

- ~~14. ~~INFO ROSSON 230405Z MAY68 (S)~~
~~ROSSON TO PALMER INFO CUSHMAN~~
~~FUTURE POSTURE OF PCV FORCES~~~~
- ~~15. ~~ADMINO GENRACITE 240248Z MAY68~~
~~WASHINGTON POST STORY ON CR 72~~~~
16. USADO AMCONSUL HONGKONG 250242Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
FOR AIDE DE CAMP
CUSHMAN'S TRIP TO HONG KONG
21. COMUSMACV 260207Z MAY68 (C) *group-4*
WESTMORELAND TO CUSHMAN
LOCATION OF I DASC
- ~~18. ~~CG FMAW 260216Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~~~
- 4 19. PALMER 260425Z MAY68 (S) *group - not shown*
PALMER TO ROSSON INFO CUSHMAN
FUTURE POSTURE OF PCV FORCES
- ~~5 20. ~~CG FMAW 260859Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~~~
- 6 21. CG FMFPAC 262248Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
KRULAK TO CHAPMAN INFO CUSHMAN
FURTHER COMMENTS ON 70-75% OPCON FORMULA
- 7 22. CG FMAW 270707Z MAY68 (C) *group-4*
ANDERSON TO KRULAK INFO CUSHMAN
IN-EXCESS ALLOWANCE FOR PROV MAG-39)U)
- 8 23. COMUSMACV 270902Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND TO DAVID INFO ROSSON AND CUSHMAN
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 9 24. COMUSMACV 270905Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND TO DAVIS INFO CUSHMAN & ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- ~~10 25. ~~CG FMAW 280046Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~~~
- ~~11 26. ~~CG FMAW 280931Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~~~
- 12 27. COMUSMACV 280931Z MAY68 (U)
WESTM RELAND TO DAVIS, INFO CUSHMAN & ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 13 28. GEN ABRAMS 281151Z MAY68 (S) *gp-3 (w attachment)*
ABRAMS TO ROSSON
SITUATION IN ICTZ

- 41 ~~2.~~ CG FMFPAC 222124Z MAY68 (S) *Group-4*
KRULAK TO ANDERSON INFO CUSHMAN
IN-EXCESS ALLOWANCE ALLOWANCE FOR PROV MAG 39)U)
- 42 ~~3.~~ CG FMFPAC 221851Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *Gr-4*
KRULAK TO CUSHMAN
TRANSMISSION OF DAILY REPORT
- 43 ~~4.~~ CG FMFPAC 221855Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
KRULAK to ANDERSON info CUSHMAN, ROBERTSON, TOMPKINS, CHAPMAN
KEEP WING DAILY REPORT COMING FOR 30 MORE DAYS
- 44 ~~5.~~ COMSEVENTHFLT 230854Z MAY68 (C) *Group-4*
BRINGLE TO CUSHMAN
INVITATION TODINNER
- 45 ~~6.~~ ~~CG FMAW 231406Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~WING TO CMC, FMFPAC, III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 46 ~~7.~~ CG NINTH MAB 230215Z MAY68 (S) *Group-4*
CHIP TO COL ETHERIDGE
SLF ~~NEWXX~~ HELICOPTERS
- 47 ~~8.~~ CG FMFPAC 232309Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*
KRULAK TO CUSHMAN, INFO CHAPMAN & MASTERS
COMMENTS ON CUSHMAN'S TACTICS MSG
- 48 ~~9.~~ GEN ABRAMS 240042Z MAY68 (U)
ABRAMS TO ROSSON, INFO PALMER & CUSHMAN
CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS
- 49 ~~10.~~ JCS 202253Z MAY68 (S) *Group-3*
PASSED TO III MAF BY WESTMORELAND
SECDEF'S DECISION RE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
- 50 ~~11.~~ CG 9TH MAB 232330Z MAY68 (U)
CHIP TO ELDRIDGE
SLF HELICOPTERS
- 51 ~~12.~~ CG 101ST ABN DIV 240315Z MAY68 (C) *Group-4*
BERSANTI TO CUSHMAN
HEAT CASUALTIES -- SALT TABLETS & WATER
- 52 ~~13.~~ ~~CG FMAW 241536Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~WING TO CMC, FMFPAC & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 53 ~~14.~~ LTG ROSSON 230405Z MAY68 (S) *Group - not shown w/attachment, Gr-4*
ROSSON TO PALMER INFO CUSHMAN
FUTURE POSTURE PCV FORCES
- 54 ~~15.~~ ~~ADMNO CINCPACFLT 242248Z MAY68 (21)~~
WASHINGTON POST STORY ON SR-71

- ~~29~~ 40. LGEN ROSSON 180244Z MAY68 (U)
ROSSON to WESTMORELAND info CUSHMAN
CONTROL AND TURNIN AND DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS
- ~~30~~ 41. ~~CG FMAW 180527Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~WING to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 31 ~~42~~. GEN WESTMORELAND 181228Z MAY68 (S) *gp - not shown*
WESTMORELAND TO ALL
SECURITY BREACH ON AIR STRIKE - 20TH PARALLEL
- 32 ~~43~~. CG FMFPAC 182001Z MAY68 (S MCEO) ~~4~~ *gp - 4*
KRULAK to CUSHMAN & ANDERSON
DEP SECDEF'S COMMENTS ON AIR CONTROL - KRULAK'S FACE-SAVING CLAUSE
- 33 ~~44~~. CG FMFPAC 182002Z MAY68 (U)
KRULAK to DRAKE
"WELCOME ABOARD"
- ~~34~~ 45. ~~CG FMAW 190810Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- ~~35~~ 46. ~~CG FMAW 200630Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~WING to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 36 ~~47~~. COMUSMACV 200924Z MAY68 (C) *gp - 4*
FOR BGEN ANDERSON
TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION ABOUT LTGEN ROSSON'S REACTION TO PRESS
- ~~37~~ 48. ~~CG FMAW 210647Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 38 ~~49~~. GEN ABRAMS 211027Z MAY68 (C) *gp - not shown*
ABRAMS to CUSHMAN
APPROVES HONG KONG TRIP REQUEST
- 39 50. CG NINTH MAB 211145Z MAY68 (S) *gp - 4*
CHIP to VAN RYZIN
C-130 SITUATION
- ~~40~~ 51. ~~CG FMAW 220854Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~WING to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~

- 15 ~~26.~~ COMUSMACV 150251Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND to TOMPKINS, info CUSHMAN & ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 16 ~~27.~~ ~~CG FMAW 150705Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 17 ~~28.~~ GEN WESTMORELAND 151235Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
WESTMORELAND to ALL
SINGLE MANAGEMENT -- CHANGES TO SYSTEM -- III MAF COMMENTS
- 18 ~~29.~~ GEN ABRAMS 160423Z MAY68 (C) *gp - not shown*
ABRAMS TO ALL
AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES
- 19 ~~30.~~ ~~CG FMAW 160534Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 20 ~~31.~~ GEN ABRAMS 160842Z MAY68 (C) *group - not shown*
ABRAMS TO ALL
WILL BE AT III MAF 17MAY68
- 21 ~~32.~~ CG FMFPAC 160911Z MAY68 (S) *group - 4*
KRULAK TO CUSHMAN & SHARP
SINGLE MANAGEMENT -- RETURN TO HQTRS
- 22 ~~33.~~ CG FMFPAC 160134Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group - 4*
KRULAK TO CUSHMAN
REQUEST FOR SINGLE MGR DATA ON KAHM DUC
- 23 ~~34.~~ CMC 161504Z MAY68 (C) *group - 4*
CHAPMAN TO CUSHMAN
CAPT MCCOLLEY
- 24 ~~35.~~ CMC 161719Z MAY68 (C) *gp - 4*
CHAPMAN TO CUSHMAN
PROMOTION OF VAN RYZIN
- *25 ~~36.~~ CG 3D MARDIV 160725Z MAY68 (S) *gp - 4*
TOMPKINS to ROSSON info CUSHMAN
PATTERN OF ENEMY SITUATION AROUND KHE SANH
- 26 ~~37.~~ ~~CMC 170143Z MAY68 (C)~~
~~GEN OFFICERS' EYES ONLY ALL COPIES IN SAFE~~
- 27 ~~38.~~ ~~CG FMAW 170530Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 28 ~~39.~~ AMB KOMER 171231Z MAY68 (S) *group - not shown*
KOMER to CUSHMAN, AND ROSSON
DEFENSE OF QUANG TRI RD CADRE

* Declassified and placed in sep. folder

- ~~1~~ ~~22.~~ ~~ADMINSO FMAW 091553Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 2 ~~23.~~ COMUSMACV 100130Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND to MOMYER, CUSHMAN, WEYAND, ETC.
COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY.
- ~~3~~ ~~14.~~ ~~ADMINSO FMAW 100912Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~FMAW TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 4 ~~15.~~ SSO MACV 100606Z MAY68 (S) *group - not shown*
DELAY FUSES
- 5 ~~16.~~ MGEN KERWIN 110154Z MAY68 (C) *gp - not shown*
to WESTMORELAND, ABRAMS, MOMYER, CUSHMAN
Recap of CINCPAC MEETING ON AIR CONTROL
- 6 ~~17.~~ ADMINSO FMFPAC 110334Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp - 3*
THARIN to KRULAK & CUSHMAN
SUMMARIZES CINCPAC MEETING
- ~~7~~ ~~18.~~ ~~ADMINSO FMAW 111438Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~FMAW TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 8 ~~19.~~ ADM SHARP, 112316Z MAY68 (S) *gp - not shown*
SHARP to WESTMORELAND info MOMYER & CUSHMAN
REQUESTS IMPROVED CHANGES TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND REQUESTS
CUSHMAN'S COMMENTS ~~ENTHEREON~~.
- ~~9~~ ~~20.~~ ~~CG FMAW 120658Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- ~~10~~ ~~21.~~ ~~CG FMAW 122910Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 11 ~~22.~~ CTG 76.4 141250Z MAY68 (C) *gp - +*
HARBERT to GLICK
PROSPECTIVE CTG 76.4 VISIT
- ~~12~~ ~~23.~~ ~~CG FMAW 141359Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAW to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 13 ~~24.~~ GEN WESTMORELAND 141411Z MAY68 (S) *gp - not shown*
WESTMORELAND to ALL
GUIDANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS
- 14 ~~25.~~ ADMINSO FMFPAC 141901Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group - 3*
THARIN to CUSHMAN
HYLAND msg TO SHARP on AIR CONTROL

35. ~~CG 1ST AIR CAV 282220Z APR68 (U)~~
~~TOLSON TO MOSEBY, INFO ALL~~
~~COURAGE OF C-130 CREWS IN A SHAU~~
36. ~~COMUSMACV 200226Z APR68 (U)~~
~~WESTMORELAND to BARSANTI, CELLING, info CUSHMAN, ROSSON~~
~~CONGRATULATORY MSG~~
- ~~28~~ 37. ~~CG FMAN 010040Z MAY68 (S) MCTO~~
~~MAW TO CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- ~~29~~ 38. ~~CG FMAN 020520Z MAY68 (S) MCTO~~
~~MAW TO CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 30 39. COMUSMACV 020703Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND TO BARSANTI, CUSHMAN, ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 31 40. COMUSMACV 020945Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND TO BARSANTI, info CUSHMAN, ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 32 41. COMUSMACV 021035Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND TO BARSANTI, info CUSHMAN, ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 33 42. GEN WESTMORELAND 030006Z MAY68 (S EYES ONLY) *9-3*
WESTMORELAND to MOMYER, CUSHMAN, WEYAND, ETC.
RVNAF LEAVE POLICIES FOR TET 1968
- 34 43. CINCPAC 030139Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
SHARP TO WESTMORELAND, MOMYER, & CUSHMAN
WILL SEND TEAM TO ANALYZE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
- 35 44. CINCPAC 030528Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
SHARP TO WESTMORELAND, INFO MOMYER, CUSHMAN
REQUEST FOR DATA TO BE PROVIDED TEAM ANALYZING SINGLE MGMT.
- ~~26~~ 45. ~~CG FMAN 030700Z MAY68 (S) MCTO~~
~~MAW TO CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 37 46. DIRINFO HQMC 031454Z MAY68 (U)
GARRETSON TO CUSHMAN
NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ON GEN CUSHMAN
- ~~38~~ 47. ~~CG FMAN 040825Z MAY68 (S) MCTO~~
~~MAW TO CMC, FMPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~

- 39 ~~48.~~ COMUSMACV 041230Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND TO TOMPKINS, INFO CUSHMAN AND ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 40 ~~49.~~ CG FMFPAC 042156Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
KRULAK TO CUSHMAN
2/4's heavy losses; OUT-OF-COUNTRY REHAB
- 41 ~~50.~~ CTF 76 050844Z MAY68 (S) *Group-4*
BEHRENS TO BGEN ANDERSON
ARG/SLF Capabilities (U)
- 42 ~~1.~~ COMUSMACV 051141Z MAY68 (U)
WESTMORELAND to TRUONG, VIEN, LAM
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- ~~43 2.~~ ~~CG FMAN 051547Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAN TO CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 44 ~~3.~~ COMUSMACV 040106Z MAY68 (C) *Group-4*
WESTMORELAND to SHARP, info WHEELER, PEERS, WEYAND, CUSHMAN, ETC.
PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING MAR68
- 45 ~~4.~~ LTGEN ROSSON 061530Z MAY68 (C) *Group - not shown*
ROSSON to WESTMORELAND, CUSHMAN, SIDLE
PROPOSED PRESS BRIEF for 7MAY68
- ~~46 5.~~ ~~CG FMAN 061603Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAN to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- ~~47 6.~~ ~~COMUSMACV 070100Z MAY68 (S)~~ ~~FROM~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX to SEITH, ANDERSON, INFO HUTCHIN & KERRIN~~
~~PRESENTATIONS TO COMUSMACV AND CINCDCM~~
- ~~48 7.~~ ~~CG FMAN 070617Z MAY68 (S) MCEO)~~
~~MAN to CMC, FMFPAC, & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 49 ~~8.~~ COMUSMACV 071250Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
WESTMORELAND to CUSHMAN
OPERATION ~~3~~ INFERNO
- 50 ~~9.~~ CG FMFPAC 080254Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
KRULAK to CUSHMAN, info ANDERSON & BOUKER
AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION
- ~~51 10.~~ ~~ADMINS FMAN 080933Z MAY68 (S MCEO)~~
~~MAN TO CMC, FMFPAC & III MAF~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 52 ~~11.~~ LTG ROSSON 081230Z MAY68 (S) *Group - not shown*
ROSSON to MCMILLAN, CUSHMAN, TOLSON
DELAY FUSES

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TIMEFORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	30 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
	302121Z MAY 68	1 / OF 3

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
2	CG		6/6		
3	DCG		6/1		Rues
4	DCG AIR		has seen		
11	C/S		5/31		me
	D C/S		6/2		
	D C/S DM				
	S/S	310740			2DU
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

SUBJECT
SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS (U)

REMARKS
 0-3 Get out there
 one night away

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

Comment + copy to G-3 310925H Max Th

SECRET 19

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMUCRA RUMHAW
 DE RUHHFMA 5380 QT QWQWQ
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 302121Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUCRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO ZEN/CMC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN AND
 MGEN ANDERSON INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LT GEN
 KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS (U)

- A. COMUSMACV 211145Z/MAY 68 KS)
 B. COMUSMACV 150905Z/MAR 68 KC) NOTAL
 C. CG FIRST MAW 230300Z/APR 68 KS)

1. REFERENCE A MODIFIED THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B,
 EFFECTIVE 300600H/MAY 68

TO PROVIDE QUOTE: GREATER FLEXIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS
 AND CONTINUITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PREPLANNED AIR
 SUPPORT TO MEET THE DAY-BY-DAY REQUIREMENTS OF
 GROUND COMMANDERS. UNQUOTE. COMUSMACV STATED THAT

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA5380 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AN EVALUATION WILL BE CONDUCTED FOLLOWING THE
 OPERATION OF THE MODIFIED SYSTEM FOR A THIRTY DAY
 PERIOD ENDING 30 JUNE.

2. TO ASSIST IN DOCUMENTING THE MARINE CORPS POSITION
 RELATIVE TO THIS MODIFICATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED.

3. FOR CG III MAF: TO PROVIDE DETAILED DOCUMENTATION
 OF THE MODIFIED SYSTEM FOR THE PROPOSED THIRTY DAY
 TEST PERIOD IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOUR OPERATIONS
 ANALYSIS SECTION ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO PROVIDE A
 DAY BY DAY DESCRIPTION OF THE EFFECTS OF THIS NEW
 APPROACH ON III MAF OPERATIONS. I HAVE ORDERED LTCOL
 BUCKON AND MR. JOHN SESSLER, OPERATIONS ANALYSIS FROM
 HQ FMFPAC, TAD TO III MAF TO ASSIST, AS YOU DIRECT, IN ESTABLISH-
 ING WHATEVER DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES ARE NECESSARY.
 ONGOING PROJECTS HERE REQUIRE THEIR RETURN NLT 6 JUNE.
 MAJOR ROBERTSON, AN OPERATIONS ANALYST NOW ENROUTE TO
 III MAF ON PCS ORDERS, IS BEING BRIEFED HERE ON THE
 BACKGROUND, INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND WILL ARRIVE III MAF ON OR ABOUT

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

5 JUNE.

4. FOR CG FIRST MAW: REFERENCE C ESTABLISHED THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT, WHICH HAS BEEN INVALUABLE IN THE ACCUMULATION OF DATA FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS OF AIR CONTROL. TO PROVIDE A BROADER DATA BASE FOR DOCUMENTING THE MODIFIED SYSTEM THE FOLLOWING REVISIONS TO THE FIRST MAW DAILY SPECIAL REPORT ARE RECOMMENDED:

A. SECTION ONE, PARAGRAPH CHARLIE:

C. PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT.

(1) NUMBER OF TARGETS THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRED HIT.

(2) NUMBER OF TARGETS FRAGGED TO BE HIT.

(3) NUMBER OF WEEKLY PREPLANNED SORTIES FRAGGED TO HIT THESE FRAGGED TARGETS.

(4) NUMBER OF DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES FRAGGED TO HIT THE REMAINDER OF THE FRAGGED TARGETS.

(5) NUMBER OF FRAGGED TARGETS WHICH WERE HIT.

PAGE 4 RUMHMA5380 SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEG

(6) NUMBER OF WEEKLY PREPLANNED SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED.

(7) NUMBER OF DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES WHICH WERE PROVIDED.

B. SECTION ONE, PARAGRAPH FOXTROT:

F. NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES.

(1) REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDER.

(2) APPROVED BY IDASC/DASC VICTOR.

(3) RECEIVED FROM DIVERTED SORTIES.

(4) RECEIVED FROM SCRAMBLED SORTIES.

C. SECTION ONE, PARAGRAPH INDIA:

I. EXTRA OR UNREQUESTED SORTIES RECEIVED FROM SERVICES.

(1) USMC

(2) USAF

(3) USN

(4) OTHER (VNAF, RAAF)

D. SECTION TWO, PARAGRAPH ALFA:

A. SORTIES FLOWN

(1) PREPLANNED

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

(2) SCRAMBLED

(3) ADDED-ON

E. SECTION TWO, NEW PARAGRAPH JULIET:

J. PREPLANNED SORTIE BREAKDOWN (EMPLOYMENT)

(1) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF
MARINE DIVS/SEPARATE REGTS/BNs:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(2) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF U.S.

ARMY:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(3) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(4) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ROKMC:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(5) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER

ICIZ FORCES, KUNAF, SSF)

PAGE 6 RUNHFMA5380 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(6) PREPLANNED SORTIES IN II CORPS

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

(7) PREPLANNED SORTIES OUT OF COUNTRY:

(A) WEEKLY ALLOCATION

(B) DAILY ALLOCATION

F. SECTION TWO, NEW PARAGRAPH KILO:

K. REMARKS

(1) OTHER REMARKS (KEYED TO SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS, WHEN APPROPRIATE)

(2) WEEKLY BASIS ONLY: THE NUMBER OF USAF AND USMC SORTIES FRAGGED TO CG III MAF, THE NUMBER ACTUALLY PROVIDED AND AN EVALUATION OF THESE SORTIES IN TERMS OF TON AND ORDNANCE EXPENDED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**
#19

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 30 MAY 68
	SERIALN/CONTROL DATE 300511Z MAY 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/2		lp	AIR CONTROL (U) REMARKS <h1>EXCLUSIVE</h1> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY To CG - Only one real substantive comment as I see this long message. We made marginal comments on inaccuracies and over simplifications. I'm obviously not impressed by this message - it really makes its mark, in my opinion. J. Perry
3	DCG		6/3		Over	
4	DCG AIR		6-5		HS	
	C/S		5/30		HS	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	301624			DMU	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
						Oversimplified - we have had intermingled P...

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUMUGRA RUMHAW
DE RUMKM 5342 QTOPTQQ
ZNY SSSSS
O P 30051Z MAY 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC SECTION 1 OF 2
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, INFO
LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KULAK. MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY
AIR CONTROL (U)

1. CMC 290144Z/MAY68 (S) (NOTAL)
1. YOUR SUMMARY CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A IS SOLID, AND
ELIMINATES A CASE THAT HAS BEEN LOGICAL FROM THE START. BY NOW,
I BELIEVE THAT ALL THE LITIGANTS KNOW WE ARE RIGHT.
THE PROBLEM IS TO GET THEM TO ADMIT IT. I FEEL THAT WE GAIN
THE MOST SYMPATHETIC HEARING TO THE EXTENT THAT WE SHOW THAT
OUR PROPOSITION IS BEST FOR THE TOTAL WAR EFFORT WHILE OFFERING
THE FACE SAVING REQUIRED BY THE STRONG PERSONALITIES INVOLVED.
IN THIS

PAGE 2 RUMKM 5342 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
LATTER CONTEXT I BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL MIGHT BE STRENGTHENED
BY FLAVORING IT TO MAKE THE MARINE CORPS DEDICATION TO
THE COMMON GOAL STAND OUT MORE CLEARLY. FOR INSTANCE, RESTORING
THE COMBAT INTEGRITY OF MARINE FORCES ENABLES MARINES TO
FIGHT AS THEY WERE DESIGNED, TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO FIGHT,
THUS ENHANCING NOT JUST THE MARINE CAPABILITY, BUT THE TOTAL
COMBAT CAPABILITY OF MACV. ADDITIONALLY, IN TERMS OF THE JOINT
FORCE, THE DEDICATION OF 50 PERCENT OF MARINE AIR TO THE
OVERALL EFFORT IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
COMUSMACV SEEKS WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, CG III MAF,
WITH OPCON OF HIS ORGANIC AIR, WOULD HAVE GREATER
FLEXIBILITY TO FOCUS HIS MARINE AIR WHEREVER REQUIRED, TO MEET
THE NEEDS OF HIS FORCES.

2. WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 5, I SUGGEST A MODIFICATION IN
THE ACTUAL WORDING OF YOUR PROPOSAL. SPECIFICALLY I SUGGEST IT
PROPOSE THAT OPCON OF MARINE FIXED WING ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE
AIRCRAFT AND THE RELATED CONTROL MEANS BE RETURNED TO CG III MAF
WITH THE STIPULATION THAT CG III MAF WILL ASSIGN TO 7TH AIR FORCE
FOR MISSION DIRECTION, 30 PERCENT OF HIS SORTIE GENERATION

*Similar to
our country*

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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SECRET

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PAGE 3 RUMKM 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
CAPABILITY, BASED ON THE ACCEPTED AIR FORCE 1:1 SORTIE RATE.
THIS WOULD BE THE PRACTICAL MECHANICS OF RETURNING 70 PERCENT
OF OUR AIR, WHILE LEAVING 30 PERCENT WITH THE AIR FORCE.

Cant agree as stated

3. TURNING TO OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION MONDAY MORNING
WHEN YOU OBSERVED THAT THE SO-CALLED "INTERMINGLING" OF FORCES
IN I CTZ MAY BE USED AS RATIONALE FOR THE STATUS QUO, I HAVE
FOUR SPECIFIC POINTS IN MIND WHICH MAY BE OF ASSISTANCE TO
YOU IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS:

A. INTERMINGLING OF ARMY AND MARINE FORCES IN I CTZ DOES
NOT EXIST FROM EITHER A COMMAND OR A PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT.

*B. DESPITE SINGLE MANAGEMENT THERE ARE IN FACT TWO AIR CONTROL
SYSTEMS NOW FUNCTIONING IN I CTZ.

These depends on whether you means air traffic control or not. otherwise he is not correct. Also, an air warning system is completely different in my mind.

C. REGARDLESS OF INCREASED TROOP DENSITY IN I CTZ THE AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME AS IT WAS BEFORE THE BUILD-UP.

D. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A SINGLE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST
PROCEDURE FOR, IN FACT, MULTIPLE REQUEST PROCEDURES CAN BE
EMPLOYED FOR AIR AS IS THE CASE FOR OTHER SUPPORT MEANS.
I WILL TAKE UP EACH OF THESE THOUGHTS IN TURN.

→ might drive a man to drink - hopefully, only Sherry.

PAGE 4 RUMKM 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

4. REALISTICALLY, FIVE U.S. DIVISIONS SPREAD OVER A
TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY MILE AXIS, SEPARATED BY CLEARLY
DEFINED TERRAIN FEATURES, AND OPERATING IN WIDELY
SEPARATED ZONES CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS INTERMINGLED. THOSE
WHO USE "INTERMINGLING" AS AN EXCUSE FOR SINGLE
MANAGEMENT IGNORE THE FUNCTION OF BOUNDARIES, NO FIRE LINES,
AND SIMILAR CONTROL DEVICES WHICH DEFINE, COORDINATE, AND
COMPARTMENT THE OPERATIONS OF ADJACENT FORCES. FROM THE VIEWPOINT
OF THE MAN ON THE GROUND THERE IS MORE ISOLATION THAN THERE IS
MIX. TACTICALLY THE FORCES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT. PHYSICAL
SEPARATION OF TROOP UNITS IS GENERALLY GREAT AND, IN
THE CASE OF DIVISIONS, IS MEASURED IN MILES.

5. THE INTERMINGLING ARGUMENT IS A SUPERFICIAL ONE WHEN VIEWED IN
THE FACE OF WHAT IS ACTUALLY TAKING PLACE IN I CTZ. TWO
AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS ARE NOW JUSTAPOSED AND OPERATING IN

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111 MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PAGE 5 RUHKN 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 PRECISELY THE SAME MANNER AS THEY DID, PRIOR TO SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT, WITH ONE EXCEPTION: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF OUR
 ORGANIC AIR NOW RESTS WITH THE 7TH AIR FORCE AND
 THE AUTHORITY OF OUR TADC HAS BEEN PASSED OVER TO
 SAIGON. VIEWED IN TERMS OF INTERMINGLED FORCES, THE
 ONLY LOGICAL OBJECTIVE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WOULD BE TO
 REGULATE, INTERGRATE, AND COORDINATE, WITHIN CONTIGUOUS
 AIR-SPACE, TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN AIR SUPPORT
 MISSIONS IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE MUTUAL INTERFERENCE. HOWEVER,
 I DASC, THE AGENCY OF THE SINGLE MANAGER IN I CTZ, DOES NOT
 HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS, AND IT DOES
 NOT PERFORM THEM. IT SERVES ONLY AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING
 AGENCY FOR IMMEDIATE AIR REQUESTS. EXCEPT FOR THE FREQUENCY OF
 DIVERSIONS, ONCE AN AIR SUPPORT MISSION IS LAUNCHED, SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT HAS NO EFFECT AND CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT FOLLOWS
 THE PROCEDURES EXTANT UNDER 95-4.

6. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE INTERMINGLING OF FORCES IN I CTZ
 REQUIRED SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF SPECIFIED AIR ASSETS AND,

*Not so!
 TADC does not
 have direct authority
 TADC is not in
 the AF chain*

PAGE 6 RUHKN 5342 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 CONSEQUENTLY, A SINGLE SET OF PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING FIXED
 WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, IS NOT VALID WHEN VIEWED IN LIGHT OF
 THE MANY VARIANT REQUEST PROCEDURES CURRENTLY USED TO PROCURE
 OTHER MOBILE FORMS OF COMBAT SUPPORT. TANKS ARE NOT SINGLE
 MANAGED; THE REQUEST PROCEDURES FOR TANK SUPPORT IN THE FIRST AIR
 CAV DIVISION AND THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION ARE NOT AT ALL
 THE SAME. REQUEST PROCEDURES FOR HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS VARY GREATLY,
 EVEN BETWEEN THE THREE ARMY DIVISIONS IN I CTZ. SIMILARLY,
 VARIANT PROCEDURES TO PROCURE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER SUPPORT
 EXIST. THE UNITS USING THESE FIRE SUPPORT MEANS ARE THE SAME
 SO-CALLED INTERMINGLED UNITS AS USE FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT,
 YET WESTY HAS NOT SEEN FIT TO DECREE THAT A SINGLE REQUEST
 PROCEDURE MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO PROCURE TANK AND HELICOPTER
 SUPPORT. THE FACT IS THAT A SINGLE REQUEST PROCEDURE
 FOR FIXED WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS NO MORE REQUIRED THAN IT
 IS FOR THESE OTHER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS.

7. IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT THE INFUSION OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT INTO
 BT

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OO RUEBHOA RUMUGRA RUMHAW
DE RUHKM 5343 GT QPT QQ
ZNY SSSSS
O P 300 11Z MAY 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FINAL SECTION OF 2
THE SKIES OVER I CTZ, NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE ARMY
UNITS WHICH MIGRATED NORTHWARD, REQUIRED THE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION OF AIR ASSETS AND TACTICAL
AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS TO ENSURE COMPATIBILITY WITH THE
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM AND TO ENSURE SAFE
CONTROL OF AIRBORNE TRAFFIC. THE FACT IS, THERE HAS BEEN
NO CHANGE IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES UNDER SINGLE
MANAGEMENT. THE COMBAT REPORTING CENTER (PANAMA) AND THE COMBAT
REPORTING POINT (WATERBOY) WHERE ESTABLISHED, WERE FUNCTIONING AND
WERE BEING USED BY MARINE AND AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IN
EXACTLY THE SAME MANNER AS NOW, LONG BEFORE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT WAS PLACED IN EFFECT. THE AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL PROCEDURES HAVE NOT BEEN CHANGED; THE

PAGE 2 RUHKM 5343 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
PROCEDURES COULD ACCOMMODATE THE INCREASED DENSITY
OF AIR TRAFFIC IN I CTZ UNDER EITHER THE NEW OR THE
MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS
NOT NECESSARY TO CONTROL THE INCREASED AIR TRAFFIC, AS IS
EVIDENCED BY THE HUNDREDS OF HELICOPTERS AND
FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN ATTACK AND RECONNAI-
SSANCE TYPES, WHICH OPERATE DAILY AND ARE NOT SINGLE
MANAGED.

8. IN RETROSPECT, IT SEEMS THAT THE AIR FORCE USED THE
RAPID BUILD-UP IN I CTZ AS A VEHICLE TO CREATE THE
ILLUSION IN WESTMORELAND'S MIND THAT WITHOUT
MOMYER'S FIRM HAND ON THE THROTTLE INCLUDING OPCON OF OUR AIR CHAOS
WOULD RESULT IN I COPRS. WESTMORELAND, LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM FROM
ABOVE, COULD NOT PERCEIVE THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT WOULD ENTAIL
NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN EITHER AIR CONTROL OR TACTICAL AIR
DIRECTION PROCEDURES AT THE EXECUTION LEVEL. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

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II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE
X- ORIGINATOR
A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE
C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION
I- INFORMATION
S- SIGNATURE

FROM
CG FMFPAC

DATE
30 MAY 68

SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE
291917Z MAY 68

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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
2	CG		5/30		P
3	DCG		6/1		R
4	DCG AIR		5/30		Q
1	C/S		5/30		Q
	D C/S		6/2		R
	D C/S DM				
	S/S	300735			DKU
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

SUBJECT
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN

REMARKS
EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
As Give copy to AWC at
MMA following morning brief.

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OO RUMUGRA
DE RUHFMA 5204 QIPQOQU
ZNY SSSSS
O 291917Z MAY 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DELIVER AT THE BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF GEN CHAPMAN'S 290144Z/MAY
SETTING FORTH THE SUMMARY OF A PROPOSAL BEING
PRESENTED TO SECNAV FOR HIS POSSIBLE PRESENTATION TO
DEPSECDEF.

QUOTE:

SUBJ.

CHANGE TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF III MAF AIR ASSETS (U)

1. COMUSMACV MESSAGE 211145Z MAY68 ANNOUNCES MODIFICATIONS OF
THE PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM TO BE EFFECTIVE COMMENCING 200600 MAY 68.

2. THE CHANGE ESSENTIALLY PROVIDES FOR MAJOR DECENTRALIZATION
IN THAT IT ASSIGNS BLOCKS OF AIR SUPPORT ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE WITH
PREDETERMINED TOTS AND ORDNANCE LOADS. 70PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE

PAGE 2 RUHFMA5204 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SORTIES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS,
AND THE REMAINING 30PERCENT ON A DAILY FRAG IN RESPONSE TO AIR
REQUESTS RECEIVED BY 1600 THE DAY BEFORE THEY ARE TO BE FLOWN.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS WERE BROUGHT ABOUT
BY THE UNWIELDINESS AND UNRESPONSIVENESS OF THE ORIGINAL PLAN.
ALSO EVIDENT IS THAT THE CENTRALIZATION, ENVISIONED AS A PARA-
MOUNT REQUIREMENT BY THE ORIGINAL PLAN, HAS BEEN ABANDONED.

3. THIS MODIFIED SYSTEM, BY PUSHING AIR TO THE USER, IS
INTENDED TO PROVIDE GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF
PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT TO MEET THE DAY-BY-DAY REQUIREMENTS
OF GROUND COMMANDERS. RESPONSIVENESS, HOWEVER, WILL STILL BE
DEFICIENT COMPARED TO THE MARINE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. THE WEEKLY FRAG WILL BE PUBLISHED 36 HOURS AHEAD OF ITS
EFFECTIVE TIME OF IMPLEMENTATION. ACTUAL GROUND REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT CANNOT BE PREDICTED ONE WEEK PLUS 36
HOUR AHEAD OF TIME.

B. THE WEEKLY FRAG WILL BE PUBLISHED SHOWING THE TIMES SORTIES
WILL BE FLOWN AND ORDNANCE TO BE CARRIED. THUS GROUND
OPERATIONS REQUIRING AIR SUPPORT MUST BE PLANNED TO ACCOMODATE

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA5204 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THE SUPPORTING AIR ARM WITH NO BEARING ON THE FLUID ENEMY
 SITUATION. THIS MEANS THAT GROUND OPERATIONS MUST NECESSARILY
 BECOME RESPONSIVE TO, AND DEPENDENT UPON, AN AIR SCHEDULE PLANNED
 A WEEK IN ADVANCE. INTELLIGENT ALLOCATION OF THE 30PERCENT
 OF AVAILABLE SORTIES HELD BACK FOR THE DAILY FRAG WILL HELP,
 BUT CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO OVERCOME THIS BASIC DEFICIENCY.
 C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AIR ASSETS REMAINS WITH THE
 CG, 7TH AIR FORCE. ONLY BY POSSESSING OPCON OF ITS OWN AIRCRAFT
 CAN III MAF ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY
 OF AIRCRAFT WHICH CAN THEN BE EMPLOYED THROUGH A SYSTEM DELIBERATELY
 DESIGNED TO PROMOTE ITS MOST EFFECTIVE USE BY
 KEYING ITS EMPLOYMENT TO THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND IN
 COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS.
 5. IN CONCLUSION, IT APPEARS THAT THERE ARE TWO OVERRIDING
 CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT PLAN:
 A. THE REQUIREMENT FOR 30PERCENT OF THE AIR ASSETS TO BE
 HELD BY COMUSMACV AS A HEDGE AGAINST THE OVERALL TACTICAL
 SITUATION.
 B. THE RECOGNITION THAT AT LEAST 70 PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA5204 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AIR ASSETS ARE REQUIRED ON A DAILY BASIS BY THE GROUND
 COMMANDERS.
 IT LOGICALLY FOLLOWS THAT CG III MAF WHO HAS ORGANIC
 AIR ASSETS, SHOULD APPLY THOSE ASSETS AGAINST HIS OWN RE-
 QUIREMENTS. THIS WOULD ENABLE RESPONSIVENESS KEYED TO
 THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER RATHER THAN HAVING THE GROUND COMMANDER
 RESPONDING TO TOTS, ORDNANCE LOADS AND AVAILABILITY OF AIR-
 CRAFT AS DETERMINED BY THE AIR COMMANDER.
 5. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS PROPOSED THAT CG, III MAF BE ASSIGNED
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HIS AIR ASSETS THAT CONSTITUTE 70 PERCENT
 OF THE SORTIES AVAILABLE FOR AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES IN I
 CORPS, WHILE RETAINING 30PERCENT AT THE ACCEPTED 1:1 RATE FOR
 ALLOCATION BY COMUSMACV ON A DAILY BASIS.
 6. AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR US ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS WOULD BE
 SUBMITTED TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF,
 FOR COORDINATION AND ALLOCATION OF SORTIES FROM THE 7TH
 AIR FORCE WEEKLY OR DAILY FRAG, AS APPROPRIATE.
 7. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE 70/30 PROPOSAL ARE:
 A. ADVANTAGES.
 (1) IT RETURNS TO THE MARINE COMMANDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A

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III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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#16

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA5204 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO .
 SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF HIS ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT MEANS,
 WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SATISFYING COMUSMACV'S NEEDS.
 (2) IT REESTABLISHES THE PREPLANNING CYCLE THAT WAS
 IN EXISTENCE UNDER 95-4.
 (3) IT OBTVIATES THE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE MARINE
 PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION TO THE AIR FORCE CONTROL SYSTEM.
 (4) IT RESTORES THE CLEAN LINES OF NORMAL COMMAND
 AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS AND ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR
 IMPROVISATIONS.
 (5) IT REDUCES RELIANCE ON THE USE OF DIVERTS TO FILL
 IMMEDIATE MISSION REQUIREMENTS, AND RESTORES DIVERT
 AUTHORITY TO THE GROUND COMMANDER VIS-A-VIS, THE AIR
 COMMANDER.

B. DISADVANTAGES.

- (1) IT IS ONLY A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
 RESTORING THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY NECESSARY FOR MARINE FORCES TO
 FUNCTION MOST EFFECTIVELY.
- (2) IT FIXES A CEILING ON MARINE SORTIES AVAILABLE TO
 SUPPORT MARINE GROUND FORCES.
- (3) INSTEAD OF ASSURING THAT MARINE AIR RESOURCES

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA5204 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 ARE AVAILABLE TO MACV ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS (MACV 95-4).
 III MAF WOULD BE PROVIDING THIS AMOUNT AS A MATTER OF COURSE,
 REGARDLESS OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION."
 UNQUOTE.

2. PLEASE GIVE GEN CHAIPTMAN YOUR COMMENTS ON THE POINT
 PAPER ASAP. WE ARE ALSO PREPARING COMMENTS AND WILL
 FORWARD THEM SEPARATELY.

GP-4
 EC

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/2 (REV. 11-66)

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PT002986
PTTUZYUW RUMUHFABISS 1500402-UUUU--RUMUGRA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 290347Z MAY 68 ZFF6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMNVH/SA 1ST INF DIV ARVN
INFO ZEN/CHIEF JGS
RUMUGRA/SA I CTZ III MAF

BT

UNCLAS 15397

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR BG TRUONG: INFO GEN VIEN, LYG L. 1.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

CONGRATULATIONS TO 1ST AND 4TH BATTALIONS, 2D ARVN INF, FOR
CONTACT 8 KM N OF DONG HA ON 27 MAY. HEAVY ENEMY LOSSES INDICATE
SPIRITED AND AGGRESSIVE ACTION.

BT

FOR

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14

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TMAF FORM 5216 (REV 5-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			GEN ABRAMS		28 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	1, 2 & 3		
			281151ZMAY 68	COPIES OF 4 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS In 111500H Feb 69 B Copy #2 to G-3 290830H May 68 Vm Still out to G-3 5 Jun 68 Lined in error. Copy #1 to G-3 1 Jun 68 Vm Schuller In 5 Jun 68 Vm Copy to CG 29 May 68 Vm
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

O 284151Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV SAIGON
 TO LTG ROSSON ACTING CG III MAF DA NANG
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 7816 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: SITUATION IN I CTZ

1. (S) THE OVERALL SITUATION IN I CTZ HAS TO BE LOOKED AT VERY CLOSELY IN VIEW OF RECENT ENEMY MOVES. THE KEY, OF COURSE, IS THE HIGHLY PROBABLE MOVE OF ELEMENTS OF THE 2D NVA DIV TOWARDS DAK PEK.

2. (S) THIS MOVE, IF VERIFIED, TAKES A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THE PRESSURE OFF SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL I CTZ, ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY FORCES SOUTHWEST OF DA NANG STILL POSE AN IMMEDIATE THREAT. I WOULD THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICAL DIV AND THE 1ST MAR DIV SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THAT, AND WITH SOMETHING TO SPARE FOR BEEFING UP 1ST MAR DIV FORCES NORTH OF HAI VAN, IF REQUIRED.

3. (S) I RAISE THE QUESTION OF 1ST MAR DIV REDEPLOYMENTS BECAUSE I SUSPECT THAT WE MUST FACE UP TO A REQUIREMENT TO STAND DOWN THE 3RD BDE OF THE 82 DIV WITHIN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS FOR A RETRAINING PERIOD. AT PRESENT, WITH THE 3RD OF THE 101ST COMMITTED IN KONTRUM, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE 3RD/82D WILL BE REPLACED. YOU WILL HAVE TO DO THE RETRAINING IN PLACE.

4. (S) AT THE SAME TIME, I AM RELUCTANT TO SEE THE 101ST DIV OPERATIONS COMPRESSED TO THE EXTENT THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO PULL BACK FROM ROUTE 547. OUR PRESENCE IN THAT AREA IS CRITICAL TO THE DEFENSE OF HUE, AND MUST BE RETAINED IF WE ARE TO BLOCK THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICAL EFFORTS IN THUA THIEN.

5. (S) THEREFORE, EITHER 1ST MAR DIV MUST BE EXPANDED TO THE NORTH, OR THE 1ST CAV MUST SLIDE SOUTH TO PICK UP THE SLACK FROM THE 101ST DIV. MAYBE A LITTLE OF BOTH WILL BE NECESSARY.

6. (S) TO REORIENT THE 1ST CAV TO THE SOUTH, WOULD REQUIRE SOME DECREASE IN THEIR NORTHERN COMMITMENTS. THIS LEADS ME TO THE 3RD MAR DIV. MAYBE THEY SHOULD MOVE BACK INTO THE QUANG TRI CITY AREA. TO DO THIS THEY WOULD HAVE TO THIN OUT AT KHE SANH. I AM OF THE OPINION THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO ACHIEVE OUR PROJECTED MOBILE POSTURE WEST OF LZ STUD AND CA LU BY ABOUT 15 JUNE RATHER THAN WAITING FOR AUGUST. WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF TWO REGIMENTS OF THE 304TH AROUND KHE SANH, WE COULDN'T JUST PULL OUT. ON THE OTHER HAND, AN EARLY INITIATION OF THE OFFENSIVE WHICH YOU SUGGESTED TO ME ON MY LAST VISIT, MIGHT FINISH OFF THE ENEMY IN THAT AREA AND GIVE US THE RIGHT TIMING FOR A DRAWDOWN IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. ?

#139)

7. (S) AS YOU CAN SEE, I CONSIDER ALL OF THE MOVES WHICH I HAVE OUTLINED TO BE CLOSELY INTERRELATED. ALSO, I FEEL THAT WE MUST NAIL DOWN RATHER QUICKLY WHAT OUR TOTAL PLAN SHOULD BE. I SUGGEST THAT III MAF GIVE THIS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION AND BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS A SOLUTION WITH ME ON THURSDAY. WARM REGARDS.
GP-3

SSC NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
400

NNNN

SECRET

#13(2)

III MAF Fact Sheet

29 May 1968

Subject: Realignment of Forces in ICTZI. GENERAL:

Depty COMUSMACV directed that the possibilities of realignment of forces within ICTZ be reviewed in view of the highly probable move of elements of 2d NVA Division towards DAK PEK, reducing the pressure on Southern ICTZ, and the requirement for 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to stand down for training. (TAB A)

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. On going and projected operations:

(1) Operation Allen Brook (GO NOT ISLAND). If the 2d NVA Division elects to move toward DAK PEK rather than moving against Quang Nam Province (Hoi An and/or Danang), it is unlikely that the enemy will attempt any major reinforcement of the Go Noi Island area. However, within Quang Nam, the enemy has introduced two (2) new battalions which have been identified and four (4) additional battalions which are carried as probable/possible. Therefore, if the 2nd NVA has moved South, the force level available to the enemy in Quang Nam Province would/could remain the same. The Go Noi Island Operation is designed to completely destroy the enemy's war ending potential in that area. To do so will require the complete destruction of every bunker, trench system, fighting hole and logistic facility there on. This will require the continual application of force until the job is done at which time the operation will terminate. Subsequent to the Go Noi Operation it should be possible to free forces for further operations against identified NVA/VC within the 1st Marine Division TAOR.

(2) Operation Mameluke Thrust. If the 2nd NVA Division elects to move South towards DAK PEK, the 31st NVA Regiment, the 402nd Sapper Battalion, plus elements of the 368B Rocket Regiment and elements of the six battalions referred in sub para (1) above could operate in the Thung Duc, Charlie Ridge, Happy Valley area of Quang Nam Province. However, it is not considered necessary at this time to reinforce the Mameluke Thrust force; neither is it considered prudent to reduce this force pending future developments.

(3) Operation Scotland II. In conjunction with Operation Drumfire II, 3d Marine Division will conduct a multi battalion offensive operation toward the south and southwest from Khe Sanh Combat Base into the Vietnamese Salient, vicinity of the ^{NVA} NVA read which extends from XD 783233 to XD 912298. This operation commences on 31 May and if successful in engaging major NVA forces in the area, should reduce

*Lower
Drawn.**Concur.*

the enemy influence in Khe Sanh area to the extent that it would be feasible to reduce the Scotland II forces to one or two battalions after mid-June.

*Very
iffy!*

(4) SLF Operations: The back loading of BLT 3/1, 4-7 June and execution of an amphibious operation in the Elephant Valley area, 7-11 June will provide a one-for-one replacement for BLT 2/7. BLT 2/7 is scheduled for rehab/training at Subic Bay and will return to ICTZ as a readily deployable, mobile reserve O/A 1 July. This force is then available to influence the action anywhere within ICTZ on short notice.

B. Stand down of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for training. It is envisioned that the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division will stand down for training "in place" although the area assigned would

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IT IS PLANNED TO RETURN THE 1ST MARINE REGIMENT (-), NOW WITH THE 3B MARINE DIVISION, TO THE 1ST MARINE TO REPLACE THE 27TH MARINE REGIMENT ON DEPARTURE OF THAT REGIMENT FROM SVN. THIS IS EXPECTED TO OCCUR ABOUT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST BDE, 5TH MECH DIV IN THE FOA AO.

3. WITH REGARD TO PARA 3B (1) (D), REF A, A FINAL DECISION REGARDING RELOCATION OF FOB-3 IS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY.

GP-4

BT

probably be an area between northern Phu Bai TAOR and Hue. The Brigade would have some residual offensive and defensive capability during the stand down period and could therefore provide reinforcement capability for the defense of Hue if required. Other forces would be required to assume responsibility for the current area of responsibility of the 3d Brigade (west of Hue). In the interest of unity of command in the critical Hue area, it is essential that forces assuming this responsibility be under OPCON of CG, 101st Airborne Division. A two battalion brigade could adequately cover this area considering the residual capability of 3d Brigade.

C. Task Force Xray. Following release of forces from Operation Allen Brook, 1st Marine Division could deploy an additional battalion north of Hai Van Pass if the enemy situation/threat in that area so dictates. No adjustment in 1st Marine Division/PCV boundary would be effected with such reinforcement, however, due to the necessity for maintaining unity of command in the Hue area.

D. 3d Marine Division. Upon draw down of forces from Khe Sanh, 3d Marine Division can assume responsibility for an expanded area, to include the Quang Tri complex. Such expansion south by 3d Marine Division would permit a shift to the south by 1st Air Cavalry Division elements to compensate for stand down of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

III. RECOMMENDATION:

- one or*
- A. That Khe Sanh forces be reduced to two battalions by mid June.
- B. That 3d Marine Division area be *subsequent to reduction of forces in KSCB,* expanded south to include the Quang Tri Complex.
- C. That a two battalion brigade of 1st Air Cavalry Division be deployed to current area of responsibility of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and CHOPPED to CG, 101st Airborne Division.
- D. That 1st Marine Division be prepared to reinforce Task Force Xray by a battalion as required on order.
- E. That no change in boundary between PCV and 1st Marine Division be effected.

00002175.TIF ---- RESCAN HERE *****
00002175 TIF ---- RESCAN HERE *****

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IT IS PLANNED TO RETURN THE 1ST MARINE REGIMENT (-), NOW WITH THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION, TO THE 1ST MARINE TO REPLACE THE 27TH MARINE REGIMENT ON DEPARTURE OF THAT REGIMENT FROM SVN. THIS IS EXPECTED TO OCCUR ABOUT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST BDE, 5TH MECH DIV IN THE PCE AO.

3. WITH REGARD TO PARA 3B (1) (B), REF A, A FINAL DECISION REGARDING RELOCATION OF FOB-3 IS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY.

GP-4

BT

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		5/29		JP	COMUSMACV SERIAL 280931Z MAY COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		5/30		Rund	SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR	✓			6-1	J	REMARKS
C/S	1		5/29		Q	FOR
DC/S				6/1	M	
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DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
DLG (Amj)	5				4	
S/S			290555		SM JLW	
S/C						

"# 3 & 4 Burned
5 Nov 68"

LEGEND
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
C- COMMENTS
I- INFORMATION

27

#12

FOR

PTI UZ YUW RUMUHFA5031 149 1000-UUUU--R UMUGRA.

ZNR UUUUU

P 280931Z MAY 68 ZFFG

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMHVP/CG 3E MARDIV

INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPSV

BT

INCLAS 15330

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG DAVIS, INFO LTG CUSHMAN, LTG ROSSON.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

CONGRATULATIONS TO D AND F/2/3 USMC FOR CONTACT 3 KM E OF KHE SANK VILLAGE ON 25 MAY. EXCELLENT USE OF TAC AIR AND SUPPORTING ARTY RESULTED IN HEAVY ENEMY LOSSES WITH NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. WELL DONE.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#12

FOR

PT008717
 PTTUZYUW RUMUHFA4824 1480926-UUUU--RUMUGRA.
 ZNR UUUUU.
 P 270905Z MAY 68 ZFF6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV
 BT
 UNCLAS 15207
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG DAVIS, INFO LTG CUSHMAN AND
 LTG ROSSON
 SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
 HARD FIGHTING BY 30 K, AND M/3/3 USMC NORTH OF DONG HA
 ON 26 MAY DESERVES SPECIAL NOTE. GROUND FORCES AND SUPPORTING
 FIRE INFLICTED HEAVY LOSSES ON ENEMY. CONGRATULATIONS.
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	NTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 9	

FOR

PTT UZ YUW RUM UHFA4827 1480928-UUUU--R UMUGRA.
 ZNR UUUUU
 P 270902Z MAY 68 ZFFG
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3C MARDIV
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG PROVOCRPSV

BT

UNCLAS 15204

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG DAVIS, INFO LTG CUSHMAN, LTG
 ROSSON

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

CONGRATULATIONS TO 2/4 AND 1/3 USMC FOR ACTION ON 25 MAY
 NNE OF DONG HA. AGGRESSIVE GROUND ATTACKS COUPLED WITH EXCELLENT
 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT DEFEAT OF ENEMY.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#8	

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

NR RUKKM
 DE RUMSAV 078W 1480730
 ZNY 00000
 R 210707Z MAY 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUKKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KHULAK
 INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN ANDERSON
 FOR FMFPAC F-030

IN-EXCESS ALLOWANCE FOR PROV MAG-39 (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 222124Z MAY 68

B. CG FMAV 220558Z MAY 68

1. IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE
 SUBMITTED:

A. THE INTENT OF THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A PROVISIONAL
 MAG AT CUANG TRI WAS TO REDUCE THE COMPLEX AND MULTIPLE
 PROBLEMS OF MAG-36 TO MORE MANAGEABLE DIMENSIONS. IMPLEMENTATION
 OF THE PROV MAG ACCOMPLISHED THAT OBJECTIVE VERY EFFECTIVELY.
 REF(B) WAS NOT SUBMITTED WITH ANY INTENT TO INCREMENTALLY INCREASE
 NEEDS OR TO VIOLATE EITHER IN SPIRIT OR FACT, THE INITIAL
 ARRANGEMENT. THE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATION

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 078W C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
 AND MT ITEMS WAS BASED ON A DESIRE TO MORE EFFICIENTLY
 UTILIZE THE ASSETS AVAILABLE.

2. I CAN OPERATE PROV MAG-39 ON ITS CURRENT STRINGENT
 ALLOWANCES AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THE BASIC CONCEPT
 OF THE PROV MAG IS PROVING EXCEEDINGLY SOUND AND THE OPERATIONAL
 EFFICIENCY OF BOTH 36 & 39 CONTINUE TO IMPROVE WITHOUT
 THE EQUIPMENT REQUESTED BY REF B. ACCORDINGLY
 REF B IS BEING CANCELLED BY SEPARATE DESPATCH.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#7

SECRET

FILE 7 CON 218

		FROM CG FMFPAG	DATE 27 MAY 68
		SERIAL # 262248Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN	
27 May 5/29	W.H. Steenson	DATE	SIGNATURE
28 May 5/29	R. Douglas		
6/1	W Anderson		
6/1	Al Jm		
S/S	CORPE 1 2 MAY OF 3 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUMUGRA
 DE RUHFMA 4722 ORUWRI
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 262248Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN,
 INFO LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY

AIR CONTROL (U)

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE NEW PROPOSITION WE DISCUSSED
 FRIDAY TO RETURN OPCON OF SOME 70 PERCENT OF THE FIRST
 MAW ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY TO CG III MAF
 LEAVING THE BALANCE TO BE IDENTIFIED TO CG 7TH AIR FORCE
 FOR MISSION DIRECTION. I AM IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH
 BOB'S 260728Z/MAY ON THIS SAME SUBJECT. ADDITIONALLY,
 HEREIN, I WILL GO OVER THE GROUND FROM MY OWN VIEW-
 POINT.
2. BASICALLY, THOUGH FALLING SHORT OF WHAT WE SEEK, IT
 IS A MAJOR STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT WILL SAVE
 MARINES LIVES, IT HELPS COMUSMACV, AND IT SERVES THE

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT A UNISERVICE FORCE ASSIGNED
 TO A UNIFIED COMMANDER SHOULD REMAIN INVIOLEATE.
 HAVING SAID THAT, JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING ELSE IN THIS
 MESSAGE IS SAWING SAWDUST. HOWEVER, AIMING TO ASSIST
 YOU IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. NITZE, THE PROBLEM
 WILL BE REVIEWED BELOW, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE
 BASIC CONCEPT, ESSENTIAL IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES, THE
 PROS AND CONS AS THEY RELATE TO THE WAR EFFORT, AND THE
 ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS OF A NEW IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE.
 I WILL ADDRESS EACH IN THAT SEQUENCE.

3. AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR CONCEPT OF AIR OPERA-
 TIONS IN RVN IS TO ENSURE THAT THE AIR CONTROL ARRANGE-
 MENTS GUARANTEE TO COMUSMACV THE EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT,
 AND FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES
 WITHOUT, AT THE SAME TIME, REQUIRING ONE OF HIS
 COMMANDERS TO EXERCISE INCRDINATE AUTHORITY OVER THE
 ORGANIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF ANOTHER OF HIS COMMANDERS.
 AS I SEE IT, THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT IS GENERALLY
 CONSISTENT WITH THIS ORIENTATION AND WITH THE MARINE
 CORPS DEDICATION TO APPLYING ITS RESOURCES IN THE WAY

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#6

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHNFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO THAT MAKES THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO WINNING THE WAR. FOR OUR AVIATION, THIS MEANS FIRST TO APPLY THE SORTIES REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE COST AND INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE MARINE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND, AFTER THAT, TO CONTRIBUTE APPROPRIATELY TO THE OVERALL AIR EFFORT. WE DID IT UNDER MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 AND ARE DOING IT NOW. WE WOULD DO IT EVEN IN THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF ANY FORMAL ORDER TO DO SO. THEREFORE, RETURN OF ALL OR A PORTION OF OUR MARINE AIR CAPABILITY TO III MAF OPERATIONAL CONTROL SIMPLY MOVES TOWARD THE WAY WE WERE OPERATING UNDER 95-4. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS THAT, UNDER THAT DIRECTIVE, WE WERE CAREFUL TO USE LANGUAGE TO QUOTE IDENTIFY UNQUOTE RATHER THAN QUOTE ASSIGN UNQUOTE SORTIES TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE. UNDER THE OLD SYSTEM, THE 20-30 PERCENT IDENTIFIED TO 7TH AIR FORCE FOR FRAGGING THEORETICALLY CAME OFF THE BOTTOM OF OUR CAPABILITY. AS I SEE IT FROM HERE, UNDER THE PROPOSED PLAN IT WOULD HAVE TO COME OFF THE TOP AND, IN EFFECT, BE GUARANTEED. IN ACTUAL PRACTICE, I DOUBT THAT THE DIFFERENCE WOULD OFTEN BE SIGNIFICANT. FROM A PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT,

PAGE 4 RUHNFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO THEREFORE, I SEE NOTHING THAT RUNS COUNTER TO EITHER OUR TACTICAL DOCTRINE OR OUR INTENTIONS.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES TO BE PROVIDED THE AIR FORCE, WE MUST BE SPECIFIC. SOME CRITERIA MUST BE ESTABLISHED UPON WHICH TO BASE THE NUMBER OF SORTIES FURNISHED. THE IDEA OF ASSIGNING SPECIFIC SQUADRONS OPCON TO 7TH AIR FORCE SHOULD BE REJECTED, I BELIEVE, DUE SIMPLY TO THE FACT THAT THE APPROACH LACKS FLEXIBILITY AND FAILS TO EXPLOIT OUR VERSATILE CAPABILITIES. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IS TO GUARANTEE THE AIR FORCE 30 PERCENT OF OUR EFFORT BASED ON THE ACCEPTED 1.1 SORTIE RATE. THE DETAILS CAN BE COORDINATED THROUGH EXISTING LIAISON BETWEEN FIRST MAW TADC AND 7TH AIR FORCE TACC. THESE AGENCIES WOULD DETERMINE, WITHIN THE SORTIE LIMITS PRESCRIBED, THE MIX OF FIRST MAW ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY THAT WOULD MAKE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL EFFORT. THIS OFFERS THE REQUIRED FLEXIBILITY FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS TO BOTH 7TH AIR FORCE AND FIRST MAW. COMUSMACV'S IMPLICIT EMERGENCY AUTHORITY WOULD COVER ALL OTHER SITUATIONS.

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES**SECRET**
#6

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

THE DETAILED MECHANICS OF SORTIE ALLOCATION WERE ALREADY ESTABLISHED UNDER 95-4. UNDER THAT SYSTEM, THE TACC SAIGON ASSIGNED TARGETS AND TOT'S TO THE FIRST MAW, WHICH IN TURN, PUBLISHED A SINGLE FRAG ORDER TO WING UNITS. THE SYSTEM IS SIMPLE AND DIRECT, AND REQUIRES NO CHANGE.

AS FOR THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, SINGLE MANAGEMENT LEFT THE MARINE APPARATUS INTACT. THEREFORE, THE REVERSION OF ORGANIC AIR UNITS TO MARINE OPCON BRINGS NO CONTROL PROBLEMS OR CHANGES. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE IS NOT ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT UNDER EITHER SYSTEM. I HAVE IN MIND, CONSIDERING THE PRESENT LEVEL OF UNITED USAF/USMC AIR EFFORT IN I CORPS, CUSHMAN'S NEED FOR A JOINTLY MANNED I CTZ AIR DIRECTION AGENCY, COLLOCATED WITH HIS COC. BUT THIS IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION.

3. ANY PROPOSAL ON OUR PART FOR SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT IS ONLY GOING TO GET A SYMPATHETIC HEARING IF IT IS BASED ON WHAT IS BEST FOR THE WAR EFFORT. IN THAT REGARD, THE EXISTING SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM HAS PROVEN TO BE UN-

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 4722 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

WIELDY AND HAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED THE DESIRED RESULTS. THAT THIS IS RECOGNIZED IN SAIGON IS IMPLICIT IN THE IMPROVISATIONS NOW PROPOSED BY THE 7TH AF IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THE NEW SYSTEM FUNCTION SATISFACTORILY. LIKEWISE, THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM, DEFINED IN 95-4, WHILE EFFECTIVE FOR MARINE PURPOSES, WAS ALSO DEFICIENT IN THE OVERALL THEATER SENSE WHERE FLEXIBILITY OF TACTICAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION WAS CONCERNED. WHAT WE NEED IS A MODERATED FORMULA WHICH ENSURES TO MACV HIS OBJECTIVE OF CERTAIN SINGLE MANAGEMENT WHILE STILL GIVING THE MARINES THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THE ORGANIC RESOURCES THAT WE REQUIRE TO DO OUR JOB. EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSAL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE OVERALL GOOD, AND AGAINST THE KNOWN PREDISPOSITION OF THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES:

A. ADVANTAGES

- (1) THE SCHEME YOU PROPOSE SATISFIES THE NEED FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH BUILT-IN FACE SAVING FEATURES.
- (2) IT MORE ACCURATELY REFLECTS AN ARRANGEMENT

BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#6

SECRET

OO RUEBHOAT RUMUGRA
 DE RUHFMA 4723 ORUWR I
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 262248Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN,
 INFO LI GEN CUSHMAN FROM LIGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY

NOW BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN III MAF AND 7TH AIR FORCE,
 WHEREBY ALL MARINE ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY
 IS PRESENTED TO 7TH AIR FORCE, WHO IN TURN HANDS ABOUT
 70 PERCENT BACK TO III MAF.

(3) IT RETURNS TO THE MARINE COMMANDER OPERATION-
 AL CONTROL OF A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF HIS ORGANIC FIRE
 SUPPORT MEANS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SATISFYING
 COMUSMACV'S NEEDS.

(4) IT REESTABLISHES THE PREPLANNING CYCLE THAT
 WAS IN EXISTENCE UNDER 95-4.

(5) IT OBTVIATES THE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE MARINE
 PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION TO THE AIR FORCE CONTROL

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 4723 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SYSTEM.

(6) IT RESTORES THE CLEAN LINES OF NORMAL COMMAND
 AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS AND ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR
 IMPROVISATIONS.

(7) IT REDUCES RELIANCE ON THE USE OF DIVERTS TO FILL
 IMMEDIATE MISSION REQUIREMENTS, AND RESTORES DIVERT
 AUTHORITY TO THE GROUND COMMANDER VIS-A-VIS, THE AIR
 COMMANDER.

KIL IT REDUCES THE NUMBER OF BATTALIONS SUPPORTED
 BY I DASC FROM 93 TO 65.

B. DISADVANTAGES

(1) THE 70 PERCENT SCHEME IS ONLY A PARTIAL SOLUTION
 TO THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING THE TACTICAL INTEGRITY
 NECESSARY FOR MARINE FORCES TO FUNCTION MOST EFFECTIVE-
 LY.

(2) IT REQUIRES CG, III MAF TO COORDINATE AIR SUPPORT
 THROUGH TWO SEPARATE AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS IN I CTZ.

(3) IT FIXES A CEILING ON MARINE SORTIES AVAILABLE TO
 SUPPORT MARINE GROUND FORCES.

6. YOUR PROPOSAL, IF ADOPTED, SHOULD BE FORMALIZED IN

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET
#6

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHFMA 4723 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AN IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE WHICH SHOULD BE ISSUED BY
 SHARP, AND WHICH SHOULD EMBODY THE FOLLOWING
 ESSENTIAL FEATURES.

A. IT SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT AS TO COMUSMACV'S
 ULTIMATE AUTHORITY TO FOCUS, WEIGHT, PREEMPT OR
 OTHERWISE DIRECT THE AIR EFFORT IN THE OVERALL TACTICAL
 INTEREST.

B. AT THE SAME TIME, IT SHOULD CLEARLY SPECIFY THE
 BASIC PROPORTION OF MARINE AIR SORTIES TO BE ALLOCATED
 FOR NORMAL 7TH AIR FORCE MISSION DIRECTION, WITH
 PROVISION FOR DEVIATION AS JUDGED NECESSARY BY
 COMUSMACV OR CG III MAF.

C. IT MUST REQUIRE REAL TIME EXCHANGE OF ESSENTIAL
 INFORMATION THROUGH SECURE, DEDICATED CIRCUITRY
 BETWEEN III MAF TADC AND THE TACC IN SAIGON.

7. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE
 SUPPORTED, AND THAT THE THRUST OF OUR ARGUMENT
 SHOULD BE THAT THE PROPOSAL CLEANS UP MANY OF THE
 IMPEDIMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT
 SYSTEM, THAT IT PRESERVES COMUSMACV'S FLEXIBILITY AND

PAGE 4 RUMHFMA 4723 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 WILL REDUCE USMC CASUALTIES BY REDRESSING THE BALANCE
 OF OUR TEAM. WE MAY BE ACCUSED OF NEEDING BUT 70
 PERCENT OF OUR CAPABILITY NOW IN-COUNTRY. HOWEVER,
 THERE IS REALLY NO PROBLEM HERE, SINCE WE ARE DELIBERATE-
 LY STRUCTURED TO EXECUTE BOTH THE CLOSE SUPPORT AND
 THE AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS IN AN AMPHIBIOUS ENVIRONMENT.
 THE LATTER FUNCTION IS FULFILLED BY THE SO-CALLED 30
 PERCENT EXCESS, WHICH IS WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR
 STATUTORY MISSION. FROM OUR OWN VIEWPOINT, MY
 REACTION IS BEST DISTILLED IN THE THOUGHT THAT IT GETS
 THE CAMEL'S NOSE BACK INTO THE TENT A MOST ADVANTA-
 GEOUS, SINCE THE TENT HAPPENS TO BE OUR OWN.

8. I HAVE NOT BROACHED THIS PROPOSITION TO SHARP,
 FEELING THAT THE IMPETUS JUST HAS TO COME FROM THE
 TOP DOWN. SO FAR, HE HAS FELT ABSOLUTELY NO PRESSURE
 FROM ABOVE. ALL OF HIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN LATERALLY FROM
 ME, OR VERTICALLY, FROM BELOW. IF YOU WISH, I WILL
 TAKE HIM ON IMMEDIATELY, AND TRY AND SELL THE IDEA, BUT
 MY RECOMMENDATION IS TO GIVE HIM A FEW THOUSAND
 VOLTS FROM ABOVE FIRST. BEST REGARDS. GP-4
 BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET
#6

O 260425Z ZYR ZEPH
 FM PALYR 200 USARV LONG BINH
 TO ROSSON CG PCV
 INFO CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 ZEM
 S E C R E T ARV 1417 EYES ONLY
 REF: A. USARV MSG DTG 200410Z MAY 68.
 B. PHE 727.

SUBJECT: FUTURE POSTURE, PCV FORCES (U)

1. REF ALPHA WAS WRITTEN TO SURFACE WITH MACV THE PRESSING PROBLEM OF FUTURE STATIONING AND ALLOCATIONS OF COMBAT FORCES. AT THIS TIME THERE IS NO CLEAR GUIDANCE AS TO WHICH ARMY DIVISION(S) WILL FILL THE REQUIREMENTS STATED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

2. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED:

A. USARPAC GO-231 DATED 13 MAY 1968 DIRECTS THE CONVERSION OF THE 3D BDE 82D ABN DIV TO A LT INF BDE UNDER THE TAMCO SERIES MTOE. PHYSICAL CONVERSION HAS BEGUN AND IS EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED BY 1 SEP. THIS CONFIGURATION INCREASES BOTH PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED AND PIPE POWER AVAILABLE. EMPLOYMENT OF THE 3D BDE 82D ABN DIV DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS OF SEVERE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE AND REORGANIZATION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION AT MACV.

B. THE 161ST ABN DIV WILL BE REORGANIZED AS AN AIRMOBILE DIV STARTING IN JUNE. THE REVISED PLAN, SUBJECT: REVISED PLAN, SECOND AIRMOBILE DIVISION, DATED 17 MAY 1968 (U), WAS FORWARDED TO YOU ON 17 MAY 1968.

C. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, YOUR ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MFOH), 1ST SQDN, 15TH ACP, AND THE ADDITIONAL FA BN (155 SP) ARE CORRECT.

3. ALTHOUGH REF ALPHA HAS CAUSED YOU SOME CONCERN I BELIEVE THAT FORTHCOMING GUIDANCE FROM MACV WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PLANNING DIRECTION. MY PERSONAL ESTIMATE IS THAT THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV WILL REMAIN WITH PCV INDEFINITELY AND THAT THE 161ST ABN DIV (-) WILL REDEPLOY OUTSIDE OF I CTZ. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV HAS ONLY BARE MINIMAL ADMINISTRATIVE ELEMENTS AT AN KHE WITH ALL THE REST OF THE DIVISION DEPLOYED IN I CTZ.

WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS

350

NNNN

SECRET

#4

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE				FROM	DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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	CG					REMARKS #12 <i>Beinad</i> 4/26/68 EXCLUSIVE Copy #2 to G-3 26 May 68 Original for <i>the</i> <i>the</i> In 9 June 68 Copy #1 to G-6 26 May 68 <i>the</i> 26 26 May 68 Copy #3 to Air Control 26 May 68 #2
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
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	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
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	INSP					
	MTO					
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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 26 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 260207Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
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	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE #2 26 May 68 26 May 68 Ame
	DCG					
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	ENGR					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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NNNNZ CZ CSAA39&VZ CZ CKXC3 961305
 PP RUMSAK
 Z NY CCCCC
 PTICZYUW RUMUKFA4612 1470220-CCCC--RUMSAK.
 Z NY CCCCC
 P 260207Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 15079 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG CUSHMAN
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

REF: CG III MAF DTG 240226Z (C)

(C) AGENCIES AND SERVICES IDENTIFIED IN REFERENCE MESSAGE
 ARE READY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT TO EXPEDITE
 RELOCATION OF I DASC. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PLANNING, REQUEST
 YOU FORWARD A FIRM DATE AND IDENTIFY SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE AND
 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.

GP-4

BT

EXCLUSIVE**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

PT007657
 PTFZYUW RUMACMU7864 1460000-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 DE RUMJQH 6414A 1460256
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 250242Z MAY 68
 FM USDAO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
 TO CG III MAF DANANG
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L 0758 MAY 68. NLO SENDS. FOR
 AIDE-DE-CAMP.

FOR

1. REF UR 240258Z MAY 68.

2. REF A REFERS. REQUEST FOLLOWING NUMBER IN PARTY:
 ETA HONG KONG; ACCOMMODATIONS DESIRED; GENERAL'S DESIRES
 CONCERNING CALLS; ANY OTHER MATTERS IN WHICH NLO MAY ASSIST.
 GP-4.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL
#1

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2				<i>6</i>	ADMINO CINCPACFLT
DCG	3				<i>EW</i>	SERIAL 242248Z MAY 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4				<i>A</i>	SUBJECT WASHINGTON POST STORY ON SR-71
C/S	1				<i>A</i>	REMARKS
DC/S						FOR
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			25/320		<i>EW</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
- C-COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

"#364 Burned - Nov 68"

#54

FILE 37 CON 205

		FROM ADMING CINCPACFLT	DATE 25 MAY 68
		SERIAL# 21218Z MAY68	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT WASHINGTON POST STORY ON SR-71	
25 May	<i>V. H. Hatten</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
26 May	<i>R. J. [unclear]</i>		
26 May	<i>M. J. Anderson Has Seen</i>		
S/S	COPY 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#54

PT007619
 RTTUZYUW RUHHBRA6088 1452248-UUUU--RUMUGRA
 ZNR UUUUU
 R 242240Z MAY 68
 FM ADMINO CINCPACFLT
 INFO RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUHJHIA/COMFIRSTFLT
 RUHFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUHFKRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 RUHSSBB/COMNAVFORV
 RUHJUMUA/COMNAVYAIRPAC
 RUHHFMA/CGFMFPAC
 RUHUGRA/CG IIMAF
 R 240452Z MAY 68
 FM CINCPAC
 INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
 RUHCSAAA/CINCSAC
 RUHFDA/COM 3AD ANDERSEN
 RUHCSAAA/CINCPACREP SAC
 O 232116Z MAY 68 ZFF-1
 FM SECDEF
 TO RUHHHGA/CINCPAC
 RUHMHFA/COMUSMACV
 RUHMTLA/COMUSMACTHAI
 INFO RUMSEM/AMEMB SAIGON
 RUMTBK/AMEMB BANGKOK
 RUMBSL/AMEMB VIENTIANE
 RUMFUC/AMEMB PARIS
 BT
 UNCLAS 9768 OASD(PA) FOR IO
 AMEMB PARIS FOR LTGEN GOODPASTOR
 SUBJ: WASHINGTON POST STORY ON SR-71
 1. FOL STORY BY GEORGE WILSON APPEARED IN
 WASHINGTON POST 13 MAY 1968:
 --- SAIGON: MAY 22---THE SUPERSECRET SR-71
 SPY PLANE IS FLYING OUT OF THE TAKHLI FIGHTER
 BASE IN THAILAND---PROBABLY TO KEEP TRACK OF
 NVN'S WAR TRAFFIC AND TO PEEK ACROSS THE BOR-
 DER INTO COMMUNIST CHINA.

FOR

PAGE 2 RUEOJFA 9260 UNCLAS
 ---THE SR-71'S CAMERAS, WHICH LOOK DOWN ON
 THE GROUND FROM SOME 15 MILES UP, CAN COLLECT
 THE KIND OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE THAT
 AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS MIGHT PULL OUT
 OF THE BRIEFCASE AT THE RIGHT MOMENT TO DOCU-
 MENT NVN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR.
 THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS JUST ISSUED A
 39-PAGE WHITE PAPER DISTRIBUTED BY THE JOINT
 U.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE HERE TODAY DESIGN-

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

#54

ED TO SHOW THAT HANOI HAS BEEN THE DRIVING FORCE IN THE VIETNAM WAR SINCE 1959. THE PAPER, ENTITLED WORKING PAPER ON THE NVN ROLE IN THE WAR IN SVN MENTIONS AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AS PART OF THE PROFF. THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE CONCLUSION SAID IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE IN THE PAST WTO YEARS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO DOCUMENT NVN'S ROLE MOST COMPLETELY FOR THIS PERIOD. PART OF THAT IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE IS THE SR-71. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS ARE USED TO LEARN

PAGE 3 RUEOJFA 9260 UNCLAS
WHAT IS GOING ON IN SUCH CLOSED SOCIETIES AS NVN AND RED CHINA. THE LOCKHEED SR-71 IS THE SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2, WHICH FIGURED IN DISSOLUTION OF OF ANOTHER PARIS CONFERENCE THE ONE IN 1960 WHEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV WERE SUPPOSED TO MEET WHEN THE SOVIETS DOWNED ONE OF THE PLANES. WHILE IT HAS BEEN A FAIRLY OPEN SECRET THAT THE U-2 HAS BEEN FLYING RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER NVN, THE SR-71'S SPYING HAS BEEN VERY SECRET. WHEREAS THE U-2 WAS A SUBSONIC A/C WITH THE LONG TAPERING WINGS OF A GLIDER, THE SR-71 IS A SLEEK, DELTA-WINGED SHIP CAPABLE OF SUSTAINED FLIGHT AT MACH 3 (2000 MPH). OPERATIONAL WITH SAC, THE SR-71 IS A DERIVATIVE OF THE A-11 SPY PLANE DEVELOPED IN SECRECY FOR CIA. BUT OBSERVERS WITH ENOUGH PATIENCE CAN SEE BOTH THE SR-71 AND THE U-2 FLYING INTO

PAGE 4 RUEOJFA 9260 UNCLAS
TAKHLI ON OCCASION. THE CIA IS INVOLVED WITH RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS OUT OF THE THAI FIELD. THE SPY PLANES APPARENTLY ARE ROTATED FROM BASE TO BASE FOR MAXIMUM SECURITY AS ARE B-52 STRATEGIC BOMBERS IN THE U.S. THE SR-71, FOR EXAMPLE SOMETIMES FLIES INTO OKINAWA'S KADENA AFB, WHERE IT IS QUICKLY HIDDEN IN A CLOSED HANGAR. FLYING THE SR-71 AND U-2 OVER NVN'S FORMIDABLE AIR DEFENSE INVOLVES SOME RISK FRN THE SOVIET MADE SAM-2 ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES THE SAME TYPE THAT KNOCKED GARY PHERS U-2 OUT OF THE SKY IN 1960 WHILE ON A SPY FLIGHT OVER RUSSIA. BUT THE SAM-2 HAS FINS DESIGNED FOR THE

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

#54

LOWER ATMOSPHERE NOT THE THIN AIR IN WHICH THE SPY PLANES FLY AT 70,000 FT. OR MORE HITTING THE POWERS PLANE WAS CONSIDERED A LUCKY SHOT SINCE THE SAM-2 WAS INACCURATE ITS USUAL ALTITUDE.

PAGE 5 RUEOJFA 9260 UNCLAS

BUT FOR EXTRA INSURANCE, THE U-2S FLYING OVER NVN ARE ESCORTED BY F-4S FLYING BELOW THEM. THEY ARE TO DOWN ANY MIG-21S WHICH MIGHT FIRE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES.

THE SR-71 HAS TO BE MADE ALMOST ENTIRELY OF TITANIUM SO THAT IT WILL NOT MELT AS IT LACES ALONG AT CLOSE TO 2000 MILES AN HOUR. THE FRICTION GENERATING TEMPERATURES RISE ABOVE 4000F. IT CAN FLY EVEN HIGHER THAN THE U-2.

ITS CAMERAS AND OTHER SENSORS COULD FOCUS ON A CONVOY OF TRUCKS GOING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH VIETNAM OR TAKE A PANORAMA OF THE LANDSCAPE. THE PLANE'S HIGH POSITION ENABLES ITS CAMERAS TO SEE BEYOND TERRITORIAL BORDERS.

BT

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

54

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

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SIAMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	LTC ROSSON CG PVT PER 242	26 MAY 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF COPIES RECD
	230405	102 OF 3

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
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	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

5 *Jim Stewart*

4

"#263 Burned
4 Nov 68"

SECRET

U 250405Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM LTG ROSSON CG PCV PHU BAI
 TO LTG PALMER DCG USARV LONG BINH
 INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 ZEM

SECRET PHB 727 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: FUTURE POSTURE, PCV FORCES (U)

REF: A. III MAF STAFF STUDY 2-68, DTG 31 MAR 68 (TS).

B. USARV MESSAGE DTG 200410Z, MAY 68 (S) *attached*

1. REF A, APPROVED BY COMUSMACV ON 28 MAR 68, ESTABLISHED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THE FOLLOWING 1 SEP 68 POSTURE FOR PCV:

A. TAOI AND MISSION SUBSTANTIALLY AS AT PRESENT.

B. MAJOR SUBORDINATE UNITS CONSISTING OF ONE USMC DIV AND ONE US ARMY DIV.

2. SUBSEQUENTLY, I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS, FORMAL AND INFORMAL, THAT:

A. 3D BDE, 82D ABN DIV WILL BE CONVERTED TO A LT INF BDE. I AM WITHOUT GUIDANCE AS TO WHETHER THE NEW LT INF BDE WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITH THE 101ST ABN DIV, ALTHOUGH REF B SUGGESTS THAT IT WILL BE IN SEPARATE STATUS.

B. 101ST ABN DIV WILL BE RECONFIGURED AS AN AIRMOBILE DIV.

C. 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) CONSISTING OF ONE INF BN, ONE MECH BN AND ONE TANK BN WILL BE PLACED UNDER OPCON OF PCV IN THE LATE SUMMER OR EARLY FALL. THE LIAISON TEAM OF THIS UNIT IS IN THE PCV AREA NOW.

D. THE 3D SQN, 5TH CAV (-) WILL BE REPLACED BY THE 1ST SQN, 18TH CAV IN THE FALL.

E. AN ADDITIONAL FA BN 155 SP WILL JOIN PCV ARTILLERY IN THE LATE SUMMER OR EARLY FALL.

3. ARMED WITH THE FOREGOING INFORMATION, I HAVE MADE A MAJOR EFFORT IN COORDINATION WITH III MAF TO FINALIZE PCV PLANS FOR 1 SEP 68 DEPLOYMENTS BUNDARIES, BASE DEVELOPMENT, LOC UPGRADING, BASE DEFENSE AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE. ALTHOUGH THIS ENDEAVOR HAS BEEN HANDICAPPED TO SOME EXTENT BY UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV OR THE 101ST ABN DIV WILL REMAIN WITH PCV, PROGRESS HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING UP TO THE MOMENT OF RECEIPT OF REF B. AS I UNDERSTAND THE LATTER, PCV IS DESTINED TO CONSIST OF ONE USMC DIV, TWO SEPARATE ARMY BDES AND AN ARMORED CAV SQN. QUITE FRANKLY, I CONSIDER THIS STRUCTURE INADEQUATE TO COPE WITH AN ENEMY THREAT OF PRESENT DIMENSIONS. MOREOVER, SHOULD THE ARMY COMPONENT OF THE CORPS BE REDUCED TO THIS EXTENT I COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE ADHERE TO MY PRESENT VIEW, EXPRESSED BOTH TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND LTG CUSHMAN. THAT PCV SHOULD BE RETAINED ON A PERMANENTLY AUTHORIZED BASIS.

4. ALTHOUGH I AM RELUCTANT TO ADD TO THE MANY PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT YOU I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND MY QUEST FOR DEFINITIVE GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTERS DISCUSSED ABOVE. WHATEVER FURTHER INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE APPRECIATED DEEPLY.

5. WARMEST REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRESEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

#53

425

SECRET

* S E C R E T *

PT005882
PTTSZYUW RUMSCMV1984 1420000-SSSS--RUMUGRA,
ZNY SSSSS
DE RUMUGDA 8173 141055Z
ZNY SSSSS
P 200410Z MAY 68

COG: G-3
INFO: G-4 G-2
COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6 FEO

FM CG USAR 10th RVN
TO RUMHFA/COMUSMACV
INFO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
1st INF/CG I FORCEV NHA TRANG
ZEN/CG II FORCEV LONG BINH
RUMUGRA/CG XII MAP DA NANG
HMSLT/SA IV CORPS CAN THO
ZEN/CG 1ST LOG COMD LONG BINH
ZEN/CG 1ST AVN BDE LONG BINH
HMSRT/CG 1ST SIG BDE LONG BINH
ZEN/CG 18TH MP BDE LONG BINH
ZEN/CG 44TH MED BDE LONG BINH
COMSVS/CO 34TH GS GP SAIGON
BT

S E C R E T AVHGC-0 200340
SUBJECT: STATIONING OF US ARMY UNITS (U)
REF: A, MACV CONF MSG 12235, DTG 300715Z APR 68 (NOTAL)
B, LETTER HQ USARV AVHGC-PD, 16 MAY 68, SUBJ: REVISED PLAN
101ST ABN DIV CONVERSION (NOTAL)

PAGE 2 RUMUGDA 8173 S E C R E T

- 1. (C) REF A APPROVED HQ USARV AS THE HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING STATIONING OF ALL US ARMY UNITS IN RVN.
- 2. (C) TO FACILITATE OPERATIONAL PLANNING, PREPARATION FOR RELOCATION OF APPLICABLE BASE CAMPS, AND RECEPTION OF PROGRAM & DEPLOYING UNITS, MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS MUST BE INFORMED OF THE APPROVED STATIONING PLAN FOR THEIR MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS.
- 3. (S) IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR HEADQUARTERS THAT O/A SEP 68 MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS WILL BE STATIONED AS FOLLOWS:

UNIT	MAJOR BASE	TACTICAL OPERATIONAL BASE
1ST CAV DIV (AM)	AN KHE	
101ST ABN DIV	BIEN HOA	PHUOC VINH AND BEARCAT
AMERICAL DIV	CHU LAI	DUC PHO
4TH INF DIV	CAMP ENARI	
1750 ABN BDE	AN KHE	
1ST INF DIV	LAI KHE	QUAN LOI AND DE AN
11TH ACR	DI AN	BLACKHORSE
25TH INF DIV	CU CHI	TAY NINH AND DAU TIENG
199TH LT INF BDE	LONG BINH	
9TH INF DIV	DONG TAM	
3D BDE 82D ABN DIV	PHU BAI	

* S E C R E T *

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SECRET

 * S E C R E T *

PAGE 3 RUMUGDA 8173 S E C R E T

1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) PHU BAI

1ST SQDN 18TH CAV PHU BAI

2/138 FA BN (155 SP) PHU BAI

3/197 FA BN (155 TOWED) SEAR CAP

PROGRAM 6 COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS.

6. (S) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IT IS ASSUMED THAT UNTIL EARLY FALL,
 ARMY COMBAT FORCES WILL BE DEPLOYED AS FOLLOWS:

A. I CTZ (PCV)

(1) 1ST CAV DIV (AM)

(2) 101ST ABN DIV (-). THE RECENTLY APPROVED REVISED CONVERSION
 PLAN TO THE AIRMOBILE CONFIGURATION WILL BE EXECUTED ON SCHEDULE
 WITH PHASE I TAKING PLACE AT UNIT'S PRESENT LOCATION. REF B APPLIES.

(3) 3D BDE 82D ABN DIV. PRIOR TO THE FULL EMPLOYMENT OF THE
 UNIT, ON OR ABOUT 1 SEP 68, THIS BDE WILL BE RELOCATED IN AN AREA
 OF REDUCED ACTIVITY, VICINITY OF PHU BAI, FOR REORGANIZATION,
 LIMITED OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING. CONDUCTING THESE ACTIVITIES
 IN THE PHU BAI AREA PERMITS THE BDE TO USE ESTABLISHED COMMAND AND
 LOGISTICAL CHANNELS AND MINIMIZES TIME LOST IN MOVEMENT.

(4) 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH). A PROGRAM 6 UNIT WHICH
 SHOULD ARRIVE IN-COUNTRY IN EARLY AUG 68.

PAGE 4 RUMUGDA 8173 S E C R E T

(5) 1ST SQDN 18TH CAV. A PROGRAM 6 UNIT WHICH SHOULD ARRIVE
 IN-COUNTRY IN MED SEP 68:

16) 3D SQDN 5TH CAV (-) (PLUS).

B. I CTZ (III MAF): AMERICAL DIVISION

C. II CTZ:

(1) 4TH INF DIV.

(2) 173D ABN BDE.

D. III CTZ:

(1) 1ST INF DIV.

(2) 9TH INF DIV. UNIT WILL CONTINUE DISPLACEMENT TO IV CTZ
 AND CLOSE DONG TAY BY 30 SEP 68.

(3) 25TH INF DIV.

(4) 11TH ACR.

(5) 199TH INF BDE.

(6) 3D BDE 101ST ABN DIV. UNIT WILL
 REMAIN IN III CTZ UNLESS

CONTINGENCIES DICTATE OTHERWISE.

E. IV CTZ: ELEMENTS OF 9TH INF DIV.

6. (S) DISPOSITION ON FORCES IN LATE FALL IS EXPECTED TO BE:

A. I CTZ (101ST)

(1) 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

SECRET

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SECRET

 * S E C R E T *

PAGE 5 RUMUSDA 8173 S E C R E T

(2) 3D BDE 82D ABN DIV (LIB).

(3) 1ST SQDN 18TH CAV.

B. I CTZ (III MAF's) AMERICAN DIVISION.

C. II CTZ:

(1) 1ST CAV DIV (AM). UPON ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) IN I CTZ, AND AFTER REORGANIZATION OF THE 3D BDE, 82D ABN DIV, THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) WILL RETURN TO AN KHE AND OPERATE NORTH OF NHA TRANG.

(2) 4TH INF DIV.

(3) 173D ABN BDE.

D. III CTZ:

(1) 1ST INF DIV.

(2) 25TH INF DIV. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) IN I CTZ, CO C 2/34 ARMOR WILL RETURN TO III CTZ. MEANWHILE, 2/34 ARMOR (-) WILL REMAIN WITH THE 25TH INF DIV, FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST MOVING 2/34 ARMOR (-) TO I CTZ AREA.

(4) THE ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) IN EARLY AUGUST AND THE 1ST SQDN 18TH CAV IN MID SEPTEMBER WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ARMOR CAPABILITY IN I CTZ. (ONE TANK BN AND A 44-TANK AIR ORED CAV SQDN).

PAGE 6 RUMUSDA 8173 S E C R E T

(a) THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR A TANK BATTALION IN III CTZ.

(c) THE TIME LOST IN MOVING THIS BN FROM III CTZ TO I CTZ, AND POSSIBLY BACK AGAIN.

(d) THE INCREASED LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS IN I CTZ TO SUPPORT AN ADDITIONAL TANK BATTALION.

(3) 101ST ABN DIV. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) IN I CTZ, AND AFTER REORGANIZATION OF THE 3D BDE, 82D ABN DIV, THE PARTIALLY CONVERTED 101ST ABN DIV (-) WILL RETURN TO III CTZ AND OPERATE SOUTH OF NHA TRANG. CONVERSION TO THE AIRMOBILE CONFIGURATION WILL BE COMPLETED IN III CTZ.

(4) 11TH ACR.

(5) 199TH INF BDE.

E. IV CTZ: 9TH INF DIV. UPON ARRIVAL OF 1ST SQDN, 18TH CAV

I. I CTZ: THE 3D SQDN 5TH CAV WILL RETURN TO THE 9TH DIV.

6. (C) REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE WITH, OR COMMENTS ON THIS CONCEPT AND STATIONING PLAN PRIOR TO 1 JUN 68 SO THAT APPROPRIATE ACTIONS MAY BE INITIATED.

GP4

CE

SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG 101ST ABN DIV		DATE 24 MAY 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 240315Z MAY 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG				4	FOR LTGEN G SHMAN
3	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					FOR
1	C/S				2	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	241655			SM	
	G-1					
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	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

"#304 Burned
4 Nov 68"

CONFIDENTIAL

#51

CONFIDENTIAL**FOR**

GRA 103

OO RUMUGRA RUMHMA
 DE RUMHMB 2445 1450315
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 240315Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
 FM CG 101ST ABN DIV CAMP EAGLE RVN
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DA NANG RVN
 INFO RUMHMA/CG PCV HUE PHU BAI RVN
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL 250321A FR AVDG-GC, MG BARSANTI FOR
 LIG CUSHMAN.

1. REFERENCE CONF MSG DTG 200612Z MAY 1968.
2. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING HEAT CASUALTIES. I AM COMPLYING WITH YOUR DESIRES.
3. I HAVE PERSONALLY INSISTED AND CONTINUE TO INSURE THAT SALT TABLETS AND AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF WATER ARE READILY AVAILABLE TO ALL OF MY TROOPERS. AS A RESULT, I FEEL THAT IN THE 101ST ABN DIV, WE HAVE SUFFERED A MINIMUM OF HEAT CASUALTIES.
4. AS YOU KNOW, THE MAJORITY OF OUR FIGHTING IS DONE AT NIGHT AND I WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE NIGHT OPERATIONS IN CONSONANCE WITH YOUR POLICIES.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL
#51

UNCLAS
~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONTROL SHEET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG 9TH MAB		DATE 24 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 232330Z MAY 68		FILLER COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					FOR copy #1 24 May <i>[Signature]</i> copy #2 24 May #3 Burned 4/10/68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SBC					

UNCLAS
~~SECRET~~

PT006959
OTTUZYUW RUABCMW1397 1440000UUUUU-RUMUGRA
ZNR UUUUU
DE RUABQL 1355B 1442330
ZNR UUUUU
O 232330Z MAY 68
FM CG NINTH MAB
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
INFO RUYNBUC/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
RUYEUAE/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
BT
UNCLAS
FROM BGEN CHIP TO COL ETHERIDGE INFO COL THOMAS AND COL BUTCHER
A. CTG 79.5 MSG 230855ZMAY68
1. CONCUR YOUR PROPOSAL IN REF A.
2. FURTHER CONCUR YOU TRIP TO SUBIC. LET US KNOW YOUR ETA OKINAWA.
BT

NNNN#

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

#50

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

FMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM JCS		DATE 24 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 202253Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIGHTER BOMBER/RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS IN SVN
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					<p>REMARKS</p> <p><i>This is what Gen Kerwin mentioned to me. We've had this for a while.</i></p> <p>LIMDIS</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE FOR</p>
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
1	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	242000			242	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #49

WITHDRAWN MATERIALS
"OUT CARD"

DESCRIPTION of WITHDRAWN MATERIALS:

Collection Title: III MAF Incoming Mags 9-24 May 68

PC Number: _____

Location: Folder, Drawer L5

Box Number: _____

Folder Title: _____

Photo Number: _____

Description of Item: Referral I ~~202~~ Serial # 2022538
MAY 68

THESE MATERIALS HAVE BEEN SIGNED OUT TO:

Name/Rank: _____

Unit: _____

Address: _____

Phone Number: _____

Date: _____

Purpose: _____

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CIN ABRAMS, DEPCOMUSMACV		DATE 24 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 240042		COPY# 112 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					REMARKS Pms
3	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S				a	
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
	S/S	241055			SD	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
4	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #10

0 240040Z
FM GEN APPAMS, DEPCOMUSMACV
TO LTC ROSSON, CG PCV
INFO LTC PALMER, DCG USARV
LTC CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
ZEM

UNCLAS E F F O MAC S7SS EYES ONLY
SUBJ: CONTROL, TURN-IN AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS
REF: PCV MESSAGE (U) (EFTO) PHP 692, DTC 180244Z MAY 68
1. YOUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IMPROVEMENTS ARE APPRECIATED.
2. REFERENCE YOUR RECOMMENDATION, UPON REQUEST FROM YOUR
HEADQUARTERS, CMFC "GO TEAMS" WILL BE PLACED WITH DIVISONS,
SUBJECT TO PRIORITIES EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE REQUEST.
THIS WILL PARTIALLY ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM AREAS YOU HAVE
IDENTIFIED

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

099

240225

NNNN

2

UNCLASSIFIED
(EFTO)

#48

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

SI MAF FORM 5218 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 24 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0323007 MAY 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG				le	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S				Q	
	D C/S			4/5	R	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	241325			ZND	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

"#2" 3 Burned
4 Nov 68"

SECRET

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUMUGRA RUEBHOA
DE RUHFMA 4144 QRRWEPO
ZNY SSSSS
P 232309Z MAY 68
FM CG FMFPAC

EXCLUSIVE

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
ZEN/CG MARCOR DEV & EDUC COMD QUANTICO VA
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMANG INFO
GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN MASTERS FROM LTGEN KKULAK.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAF 203628Z/MAY 68

1. I UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE MESSAGE
QUOTED IN REFERENCE A AND AGREE THAT THERE HAS BEEN
NEEDLESS LOSS OF MARINE LIVES IN THE THREE PLUS YEARS
OF OUR VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT. WE NEED TO DO ALL WE
CAN TO DIMINISH THE NUMBER OF AVAILABLE WHITE
CROSSES, AND I CONCUR THAT MUCH CAN AND MUST BE DONE BEYOND
OUR CURRENT ACTIONS.

2. BUT THERE IS ONE THING ABOUT REFERENCE A THAT
TROUBLES ME. THAT IS THE IMPLICATION THAT MAY BE DRAWN
FROM PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 6 THAT THE MARINES' APPROACH TO

PAGE 2 RUHFMA4144 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS INVOLVES A DIFFERENT SET OF
PRINCIPLES OR A DIFFERENT SET OF TACTICAL VALUES, AS
RELATES TO AGGRESSIVENESS, FROM THE WAR IN WHICH WE
ARE PRESENTLY INVOLVED. THIS IS NOT TRUE, AND I DOUBT
IF SUCH WAS INTENDED. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT SUCH
AN INFERENCE CAN BE DRAWN--THAT THERE ARE VARYING
COEFFICIENTS OF COURAGE, DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF
THE OPERATIONS. SUCH A CONCEPT STANDS ATWART ONE OF
OUR DEEPEST RESERVOIRS OF STRENGTH.

3. TO ME, IT IS NOT THE DEGREE OF AGGRESSIVENESS THAT
IS IN ISSUE. NOR IS IT IN ANY SENCE A MATTER OF EXOTIC
CHANGES IN PRINCIPLE BEING EVOLVED TO RESPOND TO THE
CURRENT WAR SITUATION. TO THE CONTRARY, BASIC TACTICAL
PRINCIPLES ARE IMMUTABLE. THEY ARE AFFECTED NEITHER BY
TERRAIN NOR BY ENEMY CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY ARE COM-
PLETELY APPLICABLE TO THE VIETNAM WAR, AND THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE THAT THOSE BASIC PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE IN ANY
WAY ALTERED. IN A WAY, THIS IS EMPHISIZED BY SOME OF THE
DETAILS ENUMERATED IN PARAGRAPH 5.

4. WHAT IS NEEDED, IS NOT A CAMPAIGN TO

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
#47

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE

PAGE 3 RUMHFM44144 S E C R E T SPECIALLY EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
"SOFT PEDAL A GENERATION OF TRAINING IN THE ASSAULT",
BUT A CAMPAIGN TO EMPHASIZE A SOUND AND MORE
THOROUGH APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE
MADE US SUCCESSFUL IN THE PAST. DETAILED PLANNING,
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, Meticulous RECONNAISSANCE,
SCRUPULOUS SECURITY, THE OPTIMUM EXPLOITATION OF
SUPPORTING ARMS AND THEIR PRECISE EMPLOYMENT IN
COORDINATION WITH TACTICAL MANEUVER, ALL EXECUTED
WITH THOROUGHNESS AND RELENTLESS AGGRESSIVENESS BY
A CLOSELY KNIT CHAIN OF COMMAND. THESE, IT SEEMS TO
ME, COMPRISE THE PROFESSIONAL FORMULA THAT WILL SAVE
LIVES. THEY HAVE RECENTLY BEEN UNDERSCORED IN ORDERS
TO THE NON COMBAT-COMMITTED ELEMENTS OF THE PAC.
THEY WILL BEAR FURTHER EMPHASIS AND PURSUIT. BEST REGARDS.

*a repeat in
different words
that is outlined
to para 5 a b c
of ref A.*

GP-4
BY

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

447

SECRET

 * SECRET *

PT005592
 OYTSZYUW RUABCHN0162 1440000-SSSS-RUMUGRA
 ZNY SSSSS RO 230215Z
 DE RUABOL 12960 1440215
 ZNY SSSSS RO 230215Z
 FM CG NINTH MAF
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUYEUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 RUYEUAE/COG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

FOR

BT

SECRET

FOR COL ETHERIDGE FROM DEEN CHIP

A. CG III MAF 221302Z MAY60 (NOTAL)

1. CONCUR YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM IN PARA 2 OF REF.

2. FOLLOWING COMMENTS RELATIVE TO PORTION OF PARA 3:

A. RECOMMEND SENTENCE IN PARA 204 OF DRAFT LOI WHERE IT STATES: QUOTE: IT BASED AFLOAT, OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE HMM WILL REMAIN WITH THE SLP COMMANDER, HOWEVER, BY ARRANGEMENT WITH CG, 9TH MAF, AND WITH CONCURRENCE OF COMSEVENTHFLT, ALL AVAILABLE HELICOPTERS WILL BE PROVIDED TO CG, 1ST MAF, FOR UTILIZATION IN THE TOTAL SUPPORT OF III MAF MARINE CORPS FORCES FOR FRIGGING IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION III. UNQUOTE BE CLARIFIED. THE WORDS QUOTE ALL AVAILABLE

PAGE TWO RUABOL 12960 SECRET

HELICOPTERS UNQUOTE COULD BE SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION IN THAT IT COULD MEAN ALL SLP HELICOPTERS IN AN UP STATUS LEAVING NONE TO MEET THE JUSTIFIABLE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SLP'S.

B. CONCURRENCE OF COMSEVENTHFLT WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO BE OBTAINED BY CG, III MAF.

C. CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF COMSEVENTHFLT STATEMENT THAT CATF REMAINS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE WILL HAVE TO BE MADE BY COMSEVENTHFLT IF A DEFINITION IS BELIEVED NECESSARY.

GP-4

BTR

SECRET
#46

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM COM SEVENTHFLT		DATE 25 MAY 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 237054Z MAY 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS
			IN	OUT			
2	CG						<p><i>Regrets - in Saigon</i></p> <p>FOR</p> <p><i>"# 3 + 4 Burned # Nov 68"</i></p> <p><i>SS</i></p>
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
1	C/S						
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
	S/S	237450					
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**FOR**

FITCZYUW RUMACMU4778 1440000-CCCC--R UMUGRA.
 ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMGCS
 DE RUMGUL 1841 1440854
 ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMGCS
 P 230854Z MAY 68
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM BRINGLE

1. IF YOUR SCHEDULE PERMITS WOULD BE PLEASED IF YOU COULD JOIN ME FOR LUNCH ON BOARD PROVIDENCE 261145H9. RPT 261145H9.
2. EXPECT PROVIDENCE TO BE ON NGFS VICINITY OF DANANG.
3. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#44

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 22 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 221855Z MAY 68		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPECIAL REPORT (U)
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS #2 burned 4/6/68 EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Copy #3 to Air Control 23 May 68 SECRET
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 22 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 221855Z MAY 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					SPECIAL REPORT (U) REMARKS <div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold; text-align: center;">EXCLUSIVE</div> <div style="text-align: center;">MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</div>
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
41	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	235700				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMS/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

RR RUEBHOA RUMHAW RUMUGRA RUMHVP RUMHLA
 DE RUHNFMA 3907 OREQYT
 ZNY SSSS
 R 221855Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ANDERSON, INFO
 GEN CHAPMAN, LIGEN CUSHMAN, MGEN TOMPKINS, AND
 MGEN ROBERTSON FROM LIGEN KEULAK. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY

SPECIAL REPORT (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 150700Z/MAY 68 (S)

B. CG FIRST MAW 032300Z/APR 68 (S)

1. REFERENCE A STATED INTENT TO TERMINATE THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B.
2. DATA SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE B HAVE BEEN OF INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE IN DOCUMENTING THE MARINE CORPS POSITION RELATIVE TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT

PAGE 2 RUHNFMA3907 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SYSTEM OF AIR CONTROL. IT IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM ANY OTHER SINGLE SOURCE, AND THE ACCUMULATED DATA WILL PROVIDE USEFUL MEASUREMENT FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS.

3. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST THAT THE FIRST MAW SPECIAL REPORT CONTINUE FOR AN ADDITIONAL THIRTY DAYS AND BE REEVALUATED AT THAT TIME.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

43

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	22 MAY 68
	SERIALS/CONTROL DATE	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
	221851Z MAY 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG				g	EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO REMARKS
2	DCG				Rover	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S				Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	236700			SAF	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

"#2 & 3 Burned
4 Nov 68"

3

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMUGRA
DE RUHFMA COPY QREGITG
ZNY SSSSS
P 22185 IZ MAY 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
LTGEN KRULAK, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG FMFPAC 222148Z/APR 68

1. YOUR MODIFICATION TO THE SPECIAL REPORT TO COINCIDE WITH THE FORMAT AND SUBMISSION TIME OF THE COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY HAS IN NO WAY IMPAIRED ITS QUALITY OR USEFUL CONTENT. IN ADDITION TO THE OBVIOUS BENEFIT OF COMBINING THE TWO REPORTS, THE NEW METHOD, BY TERMINATING THE PERIOD FOR THE SPECIAL REPORT AT 0900, VICE 1000, GAINS FOR US A MUCH NEEDED HOUR.

2. OUR SOURCES AT HMC CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ESTEEM WHICH THE REPORT ENJOYS IS KEYED NOT ONLY TO ITS QUALITY BUT TO ITS TIMELINESS; HOWEVER, IN RECENT DAYS I HAVE OBSERVED THAT THE REPORT HAS NOT BEEN ON TIME, PERHAPS DUE TO THE NEW REPORTING METHOD.

*Quas
unaware //
this
read out the AM as the
to the allegation. then
the time
was picked
G-3
said "no bubbles"*

AGE 32 RUHFMA 3906 SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

3. AS I REQUESTED IN REFERENCE A, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COMPLETED TRANSMISSION OF THE REPORT TO US BY 1230 DAILY YOUR TIME. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4 .1
BT

SECRET

#42

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE 4 CCN 186

		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 22 MAY 68
		SERIAL# 222124Z MAY 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT IN-EXCESS ALLOWANCE FOR PROVMAG 39 (U)	
23 May	St. Stevenson	DATE	SIGNATURE
	<i>[Signature]</i>		
5/22/68	Paul Thompson		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES TAPE AND MAT		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#41
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMHAW RUMUGARA
 DE RUHHFMA3931 1432124
 ZNY CCCCC
 P R 222124Z MAY 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ANDERSON,
 INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK
 IN-EXCESS ALLOWANCE FOR PROV MAG 39 (U)

- A. CG FIRST MAW 260030Z/MAR68
- B. CG FMFPAC 141942Z/MAR68
- C. CMC 261218Z/MAR68
- D. CG FMFPAC 300331Z/MAR68
- E. CG FIRST MAW 220558Z/MAY68

1. IN REF A, WHICH CONTAINED THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR
 THE ACTIVATION OF A PROV MAG TO OPERATE FROM QUANG TRI,
 YOU STATED THAT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY
 AVAILABLE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE FORMATION OF
 THE UNIT. IN REF B, SUPPORTING THE PROPOSAL TO CMC,
 I INCLUDED THE STATEMENT THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED WITH
 AVAILABLE RESOURCES, AND THE CMC APPROVAL.

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA3931 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 REF C, REITERATED THIS ARRANGEMENT, SPECIFICALLY NOTING
 THAT NO ADDITIONAL OUTFITTING WAS AUTHORIZED. REF D, THE
 ACTIVATING DIRECTIVE, INVITED ATTENTION TO THIS
 PROVISION.

2. THE REQUEST FOR IN-EXCESS ALLOWANCES IN REF E
 MAKES NO ALLUSION TO THIS BACKGROUND OF PREVIOUS CORRESPON-
 DENCE OR YOUR EARLIER STATEMENT IN REF A, AND PROVIDES NO
 JUSTIFICATION BEYOND THE STATEMENT THAT
 MAXIMUM REDISTRIBUTION OF FIRST MAW ASSETS HAS BEEN EFFECTED.

3. PRIOR TO FURTHER ACTION ON REF E, I
 MUST REQUIRE THE REQUIREMENTS STATE
 THEREIN IN LIGHT OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF TWO
 MONTHS AGO.

GP-4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

VV DDKA855AIVV MMSA502TQVV MSB223
 OO DDKE
 DE MMSB 1219B 1421145
 ZNY SSSS
 O 211145Z MAY 68
 FM CG NINTH MAB
 TO CG III MAF DNG
 BT

FOR

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR M/GEN VAN RYZIN FROM B/GEN CHIP.

A. CG III MAF 210302Z MAY 68.

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, MY CHIEF OF STAFF AND YOUR FORMER AIR OFFICER DEPARTING FUTEMA VIA C-130 TAIL NR 799 DEPARTING FUTEMA 0600 ON 22ND. HE IS AVAILABLE TO YOU AND III MAF STAFF TO RESOLVE THIS SITUATION AND IS AVAILABLE AS LONG AS REQUIRED.
2. I REGRET CURRENT PROPOSED PROCEDURES HAVE NOT BEEN ADEQUATE. JIM ETHERIDGE UNDERSTANDS MY POLICIES COMPLETELY AS DISCUSSED IN REF A. AND HE HAS MY DIRECTIVE TO SEE THEY ARE IMPLEMENTED.
3. LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU SOON. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#39

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2				<i>lp</i>	GEN ABRAMS DEFCOMUSMACV
DCG						SERIAL 211027
DCG AIR						1, 2 & 3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	1				<i>Q</i>	SUBJECT VIST OF HONG KONG
DC/S						REMARKS <i>CG -</i>
DC/S DM						<i>Here goes the Savings Deposit for May! 1/Kepp</i>
DC/S AIR						<i>Negative - I am a most abstemious, austere and pedestrian character with only the simplest of needs - wine women song</i>
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			226715		<i>815</i>	LEGEND
S/C						A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
						C - COMMENTS
						I - INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

"# 263 Burned 4 Nov 69"

38

O 211027Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 6658 EYES ONLY

(C) REQUEST TO VISIT HONG KONG 27-29 MAY APPROVED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

060

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL**FOR**

PT005389
 PTTTCZYUH RUMUHFA3441 1410950=CCCC--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 200924Z MAY 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 14404 FOR BG ANDERSON.
 SUBJ: YOUR TELEPHONIC MESSAGE CONCERNING LTG ROSSON'S
 REACTION TO PRESS STORY - A SHAU (C)
 1. (C) STORY IN QUESTION WAS THIRD OF SIMILAR VEIN RELEASED
 BY WIRE SERVICES. FOLLOWING AP NEWSBREAK, REUTERS PICKED UP
 STORY FOLLOWED BY UPI.
 2. (C) ENTIRE SUBJECT NOW UNDER STUDY BY MACOI. STRONGLY
 RECOMMEND FURTHER ACTION BE DELAYED FROM YOUR END PENDING
 RETURN OF BG SIDLE, 21 MAY, FROM OUT OF COUNTRY. GP=4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#36

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						SERIAL
						COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT
DCG AIR						REMARKS <i>4 4 Runed 4 dec 68</i> <i>Copy to the Drake 20 by 5704</i> LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
C/S						
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM CG FMFPAC
CG	2		5/20		<i>Jo</i>	SERIAL 182002Z MAY68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		5/19		<i>JA</i>	SUBJECT TO MGEN DRAKE
DCG AIR	4			20	<i>A</i>	REMARKS
C/S	1.		5/19		<i>Q</i>	
DC/S				5/20	<i>JA</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			190740		<i>JA</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

JA

RR RUMUGRA
 DE RUHFMA 3226 1392002
 ZNY EEEEE
 R 182002Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O

1. PLEASE PASS TO MGEN DRAKE: WELCOME TO FLEET
 MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC, AND CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR
 ASSIGNMENT AS DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL OF
 PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM. GOOD LUCK AND GOD SPEED.
 LTGEN KRULAK.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#33	

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 18 AMY 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 182001Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES REC'D

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/20			EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
3	DCG		5/19			REMARKS <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</div>
4	DCG AIR		5/19			
1	C/S		5/19			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	190755			FAU	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

43

SECRET

#32

SECRET

OO RUMUGRA RUMHAW
 DE RUHHFMA 3225 1392001
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 182001Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND
 MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK, MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY

1. HERE IS THE BAD NEWS, IN THE FORM OF A MEMO FROM
 DEPUTY SEC DEF, TO THE CHAIRMAN JCS.

QUOTE:

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE VARIOUS POSITIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
 STAFF ON THE ISSUE CONCERNED WITH ASSIGNING THE III MAF FIGHTER-
 BOMBER AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 OF THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR, AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCE (A).
 2. I AM IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN JOINT
 CHIEFS OF STAFF, IN APPENDIX D OF REFERENCE (A) THAT THE UNIFIED
 COMBAT COMMANDER ON THE SCENE SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO BE THE BEST
 JUDGE OF HOW THE COMBAT FORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM ARE TO BE ORGANIZED
 COMMANDED AND DEPLOYED TO MEET THE THREAT FACING HIM JUST AS THE

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA3225 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 UNIFIED COMMANDER IS PRESUMED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE NEEDS OF
 HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND RESPONSIVE TO GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER
 ECHELONS). FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF
 MARINE AIR UNITS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV
 FOR AIR SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF
 AIR OPERATIONS UNDER OTHER COMBAT CONDITIONS, OR NEED POSE A
 THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM.

3. I NOTE IN APPENDIX D TO REFERENCE (A) THE ASSURANCES MADE BY
 COMUSMACV TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SINGLE
 MANAGER ARRANGEMENT OVER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
 WILL NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THAT NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC
 COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH IT WAS DEvised. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV
 SHOULD REVERT TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF WHEN
 THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS.

4. THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
 THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 CONCEPT, CITING UNUSUAL DELAYS IN PLANNING CYCLES AND IN PROVIDING
 AIRCRAFT FOR IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES. THE REPORT CONTAINED IN
 REFERENCE (B) INDICATES THAT COMUSMACV HAS ALREADY INITIATED ACTIONS
 WHICH SHOULD ALLAY THESE CONCERNS. I AM ALSO CONFIDENT

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA3225 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THAT CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE POINTS RAISED BY THE
 COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF DIVERTED
 AIRCRAFT TO SATISFY IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING
 THE PROBLEMS CITED BY THE COMMANDANT REGARDING ORDNANCE LOAD
 MIXES AND PRE-BRIEFING OF PILOTS ON IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES IN
 SUPPORT OF MARINE OPERATIONS IN I CORPS.

5. I DESIRE THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW
 PERSONALLY THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT IN I CORPS TO DETER-
 MINE, IN COORDINATION WITH CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV, SUCH CHANGES AS
 HE CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO MINIMIZE DELAYS BETWEEN REQUESTS FOR
 AIR SUPPORT AND THEIR EXECUTION AND TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF SIGNIF-
 ICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

/S/ PAUL H NITZE

UNQUOTE.

2. THIS DECISION JUST REFLECTS THE CIRCUMSTANCE
 WHICH I OUTLINED TO NORM THE OTHER EVENING. MR.
 NITZE, WHILE AWARE OF AND SYMPATHETIC TO OUR POSITION,
 STILL WAS FACED, AS A CIVILIAN, WITH MAKING A PURE
 MILITARY DECISION WHICH OVERRIDES THE FIELD COMMANDER,
 THE THEATER COMMANDER AND THE JCS CHAIRMAN. THAT IS

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA3225 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 WHY I WANTED BADLY TO FLOAT A FACE-SAVER, SUCH AS IN
 MY 160911Z/MAY. AND THAT FORMULA WILL STILL GIVE US
 SOME HELP.

3. A LONG DISCUSSION WITH CMC BROUGHT OUT THE
 FOLLOWING:

A. OBVIOUSLY, WE HAVE TO KEEP TRYING. WE CANNOT GIVE UP, OR
 WAVER. NITZE'S MEMO, IN PARAGRAPH THREE, GIVES US A TINY LOOPHOLE
 WHERE IT SAYS THAT WE SHOULD GET BACK TO THE NORMAL COMMAND POSTURE
 AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. USING THIS AS A SPRINGBOARD
 CMC HAS TABLED A PAPER AT JCS PROPOSING THE
 FORMULA IN MY 160911Z/MAY AS A LOGICAL INTERVENING
 STEP IN THE MOVE BACK TO THE PROPER COMMAND RELATIONSHIP. I
 AM GOING TO DO THE SAME WITH SHARP. IF WE ARE
 SUCCESSFUL IN THAT EFFORT, WE WILL HAVE THE OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE
 REDRESSED - THE MATTER OF OPCON. AND I CANNOT OVER-
 STRESS MY OWN CONVICTION THAT GETTING OPCON BACK
 IN MARINE HANDS IS, BY A MILE, THE MOST IMPORTANT
 THING OF ALL.

B. WE HAVE TO UNDERSCORE, BY HARD FACTS AND BY
 VALIDATED GROUND COMMANDER TESTIMONY, ANY AND

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHFMA3225 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
EVERY OCCASION WHERE THAT GROUND COMMANDER CAN
LEGITIMATELY RELATE CASUALTIES OR LACK OF SUCCESS TO
ANY PART OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM. CMC WILL
TAKE ANY SUCH INSTANCES TO SEC DEF - OR THE WHITE
HOUSE - AND I WILL DO THE SAME WITH SHARP. BEST REGARDS
TO ALL.
GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

NO 1 18227 NVA 207-37

EX C 1 WESTPHALIA

TO GEN MOMYER CGM 7TH AF

LGEM PALMER DCG USARV

PADM, VETR COMUSNAVFORV

LGEM CUSHMAN CG III MAF

LGEM ROSSON CG PROV CORPSV

LGEM HEYAND CG II FFV

MGEM PEERS CG I FFV

MGEM ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ

ZEM

SECRET MAC 6523 EYES ONLY

1. THIS COMMAND HAS BEEN GREATLY EMBARRASSED BY THE PUBLICATION OF A NEWS STORY ALLEGING THAT THE PENTAGON HAS REFUSED PERMISSION FOR THE U. S. MILITARY TO BOMB A NORTH VIETNAMESE MIG AIRFIELD BELOW THE 20TH PARALLEL. MALICIOUS SPECULATION AND LEAKAGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE PRESS IS PREJUDICIAL TO MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND UNDERMINES OUR WHOLE SECURITY SYSTEM. DURING THE SENSITIVE PERIOD OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, SUCH SPECULATION AND LEAKS CAN BE EXTREMELY INJURIOUS TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, THE NEWS STORY HAS DAMAGED OUR MILITARY POSITION AND HAS PRODUCED AN EFFECT ENTIRELY OPPOSITE TO WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED BY THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE.

2. I HAVE DIRECTED THE MACV INSPECTOR GENERAL TO MAKE A FULL AND EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS UNFORTUNATE NEWS STORY.

3. I ALSO WISH TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO REITERATE THAT EXTREME CAUTION AND EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION WHICH COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE NEGOTIATIONS OR FURNISH PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. WARM REGARDS.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER DURING HOURS

PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

300

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			LTG ROSSON CG PCV		18 MAY 68	
			SERIAL #/CONTROL DATE		COPY# / OF COPIES RECD	
			180246		1 & 2 3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2/3	CG		5/20		de	REMARKS C/S - Don't we owe Westy a reply vis-a-vis America + 1st Mar Divs? C. To CG - see attached memo H. Regg of
3/3	DCG		5/19		de	
4/6	DCG AIR					
	C/S		5/18		W	
5	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
4	S/S		18:40		ms	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

UNCLASSIFIED

#29

MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR: CG *le*

We replied to MACV
by the below message on 27
April. We have since completed
revision of our order and it's
being distributed at the present
time. If you feel that this
inp would be helpful, I can
prepare a msg, although we
told you Westmoreland that we
were being just that.

Wesley
G.

O 150247Z ZYH 277-5
 FM LTC JOSSON CG PCV
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
 INFO LTC CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O PHB 592 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: CONTROL, TUGN-IN AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY
 WEAPONS (U)

REF: A. MACV MSG (U) (EFTO) 25409, DTG 240114Z APR 68

B. PCV MSG (U) (EFTO) PHB 375 EO, DTG 290645Z APR 68

1. (U) THIS IS THE FINAL REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 APRIL, SUBJECT AS A
 VE (REF A). REF B WAS INTERIM REPLY.

2. (U) FOLLOWING ARE FINDINGS BASED ON DIRECT OBSERVATIONS
 BY PCV STAFF, AND REPORTS FROM DIVISIONS:

A. POSITIVE CONTROL IS BEING EXERCISED OVER CAPTURED
 ENEMY WEAPONS.

B. DIVISIONS' PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND ARE CON-
 sidered ADEQUATE.

3. (U) PROBLEM AREAS IDENTIFIED BY PCV ARE FIRST, A SHORT-
 AGE OF PERSONNEL TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED TO IDENTIFY ITEMS OF
 INTELLIGENCE VALUE; SECOND, THE REQUIREMENT TO SECURE WEAPONS
 AND/OR CACHES UNTIL EVALUATION IS COMPLETED AND DISPOSITION
 DETERMINED; AND THIRD, OCCASIONAL DIFFICULTY OR DELAY IN
 ARRANGING TRANSPORTATION TO COLLECTION POINTS.

4. (U) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT UPON REQUEST CMEC "GO
 TEAMS" BE IN PLACE WITH DIVISIONS AT THE OUTSET OF LARGE-
 SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS IN REMOTE AREAS TO EXPEDITE EVAL-
 UATION AND DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED MATERIALS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

250

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			AMB KOMER		17 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		1, 2 & 3	
			171231Z MAY 68		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/3		le	<p>REMARKS</p> <p>RECORDS:</p> <p>I took this up personally with Sam - has anything happened?</p> <p>Talked w/ Chuck Cross who is checking on this matter and will probably prepare for answer back to Comd. Komer.</p> <p>J.</p>
3	DCG		6/3		le	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		5/18		Q	
	D C/S		6/3		le	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	180930			SAD	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

"# 2 & 3 Burned 4 Nov 68"

SECRET #28

0 171231Z ZYM ZFF-3

FM AMB KONEP, 221R, MACV, SAIGON
 TO LTC CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
 INFO LTC ROSSON, IFFORCEV, NHA TRANG
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 6462 EYES ONLY

1. WHILE POPULAR MORALE SEEMS HIGH IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, ONE RECURRENT PACIFICATION PROBLEM WHICH BOTH VIETNAMESE AND US SOURCES KEEP RAISING IS THE APPARENT RELUCTANCE OF 1ST ARVN INF DIV TO INSURE THAT BATTALIONS OF 1ST ARVN REGT ARE USED TO SUSTAIN AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF SECURITY WITHIN AND AROUND THE RD AREA JUST NORTHEAST OF QUANG TRI CITY. BG TRUNG'S SCHEME SEEMS TO INVOLVE BRINGING THESE BATTALIONS IN FOR THE DEFENSE OF QUANG TRI CITY, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT, LEAVING THE RD CADRE, RF AND PF IN THE RD AREA WITHOUT THE HEAVY CLOUT AND BACKBONE OF ARVN BATTALIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THEIR ABSENCE IN CITY DEFENSE ROLE. FOR EXAMPLE, PSA BREWER POINTED OUT TO ME WHILE IN TOWN YESTERDAY THAT VC ARE NOW FAR MORE ABLE TO PENETRATE THE RD AREA AND THAT THE RDPG'S, RF/PF COULD GIVE ENEMY A HELL OF A TOUGH TIME IF THEY FELT THEY COULD ROUTINELY COUNT ON ARVN PRESENCE IN OR NEAR THEM IN THE CAMPAIGN AREA.

2. WHILE BREWER WASN'T COMPLAINING, IT REMINDED ME THAT I NOTED THE SAME PROBLEM WHEN IN QUANG TRI RECENTLY. IF YOU TOO THINK TRUNG IS BEING OVERLY SENSITIVE TO DEFENSE OF THE CITY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE NEARBY PD AREA, WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU OR BILL ROSSON COULD NUDDGE HIM A BIT. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

235

UNCL

#28

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 16 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 161719Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG		5/17		JK	EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN REMARKS
3	DCG		5/17		JK	
	DCG AIR					<p>Seen again.</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>FOR</p> <p><i>what I've been saying all along!</i></p> <p>#243 Burned 4 Nov 68</p>
1	C/S		5/17		JK	
	D C/S		5/17		JK	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	170635			DKW.	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL #24

CONFIDENTIAL

WV PAC 737

//////SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOLLOWS////////

W CMC291

RR RUMUGRA RUMHMA

DE RUEBHOA7267 1371724

ZNY CCCCC

PAC-I-III MAF

R 161719Z ZFF-6

FM CMC

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN/AND LGEN KRULAK/ FROM GEN CHAPMAN

REGRET VAN RYZIN CANNOT BE PROMOTED UNTIL BUSE VACATES

CHIEF OF STAFF BILLET ON WJUNGS. WILL PLAN TO DO IT AT HQMC.

CONCUR WITH PROPOSED VISITS TO OKINAWA AND HQ, FMFPAC.

BEST WISHES.

GP-4

BT

**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

VV PAC735VV CMC290
 RITCZYUW RUEBHOA7241 1371513-CCCC--RUMUGRA RUHFMA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 PAC T III MAF VIA DED CKT
 R 151504Z MAY68 ZFF-6
 FM CMC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DNG
 INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN KRULAK AND LIGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN
 CHAPMAN

YOUR PR 140810Z MAY68 ACKNOWLEDGED. ORDERS ON CAPT MCCOLLEY
 TRANSFERRING HIM TO HQTRS III MAF TO FOLLOW IMMED. WITH FURTHER
 ACTION DEPENDENT UPON MY REVIEW OF HIS FITNESS REPORT. RELIEF MAJ
 R T HENRY 070650 30JUN68. NO DATA TRAINED CAPT/MAJ IDENT IN WESTPAC
 AVAIL FOR REASON. EVENT 30 JUN 68 REPL NOT ACCEPTABLE FILL ON INTERIM
 BASIS FROM ON BOARD RESOURCES.

GF-4

BT

EXCLUSIVE
 FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG F FNO		DATE 15 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 10 1982 10 Y C		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR USE
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS * Comment on route sheet Copy # 2 to 6.3 16/14/2011 May 68 - B. Brown DM IK 21 May 68 EXCLUSIVE #2 Burned 4/10/88 MARINE COMPANIES ONLY Copy # 3 to Air Control 17 May 68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #22

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 16 MAY 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 160134Z MAY 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
			IN	OUT		
3	CG		5/17			REMARKS G-3 prepare answer in combination with CG 1st MAW.
4	DCG		5/17			
5	DCG AIR		5/17	20		
2	C/S		5/16			
	D C/S		4/5	SEEN		
	D C/S DM					
1.	S/S		5/16		DUN	
	G-1			5/20	DA	
	G-2					
	G-3	Comment & Copy to G-3.			KAH 20 May 68	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

33

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

OO RUMUSRA RUMHAW
 DE RUHFMA JPPP GEUPGER
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 160134Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUAR/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO
 MGEN ANDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY.

1. THIS CONCERNS THE EVACUATION AND SUPPORT OF
 KHAM DUC ON 12-13 MAY. CAN YOU GIVE ME THE FACTS
 RELATING TO TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF THIS ACTION IN THE
 FOLLOWING TERMS:

- A. WHAT WAS PLANNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR SUPPORT
 PRIOR TO ENEMY ATTACK?
- D. HOW WAS TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT REQUESTED? TO WHOM?
 BY WHOM?
- C. WHO DIRECTED RESPONSE? HOW LONG DID IT TAKE?
- B. WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT, IN NUMBER OF SORTIES?
- E. WHAT UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF AIR SUPPORT WERE
 ENCOUNTERED, IF ANY?

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#22

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JMAM FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM CG FLFPAC	DATE 15 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 160911Z MAY 68	COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR Copy #2 to Adm Sharp 17 May 68 Copy #3 to Air Control 17 May 68 Copy #1 to G3 Air 25 May 68 <i>S.T. Jones</i> 25 May 68 Copy #4 to DCG Air 17 May 68 <i>Bl. White</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	16 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF / COPIES RECD
	160911Z MAY 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/17		ck	EXCLUSIV FOR LTG CUSMINN, SHARP
3	DCG		5/17		ck	
4	DCG AIR		5/17	20	ck	REMARKS For CG - will deliver copy to Gen Sharp G.
1	C/S		5/17		ck	
	D C/S		5/20		ck	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		5/17		ck	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

SECRET

SECRET

DDKA 782
 VV YVNA712V NAB796
 OO DDKE
 DE YVNA 2790 1370911
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 160911Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, PLEASE DELIVER TO ADMIRAL SHARP, FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. THIS MORNING, WHEN I RETURNED FROM CONUS, MY STAFF BRIEFED ME ON THE PRESENTATION MADE TO YOU LAST FRIDAY BY WESTY'S TEAM ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR ASSETS.

2. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONING, I COME OUT WITH THE FOLLOWING DISTILLATION:

A. THE CURRENT PROCEDURE IS UNWIELDY; NOT YET PRODUCING THE RESULTS IT WAS INTENDED TO ACHIEVE.

D. THE PROPOSED FIXES WILL IMPROVE THE SITUATION, BUT WILL STILL EMBODY AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY WHICH IS BASICALLY INFERIOR TO THE REPLACED MARINE SYSTEM.

C. THE ORIGINAL MARINE ARRANGEMENT, WHILE EFFECTIVE FOR MARINE PURPOSES IS DEFICIENT, IN THE

PAGE 2 YVNA 2790 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR OVERALL THEATER SENSE, WHERE FLEXIBILITY OF TACTICAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION IS CONCERNED. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THAT OPTIONAL SINGLE AIR MANAGEMENT WHICH COMUSMACV SEEKS.

D. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A MODERATED FORMULA WHICH ENSURES TO COMUSMACV HIS OBJECTIVE OF CERTAIN SINGLE MANAGEMENT, WHILE STILL GIVING THE MARINES THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THEIR ORGANIC TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES.

E. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THIS CAN BE DONE; THAT WHAT HAS BECOME A GRAVE PROBLEM, ABSORBING THE ATTENTIONS OF MANY AT ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND, CAN BE SOLVED REASONABLY, SATISFYING BOTH OF THE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED ABOVE.

3. AS BACKGROUND FOR MY PROPOSAL LET ME ILLUMINATE THESE POINTS FROM OUR EARLIER EXPERIENCE:

A. UNDER 95-4 COMUSMACV EXERCISED UNRESTRAINED SINGLE MANAGERSHIP OVER 7TH AF FIXED WING TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES; WHICH IS TO SAY ABOUT 65 PERCENT OF ALL THE TACTICAL AIR IN-COUNTRY.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

21

SECRET

PAGE 3 YNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

B. AT THE SAME TIME, III MAF WAS DELIVERING ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF ITS DAILY SORTIE GENERATION TO 7TH AF, AND THESE SORTIES WERE EXECUTED WHEREVER COMUSMACV CHOSE.

C. OR, PUT ANOTHER WAY, COMUSMACV SINGLE MANAGED ABOUT 70-75 PERCENT OF ALL OF THE TACTICAL SORTIES IN RVN BEFORE THE CURRENT CHANGE TOOK PLACE.

D. BUT, FROM COMUSMACV'S VIEWPOINT, SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF 75 PERCENT REALLY WAS NOT ENOUGH. HE WAS NEVER SURE OF WHAT NUMBER OF SORTIES THE MARINES WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE, NOR WAS THE EMERGENCY AUTHORITY WHICH YOU GAVE HIM UNDER 95-4 QUITE ENOUGH TO LEGITIMIZE A DAY-IN DAY-OUT DIVERSION OF ADDITIONAL MARINE SORTIES TO OTHER WEIGHT-OF-EFFORT TASKS WHICH COMUSMACV, IN HIS OVERALL TACTICAL JUDGEMENT, REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE.

E. SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE BUT, IT SEEMS TO ME, THE SURGERY WAS SO SEVERE THAT IT HAS LEFT THE PATIENT EXTREMELY WEAK, WITH HIS MARINE LEG

PAGE 4 YNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR PARTIALLY PARALYZED.

4. HERE, IN ITS ESSENCE, IS MY PROPOSAL TO OVERCOME THOSE GENUINE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE DESCRIBED ABOVE:

A. RETURN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE FIXED WING ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND THE RELATED CONTROL MEANS TO CG III MAF. REUNITE THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM.

B. ISSUE A CINCPAC DIRECTIVE WHICH AUTHORIZES COMUSMACV TO DIRECT CG III MAF TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO CG 7TH AF SUCH SORTIES AS COMUSMACV REGARDS AS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A PROPER WEIGHT OF TACTICAL AIR EFFORT. THIS AUTHORITY, MOREOVER, SHOULD EXTEND NOT ONLY TO PRE-PLANNED ACTIVITY, BUT SHOULD ENVISION THE AUTHORITY OF MACV TADC TO PRE-EMPT ADDITIONAL MARINE AIR RESOURCES WHEN, IN MACV'S JUDGEMENT, THE OVERALL TACTICAL EFFORT SO REQUIRES. I VISUALIZE, IN THIS REGARD, THAT III MAF TADC WOULD PROVIDE MACV TASE WITH REAL TIME INFORMATION ON MARINE AIR AVAILABILITY AND STATUS AT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 5 YNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ALL TIMES. I VISUALIZE, ALSO, THAT CG III MAF, UTILIZING THE REGULAR CHAIN OF COMMAND, WOULD ENSURE THAT CG PROV CORPS V WOULD MAKE HIS AIR REQUIREMENTS KNOWN ON A CERTAIN AND TIMELY BASIS.

5. AS YOU CAN SEE, SUCH A CINCPAC ORDER WOULD LEGITIMIZE SINGLE MANAGERSHIP WITHOUT QUESTION, AND WOULD STILL LEAVE THE ESSENTIAL OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF III MAF ORGANIC AIR RESOURCES IN CG III MAF HANDS.

6. IT MIGHT BE CONTENDED THAT THE SOLUTION I HAVE PROPOSED COULD RESULT IN ALL OR MOST OF THE MARINE AIR BEING DIVERTED AT ANY TIME TO OTHER TASKS, WITH CG III MAF LEFT TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER ESSENTIALLY NO AIRPLANES; - A HOLLOW TRIUMPH IN PRINCIPLE. I CANNOT BUY SUCH REASONING, SINCE IT IS TANTAMOUNT TO CONCLUDING THAT THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER IS NOT GOING TO USE HIS TOOLS TO THE OVERALL BENEFIT OF THE MISSION. TO THE CONTRARY AND, ASSUMING UNIVERSAL DEDICATION TO THE TASK AT HAND, I BELIEVE THIS IS A SOUND ANSWER

PAGE 6 YNA 2790 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR TO THE PROBLEM, AND ONE WHICH COULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT ONCE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

GP -4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

21

SECRET

VV PAC 746
 ***** DE RUHNMMA SUPVR SPECAT EXCLUSIVE, FOLLOWS*****

CC RUMUGRA
 DE RUHNMMA 80830 1372240
 ZNY SSSSS
 BT
 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SUP
 SMM RUHNFMA2790 1370911 0 16091Z MAY 68
 C FARA 4 SUBPARA B LN 7 WA KACV 3D RD s
 TACC VICE TASE
 BT

SECRET

21

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN ABRAMS
CG	2		5/17		<i>lo</i>	SERIAL 160842Z MAY 68
DCG	3		5/17		<i>gl</i>	1, 2 & 3 COPY# OF, COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	<i>1</i>			<i>10</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	SUBJECT MAC 6382 EYES ONLY
C/S	<i>1</i>		5/16		<i>R</i>	REMARKS SR AIDE CALLED GEN ABRAMS office 170740 H. DHW.
DC/S				<i>4/20</i>	<i>DM</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
Aide			5/16	5/16	<i>EE</i>	
S/S			162030		<i>DKW</i>	
S/C						

*"# 2 & 3 Burned
4 Nov 68"*

LEGEND
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
C- COMMENTS
I- INFORMATION

31

CONFIDENTIAL

#20

G 160842Z ZYH Z4F-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV SAIGON
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO LTG ROSSON CG PROV CORPS VIETNAM
 MG TOLSON CG 1ST CAV DIV
 MG KOSTER CG AMDIV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 6382 EYES ONLY

1. I WILL BE IN DANANG 17 MAY MEETING ADM SHARP AND ATTENDING BRIEFINGS UNTIL 1400.
2. I HOPE TO VISIT 1ST CAV DIV AND AMERICAL DIV AFTER THE BRIEFINGS, ARRIVING 1ST CAV ABOUT 1430 AND CHU LAI ABOUT 1630.
3. PLEASE ADVISE IF VISIT IS CONVENIENT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

100

T. S. KOSTER

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV
CG						SERIAL 16023
						COPY # 1 OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT
DCG AIR						ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES
C/S						REMARKS
DC/S						Copy # 2 to 6-4 16 May 68 Th R. Bahls
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						orig to C/S. 7/10/68
G-2						
G-3						#3 Burned
G-4						4 Nov 68
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

#18

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN ARRANGS DEPCOMUSMACV
CG	2		5/17		lo	SERIAL 100433 COPY # 1 of 3 OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		5/17		Ph	SUBJECT AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES
DCG AIR	4			20	A	REMARKS
C/S	1.		5/16		Q	<p>B-4. Request may of outline our views. It would be helpful to relate what steps we have taken over the past few months as an introduction.</p> <p>Include my personal on H & S. However, in DMZ area, we deliberately stock up gun points for safety - & SP's are in arty range. Bring this out - and that our reporting incl arms on point.</p>
DC/S				8/20	PH	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4		Copy to Note - Copy to 6-4 16/11/68 PH				
CEO						
S/S			16/4/25		DUN	
S/C						

CONFIDENTIAL

C-4 - please note.

#18 29

done by [unclear]

0 160423Z

FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFV
 MG PEERS CG I FFV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 INFO LTG ROSSON CG PROV CORPS
 LTG PALMER DCG USARV
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 6365 EYES ONLY

1. (C) GROUND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES IN SVN NOW AVERAGE IN EXCESS OF \$200 MILLION A MONTH. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED APPROVAL FOR SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER RATES FOR RVNAF. EVEN WITH THE

NEW RATES RVNAF ALLOCATIONS WILL BE WELL BELOW THE RATES FOR OTHER FORCES IN SVM.

2. (C) EXPENDITURES SINCE JANUARY HAVE BEEN MUCH HIGHER THAN AVERAGE. THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF INCREASED EXPENDITURES AND RATES ARE:

A. STOCKS IN COUNTRY HAVE BEEN DRAWN DOWN TO SUCH LOW LEVELS THAT 23 ITEMS IN USARV ARE UNDER ASR CONTROL.

B. NEW PRODUCTION FACILITIES HAVE HAD TO BE OPENED. THE EFFECTS OF THE NEW PRODUCTION WILL NOT BE FELT IN SVN FOR MANY MONTHS.

3. (C) I BELIEVE WE CAN DO MUCH TO REDUCE AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES WITHOUT OPERATIONAL IMPACT. TWO AREAS IMMEDIATELY COME TO MIND:

A. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO BUILD UP LARGE BACK-UP STOCKS AT GUN POSITIONS. THESE STOCKS ARE DROPPED FROM INVENTORY SO DO NOT SHOW UP AS THEATER ASSETS. FURTHER, ISSUES FOR THIS PURPOSE INFLATE EXPENDITURE

PLUS INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION WHICH BECOMES UNSERVICEABLE. OUR EXPERIENCE IN KOREA SHOWED THAT LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF TONS OF EXCESS AMMUNITION ACCUMULATED AT THE GUN POSITIONS.

B. THE USE OF H AND I FIRES. I AM A FIRM BELIEVER IN USE OF FIREPOWER TO SAVE MANPOWER. HOWEVER, INDISCRIMINATE USE IN TRYING TO SEARCH OUT AN ENEMY WITHOUT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AS TO HIS LOCATION DOES NOT PAY VERY BIG DIVIDENDS. #18

4. (C) CORRESPONDENCE HAS RECENTLY BEEN DIRECTED TO GENERAL VIEN REQUESTING THAT HE TAKE ACTION TOWARD CONSERVING AMMUNITION. I BELIEVE IT IS TIME THAT U.S. FORCES EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PROGRAM. REQUEST ALL ADDRESSEES:

A. TAKE ACTION TO INSURE THAT STOCKS OF AMMUNITION AT GUN POSITIONS ARE KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE LEVELS. THE ACTION SHOULD INCLUDE AN INSPECTION SYSTEM TO INSURE COMPLIANCE.

B. PROVIDE ME WITH SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE CAN ESTABLISH A PROGRAM WHEREBY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES CAN BE REDUCED AT LEAST TEN PERCENT. SUCH A PROGRAM WILL HAVE THE DUAL EFFECT OF ENABLING US TO REBUILD STOCKS TO A SAFER LEVEL AND THE LONGER RANGE BENEFIT OF REDUCING COST.

5. (C) I WISH TO REITERATE THAT THERE IS NO INTENT TO CURTAIL ESSENTIAL

COMBAT EXPENDITURES NOR TO REDUCE STOCKS BELOW PRUDENT SAFETY LEVELS. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE REDUCTIONS CAN BE MADE WITHOUT IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

460

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	GEN WESTMORELAND	15 MAY 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	1, 2 & 3
	151235Z MAY 68	COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/16		JP	REMARKS
3	DCG		5/16		JP	
4	DCG AIR		5/16	17	JP	
1.	C/S		5/16		JP	
	D C/S		5/17		JP	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	160750			JMN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

IS AC

SECRET

O 151235Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV.
TO ADMIRAL SHARP, CINCPAC
INFO GENERAL MOMYER, CDR 7TH AF
LT GENERAL CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 6343 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)
REF: CINCPAC 112316Z MAY 68 (S)

1. (C) I FULLY AGREE THAT OUR COMMON CONCERN MUST BE TO GET THE MOST OUT OF OUR AVAILABLE TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES AND THAT WE MUST IMPLEMENT QUICKLY THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

2. (S) STAFF MEMBERS OF 7TH AIR FORCE AND MACV TASE PRESENTLY ARE WORKING OUT MODIFICATIONS FOR PREPLANNED REQUESTS WHICH WERE OUTLINED TO YOU ON 10 MAY.

3. (C) I WILL FORWARD DETAILS OF THE NEW SYSTEM TO YOU AS SOON AS THEY ARE COMPLETED. WE EXPECT TO HAVE THE PACKAGE, TOGETHER WITH III MAF COMMENTS, BY 25 MAY. HOWEVER, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL DURING YOUR VISIT LATER THIS WEEK. LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT.
BEST REGARDS

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

360

NNNN

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM COMUSMACV
CG	2		5/16		lp	SERIAL 150251Z MAY 68
DCG	3		5/16		PM	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4					SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
C/S	1.		5/15		6	REMARKS
DC/S			5/17		DM	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			157325		DKW	
S/C						

FOR

#344 Burned
4 Nov 68

LEGEND
A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
C- COMMENTS
I- INFORMATION

26

FOR

PYTUZYUW KUMUNFA2021 1360356-0000--RUMUGRA.
 ZLP 3100H
 P 19025 12 MAY 68 ZFFS
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMHUP/CS 3RD MAR DIV
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG 1ST MAF
 ZLN/CG PROVCORPSV

31
 UCLAS 13785
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG TOPPING, INFO LTG CUSHMAN,
 LTG ROSSON.
 SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
 ON NAPOLEON SALINE FIGHTING VICINITY DONG NACHAS TAKEN HEAVY
 KILL OF ENEMY FORCES DURING PAST 10 DAYS, PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY
 HAVE BEEN ACTIONS BY 1/5 USMC ON 5 MAY, 1/5 CAV (US) ON 9 MAY,
 AND 3/21ST INF (US) ON 9 AND 11 MAY, OUTSTANDING AIR AND ARTY FIRE
 SUPPORT HAS PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN THESE BATTLES. CONGRATULATIONS TO
 ALL.

B1

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#15

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM ADMINO FMFPAC	DATE 14 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 141901Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
2	CG		5/15		lo
3	DCG		5/15		lo
4	DCG AIR		16		lo
1	C/S		5/15		lo
	D C/S		5/16		lo
	D C/S DM				
	S/S	150600			lo
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

SUBJECT
QUOTE ADM HYLAND'S 112321Z MAY

REMARKS

EXCLUSIVE
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

VV PAC687

OO RUMUGRA
 DE RUHHFMA 2457 1351901
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 141901Z MAY 68
 FM ADMINS FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 MGEN THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ADM HYLAND'S SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 112321Z/MAY TO ADM SHARP INFO LTGEN KRULAK. IT MAY BE
 OF SOME VALUE TO YOU IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ADM
 SHARP.

QUOTE:

SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR ASSETS (U)

1. I THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENTATIONS ON FRIDAY 10 MAY BY REPS OF
 CG III MAF, SEVENTH AF AND COMUSMACV CLEARLY BROUGHT OUT THE FACT
 THAT HIGHLY CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS IN
 COUNTRY IS CLEARLY INFERIOR TO THE SYSTEM WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY IN
 EFFECT UNDER MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4.
2. THE MARINE PRESENTATION WAS FACTUAL AND SHOWED THAT THE NEW
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS BROUGHT NO ADVANTAGES WHILE IT HAS
 BROUGHT THE SEVERAL IMPORTANT DISADVANTAGES TO THE MARINES WHICH

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA2457 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN
 WERE SO CLEARLY PRESENTED.

3. IN MY OPINION THE SEVENTH AF PITCH CONFINED ITSELF TO CLAIMS
 THAT THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE NEW SYSTEM WERE DOING A GOOD JOB
 TRYING TO MAKE IT WORK. INCIDENTALLY FULL MARINE COOPERATION WAS
 SHOWN TO HAVE EXISTED DURING THE TRIAL PERIOD. ALL THE PROPOSED
 FIXES TO THE ADMITTEDLY MORE COMPLEX AND CUMBERSOME SYSTEM WERE IN
 THE DIRECTION OF MOVING AWAY FROM HIGHLY CENTRALIZED CONTROL TOWARD
 A MORE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM, BUT IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE UNILMATE
 IN THESE CORRECTIVE MEASURES WOULD AMOUNT TO A RETURN TO THE OLD
 SYSTEM.

4. I DO NOT SEE ANY REASON WHY UNDER THE OLD SYSTEM A MAJOR PORTION
 OF ALL OF THE MARINE ASSETS COULD NOT BE UTILIZED IN SUPPORT OF ARMY
 UNITS IF THAT WAS NECESSARY AT ANY TIME. AS WAS BROUGHT OUT
 GEN CUSHMAN WORKING UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM CAUSED MORE SUPPORT TO GO
 TO THE ARMY THAN TO THE MARINES BECAUSE THE TACTICAL SITUATION
 REQUIRED THIS DURING SOME OF THE HEAVY FIGHTING IN APRIL. THE
 SEVENTH AF PITCH SEEMED TO TAKE CREDIT FOR THIS AND FOR THE FACT
 THAT OPERATIONS IN THE EYE CORPS WERE CONSISTENTLY MORE HEAVILY
 SUPPORTED FROM THE AIR THAN OPERATIONS IN THE OTHER CORPS AREAS.
 OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD HAVE OCCURRED REGARDLESS OF THE SYSTEM IN USE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#14

SECRET

R U H H F M A 2 4 5 7 S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SINCE THE HEAVY FIGHTING HAS OCCURRED IN THE EYE CORPS, ALSO THERE
 WERE SEVERAL AREAS OF DOUBTFUL VALIDITY IN THE AIR FORCE PRESENTATION
 WHICH GLOSSED OVER OR WHICH DID NOT IN MY JUDGEMENT PRESENT THE
 FACTS OBJECTIVELY. THE BROAD ADVANTAGES TO THE AREA COMMANDER WERE
 PARTICULARLY VAGUE TO ME. ALTHOUGH I KNOW BOTH WESTY AND SPIKE SEEM
 TO PREFER THE NEW SYSTEM AND ARE DETERMINED TO MAKE IT WORK.
 5. I AM CONVINCED THAT DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT IS FAR SUPERIOR
 TO CENTRALIZED CONTROL. OUR CVA OPERATIONS ARE A GOOD EXAMPLE.
 WE GET THE UTMOST RESPONSIVENESS BY DECENTRALIZED TACTICAL
 MANAGEMENT IN DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS AND THIS AS YOU KNOW IS BROADLY
 GUIDED AND TEMPERED BY HIGHER ECHELON MONITORING AND SUGGESTION
 OR DIRECTION AS DESIRED BY THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES. I BELIEVE
 THAT IF NAVY ASSETS SHOULD EVER BE INCLUDED IN A CENTRALIZED
 SYSTEM VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE UNIQUE ADVANTAGES WE NOW ENJOY
 WOULD DISAPPEAR.
 6. I CONSIDER A FURTHER TEST PERIOD FOR THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM DURING WHICH THE MOST SINCERE EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO
 MAKE IT WORK BETTER WILL REALLY AMOUNT TO SHOVELLING AGAINST
 THE TIDE. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ADMIT THAT THE QUOTE EMERGENCY
 UNQUOTE IS OVER AND RETURN MARINE AIR ASSETS TO THE MARINE AIR/

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA2457 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 GROUND TEAM.

UNQUOTE.

GP-3

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

14

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	GEN WESTMORELAND	15 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D
	141411Z MAY 68	1, 2 & 3

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
						MAG 06301 EYES ONLY
2	CG		5/15		g	REMARKS
3	DCG		5/15		AW	
4	DCG AIR			16	AW	
11	C/S		5/15		AW	
	D C/S		5/16		AW	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	150725			PAW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
3	Major General		5/17			

"#2 & 3 Burned + Nov 68"

SECRET

O 141112 ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND--COMUSMACV

TO GEN MOMYER--COM 7TH AF
 LGEN PALMER--DCG USARV
 RADM VETH--COMUSNAVFORV
 LGEN CUSHMAN--CG III MAF
 LGEN ROSSON--CG PROVCORPSV
 LGEN WEYAND--CG II FFV
 MGEN PEERS--CG I FFV
 MGEN ECKHARDT--SA IV CTZ



ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 06301 EYES ONLY

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SEEK TO GAIN PROPAGANDA VALUE FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS DURING THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE WELL FOR ALL OF US TO REFRAIN FROM MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ANY FORM WHICH COULD BE SO APPLIED BY THE ENEMY TO OUR DETRIMENT.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

130

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUHKMOD1929 1350000-CCCC--RUMUGRA.

ZNY CCCCC

DE RUYEUAK 082 1331314

ZNY CCCCC

P 141250Z MAY 68 ZYO RUYE

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

INFO ZEN/USS ALAMO

ZEN/USS IVO JIMA

ZEN/COMPHIBRON SEVEN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL TO BGEN GLICK FM COMMODORE HARBERT

PROSPECTIVE CTG 76.4 VISIT (U)

1. CAPT. C.B. BISHOP, USN, (COMPHIBRON SEVEN) PROSPECTIVE CTG 76.4, AND FIVE MEMBERS HIS STAFF WILL ARRIVE DANANG 160715H0 MAY IN USS ALAMO FOR VISIT TO THIRD MAF HEADQUARTERS.
2. COMPHIBRON SEVEN HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO ATTEND THIRD MAF REGULAR MORNING BRIEF, WITH ACCOMPANYING STAFF OFFICERS, AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THIRD MAF STAFF ON ARG/SLF MATTERS.
3. REQUEST INFORMATION ON:
 - A. NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO MAY ACCOMPANY COMPHIBRON SEVEN AT 16 MAY BRIEFING.
 - B. CONVENIENT TIME 16 RPT 16 MAY FOR BRIEF VISIT BY CAPT BISHOP WITH YOU.

PAGE TWO RUYEUAK 082 C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. FOR INFO AND PLANNING, COMPHIBRON SEVEN AND ACCOMPANYING STAFF WILL EMBARK IN ALAMO FOR PASSAGE TO DANANG AT/ABOUT 151700H MAY.

5. SINCERE REGARDS TOM HARBERT

GP-4.

BT

FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JMAM FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM ADM SHARP, GERPAC		DATE 12 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 112316 MAY 68		COPY# 182 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/12		[Signature]	REMARKS RECEIVED BY [Signature]
3	DCG		5/12		[Signature]	
4	DCG AIR		5/13		[Signature]	
1	C/S		5/12		[Signature]	
	D C/S		5/15		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	120915			SGU	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

R 112316Z

FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII
TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV, SAIGON
INFO GEN MOMYER, CDR 7AF, VIETNAM
LGEN CUHMAN, CG III MAF, VIETNAM
ZEM

S E C R A T EYES ONLY

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAVER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

1. YOUR TEAM HEADED BY MGEN KERWIN HAS BRIEFED ME ON THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF AIC IN I CORPS, THE DEFICIENCIES AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED TO DATE AND IN GENERAL TERMS THE ACTIONS PROPOSED TO CORRECT THOSE PROBLEMS. WHILE THE PRESENTATIONS WERE INFORMATIVE, THEY DID NOT IDENTIFY IN DETAIL THE CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS WHICH YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE TO THE SYSTEM -- NOR WERE THE CHANGES DEFINED IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO PERMIT AN EVALUATION HERE AS TO WHETHER THEY WILL CORRECT THE PROBLAM AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED.
2. OUR COMMON CONCERN MUST BE TO GET THE MOST OUT OF OUR AVAILABLE RESOURCES UND FOR THIS REASON IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE PROCEED QUICKLY TO DEFINE AND IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM. AS SOON AS YOU CAN DEVELOP WITH ALL CONCERNED THE DETAILED CHANGES YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE, PLEASE FORWARD THEM TO ME. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CG III MAF'S COMMENTS ON THESE CHANGES FOR MY FINAL APPRAISAL.
3. PLEASE GIVE ME AN ESTIMATE OF WHEN YOU EXPECT TO HAVE MITHESE CHANGES COMPLETED.

WARM REGARDS.

270

NNNNV

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
DE RUHKM 1966 1320334

ZNY SSSSS
P 110334Z MAY 68
FM ADMINO FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CG FMFPAC
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

S E C R E T (AMC005 RPT AMC005)
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAN AND LTGEN
CUSHMAN FROM MGEN THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 2

1. BEFORE SUMMARIZING THE AIR CONTROL BRIEFING TO
SHARP, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET THAT NORM
ANDERSON MET FULL FACE THE CURRENT AIR FORCE TACTICS
OF ACCOMMODATION AND ADJUSTMENT BOTH IN HIS
EXCELLENT PRESENTATION AND IN DISCUSSIONS WHICH
FOLLOWED.

2. IN ADDITION TO SHARP, THE AUDIENCE INCLUDED RYAN,
HYLAND, MYSELF AND THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE
CINCPAC STAFF. THE BRIEFERS WERE MGEN'S KERWIN,
ANDERSON, AND BLOOD FOLLOWED BY A LTCOL STONER OF
THE MACV OPERATIONS EVALUATION GROUP.

PAGE 2 RUHKM 1966 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
3. FIRST, HERE IS WHERE WE STAND. SHARP DIRECTED THAT
THE PROPOSED MACV MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING
SYSTEM BE PROVIDED TO HIM IN WRITING WITH III MAF'S
DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE CHANGES. HE ALSO MADE IT
CLEAR THAT CG, III MAF WAS FREE TO PRESENT ANY MATERIAL
HE MIGHT DESIRE ON THE SUBJECT.

4. MGEN KERWIN
INTRODUCED NORM ANDERSON. BLOOD FOLLOWED NORM,
THEN STONER. PRESENTATION WAS CONCLUDED BY MACV REMARKS
BY KERWIN.

5. NORM'S BRIEFING WENT SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT
INTERRUPTION EXCEPT FOR SHARP'S KEEN INTEREST IN TWO
CHARTS. FIRST WAS THE ARMY-MARINE I CTZ TACTICAL
PACKAGE COMPARISON (SLIDE 7). SECOND, WAS THE CHART
COMPARING PREPLANNED SORTIES TO SCHEME OF MANEUVER
VERSUS SPECIFIC TARGETS (SLIDE 13). NORM ADHERED TO
HIS ORIGINAL SCRIPT EXCEPT FOR MINOR WORD CHANGES
AND AN ADDED CONCLUSION THAT: QUOTE: THE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CAN BE FURTHER ADJUSTED AND

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#6

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHNM 1966 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO ACCOMMODATED TO SHOW ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENT OVER THE CONDITIONS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED IN APRIL AND ARE DISCUSSED IN THIS PRESENTATION. BUT NO AMOUNT OF ACCOMMODATION WILL SOLVE THAT ASPECT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WHICH DEPRIVES THE MARINE-AIR-GROUND COMMANDER OF MISSION CONTROL OF HIS ORGANIC AIR FIRE SUPPORT. UNQUOTE.

6. BLOOD'S BRIEFING WAS LESS POLISHED, AND HEAVY ON STATISTICS, THE MOST REMARKABLE OF WHICH WAS THE ASSERTION THAT ONLY 4 PERCENT OF APRIL PREPLANNED SORTIES WERE DIVERTED. HE WAS INTERRUPTED FREQUENTLY BY SHARP. HE OPENED WITH CHARTS SHOWING COMPARATIVE USAF-USMC SORTIE CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARMY AND MARINE FORCES IN I CTZ. STRESSING THE POINT THAT III MAF CHOSE TO WEIGHT THE AIR EFFORT TO ARMY FORCES, HE EXPLAINED THAT ARMY BATTALIONS (28 OUT OF 31) WERE MORE HEAVILY ENGAGED THAN MARINE BATTALIONS (19 OUT OF 24). SHARP INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO ASK IF THIS MEANT THAT PEOPLE ON SECURITY TASKS DID NOT REQUIRE AIR SUPPORT. BLOOD REPLIED NOT AS MUCH AND THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF

PAGE 4 RUHNM S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO WEIGHTING. LATER BLOOD AGAIN REFERRED TO III MAF AIR ALLOCATION DECISIONS ON A CHART WHICH SHOWED THAT III MAF HAD FORWARDED TO TASE ONLY 24 PERCENT OF THE 1ST MARDIV AND 30 PERCENT OF THE 3D MARDIV PREPLANNED REQUESTS WHEREAS HE NOMINATED ABOUT 67 PERCENT OF BOTH THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION AND 101ST AIRBORNE REQUEST. HIS IMPLICATION WAS CLEAR. THE MARINES ASKED FOR TOO MUCH AIR AND THUS III MAF WAS CONFRONTED WITH SOME HARD DECISIONS. HE EVEN LINKED THE MARINE PHILOSOPHY FOR PRELANNED SORTIES TO STATIONING COMBAT AIR PATROL OVER THE BATTLEFIELD. IN CONTRAST, HE INDICATED THAT THE ARMY LEANS TO SELECTION OF FINITE TARGETS.

7. A KEY EXCHANGE DEVELOPED BETWEEN SHARP AND BLOOD ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF IN-COUNTRY AIR FORCE ASSETS TO MEET IN-COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS. SHARP ASKED WHAT HAS BEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF USAF SORTIES IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY AND SPECIFICALLY HOW IS SPIKE USING THE F-4'S AT DANANG. WHEN BLOOD TOLD HIM THAT ABOUT 24 OF THE 65 WERE BEING EMPLOYED OUT-OF-COUNTRY, SHARP SAID THIS WAS MAL-USE OF ASSETS AND WENT ON TO SAY HE DID

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#6

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMKM 1966 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO
 NOT SEE WHY ANY AIR BASED IN I CTZ SHOULD BE GOING
 ANYWHERE BUT I CTZ OR II CTZ. BLOOD COOLED HIM ON
 THIS POINT SAYING THAT WITH THE BOMBING PAUSE ALL OF
 THE DANANG WING WAS BEING DIVERTED IN-COUNTRY AND
 A PORTION OF UBON ASSETS AS WELL. BLOOD WAS QUICK TO
 NOTE THIS WOULD HELP ALLEVIATE PRESSURE ON MARINE AIR.

8. BLOOD TALKED AT LENGTH ON IMPROVEMENTS AND
 REFINEMENTS, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH FOLLOWS:

A. TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS, 7TH AF WILL PROMUL-
 GATE A WEEKLY FRAG THAT PREALLOCATES SORTIES FOR EACH
 DAY TO EACH CORPS DASC FOR SUBALLOCATION IN ACCORD-
 ANCE WITH THE CORPS COMMANDER'S PRIORITIES.

B. DISTRIBUTION, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DAILY
 FRAG WILL BE SIMPLIFIED BY USING AUTOMATED TRANSMISSION
 PROCESSES ADDRESSING TO EACH CUSTOMER ONLY THOSE
 PORTIONS OF THE FRAG WHICH CONCERNS HIM. THIS IS
 FORECAST TO REDUCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN BY 60 PERCENT.

C. TO REDUCE REPORTING, 7TH AF WILL ACCEPT THE
 MARINE SPHYNX REPORT IN LIEU OF THE CONSOLIDATED
 MISSION REPORT.

PAGE 6 RUMKM 1966 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO

D. IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNICATIONS IS UNDER WAY.
 HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC HERE BUT DID ALLUDE TO HOT LINES
 FROM I DASC TO THE MARINE FIXED WING MAG'S STATING
 THAT III MAF WAS OPPOSED TO THIS BUT FURTHER NEGOTIA-
 TIONS WERE IN PROGRESS.

9. BLOOD CONCLUDED THAT:

A. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 HAVE BEEN ATTAINED; THE AIR EFFORT HAS BEEN CONCEN-
 TRATED AND HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE TO THE NEED. COMUSMACV
 HAS A SINGLE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIR EFFORT.

B. CG III MAF HAS APPLIED THE FLEXIBILITY THAT IS
 PROVIDED BY THE SYSTEM.

C. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE.

10. THE MACV OPEVAL PRESENTATION IS PERHAPS BEST
 SUMMARIZED BY SHARP'S REMARK THAT THE CHARTS REALLY
 DIDN'T SHOW ANYTHING AND HE CONSIDERED THE STUDY TO
 BE DEFICIENT. IN A NUTSHELL, THE STUDY EQUATED ALL
 ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE TO 105 HOWITZER EQUIVALENTS
 AND USED THIS TO RELATE THE WEIGHT OF METAL TO THE
 NUMBER OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN EACH CORPS AREA. IT
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#6

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
 DE RUMKM 1968 1320334
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 110334Z MAY 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T (AHE224 RPT ANCOMS)
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KHULAK AND LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM NGEN THARIN. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF 2
 THEN MADE A SIMILAR COMPARISON OF AIR EFFORT BY COMPS
 AREAS. THESE CHARTS DEMONSTRATED THAT I CTZ RECEIVED
 MORE THAN A STRAIGHT LINE PROPORTION OF FIRE SUPPORT,
 TO WHICH SHARP COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS TO BE EX-
 PECTED SINCE I CORPS WAS WHERE THE FIGHTING WAS. IT
 WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH WHETHER THE MARINES
 OR THE ARMY WERE BEING FAVORED, BECAUSE THE ARMY
 GUNSHIPS WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN THE EVALUATION. THE
 STUDY DID SKIRT A SIGNIFICANT FINDING WHEN THEY SHOWED
 THAT THE AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION WAS 96PERCENT AND
 THAT THE MARINES HAD A 122PERCENT RATE OF PROGRAMMED

PAGE 2 RUMKM 1968 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 UTILIZATION, WHICH EQUATE TO SORTIE RATES OF 1.06 AND
 1.34 RESPECTIVELY. THEY THEN SHOWED THAT THE AIR FORCE
 AVERAGE SORTIE LENGTH WAS 1.72 HOURS AS OPPOSED TO
 THE MARINE 1.19 HOURS. SHARP COMMENTED ON THEIR
 FAILURE TO APPLY THESE TWO FACTORS AGAINST EACH OTHER
 TO PRODUCE A USEFUL COMPARISON. WE HOLD A COPY OF
 THIS ANALYSIS.

11. MY IMPRESSIONS FOLLOW:

A. THE AIR FORCE IS ALMOST STAMPEDED TO ACCOMMO-
 DATE CHANGES TO MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK. THEY KNOW
 THEY'RE IN TROUBLE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF SHARP'S
 ATTITUDE TODAY.

B. WE SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND WAIT QUIETLY UNTIL WE
 HAVE THEIR PROPOSALS IN WRITING, AT WHICH TIME WE CAN
 EXPLOIT THE SEVERAL HOLES WHICH ARE IDENTIFIABLE IN
 THEIR ORAL PROPOSALS.

C. SHARP APPEARED NOT TO UNDERSTAND COMPLETELY
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN I DASC AND CG III MAF. HE
 SEEMED TO THINK THAT I DASC WAS UNDER CONTROL OF
 ICG MAF. ENSUING DISCUSSION STILL LEFT SOME DOUBT IN

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#6

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHGM 1968 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 HIS MIND REGARDING THE TRUE RELATIONSHIP. WE CAN
 EXPAND ON THIS TO DEMONSTRATE THE BASIC DEFICIENCY
 OF THE AIR FORCE PHILOSOPHY WITH RESPECT TO SERVING
 THE GROUND COMMANDER.

12. I HAVE ASKED HUTCH TO PUT SHARP'S INSTRUCTIONS
 IN WRITING, SPECIFYING AN APPROPRIATE DEADLINE. WE WILL
 MANEUVER TO HAVE BOB'S COMMENTS ON MACV'S WRITTEN
 PROPOSALS SUBMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO SHARP AND WESTY
 IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE EXPOSING OUR HAND PREMATURELY.

13. HAVE JUST BEEN MADE AWARE OF SOME REMARKS BY
 SHARP TO GEN KERVIN LATER THIS AFTERNOON. THE TENOR
 OF HIS REMARKS FOLLOWS:

A. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT ANY OF THE BRIEFINGS GIVEN
 DURING THE MORNING WERE AS PRODUCTIVE AS THEY SHOULD
 HAVE BEEN. HE FELT THAT THE MARINES HAD VERY EARLY
 STATED WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE; THAT THE AIR FORCE
 HAD DONE LIKEWISE TO INCLUDE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
 CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES WHICH HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE
 MARINES, AND THEIR GENERAL INTENTIONS TO ADJUST
 PROCEDURES TO CORRECT THEM; AND THAT COMUSMACV HAD

PAGE 4 RUHGM 1968 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 FAILED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION IN THAT THEY HAD SUB-
 MITTED NO DEFINITE SOLUTIONS OTHER THAN TO CONTINUE
 WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ADJUSTED IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH AIR FORCE PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS.
 HE THEN CONCLUDED THAT THE REAL NUB OF THE
 PROBLEM WAS YET TO BE RESOLVED, I.E., IN SPECIFICS,
 WHAT IS THE BEST SYSTEM TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE
 SUPPORT POSSIBLE FOR ALL FORCES INVOLVED. HE WOUND
 UP BY COMMENTING THAT THIS PROBLEM HE CONSIDERED TO
 BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO BE SOLVED
 WHILE HE WAS STILL CINCPAC, AND THAT HIS INTENTION
 WAS TO DETERMINE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM FOR THE
 ENTIRE COUNTRY AT LARGE WITHOUT MAJOR INFLUENCE AS
 TO WHAT THE MARINES, THE AIR FORCE, OR THE ARMY WOULD
 THEMSELVES ALONE PREFER.

14. NORM ANDERSON HAS SEEN. THIS CONSTITUTES HIS
 INTERIM REPORT TO GEN CUSHMAN.

CP-3

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#6

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM MGEN KERWIN, TDY HAWAII		DATE 11 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 1101542 MAY 68		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/12		[Signature]	REMARKS
3	DCG		5/12		[Signature]	
4	DCG AIR		5/13		[Signature]	
1.	C/S		5/11		[Signature]	
	D C/S		5/15		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	112100H			JHW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL #5

P 110154Z ZFF4

FM MOEN KERVIN, TDY HAWAII
 TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
 VEN ABRAMS DEPUTY COMUSMUCV SAIGON
 GEN MOMYER OMDR 7AF T N AB, RVN
 LGEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAF, DANANG
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY
 SKBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND
 RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

THE CONFERENCE WAS HELD WITH CINCPAC FROM 1015 TO
 1230 MAY 10. ADMIRAL SHARP, COMPONENT COMMANDERS OR
 THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT. THREE QUESTIONS
 WERE ASKED AND DISCUSSED AS FOLLOWS:

1. "WHY NOT ALLOCATE AIR DIRECTLY TO THE CORPS COM-
 MANDER? IS THE I DASC UNDER THE CONTROL OF CG III MAF OR
 7TH AIR FORCE?" THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WERE PRO-
 VIDED BY THE TEAM REPRESENTATIVES AND RESOLVED.
2. "WHY ARE THE IN-COUNTRY ASSETS GOING TO THE OUT-OF-
 COUNTRY EFFORT?" HERE ADMIRAL SHARP SPECIFICALLY REFERRED
 TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE DANANG-BASED AIRCRAFT BEING UTILIZED IN
 ROUTE PACKAGE I. HE MADE THE STATEMENT THAT HE FELT UNDER
 THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF REDUCTION OF ROLLING THUNDER THAT
 THIS WAS A MAL-UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES. 7TH AIR FORCE
 REPRESENTATIVE REVIEWED THE CURRENT TREND AS DISCUSSED BY
 GENERAL MOMYER AT THE COMUSMACV PRESENTATION ON 8 MAY.
 THIS EMPHASIZED THAT 7TH AIR FORCE IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF
 REDUCING THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY APPLICATION OF IN-COUNTRY RESOURCES,
 AND, IN FACT, REFLECTED THAT THAI FORCES WERE BEING DIRECTED TO
 IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT OF I CORPS. THE RESPONSE RESOLVED THE
 QUESTION TEMPORARILY. HOWEVER, I FEEL THIS WILL BE THE SUBJECT
 OF CONTINUING REVIEW.
3. "WHAT DOES III MAF THINK OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE PROPOSALS?"
 TO THIS QUESTION III MAF REPLIED THAT SO FAR 7TH AIR FORCE PROPOSALS
 HAD ONLY BEEN GENERAL. THEY HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC UPON WHICH TO
 COMMENT. CINCPAC INDICATED THAT HE DESIRES THE 7TH AIR FORCE
 PROPOSALS IN WRITING. FOLLOWING THIS HE EXPECTS III MAF TO COM-
 MENT UPON THESE PROPOSALS IN WRITING AND TO MAKE SUCH COMMENTS
 AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS NECESSARY. CINCPAC ALSO INDICATED THAT HE
 EXPECTED THESE TO BE SUBMITTED SOONEST. HE ALSO INDICATED
 THAT HE REALIZED THE NEW SYSTEM MAY NOT BE FULLY OPERATIONAL
 FOR AT LEAST FIVE TO SEVEN DAYS AND THAT IT MAY BE SOME TIME
 BEFORE THE RESULTS OF THE PROPOSALS CAN BE TESTED. BUT HE DOES
 NOT DESIRE TO DELAY THE SUBMISSION OF THE WRITTEN PROPOSALS
 AND III MAF COMMENTS. WARM REGARDS

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM SSO MACV		DATE 11 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 100606Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 2 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/11		[Signature]	REMARKS
8	DCG		5/11		[Signature]	
	DCG AIR		5/11		[Signature]	RECEIVED 1 COPY OF 100606Z MAY 68
1	C/S				[Signature]	
	D C/S		5/11		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	110720			[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
✓	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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SECRET

P 100606Z

FM SSO MACV

TO SSO PCV

INFO CG III MAF

SSO 1ST CAV

ZEM

SECRET MAC 6102 INTEL

MCMILLAN, MACV-MACSA SENDS TO COL MARSHALL, PCV, INFO: LTG CUSHMAN
CG III MAF, DANANG, MG TOLSON, CG IACD, EVANS

REF: SECRET CITE PHB 639 DIG 081230Z MAY.

1. SUBJECT: DELAY FUSES.

A. REQUESTED AC DELAY FUSES WITH DETONATORS AND ADAPTOR BOOSTERS BEING AIRLIFTED VIA C-130, TAIL NO 6477 FROM NAHA ETA HUE/PHU BAI 1400H 10 MAY. THIS PROGRAM BEING ACCOMPLISHED UNDER PROJECT H 130-571 WITH A TCN OF AT 69088130, 8043130 (FOR BACKTRACKING IF UNITS BECOME MISPLACED DURING SHIPMENT).

B. OSA FUSE SPECIALIST WALTER SHPMAN BEING DISPATCHED TO CAMP EVANS TO ASSIST IN EMPLOYMENT.

C. LCOL CESAR OF MACSA ALSO ARRIVES PCV/CAMP EVANS TODAY TO ASSIST AS REQUIRED.

2. NEW SUBJECT: RINGTROP.

A. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING RINGTROP DENIAL DEVICES FORWARDED AS FOLLOWS. 43,000 RINGTROP UNITS AND A CH-47 DISPENSER AVAILABLE AT CAMP HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU, UNDER CONTROL OF LCOL LEHMAN, CO, 52D BN, 4TH INF DIV. RECOMMEND BOTH RINGTROP AND DISPENSERS BE REQUESTED IMMEDIATELY FOR APPLICATION IN A SHAU AND ACCESS ROUTES.

B. RINGTROP APPEAR MOST APPROPRIATE IN A SHAU FOR INHIBIT OF ROAD REPAIR, PARTICULARLY ALONG RTS 922 AND 548, INCLUDING SOUTHERN EXTENSION INTO BASE AREA 607. RTS 547 AND 547A ARE ALSO CANDIDATE TRAGETS, SUBJECT TO JUDGEMENT CONCERNING POSSIBLE FUTURE FRIENDLY TRAFFIC. MOST VULNERABLE AREAS ARE THOSE REQUIRING A LABOR FORCE TO REPAIR ROAD, E.G., INTERDICTED AREAS AND THOSE SUBJECT TO WASHOUT OR FLOODING. WITH COMING MONSOON SEASON, RINGTROP DEVICES WILL INTERMIX WITH SOIL AND INHIBIT LABOR FORCE IN ROAD REPAIR BY INFLECTING WOULD IN FEET, DAMAGE TO TIRES, ETC. ADDITIONALLY,

SOME CONSPICUOUS RINGTROP UNITS MIGHT BE BOOBY TRAPPED TO INDUCE DELAY AND HESITANCY IN ROAD SWEEPING.

3. NEW SUBJECT: QUID PRO QUO. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING TWO COMPLETE SOVIET ELECTRONIC MINE DETECTORS CAPTURED IN A SHAU FOR TEST AND EVALUATION IN SECMA (COUNTERMINE) STUDY. IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE HAVE DELIVERED TO LCOL CESAR FOR HAND CARRY TO MACSA. BEST REGARDS.

360

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	<i>B</i>		<i>5/10</i>		<i>lp</i>	COMUSMACV SERIAL 100130Z MAY 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY
DCG AIR						REMARKS <i>CG - Have notified B-3</i> <i>Ukepp</i> <i>[Signature]</i>
C/S	<i>1.</i>		<i>5/10</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>	FOR
DC/S			<i>5/10</i>		<i>m</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3		<i>copy</i>				
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>101345</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>	LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						

"#2 Burned 4 Nov 68"

#2

PTTUZYUW RUMUNFA 1514 1310150-UUUU--RUMUGRA.
 ZNR UUUUU
 P 100130Z MAY 68 ZFFG
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMUFGKA/CDR 7AF SAIGON
 RUMUGRA/CG XIX MAP DA NANG
 RUMUVF/CG I PFORCEV NHA TRANG
 RUMSPF/CG II PFORCEV LONG BINH
 ZEN/SA IV CTZ CAN THO
 INFO RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV

FOR

BT

UNCLAS 13229

FOR GEN MONYER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, MG ECKHARDT, MG PEERS
 INFO LTG PALMER, LTG ROSSON, RADN VETH, FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
 SUBJ: COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY

REF: A. COMUSMACV 07754 DTG 190741Z MAR 68 (U)

B. MACV DIR 335-12 DTD 29 NOV 67 (U)

1. THE CURRENT TACTICAL SITUATION AND PEACE TALKS HAVE INCREASED
 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY REQUIRED BY REFER-
 ENCE A.

PAGE 2 RUMUNFA 1514 UNCLAS

2. THE CURRENT REPORTING TIME-FRAME (1201H TO 1200H) IS NOT
 RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, EFFECTIVE 12 MAY THE
 REPORTING PERIOD FOR THE COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY WILL BE CHANGED
 TO 0901H TO 0900H DAILY. THE SUMMARY SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED OVER
 THE DEDICATED TELETYPE CIRCUIT SO AS TO REACH THE MACV COMMAND
 CENTER NLT 1300H DAILY. TIMELY RECEIPT OF COMMANDER'S DAILY
 SUMMARY IS MOST IMPORTANT.

3. SPOT REPORTS, AS REQUIRED BY REFERENCE B WILL BE USED TO
 UPDATE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS. PLACE SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON UPDATES
 THROUGH 1300H DAILY SO THAT CURRENT INFORMATION CAN BE INCLUDED
 IN MACV TELECONS AND REPORTS.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#2

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTC BOBSON ON PTY		DATE 08 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 0812303 MAY 68		1, 2 & 3 COPIES OF 1 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT DELAY PHASE
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/9		lp	REMARKS REF A. WAS DELIVERED TO LTCOL. OLIVER G. 3 YESTERDAY. BY SSO. UR DAVE.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		5/8		Q	
	D C/S		5/9		Dr	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	082155			HW	
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	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

Copy #3 to G-3 Ops 9 May 68

263 Burned
5 Nov 68

SECRET

TO DR MCNILLAN MACV-MACSA SGM
INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DNG
MSGEN TOLSON CG I ACB EVANS
ZCOM

SECRET PHB 639 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DELAY FUSES (ID

REF: SECRET CITE: MAC 5976 DTG 070649Z MAY

1. (S) REQUEST 100EA. AC DELAY FUSES WITH DETONATORS AND ADAPTER BOOSTERS BE SHIPPED BY AIR TRANSPORT ASAP TO CAMP EVANS (YD 5231).
2. (ID) REQUEST THAT ORDNANCE TECHNICIAN BE PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF FUSES.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING NORMAL BUTY HOURS
100

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

VV PAC 510

NAF-T-CG FIRST MAB

PP RUMUGRA
 DE RUNHFMA 1322 1290254
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 080254Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUNURRA/CG FIRST MAB
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 ZEN/CG NINTH MAB
 BT

EXCLUSIVE**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTJEN CUSHMAN, INFO WGENS
 ANDERSON AND BOUKER AND BGEN CHIP FROM LTJEN
 KFLAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION (U)

A. CG III MAF 02054Z MAY 68 (S)

1. REFERENCE A REQUESTED CONTINUANCE OF FOUR KC-130
 AUGMENTATION UNTIL 31 MAY 68.

2. THE REDUCTION OF KC-130 ASSETS IN NINTH MAB,
 NECESSITATED BY THE PROGRAM UNDERWAY TO UPGRADE THE
 ENGINES, HAS REDUCED BY 50% THE KC-130 FLIGHT HOURS
 PER MONTH AVAILABLE FROM NINTH MAB. THIS, IT IS
 NECESSARY THAT COMMON USER AIRLIFT MUST BE UTILIZED
 TO THE MAXIMUM TO FILL THE VOID.

PAGE 2 RUNHFMA 1322 SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOB

3. STATISTICAL DATA DERIVED FROM IN-COUNTRY KC-130
 LEG LOAD REPORTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH 23 APRIL 1968
 SHOW THAT AN INCREASING PERCENTAGE OF KC-130
 EMPLOYMENT IS FOR MISSIONS OTHER THAN FLARE DROP AND
 AERIAL REFUELING. CARGO AND PASSENGER CARRYING
 SORTIES INCREASED FROM 83 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
 EFFORT IN JAN 68 TO 92 PERCENT FOR THE FIRST THREE
 WEEKS IN APRIL. ADDITIONALLY, CARGO AND PASSENGER
 FLIGHT HOURS INCREASED FROM 84 PERCENT TO 91 PERCENT.
 CORRESPONDINGLY, FLARE DROP AND AERIAL REFUELING
 SORTIES FOR APRIL WERE LOWER THAN FOR ANY PREVIOUS
 MONTH THIS YEAR.

4. REQUEST YOU CONDUCT A CAREFUL REVIEW OF KC-130
 EMPLOYMENT TO ENSURE THE MISSIONS ASSIGNED WILL STAND
 THE SEARCHING POST-WAR SCRUTINY THEY ARE DUE TO
 RECEIVE.

5. ACTION ON REF A WILL AWAIT THE RESULTS OF YOUR
 REVIEW.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#50

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

OO RUMSAK
DE RUMSAW 1166U 1281300
ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
O 071250Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF DA NANG
BT

SECRET S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CUSHMAN FROM
GENERAL WESTMORELAND. 12959

SUBJ: OPERATION INFERNO (U)

1. (U) WITHIN THE PAST MONTH A SERIES OF BURN MISSIONS (CODE NAME INFERNO) HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN III CORPS TO DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL VALIDITY OF THIS TYPE ATTACK AGAINST ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS IN HEAVY JUNGLE AREAS.
2. (S) THE CONCEPT OF THIS OPERATION INVOLVES SATURATING A PRE-DETERMINED AREA WITH A COMBINATION OF JP-4 AND DIESEL FUEL DISPERSED FROM 55 GALLON FRANGIBLE DRUMS FROM C-130 AIRCRAFT. IGNITION IS ACCOMPLISHED BY USE OF A SMOKE GRENADE ATTACHED TO ONE OF THE DRUMS IN EACH AIRCRAFT LOAD. A BACK UP METHOD OF IGNITION IS PROVIDED BY THE FAC AIRCRAFT FIRING WHITE PHOSPHOROUS ROCKETS INTO THE FUEL SATURATED AREA. THE SIZE OF THE AREA TO BE BURNED IS, OF COURSE, A FUNCTION OF THE SIZE OF THE ATTACK FORCES. THE FOUR MISSIONS ACCOMPLISHED IN III CORPS ON

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 1166U SECRET S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE

7, 27, 28 AND 29 APRIL USED 14 C-130S EACH DISPENSING SIXTY-FOUR 55 GALLON DRUMS. THESE MISSIONS SUCCEEDED IN BURNING AREAS RANGING FROM 300M X 500M TO 300M X 1200M DEPENDENT UPON THE DISPERSAL PATTERN OF THE DRUMS OF FUEL ON RELEASE.

3. (S) ALTHOUGH POST-MISSION ANALYSIS IS NOT COMPLETE, VISUAL OBSERVATION AND PHOTO COVERAGE CONFIRMED THE INTENSITY AND MAGNITUDE OF THIS LOCALIZED FIRE, AS WELL AS THE DENSITY AND PERSISTENCE OF ENORMOUS SMOKE CLOUDS. IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THAT ANY ENEMY RESOURCES OF ANY NATURE COULD HAVE SURVIVED THE HEAT, FLAME, SMOKE AND SUFFOCATION ENVIRONMENT PRODUCED.

4. (S) I AM PASSING THIS TO YOU FOR APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION AS A POSSIBLE MEANS OF ATTACK AGAINST CERTAIN TYPES OF TARGETS IN YOUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. I HAVE ASKED MY STAFF TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR THIS TYPE OF ATTACK. YOUR SPECIFIC TARGET NOMINATIONS ARE REQUESTED.

5. (S) CCC WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOU THE COLOR MOVIE FILM OF THE 27 AND 28 APRIL ATTACKS. FURTHER DETAILED INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE THROUGH COC, MACSA AND 7AF. GP-4

BT

SECRET

49

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM LTJN ROSSON
CG						SERIAL 061530Z MAY68
DCG						1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT PROPOSED PRESS BRIEF
C/S						REMARKS CIB 061800H May <i>C. J. Dunne</i> Copy # 1 Copy # 2 to Press Delaware file 92
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S/S						CONFIDENTIAL
S/C						

#45

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM LTGEN ROSSON
CG						SERIAL 061530Z MAY68
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DCG						SUBJECT PROPOSED PRESS BRIEF
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LEGEND
 A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C - COMMENTS
 I - INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

#45

TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMBAT COM
 LTJG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 BG SIBLE / INFO MACV SAIGON
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHB 626 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO

FOLLOWING IS THE PROPOSED PRESS BRIEF I AM PRESENTING AT HQ, PGV AT 071500H. AN UPDATED LIST OF CAPTURED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS WILL BE DISPLAYED. REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

GENTLEMEN: THIS IS THE SECOND IN A SERIES OF UP-DATE BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 16. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE GROUND RULES AND WITH THE NEED FOR STRINGENT SECURITY SURROUNDING THIS HIGH RISK UNDERTAKING. THE GROUND RULES ARE BASED ON NEED TO DENY TO THE ENEMY

IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE BE OBTAINABLE BY HIM, AND TO SAFEGUARD THE LIVES OF THE TROOPS, US AND ARVN, PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT WHEN GENERAL CUSHMAN BRIEFED YOU ON 2 MAY HE COVERED THE PERIOD 21-30 APRIL AND CARRIED YOU THROUGH WHAT I WOULD DESCRIBE AS ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOLID FOOTHOLD IN THE A SHAU VALLEY. WE HAD FOUND AA POSITIONS, CACHES OF VARIOUS SIZES AND TYPES VEHICLES, VEHICLE PARKS AND REPAIR FACILITIES, MINE DETECTORS, SIGNAL EQUIPMENT, FLAME THROWERS, BUNKER COMPLEXES AND LIVING AREAS, PLUS ASSORTED VARIETIES OF PERSONAL EQUIPMENT. AMMUNITION STORES AND BASE CAMPS WITH WELL FORTIFIED BUNKER COMPLEXES WERE FOUND ADDITIONALLY IN THE ROUTE 547/547A AREA LEADING INTO THE A SHAU FROM THE EAST. DURING THE PERIOD 1-30 APRIL WE HAD SUFFERED 64 KIA AND 07 WIA EVACUATED FRIENDLY CASUALTIES, WHILE THE ENEMY HAD SUSTAINED 377 KIA BY ~~007~~ ~~004~~ ~~005~~ ~~006~~ ~~007~~ ~~008~~ ~~009~~ ~~010~~ ~~011~~ ~~012~~ ~~013~~ ~~014~~ ~~015~~ ~~016~~ ~~017~~ ~~018~~ ~~019~~ ~~020~~ ~~021~~ ~~022~~ ~~023~~ ~~024~~ ~~025~~ ~~026~~ ~~027~~ ~~028~~ ~~029~~ ~~030~~ ~~031~~ ~~032~~ ~~033~~ ~~034~~ ~~035~~ ~~036~~ ~~037~~ ~~038~~ ~~039~~ ~~040~~ ~~041~~ ~~042~~ ~~043~~ ~~044~~ ~~045~~ ~~046~~ ~~047~~ ~~048~~ ~~049~~ ~~050~~ ~~051~~ ~~052~~ ~~053~~ ~~054~~ ~~055~~ ~~056~~ ~~057~~ ~~058~~ ~~059~~ ~~060~~ ~~061~~ ~~062~~ ~~063~~ ~~064~~ ~~065~~ ~~066~~ ~~067~~ ~~068~~ ~~069~~ ~~070~~ ~~071~~ ~~072~~ ~~073~~ ~~074~~ ~~075~~ ~~076~~ ~~077~~ ~~078~~ ~~079~~ ~~080~~ ~~081~~ ~~082~~ ~~083~~ ~~084~~ ~~085~~ ~~086~~ ~~087~~ ~~088~~ ~~089~~ ~~090~~ ~~091~~ ~~092~~ ~~093~~ ~~094~~ ~~095~~ ~~096~~ ~~097~~ ~~098~~ ~~099~~ ~~100~~ ~~101~~ ~~102~~ ~~103~~ ~~104~~ ~~105~~ ~~106~~ ~~107~~ ~~108~~ ~~109~~ ~~110~~ 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TODAY WE SHALL CONCENTRATE ON THE PERIOD 17 THROUGH 6 MAY. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THIS WAS A PERIOD IN WHICH WE CONTINUED OUR BUILDUP IN THE VALLEY, ACTIVATED AN AIRFIELD, DISCOVERED AN INCREASING NUMBER OF CACHES AND CONTINUED OUR SYSTEMATIC PROBING OF LIKELY LOGISTIC SITES ALONG THE EDGES OF THE VALLEY. THE HIGHWAY 547/547A AREA WITNESSED CONTINUING MOVEMENT WESTWARD TOWARD THE VALLEY. THERE WAS AN

#45(1)

HAPPILY, WEATHER WAS SOMEWHAT BETTER DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY THUS FACILITATING MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. AS OF TODAY WE HAVE RECAPTURED LOST TIME OCCASIONED BY AVERSE WEATHER, AND THE OPERATION MAY BE SAID TO BE ON SCHEDULE. CASULTIES HAVE BEEN ~~-----~~ ON OUR SIDE; ~~-----~~ FOR THE ENEMY. WE HAVE A HANDOUT LISTING CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIAL. THE FIGURES ARE CUMULATIVE AND INCLUDE THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY GENERAL CUSHMAN.

NOW FOR A SYNOPSIS OF DAY-BY-DAY ACTIVITY.

D PLUS 12 (1 MAY)

THE SPOILING ATTACK CONTINUED WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST ACD AND 1ST ARVN DIVISION CONDUCTING COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY, AND WITH THE 101ST ABN DIV AND ARVN ABN TASK FORCE PRESSING FORWARD ALONG ROUTES 547 AND 547A. GROUND ACTION, GENERALLY SPEAKING, HAS BEEN LIGHT, SPORADIC AND CHARACTERIZED BY SHARP, SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. LOGISTIC BUILDUP HAS CONTINUED WITH C-130 AIR DROPS PLUS AIR LANDED RESUPPLY. A C-7A AIRCRAFT LANDED ON AN AIRSTRIP OPENED EARLIER THAT DAY. SEVERAL WEAPONS CACHES CONSISTING MAINLY OF 37 MM AMMUNITION AND B-40 ROCKETS WERE DISCOVERED BY 1ST ACD TROOPS. ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIV UNCOVERED SEVERAL WELL FORTIFIED BUNKERS. IN THE SAME AREA THEY FOUND A LARGE CACHE CONTAINING 1500 HAND GRENADES, 3000 ROUNDS OF .50 CALIBER AMMO, FIVE BOXES OF VEHICLE PARTS, 10 BOXES OF TNT AND 10,000 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMO. ALONG ROUTE 547, ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST AND ARVN ABN TASK FORCE DISCOVERED AMMO STOCKPILES CONTAINING SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF 75 MM RR ROUNDS, PLUS 12.7 MM AND 25 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROUNDS. THE 101ST ALSO DISCOVERED AN ENEMY BASE CAMP AREA LARGE ENOUGH FOR 200 MEN COMPLETE WITH FORTIFIED POSITIONS.

D PLUS 13 (2 MAY)

C7AS AND C-123S LANDED AT THE AIRSTRIP AS THE MARGINAL WEATHER LIFTED TO SOME DEGREE. TWO MORE 37 MM AA GUNS WERE CAPTURED BY THE 1ST AIR CAVALRYMEN AS THEY CONTINUED PROBING FOR ENEMY SUPPLY CACHES. THIS BROUGHT THE TOTAL NUMBER CAPTURED BY THEM AS OF THAT DATE TO NINE, WHICH IS MORE THAN A COMPLETE ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERY.

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TO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 BG SIDLE C/ INFO MACV SAIGON
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL PHB 626 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 CAVALRYMEN ALSO FOUND AND DESTROYED TWO RUSSIAN MADE HALF TON TRUCKS.
 ARVN ELEMENTS FOUND A LARGE CACHE THAT INCLUDED MORE THAN
 A TON OF ASSORTED AMMUNITION. THE 101ST UNCOVERED 445
 ROUNDS OF 76MM TANK AMMO ANB 30,000 ROUNDS OF 23MM ANTI-2
 AIRCRAFT AMMO.

D PLUS 14 (3 MAY) 4

LIGHT SCATTERED GROUND CONTACT CONTINUED IN ^{CADENCE} CADENCE
 WITH DISCOVERY OF ADDITIONAL CACHES, VEHICLES AND VEHICLE
 PARKING AREAS. HEAVY RAINS THE PREVIOUS NIGHT CAUSED TEM-
 PORARY CLOSURE OF THE AIRSTRIP. TWO MORE WELL MAINTAINED
 37 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS WERE FOUND BY ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST
 ACD ALONG WITH 400 ROUNDS OF ASSORTED AMMO. THEY ALSO
 UNCOVERED A WELL FORTIFIED TRENCH NETWORK, SEVERAL BUNKERS,
 ENGINEER EQUIPMENT, PICKS AND SHOVELS, CLEANING EQUIPMENT
 FOR THE 37 MM GUNS, AND SEVERAL POUNDS OF DOCUMENTS. IN
 THE SAME AREA, SEVEN SMALL REPLICAS OF US JET AIRCRAFT
 WERE FOUND - APPARENTLY TRAINING AIDS. 1ST ARVN CONTIN-
 UED TO TURN UP SUBSTANTIAL CACHES, ONE CONTAINING 560
 ROUNDS OF 37 MM AMMUNITION.

D PLUS 15 (4 MAY)

ON 4 MAY GROUND CONTACT WAS LIGHT AND SCATTERED.,
 DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING, LIGHT TO MODERATE
 MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS WERE RECEIVED AT SEVERAL POINTS
 IN THE VALLEY. THIS WAS THE SAME EVENING DURING WHICH
 OTHER ALLIED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND CITIES THROUGHOUT
 THE COUNTRY RECEIVED ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE., ADDITIONAL
 CACHES WERE UNCOVERED. 1ST ACD ELEMENTS DISCOVERED A
 SUPPLY AREA CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING: APPROXIMATELY 400
 AK47 RIFLES, SEVERAL FLAME THROWERS, 18 ONE AND ONE-HALF
 TON TRUCKS (TWO WERE OPERATIONAL), 5,000 ROUNDS OF 37 MM
 AMMO, 120 ROUNDS OF 75 MM AMMO, 5,000 ROUNDS OF 12.7,
 4,000 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMO, 400 RIFLE GRENADES, OVER
 TWO TONS OF RICE, 400 POUNDS OF CLOTHING AND THREE TONS OF
 TRUCK PARTS. IN AN ADJACENT AREA OTHER CAV ELEMENTS FOUND
 AN ADDITIONAL 457 AK47 RIFLES AND ONE 12.7 MM MACHINE GUN.
 ARVN 1ST DIV UNITS REPORTED FINDING TWO TUNNEL COMPLEXES
 WHICH CONTAINED AN ESTIMATED THREE TONS OF ASSORTED AK47S,
 GRENADES, MINES, FIVE 55 GALLON DRUMS OF OIL, 5 BICYCLES,
 1,000 METERS OF COPPER WIRE. FROM NOON ON THE 4TH OF MAY
 THROUGH NOON ON THE 5TH, 21 C-123S DELIVERED 92 SHORT TONS

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OPERATIONS CONTINUED WITH MORE WEAPONS AND AMMO CACHES BEING UNCOVERED. SKY TROOPERS KILLED 19 ENEMY IN LIGHT SCATTERED CONTACTS, WHILE RECORDING 13 INCIDENTS OF ENEMY GROUND TO AIR FIRINGS. ONE 1ST ACD UNIT FOUND A LARGE BUNKER COMPLEX AND LIVING AREA. FOUR OF NUMEROUS AIR STRIKES CALLED IN DESTROYED A TOTAL OF 69 BUNKERS. THE CAV ALSO UNCOVERED 27 9MM SUBMACHINE GUNS, 13 122MM ROCKET ROUNDS AND 1,000 ROUNDS OF 25MM AMMO, SIX 75MM RECOILESS RIFLES, FOUR MORTAR SIGHTS, TWO 12.7MM HEAVY MACHINEGUNS. THE 101ST ABN DIV AND ARVN ABN TASK FORCE, CONTINUING THEIR OPERATIONS ALONG THE ROUTE 547/547A AXIS UNCOVERED A CACHE CONTAINING 85MM, 76MM AND 25MM AMMO. THE COUNT ON THIS CACHE IS INCOMPLETE AT THIS POINT., THE CAV CALLED IN TAC AIR ON AN ENEMY STORAGE AREA RESULTING IN 3 NVA KIA, 4 BUNKERS AND TWO HUTS DESTROYED, ONE SECONDARY EXPLOSION. ALSO FOUND WAS A SOVIET ARMORED VEHICLE PREVIOUSLY DESTROYED BY TAC AIR.

D PLUS 17 (6 MAY)

(WILL FOLLOW IN SAME TENOR; WILL BE FORWARDED AS PREPARED ON 7 MAY)

GENTLEMEN, THIS CONCLUDES THE BRIEFING. (IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NEXT UP-DATE WILL BE HELD ON ~~10~~ IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS ~~MAY AT THE III MAF COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU IN DANANG.~~ AT A PLACE AND TIME MEANWHILE, YOUR CONTINUED COOPERATION IN PREVENTING THE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY BENEFIT THE ENEMY IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. TODAY'S BRIEFING HAS COVERED THE PERIOD FROM 1 THROUGH 6 MAY. THE PERIOD BEGINNING 7 MAY WILL BE UNDER EMBARGO UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE FROM GENERAL ~~WESTMORELAND.~~ (Delete by MACV CH) I AM PREPARED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE OPERATION UNDER PRESENT SECURITY GUIDELINES.

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 06 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 040106Z MAY 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECTIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING MAR 1968 (U)
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/9		DR	REMARKS FOR NO FORM
3	DCG		5/9		DR	
	DCG AIR		5/9		DR	
1.	C/S		5/8		DR	
	D C/S		5/9		DR	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		070745	5/9	DRW.	
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	G-2					
	G-3	COPY				
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	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS	COPY				
	EMB/TRANS					
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	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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TYPE TRANSMISSION	TO	INFO	
ELECTRICAL			
AIR MAIL			
COURIER	X	X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION TO:	COURIER		
INFO	COURIER		

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X 1	X 3	
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X 4		
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CH	SOG	
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	X 6	
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	X 1	
IG	11 FFLNO	
X 2	X 3	
JRATA	111 MAFLNO	
	X 1	
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X 2		
MACDC	7TH AF	
MACON	MACCORDS A 30	
MACPD	MACJOIR 3	
X 2		
DIR PHOENIX	OSA 1	

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TO: CINCPAC 2

INFO: CJCS 2

DOD 2

STATE/AID 2

CIA 2

CG, I FFORCEV/SA II CTZ 2

CG, II FFORCEV/SA III CTZ 2

CG, III MAF/SA I CTZ 8

SA, IV CTZ 2

FOR NO FORN

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SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, MG PEERS, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, MG ECKHART

Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam during March 1968 (U)

- (U) This is the third in the 1968 series of monthly assessments of pacification.
- (CNF) SUMMARY:
 - While pacification suffered some setback as a result of the VC Tet Offensive, the dimensions of the setback were not as great as

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	LTC Franklyn Lippincott Reports Officer MACCORDS-RE MACV 3556		W. T. Kerwin, Jr.
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previously feared. The pacification effort throughout the nation in March was characterized by accelerated military and civil activity and a substantial back-to-the-countryside movement by GVN. VC activity declined in frequency and intensity and security improved throughout the country as friendly troops resumed offensive operations and RD cadre groups moved back into hamlets. The percentage of the population living in relatively secure areas increased from 59.8 percent at end-February to 61.0 percent at end-March.

b. In the wake of the Tet Offensive, there has been an upward swing in GVN acceptance of the importance of the attack on the VC infrastructure. The mounting emphasis is evidenced by the increase in the number of VCI eliminated in March.

c. Economically, considerable progress has been made toward normalization in I, II and III Corps. Curfews have been eased, major LOCs reopened and commerce is approaching pre-Tet levels. Restoration of commercial activity brought a decline in prices from the February inflationary trends to slightly above pre-Tet levels. IV Corps, where the VC are making a determined effort to discourage movement of commodities to and from the Delta, remains a problem, and is receiving priority attention.

d. GVN reaction to and performance during and after the Tet Offensive has been spotty. In general, where strong leaders were in-place the reaction and subsequent performance has been good and the situation now is not bad; where strong leaders were not in command the reaction and performance varied from bad to terrible. At the National level, the performance has been somewhat better than

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many would have predicted but, over-all, the GVN was slow to start, preoccupied first with Saigon and Hue, and uneven in pace once moving. There has been much greater cooperation among the different Ministries and agencies of the GVN, but much room is left for improvement. The main problem ahead will be to maintain the momentum of Recovery to completion of its tasks.

e. The Central Recovery Committee has been successful in meeting the immediate needs (food and/shelter) of persons made homeless as a result of the VC Offensive, but more permanent GVN assistance leaves much to be desired.

f. A major negative result of the VC Tet Offensive is the lingering fear of a second attack. The enemy still possesses the capability to conduct widespread operations and his infrastructure is relatively intact. Whether he will actually launch such attacks depends largely on the success of our counteroffensive operations and attacks on the VC infrastructure.

3. (C) PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS:

a. Territorial Security:

(1) The February Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reflected all of Thua Thien as contested or VC due to the fact that the province was not evaluated that month. The March HES, therefore, is felt to be a more accurate picture of the true impact of the VC Tet Offensive. This evaluation reveals a total shift of approximately 1,110,000 people from the GVN controlled (A, B and C) to other categories. There was an addition of approximately 736,000 to contested and 202,500 to VC controlled categories. TABLE 1

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reflects status of population control.

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TABLE 1

POPULATION CONTROL (Thousands)

(Security and Development)

31 Dec 67 29 Feb 68 31 Mar 68

GVN CONTROLLED

I CTZ	1853.5	56.6%	1474.0	45.4%	1591.6	49.1%
II CTZ	2130.2	74.8%	1984.6	69.9%	1996.4	70.1%
III CTZ	4326.3	81.4%	3839.6	73.4%	3936.1	75.0%
IV CTZ	3204.8	55.6%	2959.7	50.8%	2947.1	50.6%
RVN	11514.8	66.9%	10257.9	59.8%	10471.1	61.0%

CONTESTED

I CTZ	625.3	19.1%	916.9	28.2%	785.2	24.2%
II CTZ	491.4	17.2%	619.3	21.8%	600.0	21.1%
III CTZ	707.1	13.3%	1098.1	21.0%	1022.7	19.5%
IV CTZ	1008.6	17.5%	1141.7	19.6%	1145.3	19.7%
RVN	2832.4	16.5%	3776.0	22.0%	3553.2	20.7%

VC CONTROLLED

I CTZ	793.9	24.3%	859.1	26.4%	867.4	26.7%
II CTZ	228.2	8.0%	237.1	8.3%	253.2	8.9%
III CTZ	283.2	5.3%	296.1	5.7%	286.3	5.5%
IV CTZ	1555.8	27.0%	1724.8	29.6%	1729.8	29.7%
RVN	2861.1	16.6%	3117.1	18.2%	3136.7	18.3%

The following table depicts the shift of hamlets between the various HES categories, to indicate trends in progression and regression. The categories are based upon security and

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development factors. The base line "Total Moved" shows the numbers of hamlets that exhibited a shift during the month of March. Reading up or down within a column, progression or regression is shown in terms of hamlets and percentage of the "Total Moved" base line figure:

TABLE 2

MONTHLY HAMLET MOVEMENT

From: 29 Feb 68 To: 31 Mar 68

	A	A	A	A	A	
	18(17.8%)		1(0.5%)			
↑ P R O G R E S S I O N ↓		B	B	B	B	
		58(30.8%)	1(0.5%)		10(13.6%)	
			C	C	C	
			101(51.5%)	6(6.9%)	15(20.3%)	
				D	D	
			28(32.2%)	43(58.0%)		
				E		
				6(8.1%)		
<u>TOTAL MOVED</u>	A 9	B 101	C 188	D 196	E 87	VC 74
↓ R E G R E S S I O N ↑		B				
		8(88.9%)				
		C	C			
		1(11.1%)	79(78.3%)			
			D	D	D	
		4(3.9%)	125(66.5%)			
		E	E	E	E	
				42(21.4%)		
		VC	VC	VC	VC	VC
			5(2.7%)	51(26.1%)	53(60.9%)	
<u>NO CHANGE</u>	A 147	B 1171	C 2823	D 2094	E 446	VC 3935

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<p><u>RECAPITULATION:</u></p> <p>Hamlets exhibiting a shift: 655</p> <p>Hamlets that progressed: 287 (43.8% of "Total Moved")</p> <p>Hamlets that regressed: 368 (56.2% of "Total Moved")</p> <p>(2) Territorial security improved substantially in March, when friendly operations emphasized an offensive posture. There was a general reduction in enemy activity, with his major units avoiding contact and apparently resupplying and refitting. The enemy continues, however, to engage in harassing attacks, attacks by fire, and interdiction of LOCs.</p> <p>(3) Territorial security in IV Corps increased dramatically during March with the arrival of the new Corps Commander, Major General Thang. GVN forces took to the offense and began the task of regaining the losses suffered during the Tet Offensive. Particular emphasis was directed toward the major LOCs, Route #4, Mang Thit-Nicolai Canal and Cho Cao Canal. The RD effort, which had been almost stopped, began to be re-established. RF/PF units which had been moved to help secure district and province capitals were returned to their original missions or in the case of those in support of RD, to the new areas. A major recruiting effort was directed to bring RF/PF units up to authorized strength, particularly those along the major LOCs. ARVN's emphasis was directed toward offensive operations and RD direct support battalions have been ordered to operate aggressively, frequently, and at extended distances from their areas of responsibility. Each province was required to designate a three company RF mobile force and each</p>	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
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district a three PF platoon mobile force. These forces are used to provide instant reaction to VC attacks in the provinces and districts. Most provinces organized provisional headquarters to command and control these elements, allowing the force to be deployed as a single unit. The organization of these mobile elements coincided with a large increase in operations conducted by sectors and subsectors.

(4) In I Corps most of the Tet losses of territory had been recouped as friendly forces advanced into the countryside and enemy activity decreased. RF and PF units were moving with more confidence than they have since before the Tet Offensive, and the number of RF and PF operations showed a positive gain. As of 31 March, 123 out of 148 RD Teams were working in their 1968 hamlets. Resumption of RD momentum, however, was not entirely satisfactory with most RD Teams concentrated almost exclusively on hamlet self-defense. A few teams did engage in recovery projects and "Show the Flag" operations.

(5) In II Corps during the month of March, friendly operations emphasized an offensive posture in the countryside while enemy forces have maintained pressure on some major urban areas and interdicted LOCs. Although few large battles developed, enemy activity was still greater than that in the latter part of 1967. The enemy has repositioned some of his forces while resupplying and replacing personnel and new units may have been introduced. ARVN forces have moved out into the near-countryside, securing RD campaign areas, artillery, logistical and construction bases, and opening LOCs.

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(6) The number of VC initiated incidents against RDC in III CTZ was down slightly with 22 reported attacks in March compared with 26 in February. The reaction to these attacks by forces securing the RD effort was better; consequently, VC casualties in these attacks were 43 KIA and three captured. By the middle of March, it was evident that friendly operations had removed the immediate threat to Saigon, although attacks by fire, small unit probes into hamlets and outposts, and interdiction of LOCs continued.

(7) National Security resume follows:

TABLE 3

National Security Resume

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
Incidents of Terrorism	1,075	*	821
Assassinations and Abductions of Civilians	1,479	*	1,676
VC Incidents Against RDC	148	199	167
Status of Roads (%):			
Green	42.5	37.6	46.1
Amber	53.1	53.9	46.1
Red	4.4	8.5	7.8
Status of Waterways in III and IV Corps (%):			
Green	27.9	9.8	15.1
Amber	65.3	83.1	77.5
Red	6.8	7.1	7.4

*These statistics not maintained for February due to difficulty of differentiating between terrorism and the VC Tet Offensive.

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b. Project Recovery:

(1) The Central Recovery Committee (CRC), established a few days after the Tet Offensive began, first was necessarily pre-occupied with Saigon. The capital city was literally tied in knots by the curfew and security situation. By end-March, the Saigon situation largely had returned to normal, the refugee situation in Saigon was controlled, and the CRC was beginning to lift its eyes to first, Hue and second, the country-side.

(2) Throughout the country there were 9,600 civilians killed and 21,000 wounded, and 89,000 private houses over 50% damaged or destroyed. A countrywide survey conducted to determine the extent of Tet Offensive damages indicates that losses total about 173.5 million dollars of which about 46% was to private housing; 34% to private industry; 10% to agriculture and fisheries; and 10% to public facilities. About two thirds of the total damages to private industry occurred in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area and nearly all the remainder occurred in the I CTZ.

(3) GVN has not concerned itself to date with reconstruction of facilities other than housing, except in Saigon and Hue, due to the magnitude of damage in these two locations. Certain essential facilities such as water supplies and electrical power equipment have been repaired or alternate facilities provided. Some radio/TV stations remain inoperable. Temporary facilities provide reduced transmission coverage and/or time in I Corps. In general, public utilities were not hard hit.

(4) It is estimated that 4.5 to 5.0 billion piasters will

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be required to pay temporary relief allowances, cash resettlement allowances, and for GVN construction of urban housing developments. To date, there has been a total of 691.3 million piasters allocated to the CTZs and provinces in support of recovery. There is an additional 40.5 million piasters available in US/FWMAF military units and the advisory detachments which are supporting Recovery. A total of 107.5 million piasters has been donated by private organizations and individuals. In addition, funds, as well as commodities, have been donated by foreign personnel and governments. An initial special fund for the Central Recovery Committee (CRC) of 600 million piasters from US generated piasters was established under direct control of the Prime Minister. Of this, 235 million has been allocated to the provinces.

(5) Given a tight budget and legislative restrictions on shifts within budgets, local currency financing for recovery is and threatens to remain a major problem. A variety of measures to make the necessary funds available are under active review with the GVN.

(6) The GVN logistic system became almost entirely inoperative in the early days following Tet. Air American and US military facilities were used extensively to distribute urgently needed supplies. As security was restored and curfew restrictions relaxed, the GVN system, through the Central Procurement and Supply Agency, began to resume operations. Flow of bulk supplies to the Delta is still limited to a considerable extent to convoy operations both by land and by water.

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c. Upgrade Refugee Care and Resettlement:

(1) The total number of people requiring temporary relief and care as a result of the VC Tet Offensive was 821,192. The overwhelming majority of the damage was in eight cities: Hue, Saigon, My Tho, Can Tho, Ban Me Thuot, Ben Tre, Vinh Long and Phan Thiet. The GVN recovery effort has been successful in meeting emergency requirements in providing shelter and other relief to Tet evacuees and established numerous centers to provide for their care. By end-March, the level of Tet evacuees had dropped to 408,618, about half of whom were in temporary centers.

(2) Resettlement of the homeless is in two programs: One, the larger of the two, will be self-help with government assistance in the form of money and commodities; and two, construction of two-story buildings which will be available to Tet evacuees who lost their homes. The latter program will be only in Saigon and Hue with 6,000 units planned in Saigon and approximately 4,000 in Hue. The second program requires special temporary centers for the ultimate occupants of apartments. Such centers are almost complete in Saigon, and have been started in Hue; however, apartment construction is not progressing at the desired speed. Steps have been taken to have GVN accelerate the program.

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<p>a. <u>PHOENIX:</u></p> <p>(1) Since the VC Tet Offensive a most significant development in the PHOENIX program has been the increased GVN awareness at all levels of the necessity of eliminating the VC infrastructure. Twenty-nine provinces and 31 districts have formed PHUNG HOANG Committees. The GVN have put into operation six more Permanent Offices of the Provincial Intelligence Coordinating Committee for a total of 24 nation-wide.</p> <p>(2) The number of District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) remains at 107, of which 92 are operational. Additional PHOENIX personnel began arriving in-country during March. With their assignment to the field in the next three months, the planned goal of 125 DIOCCs by mid-year should be achieved.</p> <p>(3) The objective for CY 68 is elimination of 12,000 VCI, 5,000 of which are to be political leaders, command and control cadre and activists. As of the end of March, 2,351 VCI (not including the Capital Military District) had been eliminated against a planned goal of 1800 for the period. PHOENIX reports carry those individuals who meet the criteria for classification as VCI and are verified by PHOENIX coordinators. There are undoubtedly others who are still in the screening process or in the hands of military units who have not been reported. Total VCI eliminations for first</p>		DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
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
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quarter, CY 68, were as follows:

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TABLE 4


Total Eliminations of Infrastructure



The following table depicts eliminations by level by Corps for the month of March:

TABLE 5

Eliminations by Level - March



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(5) If the increased impetus and direction being given to the PHUNG HOANG program by the GVN is maintained, there is every promise that 1968 goals for attack on the VC infrastructure will be met.

e. Territorial Security Forces:

(1) During the Tet Offensive, 22 of the 51 ARVN battalions in DSRD were redeployed for the defense of province and district capitals. By 31 March, 46 battalions were operating in RD campaign areas, bolstering territorial security and carrying out offensive operations against enemy guerrillas and local forces.

(a) During March, RF units sustained casualties of 435 KIA, 1,213 WIA, and 45 MIA. During the month they inflicted a total of 4,449 VC KIA. PF units sustained 808 KIA, 1,546 WIA, and 371 MIA while killing 1,478 VC. All casualty figures, both friendly and enemy, were a substantial drop from February, reflecting the decreased intensity of operations.

(b) RF/PF units lost a total of 1,002 individual and 35 crew served weapons while capturing 1,054 individual and 95 crew served weapons. Both weapons losses and weapons captured in March also showed a large drop from February data.

(2) Both RF and PF units operated increasingly in a more aggressive manner. RF conducted a total of 37,289 operations (26,330 at night), 1,062 of which were with contact. PF conducted 54,997 operations including 43,711 at night, 1,488 of which were with contact.

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
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(3) The VC continue to enjoy a relative firepower advantage over RF/PF. In March, 34% of the RF and 52% of the PF reported their firepower as being inferior to nearby enemy units. Action is being taken to expedite upgrading of RF and PF weapons. Additional M2 carbines and BARs now authorized are being recouped from ARVN as a result of the issue of M16 rifles and issue of these weapons to RF/PF has started in I and IV Corps. Under present priorities, the issue of M16 rifles to RF/PF will begin in July 1968.

(4) Strength statistics are at TABLE 6 (RF) and TABLE 7 (PF). NOTE: All statistical data dealing with RF/PF are based upon the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES), and include only combat units.

TABLE 6

Regional Forces Strength
(Thousands)



— Authorized — — Assigned Present for Duty

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
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TABLE 7

Popular Forces Strength
(Thousands)



— Authorized — — Assigned - - - Present for Duty

f. Civil Defense Units:

(1) As a result of the Tet Offensive, in February the Minister of the Interior issued a directive providing for the formation of Civil Defense Units. The directive envisioned the organization of three types of units, official Civil Defense Units composed of civil servants, Business Civil Defense Units composed of business men and their employees, and Public Civil Defense Units composed of civilians living in the same neighborhood. Although new, the program has shown good results, and has been received with enthusiasm by the people. As of 10 April, 140,485 members of civil defense units had been trained, and 10,092 weapons issued.

(2) Extending back into 1967, progress in organizing, training, and arming of hamlet self defense forces has been slow. The number of people who have received training approximates 22,000, and the number armed about 3,500. These totals, however, are pre-

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Tet figures, and the number of armed and trained units now in place in I and II Corps is unknown. Early in April, MRD completed a survey of ~~units~~ ^{UNITS} in place in III and IV Corps. This study revealed 2,173 trained individuals in III Corps, 89 of whom were armed; and ~~3,479~~ ^{3,479} trained individuals in IV Corps, 890 of whom were armed.

4. (C) OTHER IMPORTANT PACIFICATION PROGRAMS:

a. Economic Revival: Economically, I, II and III Corps largely have returned to normal. Prices are stabilized approximately at pre-Tet levels. In I Corps, repair of damaged houses and bridges, preparation for the rice harvest, and return of troops and RD Groups paced the revival of the countryside. Market activity in II Corps is back to normal in provincial capitals. The volume of commercial traffic is still down, however, principally on Routes 20 and 11 from Dalat. VC road blocks and taxation and delays in getting through checkpoints into Saigon have inhibited traffic on these routes. In III Corps, relative normalcy has been reestablished. IV Corps remains a problem and is receiving priority attention. The difficulties primarily involve GVN organizational problems which have resulted in delays in shipping of commodities to the Delta and the movement of excess stocks of rice from the Delta to Saigon.

b. Expand and Improve the RD Cadre Program:

(1) The Revolutionary Development (RD) and Truong Son RD (TSRD) programs gradually are regaining the momentum lost as a result of the Tet Offensive. As of 31 March, there were 629 RD Groups

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
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and 108 TSRD Groups in the field as compared with 557 RD (not including 21 groups in Thua Thien Province) and 108 TSRD Groups as of 29 February. Of the 629 RD Cadre Groups, 545 are in their hamlets - 96 in 1967 hamlets and 449 in 1968 hamlets - and 519 of these groups remain in their hamlets at night. The 87 RD Groups remaining out of their hamlets are performing security missions, helping with refugees, or are newly trained groups awaiting assignments. Status of RD Groups is as follows:

TABLE 8

Status of RD and TSRD Groups



*Does not include Thua Thien Province.

(2) Losses of RD Cadre rose in March, but losses for the period 1 January - 31 March were only slightly higher than normal. Losses from all causes during this quarter were 2,381, as compared with 2,196 during the last quarter of 1967. RD Cadre losses by month for the first quarter of 1968 follow:

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
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TABLE 9

RD Cadre Losses



— Killed/Captured --- Deserted Other

(3) The 108 TSRD Groups are working in 88 hamlets - 12 in 1967 and 76 in 1968 hamlets. Eighty-seven of these groups remain in their hamlets at night. The 24 groups not in hamlets are being used as security forces or are working with Montagnard refugees. Total losses from all causes of TSRD Cadre were 523 for the first quarter of 1968 as compared with 378 for the last quarter of 1967.

c. Improve Effectiveness of National Police:

(1) The decline in police recruitment which started in February continued during March. National Police strength at end-March was 73,389, an increase of 560 over the end-February total. A monthly average increase of 1,350 is required to meet the year-end goal of a total strength of 86,000. The Minister of the Interior approached the Minister of Defense requesting that recruitment of police be excluded from the General Mobilization decree,

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but this request was refused. The MOI also requested that a total of 16,500 draft age police candidates be recruited for the NPPF. A response has not yet been received.

(2) Although advisory effort is directed toward raising the proportion of NP serving at district level, the planned goal for end-March was not attained. Subsequent goals will not be achieved until other security forces superior to the NP in terms of firepower and numerical strength have returned to the "countryside". In isolated instances, the NP have returned to district level but not in numbers equal to pre-Tet deployment. This is not meant to imply there are relatively few NP at district level; there are many districts from which the NP never left.

(3) The end-1968 goal to have 80% of the Marine Police located in the Delta is 100% on schedule; 60% of them are now assigned to that area. Further progress will depend upon delivery of police patrol boats being constructed in Taiwan. It is believed there will be no problem in meeting the year-end goal.

(4) The program to focus National Police Field Forces on attack against the VC infrastructure is steadily improving. Fifty-six out of 68 NPPF Companies are now employed in this role, the highest number to be so employed to date.

(5) An analysis of prisoner and detainee data in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive reveals probably the highest number of persons confined in the history of the war. Concurrent with this precipitate rise in persons confined is the concomitant rise in the percentage of persons confined who have not been sentenced. Prior

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to Tet this figure had held at a steady 55% for over a year, but the sudden influx of detainees has pushed this to 78%. Work proceeded throughout March in selection of a new campsite on Con Son Island for an emergency 5,000 man facility. At end-March, firm obligations for tents, barbed wire, and other essentials for the camp were assured. On the 29th of March, the Director of Corrections and his American counterpart approved the final blueprints for a 4,000 man maximum security masonry prison for Con Son Island, completion of which is estimated for December 1968, and a similar 500 man addition to the National Correctional Center at Tan Hiep in III CTZ. In addition, 2800 prisoners will be transferred from I CTZ over the next two months to the more secure An Tuc Facility in Binh Dinh Province, II CTZ.

d. Expand and Improve the Chieu Hoi Program:

(1) It should be noted that the general situation during the recent past has been dramatically different than that which existed a year ago. Intensive combat activity, particularly when initiated by the enemy, does not create an atmosphere conducive to rallying. In view of recent developments leading to changes in the bombing policy and US-Hanoi peace talks, a large increase in returnee rates in the immediate future does not seem likely.

(2) Chieu Hoi returnee figures for the first quarter, CY 68, are reflected in the following table:

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
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TABLE 10

Chieu Hoi Returnees

(3) Kit Carson Scouts have continued to perform most effectively during and following the Tet campaign. Progress is being made throughout the country in organizing Kit Carson Scout elements in US military units. During the last month there was a modest increase from 315 to 332. The 1968 goal as established by COMUSMACV provides for 100 scouts per division with an overall ^{TOTAL} country-wide of 1500. Since Kit Carson Scouts, like the APTs, are recruited from among Hoi Chanh, this program will be affected by lower returnee rates. The rate of growth will undoubtedly continue to be slow.

(4) The number of Hoi Chanh enrolled in APTs increased following the Tet Offensive. The actual strength rose from 2664 on 31 January to 2919 on 29 February and was 2929 at end-March. The performance of these teams has been remarkably good in the face of earlier disquieting rumors implying untrustworthiness on the part of Hoi Chanh. The Minister of Chieu Hoi already has increased authorization to ~~specific~~ provinces for additional APTs by spot approvals in the course of his recent field visits.

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e. Psychological:

(1) All Corps reported resentment on the part of the people towards the VC/NVA as a result of the Tet Offensive. In both I and II Corps, there is considerable apprehension of a second VC offensive and reservations about the ability of the government to defend the people. In III and IV Corps, a greater sense of security is felt by the population. There is a marked difference, however, in the attitudes of the rural and urban people, with the inhabitants of the more heavily populated areas accounting almost totally for this improved sense of security. These attitudes are partially attributable to the fact that the performance of VIS in III and IV Corps, is in general, more effective than in I and II Corps.

(2) Prime Minister Loc has directed COL Vinh, Director of the Vietnamese Radio Network, to proceed with implementing^a/four-station concept as the national network. This proposal calls for upgrading the 50 KW Saigon station to 100 KW, and upgrading the Danang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang stations to 50 KW. Prime Minister Loc also directed the immediate closure of the 50-watt provincial station at Hoi An. The 50-watt provincial station at Kien Hoa has been off the air for technical reasons and will not be returned to operation. All other stations in the present network will continue to operate until the four stations mentioned above are operational. These stations will then close except for the ones located in Can Tho and Long An. These will be retained so long as the GVN does not have to provide any technical or equipment support for them. JUSPAO is working to also keep the My Tho station on the air because of its

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importance to the Highway 4 program and has tentative agreement from the GVN to do so. Switchover to this four-station system will cause some delay in attaining the goal of 80% coverage but when completed will provide coverage to 99% of the population.

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f. Develop Systematic New Life Development Goals:

(1) Hamlet Schools: March was devoted mostly to repairing damage and getting ready for the opening of the schools ^{ON} 1 April. Because of diversion of commodities to Recovery and the lack of firm decisions on revised RD plans, very little new construction has taken place during the month. No new hamlet school teachers have commenced their training program, although many provinces report an active recruiting program. The biggest problem facing the entire education effort appears to be the drafting of teachers under the recent mobilization law.

(2) Self-Help: As previously forecast, the Self-Help picture is brightening slowly. Nineteen provinces (four of them in the Delta) indicate satisfactory Self-Help operations as of the end of March, compared to eleven so reporting as of the end of the previous month. Transportation facilities, over-loaded with requirements imposed by post-Tet recovery programs, have been unable to keep up with commodity shipments and provincial warehouse stocks of cement, roofing, and reinforcing ^{BAR} ~~bars~~ are being reported as inadequate to support Self-Help operations in nine provinces. Lack of rural security, however, continues to be the major factor limiting program accomplishment^{MENT}.

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(3) Agriculture:

(a) Residual effects from the February Tet Offensive continue adversely to affect the agricultural programs throughout the country. The lack of security (real or imagined) in rural areas, high transportation costs, curfew restrictions, and the loss of livestock due to military operations, have been a detriment to the various agricultural training programs, farmers' morale, and agricultural development.

(b) In I CTZ the Tet Offensive has caused a virtual standstill of all agricultural programs, particularly in the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The lack of security and the delay in receiving rice seed, fertilizer and herbicides will seriously affect the IR 8/IR 5 production for the other I CTZ provinces.

(c) II and III CTZ reports indicate an improvement in all agricultural programs during the month. Security in border provinces continues to affect land reform activities. The slaughter of animals during the Tet Offensive has decreased the production of pork and poultry products in the provinces of Darlac, Kontum and Pleiku. Post-Tet curfews have restricted fishing operations among the coastal provinces. In most of the provinces, however, the IR 8/IR 5 training programs are doing well.

(d) IV CTZ agricultural activities continue to be restricted due to insecurity within the rural areas and communications routes. Land Reform has made little or no progress since Tet. Pork, poultry and fish production generally is increasing throughout the provinces in spite of losses caused by VC activity and GVN curfew restrictions.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OFFICE SYMBOL

PAGE

NR. OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

MACCORDS-RE

NR.

PAGES

25

26

#111

CONFIDENTIAL

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM CONTINUATION SHEET	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N	
<p>(e) Shipment of IR 8/IR 5 rice seed to the provinces continues to be one of the priority programs during the next few months. The Tet Offensive has seriously hampered the 1968 Production Program in the I and IV CTZ by stopping and/or delaying the agriculture cadre and farmer training programs.</p> <p>(4) <u>Village/Hamlet Administration</u>: Countrywide, the village/hamlet training program presents a rather dismal picture. In March there were only seven provinces in which some training of officials took place: Quang Tin, Binh Dinh, Ninh Thuan, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Long An and Kien Giang for a total of 1,737. The current emphasis of the GVN on recovery fully occupied officials and made it impossible to conduct training. Some of the provincial reports indicate that they hope to be able to resume training of village and hamlet officials in April. GP4</p>		DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N		OFFICE SYMBOL M A C C O R D S - R E
MACV FORM 297-1 (Mar 66) (MACAG - AM)		PAGE NR. 26 NR. OF PAGES 26

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		5/6		lp	COMUSMACV SERIAL 051441Z MAY 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3				lp	SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR	4			5-7	lp	REMARKS FOR
C/S	1.		5/6		Q	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			060730		D4W	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

442

PTTUZYUW RUMUHFA0842 1261510-UUUU--RUMMWAA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 051441Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMHVVH/CG 1ST INF DIV ARVN
INFO ZEN/CHIEF JGS
RUMMWAA/SA I CTZ/III MAF
BT

FOR

UNCLAS 12782
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR BG TRUCNG, INFO GEN VIEN, LIG LAM.
SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
FINAL RESULTS OF HEAVY CONTACT 4 KM NW OF DONG HA ON 29 APRIL
THROUGH 1 MAY MOST IMPRESSIVE. CONGRATULATIONS TO 1/2, 4/2 ARVN
INF AND 2/7 APC FOR HARD-WON VICTORY.
BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#42

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JM AF FORM 6216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE		FROM GTF 76	DATE 5 MAY 68
		SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 050844Z MAY 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG		5/5			<p>ARG/SLF CAPABILITIES (U) 7</p> <p>REMARKS CG - Personal from Betrean to Chip, info to me. This ties in somewhat with Gen Kulek's msg to you on the 5th. There is a United Street contained in para 4. No action is required on our part and I presume no further action is required with respect to Gen Kulek's message.</p> <p>J. Regan 9.</p> <p>Perhaps repeat of thought opposite plus gentle statement that contingency is <u>here now</u>.</p>
3	DCG		5/4			
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		5/7			
	D C/S		5/4			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	052130			SHD	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

3 returned
5/6/68

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

O 050344Z
FM CTF 76
TO CTF 79
INFO CG 111 MAF
COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN CHIP INFO BGEN ANDERSON
AND CAPT LILLY FROM BEKRENS
ARG/SLF CAPABILITIES (U)

1. HIGH ON MY LIST OF ITEMS TO DISCUSS TOMORROW IS REVIEW OF PRESENT CAPABILITIES OF ARG/SLF.
2. I KNOW WE ALL ARE MOST REGRETFUL OF THE HEAVY LOSSES SUFFERED BY BLT 2/4 IN THE LAST FEW DAYS AND BY BLT 3/1 TO DATE. THE REDUCTION IN ARG/SLF CAPABILITY, HOWEVER, WHICH RESULTS FROM THESE HIGH PERSONNEL AND GREAT EQUIPMENT LOSSES CAUSES SERIOUS CONCERN OVER CTF 76/CTF 79 ABILITY TO SUPPORT CONTINGENCY PLANS. IN FACT, WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF TRAINED SLF'S (UNITS SEPARATED AND STRENGTHS GREATLY REDUCED BY LOSSES AND UNTRAINED REPLACEMENTS, LARGE EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES, SLF STAFFS REDUCED), THE SEVENTHFLT TODAY DOES NOT HAVE A READY MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY.
3. THE 104 PLAN (MOUNT OUT PLAN PROCEEDING OPLANS 25, 27, 32, 60, 105, 106, 120) REQUIRES CONNOTIONAL NUMBERING OF SHIPS AND EMBARKED SLF'S IN THE ARG'S. IN THE 104 PLAN CURRENT REACTION TIME ASSIGNMENTS FOR ALPHA AND BRAVO GROUPS WITH SLF'S EMBARKED IS 96 HOURS TO LANANG (COMSEVENTHFLT 100650Z MAR 67).
4. YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJ WILL BE HELPFUL. I BELIEVE RECONSTITUTING THE SLF BLT'S TO MEET OUR COMMITMENTS IS MORE URGENT THAN EVER. IF NOT DONE, WITH NECESSARY BACKLOAD, REHAB AND TRAINING, IT APPEARS A SUMMARY REPORT WILL HAVE TO BE MADE TO HIGHER AUTHORITY.
5. ALL MY OTHER SUBJECTS ARE OF LESSER IMPORTANCE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#41

SECRET

VV PAC430

OO RUMWAA
 DE RUMHMA 0806 125215G
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 042136Z MAY 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 LIGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. 2/4'S LOSSES HAVE BEEN SEVERE, AND IT SEEMS TO ME
 THAT A GOOD WAY TO PUT IT BACK ON ITS FEET IS TO DO THE
 JOB VIA THE MUCH-DISCUSSED OUT-OF-COUNTRY REHAB
 ROUTE, PROBERLY AT SUBIC FOR 10 DAYS, DURING WHICH
 TIME WE WOULD DO MUCH TO CLEAN UP BOTH THE
 PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL SITUATION.

2. I AM WELL AWARE OF WESTY'S RELUCTANCE TO ADMIT
 TO THE VALIDITY OF THIS APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, THE
 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND LOGIC
 FAVOR IT.

3. IF YOU AGREE, I SUGGEST YOU TRY IT OUT ON MACV.
 BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#40

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
						COMUSMACV
CG	2		5/5		lo	SERIAL 041230Z MAY 68 COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		5/5		9W	SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR	4			5/6	4	REMARKS FOR
C/S	1.		5/5		Q	
DC/S			5/6		DR	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			050745		DW.	LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION 48
S/C						

39

VV SEA 488

ZVA 666

PP UUMSEA
DE UUMSA 0658 1251240
ZNR UUUUU
P 041230Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO ZEN/CG 3RD MARDIV
INFO UUMSEA/CG III MAF
UUMSEM/CG PROVCORPSV
BT

UNCLAS 12684

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG TOMPKINS, INFO LTG CUSHMAN,
LTG ROSSEN.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

HARD FIGHTING BY ELEMENTS OF 1/3, 2/4 USMC AND 3/21 INF NE OF
DONG HA FROM 30 APRIL THROUGH 2 MAY HAS DEALT ENEMY A SOLID DEFEAT
CONGRATULATIONS TO OFFICERS AND MEN OF THESE UNITS FOR DETERMINED
FIGHT

BT

FOR

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

39

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM DIRINFO HQMC
CG	2		5/4		<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	SERIAL 031454Z MAY 68 COPY # 3 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		5/4		<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	SUBJECT NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ON GEN CUSHMAN
DCG AIR						REMARKS - <i>Write a tribute FOR [Handwritten]</i>
C/S	1.		5/4		<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	
DC/S			5/4		<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			040740		<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

#2 & Burned 5 Nov 68 #37

RR RUHHFMA
 DE RUEBHOA0536 1241451
 ZNR UUUUU
 R 031454Z MAY68
 FM DIRINFO HMC (BGEN GARRETSON)
 FOR RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC (COL JAMES, FORCE INFO OFF)
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS

1. THE FOLLOWING NEWSPAPER ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE
 3 MAY 1968 EDITION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

2. PLEASE PASS TO CG III MAF
 ADVOCATE OF MOBILITY

ROBERT EVERTON CUSHMAN JR

WASHINGTON MAY 2 THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS
 SEEKING OUT TOUGH AND ELUSIVE NORTHERN VIETNAMESE AND VIETCONG
 FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S ASHAU VALLEY CAN CITE PARTICULAR
 QUALIFICATIONS FOR HIS JOB. THE OFFICER, LIEUT. GEN ROBERT EVERTON
 CUSHMAN JR OF THE MARINES, IS A COMBAT A STUDENT
 OF COMMUNISM AND A VETERAN OF FOUR TOURS OF DUTY IN AND , IF THAT WERE
 NOT QUALIFICATION ENOUGH, GENERAL CUSHMAN HAS THE Demeanor OF THE
 CLASSIC MARINE-SQUARE JAW, BROAD SHOULDERS, BARREL CHEST, RAMROD
 POSTURE.

THIS IS NOT TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE GENERAL IS JUST ANOTHER "GUTS

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA0536 UNCLAS

AND STEEL" SOLDIER. TO THE CONTRARY, HE REPEATEDLY HAS DEMONSTRATED
 A KEEN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION AND
 WHY THEY HAVE THUS FAR THWARTED THE EFFORTS OF THE MOST POWERFUL
 NATION ON EARTH.

ONE OF GENERAL CUSHMAN'S FAVORITE THESE ON THE WAR IS THAT THE BEST
 OFFENSIVE WEAPON IN THE HANDS OF THE ALLIES IS NOT A RIFLE OR A
 ROCKET, BUT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THE JOB OF THE MILITARY, HE
 CONTENDS, IS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PROGRAM HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
 OPERATE WITHOUT ENEMY INTERRUPTIONS.

COMMANDS 163,000 TROOPS

AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE 163,000 UNITED STATES TROOPS IN
 ARMY AND MARINE UNITS IN THE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM
 -THE I CORPS AREA - GENERAL CUSHMAN HAS SHOWN AN INDEPENDENCE
 FROM SOME OF THE MILITARY IDEAS PREVALENT AT THE UNITED STATES
 HEADQUARTERS IN SAIGON, TO WHICH HE MUST ANSWER.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE GENERAL IS SAID TO HAVE ARGUED AGAINST STATIC
 DEFENSE CONCEPTS SUCH AS THOSE EMPLOYED AT KHE-SANH, THE AMERICAN
 BASTION BEDIEGED BY THE ENEMY FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. HE IS
 REPORTED TO HAVE ARGUED THAT SIEGE WARFARE WOULD SACRIFICE ONE OF
 HIS GREATEST ADVANTAGES- THE CAPACITY TO MANEUVER INFANTRY AND
 ARTILLERY RAPIDLY IN HELICOPTERS.

GENERAL CUSHMAN WAS BORN IN ST PAUL MINN ON CHRISTMAS EVE, 1914

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

#37

PAGE THREE RUEBHQA0536 UNCLAS

AT THE OUTSET OF A WAR IN WHICH STATIC DEFENSES PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE. NOW, 53 YEARS LATER, HE IS SO CONVINCED THAT MOBILITY, NOT THE TRENCH, IS THE KEY TO SUCCESS THAT HE HAS TAUGHT HIMSELF TO FLY THE HELICOPTER HE USED TO HOP ABOUT HIS COMMAND. NO MARINE OFFICER HAS EVER COMMANDED SO MANY BATTLEFRONT TROOPS AS GENERAL CUSHMAN. TO KEEP ON TOP OF HIS JOB HE WORKS SEVEN DAYS A WEEK OFTEN 18 HOURS A DAY. HIS ENERGY IS SAID TO BE "PRODIGIOUS" SO, TOO HIS POWER OF CONCENTRATION. ONE MARINE FAMILIAR WITH THE GENERAL'S WORKING HABITS ESTIMATES THAT FEW MEN IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAN READ AS RAPIDLY OR RETAIN AS MUCH. BUT GENERAL CUSHMAN ALSO HAS AN ABILITY TO PUSH HIS PROBLEMS ASIDE WHILE HE CHARMS A VISITOR AND REMINISCES WITH AN OLD FRIEND. THEN THE INTENSITY SUBSIDES AND A SENSE OF HUMOR AND A GREGARIOUSNESS COME TO THE SURFACE. HE MAY DISPLAY ONE OF THE GREETING CARDS THAT HIS WIFE THE FORMER AUDREY BOYCE OF PORTSMOUTH VA. HAS SENT TO HIM FROM THEIR HOME AT CAMP PENDLETON CALIF. OR, IF IT IS SUPPERTIME, HE MAY BREAK OUT A BOTTLE OF SHERRY AND TURN ON HIS HI-FI PHONOGRAPH, PILED WITH HIS FAVORITE POP AND CLASSICAL PIECES.

PAGE FOUR RUEBHQA0536 UNCLAS

THE CONVERSATION MIGHT RANGE FROM THE GENERAL'S DAYS AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY-FROM WHICH HE WAS GRADUATED IN 1935 TENTH IN HIS CLASS- TO PRESENT-DAY FRAGMENTATION AND SOLIDARITY AMONG COMMUNIST POWERS A SUBJECT IN WHICH HE HAS READ DEEPLY. WITH SOME PRODDING, THE GENERAL MIGHT TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE BATTLES HE WAS IN DURING WORLD WAR II, THOUGH HE IS UNLIKELY TO MENTION THAT IN 1944, ON THE ISLAND OF GUAM, HE WON THE NAVY CROSS WHEN HE MOVED TO THE FRONT OF HIS CRUMBLING BATTALION AND SET UP AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST A JAPANESE ATTACK. GENERAL CUSHMAN SELDOM DISPLAYS TEMPER, THOUGH INCOMPETENCE WILL SOMETIMES MAKE HIM NOTICEABLY ANGRY. HIS FRIENDS SAY HIS INTELLIGENCE AND HIS FLEXIBILITY ENABLE HIM TO REMAIN CALM IN THE MOST PERPLEXING SITUATIONS. BUT ABOUT A YEAR AGO, SOON AFTER HE HAD ARRIVED IN VIETNAM HE LOST HIS TEMPER IN PUBLIC DURING A SAIGON NEWS CONFERENCE. AS REPORTERS BORED IN DEEPER AND DEEPER WITH SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR, THE GENERAL FINALLY EXPLODED AND DECLARED ANGRILY: "WHEN I SAY SOMETHING, IT IS TRUE".

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

#37

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CINCPAC		DATE 3 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 030528Z MAY 68		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					IN COUNTRY AIR SUPPORT DATA (U) REMARKS <i>#2 & 3 Burned 5 Nov 68</i> EXCLUSIVE <i>Copy #2 to 6.3 3 May 68 PM [Signature] PM In 070930H May 68 PM</i> <i>Copy #3 to JMAW 3 May 68 PM P. R. Johnson, JSTC</i> <i>Copy # 1A to Air Control / 3 May 68 PM</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM C.INCPAC		DATE 3 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 030528Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/4			REMARKS - Have notified G-3 (air) and 1st MAW [Signature] G.
3	DCG		5/4			
4	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		5/3			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	031445			PHW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

#

SECRET

SECRET

NNNNZCZCSAA696ZVA 779VV PHN394VV AA

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMKA 0429 1240529
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JFCCO
 O P 030528Z MAY 68
 FM CINCPAC
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUMSAL/CMDR 7AF
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTHOFFELAND INFO GEN NOMYER AND LT
 GEN CUSHMAN FROM ADMIRAL SHARP
 IN COUNTRY AIR SUPPORT DATA (CU)

A. CINCPAC 030139Z MAY 68

1. IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE TEAM VISIT REFERRED TO IN
 REF A, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE AVAILABLE FOR THEIR
 REVIEW THE FOLLOWING DATA ON AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR
 EACH OF THE MONTHS FEBRUARY, MARCH AND APRIL 1968 BROKEN
 OUT BY CORPS ZONES WITH 1 CTZ SUBDIVIDED INTO MARINE CORPS
 AND ARMY FORCES:

A. AVERAGE NUMBER OF FRIENDLY MANEUVER BATTALIONS
 ASSIGNED TO THE CTZ.

PAGE 2 RUMKA 429 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

B. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED FIXED WING SUPPORT REQUESTS
 SUBMITTED BY GROUND UNITS.

C. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED REQUESTS FRAGGED BY THE TACC.

D. NUMBER OF FRAGGED PREPLANNED MISSIONS (IN C ABOVE)
 ACTUALLY EXECUTED ON FRAGGED TARGET.

E. NUMBER OF FRAGGED MISSIONS DIVERTED TO OTHER
 TARGETS DUE TO:

(1) HIGHER PRIORITY MISSION

(2) OTHER REASONS SUCH AS WEATHER, ETC.

F. NUMBER OF PREPLANNED SORTIES FLOWN BY USAF AND
 USMC AIRCRAFT. IN 1 CTZ IDENTIFY SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF
 ARMY, MARINE AND RVN FORCES BY USAF AND USMC AIRCRAFT
 SEPARATELY.

G. SAME SORTIE DATA AS IN F ABOVE IN RESPONSE TO
 IMMEDIATE (SCRAMBLE) REQUESTS FROM GROUND UNITS. GP-4.
 BT

SECRET

#35

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBASSIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CINCPAC		3 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPIES OF COPIES RECD		
			030139Z MAY 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS <i>#1 burned</i> <i>Scout of JMWK</i> <i>Copy #2 CG (AIR) <u>WPL</u></i> <i>051100H</i> <i>Copy #2 to G-5 <u>Stuart</u></i> <i>Copy #3 to Air Control 3 May 68</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #34

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

SI MAF FORM 5218 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CINCPAC		DATE 3 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 030139Z MAY 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/4			REMARKS for CG- G-2 (air) and 1st MAB notified V. Ray
3	DCG		5/4			
3	DCG AIR					
11	C/S		5/3			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		5/3		DKW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

43

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUMSAK
DE RUHKA 0344 1240139
ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO

O P 030139Z MAY 68
FM CINCPAC
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
INFO RUMSAL/CMDR 7AF
RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO GEN MOMYER AND
LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM ADMIRAL SHARP
SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
REF: A CG IIIMAF 221340Z APR 68
B CINCPAC 230409Z APR 68
C COMUSMACV 11604/241216Z APR 68

1. REF A ADVISED OF DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SYSTEM FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS RECENTLY INSTITUTED IN SVN. REF B REQUESTED COMUSMACV'S COMMENTS ON REF A AND REF C ADVISED THAT REF A WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY, BASED ON ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE DURING APRIL.
2. IN ORDER FOR ME TO BE FULLY ADVISED OF ALL FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS

RELATIVE TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM, I AM SENDING A CINCPAC EVALUATION TEAM TO SVN FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECEIVING BRIEFINGS AND PARTICIPATING IN DISCUSSIONS AT THE VARIOUS COMMAND ECHELONS CONCERNED WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM. THE CINCPAC TEAM WILL CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING:
ASST C/S, OPERATIONS BGEN H. G. HUTCHINSON, JR., USMC
HEAD, AIR OPS BRANCH COL E. S. WILLIAMS, USAF
HEAD, GROUND OPS BRANCH COL T. W. BROWN, USA
HEAD, POLICY SECTION PLANS DIV CAPT J.G. BROZO, USN

3. ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS (ALL TIMES LOCAL):

ETA	PLACE	ETD
040800	SAIGON	070800

OUT-OF-COUNTRY TRAVEL VIA CINCPAC BLUE EAGLE AIRCRAFT.
IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL AND RETURN TO CLARK TO BE PROVIDED BY COMUSMACV. ALL TEAM MEMBERS ARE FAMILIAR WITH BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM, THE PROCEDURES AND FORCES INVOLVED, AND ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH EXTENSIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER AT HAND.

4. REQUEST COMUSMACV ARRANGE IN-COUNTRY BRIEFINGS AS APPROPRIATE, TO INCLUDE VISITS TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AS REQUIRED. REQUEST COPIES OF ALL PREPARED BRIEFINGS BE DELIVERED TO THE TEAM PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTING SVN. 3P-4
BT

SECRET

#34

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

SIAMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN WESTMORELAND		DATE 3 MAY 1968	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 030006Z MAY 68		1,2 AND 4 OF 4 COPIES OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/14			<p>REMARKS</p> <p>This info will have to come from the USA. Will handle personally with SA Bacon if you concur.</p> <p>Yes, Wherry</p>
3	DCG		5/14			
	DCG AIR					
4	C/S		5/13			
	D C/S		5-14			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	030945			315-1100	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
<p>if any Gen Tidwell has seen this</p>						
<p># 204 burned 5 Nov 68</p>						

SECRET

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	COMUSMACV
CG	2A		5/3		D	SERIAL 021035Z MAY 68	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		5/3		JA	SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE	
DCG AIR	4			4		REMARKS	
C/S	1.		5/3		CE	FOR	
DC/S			5/4		DE		
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S			030715	5/4	DHW	#3 & 4 Burned 5 Nov 68 LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION	
S/C							

#32

FOR

MWB 12800ZVA 647ZVV ASA634
PP RUMMWAA
DE RUMUHFA 0300 1231120
ZNR UUUUU
P 021035Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMHMB/CG 101ST ABN DIV
INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV
BT
UNCLAS 12460
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG BARSANTI, INFO LTG CUSHMAN, LTG
ROSSON.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
NOW APPARENT THAT BATTLE 6 KM NW OF HUE ON 29 APRIL VIRTUALLY
ANNIHILATED ENEMY UNIT. HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS TO OFFICERS AND MEN
OF A/1/501, B&D/2/501, AND A/1/502 FOR THIS OUTSTANDING DISPLAY OF
COMBAT POWER --- ALL THE WAY.
BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

VVZ CZ CMAA52 IZVA 456VV ASA607
 PP RUMMVAA
 DE RUMUHFA 0269 1230950
 ZNR UUUUU
 P 020945Z MAY 68 ZFFG
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUMMB/CG 101ST ABN DIV
 INFO RUMVAAA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG PROVCORPSV

FOR

BT

UNCLAS 12451
 FROM GE WESTMORELAND FOR MG BARSANTI, INFO LTG CUSHMAN,
 LTG ROSSON.

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
 CONGRATULATIONS TO A&C/1/505 ABN FOR OUTSTANDING ACTION
 W OF HUE ON 1 MAY. QUICK AND AGGRESSIVE REACTION RESULTED IN
 DEFEAT OF ENEMY UNIT. GOOD WORK--ALL THE WAY.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

III MAF 2100/5 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 31

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM COMUSMACV
CG	2		5/3		<i>lf</i>	SERIAL 020703Z MAY 68 COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		5/3		<i>lf</i>	SUBJECT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		5/2		<i>a</i>	<p>FOR</p> <p>"# 3 & 4 Burned 5/16/68</p> <p>LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p>
DC/S			5/3		<i>DL</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			021905		<i>DKU</i>	
S/C						

#30

FOR ✓

NNNNKVV MWB087Y00ZVA 308/V ASA 572

PP RUMWAA

DE RUMUNFA 0240 1230715

ZNR UUUUU

P 020703Z MAY 68 ZFFG

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMHMB/CG 101ST ABN DIV

INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAP

RUMHNA/CG PROVCORPSV

BT

UNCLAS 12438

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR MG BARSANTI, INFO LTG CUSHMAN, LTG
ROSSON.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

ACTION BY ELEMENTS OF 2/17 CAV 16 KM NW OF RUE ON 1 MAY
PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY. AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT BY "A" CO, PLUS TIMELY
REINFORCEMENT BY "B" CO, RESULTED IN OVEFRUNNING OF ENEMY POSITIONS
WITH HEAVY ENEMY LOSSES. HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#30