TO BE PROVIDED BY THE
 AIR FORCE TO THE ARMY. THE LARGER NUMBER IS BASED ON MARINE
 BATTALION COMPOSITION, LESS ORGANIC ARTILLERY SUPPORT, AND THE
 MARINE CORPS' LACK OF ARMED HELICOPTER SUPPORT

(SLIDE 5 - OFF)

NOW LOOKING AT THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL PACKAGE IN ICTZ,

(SLIDE 6 ON - ARMY/AF TACT PACKAGES)

WE SEE THAT TO SUPPORT AN APPROVED FOXHOLE STRENGTH OF 17,116

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0918 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SOLDIERS, THE ARMY HAS 479 TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS, AND 184 FIRE
 SUPPORT HELICOPTERS WHILE THE AIR FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE
 132 FIXED WING FIRE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT FOR THE SAME 17,116 SOLDIERS.
 AUTHORIZATION FOR THESE 132 AIRCRAFT IS DETERMINED BY COMPUTING
 THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENT OF 150
 COMBAT SORTIES PER ARMY MANUEVER BATTALION PER MONTH, AS STATED IN
 THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA AIR PROGRAM.

(SLIDE 6 - OFF)

(SLIDE 7 ON - TACTICAL PACKAGE COMPARISON)

HERE SIDE BY SIDE, ARE THE MARINE AND ARMY/AIR FORCE TACTICAL
 PACKAGES IN ICTZ ON 20 MARCH 1968 CONSIDERING THE STRUCTURE OF THESE
 FORCES AND THEIR TOTAL RESOURCES.

(PAUSE WHILE SLIDE IS VIEWED)

(SLIDE 7 - OFF)

SO MUCH FOR FORCE STRUCTURE.

A STATED OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS TO ACHIEVE
 A MORE FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT.

(SLIDE 8 ON - AVG SORTIES FLOWN DAILY - BOTTOM FLIP DOWN)

REGARDING FLEXIBILITY, THIS CHART, ILLUSTRATES AMONG OTHER THINGS,
 THE EFFECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS HAD ON THE PROPORTION OF

PAGE 4 OF 13 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUNSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR WCEO
 MARINE EFFORT FLOWN FOR MARINES AND FOR OTHER FORCES. THE AREA
 AT THE TOP SHOWS THE NON-MARINE SUPPORT; CHIEFLY FOR THE ARMY
 IN SUPPORT OF THE AIR FORCE MANAGED ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM. IN
 ORDER TO MEET THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA AIR PROGRAM, MARINES MUST FLY
 TO SUPPORT THE 24 BATTALIONS IN I CORPS, 160 SORTIES PER DAY OR
 200 SORTIES PER MARINE BATTALION PER MONTH, SHOWN BY THE BLACK LINE.
 DURING THE FIRST PERIOD, MARINE GROUND FORCES WERE ENGAGED IN
 HEAVY COMBAT AND MARINE AIR SURGED, IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO THE
 REQUIREMENTS, FLYING AN AVERAGE OF 198 SORTIES PER DAY FOR MARINES -
 GREEN LINE AND IN ADDITION FLEW 48 SORTIES PER DAY IN SUPPORT OF
 OTHER TROOPS AND THE OUT OF COUNTRY INTERDICTION EFFORT FOR A
 TOTAL OF 246 SORTIES - RED LINE. NOTE THAT AFTER SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT WAS IMPOSED MARINE AIR STILL FLEW WELL OVER THE
 PROGRAMMED RATE.

IF THE NEED EXISTS, MARINES CAN DIVERT ESSENTIAL AIR SUPPORT TO
 ARMY FORCES, BUT, IT IS OBSERVED, AS ILLUSTRATED ON THE LOWER
 PORTION OF THIS

(FLIP UP)

CHART, THAT THE AIR FORCE HAS NOT FLOWN A COMMENSURATE AMOUNT TO
 MEET THE EMERGENCY THAT EXISTED IN I CORPS. THIS BOTTOM PORTION

PAGE 4 RUNSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR WCEO
 SHOWS THE AVERAGE DAILY AIR FORCE SORTIES FLOWN IN IC1Z FOR ALL
 CONSUMERS (BLUE LINE) COMPARED TO THE PLANNED DOD APPROVED 145 V
 SORTIES TO BE FLOWN BY THE AIR FORCE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY IN
 I CORPS (BROWN LINE) - BASED ON THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED DOD
 PLANNING FACTOR OF 150 SORTIES/BN/MONTH. AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, THE
 AIR FORCE HAS MAINTAINED AN AVERAGE RATE WELL BELOW THIS
 PLANNING FACTOR DURING BOTH PERIODS. AT THE SAME TIME THE MARINE
 CORPS HAS RESPONDED ABOVE THE PLANNED RATE IN SUPPORT OF BOTH MARINE
 AND ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS. THESE 87 AIR FORCE SORTIES ARE ONLY
 60 PERCENT OF THE SORTIES PLANNED FOR THE ARMY BY THE DOD APPROVED
 SEASIA PROGRAM. THIS HAS EVIDENTLY PRODUCED A SCARCITY OF SORTIES IN
 I CORPS AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR MARINES TO CONTINUOUSLY PROVIDE
 A HIGH PROPORTION OF THEIR SORTIES TO OTHER FORCES. THIS HAS
 FURTHER RESULTED IN MARINE UNITS RECEIVING LESS AIR SUPPORT THAN
 THEY DID BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

(SLIDE 8 - OFF)

(SLIDE 9 ON - USMC FRAGGED SORTIES)

IT CAN BE SEEN HERE BY THE TREND OF THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO
 MARINES AND OTHER UNITS, THAT THIS IS OCCURRING EVEN WHILE MARINE
 AIR IS SURGING, FAR BEYOND PLANNED LEVELS-IN AN EFFORT THAT WILL

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
INEVITABLY EXACT A LATER DECREASE IN PERFORMANCE.

(SLIDE 9 - OFF)

(SLIDE 10 ON - TACTICAL PACKAGES IN ICIZ 21 MARCH 1968)
AS CAN BE SEEN BY THIS CHART, IMPOSITION OF THE SINGLE MANAGER
SYSTEM ON THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAS DEPRIVED THE
TEAM OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ITS FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. NO SUB-
STITUTE FOR THIS LOSS HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN THE FORM OF ORGANIC
GUN SHIPS AS ARE EMPLOYED BY THE ARMY. TO ACHIEVE PARITY OF FIRE
SUPPORT WITH THE ARMY UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM, MARINES WOULD
REQUIRE THE USE OF NEARLY 200 FIRE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS.

(SLIDE 10 - OFF)

(SLIDE 11 ON - MUST INTERGRATE)

OUR NEXT CRITERION IS THE INTEGRATION OF AIR WITH OTHER
SUPPORTING FIRES AND GROUND MANUEVER.

(SLIDE 11 - OFF)

(SLIDE 12 ON - INTEGRATION OF AIR - FLIP DOWN)

THE MARINE AIR GROUND CONTROL SYSTEM SERVES THE MARINE'S
INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE. IT HAS BUILT INTO IT THE CAPABILITY
TO COORDINATE AIR WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS. THE TOTAL SYSTEM
PROVIDES THE INFORMATION WHICH IS CONTINUOUSLY BEING COLLECTED

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
BY THE DASC'S AND TADC, AGENCIES SPECIFICALLY TASKED WITH THE
COORDINATING FUNCTION. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THEIR CAPABILITY, DURING
THE SEPTEMBER 1967 BATTLE FOR CON THIEN, 3,618 MARINE, NAVY AND
AIR FORCE SORTIES WERE FLOWN INTO A 20 SQUARE MILE AREA IN LESS
THAN A MONTH. IN ADDITION, 127,000 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY AND
6,100 ROUNDS OF NAVAL GUNFIRE WERE DELIVERED INTO THE AREA. THERE
WERE NO COORDINATION AND CONTROL DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY
THE GROUND COMMANDERS.

(SLIDE 12 FLIP UP)

THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT DASC'S ON THE OTHER HAND DO NOT PROVIDE THE
DETAILED CONTROL AND COORDINATION FOR THIS ESSENTIAL SERVICE BUT
MUST DEPEND ON SUBORDINATE AGENCIES. ADDITIONALLY, SINGLE MANAGEMENT
DOES NOT ALWAYS PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COORDINATION BETWEEN SUCH
SUBORDINATE AGENCIES AS MARINE DASC'S AND ARMY/AF TACP'S TO
ENSURE THE MOST EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THESE AGENCIES DURING
THESE JOINT OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, THIS NEW SYSTEM DOES NOT
PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROCEDURES FOR ARTILLERY SUPPRESSION OR AIRCRAFT
DIVERSION AROUND DANGER AREAS COMPARABLE TO THE MARINE
SAV-A-PLANE PROGRAM WHICH WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE CO-LOCATION OF
THE DASC AND THE FSOC. THE NEW SYSTEM IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
BT

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 IN THAT IMMEDIATE ARTILLERY FIRE MISSIONS CAN BE CARRIED OUT
 BEFORE AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA CAN BE WARNED.

(SLIDE 12 - OFF)

(SLIDE 13 ON - IT SHOULD IMPOSE MINIMUM BURDEN...)

NOW, LOOKING AT OUR THIRD CRITERION - IT SHOULD IMPOSE MINIMUM
 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND DELAY.

(SLIDE 13 - OFF)

(SLIDE 14 ON - PREPLANNED REQUEST/FRAG)

THE SIZE OF THE NEW FRAG IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS MORE COMPLEX
 CHAIN IN PREPARING THE FRAG. AT BATTALION LEVEL, MARINES HAVE TO
 FILL OUT LENGTHY FORMS, ONE FOR EACH REQUESTED TARGET. THESE HAVE
 TO BE SHACKLED OR ENCRYPTED AT EACH LEVEL IN THE CHAIN, OR
 DELIVERED BY COURIER TO THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON AND SO ON.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0960 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 FORMERLY, UNDER 95-4, WHEN AIR WAS FRAGGED TO THE UNITS, ALL THAT
 WAS NECESSARY WAS TO PASS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED, TOT'S
 AND DESIRED ORDNANCE. (MORE OPPORTUNITY FOR CATASTROPHIC ERROR)

(SLIDE 14 OFF)

HERE IS A TYPICAL FRAG ISSUED DAILY TO MARINE UNITS PRIOR TO
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT. (HOLD UP AN OLD FRAG 9 PAGES). NOT ONLY WAS IT
 RELATIVELY SHORT AND SIMPLE BUT IT WAS ALSO VERY RESPONSIVE TO
 GROUND COMMANDERS RAPIDLY CHANGING SITUATIONS, IN THAT, REQUESTED
 CHANGES WERE OFTEN MADE TO IT ON THE BASIS OF A TELEPHONE
 REQUEST AS LATE AS MIDNIGHT THE NIGHT BEFORE. HERE IS THE NEW FRAG.
 IT IS MADE UP USUALLY OF 10 TO 15 SECTIONS; ABOUT 50-60 PAGES. THIS
 MESSAGE MUST BE TRANSMITTED TO ALL USING UNITS DOWN THE LINE. EACH
 OF THEM MUST GO THROUGH IT, AND SIFT OUT THE PORTIONS THAT APPLY TO
 HIM. THIS IS A TASK OF 2 TO 4 HOURS DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF
 GARBLES, OR ERRORS IN THE FIRST COPY.

IN SHORT, SINGLE MANAGEMENT WITH ITS COMPLEX AND CENTRALIZED
 SYSTEM HAS MARKEDLY INCREASED OUR ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS.

(SLIDE 15 ON - RESPONSIVE TO TACTICAL NEEDS)

IN TESTING THE COMPARATIVE ABILITY OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 TO SATISFY THIS LAST REQUIREMENT, WHICH IS RESPONSIVENESS TO

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0960 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
TACTICAL NEEDS, WE SHOULD LOOK FIRST AT THE ARRANGEMENT FOR LAYING
ON "PREPLANNED" MISSIONS.

(SLIDE 15 OFF)

UNDER 95-4, WHEN THE NEED AROSE FOR AN AIR STRIKE THE GROUND
COMMANDER'S REQUEST WAS PROVIDED FROM THE AIRCRAFT OVERHEAD, IF
POSSIBLE. RESPONSE TIMES WERE USUALLY MEASURED IN MINUTES. THE CLOSE
WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN THE AIR-GROUND TEAM PERMITTED INCREASE
OF DECREASE OF THE FLOW OF AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN CONTACT.
TARGET LISTS WERE KEPT OF TARGETS TO BE STRUCK WHEN AIRCRAFT WERE
NOT NEEDED FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. STRIKE SURGE CAPABILITY WAS
PROVIDED BY ALERT AIRCRAFT AND THE ABILITY TO SCHEDULE
ADDITIONAL MISSIONS ON SHORT NOTICE. THE SYSTEM WAS SIMPLE, BUT
MOST IMPORTANT, IT PROVIDED FOR AIR WHICH WAS RESPONSIVE TO THE
GROUND COMMANDER'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS.

UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE MAJORITY OF AIR IS SCHEDULED
THROUGH AN ELABORATE AND CENTRALIZED SYSTEM. IT REQUIRES THE
BATTALION COMMANDER TO FORECAST THE EXACT TARGETS HE WANTS
ATTACKED TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE.

UNDER 95-4, THE LEAD TIME FOR THE BATTALION WAS ABOUT 14 HOURS.
UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, THE TIMES BATTALIONS WERE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0960 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THEIR TARGETS VARIES, DEPENDING ON THE QUALITY
OF COMMUNICATIONS. THIS MAY BE AS EARLY AS 1300 OR AS LATE AS 2100

IF COMMUNICATIONS ARE EXTREMELY GOOD, OR THE LIST OF REQUESTS IS
SHORT. IN EITHER CASE; HOWEVER, THE LEAD TIME IS ABOUT 35 TO
40 HOURS. A BATTALION COMMANDER MUST PREDICT ON MONDAY THE
PRECISE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TARGET HE WANTS HIT ON WEDNESDAY,
THE TIME HE WANTS IT HIT, AND THE ORDNANCE HE WILL NEED. THIS
CREATES AN OBVIOUSLY UNREALISTIC SITUATION.

THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY EXCESSIVE LEAD TIMES INHERENT IN THE NEW
SYSTEM ARE AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT DOES NOT
PROVIDE FOR LATER ADD-ONS TO THE DAILY FRAG. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A
BATTALION COMMANDER DECIDES THIS AFTERNOON HE WOULD MAKE A
COMPANY HELILIFT TOMORROW AT 1100, AND HE NEEDS A LANDING ZONE
PREPARATION, HIS ONLY CHOICE IS TO CALL FOR AN "IMMEDIATE".
HERE IS THE PATH FOLLOWED BY THE REQUEST UNDER THE MARINE SYSTEM
AND THE SYSTEM OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT:

(SLIDE 16 ON - METHOD OF REQ IMD MISS PRIOR)

UNDER 95-4, THE PROCESS WAS SIMPLE. THE AGENCY PERCEIVING A
NEED FOR AN AIR STRIKE WOULD CALL FOR IT FROM THE DIVISION DASC,
WHICH WOULD DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE AIRCRAFT, WHICHEVER WAS THE MOST

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0960 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
RESPONSIVE AND THE STRIKE WOULD BE RUN. OUR DASC MAINTAINED CUR-
RENT, REAL TIME DATA ON THE GROUND SITUATION.

(SLIDE 16 OFF)

(SLIDE 17 ON - IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST AFTER 21 MARCH)
IN THE CASE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, HERE IS HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS.
FOR A 3D MARINE DIVISION BATTALION, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BATTALION
TRANSMITS THE REQUEST FOR AIR TO THE DIVISION DASC, WHO PASSES
IT TO THE PCV DASC WHO PASSES TO I DASC WHO PASSES TO 7TH AF TACC
OR III MAF TADC, WHO DIVERTS OR SCRAMBLES AS THE SITUATION
REQUIRES. AGENCIES AUTHORIZED TO DIVERT WILL NOT ALWAYS HAVE
CURRENT GROUND SITUATION DATA AND WILL NOT BE IN THE BEST
POSITION TO MAKE A DECISION. THE DECISION IS USUALLY ACCOMPLISHED
BY AN AIR CONTROL DUTY CONTACT OFFICER WHOSE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
GROUND TACTICAL SITUATION IS INCOMPLETE, WHO IS NOT IN POSITION
TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF HIS DECISION ON THE GROUND ACTION, AND
WHO, IN ANY CASE, HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EFFECT ON THE
GROUND COMBAT OF HIS DIVERSION DECISION. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE
DIVERT IS BY FAR THE LEAST DESIREABLE OF SUPPORT SORTIES, SINCE
IT DEPRIVES ANOTHER GROUND COMMANDER OF A VITAL ELEMENT OF HIS
TACTICAL PLAN, AND POSSIBLY AT A CRITICAL MOMENT. UNDER THE

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0960S SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
MARINE SYSTEM WHEN AIRCRAFT WERE DIVERTED IT WAS THE GROUND
COMMANDER WHO MADE THE DECISION, NOT THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(SLIDE 17 OFF)

OVERALL, SINGLE MANAGEMENT'S LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND
TACTICAL SITUATION IS LARGELY A RESULT OF OVER CENTRALIZATION
BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTATED TO THE SUPPLIER RATHER THAN THE CONSUMER.
THE SYSTEM MAKES FOR CONVENIENT AND ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY
AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER. THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SORTIES FRAGGED BY TYPE BEFORE AND AFTER SINGLE
MANAGEMENT.

(SLIDE 18 ON - DISTRIBUTION OF FRAGGED PREPLANNED
SORTIES) (FLIP DOWN)

BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ABOUT 85 PERCENT OF OUR AIR SUPPORT
MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND
HIS SCHEME OF MANEUVER. THAT IS, THEY REPORTED TO THE AIR CONTROL
AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED TOT, WITH THE
REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND BRIEFED ON THE GROUND SITUATION.
THE REMAINING 15 PERCENT OF THE PRE-PLANNED SORTIES WERE FOR
MISSIONS THAT COULD REASONABLY FORECAST SPECIFIC TARGETS. FOR
EXAMPLE, A BRIDGE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 (1ST FLIP UP)

AFTER SINGLE MANAGEMENT, VIRTUALLY ALL THE SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED AS PREPLANNED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NO MORE REALISTIC TO FORECAST TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE AFTER SINGLE MANAGEMENT THAN BEFORE. THE LOST EFFORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN CREATED BY THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT; AFTER A BATTALION UNDERWENT THE EFFORT OF IDENTIFYING AND TRANSMITTING SPECIFIC TARGETS, ONLY TWO THIRDS OF THOSE REQUESTED WERE FRAGGED, AND OF THESE LESS THAN HALF WERE HIT. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE BASIC RESPONSIVENESS OF THE AIR SUPPORT DECREASED WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE SORTIE SCHEDULED TO FIT THE GROUND UNIT SCHEME OF MANEUVER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NUMBER OF SCRABLES OF AIRCRAFT ON ALERT INCREASED BY 40 PERCENT SHOWING A REQUIREMENT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0961 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 FOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF THE FLEXIBILITY THEY HAD BEEN AFFORDED UNDER THE SYSTEM IN EFFECT UNDER 95-4. TAKING ALL THESE THINGS INTO ACCOUNT WE FOUND SINGLE MANAGEMENT OPERATION TO BE OVER CENTRALIZED AND HENCE INFERIOR FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RESPONSIVENESS.

(SLIDE 18 OFF)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

FIRST, AS A MARINE SERVICE COMMANDER, I CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM TO BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. THE MARINE DIVISION-WING TEAM WAS DESIGNED AS A BALANCED FORCE OF MEN AND WEAPONS INCLUDING AIR. IT WAS THEREFORE PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED TO INCLUDE INFANTRY, AIR AND ARTILLERY IN PRESCRIBED AMOUNTS AS ONE PACKAGE. THE PRESENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS REMOVED ONE ELEMENT OF THAT FORCE AND UNBALANCED THE PACKAGE.

2. MARINES HAVE LOST OUT ON TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE WITH THE ADDED DELAY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM, AND HAVE FOUND NO COMPENSATORY GAINS.

3. MARINES HAVE LOST OUT ON RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0961 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO
 COMMANDER'S TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS BECAUSE OF THE GREATLY
 DECREASED NUMBER OF PREPLANNED SORTIES INTEGRATED INTO THE SCHEME
 OF MANEUVER.

SECOND, AS A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER, I HAVE NOT FOUND THAT THE
 NEW SYSTEM PROVIDES ANY ADVANTAGES AND IT HAS HAD THE FOLLOWING
 DISADVANTAGES:

1. JUST AS WITH THE MARINE DIVISIONS, THE ARMY DIVISIONS
 HAVE NOT RECEIVED PREPLANNED SORTIES THAT FITTED THE TACTICAL
 SITUATION AT THE TIME THE PLANES BECAME AVAILABLE. RECTIFYING
 THIS HAS REQUIRED A HIGH NUMBER OF DEVERTS AND SCRAMBLES. THE
 MARINE WING HAS ATTEMPTED TO KEEP UP WITH THIS REQUIREMENT BY
 CONTINUOUS REPLACEMENT OF SCRAMBLE PLANES ON THE HOT PAD AND
 THIS HAS RUN THE SORTIE RATE UP TO A LEVEL IMPOSSIBLE TO
 MAINTAIN ON A SUSTAINED BASIS. THIS METHOD OF MAKING UP FOR
 INAPPROPRIATE AND UNRESPONSIVE PREPLANNED SORTIES IS WASTEFUL
 OF OVERALL AIR EFFORT WITHIN ICYZ.

2. IT OVERCENTRALIZES THE CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS DEVOTED
 TO THE SUPPORT OF FORCES IN I CORPS, AND DEPRIVES THE JOINT
 FORCE COMMANDER OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A VITAL ELEMENT
 OF HIS COMMAND.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0961 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO

3. STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS WHICH ARE A BUILT-IN
 PART OF THE MARINE PORTION OF THE FORCE ARE DISTRIBUTED ON A
 ROUTINE BASIS TO OTHER UNITS IN THE FORCE WHICH HAVE OTHER MEANS
 OF FIRE SUPPORT. HENCE THERE IS A RESULTING IMBALANCE IN THE
 FORCE AS A WHOLE DURING ROUTINE DAY TO DAY COMBAT. IT WILL BE
 ACCENTUATED WHEN THE MARINE WING UNAVOIDABLY HAS TO DROP TO A
 LOWER SORTIE RATE.

RECOMMENDATION

NOW THAT THE EMERGENCY CONDITIONS OF THE KHE SANH
 SITUATION AND THE BIRTH OF PROV CORPS V HAVE BEEN MET IT
 IS RECOMMENDED:

1). THAT THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE FIXED WING
 STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BE RETURNED TO CG III MAF
 UNDER THE NORMAL PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 OF
 28 JUNE 1966 AND,

2). THAT MACV 7TH AIR FORCE AND III MAF WORK OUT
 TOGETHER THOSE PROCEDURES WHICH UNDER THAT DIRECTIVE WILL
 ENSURE THAT ARMY FORCES IN III MAF WILL RECEIVE THAT SHARE
 OF AVAILABLE AIR ASSETS DEMANDED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION
 AND DESIRED BY COMUSMACV. UNQUOTE

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PAGE 5 RUMSAX 0861 S E C R E T SPECAT-EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO

2. SLIDES UTILIZED:

(SLIDE 2)

MARINE AIR MUST DO THESE JOBS FOR THE RIFLEMAN

& DEFEND THE SKY ABOVE HIM

& DESTROY THE ENEMY BEFORE HIM

& DELIVER HIM INTO BATTLE

& RESUPPLY HIM

(SLIDE 3)

MINIMUM ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

& MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE

& MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER

& MUST IMPOSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND DELAY

& MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO TACTICAL NEEDS

(SLIDE 4)

& MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE

(SLIDE 5)

MARINE CORPS TACTICAL PACKAGE IN ICTZ

20 MARCH 1968

FOX HOLE STRENGTH

20,736

PAGE 6 RUMSAX 0861 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO

TRANSPORT AND OBS HELO 276 TRANS / 60 OBS

FIXED WING STRIKE ACFT 150

(SLIDE 6)

ARMY AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL PACKAGE IN ICTZ

FOXHOLE STRENGTH 17,116

TRANSPORT HELOS 479 TRANS

FIRE SUPPORT HELOS 154

FIXED WING STRIKE ACFT 132

(SLIDE 7)

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS TACTICAL PACKAGES IN ICTZ

20 MARCH 1968

MARINE AUTHORIZED ARMY/AIR FORCE

20,736 FOXHOLE STRENGTH 17,116

276 TRANS/60 OBS TRANSPORT AND OBS 479 TRANS

HELOS

159 FIXED WING STRIKE ACFT 132

FIRE SUPPORT HELOS 154

(SLIDE 8 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)

(SLIDE 9 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)

(SLIDE 10 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 5 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 (SLIDE 11)
 & MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER
 (SLIDE 12)
 INTEGRATION OF AIR WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS
 --THE MARINE AIR GROUND CONTROL SYSTEM COORDINATES SUPPORTING
 FIRES, HELICOPTER MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.
 --THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ADDS COMPLEXITY AND COMMUNICA-
 TION DELAYS WITHOUT ACHIEVING AN ADEQUATE SAVE A PLANE
 PROGRAM
 (SLIDE 13)
 & MUST IMPOSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND DELAY
 (SLIDE 14 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)
 (SLIDE 15)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0965 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCOE
 & MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO TACTICAL NEEDS
 (SLIDES 16, 17, 18 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)
 GP-4
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CONFIDENTIAL

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 P 071424Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SAIGON
 INFO RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG: G-3
 REL: C/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ATTN: SEVENTH AF (TACC TSN AB SAIGON)

MIX OF PREPLANNED TACTICAL AIR SPT ALLOCATION

A: PHONCON III MAF TARC/TASE J3 AIR OF 29APR68

1. (C) BY REF A III MAF REQUESTED 10 ADDITIONAL SKYSPOT (CSS) SORTIES BE PROVIDED IN CSS ALLOCATION, AND STIPULATED THAT, IF NECESSARY, A COMPENSATORY REDUCTION IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THIS REQUEST WAS DENIED.

2. (C) AT THE TIME REQUEST WAS MADE ALLOCATION HAD BEEN STABILIZED FOR FIVE DAYS AT 51 CSS SORTIES AND 180 CAS SORTIES. HAD III MAF REQUEST BEEN HONORED A MIX OF 61 CSS AND 170 CAS SORTIES WOULD HAVE RESULTED.

3. (U) SINCE TARGETS ARE SELECTED BY MANEUVER BNS AND PARENT DIVISIONS, IT IS BELIEVED THAT IF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT IS TO SUPPORT

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA0894 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND BE RESPONSIVE TO GROUND COMMANDER, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE TAC AIR SORTIE (CSS/CAS) MIX REQUESTED.

4. (C) IN VIEW OF FOREGOING IT IS REQUESTED THAT CSS ALLOCATION TO CG III MAF BE RAISED FROM 51 TO 61 WITH, IF NECESSARY, A COMPENSATORY REDUCTION IN CAS ALLOCATION.

5. (C). IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT CSS/CAS MIX MAY REQUIRE SIMILAR ADJUSTMENT IN FUTURE. REQUEST III MAF BE INFORMED OF PROCEDURE AND LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO RECEIVE MIX ADJUSTMENT.

GP-4
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VV AWB 962
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 O P 070100Z MAY 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMSAL/GDR 7AF SAIGON
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG
 INFO RUMKA/CINCPAC
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EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR B/GEN SEITH, B/GEN
 ANDERSON, INFO LT/GEN HUTCHIN FROM M/GEN KERWIN 12890
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT REVIEW (U)
 REF: A. COMUSMACV 12217 DTG 300030Z APR 68 (S) (NOTAL)
 B. COMUSMACV 12781 DTG 051440Z MAY 68 (S) (NOTAL)

THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS.

PART I. PRESENTATION TO COMUSMACV

1. (S) AS DIRECTED IN REF A ACTION ADDRESSEES WILL PRESENT 30 DAY ANALYSIS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS AT THIS HEADQUARTERS 081000 MAY 1968. PRESENTATION WILL BE IN COMUSMACV CONFERENCE ROOM. ATTENDANCE WILL BE LIMITED TO THREE FROM EACH COMMAND AND SELECTED REPRESENTATION FROM MACV STAFF.
2. (S) AGENDA FOR THIS MEETING AS FOLLOWS:
 CG, III MAF PRESENTATION

PAG 2 RUMSAW 1152U S E C R E T SPECAT
 CDR, 7AF PRESENTATION
 MACEVAL BRIEFING

COMUSMACV DISCUSSION WITH COMMANDERS

PART II. PRESENTATION TO CINCPAC

1. (S) THIS PRESENTATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO CINCPAC, 10 MAY 1968 AT CINCPAC HQ, HONOLULU. MACV COMMAND REPRESENTATION WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

III MAF BRIEFING TEAM

7AF BRIEFING TEAM

MACEVAL BRIEFING TEAM

COL ROBERT PHELPS - MACV TASE

2. (S) ORDER OF PRESENTATION WILL BE AS REFLECTED IN PART I. COL PHELP WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR DISCUSSION OF TASE ASPECTS, AS NECESSARY. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE CINCPAC HIS ASSESSMENT AND INTENDED ACTIONS BY MESSAGE SUBSEQUENT TO THE 8 MAY MEETING AN

PRIOR TO THE CINCPAC PRESENTATION.

3. (S) ATTENDEES WILL PROCEED TO HONLULU BY INDIVIDUAL COMMAND ARRANGMENT TO ARRIVE NLT EVENING 9 MAY. TIME AND PLACE OF 10 MAY PRESENTATION WILL BE PROVIDED AT 8 MAY MEETING HERE. ACTION ADDRESSEES WILL IDENTIFY TEAM MEMBERSHIP AT THAT

PAG 3 RUMSAW 1152U S E C R E T SPECAT
 TIME. GP-4
 BT

SECRET

190

SECRET

PP RUHKN
 DE RUMSAK 0418 1250906
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 040906Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUEBHOA/CNC
 RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN
 KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 1. I HAVE SENT THE FOLLOWING TO GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO

ADM SHARP:

QUOTE:

P 040902Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMSAK/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM
 SHARP, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
 A. CG III MAF 221340Z APR 68
 B. COMUSMACV 300330Z APR 68

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0418 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

1. (C) REFERENCE A RECORDED MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
 SUBJECT SYSTEM IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS,
 BASED ON A THIRTY-DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM DURING
 THE PERIOD 22MAR-21APR68. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF THE SYSTEM
 HAS CONTINUED AND I HAVE CONFIRMED MY OPINIONS BASED ON
 FURTHER EVALUATION DURING THE PERIOD 1-30APR68. AS A RESULT
 OF THIS FURTHER REVIEW, I REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE VALIDITY OF
 MY VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REF A, BUT DESIRE TO AMPLIFY SOME OF
 THEM AS FOLLOWS:

A. (C) SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(1)(C): RESPONSE TIMES TO RE-
 QUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES HAVE IMPROVED; HOWEVER, THIS HAS
 BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY UTILIZING THE PROCEDURE OF DIVERTING
 AIRCRAFT FROM PREPLANNED TARGETS AND SUBSEQUENTLY COVERING
 THOSE PREPLANNED TARGETS WITH SCRAMBLE AIRCRAFT, PRIMARILY
 MARINE CORPS. THE MARINE SYSTEM HAS LONG UTILIZED THIS
 PROCEDURE, BUT WITH LESS FREQUENCY AND GREATER DISCRETION.
 NEVERTHELESS, WHEN DIVERTS WERE NECESSARY, THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHED
 BY ORGANIC MARINE AGENCIES WHICH WERE COMPLETELY COGNIZANT OF
 THE CURRENT GROUND SITUATION AND, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO
 DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF THE DIVERT ON THE GROUND ACTION.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES HAS BEEN SENT**SECRET**

#187

SECRET

RUMSAK 0418 S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE

NOTWITHSTANDING THIS MODICUM OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE RESPONSE TIME FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES, THE UNWIELDY AND TIME-CONSUMING PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING PREPLANNED STRIKES STILL EXIST.

B. (S) SUBPARA 3B(2)(A): I'M HAPPY TO REPORT THAT THE NEW SYSTEM IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE INHERENT CAPABILITIES OF OUR MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES TO COORDINATE AIR WITH GROUND MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. HOWEVER, IN AREAS OF I CORPS OUTSIDE OF WHERE MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES FUNCTION, THIS ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY COORDINATE FIRES DOES NOT EXIST. SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES PREVAIL IN THOSE AREAS, WHEREBY THE FIRING UNIT PASSES ARTILLERY INFORMATION THROUGH ONE OR MORE AGENCIES TO A MORE DISTANT COMBAT REPORTING CENTER FOR DISSEMINATION. THESE PROCEDURES INVOLVE INHERENT DELAYS AND AIRCRAFT CAN BE OPERATING IN AREAS WHERE IMMEDIATE ARTILLERY FIRE MISSIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED, WITHOUT RECEIVING THE NECESSARY WARNINGS.

C. (C) SUBPARA 3B(3): ADD AN ADDITIONAL SUBPARA (C) AS FOLLOWS:

(C) ADDITIONAL REPORTS ARE NOW REQUIRED. THE WORKLOAD

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0418 S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE MCEO INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE CONSOLIDATED RVN MISSION REPORT, INSTITUTED BY 7TH AF LETTER OF 2 APRIL 1968, REQUIRES THE SERVICES OF ELEVEN (11) ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL IN THE WING AND AIRCRAFT GROUP 3-SECTIONS. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE ADDITIVE TO THE FIFTEEN (15) MARINE OFFICERS AND TEN (10) MARINE ENLISTED REQUIRED AT THE TACC, TASE, I DASC, DASC-V, AND III MAF TARC AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THREE (3) USA OFFICERS AND TWO (2) USA ENLISTED ARE ALSO REQUIRED AT III MAF TARC, BUT THE ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO MAN THE OTHER MENTIONED AGENCIES IS NOT KNOWN.

D. (S) SUBPARA 3B(4): I WISH TO EMPHASIZE MY CONTINUED CONCERN REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT IN ICTZ. DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL, THE NUMBER OF MARINE AIRCRAFT FRAGGED FOR SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ INCREASED ALMOST DAILY WHILE AIR FORCE SORTIES REMAINED SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE PROGRAMMED LEVEL ESTABLISHED FOR ARMY BATTALIONS.

2. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I AGAIN STRONGLY URGE THAT MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME AND THAT THE WORKABLE PROCEDURES

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0418 S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE MCEO OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR DIRECTIVE CONTAINED IN REF B, I WILL BE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON MY VIEWS AT 081000H AT YOUR HQTRS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#187

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

PP RUNSAV
DE RUNSAK 0417 1250902
ZNY SSSSS
P 040902Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUNSAV/COMUSMACV
INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN VESTMORELAND, INFO ADM
SHARP, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

A. CG III MAF 221340Z APR68

B. COMUSMACV 300330Z APR68

1. (C) REFERENCE A RECORDED MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
SUBJECT SYSTEM IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS,
BASED ON A THIRTY-DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM DURING
THE PERIOD 22MAR-21APR68. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF THE SYSTEM
HAS CONTINUED AND I HAVE CONFIRMED MY OPINIONS BASED ON
FURTHER EVALUATION DURING THE PERIOD 1-30APR68. AS A RESULT
OF THIS FURTHER REVIEW, I REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE VALIDITY OF
MY VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REF A, BUT DESIRE TO AMPLIFY SOME OF
THEM AS FOLLOWS:

A. (C) SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(1)(C): RESPONSE TIMES TO RE-

PAGE 2 RUNSAK 0417 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
QUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES HAVE IMPROVED; HOWEVER, THIS HAS
BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY UTILIZING THE PROCEDURE OF DIVERTING
AIRCRAFT FROM PREPLANNED TARGETS AND SUBSEQUENTLY COVERING
THOSE PREPLANNED TARGETS WITH SCRAMBLE AIRCRAFT, PRIMARILY
MARINE CORPS. THE MARINE SYSTEM HAS LONG UTILIZED THIS
PROCEDURE, BUT WITH LESS FREQUENCY AND GREATER DISCRETION.
NEVERTHELESS, WHEN DIVERTS WERE NECESSARY, THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHED
BY ORGANIC MARINE AGENCIES WHICH WERE COMPLETELY COGNIZANT OF
THE CURRENT GROUND SITUATION AND, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO
DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF THE DIVERT ON THE GROUND ACTION.
NOTWITHSTANDING THIS MODICUM OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE RESPONSE
TIME FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES, THE UNWIELDY AND TIME-CONSUMING
PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING PREPLANNED STRIKES STILL EXIST.

B. (S) SUBPARA 3B(2)(A): I'M HAPPY TO REPORT THAT THE
NEW SYSTEM IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE INHERENT CAPABILITIES
OF OUR MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES TO COORDINATE AIR WITH
GROUND

MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. HOWEVER,
IN AREAS OF I CORPS OUTSIDE OF WHERE MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES
FUNCTION, THIS ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY COORDINATE FIRES DOES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#186

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0417 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 NOT EXIST. SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES PREVAIL IN THOSE AREAS,
 WHEREBY THE FIRING UNIT PASSES ARTILLERY INFORMATION THROUGH ONE
 OR MORE AGENCIES TO A MORE DISTANT COMBAT REPORTING CENTER FOR
 DISSEMINATION. THESE PROCEDURES INVOLVE INHERENT DELAYS AND
 AIRCRAFT CAN BE OPERATING IN AREAS WHERE IMMEDIATE ARTILLERY
 FIRE MISSIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED, WITHOUT RECEIVING THE
 NECESSARY WARNINGS.

C. (C) SUBPARA 3B(3): ADD AN ADDITIONAL SUBPARA (C)
 AS FOLLOWS:

(C) ADDITIONAL REPORTS ARE NOW REQUIRED. THE WORKLOAD
 INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE CONSOLIDATED RVN MISSION
 REPORT, INSTITUTED BY 7TH AF LETTER OF 2 APRIL 1968, REQUIRES
 THE SERVICES OF ELEVEN (11) ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL IN THE WING
 AND AIRCRAFT GROUP 3-SECTIONS. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE ADDITIVE
 TO THE FIFTEEN (15) MARINE OFFICERS AND TEN (10) MARINE ENLISTED
 REQUIRED AT THE TACC, TASE, I DASC, DASC-V, AND III MAF TARC
 AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THREE (3)
 USA OFFICERS AND TWO (2) USA ENLISTED ARE ALSO REQUIRED AT
 III MAF TARC, BUT THE ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE
 PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO MAN THE OTHER MENTIONED AGENCIES IS NOT

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0417 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 KNOWN.

D. (S) SUBPARA 3B(4): I WISH TO EMPHASIZE MY CONTINUED
 CONCERN REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT IN ICTZ.
 DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL, THE NUMBER OF MARINE AIRCRAFT
 FRAGGED FOR SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ INCREASED ALMOST
 DAILY WHILE AIR FORCE SORTIES REMAINED SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW
 THE PROGRAMMED LEVEL ESTABLISHED FOR ARMY BATTALIONS.

2. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I AGAIN STRONGLY URGE THAT
 MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN
 III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME AND THAT THE WORKABLE PROCEDURES
 OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR DIRECTIVE CONTAINED IN REF B, I WILL
 BE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON MY VIEWS AT 0800G AT YOUR HQTRS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#186

For General Anderson:

Subj: Artillery Warning System PCV

Ref: (a) Current "MACV Dir 95-13 of 24Feb68" (attached)
 (b) Telecon PCV FSCC

1. Aviation Artillery Warning System uses or is handled by the Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) which may be an element of the TOC, FSCC/FSCE or the DASC.

a. The reporting system is as follows:

(1) Btry to FDC to FSCE "which is at PCV Hqs" to DASC V to CRC "Panama".

(2) CRC then passes to A/C or other flight following agencies, communications permitting.

Additional Manpower:

TACC = 2 Majors	USMC	2
TASE = 2 Majors	USMC	
1 Captain	USMC	
1 E-6	USMC	4
I DASC = 1 LtCol	USMC	
3 Captains	USMC	
1 Lt	USMC	
3 Enl	USMC	8
DASC V = 1 LtCol	USMC	
3 Captains	USMC	
1 Lt	USMC	
3 Enl	USMC	8
TARC = 1 Major	USA	
2 Captains	USA	
5 Enl	(3 USMC; 2 USA)	8
TOTAL = 15 USMC officers		} 18 officers
3 USA officers		
10 USMC Enl		
2 USA enl		

PROPOSED DRAFT RECEIVED FROM CG FMAW, THAT WAS REWRITTEN AND
 RELEASSED AS CG III MAF 040902 MAY68 BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF

PRIORITY

S E C R E T

2MAY68/IMS

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: COMUSMACV

INFO: CINCPAC

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM SHARP, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

A. MY 221340Z APR68

1. (C) REFERENCE A RECORDED MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SUBJECT
 SYSTEM IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS, BASED ON A
 THIRTY DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM DURING THE PERIOD 22 MAR-
 21 APR 68. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF THE SYSTEM HAS CONTINUED AND I HAVE
 CONFIRMED MY OPINIONS BASED ON FURTHER EVALUATION DURING THE PERIOD 1-30
 APR 68. ACCORDINGLY, I WISH TO REVISE REF A, AS FOLLOWS:

A. (C) SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(1)(C): RESPONSE TIMES TO REQUESTS FOR
 IMMEDIATE STRIKES HAVE IMPROVED; HOWEVER, THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
 BY THE PROCEDURE OF DIVERTING AIRCRAFT FROM PREPLANNED TARGETS AND SUB-
 SEQUENTLY COVERING THE PREPLANNED TARGETS WITH SCRAMBLES. THE MARINE
 SYSTEM HAS LONG UTILIZED THIS PROCEDURE, BUT WITH LESS FREQUENCY AND
 GREATER DISCRETION. WHEN DIVERTS WERE NECESSARY, THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHED
 BY AN ORGANIC MARINE AGENCY WHICH WAS COGNIZANT OF THE CURRENT GROUND
 SITUATION AND, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF THE
 DIVERT ON THE GROUND ACTION. ADDITIONALLY, THIS PROCEDURE HAS A REC-
 OGNIZED DISADVANTAGE OF PILOTS NOT BEING PRE BRIEFED ON THE PARTICULAR
 MISSION.

B. (S) SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(2)(A): THE NEW SYSTEM IS EXPLOITING THE
 MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND, THEREFORE, CONTAINS THE BASIC ABILITY
 WHERE SO EMPLOYED TO COORDINATE SUPPORTING AIR WITH GROUND MANEUVERS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#186

PRIORITY

S E C R E T

PRIORITY

AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE ABILITY OUTSIDE MARINE CONTROL AREAS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COORDINATION OF FIRES IN I CORPS. THE PROCEDURE WHEREBY THE FIRING UNIT PASSES ARTILLERY INFORMATION TO A MORE DISTANT AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUCH AS THE SENIOR CRC FOR DISSEMINATION TO OTHER CONTROL AGENCIES CONTAINS INHERENT DELAYS WHICH ALLOWS IMMEDIATE ARTILLERY FIRE MISSIONS TO BE CONDUCTED BEFORE AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA CAN BE WARNED.

2. (C) MY OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN THE REMAINING SECTIONS OF REF A REMAIN THE SAME AND I WISH TO EMPHASIZE MY CONTINUED CONCERN REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT IN ICTZ. DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL, THE NUMBER OF MARINE AIRCRAFT FRAGGED FOR SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ INCREASED ALMOST DAILY WHILE AIR FORCE SORTIES REMAINED SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE PROGRAMMED LEVEL. I FURTHER EMPHASIZE THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM CONTROVENES THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM. *Correct*

3. (U) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I AGAIN STRONGLY URGE THAT MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME AND THAT THE WORKABLE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

GP-4
DIST: G-3, S/S

C. C. Chamberlin
C. C. CHAMBERLIN, LTCOL
ASS'T PLANS/STATS OFFICER
FIRST WING 203

RELEASED BY: _____

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE
FOP**

OO RUHKM RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 0413 1250810
ZNY CCCCC
PAC -T- CMC
O 040810Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAR FROM LTGEN
CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD WAS PREPARED BY
NORM ANDERSON AND IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE
SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
1. AT APPROXIMATELY 1000, 2 MAY 1968 GENERAL MOMYER, COMMANDER
7TH AIR FORCE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROSSON, COMMANDER PROV CORPS V;
MAJOR GENERAL RAY DAVIS, DEPUTY COMMANDER, PCV; BRIGADIER GENERAL
BOLT, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS, 7TH AIR FORCE; COLONEL
PHELPS, USA, DIRECTOR TASE, SAIGON; COLONEL HENDERSON, USAF, OIC
DASC-V, AND I CONFERRED AT HEADQUARTERS, PCV ON THE BASIC SUBJECT.
INITIALLY THE MEETING HAD BEEN SCHEDULED BETWEEN GENERAL MOMYER AND
GENERAL ROSSON, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MARINE
CORPS, CG, III MAF DIRECTED MY PRESENCE WITH THE APPROVAL OF

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0413 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

2. GENERAL MOMYER PRESIDED AND COMMENCED THE DISCUSSION BY
REMARKING THAT A REVIEW OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AFTER 30
DAYS OF IMPLEMENTATION HAD BEEN DIRECTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING WHAT FLAWS EXISTED IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND
HOW TO CORRECT THEM. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT HIS INTERPRET-
ATION OF THIS PROVISIO DIFFERS FROM MINE IN THAT I WOULD HAVE
THOUGHT THE INTENT WAS TO REVIEW THE 30 DAYS TO DETERMINE
WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH SINGLE MANAGEMENT.) AT ANY
RATE, COMUSMACV HAS DIRECTED AN EVALUATION REPORT BE PRESENTED TO
HIM NEXT WEDNESDAY, 8 MAY 1968. IN THIS CONNECTION, GENERAL MOMYER
INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH SINGLE MANAGEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT ON THE
10TH OF MARCH, THE EVALUATION WILL COVER PERFORMANCES FROM 1 THRU
30 APRIL BECAUSE FULL IMPLEMENTATION WAS A GRADUAL MATTER. AS WITH
ALL NEW SYSTEMS, HE SAID, A SHAKEDOWN PERIOD IS
NECESSARY.

3. GENERAL MOMYER REMARKED THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT HAD BEEN
ASKED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND TO EXAMINE AND REPORT TO HIM ALL AIR
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS WHILE IN THE III MAF AREA. THIS GENERAL WALT
DID. FURTHER HE WAS ASKED WHEN HE RETURNED TO SAIGON TO SEE

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 NEED AND DO RELY ON MORE FIXED WING HABITUALLY. GENERAL MOMYER
 ASSERTED THAT HIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL ALLEVIATE THIS
 PROBLEM. HE WOULD SHOW IN 7TH AIR FORCE FRAG A SET NUMBER OF
 SORTIES DAILY RESERVED FOR USE AS ESCORT FOR HELICOPTERS.

6. THE SUBJECT OF DIVERTS WAS NEXT ADDRESSED. IT SEEMED
 AGREED BY ALL, INCLUDING GENERAL MOMYER, THAT PRE-PLANNING MERELY
 RESULTS IN PLACING A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF AIR EFFORT AIRBORNE AND
 AVAILABLE FOR ANY USE A SPECIFIC GROUND COMMANDER MAY WISH. IT
 APPEARED THAT GENERAL MOMYER AND GENERAL BOLT HAVE SOME INTENTIONS
 OF REDUCING THE TIME DELAYS IN THE PRE-PLANNING PROCESS,
 A WEAKNESS WHICH GENERAL ROSSON EMPHASIZED HEAVILY, SAYING THE
 SYSTEM IS TOO PONDEROUS BUT WE ARE TRYING TO MAKE IT WORK. GENERAL
 MOMYER AGREED THAT EVERYONE HAS DONE A GOOD JOB SO FAR IN TRYING
 TO MAKE IT WORK.

7. ADDRESSING THE SUBJECT OF SUITABLE ORDNANCE, GENERAL MOMYER
 SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS A FRAG MODIFICATION RECEIVED ABOUT 6 HOURS
 PRIOR TO TOT MIGHT SPECIFY THE ORDNANCE LOAD TO BE CARRIED. I
 INDICATED THAT IT'S MY EXPERIENCE THAT DOWN-LOADING OF ORDNANCE
 AND SUBSTITUTING ANOTHER IS MUCH TOO WASTEFUL OF MANPOWER.
 A SUPERIOR SOLUTION, I STATED, WAS TO HAVE STRIP ALERT AIRCRAFT

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0413 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 PRE-LOADED WITH VARIOUS DESIRED TYPES OF ORDNANCE.

8. THE DISCUSSION CONTINUED AFTER GENERAL MOMYER INQUIRED FROM
 ALL PARTICIPANTS IF THEY HAD ANY FURTHER SUBJECTS TO OFFER.
 EXCEPT FOR A REFERENCE MADE BY COLONEL PHELPS TO THE DESIRE OF THE
 3D MARINE DIVISION FOR MORE NIGHT TPQ'S, THERE WAS NO
 CONSTRUCTIVE THOUGHT ADDED.

9. THE TENOR OF THIS DISCUSSION LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE
 AIR FORCE KNOWS IT IS IN SOME TROUBLE ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND IS
 WILLING TO MODIFY THE SYSTEM, IN MAJOR RESPECTS IF NECESSARY, TO
 KEEP THE SYSTEM IN FORCE. THERE WAS A STATED WILLINGNESS ON THE
 PART OF GENERAL MOMYER TO ADJUST IN ORDER TO CORRECT THE
 DISADVANTAGE OF LONG LEAD TIME, THE DISADVANTAGE OF IMPROPER
 ORDNANCE, AND EVEN THE DISADVANTAGE OF NOT PROVIDING SUFFICIENT
 FLEXIBILITY FOR THE MARINES TO PLAN THEIR SUPPORT OF HELICOPTER
 OPERATIONS WITH PRACTICAL CERTAINTY. I FEEL 7TH AIR FORCE WILL GO
 TO ANY LENGTH TO MAINTAIN THE AIR CONTROL AND SCHEDULING AUTHORITY
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT GIVES THEM. IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE OF ACCOMMODA-
 TION WE WILL BE HARD PRESSED TO OBTAIN A REVERSAL OF THE DECISION
 TO IMPLEMENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT. SINCE OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO REGAIN
 THE CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF MARINE GROUND AND AIR UNITS AND

BT

PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

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CONFIDENTIAL

OO RUMKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 0439 1250810
 ZNY CCCCC
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 040810Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 RESOURCES WHICH WE FORMERLY ENJOYED. WE SHOULD EXAMINE WITH
 GREAT CARE THE POINTS WE MAKE ON THE 8TH OF MAY TO INSURE THAT WE
 RETAIN THE GREATEST POSSIBLE IMPACT FOR LATER CONSIDERATION BY
 HIGHER AUTHORITY.

UNQUOTE
 WARM REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

#184

OO RUMWAA
 DENYUMHFA 0566 1250600
 ZNY EEEEE
 O 040550Z MAY 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 INFO RUMHAW/CG 1ST MAW DANANG
 BT
 UNCLAS E F T O 12643
 SUBJ: IN-COUNTRY AIR SUPPORT DATA
 REF: A. FONECON COL SMITH, MACCOC AND COL WILKER, III MAF,
 3 MAY

B. CINCPAC 030528Z MAY 68 (NOTAL)

1. AS INDICATED IN REFERENCE A, CERTAIN INFORMATION REQUESTED IN REFERENCE B MUST BE PROVIDED FROM III MAF RECORDS, SPECIFICALLY, DATA PERTAINING TO III MAF AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS FOR PERIOD 1 FEB -21 MAR 68 IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN SUBPARAGRAPHS 1B THROUGH 1G OF REFERENCE B.
2. REQUEST THIS INFORMATION BE PROVIDED DIRECT TO THE CINCPAC TEAM DURING THE III MAF VISIT, IF POSSIBLE. AT THE LATEST, INFORMATION MUST BE FURNISHED MACV, COC, NLT COB, 6 MAY, TO BE PROVIDED CINCPAC TEAM PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

00 RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAL 94D 1230950
 ZNY CCCCC ZOK JPCCO
 O 020945Z MAY 68

ACT G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO ADJ S/S
 G-6

FM TAF TACC TSN AB RVN
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG AB RVN
 INFO RUMSARH/PROV CORPS VICTOR HUE PHU BAI RVN
 RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG AB RVN
 RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU BAI RVN
 UUMSE/MACV COC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L T A C W F P
SUBJECT: DIVERT MISSIONS WITHIN I CORPS (U)

1. (C) AN OPERATIONAL PROBLEM PRESENTLY EXISTS AT I DASC AND DASC VICTOR IN REGARDS TO DIVERTING PREPLANNED MISSIONS IN I CORPS TO FULFILL IMMEDIATE REQUESTS. AS YOU ARE AWARE THE AIR FORCE/ARMY PROCEDURE HAS BEEN AND IS TO USE DIVERTS FROM LOWER PRIORITY MISSIONS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE TO MEET IMMEDIATE REQUESTS FOR TROOPS IN CONTACT AND/OR OTHER URGENT SITUATIONS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THE REDUCED REACTION TIME OBTAINABLE THROUGH THE USE OF DIVERTS WHICH MINIMIZES FRIENDLY CASUALTIES AND INFLECTS MAXIMUM LOSSES ON THE ENEMY. WHERE NECESSARY, AIRCRAFT MAY BE SCRAMBLED TO COVER THOSE TARGETS FROM WHICH SORTIES ARE DIVERTED.

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 94D **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
 THE ULTIMATE DECISION AS WHETHER TO DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE MAY BE MADE BY THE G-3 AIR CONCERNED OR BY THE DASC IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY G-3 AIR.

2. (C) RECOGNIZING THAT THE DIVERT SYSTEM OF THE AIR FORCE/ARMY JAGOS MAY NOT COINCIDE IN DETAILS WITH THE MARINE SYSTEM, DEFINED III MAF POLICY AND GUIDELINES TO I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE NEEDED ON THE AIR SORTIE DIVERTS IN I CORPS. SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ARE TO WHAT DEGREE DIVERTS ARE TO BE USED TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN CONTACT AND ENEMY TROOPS IN THE OPEN, THE POLICY OF DIVERTS FROM LZ PREPARATIONS, AN ORDERING OF THE RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF MISSIONS AND TARGETS AMONG WHICH DIVERTS ARE USUALLY ACCEPTABLE OR DESIRABLE AND ANY FURTHER GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR DASC PERSONNEL TO ASSURE A HIGH DEGREE OF TIMELY AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSIVENESS TO THE OBJECTIVES OF CG III MAF.

3. (C) DEFINED III MAF POSITION AND GUIDELINES ARE REQUESTED TO ASSURE THAT I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE RESPONSIVE TO AND CONFORM TO III MAF DESIRES AND POLICY.

4. (C) SUBJECT TO THE POLICIES AND GUIDELINES YOU PROVIDE I DASC, WE PROPOSE THAT CG PROV CORPS VICTOR PROVIDE SIMILAR GUIDANCE TO DASC VICTOR.

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/6 (3/68)

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SECRET

ZCZCSAA456VV ARA225
 OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAR 51 1230459
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 020450Z MAY 68
 FM 7AF TACC TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
 TO RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU BAI AB RVN
 RUMBDF/ABCCC UDORN THAIL
 R MSAGP/I DASC DANANG AB RVN
 RUMSARH/PROV CORPS VICTOR HUE PHU BAI AB RVN
 RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG AB RVN
 BT

6
 ACT G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

S E C R E T TACWFP

1. (S) A RECENT MESSAGE FROM III MAF, IN WHICH DASC VICTOR WAS NOT AN ADDRESSEE, ESTABLISHED AN AREA WEST OF KHE SANH ENCLOSED BY THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES:

FROM XD 8539
 TO XD 7925
 TO XD 6144
 TO XD 6155
 TO XD 7661
 TO XD 0948
 TO XD 8247
 TO XD 8539

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 51 **S E C R E T**

2. (S) THE MAJORITY OF THIS AREA IS IN-COUNTRY, HOWEVER THE WESTERNMOST PORTION IS OUT-COUNTRY. TWO ADDITIONAL FAC AIRCRAFT AND THREE FAC'S HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED TO KEEP THIS AREA UNDER INCREASED SURVEILLANCE AS IT IS THE AREA FROM WHICH ARTILLERY, ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS ARE LAUNCHED ON KHE SANH. STRIKES REQUESTED FOR THE OUT-COUNTRY PORTION WILL BE HANDLED AND PROCESSED AS IN-COUNTRY. NO ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES ARE REQUIRED ON YOUR PART. FOR PRE-PLANS, 7TH AIR FORCE WILL DETERMINE WHETHER IN-COUNTRY OR OUT-COUNTRY EFFORT WILL BE USED TO STRIKE OUT-COUNTRY TARGETS IN THIS AREA. TREAT IMMEDIATE REQUESTS FOR TARGETS IN THE OUT-COUNTRY PORTION AS IN-COUNTRY.

GP-4
 BT

air control

SECRET

SECRET

NNNNZCZCSAA696ZVA 779VV PHN394VV AA
05

OO RUMSAK
DE RUHKA 0429 1240529
ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
O P 030528Z MAY 68
FM CINCPAC
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
INFO RUMSAL/CMDR 7AF
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND INFO GEN MOMYER AND LT
GEN CUSHMAN FROM ADMIRAL SHARP
IN COUNTRY AIR SUPPORT DATA (U)
A. CINCPAC 030139Z MAY 68
1. IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE TEAM VISIT REFERRED TO IN
REF A, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE AVAILABLE FOR THEIR
REVIEW THE FOLLOWING DATA ON AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR
EACH OF THE MONTHS FEBRUARY, MARCH AND APRIL, 1968 BROKEN
OUT BY CORPS ZONES WITH I CTZ SUBDIVIDED INTO MARINE CORPS
AND ARMY FORCES:
A. AVERAGE NUMBER OF FRIENDLY MANEUVER BATTALIONS
ASSIGNED TO THE CTZ.

PAGE 2 RUHKA 429 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
B. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED FIXED WING SUPPORT REQUESTS
SUBMITTED BY GROUND UNITS.
C. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED REQUESTS FRAGGED BY THE TACC.
D. NUMBER OF FRAGGED PREPLANNED MISSIONS (IN C ABOVE)
ACTUALLY EXECUTED ON FRAGGED TARGET.
E. NUMBER OF FRAGGED MISSIONS DIVERTED TO OTHER
TARGETS DUE TO:
(1) HIGHER PRIORITY MISSION
(2) OTHER REASONS SUCH AS WEATHER, ETC.
F. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED SORTIES FLOWN BY USAF AND
USMC AIRCRAFT. IN I CTZ IDENTIFY SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF
ARMY, MARINE AND RVN FORCES BY USAF AND USMC AIRCRAFT
SEPARATELY.
G. SAME SORTIE DATA AS IN F ABOVE IN RESPONSE TO
IMMEDIATE (SCRAMBLE) REQUESTS FROM GROUND UNITS. GP-4.
BT

SECRET

#179

SECRET

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUHKA 0344 1240139
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO

O P 030139Z MAY 68
 FM CINCPAC
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUMSAL/CMDR 7AF
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GEN MONYER AND
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM ADMIRAL SHARP
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
 REF: A CG IIIMAF 221340Z APR 68
 B CINCPAC 230409Z APR 68
 C COMUSMACV 11604/241216Z APR 68

1. REF A ADVISED OF DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SYSTEM FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS RECENTLY INSTITUTED IN SVN. REF B REQUESTED COMUSMACV'S COMMENTS ON REF A AND REF C ADVISED THAT REF A WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY, BASED ON ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE DURING APRIL.
2. IN ORDER FOR ME TO BE FULLY ADVISED OF ALL FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS

RELATIVE TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM, I AM SENDING A CINCPAC EVALUATION TEAM TO SVN FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECEIVING BRIEFINGS AND PARTICIPATING IN DISCUSSIONS AT THE VARIOUS COMMAND ECHELONS CONCERNED WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM. THE CINCPAC TEAM WILL CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING:
 ASST C/S, OPERATIONS BGEN H. G. HUTCHINSON, JR., USMC
 HEAD, AIR OPS BRANCH COL E. S. WILLIAMS, USAF
 HEAD, GROUND OPS BRANCH COL T. W. BROWN, USA
 HEAD, POLICY SECTION PLANS DIV CAPT J.G. BROZO, USN

3. ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS (ALL TIMES LOCAL):

ETA	PLACE	ETD
040800	SAIGON	070800

OUT-OF-COUNTRY TRAVEL VIA CINCPAC BLUE EAGLE AIRCRAFT.

IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL AND RETURN TO CLARK TO BE PROVIDED BY COMUSMACV. ALL TEAM MEMBERS ARE FAMILIAR WITH BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM, THE PROCEDURES AND FORCES INVOLVED, AND ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH EXTENSIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER AT HAND.

4. REQUEST COMUSMACV ARRANGE IN-COUNTRY BRIEFINGS AS APPROPRIATE, TO INCLUDE VISITS TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AS REQUIRED. REQUEST COPIES OF ALL PREPARED BRIEFINGS BE DELIVERED TO THE TEAM PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTING SVN. GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#178

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NNNNZCZCSAA204ZVA 339VV ARA839

PP RUMSAK

DE RUMSAR 9 1220305

ZNY CCCCC

P 010145Z MAY 68

FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN

TO RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG

INFO RUMHLA/I MAW DANANG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L T A C P .

SUBJECT: RADIO FREQ DESIGNATORS AND COLOR CODES (U).

REFERENCE: III MAF MESSAGE 05/0244Z APR 68.

1. (C) REFERENCED MESSAGE REQUESTS 7AF UNITS TO ADOPT CODED FREQUENCY DESIGNATORS USED BY III MAF.

2. (C) 7AF HAS NOT SANCTIONED USE OF CODED FLIGHT PARAMETERS BY ITS UNITS ON IN-COUNTRY STRIKE SORTIES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT I MAW USES NUMEROUS BASE REFERENCES AND CODE WORDS AND RESPECT THEIR RIGHT TO DO SO AS THEY DEEM NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT JUDGED ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION TO CAUSE ELEMENTS OF FIVE WINGS TO INCORPORATE A CODING PROCEDURE.

3. (C) WE QUESTION THE SUGGESTION THAT SECURITY OF FREQUENCIES MAY BE COMPROMISED. 7AF BELIEVES THE ENEMY TO BE SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO READILY IDENTIFY AND USE ANY UHF FREQUENCY.

4. (U) REQUEST RE-CONSIDERATION OF YOUR REQUEST.

ACT G-6
INFO RPS
COPY TO G-2 ADJ S/S

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 9 C O N F I D E N T I A L

GP-4

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