

- 24~~23~~. CG III MAF 260728Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & KRULAK
 POSSIBILITY OF 70-75% OPCON RETURNED TO III MAF
- 25~~24~~. CG III MAF 271244Z MAY68 (C MCEO) *group 4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK INFO ANDERSON
 BGEN TO MACV -- DRAFT TERMS OF REF
- 26~~25~~. CG III MAF 301458Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN INFO KRULAK
 COMMENTS ON CMC POINT PAPER FOR SECNAV AND DEPSECDEF
- ~~27~~26~~. CG III MAF 311250Z MAY68 (C)
 CONGRATS TO FIELDS~~
- ~~28~~27~~. CG III MAF 311252Z MAY68 (C)
 CONGRATS TO KRULAK~~
- ~~29~~28~~. CG III MAF 311254Z MAY68 (C)
 CONGRATS TO KOSTER~~
- ~~30~~29~~. CG III MAF 311256Z MAY68 (C)
 CONGRATS TO BUST~~

14. CG III MAF 200628Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
 ASSES TACTICS MSG TO CMC, FMEFAC, & QUANTICO

15. CG III MAF 200630Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK
 AIR CONTROL DATA FROM KHAM DUC

16. CG III MAF 210254Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK, INFO ANDERSON, BOUKER, & CHIP
 AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION

~~17. CG III MAF 210614Z MAY68 (C)
 CUSHMAN FOR CHAPMAN
 RECORD BOOK ON MCCOLLEY~~

18. CG III MAF 210802Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
 VAN RYZIN TO CHIP
 SLF HELICOPTERS

19. CG III MAF 220800Z MAY68 (C) *group-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO ROSSON
 GROUND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

20. CG III MAF 221342Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
 ECOL ETHERIDGE TO CHIP
 UTILIZATION OF SLF HELOS

21. CG III MAF 230900Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK
 COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY

22. CG III MAF 240226Z MAY68 (C) *group-4*
 CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND
 RELOCATION OF I DASC

~~23. CG III MAF 240120Z MAY68 (C)
 CUSHMAN TO DRINGLE
 REGRETS CANNOT ATTEND BUNCH~~

23. CG III MAF 260728Z MAY68 (S MCEO)
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & KRULAK
 POSSIBILITY OF 70-75% OPCON RETURNED TO III MAF

24. CG III MAF 271244Z MAY68 (C MCEO)
 CUSHMAN TO KRULAK INFO ANDERSON
 BGEN TO MACV -- DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

25. CG III MAF 301458Z MAY68 (S MCEO)
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN INFO KRULAK
 COMMENTS ON CMC POINT PAPER FOR SECNAV AND DERSECDEF

1. ~~50.~~ CG III MAF 120546Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to KIM info ROBERTSON
TANK & LVT support for 2D ROKMC BDE
2. ~~2.~~ CG III MAF 131012Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN for KIM
ROCKET LAUNCHING SITES
3. ~~3.~~ CG III MAF 140810Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to JONES, info KRULAK
CAPT JOHN A. MCCOLLEY
- ~~4. ~~2.~~ CG III MAF 160208Z MAY68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN
PROMOTION OF VAN RYZIN MAYBE HERE~~
5. ~~4.~~ CG III MAF 160750Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
~~CUSHMAN TO ROSSON TO TOMPKINS INFO ROSSON~~
EXPRESSES APPRECIATION FOR PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
6. ~~5.~~ CG III MAF ~~160946Z~~ 160946Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
CROSS TO KOMER
REFUGEE RELIEF PAYMENTS
7. ~~6.~~ CG III MAF 170030Z MAY68 (S) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON
DOES NOT CONCUR ON KHE SANH
8. ~~7.~~ CG III MAF 171020Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
CROSS to KOMER
THREAT IN DANANG--ABSENCE FROM DNG 18MAY68--ATTEND MEETING
9. ~~8.~~ CG III MAF 181730Z MAY68 (S) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND
CRUSHED ROCK REQUIREMENTS IN ICTZ
10. ~~9.~~ CG III MAF 190210Z MAY68 (S)
CUSHMAN to ALL CG'S
PASSES WESTMORELAND'S SECURITY MSG *gp-4*
11. ~~10.~~ CG III MAF 200530Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to KRULAK
KRULAK'S MSG on TANK DECISION -- BGEN FOR MACV
12. ~~11.~~ CG III MAF 200610Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to TOMPKINS & ROBERTSON
EVALUATION OF TACTICS
13. ~~12.~~ CG III MAF 200612Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ALL
SALT TAB LETS - HEAT

DECLASSIFIED

16. CG III MAF 040316Z MAY68 *Op-1*
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON
PASSES WESTY'S PRAIRIE FIRE TERM, MSG

17. CG III MAF 040318Z MAY68 *Op-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON & TOMPKINS
ENEMY SITUATION QUANG TRI-BASE AREA 101-WUNDER BEACH AREA

18. CG III MAF 140638Z MAY68 *Op-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON info TOMPKINS, ROBERTSON, AND KOSTER
DEPLOYMENT OF 3/21st -- INTELLIGENCE ON DNG ATK

DECLASSIFIED

25. CG III MAF 220346Z Apr 68 *Switch II group-4*
- 26 ~~36.~~ LTGEN CUSHMAN 011545Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to WESTMORELAND
PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE ON DELAWARE
- 27 ~~37.~~ CG III MAF 040810Z MAY68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & KRULAK
PASSES MGEN ANDERSON'S MEMO FOR RECORD
- 28 ~~38.~~ CG III MAF 040902Z MAY68 (S) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND info SHARP
ADDENDUM TO 30-DAY DISPOSITION OF SINGLE MGR SYSTEM MSG.
- 29 ~~39.~~ CG III MAF 040906Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & KRULAK
PASSES ABOVE MSG (Tab 38) TO KRULAK & CHAPMAN
- 30 ~~40.~~ CG III MAF 052359Z MAY68 (S) *gp-3*
CUSHMAN TO WESTMORELAND
RVN LEAVE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR TET 1968
- 31 ~~41.~~ CG III MAF 080250Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
PASSES III MAF presentation at MACV to KRULAK
- 32 ~~42.~~ CG III MAF 081344Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO KRULAK
Recaps meeting at COMUSMACV 8May68
- 33 ~~43.~~ CG III MAF 081432Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
MGEN ANDERSON to BEHRENS, info CHIP
SLF Situation
- 34 ~~44.~~ CG III MAF 090014Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO KRULAK
2/4's losses--REHAB--current offensive
- ~~35 ~~45.~~ CG III MAF 090640Z MAY68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO NICKERSON
LCPL RAYMOND A. TUTTAM 220806Z USMC~~
- 36 ~~46.~~ CG III MAF 090940Z MAY68 (S) *group-4*
CUSHMAN FOR CHAPMAN & KRULAK
GEN OFFICER REASSIGNMENTS
- 37 ~~47.~~ CG III MAF 100008Z MAY68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN, KRULAK info ANDERSON
NOTES TAKEN AT MACV PRESENTATION
- 38 ~~48.~~ CG III MAF 100704Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN to ROSSON
ARTY AMMO EXPENDITURES
- 39 ~~49.~~ CG III MAF 100824Z MAY68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO TOMPKINS, info DAVIS
PASSES GO reassignment msg

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 30 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 301458Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/1		lp	REMARKS AIR CONTROL (U)
3	DCG		6/1		lp	
3	DCG AIR				lp	
11	C/S		5/31		lp	
	D C/S		6/2		lp	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	310740			lp	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

25

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUMKM RUEBKDA
 DE RUMSAK 3922 15 11438
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 301458Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASHINGTON D C
 INFO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, INFO LEGEN KRULAK
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 AIR CONTROL (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 291917Z MAY 68 (NOTAL)
- B. CG FMFPAC 262248Z MAY 68
- C. CG III MAF 260728Z MAY 68

1. REFERENCE (A) QUOTED A CMC POINT PAPER ON CHANGE TO THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT OF III MAF AIR ASSETS AND REQUESTED COMMENTS THEREON
 BE FORWARDED TO CMC. ACCORDINGLY, PERTINENT COMMENTS, IN ADDITION
 TO THOSE CONTAINED IN REFERENCES B AND C ARE AS FOLLOWS:
 COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO QUOTED PARAGRAPHS OF REF A.

A. PARAGRAPH 2

COMMENT: THE MODIFIED SYSTEM ASSIGNS 70 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED AIR
 AVAILABLE WEEKLY AND PRESCRIBES TYPE ORDNANCE AND ASSIGNS
 TOTS. FRAG PROVIDES GROUND UNITS A FIXED AIR SUPPORT PACKAGE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3922 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE WCEO
 AND AIR UNITS A PARTIAL TIME TABLE THAT FACILITATES AIRCRAFT
 UTILIZATION AND SCHEDULING. HOWEVER, THE CMC'S PROPOSAL,
 WHICH ASSIGNS OPCON OF AIR ASSETS TO III MAF,
 CONSTITUTING 70 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIES AVAILABLE, IS
 MUCH PREFERRED.

B. PARAGRAPH 3B

COMMENT: AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED
 FRAG IS MORE RESPONSIVE THAN THE WORDS "WEEKLY FRAG" IMPLIES.
 AGREE ACTUAL GROUND REQUIREMENTS CANNOT BE PREDICTED ONE WEEK
 IN ADVANCE; HOWEVER THE SYSTEM IS NOT COMPLETELY INFLEXIBLE, AND
 REQUIREMENTS CAN BE ADJUSTED. PROBLEM HERE IS FIXED ORDNANCE
 LOADS AND TOTS. THESE CAN BE ADJUSTED UPON REQUEST TO TADC OR
 TACC VIA III MAF OR I DASC, (TOTS NLT 7 HOURS BEFORE TARGET
 TIME AND ORDNANCE LOADS NLT 2 TO 4 HOURS PRIOR TO TOT). FOR
 DAILY FRAG; UNITS REQUIRING AIR SUPPORT BEYOND WEEKLY ALL-
 OCATIONS SUBMIT REQUESTS TO III MAF NLT 1400 DAILY TO BE
 EFFECTED THE FOLLOWING DAY. PROCESSING OF THE 30 PERCENT PRE-
 PLANNED SORTIES AVAILABLE DAILY IS ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO
 ORIGINAL PROCEDURE EFFECTED 21 MARCH 1968 EXCEPT REQUESTS REQUIRE
 LESS DETAILED INFORMATION.

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C. PARAGRAPH 5

COMMENT: CG III MAF SHOULD HAVE OPCOM OF ALL MARINE AIRCRAFT UNITS AND MAKE AVAILABLE TO MACV 30 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIES AT THE 1:1 RATE. THE USE OF THE TERM OPCOM IN CONNECTION WITH SORTIES SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

(2) THIRTY PERCENT OF MARINE CORPS SORTIES MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR EMERGENCY AIR SUPPORT TO OTHER UNITS BUT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE IN EXCESS OF DAILY ROUTINE REQUIREMENTS, PROVIDED AIR FORCE PROVIDES ITS SHARE OF SORTIES. THIRTY PERCENT IS ALSO CONSIDERED AN EXCESSIVE TAX ON DAILY MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS SINCE AN AVERAGE OF 9.4 SORTIES HAVE BEEN PROVIDED EACH MARINE BN PER DAY THE PAST YEAR.

D. PARAGRAPH 6

COMMENT: FRAGGING OF MARINE SORTIES UNDER MY OPCOM TO SUPPORT MARINES MAY BECOME A PROBLEM DUE TO MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER IF THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ARMY DIVISIONS WITH SUFFICIENT AIR SUPPORT. ADDITIONALLY, UNLESS AIR FORCE REVISES ITS METHOD OF FRAGGING SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY, MARINES UNITS WILL BE RECEIVING AIR SUPPORT WHICH IS MUCH MORE RESPONSIVE THAN THAT PROVIDED TO THE ARMY.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 3922 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
FURTHER, IT IS NOT BELIEVED REASONABLE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO INSIST THAT ONLY WITH AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT SUPPORT ARMY UNITS. THE 30 PERCENT SORTIE SLICE AVAILABLE TO MACV SHOULD NORMALLY COME BACK TO I CORPS AND BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT I CORPS GROUND FORCES, BOTH MARINE AND ARMY, AS REQUIRED.

E. PARAGRAPH 7A (2)

COMMENT: A PREPLANNING CYCLE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED FOR III MAF BY COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE 35-4. THIS DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHED THE SYSTEM USED BY ARMY DIVISIONS AND WAS SIMILAR TO PRESENT SYSTEM. MARINE CORPS SYSTEM WAS IN-HOUSE PROCEDURE.

F. PARAGRAPH 7A (3)

COMMENT: SYSTEM DOES NOT OBLIATE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE MARINE PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT THE ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM SINCE TWO SYSTEMS WOULD BE EXERCISED. NECESSITY TO PROCESS ARMY AND MARINE REQUESTS THROUGH ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM STILL EXISTS. SOME REDUCTION IN MARINE PERSONNEL MAY BE REALIZED.

G. PARAGRAPH 7A (4)

COMMENT: CLEAN LINES OF NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS WILL NOT BE COMPLETELY RESTORED UNDER PROPOSED SYSTEM, UNTIL MARINE AIR ASSETS ARE RETURNED TO FULL OPCOM OF CG III MAF.

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 3922 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WILL REMAIN MORE COMPLEX.

H. PARAGRAPH 7B (2)

COMMENT: THE 70 PERCENT ALLOCATION DOES NOT ESTABLISH A CEILING BUT REPRESENTS A MINIMUM LEVEL SINCE THE REMAINING 30 PERCENT SHOULD LARGELY BE REALLOCATED TO I CORPS.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PP RUMKM
 DE RUMSAK 3545 1481244
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 271244Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK, INFO
 MAJGEN ANDERSON, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A MARINE GENERAL OFFICER,
 ASSISTANT TO THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS (C)
 A. MACJOO DTD 7 MARCH 1968

1. IN ELABORATION OF OUR RECENT PHONE CALL CONCERNING UTILIZATION
 OF A 1ST MAW AWC ON TAD TO MACV HEADQUARTERS AS ASST TO COMUSMACV'S
 DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED TERMS OF
 REFERENCE ARE SUBMITTED FOR YOUR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION:

A. BACKGROUND:

(1) REFERENCE (A) CHARGED THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER
 FOR AIR OPERATIONS WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING AND
 DIRECTING THE AIR EFFORT THROUGHOUT VIETNAM TO INCLUDE ICTZ AND
 THE EXTENDED BATTLE AREA.

(2) CG III MAF WAS DIRECTED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3545 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS THE FOLLOWING ASSETS
 FOR MISSION DIRECTION: STRIKE AIRCRAFT, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
 AND THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AS REQUIRED.

B. REQUIREMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF MARINE STRIKE AND
 RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO ARMY, AS WELL AS MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS
 IN VIETNAM, IS RECOGNIZED BY THE SENSE OF THE REFERENCE, THIS
 IMPORTANCE, AND THE DYNAMIC CHARACTER OF OPERATIONS, MAKE IT
 NECESSARY THAT MARINE AIR BE APPROPRIATELY REPRESENTED AT
 COMUSMACV.

C. ACTION: A MARINE GENERAL OFFICER WILL BE ASSIGNED AS THE
 ASSISTANT FOR MARINE AIR MATTERS TO THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER
 FOR AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS SPECIFIED
 BY THE REFERENCE AND CHANGES THERETO.

**D. THE TASKS OF THE ASSISTANT FOR MARINE AIR MATTERS TO THE
 COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER AIR OPERATIONS FOLLOW. HE WILL:**

(1) PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING, COORDINATING AND
 DIRECTING MARINE AIR EFFORTS.

(2) PROVIDE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO APPLYING MARINE AIR IN
 THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER; IN FURTHERANCE OF ASSIGNED MISSIONS AND
 IN EQUITABLE AND TIMELY APPORTIONMENT.

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 3545 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE NCEO

(3) CONSISTENT WITH THE TACTICAL SITUATION, ENSURE THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIR TO SUPPORT MARINE GROUND UNITS.

(4) ASSIST IN THE CONCERTED USE OF ALL TACTICAL AIR CONTROL ASSETS WHILE PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(5) CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND DELAYS ARISING FROM REQUESTING, ALLOCATING, REPORTING AND EXECUTING AIR OPERATIONS.

(6) MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE AND ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFERENCE.

E. THE ASSISTANT FOR MARINE AIR MATTERS TO THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS SHALL ADVISE AND BE CONSULTED ON THE ABOVE LISTED ITEMS AND ALL OTHERS OF SPECIFIED DIRECT CONCERN TO MARINE AIR OPERATIONS. HE SHALL HAVE ACCESS TO ORGANIZATIONS, RECORDS AND REPORTS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT ASSIGNED TASKS.

2. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A BILLET BY CINCPAC, RATHER THAN AS A SUGGESTION FROM MY HEADQUARTERS, WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. IF YOU CONCUR, YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THE MATTER WITH ADM SHARP WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

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CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 260128Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT ASSETS
			IN	OUT		
4	CG		5/30			REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
2	DCG			27 May	Ruef	
3	DCG AIR			6-1	QJ	
1	C/S			26 May		
	D C/S			11	M	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	261705	4/30			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #24

SECRET

FILE 37

CCN 211

		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 MAY 68	
		SERIAL# 260728Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
DATE		SIGNATURE		SUBJECTS: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARTIME ARTICLE AND RECON AIRCRAFT ASSETS	
26 May		W. Stevenson		DATE	
26 May		[Signature]		SIGNATURE	
27 May		R. Thompson			
5/30					
6/1		M. Anderson			
6/1		D. Wan			
PAC					
S/S		COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES			
		TAPE & MAT			

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#24

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHMM
 DE RUMSAK 3418 1470728
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 260728Z MAY 68
 RM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH D.C.
 RUHMM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 BT

EXCLUSIVE**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY****HAS BEEN SENT**

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN
 WRILAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE
 AIRCRAFT ASSETS (U)

REF A. COMUSMACV 211145Z MAY68

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT A PROPOSAL TO LEP SEC DEF TO RETURN
 70-75 PERCENT OF MARINE FIXED WING ASSETS TO MARINE OPCON
 IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

2. MY COMMENTS ARE:

A. IT IS HIGHLY DESIREABLE TO RETURN ALL MARINE STRIKE
 AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO MARINE OPCON AS SOON AS
 POSSIBLE AND THE PROPOSAL TO IMMEDIATELY RETURN 70-75
 PERCENT OF THEM HAS MUCH MERIT.

B. THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS PROPOSAL SEEM TO BE:

(1) IT WOULD REGAIN OPCON OF A VITAL PORTION OF OUR

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3418 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 AVIATION ASSETS.

(2) IT WOULD EFFECT A WORKABLE COMPROMISE AND FOR THE
 TIME RESOLVE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ISSUE.

(3) IT WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO COMUSMACV AND THE 7AF A
 DEFINITE PORTION OF MARINE EFFORT TO BE EMPLOYED AS NECESSARY
 FOR EMERGENCIES AND MASSES AIR EFFORTS.

C. THE DISADVANTAGES ARE:

(1) IT WOULD ROUTINELY PROVIDE A DAILY ALLOCATION OF 20-25
 PERCENT OF MARINE STRIKE ASSETS TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE FOR USE
 AS COMUSMACV SAW FIT. THUS, APPROXIMATELY ONE-FOURTH OF ALL
 MARINE SORTIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR USE IN SUPPORT OF ARMY
 UNITS IN I CORPS OR OTHER CORPS AREAS. CONSEQUENTLY, INSTEAD
 OF ASSURING THAT MARINE AIR RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO MACV
 ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS, WE ARE PROVIDING THIS AMOUNT AS A
 MATTER OF COURSE, REGARDLESS OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

(2) IT COULD BE USED TO DIVERT MARINE AIR ASSETS NEEDED IN
 I CORPS INTO OTHER CORPS AREAS IN OTHER THAN EMERGENCY SITU-
 ATIONS.

(3) IT WOULD ENTAIL DUPLICATIVE AIR REQUEST, CONTROL, AND
 DIRECTION SYSTEMS IN I CORPS, AND THUS TEND TO RESULT IN

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PAGE 3 RIMSAX 3418 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
CONSIDERABLE COMPLICATIONS.

(4) IT COULD EXPOSE US TO THE CONTENTION THAT THE MARINE
AIR-GROUND TEAM, EVEN WITH ONLY ONE REINFORCED WING DEPLOYED
WITH TWO DIVISIONS, HAS A THIRTY-PERCENT EXCESS STRIKE CAPABILITY.

D. ASSETS PROVIDED UNDER SUCH A SYSTEM SHOULD BE IN THE FORM
OF SORTIES AND NOT BY SQUADRON. THE DEDICATION OF SQUADRONS
TO SUCH A PURPOSE IS INFLEXIBLE IN OPERATION AND WOULD PRESENT
AN EASY TARGET IN POST-WAR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. A NEW BUI RELATED SUBJECT FOLLOWS. REFERENCE A IS A MACV
DIRECTIVE MODIFYING SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES FOR A THIRTY-
DAY TRIAL PERIOD. IT APPEARS TO OFFER US A CONSIDERABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO REGAIN CONTROL OF OUR ASSETS. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED
THAT I SHOULD NOT FORWARD COMMENTS ON IT TO CINCPAC UNTIL AFTER
ANOTHER THIRTY-DAY PERIOD; HOWEVER, I DO INTEND TO COMMENT TO
COMUSMACV. I WILL FORWARD THESE DRAFT COMMENTS TO YOU TOMORROW
TO OBTAIN ANY SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS AND TO PRECLUDE ANY ACTION
THAT WOULD CROSS PENDING PROPOSALS TO DEP SEC DEF OR JCS.

GF-4

BT

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 MAY 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 240226Z MAY 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS
			IN	OUT			
2	CG						
3	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
	C/S						
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
	S/S		241325				
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6		26May	26May			
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

EXCLUSIVE
FOR
HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

#22

CONFIDENTIAL**FOR
CONFIDENTIAL**

T
PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 3106 1450226
ZNY CCCCC
P 240226Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN RVN
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM
GEN CUSHMAN

RELOCATION OF IDASC

A. COMUSMACV 190154Z MAR 68

1. MY STAFF AND COGNIZANT OFFICERS OF THE IDASC AND IS 72 COMM SQD ARE CONDUCTING LIAISON, DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS AND FORMULATION PLANS TO RELOCATE IDASC IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF REF A.
2. PLANNING TO DATE INDICATES THAT ADEQUATE BUILDING AND FLOOR SPACE WILL BE PROVIDED BY ALTERATION OF A PRESENT STRUCTURE AT III MAF HQTRS.
3. REVIEW OF COMMUNICATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS INDICATES THAT COMMAND ASSISTANCE WILL BE REQUIRED TO TASK CERTAIN AGENCIES AND SERVICES TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR IDASC OPERATION. REQUEST THAT COMM SEVENTH AF, CG USARV, CG FIRST SIGNAL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3106 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR EDG, AND DCA SAM BE APPRISED OF THE DESIRED RELOCATION OF IDASC AND TASKED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE/EQUIPMENT WITH PRIORITY IN CONSONANCE REF A AS REQUIRED. APPRISAL AND TASKING IS REQUESTED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME TO PROVIDE TIMELY SUPPORT FOR IDASC RELOCATION.

GP-4

BT

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 MAY 68	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 260128Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT ASSETS	
			IN	OUT			
4	CG		5/30			REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT	
2	DCG			27 May	Ruef		
3	DCG AIR			6-1	QJ		
1	C/S			26 May			
	D C/S			11	M		
	D C/S DM						
	S/S	261705	4/30	11			
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

SECRET #24

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUHKM
 DE RUMSAK 3028 1440900
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 230900Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
 CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 COMMANDERS DAILY SUMMARY (U)

1. I HAVE EXAMINED THE PREPARATION AND TRANSMITTAL PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN THE SUBMISSION OF THE COMMANDERS DAILY SUMMARY. AS YOU KNOW, THE END OF THE REPORTING PERIOD IS 0900H. WE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO COMPILE, EDIT AND APPROVE THE REPORT BY 1130H. THIS TIMING I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN SHORTEN SIGNIFICANTLY. HOWEVER, THE TRANSMISSION TIME FROM DTG TO TOR AT YOUR HQ HAS AVERAGED 109 MINUTES OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS. THIS TIME I CONSIDER TO BE EXCESSIVE AND AM TAKING STEPS TO SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE. HOPEFULLY, YOU SHOULD IN THE FUTURE RECEIVE THE REPORT BY 1230H DAILY. I WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR TO IMPROVE YOUR TOR.
 GP-4
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

SECRET

OO MMSB
 DE RUMSAK 2948 143134Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 221342Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO MMSB/CG NINTH MAB OKI
 BT

FOR**S E C R E T**

FOR BGEN CHIP FROM COL ETHERIDGE

- A. COMSEVENTHFLT 152316Z JAN 68
- B. ADMNO COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT 010838Z MAR 68
- C. CTF SEVEN SIX 280422Z APR 68

1. ARRIVE III MAF HQ 1130 AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED ON MAJEN VAN RYZIN. DURING THIRTY MINUTE DISCUSSION AND LUNCH FOLLOWING I REITERATED YOUR POLICY THAT IF WE HAVE ASSETS AVAILABLE WHEN NOT COMMITTED TO AMPHIBIOUS OPNS AND III MAF NEEDS THE HELICOPTERS, THEY WILL BE PROVIDED. WHEN THE EIGHTY PERCENT FIGURE FOR HELOS TO BE PROVIDED WAS DISCUSSED, THE GENERAL STATED THIS WAS PICKED OUT OF THE AIR AND CONCURRED THAT WE SHOULD NOT INCLUDE SPECIFIC FIGURES WHEN DISCUSSING UTILIZATION OF SLF HELOS.

2. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE BEST WAY TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM HELO SUPPORT TO III MAF WHEN NOT IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IS

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2948 **S E C R E T**

FOR THE SLF COMMANDER NOT TO DETERMINE HOW MANY HELOS CAN BE PROVIDED ON A DAILY BASIS BUT TO DETERMINE WHAT HIS, THE SLF COMMANDERS, REQUIREMENTS ARE ON A DAILY BASIS AND TO PASS THIS TO THE WING (III MAF) ON A DAILY BASIS TOGETHER WITH THE NUMBERS OF HELOS IN AN UP STATUS. ONE REQUIREMENT WOULD ALWAYS BE AN SAR BIRD ABOARD. UTILIZING THIS PROCEDURE, THE SLF COULD PARTICIPATE TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE, IAW A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO BE PUBLISHED BY III MAF ON HELO UTILIZATION. SLF COMMANDER WOULD RETAIN OPCON AND STILL BE SUPPORTED BY WING HELOS IF ALL SLF BIRDS ARE DOWN.

3. ON FRI 24 MAY AT 1330 MAJEN VAN RYZIN WILL CHAIR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE TO FIRM UP THE AFORE-MENTIONED LOI. I HAVE GONE OVER THE DRAFT LOI CAREFULLY WITH FRANK SMITH AND THE MAIN PARA WHICH AFFECTS US IS 204 WHICH FOLLOWS; QUOTE: SLF HMM'S. WHEN A BLT FROM AN SLF IS OPERATING ASHORE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG, III MAF, THE SLF'S HMM MAY CONTINUE TO BE BASED AFLOAT, OR MAY OPERATE FROM A BASE ASHORE DURING PERIODS ARG SHIPPING IS ABSENT FROM SVN WATERS. IF BASED AFLOAT, OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE HMM WILL REMAIN WITH THE SLF COMMANDER, HOWEVER, BY ARRANGEMENT WITH CG, 9TH MAB, AND WITH CONCURRENCE OF

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2948 S E C R E T

CONSEVENTHFLT, ALL AVAILABLE HELICOPTERS WILL BE PROVIDED TO CG, 1ST MAW, FOR UTILIZATION IN THE TOTAL SUPPORT OF III MAF MARINE CORPS FORCES FOR FRAGGING IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION III. IN THE EVENT THE HMM IS BASED ASHORE, IT WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG, 1ST MAW AND WILL BE EMPLOYED, FRAGGED AND SUPPORTED IN THE SAME MANNER AS ANY SQUADRON ORGANIC TO 1ST MAW, WITH DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE PRESENCE AND ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS POSED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE SLF BLT ASHORE. PROCEDURES WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY CG, 1ST MAW THROUGH DIRECT LIAISON WITH SLF COMMANDERS TO EFFECT THIS PROGRAM. END QUOTE. I WILL REPRESENT YOU ON THIS AD HOC COMMITTEE, THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE IN PARA 2 AND 3 ABOVE.

4. IN STUDYING REFS A, B AND C I CAN SEE WHY YOUR SLF CDRS MAY FEEL THEIR BLT CHOPPED ASHORE SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY OR DIRECT SUPPORT FROM THE SLF HMM. REF A I FEEL IS WRITTEN CORRECTLY WHEREIN PARA 9B STATES CAIF REMAINS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE, BUT DOES NOT SPECIFY WHAT OPERATIONS OR WHAT UNIT. REFS B AND C I FEEL ARE WRITTEN INCORRECTLY AS THEY SPECIFY WHICH UNITS.

5. IT IS MY INTENTION TO PROCEED TO THE 1ST MAW TONIGHT AND

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 2948 S E C R E T

GET TO BOTH LPHS TOMORROW AND RETURN TO III MAF FRIDAY AM. WILL TRY TO SEE BRUCE AND RETURN SUNDAY. COULD YOU PLEASE SEND ME YOUR CONCURRENCE, NON-CONCURRENCE AND OR GUIDANCE TO III MAF INFO 79.4 AND 79.5 SO I WILL RECEIVE EARLY AS POSSIBLE. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#20

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 2868 1408800
ZNY 00000
P 220000Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
TO RUMSAW/DEPCOMUSMACV SGN RVN
INFO LHMMA/CG PROV CORPUSV CP HOCHINH RVN
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LEAD
ROSSON FROM LGEN CUSMAN
GROUND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES
A. DEPCOMUSMACV MADECS5 DTG 160403Z MAY68 (BY OTHER MEANS)
1. REF A REQUESTED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT STOCKS
OF AMMUNITION AT GUN POSITIONS ARE KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE
LEVELS, AND SOLICITED SUGGESTIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
PROGRAM TO REDUCE EXPENDITURES BY AT LEAST TEN PERCENT.
2. THIS HQ SETS POLICY ON STOCKAGE LEVELS FOR ALL LOCATIONS
DEPENDING UPON TACTICAL SITUATION, UP TO 10 DOA AUTHORIZED
IN SOME CASES AS FOR EXAMPLE DISPERSION OF ASSETS IN DAZ AREA
AND FOR LOCATIONS DIFFICULT TO SUPPLY DURING MONSOON WEATHER.
DAILY REPORTS ARE RECEIVED OF BOTH RSP AND ON POSITION ASSETS.
THESE REPORTS USED TO MONITOR STOCK LEVELS BOTH TO INSURE
COMPLIANCE WITH STOCKAGE POLICY AND FOR DETERMINING PRIORITIES

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2868 CONFIDENTIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR
FOR RESUPPLY SHIPMENTS OF AMMO. INCREASED EMPHASIS WILL BE
GIVEN IN FUTURE TO INSPECTION OF ON POSITION ASSETS FOR
VERIFICATION ON POSITION STOCKS.

3. I RECEIVE DAILY EXPENDITURE REPORTS BY UNIT BY TYPE OF
AMMUNITION, WHICH ARE PRESENTED IN COMPARISON WITH AUTHORIZED
RATES. IMMEDIATE COMMAND ACTIONS ARE TAKEN EITHER TO REDUCE
EXPENDITURES NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION OR TO
SHIFT ASSETS BETWEEN UNITS. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS HAS BEEN
GIVEN TO WASTEFUL HEAVY VOLUMES OF FIRE AGAINST SMALL ENEMY
FORMATIONS AND INJUDICIOUS USE OF H AND I FIRES. INSTRUCTIONS
HAVE BEEN ISSUED ON LIMITING H AND I FIRES TO TARGETS INDICATED
BY POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE PROPER SELECTION OF WEAPONS
AND AMMO FOR EACH TARGET TO AVOID EXCESSIVE DRAW DOWN ONE TYPE
OF AMMO.

4. MY MOST RECENT AND STRONGEST INSTRUCTION ON THIS MATTER
ISSUED ON 10 MAY. ALTHOUGH TOTAL REDUCTIONS CANNOT NECESSARILY
BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS ONE DIRECTIVE, AVERAGE DAILY EXPENDITURES
OF ARTY AMMO REDUCED BY 25 PERCENT FOR THE PERIOD SUBSEQUENT
TO 10 MAY AS COMPARED TO PRECEDING TWO WEEKS.

5. TO ACCOMPLISH A FURTHER REDUCTION RECOMMEND THAT USMACV AND

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 2858 C O N F I D E N T I A L ENCLUSIVE FOR
ALL MAY EACH REDUCE EXPENDITURES BY A FIXED PERCENTAGE OF
CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED RATES. MAKE THE AMMUNITION SAVED BY THE
REDUCTION AVAILABLE TO THE CORPS COMMANDER FOR HIS ALLOCATION
TO SUBORDINATE UNITS IF IN HIS OPINION EXPENDITURE JUSTIFIED
BY TACTICAL SITUATION.

CF-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

#19

SECRET**FOR**

CG MMSB
 DE DD KE 2759 142030Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 210002Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO MMSB/CG NINTH MAB OKI
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T

FOR BOEN CHIP FROM NGEN VAN RYZIN
 SLF HELICOPTERS

A. DISCUSSION NGEN VAN RYZIN/BOEN CHIP OF 13MAY68

1. REF A, AS UNDERSTOOD HERE, IS THAT EACH SLF HMM, DURING SUCH TIMES AS BLT IS COMMITTED ASHORE UNDER OPCON CG III MAF, WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO CG FIRST MAW ALL AVAILABLE HELICOPTERS FOR FRAGGING.

2. TO DATE, THIS ARRANGEMENT HAS WORKED HAP-HAZARDLY, AT BEST. THERE HAVE BEEN ALL TOO MANY DAYS WHEN SLF COMMANDERS REPORTED NONE AVAILABLE TO FIRST MAW.

3. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN ASSURING US OF THE SUPPORT WE NEED, WITHOUT ASKING FOR OPCON OF SLF HMM'S, DURING TIMES BLT'S ARE ASHORE AND OPCON TO III MAF. AS YOU KNOW, UNDER SUCH SITUATION DIVISION CG CONCERNED IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING SUPPORT TO SLF BLT ON SAME BASIS AS FOR HIS OTHER BNS.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2759 S E C R E T

IT APPEARS INCONGRUOUS AND WASTEFUL OF HELO ASSETS TO RETAIN ALL, OR EVEN MAJOR PORTION, OF HMM RESOURCES FOR SUPPORT OF SLF BLT WHEN WE HAVE BUT 8 RPT 3 HMM'S AND 3 RPT 3 HML/VMO'S IN SUPPORT OF 22 OTHER USMC BNS AS WELL AS 8 REGTL, 2 DIVISIONAL, 2-BDE, 1-FLC, 1-WING AND III MAF STAFFS. IN SHORT WE NEED ALL THE HELO SUPPORT WE CAN GET.

4. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT YOU TAKE SUCH STEPS AS MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO INSURE THAT EACH SLF MAKES AVAILABLE TO THE 1ST MAW A MINIMUM OF 80 PERCENT OF OPERATIONALLY READY HELICOPTERS EACH DAY WHEN ITS BLT IS UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG III MAF.

CP-4

BT

SECRET

#18

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 200630Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK
3	DCG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
3	DCG AIR			23		
1	C/S		5/21			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		5/21		SHW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET #15

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUKM
DE RUMSAK 2706 1420254

ZNY SSSSS

P 210254Z MAY 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII

INFO RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAF DNG RVN

ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD) OKINAWA

ZEN/CG NINTH MAB OKINAWA

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK, INFO MGEN
ANDERSON AND BOUKER AND BGEN CHIP FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY.

AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 020254Z MAY 68

B. CG III MAF 020545Z MAY 68

1. AS REQUESTED IN REF (A), A CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR KC-130 AIRCRAFT IN COUNTRY HAS BEEN CONDUCTED.
2. GOOD FLYING WEATHER IN APRIL AND MAY HAS REDUCED REQUIREMENT FOR STANDBY TANKER AIRCRAFT. VISUAL FLIGHT RULES WEATHER HAS ALSO PERMITTED RAPID CYCLING WHICH REDUCES REQUIREMENT FOR STANDBY OR BACKUP AIRCRAFT.
3. IN ANTICIPATION OF CONTINUED FAVORABLE WEATHER THROUGH AUGUST.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2706 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
KC-130 AUGMENTATION CAN BE REDUCED TO THREE (3) IN COUNTRY AIR-
CRAFT VICE FOUR (4) AS STATED IN REF (B). THREE IN COUNTRY
AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENT IS JUSTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. TWO AIRCRAFT ARE FRAGGED FOR FLARE MISSIONS EACH NIGHT.
- B. AIRBORNE DASC IS INSTALLED IN ONE AIRCRAFT. THIS AIR-
CRAFT ALSO DOUBLES AS STANDBY TANKER FOR AIR REFUELING MISSIONS.
IT CANNOT BE USED FOR FLARE DROP UNLESS DASC EQUIPMENT IS
REMOVED.
4. IN EVENT EMERGENCY SITUATION ARISES, ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION
WILL BE REQUESTED.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#16

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 200630Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK
3	DCG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
4	DCG AIR			23		
1	C/S		5/21			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		5/21		24W	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #15

SECRET

FILE 37 COPY 162

		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 29 MAY 68
		SERIAL# 200630Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK	
5/21	<i>DKW</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
5/21	<i>@</i>		
5/23	<i>MANNERSON</i>		
S/S	COPY 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES TAPE & MAT		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

SECRET

DE RUMSAK 2591 1410630
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 200630Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
FOR HAS BEEN SENT
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGEN ANDERSON
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REF A: CG FMFPAC 160134Z MAY 68 (SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE)
 THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RESPONDS TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED IN
 REFERENCE A.

QUESTION A:

ANS: "C" CO, FIFTH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP DANANG THROUGH SOG SAIGON
 TO TACC 7TH AF INITIALLY. ON 101050H O-PCON PASSED TO CG AMERICAL
 DIV (2ND BN, 1ST INF), WHO THEN HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR REQUESTING
 AIR SUPPORT.

QUESTION B:

ANS: NO PRE-PLANNED AIR WAS REQUESTED BY CG AMERICAL DIV.
 HAD THERE BEEN, REQUESTS WOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH NORMAL
 CHANNELS, 2ND BN TO AMCL TO III MAF TO TASE. IMMEDIATE AIR WAS
 REQUESTED BY ALO WITH BN AT KHAM DUC THROUGH AMCL TOC TO I DASC.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2591 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

QUESTION C:

ANS: INITIAL REQUEST RECEIVED BY I DASC AT 120510H. TACTICAL AIR
 DIVERTED IMMEDIATELY AND ARRIVED ON STATION AT 120530H. GRAND
 SLAM DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV AT 120830H. DIVERTS AND SCRAMBLES
 CONTINUED UNTIL EVACUATION COMPLETED AT 121630H.

QUESTION D:

ANS AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED; 12 MAY 1968:

COMPONENT	TYPE A/C	SORTIES
7TH AF	C-130	8
	C-123	4
	F4/F105	120
	O-2	10
MAW	CH-46	110
	UH-1E	10
	A4/F4	18
AMCL DIV	CH-47	44
	UH-1E	41
	UH-1C	8

QUESTION E:

ANS:

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2591 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 1. 7TH AF ABCCC WAS PUT ON STATION TO COORDINATE AIR SUPPORT
 AND ACT AS AN EXTENSION OF THE 7TH AF TACC. THE ABCCC
 HANDED AIRCRAFT OFF TO FAC'S AND MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH 7TH AF
 TACC.

2. CONCENTRATION OF TACTICAL AIR WITHIN CONFINED AREA WAS
 POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS BUT SUCCEEDED BY MAGNIFICANT EFFORT
 OF USMC/USAF AIRBORNE FAC'S WHO CONTROLLED AIR STRIKES.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 200628Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					<p>IT HAS BEEN SENT I want full stay on the line EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>9</p> <p>Action completed 22 May Verbally MARINE CORPS SITES ONLY Msg to CMC - CG III MAF 220230Z May 68</p>
	C/S		5/21			
	D C/S			5/21		
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

3

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMHM RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 2590 1410628
ZNY SSSSS

PAC -T- CMC

CMC -T- CG MAR COR DEV & EDUC COMD QUANTICO VA

O 200628Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH DC

RUMHM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII

RUEBHOA/CG MAR COR DEV & EDUC COMD QUANTICO VA

BT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, LGEN KRULAK, AND LGEN MASTERS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. I HAVE THIS DATE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MY MARINE DIVISION COMMANDERS IN THE INTEREST OF EDUCATING OUR UNIT LEADERS IN A MOST VITAL AREA: QUOTE

O 200610Z MAY 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS AND MGEN ROBERTSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2590 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

1. WE ARE SUFFERING TOO MANY MARINE CASUALTIES -- PARTICULARLY KIA.

2. I HAVE TALKED TO NUMEROUS SMALL UNIT LEADERS, AND IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT WE HAVE NOT ADAPTED OUR TACTICS AND MENTAL OUTLOOK TO THIS WAR.

3. ONE OF THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVES IS TO INFLICT A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES ON AMERICANS. AS FAR AS MARINES ARE CONCERNED HE IS SUCCEEDING TOO WELL.

4. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS REQUIRE DO OR DIE ASSAULTS IN ORDER TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN A BEACHHEAD, BUT IN THIS WAR THERE IS PRACTICALLY NO TERRAIN THAT HAS TO BE CAPTURED IN A HURRY REGARDLESS OF COST.

5. IT IS THEREFORE DIRECTED THAT SCHOOL BE HELD ON REGIMENTAL, BATTALION, AND COMPANY COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS AND ON DIVISION STAFF WHO HELP DIRECT THEIR EFFORTS, AS TO THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

A. MOVEMENT INTO CONTACT SHOULD BE BY THE BOOK; NAMELY, SCOUTS OUT AND MOVE BY BOUNDS. SCOUTS STUDY TERRAIN TO FRONT BEFORE ANYBODY MOVES. I WANT NO MORE SKIRMISH LINES MARCHING INTO DISASTER. INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS NORMALLY GIVE US

right and this is what is between of them.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#14

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2590 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE
 THE GENERAL AREA OF THE ENEMY. RECON BY AERIAL VR AND
 SENSOR, BY FIRE, AND BY VISUAL OBSERVATION BY SCOUTS CAN
 GIVE US THEIR EXACT LOCATION. COMMON SENSE MUST BE USED --
 WE KNOW THEIR DEFENSIVE HABITS: TREE LINES AND VILLES,
 FINGER RIDGES AND PADDY DYKES.

B. CONTACT MADE, TROOPS ARE THEN USED TO FIX THE ENEMY,
 NOT TO ASSAULT HIM. THE ASSAULT IS BY FIRE POWER, FOR SEVERAL
 DAYS AND NIGHTS IF NECESSARY. THEN AND ONLY THEN, INFANTRY
 SWEEPS UP THE REMAINS.

C. PATIENCE AND FIRE POWER ARE THE KEY CONSIDERATIONS.
 THE ROLE OF INFANTRY IS TO MAKE SURE THE ENEMY DOES NOT
 ESCAPE; THE ROLE OF FIRE POWER IS TO ASSAULT AND DESTROY
 HIM.

6. IT IS HARD TO SOFT PEDAL A GENERATION OF TRAINING IN THE
 ASSAULT AS REQUIRED FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A BEACHHEAD, BUT IT
 MUST REPEAT MUST BE DONE IF WE ARE TO FIGHT AND WIN THIS
 WAR.

7. IMMEDIATE ACTION IS DIRECTED AGAINST THIS PROBLEM.

GP-4

UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#14

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUMMB
 DE RUMSAK 2589 141061Z
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 200612Z MAY 68
 RM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST CAV DIV CAMP EVANS
 RUMHMB/CG 101ST AIRBORNE DIV CAMP EAGLE
 RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN ROSSON, MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN
 TOLSON, MGEN BARSANTI, MGEN ROBERTSON, AND MGEN KOSTER FROM
 LGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE EXTREMELY HOT WEATHER IS UPON US AND I HAVE NOTICED
 A RAPIDLY RISING RATE OF HEAT CASUALTIES.
2. HERE ARE SOME ACTIONS WHICH CAN ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM:
 - A. INCREASE WATER SUPPLY TO THE TROOPS AT LEAST FOURFOLD
 AND INSIST ON SALT TABLET INTAKE.
 - B. CONDUCT TROOP MOVEMENTS AND ATTACKS AT NIGHT TO THE
 MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. IF ATTACKS REQUIRE GREATER VISIBILITY,

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2589 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 DAWN OR NEAR DUSK "H" HOURS CAN BE USED.
 3. DELIBERATE RATHER THAN HIGH SPEED TIME TABLES ARE REQUIRED
 WHERE PHYSICAL EXERTION DURING THE DAYTIME IS INVOLVED. WARM
 REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

#13

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 200610Z MAY 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
7	DCG		5/21		JA	
7	DCG AIR				JA	
1	C/S		5/21		JA	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	5/21			JAN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #12

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT**

O 200610Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV
BT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS AND MGEN ROBERTSON
FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. WE ARE SUFFERING TOO MANY MARINE CASUALTIES -- PARTICULARLY KIA.
2. I HAVE TALKED TO NUMEROUS SMALL UNIT LEADERS, AND IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT WE HAVE NOT ADAPTED OUR TACTICS AND MENTAL OUTLOOK TO THIS WAR.
3. ONE OF THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVES IS TO INFLICT A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES ON AMERICANS. AS FAR AS MARINES ARE CONCERNED HE IS SUCCEEDING TOO WELL.
4. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS REQUIRE DO OR DIE ASSAULTS IN ORDER TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN A BEACHHEAD, BUT IN THIS WAR THERE IS PRACTICALLY NO TERRAIN THAT HAS TO BE CAPTURED IN A HURRY REGARDLESS OF COST.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2588 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
5. IT IS THEREFORE DIRECTED THAT SCHOOL BE HELD ON REGIMENTAL, BATTALION, AND COMPANY COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS AND ON DIVISION STAFF WHO HELP DIRECT THEIR EFFORTS, AS TO THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

A. MOVEMENT INTO CONTACT SHOULD BE BY THE BOOK; NAMELY, SCOUTS OUT AND MOVE BY BOUNDS. SCOUTS STUDY TERRAIN TO FRONT BEFORE ANYBODY MOVES. I WANT NO MORE SKIRMISH LINES MARCHING INTO DISASTER. INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS NORMALLY GIVE US THE GENERAL AREA OF THE ENEMY. RECON BY AERIAL VR AND SENSOR, BY FIRE, AND BY VISUAL OBSERVATION BY SCOUTS CAN GIVE US THEIR EXACT LOCATION. COMMON SENSE MUST BE USED -- WE KNOW THEIR DEFENSIVE HABITS: TREE LINES AND VILLES, FINGER RIDGES AND PADDY DYKES.

B. CONTACT MADE, TROOPS ARE THEN USED TO FIX THE ENEMY, NOT TO ASSAULT HIM. THE ASSAULT IS BY FIRE POWER, FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND NIGHTS IF NECESSARY. THEN AND ONLY THEN, INFANTRY SWEEPS UP THE REMAINS.

C. PATIENCE AND FIRE POWER ARE THE KEY CONSIDERATIONS. THE ROLE OF INFANTRY IS TO MAKE SURE THE ENEMY DOES NOT ESCAPE; THE ROLE OF FIRE POWER IS TO ASSAULT AND DESTROY

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2588 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
HIM.

6. IT IS HARD TO SOFT PEDAL A GENERATION OF TRAINING IN THE ASSAULT AS REQUIRED FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A BEACHHEAD, BUT IT MUST REPEAT MUST BE DONE IF WE ARE TO FIGHT AND WIN THIS WAR.

7. IMMEDIATE ACTION IS DIRECTED AGAINST THIS PROBLEM.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#12

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 200530Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO REMARKS
3	DCG				Rweh	
4	DCG AIR				H	
1	C/S				5/21	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		5/21		DMW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #11

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUMKM
 DE RUMSAK 2587 1410530
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 200530Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. TODAY I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE GIVING THE BAD NEWS FROM MR. NITZE. GEN MOMYER ALSO GAVE THE NEWS AT COMUSMACV CMDRS CONFERENCE TODAY. MOMYER FURTHER DIVULGED THAT ADM SHARP HAD APPROVED THE PROPOSED MACV IMPROVEMENTS, PRESENTED TO HIM DURING HIS SAIGON VISIT, FOR A 30 DAY TRIAL PERIOD.

2. IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS I THINK IT IS WISE TO CONSIDER THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND HOW TO MAKE THE BEST OF THIS SITUATION. COMUSMACV AND THE AIR FORCE CANNOT DENY THAT MARINE AIR IS FLYING MORE THAN ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL EFFORT IN SVN. NEITHER CAN THEY IGNORE THAT WE HAVE AVERAGED 9.4 SORTIES PER MARINE BN PER DAY FOR THE PAST YEAR. HOWEVER WE NEED TO KEEP THESE AND SIMILAR FACTS CONSTANTLY BEFORE THEM AND TO INFLUENCE THE DAILY AND HOURLY DECISIONS IMPINGING ON OUR MARINE PERFORMANCE. THE QUESTION IS HOW? HERE IS WHERE WE NEED HELP AND AUTHORITY FROM CINCPAC.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2587 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

3. IF WE CAN PLACE A MARINE BGEN AS AN ASSISTANT DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS (MARINE) TO MOMYER IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR, OPERATIONS; I BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE A VALUABLE ENTREE INTO ALL AIR OPERATIONS BOTH IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY. FURTHER SUCH ASSIGNMENT TO COMUSMACV WOULD AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF SUBSERVIENCE TO THE 7TH AF THAT COULD RETURN TO HAUNT US IN THE POST WAR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. OF COURSE, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT ANY SENIOR OFFICER PLACED AT COMUSMACV IN SUCH A CAPACITY WILL BE IGNORED OR WILL BE CONSIDERED AS SEALING OUR DEFEAT. I DO NOT AGREE WITH EITHER SUPPOSITION. IF WE CAN OBTAIN AUTHORITY FROM CINCPAC TO INSTALL AND CHARTER HIM TO SPEAK ON MARINE AIR OPERATIONS AT COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF, HE COULD BE INVALUABLE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE. WE COULD AVOID CONNOTATIONS OF PERMANANCY BY ASSIGNING HIM, FOR THE DURATION OF THE PRESENT OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENT, INDICATING THAT WHEN A MORE NORMAL SITUATION PREVAILS HE WILL BE REMOVED.

5. BGEN NISE, AS YOU RECALL, WAS DETAILED AS A 2ND ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER AT THE TIME OF THE BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN I CORPS. HE WAS TASKED TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF OUR SIX AIR BASES IN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#11

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUSMAK 2587 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 I CORPS AND HAS DEVELOPED A WORKING STAFF AND PROCEDURES FOR
 THIS PURPOSE. HE HAS ALSO RECENTLY MANAGED THE PREPARATION OF
 THE BRIEFING AND BACK-UP INFORMATION I USED AT COMUSMACV AND AT
 CINCPAC ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT. HE IS THEREFORE WELL READ INTO
 THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ISSUE.

6. CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE AND RELATIVE URGENCY OF THE TASKS
 OF AIRBASE MANAGEMENT AND THE TASKS OF INFLUENCING OPERATIONAL
 USE OF MARINE AIR AT COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF, I RECOMMEND THAT
 BGEN HISE BE ASSIGNED TO COMUSMACV. I THINK THE TIME IS RIPE
 TO OBTAIN SENIOR AIR REPRESENTATION AT COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF
 BEFORE WE ARE FACED WITH AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT AND UNNEGOTIABLE
 SITUATION.

7. SHOULD YOU CONCUR IN THIS PROPOSAL WE COULD MAKE SUCH A
 RECOMMENDATION IN OUR COMMENTS TO CINCPAC ON THE PROPOSED MACV
 IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

11

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUMMB
 DE RUMSAK 2440 1400210
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 190210Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMMB/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 RUMHVP/THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUMMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV CAMP EVANS
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAF DNG
 RUMVA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUMIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI
 RUMVA/CG TASK FORCE KRAY
 RUMPL/CG FORCE LOG CMD DNG
 RUMHVP/CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 BT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN ROSSON, MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN TOLSON,
 MGEN ANDERSON, MGEN ROBERTSON, MGEN KOSTER, BGEN MCLAUGHLIN,
 BGEN OLSON, AND BGEN HOFFMAN FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

L THE FOLLOWING PASSED FOR YOUR INFO AND APPROPRIATE ACTION:
 QUOTE

O 181222Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2440 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 TO GEN MONYER COM 7TH AF
 LGEN PALMER DCG USARV
 RADM VEIH COMUSNAVFORV
 LGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LGEN ROSSON CG PROVCORPSV
 LGEN WEYAND CG II FFV
 MGEN PEERS CG I FFV
 MGEN ECHKARDT SA IV CTZ
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 6523 EYES ONLY

1. THIS COMMAND HAS BEEN GREATLY EMBARRASSED BY
 THE PUBLICATION OF A NEWS STORY ALLEGING THAT THE PEN-
 TAGON HAS REFUSED PERMISSION FOR THE U. S. MILITARY TO
 BOMB A NORTH VIETNAMESE MIG AIRFIELD BELOW THE 20TH
 PARALLEL. MALICIOUS SPECULATION AND LEAKAGE OF CLAS-
 SIFIED INFORMATION TO THE PRESS IS PREJUDICIAL TO MILITARY
 DISCIPLINE AND UNDERMINES OUR WHOLE SECURITY SYSTEM.
 DURING THE SENSITIVE PERIOD OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS,
 SUCH SPECULATION AND LEAKS CAN BE EXTREMELY INJURIOUS
 TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

10

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2440 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 THE NEWS STORY HAS DAMAGED OUR MILITARY POSITION AND
 HAS PRODUCED AN EFFECT ENTIRELY OPPOSITE TO WHAT MAY HAVE
 BEEN INTENDED BY THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE.

2. I HAVE DIRECTED THE MACV INSPECTOR GENERAL TO
 MAKE A FULL AND EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION IN AN ATTEMPT
 TO DETERMINE THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS UNFOR-
 TUNATE NEWS STORY.

3. I ALSO WISH TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO REITERATE
 THAT EXTREME CAUTION AND EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES
 MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE
 INFORMATION WHICH COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE NEGOTIA-
 TIONS OR FURNISH PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO THE NORTH
 VIETNAMESE. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

BT

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#10

SECRET

PP RUMHNA RUMHNA RUMHVT
 DE RUMSAK 2431 139 1730
 ZNY SSSSS

P 181730Z MAY 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN

INFO RUMHNA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI

RUMHNA/COMNAVFORV REP DNG

RUMHNA/CON THIRD NOB DNG

RUMHVT/USA SUP CMD DNG

BT

S E C R E T

CRUSHED ROCK REQUIREMENTS IN ICTZ

1. FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.

2. PURSUANT TO OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS REGARDING CRUSHED ROCK AVAILABILITY IN ICTZ, A DETAILED REVIEW OF ROCK ASSETS AND REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN COMPLETED WHICH INDICATES CRUSHED ROCK SHORTAGE OF APPROXIMATELY 20,000 SHORT TONS/WEEK IN ICTZ, 10,000 S/T NICTZ AND 10,000 S/T DANANG. THIS ROCK SHORTFALL CREATED PRIMARILY BY INCREASED CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FROM EXPANDED TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN ICTZ WITHOUT COMMENSURATE INCREASE IN SUITABLE ROCK CRUSHER SITES. CRUSHED ROCK WILL BE SHIPPED TO NICTZ FROM DANANG AS SHIPPING

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2431 **S E C R E T**

PERMITS, BUT SUCH SHIPMENTS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET ALL NICTZ REQUIREMENTS AND WILL CREATE EQUIVALENT SHORTFALL IN DANANG AREA.

3. EXISTING ROCK ASSETS IN NICTZ PLANNED TO BE UTILIZED FOR UPGRADING MOST STRATEGIC PORTIONS OF ROUTES 1, 9, 547, 551, AND DYEMARKER ROADS, AND IN CONSTRUCTION AMMO STORAGE POINTS AND SOME BASE CAMP INTERIOR ROADS DURING THIS CONSTRUCTION SEASON. HIGH PRIORITY PROJECTS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY PLANNED TO BE DEFERRED OR SEVERELY CURTAILED BUT WHICH COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH ADML ROCK FROM SOURCES OUTSIDE ICTZ INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- A. INTERIOR ROADS FOR ALL BASE CAMPS.
 - B. CAMP EVANS AIRFIELD UPGRADE TO C133 TYPE TWO.
 - C. LOGISTIC SUPPORT ROAD FROM CUA VIET TO QUANG TRI.
 - D. CAMP EVANS AMMO STORAGE POINT.
4. FOLLOWING MAJOR HORIZONTAL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS NOT PLANNED FOR THIS CONSTRUCTION SEASON REGARDLESS OF ROCK AVAILABILITY DUE TO LACK OF CONSTRUCTION CAPABILITY AND LOW RELATIVE PRIORITY:
- A. HUE BY-PASS ROAD AND NORTH HUE LCU RAMP.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#9

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAX 2431 SECRET

B. UPGRADING OF ROUTE 9 FROM CA LU TO NHE SANH.
 C. UPGRADING OF ROUTE ONE FROM HUE TO QUANG TRI.
 5. CONSIDER DEFERRAL OR CURTAILMENT PROJECTS LISTED PARA 3
 ABOVE EXTREMELY DETRIMENTAL TO NICIZ LOGISTICS POSTURE DURING
 NEXT MONSOON SEASON. THEREFORE REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN
 ALLOCATION AND DELIVERY OF CRUSHED ROCK TO ICIZ FROM SOURCE
 OUTSIDE ICIZ IN TOTAL QUANTITIES UP TO 20,000 ST/WEEK WITH
 10,000 ST/WEEK TO BE DELIVERED TO DANANG AREA AND 10,000
 ST/WEEK TO BE DELIVERED DIRECT TO NICIZ BY BARGE SINCE TRANS-
 SHIPMENT CAPABILITY NOT AVAILABLE FROM DANANG NORTH. COMMENCE-
 MENT OF SHIPPING DESIRED ASAP WITH SHIPPING TO CONTINUE UNTIL
 LATE SEPTEMBER OR AS WEATHER DICTATES.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**
#9

SECRET

OO RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2231 1361020
 ZNY 85555
 O 171020Z MAY 68
 RM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SAIGON
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
 FOR

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR AMBASSADOR KOMER, DEF CORDS FROM DFC CROSS.

6. IN VIEW INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS THAT ENEMY MAY BE INTENDING TO ATTACK DANANG FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT DURING PERIOD 18-19 MAY, FEEL IT INADVISABLE FOR ME TO BE AWAY FROM DANANG NIGHT OF 18 MAY. GENERAL CUSHMAN CONCURS. HOWEVER, IN ORDER NOT TO LOSE THE ADVANTAGES OF ATTENDING MEETING, I COULD SEND MAHONEY DOWN AFTERNOON OF THE 18TH AND IF NOTHING HAPPENS COME DOWN MYSELF IN TIME FOR SUNDAY MEETINGS WHICH I UNDERSTAND BEGIN AT 0930. ALTERNATIVELY, CLIFF NELSON AND MAHONEY COULD ATTEND ALL SESSIONS. PLEASE ADVISE.

GP-4
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

8

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 17MAY68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 170030Z MAY68		COPY# 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS -112030 5 JUN 68
2	DCG		5/17		GM	
3	DCG AIR			20	GM	
1.	C/S		5/17		GM	
	D C/S			100	GM	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		171030		DMM	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #7

CG III MAF

17 MAY 68

170000Z MAY 68

1 0 3 (STANDARD)

EXCLUSIVE FOR

5/17
5/17
5/17
5/20
5/20

Drury

US Intelligence Affairs
Drury

EXCLUSIVE

170000Z MAY 68

S/S

COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES
TAPE AND MAT

EXCLUSIVE FOR
US INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS

#7

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
HAS BEEN SENT

TO DIRECTOR
FROM
SUBJECT

RE: [Illegible text]

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

#7

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 2133 1370946
ZNY CCCCC
P 160946Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG RVN
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR KOMER FROM CROSS
REFUGEE RELIEF PAYMENTS: QUANG TRI & QUANG NGAI

A. YOUR 121033Z MAY 68

1. IN RESPONSE YOUR INQUIRY REGARDING DISTRIBUTION REFUGEE FUNDS IN QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TRI, I HAVE DONE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH PROVINCES TO DETERMINE WHERE PROBLEM LIES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MOVE THINGS ALONG. MY CONCLUSIONS IN SUMMARY ARE THAT BOTH MSWR CHIEFS HAVE DONE QUITE WELL IN ORGANIZING PROGRAM AND EFFECTING PAYMENT OF ALLOWANCES. IF THERE IS ANY HOLD UP APPEARS TO BE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN GVN/SAIGON. SPECIFICALLY:

A. QUANG TRI. MSWR CHIEF THAC COMPLETED PROVINCIAL SURVEY OF TET VICTIMS TWO WEEKS AGO AND APPLIED IMMEDIATELY TO SAIGON FOR FUNDS TO COMPLETE PAYMENT. IN A TELEGRAM TO MSWA LABELLED "MESSAGE NUMBER 807" DATED MAY 8, THAC REQUESTED MORE THAN 29 MILLION PIASTERS. NO REPLY RECEIVED TO DATE FROM SAIGON. THAC HOPED TO SEND HIS DEPUTY TO SAIGON THIS WEEK TO SPEED PAPERWORK BUT RECENT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2133 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE UNSETTLED CONDICTIONS IN CAPITAL FORCED HIM TO POSTPONE HIS PLAN. THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN CARRIED THROUGH IN QUANG TRI DURING A TIME WHEN BURDEN OF REGULAR REFUGEE WORK HAS BEEN EXTREMELY HEAVY. FOLLOWING THE INITIAL ONSLAUGHT OF TET, THE REFUGEE POPULATION CONTINUED TO GROW AT A RATE OF APPROX. 6000 PEOPLE PER MONTH. AS A CONSEQUENCE, MR. THAC AND HIS DRAFT-DEPLETED STAFF HAVE HAD TO DEVOTE ATTENTION TO IMMEDIATE LIFE AND DEATH PROBLEMS AND TO PUT RELATIVELY LESS PRESSING MATTERS ON "PROBLEMS PENDING" LIST.

B. QUANG NGAI. IS MAKING PROGRESS WITH ITS PAYMENTS TO WAR VICTIMS. DURING THE WEEK OF MAY 11-17, THEY REPORT THAT 169 FAMILIES RECEIVED CASH INDEMNITY PAYMENTS FOR HOMES MORE THAN 50 PERCENT DESTROYED. CUMULATIVE CASH PAYMENTS TO WAR VICTIMS TOTALS NEARLY 5 MILLION PIASTERS. I DON'T THINK THAT WE SHOULD CHARACTERIZE THIS ACIEVEMENT AS "EXCEEDINGLY SLOW" IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT QUANG NGAI'S REPEATED REQUESTS FOR TRUCKS (QUANG NGAI'S REQUEST 1391/XH/QNG/TC/2, MAY 10, 1968) AND FOR 2 ADDITIONAL MOBILE REFUGEE RELIEF TEAMS HAVE BEEN IGNORED BY MSWR SAIGON.

THE REFUGEE SERVICE CHIEF IN QUANG NGAI HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2133 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 BY DR. QUE TO MAKE WAR VICTIM PAYMENTS BY BORROWING FROM THE
 1968 RESETTLEMENT RELIEF BUDGET (5 MILLION PIASTERS) AND
 FROM THE TEMPORARY RELIEF BUDGET (7 MILLION PIASTERS). BY
 UTILIZING THESE BUDGETS, FUNDS HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE THUS FAR.
 THE QUANG NGAI REFUGEE CHIEF IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE
 ORDINARY REFUGEE BUDGETS FOR 1968 ARE BEING EXHAUSTED IN
 ORDER TO MEET WAR VICTIM PAYMENTS. HE WOULD LIKE YOUR
 ASSISTANCE IN GETTING MSWR SAIGON TO EXTEND 19,348,000
 PIASTERS TO THE PROVINCE, AN AMOUNT THAT WOULD COVER ALL
 WAR VICTIM CLAIMS AS WELL AS ENABLING QUANG NGAI TO
 REPLENISH THE ORDINARY 1968 REFUGEE BUDGETS NOW BEING
 UTILIZED TO MAKE WAR VICTIM PAYMENTS.

AS FAR AS THE PROVINCE CHIEF IS CONCERNED, HE IS GIVING
 HIS FULL COOPERATION AND SEEMS ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE PAYMENTS
 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT
 THAT THE REFUGEE SERVICE CHIEF IN QUANG NGAI HAS DESERVED
 REPUTATION AS HONEST, DEDICATED, AND HARD WORKING CIVIL
 SERVANT. WHAT HE NEEDS IS SAIGON'S ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING:
 (A) 19,348,000 PIASTERS FROM MSWR; (B) 4 TRUCKS 2 1/2 TON) AS
 WELL AS FUNDS TO REPAIR HIS VEHICLES; AND (C) 2 MOBILE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 2133 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 RELIEF TEAMS AUTHORIZED BUT NEVER DISPATCHED TO PROVINCE.
 C. WILL RAISE PROBLEM OF SLOW DISBURSMENT OF FUNDS WITH
 LAM AT NEXT RECOVERY MEETING. HE ALWAYS INSISTS ON THOROUGH
 BRIEFING THIS SUBJECT AND HE MAY BE ABLE TO INSTILL SOME
 MORE ENERGY IN THE PROVINCES. BUT WITHOUT SAIGON ACTION AS
 LISTED ABOVE THIS WON'T AMOUNT TO MUCH.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

#6

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

RR RUMHMA RUMHVP RUMUHFA RUMHFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RUMUGRA 2118 1570750
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 160750Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 INFO RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPS V PHU BAI
 RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
 RUMHFMA/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 RUEBHOA/CMC WASH DC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR MGEN TOMPKINS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO LTGEN ROSSON
 I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE COURAGEOUS AND
 EXEMPLARY PERFORMANCE OF DUTY YOU HAVE EXHIBITED SINCE
 ASSUMING COMMAND OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION 28 NOVEMBER
 1967. TIME AND TIME AGAIN I HAVE OBSERVED WITH PRIDE THE
 ENTHUSIASM AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE OFFICERS AND MEN UNDER
 YOUR COMMAND. THE MISSION OF THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
 HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY FURTHERED BY THE NUMEROUS SUCCESSFUL
 COMBAT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE 3D MARINE DIVISION DURING
 YOUR TENURE AS COMMANDING GENERAL. I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL
 MEET THE CHALLENGES OF YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT WITH THE SAME

PAGE 2 RUMUGRA 2118 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 DEDICATION THAT HAVE MARKED ALL OF YOUR PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
 GP-4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL
#5

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMSAK HUSBHOA
 DE RUMSAK INFO 1888316
 ZNY 00000
 PAS -T- ONE
 P R 182810Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DMC
 TO RUMBHOA/CMC WASH DC
 INFO RUMKHM/CG FMPPAC HAWAII
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN JONES, INFO LOEN BRULAK, FROM
 LGEN CUSHMAN

1. CAPT JOHN A. MCCOLLEY, 084301/0802 USMC IS ASSIGNED TO
 COMUSMACV FOR DUTY WITH I CORPS ADV GROUP AND HAS BEEN THE
 SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE 3D BN, 51ST INF REGT, ARVN. MCCOLLEY
 HAS BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS DUTIES FOR REASONS SET FORTH BELOW.
 2. FROM PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES, WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD CLOSE,
 IT APPEARS THAT MCCOLLEY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN RAPPORT
 WITH OR RESPECT OF HIS COUNTERPART. HIS PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
 HAS BEEN ANYTHING BUT SATISFACTORY TO HIS SUPERIORS, AND HAS
 CAUSED A RIFT BETWEEN THE 3D BN, 51ST INF REGT, ARVN, AND
 ADJACENT USMC FORCES. U.S. ADVISORY PERSONNEL, BOTH OFFICER
 AND ENLISTED, IN HIS MIDST HAVE MADE STATEMENTS DEROGATING
 HIS PROFESSIONAL ABILITY AND HIS ALLEGED INORDINATE FEAR OF

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1888 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 ENEMY FIRE. CAPT MCCOLLEY HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED AND HAS SUB-
 MITTED A SIGNED STATEMENT IN WHICH HE AGREES WITH THE FACTS
 AS STATED ABOVE, BUT HE PLACES A HEAVY SHARE OF THE BLAME ON
 LACK OF COOPERATION AND SUPPORT BY HIS COUNTERPART. HE
 ADMITS FEAR OF ENEMY FIRE BUT STATES IT IS CONTROLLABLE AND
 WAS CONTROLLED SUFFICIENTLY TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES. HE PRO-
 FESSES MAXIMUM EFFORT ON HIS PART, BUT ADMITS FAILURE OF
 HIS MISSION.

3. TO DATE NO OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR ACTION HAS BEEN REFERRED
 TO COMUSMACV. I BELIEVE IF AT ALL POSSIBLE WE SHOULD KEEP IT
 THAT WAY. THE LESS NOTICE GIVEN AMONG U.S. OR ARVN FORCES
 SEEMS APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, AN UNSATISFACTORY FITNESS REPORT
 HAS BEEN FORWARDED VIA ADVISOR CHANNELS. MCCOLLEY HAS STATED
 A DESIRE TO REMAIN ASSIGNED TO MACV BUT IN A LESS
 COMBAT ORIENTED SITUATION OR TO BE REASSIGNED TO III MAF.
 MCCOLLEY HAS ALSO STATED AN INTENTION TO RESIGN HIS COMMISSION
 UPON COMPLETION OF HIS CURRENT TOUR, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
 I THINK WE SHOULD ACCOMMODATE HIM AT THE EARLIEST. MCCOLLEY'S
 PERSONNEL RECORDS ARE RETAINED AT 3D BN, HHC, SO I DO NOT
 KNOW HIS EXACT STATUS. ACCORDING TO MCCOLLEY HE WAS RECENTLY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUNSAR 1800 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 INTEGRATED INTO THE REGULAR MARINE CORPS, AND HIS OBLIGATED
 SERVICE UNDER THE UNT ACT WILL BE COMPLETED 30 JUNE. FROM
 INITIAL FINDINGS I CONSIDER THAT HE SHOULD BE COMPLETELY
 SEVERED FROM THE MARINE CORPS AND THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE.
 4. AS AN INTERIM MEASURE I HAVE BROUGHT CAPT MCCOLLEY INTO
 MY HQTRS WHERE HE WILL BE INCONSPICUOUSLY ASSIGNED TO A
 ROUTINE FUNCTION PENDING FURTHER ACTION. HE CAN BE GAINFULLY
 EMPLOYED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HE RETURNS TO COMUS FOR RELAD.
 5. IN ANY INSTANCE, MCCOLLEY STATES WILLINGNESS TO SUBMIT
 RESIGNATION EFFECTIVE SUCH DATE AS IT MAY BE IN THE BEST
 INTEREST OF THE USMC. SUGGEST 30 JUNE.
 6. RECOMMEND THAT CAPT MCCOLLEY BE REASSIGNED IMMEDIATELY
 TO HQ III MAF FOR DUTY. IN ADDITION, RECOMMEND THAT HE BE
 ADVISED THAT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE 1968
 WOULD BE OF MUTUAL INTEREST. I WISH TO AVOID THE PUBLICITY
 AND EMPHASIS WHICH WOULD ACCRUE SHOULD HE PURSUE REGULAR
 INVESTIGATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND POSSIBLY DISCIPLINARY
 CHANNELS. THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVICTION FOR AN OFFENSE IS
 SPECULATIVE AND REMOTE.
 7. SEPARATE BUT RELATED SUBJECT. RECOMMEND MCCOLLEY BE

PAGE 4 RUNSAR 1800 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 REPLACED ASAP WITH COMPETENT USMC OFFICER IN ORDER TO
 RECOUP SOME OF THE LOST RESPECT FOR THE MARINES IN THE
 EYES OF THE 3D BN, 51ST INF REGT, ARVN, AND TO IMPROVE
 RELATIONSHIP WITH ADJACENT USMC UNITS.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMHMB
 DE RUMSAR 1790 1350638
 ZNY TTTTT
 O 140638Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROVCORPS/ PHU BAI
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUMNIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI
 BT

TOP SECRET
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON INFO MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN
 ROBERTSON AND MGEN KOSTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. SINCE MY DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU YESTERDAY, I HAVE
 RECEIVED ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATING
 AN ATTACK AGAINST DANANG IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
 2. IT WILL, THEREFORE, BE NECESSARY TO HAVE THE 3D
 BATTALION, 21ST JOIN ITS PARENT 196TH BRIGADE AS SOON
 AS POSSIBLE. THE SLACKENING OF PRESSURE FROM THE 320TH
 NVA DIVISION HAS LESSEned THE DANGER TO THE DONG HA AREA
 AND SHOULD PERMIT THIS EARLY DEPLOYMENT.

GP-4
 BT

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	10 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF / COPIES RECD
	100824Z MAY 68	1 / OF 3

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
	CG				
	DCG				
	DCG AIR				
1.	C/S		5/11		(2)
	D C/S		5/11		DM
	D C/S DM				
	S/S		102120	5/11	JMKW
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

SUBJECT

EXCLUSIVE FOR

REMARKS

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

*"# 2 & 3 burned
6 Nov 68"*

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

FOR

OC RUMHGK
 DE RUMSAK 1583 1341012
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 131012Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHGK/CG SECOND BORMG BDE HOI AN
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR BGEN KIM FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 ROCKET LAUNCHING SITES

1. MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY HAS SUSTAINED EXTENSIVE HELO AND MATERIEL DAMAGE FROM ROCKETS FIRED FROM THE AREA ENCOMPASSED BY THE FOLLOWING GRID COORDINATES:

BT 0366, BT 1166, BT 1462, BT 0862
 INCIDENTS OF ROCKET ATTACK ON MARBLE MOUNTAIN HAVE BEEN ON THE INCREASE.

2. REQUEST YOU CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE SWEEPS AND DAY AND NIGHT PATROLLING AND AMBUSHING IN THAT PORTION OF THE AREA OUTLINED ABOVE FALLING IN YOUR AO. SUCH PATROLLING IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERRUPTING/INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AND SUPPLY ROCKET FIRING POSITIONS, TO DESTROY ROCKETS ALREADY ON POSITION, AND TO PREVENT THE CONDUCT OF ROCKET FIRE MISSIONS. GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

FP RUMHVA
 DE RUMSAK 1533 1330546
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 120546Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHGX/CG SECOND ROX MAR BDE
 INFO RUMHVA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN KIM INFO MGEN ROBERTSON FROM
 LGEN CUSHMAN

A. CG 2D ROK MAR BDE 141625Z APR68 (NOTAL)

B. CG 2D ROK MAR BDE 241210Z FEB68 (NOTAL)

C. CG III MAF 290954Z FEB68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTED RECONSIDERATION OF REF B, WHICH REQUESTED ADDITIONAL TANK AND LVT SUPPORT FOR 2D ROK MAR BDE. REF C STATED AVAILABILITY OF REQUESTED SUPPORT WOULD BE RECONSIDERED WHEN THREAT TO DNG CITY SUBSIDED.
2. AS I STATED IN REF C, I HOPED TO INCREASE YOUR TANK SUPPORT AT SUCH TIME AS THE THREAT TO DANANG CITY SUBSIDED. I NEED NOT TELL YOU THAT TODAY, THE THREAT TO DANANG CITY IS AS GREAT AS IT HAS EVER BEEN. IN FACT I AM MOVING SOME TANKS INTO THE CITY. CONSEQUENTLY, AS MUCH AS I WOULD

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1533 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 LIKE TO APPROVE YOUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TANK ASSETS, I
 CANNOT, WHEN THIS THREAT EXISTS. I KNOW THAT YOU
 REALIZE THAT ANY TANK OR LVT SUPPORT THAT I PROVIDE YOU IS AT
 THE EXPENSE OF TANK AND LVT SUPPORT THAT IS PROVIDED
 TO EACH MARINE DIVISION BY TO&E. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS, I
 REALIZE YOUR LACK OF COMBAT SUPPORT. IN THIS REGARD, I HAVE MADE
 THIS LACK OF COMBAT SUPPORT A MATTER OF RECORD TO COMUSMACV
 AND HAVE REQUESTED THAT YOUR BRIGADE BE INCREASED TO A FULL
 DIVISION, OR AT THE VERY MINIMUM, REINFORCED BY ADDITIONAL
 TANK, LVT, AND ENGINEER SUPPORT.

3. IT IS MY HOPE THAT UPON THE RELAXATION OF THE PRESENT
 THREAT TO DANANG, I WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU ADDITIONAL
 TANK SUPPORT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT AS SOON AS THE
 TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS, I WILL SEE TO IT THAT YOU ARE
 REINFORCED WITH ADDITIONAL COMBAT SUPPORT, WITHIN THE
 LIMITS OF MY CAPABILITIES AND ASSETS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMHVP
 DE RUMSAK 1263 1310324
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 100824Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 INFO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 BT

S E C R E T
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOMPKINS INFO MGEN DAVIS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE

O 090940Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANG RVN
 TO RUEBHQA/CNC WASH DC
 INFO RUMKRM/CG FMFPAC HAV
 BT

S E C R E T
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN
 CUSHMAN
 GENERAL OFFICER REASSIGNMENTS
 1. IN LINE WITH RECENT COMMUNICATIONS, UPON ARRIVAL, MGEN
 DRAKE THIS HQ ABOUT 20 MAY INTEND ASSIGN HIM DUTY AS DEP
 CG PROV CORPS VN ON OR ABOUT 21 MAY VICE MGEN DAVIS.
 2. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST ORDERS DIRECTING REASSIGNMENT MGEN

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1263 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 DAVIS FROM HQ III MAF TO 3RD MARDIV ON OR ABOUT 21 MAY FOR
 DUTY AS CG 3RD MARDIV AS RELIEF FOR MGEN TOMPKINS.
 3. FINALLY, IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT ORDERS BE ISSUED
 DIRECTING MGEN TOMPKINS TO REPORT HQ III MAF ON OR ABOUT
 21 MAY AS PROSPECTIVE DEP CG III MAF
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 UNQUOTE
 BEST REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#39

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5210 (REV 3-60)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 100704Z MAY 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
7	CG		5/11			REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR
7	DCG		5/11			
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		5/10			
	D C/S		5/11			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	10405			DHW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	COPY				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

"#3 & 4 burned
[2/10]"

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMHNS
 DE RUMSAK 1246 1310704
 ZNY SSCSS
 P 100704Z MAY 68 ZFF-3
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMHNS/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 INFO RUMIVA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV ONU LAI
 BT

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T

FOR LGEN BOSSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 ARTY AMMO EXPENDITURES (UD)

- A. CG III MAF 032012Z FEB68 (NOTAL) (PASEP)
- B. CG III MAF 221116Z FEB68 (NOTAL) (PASEP)
- C. CG USARV CITE 200254 DTG 031000Z APR68
- D. COMUSMACV CITE 12850 DTG 261040Z MAY68

1. REFS A AND B ARE III MAF MSGS REGARDING EXCESSIVE ARTY AMMO EXPENDITURES. REF C IS CG, USARV MSG REGARDING SAME SUBJ. REF D IN PART DIRECTS SUPT ARMS NOT BE DISSEPIATED ON SOFT TARGETS AND INFERS A REDUCTION OF HARRASSING FIRES.
2. THE EXCESSIVE ARTY AMMO EXPENDITURES BY MARINE AND ARMY UNITS IS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO ME.
3. AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT EXPENDITURES AND AMMO AVAILABILITY

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1246 S E C R E T

INDICATES THAT WE MUST USE OUR ARTY AMMO JUDICIOUSLY; OTHERWISE, WE CANNOT SUSTAIN THE AVAILABLE SUPPLY RATE.

4. CONSIDERING 105MM AMMO ALONE, A COMPARISON OF DAILY EXPENDITURES VS ASR DURING THE 13 DAY PERIOD 25APR-7MAY INDICATES:

A. THIRD MARINE DIVISION EXCEEDED AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES BY 41,514 RDS OR 6.5 DOA.

B. 101ST ABN DIV AND 1ST AIR CAV DIV TOGETHER EXCEEDED AUTH EXPENDITURES BY 45,915 RDS OR 8.5 DOA.

C. COMMANDS IN SOUTHERN I CORPS REDUCED THEIR AMMO EXPENDITURES BELOW AUTH ASR, BUT NOT IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO COMPENSATE FOR THE HIGH EXPENDITURE IN NICTZ; FURTHER REDUCTION OF THEIR ASR'S IS NOT FEASIBLE.

5. I CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS SITUATION AND REQUEST THAT YOU DIRECT YOUR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO EXPEND THEIR ARTY AMMO WISELY AND WITHIN THEIR EXISTING ASR.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#38

SECRET

OO RUMKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1198 1312008
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 100008Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH D.C.
 RUMKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FMAW DNG
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN KRULAK INFO WGEN
 ANDERSON FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT (U)
 1. THE FOLLOWING NOTES WERE TAKEN IN THE CLOSED SESSION AFTER
 THE FORMAL BRIEF AT MACV ON 8 MAY 1968. THEY PROVIDE INSIGHTS
 THAT MIGHT BE VALUABLE BEFORE AND AFTER THE MACV/AIR FORCE/III
 MAF PRESENTATION AT CINCPAC.
 2. GEN WESTMORELAND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
 A. "THIS IS A SERVICE CONFLICT" - INVOLVING:
 (1) PROCEDURES
 (2) TACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS
 (3) PHILOSOPHY AND DESIRE OF COMMANDERS TO ALLOCATE
 TOTAL RESOURCES IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1198 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 B. THE BRIEF WAS HELPFUL IN REFINING POINTS OF CONFLICT
 IN THE SYSTEM THAT WE HAVE BEEN EXPERIMENTING WITH.
 C. THE PROBLEM IS CREATED BY THE CONFLICT IN ICTZ
 RESULTING FROM THE ENEMY STRATEGY TO SEIZE AND CONTROL QUANG
 TRI, THUA THIEN. THIS HAS RESULTED IN DEPLOYING REINFORCEMENTS
 OF THREE (3) ARMY DIVISIONS TO I CORPS. THIS DEPLOYMENT
 CREATED A REQUEST FOR A TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS NORTH OF HAI VAN
 PASS TO HELP GENERAL CUSHMAN.
 D. THE FIRST JOB WAS TO REACT TO THE TET OFFENSIVE AND
 THE SECOND JOB WAS TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE WHEN THE WEATHER BROKE.
 A PROBLEM WAS CREATED BY THE SATURATION OF AIR, BOTH TACTICAL
 AND LOGISTICAL -- PARTICULARLY DURING CRACHIN WEATHER.
 E. WE HAD TO ADDRESS THE IN-COUNTRY AND EXTENDED BATTLE
 AREA AIR REQUESTS.
 F. THE TRIAL PERIOD HAS DEMONSTRATED - THAT THE STRONG
 FEATURES OF THE MARINE SYSTEM ARE EVIDENT. THE PRACTICAL
 ADVANTAGE OF COMMAND WIDE AREA OF THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM IS
 ALSO EVIDENT.
 G. IT IS HOPED WE CAN DEVISE A SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE THE
 PRIMARY OBJECTIVES AND INCORPORATE THE BEST FEATURES OF THE

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCOE
TWO USEABLE SYSTEMS.

H. MARINE SYSTEM IS RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE. THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM PROVIDES FOR SHIFTING OF AIR ASSETS BY FIELD COMMANDERS.

I. MARINE SYSTEM DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF BOMBS AND AIRCRAFT, DUE TO ITS AMPHIBIOUS ROLE. IT IS NOW EMPLOYED IN SUSTAINED LAND WARFARE AND NEEDS TO ADJUST.

J. AIR FORCE SYSTEM IS FAR TOO CUMBERSOME AND NEEDS TO BE POLICED UP. THE TASE MUST ALSO BE IMPROVED AND MODIFIED TO TAKE PRACTICAL ADVANTAGE OF OUR EXPERIENCE.

K. IT IS EVIDENT THAT WE HAVE BEEN EMPLOYING STEREOTYPED METHODS AND PROCEDURES. THE INTENT IS TO USE OUR RESOURCES TO MEET THE PROBLEM WE FACE NOT ON THEORY AND NOT BY INEFFECTIVE PRACTICES.

L. EQUITY IN USE OF TOTAL RESOURCES IS HARD TO ACHIEVE BUT HE WILL NOT BE A PARTY OF SHORT CHANGING THE MAN ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

M. MANY PECULIAR THINGS HAVE HAD TO BE DONE IN THIS WAR WITH UNITS OF ONE SERVICE UNDER THE OPCON OF OTHER SERVICES, FOR

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCOE
EXAMPLE - MOHAWK AIRCRAFT ARE IN TALLY HQ UNDER THE OPCON OF 7TH AIR FORCE. THIS ABILITY TO MIX OPERATIONS SPEAKS WELL FOR THE PROFESSIONALISM OF ALL SERVICES IN THIS WAR.

N. HE DOUBTED - OR DOES NOT KNOW, IF GENERAL MOMYER WILL MEET NEEDS OF III MAF, BUT THE PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD APPEAR TO HELP. HE ASKED GENERAL MOMYER WHY HE HAD NOT MADE THE IMPROVEMENTS A YEAR AGO. MOMYER REPLIED THERE WAS NOT THE REQUIREMENT, BUT THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO GO IN A WEEK WITH THE IMPROVEMENTS.

3. GEN ABRAMS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO HASTY IN IMPLEMENTING NEW PROCEDURES. THERE ARE TWO PROBLEMS. THOSE OF GEN WESTMORELAND'S ARE MACV WIDE AND GENERAL CUSHMAN'S PROBLEMS ARE ASSOCIATED ONLY WITH I CORPS. GEN CUSHMAN CANNOT HELP MUCH WITH GEN WESTMORELAND'S BUT GEN WESTMORELAND CAN BE SYMPATHETIC WITH GEN CUSHMAN.

B. SOMEONE HAS TO PAY - THAT IS WHY WE HAVE THE HQTRS HERE - TO MAKE EXCRUCIATING DECISIONS. THE IDEAS PRESENTED TODAY HIGHLIGHTS THE KIND OF DATA NEEDED AT MACV; NEEDED TO PROPERLY INFLUENCE WITH GREATER PRECISION THE DISTRIBUTION OF

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#37

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO EFFORT.

C. WE HAVE MADE UP FOR A LACK OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CORPS BY WEIGHT OF FIRE SUPPORT EMPLOYED THERE. I WOULD LIKE TO TRY OUT SOME SUGGESTIONS - BASED ON THE MAC/EVAL BRIEF. FROM WHAT LOCATIONS DO YOU USE AIRPLANES MOST EFFICIENTLY? WHERE SHOULD THE NAVY APPLY AIR ASSETS OUT OF COUNTRY? WHERE SHOULD THE AIR FORCE USE AIR ASSETS OUT OF COUNTRY? WHAT CAN YOU DO WITH AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT AT DANANG TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF THE AIR FORCE FORCES IN THE SOUTH PORTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM? IF NAVY IS PUTTING ALL ITS AIR INTO NORTH VIETNAM, DOESN'T THIS UP EFFICIENCY?

D. THAILAND BASED AIRCRAFT SHOULD LIKEWISE BE USED IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE BEST PLACE TO USE DANANG BASED AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IS IN I CORPS. THIS MIGHT GET AIR FORCE UP TO PROVIDING AS MUCH AS 84 PERCENT OF THE REQUIRED FACTORS INSTEAD OF ONLY 76 PERCENT OF THE GOAL.

E. THIS SERIES OF PRESENTATIONS HAS OPENED UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE THOUGHT ON PROCEDURES AND DETAILS -- WE DO NOT HAVE IN OUR HANDS AN OPTIMUM REFINED SYSTEM TO RUN ALL THIS.

4. GENERAL MOMYER THEN ADDRESSED THE USE OF F4'S AT DANANG.

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 1198 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
HE STATED THAT TWO WEEKS AGO HE BEGAN TO SHIFT MORE OF 366TH SORTIES, MOVING THEM TO IN COUNTRY OPERATIONS AND MOVING MORE AIR FROM THAILAND INTO LAOS. THIS SHOULD PRODUCE AN UPTURN IN THE AVAILABILITY OF MORE AIR IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS A DEFICIT OF RESOURCES - THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH FORCES FOR ALL. WE ARE FILLING GAPS. FOR EXAMPLE - IF 50,000 GROUND TROOPS WERE MOVING DOWN THROUGH LAOS I AM SURE THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND WOULD ORDER THE DIVERSION OF AIR ASSETS OUT OF COUNTRY TO STRIKE THEM. AS LONG AS WE ARE BOMBING BELOW THE 19TH PARALLEL, I WILL SHIFT AIR DOWN INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. BUT WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH AIR TO DO THE WHOLE JOB. MALDISTRIBUTION OF AIR HAS CREATED A PROBLEM - THE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH AIR AVAILABLE TO FURNISH ARMY REQUESTS WITHOUT USING MARINE AIR.

5. GENERAL WESTMORELAND THEN ASKED IF THE MARINE SYSTEM WAS INTACT. GENERAL ANDERSON REPLIED THAT IT WAS, EXCEPT THAT GENERAL CUSHMAN NO LONGER HAS CONTROL OF THE ALLOCATION OF HIS AIR ASSETS.

6. GENERAL CUSHMAN ADDED THAT HE AGREED THAT ASSETS MUST BE DISTRIBUTED TO MEET THE ENEMY THRUST AND SUPPORT U.S. MAIN EFFORT.
BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

37

SECRET

OO RUHNM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1199 1310008
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 100008Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH D.C.
 RUHNM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMSAV/CG FMAW DNG
 BT

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2
 HE SAID HE COULD CONTROL MARINE AIR AND USE THAT PROVIDED BY THE
 AIR FORCE.

7. GEN MOMYER REMARKED THAT 25 TO 30 F-105 SORTIES ARE NOW
 USED IN SOUTH VIETNAM FROM THAILAND BASED AIRCRAFT.

8. GENERAL ABRAMS ASKED IF WE GO BACK TO THE OLD SYSTEM, HOW
 DO WE VISUALIZE THE SYSTEM OPERATING?--THERE IS THE PROBLEM
 OF JOINT COMMAND.

9. GENERAL CUSHMAN REPLIED THAT WE COULD KEEP THE PRESENT
 JOINT SYSTEM OF DASC'S--REQUESTS WOULD COME UP THE CHAIN OF
 COMMAND. THE WING WOULD PRODUCE ALL IT COULD AND THE AIR
 FORCE WOULD PRODUCE THAT WHICH IS MISSING.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPEGAT EXCLUSIVE MCRG

10. GEN ABRAMS REPLIED THAT UNDER OLD SYSTEM III MAF WOULD USE OPCON
 OF FMAW TO SATISFY ALL MARINE AIR REQUESTS AND REPORT EXCESS TO
 7TH AIR FORCE AND THE 7TH AIR FORCE FRAG THE EXCESS AS IT SEES
 FIT. IF WE RETURN TO THAT, THE 1ST CAV AND 101ST WOULD GO TO
 7TH AIR FORCE DIRECTLY. THE REQUEST WOULD BE FILLED BY 7TH AIR
 FORCE FROM AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES. HE SAID ALSO, UNDER OLD
 SYSTEM, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION TO
 GO TO PROV CORPS; IT WOULD GO DIRECT TO FMAW. HE DID NOT SEE
 HOW SUCH A PROCEDURE COULD WORK, SINCE IT LEFT PROV CORPS OUT
 OF PICTURE.

11. GENERAL CUSHMAN ANSWERED, THAT REQUESTS SHOULD GO THROUGH
 THE CHAIN OF COMMAND INCLUDING PROV CORPS SO COMMAND COULD
 WEIGHT AIR EFFORT. THE FMAW WOULD TAKE CARE OF MARINE REQUIREMENTS
 AND SOME ARMY NEEDS. REST WOULD BE REQ FROM 7AF.

12. GEN ABRAMS THEN STATED THAT THE BRIEF IS FOCUSED ON
 AIR - BUT, THE FACT THAT TORE UP RELATIONSHIP IN 10TZ IS
 ARMY DIVISIONS ARE EMPLOYED THERE. THERE IS THE EXAMPLE OF
 THE ARMY AND THE NAVY RUNNING A MEDICAL SYSTEM AT HUE.--THEY
 SEE THAT EACH MAN GOT THE BEST OF ATTENTION HE COULD GET,
 WITHOUT REGARD TO SERVICE, AND FOR EXAMPLE - LOGISTERS ALL

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#37

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 USE COMMON POOL. THIS WAR IS AN IRREGULAR SITUATION, AN
 UNPREDICTABLE CONDITION.

13. GEN ANDERSON, SPEAKING FOR MARINES, ADDED THAT WE SHOULD
 NOT REGARD MARINE AIR IN THE SAME CONTEXT AS AIR FORCE AIR.
 MARINE AIR IS AN ORGANIC COMPONENT OF THE MARINE TEAM. HE
 LISTED THE HYPOTHETICAL EFFECT OF TAKING ARMED HELOS AWAY FROM
 THE SEA GAV. HE STATED THAT, IT IS INCUMBENT ON MARINES TO
 PROTECT MARINE STRUCTURE.

14. GEN WESTMORELAND STATED THAT THE MARINE STRUCTURE AND
 DOCTRINE ARE NOT COMPLETELY APPROPRIATE IN PROLONGED LAND
 WAR. HE SAID THAT THE MARINE AIR GROUND SYSTEM IS TO REMAIN
 INTACT, BUT HE MUST MAKE THE BEST ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.
 HE ACCEPTED MARINE PHILOSOPHY AND INTERNAL REQUIREMENTS, BUT
 THE ARMY AND MARINE DIVISION ARE VERY SIMILAR--SOME CONSIDERATION
 SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR FRAGGING FOR THE MARINE'S LACK OF SUN SHIPS.

15. GEN WESTMORELAND THEN ADDRESSED THE MATTER OF THE BRIEFING
 FOR CINCPAC. HE STATED THAT CHANGES IN THE BRIEF SHOULD BE
 MADE: THE 7TH AIR FORCE BRIEF HAD INCLUDED HIS PHILOSOPHY
 AND REASONING. THE 7TH AIR FORCE SHOULD STICK TO 7TH AIR
 FORCE CONSIDERATIONS.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

16. CHIEF OF STAFF COMUSMACV, GEN KERWIN, WAS DESIGNATED
 COMUSMACV REP AT CINCPAC. HE WILL GIVE THE OPENING RATIONALE,
 AND THE ORDER OF PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. III MAF
- B. 7TH AF
- C. MACEVAL
- D. CHIEF OF STAFF FIELD ANY QUESTIONS.

17. THE ABRAMS MADE THE POINT THAT THE WORD "DISSATISFACTIONS" AS
 LISTED, SET A BAD TONE IN THE 7TH AIR FORCE PRESENTATION.
 THE MACV BRIEF CAN RECOGNIZE ANY DISSATISFACTIONS IN A
 GENERAL STATEMENT.

18. GEN MOMYER ADDED THAT HE COULD ISOLATE THE PROBLEMS,
 SUCH AS THE PREPLANNED FRAGGING SYSTEM, AND PROVIDE FOR
 MARINE HELICOPTER ESCORT A CUT OUT OF THE SORTIES BASED ON
 THE HISTORICAL PERCENTAGE OF HELO ESCORT MISSIONS.

19. GEN ABRAMS THOUGHT THAT FIFTY SORTIES PER BATTALION PER
 MONTH DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARINE AND ARMY BATTALIONS MIGHT BE
 USED FOR THE HELO SUPPORT CUT.

20. GEN MOMYER RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IN A SHORT WHILE, WE
 WILL HAVE TAKEN UP AND FIXED MOST OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS.

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 1199 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

21. GEN WESTMORELAND ENDED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT IT
 WAS FICTION THAT THIS THING WAS GENERATED BY THE AIR FORCE
 ROLES AND MISSION. IT WAS HIS IDEA -- HIS DECISION AND NOT A
 MANEUVER BY THE AIR FORCE. HE WANTED THIS POINT INCLUDED IN
 THE BRIEFING.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#37

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 5-68)

X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	OPERATION CODE	FROM CG III MAF	DATE 9 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 090940Z MAY 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT GENERAL OFFICER REASSIGNMENTS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE " #2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68 "
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		5/9		DL	
	D C/S		5/9		DL	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		091825 5/9		DL	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SAC					

SECRET

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

CG RUMKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 1124 1302930
 ZNY SSSSS
 FMFPAC -T- CMC
 O 090940Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANG HUN
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC WASH DC
 INFO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC HAV
 BT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
 CUSHMAN

GENERAL OFFICER REASSIGNMENTS

1. IN LINE WITH RECENT COMMUNICATIONS, UPON ARRIVAL WGEN
 DRAKE THIS HQ ABOUT 20 MAY INTEND ASSIGN HER DUTY AS DEP
 CG PRGV CORPS VN ON OR ABOUT 21 MAY VICE WGEN DAVIS.
2. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST ORDERS DIRECTING REASSIGNMENT WGEN
 DAVIS FROM HQ III MAF TO 3RD MARDIV ON OR ABOUT 21 MAY FOR
 DUTY AS CG 3RD MARDIV AS RELIEF FOR WGEN TOMPKINS.
3. FINALLY, IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT ORDERS BE ISSUED
 DIRECTING WGEN TOMPKINS TO REPORT HQ III MAF ON OR ABOUT
 21 MAY AS PROSPECTIVE DEP CG III MAF

WARM REGARDS.

GF-4

BT

SECRET

36

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	9 MAY 68
	SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
	090855 / 14Z MAY 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE <i>"#2 & 3 burned 6 Nov 68"</i> <i>4/4</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		5/9			
	D C/S		5/9			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	090855				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

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 DE RUMSAK 1037 1300014
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 090014Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. AGREE THAT 2/4'S LOSSES HAVE BEEN SEVERE AND APPRECIATE
 DESIRABILITY OF REHAB AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, THE SECOND
 GENERAL OFFENSIVE IS NOW ON IN IOTZ AND EVERY UNIT IS SORELY
 NEEDED. IN FACT, DUE TO THE ENEMY SITUATION PREVAILING SOUTH
 OF THE DMZ, IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO REINFORCE THE 3D MARDIV
 WITH 3/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON (-) AND THE 3/21ST.
 CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A PROPITIOUS TIME
 TO WITHDRAW IN-COUNTRY MARINE CORPS UNITS UNDER THESE
 CONDITIONS. IT'S STILL MY INTENT TO REQUEST THE BACKLOADING
 OF THE SLP'S UPON TERMINATION OF OPN DELAWARE (NOW SET FOR
 20-25 MAY) PROVIDED THE PRESENT ENEMY OFFENSIVE HAS SUBSIDED
 SOMEWHAT.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#34

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	08 MAY 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
	081432Z MAY 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE OFFICERS EYES ONLY REMARKS EXCLUSIVE <i>"#2 & 3 Burned 6 Nov 68"</i> <i>#3</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		5/9		Q	
	D C/S		5/9		W	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	090700			DKW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

P 081432Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CTF 76
INFO CTF 79
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM BEHRENS, INFO BGEN CHIP,
FROM BGEN ANDERSON, OFFICERS EYES ONLY

1. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS CHANNEL ONLY
 2. APPRECIATE YOUR SOLID COMMENTS RE SLF SITUATION AND AGREE WITH DESIRABILITY OF YOUR SUGGESTION. HOWEVER, THE SECOND GENERAL OFFENSIVE IS IN FULL SWING IN ICTZ AS WELL AS THROUGHOUT RVN AND THE LAUNCHING OF THIS OFFENSIVE RESULTED IN THE LOSSES INFLICTED ON 2/4. FMFPAC HAS OPENED ALL STOPS TO SUPPLY REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.
 3. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE ENEMY SITUATION SOUTH OF THE DMZ IN THE 3D MARDIV AREA IS SUCH THAT THE 3/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON (-) AND THE 3/21ST HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM U. S. ARMY UNITS AND PLACED UNDER OPCON 3D MARDIV. ALL UNITS ARE SORELY NEEDED AT THIS MOST VITAL JUNCTURE AND IN FACE OF ARMY REINFORCEMENTS THIS IS NOT A FAVORABLE TIME FOR RAISING THE ISSUE WITH COMUSMACV.
 4. RECENTLY, GEN CUSHMAN ADVISED GEN KRULAK THAT HE INTENDS REQUESTING BACKLOADING OF THE SLF'S UPON THE CONCLUSION OF OPN. DELAWARE (NOW SCHEDULED FOR 20-25 MAY) AND IT IS HIS HOPE THAT THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE WILL HAVE SUBSIDED BY THAT TIME SO THAT HE CAN EXPECT FAVORABLE REACTION TO HIS REQUEST.
- WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

33

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

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 DE RUMSAK 1004 1291344
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 081344Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 TODAY WE PRESENTED OUR VIEWS TO COMUSMACV WITH RESPECT
 TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS.
 OUR PRESENTATION WAS FOLLOWED BY THE 7TH AF AND MACEVAL BRIEFS.
 IT WAS A VERY LENGTHY SESSION BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY OF US
 CONVINCED THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MERITS OF THEIR POSITION.
 FORTUNATELY, THE BRIEFS WERE CONDUCTED IN A VERY AMICABLE
 ATMOSPHERE. ALSO, GEN WESTMORELAND WAS CONVINCED THAT THE
 PRESENT AIR FORCE SYSTEM WAS QUITE PONDEROUS. HOWEVER, IN
 SPIITE OF HIS FEELINGS IN THIS AREA, HE DID NOT FALL OFF HIS
 POSITION THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF ALL STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE
 ASSETS IN RVN WAS A NECESSITY. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT EXISTING
 PROCEDURES WERE UNWIELDY AND TIME CONSUMING AND DIRECTED
 IMMEDIATE CORRECTION. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS POSITION, HE
 STILL ADHERED TO HIS FORMER DECISION TO SINGLE MANAGE ALL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1004 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 ASSETS IN THE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AREA. IF YOU DESIRE
 ADDITIONAL ELABORATION PRIOR TO YOUR TRIP EAST, DON'T HESITATE
 TO CALL AT ANY TIME.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

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EXCLUSIVE

OO RUHNM
 DE RUMSAR 0917 129025G
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 030250Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHNM/CG FMFPAC
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE III MAF SINGLE MANAGEMENT PRESENTATION
 GIVEN AT COMUSMACV HQTRS THIS DATE: QUOTE

SECRET

APPROXIMATELY 1 1/2 MONTHS AGO III MAF'S MARINE FIGHTER WING COMBAT
 AIRCRAFT WERE PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL, OR SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT, OF 7TH AIR FORCE. AT THE SAME TIME, A 30 DAY PERIOD
 WAS ESTABLISHED IN WHICH TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS. THE MONTH OF APRIL
 WAS SELECTED. WGEN ANDERSON'S PRESENTATION SUMMARIZES MY CON-
 CLUSIONS IN MY CAPACITY AS A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND IN MY
 CAPACITY AS COMMANDER OF A MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM.
 GEN. WESTMORELAND, GEN. ABRAMS, GEN. MOWBR, GENTLEMEN:
 OF COURSE, OPERATIONAL CONTROL BY THE AIR FORCE OF SOME
 FUNCTIONS OF MARINE AIR IS NOT NEW. OUR AIR DEFENSE ASSETS IN

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 0917 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR COMUSMACV
 CORPS HAVE LONG BEEN CONTROLLED BY 7TH AIR FORCE. WE HAVE ALSO
 LENT OUR FULL SUPPORT TO THE AIR FORCE MANAGED INTERDICTION
 EFFORTS IN LAOS AND NVN. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1967,
 MARINE AIR OPERATING UNDER MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 FLEW 20 PERCENT OF
 ITS EFFORT (18,000) SORTIES FOR OTHER THAN SUPPORT OF MARINES;
 THESE WERE MAINLY IN LAOS AND NVN. HAD COMUSMACV OR THE 7TH AF SO
 ELECTED, MOST OF THIS CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SORTIES COULD HAVE
 BEEN DEVOTED TO CLOSE TROOP SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITHIN RVN. FOR
 THE PAST THREE YEARS OF THE CURRENT WAR, THIS ARRANGEMENT HAS
 PREVAILED AND IT HAS WORKED WELL, PROVING THE WISDOM OF
 COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, AND JCS IN DEFINING SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.
 WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, THE MARINE CORPS SYSTEM FUNCTIONED UNDER
 THE NORMAL PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 OF 28 JUNE 1966. IT
 DID SATISFY THE RESPONSIVENESS REQUIRED BY THE MARINE GROUND
 COMMANDER, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING RESPONSIVE TO THE OVERALL
 DIRECTION OF COMUSMACV.

THE PROVISIONS OF 95-4 RECOGNIZED THAT MARINE AVIATION RESOURCES
 ARE ORGANIC TO THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM AND ARE COMMANDED IN
 SUPPORT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY CG, III MAF. 95-4
 MADE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR BOTH ROUTINE AND EMERGENCY AIR

PAGE 1 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

OPERATIONS. FOR ROUTINE OPERATIONS THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF WAS DIRECTED TO AUGMENT DAILY THE U. S. AIR FORCE RESOURCES WITH THOSE OF HIS NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS OF PRIME CONCERN TO III MAF. COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF IDENTIFIED TO THE COMMANDER 7TH AF, FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL THROUGH THE TACS, THE SORTIES IN EXCESS OF THAT DAY'S REQUIREMENT. THESE SORTIES WERE THEN ALLOCATED IN SUPPORT OF OTHER MISSIONS BY COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF. THE DIRECTIVE WAS EMINENTLY WORKABLE AND PERMITTED FIELD COMMANDERS TO OBTAIN THE FULL PRODUCTIVITY OF U. S. AIR CAPABILITIES. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INHIBITING RESPONSIVENESS OR THE UNTIMELY DIVERSION OF ORGANIC FIRE SUPPORT RESOURCES. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS WERE COVERED IN 95-4 BY THE PROVISION THAT: "IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER COMUSMACV MAY DIRECT THE COMMANDER, 7TH AF TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER CERTAIN DESIGNATED U. S. AIR RESOURCES." IT WAS FURTHER STATED, "UPON TERMINATION OF THE EMERGENCY CONDITION, OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER U. S. AIR RESOURCES WILL REVERT TO NORMAL AS SPECIFIED IN THIS DIRECTIVE." IT APPEARS THAT THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT IS A DE FACTO EXECUTION OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISION OF 95-4 IN THAT THE OPERATIONAL

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0917 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MSEO CONTROL OF MARINE AIR WAS PASSED TO THE 7TH AF COINCIDENTAL WITH THE RISING TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN I CORPS THAT CULMINATED IN THE SEIGE OF KHE SANH. HOWEVER, WITH THE RESUMPTION OF MORE ROUTINE OPERATIONS IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE FIXED WING ASSETS BE RETURNED, -FOR THE MARINE TEAM IS UNIQUELY DEPENDENT ON THE INTEGRATED EMPLOYMENT OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES. IN THIS REGARD MARINE AIR IS TASKED AND TAILORED TO DO FOUR THINGS FOR THE MARINE RIFLEMAN.

(SLIDE 2 ON - FUNCTIONS OF MARINE AIR)

THE FIRST OF THESE; AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, FUNCTIONS UNDER AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT. THE OTHER 3; HOWEVER, DEPEND ON EACH OTHER AND ARE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING. THEY ARE CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE SAME SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM WHICH DIRECTS ALL TACTICAL MARINE UNITS.

(SLIDE 2 - OFF)

IN MAKING A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, WE SHOULD LOOK AT THE FOUR CHARACTERISTICS THAT WE DEMAND OF OUR OWN SYSTEM AND CONSIDER ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO ANY SYSTEM FOR MANAGEMENT OF MARINE AIR.

(SLIDE 3 ON - MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS)

PAGE 2 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0917 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

(1) IT MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

(2) IT MUST INTERGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER-AMONG THESE IS THE IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF MINIMIZING THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES, THAT ALWAYS POSE A THREAT IN FAST MOVING SITUATIONS.

(3) IT MUST POSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BUDENS AND DELAYS. IT SHOULD INVOLVE THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INTERVENING AGENCIES BETWEEN THE PRODUCER AND THE CONSUMER.

(4) AND FINALLY, IT MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S NEEDS. IT MUST GIVE HIM FIRE SUPPORT THAT IS ACCURATE, APPROPRIATE AND TIMELY.

(SLIDE 3 - OFF)

(SLIDE 4 ON - MUST BE COMPATIBLE)

THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

OUR AIR GROUND TEAM PACKAGE, STEMMING ORIGINALLY OUT OF OUR AMPHIBIOUS MISSION, CONTAINS AMONG THE SUPPORTING ARMS, HIGH PERFORMANCE, HIGHLY POTENT AIRCRAFT. WE HEAVILY DEPEND ON THESE AIRCRAFT AND OUR CONTROL SYSTEM TO PROVIDE THE FOUR FUNCTIONS

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0917 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

MENTIONED EARLIER. THE CLOSE INTERGRATION OF ALL THESE WEAPONS INTO A SINGLE COMMAND PACKAGE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH MANY YEARS OF EFFORT AND IT NOW PERMITS US TO DO OUR JOB WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF THESE AIRCRAFT. TO EMPHASIZE THIS LET US EXAMINE THE FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE MARINE CORPS IN I CORPS FOR JUST A MOMENT.

(SLIDE 4 - OFF)

(SLIDE 5 ON - TACTICAL MARINE PACKAGE IN I CORPS 20 MARCH)

IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OUR AUTHORIZED 20,736 RIFLEMEN, WE WERE AUTHORIZED 276 TRANSPORT AND 60 ARMED OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS ALONG WITH 159 FIXED WING FIRE SUPPORT AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT. THE 60 OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS, IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED, HAVE BEEN ARMED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLOSE IN FIRE SUPPORT AGAINST SOFT TARGETS DURING PERIODS OF EXTREMELY LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY IN THE LANDING ZONE. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE, THEY CANNOT BE FULLY UTILIZED AS GUNSHIPS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY MUST ALSO PERFORM THE TASKS FOR WHICH THEY ARE AUTHORIZED, E. G. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION, GUNFIRE SPOTTING, EMERGENCY AERIAL SUPPLY AND RESUPPLY, LIAISON AND COURIER SERVICE, AND, OF COURSE, EMERGENCY REDEVAC.

BT

PAGE 3 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

OO RUMKM
 DE RUNSAX 0918 1230250
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 O 080250Z MAY 68
 FM CG 111 MAF
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 ACCORDING TO THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA AIR PROGRAM PLANNING FACTORS,
 THE APPROVED AIRCRAFT WHICH YOU SEE HERE ARE PROGRAMMED TO
 PROVIDE EACH MARINE BATTALION 200 FIXED WING SORTIES PER MONTH.
 INCIDENTALLY, WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY FLOWN IN EXCESS OF THIS
 PLANNING FACTOR FOR THE PAST YEAR. THIS SUPPORT IS 1/3 GREATER
 FOR THE MARINES THAN THE SUPPORT PROGRAMMED TO BE PROVIDED BY THE
 AIR FORCE TO THE ARMY. THE LARGER NUMBER IS BASED ON MARINE
 BATTALION COMPOSITION, LESS ORGANIC ARTILLERY SUPPORT, AND THE
 MARINE CORPS' LACK OF ARMED HELICOPTER SUPPORT

(SLIDE 5 - OFF)

NOW LOOKING AT THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL PACKAGE IN IGTZ,

(SLIDE 6 ON - ARMY/AF TACT PACKAGES)

WE SEE THAT TO SUPPORT AN APPROVED FOXHOLE STRENGTH OF 17,116

PAGE 2 RUNSAX 0918 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN
 SOLDIERS, THE ARMY HAS 479 TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS, AND 184 FIRE
 SUPPORT HELICOPTERS WHILE THE AIR FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE
 132 FIXED WING FIRE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT FOR THE SAME 17,116 SOLDIERS.
 AUTHORIZATION FOR THESE 132 AIRCRAFT IS DETERMINED BY COMPUTING
 THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENT OF 150
 COMBAT SORTIES PER ARMY MANUEVER BATTALION PER MONTH, AS STATED IN
 THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA AIR PROGRAM.

(SLIDE 6 - OFF)

(SLIDE 7 ON - TACTICAL PACKAGE COMPARISON)

HERE SIDE BY SIDE, ARE THE MARINE AND ARMY/AIR FORCE TACTICAL
 PACKAGES IN IGTZ ON 20 MARCH 1968 CONSIDERING THE STRUCTURE OF THESE
 FORCES AND THEIR TOTAL RESOURCES.

(PAUSE WHILE SLIDE IS VIEWED)

(SLIDE 7 - OFF)

SO MUCH FOR FORCE STRUCTURE.

A STATED OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS TO ACHIEVE
 A MORE FLEXIBLE AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT.

(SLIDE 8 ON - AVG SORTIES FLOWN DAILY - BOTTOM PIEP DOWN)
 REGARDING FLEXIBILITY, THIS CHART, ILLUSTRATES AMONG OTHER THINGS,
 THE EFFECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS HAD ON THE PROPORTION OF

PAGE 4 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DCEO
 MARINE EFFORT FLOWN FOR MARINES AND FOR OTHER FORCES. THE AREA
 AT THE TOP SHOWS THE NON-MARINE SUPPORT; CHIEFLY FOR THE ARMY
 IN SUPPORT OF THE AIR FORCE MANAGED ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM. IN
 ORDER TO MEET THE DOD APPROVED SEASIA AIR PROGRAM, MARINES MUST FLY
 TO SUPPORT THE 24 BATTALIONS IN I CORPS, 160 SORTIES PER DAY OR
 200 SORTIES PER MARINE BATTALION PER MONTH, SHOWN BY THE BLACK LINE.
 DURING THE FIRST PERIOD, MARINE GROUND FORCES WERE ENGAGED IN
 HEAVY COMBAT AND MARINE AIR SURGED, IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO THE
 REQUIREMENTS, FLYING AN AVERAGE OF 198 SORTIES PER DAY FOR MARINES-
 GREEN LINE AND IN ADDITION FLEW 48 SORTIES PER DAY IN SUPPORT OF
 OTHER TROOPS AND THE OUT OF COUNTRY INTERDICTION EFFORT FOR A
 TOTAL OF 246 SORTIES - RED LINE. NOTE THAT AFTER SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT WAS IMPOSED MARINE AIR STILL FLEW WELL OVER THE
 PROGRAMMED RATE.

IF THE NEED EXISTS, MARINES CAN LIBERTY ESSENTIAL AIR SUPPORT TO
 ARMY FORCES, BUT, IT IS OBSERVED, AS ILLUSTRATED ON THE LOWER
 PORTION OF THIS

(FLIP UP)

CHART, THAT THE AIR FORCE HAS NOT FLOWN A COMMENSURATE AMOUNT TO
 MEET THE EMERGENCY THAT EXISTED IN I CORPS. THIS BOTTOM PORTION

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DCEO
 SHOWS THE AVERAGE DAILY AIR FORCE SORTIES FLOWN IN ICZ FOR ALL
 CONSUMERS (BLUE LINE) COMPARED TO THE PLANNED DOD APPROVED 145 V
 SORTIES TO BE FLOWN BY THE AIR FORCE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY IN
 I CORPS (BROWN LINE) - BASED ON THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ICD
 PLANNING FACTOR OF 150 SORTIES/BN/MONTH. AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, THE
 AIR FORCE HAS MAINTAINED AN AVERAGE RATE WELL BELOW THIS
 PLANNING FACTOR DURING BOTH PERIODS. AT THE SAME TIME THE MARINE
 CORPS HAS RESPONDED ABOVE THE PLANNED RATE IN SUPPORT OF BOTH MARINE
 AND ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS. THESE 87 AIR FORCE SORTIES ARE ONLY
 60 PERCENT OF THE SORTIES PLANNED FOR THE ARMY BY THE DOD APPROVED
 SEASIA PROGRAM. THIS HAS EVIDENTLY PRODUCED A SCARCITY OF SORTIES IN
 I CORPS AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR MARINES TO CONTINUOUSLY PROVIDE
 A HIGH PROPORTION OF THEIR SORTIES TO OTHER FORCES. THIS HAS
 FURTHER RESULTED IN MARINE UNITS RECEIVING LESS AIR SUPPORT THAN
 THEY DID BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

(SLIDE 8 - OFF)

(SLIDE 9 ON - USMC FRAGGED SORTIES)

IT CAN BE SEEN HERE BY THE TREND OF THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO
 MARINES AND OTHER UNITS, THAT THIS IS OCCURRING EVEN WHILE MARINE
 AIR IS SURGING, FAR BEYOND PLANNED LEVELS-IN AN EFFORT THAT WILL

PAGE 5 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUNSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
INEVITABLY EXACT A LATER DECREASE IN PERFORMANCE.

(SLIDE 9 - OFF)

(SLIDE 10 ON - TACTICAL PACKAGES IN IOTZ 21 MARCH 1968)
AS CAN BE SEEN BY THIS CHART, IMPOSITION OF THE SINGLE MANAGER
SYSTEM ON THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM IN I CORPS HAS DEPRIVED THE
TEAM OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ITS FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. NO SUB-
STITUTE FOR THIS LOSS HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN THE FORM OF ORGANIC
GUN SHIPS AS ARE EMPLOYED BY THE ARMY. TO ACHIEVE PARITY OF FIRE
SUPPORT WITH THE ARMY UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM, MARINES WOULD
REQUIRE THE USE OF NEARLY 200 FIRE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS.

(SLIDE 10 - OFF)

(SLIDE 11 ON - MUST INTEGRATE)

OUR NEXT CRITERION IS THE INTEGRATION OF AIR WITH OTHER
SUPPORTING FIRES AND GROUND MANUEVER.

(SLIDE 11 - OFF)

(SLIDE 12 ON - INTEGRATION OF AIR - FLIP DOWN)

THE MARINE AIR GROUND CONTROL SYSTEM SERVES THE MARINE'S
INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE. IT HAS BUILT INTO IT THE CAPABILITY
TO COORDINATE AIR WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS. THE TOTAL SYSTEM
PROVIDES THE INFORMATION WHICH IS CONTINUOUSLY BEING COLLECTED

PAGE 6 RUNSAK 0918 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
BY THE DASC'S AND TADC, AGENCIES SPECIFICALLY TASKED WITH THE
COORDINATING FUNCTION. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THEIR CAPABILITY, DURING
THE SEPTEMBER 1967 BATTLE FOR CON THIEN, 3,618 MARINE, NAVY AND
AIR FORCE SORTIES WERE FLOWN INTO A 20 SQUARE MILE AREA IN LESS
THAN A MONTH. IN ADDITION, 127,000 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY AND
6,100 ROUNDS OF NAVAL GUNFIRE WERE DELIVERED INTO THE AREA. THERE
WERE NO COORDINATION AND CONTROL DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY
THE GROUND COMMANDERS.

(SLIDE 12 FLIP UP)

THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT DASC'S ON THE OTHER HAND DO NOT PROVIDE THE
DETAILED CONTROL AND COORDINATION FOR THIS ESSENTIAL SERVICE BUT
MUST DEPEND ON SUBORDINATE AGENCIES. ADDITIONALLY, SINGLE MANAGEMENT
DOES NOT ALWAYS PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COORDINATION BETWEEN SUCH
SUBORDINATE AGENCIES AS MARINE DASC'S AND ARMY/AF TACP'S TO
ENSURE THE MOST EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THESE AGENCIES DURING
THESE JOINT OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, THIS NEW SYSTEM DOES NOT
PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROCEDURES FOR ARTILLERY SUPPRESSION OR AIRCRAFT
DIVERSION AROUND DANGER AREAS COMPARABLE TO THE MARINE
SAV-A-PLANE PROGRAM WHICH WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE CO-LOCATION OF
THE DASC AND THE FSCC. THE NEW SYSTEM IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
BT

PAGE 6 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

#31

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OO RUMRM
 DE RUMBAK 0960 1200250
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 O 030250Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMRM/CG FWPAG
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 SECTIONS
 SPECIALLY EXCLUSIVE FOR LOW KEY FROM LOW KEY COUNCIL FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 IN THAT IMMEDIATE ARTILLERY FIRE MISSIONS CAN BE CARRIED OUT
 BEFORE AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA CAN BE WARNED.

(SLIDE 12 - OFF)

(SLIDE 13 ON - IT SHOULD IMPOSE MINIMUM BURDEN.)
 NOW, LOOKING AT OUR THIRD CRITERION - IT SHOULD IMPOSE MINIMUM
 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND DELAY.

(SLIDE 13 - OFF)

(SLIDE 14 ON - PREPLANNED REQUEST FRAG)

THE SIZE OF THE NEW FRAG IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS MORE COMPLEX
 CHAIN IN PREPARING THE FRAG. AT BATTALION LEVEL, MARINES HAVE TO
 FILL OUT LENGTHY FORMS, ONE FOR EACH REQUESTED TARGET. THESE HAVE
 TO BE SHACKLED OR ENCRYPTED AT EACH LEVEL IN THE CHAIN, OR
 DELIVERED BY COURIER TO THE NEXT HIGHER Echelon AND SO ON.

PAGE 2 RUMBAK 0960 **S E C R E T** SPECIALLY EXCLUSIVE FOR LOW KEY
 FORMERLY, UNDER 95-4, WHEN AIR WAS FRAGGED TO THE UNITS, ALL THAT
 WAS NECESSARY WAS TO PASS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUESTED, TGT'S
 AND DESIRED ORDNANCE. (MORE OPPORTUNITY FOR COUNTERSUPPORT THROUGH)

(SLIDE 14 OFF)

HERE IS A TYPICAL FRAG ISSUED DAILY TO MARINE UNITS PRIOR TO
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT. (HOLD UP AN OLD FRAG 9 PAGES). NOT ONLY WAS IT
 RELATIVELY SHORT AND SIMPLE BUT IT WAS ALSO VERY RESPONSIVE TO
 GROUND COMMANDERS RAPIDLY CHANGING SITUATIONS, IN THAT, REQUESTED
 CHANGES WERE OFTEN MADE TO IT ON THE BASIS OF A TELEPHONE
 REQUEST AS LATE AS MIDNIGHT THE NIGHT BEFORE. HERE IS THE NEW FRAG.
 IT IS MADE UP USUALLY OF 10 TO 12 SECTIONS, ABOUT 50-60 PAGES. THIS
 MESSAGE MUST BE TRANSMITTED TO ALL USING UNITS DOWN THE LINE. EACH
 OF THEM MUST GO THROUGH IT, AND SIFT OUT THE PORTIONS THAT APPLY TO
 HIM. THIS IS A TASK OF 2 TO 4 HOURS DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF
 GARDLES, OR ERRORS IN THE FIRST COPY.
 IN SHORT, SINGLE MANAGEMENT WITH ITS COMPLEX AND GENERALIZED
 SYSTEM HAS MARKEDLY INCREASED OUR ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS.

(SLIDE 15 ON - RESPONSIVE TO TACTICAL NEEDS)

IN TESTING THE COMPARATIVE ABILITY OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 TO SATISFY THIS LAST REQUIREMENT, WHICH IS RESPONSIVENESS TO

PAGE 2 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0960 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR NSIC
TACTICAL NEEDS, WE SHOULD LOOK FIRST AT THE ARRANGEMENT FOR FLYING
ON "PREPLANNED" MISSIONS.

(SLIDE 15 OFF)

UNDER 95-4, WHEN THE NEED AROSE FOR AN AIR STRIKE THE GROUND
COMMANDER'S REQUEST WAS PROVIDED FROM THE AIRCRAFT OVERHEAD, IF
POSSIBLE. RESPONSE TIMES WERE USUALLY MEASURED IN MINUTES. THE CLOSE
WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN THE AIR-GROUND TEAM PERMITTED INCREASE
OF DECREASE OF THE FLOW OF AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN CONTACT.
TARGET LISTS WERE KEPT OF TARGETS TO BE STRUCK WHEN AIRCRAFT WERE
NOT NEEDED FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. STRIKE SURGE CAPABILITY WAS
PROVIDED BY ALERT AIRCRAFT AND THE ABILITY TO SCHEDULE
ADDITIONAL MISSIONS ON SHORT NOTICE. THE SYSTEM WAS SIMPLE, BUT
MOST IMPORTANT, IT PROVIDED FOR AIR WHICH WAS RESPONSIVE TO THE
GROUND COMMANDER'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS.

UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE MAJORITY OF AIR IS SCHEDULED
THROUGH AN ELABORATE AND CENTRALIZED SYSTEM. IT REQUIRES THE
BATTALION COMMANDER TO FORECAST THE EXACT TARGETS HE WANTS
ATTACKED TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE.

UNDER 95-4, THE LEAD TIME FOR THE BATTALION WAS ABOUT 14 HOURS.
UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, THE SIMILAR BATTALIONS WERE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0960 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR NSIC
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THEIR TARGETS VARIES, DEPENDS ON THE QUALITY
OF COMMUNICATIONS. THIS MAY BE AS EARLY AS 1300 OR AS LATE AS 2100

IF COMMUNICATIONS ARE EXTREMELY GOOD, OR THE LIST OF REQUESTS IS
SHORT. IN EITHER CASE; HOWEVER, THE LEAD TIME IS ABOUT 36 TO

40 HOURS. A BATTALION COMMANDER MUST PREDICT ON MONDAY THE
PRECISE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TARGET HE WANTS HIT ON WEDNESDAY,
THE TIME HE WANTS IT HIT, AND THE ORDNANCE HE WILL NEED. THIS
CREATES AN OBVIOUSLY UNREALISTIC SITUATION.

THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY EXCESSIVE LEAD TIME INHERENT IN THE SMC
SYSTEM ARE AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT DOES NOT
PROVIDE FOR LATER ADD-ONS TO THE DAILY FRAG. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A
BATTALION COMMANDER DECIDES THIS AFTERNOON HE WOULD WANT A
COMPANY HELILIFT TOMORROW AT 1100, AND HE NEEDS A LANDING ZONE
PREPARATION, HIS ONLY CHOICE IS TO CALL FOR AN "IMMEDIATE".
HERE IS THE PATH FOLLOWED BY THE REQUEST UNDER THE MARINE SYSTEM
AND THE SYSTEM OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT:

(SLIDE 16 ON - METHOD OF REQ IMM MISS PRIOR)

UNDER 95-4, THE PROCESS WAS SIMPLE. THE AGENCY PERCEIVING A
NEED FOR AN AIR STRIKE WOULD CALL FOR IT FROM THE DECISION BASE,
WHICH WOULD DEVERT OR SCRABBLE AIRCRAFT, WHICHEVER WAS THE BEST

PAGE 8 OF 13 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0960 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO RESPONSIVE AND THE STRIKE WOULD BE RUN. OUR DASC MAINTAINED CURRENT, REAL TIME DATA ON THE GROUND SITUATION.

(SLIDE 16 OFF)

(SLIDE 17 ON - IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST AFTER 21 MARCH) IN THE CASE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, HERE IS HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS. FOR A 3D MARINE DIVISION BATTALION, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BATTALION TRANSMITS THE REQUEST FOR AIR TO THE DIVISION DASC, WHO PASSES IT TO THE PCV DASC WHO PASSES TO I DASC WHO PASSES TO 7TH AF TACC OR III MAF TADC, WHO DIVERTS OR SCRAMBLES AS THE SITUATION REQUIRES. AGENCIES AUTHORIZED TO DIVERT WILL NOT ALWAYS HAVE CURRENT GROUND SITUATION DATA AND WILL NOT BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO MAKE A DECISION. THE DECISION IS USUALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY AN AIR CONTROL DUTY CONTACT OFFICER WHOSE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GROUND TACTICAL SITUATION IS INCOMPLETE, WHO IS NOT IN POSITION TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF HIS DECISION ON THE GROUND ACTION, AND WHO, IN ANY CASE, HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EFFECT ON THE GROUND COMBAT OF HIS DIVERSION DECISION. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE DIVERT IS BY FAR THE LEAST DESIRABLE OF SUPPORT SORTIES, SINCE IT DEPRIVES ANOTHER GROUND COMMANDER OF A VITAL ELEMENT OF HIS TACTICAL PLAN, AND POSSIBLY AT A CRITICAL MOMENT. UNDER THE

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0960S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO MARINE SYSTEM WHEN AIRCRAFT WERE DIVERTED IT WAS THE GROUND COMMANDER WHO MADE THE DECISION, NOT THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(SLIDE 17 OFF)

OVERALL, SINGLE MANAGEMENT'S LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND TACTICAL SITUATION IS LARGELY A RESULT OF OVER CENTRALIZATION BEING PRIMARILY ORIENTATED TO THE SUPPLIER RATHER THAN THE CONSUMER, THE SYSTEM MAKES FOR CONVENIENT AND ORDERLY PROGRAMMING, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER. THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF SORTIES FRAGGED BY TYPE BEFORE AND AFTER SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

(SLIDE 18 ON - DISTRIBUTION OF FRAGGED PREPLANNED SORTIES) (FLIP DOWN)

BEFORE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ABOUT 85 PERCENT OF OUR AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WERE FRAGGED AND FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSUMER AND HIS SCHEME OF MANEUVER. THAT IS, THEY REPORTED TO THE AIR CONTROL AGENCY SUPPORTING THE CONSUMER AT THE REQUESTED TOT, WITH THE REQUESTED ORDNANCE AND BRIEFED ON THE GROUND SITUATION. THE REMAINING 15 PERCENT OF THE PRE-PLANNED SORTIES WERE FOR MISSIONS THAT COULD REASONABLY FORECAST SPECIFIC TARGETS. FOR EXAMPLE, A BRIDGE.

BT

PAGE 9 OF 13 PAGES

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 FM CG III MAF
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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(1ST FLIP UP)

AFTER SINGLE MANAGEMENT, VIRTUALLY ALL THE SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED AS PREPLANNED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NO MORE REALISTIC TO FORECAST TARGETS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE AFTER SINGLE MANAGEMENT THAN BEFORE. THE LOST EFFORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN CREATED BY THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT; AFTER A BATTALION UNDERWENT THE EFFORT OF IDENTIFYING AND TRANSMITTING SPECIFIC TARGETS, ONLY TWO THIRDS OF THOSE REQUESTED WERE FRAGGED, AND OF THESE LESS THAN HALF WERE HIT. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE BASIC RESPONSIVENESS OF THE AIR SUPPORT DECREASED WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE SORTIE SCHEDULED TO FIT THE GROUND UNIT SCHEME OF MANEUVER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NUMBER OF SCRABLES OF AIRCRAFT ON ALERT INCREASED BY 40 PERCENT SHOWING A REQUIREMENT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0961 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 FOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF THE FLEXIBILITY THEY HAD BEEN AFFORDED UNDER THE SYSTEM IN EFFECT UNDER 95-4. TAKING ALL THESE THINGS INTO ACCOUNT WE FOUND SINGLE MANAGEMENT OPERATION TO BE OVER CENTRALIZED AND HENCE INFERIOR FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RESPONSIVENESS.

(SLIDE 18 OFF)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

FIRST, AS A MARINE SERVICE COMMANDER, I CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM TO BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. THE MARINE DIVISION-WING TEAM WAS DESIGNED AS A BALANCED FORCE OF MEN AND WEAPONS INCLUDING AIR. IT WAS THEREFORE PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED TO INCLUDE INFANTRY, AIR AND ARTILLERY IN PRESCRIBED AMOUNTS AS ONE PACKAGE. THE PRESENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS REMOVED ONE ELEMENT OF THAT FORCE AND UNBALANCED THE PACKAGE.

2. MARINES HAVE LOST OUT ON TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE WITH THE ADDED DELAY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM, AND HAVE FOUND NO COMPENSATORY GAINS.

3. MARINES HAVE LOST OUT ON RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND

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SECRET

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0961 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 COMMANDER'S TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS BECAUSE OF THE GREATLY
 DECREASED NUMBER OF PREPLANNED SORTIES INTEGRATED INTO THE SCHEME
 OF MANEUVER.

SECOND, AS A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER, I HAVE NOT FOUND THAT THE
 NEW SYSTEM PROVIDES ANY ADVANTAGES AND IT HAS HAD THE FOLLOWING
 DISADVANTAGES:

1. JUST AS WITH THE MARINE DIVISIONS, THE ARMY DIVISIONS
 HAVE NOT RECEIVED PREPLANNED SORTIES THAT FITTED THE TACTICAL
 SITUATION AT THE TIME THE PLANES BECAME AVAILABLE. RECTIFYING
 THIS HAS REQUIRED A HIGH NUMBER OF DIVERTS AND SCRAMBLES. THE
 MARINE WING HAS ATTEMPTED TO KEEP UP WITH THIS REQUIREMENT BY
 CONTINUOUS REPLACEMENT OF SCRAMBLE PLANES ON THE HOT PAD AND
 THIS HAS RUN THE SORTIE RATE UP TO A LEVEL IMPOSSIBLE TO
 MAINTAIN ON A SUSTAINED BASIS. THIS METHOD OF MAKING UP FOR
 INAPPROPRIATE AND UNRESPONSIVE PREPLANNED SORTIES IS WASTEFUL
 OF OVERALL AIR EFFORT WITHIN ICTZ.

2. IT OVERCENTRALIZES THE CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS DEVOTED
 TO THE SUPPORT OF FORCES IN I CORPS, AND DEPRIVES THE JOINT
 FORCE COMMANDER OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A VITAL ELEMENT
 OF HIS COMMAND.

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0961 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

3. STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS WHICH ARE A BUILT-IN
 PART OF THE MARINE PORTION OF THE FORCE ARE DISTRIBUTED ON A
 ROUTINE BASIS TO OTHER UNITS IN THE FORCE WHICH HAVE OTHER MEANS
 OF FIRE SUPPORT. HENCE THERE IS A RESULTING IMBALANCE IN THE
 FORCE AS A WHOLE DURING ROUTINE DAY TO DAY COMBAT. IT WILL BE
 ACCENTUATED WHEN THE MARINE WING UNAVOIDABLY HAS TO DRIP TO A
 LOWER SORTIE RATE.

RECOMMENDATION

NOW THAT THE EMERGENCY CONDITIONS OF THE KHE SANH
 SITUATION AND THE BIRTH OF PROV CORPS V HAVE BEEN MET IT
 IS RECOMMENDED:

1). THAT THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE FIXED WING
 STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BE RETURNED TO CG III MAF
 UNDER THE NORMAL PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 05-4 OF
 28 JUNE 1966 AND.

2). THAT MACV 7TH AIR FORCE AND III MAF WORK OUT
 TOGETHER THOSE PROCEDURES WHICH UNDER THAT DIRECTIVE WILL
 ENSURE THAT ARMY FORCES IN III MAF WILL RECEIVE THAT SHARE
 OF AVAILABLE AIR ASSETS DEMANDED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION
 AND DESIRED BY COMUSMACV. UNQUOTE

PAGE 11 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0061 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCO

2. SLIDES UTILIZED:

(SLIDE 2)

MARINE AIR MUST DO THESE JOBS FOR THE RIFLEMAN
 & DEFEND THE SKY ABOVE HIM
 & DESTROY THE ENEMY BEFORE HIM
 & DELIVER HIM INTO BATTLE
 & RESUPPLY HIM

(SLIDE 3)

MINIMUM ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL
 SYSTEM

& MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE
 & MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER
 & MUST IMPOSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND DELAY
 & MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO TACTICAL NEEDS

(SLIDE 4)

& MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH MARINE EQUIPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE

(SLIDE 5)

MARINE CORPS TACTICAL PACKAGE IN I CTZ

20 MARCH 1968

FOX HOLE STRENGTH

20,736

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0061 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCO

TRANSPORT AND OBS HELO

276 TRANS / 60 OBS

FIXED WING STRIKE ACFT

150

(SLIDE 6)

ARMY AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL PACKAGE IN I CTZ

FOXHOLE STRENGTH

17,118

TRANSPORT HELOS

479 TRANS

FIRE SUPPORT HELOS

134

FIXED WING STRIKE ACFT

132

(SLIDE 7)

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS TACTICAL PACKAGES IN I CTZ

20 MARCH 1968

MARINE

AUTHORIZED

ARMY/AIR FORCE

20,736

FOXHOLE STRENGTH

17,118

276 TRANS/60 OBS

TRANSPORT AND OBS

479 TRANS

HELOS

159

FIXED WING STRIKE ACFT

132

FIRE SUPPORT HELOS

134

(SLIDE 8 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)

(SLIDE 9 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)

(SLIDE 10 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)

BT

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 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 5 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN FOR
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 (SLIDE 11)
 & MUST INTEGRATE AIR WITH OTHER FIRES AND GROUND MANEUVER
 (SLIDE 12)
 INTEGRATION OF AIR WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS
 --THE MARINE AIR GROUND CONTROL SYSTEM COORDINATES SUPPORTING
 FIRES, HELICOPTER MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.
 --THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ADDS COMPLEXITY AND COMMUNICA-
 TION DELAYS WITHOUT ACHIEVING AN ADEQUATE SAVE A PLANE
 PROGRAM
 (SLIDE 13)
 & MUST IMPOSE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND DELAY
 (SLIDE 14 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)
 (SLIDE 15)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0965 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO
 & MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO TACTICAL NEEDS
 (SLIDES 16, 17, 18 WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY COC TELECON)
 GP-4
 BT

PAGE 13 OF 13 PAGES

SECRET

#31

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAY FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR			FM III MAF		21 MAY 68	
A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE		21 MAY 68	
C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION			DEGREE MAY 68		2, 2 & 3	
I-INFORMATION			COPIES		OF 1 COPIES REC'D	
S-SIGNATURE						
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/7		[Signature]	REMARKS
3	DCG		5/7		[Signature]	
H	DCG AIR		5/7	15	[Signature]	
	C/S		5/7		[Signature]	
	D C/S		5/15		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	070720			DKU	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"#2 & 3 Burned
6 Nov 68"

May Gen Stewart

SECRET

W E T NOFORN

LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
RVN LEAVE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR TET 1968

A. COMUSMACV 030006Z MAY68

1. IAW REF A FOL INFO PROVIDED RE SUBJ.

2. EFFORTS WERE MADE THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH ARVN COUNTERPARTS BY UNIT ADVISORS THROUGHOUT ICTZ, PRIOR TO TET OFFENSIVE, TO DISCOURAGE AND LIMIT ABSENCES DURING TET BASED UPON VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY COMUSMACV ON 27JAN68 DURING VISIT TO ICTZ, EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE EFFORTS VARIED AMONG UNITS AND IS ESTIMATED IN PAR 3. INFO COPY OF MEMO OF 11JAN68, JGS/RVNAF, SUBJ: PREVENTIVE MEASURES AGAINST AWOL AND DESERTION DURING TET SEASON, WAS RECEIVED BY THIS HQ DISSEMINATED BY MACV LTR. OF 25JAN68 BUT NOT UNTIL 29JAN68; TOO LATE FOR TIMELY DISTRIBUTION TO ADVISORS PRIOR TO TET OFFENSIVE. ADDITIONALLY, DURING WEEK PRIOR TO TET OFFENSIVE, ADVISORS STRESSED ENEMY BUILDUP IN AREA AND IMPRESSED UPON ARVN NECESSITY TO REMAIN COMPLETELY ALERT.

3. PERCENTAGE ABSENT AT COMMENCEMENT OF TET:

	1ST DIV	2D DIV	31ST REG
AUFLV AND PASSES	18	23	14
UNAU H LV	3	4	2
TOTAL	21	27	16

DOES NOT INCLUDE PERSONNEL ON LOCAL PASS (VCCG) WHO DID NOT REJOIN UNITS AT START OF OFFENSIVE FOR VARIOUS REASONS.

4. THERE WAS NO DEFINITE FORM OF RECALL SYSTEM IN EFFECT.

5. RETURNEES AT THE ONSET OF THE TET OFFENSIVE (BEST ESTIMATE)

A. 1ST DIV - 200

B. 2D DIV - 400

C. 31ST REG - 150

6. MANY OTHER ARVN PERSONNEL DESIRED TO RETURN TO THEIR UNITS AT ONSET OF TET OFFENSIVE BUT COULD NOT BECAUSE OF A SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORTATION AND CLOSED LOCS.

GP-3

350

SECRET

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 4 MAY 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 040316Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		5/4		Q	
	D C/S		5/4		M	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	041320			PHW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	S&C					
Maj Gen Stewart Has seen. 042150H						

TOP SECRET #16

TOP SECRET

O 040316Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE

O 030452Z MAY 68
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
 TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON
 ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
 INFO AMB BUNKER SAIGON
 AMB SULLIVAN VIENTIANE LAOS
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG

HAS BEEN ~~CLASSIFIED~~
EXCLUSIVE

BT

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS PRAIRIE FIRE IVY TREE MAC 5817
 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS (U)

1. (TS) AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION IN BASE AREA 607 IN CONJUNCTION WITH OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 WAS SOUGHT ON THE

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0376 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 BASIS THAT A HAYMAKER-SIZE INCURSION INTO THIS AREA WOULD HAVE A STRONG CHANCE OF REMAINING UNDISCOVERED BY THE NEWS MEDIA. TODAY, I CANNOT GIVE THAT ASSURANCE.

2. (TS) NEWSMEN HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO EXPLORE OUR COURSES OF ACTION AND ARE PROBING TO DETERMINE OUR INTENTIONS OF EXPANDING DELAWARE/LAM SON 216. SUFFICIENT INDICATORS EXIST WHICH SHOW THAT WE ARE, AT THIS TIME, UNABLE TO PREVENT REPORTERS FROM DEDUCING OUR LAOTIAN OPERATIONS, AND IT IS NOW OBVIOUS THAT WE WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DENY CATEGORICALLY THE INVOLVEMENT OF SIZEABLE FORCES IN LAOS IF QUERIED BY THE PRESS. THE MILITARY GAIN RESULTING FROM A SUCCESSFUL FORAY INTO BASE AREA 607 DOES NOT APPEAR SUFFICIENT TO OFFSET THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC EMBARRASSMENT WHICH THE DISCLOSURE OF THE OPERATION COULD CAUSE AT THIS TIME.

3. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I HAVE DECIDED TO CANCEL THE HAYMAKER-SIZE OPERATION IN BASE AREA 607, AS AN EXTENSION OF OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 216.

4. (TS) WE WILL CONTINUE OUR RECONNAISSANCE OF BASE AREA 607 THROUGH NORMAL PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS. IF RECONNAISSANCE SUGGESTS THAT THERE WILL BE A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO THE COMMIT-

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0376 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 MENT OF A BATTALION SIZE FORCE INTO BASE AREA 607, I WILL PROPOSE A SEPARATE PLAN FOR AN OPERATION WHICH WILL BE LAUNCHED FROM A SITE OTHER THAN A SHAU, AND WHICH CAN BE MORE EASILY SCREENED FROM THE PRESS.

GP-1
 UNQUOTE
 GP-1
 BT

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 4 MAY 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 040318Z MAY 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE
2	DCG		5/4		DL	
3	DCG AIR		5/5		DL	
1.	C/S		5/4		DL	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	041320			DHW.	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SBC					

My Gen Stehler

TOP SECRET

#17

TOP SECRET**HAS BEEN SENT****EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUMHMB
 DE RUMSAK 0377 1250318
 ZNY TTTT
 O 040318Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 RUMHVF/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON AND MSBN
 TOMPKINS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. IN CONFIRMATION OF OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY, IT IS MY
 OPINION THAT ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND A STUDY OF OUR RECENT
 CONTACTS INDICATES THAT WITHIN 3D MARDIV AO, THE ENEMY HAS
 LESSENED THE PRESSURE FROM THE LAOS BORDER TO THE CAMP CARROLL
 AREA AND HAS CONCENTRATED HIS FORCES IN THE DONG HA AREA AND
 TO A LESSER EXTENT IN THE QUANG TRI-BASE AREA 101 AREA.

2. AN OPPORTUNITY IS PRESENTED TO DEFEAT THE 320TH NVA
 DIVISION AND ASSOCIATED UNITS AND IT IS DESIRED THAT THE AP-
 PROPRIATE CONCENTRATION OF OUR FORCES BE MADE AND THE NECESSARY
 OFFENSIVE ACTIONS BE CONDUCTED. THE QUANG TRI-BASE AREA 101-
 WUNDER BEACH AREA MUST CONTINUE TO BE PROTECTED.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**TOP SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5210 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	DATE 04 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 040906Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		5/5		[Signature]	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS FOR EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT <i>"2 burned 6 Nov 68"</i>
3	DCG				[Signature]	
4	DCG AIR				[Signature]	
1.	C/S		5/6		[Signature]	
	D C/S		5/6		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	042245			DKW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

29

SECRET

SECRET

FILE 37

GCN 842

		FROM CG III MAP	DATE 04 MAY 68
		SERIAL# 848966Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
5/4	DtW egn	DATE	SIGNATURE
5/4	<i>[Signature]</i>		
5/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
5/6	NS Anderson (Hudson)		
5/6	DtW on		
8/8	COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
8/8	TAPE & MAT		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PP RUHKM
DE RUMSAK 0418 1250906
ZNY SSSSS
P 040906Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN
KRULAK FROM LGEN CUSHMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. I HAVE SENT THE FOLLOWING TO GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO
ADM SHARP:

QUOTE:

P 040902Z MAY 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM
SHARP, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

A. CG III MAF 221340Z APR68

B. COMUSMACV 300330Z APR68

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0418 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

1. (C) REFERENCE A RECORDED MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
SUBJECT SYSTEM IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS,
BASED ON A THIRTY-DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM DURING
THE PERIOD 22MAR-21APR68. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF THE SYSTEM
HAS CONTINUED AND I HAVE CONFIRMED MY OPINIONS BASED ON
FURTHER EVALUATION DURING THE PERIOD 1-30APR68. AS A RESULT
OF THIS FURTHER REVIEW, I REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE VALIDITY OF
MY VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REF A, BUT DESIRE TO AMPLIFY SOME OF
THEM AS FOLLOWS:

A. (C) SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(1)(C): RESPONSE TIMES TO RE-
QUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES HAVE IMPROVED; HOWEVER, THIS HAS
BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY UTILIZING THE PROCEDURE OF DIVERTING
AIRCRAFT FROM PREPLANNED TARGETS AND SUBSEQUENTLY COVERING
THOSE PREPLANNED TARGETS WITH SCRAMBLE AIRCRAFT, PRIMARILY
MARINE CORPS. THE MARINE SYSTEM HAS LONG UTILIZED THIS
PROCEDURE, BUT WITH LESS FREQUENCY AND GREATER DISCRETION.
NEVERTHELESS, WHEN DIVERTS WERE NECESSARY, THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHED
BY ORGANIC MARINE AGENCIES WHICH WERE COMPLETELY COGNIZANT OF
THE CURRENT GROUND SITUATION AND, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO
DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF THE DIVERT ON THE GROUND ACTION.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

SECRET

RUMSAK 0418 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E M C E O

NOTWITHSTANDING THIS MODICUM OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE RESPONSE TIME FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES, THE UNWIELDY AND TIME-CONSUMING PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING PREPLANNED STRIKES STILL EXIST.

B. (S) SUBPARA 3B(2)(A): I'M HAPPY TO REPORT THAT THE NEW SYSTEM IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE INHERENT CAPABILITIES OF OUR MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES TO COORDINATE AIR WITH GROUND MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. HOWEVER, IN AREAS OF I CORPS OUTSIDE OF WHERE MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES FUNCTION, THIS ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY COORDINATE FIRES DOES NOT EXIST. SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES PREVAIL IN THOSE AREAS, WHEREBY THE FIRING UNIT PASSES ARTILLERY INFORMATION THROUGH ONE OR MORE AGENCIES TO A MORE DISTANT COMBAT REPORTING CENTER FOR DISSEMINATION. THESE PROCEDURES INVOLVE INHERENT DELAYS AND AIRCRAFT CAN BE OPERATING IN AREAS WHERE IMMEDIATE ARTILLERY FIRE MISSIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED, WITHOUT RECEIVING THE NECESSARY WARNINGS.

C. (C) SUBPARA 3B(3): ADD AN ADDITIONAL SUBPARA (C) AS FOLLOWS:

(C) ADDITIONAL REPORTS ARE NOW REQUIRED. THE WORKLOAD

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0418 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E M C E O INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE CONSOLIDATED RVN MISSION REPORT, INSTITUTED BY 7TH AF LETTER OF 2 APRIL 1968, REQUIRES THE SERVICES OF ELEVEN (11) ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL IN THE WING AND AIRCRAFT GROUP 3-SECTIONS. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE ADDITIVE TO THE FIFTEEN (15) MARINE OFFICERS AND TEN (10) MARINE ENLISTED REQUIRED AT THE TACC, TASE, I DASC, DASC-V, AND III MAF TARC AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THREE (3) USA OFFICERS AND TWO (2) USA ENLISTED ARE ALSO REQUIRED AT III MAF TARC, BUT THE ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO MAN THE OTHER MENTIONED AGENCIES IS NOT KNOWN.

D. (S) SUBPARA 3B(4): I WISH TO EMPHASIZE MY CONTINUED CONCERN REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT IN ICTZ. DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL, THE NUMBER OF MARINE AIRCRAFT FRAGGED FOR SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ INCREASED ALMOST DAILY WHILE AIR FORCE SORTIES REMAINED SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE PROGRAMMED LEVEL ESTABLISHED FOR ARMY BATTALIONS.

2. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I AGAIN STRONGLY URGE THAT MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME AND THAT THE WORKABLE PROCEDURES

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 0418 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E M C E O OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR DIRECTIVE CONTAINED IN REF 3, I WILL BE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON MY VIEWS AT 081000H AT YOUR HQTRS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#29

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM CG 111 MAF	DATE 04 MAY 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 040902Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG			5/5		REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR FOR HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG			5/6		
	DCG AIR			5/6		
	C/S			5/9		
	D C/S			1/6		
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	042245			DRW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

FILE 37 DCN 040

		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 04MAY 68
		SERIAL# 040902Z MAY 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT SPEGAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
5/4	<i>D. Wagon</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
5/4	<i>[Signature]</i>		
5/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
5/15	<i>[Signature]</i>		
5/6	<i>NJ Anderson Has Sen</i>		
5/6	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
S/S	TAPE & MAT		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 0417 1250902
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 040902Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 INFO ZEN/CINCPAC
 BT

**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, INFO ADM
 SHARP, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS (U)

A. CG III MAF 221340Z APR68

B. COMUSMACV 300330Z APR68

1. (C) REFERENCE A RECORDED MY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
 SUBJECT SYSTEM IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS,
 BASED ON A THIRTY-DAY OBSERVATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM DURING
 THE PERIOD 22MAR-21APR68. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF THE SYSTEM
 HAS CONTINUED AND I HAVE CONFIRMED MY OPINIONS BASED ON
 FURTHER EVALUATION DURING THE PERIOD 1-30APR68. AS A RESULT
 OF THIS FURTHER REVIEW, I REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE VALIDITY OF
 MY VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REF A, BUT DESIRE TO AMPLIFY SOME OF
 THEM AS FOLLOWS:

A. (C) SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(1)(C): RESPONSE TIMES TO RE-

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0417 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 QUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES HAVE IMPROVED; HOWEVER, THIS HAS
 BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY UTILIZING THE PROCEDURE OF DIVERTING
 AIRCRAFT FROM PREPLANNED TARGETS AND SUBSEQUENTLY COVERING
 THOSE PREPLANNED TARGETS WITH SCRAMBLE AIRCRAFT, PRIMARILY
 MARINE CORPS. THE MARINE SYSTEM HAS LONG UTILIZED THIS
 PROCEDURE, BUT WITH LESS FREQUENCY AND GREATER DISCRETION.
 NEVERTHELESS, WHEN DIVERTS WERE NECESSARY, THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHED
 BY ORGANIC MARINE AGENCIES WHICH WERE COMPLETELY COGNIZANT OF
 THE CURRENT GROUND SITUATION AND, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO
 DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF THE DIVERT ON THE GROUND ACTION.
 NOTWITHSTANDING THIS MODICUM OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE RESPONSE
 TIME FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKES, THE UNWIELDY AND TIME-CONSUMING
 PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING PREPLANNED STRIKES STILL EXIST.

B. (S) SUBPARA 3B(2)(A): I'M HAPPY TO REPORT THAT THE
 NEW SYSTEM IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE INHERENT CAPABILITIES
 OF OUR MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES TO COORDINATE AIR WITH
 GROUND
 MANEUVER AND SUPPORTING ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. HOWEVER,
 IN AREAS OF I CORPS OUTSIDE OF WHERE MARINE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES
 FUNCTION, THIS ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY COORDINATE FIRES DOES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

28

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 0417 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 NOT EXIST. SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES PREVAIL IN THOSE AREAS,
 WHEREBY THE FIRING UNIT PASSES ARTILLERY INFORMATION THROUGH ONE
 OR MORE AGENCIES TO A MORE DISTANT COMBAT REPORTING CENTER FOR
 DISSEMINATION. THESE PROCEDURES INVOLVE INHERENT DELAYS AND
 AIRCRAFT CAN BE OPERATING IN AREAS WHERE IMMEDIATE ARTILLERY
 FIRE MISSIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED, WITHOUT RECEIVING THE
 NECESSARY WARNINGS.

C. (C) SUBPARA 3B(3): ADD AN ADDITIONAL SUBPARA (C)
 AS FOLLOWS:

(C) ADDITIONAL REPORTS ARE NOW REQUIRED. THE WORKLOAD
 INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE CONSOLIDATED RVN MISSION
 REPORT, INSTITUTED BY 7TH AF LETTER OF 2 APRIL 1968, REQUIRES
 THE SERVICES OF ELEVEN (11) ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL IN THE WING
 AND AIRCRAFT GROUP 3-SECTIONS. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE ADDITIVE
 TO THE FIFTEEN (15) MARINE OFFICERS AND TEN (10) MARINE ENLISTED
 REQUIRED AT THE TACC, TASE, I DASC, DASC-V, AND III MAF TARC
 AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THREE (3)
 USA OFFICERS AND TWO (2) USA ENLISTED ARE ALSO REQUIRED AT
 III MAF TARC, BUT THE ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE
 PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO MAN THE OTHER MENTIONED AGENCIES IS NOT

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 0417 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 KNOWN.

D. (S) SUBPARA 3B(4): I WISH TO EMPHASIZE MY CONTINUED
 CONCERN REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR EFFORT IN ICTZ.
 DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL, THE NUMBER OF MARINE AIRCRAFT
 FRAGGED FOR SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ INCREASED ALMOST
 DAILY WHILE AIR FORCE SORTIES REMAINED SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW
 THE PROGRAMMED LEVEL ESTABLISHED FOR ARMY BATTALIONS.

2. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I AGAIN STRONGLY URGE THAT
 MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN
 III MAF BE RETURNED TO ME AND THAT THE WORKABLE PROCEDURES
 OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REINSTITUTED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR DIRECTIVE CONTAINED IN REF B, I WILL
 BE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON MY VIEWS AT 081030H AT YOUR HQTRS.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#28

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE****FOR HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUHKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 0413 1250810
 ZNY CCCCC
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 040810Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD WAS PREPARED BY
 NORM ANDERSON AND IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
 1. AT APPROXIMATELY 1000, 2 MAY 1968 GENERAL MOMYER, COMMANDER
 7TH AIR FORCE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROSSON, COMMANDER PROV CORPS V;
 MAJOR GENERAL RAY DAVIS, DEPUTY COMMANDER, PCV; BRIGADIER GENERAL
 BOLT, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS, 7TH AIR FORCE; COLONEL
 PHELPS, USA, DIRECTOR TASE, SAIGON; COLONEL HENDERSON, USAF, OIC
 DASC-V, AND I CONFERRED AT HEADQUARTERS, PCV ON THE BASIC SUBJECT.
 INITIALLY THE MEETING HAD BEEN SCHEDULED BETWEEN GENERAL MOMYER AND
 GENERAL ROSSON, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MARINE
 CORPS, CG, III MAF DIRECTED MY PRESENCE WITH THE APPROVAL OF

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0413 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

2. GENERAL MOMYER PRESIDED AND COMMENCED THE DISCUSSION BY
 REMARKING THAT A REVIEW OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AFTER 30
 DAYS OF IMPLEMENTATION HAD BEEN DIRECTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
 DETERMINING WHAT FLAWS EXISTED IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND
 HOW TO CORRECT THEM. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT HIS INTERPRET-
 ATION OF THIS PROVISIO DIFFERS FROM MINE IN THAT I WOULD HAVE
 THOUGHT THE INTENT WAS TO REVIEW THE 30 DAYS TO DETERMINE
 WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH SINGLE MANAGEMENT.) AT ANY
 RATE, COMUSMACV HAS DIRECTED AN EVALUATION REPORT BE PRESENTED TO
 HIM NEXT WEDNESDAY, 3 MAY 1968. IN THIS CONNECTION, GENERAL MOMYER
 INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH SINGLE MANAGEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT ON THE
 10TH OF MARCH, THE EVALUATION WILL COVER PERFORMANCES FROM 1 THRU
 30 APRIL BECAUSE FULL IMPLEMENTATION WAS A GRADUAL MATTER. AS WITH
 ALL NEW SYSTEMS, HE SAID, A SHAKEDOWN PERIOD IS
 NECESSARY.

3. GENERAL MOMYER REMARKED THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT HAD BEEN
 ASKED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND TO EXAMINE AND REPORT TO HIM ALL AIR
 MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS WHILE IN THE III MAF AREA. THIS GENERAL WALT
 DID. FURTHER HE WAS ASKED WHEN HE RETURNED TO SAIGON TO SEE

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MDCO
 NEED AND DO RELY ON MORE FIXED WING HABITUALLY. GENERAL MOMYER
 ASSERTED THAT HIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL ALLEVIATE THIS
 PROBLEM. HE WOULD SHOW IN 7TH AIR FORCE FRAG A SET NUMBER OF
 SORTIES DAILY RESERVED FOR USE AS ESCORT FOR HELICOPTERS.

6. THE SUBJECT OF DIVERTS WAS NEXT ADDRESSED. IT SEEMED
 AGREED BY ALL, INCLUDING GENERAL MOMYER, THAT PRE-PLANNING MERELY
 RESULTS IN PLACING A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF AIR EFFORT AIRBORNE AND
 AVAILABLE FOR ANY USE A SPECIFIC GROUND COMMANDER MAY WISH. IT
 APPEARED THAT GENERAL MOMYER AND GENERAL BOLT HAVE SOME INTENTIONS
 OF REDUCING THE TIME DELAYS IN THE PRE-PLANNING PROCESS,
 A WEAKNESS WHICH GENERAL ROSSON EMPHASIZED HEAVILY, SAYING THE
 SYSTEM IS TOO PONDEROUS BUT WE ARE TRYING TO MAKE IT WORK. GENERAL
 MOMYER AGREED THAT EVERYONE HAS DONE A GOOD JOB SO FAR IN TRYING
 TO MAKE IT WORK.

7. ADDRESSING THE SUBJECT OF SUITABLE ORDNANCE, GENERAL MOMYER
 SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS A FRAG MODIFICATION RECEIVED ABOUT 6 HOURS
 PRIOR TO TOT MIGHT SPECIFY THE ORDNANCE LOAD TO BE CARRIED. I
 INDICATED THAT IT'S MY EXPERIENCE THAT DOWN-LOADING OF ORDNANCE
 AND SUBSTITUTING ANOTHER IS MUCH TOO WASTEFUL OF MANPOWER.
 A SUPERIOR SOLUTION, I STATED, WAS TO HAVE STRIP ALERT AIRCRAFT

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 0413 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MDCO
 PRE-LOADED WITH VARIOUS DESIRED TYPES OF ORDNANCE.

8. THE DISCUSSION CONTINUED AFTER GENERAL MOMYER INQUIRED FROM
 ALL PARTICIPANTS IF THEY HAD ANY FURTHER SUBJECTS TO OFFER.
 EXCEPT FOR A REFERENCE MADE BY COLONEL PHELPS TO THE DESIRE OF THE
 3D MARINE DIVISION FOR MORE NIGHT TPO'S, THERE WAS NO
 CONSTRUCTIVE THOUGHT ADDED.

9. THE TENOR OF THIS DISCUSSION LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE
 AIR FORCE KNOWS IT IS IN SOME TROUBLE ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND IS
 WILLING TO MODIFY THE SYSTEM, IN MAJOR RESPECTS IF NECESSARY, TO
 KEEP THE SYSTEM IN FORCE. THERE WAS A STATED WILLINGNESS ON THE
 PART OF GENERAL MOMYER TO ADJUST IN ORDER TO CORRECT THE
 DISADVANTAGE OF LONG LEAD TIME, THE DISADVANTAGE OF IMPROPER
 ORDNANCE, AND EVEN THE DISADVANTAGE OF NOT PROVIDING SUFFICIENT
 FLEXIBILITY FOR THE MARINES TO PLAN THEIR SUPPORT OF HELICOPTER
 OPERATIONS WITH PRACTICAL CERTAINTY. I FEEL 7TH AIR FORCE WILL GO
 TO ANY LENGTH TO MAINTAIN THE AIR CONTROL AND SCHEDULING AUTHORITY
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT GIVES THEM. IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE OF ACCOMMODA-
 TION WE WILL BE HARD PRESSED TO OBTAIN A REVERSAL OF THE DECISION
 TO IMPLEMENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT. SINCE OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO REGAIN
 THE CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF MARINE GROUND AND AIR UNITS AND

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

OO RUHKN RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 0439 1250810
 ZNY CCCCC
 PAC -I- CMC
 O 040810Z MAY 68
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN
 CUSKMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 RESOURCES WHICH WE FORMERLY ENJOYED, WE SHOULD EXAMINE WITH
 GREAT CARE THE POINTS WE MAKE ON THE 8TH OF MAY TO INSURE THAT WE
 RETAIN THE GREATEST POSSIBLE IMPACT FOR LATER CONSIDERATION BY
 HIGHER AUTHORITY.

UNQUOTE
 WARM REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM LTOEN CUSHMAN
CG						SERIAL 011545ZMAY8 1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPY # OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT PRESS BRIEF
DCG AIR						REMARKS Copy # 2 To Press Delaware File 5 May 88 Th CIB Copy # 3 <u>K. E. Farer</u>
C/S						
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						CONFIDENTIAL

#26

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		5/2		lp	LTGEN CUSHMAN
DCG	3		5/2		gk	SERIAL 011545ZMAY8
DCG AIR	4			4	gk	1, 2, AND 4 OF 4 COPY # OF COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	1		5/2		Q	SUBJECT PRESS BRIEF
DC/S			5/4		mk	REMARKS For 9/5. CIB will have to reproduce after approval or modifications are received from WCV. gk
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			020720		JKW	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
 C - COMMENTS
 I - INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO SSO PCV

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION ONE OF TWO
 LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, LTGEN ROSSON, BGEN SIDLE.
 THE FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED PRESS BRIEF I INTEND TO PRESENT
 AT III MAF CIB AT 021500H. ALSO, I INTEND TO PROVIDE COMPLETE
 LIST OF CAPTURED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT TOGETHER WITH A
 DISPLAY OF MORE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS. REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF
 FOLLOWING TEXT:

GENTLEMEN, LET ME START OFF BY SAYING THAT I AM AS HAPPY TO GIVE
 THIS BRIEFING TODAY AS YOU MAY BE TO RECEIVE IT, FOR TWO REASONS:
 FIRST, IT IS A MEANS OF LETTING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW THAT OUR
 FORCES ARE BACK IN THE AREA WHERE WE HAVEN'T OPERATED IN OVER TWO
 YEARS. AND SECOND, THIS MEETING PROVIDES ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO
 PERSONALLY AND EARNESTLY REQUEST YOUR COOPERATION IN MAIN-
 TAINING A TIGHTER SECURITY THAN WE HAVE PRACTICED HERETOFORE.
 THE REASON FOR THE SECURITY IS SIMPLY THAT THE ENEMY IN THE PAST
 HAS OBTAINED INFORMATION FROM OUR PRESS RELEASES THAT HE COULDN'T
 ACHIEVE IN ANY OTHER WAY. ADDITIONALLY, IF THE ENEMY IS PROVIDED
 SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT UNITS, LOCATIONS, CASUALTIES AND MATERIAL
 LOSSES, IT COULD AID HIM IN HIS EFFORTS IN THIS OPERATION. THE
 LOCATION OF THIS OPERATION AND THE DESIRE FOR MAXIMUM SUCCESS
 IS THE REAL REASON GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS EMBARGOED THE DELAWARE
 OPERATION. ANOTHER WAY TO PUT IT IS THAT WE DESIRE TO MAKE EVERY
 EFFORT TO SAFEGUARD AMERICAN LIVES ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE, AND I
 KNOW THAT YOU JOIN US IN THIS EFFORT. MY BRIEFING WILL COVER THE
 PERIOD FROM 21 APRIL THROUGH 30 APRIL - THE PERIOD FROM 1 MAY IS
 STILL EMBARGOED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND.
 FOR PURPOSES OF EMPHASIS I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY REMIND YOU OF SOME
 OF THE GROUND RULES APPLICABLE IN THIS OPERATION.

1. UNIT DESIGNATIONS WILL BE USED ONLY DOWN TO DIVISION LEVEL.
2. SPECIFIC UNIT LOCATIONS ARE EMBARGOED.
3. UNIT STRENGTHS ARE EMBARGOED.
4. OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD AND LANDING ZONE LOCATIONS AND NAMES
 ARE EMBARGOED. USE OF GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS, NOT NAMES, IS PERMISSABLE.
5. DETAILED CASUALTIES AND HELICOPTER LOSSES ARE EMBARGOED AND WILL
 BE SPECIFIED AS LIGHT, MODERATE, OR HEAVY EVEN THOUGH YOU MAY HAVE EXACT
 FIGURES FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION OR OTHER SOURCES.

ENEMY SITUATION

THE A SHAU VALLEY AND ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY SERVES AS A LARGE
 LOGISTICS COMPLEX AND SUPPLY ROUTE FOR ENEMY FORCES OPERATING
 IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE AND NORTHERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THE VALLEY
 IS ALSO CONSIDERED A WELL

...SCHEDULE OF AIRCRAFT POSITIONS ALONG THE RIDGES OF THE VALLEY. FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT CAME UNDER INCREASED ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. THERE WERE SIGHTINGS OF WHEELED AND TRACKED VEHICLES BOTH IN THE VALLEY AND ALONG HIGHWAY 547, 547A.

OUR ESTIMATE OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE A SHAU VALLEY AREA INCLUDED A SIZEABLE FORCE OF ENGINEERS SUPPORTED BY SECURITY TROOPS AND AN UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF ARTY AND ARMOR.

OPERATION DELAWARE/LAMSON 216 COMMENCED ON 19 APRIL (D-DAY) - THE OPERATION INVOLVED ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV, ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIV, AN ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE AND ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION.

MISSION.

TO CONDUCT A SPOILING ATTACK INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY BY THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV WITH ELEMENTS OF 1ST ARVN DIVISION, WHILE ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION AND THE ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO THE WEST ALONG ROUTE 547.

BY A MACV PRESS RELEASE OF 28 APRIL, YOU WERE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE OPERATION FOR THE PERIOD 19 TO 21 APRIL. TO-DAY I WILL UPDATE THAT INFORMATION COMMENCING WITH D-2, 21 APRIL.

D-2 (21 APRIL)

IN A SHAU VALLEY UNITS IMPROVED THEIR LANDING ZONES AND BROUGHT IN SUPPLIES. CONTACT WAS LIGHT. TWO ENEMY BULLDOZERS WERE DESTROYED NEAR ONE LANDING ZONE. ADDITIONAL TROOPS OF THE 101ST WERE AIRLIFTED INTO A LANDING ZONE ALONG ROUTE 547.

D-3 (22 APRIL)

ELEMENTS OF THE AIR CAV DIVISION AIR ASSAULTED ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE VALLEY WITH LIGHT CONTACT. ADDITIONAL ARVN ELEMENTS WERE LANDED IN THE 547 AREA. MODERATE TO HEAVY CONTACT CONTINUED IN THIS AREA THROUGHOUT THE DAY.

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CONFIDENTIAL FINAL SECTION OF TWO
LTGEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN WESTMORELAND, LTGEN ROSSON, BGEN SIDLE.
D-4 (23 APRIL)

THE ENEMY ATTACKED ONE OF THE NORTHERN AIR CAV LANDING ZONES WITH
MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS IN THE MORNING. 155MM HOWITZERS OF THE
1ST AIR CAV DIV WERE AIRLIFTED INTO THE AREA. DURING THE DAY ELEMENTS
OF THE 101ST AND THE ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE HAD 16 CONTACTS
RESULTING IN 48 ENEMY KILLED. THE 101ST BEGAN DEVELOPING A FIRE
SUPPORT BASE. ARVN AIRBORNE TROOPS ALSO LOCATED A LARGE AMMO CACHE.

D-5 (24 APRIL)

ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV ASSAULTED INTO THE NORTH CENTRAL
PORTION OF THE VALLEY. WEATHER HAMPERED OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY
AND REMAINING CAV UNITS IN THE VALLEY IMPROVED THEIR POSITIONS.
WEATHER ALSO LIMITED 101ST ACTIONS AND ARVN ACTIONS ALONG ROUTE 547.

D-6 (25 APRIL)

ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE OF THE AIR CAV DIV ASSAUL-
TED INTO THE NORTHERN CENTRAL PORTION OF THE VALLEY. 5 ENEMY
TRUCKS WERE DESTROYED AND A LARGE CACHE OF WEAPONS WAS DISCOVERED.
101ST ACTION CONTINUED MODERATE WITH THE FORCE ENGAGING 2 NVA
COMPANIES KILLING 22 ENEMY. A LATER CONTACT THAT DAY RESULTED IN
28 ENEMY KILLED. A TOTAL OF 30 CONTACTS WERE REPORTED DURING
THE DAY.

D-7 (26 APRIL)

BUILD UP IN THE NORTH CENTRAL PORTION CONTINUED WITH C-130 AIR
DROPS. MODERATE CONTACT CONTINUED IN THE ROUTE 547 AREA WITH ONE
101ST CONTACT ACCOUNTING FOR 13 ENEMY KILLED AND 12 WEAPONS CAP-
TURED.

D-8 (27 APRIL)

IN THE VALLEY, POOR WEATHER CONDITIONS LIMITED GROUND ACTION TO
VERY LIGHT AND SPORADIC CONTACT. IN A LANDING ZONE NORTH OF ROUTE
547, AN ARVN AIRBORNE UNIT CALLED IN AN ARTILLERY MISSION ON 80
NVA, KILLING 56.

D-9 (28 APRIL)

POOR WEATHER CONTINUED TO RESTRICT OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY. ELE-
MENTS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION WERE AIR LIFTED INTO THE CENTRAL
PORTION OF THE VALLEY WITHOUT INCIDENT. ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY WAS
AIR LIFTED INTO THE VALLEY AND THE LOGISTIC BUILDUP CONTINUED.
ONE 101ST UNIT DISCOVERED AN ENEMY BASE CAMP WITH A LARGE CACHE
OF AMMUNITION. THE BASE CAMP APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN HASTILY
EVACUATED.

D-10 (29 APRIL)

THE AIR CAV BUILDUP CONTINUED IN THE VALLEY WITH MARGINAL WEATHER.
ANOTHER 155MM HOWITZER UNIT WAS AIR LIFTED INTO THE VALLEY. SIX ENEMY
TRUCKS WERE DESTROYED BY TAC AIR. CONTACTS REMAINED SCATTERED
AND LIGHT. OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST DIVISION WERE AIR LIFTED

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FRIENDLY CASUALTIES - VERY LIGHT
ENEMY - 377 KILLED, 2 PW'S, 593 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS AND 37 CREW
SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED.

SUMMARY

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE A SHAU VALLEY HAS LONG BEEN A MAIN ENEMY
INVASION ROUTE AND RESUPPLY CENTER. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE USE THE
ENEMY HAS MADE OF THE VALLEY, LET ME GIVE YOU A COUPLE OF EXAMPLES
OF THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WE HAVE CAPTURED AND DESTROYED. IN TWO
DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS IN THE OPERATION, THE FOLLOWING SUPPLIES
WERE CAPTURED ON 25 APRIL:

THREE 37MM ANTI AIRCRAFT GUNS (WITH 300 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION); 315
RIFLES, SEVERAL TRUCKS, 150 ROUNDS OF 152MM AMMUNITION, 600 ROUNDS
OF 122MM ARTILLERY AMMUNITION, 36 MINE DETECTORS, 30 FLAMETHROWERS OF
SOVIET MAKE, GAS MASKS AND ASSORTED COMMUNICATIONS AND PROPAGANDA
PROCESSING EQUIPMENT. AGAIN ON 28 AND 29 APRIL, U.S. AND ARVN TROOPS
CAPTURED OVER 2000 ROUNDS OF 12.7MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION, NEARLY
2000 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, 80 B-40 ROCKET ROUNDS, 17-122MM
ROCKETS, ABOUT 300-75MM HOWITZER ROUNDS, PLUS STACKS OF DEMOLITION
EQUIPMENT. ALSO, ON THOSE SAME DAYS, ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV
DESTROYED 1-PT 76 TANK AND 6 TRUCKS.

GENTLEMEN, THIS CONCLUDES MY PRESENTATION. I DO WANT YOU TO KNOW
THAT WE WILL HAVE FUTURE BRIEFS ON OPERATION DELAWARE WHEN DIRECTED BY
GENERAL WESTMORELAND, AND THESE BRIEFS MAY BE CONDUCTED HERE OR AT
PHU BAI AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF PROVISIONAL CORPS VIET-NAM. I CAN
ALSO TELL YOU THAT A COMPLETE, DETAILED BRIEF WILL BE PROVIDED YOU UPON
CONCLUSION OF OPERATION DELAWARE. OUR PURPOSE IN PRESENTING THESE
BRIEFS AND PROVIDING YOU WITH INFORMATION IN THIS MATTER, IS TO REDUCE
TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM THE LOSS OF AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIFE
ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE. AGAIN I ENJOIN YOU TO ASSIST US IN EVERY WAY
YOU POSSIBLY CAN TO PREVENT AIDING THE ENEMY BY DISCLOSURE OF INFOR-
MATION THAT MAY BE OF VALUE TO HIM. FINALLY, I HAVE PROVIDED YOU
WITH THE COMPLETE PICTURE OF OPERATION DELAWARE FOR THE TEN DAYS,
21 APRIL THROUGH 30 APRIL, WITHIN THE SECURITY PARAMETERS THAT HAVE
BEEN ESTABLISHED, BUT IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT YOU WILL HAVE SOME
QUESTIONS ON MATTERS THAT I CAN ANSWER, SO I AM PREPARED TO TRY AND
ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

IMMEDIATE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY.
DELIVER FIRST WAKING HOURS.

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 DE RUMKAY 2739 113034G
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 220546Z APR 68
 FM CG XII MAF DANANG
 TO RUMKII/CG FMETAC CAMP SMITH KAWAII
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LEGEN KRULAK AND NOEN TOMPINS FROM LEGEN CUSHMAN

1. EGEN HOFFMAN'S TOUR OF TDY WITH 1ST MAF IS UP ON 26 APRIL AND I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN HIM TO 3D MARDIV. MY PROBLEM STILL REMAINS THAT OF A SUITABLE G-3 AND I PROPOSE BGEN GLEBY BE ASSIGNED TO THAT POSITION UNTIL HE RETURNS TO CONUS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

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