

DECLASSIFIED

321. 7AF TACC TSN 240820Z JUN68 (S) *pp-4*

Subj: Air Effort for Coming Week

322. 7AF TSN 241205Z JUN68 (S) *pp-4*

Subj: Air Effort for Coming Week

DECLASSIFIED

296. CG III MAF 290334Z JUN68 (S MCEO) gp-4

Subj: Proposed msg to Abrams - Requests comments from
CMC AND FMFPAC

297. COMUSMACV 291047Z JUN68 (C) gp-4

Subj: Status of action on assistance for relocation of
I DASC

~~298. CG FMAW 291130Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

299. CMC 291934Z JUN68 (S MCEO) gp-4

Subj: Comments on III MAF draft msg to ABRAMS

300. CG FMFPAC 292245Z JUN68 (S MCEO) gp-3

Subj: In-depth comments on III MAF draft msg to ABRAMS

301. COMUSMACV 290911Z JUN68 (C) gp-4

Subj: Relocation of I DASC

302. CG III MAF 300636Z JUN68 (S) gp-4

Subj: III MAF Evaluation of Single Management/Strike
Support Procedures

303. CG III MAF 300730Z JUN68 (S MCEO) gp-4

Subj: Passes Evaluation msg to CMC AND FMFPAC

304. 7AF TACC TSN 300800Z JUN68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Air Effort for the Coming Week

305. CG FMAW 301730Z JUN68 (S MCEO) group-4

Subj: Routine Input - Requests termination Wing Daily

~~306. CG FMAW 011036Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

307. CG THIRD MARDIV 240206Z JUN68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Evaluation of Sgle Mngment Strike Spt Procedures

308. CG III MAF 020816Z JUL68 (C) gp-4

Subj: Change to Modified Preplanned Air Spt System

309. CG III MAF 301450Z JUN68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Night Air Support

*W file
HAR-40* 283. CG FMFEAC 222058Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: QUOTES DEPSECDEF MEMO TO SECNAV

~~284. CG FMAW 230038Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input on Air Control~~

~~285. CG FMAW 230940Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~286. CG FMAW 241246Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

287. GEN ABRAMS 230757Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Enemy Intentions and Capabilities
Plans to allocate Tac Air

~~288. CG FMAW 251035Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~289. CG FMAW 261235Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

290. I DASC DNG 270817Z JUN68 (U)

Subj: Command and Control Procedures

~~291. CG FMAW 270845Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

292. CG FMFPAC 272228Z JUN68 (U)

Subj: Hoffman press story on Air Control ICTZ

293. CG PCV 280810Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Tactical Air Support for Coming Weeks (U)- Opn THOR

~~294. CG FMAW 281115Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

295. CG III MAF 290234Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: I DASC LOCATION

~~270. CG FMAW 130741Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

271. ADMINO FMFPAC 132337Z JUN68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Tharin Exclusive on Single Management Exclusive

~~272. CG FMAW 141150Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

273. CG III MAF 151428Z JUN68 (C) gp-4

Subj: Evaluation of Modified Air Strike Support System

~~274. CG FMAW 151230Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~275. CG FMAW 160640Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~276. CG FMAW 171626Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~277. CG FMAW 180930Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~278. CG FMAW 190700Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

x (279.) CG FMFPAC 200035Z JUN68 (S MCEO) gp-4

Subj: Operational Control of III MAF Aviation Assets

Passes CMC's CMCM (Changes attached)

~~280. CG FMAW 200630Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~281. CG FMAW 211330Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

y (282.) CG FMFPAC 222052Z JUN68 (S MCEO) group-4

COMMENTS ON CMCM

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253. CG III MAF 010314Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Modified Preplanned Air Support

~~254. CG FMAW 010615Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine input~~

~~255. CG FMAW 020903Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

256. CG III MAF 030838Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: Modified Preplanned Air Support System

DECLASSIFIED

~~257. CG FMAW 031340Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~258. CG FMAW 041108Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~259. CG FMAW 051250Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

260. 7AF TACC 060210Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: I MAW Sortie Allocation

~~261. CG FMAW 061607Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~262. CG FMAW 070810Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

263. COMUSMACV 071135Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: Evaluation of Single Management/Strike Support Procedures ✓

~~264. CG FMAW 080910Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~265. CG FMAW 090800Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

266. ADMINO FMFPAC 110358Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Tharin Exclusive on Single Management Analysis

~~267. CG FMAW 110546Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~268. CG FMAW 111210Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~269. CG FMAW 120720Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

SECRET

ditto

PT003330
OTTSZYUW RUMACMU4125 1770000-SSSS--RUMUGRA
ZNY SSSSS ZFH1 RUMSA
VV ARA524
OO RUMSAK
DE RUMSAR 992 1761211
ZNY SSSSS

ACT: G-3
INFO: G-2
COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

O 241205Z JUN 68
FM 7AF TSN RVN
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
INFO RUMSAB/CG 1ST MAF DANANG
RUMSAGP/E DASC DANANG
RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU RAI
BY

S E C R E T/TACD

SUBJECT: AIR EFFORT FOR COMING WEEK (U)

REFERENCE (A) HEADQUARTERS USMACV CHIEF OF STAFF ACTION MEMO NO. 68-95 DATED 22 JUNE 68 (S);

REFERENCE (B) TACC 7AF MSG 24/10407 JUNE 68 (S)

1. REFERENCE (A) IS QUOTED IN PART, PARAGRAPH C: AIR EFFORT FOR COMING WEEK, AFTER REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE COMBAT SUMMARY DATA AND THE PROJECTED ENEMY OFFENSIVES, COMUS MADE DECISION THAT THE TAC AIR EFFORT FOR THE COMING WEEK WOULD BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS: I CTZ-25 PER CENT, II CTZ-10 PER CENT, III CTZ-25 PER CENT, IV CTZ-5 PER CENT AND RP-1/TALLY HO/LAOS-35 PER CENT. HE DESIRES THAT FIELD COMMANDERS BE ADVISED OF THIS PLANNING AND RATIONALE BEHIND IT.
2. (S) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THE RATIONALE DESCRIBING THE

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 992 S E C R E T

DISTRIBUTION OF SORTIES IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. IN DETERMINING THE TOTAL TACTICAL AIR EFFORT USMC AND USAF DAILY SORTIE RATES FOR IN-COUNTRY AND OUT OF COUNTRY USE WERE ADDED TOGETHER.

B. FROM THIS TOTAL CERTAIN COMMITTED ASSETS WERE SUBTRACTED, FOR EXAMPLE SOG, IGLOO WHITE, AND MARINE HELICOPTER ESCORT MISSIONS. THIS TOTAL WAS THEN SUB-DIVIDED BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-COUNTRY AT A RATIO, RESPECTIVELY, 0 65 PER CENT TO 35 PER CENT, AS DIRECTED BY REFERENCE (A).

C. THEN THE PERCENTAGE FOR USE IN I CTZ WAS DETERMINED. THE I CTZ ALLOCATION IS 212 SORTIES PER DAY.

D. TO OBTAIN THE PRE-PLANNED AMOUNT THE AVERAGE DAILY SCRAMBLES OF THE ALERT A1HE PREVIOUS THREE WEEKS WAS SUBTRACTED. THIS LEFT A REMAINDER OF 161 SORTIES FOR I CTZ.

E. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE SAME PROPORTION OF SUPPORT FROM USMC AND USAF ASSETS THE PREVIOUS THREE WEEK PERIOD WAS USED AS A GUIDE. THE RATIO WAS DETERMINED TO BE 70 PER CENT USMC AND 30 PER CENT USAF. THIS EQUALS APPROXIMATELY 118 SORTIES TO BE FLOWN BY USMC ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF I CORPS ON A PRE-PLANNED BASIS.

F. THESE 118 SORTIES ARE FURTMLR DIVIDED INTO THE WEEKLY FRAG

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE 3 RUMSAR 992 S E C R E T
AND THE DAILY FRAG AT THE RATIO OF 70 PER CENT AND 30 PERCENT
RESPECTIVELY.

G. THEREFORE THE USMC WEEKLY FRAG TOTALS 84 SORTIES AND THE
USMC DAILY FRAG TOTALS 34 SORTIES.


H. A RECAP OF USMC DAILY SORTIES IS AS FOLLOWS: FROM A TOTAL OF
190 AIRCRAFT POSSESSED MULTIPLIED BY 1.2 SORTIE RATE THERE ARE 228
SORTIES AVAILABLE. SUBTRACT THREE (3) FOR THE AIR DEFENSE COMMITMENT,
EIGHTEEN (18) FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT, SIXTEEN (16)
PRESENTLY FRAGGED FOR OUT OF COUNTRY TARGETS AND FORTY EIGHT (48)
FOR SCRAMBLES FROM THE GROUND ALERT. THIS LEAVES A
REMAINDER OF 143 WITH 118 TO BE USED FOR I CTZ ALLOCATION AND
TWENTY FIVE (25) FOR USE IN THE TALLY HO/DMZ AREA, AS INDICATED IN
REFERENCE (B).

3. (S) THE PERIOD COVERED FOR THE REVISED WEEKLY FRAG REFLECTING
THESE CHANGES IS 26/0600H JUNE 68 THROUGH 04/0600/! 0716 68.

4. (S) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE CALL SIGNS AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENTS
AND DESIRED TOT'S FOR THE 7AF TACC WEEKLY FRAG, AND THE CALL SIGNS
AND AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE DAILY FRAG BE SUBMITTED ASAP.
THIS INFORMATION IS REQUIRED FOR THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE FRAG FROM THIS
HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAT 25/1200H JUNE 1968. GP-4
BY

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THIS INFORMATION IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE
 AND AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE DAILY FRAS BE SUBMITTED EARLY
 AND DESIRED TOTAL FOR THE DAILY FRAS AND THE CALL SIGNS
 # 121 IT IS REQUESTED THAT TO CALL SIGNS AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENTS
 THESE CHANGES THROUGH JUNE 1958. THROUGH AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENTS
 3. (2) THE MESSAGE FOR THE REVISED WEEKLY FRAS BE SUBMITTED
 REFERENCE (B) IN THE MESSAGE TO USE IN THE DAILY FRAS AND THE CALL SIGNS
 TWENTY FIVE (25) IN THE DAILY FRAS AND THE CALL SIGNS
 REMAINDER OF 1958 BE USED FOR THE MESSAGE AND THE CALL SIGNS
 FOR SCRAMBLERS FROM THE GROUND ALERTS THIS LEAVES
 PRESENTLY FRASSED FOR OUT OF COUNTRY TRAVEL AND FOUR (4) FOR
 EIGHTEEN (18) FOR HELICOPTER ESCORTS SEVEN (7)
 SORTIES AVAILABLE. SUBJECT THREE (3) FOR THE AIR DELIVER EQUIPMENT
 FOR AIRCRAFT POSSESSED MULTIPLED BY THE SORTIES AND THE CALL SIGNS
 IN A RECORD OF USMC DAILY SORTIES IS AS FOLLOWS FROM A TOTAL OF
 USMC DAILY FRAS TOTAL 34 SORTIES
 21 THEREFORE THE USMC WEEKLY FRAS TOTAL BE SORTIES AND THE
 RESPECTIVELY.



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Mac - This one in our control file 9

NNNNZCZCSAA889ZVA 914SSZZ RUMSAK
DE RUMSAR 1021 1770841
ZNY SSSSS
240820Z JUN 68

- TO RUMSAR/COMUSMACV
- RUMSARH/DASO VICTOR HUE PHU BAI
- RUMSARH/PCW NHA TRANG PHU BAI
- RUMSAR/37 TFW DANANG
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- RUMSAR/99 TFW DANANG
- RUMSAR/100 TFW DANANG

ACT G-3
INFO G-2
COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

- PAGE 2 RUMSAR 1021 S E C R E T
- RUMSARA/37 TFW PHU CAT
- RUMSAGP/366 TFW DANANG
- RUMSAB/5 ACS NHA TRANG
- RUMSAGP/A FLT 8 ACS DANANG
- RUMSARB/B FLT 5 ACS BIEN HOA
- RUMSAU/C FLT 5 ACS BINH THUY
- RUMSAGF/315 ACW RANH HAND PHAN RANG
- RUMSAB/14 ACW NHA TRANG
- RUMSAB/361 RS NHA TRANG
- RUMSAE/362 RS PLEIKU
- RUMSAE/FLT B 9 ACS PLEIKU
- RUMSAGP/DET 1 12 ACS DANANG
- RUMSARB/OL 21 BIEN HOA
- RUMSAE/OL 22 PLEIKU
- RUMSAGK/OL 24 HUE PHU BAI
- RUMSARD/OL 25 QUANG TRI
- RUMSAU/OL 26 BIEN THUY
- RUMSARA/460 TRW OL AA PHU CAT
- RUMSAED/6 ACS PLEIKU
- RUMSAGP/334 ACS DANANG

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08

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SECRET
#321

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PAGE 3 RUMSAR 1021 S E C R E T
 RUMSAGP/20 TASS ALCE DANANG
~~RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG~~
 RUMSAV/CG I MAF DANANG
 RUMHLA/CG 1ST MARDIV DANANG
 RUMHVP/CG 3RD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUMHVP/26 MAR REGT KHE SANH
 RUMFUD/CTG 77 3
 RUMSAV/MAG 11 DANANG
 RUMSAV/MAG 12 CHU LAI
 RUMSAV/MAG 13 CHU LAI
 RUMSAV/VICE SQUAD DANANG
 RUMSAV/DANANG DASC DANANG
 RUMSAV/DANANG ASRT DANANG
 RUMHLA/PHU BAI DASC HUE PHU BAI
 RUMHLA/PHU BAI ASRT HUE PHU BAI
 RUMHVP/KHE SANH DASC KHE SANH
 RUMHVP/KHE SANH ASRT KHE SANH
 RUMHVP/DONG HA DASC DONG HA
 RUMHVP/DONG HA ASRT DONG HA
 RUMHVP/CAMP CARROLL ASRT CAMP CARROLL

PAGE 4 RUMSAR 1021 S E C R E T
 RUMSAGD/DET 00 520 TCS DONG HA
 RUMSARB/504 TASG BIEN HOA
 BT

S E C R E T T A C O .

~~SUBJECT: AIR EFFORT FOR COMING WEEK (U)~~

REFERENCE (A) HEADQUARTERS USMACV CHIEF OF STAFF ACTION MEMO NO. 68-96
 DATED 22 JUNE 68 (S).

REFERENCE (B) TACC 7AF MSG 24/1240Z JUNE 68 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE (A) IS QUOTED IN PART. "PARAGRAPH C. AIR EFFORT FOR
 COMING WEEK. AFTER REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE COMBAT SUMMARY
 DATA AND THE PROJECTED ENEMY OFFENSIVES, COMUS MADE DECISION THAT
 THE TAC AIR EFFORT FOR THE COMING WEEK WOULD BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:
 I CTZ-25PCT, II CTZ-10PCT, III CTZ:25PCT, IV CTZ-5PCT AND RP-1/TALLY
 NO/LAOS=35PCT. HE DESIRES THAT FIELD COMMANDERS BE ADVISED OF THIS
 PLANNING AND RATIONALE BEHID IT".

2. (S) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THE RATIONALE DESCRIBING THE
 DISTRIBUTION OF SORTIES IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. IN DETERMINING THE TOTAL TACTICAL AIR EFFORT THE USAF AND
 USMC DAILY FORTIE CAPABILITY FOR IN AND OUT COUNTRY USE WER
 COMBINED TO EQUAL 990 SORTIES. 80 COMMITED SORTIES WERE SUBTRACTED

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PAGE 5 RUMSAR 1021 S E C R E T.
 FROM THIS FIGURE WHICH WERE: 12 SAR, 12 SOG, 38 IGLOO WHITE, AND
 18 FOR USMC HELICOPTER ESCORT.

B. APPLYING THE COMUSMACV ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE MAKES 318 (35PCT)
 SORTIES STRIKE OUT COUNTRY AND 592 (65PCT) SORTIES STRIKE IN-COUNTRY.
 FROM THIS 592 FIGURE 40 SORTIES ARE REMOVED FOR INTERDICTION, TRAILDUST
 AND CARGO ESCORT, BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST 3 WEEKS.
 AT THIS POINT THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF USAF IMMEDIATE SCRAMBLE SORTIES
 PER DAY THAT WAS USED BY EACH CORP OVER THE LAST 3 WEEKS WAS COMPUTED.
 THIS EQUATED TO I CORPS 51, II CORPS 27, III CORPS 35, AND IV CORPS 15.
 THESE FIGURES WERE SUBTRACTED FROM EACH CORPS ALLOCATION AND THEN
 SPLIT 70PCT/30PCT FOR THAT CORPS FINAL DAILY FLYING SCHEDULE ON THE
 WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG.

C. THE PERIOD COVERED FOR THE REVISED WEEKLY FRAG REFLECTING THESE
 CHANGES IS 26/0600H JUNE 68 THROUGH 04/0600H JULY 68.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

321

SECRET/NOFORN

PTTSZYUW RUMUGRA0519 1861440-SSSS--RUMUHFA RUMUFKA RUHHFMA.
ZNY SSSSS

P 041440Z JUL 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF-DN3

TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN

INFO RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

HAS BEEN SENT
ORIG G-1
CONC G-3 AIR
REL G-3

S E C R E T

PERS AUG FOR SINGLE TGMT STRIKE AND RCN ASSETS (U)

A. CG III MAF 150520Z MAR 68

B. 7AF TACC TAN SON NAUT 171440Z MAR 68

1. REF A STATES PERS REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED BY III MAF
TO MACV (TASE) IN TDY STATUS PENDING FORMALIZATION AS MACV
JTD BILLETS. REQ CURRENT STATUS OF JTD FORMALIZATION.

2. PERS PROVIDED IAW REF B APPROACHING ELIGIBILITY FOR
ROTATION TO CONUS. IN VIEW OF CURRENT PERS SITUATION REQ
III MAF BE RELIEVED OF REQUIREMENT TO REPLACE TDY PERS IN
MACV (TASE) BILLETS WHEN INCUMBENTS ROTATE.

P-4

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RR RUMHAW RUEBHOA RUMUGRA RUMHVP RUMHLA

DE RUHMFMA 0303 1850211

ZNY SSSSS

R 030211Z JUL 68

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

INFO RUEBHOA/CMC

RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARL IV

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARL IV

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN QUILTER, INFO GEN
 CHAPMAN, MGEN THOMPSON, MGEN DAVIS AND MGEN YOUNG-
 LALE FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY.

SPECIAL REPORT (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 301730Z/JUN68 (S)

B. CG FIRST MAW 030300Z/APR 68 (S)

1. REFERENCE A RECOMMENDED TERMINATION OF THE SPECIAL REPORT ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B, WHEN IT WAS NO LONGER REQUIRED. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE FULLY THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE WORKLOAD INVOLVED.
2. HOWEVER, FOR THE INTERIM, IT IS REQUESTED THAT

PAGE 2 RUHMFMA0303 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B
 BE CONTINUED. IT PROVIDES VITAL
 STATISTICAL DATA WHICH IS NOT AVAILABLE, EITHER
 HERE AT HQ, FMFPAC OR HQMC, AND WHICH IS
 OF INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE IN DOCUMENTING
 OPERATIONS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. WHEN
 THE DATA CONTAINED IN THE REPORT IS NO LONGER AB-
 SOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR OUR EFFORTS TO RETURN OPCON
 OF FIRST MAW FIXED WING ATTACK AND RECON ASSETS TO
 THE MARINE CORPS, THE REPORT WILL BE TERMINATED
 IMMEDIATELY.
 BEST REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT

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PTTSZYUW RUMUGRA5398 1821450-SSSS--RUMHAW RUMHMA RUMHVH
 RUMHVP RUMUFKA RUMUHFA
 ZNY SSSSS

P 321450Z JUN 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHB

RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN

INFO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGM

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH

RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

BT

S E C R E T

(NIGHT AIR SUPPORT (U))

A. CG PCV 120942Z JUN 68 AVII-GCAU 33204 (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 131542Z JUN 68 (S) (NOTAL)

C. 7AF TACC 270630Z JUN 68 (S) NOTAL

D. CG FIRST MAW 230855Z JUN 68 (S) NOTAL

1. REF A POSED THE PROBLEM OF REQUESTING FLARE/SPOOKY ACFT TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN CONTACT AND HAVING THESE REQUESTS DENIED BECAUSE THE SUPPORT WOULD REQUIRE OPERATING AIRCRAFT IN A HIGH SAM THREAT AREA. FURTHER, REF A REQUESTED THAT HIGH SAM THREAT AREAS BE IDENTIFIED AND IF ALTERNATE MEANS OF SUPPORT ARE AVAILABLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG: G-3

REL: G-3

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 5398 **S E C R E T**

THE ALTERNATES BE IDENTIFIED.

2. REF B REQUESTED CDR SEVEN AF PROVIDE COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ON QUESTIONS IN PARA 3 REF A.

3. BY REF C, IN RESPONSE TO REF A AND B, 7 AF TACC STATED REQUESTS WOULD BE CONSIDERED INDIVIDUALLY, BASED ON THE EXISTING THREAT AND THAT SUPPORT WILL BE GIVEN IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

4. BY REF D CG FMAW RESPONDED TO REF B WITH FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. COMMENTS:

(1) AREA NORTH OF 090/270 RADIAL DONG HA TACAN IS A HIGH SAM THREAT AREA.

(2) C-117 AND KC130 ACFT HAVE NO DECM EQUIP NOR SUFFICIENT MANEUVERABILITY FOR SAM AVOIDANCE AND WILL NOT NORMALLY BE OPERATED IN SAM THREAT AREA.

(3) TACTICAL EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS MAY WARRANT ACCEPTANCE OF RISK. IN THIS CASE EACH ACFT WOULD BE DEDICATED TO SUPPORT TRANSPORT ACFT ON-FLARE MISSION AND WOULD RESULT IN REDUCTION OF ECM PROTECTION WITHIN DMZ AND LOWER RP-1 INCREASING TAC FIXED WING ACFT VULNERABILITY.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FMAW ACFT UTILIZATION IN HIGH SAM THREAT AREA.

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#309

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA 5398 S E C R E T

(1) TACTICAL ACFT BE PROVIDED FROM ALERT PAD ON PREPLANNED OR IMMEDIATE BASIS. PRIMARY MISSION OF TACTICAL ACFT TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY ILLUMINATION FOR CAS OR TROOPS IN HEAVY CONTACT.

(2) C-117 AND KC-130 ILLUMINATION BE PROVIDED ON AN AS REQUIRED BASIS.

5. THE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED VALID AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR REQUESTING NIGHT AIR SUPPORT.

6. SINCE COMUSMACV DEPUTY FOR AIR OPS HAS MISSION DIRECTION OF FMAW TACTICAL FIXED WING ACFT AND OPCON OF SPOOKY ACFT THIS HQ WILL REQUEST NIGHT AIR SUPPORT THROUGH NORMAL PREPLANNED CHANNELS BASED ON GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTS. WHEN SITUATION WARRANTS, AND UPON REQUEST, TACTICAL FIXED WING HOT PAD ACFT WILL BE ARMED WITH FLARES FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT.

7. FOR 7AF: REQUEST EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO PROVIDE FLARE/ SPOOKY SUPPORT IN RESPONSE TO PREPLANNED OR EMERGENCY REQUESTS.

GP-4

BT

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CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUMUGRA0197 1840016-CCCC--RUMHIC RUMHAW RUMHGK RUMHLA
RUMHMA RUMHMB RUMHVH RUMHVP RUMUHFA RUMUFKA.
ZNY CCCCC HAS BEEN SECT

P R 020816Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG
TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHB
RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL CHL
RUMHGK/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE HOI AN
INFO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV PHB
RUMHMB/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV GIA LE
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG
RUMHVH/I DASC DNG
RUMHMB/DASC VICTOR PHB

ORIG G-3
REL G-3

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: CHANGE TO MODIFIED PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (U)

- REF: A. COMUSMACV 211145Z MAY68 (NOTAL)
- B. COMUSMACV 230935Z JUN68 (NOTAL)
- C. III MAF 271340Z MAY68

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA0197 C O N F I D E N T I A L
D. 7TH AF TACC 300800Z JUN68 (NOTAL)

1. REFERENCE A ESTABLISHES THE 7TH AF MODIFIED PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM.
2. REFERENCE B DOWNGRADES REFERENCE A FROM SECRET TO CONFIDENTIAL.
3. REFERENCE C ESTABLISHES III MAF MODIFIED PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM AND III MAF WEEKLY FRAG EFFECTIVE FROM 0600 HRS THURSDAY TO 0600 HRS THURSDAY.
4. REFERENCE D CHANGES THE EFFECTIVE TIME OF 7TH AF WEEKLY FRAG FROM 0600 THURSDAY - 0600 THURSDAY TO 0600 TUESDAY - 0600 TUESDAY.
5. REFERENCE C IS DOWNGRADED FROM SECRET TO CONFIDENTIAL AND WEEKLY FRAG PARA 2A(1) OF REF C IS CHANGED TO BE EFFECTIVE FROM 0600 TUESDAY UNTIL 0600 TUESDAY.

GP-4
BT

Air Control

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOC.	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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SECRET

Capt Sullivan

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF 1840346-SSSS--RUMHAW.

ZNY SSSSS

P 020346Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF

O 240206Z JUN 68 ZSF

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CG PCB PHB

INFO CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T

EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES

A. CG PCV PHB MSG 161415Z JUN68

1. BEFORE 21MAR68 ALL MARINE AVN FORCES IN VIETNAM WERE UNDER THE DIRECT CMD OF CG III MAF AS A PART OF A CLOSELY INTEGRATED MARINE AIR/GRND TASK FORCE, CG III MAF EXERCISED CENTRALIZED CONTROL OVER THESE FORCES THRU THE 1STMAW TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION CTR (TADC), A PART OF III MAF TAOC, ACFT WERE SUPPLIED ON A CONTINUING BASIS IN SUPT OF THE GRND CMDR'S REQUIREMENT. WHEN THE SITUATION DEMANDED A SURGE, IMMED CLOSE AIR SUPT WAS REQUESTED VIA THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE LINES ON COMM. THE REQUESTING UNIT SUBMITTED A GAS REQUEST TO THE DIRECT AVAIL AIR SUPT CTR (DASC) AT DIV LEVEL WHICH HAS THE OPTION TO DIVERT AVAIL AIR OR SCRAMBLE THE DESIRED SUPT FROM 1ST MAF TADC, WHO HAS A DIRECT LINE WITH THE ALERT SQDN.

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 217Z S E C R E T

2. ON 21MAR68, THE AIR FORCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT WAS IMPOSED ON MARINE AIR ASSETS-IN THE I CORPS AREA FOR THE STATED PURPOSE OF IMPROVING FLEXIBILITY AND RESPOSNIVENESS. INITIAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT DEMONSTRATED CERTAIN SHORTCOMINGS:

A. LEAD TIME FOR PRE-PLANNED AIR SUPT TENDED TO BE EXCESSIVE.

B. TIME DELAY IN PROCESSING REQUESTS THRU THE ADDITIONAL CMD LAYERS WAS PROHIBITIVE.

C. INCREASED ADMIN REQUIREMENTS NECESSITATED THE FORMATION RESTRICTIVE OF AN ADDITIONAL STAFF SUB-SECTION IN THE 3D MARDIV AIR OFFICE.

3. THE PROBLEM AREAS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT/STRIKE SUP PROCEDURES WERE IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT, AND AFTER APPROX A TWO MONTH TRIAL PRD, SUBSTANTIOL MODIFICATIONS WERE INTRODUCED, EFF 1JUN68. THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE MODIFICATION WAS TO RESTORE 70 PER CENT OF THE AVAIL AIR SUPT IN THE I CORPS AREA TO III MAF TACC CONTROL. THE REMAINING 30 PERCENT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ACFT AND MORE DIVERIFIED ORD FOR SPECIAL OPERATION ON A PRIORITY BASIS.

4. DURING THE PERIOD 21MARCH THROUGH 21 JUNE THE AVERAGE

Air Control File

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA 0170 S E C R E T
NUMBER OF CAS/TPQ SORTIES PROVIDED TO THE 3D MARDIV HAS DIMINISHED ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY THREAT HAS NOT DIMINISHED: IN MARCH, SORTIES FLOWN AVERAGED IN EXCESS OF 1600 PR WEEK. THE WEEKLY AVERAGE FOR JUNE IS APPROXIMATELY 800 SORTIES.

5. PCV G-3 (AIR) CURRENTLY DUPLICATES TGTING PROCEDURES THAT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DIV FSCC, THE DIV AIR OFF AND SUBORDINATE UNITS. THERE IS A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THIS DUPLICATION IS NECESSARY.

6. COMM CHANNELS FOR THE GRND CDR IN TWO COMBAT AREAS ARE USUALLY SEVERELY LIMITED AS A RESULT REAL TIME RESPONSIVENESS IS DIMINISHED. ADDITIONAL RPTING REQUIREMENTS IN THE CURRENT AIR SUPT SYS MAKE IT MUCH LESS RESPONSIVE THAN THE SYS IN EFFECT BEFORE 21MAR68.

7. THE OVERALL SHORTAGE OF TACTICAL AIR SUPT FORCES AVAIL TO SUPT GRND FORCES IN I CORPS IS A BASIC PROBLEM THAT WILL NOT BE OVERCOME BY CHANGES IN THE AIR CMD AND CONTROL SYS, HOWEVER, IF THE STREAMLINING PROCESS NOW BEING APPLIES TO THE SYS IS CARRIED TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION, THE RESULTING AIR SUP SYS WILL BE ESSENTIALLY THAT WHICH WAS IN EFFECT PRIOR TO 21MAR68; I.E. THE MARCOR AIR/GRND TEAM TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYS. GP-4
BT

SECRET

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SECRET

PP RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 113W 1821840
 ZNY SSSSS
 F 301730Z JUN 68
 FM CG FIRST MAF
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT MAR CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC F-044

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 - A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 281900H TO 291900H JUN 68.
 - B. (1) 120
 - (2) 6
 - (3) 2
 - (4) 0
 - C. (1) 190
 - (2) 37
 - (3) 53

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 113W S E C R E T SPECAT

- (4) 18
- (5) 55
- (6) 40
- (7) 8
- D. (1) 22
- (2) 15
- (3) 10
- (4) 1
- E. (1) 41
- (2) 7
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- F. (1) 26
- (2) 26
- (3) 12
- (4) 14
- G. (1) 2
- (2) 12
- (3) 10
- (4) 2

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 113W S E C R E T SPECAT

H. (1) 14
 (2) 12
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 11
 (2) (A) 50
 (B) 2
 (C) 2
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 61
 (3) 52
 (4) 2
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 23
 L. (1) 2

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 113W S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 0
 (3) 2
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 5
 (7) 4
 M. (1) L (7) 4 SORT DIV TO TADC NO TAC(A) AVAIL.
 L (1) NEG COMM WITH A/C.
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 82
 (B) 77
 (2) 18
 (3) 17
 B. (1) 160
 (2) 34
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 84 (B) 41
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 39
 (3) (A) 2 (B) 0
 D. (1) 0

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 113W S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 18

(3) 0

E. (1) 4

(2) 10

(3) 0

(4) 4

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

F. (1) 0

(2) 17

(3) 0

G. (1) 14

(2) 3

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

H. (1) 33

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 113W S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 6

(3) 1

I. (1) 2

(2) 38

(3) 0

J. (1) (A) 53 (B) 30

(2) (A) 34 (B) 6

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

(4) (A) 2 (B) 0

(5) (A) 0 (B) 4

(6) (A) 0 (B) 0

5 KUL KA) 0 (B) 30

K. (1) 1 (1) 2 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY

1 (2) 3 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY

5 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN

6 USMC TO USMC, NEG TGT

3 USMC TO USMC, CSS DOWN

4 USMC TO USA, WX

1 USMC TO USA, ASRT DOWN

4 USMC TO USA, NEG TGT

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

305

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 114W 1821840
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 301730Z JUN 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHXM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MAR CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

2 USA TO USA, NEG CONT

1 USA TO USA, CSS DOWN

2 USMC TO ROKMC, TGT PRI

5 OUT- OF- COUNTRY TO USMC, ASRT DOWN

2 OUT- OF- COUNTRY TO USMC, NEG CONT.

(2) THE REPLY TO A REQUEST TO TERMINATE THE SPECAT REPORTS MADE IN THE 15 MAY RPT DIRECTED CONTINUANCE OF THE RPT THROUGH JUNE. REQ CONFIRMATION OF TERMINATION DATE. STRONGLY RECOMMEND PROMPT TERMINATION WHEN NO LONGER REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE EXCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

+ 305

SECRET

VV QAWF337
 ' ' ' ' ' ' ZZ RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAR 1243 1820305
 ZNY SSSSS

FILE IN

Z 300800Z JUN 68
 FM 7AF TACC ISN RVN
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO RUMSAV/CG 1ST MAW DANANG
 RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG
 RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU BAI
 BT

ACT G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO AGJ S/ S G-6

S E C R E T / I A C D

SUBJECT: AIR EFFORT FOR THE COMING WEEK

1. (S) EACH SATURDAY MORNING COMUSMASTERMINE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF AIR EFFORT TO BE APPLIED BY CORPS AND EBA FOR THE COMING WEEK. THE WEEKLY FRAG IS COMPILED BASED UPON THIS GUIDANCE. IN ORDER TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE THE FRAG WEEK HAS BEEN CHANGED TO 0600H TUESDAY TO 0600H TUESDAY.
2. (S) FOR THE WEEK OF 2 JULY TO 9 JULY 68 IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE MARINE CAPABILITY WILL REMAIN AT A LEVEL OF 225 SORTIES PER DAY. FROM THIS 48 ARE SUBTRACTED FOR IMMEDIATES, 18 FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT AND 41 FOR OUT-COUNTRY STRIKES. THE REMAINING 118 ARE AVAILABLE FOR IN-COUNTRY PRE-PLANS. THROUGHOUT THE 2 - 9 JULY WEEKLY FRAG PERIOD 18 MARINE SORTIES WILL BE FRAGGED AS WEEKLY PRE-PLANS.

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 1243 **S E C R E T**

SINCE THOR ALLOCATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS 1 - 2 JULY 100 SORTIES, 3 - 4 JULY 75 SORTIES, 5-6-7 JULY 60 SORTIES. DAILY PRE-PLANS WILL BE AS FOLLOWS 1 - 2 JULY ZERO, 3 - 4 JULY 25, 5-6-7 JULY 40 AND 8 JULY 100. UPON COMPLETION OF THOR THERE WILL NO LONGER BE A REQUIREMENT TO COMMIT MARINE SORTIES TO A SPECIFIC AREA WITHIN THE MARINE TAOR.

3. (S) REQUEST SUBMISSION OF CALL SIGNS, TYPE AIRCRAFT, AND TO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED SORTIES FOR THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG PERIOD OF 2 JULY

H-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUHKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 5347 1820730
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -I - OMC
 P 300730Z JUN 68
 RM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY****HAS BEEN SENT**

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN EUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN
 FROM L GEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2

A. CG FMFPAC 292245Z JUN 68
 1. THE FOLLOWING MSG WAS DISPATCHED TO COMUSMACV, INFO
 CINCPAC, CONCERNING OUR EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED PRE PLANNED
 REQUEST SYSTEM UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT:

QUOTE

P 300636Z JUN 68 ZFF-1
 RM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 BT

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO
 III MAF EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT/STRIKE SUPPORT
 PROCEDURES (U)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5347 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

- A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF MAR 68 (S)
 B. COMUSMACV 14578 MSG 211145Z MAY 68 (S)
 C. COMUSMACV 16352 MSG 071135Z JUN 68 (C)
 D. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUNE 1966 (C)
 1. III MAF HAS ONE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE: TO FORGE A
 COMBINED ARMY-MARINE-ARVN-SUPPORTING ARMS TEAM IN I CORPS
 WHICH WILL DEFEAT THE ENEMY IN THE MOST RAPID AND LEAST COSTLY
 MANNER. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THIS CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY
 PROVIDING COORDINATED AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NGF SUPPORT TO ALL
 GROUND FORCES IN I CORPS FROM THOSE RESOURCES APPORTIONED TO
 US BY COMUSMACV. THE MOST EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE,
 AND RESPONSIVE METHOD OF DOING THIS, FOR AIR RESOURCES, IS FOR
 CG III MAF TO FRAG MARINE AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF GROUND UNITS
 OF ALL SERVICES, USING THE PRESENT JOINT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.
 MARINE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED OUTSIDE OF I CORPS WOULD BE FRAGGED
 BY 7TH AF, AS WOULD AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT RESPONDING TO I CORPS
 REQUIREMENTS BEYOND III MAF CAPABILITIES. THE SLIGHT ADJUST-
 MENTS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM TO EFFECT THIS IMPROVEMENT ARE
 DISCUSSED BELOW.
 2. (C) OBJECTIVE OF REF A WAS TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFECTIVE-

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 5347 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
NESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRINCIPALLY BY PROVIDING:

- A. GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TOTAL STRIKE RESOURCES AVAILABLE.
- B. IMPROVING RESPONSIVENESS TO THE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDERS.
- C. SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCEDURES AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.

3. (U) REF C DIRECTED A 30-DAY EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE PROMULGATED BY REF B, IN ORDER TO ASSESS PROGRESS OF THE SYSTEM AND TO IDENTIFY NECESSARY PROCEDURAL CHANGES. COVERAGE OF THE FOLLOWING WAS REQUESTED AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE ORDER LISTED:

- A. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.
- B. EVALUATION.
- C. CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS AND APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.
- 4. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.
- A. THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK LOAD PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REF A HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REF B. HOWEVER, BOTH FACTORS CAN BE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 5347 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
IMPROVED WITH RELATIVELY MINOR MODIFICATIONS. IN ADDITION, FULLY ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR ARTILLERY COORDINATION WITH AIR OR AIRCRAFT DIVERSION AROUND DANGER AREAS.

- 5. EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM.
- A. ADMINISTRATION - UNDER REF B THE ADMINISTRATIVE WORK LOAD WAS LESSENERED BY REDUCTION IN THE LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY OF FRAGS AND REQUEST DATA; HOWEVER, THE BURDEN IS STILL EXCESSIVE. THIS IS DUE TO THE CURRENT DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG PROCEDURES AND DETAILED SCHEDULING THROUGH THE TACC. IT IS NOTED THAT DURING THE TEST PERIOD, THE SORTIES ASSIGNED 1ST MAW BY THE DAILY FRAG WERE ESSENTIALLY AS UNVARYING AS THOSE IN THE WEEKLY FRAG. FURTHER, BASED UPON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS, THERE WERE NO DIVERTS FROM I CORPS DAILY SORTIES TO OTHER CORPS AREAS. CONSEQUENTLY, INASMUCH AS COMUSMACV HAS FREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER ALL SORTIES AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL AGENCY (7TH AF TACC) IS FULLY INFORMED OF SORTIE STATUS AND CAPABILITIES, THE DAILY FRAG PROCEDURES APPEAR TO BE AN UNNECESSARY COMPLEXITY IN ICTZ.
- B. (C) EFFICIENCY - THE PROVISIONS OF REF B BROUGHT

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 5347 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN SORTIE ALLOCATION, BUT OPTIMUM USE OF
 SORTIES WAS NOT REALIZED. THIS IS EVIDENCED IN I CORPS BY THE
 HIGH NUMBER OF SCRAMBLE AND ADD-ON SORTIES TO MEET THE DAILY
 NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS, RESULTING IN THE 1ST MAW BEING
 FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCTION.
 OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL
 DOES NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER IN I CORPS WITH THE NUMBER
 OF SORTIES HE DESIRES, AND THE SORTIES AVAILABLE ON THE PREPLANNED
 FRAG ARE NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER IN SUFFICIENT
 NUMBERS AT THE CRITICAL TIMES NEEDED TO INFLUENCE THE TACTICAL
 SITUATION. THEREFORE, ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN THE FORM OF SCRAMBLES
 ARE REQUIRED. OF COURSE, SCHEDULES FOR SORTIE PRODUCTION, WHEN
 APPROACHED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY ON THE PART
 OF AIR UNITS, RARELY COINCIDE WITH THE TOTS REQUIRED BY THE GROUND
 SCHEMES OF MANEUVER. BASE LOCATIONS AND AIRCRAFT RADIUS OF ACTION
 STRONGLY INFLUENCE ORDNANCE LOADS, A/C TURN AROUNDS, AND TIME ON TARGETS.
 ADJUSTMENTS AND COMPROMISES BETWEEN THESE REQUIREMENTS CAN BEST BE
 MADE LOCALLY, THUS ENSURING GREATER SORTIE EFFECTIVENESS AND
 PRODUCTION.

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 5347 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 C. (C) CONCENTRATION OF AIR EFFORT - THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG
 WAS INSTITUTED, INTER ALIA, TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY TO CONCENTRATE
 THE AIR EFFORT AS DICTATED BY THE ENEMY THREAT. DURING THE TEST
 PERIOD, WHICH ENDED 270602H JUN, THIS EMERGENCY MASSING AND
 DIVERSION OF AIR EFFORT FROM I CORPS WAS NOT EMPLOYED, EXCEPT
 FOR A REDUCTION IN TAC AIR AVAILABLE TO I CORPS TO 25 PCT OF TOTAL
 IN-COUNTRY TAC AIR SORTIES COMMENCING 260600H JUNE FOR THE
 REMAINDER OF THAT MONTH. THE CHANGE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE AIR
 EFFORT WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO INCREASE THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY
 SORTIES TO 35 PCT OF TOTAL STRIKES AVAILABLE (SEE MACV MSG
 230757Z JUNE). ALSO, THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSION CHANGED
 LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY. RATHER THAN CONTINUING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
 BURDEN AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG, MARINE
 SORTIES IN I CORPS COULD BE MORE EFFICIENTLY EMPLOYED BY
 ALLOCATION OF A BLOCK OF MARINE SORTIES TO BE SCHEDULED IN
 I CORPS.

D. (C) PRODUCTION OF SORTIES - DURING THE TEST PERIOD MARINE
 FIXED WING AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, BASED ON POSSESSED
 AIRCRAFT IN-COUNTRY AGAINST A 1.2 SORTIE RATE, WERE PROGRAMMED
 AT 225 SORTIES PER DAY. OF THIS NUMBER, 16 WERE
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 5348 1820730
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 P 300730Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE INFO GEN CHAYAN
 FROM LGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2
 ROUTINELY EMPLOYED IN NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS OUT OF
 COUNTRY; 48 SORTIES WERE EMPLOYED AS SCRAMBLES TO MEET
 EMERGENCY NEED OF ALL FORCES IN I CORPS; 18 WERE DESIGNATED
 FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT, AND 143 SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED BY THE
 COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS THROUGH THE
 TACC AT SAIGON. OF THE 143 SORTIES, 70 PCT, OR 111, WERE
 SCHEDULED BY THE WEEKLY FRAG AT SET TIMES AND WITH STANDARD
 CRENANCE LOADS; THE REMAINING 32 WERE SCHEDULED DAILY, BASED
 ON INDIVIDUAL TARGETS REQUESTED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.
 THE 1ST MAW, TO MEET THE NEEDS OF FORCES IN I CORPS, ALSO
 AVERAGED AN ADDITIONAL 18 SORTIES PER DAY, EMPLOYED BY SCRAMBLE
 AND ADD-ON MISSIONS (FOR A DAILY AVERAGE OF 243 ATTACK SORTIES).
 6. SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5348 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

A. (C) SUMMARY:
 THE MODIFIED SYSTEM IS AN IMPROVEMENT, A STEP
 FORWARD FROM THE CUMBERSOME SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED ON 20 MARCH.
 AIR FORCE SORTIES HAVE IMPROVED GREATLY UNDER THE SYSTEM.
 IN FACT, A 54 PCT INCREASE IN AIR FORCE SORTIES HAS BEEN REALIZED
 DURING THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH IS COMMENDABLE. STILL, THE
 SYSTEM CONTINUES TO HARBOR DEFICIENCIES. THE WEEKLY AND DAILY
 FRAG, WHILE IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF THE ORIGINAL SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE, HAS REQUIRED AN INORDINATELY HIGH NUMBER
 OF SCRAMBLES AND ADD-ON SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS.
 CONSEQUENTLY, THE 1ST MAW HAS BEEN FORCED TO CONTINUALLY
 EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCTION. AN ANALYSIS OF
 THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM INDICATES THAT THE
 PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER
 WITH ALL THE SORTIES HE REQUIRES. FURTHERMORE, TOTS ASSIGNED
 A WEEK IN ADVANCE DO NOT PERMIT SURGE AIR EFFORTS IN RESPONSE
 TO THE CHANGING TACTICAL SITUATIONS FACING THE GROUND COM-
 MANDER, THEREBY REQUIRING INCREASED SCRAMBLES. THE LENGTH
 OF THE AIR REQUEST CHAIN AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
 IMPOSED BY THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG ARE STILL EXCESSIVE.

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SECRET

303

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 5348 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSIONS ALSO APPEAR MORE SUITABLE FOR
WEEKLY FRAGGING SINCE THEY HAVE CHANGED LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY.

B. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE
THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT
IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL PLANS AND TO MEET EMERGENCY AND
CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE
RESPONSIVENESS:

- (1) THAT THE PRESENT JOINT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM
BE FURTHER IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF
SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIR.
- (2) THAT THE NUMBER OF MARINE STRIKE SORTIES SET
ASIDE BY COMUSMACV FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR EFFORT (CURRENTLY
16 SORTIES PER DAY) BE FRAGGED BY THE TACC CONSISTENT WITH
OVERALL INTERDICTION PLANS.
- (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES (CURRENTLY
269 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 32 DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES AS
WELL AS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 18 HELO ESCORT MISSIONS) BE FRAGGED
BY CG III MAF. TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE
DETERMINED BY CG III MAF BASED ON THE TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 5348 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
AND ARMY DIVISIONS, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS AND
COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS.

- (4) THAT, AS NECESSARY, EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS
ARISING OUTSIDE I CORPS BE MET BY COMUSMACV PREEMPTION OF
SORTIES SCHEDULED IN I CORPS IAW REF D.
- (5) THAT III MAF (THROUGH I DASC) INFORM COMUSMACV
BY DIRECT LINE TO TACC OF ALL MARINE SORTIES SCHEDULED IN
I CORPS AND BY COPY OF THE 1ST MAW FRAG. REAL TIME REPORTS
WILL BE MADE TO AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA AND TACC), AS SORTIES
ARE FLOWN.
- (6) THAT IN RECOGNITION OF AIR FORCE BASE
LOCATION AND LOADINGS, PREPLANNED AIR FORCE SORTIES, TOTS, AND
ORDNANCE LOADS BE ADJUSTED THROUGH REQUESTS AND COORDINATION
BETWEEN III MAF, COMUSMACV TASE AND TACC. AIR FORCE SORTIES
SUPPORTING FORCES IN I CORPS CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY
COMUSMACV AND SCHEDULED BY TACC.
- (7) THAT THE INITIAL POINT (IP) BE ELIMINATED
FROM THE WEEKLY FRAG. THE CORRECT IP IS CONTINGENT UPON
ASSIGNMENT OF A SPECIFIC III MAF SUBORDINATE TO BE SUPPORTED.
UNTIL THE WEEKLY FRAG IS RECEIVED BY III MAF AND SUBALLOCATED

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 5348 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO TO ITS SUBORDINATES, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE A CORRECT IP. I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE PASSING NIGHTLY TO 7TH AF AND FMAW THE CORRECT IP FOR EACH MISSION ON THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG.

(8) THAT, IN THE CASE OF I CORPS, CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ADOPTION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE COACT, MARINE SPHINX REPORT, AND INFORMATION ON DIVERTS FROM I DASC TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ON MARINE AIR FOR THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT.

(9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH (REF A) BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGER TACTICAL AIR CONCEPT.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. APPRECIATE HELPFUL RECOMMENDATIONS, AND I INCORPORATED AS MANY AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING. MUCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSED IN REF A HAS BEEN ADVANCED SEVERAL TIMES TO COMUS AND TO REPEAT IT ONCE AGAIN COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. FURTHER, I'M CONVINCED THAT IF GEN ABRAMS ACCEPTS OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, I WILL ONCE AGAIN HAVE CONTROL

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 5348 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO OF ALL MY AIR ASSETS, LESS THOSE FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND EMERGENCY MISSIONS. I'M NOT TOO ENCOURAGED OVER THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THIS CONTROVERSY, BUT BELIEVE OUR PRESENT PROPOSAL TO BE MORE SALEABLE THAN OUR PAST DIRECT APPROACHES.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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SECRET*63 Air*
302

PITSZYUW RUMUGRA5332 1820636-SSSS--RUHHGA RUMUHFA.
ZNY SSSSS

P 300636Z JUN 68 ZFF-1
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
INFO RUHHGA/CINCPAC
BT

6
HAS BEEN SENT
ORIG G-5
REL C/S

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO
III MAF EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT/STRIKE SUPPORT
PROCEDURES (U)

- A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF 7MAR68 (S)
 - B. COMUSMACV 14578 MSG 211145Z MAY68 (S)
 - C. COMUSMACV 16352 MSG 071135Z JUN68 (C)
 - D. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUNE 1966 (C)
1. III MAF HAS ONE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE: TO FORGE A COMBINED ARMY-MARINE-ARVN-SUPPORTING ARMS TEAM IN I CORPS WHICH WILL DEFEAT THE ENEMY IN THE MOST RAPID AND LEAST COSTLY MANNER. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THIS CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY PROVIDING COORDINATED AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NGF SUPPORT TO ALL GROUND FORCES IN I CORPS FROM THOSE RESOURCES APPORTIONED TO US BY COMUSMACV. THE MOST EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE, AND RESPONSIVE METHOD OF DOING THIS, FOR AIR RESOURCES, IS FOR

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 5332 SECRET

CG III MAF TO FRAG MARINE AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF GROUND UNITS OF ALL SERVICES, USING THE PRESENT JOINT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. MARINE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED OUTSIDE OF I CORPS WOULD BE FRAGGED BY 7TH AF, AS WOULD AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT RESPONDING TO I CORPS REQUIREMENTS BEYOND III MAF CAPABILITIES. THE SLIGHT ADJUSTMENTS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM TO EFFECT THIS IMPROVEMENT ARE DISCUSSED BELOW.

2. (C) OBJECTIVE OF REF AWAS TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRINCIPALLY BY PROVIDING:
- A. GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TOTAL STRIKE RESOURCES AVAILABLE.
 - B. IMPROVING RESPONSIVENESS TO THE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDERS.
 - C. SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCEDURES AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.
3. (U) REF C DIRECTED A 30-DAY EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE PROMULGATED BY REF B, IN ORDER TO ASSESS PROGRESS OF THE SYSTEM AND TO IDENTIFY NECESSARY PROCEDURAL CHANGES. COVERAGE OF THE FOLLOWING WAS REQUESTED AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE ORDER LISTED:

AIR CONTROL
FILE

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PAGE THREE RUMUGRA 5332 S E C R E T

A. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.

B. EVALUATION.

C. CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS AND APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.

A. THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK LOAD PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REF A HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REF B. HOWEVER, BOTH FACTORS CAN BE IMPROVED WITH RELATIVELY MINOR MODIFICATIONS. IN ADDITION, FULLY ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR ARTILLERY COORDINATION WITH AIR OR AIRCRAFT DIVERSION AROUND DANGER AREAS.

5. EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM.

A. ADMINISTRATION - UNDER REF B THE ADMINISTRATIVE WORK LOAD WAS LESSENED BY REDUCTION IN THE LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY OF FRAGS AND REQUEST DATA; HOWEVER, THE BURDEN IS STILL EXCESSIVE. THIS IS DUE TO THE CURRENT DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG PROCEDURES AND DETAILED SCHEDULING THROUGH THE TACC. IT IS NOTED THAT DURING THE TEST PERIOD, THE SORTIES ASSIGNED 1ST MAW BY THE DAILY FRAG WERE ESSENTIALLY AS UNVARYING AS THOSE IN THE

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA 5332 S E C R E T

WEEKLY FRAG. FURTHER, BASED UPON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS, THERE WERE NO DIVERTS FROM I CORPS DAILY SORTIES TO OTHER CORPS AREAS. CONSEQUENTLY, INASMUCH AS COMUSMACV HAS PREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER ALL SORTIES AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL AGENCY (7TH AF TACC) IS FULLY INFORMED OF SORTIE STATUS AND CAPABILITIES, THE DAILY FRAG PROCEDURES APPEAR TO BE AN UNNECESSARY COMPLEXITY IN ICIZ.

B. (C) EFFICIENCY - THE PROVISIONS OF REF B BROUGHT IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN SORTIE ALLOCATION, BUT OPTIMUM USE OF SORTIES WAS NOT REALIZED. THIS IS EVIDENCED IN I CORPS BY THE HIGH NUMBER OF SCRAMBLE AND ADD-ON SORTIES TO MEET THE DAILY NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS, RESULTING IN THE 1ST MAW BEING FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCTION. OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER IN I CORPS WITH THE NUMBER OF SORTIES HE DESIRES, AND THE SORTIES AVAILABLE ON THE PREPLANNED FRAG ARE NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS AT THE CRITICAL TIMES NEEDED TO INFLUENCE THE TACTICAL SITUATION. THEREFORE, ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN THE FORM OF SCRAMBLES ARE REQUIRED. OF COURSE, SCHEDULES FOR SORTIE

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PAGE FIVE RUMUGRA 5332 S E C R E T
 PRODUCTION, WHEN APPROACHED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY ON THE PART OF AIR UNITS, RARELY COINCIDE WITH THE TOTS REQUIRED BY THE GROUND SCHEMES OF MANEUVER. BASE LOCATIONS AND AIRCRAFT RADIUS OF ACTION STRONGLY INFLUENCE ORDNANCE LOADS, A/C TURN AROUNDS, AND TIME ON TARGETS. ADJUSTMENTS AND COMPROMISES BETWEEN THESE REQUIREMENTS CAN BEST BE MADE LOCALLY, THUS ENSURING GREATER SORTIE EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTION.

C. (C) CONCENTRATION OF AIR EFFORT - THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG WAS INSTITUTED, INTER ALIA, TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY TO CONCENTRATE THE AIR EFFORT AS DICTATED BY THE ENEMY THREAT. DURING THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH ENDED 270600H JUN, THIS EMERGENCY MASSING AND DIVERSION OF AIR EFFORT FROM I CORPS WAS NOT EMPLOYED, EXCEPT FOR A REDUCTION IN TAC AIR AVAILABLE TO I CORPS TO 25 PCT OF TOTAL IN-COUNTRY TAC AIR SORTIES COMMENCING 260600H JUNE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THAT MONTH. THE CHANGE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE AIR EFFORT WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO INCREASE THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY SORTIES TO 35 PCT OF TOTAL STRIKES AVAILABLE (SEE MACV MSG 230757Z JUNE). ALSO, THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSION CHANGED LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY. RATHER THAN CON-

PAGE SIX RUMUGRA 5332 S E C R E T
 TINUING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG, MARINE SORTIES IN I CORPS COULD BE MORE EFFICIENTLY EMPLOYED BY ALLOCATION OF A BLOCK OF MARINE SORTIES TO BE SCHEDULED IN I CORPS.

D. (C) PRODUCTION OF SORTIES - DURING THE TEST PERIOD MARINE FIXED WING AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, BASED ON POSSESSED AIRCRAFT IN-COUNTRY AGAINST A 1.2 SORTIE RATE, WERE PROGRAMMED AT 225 SORTIES PER DAY. OF THIS NUMBER, 16 WERE ROUTINELY EMPLOYED IN NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS OUT OF COUNTRY; 48 SORTIES WERE EMPLOYED AS SCRAMBLES TO MEET EMERGENCY NEED OF ALL FORCES IN I CORPS; 18 WERE DESIGNATED FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT, AND 143 SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED BY THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS THROUGH THE TACC AT SAIGON. OF THE 143 SORTIES, 70 PCT, OR 111, WERE SCHEDULED BY THE WEEKLY FRAG AT SET TIMES AND WITH STANDARD ORDNANCE LOADS; THE REMAINING 32 WERE SCHEDULED DAILY, BASED ON INDIVIDUAL TARGETS REQUESTED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. THE 1ST MAW, TO MEET THE NEEDS OF FORCES IN I CORPS, ALSO AVERAGED AN ADDITIONAL 18 SORTIES PER DAY, EMPLOYED BY SCRAMBLE AND ADD-ON MISSIONS (FOR A DAILY AVERAGE OF 243 ATTACK SORTIES).
 BT

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PTTSZQUW CUMUGRK5333 1:2013USSFSAARUHHMA RUMUHXA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 300636Z JUN 68 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF DANANG
 TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO RUHHHGA/CINCPAC
 BT

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 6. SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. (C) SUMMARY:

THE MODIFIED SYSTEM IS AN IMPROVEMENT, A STEP FORWARD FROM THE CUMBERSOME SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED ON 20 MARCH. AIR FORCE SORTIES HAVE IMPROVED GREATLY UNDER THE SYSTEM. IN FACT, A 54 PCT INCREASE IN AIR FORCE SORTIES HAS BEEN REALIZED DURING THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH IS COMMENDABLE. STILL, THE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO HARBOR DEFICIENCIES. THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG, WHILE IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF THE ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE, HAS REQUIRED AN INORDINATELY HIGH NUMBER OF SCRAMBLES AND ADD-ON SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE 1ST MAW HAS BEEN FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCTION. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM INDICATES THAT THE

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 5333 **S E C R E T**
 PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER WITH ALL THE SORTIES HE REQUIRES. FURTHERMORE, TOTS ASSIGNED A WEEK IN ADVANCE DO NOT PERMIT SURGE AIR EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANGING TACTICAL SITUATIONS FACING THE GROUND COMMANDER, THEREBY REQUIRING INCREASED SCRAMBLES. THE LENGTH OF THE AIR REQUEST CHAIN AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IMPOSED BY THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG ARE STILL EXCESSIVE. THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSIONS ALSO APPEAR MORE SUITABLE FOR WEEKLY FRAGGING SINCE THEY HAVE CHANGED LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY.

* B. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL PLANS AND TO MEET EMERGENCY AND CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS:

- (1) ~~THAT THE PRESENT JOINT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM~~ BE FURTHER IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIR.
- ✓ (2) THAT THE NUMBER OF MARINE STRIKE SORTIES SET ASIDE BY COMUSMACV FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR EFFORT (CURRENTLY

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA 5333 S E C R E T
 16 SORTIES PER DAY) BE FRAGGED BY THE TACC CONSISTENT WITH
 OVERALL INTERDICTION PLANS.

(3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES (CURRENTLY
 209 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 32 DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES AS
 WELL AS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 18 HELC ESCORT MISSIONS) BE FRAGGED
 BY CG III MAF. TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE
 DETERMINED BY CG III MAF BASED ON THE TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE
 AND ARMY DIVISIONS, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS AND
 COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS.

(4) THAT, AS NECESSARY, EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS
 ARISING OUTSIDE I CORPS BE MET BY COMUSMACV PREEMPTION OF
 SORTIES SCHEDULED IN I CORPS IAW REF D.

(5) THAT III MAF (THROUGH I DASC) INFORM COMUSMACV
 BY DIRECT LINE TO TACC OF ALL MARINE SORTIES SCHEDULED IN
 I CORPS AND BY COPY OF THE 1ST MAW FRAG. REAL TIME REPORTS
 WILL BE MADE TO AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA AND TACC), AS SORTIES
 ARE FLOWN.

(6) THAT IN RECOGNITION OF AIR FORCE BASE
 LOCATION AND LOADINGS, PREPLANNED AIR FORCE SORTIES, TOTS, AND
 ORDNANCE LOADS BE ADJUSTED THROUGH REQUESTS AND COORDINATION

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA 5333 S E C R E T
 BETWEEN III MAF, COMUSMACV TASE AND TACC. AIR FORCE SORTIES
 SUPPORTING FORCES IN I CORPS CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY
 COMUSMACV AND SCHEDULED BY TACC.

(7) THAT THE INITIAL POINT (IP) BE ELIMINATED
 FROM THE WEEKLY FRAG. THE CORRECT IP IS CONTINGENT UPON
 ASSIGNMENT OF A SPECIFIC III MAF SUBORDINATE TO BE SUPPORTED.
 UNTIL THE WEEKLY FRAG IS RECEIVED BY III MAF AND SUBALLOCATED
 TO ITS SUBORDINATES, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE A CORRECT
 IP. I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE PASSING NIGHTLY TO 7TH AF
 AND FMAW THE CORRECT IP FOR EACH MISSION ON THE WEEKLY AND
 DAILY FRAG.

(8) THAT, IN THE CASE OF I CORPS, CONSIDERATION
 BE GIVEN TO ADOPTION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE COACT,
 MARINE SPHINX REPORT, AND INFORMATION ON DIVERTS FROM I DASC
 TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ON MARINE AIR FOR THE CONSOLIDATED
 MISSION REPORT.

(9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH (REF A)
 BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE TEMPORARY
 SINGLE MANAGER TACTICAL AIR CONCEPT.

GP-4
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* C O N F I D E N T I A L *

AC301

PT005934
RTTCZYUW RUMUHFA5130 1811700-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
ZNY CCCCC
R 290911Z JUN 68
FM COMUSMACV
TO ZEN/CDR 7AF
RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
INFO ZEN/CG USARV
ZEN/CH DCA SAM
BT

ACT G-6
COPY TO ADJ G-2
S/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L 18718
(SUBJ: RELOCATION OF I DASC (U))

THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART I FOR ALCON.
1. (U) CG III MAF HAS BEEN TASKED TO PLAN FOR RELOCATION OF I DASC TO CAMP VAN HORN AND TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY ESSENTIAL FOR OPERATION FROM THE NEW LOCATION.
2. (C) PLANNING ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENT IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
A. 100 VF CIRCUITS DA NANG AFB TO III MAF MDF.
B. ONE 100 LINE 1A1 TELEPHONE KEY SYSTEM FOR INTERNAL DASC COMMUNICATIONS.
C. TWO FDX 100 WPM SECURE TTY OPERATING POSITIONS WITH ONE SPARE POSITION.

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 5130 C O N F I D E N T I A L
D. ONE SECURE, POINT-TO-POINT VOICE CIRCUIT BETWEEN I DASC (CAMP VAN HORN) AND CG I CORPS (RVN).
E. ONE SECURE AIR-TO GROUND VHF RADIO FACILITY.
F. TACTICAL VHF RADIO FACILITY.
G. THREE HF SSB RADIO BASE STATIONS TO BE REMOTELY KEYED FROM NEW I DASC LOCATION.
H. TERMINATING EQUIPMENT FOR BOTH POINT-TO-POINT AND COMMON USER VOICE CIRCUITS.
3. (U) ANY ADDRESSEE KNOWING OF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS NOT ENUMERATED BY ABOVE, OR ANTICIPATING UNDUCE DELAY IN EXECUTION OF TASKS WHICH FOLLOW IS REQUESTED TO NOTIFY MACJ6 WITHOUT DELAY.
PART II FOR CDR 7AF AND CG III MAF.
4. (U) REQUEST CDR 7AF PROVIDE, INSTALL, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT LISTED IN PART I.
5. (U) CDR 7AF AND CG III MAF TO COORDINATE BOD OF NEW FACILITY AND JOINTLY DEVELOP TIME PHASING OF RELOCATION AND INSTALLATION OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT.
APRT III FOR CDR 7AF.
6. (U) COORDINATE EXTENSION CUTOVER AND RETERMINATION OF DCS CIRCUITS WITH CH DCA SAM TO ENSURE TIMELY CIRCUIT VALIDATION

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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* C O N F I D E N T I A L *

PAGE 3 RUMUHFA 5130 C O N F I D E N T I A L
AND PUBLICATION OF CEO'S FOR DCS REQUIREMENTS FOR I DASC AND
INDICATE BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS ANY ADDITIONAL FACILITIES DEEMED
ESSENTIAL, WHICH ARE NOT LISTED IN PART I ABOVE. GP-4
BY

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

301

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FOR

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	29 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
	292245Z JUN 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
2	DCG					REMARKS
4	DCG AIR					
5	C/S					
	D C/S			77		
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		300800H			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

29

SECRET 300

SECRET

OO RUMUGRA RUEBHOA
DE RUHHRMA 5356 1812245
ZNY SSSSS
O 292245Z JUN68
(RM) CG FM EPAC
TO RUMUGRAZCG III MAF
INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN, INFO
GEN CHAPMAN FROM LT GEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WAKING
HOURS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
A. CG III MAF 293334Z/JUN68 (S)
B. CMC 291934Z/JUNE 68 (S)
1. THE COMMANDANT AND I HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
EXCHANGE THOUGHTS CONCERNING YOUR PROPOSED
MESSAGE TO ABRAMS, REFERENCE A, OUTLINING YOUR
VIEWS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT. WHILE CONCURRING WITH
YOUR EVALUATION AND SUMMARY, AND UNDERSTANDING
THAT IN YOUR POSITION LOGMATISM MAY BE COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE, [WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT ANY RECOM-
MENDATION WITH REGARD TO CHANGES IN THE SINGLE
MANAGER SYSTEM MUST BE PREFACED BY A POSITIVE STATE-
MENT REAFFIRMING OUR COLLECTIVE POSITION ON THE

*Have stated this
position several
times in writing
to MACV, but can't
repeat again if
deemed necessary*

PAGE 2 RUHHRMA 5356 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE
RETURN OF AIR ASSETS TO III MAF.) THIS POSITION SHOULD
BE STATED IN UNEMOTIONAL TERMS, TIED CLOSELY TO A
PHILOSOPHY OF A MUTUAL DESIRE TO GET ON WITH THE WAR.
2. ACCORDINGLY, OUR APPROACH TO THE NEW COMMANDER
IN SAIGON SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MAY BE THE BEST
CHANCE YET TO REVERSE THE SINGLE MANAGER DECISION.
IT MAY ALSO BE OUR LAST FULL SHOT AT IT BECAUSE ABE
AND NO ONE ELSE WILL MAKE THIS DECISION AND ONCE
MADE WE CAN EXPECT IT TO LAST FOR THE DURATION. SINCE
IT IS PRACTICAL, APOLITICAL, NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY
PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS AND NOT INFLUENCED BY 7TH AF
PRESSURE, OUR ARGUMENTS SHOULD MAKE A POWERFUL
IMPRESSION BECAUSE THEY ARE COMPELLING AND HOLD
SPECIAL APPEAL TO THOSE WHO UNDERSTAND THE INFANTRY/
SUPPORTING ARMS COMBINATION. IT APPEARS TIMELY TO
REITERATE TO ABE OUR POSITION THAT THE GROUND COM-
MANDER MUST HAVE FULL MISSION DIRECTION OF HIS
TACTICAL ELEMENTS, STRESSING THAT WE HAVE GIVEN UP
MUCH IN OTHER HIGHLY DESIRABLE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE THE BALANCED AIR-GROUND CONFIGURATION.

*Disagree fully and
state why. A balance
if we take the blunt
logistic approach
we are doomed to
failure. We may be
anyways, but I
think the indirect
approach is
more likely to
succeed.*

will not work →

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

*We have said this
several times and the
thoughts can be repeated
it's becoming "old hat"
though*

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 5356 S E C R E T P S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
 THAT WE PRESENT TO AN ENEMY. THESE POINTS, PLUS THE
 CONSISTENT WOES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 REQUIRING PATCHWORK FIXES, WHICH ALL LEAD BACK IN THE
 DIRECTION OF THE OLD ARRANGEMENT, MAY INDUCE ABE TO
 SCRAP THIS CONTROVERSIAL SET UP ALTOGETHER, RETURN TO
 95-4, AND GET ON WITH THIS WAR. REMINDERS MAY BE IN
 ORDER TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTUAL
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSUMER ORIENTED MARINE AVIATION
 AND PRODUCER ORIENTED USAF TACTICAL AIR WILL CONTINUE
 TO BE DEEP AND ENDURING DESPITE THE BEST EFFORTS AND
 GOODWILL OF THOSE IN THE FIELD WHO TRY TO MAKE THEM
 OVERLAY; THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT SPANNED THE SINGLE
 MANAGER DECISION ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT TODAY;
 AND, FINALLY, THAT EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT WHATEVER
 CONCERN AROSE OVER POSSIBLE CONFLICT DUE TO INTER-
 MINGLING OF ARMY AND MARINE FORCES IN ICIZ PROVED
 UNFOUNDED. THE LAST THOUGHT IS THAT ABE MUST BE
 ASSURED THAT MARINE AIR IS READY TO GO ANYWHERE IN
 SEASIA AT ANY TIME AND IN WHATEVER NUMBERS THAT HE
 DIRECTS AND WE CAN DO IT UNDER 95-4.

*not one particle!
 only KSCB sit.*

Agree

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 5356 S E C R E T P S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
 3. THE MATTER OF RECENTLY IMPROVED AIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY
 MUST ALSO BE ADDRESSED BECAUSE IT MAY CONSTITUTE THE
 STRONGEST DETERRENT FOR ABE TO MAKE ANY CHANGE NOW.
 HERE IS OUR ESTIMATE OF WHAT HAS ACTUALLY OCCURRED
 UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN THIS RESPECT. IT FORCED
 THE CUMBERSOME, LONG-LEAD TIME, COMPLETELY
 CENTRALIZED 7TH AF SYSTEM TO INTERFACE WITH THE
 FLEXIBLE AND HIGHLY RESPONSIVE MARINE SETUP. THE
 MANY RESULTANT PATCHES AND IMPROVISATIONS HAVE ALL
 TENDED TOWARD OUR SYSTEM AND THE ARMY HAS BENEFITTED
 SIGNIFICANTLY. THE KEY POINT HERE, HOWEVER, IS THAT
 IT WAS THE INTERFACE ITSELF AND THE WAY IN WHICH IT
 HIGHLIGHTED THE RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY AND UNRESPONSIVE-
 NESS OF 7TH AF IN COMPARISON TO OUR SYSTEM THAT FORCED
 MORE SORTIES AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE ARMY. IN THE
 END IT'S CLEAR THAT NO GREAT EFFICIENCIES RESULTED FROM
 CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT PER SE, BUT RATHER RESULTED
 FROM INTERFACE AND IMPROVISATIONS.
 4. ACCORDINGLY, I BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD RECOMMEND
 MARINE FIXED WING RECONNAISSANCE AND STRIKE ASSETS BE

*would not
 have been
 accomplished
 if 7 March
 Directive had
 not been issued*

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#300

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 5356 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
RETURNED TO CG, III MAF IN ACCORDANCE WITH 95-4.
5. HAVING MADE YOUR POSITION CLEAR, AND SHOULD YOU
DEEM IT REQUIRED AND NECESSARY, BELIEVE THAT THE FOL-
LOWING CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE IN YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS;
REFERENCE B PERTAINS.

Can do but doubt that it will be all in the direct approach.

A. PARAGRAPH 5.E LEAD-IN -REWORD TO READ:
QUOTE: THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL PLANS, TO MEET EMERGENCY AND CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN, AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS. UNQUOTE.

B. PARAGRAPH 5.E.(1) -REWORD TO READ:
QUOTE: (1) THAT THE PRESENT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM BE FURTHER IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIR. UNQUOTE.

C. PARAGRAPH 5.E.(3) -REWORD TO READ:
QUOTE: (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES (CURRENTLY 209 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 32 DAILY PLANNED SORTIES AS WELL AS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 18 HELO

? modified by adding "joint"

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA5356 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ESCORT MISSIONS) BE RETURNED TO MISSION DIRECTION OF CG, III MAF. TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG, III MAF BASED ON THE TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS. UNQUOTE.

D. PARAGRAPH 5.L.(9) -REWORD TO READ:
QUOTE: (9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH (REFERENCE A) BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGER TACTICAL AIR CONCEPT. UNQUOTE.

6. I'LL CALL YOU ABOUT NOON, YOUR TIME TO DISCUSS THE WHOLE MATTER. BEST REGARDS.

GP-3
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#300

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

OTT SZ YUW RUEBHOA9832 1811933-SSSS--RUHHFMA RUMUGRA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 291934Z JUN 68

FM OMC

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE, INFO LT GEN CUSHMAN
FROM GEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CG III MAF 290334Z JUN68

1. THIS CONFIRMS OUR TELECON OF 29 JUNE.

2. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS APPLY TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF REF A.

A. (QUOTE) THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE...

REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS: (CLOSE QUOTE).

B. (QUOTE) (1) THAT THE PRESENT INTEGRATED AIR CONTROL SYSTEM BE FURTHER IMPROVED... (CLOSE QUOTE).

C. (QUOTE) (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE... BE RETURNED TO MISSION DIRECTION OF CG III MAF. TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG III MAF BASED ON THE

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA9832 SECRET SPECAT
TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS. (CLOSE QUOTE)

D. (QUOTE) (9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE... REFINEMENTS TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGER... (CLOSE QUOTES)

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

299

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAW 1815U 1811105
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 291247Z JUN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF DANANG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 18729 FOR LTG CUSHMAN
 FROM GEN ABRAMS

SUBJECT: DASC LOCATION

1. (U) REFERENCE YOUR MSG 290234Z JUN 68.
2. (C) MACV MSG RELEASED THIS DATE DIRECTING THE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED IN YOUR PREVIOUS MSGS ON THIS SUBJECT.
3. (C) DELAY IN RESPONSE SIMPLY DUE TO TOO MUCH STAFF COORDINATION, AND INSUFFICIENT STAFF ACTION.

GP-4
 BT

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 5118 1810334
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- OMC
 O 292334Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF ENG
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/OMC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE, INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM
 LT GEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2

REF: A. CG FMFPAC MSG 200239Z JUN68

B. CG FMFPAC MSG 222252Z JUN68

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO GEN ABRAMS
 OUTLINING MY VIEWS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOLLOWING THE JUNE
 TRIAL PERIOD: QUOTE

FROM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV SAIGON

BT

SECRET

III MAF EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT/STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)

A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF 7MAR68 (S)

B. COMUSMACV 14578 MSG 211145Z MAY68 (S)

C. COMUSMACV 16352 MSG 071135Z JUN68 (C)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5118 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

D. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUNE 1966 (C)

1. (C) OBJECTIVE OF REF A WAS TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFECTIVE-
 NESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRINCIPALLY BY PROVIDING:

- A. GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TOTAL STRIKE
 RESOURCES AVAILABLE.
- B. IMPROVING RESPONSIVENESS TO THE AIR SUPPORT REQUIRE-
 MENTS OF GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDERS.
- C. SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCEDURES AND REDUCTION OF
 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.

2. (U) REF C DIRECTED A 30-DAY EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED
 PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE FORMULATED BY REF B, IN ORDER TO
 ASSESS PROGRESS OF THE SYSTEM AND TO IDENTIFY NECESSARY
 PROCEDURAL CHANGES. COVERAGE OF THE FOLLOWING WAS REQUESTED
 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE ORDER LISTED:

- A. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.
 - B. EVALUATION.
 - C. CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS AND APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.
3. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.
- A. THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK
 LOAD PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REF A

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE
PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REF B. HOWEVER, BOTH FACTORS CAN BE
IMPROVED WITH RELATIVELY MINOR MODIFICATIONS. IN ADDITION,
FULLY ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR ARTILLERY
COORDINATION WITH AIR OR AIRCRAFT DIVERSION AROUND DANGER
AREA.

4. EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM.

A. ADMINISTRATION - UNDER REF B THE ADMINISTRATIVE
WORK LOAD WAS LESSENED BY REDUCTION IN THE LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY
OF FRAGS AND REQUEST DATA; HOWEVER, THE BURDEN IS STILL
EXCESSIVE. THIS IS DUE TO THE CURRENT DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG
PROCEDURES AND DETAILED SCHEDULING THROUGH THE TACC. IT IS
NOTED THAT DURING THE TEST PERIOD, THE SORTIES ASSIGNED 1ST MAW
BY THE DAILY FRAG WERE ESSENTIALLY AS UNVARYING AS THOSE IN THE
WEEKLY FRAG. FURTHER, BASED UPON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS
HEADQUARTERS, THERE WERE NO DIVERTS FROM I CORPS DAILY SORTIES
TO OTHER CORPS AREAS. CONSEQUENTLY, INASMUCH AS COMUSMACV HAS
FREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER ALL SORTIES AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL
AGENCY (7TH AF TACC) IS FULLY INFORMED OF SORTIE STATUS AND
CAPABILITIES, THE DAILY FRAG PROCEDURES APPEAR TO BE AN UNNECESSARY

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
COMPLEXITY IN ICIZ.

B. (C) EFFICIENCY - THE PROVISIONS OF REF B BROUGHT
IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN SORTIE ALLOCATION, BUT OPTIMUM USE OF
SORTIES WAS NOT REALIZED. THIS IS EVIDENCED IN I CORPS BY THE
HIGH NUMBER OF SCRAMBLE AND ADD-ON SORTIES TO MEET THE DAILY
NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS, RESULTING IN THE 1ST MAW BEING
FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCTION.
OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES
NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER IN I CORPS WITH THE NUMBER
OF SORTIES HE DESIRES, AND THE SORTIES AVAILABLE ON THE PREPLANNED
FRAG ARE NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER IN SUFFICIENT
NUMBERS AT THE CRITICAL TIMES NEEDED TO INFLUENCE THE
TACTICAL SITUATION. THEREFORE, ALL ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN THE FORM
OF SCRAMBLES ARE REQUIRED. OF COURSE, SCHEDULES FOR SORTIE
PRODUCTION, WHEN APPROACHED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MAXIMUM
EFFICIENCY ON THE PART OF AIR UNITS, RARELY COINCIDE WITH THE
TOTS REQUIRED BY THE GROUND SCHEMES OF MANEUVER. BASE LOCATIONS
AND AIRCRAFT RADIUS OF ACTION STRONGLY INFLUENCE ORDNANCE
LOADS, A/C TURN AROUNDS, AND TIME ON TARGETS. ADJUSTMENTS AND
COMPROMISES BETWEEN THESE REQUIREMENTS CAN BEST BE MADE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#296

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
LOCALLY, THUS ENSURING GREATER SORTIE EFFECTIVENESS AND
PRODUCTION.

C. (C) CONCENTRATION OF AIR EFFORT - THE DAILY PRE-
PLANNED FRAG WAS INSTITUTED, INTER ALIA, TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY
TO CONCENTRATE THE AIR EFFORT AS DICTATED BY THE ENEMY THREAT.
DURING THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH ENDED 270600H JUN, THIS EMERGENCY
MASSING AND DIVERSION OF AIR EFFORT FROM I CORPS WAS NOT EM-
PLOYED, EXCEPT FOR A REDUCTION IN TAC AIR AVAILABLE TO I CORPS
TO 25 PERCENT OF TOTAL IN-COUNTRY TAC AIR SORTIES COMMENCING
JUNE 260600H FOR THE REMAINDER OF THAT MONTH. THE CHANGE IN THE WEIGHT
OF THE AIR EFFORT WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO INCREASE THE OUT-OF-
COUNTRY SORTIES TO 35 PERCENT OF TOTAL STRIKES AVAILABLE (SEE MACV
MSG 23075 Z JUNE). ALSO, THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSION CHANGED LITTLE
FROM DAY TO DAY. RATHER THAN CONTINUING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG, MARINE SORTIES IN
I CORPS COULD BE MORE EFFICIENTLY EMPLOYED BY ALLOCATION OF A
BLOCK OF MARINE SORTIES TO BE SCHEDULED IN I CORPS.

D. (C) PRODUCTION OF SORTIES: DURING THE TEST PERIOD MARINE
FIXED WING AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, BASED ON POSSESSED AIR-
CRAFT IN COUNTRY AGAINST A 1.2 SORTIE RATE, WERE PROGRAMMED AT 225

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SORTIES PER DAY. OF THIS NUMBER, 16 WERE ROUTINELY EMPLOYED
IN NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS OUT OF COUNTRY; 48 SORTIES WERE
EMPLOYED AS SCRAMBLES TO MEET EMERGENCY NEEDS OF ALL FORCES
IN I CORPS; 18 WERE DESIGNATED FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT, AND
143 SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED BY THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER
FOR AIR OPERATIONS THROUGH THE TACC AT SAIGON. OF THE 143
SORTIES, 79 PERCENT OR 111, WERE SCHEDULED BY THE WEEKLY FRAG AT
SET TIMES AND WITH STANDARD ORDNANCE LOADS; THE REMAINING 32
WERE SCHEDULED DAILY, BASED ON INDIVIDUAL TARGETS REQUESTED
THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. THE 1ST MAW, TO MEET THE NEEDS
OF FORCES IN I CORPS, ALSO AVERAGED AN ADDITIONAL 18 SORTIES
PER DAY, EMPLOYED BY SCRAMBLE AND ALL-ON MISSIONS (FOR A
DAILY AVERAGE OF 243 ATTACK SORTIES).

5. SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. (C) SUMMARY:

THE MODIFIED SYSTEM IS AN IMPROVEMENT, A STEP
FORWARD FROM THE CUMBERSOME SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED ON 20 MARCH.
AIR FORCE SORTIES HAVE IMPROVED GREATLY UNDER THE SYSTEM IN FACT,
A 54 PERCENT INCREASE IN AIR FORCE SORTIES HAS BEEN REALIZED DURING
THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH IS COMMENDABLE. STILL, THE SYSTEM
BT

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SECRET

#296

SECRET

OO RUHNM RUEBMOA
 DE RUMSAK 5136 1810334
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -I - CMC
 O 290334Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUHNM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBMOA/CMC
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN DUSE, INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2
 CONTINUES TO HARBOR DEFICIENCIES. THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG,
 WHILE IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF THE ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 DIRECTIVE, HAS REQUIRED AN INORDINATELY HIGH NUMBER OF SCRABLES AND
 ADD-ON SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS. CONSEQUENTLY THE
 1ST MAW HAS BEEN FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF
 SORTIE PRODUCTION. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT
 SYSTEM INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOT
 PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER WITH ALL THE SORTIES HE REQUIRES.
 FURTHERMORE, TOTS ASSIGNED A WEEK IN ADVANCE DO NOT PERMIT
 SURGE AIR EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANGING TACTICAL
 SITUATIONS FACING THE GROUND COMMANDER, THEREBY REQUIRING
 INCREASED SCRABLES. THE LENGTH OF THE AIR REQUEST CHAIN AND
 THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IMPOSED BY THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5136 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 ARE STILL EXCESSIVE. THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSIONS ALSO
 APPEAR MORE SUITABLE FOR WEEKLY FRAGGING SINCE THEY HAVE CHANGED
 LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY.

B. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE
 THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT
 IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL PLANS AND TO MEET EMERGENCY AND
 CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN:

(1) THAT THE PRESENT INTEGRATED AIR CONTROL SYSTEM
 BE RETAINED, BUT IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF
 SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIR.

(2) THAT THE NUMBER OF MARINE STRIKE SORTIES SET
 ASIDE BY COMUSMACV FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR EFFORT (CURRENTLY
 16 SORTIES PER DAY) BE FRAGGED BY THE TACC CONSISTENT WITH
 OVERALL INTERDICTION PLANS.

(3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES (CURRENTLY
 209 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 32 DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES AS
 WELL AS THE 48 SCRABLES AND 18 HELO ESCORT MISSIONS) BE ASSIGNED
 TO CG III MAF AS A WEEKLY SORTIE BLOCK. TIMES ON TARGET AND
 ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG III MAF BASED ON THE

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#296

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 5136 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS.

(4) THAT, AS NECESSARY, EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS
ARISING OUTSIDE I CORPS BE MET BY COMUSMACV PREEMPTION OF
SORTIES SCHEDULED IN I CORPS IAW REF D.

(5) THAT III MAF (THROUGH I DASC) INFORM COMUSMACV
BY DIRECT LINE TO TACC OF ALL MARINE SORTIES SCHEDULED IN
I CORPS AND BY COPY OF THE 1ST MAW FRAG. REAL TIME REPORTS
WILL BE MADE TO AIR FORCE CRC, (PANAMA AND TACC), AS SORTIES
ARE FLOWN.

(6) THAT IN RECOGNITION OF AIR FORCE BASE
LOCATION AND LOADINGS, PREPLANNED AIR FORCE SORTIES, TOTS, AND
ORDNANCE LOADS BE ADJUSTED THROUGH REQUESTS AND COORDINATION
BETWEEN III MAF, COMUSMACV TASE AND TACC. AIR FORCE SORTIES
SUPPORTING FORCES IN I CORPS CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY
COMUSMACV AND SCHEDULED BY TACC.

(7) THAT THE INITIAL POINT (IP) BE ELIMINATED
FROM THE WEEKLY FRAG. THE CORRECT IP IS CONTINGENT UPON
ASSIGNMENT OF A SPECIFIC III MAF SUBORDINATE TO BE SUPPORTED.
UNTIL THE WEEKLY FRAG IS RECEIVED BY III MAF AND SUBALLOCATED
TO ITS SUBORDINATES, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE A CORRECT

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 5136 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
IP. I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE PASSING NIGHTLY TO 7TH AF
AND FMAW THE CORRECT IP FOR EACH MISSION ON THE WEEKLY AND
DAILY FRAG.

(8) THAT, IN THE CASE OF I CORPS, CONSIDERATION
BE GIVEN TO ADOPTION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE COACT,
MARINE SPHINX REPORT, AND INFORMATION ON DIVERTS FROM I DASC
TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ON MARINE AIR FOR THE CONSOLIDATED
MISSION REPORT.

(9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH (REF A)
BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE SINGLE
MANAGER TACTICAL AIR CONCEPT.

GP-4 UNQUOTE

2. YOUR VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSED MESSAGE ARE SOLICITED
EARLIEST, AS MY REPLY MUST BE TO COMUSMACV BY 210700H JUL 68.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#296

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUHMM RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 444S 1811027
ZNY SSSSS
PAC -T- OMC
BT

SECRET SVC SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
ZUI RUMSAK 5118 1810534 292334Z JUN 68 SECTION 1 OF 2
C: PAGE 5 LN 10 AA COMMENCING AD FOR TO REAL 262622H JUNE 68
BT

SECRET

#296

SECRET

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 5113 1812234
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 290234Z JUN 68
 RM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 I DASC LOCATION (U)

- A. 7H AF 141245Z MAR 68
- B. COMUSMACV 07756 DTG 190154Z MAR 68
- C. 366 CBMT SPT GRP L NG 16092Z APR 68
- D. CG III MAF 24022Z MAY 68
- E. COMUSMACV 15079 DTG 260207Z MAY 68
- F. ADMINS III MAF 282704Z MAY 68
- G. CG III MAF 150544Z JUN 68

1. REFERENCES (A), (B) AND (C) ALL CONCUR THAT THE FINAL AND MOST DESIRABLE LOCATION FOR I DASC IS ADJACENT TO MY COC. REF (D) ADVISED OF THE AVAILABILITY OF SPACE WITHIN MY HEADQUARTERS FOR I DASC AND EXPRESSED MY DESIRE FOR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT. REF (E) STATED THAT ALL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5113 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AGENCIES AND SERVICES WERE READY TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT AND REQUESTED A FIRM DATE FOR RELOCATION FROM I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. I RESPONDED ON 28 MAY (SEE REF F) OUTLINING IN DETAIL MY REQUIREMENTS AND ON 15 JUNE, IN REF (G), I REQUESTED TO BE ADVISED AS TO THE CURRENT STATUS OF MY REQUEST CONTAINED IN REF (F).

2. THE PHYSICAL FACILITIES ARE BEING MODIFIED AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT UNTIL I RECEIVE THE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE I WILL BE UNABLE TO MOVE FURTHER FORWARD ON THE RELOCATION OF I DASC AT III MAF HEADQUARTERS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#296

SECRET

VV GRA 305

OO RUMUGRA
DE RUMHMA 838 1800835
ZNY SSSSSCOG G-3
INFO G-2
COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

O 280810Z JUN 68

FMCG PCV PHB

TO RUMHMB/CG 1ST ACD CES
RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
RUMHMB/CG 101ST ABN DIV CEE
INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DNG

BT

SECRET AVII-GCAV 04229

SUBJ: TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR COMING WEEKS (U)

1. (S) BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY TACTICAL AIR REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATION THOR, A MASSIVE ARTILLERY, AIR

YRLNG OPERATION DESIGNED

TO DESTROY EMEMY ARTILLERY IN THE CAP MUI LAY JCYIDPORTH OF

THE DMZ ADDRESSEES CAN EXPECT TO RECEIVE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN NORMAL TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, BOTH PREPLANNED AND IMMEDIATE, DURING THE PERIOD 1-7 JULY. REQUESTS FOR TACTICAL AIR DURING THE PERIOD SPECIFIED SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND IF POSSIBLE TARGETS ENGAGED WITH ALLTERNATE MEANS TO INSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF REMAINING TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES.

2. (S) ADDITIONALLY, IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED LACK OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE SCRAMBLE DURING THIS PERIOD, ADDRESSEES

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 838 SECRET

SHOULD EXPECT THAT SOME PREPLANNED TACTICAL AIR MAY BE DIVERTED TO VALID HIGH PRIORITY TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS WITHING THE CORPS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#293

PT005019
 OTTEZYUW RUHHFMA4907 1792228-EEEE-RUMUGRA
 ZNY EEEEE ZFG
 PP RUMUGRA
 DE RUHHFMA 4907 1792228
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 272228Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG YII MAP

FOR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE FOLLOWING NEWS RELEASE IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION.
 QUOTE:

BY FRED S. HOFFMAN
 AP MILITARY WRITER

WASHINGTON AP - THE AIR FORCE HAS WON, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, A DISPUTE OVER CONTROL OF MARINE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE MARINES ARE NOT CONCEDED FINAL DEFEAT, EVEN THOUGH A DECISION MADE AT THE TOP CIVILIAN LEVEL IN THE PENTAGON WENT AGAINST THEM.

ONE MARINE GENERAL SAID THAT "TO GRAB HALF OUR FORCE AWAY JUST BECAUSE IT OPERATES IN THE AIR THREATENS THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARINE CORPS."

AIR FORCE OFFICIALS DENIED THIS, CONTENDING THE AIM IS ONLY TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND TROOPS PARTICULARLY NOW THAT ARMY FORCES ALSO ARE FIGHTING IN THE

N

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA4907 UNCLAS E F T O

NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES WHICH ONCE WERE KNOWN AS "MARINE LAND."

THE SITUATION IS SUBJECT TO PERIODIC REVIEW AND THERE ARE COMMAND CHANGES UNDER WAY OR COMING THAT COULD ALTER POSITIONS.

THE ISSUE WHICH SPLIT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AROSE EARLIER THIS YEAR.

SOURCES SAID AIR FORCE GEN. WILLIAM MOMYER URGED IN MARCH THAT THE AIR FORCE SHOULD COORDINATE TACTICAL AIR MISSIONS IN THE NORTHERNMOST SECTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM BOTH ITS OWN MISSIONS AND THOSE OF MARINE WARPLANES.

THE MARINES WERE TO BE PERMITTED TO EXERCISE SOME LIMITED CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN AIR OPERATIONS, WHICH THE CORPS TRADITIONALLY HAS REGARDED AS AN EXTENSION OF ITS INFANTRY. THE TWO FORM AN "AIR-GROUND TEAM" IN MARINE DOCTRINE.

MOMYER, COMMANDER OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WAS BACKED BY GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, TOP U.S. COMMANDER IN THE VIETNAM WAR. MOMYER WAS ONE OF WESTMORELAND'S TOP DEPUTIES.

EVENTUALLY, SOURCES SAID, MOMYER ALSO RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF ADM. U.S. GRANT SHARP, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL U.S. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA. THIS WAS A BLOW TO THE MARINES, WHO

EXPECT TO BE UPHELD BY NAVY ADMIRALS IN SQUABBLES WITH THE

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA4907 UNCLAS E F T O

OTHER SERVICES SINCE THE MARINES ARE AN ARM OF THE NAVY. MARINE GROUND TROOPS HAD EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES UNTIL ARMY TROOPS WERE SENT UP LAST YEAR TO HELP THE THIN-SPREAD MARINES DEAL WITH GROWING PRESSURE FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

AIR FORCE PLANES HAVE OPERATED OUT OF BASES IN THE NORTHERNMOST AREA FOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS, FLYING STRIKES INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, AND ALSO HITTING ENEMY TARGETS INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM.

BUT UNTIL MOMYER MADE HIS MOVE, THE MARINE AIR WING HANDLED ALL REQUESTS FROM MARINE GROUND UNITS FOR SUPPORT, CALLING ON THE AIR FORCE FOR HELP ONLY IF HELP WERE NEEDED BEYOND MARINE RESOURCES.

WHEN THE DISPUTE REACHED WASHINGTON, SOURCES SAID, THE JOINT CHIEFS DIVIDED.

GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, LINED UP WITH GEN. JOHN P. MCCONNELL IN SUPPORT OF THE MOMYER-WESTMORELAND POSITION.

THE MARINE STAND WAS BACKED BY GEN. LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, MARINE COMMANDANT, ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, CHIEF OF NAVAL

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA4907 UNCLAS E F T O

OPERATIONS, AND GEN. HAROLD X. JOHNSON, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE JOHNSON LINED UP WITH CHAPMAN AND MOORER BECAUSE THE ARMY MAY BE CONCERNED THAT THE AIR FORCE MAY NEXT REACH OUT FOR CONTROL OF SUCH ADVANCED HELICOPTERS AS THE CHEYENNE. THIS IS A WINGED CHOPPER WHICH IS SOME RESPECTS VERGES ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A CONVENTIONAL AIRPLANE.

PENTAGON SOURCES SAID THE MATTER WENT TO THE HIGHEST CIVILIAN LEVEL AND THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL H. NITZE MADE A DECISION UPHOLDING THE AIR FORCE VIEW AND SPECIFYING THE RETENTION OF SOME LIMITED CONTROL BY THE MARINES. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS TO BE LOOKED AT PERIODICALLY TO SEE HOW IT IS WORKING, SOURCES SAID.

MEANWHILE, CHANGES ARE IMMINENT IN THE U.S. COMMAND IN VIETNAM AND THE OVER-ALL PACIFIC AREA. THIS OPENS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL IN I CORPS OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

WESTMORELAND IS REPLACING JOHNSON AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF BUT HE IS NOT EXPECTED TO CHANGE HIS VIEW IN SWITCHING JOBS.

UNQUOTE.

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 4 OF 6 COPIES

#297

* UNCLASSIFIED E F T O *

JUN 27 11 50 PM '68

PT004805
OTTEZYUW RUMHCTA1121 1790000-EEEE-RUMUGRA.

ZNY EEEEE

DE RUMHVH 5991 791050

COG: G-3

ZNY EEEEE

INFO: G-2

O 270817Z JUN 68

COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

FM I DASC DANANG AB RVN

TO RUMHAN/CG FMAW (ATTN: G-3 AIR) TADC DANA G

VN

RUMHMA/DIREITOR DASC VICTOR PHU BAI RVN

INFO: RUMSAW/ 7 AF TACD AD RVN

RAMUGRA/CG III MAF (ATTN: GAE AIR BL DANANG RVN

BT

UNCLAS E F T O I DASC JUN 68:

SUBJECT: COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

TO INSURE THAT OPERATIONAL MATTERS X THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE
SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN THE I CTZ ARE PROMPTLY AND PROPERLY
COORDINATED PROBLEM AREAS ENCOUNTERED BY DASC VICTOR O R TADC WILL
BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENT

ON OS I DASI, I DASC WILL DETERMIN THE
NECESSARY COURSES OF AITION TO BE FOLLOWED OR TAKEN FOR THEIR
SOLUTION

BT

*Air Control
File*

290

O 230757Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN WEMYER CDR 7AF TSN
 LTG MILDREY SCS USARV
 LTG ROSSON CG III MAF
 LTG WEYANDIGO II FFORCEV
 MG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 RADM VETH COMNAVFORV
 INFO MG STILLWELL CG PCV
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 8316 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO

1. (S) THE STAFF HAS JUST COMPLETED A STUDY EXTENDING ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES INTO THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. WE EXPECT ENEMY OFFENSIVES TO BE STAGGERED THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER. FIRST, WE SEE ANOTHER GO AT SAIGON WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. IN MID OR LATE JULY THERE WILL BE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN I CTZ WITH AN EFFORT MADE TO TAKE DANANG AND THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. AS FOR THE HIGHLANDS, WE DO NOT SEE ANOTHER OFFENSIVE THERE PRIOR TO THE FIRST PART OF AUGUST. IF ANYTHING, THESE ESTIMATES AS TO ENEMY TIMING ARE PROBABLY ON THE NEAR SIDE. EXCEPT FOR THE TET EXPERIENCE, ENEMY ACTIONS HABITUALLY LAG BEHIND HIS PLANS. WITH THESE ESTIMATES IN MIND AND TO GET THE PROPER PERSPECTIVE, WE WILL REVIEW LAST WEEK'S ACTIVITY.

2. (S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECAPITULATES THE ACTIVITY IN THE FOUR CORPS TACTICAL ZONES DURING THE WEEK FROM 140001 TO 202400 JUNE. THE SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS ARE THOSE THAT RESULTED IN FIVE OR MORE FRIENDLY OR ENEMY KIA. ALL PERCENTAGES GIVEN RELATE TO SOUTH VIETNAM ONLY EXCEPT THE TACTICAL AIR AND ARC LIGHT SORTIES. ONE CAVEAT IS INDICATED, THE ENEMY BATTALIONS LISTED INCLUDE THE 304 AND 320 NVA DIVISIONS FOR I CORPS AND THOSE THAT MAY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AREA.

A. I CTZ HAD 92 FRIENDLY MANEUVER BATTALIONS (31 PERCENT), 93 ENEMY (40.6 PERCENT) AND HAD 23 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (25.7 PERCENT). THERE WERE 47 FRIENDLY AND 667 ENEMY KIA. THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY 37.5 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE TACTICAL AIR SORTIES AND DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ARC LIGHT SUPPORT.

B. II CTZ HAD 63 FRIENDLY (21.3 PERCENT) AND 50 ENEMY (21.8 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND HAD NINE CONTACTS (10.1 PERCENT). THEY HAD 55 FRIENDLY AND 101 ENEMY KIA; AND WERE SUPPORTED BY 15.4 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 28 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (6.7 PERCENT).

C. III CTZ HAD 94 FRIENDLY (31.2 PERCENT) AND 60 ENEMY (26.2 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND HAD 36 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (40.5 PERCENT). THEY HAD 116 FRIENDLY AND 678 ENEMY KIA. IN SUPPORT THERE WERE 18.4 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 331 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (79 PERCENT).

D. IV CTZ HAD 47 FRIENDLY (15.9 PERCENT) AND 26 ENEMY (11.4 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS, AND HAD 21 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (23.7 PERCENT). THEY HAD 90 FRIENDLY AND 313 ENEMY KIA. IN SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED 7.3 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 30 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (7.15 PERCENT).

E. WE PUT 14.4 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE. IN LAOS WE USED 7 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 30 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (7.15 PERCENT).

3. (S) AFTER AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION AND INDICATIONS, AND IN LIGHT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT OF AIR SUPPORT FOR LAST WEEK, I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A SHIFT. FROM NOW UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH, EMPHASIS WILL BE PRIMARILY ON PREEMPTING OR BLUNTING THE FORTHCOMING ENEMY ATTACK ON SAIGON. AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE INFILTRATION AND LOGISTIC EFFORT IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND LAOTIAN AREAS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO TALLY HO. SUFFICIENT SUPPORT WILL BE ALLOCATED TO I CTZ TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN HAND IN THE KHE SANH, EASTERN DMZ, QUANG TRI, HUE AND DANANG AREAS. THE TAC AIR IN TALLY HO WILL ALSO BE TARGETED ON THE SAM SITES IN PREPARATION FOR JULY OPERATIONS. TAC AIR WILL BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS: I CTZ 25 PERCENT; II CTZ 10 PERCENT; III CTZ 25 PERCENT; IV CTZ 5 PERCENT; ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND LAOS 35 PERCENT. THE ARC LIGHT WEIGHT OF EFFORT WILL REMAIN IN III CTZ THROUGH JUNE TO DISRUPT THE ENEMY'S INFILTRATION ROUTES, BASE AREAS AND HARBOR SITES. THIS B-52 CAMPAIGN AROUND SAIGON MAY TAKE 90 TO 100 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE SORTIES.

4. (S) TENTATIVELY, THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT WILL BE SHIFTED TO THE NORTH ON 1 JULY. WE PLAN TO KICK OFF WITH OPERATION THOR, AN INTEGRATED AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE OPERATION. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO SMOTHER THE ENEMY WITH FIREPOWER JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ. THE BOUNDARIES FOR THIS OPERATION RUN FROM THE GULF OF TONKIN TO THE YD00 LINE ON THE WEST, AND FROM THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE DMZ TO THE YD00 LINE ON THE NORTH. AFTER THIS SEVEN-DAY OPERATION, WE WILL CONTINUE FOR THE MONTH OF JULY TO WORK OVER RP-1 WITH TACTICAL AIR AND B-52'S. WE INTEND TO SMASH HIS LOC AND INFILTRATION TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. TO DO SO THE AIR ATTACKS MUST BE INTENSIVE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

900

#287

O 230757Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN MOMYER CDR 7AF TSN
 LTO MILDREN DCG USARV
 LTO ROSSON CG III MAF
 LTO WEYAND CG II FFORCEV
 MG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 RADM VETH COMNAVFORV
 INFO MG STILLWELL CG PCV
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 8316 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 5. (S) THE ABOVE PLANS FOR LATE JUNE AND JULY RELATE DIRECTLY TO THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. OUR ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES AND OUR PLANNED FIRE POWER UTILIZATION ARE INTERWOVEN. SIMILARLY, MY TROOP POSTURE MUST ENABLE ME TO STRIKE THE ENEMY WHEREVER HE CHOOSES TO COMMIT HIMSELF. TO DO SO I MUST GET THE UTMOST EFFECT FROM A FLEXIBLE WEIGHT OF EFFORT. I HAVE THAT IN TACTICAL AIR, B-52'S AND NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND I INTEND TO USE THEM TO THAT END. COUPLED WITH FLEXIBLE FIREPOWER MY TROOP FORMATIONS MUST HAVE THE MOBILITY TO REACT TO OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK AND TO THWART ENEMY THREATS. HENCE, WE WILL CHANGE TO A MOBILE POSTURE IN THE KHE SANH AREA. THE SITUATION HAS NOT CHANGED IN THIS RESPECT BY THE APPARENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE 304 AND 328 NVA DIVISIONS. IN FACT, THE RESULTANT DISPOSITION IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI WILL BETTER ENABLE US TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT WHEN AND WHERE IT MATERIALIZES.

6. (S) THIS INFORMATION SHOULD GIVE YOU AN INSIGHT INTO THE PICTURE AS I SEE IT. YOU REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY SITUATION IS THE KEY ISSUE; AND WHEN IT CHANGES, OUR PLANS CHANGE, AS WILL THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT. THE ENEMY IS ELUSIVE AT PRESENT WHILE HE IS PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. OUR JOB IS TO FERRET HIM OUT, KEEP HIM OFF BALANCE, AND PREEMPT HIS ATTACKS BY PUTTING OUR SUPPORTING ARMS ON HIS BASE AREAS AND ASSEMBLY AREAS. IF YOU ARE NOT IN CONTACT, YOU MUST REDOUBLE YOUR RECONNAISSANCE.

7. (S) I CONSIDER THIS SUMMER CAMPAIGN TO BE CRITICAL TO OUR OBJECTIVES. THE ACTION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FIND EACH OF YOU WITH INTENSIVE COMBAT PERIODS AND PERIODS OF REDUCED ENEMY PRESSURES. ACCORDINGLY, EACH OF YOU MAY FIND YOURSELVES FACED WITH "ECONOMY OF FORCE" MEASURES AS TO MANEUVER UNITS, AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT, OR BOTH. YOU MAY FIND THESE LATTER PERIODS TO BE YOUR GREATEST CHALLENGE.
 SP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

450

#287

SECRET

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMKM 4073 1742053
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 222053Z JUN 68
 RM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN CUSHMAN FROM L GEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS, SECTION 1 OF 2
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 1. OMC 191348Z/JUN68 IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SUBJ: III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U).
 2. FOLLOWING MEMO FROM DESEDEF TO SECNAV DATED 15 JUNE 68 PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE PAUL: AS YOU REQUESTED I HAVE LOOKED INTO THE VARIOUS POINTS RAISED IN THE MARINE CORPS PAPER YOU SENT ME. THE PAPER YOU SENT ME THIS WEEK ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT. CONTRARY TO THE THRUST OF THE MARINE PAPER, I HAVE FOUND THAT UNDER THE MODIFIED SYSTEM COMUSMACV DOES NOT REQUIRE SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION IN ADVANCE OF THE WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES TO THE MAJOR GROUND

PAGE 2 RUMKM 4073 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO COMMANDERS. UNDER THIS NEW MODIFICATION OF THE WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES PERMITS THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT AIR SUPPORT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THEM WHEN THEY REQUIRE IT, AND REDUCES CONSIDERABLY THE TIME BETWEEN TARGET SELECTION AND TARGET STRIKE. AS YOU MAY RECALL, RESPONSIVENESS WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR CONCERNS OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT. I BELIEVE THIS MODIFIED SYSTEM PROVIDES THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS A LARGE MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SINCE THEY NOW CAN OBTAIN AIR SUPPORT AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION DEVELOPS WITHOUT REFERRING SPECIFIC TARGET DATA AND DETAILED REQUIREMENTS TO EITHER THE MACV TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT ELEMENT OR THE 7TH AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER. I NOTE THAT COMUSMACV IS CONDUCTING AN EVALUATION DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE OF THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT. I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION COMUSMACV WILL MAKE WHATEVER CHANGES

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHNFMA 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 TO THE SYSTEM HE FEELS NECESSARY TO INSURE MAXIMUM
 FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF
 AIR ASSETS IN SOUTH VIETNAM... SIGNED PAUL UNQUOTE.
 2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PROVIDED SECNAV IN RE-
 SPONSE TO THE DESECEDEF MEMO. QUOTE A. IN HIS MEMO
 TO SECNAV OF 15JUN68, THE DESECEDEF INDICATES THAT,

CONTRARY TO THE THRUST OF CMC'S LETTER TO SECNAV OF
 20MAY68, HE FINDS THAT UNDER THE MODIFIED SYSTEM
 COMUSMACV DOES NOT REQUIRE SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION
 IN ADVANCE OF THE WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED
 SORTIES TO THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS. B. EXAMINA-
 TION OF CMC'S LETTER DISCLOSES NO REFERENCE TO SPE-
 CIFIC TARGET SELECTION, WHICH LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION
 THAT THE DESECEDEF HAS BEEN ERRONEOUSLY BRIEFED TO
 THE EFFECT THAT TIME ON TARGET (TOT) REFERS TO A
 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION INSTEAD OF A TIME THAT AIRCRAFT
 ARE AVAILABLE TO DELIVER SUPPORT. C. COMUSMACV'S
 MESSAGE 211145Z MAY68 SPECIFIES THAT "THE WEEKLY
 FRAG WILL LIST FLIGHTS BY...THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF
 AIRCRAFT...ORDNANCE LOADS... AND SCHEDULED TIME WILL

PAGE 4 RUHNFMA 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 BE SHOWN FOR EACH FLIGHT, NIGHT TOYS WILL BE INCLUDED
 IN THE WEEKLY FRAG...EACH MAJOR GROUND COMMANDER MAY
 USE THESE SORTIES IN ANY MANNER HE CONSIDERS WILL
 SUPPORT HIS TACTICAL PLANS MOST EFFECTIVELY SO LONG
 AS HIS INTENDED UTILIZATION IS CONSISTENT WITH AIR-
 CRAFT AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES." D. THE PRECEDING
 PARAGRAPH IS QUOTED TO EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR STATING
 THAT THIS MODIFICATION STILL DOES NOT MEET THE STAND-
 ARDS OF RESPONSIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM,
 FOR THE SPECIFIC ISSUE TAKEN WITH THE MODIFIED VER-
 SION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT PLAN IS THAT THE WEEKLY
 FRAG CONTINUES TO PHILOSOPHY OF PRODUCER ORIENTATION
 RATHER THAN EMPLOYING AIR ORIENTED TO THE NEEDS OF
 THE CONSUMER. THE PRESENT WEEKLY FRAG IS IN EFFECT
 AN AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WHICH ALLOWS THE
 PRODUCER (THE AIR FORCE) TO DICTATE WHEN (SCHEDULED
 TIMES) HOW MUCH (NUMBER AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT), AND
 WHAT EFFECT (ORDNANCE LOADS) THE CONSUMER (GROUND
 OPPOSITION TO THE MARINE CORPS CONCEPT THAT THE EM-

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

283

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHMM 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 ROYMENT OF AIR, AS A SUPPORTING ARM, MUST BE KEYED
 TO THE DIRECT NEEDS (TIME, QUANTITY AND ORDNANCE) OF
 THE GROUND FORCES. E. IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM, THE AIR FORCE RETAINS THE PREROGATIVE TO
 EMPLOY AIR INDEPENDENT OF THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
 OF THE GROUND FORCES. THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER, WHO
 IN EFFECT HAS PARITY WITH THE GROUND COMMANDER, RE-
 COGNIZES HIS MISSION TO SUPPORT GROUND FORCES BUT
 DETERMINES BOTH DEGREE AND QUANTITY OF THE SUPPORT.
 THIS IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE MARINE CORPS
 CONCEPT OF A SINGLE COMMANDER OF AN INTEGRATED AIR-
 GROUND TEAM. F. AS STATED IN CMC'S LETTER OF 29MAY
 68, THESE CHANGES TO INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE
 AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE GROUND COMMANDER ARE WEL-
 COMED; HOWEVER, THE DEGREE OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
 FORCES ATTAINED BY THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM IS
 STILL NOT ACHIEVED IN THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM NOR
 CAN IT BE UNTIL THE AIR SUPPORT RESOURCES ARE RE-
 STORED TO THE POSITIVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG III
 MAF. UNQUOTE.

PAGE 6 RUHMM 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 3. IN THAT SECDEF CONTINUES TO SUP-
 PORT COMUSMACV AND IN LIGHT OF YOUR 160012Z JUN68 IT
 APPEARS THAT A MOVE FROM SAIGON MAY BE OUR BEST BET
 AT THIS TIME. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AS TO: A.
 HAVING BOB APPROACH ABE ON IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN SET
 FORTH IN OMCN31-68 (CMC 142003Z JUN68 AT THE END
 OF THE PRESENT EVALUATION PERIOD (30JUN). B. YOUR
 APPROACHING SHARP ON THE SAME SUBJECT IN CONJUNCTION
 WITH OTHER INFORMATION RECEIVED ON YOUR TRIP.
 4. HAVE URMOST CONFIDENCE YOU CAN MAKE THE BELL RING
 LOUD AND CLEAR--UNQUOTE.
 2. MY REPLY TO CMC IS BEING FORMULATED WITH PARTICULAR
 CONSIDERATION OF THE VIEWS AND COMMENTS YOU AND
 OTHERS MADE DURING MY TRIP.
 3. TENTATIVELY, I THINK THE NEXT MOVES SHOULD BE:
 A. YOUR GOING TO ABE IN YOUR END-JUNE EVALUATION
 WITH A PLAN FOR RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR-GROUND
 TEAM. YOUR PROPOSAL MUST TAKE FULL COGNIZANCE OF
 OMCN 31-68, WHILE ADDING THE EXPERT ON THE SCENE
 DIAGNOSIS AND IDEAS FOR ACCOMMODATIONS HELD BY YOUR-
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

#283

SECRET

I
 PP RUMSAK
 DE RUHMM 4074 1742053
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 222053Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN CUSHMAN FROM L GEN BUSE.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
 FINAL SECTION OF 2
 SELF AND THE 1ST MAW. IN THIS REGARD, IF YOU HAVE SOME
 PROPOSED LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS VARYING FROM
 GICM 31-68 PLEASE LET US KNOW.

B. MY GOING TO SHARP AT A TIME AND IN CONSONANCE
 WITH YOUR APPROACH TO ABE.
 4. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

283

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
DE RUMKM 4072 174205Z
ZNY SSSSS
P 222052Z JUN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO L GEN
CUSHMAN FROM L GEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 19134EZ/JUN68 (S)

1. IN REFERENCE A YOU ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS ON
HAVING BOB CUSHMAN APPROACH ABRAMS ON IMPLEMENTING THE
PLAN SET FORTH IN CMCN 31-68. ADDITIONALLY YOU
ASKED FOR MY THOUGHTS ON APPROACHING SHARP ON THE
SAME SUBJECT.

2. I HAVE PASSED REF A TO CUSHMAN FOR HIS INFORMA-
TION AND POSSIBLE USE. YOUR WORDS TO SECNAV CON-
TAINED IN PARA 2 THEREIN ARE PARTICULARLY COGENT.

3. YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE AVENUES OF APPROACH TO
ABRAMS AND SHARP SEEM THE BEST WAY TO GO. UNLESS

PAGE 2 RUMKM 4072 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO
YOU DESIRE OTHERWISE, I PLAN TO:

A. ADVISE BOB CUSHMAN TO PRESENT, IN HIS END-JUNE
EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGE ARRANGEMENT,
A PLAN FOR RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR-GROUND
TEAM. I CAME AWAY FROM MY RECENT VISIT WITH THE FEELING
THAT BOB AND HIS STAFF HAD AN EXCELLENT DIAGNOSIS OF THE
CASE AND, WHILE HIS REMEDY MUST TAKE FULL COGNIZANCE
OF CMCN 31-68, HE HAD A GOOD FEEL OF THE PULSE AND MAY
HAVE SOME LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS WHICH CAN BE DIGESTED
AT THIS POINT AND STILL LEAD TO FULL RECOVERY. I THINK
WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THIS BASIS WITH BOB WORKING IN
CLOSE HARMONY WITH ABE. AT THE SAME TIME, IF SOME OF
BOB'S PROPOSED LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS VARY FROM CMCN
31-68 HE IS TO LET US KNOW IMMEDIATELY.

B. APPROACH SHARP IN CONSONANCE WITH CUSHMAN'S
EFFORTS AND RATIONALE, ADDING TO THEM THE PERSONAL
OBSERVATIONS AND STAFF DATA I FOUND DURING MY TRIP.
BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#281

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 20 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 200035Z JUN 68		COPY# 3 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
			IN	OUT		
7	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

REF A

SECRET #279

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMUGRA
DE RUHHFMA 3567 1710035
ZNY SSSSS
P 200035Z JUN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT
SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM
LT GEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE COMMANDANT'S
070027Z/JUN WHICH WE DISCUSSED ON MY WESTPAC TRIP.

QUOTE:

A. CG FMFPAC 300511Z MAY68
YOUR COMMENTS CONTAINED IN REF A WERE INCORPORATED IN THE
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO SEC NAV. THE FOLLOWING OMC MEMO PARALLELS
THAT PROPOSAL.

IT HAS NOT BEEN CIRCULATED AND IS PROVIDED FOR
INFORMATION. QUOTE:

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

REF: (A) DEP SEC DEF MEMO DTD 15MAY68

(B) COMUSMACV MSG 211145Z MAY68

1. IN REFERENCE (A) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NOTED THAT
THE SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTROL OF AIR IN SOUTH

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
VIETNAM WOULD NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THE SPECIFIC SITUATION
FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNED, AND THAT COMUSMACV SHOULD REVERT TO
NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR III MAF WHEN THE TACTICAL
SITUATION PERMITS. MR NITZE ALSO STATED THAT CHANGES SHOULD
BE SOUGHT TO RECTIFY DEFICIENCIES IN THE INTERIM SYSTEM.

2. BY REFERENCE (B) GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS ANNOUNCED MODIFI-
CATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT PLAN. THIS ESSENTIALLY PROVIDES
FOR MAJOR DECENTRALIZATION OF PRE-PLANNED AIR OPERATIONS BY
ASSIGNING BLOCKS OF AIR SUPPORT ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE WITH PRE-
DETERMINED TOTS AND ORDNANCE LOADS. 70 PER CENT OF THE AVAILABLE
SORTIES ARE DISTRIBUTED TO THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS, NAMELY
III MAF, I FFV AND II FFV, BY MEANS OF A WEEKLY FRAGMENTARY
OPERATIONS ORDER, AND THE REMAINING 30 PER CENT ARE FRAGGED ON A
DAILY BASIS IN RESPONSE TO AIR REQUESTS RECEIVED THE DAY BEFORE THE
SORTIES ARE TO BE FLOWN. THE NEW PROCEDURES WERE EFFECTIVE ON
30 MAY.

3. THIS CHANGE IS INTENDED TO INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE
AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE GROUND COMMANDER, AND THE EFFORT TO
DO SO IS WELCOMED. THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMUSMACV TO ~~RETAIN A~~ ensure full
~~DEGREE OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT~~ OF HIS TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES IS
and effective utilization

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FULLY APPRECIATED AND SUPPORTED. HOWEVER, THE RECENT ALTERATIONS STILL WILL NOT MEET THE STANDARDS OF RESPONSIVENESS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE MARINE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

- A. THE WEEKLY FRAG IS PUBLISHED 36 HOURS AHEAD OF ITS EFFECTIVE TIME OF IMPLEMENTATION. IT FORMULGATES AN AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE. ACTUAL GROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE PREDICTED 36 HOURS PLUS UP TO ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE.
- B. THE WEEKLY FRAG CONTAINS THE TIMES SORTIES ARE TO BE FLOWN AND ORDNANCE TO BE CARRIED. THEREFORE, GROUND OPERATIONS MUST BE PLANNED TO ACCOMMODATE THE ADVANCE SCHEDULE OF THE SUPPORTING AIR ARM. THE MODIFICATION INDICATES THAT PROVISIONS WILL BE MADE FOR MINOR CHANGES IN TOT OR A CHANGE IN ORDNANCE. HOWEVER, THE NET EFFECT IS THAT GROUND OPERATIONS BECOME RESPONSIVE TO AIR OPERATIONS, RATHER THAN THE CONVERSE.
4. ALTHOUGH THE BUILDUP OF GROUND FORCES AND THE DIVERSITY OF AIR SUPPORT MEANS INTRODUCED INTO I CORPS ORIGINALLY WERE ADVANCED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONCENTRATION OF AIR SUPPORT ASSETS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM, ALLOCATION OF 72 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE SORTIES NOW HAS BEEN DECENTRALIZED TO THE MAJOR

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO GROUND COMMAND. THIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION, IN FACT, POSES NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS. ARMY AND MARINE GROUND UNITS HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY, AND DESPITE SINGLE MANAGEMENT, THERE ARE, IN FACT, TWO AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS NOW FUNCTIONING IN I CORPS. REGARDLESS OF THE INCREASED TROOP DENSITY, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME AS IT WAS BEFORE THE BUILDUP. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A SINGLE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST PROCEDURE ANY MORE THAN THERE IS FOR A SINGLE REQUEST PROCEDURE FOR OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS, I. E. NAVAL GUNFIRE, ARTILLERY, OR TANKS. WHAT IS REQUIRED IN THE CASE OF AIR SUPPORT IS THE MOST RESPONSIVE SYSTEM THAT CAN BE DEvised FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE BATTLE PLAN WITH THE APPLICATION OF ITS DECISIVE WEIGHT WHEN AND WHERE REQUIRED.

5. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS I CANNOT ACCEPT THE PRESENT MODIFICATION AS A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM SINGLE MANAGEMENT. ONLY BY POSSESSING MISSION DIRECTION ^{operational control} OF ITS OWN AIR ASSETS CAN III MAF ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT FOR SUPPORT OF THE TROOPS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THESE AIR ASSETS CAN THEN BE EMPLOYED THROUGH A SYSTEM DELIBERATELY DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE USE.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**
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PAGE 5 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
 6. THE NATURE OF THE MODIFICATION ANNOUNCED IN REFERENCE (B) DOES, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE INTERIM SOLUTION. SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE TO RETURN TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF, FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF MARINE GROUND FORCES IN I CORPS, ~~OPERATIONAL CONTROL~~ OF THOSE AIR ASSETS WHICH CONSTITUTE 70 PERCENT OF HIS AVAILABLE SORTIES. THE REMAINING 30 PERCENT OF HIS SORTIE GENERATION, AT THE ACCEPTED 1.1 SORTIE RATE, WOULD BE RETAINED BY COMUSMACV FOR ALLOCATION ON A DAILY BASIS. THE AIR ASSETS RETURNED TO ~~OPERATIONAL CONTROL~~ OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL III MAF, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DIVERSION AT ANY TIME TO MEET EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS OF COMUSMACV, AS SPECIFIED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4. AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR US ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF, FOR COORDINATION AND ALLOCATION OF SORTIES FROM THE 7TH AIR FORCE WEEKLY OR DAILY FRAG AS APPROPRIATE. *CG III MAF could also assign Marine Sorties to Army units as required.*
 7. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT BY ENABLING THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF TO ASSIGN HIS SORTIES TO THE FOLLOWING DAYS TASKS AS REQUIRED BY THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS PLANS. IT WOULD PERMIT CLOSE INTERGRATION WITH THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER; IT WOULD ENSURE ORDNANCELOADS

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
 RESPONSIVE TO THE SPECIFIC TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS, AND IT WOULD ENABLE CLOSE COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS. AT THE SAME TIME, COMUSMACV WOULD MAINTAIN HIS PREROGATIVE TO PREEMPT MARINE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO FOCUS THE BIGHT OF, AND OTHERWISE DIRECT, HIS TOTAL TACTICAL AIR EFFORT AS NECESSARY TO MEET EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.

8. I BELIEVE THE FORMULA PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THIS MEMORANDUM FALLS WITHIN THE TENOR AND SPIRIT OF MR NITZES DECISION AND MORE EFFECTIVELY MYSTIFIES THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES SOUGHT BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND IN HIS LATEST CHANGE TO IMPROVE OVERALL AIR SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT MOST CERTAINLY WILL ENABLE A GREATER DEGREE OF COHESIVENESS AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT WITHIN MARINE AIR-GROUND FORCES. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT I OFFER THIS PROPOSAL AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.
 END QUOTE.

UNQUOTE.

2. THE COMMANDANT HAS INFORMED ME THAT THE MEMO HAS BEEN SIGNED AS CMC MEMO 31-68, ESSENTIALLY AS ABOVE, DATED 14 JUNE AND CIRCULATED TO JCS.

GP-1

BT

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SECRET

FONECON REC'D AT COC 230500H JUN68:

TO: EGEN ANDERSON
 FROM: DIRECTOR, FMPAC COMMAND CENTER

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. FMPAC MSG 200035Z PASSED TO YOU. CMC MSG 070027Z CONTAINED THE PROPOSED CMCM 31-68, SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS.

2. THIS PROPOSED CMCM WAS SLIGHTLY MODIFIED AND CIRCULATED TO THE JCS ON 14 JUNE. I BELIEVE JIM ORD PROVIDED YOUR G-3 AIR, COL. WILKES, A COPY OF THE MODIFIED CMCM WHILE HE WAS AT YOUR HQTRS WITH GEN BUSE'S PARTY. HOWEVER, TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE THE CORRECTED VERSION, HERE ARE THE CHANGES TO THE PROPOSED CMCM AS IT WAS OFFICIALLY PASSED TO YOU BY FMPAC MSG 200035Z (PARA 1 ABOVE).

A. PARA 3, SECOND SENT., CHANGE TO READ: "THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMUSMACV TO ENSURE FULL AND EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF HIS TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES IS FULLY APPRECIATED AND SUPPORTED."

B. PARA 5, SECOND SENT, REPLACE THE WORDS "MISSION DIRECTION" WITH THE WORDS "OPERATIONAL CONTROL."

C. PARA 6, SECOND AND FOURTH SENT, REPLACE THE WORDS "MISSION DIRECTION" WITH THE WORDS "OPERATIONAL CONTROL" AND ADD THE FOLLOWING SENT TO PARA 6: "OR III MAF COULD ALSO ASSIGN MARINE SORTIES TO ARMY UNITS AS REQUIRED."

3. INFORMATION NOW BEING PASSED TO YOU SEPARATELY BY SPECAT REQUIRES THAT YOU POSSESS CORRECTED VERSION OF CMCM 31-68.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMHMB RUMHVH RUMNVB RUMNVF RUMUFKA RUMUHFA
 DE RUMUGRA 2054 1671428
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 151428Z JUN 68 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN
 RUMNVF/CG IFFV SA II CTZ NHA TRANG
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUMHVH/DSA I CTZ DNG
 RUMHVH/I DASC DNG
 RUMHMB/DASC V PHU BAI
 RUMNVB/II DASC PLEIKU
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT
 ORIG G-3
 REL C/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF MODIFIED AIR STRIKE SUPPORT SYSTEM(SINGLE MANAGEMENT)

A: COMUSMACV 16814 DTG 111649Z JUN 68 (PASEP)

1. REF A ADVISED MACV EVALUATION GROUP WILL VISIT III MAF/ICTZ 17-18 JUNE AND REQUESTED ITINERARY BE DIVISED TO INCLUDE THOSE ORGANIZATIONS AS SPECIFIED.

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 2054 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. PROPOSED ITINERARY FOLLOWS:

- (A). 17 JUNE 68
- (1) 0900 ARRIVE DANANG AB
 - (2) 0900-0910 ENROUTE FMAW
 - (3) 0910-1040 VISIT FMAW
 - (4) 1040-1055 TRAVEL FIRST MAR DIV
 - (5) 1055-1200 VISIT FIRST MAR DIV G-3
 - (6) 1200-1300 LUNCH FIRST MAR DIV
 - (7) 1300-1330 ENROUTE I DASC
 - (8) 1330-1500 VISIT I DASC
 - (9) 1500-1515 ENROUTE III MAF
 - (10) 1515-1530 VISIT AC/S G-3 III MAF
 - (11) 1530-1700 VISIT G-3 AIR/TARC
 - (12) 1700-1900 FREE
 - (13) 1900-2030 DINNER
 - (14) 2030 FREE
- (B). 18 JUNE 68
- (1) 0600-0700 BREAKFAST III MAF
 - (2) 0700-0730 TRAVEL TO PCV
 - (3) 0730-0900 VISIT PCV

*Air Control File
(?)*

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									

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PAGE THREE RUMUGRA 2054 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (4) 0900-1030 VISIT DASC VICTOR
 - (5) 1030-1100 TRAVEL TO 101ST ABN DIV
 - (6) 1100-1300 VISIT AND LUNCH 101ST ABN DIV
 - (7) 1300-1345 TRAVEL TO III MAF
 - (8) 1345-1500 DEBRIEF III MAF G-3
 - (9) 1500-1515 TRAVEL TO DANANG AB FOR 1600 DEPARTURE TO I FFV
3. LCOL C.C. CHAMBERLAIN USMC, 1ST MAW, AND LCOL CLARK HQ III MAF WILL ACCOMPANY EVALUATION GROUP WHILE IN ICTZ
4. POINT OF CONTACT FOR COORDINATION COL S.F. LEIS G-3 (AIR)
PHONE DANANG 3435.
- GP-4
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 1) -66

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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SECRET

PP RUMSAK RUEBHOA
 DE RUHHPMA 2331 1652337
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 132337 JUN 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 RUMSAK/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN
 CUSHMAN AND MAJGEN ANDERSON FROM MGEN THARIN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

4. ADMINO FMFPAC 110358Z/JUN68 (NOTAL)

3. CG FIRST MAW 030300Z/APR68

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR STATISTICS
 PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND TO
 PROVIDE COMPARATIVE DATA FOR THE STATISTICS SUB-
 MITTED BY REFERENCE A, A COMPUTER PRINTOUT OF
 THE FIRST MAW DASC RECORD ENTRY LOGS HAS BEEN
 PERFORMED FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 21 MAR 1968.
 THIS PRINTOUT OF THE DASC FUNCTIONS IS THE
 FIRST OF THE SERIES REQUESTED BY MAJGR WRIGHT,
 DCS AIR/AAM FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS. THE

PAGE 2 RUHHPMA2331 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 REMAINDER OF THE MILESTONES FOR PRINTOUTS OF THE
 DASC RECORD ENTRY LOGS ARE 22 JUNE FOR THE PERIOD
 1 APR THROUGH 31 MAY, 3 JUL FOR THE PERIOD

1 JUN THROUGH 20 JUN AND 12 JULY FOR THE PERIOD
 1 JUN THROUGH 30 JUN. A CONCURRENT PRINTOUT OF
 THE TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS WILL BE COMPLETED FOR
 THESE SAME PERIODS, INCLUDING THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO
 21 MAR 68. THESE STATISTICS WILL PROVIDE THE BEST
 DATA BASE AVAILABLE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
 RESPONSIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR PROCEDURES ESTAB-
 LISHED BY COMUSMACV.

3. THE INITIAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY FOR WHICH THE
 DASC/TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS WERE CONSTRUCTED WAS
 TO PRESENT A TIME RESPONSE PICTURE OF MARINE AIRCRAFT
 SUPPORT IN VIETNAM. THE ENTRIES TO THE DASC RECORD
 LOGS MISSION RESPONSE TIME TO MARINE GROUND UNITS
 WHILE THE ENTRIES TO THE TADC RECORD LOGS THE TOTAL
 MISSION SUPPORT BY FIRST MAW. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE
 IS VERY LITTLE OVERLAP REGARDING THE INFORMATION
 RECEIVED FROM THE DASC/TADC REPORTS AND THE INFOR-

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA2331 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR
 MATION PROVIDED BY THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT ESTABLISHED
 BY REFERENCE B WHICH FOCUSES ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR
 SUPPORT IN TERMS OF SORTIES REQUESTED AND THOSE
 WHICH ARE PROVIDED TO THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDER.
 4. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DATA PRO-
 VIDED BY THE PRINTOUT OF THE DASC/TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS
 FROM 1 JAN THROUGH 30 JAN BE UTILIZED PRIMARILY FOR COMPAR-
 ATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IN ICTZ
 PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR SUPPORT
 PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY COMUSMACV 20 MAR 68 AND THE
 EVOLUTIONARY GROWTH OF THE NEW SYSTEM SINCE ITS INCEPTION
 THROUGH 30 JUN. THE DATA PROVIDED BY REFERENCE B
 EFFECTIVELY RECORDS WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE DAILY SINCE 3
 APR REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIR AND THE AIR
 SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MARINE GROUND UNITS IN ICTZ.
 5. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
 IS PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST AND IS THE
 RESULT OF THE PRINTOUT DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH ONE:
 A. TO PARAGRAPH ONE REFERENCE A ADD PERIOD (D)
 212001 JAN TO 212400 MAR,

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA2331 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR
 B. TO PARAGRAPH ONE ECHO REFERENCE A ADD (D) 83.3
 C. TO PARAGRAPH ONE FOXTROT REFERENCE A ADD (D)
 53.7
 D. CHANGE PARAGRAPH ONE INDIA, REFERENCE A TO READ
 QUOTE: THAT (A) 62.8 (B) 64.5 (C) 52.6 (D) 36.4
 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE
 PREPLANNED, (A) 28.7 (B) 38.6 (CL 38.0) (C) 13.6 PERCENT
 WERE IMMEDIATES (OF WHICH (A) 66.9 (B) 65.8 (C) 52.3
 (D) 18.9 PERCENT WERE FROM SCRAMBLES) AND (A) 8.5 (B)
 9.4 (C) 8.2 (D) (NOT AVAILABLE) PERCENT WERE EXTRA OR
 ADD ON SORTIES: UNQUOTE.
 E. TO PARAGRAPH ONE JULIET REFERENCE A ADD (D)
 81.6 AND (D) 18.4 IN THAT ORDER.
 5. ONE COPY OF THE TWENTY FOUR PAGE PRINTOUT OF THE
 DASC RECORD ENTRY LOG FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 21 MAR IS
 BEING FORWARDED BY REGISTERED MAIL, NUMBER 7068 ABCARD
 UAL FLIGHT 58 ARRIVING FRIENDSHIP AIRPORT 140630 LOCAL.
 INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE, ADDRESSED TO MAJ G. WRIGHT,
 ARE THE READING DEFINITIONS TO FACILPTATE READING THIS
 INITIAL PRINTOUT. ALSO INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE, AS A

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA2331 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR
 MATTER OF INTEREST, ARE THE USAF FORMS USED AT I
 DASC AND DASC V TO RECORD COMPARABLE DATA DURING THE
 JUNE EVALUATION PERIOD. FUTURE PRINTOUTS OF THE DASC/
 TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS WILL BE FORWARDED AS THEY BECOME
 AVAILABLE IN ADDITION TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA PRO-
 VIDED BY REFERENCE B. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

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SECRET
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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUMUGRA
 DE RUHHFMA 1749 1630358
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 110358Z JUN 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN INFO LIGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM MGEN THARIN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS

- A. COMUSMACV 211145Z/MAY68
- B. COMUSMACV 150905Z/MAR68
- C. CG FIRST MAW 030300Z/APR68
- D. CG FIRST MAW 041108Z/JUN68

1. REFERENCE A MODIFIED THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR SUPPORT
 PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B AS OF 300600H MAY68 TO
 PROVIDE QUOTE GREATER FLEXIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS AND
 CONTINUITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT
 TO MEET THE DAY BY DAY REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND COMMANDERS
 UNQUOTE. TO ASSIST IN ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF THIS
 MODIFICATION, THE DATA FOR THE PREVIOUS PERIODS OF
 APRIL AND MAY ARE PRESENTED FOR COM-

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA1749 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 PARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE DATA ACCUMULATED FOR THE
 PERIOD FROM 311901 HOTEL MAY TO 071900 HOTEL JUN68
 IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT:

- (A) 031901APR TO 301900APR; (B) 301901APR TO 301900MAY;
- (C) 311901MAY TO 271900JUN.

ALL DATA IS BASED ON REPORTY SUBMITTED IAW
 REFERENCE C AND AS MODIFIED BY REFERENCE D; ALL TIMES
 HOTEL.

A. THAT (A) 74.1 (B) 88.3 (C) 84.2 PERCENT OF THE
 TOTAL SORTIES PROVIDED MARINE GROUND UNITS WERE FLOWN
 BY FIRST MAW, (A) 17.6 (B) 3.8 (C) 5.2 PERCENT BY
 USN, AND (A) 8.3 (B) 7.8 (C) 10.6 PERCENT BY USAF.

B. THAT (A) 42.6 (B) 42.4 (C) 52.0 PERCENT OF THE
 TOTAL SORTIES PROVIDED MARINE GROUND UNITS WERE PRE-
 PLANNED, (A) 42.8 (B) 34.4 (C) 25.3 PERCENT WERE EXTRA OR
 ADD ON, AND (A) 14.6 (B) 23.2 (C) 22.7 PERCENT WERE
 IMMEDIATE.

C. THAT (A) 82.4 (B) 78.1 (C) 71.5 PERCENT OF THE
 MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED AND APPROVED PRE-
 PLANNED SORTIES WERE PROVIDED. DURING THE JUNE PERIOD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA1749 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
73.5 PERCENT WERE PROVIDED FROM THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED
FRAG AND 26.5 PERCENT FROM THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG.

D. THAT (A) 97.7 (B) 97.7 (C) 99.7 PERCENT OF THE
MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE AIR
SUPPORT SORTIES WERE PROVIDED. DURING THE JUNE PERIOD
53.6 PERCENT WERE SCRAMBLED AND 46.4 PERCENT DIVERTED
TO FILL IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS.

E. THAT (A) 60.1 (B) 62.9 (C) 78.0 PERCENT OF THE
MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED PREPLANNED SORTIES
ARRIVED WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF THE SCHEDULED TIME ON
TARGET.

F. THAT (A) 31.1 (B) 73.1 (C) 73.7 PERCENT OF THE
MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE SORTIES
ARRIVED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FROM THE TIME OF THE INITIAL
REQUEST.

G. THAT THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN
SATISFIED (A) 56.3 (B) 64.7 (C) 68.3 PERCENT OF THE
TIME WITH THE TYPE OF ORDNANCE DELIVERED.

H. THAT (A) 83.1 (B) 90.3 (C) 90.4 PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE IN I CIZ.

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA1149 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

I. THAT (A) 62.8 (B) 64.5 (C) 52.6 PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE PREPLANNED
(A) 28.7 (B) 38.6 (C) 38.0 PERCENT WERE IMMEDIATES
(OF WHICH (A) 66.9 (B) 65.8 (C) 60.3 PERCENT WERE
SCRAMBLES) AND (A) 8.5 (B) 9.4 (C) 8.8 PERCENT WERE
EXTRA OR ADD ON SORTIES.

J. THAT (A) 56.6 (B) 65.9 (C) 75.0 PERCENT OF
THE SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE PROVIDED TO THE
MARINES AND (A) 43.4 (B) 34.1 (C) 25.0 PERCENT WERE
PROVIDED TO OTHER THAN MARINES.

2. IT CAN READILY BE SEEN FROM THIS INITIAL PERIOD OF
OBSERVATION DURING JUNE THAT NO AMOUNT OF AIR FORCE ACCOMMODATION
WILL RESOLVE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
CONCEPT FOR CONTROL OF AIR SUPPORT AND THE MARINE
CORPS AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. THE MOST PERTINENT POINTS
WHICH SUPPORT THIS RATIONALE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THAT MARINE GROUND UNITS ARE STILL RECEIVING
AIR SUPPORT FROM OTHER THAN CG FIRST MAW, WHO IN TURN
IS DIRECTED TO FLY MORE THAN ONE OF HIS FIXED
WING EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF FORCES OTHER THAN MARINES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 1749 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

B. THAT ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER ONE HALF OF THE AIR SUPPORT RECEIVED BY MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS IS PREPLANNED.

C. THAT LESS THAN THREE FOURTHS OF THE APPROVED PREPLANNED SORTIES ARE RECEIVED BY MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS.

D. THAT SLIGHTLY LESS THAN ONE HALF OF THE IMMEDIATE SORTIES REQUIREMENTS WERE FULFILLED BY DIVERTING PREPLANNED SORTIES.

E. THAT MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS HAVE ONLY BEEN SATISFIED 68.3 PERCENT OF THE TIME WITH THE TYPE OF ORDNANCE DELIVERED.

F. THAT FIRST MAW FLEW 38.0 OF THEIR TOTAL EFFORT FULFILLING IMMEDIATE SORTIE REQUESTS AND THAT WELL OVER ONE HALF OF THESE (60.3 PERCENT) WERE PROVIDED BY SCRAMBLES.

3. THE REMAINDER OF ITS EVALUATION PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE A WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 1749 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO WILL FOLLOW. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

266

CONFIDENTIALAIR CONTROL
FOLDER
263

PT004463
 RYTZYUW RUMUHFA1226 1591200-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
 ZIY CCCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 RA CONDENSED

TO ZEN/CDR 7AF SAIGON
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF/SA I CTZ DA NANG
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV/SA II CTZ NHA TRANG
 RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV/SA III CTZ LONG BINH
 RUMSMP/SA IV CTZ CAN THO
 INFO RUMUGDA/DCG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI
 RUMHAW/CG 1ST MAW DA NANG
 RUMHVV/DSA I CTZ DA ANANG
 RUMNVB/DSA II CTZ PLEIKU
 RUMSBH/DSA III CTZ BIEN HOA
 BT

ACT: G-3
 INFO: G-2
 COPY TO G-6 S/S ADJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 16352

SUBJ: ~~EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT/STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)~~

REF: COMUSMACV 14578 DTG 211145Z MAY 68 (S)

1. (C) THE REFERENCE PROMULGATED MODIFIED PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND USE OF STRIKE RESOURCES FOR PRE-PLANNED AIR SUPPORT WITHIN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE BASIC OBJECTIVE

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OF THE REFERENCE WAS TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRINCIPALLY BY PROVIDING GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF THE TOTAL STRIKE RESOURCES AVAILABLE AND BY IMPROVING RESPONSIVENESS TO THE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDERS. ANOTHER OBJECTIVE WAS THE SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD PERMIT A REDUCTION OF:

- A. LEAD TIME FOR MOST PRE-PLANNED AIR REQUESTS.
- B. REQUEST DATA REQUIRED.
- C. TIME REQUIRED FOR PROCESSING AND TRANSMITTING REQUESTS.
- D. LEVELS OF REVIEW.
- E. LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY OF FRAGMENTARY ORDERS.
- F. ADMINISTRATIVE WORK LOAD.

2. (C) THE PROVISIONS OF THE REFERENCE BECAME EFFECTIVE 300600H MAY 68. AN EVALUATION WILL BE MADE OF OPERATIONS UNDER THE MODIFIED SYSTEM DURING THE FOUR-WEEK PERIOD FROM 300600H MAY TO 270600H JUNE 1968. THE PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION WILL BE TO ASSESS PROGRESS OF THE SYSTEM AND TO IDENTIFY PROCEDURAL CHANGES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE OVER-ALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

3. (C) IT IS REQUESTED THAT ACTION ADDRESSEES EXAMINE THE

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PAGE 3 RUMUFA 1226 C O N F I D E N T I A L
FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM AS IT AFFECTS US/FW/ARVN OPERATIONS
DURING THE FOUR-WEEK PERIOD SPECIFIED IN PARA 2 ABOVE AND PROVIDE
THEIR RESPECTIVE EVALUATIONS, TOGETHER WITH CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS APPROPRIATE, TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE AFTER 270600H JUNE, BUT NOT LATER THAN 010700H JULY 68.

4. (U) AN EVALUATION GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITHIN THIS HQ
FOR THE DUAL PURPOSE OF CORRELATING ALL FACETS OF THIS ASSESSMENT
OF PROGRESS AND RECOMMENDING APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO COMUSMACV
7TH AIR FORCE AND III MAF WILL BE REQUESTED TO DESIGNATE ONE OR
MORE REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN APPROPRIATE PHASES OF THE
EVALUATION. COMMENCING APPROXIMATELY 17 JUNE, THIS GROUP WILL VISIT
EACH ADDRESSEE HEADQUARTERS FOR PERSONAL EVALUATION OF THE WORKING
OF THE SYSTEM. ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISITS WILL BE COORDINATED BY
TELEPHONE. GP-4.

BT

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FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND

AIR CONTROL
POWER

NRWZCZCSAA8390VV ARA527

DESTROY BY BURNING

PP RUMSAK
DE RWSAR 224 1580293
ZNY SSSSS

COG G-3
INFO G-2
COPY TO: ADJ S/S G-6

P 368214Z JUN 68

~~FM 7AF TACC TAN SON NHUT A RVN~~
TO RUMSAV/FIRST MAW DANANG AB RVN
INFO RUMSAK/III MAF DANANG AB RVN
BT

SECRET /TACD/JUN 68

SUBJECT: (1) ~~MAW SORTIE ALLOCATION (U)~~

REFERENCES: A CG III MAF 160117Z APR 68 FIRST MAW
FIXED WING SORTIE RATE
B. COMUSMACV 211145Z MAY 68, MODIFIED
PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM

MESSAGE IN VI PARTS.

PART I. (S) AFTER ONE WEEK'S EXPERIENCE UNDER THE
MODIFIED PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM IT IS BELIEVED
USEFUL TO REVIEW THE RATIONALE USED FOR ESTABLISHING
FIRST MAW SORTIE RATE AND ALLOCATION.

PART II. (S) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE A ESTABLISH-
ING A 1.2 SORTIE RATE AND AN AVERAGE POSSESSED FIGURE
OF 190 AIRCRAFT MINUS TWO AIRCRAFT DEDICATED TO AIR
DEFENSE LEAVES AN AVERAGE DAILY SORTIE RATE OF 225.

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FROM THIS SORTIE RATE OF 225 IS SUBTRACTED 48 SORTIES
(16 AIRCRAFT X .3) DEDICATED TO THE HOT PAD LEAVING
177 AVAILABLE SORTIES. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE NEED
TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER ESCORT TEN PERCENT OF THE
AVAILABLE SORTIES (18) HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED ON A
DAILY BASIS. THE RESULT BEING 159 SORTIES AVAILABLE FOR
THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG.

PART III (S). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN
REFERENCE B PARA 2, 70 PERCENT OF THE STRIKE SORTIES
WILL BE COMMITTED TO THE "WEEKLY PREPLANNED FRAG"
RESULTING IN 111 SORTIES FOR THE WEEKLY MISSIONS.

PART IV. (S) IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PRESENT MARINE
OUT-COUNTRY EFFORT, AVERAGING 16 SORTIES, THE RE-
MAINING SORTIES FOR THE "DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG"
IS 32 SORTIES.

PART V. (S) THE 18 SORTIES IDENTIFIED FOR HELICOPTER
ESCORT ARE TO BE UNDER THE OP CON OF CG FIRST MAW
FOR ESCORT OF MARINE HELICOPTERS AND TO SUPPORT
MARINE GROUND FORCES (IF NOT USED). IT IS RECOGNIZED
THAT THIS FIGURE WILL VARY. CONSISTENT WITH EFFECTIVE

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO		
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

SECRET

SECRET

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FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

PAGE 3 RUMSAR 224 S E C R E T
MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL
ADJUST THIS COMMITMENT UPON NOTIFICATION BY EITHER
CG FIRST MAW AND/OR CG III MAF.
PART VI. (C) THE ABOVE CITED ALLOCATIONS WILL VARY
SLIGHTLY DEPENDENT UPON AIRCRAFT POSSESSED AND IN-
COMMISSION RATES.
GP-4
BT

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																				
INFO/COORD																				

SECRET

SECRET~~IT HAS BEEN SENT~~

DE RUMUGRAM 047 1530314

ZNY SSSS

P 010314Z JUNE 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

BT

S E C R E T**MODIFIED PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT**

A. CG III MAF 271340Z MAY 68

B. CG FIRST MAW 030300Z APR 68

C. CG FIRST MAW 311345Z MAY 68

1. REF A IMPLEMENTS A MODIFIED AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM. SYSTEM IS TO BE EVALUATED AFTER THIRTY DAY PERIOD OF OPERATION.
2. REPORT ESTABLISHED BY REF B AS AMENDED BY REF C WILL SUPPORT SOME ASPECTS OF EVALUATION. ADDITIONAL DATA CONCERNING RESPONSIVENESS/EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEM WILL BE REQUIRED.
3. A MEETING WILL BE HELD IN THE COC BRIEFING ROOM HQ III MAF AT 1300H ON 3JUN68. DATA REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY AND CHANGES REQUIRED BY REF C WILL BE DISCUSSED.
4. FOR CG FIRST MAW: IT IS REQUESTED THAT REPS FAMILIAR

PAGE TWO RUMUGRAM 047 **S E C R E T**

W/ FIXED WING FRAGGING/ CONTROL PROCEDURES, REPORTS REQUIRED BY REF B & C AND RESPONSIVENESS/EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM ATTEND THIS MEETING. REPS FROM MARCOR DASCS WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE.

5. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV AND CG THIRD MARDIV: IT IS REQUESTED THAT REPS FAMILIAR W/ FIXED WING REQUEST/ ALLOCATION PROCEDURES, REPORTS REQUIRED BY REF B&C, FIRE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, AND RESPONSIVENESS/EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM ATTEND THIS MEETING.

GP-4

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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