

- 16 ~~21~~. COMSEVENTHFLT 270925Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
MR MORRIS VISIT TO HOSPITAL SHIP
- 17 ~~22~~. LTG ROSSON 271104Z JUN68 (S) *group - not shown*
ROSSON TO CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS & DAVIS
INVESTIGATION OF KHE SANH BREACH
- 18 ~~23~~. CG FMFPAC 272132Z JUN 68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
BUSE TO CHAPMAN AND CUSHMAN
HYLAND PERSONAL ~~FM~~ FROM VETH.
DISPOSITIONS OF FORCES ICTZ
- 19 ~~24~~. CG FMFPAC 272228Z JUN68 (U)
PRESS STORY ON SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM
- 20 ~~25~~. COMUSMACV 281150Z JUN68 (S) *group-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
DIVERGENCY OF CASUALTY FIGURES
- ~~24~~ ~~CG FMFPAC 272228Z JUN68 (U)~~
~~NEWS RELEASE~~
- ~~25~~ ~~COMUSMACV 281150Z JUN68 (S)~~
~~ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN~~
~~DIVERGENCY OF CASUALTY FIGURES~~
- ~~26~~ ~~CG FMFPAC 281115Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 22 ~~27~~. CINCPAC 290156Z JUN68 (S) *group - not shown*
CINCPAC TOALL
DEFENCE ACTION; HELICOPTERS
- 23 ~~28~~. LTG ROSSON 291000Z JUN68 (S) *group - not shown*
ROSSON TO CUSHMAN INFO ~~ROSSON~~ ABRAMS
REQUESTS TERMINATION OF PRESS INVESTIGATION OF KHE SANH
- 24 ~~29~~. COMUSMACV 291047Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
DASC LOCATION
- ~~25~~ ~~CG FMFPAC 291130Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 26 ~~41~~ ← ~~27~~ ~~42~~ → ~~41~~. CMC 291611Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CHAPMAN TO CUSHMAN
ITINERARY FOR WASH, D.C.
- 27 ~~42~~. CMC 291906Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CHAPMAN TOBUSE INFO CUSHMAN
RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ
- 28 ~~43~~. CMC 291934Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
CHAPMAN TO BUSE INFO ~~FM~~ CUSHMAN
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO SINGLE MGR MSG TO ABRAMS
- 29 ~~44~~. CG FMFPAC 292245Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-3*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN INFO CHAPMAN
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO SINGLE MGR MSG TO ABRAMS

- ~~1~~ 26. ~~CG FMAN 241246Z JUN68 (S MCFD)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 2 27. CMC 241452Z JUN68 (U)
MCCUTCHEON TO BGEN ANDERSON
RECEIVED EXCLUSIVE PACKAGE
- 3 28. GEN ABRAMS 251012Z JUN68 (S) *group - not shown*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN INFO ROSSON
TALKING TO PRESS - KHE SANH COMMANDER
- 4 ~~29.~~ COMSEVENTHFLT 251022Z JUN68 (C) *group - 4*
~~EMXRM~~ BRINGLE TO ROBERTSON INFO CUSHMAN AND BUSE
UTILIZATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE
- ~~5~~ 20. ~~CG FMAN 251025Z JUN68 (S MCFD)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 6 ~~21.~~ COMPHIBGRU THREE 251022Z JUN68 (C) *group - 4*
RADM LACY TO CUSHMAN INFO OSBORN
INTENDS VISIT DANANG 29JUN
- 7 ~~22.~~ CINCPAC, HAWAII 260737Z JUN68 (S) *group - 4*
VISIT OF THOMAS D. MORRIS
- 8 ~~23.~~ LTG ROSSON 261216Z JUN68 (S) *group - not shown*
ROSSON TO CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS, DAVIS, & CUSHMAN
INVESTIGATION OF PREMATURE STATEMENT ON KHE SANH
- ~~9~~ 24. ~~CG FMAN 261235Z JUN68 (S MCFD)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- ~~10~~ 25. ~~CG FMAN 270845Z JUN68 (S MCFD)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 11 26. MILDREN 240614Z JUN68 (C) *gp - 4*
MILDREN TO ABRAMS INFO CUSHMAN, ROSSON, ETC
REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES
- 12 27. CG PCV 250140Z JUN68 (S) *gp - 4*
ROSSON TO DAVIS AND CUSHMAN
RESTRICTIONS AND REDUCTION OF FIRE SUPPORT
- 13 28. GEN ABRAMS 251130Z JUN68 (S) *gp - 4*
ABRAMS TO ALL
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- 14 29. CG THIRD MARDIV 270110Z JUN68 (S) *gp - 4*
DAVIS TO CUSHMAN
FIREWATCH * MITHRAS
- 15 30. CG NINTH MAB 270530Z JUN68 (S) *gp - 4*
CHIP TO ANDERSON
BLT REHAB

- 44 43 CG PCV PHB 192150Z JUN68 (S) *group-4*
ROSSON TO CUSHMAN
ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY/INSTALLATIONS CAP MUI LAY SECTOR
- ~~45 34~~ ~~CG FMAW 200632Z JUN68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 46 45 CG FMFPAC 202116Z JUN68 (U)
KRUJIAK TO ROBERTSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- ~~47 34~~ ~~CG FMAW 211330Z JUN68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 48 847 CG THIRD MARDIV 221007Z JUN68 (U)
DAVIS TO BUSE AND CUSHMAN
EXCHANGE OF 03 MARINES BETWEEN 3D MARDIV, 1ST MAW AND FLC
- 49 748 CMC 221650Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
CHAPMAN TO BUSE AND CUSHMAN
RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ
- ~~50 49~~ CG FMFPAC 222052Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
BUSE TO CHAPMAN INFO CUSHMAN
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS
- ~~51 50~~ CG FMFPAC 222053Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS
- 52 10 51 CG FMFPAC 222101Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *group-3*
BUSE TO
RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ
- ~~53 52~~ ~~CG FMAW 230038Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- ~~54 33~~ BGEN FORBES 230543Z JUN68 (C) . *group - not shown*
FORBES TO CUSHMAN
GEN OFFICER PROMOTION - ROSSON - EERS
- ~~55 34~~ BGEN ABRAMS 230757Z JUN68 (S) *group-4*
ABRAMS TO ALL
ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
- ~~56 34~~ ~~CG FMAW 230940Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 57 556 LTG ROSSON 231127Z JUN68 (C) *group - not shown*
ROSSON TO ABRAMS INFO CUSHMAN
GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES

- 30 ~~5.~~ CG FMFPAC 040203Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN INFO CHAPMAN
CAPTAIN ROBB
- 31 ~~46.~~ CMC 041822Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CHAPMAN TO BUSE AND CUSHMAN
COMMENTS ON CUSHMAN'S TACTICS MSG
- ~~32 47. CG FMAW 041108Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 33 ~~48.~~ DA 042050Z JUN68 (U)
WESTMORELAND TO TRUONG, VIEN, ABRAMS, LAM, CUSHMAN, ROSSON
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- 34 ~~49.~~ PALMER 050230Z JUN68 (U)
THANKS FOR CONGRATS MSG TO CUSHMAN
- ~~35 50. CG FMAW 051250Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 36 ~~51.~~ CG THIRD MARDIV 051405Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
DAVIS TO VAN RYZIN, INFO BUSE AND CUSHMAN
AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGR EQUIP
- 37 ~~52.~~ GEN ABRAMS 060139Z JUN68 (U)
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
APPROVAL OF LEAVE REQUEST
- 38 ~~53.~~ GEN ABRAMS 060620Z JUN68 (S) *gp - not shown*
ABRAMS TO ALL
REPORTING AND RELEASE OF GOOD, BAD NEWS
- 39 ~~54.~~ GEN ABRAMS 061125Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
EMERGENCY SUPPORT OF CIDG CAMPS
- ~~40 55. CG FMAW 061607Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- ~~41 56. CG FMAW 070810Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- ~~42 57. CG FMAW 080910Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 43 ~~58.~~ CG FMFPAC 082003Z JUN68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN
ANNUAL AUSTRALIAN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF EXERCISES
- 44 ~~59.~~ CG FMFPAC 082004Z JUN68 (C) *group-4*
BUSE TO CHAPMAN INFO CUSHMAN & DAVIS
AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

- ~~31 29. CG THIRD MARDIV 170530Z JUN68 (S)
DAVIS TO CUSHMAN
VISUAL PERSONNELSANCE HELICOPTERS~~
- ~~32 40.38 CG TMAW 180930Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 35 42.32 GEN ABRAMS 181102Z JUN68 (S) *Group - not shown*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
DISCONTINUE TO FOUR-HOUR DAILY REPORT
- 39 43.33 CG FMFPAC (FWD) 180155Z JUN68 (C) *group-4*
BOUKER TO CUSHMAN
PROPOSED ITIN. FOR VISIT TO BLT REHAB SUBIC AND MARCORPS ACT. OKI
- 35 43.34 AFWL KIRTLAND AFB NMEX 182208Z JUN68 (U)
TDY TO SEA OF AFWL PERSONNEL
- ~~36 44.35 CG TMAW 190700Z JUN68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 37 45.36 CG THIRD MARDIV 190830Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
DAVIS TO ROSSON AND CUSHMAN
RESTRICTIONS AND REDUCTION OF FIRE SUPPORT
- 38 46.37 LTG ROSSON 191110Z JUN68 (S) *gp - not shown*
ROSSON TO CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS
OPERATION THOR (DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY ARTILLERY IN EASTERN DMZ-CAP
LAY AREA)
- 34 47.38 CG FMFPAC 200003Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN
PLANS FOR PLANE TO SYMPOSIUM
- 40 48.39 CG FMFPAC X 192313Z JUN68 (U)
BUSE TO ANDERSON AND QUILTER
CONGRATULATORY MSG
- ~~41 49.40 CG FMFPAC 200035Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp - 1*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN
COMMANDANT'S MSG QUOTING DEPSECDEF'S MSG - AIR CONTROL~~
- 42 50.41 GEN ABRAMS 200110Z JUN68 (S) *Group - not shown*
ABRAMS TO ALL
BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOR ARC LIGHT STRIKES
- 43 1.42 GEN ABRAMS 200429Z JUN68 (C) *Group - 4*
ABRAMS TO ALL
REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES

- ~~15~~ 24. ~~CG FMAW 130741Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT ON AIR CONTROL~~
- 16 25. CMC 131130Z JUN68 (C) *group-4*
CMC TO BUSE, CUSHMAN AND MGEN DAVIS
AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT (C)
- 17 26. ADMINO FMFPAC 132256Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
THARIN TO CUSHMAN
THARIN VISIT TO III MAF 22-25JUN68
- 18 27. ADMINO FMFPAC 132337Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
THARIN TO CUSHMAN
SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
- 19 28. CMC 141200Z JUN68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
CHAPMAN TO BUSE, CUSHMAN, & BOUKER
CMC TELENIK
- ~~20~~ 29. ~~CG FMAW 141450Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 21 30. CMC 142355Z JUN68 (C) *group-4*
CHAPMAN TO CUSHMAN INFO BUSE
ACQUAINTANCE OF CHAPMAN VISITING I CORPS - REQUESTS ASSISTANCE
- 22 31. COMUSMACV 151053Z JUN68 (U) *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
APPROVES SUBIC BAY REQUEST VISIT
- ~~23~~ 32. ~~CG FMAW 151320Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 24 33. CMC 151621Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
CMC TO BUSE AND CUSHMAN
PASSES ABRAMS MSG ON "URBAN WARFARE (U)"
- ~~25~~ 34. ~~CG FMAW 160640Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 26 35. GEN ABRAMS 161035Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
APPROVES REQUEST FOR SUBIC BAY VISIT
- 27 36. GEN ABRAMS 170442Z JUN68 (S) *group-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
GUIDANCE ON ACTIONS RE HELO SIGHTINGS
- 28 37. GEN ABRAMS 171104Z JUN68 (S) *group-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
MODIFIED POSTURE IN KHE SANH
- ~~29~~ 38. ~~CG FMAW 171626Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 30 39. CG THIRD MARDIV 170530Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
DAVIS TO CUSHMAN - VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTERS

- 1 ~~10.~~ AMB KOMER 090258Z JUN68 (C) *Group - not shown*
KOMER TO CUSHMAN INFO CROSS
CUSHMAN JOINING LAM IN VISIT TO PROVINCES
- ~~2 11.~~ ~~CG FMAW 090800Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 3 ~~12.~~ CG NINTH MAB 100015Z JUN68 (C) *Group not shown*
CHIP TO CUSHMAN
VISIT TO SUBIC
- 4 ~~13.~~ MG PEERS 101020Z JUN68 (S) *Group - not shown*
PEERS TO CUSHMAN
ALPHA ROAD
- 5 ~~14.~~ ADMINO FMFPAC 110358Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *Gp-4*
THARIN TO CUSHMAN
SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
- ~~6 15.~~ ~~CG FMAW 110546Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 7 ~~16.~~ CG 3D MARDIV 110720Z JUN68 (U)
REQ FOR INFO ON PVT DONALD G. SCARBERRY 2461311
- 8 ~~17.~~ GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV 111208Z JUN68 (C) *Gp - not shown*
XX TO PEERS AND CUSHMAN
VISIT TO IV CTZ
- ~~9 18.~~ ~~CG FMAW 111210Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 10 ~~19.~~ CG 3D MARDIV 110635Z JUN68 (U)
FOR GEN OLSON
SUPPLY ASSISTANCE ON NETS
- ~~11 20.~~ ~~CG FMAW 120720Z JUN68 (S MCEO)~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 12 ~~21.~~ CG THIRD MARDIV 120920Z JUN68 (S) *Gp-4*
DAVIS FOR CUSHMAN
1ST BN 4TH MAR CONTACT
- 13 ~~22.~~ CG FLC 121350Z JUN68 (U)
OLSON TO DAVIS
SUPPLY ASSISTANCE ON NETS
- ~~14 23.~~ ~~GEN ABRAMS 121125Z (C)~~
~~ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN~~
~~ALL COPIES SEALED ENVELOPE SAFE~~
III MAF COMMAND

SECRET

OO RUABQL RUMHVA RUMUGRA
 FE RUMHVP 0613L 1821440
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 30144Z JUN 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMHVA/CG FMFPAC (D 020)
 RUBBQ/CG NINTH MAB
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET

SPEC CAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN DAVIS INFO
 LTGEN BUSE AND BGEN CHIP

- A. CG NINTH MAB 100130Z JUN 68 TO CG III MAF (S)
 - B. NY 301430Z JUN 68
 - C. CG III MAF 191104Z JUN 68
 - D. CG PCV 260630Z JUN 68
1. I CONCUR WHOLEHEARTEDLY IN THE CONCEPT OF REF A FOR A MULTI-SLF OPN IN I CORPS, SPECIFICALLY RECOMMENDING THE NAPOLEON/SALINE AO AS THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
2. IN REF B, I RESPONDED TO REF C AND D, RECOMMENDING THE ARG/SLF (ONE OR BOTH) BE EMPLOYED IN THE NAPOLEON/SALINE AO FOR A PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS COMMENCING ABOUT 23 AUG. THIS OPN WOULD THEN BE TIMED WITH THE RETURN OF 1ST MARINES TO 1ST MARDIV

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 0613L SECRET

PERMITTING INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV INTO THE PROBABLE EXPANSION OF THE L IV AO VICINITY OF QUANG TRI AND SOUTH.

3. WHILE AGREEING WITH THE CONCEPT OF REF A, I WOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO THE OUTLINED RATIONALE:

- A. THE PRACTICE OF DESIGNATING BNS FROM 1ST AND 3D MARDIV FORCES AS SLFS SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED AS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. TASKING 26TH MARINES TO PROVIDE BOTH SLFS ON A CONTINUING BASIS PRESENTS A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF MEETING THE REQUIREMENT. THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY WITH A BN FROM 26TH MARINES RELIEVING BLT 2/4. IF POSSIBLE, 2/4 SHOULD BE DEACTIVATED WHILE ASHORE, ALLOWING HIGHLY DESIRABLE CONTINUITY TO OPNS FOR ITS PARENT REGT IN THE SENSITIVE SCOTLAND II AO. SUBSEQUENTLY, OTHER BNS, REGTS AND DIVS WOULD SIMILARLY PROFIT BY NOT BEING REQUIRED TO DISRUPT OPNS CAUSED BY PERIODIC LOSS OF A BN TO ACTIVATION OR EMPLOYMENT AFLOAT AS BLT.
- B. 26TH MARINES HQ COULD BE RECONSTITUTED AS BLT 26 AND COMMAND ONE OR BOTH OF THE SLFS. HOWEVER, IF

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHVP 2613D S E C R E T
 WOULD THEN DUPLICATE EXISTING SLF COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS
 AND COMPLICATE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, PARTICULARLY WHEN
 SLFS ARE COMMITTED INDEPENDENTLY. IT WOULD ALSO
 DEPRIVE THE DIVS OF A REGT HQ. AS A MODIFIED APPROACH,
 RECOMMEND THE 26TH MARINE HQ BE ASSIGNED TO A COASTAL
 AO (SPECIFICALLY NAPOLEON/SALINE) IN AN ECONOMY OF
 FORCE POSTURE, WITH THE ONE ORGANIC B NOT ON SLF DUTY
 UNDER REJZ OPCON. AS THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THAT AO
 MAY SUBSEQUENTLY DICTATE, SLF RAPID RESPONSE WOULD
 PLACE ORGANIC BNS UNDER 26TH MARINES OPCON WHILE SLFS
 ASHORE. FOR SPECIFIED PERIODS, OPNS ASHORE COULD BE
 BROUGHT UNDER 9TH MAB CONTROL. AT THE SAME TIME,
 SHOULD THE 3D MARDIV SITUATION PERMIT, 26TH MARINES
 AND ITS ASHORE BN WOULD BE IN OPTIMUM POSITION TO
 COMBINE WITH THE SLFS AND READY FOR COMMITMENT AS AN
 FLT WHERE NEEDED.

C. I SEE NO ADVANTAGE TO REDESIGNATING ENS (E.G 2/7
 AND 2/4) AS THE 26TH MARINES. I MUCH PREFER THAT 2/4
 CONTINUE ITS PRESENT MISSION ASHORE.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 2 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**
#31

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM MEMO EWELL CG 9TH INF DIV		DATE 300030Z JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 300030Z JUNE 68		1, 2 & 3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	<i>For you lossan</i>				REMARKS
	DCG					<p><i>Protocol -</i></p> <p><i>Make necessary</i></p> <p><i>Arrangements</i></p> <p><i>OK. Please represent</i></p> <p><i>me as required.</i></p> <p><i>S/S Please note</i></p> <p><i>He</i></p> <p><i>See sec</i></p> <p><i>#30</i></p>
	DCG AIR					
<i>2</i>	C/S				<i>9</i>	
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
<i>1</i>	S/S	<i>301020H</i>			<i>JCH</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #30

C 320740Z ZYB ZFF-1
 FM EWELL, CC, 5TH INF DIV
 TO CG, III MAF
 INFO: CG, PROV CORPS
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F I O BKT 746 EYES ONLY
 ON TUESDAY 2 JULY I PLAN TO ATTEND THE UNMACE OF COMMAND CEREMONY FOR
 THE 3/5TH CAV. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE CC OF C/S PROV CORPS AND
 THEN VISIT WITH YOU OR YOUR ~~(C/N)~~ BRIEFLY. I HAVE A JET TO DANANG AND
 MUST BE AT WUNDER BEACH BY 1130 HRS. I WOULD LIKE TO DEPART THERE AT
 1300 HRS, AND THEN MAKE MY OTHER TWO VISITS, DEPARTING DANANG AT

APPROXIMATELY 1600 HRS. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD SUPPLY
 ME WITH A CHOPPER OR PLANE TO TAKE ME FROM DANANG TO WUNDER
 BEACH, PHU BAI, AND BACK TO DANANG. IF I AM UNABLE TO MAKE IT, MY
 ADC, BG ROBERTS, OR MY CHIEF OF STAFF, COL LUNT, WILL FILL IN AND
 FOLLOW THE SAME SCHEDULE.
 I'LL APPRECIATE ANY EFFORTS MADE.
 EWELL.

SSS NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 200

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FOR

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAG	29 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECD
	292245Z JUN 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Copy #2 to DC6 Air 30 Jun 68 Whyte Copy #3 to Air Control 30 Jun 68 PM Returned 3 Aug 68 M Copy #1 to Air Control 3 Aug 68 M
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

CG RUMUGRA RUEBHOA
 DE RUHHFMA 5356 1812245
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 292245Z JUN68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUEBHOA/CNC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN, INFO
 GEN CHAPMAN FROM LEGEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WAKING
 HOURS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 A. CG III MAF 292334Z/JUN68 (S)
 B. CNC 291934Z/JUNE 68 (S)
 1. THE COMMANDANT AND I HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
 EXCHANGE THOUGHTS CONCERNING YOUR PROPOSED
 MESSAGE TO ABRAMS, REFERENCE A, OUTLINING YOUR
 VIEWS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT. WHILE CONCURRING WITH
 YOUR EVALUATION AND SUMMARY, AND UNDERSTANDING
 THAT IN YOUR POSITION DOGMATISM MAY BE COUNTER-
 PRODUCTIVE, WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT ANY RECOM-
 MENDATION WITH REGARD TO CHANGES IN THE SINGLE
 MANAGER SYSTEM MUST BE PREFACED BY A POSITIVE STATE-
 MENT REAFFIRMING OUR COLLECTIVE POSITION ON THE

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 5356 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 RETURN OF AIR ASSETS TO III MAF. THIS POSITION SHOULD
 BE STATED IN UNEMOTIONAL TERMS, TIED CLOSELY TO A
 PHILOSOPHY OF A MUTUAL DESIRE TO GET ON WITH THE WAR.
 2. ACCORDINGLY, OUR APPROACH TO THE NEW COMMANDER
 IN SAIGON SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MAY BE THE BEST
 CHANCE YET TO REVERSE THE SINGLE MANAGER DECISION.
 IT MAY ALSO BE OUR LAST FULL SHOT AT IT BECAUSE ABE
 AND NO ONE ELSE WILL MAKE THIS DECISION AND ONCE
 MADE WE CAN EXPECT IT TO LAST FOR THE DURATION. SINCE
 HE IS PRACTICAL, APOLITICAL, NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY
 PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS AND NOT INTIMIDATED BY WITH AF
 PRESSURE, OUR ARGUMENTS SHOULD MAKE A POWERFUL
 IMPRESSION BECAUSE THEY ARE COMPELLING AND HOLD
 SPECIAL APPEAL TO THOSE WHO UNDERSTAND THE INFANTRY/
 SUPPORTING ARMS COMBINATION. IT APPEARS TIMELY TO
 REITERATE TO ABE OUR POSITION THAT THE GROUND COM-
 MANDER MUST HAVE FULL MISSION DIRECTION OF HIS
 TACTICAL ELEMENTS, STRESSING THAT WE HAVE GIVEN UP
 MUCH IN OTHER HIGHLY DESIRABLE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO
 ACHIEVE THE BALANCED AIR-GROUND CONFIGURATION

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

29

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 5356 S E C R E T P S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
 THAT WE PRESENT TO AN ENEMY. THESE POINTS, PLUS THE
 CONSISTENT WOES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 REQUIRING PATCHWORK FIXES, WHICH ALL LEAD BACK IN THE
 DIRECTION OF THE OLD ARRANGEMENT, MAY INDUCE ABE TO
 SCRAP THIS CONTROVERSIAL SET UP ALTOGETHER, RETURN TO
 95-4, AND GET ON WITH THIS WAR. REMINDERS MAY BE IN
 ORDER TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTUAL
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSUMER ORIENTED MARINE AVIATION
 AND PRODUCER ORIENTED USAF TACTICAL AIR WILL CONTINUE
 TO BE DEEP AND ENDURING DESPITE THE BEST EFFORTS AND
 GOODWILL OF THOSE IN THE FIELD WHO TRY TO MAKE THEM
 OVERLAY; THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT SPANNED THE SINGLE
 MANAGER DECISION ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT TODAY;
 AND, FINALLY, THAT EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT WHATEVER
 CONCERN AROSE OVER POSSIBLE CONFLICT DUE TO INTER-
 MINGLING OF ARMY AND MARINE FORCES IN ICIZ PROVED
 UNFOUNDED. THE LAST THOUGHT IS THAT ABE MUST BE
 ASSURED THAT MARINE AIR IS READY TO GO ANYWHERE IN

SEASIA AT ANY TIME AND IN WHATEVER NUMBERS THAT HE
 DIRECTS AND WE CAN DO IT UNDER 95-4.

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 5356 S E C R E T P S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
 3. THE MATTER OF RECENTLY IMPROVED AIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY
 MUST ALSO BE ADDRESSED BECAUSE IT MAY CONSTITUTE THE
 STRONGEST DETERRENT FOR ABE TO MAKE ANY CHANGE NOW.
 HERE IS OUR ESTIMATE OF WHAT HAS ACTUALLY OCCURRED
 UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN THIS RESPECT. IT FORCED
 THE CUMBERSOME, LONG-LEAD TIME, COMPLETELY
 CENTRALIZED 7TH AF SYSTEM TO INTERFACE WITH THE
 FLEXIBLE AND HIGHLY RESPONSIVE MARINE SET UP. THE
 MANY RESULTANT PATCHES AND IMPROVISATIONS HAVE ALL
 TENDED TOWARD OUR SYSTEM AND THE ARMY HAS BENEFITED
 SIGNIFICANTLY. THE KEY POINT HERE, HOWEVER, IS THAT
 IT WAS THE INTERFACE ITSELF AND THE WAY IN WHICH IT
 HIGHLIGHTED THE RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY AND UNRESPONSIVE-
 NESS OF 7TH AF IN COMPARISON TO OUR SYSTEM THAT FORCED
 MORE SORTIES AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE ARMY. IN THE
 END IT'S CLEAR THAT NO GREAT EFFICIENCIES RESULTED FROM
 CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT PER SE, BUT RATHER RESULTED
 FROM INTERFACE AND IMPROVISATIONS.
 4. ACCORDINGLY, I BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD RECOMMEND
 MARINE FIXED WING RECONNAISSANCE AND STRIKE ASSETS BE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#29

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 5356 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
RETURNED TO CG, III MAF IN ACCORDANCE WITH 95-4.

5. HAVING MADE YOUR POSITION CLEAR, AND SHOULD YOU
DEEM IT REQUIRED AND NECESSARY, BELIEVE THAT THE FOL-
LOWING CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE IN YOUR RECOMMEND-
ATIONS; REFERENCE B PERTAINS.

A. PARAGRAPH 5.E (1) - REWORD TO READ:

QUOTE: THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE
TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE
THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL
PLANS, TO MEET EMERGENCY AND CONTINGENCY REQUIRE-
MENTS THROUGHOUT RVN, AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE
RESPONSIVENESS. UNQUOTE.

B. PARAGRAPH 5.E (1) - REWORD TO READ:

QUOTE: (1) THAT THE PRESENT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM BE
FURTHER IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION
OF SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIR. UNQUOTE.

C. PARAGRAPH 5.E (3) - REWORD TO READ:

QUOTE: (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES
(CURRENTLY 209 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 32 DAILY PRE-
PLANNED SORTIES AS WELL AS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 18 HELO

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 5356 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ESCORT MISSIONS) BE RETURNED TO MISSION DIRECTION OF
CG, III MAF. TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO
BE DETERMINED BY CG, III MAF BASED ON THE TACTICAL
NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE
RESPONSIVENESS AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING
ARMS. UNQUOTE.

D. PARAGRAPH 5.L (9) - REWORD TO READ:

QUOTE: (9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF
7 MARCH (REFERENCE A) BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE
ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGER
TACTICAL AIR CONCEPT. UNQUOTE.

6. I'LL CALL YOU ABOUT NOON, YOUR TIME TO DISCUSS
THE WHOLE MATTER. BEST REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
#29

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CMC		DATE 29 JUN 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 291934Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS
			IN	OUT			
3	CG					III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)	
4	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S						
	D C/S			717			
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S		300725Z Jun		JCT		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

28

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

QT SZ YUW RUEBHOA9832 1811933-SSSS--RUHHMA RUMUGRA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 291934Z JUN 68

FM OMC

TO RUHHMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN EUSE, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN
FROM GEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CG III MAF 290334Z JUN68

1. THIS CONFIRMS OUR TELECON OF 29 JUNE.

2. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS APPLY TO PARA 5E OF REF A.

A. (QUOTE) THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE...

REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS; (CLOSE QUOTE).

B. (QUOTE) (1) THAT THE PRESENT INTEGRATED AIR CONTROL
SYSTEM BE FURTHER IMPROVED... (CLOSE QUOTE).

C. (QUOTE) (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE... BE RETURNED TO
MISSION DIRECTION OF CG III MAF. TIMES ON TARGET AND
ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG III MAF BASED ON THE

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA9832 SECRET SPECAT
TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO
IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING
ARMS. (CLOSE QUOTE)

D. (QUOTE) (9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE... REFINEMENTS
TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGER... (CLOSE QUOTES)

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET
#28

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 29 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 291906Z JUN 68		COPY# (OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CTZ (U)
			IN	OUT		
3 4	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		300725H		JCF	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"copy #2 & 3 Burned
6 Nov 68"

42

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

OO RUHHFMA RUMUGRA
 DE RUEBHOA9817 1811906
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 291906Z JUN 68
 RM CMC
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN EUSE INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 GEN CHAPMAN, DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CTZ (U)

A. CG III MAF 290236Z JUN68

1. CONCUR WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED REF A.

2. WHEN TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS, THE REALIZATION OF MARINE
 FORCES TO THE SOUTHERN THREE PROVINCES, I CTZ, APPEARS TO BE
 ADVANTAGEOUS PROVIDED CG III MAF RETAINS OVERALL COMMAND OF US
 FORCES IN I CTZ FOR THE PURPOSE OF FACILITATING COORDINATION
 WITH ARVN, CORDS AND THE ADVISORY EFFORT, AND FOR COORDINATING
 TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#27

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

RTTCZYUW RUEBHOA9794 1811723-0000-R UYUGR .

ZNY CCCCC

P 29 1611Z JUN68

FM CMC

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPEC CAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN VAN RYZIN

1. FOLLOWING IS STATUS OF PLANS FOR YOUR WASHINGTON COMMITMENTS:

THURSDAY 9 JUL 68

2830-1900 QUANTICO

1200 PRESS CONF (PENDING)

1430 UNSECNAV BRIEFING

1530 CALL ON DEPSECDEF

WEDNESDAY 10 JUL 68

1100 GEN CUSHMAN'S SYMPOSIUM PRESENTATION

1400 MEET WITH JCS

ADDITIONAL CALLS PENDING

PRESIDENT

VICE PRESIDENT

SECDEF

GP-4

BT

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

#26

FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 29 JUN 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 291047Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT DASC LOCATION
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS CG Our msg struck a nerve. <i>[Signature]</i>
4	DCG		6/27		<i>[Initials]</i>	
5	DCG AIR				<i>[Initials]</i>	
2	C/S				<i>[Initials]</i>	
	D C/S			7/7	<i>[Initials]</i>	
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		292120H		<i>[Initials]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

24

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 1815U 1811105
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 291207Z JUN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF DANANG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 18729 FOR LTG CUSHMAN
 FROM GEN ABRAMS

SUBJECT: DASC LOCATION

1. (U) REFERENCE YOUR MSG 290234Z JUN 68.
2. (C) MACV MSG RELEASED THIS DATE DIRECTING THE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED IN YOUR PREVIOUS MSGS ON THIS SUBJECT.
3. (C) DELAY IN RESPONSE SIMPLY DUE TO TOO MUCH STAFF COORDINATION, AND INSUFFICIENT STAFF ACTION.

GP-4
 BT

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

#24

FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 291009Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM LTG ROSSON CG PCV PHU BAI
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DNG
INFO GEN ABCAMS COMUSMACV CON
ZEM

S E C R E T PHB 033 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: PRESS GROUND RULES VIOLATION (U)

REFERENCE: PHB 022 27 JUN 68 (LTC 071104Z)

1. (S) AS WAS INDICATED BY REF, THE INVESTIGATION WAS REDIRECTED TO ASCERTAIN IF POSSIBLE THE SOURCES FOR THE JOHN CARROLL STORY IN REGARD TO KSCR. THE PCV IG CONTINUED HIS INVESTIGATION ON FRIDAY, 25 JUNE, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DEVELOP EITHER CONCRETE INFORMATION OR PROMISING LEADS. CHIEF OF STAFF, PCV, BY TELECON WITH CHIEF OF INFORMATION, MACV, HAS LEARNED THAT CARROLL IS PRESENTLY IN SAIGON, THAT HIS ACCREDITATION HAS BEEN LIFTED, BUT THAT A PROTEST IS EXPECTED FROM HIS EDITOR AND PUBLISHER.

2. (S) IF THE INVESTIGATION IS TO BE PURSUED, THE LOGICAL STARTING POINT APPEARS TO BE WITH CARROLL HIMSELF. HOWEVER, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TRADITIONAL PRESS POSITION, WHICH ARGUES STRONGLY FOR PROTECTION OF SOURCES FROM IDENTIFICATION, AND IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE BALTIMORE SUN PROTEST, IT IS MY CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION DIRECTED TOWARD IDENTIFICATION OF CARROLL'S SOURCES WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE. IT IS THEREFORE PROPOSED, SUBJECT TO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM CG III MAF OR COMUSMACV, THAT THE INVESTIGATION BE TERMINATED.

3. (S) BASED ON THE INFORMAL ADVICE THAT THE BALTIMORE SUN WILL PROTEST THE CANCELLATION OF CARROLL'S ACCREDITATION, THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS SUBMITTED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF MY VIEWS WHEN ACTION ON THE EXPECTED PROTEST IS BEING CONSIDERED:

"A. HEADQUARTERS, PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM AND ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ASSIST THE PRESS IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE WITH TRANSPORTATION TO THE SCENE OF MILITARY ACTION AND OTHER REMOTE AREAS WITHIN THE AO. FOOD AND SHELTER ALSO HAVE BEEN PROVIDED THESE NEWSMEN AT A STANDARD EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE HOST UNITS. THIS HAS BEEN DONE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE NEWSMEN WOULD ABIDE BY THE GROUND RULES. IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE HAS TWO KEY

POINTS:

"(1) FIRST, THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES INASMUCH AS THE RELEASE TIME OF CARROLL'S STORY ON KHE SANH COMBAT BASE WAS SUCH THAT THE ENEMY WAS GIVEN A CLEAR INDICATION OF OUR INTENTIONS PRIOR TO THE DATE THAT INACTIVATION WOULD BE COMPLETED. THIS, OF COURSE, ENCOURAGES THE ENEMY TO SELECT A COURSE OF ACTION BEST CALCULATED TO HAMPER OUR PROGRESS TOWARD THE NEW POSTURE. THE STORY MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS HAVING INCREASED THE ALREADY CONSIDERABLE THREAT TO U.S. MILITARY UNITS AND TO THE LIVES OF DEDICATED SERVICEMEN CARRYING OUT ORDERS OF THEIR COMMANDERS IN THE NATION'S INTEREST.

"(2) THE SECOND PORTION OF CARROLL'S VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A GROSS EXAMPLE OF A SITUATION WHEREIN, ACTING ONLY IN HIS OWN SELF-INTEREST, A REPORTER HAS JEOPARDIZED MAJOR PLANS BY THE DETAIL IN WHICH HE DESCRIBES FUTURE PLANS IN THE OPERATING AREA. HIS OWN EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS ON THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF INSTALLATIONS, WHETHER ACCURATE OR NOT HAVE IDENTIFIED FOR THE ENEMY POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION, THUS FURTHER MAGNIFYING THE RISKS TO UNITS AND THE DANGERS TO INDIVIDUALS.

"B. IN SUMMARY, IT IS MY CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT CARROLL HAS PRESENTED A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL EXAMPLE OF A KNOWING VIOLATION OF A SERIOUS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PENALTY WHICH MIGHT ACCRUE. IT IS MANDATORY, THEREFORE, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE STAKES ARE CONSIDERED, THAT THIS PENALTY BE ENFORCED."

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

800

#23(2)

NNNN

SECRET

#23(2)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	GINCPAG	30 JUNE 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# 1, 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD
	255156	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
7	CG				LP	DEFENCE ACTION; HELOS
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S				Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		900810		JCF	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMS/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

11 # 2 & 3 burned
6 Nov 68

SECRET

R 290156Z 4FFA

FM CINCPAC

TO GEN RYAN, CINCPACAF

ADM NYLAND, CINCPACFLT

GEN MONYER 7AF

VADM BRINGLE COMSEVENTHFLT

LOEN CUSHMAN III MAP

RAMO COUSINS, CTF-77

ZEN

O 212902Z ZYM EFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

ADM SHARP CINCPAC

ZEN

SECRET MAC MISS EYES ONLY

THE FOLLOWING IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ON THE ACTIONS BEING TAKEN FOR DEFENSE AGAINST HOSTILE HELICOPTERS IN THE 002 AND I CORPS.

A. (C) TO COUNTER THE THREAT OF THE HOSTILE HELICOPTERS AND TO MAKE A REALISTIC DETERMINATION OF ENEMY INTENTIONS, GENERAL MONYER HAS INSTRUCTED HIS STAFF TO IMMEDIATELY TAKE THE ACTIONS SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

B. (5) AIR DEFENSE PROCEDURES: AIR DEFENSE PROCEDURES ARE TO BE TIGHTENED UP THROUGHOUT THE AREA, WITH SPECIFIC AND CONTINUOUS CROSS-TALK BETWEEN THE CONTROL AND REPORTING PARTIES (CORPS) AT BONG HA AND DA NANG AND THE OVERALL CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER (CRC) AT MONKEY MOUNTAIN. CLOSE ATTENTION IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE AREA NORTH OF DONG HA TO INCLUDE THE BEACH AND ADJACENT LAND AND WATER AREAS. ALL AIRBORNE OPERATIONS WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORED TO INCLUDE MILITARY, GUERRILLA, VMAF AND CIVILIAN. THE STAFF HAS MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL RADAR EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE AREA, WHICH INCLUDES MORTAR TRACKING AND AIRBORNE RADAR AIRCRAFT (COLLISE EYE). IN THIS MANNER WE INTEND TO TIE TOGETHER ALL RADAR TRACKING EQUIPMENT IN I CORPS INTO A COMMON CONTROL POINT AT PANAMA, WITH INFORMATION BEING PASSED IN A REAL TIME BASIS TO HIS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER IN HQ 7TH AIRFORCE.

C. (3) SANITIZED AREAS:

1) IN ORDER TO CLOSELY MONITOR ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE HIS BASES OF OPERATION AND PATTERN, AN AREA BOUNDED BY Y6818- Y6818- Y6888- MOUTH OF BEN HAI RIVER FOLLOWING TRACE OF BEN HAI RIVER TO Y68878 HAS BEEN SANITIZED BETWEEN 1920H AND 0620H FROM ALL AIR MOVEMENT WITH EXCEPTION OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

THIS RESTRICTION WILL BE APPLIED NO LONGER THAN NECESSARY.

Mighty late

rest possible

22(1)

22(1)

2
 NIGHTS, THE COMMANDER, SEVENTH FLEET DECIDED TO WITHDRAW HIS SURFACE FORCE FROM THE AREA ON 17 JUNE. SEVENTH FLEET SURFACE SHIPS WILL THUS BE RESTRICTED TEMPORARILY FROM OPERATIONS WITHIN AN AREA THIRTY MILES RADIUS OF CAP LAY (MUI LAY POINT, NORTH OF DMZ) AT NIGHT.

D. (S) TACTICAL AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

1) A C-130 FLARE SHIP (BLIND BAT) WILL BE ON STATION IN THE EASTERN DMZ AREA BELOW SAM AND AAA THREAT FROM 1900- 2700 HOURS BACKED UP BY AC-47 GUNSHIP (SPOOKY) ON AIRBORNE ALERT IN THE AREA AND TWO AC-47 AIRCRAFT ON GROUND ALERT.

2) EIGHT F-4 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON ALERT AT DA NANG LOADED WITH MAXIMUM FLARE CAPABILITY AND ARMAMENT. THERE WILL BE NO SOG OPERATIONS OR IOLSO WHITE OPERATIONS AT NIGHT IN THE AREA UNTIL SANITIZED PERIOD IS TERMINATED. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FIRING ON AIRCRAFT WITHOUT SPECIFIC PERMISSION OF 7TH AIR FORCE EXCEPT WHEN FIRED UPON FROM THE AIR. FOR AIR DEFENSE ALERT THERE WILL BE SIX F-105S AND FOUR F-4S ON MINIMUM ALERT AT DA NANG.

3) IF THE ENEMY ACTIVITIES BRING HIM TO A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT THE BLIND BAT WILL BE USED TO FLARE FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES.

4) ALL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO FIND ENEMY DOWNED CHOPPERS AND ENEMY CHOPPER BASES.

5) RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED TO OBTAIN LOW-LEVEL PHOTO AND AIR COVERAGE OF TIGER ISLAND AND SANITIZED AREA IN DMZ AND TALLY NO. RF-40'S 6) -> OBTAIN NIGHT PHOTO COVERAGE OF SELECTED POINTS.

6) RF-57 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WILL COVER THE AREA SOUTH OF THE DMZ AT NIGHT.

7) COLLEGE EYE AIRCRAFT WILL PROVIDE RADAR COVERAGE OF THE AREA FROM 1900H TO 2230H AND 2230H TO 2500H.

8) COMMANDO LANCE (C-130) WILL PROVIDE COVER FROM 1800H TO 0600H.

3. (S) SUMMARY: THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THESE TASKS WILL DO MUCH TO ESTABLISH THE INTENTION OF THE ENEMY HELICOPTER FORCE, PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR ITS LOCATION AND WILL PROVIDE FOR THE LEAST DISRUPTION OF OUR FORCES THROUGHOUT SVN AND THE EXTENDED BATTLE AREA. THESE EFFORTS WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY EVALUATED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT, WITH MAXIMUM EFFORT BEING PLACED UPON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION THROUGH RECONNAISSANCE. WHEN LOCATION OF ENEMY CHOPPER BASE IS DETERMINED, MAXIMUM EFFORT WILL BE EMPLOYED TO ASSURE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY CHOPPERS AND SUPPORT.

Hasn't done
so.

22(2)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

8

22(2)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM COMUSMACV	DATE 28 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 281150Z JUN 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG CUSHMAN
3 4	DCG			6/29	le Rmst	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S				B	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		290730H Jun		JCT	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

#2 & 3 burned
6 Nov 68

25
35

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMSAK
 EE RUMSAW 1826U 180123Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 28115Z JUN 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF DANANG

EXCLUSIVE

BT
 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 18635 FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM
 GEN ABRAMS

REF: A. CG III MAF LTG 28232Z JUN 68
 B. COMUSMACV 2316 LTG 232757Z JUN 68

1. (S) YOU ARE CORRECT IN YOUR STATEMENT CONCERNING DIVERGENCE OF CASUALTY FIGURES, BOTH FRIENDLY AND ENEMY, FROM TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR THE WEEK 142231 TO 222422 JUNE (REFERENCE A).
2. (S) THERE ARE TWO REASONS FOR THIS. THE CASUALTY FIGURES REPRESENTED IN REFERENCE B WERE ONLY THOSE INCURRED IN THE SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS, ALSO CITED IN THE MESSAGE. SECONDLY, THESE WERE ROUGH FIGURES CALCULATED FROM SPOT REPORTS. THE REFINED FIGURES WHEN RECEIVED, ARE INVARIABLY HIGHER, REFLECTING THE LAG IN CASUALTY REPORTING.
3. (C) I HAVE DIRECTED THAT TOTAL CASUALTY FIGURES BE USED FOR THE COMBAT SUMMARY IN THE FUTURE, AND THE RESULTANT FIGURES WILL MORE ACCURATELY PORTRAY THE TRUE PICTURE. ADDITIONALLY, I AM DROPPING

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 1826U SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 THE ATTEMPT TO CATEGORIZE ENGAGEMENTS AS SIGNIFICANT AND OTHERWISE, AS THIS MERELY CONFUSES THE ISSUE (GP-4)
 BT

SECRET
20

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM CG FMFPAC
CG						SERIAL 272228Z JUN 68
DCG						COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT NEWS RELEASE
C/S						REMARKS #3 burned 5 dou68 FOR Copy #4 to Air Control 29 Jun 68 LEGEND A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

#19

P7005019
 OTTEZYUW RUHHFMA4907 1792228-EEEE-LRUMUGRA
 ZNY EEEEE ZFG
 PP RUMUGRA
 DE RUHHFMA 4907 1792228
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 272228Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS E F T O FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 1. THE FOLLOWING NEWS RELEASE IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION.
 QUOTE:

BY FRED S. HOFFMAN
 AP MILITARY WRITER

WASHINGTON AP - THE AIR FORCE HAS WON, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, A
 DISPUTE OVER CONTROL OF MARINE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH
 VIETNAM.

THE MARINES ARE NOT CONCEDED FINAL DEFEAT, EVEN THOUGH A DECISION
 MADE AT THE TOP CIVILIAN LEVEL IN THE PENTAGON WENT AGAINST THEM.

ONE MARINE GENERAL SAID THAT *TO GRAB HALF OUR FORCE AWAY JUST
 BECAUSE IT OPERATES IN THE AIR THREATENS THE EXISTENCE OF THE
 MARINE CORPS.*

AIR FORCE OFFICIALS DENIED THIS, CONTENDING THE AIM IS ONLY TO
 IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND TROOPS,
 PARTICULARLY NOW THAT ARMY FORCES ALSO ARE FIGHTING IN THE
 N

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA4907 UNCLAS E F T O
 NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES WHICH ONCE WERE KNOWN AS *MARINE LAND.
 THE SITUATION IS SUBJECT TO PERIODIC REVIEW AND THERE ARE
 COMMAND CHANGES UNDER WAY OR COMING THAT COULD ALTER POSITIONS.
 THE ISSUE WHICH SPLIT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AROSE EARLIER
 THIS YEAR.

SOURCES SAID AIR FORCE GEN. WILLIAM MOMYER URGED IN MARCH THAT
 THE AIR FORCE SHOULD COORDINATE TACTICAL AIR MISSIONS IN THE
 NORTHERNMOST SECTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM BOTH ITS OWN MISSIONS AND
 THOSE OF MARINE WARPLANES.

THE MARINES WERE TO BE PERMITTED TO EXERCISE SOME LIMITED CONTROL
 OVER THEIR OWN AIR OPERATIONS, WHICH THE CORPS TRADITIONALLY HAS
 REGARDED AS AN EXTENSION OF ITS INFANTRY. THE TWO FORM AN *AIR-
 GROUND TEAM** IN MARINE DOCTRINE.

MOMYER, COMMANDER OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WAS
 BACKED BY GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, TOP U.S. COMMANDER IN THE
 VIETNAM WAR. MOMYER WAS ONE OF WESTMORELAND'S TOP DEPUTIES.

EVENTUALLY, SOURCES SAID, MOMYER ALSO RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF
 ADM. U.S. GRANT SHARP, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL U.S. FORCES
 IN THE PACIFIC AREA. THIS WAS A BLOW TO THE MARINES WHO

EXPECT TO BE UPHELD BY NAVY ADMIRALS IN SQUABBLES WITH THE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#19

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA4907 UNCLAS E F T O

OTHER SERVICES SINCE THE MARINES ARE AN ARM OF THE NAVY.

MARINE GROUND TROOPS HAD EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES UNTIL ARMY TROOPS WERE SENT UP LAST YEAR TO HELP THE THIN-SPREAD MARINES DEAL WITH GROWING PRESSURE FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

AIR FORCE PLANES HAVE OPERATED OUT OF BASES IN THE NORTHERNMOST AREA FOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS, FLYING STRIKES INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, AND ALSO HITTING ENEMY TARGETS INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM.

BUT UNTIL MOMYER MADE HIS MOVE, THE MARINE AIR WING HANDLED ALL REQUESTS FROM MARINE GROUND UNITS FOR SUPPORT, CALLING ON THE AIR FORCE FOR HELP ONLY IF HELP WERE NEEDED BEYOND MARINE RESOURCES.

WHEN THE DISPUTE REACHED WASHINGTON, SOURCES SAID, THE JOINT CHIEFS DIVIDED.

GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, LINED UP WITH GEN. JOHN P. MCCONNELL IN SUPPORT OF THE MOMYER-WESTMORELAND POSITION.

THE MARINE STAND WAS BACKED BY GEN. LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, MARINE COMMANDANT, ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, CHIEF OF NAVAL

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA4907 UNCLAS E F T O

OPERATIONS, AND GEN. HAROLD X. JOHNSON, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE JOHNSON LINED UP WITH CHAPMAN AND MOORER BECAUSE THE ARMY MAY BE CONCERNED THAT THE AIR FORCE MAY NEXT REACH OUT FOR CONTROL OF SUCH ADVANCED HELICOPTERS AS THE CHEYENNE. THIS IS A WINGED CHOPPER WHICH IS SOME RESPECTS VERGES ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A CONVENTIONAL AIRPLANE.

PENTAGON SOURCES SAID THE MATTER WENT TO THE HIGHEST CIVILIAN LEVEL AND THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL H. NITZE MADE A DECISION UPHOLDING THE AIR FORCE VIEW AND SPECIFYING THE RETENTION OF SOME LIMITED CONTROL BY THE MARINES. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS TO BE LOOKED AT PERIODICALLY TO SEE HOW IT IS WORKING, SOURCES SAID.

MEANWHILE, CHANGES ARE IMMINENT IN THE U.S. COMMAND IN VIETNAM AND THE OVER-ALL PACIFIC AREA. THIS OPENS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL IN I CORPS OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

WESTMORELAND IS REPLACING JOHNSON AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF BUT HE IS NOT EXPECTED TO CHANGE HIS VIEW IN SWITCHING JOBS.

UNQUOTE:

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#19

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JEMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-60)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	28 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
	272132Z JUN 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY REMARKS CG I have G-3 and C1 Mastella (our rep on this project) working up a report para 2 This page EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	280715H			JCH	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SAC					

Copied Dual Blade 28 June 68

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RUMUGRA
DE RUMHPMA 4897 1792 132
ZNY 58589

P 272132Z JUN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHARNAN AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL FOR ADM HYLAND INFO VADM SAUMBERGER FROM RADM VETH, COMNAVFORV. JOHNNY HYLAND PROVIDED IT TO ME SO PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE.

QUOTE.

A. MACV DIRECTIVE 13-11.

1. (S) A MEETING WAS HELD 25 JUNE MACV HQ TO CONSIDER MACV WORKING LEVEL PAPER WHICH DISCUSSED ASSUMPTIONS AND BROAD CONCEPTS OF ASSIGNING NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES OF I CTZ TO THE ARMY, WITH THE ARMY OPERATING AS A FIELD FORCE. III MAF WOULD BE ASSIGNED THE THE SOUTHERN THREE PROVINCES OF I CTZ. THE MAJOR RESHUFFLE OF ARMY AND MARINE UNITS TO OCCUR IN AUGUST WITH COMPLETION PRIOR TO

PAGE 2 RUMHPMA 4897 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO COMMENCEMENT OF THE MONSOON SEASON (1 SEP).

2. (S) INSOFARAS NAVFORV IS CONCERNED, PRINCIPAL IMPACT OF RE-ORGANIZATION WOULD BE ON REAL ESTATE, BASE DEVELOPMENT, AND AREA COORDINATION FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED NE BY PARA 5E OF REF A. ALTHOUGH NOT ADDRESSED IN THE WORKING PAPER, DISCUSSION DURING THE MEETING INDICATED THAT THESE FUNCTIONS FOR NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES WOULD PROBABLY BE ASSIGNED TO ARMY. A FURTHER IMPACT OF REORGANIZING WOULD BE ON NSA DANANG, ANTICIPATE LITTLE CHANGE IN THE PRESENT NMCC DISPOSITION.

3. (S) INITIAL CONCEPT INDICATES THAT WITH INTER-CHANGE OF UNITS WITHIN I CTZ THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN NSA DANANG'S MISSION AS WHOLESALE SUPPLIER OF COMMON SUPPORT ITEMS, ALTHOUGH VOLUME OF SUPPLIES TO VARIOUS PORTS MAY CHANGE.

4. (S) NSA DANANG HAS ADVISED THAT, ON INITIAL REVIEW, NO MAJOR MOVS ARE CONTEMPLATED OTHER THAN THOSE INCIDENT TO INTRA-CORPS UNIT MOVES, FACILITY REARRANGEMENTS, AND WORKING WITH NEW GROUPS. MACV WORKING PAPER DID NOT COVER:

- A. POL DISTRIBUTION RESPONSIBILITY IMPL.
- B. BOMB CONCEPT.

5. (S) SMCY GROUP WILL RECONVENE MACV HQ 1001 FOR ALL SERVICE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUKHFWA 4897 SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR A CEO
 REPS TO PLAN IN DEPTH AND PREPARE FINAL STUDY. IT APPEARS THAT
 PRO OR CON OF MAKING CHANGE WILL NOT BE PURPOSE OF STUDY.
 DECISION TO REORGANIZE APPEARS ALL BUT FINAL. STUDY WILL
 INVESTIGATE METHOD OF EXECUTION AND DELINEATION OF ULTIMATE
 RESPONSIBILITIES.

6. (S) AT THIS TIME FORESEE NO MAJOR EFFECT ON NAVFORV
 EXCEPT DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT IN 1 CORPS. WILL KEEP YOU
 ADVISED. BEST REGARDS.
 UNQUOTE.

2. FOR CG III MAF. THE COMMANDANT'S 22165 Z/JUN AND
 MY 222353Z/JUN, BOTH SPECAT EXCLUSIVES, ARE PERTINENT.
 WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON VETH'S MESSAGE TO
 JOHNNY KYLAND, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS AS TO TIMING,
 AND ANY OTHER REACTIONS YOU MAY NOW HAVE ON THE MATTER. BEST
 REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#18

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	LTC ROSSON CG PCV	27 JUNE 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	
	271101	COPY# 1, 205 1 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					REMARKS
3	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	280730 KJ				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"# 263 burned
6 Nov 68"

SECRET #17

TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
INFO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
INFO DAVIS CG 3D MARDIV
ZEM

SECRET PHB 922 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG, DTG 251320Z

B. COMUSMACV MAC 8440

C. CG PCV PHB 916, DTG 261216Z

1. (U) REFERENCES A AND B DIRECTED INVESTIGATION NOW BEING CONDUCTED;
REF C WAS INITIAL REPORT.

2. (S) SSGT FRYMAN, III MAF COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU, WAS INTERROGATED
27 JUNE IN REGARD TO ABOVE SUBJECT MATTER. SSGT FRYMAN ESCORTED
MR. MICHAEL ROBERTS, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER NEWSPAPER, AND MR. L.
DEMBART, WBAI RADIO, NEW YORK CITY, TO DONG HA AND KHE SANH ON 21-
22 JUNE. SSGT FRYMAN WAS PRESENT WHEN THEY INTERVIEWED GENERAL
HOFFMAN AT KHE SANH. HE STATES THAT GENERAL HOFFMAN, WHEN ASKED
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE DISPOSITION OF XSCB, WITHHELD COMMENT.
FRYMAN FURTHER STATES THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE NEITHER
ROBERTS NOR DEMBART INTERVIEWED ANY OTHER COMMANDER. DURING THE
MORNING OF 22 JUNE, DEMBART MADE A TOUR OF THE PERIMETER AT KHE SANH
THEN RETURNED TO DANANG. NO ADDITIONAL LEADS WERE DEVELOPED FROM THE
INTERVIEW WITH SSGT FRYMAN.

3. (S) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE INVESTIGATION INSOFAR AS ROBERTS
IS CONCERNED BE CLOSED. HAVING SEEN THE JOHN CARROLL STORY I AM
REORIENTING MY IG'S EFFORTS TO DETERMINATION OF HOW CARROLL OBTAINED
HIS INFORMATION ON FIVE BASES AND FUTURE MODUS OPERANDI AND FROM
WHOM.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

290

NNNN

SECRET

#17

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE


SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMSEVENTHFLT		DATE 28 JUNE 68		
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 270925		COPY# 1 of 4 COPIES REC'D		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	VISIT
			IN	OUT			
	CG					REMARKS <i>Too Late</i> <i>9.</i>	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
<i>2</i>	C/S				<i>Q</i>		
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
	S/S		<i>7/22/68</i>		<i>Ju</i>		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
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	S&C						
<i>3</i>	<i>PROB</i>				<i>Am 8.</i>		
<i>4</i>	<i>AIDE</i>		<i>6/29/68</i>	<i>6/29/68</i>	<i>CE</i>		

SECRET #16

OP 070005 ZYH
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO C3 III AF
INFO CINCPACFLT
COMNAVFORV
CENLANTAC
ZBT



1. AREA 3. IF A NOTES DESIRE BY ASST SECDEF MORRIS TO VISIT
HOSPITAL SHIP WHILE IN-COUNTRY.
2. IF FEASIBLE, REQUEST YOU INCLUDE AN VISIT IN ITINERARY
WHILE MORRIS IN LAGANG AREA.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG NINTH MAB		DATE 27 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 270530Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN ANDERSON
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE 2-3 provided me with an answer 9. Copy of msg & note slip to 6-3 281100H Jun J Notified " "# 263 burned 6 Nov 68" SECRET #15
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S				at	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		280715H Jun		JCV	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
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	INSP					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

P 270530Z JUN 68
 FM CG NINTH MAF
 TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN ANDERSON FROM BGEN CHIP

A. CG III MAF 241030Z JUN 68.

1. I AM CONCERNED THAT REF A, WHICH WAS PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION WITH REFS FROM COMSEVENTHFLT AND CTF 76 BUT NOT CTF 79, PROPOSES BLT REHAB IN SUBIC 5 THRU 15 SEP. IN DISCUSSION WITH GENERALS BUSE AND CUSHMAN, I HAD A DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE TO ENDEAVOR TO ARRANGE FOR THE NEXT BLT REHAB PERIOD TO BE CONDUCTED ON OKINAWA. I AM CERTAIN GEN BUSE IS GOING TO PERSONALLY PROPOSE THIS TO ADM HYLAND FOR HE ASKED ME FOR AND I HAVE SUBMITTED TO HIM A TALKING PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT. ADMITTEDLY, SUBIC PROVIDED CERTAIN ADVANTAGES FOR THE NAVY HOWEVER FOR THE MARINE CORPS IT REPRESENTS MULTIPLE DISADVANTAGES, ONE OF WHICH IS THE EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURE OF MAN HOURS AND MONEY. IN ADDITION THE FACILITIES TO TRAIN THE BLT AT SUBIC DOES NOT EQUATE TO THOSE ON OKINAWA.

2. ON THE SUBJECT OF TRAINING, I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT REF A PROGRAMS SLF A INTO TWO PERIODS OF SPEC OPS PRIOR TO AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRAIN AS AN AMPHIBIOUS BLT.

3. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WHICH YOU CAN PROVIDE RELATIVE TO RATIONALE WHICH FOSTERED REF A.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#15

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG THIRD MARDIV		DATE 27 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 270110Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FIREWATCH FOR LGEN CUSHMAN
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS CG - Have I-4 on this now will provide you with an answer answer prompt Vle J. Lopez 9
4	DCG			19/24	Kriet	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S				a	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		270301		JCT	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I				
	G-4	A				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"#3 & 4 burned
6 Nov 68"

SECRET #14

~~SECRET~~

FOR

SCPVVV PVFG24
 OO RUMUGRA
 DE RUMHVP 8867D 1790110
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 270110Z JUN 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T
 FIREWATCH

PERSONAL FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN DAVIS

1. REQUEST III MAF TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO PROVIDE GENERATORS FOR MITHRAS FIREWATCH PROJECT. 5KW GENETAROS WHICH WERE BROUGHT WITH SYSTEM ARE INADEQUATE. REQUIRE TWO 10 KW, 60 CYCLE, ONE OF WHICH IS FOR BACK UP GENERATORS USED TO PROVIDE POWER TO OPERATIONS BUNKER. EMERGENCY GENERATORS, TWO, 1.5 KW AVAILABLE TO POWER EQUIPMENT FOR SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.
2. DURING FIRST FOUR DAYS OF OPERATION ALL GENERATORS WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE PROJECT HAVE BECOME INOPERATIVE FOR SOME REASON. ONE 5KW HAS NOT BEEN SATISFACTORILY REPAIRED, CONTINUED TO EXPERIENCE A VOLTAGE DROP. THE SECOND GENERATOR WAS REPAIRED BUT BECAME INOPERATIVE THIS PM. VALUABLE TIME IS LOST WHILE REPAIRS ARE MADE.
3. CONSIDER IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING GENERATORS WITH

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 8867D S E C R E T
 DEPENDABLE POWER SOURCE ESSENTIAL IN ORDER THAT SYSTEM MAY BE USED DURING OPERATION THOR.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#14

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			GEN ABRAMS		28 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	1, 2, 3, OF 4		
			251130	COPIES OF COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS Copy #2 to DC6 Army 29 Jun 68 <i>TH</i> <i>JL. Douette</i> In 30 Jun 68 <i>TH</i> Copy #3 to DSA I Corps 29 Jun 68 <i>TH</i> Raymond H Rubin Major in Det A-3 Copy #1 to DM2 File 27 Aug 68 <i>TH</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #13

0 251130Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 INFO LTG ROSSON CG PCV
 MG STILWELL DEP CG III MAF
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 8620 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - DMZ (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 10386 DTG 121231Z APR 68 (TS)

B. COMUSMACV 18085 DTG 232832Z JUN 68 (S)

1. (S) FOR THE PURPOSE OF BACKGROUND FOR THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, WE FORWARDED LAST MONTH TO HIGHER AUTHORITY A REPORT OF PAST OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ. THIS REPORT INCLUDED THE INFORMATION THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FRIENDLY OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ IN THE CALENDER YEAR 1968. THIS LATTER ITEM WAS PUBLICLY STATED IN THE TALKS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
2. (S) WHEN THIS HEADQUARTERS WAS QUERIED BY CG, III MAF CONCERNING PROPOSED OPERATIONS IN THE LANCASTER II AREA WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE ENTRY INTO THE SOUTHERN DMZ, THE CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE DMZ, REFERENCE A, WERE REAFFIRMED BY REFERENCE B. IN THIS CONNECTION, HIGHER AUTHORITIES WERE NOTIFIED OF IMPENDING OPERATIONS AND OF MY INTENT TO ADHERE TO THE EXISTING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THEY HAVE PLACED NO CONSTRAINTS ON SUCH OPERATIONS AND THERE IS NO INTENT ON MY PART TO EXERCISE ANY CONSTRAINTS, OTHER THAN THOSE OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A.
3. (S) HOWEVER, WHEN OPERATIONS ARE INITIATED WHICH COULD LEAD TO ENTRY INTO THE SOUTHERN DMZ, I MUST BE INFORMED AT LEAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN ADVANCE. IN TURN, HIGHER AUTHORITY WILL BE INFORMED FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. FURTHER, WHEN A TACTICAL COMMANDER MAKES THE DECISION TO ENTER THE SOUTHERN DMZ IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, HE MUST HAVE THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE IN THE NECESSITY FOR SO DOING OR IN THE PRODUCTIVITY EXPECTED IN TERMS OF DEFEATING THE ENEMY. ENTRY MUST BE CLEARLY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HIS OWN TROOPS OR THE OPPORTUNITY MUST EXIST FOR DEVASTATING ATTRITION OF THE ENEMY.
4. (S) IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, I HAVE DECIDED TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY ALL SOG PATROLLING WITHIN THE DMZ.
5. (S) IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY TO ARVN AND OTHER FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES. AS STATED IN REFERENCE A, THE ARVN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE SIMILAR. YOU ARE EXPECTED TO EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE THROUGH ADVISORY CHANNELS TO EFFECT ADHERENCE TO THESE RULES. I DESIRE TO BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF ANY ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS BY THESE FRIENDLY FORCES WHICH MAY RESULT IN OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ.

GP-4

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

#13

SECRET

FILE 7 GUN 209

		FROM CG PGV PHB	DATE 27 JUN 68
		SERIAL # 250140Z JUN 68	COPY# 7 OF 6 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT RESTRICTIONS AND REDUCTION OF FIRE SUPT. (U)	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
	<i>[Signature]</i>		
6/5/68	<i>[Signature]</i>		
	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPY 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

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#12

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RESEV. COMMUNICATION CENTER

MACV JOINT MESSAGE FORM

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

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SECRET		
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI SINGLE
		M
TYPE TRANSMISSION	TO	INFO
ELECTRICAL		
AIR MAIL		
COURIER	X	X
PRECEDENCE		

C/S	X-4-7	SJS	REST
J1		J2	CIIB
J3		J4	
J5	A 1-3	J6	
CORDS		NAG	

FOR

ACTION TO:	IMMEDIATE
INFO:	PRIORITY

DTG 250140Z JUN 68

FROM: COMUSMACV CG PCV PHB
 TO: CG 3D MAR DIV DGH (COURIER) 12-21
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG (COURIER) 22-41

SECRET AVII-GCO 04141

Subj: Restrictions and Reduction of Fire Supt.(U)

Personal for MG Davis and LTG Cushman from LTG Rosson

Ref: CG 3D MAR DIV MSG DTG 190830Z Jun 68 (S)

- (C) The impact on your forces of the virtual cancellation recently of naval gunfire and air support by component commanders is apparent. Your concern in insuring that such actions are not repeated without thorough prior coordination is fully appreciated.
- (S) The 21 June conference at 4th AF, at which you were represented, appears to have devised a workable means of conducting anti-helo operations in your AO and to the North without undue detriment to your ground operations. The first of the overall recommendations of this committee was, in effect, that normal fire support including artillery, naval gunfire and tactical air, as well as aerial observation, logistic and medevac, must continue

AFGP	NAVFORV	
AG	OICG	
AMEMB	FM	
DCA SAM	SJA	
CH	SOG	
COC	SURG	
COMB	TMA	DCPG LNO
COMPT	TNG	MACMA
DOD SPEC REP	USAID	
FWMAO	USARV	
HC	IFFVLNO	
IG	IIPFVLNO	
MACSA	IIMAFINO	
JUSPAO	5TH SF LNO	
MACDC	7TH AF	
MACOI	PROTOCOL	
MACPD	ARTY X 8-10	
DASC-V	X 11	

TYPED NAME, TITLE, PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL	
RICHARD G. HALLOCK LTC, GS AVII-GCO/2334	

SIGNATURE	
<i>[Signature]</i>	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE	
J. F. DONAHUE, COL, USMC Acting Chief of Staff	

rev 883-68

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MACV FORM 297
16 Nov 67

(MACV Staff Memorandum 105-10)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

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#12

CONTINUATION SHEET

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DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

unimpeded until positive identification is made of a hostile helo. This recommendation implies understanding of your situation and, when approved, will constitute a policy under which a recurrence of the problem is not likely.

3. (S) The recommendations further provide that, after identification of an hostile helo, interference with support of ground operations will be held to a minimum by close coordination between the anti-helo agency (Waterboy), Dong Ha DASC, and 3d Mar Div FSCC. The committee has outlined the details of this coordination and the measures to be used in anti-helo operations as assigned specific areas of responsibility to ground, air, and naval commanders. It is understood that the formal committee report will be made available and it is CG, PCV's intention to obtain your views thereon.

4. (U) This headquarters will insure that you are kept advised of developments in this area.

GP-4

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FORM 297-1 (Mar 66)
(Rev. 5 - AM)

UNCLASSIFIED EYES ONLY
 NO RELEASE FOR USARPAC
 NO USARPAC COMBATANT

INFO CUSHMAN CG III MAF

ROSSON CG PCV

WEYAND CG IFFV

PEERS ACG IFFV

ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL ARV 1600 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (U)

REF: MAC CONF 8148

1. (U) IN RESPONSE TO REF MESSAGE, IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION OF EXPENDITURES OF GROUND MUNITIONS CAN BE EASILY IMPLEMENTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

2. (C) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS PERTAIN:

A. REDUCTION OF ASR'S OR ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW ASR'S WITHOUT CONCURRENTLY CHANGING ROR'S WOULD NOT REDUCE MUNITIONS SHIPPED TO RVN UNTIL IN-COUNTRY (60 DAYS) AND OFFSHORE (30 DAYS) STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED.

B. CURRENTLY, ASR IS USED ONLY AS A MEANS OF CONTROLLING ITEMS IN CRITICAL SHORT SUPPLY. IF THE PROCEDURE OUTLINED IN REF MSG IS IMPLEMENTED, THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL ADVISE USARPAC AND DA THAT, IN ADDITION TO ITS CURRENT APPLICATION, ASR WILL BE USED AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL TO REDUCE EXPENDITURES OF SELECTED ITEMS, EVEN THOUGH THOSE ITEMS ARE NOT NECESSARILY IN SHORT SUPPLY.

3. (U) CONCUR WITH PARAS 1A AND 1C OF REF.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

250

Copy #1

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#11

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

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II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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3	CG					REMARKS
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1	DCG AIR					
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6 Nov 68"

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0 201216Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM LTG ROSSON CG PCV

TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF

INFO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

MG DAVIS CG 3D MARDIV

YMRLK'S C/ BG HOFFMAN CG TASKFORCE HOTEL

ZEM

SECRET PHB 016 EYES ONLY

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG, DTG 251320Z

B. COMUSMACV MAC 2440

1. REF A PASSED REF B TO CG, PCV FOR ACTION.
2. INVESTIGATION CURRENTLY IS BEING CONDUCTED BY PCV IG. INTERVIEWS WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS) AND THE INFORMATION OFFICE PERSONNEL, 3D MAR DIV, REVEALED THAT MICHAEL ROBERTS VISITED DONG HA AND KHE SANH ON 21 JUNE 1968. HE WAS ESCORTED BY STAFF SERGEANT FRYMAN OF III MAF CIR. INTERVIEWS WERE ALSO CONDUCTED WITH CG, COFS, AIDE DE CAMP AND ISO NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER OF TASK FORCE HOTEL. CG AND AIDE DE CAMP RECALLED ROBERTS VISIT. THE CG WAS ABLE TO RECONSTRUCT SALIENT PORTIONS OF THE INTERVIEW. HE STATES THAT, FROM THE NATURE OF ROBERTS QUESTIONS, IT WAS APPARENT THAT ROBERTS WAS AWARE OF SOME FORTHCOMING ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA. THE CG REPLIED TO ALL QUESTIONS ON THE FUTURE WITH "NO COMMENT".
3. IG OBSERVES THAT DISMANTLING AND INACTIVATION OF KHE SANH HAS PROCEEDED TO THE POINT WHERE EVEN THE UNINITIATED ARE ABLE TO ASSESS THE SITUATION ACCURATELY. A SPS STENOGRAPHER ACCOMPANIED THE IG AND ALTHOUGH NOT BRIEFED ON THE DISPOSITION, MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENT UPON TOUCHDOWN AT KSCB: "THEY ARE CLOSING THIS BASE DOWN AREN'T THEY?"
4. INVESTIGATION WILL CONTINUE WITH INTERVIEW OF STAFF SERGEANT FRYMAN AND FOLLOW UP OF ANY ADDITIONAL LEADS UNCOVERED BY THAT INTERVIEW.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 3D MARDIV PLS PROTECT FOR BG HOFFMAN

3500

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

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JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	GINCPAG, HAWAII SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 260737	26 JUNE 68

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS TITLE OF STAFF LT. MORRIS Copy # 2 to G-4 <i>[Signature]</i> 301245 Copy # 7 to 3MNCB <i>[Signature]</i> Copy # 5 to NSA <i>[Signature]</i> Copy # 6 to FLC <i>[Signature]</i> 4 extra copies rec'd JCL 4/6 # 5-8 # 2, 3 & 4 burned 6/10/68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
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	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		26 Jun 68		<i>[Signature]</i>	
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	CAP					
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	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

O 250737Z ZYH ZFFS
 FM CINCPAC, HAWAII
 TO COMUSMACV
 COMUSKOREA
 COMUSMADTHAI
 YADRNKC/CG USARYIS
 YADRNKC/CG 2D LOG COMD
 YSHKOIC/CG USARV
 CG III MAF
 COMNAVFORV
 CDR 7TH AF
 INFO CINCUSARPAC
 CINCPACAF
 CINCPACFLT
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
 VISIT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. MORRIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 OF DEFENSE (I&L) TO CINCPAC

1. SECRETARY MORRIS AND PARTY ARRIVED HAWAII LATE AFTERNOON
 24 JUN 68. ON 25 JUN 68, ENTIRE PARTY RECEIVED
 CINCPAC BRIEFING COVERING PACOM ORGANIZATION, PACIFICATION,
 LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS. ONLY QUESTION ASKED
 CONCERNED RECENTLY REPORTED ENEMY HELICOPTER SIGHTINGS VICINITY
 DMZ.

2. PARTY THEN SEPARATED INTO FOUR SEPARATE GROUPS:

A. SECRETARY MORRIS AND SECRETARY SHILLITO WERE BRIEFED ON
 TRANSPORTATION SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (ANALYSIS OF PORT
 STATUS), STATUS OF PACOM UTILIZATION AND REDISTRIBUTION AGENCY
 (PURA), KOREA LOC, OPLAN 67-68, PROJECT MACONOMY, PACOM GENERAL
 PURCHASING AGENCY SYSTEM, AND MAP COST REDUCTION PROGRAM
 ACCOMPLISHMENTS. NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS DEVELOPED; HOWEVER,
 SECRETARY MORRIS INDICATED INTEREST IN RED BALL EXPRESS AND THE
 RESULTS ATTAINED THROUGH UTILIZATION OF MULTIPLE PODS, AND THE COMMON
 SUPPLY SYSTEM (CSS) IN RVN. INDICATIONS ARE THAT SECDEF WILL NOT FORCE
 CSS EXPANSION BEYOND PRESENT SCOPE UNTIL COMPLETION OF PRESENT EFFORTS
 TO IMPROVE THE ARMY SUPPLY POSTURE IN RVN AND THE ARMY HAS THE
 CAPABILITY FOR FURTHER EXPANSION. OPERATION OF PORTS AND BEACH SITES
 IN NORTHERN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE WAS ALSO COVERED, PARTICULARLY THE
 IMPORTANCE OF TAN MY DEVELOPMENT FOR THE NEXT MONSOON SEASON.
 SECRETARY MORRIS INDICATED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN VISITING PURA ON
 OKINAWA, AND HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO RAISE THE SUBJECT OF PROJECT
 MACONOMY IN RVN.

B. CONSTRUCTION. MR. SHERIDAN AND BOEN RAYMOND WERE BRIEFED ON
 KOREA LOC SITUATION, PREVIEW OF FY70 MCP FUND REQUIREMENTS FOR KOREA
 AND SEASIA AND CINCPAC BASE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING SYSTEM WITH EMPHASIS
 ON THE NEED TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATION OF EFFORT BETWEEN SERVICE AND
 UNIFIED SYSTEMS. IN DISCUSSION, THE MAJOR AREAS OF INTEREST WERE: (21)

#7(1)

(1) THE REQUIREMENT FOR FY70 PROGRAM. STRONG JUSTIFICATIONS WILL BE #7(2)
 REQUIRED BY OSD AND THE CONGRESS. (2) THEATER CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE
 PRESENTLY FUNDED PROGRAM PLUS FY68S. FEELING EXISTS THAT PRESENT
 FUNDING MAY EXCEED CAPABILITY TO BUILD. (3) CONSTRUCTION STANDARD
 PROBLEMS. RELOCATABLE STRUCTURES SEEMED ACCEPTABLE FOR KOREA, RVN
 AND THAILAND. (4) OSD TEAM ADVISED THAT: FY68S NOW CONTAINS FOLLOWING
 (\$ MILLIONS): KOR ARMY 41.8; KOREA AIR FORCE 46; SVN ALL SERVICES
 HAVE AUTHORIZATION ONLY WITH NO FUNDS; THAI ARMY HAS AUTHORIZATION WITH
 NO FUNDS BECAUSE HIGHWAY PROJECT NOW IN REPROGRAMMING; THAI AIR FORCE
 1.1; AND LAOS AIR FORCE 1.0.

C. PERSONNEL. A ONE HOUR BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION PERIOD WAS CON-
 DUCTED CONCERNING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL POLICIES IN PACOM.
 THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY LT GEN LAMPERT, MAJ GEN BERG, MR. BARTIMO,
 MR. REED AND MR. DURKIN. TOPICS COVERED WERE MORALE IN SVN, R & R
 PROGRAM, SEASIA BENEFITS, ENEMY AND U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR, EXCHANGE
 LOSSES, MANPOWER MANAGEMENT, ILLICIT DRUG AND NARCOTIC ACTIVITIES,
 VETERANS ADMINISTRATION ENTITLEMENT, AND A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CIVILIAN
 PERSONNEL EMPLOYMENT AND UTILIZATION WITHIN PACOM. THE FOLLOWING
 TOPICS WERE RAISED BY THE VISITORS: (1) PERSONAL COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS:
 GENERAL LAMPERT STATED THAT CONGRESSMAN PATMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
 THE HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE WOULD BE VISITING PACOM
 PROBABLY IN AUGUST. THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO FIND IF ANY
 EVIDENCE EXISTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY LOWER GRADE EM AND
 OFFICERS, BEING VICTIMIZED BY COMMERCIAL CONCERNS. FURTHER DETAILS
 OF THE VISIT WILL BE FURNISHED WHEN AVAILABLE. (2) DRUGS AND
 DANGEROUS NARCOTICS: MR. BARTIMO DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE INFORMATION
 WHICH HE HAS ON THE USE OF DRUGS AND DANGEROUS NARCOTICS. HE
 INDICATED THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BECOME LARGER DURING THE FIRST MONTHS
 OF 1968 AND THAT HE FELT THAT IT WOULD FURTHER MAGNIFY IF A REAL SLOW
 DOWN OR END OF HOSTILITIES OCCURRED. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
 SUBJECT AT ALL LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. (3) BLACKMARKETEERING: MR.
 BARTIMO IS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN ALL ASPECTS OF BLACKMARKET ACTIVITIES
 IN VIETNAM. HE IS EXPECTED TO MAKE DETAILED INQUIRIES INTO THIS AREA
 AND HAS STRONG FEELINGS AS TO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN
 BY GVN. HE INDICATED THAT THIS PROBLEM IS ALSO OF GREAT INTEREST AT
 ALL LEVELS IN WASHINGTON.

320

7(2)

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#7(2)

O 260737Z ZYH ZFF6
 FM CINCPAC, HAWAII
 TO COMUSMACV
 COMUSKOREA
 COMUSMACTHAI
 YARRRKC/CG USARYIS
 YARRRKC/CG 2D LOG COMD
 YSHKOIC/CG USARV
 CG III MAF
 COMNAVFORV
 CMDR 7TH AF
 INFO CINCUSARPAC
 CINCPACAF
 CINCPACFLT
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION TWO OF TWO
 VISIT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS D. MORRIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 OF DEFENSE (I&L) TO CINCPAC

D. AMMUNITION. DR. BROOKS AND MAJ GEN STANWIX-HAY WERE BRIEFED
 ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF AIR MUNITIONS IN SEA, THE GROUND MUNITIONS
 SITUATION IN VIETNAM, INCLUDING III MAF, THE GROUND MUNITIONS REQUIRE-
 MENT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ROK FORCES, AND THE DEVELOPING NEED FOR CS
 MUNITIONS. WITH RESPECT TO AIR MUNITIONS MAJ GEN STANWIX-HAY EXPRESSED
 AN INTEREST IN OBTAINING A FEELING OF PERSONNEL IN THE FIELD FOR THE
 NECESSITY OF REINSTATING PRODUCTION OF THE M118 BOMB, AND THE USAGE AND
 REQUIREMENT FOR THE MK83 BOMB. WITH RESPECT TO GROUND MUNITIONS,
 INTEREST WAS PRINCIPALLY FOCUSED ON THE MODERNIZATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF
 THE RVNAF AND RESULTANT IMPACT ON GROUND MUNITIONS SUPPORTABILITY.
 QUESTIONS REVOLVED ABOUT RVNAF REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY OF INFORMA-

TION ON ACTUAL EXPENDITURES. DR. BROOKS INDICATED INTEREST IN THE
 FOLLOWING SPECIFIC AREAS: (1) THE IMPACT OF SHARING U.S. FORCES' ASSETS
 OF CERTAIN ITEMS, I.E. 5.56MM AND THE 40MM HE WITH THE RVNAF; (2) III
 MAF USE OF AND SUBSTITUTION FOR THE M557 FUZE; (3) UTILIZATION OF VT
 AND MTSQ FUZES IN POINT DETONATING ROLES, AND THE STATUS OF ARTILLERY
 FUZES IN GENERAL. DR. BROOKS INDICATED THAT ITEMS ON ASR ARE EXPECTED
 TO BE REDUCED TO (3) THREE ITEMS AFTER DEC 68---THOSE ITEMS FORECAST TO
 REMAIN ON ASR ARE THE 175MM PROJECTILE, HE, 40MM CARTRIDGE HE, AND THE
 CLUSTER CANISTER, E158. RECOMMEND YOU STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF CS
 MUNITIONS AND BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS BULK CS REQUIREMENTS. THE
 GROUP WAS INTERESTED IN THE UTILIZATION OF THE E8 LAUNCHER.
 MAJ GEN STANWIX-HAY ASKED ABOUT THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE STATEMENT
 AS BRIEFED QUOTE RVNAF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WILL RESULT IN
 INCREASED AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION FOR VIETNAMESE ARMY UNITS AS THEY
 ASSUME GREATER OFFENSIVE ROLES WITH NO DECREASE IN REQUIREMENTS FOR
 U. S. FORCES. UNQUOTE. #7(3)

#7(3)

3. SECRETARY MORRIS DESIRES TO VISIT A HOSPITAL SHIP WHILE IN RVN. SECRETARY SHILLITO DESIRES TO ACCOMPANY. SECRETARY SHILLITO WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING MORE ABOUT RIVERINE FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY HELICOPTER AND BOAT REQUIREMENTS. PARTY WAS INTERESTED AND RECEPTIVE THROUGHOUT VISIT. DEPARTED HICKAM AIR FORCE BASE 251130W JUN 68 FOR DA NANG VIA GUAM. GP-4.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. 475

#7(4)

NNNN

#7(4)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	COMPHIBGRU THREE	26 JUN 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY#
	251022Z JUN 68	2 OF 6 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					ARRIVAL OF RADM LACY REMARKS 281355H June COC notified to set aside a seat for Adm Lacy VK Jm FOR "# 307 burned 6 Nov 68" #6
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
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1	S/S		261450H June		JCF	
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	G-6					
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	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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 ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMNVH
 DE RUMFKRV 4946 1771022
 ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMNVH
 R 251022Z JUN 68
 FM COMPHIBGRU THREE
 TORAMUGRA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMFKRC/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO RADM OSBORN FROM RADM LACY

1. INTEND ARRIVE DANANG IN ESTES 29 JUNE HOPEFULLY IN TIME TO ATTEND
 YOUR MORNING BRIEF; AT ANY RATE WOULD LIKE TO CONFER WITH YOU ON
 MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST SAME DAY;

2. WARM PERSONAL REGARDS;

GP-4

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#6

FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMSEVENTHFLT		DATE 25 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 251022Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS FOR <i>#3 + burned 5 Nov 68</i> <i>19</i>
4	DCG					
5	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
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	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

CONFIDENTIAL #4

CONFIDENTIAL

OPRT CZ YUN RUMACNU4942 177222Z-CCCC--R UNUGRA.

ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMGCS

DE RUMGUL 1616 177122Z

ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMGCS

P 231222Z JUN 68

R1 CON SEVENTHFLT

TO RUMKLA/CG FIRST MARB IV

INFO RUMUGRA/CG THIRD MAP

RUMHMA/CG AMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR MAJGEN ROBERTSON INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN, LTGEN EUSE FROM BRINGLE

1. UPON YOUR RELINQUISHING COMMAND OF THE 1ST MARB IV, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN USING TO THE MAXIMUM THE SEVENTH FLEET ASSETS AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT OF MARPNE OPERATIONS ASHORE.

2. YOUR SKILLEST USE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE DURING THE PAST YEAR HAS MARKEDLY IMPROVED OUR NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OF OPS ASHORE AND HAS HEIGHTENED THE MORALE OF THE SAILORS FIRING THE GUNS. AFTER ABOUT FOUR MONTHS OF RELATIVE INACTIVITY FOR OUR AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, IT IS A PLEASURE TO HAVE THE SEVENTHFLT AMPHIB CAPABILITY REINSTATED AND SUCCESSFULLY RECOMMITTED AS IN OPERATION SWIFT SABER. I HOPEFULLY THESE AMPHIB OPERATIONS WILL NOW FOLLOW ONE ANOTHER AT A CONTINUOUS, MEASURED PACE.

3. GOOD LUCK IN YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT. BEST REGARDS,

CP-1

BT

FOR

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#4

FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

O 251012Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
INFO LTG ROSSON CG PROV CORPS V
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 8440 EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: TALKING TO THE PRESS
REFERENCE: MAC 05136

1. A NEWSMAN, MICHAEL ROBERTS OF THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, RETURNED TO SAIGON FROM THE KHE SANH AREA RECENTLY. YESTERDAY EVENING, WHEN TALKING TO A MEMBER OF THE MISSION PRESS CENTER, HE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE PLANS AT KHE SANH. HE WAS REMINDED BY THE MISSION PRESS CENTER OFFICIAL THAT ANY STORY INVOLVING FUTURE PLANS, TROOP MOVEMENTS AND FUTURE OPERATIONS IS EMBARGOED UNTIL RELEASED BY MACV AND THAT EARLY RELEASE WOULD RESULT IN THE REPORTER'S DISACCREDITATION. ROBERTS REPLIED THAT THE LOCAL COMMANDER HAD GIVEN HIM THE STORY AND THAT HE, ROBERTS, UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS RELEASEABLE ON THURSDAY, 27 JUNE.
2. MACOI HAS CONTACTED ROBERTS AND INFORMED HIM THAT THE STORY IS NOT USABLE UNTIL RELEASED BY MACV. THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM SEEMS TO BE RESOLVED. HOWEVER, I AM CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ROBERTS IS TELLING THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE REMARKS OF THE LOCAL COMMANDER.
3. REFERENCE MAKES IT CLEAR THAT COMMANDERS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESS FUTURE OPERATIONAL PLANS AND OTHER INFORMATION THAT WILL BE OF VALUE TO THE ENEMY. I RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY OF CARRYING OUT THIS INSTRUCTION WHEN A NEWSMAN IS ON THE SPOT AND SEES THAT SOMETHING IS GOING ON. HOWEVER, THE COMMANDER MUST NOT COMMENT, PARTICULARLY IF HE IS A SENIOR COMMANDER AND MAY BE PRESUMED TO BE SPEAKING FOR MACV. THE PROPER PROCEDURE WOULD BE TO SAY, "I HAVE NO COMMENT, BUT I WOULD REMIND YOU THAT ANY STORY DISCUSSING FUTURE PLANS, REDISPOSITIONS OF TROOPS, AND THE LIKE IS SUBJECT TO THE PRESS GROUND RULES AND CANNOT BE USED UNTIL RELEASED BY MACV."
4. I WOULD LIKE AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION MADE OF ROBERTS' ALLEGATIONS AND THE RESULTS PROVIDED ME WITHOUT DELAY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
350

23

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	CMC
CG						SERIAL 241452Z JUN 68	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT FOR BGEN ANDERSON	
DCG AIR						REMARKS	
C/S	/				<i>Q</i>	FOR	
DC/S							
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S			6/25		<i>J</i>	<p>LEGEND A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE C- COMMENTS I- INFORMATION</p> <p><i>"#3 & 4 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p>	
S/C							

FOR

PT003142
PPTUZYUW RUEBHOA8608 1761454 UUUU--RUMUGRA.
ZMR UUUUU
P 241452Z JUN68
FM CMC
TO RUMUGRA/CG, III MAF
BY

JUN 23 2:30 AM '68

UNCLAS
PERSONAL FOR BGEN ANDERSON FROM MC CUTCHEON
MANY THANKS FOR THE BUNDLE. RECEIPT IN THE MAIL.
CONGRATS ON SURVIVING ANOTHER YEAR.
BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#2

MEMORANDUM

24 June 68
FROM: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4
FOR: C/S

1. Your note on routing sheet of 20 June stated: "G-4; G-3 - comment and prepare msg reply for CG's release."

2. I went over the matter with Col Carl and asked him to prepare a reply and route to G-3. He reported that G-3 was preparing a reply. I received and concurred with G-3 proposed reply on 23 June.

Very respectfully
R. D. Miller

O 231127Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM LTG ROSSON CG PCV
 TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHB 893 EYES ONLY

REF: MAC 8148 DTG 200429Z JUN 68 (C)

SUBJ: REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (U)

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING TABLE REFLECTS THE ACTUAL EXPENDITURE RATES FOR GROUND MUNITIONS IN PCV:

	81 HE	4.2 HE	105 HE	155 HE	8" HE	175 HE
USA	5.2	15.3	41.6	31.0	20.7	21.8
USMC	22.5	21.0	60.0	27.9	22.7	NA

THE ARMY FIGURES ARE BASED UPON EXPENDITURES FROM 24 FEB - 9 JUN; USMC FIGURES ON EXPENDITURES FROM 1 JAN - 31 MAY.

2. (C) OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, PCV EXPENDITURE RATES APPROXIMATELY EQUAL THOSE LISTED IN REFERENCE.

3. (C) CONCUR IN PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR REDUCING GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY; DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

200

#56

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS		DATE 23 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 230757Z JUNE 68		1, 2 & 3 COPIES OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MAC 8316 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS Copy #3 burned 4 Nov 68 Copy #2 to DC6 Army 24 Jun 68 Floyd J. [Signature] In 29 Jun 68 Copy #3 to G-3 27 Jun 68 [Signature] In 8 Jul 68 Copy #2 to Air Control 30 Jun 68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #54

O 230757Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN MOMYER CDR 7AF TSN
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
 LTG ROSSON CG III MAF
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFORCEV
 MG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 RADM VETH COMNAVFORV
 INFO MG STILLWELL CG PCV
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 8316 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO

1. (S) THE STAFF HAS JUST COMPLETED A STUDY EXTENDING ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES INTO THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. WE EXPECT ENEMY OFFENSIVES TO BE STAGGERED THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER. FIRST, WE SEE ANOTHER GO AT SAIGON WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. IN MID OR LATE JULY THERE WILL BE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN I CTZ WITH AN EFFORT MADE TO TAKE DANANG AND THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. AS FOR THE HIGHLANDS, WE DO NOT SEE ANOTHER OFFENSIVE THERE PRIOR TO THE FIRST PART OF AUGUST. IF ANYTHING, THESE ESTIMATES AS TO ENEMY TIMING ARE PROBABLY ON THE NEAR SIDE. EXCEPT FOR THE TET EXPERIENCE, ENEMY ACTIONS HABITUALLY LAG BEHIND HIS PLANS. WITH THESE ESTIMATES IN MIND AND TO GET THE PROPER PERSPECTIVE, WE WILL REVIEW LAST WEEK'S ACTIVITY.

2. (S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECAPITULATES THE ACTIVITY IN THE FOUR CORPS TACTICAL ZONES DURING THE WEEK FROM 140001 TO 202400 JUNE. THE SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS ARE THOSE THAT RESULTED IN FIVE OR MORE FRIENDLY OR ENEMY KIA. ALL PERCENTAGES GIVEN RELATE TO SOUTH VIETNAM ONLY EXCEPT THE TACTICAL AIR AND ARC LIGHT SORTIES. ONE CAVEAT IS INDICATED, THE ENEMY BATTALIONS LISTED INCLUDE THE 304 AND 320 NVA DIVISIONS FOR I CORPS AND THOSE THAT MAY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AREA.

A. I CTZ HAD 92 FRIENDLY MANEUVER BATTALIONS (31 PERCENT), 93 ENEMY (40.6 PERCENT) AND HAD 23 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (25.7 PERCENT). THERE WERE 47 FRIENDLY AND 667 ENEMY KIA. THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY 37.5 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE TACTICAL AIR SORTIES AND DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ARC LIGHT SUPPORT.

B. II CTZ HAD 63 FRIENDLY (21.3 PERCENT) AND 50 ENEMY (21.8 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND HAD NINE CONTACTS (10.1 PERCENT). THEY HAD 55 FRIENDLY AND 101 ENEMY KIA; AND WERE SUPPORTED BY 15.4 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 28 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (6.7 PERCENT).

C. III CTZ HAD 94 FRIENDLY (31.8 PERCENT) AND 60 ENEMY (26.2 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND HAD 36 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (40.5 PERCENT). THEY HAD 116 FRIENDLY AND 678 ENEMY KIA. IN SUPPORT THERE WERE 18.4 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 331 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (79 PERCENT).

#54(1)

#54(1)

D. IV CTZ HAD 47 FRIENDLY (15.9 PERCENT) AND 26 ENEMY (11.4 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS, AND HAD 21 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (23.7 PERCENT). THEY HAD 90 FRIENDLY AND 313 ENEMY KIA. IN SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED 7.3 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 30 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (7.15 PERCENT).

E. WE PUT 14.4 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE. IN LAOS WE USED 7 PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES AND 30 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (7.15 PERCENT).

3. (S) AFTER AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION AND INDICATIONS, AND IN LIGHT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT OF AIR SUPPORT FOR LAST WEEK, I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A SHIFT. FROM NOW UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH, EMPHASIS WILL BE PRIMARILY ON PREEMPTING OR BLUNTING THE FORTHCOMING ENEMY ATTACK ON SAIGON. AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE INFILTRATION AND LOGISTIC EFFORT IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND LAOTIAN AREAS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO TALLY HO. SUFFICIENT SUPPORT WILL BE ALLOCATED TO I CTZ TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN HAND IN THE KHE SANH, EASTERN DMZ, QUANG TRI, HUE AND DANANG AREAS. THE TAC AIR IN TALLY HO WILL ALSO BE TARGETED ON THE SAM SITES IN PREPARATION FOR JULY OPERATIONS. TAC AIR WILL BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS: I CTZ 25 PERCENT; II CTZ 10 PERCENT; III CTZ 25 PERCENT; IV CTZ 5 PERCENT; ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND LAOS 35 PERCENT. THE ARC LIGHT WEIGHT OF EFFORT WILL REMAIN IN III CTZ THROUGH JUNE TO DISRUPT THE ENEMY'S INFILTRATION ROUTES, BASE AREAS AND HARBOR SITES. THIS B-52 CAMPAIGN AROUND SAIGON MAY TAKE 90 TO 100 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE SORTIES.

4. (S) TENTATIVELY, THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT WILL BE SHIFTED TO THE NORTH ON 1 JULY. WE PLAN TO KICK OFF WITH OPERATION THOR, AN INTEGRATED AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE OPERATION. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO SMOTHER THE ENEMY WITH FIREPOWER JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ. THE BOUNDARIES FOR THIS OPERATION RUN FROM THE GULF OF TONKIN TO THE YD00 LINE ON THE WEST, AND FROM THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE DMZ TO THE YD90 LINE ON THE NORTH. AFTER THIS SEVEN-DAY OPERATION, WE WILL CONTINUE FOR THE MONTH OF JULY TO WORK OVER RP-1 WITH TACTICAL AIR AND B-52'S. WE INTEND TO SMASH HIS LOC AND INFILTRATION TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. TO DO SO THE AIR ATTACKS MUST BE INTENSIVE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

900

#54(2)
SECRET

#54(2)

O 230757Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN MOMYER CDR 7AF TSN
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
 LTG ROSSON CG III MAF
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFORCEV
 MG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 RADM VETH COMNAVFORV
 INFO MG STILLWELL CG PCV
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 8316 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 5. (S) THE ABOVE PLANS FOR LATE JUNE AND JULY RELATE DIRECTLY TO THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. OUR ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES AND OUR PLANNED FIRE POWER UTILIZATION ARE INTERWOVEN. SIMILARLY, MY TROOP POSTURE MUST ENABLE ME TO STRIKE THE ENEMY WHEREVER HE CHOOSES TO COMMIT HIMSELF. TO DO SO I MUST GET THE UTMOST EFFECT FROM A FLEXIBLE WEIGHT OF EFFORT. I HAVE THAT IN TACTICAL AIR, B-52'S AND NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND I INTEND TO USE THEM TO THAT END. COUPLED WITH FLEXIBLE FIREPOWER MY TROOP FORMATIONS MUST HAVE THE MOBILITY TO REACT TO OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK AND TO THWART ENEMY THREATS. HENCE, WE WILL CHANGE TO A MOBILE POSTURE IN THE KHE SANH AREA. THE SITUATION HAS NOT CHANGED IN THIS RESPECT BY THE APPARENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE 304 AND 320 NVA DIVISIONS. IN FACT, THE RESULTANT DISPOSITION IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI WILL BETTER ENABLE US TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT WHEN AND WHERE IT MATERIALIZES.

6. (S) THIS INFORMATION SHOULD GIVE YOU AN INSIGHT INTO THE PICTURE AS I SEE IT. YOU REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY SITUATION IS THE KEY ISSUE; AND WHEN IT CHANGES, OUR PLANS CHANGE, AS WILL THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT. THE ENEMY IS ELUSIVE AT PRESENT WHILE HE IS PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. OUR JOB IS TO FERRET HIM OUT, KEEP HIM OFF BALANCE, AND PREEMPT HIS ATTACKS BY PUTTING OUR SUPPORTING ARMS ON HIS BASE AREAS AND ASSEMBLY AREAS. IF YOU ARE NOT IN CONTACT, YOU MUST REDOUBLE YOUR RECONNAISSANCE.

7. (S) I CONSIDER THIS SUMMER CAMPAIGN TO BE CRITICAL TO OUR OBJECTIVES. THE ACTION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FIND EACH OF YOU WITH INTENSIVE COMBAT PERIODS AND PERIODS OF REDUCED ENEMY PRESSURES. ACCORDINGLY, EACH OF YOU MAY FIND YOURSELVES FACED WITH "ECONOMY OF FORCE" MEASURES AS TO MANEUVER UNITS, AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT, OR BOTH. YOU MAY FIND THESE LATTER PERIODS TO BE YOUR GREATEST CHALLENGE.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

450

SECRET

454(3)

O 230543Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM BG FORBES J1 MACV SAIGON
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 8309 EYES ONLY
MG KELLY, ADCSPER, DA, HAS ADVISED THAT DA PLANS TO
PUBLISH ORDERS 24 JUNE ASSIGNING LG ROSSON TO PROV CORPS
VIETNAM. HE ALSO ADVISES THAT SENATE CONFIRMATION OF MG PEERS
NOMIN TO LG IS EXPECTED DURING WEEK OF 24 JUNE. PROM ORDERS
WILL BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY UPON CONFIRMATION.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

Ø95

NNNN

#53

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG FMFLAG		23 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
			220101Z JUL 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RESPONSIBILITIES IN I COPS TACTICAL ZONE (U)
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS Copy # 2 of 3 Banned 4/10/68 EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Copy # 3 to G-3 23 Jun 68 [Signature] In 31 Jun 68 Copy # 2 to DC/S Dymarker 24 Jun 68 [Signature] In 24 Jun 68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #57

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 23 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 222101Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (U)
			IN	OUT		
4	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
3	DCG		6/23		Rue	
3	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	230840N				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

51
SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUHKK 4075 1742121
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 222101Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSIMAN FROM
 LT GEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. MARINE
 CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 2

A. OMC 221650Z/JUN68 (S)

B. CG FMFPAC 220353Z/JUN68 (S) NOTAL

1. IN REFERENCE A, THE COMMANDANT STATED THAT HE
 AGREED WITH OUR RATIONALE AND POSITION ON RESPONSIBI-
 LITIES IN I CTZ.

2. OUR MESSAGE FROM HERE TO THE COMMANDANT,
 REFERENCE B, IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. IT MAY
 BE HELPFUL.

QUOTE:

RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (U)

A. CG III MAF 210134Z/JUN68

1. UNDER THE CURRENT FAVORABLE SITUATION IN I CORPS AND KNOWN

PAGE 2 RUHKK 4075 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 PENDING DEVELOPMENTS IT APPEARS FROM HERE THAT BOB
 CUSIMAN'S POSITION IN REFERENCE A RELATIVE TO
 RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CORPS IS BASICALLY SOUND. THE
 FOLLOWING THOUGHTS ON THE MATTER, SOME OF WHICH
 ARE PARALLEL TO THOSE IN BOB'S MESSAGE, MAY ASSIST YOU
 IN ARRIVING AT A POSITION APPROPRIATE NOT ONLY FOR
 DISCUSSIONS IN-COUNTRY BUT ALSO FOR THOSE WHICH WILL
 OBVIOUSLY DEVELOP HERE AND IN WASHINGTON.

A. WE HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL PERIOD IN THE WAR IN
 THAT WE HAVE MAINTAINED THE INITIATIVE AND OUR OPERATIONS
 ARE PREEMPTING ENEMY EFFORTS TO GAIN A SUCCESS - A SUCCESS SO
 BADLY NEEDED BY THEM FOR THE DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS. THIS IS
 ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT IN THE 3D MARINE DIVISION ZONE WHERE
 RAY DAVIS HAS INSTILLED A NEW SENSE OF FLEXIBILITY AND
 TACTICAL MOBILITY - ALL TO THE GOOD OF OUR CURRENT POSTURE.
 A SWEEPING REALIGNMENT OF FORCES
 AND COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE, AT THIS
 TIME OTHER THAN PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING
 IN THE WAR CONTINUES IN NORTHERN I CORPS.

B. THE FORCES INVOLVED KNOW THEIR AREAS OF OPERA-
 TIONS INTIMATELY. TOGETHER WITH THE DR ARVN COUNTER-

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
#57

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMKM 4075 S E C R E T S E P C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO PARTS. THEY ARE WORKING SMOOTHLY AND EFFECTIVELY TOWARD A COMMON GOAL. THEIR RELATIONSHIPS ARE EXCELLENT AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO PROBLEMS IN THEIR TACTICAL MANEUVERS IN AND OUT OF EACH OTHER'S ZONES. REGASUS IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION AND THE 3D MARINE DIVISION. SIMILARLY, DELAWARE VALLEY SAW BOTH U.S. ARMY AND ARVN OPERATING IN CONCERT DEEP IN THE INTERIOR.

C. THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM WHICH STANDS BEHIND THESE COMBATANT COMMANDS IS EXCELLENT. IT IS FUNCTIONING EFFICIENTLY AND IT HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS CAPABILITY DESPITE THE SETBACKS OF THE ENEMY TET OFFENSIVE AND THE BUILD-UP OF OUR FORCES NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS. AT PRESENT FORCE LEVELS, ITS CAPACITY EXCEEDS THE DEMANDS MADE UPON IT. WE WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD OUR OWN WHEN THE MONSOONS ARRIVE. WE ARE AHEAD OF THE POWER CURVE LOGISTICALLY; THE SYSTEM IN BEING REPRESENTS A TREMENDOUS INVESTMENT IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AND MATERIAL - ALL OF WHICH IS PAYING OFF HANDSOMELY.

PAGE 4 RUMKM 4075 S E C R E T S E P C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR CEO

D. AT EXISTING FORCE LEVELS IN I CZ, THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF THE THREE DIVISIONS IN QUANG TRI AND TRUA THIEN HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PCV. THE BUGS WHICH INITIALLY SHOWED UP IN THE ORGANIZATION WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CORPS SUBORDINATE TO III MAF HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED, AND THE III MAF-PCV RELATIONSHIP IS A GOOD ONE. COMMANDERS CONCERNED ARE WELL SATISFIED WITH IT, AND TO DISRUPT THIS FUNCTIONING TEAM PRIOR TO THE POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF FORCES NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS MAY BE PREMATURE AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

E. THE HIGH TIDE OF U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN I CZ PROBABLY HAS BEEN REACHED. THE REDEPLOYMENT TO MIDPAC AND EASTPAC BASES OF RL1-27 WILL BE COMPENSATED FOR BY THE PLANNED ASSIGNMENT OF 1ST BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY (MECH) TO PCV. HOWEVER, THE REORGANIZATION OF THE 121ST ARN DIVISION (-) AS AN AIRMOBILE UNIT AND ITS PROBABLE REDEPLOYMENT TO ONE OF THE FFV'S WILL RESULT IN A TWO-THIRD DIVISION EQUIVALENT DRAWDOWN

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMKM 405 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE
OVERALL IN I CTZ. SHOULD SUBSEQUENT REDEPLOYMENT
TO OTHER CTZ'S OF OTHER ARMY ELEMENTS OCCUR, THERE
WOULD BE LITTLE JUSTIFICATION FOR RETENTION OF AN
ADDITIONAL CORPS LEVEL HEADQUARTERS UNDER III MAF.
THERE WOULD BE EVEN LESS REASON FOR DIVIDING I CTZ
INTO SEPARATE ARMY AND MARINE ZONES.

F. THE CONTIGUOUS LOCATION OF OUR TWO MARINE
DIVISIONS MIGHT INDEED PROVIDE THE SITUATION IN WHICH
A RETURN OF III MAF'S STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION
ASSETS TO PARENT CONTROL MAY BE ACHIEVED. HOWEVER,
WITH THE COMMAND CHANGES IN SAIGON, A MORE RECEPTIVE
ATMOSPHERE HAS BEGUN TO EMERGE, AND ADDITIONAL GAINS
MAY BE IN THE OFFING. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POSITION
OF CG III MAF AS A TWO-DIVISIONAL CORPS COMMANDER
MIGHT PRECLUDE THE VERY THING WE SEEK IN THAT THE AIR
FORCE ARGUMENT OF "EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR
SUPPORT" WOULD APPEAR TO BE VALIDATED BY THE REDUCED
AREA OCCUPIED BY THE MARINES, WITH 70 TO 100 PERCENT
OF THE WING EFFORT GOING INTO IT. WE WOULD BE
SATISFIED WHILE OUR ARMY NEIGHBORS, WHO NOW HAVE NO

PAGE 6 RUMKM 4075 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCO
COMPLAINTS, COULD SURVIVE.

G. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE GVN WOULD AGREE
TO A PARALLEL SPLIT SO AS TO ACCOMMODATE THE PROPOSED
ARRANGEMENT. IN FACT, THE ARGUMENT COULD BE PRE-
SENTED THAT THERE ARE IN EXISTENCE TWO ARVN COMMAND-
ERS IN I CTZ WHO SHARE BETWEEN THEM THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN PORTIONS, RESPECTIVELY,
OF I CTZ. THESE ARE THE 1ST AND 2D ARVN DIVISION COM-
MANDERS, WHO COULD LOGICALLY PARALLEL THE NEW ARMY
CORPS COMMANDER AND CG III MAF. THE NEXT STEP MAY
BE THE CREATION OF AN ECHELON PARALLEL TO GENERAL LAN,
I.E., ANOTHER FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDED BY
AN ARMY GENERAL. THIS COULD MILITATE AGAINST THE
MARINE'S RETENTION OF OPCON OF THEIR FIXED WING AVIATION
ASSETS, AND WOULD RELEGATE CG III MAF TO THE POSITION
OF BEING ON A PARALLEL LEVEL WITH CG 2D ARVN DIVISION.

H. OUR LOGISTIC FACILITIES AT DANANG AND OUR REQUIRE-
MENT TO HAVE THEM COLLOCATED WITH THE NAVY SUPPORT
ACTIVITIES AT A DEEP-WATER PORT, PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION
OF MOVING THEM NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS. THIS, IN TURN,
IF

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

DE RUHKM 4076 1742101
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 222101Z JUN 68
 RM CG DMFPAC
 TO RLMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM
 LT GEN BUSE, DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. MARINE
 CORPS EYES ONLY. FINAL SECTION OF 2
 WOULD TIE THE MARINE TO THE SOUTHERN THREE PROVINCES
 OF I CORPS. THE WAR, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS IN THE
 NORTH.

1. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS
 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARMY PROPOSAL ARE
 DISTURBING FOR THE SHORT HAUL POINT OF VIEW.
 WE ARE JUST NOW CURING THE COMMUNICATIONS
 ILLS THAT BEDEVILED US WHEN 3D MAR DIV MOVED
 TO PHU BAY AND THENCE TO LONG HA. THE ADDITIONAL TIME AND
 COST INVOLVED IN ANOTHER MAJOR REDEPLOYMENT OF
 FORCES WOULD BE APPALLING, ESPECIALLY SO WERE THE
 MAF HEADQUARTERS TO MOVE NORTH.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I MENTIONED THAT I THOUGHT BOB'S

PAGE 2 RUHKM 4076 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 POSITION WAS BASICALLY SOUND; HOWEVER, THERE IS
 ANOTHER SIDE TO THE COIN. THE CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING A
 MAJOR CHANGE IN THE RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CORPS ARE SIGNIFICANT.
 IN THE SIMPLEST TERMS, IF WE CONSOLIDATED OUR MARINE FORCES
 SOUTH OF THE HAY VAN PASS, MEETING OUR OVERALL
 REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE EASIER. THE PROBLEMS OF
 COMMUNICATIONS IN THE LONG HAUL WOULD BE REDUCED,
 THERE WOULD NOT BE SO MUCH WEAR AND TEAR ON OUR
 HELICOPTERS IN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT MISSIONS AND WE COULD
 CONCENTRATE ON SOME OF OUR MARINE CONCEIVED
 PACIFICATION PROGRAMS; ALL THING BEING EQUAL OUR CASUALTIES MAY EVEN BE
 LESS. IN THE HASTE TO GIVE YOU OUR POSITION ON THE
 MATTER, I HAVE NOT DISCUSSED EACH OF THESE POINTS IN DETAIL.

3. THESE ARE THE KEY CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED AS WE
 SEE THEM FROM HERE. WE MUST DO EVERY-
 THING WE CAN TO PROSECUTE THIS WAR TO A SUCCESSFUL
 CONCLUSION. SO LONG AS FORCE OF ARMS REMAINS AN
 ACTIVE INGREDIENT IN THE EQUATION, THE MARINE CORPS
 CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE SOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE DIMINI-
 SHED EITHER IN EFFECTIVENESS OR IN STATUS.

PAGE 3 RUHKM 4076 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 4. IN VIEW OF THE WORLD ATMOSPHERE, CONDITIONS IN
 SAIGON AND THE SITUATION IN I CORPS, RECOMMEND WE
 CONCUR WITH BOB CUSHMAN'S POSITION.
 UNQUOTE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-3
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FP RUMSAK
 RE RUMSAK 4973 1742053
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 222033Z JUN 68
 M. CG. RMPAC.
 TO RUMSAK/CG-111 *AF
 E

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN CUSHMAN FROM L GEN
 BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WAKING
 HOURS. SECTION 1 OF 2
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 1. DND 191840Z/JUN68 IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE SP002
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY. SUBJECT: III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U).
 1. FOLLOWING MEMO FROM DESECDEF TO SECNAV DATED
 15 JUNE 68 PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE PAUL:
 AS YOU REQUESTED I HAVE LOOKED INTO THE VARIOUS
 POINTS RAISED IN THE MARINE CORPS PAPER YOU SENT ME
 RE PAPER YOU SENT ME
 THIS WEEK ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT. CONTRARY TO THE
 TRUST OF THE MARINE PAPER, I HAVE FOUND THAT UNDER
 THE MODIFIED SYSTEM COMUSMACV DOES NOT REQUIRE SPEC-
 IFC TARGET SELECTION IN ADVANCE OF THE WEEKLY
 ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES TO THE MAJOR GROUND

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 4973 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE
 COMMANDERS. UNDER THIS NEW MODIFICATION OF THE WEEKLY
 ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES PERMITS THE MAJOR
 GROUND COMMANDERS TO HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE
 THAT AIR SUPPORT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THEM WHEN THEY
 REQUIRE IT, AND REDUCES CONSIDERABLY THE TIME BETWEEN
 TARGET SELECTION AND TARGET STRIKE. AS YOU MAY RE-
 CALL, RESPONSIVENESS WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR CONCERNS
 OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS UNDER THE
 SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT. I BELIEVE THIS MODIFIED
 SYSTEM PROVIDES THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS A LARGE
 MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO PREPLANNED AIR
 SUPPORT SINCE THEY NOW CAN OBTAIN AIR SUPPORT AS THE
 TACTICAL SITUATION DEVELOPS WITHOUT REFERRING SPEC-
 IFC TARGET DATA AND DETAILED REQUIREMENTS TO EITHER
 THE MACV TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT ELEMENT OR THE 7TH AIR
 FORCE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER. I NOTE THAT COM-
 USMACV IS CONDUCTING AN EVALUATION DURING THE MONTH
 OF JUNE OF THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE SINGLE MANAGER
 ARRANGEMENT. I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT AS A RESULT OF
 THIS EVALUATION COMUSMACV WILL MAKE WHATEVER CHANGES

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHMA 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE
 TO THE SYSTEM HE FEELS NECESSARY TO INSURE MAXIMUM
 FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF
 AIR ASSETS IN SOUTH VIETNAM... SIGNED PAUL UNQUOTE.
 2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PROVIDED SECNAV IN RE-
 SPONSE TO THE DESEDEF MEMO. QUOTE A. IN HIS MEMO
 TO SECNAV OF 15 JUNE 68, THE DESEDEF INDICATES THAT,

CONTRARY TO THE THRUST OF CMC'S LETTER TO SECNAV OF
 20 MAY 68, HE FINDS THAT UNDER THE MODIFIED SYSTEM
 COMUSMACV DOES NOT REQUIRE SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION
 IN ADVANCE OF THE WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED
 SORTIES TO THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS. B. EXAMINA-
 TION OF CMC'S LETTER DISCLOSES NO REFERENCE TO SPE-
 CIFIC TARGET SELECTION, WHICH LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION
 THAT THE DESEDEF HAS BEEN ERRONEOUSLY BRIEFED TO
 THE EFFECT THAT TIME ON TARGET (TOT) REFERS TO A
 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION INSTEAD OF A TIME THAT AIRCRAFT
 ARE AVAILABLE TO DELIVER SUPPORT. C. COMUSMACV'S
 MESSAGE 211145Z MAY 68 SPECIFIES THAT "THE WEEKLY
 FRAG WILL LIST FLIGHTS BY... THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF
 AIRCRAFT... ORDNANCE LOADS... AND SCHEDULED TIME WILL

PAGE 4 RUMHMA 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE
 BE SHOWN FOR EACH FLIGHT, NIGHT TOTS WILL BE INCLUDED
 IN THE WEEKLY FRAG... EACH MAJOR GROUND COMMANDER MAY
 USE THESE SORTIES IN ANY MANNER HE CONSIDERS WILL
 SUPPORT HIS TACTICAL PLANS MOST EFFECTIVELY SO LONG
 AS HIS INTENDED UTILIZATION IS CONSISTENT WITH AIR-
 CRAFT AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES." D. THE PRECEDING
 PARAGRAPH IS QUOTED TO EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR STAYING
 THAT THIS MODIFICATION STILL DOES NOT MEET THE STAND-
 ARDS OF RESPONSIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM.
 FOR THE SPECIFIC ISSUE TAKEN WITH THE MODIFIED VER-
 SION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT PLAN IS THAT THE WEEKLY
 FRAG CONTINUES TO PHILOSOPHY OF PRODUCER ORIENTATION
 RATHER THAN EMPLOYING AIR ORIENTED TO THE NEEDS OF
 THE CONSUMER. THE PRESENT WEEKLY FRAG IS IN EFFECT
 AN AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WHICH ALLOWS THE
 PRODUCER (7TH AIR FORCE) TO DICTATE WHEN (SCHEDULED
 TIMES) HOW MUCH (NUMBER AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT), AND
 WHAT EFFECT (ORDNANCE LOADS) THE CONSUMER (GROUND
 OPPOSITION TO THE MARINE CORPS CONCEPT THAT THE EM-

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHNM 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 BLOWMENT OF AIR, AS A SUPPORTING ARM, MUST BE KEYED
 TO THE DIRECT NEEDS (TIME, QUANTITY AND ORDNANCE) OF
 THE GROUND FORCES. E. IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM, THE AIR FORCE RETAINS THE FREROGATIVE TO
 EMPLOY AIR INDEPENDENT OF THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
 OF THE GROUND FORCES. THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER, WHO
 IN EFFECT HAS PARITY WITH THE GROUND COMMANDER, REC-
 COGNIZES HIS MISSION TO SUPPORT GROUND FORCES BUT
 DETERMINES BOTH DEGREE AND QUANTITY OF THE SUPPORT.
 THIS IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE MARINE CORPS
 CONCEPT OF A SINGLE COMMANDER OF AN INTEGRATED AIR-
 GROUND TEAM. F. AS STATED IN CMC'S LETTER OF 29MAY
 68, THESE CHANGES TO INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE
 AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE GROUND COMMANDER ARE WEL-
 COMED; HOWEVER, THE DEGREE OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
 FORCES ATTAINED BY THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM IS
 STILL NOT ACHIEVED IN THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM NOR
 CAN IT BE UNTIL THE AIR SUPPORT RESOURCES ARE RE-
 STORED TO THE POSITIVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG III
 MAF. UNQUOTE.

PAGE 6 RUHNM 4073 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 3. IN THAT SECDEF CONTINUES TO SUP-
 PORT COMUSMACV AND IN LIGHT OF YOUR 160012Z JUN68 IT
 APPEARS THAT A MOVE FROM SAIGON MAY BE OUR BEST BET
 AT THIS TIME. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AS TO: A.
 HAVING BOB APPROACH ABE ON IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN SET
 FORTH IN CMC31-68 (CMC 142003Z JUN68 AT THE END
 OF THE PRESENT EVALUATION PERIOD (32JUN). B. YOUR
 APPROACHING SHARP ON THE SAME SUBJECT IN CONJUNCTION
 WITH OTHER INFORMATION RECEIVED ON YOUR TRIP.
 4. HAVE UTMOST CONFIDENCE YOU CAN MAKE THE BELL RING
 LOUD AND CLEAR--UNQUOTE.
 2. MY REPLY TO CMC IS BEING FORMULATED WITH PARTICULAR
 CONSIDERATION OF THE VIEWS AND COMMENTS YOU AND
 OTHERS MADE DURING MY TRIP.
 3. TENTATIVELY, I THINK THE NEXT MOVES SHOULD BE:
 A. YOUR GOING TO ABE IN YOUR END-JUNE EVALUATION
 WITH A PLAN FOR RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR-GROUND
 TEAM. YOUR PROPOSAL MUST TAKE FULL COGNIZANCE OF
 CMC 31-68, WHILE ADDING THE EXPERT ON THE SCENE
 DIAGNOSIS AND IDEAS FOR ACCOMMODATIONS HELD BY YOUR-
 BE

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

#570

SECRET

I
 PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMKM 4074 1742053
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 222053Z JUN 68
 RM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN CUSHMAN FROM L GEN BUSE.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

FINAL SECTION OF 2

SELF AND THE 1ST MAW. IN THIS REGARD, IF YOU HAVE SOME
 PROPOSED LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS VARYING FROM
 OICM 31-68 PLEASE LET US KNOW.

B. MY GOING TO SHARP AT A TIME AND IN CONSONANCE
 WITH YOUR APPROACH TO ABE.

4. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG ENMADAC		DATE 25 JUN 68
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 2228897 JUN 68		COPY# OF COPIES RECD
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III NAF AVIATION ASSETS (II)
	CG					
	DCG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Copy #1 to G-3 25 Jun 68 <i>[Signature]</i> In 18 Jul 68 Copy #2 to DCS (Air) <i>[Signature]</i> 25 Jun 68 Copy #3 to Air Control 23 Jun 68 <i>[Signature]</i> Copy #3 to G-3 6/24 <i>[Signature]</i> In 24 Jun 68
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	23 JUN 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF / COPIES RECD
	222052Z JUN 68	1 / OF 3

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF 141 MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
			IN	OUT		

2	CG					
3	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
4	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
4	G-3	A				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

REMARKS
 4/25 Power have copies of
 JOC

EXCLUSIVE
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

49

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
DE RUHNM 4072 174203Z
ZNY SSSSS
P 222032Z JUN 68
FM CG MFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LGEN
CUSHMAN FROM LGEN BUSE, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 191348Z/JUN68 (S)

1. IN REFERENCE A YOU ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS ON
HAVING BOB CUSHMAN APPROACH ABRAMS ON IMPLEMENTING THE
PLAN SET FORTH IN COM 31-68. ADDITIONALLY YOU
ASKED FOR MY THOUGHTS ON APPROACHING SHARP ON THE
SAME SUBJECT.

2. I HAVE PASSED REF A TO CUSHMAN FOR HIS INFORMA-
TION AND POSSIBLE USE. YOUR WORDS TO SECNAV CON-
TAINED IN PARA 2 THEREIN ARE PARTICULARLY COGENT.

3. YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE AVENUES OF APPROACH TO
ABRAMS AND SHARP SEEM THE BEST WAY TO GO. UNLESS

PAGE 2 RUHNM 4072 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
YOU DESIRE OTHERWISE, I PLAN TO:

A. ADVISE BOB CUSHMAN TO PRESENT, IN HIS END-JUNE
EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGE ARRANGEMENT,
A PLAN FOR RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR-GROUND
TEAM. I CAME AWAY FROM MY RECENT VISIT WITH THE FEELING
THAT BOB AND HIS STAFF HAD AN EXCELLENT DIAGNOSIS OF THE
CASE AND, WHILE HIS REMEDY MUST TAKE FULL COGNIZANCE
OF COM 31-68, HE HAD A GOOD FEEL OF THE PULSE AND MAY
HAVE SOME LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS WHICH CAN BE DIGESTED
AT THIS POINT AND STILL LEAD TO FULL RECOVERY. I THINK
WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THIS BASIS WITH BOB WORKING IN
CLOSE HARMONY WITH ABE. AT THE SAME TIME, IF SOME OF
BOB'S PROPOSED LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS VARY FROM COM
31-68 HE IS TO LET US KNOW IMMEDIATELY.

B. APPROACH SHARP IN CONSONANCE WITH CUSHMAN'S
EFFORTS AND RATIONALE, ADDING TO THEM THE PERSONAL
OBSERVATIONS AND STAFF DATA I FOUND DURING MY TRIP.
BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET
#49

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 22 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 221650Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (U)
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"Copies 2 & 3 burned
4 Nov 68"

48

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUHFMA
 DE RUEBHOA6295 1741651
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUHFMA T RUMUGRA
 P 221650Z JUN68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (ID):

A. CG FMFPAC 220353Z JUN
 B. CG III MAF 210134Z JUN

1. I HAVE EXAMINED CAREFULLY THE PROS AND CONS CONCERNING
 THE SEVERAL COURSES OF ACTION CONTAINED IN REFERENCES A
 AND B AND CONCUR FULLY WITH YOUR RATIONALE AND POSITIONS
 FOR NO CHANGE AT THIS TIME.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY CHANGE WHICH
 WOULD WARRANT ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT.
 IF SO, WE CAN ADDRESS IT AT THAT TIME. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET
#48

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2				<i>le</i>	CG THIRD MARDIV
DCG	3		<i>6/24</i>		<i>Rmd</i>	SERIAL 221007Z JUN 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	4				<i>Q</i>	SUBJECT EXCHANGE OF 03 MARINES BETWEEN 3D MARDIV, 1ST MAW AND FLC REMARKS <i>S/S Have we received 9 copy of (of 6)?</i> <i>9.</i> <i>Sw:</i> <i>attached ✓</i> <i>FOR</i>
C/S	1	<i>I</i>			<i>a</i>	
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2		<i>I</i>		<i>has copy</i>		
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>231015H</i>		<i>JCR</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
- C- COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

"Copy # 307 burned 4 Nov 68"

47

PP RUMHMA RUMUGRA
 DE RUMHVP 8023D 1741007
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 221007Z JUN 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC (0241)
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

FUR

UNCLAS E F T O

PERSONAL FROM MAJGEN DAVIS FOR LT GEN BUSE AND LT GEN CUSHMAN
 EXCHANGE OF 23 MARINES BETWEEN 3D MARDIV, 1ST MAW AND FLC
 A. CG, 3D MARDIV LTR 1/JCM/R SSG OVER 1300 OF 16 JUNE 1968 ✓

1. REF A ADDRESSED THE SUBJ OF ASSIGNMENT POLICY FOR TWICE/
 THRICE WOUNDED MARINES AND IN PART STATED THAT IN PAST A
 LIMITED NUMBER OF MARINES HAVE BEEN TRADED OFF BETWEEN THIS
 DIVISION, 1ST MAW AND FLC. TO DATE THIS PROCEDURE HAS BEEN
 FOLLOWED ON AN INFORMAL BASIS BETWEEN PERSONNEL OFFICERS
 INVOLVED.

2. IT IS MY OPINION THAT SUCH A REASSIGNMENT PRACTISE SHOULD
 BE FORMALIZED AND INCORPORATED INTO APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES
 WHICH RELATE TO ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH WPGF AND 1ST MAW.
 MANY TWICE WOUNDED MARINES HAVE EXCELLENT POTENTIAL FOR
 COMPLETION OF A FULL TOUR IN RVN PROVIDED THEY ARE UTILIZED

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 8023D UNCLAS E F T O

IN ASSIGNMENTS REMOVED FROM ACTIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS. IT
 IS RECOGNIZED THAT REASSIGNMENT OF ALL WOUNDED MARINES IN
 THIS DIVISION WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL BECAUSE OF THE OBVIOUS
 NEED FOR CONTINUITY IN OTHER COMMANDS INVOLVED. IT IS REC-
 OMMENDED THEREFORE THAT ONLY THOSE MARINES WITH A MINIMUM
 OF FOUR MONTHS REMAINING ON THEIR TOUR BE SO REASSIGNED FROM
 THIS DIVISION AND THAT MARINES ORDERED FROM 1ST MAW OR FLC
 HAVE A MINIMUM OF FOUR MONTHS REMAINING ON THEIR TOUR.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#47

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2				<i>Q</i>	CG FMEPAC
DCG	3				<i>Mr Buel</i>	SERIAL 202116Z JUN 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT CHANGE OF COMMAND MESSAGE
C/S	1	A			<i>Q</i>	REMARKS <p><i>Map of congrats to all four Guards were sent out in your name FOR</i></p> <p><i>Thanks, Good</i></p> <p><i>b. 9</i></p> <p><i>" Copies 3 + 4 burned + Nov 68 "</i></p>
DC/S	1	A				
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>210820H</i>		<i>Mr</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
- C- COMMENTS
- I- INFORMATION

45

F001158
 FTEZYUW RUHFMMA3632 1722116-EEEE--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 202116Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARINE DIV (W 035)
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG IIII MAF
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS E F T O

CHANGE OF COMMAND MESSAGE

1. FOR MGEN ROBERTSON: AS YOU RELINQUISH COMMAND OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPERB ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE DIVISION OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE FIRST DIVISION, UNDER YOUR ABLE GUIDANCE, HAS MADE IMMEASURABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND ENHANCED THE FINEST TRADITIONS OF OUR CORPS. GOOD LUCK AND GOD SPEED.
 2. FOR MGEN YOUNGLALE: CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ASSIGNMENT AS COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST MARINE DIVISION. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL COMMAND THIS DISTINGUISHED UNIT WITH THE SAME FINE LEADERSHIP AND DEDICATION THAT HAVE CHARACTERIZED YOUR CAREER. LTGEN BUSE.
- BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM CG PCV PHB	DATE 29 JUN 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 192150Z JUN 68	COPY# OF 6 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY / INSTA-
	DCG					LLATIONS CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (CMIS)
	DCG AIR					REMARKS
	C/S					<p style="font-size: 2em; text-align: center;">FOR</p> <p>Copy #3 to G-2 21 Jun 68 <i>[Signature]</i></p> <p>Copy #4 burned 4 Nov 68</p>
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE: X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG PCV PHB	20 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF COPIES RECD
	192150Z JUN 68	2 OF 6

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY/INSTALLATIONS CAP MUL LAY SECTOR (CMIS) REMARKS Q-2. Please comment FOR 91
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
1	C/S					
	D.C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	202055			ZWW	
	G-1					
	G-2	Copy to G-2	210915H	21 Jun 68	DM	
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

43
SECRET

SECRET

W GRA 5 19 GRA 5 19
 HP RUMUERA
 DE RUMHVA 939 1720310
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 192150Z JUN 68
 FM CG PCV PHB
 TO CG III MAF DNG
 BT

FOR

S E C R E T AVII-GB 04032 FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN
 ROSSON.

SUBJ: ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY/INSTALLATIONS CAP MUL LAY SECTOR (COMB) (S)
 REF: CG III MAF MESSAGE 161628Z JUN 68.

1. (S) IN REGARD TO ABOVE REF, PARAGRAPH 3 (A), IT IS REQUESTED THAT
 THE 1ST MAW BE TASKED SOLELY WITH THE MISSION OF PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE
 SUPPORT OF THE UPCOMING OMLS OPERATION.

2. (S) 1ST MAW'S LOCATION CLOSE TO THE OPERATIONAL WILL PROVIDE
 MORE TIMELY COVERAGE AND DELIVERY AND ITS PROXIMITY TO THE OMLS AREA
 WILL PERMIT ITS AIRCRAFT TO REMAIN ON STATION LONGER. THE STAGING
 AND PROCESSING FROM DA NANG WILL ALSO ENABLE THE OPERATIONS COORDINATOR
 TO HAVE THE COVERAGE MORE READILY AVAILABLE FOR INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
 ING.

4. (S) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE AREA OF 15 0200 TO 15 197 TO
 152600 BE INCLUDED INTO THE OMLS AREA FOR PHOTO COVERAGE.

OP-3
 BT

SECRET

#43

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM GEM ABRAMS		DATE 20 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 200129Z JUNE 68		COPY# 1 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG				lp	REMARKS 64, 6-3 - Comment and super mag reply for CG's release G.
3	DCG				Rmsl	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S				Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	201415			EDW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3		201515H	Jun	Th	
	G-4		201520H	Jun	Th	
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"Copies # 2 & 3 burned
4 Nov 1968"

CONFIDENTIAL

6-20042E IYH ZFF-1
 PW GEN ARMS COMUSMACV
 TO THE COMMANDER OF III MAF
 US ARMY
 LTC ROSSON CG PROV CORPS V
 LTC WEYAND CG II FFV
 MG PEERS ACG I FFV
 ZEN

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 8148 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (U)
 1. (C) IN ORDER TO REDUCE GROUND MUNITION EXPENDITURES OF HIGH DOLLAR VALUE AMMUNITION, REQUEST COMMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

A. US ARMY AND III MAF WOULD PLACE ASR CONTROLS ON 8MM, 4.2" MORTAR AND ALL HOWITZER AMMUNITION. ASR WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT 10 PERCENT BELOW THE CURRENT RSR OR EXPERIENCE RATE. RECOMMENDED RATES ARE AS LISTED BELOW:

	US ARMY		III MAF	
	RSR	RCMD ASR	RSR	RCMD ASR
8MM HE	10.0	9.0 (2)	22.5	20.7 (1)
4.2" HE	15.0	13.5 (1)	29.0	18.0 (1)
105MM HE	49.0	36.6 (1)	62.0	58.5 (1)
120MM HE	58.0	30.2 (1)	27.8	27.8 (1)
8" HE	30.0	25.4 (1)	18.0	23.4 (1)

ALL FIGURES IN RDS/WPN/DAY

(1) BASED ON 10 PERCENT REDUCTION OF CURRENT ACTUAL EXPENDITURE RATES.

(2) BASED ON 10 PERCENT REDUCTION OF CURRENT RSR.

B. BASED ON THESE ASR'S, US ARMY AND III MAF PROVIDE ALLOCATIONS TO FIELD FORCE, CORPS AND/OR DIVISION COMMANDERS AS APPLICABLE.

C. EACH OF THESE COMMANDERS WOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED WITH A SUPPLEMENTAL ALLOCATION EQUAL TO 50 PERCENT OF THE 10 PERCENT SAVING. THIS WOULD BE RESERVED FOR SUB-ALLOCATION TO SUBORDINATE UNITS IF JUSTIFIED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

2. (C) THE 5 PERCENT OR GREATER RESULTANT SAVING WOULD BE USED TO BUILD IN-COUNTRY STOCKS TO AUTHORIZED LEVELS AND WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCE THE VALUE OF MUNITIONS SHIPPED TO RVN BY \$58.7 MILLION ANNUALLY.

CP-2

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

370

Copy #1

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS		DATE 20 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 200110Z JUNE 68		1, 2 & 3 COPY# / OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					REMARKS G-362. I think our force order covers this if not see that it does and report back to me 9. AND, we need to follow up to see that are lights have a specific BDA mission right after the strike! 41
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
	C/S		6/20			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		201305H Jun		JCR	
	G-1					
	G-2	G-2	201350H Jun		rm	
	G-3	G-3	201345H Jun		rm	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

4 Copies
2-3
4-11-68

SECRET

0 200110Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN MOMYER CDR 7AF
LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
LTG WEYAND CG II FFORCEV
MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
MG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
INFO LTG ROSSON CG PROVCORPSV
ZEM
S E C R E T MAC 8134EYES ONLY
SUBJ: BOMB DAM

GE ASSESSMENT FOR ARC LIGHT STIKES

1. (S) ALL OF YOU ARE AWARE OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF ARC LIGHT TO THE WAR EFFORT IN YOUR RESPECTIVE OPERATIONS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE B-52 PROGRAM AT THIS POINT IN TIME IS BEING REVIEWED AND THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE NUMBER OF MONTHLY SORTIES WILL BE REDUCED. THEREFORE, BDA AS ONE YARDSTICK IS IMPORTANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEVEL OF EFFORT. HOWEVER, OUR BDA REMAINS INADEQUATE. I SUSPECT THAT WE SOMETIMES GIVE IT ONLY LIP-SERVICE OR A HALF-HEARTED EFFORT.
2. (S) GROUND FOLLOW-UP PRODUCES THE BEST BDA. I RECONGNIZE THAT EVERY STRIKE CANNOT BE EXPLOITED BY INFANTRY ON THE GROUND. I DO EXPCT THAT YOU HAVE A PLAN FOR ASSESSMENT OF EVERY STRIKE YOU REQUEST, UTILIZING ONE OR MORE OF YOUR VARIOUS RECONNAISSANCE MEANS OR EXPLOITAION BY TROOP UNITS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

210

NNNN

SECRET

#41

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-69)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	20 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF COPIES RECD
	200035Z JUN 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

Copy #1 to G-3 Air 25 Jun 68 TM
[Signature]
In 18 Jun 68 TM

Copy #2 to DCG (Air) *[Signature]*

Copy #3 to Air Control 20 Jun 68 TM

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FOR

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 20 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 200035Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					REMARKS G-1 G-2 G-3 G-4 G-5 G-6 ADJ CAP CORDS EMB/TRANS ENGR H&S CO INSP MTO OP ANAL ORD PSY OPS SUPPLY S&C
4	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
1	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	201220			DW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

40

SECRET

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMUGRA
DE RUHFMMA 3567 1712035
ZNY SSSSS
P 200035Z JUN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM
LT GEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS, MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE COMMANDANT'S
070027Z/JUN WHICH WE DISCUSSED ON MY WESTPAC TRIP.

QUOTE:

A. CG FMFPAC 300511Z MAY68
YOUR COMMENTS CONTAINED IN REF A WERE INCORPORATED IN THE
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO SEC NAV. THE FOLLOWING CNC MEMO PARALLELS
THAT PROPOSAL.

IT HAS NOT BEEN CIRCULATED AND IS PROVIDED FOR
INFORMATION. QUOTE:

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROLL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

REF: (A) DEP SEC DEF MEMO DTD 15MAY68

(B) COMUSMACV MSG 211145Z MAY68

1. IN REFERENCE (A) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NOTED THAT
THE SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTROL OF AIR IN SOUTH

PAGE 2 RUHFMMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
VIETNAM WOULD NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THE SPECIFIC SITUATION
FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNED, AND THAT COMUSMACV SHOULD REVERT TO
NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR III MAF WHEN THE TACTICAL
SITUATION PERMITS. MR MITZE ALSO STATED THAT CHANGES SHOULD
BE SOUGHT TO RECTIFY DEFICIENCIES IN THE INTERIM SYSTEM.

2. BY REFERENCE (B) GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS ANNOUNCED MODIFI-
CATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT PLAN. THIS ESSENTIALLY PROVIDES
FOR MAJOR DECENTRALIZATION OF PRE-PLANNED AIR OPERATIONS BY
ASSIGNING BLOCKS OF AIR SUPPORT ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE WITH PRE-
DETERMINED TOTS AND ORDNANCELOADS. 70 PER CENT OF THE AVAILABLE
SORTIES ARE DISTRIBUTED TO THE MAJOR GROUND COMMANDS, NAMELY
III MAF, I FFV AND II FFV, BY MEANS OF A WEEKLY FRAGMENTARY
OPERATIONS ORDER, AND THE REMAINING 30 PER CENT ARE FRAGGED ON A
DAILY BASIS IN RESPONSE TO AIR REQUESTS RECEIVED THE DAY BEFORE THE
SORTIES ARE TO BE FLOWN. THE NEW PROCEDURES WERE EFFECTIVE ON
30 MAY.

3. THIS CHANGE IS INTENDED TO INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE
AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE GROUND COMMANDER, AND THE EFFORT TO
DO SO IS WELCOMED. THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMUSMACV TO ~~REMAIN~~ ENSURE FULL
~~SECRET OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT~~ OF HIS TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES IS

AND EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
#40

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FULLY APPRECIATED AND SUPPORTED. HOWEVER, THE RECENT ALTERATIONS STILL WILL NOT MEET THE STANDARDS OF RESPONSIVENESS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE MARINE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. THE WEEKLY FRAG IS PUBLISHED 36 HOURS AHEAD OF ITS EFFECTIVE TIME OF IMPLEMENTATION. IT PROMULGATES AN AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE. ACTUAL GROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE PREDICTED 36 HOURS PLUS UP TO ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE.

B. THE WEEKLY FRAG CONTAINS THE TIMES SORTIES ARE TO BE FLOWN AND ORDNANCE TO BE CARRIED. THEREFORE, GROUND OPERATIONS MUST BE PLANNED TO ACCOMMODATE THE ADVANCE SCHEDULE OF THE SUPPORTING AIR ARM. THE MODIFICATION INDICATES THAT PROVISIONS WILL BE MADE FOR MINOR CHANGES IN TOT OR A CHANGE IN ORDNANCE. HOWEVER, THE NET EFFECT IS THAT GROUND OPERATIONS BECOME RESPONSIVE TO AIR OPERATIONS, RATHER THAN THE CONVERSE.

4. ALTHOUGH THE BUILDUP OF GROUND FORCES AND THE DIVERSITY OF AIR SUPPORT MEANS INTRODUCED INTO I CORPS ORIGINALLY WERE ADVANCED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONCENTRATION OF AIR SUPPORT ASSETS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM, ALLOCATION OF 70 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE SORTIES NOW HAS BEEN DECENTRALIZED TO THE MAJOR

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO GROUND COMMAND. THIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION, IN FACT, POSES NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS. ARMY AND MARINE GROUND UNITS HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY, AND DESPITE SINGLE MANAGEMENT, THERE ARE, IN FACT, TWO AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS NOW FUNCTIONING IN I CORPS. REGARDLESS OF THE INCREASED TROOP DENSITY, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME AS IT WAS BEFORE THE BUILDUP. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A SINGLE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST PROCEDURE ANY MORE THAN THERE IS FOR A SINGLE REQUEST PROCEDURE FOR OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS, I. E. NAVAL GUNFIRE, ARTILLERY, OR TANKS. WHAT IS REQUIRED IN THE CASE OF AIR SUPPORT IS THE MOST RESPONSIVE SYSTEM THAT CAN BE DEvised FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE BATTLE PLAN WITH THE APPLICATION OF ITS DECISIVE WEIGHT WHEN AND WHERE REQUIRED.

5. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS I CANNOT ACCEPT THE PRESENT MODIFICATION AS A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM SINGLE MANAGEMENT. ONLY BY POSSESSING ~~MISSION DIRECTION~~ ^{Operational Control} OF ITS OWN AIR ASSETS CAN III MAF ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT FOR SUPPORT OF THE TROOPS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THESE AIR ASSETS CAN THEN BE EMPLOYED THROUGH A SYSTEM DELIBERATELY DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE USE.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
#40

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC

6. THE NATURE OF THE MODIFICATION ANNOUNCED IN REFERENCE (B) DOES, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE INTERIM SOLUTION. SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE TO RETURN TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF, FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF MARINE GROUND FORCES IN I CORPS, Operational Control OF THOSE AIR ASSETS WHICH CONSTITUTE 70 PERCENT OF HIS AVAILABLE SORTIES. THE REMAINING 30 PERCENT OF HIS SORTIE GENERATION, AT THE ACCEPTED L. I SORTIE RATE, WOULD BE RETAINED BY COMUSMACV FOR ALLOCATION ON A DAILY BASIS. THE AIR ASSETS RETURNED TO Operational Control OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL III MAF, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DIVERSION AT ANY TIME TO MEET EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS OF COMUSMACV, AS SPECIFIED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4. AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR US ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF, FOR COORDINATION AND ALLOCATION OF SORTIES FROM THE 7TH AIR FORCE WEEKLY OR DAILY FRAG AS APPROPRIATE. ^{CG III MAF COULD ALSO ASSIGN Marine Sorties to Army units as required.}

7. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT BY ENABLING THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF TO ASSIGN HIS SORTIES TO THE FOLLOWING DAYS TASKS AS REQUIRED BY THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS PLANS. IT WOULD PERMIT CLOSE INTERGRATION WITH THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER; IT WOULD ENSURE ORDNANCE LOADS

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA3567 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC

RESPONSIVE TO THE SPECIFIC TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS, AND IT WOULD ENABLE CLOSE COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS. AT THE SAME TIME, COMUSMACV WOULD MAINTAIN HIS PREROGATIVE TO PREEMPT MARINE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO FOCUS THE WEIGHT OF, AND OTHERWISE DIRECT, HIS TOTAL TACTICAL AIR EFFORT AS NECESSARY TO MEET EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.

8. I BELIEVE THE FORMULA PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THIS MEMORANDUM FALLS WITHIN THE TENOR AND SPIRIT OF MR NITZES DECISION AND MORE EFFECTIVELY ~~SATISFIES~~ SATISFIES THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES SOUGHT BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND IN HIS LATEST CHANGE TO IMPROVE OVERALL AIR SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT MOST CERTAINLY WILL ENABLE A GREATER DEGREE OF COHESIVENESS AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT WITHIN MARINE AIR-GROUND FORCES. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT I OFFER THIS PROPOSAL AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.

END QUOTE.

UNQUOTE.

2. THE COMMANDANT HAS INFORMED ME THAT THE MEMO HAS BEEN SIGNED AS OMC MEMO 31-68, ESSENTIALLY AS ABOVE, DATED 14 JUNE AND CIRCULATED TO JCS.

GP-1

BT

Declassified by the Director of
Marine Corps History and Museums
in accordance with the provisions
of E.O. 13526, Ser 009D323/232095 of
21 Feb 1979

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

[Signature] Signature Date 3/19/92

SECRET

40

SECRET

FONECON REC'D AT COC 230500H JUN68:

TO: BGEN ANDERSON
 FROM: DIRECTOR, FMFPAC COMMAND CENTER

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. FMFPAC MSG 200035Z PASSED TO YOU. CMC MSG 070027Z CONTAINED THE PROPOSED CMCM 31-68, SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS.

2. THIS PROPOSED CMCM WAS SLIGHTLY MODIFIED AND CIRCULATED TO THE JCS ON 14 JUNE. I BELIEVE JIM ORD PROVIDED YOUR G-3 AIR, COL. WILKER, A COPY OF THE MODIFIED CMCM WHILE HE WAS AT YOUR HQTRS WITH GEN BUSE'S PARTY. HOWEVER, TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE THE CORRECTED VERSION, HERE ARE THE CHANGES TO THE PROPOSED CMCM AS IT WAS OFFICIALLY PASSED TO YOU BY FMFPAC MSG 200035Z (PARA 1 ABOVE).

A. PARA 3, SECOND SENT., CHANGE TO READ: "THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMUSMACV TO ENSURE FULL AND EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF HIS TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES IS FULLY APPRECIATED AND SUPPORTED."

B. PARA 5, SECOND SENT, REPLACE THE WORDS "MISSION DIRECTION" WITH THE WORDS "OPERATIONAL CONTROL."

C. PARA 6, SECOND AND FOURTH SENT, REPLACE THE WORDS "MISSION DIRECTION" WITH THE WORDS "OPERATIONAL CONTROL" AND ADD THE FOLLOWING SENT TO PARA 6: "CG III MAF COULD ALSO ASSIGN MARINE SORTIES TO ARMY UNITS AS REQUIRED."

3. INFORMATION NOW BEING PASSED TO YOU SEPARATELY BY SPECAT REQUIRES THAT YOU POSSESS CORRECTED VERSION OF CMCM 31-68.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

ROUTED:

1. C/S _____
2. CG _____
3. DCG _____
4. DCG AIR _____

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2				ll	CG FMEPAC SERIAL 192313Z JUN 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3		6/20		Rwd	SUBJECT CHANGE OF COMMAND MESSAGE
DCG AIR	4					REMARKS
C/S	1		6/20			
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			201220		DW	
S/C						

FOR

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

39

FOR

#000685
 #12ZYUW RUMHMA3546 1712513-EEEE--R UMUGRA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 192513Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMPPAC
 TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW (P851)
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O

CHANGE OF COMMAND MESSAGE

1. FOR MGEN ANDERSON: UPON COMPLETION OF YOUR TOUR AS COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND APPRECIATION FOR A JOB WELL DONE, THE MANY OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE WING OVER THE PAST YEAR REFLECT YOUR ASTUTE LEADERSHIP AND DEDICATION. BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS.
 2. FOR MGEN QUILTER: CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ASSIGNMENT AS COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THIS VITAL ASSIGNMENT WITH THE SAME SKILL AND DEDICATION YOU DISPLAYED THROUGHOUT YOUR CAREER. MGEN BUSH.
- BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#29

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 20 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 200000Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
9	CG				le	REMARKS CG - Jim still working on the KC-130. Vloggy FOR 9 OK, lets discuss when I return Mon le #7
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		6/20		le	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	200000H			le	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

#38

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR

VV PAC844
KI
PP RUMUGRA
DE RUHFMA 3543 1710023
ZNY CCCCC
P 200023Z JUN 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BT

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. BILL JONES CALLED WIDLECKE MONDAY MORNING WITH TENTATIVE INFORMATION ON THE DEPARTURE OF GENERAL OFFICERS FROM EL TORO TO WASHINGTON FOR THE GENERAL OFFICERS SYMPOSIUM. BILL SAID THAT THE PLANE CARRYING GENERAL OFFICERS (CURRENTLY ENGLISH, THRASH, ALAMS, HERBOLD AND FULLER) AND WIVES IS SCHEDULED TO DEPART EL TORO 0800 SATURDAY 6 JULY, ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON LATE THAT EVENING. THERE ARE SPACES FOR YOU AND MRS. CUSHMAN AND THE DEPARTURE TIME IS SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT IF YOU SO DESIRE.

2. THIS WILL PERMIT ONE FULL DAY OF REST IN WASHINGTON SUNDAY 7 JULY BEFORE THE SYMPOSIUM STARTS ON MONDAY THE 8TH.

3. BILL FURTHER STATED HE IS WRITING YOU A NOTE ABOUT THIS. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#38

0 191110Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM LTG ROSSON CG PCV PHU BAI
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON
 ZEM

S E C R E T PHB 868 EYES ONLY

1. A FEW MINUTES AGO I DECIDED TO SHOOT FOR 1 JULY AS D-DAY FOR OPERATION THOR (DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY ARTILLERY IN THE EASTERN DMZ-CAP LAY AREA). THIS TIMING PUTS SOMETHING OF A SQUEEZE ON US, NOTABLY IN CONNECTION WITH ENGINEER EFFORT, ARTILLERY AMMO MOVEMENT AND ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN 3D MARDIV OPERATIONS, BUT I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO PRESS ON IN THE HOPE OF CATCHING ELEMENTS OF THE 312TH NVA DIV (OR SOME INCOMING ELEMENT) IN THE KILLING ZONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. TO ACCELERATE REQUIRED PLANNING IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN MY JUDGMENT TO BRING TOGETHER SOONEST AT PCV HEADQUARTERS REPRESENTATIVES OF MACV, 7TH AF, 7TH FLEET, III MAF, 1ST MAW, AND OTHERS WHOM I CAN ASSEMBLE. ACCORDINGLY, I PROPOSE 1000H ON 21 JUNE AS THE TIME FOR SUCH A MEETING. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING REPRESENTATION FROM AGENCIES OUTSIDE OF PCV WOULD BE APPRECIATED GREATLY.

3. RECOMMEND THAT DICK STILWELL PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THIS UNBETAKING SINCE HE WILL BE HOLDING THE LANYARD ON D-DAY.

4. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOURS

250

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG THIRD MARDIV		DATE 19 JUN 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 198830Z JUN 68		COPY# OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RESTRICTIONS AND REDUCTION OF FIRE SUPT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS FOR <i>Copies 3+4 burned 4 dec 68</i> <i>Copy #3 to G-3 21 Jan 68 thru Holloman Jan 26 Jun 65 thru</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #36

SECRET

ZDVVV VPF209
 OO RUMHMA RUMUGRA
 DE RUMHVP 7307D 1710330
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 190830Z JUN 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RUMHMA/CG PCV
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

FOR

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROSSON AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN DAVIS
 RESTRICTIONS AND REDUCTION OF FIRE SUPT

1. RECENT DIRECTIVES WHICH PRESCRIBED SUDDEN DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN AVAILABLE SUPT WERE NOT RECEIVED IN TIME TO PERMIT REDISPOSITION OF 3D MARDIV FORCES TO ENSURE MINIMUM SECURITY.
2. MSG RECEIVED THIS CMD FROM CTG 70.3.9 AT 181130Z JUN 68 STATED THAT DMZ SHIPS WERE DIRECTED BY COM 7TH FLEET TO DEPART FIRE SUPT AREA DURING DARKNESS. FURTHER STATED INTENT WAS TO REMAIN THIRTY MILES FROM DMZ BUT WOULD BE READY FOR EMERGENCY CALL FIRE SUPT MISSIONS.
3. INFORMATION FROM USAF GRP DONG HA STATED THAT A STERILE AREA WAS IN EFFECT THROUGH LAST NIGHT (18JUN68). STERILE AREA WAS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: SOUTH BOUNDARY EXTENDING FROM DONG HA EAST (090-DEGREES) TO GULF OF TONKIN AND WEST (270-DEGREES) FROM DONG HA TO THE N-S GRID 00. NORTH OF GRID YD 00 TO GULF OF TONKIN. SOUTH ALONG COAST TO POINT

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 7307D S E C R E T
 EAST OF DONG HA.

4. CURRENT 3D MARDIV OPERATIONS IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE ARE ON A MINIMUM FORCE, HIGH RISK BASIS WHICH REQUIRE IMMEDIATE MAXIMUM SUPT WHEN CONTACT IS MADE. CURRENT ARVN AND 3D MARDIV OPERATIONS ABOVE CAM LO WERE IN CONTACT THROUGH MUCH OF THE DAY AND NIGHT IN THE PRESCRIBED "STERILE AREA" IT WAS NECESSARY TO WORK WELL INTO THE NIGHT BEFORE OUR NEEDS FOR TOT'S AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSE MEDEVAC AND OTHER ESSENTIAL SUPT WERE RECOGNIZED.
5. THE EXACT NATURE OF THE CURRENT ENEMY ACTIVITY MANIFESTED IN NUMEROUS VISUAL AND RADAR SIGHTINGS IS NOT KNOWN. HOWEVER ON NIGHTS OF 15 AND 16 JUN 68 NIGHT SUPPORTING ARMS FIRES WERE CURTAILED DUE TO FRIENDLY ACFT OPERATING IN DMZ AREA. ON THE NIGHT OF 17JUN68 A LARGE STERILE AREA COMMENCING NORTH OF DONG HA AND EXTENDING INTO THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF NORTH VIETNAM WAS ENFORCED. IN ADDITION NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIPS DEPARTED FROM THE AREA AND WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE SUPT. THIS RESULTED IN A SERIOUS REDUCTION OF SUPPORTING FIREPOWER AND REDUCED FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS IN EMPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE FIREPOWER.
6. THE MINIMUM REACTION TIME OF ONE-HOUR RESULTING FROM THE DEPARTURE OF NGF SHIPS, THE LOSS OF NGF SUPT EXCEPT IN EMERGENCIES AND THE LARGE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

TO
 THREE THREE RUMZUP 7307D S E C R E T
 AREA DESCRIBED IN PAR "3" CREATED AN UNDESIRABLE SITUATION.
 THE NEED FOR MEASURES TO RESOLVE THE UNUSUAL CURRENT ENEMY ACTIVITY IS
 APPARENT. HOWEVER SOME OF THE MEASURES APPEAR TO BE SOMEWHAT DRASTIC
 IN VIEW OF THE TOTAL GEMY AND TACTICAL SITUATION.
 ACCORDINGLY IT IS REQUESTED THAT FUTURE CHANGES IN SUPT OF
 RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS BE COORDINATED WITH ARVN AND 3D MARDIV
 ON A MORE TIMELY BASIS AND WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR OPERATIONS
 IN PROGRESS.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

436

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM AWFL KIRTLAND AFB NMEX
CG	✗					SERIAL 182208Z JUN 68 COPY# 4 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	✗					SUBJECT TDY TO SEA OF AFWL PERSONNEL.
DCG AIR						REMARKS
C/S	1.		6/19		Q	FOR
DC/S			4/19		PK	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2	Copy					
G-3	Copy					
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			191345		DKW	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

*"Copies 2 & 3 burned
 4 Nov 68"*

#34

PT000045
 PTTUZYUW RUMTKIA1203 1702243-0000--RUMUGRA.
 ZNR 00000
 P 182208Z JUN 68
 FM AFWL KIRTLAND AFB NMEX
 TO RUEBBAA/AFSC/SCT
 INFO RUEFHQA/CSAF/AFRDD
 RUEBBAA/AFSC/SCGA
 RUCIFGA/ASD/ASJC/WPAFB OHIO
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DA NANG RVN
 RUMUFKA/MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND/MACSA/TSN AB RVN
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS WLG
 DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS
 FOR BRIG GEN GILBERT, SCT. INFO COL LEAF, AFRDD; BRIG GEN
 CHAIRSELL, SGCA; MR REAMER, ASJC; CAPT BAILY, III MAF. SUBJECT:
 TDY TO SEA OF AFWL PERSONNEL. REFERENCE CONFIDENTIAL WLG MESSAGE
 DATED 17 JUN. SUBJECT AS ABOVE. THIS MESSAGE REFERENCE TELEPHONE
 CONVERSATION BETWEEN CAPTAIN LANIER, DDR&E, AND COL MUNYON, AFWL,
 18 JUN, WHICH PROVIDES VERBAL AUTHORITY FROM MR. LEONARD SULLIVAN,
 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SEA MATTERS, DDR&E, TO DEPLOY AFWL ADVANCE
 PARTY TO REPORT TO THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR, MACV, SAIGON. CONFIRMING
 MESSAGE WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN THE WEEK FROM DDR&E OR JCS. COL

PAGE 2 RUMTKIA1203 UNCLAS
 MUNYON AND MAJ STURGES WILL DEPART TRAVIS AFB ON FLT W-243 0100 21
 JUN 68.
 BT

COPY 4 OF 6 COPIES

#34

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC (FWD)		DATE 19 JUN 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 180155Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PROPOSED ITIN. FOR VISIT TO REHAB SUBIC AND MARCORPS ACT. OKI.
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS FOR "Copies 3 & 4 burned 4 Nov 68" #2
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		6/19		ds	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	191030			JHW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PT009850
 SD-PTTCZYUW RUABCMW0603 1700000 ~~VRUMU-CCCC~~--VRUMUGRA.
 PTTCZYUW RUABCMW0603 1700000 RUMU-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
 PTTCZYUW RUABCMW0603 1700000-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 DE RUABCM 018A 1700155
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 180155Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAG
 INFO ZEN/CG 9TH MAG
 RUYEUAE/CTG 79.5
 BT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FM MAJEN BOUKER INFO
 HGEN CHIP AND CO BUTCHER
 PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR VISIT TO BLT REHAB SSBIC AND MARCORPS
 ACTIVITIES, OKINAWA(U)
 1.(C) FULL ITINERARY IS PROPOSED FOR SSBIC VISIT. ALL TIMES
 LOCAL AND TRAVEL VIA C-39.
 A. FRI 21 JUN
 0900 - DEP DANANG
 1115 - ARR CUBI PT NAS
 1115 - 1400 - VISIT BLT REHAB/TRNG
 1500 - DEP CUBI PT NAS
 1615 - ARR FUTEMA, OKI
 B. SAT 22 JUN

PAUL YOU RUABCM 018A **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
 0830 - 1030 - BRIEFING AT 3RD FSR
 1030 - 1200 - VISIT OTHER MARCORPS ACTS OKI AS DESIRED.
 C. SUN 23 JUNE
 FREE
 D. MON 24 JUNE
 0900 - DEP FUTEMA
 1015 - ARR CUBI PT NAS
 1115 - DEP CUBI PT NAS
 1315 - ARR DANANG
 2.(U) ACCOMMODATIONS FOR YOU ARE AID ARRANGED AT PLAZA
 HENSENG AREA OKI. SEDAN AND DRIVER AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT
 VISIT.
 WARR REWARDS
 GPM

III MAF 2100/L (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#33

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM		DATE	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 181102		18 JUNE 68 1, 2, 3, of 4 COPIES OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
✓	CG					DISCONTINUE LOG
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
	C/S		6/18			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		181930H		TCK	
	G-1					
	G-2	I				
	G-3	A				Copy # 2 provided 6-3
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"Copies 2 & 3 burned
4-11-68"

###

SECRET

#32

Z 181102Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM
S E C R E T MAC 8079 EYES ONLY
EFFECTIVE NOW PLEASE DISCONTINUE THE SPECIAL FOUR HOURLY
REPORT THAT I LEVIED ON YOU.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
040

NNNN

SECRET

32

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 521c (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG THIRD MARDIV		DATE 18 JUN 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 170530Z JUN 68		COPY# OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTERS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS Copy # 3 CG FMAW <i>Shaw</i> 140950H Copy # 4 loaned 4/20/68 FOR
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET +30

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG THIRD MARDIV		18 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			170530Z JUN 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/20			<p>REMARKS</p> <p>CG - It would appear to me that a matter like this could best be handled by an exchange of views between the two division Comd'rs and the Wing Comd'r, followed by discussion at the III MAF level.</p> <p>90 and then put everyone's weight behind the proposal.</p> <p>I agree. <i>Completed</i></p> <p>6. 30</p>
3	DCG		6/21			
4	DCG AIR		6/19			
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	190730			DKW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

VV MWB 852MMZVA 89 3VV PVA485
 OO RUMUGRA
 DE RUMHVP 602SD 169053Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 17053Z JUN 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC (0252)
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW -

FOR

BT

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM MGEN DAVIS
 VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTERS

1. AS A FOLLOW UP TO MY DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON FIXED WING RECON-
 NAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE
 HELICOPTERS. FROM EXPERIENCE IN THIS AO, I BELIEVE THERE IS AN
 URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR A SURVEILLANCE "MAP OF THE EARTH" VISUAL
 RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE YIELDING REAL TIME READOUTS ON THE PRECISE
 CONDITIONS IN HLZ'S AND OTHER KEY VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE TARGETS.
 WITH A PROPER AIRCRAFT WE CAN OBSERVE SUCH THINGS AS SURFACE
 BOOBY TRAPS, HEIGHT OF ELEPHANT GRASS AND OTHER OBSTACLES
 WHICH HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS GONE UNDETECTED IN SELECTED
 HLZ'S DESPITE INTENSIVE USE OF CURRENTLY AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE
 VEHICLES, TO OUR CONSIDERABLE DISCOMFORT.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 602SD SECRET

2. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW AS THE CUSTOMER FOR THIS TYPE OF RECON-
 NAISSANCE EFFORT, BOTH THE OV10A AND THE UH-1 LEAVE
 MUCH TO BE DESIRED FOR THIS TYPE OF MISSION.
 A. THE OV10A IS OVERDUE IN COUNTRY; IT'S PERFORMANCE IN THE FIELD
 IS SPECULATIVE AND IT APPEARS BOTH LARGER AND MORE COMPLEX
 THAN DESIRABLE FOR LOW ALTITUDE VR.
 B. THE UH-1 PRESENTS AN EXCESSIVELY LARGE, NOISY, VIBRATING
 AND VULNERABLE TARGET IN AN AIRFRAME WITH MANY UNDESIRABLE
 CHARACTERISTICS FOR VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE.
 (1) EXCESS VIBRATION PRECLUDES EFFECTIVE USE OF BINOCULARS.
 (2) NOISE LEVELS BOTH ALERT THE ENEMY AND PREVENT HEARING
 FIRE INCLUDING THAT DIRECTED AT THE AIRCRAFT.
 (3) LATERAL VISIBILITY TO THE RIGHT IS UNSATISFACTORY FROM
 THE COPILOTS SEAT, ANY REAR SEAT POSITION IS UNSATISFACTORY TO
 ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AND THE JUMP SEAT IS UNSATISFACTORY IN
 ALL DIRECTIONS.
 (4) IF NOT IN THE COPILOTS SEAT THE OBSERVER HAS NO RADIO
 COMMUNICATIONS. EVEN IF HE IS IN THE COPILOTS SEAT, HE HAS
 ONLY ONE INSTEAD OF THE TWO FM RADIOS REQUIRED.
 C. THE 9Z MINUTE ENDURANCE ACHIEVED WITH UH-1 VR IS UNSATIS-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
#30

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHVP 6229D S E C R E T
FACTORY.

D. FROM INCOMPLETE DATA AVAILABLE HERE, IT APPEARS THAT THE UH-1 IS MORE VULNERABLE DUE TO ITS SIZE AND DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS THAN IS THE CASE WITH OTHER AVAILABLE OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT.

3. SINCE WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH UH-1'S FOR THE MANY MISSIONS FOR WHICH IT IS WELL SUITED; THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR SOME OTHER ALREADY AVAILABLE AND COMBAT TESTED OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT.

4. FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE AIR CAVALRY AND MY DIVISION AO'S, THE OH-6 APPEARS TO BE THE OBSERVATION HELICOPTER OF CHOICE.

A. IT HAS CONSIDERABLY LESS VIBRATION AND IS MUCH QUIETER THAN THE UH-1.

B. WITH ONLY A PILOT AND OBSERVER ABOARD, AN UNDURANCE OF 4 HOURS IS ACHIEVEABLE.

C. LATERAL VISIBILITY IS MUCH SUPERIOR.

D. BECAUSE IT IS SMALLER AND MORE MANEUVERABLE, IT IS HARDER TO HIT; WHEN HIT A NUMBER OF NEW DESIGN FEATURES ENHANCE SURVIVABILITY CONSIDERABLY OVER THE UH-1.

E. COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS ARE BASICALLY SATISFACTORY

PAGE FOUR RUMHVP 6229D S E C R E T

ALTHOUGH AN ADDITIONAL FM RADIO IS DESIRABLE.

F. BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIVE CHEAPNESS, SMALL SIZE AND SIMPLICITY IT IS ALSO AN EXTREMELY ATTRACTIVE REGIMENTAL C AND C AIRCRAFT WHEN COMPARED TO OTHER HELO TYPES IN MARINE CORPS SERVICE.

5. THE NAVY HAS OBTAINED 22 UH-1' ON LOAN FROM THE ARMY FOR GAME WARDEN OPERATIONS UNDER A MOST SATISFACTORY INTERDEPARTMENTAL AGREEMENT. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN A DOZEN OR SO OH-6'S FOR THIS DIVISION'S AO UNDER A SIMILAR AGREEMENT. IF NECESSARY, I THINK WE SHOULD BE READY TO AGREE TO REPLACEMENT OUT OF PANN FUNDED NEW PRODUCTION OBTAINING THE FUNDS, AS A LAST RESORT, FROM FUNDED PROGRAMS FOR MEDIUM AND HEAVY TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS.

CP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
#30

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMBACT		DATE 17 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL N/CONTROL DATE 3121101		1, 2, 3, or 4 COPIES OF COPIES REQD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/18			REMARKS
2	DCG		6/18		Boyer	
3	DCG AIR					
7.1	C/S		6/17		R	
	D C/S		6/20		R	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	172045			JW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

"Copies 203 burned
4-11-68"

~~373~~
SECRET #28

C 1711ZC ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTC CUSHMAN CG III MAF
INFO LTC ROSSON CG PCV
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 8023 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: MODIFIED POSTURE IN KNE SAHM

REF: SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DTG 110115Z JUNE 68 (S) FROM III MAF
I HAVE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF YOUR PROPOSAL. YOU WILL BE
INFORMED AS SOON AS A DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING DUTY HOURS
075

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			GEN ABRAMS		17 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	1, 2, & 3		
			170012Z JUNE 68	COPY#	OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MAC 8002 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
✓	CG		6/18			REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/17		Q	
	D C/S		6/18		Q	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	171400			EBUN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

*"Copies 2 & 3 Burned
4-11-68"*

SECRET #27

0 170438Z ZTR 077-1
FM GEN ABAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTC CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

SECRET MAC 8802 EYES ONLY

1. (C) REFERENCE THE ENEMY HELO INCIDENTS 15 TO 17 JUNE IN
CUA VIET -- CAP MUI LAY--TIGER ISLAND AREA, AN UNNECESSARILY
CONFUSED PICTURE EMERGES FROM REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES.
TO GET A CLEAR PICTURE WE MUST MANAGE THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES
AND TIGHTEN UP OUR CONTROL OF THE SYSTEM TO ENSURE REALISTIC
REPORTS WHICH WILL PERMIT VALID ANALYSIS AND ACCURATE
ESTIMATES OF THE ENEMY.

2. (C) AT THIS POINT I ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE ARE ENEMY
HELOS OPERATING ABOVE THE BON HAI, PURPOSE UNDETERMINED.
OUR NEXT MOVE IS TO CONFIRM THE PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY HELOS
AND DISCOVER THE OPERATING LANDING ZONES. TO THAT END 7AF
IS LAUNCHING A RECON EFFORT, VISUAL AND WITH ALL TYPES OF
SENSORS. TONIGHT ARMED AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN
THE EASTERN 802 AREA BY 7AF IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE RECON
EFFORT. WHEN THIS INFORMATION IS IN HAND, WE WILL ENGAGE THE
TARGETS WITH THE APPROPRIATE MEANS: TACTICAL AIR, B-52'S,
OR BCF, OR A COMBINATION THEREOF.

3. (C) REQUEST YOU TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO WASH THE VARIOUS
REPORTING AGENCIES AVAILABLE TO YOU TO PRODUCE TIMELY
CORRELATED, EVALUATED OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

4. (S) I HAVE DIRECTED THE CANCELLATION OF THE
MOVEMENT OF THE BAWK BATTERY FROM CHU LAI TO DONG WA
AS THE THREAT FROM ARMED HELOS DOES NOT WARRANT THE
MOVE. AS OF NOW I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT ENEMY JET
AIRCRAFT WERE INVOLVED IN THE EVENTS OF THE LAST TWO
NIGHTS.

CP-4

SEO NOTE: DELIVERY IMMEDIATELY
250

NNNN

SECRET

O 161035Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DNG
ZEM
C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 7595 EYES ONLY
1. (C) YOUR REQUEST TO OBSERVE REHAB AT SUBIC AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
21-24 JUNE APPROVED.
GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING DUTY HOURS
050

NNNN

K

CONFIDENTIAL

26

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CMC		15 JUN 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			161621Z JUN 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/17		le	URBAN WARFARE (U) REMARKS For CG I believe the substance of this may should go to only subordinate Comd's. However this cannot be done until we receive it officially. <i>Yes</i>
3	DCG		6/17		Rmet	
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		6/16			
	D C/S		4/17		M	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	160805H			SW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

*"Copies 20 3 Bureau
4 Nov 68"*

33
SECRET #24

SECRET

RR RUHNFMA
 DE RUEBHOA25 73 1671621
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUHNFMA-T-RUMUGRA
 R 15 1621Z JUN68
 RM CMC

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT MCEO FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
 1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
 ACTION AS APPROPRIATE.

O 141007Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

INFO ADM SHARP CINCPAC

ZEM

SECRET MAC 7671 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: URBAN WARFARE (U)

(S) MACV/JCS HAVE COMPLETED A COMBINED STUDY, "COMBAT
 TACTICS TO MINIMIZE DESTRUCTION TO CIVILIAN PROPERTY IN
 URBAN AREAS". I HAVE APPROVED THE FOLLOWING STUDY
 RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THAT US/RVNAF FORCES IMPROVE THEIR URBAN AREA

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA25 73 SECRET SPECAT MCEO

DEFENSE PLANS SO THAT THE ENEMY IS INTERCEPTED AND ENGAGED
 BEFORE REACHING THE CITIES.

B. THAT THE DECISION TO USE NAPALM, INDIRECT ARTILLERY,
 HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND TACTICAL AIR FOR CLOSE FIRE SUPPORT
 IN URBAN AREAS BE RETAINED AT CORPS/FIELD FORCE LEVEL.

C. THAT SELECTED RVNAF UNITS BE EQUIPPED ASAP WITH 90
 AND 106MM RECOILLES RIFLES FOR CLOSE FIRE SUPPORT IN URBAN
 AREA FIGHTING.

D. THAT DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS WILL BE USED TO THE MAXIMUM
 WHEN NECESSARY, TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY STRONG POINTS OR
 FORTIFIED STRUCTURES IN URBAN AREAS.

E. THAT RVNAF UNITS RECEIVE ADDITIONAL URBAN WARFARE TRAINING
 AND USE TO THE MAXIMUM TANK/INFANTRY TEAMS IN URBAN AREA OPERATIONS.

F. THAT HELICOPTERS BE USED TO MANUEVER TROOPS AND HEAVY
 WEAPONS TO ROOFS OF KEY BUILDING AND OTHER LOCATIONS TO EXPEDITE
 CORDONING THE ENEMY.

G. THAT US/RVNAF UNITS AND THEIR COMMANDERS, CHARGED WITH
 DEFENSE OF KEY URBAN AREAS, BE GIVEN EXTENSIVE REFRESHER TRAINING
 URBAN WARFARE TACTICS AND THAT THESE UNITS CONDUCT EXERCISES
 TO PRACTICE AND IMPROVE THESE TACTICS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#24

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA2573 S E C R E T S P E C I A T M C E O

H. THAT RVNAF UNITS BE EQUIPPED, TRAINED FOR, AND UTILIZE TO THE MAXIMUM CS RIOT CONTROL AGENST IN URBAN WARFARE. THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR A LARGE CALIBER CS PROJECTILE FOR THE ON HAND DIRECT FIRE DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

I. THAT SELECTED CS AGENT MUNITIONS BE CONTROLLED AND USED ONLY IN URBAN AREA OPERATIONS UNTIL THEATER STOCKS HAVE REACHEL REQUIRED LEVELS.

J. THAT MACV/JGS AND GVN AGENCIES INITIATE AN INTENSIVE PSYOP PROGRAM DIRECTED AT THE CIVILIAN POPULACE IN ALL URBAN AREAS OF RVN AS TO PROTECTIVE MEASURES, REFUGEE GUIDANCE, RESIST THE ENEMY AND SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT.

K. THAT LARGE SCALE (1:1000) DETAIL CITY MAPS BE MADE AVAIL- ABLE TO APPROPRIATE US/RVNAF UNITS AND THAT THESE UNITS BE PROVIDED AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE COMBAT AREA ON AN "ON CALL" BASIS.

L. THAT ALL DEFENSE PLANS BE REVIEWED TO INSURE THAT THERE IS AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE, TO INCLUDE US/RVNAF, NATIONAL POLICE AND OTHER GVN AGENCIES, AGAINST INFILTRATION OF VC/NVA SAPPER, ARSONIST, AND TERRORISTS INTO THE CITIES.

M. THAT THE DEFENSE PLANS PROVIDE FOR REFUGEE CARE.

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA2573 S E C R E T S P E C I A T M C E O

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND RESUPPLY TO NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES AND SECURITY FOR LOCAL GVN FIRE FIGHTING UNITS.

N. THAT JGS/GVN DEVELOP AN ACTIVE CIVILIAN SELF-DEFENSE PROGRAM DESIGNED TO AUGMENT WARNING NETS, CONTROL POINTS ON ROUTES OF ACCESS, MONITOR CURFEW VIOLATIONS AND REPORT VC/NVA COVERT ACTIVITES.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**
#24

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	<i>N</i>		<i>6/17</i>		<i>lp</i>	COMUSMACV SERIAL 151053Z JUN 68 COPY # 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT BOR
DCG AIR						REMARKS FOR <i>Referenced may be CGs request for permission to visit S&F at Subic and 3d FSE at Okin</i> <i>VR JCH</i>
C/S	<i>1.</i>		<i>6/16</i>		<i>CB</i>	
DC/S				<i>6/17</i>	<i>W</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			<i>160605H JUNE 68</i>		<i>DWU</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

*" # 364 burned
4 Nov 68"*

31

22

FOR

PT000024
RTTUZYUW RUMUHFA2605 1671100-UUUU--RUMUGRA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 151053Z JUN 68 ZFF6
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF
BT
UNCLAS 17217
FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM GEN ABRAMS
REFERENCE YOUR 150036Z OF 15 JUNE. REQUEST
APPROVED.
BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#22

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUSIVE

RR RUMDMA RUMDMA
 DE RUEBDA 2426 1662234
 ZNY 00000
 PAC-T-MAF
 R 142355Z JUNE 68
 RM 000
 TO RUEBDA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMDMA/CG DMFPAC
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL - EXCLUSIVE FOR LEGAL COUNSEL
 INFO - LIAISON BUREAU
 FROM GEN CHAINAN

1. AN ACQUAINTANCE OF MINE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, FATHER MICHAEL V. GANNON, DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION, WILL BE IN VIETNAM FOR ABOUT ONE MONTH DURING LATE JUNE. HE WILL BE VISITING AS AN ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENT OF AMERICA MAGAZINE, A CATHOLIC WEEKLY PUBLISHED IN NEW YORK CITY, WITH A CIRCULATION OF ABOUT 97,000.
 2. FATHER GANNON WILL ARRIVE IN SAIGON JUNE 19TH, AND WILL SPEND 2 DAYS THERE. HE WILL PROCEED TO LA NANG ON JUNE 21 OR 22 AND IS PLANNING TO REMAIN IN I CORPS FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS. I HAVE TOLD HIM TO CALL CIB WHEN HE ARRIVES. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR STEERING HIM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND ASSISTING IN ANY WAY. BELIEVE THE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM AND CIVIC ACTION WOULD BE AREAS OF GREAT INTEREST TO HIM. WARM REGARDS,
 GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC GS	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

21

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUHFMA
DE RUEBHOA 1906 1661201
ZNY CCCCC
PAC-T-PAC FWL
-T- III MAF
P 141200Z JUN 68
FM CMC
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC (FWD)
CG III MAF
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOR

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT MARCORPS EYES ONLY FROM GEN. CHAPMAN
FOR LGEN BUSE, LGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN BOKER.
CMC TELENIK (TELEPHONE NICKNAMES)

1. NEW EDITION SUBJECT DOCUMENT EFFECTIVE 191200Z JUN 68.
NEW EDITION DELIVERED BY CMC AIDE DURING JAN68 WESTPAC TRIP.
2. SUPERCEDED EDITION WITH EFFECTIVE DTG OF 151200Z AUG67

IS TO BE DESTROYED WITHOUT REPORT

3. REQUEST ADDRES ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT THIS MESSAGE ATTN:
CODE AC.

4. FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST SUBSTANCE THIS MESSAGE BE
PASSED TO BGEN MCLAUGHLIN, MACV COC.

GP-4

BT

*may passed to Gen
MCLAUGHLIN on security
157055H June 68
JCh*

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#19

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM ADMINO RUFFAG		DATE 12 JUL 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 1325372 JUL 68		COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TITLE OF INCIDENT ANALYSIS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE <i>Copy # 2 burned 4/26/68 92</i> <i>Copy # 3 to Air Control. 14 Jun 68 92</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #18

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM ADMINO FMFPAC		DATE 14 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 132337Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	EG		6/15			REMARKS EXCLUSIVE
3	DCG		6/15		Dueb	
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		6/14	6/15	Q	
	D C/S				R	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		41600H	6/15	JUN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

27

SECRET #18

SECRET

PP RUMSAK RUEBHOA
 DE RUHFMA 2331 1652537
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 132337 JUN 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 RUMSAK/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN
 CUSHMAN AND MAJGEN ANDERSON FROM MGEN THARIN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

A. ADMINO FMFPAC 112358Z/JUN68 (NOTAL)

B. CG FIRST MAW 232302Z/APR68

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR STATISTICS
 PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND TO
 PROVIDE COMPARATIVE DATA FOR THE STATISTICS SUB-
 MITTED BY REFERENCE A, A COMPUTER PRINTOUT OF
 THE FIRST MAW DASC RECORD ENTRY LOGS HAS BEEN
 PERFORMED FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 21 MAR 1968.
 THIS PRINTOUT OF THE DASC FUNCTIONS IS THE
 FIRST OF THE SERIES REQUESTED BY MAJOR WRIGHT,
 DCS AIR/AM FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS. THE

PAGE 2 RUHFMA2331 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 REMAINDER OF THE MILESTONES FOR PRINTOUTS OF THE
 DASC RECORD ENTRY LOGS ARE 22 JUNE FOR THE PERIOD
 1 APR THROUGH 31 MAY, 3 JUL FOR THE PERIOD
 1 JUN THROUGH 28 JUN AND 12 JULY FOR THE PERIOD
 1 JUN THROUGH 30 JUN. A CONCURRENT PRINTOUT OF
 THE TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS WILL BE COMPLETED FOR
 THESE SAME PERIODS, INCLUDING THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO
 21 MAR 68. THESE STATISTICS WILL PROVIDE THE BEST
 DATA BASE AVAILABLE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
 RESPONSIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR PROCEDURES ESTAB-
 LISHED BY COMUSMACV.

3. THE INITIAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY FOR WHICH THE
 DASC/TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS WERE CONSTRUCTED WAS
 TO PRESENT A TIME RESPONSE PICTURE OF MARINE AIRCRAFT
 SUPPORT IN VIETNAM. THE ENTRIES TO THE DASC RECORD
 LOGS MISSION RESPONSE TIME TO MARINE GROUND UNITS
 WHILE THE ENTRIES TO THE TADC RECORD LOGS THE TOTAL
 MISSION SUPPORT BY FIRST MAW. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE
 IS VERY LITTLE OVERLAP REGARDING THE INFORMATION
 RECEIVED FROM THE DASC/TADC REPORTS AND THE INFOR-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#18

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA2331 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DAILY SPECIAL REPORT ESTABLISHED
 BY REFERENCE B WHICH FOCUSES ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR
 SUPPORT IN TERMS OF SORTIES REQUESTED AND THOSE
 WHICH ARE PROVIDED TO THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDER.
 4. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DATA PRO-
 VIDED BY THE PRINTOUT OF THE DASC/TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS
 FROM 1 JAN THROUGH 31 JAN BE UTILIZED PRIMARILY FOR COMPAR-
 ATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IN ICITZ
 PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR SUPPORT
 PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY COMUSMACV 20MAR68 AND THE
 EVOLUTIONARY GROWTH OF THE NEW SYSTEM SINCE ITS INCEPTION
 THROUGH 31 JUN. THE DATA PROVIDED BY REFERENCE B
 EFFECTIVELY RECORDS WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE DAILY SINCE 3
 APR REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIR AND THE AIR
 SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MARINE GROUND UNITS IN ICITZ.
 5. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
 IS PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST AND IS THE
 RESULT OF THE PRINTOUT DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH ONE:
 A. TO PARAGRAPH ONE REFERENCE A ADD PERIOD (D)
 310021 JAN TO 212402 MAR,

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA2331 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 B. TO PARAGRAPH ONE ECHO REFERENCE A ADD (D) 83.3
 C. TO PARAGRAPH ONE FOXTROT REFERENCE A ADD (D)
 53.7
 D. CHANGE PARAGRAPH ONE INDIA, REFERENCE A TO READ
 QUOTE: THAT (A) 62.8 (B) 54.5 (C) 52.5 (D) 36.4
 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE
 PREPLANNED, (A) 28.7 (B) 35.6 (C) 38.2 (D) 13.6 PERCENT
 WERE IMMEDIATES (OF WHICH (A) 66.9 (B) 55.8 (C) 52.3
 (D) 18.9 PERCENT WERE FROM SCRAMBLES) AND (A) 8.5 (B)
 9.4 (C) 8.9 (D) (NOT AVAILABLE) PERCENT WERE EXTRA OR
 ADD ON SORTIES: UNQUOTE.
 E. TO PARAGRAPH ONE JULIET REFERENCE A ADD (D)
 31.6 AND (D) 18.4 IN THAT ORDER.
 5. ONE COPY OF THE TWENTY FOUR PAGE PRINTOUT OF THE
 DASC RECORD ENTRY LOG FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 21 MAR IS
 BEING FORWARDED BY REGISTERED MAIL, NUMBER 7088 ABCARD
 UAL FLIGHT 58 ARRIVING FRIENDSHIP AIRPORT 140630Z LOCAL.
 INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE, ADDRESSED TO MAJ G. WRIGHT,
 ARE THE HEADING DEFINITIONS TO FACILPATE READING THIS
 INITIAL PRINTOUT. ALSO INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE, AS A

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA2331 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 MATTER OF INTEREST, ARE THE USAF FORMS USED AT I
 DASC AND DASC V TO RECORD COMPARABLE DATA DURING THE
 JUNE EVALUATION PERIOD. FUTURE PRINTOUTS OF THE DASC/
 TADC RECORD ENTRY LOGS WILL BE FORWARDED AS THEY BECOME
 AVAILABLE IN ADDITION TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA PRO-
 VIDED BY REFERENCE B. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
 ST

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#18

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM ADMINSO FMFPAC		DATE 14 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 132256Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/15			REMARKS Di taking necessary action FOR Respy J.
3	DCG		6/15			
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		6/14		DKW	
	D C/S		6/15			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	14/0945	6/15		DKW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"Copies 3 & 4 burned
4 Nov 68"

26

SECRET

#17

SECRET

FILE 7 CON 290

		FROM ADMINS FMFPAC	DATE 14 JUN 68
		SERIAL# 132256Z JUN 68	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT DEP CG FMFPAC VISIT 22-25 JUN 68	
6/14	<i>D. W. Wagon</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
6/14	<i>C. S. G. sen.</i>		
6/15	<i>[Signature]</i>		
6/15	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPY 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#17

SECRET

* SECRET *

JUN 19 8 30 AM '68

PT007704
PTTSZYUW RUMHEMA2318 1652256-SSSS--RUMUGRA.
ZNY SSSSS
P 132256Z JU 68
FM ADMENO FMFPAC
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BY

FOR

SECRET
FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN THARIN
DEP CG FMFPAC VISIT 22 - 25 JUN 68 (U)
DURING VISIT YOUR COMMAND 22-25 JUNE I WOULD LIKE
TO INCLUDE VISITS TO THE MARINE DIVISION HQS, WING HQ,
FLC AND YANKEE STATION (WITH RON). OTHER LOCATIONS
AS YOU PROPOSE. BASIC PURPOSE OF VISIT, BESIDES BEING
CG FMFPAC REP TO WING AND 1ST DIV CHANGES OF COMMAND,
IS TO OBTAIN AN UPDATE ON III MAF OPERATIONS TO ASSIST
IN MY NEXT JOB.
REQUEST YOU MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT TO YANKEE
STATION ON 23RD OR 24TH. WARM REGARDS.

CP-1

NNNN#

SECRET
17

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 13 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 131130Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT (C)
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/15		J	REMARKS Copy 5 to FED Copy 6 to LGEN BOSE'S AIDE
3	DCG		6/15		J	
4	DCG AIR		6/15		J	
1	C/S		6/15		Q	
	D C/S		6/15		R	
	D C/S DM		6/15		R	
	S/S	140559H JUN 68	6/15		SKW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR	A				
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

25

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PT007616
 RTTCZYUW RUEBHOA1272 1651130-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 131130Z JUN 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMIIVP/CG 3RD MAR DIV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR LTGEN BUSE, LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN DAVIS
 AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT (C)
 A. CG 3RD MAR DIV 051405Z JUN 68
 B. CG FMFPAC 082004Z JUN 68
 1. REF A STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR 3 RUBBER TIRED TRACTORS IN MODEL 3414 AND 3 TRACTORS, FULL TRACKED IN MODEL TD 340. REF B CONCURRED AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE PROCUREMENT BE FOR 8 OF EACH ITEM VICE 3 AND THAT EQUIVALENT EQUIPMENT OF TOP MANUFACTURERS WOULD BE SUITABLE.
 2. RUBBER TIRED TRACTOR MODEL 3414 REFERRED TO IN REF A HAS BEEN REPLACED BY IH MODEL 3444. HOWEVER THE AVAILABILITY OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS 90 DAYS. EQUIVALENT CASE TRACTOR MODEL 580 WITH FRONT END LOADER, BACKHOE AND EARTH AUGER IS AVAILABLE WITHIN 30 DAYS.
 3. IH TRACTOR MODEL 340 REFERRED TO IN REF A HAS BEEN REPLACED BY IH

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA1272 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
 MODEL TD 500. HOWEVER AVAILABILITY IS 90 DAYS, EQUIVALENT CASE TRACTOR MODEL 450 IS AVAILABLE WITHIN 30 DAYS.
 4. ACTION IS BEING TAKEN TO EXPEDITE PROCUREMENT AND DELIVERY OF CASE MODEL 580 AND 450 WITH ONE YEAR SPARE PARTS. REPLACEMENT PLAN FOR SPARE PARTS IS BEING FORMULATED.
 GP-4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL#16
FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

FTZYZUW RUMHCTA2368 1640000-13353 --RUMUGRA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 DE RUMHFL 1356 1641350
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 121350Z JUN 68
 FM CG FORLOGCOMD LNG RVN
 TO RUMHWP/CG THIRD MARD IV
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF LNG RVN
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS E F T O
 FOR MGEN DAVIS
 SUPPLY ASSISTANCE ON NETS, CARGO 20,000 LB FSN 1670-781-9222
 A. YR MSG 110635Z JUNE 68R
 B. CG MCSA PHILA 25 1503Z JUNE 68
 C. YR MSG 100524/2 JUNE 68 (NOTAL)
 1. BE ADVISED THAT APPROX 75 REPEAT 75 CARGO NETS 10,000 LBS
 ARE BEING PROCURED FROM NSA, LANANG FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO
 THIRD SHORE PARTY AT DONG HA BY AIRBN
 2. I HAVE CONTACTED THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL AND CG MCSA PHILA
 AND REQUESTED THEIR PERSONAL INTERVENTION TO OBTAIN ASSETS OF
 EITHER THE 10,000 LB OR 20,000 LB. NETS FROM EITHER OTHER SERVICES
 OR CONTRACTUAL SOURCES. THEY HAVE ADDITIONALLY BEEN REQUESTED
 TO PROVIDE FIRM QTY'S AND DELIVERY DATES FOR THAT MATERIAL CURRENTLY
 ON CONTRACT.

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 1356 UNCLAS E F T O
 3. REF'S B AND C REFER.

4. BGEN OLSON SENDS.
 BT

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG THIRD MARDIV		12 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
			120920Z JUN 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/14		LD	1ST BN 4TH MAR CONTACT OF 11 APRIL AT LZ TOBCH REMARKS At least we are permitted a full report of all circumstances. [Signature] PERSONAL FOR
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		6/12		[Signature]	
	D C/S		4/14		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	122055	4/14		[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #12

SECRET

VV VPF 689

OO RUMUGRA
 DE RUMHVP 3999D 1640920
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 120920Z JUN 68
 FM CG 3D MARDIV
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

(PERSONAL FOR)

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN DAVIS
 SUBJ: 1ST BN 4TH MAR CONTACT OF 11 APRIL AT LZ TORCH
 1. ATTACK DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS WAS MADE BY ESTIMATED ENEMY BATTALION SUPPORTED BY 82MM MORTAR S.T.RIP FLARES AND CLAYMORES WERE EMPLACED BUT NO FORTIFICATIONS SUCH AS SUBSTANTIAL BUNKERS OR CONCERTINA HAD BEEN COMPLETED. ALL PERSONNEL WERE WELL DUG IN. FRIENDLY ARTY WAS REGISTERED AND BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRES WERE EMPLOYED DURING THE GROUND ATTACK AND ATTACK BY FIRE.
 2. I HAD PERSONALLY INSPECTED THE POSITIONS AT LZ TORCH AT TIME OF ARTILLERY INSERT. GOOD DEFENSIVE TERRAIN, INSTRUCTED ARTY TO DIG IN AND PREPARE POSITION WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED IN VIEW OF ENY ARTY/MORTAR CAPABILITY. MINIMAL HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE ENGR EQUIP AVAILALBE TO FORCES IN THIS AREA MAKE QUICK PREPARATION OF COVERED POSITIONS LIFFICULT.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 3999D S E C R E T

3. CASUALTIES MAINLY CAUSED BY MORTAR FIRE. CONTINUING SHORTAGE OF O-1 AIRCRAFT FOR TACTICAL AND ARTY SPORT MISSIONS PERMITS ENEMY HIGH DEGREE OF EFFENTIVENESS IN USE OF MORTARS IN THIS TERRAIN
 BREAKDOWN OF CASUALTY COUNT:

	1/4	C/ 1/ 12
KIA	13	1
WIA	80	33

4. OF THE 14 KIA AND 113 MEDEVAC RESULTING FROM THE CONTACT, 5 KIA AND APPROX 30 MEDEVAC RESULTED FROM THE GROUND ATTACK. TOTAL OF TEN MEDEVACS CLASSIFIED AS EMERGENCY. ATTACK BY FIRE CAME AS FREILNLY TROOPS WERE POLICING THE BATTLEFIELD AND COUNTING ENEMY DEAD, CURRENTLY AT 28 (C).

5. RAPID MOVEMENT OF INF AND ARTY UNITS BY HELICOPTER AND AERIAL RESUPPLY OF SUCH OPNS IS MEANS OF FIXING AND DESTROYING THE ENEMY WHICH WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING. THIS HIGH MOBILITY CONCEPT PRESENTS MANY PROBLEMS BUT THEY ARE BEING SOLVED.

INCREASING EXPERTISE AND AVAILABLITY OF AIR, ENGR AND ASSOCIATED ASSETS NECESSARY FOR ITS PROSECUTION IN MOUNTAINOUS, HIGH CANOPY COUNTRY WILL MOVE THE CONCEPT FORWARD AT A RAPID PACE.

6. MY INVESTIGATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNING INCIDENT CONTINUES.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#12

FT 006584
 FTTEZYUW RUMHCTA1981 0000163-EEEE --R UMUGRA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 DE RUMHVP 375 TD 1630635
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 110635Z JUN 68
 RM CG 3D MARDIV
 TO RUMHFL/CG FLC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

FOR

BT
 UNCLAS EFTO
 SUPPLY ASSISTANCE ON NETS, CARGO 20,000 LB FSN-
 1670-781-9220

A. CG MCSA PHILA 251503Z JUN 68
 B. MY 100524Z JUN 68
 RM BGEN OLSON

1. REF A STATED THAT SUBJ ITEMS BEING DIVERTED FROM
 PROCUREMENT FOR DIRECT DEL TO AC13550. INCREMENTED DEL
 TO COMMENCE 1 JULY 68 WITH COMPLETION BY 29 JAN 69.
 2. REF B REQUESTED CLARIFICATION FROM MCSA, PHILA ON
 INCREMENTED DEL AND STATED THAT DEL OVER 7 MONTH PERIOD
 TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.
 3. THE SUCCESS OF THE TACTICAL MISSION IN THIS AREA IS
 DEPENDENT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF SUBJECT NETS. REQUEST
 YOUR ASSISTANCE AND ALL POSSIBLE ACTION TO EXPEDITE
 DELIVERY OF SUBJ NETS.
 MAG GEN DAVIS SENLS.

BT

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

#10

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		6/12		lp	GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV SERIAL 111208 1, 2, 13 of 4 COPY # / OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG	3			6/12	revised	SUBJECT VISIT TO IV RTZ
DCG AIR						REMARKS For G-3 G-2 - Please comply for CG's release S/S send copy to G-2 G-3 Comment & msg to G-2 & G-3 at 112230H Jun 68 TM
C/S	1.		6/11		Q	
DC/S				6/12	re	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S			112035		DUN	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
 C - COMMENTS
 I - INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

O 111208Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV, SAIGON
TO LTG CUSHMAN, III MAF
LTG WEYAND, II FFV
MG PEERS, I FFV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 7712 EYES ONLY
I PLAN TO BE IN IV CTZ ON 13 AND 14 JUNE. I WILL RON AT
CAN THO. PLEASE SEND ME A WRAP UP OF YOUR CURRENT SITUATION
ON 13 JUNE FOR DELIVERY AT APPROXIMATELY 2100. INCLUDE
MG KERWIN AS INFO ADDRESSEE.

SSD NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

100

#8

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						SERIAL
DCG						COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT
C/S						REMARKS
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S						
S/C						

Copy # 2 to G 4 12 Jun 68
W. S. ...
 In 14 Jun 68

FOR

Copies 3 & 4 burned 4/11/68

LEGEND
 A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

#7

FOR

PT006505
 PYTEZYUW RUMHCTA1531 1630000-EEEE--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 DE RUMHVP 37830 1730720
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 110720Z JUN 68
 FM CG 3D MARDIV
 TO RUEBHQA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O

REQ FOR INFO ON PVT DONALD G SCARBERRY 2461311

1. THIS HQ IS IN RECEIPT OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM SNM. HIS WIFE AND MOTHER WHICH WAS ADDRESSED PERSONALLY TO MAJGEN R MC C. TOMPKINS. CORRESPONDENCE ALLEGES SNM MARRIED TO 15 YEAR OLD SPOSE NOW FOUR MONTHS PREGNANT AND THAT HIS OR HER PARENTS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOOD OR SHELTER FOR HIS SPOUSE.

2. CORRESPONDENCE ALLEGES SNM DUE TO LEAVE 29MAY68 AND NOT SPECIFIED IF SNM HAS ACTUALLY COMPLETED RECRUIT/ITR TRNG AND NOW ENROUTE WPGF. WORLD WIDE LOCATER DOES NOT SHOW SNM AND POSSIBILITY EXISTS HE MAY NOT HAVE YET COMPL RECRUIT TRNG.

3. REQ INFO AVAIL TO ASSIST IN PROPER DISPOSITION OF CORRESPONDENCE NOW HELD.

4. FOR CG III MAF. THIS MSG FOR MAJGEN TOMPLINS FOR INFO.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

7

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM ADMINDO FMFPAC		DATE 11 JUN 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 110358Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/12			REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
3	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
1	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	111955				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

Copy #3 of 3 to
PCCG (AIR)
Bl. Whyte 418 #2
c/s 9000 copy #2
to CG FMFPAC
DAN

SECRET #5

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PP RUMUGRA
 DE RUMHMA 1749 1630558
 ZNY 85558
 P 110000Z JUN 68
 FM ADMINO IMPFAC
 TO RUEBKHA/CMC
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM MGEN THARIN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
 A. COMUSMACV 211145Z/MAY68
 B. COMUSMACV 150905Z/MAR68
 C. CG FIRST MAW 030300Z/APR68
 D. CG FIRST MAW 041108Z/JUN68
 1. REFERENCE A MODIFIED THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR SUPPORT
 PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE B AS OF 300600H MAY68 TO
 PROVIDE QUOTE GREATER FLEXIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS AND
 CONTINUITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT
 TO MEET THE DAY BY DAY REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND COMMANDERS
 UNQUOTE. TO ASSIST IN ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF THIS
 MODIFICATION, THE DATA FOR THE PREVIOUS PERIODS OF
 APRIL AND MAY ARE PRESENTED FOR COM-

PAGE 2 RUMHMA1749 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 PARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE DATA ACCUMULATED FOR THE
 PERIOD FROM 311901 HOTEL MAY TO 071900 HOTEL JUN68
 IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT:
 (A) 031901APR TO 301900APR; (B) 001901APR TO 301900MAY;
 (C) 311901MAY TO 271900JUN.
 ALL DATA IS BASED ON REPORTY SUBMITTED IAW
 REFERENCE C AND AS MODIFIED BY REFERENCE D BY ALL TIMES
 HOTEL.

A. THAT (A) 74.1 (B) 88.3 (C) 84.2 PERCENT OF THE
 TOTAL SORTIES PROVIDED MARINE GROUND UNITS WERE FLOWN
 BY FIRST MAW, (A) 17.6 (B) 3.8 (C) 5.2 PERCENT BY
 USN, AND (A) 8.3 (B) 7.8 (C) 10.6 PERCENT BY USAF.

B. THAT (A) 42.6 (B) 42.4 (C) 52.0 PERCENT OF THE
 TOTAL SORTIES PROVIDED MARINE GROUND UNITS WERE PRE-
 PLANNED, (A) 42.8 (B) 34.4 (C) 25.3 PERCENT WERE EXTRA OR
 DD ON, AND (A) 14.6 (B) 23.2 (C) 22.7 PERCENT WERE
 IMMEDIATE.

C. THAT (A) 82.4 (B) 78.1 (C) 71.5 PERCENT OF THE
 MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED AND APPROVED PRE-
 PLANNED SORTIES WERE PROVIDED. DURING THE JUNE PERIOD

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#5

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHFMA1749 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
73.5 PERCENT WERE PROVIDED FROM THE WEEKLY PREPLANNED
FRAG AND 26.5 PERCENT FROM THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG.

D. THAT (A) 97.7 (B) 97.7 (C) 99.7 PERCENT OF THE
MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE AIR
SUPPORT SORTIES WERE PROVIDED. DURING THE JUNE PERIOD
53.6 PERCENT WERE SCRAMBLED AND 46.4 PERCENT DIVERTED
TO FULFILL IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS.

E. THAT (A) 62.1 (B) 62.9 (C) 78.0 PERCENT OF THE
MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED PREPLANNED SORTIES
ARRIVED WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF THE SCHEDULED TIME ON
TARGET.

F. THAT (A) 81.1 (B) 73.1 (C) 73.7 PERCENT OF THE
MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE SORTIES
ARRIVED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FROM THE TIME OF THE INITIAL
REQUEST.

G. THAT THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN
SATISFIED (A) 56.3 (B) 64.7 (C) 68.3 PERCENT OF THE
TIME WITH THE TYPE OF ORDNANCE DELIVERED.

H. THAT (A) 83.1 (B) 90.3 (C) 90.4 PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE IN I CTZ.

PAGE 4 RUMHFMA1149 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

I. THAT (A) 62.8 (B) 64.5 (C) 52.6 PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE PREPLANNED
(A) 28.7 (B) 38.6 (C) 38.2 PERCENT WERE IMMEDIATES
(OF WHICH (A) 66.9 (B) 65.8 (C) 60.3 PERCENT WERE
SCRAMBLES) AND (A) 8.5 (B) 9.4 (C) 8.8 PERCENT WERE
EXTRA OR ADD ON SORTIES.

J. THAT (A) 56.6 (B) 65.9 (C) 75.0 PERCENT OF
THE SORTIES FLOWN BY FIRST MAW WERE PROVIDED TO THE
MARINES AND (A) 43.4 (B) 34.1 (C) 25.0 PERCENT WERE
PROVIDED TO OTHER THAN MARINES.

2. IT CAN READILY BE SEEN FROM THIS INITIAL PERIOD OF
OBSERVATION DURING JUNE THAT NO AMOUNT OF AIR FORCE ACCOMMODATION
WILL RESOLVE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
CONCEPT FOR CONTROL OF AIR SUPPORT AND THE MARINE
CORPS AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. THE MOST PERTINENT POINTS
WHICH SUPPORT THIS RATIONALE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THAT MARINE GROUND UNITS ARE STILL RECEIVING
AIR SUPPORT FROM OTHER THAN CG FIRST MAW, WHO IN TURN
IS DIRECTED TO FLY MORE THAN ONE FOURTH OF HIS FIXED
WING EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF FORCES OTHER THAN MARINES.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

5

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHMFMA 1749 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

B. THAT ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER ONE HALF OF THE AIR SUPPORT RECEIVED BY MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS IS PREPLANNED.

C. THAT LESS THAN THREE FOURTHS OF THE APPROVED PREPLANNED SORTIES ARE RECEIVED BY MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS.

D. THAT SLIGHTLY LESS THAN ONE HALF OF THE IMMEDIATE SORTIES REQUIREMENTS WERE FULFILLED BY DIVERTING PREPLANNED SORTIES.

E. THAT MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS HAVE ONLY BEEN SATISFIED 66.3 PERCENT OF THE TIME WITH THE TYPE OF ORDNANCE DELIVERED.

F. THAT FIRST MAW FLEW 38.0 OF THEIR TOTAL EFFORT FULFILLING IMMEDIATE SORTIE REQUESTS AND THAT WELL OVER ONE HALF OF THESE (66.3 PERCENT) WERE PROVIDED BY SCHEDULES.

G. THE REMAINDER OF ITS EVALUATION PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE A WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

PAGE 6 RUHMFMA 1749 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
WILL FOLLOW. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#5

O 111202 ZYB ZFW-1
 FM MG PEERS, CG 18FW
 TO LTC CUSHMAN, CG 111 MAF
 ZEM

S E C R E T NHT 777 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: ALPHA ROAD

1. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT AT ACTION OFFICER LEVEL IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT OPERATION "TURNPIKE" SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT ALPHA ROAD (WITHIN COORDINATES YD296372, YD352368, YD350710, YD357018, THEN NORTH ALONG THE BORDER TO START POINT) WILL CONTINUE UNDER YOUR AUSPICES. I AM PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO SEE CONTINUED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA, WHICH IS A PRIMARY ENTRY AVENUE OF APPROACH INTO II CORPS. IN THE EVENT THE AIR FORCE SHIFTS ITS "TURNPIKE" EMPHASIS AWAY FROM ALPHA ROAD, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OF AIR STRIKES AND OBSERVATION COVERAGE OF ALPHA ROAD.

2. DAK PEK HAS SUDDENLY BECOME A CENTER OF ENEMY ACTIVITY, HENCE, I WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO EXPEDITE "TURNPIKE" AND TO ASSURE STRONG ACTION BY THE USAF. IN THE EVENT THERE IS ANY PROBLEM IN COORDINATING THIS REQUIREMENT, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO AGAIN TAKE OVER THE AO AS PART OF THE DAK PEK OPERATIONAL COMPLEX.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

200

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

M

PT CZ YUW RUABCMW 0057 162000Z-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUABQL 482B 1620015
ZNY CCCCC
P 100015Z JUN 68
RM CG NINTH MAF
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
BT

FOR

(SIC) CLAD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PERSONAL FROM BGEN CHIP FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
1. I PLAN TO VISIT SUBIC IN CONNECTION WITH REHAB OF
BLT 2/7 DEPARTING OKI ON 20 JUN VIA T-39. I WOULD BE
TAD TO ARRANGE T-39 FLIGHT TO PICK YOU UP AT
DANANG MORNING 21 JUN AND ACCOMPANY YOU ON A VISIT
TO THE REHAB PROGRAM. WOULD SUGGEST DEPARTING FROM SUBIC
ON AFTERNOON 21ST AFTER VISITING BLT REHAB.
FURTHER SUGGEST 2 DAYS ON OKI TO VISIT SUCH MARINE
CORPS ACTIVITIES AS YOU DESIRE. WILL ALSO ARRANGE
RETURN TRANSPORTATION TO DANANG MORNING 24 JUN.
PLEASE ADVISE.
VERY RESPECTFULLY
BT

RON - Bekner

SAT AM. 0830 3179R - no touch log

SUN Nothing

No dinner engagements.

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#3

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	2		6/9		6	AMB KOMER MAGJOIR MACV SAIGON
DCG	3				4/10 R...	SERIAL 090258ZJUNE68 1, 2 & 4 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT MAC 7570 EYES ONLY
C/S	1.		6/9		a	REMARKS CG - Dep have Cliff Dela look into Allegation Com- pained in penultimate sentence. (Copy)
DC/S				4/10	DL	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
CORDS BEING GIVEN COPY BY 560						
S/S			091505		DEW	
S/C						

LEGEND

- A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE
- C - COMMENTS
- I - INFORMATION

"Copies 2 & 3 burned 4 Nov 68"

CONFIDENTIAL

#1

0 060302Z EYH ZN-3

FM AMB ROBERT MACJUIE MACV (RIGG)
TO LTG ROBERT CUSHMAN CG III MAF DANANG
INFO MR CHARLES CROSS ACTING DEPCORDS III MAF
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 7570 EYES ONLY

1. I SEE FROM YOUR MESSAGE 062330Z JUNE 68
THAT LAM HAS INVITED YOU TO JOIN HIM NEXT WEEK
ON RD INSPECTION VISIT TO ALL I CTZ PROVINCES.
THIS IS A HIGHLY PROMISING DEVELOPMENT AND I
WILL BE MOST INTERESTED TO HEAR RESULTS.

2. SUGGEST YOU SEEK TO FORESTALL NORMAL
AVN TENDENCY TO LOOK AT PACIFICATION PROBLEM
STRICTLY IN TERMS OF RD TEAMS, RD HAMLETS, AND
SUPPORT OF RD CAMPAIGN AREAS. WOULD BE MOST
HELPFUL IF YOU COULD GET GENERAL LAM TO FOCUS
ALSO IN I CTZ REGULAR REFUGEE PROBLEM, LAGGING
TET EVACUEE RESETTLEMENT IN MOST I CTZ
PROVINCES, PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM ESPECIALLY
DICCC'S, AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST THE UPGRADING
OF RF/PF. FOR EXAMPLE, NG FORSYTHE TELLS ME
AFTER RECENT VISIT TO HUE/QUANG TRI THAT FIRST
ARVN DIVISION IS REISSUING M-2 CARBINES TO DIVISION
SUPPORT ELEMENTS RATHER THAN TO RF/PF. IF
THIS TRUE, IT IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO POLICY.
WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

175

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FMFPAC	8 JUN 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD
	082004Z JUN 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/9			AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGINEER EQUIP (C) REMARKS
2	DCG			6/10	R-uni	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/10			
	D C/S		6/9		Bps	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	090700			DMM	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4	Copy				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

#3 & 4 Burned
5 Nov 68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMJGRA RUMNVP RUEBHOA
 DE RUMHFMA 1421 1602004
 ZNY CCJCC
 P 082004Z JUN 68
 FM CG WFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO R RUMGRA/CG III MAF
 RUMNVP/CG THIRD MARDIV (R018)
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR GEN CHAPMAN, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN DAVIS FROM LTGEN BUSE. AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT (C) A. CG THIRD MARDIV 291425Z/JUN68 (C).
 1. I SUPPORT RAY'S REQUEST FOR AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT AND URGE THAT PROCUREMENT BE EXPEDITED TO THE MAXIMUM SO THAT WE HAVE THE ORGANIC CAPABILITY TO DIG IN OUR ARTILLERY AT FIRE SUPPORT BASES WITHOUT MOVING; HEAVY GEAR OVERLAND. IN THE LONG HAUL, ANY REPETITIVE OR PROLONGED BORROWING OF SUCH ASSETS FROM THE ARMY WILL ONLY ENTER THE LEDGER ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE.
 2. WE CANNOT IDENTIFY HERE THE SPECIFIC MODEL NUMBERS CITED IN REFERENCE A. LOCAL RESEARCH REVEALS THAT THE BACKHOE IS INTL HARVESTER 34-44, AND THE TRACTOR IS THE

PAGE 2 RUMHFMA 1421 CONFIDENTIAL
 INTL HARVESTER T-500. IN ANY CASE, WEIGHT IS THE PRIME CONSIDERATION, AND EQUIVALENT EQUIPMENT OF OTHER TOP MANUFACTURERS WOULD BE SUITABLE. IN ORDER THAT BOTH DIVISIONS HAVE THE SAME ORGANIC CAPABILITY, AND TO PROVIDE A FLOAT BACK-UP, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT PROCUREMENT BE FOR EIGHT OF EACH ITEM VICE THREE AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCE A. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT SIX MONTHS PROVISIONING BE INCLUDED IN THE BUY.
 URMN REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#44	

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE		FROM CG FMEPAC	DATE 08 JUN 68
		SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 082003Z JUN 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/9			ANNUAL AUSTRALIAN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF EXERCISES (U)
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					REMARKS <i>CG nominated Gen Tompkins</i> EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
1	C/S					
	D C/S		6/9			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	090700				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

*"# 263 Burned
5 Nov 68"*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMUGRA
 DE RUHFMA 1400 1602033
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 082033Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 ANNUAL AUSTRALIAN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF EXERCISES,
 ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, DUNTRON (U)

1. LTGEN T.J. DALY, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, AUSTRALIAN ARMY, HAS EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE COMMANDANT FOR TWO MARINE OFFICERS TO MAKE A PRESENTATION AT THE ANNUAL AUSTRALIAN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF EXERCISE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, DUNTRON DURING THE PERIOD 11-16 AUGUST 1968.

2. THE COMMANDANT HAS REQUESTED THAT, IN VIEW OF THE SCOPE OF THE EXERCISES, AND PRIOR ATTENDANCE BY FMFPAC REPRESENTATIVES AT PREVIOUS EXERCISES, FMFPAC PROVIDE THE OFFICERS TO ATTEND. I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN BEST BE REPRESENTED BY HAVING A GENERAL OFFICER FROM III MAF AND A COLONEL FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS, WITH THE COLONEL

PAGE 2 RUHFMA1400 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO DOING THE DETAILED SPADE WORK SUCH AS DESIGNING TRAINING AIDS AND MAKING OTHER NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

3. I PLAN TO TALK TO THE COMMANDANT ABOUT THIS AND HOPE THAT HE WILL AGREE. ON THE FORTHCOMING TRIP MY STAFF WILL HAVE ALL OF THE CORRESPONDENCE ON THE MATTER AND IT WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO DO SOME PLANNING SINCE I HAVE TO FORWARD A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE PRESENTATION TO GEN DALY IN MID-JUNE, IMMEDIATELY UPON MY RETURN. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#43

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM GEN ABRAMS DEPOONUSMACV SEACOM
CG	2	I	6/7		le	SERIAL 061123
DCG			6/2		gr	COPY 2.0 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT EMERGENCY SUPPORT OF CIDG CAMPS
C/S			6/9		Q	REMARKS Sep C/S ops G-3
DC/S	1A	I		6/7	DR	<p>Include an assessment, if appropriate, on evacuation as opposed to keeping the camp. Must consider population control & GVN presence of course as well as military factors.</p> <p>LEGEND A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENTS I - INFORMATION</p> <p><i>This needs a real hard look.</i></p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3	3	A				
G-4						
CEO						
DC6 (A)	4	I			DCG (A) DR	
S/S					DRW	
S/C						

copy of report sent to G-3

Copy to G-3 - Bldg 106/107 07083 OH J - 684

AND, Abrams is right: if we stay we need to do it correctly.

#39

CONFIDENTIAL

O B 1105Z ZYH 747-1
 FM SAIGON AL ABRAMS DEPOXUSDAOV SAIGON
 TO LTG CUSHMAN SC III WAF DANANG
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 7482 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT OF CIDG CAMPS.

1. RECENTLY, I HAVE REVIEWED OUR POSTURE AT SEVERAL REMOTE CIDG CAMPS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE BEEN REFLECTING ON THE ACTIONS AT LANG VEI, NGOK TAVAK AND KHAM DUC. BASED ON THE SCANT DETAIL WHICH IS AVAILABLE TO ME THROUGH REPORTS, I HAVE ASSESSED EACH OF THESE ACTIONS AS MINOR DISASTERS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD HAVE HAD THIS STRING OF FAILURES IF OUR PLANS FOR THE SUPPORT, OR RELIEF OF THESE CAMPS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY PREPARED.

2. I REQUEST THAT YOU REVIEW EACH OF THESE ACTIONS AND SATISFY YOURSELF THAT YOUR COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES, REACTION PROCEDURES AND DAY-TO-DAY SITUATION REPORTING HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY PROVIDED FOR. THROUGH THIS PROCESS I WOULD EXPECT THAT WHEN YOUR COMMAND IS CONFRONTED WITH A SIMILAR IMMINENT PROBLEM, APPROPRIATE ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN SO THAT WE WOULD NOT LOSE ANOTHER CAMP.

GP-4

SSC NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

200

NNNN

184

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JMRF FORM 5218 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GSE ADDRESS DISCOMENACT 0		DATE 06 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 060420		1,243 of 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT REPORTING & RELEASE OF GOOD, BAD NEWS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS #3 Banned 5/20/68 070930H Copy #1 with date sheet to COL. FASER. In 09 ^{DM} June 68 Copy #1 to CI B 28 Aug 68 JW Pannel
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #38

LTG PALNER DCG USARV
 RADM VETH COMUSNAVFORV
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG ROSSON CG PCV
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFV
 MG PEERS CG I FFV
 MG ECKARDT SA IV CTZ

ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 7429 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: REPORTING AND RELEASE OF GOOD AND BAD NEWS

1. I HAVE TODAY INSTRUCTED THE MACV STAFF AS FOLLOWS WITH RESPECT TO THE OPERATIONAL REPORTING AND PUBLIC RELEASE OF GOOD AND BAD NEWS.

2. BAD NEWS.

A. THE RECIPIENT OF INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES THAT SOMETHING "BAD" HAS HAPPENED WILL INFORM THE COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER (COC) AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF WITHOUT DELAY. THE COC WILL THEN MAKE A "SURGE" EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS OF THE CASE. IF REQUIRED, THE DIRECTOR COC WILL CONTACT IMMEDIATELY THE SENIOR COMMANDER CONCERNED TO ENSURE THAT THE FACTS ARE OBTAINED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

B. WHILE THIS INVESTIGATION IS TAKING PLACE, MACOI, IF QUERIED, WILL RESPOND TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COMMAND HAS NO COMMENT OTHER THAN THAT THE MATTER IS BEING INVESTIGATED.

C. IF THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS IN "BAD NEWS", NO ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO DODGE THE ISSUE. IF AN ERROR HAS BEEN MADE, IT WILL BE ADMITTED BY MACOI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WITH APPROPRIATE COORDINATION, AS NECESSARY.

3. GOOD NEWS

A. MANY INITIAL REPORTS OF UNUSUALLY GOOD NEWS TURN OUT TO BE EITHER BADLY EXAGGERATED OR, IN SOME CASES, TOTALLY INCORRECT.

B. HENCE, THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO THE PRESS IN SUCH INSTANCES WILL NOT BE MADE UNTIL THE REPORT IS COMPLETELY AUTHENTICATED. COC WILL BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THE REPORT IS CORRECT BEFORE MACOI MAY SAY ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THE CHIEF OF INFORMATION, MACV, AND THE DIRECTOR, COC, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT SUCH REPORTS ARE AUTHENTIC BEFORE RELEASE.

4. IT IS DESIRED THAT ALL ADDRESSEES ADOPT SIMILAR PROCEDURES WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS, MODIFIED AS REQUIRED BY THE FACT THAT MACV IS THE SOLE RELEASING AUTHORITY FOR INFORMATION PROVIDED THE PRESS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

#38

#38

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM G-1 ABRAMS DEPOONUSMACV		DATE 06 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 060139		COPY# 1, 2, 3 OF 4 OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT ANSWER TO REQUEST
			IN	OUT		
	CG			6/6	[Signature]	REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S			6/6	C/S [Signature]	
	DC/S			6/4	[Signature]	
	DC/S DM					
	S/S	0613224			[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

*"# 2 & 3 Bear not
5 Nov 68"*

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #37

Q 000139Z ZYH ZF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CB III USAF
ZEM
UNCLAS E F T O MAC 7413 EYES ONLY
REQUEST CONTAINED IN YOUR 050830Z IS APPROVED.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

050

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
"EFTO"

184

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG THIRD MARDIV		DATE 06 JUN 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 051405Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/6			REMARKS A little out of character / sloppy
3	DCG		6/7			
4	DCG AIR		6/6			
2	C/S		6/7			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	060915H				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

* 3 & 4 burned
5 Nov 68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**(PERSONAL FOR)**

PT003343
 PTTTCZYUW RUMHCTA0029 1580000-CCCC--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 DE RUMHVP 2451D 1571405
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 051405Z JUN 68
 FM CG 3D MARDIV
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMHFMA/CG FMFPAC(DD47)
 A SGREVKGRA/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 CMC (CODE AD)

PERSONAL FOR LGEN VAN RYZIN: INFO LGEN BUSE AND LGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 M3DN DAVIS.

AIR TRANSPORTABLE ENGR EQUIP

1. AS YOU WILL RECALL ONE SECRET OF AIR MOBILE CONCEPT IS AIR LIFT
 OF BACK HOES AND BULLDOZERS TO DIG IN ARTILLERY AT FIRE SUPPORT
 BASES. DURING CURRENT OPERATION SOUTH OF KHE SANH I AM BORROWING
 DOZER AND BACK HOE ASSETS OF 1ST ACD. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE AS INTERIM
 MEASURE ONLY.

2. IT WOULD FURTHER OUR EFFORTS AND ENHANCE OUR COMBAT EF-
 FECTIVENESS IF IMMEDIATE OFF THE SHELF PROCUREMENT AND AIR DELIVERY
 OF HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE ENGR EQUIPMENT CAN BE MADE AS A START
 THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE NEEDED WITH SPARE PARTS.

THREE 34-14 BACKHOE, RUBBER TIRED, I-H 9,400 LBS
 THREE TRACOTR, FULL TRACKED, TD-340, I-H 8,300 LBS

GP-4
 BT

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

#36

FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM PALMER DCG USARV		DATE 05 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 050230		COPY# 1, 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		4/5		de	REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1.	C/S		6/5		Q	
	DC/S		6/5		M	
	DC/S DM					
	S/S	051500	6/6		PMW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

*#203 Burned
5 Nov 69*

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

#34

O 1536Z ZYY ZNY-1
FM PALMER POC USA IV
TO CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O ARV 1536 EYES ONLY
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS. WILL DO
ALL I CAN FROM THE WASHINGTON END TO SUPPORT OUR TROOPS AND ALLIES AT
THE FIGHTING END.

WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING NORMAL
DUTY HOURS

269

UNCLASSIFIED
"EFTO"

#24

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM DA	
CG	2		6/6		lp	SERIAL 042050Z JUN 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED	
DCG	3			6/7	Emc	SUBJECT CONGRATULATIONS MESSAGE	
DCG AIR						REMARKS FOR # 4 Banned 5 Nov 68	
C/S	1.		6/6		Q		
DC/S				6/7	R		
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
Copy to CG I CORPS BY COC							
S/S			052205		DM		
S/C							

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C- COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

#

RFT UZ YUW RUEONSH0190 15 7125 6-UUUU--RUMSAK.
242050Z JUN 68 ZFF-3

FM DA

TO RUMHVM/SA 1ST INF DIV ARVN
INFO RUMUHFA/DEPCOMUSMACV SAIGON
RUMSAK/SA ICEZ/IIIMAF
RUMHIA/CG PROV COR PSV

BT

UNCLAS DAB66764 FROM OCOFSA
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR BG TRUONG, INFO GEN VIER, GEN
ABRAMS, LTGS LAM, CUSHMAN, AND ROSSON. MACV PASS
TO CHIEF, JGS (VIA USMACV COURIER)

SUBJ: CONGRATULATIONS

HEARDY CONGRATULATIONS TO THE BLACK PANTHERS FOR ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT
VICTORY NE OF PHU BAI. SURRENDER OF MORE THAN 80 ENEMY
ILLUSTRATES THE DEGREE OF THE MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT
INFLICTED UPON HIM BY THIS ELITE UNIT.

BT

FOR

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#33

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 04 JUN 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 041822Z JUN 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/5			EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/5			EXCLUSIVE
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	050640			20 200	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

Handwritten initials

SECRET #31

SECRET

VV PAC253

PP RUHHFMA RUMUGRA
DE RUEBHOA6622 1561851

ZNY SSSSS
P 041822Z JUN 68
FM CMC

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

I think a comparison of the way the Army is fighting in I Corps (which along the line you suggested) is below a field rating and PC count - better than some of our changes. V. G. 1/2

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
A. CG III MAF 202628Z MAY68 (SPECAT)
B. CG FMFPAC 232309Z MAY68 (SPECAT)

1. I HAVE STUDIED REFERENCE A AND WHILE I AGREE TO THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE SOUGHT, THE GENERAL TENOR IS DISTURBING TO ME IN CERTAIN ASPECTS.
2. OUR CASUALTY RATES ARE AND HAVE BEEN OF GRAVE CONCERN TO ME, AND ANALYSES OF AFTER ACTION REPORTS HAVE REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT EMPHASIS MUST CONTINUE TO BE PLACED ON SMALL UNIT TACTICS (PARTICULARLY PATROLLING, MOVEMENT TO CONTACT AND FIRE AND MANEUVER) AND THE COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT MEANS TO INCLUDE A BETTER APPRECIATION OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AND THE REQUISITE DEGREE OF APPLICATION REQUIRED TO FACILITATE MANEUVER.
I AM CONVINCED THAT IN THE MAIN THE OFFENSIVE PRINCIPLES TAUGHT TO OUR MARINES FROM BOOT CAMP THROUGH C&SC ARE SOUND, ALTHOUGH THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES IS AN ART WHICH MUST CONSTANTLY BE

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA6622 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN

REFINED AND PRACTICED BY ALL LEADERS. MOREOVER, THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE SERVED US WELL AS THE BASIS FOR FOSTERING THE "CAN DO" OFFENSIVE SPIRIT SO ESSENTIAL TO A UNIT IN COMBAT. IT IS THIS LATTER ASPECT THAT DISTURBS ME THE MOST. SPECIFICALLY, I AM CONCERNED THAT A LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPHS 5 b AND C COULD LEAD TO A DEROGATION AND EVEN THE LOSS OF THIS TRADITIONAL MARINE ATTRIBUTE. ADMITTEDLY THERE IS A DELICATE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND RECKLESS ASSAULT, BUT IT IS THIS THIN LINE THAT WE MUST CLARIFY TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED BALANCE LEST OUR YOUNG LEADER MISINTERPRET OUR OBJECTIVE.

3. ANOTHER ASPECT OF REF A WHICH BOTHERS ME IS THE EXHORTATION TO USE RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE TO DETERMINE THE ENEMY'S EXACT LOCATION. WHILE THIS TECHNIQUE IS VERY PRODUCTIVE IN UNINHABITED AREAS, ITS INDISCRIMINATE USE IN VILLAGES AND AREAS OF HIGH POPULATION DENSITY COULD LEAD TO UNWARRANTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

4. I HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE FOREGOING AREAS BE STRESSED IN OUR PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING.

5. I CONCUR WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH THE "PROFESSIONAL FORMULA" SET FORTH SO WELL IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF REF B. TO CARRY THE THOUGH FURTHER, HOWEVER

I consider this to be taken completely out of context - it was just one of several types of pages to be used e.g., aerial VRA sensor and thermal detection by points

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

#31

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA6622 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
AND LTGEN CUSHMAN

WHILE OUR MARINES ARE HIGHLY MOTIVATED, AND PROPERLY SO, TO ACHIEVE PROFESSIONALISM IN THE PRINCIPLES AND TACTICS DIRECTLY RELATED TO PERFORMANCE IN COMBAT, IT IS SOMEWHAT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP THE SAME DEGREE OF MOTIVATION TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING THE EVERYDAY, MUNDAINE, LABORIOUS AND SOMETIMES DISTASTEFUL TASKS INVOLVED IN LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION. OUR LEADERSHIP EFFORTS SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO THIS END AS WELL, FOR THEN, AND THEN ALONE, WILL WE BE ABLE TO PERPETUATE THE DESIRED DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM THAT HAS BEEN OUR HALLMARK IN THE PAST THE ASSURANCE THAT EACH TASK, NO MATTER HOW SEEMINGLY TRIVIAL OR UNRELATED TO COMBAT, WILL BE PERFORMED THOROUGHLY, CONSCIENTIOUSLY, AND AS EFFECTIVELY AS OUR CAPABILITIES PERMIT. I FEEL SO STRONGLY ABOUT THIS SUBJECT THAT I HAVE CHOSEN, "PROFESSIONALISM AND DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP" AS THE THEME FOR THIS YEAR'S GENERAL OFFICERS' SYMPOSIUM.

6. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

31

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG FMFPAC		04 JUN 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# / OF# COPIES RECD	
			040203Z JUN 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/4			EXCLUSIVE MCEO
3	DCG		6/4		Bues	REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/4		Q	
	D C/S		6/4		Q	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	04 1115			Dhol.	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

"#2 & 3 Burned
5 Nov 68"

SECRET #30

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

OO RUEBHQA RUMSAK
 DE RUMKM 2445 QIYFWE
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 240203Z JUN 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUEBHQA/CMC
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**S E C R E T**

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN, INFO
 GEN CHAPMAN FROM LT GEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY

A. CMC 23 14 18Z/JUN 68

1. AFTER OUR DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT OF POSSIBILITY OF A KIDNAPPING, I CALLED THE COMMANDANT AND GAVE HIM YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE PRECAUTIONS BEING TAKEN. HE IS IN AGREEMENT WITH YOUR APPROACH.
2. I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, TO EMPHASIZE THE INTENSE CONCERN AT HIGH LEVELS IN WASHINGTON OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF KIDNAPPING OR OTHER ACTS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO ENTRAP OR KILL HIM. I REALIZE THAT YOU ARE TAKING ALL POSSIBLE PRUDENT PRECAUTIONS AND CONCUR THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS FOR HIM TO BE WITH

PAGE 2 RUMKM0445 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MEGO
 TROOPS ON THE MOVE, WITH NO PATTERN BEING DEVELOPED OR
 STEREOTYPED OPERATIONS BEING CONDUCTED.

3. LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT WEEK. BEST
 REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

30

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 03 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 031418Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG		6/14		le	REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR CG - The late time group of this msg is about 2 hours earlier than my first phone call from Gen. Van Hye. I don't think it requires an answer. Peggy G.
3	DCG		6/14		Rusel	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/14		Q	
	D C/S		1/4		Dr	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	040730			DTW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"#2 & 3 Burned
5 Nov 68"

#4

SECRET #29

SECRET

FILE 7 CCM 015

		FROM CMC	DATE 03 JUN 68
		SERIAL# 031418Z JUN 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CAPTAIN ROBB	
6/3	<i>D. W. [unclear]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
6/4	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPY 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#29

SECRET

VV PAC2 14
 VV CMC325
 OO RUMHMA RUMUGRA
 DE RUEBHOA TOUI GTTGPW
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUMHMA -I- RUMUGRA
 O 031418Z JUN 68 ZFF-6

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOR

FM CMC
 TO RUMUGRA/CS III MAF
 INFO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC
 DT

SECRET SPECAT MCEO FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN INFO LT GEN
 BUSE FROM LT GEN VAN RYZIN
 CAPTAIN ROBB

1. WHITE HOUSE HAS BEEN PROVIDED VIA STATE CHANNELS AN EMBASSY SAIGON MESSAGE REPORTING THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNICATION PROVIDED BY VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND RECEIVED AT III MAF ON 25 MAY. WHITE HOUSE STAFF SIGNIFICANTLY CONCERNED OVER KIDNAP POSSIBILITIES, BUT HAS NOT YET SHOWN MESSAGE TO HIGHETS AUTHORITY.
2. BEFORE DOING SO THEY REQUEST YOUR EVALUATION OF THE REPORT, AND ANY FOLLOW-ON INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT HAVE COME TO LIGHT SINCE RECEIPT OF INITIAL REPORT DESCRIBED PARAGRAPH ONE ABOVE.
3. REQUEST YOUR RESPONSE TO FOREGOING ASAP.
4. FYI WHITE HOUSE STAFF HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT RAMIFICATIONS

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA TOUI SECRET SPECAT MCEO
 OF ROBB'S SITUATION ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD AT ALL APPROPRIATE
 ECHELONS OF III MAF, AND THAT CONSISTENT WITH ROBB'S DUTY
 ASSIGNMENT, ALL PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#29

O 030223Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM GEN APPANS DEFCOMUSMACV
 TO GEN MONYER CDR 7TH AF
 LTG PALMER DCS USARV
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ
 MG PEERS CG I FFV
 RADM HOUSE ACTG COMNAVFORB
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 7288 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: NEWS STORY ON 6 MAY MACV SECRET DIRECTIVE

REF : MACV 061247Z MAY 68 CITE 12254

1. THE REFERENCE IS A DIRECTIVE FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS CONTAINING GUIDANCE CONCERNING OUR EFFORTS DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS AND WAS NOT LIGHTLY CLASSIFIED AS SECRET. ITS CONTENTS ARE OF DISTINCT VALUE TO THE ENEMY.
2. YET IT APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME RATHER WIDELY KNOWN THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF A CHICAGO DAILY NEWS SYNDICATED STORY. ALTHOUGH THE STORY WAS PARTIALLY INCORRECT, THE RESULTANT "FLAP" HAS BEEN OF CONSIDERABLE PROPAGANDA VALUE TO THE ENEMY DURING THE PARIS TALKS.
3. IT IS VERY DISQUIETING TO ME THAT THE COMMAND APPEARS TO BE AS LEAKY AS A SIEVE AS FAR AS SECURITY MATTERS ARE CONCERNED. IN ADDITION, PRIVILEGED PROFESSIONAL AND OPERATIONAL MATTERS FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE PRESS. THIS INFORMATION CAN ONLY COME FROM PERSONNEL WHO ARE TALKING TOO MUCH.
4. IT IS CERTAINLY FAIR TO SAY THAT THE PRESS IS CURRENTLY HUNGRY FOR ANY TYPE OF INFORMATION OR REACTION FROM MILITARY PERSONNEL, HIGH OR LOW RANKING, WHICH CAN BE APPLIED TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. ALTHOUGH DISCUSSING ANY CLASSIFIED PAPER WITH A NEWSMAN IS AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AT THE MOMENT THAT WE ALL ABSTAIN FROM MAKING COMMENTS WHICH MAY HAVE SOME IMPACT ON THESE TALKS.
5. IN ADDITION, IF WE CANNOT STOP TALKING ABOUT THINGS WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH, OUR EFFORTS WILL SURELY BE THWARTED BY OUR OWN DIARRHEA OF THE MOUTH WHETHER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS ARE INVOLVED OR NOT.
6. COMMANDERS MUST, THEREFORE, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO STOP THE FLOW OF UNAUTHORIZED INFORMATION TO THE PRESS OR TO ANY OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE SUCH INFORMATION.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 1 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

422

SECRET

#27

0 220755Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV
 TO LTJ USMAN CG III
 LTJ MEYLAND CG II
 BR FEELS CG I
 ZFF

S E C R E T MAC 7250 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

1. DURING THE PAST THREE DAYS, I HAVE REVIEWED CAREFULLY THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN I, II AND III CTZ'S. THIS MORNING I DISCUSSED MY CONCLUSIONS WITH GEN VIEN AND WE HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENTS:

A. THE ARVN ABN TF NOW OPERATING IN HUE WILL COMMENCE REDEPLOYMENT TO SAIGON DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE EXACT DATE WILL BE ANNOUNCED SEPARATELY. THE THREE BATTALIONS OF THE TASK FORCE WILL STAND DOWN FOR ABOUT FIVE DAYS AND THEN BE COMMITTED IN THE SAIGON AREA. AT THAT TIME A DECISION WILL BE MADE AS TO WHETHER THE SITUATION IN III CTZ WILL PERMIT ANOTHER ABN TASK FORCE TO BE REDEPLOYED TO I CTZ.

B. COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT 8 JUNE, THE 3RD BDE OF THE 131ST DIV (ABN) WILL RETURN TO III CTZ FROM THE HIGHLANDS.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

175

GP-4

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TIMEFORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV		DATE 02 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 020158		COPY# 1 of 2 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/3			REMARKS S/S. See that Col Faser reads this 9/1 6/3 COL. FASER HAS READ DAN SIS
3	DCG			6/3		
4	DCG AIR			6.5		
11	C/S		6/2			
	D C/S			4/3		
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	021310			DMJ DW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
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	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
Gen. St. ...					4	

SECRET #24

O 0001537 7YH ZFM-3
 FM CDR ABRAMS DECOMUSMACV
 TO CDR MONYER CDR 7TH AF
 LTG PALMER DCG USARV
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG WEYAND CG II FFV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ
 MG PEERS CG I FFV
 RADM HOUSE ACTG COMNAVFORV
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 7236 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

1. (S) EFFECTIVE NOW, THE OVERALL PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY OF THIS COMMAND WILL BE TO LET RESULTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. WE WILL NOT DEAL IN PROPAGANDA EXERCISES IN ANY WAY, BUT WILL PLAY ALL OF OUR ACTIVITIES AT A LOW KEY.

2. (S) PARTICULAR CARE MUST BE TAKEN BY ALL SENIOR COMMANDERS TO AVOID MAKING KNOWN TO THE PRESS FUTURE OPERATIONS AND PLANS OF ANY TYPE. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT ONLY OF VALUE TO THE ENEMY, BUT IT ALSO BACKFIRES IF THE PLANS DO NOT WORK OUT AS ADVERTISED, THEREBY WIDENING THE CREDIBILITY GAP. ACHIEVEMENTS, NOT HOPES, WILL BE STRESSED.

3. (S) THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO COMMANDERS TALKING TO THE PRESS: HOWEVER, CONSIDERABLY MORE EXTENSIVE USE SHOULD BE MADE OF THE PHRASE, "NO COMMENT." //

SSC NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
185-

SECRET

#24
~~SECRET~~

NNNNG

M

B

GRA82...872

BYWKTKSUSBSAUA

PP RUMUGRAX I

DE RUMHME 5337C 1531310

ZNR UUUUU

P 011240Z JUNE 68

FM CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV CAMP EVANS, RVN

TO RUMFVE/CG 3D AIR DIV ANDERSEN AFB GUAM

INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DA NANG RVN

RUMHMA/CG PCV PHU BAI RVN

RUMSBJ/CG 7TH AF TSN RVN

RUCISKI/CINC SAC OFFUTAFB OMAHA NEB

BT

UNCLAS AVDAGT-O 8FU15310 FOR MG WELLS FROM MG TOLSON

1. MY CONGRATULATIONS AGAIN FOR THE OUTSTANDING SUPPORT PROVIDED BY YOUR BOMBER CREWS TO THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION DURING THE RECENTLY COMPLETED OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 216.

2. DURING THE PERIOD 15 APRIL TO 17 MAY 1968, A TOTAL OF 68 MISSIONS WERE FLOWN, CONSISTING OF 408 SORTIES WHICH DELIVERED OVER 11,000 TONS OF BOMBS ON ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE A SHAU VALLEY. THESE STRIKES CONTRIBUTED IMMEASURABLY TO THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST TEAM'S RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE IN THE VALLEY. YOUR INITIAL DELIVERY OF FIRE-POWER ON SELECTED LANDING ZONES AND LOCATIONS OF HEAVY ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS WAS A KEY TO OUR GETTING A Foothold IN THE VALLEY. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR BOMBING WAS VERIFIED BY THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGED AND DESTROYED MATERIEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT DISCOVERED BY SKY-

PAGE TWO RUMHME 5337 UNCLAS

TROOPERS IN THEIR SEARCH OF LOGISTICAL COMPLEXES. IN ADDITION, THE TIMELINESS AND ACCURACY OF BOMBS DELIVERED ON ENEMY FORCES IN AND NEAR THE VALLEY PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN PREVENTING THE ENEMY FROM MOUNTING SIZEABLE COUNTERATTACKS.

3. PLEASE CONVEY TO ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMAND FROM ALL THE TROOPERS ON THE FIRST TEAM THANKS FOR ANOTHER OUTSTANDING JOB OF "CLOSE AIR SUPPORT"

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#23

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMSEVENTHFLT		DATE 01 JUN 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 010714Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
						STRIKE INCIDENT OF 4 MAY 68 (U)
2	CG		6/2			REMARKS FOR
3	DCG		6/3			
4	DCG AIR					
AP	C/S		6/1			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	012030				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"#3 & 4 Burned
5 Nov 68"

77

SECRET

#22

SECRET

		FROM COMSEVENTHFLT	DATE 01 JUN 68
		SERIAL# 010714Z JUN 68	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT STRIKE INCIDENT OF 11 MAY 68 (U)	
6/1	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
6/2	<i>[Signature]</i>		
6/2	<i>[Signature]</i>		
6/3	<i>[Signature]</i>		
6/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPY 2,3,4 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

SECRET

PT 000936

PT SZ YUW RUMACMU5B46 1530000-S SSS--RUMUGRA.
 ZNY SSSSS ZYO RUMGCS
 DE RUMGUL 0031 1530714
 ZNY SSSSS ZYO RUMGCS
 P 010714Z JUN 68
 RM COMSEVENTHFLT
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMFUK/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
 BT

FOR

SECRET

FOR LGETSCHUSMAN INFO ADM HYLAND, RADM COUSINS AND RANBARL HAR
FROM BRINGLE

STRIKE INCIDENT OF 4 MAY 68 (U)

1. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF 8MM FILM MADE JOINTLY BY REPRESENTATIVES OF III MAF AND COMMANDER COURIER DIVISION SEVEN REVEALED THAT THE ATTACK ON FRIENDLY RADAR AT CON THIEN WAS MADE BY A PILOT FROM TF 77. I VERY MUCH REGRET THIS UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED AND I HAVE ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COMPLETE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. I WILL ENSURE THAT RIGOROUS CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TAKEN PROMPTLY.

2. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET
#22